GUIDE TO THE RD1 UKRAINE FILE

/The Ukraine, a constituent republic of the U.S.S.R., is the second largest soviet republic in population and in economic potentialities. It is bordered on the southwest and west by Rumania, the Moldavian SSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland; on the northwest by the Belorussian SSR, and on the northeast and east by the Russian SFSR. The Ukraine is subdivided into political units called oblast' and raion similar to other territories of the Soviet Union. There are no longer any other subordinate units of administration (such as the krai, okrug, and autonomous republics, as found elsewhere in the U.S.S.R.).

There appears to be reasonable justification for identifying eight culturally distinct ethnic groups within the political boundaries of Ukrainian SSR. These are the Boiki, Lemki, Hutsul, Galicians, Cossacks, Black Sea Ukrainians, Central Ukrainians, and Left Bank Ukrainians. The Boiki, Lemki and Hutsul are Carpathian mountaineers living in sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. They are culturally distinct because of their long, relative isolation and their history of variable Hungarian and Slovakian influences. Galicians include those Ukrainians living northwest of the former (1919-1939) Polish boundary and southeast of the present (1939-) Polish boundary. The history of Europeanization in this area justifies its differentiation from other groups in this file. Zaporogian Cossacks as a socially organized group no longer exist but their influence on Ukrainian culture is extensive and their historical importance as a frontier people makes their inclusion as a separate group mandatory. Black Sea, Central and Left Bank Ukrainians are probably legitimate ethnic subdivisions but as yet no indication has been found that these groups are treated separately in the literature. Therefore, the file user will find no file slips so headed.

GUIDE TO THE RD1 UKRAINE FILE

The RD1 Ukraine file consists of twenty sources, two of which are translations from the German. The period covered in the file is roughly from about 1917-1953 with some historical data going as far back as the 12th century (8: Fedenko). Most of the subject material is based on secondary sources, with the majority being written by social scientists, ethnologists and historians, and the remainder (one source each) by a government official, journalist, artisan and by the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic (the constitution).

The sources providing the best general background for the file are 3: Mirchuk (which presents information on the land and its people, economics, and cultural life) and 17: UNRRA (a brief summary of the Ukrainian SSR). Of particular emphasis in many of the sources in this file are the concepts of Ukrainian nationalism and relations with the Soviet Union (including data on acculturation). This information may be found in sources 2: Timoshenko, 4: Allen, 5: Manning, 6: Armstrong, 7: Bregy and Obolensky, 8: Fedenko, 9: Prothero, 10: Weinstein, 11: Obermaier, and 15: Pap. Ukrainian history which is also well represented in the file will be found in sources: 4: Allen, 7: Bregy and Obolensky, 8: Fedenko, 9: Prothero, and 11:Obermaier. Religion is covered in: 1: Reshetar (covering the struggle between the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox churches), 5: Manning, 9: Prothero, 11: Obermaier, and 20, 21 and 22: Koenig. Some limited demographic data may be found in 6: Armstrong (the population of Ukrainian cities), 8: Fedenko, and 7: Bregy and Obolensky. Other aspects of Ukrainian ethnography more lightly covered in this file are as follows:

<u>education</u> -- 7: Bregy and Obolensky, and 10: Weinstein
<u>geography</u> -- 7: Bregy and Obolensky, 9: Prothero, and 11: Obermaier
<u>politics</u> -- 7: Bregy and Obolensky, 9: Prothero and 11: Obermaier
<u>overseas Ukrainians</u> -- 8: Fedenko
<u>social conditions</u> -- 9: Prothero and 17: UNRRA

GUIDE TO THE RD1 UKRAINE FILE

agriculture -- 11: Obermaier, and 17: UNRRA
fine arts -- 12: Buraček
life cycle events -- 21: Koenig (on death) and 23: Koenig (on birth)
magic -- 20: Koenig
child care -- 23: Koenig
the constitution of the Ukraine -- 16: American Russian Institute.

It should be noted that sources 20, 21, 22 and 23: Koenig all deal with the Galician Ukrainians. Source 24: Čech and Mellon, originally found in the Czechoslovakia file, has been processed for the Ukraine file because of its data on Carpathian Ruthenia (pp. 158-170), particularly in reference to summary material on pre-World War II Ruthenia.

This file is considerably dated in the material it contains and should be used with caution by the researcher./

Processed in 1955-1956

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

1

Country and People

The Name

● 101 The name "Ukrayina" is of Slavonic origin and has four different meanings in the Ukrainian language: 1. border-land or march; 2. any remote area; 3. country in general; 4. the habitat of the people constituting the Ukrainian nation and of their culture.

Originally the accent was on the syllable "kray", which is how the word is accented still to-day in Russian and White Ruthenian. The original meaning of the name as we find it in chronicles of the 12th century and in books up to the 16th century is likely to have been "border-land". In the 17th century, however, parallel to the growth of the Cossack state, the term which was formerly applied to some portions of the territory only began to extend to the whole country and at the same time its meaning was broadened according to political facts: in the conscience of the people the Cossack state was a political power whose historical mission was to act as bulkhead against the Asiatic hordes and to protect Christianity and European culture from an invasion out of the East. The term "Ukrayina" then meant: 1. territory of the Cossack state; 2. boundary between the Asiatic East and civilised Europe.

The book by Le Vasseur de Beauplan "Description d'Ukraine" made this name popular throughout the world, as did his maps "Delineatio specialis et accurata cum suis palatinatibus" (1650).

On the geographical maps subsequently drawn, the term "Ukraine" appears continually (see L. Bagrov: "Die ersten Karten der Ukraine im 17. Jahrhundert", Beiträge zur Ukraine-

● 101 kunde, herausgegeben vom Ukrainischen Wissenschaftlichen Institut Berlin 1935).

[186] National consciousness increased as a consequence of oppression by Russians and Poles, in spite of whose resistance the name "Ukraine" as a special term for the Ukrainian territory spread quickly, thus emphasising the fact that there is a difference between the Ukrainians and their neighbors in the spheres of language, race, culture, national feeling and policy.

In Tsarist Russia the name "Ukraine" was the symbol of the Ukrainian people's struggle for independence. It was therefore abolished and replaced by "Little Russia", a term very much hated by Ukrainians.

In addition to the name "Ukrayina" Ukrainians originally used the term "Rus" to designate the political entity of the Kyiv empire to which at that time the territory of Ukraine belonged. Originally "Rus" applied solely to the southern parts of Eastern Europe, whilst the northern parts were called Muscovy. Tsar Peter the Great extended this name to the whole empire and entered it into official European nomenclature. In Peter's state, "Rus"-Ukraine was called "Little Russia" to indicate that this part of the realm was not one with the former Muscovite territory which got the name "Great Russia".

Before the First World War Austria had introduced "Ruthenia, Ruthenian" from Latin "Ruthenus" as official name for the Ukrainians in Galicia. But not before the 20th century was some order brought into the chaos of "Ukrainian — Little Russian — Ruthenian". The USSR officially acknowledged the name "Ukraine, Ukrainian" and the "Ukranian Soviet Republic" has succeeded in keeping its ground at least nominally in the world-wide family of nations.

131 in Sub-Caucasia, but also in the zone between Poland and Ukraine.

●101 The frontiers of the area settled by the Ukrainians are divided
131 into the following sections:

1. the southern section, bounded by the Seas and the Caucasus;
2. the southwestern section — the Roumanian-Magyar section;
3. the western section — bordering on Slovakia and Poland;
4. the northern section — the White Ruthenian-Russian section;
5. the eastern section — Don and Caucasus section.

The southern frontier was reached by the Ukrainian people at the end of the eighteenth century, thus linking up with the trade of the outside world. The frontier runs from the delta of the Danube to Gagry on the slopes of the Caucasus and is about 1125 miles long. Only part of the Crimean Peninsula was settled by the Ukrainians; it is a mixed settlement and includes among its population Ukrainians, Tatars and Russians.

The south-west frontier is about 625 miles long and has shifted considerably in the course of centuries in favor of the Roumanians. To-day the districts of Akkerman and Hotin as well as the north-west area of Bucovina are all that is left of the Ukrainian settlements that once spread all over Bessarabia, Moldavia and Bucovina. The losses on the Magyar frontier have not been so severe.

The western frontier, about 532 miles long, is not clearly defined in the Slovak section, there being many ethnographical insets. In the Polish section this frontier is a mixed zone, especially in the Kholm district and Podlakhia, where that section of the Ukrainian population which joined the Roman Catholic Church in the 20th century has become Polish in national consciousness.

On the northern frontier there is no rigid line of demarcation between Ukrainian and White Ruthenian dialects; east of the Dnipro (area round Chernyhiv) the frontier has become particularly blurred as the land was settled by Ukrainians, White Ruthenians and Russians.

The eastern frontier is divided into 2 parts by the wedge of Don Cossack territory projecting west, viz. the section bet-

ween Novokhopersk and Rostov and that extending from Rostov to Otomanivsk. 101 131

It is only in the western section that the frontier runs between the purely Ukrainian area in west Sub-Caucasia (Kuban area) and the Don area; eastern Sub-Caucasia is a mixed belt of Ukrainians and Russians. In the south-east, therefore, we must speak of two frontiers of Ukrainian territory, a narrower and a wider one. The former separates Ukrainian Transcaucasia from the eastern part of Transcaucasia that is partly Russian, while the latter also includes eastern Sub-Caucasia. Throughout its course, the south-eastern frontier is blurred and by no means fixed, as the process of colonisation is still going on.

c) Boundaries and Territories of the three Historical Ukrainian States:

The Kyiv state stretched in the 11th and 12th centuries from the Wyslok to the Donets and included areas which were not colonised and others whose inhabitants were not Ukrainians. It embraced almost 1153 846 square miles, almost 1/6 of which was constantly inhabited by Ukrainians. 131 175

The second Ukrainian state (the realm of the Cossacks) had an area of about 115 384 square miles, western Ukraine was not included within its boundaries.

The third Ukrainian state covered the entire area settled by the Ukrainian people, with the exception of the Don area and Sub-Caucasia. Without annexations (which were of brief duration), the third state covered about 242 308 square miles, with the Crimean Peninsula, a part of the Voronesh district, Carpathian Ukraine and Bucovina 265 384 square miles, i. e. less than the entire Ukrainian ethnographical territory (276 269 sq. miles) and much less than the entire territory originally settled by Ukrainians (357 885 sq. miles).

d) Size of the Ukrainian territory

Up to World War I 29 039 sq. miles of the Ukrainian territory belonged to Austria-Hungary and the remainder to Russia. After the end of World War I and a short period of inde- 131 162 175

The Ukrainian People

101
175

In general, the Ukrainians have marked national characteristics which make it easy to recognise them even beyond the frontiers of Ukrainian territory. They belong to the Indogermanic group — an old Slav people that grew out of elements provided by Asia Minor and Mediterranean countries. Their original home is that of all Slavs. Its neighbors in the north-west were the Baltic-Lithuanian group, in the south-west it impinged on the Thracian group. In the southern part of the territory which was not originally colonised by the Ukrainians they came into fruitful contact with the Greeks, whose influence spread as far as Poltava in early historic times.

The first Germanic colonisation in the third century before Christ interrupted the contact with the west which had brought old Mediterranean culture to the Ukrainians.

Connections with the Asiatic group of Indogermanic tribes lasted for another hundred years and were disrupted by nomadic hordes from the Urals who destroyed the last remaining Iranic tribes and from that time until the 18th century made the Ukraine steppe unsafe. Wanderings and attacks by nomadic tribes have had no influence on the physical and psychical development of the Ukrainians.

Nations of Slavonic peoples began to form between the third and fourth centuries. At that time the neighbors of the Ukrainians' ancestors in the south-west and the west were South- Slavonic and Czech tribes. In the north and north-west they were in contact with Russian, later White Ruthenian groups, though only as far as culture goes, for racially there was no contact. There is no proof that the "primeval Russian" transitional groups ever existed, though many philologists assert the contrary. On the other hand, the Ukrainian people, as the central group of central Slavs contributed much to the formation of the Russian and White Ruthenian groups of peoples.

Ukrainians appeared first in history as the "Antes" who pushed the Goths farther and farther west and who were the masters of the steppe on the shores of the Black Sea from the Dnister to the Sea of Oziv and also of the forest steppe farther north between the fourth and sixth centuries.

The Slav migration dates from this time; the Western Slavs slowly moved towards the Vistula, the Oder and the Elbe while the South Slavs wandered to the Balkans, perhaps a little later. Thereupon, ancient Ukrainian tribes also expanded to the west and the south-west, reached the Vistula and, in constant conflict, held these areas against the Poles till the 11th century and longer in parts. In the South the coast of the Sea of Oziv and the Black Sea was occupied and, at the close of the sixth century or, at latest, at the beginning of the seventh, the central Carpathian area and Carpathian Ukraine — long before the Magyars came. 101 175

During this period when the Antes were supreme, the formation and the character of the Ukrainian people was strongly influenced by the Goths. The ancestors of the Ukrainians in those days were separate tribes with no tendency to national unity. It was only when towns were founded (Kyiv, Chernyhiv, and others) and when trade connections were developed that the tribes came closer to each other, thus making it possible form a state under a Germanic Viking dynasty. The capital was Kyiv, which had assumed the former rôle of the Greek towns Olbia and Kherson since the 9th century and had become the most important center of trade in Eastern Europe.

Nestor's chronicle and other sources mention many old Ukrainian tribes who lived in accordance with customs of their own (above all marriage and funeral customs). Leadership was in the hands of the numerically small but centrally situated tribe of the Polyany. West of them, as far as the Prypyat, the Derevlyany settled while the largest tribe of the Severyany were particularly active in pushing east and settled on the Desna, the Sejm and the Sula. South of the Polyany on the western bank of the Dnipro were the Ulichy and the Tyvertsy to the west of these, on the Dnister and at times on the Danube; in the 10th century, however, they were forced north and north-west by pressure from the Magyars and Pechenegs.

Many tribes, among them the Duliby, lived in the west of the old Ukrainian area. Tribal names soon made way for political designations which, as for instance in the case of the Volynians, have been preserved till to day. Altogether the tribes of

101 175 Western Ukraine, which were later organised in the united state of Galicia and Volynia, are more pronouncedly national than the Eastern tribes round Kyiv. The Ukrainian tribes were united by the end of the 10th century and the beginning of the 11th, this process being promoted by a common religion and a common culture composed of Byzantine and Slav influences; at the same time the feelings of unity among Ukrainian peoples was furthered by political pressure from the Poles and the princes of Suzdal and Vladimir at the head of a growing Russian people (since the 12th century). Other factors that helped this union were the transfer of the political center of Ukraine to the west and the political and cultural tendencies of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian state..

It is only in the north and on the western frontiers of Ukraine that many traditional features and a great variety of signs betraying differences between tribes have been preserved. Here, and in parts of the Carpathian area there are rich sources of ancient Ukrainian folklore.

101 181 These Ukrainians of the mountains and the foothills fall into the three almost equal groups of Lemky, Bojky, and Hutsuly. The Lemky, also called the Lemaky, south of the Carpathians, inhabit the upper course of almost all the Carpathian tributaries of the Vistula and the Visloka as far as the Syan and, along with the foothill group of the Samishantsi (in the Jaslo area), are often called Ruthenians. They cling to their traditions and are economically in a sound position. They were the natural mediators between the Ukrainians and the Western and Southern Slavs, for instance, in the art of folkpoetry. Syanik and Krynytsja are the chief centers in this area.

The Boyky or Verkhovyntsi (dwellers in mountain pastures) live east of the Syan, in the districts of Sambir, Turka, Drohobych, Dolyna, and Kalush and also south of the Carpathian range. The inhabitants of the southern areas of the Bojky in the Carpathian Ukraine were also called Dolyniany (valley dwellers) and are rightly deemed to be the pioneers of the ancient Ukrainian colonisation in the South Carpathians, being in many respects different from their brethren in the north. The Tukholtsi, round Skole and Smorze, are another group that are

racially distinct from the rest of the Bojky. In contrast to the latter, who devote themselves above all to cattle-rearing, they are particularly gifted for trade and were known throughout Galicia as smart traders in fruit and wine. /01/ /81/

The Hutsuly, known also abroad as gifted craftsmen (weaving, wood and metal work, ceramics and embroidery) live in the Eastern Carpathians (on the upper reaches of the Prut and its tributaries) in Bucovina round the little town of Vyshnycya, and in the neighborhood of Marmaroshsiget and Hust. In the north-east they join the kindred tribe, the Pokutyany (in the districts of Tovmatsh, Horodenka, Obertyn, Snjatyn and Kuty) who are distinguished by rich folk-poetry and a highly developed sense for art.

North of these mountain tribes we meet the Western Ukrainians proper, who call themselves Ruthenians. They fall into several groups, mostly distinguished by costume and other externals e. g. the Pidhiriany (dwellers in foothills) in the Carpathian foothills as far as the Dnister, the Dolyniany in the Syan valley, in the districts of Peremyshl and Jaroslav and the Batjuki in the districts of Zhovkva, Rava Ruska and Javoriv.

In the East follow the Opolany (as far as the Strypa and the Seret) in the districts of Lviv, Bibrka, Rohatyn, Peremyshlany, Berezhany and Pidhajci; then still further east, the Podoliany and to the north the Volyniany who join the racially more uniform area of Eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainians of the north and north-west have also preserved traces of the customs of the original tribes — for instance the Zabuzhany on the Buh, the Podlashany round Siedlce. The Polesyany ("Polishuky") between Prypyat and Dnipro, show traces of ancient culture; their language is still mediaeval and there are pre-Christian elements in their religious services while their costume reminds us of pictures from the old Kyiv state. They are divided into Polesyany proper, Pyntshuky, Volyniany and Chernyhiv-Polesyany; groups in the north from the still unstudied transition to the White Ruthenians.

Though at first sight there appear to be many differences in the Ukrainian people, they are in reality of small account;

101 they are certainly no reason for a further national division.
181 The common cultural heritage is so great that it covers all pecularities.

The differences usually cited as important between formerly Austrian and formerly Russian Ukrainians are limited to historical influences. The ethnographical limits of Ukraine have never coincided with politi... frontiers; as far as culture goes, "Austrian West Ukraine" stretched almost to Kyiv, while, on the other hand, definitely East Ukrainian phenomena in the language that were characteristic for "Russian East Ukraine" actually begin to appear in "Austrian" Podolia and Pokutja.

144 The anthropological structure of Ukraine is much more
142 complicated. The Ukrainian people is composed of at last six racial types (Dinaric, Mediterranean, Alpine, Nordic, Subnordic and Lapponid). The original inhabitants were mostly fair and long-skulled, (Nordic racial type) then these were flooded by the Armenoid, round-headed dark race from the south-east which naturally left marks. This process produced new racial types, which also came into contact with aboriginal Asiatics in the north-east and with the numerous and prolific Mediterranean races originally from Greece and Jtaly, and produced in turn more new racial mixtures. Of all these racial mixtures with a nordic foundation, the most important is the Dinaric which appears immediately before the Bronze Age; since the Middle Ages the decisive element in the Ukrainian type has been Dinaric, to which class almost one half (44 %) of the present-day Ukrainians belong. Dinaric is a round headed dark type with a long and narrow face. Another important racial element in the national Ukrainian type is the Alpine (22 %) also a round headed dark type, but with a round face. Those two races determine the national Ukrainian type (66 %), other elements being more rare and only characteristic of frontier areas.

141 The Ukrainians belong to the Caucasian race and have an average cephalic index of 83.2 (varying from 82.8 to 89.8); the face is narrow, the nose straight and fairly narrow, the arms relatively short, the legs long, the figure being over average height (about 5 ft. 7), while the hair and the eyes are mostly dark

● 101 The area of Ukrainian economy corresponds to the expansion of the people, i. e. with the compact Ukrainian territory as settled (930 000 sq. km). Yet the frontiers do not quite coincide and the geographical principle cannot be brought into line with the ethnographical. Colonising efforts that even reached the shore of the Pacific must be left out of account, in spite of the Ukrainian population they represent, as must also large enclaves of foreign nations within Ukraine.

On the other hand we must bear those Ukrainian areas in mind where the Ukrainian population, though not yet in the majority, is still increasing (parts of North Caucasia and the Crimea).

487 **2. Ukraine's position in the European system of communications** is fairly central; it is not further from the mouth of the Dnipro to Egypt or Mesopotamia than it is to England, Southwest Germany or Moscow. Ukraine connects the Baltic states with the coasts of the Black Sea, Central Europe with Asia, the lower reaches of the Danube with Russia. Thirty percent (about 2 000 out of 6 000 km) of the route from Berlin or London to the Caspian Sea and thence to India and Western China lies in Ukrainian territory. In Asia Minor, which is near Ukraine, indeed partly connected with it by water, we find the junctions of important long-distance routes (Berlin-Bagdad; Marseilles-Suez-Indochina or Madagascar etc.).

There are no great natural obstacles to communications; even the ridge of the Carpathians is traversed by eight easy passes. From the point of view of communications, the lack of natural frontiers is a great advantage. The watersheds between the rivers flowing to the Black Sea and those to the Baltic Sea are so narrow, low and flat that it is easy to build short canals across them.

3. The geographical situation of Ukraine as a trade center which is not only a result of its position in the system of European communications, was particularly favorable in the Middle Ages. It was largely determined by the priority of overland and river communications over sea trade routes. In Kyiv the trade route to Byzantium intersected the overland route to

000 Usually when undertaking any study whatever, one has at least the advantage of dealing with a well-defined subject.

This is not the case with regard to the Ukraine.

101 Actually, from a purely political point of view, no independent state ever bore this name except during a very short period in 1918–1919, a period which coincided almost entirely with an occupation of Ukrainian territory by Austro-German military forces.

To-day, too, no independent state bears this name, as the 'Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine' is an integral part of the Soviet Union.

Consequently it will be necessary that we should first define our subject in order to indicate to our readers the significance of the word 'Ukraine' as used in this book.

It will, therefore, be well first to give some information about this term itself and about its philological origins. The word Ukraine (*Oukraina* or *Okraina*) means 'March,' 'Borderland,' 'Outskirts,' and 'Landsend.'

Formerly it had been applied by the Russians to the southern borders of the old Muscovite State, which now include the eastern districts of the present Soviet Ukraine. One of the articles of the *Sobornoie Oulojenie*, the Russian code of laws of the twelfth century, provides for condemnation to deportation to the 'Ukrainian Lands' (*Oukrainya Zemli*) giving this name to all far-away lands, not necessarily Ukrainian. The Poles used the same name for their south-eastern frontiers. The hypothesis that the name 'Ukraine' comes from a Slavonic tribe of Pomerania, the so-called *Ukres* or *Ukranes*, cannot be accepted.

It is the warriors of those frontier regions, the Cossacks (Horsemen, in the Tartar language), who, in the sixteenth century, have brought this name with

them to the right bank of the Dnieper. Some French 101
documents of the epoch which mention the name Ukraine confirm this, as for example: 'The description of the Ukraine, which are several provinces of the Polish Kingdom,' by Le Sieur de Beauplan (Rouen, 1660). Other, more ancient documents used the terms 'Russia,' 'Land of the Cossacks,' or 'Tartary' for these regions.

If one keeps to the word 'Ukraine' in its strictly philological sense, this name could not be applied to the western part of the country, and especially to Galicia, and never to Sub-Carpathian Russia, which has for centuries and in all languages used the name of Russia. In Czech and Polish it was *Rus Podkrpatska*, in Hungarian *Ruska Krajna*, in Old Russian *Ougorskaia Rous* (Hungarian Russia).

Nevertheless it is in Galicia, while existing among foreign peoples and differing religions and cultures which were politically dominant (Germans, Poles, and Hungarians), that the intellectual movement and the Ukrainian language had most developed in resisting denationalization.

One could not, impartially, take advantage of this confusion of terms in order to deny the existence of the Ukraine as a political entity, as we have other examples such as another Slavonic country, Jugoslavia, where such a situation does not allow one to deny the existence of a nation and a State.

From a strictly official point of view there exists a 000
frontier, more administrative than political, which separates the Soviet Ukraine from the rest of Russia. The term 'administrative' seems to us quite correct, as one cannot apply the description of 'political' to this frontier since it has been determined unilaterally by the central government of Moscow in accordance with

000 vaguely ethnographical and linguistic data and, especially, by taking into account the economic considerations which decided the division of the U.S.S.R. into 'industrial regions' and which accord with the general plan of organization of the Union.

This purely administrative and arbitrary character of the factors which determined the internal frontiers of the U.S.S.R. is confirmed by the creation, in the interior of the Ukraine, of an 'Autonomous Moldavian Republic.'

This territory includes the regions of Tiraspol, Ananiev, and Balta on the left bank of the Dniester, opposite Rumania.

It is of a demagogic character and serves only to menace the unity of Rumania by creating a national base of an important branch of her population outside her frontiers.

As for the Moldaves, this new republic only has an insignificant minority of them, which are almost entirely assimilated, especially in the two last-named regions, where their numerical importance does not exceed that of the German colonists.

101 The administrative frontier of the Soviet Ukraine begins on the shore of the Sea of Azov between Marioupol and Taganrog, runs along the Donietz, the tributary of the Don, turns towards the north-west, follows the border of the Central Russian plain, then points to the west and reaches the Polish boundary at about latitude fifty-one degrees north, about one hundred kilometres south of the Pripet, a tributary of the Dnieper.

The political frontier which separates the western parts of Polish Volynia and Galicia from the Soviet Ukraine are the direct result of the defeat of Russia during the Russo-Polish War of 1920, and have no geographic, ethnographic, strategic, or other justification, a fact which also applies to the rest of the frontier

101 between these two countries right up to its northern extremity.

Officially the Ukraine is limited to-day to the territory of 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic' which corresponds in some districts to the territory of 'Little Russia' or 'Russia Minor' of the time of the Tsars and to New Russia, conquered by the Russian Empire at the end of the eighteenth century (the districts of Odessa, Kherson, and of Northern Taurida).

But from the historical and linguistic point of view this territory stretches a considerable way towards the west and includes the departments (*voievodstva*) of Volynia, Lvov, Stanislavov, Tarnopol, and some districts of the departments of Polesia (the districts of Stolin, Kamien-Koszynski), and of Lioublin (the districts of Kholm, Bialgoraj, Hrubeiszov, Tomaszov, and of Zamoscie) of the Polish Republic, as constituted before the present war.

To this territory one must add Rumanian Bucovina ('Black Russia') and the northern section of Bessarabia up to the banks of the Dniester—the actual frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania—down to its mouth on the Black Sea. As for Sub-Carpathian Russia, we also include it in the 'great Ukraine' solely *because of the name which it has been given by the Government of Prague after the Munich agreement, while insisting on the complete absence of the existence of any linguistic or other reason for doing so.*

The frontier thus determined has, as we have said, only a linguistic and administrative basis, for within that line the greater part of the population speak the various Ukrainian dialects, and the territory which is enclosed by it bears to-day the name of the Ukraine.

From this Polish-Soviet frontier this line roughly follows the River Pripet, and then descends towards the town of Kholm, then to follow the Rivers Wieprz, San,

the Vistula, Wislok, Poprad, the latter in Sub-Carpathian Russia, and finally in Hungary the High Tissa, a tributary of the Danube right up to the former Czecho-Rumanian border. Then this line cuts across Rumanian territory to the south of Tchernovitz (Cernauti) and follows the little river Reout, a tributary of the Dniester, right up to the latter. 101

Speaking geographically, that which we will decide to call the 'Ukraine' in this book has only one natural frontier: the southern inclines of the western part of the Carpathians. We do not speak of the coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov which officially forms its southern frontier, as this is above all the boundary of the Russian continent in its entirety. [131]

Actually, in the north-eastern basin of the Danube rises the immense semicircle of the Carpathians, dominating the Hungarian Plain. 133

The summits of these mountains reach to more than two thousand metres and are covered by beech, oaks, ash, and some fir trees—typical European forests. They have changed much less than those of the Alps or the Sudeten ranges. Here, in the western part of the Carpathians, in Sub-Carpathian Russia, the forests are still in an almost virgin state. They are still inhabited by bears and wild boar, and are but authentic vestiges—even because of the fact of their primitive state—of the great forests of Central Europe.

The Uzok Range, which has seen the passage of so many invaders in the course of the centuries, has all the characteristics of the high mountains of Central Europe.

From the geo-physical point of view Sub-Carpathian Russia, which stretches along the southern slopes of the Carpathians, is still part of the hilly country, divided by ranges of mountains, with a temperate climate typical of the whole of Central Europe, which has

7:Bregy & Obolenský H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

western part of the Ukraine, and we shall confine ourselves to the boundaries as determined on pages 16–19.[1]

We will accept the administrative Soviet frontier as being the northern and eastern boundaries. The coast of the Black Sea and of the Sea of Azov completes the boundary.

Thus the Ukraine, as determined by us, forms a territory whose extreme points are:

In the west longtitude 19 degrees east: the town of Uzhgorod in Hungarian Sub-Carpathian Russia;

In the east longtitude 37.5 degrees east: the town of Lougansk, in the oil-basin of the Donietz;

In the north latitude 52 degrees north: the town of Novgorod-Severski;

In the south latitude 48 degrees north: the town of Ovidiopol, at the mouth of the Dniester. This is within latitudes which are familiar to us, as those of Kiev and of Calais, of Odessa and of Nantes, of Poltava and of Paris correspond with each other.[2]

The maximum extent of Ukrainian territory in a west to east direction, from Uzhgorod to Lougansk, is, as the crow flies, a distance of 1375 kilometres, while in the north to south direction, from Novgorod-Severski to Ovidiopol it is 675 kilometres.

This territory occupies a space of 588,000 square kilometres (about 25,000 square kilometres more than France) of which

Soviet Ukraine has . . .	452,000 sq. km.
Poland (Volynia, Podolia, Galicia)	107,000 sq. km.
Rumanian Bucovina and Bessarabia	17,000 sq. km.
Sub-Carpathian Russia (Hungary)	12,000 sq. km.

[1] See Map No. 1.

[2] See Map No. 2: the map of France superimposed on that of the Ukraine.

by the sale of amber, which they were transporting 175x
from the region of Königsberg, on the Baltic, to Byzantium. It is there that the great metropolis developed, whose influence will be felt throughout the Slavonic lands dominated by the Norse dynasty. The new Slav-Norse State is known in history under the name of 'the State of Kiev,' although it never officially bore this name.

Another name has certainly, from the eleventh 101
century, been applied to the whole of the territories and 175x
populations which were grouped round Kiev under the power of the Norse dynasty, which had already become entirely assimilated by the Slavs and one with the subjects it dominated. This name is 'Rouss,' the same which continued, throughout the centuries, to apply to the whole of Russia and her people.

We will not concern ourselves here with the extremely difficult controversy which exists concerning the origins of this term. It may have been Scandinavian or, on the contrary, Aloroge, it may originally have served to describe the Norse conquerors (the Finns called them *Rouotsi*) or it may have been used before them to name the country surrounding Kiev (as the name 'France' was originally applied only to the 'Ile de France'). We only have to remember that during the most flourishing epoch of the 'Kiev State' it was already applied to the basin of the Dnieper as well as to Novgorod, to Galicia and to the north-eastern territory in which Great Russia was formed. One said 'Russian Land,' *Roussk Zemlia*, to describe the whole of the country. The Metropolitan of Kiev, whose jurisdiction extended to the north and to the south, was designated as 'Metropolitan of all Russia' (*Vseia Roussi*). All the members of the dynasty were called Russian princes, *kniazi rousski*, both in the south and in the north. The territory of

X/75 101 Novgorod disputed the title of 'the most ancient of Russian lands' with that of Kiev. The chronicler says that the language of the Eastern Slavs is the 'Russian language.' The most ancient code of law and customs, which applied to the whole land, is called 'Russian justice' (*Roussk Pravda*), etc. Prince A. Wolkonsky has estimated how many times the word '*Rouss*' and its derivatives is met with in the Lavrentievsky code of the original Russian chronicles. Up to the year 1110 one meets it no less than two hundred and fifty-one times. There is no other word to describe the whole of the territory and the new, developing nation.

The inhabitants of the country call themselves like this, in using the substantive in '*Roussin*' or the adjective '*Roussky*.' It is this latter form which prevails, like the adjective '*Français*' has supplanted the substantive '*Franc*.' It remains no less true that the substantive form '*Roussin*,' still used to-day in the West of the Ukraine, in Galicia, and in Sub-Carpathian Russia, is the somewhat archaic synonym of the current expression '*Roussky*' (Russian). It is precisely this antique form, '*Roussin*,' which has given birth to the Latin form of '*Ruthenus*' or '*Ruthenian*' which one still sometimes meets to-day. In the Middle Ages the west vaguely used the expression 'Russia' or 'Ruthenia' ('*rex russorum*' or '*ruthenorum*') in speaking of all parts of Russia, and it is still the form '*Imperator ruthenorum*,' which, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, was the Latin title of the pseudo-Dimitrius, who reigned only in Great Russia. Later, in the nineteenth century, the Austro-Hungarian authorities used the word 'Ruthene' to describe only the population of Western Ukraine and of Sub-Carpathian Russia, which were under their domination.

In speaking also of the 'State of Kiev,' of its territory

and its people, we cannot, historically, call them otherwise but 'Russia,' 'Russian land,' 'Russian people,' as these are the expressions used by them, to the exclusion of any other, to describe themselves. 175x [101]

Hemmed in by the forest zone, the Russia of Kiev was condemned to a perpetual struggle with the nomads of the Steppes.

First she had to protect the Slavonic agriculturalists against these enemies. She was, moreover, obliged to control the commercial routes which, after emerging from the forest, crossed the Steppe before reaching Byzantium and the markets of the Near East. These were the essential functions of the political power which had established itself in Russia at the end of the tenth century.

While taking advantage of the final disintegration of the Khazar Empire, the Russian princes tried to occupy the whole course both of the Don and the Volga by military force. But this conquest, the work of Sviatoslav, about 964–71, remained nominal, as the lasting occupation of such vast and remote territories surpassed the means of Russia at that time.

On the other hand the State of Kiev, though it had never succeeded in permanently occupying the course of the lower Dnieper, did succeed, in the eleventh century, in assuring this route the necessary security to make it usable. From the time they established themselves at Kiev, the Varengian princes used this route for the commerce with Byzantium.

Towards the month of November, when the snow tracks could be used, the Prince, accompanied by his *drouzhina*, left the capital to make a tour of the towns and villages in order to receive tribute in kind. This lasted almost the whole winter and only ended in March. During the same time it was the period at which trees

The Ukraine]

I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

101 Ukraina or Okraina (meaning 'border') appears originally to have formed the 'limes Rossicus' or 'Polonicus', i. e. borderland between the Russians, Poles, Turks, and Tatars, the centre of which lay in the lower reaches of the Dnieper valley. The connotation of the word has varied widely. When in process of time this borderland was colonized, and with the rise of Great Russia was extended in many directions, the old name Ukraina or Ukraine was loosely applied to the whole of the enlarged area where the Little Russians (Ruthenians) were in an increasing majority. This extension of the term was facilitated by the modern rise of Little Russian literature, especially in Austrian Galicia, where the use of the Little Russian language was permitted, and 'Ukrainian' rapidly passed from archaeological into literary currency as the equivalent of Little Russian in general.

The connotation of the Ukraine adopted here is that of the General Proclamation of the Ukrainian National Council, issued November 20, 1917, in which it is definitely stated: 'Therefore we announce: to the territory of the National Ukrainian Republic belong the lands where the majority of the population is Ukrainian—Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov, Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida (without the Crimea).'[1]

131 The Ukraine as thus constituted consists of three provinces, the South-west Territory (*Yugo-Zapadny*

[1] On March 29, 1918, the German Government recognized, in accordance with the Treaty of February 9 and the Ukrainian Proclamation, the nine Governments mentioned above as belonging to Ukraine proper, as well as parts of Cholm and Grodno.

131 *Krai*), Little Russia (*Malorossiya*), and part of South or New Russia (*Novorossiya*). The South-west Territory is formed by the three Governments (*gubernii*) of Volhynia (area, 27,700 square miles), Podolia (16,219 square miles), and Kiev (19,686 square miles); Little Russia by those of Chernigov (20,233 square miles), Poltava (19,265 square miles), and Kharkov (21,035 square miles); and New Russia contains the Governments of Yekaterinoslav (24,478 square miles), Kherson (27,337 square miles), and Taurida (23,312 square miles, of which 9,704 belong to the Crimea). It should be noted that the Ukraine by this definition excludes Bessarabia, the Don Cossacks' Territory, and the Crimea, all of which are included in New Russia.

131 The Ukraine thus occupies an area of more than
● 101 190,000 square miles. It is bounded on the north by the Governments of Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, Smolensk, Mohilev, Minsk and Grodno; on the west by the recently created Russian Polish Government of Cholm, Eastern Galicia, and Bessarabia; on the south by the Black Sea, the Crimea, and the Sea of Azov; on the east by the Don Cossacks' Territory.

Except on the west and in the south the boundaries can hardly be said to coincide with natural divisions. Nor are they completely ethnographical, for the ethnographical area extends into Kursk, Voronezh, Grodno, Minsk, Cholm, and Eastern Galicia.

(2) Surface, Coast, and River System

Surface

133 The Ukraine falls naturally into three divisions: Polyesia in the north, the Black Sea plateau, extending from the western boundary to the Dnieper, and Little Russia on the left bank of the Dnieper.

Polyesia (of which only the southern part actually falls within the boundaries of the Ukraine as claimed by the Little Russians) occupies primarily the basin of the Pripet, a right-bank tributary of the Dnieper. The central portion consists of an almost unbroken

184 Ukraine, to the small farmers in the Polish Ukraine, helpless and oppressed by the Poles, to the Soviet Ukrainians working in factories or on collective farms, or even to the exiles! They[1] all [212] speak the same language, albeit in different dialects, they write the same Cyrillic script, regard the good fortune of one among them as a common possession, while the misfortune that strikes one is felt by all.

•101 The thousand souls of Velykyi Lypnyk belong to the westernmost tribe of Ukrainians, the Lemki. [197] They apeak a Slovakian-Ukrainian border dialect. Ukrainian scholars maintain that the Ukrainian settlements formerly reached almost to Cracow, but that the Lemki were pushed back into the mountains by the Poles in the North and the Slovaks in the South. Until the collapse of Poland a bitter nationality fight went on for this small spearhead, especially on the part of Poland, and in the process the Lemki, as the weaker ones, were obliged to yield step by step. The Magyars, no less than the Poles, oppressed the Ukrainian neighboring tribes of Boyki and Huzul and even more than the Slovaks oppressed the Lemki. The Magyar clergy added close to 160,000 Ukrainian souls to their ethnic group. In the census the word "Magyar" stands under the heading of "nationality", and "Greek Orthodox" under the heading of "religion". They are the denationalized Ukrainians who have, for the present, still remained true to their faith. All this began when, at the /11/ end of the last century, the Magyar clergy introduced Magyar hymns, and when in 1912 the Bishop of Haydudorog invented and decreed a Hungarian liturgy in place of the Old Slavic one. (1)

1. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 33.

1 [The Carpatho-, Polish-, Soviet-, and East Slovakian Ukrainians - Analyst]

/12/ Come Along, Friend

•/10/ The Ukrainian country has been given various names. It is called the "largest meadow", and this implies the blossoming steppe in springtime and the nomadic herds numbering hundreds of thousands of cattle and sheep. But it is also called "cornhouse", and this recalls the huge granaries in the harbors of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. It is said to be the easternmost Mediterranean country, because its people are dark-haired and gayer than the thick-blooded Russians in the north, because the sun beats down as it does on the shores of the Mediterranean, and because in the Crimea cypresses and cedars tower into the heavens, figs and almonds ripen. Then, too, it is called a "peninsula of Asia" because the steppes of this continent reach over as far as the Dniestr and the delta of the Danube, and for two thousand years one Asiatic horde after another have pitched their tents in these wide spaces. Still others say that the Ukraine is the "bridge to India", for up to the Middle Ages the large trade routes from the West to the Far East and Asia Minor intersected here with those of the northern countries to Byzantium. Napoleon was of this opinion when he wanted to destroy the British Empire through the conquest of India. Czar Paul III[2] was supposed to carry out this plan, and had declared himself prepared to do so. His well-timed murder, however, in those days saved the British rule in India. (2)

2. Trietsch, Russia, page 24.

/11/ Geographers have established the fact that the Ukrainian national territory extends from 43 to 53 degrees northern latitude and from 21 to 45 degrees eastern longitude. /13/ They say

2 [sic--Analyst]

The maximal result means that the Ukrainians in /62 these maximal boundaries have partly an absolute, partly a relative majority. The Ukrainians have an absolute majority in a total of 718,300 square kilometers on which there are 47,657 million inhabitants. (4)

4. Kubyievych: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 19.

Within the wider boundaries there are 30.2% foreign minorities, and in the narrower boundaries, 24.7%. (5)

5. Kubyievych: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 305 ff.

In 1933 there was a total of 43,360,000 Ukrainians throughout the world; of these 34.43 million were in the Soviet Union, 5.87 million in Poland, 1.1 million in Rumania (including Bessarabia and Bukovina), and 590,000 in Czechoslovakia. The remainder were Ukrainians living outside the country. (6) According to the well-known Ukrainian [101]

6. Ibid., page 325.

geographer Kubyievych, the Ukrainian racial /11/ boundary is difficult to determine in the eastern part of the Caucasian foreland where, besides Ukrainians, there are also Russian and Caucasian peoples, and on the northern boundary, where in the region of Chernigov the question is disputed as to whether the inhabitants are Ukrainians, Russians or White Russians. If we distribute the /61 54,870,000 inhabitants of the entire Ukrainian settled area over the 938,000 square kilometers of surface, 58.5 souls accrue to one square kilometer, while the number is 67.3 if we do not include the thinly populated mixed area of the eastern

11: Obermaier--13 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Podolia] [Volhynia]

everyone else from among our ranks. 000

Before the First World War it was said of 101
Podolia, which you will reach if you wander farther 181
north and which lies like a plateau over the Dniestr 311
Valley, that bread grows on fence posts there,
/Facing page 16: Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. [000]
View of the lower part of the city/; /Facing page
17: The old fortress of Feodosiya on the Crimea/ 3
/17/ and that the fences are woven out of sausages. For the first time there lies before you an immeasurable sea of surging grain. Not a house far and wide, rarely a small wood. A groundless, dusty field road, surprisingly seems to lead into empty space, but where you think it ends, it leads you straight as a die, by means of steep turns into one of those deep valleys which the rivers in the course of thousands of years have carved into the plateaus. Down there the Podolians build their loam huts, the whitewashed walls of which have already greeted you from a distance through the green of the plum and cherry trees. If you follow the river upstream, it will more and more often lead you around ponds, marshes and swamps the nearer you come to its sources. You will see more storks than you have ever seen before in your life.

Almost imperceptibly you will reach Volhynia, 101
the western part of which belonged to Poland up to 491
1939, but was subject to the czar before that. You 361
will notice this immediately by the lack of good roads. For, as everywhere in former Czarist Russia, there are only a few paved roads, but all the more are there roads on which in dry weather you sink into the dust and in wet weather into mud. You will 361
notice it also by the cities and towns which are even dirtier and more neglected than those of Galicia. You are in the midst of the ghettos of the world. These cities are a jumble of houses, "with an ugly traffic artery in the middle". They are spread out with a total absence of form, as though they had been

3 [For plates, cf. pp. 215-216, category 116 — Analyst]

[volhynia]

361 tossed down on the land, without any relationship to it. "The absence of public buildings alone had
[343] a depressive effect. These wooden huts on a slope, supported by stakes as though by high stilts, seemed merely to have been set down as chance would have it, less secure and permanent than nomad tents which the next day perhaps might already be taken down again. It scarcely seemed worthwhile to lay out a few roadways provisionally. For the rest, there was not a trace of a city plan, of a systematizing, architectural hand. Everything seemed temporary and unfinished, simply amassed, never shaped. The expression "shanty town" applied in a special /18/ sense to these places. Our criteria of beautifully compact city plans do not apply. Never concentrated within the area most difficult to attack, never held together by walls and moats, these Russian clusters of houses and courtyards which can scarcely be called cities any more, gradually become lost in the distance, without shape or outline: mirror images of the landscape that bears them, of the language that echoes in them, of the way of thinking of the people they house." (9)

9. Tintrup: War in the Ukraine, pages 23 and 24.

•101 If you would now turn east in the direction
361 of Kiyev, you would come through numerous rambling villages with streets. They contain attractive
563 farms where until recently you would have been warmly welcomed with German sounds. The Volhynia Germans lived here. But you continue northward
101 until the Volhynia plateau with a gradual incline
133 sinks into the Polesian swamps. You avoid this marsh land by turning northeast, and thus come to the extreme northwest tip of the Ukrainian area of settlement, Podlakhia, whose waters flow toward the Baltic. The primeval forests of Bila Vesha are gloomy, but even more gruesome are the deep

•101 swamps of Polesia. Faggot and fascine paths lead
133 you from village to village, from settlement to settlement. If you visit this swamp land which extends almost to the central Russian plain and is about at large as Hungary including Carpatho-Ukraine, in spring during the time of thaws or during the floods of early summer, people will row you in a boat to their neighbor's. For at these times the rivers creeping in countless bends through lakes, ponds and tributaries of this country, which is only 170 meters above sea level, flood their banks for many weeks, even months. This landscape is unutterably sad, and, it has deprived of laughter the few people it scantily nourishes with fish,
[136] potatoes and oats. Polesia is a land of spooks without equal, where, across the bog through which elk and bison, sure-footed, make their way, there
[137] rises the "pillared hall of centuries-old oaks, lindens, aspens, ash trees, firs, spruces and pines." /19/ The sun rarely shines into this twilight where at night there are mysterious will-o'-the-wisps in this world of mold. Deathly silence prevails in this accursed land which even the birds avoid. You are standing on the border of the Soviet Union.

133 Descending the navigable Pripyat, and traveling eastward halfway to the central Russian plain, you reach, friend, the Dniepr, which comes from the north. You have come to the sacred river of the Ukrainians. They chant its praises in countless songs. This third largest river of Europe flows 2100 kilometers until, exhausted, it empties into the Black Sea. If it happens to be flood time, you will not be able to see from one bank to the other, the river rises to such an extent. It gets to be six, eight, even ten kilometers wide. Herodotus already compared it with the Nile.

505 If you now sail south[1] on a Dniepr steamer you will reach Kiyev. Do not be surprised at the numerous vessels which you meet on the river, for

1 [From the confluence of the Dniepr and the Pripyat - Analyst]

133 Plain where lie the coal districts of the Ukraine. The more bleak and unfriendly this industrial country with its black chimneys appears to you, the friendlier the quiet, pale yellow Donets beckons yonder, with its broad, green valley and the white chalk precipices crowned by dark green forests. Now your journey takes you south to the Sea of Azov, across the mouth of the Don to the Caucasian foothills. Immeasurable fields of sun-
•101 flowers accompany you into this "second Ukraine".
133 Here you feel the refreshing breath of the snowy mountains of the Caucasus. You are on the shores of the Argonauts. Virile and full of strength is this untouched land at the foot of the Elbrus. Like the mountains, the people, too, are giants. You have before you the descendants of the flower of the Ukrainian people, of the Zaporogian Cossacks who were settled here by Catherine II.

137 And now turn west, start homeward! The way
[133] leads across the Pontic Plain which extends north of the Black Sea as far as the Danube. On this "racial meadow" you will look in vain for the much-praised wild uncultivated steppe. You are in the land of Taras Bulba. Gogol, a Ukrainian, erected an imperishable monument to the bold Cossack in his tale. /21/ In those days the grass and shrubs of the steppe grew taller than a man, but today you will find only the knee-high herbs of the temporarily fallow fields, and here and there a thicket of wild cherries, mahaleb and thistles. Perhaps you will also come to one of those meadows that have become rare, which in a brief whiff of spring changes its color like a rich woman her clothes, wrapping itself in silver gray during the summer, and adorning itself in moss-green in autumn, when rain finally quenches the cracked earth. Smooth
133 and flat, amorphous as a calm sea, the Pontic Steppe stretches out before you. Burial mounds as
764 large as houses, called kurgany, point the way to the Dniestr. What ghastly secrets may they not

[i.e. the Caucasian foothills — Analyst]

000 you with a strong drink of spirits after your long journey.

/23/ Grand-Princes

•101 174 A song attributed to Mazepa compares the Ukrainian people to a bird that builds its nest in a tree on a much-frequented street, and is therefore often startled and obliged to live in a state of constant unrest. Today it has been proved that the ancestors built their nest very early along the much-traveled road from Asia to the lower Danubian plains. According to the most recent research (10), the Ukrainians settled as

10. According to verbal statements of the Ukrainian archaeologist Pasternak of Lwow.

early as the Bronze Age between Carpathia, San, Pripyat and Dniepr. Even at that time they were obliged to shoulder a foreign yoke. At all times nomadic peoples with their herds of many hundreds of thousands of sheep, horses and camels were attracted to the succulent grasses of this endless steppe. A thousand years before our era the Cimmerii rode into the Ukrainian settlements at the head of restless peoples. Whether they were nomads or farmers, and whether they came over the Danube or the Volga has not yet been made clear. At about the same time the Thracians in the west sought their way from the Balkans across the Carpathians to East Galicia. To them the native population owes its ceramic art. The period of nomadic invasions occupies 2600 years of the country's history. The Scythians follow the Cimmerii about 800 B.C. Herodotus tells of their battles. Through him and through excavations we learn of the culture of this Mongol-Iranian people. The goldsmith's work with its magnificent ornaments, mostly of Greek origin, found in their

•101 174 graves, calls forth our admiration. Their aristocratic kingdom of the steppes was rigidly organized. For 400 years /24/ their kings accompanied by their retinues rode through the Pontic Plain until they were driven out by a stronger people, the Sarmatians. Scythians as well as Sarmatians repeatedly broke into Hungary on their marauding expeditions. In the second century of our era it is assumed that the Goths arrived in this plain of peoples. They came by way of the water route from the land of the Baltic and were the first river navigators in the Ukrainian countries - according to one group of investigators. Others say they are aborigines, and still others, have them come from the west or even the east. They allegedly dragged their boats on rollers across the flat watersheds between the rivers which flow toward the Baltic or the Black Sea. The fact that in the southern lands they did not sever connections with their homeland is proved by the military and commercial points of support which they established along these waterways. Their neighbors in Galicia were the Vandals. It was in 370 A.D. that the flood of Huns from Mongolia reached the dwellings of the Goths and swept away the latter. This was only the first wave of later mixed Finno-Turkish tides. This inexhaustible stream of humanity, at times slower, at other times torrential, engulfing everything, flowed along. Unpredictable was the will of these hordes which through many generations led a hunter's and shepherd's existence, only to plunge suddenly, like wolves, into the dwelling-places of foreign peoples.

It was not long before the Huns exhausted these ideal pastures and rode on in order to threaten western peoples. Along their trails the herds of the Bulgarians and after them the herds of the Turkish Avars passed across the Pontic Steppes. Finally, the Finno-Turkish race

•101 174 of Khazars established a kingdom here, which extended from the Volga to the Danube. The Khazars were nomads who became domiciled, founded cities and carried on trade. At their court the Jews obtained predominating influence, and it sounds almost unbelievable to say that the khans adopted the faith of Moses. /Facing page [000] 24: Character study of a Ukrainian head*/Facing page 25: A Ukrainian girl with pronounced nordic features*/25/

[101] [174] 181 Kiyev, the center of the Polyani, was tributary to the Khazar. The Slavic tribes of the Antae, the ancestors of the Ukrainians, were divided and fought one another. In the establishment of their society they scarcely developed beyond the formation of a district with several peasant communities. Fields and pastures belonged to all jointly. Family life was a patriarchy, and unanimity was demanded at the village and district meetings. These Slavs built compact houses of loam, and placed embankments around their towns. They cultivated their fields, made pottery and bartered their goods for swords, knives and various handicraft products. They offered sacrifice to the sun god Dashdboh, the wind god Stryboh, the thunder god Perun and other deities.

*

175 It was the Swedish Vikings, called Varangians, who in the ninth and tenth centuries unified the Slavic tribes and established a kingdom with Kiyev as the capital, which, during its most flourishing period, extended from the Carpathians to the Volga and from the Caucasus to the White Sea. They rowed in boats to Lake Ilmen, founded Novgorod and from there, about the middle of the ninth century, conquered Kiyev. Rurik was the name of the Viking king of Novgorod; his warriors were called Rus', meaning "rowers",

*[For plates, cf. pp. 217-218, Category 116 - Analyst]

[Ruthenians]

728 ies in Austria and boundaries of the various gub-
631 ermyas in Russia./

/81/

Fair Play

186 In the winter of 1938/39 the Ukrainian peasants in Poland were no longer recognizable. If after the pacification of 1930 they went about for many years bent and timid like beaten dogs, they now carried their heads higher. It was as though they felt a fresh breeze, and whenever they had business with Polish officials they omitted expressions of due respect, in fact they became cynical. They stood around in groups, talked in the most animated fashion, nudged each other meaningfully and sometimes laughed out loud.

[186] What happened? Since the end of October
•101 1938, there was the "Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy"
642 beyond the Carpathians. There on the southern slopes of the Carpathians live the Ukrainian tribes of Lemki, Boyki and the Huzul. On poor soil they eke out a precarious living as small farmers, woodsmen and shepherds. In the warmer season many of them hire themselves out as harvest workers in the fertile Hungarian lowlands, and there they also trade in carriage grease. Before the First World War they shipped salt to Warsaw and fruit even as far as Moscow. Ruthenia, as their little country was once called, always belonged to the Kingdom bearing the crown of Stephen. After the downfall of the Hapsburg monarchy Czech insatiability succeeded in having "Carpatho-Russia" - that is what Ruthenia was now called - assigned to the Czechs by the edict of Saint-Germain. The "autonomy" which the little country was promised on paper in the edict remained an unfulfilled dream for its inhabitants. "Carpatho-Russia" was a province abounding in forests, which Prague could and would exploit. It was only after the solution of the Sudeten

[Ruthenians]

•101 642 crisis when the centralistic /82/power of the Czechs slackened and the Slovaks stubbornly insisted on their autonomy, that the "Carpatho-Ukrainians" - this is the name they henceforth adopted - were also granted a certain autonomy.

186 This seeming independence, nothing more than a weak, short-lived light which the Hungarian storm was to blow out only a few months later, in March 1939, sufficed, however to nourish vigorously the hopes of West Ukrainians north of the Carpathians. Therefore Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy was more important to them than sunshine and rain. This was the great event which they were discussing and on account of which they even neglected their fields. Just as all Ukrainians from the Kuban to the Carpathians honor the same heroes in their common folksongs, the seafarers of the Rus and the Cossacks of the sech, just as they shared the experience and the suffering of the wars of liberation between 1917 and 1923, so they now regarded as their own good fortune the fact that a piece of land, if only a small one, was apparently under independent Ukrainian administration.

In Ruska Lane and on the "Ring" in Lwów the newly-awakened Ukrainian self-awareness made itself felt in demonstrations. In the middle of October and the beginning of November 1938, the Ukrainians of Lwów protested against the foes of the "Silver Land". Not only in the Galician metropolis, but also in Przemysl, in Stryj, in all of West Ukrainia, the Ukrainians mustered: cries of abuse against Poland and cries of "Slava Ukrajini!" - "Glory to - the Ukraine!" - were heard, and the national anthem was repeated innumerable times. It did not cool the hot passions to have Poles on these occasions beat to death a few Ukrainians or shoot them down. The fever of hope that they might shake off Polish domination seized them. Ukrainian daily papers filled their front pages exclusively with reports from Carpatho-Ukraine.

241 the Sea of Azov also deserves to be mentioned./ /Key inside map: I Rye, potato and oats region. II Wheat and rye region; sub-zone of rye, wheat, potatoes; sub-zone of rye, winter wheat, sugar beets; sub-zone of summer wheat, rye, sugar beets. III Region of wheat, barley, corn; sub-zone of winter wheat, corn, barley, sunflowers. IV Summer wheat and rye zone; cotton. V Region of corn; sub-region of corn, wheat; sub-region of corn, barley. VI Oats and potato region. VII Forest region. VIII Grassland (pastures, alpine pastures, natural meadows). ⊥⊥⊥⊥ Area with abundant millet cultivation. ⊞ Area with abundant buckwheat cultivation. ....Northern boundary of region growing abundant amounts of corn. Intensive horticulture./ /97/ Cracow a Ukrainian
873 professor lectured in Polish on Ukrainian liter-
178 ature, and in Warsaw Polish and Ukrainian professors lectured in Polish on Ukrainian literature and "History of the East" which meant history of the Ukraine under Polish rule. Moreover, study in Lwów was made very difficult for Ukrainian students. Warsaw wanted the Ukrainians to study in Cracow and in the capital of the country, and to have them taken out of the Ukrainian environment and drawn into the Polish one. In this connection a secret numerus clausus proved very useful: the Ukrainians, in contrast to their smarter Polish colleagues often failed.

*

●101 How was the situation in Bukovina? This little country of 5000 square kilometers on the northeast slope of the Carpathians in between the three countries, Poland, Soviet Union and Rumania, was, until its transfer to the Habsburg Kingdom in 1776, purely a colonial country of the Sublime Porte. Under Austria it experienced a rapid rise, and its chief city Czernovits (now Chernovtsy) was given the epithet "Vienna of the

[Bukovina]

●101 East". The region was very fertile, with the exception of the western part which was overgrown with beech forests. It was thickly settled by Germans, Walachians and Ukrainians. In the cities there were a great many Jews. As a result of a secret agreement between the countries of the Entente, it was transferred to Rumania August 18, 1916 and on November 11, 1916, it was occupied by troops. Up to this day the Ukrainians enjoyed practical autonomy. Neither their compatriots in Czarist Russia nor in Galicia, where the Poles, thanks to their predominance at the Viennese court, had secured the upper hand, nor in Hungarian Carpathia were in possession of so many rights and institutions as they were, beginning with the public schools and on up to university chairs and to their own government. Bukovina was the "pet" of Vienna. It could not maintain this privileged position under Rumanian domination. /98/

Merely a Poet

000 Solemn, like a religious service, was the first performance of Ukrainian concert music in the Old Municipal Theater of Lwów on a Sunday in March, 1939. Magnificent choirs of many voices swayed humbly, rose up exultantly as though heaven should hear them; light sopranos twittered, deep basses rolled, and finally the song died away like a breath of the steppes. It was a strangely moving music in an echoing language. But the world knew little about it. There was no station that might broadcast it, no disk that might reproduce it. The art of this people, talented in song and music, experiences the same fate as the manuscripts of its scholars which molder in drawers because they do not find any publishers. And yet there is tireless work going on in all fields of art and science.

The first performance was the great event which no one must miss who had a good opinion of himself.

174 Ivan Kalita destroyed the power of the nobility and therewith laid the foundation for Muscovite despotism. A further example of historically proved contrariety is furnished during the time of Ivan the Terrible. The most sinister force rules at that time in Moscow, while in the Ukraine the Cossacks are preparing to found the freest state that probably ever existed in East Europe.

*

•101 184 Among the Ukrainians there are, in turn, tribal differences. The inhabitants of the dark forest region of Podlakhia and Polesia, who are obliged to wrest all fruits from the earth, can scarcely be as gay as those of the sunny spaces of the south. Those are melancholy and oppressed people who up there carry on the struggle for existence. Farther south, from the fertile hills of Podolia way over to the foothills of the Caucasus, there are fields of golden grain, fruit grows of its own accord, the sky is blue for many months, and on the Kuban there is paradise itself. Cheerful, candid people live here.

181 The Ukrainians are a peasant people and more than 90% of all children first see the light of the world through the small window-panes of a straw- or shingle-covered cottage. They are peasant souls - that is, quiet, good-natured, placid human beings who cling to the sod, to their own farm, who want to plow, sow and reap. They are poor, but honest and at the same time hospitable and positively ceremonially polite. People like to call them "Southerners" because of their cheerful disposition and their humor. They love that contemplative life which /132/ is hard to combine with constant hard work. It has not been a blessing to the Ukrainian that the soil yields richly and effortlessly, that his daily bread need not be obtained amid constant toil and hardships. If that were the case, perhaps he

I INTRODUCTION

101 The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (the Ukraine) is one of the U.S.S.R.'s sixteen constituent Union Republics. Situated in the south-western corner of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine is bordered on the south by the Black and Azov Seas and the Crimea (part of Russia); its western border touches the frontiers of Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as well as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Towards the north the Ukrainian S.S.R. verges on two other Soviet Republics: Byelorussia and Russia; and it is the Russian neighbourhood of the Don river which forms the Ukraine's eastern border.

101 135 In economic development and in population the Ukraine is second greatest of the Soviet Republics. It has a fertile soil, a mild humid climate, and is rich in deposits of coal, oil, iron, manganese and salts, as well as in building materials. It has four main rivers: the Dnieper (third largest in Europe), the Dniester, the Bug, and the Donets (a tributary of the Don), which are navigable and are also useful reservoirs of power.

433 162 Before 1941 the Ukraine contained more than one-fifth of the inhabitants of the entire Soviet Union. Its industry produced 54 per cent. of the coal, 60 per cent. of the pig iron, 48 per cent. of the steel, and 35 per cent. of the manganese ore turned out in the whole U.S.S.R.; it manufactured railway engines and cars, tractors, turbines, harvester combines, and mining and agricultural machinery for all parts of the Soviet Union. "It also produced artificial fertilizers, soda, glass and cement. The output of the sugar, meat-packing, flour-milling, distilling, and dairy industries reached great dimensions. Fishing was developed in the Black Sea and Azov Sea. The Dnieper Power Station, 361 the largest in Europe, was famous throughout the world. The cities of the Ukraine, both old and new, developed rapidly; during the past 25 years 77 new cities and 285 industrial settlements were built."[1]

241 Agriculture also was highly developed. In 1937-38 Ukrainian farms accounted for nearly one-fifth of the grain, one-sixth of the potatoes, and two-thirds of the sugar beet produced in the Soviet Union. The Ukraine also had a large proportion of the total Soviet Union livestock. Millions of head of cattle, pigs, sheep, and poultry were raised. Ukrainian agriculture was highly mechanized; before the war there were 90,000 tractors and 31,000 harvesting combines operating in the fields.

Area and Population

131 In January 1939 the Ukrainian Republic had an area of about 469,700 square kilometres including 8,000 square kilometres in its

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1 The Sixteen Soviet Republics, Soviet News, London, 1945.

Soviet Union in 1939.

101 In the years before its reunion with the Ukrainian S.S.R. Western Ukraine was relatively undeveloped, as compared with the industrial and agricultural expansion which was taking place in the Ukraine itself. The backwardness of Western Ukraine before its incorporation into the Soviet Union is shown by the following table, which compares per person output in 1938 of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with that of Western Ukraine.

TABLE II

433 Per Person Output of Western Ukraine and of Ukrainian S.S.R., 1938

	Western Ukraine	Ukrainian S.S.R.
Electro power (kilowatt hours)	13.05	305
Cement (kilograms)	12.2	39.7
Bricks (pieces)	17.0	50.3
Sugar (kilograms)	5.9	58.9
Soap (kilograms)	0.5	2.58

Source : Planned Economy, State Planning Commission, Moscow, 1940.

Transfer to the U.S.S.R. of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina

728 On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Government communicated with the Rumanian Minister in Moscow concerning Bessarabia[1]. In 1918, said the communication, Rumania, "taking advantage of the military weakness of Russia....(seized) a part of her territory, namely, Bessarabia, which is principally occupied by Ukrainians..." The Soviet Government, never having recognized any justice in Rumania's claims to Bessarabia, demanded the immediate return of this territory to the Soviet Union. The communication also stated that "... the return of Bessarabia is organically connected with the question of the return to the Soviet Union of that part of the Bukovina the majority of whose population is connected with the Soviet Union not only through the community of their historic destinies but through the similarity of their language and national Constitutions".

It was therefore proposed that Northern Bukovina, as well as Bessarabia, should be given to the Soviet Union, and that the transfer should take place immediately. On June 27, 1940, after the Rumanian Government's acceptance of the Soviet Proposals, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were re-joined to the Ukrainian Republic. The total area of these two ceded territories was 50,400 square kilometres, of which 21,300 were added to the Ukraine, and 29,100 square kilometres were incorporated into the newly created Moldavian S.S.R.

1 The Bulletin of International News, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, July 13, 1940.

20: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1937 RD1 Ukraine RD1

MAGICAL BELIEFS AND PRACTICES AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS[1]

PART I

The Black Art and its Representatives

To the inhabitants of the plains and plateaus and the majestically rising Carpathians of Southern Poland—the Galician Ukrainian—life in its manifold aspects is pervaded by a mul-

[1] The Galician Ukrainians, also known as Ruthenians, are Eastern Slavs, and constitute a branch of the numerous Ukrainian, or Little

771 titude of mysterious, evil forces which he endeavours either to
789 ally himself with, propitiate, or combat in order to assure himself of good luck or avert the many calamities which these supernatural powers may bring. Magical beliefs and practices are therefore widespread and deeply rooted among the people. Even where the church has opposed and tried to counteract the older notions and usages, its success has been at best only partial. What it often has effected was a change in form, or the substitution of an authorized rite for an ancient magical practice.[2] The priest, for example, sometimes takes the place of the sorcerer by holding a special midnight Mass, the *czorna służba* (black service), at the instigation of a person who wishes to harm an enemy.[3] At other times he acts as medicine man, e.g. by stepping over the back of an ailing parishioner in order to relieve his
[342] backache.[4] A case of substitution is noticeable in the rite observed before moving into a newly constructed house. Wherever the old practices of sacrificing a black rooster, as an offering to the Devil or as a preventive against disease, has become extinct, its equivalent has appeared in the solemn consecration of the house by the priest.[5]

154 Among the Ukrainians, as elsewhere, magical beliefs and prac-
791 tices have two main aspects, which may be termed respectively
189 the black and white arts. While the former has its prime source in the arch enemy of man, the Devil, the latter, which functions mainly to counteract evil influences, relies on some powerful medium, sometimes God himself, to neutralize or overcome the

Russian, people inhabiting South Russia. They occupy the eastern section of the former Austrian province of Galicia, which is at present part of Poland. They number approximately 3,000,000 and belong almost exclusively to the peasant class. Geographically, and to a certain extent also culturally, they may be divided into lowlanders and highlanders, the former inhabiting the plains to the north and the latter the Carpathian mountains to the south.

[113] [2] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Rutenen in der Bukowina und Galizien," *Globus*, lxi, 282.

[3] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Kuzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 277.

[4] Kaindl, R. F. "Neue Beitraege zur Ethnologie und Volkskunde der Húzulen," *Globus*, lxix, 71.

[5] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 282.

7

THE BRIDGE BETWEEN WEST AND EAST

101 The political boundary between Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia is not a clear-cut dividing line between two different worlds. There are a number of Ruthenian peasants in the eastern parts of Slovakia who form a gradual transition between the two neighbours. True, the Slovaks and the Ruthenians are two different Slav races. The Slovaks are closely related to the Moravians and Czechs in the West; the Ruthenians belong to the Russian family—mainly to its Ukrainian branch—although the thousand years of isolation from their kinsmen have had a specific effect on the character of the Ruthenian population on the southern slopes of the Carpathians. But there is a gradual link between the Slovaks and the Ruthenians, and Carpathian Ruthenia may aptly be described as a bridge between the Western and Eastern Slavs.

131 Geographically, too, the two neighbouring countries are similar. A
175 chain of wooded mountains separates them from the kindred Slav populations to the North and North-East; while to the South both countries have stretches of fertile plain which run down unobstructed into the vast Danubian basin. That is the reason why both countries fell victim to Hungarian expansion early in their history and remained under Hungarian rule as second-rate provinces for a thousand years. Until the end of 1918, neither Slovakia nor Carpathian Ruthenia were on the map.

177 Both these countries suffered from the long alien domination which
212 hampered their development. Slovakia was the more fortunate of the two because, in spite of her political separation from the independent lands of the Czech Crown, cultural and religious contacts with them had been maintained for centuries. But the Ruthenians received less support of this kind from their kindred beyond the Carpathians. As a result, Ruthenia was still more at the mercy of her Hungarian overlords and remained in a state of greater backwardness than her neighbour in the West. This is well illustrated by the degree of illiteracy in Ruthenia under the Hungarian regime which was, indeed, appalling; according to the last Hungarian census about three quarters of the Ruthenian population could not read or write.

177 Only people of considerable racial individuality could have resisted
181 systematic denationalisation as the Ruthenians did. They may be a simple people; but their mode of living, their outlook and their character have an unmistakable stamp of their own.

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-
Ruthenians

Shepherds blow huge horns to round up their sheep by night

511 464 241 311 In the narrow valleys and on their slopes are cottages and straggling villages where the Ruthenian uplanders live. Nearly, all the huts are made of wood and are flanked by gardens with patches of sunflowers. In the higher altitudes the land consists mainly of meadows, and such meagre fields as there are yield scanty crops of oats, potatoes or hemp—not sufficient to live on. No wonder that during the summer months it is chiefly women and children who can be found at home; the menfolk either fell trees in the forest or earn their living as seasonal labourers in the towns and villages of the more prosperous South.

101 162 These lonely mountains and forests breed a people with a distinct character of their own. Living as they do in seclusion, they not only differ from their Slovak neighbours but show distinct regional differences

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

101 among themselves. They can be divided into three well-defined tribes
162 —the Lemki on the Slovak border, the Boiki in the centre, and the Huculs in the eastern tip of Ruthenia.

The most interesting tribe are the Huculs. They have preserved
186 their tribal characteristics better than their kinsmen. Their standard of education is higher, and they are more conscious and proud of their national individuality. When the Hungarians invaded Ruthenia after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Huculs offered the stiffest resistance, and during the war they were the core of the partisan force fighting against the totalitarian powers. Like the other Ruthenian
463 mountaineers, the Huculs are largely wood-cutters and raftsmen. But
342 they are distinguished by their skill as carpenters and wood-carvers. This is clearly reflected in their mode of life. Their wooden-cottages are neatly built and furnished and impress the visitor by their scrupulous cleanliness. Their tribal individuality and artistic skill find expression in the numerous carvings with which they like to decorate their unpainted houses.

181 The neighbouring Boiki have also, to some extent, preserved their pride in racial individuality, and their mode of life, though more primi-
511 tive, has some interesting features. They are kind-hearted, sincere and hospitable, in spite of their poverty. Though less proud than the Huculs, they fly into a temper when crossed, and impulsive outspoken-
342 ness is one of their traits. They live in cottages and huts which they like to paint in blue and brown, and this makes their exterior rather attractive. But the interior does not always live up to the façade. The better-off Boiki manage to live in fairly decent cottages with two or more rooms, but the huts of the poor often consist of one room only—a dark room with no chimney, one small window, and some roughly
352 made furniture. Some have no bedsteads in the true sense of the word; along the whole wall of the room one may find a long "plank-bed" where the grown-ups sleep at the one end and the children at the other. When the children grow up they sleep on separate beds of the same kind. Unlike the Hucul houses, the Boiki huts have no wooden
342 floors. The domestic animals often share the same room with their
511 masters in winter, sleeping on the bare earth. For many families such a room is therefore a kitchen, living room, bedroom, hall and stable in one.

511 Much the same applies to the Lemki tribe who live partly on Slovak territory. They are the poorest Ruthenian tribe and their racial
181 character has undergone a certain deterioration. Their standard of life is often appalling, the hygiene leaves much to be desired, and they have the largest number of illiterates, though some improvement has taken place under the Republic.

000 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

S.U. 563 635 UK 698 175 Soviet Russia has often followed in the footsteps of Czarist Russia, but as far as the appraisal of the Ukraine is concerned there is no continuity between old and new Russia. Czarist Russia simply denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation and denounced all Ukrainian national feeling as 'South Russian separatism'. Soviet policy, on the other hand, has encouraged Ukrainian nationalism in as far as it was able to serve Russia's territorial expansion. The most spectacular territorial advance which the Soviet Union has made since 1939 was that realized under the slogan 'unification of all Ukrainian lands in one national State'. In the course of this unification the Soviet Union not only re-annexed territories which Russia had lost in the Civil War but also occupied territories which had ceased to be 'Russian' ever since the Middle Ages, such as Eastern Galicia with the city of Lvov.

UK. [101] There cannot be the slightest doubt about the existence of a Ukrainian nation which some Russian nationalists tried to deny in the past, but it would be a mistake to consider the Ukrainians, despite their numbers, as a nation equal in character to the French, Italians, Spaniards, etc., as the extremists among the Ukrainian nationalists would like to represent it. The Ukrainians cannot claim to be historically and culturally a nation so complete that they could afford to cut themselves loose from their Russian neighbours and exist without them.

All foreign invaders fighting Russia had illusions in this respect; they all believed in a separation of Ukraine and Muscovy and conducted their political warfare accordingly. The Swedish King, Charles XII, allied himself with the Ukrainian Cossack Hetman Mazeppa; Napoleon came to Russia with the project of a Ukrainian State, 'Napoleonide', cutting Russia off from the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. The Third Reich of Adolf Hitler also tried to play up the Ukrainian issue against Great Russia.

'LITTLE RUSSIA' AND 'NEW RUSSIA'

UK 101 186 538 There is every justification in the demand for a genuinely autonomous Ukraine but there is no logic and no life in an anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalist ideology. Neither Russian and Ukrainian history, nor the area of Russian and Ukrainian settlement, nor even Russian and Ukrainian literature can be separated from each other. Gogol, for instance, who wrote in Russian only, can be claimed by the Ukrainians not only because he was born in 'Little Russia', as the Ukraine used to be called in Czarist times, but also because some of his great works are devoted to his homeland, including the most Ukrainian literary work *Taras Bulba*. The Ukrainians have failed to produce any Ukrainian-writing poet or writer who even approximates to the importance of a Gogol.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

Nor is Gogol an isolated example. Count Alexey Tolstoy too belongs to some extent to the Ukraine and no Ukrainian poet has succeeded in paying to his homeland a more beautiful lyrical tribute than Tolstoy's.

Were the Ukraine 'Little Russia' only, the land of the Cossacks, the problem would be more straightforward; but the Ukraine is, apart from minor territories, at least Little Russia plus New Russia. New Russia comprises those territories along the shores of the Black Sea which were incorporated into the Russian Empire for the most part under Catherine the Great. It was only by the amalgamation of Little Russia with a large part of New Russia that the Ukraine obtained a sea-coast and was able to include within its borders places like Odessa, Kherson, Mariupol and Nikolayev whose history was in no way linked with that of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmans. New Russia became a true microcosm of Europe. Just as the ancient and medieval history of New Russia is a mosaic of the history of many peoples which had settled on the northern shores of the Black Sea, traded with the goods and products of its hinterlands and founded states, a history of Greeks and Scythians, Khazars, Goths, Genoese and Tartars, so too the history of modern New Russia is a tale of all sorts of races. People from many lands transformed the steppe into arable soil, built ports and railway lines and developed the industry of the Donets Basin. New Russia was a little America in the sense of being a melting-pot of European races, with the difference, however, that not all pioneer settlers forgot the language of their forefathers in the Ukrainian-Russian surroundings.* The people who brought New Russia into being included sons of every nation of the Balkans, many Germans and even individual Frenchmen who assumed high administrative posts there. At least one Briton played a distinguished part in the development of New Russia, John Hughes, a pioneer of coal-mining in the Donets region, to whose initiative is due the foundation of the big industrial centre now called Stalino. (Until the early twenties the place was called after him 'Yuzovka'.)

UKRAINIAN DIASPORA IN THE U.S.S.R.

Whilst Russians and other peoples shared with the Ukrainians the credit for the colonization of what is to-day the Ukrainian S.S.R., millions of Ukrainians now live dispersed all over the Soviet Union.

The Ukraine, being a densely populated country, was able to contri-

* An ethnical group of colonists in New Russia, who were completely assimilated by their Russian-Ukrainian surroundings, were the Serbs, of whom about 100,000 came to the Southern Ukraine between 1739 and 1752. The Serbs colonized two Ukrainian regions, one on the right bank of the Dnieper, originally called 'New Serbia', and the other in the Donets Basin, called 'Slavyanoserbia'. A century after the Serbian pioneer immigration into New Russia the Serb element could no longer be traced in any population statistics of the Russian Empire.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

167 bute a large army of colonists to the Slav ethnical expansion towards the East at the end of the nineteenth and in the twentieth century. To describe the Ukrainians as junior partners in the Russian colonization of Eurasia would hardly do full justice to the role which they played. Thus among the eight 'Governments' of European Russia which between 1897 and 1911 supplied the highest number of settlers for Russian Asia four were predominantly Ukrainian, Poltava, Chernigov, Kiev and Kharkov – two were Byelorussian – Mogilev and Vitebsk, and only two Great Russian – Kursk and Voronezh.

167 The share of the Ukrainians in the Eurasiatic colonization makes any
162 complete separation of Ukrainians and Russians, such as the extreme Ukrainian nationalists advocate, difficult if not impossible. Almost everywhere throughout the Soviet Empire there are Ukrainians living as workers, peasants and technical specialists. According to incomplete figures referring to the early thirties 1,049,000 Ukrainians then lived in Kazakhstan, 966,000 in Western Siberia, 447,000 in the Lower Volga region and roughly 400,000 in the Far East.[1] Smaller groups of Ukrainians lived in the Middle Volga region (215,000), in the Ural region (137,000) and in the western regions of the R.S.F.S.R. (186,000). This
[101] last-mentioned group of Ukrainians, particularly those of the province of Bryansk, constitute a particularly interesting species. They speak a strange Russian-Byelorussian-Ukrainian mixed language but have retained some sort of romantic attachment to the Ukraine on account of the alleged relationship of their forefathers with the Ukrainian Cossacks.[2]

The largest Ukrainian group outside the Ukraine, over 3,500,000 strong, inhabits the North Caucasus region where the Ukrainians in certain areas form up to 60 per cent of the total population. Ukrainian nationalists have therefore demanded that the borders of the Ukrainian Republic should be shifted towards the east to include in particular the fertile Kuban area.

The Ukrainian diaspora, particularly in the R.S.F.S.R., was steadily reinforced throughout the inter-war period. Between the 1926 and the 1939 census a considerable number of Ukrainians left the Ukraine to settle in the new industrial centres of Russia proper, thus increasing the Russian-Ukrainian intermixture. Through this migration such typical national Ukrainian provinces as Poltava and Vinnitsa lost within twelve years 15 and 7 per cent, respectively, of their total population.

RUSSIAN DIASPORA IN THE UKRAINE

000 From the point of view of future Ukrainian-Russian relations the existence of the Russian ethnical element in the Ukraine is no less important than the numerous Ukrainian diaspora in the R.S.F.S.R. and in the Central Asiatic Soviet Republics.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

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

The Kyiv State in the 10th and 11th centuries

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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
UKRAINIAN
PRINCIPALITIES
in the XI—XIII C.
0 50 100 150 Miles
0 100 200 Kilometr.
KYIV
Halych
Volyn
Chernihiv
Pereyaslavl
Tmutarakan
Kherson
Dnieper R.
Dniester R.
Don R.
Donets R.
Vistula R.
Prut R.
Sereth R.
Danube R.
Black Sea
Sea of Azov
Crimea
Kuban
Volga
Kama
Ural
Caspian Sea
Aral Sea
Tatar
Polovtsy
Pechenegs
Khazars
Bulgars
Mongols
Lithuania
Poland
Hungary
Moldavia
Wallachia
Byzantine Empire
Asia Minor
Caucasus
Persia
Turkestan
Siberia
Finland
Sweden
Norway
Denmark
Germany
Bohemia
Moravia
Austria
Italy
Sicily
Malta
Crete
Cyprus
Rhodes
Sinai
Palestine
Syria
Mesopotamia
Arabia
Egypt
Libya
Tripoli
Algeria
Tunis
Morocco
Spain
Portugal
France
Britain
Ireland
Iceland
Greenland
Canada
Alaska
Mexico
Cuba
Haiti
Jamaica
Panama
Venezuela
Colombia
Peru
Brazil
Bolivia
Paraguay
Chile
Argentina
Uruguay
Mediterranean Sea
Red Sea
Persian Gulf
Indian Ocean
Pacific Ocean
Atlantic Ocean
Arctic Ocean
Bering Sea
Sea of Japan
Yellow Sea
China Sea
Indonesia
Philippines
Australia
New Zealand
Japan
Korea
Manchuria
Mongolia
Tibet
Afghanistan
India
Burma
Siam
Indochina
Malaya
Sumatra
Java
Borneo
New Guinea
Madagascar
Zanzibar
Kenya
Uganda
Sudan
Abyssinia
Somaliland
Nigeria
Ghana
Liberia
Sierra Leone
Senegal
Mauritania
Sahara
Congo
Angola
Rhodesia
Transvaal
Cape Colony
Natal
Orange Free State
Bechuanaland
Basutoland
Swaziland
Madagascar
Mauritius
Reunion
Seychelles
Socotra
Aden
Muscat
Oman
Yemen
Hejaz
Nejd
Kuwait
Bahrein
Qatar
Trucial Oman
Baluchistan
Sind
Punjab
Rajputana
Gujarat
Deccan
Mysore
Madras
Bengal
Assam
Burma
Siam
Indochina
Malaya
Sumatra
Java
Borneo
New Guinea
Philippines
Australia
New Zealand
Japan
Korea
Manchuria
Mongolia
Tibet
Afghanistan
India

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDI Ukraine RDI



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

following p. 280-A

Handbook of Ukraine.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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Limits of the Ukrainian ethnographical territory, ●●●●●●●●● Limits of the Ukrainian territo

Following p. 280-B

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDI Ukraine RDI

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following p. 280-C

ian territory with mixed population

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD

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Klein u. Volbert, München

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4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

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XVI (A)

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

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

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

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XVI (F)

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XVI (G)

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

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map facing page 11

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

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UNION OF LUBLIN 1569
External boundaries of Rzecz Pospolita
Internal boundaries
Undefined boundaries
SWEDEN
BALTIC SEA
ESTONIA
LIVONIA
KURLAND
Riga
Pskov
Novgorod
Tver
Moscow
Torzhok
Smolensk
Kaluga
Vitebsk
Orsha
Mohilev
Bryansk
Novgorod Seversk
Rylsk
Kursk
Kovno
Vilna
Trakai
Minsk
Grodno
Novogrodek
Kenigsberg
Danzig
Warsaw
Lublin
Kiev
Pereyaslavl
Chernigov
Bratslav
Vinnitsa
Lvov
Halych
Uman
Kamenets
Yaroslav
Cracow
Brest
Pinsk
Volhynia
Podolia
Ukraine
Tatars
Crimea
Sevastopol
Kerch
Kaffa
Azov
Ochakov
Bucharest
Moldavia
Wallachia
Transylvania
Hungary
Carpathian Rus
Carpathians
Bukovina
Galicia
Poland
Lithuania
Grand Duchy of Lithuania
Kingdom of Poland
Silesia
Hapsburg Dominions
Turkey
Khanate
Black Sea
Constantinople
R. Vistula
R. Warta
R. Oder
R. Dniester
R. Prut
R. Danube
R. Volga
R. Oka
R. Dnieper
R. Don
R. Bug
R. Pripyet
R. Dvina
R. Niemen
R. Tisza
R. Seret
R. Boryslaw
R. Dniester
R. Kuban
R. Terek
R. Don
R. Donets
R. Dnieper

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

●102
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EXPANSION OF RUSSIA, 1648-1795

Roman figures denote the order in which the various regions came under Muscovite rule.

Large Arabic figures—the dates when boundaries were constituted.

Small Arabic figures—the dates when towns were founded and their environs settled.

••••••• Definite, ---- Indefinite, boundaries.

I Muscovy, when the Hetman's Ukraine transferred its allegiance in 1648.
II Smolensk and left bank Ukraine, 1667.
III Duchy of Kurland, 1715.
IV Zaporogian Country, 1750–1775.
V Polotsk and East White Russia, 1772.
VI Coast from Bug to Don (New Russia), 1774.
VII Crimea and the Kuban, 1783.
VIII West White Russia to Podolia, 1793.
IX Lithuania and West Volhynia, 1795.

map from
p.133

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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404 (A)

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

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404 (B)

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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135
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404 (C)

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

REGIONS OF THE EAST UKRAINE

- Polessia
- Volhynia-Podolia
- Kiev area
- "Left Bank" (wooded steppe)
- Steppe industrial area
- Southern coastal area
- Donbas

G: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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
THE GREAT UKRAINE
CHAPTER I
NOTE:
State Boundaries
Boundaries of the Great Ukraine
BALTIC SEA
LITHUANIA
Kovno
Vilna
Minsk
Danzig
Berlin
Posen
Warsaw
POLAND
GERMANY
SOVIET RUSSIA
Novgorod Seversky
Putivl
Chernigov
R. PRIPET
Vladimir Volynsky
VOLYNIA
Lublin
Prague
Cracow
BOHEMIA
MORAVIA
Lvov
GALICIA
Tarnopol
PODOLIA
Vinnitsa
Pereiaslavl
Poltava
Kharkov
R. DONETZ
R. DNIEPER
Luganik
Dniepropetrovsk (Ekaterinoslav)
Taporojie
Alexandrovsk
Taganrog
Rostov-on-Don
Mariupol
Nikolaiev
Kherson
Odessa
Tiraspol
Ovidiopol
NORTH TAURIDA
SEA OF AZOV
CRIMEA
Sevastopol
CAUCASUS
BLACK SEA
Kaunas
Danube
SLOVAKIA
Vienna
Budapest
Munich
Zurich
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
Belgrade
YUGOSLAVIA
ITALY
Rome
ADRIATIC SEA
ALBANIA
Sofia
BULGARIA
GREECE
Bucharest
RUMANIA
R. DANUBE
Constantinople
TURKEY

MAP No. 1

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7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1



MAP No. 5

p 151

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

p. 81a

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

page 81 G.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKraine RD1

SU
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U
102

436 [left hand side of map]

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1

Ukraine RD1

SU
102
U
102

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

(Donets Basin is shown in detail on p. 451.)

437 [right hand side of map]

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 RI Soviet Union RI
Ukraine RDL



DONETS BASIN

SU
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List of Names

● 103

Ukrainian	Russian or Polish
Berdychiv	Berdichev
Berestechko	Beresteczko
Berestya	Brest-Litowsk, Brzesc nad Bugiem
Berezhany	Brzezany
Buh	Bug
Chernivtsi	Cernauti
Chernyhiv	Chernigov
Dnipro	Dnepr, (Dnieper)
Dniprodshershinske	Dneprodzershinsk
Dnipropetrovske / Katerynoslav	Dnepropetrovsk / Ekaterinoslav
Dnister	Dnestr, (Dniester)
Halych	Halich
Kamianets-Podilskyj	Kamenets-Podolsk
Kharkiv	Kharkov
Konstantynivka	Konstantinovka
Kremianets	Krzemieniec
Kryvyj Rih	Krivoi Rog
Kyiv	Kiev
Lviv	Lwow, - Lemberg
Mohyliv	Mogilev
Mykolajiv	Nikolaev
Nikopil	Nikopol
Novhorod	Novgorod
Oziv	Sea of Azov
Peremyshl	Przemysl
Proskuriv	Proskurov
Rivne	Rowne - Rovno
Sandomir	Sandomierz
Sevastopil	Sevastopol
Syanik	Sanok
Stanislaviv	Stanislawow
Taganrih	Taganrog
Tarnopil	Tarnopol
Volynia	Wolhynia
Voronizh	Voronezh
Vynnytsia	Vinnitsa
Zaporizha	Zaporozhe
Zhytomyr	Zhitomir

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

464 labour is very fluid in Donbass; an annual turnover of 40–50 per cent is estimated.

Soviet official information concerning the iron-ore industry 135 of Krivoy Rog is probably more reliable than that concerning 316 Donbass. The reserves of iron ore of high quality (40 per cent iron) are reckoned at 1100 million tons; some Ukrainian economists put these in excess of 3000 million tons. Mining in the Krivoy Rog (south-west of Ekaterinoslav and south-east of Elizavetgrad) began in the nineties and attained considerable proportions by the beginning of the present century. For the years 1913–16 average output was about 5 million tons per annum. According to Soviet statistics, output for 1938 was round 18 million tons.

Conditions for the development of metallurgical industry are extraordinarily favourable in New Russia: on one side of the Dniepr coal, and on the other iron. This is not all: along the banks of the Dniepr itself, round Nikopol and Khvochevatka, to the south of the old ground of the Zaporogian *Sech*, are rich mines of manganese, the quality of which is little inferior to that of the Georgian deposits at Chiaturi. According to the estimates of Ukrainian economists, reserves on the Dniepr amount to about 400 million tons: even if these estimates are exaggerated, there can be no doubt that the deposit is one of the most valuable in the world.

The production of the Dniepr manganese mines has risen from 260,000 tons in 1916 to over 1,000,000 tons in 1938. If the U.S.S.R. is the principal world producer, the Ukraine alone ranks before British India and South Africa (from which two latter countries it is worth recalling that Germany imported 585,000 tons in 1937).

The deposits of coal in Donbass, of iron at Krivoy Rog and of manganese round Nikopol are connected by railway lines which function probably more efficiently than any others in U.S.S.R. The juxtaposition of the mineral deposits and the metallurgical plants ensures full loads both ways. Only 18 per cent of Donets coal is exported outside the Ukraine, and only 5 per cent of the iron ore; the balance is consumed by the South Russian industries. Manganese, on the other hand, is exported abroad in large quantities.

325 Important metallurgical plants (70 per cent of the capital of 103 which had been found by French and Belgian houses) existed in the South of Russia prior to the Revolution. In the 'Eastern' (Donets-Azov) group were included the following works: 'The New Russian' (station, Yuzovka, recalling the name of the Welshman Hughes); 'The Russo-Belgian' (Enakievo); 'The Kramatorsky' (Kramatorskaya); 'The Konstantinovsky' (Konstantinovskaya); 'The Donets-Yuriev' (Alchevskaya); 'The Nikopol-Mariupol'

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

(Mariupol); 'The Russian Providence' (near Mariupol); 'The Kerch' (near Kerch). In the 'Western' (Dniepr) group the principal works were: 'The Gdantsev' (Krivoy Rog); 'The Dniepr' (near Ekaterinoslav); 'The Alexandrovsky' (near Alexandrovsk). Almost all these works have continued to function under the Soviets; during the course of the last twenty years some have been considerably enlarged and others modernized. Some have been renamed: e.g. 'Alexandrovsky', now 'Zaporogian Steel'; 'Gdantsev', 'Krivoy Rog'; 'Russian Providence', 'Azov Steel'. These three, particularly, have become very important plants. 325 103

The Ukrainian and New Russian metallurgical industry comprises 45 blast furnaces and 118 open-hearth furnaces. In the twenty-five years between 1913 and 1938 the output of pig iron has been expanded from 3 million to nearly 8 million tons; rolled iron from 1 million to 3 million; steel from 2 to 5 million tons. Thus, the metallurgical industry of Ukraine and New Russia (excluding the rest of U.S.S.R.) ranks fourth in world production of pig iron (after U.S., Germany and Great Britain) and fifth in the production of steel and rolled iron (after U.S., Germany, Britain and France). In 1938 the Ukrainian and New Russian industries produced 55 per cent of all Russian pig iron, 35 per cent of all steel and 25 per cent of all rolled iron. Concentrated within a comparatively limited region the heavy industry of New Russia and the Ukraine constitutes the most highly developed industrial area of the Soviet Union. 327

The Revolutionary régime was fortunate in inheriting a wide area of industrialization which, in the immediate pre-Revolutionary period, had been expensively equipped with modern plants by West European capitalist groups. The régime cannot be considered to have achieved anything remarkable in further development, and had the capitalist system of promotion been allowed to survive it is probable that progress would have been more rapid.

The most spectacular (and widely advertised) achievement of the Soviet régime in the Ukraine has been the construction of the grandiose hydro-electric plant in the neighbourhood of the rapids of the Dniepr (Dnieprostroy). A new source of energy (about 600,000 kilowatts), equivalent to a third of the electric energy produced in the Ukraine, has been made available for industry. Dnieprostroy may, however, be considered as a somewhat redundant reinforcement of the power sources of the country which could only have been undertaken by a régime which was not hampered by considerations of productive yield on capital investment. In view of the vast deposits of coal and anthracite to hand and of the as yet unexplored reserves of lignite, the development of a new source of 377

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

377 energy was not of urgent importance. Dnieprostroy supplies neighbouring towns and industrial plants with light and power (including the new 'Dniepr Electrical-Metallurgical Works' and the 'Dniepr Aluminium Works'), but the electrification of the railways of Soviet Ukraine has not yet been undertaken, nor does this appear necessary in view of the cheap supplies of fuel locally available.

397 As for machine and other mechanical works, there were in
392 existence before 1916: 'Hartmann's Locomotive Works' at Lugansk;
103 the more modern 'Kharkov Locomotive Works' and 'The Electro-Mechanical Works', also at Kharkov; and a series of smaller machine works (particularly for the manufacture of agricultural machinery) at Sumy, Alexandrovsk, Berdyansk, Odessa and Kiev. The Soviet Government considerably enlarged the 'Lugansk Locomotive Works', and recently machine and locomotive works have been in process of construction and subsequent enlargement at Kramatorskaya (in the Donets region). New 'Tractors' Construction Works' have been built in Kharkov. Machinery plants have been founded in Berdyansk and Cherkassy; the old Kiev and Alexandrovsk works have been enlarged; and new agricultural machinery works have been built in Elizavetgrad, Melitopol and Kherson. The shipbuilding works in Nikolaev continue to supply the Black Sea fleet as before the Revolution. There, during the last war, ships were in construction for the Imperial Navy; armour-plate being manufactured in the 'Nikopol-Mariupol Works'.

381 Some progress has been made in the development of a chemical industry based on the abundant supplies of coal in Donbass. There are chemical processing plants at Slavyansk and Lisichansk, and near the railway stations of Gorlovka and Konstantinovka. The industry is still in the experimental stage, but Soviet 'Plans' envisage the supply of 30 per cent of the needs of the home market.

433 The Soviet emphasis on the development of Ukrainian heavy industry and a parallel neglect of the possible expansion of light industries has produced a badly balanced economy in Soviet Ukraine and the country remains dependent on other and often distant parts of the Union for the satisfaction of many of the needs of the people. Political considerations which aim at establishing the complete interdependence of the various parts of the Union are at the basis of the particular direction of the Five Year Plans in the Ukraine. The emigré Ukrainian economist, V. Sadovsky, writes: 'In 1934, 69·4 per cent of industry went to the production of materials and of the tools of production, and only 34·6 per cent for general needs. In this sense the relations existing in 1913 were

CHAPTER I

IMPORTANT FACTS FROM UKRAINIAN HISTORY

The ancient name of the Ukrainian nation was 'Rus' (as a collective name) and 'Rusyn' as the name of the individual. 103

The name Rus was used in the beginning for the tribe of the Polyans near the city of Kiev on the Dnieper River. When the rule of the 'Russian' Princes had spread over other territories inhabited by the ancestors of the Ukrainian nation between the Don River and the Carpathian Mountains, this name was accepted for the whole state. The Finnish tribes on the Oka and Moskva Rivers that were later colonised, gradually took the name 'Rus' as subjects of the 'Rusyns', the Kievan Princes. Usually these territories, united under the rule of the Princes (later Tsars) of Moscow, were called the 'Muscovite State', and the subjects of the Tsar the 'Muscovite people'. The state of the Tsars of Moscow was known in the world as 'Moscoviae Ducatus, Moscovia, Regnum Moscovitarum' etc. At the beginning of the 18th century Tsar Peter I. forbade the official use of the name 'Muscovite State' and ordered his state to be called 'Russia' (from 1721 on 'Russian Empire').

The Ukrainian patriots refused to recognise the name 'Rus' for the Muscovite State for a long time. Thus we read in the anonymous 'Istoriya Rusov' (History of the Ruthenians), written in the second half of the 18th century:

"It is known that we were formerly what the Muscovites are actually (ruling nation, *P. F.*), government, priority, and even the name Rus have passed from us to them, and we are for them like a byword among the heathen".

The word 'Ukraine' is very old. The name 'Rus' was of political origin, it was brought into the territories subordinated to Kiev by the rule of the Princes and the Church hierarchy. The name 'Ukraine' is truly popular. It can be traced back to ancient times in Ukrainian popular songs, in historical tales and legends. In written memorials we find the name of Ukraine in the Hypatian Chronicle, for the first time in 1187: The Prince of Pereyaslav Volodymer died from the wounds he received in a battle against the Polovets (Kuman)

103 nomads "whom Ukraine mourned very much." This popular name gradually supplanted 'Rus'. The nearer to our times, the more the names 'Ukraine', 'Ukrainian' are used*). The name 'Little Russia', which had been used as the official name of Ukraine in Tsarist Russia, was not accepted by the Ukrainian people**).

175 The Ukrainian problem is not new in European history. The Ukrainian nation (Ruthenians), which had lived for millenniums on the territories between the Don River and the Carpathian Mountains, and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, has rendered Europe a great service. The knight armies of the Princes of Kiev, Chernigov, Galicia and Volhynia, in heroic exploits defended their country against the nomad hordes, and for centuries did not allow the wild Asiatic tribes to enter Western Europe. A poetical picture of this struggle gives us the famous 'Discourse of the Campaign of Igor' from the 12th century, in which is described the campaign of the 'Rusychi' of Prince Igor against the steppe horde of the Kumans. The powerful Tartar Horde coming from the interior of Asia destroyed the Ukrainian capital Kiev and other cities, and devastated the country in 1240.

After the destruction by the Tartars in the 13th century the Ukrainian public life was concentrated in Galicia and Volhynia. In the 14th century Galician territory was annexed by the Poles after the dynasty of the Galician Princes, the descendants of Vladimir the Saint, had died out. Volhynia and other parts of the Ukrainian territory weakened and devastated by the Tartars, came under the rule of Lithuanian Princes. The Lithuanian state was the immediate continuation of the political and cultural tradition of the Kievan state. The official language of the Lithuanian state was White-Ruthenian and Ukrainian.

With the coming of the Tartars the complete separation of the northern principalities of the former State of Kiev (Suzdal, Ryazan, Moscow, Tver) from Ukraine took place. Under the rule of the Princes of Moscow who 'collected the country', a peculiar system of a centralised despotic state arose. Of the liberal constitu-

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*) The famous Czech scholar Jan Amos Comenius who had lived for a long time in Poland, wrote in a letter dated 24, 5, 1655: "Polonia nostra tota bellis ardet ... tacebo de remotioribus oris Lithuania et *Ukraina*". *The Correspondence of Comenius. Treatises of the Czech Academy of Science*, Class III, Ann. 1, No. 2, p. 179: Prague 1892.

**) The name 'Little Russia' for Ukraine is of scholarly origin. For the first time (1303) it was used in a paper of the Patriarch of Constantinople for the designation of Ukraine as the Metropolis *(μικρὰ 'Ρωσία)* in contrast to Moscow *(μεγάλη 'Ρωσία)* which formerly was hierarchically subordinated to Kiev.

175 fought against these insubordinate boyars. To break down their defiance, entire cities with all their inhabitants are destroyed. Ambitious Danilo has far-flung plans. He, the tributary prince of the Tatar khan in Sarai on the /35/ Volga, who has a king's crown from the papal city on the Tiber, wants to stretch out his hand to Kiyev, in spite of the fact that his plans of a crusade against the Tatar failed, and that only legates in cowls came instead of well-armed warriors. The khans, however, had long since seen through him; at their command he was obliged to burn down his own fortifications in 1259. Poisoned by the boyars, Danilo dies, and with him ends the Rurik dynasty of Halicz, exactly one hundred years after the destruction of Kiyev.

The history of the Ukraine, the territory on the border*, as the southern regions of the

•[103]

*The name "Ukraine", meaning "borderland", appears for the first time in the chronicle of Nestor, which tells of a prince of Pereiaslav who is killed in 1187 in a battle with the nomads. The chronicle reported that "the Ukraine mourned him a great deal". In the year 1198 there is mention of a "Galician Ukraine" on the Polish border, and in 1215 of a "Ukraine" near Brest Litovsk. In the ceaseless wars of the principalities of the Rus', the various border countries gradually shrink to a single frontier country, the "Ukraine". This name which bears witness to the life of constant danger in these regions, is also in the course of time applied to the indigenous population.

Kiyev Rus began to be called, is from now on for long periods a history of its bondage. Foreign peoples dictate its laws. The country is completely exhausted as a result of the eternal wars of the

114 midable task of presenting the entire economic life in Ukraine in a brief and concise manner, both from the aspect of its development and in its present state. The third section of the book which describes the cultural life of Ukraine, the Church, and the psychological characteristics of the people are products of the writer's pen.

121 The work as a whole has been composed from a historical point of view and includes the period up to the year 1939. It is to be particularly emphasised that it has been necessary to present this complete historical development of Ukrainian public life in order to be able to explain adequately the present situation. This is the first extensive treatise on Ukraine in English and for this reason it appeared advisable to take into account the historical preliminaries of the present. However, it has also seemed wisest not to proceed in the treatment beyond the year 1939, since reliable statistical data are lacking for an authoritative presentation of recent years. During the second World War the Ukrainian territory was so thoroughly devastated by military operations, and so great changes of a political character have taken place, that a correct treatment of the present situation is essentially impossible. To make the matter still more difficult is the fact that the Soviet government, in whose sphere of authority lies the entire native soil of Ukraine, gives out almost no statistics and when any do appear their validity is of a very doubtful character.

● 104 The book has set as its goal the illumination of all aspects of the Ukrainian problem. With the one exeption noted above it has been composed by Ukrainian scholars, and now appears for the public as authentically representative of Ukrainian public opinion. For that reason, it is appropriate that it should render the Ukrainian names, not in the general and customary Russian or Polish transliteration, but in the little known Ukrainian one. We use, therefore, "Chernvhiv" instead of the customary "Chernigov", "Kyiv" instead of the generally known "Kiev", "Lviv" instead of "Lemberg" or "Lwow", etc. However, in order to make the reader familiar with the Ukrainian form of the names, we include with this introduction a list of Ukrainian geographical and proper names in which the Ukrainian and usual

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

transliteration is presented. The rendition of Ukrainian sounds in English transcription is perhaps the weakest aspect of this publication, but the author can hardly avoid this, since up to now there has existed no officially recognised formula for such a rendition. At this juncture, however, I should like to call the reader's attention to one item, namely the ending of the masculine Ukrainian name "yj" as in "Khmelnytskyj", or "Tarnovskyj", for example. The ending in "y" alone does not accurately render the English sound, but we have for aesthetic reasons not given it as "yy", and have kept the form "yj", whereby it must be clearly emphasised, however, that this "j" in Slavic names must be pronounced not like an English "j" but like a Latin "i" or Greek "jota". Also, for example, the name of the city "Kyiv" consists of two syllables "Ky-iv".

Inasmuch as this book is not designed for a particular country such as America or Canada, but for the entire world and has only employed English as one of the recognised world languages Professor Dyminskyj, in the calculations of his section on economics, has employed the European system of measures. However in order to facilitate the orientation for readers of other continents we include a table of equivalent measures which permits the conversion, in a simple fashion, of European measures into the American or Canadian.

I am entirely aware that various aspects of this book might be improved; but, as has been said, the better is the enemy of the good we have above all, for reasons of time, found it desirable to effect the publishing of the book in such manner as was feasible under prevailing circumstances.

The work has involved considerable effort and labor. To all who have so helpfully collaborated with me in its production are tendered my hearty thanks. I am especially obliged to the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee at Munich and its Director Roman Smook, who contributed greatly towards a speedy publication of the work.

J. Mirchuk

111 RD1 Ukraine

1: Reshetar, John S. Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox Church. The American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. X, pp. 38-49. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.

Yale: A89. Am 35795. 10 - 11.

[This article presents a chronological description of the struggle between the Russian Orthodox Church with its Patriarchate in Moscow and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church movement. The article describes the revival of religious nationalism in the Ukraine during the German occupation and discusses the domination of the Church by the Soviet State--Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst Michael Lazna

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955

111 RD1 Ukraine

2: Timoshenko, Woldemar. Ukraine and Russia. Washington, D. C.: Friends of Ukraine, 1919.

Pp. 16

Yale: Nc95. R7. 1

[This is a brief discussion of economic relations between Russia and the Ukraine, early in the 20th century. It examines the contentions for mutual dependence and presents figures on Ukrainian production and export to Russia of grain, coal and iron. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Angelica Baumann

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4, 5
Processed in 1955

3: Mirchuk, I. ed. Ukraine and Its People: a Handbook with Maps, Statistical Tables and Diagrams. Munich: Ukrainian Free University Press, 1949.

Pp. xii, 280; maps; tables; diagrams; bibliography; index.

Yale: Bw51.Uk7.949m.

[This handbook gives extensive information on all aspects of Ukrainian life, although from the nationalistic point of view. The book consists of three main parts: 1. Country and people; 2. Economic; and 3. Cultural life. All three parts are compiled from articles that were contributed by various specialists. The chapter on Ukrainian economy contains many good charts, tables and surveys. The sources for this statistical material, however, are not stated. A comprehensive bibliography refers to further material on the subject. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Ingrid B. Wagner

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955

111 RD1 Ukraine

4: Allen, W. E. D. The Ukraine: A History. Cambridge: University Press, 1941.

Pp. xvi, 404; 5 maps.

Yale: Bw5lu.190. copy 2.

[Written against the background of the broader trends of European history, this book provides information on the political, social, economic and cultural history of the Ukraine. The author discusses all aspects of the Ukrainian Separatist movements. He also emphasizes the artificial and academic character of these movements and the responsibility of their leaders for a lamentable failure to gain their objectives during the Soviet Revolution in 1917. Bibliographical references and additions to the text appear at the end of each chapter. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Dragan Zivanovic

Evaluation: Historian 4
Processed in 1955

111 RD1 Ukraine RD1

5: Manning, Clarence A. Ukraine Under the Soviets. New York: Bookman Associates, 1953.

Pp. 223

Yale: Bw51 Uk7 953M

[This is a detailed history of the Ukraine under Soviet domination from 1917 to 1953. It traces both the Ukrainian nationalist struggle to gain political and cultural independence, and also Soviet policies of subjugation and oppression designed to eradicate all manifestations of the former. Militant Communism, NEP, Five Year Plans, the Famine of the early 1930's, trials and purges are discussed at length. There is also detailed treatment of the occupation of the Ukraine by Russia, Germany, and Poland before, during and after World War II, and several chapters are devoted to cultural and religious developments. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Angelica Baumann

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955

111 Ukraine RD1

6: Armstrong, John A. Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.

Pp. xv, 322

HRAF copy

[This source deals in detail with Ukrainian nationalism during the years of 1939 and 1945. The author treats nationalism as a political movement aiming at the establishment of an independent state, and describes the efforts of nationalists both within and outside of the Ukraine to achieve this goal. The history of the nationalist parties is traced and the diverse social elements of the movement are described. An appendix listing the populations of Ukrainian cities, a bibliography, and eight maps are included.. Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Cory Berman

Evaluation: Social Scientist - 4
Processed in 1955

7: Bregy and Obolensky. The Ukraine--A Russian Land. London: Selwyn and Blount, 1940.

Pp. 260; 5 maps

Yale: BW51. UK7. 939Bg.

[This book, written before World War II and therefore somewhat dated in material and presentation, attempts to define both the political and geographical boundaries of the Ukraine. The authors discuss Ukranian history, transportation, economic capacity and production, population, and growth of the cultural level and education. Political movements and the structure of the government are also considered. It is the thesis of the authors that, in order to survive, the Ukraine must permanently ally herself with Russia. -- Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: June Orloff

Evaluation: Historian--4, 5
Processed in 1955

111. RD1 Ukraine

8: Fedenko, Panas. Ukraine, the Struggle For Freedom. Augsburg, Germany: Free Ukraine, 1951.

Pp. viii, 80, 1 map

Yale: Bw-1951-f

[This book presents a detailed account of the Ukrainian struggle for independence between 1917 and 1951. It covers Soviet policies of terrorism and repression, enforced famines and economic exploitation. It discusses the Ukraine under foreign rule (Polish and German) and her role during World Wars I and II. An entire section is devoted to Ukrainians outside the Soviet Union. The introductory chapter contains historical background information from the 12th to the 20th century. -- Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Angelica Baumann

Evaluation: Historian- 4, 5
Processed in 1955

111 RD1 Ukraine

9: Prothero, G. W. The Ukraine. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1920.

Pp. vi, 110

Yale: BW51 u. 277

[This source deals with the geographical, historical, religious, political, economic and social conditions of the Ukraine, and the development of Ukrainian nationalism prior to 1920 . It was originally prepared by the British Foreign Office as a handbook to provide information for their delegates to the Peace Conference after World War I. --- Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: C. Harvey

Evaluation: Government Official-4
Processed in 1955

111 RD1 Ukraine

10: Weinstein, Harold R. Language And Education In The Soviet Ukraine. The Slavonic And East European Review, American Series I, Vol. XX, pp. 124-148. Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company, 1941.

Yale: A88. S1 16-v. 20-21

[This is a study primarily of the linguistic phases of Soviet educational policy in the Ukraine during 1917-1940. It traces the program of Ukrainization in the schools (as evidenced by the prescribed use of the Ukrainian language) from its inception in 1919, through its reenforcement during the mid-1920's and the application of high pressure in 1932, to its condemnation as "over-Ukrainization" in 1933. Definite trends towards renewed Russification are shown to have existed by 1939. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Angelica Baumann

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955

11: Obermaier, Franz Ukraine Land der schwarzen Erde. [Ukraine, Land of the Black Earth]. Vienna: Wiener Verlagsgesellschaft 1942.

HRAF MS: Pp. 205: 14 plates, 12 maps, 1 end map.

Yale: Bw51. Uk7. 942o

Translated from the German for the Human Relations Area Files by Frieda Schütze.

[The above work, written in a narrative style, is concerned primarily with the political struggles of the Ukrainian peoples. Within the geographical area now known as the Ukrainian SSR, and beginning with the Varangian princes, the author has provided an historical sketch of the people who have lived and are living there. This sketch includes a treatment of the varying political developments of Galicia and the national aspirations of its people. The Author has dwelth in considerable length on the Civil War period after 1917, when Ukrainian independence movements were particularly successful. In the subsequent Bolshevik period he considers the political, sociological,

11: Obermaier, Frank

economic and industrial aspects of the Ukraine as determined by Russian communist policy.

There are some general sociological, agricultural, religious and demographical references and a discussion of topography, soil and mineral resources. Certain sociological, ethnic and political stereotypes damage considerably the overall worth of the book. For instance, his treatment of the Jews in the Ukraine and of the Russians and Poles is emotional and unqualifiedly hostile.

The accompanying maps present the various boundary changes in the history of the Ukraine and show the agricultural zones, railroad communications and the trade incidence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic with the Soviet Union generally--analyst]

Field date: no date
Analyst: Robert Karlowich

Evaluation: Journalist 3
Processed in 1955

12: Buraček, M. Von Die darstellende Kunst der Ukraine. [Fine Arts in the Ukraine.] Slavische Rundschau, Vol. II, Pp. 401-403. Berlin-Leipzig-Prag: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1930.

Yale: B35. SL183. 2. [HRAF MS: Pp. 1-4]

[This is a short account of Ukrainian fine arts as of 1930 including material on artists' associations and their activities, plus a discussion of predominant styles--Analyst.]

Field date: none
Analyst: Robert Karlowich

Evaluation: Artisan-4, 5
Processed in 1956

15: Pap, Michael. Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine. The Review of Politics, Vol. xiv, pp. 204-232. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1952.

Yale: Oa10.R31.14

[This article has as its central theme the resistance that the Ukranian people have evinced towards Russian authority. The author describes the formation and functioning of an independent Ukranian government in 1917. After the Ukraine was officially declared to be under Russian rule, there was a cleavage between Russians and Ukrainians which extended even to an internal split in the Communist party. The author claims that there is still a strong feeling of nationalism which will continue to assert itself in the Ukraine--Analyst]

Field date: no date
Analyst: June Orloff

Evaluation: Social Scientist - 4, 5
Processed in 1955

111 RD1 Ukraine

16: American Russian Institute. Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of January 30, 1937 As Amended Through November 21, 1949. New York: American Russian Institute, April 1950.

Pp. ii, 16.

Yale: Osf23. + 950c. 2.

[This is a translation, without comment, of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR. Similarities and differences between the various constitutions of the 16 constituent republics of the USSR are discussed in 70: American Russian Institute, R1 Soviet Union, category 116. --Analyst]

Field date: none Processed in 1955
Analyst: Robert Karlowich

17: UNRRA. Economic Rehabilitation in the Ukraine. Operational Analysis Papers No. 39, Division of Operational Analysis. London: UNRRA European Regional Office, April 1947.

Pp. vi, 79; xxix tables.

Yale: Nvb31+Un32k. 39.

[This is a factual account of the effects of World War II on the economy and living conditions in the Ukraine and of the large-scale program of reconstruction carried on with United Nations assistance throughout 1946 to date of writing. After providing basic summary data on the Ukraine SSR, the report discusses both pre-war and postwar farming, the extent of wartime damage to industry and transport, and the provisions of the Soviet 1946-1950 Five-Year Plan. The final section describes in detail the organization and operation of the rehabilitation programs, the delivery and distribution of relief and medical supplies, the system of food marketing, and living and housing standards prevailing at the time. This report is based on information provided by the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine and by the government to which it was accredited--Analyst]

Field date: no date
Analyst: Jack Crane

Evaluation: Government, 4
Processed in 1956

20:Koenig, Samuel. Magical Beliefs and Practices among the Galician Ukrainians. Folk-Lore, Vol. XLVIII, March 1937, pp. 59-91. London: published for the Folk-Lore Society by D. Nutt.

Yale: Nkd 68; R7,1,1937

[This article covers in a lively manner the popular concepts in Galician Ukraine, of witches and demons and their activities in the every day life of the people; means to counteract them; activities of sorcerers, soothsayers, hail-men, and rain-men; and popular theories concerning the origins of various diseases and magical ways to cure them. The footnotes contain references to other sources. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Mary Vorobiov

Evaluation: Ethnologist--4
Processed in 1955

111 RD1 Ukraine

21: Koenig, Samuel. Beliefs Regarding the Soul and the Future World Among the Galician Ukrainians. Folk-Lore, Vol. XLIX, June 1938, pp. 157-161.

Yale: Nkd68. R7. 1. 1938.

[In addition to an interesting although brief treatment of the subject matter described in the title, the article discusses funerals and attitudes associated with them. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Robert Karlowich

Evaluation: Ethnologist--4
Processed in 1955

111 RD1 Unkraine

22: Koenig, Samuel. Supernatural Beliefs Among the Galician Ukrainians. Folk-Lore, Vol. XLIX, September 1938, pp. 270-276.

Yale: Nkd68 R7 1 1938

[The above article is primarily a delineation of the ghost-derived spirits that exist among the Galician Ukrainians. The powers attributed to them by the peasants are also considered and there is a short paragraph on fetishes. References to the influence of these beliefs on social thought are slight. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Robert Karlowich

Evaluation: Ethnologist--4
Processed in 1955

111 RD 1 Ukraine

23: Koenig, Samuel. Beliefs and Practices Relating to Birth and Childhood among the Galician Ukrainians. Folk-Lore, Vol. L, September, 1939, pp. 272-286. London. Published for the Folklore Society, by D. Nutt.

Yale: Nkd68. R7. /. 1939

[This is an extensive discussion of taboos and rituals connected with pregnancy and childbirth, christening ceremonies, and, to a lesser extent, childhood in Galician Ukraine. In the footnotes there are references to other sources. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Mary Vorobiov

Evaluation: Ethnologist--4
Processed in 1955

24: Cech, Jan and J. E. Mellon. Czechoslovakia: Land of Dream and Enterprise. Tottenham, London: Lawrence Press Ltd., 1944.

Pp. 184; preface by Wickham Steed; 148 illustrations; fold-out map; index.

Yale: Edkm. 938D

[This source on Czechoslovakia contains one chapter (pp 158-170) on Carpathian Ruthenia which has been exerpted for the Ukrainian File. In spite of its appearance as what might be called footnote material in a source largely devoted to another area, this chapter contains good summary material on pre-World War II Ruthenia. The rest of the source appears in the Czechoslovakia File as source #14.
The source was analyzed for the Files by K.A.Terry.
Field date: no date Evaluation: S-2.]

113, 539 Ukraine RD1

[For a brief analysis of the texts of old Ukrainian folk songs see 7:Lineva, RF1 Great Russia, category 116, pp. 47-51.]

113, 533 Ukraine RD1

[For information pertaining to the musical form of Ukrainian songs, see 7: Lineva, RF1 Great Russia, category 116, p. 62.]

[For bibliographical references on the Ukraine, see 17: UNRRA, RD1 Ukraine, cat. 116, footnotes entire source]

[For information pertaining to the Ukrainian language, see 22: Matthews, R1 Soviet Union, category 116; pp. 118-119.]

113, 175, 795, 474

Ukraine RD1

[For information pertaining to Soviet policies in the Western Ukraine, particularly in regard to the Uniate Church and collectivization, see 26: Anonymous, R1 Soviet Union, Cat. 116.]

113, 13

Ukraine RD1

/For data on the physical geography, geology, climate, flora, fauna and soil of the forest steppe of the Ukraine, see 58: Berg, R1 Soviet Union, cat. 116, pp. 68-89. -- Analyst. /

113, 13 Ukraine RD1

/For data on the physical geography, geology, climate, flora, fauna and soil of the steppe of the Ukraine, see 58: Berg, R1 Soviet Union, cat. 116, pp. 90-110. --Analyst/

113, 642 Ukraine RD1

[For comparisons of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of January 30, 1937 as amended through November 21, 1949 with other constitutions of the Soviet Union, see 70: American Russian Institute, R1 Soviet Union, category 116.]

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

● 113
814

Several Ukrainian grammars have appeared in German, e. g. "Studien auf dem Gebiete der ruthenischen Sprache" (Studies in Ruthenian) by P. Ogonovski, Lemberg 1880. St. Smal-Stotskyj and Th. Gärtner wrote the "Grammatik der ruthenischen Sprache" (Ruthenian Grammar), Vienna 1913. Two books that served practical purposes were M. Simovych's "Grammatik zum Selbstunterricht" (Grammar for Home Students) and Jaroslav Rudnytskyj's "Lehrbuch der ukrainischen Sprache" (Course in Ukrainian), Leipzig 1940.

B. Hrinchenko compiled the most important dictionary: "Slovar ukraijinskoji movy", Kyiv 1907—1909. The Russian-Ukrainian dictionary published under the auspices of the Ukrainian Academy by A. Krymskyj and S. Jefremov is said to be the best of its kind: "Rosijsko-ukraijinskyj slovnyk" (to the letter P) Kyiv, 1924—1928. A large Ukrainian-German dictionary appeared in 1943. It was compiled by Z. Kuzela and J. Rudnytskyj with the collaboration of Prof. Dr. K. H. Meyer and published by the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at Berlin. V. Kmitsykevych and V. Spilka published a German-Ukrainian dictionary (Czernovitz 1912); others were published by I. Sharovolskyj (Kyiv 1931) and H. Nakonetshna (Leipzig 1939).

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

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3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

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● 113 Kuziela Z., Die ukrainische Emigration in Amerika und ihre Bedeutung für das Mutterland, Der nahe Osten, II. Heft 10 und 11, Berlin 1928.

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a combination of Mongol and earlier Polovtsy elements, was established behind the Volga and on the old ground of the Khazars. 175*

The date of the destruction of Kiev by the Mongols can be considered as the date marking the end of the period when 'meridial' forces linked the north and south of Russia together. In the thirteenth century the pressure from the east had become incomparably greater than it had been during the eleventh and twelfth centuries; it had overwhelmed the Russia of the fluvial states. A reaction against the pressure from the east was coming and it came, naturally, from the west. But the western forces, as those from the east, acted in a 'latitudinal' direction and tended to be destructive of any renewal of 'meridial' development.(15)

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(4) *On the Khazars*

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(6) *On the term 'Rus' in Western sources*

In the St Bertin Annals of the year 839 Bishop Prudentius writes about certain men who accompanied the envoys of the Emperor Theophilus on an embassy to the Emperor Louis the Pious: 'qui se, id est gentem suam, Rhos vocari dicebant, quos rex illorum, Chacanus vocabulo, ad se amicitiae, sicut asserebant, causa direxerat.' When the Emperor Louis began to ask who they were, he gathered from their answers that they were Swedes: 'comperit eos gentis esse Sueonum.' *M.G.H.* I, p. 434.

Luitprand of Cremona, about the year 970, writes: 'Rusios, quos alio nomine Nordmannos appellamus.'

In Arab sources

Numerous Arab writers mention 'Rus' or the 'King of Rus' or the Rus 'Kagan' (e.g. Ibn Rusta and Gardizi). The latter: 'Many men among the Slavs go over to the Rus and serve them in order to be under their protection.'

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(8) *On the Nomads and Kiev*

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175 For an understanding of the role of the Altaian nomads in medieval Russia it is essential to read Boswell's brilliant study. 'The Arabs and the Georgians alone called the Kipchaks by their proper name. It appears in Western sources for the first time in Edrisi, who refers to the original Kipchak in Asia, after a detailed description of Comania. While the Greeks called the Kipchaks "Comans" the Saxons of Transylvania called them Valvi, or Falben, i.e. "sallow people". The Russians called them Pólovtsy, which some philologists derive from *polóvy* (*pálevy*), "sallow", but which is generally taken to mean "steppe folk" from *pole*, "field", i.e. it is a translation of the Turkish "Kipchak". (These Kipchaks should be distinguished from the Golden Horde, V, p. 42.)

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'The main facts of Cuman history are quite clear, and their importance is undeniable. It is difficult to conceive of a successful Mongol penetration of Central Europe, if a great part of Eastern Europe had not been peopled by a Turkish folk not undisposed to welcome distinguished invaders with similar Turanian traditions of nomadic life, of rapacity and of unity under a despot. 175-*

'Kiev, Pereyaslavl and Chernigov lay near the southern frontier and were permanently exposed to the incursions of the crafty Turks. For their periodic migrations north and south they found the rich pastures of the Ozu, as they called the Dniepr, most congenial; and on the rich grasslands up the river, they found the Russians firmly established and beginning to practise agriculture. The eternal struggle of settled and pastoral folk was long and obstinate in this region, and the Kipchaks came to regard the capital of this coveted territory, Menkerman, "the great city" (as they called Kiev) as the centre of their world.'

After the victories of Vladimir Monomakh, according to Boswell, large numbers of the nomads left the steppe and transferred their allegiance to the Russian princes. They settled in parts of Chernigov and all over the lands of Pereyaslavl. 'In the usual Turkish fashion these petty tribes soon became merged in a new federation of Turks, who took the name of Karakalpaks or Blackcaps.'

'They even became an important factor in Russian political life; and we find the election of a prince carried out not only by Russians, but "by the Russian land and the Blackcaps". It is a matter for debate whether the exodus of Russian peasants to the north-east was not due to the peaceful penetration of these barbarians, as much as to the external pressure of the Kipchaks. In the bitter civil strife of the twelfth century, a Russian prince found these mobile horsemen more valuable subjects than the peaceful Russian peasants. The changed conditions on the frontier stand out sharply when we find a Blackcap Khan like Kuntuvdey invested with a Russian appanage on the River Ros. Finally at the time of the Mongol invasion we hear of a shadowy Izyaslav of Chernigov who is purely a Turkish chieftain. The process was inevitable, and no one can doubt that the weakening of the Russian element in the south was an accomplished fact before the Mongol conquest.... Apart from ancient cities like Tmutarakan, Oleshye, Cherson and Caffa, which were for a time Slav, and became Greek and then Genoese, we see the rise of a mixed population in the steppes, like the Cossacks of later times. The princes of Berlad and Bolkhov and the Brodniki of the Upper Don and of Moldavia represent semi-Slav communities with an admixture of Turk, Roumanian and other nationalities.'

The latest work is by D. A. Rasovski, *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, vols. VII–XI, 1935–40, 'Polovtsy'. 113●

(9) *On the Russian Chronicles*

Shakhmatov, A. *Rozyskaniya o Drevneyshikh Russkikh Letopisnykh Svodakh* (Researches concerning the oldest Russian Corpuses of Chronicles). Also his critical edition of 'The Record of Passing Years', Petersburg, 1916.

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•113 Chronicles existed in Russia at a very early date. The most ancient Kievan Corpus dates from 1039, and the Novgorod Chronicle from 1017; the oldest Polish Chronicle from the end of the eleventh century, and the oldest Hungarian ones from the thirteenth century. The most ancient Russian Chronicles are only known in copies of a later period; the Lavrentiev copy of 1377, and the Ipatiev of the first quarter of the fifteenth century. In the Ipatiev copy the chronicle of events in South Russia is continued until 1292.

(10) *On the Right of the Princes*

Presnyakov, A. *Knyazhee Pravo v Drevney Rusi* (The Prince's Right in Ancient Russia), Petersburg, 1909.

The chief Prince, whether of Kiev or later of Moscow or Lithuania, is often called in the west 'Grand Duke', but 'Great Prince' best renders his title of *Veliki Knyaz'*, *Wielki Książę*.

(11) *On Byzantium and the Kievan State*

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(12) *On Novgorod and Pskov*

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(13) *On the Rise of the Principality of Vladimir-Suzdal*

In addition to the standard Russian histories mentioned above see:

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(14) *On the Relations between Church and State in Medieval Russia*

Goetz, L. *Staat und Kirche in Altrussland (988–1240)*, Berlin, 1928.

(15) *On the Mongol Invasion*

The Mongol Invasion was described by a contemporary under the title of 'The Tale of the Ruin of the Russian Land'. Unfortunately only a small fragment has been preserved. It is in the spirit of 'The Tale of Igor's Host'.

For a recent summary, see H. T. Cheshire, 'The Great Tartar Invasion of Europe', in *Slavonic Review*, vol. v, no. 13.

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For an appreciation of the relations of Lithuania, South Russia and Poland with neighbouring countries during the period under review the following chapters of the *Cambridge Mediaeval History* should also be consulted:

Vol. VI, Bruce-Boswell, A., 'Poland (1050–1303)'; vol. VII, *idem*, 'The Teutonic Order'; vol. VIII, *idem*, 'Poland and Lithuania in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries'.

The following general works also contain excellent chapters on the historical role of Poland and Lithuania during the period under review:

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(1) *On the Destruction of Kiev and the Devastation of Kievan lands by the Tartars*

Ukrainian historians (e.g. Doroshenko) endeavour to deny the complete devastation of Kiev and Kievan lands after the invasion of Batu in 1240. Here their views are in direct opposition to those of Polish and Russian historians. In 1857 M. Maksimovich went so far as to compose a work 'On the supposed devastation of Ukraina by Batu's invasion'. This tendency of Ukrainian historians is explained by the desire to establish that Ukraina was not re-peopled by newcomers from the west during the sixteenth century, and that the majority of the population of the land is descended from those 175*

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175* who had survived the Mongol devastations. The view is not, however, really confirmed by Ukrainian historians themselves, in that they describe facts concerning the conditions in the Dniepr region during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries which justify the 'immigration theory'.

(2) *On the West Russian State in Galicia*

● 113 Dashkevich, N. *Knyazhenie Daniila Galitskago po Russkim i Inostrannym Istochnikam* (The Reign of Daniel of Galicia according to Russian and Foreign Sources), Kiev, 1873.

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(3) *On Daniel of Galicia*

175* The personality of Daniel of Galicia appears to have been attractive, although he did not prove to be one of the great leaders of his difficult time. 'Courageous and fearless, generous and kind-hearted to the point of being naive, Daniel was a politician least of all' (Shmurlo). Tomashivsky calls Daniel 'an intelligent, chivalrous, cultured, humane and energetic prince'.

(4) *On the Galician Chronicle*

The principal source for the history of Galicia and Volhynia in the thirteenth century is the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, an anonymous work which embraces the period from 1209 to 1292. The Chronicle is written in a vivid and rather flowery style. It contains many picturesque episodes, and is ornamented with poetical comparisons and allegories which indicate that the author was familiar with Classical and European medieval literature.

The chronicler writes with sympathy of Prince Daniel and refers thus to his relations with the *boyars*: 'The Galician *boyars* called Daniel their Prince but in reality they ruled the whole land themselves.'

(5) *On the Annexation of Galicia to Poland*

Doroshenko writes: 'In the fourteenth century Galicia was politically disorganized, and, though culturally on the same level as Poland, was much weaker than the latter. She lacked inner stability and suffered from the feuds of the *boyars* and the absence of a strong central power.'

Until 1434–5 the Poles allowed the old order of things to remain (*tempus juris Ruthenorum*). After 1430, however, Jagiello granted to the Galician nobility the same privileges as were enjoyed by the Polish nobility. At the same time the Polish King began to grant wide lands in Galicia to his Polish favourites, and the Galician *boyars* came under the influence of and were rapidly absorbed into the world of their Polish neighbours. 'A great part of them were swept away by the wave of Polish colonization and returned to

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their primary origin—the people' (Efimenko). In the sixteenth century, according to Hrushevsky, there remained no noble Galician families who retained their Russian or Ukrainian nationality. At the same time as the Polish gentry were overflowing the countryside, the towns were being populated by Germans and Jews. Under the Magdeburg Law municipal power was in the hands of the Catholics—Poles and Germans. The former Russian urban population was gradually eliminated from the towns and lost among the peasantry. (See A. Halban, *Zur Geschichte d. Deutschen Rechts in Podolien, Volhynien und Ukraina*, Berlin, 1896.)

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(6) *On the Rivalry between Muscovy and the Russo-Lithuanian State*

The rivalry between Olgerd and Dmitri Donskoy did not prevent Russo-Lithuanian detachments—who were much better trained than the Muscovite militia of the day—from taking part against the Tartars on the famous field of Kulikovo. A decisive role was played in the battle by a certain 'Volhynian *Voyevode* Bobrok', who was the initiator of the manœuvre which decided the day in favour of the Russians.

An original view is taken of the relations between Lithuania and Muscovy by a group of Russian historians and publicists who call themselves 'Eurasians'. The ideology of the Eurasians is based on the affirmation that the Moscow State owed the whole of its interior structure and rapid external expansion to the example of 'the great Mongolian Empire'. Russia is considered only as a projection of the 'Eurasian State' created by the Mongols. In the opinion of the Eurasian school, the Mongols who defeated Vitovt in 1399 rendered Russia a great service because they undermined 'the pressure of Latinism in the East'. (See articles by Trubetskoy, Savitski, Vernadski and others, and for a summary of the Eurasian theory see article by Prince D. S. Mirsky in *Slavonic Review*, vol. VI, no. 17.)

(7) *On Vitovt*

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Idem. Vitovt: Poslednie 20 let Knyazhenya (Vitovt: the Last Twenty Years of his Rule), Petersburg, 1891.

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In *C.M.H.*, vol. VIII, Bruce-Boswell gives a good description of the campaign of Grünwald-Tannenberg. 'The complete army was of imposing size and unusual diversity. Alongside the Polish knights and the clan groups, each with its common arms and slogan, rode thousands of Tartars under Soldan, soon to be Khan of the Golden Horde. Martial Lithuanians marched side by side with sturdy Czech mercenaries who were destined to astonish the world. The model of Polish chivalry, Zawisza the Black, was in striking contrast to the turbulent Russian *boyars* or the rude skin-clad Samogitians.'

(8) *On Tokhtamish and Tamerlane*

Articles in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* under names Tokhtamish and Timur Leng by W. Barthold and L. Bouvat respectively. The latter erroneously states that Tamerlane 'occupied Moscow for over a year'.

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For the influence of events in Georgia and the Caucasus on Tamerlane's movements in Kipchak, see W. E. D. Allen, *History of the Georgian People*, where the connection between Tamerlane's campaigns in Georgia and his policy in Kipchak and Turkey is not sufficiently emphasized, and V. F. Minorsky, 'Transcaucasica', in *Journal Asiatique*, 1930, Juillet–Sept. pp. 41–111.

Tokhtamish, originally a lieutenant of Tamerlane, appeared from behind the Volga with a part of the Kirghiz 'Blue Horde'. He completed the downfall of Mamay after the defeat of the latter at Kulikovo in 1380. In 1382 he sacked Moscow. According to contemporary sources he was a just and vigorous ruler; he is also said to have been a handsome man (Barthold). In the years following his usurpation of the Golden Horde and his defeat of Dmitri Donskoy, he came into conflict with Tamerlane in Central Asia (Khvarism) and in the eastern Caucasus. Tamerlane, in his campaign of 1395, reached the region of the upper Don; and he rendered a signal service to the Muscovites when he devastated the encampments of the Blue Horde and destroyed Saray on the Volga—the old capital of the Golden Horde. The Kirghiz Blue Horde did not rally after the blow, and retired first beyond the Volga, and later behind the Ural.

The empire of the Golden Horde which Béréké established had lasted for a little over a century. In the fifteenth century, following the attacks of Tamerlane, it became divided into three parts governed by three different Khans—The Golden Horde proper (Kazan), the Crimea, and Nogay (with a capital at Astrakhan).

(9) *Casimir the Jagiellon*

He showed tolerance towards the Greek Orthodox Church. In the chapel of the Holy Cross in the cathedral of Cracow—where his grave is—there are frescoes dating from the end of the fifteenth century painted by Russian masters in the Russo-Byzantine style. Similar frescoes can be seen in Lublin, Sandomierz and other Catholic churches in Poland of the fifteenth–sixteenth centuries.

(10) *On the Discovery of 'Moscovia'*

'The Discovery' of 'Moscovia' was first made by Ritter Poppel and other foreigners, mostly military men, during the reign of Ivan III (1462–1505). Until his visit there, Poppel regarded 'Moscovia' as a remote dependency of the Polish kings.

The most celebrated description of the period is that of Sigismund von Herberstein, who was sent on two missions (1517 and 1526) to the court of Vasili III. His book was published only in 1549.

The German powers soon became conscious of the possibilities of exploiting antagonism between Muscovy and Poland. In the first decade of the sixteenth century the Hohenzollern Grand Master of the Teutonic Order was sending arms and military organizers to Moscow; while, at the Congress of Vienna in 1515, the Poles were concerned to secure the withdrawal of Habsburg support from Vasili III. In the seventies of the sixteenth century the intrigues of the city of Danzig with Ivan IV forced the intervention of the Polish king Stephen Báthory, and in 1581, Ivan, after the victories of Báthory in Russia, sought the intervention of both the Emperor and the Pope.

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(11) *On the Muscovite Tsars as 'Descendants of Augustus' and on the Lithuanians as 'Italians'*

The Lithuanians shared with Ivan III a desire to seek ancestors in the Classical world. At Lutsk, in 1429, during Vitovt's entertainment of the Emperor Sigismund, the Lithuanian nobles declared to the Emperor that 'the Poles were not nobles before but just simple folk who had bought their coats of arms from the Czechs, while the Lithuanian nobility was the old Roman nobility, their ancestors having come from Italy'. The chronicler relates that the Emperor replied that 'we know ourselves that you are the descendants of the old Roman nobles'. (*Chronicle of Bykhovets*, cited by Lappo.) 113 175

(12) *On the Lithuanian Statute*

The first Lithuanian Statute was established in the year 1529. Considerable alterations were introduced into the second version published in the year 1566. It was only then that the political and social privileges of the Lithuanian gentry were definitely confirmed. After the Lublin Union other alterations in the Statute became necessary, and its last and final version was approved by Stephen Báthory and adopted in the year 1588. All three texts of the Lithuanian Statute were written in Russian.

(13) *On the Union of Lublin*

Maksimeyko, N. *Seymy Litovsko-Russkago Gosudarstva do Lublinskoy Unii* (The *Seyms* of the Russo-Lithuanian State to the Union of Lublin), Kharkov, 1902.

Halecki, O. *Dzieje Unii Jagiellońskiej* (History of the Jagellonian Union), Cracow, 1919–20.

Kutrzeba, S. *Unia Polska z Litvą* (The Union of Poland and Lithuania), Cracow, 1914.

The Minutes of the Lublin *Seym* were written in Russian.

(14) *On 'Rzecz Pospolita'* (= *Res publica*)

The Lublin Union of 1569 created out of the Kingdom of Poland and the Great Principality of Lithuania (and the Duchy of East Prussia) one common state 'Rzecz Pospolita'. The fusion of two different states and two different dominant nationalities was completed. A single ruler, the King of Poland, who was at the same time Great Prince of Lithuania, was elected in full session by the *Rada* (Senate), and the nobility of Poland and Lithuania. During his coronation at Cracow he confirmed the rights and privileges of both nations, the Poles and the Russo-Lithuanians, and swore to maintain those rights and privileges. But the Russo-Lithuanian state (with the exception of the Ukrainian provinces which were severed from it and incorporated in Poland) retained a separate administration, its own seal, its Lithuanian Statute, and its separate army and budget. 'One cannot but note the vital contradiction at the basis of which are two absolutely opposite ideas—of a unitary and of a federative state. This was the result of the contradictory tendencies and wishes brought to the Lublin *Seym* by the representatives of Poland and of the Russo-Lithuanian state' (Lappo).

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who was still on the right bank of the Dniepr, was expected. He arrived on 6 January, accompanied by the Cossack General Secretary Vyhovsky and many colonels and *starosty*. On the following day Khmelnytsky visited the Muscovite envoys 'quite privately'. On the 8th all the colonels and *starosty* gathered at Khmelnytsky's quarters for a secret council, and later in the day the *Rada* met, when a great number of Cossacks of different ranks and callings were present. The Hetman made a speech at which he stated that a choice had to be made between the four monarchs—the King of Poland, the Sultan of Turkey, the Khan of the Crimea and the Tsar of Muscovy. The decision of the Hetman and the *starosty* was known already, and the *Rada* answered by acclamation: 'We want to go to the Tsar who belongs to the Eastern Orthodox Faith. God help us, God make us strong and united for all time!' 175*

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND ADDITIONS TO CHAPTER III

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Idem. Istoriya Ukrainskago Kazachestva (History of Ukrainian Cossackdom), Kiev, 1913 (Russ.).

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The following rather antiquated studies, which contain many errors and inexactitudes, still merit reference:

Bantysh-Kamenski. *Istoriya Maloy Rossii* (History of Russia Minor), 1–2, Moscow, 1830.

Markovich, N. *Istoriya Malorossii* (History of Russia Minor), Moscow, 1842.

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(1) *On the 'Wilderness' and its Population*

175* Herberstein calls Putivl a frontier town 'from whence travellers sally forth on their journeys through the Wilderness to the Crimea, called Tauris in Latin'. Kursk, which had existed in the days of Kievan Russia, was refounded and rebuilt towards the end of the fifteenth century. The place where it had formerly stood was covered with dense forest.

It is probable that at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries isolated settlements of Russians had been established along the upper courses of the Seym, the Psiol and the Vorskla—where they had intermixed with Turkish nomads. Doroshenko remarks on the Turkish type of the population in certain localities of the Poltava region.

(2) *On the Origin of the Cossacks*

One of the earliest authors who treated of the origin of the Ukrainian Cossacks proved to be nearest to the truth. This was Martin Bielski, a Protestant, the nephew of a Cossack *starosta*, and the author of *Kronika Polska*—written in the year 1597. In Bielski's view the Cossacks were formed from the lower classes of the original Ukrainian population. This idea was shared by the French military engineer Beauplan, author of *Description de l'Ukraine* (seventeenth century). Some fantastic theories on the subject of Cossack origins were adumbrated by writers of the seventeenth, eighteenth and even nineteenth centuries. Pyasetski and Kakhovsky derive the name Cossack from the fact that in battle 'they were as light and agile as wild goats' (Russian, *koza*). Hrabyanka, a Cossack writer of the eighteenth century, held that the Cossacks were the descendants of the Khazars, and another, Simonovsky, affirmed that they originated from the Caucasians on the ground that in the region of the Caucasus is Hyrcania and that *hircus* means 'goat' (*koza*).

The belief that the Cossacks were not of Slavonic origin was widespread in the nineteenth century. Russian historians like Karamzin, Miller and Soloviëv sought their origin in the Kara-Kalpaks; others from the Torks or from the Polovtsy. Bantysh-Kamenski regarded them as Circassians who had settled on the Dniepr (there was certainly a substantial Circassian element established as far west as the Crimea, see Markov, *Ocherki Kryma*, pp. 417 *et sqq.*). Recently Lyubavski expressed the view that the Cossacks were Russified Tartars.

In the second half of the nineteenth century Antonovich and Kulish elaborated the theory that the Cossacks did not owe their characteristic individuality to any ethnic particularities but to certain special social conditions. This theory is accepted by most of the modern historians of the Ukraine.

Jablonowski, the Polish historian of the Ukraine, came to the following conclusion: 'At the end of the fifteenth century Lithuanian princes who had settled in Kiev attracted to the border regions Tartars who entered their service and who were joined by people who were descendants of "wanderers" (*brodniki*), who had been scattered over the steppe since the twelfth century. Amongst these could have been Torks and Kara-Kalpaks. In the sixteenth century the Slav element begins to predominate decidedly, and

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then was formed the special nationality of the Ukraine which colonized the steppe.' 175 A 113 ●

Ukrainian Cossacks 'appear in history' at a comparatively late date—about 1500. The historians of the Don Cossacks, probably with some justice, attribute the origin of the Don Cossacks to the pre-Mongol period and affirm their service with the Golden Horde. They contend that the parishioners of the Orthodox Diocese, founded by Khan Beréké at Saray and called 'the Diocese of Saray and the Don', were mostly Cossacks who had settled along the rivers Don and Khoper. (See Bykadorov, *Istoriya Kazachestva* (History of Cossackdom), vol. 1, Praha, 1930.)

(3) *On the Ryazan Tartars and the Ryazan Cossacks*

Among the Ryazan Cossacks who undertook sentry service along the borders of Muscovy were doubtless many Tartars. In the year 1452 Vasili II invited Tartars to settle along the Oka in the lands of the wild Finnic Meshchera. Along with these Tartars came their *mirzas* or princes, including Kasim, a member of the royal house of Kazan (and founder of the Kasimov principality, see bibliographical note under 'Kasimov' in *E.I.*). During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Muscovite rulers accorded a willing welcome to Tartar nobles and made them grants of land. Between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries official documents mention about 120 noble families of Tartar descent, among whom are the Apraxins, Bakhmetievs, Bibikovs, Golovins, Muratovs, Naryshkins, Saburovs, Turgenevs, Uvarovs, Urusovs and Yusupovs. The prevalent notion in the West that the Tartar element is stronger in the north of Russia than in the south is incorrect. For polemical reasons Polish and Ukrainian propagandists have repeatedly described the Muscovites as 'rather Tartars than Slavs'. Actually in the peasant population of Northern and North-Eastern Russia there is a strong strain of Finnic blood, and in many localities the Finnish ethnic element predominates over the Slav. As for the Tartar strain, it is not so much Mongol as Turk (it is estimated that even in the horde of Chingiz the proportions were one-third Mongol and two-thirds Turk). The Tartar element is more noticeable in the southern than in the northern rural population.

(4) *On the Southern Border of the Muscovite State in the Sixteenth Century*

About the year 1550 the border ran in a north-east to south-west direction from Sviyazhsk on the Volga through Alatyr, Temnikov, Ryazhsk, Pronsk, Epiphan, Novosil, Mtsensk, Novgorod-Seversk, Rylsk, Putivl to Chernigov.

(5) *On Dmitri Vishnevetsky ('Bayda')*

The popular song about 'Bayda'—Prince Dmitri Vishnevetsky, who was the first Zaporogian Hetman—begins with the words: 'In Tsargrad, on the market-place, Bayda sits and drinks his vodka.' It goes on to relate that the Sultan tried to persuade Bayda to become 'his true and faithful knight', promising to reward him by giving him 'a little princess in marriage' and making him the lord of all 'little Ukraine'. Bayda, however, tells the

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175* Sultan that both his faith and his little princess are unclean. The irate Sultan
●113 thereupon exclaims: 'Good people, take Bayda and hang him on a hook by the rib.' (Kashchenko, *Opovidannya pro slavne voysko Zaporozhske* (Tales of the Zaporogian *Sech*), Leipzig, 1923 (Ukr.)

(6) *On the Turkish Volga Campaign of* 1569 *and the Raids of the Crim Tartars on Moscow in* 1570–1

The Turks regarded the Tartar Khanates of Astrakhan and Kazan as their vassals, and Mehmed Sökölli appears to have fully recognized the significance of the expansion of Muscovite power down the Volga. Azov, situated at the mouth of the Don, became the base for a formidable Turkish military expedition to Astrakhan. The Turkish army advanced along the Don and the sparse settlements of the Don Cossacks were suppressed. Work on the canal which was to link the Don with the Volga was at the same time begun. The siege of Astrakhan, however, ended in disaster. The moment had been judiciously chosen; the Muscovites had been exhausted by the Livonian War and by the struggle of Ivan IV with the *Boyars*. In the following two years, 1570–1, the Crim Tartars made two raids on Moscow, during which they crossed the Oka and burnt the suburbs of the capital. Many thousands of men and women were carried off to slavery in the Crimea.

For the Turkish campaign on the Don and Volga see von Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, vol. VI; Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. III. For the effect on the internal situation in Muscovy of the Crimean raids of 1570–1, and for their influence on the external policy of Ivan IV, see Pares, *A History of Russia*, chap. VI. The Turkish naval defeat at Lepanto (1570) undoubtedly had a negative influence on Sökölli's Black Sea policy during the following years; but the invasion of Georgia and Daghestan in 1578 was probably in part designed to check further Russian expansion in the Caspio-Volga region.

(7) *On Life in the Zaporogian* Sech

Gogol, the greatest Ukrainian literary figure (who incidentally wrote in Russian), gives an attractive description of the Zaporogian *Sech* in his romance entitled *Taras Bulba*. The *Sech*, founded by Dmitri Vishnevetsky on the island of Khortytsa, was later transferred to other islands in the Dniepr (although for a time it again returned to Khortytsa). The *Sech* was a fortified camp surrounded by trenches and moats. The moats themselves were defended by stockades of tree-trunks (in Russian, *zaseki*, from which the name *Sech* was derived). Stiff hedges built of dried branches and clay constituted an inner line. Two gates gave entry. Within the hedge-wall were built long huts or *kurenyi* (with which it is interesting to compare the communal huts of the Circassians where the English travellers Longworth and Bell found lodging during their travels in Circassia during the second quarter of the nineteenth century). These *kurenyi* were covered with reeds. Here the Cossacks lived—a hundred or several hundred men in each. In normal times there were thirty-eight of these huts, which were named after different Ukrainian towns or after famous Zaporogians. Apart from the living quarters there were a 'chancellery', an arsenal and food magazines;

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and in the seventeenth century the church of Our Lady's Protection was built. Beyond the gates of the *Sech* was a market-place with shops and taverns. There travellers were allowed to lodge—Russians, Armenians and Jews—and, in time of peace, Turks and Tartars. The outer market was a kind of trading centre where the booty won on campaigns could be sold. There was also a small river harbour which was visited by Turkish, Greek and Italian ships. 175-*

Once a year each of the *kurenyi* elected its *ataman*, and all the *kurenyi* together, in other words the *Rada*, elected the Hetman and also all men who had to fill posts in the administration. All important matters were decided by the *Rada*. At the end of the winter lots were drawn to decide who among the Cossacks were to prepare for campaign, who were to remain to defend the *Sech*, and who were to go off on hunting and fishing expeditions. Booty was divided into two equal parts. One part went to the treasury of the *Sech*, and the other, after withdrawing what was destined for the *Sech* Church and for certain monasteries which were supported by the Zaporogians, was divided equally between all the Cossacks—both those who had taken part in the campaign and those who had remained behind for defence and supplies.

Every Zaporogian was free to leave the *Sech* whenever he wanted to do so. He might also leave the *Sech* for a time and return later. Entry into the *Sech* was confined to the following simple question and answer: the Hetman would ask a candidate: 'Dost thou believe in God?' and if the man answered 'Yes', he would be told to cross himself, and if he crossed himself it was considered a sufficient proof that he was a Christian. After that no one asked him who he was, from where he was or why he had come to the *Sech*. The majority of Zaporogians were of Ukrainian origin; but there were many who had come out of Muscovy and White Russia and a certain proportion of all sorts of nationalities.

The *Hetman* was the "headman" of the free Cossacks, but also in Poland and Lithuania the C.I.C. was called Grand Crown Hetman.

Ataman, Ukr. *otaman*, seems to be the same word, but is applied to minor chiefs, e.g. of *kurenyi* or small gangs.

(8) *On Church History and the Union of the Churches*

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113 See also two articles in the *Slavonic Review*: K. Gorski, 'Some Aspects of the Polish Reformation', vol. IX, no. 27; J. Mirtshuk, 'The Ukrainian Uniat Church', vol. X, no. 29.

(9) *On the Early Cossack Insurrections*

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(10) *On Ivan Podkova*

175 113 * In 1574 the Moldavian Hospodar Ion (John) III ('The Terrible' or 'The Armenian') appealed to King Stephen Báthory for help against the Turks. A Polish noble, another John, Swirgowski, with or without the knowledge of the Polish authorities, gathered a troop of Zaporogian Cossacks and entered Moldavia. The Cossacks were at first victorious, but were finally defeated by the Turks and their nominee Peter III the Lame; both Johns were killed. Three years later, the Moldavians called in the Cossacks to help in a revolt against Peter. Among the Zaporogians who rode into Moldavia was a certain Ivan Podkova who gave himself out to be a brother of the deceased Hospodar Ion III (the cognomen of Podkova ('horseshoe' in Russian) was given him on account of his great strength because he could break horseshoes with his hands). With 600 of the Zaporogians Podkova crossed the Dniestr and was proclaimed Hospodar in Jassy, where he established himself in great pomp. But Stephen Báthory, fearing war with the Turks, ordered Podkova to quit Moldavia; he was later arrested in Poland and beheaded in Lvov in the presence of the Turkish ambassador.

Cf. also Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. III, and *Histoire des Roumains et de leur Civilisation*, Bucharest, 1922.

A valuable biography of Stephen Báthory has recently been published as the joint work of the Polish and Hungarian Academies: *Étienne Bathory, Roi de Pologne, Prince de Transylvanie*, Cracow, 1935. See also, *Revue du Sud-Est Européen*, vol. VII, nos. 1–3, 'Moldavie et Pologne au commencement du XVIIme siècle', and other articles on Roumano-Polish relations.

(11) *Samuel Kishka: Popular Songs*

The Zaporogian Samuel Kishka ('the Cat') is the hero of the longest historical song of the Ukrainian people. It relates, with a great many details, how Samuel Kishka, after languishing for long years in captivity among the Turks, seized the galley in which he worked with other Ukrainian prisoners and brought it to the mouth of the Dniepr, where he met a band of Zaporogians about to set out on a sea raid. These songs were composed and sung by the *kobzars*—old men, often blind, who wandered round the Ukraine, going from one village to another, singing, or rather declaiming, about 'deeds done long ago', to the accompaniment of the plaintive notes of the

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kobza, a very primitive chord instrument. These *kobzars* continued to survive in the Ukraine until the Revolution. As a social phenomenon they may be compared to the Irish bards who flourished in the Gaelic-speaking villages and Jacobite country-houses of eighteenth-century Ireland and who survived even into the early decades of the nineteenth century (for the spirit of this late bardic world of the hedgerows, read Donn Byrne's 'Blind Raftery').

The Ukrainian laments for the bygone glories of the noble Russian Orthodox houses may be compared to the Irish laments for the passing of the Anglo-Irish Catholic families in the proscription which followed the surrender of Limerick.

George Fox's rendering in English of the Irish country poem 'The County of Limerick' is a fine example of a lament for the Jacobite emigration.

On the deck of Patrick Lynch's boat I sit in woeful flight,
Through my sighing all the livelong day and weeping all the night,
Were it not that from my people full of sorrow forth I go,
By the blessed sun! 't is royally I'd sing thy praise, Mayo!

'T is my grief that Patrick Laughlin is not Earl of Irrul still,
And that Brian Duff no longer rules as lord upon the hill,
And that Colonel Hugh MacGrady should be lying dead and low,
And I sailing swiftly from the County of Mayo.

The numbers of blind among the Ukrainian *kobzars* of the seventeenth century is explained by the fact that the Crim Tartars severely punished Ukrainian captives after a first unsuccessful attempt at escape, but after a second attempt they put out their eyes and let them go free. When these men returned to their own districts they usually eked out a livelihood by singing. The recorded songs of the Ukrainian villages contain much valuable historical material. Cf. Dragomanov's *Politicheskiya Pesni Ukrainskago Naroda* (Political Songs of the Ukrainian People), vols. I–II, Geneva, 1883–5; Kashchenko, *Opovidannya pro slavne voysko Zaporozhske* (Tales of the Zaporogian *Sech*), Leipzig, 1923.

(12) *On 'The Time of Troubles': Ataman Zarutsky*

Among the Ukrainian Cossacks who participated in the chaotic events of the Troubled Times was the Zaporogian Ataman Zarutsky. He gained a certain prominence owing to the fact that Marina Mniszek, the Polish lady who had become successively the wife of the first False Dmitri and the second, fell into his hands. When the second Pretender, known to his enemies as 'the Thief of Tushino' (owing to the fact that he had made his camp at the village of Tushino near Moscow), quitted the field of action, Zarutsky carried off Marina Mniszek to Astrakhan together with her son by the second Dmitri—who became known as 'the Little Thief'. 'The Little Thief' continued to be a source of anxiety even after the election of Michael Romanov as Tsar in 1613. The following missive was sent to the Don Cossacks from the new Tsar: 'Write to your brothers the Volga, the Ural and the Terek Cossacks, that if they have the fear of God in them they must not lend their support to the Little Thief.' The *voyevodes* Princes Odoevski and Golovin

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175* 113 descended the Volga in boats, supported by the Don Cossacks, against Zarutsky and the adherents of 'the Little Thief'. Zarutsky disappeared into the steppes beyond the Caspian and perished there.

(13) *On the Raids of the Zaporogian Cossacks in the Time of Sahaydachny*

Many legends and songs about the sea raids of the Zaporogians are remembered to this day in the Ukraine. The Zaporogians acquired great fame through the raid on Caffa in 1617 during which large numbers of captives were liberated. Mansurov, the Muscovite ambassador in Stambul, and the clerk, Simonov, give a contemporary account of the raid when the Cossacks, whose ladders were too short to allow them to scale the walls, commandeered grazing camels on which they proceeded to mount the ladders.

For the Turkish accounts of the sea raids, see von Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, vol. IX.

(14) *On the Relations between the Zaporogian and the Don Cossacks*

Except on a few occasions when the Zaporogians found themselves in the Polish ranks and the Don Cossacks fought under the Muscovite banner, the two Cossack communities never came into serious conflict. Both the *Sech* and the Don were allies in their common struggle against the Turks and the Crim Tartars. The Don annals frequently record occasions during which the Zaporogians came to their aid. Many individuals and groups from the *Sech* fled to the Don to escape from the sphere of Polish authority. A Muscovite report of the seventeenth century states that: 'There are Zaporogian Cherkasses on the Don and many people do not know why these Cherkasses live on the Don. The *atamans* and the Cossacks are in contact with the Cherkasses. The *atamans* and the Cossacks visit them also beyond the cataracts, and the Cherkasses come to the Don' (Bykadorov, *Donskoe Voysko v Borbe za Vykhod v More* (The Don Cossacks in their Struggle for Issues to the Sea), Paris, 1937).

In the year 1621, 1500 Don Cossacks and 300 Zaporogians went off in company on a sea raid. In 1629 the Don Cossacks and the Zaporogians combined in an attack on the coasts of the Crimea. In 1639, 3000 Zaporogians went to the Don to take part in the operations round Azov, thus considerably weakening Pavluk in his rising against the Poles.

(15) *On the Liberation of Captives by the Cossacks*

The desire to liberate their captive compatriots gave a real spiritual background to the exploits of the Cossacks; and the miseries of the thousands of prisoners in Turkish hands form the motive of many Cossack legends and songs (the popular 'propaganda' of those days). For instance: 'There is a fire beyond the river where the Tartars are dividing their prisoners. Our hamlet has been burned and our goods plundered. The old mother has been killed and the wife carried off captive. The tambourines are heard from the valley. People are led to slaughter there, with nooses round their necks and chains that clatter on their feet. I am all done with my grief and despair, with only small children beside me. I will away into the forest along the tracks.'

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Many songs were composed about Ukrainian girls who became the wives of Turks. A usual motive is: a Ukrainian girl is loved by a Turkish Pasha and lives a life of luxury, but her heart is wrung at the sight of the hard lot of her compatriots. A very popular song was one about a girl—'Marusya the priest's daughter from Bohuslav'. Marusya enjoyed the confidence of her Turkish lover, but she stole the key of the prison from him and set the captives free: 'from hard captivity, from the Muslim Faith, to the land of bright dawn where still rivers flow, to the happy land, to the Christian world'.

The Cossacks considered the liberation of captives to be their holy duty, although it imposed on them much onerous trouble, and the keep of the liberated prisoners often cost them much money. The Don Cossacks reminded the Muscovite Tsar of this fact when the pay due to them did not reach them in time. In 1614 we find the Don Cossacks writing: 'My Lord, this year we have sent off three hundred souls, male and female, to Your Majesty's Ukraine, and yet there did not come your high order to send craft and food for these captives. They are dying of hunger; they cannot live, as we live, on grass and water.' The Don Cossacks were accustomed to reproach Moscow, recalling that they served 'not for lucre or lands but only for grass and water' (Bykadorov).

(16) *Kiev as an Intellectual Centre*

Owing to the initiative and influence of Sahaydachny, Kiev became an intellectual centre for the Ukraine. In the time of the Metropolitan Peter Movila the young men who were educated in the Kievan schools and monasteries and in the newly founded Academy of Kiev differed little in the quality of their learning from those educated in the Polish Jesuit schools and colleges. The influences of the Orthodox revival in the Roumanian principalities and at Constantinople also spread to the Ukraine. After the incorporation of the Ukraine with Muscovy, the superior learning of the Kiev Academy and the influences from the Orthodox lands of the south-west were felt in Moscow. Graduates of the Kiev Academy played an important part in the reforms of the Patriarch Nikon during the sixties of the seventeenth century. The Ukrainian factor, with its Danubian and Italo-Greek connections, had a significant relation to the spread of Western influences in Russia half a century before the period of Peter the Great. Apart from commercial contacts with North-Western and Central Europe, these influences were exemplified in the Danubo-Aegean and Romance tendencies to be noted in the sacred literature, church painting and ecclesiastical architecture of the time.

Notwithstanding wars and internal dissensions during the second half of the seventeenth century, Kiev continued to be an intellectual centre. But the intellectual groups in Kiev who showed themselves particularly active in Church politics failed to exercise any important political influence on events because they became and remained alien to the mass of peasants and Cossacks. In this sense, a very characteristic example is the personality of Yuri Nemirich, who completed a very thorough education in Holland (Leyden), where he spent ten years of his life. When he returned to his

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*175 native land he took part in Khmelnytsky's movement and in the subsequent
113 political conflicts. But in spite of the best intentions, his activities were not successful. The Cossacks could never understand him and he perished.

(17) *On the Risings between* 1630 *and* 1638

Shevchenko, the Ukrainian national poet of the nineteenth century, dedicated one of his poems, 'Taras's Night', to the rising of Taras Fedorovich. There is a Ukrainian song about the Hetman Sulima very similar to that about Samuel Kishka. Pavluk, who sacrificed himself in order to save the others, has remained the hero of many legends. Ostranitsa appears to have been one of the most talented of the Cossack military leaders. Despairing of the struggle, he abandoned it in time and withdrew beyond the Donets. (Cf. P. Kulish, 'Ukrainian Cossacks and Polish landlords in the decades before Khmelnytsky's Rising', in *The Russian Review*, vols. I–V, 1895.)

(18) *On the Ukraine after the Suppression of the First Cossack Risings*

The Ukrainian lays picture the period between 1638 and 1648 as one of misery and humiliation. 'Nothing good ever happened in the King's land from the time of the Kumeyki battle till Khmelnytsky. The "undertakers" came down like a swarm of locusts. All the Cossack roads were leased and at intervals of every three miles a toll-house was opened. In dear old Ukraine even churches were leased to the Jews.'

The *Sech* was dead; sea raids and raids on the Crimea had ceased. 'The Dniepr asks the gentle Danube: "Why hast thou no more my own Cossacks on thy banks?" The gentle Danube murmurs: "Father Dniepr, I am myself wondering and guessing why thy Cossacks no longer come my way".'

In spite of the tendency of Polish historians to minimize the intolerable conditions which the Orthodox population endured, some who lived at dates not far removed from the period, as for instance the author of *Three Kings of the House of Vasa*, are not sparing of abuse of the landlords for their oppression of the peasants. Twardowski, a contemporary of Khmelnytsky, frankly admits that all which happened was the fault of the Poles, whose treatment of the peasantry provoked the rising. The French engineer Beauplan expressed the opinion that the condition of the Ukrainian peasantry was only comparable to that of French peasants serving sentences of forced labour. Modern Polish historians do not ignore the true significance of the peasant revolt under Khmelnytsky (cf. Halecki, *La Pologne de* 963 *à* 1914).

(19) *On the Rising of Bohdan Khmelnytsky*

A series of classical works by Russian historians has been dedicated to Bohdan Khmelnytsky's rising. Most important of these are the works of N. Kostomarov (1817–85) and P. Kulish (1819–97). The work of P. Kulish remains of considerable historical value (*Istoriya Obedineniya Rossii* (The History of the Unification of Russia), vols. I–III, Petersburg, 1874–7). Kulish was a contemporary of Kostomarov, but their outlook differs. It is curious that Kostomarov's work—though he was not a Ukrainian by birth—pleased the Ukrainian nationalists of his time; he idealized the 'love of

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liberty' of the Cossacks and sought to see social and revolutionary motives in the movement of 1648–54. Kulish, on the other hand, although he was a Ukrainian, considers that the union of the Ukraine with Muscovy was a matter of historical necessity, and that the Ukrainians, left to themselves, would have been unable to establish an ordered life in their country. At the time Kulish's conclusions called forth indignant protests from Ukrainian nationalists, but at present Ukrainian scholars consider the work of Kulish as more serious than the talented literary essays of Kostomarov.

The events of 1648–53 are described in great detail by Hrushevsky in his *History of Ukraine-Rus*, vol. VIII, part 3 (1648–50), Wien, 1922; and in vol. IX, part 1 (1650–3), Kiev, 1928. See also, D. Odinets, *Prisoedinenie Ukrainy k Moskovskomu Gosudarstvu* (The Union of the Ukraine with the Muscovite State), Paris, 1936; and especially the important work of Myakotin, *Ocherki Sotsialnoy Istorii Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII vv.* (Sketches in the Social History of the Ukraine in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries), vols. I–III, Praha, 1924–6.

(20) *On the Internal Policy of Vladislav IV*

For an interpretation of the relations of Vladislav IV with Bohdan Khmelnytsky, summarized in David Hannay's brilliant essay on Polish history in the 11th edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, see the Polish work by Szajnocha (which has not been accessible to the present writer), *Two Years of our History* (1646–1648), Lvov, 1865. See also the Polish works by Czermak: *The Plans of the Turkish Wars of Vladislav IV*, Cracow, 1895, and *Letters and Other Writings of Vladislav IV*, Cracow, 1845.

If, as is probable, the 'Royal Letter' of Vladislav IV to Khmelnytsky never existed, there is little doubt that the King had taken the Hetman into his confidence with regard to his political plans. These plans included an intention to undertake decisive action against the Turks (an action which would have anticipated the Ottoman revival and offensive of the third quarter of the century) in alliance not only with Vienna and Venice, but also, if possible with Moscow. In the event of war, the whole-hearted participation of the Cossacks would have been of the greatest value to Poland and—whether or not the King went so far as to conspire with the Hetman against the liberties of the Polish oligarchy—it is likely that he promised Khmelnytsky to restore all the ancient privileges of the Cossacks.

(21) *On the Polish Army in August* 1648

The Polish troops which were hastily raised after the defeat of the Crown Hetman Potocki at Zhovti Vody and near Korsun consisted of numerous detachments of feudal militia together with a force of trained German mercenaries. The Polish nobles could not agree upon one commander, and three of their number were appointed to lead the troops: Dominic Zasławski, Ostrorog, and the younger Koniecpolski. Khmelnytsky described the Polish command as 'a feather bed, a Latinist, and a babe'; for Zasławksi was known for his luxurious habits, while Ostrorog was renowned for his classical learning, and the son of the veteran friend of Vladislav IV was only eighteen years of age. Like the doomed army of Kara Mustafa, which three

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175* demanding their delivery, and to secure it Peter had written a letter in his own hand to the Grand Vizier which was accompanied by a substantial sum in gold. However, on Swedish intercession and also on instructions from Versailles, the French ambassador, the Marquis de Ferrioles, took up the defence of the wretched Hetman.

Soon the illness and death of Mazeppa delivered the Porte from further anxieties. He died on 2 October 1709 and was buried in the Orthodox Church of Tighin; but later the coffin with his remains was transported to the monastery of St George at Galatz.

A year earlier in Glukhov 'the state burial' of Ivan Mazeppa had taken place. With his love of macabre horseplay the Tsar himself was the author of this uncanny ceremony, which was called 'Mazeppa's speeding to Hell'. An effigy representing the dead traitor wearing full Hetman's dress and all the orders which he had received during his life was hung from a gallows. The hangman pulled down the effigy and dragged it into the cathedral, where Theophan Prokopovich, the former eulogist of Mazeppa's classical learning and taste in architecture, pronounced a curse. Menshikov and Golovkin then tore up all the Tsar's letters which had been addressed to the Hetman and ripped the decorations from the effigy. Clergy and choir, clad in black garments with black candles in their hands, intoned curses and spluttered black wax over it. Finally, Theophan Prokopovich hit the Hetman's effigy with his episcopal staff and pronounced 'anathema'. The effigy was then again hung on the gallows and afterwards burnt. 'Anathema' on Mazeppa, False Dmitri and Stenka Razin, all of whom had attempted to shake the foundations of the Muscovite state, continued to be proclaimed every year in all the churches of the Russian Empire. (8)

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND ADDITIONS TO CHAPTER IV

Sources and General Bibliography for the Period of the Hetmans

175* 113 A great mass of original documents concerning this period is preserved in the Russian Archives; notably the *Archives concerning Little Russia.* Originally Ukrainian affairs came under the control of the *Posolski Prikaz*—the Muscovite Foreign Office; later they were transferred to a special *Malorusski Prikaz* or Little Russian Office; and finally, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Little Russian Collegium was set up, and to the offices of this body were transferred all documents and archives concerning the Ukraine.

The most important papers were edited by D. Bantysh-Kamenski and were published in 1858 under the title of *Istochniki Malorossiyskoy Istorii* (Sources for the History of Little Russia). Valuable materials have also been published in *Arkhiv Yugo-Zapadnoy Rossii* (Archives of South-Western

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Russia), a periodical edited in Kiev from 1860 onwards by the well-known Ukrainian historian and political leader, Professor Antonovich. 176 113

Ukrainian chronicles concerning events at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries contain much original material on the history of the country. Of these the most important is 'The Eye-Witness's Chronicle'; the author, Roman Rakushko, was a contemporary and participator in the events of the Khmelnytsky period. His Chronicle was edited in Kiev in 1878 under the title *Letopis Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam* (Eye-Witness's Chronicle according to Recently Discovered Texts). Two other chroniclers, Velichko and Hrabyanka, wrote during the eighteenth century of the events of the epic period of Ukrainian history of which they themselves were not contemporary: S. Velichko, *Letopis Sobytiy* (Chronicle of Events), 3 vols. Kiev, 1855; *Letopis Grabyanki* (Hrabyanka's Chronicle), Kiev, 1854.

Based on these chronicles, an early history of Little Russia was written towards the end of the eighteenth century, but it only appeared in print in the middle of the nineteenth century. *Istoria Russov ili Maloy Rossii* (History of the Rus or of Little Russia), Moscow, 1846, was ascribed to Yuri Konisski, Archbishop of White Russia, but it is now generally attributed to Gregory Poletika, a Ukrainian political figure of the days of Catherine II. To the same category belongs General Riegelmann's *Letopisnoe Povestvovanie o Maloy Rossii i eya narode i kazakakh voobshche, sostavlennoe v* 1786–1795 (Chronological History of Little Russia and her People and the Cossacks in general, composed in 1786–1795), 4 vols. Moscow, 1847.

In addition to the standard works mentioned in the Bibliography to Chapter III, the following biographical works are of value for the history of the Hetman period:

Antonovich, V. *Istoricheskie Deyateli Yugo-Zapadnoy Rossii* (Historical Figures of South-Western Russia).

Kostomarov, N. *Sobranie Sochineniy* (Collected Works): vol. II, *Getmanstvo Vigovskago* (*Vyhovsky Hetman*); vols. IX–XI, *Bogdan Khmelnitski*, Petersburg, 1903–4.

The following works should also be consulted:

Vovk Karachevski, V. *Borba Polshi s Kazachestvom vo vtoroy polovine XVII i nachale XVIII veka* (Poland's Struggle with the Cossacks in the second half of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth century).

Doroshenko, D. *Narys Istoriyi Ukrayiny* (Outline of the History of the Ukraine), vol. II, Warsaw, 1933.

(1) *The Agreement of* 1654 *and the Actual Position in the Ukraine during Khmelnytsky's Lifetime*

One of the most valuable works on this subject is Baron Nolde's critical essay: *L'Ukraine sous le Protectorat Russe*, Paris, 1915 (a Ukrainian translation has been published in Lvov). See also D. Odinets, *Prisoedinenie Ukrainy k Moskovskomu Gosudarstvu* (The Union of Ukraine with the Muscovite State), Paris, 1938.

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*175 An old but authoritative analysis of the Agreement is to be found in 113 G. Karpov's 'Peregovory o Prisoedinenii Malorossii k Velikoy Rossii' (Pourparlers on the Union of Little Russia with Great Russia), published in *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosveshcheniya* (Journal of the Ministry of Public Instruction), no. 11, 1871. According to Karpov, only a copy of the draft of the Agreement has been preserved in the Moscow Archives. When, in 1709, Peter I asked for the original, it could not be found.

For an appreciation of the actual social conditions existing in the Ukraine at the time of the Union, Myakotin's book is of great importance: V. Myakotin, *Ocherki Sotsialnoy Istorii Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII veke* (Essays on the Social History of the Ukraine in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries), 3 vols. Prague, 1924–6.

(2) *The Population of the Ukraine at the Time of the Union*

During the Cossack campaigns of 1648–53 Volhynia was terribly devastated. The Polish register of the year 1657 gives a detailed account. The town of Kremenets was entirely destroyed and not a soul was left alive in the scores of villages which lay in the surrounding countryside. The estates of the Vishnevetsky princes seem to have suffered most: in the borough of Monachin and twenty-two surrounding villages only six houses were left standing; in the town of Zbarazh and its thirty-five villages only nineteen houses remained, and in twenty-two other villages not even an empty house was left. In the town of Vladimir-Volynsk, 'rich and flourishing before', only two houses remained standing in 1657. In another formerly prosperous Volhynian town, Lutsk, only fourteen houses were left: 'the inhabitants had either fled or died of the plague'. The greatest part in this work of destruction was played by the Tartars, but the Cossacks and the Polish soldiery also ravaged wide stretches of country. The Jewish population was either slaughtered or fled to Galicia and Poland. The Tartars did not take the Jews prisoners but slew them on the spot. Only 10 per cent of the Jewish population of Volhynia, Podolia and the Ukraine survived. The Russian population suffered most in Podolia in the region of Bratslav; less in other parts of right-bank Ukraine.

As a result of these calamities there was a great increase of population on the left bank. In 1654 about 128,000 men were brought to swear allegiance to the Tsar's commissioners: this number represented apparently between one-third and one-half of the total grown male population. In the last years of Khmelnytsky's life the population of that part of the Ukraine which was under his rule numbered about a million and a half.

A curious feature of the Hetman's Ukraine was the unusual number of 'towns' for the period: in the district of the Bratslav regiment, 20; in that of the Nezhin regiment, 16; in that of the Poltava regiment, 15. There was one town to every three or four villages. But every strong place in which there was a fort surrounded by a wall and moat was called a 'town' (*gorod*). In the agitated period of the seventeenth century the inhabitants preferred these 'towns' to defenceless villages. In this wise and for similar reasons the old tradition of Kievan Rus was renewed in the Ukraine; in the twelfth century

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the inhabitants of the Pereyaslavl, Chernigov and Kiev lands had had a distinct preference for living in towns. 175 * 113 ●

See M. Vladimirski-Budanov, *Peredvizhenie Yuzhno-Russkago Naseleniya v epokhu Bogdana Khmelnitskago* (Migration of the South-Russian Population in the time of Bogdan Khmelnitsky), Kiev, 1888.

(3) *The Ambassadors of Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich in Warsaw in* 1658

The ambassadors sent to Warsaw, and at first very graciously entertained by King John Casimir, complain in curious terms about the Poles to Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich: 'In Warsaw the Poles often whisper in each others' ears; they also wink at us and make fun of us. When we are walking round the town or sitting in taverns, their soldiers make such a noise with their swords that we are often terrified. The whole countryside, they say, swarms with troops, and little Polish drunkards among each other speak of our Cossacks as belonging to them and they say that Smolensk will soon be theirs. As for our dignity as ambassadors no one gives it a thought, and they have also forgotten all about Thy Polish inheritance, My Lord. When we try and discourse with them about it, they answer us with grins and by clicking their heels together. And O My Lord, if truth be said, we are simply the Polish laughing stock.'

(4) *The Title of Hetman in the Hadyach Agreement*

'Russian Hetman and First Senator of the Voyevodes' Districts of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernigov.'

(5) *The End of Yuri Khmelnytsky*

Colonel Samko defeated Yuri Khmelnytsky in July 1662. Among the latter's troops were Don Cossacks and a thousand German mercenaries. Yuri fled to his friend the Archimandrite Tukelsky and, after resigning the Hetmanship in favour of Colonel Teterya, became a monk. When King John Casimir embarked on his campaign on the Dniepr, Yuri went to him. The King proposed to make him Metropolitan, but Yuri wanted to be Hetman again. Tukelsky became Metropolitan instead of him. Together with Tukelsky Yuri was arrested by Czarniecki in 1664, and sent to the fortress of Marienburg. After two years' imprisonment, they were set at liberty through the intercession of Peter Doroshenko. During his residence in the Moshnin monastery Yuri received information about the relations existing between Doroshenko and the Turks. When the Poles again wanted to arrest Yuri and his friend Tukelsky, they took refuge with Doroshenko. At the end of the year 1667, the Muscovite envoy with Doroshenko, going to church, found that the officiating priest was none other than Yuri Khmelnytsky, who was now known as the Archimandrite Gideon. However, when Doroshenko's position became insecure, Yuri Khmelnytsky joined Khanenko. Khanenko was defeated by Sirko and some Tartar friends of Sirko's took Yuri to the Turkish fort at Akkerman. Doroshenko, who did not desire the return of Yuri to Ukraine, asked the Pasha to send him to Istanbul. This was done, and Archimandrite Gideon was incarcerated in the

175* castle of the Seven Towers, where he remained until 1677, when he was set
113 free and taken by sea to the Crimea.

(6) *Ataman Sirko*

Unreasoning and brave, Sirko was chaotic in all his actions throughout all his life. He is the most fantastic of all the fantastic figures in the Zaporogian *Sech*. Indifferent to booty, lucre and honours, Sirko was the very pattern of the wild Zaporogian chivalry. However, owing to his childish imagination and trusting disposition he was quite incapable of understanding the tortuous men and difficult circumstances of his time. There is an episode which well illustrates the simplicity of the Zaporogian hero. One day a young man appeared in the *Sech* who had been brought there by Don Cossacks. This young man gave himself out to be 'the Tsarevich Simeon', the son of Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich, who, on account of some dark plot, had been banished to the Solovetski monastery, whence he had managed to escape. Sirko tried to persuade the impostor 'not to fool the Zaporogians' but in the end believed his tale. In 1674 envoys came from Moscow to demand the delivery of 'the Tsarevich'. Sirko called the *Rada* together and persuaded the Zaporogians not to surrender their guest. The Zaporogians agreed and nearly drowned the Muscovite envoys. On second thoughts, however, Sirko asked the Muscovites to procure him a 'writing' from the Tsar himself to tell him whether Simeon was his son or not. Tsar Alexey had the graciousness to send him such a writing. Simeon was then sent off to Moscow, where he was executed.

There are many legends about *ataman* Sirko. In the spring of 1675, with 20,000 Zaporogians, he undertook his celebrated campaign to the Crimea. Having defeated the Tartars and taken Baghchi-Saray and Ak-Mechet (Simferopol), the Zaporogians were returning home with about 7000 liberated captives who had lived for years among the Muslims. Sirko noticed that by no means all of them were delighted to return to the Ukraine; many of them had married Tartar women and had really settled down to the Muslim way of life. Sirko decided to give a lesson to those 'who go over so easily not only to the Moscow people and the Poles but even to the enemies of the Christian Faith'. Having reached a place called the Black Valley he ordered his men to halt and declared to the liberated captives that he did not want to force anyone to go to the Ukraine and that those who wished to do so could return to the Crimea. About 3000 of them took him at his word and formed into a column to return to the south. Sirko sent young Cossacks after them with the order to slaughter them all. Later, looking round on all the heaps of corpses, he observed: 'Pardon me, brothers, but it is better for you to sleep here until the Day of Judgment than to settle in the Crimea and beget children and be damned to all eternity.'

Though the most bitter enemy of the Tartars, Sirko was respected by them for his fairness. During periods of armistice, these children of the steppe often asked him to act as an arbiter in their own quarrels. Hetman Samoylovich rebuked him once for allowing the Tartar herds to graze over the Cossack pastures. Sirko replied: 'Lord Hetman, if myself would help people in their dire need, it is not well to look down on that. There is a saying that need

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changes law. We and the Tartars are neighbours and help each other in a neighbourly way.' Legend ascribes to Sirko 'the answer to the Sultan's letter'. In his letter, according to the tradition, Sultan Muhammad IV called himself the Vice-Regent of God upon Earth, the King of Kings and so forth. Sirko is reputed to have begun his answer with the words: 'Thou art nought but the Turkish Shaitan, brother and comrade of the accursed Satan, Lucifer's own secretary.'

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(7) *The Disgrace of Hetman Samoylovich*

All the property of the disgraced Hetman was confiscated to the Muscovite Exchequer. A touching love affair was taking place during the downfall of Samoylovich. His daughter was engaged to young Prince Chetvertinsky. 'For three years the young people hid in the village of Dunaytsy. A local tradition shows the deep wooded valley where they took shelter. Having fallen in love with a brilliant young woman, the Hetman's daughter, the fiancé did not desert her when events deprived her of rank, riches and even decent clothing. He was able to marry her only in 1690' (N. Markovich).

(8) *Mazeppa*

Hetman Ivan Mazeppa has not yet found a critical and unbiased biographer. Even in the nineteenth century Russian historians were inhibited from objective study by the fact that Mazeppa was considered as 'one of the greatest criminals against the State' and by the continuing anathema of the Church. This background influenced such works as, for instance, N. Kostomarov's *Mazeppa i Mazeppintzy* (Mazeppa and the Mazeppans), Petersburg, 1885.

On the other hand the idealization of Mazeppa by the Ukrainian nationalists as a hero who pursued a far-sighted policy against the Muscovite hegemony in the Ukraine is equally unscientific. As a sample of this school see E. Borshak and R. Martel, *Vie de Mazeppa*, Paris, 1931.

The Kiev professors of the latter half of the nineteenth century, as for instance Antonovich, formed a more objective view of Mazeppa as an adventurer in the grand manner who would stop at nothing to attain rank, pomp and wealth. The 'treason' of Mazeppa against Tsar Peter was almost accidental, and doubtless no great moral issue disturbed the mind of the old Hetman who, it must be remembered, had spent his youth at the Polish court where no sanctity surrounded the office of monarch, and where 'treason' was indistinguishable from faction. Like old Simon Lovat in the '45, Mazeppa at the end of his life was the victim of his own calculating brain, and his love of intrigue and combinations led him into a position from which he found it impossible to escape.

For Mazeppa's relations with Colonel Paley, see M. Andrusyak, *Mazeppa i Pravoberezhye* (Mazeppa and the Right Bank), Lvov, 1938.

The same author has written an essay in which he establishes that, until 1705, Mazeppa had never thought of going over to Charles XII. (See M. Andrusyak, 'Zavyazky Mazepy z Stanislavom Leshchinskim i Karlom XII', in *Zapysky Naukovoho Tov. Shevchenki* (The Relations of Mazeppa with Stanislas Leszczyński and Charles XII, in *Proceedings of the Shevchenko*

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Scientific Society), vol. CLII, Lvov, 1933). See also for this period: J. Feldman, *Polska w Dobie Wielkiej Wojny Północnej* (Poland in the Great Northern War), Cracow, 1926; *Trudy Imp. Russkago Voenno-Istoricheskago Obshchestva*; *Pisma i Bumagi Petra Velikago*; *Dokumenty Velikoy Severnoy Voyny, Poltavski Period* (Works of the Imperial Russian Society for Military History, Papers and Letters of Peter the Great, Documents of the Great Northern War, Poltava Period), vols. III–VI, Petersburg, 1893–1907. See also Swedish biographies of Charles XII by Frixell and others and the series of memoirs in *Karolinska Krigares Dagböcker*, Lund.

Mazeppa has acquired a wide celebrity in international literature through Passek's Memoirs and Voltaire's *Histoire de Charles XII*. These works were the origin of Byron's poem and of Horace Vernet's well-known picture. Chaykovski also dedicated one of his operas to Mazeppa. The hero of the great Russian poet Pushkin, in his poem *Poltava*, is not Mazeppa but Peter the Great. Pushkin, in relating the tragic fate of Kochubey, represents Mazeppa as he really was: a man of violent passions who knew how to hide not so much his thoughts as his feelings. Pushkin rightly guessed the motive which led the old Hetman to his ruin: the fear, which tortured him, that, in remaining loyal to Tsar Peter, he might be supporting the losing side.

Some letters have been preserved which are considered to be Mazeppa's letters to Maria Kochubey. These letters are supposed to have been found in Kochubey's house after his arrest and to have been produced during the trial. It is related that Count Golovkin returned these letters to the Hetman with assurances that he had not shown them to anyone and that he had not had them copied: but he had in fact had copies taken. Even if these letters may be regarded as genuine they give no clue to the character of their author. Their theme is love, forced parting, the sufferings of lovers, and indignation against Maria's parents. The promises never to forget Maria are accompanied by explanations as to why the Hetman could not keep her in his house. Some of the later letters speak of 'the change in Maria's heart' and of the Hetman's grief on account of it. But it is possible that the melancholy lines of the old reprobate were only the considered epilogue to a love affair which was too perilous and which had lasted too long. Before Maria and after Maria, Ivan Mazeppa continued to be surrounded by 'Ukrainian ladies'.

For the comparative history of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe during the period of the Hetmans, the relevant volumes of von Hammer's and Jorga's great Histories of the Ottoman Empire have been consulted. The former, though over a century old, is based largely on original Turkish, Venetian, Dutch and Austrian sources, and contains a mass of material not otherwise available. The more modern and more critical work of Jorga is the best general history for South-Eastern Europe. Reference has also been made to the following excellent surveys in the *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. V: Prof. R. Lodge, chap. XII, 'Austria, Poland and Turkey'; chap. XVII, R. Nisbet Bain, 'Peter the Great and His Pupils'; chap. XIX, *idem*, 'Charles XII and the Great Northern War'.

The *Revue du Sud-Est Européen*, published in Bucarest by Professor Jorga, contains a number of papers covering this period, notably: vol. X, nos. 1–3, M. Kasterska-Sergescu, 'L'expédition de Sobieski en Moldavie en 1686';

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vol. x, nos. 7–9, N. Jorga, 'Sobieski et les Roumains'; vol. xiii, nos. 7–9, O. Halecki, 'Relations Polono-Roumaines'. 175*

A valuable article by the Ukrainian writer E. Borshak in the *Slavonic Review*, vol. x, no. 28, p. 138, surveys the 'Relations of England and the Ukraine' from the visit of Yuri Nemirich to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge to the correspondence of Orlik and later Ukrainian leaders with English statesmen and private individuals. The writer gives numerous details about the mysterious Scotsman 'Krivonos' ('Broken-Nose') who was prominent in the immediate entourage of Khmelnytsky and who was believed by many to have been an agent of the Commonwealth Government. 113

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*175 when he spoke in the Duma on the occasion of a debate (spring of 1914) during which Russian members of conservative and nationalist tendencies were opposing the holding of festivals in Kiev on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Shevchenko. 'A Ukrainian movement exists', he affirmed, 'and it cannot be stopped.' He went on to declare that: 'As yet there is no separatist movement in the Ukraine. Even if it exists in an embryonic state it is very weak. But it can be brought to life—and that is what Russian Nationalists are doing.'

As it was, when in the summer of 1914 the crisis of the Slav world approached catastrophe, the Ukrainians showed themselves prepared to submerge their own national individuality in the cause of All the Russias.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND ADDITIONS TO CHAPTER V

General Bibliography for the Period of the Later Hetmans

●113 See works already mentioned in Notes to Chapter IV by Nolde, Myakotin, Doroshenko. *The Ukrainian Encyclopaedia* is also useful for the history of the Ukraine in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

For the history of the Zaporogian *Sech* in the eighteenth century, see:

Skalkovski. *Istoriya Novoy Sechi* (History of the New *Sech*), Odessa, 1845.

Evarnitski. *Istoriya Zaporozhskikh Kazakov* (History of the Zaporogian Cossacks), vols. I–III, Petersburg, 1852–97.

For Hetman Cyril Razumovsky, see:

Vasilichkov. *Semeystvo Razumovskikh* (The Razumovski Family), Petersburg, 1880.

Cf. also *Camb. Mod. Hist.* vol. VI, chap. VII, R. Nisbet Bain, 'Poland under the Saxon Kings'; chap. X, *idem.* 'Russia under Anne and Elizabeth'.

For the period of Catherine II in general, see:

Bilbasov, V. *Istoriya Ekateriny II* (History of Catherine II), Eng. ed. London, 1895.

Kostomarov, N. *Poslednie Gody Rechi Pospolitoy* (The Last Years of *Rzecz Pospolita*), 1905.

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Sorel, A. *The Eastern Question in the Eighteenth Century*, London, 1898.

Camb. Mod. Hist. vol. VI, chap. XIX, Prof. O. Hötzsch, 'Catharine II'.

Bagaley, D. *Istoriya Slobodskoy Ukrainy* (History of the Eastern or New Ukraine), Kharkov, 1918.

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(1) *Ukrainians on Forced Works During the Reign of Peter I* 175 *

Many folk songs recall the memory of these forced works:

'Oh! They gave the boys large spades,
And they sent a young lad to dig ditches.
Oh! And a raven flew from the foreign land,
He flew and crowed
That the lad is sitting by the ditch,
Sitting and crying bitterly:
"I am only a lad so young,
And Oh! So strange am I here!
Oh father! Sell the black steed,
Pay ransom for me,
Then back to dear freedom again."'

Kashchenko's *Opovidannya*.

(2) *The Fate of Orlik and Voynarovsky*

Until the death of Charles XII and the end of the Great Northern War, Philip Orlik continued to entertain hopes that his services might prove of profit to one or other of the Great Powers. The Swedes had recognized him as the lawful Hetman of the Ukraine, and the Turks continued to allow him to remain in Istanbul in case they found themselves in need of his help in the Ukraine. The English even took some interest in him, since the Government of George I was irritated by Peter's passing patronage of the Jacobite cause (see Borshak, *Slavonic Review*, vol. x, no. 28, p. 138). 175* 113 ●

In 1722, however, Orlik found it necessary to leave Istanbul, and he wandered about Europe for some time. In Hamburg he was successful in marrying off his daughter to a French nobleman; and he ended his days peacefully at the Château de Dinteville near Chaumont.

Hamburg turned out to be a more tragic halting place for Mazeppa's favourite nephew, Andrew Voynarovsky. The old Hetman appears to have had a genuine and fatherly affection for his sister's son. Good-looking, gifted, courageous and adventurous, Andrew Voynarovsky appeared to the Hetman to have all the qualities which he may have imagined himself as possessing as a young man.

Voynarovsky had been sent to study abroad in Dresden where, owing to his uncle's friendship with Augustus the Strong, he was received into the most intimate circle of the court and became acquainted with the celebrated Aurora Königsmarck.

During his sojourn in Tighin and Istanbul, Voynarovsky found himself involved in quarrels with Philip Orlik in respect of the considerable sums of treasure which remained in the hands of the fugitives after Mazeppa's death. In 1715 Voynarovsky took up his abode in Vienna and from there removed to Sweden, since included in his inheritance was the enormous debt amounting to about a million *kröner* from Charles XII for monies borrowed after Poltava. In Stockholm he found difficulty in securing settlement from the hard-pressed King, but otherwise he was treated with consideration.

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113 175* From Sweden Voynarovsky found occasion to visit Hamburg, where he again met Aurora Königsmarck, at that time living in the Free City which in those days was a centre for the fashionable international world, since it had a reputation for political intrigue, high play and agreeable life. In the salon of his old friend he met an English diplomat named Mattison, whom he tried to interest in 'the freedom-loving Ukrainian people': it was not an unfavourable moment, since the British Government were unquiet at the possible disturbance of the balance of power in the Baltic and the Black Sea as a result of the Russian successes in the Northern War. But Voynarovsky's advances, like Orlik's, had no result; and Mazeppa's nephew, possibly as a result of his failure in this direction, began to play with the idea of a reconciliation with the Russian authorities through the mediation of Aurora Königsmarck.

Peter I, however, being informed of Voynarovsky's presence in Hamburg, ordered his Resident there, Frederick Bettichger, to kidnap him, and to forward a demand at the same time to the Senate of the Free City for the delivery of 'the criminal'. Several Russian officers were sent to Hamburg to help Bettichger in these plans. At that time Russian troops were quartered in Mecklenburg under the command of Rumyantsev, who later was to have a hand in 'bringing back' the Tsarevich Alexey Petrovich from Naples. An ambush was arranged and Voynarovsky was kidnapped in the street and taken to Bettichger's house, where he could be held a prisoner owing to the extra-territorial status of the Resident. The Hamburg Magistrates protested and the Swedish envoy demanded the release of Voynarovsky on the ground that he was a 'Colonel in the Swedish Royal Guard'. It is difficult to say how this affair would have ended if Aurora Königsmarck had not intervened. She persuaded Voynarovsky to avail himself of the visit of the Russian court to Altona to go there on 5 December, the name-day of the Empress Catherine, and throw himself on the Tsar's mercy. The Swedish envoy, for some unknown reason, also advised him to do so. Voynarovsky imprudently yielded and was immediately sent off to Petersburg 'in order that the case might be investigated'. There he was incarcerated in the fortress of Peter and Paul, where he remained until 1723, when he was sent to Yakutsk in the far north-east of Siberia. He died there in 1740. The traveller Miller saw him in Yakutsk—a complete moral and physical wreck. This meeting became the theme of the poem 'Voynarovsky' composed by a Russian author at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This poet was himself involved in the Decabrist movement—so many of the participators in which ended their days in Siberia. (See Ilya Borshak, *Voynarovsky*, Lvov, 1938.)

(3) *The Haydamaky*

175* The *Haydamak* movement, beginning in the thirties of the eighteenth century, acquired ferocious and anarchical proportions during the sixties when Gonta and Zaliznyak took Uman. The movement has been idealized by Ukrainian nationalists—even by such eminent historians as Professor Antonovich (*Izsledovanie o Gaydamachestve po Aktam* 1700–1768 (Researches on the Haydamaks based on Documents 1700–1768), Kiev, 1876). Kulish, however, protested against this idealization, on the ground that the movement was the most vivid expression of the anarchic elements in the character

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In the nineteenth century the former Zaporogians gradually died out, and the Danube delta became a refuge simply for peasants escaping from over the Russian frontier; about 1820 these fugitives had become rather numerous; there were about 15,000 to 20,000 of them. The Russo-Turkish War of 1828–9 put an end to this situation. When the Russian Army crossed the Danube the last *ataman* of the Danube Cossacks, Hladky, went to the Emperor Nicholas I at Izmail to implore his pardon and mercy. Hladky was given the rank of colonel and later that of general. The Danube Cossacks went back to Russia; the majority of them joined the descendants of the Zaporogians on the Kuban. 113● 175*

For some interesting details on Polish military refugees in the Ottoman Empire, particularly during the nineteenth century, see Thadée Gosztowt, *La Pologne et l'Islam*, Paris, 1907.

(5) *Decabrists in the Ukraine*

The Decabrists had numerous supporters among the young officers in garrison in the Ukraine. The movement found scarcely any support among the people, but many landowners in the Ukraine, Polish, Ukrainian and Russian, favoured the aims of a constitutional monarchy in Russia, a liberal régime and the abolition of serfdom. Colonel Pestel, probably the most determined and gifted of the Decabrist leaders, was stationed in the Ukraine, and at the time of the attempted coup in Petersburg, a mutiny of officers took place at the small town of Tulchin in Podolia. (See Bagaley, *Povstania Dekabristov na Ukraine*, Kharkov, 1926.)

(6) *The Development of New Russia during the Nineteenth Century*

The fashionable intelligentsia who liked to sneer at 'the Potëmkin villages' at the beginning of the nineteenth century were fond of repeating the phrase: 'One can hear the steppe winds howl where Catherine's favourite built his ephemeral towns.' As a matter of fact, of the four towns founded by Potëmkin, Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, Sevastopol, Nikolaev, each already had a population of 100,000 or over within a century of his death. Potemkin did not live to supervise the building of Odessa, but the site was chosen by him. Odessa was built by French *émigrés*—de Ribas, Langeron and the Duc de Richelieu. During the reign of Alexander I it had already become a flourishing commercial town with a busy port and broad boulevards and buildings in the French 'Empire' style. The *Lycée* founded by Richelieu was transformed later into the New Russian University. Pushkin, who visited Odessa in the twenties of the nineteenth century, describes the gay and busy life of this cosmopolitan city which had arisen on the site of a forlorn Turkish hamlet. It had become a great centre for merchants and tradesmen of different nationalities—Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Italians, Moldavians, Germans and Poles—who streamed there from all parts. 175*

After the Vienna Congress which marked the end of the period of wars, the South Russian grain trade began to develop on a prodigious scale and Odessa became the main port of export. The cultivation of the virgin soil of New Russia gave fabulous results; but there was a great lack of labour, which was not adequately supplied by the migrant population of fugitive peasants

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Section (*c*) of the same Paragraph reserved all questions of finance, including the local budgets of the constituent republics, to the discretion of the Central Government. 642

Paragraph 60 provided that the Parliaments of the Republics could make changes in their respective constitutions, but that these changes must correspond to the spirit of the Constitution of the Union. Under Paragraph 69 the Central Government retained the right to veto any decisions taken by the governments of the local republics. As has already been stated, Stalin did not consider it necessary to deprive the national republics of the illusory right of opting out of the Union. At the same time he not only retained the conception of the Constitution of 1923 which provided for a special representation of the minority nationalities in the central legislature, but his pleasing sense of the ridiculous in regard to the automatic reactions of his admirers in foreign countries induced him to give orders for the members of this body to be elected. In this Chamber of Nationalities the Ukrainians have rather less than 200 representatives out of 574—a figure which corresponds probably to the relative numerical importance of their population in relation to the other nationalities in the Union. Any advantage which might theoretically accrue from this representation is lost at the joint sittings of 'the two Chambers of the Superior Council', when the delegates of the nationalities find themselves in a minority among 1143 of their colleagues.

Stalin would have been but a poor Marxist if he had forgotten that the laws regulating the political existence of the Soviet Ukraine would only correspond to the actual state of things if they expressed 'economic realities'. Though strengthened by the new Constitution of the Union, the link between the Ukraine and Great Russia would still remain only theoretical, in the Marxist view, if the Soviet Government had not succeeded in absorbing the economic life of the Ukraine into that of the rest of the Union and welding out of the two an indestructible whole. (11, 12)

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND ADDITIONS TO CHAPTER VI

(1) *The Austrians and Russians in Galicia*

A full documentation of the Austrian repression of the *Promoskovity* in Galicia is to be found in the Telerhof Almanack published in several series by the Galicians after the war (*Telerhofsky Almanakh*, 1–4, Lvov, 1926–9). 113

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●113 Telerhof was the largest concentration camp for 'pro-Russians'; at times their number reached 10,000, and about 2000 died during the typhus epidemic. The Austrian authorities later acknowledged that 'among the people arrested in the war zone were many who were arrested by mistake or upon false denunciations'. (See also D. Yavorsky, *Dumy o Rodine* (Thoughts about my Native Land), Lvov, 1923.)

For the relations between the Russian troops and the population, see General A. A. Brusilov, *A Soldier's Note Book*, London, 1930; also Bernard Pares, *My Russian Memories*, London, 1925.

Russian blunders have been described with many exaggerations in Ukrainian 'separatist' literature. For a more balanced view see D. Doroshenko, 'Voyna i Revolutsia na Ukraine', in the periodical *Istorik i Sovremennik* ('War and Revolution in the Ukraine,' in *The Historian and Contemporary*), vols. I–V, Berlin, 1923.

(2) *Biographical Note on Vinnichenko and Petlyura*

643 *Mark Vinnichenko* belonged to the Ukrainian intelligentsia. He failed to complete his studies on account of revolutionary activities which he started when a boy at a Gymnasium and on account of which he had to leave the University of Kiev after his first year.

During the period 1906–14 Vinnichenko wrote novels (in Russian) which were quite widely read. The themes were not political but rather romantic, and the author delighted in the delineation of psychological conflicts which were intended for the imagination of readers who were not too exacting. Vinnichenko had tuberculosis and he seems to have been consumed by an 'inner fever' which can often be observed in persons who are suffering from that malady.

People who knew Vinnichenko do not deny that he possessed a certain honesty of purpose which was generally not one of the distinctive traits of his colleagues in the *Rada*.

Simon Petlyura was quite a different type. He was the son of a simple cabman, but received his education in the Poltava Gymnasium. Later he became a book-keeper in a commercial undertaking in Moscow, and collaborated in a periodical which appeared before the war called *Ukrainian Life* (in Russian). Petlyura belonged to a milieu which produced many capable and energetic men in the years preceding the war. It was such men, for instance, who had created the widespread co-operative movement in Russia. Many representatives of this class worked successfully during the war in the Unions of Towns and the Unions of Zemstvos. In contrast to Vinnichenko, Petlyura was eloquent neither in his speech nor with his pen. He was a man of action and practical capacity rather than a propagandist of ideals. However, unlike many of his more vocal and emotional collaborators, he maintained an irreconcilable attitude towards the Bolsheviks to the end; his assassin, Schwartzbrod, may well have been a (possibly unconscious) agent of the G.P.U.

(3) *The Conflict Between the Rada and the Provisional Government*

113 See Paul Milyukov, *Istoriya Vtoroy Russkoy Revolutsii* (History of the Second Russian Revolution), vols. I–III, Sofia, 1921; Bernard Pares, *The Downfall of the Russian Monarchy*, London, 1939; and other works dealing

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with the period March–November 1917. A series of interesting articles on the subject from the pen of Milyukov has been published recently in the Parisian Russian daily newspaper *Posledniya Novosti* (The Latest News), 19 March–1 April 1939. For the Ukrainian point of view see D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy* (1917–23), Uzhhorod, 1935; Vinnichenko, *Vozrozhdenie Natsii* (The Resurrection of a Nation), vols. I–III, Vienna, 1925. 113

(4) *The Ukrainians at Brest-Litovsk*

A vivid description of the course of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and of the part played by the delegates of the *Rada* is given in the scholarly work of J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*, London, 1938. An Appendix gives the text of the Peace Treaty with the Ukraine, and a valuable Bibliography is included.

The reminiscences of the leading personalities at Brest-Litovsk have been published in English translations: Hoffmann, *War Diaries and Other Papers*, London, 1929; Czernin, *In the World War*, London, 1919; Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk*, London, 1919; *My Life*, London, 1935.

(5) *The First 'Siege' of Kiev by the Bolsheviks*

This 'siege' continued for about ten days—from 30 January to 8 February 1918. The first Bolshevik detachments approached the city from the left bank of the Dniepr. The city is situated on the high right bank and presented a perfect target for the Red artillery. Most of the damage was done by an armoured train mounting naval guns, which destroyed, among other architectural features, the block of flats built by Professor Hrushevsky when he decided to settle in the city. When other Bolshevik detachments and the 'Ukrainian regiments' which had gone over to them appeared on the right bank, further resistance became impossible. The brunt of the defence was borne, not by the supporters of Holubovich and Vinnichenko, but by volunteer detachments consisting of officers, students and even schoolboys; many young lives were lost. 669

(6) *The Austro-German Occupation of the Ukraine and the Régime of Skoropadsky*

Most interesting material is revealed in the documents published by the Soviets in an anonymous book entitled *Krakh Nemetskoy Okkupatsii na Ukraine: Sbornik Dokumentov izdannykh Gosizdatom* (The Crash of the German Occupation in the Ukraine: Collection of Documents published by the State Publishing Organization), Moscow, 1936. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of these documents which fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks after they occupied Kiev (some of the documents are reproduced in facsimile). It will be difficult, however, for the reader to agree with the deductions made by the Soviet editor. He affirms, for instance, that the Occupation troops were unable to deal with the resistance of 'the great popular masses', and that whole German divisions were employed in putting down workmen's strikes and peasant risings. These assertions are not confirmed by any document. In the documents reference is only made to the assassination of 727 642 113

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727 isolated landowners and to the sending of punitive detachments to certain
642 districts.

The principal reason for the downfall of the German occupation of the
113 Ukraine was, of course, the defeat of the German Armies on the Western Front. The 8th of August is the date which marks a break in the frame of mind of the German Command in Kiev. This can be noted in the documents published in Germany: *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*, Berlin, 1936.

Wheeler-Bennett describes the situation in the Ukraine in these terms: 'The early months of the Skoropadsky regime were marked by a substantial economic revival; the landowners, industrialists and bourgeois being anxious to co-operate with the new government and the agencies of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.... Passive resistance in certain districts was coupled with acts of sabotage in others. In Odessa an aeroplane factory was set on fire, numerous munition dumps were exploded and trains wrecked.'

See also on the same subject: Pierre Brégy and Prince Serge Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, Paris, 1939, pp. 207–8. (Eng. translation, London, 1940.)

(7) *Activities of the Bolshevik 'Peace Delegation' in Kiev*

727 The German authorities were well informed of the subversive activities of the Soviet 'Peace Delegation' in Kiev, but they ignored them—as they ignored the assassination of their Ambassador, Count Mirbach in Moscow, and of their Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Eichhorn in Kiev, in order to avoid the precipitation of a further conflict with the Soviet Government at the moment of crisis on the Western Front. In order to produce incontrovertible proof of the Soviet activities, the Hetman's Minister of the Interior, Igor Kistyanovsky, had recourse to a very original mode of action. With the aid of the Ukrainian police, he arranged 'a brigands' attack on the train in which Rakovski and Manuilsky were returning to Moscow. In order to give reality to the attack 'the brigands' confiscated all the valuables and personal possessions of the two delegates, together with the mass of compromising documents which Kistyanovsky desired to lay hands on and which he afterwards presented to Baron Mumm for perusal. The revelations failed, however, to change the German attitude.

(8) *Revolution and Civil War in the Ukraine*, 1919–20

113 Ukrainian historians of the Revolution and Civil War are often exceedingly biased in their accounts of military operations; see, for instance, Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy*, quoted above. General Denikin, also, cannot set aside his prejudices in writing of the 'Petlyurians' who not infrequently fought on his side against the Soviet forces; see General A. Denikin, *Ocherki Russkoy Smuty* (Sketches of the Russian Trouble), vols. I–V, Berlin, 1925–9.

Much interesting material concerning the Volunteer Army is to be found in the almanack published in Berlin: *Beloe Delo* (The White Cause), vols. I–VI, 1924–7. In the Soviet periodical, *Voyna i Revolutsia* (War and Revolution), 1932–5, many episodes of the fighting against the 'Whites', the 'Petlyurians' and the Poles are described.

For the Anglo-French intervention see James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia*, 1918, Baltimore, 1936.

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Not devoid of interest are the reminiscences of 'Batko' Makhno which were published after his flight to Paris, evidently with the help of someone: Nestor Makhno, *Russkaya Revolutsia na Ukraine* (The Russian Revolution in the Ukraine), vols. I–II, published by the Anarcho-Communist Group of North America and Canada. 113

(9) *Jewish Pogroms in the Ukraine*, 1918–20

Jewish organizations in Western Europe have thoroughly studied this question and a series of works has been published which give a good deal of information: Schechtman, *The Pogroms of the Ukraine and the Ukrainian Government*, 1917–21, London, 1927; by the same author, *Pogromy Dobrovolcheskoy Armii na Ukraine* (Pogroms of the Volunteer Army in the Ukraine), Berlin, 1922; I. Cherikower, *Antisemitizm i Pogromy na Ukraine*, Berlin, 1923.

(10) *The Ukrainian Delegation at the Peace Conference*

The disappointment of the Ukrainian delegates on account of the reception which they met with in Paris from the representatives of the Great Powers is minutely described in I. Borshak's *Ukraintsy na Mirnoy Konferentsii* (The Ukrainians at the Peace Conference), Lvov, 1928; interesting also is Arnold Margolin's book: *Ukraina i Politika Antanty* (The Ukraine and the Policy of the Entente), Berlin, 1922.

(11) *The Soviet Régime in the Ukraine*, 1920–39

Owing to the control exercised by the authorities over all publications, particularly of a political character, in U.S.S.R., Soviet sources concerning the Ukraine are of a strictly official nature. Therefore, if these sources have a considerable importance for assessing economic conditions or cultural phenomena (science, art, even past history), they always describe Ukrainian conditions from a very definite point of view. For the first period of the Soviet régime in the Ukraine, the sources are the official newspapers, *Izvestiya* and *Pravda* (1918–20), *Konstitutsia Sovetskih Respublik* (The Constitution of the Soviet Republics), the daily *Visty* (in Ukrainian), Kiev, 1919, another daily *Kharkovski Rabochi* (in Russian), Kharkov, 1920. A publication of the Communist Academy should also be consulted: *Natsionalnaya Politika Vserossiyskoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii* (National Policy of the All-Russian Communist Party), Moscow, 1930. Information on political trials can be culled from a perusal of the files of the daily *Proletari*, Kharkov, 1934, in which the speeches pronounced at the Twelfth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party are reproduced. Stalin's Constitution was published in Moscow in 1937.

The works of Russian and Ukrainian refugees, some of whom occupied official positions under the Soviet régime, offer a second important source of information. See, for instance, Isaac Mazeppa (an associate of Petlyura), *Ukrayina pod Chervonoy Moskvoy* (Ukraina under Red Moscow), Lvov, 1935; M. Slavinski, *Natsionalno-Gosudarstvennaya Problema S.S.S.R.* (The National Problem as a State Problem in U.S.S.R.), Paris, 1938; V. Sadovski, *Natsionalnaya Politika Sovetov na Ukraine* (The National Policy of the Soviets in

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● 113 the Ukraine), Warsaw, 1937; Pierre Brégy and Prince Serge Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, Paris, 1939.

A third group of sources is to be found in the accounts of foreign travellers who have visited the Ukraine during the last two decades. Although few of these would claim to have had a proper opportunity of forming a true impression of the political and social struggle which has been going on in the Ukraine, there are some foreign newspaper correspondents whose knowledge and contacts gave them certain facilities for securing information which no passing tourist (however enthusiastic) could acquire. The most distinguished of these correspondents (up to 1934) was Paul Scheffer of the *Berliner Tageblatt* and Dr Basseches of the *Neue Freie Presse*.

The writer of an article in the *Fortnightly Review* of October 1934 gave an important account of the famine in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava and Kharkov. He confirmed the fact that cases of cannibalism had occurred. One of these cases later became known from Soviet sources, in consequence of a trial which took place in the town of Izyum in the region of Kharkov. A female shopkeeper named Kovaleva was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment for selling human flesh. She confessed that she had also done so during the famine of 1920–21.

648 (12) *The Diplomatic Representation abroad of the Ukrainian S.S.R.*

A curious evolution in the views of the Soviet Government concerning the degree of independence to be enjoyed by the Ukrainian S.S.R. can be traced in the history of the diplomatic representation of the Republic abroad. After the first Constitution of the Ukrainian S.S.R. had been legalized in March 1920, a Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was established in Kharkov—which city had been made the capital of the Ukraine. The first Commissar for Foreign Affairs was Kovalev, who within a month was replaced by Rakovski—at that time also President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. In April 1920, Rakovski appointed his first diplomatic representative abroad in the person of M. Levitsky, who was sent to Prague, although the new Czech Republic had not yet recognized either the Soviet Union or the Ukrainian S.S.R. A little later a certain Aussem arrived as Ukrainian Ambassador in Berlin. In the autumn of 1921 a third Ukrainian diplomat appeared in Warsaw in the person of Shumsky. Not one apparently of the unfortunates who decorated the Ukrainian Foreign Office is alive to-day; all, including Rakovski, were 'eliminated' later—either with or without trial.

In 1920–21 Ukrainian representatives abroad were officially independent of Moscow, but they were under the orders of Rakovski. There existed, however, a secret decision of the Politbureau, according to which the Foreign Office of the U.S.S.R. had the right to send instructions to the Foreign Office of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and could interfere in the activities of the Ukrainian diplomats in the Central European capitals.

This situation continued until the new Constitution of the Union, proclaimed on 6 July 1923. The Ukrainian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was then abolished. The Ukrainian representation abroad was fused with that of U.S.S.R.; but it was agreed that an Ukrainian Communist should be

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Outside Poland, Ukrainians are to be found in many European and American countries. Political and academic circles of Ukrainian intelligentsia are grouped round periodicals of varying views, but these circles consist of scores, perhaps, of persons out of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian land labourers who have migrated from over-populated Galicia. After the war and revolution thousands of fugitives from the South of Russia and Volhynia joined them. In the Ukrainian press from time to time appear statements that the number of Ukrainians in Western Europe reaches 500,000, in Canada over a million, in the United States about 700,000 and in South America 200,000. These figures are undoubtedly exaggerated. In France the number of refugees from the South of Russia who can be considered 'Ukrainians' did not exceed a few scores of thousands, and the same must be said about Czechoslovakia and Balkan countries. However, among the Polish agricultural workers and miners in France (900,000) a third came from Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. And there is no doubt that hundreds of thousands have migrated from Galicia to the United States and especially to Canada where, owing to hard work and a certain capacity for organization, brought over from their native land, many have attained prosperity. America is the land where emigrants from Europe keep together according to their nationality more than anywhere else. The Ukrainian emigration in Canada and the United States has retained a vivid interest in everything pertaining to Ukrainian nationality. It has its own press, publishes its books, teaches its language and history in its schools. The Ukrainians in America consider it their duty to respond to the appeals of the different Ukrainian parties and groups which have remained in Europe. Therefore echoes of all the different tendencies of Ukrainian political life can be found in Canada and the United States: 'pro-Russians' who do not wish to be called 'Ukrainians', adherents of U.N.D.O., followers of Colonel Konovalets, partisans of Petlyura and the 'Petlyurians', admirers of 'the young Hetman' Danylo Skoropadsky. However, purely ideological discussions are not so acute there as among the different 'fractions' in Europe. 'The united Ukrainian front' would have a better chance in emigration, because its basis would not be so much political activity, as a common historical tradition and a common love of the Ukrainian land.

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(14) *Literature on the Ukrainian Question*

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Numerous papers, mostly by well-known Ukrainian writers and political leaders, have appeared in the *Slavonic and East European Review*. These papers have made available to English readers information on various aspects of the Ukrainian Question. The following should be noted:

Vol. v, No. 13, p. 169, Kolessa, A., 'Bibliography of the Ukrainian Language'.
ix, No. 27, p. 367, Paneyko, B., 'Galicia and the Polish-Ukrainian Problem'.
Ibid. p. 88, Skorowski, S., 'The Ukrainian Problem in Poland'.
x, No. 28, p. 116, Loś, S., 'Ukrainian Question in Poland'.
Ibid. p. 138, Borshak, E., 'Relations of England and Ukraine.'
xii, No. 35, p. 323, Mazepa, I., 'Ukrainia under Bolshevist Rule' (valuable, based on careful study of the Ukrainian Soviet press).
Ibid. No. 36, p. 622, Doroshenko, D., 'The Uniat Church in Galicia'.

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●113 XIII, No. 37, p. 139, Kirkconnell, W., 'Ukrainian Poetry in Canada'.
Ibid. No. 38, p. 350, Shulgin, A., 'Ukraine and Its Political Aspirations'.
Ibid. Nos. 38, 39, pp. 363, 611, Krofta, K., 'Ruthenes, Czechs and Slovaks' (the official Czech view of the position of the Carpathian Ukrainians by the distinguished Czechoslovak politician).
Ibid. No. 38, p. 372, Voloshin, A., 'Carpathian Ruthenia' (the view of the luckless leader of the Carpathian Ukrainians).
XIV, Nos. 40–41, pp. 163, 372, Andrusiak, N., 'The Ukrainian Movement in Galicia'.
XVI, No. 48, p. 654, Doroshenko, D., 'Mykhailo Dragomanov and the Ukrainian National Movement' (a study of permanent value).

La Revue de Prométhée published in Paris and *East Europe* published in London have contained a number of topical articles on the Ukraine, many of which are of a polemical character. The former review is the organ of the Promethean League which professes to represent all the 'minority nationalities' of the former Russian Empire (i.e. Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Don and Kuban Cossacks, North Caucasia, Turkestan, Idel-Ural, the Ukraine, the Crimea, Ingria, Karelia, and the Komi (Zyryan) Region; the Armenians are, or were, not included). The League, which numbers among its members many notable political emigrants and writers of talent, held a 'First Promethean League Linguistic Congress' in Warsaw in the spring of 1936 (see *Baltic and Scandinavian Countries*, vol. III, no. 1 (5)).

The principal source for the contemporary history of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia is the work of the leader of U.N.D.O.—Dr Kost Levitsky: *Historiya Politichnoy Dumky Halytskykh Ukraintsev*, 1848–1914; *na Podstavi Spomynov* (History of the Political Thought of the Galician Ukrainians; on the basis of (the author's) Reminiscences), Lvov, 1926. See also A. Shulgin, *L'Ukraine contre Moscou*, Paris, 1935; A. Martel, *La Langue Ruthène*, Paris, 1938.

The period between 1914–18 and 1939 can be studied in the Ukrainian periodical press: *Dilo, Zhive Slovo* (Lvov), *Nash Klych* (Peremyshl). See also the newspapers published in Russian in Podkarpatska Rus: *Russki Golos*, *Russki Vestnik* (Uzhhorod).

The different political orientations of Ukrainian groups in emigration are illustrated in the pages of *Svit* (America), *Trizub* (Petlyurian), *Ukrainske Slovo* (the organ of U.N.U.), and *Ukraina*, also in *La Revue de Prométhée* (all published in Paris).

For the views of Russian polemists on the subject see: Shchegolev, S., *Ukrainskoe Dvizhenie kak Sovremenny Etap Yuzhno-Russkago Separatizma* (The Ukrainian Movement as the Modern Stage of South Russian Separatism), Kiev, 1912; Volkonski, Prince A., *Istoricheskaya Pravda i Ukrainofilskaya Propaganda* (Historical Truth and Ukrainophil Propaganda), Turin, 1920 (also in an Italian translation); Tsarinny, A., *Ukrainskoe Dvizhenie* (The Ukrainian Movement), Berlin, 1922.

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231 a high standard of breeding—particularly of draught horses. The Army Remount Department fulfilled a third of its requirements in the south, and there was a considerable export abroad. As a result of the Revolution, breeding suffered probably more than any other branch of rural production. Statistics for 1922 illustrate the disastrous effect of the Revolution on livestock throughout the whole Empire. In 1916 the total head of cattle was about 60 million: in 1922, 23 million. The number of horses in 1916 was estimated at 35 million: in 1922 at 20 million. Sheep numbered 120 million in 1916: 46 million in 1922. In view of the fact that South Russia was the principal field of the Civil War, it is probable that about 50 per cent of the horses and cattle destroyed were lost in this region. It is reckoned that in the Ukraine and New Russia only one-third of the pigs remained and one-quarter of the sheep. Losses in domestic animals are much more difficult to recover than losses in other branches of domestic industry; further, the special conditions of field labour in New Russia required a large proportion of draught oxen and horses.

[656] 433 One of the principal reasons which compelled Lenin to formulate the New Economic Policy was the necessity of restoring the food production of the Soviet Union.

'"War Communism" and attempts to introduce "integral socialism" into the countryside ended in 1922. At that date began the period of "liberalism" in Communist policy in relation to the villages. The peasantry were allowed freedom in the choice of land labour and almost complete freedom in other economic activities. The years between 1922 and 1929 produced excellent results: the lost sowing area was recovered and breeding was resumed. The food question in the country was improving' (Prof. Markov, *Socialist Economy in U.S.S.R.*, Part 2, *Agriculture*, Paris, 1937). By 1929 agricultural production approached pre-war standards (150–160 million quintals of cereals compared with 200 millions average for the years 1909–13). In spite of the fact that, following the break-up of large estates, the peasants had expanded the sown area at the expense of pasture (and according to the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia* were showing a diminishing average on arable of 15–20 per cent as a result of more primitive methods of farming), the breeding of cattle and horses was nearing pre-war figures and the production of pigs was improving.

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433 be held to have been primarily responsible for the backwardness of craftsmanship in the Ukraine nor of those 'light industries' which may be said to have taken the place of the crafts in the modern world. Crafts are created as a result of a long historical process which marches with the cultural development of a country. In the Ukraine a modern capitalist heavy industry was superimposed upon the structure of a rather backward rural economy in the latter half of the nineteenth century. By contrast France is the living embodiment of cultural processes which have produced a harmonious economic life where agriculture and both 'heavy' and 'light' industries are blended in such happy combination and where the work of craftsmen has reached perfection. But then France has a long independent historical past behind her, the political and social experiences of a nation of genius and great achievements in all the domains which challenge the human mind and human activities.

In this wise even 'the economic problem' of 'Greater Ukraine' is not limited by simple figures concerning her 'economic potentialities'. Therefore 'the political problem' which the present and future of the Ukraine represents becomes even more complex. With all the assets of her 'economic potentialities', with all the positive features which can be observed in her economic life even under present conditions, the Ukraine is still very far, as regards herself and other countries concerned, from a satisfactory solution of 'the political problem' of her form in the present and the future. The 'Ukrainian problem' is, perhaps, one of the chief reasons for the absence of balance in continental Europe.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND ADDITIONS TO CHAPTER VII

Sources for the Economic History of S.S.R. Ukraine

113 Any attempt to acquire an objective view of the course of economic life in the Soviet Union calls for an attentive, prudent and critical survey of the vast material published on the subject in Soviet periodicals during the past two decades. A work of this kind is beyond the resources of a single student and requires the corporate study of whole institutions, as for instance: the International Agricultural Institute in Rome; the East European Institute in Breslau (under the direction of Professor Auhagen); the Ukrainian Academy of Podebrady (Czechoslovakia); the Economic Cabinet of Professor Prokopovich in Prague; the Society for the Study of Modern Russia in Paris; the Bureau for Researches on Russia in Birmingham.

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Particularly valuable is the material collated during recent years by Professor Prokopovich's Cabinet (unfortunately closed in 1938) and by the Birmingham Bureau of Professor Konovalov (which terminated its activities in 1935). The Paris Society has published the very instructive and impartial works of Professor Markov: *Krisis Selskago Khozyaystva v S.S.S.R.* (The Crisis in Agriculture in U.S.S.R.), Paris, 1933; *Sotsialisticheskoe Khozyaystvo v S.S.S.R.*; 1, *Promyshlennost*, 2, *Selskoe Khozyaystvo* (Socialist Economics in U.S.S.R.; 1, Industry, 2, Agriculture), Paris, 1937–8. 113

The principal Soviet publications on which the researches of the above institutions are based are:

Mirovoe Khozyaystvo i Mirovaya Politika (World Economy and World Policy).
Sotsialisticheskaya Rekonstruktsia Selskago Khozyaystva (Socialist Reconstruction of Rural Economy).
Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie (Socialist Agriculture).
Za Industrializatsiu (Towards Industrialization).
Ekonomicheskaya Zhisn (Economic Life).
Plan (The Plan).
Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo (Socialist Building-up, Yearbook).
Planovoe Khozyaystvo (Planned Economy).
Khozyaystvenniya Problemy (Economic Problems).
Sotsialisticheski Transport (Socialist Transport).

Significant information may be extracted from the files of the leading daily papers in U.S.S.R.: *Izvestia* and *Pravda*. The provincial dailies published in the Ukraine contain many items of interest for the study of conditions in that Republic: *Sovetskaya Ukraina*; *Visty* (News); *Proletariy* (Proletarian); and others.

The Ukrainian emigration in Poland and Czechoslovakia has been responsible for the publication of a number of valuable works:

Ukrayinska Zahalna Entsiklopedia (Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia), vols. I–III, Lvov, 1935.
Atlas Ukrayiny (with statistical material), Lvov, 1938.
Glovinsky-Matsievich-Sadovsky, *Suchasni Problemy Ekonomyky Ukrayiny* (Present Problems of the Economics of the Ukraine), Lvov, 1930.
Ukrayinsky Statistychny Yezhehodnyk (Ukrainian Statistical Yearbook), Warsaw, 1936–7.

The following books, published recently, are also important:

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Brutzskus, Prof. Boris. *U.R.S.S.—Terrain d'Expériences Économiques*, Paris, 1937.
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Brégy, P. and Obolensky, S. Prince. *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, Paris, 1939.
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Handan. *Das Motorisierungs-potenzial der Soviet Union*, Hamburg, 1937.

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● 113 The following Soviet books, in addition to the periodical publications, may also be consulted:

Mikhailov, I. *Evolutsia Russkago Transporta* (The Evolution of Russian Transport), Leningrad, 1925.

Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenie Sovetskago Soyuza (The Economic Situation of the Soviet Union), published by the Moscow Institute for Economics, Moscow, 1926.

Pyatiletni Plan razvitiya Narodnago Khozyaystva v S.S.S.R. (1928). Five Year Plan for developing the National Economy, I, II, Moscow, 1930.

Resultaty Vypolneniya pervago pyatiletnyago Plana (Results of the Execution of the First Five Year Plan), Moscow, 1933.

S.S.S.R. v Tsifrakh (The U.S.S.R. in Figures), Moscow, 1935.

Ekonomicheskaya Geografiya S.S.S.R. (The Economic Geography of the U.S.S.R.), published by the Communist Academy, Moscow, 1935.

U.S.S.R. Handbook, London, 1936.

Plan Narodnago Khozyaystva na 1936 *god* (Plan of National Economy for 1936), Moscow, 1936.

For economic conditions in Galicia see 'Galicia' in *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia* (The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia); *L'Annuaire Statistique de la Pologne*, Warsaw, 1935 and after.

Soviet Statistics

No less a person than the President of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party, Orzhonikidze, during the Moscow Regional Congress of the Party in 1929, said: 'It would seem that no one should be more trustworthy than persons employed in statistical work, conscientiously adding up their figures—and that is all. But no! These people with us have become a political factor and are well aware of it.' Orzhonikidze further affirmed that: 'The Statistical Bureau makes a terrible muddle of all its materials.' In 1930 Syrtsov, who was then President of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, found that: 'The pace of production in Soviet statistics is ordered beforehand and is not a result of calculation' (*Ekonomicheskaya Zhisn*, 2/18 December, 1930).

Dr Albrecht Kaysenbrecht is of opinion that: 'Among the staff of the statistical workers are very experienced and scientifically well-qualified persons. The whole misfortune consists in the fact that Soviet statistics are the slave of the Government and are dominated by purely political considerations' (*Die Entwicklung der Agrärfrage in Soviet Russland*, Schmöllers Jahrbuch, 1926). In 1927 Trotsky expressed the opinion that intentionally faked statistics had begun to alter the whole outlook on the actual situation. 'The figures of Soviet statistics are very doubtful' is the view of Professor Auhagen (*Ost-Europa*, Breslau, Jun[illegible]31).

As for agriculture, there is no doubt that the reports which come in every five days during the spring sowing season 'according to law' are frequently faked. 'The sowing area is often reckoned according to the quantity of seed which has been given out for this purpose without any assurance as to

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whether it has been properly used. For instance, one of the Ukrainian *Kolkhozy* reported that it had accomplished 50 per cent of the Sowing Plan when in reality it had only accomplished 2 per cent of it' (*Pravda*, 14 June, 1932). The harvest is continually assessed 'by the look of it in the fields' before it has been gathered in. Over a series of years the harvest has been between 20 and 30 per cent less than reports showed it to be. 113

The comparisons between Soviet actuality and pre-Revolutionary conditions are often unconvincing because Soviet statistics do not take quality into consideration. For instance, according to Soviet statistics, the output of peat has risen by 30 per cent. In reality, only the percentage of moisture retained in the peat accepted for delivery has risen.

In the *Times* article on 'The Plight of the Plan' (29 January, 1938) this question of quantity being the chief concern, irrespective of quality, in all the most important branches of industry in Soviet Ukraine, is discussed: 'The coal-mines show impressive figures but quantity is the chief concern. This has risen threefold or fourfold in the last decades, but recent disclosures indicate that the calorific value of the coal leaving Soviet mines is less even than that of the output in old Russia. The production of iron ore has gone up at a similar rate, but the final result is similar.' Cf. Makcheef, Th. (Maksheev), 'Heavy Industry in the Soviet Union,' *Contemporary Russia*, II, 2, London, 1938.

The Territory of Soviet Ukraine

Out of the 588,000 sq. km. claimed for 'Greater Ukraine', Soviet Ukraine occupied (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia in September 1939) 452,000. This area represents 2·1 per cent of the whole extent of the U.S.S.R. Soviet Ukraine occupies the territory of eight former Governments of the Empire: Kharkov, Chernigov (less five northern districts), Poltava, Ekaterinoslav (now renamed Dniepropetrovsk), Kherson, Podolia, Volhynia (excluding, until September 1939, the western districts annexed to Poland in 1921), Kiev. Three northern districts of the former Government of Tauris (Berdyansk, Melitopol, Dnieprovsk) are also included. The Putivl district of the former Kursk Government as well as some villages of the former Orel Government are also deemed to form part of the Ukraine. 131

In 1924 an 'Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic' was formed out of the Podolian districts of Balta and Tulchin along the Dniestr in order to give a semblance of self-government to the Roumanian-speaking villages of that region. The area of A.S.S.R. Moldavia is 8288 sq. km. and the population 572,000. The capital is located at Tiraspol.

The capital of the Ukrainian S.S.R. until 1934 was Kharkov; it is now Kiev.

In 1925 the administrative divisions of the area occupied by the Republic were reorganized into 40 Districts, 662 Regions, and 10,733 village and town Soviets. In 1929 the Districts were abolished out of economy and 7 *Oblasti* (Provinces) were established, roughly equivalent in size to the former Governments. These are: Vinnitsa (formerly Podolia), Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkov, Chernigov and Donets. Seven 'National Minority' Regions have been set up, and also 366 'National Minority' village Soviets 631

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Acknowledgments

113 This volume is primarily based upon a series of detailed studies of Ukraine under the Soviets, which were prepared by a group of Ukrainian DP professors in Europe. They were selected by the Shevchenko Scientific Society and supported during their work by the Ukrainian National Association, which has provided the means for publication. They were:

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N. Makhiv—The Natural Sciences in Ukraine
Iv. M.—Ukrainian Religious Life

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ABBREVIATIONS

113 The code letters preceding the documents in the various collections listed in this bibliography have the following significance:

CXL	(The numerical designation of the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine documentary series on Eastern Europe)
EC	Economic (referring to Nuremberg collection on cases arising in connection with economic matters)
NO	Nuremberg, Organizations (referring to documents collected for proceedings against Nazi organizations)
NOKW	Nuremberg, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (referring to documents collected for trial of German army officers)
Occ E	Occupation, East (referring to documents in the Yiddish Scientific Institute pertaining to the German occupation in Eastern Europe)
PS	Paris—Storey (referring to documents collected at Paris for the Nuremberg Trials by Colonel Robert G. Storey, an American officer)
USSR Exhibit	(Referring to documents presented by the Soviet prosecution staff at Nuremberg)

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Documents and depositions collected for the trials of war criminals conducted by the United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, of which photostats, mimeographed reproductions, translations, or summaries (Staff Evidence Analyses) are available in various major libraries. The documents and depositions in this category used for this study are in the NO or NOKW series. Collections in the Library of Congress, Washington; the Columbia University Libraries, New York; and the Mid-West Interlibrary Center, Chicago, have been utilized.

Documents in the archives of the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, Paris, in the CXL series.

Documents in the archives of the Yiddish Scientific Institute, New York, in the Occ E series.

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Documents in the Himmler File, Manuscript Room, Library of Congress, Washington, and one document (HH 263) from the section of the Himmler collection at the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace, Palo Alto, California. 113

Letter from Bauer to Schenck and Bizantz (all officials in the Generalgouvernement), dated August 18, 1943. In the possession of Liubomyr Makarushka.

Pastoral letter of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptits'kyi, July, 1941. Single printed sheet in the possession of Volodymyr Stakhiv.

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Proclamation of the Ukrainian state in L'vov, June 30, 1941. Typewritten copy in the possession of Volodymyr Stakhiv.

UHVR, document among uncatalogued captured materials in the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace, Palo Alto, California.

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* After the fall of Kiev to the Germans in September 1941, *Komunist* was published for a time in Saratov, then in Moscow (see K. Litvin, "Slavnyi shliakh" [Glorious Path], *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, July 15, 1945, p. 3). *Sovetskaia Ukraina* (see below) also continued as a Soviet publication, but I have not been able to determine its place of publication.

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●113 *Natsionalist* (The Nationalist). Prague, monthly supplement to *Nastup*. January, 1940–December, 1943, in Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel.

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Ukraïns'ka Diisnist' (Ukrainian Reality). Prague, semimonthly. November, 1940–March, 1944, and June, 1944–April, 1945, in Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel.

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The Ukraine is covered by eight sheets (Bucarest, L. 35; Odessa, L. 36; Rostov, L. 37; Krakau, M. 34; Jitomir, M. 35; Kiev, M. 36; Kharkov, M. 37; Smolensk, N. 36) of the International Map (G.S.G.S. No. 2758) published by the War Office on the scale of 1 : 1,000,000.

A special map of the Ukraine, on the scale of 1 : 4,500,000, has been issued by George Philip & Son (London Geogr. Institute).

771 titude of mysterious, evil forces which he endeavours either to
789 ally himself with, propitiate, or combat in order to assure himself of good luck or avert the many calamities which these supernatural powers may bring. Magical beliefs and practices are therefore widespread and deeply rooted among the people. Even where the church has opposed and tried to counteract the older notions and usages, its success has been at best only partial. What it often has effected was a change in form, or the substitution of an authorized rite for an ancient magical practice.[2] The priest, for example, sometimes takes the place of the sorcerer by holding a special midnight Mass, the *czorna służba* (black service), at the instigation of a person who wishes to harm an enemy.[3] At other times he acts as medicine man, e.g. by stepping over the back of an ailing parishioner in order to relieve his
[342] backache.[4] A case of substitution is noticeable in the rite observed before moving into a newly constructed house. Wherever the old practices of sacrificing a black rooster, as an offering to the Devil or as a preventive against disease, has become extinct, its equivalent has appeared in the solemn consecration of the house by the priest.[5]

754 Among the Ukrainians, as elsewhere, magical beliefs and prac-
791 tices have two main aspects, which may be termed respectively
789 the black and white arts. While the former has its prime source in the arch enemy of man, the Devil, the latter, which functions mainly to counteract evil influences, relies on some powerful medium, sometimes God himself, to neutralize or overcome the

101 Russian, people inhabiting South Russia. They occupy the eastern section of the former Austrian province of Galicia, which is at present part of Poland. They number approximately 3,000,000 and belong almost exclusively to the peasant class. Geographically, and to a certain extent also culturally, they may be divided into lowlanders and highlanders, the former inhabiting the plains to the north and the latter the Carpathian mountains to the south.

[113] [2] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Rutenen in der Bukowina und Galizien," *Globus*, lxi, 282.

[3] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Kuzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 277.

[4] Kaindl, R. F. "Neue Beitraege zur Ethnologie und Volkskunde der Huzulen," *Globus*, lxix, 71.

[5] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 282.

forces of evil. The agents of the former include the witch and 754
the wizard; and those of the latter, the fortune-teller, the sooth- 791
sayer, the conjuror, and, in cases of sickness, the healer. Between 789
these two groups of "professional" intermediaries between the supernatural and natural worlds stands the ordinary non-professional man or woman, who, by using certain formulas or more concrete means, can also invoke superhuman intervention.

A person associated with powers of evil, though difficult or 754
impossible to recognize by ordinary means, since he usually looks 777
exactly like any other human being, can be singled out much more easily by his actions, and especially by the results he is supposed to obtain. Thus a successful person, it is thought, is necessarily allied in one way or another with the Devil, or his assistants. A man who has luck in hunting or fishing is undoubtedly in communication with the Devil.[6] A woman who repeatedly returns from the woods with her basket full of mushrooms, or whose cow continuously yields more than an average quantity of milk, is nothing but a witch who is using her unholy powers to her own profit and, usually, also the detriment of her neighbours.[7] Indeed, there is not a wealthy or successful person in the village or town who is not in league with the Devil.[8] A peasant, therefore, who has luck with his crops and cattle most likely receives help from evil spirits; and a manufacturer who makes money from his factory in town does so because he has demons to work for him.[9] Thus, although there exist special means of detection, which, as we shall see, are made use of when necessary, mere good fortune is the simplest criterion.

Among individuals occupied with the black art, the witch 754
(*widma*) wields by far the greatest power.[10] Just as after death she becomes the most feared of evil spirits, so during her life she is considered the most dangerous of the Devil's disciples. The

[6] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), iii, 12. [113]

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 114. [8] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 229, 232.

[9] Onyščuk, A. "Materyaly do huculskoi demonologii," *Materyaly do Ukrainskoi Etnologii* (Lviw, 1909), xl, 73.

[10] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 280.

754 people know, therefore, of no more derogatory term to apply to a woman than "witch."[11] In her ordinary life, the *widma* resembles other women in every respect; only in action does she take on a weird or unhuman aspect. Then she is found walking around in a totally nude state with her hair in disorder, carrying in her right hand a baking spatula or a broom and in her left a bucket filled with milk stolen from strange cows.[12] She may also appear in the form of a dog, mouse, cat, or other animal,[13] of a flashing, transparent ball rolling in the air,[14] or of sparks escaping from a chimney.[15]

The *widma* is not only a close ally of the Devil, but also a faithful servant ever ready to fulfil his commands. Besides the personal advantage which she derives from her destructive activities, she experiences a devilish pleasure in harming people, especially those whom she considers her enemies. Quiescent during the daytime, she begins her depredations only after
754 dusk (*pidweczer*).[16] Nobody in the house is aware of her ac-
774 tivities, for only her spirit leaves, her body remaining in a sleeping or dormant state. But if her spirit experiences any harm during its nightly excursions, the mark of the injury is registered simultaneously upon the motionless body at home.[17] Its activities finished, the spirit returns to the body, but can re-enter it only if it has remained in exactly the same position as it was left; otherwise the body cannot come to life again. It is enough to turn the body over to prevent the spirit from becoming re-united with it.[18] Thus during the Austro-Prussian war a soldier stayed overnight with a certain family. He became aware that the housewife was a witch and decided to play a trick on her. After her spirit had left, he turned the body over. Since, as a consequence, the spirit could not re-enter it, the woman was found lifeless when morning came. However, when the husband, thinking his wife dead, had summoned his neighbours and begun to make funeral preparations, the soldier

[11] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 280. [12] *Idem*. [13] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 131.

113 [14] Szuchiewicz, W. *Huculszczyzna* (Lwów, 1902-8, 4 vols.) iv, 283.

[15] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 231. [16] *Idem*.

[17] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 131. [18] *Ibid.*, pp. 130-31.

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country on the other side has plenty while there is starvation at home.[24] Witches are also held responsible for hails, storms, floods and drought.[25] 754

The commonest speciality of witches, however, is the bewitching or drying up of cows. The methods and means employed are many. Some believe that the *widma* simply milks the cow once in the usual way. Others assert that she takes some milk from the victimized cow, especially on the eve of St. George or St. John, and with it smears the teats of her own cow, which then gives milk in abundance while the udder of the bewitched animal dries up or yields only blood. According to some, the witch need not even actually touch or see the cow she wishes to charm; she has only to think of a particular animal to receive her milk which in such a case flows from a door post, table, bench, or other object in the house.[26] Hence a witch does not actually have to possess a cow in order to have milk. "Marusia of Ispas never had a cow, but nevertheless always enjoyed an abundant supply of milk, and even had enough to sell; this astounded the people greatly until Petro Hyrak once came to her and found her milking a board."[27]

Although hated and despised, a witch must never be openly insulted or mistreated. In mentioning a witch, one should always append a curse, such as: "May she disappear"; "May the Devil stand between her eyes and the bear between her shoulders."[28] [789]

The wizard (*opyr*), although as harmful as his female counterpart, is considered lower in rank and is, in general, less frequently encountered.[29] He is even forced to serve the witch, e.g. as the steed on which she rides to her meetings, but he has the power to counteract any harm she may intend to do him.

[24] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 232-3.

[25] Kaindl, R. F. "Wetterzauberei bei den Rutenen und Huzulen," *Mittheilungen der k.k. geogr. Gesellschaft in Wien*, xxxvii, 637. [113]

[26] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 254.

[27] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 128.

[28] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 231.

[29] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 109.

Part II

The White Art: Counteracting Means

The Ukrainian peasant believes that all calamities can be 789
avoided or removed by conjuration, by the use of mysterious
concoctions, or by other magical means. Counteracting the [791]
work of the Devil and his associates and inducing good luck
are the special business of the professional soothsayer or conjuror, but even the ordinary person with no pretensions to extraordinary power can do much in this direction. Without employing the services of a professional conjuror he can, for instance, ward off evil from his cattle, assure himself of good luck in an enterprise, bring harm to his enemies, force a favourable turn in his love affair, foretell the future, and even banish an impending storm from his fields.

Thus in order to protect their cattle from harm, or to alleviate 789
damage already done, on the eve of St. George people fasten 777
brooms on long poles (*wichy*) to their gates as a notification to witches to leave the farmstead undisturbed.[36] The first milk from a cow that has calved is salted and poured into her drinking water. Old horseshoes are scattered around the yard, since it is thought that cattle stepping over them cannot be bewitched. To remove the spell on a cow, she is given a drink of holy water mixed with petals from a consecrated Palm Sunday branch; to make this potion even more effective some sulphur is added. If a cow has been taken sick and the owner does not know the reason thereof, the best thing to do is to "extinguish some coals." The peasant, or the soothsayer in his stead, throws glowing coals into a bucket of water; if they sink, the cow is bewitched. To bring her back to health it is only necessary to spill the water upon a black dog; the malady then passes to the dog, and the cow recovers. So greatly does the peasant fear possible harm to his cattle, that he often refrains from even the seemingly most innocent expressions. Instead of saying, for example, "The milk is boiling," he says "The milk is warming up."[37] [113]

[36] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), iii, 124.

[37] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 234-255.

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The most effective way of assuring oneself of good luck and prosperity is to ally oneself in some way with the Devil. The usual method is to sell him one's soul. A person wishing to do this draws up a formal contract, written with blood drawn from his little finger, whereby Satan is obligated to serve him throughout his life but in return gains possession of his soul after death.[38] One who has entered into such a pact with the Devil can share his benefits with another by selling the latter a lesser devil, who will bring him luck in all his undertakings.[39] A person cannot only buy a devil but also make one for himself. To do so he secures a partly developed egg from the body of a dissected hen and keeps it under his arm for nine consecutive days, even when walking and sleeping, taking care the while not to wash himself or comb his hair and, above all, not to pray. If he observes these rules there will hatch out of the egg a little devil, called *chowanec* (the nurtured), who too will serve him only on condition that he promise him his soul after death.[40] Another way of enlisting the services of the Devil is to stand at a crossways after midnight and call him thrice by name, whereupon Satan appears in person and gives the suppliant a coin (*inkluz*) which always brings him good luck.[41]

Any person, it is believed, can attain to supernatural or extraordinary powers if only he has a strong will, determination and courage, and can hold a secret. Thus one can gain control over hail by stealing a piece of wood from the church and having the priest (unwittingly, of course) read twelve masses over it.[42] A thief, to avoid detection, uses a curious amulet consisting of a human shin-bone emptied of its marrow and filled with candle wax. If he walks three times around a house with such a candle, all its occupants sink into a death-like slumber, and he can steal whatever he pleases with no danger of being caught.[43]

Mastery in any of the arts is attainable only with the help of

[38] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 86. [39] *Ibid.*, p. 86. [40] *Ibid.*, pp. 86-7.

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[41] Hnatiuk, V. "Znadoby do halicko-ruskoi demonologii," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (Lviw, 1904), xv, 255.

[42] Szuchiewicz, W. *Huculszczyzna*, (Lwów 1902-8, 4 vols.), i, 54.

[43] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Rutenen in der Bukowina und Galizien," *Globus*, lxi, 282.

expert. The simplest means is to toss holy water from an elevated place towards a threatening hail cloud. Another way of averting hail or an approaching storm is to light candles consecrated at Epiphany, or to put an oven spatula and a broom crosswise in front of the door. A further effective way of preventing hail is to take a piece of black cloth which has been used to wrap the feet, light it, and throw it half burned into the open. If this does not help, then the straw upon which someone has died is used instead. The most universal means, however, is the ringing of church bells, specially consecrated for the purpose, for as long as the danger lasts. Individual fields can be insured against hail throughout the year by burying consecrated Easter bread in the corners of the field.[60] An effective annual " insurance policy " can be taken out on Christmas Eve. Among the mountaineers it is the women who are entrusted with this task. After having fasted all day long, they repair with the approach of evening to their gardens and fields. There they walk around with their apron-dresses over their heads uttering their conjuration formulas. Upon their return home they immediately set the table, and, putting upon it their best food, they ask the Hail to enter as a guest, entreating him not to bother them during the year.[61]

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The people also know of many ways to bring rain when it is badly needed. The means, once more, range from the simplest to the most complex and elaborate practices. Rain can sometimes be induced by merely plucking some grass with the hand, by overthrowing a cross in the graveyard, or by throwing a poppy-head into a well. Another method is for the woman to refrain from washing clothes in the river, waiting stubbornly for rain. Still another is to kill a rooster on the bank of a river and then throw its blood and head into the water.[62] A curious means for breaking a long drought employed by people of certain villages towards the end of the last century is recorded by Kolberg.[63]

[60] Kaindl, R. F. " Wetterzauberei bei den Rutenen und Huzulen," *Mitt. der k.k. geogr. Gesellsch. in Wien*, xxxvii, 625, 628.

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[61] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 253.

[62] Kaindl, in *Mitt. k.k. geogr. Gesellsch.*, xxxvii, 639.

[63] *Pokucie*, iii, 122-3.

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people seize stones and with them beat their foreheads three times, saying: "Stone-head, stone-head, stone-head." This is supposed to make the head as hard as stone, i.e. immune to any ache.[75] 751

The evil spirits residing in natural phenomena can be a source of danger unless one takes the necessary precautions. When it thunders and lightens, one should avoid walking along the road, and should sit down somewhere at the side, because God is shooting at the fleeing Devil and his arrows may accidentally kill the wayfarer.[76] One should do the same in the case of a dust storm, for its indwelling Devil is likely to harm a Christian.[77] One can lessen the severity of a blizzard (*metylycia*), and cause it to subside, by throwing sharp edged sticks at the driving snow. Falling hail can also be rendered harmless by catching the first hailstones, chewing them, and spitting them on the ground; "the horns of the evil spirit are then chewed off," and the hail loses its harmfulness in that locality.[78] 821 789

Part III

Healing by Magic

Disease, like other calamities, is attributed by the people to evil spirits. It is the incessant activities of a multitude of supernatural beings, the people believe, that cause the many afflictions that befall the human body and soul.[79] Epidemic and fatal diseases are personified as supernatural women. The female personification of the plague, according to a popular story, once made a young peasant carry her on his shoulders. Wherever he went people began to die by the thousands. Finally he attempted to get rid of his dread burden by throwing himself into a river. It was he alone, however, who drowned; the plague, being light 753

[75] Kolessa, F. "Ludowy wiruwania na pidhirju," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (Lviw, 1898), v, 77. [113]

[76] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 91. [77] Kolessa, F. *op cit.*, v, 76.

[78] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 234.

[79] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), 160.

753 as a feather, escaped. She was so frightened, nevertheless, that she fled to the forest and forsook her activities, so that the epidemic ceased.[80]

755 One way of avoiding death or serious harm is to propitiate the
782 spirits through vows.

It happens often that a sick person makes a vow (*zarikajet sie*), i.e. a promise, that if he regains his health, he will forego certain pleasures in life, or abstain from some pleasant task. A certain woman, for example, accidentally drove a needle into the palm of her hands, and when the physician, after chloroforming her, removed the needle, the convalescent pledged herself never again to sew embroidered shoulder-pieces on to a shirt of hers. This promise she kept religiously, sewing only on shirts belonging to others. Another woman, in order to rid herself of a headache, promised that she would not spin on Fridays; when relieved, she occupied herself every Friday with a different task in order to avoid spinning. A peasant in order to preserve his cattle during an epidemic that had broken out, solemnly vowed to give up drinking liquor for half a year, and when his cattle were saved he kept his word.[81]

755 Believing in the supernatural causation of disease, the people have little faith in scientific medical treatment, if they do not ignore it altogether. Poverty, though doubtless a factor, is far less important than the conviction, fully compatible with the prevailing conception of disease, that the native medicine-men and their remedies are more reliable than physicians and their medications. That the question of money is not decisive can be seen from the fact that quack doctors often receive larger fees than trained physicians. Even when given free treatment and medicine, an individual often puts aside the medicament and then boasts that he has gotten well because he has not used it.[82] While he places full confidence in his own remedies,

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[80] Woycicki, K. W. *Polnische Volkssagen und Maerchen* (Berlin, 1839), pp. 23-4.

[81] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 160.

[82] Kaindl, R. F. *Die Huzulen* (Wien, 1894), p. 93.

sanctioned by the tradition of generations, he looks upon all 755
medicines prescribed by a physician with a certain suspicion.[83]

Popular remedies fall roughly into three categories: (1) amu- [751]
lets and other prophylactic and precautionary means, (2) incantations, and (3) concoctions, compounded of strange and varied elements from the animal, plant, and mineral worlds. Only in serious, persistent, or complicated cases, or in those ascribed to the direct influence of spirits, e.g. snake-bite, fright,[84] partial paralysis, and stomach disorders,[85] does the peasant consult a professional healer, man or woman: otherwise he uses the standard remedies passed on from generation to generation. Many of the treatments hereinafter to be described, therefore, are often undertaken without the help of a healer.[86]

The healer, who is called *znachor* (fem. *znachorka*) from *znaty* (to know), is not a wizard, nor is he in league with any of the forces of evil. His sole power and function is to combat or counteract ailments by performing conjurations and compounding remedies; he thus plays the role of physician. He is, to be sure, endowed with supernatural powers—he is even referred to as the "earthly god"—but he gets these from God himself.[87] As a matter of fact, the priest and his assistant, it is thought, can sometimes counteract the work of the Devil by ridding a person of his malady. Thus in some sections of the mountains the people commonly seek the aid of the sexton in case of illness. This official inserts a knife between the pages of the church prayer book as many times as are necessary to find the alleged "right place," charging the patient a certain fee for each insertion. He then reads from the book, as if they were written there, the causes and cure of the disease. This practice is said to be slowly becoming obsolete, but it is still not unusual for priests to undertake to cure people by special Masses and prayers and by consecration with holy water.[88]

[83] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 160. [84] *Ibid.*, pp. 167-69.

[85] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 239. [86] *Idem.*

[87] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161; Szuchiewicz, W. *Huculszczyzna* (Lwów, 1902-08, 4 vols.) iv, 297, 312. [113]

[88] Kaindl, R. F. "Aus der Volksueberlieferung der Bojken," *Globus*, lxxix, 152.

755 Although the *znachor*, especially one of reputation, can diagnose and treat any disease, he often specializes in particular ailments, e.g. fevers, paralysis, headaches, or snake-bite. He keeps his formulas and concoctions strictly secret, for a knowledge of them by others would impair if not invalidate his powers.[89] The formulas and recipes are much more numerous and varied than the ailments themselves; for curing fever, for instance, there are not less than seventy-seven remedies, corresponding to seventy-seven causes, i.e. spirits.[90] They range from the simplest prescriptions, e.g. to drink water drawn from a well before sunrise, to the most complicated compounds of herbs, animal and human exuviae and excrements, insects, dirt, etc., accompanied by elaborate verbal formulas and grotesque performances. While certain remedies are the private property of an individual healer and are only effective when performed or suggested by him, others are common knowledge and freely used by the people.

[754] The *znachor* or *znachorka*, is also an expert in inducing love, causing barren women to conceive, foretelling future events, and even settling difficult family problems.[91] Healers of reputation, like expert weather-men, are comparatively few in number—very often only one in a considerable territory—and are widely sought after. People often travel many miles to consult a master healer, and pay large fees for his services.[92]

The *znachor* ascribes his power to his special endowment from God, and his knowledge of the medicinal properties of different ingredients to a secret source which he cannot divulge. Every healer has his own fast-day, when he communes with God.[93] He knows which wells have water containing therapeutic qualities and what herbs are good for particular diseases. He gathers the herbs at certain seasons of the year and at prescribed hours during the day, and keeps them in readiness at his home. It is noteworthy that this mysterious art of healing, being the pro-

[89] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[90] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

[113] [91] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 233.

[92] *Ibid.* p. 277; Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[93] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, iv, 297.

* [healer -- analyst]

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perty of an individual, can be stolen.[94] Usually, however, it is transmitted from father to son.[95]

That the people, at least those seeking his advice, consider the *znachor* as endowed with unusual powers is obvious. But how does he regard himself? Does he really believe in his art, or does he merely take advantage of the ignorance of the people? There is no doubt that many actually believe in their extraordinary powers and in the effectiveness of their remedies.[96] On the other hand, however, there are those who admit, when pressed hard, that they sometimes delude and even mislead their patients,[97] while others claim—only before intelligent people, of course—that their conjurations really consist largely of Christian prayers, which cannot, at the worst, do any harm to the patient.[98]

The excuse for an obvious failure is the usual one of the shaman, or, for that matter, of quacks all over the world, namely, that the patient did not follow the directions strictly. This the healer usually finds very easy, since he often requires impossible tasks of his patients. He claims, for example, that the recommended water was not drawn from the well in the specified hour or manner, or that the coals over which he pronounced his conjuration were not taken from a "living" fire.[99] In one case two Jewish girls, who had come from afar to a famous *znachor* for a love potion, were sent all the way back on foot to fetch new containers, since those they had brought with them had been used and the potion poured into them would thus have had no effect.[100]

In mild cases and in those of chronic or general ill health, the healer, as a rule, merely offers advice. He tells the patient that his affliction is caused perhaps by the fact that he has built his house on the head of a demon, or that he has unwittingly dug up the root of a lilac bush, or that he has started some task at

[94] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[95] Kaindl, R. F. "Neue Beitraege zur Ethnologie und Volkskunde der Huzulen," *Globus*, lxix, 74.

[96] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 217.

[97] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxix, p. 74.

[98] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[99] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, iv, 313.

[100] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxix, 74.

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BELIEFS REGARDING THE SOUL AND THE FUTURE WORLD AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS

775 THE departed soul, it is believed by the Ukrainian peasant, does not enter the other world immediately, except in the case of baptized children. It accompanies its body to the place of burial,[1] and returns home with its relatives.[2] When the mourners leave the cemetery, therefore, they are careful to follow the same route as on the outgoing journey, so as not to cause the soul any inconvenience; otherwise it might lose its way, and wander around before finding its way home.[3] Moreover, when the rela-

113 [1] Onyščuk, A. "Materyaly do huculskoi demonologii," *Materyaly do Ukrainskoi Etnologii*, xi (Lviw, 1909), 48.

[2] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna*, (Lwów, 1902-08, 4 vols.) ii, 275.

[3] *Ibid.*, ii, 273.

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p. 157

775 tives and guests sit down to their post-funeral dinner—a meal nearly as elaborate as that at a christening or a wedding [4]—a candle, preferably one used at the funeral, is lit and put on the oven, and beside it are placed a glass of brandy and a morsel of bread, in the conviction that the soul will thus participate in the meal.[5] The mountaineers, for a similar reason, usually scatter a little flour on the table and window sill. In the morning they even prove that the soul has touched the flour by pointing to traces which have unquestionably been left by cockroaches and flies.[6] For several days, bread and brandy or water are offered anew each day.[7] In some localities the relatives visit the grave on the third day after the funeral, and place upon it little loaves of bread, cheese, milk, flour, dried prunes, or other foods. After the priest, who is present on such occasions, has finished his prayer, the food is distributed among the poor.[8] On a Sunday a few weeks later, if possible on Easter Sunday, the visit to the grave and the food offering are repeated.[9] These sacrifices to the dead, called *mesoczky* or *perepiczky*, can be explained in two possible ways; either as gifts of food for actual consumption by the dead, or—as is more likely—as attempts to propitiate the ghost, especially a vampire, and thus escape its evil influences.[10] The people are totally unaware of the meaning of the practice. When asked for an explanation, they reply: "*Tak si hodyt*" (this is as it should be).

Before departing for the other world, the soul roams about on earth for forty days, during which time it makes nightly visits to its former home.[11] According to some, it must spend seven years on earth and revisit all the places where during its lifetime

113 [4] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie*, (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), i, 219.

[5] *Ibid.*, i, 219.

[6] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 275.

[7] Kaindl, R. F. "Die Seele und ihr Aufenthaltsort nach dem Tode in dem Volksglauben der Rutenen und Huzulen," *Globus*, lxvii (Braunschweig, 1895), 358.

[8] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 277.

[9] Kaindl, R. F., *Die Huzulen* (Wien, 1894), p. 129.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 127 n.

[11] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxvii, 357.

it did anything good or bad.[12] During its nightly visits to its old home it enters the room quietly, even though the doors and windows be shut, uncovers the children and rocks them, and sometimes plays practical jokes on the members of the family.[13] It retains the power to harm, however, only for one year after the funeral, and the members of the family consequently fear it most during this period.[14] Especially must it be guarded against on the night following the funeral. On this night the members of the household of the deceased must not go to sleep, but must continue their vigil as in the two preceding nights. Although some of the participants in the post-funeral dinner leave after a few hours, others remain in the house to keep the mourners company. In order to keep awake, the watchers resort to various tricks to evoke laughter and ban sleep. As soon as one dozes off, for example, another smears soot on his face, fastens a rag to his coat, or sews his coat to that of another, and the ensuing laughter causes the napping one to awake.[15]

The other world, it is believed, is very distant, and the journey thither takes many days. The mountaineers believe that the soul travels on horseback,[16] and that the road is beset with obstacles and strewn with thorns. To reach the other world the soul must also cross a fathomless sea. If it is deserving, the Mother of God carries it over the water in a tightly woven net.[17]

The peasant conceives the future world in terms of the one he lives in. In heaven, people continue their daily existence much as they did on earth. They lead, to be sure, a life "where neither the burning sun, nor wind and storm disturb the perfect tranquility." But they occupy houses exactly like those found in the native villages, and they eat food which differs in no way from the regular peasant diet. Shepherds busy themselves tending cattle upon rich pastures, and tillers of the soil do their

[12] Onyšćuk, *op. cit.*, xi, 48.

[13] Kolessa, J., "Narodziny i chrzciny, wesele i pogrzeb u ludu ruskiego," *Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej*, xiii, (Kraków, 1889), 150.

[14] *Ibid.*, xiii, 150.

[15] Kolberg, *op. cit.*, i, 219.

[16] Kandi, in *Globus*, lxvii, 358.

[17] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 274.

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SUPERNATURAL BELIEFS AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS

BY SAMUEL KOENIG

116 THE Ukrainian peasant of south-eastern Poland or Galicia looks upon all the forces of nature as actuated by spirits which must be conceived of as mainly ghost-derived. True nature spirits, whatever importance they may once have had, play to-day only a minor role in the folk beliefs of the Galician Ukrainians.[1] In the spirit environment of the peasant, their place is taken by two classes of beings: the Devil with his cohorts, and the ghosts of the dead.[2] It is to these that the various calamities and afflictions that befall man are attributed, and against them that all possible defensive measures are directed.

The most important spirit, and the most generally feared, is the Devil (*didko*). He causes extremes in natural phenomena with all their disastrous results to man. He brings, not only hail and whirlwinds, but also floods and excessive droughts. Indeed, he or his demons lie behind every mysterious force.[3]

As to the appearance of the Devil, popular beliefs are at variance. In general, he is thought to assume human shape, but he is black and has horns and a fiery tongue. Although

113 [1] Even Baba Jeudocha, the personification of the snowstorm, and Did (Old Man), the grim winter god who is symbolically burned some days after Christmas, can hardly be looked upon as strict nature spirits; both are said to have been originally human beings who turned into spirits only after their death. (See Kaindl, R. F., "Wetterzauberei bei den Rutenen und Huzulen," *Mittheilungen der k.k. geogr. Gesellschaft*, XXXVII (Wien, 1894), 631, 636.)

[2] Zelenin, D., *Russische (Ostslavische) Volkskunde* (Berlin, 1927), p. 384.

[3] Onyščuk, A., "Materyaly do Huculskoi Demonologii," *Materyaly do Ukrainskoi Etnologii* (Lviw, 1909), XI, 72-3.

776 he may take the form of either sex, the Devil himself is a male.[4] Sometimes he appears as a chimney sweep, when he has wings like a bat, tangled horns like a ram, and a tail.[5] The Devil can change his shape to suit his fancy, and can assume almost any form, e.g., that of a baby, a cow, a pig, an insect, a worm, or a straw.[6] Even when visible in no concrete form, he may nevertheless be present. When one sees a flash of light from afar at dusk, or hears a sudden whisper or rustle, one is certain it is the Devil, whose unseen presence is felt everywhere.[7] The Devil fears nothing save God, the cross, and holy water.[8] Nevertheless, he is mortal, and is particularly vulnerable to lightning. During a thunderstorm he seeks any available cover, but Elijah's arrow discovers him, and destroys him and his shelter.[9] His ordinary abode is hell, whence he ascends at night to pursue his baneful activities on earth.[10]

551 The people, as a rule, carefully avoid mentioning the name
TB of the Devil (*didko* or *czort*). To utter it would be blasphemy (*lichoslowyty*), and to blaspheme against the Devil is a serious sin (*hrich wełykyj*).[11] The people, therefore, usually resort to a circumlocution and call him *win* (he), *tot szczezby* (that one, may he be lost!), *zlyj duch* (the evil spirit),[12] or *neczystyj* (the unclean one).[13] His name may be mentioned, however, in extreme anger,[14] or he may be called familiarly by a nickname, such as Fedko or Chitko.[15] To some individuals, who have formed a pact with the Devil and have sold him their souls, he is harmless and even exceedingly helpful in attaining power and wealth.

113 [4] Kaindl, R. F., *Die Huzulen* (Wien, 1894), p. 81.
[5] Onyščuk, *op. cit.*, XI, 72.
[6] Kolberg, O., *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 232.
[7] *Idem.*
[8] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie* (Kraków, 4 vols., 1882-9), III, 86n.
[9] Zelenin, *op. cit.*, p. 397.
[10] Kaindl, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[11] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 81 n.
[12] *Idem.*
[13] Kaindl. *op. cit.*, p. 83.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 84.
[15] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 232.

775 The earth, according to peasant belief, literally teems with spirits of all sorts. Aside from Satan and his demons, however, these are mainly the ghosts of unclean persons more or less recently deceased. Some are exceedingly malevolent and harmful; others are less so, but none are beneficial to man.

Among the most dangerous of supernatural beings are the vampires, the ghosts of deceased witches and wizards. Destructive even in life, they have been released by death from all earthly restraints, and their evil nature, now given full freedom, makes them the most feared element in the imaginary environment. Vampires are of both sexes; males are called *opyry* and females *widmy*. Their corpses are revived at night by the action of the moonbeams, for which reason they are most active during the full moon. Leaving their graves, they first turn their steps to their former homes, to visit their families. An *opyr* who is survived by a widow is said to have intercourse with her. He may even beget offspring in this way, but they are born without bones. A *widma*, on the other hand, is innately modest, and is satisfied to turn loving eyes upon her husband or sweetheart. After visiting their homes, the vampires wander about the houses in the vicinity, rattling the doors and windows and even calling the occupants by name. Sometimes they enter a house by crawling under the door. Once inside, they fasten themselves on the chest of a sleeper and suck his warm blood, before hurrying back to their graves. Vampires usually wander for nine consecutive nights. Besides the harm they do to individuals, they send pestilences upon the village and cause excesses in natural phenomena.[16]

Much less harmful, as well as more restricted in their sphere of activities, are the ghosts of ordinary sinners

113 [16] Wagilewicz, J. "O upiorach i wiedźmach", *Časopis českoho museum* (Quoted by O. Kolgerg, *Pokucie*, III, 209, 211).

775 (*pokutnyky*) and those of persons who have died a violent death. They occupy themselves mainly with praying to God on moonlit nights in front of the church, and with frightening people.[17] Some of them, however, are definitely malignant, especially the ghosts of drowned persons (*topelnyky*). Such ghosts are doomed to roam the earth for seven years. They live in the water, usually near the spot where they met their death, and, like the vampires, are especially active at the full moon.[18] The appearance ascribed to them differs with the locality. Some picture the *topelnyk* as a little man with long hair which reaches to the ground and covers him completely; others describe him as completely covered with fish-like scales.[19] The *topelnyky* are dangerous only to persons on the water, especially to those rowing in a boat. Since their redemption depends upon their success in drowning another person, they are always on the lookout for a victim.[20] In some places no peasant dares to go rowing on a Sunday or holiday, except to attend church or to call a priest or a doctor, under which circumstances the *topelnyky* have no power to harm.[21]

776 The waters also harbour *rusalky*, or nymphs, the ghosts of girls who have died before marriage. Their bodies are half human and half fish-like. They are not, as a rule, harmful, but spend their time singing, praying and telling stories.[22] It is interesting to note that neither the *rusalky* nor the *topelnyky* are really water spirits, i.e. nature spirits, but rather human ghosts who inhabit the waters. This again emphasizes the fact that true nature spirits are almost completely lacking among the Ukrainians. Moreover, the *rusalky* frequently take up their abode in forest glades and

113 [17] Hnatiuk, V., "Znadoby do halicko-ruskoĭ demonologii," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnik* (Lviw, 1904), XV, 145.

[18] *Ibid*, XV, 154. [19] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 233.

[20] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna* (Lwów, 4 vols., 1902-8), IV, 283.

[21] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 233. [22] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, IV, 282.

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BELIEFS AND PRACTICES RELATING TO BIRTH AND CHILDHOOD AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS

I. Pregnancy and Birth

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Pregnancy, to the Ukrainian peasant, is a phenomenon surrounded by mysterious forces which, if offended in any way, are sure to bring misfortune upon the expectant mother and her unborn child. A pregnant woman is treated with consideration, and is usually showered with wishes for an easy confinement. A person mistreating an expectant mother exposes himself and his household to harm.[1] In the belief that labour pains, especially acute ones, are not inevitable but are caused by evil powers,

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[1] *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, by G. R. Owst, Cambridge, 1933. P. 99. Reinfelden's Moralization is in MS. Egerton 2419.

[1] Kaindl, R. F., *Die Huzulen: Ihr Leben, ihre Sitten, und ihre Volksüberlieferung* (Wien, 1894), p. 4.

843 784 789 the Ukrainian peasant woman keeps her pregnancy as secret as possible. The Devil and persons with supernatural powers will thus be kept in ignorance and, consequently, be prevented from interfering in any way with her accouchement.[2] The expectant mother therefore avoids mentioning her condition to any one except the midwife. A husband, for the same reason, dislikes to speak of his wife's pregnancy.[3] Some women, especially among the mountaineers (*hutzuls*), even wind about themselves a broad strip of woollen bandage, in order to hide their condition. So tightly is the bandage wrapped that it has a definite effect upon the child, which is usually very small at birth; in order to assure its normal development the midwife, upon delivering it, exclaims: "Now grow!"[4]

[847] A child is, as a rule, a welcome addition to the family. Hence an enceinte woman, legitimately married, rarely attempts abortion or infanticide.[5] On the contrary, she is greatly concerned to give birth to a healthy child, and in order to assure herself of this, she cautiously watches nearly every step she takes and strictly observes a variety of taboos. The precautions and taboos, both before and after birth, are based in most cases on the belief that things or actions produce similar results. In other words, certain objects that the pregnant woman may see or touch, certain foods that she may eat, and certain phenomena that she may observe, hear, or feel, will register a corresponding effect upon her child. Wherever, therefore, the consequences are obviously undesirable, a pregnant woman tries to avoid doing or observing the thing in question, or, if this is impossible, to guard against them by certain means which are usually imitative in nature. A few examples follow.

[13] [2] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie: Obraz Etnograficzny* (4 vols., Kraków, 1882–1889), i, 208.

[3] *Idem.*

[4] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna* (4 vols., Lwów, 1902–1908), ii, 2.

[5] Unmarried girls, on the other hand, very often take steps to dispose of their unborn children. Cf. Koenig, S., "Marriage and the Family among the Galician Ukrainians," in *Studies in the Science of Society*, G. P. Murdock (Editor) (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937), pp. 302–303.

843 If a pregnant woman looks fixedly at a person, or for that
784 matter if he stares at her, her child will be pretty or the reverse,
789 depending on that person's appearance. She therefore tries not to look at or be seen by an ugly individual.[6] She also avoids looking at a fisherman, lest her child will have a restless nature.[7] Neither must she watch a horse shaking its head, or her child will be constantly subject to similar behaviour.[8] If, on the other hand, she happens to see a galloping steed, her pregnancy will last twelve months.[9] Upon observing a mouse, an expectant mother must spit and touch her abdomen; otherwise her child will be born with a mark resembling a mouse on its body. A fire in the village may have a similar effect; if a woman is frightened by it and does not spit immediately, her unborn child will have the mark of a flame on its body. Should a pregnant woman eat an apple at the approach of her confinement, warts are likely to appear on the face of her child;[10] and if the apple be a stolen one, the child will grow up to be a thief.[11]

843 Definite signs enable one to predict the sex of an unborn child. If the prospective mother eats her meals with a good appetite, for example, it is a sign that she will have a boy; otherwise her child will be a girl. According to another indication, if the woman is to have a boy large spots appear on her face before her confinement, but if her face remains smooth and white
844 she is sure to have a girl.[12] The destiny of the child, and even
777 of the parents, can be foretold from certain omens. If birth
787 occurs around noon the child is destined to be unfortunate, while a baby born at daybreak will be lucky.[13] The crowing of a cock during birth is a bad omen. The birth of twins presages disaster, *e.g.*, the imminent death of one of the parents or the

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[6] Kolessa, J., "Narodziny i chrzciny, wesele i pogrzeb u ludu ruskiego," *Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej*, xii (Kraków, 1889) 117; Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[7] Kaindl, *ibid.*, p. 4.

[8] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

[9] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[10] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 1.

[11] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[12] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 174.

[13] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

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844 impoverishment and consequent ruin of the homestead.[14] Ac-
777 cording to another version, the birth of twins or triplets is a
787 general punishment from God.[15] Since eating two potatoes, two apples, or two plums would result in her having twins, a pregnant woman is most careful to abstain therefrom.[16] A child born before the ninth month indicates that the woman has been unfaithful to her husband.[17]

843 The Ukrainian peasant woman, as a rule, goes about her daily
844 tasks uninterruptedly until the very onset of labour pains. The mountainee. woman in particular, owing to her robustness, seems to give birth with an unusual ease and unconcern. Besides attending to her routine work in the house, she is occupied at a period very close to her confinement with such work as milking cows, constructing fences, and pitching hay. Only a woman who is constitutionally weak takes to bed when she feels that her accouchement is not far off. Others often deliver their babies wherever they happen to be at the time—in the barn milking, in the field, or anywhere else. Sometimes a woman goes up to the attic, and after a few moments hands her baby down to someone below and then climbs down after it.[18] Women have even been known to return from market with a newborn baby in their arms and a sack full of purchased articles on their backs. In order to avoid leaving blood spots behind her in case she delivers her baby outside of the home, a woman who expects to give birth at any moment often puts on a pair of men's trousers under her dress when leaving the house.

844 Birth itself is surrounded by a mass of practices, again mostly imitative in nature, which are concerned rather with the well-being of the infant than with preserving the health of the mother.[19] When the hour of confinement arrives the husband repairs to call the midwife (*baba*), who is usually a woman with

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[14] Kolessa, J., "Ludowy wiruwania na pidhirju," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk*, v (Lwów, 1898), 83.

[15] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5.

[16] Kolessa, in *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk*, v, 83.

[17] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[18] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 2.

[19] Vowk, C., *Studii z Ukrainskoi Etnografii ta Antropologii* (Praha, n.d.), p. 188.

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844 bed, a knife and some keys, because iron has the power to
784 drive away evil forces.[24]

789 A precaution never forgotten is to light a candle immediately after the delivery; otherwise the baby, not being baptized as yet, would surely be harmed by lurking evil forces. Under no circumstances must the light be extinguished, at least not until holy water is obtained from the priest and sprinkled over the mother, the baby, and the entire room.[25] Besides this essential precaution, a multitude of other means are taken to protect the child and assure its healthy growth. As soon as possible after birth, for example, there is tied to the right wrist of the infant a little sack, called *szkalytoczka*, which contains the following articles: a piece of garlic—to make the child as sharp as this vegetable; a piece of clay from the oven—to make it as immune to the evil eye as is the oven; a piece of coal—to make the eyes of whoever casts upon it an evil glance burn like coal; some dust from the tracks of a dog—so that people will stare at it no more than they do at a dog's tracks. A small wooden cross is likewise hung on the infant's neck.[26] A mother must not turn her back upon her baby lest it turn yellow,[27] or be taken by a superhuman woman, the *diwa-baba*,[28] in exchange for a brat of hers. Nothing in the house may be given away on the day of birth, or the child will be given to sleeplessness. Whoever takes a glance at a newborn infant must spit immediately—to make sure that the child has not been bewitched.[29] Throughout the first night, some member of the family must keep watch, so that nothing may befall the child.[30]

777 A person's destiny, it is believed, is determined immediately upon his birth, at which moment twelve invisible judges convene on the window-sill near the table. Eleven of them pronounce

[24] *Idem.*

[25] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [26] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 4.

[27] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

[113] [28] Regarding the nature of this mysterious woman, see Koenig, S., "Supernatural Beliefs among the Galician Ukrainians," *Folk-Lore*, xlix (Sept. 1938), 274.

[29] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 4–5.

[30] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

777 various prophecies as to the future of the child, but final decision rests with the oldest, whose judgment prevails. These same judges grant the child a star, which shines only so long as he [776] lives; upon his death it falls to earth. Every person at birth likewise receives a guardian angel, whose duty it is to protect him throughout his life. Before starting any new task, and especially when in danger, the peasant calls upon his ministering angel for assistance, saying: "Guardian angel, help me!"[31] Since one's fate is determined at birth, one can do little to change it. This explains, in the popular mind, why one man is poor and another rich, one healthy and another sick, why one lives long and another dies young. It also explains why there are all kinds of children in the world, and why even children of the same parents often differ so markedly.[32]

845 A deformed or mentally deficient child is ascribed to the act 732 of an evil spirit, particularly the *diwa-baba*. Such a child has a large head, is always lean, and can never be satiated. With his tremendous appetite he suckles so ravenously that his mother's breast finally withers away. Such a child causes constant trouble, is retarded in its growth and short-lived, and does not reach a stature commensurate with his age until after death.[33]

II. Christening Ceremonies

851 While great secrecy surrounds pregnancy and birth, the 553 ceremonies that follow are ushered in with the greatest publicity. As soon as she has attended to the child and the mother, the midwife begins to make preparations for the christening (*chres-* [777] *tyny*), which must take place immediately. A child who is allowed to remain unbaptized over night is exposed to all sorts of dangers. If at all possible, therefore, an infant is taken to church to be baptized on the very day it is born, even though the hour be late in the evening, the weather extremely unfavourable, and the distance considerable.[34] While the father, who takes

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[31] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [32] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 287.

[33] Kaindl, R. F., "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi (Braunschweig, 1899), 256.

[34] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 113; Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6.

851 608 553 a passive part throughout the ceremony,[35] busies himself with supplying the assembled guests with drinks, the *baba* repairs to the village to invite the godparents (*kumy*) to the christening. The number of men and women asked to act in this capacity ranges from a single couple to as many as fifteen, depending upon the wealth and social status of the parents. The most desirable godparents are the couple who acted as best man and maid of honour at the wedding of the parents.[36] A pregnant woman, too, is considered a most acceptable godmother, for a child held during baptism by such a woman is assured of good luck. An enceinte woman, however, seldom consents to play the rôle, since her own child may be harmed thereby.[37] The wealthier and more prominent the godparents, the more desirable they are. If the parents have been unfortunate in rearing children, however, they invite a couple of wandering beggars to act as godparents and treat them with the greatest of courtesy. This, it is asserted, will change the luck of the parents, and will make the child grow and be healthy.[38] For two women to reciprocate as godmothers is considered not only unwise but a downright sin.[39] Near neighbours, too, make anything but good godparents. Since the two families live in close contact, it is almost inevitable that a quarrel shall sometime arise between them, and tradition as well as propriety strongly disapproves of unfriendly relations with one's *kumy*.[40] Contrary to what one might expect, for a gypsy to hold a child at baptism is supposed to bring it good luck, especially in trade and horse-raising.[41]

851 608 553 The midwife approaches the people selected as godparents with these words: "May God grant you health! The mother of the baby has sent me to ask you to do her the favour of holding her child during baptism." If they agree to undertake the function, they either follow her to the house a little later or else promise to meet her in the church at a designated hour.

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[35] According to D. Zelenin, *Russische (Ostslavische) Volkskunde* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1927), p. 295, the passivity may be explained by the fact that he is, like his wife, considered unclean.

[36] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 208–211.

[37] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 0.

[38] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

[39] *Idem.*

[40] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[41] *Idem.*

851 553 Upon returning home, she swathes the baby and takes a piece of bread and a knife, but does not leave the house until the mother has wiped the infant with her shirt to protect it from the evil eye. On the doorstep the *baba* makes the sign of the cross over the child, and sometimes another woman sprinkles it with holy water. The same procedure is repeated on the other side of the door. Here, however, the midwife sticks her knife into the door, and leaves it for some member of the household to remove later.[42]

If the godparents have come to the house, they follow the midwife, each carrying a long piece of linen (*kryżmo*) and a candle, while the father bears a hen, two loaves of bread, and a " head " of salt as a present for the priest. At the church, all kneel down while some of the godparents remove the swaddling clothes and two others hold the sides of the *kryżmo* on which the infant is placed. The priest, after lighting the candles and handing them back to the participants, reads a prayer, then turns to them and repeats thrice the question : " Do you renounce the evil spirit? " To this, the *baba* and the godparents, turning their heads to the door, reply : " We renounce! " The priest next asks them : " Are you willing to serve God and Jesus Christ? " Each godparent then hands over to the priest his piece of linen, which later becomes the property of the child. After these preliminaries comes the actual christening, which differs little from the usual Catholic ceremony. The name given the child is usually that of the saint who presides over that particular day. For boys, the most popular names are Iwan, Hryć, Hawrylo, Nykola, Michajlo, and Petro ; for girls, Maryja, Katerina, Hanna, and Paraska.[43] Children, even twins, are usually baptized in church ; only in the case of triplets does the priest go [793] to the house of the parents to perform the ceremony. Among the highlanders, it is believed that a widowed priest who learns of the birth of triplets, and goes voluntarily to the house, is allowed to remarry.[44] After the ceremony the sexton extin-

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[42] Kolberg, *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 49 ; Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

[43] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, pp. 49–50 ; *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[44] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6 ; ordinarily a uniate priest is allowed to marry only once—prior to his being ordained.

851 553 guishes the candles, appropriates half of them himself, and returns the rest to the participants, who must light them again in the room where the mother is confined.[45] If the candles are not easily extinguished, it is a sign that the baptized child will have a long life.[46]

851 574 In some localities the godparents leave immediately after the close of the ceremony for the house of the parents, where a festive dinner is served; in most places, however, they return to their homes and go to the party in the evening.[47] The midwife, upon her return, greets the mother with these words: "You have given us the child born; we, however, return it to you [777] sacrificed and baptized." She then places the infant on a black fur coat (*kożuch*), which is thought to bring luck, and hands it over on the coat to the mother.[48]

At the christening dinner the father again plays a most inconspicuous rôle, the midwife and the godparents being the principal [431] actors. Each guest brings presents of foodstuffs, chiefly beans, peas, eggs, cheese, salt, and bread. After a flood of greetings and congratulations, the women give their presents to the mother, placing them on her bed, while the men hand their gifts, usually loaves of bread, to the father.[49]

After these preliminaries, the guests seat themselves at the table. The master of the house serves each of them with a drink of whisky, and the midwife or the cook places before each an appetizer consisting of a piece of meat or another delicacy. The courses served at this meal are as numerous and elaborate as those of a wedding dinner. They usually include meat with gravy, *holubci* (grouts enveloped in cabbage leaves), *pirohy* (potatoes or grouts enveloped in dough), sour cream, *borszcz* (beet soup), and many other dishes, depending, of course, upon the economic status of the parents. Whisky is lavishly provided, and each guest offers a toast before every drink. It is interesting to note that, if the baby be a boy, the godparents,

[45] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[46] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[47] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[113] [48] Jandaurek, J., *Das Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien und das Herzogtum Bukowina* (Wien, 1884), p. 62.

[49] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

*[christening -- Analyst]

857 Before the age of twelve or thirteen, boys and girls rarely ever play together or have any other contact with each other. Whenever children are seen at play, a strict separation of the sexes is noticed. This is not the result of any special instruction on the part of the parents, and still less the outcome of imitation. [562] Besides their different spheres of interest, the boys manifest a certain pride and self-consciousness which causes them to band together, leaving the girls to themselves. With puberty, however, boys and girls mix freely and seek each other's company. Peasant children scarcely recognize any distinction between rich and poor; the sons and daughters of the wealthy associate with those of the poor without consciousness of superiority or inferiority on either side.[71]

538 861 593 The philosophy of parents with regard to the training of their children, in so far as they can be said to have one, is summed up in the following proverbial expressions: "The granting of freedom to children means the constraint of the parents";[72] or, "Give the children freedom and you will find yourself in slavery."[73] Other examples of folk wisdom reveal a similar attitude: "A child will not grow up without a rod." "Do not give in to a child." "Love your child with your heart and drive it with your hands."[74] "Love your child like your soul, and shake it like the pear tree."[75] The burden of rearing children, although actually not very heavy, is, nevertheless, a source of complaint and finds expression in proverbs, *e.g.*, "To feed a child is like carrying a rock." "Small children don't let you sleep, and big ones don't let you live." "Whoever has no children does not know what trouble is."[76] Other proverbs reflect an opposite attitude towards children: "A mother of ten is a joy."[77] "If God grants children, He will provide for them."[78]

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[71] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 8–9.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[113] [73] Franko, I., "Halicko-ruski narodni prypowidky," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (vols. xvi, xxiii–xxiv, Lwów, 1905–1908), xvi, 562.

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 563–564.

[75] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 8.

[76] Franko, *op. cit.*, pp. 564, 600.

[77] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 179.

[78] Franko, *op. cit.*, p. 598.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Introduction

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This is a collaborative work whose aim is to impart to the English reader general information concerning the Ukrainian people, their territory and their achievements in public life. It might be termed a Ukrainian encyclopaedia in miniature. With the exception of Professor Manning of Columbia University who has provided the contribution on "The Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon World," and to whom I owe special thanks for this essay, all the authors are Ukrainian specialists, who have devoted their best efforts to the furtherance of the project. The geographical depiction of the country was written by Professor W. Kubiyovych, formerly of the University of Cracow, and now engaged at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich. He is the author of a large textbook on the geography of Ukraine and of a Ukrainian atlas. The contributions on the "Ukrainian People", "Ukrainian Emigration", "Minorities in Ukraine", and the "Ukrainian Press", are the product of Prof. Z. Kuziela, president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. The essays on the name "Ukraine" and the "Ukrainian Language" were presented by Professor Rudnytskyj, formerly of the Ukrainian University, Munich, but now at the university of Manitoba, Canada. The brief summary of the thousand years' history of the Ukrainian people owes its production to the pen of the young scholar Dr. Michael Antonovych, a lecturer from the University of Vienna in the field of Eastern European History. The articles concerning the social structure of the Ukrainian community and the different areas of Ukraine, their nationality and political position were written by an outstanding specialist in this field, Mr. Viktor Sadovskyj from Prague. The noted economist Diploma Engineer D. Dyminskyj, Professor at the Ukrainian Free University and at the Ukrainian Technical Institute in Regensburg assumed the for-

114 midable task of presenting the entire economic life in Ukraine in a brief and concise manner, both from the aspect of its development and in its present state. The third section of the book which describes the cultural life of Ukraine, the Church, and the psychological characteristics of the people are products of the writer's pen.

121 The work as a whole has been composed from a historical point of view and includes the period up to the year 1939. It is to be particularly emphasised that it has been necessary to present this complete historical development of Ukrainian public life in order to be able to explain adequately the present situation. This is the first extensive treatise on Ukraine in English and for this reason it appeared advisable to take into account the historical preliminaries of the present. However, it has also seemed wisest not to proceed in the treatment beyond the year 1939, since reliable statistical data are lacking for an authoritative presentation of recent years. During the second World War the Ukrainian territory was so thoroughly devastated by military operations, and so great changes of a political character have taken place, that a correct treatment of the present situation is essentially impossible. To make the matter still more difficult is the fact that the Soviet government, in whose sphere of authority lies the entire native soil of Ukraine, gives out almost no statistics and when any do appear their validity is of a very doubtful character.

104 The book has set as its goal the illumination of all aspects of the Ukrainian problem. With the one exeption noted above it has been composed by Ukrainian scholars, and now appears for the public as authentically representative of Ukrainian public opinion. For that reason, it is appropriate that it should render the Ukrainian names, not in the general and customary Russian or Polish transliteration, but in the little known Ukrainian one. We use, therefore, "Chernvhiv" instead of the customary "Chernigov", "Kyiv" instead of the generally known "Kiev", "Lviv" instead of "Lemberg" or "Lwow", etc. However, in order to make the reader familiar with the Ukrainian form of the names, we include with this introduction a list of Ukrainian geographical and proper names in which the Ukrainian and usual

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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NOTE ON SOURCES

SOURCES for the study of Ukrainian nationalism during the Second World War are extremely varied. Published personal narratives are important. Ukrainian memoirs, like most others, however, have serious defects as sources for the history of political events. On the nationalist side, memoirs are usually highly colored by the views or prejudices of the authors, since the tempestuous Ukrainian nationalist politics have rarely been conducive to impartial reflection. Moreover, the flight of the nationalists from Eastern Europe as the Soviet armies advanced resulted in the loss of many of the documents which might have enhanced the reliability of their memoirs. In many cases the personal circumstances of the writers have made it impossible for them to check their narratives against documents available since the war. Soviet memoirs of wartime events, on the other hand, suffer from the distortions resulting from adherence to the official line. 114 127

Fortunately, it is in many cases possible to check postwar narratives against contemporary records. In this respect documents from German archives made available to the public in connection with the Nuremberg trials are extremely valuable. Some of these documents, composed by Ukrainian nationalist leaders themselves, provide direct evidence of nationalist activity. Most of the documents concerning aspects of Ukrainian nationalism are reports by German political, military or police officials; they are of course subject to error due to misinformation or negligence of the authors. Occasionally the desire of an official of the Nazi dictatorship to put himself in a better light before his superiors, or to advance a policy he preferred, led to intentional distortion. Since the reports were for official use only, and as a rule were written by officials who were personally not deeply involved in Ukrainian affairs, the element of intentional coloring is comparatively minor, however.

A second very important body of contemporary sources consists of published material. Some publications were issued clandestinely; while the authors may have had numerous reasons for distortion, they were at least not subject to German censorship. By far the larger amount of available contemporary published material, however, was published under German censorship. Consequently, numerous facts had to be omitted and many views colored to make them acceptable to the Germans. German censorship was not iron-clad, however; the numerous ways in which publications in territories occupied by the Germans

●114 could express real views and present facts have been touched upon
127 throughout this study. Because of censorship contemporary published sources present comparatively little material of direct political relevance. They do, however, present valuable information on the closely related topics of religious, cultural, and economic activity. Moreover, they describe the overt activities of individuals in specific places at specific times; it is often possible to check such facts in postwar descriptions of covert political activities against the framework obtained from contemporary sources. The extent to which facts cited by the postwar informant conform to the contemporary sources permits one to make a partial evaluation of the reliability of the informant. Contemporary Soviet sources on nationalist activities are much sparser, but for some events they provide valuable information which shifts in Soviet policy have caused to be deleted from postwar publications.

124 Important as are the contemporary sources, a rounded picture of the wartime nationalist movements could not have been obtained without the aid of unpublished accounts of the participants. Some of these are in the form of manuscripts made available to the author of this study, but most were obtained through oral interviews. For reasons which should be clear to the reader of this study, it has been necessary to preserve the anonymity of the informants. The code system adopted makes it possible for the author to determine the source of each statement, however, and in many cases it will be possible for him to suggest persons whom an inquirer might approach for further information on a given topic.

The interviews were conducted during 1952–53 in Europe, Canada, and the United States. Before beginning the interviews, the author made a thorough examination of the greater part of the German documents and the published materials, contemporary and memoir. He was also fortunate enough to secure advice and information from a number of scholars who had worked on related studies of the Ukraine and of wartime Eastern Europe. These preliminary investigations enabled him to form an over-all picture of the topic. For many sections of the study, he could establish a reliable account lacking only a limited number of details. This approach was essential for the success of the interviews. Prospective informants were more inclined to furnish information when they learned that the author had acquired the background knowledge of subjects which were of intense personal interest to them. The preliminary investigation also enabled the author to determine some of the key questions, or at least to know which areas of his topic needed probing. An equally useful result of this investigation was that the knowledge acquired enabled the author to assess the validity of many statements while the informant was still available, so that dubious statements could be questioned or further information elicited.

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

About the author

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Panas Fedenko is a historian, politician, journalist and novelist. He is author of works on Ukrainian history. In 1917 he was elected to the Ukrainian Central Council, the first Ukrainian Parliament in Kiev, and in 1919 to the Ukrainian Congress as member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party. As member of the Central Ukrainian Partisan Committee he was concerned with the guerilla war against Russia in 1919—20. He edited Ukrainian Socialist newspapers at home and in exile, where he had to go in 1921. In exile Panas Fedenko taught at the Ukrainian Pedagogic University and the Ukrainian Free University in Prague. Now he is member of the Ukrainian National Council in exile.

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INTRODUCTION

The author of this book is a historian. He has taken part in the Ukrainian national revolution from 1917 on. The book has been written to fix facts that are very often forgotten in the world, or are given a false interpretation in the various books on the Eastern European problem. U 114

The principal fact from which the whole fatal conflict between Ukraine and Soviet Russia arises is that Ukraine has a democratic tradition created by the preceding historical evolution. Modern Russia is a continuation of the Muscovite Tsardom that has grown on the foundations of eastern despotism. For this reason Russia has not created a democratic tradition of its own up to this day and has a "considerable lack of European tradition", as it has been stated by the well known Russian historian Klyuchevsky. Therefore Communist dictatorship so easily seized power in Russia after the revolution of 1917, while the other peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, Ukrainians, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians, etc., created democratic states of their own. U 181 SU 181

The tragedy of the unhappy neighbours of Russia is that Russian imperialism in the past and present times has been principally directed against them, has enslaved and even exstirpated them.

The Ukrainian nation occupies a particular place in Eastern Europe both by its number, circa 35 millions, and by its geographical position, and especially by its large natural resources*). The famous British political writer Professor R. W. Seton-Watson states that the Ukrainian problem has been one of the reasons for World War I 1914—1918. It is generally known that the conquest of Ukraine was the principal aim for Hitler's 'Pressure to the East'. Thus World War II had the struggle for Ukraine as one of its reasons too. U 161 135

We are living in a time when imperialism is being condemned as one of the greatest evils to mankind, but we see at the same time U 181

*) The most important natural riches of Ukraine are: coal (Donets Bassin), iron ore (Krivoy Rog), oil (Boryslaw), manganese (Nikopol). The export of grain from Ukraine to Western Europe until 1914 was higher than 5,5 mil. tons per year. The production of sugar and spirit was very important. The export of agricultural products from Tsarist Russia came in its great part from Ukraine. U 439

000 Editor's Note: Since this book is translated from German, the titles of books are translated from German also - instead of from original Ukranian or Russian. Therefore, the original titles are not given, only the translation.

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Foreword

•[114] The present work was written in the years 1938/39, - in the period when the West Ukrainians in the, however brief, existence of what was then Poland, were very much excited by an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine, the present-day Hungarian Carpathia. It was not only the West Ukrainians who in those days believed the hour of Greak Ukraine had come.

/2/ The book represents an attempt, based on a journalist's personal knowledge and a thorough study of the country, to acquaint the German reader with the Ukrainian people, their country, their history, their culture, their way of life and their character.

In spite of the fact that since the book was completed in August 1939, fundamental changes have occurred in the eastern part of Europe as a result of the defeat of Poland and the struggle against Bolshevik Muscovite rule, the book can be published almost unchanged. For there was no 000 change in the terrible fate of the East Ukrainians in the old Soviet Ukraine up to the day of their liberation by German troops. The West Ukrainians in eastern Poland, in Bukovina and Bessarabia - regions which Moscow appropriated more or less forcibly after the collapse of Poland - had to learn during the brief period of

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UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

JOHN S. RESHETAR

995 186 EASTERN ORTHODOXY, unlike Roman Catholicism, is organized on the principle of autocephalous national churches—each constituting an independent administrative entity. This fundamental difference between Eastern and Western Christianity causes the thinking Orthodox Christian to be confronted with a dilemma. He wants the Church to be close to the communicant and the clergy to teach him and pray in his own language, and yet if he desires that the whole Church be able to perpetuate itself and propagate the faith, he must grant to it a sufficiently centralized organization and at the same time combat all fissiparous tendencies. Thus, on the surface at least, there appears to be a conflict between Christ's injunction that there be "one fold and one shepherd" (John 10:16) and the actual establishment of national churches which can easily render unto Caesar what may be correctly regarded as "things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21).

While the communicant may ponder over this dilemma, there is in the last analysis little that he can do to reverse centuries of historical development which have led to the woefully loose organization of the present day. The titular head of the Eastern Orthodox [793] Church, the Patriarch of Constantinople, is but *primus inter pares* in his relations with the other patriarchs and branches of the Church. Individual ecclesiastical jurisdictions do not extend across political frontiers, and as a result the national churches have rarely been able to oppose secular rulers. The development of each new national movement in the Orthodox world of Eastern and Southeastern Europe has been accompanied by a demand for a separate national church and has accentuated this divisive tendency.

While the Orthodox Balkan peoples were acquiring ecclesiastical independence prior to World War I, the Orthodox Ukrainians living in the Russian Empire were denied the national status which would enable them to establish their own church and, instead, were regarded as Little Russians. Studies of the Orthodox Church made at that time by Western scholars contain no reference to its Ukrainian branch since it did not even enjoy a limited autonomy but was 000 regarded as an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church.[1] The

[1] See Adrian Fortescue's *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, 2nd ed. (London, 1908), pp. 285 ff. That the Orthodox Church in Ukraine exercised considerable influence on the Russian Church is made amply evident in the ponderous study by Constantine V. Kharlampovič, *Malorossijskoe Vlijanie na Velikorusskuju Cerkovnuju Žizn'* (Kazan, 1914), which deals with the period beginning in the middle of the sixteenth century and ending in 1762.

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The development of a Ukrainian historiography during the nineteenth century caused some of the nationalist intellectuals, many of whom were sons of priests, to discover that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine did not originally regard itself as bound by the protectorate which Muscovy assumed over the Ukrainian Cossacks as a result of the Perejaslav Treaty of 1654. By 1686, however, the influence of the Muscovites was so great among the Cossacks that the Orthodox Churches of Ukraine and Muscovy were merged on the basis of internal independence; the Cossacks retained the right to elect their metropolitan archbishop but pledged nominal subordination to the Patriarchate of Moscow, which had been established less than a century before, in place of their traditional tie with the Constantinople Patriarchate.

The domain of the Cossacks was gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire, and by the nineteenth century the metropolitan archbishops of Kiev were being appointed by Moscow. Many of these were not natives of Ukraine and had little in common with the local population, whose spiritual needs were ministered to by natives who entered the priesthood of the Russian Church. They employed the archaic Church Slavonic language in the performance of Church offices, but in many parishes sermons were delivered in the peasant vernacular which in the twentieth century was to serve as the basis for the development of literary Ukrainian. By the turn of the century Bishop Parfeny Levyc'kyj of the diocese of Podollia was himself delivering sermons in Ukrainian, and encouraging priests to do so, until he was transferred to the Russian diocese of Tula. The Orthodox seminaries in Kiev and Poltava were hotbeds of Ukrainian nationalist and revolutionary socialist agitation prior to the revolution.[2]

When the Imperial regime collapsed in February of 1917 and was replaced by the Provisional Government, a multitude of functional congresses met in Kiev to give voice to the economic and social objectives of the revolution, and to demand political autonomy for Ukraine. At the same time, they did not neglect to advocate reorganization of the Orthodox Church. Initially their demands were modest, but by the time of the November Revolution the nationalists were asking for an autocephalous Ukrainian Church which would be independent of the State in its internal administration and provide for the use of the Ukrainian language in the celebration of the divine liturgy. Since this was a period in which soviets, or councils, were being formed as political institutions, it is not surprising that there was considerable sentiment in favor of

[2] This is admitted even by a sworn enemy of everything Ukrainian. See A. Carinnyj, *Ukrainskoe Dviženie* (Berlin, 1925), p. 134.

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795 adopting a conciliar form of government for the proposed church.
668 Despite the enactment of many resolutions calling for ecclesiastical independence, little real progress was made during 1917, primarily because other matters of a more immediate nature, especially the agrarian problem and the demand for peace, absorbed public attention. Among other obstacles there was the hesitancy of many priests to challenge the established religious order and the lack of forthright support from the Ukrainian Central Council *(Ukrainska Central'na Rada)* which was the recognized representative body attempting to govern Ukraine at the time.

795 When the government of the Central Council was replaced by
659 that of Hetman Paul Skoropads'kyj in April of 1918 the official attitude toward the organization of a separate church became more sympathetic. A Ministry of Religious Cults was established under the direction of Professor Basil Zin'kivs'kyj, a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the University of Kiev. Plans were made to convoke a *sobor*, or general church conclave, but before this could be done it was necessary to select a new metropolitan archbishop of Kiev to succeed Metropolitan Vladimir, who had been murdered in February while the city was under Bolshevik rule. According to established procedure the metropolitan was to be elected at a diocesan congress, but Zin'kivs'kyj wished to depart from this practice and have all of the Ukrainian dioceses participate in the electoral meeting. His reason for making this request was that the Metropolitan of Kiev is regarded as the ranking hierarch in Ukraine and not merely as the head of another diocese.

However, the Church administration, which was in Russian hands at the time, proceeded to call an ordinary congress of the Kiev diocese thus ignoring Zin'kivs'kyj's proposal. In view of the nature of the Congress' membership it is not surprising that Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovits'kyj of Kharkov was elected. This did not please the Ukrainian nationalists because Anthony had forbidden the clergy of the Kharkov diocese to read the Gospel in Ukrainian, which he termed "a language of the market place." Zin'kivs'kyj wrote in vain to His Holiness Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, requesting that Anthony's election be set aside. The new Metropolitan immediately made plans for his journey to Kiev with the intention of arriving there in the morning, but railway workers, who were aware of the hierarch's anti-nationalist views, delayed the train for nearly ten hours and prevented a ceremonial welcome planned by his supporters.[8]

The German-sponsored Skoropads'kyj Government continued to lend its support to the convocation of the All-Ukrainian *Sobor*

[8] Dmytro Doroženko, *Istorija Ukrainy* (Užhorod, 1930), II, 322.

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which met on June 20. Metropolitan Anthony as senior bishop was elected to the honorary presidency of the *Sobor*, but Bishop Pimen of the Balta diocese presided over the sessions. A national church did not emerge from these meetings because its adherents controlled no more than a third of the votes. The *Sobor* contented itself with requesting the Government to recognize Anthony as Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, which meant that it wished to have the parishes in Ukraine remain part of the Russian Orthodox Church. On July 9, it enacted a statute for the provisional administration of the Church in Ukraine which granted to the Patriarch of Moscow the right to confirm the election of the Metropolitan of Kiev, hear complaints directed against him and other Ukrainian bishops, bless the convocation of Ukrainian *sobors*, and be prayed for in the performance of every liturgical office in every Ukrainian parish. In effect, the statute provided for autonomy and not the autocephalous status which the nationalist clergy desired.

The statute also conferred upon Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow the right to reject any of its provisions, and the head of the Russian Church did not hesitate to do so. In a letter written to Metropolitan Anthony on September 26, 1918, the Patriarch expressed his willingness to accept the statute, but only if the Orthodox dioceses in Ukraine were to remain "an inseparable part of the one Russian Orthodox Church" on an autonomous basis, and accept decisions of the All-Russian Church *Sobors*. He also insisted upon the right to send his own representative to Ukrainian *sobors* and confirm the ruling hierarch in every Ukrainian diocese.[4] The Patriarch's conditions were not calculated to endear him to the advocates of a national church. Their dissatisfaction found expression in the address which Hetman Skoropads'kyj's new Minister of Cults, Alexander Lotoc'kyj (1870–1939), delivered before the All-Ukrainian *Sobor* on November 12, when it reconvened in Kiev. In no uncertain terms he attacked the Patriarch's autocratic methods and flatly stated that the Government favored an autocephalous church for Ukraine.

However, the conflict remained unresolved because of the collapse of Hetman Skoropads'kyj's regime as a result of the withdrawal of the German army of occupation in conformity with the armistice provisions which had been negotiated in the West. As the Germans withdrew, the Red Army invaded Ukraine and attacked the newly-organized armed forces of the Directory Government, the troops commanded by Symon Petljura. Many of the members of this new Government which succeeded that of Skoropads'kyj were republican socialists who had been prominent in the Central Council *(Rada)* of 1917. While many of these men were secularists

[4] *Ibid.*; Appendix 11 contains the text of the Patriarch's letter.

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and opposed to the perpetuation of the close relationship between Church and State which had existed under the Hetman's regime, they nevertheless thought it best to recognize the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and did so in a law enacted on January 2, 1919. In the two years of anarchy and civil war which followed, little could be done to further the actual establishment of the Church. The Directory Government's diplomatic envoy in Constantinople, Alexander Lotoc'kyj, attempted in vain to obtain recognition of the Church by the *locum tenens* of the Constantinople Patriarchate in order to assure its canonical status. Metropolitan Dorofej, who was serving as *locum tenens* at the time, refused to decide on recognition, since he was convinced that only a patriarch could take such a step.[5] Lotoc'kyj's efforts had been hampered in Constantinople by the émigré Russian hierarchs, including Metropolitan Anthony and Metropolitan Platon of Odessa, who had found refuge there from the Bolsheviks. They ultimately established themselves as the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad with headquarters in the Yugoslav city of Sremski-Karlovtsi. Their departure from Ukraine, however, meant that the opposition to the national church would be diminished to a slight degree.

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Thus in 1920 there commenced to function effectively in Kiev an All-Ukrainian Church Council which was a synod composed of priests and deacons. It had the task of promoting the organization of parishes for the new Church and also served as its highest administrative organ. The Russian bishops whom Metropolitan Anthony had left in charge prior to his departure expressed their opposition to this Ukrainian "sectarianism" and forbade the members of the Ukrainian Church Council to celebrate the liturgy. However, the new Church retained control of four of the largest houses of worship in Kiev, including historic St. Sophia's Cathedral, and held the usual Eastern Orthodox religious offices, but conducted them in the Ukrainian language instead of in the archaic and not easily understood Church Slavonic which is the liturgical medium of the Russian Church. Other parishes left the Russian Church and attached themselves to the Ukrainian Church Council, and it soon became evident that this new branch of Eastern Orthodoxy would have to obtain its own episcopate. No bishop of the Russian Church was willing to join the Ukrainians, and when they requested several of them to consecrate two Ukrainian priests as bishops they met with refusals. It was in such an atmosphere of frustration that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor* convened in the Cathedral of St. Sophia on October 14, 1921.

The *Sobor*, in a final, futile attempt to seek a reconciliation with

[5] Alexander Lotoc'kyj, *V. Carborodi* (Warsaw, 1939), pp. 92 f.

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795 the Russians, invited Metropolitan Michael (Jermakov), the Patriarch's exarch in Ukraine, to attend its sessions, but he countered by declaring it uncanonical. Thus the Ukrainians had no alternative but to establish a hierarchy by consecrating their own metropolitan. Such a consecration has generally been regarded as invalid since it is not effected by means of the "laying on of hands" by at least two bishops and is said to constitute disruption of the Apostolic Succession. Despite this the *Sobor* proceeded to elect the Very Reverend Basil Lypkivs'kyj (1864–1938) as "Metropolitan of Kiev and the whole Ukraine," and arranged a unique form of conciliar consecration, which was performed in St. Sophia's on Sunday, October 23. The Metropolitan-elect was surrounded by a number of priests who laid their hands upon his head; the worshipers who filled the cathedral placed their hands upon one another's shoulders and those who stood immediately behind the consecrating priests touched their robed shoulders. In all other respects the consecration was Orthodox in form. The bishops whom Lypkivs'kyj consecrated after assuming his office had their status challenged by the various Orthodox national churches which also refused to accept the Metropolitan's consecration as canonical.[6]

795 This did not prevent the Ukrainian Church from ordaining
793 priests, acquiring additional parishes, and pursuing its program of reformed Orthodoxy. The new Church departed from tradition in permitting clergymen to appear in public wearing nonclerical dress when not performing ceremonial duties. Similarly it allowed them to cut their hair and not grow beards, although Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj retained the appearance of a bishop of the old school. Bishops were permitted to live in the married state, and Lypkivs'kyj himself and all but a few of the persons whom he consecrated continued to live with their wives—a practice which the Orthodox Church does not condone. A bachelor consecrated as a bishop could marry, and priests (and presumably bishops) were allowed to divorce their wives and marry a second time.[7] The practice of allow-

[6] The Russian Church branded this whole procedure as "self-consecration" (*samosvjastvo*) and regarded all priests who were ordained by these hierarchs as apostates, and the sacraments performed by them as invalid and blasphemous. See the brief and biased account of the establishment of the Ukrainian Church in Nicholas Briančaninov, *The Russian Church* (New York, n. d.), pp. 159 ff. Reverend Lypkivs'kyj's ordination into the priesthood had been canonical because he had served as a priest in the Russian Church since 1891 following his graduation from the Kiev Theological Academy. He had demonstrated ability at an early date, and in 1903 he was appointed to the directorship of an ecclesiastical normal school in Kiev. He was removed from this post because of his enthusiasm for the 1905 Revolution; he then accepted a pastorate in a Kiev suburb which he held until he assumed the leadership of the movement for a national church.

[7] See *Dijannja Vseukrains'koho Pravoslavnoho Cerkovnoho Soboru v Kyjevi 1921 roku* (Frankfurt am Main, 1946), pp. 14 f.

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795 ing bishops to be married at all resulted from a reaction which was
793 general in Russia at the time amongst the "white" or married secular clergy against the monopoly which the "black" or celibate regular clergy held on practically all of the episcopal offices. The canons enacted at the 1921 *Sobor* specifically denied the regular clergy any privileges in obtaining bishoprics.

795 Liberalism also made itself felt in the administration of the Ukrainian Church, which was based on the principle of *soborno-pravnist'*, a conciliar and democratic form of ecclesiastical government in which all members of the Church—bishops, priests, and lay representatives—participate co-equally in all of its organs. The *Sobor* of 1921 specifically denied that hierarchs meeting alone could represent the whole Orthodox Ukrainian population. It declared that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor*, which was to meet at least once every five years, "possesses the highest religious, legislative, executive, judicial, and supervisory authority in the Ukrainian Church."[8] In the periods between *sobors* a smaller body, the Church Council, met semi-annually to serve as the highest executive organ and as an interim legislative body for the Church. Part of the Council met on a monthly basis to deal with more immediate matters. On the diocesan and district levels popular assemblies were to operate and each of the former was to elect its own bishop; the elective principle was also to prevail in the individual parishes, the members of which were empowered to select their own pastors with the consent of the diocesan council, a body elected by the diocesan assembly.

771 Another characteristic of the Ukrainian Church was its sense of
795 social consciousness, although expressed within a national context. The canons declared that "who utilizes Church life for social, national, political or personal subjugation should be excommunicated from the Church."[9] They specifically condemned all who employed national sentiments in order to renew the rule of the wealthy classes of society. The Russian Church was charged with having betrayed Orthodoxy *(Pravoslavje)* and having become a bulwark of *caroslavje* and *panoslavje*—glorification of tsars and landowners. In this way the new Church attempted to find a place for itself in the new revolutionary order and gain widespread popular support.[10]

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 9. For French translations of some of the documents pertaining to the Ukrainian Church see "L'Église Orthodoxe Panukrainienne créée en 1921 à Kiev," *Orientalia Christiana*, No. 3 (June, 1923), pp. 73 ff.

[10] The Ukrainian Church was not unique as a reformed group in the Russia of this period. A similar movement arose within the Russian Orthodox Church in the form of the "Renovated" or "Living" Church which also endeavored to break the monopoly of the monastic clergy on episcopal offices by permitting bishops to

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795 This was not an easy task, although by March of 1923 the Church had more than three thousand parishes. These were cared for by priests who were ordained by the new Ukrainian hierarchy, since the vast majority of the pre-revolutionary clergymen who were with the Russian Church in Ukraine remained loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate and refused to join the new Church. During the spring of 1922 the Ukrainians, conscious of their *de facto* status, attempted in vain to effect a reconciliation with the other Orthodox churches and obtain recognition by inviting them to send delegates to a meeting in Kiev for the purpose of creating a league of Orthodox churches. The other churches refused to establish any contacts with a group which they regarded as having violated the canons of the Church, which require no less than two hierarchs to consecrate a bishop. Faced with such formidable opposition, the Ukrainian Church had no alternative but to attempt to pursue an independent course. However, before it could do so it needed a rationale for its method of consecration. This was provided by the Most Reverend John Teodorovyč, then Bishop of Vinnica and now Archbishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, in the form of a disquisition on the Grace of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church; he wrote it during the autumn of 1922.

779 795 713 The Grace of the Holy Spirit, according to Orthodox dogma, is the divine power which is necessary for salvation and which resides in the Church and is dispensed by it through the sacraments.[11] The dispute between the Ukrainian Church and the other Orthodox national churches resulted from contrary views regarding the role which should be granted to tradition as a source of divine knowledge. Archbishop Teodorovyč bases his argument largely on Scriptural writings and contends that the hierarchy or institution of the pastorate in the primary Church, which was established by Christ, was the Apostolate. This body of men, it is claimed, was not above or outside of the Church but was of the Church since Christ "called unto him his disciples: and of them he chose twelve, whom also he named Apostles" (Luke 6:13). Thus the Apostolate, it is argued, could not have been anterior to the Church, nor could it have created the Church, because Christ founded both and selected the Apostolate from the Church.[12]

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marry. It allowed clergymen to cut their hair and shave their beards and for a brief period in the mid-twenties preached the sinfulness of capitalism and temporarily won the support of the Soviet Government which hoped in this way to weaken the Moscow Patriarchate and the traditional Church.

[11] Rev. Frank Gavin, *Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought* (Milwaukee, 1923), p. 219.

[12] Archbishop John Teodorovyč, *Blahodatnist' Jerarkhii Ukrains'koi Avtokefalnoi Cerkvy*, 3rd ed. (Regensburg, 1947), pp. 11 ff.

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779 The act of conciliar consecration performed in Kiev in October
795 of 1921 is justified on the grounds that the Ukrainian Church,
although without its own bishops while under Muscovite domina-
793 tion from 1686 to 1921, never lost its Grace. Consecration is a bestowal of Grace which is a gift of God not subject to human control; what is granted by God, it is reasoned, cannot be withheld by any individual who has the task of laying on hands. Bishops alone did not at all times enjoy a monopoly of the right to consecrate since such a doctrine would exclude God who is the sole consecrator. The election of Reverend Lypkivs'kyj as Metropolitan was not a renewal of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church but rather a renewal of the traditional fullness of its structure. The Ukrainian Church continued to possess Grace even when its bishops were being appointed by Moscow. The *Sobor* of 1921, it is contended, merely renewed the function of the episcopacy; prior to that time the Church possessed pastors who were abiding by the instructions which Christ gave to teach and baptize. Apostolic Succession, it is argued, was preserved during the 1686–1921 period in the whole institution of the pastorate in Ukraine and not in the episcopacy alone since it is but one part of the whole hierarchy.

This contention is based on the assumption that the bishops alone cannot be identified with the Apostles since in the primary Church the terms "presbyter" or elder and "bishop" were apparently employed interchangeably in referring to the Apostles. The distinction in rank between the episcopacy and the priesthood, it is argued, was developed later by man. Thus the institution of the pastorate, which includes priests as well as bishops, proceeds from the Apostolate established by Christ. By this logic priests must be regarded as successors of the Apostles no less than bishops are since all of the Apostles were equal in the Grace which they enjoyed. As proof of this, Archbishop Teodorovyč cites Peter's reference to himself as an elder or presbyter (I Peter 5:1) together with Paul's Epistle to Titus; in the latter (Titus 1:5–6), qualifications for elders are laid down and without any apparent interruption in the train of thought the term "bishop" is then substituted for "elder" in the following verse indicating that the two terms were synonymous in the primary Church.[18] A bishop did not and does not enjoy a greater degree of Grace than did a presbyter (elder) or priest since the Grace which Christ bestowed upon the Apostles was of a uniform quality. Mortals cannot attempt to measure Grace. There is no evidence, says Archbishop Teodorovyč, to indicate that the sacrament of holy orders, which is now performed exclusively by bishops, is

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 50 ff. Also see Paul's Epistle to the Philippians 1:1.

779 of greater magnitude or requires more Grace than the other six
795 sacraments which are performed by all priests.

It is claimed that the differentiation which now exists between a
793 bishop and presbyter or priest lies not in the degree or quality of Grace which each enjoys, but only in the functions which each performs. Yet when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church re-established itself in 1921, it did not abolish the episcopacy or argue in a presbyterian manner that the episcopacy has no place in the Church. It merely argued that the exclusive right of bishops to administer the sacrament of holy orders (ordination and consecration) developed as a result of the actual needs of Church life and not on the grounds that bishops possess a greater degree or higher quality of Grace. The Church itself, it is contended, is the source of the differentiation in functions performed by bishops and presbyters or priests. Administrative necessity and the need for unity and stability alone caused the Church to grant to bishops the exclusive right to ordain and consecrate. This right is a purely canonical matter and is therefore, unlike religious dogma, not immutable. It is a practice developed by the Church, and it is consequently possible for the Church to redistribute functions at any time, as its Ukrainian branch did in 1921 when it became necessary to obtain a truly Ukrainian episcopate. This was a drastic step, and it was accompanied by an appeal to the Lord, the Supreme Pastor, before whom the Ukrainians laid their faith, hopes, and prayers.[14]

795 Under Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj's leadership thirty-five bishops
659 were consecrated in the traditional Orthodox manner, and the new Church appeared to be prospering. The Soviet Government had
687 done little to prevent its establishment but within a few years commenced a campaign of gradual suppression. In 1924 and during each of the three succeeding years Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj was placed under arrest. In 1927 he was compelled to resign and a *sobor* elected Nicholas Borec'kyj to succeed him. The new Metropolitan governed the Church until 1930 when it was implicated in the alleged plot of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine *(Spilka Vyzvolennja Ukraïny)*. This clandestine organization was accused of promoting separatist tendencies and desiring to restore private property. Vladimir Čekhivs'kyj, a Social Democrat who had been premier of the anti-Bolshevik Directory Government early in 1919, was charged with having headed the Union's religious section. During the trial of the forty-five leaders of the Union in March and April

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 100 f. Archbishop Teodorovyč (pp. 124 ff.) has cited considerable evidence which indicates that consecration of bishops by a college of presbyters was a practice employed by the Church of Alexandria for more than two centuries preceding the convocation of the First Ecumenical Council in 325 A.D.

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795 of 1930 the prosecution alleged that the Church held secret requiems
for Symon Petljura, the émigré nationalist, following his murder in
659 Paris.[15] The Ukrainian Church never recovered from the setback
687 which it suffered as a result of the trial. During the 1930's all of the bishops were arrested, and with the advent of World War II there remained only Archbishop Teodorovyč in the United States, the sole surviving hierarch of the original thirty-five.[16]

793 The opportunity to renew the autocephalous status of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church came with the Nazi invasion of the
795 Soviet Union. The movement was headed by Bishop Polikarp Sikors'kyj of the diocese of Lutsk in Volynia, who in February of 1942 re-established the Church at a *sobor* in Pinsk and consecrated several bishops. At the same time Bishop Polikarp succeeded in obtaining the support of his nominal superior, Metropolitan Dionisij of Warsaw, who had consecrated him in 1932 and ten years later elevated him to an archbishopric. Polikarp's consecration had been canonical since he had headed part of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Poland, which was recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople during the inter-war period. Thus the renewed Ukrainian Church was not plagued with the charge of "self-consecration" which served the enemies of the national church so well during the

[15] Nicholas Kovalevs'kyj, *Ukraïna Pid Červonyin Jarmom* (Lviv, 1936), pp. 72 ff.

[16] The demise of the Church in Ukraine itself did not hinder the development of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the United States and in Canada. Many of the Ukrainian immigrants in both countries desired such a Church, and when the movement first manifested itself in the homeland they were quick to assume the initiative. As early as July 18, 1918, a group of 150 laymen held a church congress in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The participants were members of the Uniat Church, adhering to the Eastern Orthodox ritual but acknowledging the Papacy, who were dissatisfied with the arbitrary nature of its administration and the principle of personal episcopal ownership of all church buildings and parochial property. They also objected to the attempt of the Uniat Church to obtain control of the Peter Mohyla Institute, a Ukrainian educational institution in Saskatoon. When the Uniat bishop denied them the sacraments, they decided to establish a truly national and democratically governed church and return to the Orthodox faith of their forefathers. The new Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada gained adherents from the Russian Orthodox Church which lost whole parishes composed of emigrants from Bukovina; many Uniats also joined the new Church which now has more than two hundred congregations although many of these are rural and small. The Canadian Church, unlike the movement in Ukraine itself, succeeded in obtaining recognition from a canonically consecrated Orthodox hierarch in the United States, the Syrian Metropolitan Germanos, who served as its acting bishop until Archbishop Teodorovyč succeeded him in 1924. The latter also assumed control over the numerically smaller Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, but in 1947 he relinquished the leadership of the Canadian Church which now has a separate hierarch. It is significant that the Canadian Church did not accept the canons which were adopted at the Kiev *Sobor* in 1921, since it wished to be in a position to establish relations with the other branches of the Orthodox Church on the North American continent.

793 1920's. However, Archbishop Polikarp had placed himself under
the Moscow Patriarchate in 1939 when his diocese was incorporated
795 into the Soviet Union; he now had to bear the onus of disobeying Moscow and in May of 1942 was divested of all sacerdotal position *in absentia*. This did not prevent him from proceeding with the organization of the autocephalous church, although a rival movement for mere autonomy headed by Archbishop Alexei Hromads'kyj served to weaken the effort. When the Nazis retreated from Ukraine, Archbishop Polikarp and eleven other hierarchs obtained refuge in Germany with thousands of other Ukrainian displaced persons.

779 Two attempts in as many decades to establish an autocephalous
Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union have ended in
795 failure with the believers reintegrated into the Russian Church on both occasions. The attempts, although abortive, were made possible by the vague unity of Eastern Orthodoxy which is not organized on the monarchical model. No patriarch is regarded as the head of the whole Church, for this distinction belongs exclusively to Christ (Ephesians 2:20, 5:23; I Corinthians 3:11). What unity the Church possesses is reflected not in its external organization but in the whole episcopacy in accordance with the principle of harmony and corporateness which is *Sobornost*. The autocephalous units of the Church agree on dogma, recognize each other's sacraments as valid, and engage in concelebrations of the liturgy on occasions of great importance. Yet once the principle of autocephaly is accepted it is only logical that there be as many distinct churches, albeit of the same confession, as there are nations and that the boundaries of religious and political jurisdictions coincide. It is a principle which, in the last analysis, leads to a limitation of the universality of Eastern Orthodoxy, since it isolates the various branches of the Church, spelling death to the notion of effective organic unity.

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Ukraine and Russia

A Survey of Their Economic Relations

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Ukraine and Russia

A Survey of Their Economic Relations

It has long been contended that the Ukraine could not 000
exist as a separate state. It is said her economic interests are so largely dependent upon those of the old Russian Empire that if separated therefrom, she would lack the economic strength to form a viable entity, and thus would render herself liable to decline or gradual absorption by some other state. In the light of present facts, both economists and impartial statesmen will find that this argument, which, among members of the opposing faction, seems to form the primary basis for objection to Ukraine's independent statehood, will not bear even the most superficial investigation.

Ukraine's Richness in Natural Resources

The Ukraine is a country with nearly 50,000,000 inhabi- [41]
tants, and possesses within its limits the most fertile lands 433
of Europe, which, every year, feed the western countries from their enormous surplus of cereals, of cattle and of sugar. It is a country which stands fifth in the world in its production of coal and iron; which has at its disposal quantities of other raw materials, such as naphtha, magnesia, salt and mercury; which has, moreover, several hundred kilometers of water front. If, with all these natural 000
advantages and wealth, the Ukraine cannot enjoy an autonomous life, how, then, can one explain the existence of Italy, Spain, Roumania and many other European countries in which the natural conditions are far less favorable to economic independence?

These facts have gradually become so self-evident to the public mind that oppositionists are being forced to abandon their former line of argument, and are now beginning to attack the question from the reverse standpoint. They now claim, not that Ukraine cannot form and maintain her economic unity, but that Russia cannot live without Ukraine, and that, without Ukraine, Russia would lack

000 elements which are absolutely essential to her economic existence. In this new phase of reasoning, it is evident that other interests than those of the Ukraine intervene, and one can easily detect the Russian point of view. However, in our present study of the subject, let us lay aside all thought of any ulterior motive on the part of our adversaries, and approach the matter in an objective manner, in order to discern, if possible, the vital economic interests of the Russian people which might suffer through the creation of an independent Ukraine.

Is Great Russia Economically Dependent on Ukraine?

Concisely stated, the three fundamental bases of opposition usually put forward are:

1. The Ukraine is the granary of Russia. Without Ukraine, upon which she depended for her entire supply of agricultural products, Russia would suffer from hunger.

2. The Ukraine separates Russia from the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, thus closing the door to foreign markets.

3. If the Ukraine were established in ethnographic limits, she would thus possess nearly all the coal and iron of the old Russian Empire, and hence would cut off Russia's present supply of these indispensable raw materials of industry.

Let us candidly and thoroughly examine each of these
U. arguments.
243 In the first place, statistics show that Ukraine has always
438 been the granary for western Europe rather than for
S.U Russia and has, in fact, exported only a very small per
243 cent of her cereal products into Russia. The latter, fur-
438 thermore, possessed such an excess of grain that she herself has exported in the past, and still continues to export, an appreciable quantity of cereals.

Great Russia's Own Grain Supply Ample

For the years 1909-1911, during which time the exports were especially large, the total quantity of cereals shipped from former Russia averaged 440,000,000 bushels each year. Of this amount the nine Ukrainian governments

supplied 201,670,000. If we now add to these nine governments the Kuban, the Ukrainian region north of the Caucasus, as well as the Ukrainian parts of other governments which border them, we must increase these figures by 91,670,000, which gives to ethnographic Ukraine an exportation of about 293,340,000 bushels of cereals. During this time the other parts of former Russia, including Siberia, exported about 40,000,000 bushels annually. As neither Poland nor Finland exported cereals, and Lithuania and the Baltic provinces only small quantities, if any, it was Russia proper that had the large excess.

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As to the Ukraine, her exportations of cereals to Russia did not reach more than 10 to 15 per cent of her total export; that is to say, about 36 million bushels, and nearly all of that was destined for Poland, Lithuania and White Russia, Great Russia consuming only a small fraction of the amount. Then, too, the Ukrainian wheat has always had as a competitor in the markets of Moscow and Petrograd the wheat from the fields of Siberia and the regions of the Volga.

If hunger now exists in Russia, it is due to a dreadful crisis in transportation, to which may be added the fact that Siberia and some parts of the Volga regions refuse their wheat to Russia in the present Bolshevist state and, even within Bolshevist Russia, the peasants will not give their wheat to the cities, since they get nothing from the cities in return. In the Petrograd and Moscow districts, suffering has been heightened by the Allied blockade.

In this way, a fair analysis of existing agricultural conditions with reference to relative production and exportation in both Ukraine and Russia proves the fallacy of the first argument advanced by those who interpose these conditions as a barrier to Ukraine's economic freedom. The irrefutable fact remains that, instead of depending upon the Ukraine for wheat, Russia not only has enough for her own use but, even during those years when the harvests in the east of Russia and in Siberia fail to reach their maximum, retains a sufficient surplus of grain to enable her to export it in considerable quantities.

The second objection, which involves the question of 000

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The second objection, which involves the question of Russia's need for the Ukrainian ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, is readily refuted by Russian maritime history.

Great Russia Not Dependent on the Black Sea Ports

We grant that, to the casual thinker with little or no knowledge of the trade routes of modern commerce, it may at first appear that Russia cannot live without southern ports, but, while it is true that more than half of the maritime exports of former Russia were on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, those who present this argument forget that the Ukrainian exports composed nearly half of those of the whole Russian Empire. It has already been proved that ethnic Ukraine shipped about two-thirds of the total amount of cereals. If we take these facts into consideration, we must conclude that it was the Ukraine which used the southern ports and not Russia. Nor did Russia export much of her merchandise by way of the Black Sea. The official Russian statistics of the traffic of merchandise by rail show no southern port except Rostov-on-the-Don, which served as an outlet for the products of the territories situated north of the ethnic frontier of the Ukraine and Russia. As to Novorosseysk, that was always the port for the Cossacks of Kuban and of the northern Caucasus. Even the northern regions of the Ukraine, including the governments of Tchernihov, that of Poltava and a part of the government of Kharkov, sent their wheat by the ports of the Baltic and even by Libau and Koenigsberg.

Statistics indicate that imports have never been shipped in by way of the Black Sea to any great extent. The records of Russian foreign commerce for the year 1912 show that 80 per cent of the maritime imports of the old empire of Russia were made by way of the Baltic, so that even the Ukraine received much foreign merchandise by this route. The policy of the Russian Government was always in favor of Baltic ports, to the detriment of those on the Black Sea. Finally speaking, all Russian commercial policy, in which an important item was the railroad rates, was in favor of the Baltic ports.

504 Let us compare for a moment the regions for which the Black and the Baltic Seas serve as ports. That for which the Black Sea affords an outlet does not extend more than 500 or 600 kilometers, while that served by the Baltic ports reaches as far as western Siberia. Thus, the Baltic region exceeds that of the Black Sea by several thousand kilometers.

000 Surely these facts, coupled with even the most cursory consideration of the Russian imperialistic policy, show beyond a doubt that in respect to the direct economic utilization of the southern ports, the setting up of a separate government by the Ukraine does not obstruct any fundamental interests of the Russian people. Briefly stated, Russia proper does not use directly the southern ports except Rostov, which is the outlet of the region of the Don and in part of the lower region of the Volga, but there is not such a vast difference between the Russian and Ukrainian interests that these minor details as to a common use of various ports can not be conciliated by special agreement.

Coal Fields of Ukraine Not Necessary to Great Russia

316 433 Proceeding directly to the third and last question, that involving coal and iron, we are confronted first of all with the geographic fact that it is really within the ethnographic limits of the Ukraine that are found nearly all the coal fields of Donetz, as well as most of the productive centers of anthracite. More than 90 per cent of the total output of coal of the Donetz basin, during the last years of normal exploitation, came from the Ukrainian regions, while the total production of coal of the Donetz basin reached 70 per cent of the general production of coal of the old Russian Empire, and we may increase this to 85 per cent, if we do not include in the total the output of Russian [438] Poland. Notwithstanding these percentages of production, the general statistics of railroad traffic, together with the data collected by the Special War Committee on the Supply of Fuel, show that nearly four-fifths of the Ukrainian coal and anthracite was used in Ukraine, one-fifth only being exported to Russia.

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The Ukraine has almost no fuel except the coal from Donetz. Northern and Central Russia, on the contrary, have wood, peat and coal from the south of Moscow. Northwestern Russia and the Baltic provinces never used the coal from Donetz, as it could not compete in price with the English or German coal. During the war, doubtless because the Baltic Sea was closed, they began to transport coal from Donetz to Petrograd. Now the Baltic Sea is reopened and its freedom guaranteed by the Allies. Therefore, English coal can regain its natural markets.

The industrial region of Moscow, as well as that of the Volga, received an enormous quantity of naphtha from Baku which competes as fuel with the coal of Donetz. When the conditions have again become normal, exports of naphtha will recommence, because the basin of the Volga is the natural outlet for the oil fields of Baku. The Urals and Siberia are supplied with local coal, while in western Siberia are found vast deposits, in the region of Kutznetsk. These beds are more extended and richer than those of Donetz, but the coal fields were scarcely worked because the means of transportation was very primitive. They can be joined to the Ural and Altai regions either by rail or water. Under these conditions the inexhaustible ore supplies of the Urals and the Altai district will supply the metal industry of Russia in such quantities that Russia will become metallurgically independent of the Ukraine. Thus the coal fields of Donetz, which have always been more Ukrainian than Russian, should in the future remain entirely Ukrainian.

Furthermore, the question of the basin of Donetz is not concluded. The ethnographic frontier of the Ukraine and of Russia passes through these coal fields. The Ukraine and Russia could easily, for their mutual interests, reach some understanding and modify this frontier. But in any event the most important part of the coal field should remain in the Ukrainian limits, because the facts up to date show how much more Donetz is bound to the Ukrainian industry than to that of Russia. The metallurgical industry alone of the Ukraine consumes nearly 30 per cent of the total production of the basin.

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Ukraine's Iron Supply Not Essential to Great Russia

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We now come to the question of iron. Here also it is claimed that the economic development of Russia is impossible without the Ukrainian iron. But we can answer without the slightest hesitation that this affirmation is incorrect.

It is a fact that the Ukraine produced two-thirds or three-fourths of the iron of former Russia. She exported a considerable quantity into the old empire, but one cannot conclude that this situation will not change in the future. True, the development of the metallurgical industry in the Ukraine in the last forty years was much greater than in the Urals and the other provinces. But if we wish to draw more specific conclusions, we must remember that the beds of iron ore in the Ukraine are not very large. Those in the region of Krivy Rih in the Kherson government near that of Ekaterinoslav, which are now the principal source of the iron ore in the Ukraine, may exhaust themselves in a few decades as will the scarcely more abundant ore fields of Crimea.

It would be erroneous to assume that the metal production of the Ukraine would be adequate to the needs of all Russia for any great period of time. Knowing the probabilities of early exhaustion of the limited beds of Ukrainian ore, and in intelligent observance of the laws of conservation, Russia must, with that wisdom and foresight which has made for industrial soundness in all strong nations, increase her production of iron in the Urals and in Siberia. For the time being, however, and until Russia can bring into operation the products of her hitherto undeveloped areas, the Ukraine can and desires to maintain her place on the Russian markets with metals, as with sugar.

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Economic Co-operation is Possible

It is the earnest desire of the Ukraine that her future economic relations with Russia be intensely co-operative and that the commercial relations of the two states under

000 the sane regulation of special treaties become closer and more sound as time progresses, after the manner of those in all other independent countries. The essentials in the case are two-fold: On the one hand, the constitution of the independent Ukrainian State must not violate the vital interests of great Russia; on the other hand, the wish of the Ukrainian people to be self-governing and therefore to create an independent national state wherein they can enjoy the blessings of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" must be given just consideration, and there must be no unreasonable violation of the sacred principles involved. Nor should the people's inalienable rights be subordinated in any degree to mere commercial, political or any selfish or less worthy interests, which though advantageous to one nation, work irreparable wrong to another. Mutuality of interests must be the ruling motive in all such dealings between the nations.

Let us go deeper into our subject and discuss now the economic advantages enjoyed by the Ukraine when she formed an integral part of the Russian Empire; let us discover, if possible, what has been the economic policy of the empire for the last forty years. The fundamental directing idea of this policy was industrial protection, and we can interpose no objection to such a general idea, for is it not incumbent upon any state that is seeking the highest in economic development to protect its national industries? But now we come to the vital issue of the operation of this policy of industrial protection as exercised by Russia in her relations with the Ukraine. Here we shall see, as has often been the case, that the theory of a policy and its realization were two different things.

Customs System of Old Russian Empire

631 The old Russian Empire, with its immense territory, exceeds that of all other European countries combined, provided we exclude from our comparison all colonial possessions. It presents itself to us as a striking example of a conglomeration of different countries and peoples who differed greatly in the organization of their economic life, as well as in the degree of their culture. Indeed, several

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of its governments were nothing but colonies, differing 631
from such only in that colonies, in the strict sense of the
term, are geographically separated from the mother coun-
try. Notwithstanding this natural condition, Russia adopt- 651
ed the economic policies of the other continental European
countries, which were much more compact and decidedly
more homogeneous than herself, and whose colonies, being
outside the custom frontiers of their respective mother
countries, enjoyed a separate customs regulation adapted
to the facilities and conditions of their separate locations.
Contrary to this seemingly universal European colonial
regulation, Russia made all her colonies enter into a com-
mon frontier as to customs, and applied to them a general
customs tariff, which gives her commercial policy a peculiar
characteristic.

Immense Russia, whose provinces were so unlike, had
an abundance of natural resources for developing and
satisfying the many diversified interests of her entire ag-
gregation of possessions. Yet her customs tariff was
strictly uniform in its application to her whole territory,
inclusive even of remote Vladivostok. Every possible in-
dustry was protected, and in Petrograd and Moscow, for
example, every branch of every legitimate industry was
under the strictest surveillance as to customs tariff. As
a consequence, all Russia paid a high tax for every factory
in the land, whether it was near to or far removed from
the territory thus unjustly encumbered with taxes to sup-
port industries from which it derived not even the most
meager benefit. Furthermore, there was a uniform tariff
for customs, so that one form of protection operated to the
detriment of the other, and in particular caused a gradual
annihilation of the growth of agricultural industry in the
provinces. The result is easily foreseen: Such a rigid and
uniform commercial policy proved absolutely impracticable
in a country as non-homogeneous as was Russia.

Agriculture proved to be the most seriously affected of 241
all the industries, not only because the agricultural peoples 651
under this system were forced to pay nearly double prices 439
for industrial products, but also because Russia at this
time engaged in a customs war with western Europe. In

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241 an effort to lower the tax on manufactured articles, the
651 European countries began to put exorbitant duties on Rus-
439 sian agricultural products. Subsequent records show how detrimental was the Russo-German treaty of 1904 to agriculture among the Russian peoples. Thus were the interests of the agricultural regions clearly sacrificed to the interests of a few industrial centers.

Policy of Former Russia Injurious to Ukraine

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439 How did this affect the Ukraine? We have shown that,
433 in former Russia, the Ukraine was the principal exporter
SU of agricultural products, and that she could not find a
439 market for her wheat in industrial Russia because of the
433 stern competition offered by the Volga and Siberia. Hence her only course was to seek an outside market, and this she did by exporting all surplus cereals to western Europe.
SU Even here Russia subordinated the Ukrainian agricultural
[438] interests to the interests of industrial security. Added to this injustice, she took no steps to encourage Ukrainian exportation into central Russia. Money was spent in constructing elevators in the region of the Volga and in Siberia and refrigerator trains were organized for shipping meat, poultry, butter and fruit into eastern Russia, Siberia and Central Asia: all this to the neglect of Ukrainian interests. Nor was there any compensation for this loss by the promotion of the manufacturing industry in Ukraine. It is an indisputable fact that Ukrainian manufactures are much less developed than those of either Russia or Russian Poland. We can find one reason for this, however, in a certain period of Ukraine's history.

000 Russia and Poland were already enjoying an assured and peaceful national life while Ukraine was still struggling against the factors which were devastating her territory. The colonization of certain Ukrainian territories after the expulsion of the nomads took place much later than that of the other Russian provinces. Later, Ukraine was invaded by the Poles, who did not cease to treat her like a colony, and exploited her entirely for their own benefit. Hence, at the time of Ukraine's incorporation into Russia,

2: Timoshenko 5-4, 5 (no date) 1919 RD1 Ukraine RDL
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Hence, at the time of Ukraine's incorporation into Russia, the latter had industries, while Ukraine had none. To add to the difficulties already surrounding her industrial initiative and development, Ukraine, being included in the same customs frontier with Moscow and Warsaw, was forced from the very first to compete with districts industrially much stronger than herself. Thus, while Ukraine remained a colony of Russia, her growth was thwarted and checked rather than fostered by the mother country and was in danger of the same fate that overtook Ukrainian Galicia, which was smothered in the custom frontiers of Austria, and remained a colony for the industries of German Austria. UL 433 SUL 433

We cannot stop with a consideration of commercial policies alone in seeking to discover the Russian agencies that were unfavorable to the economic interests of Ukraine, for there are many other matters to be studied, if one is to give a clear and unbiased perspective of the true situation. 000

Over-centralization in Former Russia

Results show that the guiding principle of all Russian policy was centralization, absolute and unqualified. Even the most insignificant orders of the State, which were to be carried out thousands of miles away from the center of the empire, could not be passed except by the agreement of the central government in Petrograd, which, from the very nature of affairs, understood little of the needs and condition of the people upon whom they were to be inflicted. Naturally, the only beneficiaries were the manufacturers, contractors or intermediaries who were in favor at court and near the antechambers of the ministries, while the interests having no headquarters at Petrograd stood little chance of securing any orders from the State. Because of these conditions, the administration of all the important enterprises—factories, banks, insurance companies and similar organizations—was located in Moscow or Petrograd. Even mills and factories were often located in inconvenient points, simply because they were nearer the center of things. The higher branches of technical education were likewise centralized there. SUL 642

257 During the last thirty or forty years, it is true, the
316 economic situation of the Ukraine has changed consider-
325 ably; three large industries have developed in the country:
651 the sugar industry, the mining and the metal industries. And one is tempted to say that this development was due to Russian protection. But is this quite correct? Undoubtedly the protection had some influence, but not as much as one might suppose. In the first place, one must not forget that in the Ukraine there are natural conditions much more favorable to these industries than in any other part of the Russian Empire. Certainly the sugar, metal and mining interests are among those which depend on the location of their raw materials and can never start in a place where these are lacking. Besides, these industries are infinitely more fostered by transportational advantages than by custom duties. The duties which were imposed on foreign coal did not prevent the importation of English coal into the Baltic provinces nor into Petrograd. On the other hand, even if all custom duties on foreign coal had been suppressed, it would never have penetrated into central Russia and there replaced the fuel of Donetz. As to the sugar, the situation in the Ukraine was perhaps even more favorable. As to metallurgy, it no doubt profited by the protective Russian tax. But there again the role of this tax was not very great. In fact, the products of Ukrainian metallurgy were heavy (rails, beams, tires, wheels, pipes, iron bars, etc.), and their manufacture was only slightly stimulated by the tax because of the great distances over which they had, in any case, to be carried. Protective tariff is much more necessary to those industries which supply finished products of light weight, but of these the Ukraine furnished very few. The textile industry of Moscow and of Poland profited much more by protection, as did many other branches of the industrial activities of central Russia.

Effect of Russian Imperial Methods in Ukraine

369 Therefore, by this system, the Ukraine had more loss
241 than profit. She was still a market for Russian and Polish industrial products, for which she paid high prices. But

for her own industry the Russian custom frontier gave her 369
insufficient protection; on the contrary, it rather reserved 241
the Ukrainian market to Moscow and Warsaw.

Consequently the industrial development of the Ukraine 369
was very slow. The agricultural population did not find 241
enough work in the towns, and, as a result, the surplus of 162
agrarian population increased every year. In some parts of the Ukraine this surplus population was more serious than in any other part of former Russia. In the central Ukrainian provinces the agrarian population reached 800 to 1,000 inhabitants per 1,000 hektares of arable land, while in France and Germany the average was about 500 inhabitants. There was nothing left for the Ukrainian population [167] but to emigrate and colonize the lands of Siberia and of Central Asia. There was also a rather considerable movement of emigration towards America. The most fertile governments of the Ukraine furnished many more emigrants than the less fertile but more industrial regions of central Russia.

Emigration as a Possible Solution

As a consolation, it is pointed out that, in case of the 000
reunion of the Ukraine with Russia, the Ukraine will have in Siberia a field for emigration all ready. But that is very poor consolation. Can emigration satisfy any country? Are the Italians proud of sending many emigrants to America? Did the Germans have cause to feel flattered by increasing the trans-Atlantic emigration, before they developed their own industries?

Why, then, should it be the lot of the Ukraine to let her population emigrate to distant Siberia?

Why can she not develop her economic life in such a manner that all her people shall have work on their own soil? The Ukraine ought not to remain an outlet for the industrial work of the Russians and Poles when her own people cannot find any work at home.

But one might ask why no complaint has been heard up to the present, either from the Ukrainians engaged in industry or from those engaged in agriculture? Why did

000 they not protest against a policy which was almost fatal to them? At first, it is true, complaints were sometimes made, and if they have not been more frequent, it is because in the old Russian Empire there was no tribunal where they might be heard. Political economy in Russia was centralized in the ministry. It was never the subject of any public discussion. Hereafter she should face the political stage where the voice of the Ukrainian people can make itself heard.

However, the policies of the present directors of the resurrection of the Russian Empire seem to tend, like those of their predecessors, toward preventing the Ukrainian people from manifesting their will, disposing freely of their fate or regulating their lives according to their own interests.

Summary

These politicians claim, on the one hand, that the interests of the Ukrainian people imply without any doubt their union with Russia; on the other hand, they are afraid to give to the people of Ukraine the chance of presenting their interests in an entirely free way. They are afraid that these people will have a Constituent Assembly, where they can discuss directly and clearly this problem whether it is to their interests to unite with Russia or to create an independent state.

If these protectors of the Ukrainian people are firmly convinced that the interests of the Ukraine demand that this nation remain a part of Russia "one and indivisible," why will they not listen to the free voice of the Ukrainian people in their Constituent Assembly?

Then let the people of the Ukraine express their own wishes and decide their own fate. They will say where their real interests are and in what manner they intend to construct their political and economic life. And they are infinitely better qualified to say it than those who, pretending to uphold the Ukrainian interests, are really working for their own.

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UKRAINE and *ITS PEOPLE*

A Handbook with Maps, Statistical Tables and Diagrams

edited
by
I. Mirchuk Ph. D.
Professor at the Ukrainian Free University

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Introduction

114 This is a collaborative work whose aim is to impart to the English reader general information concerning the Ukrainian people, their territory and their achievements in public life. It might be termed a Ukrainian encyclopaedia in miniature. With the exception of Professor Manning of Columbia University who has provided the contribution on "The Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon World," and to whom I owe special thanks for this essay, all the authors are Ukrainian specialists, who have devoted their best efforts to the furtherance of the project. The geographical depiction of the country was written by Professor W. Kubiyovych, formerly of the University of Cracow, and now engaged at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich. He is the author of a large textbook on the geography of Ukraine and of a Ukrainian atlas. The contributions on the "Ukrainian People", "Ukrainian Emigration", "Minorities in Ukraine", and the "Ukrainian Press", are the product of Prof. Z. Kuziela, president of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. The essays on the name "Ukraine" and the "Ukrainian Language" were presented by Professor Rudnytskyj, formerly of the Ukrainian University, Munich, but now at the university of Manitoba, Canada. The brief summary of the thousand years' history of the Ukrainian people owes its production to the pen of the young scholar Dr. Michael Antonovych, a lecturer from the University of Vienna in the field of Eastern European History. The articles concerning the social structure of the Ukrainian community and the different areas of Ukraine, their nationality and political position were written by an outstanding specialist in this field, Mr. Viktor Sadovskyj from Prague. The noted economist Diploma Engineer D. Dyminskyj, Professor at the Ukrainian Free University and at the Ukrainian Technical Institute in Regensburg assumed the for-

[i-ii blank]

114 midable task of presenting the entire economic life in Ukraine in a brief and concise manner, both from the aspect of its development and in its present state. The third section of the book which describes the cultural life of Ukraine, the Church, and the psychological characteristics of the people are products of the writer's pen.

121 The work as a whole has been composed from a historical point of view and includes the period up to the year 1939. It is to be particularly emphasised that it has been necessary to present this complete historical development of Ukrainian public life in order to be able to explain adequately the present situation. This is the first extensive treatise on Ukraine in English and for this reason it appeared advisable to take into account the historical preliminaries of the present. However, it has also seemed wisest not to proceed in the treatment beyond the year 1939, since reliable statistical data are lacking for an authoritative presentation of recent years. During the second World War the Ukrainian territory was so thoroughly devastated by military operations, and so great changes of a political character have taken place, that a correct treatment of the present situation is essentially impossible. To make the matter still more difficult is the fact that the Soviet government, in whose sphere of authority lies the entire native soil of Ukraine, gives out almost no statistics and when any do appear their validity is of a very doubtful character.

104 The book has set as its goal the illumination of all aspects of the Ukrainian problem. With the one exeption noted above it has been composed by Ukrainian scholars, and now appears for the public as authentically representative of Ukrainian public opinion. For that reason, it is appropriate that it should render the Ukrainian names, not in the general and customary Russian or Polish transliteration, but in the little known Ukrainian one. We use, therefore, "Chernvhiv" instead of the customary "Chernigov", "Kyiv" instead of the generally known "Kiev", "Lviv" instead of "Lemberg" or "Lwow", etc. However, in order to make the reader familiar with the Ukrainian form of the names, we include with this introduction a list of Ukrainian geographical and proper names in which the Ukrainian and usual

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transliteration is presented. The rendition of Ukrainian sounds 104
in English transcription is perhaps the weakest aspect of this publication, but the author can hardly avoid this, since up to now there has existed no officially recognised formula for such a rendition. At this juncture, however, I should like to call the reader's attention to one item, namely the ending of the masculine Ukrainian name "yj" as in "Khmelnytskyj", or "Tarnovskyj", for example. The ending in "y"alone does not accurately render the English sound, but we have for aesthetic reasons not given it as "yy", and have kept the form "yj", whereby it must be clearly emphasised, however, that this "j" in Slavic names must be pronounced not like an English "j" but like a Latin "i" or Greek "jota". Also, for example, the name of the city "Kyiv" consists of two syllables "Ky-iv".

Inasmuch as this book is not designed for a particular country 000
such as America or Canada, but for the entire world and has only employed English as one of the recognised world languages Professor Dyminskyj, in the calculations of his section on economics, has employed the European system of measures. However in order to facilitate the orientation for readers of other continents we include a table of equivalent measures which permits the conversion, in a simple fashion, of European measures into the American or Canadian.

I am entirely aware that various aspects of this book might be improved; but, as has been said, the better is the enemy of the good we have above all, for reasons of time, found it desirable to effect the publishing of the book in such manner as was feasible under prevailing circumstances.

The work has involved considerable effort and labor. To all who have so helpfully collaborated with me in its production are tendered my hearty thanks. I am especially obliged to the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee at Munich and its Director Roman Smook, who contributed greatly towards a speedy publication of the work.

J. Mirchuk

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List of Names

Ukrainian	Russian or Polish
Berdychiv	Berdichev
Berestechko	Berestoczko
Berestya	Brest-Litowsk, Brzesc nad Bugiem
Berezhany	Brzezany
Buh	Bug
Chernivtsi	Cernauti
Chernyhiv	Chernigov
Dnipro	Dnepr, (Dnieper)
Dniprodshershinske	Dneprodzershinsk
Dnipropetrovske / Katerynoslav	Dnepropetrovsk / Ekaterinoslav
Dnister	Dnestr, (Dniester)
Halych	Halich
Kamianets-Podilskyj	Kamenets-Podolsk
Kharkiv	Kharkov
Konstantynivka	Konstantinovka
Kremianets	Krzemieniec
Kryvyj Rih	Krivoi Rog
Kyiv	Kiev
Lviv	Lwow, - Lemberg
Mohyliv	Mogilev
Mykolajiv	Nikolaev
Nikopil	Nikopol
Novhorod	Novgorod
Oziv	Sea of Azov
Peremyshl	Przemysl
Proskuriv	Proskurov
Rivne	Rowne - Rovno
Sandomir	Sandomierz
Sevastopil	Sevastopol
Syanik	Sanok
Stanislaviv	Stanislawow
Taganrih	Taganrog
Tarnopil	Tarnopol
Volynia	Wolhynia
Voronizh	Voronezh
Vynnytsia	Vinnitsa
Zaporizha	Zaporozhe
Zhytomyr	Zhitomir

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Tables for Conversion of European Metric System into American or Canadian measures

804

1 Meter	= 1.0936 yd	1 yard	= 0.9144 m
1 Meter	= 3.2808 ft	1 foot	= 0.3048 m
1 Kilometer	= 0.6214 mi	1 mile	= 1.6094 km
1 Squarekilometer	= 0.3861 sq. mi	1 square mile	= 2.5900 km²
1 Hectare	= 2.4710 acre	1 acre	= 0.4047 ha
1 Kilogramm	= 2.2046 lb	1 pound	= 0.4536 kg
1 metric ton	= 0.9842 t long	1 ton long	= 1.0160 t
1 metric ton	= 1.1023 t short	1 ton short	= 0.9072 t

Yield of Produce per Unit of Land

q/ha (Centners per Hectare) — bu/acre (US or Winchesterbushel per acre)

In converting the number of centners or bushels to get the corresponding number of bushels (per acre) or of centners (per ha) we multiply by one of the following coefficients.

Wheat

q/ha x 14.870 = bu/acre (1 bu = 60 lbs); bu/acre x 6.725 = q/ha

Rye — Maise

q/ha x 15.932 = bu/acre (1 bu = 56 lbs); bu/acre x 6.277 = q/ha

Barley

q/ha x 18.588 = bu/acre (1 bu = 48 lbs); bu/acre x 5.379 = q/ha

Oats

q/ha x 27.882 = bu/acre (1 bu = 32 lbs); bu/acre x 3.587 = q/ha

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1

Country and People

The Name

101 The name "Ukrayina" is of Slavonic origin and has four different meanings in the Ukrainian language: 1. border-land or march; 2. any remote area; 3. country in general; 4. the habitat of the people constituting the Ukrainian nation and of their culture.

Originally the accent was on the syllable "kray", which is how the word is accented still to-day in Russian and White Ruthenian. The original meaning of the name as we find it in chronicles of the 12th century and in books up to the 16th century is likely to have been "border-land". In the 17th century, however, parallel to the growth of the Cossack state, the term which was formerly applied to some portions of the territory only began to extend to the whole country and at the same time its meaning was broadened according to political facts: in the conscience of the people the Cossack state was a political power whose historical mission was to act as bulkhead against the Asiatic hordes and to protect Christianity and European culture from an invasion out of the East. The term "Ukrayina" then meant: 1. territory of the Cossack state; 2. boundary between the Asiatic East and civilised Europe.

The book by Le Vasseur de Beauplan "Description d'Ukraine" made this name popular throughout the world, as did his maps "Delineatio specialis et accurata cum suis palatinatibus" (1650).

On the geographical maps subsequently drawn, the term "Ukraine" appears continually (see L. Bagrov: "Die ersten Karten der Ukraine im 17. Jahrhundert", Beiträge zur Ukraine-

101 kunde, herausgegeben vom Ukrainischen Wissenschaftlichen Institut Berlin 1935).

[186] National consciousness increased as a consequence of oppression by Russians and Poles, in spite of whose resistance the name "Ukraine" as a special term for the Ukrainian territory spread quickly, thus emphasising the fact that there is a difference between the Ukrainians and their neighbors in the spheres of language, race, culture, national feeling and policy.

In Tsarist Russia the name "Ukraine" was the symbol of the Ukrainian people's struggle for independence. It was therefore abolished and replaced by "Little Russia", a term very much hated by Ukrainians.

In addition to the name "Ukrayina" Ukrainians originally used the term "Rus" to designate the political entity of the Kyiv empire to which at that time the territory of Ukraine belonged. Originally "Rus" applied solely to the southern parts of Eastern Europe, whilst the northern parts were called Muscovy. Tsar Peter the Great extended this name to the whole empire and entered it into official European nomenclature. In Peter's state, "Rus"-Ukraine was called "Little Russia" to indicate that this part of the realm was not one with the former Muscovite territory which got the name "Great Russia".

Before the First World War Austria had introduced "Ruthenia, Ruthenian" from Latin "Ruthenus" as official name for the Ukrainians in Galicia. But not before the 20th century was some order brought into the chaos of "Ukrainian — Little Russian — Ruthenian". The USSR officially acknowledged the name "Ukraine, Ukrainian" and the "Ukranian Soviet Republic" has succeeded in keeping its ground at least nominally in the world-wide family of nations.

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The Ukrainian Territory

I

1. Geographical Relations

a) Its place in Europe

The frontiers of Ukraine coincide with the boundaries of the /131
area settled by the Ukrainian people. This area stretches from the Upper Tisa, the Danube, the Black Sea and the Caucasus to the woods and marshes of Polesya, from the Poprad, the Syan, the Vepr and the Pilitsa rivers (affluents of the Vistula) to the valleys of the Caucasus and the broad waters of the Don; further east numerous Ukrainian settlements lie on the way to Siberia and the Pacific.

Ukraine is the bridge between Eastern Europe and the /133
Mediterranean countries. Its tectonic structure is determined by the Ukraine gneiss and the chains of the Carpathians, the Yaila mountains and the Caucasus (young fold system). Recent shiftings of the surface have lent a more varied shape to this landscape than to any other in Eastern Europe. The glaciers of the Ice Age covered only a small part of what we call Ukraine to-day, with the result, however, that most of the country was covered with a thick crust of loess, the origin of the fertile Black Earth. Climate and flora are distinctly different from those of adjoining countries but, in spite of this, Ukraine does not possess any marked natural frontiers. The Black Sea and the Caucasus alone may be regarded as such and in the north, the boundary is partly given by the marshes of Polesya. The history of Ukraine has been in part determined by its lack of frontiers protected by Nature.

b) Frontiers

The Ukrainian territory lies between 43° and 53°N and 21° /131
and 45°E on the way to Asia, the continent of steppes and deserts. In consequence of their position, the frontiers of Ukraine have often been subject to alterations; the limits of the settled area often overlap neighboring areas and are, indeed, often so blurred that no sharp boundaries can be drawn, especially

131 in Sub-Caucasia, but also in the zone between Poland and Ukraine.

101 The frontiers of the area settled by the Ukrainians are divided
131 into the following sections:

1. the southern section, bounded by the Seas and the Caucasus;
2. the southwestern section — the Roumanian-Magyar section;
3. the western section — bordering on Slovakia and Poland;
4. the northern section — the White Ruthenian-Russian section;
5. the eastern section — Don and Caucasus section.

The southern frontier was reached by the Ukrainian people at the end of the eighteenth century, thus linking up with the trade of the outside world. The frontier runs from the delta of the Danube to Gagry on the slopes of the Caucasus and is about 1125 miles long. Only part of the Crimean Peninsula was settled by the Ukrainians; it is a mixed settlement and includes among its population Ukrainians, Tatars and Russians.

The south-west frontier is about 625 miles long and has shifted considerably in the course of centuries in favor of the Roumanians. To-day the districts of Akkerman and Hotin as well as the north-west area of Bucovina are all that is left of the Ukrainian settlements that once spread all over Bessarabia, Moldavia and Bucovina. The losses on the Magyar frontier have not been so severe.

The western frontier, about 532 miles long, is not clearly defined in the Slovak section, there being many ethnographical insets. In the Polish section this frontier is a mixed zone, especially in the Kholm district and Podlakhia, where that section of the Ukrainian population which joined the Roman Catholic Church in the 20th century has become Polish in national consciousness.

On the northern frontier there is no rigid line of demarcation between Ukrainian and White Ruthenian dialects; east of the Dnipro (area round Chernyhiv) the frontier has become particularly blurred as the land was settled by Ukrainians, White Ruthenians and Russians.

The eastern frontier is divided into 2 parts by the wedge of Don Cossack territory projecting west, viz. the section bet-

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ween Novokhopersk and Rostov and that extending from Rostov to Otomanivsk. 101 131

It is only in the western section that the frontier runs between the purely Ukrainian area in west Sub-Caucasia (Kuban area) and the Don area; eastern Sub-Caucasia is a mixed belt of Ukrainians and Russians. In the south-east, therefore, we must speak of two frontiers of Ukrainian territory, a narrower and a wider one. The former separates Ukrainian Transcaucasia from the eastern part of Transcaucasia that is partly Russian, while the latter also includes eastern Sub-Caucasia. Throughout its course, the south-eastern frontier is blurred and by no means fixed, as the process of colonisation is still going on.

c) Boundaries and Territories of the three Historical Ukrainian States:

The Kyiv state stretched in the 11th and 12th centuries from the Wyslok to the Donets and included areas which were not colonised and others whose inhabitants were not Ukrainians. It embraced almost 1153846 square miles, almost 1/6 of which was constantly inhabited by Ukrainians. 131 175

The second Ukrainian state (the realm of the Cossacks) had an area of about 115384 square miles, western Ukraine was not included within its boundaries.

The third Ukrainian state covered the entire area settled by the Ukrainian people, with the exception of the Don area and Sub-Caucasia. Without annexations (which were of brief duration), the third state covered about 242308 square miles, with the Crimean Peninsula, a part of the Voronesh district, Carpathian Ukraine and Bucovina 265384 square miles, i. e. less than the entire Ukrainian ethnographical territory (276269 sq. miles) and much less than the entire territory originally settled by Ukrainians (357885 sq. miles).

d) Size of the Ukrainian territory

131

Up to World War I 29039 sq. miles of the Ukrainian territory belonged to Austria-Hungary and the remainder to Russia. After the end of World War I and a short period of inde- 162 175

131 pendence in the years 1917—1920, Ukraine was distributed among the following countries:
162
175

Ukraine Territory	Area	Population on 1. 1. 1939 (in millions)
to USSR	216 846 sq.m.	37.3
to Poland	46 932 sq.m.	9.7
to Roumania	6 769 sq.m.	1.4
to Czechoslovakia	5 730 sq.m.	0.8

A separate Ukraine Soviet Republic was formed within the USSR (170 423 sqm. with 31.9 million inhabitants). The remaining Ukraine districts in Soviet Russia belonged to the RSFSR, and a tiny piece of Polesya to the Republic of Whi e Ruthenia. At the end of World War II almost the whole Ukrainian territory fell to the Soviet Union. 20 000 km² with more t' an a million inhabitants belongs to Poland, 5 000 km² with 100 00. inhabitants to Slovakia and small minorities to Roumania.

Soviet Ukraine embraces about 261 538 sq.m. with 43 million inhabitants. —

2. Natural Conditions in Ukraine

a) Landscape of Ukraine

133 Ukraine consists of vast plains and plateaus which seldom rise as high as 1000 ft. above sea-level. The monotony of the Ukrainian landscape is akin to that of neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. One can travel for hundreds of miles through a landscape that never changes, for the plateaus differ little from the plains, the transition from the one physical configuration to the other being scarcely perceptible. In the south, the scene is varied by mountains, but these constitute but 1/10 of the entire area of Ukraine.

Passing from south to north, we can distinguish 5 different forms of landscape.

In the south the southern low plain stretches along and includes the plains at the foot of the Carpathian mountains with the valley of the Vistula, the Syan and the Dnister, the Black Sea depression and the plain surrounding the lowlands of

the Don, touching the valley of the Kuban and the shore of 133
the Caspian Sea.

This is followed by the zone of plateaus: the plateau between Lviv and Tomashev, Podolia, the Kholm-Volynia plateau, the Pokutia-Bessarabia plateau, the Dnipro plateau, and the Oziv-Donets plateau.

This zone of plateaus is bounded on the north by a strip of the northern plain. It embraces Podlakhia, Polesya and the district of Chernyhiv.

This zone unites with the plain on the left bank of the Dnipro in its middle course which merges on the eastern boundary with the plain on the left bank of the Donets.

Only the southern slope of the isolated plateau of Central Russia belongs to Ukraine.

From the point of view of geology, the oldest area is the so-called Ukrainian Crystal Plateau, consisting of the Dnipro and the Oziv plateaus and the eastern part of Volynia. Water and weathering influences have destroyed this ancient mountain ridge. Early in the Tertiary period it was flooded by the sea, covered with sands and loams and then, during the Ice Age, with a thick crust of loess.

In the Carbon period of the Paleozoic era the seams in the Donets Basin were formed. They seemed to turn north-west under the Dnipro Plain, for coal has also been found at Poltava.

The plain on the left bank of the Dnipro was formed by the depression between the Ukrainian Crystal Plateau and the Russian Central Plateau; this took place in the Jurassic period of the Mesozoic formation. The Carpathians, the Yaila mountains and the Caucasus belong to the Tertiary period.

No mountain-forming agents influenced other parts of Ukraine. The horizontal deposits in these areas are called „Black Sea Plateau".

Diluvial glaciers reached a line running over Sambir — Lviv — Lutsk — Zhytomyr — Kremenchuk — Hadiach — Briansk.

133 When the glaciers receded, sands, loams, moranes and numerous lakes were left. The wind blew tiny particles of loam (loess) out of the masses of sand and they gradually covered the entire central strip of the plateau and of the southern plain. This loess soil of Central and Southern Ukraine, the famous Black Earth, is the best type of soil in Europe. It covers about 70 million hectares (about 200 million acres) and makes Ukraine the granary of Europe.

The northern areas which retained sand and flint silted up and became marshes.

As a result of the emergence of the Ukrainian ridge and the plateau and of the depression of Polesya and the Black Sea Plain, the work of the rivers was sped up in the uplands and retarded in the plains. The river beds became deeper and deeper and formed the ravines (jary) which are characteristic of the Ukraine.

The landscape of Polesya has changed least of all. Extensive fens, marshy meadows and forests, from which a solid island occasionally emerges (all that is left of an old moraine or sand-dune) flank the sluggish waters of the Prypyat and its tributaries. In spring and after rains the banks are flooded and Polesya becomes one wide lake with trees and huts showing above the surface. What agrarian land exists is bad, and the population poor. Podlakhia is drier and richer in forests; the virgin forest of Bielovjesh with its herds of bison is well-known. The district round Chernyhiv is also higher and therefore more densely populated. The zone of the plateaus, especially Podolia, offer the eye a very different scene. It is a landscape of ravines, the largest and finest of which is that cut by the Dnister. The table-lands of Podolia slope gently towards the south and the plateau of Kholm and Volynia. Its „mountain ridge" is the Towtry chain formed of old coral reefs.

The Pokutia-Bessarabian plateau has a structure similar to Podolia. The plateau on the right bank of the Dnipro falls down abruptly 300 ft. to the river-bed, providing a jagged, mountainous horizon. The right bank tributaries have rocky channels and their courses are marked by frequent rapids

(porohy). The most famous of these is between Dnipropetrovske and Zaporizha; they are regulated to-day and no longer an obstacle to navigation. /133

The lowlands on the left bank form a sandy plain that rises in terraces to the Central Russian Plateau. It is steppe, bare of trees and rich in loess and is therefore fertile and densely populated.

On the Donets Plateau at the bend of the Donets river big industrial towns have sprung up in the last centuries, thus completely altering the appearance of the old steppes.

The characteristic features of the Black Sea Plain are the sluggish rivers that flow between banks overgrown with reeds; where they enter the sea, they form so called "Lymany", i. e. flooded valley bottoms which are separated from the sea by a strip of land broken at more than one point. In northern Crimea we are struck by the numerous salt lakes from which salt is extracted. The Kuban plain is distinguished by its fertility and mild climate; the Caspian plain, on the other hand, is a dry steppe merging into a sandy, salty desert blown over by all the winds of heaven.

On the coast of the Black Sea which falls away in low rocks we find again the flat sandbanks of the Adriatic character (the Lido). Such a sandbank, the Arabat, on the Oziv coast separates the Sea of Oziv from the "Lazy Sea".

The southern coast of the Crimea and the Caucasus, on the other hand, is steep and provides good harbors, as the sea is deep here (e. g. Sevastopil, Novorossijske etc).

The surface of the Crimean mountains which reach a height of 3800 ft. in Roman Kosh, is eroded. On the tops there are alpine pasturages (Jajla); on the north the wooded slopes fall gently, while on the south they descend abruptly to the sea.

The Caucasus has all the characteristics of a high mountain range; the lower heights are covered with virgin forest, the massed peaks in the centre rise far above snow-line (7500 — 10 000 ft.) reaching the highest point in the giant Elbrus (ca. 17 000 ft.).

133 In the Carpathians, too, it is only the central area that was settled by the Ukrainian people; this is a rolling, hilly landscape, rising to some 7.000 ft. (Chornohora). The Carpathian foothills are fertile and thickly populated and rich in mineral wealth (petroleum in Boryslav and Jaslo, potassium and common salt in Kalush, brown coal).

b) Climate

132 The climate of Ukraine is moderate, a continental climate with big differences between summer and winter temperatures (s. table).

Table:

Area	Lat.	Longit.	Height (meters)	Temperature in Celsius				Rainfall (mm)
				av. Jan.		July	Diff.	
Lviv	49° 50	24° 21	298	7.6	-4.0	18.7	22.7	690
Kyiv	50° 27	30° 30	183	6.9	-6.0	19.3	23.3	590
Kharkiv	50° 00	36° 14	140	6.6	-7.8	20.4	28.2	507
Stalingrad	48° 42	44° 31	42	7.7	9.9	24.7	34.6	372

Compared with that of Russia, the climate of Ukraine is warmer and more favorable to the cultivation of the soil; compared with that of western countries, it is drier and much healthier.

Climatically, Ukraine falls into four provinces, viz.:

1. the province of boreal climate (cold in winter, moderately warm in summer) lies in the north and stretches to the line Chisinau — Poltava — Voroshylivhrad — Saratov. It is favorable for the growth of forest plants.

2. the province of the dry steppe climate (cold winters, hot summers. low rainfall) stretches farther south to the mountains. Rainfall is irregularly distributed and is often insufficient for tree growth. The grass steppe is characteristic of this province.

3. the province of alpine climate includes the Carpathians, the Yaila and Caucasus ranges. The most striking feature in the alpine climate is the drop in average temperature in inverse proportion to altitude and the higher rainfall.

4. the province of oceanic climate (southern coast of Crimea and that part of Sub-Caucasia that lies along the sea coast) has warm, rainy winters and hot, dry summers. 132

c) Rivers and Seas

The rivers of Ukraine are long and carry much water. They either flow to the Baltic (Syan, Veper, Buh and Narew and other tributaries of the Vistula), or to the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv (Danube with tributaries, Dnister, Buh, Dnipro, Don with Donets etc.). The fact that the main watershed runs through the plains faciliates the construction of a network of canals connecting the seas. The Dnipro (1405 miles long and draining an area of 199 230 sq. miles) is the largest river in Ukraine. Historical settlements lie on its banks and the Ukrainian state developed along its course. For the people of Ukraine it is a sacred river. 133 487

The Buh (497 miles long, draining an area of 24 450 sq. miles) flows into the Black Sea west of the Dnipro. It has not much water and is not navigable.

South-west Ukraine is drained by the Dnister (856 miles long, area of basin 29615 sq. m.). Its course is not regulated either and it is not navigable. The rivers Prut and Cheremosh connect Ukraine with the Danube, while the Don and the Donets form the channel to the Sea of Oziv; the Kuban river drains the Kuban plain.

The Black Sea (area 158 462 sq. miles) connected by the Kerch Strait with the Sea of Oziv (area 14 615 sq. miles) has always been the channel of commerce between the eastern world and the countries round the Mediterranean. Its most important harbors, Odessa, Sevastopil, and Novorossijske are blocked by ice for a short time only; the Sea of Oziv, on the other hand, is too shallow to be navigable.

d) Flora and Fauna

The commonest tree in the northern forest zone is the pine; the birch, the alder, the ash and other species also occur frequently. In the west we find beech and larch, and in the Carpathians the spruce and the fir, and sometimes even the cedar. 137

137 Oaks and hornbeams grow plentifully in the zone of transition between forest and the steppe while the pine prefers sandy river valleys. Vegetation in the mountains corresponds to that in western surroundings. The vast mountain pastures deserve special mention. On the coast of the Crimea and the Caucasus we find the buttertree, the cypress, the stone pine, the laurel, opuntias, agaves and other Mediterranean plants.

136 Prevalent animal species vary only slightly from those found in neighboring countries in the west. Worthy of mention are wild-cat, ermine, and bison in the forest region, bear, lynx and wild-cat in the Carpathians. In the Yaila mountains there are vultures. The Caucasus has the greatest variety of animals. It is still possible there to hunt ibex, jackals and ure-ox. On the southern slopes there are even panthers. Numerous rodents live in the steppes. The ure-ox, the beaver and the marmot are dying out.

3. Population.

a) Density

161 In 1939 the average density of the population in Ukraine was 68 persons per sq. kilometer. In the central forest-steppe zone, one of the most thickly populated agrarian areas in Europe, 80—120 people live on a sq. kilometer, between the Syan and Kursk. Northern Ukraine with its lighter soil is much more thinly populated; here the average density amounts to 40—60 persons per sq. kilometer, and in Polesya this figure even falls below 25. The density of the population in Southern Ukraine corresponds roughly to that in the north, though the Donets basin is an isolated area of dense population. The Caucasus foothills, a country with a climate at least as favorable as that of Central Ukraine is only two-thirds as densely populated, as it was colonised late. The mountains are thinly populated.

162 361 The majority of the Ukrainian people live in villages; 29 % live in towns and 10 % in cities with more than 100 000 inhabitants; trade and industry are not intensively developed; we are struck by the many towns that have grown up at the frontiers between the various natural areas; there are 60 bet-

ween the forest steppe and the Kholm forests, among them Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Kyiv and Konotip. Akkerman, Odessa, Mykolajiv, Kherson, Sevastop'l lie on the sea coast. In all there are 18 towns with more than 100 000 inhabitants (statistics dating from 1939 and for Western Ukraine from 1931). 162 361

Kyiv	846 000
Kharkiv	833 000
Odessa	604 000
Dnipropetrovske	500 000
Stalino	462 000
Lviv	316 000
Zaporizha	289 000
Mariupil	222 000
Voroshylivhrad	213 000
Kryvyj Rih	198 000
Taganrih	189 000
Symferopil	143 000
Chernivtsi	111 000
Kerch	104 000

b) Movement of population

Movements in the population of Ukraine have been caused by natural increase and emigration and immigration, these movements being more pronounced than elsewhere in Europe. 161

Natural Increasein 1927 per 1000	Births	Mortality	Actual Increase
USSR	40.3	17.8	22.5
North Caucasia	42.7	17.1	25.6
Crimea	44.7	18.1	26.6
Galicia	31.8	20.3	11.5
Volynia and Polesya	39.4	17.7	19.4
Carpathian Ukraine	37.4	23.3	16.1

The greatest natural increase is to be found in those parts of Ukraine that are most sparsely populated, while the lowest, determined by low birthrate, is provided by Galicia which is over-populated. Increase in purely Ukrainian elements of the population exceeds the average value for other elements inhabiting the same areas of settlement. There are no data on

161 natural increase in the Ukrainian parts of the Soviet Union. The USSR not having issued any statistics. It seems, however, that population was reduced by increased mortality.

161 The steady flow of emigration diminished the actual in-
166 crease of the Ukrainian people. West Ukrainians go to the United States and Canada, the inhabitants of the Dnipro area to the Caucasus and Asia. Movements within the frontiers shift the population slowly to the east and south, these movements being strongest towards the Basin of the Donets and the North Caucasus, and weakest towards the areas on the right banks of the Dnipro and Galicia. There is also a steady flight from the country to the town. In consequence to an increase of the collective system, of famine and flight to the town, the population of the USSR did not grow since 1932; increase of population in the towns was opposed by considerable decrease in the country.

c) National Conditions

182 National conditions in the Ukrainian territory at present have been produced by long and complicated processes which Ukraine was forced to undergo by factors such as her geographical position, the extent of her territory, movements of colonisation, natural increase, migration, lack of an independent government, etc.

In consequence, the national composition of Ukrainian areas is characterised by peculiar features, such as a mixture of nationalities in many provinces, a fairly high percentage of national minorities, a considerable difference from the ethnological point of view between the populations of town and village, and so on.

167 We find different national conditions in the different frontier districts. In the West, the Ukrainian factor receded; the frontier between Ukraine and Poland was regulated in favor of the latter and, what was more important, the entire region of the frontier was settled by Poles who had been pressing east from time immemorial, in the search for better opportunities for their surplus population. The Polish immigration in these districts is

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

best demonstrated by the fact that there are scarcely 100 000 Ukrainians living west of the ethnographical frontier between Ukraine and Poland, while 2.5 million Poles are to be found east of the same line. (All statistics from the end of 1932). 167

The area of the eastern frontier is different; due to pressure from Ukrainian colonisation movements, many Ukrainian "islands" appear on the eastern frontier and occur repeatedly right to the Pacific Coast. Some districts were colonised by Ukrainians and Russians in common, which explains the mixed character of the population of the foothills of the Eastern Caucasus and the Crimea.

If we consider the Ukrainian national territory as a whole, within its narrower and wider boundaries, we find a large percentage of foreigners — 25 % within the narrower and up to 30 % within the wider frontiers —, although Ukrainian territory never goes beyond its ethnographical frontiers and although these national minorities are not concentrated in a few places but are scattered throughout the territory. No other extensive ethnographical unit in Europe has so many national minorities as Ukraine. The history of the Ukrainian territory is to blame for this handicap. It was repeatedly swamped by foreign peoples, the upper classes were robbed of their original nationality and in recent times Ukrainians settled unwillingly and in small numbers in towns. 162 167

Another characteristic of Ukrainian ethnographical territory is the great diversity in the national composition of the rural and urban population. The village is purely Ukrainian, the town mixed, often indeed of alien population. The lack of an independent political status and the reluctance of the Ukrainian peasantry to settle in towns opened the way for immigration from abroad, which in turn, helped to erase the national character of urban life; in addition, there are more Jews in the towns of Ukraine than in those of other European states. Thus the towns in the west of Ukraine are Ukrainian-Jewish-Polish, those on the Right Bank on the other hand are Ukrainian-Jewish-Russian while those on the Left Bank are Ukrainian-Russian. The following table shows the different national composition of

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rural and urban population. Out of every 1000 persons in Ukraine there are

	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews	Poles	Germans	Others
Town population	388	281	216	69	8	38
Rural population	767	121	18	50	14	30

The Ukrainians are unequally distributed over their ethnographical area. That part of Ukraine that was longest settled and that is most centrally situated is ethnographically purely Ukrainian, the national minorities amounting to less than 10 % of the population. This central area is a quadrangle with unequal sides, reaching in the west to the line Mohyliv-Berdychiv -Kyiv, in the east to Myropil on the line Sumy-Charkiv-Hrishyne, in the north to the White Ruthenian frontier and in the south across the steppe to the line Balta-Pershomajske-Zaporizha-Hrishyne. The Right Bank area is the most exclusively Ukrainian national territory. The population of the wide plains of this area is up to 99 % Ukrainian.

In frontier districts and also in the many mixed areas there is a large percentage of non-Ukrainians. In Galicia, the Kholm district, Podlakhia, Bucovina, Bessarabia, Slobodian Ukraine and in the areas of the Donets and the Kuban, non-Ukrainians amount to $^1/_3$ and more of the population.

In the steppe zone, too, there is a high percentage of national minorities, a result of the rapid colonisation of the steppe at the end of the 18th century. There were not sufficient Ukrainians to colonise the vast steppes, so the gaps were filled up by people of the most varied nationality — Ukrainians and Russians, many Germans as good farmers, and emigrants from the Balkans — Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks and Moldavians. National minorities are scattered here and represent 34 % of the population as against 66 % Ukrainians, so that the latter are everywhere in the majority. We find here 14.3 % Russians, 7.1 % Jews, 4.4 % Roumanians, 4.7 % Germans, 1.3 % Greeks, 1.6 % Bulgarians and 1.6 % others. The Ukrainians exceed even the largest group, the Russians, for there are $4^1/_2$ Ukrainians for every Russian, and in the country even 7½.

Besides Ukrainians, the area that is ethnographically and nationally Ukrainian counts among its population Russians, Jews, Poles, Germans. The Russians, according to statistics for 1. 1. 1933, amount to 8 million and live in Slobodian Ukraine, the Donets Basin (foreign labor immigration), the coastal areas (agricultural colonies) and, alongside of Ukrainians, in the eastern foothills of the Caucasus. Jews — 3 millions — $^2/_3$ of them in towns, live west of the Dnipro (the boundary of their former settlement under the Tsars), and from 2-3 % of the population of Left Bank Ukraine and less than 1 % in Slobodian Ukraine and the Caucasus. Poles numbering 2 800 000 live in districts that were formerly part of Poland, mainly on the "black earth" belt of Galicia and the Kholm district. The other national minorities are insignificant. 162 167

If we study the development of national minorities up to the time of enforced collectivisation, we notice that the Ukrainian element in Dnipro-Ukraine was strengthened, while it receded in Western Ukraine under pressure from the Poles. We cannot tell what changes have taken place in the national element of Soviet Ukraine in recent years, as the results of the last census, held in 1939, have not been published. We can only suppose that Ukrainian national substance has suffered severe losses from the enforced collectivisation, the eviction of Ukrainian peasants, famine, and Russian immigration, especially to the towns and the Donets Basin.

d) Ukrainians outside the boundaries of the ethnographical territory

6 millions, i. e. 13.5 % of the Ukrainian people live without its national territory, 700 000 in islands dispersed throughout neighboring western countries, above all in Batshka while others live as emigrants or laborers, especially in Germany and France. In 1933, there were 300 000 in Roumania, 100 000 in Poland, 40 000 in Czechoslovakia, 50 000 in Jugoslavia and 160 000 in other countries of Europe. 3 % of the Ukrainians — 1.3 millions — are scattered throughout the Soviet Union in Europe; the majority of these live in the lower reaches of the Volga (450 000), the middle reaches of the Volga (220 000), in the republic of 161 167

161 Bashkir (80 000) and the Ural area (50 000). Besides, Ukrainia
167 have been actively colonising Asia, their superiority in numbers as compared with the Russians may be seen in the appended table (statistics from 1926).

Asia	Surface in sqm.	Population in 1000	Ukr.	Russ.	Kas.-Sib.	Others
Kasak in Siberia	174 075	2 240	40	22	27	11
Grey Wedge	12 308	17	29	19	44	8
Green Wedge						
1) Rayon Spask	26 928	232	59	22	—	19
2) Blahovischensk	3 846	86	50	4[illegible]	—	7

The "Grey wedge" lies between the Khirgisi country and Kasakstan, the "Green wedge" on the Amur and nea- Spask.

1.3 million Ukrainians live in America (U.S.A. 7—8 0 000, Canada 3-400 000, South America 130 000).

e) Ukrainians in the world

At the end of 1932 there were 43-44 million Ukrainians; as far as numbers go, they are the second of the Slav peoples, and the seventh among European nations. The number of Ukrainians living in the different states towards the end of the years 1938 and 1940 was:

States	Ukrainians in millions	in the world Percentage of Ukrainians
a) 1938	[1])	
Soviet-Union	34.4	79.1
Poland	6.0	13.8
Roumania	1.1	2.5
U.S.A.	0.7	1.6
Czechoslovakia	0.6	1.4
Canada	0.3	0.7
And others	0.4	0.9

[1]) Among these 25.6 millions in Soviet-Ukraine.

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States	Ukrainians in millions	Percentage of Ukrainians in the world
b) 1940	[2]	
Soviet-Union	40.2	92.4
Germany	0.8	1.8
Hungary	0.6	1.4
U.S.A.	0.7	1.6
Canada	0.3	0.7
And others	0.9	2.1
Total	43.5	100

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[2] Among these 30.7 millions in Soviet-Ukraine.

The Ukrainian People

101 175 In general, the Ukrainians have marked national characteristics which make it easy to recognise them even beyond the frontiers of Ukrainian territory. They belong to the Indogermanic group — an old Slav people that grew out of elements provided by Asia Minor and Mediterranean countries. Their original home is that of all Slavs. Its neighbors in the north-west were the Baltic-Lithuanian group, in the south-west it impinged on the Thracian group. In the southern part of the territory which was not originally colonised by the Ukrainians they came into fruitful contact with the Greeks, whose influence spread as far as Poltava in early historic times.

The first Germanic colonisation in the third century before Christ interrupted the contact with the west which had brought old Mediterranean culture to the Ukrainians.

Connections with the Asiatic group of Indogermanic tribes lasted for another hundred years and were disrupted by nomadic hordes from the Urals who destroyed the last remaining Iranic tribes and from that time until the 18th century made the Ukraine steppe unsafe. Wanderings and attacks by nomadic tribes have had no influence on the physical and psychical development of the Ukrainians.

Nations of Slavonic peoples began to form between the third and fourth centuries. At that time the neighbors of the Ukrainians' ancestors in the south-west and the west were South- Slavonic and Czech tribes. In the north and north-west they were in contact with Russian, later White Ruthenian groups, though only as far as culture goes, for racially there was no contact. There is no proof that the "primeval Russian" transitional groups ever existed, though many philologists assert the contrary. On the other hand, the Ukrainian people, as the central group of central Slavs contributed much to the formation of the Russian and White Ruthenian groups of peoples.

Ukrainians appeared first in history as the "Antes" who pushed the Goths farther and farther west and who were the masters of the steppe on the shores of the Black Sea from the Dnister to the Sea of Oziv and also of the forest steppe farther north between the fourth and sixth centuries.

The Slav migration dates from this time; the Western Slavs slowly moved towards the Vistula, the Oder and the Elbe while the South Slavs wandered to the Balkans, perhaps a little later. Thereupon, ancient Ukrainian tribes also expanded to the west and the south-west, reached the Vistula and, in constant conflict, held these areas against the Poles till the 11th century and longer in parts. In the South the coast of the Sea of Oziv and the Black Sea was occupied and, at the close of the sixth century or, at latest, at the beginning of the seventh, the central Carpathian area and Carpathian Ukraine — long before the Magyars came. 101 175

During this period when the Antes were supreme, the formation and the character of the Ukrainian people was strongly influenced by the Goths. The ancestors of the Ukrainians in those days were separate tribes with no tendency to national unity. It was only when towns were founded (Kyiv, Chernyhiv, and others) and when trade connections were developed that the tribes came closer to each other, thus making it possible form a state under a Germanic Viking dynasty. The capital was Kyiv, which had assumed the former rôle of the Greek towns Olbia and Kherson since the 9th century and had become the most important center of trade in Eastern Europe.

Nestor's chronicle and other sources mention many old Ukrainian tribes who lived in accordance with customs of their own (above all marriage and funeral customs). Leadership was in the hands of the numerically small but centrally situated tribe of the Polyany. West of them, as far as the Prypyat, the Derevlyany settled while the largest tribe of the Severyany were particularly active in pushing east and settled on the Desna, the Sejm and the Sula. South of the Polyany on the western bank of the Dnipro were the Ulichy and the Tyvertsy to the west of these, on the Dnister and at times on the Danube; in the 10th century, however, they were forced north and north-west by pressure from the Magyars and Pechenegs.

Many tribes, among them the Duliby, lived in the west of the old Ukrainian area. Tribal names soon made way for political designations which, as for instance in the case of the Volynians, have been preserved till to day. Altogether the tribes of

101 Western Ukraine, which were later organised in the united s' .te
175 of Galicia and Volynia, are more pronouncedly national than the Eastern tribes round Kyiv. The Ukrainian tribes were united by the end of the 10th century and the beginning of the 11th, this process being promoted by a common religion and a common culture composed of Byzantine and Slav influences; at the same time the feelings of unity among Ukrainian peoples was furthered by political pressure from the Poles and the princes of Suzdal and Vladimir at the head of a growing Russian people (since the 12th century). Other factors that helped this union were the transfer of the political center of Ukraine to the west and the political and cultural tendencies of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian state..

It is only in the north and on the western frontiers of Ukraine that many traditional features and a great variety of signs betraying differences between tribes have been preserved. Here, and in parts of the Carpathian area there are rich sources of ancient Ukrainian folklore.

101 These Ukrainians of the mountains and the foothills fall into
181 the three almost equal groups of Lemky, Bojky, and Hutsuly. The Lemky, also called the Lemaky, south of the Carpathians, inhabit the upper course of almost all the Carpathian tributaries of the Vistula and the Visloka as far as the Syan and, along with the foothill group of the Samishantsi (in the Jaslo area), are often called Ruthenians. They cling to their traditions and are economically in a sound position. They were the natural mediators between the Ukrainians and the Western and Southern Slavs, for instance, in the art of folkpoetry. Syanik and Krynytsja are the chief centers in this area.

The Boyky or Verkhovyntsi (dwellers in mountain pastures) live east of the Syan, in the districts of Sambir, Turka, Drohobych, Dolyna, and Kalush and also south of the Carpathian range. The inhabitants of the southern areas of the Bojky in the Carpathian Ukraine were also called Dolyniany (valley dwellers) and are rightly deemed to be the pioneers of the ancient Ukrainian colonisation in the South Carpathians, being in many respects different from their brethren in the north. The Tukholtsi, round Skole and Smorze, are another group that are

racially distinct from the rest of the Bojky. In contrast to the latter, who devote themselves above all to cattle-rearing, they are particularly gifted for trade and were known throughout Galicia as smart traders in fruit and wine. 101 181

The Hutsuly, known also abroad as gifted craftsmen (weaving, wood and metal work, ceramics and embroidery) live in the Eastern Carpathians (on the upper reaches of the Prut and its tributaries) in Bucovina round the little town of Vyshnycya, and in the neighborhood of Marmaroshsiget and Hust. In the north-east they join the kindred tribe, the Pokutyany (in the districts of Tovmatsh, Horodenka, Obertyn, Snjatyn and Kuty) who are distinguished by rich folk-poetry and a highly developed sense for art.

North of these mountain tribes we meet the Western Ukrainians proper, who call themselves Ruthenians. They fall into several groups, mostly distinguished by costume and other externals e. g. the Pidhiriany (dwellers in foothills) in the Carpathian foothills as far as the Dnister, the Dolyniany in the Syan valley, in the districts of Peremyshl and Jaroslav and the Batjuki in the districts of Zhovkva, Rava Ruska and Javoriv.

In the East follow the Opolany (as far as the Strypa and the Seret) in the districts of Lviv, Bibrka, Rohatyn, Peremyshlany, Berezhany and Pidhajci; then still further east, the Podoliany and to the north the Volyniany who join the racially more uniform area of Eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainians of the north and north-west have also preserved traces of the customs of the original tribes — for instance the Zabuzhany on the Buh, the Podlashany round Siedlce. The Polesyany ("Polishuky") between Prypyat and Dnipro, show traces of ancient culture; their language is still mediaeval and there are pre-Christian elements in their religious services while their costume reminds us of pictures from the old Kyiv state. They are divided into Polesyany proper, Pyntshuky, Volyniany and Chernyhiv-Polesyany; groups in the north from the still unstudied transition to the White Ruthenians.

Though at first sight there appear to be many differences in the Ukrainian people, they are in reality of small account;

101 they are certainly no reason for a further national division.
181 The common cultural heritage is so great that it covers all pecularities.

The differences usually cited as important between formerly Austrian and formerly Russian Ukrainians are limited to historical influences. The ethnographical limits of Ukraine have never coincided with politi... frontiers; as far as culture goes, "Austrian West Ukraine" stretched almost to Kyiv, while, on the other hand, definitely East Ukrainian phenomena in the language that were characteristic for "Russian East Ukraine" actually begin to appear in "Austrian" Podolia and Pokutja.

144 The anthropological structure of Ukraine is much more
142 complicated. The Ukrainian people is composed of at last six racial types (Dinaric, Mediterranean, Alpine, Nordic, Subnordic and Lapponid). The original inhabitants were mostly fair and long-skulled, (Nordic racial type) then these were flooded by the Armenoid, round-headed dark race from the south-east which naturally left marks. This process produced new racial types, which also came into contact with aboriginal Asiatics in the north-east and with the numerous and prolific Mediterranean races originally from Greece and Jtaly, and produced in turn more new racial mixtures. Of all these racial mixtures with a nordic foundation, the most important is the Dinaric which appears immediately before the Bronze Age; since the Middle Ages the decisive element in the Ukrainian type has been Dinaric, to which class almost one half (44 %) of the present-day Ukrainians belong. Dinaric is a round headed dark type with a long and narrow face. Another important racial element in the national Ukrainian type is the Alpine (22 %) also a round headed dark type, but with a round face. Those two races determine the national Ukrainian type (66 %), other elements being more rare and only characteristic of frontier areas.

141 The Ukrainians belong to the Caucasian race and have an average cephalic index of 83.2 (varying from 82.8 to 89.8); the face is narrow, the nose straight and fairly narrow, the arms relatively short, the legs long, the figure being over average height (about 5 ft. 7), while the hair and the eyes are mostly dark

In the northern zone of the country, including northern parts of the Kyiv and Chernyhiv areas and Northern Volynia purely Nordic elements prevail, alongside of Subnordic, Nordic and Laponoid mixtures; the middle zone is mostly Dinaric, above all in Podolia and Southern Volynia, Eastern Galicia (without the Hutsuly and Bojky) and in the extreme east of the Kharkiv area. 144

But the Dinaric domain proper is the southern zone of Ukraine, including Carpathian Ukraine, the Hutsul area, Bucovina, Southern Podolia and all adjacent territory in the south and south-east including the Crimea and the Kuban area. Ukrainians in this area are definitely short-headed, darkish, tall, (about 5 ft. 9) and most resemble the South Slavs. On the middle reaches of the Dnister, the Prut and the Boh there are more marked traces of the Mediterranean race.

A certain deliberateness and modesty are characteristic for the Ukrainian who is most sensitive to impressions from without, though he reacts slowly to them. He is of balanced, even temperament and has humor and irony which help him to cope with the irritations of everyday life. He judges life from the standpoint of feeling; favorable climatic conditions and the relatively easy work in the fields betray him into a certain quiescence. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian loves his work and is most active in intellectual, artistic and practical provinces. On the other hand, hard times both in the past and at present have made him suspicious and increased his innate individualism. In social intercourse, for instance, although he is friendly, he is reserved rather than importunate. Revenge and cruelty are foreign to his nature. 157

As is the case with most old peasant peoples, the relationship of the Ukrainian to others is based on definite forms, that express social culture, good manners, courtesy and hospitality. Contrary to the Russian custom, authority in the home is shared by the head of the house and his wife; the functions of the latter extend beyond the duties of housekeeping and the upbringing of children and she has a say in all economic questions. Children enjoy a relatively generous amount of freedom and may be present at the customary morning and evening 156 593

593 meetings ("posydilky" and "Vetshernytsi"), and even at the
584 street meetings that are held at night ("vulytsja"); marriage is
591 seldom an affair of arrangement. After marriage, children generally leave their parents' home; a father often provides a home of his own for a son who wishes to marry.

586 Divorce is rare in the country. An unlucky choice of a conjugal
836 partner is borne with patience. Up till recently, in spite of the fact that boys and girls are constantly thrown together at work and at play, a high standard of chastity prevailed and illicit sexual intercourse was the exception. A "pokrytka" who has been seduced by a Russian soldier ("saldatka") or a foreigner (mostly a Pole) has no easy lot in the country. The whole family is deeply ashamed when the "bundling" custom ("komora") which is still practised in some parts of the country reveals that the
183 bride is no longer a virgin. Customs have been strengthened
561 by the respect for national traditions, a deep religious feeling and tolerance. Birth, baptism, marriage, death and burial are accompanied by very many, original, symbolic customs, dating partly from before the birth of Christ. For instance, the old custom of duly "recognising" the newborn has been preserved as well as the ceremony of the baptismal banquet which marks the reception of the newly born child into the community.

585 In the varied wedding customs which generally take the better part of three days, there are memories of the days when the men of the tribe kidnapped or bought their brides. A marriage in a national setting has many dramatic effects and is accompanied by a whole series of symbolical actions and choruses. They remind us of the original rôle of the family in society. Customs from the world of the Grand Princes have been preserved in those marriage rites as in the ritualistic folk-songs, while the influence of the church is confined to the
765 actual ceremony in the church. The wake ("posyzhinja") and the wake games, which are dying out, are echoes of ancestor-worship and intended to prevent the dead from returning to life. The custom of special laments for the dead ("holosinnia") and the funeral banquet (formerly "tryzna") have persisted; on the many days of commemoration of the dead (e. g. on the

40th day after death, at Easter, Whitsuntide, and on St. Dimitry's day) special dishes are eaten. 765

The course of the year in Ukraine is accompanied by many old customs which are not to be found among Russians but which resemble those of Southern Slavonic peoples. They spring from the world of Pontium and Greece and Rome; such are the festivals at Christmas ("koljada"), New Year ("novyj rik"), the consecration of water ("shtshedryj vetshir"), Easter ("hayivky"), the beginning of spring ("vesnyanky"), solstice ("kupalo"), the beginning of autumn ("Andrija") etc. They are accompanied by games and country dances, of which there are several thousand. The beginning of the most important agricultural operations is also celebrated (building the house, ploughing, sowing, driving the cows to pasture, hay and grain harvest etc). 796

Ukrainian demonology, founded on ancient animistic beliefs, has, in contrast to the Russian, lost all its terrors; the devil, for instance, is stripped of all horror. Magic and the belief in witchcraft are very probably of more modern, partly Christian origin. There is no higher mythology. The worship of fire and water is more developed and there are some faint traces of the worship of plants. Much of popular belief is preserved in fairy tales, fables, sagas, legends, proverbs and riddles, of which there is an inexhaustible store. Some 4 years ago Savtshenko found 2000 main variants of Ukrainian fairy tales, compared with about 1700 Russian and 1500 White Ruthenian versions. V. Hnatjuk has counted 327 fables of animals (exclusive of variants). We must finally mention the incredible wealth of popular stories and anecdotes. 771 538

But the Ukrainian people's most precious spiritual possession is their folk-poetry, one of the richest in Europe and characterised by aesthetic values, depth of poetic feeling and perfection of form. F. v. Bodenstedt, who published "Die poetische Ukraine" in 1843 put these Ukrainian poems above those of all other nations. Hohol said of them that they comprehended poetry and history and were a monument to the nation's ancestors. Every kind of song is represented, from the traditional songs of ritual and later ballads to the short song of to-day ("Shumky", "Kozatshky", "Kolomyjky" and "Tshabarashky"). These histo-

538 rical ballads (dumy) which glorify and preserve the whole of the past of Ukraine, are deservedly famous.

533 The Ukrainian folk-song which has been handed down in many collections and manuscripts from the 16th century, enjoys a great reputation both at home and abroad. These songs were sung at Lithuanian and Polish courts (14th - 16th centuries) and before Tsars and boyars in Moscow down to the second half of the 18th century. They were admired in Turkey and Italy too, and found honorable mention as early as 1675 in Herbigny's collection "Religiosae Kijovienses Cryptae".

534 The Ukrainian accompanies his singing on many instruments: there are the "kobza" and the "bandura", stringed instruments of foreign origin, cymbals which are unknown to the Russians, bag-pipes ("duda"), a peculiar kind of flute ("svyril") and the mountain pipe ("trembita"); primitive instruments like the lyre
535 have also persisted. The dance plays a comparatively minor part. Besides the ceremonious dances ("kolo") there are round dances ("hopak", "kozatshok" and "kolomyjka"), and the old sword dance is found among the Hutsuly.

531 A richly developed folk-art is on the same level as the folk-poetry and music; it finds expression above all in national costumes and ornaments, in painted Easter eggs, embroidery, in the complicated weaving and wood-carving patterns and in bead-work, ceramics, furniture and household utensils.

291 The ornate costumes often show in their embroidery influen-
531 ces from the East, the South and the Balkans. Particular attention is paid to embroidery on shirts, while women's skirts ("plakhty") and men's coats are often magnificent works of art for which, according to the district, homespun linen and woollen stuffs are used. Embroidery patterns utilise geometric forms as well as conventional flowers and leaves.

352 Furniture consists mainly of benches, a carved table, painted
531 and inlaid chests ("skryni") and a carved pottery cupboard ("mysnyk"). The room is, in addition, decorated with paintings, embroidered towels and carpets; in Eastern Ukraine the stove is also painted.

The typical Ukrainian house ("khata") is a low house, all 342
on the ground floor; it consists of a living room ("svitlytsja"), a vestibule ("siny") and a bedroom ("komora"). It is built of wood, willows, twigs or reeds, plastered over with clay. In the steppe bricks dried in the sun and made of clay, chaff or chopped straw, are used. Larger stones or short, thick wooden props form the foundation. In mountain areas and in richly wooded Polesia, houses are mostly made of wood. The roofs of Ukrainian houses are usually square and covered with straw, reeds or shingles according to the district.

The Ukrainian farm-house is carefully fenced and surrounded by a garden with fruit and flowers. The house is separate from the farm buildings which are generally round a yard ("obijstja") beside the house; in Northern Ukraine, the latter is smaller, but has a roof of its own. In areas inhabited by Hutsuly, Bojky and partly also by Lemky, house and buildings are under one roof and connected by a roofed passage, ("hrasda").

The wooden churches, a native creation of high artistic 346
value, are a peculiar charm of Ukrainian architecture. We find the oldest forms in Podolia and the country of the Bojky. The wooden churches of the Hutsuly show Byzantine influence, the churches in Carpathian Ukraine, Gothic, and those in the territory of the Lemky, baroque tendencies. The village in 361
Ukraine generally consists of a group of houses with several irregular streets; in the mountains, in areas inhabited by Bojky and Lemky, there are long chain villages, while the Hutsuly prefer the collection of peasant-houses as found in the steppe. In north-west Ukraine there are also chain villages, usually consisting of two streets, which, in Polesya and Volynia, cross each other; in the plains the villages rarely number more than 1000 inhabitants, but in Podolia and Volynia there are also villages with 3000, 4000 and more inhabitants.

Ukrainians are occupied chiefly with agriculture; cattle are 291
reared, particularly in the Carpathians and in the foothill areas, partly also in the steppe. Up till recently, agricultural methods were primitive. Later, however, more modern ways of cultivation and a rotation of crops were introduced and the entire industry modernised.

241 Nevertheless, old traditions are preserved in connection with agricultural implements and habits. The Ukrainian peasant uses the ancient Slav "ralo" with one plowshare and the old plow reminiscent of Roman models, which is unknown to Russian and White Ruthenian peasants. Up till recently the heavy wooden plow was used in the steppe, drawn by 14 - 16 oxen. As with South and West Slavs, the ox is here the animal usually used for draught, and not the horse, as with the Russians.

The scythe is the most important implement for harvesting. Wheat, rye and barley are cut with the scythe which has developed curious 3-blade forms in Ukraine. The sheaves are first laid together in small stacks, composed of 30 sheaves and called "polukipok". This traditional harvesting operation is known to-day only in Ukraine and White Ruthenia. The latter nation, on the other hand, and the Russians use the drying kiln for grain which has never become common in Ukraine, being used only in Volynia and in the north of the district round Chernyhiv.

Threshing is done by flail ("cip"), a characteristic form of which appears also in Mecklenburg. In the south, in addition to threshing by means of a wheel-cart drawn by oxen ("harnanyty"), a roller is also used, while in Bessarabia and the Kuban area, special boards ("mjalky") are found, such as are also used extensively to-day in Greece and Macedonia. Threshing is mostly done in special sheds ("tik") and in winter on ice and in barns ("stodola"), which have a small floor specially for this purpose. The threshing procedure of the Ukrainian differs also from that of the Russian; he does not lay the sheaves out in rows like the latter, but threshes not more than 2 - 3 sheaves at once. Grain is stored in granaries and in the steppe also in 251 pearshaped pits or in straw-containers ("solomjanyk"); in the Carpathians, Polesya and Volynia the custom of storing grain in hollowed trees ("kadovby") is still preserved. In Podolia, Bessarabia and in Southern Ukraine generally maize is gathered 231 and dried in special contraptions, woven like baskets. The shape of the bee-hives in Ukraine is also peculiar. In addition to the forest hives ("kolody") there are also hives lying or standing ∞ on a log or piece of wood ("lezen" or "stojan"). The peculiar

and often ancient methods and apparatuses used in catching 000
fish in Ukraine are also worth mentioning.

The food of the peasants is almost exclusively vegetarian and 262
consists of bread and cake, vegetables and milk. Although meat 252
is eaten only on very special occasions, the menu is not monotonous. Bread is made of wheat or rye, in the mountains also of barley. The Ukrainians leaven their bread but, in contrast to the Russians, usually bake it without salt. Some unleavened kinds of bread ("mlynets", "perepitshka") are used for ritualistic purposes.

The national dishes in Ukraine are "borshtsh", a soup made of the juice of pickled beetroot ("kvas"); "halushky" boiled flour dumplings of unleavened buckwheat or wheat flour, "varenyky", called "pyrohy" in Western Ukraine, small flour pastries, filled with potatoes, curd, millet, cabbage and so on, which are boiled and eaten with sour cream, butter or honey; "holubtsy" = cabbage roulades; "kasha" = porridge; "kysil", a sourish porridge of flour; in Southern Ukraine "kulesha" or "mamalyga" = maize porridge and finally, different soups with dough ("zatyrka") and cabbage ("kapusnjak").

Ritual dishes are "kutja" (wheat and honey) and "uzvar" (Christmas dish of dried fruit). Salted lard ("salo") and bacon ("solonyna") are much used at cooking. In periods of fasting, food is baked in oil. Roasting and smoking are not usual cooking procedures, but boiling in pure butter or fat is popular.

The national beverages are brandy ("horilka"), mead ("med"), 273
honey boiled with brandy ("varenukha"), "kvas", made of sour rye, biscuit or fruit, in places also a drink of millet malt ("braha") and birch, and maple juice.

The Ukrainian is good at all peasant crafts, especially at wood 32
work, carpentry, turnery and rope-making. Weaving and fur- 28
rier-work is widely practised and ceramic work is done everywhere, while work in metal which was formerly common, has almost died out. Tailoring to-day is also mostly in the hands of foreigners.

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The Ukrainian Language

197 Ukrainian belongs to the Slavonic branch of the family of Indogermanic languages and this branch again divides into South Slav, West Slav and East Slav. Ukrainian, with Russian and White Ruthenian, forms the East Slav group which is an intermediary among Slavonic languages. Morphologically Ukrainian is like Russian, phonetically it approaches Serbo-Croatian and, as far as meaning goes, it has much in common with Polish. The north-west area of Ukrainian lies in the region of the home of Slavonic languages.

195 The development of Ukrainian as an independent language dates from the 9th century. Up to the end of the 18th century, old Church Slavonic, which had come with Christianity mainly from Bulgaria, served as the language of literature. With Ukrainian additions this has remained the language of the church up till the present. It is also the vehicle for historical chronicles (the Nestor Chronicle, the Chronicle of Galicia and Volynia) and the Igor Song, the greatest epic of the 12th century. Most of the literary monuments of those days, however, were destroyed in the wars against the Asiatic hordes. And yet the importance of old Church Slavonic as used in Ukraine spread far beyond the frontiers of the country; it became the court language of the Grand Princes of Lithuania and the official
197 language in Moldavia. Literary activity increased in Ukraine
538 in the 17th century but the subjects treated were taken from religion and so Church Slavonic continued to be the vehicle of literary expression. Historical works in the 17th and 18th centuries, the Cossack Chronicles by Velychko, Samovydets and the "History of the Ruthenes" (Istorija Rusow) are written in Church Slavonic with popular Ukrainian and Polish additions and many foreign words. At the same time individual writers are already writing in the national language, for example Nekrashevych, Gavatovych, partly also Skovoroda, while "Dumy", folksongs and anonymous verses are also written in Ukrainian.

About the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries Ukrainian finally managed to establish itself, for which Kotlarevskyj's travesty of the Aeneid (1798) was originally responsible. Literature becomes a national concern (cf. Kvitka-Osnovjanenko, Met-

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lynskyj, Hrebinka etc.). Shevchenko, the greatest Ukrainian poet and Panko Kulish, the most eminent scholar of those days helped to perfect Ukrainian as a literary language. As all these writers came from Eastern Ukraine, the literary language grew from the East Ukrainian dialects of Poltava, Kharkiv and Kyiv.

In subsequent years Ukrainian became a still finer instrument in the hands of Marko Vovchok, Hlibiv, Konyskyj, Storoshenko and Shashkevych in Galicia and Fedjkovych in Bucovina.

After the Russian government laid a ban on Ukrainian (1876), literary and scientific life was concentrated in Lviv, the Ukrainian center in Austria-Hungary. This meant that western dialects came to their own, for many writers from Eastern Ukraine now published their works in the west (Myrnyj and Nechuj-Levytskyj, novelists; Starytskyj, dramatist and poet; Tobylevych, dramatist and later Hrinchenko, Kotsjubynskyj, Samijlenko and Lesja Ukrayinka, the greatest Ukrainian poetess). Ivan Franko is one of the greatest Ukrainians from the west at this time.

In Galicia a scientific and technical terminology developed so that in 1918 Ukrainian could take its place as the official language of the independent Ukrainian state and later of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The following modern writers have done much to enhance the reputation of Ukrainian as a literary language: Olha Kobylanska, Bohdan Lepkyj, Vasyl Stefanyk (in a literary Pokutish-Volynian dialect), Oleksander Oles, Spyrydon Cherkasenko, Pavlo Tychyna, Maksym Rylskyj, Mykola Khvylovyj, Oleksa Slisarenko, Jurij Janovskyj, Jewhen Malaniuk, Bohdan Ihor Antonych etc.

The scientific study of the Ukrainian language was promoted above all by the Ukrainian Academy of Learning in Kyiv: Ukrainian has up till now been taught in lectures and tutorial courses in the universities of Berlin, Königsberg, Vienna, Münster, Halle, Prague, Naples and Paris. But Ukrainian philology was first studied in the 17th century (Grammar by M. Smotrytskyj in 1618). Two hundred years later A. Pavlovskyj's grammar, the first to deal with Ukrainian as a national language, appeared in Petersburg. And it is a Ukrainian, Oleksander Potebnya (1835—1891) who is the founder of Slavonic philology.

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Several Ukrainian grammars have appeared in German, e. g. "Studien auf dem Gebiete der ruthenischen Sprache" (Studies in Ruthenian) by P. Ogonovski, Lemberg 1880. St. Smal-Stotskyj and Th. Gärtner wrote the "Grammatik der ruthenischen Sprache" (Ruthenian Grammar), Vienna 1913. Two books that served practical purposes were M. Simovych's "Grammatik zum Selbstunterricht" (Grammar for Home Students) and Jaroslav Rudnytskyj's "Lehrbuch der ukrainischen Sprache" (Course in Ukrainian), Leipzig 1940.

B. Hrinchenko compiled the most important dictionary: "Slovar ukraijinskoji movy", Kyiv 1907—1909. The Russian-Ukrainian dictionary published under the auspices of the Ukrainian Academy by A. Krymskyj and S. Jefremov is said to be the best of its kind: "Rosijsko-ukraijinskyj slovnyk" (to the letter P) Kyiv, 1924—1928. A large Ukrainian-German dictionary appeared in 1943. It was compiled by Z. Kuzela and J. Rudnytskyj with the collaboration of Prof. Dr. K. H. Meyer and published by the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at Berlin. V. Kmitsykevych and V. Spilka published a German-Ukrainian dictionary (Czernovitz 1912); others were published by I. Sharovolskyj (Kyiv 1931) and H. Nakonetshna (Leipzig 1939).

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The Basic Traits of the Ukrainian People

The cultural influences at work for thousands of years since the Secondary Stone Age in Ukrainian territory have naturally left traces: though the contribution of each varied, they combined to shape the spirit of the Ukrainian as we see it in all his actions and thoughts, in his whole conduct of life, or, to put it in general terms, in his view of the world. And when we pause to seek the basis of the specifically Ukrainian view of the world, our consciousness is suddenly flooded with the certainty that the spiritual life of the entire nation has its deepest source in an intimate relation to the soil, to Mother Earth. /8/

The Ukrainians are a people of peasants. There is no question of that. Even a hasty review of the history of Ukraine provides incontrovertible proof that it is not only an agricultural country to-day, but that it has always been an agricultural country for hundreds, nay thousands, of years.

This has meant that the population of these areas has always been in closest touch with the soil and that this intimacy with Mother Earth is particularly characteristic of the entire Ukrainian peasantry even in our own days. And this orientation of the inner man holds not only for one class, but for the entire nation, for the intelligentsia of to-day, the intellectual leaders of the people, has, in the main, sprung from the peasantry and the purely urban population, middleclass as well as laborers, is composed either of foreigners or of immigrants from the open country. The entire Ukrainian nation is to-day deeply rooted in its native soil, a circumstance which it regards as its most effective weapon, with the help of which it has managed not only to cling to the land given it by fate, in spite of numerous onslaughts by nomads both ancient and modern, but also to cherish no mean policy of expansion even in modern times. We find sufficient examples in the settlement of Siberia and other territory in the Far East, the emigration of agricultural workers to Canada and the United States. It is self-evident that such an intimate connection with the soil for almost a thousand years must have its counterpart in the spirit of the Ukrainian people. An extraordinarily strong and organic dependence of man on the soil that he cultivates and that nourishes him is

181 everywhere clearly reflected in language and literature, in habits and customs, in manifestations of religious life, in the cultural process, in music, art, and philosophy.

538 Taras Shevchenko, the intellectual leader of the Ukrainian
181 people and the national poet, was indissolubly bound to the black soil of his home, glebae adscriptus, the son of a serf, for whom a ransom of 2500 roubles had first to be paid by friends before he was physically free from the chains that bound him to the earth. To free him spiritually from Mother Earth was an impossibility, for the poet's soul was so firmly rooted in his native soil, that to have severed it from its roots would have meant spiritual death.

And it is not merely striving for external effect, but a genuine symbol of the spiritual make-up of the Ukrainian people that its national poet, though no more a serf but a fêted artist and poet, welcome in the best society of the Russian capital, is mostly portrayed in peasant costume and is handed down to posterity in this guise. Shevchenko, as a poet, was the people itself, so that external events in his life acquire symbolic significance for the entire nation. Ivan Franko, the most eminent poet of Western Ukraine, also a man of the people, bears witness to the peasantry as the foundation of a new period in the development of man:

"I am a peasant — prologue, not epilogue"

Another prominent champion of intellectual life in Ukraine is Skovoroda, a philosopher who lived in the 18th century. He is the Ukrainian Socrates and is a product of his native country, intimately connected with his surroundings and his time. We should be puzzled by his work if it were viewed apart from his relation to the broad mass of the peasantry; the whole significance of his teaching and influence can only be grasped if we remember that he was in direct contact with those elements in Ukrainian intellectual life which were deeply rooted in and inspired by the Black Earth.

V. Lypynskyj, the Ukrainian historian and sociologist of today, sums up and evaluates this intimacy with the soil in his "Letters to my Brother-Farmers", which appeared in 1921/22. He was the first to emphasise this essential feature of national

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ideology and to make a militant peasantry the foundation and the pillar of the modern Ukrainian state. 538 181

We find an astonishingly simple, but profound synthesis of this entire peasant philosophy, the product of the soil, in "The Soil", a short, moving story by Vasyl Stefanyk, a contemporary poet; "Our destiny is the soil; forsake it and you are lost, cling to it and it will develop all your powers and draw out your very soul in the hollow of its hand; embrace it, subject yourself to it and it will suck the life-blood out of your veins — but in return, you have herds of sheep and horses and full stack-yards; and for your strength it will give you a cabin full of children and grand-children whose laughter is like silver bells and whose cheeks are red as the fruit of the snow ball tree . . ."

The profound love of the Ukrainian for the beauties of Nature springs from his connection with the soil, a love which seems to be firmly anchored in the depths of his soul. This aesthetic sense which is nurtured by natural forms, is reflected by the deep longing to express beauty of form, harmony of color and originality of theme in domestic surroundings, in dress or in the utensils of everyday life. Aesthetic, and not practical considerations always play the most important part, whether it be the construction of a church, the planning of a garden round a cottage, the weaving of an apron or a kerchief, the making of a table or a bench. 181 517

It is obvious that the very rich and valuable folk music and the no less rich and original folk poetry are also based on laws of aesthetic pleasure, derived from intimate intercourse with Nature and experience of her beauties.

And the Ukrainian's traditional and age-long contact with Nature is the tenacious bond between him and his culture and that of Western Europe, while at the same time it distinguishes him from the Muscovite, his neighbor in the North-East. For the latter people had never had any feeling for the soil; it regards agriculture not as an expression of love for Mother Earth, but as a necessity, or as a chance of making money. On the other hand, the Muscovites are the best traders among Slavonic peoples. The real farmer, too firmly rooted in the 181

181 earth and in his functions, who remains in the same place for generations, becomes too fixed in his habits and loses the mobility which is naturally the first essential quality of nomad peoples and which brings great advantages in trade.

The Ukrainian view of the world is based very definitely on idealism. The actions and resolutions of the Ukrainian are based not on objective reality as it confronts us, but on an ideal „reality" which contains many elements derived from imagination and fancy. Ukrainian history offers us many examples of this. I quote only two prominent instances:

181 Kostomariv, the Ukrainian historian, inspired by Messianic
538 ideas, writes a gospel of the Ukrainian people, proclaiming its destiny as a leader in the history of mankind. The aim of this work was to bring new strength to the oppressed nation and to give new content to its life which was founded on a very sad reality; it soared so high in the clouds of idealising speculation, so oblivious of actual facts, that it was scarcely possible to establish a connection between it and real life. While it may be maintained that a people cannot be solely guided by conditions of life here and now, that it cannot do without ideals, that, on the contrary, development and progress are impossible without any inciting aim, even if it is beyond human grasp - nevertheless its efforts to rise must spring from its actual surroundings and not from the fantastic realm of the imagination. — Franko, in spite of the sad experience of his own life of suffering, is also an idealist who believes in man, in his innate goodness, his love of beauty and moral conduct. All the characters in his books, even the worst of them, often display good traits, or at least traces of a positive attitude to life which suffice to keep the chances of improvement open. It is more than obvious that these characters are not bad by nature, but that they have degenerated under the influence of different circumstances. Some critics assert that it was only this belief in an idealised humanity, in the possibility of progress, that gave Franko the moral courage to carry on in spite of bitter disappointment, and to work like one possessed for the welfare of his people and its culture.

The Ukrainian's tendency to idealise, is also expressed in his relation to the weaker sex which generally enjoys a position of superiority in Ukrainian society. In literature, too, the Ukrainian woman appears in such an idealised and spiritualised form that even her faults, her foibles, do not detract from her spiritual value, but serve rather to enhance her charm and attractiveness. 181 562

The sense for actual reality is almost completely suffocated by the enthusiasm of the soul for the world of the imagination, for the ideal. 19th century drama contains a goodly company of women with a positive attitude to life — national heroines like Marusja Bohuslavka, lovable girls, good and faithful to boredom like Natalie of Poltava, unhappy victims of male seduction like Shevchenko's Kateryna and finally, prophetesses with an air of tragedy like the Ukrainian Cassandra. We must not forget that, except for the last named, these old-fashioned plays are still popular with the Ukrainian public and are performed even to-day, times without number, with great success throughout Ukraine, in the towns as well as in the remotest villages. 181 562 536

Western systems of thought have always been founded on the personal consciousness of the individual. Beginning with Plato in ancient Greece philosophical speculation has always started from individual consciousness as the only evident reality which is disputed by no one, a process which is still more evident in modern philosophy from Descartes on. Fichte's system is based on the philosophy of the ego which elsewhere appears in philosophy as a complete entity, independent of all other features, a sovereign being, which, in the intellectual world, is usually the final foundation of a concrete reality. 812

Here Ukrainians, in contrast to Russians, are decidedly western in outlook. Though they have not produced philosophic systems of th r own based on the ego as the fundamental principle, or the foundation of further speculation, nevertheless their whole intellectual life, their ethical standards and legal code, and still more their actual conduct, are all based on the individual; and to restrict the right of the individual even in the interests of the community, is always resented as an encroachment on the freedom of will. 812 156

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The Ukrainian's individualism is most evident in his attitude to the social order, to the principle of the place of the community in society. He repudiates all forms of communal life which call for strict discipline and absolute obedience, without thinking that such a repudiation may be disastrous for the security of general interests and even, in the long run, for the personal advantage of the individual. His individualism as a social principle regards the individual as an end in himself, while the community is merely the sum or union of individuals and as such is only the means of guaranteeing the welfare of the individual. According to this national viewpoint, society — in Ukrainian "hromada" — is a voluntary union of individuals who, for the moment, are willing to work together for common aims, but who reserve the right to leave the union or even to attack it with every means in their power if they find that it is threatening their personal freedom, or when personal interest is greater than the interest of the community. We find a historical example of this attitude in the well-known military organisation of the Zaporoghian Cossacks, who regarded themselves as independent and free citizens, and only acknowledged their duty towards the community in so far as they considered it essential to the security and welfare of all.

In the history of Ukraine there are only too many cases where an exaggerated individualism prevented the formation of tradition as a supreme factor in building up a state, and where the historical existence of the entire people was at the mercy of conflicting forces which, in the absence of all desire to cooperate, were of necessity detrimental to the future of the state.

The structure of Russian society, called "mir" is diametrically opposed to this; it falls into the other extreme as the intellectual expression of the will of the community which completely absorbs personal independence. The essence and leading principle of the Russian "mir" is the compulsion inherent in the superior agency as the instrument of God's will. All rebellion against this divine compulsion is a grievous sin which the simple Russian cannot be expected to commit. This view was and is the most favorable condition for the birth and development of every absolute regime.

In contrast to Western European thought, it is characteristic for the Russian's view of the world that he definitely rejects the personal and always seeks to take his stand on a certain intellectual collectivism. In spite of the zealous efforts of some Russian scholars to explain and water down this quality of the Russian psyche, we must admit the truth of the assertion of the slavophils that the Russian spirit is collectivist, in the sense that it detests personal freedom, all kinds of contract conditions and individual property; that it prefers collectivist forms of economy was illustrated in the past by the traditional and typically Russian "Obshchina". And the collectivist experiments which have been carried out in the Soviet Union in modern times have shown that collectivist measures of the communist government met with no resistance to speak of in Russia proper, while peasants in Ukraine were ready to fight to the death in defense of the principle of private property as the fundament of western culture, and in spite of desperate conditions, actually did so. 156 829

If we wish to evaluate the principles of the Ukrainian view of the world adequately, we must study the structure of his psyche and reveal those qualities and functions that lend it its spiritual character. What strikes us most at the outset is the emphasis on the emotions; the preponderance of feelings over reason. The entire conduct of the Ukrainian is regulated, not by reason, "ratio", so characteristic for the entire philosophy of the Occident, but by profound feeling. This is a characteristic of all Slavs whose passions usually run the whole gamut of emotions. Slavs in general, and Ukrainians in particular, are capable of boundless enthusiasm which, at the first reverse, is followed by equally boundless apathy or despair. They are capable of deep love, which plays a predominant part in their psychical life, but negligible circumstances can often convert this feeling into its opposite, into a hatred for which no reason can be given other than from the emotional point of view. This lack of balance, these extreme variations within the emotions, make it difficult to preserve order and stability within; they are an important and at times decisive handicap to the formation of any system in intellectual work. 152

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152 593 Love plays a great part in all spheres of life in Ukraine, though it is less connected with eroticism than in other countries; it is first and foremost the product or the accompaniment of the relation between mother and child. Maternal love, in all its possible manifestations, is one of the spiritual prisms through which most of the phenomena of public and private life are regarded and acquire their particular color. Love comprehends an enormous complex of motives which have found expression in literature, art and music.

812 I do not intend to dwell on the manifestations of this emotion in daily life. But I should like to refer to Jurkevych, one of the few Ukrainian philosophers in the 19th century who gave his coutrymen what may be called a philosophy of the heart, a system ruthlessly opposed to the materialism at that time in vogue and also to the almost mechanical rationalism and intellectualism.

In analysing problems of contemporary philosophy, Jurkevych comes to the conclusion that a system of philosophy expressed in functions of the reason is quite incapable of including the entire and real human being. A certain modesty with regards to the limits of human knowledge is characteristic for Ukrainian philosophers. These limits are the result of the fact that human reason and its capacity of knowing the world hide another, more profound, function of the human spirit on which reason is based and which provides it with possibilities of development. This original function of the human spirit, which is fully acknowledged by Skovoroda but mentioned by I. T. Stavrovetskyj as early as the 17th century, is the human heart. The philosophy of the heart which Jurkevych has developed in his work on „The Heart and Its Importance for the Psychic Life of Man" is the most characteristic feature of the transition from Platonism to recent philosophy; but it is directly opposed to Kant and his school.

I have deliberately dwelt on Jurkevych as a representative of Ukrainian philosophy, as his theory is doubtless influenced by certain characteristics typical for the Ukrainian view of life. One of Jurkevych's pupils, Vladimir Solowjev, later a famous Russian thinker, when writing of his teacher, rightly emphasises

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the Ukrainian elements in his nature: "Jurkevych came from the Government of Poltava and was therefore a Ukrainian, a fact which left traces in his language and character." 812

Of course I do not mean to say that the Ukrainian does not fully appreciate the powers of thought, or that he is hostile towards them. On the contrary, the intellectual representatives of the Ukrainian people, such as Drahomaniv and his school, Lesja Ukrayinka, are loyal adherents of rationalism and Ivan Franko bears on his banner the proud motto "ratio vincit". But if we study these men more carefully, we come to the conclusion that their rationalist views are a concession to the spirit of the times and are perhaps more in the nature of a mask which hides the emotion they are loath to admit as the decisive factor in their psychic make-up.

The peculiar character of Ukrainian intellectual life emerges most distinctly from a comparison with the fundamental features of the German psyche: "The peculiar character of German thought", Paul Menzer says in his book on the character of the German spirit, "may be best studied in German philosophy — a belief in system is inherent in it, the view that it must be possible to classify all reality in a series of ideas". This naive belief in the omnipotence of the idea is most apparent in Christian Wolff who thinks it is possible to solve all questions of knowledge, action and feeling by means of the reason. The entire attitude to life is to be regulated by reason, all spontaneous decisions arrived at by impulse are forbidden. There can be no doubt that life, conceived thus, must atrophy, but we must admit the great sweep of such a systematic experiment. In practice, Wolff's philosophy evolved a pedantic training for Germans which, however, had its good effects as confirmed by no less a man than Kant in his famous praise of the spirit of thoroughness. If we construct the direct opposite to the characteristics of the German spirit described by Menzer, we get the Ukrainian way of thinking: in place of exaggerated systematisation a lack of all system often replaced by the intuition of genius which, unconsciously, builds up on feeling; no thoroughness, no pondering, and consequently restricted action, but, on the contrary, too great an expansion of the sphere of in- 812 153

812 terest and, at the same time, superficial work. The Ukrainian
153 does not treat problems in theory and practice from the point of view of reason, but confronts reality with emotion, takes decision on the spur of the moment and confuses theoretical and practical issues.

157 In connection herewith I shall just touch on the third sphere
771 of psychological life, namely the will. Seeing that all three functions, reason, feeling and will are closely dependent on each
181 other, the supremacy of the first or the second will necessarily
812 influence the third. A will that is under the control of feeling and not of reason, will not be very strong, steadfast or consistent, but, like the feelings, will fall from one extreme into the other in a brief interval, so that periods of great, superhuman activity and joy in work are followed by times of complete passivity and the idleness of despair. The supremacy of feeling and the predominance of love provide us with a further element in the Ukrainian view of the world, namely the deep feeling for religion which is the main component in all Slav spiritual life. Many scholars of the last century emphasise the supremacy of feeling and the all-important part played by religion as the main characteristics of the spiritual life not only of modern Slavs, but also of their ancestors, whether remote or recent. Attempts have been made to differentiate the historical peculiarity of the Slavs from that of the Romance peoples, in particular from the French and the Germanic nations. Compared with the political French and the philosophical Teutons, the Slavs are, in the widest sense, the religious race.

Quite apart from our opinion of this characteristic, it must not be forgotten that all leading Slavs, whether Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians or Russians, whether philosophers, authors or artists, display an undoubted, if varied religiousness. Even revolutionaries like Bakunin, Herzen and others, though they rejected all belief at the start, were none the less deeply religious men and their fantastic fight against religion was but a negative expression of religious feeling. Atheism in Russia is the expression of an unsatisfied passion for belief, of a passion that refuses to let

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itself be put off with inadequate creeds, and that, in despair, denies God Himself. 157 771

In spite of this general, common background, expressions of religious feeling in the various Slavonic tribes differ greatly. The Ukrainian is never orthodox in his religious life; he does not cling at all to forms, to externals; rather does he endeavour always to comprehend the essence of a creed or belief. All who have studied the character of the Ukrainian people even superficially must admit that a religious quarrel or still more, a bitter strife over ritual forms such as has become a plague with Russians is quite impossible among Ukrainians. Ukrainian history provides us with interesting and instructive examples of this. When the Kyiv State became Christian and accepted the Byzantine form of the Christian Church, being thereby automatically drawn into the whirlpool of religious strife, the Grand Prince deliberately sought to avoid all dogmatic quarrels and to keep contact with the West, even though he was a member of the Eastern Church and shared in Eastern culture. Unconcerned with the subtleties of dogma, which did not interest Kyiv princes though their church depended on Constantinople, they nevertheless sent ambassadors to the German emperors and to Popes, received delegates from the West and showered gifts on them; they formed family unions with Catholic princes and rulers — in a word, began to smooth the way of mediation between Western and Eastern Europe, a rôle which Ukraine was later to assume. It is true that fierce wars of religion were waged in Ukraine as elsewhere in the 16th and 17th centuries. But here the strife between adherents of the Orthodox Church and Unionists represented in reality the gigantic struggle between two views of the world — the Eastern conservative view and the Western, more progressive one, a struggle which, in addition to religion, comprehended many other factors, such as national feeling and political and cultural standards. At present, too, when Ukrainians must live together under most trying circumstances, church differences scarcely come into play. As a result of his over-individual nature, the Ukrainian is all too ready to utilise every opportunity of arguing with his opponent, but religious feeling is too deeply rooted and com- 181 812

157 pels too much respect for the opinion of others for him to make
771 diverging beliefs an object of strife. Skovoroda, the Ukrainian
181 Socrates, whose spiritual life reflects all the characteristics of
812 the national psyche of the Ukrainian people, expresses his attitude to religious things in a very simple formula, which is perhaps too simple for a philosopher: "Pagan temples and idols were also expressions of Christian belief, being inscribed as they were with the wise, sacred words: gnoti seauton, nosce te ipsum".

According to Skovoroda, God did not reveal His truth to Christians and Hebrews alone, but also to pagans, just as morality cannot be regarded as the monopoly of the Christian world, seeing that it has many eminent champions among the nations of the ancient world. In the province of religion the Ukrainian demands universality, respect for every genuine religious feeling, tolerance of the convictions of others, but not orthodoxy and not the forfeiture of valuable content for the sake of mere form.

181 The Ukrainian view of the world is characterised by an opti-
812 mism founded on metaphysics and ethics. In spite of the overwhelming catastrophes that have constantly shaken the historical existence of the people to its foundations, in spite of the terrible persecutions to which the heart of the nation, its peasantry, has been exposed for centuries, hope of a better future was never dead, and indeed it rose afresh at the very time when, judged by objective standards, there were practically no prospects of improvement. And yet — in defiance of all foes — the Ukrainian people will and must live and fulfil its destined mission, the motto to which all leading spirits have always sworn allegiance. Of course, Ukrainian public opinion, especially in the higher classes, has also displayed depression caused by temporary circumstances; but though the situation was often extremely critical, Ukrainian history has no proper example of general dissolution, of complete and extensive despair. On the contrary, it is characteristic of Ukrainian mentality to regard the world and its phenomena from the best side and to trust in a favorable issue of all processes. "We'll get along somehow" is the expression, not only of mental balance, of a determination to keep a stiff upper lip, but is at the same time an unmistakable sign

of a feeling of confidence, no matter how circumstances may 181
change. 812

If we seek the origin of this apparently irrational optimism, we come to the conclusion that its roots lie in prehistoric times and that its motives have been preserved in folklore, tales and fables. The study of extensive Ukrainian material proves conclusively that the belief in the victory of good over evil is part and parcel of the people's faith. The world is ruled by the principle of good; evil, and its personification, the devil, are by no means equal to good and do not have an independent existence of their own. 776 812

Without going into details, we can make the general assertion that in Ukraine the devil is no powerful god who finds satisfaction in the sea of troubles that overwhelms man; his power does not equal that of the good spirit; in the realm of evil he is not supreme over subordinate demons — he is a petty spirit who, by exploiting the weaknesses of God and man, seeks to make unpleasantness for both.

The devil cannot have the mastery over a human being during the latter's life, even if he has promised him his soul. It is fairly easy to summon the devil in order to enter into a contract with him. In drawing up the articles of such a contract, the devil does not display any special intelligence, or even intellectual superiority over his human partner. The Evil One not infrequently gets the worst of a bargain with a simple peasant; he puts himself to no end of trouble in order to get money and honor for man before death, but after he is dead, man always finds a loop-hole in the contract through which he can slip and land happily in Paradise. 776

Thus we see that, for the Ukrainian, far from being an imposing figure, the devil degenerates into something comical and, at times, even pitiable, a being to be exploited or made a fool of by man. In the eternal struggle which it is man's fate to conduct against evil, man is far superior to the devil.

Maksimov assures us that the belief in an unlimited number of evil spirits is firmly rooted in the consciousness of the Great Russian. He believes that there are scarcely any places in the

776 world free from them, that they do not even respect Russian churches. As unsubstantial beings who can, however, appear in various familiar guises to man, these servants of the Evil One do not only dwell in places forsaken by God, in bottomless moors and the depths of forests: they are just as much at home in human habitations and even penetrate into the human organism. We may see proof of this belief in the fact that all containers of drinking-water in Russian peasant houses have got some kind of lid, be it ever so primitive. If it is impossible to get a lid, two sticks are laid cross-wise on the vessel so as to prevent the devil from getting into the water. Similarly, we can scarcely find a peasant who, in spite of innate carelessness and dreaminess, will forget to make the sign of the Cross over his mouth when yawning, so as to keep the Evil One from entering into his organism.

On the basis of material at our disposal dealing with the rôle of the devil among Eastern Slavs, we may safely assert that among Ukrainians, as among the peoples of Western Europe, the demonic has lost something of its mystery, originality and power while, in the life of the Great Russian, evil may not be on the same level as good, but it has nevertheless managed to
000 preserve a fairly strong position. Russian dualism, predominant in folk-lore and expressed in the struggle between the Divine Power and the Evil One points plainly to analogy with the dualist beliefs of Oriental religions. Mazdeism in particular, the creed of aryan Iran is decidedly dualistic in character, being constructed on the contrasts between light and darkness, good and evil, salvation and destruction, as they appear in the psychical and moral world. These contrasts can be traced to two gods who are equal in power and who are constantly engaged in strife. Ahriman characterises the cause of the strife and the mutual enmity of these two powers as the ethical devil; for a moral sin, envy of Ormuzd causes Ahriman to conceive the idea of destroying his creations.

771 It is just here, in the province of ethics, that the diffe-
812 rence in the conceptions of good and evil which we have already noticed in the national beliefs of Russians and Ukrainians, becomes strikingly apparent. For the Ukrainian evil

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is, so to speak, the result of teleological conditions. It is in the world not because there is any justification for its existence in itself, and not as a power against which we struggle in vain; evil exists because we need it, because without contrast to it, good could never be brought into the right light. It is not only the evil in us, but the evil around us that seems to be the essential complement of good; the power of good grows in the struggle with evil; injustice furthers the feeling for justice, falsehood and cowardice the feeling for truth, while selfishness calls forth magnanimity. Metaphorically speaking, the devil is for the Ukrainian by no means an almost divine power, inspiring man with inexpressible terror, but a being that draws the poor sinner's attention to his sins, frightens him a little and so shows him the way to improvement and perfection. This belief has produced a thoroughly optimistic view of the world which has found striking and eminent expression in literature.

For the Great Russian, evil is a dreadful power, not a necessary attribute of good but a principle of equal value that can attract disciples and inspire them with enthusiasm. One does not commit evil from carelessness, but from conviction, for the sake of evil, because evil has the same foundation and justification in human nature as good.

This idea of evil has naturally found artistic expression in literature and its main representatives in Russian literature are Dostojevskij and Tolstoi. Tolstoi rejected all positive religion and formed his own view of the world which is characterised by perfect passivity quite opposed to combating evil. His principle of "non-resistance" to evil which he erroneously tries to derive from Christ's original teaching is really anchored in his thoroughly Russian soul and is certainly the unconscious expression of the general Russian belief in the invincibility and omnipotence of evil.

Tolstoi deliberately twists Christ's teaching and attempts to set it up against the Old Testament idea of vengeance and retribution, though there is no justification for this at all. We know that Christ did not come to destroy the law of the prophets but to fulfil it.

000 His Sermon on the Mount was intended to confute the Pharisaical idea that every wrong done to a man must be repaid at least in equal measure. And if we bear the Jewish mentality in mind we realise, that the desire for vengeance so prominent in that people would not be content with paying back wrong in the same coin, but that it probably insisted on flinging a rock back at everyone who had thrown a stone. Christ contests this law of Moses. He only wished to say that the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth is not necessarily the only means of regulating human relationships and that another method would often be better. That Christ did not despise violence when nothing else was possible is proved by His own example when He drove the money-changers out of the temple. The Christian religion must and will set out from ruthless war on evil. This war may be waged with different weapons, but it must on no account be conducted from feelings of vengeance and retribution. This is the deeper and proper sense of Christ's words which were wrongly interpreted by Tolstoi and his teaching. (Gusev).

These contrasts are still more glaring when we leave the province of individual ethics for the social sphere. Tolstoi's doctrine leads to an absolute anarchy which destroys all human institutions, the product of a thousand years' development. There is no supreme justice, no supreme legislation, there is neither authority nor governing body, no state; human society is transformed into a horde of apparently free individuals, the few good among whom try to teach and control the evil majority by example only. So if Tolstoi, whom Turgeniev calls "the great Russian writer", the most genuine of all Russian prophets, composed of the national elements in the Russian spirit, in contrast to all moral philosophy and deliberately twisting Christ's teaching, tries to spread the theory of non-resistance of evil with all the art of a gifted poet and the authority of a world-famed personality, his deeper motives do not lie in a clearer comprehension of the Christian ethic, but primarily and exclusively in the intimate connection of his way of thinking with the spirit of the Russian people which is too respectful to dare

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rebel against the majesty of the demonic and which bears in its soul a feeling of passive subjection to evil.

In addition to Tolstoi's work, Dostojevskij merits special mention here as these two, according to Ivanov-Razumnik, form the synthesis of a two centuries' development of Russian literature and the entire spirit of the Russian people

Dostojevskij analyses the motive powers of the human soul with mathematical accuracy, not as they appear in a healthy state of balance, but in a condition of suffering, of struggle, of internal dissension i. e. in a pathological condition in which their closest secrets are distorted and laid bare under the knife of the anatomist, or rather under the microscope. Dostojevskij, a hopeless pessimist, does not elevate man above the meanness of everyday life, but forces him with relentless thoroughness to experience spiritually all the misery and torture that human life can conceal. And even though the reader admits the unnaturalness of a presentation that is otherwise a work of genius, he can no more tear himself away from these scenes than he can from the sufferings of someone he loves.

With a devotion worthier of a nobler cause, Dostojevskij delineates in books that are unparalleled creations of literary art only criminals, idiots, pathological beings whose physical and psychical life is exposed to all extreme influences. Let us select only a few examples from his crowded gallery

Piotr Verkhovenskij, ethically considered, is an absolutely low, mean criminal, a villain who cynically tramples on man and feelings, cooperates with a contemptible murderer while he himself, with devilish cunning, robs innocent people of life; he is an abortion of the Evil One, a demon, in crass contrast to the debonair and often naive devil of the West. "The evil in Stavrogin was cold and quiet", says Dostojevskij, "that was sensible — and therefore the most repulsive and fearful thing that can exist". Up till 1928 there was an unprinted chapter of the "Demons" with Stavrogin's confession, in which he tells among other sins of violating a 12-year old girl, a child. He describes the child's despair and her subsequent suicide with the accuracy and the objectivity of an outsider. This presentation is one of

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000 Dostojevskij's most powerful creations, palpitating with dreadful truth to life, so that we understand those who, out of respect for the author, did not wish to have it printed even after his death. Stavrogin, who conceals behind a mask that good and evil are equal in value, is a demon of gigantic stature. Stefan Trofimovich, on the other hand, is a petty demon, an individual in every sense indolent, a caricature of intellectual sterility.

The women in the novel are of the same species. There is the simpleminded sister of Lebadkin, the captain who is always out at elbows; Stavrogin married her from sheer boredom; Maria, Shatoff's wife, who returns to her husband when pregnant by Stavrogin, and young Lisaveta, also completely under Stavrogin's spell and finally his mother, the governor's wife, in whom Russian blood is tragically mingled with social conventions — all these women are passionate creatures, but at the same time completely at the mercy of the demon hysteria.

And other characters stand out from the background of events. I leave the characterisation of the heroes in the Karamasov family to Mereshkovskij, the eminent Russian poet and excellent critic, who sums them up as follows in his study on Tolstoi and Dostojevskij: "When judging Dostojevskij as a man, we must bear in mind his all-consuming artistic need to sound the most dangerous, most inaccessible depths of the human heart, above all the depths of lust, in all its manifestations. From most enthusiastic voluptuousness of the "angel", Aljosha Karamasov, which almost reaches the heights of religious ecstasy to that of the repulsive spider that devours its own male, we pass through the entire spectrum of this the lowest of human passions, each shade merging into the next like the colors in the rainbow. It is worth noting that bonds of relationship exist connecting not only the horrible "Smerdjakov", "Ivan, who wrestles with God", the cruel "Dimitry, the voluptuary, mad, as if stung by a gadfly", but also the virtuous cherub Aljosha with their physical father, the "monster", Fedor Pavlovich Karamasov, as well as with Dostojevskij himself, their spiritual father. It is indeed mostly his own family that he describes; he would perhaps cut himself free from them in the eyes of man, but never before God and his own conscience".

In conclusion I should like to quote the words that Dostojevskij in the "Demons" puts into the mouth of the dying Stefan Trofimovich, referring to the Gospel of St. Luke: "You see, it's the same with our Russia as with those Gadarene swine. The devils who leave the sick and enter the swine, those are all the microbes and pollutions, all the poisons, all the big and little demons that have gathered in our dear, big invalid of a Russia for many, many centuries. Oui, cette Russie, que j'aimais toujours! . . . 000

We are those demons, we and those others, Petrusha et les autress avec lui, and I'm perhaps their leader; in our madness we shall cast ourselves from the cliff into the sea and shall all drown — and that's where we really belong, because we are good for naught else . . ." The boundless pessimism which we emphasised at the beginning of our analysis as the key-note in the psychological harmony of the great Russian thinker is here confirmed beyond all doubt. And we must not forget that of all Dostojevskij's novels "The Demons" and "The Brothers Karamasov" are most illuminating as a guide to the Russian soul. They are real confessions, revelations from the first page to the last, and present the Russian soul in all its manifestations.

Involuntarily we ask ourselves why the author, in solving the problem of medium, chose precisely this mode of confession and what external or inner reason compelled him to center interest on the "demonic" in all its forms. Was it necessary for Dostojevskij, in order to be able to pursue certain moral intentions, to present in concentrated form with all a genius's powers of conviction the meannesses, the crimes, the abnormities, the horrors of all times and countries? Apart from the fact that many critics are not convinced of these aims thus emphasised, the question remains whether they could not have been achieved by other means. That the demonic spirit and all its manifestations should be given so much room in Dostojevskij's creations may well be due to the fact that the demonic, evil, the devil, plays a very great part in the psychic life of the Russian people and therefore in the spiritual world of Dostojevskij, one of its leaders.

000 The devil does not, for instance, appear to Ivan Karamasov in the vagueness of a ghost, but in all the seeming reality of a hallucination. In this hallucination we feel something of the eternal Demon that was in Ivan's soul and grows out of it. Goethe's Mephistopheles is indeed the music accompanying temptation in Faust's life on earth, is also Faust himself, but he is not really "demonic". We feel that the poet never believed in the possibility of an incarnation of the devil. Dostojevskij has put more visionary power, more of the demon into Ivan's hallucination than Goethe has lent the whole temptation of Faust by the devil at his side. But Ivan Karamasov, like his bad, second self, Smerdjakov, their physical father, the "monster" Fedor Pavlovich Karamasov, and finally Mitja, Grushenka, Katja, Lisa and Piotr Verkhovenskij, Stavrogin and all the others are, according to Mereshkovskij, Dostojevskij's own family, flesh of his flesh and blood of his blood, while Tolstoi and Dostojevskij, in their turn, are according to Ivanov-Razumnik, the noblest synthesis of the spirit of the Russian people. The psychical point of view of these two great thinkers only proves their close contact with the inmost soul of their people which is indeed under Western influence but which is turned towards the East and which regards the demonic from a standpoint that differs entirely from that of the people in Western and Central Europe.

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The Ukrainian Church

When it was spreading throughout Eastern Europe, Christianity as a rule encountered peoples that were in early stages of spiritual development, when the ideas of religious, intellectual, cultural and political life were scarcely differentiated. At this time the Christian religion was the content and the basis of every development in culture, so that the acceptance of Christianity by a people was first and foremost an event of cultural and polititical importance in its life. It goes without saying that the embracing of Christianity was accompanied by contacts with those countries which were most interested in spreading the new religion. There were two possibilities for the ancient Kyiv empire which Norman Vikings had developed in the heart of present-day Ukraine in the 9th and 10th centuries to become a powerful and unique political factor in Eastern Europe: it could either embrace the Christianity of Rome in the west, or of Constantinople in the east, i. e. draw on either of the two centers of Christianity which were at that time on terms of bitter, if veiled, hostility. 175

The fact that the Grand Princes of Kyiv were christianised from Byzantium is partly explained by the geographical position of their state. Their campaigns of conquest led them along the course of rivers, which, in those days, were the natural channels of intercourse. This meant that the warlike Kyiv rulers extended their territories to the south where trade contacts were first established with Greece and that the new Christian creed could be demonstrated ad oculos when Constantinople was visited, whence it therefore slowly filtered into northern areas. A considerable number of Greeks are known to have been living in Kyiv even before Volodymyr the Great's conversion to Christianity, a fact which must have had percussions on that event. Nor must we forget that just then Byzantine culture was at its height and that, in consequence, it far outshone the culture of western peoples and further that it was already pervaded by Slavonic factors which brought it nearer the consciousness and feelings of the population than the remote sun of the west which was just rising. It was the nearest and most natural solution that the

175 Grand Princes of Kyiv, i. e. the leaders of the Norman Vikings should fetch their Christian faith from Byzantium and we are probably right in maintaining that any other state in the same circumstances would also have been christianised from Byzantium.

175 797 The new religion was at first embraced only by the Princes and their courts, but later it was forced on the people by their superiors and became a bond that united the entire state organism. There was no fear that the people would make a combined and successful stand against Christianity for there was no pagan order of priests to take over leadership in such a contest. The people had only sorcerers in place of priests and so it was possible to christianise the country by peaceful methods though pagan ideas continued to live in popular consciousness for a considerable time. It is quite legitimate therefore, to speak at this time of a "double faith".

175 792 795 The organisation of the church in the Kyiv empire came from Byzantium which was also the home of the higher clergy with the exception of two cases when representatives of the native population were consecrated metropolitans. The conventual orders and the many monasteries, among which the Cave Monastery in Kyiv attained a great reputation throughout the world of orthodoxy, attempted to shape the lives of the people on Christian lines and to realise the ideals of Christianity. The monasteries were the most important and indeed the only centers of cultural life at that time.

175 795 The Tatars who raided Europe in the 13th century destroyed the Kyiv empire and then pushed further west though they were brought to a halt in the battle of Liegnitz in 1241. Nevertheless for centuries the countries of Eastern Europe had to submit to the yoke of East Asiatic nomads.

In the Mongolian era the position of the church was not exactly unfavorable, for the Khans allowed it a certain freedom and state protection. The metropolitans had, however, to fetch the written pardons (Jarlyks) from the horde personally which was a voluntary acknowledgement of their dependence on the secular power. The dignitaries of the orthodox church continued, it is true, to be consecrated by Constantinople, but no longer

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directly but on the mediation and the recommendation of the Khans. 175 795

In the course of the 14th century after their liberation from the Tatars Ukrainian areas came under the sovereignty of the rulers of Lithuania and were then slowly absorbed by Poland after the union of that country with Lithuania. The position of the orthodox church in Ukraine which had already been weakened by the inroads of Tatars was further shaken by this political development and by the subjection of the country to an alien sovereign. It was degraded within the Polish republic from its former status as a state church to a factor of cultural life that was merely tolerated. It thereby lost authority as there was no executive power behind it and the general disorganisation and decay increased from year to year.

The southern sphere of Eastern European territory and the Ukrainian church were unmistakably characterised by a predilection for the west, and a spiritual kinship with the culture of Central and Western Europe. Even the Kyiv Grand Princes were plainly inclined to the west and, in spite of the dependence of their church on Byzantium, they contracted marriage unions with the Catholic dynasties of several European countries. The Tatar raids interrupted this movement, but only for a short time; for as soon as Ukrainian territory was absorbed first by the principality of Lithuania and then by the Polish state, it immediately formed contact again with the west. It is true that the orthodox church of Ukraine was subject to the Patriarch of Constantinople up to 1685, but spiritually it was turned towards the west. It remained loyal to its dogmas but fetched its spiritual weapons in its fight for equality from the arsenal of the leaders of the western churches, Catholic and Protestant. The educational institutes which trained for the priesthood in Ukraine borrowed their organisation from the Jesuit Colleges. Latin was the language used and Aristotle, and after him Christian Wolff with his systematic methods, reigned supreme. So it is no wonder that the youth trained in such schools was not suffocated by formalism and was therefore able to assimilate and develop new ideas. It was from this conciliatory

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795

spirit that all the movements for union with Rome sprang which were so characteristic for orthodoxy in Ukraine.

The orthodox church in the south, in Ukraine, followed its own historical development independent of events in the Muscovite state in the north. Up to the middle of the 17th century it was subject to Constantinople but incorporated within the Polish state and fought with unequal weapons for equality within the organism of a foreign state. But when, after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow, the "third Rome", became more and more supreme in the ecclesiastical and religious life of Eastern Europe, a dilemma arose for orthodox Ukrainians in Poland; they could either remain loyal to a weak Byzantium, or subject themselves to the new power of Moscow, or they could improve their political position and come into closer contact with the general process of culture in Europe by uniting with Rome. The movement for union was therefore determined not by dogma, but, in the first instance, by political and cultural considerations. The year 1596 finally witnessed the union of part of the orthodox Ukrainians with Rome. For, when faced with the choice between Moscow and Rome, most of the Ukrainian bishops decided in favor of the latter and thus created a split within the orthodox church which was to be of far-reaching consequence for the shaping of political events in Eastern Europe. Thus, since the end of the 16th century there were two church organisations on Ukrainian territory, the orthodox which was able to maintain itself chiefly in western areas and the united, which, in the course of time, developed to be the national church of Ukraine. With the increasing political importance of the Cossacks throughout the 17th century, the orthodox church tried to rise again and succeeded, above all in the province of culture, in creating new values which ultimately permeated the whole of Eastern Europe. After the fall of the Cossack state and the incorporation of the most of Ukraine in the Russian Empire in the course of the 18th century, the united church was more and more persecuted and in 1838 was finally banned; the Ukrainian orthodox church, on the other hand, fell increasingly under Russian influence. This process gained in intensity with time so that at the beginning of the 20th century the orthodox church

in Ukraine was one of the most powerful instruments for "freeing" the population from national sentiments. After the establishment of an independent Ukraine in 1918, the orthodox church in Ukraine experienced a fresh, if shortlived, renaissance. It could not last long for, when the bolshevists gained the upper hand, the entire religious life of Ukraine suffered the same treatment as that in other parts of the Soviet Union. In the first years of the Soviet regime when the pressure of the government was bearable, orthodox Ukrainians in Soviet Russia organised themselves into the Ukrainian Independent Church, replacing the Old Slavonic church language by the modern mother-tongue. But when the new order in Eastern Europe grew stronger and all religion was banned from public life, the Ukrainian Independent Church had to cease functioning at home and confined its activity to the numerous circles of emigrants who, especially after World War I, sojourned in western countries.

As already mentioned, the orthodox church in Western Ukraine, in areas like Galicia and Volynia, held its own against the Union. But at the beginning of the 18th century these sections were also won for the idea of the union, which was finally stronger here than anywhere. For, even in the days of Polish supremacy, and still more after the occupation of this area by Austria, the United or Greek-Catholic church developed into a Ukrainian national church which protected the people on the one hand from Russian, and on the other from Polish influence. In the 20th century Count Andreas Sheptytskyj, the Lviv metropolitan of this church, who accomplished much not only as the supreme head of the church but just as much as a national leader, became the symbol of the church's wide-spread significance. So it is no wonder but a procedure of accepted political expediency that, even during the First World War the Russian Government, rightly seeing in the Greek-Catholic church a center of Ukrainian nationalism, arrested the Metropolitan Sheptytskyj immediately after the occupation of Lviv and sent him into exile. Similarly, the report which appeared last year in all newspapers that the several million members of the United Church had submitted to the Patriarch of Moscow after the country was occupied by bolshevist troops and had thus returned

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to the bosom of orthodoxy, was in the same category. That this did not happen voluntarily but was carried out by means of pressure from above is as certain as the fact that it was not religious and dogmatic consideration but solely political factors that were the motive forces behind this change of front from west to east.

The Social Structure of the Ukrainian Community

The social structure of the Ukrainian people was fairly uniform till the Soviets took over the government. According to the census of 1926 which gives an accurate enough picture of pre-Soviet conditions, the majority of the people were engaged in agriculture. On December 17. 1926, 80.6 % of the population were employed in agriculture, 5.4 % in factories, 3.7 % were artisans, 0.5 % were employed in building, 1.9 % on the railway, 2.3 % in business, and 2.6 % in civil service. Te different social classes may be seen from the following table: 162

	Ukrainians %	Russians %	Jews %
Laborers	54.6	29.2	8.7
Servants	51.7	25.0	16.9
Professions	47.9	15.2	30.4
Farmers working with members of own family	88.6	4.9	1.3
Farmers with hired laborers	75.6	5.7	10.4
Independent peasants	56.7	10.7	26.7
Members of family working at home	89.1	5.2	0.6

The characteristic member of the social structure of the Ukrainian nation was the farmer who cultivated the soil with the help only of his family. The proportion of Ukrainians in the groups of laborers, employees and professions diminished as the salary and social standing of the group in question rose.

The collective system introduced by the First and Second Five Year Plans, made deep alterations in the social structure of the Ukrainian areas. The proportion between rural and urban population changed. According to the last census of 1939 the urban population had risen to 36.2 %, while the rural population had sunk to 63.8 %. In the Donets Basin and the Ukraine Steppe, where industrialisation was intensely developed, the population of the towns in some areas rose by 50 %. While from 1926-1932 towns like Dnipropetrovske increased 62.9%, Za- 162 361

162 porizha 244 %, Kryvyj Rih 156.6 %, Staline 170 %, Konstanty-
361 nivka 233 %, towns in the Right and Left Bank areas decreased.

The increase in urban population in the Ukraine Soviet Republic is most probably due to foreign immigration. Housing has become worse practically everywhere; it is difficult to imagine that the immigrants can continue to live permanently under such wretched conditions.

474 The rural population was composed almost entirely of members of colkhoses. They possessed almost the entire agricultural land in common, all agricultural machinery and draught animals and much of the other livestock. There remained for personal use only small plots round the cottages, the cottages themselves and a few head of cattle (no horses), pigs and poultry.

474 Every member had to work on the soil of the colkhose. His
465 wages were reckoned according to the number of days he had worked and these were calculated according to time and kind of work performed. The amount of grain left after fulfilling obligations to the state and payment for hire of machines and tractors, seed, cattle-breeding expenses, rate of amortisation etc. represented the wages. They were paid in kind and (a smaller proportion) in money. This meant that variations in harvest yield were almost exclusively expressed by what was left for wages. In the first years of the colkhose system, members often received 2-3 kg of grain for a day's work; as their energy was not fully utilised in the colkhose and as the members of the family who were unable to work had also to live from these meager earnings, famine arose in the early thirties in Ukraine, bringing a great increase in the death-rate. Later, wages are said to have been raised but the Soviet statistics do not show whether the wages listed (15 kg and more per day) applied to entire Ukraine or to individual colkhoses. The incomes of the various colkhose members also varied, as administrative jobs were better paid than work in fields and stables, and as several members revealed "propriety instincts" for extending or exploiting their own small share at the expense of the common property.

The proportion of farms managed by individuals decreased to less than 1 % of the entire agricultural area. The men employed at machinery and tractor centers, which seemed to attract all the mechanics required for the colkhose system, formed a privileged class. It depended on them whether an agricultural operation was carried through at the right time. This group was mainly composed of young people and non-Ukrainians. In 1934 some 797 600 were employed on the land and in forests in the Ukraine Soviet Republic. The Soviet officials, not so important numerically as on account of their influence, formed another group of the rural population. Finally, in the country districts there was a fairly large group of teaching and medical staffs and agricultural experts, mostly of Ukrainian peasant origin, as foreigners could not stand life in Ukrainian villages for long. 162 565

Urban population had a large percentage of foreigners, the main social groups being laborers in industry and commerce and the Soviet officials. The number of industrial laborers within the frontiers of the Ukraine Soviet Republic on January 1st, 1936 was 1 308 000. But this figure kept varying constantly, as many of the workers from country districts were not satisfied with conditions of life in the towns and changed jobs frequently or tried to get back home. The Soviet Government fought against these difficulties for years without being able to solve them. This group also included a great number of young people who grew up in post-war conditions. Their nationality varied; about half of the industrial proletariat in Ukraine was of Ukrainian origin. As a rule, material standards were not high. The average wage in 1934 amounted to 166.4 roubles a month, but this figure is not a clear indication of the individual's earning capacity as piece-work was general. In individual cases, where the Stakhanov system (whereby maximum output of labor was achieved) was introduced, higher than average wages were earned. In recent years real wages declined as a result of abolishing the cards which had entitled workmen to certain privileges in buying food and industrial products. Wage earners in Soviet business concerns were similarly situated to those in industrial plants but as the former were less important than the latter in the general scheme of Soviet economy, their develop- 162 369 465 434

465 ment has been slower and they have not yet reached the same
434 degree of intensity of labor which we found in factories. Jews play a great part in commercial life.

162 Among the lower categories of civil servants, Ukrainians were
465 in the majority from the beginning, while representatives of
511 foreign nationalities increased in the higher services. The average
647 salary of Soviet officials throws little light on the standard of living in this group of the population because the difference between higher and lower employees is again considerable. Incomes in the lower ranks were very small while the higher officials had a life of ease and could on occasion even afford luxury. Engineers are among the most privileged while teachers and actors are much worse off. The legal status of the Soviet official was entirely insecure; they lived constantly under threat of a "purge" or of being denounced as disturbing the process of Soviet economy. The higher ranks of bureaucrats were here in special danger.

162 The small group of the professional class (doctors, writers, lawyers), in spite of their freedom, was dependent on the apparatus of the Soviet State. The group of outcasts was most to be pitied, i. e. those who had been expelled by the regime from social intercourse, e. g. merchants, artisans, and priests. After identity cards were introduced and "socially dangerous" persons removed, this group greatly decreased.

162 Another group, finally, is formed by Ukrainians living
167 outside the frontiers of Ukrainian territory, who as "Kur-
697 kuls", "Pests", "Saboteurs" were sent to concentration camps in the North and in Siberia. The "Nationalists" are also included in this group. And the colonisation of remote frontier areas in Soviet Russia required forest laborers, miners and factory workers, who had to help in the coal mines of Siberia and in building up industrial concerns in Central Asia. It is impossible to give statistics for the proportion of Ukrainians in this group, but they cannot be ignored as they will certainly return home and play an important rôle in Ukraine whenever the general situation is altered.

162 In Ukrainian areas outside of the Soviet Union, conditions
167 resemble those obtaining in Western Europe. The Ukrainian

area in Poland showed the greatest variations, it having an urban population of 19 % in 1931; in the Lviv area of administration this rose to 30 % and sank to 12 % in Volynia. The urban population was composed of the following nationalities: Ukrainians 22.9 %, Poles 36.6 %, Jews 38.3 %. The figures for the rural population, on the other hand, were: Ukrainians 71.4 %, Poles 23 %, Jews 3.8 %, others 1.8 %. 74.9 % were employed in agriculture, 10.2 % in factories and mines, 7.4 % in business and transportation, 7.5 % in other callings. In areas previously belonging to Russia, the number of those engaged in agriculture rose to 80 % and in the administration of Lviv and Stanislaviv it only amounted to 65.5 % and 74.8 % respectively. 162 167

An excess rural population was characteristic of Polish parts of Ukraine, being particularly marked in provinces formerly Austrian. The agricultural area was divided into 52.4 % small holdings (up to 50 ha), 28.8 % large estates and 18.8 % state property. But in reality 84.3 % of the agricultural land was in small holdings as the large estates and the state property mostly consisted of forest land. In Galicia there were crofts (up to 5 ha) which could neither employ nor feed a large family. The medium-sized (5-20 ha) and larger farms (20-50 ha) did not represent even the half of all agricultural enterprises. Ukrainians were practically not represented at all in larger estates, so that the standard of living among the Ukrainian population was very low; the cooperative system which was widely spread, especially in Galicia, did something to raise the average standard.

The Ukrainian urban population was represented mainly by the lower middle-classes. In recent times efforts have been made to improve conditions for Ukrainian businessmen and to build new workshops for individual workers. These efforts soon met with success, in spite of Polish and Jewish competition.

Social conditions were different in Bucovina and Bessarabia. Though land there has been parcelled into tiny holdings and has consequently produced a social situation similar to that in Galicia, the conditions under which the Ukrainian peasant lived in Bessarabia were stable and more favorable. Jews formed a

162 proportion of the population of the little towns, the Ukrainian
167 intelligentsia being but weakly represented.

The population of those parts of *Ukrainian territory that are* in Czechoslovakia, is also mostly engaged in agriculture which accounts for 81.8 %, mining industry for 6.4 %, trade and transportation for 2.7 % and other professions for 9.1 %. In the main, Ukrainians live in the country; the less important cities and towns have a very mixed population, in which Ukrainians form the majority in only a few cases. The standards of living and material security are precarious, lower perhaps than in any other part of Ukrainian territory.

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The Different Areas of Ukraine, their Nationality and Political Position

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Let us review briefly the political development in the various areas of Ukraine between the two World Wars. Ukrainians within the Soviet Union were mainly distributed, as we have seen, between the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR) where they had no national rights, and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. By the constitution of July 6th, 1923, Soviet Ukraine is a member of the USSR which adjoined "voluntarily as a member of the union with the formal right to leave it when it likes".

The constitution of Soviet Ukraine was adjusted to that of the USSR. The Congress of Soviets, the Central Executive and its president are the supreme organs of authority. The Council of Commissaries functioned as the Executive Body and it was subject to the authority of the Congress of Soviets and the Central Executive Committee. Three categories of members were comprised in the Council of Ukrainian People's Commissaries: 1. commissaries for agriculture, justice, internal affairs, education, health and social welfare, who acted on their own authority in the provinces under their jurisdiction; 2. "unified" commissaries who had to function according to instructions from the central government, and 3. delegates from the general commissariat of the Union, appointed by different central agencies and dependent on them.

The independence of the various federal republics mainly existed merely on paper, as representatives of the RSFSR were in the majority in the supreme agencies of the USSR. The decisive feature of the organisation was that the composition of all agencies throughout the USSR was regulated by the communist party, which filled all posts with its own members. It, too, was completely centralised and took its orders from the head office of the party in Moscow which it then implemented in the various republics. The expansion of the communist party's function and the limitation of the rights of the individual republics formed the foundation of the growth of the USSR from the very beginning. Numerous amendments to the constitution which

642 reached a climax in Stalin's Constitution of December 5th, 1936
177 helped to liquidate the idea of federation; the principles on which
.64 the Soviet Union had been constituted in 1923 were denied, the rights of the federal republics being reduced to a minimum: only 4 Republican People's Commissariats remained (commissariat for education — minus universities; social welfare; local industry; communal management) and all other state functions now fell to the "unified" commissariats of the Central Government (now called unionist - republican). As the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities have, since 1936, been elected by direct and universal franchise, Russian influence gained the upper hand in these corporations, too. It is true that Stalin still recognised the right to leave the Union in principle, but at the same time he publicly stated: "It is obvious that we have no republics who would seriously entertain the idea of leaving the USSR"

While the Central Government was supreme, its relation to the Ukrainian state and nationality underwent numerous and profound changes. At first, communist leaders were inclined to ignore the Ukrainian question. But then they realised that the national movement in Ukraine was an instrument of power and that a respect for minorities was a condition of the growth of bolshevism in countries outside Russia, where the question of nationality had not been solved, the communist party began to display a readiness to make concessions. The educational system of Ukraine was organised, the activity of scientific institutes and the All-Ukrainian Academy in Kyiv supported and Russian officials instructed to learn the Ukrainian language in a short time. Considerable concessions were made to Ukrainian economy and if at the time of the New Economic Plan (NEP 1922-23) centralism was not extinct by any means, it seemed as if a tolerable modus vivendi was emerging.

But in 1929-30 when this system of political economy was liquidated in favor of the first Five Year Plan, there was a complete change. When the collectivist system was introduced it was no longer necessary to pay the respect to Ukrainian peasantry that had hitherto resulted in compromises. From now on,

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attention was concentrated on building up a system of social economy within Russia, so that it was no longer necessary to bear in mind national movements in western countries, for the world revolution had been postponed for the meantime. The change in Ukraine took place gradually and in contradiction to public expressions of loyalty. The economic needs of Ukraine were ignored already in the first Five Year Plan, the educational system was restricted and the Academy of Learning came completely under communist influence. Ukrainian officials were replaced by Russians and the standing of Ukraine suffered. Russian, as the language of the Revolution, of Lenin and Stalin, was to be the language of one people which had hitherto used several languages, a fact that had concealed the inner unity that had actually existed.

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This development caused a fresh outbreak of national resistance on the part of the Ukrainians. The movement of the rebels which had at first led to guerilla warfare, ceased about 1921-1922: factors responsible for the cessation of hostilities were the appointment of Ukrainian officials to the administration and the fact that the United Ukrainian Church was tolerated. When this also was forbidden and when the collectivist movement in the country met with the spontaneous resistance of the peasantry, a campaign of terrorism was re-started. "Nationalist" differences appeared even within party organisations: bolshevist dignitaries themselves could not keep clear of the Ukrainian movement. Thus in 1925 Shumskyj, commissary for education in the USSR, a very influential communist, was dismissed; in 1933 Skrypnyk, who held the same office and who was a personal friend of Lenin's, comitted suicide because he was unwilling to confess his "nationalist sins" to the party; his example was followed in 1937 by Lubtshenko, long president of the Council of People's Commissaries, in order not to fall into the hands of the GPU. The number of lesser communist dignitaries who were killed as nationalists or separatists is very great, and still greater is the host of those who did not belong to the communist ranks and who suffered the same fate in the struggle for national rights and political independence.

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175 The Peace of Riga (May 18th, 1921) between Poland and
728 Russia allocated to the former Volynia, Polesya and the district of Kholm, formerly parts of the Russian Empire, while the Ambassadors' Council on March 14th, 1923 added Galicia to Poland's gains. In the Treaty of Riga both partners promised to respect the rights of their minorities while the Ambassadors' Council declared that Poland was to issue laws that would preserve Ukrainian rights and that this was why the Entente Powers relegated their supreme authority to Poland. In reality, throughout the period of Polish supremacy there was little or no attempt to satisfy Ukrainian claims. The Ukrainian Chairs, established at Lviv University by Austria, ceased to exist and the law providing for a Ukrainian university was never implemented. Ukrainian schools were slowly but surely replaced by others where Polish was used either in some or in all classes. Polish became the language of instruction in secondary and vocational schools. The Ukrainian language was not recognised legally either in the administration or in law courts and Ukrainian influence declined in all selfgovernment organisations. Poles colonised Ukrainian areas. A campaign of public opposition was opened against the Ukrainian church: hundreds of churches were shut, above all in the district round Kholm, and the buildings were frequently burned.

175 The reaction of the Ukrainian population was considerable.
871 In the field of education steps were taken to organise private Ukrainian schools; thus in 1934-35 there were 21 Ukrainian secondary schools, 5 continuation vocational schools — mostly in the towns. This is no mean accomplishment in view of the Polish resistance. Besides actual schooling. Ukrainian youth outside of the schools was organised. In 1938 in Galicia. alone the Ukrainian Union for Adult Education had half a million members, 84 branches, 3208 reading rooms. 2065 theatrical societies and 1105 choirs (the Union was forbidden by Polish Law outside
175 of Galicia). Cooperative stores also served to support Ukrainian
474 interests. In 1935 there were incorporated in the Ukrainian Central Cooperative Organisation 3013 cooperative societies with a membership of 541 508. This organisation of economic self-help had also to struggle against bitter Polish resistance, as expressed in the military pacification of Galicia in 1930 or the

pogroms in the autumn of 1938 when Ukrainian economic establishments and their equipment in towns in Eastern Galicia were almost completely demolished by the Polish mob. The Ukrainians who had been incorporated in Roumania had lived undisturbed under the Austrian Empire. In Bucovina there were Ukrainian elementary and secondary schools and a Ukrainian Chair at Chernivtsi University. The Ukrainian language was recognised in administration and law. Under Roumanian supremacy these rights were all forfeited and replaced by a policy of deliberate denationalisation. The only thing that Ukraine achieved during this period was the introduction of Ukrainian as an optional subject in some elementary schools. Officials who were not Roumanian nationals were dismissed without notice.

Ukrainian territory which belonged to the Czechoslovakian republic, so-called Carpathian Russia, although it was least significant in area and culture, enjoyed the greatest measure of freedom. It cannot, however, be said that Prague satisfied all the national claims of the Ukrainians.

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The History of Ukraine

175 The two prime formative influences on the growth of the
167 Ukrainian people are the struggle for the steppe and the drive for expansion southwards; there never was any migratory movement towards Central Europe. All the strenght of the Ukrainian people was absorbed by the struggle in the steppe with an opponent who commanded respect and whose riding tactics were certainly superior to those of European armies of knights, by battles in an area devoid of natural and artificial obstacles, by the necessity of moving repeatedly into the plains of Polesya and Volynia with their great forests and many rivers and lakes whenever the mounted hosts from the east swept over the steppe. It was only at the end of the eighteenth and in the course of the nineteenth century that the steppe was finally subdued, the shores of the Black Sea reached and the eastern frontier pushed far ahead. The expansion of the territory settled on by the Ukrainians which is three times as great as 200 years ago, took place solely at the expense of nomadic peoples. It were the colonial acquisitions of the nineteenth century which brought the Ukrainian people within the orbit of Europe.

This strengthening of the Ukrainian people at its circumference was detrimental to intensive development within the state. Insets of alien nationalities remained on Ukrainian territory, above all in the towns, where trade and industry fell into the hands of foreigners. Partitioned among four states as it was after World War I, and now completely dependent on a rigidly centralised Great Power, the Ukrainian people has not yet evolved a political form of its own. Its future as a state still lies ahead.

175 Ukrainian history may be divided into the following periods:

1) the political supremacy of Kyiv up to 1154
2) the supremacy of the Galician-Volynian state from 1154-1340
3) the Lithuanian-Polish period, 1340-1648
   a) the Lithuanian 1340-1569
   b) the Polish 1569-1648
4) the Cossack State 1648-1782
5) the Russo-Austrian period 1792 (1772)-1918

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

The Kyiv State in the 10th and 11th centuries

175 Such a division seems practical, even if it does not hold for all sections of the country. Thus for the Right Bank Region the Polish period does not end in 1648 but only with the Second Partition of Poland, and for Galicia it lasts from 1349 till 1772. For Carpatho-Ukraine the Austro-Hungarian period lasts from the beginning till 1918, with short interruptions. But, regarded from the standpoint of the history of the nation as a whole, these areas are peripheral and of lesser significance, in spite of their having repeatedly supplied the capitals with leaders who played a decisive part in national life.

Political Supremacy of Kyiv till 1154

Mention is first made of the Ukrainian people as we know it now in Byzantine chronicles. If we add to these the historical records left by Kyiv monks, we can form an idea of Ukraine at the end of the 9th century as a conglomerate of strictly isolated tribes, each with its own primitive political life. Their religion was uncertain, except for vestiges of a cult of the dead. They had no distinct priest caste. The tribes of the Severyany, the Polyany, the Derevlyany and the White Croats are at this time pushing southwards, the Uglichi and Tyvertsi have already reached the shores of the Black Sea and are in touch with Byzantium. This drive south takes place under the protection of the Khazar Empire which blocked the route of the nomads towards Asia. At the end of the tenth century, Eastern Europe had become the center of the Occident as far as commercial and financial transactions were concerned. An extensive network of waterways faciliated intercourse through the plains of Eastern Europe from north to south. In the seventh and eighth centuries, the Khazars on the Volga flourished as long as they controlled the trade routes to Bagdad, then a highly developed state; the Slavonic tribes on the Dnipro were vassals of the Khazars.

The decay of Bagdad entailed changes in the economic interests of the Khazar Empire, the religion and dynasty of which were of Jewish origin. The Khazars formed closer relations with Byzantine nations, and with the decline of the Volga as a trade route, the Dnipro and the tribes on its banks gained in impor-

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
UKRAINIAN
PRINCIPALITIES
in the XI—XIII C.
0 50 100 150 Miles
0 100 200 Kilometr.
Don R.
Oskil R.
Donets R.
Dnieper R.
Dniester R.
Bug R.
Pripyat R.
Prut R.
Seret R.
Vistula R.
Dvina R.
Volga R.
Kiev
Kyiv
Chernigov
Pereyaslavl
Vladimir
Suzdal
Rostov
Yaroslavl
Galich
Halych
Lublin
Lwow
Lutsk
Volodymyr
Kremenets
Zaslavl
Turov
Pinsk
Polotsk
Smolensk
Novgorod
Pskov
Tver
Moscow
Ryazan
Kolomna
Chernigov
Putivl
Kursk
Tmutarakan
Kherson
Kaniev
Vyshgorod
Bilgorod
Kamenets
Ladoga
Lake Peipus
Lake Ilmen
Lake Onega
Lake Ladoga
Lake Chudskoe
Lake Pskovskoe

175 tance. Of these, the Polyany, numerically small but excellent soldiers, formed the kernel of the Kyiv state. The most generally accepted theory to-day, that the Kyiv state is of Scandinavian origin, is founded on philology*) alone, while archaeology and traces of law and culture testify against greater Germanic influence. In the army of the Kyiv princes Germanic elements were strongly represented though they were eventually quickly and completely absorbed by the Slavs round them.

At the beginning of the tenth century the power of Kyiv increased rapidly and soon dominated all Slavonic tribes. Novgorod and the area of the upper Volga on Russian soil were annexed. Now the entire trade route from the Gulf of Finnland to the mouth of the Dnipro was under the suzerainty of the Kyiv princes. There were repeated clashes with Byzantium, as is seen by the peace treaties of 911 and 945, these being mostly the result of conflicting trade policies. Prince Svyatoslav the Brave (956-972) destroyed the Khazar Empire and conquered Bulgarian land on the Lower Danube, though only for a decade, for Byzantine pressure forced him to withdraw again after desperate battles.

The destruction of the Khazar Empire was a blunder from the political point of view for it left the way clear for Asiatic nomads to overrun Europe. The first to appear were the Pechenegs who besieged Kyiv in 962. Svyatoslav lost his life and the Ukrainians were pushed back northwards. Svyatoslav's son Volodymyr the Great or Holy (979-1015) was exhausted in the struggle against the Pechenegs; nevertheless he was able to extend his empire by the addition of land in West Ukraine (Galicia and perhaps also Carpathian Ukraine). The fact that he embraced the Greek form of Christianity which permitted the use of Slavonic in its liturgy had still greater

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*) The name Rus (Reussen) is said to originate from the Scandinavian Vikings The similarity of the word with "Russia" has led to great confusion. At the time of the Lithuanian realm, Ukrainians and White Ruthenians both called themselves "Reussen" and this is the connotation which the word has in the present text. With the rise of Moscow, the Tsar assumed the title of "Ruler over all Reussen". In the present text, "Russian" and "Russia" are used exclusively for the northern neighbors of the Ukrainians.

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
UKRAINIAN TERRITORY
in 1939.
Ukrainians
Polonized and slavekized Ukrainians
Frontiers of the States (1949)
Frontiers of the Republics in U.S.S.R. (1947)
0 50 100 150 Miles
0 100 200 Kilometr.
White Ruthenians
Russians
Rumanei
Kalmucks
Cossacks
Sea of Oziv
BLACK SEA
CASPIAN SEA
Caucasus Peoples
Warszawa
Lublin
Pryypyat R.
Homel
Orel
Kursk
Voronezh
Tambov
Lipetsk
Saratov
Volsk
Borisoglebsk
Bakshev
Stalingrad
Astrakhan
Kyiv
Kharkiv
Poltava
Sumy
Chernihiv
Dnipropetrovsk
Kirovohrad
Kryvyi Rih
Mykolaiv
Odesa
Kherson
Zaporizhe
Stalino
Makiivka
Shakhty
Rostov
Taganrog
Mariupil
Kerch
Sevastopil
Simferopil
Yalta
Krasnodar
Voroshylovsk
Kuma
Groznyi
Tuapse
Sochi
Constanta
Bucharest
Bulgaria
Danube
Dnipro R.
Don R.
Volga
Donetsk
Kursk
Voronezh
Saratov
Volsk
Astrakhan
Kuma
Groznyi
Yeis
Kerch
Sevastopil
Yalta

175 repercussions. The reigns of Volodymyr and his son Yaroslav (1019-1054) mark the zenith of the power of Kyiv. In the battle at Eckfeld (1036) the Pechenegs were so utterly routed that they henceforth disappear completely from Ukrainian history. The first collection of Eastern Slavonic laws, the law of the "Reussen" (Ruskaja Pravda) dates from these years. From it we learn that the prince and his body-guard held the central power of the state. The latter lived at the prince's court and supplied the most important state officials. Its members were bound to the prince, though not insolubly, by oaths of loyalty and obedience. The prince consulted his body-guard before launching any important undertaking.

The town was the political center of the surrounding country and the town assembly the supreme authority of administration. A certain balance of power was maintained between the towns and the dynasty for they were dependent on each other. The peasantry had no political rights though its members were personally free and only paid tribute in kind to the prince and his body-guard. In addition there were also slaves, mostly recruited from captives taken in battle.

The theory that the entire dynasty should have the right to rule as princes prevailed generally, i. e. every prince claimed a share of the paternal possessions. This naturally caused a splitting up of the country which inevitably led to decay.

Principalities grew up in Pereyaslav, Chernyhiv and Galicia, and Turiv-Pinsk, but these became later still more disintegrated. The authority of the Grand Prince was centered in Kyiv and lasted for about another century. For the rest, there were incessant internal feuds which involved the larger cities as well as the country districts.

About the year 1060 great hordes of Asiatics, the Polovtsy or Cumans swept over the eastern frontier. The unity of the state was a thing of the past, resistance was weak and the land was hurried into the heart of the country round Kyiv and Chernyhiv. It was only after Volodymyr Monomakh, Yaroslav's son and Prince of Pereyaslav, succeeded in routing the Polovtsy in 1103 and 1111 that peace prevailed for a time.

Monomakh became Grand Prince of Kyiv (1113-1125); and the years of his reign and that of his son, Mstyslav, mark for the last time the supremacy of Kyiv. At the same time the jealousy of the Chernyhiv dynasty caused a hundred years' struggle for the prize of Kyiv. Monomakh's youngest son profited by these feuds and founded on Russian soil the principality of Suzdal and later Vladimir. The Finnish-Slav state seceded from Kyiv, soon acquired considerable power, finally aiming at supremacy over Kyiv. After the death of Isyaslav (Mstyslav's son) who had been able to maintain the authority of the state on the Dnipro from 1146 till 1154, Kyiv was stormed and sacked by the Suzdal troops in 1169. The victory of the Kyiv princes at Vishgorod (1172) rescued the country from direct dependence on Suzdal, but up to the beginning of the 13th century supremacy in Eastern Europe was centered in the settlements in Russia, north of Ukraine. /75

The end of the Kyiv state is linked with the decay of Byzantium and the ebb of the Scandinavian wave of expansion, both of which robbed the capital on the Dnipro of its importance as a center of trade. The inroads of Asiatic nomads made for a general feeling of insecurity and so, up to the 19th century, Ukraine remained on the periphery of the civilised world, impotent to attain its former greatness. The traditional customs of living in the primitive state which had been founded on trade, were gradually disintegrated and replaced by a new society which was in some ways analogous to the feudalism of Western Europe.

Political Supremacy of the Realm of Galicia and Volynia

Towards the end of the 11th century a new state grew up in the western part of Volodymyr's realm. At the turn of the century Galicia had already become a powerful principality that had successfully defended itself against Poland and Hungary. At that time it comprised the valleys of the Dnister and the Prut as far as the Black Sea. These rivers had gained in importance as they were less threatened by nomads than the Dnipro, especially in view of the Crusades. Nevertheless the Galician-Volynian realm never attained the position of Kyiv.

175 It enjoyed a period of prosperity under Yaroslav Osmomysl (1153—1187). As it was only sparsely populated, it had to expand east at the expense of the principality of Kyiv and thus had to come into conflict with the principality of Suzdal.

The solidarity of its ruling house was the chief foundation of Galicia's strength. Usually several brothers were ruling at the same time; the younger or less talented submitted themselves to the others without question. Its weakness lay in the country aristocracy, the boyars, with the resources of their estates behind them, and not bound to the person of the prince. The history of the Galician-Volynian state is a record of feuds between the prince and the boyars. While the Volynian nobility remained loyal to the prince, their Galician compeers did not shrink from alliances with rebel groups or foreign powers (Poland and Hungary). In these constant struggles Roman the Great, Prince of Volynia (1199—1205) gained a great, but only temporary victory; after overcoming the resistance of the boyars, he took Kyiv and ruled over almost all Ukraine. His early death prevented the consolidation of these successes; their sole lasting result was the union of Galicia with Volynia whither Roman's wife had fled with her young son, Danylo. In the long feuds connected with the dynastic succession. that laid Galicia waste, Volynia was an island of peace from which Danylo in the thirties extended his power once more to Kyiv. Then the invasion of the Mongols changed the situation entirely.

Already in 1223 a battle had been fought on the Kalka between the Mongols and the princes of Eastern Europe; but at first this victory of the Asiatics had no consequences to speak of, as they immediately withdrew to the east. In 1240 a new incursion followed, claiming Kyiv as a victim. From time to time Danylo had to acknowledge the supremacy of the Tatars but his entire energy was now directed towards throwing off the Mongol yoke at all costs. After routing the combined Hungarian and Polish armies at Yaroslav in 1245, thus putting an end to the claims of both countries for a hundred years, he tried to win the support of the Pope for a crusade against the Mongols. All he received at the Papal hands, however, was the royal crown (1253). All Danylo's attempts to attack the Tatars single-handed were in vain and in 1264 he died.

By this time the Galician-Volynian state was played out. The lands in Eastern Ukraine were lost, minor successes of Leo (1264—1300) and George I (1300—1308) did not last. In 1340 the last scion of the Rurik dynasty, George II Boleslav was poisoned, the consequence being the occupation of these areas by Poland. 175

Lviv, founded in the middle of the 13th century, is characteristic for the development of Galicia during this era. The Magdeburg Code was introduced into Western Ukraine and the social structure of society in the provinces adjacent to the Tatars was changed. The small princes became simple landowners. In the Kyiv district and Podolia, however, independent village communities arose which only paid certain tribute to the Khan's officials. The yoke of dependence was not heavy, and when the empire of the Tatars (the Golden Horde) began to dissolve, single communities became quite independent. These relatively good relations between Ukrainians and Mongols ended with the expansion of the state of Lithuania-Reussen.

The Lithuanian-Polish Period

From the 13th century the Lithuanians, under pressure of German colonisation in the east, had been seeking to form an alliance with the higher developed Slavonic tribes on its frontiers. These had so little political unity that they offered no resistance to the Lithuanian advance. Lithuanian princes were often called to the throne, marriages took place between Lithuanian and Ukrainian royal houses, and when George II Boleslav was murdered, the Lithuanian Prince Lubart was called to be head of the Galician-Volynian state. Lithuanian towns like Vilna, Grodno, or Kovno were Slavonic in character. As the supremacy of Lithuania-Reussen did not affect life in the single provinces, this state really consisted of a union of half independent states.

The deeper reason for the rise of the Lithuanian state lay in the decline of the trade route to the Black Sea and the fall of the Byzantine Empire. On the other hand towns like Breslau, Riga and Danzig prospered and this new life was not without importance for Ukraine. When the Teutonic Order cut

175 these centers off, the peoples of Eastern Europe allied themselves with the German towns and rose against the Order.

After the final decline of the Golden Horde Lithuanian feudalism determined political and social life among the tribes of "Reussen". Smart military organisation transformed peaceful peasant communities into settlements of soldiers. The nobility were bound by oath to bear arms; the peasants who were personally free, had to support their overlord by tributes while they were constantly at his command. In case of disobedience the land passed into the possession of the state. The citizens were responsible for the fortifications of the towns and maintenance of the garrisons. The higher nobility had some sovereign rights and played the part of intermediary between prince and people.

Under the Lithuanian Prince Gedymin (1315—1341) the Prypyat area was annexed to the state of Lithuania-Reussen. His son Olgerd was converted to the Orthodox Faith. He completed his father's work, beat the Tatars at the "Blue Water" (1363) and liberated the whole of Ukraine from the Mongols. Five years later he sacked Moscow, thereby protecting his eastern provinces from the rising power of the Muscovites. His most stubborn battles were those waged against the Teutonic Order and for succession to the state Volynia and Galicia (1340—87). Olgerd's brother, the Prince Lubart already mentioned, managed to keep Volynia only and it remained a reliable province in the Reussen state. In 1386 Yagailo, Olgerd's successor, acquired the throne of Poland by marrying the young queen Yadwiga; at the same time he joined the Roman Catholic Church, many of his nobles following his example, and he united Lithuania and Poland.

This union led to a rising of the Ukrainian nobility who thought that Poland had deceived them. Vitold, Yagailo's nephew, forced his uncle to acknowledge him as Grand Prince of Lithuania and his reign (1392—1430) marks the height of the power of the Lithuania-Reussen union. The Ukrainians reached the coast of the Black Sea for the second time and came into contact with the Genoese colonists in Crimea. Moscow was forced to recognise the suzerainty of Vitold. The victory at Grunwald

(1410) put an end to all danger from the Teutonic Order. At 175
the same time he played off the Prussians against the Poles to keep the latter in check. Vitold's state was systematically centralised and the little principalities disappeared. Fedor Koryatovych, Lord of Podolia, crossed the Carpathians and laid the foundation for the more dense colonisation of Carpatho-Ukraine. (1393—1415).

Vitold's death was followed by lengthy domestic feuds. If the Poles succeeded in gaining Podolia, the attack on Volynia was held up by the courageous defense of Lutsk (1430). The nobles were victorious after the murder of Grand Prince Sigismund (1432-1440). In the reign of Kasimir, Sigismund's successor (1440-1492), a "council of the nobles" conducted the affairs of the state. In 1446 Kasimir also became King of Poland; henceforth the king's person was the only link between Poland and the Lithuania-Reussen union.

The supremacy of the nobles in Lithuania was the beginning of decay. Poland, strengthened by the weakness of Germany in the 15th century, made increased efforts to join the neighboring state. In the east, Moscow's power was increasing, while Crimea in the south was in the hands of part of the Golden Horde. The Khans in Crimea recognised the suzerainty of Turkey in 1475 and for several years they made an annual incursion into Ukraine, sacking all in their way. Once more Ukraine had to abandon the sea-coast. The country was laid waste as far as the Prypyat and in 1482 Kyiv itself was destroyed. The Russians formed an alliance with the Tatars from Crimea and took Homel, Chernyhiv, and Smolensk. The reigns of Kasimir and his son Alexander (1492—1506) were a succession of catastrophes which was only broken by a breathing-space under Sigismund I (1506—1548). The Russians were beaten by the Volynian prince, Constantin Ostrozhskyj, at Orsha (1514) and protection from the Tatars on the frontier was better organised.

While the rule of the nobles brought constant unrest to Lithuania, Poland absorbed western culture and finally attracted some Ukrainian nobles. They became more and more Polish till the union between Reussen and Lithuania was so weakened that Sigismund II, the last of the Yagailo dynasty, accomplished

175 the real union of Poland with Reussen and Lithuania. Thus, the Ukrainian areas, while retaining their own language and laws, came under the control of Poland.

The Polish Period

By this time attacks by the Tatars in the Crimea were beginning to slacken. At the same time increasing prosperity in Central and Western Europe caused a greater demand for grain. The fertile soil of the steppe attracted cultivators and the Ukrainians began to expand again, though no longer as military colonies, but as large landowners, they alone being able to maintain the forces necessary for fighting against the Tatars. The lot of the ordinary peasant grew worse, the change in his status being reflected in various laws and finally in the Statute of Lithuania, issued in 1529. The first version was still founded on the law of the Kyiv dynasty but later (1566, 1588) the peasantry was degraded to a serfdom that had no rights at all.

The freedom of the towns also came to an end. It is true that the kings tried to win over the towns by granting them the Magdeburg Code but this intention was thwarted by the nobles, who as starosts, voevodes and officials in these towns were able to command armed support for themselves.

After 1569 the aristocrat was the only citizen of the Polish Republic to enjoy full rights and the same held for Ukrainian aristocrats. They became more and more Polish and Roman Catholic, a process hastened by the Jesuit seminaries that sprang up during the Counter-Reformation. Thus the greater part of its leading circles was lost to the Ukrainian people and little resistance was offered to the campaign of the Church of Rome. Only when, in the reign of Sigismund III (1587—1632), the Metropolitan of Kyiv and most of the bishops decided at the Council of Brest-Litovsk to proclaim the union did part of the population rebel. Brotherhoods were formed to defend the faith; but as they did not enjoy the protection of the nobles who had embraced the Roman Catholic faith, they were powerless to carry out any comprehensive scheme of action. It was only when the Cossacks intervened as the champions of the Orthodox population that matters were altered.

3. Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Cossacks — a Tatar-Turkish name for vagabonds and fighters — those Ukrainians were called who in summer earned a hard living on the steppe frontiers under constant threat of attack by the Tatars, and who thereafter, in autumn, sold the harvest of their labor in the towns (honey, fur, leather, fish and, later, also grain). They began to set up a military organisation of their own and to attack the Tatars independently (for the first time in 1492). 175

A proud feeling of independence developed among the Cossacks who were bound by no feudal laws of serfdom. They attracted numerous peasants desirous of throwing off the nobles' yoke. The bitter struggle against the frontier guards who represented the supremacy of the nobles, resulted in the formation of societies like the Zaporog Fastness „Sitsh", a fort founded amid the rapids on the Dnipro by the Cossack leader Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetskyj. All the surrounding area was regarded by the Cossacks as the special property of the Zaporog army, which only nominally acknowledged the superiority of the Polish king, while entertaining its own relations with foreign neighbors.

In 1571 King Sigismund II recognised the Cossacks as the protectors of the frontier and as auxiliary troops in time of war. The Cossacks paid no taxes; they had their own law courts and administration under a Hetman. The Cossack, therefore, was a member of a privileged class, which attracted many of the settled Ukrainian population. This influx changed the entire Cossack organisation, while the defense of national faith and life enhanced its popularity.

In the second half of the 16th century the Cossacks began to launch attacks, by water and on land. Constantinople, even, seems to have been threatened. But they also rose against the great landowners in Ukraine. It is true that the Polish general, Zolkiewski, inflicted defeat on Nalyvajko, the Cossack Hetman, at the Solonytsia (1596), but the rout was not complete. Poland required the help of the Cossacks in her wars in Moldavia, Livonia and against the Russians (1604—1613) and had therefore to continue granting them concessions. The position of Ukrainians in Poland was strengthened when Chernyhiv was once more seized from the Russians. At this time, Peter Ko-

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

175 nashevych-Zahaidachnyj (1614—1622); a Cossack leader, appears as spokesman for the entire Ukrainian people. His conduct towards the Poles was loyal; he saved the Polish troops under Prince Vladislav, who were besieged before Moscow and took a number of enemy fortresses. After Zolkiewski's death at Tsetsora (1620), Sahaidachnyj took over the command of the troops against the Turks and with the Poles won the victory at Hotin. At the same time he promoted the interest of Ukraine by bestowing the See of the Kyiv Metropolitan, vacant since the union of Brest, on the Patriarch of Antioch. He also strengthened the Kyiv Brotherhood and the Academy founded in 1615, which had been a refuge for scholars forced by the Poles to flee from Galicia. Jesuite intrigues and the persecution of adherents to the Orthodox faith combined with the cleft between Cossacks and nobles to make the continuance of Cossack loyalty to Poland impossible. There were various Cossack risings (1625, 1630, 1637-1638) which, though resulting in victory for the Poles, did not lead to any definite decision.

The Cossack Period

The man who succeeded in uniting the Ukrainian people against the Poles was Bohdan Khmelnytskyj, born in 1593, Hetman from 1648 up till 1657. He formed an alliance with the Crimean Tatars and attacked the Poles. By his victories at the Yellow Waters (Shovti Vody) and Korsun he liberated the Dnipro areas. After his victory at Pylava he marched on Varsaw. Circumstances such as the death of King Vladislav IV (1632-48), the accession of the new king and Polish peace overtures persuaded him to retreat; but when peace negotiations fell through, Khmelnytskyj besieged a Polish army at Zbarash and beat the new king, Jan Kazimir, at Zboriv. Thanks to the mediation of the Tatar Khan, peace followed for two years.

The reason for Khmelnytskyj's success was his great talent as an organiser. He merged the Ukrainian lesser nobility which had remained loyal to the Orthodox faith with the Cossacks, increased the fighting value of the Cossack army, and freed the peasants from serfdom and the tyranny of the gentry. The entire country received a military organisation and was divided

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

into hundreds (sotni). The head of a hundred directed all the 175
administrative, legal and military affairs in his district. The military commander and the Hetman were the supreme authorities. The Lithuanian Statute continued valid for the open country while the Magdeburg Code held in the towns. The area round the Zaporog Fastness was a special unit of administration, subject to the Hetman alone. Khmelnytskyj's rebellion put an end for ever to the idea of the Yagailo dynasty (i. e. that Ukrainians and Poles should live in one state). An alliance with Russia was even accepted in order to win the freedom of Ukraine from Polish supremacy. This alliance was concluded by the Hetman in 1654 at Perejaslav after various battles, (defeat of the Cossacks at Berestechko in 1651; Khmelnytskyj's victories at Batih in 1652 and Zvanets in 1653). Ukraine acknowledged the Tsar as overlord, but retained its own army, finances and foreign policy. The combined Ukrainian and Russian armies now took Smolensk and Vilna and, with the help of the Grand Prince of Transylvania, the Cossacks occupied Varsaw. But when Khmelnytskyj saw that the Tsar was not willing to acknowledge the independent rights of Ukraine, he formed alliance with Transylvania and Sweden. The Hetman died while those negotiations were in progress.

Internal unrest, caused by the attempts of gentry and Cossack authorities to restrict the freedom of the peasants still further, resulted in a movement among the broad masses of the people for alliance with Russia. As there were at the same time feuds between the Cossack aristocracy and the Hetman it was easy for the Tsar to exploit the situation. Another important factor in the general dissatisfaction of the people was the attempt made by the Zaporog Fastness under Ivan Zirko (died 1680) to obtain hegemony over Ukraine. The result was that some of the Cossack gentry wished to renew the alliance with Poland. Thus Ukraine was divided and two Hetmans were appointed simultaneously. The Cossacks who wished to be rid both of Poland and Russia, joined with the Turks, thus completing the chaos. The so-called "ruin", or Time of Troubles, began (1657—1676), a time of decay when Ukraine was divided. Hetmann Ivan Vyhovskyj (1657-59) formed an alliance with Poland and

175 beat the Russians at Konotop (1659). But he was forced to abdicate by circles hostile to Poland. Yurij Khmelnytskyj had to follow suit after four years in office, he having inherited his father's name but none of his gifts. Paul Teterya (1663-1665) and Ivan Brjukhovetskyj (1663-68) were too servile to foreign rulers to enjoy the respect of their own people; the former, with Polish help, ruled over the Right Bank area, while the latter controlled the Left Bank with the help of Russia. There were lively battles between the two factions.

A final partition was arrived at in the Peace of Andrusovo (1667) when the Right Bank area fell to Poland, while the Left Bank came under the suzerainty of Moscow. Ukraine laid down arms. Hetman Peter Doroshenko (1665-76) drove out Poland and Russia for a short time and sought refuge with the Turks; but the latter kept Podolia and their Tatar allies pillaged Ukraine. Poland and Russia set up a Hetman in opposition (Michael Khanenko 1669-1974; Damian Mnohohrishnyj 1668-1672; Ivan Samoylovych 1672—1687).

Doroshenko finally surrendered to Samoylovych who fought with the help of Russia, trying in vain to unite all the Ukrainian area. Poland, Turkey and Russia agreed to let the Dnipro Right Bank area lie waste for ever; the remnant of the people living there was driven by force on to the Left Bank. A fresh attempt on the part of Jan Sobieski III to settle Cossack captains on the devastated area led to the military organisation of Semen Palij who made Fastiv his center of operation (1688-1704). He protected the country against the Tatars, acquired for it a measure of independence from the Poles and recognised the suzerainty of Ivan Mazeppa, who had succeeded Samoloyvych as Hetman. This led to fresh conflict with Poland. In 1702 Palij took Bila Tserkva, thus extending his power to the Dnister. Mazeppa, who, by command of Peter the Great, marched against Charles XII of Sweden in 1704, once more united the territory conquered by Palij to the Left Bank Region

Mazeppa (1687-1709) was the last great Ukrainian Hetman. He managed to convince Peter the Great of his loyalty while remaining the actual ruler of Ukraine. When Charles XII marched against Moscow, Mazeppa thought that the hour had

come for throwing off the Russian yoke completely. The Zaporog Fastness joined the alliance between Mazeppa and Sweden. But Peter invaded Ukraine so quickly that plans for a general rising were frustrated. The Russians were victorious at Poltava. Charles XII and Mazeppa fled to Turkey where the latter died shortly afterwards (1709). An attempt made by Pylyp Orlyk, his successor, to regain Ukraine, failed. The Zaporog Fastness joined the Tatars and erected their new Fastness on the Lower Dnipro. 175

Ukraine now lost all its special privileges. Mazeppa's successor, Ivan Skoropadskyj, was Hetman merely in name, while on the other hand, the Cossack aristocracy grew in importance so that Ukraine became an autonomous oligarchy within the Russian Empire. Often for long intervals there was no Hetman and a "Little Russian Board", consisting of Russian and Ukrainian officers, ruled the country. Though fresh concessions were made to Ukraine by Peter's weak successor, the good old days had gone for ever.

It was Catherine II who finally put an end to home rule in Ukraine. In 1764 Hetman Cyril Rosumovskyj had to abdicate and in 1775 the Fastness was destroyed for good. The Zaporog Cossacks founded a new Fastness at the mouth of the Danube in Turkey (existed till 1828) and laid the foundation of Ukrainian colonisation in Southern Bessarabia. In 1782 governments on the Russian model took the place of regiments. Catherine did indeed appoint her favorite, Prince Potemkin, to be Hetman (1790-91) and tried to form new Cossack regiments, but the attempt failed from the start. About the middle of the 18th century the new Cossack aristocracy acquired Russian manners and education and were lost to the nation; they forfeited all their special privileges for equal rights with Russian nobles, while the Ukrainian peasants became serfs. The mass of the Cossacks continued to exist as personally free peasants, but it lost all military organisation. Their name appears in history for the last time in 1812 and 1831 when they voluntarily marched against Napoleon and the Poles respectively. In 1835 the Magdeburg Code was abolished as was also the Lithuanian Statute in 1842.

175 In order to consolidate her power in Ukraine, Russia gave the Right Bank of the Dnipro back to Poland. But the Polish Republic of nobles was not able to assert itself against the Zaporog Fastness and its guerilla warfare (Haydamak movement). At times (1743, 1750, 1768) all Ukraine rose in rebellion. It was only after the destruction of the Zaporog Fastness that the country became quiet and complete order was re-established only after the Second Partition of Poland when the Right Bank Area of Ukraine was given to Russia. In the Carpathians there were also risings, the rebels being called „Opryshki" there. More important, however, is the colonisation which took place here in the 18th century. At that time Ukrainian settlements reached the river Tisa.

The eastern areas of Ukraine, the so-called Slobodian Ukraine, were quietest in these troublous times. Here the war-weary people of the western districts found refuge and peaceful work. It is true that the country belonged to the Tsar, but the Ukrainian people were allowed to retain a certain measure of self-government, and the Cossack organisation. Both of these were finally abolished in 1765 when the Slobodian aristocracy also became russianised.

The Russo-Austrian Period

175 In the 19th century it seemed as if the Ukrainian people had
167 more or less resigned themselves to being under Russian rule. All energy was concentrated on colonising the areas freed from Turks and Tatars; the frontiers of the country settled by Ukrainians were pushed farther and farther east and south. Russia was not blind to the threat to her national existence implied in this movement and sought to counteract Ukrainian expansion by forming colonies of Germans, Bulgars, and Greeks. But to no avail. Ukrainian colonisation crossed the upper and the lower reaches of the Don and villages even sprang up on the eastern bank of the Volga. Finally the Kuban area was settled by descendants of the Zaporog Cossacks who first occupied territory in North Caucasia and later, after bitter struggles with the mountain tribes in the Caucasus, had spread south.

175 The general situation of the Ukrainian people thus improved in this era of peaceful consolidation. The coast of the Black

Sea was reached, serfdom revoked (1861), valuable deposits of coal, iron and manganese were discovered; the population increased considerably, all of which caused other national questions to recede into the background. It was only in 1900 that the first unmistakable signs of the spread of national consciousness among the broad masses began to appear. In this year the Revolutionary Ukraine Party included a demand for an independent Ukraine in its program and the Ukraine movement made great progress in the short constitutional period after 1905. Ukrainian books and reviews, the idea of national societies and unions for adult education began to spread. And yet we must admit to-day that national consciousness among the peasants was slow to awaken; the solution of social questions was felt to be more urgent.

In Galicia more progress was made. At the outbreak of World War I there was already a well-developed system of Ukrainian schools, gymnastic societies and cooperative associations built up in constant conflict with Polish officials. The Ukrainians were loyal in their feelings for Austria; they thought that the victory of the German side would bring their own national struggle immediate advantages.

Revolution and Post-War Years

When war broke out, Ukrainian divisions immediately took part voluntarily in the fighting in the Carpathians. Special camps were erected for Ukrainian prisoners of war in which Ukrainians were separated from the Russians and trained in the spirit of nationalism. In the country itself the Ukraine Central Council was formed at Kyiv after the fall of the Tsar and it demanded the right of self-government from the provisional government in St. Petersburg. This was refused and negotiations were broken off when the bolshevists finally seized power. Towards the end of 1917 Lenin sent bolshevist troops to Kyiv, whereupon the Central Council declared the independence of Ukraine on January 22nd, 1918. Now the misfortune that political power was almost exclusively in the hands of members of the socialist and democratic Left, avenged itself; for those parties had no experience in the political control of a state. No

175 steps were taken to create a national army. While the peasants
669 were engaged in carrying out agrarian reforms, they were horrified to hear that the Central Council was planning to do away with private property altogether.

The Central Council was strengthened anew by the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. German and A·· trian troops occupied the whole of Ukraine. But soon the Utopian social policy of the Central Council led to friction with the Germans so that they furthered the coup d'état of April 29th, 1918 whereby Paul Skoropadskyj, the descendant of a former Hetman became the ruler of Ukraine. But Skoropadskyj's policy of conciliation towards conservative and military groups which were more or less indifferent with regard to national problems soon met with opposition with Ukrainian nationalists. When in November 1918 the Hetman announced the federation of the new Russian state to be established from a center in the south area, there was a general rising. The Germans left Ukraine along with the Hetman as the war had meantime drawn to a close and in December 1918 a Council of Rebels took over the government in Kyiv. It had been possible to mobilise the peasantry against Skoropadskyj because they were told that under his authority they would have to give back the land that had been taken from the nobles; but the Council was unable to devise any effective slogan against bolshevism, it being itself entirely under the influence of cosmopolitan and international theories.

So the reunion with Galicia (constituted as "West-Ukrainian Republic" after the fall of the Danube monarchy) that was proclaimed on February 22nd, 1919 in Kyiv was merely the recognition of a principle. The war on two fronts against Poland and the bolshevists overtaxed the powers of the new-born state. In February 1919 Kyiv was lost and shortly after there was only a small part of Podolia still in the Council's hands. In July the government decided to abandon the struggle against Poland and to concentrate its energy against the bolshevists. The united army of Galicia and the Eastern Ukraine beat the bolshevists and towards the end of August Kyiv was re-taken. At this point Denikin's Russian White army attacked the flank of the Ukrainians who were forced to retreat once more. Typhus decimated

the forces. Simon Petlura, who was in command, negotiated 175
with the Poles for an alliance against Russia. All men still fit 669
for service were organised to produce a successful guerilla attack against Denikin's lines of communication and those of the bolshevists. Late in the spring of 1920 the Ukrainians, having once more beaten the bolshevists, formed an alliance with the Poles. A counter-attack by the bolshevists resulted in a common front of Poles and Ukrainians, on the south wing of which the latter defended the Dnister line. After the "miracle on the Vistula" the Poles forgot their allies who had finally to clear out of Podolia at the end of November.

As a result of these struggles the greatest part of Ukraine became an "independent republic". In reality the country was handed over to the central bolshevist power. Moreover about 7 million Ukrainians were incorporated in Russian territory. The Ambassadors' Council of 1923 allocated Galicia to Poland and that province, as well as the neighboring provinces of Volynia, Polesya and the district of Kholm enjoyed all the advantages of the Polish police system for two decades. Carpathian Ukraine which in 1919 had voluntarily joined Ukraine, was annexed to Czechoslovakia after the end of the war, while Bucovina and Bessarabia fell to Roumania. In spite of this partition of Ukrainian territory the struggles of 1917-1920 cannot be regarded as a failure.

Thanks to them the Ukrainian idea has now become the possession of the entire people.

It is obvious that hard times are ahead of the Ukrainians but the end of the present situation (the whole Ukrainian territory is occupied by the Soviet Union to-day) is in sight. There is a general feeling of injustice that spurs the people's determination to utilise every opportunity of launching a campaign for the life of the national state!

National Minorities in Ukraine

162 Minorities in Ukraine amount to 20 % in purely Ukrainian
563 territory and to 24.7 % in other parts of the country and are the consequence of long domination by foreigners and the immigration that entailed. The same cause is responsible for increasing Jewish immigration; Jews have always appeared to assist the spread of Russian influence in the East and Polish in the West.

175 Contemporary minorities rarely date earlier than the second
167 half of the 18th century, if we except a few peripheral areas in
563 the west, the Tatars in Crimea and Russian colonisation in the east in the 17th century. Several earlier efforts made by the Polish Government and individual magnates to colonise the Right Bank region of Ukraine were unsuccessful; the first wave spent itself in the 16th century in the rebellion of Khmelnytskyj, while later colonists were completely absorbed by the native Ukrainian population. The Roman Catholic faith was able to persist only in a few places. A similar fate overtook Roumanian expansion in the 14th and 15th centuries in the Carpathians; it left traces in names and in the legal code of the settlements.

167 The Russians form the largest minority. Apart from the
563 common colonisation of the Don area, it was only after the catastrophe at Poltava (1709) that Russians slowly penetrated into Ukraine. More numerous Russian settlers did not arrive till after there was no longer a Hetman (1764) and after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress (1775). At the same time the Turks were driven back from the Black Sea; the Ukrainian population, which had suffered great losses in the struggles with Turks and Tatars, was unable to tackle this job alone. But the Russians, who had been systematically settled, were disinclined to cultivate the steppe and preferred to move into the r ing towns as officials, artisans and laborers.

Ten thousands of German colonists took their place, settled by Catherine II in the former Governments of Kherson, Taurien, and Katerynoslav, later also in Southern Bessarabia. At the same time Emperor Joseph II settled German colonists in

Southern Galicia and Bucovina. Immigrants who were of the 167
same faith as the Ukrainians also arrived at this time from 563
Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Roumania (partly also from Armenia).

In the eighteen eighties the Russian Peasants' Bank settled 162
tens of thousands of Polish, German and Czech colonists 563
in Volynia. By far the majority of Poles in Galicia and in the 167
Kholm district also settled there as late as the second half of the 19th century, in Volynia and Polessia even in the 20th (in many cases after 1920). Single Polish settlements in the Right Bank region (especially in Podolia) are later in origin. Elsewhere the Polish population has been preserved in the towns only, the workshops and estates belonging to Polish landed proprietors. Even the "most Polish" area of Ukraine, the Markhlevitskyj district in Eastern Volynia, which was formed artificially for political reasons, only had 28 332 Poles, of whom, however, only 10 715 actually spoke Polish.

After the end of the 18th century Eastern Galicia was almost 162
purely Ukrainian; there were Poles only in the towns, in the 563
administration and in connection with big estates. This fact was emphatically recorded by Graf Pergen, an eminent Austrian official, after Galicia was transferred to Austria (1772). The official census reports for 1846 and 1851 still represented the Galician province of the Austrian empire as predominantly Ukrainian; 50.1 % (2 441 771) Ukrainians as compared with 40.9 % (1 994 802) Poles. The statistics for 1857 are: 45.2 % Ukrainians, 42.7 % Poles, 2.5 % Germans and 9.7 % Jews.

The Polish element has been artificially increased only since 1867, and then only slowly. In taking the census, the actual state of affairs was camouflaged by tricks of statistics; the Jews, for instance, were counted as Poles, thus increasing the number of the latter in the census of 1910 by more than 800 000; another paper trick was played on Roman Catholic Ukrainians, who had mostly been converted in the course of recent years by cunning and force from the Greek Catholic United Faith to Roman (in Poland synonymous with Polish) Catholicism. Although they spoke no Polish and had otherwise the same interests as other Ukrainians, most of them were

162 listed as Poles, thus increasing the number of the latter by
563 almost half a million.

Every decade more and more united Catholics who were known to be of Ukrainian nationality were entered as Poles. In 1910 there were already 235 328 such "Greek Catholic Poles"; in 1921 there were 359 000 till the number of such Poles amounted to almost half a million. This explains what would otherwise be inexplicable: that the number of Ukrainians should have decreased from 4 880 312 in 1910 to 3873 223 in 1921, i. e. by 1 006 599, while in the same period the number of Poles is alleged to have risen from 15 319 734 (1910) to 18 820 163, i. e. by 3 500 429. As this was not sufficient to justify Poland's existence as a Great Power, the special group of „natives" was introduced, which was put down tentatively in 1921 as 41 000 and then, quite brazenly in 1931 as 707 000 (i. e. 2.2 % of the entire population of Poland, these being mostly Polesian Ukrainians). In addition to these tricks of statistics, a frank campaign of denationalisation was launched after the First World War by Poland with the support of the Roman Catholic Church. The following table shows how things developed:

Year	Greek Catholic	Roman Catholic
1869	64.2 %	21.84 %
1900	62.8 %	23.51 %
1910	61.7 %	25.31 %
1921	60.8 %	27.80 %
1931	60.1 %	28.50 %

This was the origin of the legend that Eastern Galicia was a country of mixed population to which Poland had a right, having contributed her share to the native population.

It is well known that Jews are aliens in Ukraine, and that they only appeared in Galicia in the wake of the Poles. Thanks to Polish support, the number of Jews in Ukraine has been almost doubled; it rose from 6.9 % to 12.8 % (1910).

In spite of political influences, the minorities have never succeeded in settling on areas of any extent. They are more strongly represented on the periphery and it is only in manufacturing towns that we find them in greater numbers living together. Of the 40 422 places in Soviet Ukraine, for

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instance 36 569, or 90.1 % were Ukrainian according to the statistics of 1925 and only 1769 or 4.5 % predominantly Russian, 1043 or 2.8 % predominantly German, 407 or 1.0 % predominantly Polish and about 200 predominantly Jewish (0.5%) and 148 (0.4 %) predominantly Moldavian. 162 563

Circumstances are similar in the so-called „mixed" Eastern Galicia; according to official statistics before World War I there were 3298 village communities, i. e. 88.7 % with a Ukrainian majority and scarcely 436 places (11.6 %) with a majority of Poles or other nationals.

The Russian Minority

Russians form the largest minority on Ukrainian territory. It is true that the Russian population has been slowly decreasing, but probably it still amounts to-day to 5 000 000 i. e. a little less than 10 % of the entire population. According to the calculation of the Ukrainian Bureau for Statistics and Economics for 1933, the Russian minority in Central Ukraine amounted to 4 615 000 = 9.7 % and over the entire territory (including mixed zones) to 8 074 000 = 15 %. The number of Russians has decreased most in Soviet Ukraine, amounting to 2 677 200 or 9.2 % of the entire population in 1926. There are no Russians either in Galicia or Carpatho-Ukraine and in Bucovina less than 3 000. In North-West Ukraine, too, they scarcely ever amount to more than 2 % of the entire population and occur only in scattered groups in the towns of Volynia, Polesya and the Kholm District.

It is surprising that the percentage of Russians should be so low just on the ethnographical frontiers of Russia. These frontier areas of North Ukraine, Volynia, Podolia, and the former departments of Chernyhiv and Poltava are purely Ukrainian with a very small Russian population amounting to between 0.3 % — 1 %. The proportion of Russians in the entire Right Bank population amounts only to 2.6 % (in country districts alone, even to 0.7 % only).

North-West Ukraine and the colonised areas of Northern Caucasia, on the other hand, are mixed regions where Russians and Ukrainians are rivals for supremacy. In the eastern foothills

162 of Ukrainian Northern Caucasia the proportion is 57.3 % Russ-
563 ians to 33.4 % Ukrainians; some places, too, in the Donets Basin are to be regarded as areas of Russian colonisation. But even here, in spite of official support, the Russians only count 31.4 % of the entire population and, in the towns, are constantly making way for more Ukrainians so that towns that used to be predominantly Russian had, in 1926 even, no more than 48.9 % Russians.

The proportion of Russians in the population south of Kursk and Voronesh and in the surroundings of Kharkiv is relatively large. It dates from the early 18th century and is supported by the Russian population in Kharkiv (37 %). The average figure for the Russian population of these areas amounts to 22.5 % of the entire population.

In spite of a considerable Russian population in the harbor towns, Ukrainians contribute largely to the population of the area round the Sea of Oziv and the Black Sea. It is true that there are still 663 000 Russians, but they are everywhere in the minority.

Proportion of Russians in Population

Rayon	general (%)	urban (%)	rural (%)
Melitopil	25.0	39.7	24.0
Odessa	23.3	38.1	8.2
Mariupil	18.5	46.7	10.6
Mykolajiv	15.7	39.5	9.9
Kherson	11.4	31.0	7.7
Autonomous Republic of Moldavia	8.5	23.3	6.5

In the industrial districts of the West (Kryvyj Rih, Zaporizha, and Dnipropetrovske), the proportion of Russians scarcely reached the figure for the entire Ukraine — it amounts to 8.9 % (25.1 % in the towns, 5 % in the country).

From the above it is obvious that the Russian population is greatest in large towns and industrial and mining areas. But the statement that the towns in Eastern Ukraine have a Russian majority must not be repeated for it was no longer true even

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in the second half of the 19th century. Even in those days the proportion of Ukrainians in the larger towns (with the exception of government capitals) amounted to 40.5 % (compared with 29.2 % Russians and 25.6 % Jews) and in the smaller towns to 52.4 % (compared with 21.8 % Russians and 21.0 % Jews). The total urban population in the Gouvernments of Chernyhiv, Poltava and Kharkiv had then a Ukrainian majority, while the Ukrainians were relatively in the majority in the towns in the Gouvernment of Katerynoslav. 162 563

This development has been continued. The census of 1925 produced even more favorable results: in the towns there were then 38.49 % Ukrainians, 29.4 % Jews, 27.22 % Russians, and 2.03 % Poles. 14 towns show a considerable majority of Ukrainians (up to 92.33 %); in 14 more the Ukrainians were relatively the strongest national group. The proportion of Ukrainians in the south also increased astonishingly, as may be seen from the figures for the harbor town of Mykolajiv (1897 = 8.8 %, 1923 = 17.5 % Ukrainians) or for Kherson (1897 = 19.5 %, 1920 = 40.4 %).

Jews

Before World War I there were 3 795 760 Jews, i. e. 8.2 % of the entire population of Ukraine. They were massed in the provinces that used to be Polish and were later Austro-Hungarian and also in the northern districts of the Right Bank Ukraine, in Volynia and Podolia where, at that time, they contributed 12.2—12.6 % of the entire population. There are most Jews in the east of Carpatho-Ukraine (more than 25 %), in the Kholm district (on an average 15.3 %), in the districts of Berdychiv (23.1 %), Odessa (22 %), Chernivtsi (21.4 %), Brest-Litovsk (20.8 %) and Pinsk (19.5 %). On the right bank of the Dnipro the Jewish share in the population was considerably smaller while on the left bank where Jews were forbidden to settle until the great Revolution, it was quite small; with the exception of Kharkiv it varied from 2—3 %.

The Jews lived for preference in the towns; in the country they were scattered as shop-keepers, inn-keepers, tenant-farmers and artisans. But there were also a good number of towns where

162 the Jewish population was insignificant (e. g. Dmytrievsko
563 0.5 %, Vovchansk 1.1 %, Okhtyrka 1.3 %, Melitopil 3.4 %, Kamenske 4.1 %, Slovanske 4.4 %, Bila Tserkva 5.5 %, Berdiansk 8.1 %). Among the larger towns Stalino had 10.7 %, Kharkiv 19.5 % and Mykolajiv 21 % Jews.

For some time the number of Jews has been decreasing, partly as a result of emigration and partly because of the shifting of the peasant population. At the beginning of World War II there were probably about 2.5 million Jews. The last eight years have brought about a complete change and not even approximate figures can be given.

Poles

Official statistics list the Poles as third of the minorities in Ukraine. In 1914 they were responsible for 2 079 500 souls i. e. 4.5 % of the entire Ukrainian population. Of these 1 270 400 = 21.8 % were in Austrian and more than 809 000 = 2 % in Russian Ukraine (including the Kholm district and Volynia). At the outbreak of World War II there must have been 1 880 934 Poles (= 3.6 % of the entire population) on the Ukrainian ethnographical territory (1 608 900 in Poland, 246 034 in Soviet Ukraine and approximately 25 000 in Roumania). In the areas belonging to Poland they form about 18 % of the entire population and are more concentrated only in Lviv and the larger towns. In the foothills of the Carpathians, south of the Dnister, in spite of the vicinity of the ethnographical frontier, there were relatively few Poles (less than 5 % on the average in the west and less than 10 % in the east). Circumstances in Polessya and Volynia are similar. Nor have the towns in Western Ukraine a majority of Poles; in Lviv about half the population are Poles. In 1931 in all the towns in Eastern Galicia there were 26.9 % Ukrainians, in the administration area of Stanislaviv 33.8 % and in Podlakhia and Polesya 31.2 % and 31.64 respectively. In Eastern Ukraine there were 476 435 = 1.6 % Poles in 1926. They lived scattered only in 12 rayons of the Right Bank Ukraine, in Volynia and Podolia and, with the exception of Zhytomir (12.5 %) and Proskuriv (10.2 %) they accounted for less than 5 % of the entire population. 48.4 % of these

"Poles" listed Ukrainian as their mother-tongue (56.7 % even in the country), while 7 % spoke Russian. 162 563

Germans

The Germans, who cannot be very numerous in Ukraine today, amounted in 1914 to 871 270 souls = 1.9 % of the entire population. They lived mostly in three compact colonies (area round Black Sea, Kholm district, Volynia and Carpathian foothills). By 1935 they had decreased to 693 000 = 1.2 % of the entire population. In the Black Sea area they had an absolute majority in the rayons of Grossliebenthal, K. Liebknecht, Luxemburg, Prishib, Engels, Vysokopolje and Molotshna. Germans were settled in 12 of the 41 rayons of Soviet Ukraine. Most Germans lived in the country; there were communities of several thousand Germans in Odessa, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovske, Zaporizha and Mykolajiv.

Other minorities

The 460 000 Roumanians are to be found chiefly in the Moldavian Republic (0.89 %) where, however, they only constitute 30.1 % of the entire population (compared with 48.5 % Ukrainians). Otherwise Roumanians live in Bucovina and in the Bessarabian areas of Akkerman and Khotin.

The 160 000 Greeks live mostly in Mariupil and Stavropil.

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The Ukrainian Press

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Beginnings of the Ukrainian Press:

I. In foreign languages:

When published	Name	Where published	Kind
1776	Gazette de Léopol	Lviv	Items of news in French
1803	Militärische Zeitschrift	Lviv	Military paper in German
1812	Kharkowskij Jezhegodnik	Kharkiv	Russian paper
1816-1819	Ukrainskij Viestnik	Kharkiv	Russian paper with Ukrainian contributions
1844	Dramatisches Unterhaltungsblatt	Eperjes	Literary paper in German
1848	Bucovina	Chernivtsi	Paper in Roumanian and German

II. In Ukrainian:

1848-1857	Zorja Halytska (Galician Star)		Daily
1850-1866	Vistnyk dla Rusyniw (News for Ukr.)	Vienna	Official publications of Austro-Hungarian authorities
1849-1858 1872-1918	Vistnyk Zakoniw (Code of laws)	Vienna	Official publications of Austro-Hungarian authorities

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When published	Name	Where published	Kind
1849 and seq.	Vseobshchyj Dnewnyk	Lviv	Official organ for Galicia
1890-1918	Narodna Chasopys (Popular paper)	Lviv	
1850	Vistnyk (News)	Chernivtsi	Official organ for Bucovina
1850	Krajewyj Vistnyk		For the Ukrainians in Hungary

A small but influential Ukrainian press grew in the second half of the 19th century from modest beginnings which were largely official (see preceding table). This press dealt at first only with questions of national politics and of literature, but in time grew more and more specialised. The most important newspaper at that time is the "Dilo" (Deed), a Lviv daily which, since its foundation in 1882, exercised great influence on the trend of national politics in West Ukraine, and for some time even throughout Ukraine, while the "Batjkivshchyna" (Mother-country) 1879—1896, a popular paper, which has appeared since 1897 under the name of "Svoboda" (Liberty), undertook to enlighten and influence the masses. The following are also worth mentioning: the radical papers "Narod" (The People) 1890—1895, "Hromadskyj Holos" (The Voice of the Community) since 1895, and "Zhyttja i Slovo" (Life and Word) 1894—1897 which, in the hands of journalists like M. Drahomaniv and I. Franko have done much to quicken Ukrainian life and open it to European influence.

Literary and scientific reviews, under capable editors, with national Ukrainian views, played an important part in the intellectual life of the country, developing very quickly from local publications in West Ukraine to become the main organs of public opinion throughout the country. The best of these were the "Pravda" (Truth) 1867—1898 and the "Zorja" (Star) 1880—1897 which, since 1898, has appeared under the name of "Literaturno-Naukovyj Vistnyk" (News from Literature and

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204 Learning); its editors were Prof. M. Hrushevskyj, Dr. I. Franko and V. Hnatjuk, and it counted the most eminent writers in West and East Ukraine among its contributors.

After the beginnings of the East Ukraine press, "Osnova" (Intellectual Basis) 1861—1862, had been suppressed by the Imperialist Russian Government, and after all writings in Ukrainian had been forbidden by the Russian Home Minister Valujev in 1863 and by the edict of 1876, the press in West Ukraine became the voice for the entire nation. At that time the Ukrainian press consisted of 44 papers published in Austro-Hungary and in America; all political and scientific publications in Russia had to appear in Russian as the official language while Ukrainian (with official Russian spelling) might only by employed for subjects of folk-lorist or historical interest.

It was only after the Revolution of 1905 that papers could once more be published in Ukraine: on November 12th the "Khliborob" (Peasant), a national Ukrainian paper in Lubni, followed on November 24th by "Ridnyj Kraj" (Native Country), and then the most important paper in East Ukraine, the "Hromadska Dumka" (Ideas of the Community), which corresponded to the Lviv "Dilo" (Deed), which after the Revolution was replaced by the daily "Rada" (Council).

In a short time there were about 70 newspapers and journals in East Ukraine, some of which could hold their own in spite of the reaction which soon set in. At the same time the number of publications in West Ukraine was greatly increased and, before World War I, had reached the total of 80 in Austro-Hungary, 14 outside of Ukraine, 14 in USA, 10 in Canada, and 2 in Brazil.

This promising development collapsed when the First World War broke out. The government put a veto on papers in East Ukraine while Russian Military authorities suppressed those in West Ukraine. The "Dilo" and the "Ukrainske Slovo" (Ukrainian Word) and "Bucovina" (since 1885 in Chernivtsi) removed to Vienna.

The third epoch in the modern history of the Ukrainian press began with the revolution of 1917. In this year there were no

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fewer than 172 Ukrainian papers and in the following year this number increased to 268. The East Ukraine press disappeared with the rapid decline of Ukraine's independence and its place was taken by a communist press. In West Ukraine a struggle began with Polish and Roumanian authorities and with the censorship, with the result that many newspaper enterprises emigrated. 204

Official statistics give the number of Ukrainian publications in Soviet-Ukraine in 1933 as 1780 and 1494 in the middle of 1935. Among these, it is true, there are many single sheet publications to be affixed like notices or distributed and also many papers belonging to special businesses. The number of newspapers proper was 539 (23 district papers, 16 municipal and about 500 publications for the rayons). More than 80 % (465 publications) were written in Ukrainian, the remainder in the languages of the minorities: in Russian, Polish, German, and Moldavian.

Two papers published in Kyiv are reckoned to be the most important organs of the Soviet Ukrainian press, viz. the "Communist" (with a circulation of 305 000) and "Visty" (News) with a circulation of 375 000 which correspond to the Moscow "Pravda" (Truth) and "Izvestija" (News) as far as contents and technique are concerned. We might also mention the Kharkiv "Comsomolets Ukrajiny" (Comsomolets-member of the Soviet youth organisation) and "Robitnycha Gazeta" (Workers' Newspaper), "Proletar" (Proletarian) and the Kyiv papers, the "Proletarska Pravda" (Truth of the Proletariate) and "Bolshevik". The entire circulation of the Soviet Ukrainian press was somewhere between 3¾ and 5 millions and the chief centers of publication were Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odessa.

In spite of all difficulties the press in West Ukraine continued to thrive as may be seen from the following table:

Land	Number in 1934	1936	
Poland	122	143	
Czechoslovakia	16	23	
Roumania	10	10	
total	148	176	publications

204 About the half of all papers in West Ukraine (88 or 50.58 %) appeared in Lviv, 13 in Uzhhorod, 10 in Kolomea, 10 in Chernivtsi, 9 in Lutsk, 7 in Stanislaviv and 7 in Munkach. The most important Ukr. newspapers, published in 1939 in West Ukraine, are: "Dilo", (Deed), "Novyj Chas" (New Times), "Ukrajinski Visty" (Ukrainian News) in Lviv, "Chas" (Times) in Chernivtsi and "Nova Svoboda" (New Freedom) in Uzhhorod.

The Ukrainian press for emigrants increased considerably (1934 = 76; 1936 = 110). The figures for 1939 were: 17 in the so-called Protectorate, 12 in Poland, 10 in France, 7 in Germany, and 1 each in Leningrad, Moscow, and Saratow, 3 in Jugoslavia, 2 in England, 1 in Austria, 3 in the Far East, 2 in Manchukuo, 24 in USA, 18 in Canada, 4 in Argentine, 4 in Brazi.

Among the most important of these are: 1) "Svoboda" (Freedom) — New Jersey City since 1893. 2) "America" – Philadelphia since 1886. 3) "Ukrajinski Shchodenni Visty" (Ukrainian Daily News) — communist daily New York. 4) "Ukrajinskyj Holos" (Ukrainian Voice) — Winnipeg, Canada. 5) "Kanadyjskyj Farmer" (Canadian Farmer) — Winnipeg, Ukrainian Toiler (Toronto). 6) "Narodnja Gazeta" (Native Paper) — communist, Winnipeg. The circulation of Ukrainian papers outside of Ukraine amounts to about 1 000 000; but the papers are actually read by ten times as many people.

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Causes and Effects of Emigration

About 6 millions (= 15 %) of the 45 million Ukrainians live 167
outside of Ukrainian territory proper in Europe, Asia, and America. 650 000 live in the thinly populated Volga areas in Europe, and 3 millions in Western Siberia and the Far East, while there are fairly large settlements in Canada (Alberta, Sascatchewan, Manitoba) that count about 400 000 Ukrainians. By this modern colonisation in the 19th and 20th centuries, the Ukrainian people has once more given proof of its talent for colonising, a talent that had been displayed with great success in earlier times when South Ukraine was settled. Since 1881 in particular when the Russian government removed restrictions from emigration, there has been a lively increase in Ukrainian colonisation; at this time movements began to build up and protect lines of communication between the center of Ukraine and the area round Rostov. Colonisation of the Volga Valley became more intense; the number of Ukrainians settled there is estimated to-day at 1 million while the Ukrainian contribution to the eastern area of North Caucasia amounts to 33.4 % (of a total population of 3 638 000).

Towards the end of the eighties movements of emigration to Siberia set in, the Russian Government under General Unterberger, Governor of the Amur district (1888—1897) being in favor of Ukrainian emigration to the Far East for reasons of military policy. The efforts of the government were supported by the Trans-Siberian Railway which offered reduced fares and other facilities. The colonisation movement reached its height after the Russo-Japanese War and the unrest among peasants in 1902; the Russian Government seized the opportunity of getting rid of unruly subjects and at the same time of strengthening its own position in Asia. Up till then most of the colonists in Asia came from Central Russia (48 %); now the scales are turned and Central Russia contributed only 32 % while 48 % came from Ukraine, and the remainder from other parts of the Empire.

Before Stolypin's Agrarian Reform (1906—1910) some 40—50 000 Ukrainians left their homes every year; after the Reform

167 the number rose to 250 000 and in 1909 reached the record figure of 290 000, i. e. about 68 % of the natural increase of the Ukrainian population. The table below gives figures for emigration:

Year	Number of emigrants	Ukrainians	%
1890—1900	1 078 000	366 448	34
1900—1910	2 257 000	1 197 463	53
1911—1914	696 000	410 600	60.3

Alone the Far East counted about 510 000 immigrants from Ukraine in the years from 1883 up till 1928.

Most emigrants came from the Left Bank area although the Right Bank was much more densely populated and was at the same time poorer, as regards soil. 75 % of the emigrants from 1891—1900 came from the three gouvernements of Chernyhiv, Poltava and Kharkiv alone. Of the inhabitants of Siberia born in Europe, 48.6 % in the Far East, 46.6 % in Kasakstan and Kirghiz, 22 % in Siberia proper and 11.6 % of the population in the other areas were born in Soviet Ukraine. (Census of 1926). The figures in Russian statistics are, moreover, too low all over; according to careful estimations by natives 33 % of the Siberian population = 3—3.5 millions are of Ukrainian origin. Ukraine has therefore a great interest in the Russian areas that lie in Asia, all the more as the land they have colonised is much more valuable as regards economy, transportation and political development than the rest of the country that has been colonised by Russians or than the very sparsely populated areas of Siberia. The Ukrainians avoided the forests and deserts that attracted Russians and selected steppe areas as far as the river Irtysh, i. e. the fertile loess land along the Trans-Siberian Railway that is a continuation of their native Black Earth. Finally, they liked to settle in groups, often as villages, so that we find large, continuous areas that are wholly Ukrainian in character. About 67 % of all Ukrainians who have emigrated to Asia are settled on the so-called "Grey Wedge" already mentioned which adjoins the European area of the Ural and the Volga. No more than 15 % are scattered throughout the endless spaces in the North, East, and Center of Siberia.

The first mentioned area colonised by Ukrainians consists 167
of a strip about 2 000 km long and 100—400 km broad, south of the Trans-Siberian Railway from Omsk via Petropavlovsk as far as Slavhorod, the administration extending over considerable parts of Kasakstan and some districts of Western Siberia, marching in the south along the Afghanistan frontier in Kirghiz and in the Syr-Darja section of Kasakstan at Aulie-Ata and Alma-Ata with numerically smaller centers of Ukrainian colonisation. Here, over a large area of 450 000 sq. kilometres the Ukrainians are relatively in the majority while the Russians come only third, after the Kazaks.

There are, however, other isolated areas with a large Ukrainian majority. Fourteen of the twenty-seven rayons in the Aktyubinsk area for instance, have a Ukrainian majority (78.91 % on the average), in the district of Rustakov of 26—13; the population of the entire district is composed of 41.3 % Ukrainians, 31.7 % Kazaks and 21.2 % Russians. Similar circumstances prevail in the area of Syr-Darja and in Western Siberia, for example at Omsk where 60 % Ukrainians live with 25 % Russians; here, too, there are five Ukrainian rayons whose names are derived from the old country, viz. Pavlohrad (81.2 % Ukrainians), Poltava (73.1 %), Odessa (63.4 %), Taurien (58.4 %) and Ural (52.4 %). Throughout the district of Slavhorod the Ukrainians, with 46.8 % of the population are relatively in the majority, while in the more limited area they represent even the absolute majority of 56 % as compared with 33 % Russians.

Another large center of Ukrainian colonisation lies in the Far East in the river basin of the Amur and Ussuri: here, official statistics for 1926 give for a large area of 1 400 000 square kilometres with an entire population of 1 256 292 an official Ukrainian population of 315 203, in reality approximately 600 000 Ukrainians (48 % of the entire population) as compared with 205 000 Russians (16 %), 166 000 Koreans (13 %), 125 000 Kazaks (10 %), 5 % Chinese and 3 % White Ruthenians. The entire Far East, (including Transbaikalia), although four times bigger, still had 612 217 Ukrainians i. e. 25.43 % of its entire population of almost 2.5 millions.

167 In this area Ukrainians live mostly in districts on the frontier between Korea and Manchukuo, round the towns of Spask and Khabarovsk on the river Amur and also near Vladivostok and Blagovishchensk and reaching as far as Kharbin in Manchukuo. In these districts the national feeling was definitely Ukrainian which was not without influence on political life during the revolution of 1917—1921; for this feeling managed to express itself and to get special state agencies for Ukrainian affairs erected.

World War I, the revolution and the post-war years caused at first a complete stoppage of emigration; but in the years 1924—1927 173 000 people emigrated from the Soviet Ukraine (8.5 % of the natural increase). The nationalisation of the soil, the collectivisation of landed property, the complete impoverishment of the peasantry and the impossibility of free emigration have created a situation the consequences of which we have no means of judging and of which we know little.

Emigration from Ukrainian territory in Austro-Hungary developed along different lines. Here there was no land free for immigrants: moreover the peasants were far too poor to take part in any big scheme of colonisation. In the 18th century some thousand of peasants were transferred to the Bachka and Slavonia where about 20 000 of them still live to-day, in particular near Ruski Kerestur, having preserved their national language and habits. In the eighteen-nineties some 10 000 Ukrainian peasants from Galicia were settled at Prnjavor and Banjaluka and they, too, regard themselves as Ukrainians to-day. In view of the great increase in population and the consequent splitting up of family holdings, such attempts at colonisation naturally mean little. Almost half of the holdings in Galicia are no bigger than 2 ha; in addition to economic pressure, caused by dividing large Polish estates among new Polish settlers, political pressure was also increased, so that the position of the Ukrainian peasant became desperate. This was the origin of emigration overseas.

Emigration to the New World had already set in sporadically in the sixties among the Lemki and the Ukrainians in the

Carpathians, who had tried to find a living in North America. 167
They were followed in 1867 by Russian Ukrainians who settled in Alaska and by some families from Eastern Galicia and the victims of religious persecution in Russia. Once the favorable conditions for Canadian immigrants were known, many more left the Bucovina and Eastern Galicia; but a real fever of emigration was only occasioned when foreign agents opened a campaign for South America with the result that 26 % of the natural increase left the home country in the last decade of the 19th century, and from 35—45 % in the following decade, although South American conditions were not at all suitable for Ukrainians. Hundreds of thousands rushed out of the country in those days, thereby making it possible for the Poles to settle their own nationals in Eastern Galicia, fertile Podolia and elsewhere. It was a blessing that this wild emigration did not last; Ukrainian organisations managed to reduce the movement to some kind of order and to steer colonists away from South America to Canada.

At the same time emigration for the season to Germany was organised, a habit that had brought employment in Europe to unemployed and poor peasants. In the years 1907/8—1911/12 this movement comprised more than 75 000 persons a year and reached over 100 000 directly before World War I. Smaller groups went to Bohemia, Roumania and Denmark, even to France, Belgium and England.

After the war both of these opportunities became more restricted, if not completely blocked. America and Canada began to demand so much from their colonists that many turned again to South America. Seasonal emigration to Germany had been forbidden by the Poles and was now mainly directed to France where, before the economic crisis of 1931, it accounted for more than 250 000 people. At the same time a considerable number of Ukrainians began to return home as may be seen from the following table which represents emigration from Poland, Roumania and Czechoslovakia in the years 1919—1935:

167

Countries	emigration		returning emigrants		balance
including					
European countries		74 000		35 000	39 000
Overseas i. e.		146 000		15 000	131 000
United States	13 000		2 000	11 000	
Canada	73 000		6 000	67 000	
Argentine	47 000		5 000	42 000	
Brazil	8 000		1 000	7 000	
total		220 000		50 000	170 000

In those days most emigrants came from Eastern Galicia; from here and from the Kholm district they went to America or as seasonal laborers to France, from Volynia and Polesya to America, while Ukrainians from Roumania settled in Canada only. In the years 1920—1934 23 300 persons emigrated from the Carpatho-Ukraine, of whom 15 100 (65 %) were Ukrainians, 4 100 (17.5 %) Jews, 2 400 (14.7 %) Magyars and 600 (2.7 %) others.

Most Ukrainian emigrants to America went to the United States; from Galicia alone more than 300 000 Ukrainians went there in the years 1900—1919; and about the same number left Ukrainian territory in Austria-Hungary. At present about 750 000—800 000 Ukrainians live in the United States, mainly in the East, in New York and Jersey City, Philadelphia, Chicago, Pittsburg, Detroit and Cleveland, most of them being employed in the professions, and as miners, factory hands, artisans and businessmen in a small way. The most important Ukrainian organisations, unions and papers are in New York, Chicago and Philadelphia. In Jersey City the "Svoboda" (Liberty) — 40 000 subscribers — the largest Ukrainian daily in America, is published and in Philadelphia the "Ameryka", the most important organ of the Ukrainian Greek Catholics. Ukrainians are also found in smaller places as agricultural settlers and, particularly in the West, form fairly compact "islands" which even have Ukrainian names. In Dakota, for instance, there is a place called Ukraina and in Olyphant Pa the Ukrainians have a burgermeister of their own and their own municipal administration.

Ukrainians in North America are particularly well organised and have their own cultural and economic organisations amount-

ing to several thousands which are mostly amalgamated in a "Union of Ukrainian Organisations" (Objednannja) in Philadelphia. They are above all fortunate in the excellent organisation of insurance and welfare enterprises, of which practically all Ukrainians, including children, are members. The Ukrainians from Hungary are best organised, their central organisation, the "Soedinenie" (Union), amounting to about 160 000. 167

Other important central organisations of Ukrainians are listed below:

Name	Founded	Number of members	Property in dollars
Ukrajinskyj Narodnyj Sojus (Jersey City) Ukrainian National Association	1894	33 468	3 256 206
Ukrajinskyj Robitnychyj Sojus (Scranton) Ukrainian Workers' Association	1910	15 958	1 549 904
Provydinnja (Philadelphia) Guidance	1912	15 278	635 084
Ukrajinska Narodnja Pomich (Pittsburg) Ukrainian Welfare Organisation	1915	9 000	250 000
Zhoda Bratstv (Olyphant) United Brethren	—	2 000	—

Most Ukrainians in America belong to the Greek Catholic United Church and have two sees, one for immigrants from Austria (126 churches with a membership of 244 118) and another for Hungarian Ukrainians (175 churches with a membership of 309 04[illegible]). Orthodox Ukrainians have been organised in two speci[illegible] [illegible]nurches and have 63 parish offices and 57 churches. There is also a Ukrainian Protestant Church.

Canada comes next as a goal of emigration for the Ukrainians. According to official Canadian statistics of 1941, 305 929 Ukrainians are now living in Canada. But this number represents only about half of the Ukrainian settlers, as they are often

167 listed according to their land of origin, i. e. as Austrians, Hungarians, Galicians, Poles, Russians etc. A careful estimate puts them at more than 400 000 which is almost 3 % of the entire population of Canada (11 506 655). In Canada they rank fourth after settlers from England, France and Germany and are concentrated mainly in the three western provinces of Manitoba, Saskachewan and Alberta, where they live in groups in large areas, so that they can make their influence felt in politics and also lead their own cultural life. They have made great progress in Canada in the course of time and have a good reputation as excellent colonists, as may be seen in the article by Prof. Phillippovich, a well known Austro-Hungarian political economist who wrote when the emigration movement was still young (1905): "What makes their presence of particular importance is their readiness to do work that is open to everybody in a new country, and that is the hardest to do, namely ordinary unskilled labor and personal service. The Ruthenian (Ukrainian) girls have a great reputation as domestic servants throughout the West. The agent general for colonisation told me that he has known little personal comfort after his Ruthenian maid left his home. And the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) build railways and roads. And when they have earned enough to be able to settle on a holding, then they work the stiffest soil with an industry and perseverance that wins the greatest respect. We reckon them among our most successful settlers, as the Vice-Minister of the Interior wrote me, a verdict which, as an impartial observer, I have heard confirmed by English officials. Our poor, despised, or at best ignored Ruthenians have come to their own there. The colonist's work is difficult and full of hardships and their simple tastes and physical endurance are valuable guarantees of success . . . But their personality grows with success. The same people finally become owners of what is for us a large farm, which they work with machines, and on which they can call dozens of cattle herds their own. They become shrewd men of business and learn to manage things like men of commercial experience."

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

The Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon World

It is sad but true that the Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon world have never developed through the centuries that close and constant relationship which has existed in the case of so many other peoples. There have been moments of contact but these have never lasted and did not until the present time result in a steady stream of interest. — Yet this unfortunate fact has been due rather to the history of the two peoples and to their geographical locations than to any deliberate neglect on either part. The Anglo-Saxon race, taking its rise from England, an island on the northwestern coast of Europe, was chiefly concerned with areas that it could reach by sea. During its long centuries of oppression, Ukraine was completely landlocked. It was cut off from the Black Sea by the Tatars. It was hemmed in on the north and east by Moscow and on the west where it formed part of the Polish-Lithuanian state, there was littl- encouragement for foreigners to travel to it.

It is interesting, however, that in all of the periods when Ukraine was playing an important rôle in European affairs, knowledge of it reached England, but almost invariably it was by means more or less connected with the sea.

Let us look first at the Kyiv period, when Kyiv was one of the great capitals of Christian Europe and when it far surpassed in wealth and culture any of the western capitals. At this period the bonds between Kyiv-Rus and Scandinavia were close. Even Volodymyr after the death of his father Svyatoslav was obliged to retire to Scandinavia and return with Varangian troops before he could establish himself on the throne. It was the same period when England was being ruled by King Canute t' Dane. The Northmen, sailing back and forth across the North Sea, could not fail to carry news of the exploits of their Varangian cousins. A little later one of the daughters of Yaroslav was married to King Harold Hardraga, the King of Norway, who was later to fall in 1066 at the battle of Stamford Bridge only a few days before his conqueror King Harold II, the last Saxon King of England, was destined to fall before William of Normandy at Hastings. Later a daughter of Harold married Volodymyr Mono-

175 makh. Thus by the nature of events, during this period when
648 both England and Ukraine were connected with the Scandinavian north, the court of Kyiv became well-known to English and especially Saxon nobles fleeing from their enemies in their own land. It brought about a personal acquaintance which had no deep roots and which ended with the disintegration of Kyiv and the absorption of England into the area of the Norman influence.

Nevertheless there was established at Kyiv a Scotch Benedictine Monastery in the eleventh century which continued until the Mongol invasion. It would be interesting to know whether this was a purely missionary establishment in the hope of introducing the western traditions into Kyiv or whether the monks had fled from the Norman conquest and the border disturbances, since at that time the King of Scotland was connected by marriage with the Saxon royal family and strove in vain to assist them against the new conquerors. At all events their residence in Kyiv was marked by signs of close friendship between them and the clergy and population of Kyiv.

After the Tatar conquest, we find that the Metropolitan Ruthenus Petrus, the Ruthenian Metropolitan Peter, was present at the First Council of Lyons in 1245. He had been installed as Metropolitan of Kyiv about 1242 with the aid of the patriotic groups, especially Prince Mykhajlo of Chernyhiv, who was later martyred by the Tatars. It is interesting that his presence at the Council in an attempt to secure the aid of the West has been recorded only by two English chroniclers of the Council, a fact that suggests some personal friendship which had perhaps been formed at Lyons.

Then came the Middle Ages, the period of the Crusades, and the constant wars of England and France. It was a period, in Ukraine, when there was not much to attract foreigners. The English were finding themselves on the sea and their sailors appeared quite frequently in Baltic ports and in the White Sea, but the latter were in far closer relations with Moscow than with Ukraine, especially as the Muscovites completely ignored the Ukrainian Orthodox at this period.

As we might expect, it was the exploits of the Cossacks that reawakened interest and this time the English inspiration to learn more of the Ukrainians was largely derived from their relations with Constantinople. It was the sea-raids of the Cossacks that won their attention and the importance of these were stressed by the Patriarch Cyril Loukaris, who was very familiar with the situation in Ukraine. As a young man, the nephew of the then acting Patriarch, he had taught in Wilno. He was a friend of Count Constantin Ostrozhskyj and he was present at the Council at Brest. Ever after he retained his friendship with the leaders of Ukraine, Moldavia, and Vallakhia, and so he remained posted on the progress of the Orthodox in Ukraine and the history of the Cossack movement. 175 648

The English ambassador at Constantinople in the early seventeenth century, Thomas Roe, who played an important rôle in the religious conflicts in that city, was a strong supporter and friend of Cyril. He made many reports on the Cossacks and their raids and even attempted to save the life of the Cossack leader Samuil Koretsky, who had been taken prisoner by the Turkish forces, by pleading for him in the name of the King of England. Roe also, as a friend of Prince Gabriel Bethlen of Transylvania, may perhaps have been the author of the plan to unite the Ukrainian Orthodox with the Transylvanian Calvinists and the Swedes for overthrowing Poland during the Thirty Years' War. At the same time Yuryj Nemyrych who was later to succeed in arranging an alliance between Ukraine and Sweden was a student in England.

The revolt of Khmelnytskyj in 1648 was frequently noticed in the English newspapers which compared the Cossacks' leader to Oliver Cromwell. There are constant rumors that there was some correspondence between the two men but this has never been proved, perhaps because of the destruction of many of the documents of the day. It is, however, said that the radical Cossack leader who played an important rôle during part of the period, Maksym Kryvonos, Maxim of the Crooked Nose, was a Scotsman. He appears and disappears mysteriously in the course of the Cossack movement. He was far more bitter in his hatred than Khmelnytskyj and it is perhaps conceivable that

175 he was a fanatic Protestant who had come to the Cossacks to
648 stir them up to increased and unreasoning bitterness.

During the years after the Cossack uprising, several Englishmen who were either in Poland or in Russia made lengthy reports on the life of the Cossacks, but the next important event in Ukrainian history, the revolt of Mazeppa, again aroused considerable interest, no less so because Peter the Great in an endeavour to break support for Charles XII of Sweden had apparently at one time thought of making the Duke of Marlborough the master of Ukraine. Nothing of course came of this plan but the English ambassador in Russia, Charles Lord Whitworth, reported on the actions of Mazeppa and the destruction of Baturin by the Muscovite armies.

After the defeat of Charles XII at Poltava, English diplomatic circles joined the Swedes in the effort to stop the advance of Peter the Great against that country. This brought them into contact with Phillip Orlyk, who was elected Hetman after the death of Mazeppa, and who spent years in Sweden and Turkey in an effort to form a coalition against Peter and restore freedom to Ukraine. None of Orlyk's hopes materialised but when he was in Turkey, he had the active support of the British ambassador who put pressure upon the Turks to counterbalance the demands of the Russians that he be surrendered.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the destruction of the political liberties of Ukraine and the general temper of the times tended to accept Ukraine as definitely part of Russia. England's opposition to Russian expansion became more and more felt in Asia and in the Balkans, where Russia was trying to bring under her control the other Orthodox Slavs. It was a period when Western Europe abandoned any hope of securing allies from the oppressed nations of Russia, even though there was a growing interest in the cultures of the different Slav peoples.

Thus by the time of World War I, the British authorities like the Americans were inclined to accept the statements of the Tsarist diplomats that the Ukrainian movement was solely a product of German propaganda and even after the Russian

Revolution, they did not seriously consider the situation which was then presented. At the same time, the French were so interested in the restoration of Poland that they had little inclination to listen to representatives of a people who were in opposition to their friends. 175 648

We thus see that the chief relations between England and Ukraine were to be found in the diplomatic sphere and in the reports of travellers and the works of various professors who were interested in the Slav languages and literatures, while the professors of history in the later periods were inclined to accept the various Russian theories of their own history, which were of course opposed to Ukraine. There was no opportunity for any large-scale personal acquaintance with the Ukrainians or their problems, and in this the Ukrainian situation followed closely the general pattern of British relations with the other countries of Eastern Europe.

Then at the end of the nineteenth century, a new situation arose in the United States and a little later in Canada. There came a relatively large-scale immigration of Ukrainians who settled chiefly in the factory and mining centers of the Eastern United States and the prairie farming regions in Western Canada. Most of these new immigrants came from Western Ukraine which was under the domination of Austria-Hungary as a wave of the great migration of peoples from that area. The difference in their choice of occupations in the United States and Canada was largely due to the difference between the methods adopted by the two countries in dealing with new arrivals. In the United States, they were allowed to find employment as they would and they gravitated to areas where there was already a considerable population of Slavs from Austria-Hungary. In Canada they were encouraged by the government to settle on still unoccupied land in the northwest and were given opportunities for acquiring their own land, as immigrants had been in the United States a half century before. 167

Relatively few of the Ukrainian educated class came to the New World. The vast majority were peasants who hoped in the beginning to acquire the money in a few years to return to their old homes and live there in relative comfort. They were only

167 dimly conscious of their nationality and they were frequently registered by the immigration authorities who were themselves often ill informed as Ruthenians, Russians, Galicians, Austrians and Hungarians. In short they represented exactly that attitude and those classes for whom Ivan Franko was called to do so much preparatory work, before they could become fully conscious of their own value and their own national identity.

During the early years they had to undergo many hardships. Life was strange to them, far stranger than many had expected when they had listened to the tales of returning friends or the siren appeals of the steamship agencies. In communities where they were gathered in some numbers, they were drawn together and for their own protection and assistance, they began to organise along the lines which had been worked out by those nationalities which had preceded them. This process was accelerated, as they began to take root in their new environment and give up their plans for returning home in a few years.

000 Their first organisation were churches, whether of the Byzantine Catholic rite or of the Orthodox. The former had to contend again with the lack of information about them of many of the Roman Catholics who were ill prepared for the arrival of Uniat priests among them, and it was not until 1907 that they secured their first bishop.

The Orthodox came under the influence of the Russian clergy who were pushing southward from the Russian Orthodox mission established in Alaska before its purchase by the United States.

Another valuable instrument for organisation proved to be the fraternal organisation, which as a secular corporation could be organised under American laws for the development of mutual insurance funds and could also provide centres for recreation and for the self-improvement of its members in the broadest sense of the word. The first of these which has passed through several reorganisations and is still the largest is the "Ukrainian National Association" which was founded at Shamokin, Pennsylvania, in 1894. Several other such groups were founded and developed successfully but there is now a marked tendency toward consolidation among them.

Thus it was through the churches and the fraternal organisations with their accompanying newspapers as "Svoboda" (Freedom) that the Ukrainians developed a sense of national feeling parallel to that which took place in their homeland and became known to the wider circles of the American public. With each decade they have strengthened themselves financially and have won a stronger position for themselves. The children of the first immigrants have gone to American and Canadian schools and while many of them have neglected the study of the Ukrainian language and are more at home in English, they have come to be the real backbone of the Ukrainian community. In Canada the same process has gone on but the relatively large proportion living on farms and in purely Ukrainian settlements has favored the preservation of the language and there has been produced a larger volume of literature in Ukrainian than in the United States. 000

The two World Wars rudely interrupted the development of Ukrainian life not only by calling the young men into service but also by making them the victims of propaganda. In World War I, the Austro-Hungarian representatives tried to agitate among them and the Russians endeavoured to spread the belief that the Ukrainian national movement was solely a product of German policy. As there was no outstanding leader among them at the time in the United States, they found it very difficult to gain a proper and sympathetic hearing from the American government and public opinion.

Again before World War II, the Communists launched a drive against all non-communist Ukrainian manifestations and tried to prove that Ukrainians were all fascists and unreliable. They continued this propaganda despite the brilliant military record of the Ukrainians in the American armed forces and the fact that they formed one of the largest groups in the Canadian army.

Despite these attacks and these difficulties, the Ukrainians and their organisations have grown stronger and more important in every way. After the downfall of the Ukrainian National Republic they received the aid of a number of prominent intellectuals who preferred to begin their lives over again in America or Canada rather than to live as exiles in Western Europe or

000 return to Soviet Ukraine. An increasing number of young men and women are coming to the front and are holding increasingly important posts in the political and educational worlds. There can be little doubt that the admission of some of the displaced persons will add new vigor to the cultural movement, even though some of these may be surprised at the changes that have been made by decades of exposure to American and Canadian life.

Ever since World War I attempts have been made to coordinate the work of the various organisations. This has now been achieved in the United States by the Ukrainian Congress Committee and the Ukrainian War Relief and also in the Canadian Ukrainian Committee. Now with the organisation of the Pan-American Ukrainian Conference, similar relations have been established with the Ukrainians in South America.

Thus the Ukrainian contacts with the New World have been almost diametrically opposed to those in England in the past. There the contacts have been almost consistently with the leaders of both peoples. Here there has been a rank and file contact, but this has had the disadvantage of overemphasising the peasant character of the people. Far too many Americans have been content to see the Ukrainians merely as they were when they arrived and have not yet realised the cultural sides of Ukrainian life, although this has been accomplished especially in the field of music and the folkdance. It does, however, offer a firmer basis in the long run, as a growing number of young Ukrainians made their mark on American and Canadian life.

On the whole, the contacts of the Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon world throughout the centuries have been friendly and constructive, even if limited in extent. The growing menace of Communism is doing more than anything else to deepen these relations. Slowly but surely the Ukrainian problem is being understood better and better. The process is painfully slow and time is pressing but we can be sure that the hour will come when the Ukrainian people will be understood and appreciated at their true values. Then the task of the Ukrainians will be simplified and they will be accepted as one of the democratic nations of the world in their struggle for freedom, independence and the right to exist and develop in their own way for the welfare of humanity.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

II

Economic Life

By the "economy of Ukraine" in the following pages we do not mean the economy of Soviet Ukraine but of the entire Ukrainian territory. It is most difficult to present facts here, as the various sections of Ukrainian territory are not only incorporated in different states but have also varying economic organisations. These difficulties were due primarily to the peculiar character of Soviet statistics. In the statistics for the first two Five Year Plans it is impossible to translate into absolute figures either the real value of the rouble or the percentages given. More entanglements were caused by the inadequacy of data for quantity and quality and the obvious exaggeration of the natural wealth. These factors have been taken into consideration in the following pages. 000

Basic Problems

1. The area of Ukrainian economy

(far more than a million square kilometers) lies spread out like a fan round the north of the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv. Almost all its rivers flow into this north-east continuation of the Mediterranean, and Ukraine is the only country in Eastern Europe which they serve. The area includes fertile districts, and valuable mineral wealth; the various sections complement each other economically and communications between them are convenient. With a total population of about 60 millions (59 per sq. kilometer as compared with 8, the average for USSR), it approaches European conditions. So the natural, but not the political, conditions for a grand scale economy are given. /3/ /6/

101 The area of Ukrainian economy corresponds to the expansion of the people, i. e. with the compact Ukrainian territory as settled (930 000 sq. km). Yet the frontiers do not quite coincide and the geographical principle cannot be brought into line with the ethnographical. Colonising efforts that even reached the shore of the Pacific must be left out of account, in spite of the Ukrainian population they represent, as must also large enclaves of foreign nations within Ukraine.

On the other hand we must bear those Ukrainian areas in mind where the Ukrainian population, though not yet in the majority, is still increasing (parts of North Caucasia and the Crimea).

487 2. Ukraine's position in the European system of communications is fairly central; it is not further from the mouth of the Dnipro to Egypt or Mesopotamia than it is to England, Southwest Germany or Moscow. Ukraine connects the Baltic states with the coasts of the Black Sea, Central Europe with Asia, the lower reaches of the Danube with Russia. Thirty percent (about 2 000 out of 6 000 km) of the route from Berlin or London to the Caspian Sea and thence to India and Western China lies in Ukrainian territory. In Asia Minor, which is near Ukraine, indeed partly connected with it by water, we find the junctions of important long-distance routes (Berlin-Bagdad; Marseilles-Suez-Indochina or Madagascar etc.).

There are no great natural obstacles to communications; even the ridge of the Carpathians is traversed by eight easy passes. From the point of view of communications, the lack of natural frontiers is a great advantage. The watersheds between the rivers flowing to the Black Sea and those to the Baltic Sea are so narrow, low and flat that it is easy to build short canals across them.

3. The geographical situation of Ukraine as a trade center which is not only a result of its position in the system of European communications, was particularly favorable in the Middle Ages. It was largely determined by the priority of overland and river communications over sea trade routes. In Kyiv the trade route to Byzantium intersected the overland route to

the Don which continued to Ityl, the Khazar capital at the mouth of the Volga where two important routes terminated, viz. a caravan road from Bagdad via Khovaresm in the Turkestan of to-day and a road from China via the basin of the Tarim. Communicating routes led via the Pripyat to the Memel and Vistula areas, and via Halych to Hungary or via Cracow to Prague and Regensburg. 487

But Ukraine forfeited these advantages when Bagdad, Byzantium and Kyiv declined and when the Crusades shifted the main trade routes to the Mediterranean and later when America was discovered and the sea route to India became known. In addition, there were changes in the needs of civilisation; instead of furs, wax and honey, there was now a demand for goods in bulk like grain and timber which had to be transported all too expensively to the West via the Baltic as the Turks blocked the exit to the Mediterranean. The early golden age of Ukraine was the result of favorable trade conditions and it sank when these changed.

4. Black Earth and Granary

The enormous area of 70 million ha black earth produced considerable surplus grain crops. Ukraine became the granary of Europe, but as the structure of the country was wholly agrarian, industry was slow to develop so that towns and industry were flooded by aliens. 433

Grain was exported in ancient times to Greece and Rome. Grain and cattle were transported from the central Dnipro area to the harbors and markets of Germany. But export trade only began to flourish in earnest when the fertile steppe and the sea coast were re-conquered. Food requirements of European industrial states were supplied from harbors on the Black Sea and the Sea of Odiv; and yet this improvement in geographical trade conditions was no longer the decisive feature in Ukrainian economy. 439

Ukraine was responsible for 10 % of the world's production of the four European kinds of grain and was therefore among the leading sources. From 1909—1913 its grain exports accounted to 8.6 million roubles, and to more than a fifth of the entire

439 world export of grain; Ukraine played a leading part in the export of wheat, rye and barley (20.21 % and 25 % respectively of the world export).

The bulk of the exports did not go to Russia which drew its supplies from the Volga Basin and the East. Part went to White Ruthenia, Poland and the Baltic, if it was not ear-marked for Central and Western Europe. And Ukrainian cattle were not greatly in demand in the Russian market, which is one reason why cattle-rearing never developed very satisfactorily.

5. The preponderance of foreigners in industry

433 was partly due to Ukrainian concentration in agriculture. It
464 is quite true that, at the outset, Ukraine was not interested in mining and industry. On the other hand the Russians, by Nature less bound to the poorer soil on which they had settled, immigrated to mining and industrial areas of Ukraine. This produced dangerous national islands. The work done by Ukrainian laborers in the Donets area was better than in the Ural, even if it did not reach the standards of Central and Western Europe.

471 In Ukraine industry foreigners predominated even more as investors of capital than as laborers, more capital coming from countries abroad than from Russia. Before World War I about 400 million roubles were invested in Dnipro Ukraine alone, where the value of mining and industrial products amounted to 170 million roubles. 95 % of the capital invested in heavy industry was of foreign origin; 80 % of the pig-iron produced in 1913 came from 10 concerns with French capital (out of a total of 16 in the Russia of those days); they represented an investment of more than 112 million roubles. Of the 103 million roubles of French capital invested in coal mines, 82 millions were accounted for by the Donets Basin. Ten of the 12 concerns run with Belgian capital were in Ukraine.

6. Ukraine's relations to Russia as a colony

439 find expression in the economy of Dnipro Ukraine where certain industries were neglected and deprived of funds in favor of Russian areas. And this is no result of a balance between an agrarian and an industrial country for it was not to the North and the East that agricultural produce was exported

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

from Ukraine, although it is true that Russia had to be supplied 439
with sugar in addition to raw and auxiliary materials (coal, ores, pig-iron, steel etc.). Imports to Ukraine (e. g. textiles) were more than met by exports. But no capital was imported from Russia to set off the active trade balance; this came almost entirely from other countries.

In the common budget of Imperial Russia in the years 651
1909—1913 Ukraine had to supply 20 % of the total revenue 439
while it was allocated only 20 % of the expenditure. Almost half (45—46 %) of the Imperial revenue from Dnipro Ukraine was diverted to other areas of Russia. Three fourths of the funds ear-marked for capitalisation went abroad in the form of interest and dividends; Russia itself utilised revenue from Ukraine to install rival plants that very often manufactured or finished goods derived from Ukraine. Ukraine exported abroad four to nine times as much as she imported and was solely responsible for the fact that Russia had an active trade balance. It is an undisputable fact that Ukraine was an integral part of the economic system of Europe before the First World War.

7. The Russian Eurasian Theory

is that all Eurasian and Asiatic parts of Russia, including 000
peripheral areas like Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan etc. must be united in one great empire. Let us view this problem from the point of view of economic geography.

The features common to that gigantic stretch of territory are the enormous distances between the various centers of production to the frontiers and the sea, the length of time that rivers and seas are ice-bound, sparse population, high costs of transportation, and an unfavorable position with regard to world markets. It must therefore be organised as a self-supporting economy, planned from some center. Western Siberia is the heart of Eurasia.

These facts do not apply to Ukraine. The 2400 km between 131
the sea and the Semyrjechka area may be Eurasian, while in 487
Europe the least favorable points are less than 600 km from the sea, and this "European" distance from the sea holds for Ukraine where no center is further than 600 km from the Black Sea. The distance between the Kusnets Basin, the chief coal area of

131 Eurasia and the ores in the Ural is more than 2000 km; the
487 coal of the Donets Basin, on the other hand, is about 350—450 km from the iron ore of Kryvyj Rih, while the iron and manganese ores of Kerch are nearer still. The seas in the north of Russia are frozen for 20—26 weeks, while the Black Sea has ice for but 3—4 weeks in the year. Most of its harbors can be kept open all winter by means of ice-breakers. The
[161] density of the population in Ukraine is 59 to the square kilometer which cannot be compared with the figures for Siberia (1 per sq. km) or with the average for USSR (8). Conditions in Ukraine, therefore, are much more akin to those in Europe than are those in the continental heart of Eurasia some 4000 km away. And for Ukraine this fact found expression, for instance, in the fact that it could not profit from the reduced railway freights that were granted for long-distance transportation. The unfavorable position of Moscow and Leningrad as manufacturing centers was a great handicap to the economy of Ukraine which possessed all the conditions necessary for production within its own frontiers but nevertheless had to import goods from there and export raw materials to very low prices.

As long as Russia's face was turned towards Europe, these considerations did not matter much, but they are felt all the more acutely now that the economy of the Soviet Union is definitely planned.

8. The Ukrainian idea of economy

421 with its championship of private property was always entirely different from the "mir" idea, with its farming in common and periodical division of the soil which was characteristic for Russian economy. Exceptions within Ukrainian territory, due to special conditions of time and place, do not alter this fundamental fact.
[566] That serfdom should have been abolished so late was felt to be a great burden by the Ukrainian who had enjoyed personal freedom in his days of political independence. He always connected serfdom with Russian rule which naturally did not help to mitigate his aversion to everything Russian.

433 In national Ukrainian literature, the relationship of different branches of economy is often discussed. It is often maintained that up to the present, development has been along the lines of

increasing industrialisation. Extensive exports of agricultural 433
produce, we are told, are not good for a fairly densely populated country. This call for intensive industrialisation is common to the otherwise diametrically opposed groups of nationalists who dream of self-sufficiency, and of disciples of the Bolshevist Eurasian school.

One-sided industrialisation is an extravagant program, for the country of the Black Earth will, of course, always remain agrarian in character. Increasing industrialisation and the growth of the home market will intensify agriculture, though not in the usual sense, as the nature of the steppe stands in the way. It will pay to solve the problem of the arid areas and production will be increased.

In a purely liberal economic system Ukraine would, of course, have to cease being a country of extensive agrarian exports and dumping great quantities of grain on the market at a loss. But now that international commerce is planned, it is neither necessary that Ukraine should supply the world market with the great quantities of the years preceding the First World War nor that agricultural countries should be forced to sell produce at dumping prices or to other malpractices.

It would considerably strengthen the economic independence of Europe to include Ukraine as a source of agricultural produce and as an industrialised and solvent customer. The economy of Europe will find its necessary complement in a Ukrainian system that is adapted to European needs and not diverted to form part of a Eurasian scheme.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Agriculture

1. Agricultural Features and Overpopulation

162 The agricultural overpopulation of Ukraine is a result of its one-sided social and economic structure. In Germany the rural population forms 29 % of the entire population of the country, while the figures for the agrarian countries of Denmark and Hungary are 30 % and 25 % respectively, the corresponding figure for Ukraine being 75 %. The density of the agricultural population in Ukrainian territory amounts to a general average of 54 per ha of agriculturally utilised soil, in the Right Bank Region and in Western Ukraine to 80, and in Galicia to 103. In Denwark, the model agricultural country, the density of the agricultural population is not even 35 and in Bohemia, where agriculture and industry are highly developed, 241 it is only 52. And yields per ha in Ukraine are fairly low: 433 statistics for 1931—35 are as follows (q/ha):

Country	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Average
Ukraine	8.5	8.8	8.3	9.2	8.7
Roumania	9.6	10.1	10.3	9.7	9.9
Hungary	13.5	11.8	14.1	12.3	12.9
Germany	21.0	17.4	20.1	19.5	19.5

Agricultural overpopulation is particularly noticeable in view of the small share of agricultural land per head of the rural population (not quite 2 ha). Produce is therefore exported at the expense of the standard of living which actually used to be lower in Ukraine than in the European states that imported the produce.

In the years immediately preceding the Second World War yields per ha in Dnipro-Ukraine seemed to have risen

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considerably. For 1938 the average figure for grain was given as 10.9 q/ha, for 1939 = 13.9 q/ha, for 1940 = 19.5 q/ha ("Visti" of 11. II. 1941). The average for those three years would be 13 q/ha, higher by 50 % than the average for 1931—1935. As these data were compiled for a meeting of the communist party, a tendency to propaganda must be borne in mind; even in official Soviet statistics, final figures are often more modest than those just quoted. But, in spite of an undisputed increase in yield, the economy of Ukraine must either be strengthened or increased, or both, if it is to be healthy. 241 433

2. Soil and Climate

Ukraine contains 44 % of the Black Earth in Europe (160.5 million ha) and almost 8 % of that in the whole world (900 million ha) and is one of the largest Black Earth areas in existence. In Ukraine itself 3/4 of the entire soil is Black Earth and only 1/4 podsol earth, mountain soil and the good renzine soil of Galicia. Podsol earth predominated in Podlakhia, the Kholm district, North Volynia, in Galician Subcarpathia, in the flats round the Syan and the Upper Buh, in Polesya and partly in the district of Chernyhiv. 134

Black Earth is one of the best soils and excellently suited to grain. Its humus content is high, its structure crumbly and it is extremely porous. The humus binds certain quantities of moisture which are distributed fairly evenly. Black Earth dries quickly on the surface but lower down it retains moisture for a fair time, even during drought. It preserves its natural fertility for a long time, does not call for any complicated preparation and is easy to work. It requires no manure which may be positively bad for it and even when exploited, the soil preserves itself, so to speak. It needs a relatively small amount of seed.

It is not necessary to have any specially developed agricultural implements on Black Earth: motor-plows and power-driven agricultural machinery are eminently suitable for the great plains that all demand the same treatment. That is why the tendency to mechanisation and to introduce big-scale operations is particularly marked in the Black Earth areas. 241

132 The many abysses and canyons are a disadvantage. As there are no trees and therefore few birds, there are very many insects. There are also other pests and disadvantages connected with the climate. Ukraine has a continental climate, but it is milder than in Russia. The average yearly temperature of 8.10° Celsius corresponds to that of Erfurt (8.3°). The difference between the warmest month (July) and the coldest (January) is bigger than in Erfurt (18.8°) and increases towards the east (Lviv 23.4°, Kyiv 25.3°, Kharkiv 28.8°); the period of vegetation decreases in the same direction (Erfurt 218 days, Lviv 211, Kyiv 203, Kharkiv 201). The lack of clouds is favorable to growth and the ripening process.

Apart from mountainous areas, there is a rainfall in the North-west of 600 mm, in Galicia 700 mm, a figure which decreases for the central steppe to 500 mm and in the south steppe to 400 mm. In a limited territory round the Sea of Oziv and the Black Sea it is as low as 300 mm, the minimum in USA for successful agriculture. 6 million ha of the steppe often suffer from drought and bad harvests. The most important tasks of agriculture in Ukraine are to combat drought and to intensify methods of cultivating the soil; irrigation schemes in connection with the power station on the Dnipro which would ensure irrigation of 1—2 million ha, have not yet been carried out.

3. Utilisation of Soil

311 Arable land in Ukraine amounts to 66 % of the entire area, in the steppe even to 80 %. In France, Italy, Germany and Roumania the proportion is 41—45 %, while the average for USSR including Ukraine is only 31 %. Only in Hungary and Denmark we find a situation similar to that in Ukraine, though on a much smaller scale. Ukraine must rank as the first agrarian state in Europe.

The proportion of forest land is correspondingly low (12 %), though in the mountains and Polesya it accounts for 35—38 %; in the steppe it sinks as low as 4 %. Even the European countries that are poorest in forests, such as Italy and France, have 16—19 % forest land; the most of them reach the double of the figure for Ukraine

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The 15 % meadows and pastureland is a little lower than 311
the average for most European countries; this figure is higher for Polesya, the Carpathians and the foothills of the Caucasus (25—30 %); in the more intensively managed areas of the Right-Bank Region it sinks to 5 %. Ukraine (like Bohemia and Moravia) has only 7 % of land that cannot be utilised for agriculture or forestry, a proportion that is 16 % for Polesya alone. This figure is considerably higher for most European countries: Germany, Roumania, France and Italy have 12—19 %, USSR 17 %.

20 % of all plowed lands lie fallow, as, with the exception of some areas in the West, the three-crop rotation system is general. Grain takes up 76 % of the arable land, 90 % even in the steppe. Since the first World War this share has declined in favor of technical cultures which have doubled their pre-war area. In 1935 they accounted for 9 %; a further 8 % is used for other vegetation for food (potatoes), 7 % for fodder plants.

Wheat and barley are the two kinds of grain that are most 241
characteristic for Ukraine, though much rye is also grown. Its share (21 %) of the land laid down in grain and potatoes was in the years 1931—35 between that of wheat (32 %) and that of barley (13 %). Oats followed (10 %), then maize (9 %), millet (6 %) and buckwheat (3 %), potatoes (6 %). Rye is above all used for domestic consumption.

4. Grain: Areas of Production and Varieties

The biggest surpluses in grain are harvested in the old pro- 243
vinces of Katerynoslav, Kherson, Tauria and the Kuban area, crops being wheat and barley and others. The proportion of these two varieties in the entire yield of grain decreases as we pass from south-east to north-west. In Western Ukraine, Volynia and the district of Tarnopil are areas of surplus yields while the rest of Galicia has to import grain. Wheat thrives best on the Black Earth of what was once steppe and occupies about 1/3 of the area laid down in grain and potatoes. Cultivation of wheat increased for a long time in accordance with the growing world consumption, but decreased when facilities for export disappeared and when domestic consumption became more important (see tables 1 and 2).

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Table 1. Ukraine in the World Production of Grain.

1909—13	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Total in Mill.
	in thousand t.				
East Ukraine	9 350	5 200	6 100	2 350	23
Russian Empire	20 500	19 000	9 000	13 500	62
Share of East Ukraine in %	48	30	72	17	37
West Ukraine	640	680	400	250	2
Ukraine total	9 990	5 900	6 500	2 600	25
World Production in Million t.	100	45	38	65	250
Share of Ukraine in %	10	13	17	3	10
1931—1935					
East Ukraine	9 100	5 420	3 720	2 230	20,5
Soviet Union	23 900	21 900	6 600	15 000	67,5
Share of East Ukraine in %	38	25	56	15	30
West Ukraine	1 020	1 530	680	870	4,1
Ukraine total	10 120	6 950	4 400	3 100	24,6
World Production in Million t.	127	46	39	62	274
Share of Ukraine in %	8	15	11	5	9

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Table 2. Ukraine in the World Export of Grain.

1909—1913	Wheat		Rye		Barley		Oats		Total		Maize		Altogether	
	1000 t	%	1000 t	%	1000 t	%	1000 t	%	1000 t	%	1000 t	%	Mill. t	%
1. Ukraine	4300	20	600	21	2700	43	300	8,5	7900	23	700	10	8,6	21
2. Argentine . . .	2600	12	—	—	—	—	620	17,5	3220	9,5	2950	40,5	6,1	15
3. USA	2960	13,5	10	0,5	160	2,5	60	1,5	3190	9,5	1020	14	4,1	10
4. Roumania . . .	1430	6,5	100	3,5	350	5,5	150	4,5	2030	6	1000	14	3,1	7
5. Canada	2530	12	—	—	100	1,5	180	5	2810	8	—	—	2,8	6
6. Russian Empire . .	100	0,5	200	7	1000	16	800	23	2150	6	100	1,5	2,2	5
7. B. India	1380	6,5	—	—	230	3,5	—	—	1610	4,5	—	—	1,6	4
8. Australia . . .	1150	5,5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1150	5,5	—	—	1,2	3
World	21500	100	2800	100	6300	100	3500	100	34100	100	7300	100	41,4	100
Share of Ukraine in %	20		21		43		9		23		10		21	
Russian Empire	4400	21,5	800	28,5	3700	58,5	1100	31	10000	29,5	800	11	10,8	26
Share of Ukraine in %	98		75		73		27		79		88		80	

5. Other Agricultural Produce

244 433 In Western Ukraine potatoes account for 16—18 % of the arable land, decreasing towards the south-east to 3—2%. There has been a considerable increase in the cultivation of potatoes of recent times on the small property belonging to private or to collectivised peasants. The yield per ha which before World War I amounted to 92 q sank in the years 1929—1933 to 86 q (Belgium 213, Germany 156, France 110, USSR 80, USA 72). Its total production of 20.6 million t, 10 % of world production (205.6 million t in years 1931—35) puts Ukraine fourth after Germany, USSR (exclusive of Ukraine), and Polan' (exclusive of Ukrainian territory).

249 433 Sugar beet is the most important technical cultu.e. It is grown mostly in the center of Dnipro-Ukraine where the rainfall is 500 mm, above all in the area round Kyiv and in Podol.·. The average area planted in the years from 1901/02 to 1910/11 amounted to 555 000 ha and the total yield to 85 million t (154 q/ha). In 1935 Ukraine, with a sugar beet area of 952 000 ha, was the first country in the world as regards this product.

And yet the yields per hektar have decreased to 90 q, the average for 1931—35. In Germany the corresponding figure is 290 q/ha, in Denmark 322 q/ha, in Holland 350 q/ha, in the USSR

[243]



84 q/ha. The reason for the decrease is to be sought in the Soviet form of management. With an entire yield of 8.8 mil-

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lion t and 14 % of the world production of sugar beet, Ukraine comes second after Germany (10.6 million t) and before France and the USA (8.2 and 8.1 million t respectively). 249 433



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Conditions for growing tobacco in Ukraine are favorable, but the area planted, which in 1908 was 50 000 ha, has not been increased; the yield has risen slightly (8 000 t in the entire country). Better qualities were planted in the south, and elsewhere the well-known "makhorka". Hops of good quality were 249 433



[243]

grown in Volynia and partly also in Galicia; 2 000 t were harvested.

248 433 Hemp is produced above all in the Chernyhiv area (229 000 ha), Ukraine coming after the USSR in hemp production of the world; in the years 1931—35 its fibre yield was 13 % (8 000 t)

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

and its seed yield 19 % (420 000 t) of the world production. Flax is grown on an area of 230 000 ha; Ukraine with a yield of 60 000 t stands second in world production of fibre flax (9.4 % of 640 000 t) while it is sixth as a producer of flax for seed, its yield of 71 000 t being 2 % of world production (3.5 million t).

[243]



Cotton is produced on areas that shift from year to year, mostly without artificial irrigation; hitherto it has not been very successful (45,000t)

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successful (45 000 t). Sunflowers were cultivated in 1935 on an 247
area of 1 659 000 ha, mainly in the Kuban area. The yield for 1930—35 (0.9 million t) was only a little less than that of the USSR and much more than that of any other country.

As a grain producing country, Ukraine, with its yield of 433
approximately 25 million t of the four main European varieties 243
(= 10 % of world production), took a leading place in the years before the First World War (1909—1931). It exported 7.9 million t, or 1/6 of total world grain exports, topping the list for wheat and barley (4.3 million t, and 20 % and 2.7 million t and 43 % respectively of world exports). In the years 1931—35, production in Ukraine decreased by only 9 % i. e. by 24.6 million t, world production amounting then to 276.6 million t, while the decrease in export trade in the same period was much greater. The reason for this was the small yield per hektar as well as inadequate cultivation in consequence of collectivisation and unfavorable conditions for selling agricultural and buying industrial products; in addition there was an increased demand at home as the country became more industrialised.

6. Cattle Rearing

The distribution of livestock in Ukraine varies considerably. 231
In the wide spaces of North Caucasia there is much pasture- 433
land so that there are not many cattle per unit of area, though 811
quite a number per head of the population.

The opposite is true of Galicia where management is intensive. The many meadows of Polesya support good stocks of cattle while the mountain pastures of the Carpathians are not sufficiently utilised. Between those extremes we have the bulk of Ukrainian arable land with relatively poor supplies of fodder for cattle. The result is that Ukraine does not contribute to the cattle rearing industry of the world what one might expect from a country of its agricultural standing. Before World War I there were 13.5 million head of cattle in Ukraine, i. e. 2.8 % of world stock. The proportion of dairy cows in this figure increases continuously as the use of oxen for draught, which used to be a characteristic feature of the country, had been declining for some time. (Table 3).

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Table 3. The Livestock in Ukraine (1912—1937) in Million of Head.

	1912	16	20	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	37
cattle	6,5	7,7	6,8	7,1	8,3	8,9	8,4	8,4	8,6	7,6	6,8	6,2	5,0	4,4	5,3	6,3	7,8
cows	2,6	3,1	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,9	3,9	3,9	4,0	3,9	3,5	3,4	2,7	2,4	2,5	2,6	3,5
horses	5,6	5,5	3,9	3,8	4,0	4,2	4,6	5,1	5,5	5,6	5,3	4,8	3,7	2,6	2,5	2,6	3,5
pigs	4,3	4,6	5,3	2,4	4,2	3,7	3,7	4,4	7,0	4,2	3,2	5,4	2,6	2,1	4,2	4,7	7,7
sheep	6,2	6,4	6,9	8,4	9,3	9,7	8,7	8,0	8,1	7,0	4,5	3,4	2,1	2,0	2,2	2,8	3,3

In 1912 the number of horses was disproportionately high, viz., 7 millions. With the increasing use of motors, this number was reduced which, from the point of view of economy, was perfectly justifiable. Pig breeding, on the other hand, tended to increase, particularly in the north-west and the Kuban area. In spite of that, there were before World War I only 7.1 million pigs in the country, i. e. 4 % of world stock.

Sheep breeding has declined as a result of intensive management and competition from overseas on the world wool market, above all in fine wools.

Dnipro Ukraine statistics for the year 1916 provide characteristic material for judging the general development as well as the present position. Except for horses which had stopped increasing even before 1908, the figures for 1916 were only temporarily reached in the last year before the series of Five Year Plans. Diagrams 1 and 2).

[474] Collectivisation measures by the Soviets were a great blow to cattle rearing in Ukraine. Rather than hand over cattle to the State for nothing, the peasants slaughtered their stocks wholesale; and, as a result of bad treatment, epidemics and poor feeding, the cattle stocks of collective enterprises greatly declined. In 1933 the number of cattle and horses was only half what it had been in 1928 and pigs and sheep less than a quarter, while the entire stock had been reduced to 2/5, or 38 %. It was only after the colkhose peasants were allowed to keep cattle of their own, that numbers began slowly to rise, though they did not reach the level of 1928.

In Western Ukraine the development of stock-keeping was much more favorable, but the number for the whole of Ukraine was below prewar level, except in the case of pigs.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1



Diagram 1. Livestock in Dnipro-Ukraine (1912-37; in 100000)



Diagram 2. Livestock in Dnipro-Ukraine (1912-37; in 100000)

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

231 433 Cattle trade and management in Ukraine in general are far from satisfactory, though there was a well organised cooperative dairy system in Galicia; butter was even exported. On both sides, particularly in the south of the Carpathians, the production of cheese made good progress. Any export of meat that there was, is partly a result of the small demand for home consumption. Though poultry farming was neither intensive nor sufficiently progressive, a considerable number of eggs was exported.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Forestry

The natural conditions for a satisfactory system of forestry are given neither on the Black Earth nor on the steppe proper, where the low rainfall practically excludes sylviculture in place. The situation in Polesya and the mountains is entirely different, but forest areas there are too limited to play any part of importance in the general economy of the country. Exploitation in former times, above all the export of wood and potash by the Union of Poland and Lithuania, completely destroyed forest stocks. It is only since the end of the nineteenth century that there has been any forest conservation in Russia. Since 1880, Dnipro Ukraine alone has lost out of 4,2 million ha of forests (4.9 million ha of forest land), more than 40 %, so that in 1932 it had only 2.5 million ha of forests (3.5 million ha of forest land). 3/3

Reforestation of forest land would produce 650000 ha of forests, which could be increased to 1.5 million ha by including land that is not particularly valuable for agriculture. Such measures which, in the 35 years before the First World War had produced in Germany an increase of 2.5% and 13% in France in the course of 64 years, were not seriously entertained in post-war years either by USSR or Poland. Areas that had been stripped of trees (22 % and 12 % respectively) were not forested.

Forests in the Carpathians amount to 48 % of the stocks in the entire Ukraine, there being 1.08 ha per head of the population; the corresponding figures for the Caucasus, especially in the north are 58 % and 1.6 ha, for Polesya 40 %, and 0.5 ha. The other areas of the northern zone have fewer forests, the figures being 20 % and 0.23 ha for Podlakhia and Chernyhiv and 19% and 0.18 ha for Galicia and Volynia in the central zone. The center of Dnipro-Ukraine has little forest land, the figures

313 being 13 % and 0.14 ha for the Right Bank Region and 7 % or 0.12 ha for the Left Bank Region. The southern zone has still less (0.08 ha per head) and there is practically none at all in the southern steppe proper.

[311] Thanks to its enormous area Ukraine with its 11 million ha of forest land comes fifth in Europe, but there is only 12 % of forest land in the entire country, and scarcely 0.2 ha per head of the population, while 0.3 ha is regarded as the minimum. The figures for actual forest stock will be still less, as only three quarters of the nominal forest land in Soviet Ukraine (3.1 million out of 4.3 million ha) represent actual forests. Thus the ratio of forest to the entire area of Ukraine would be 9 %. Forestry in those parts of Ukraine that used to belong to Austria-Hungary was on a higher level than in the other provinces; after the war it was highest in Carpatho-Ukraine.

313 The annual increment in timber in Dnipro-Ukraine amounts to 2 cubic meters per ha, in Volynia, Podlakhia and Polesya to 1.9 cubic metres, in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine to 3.3 cubic metres, so that the average figure for the entire country is 2.3 cubic metres. This average for Ukraine is low compared with the figure of 5 cubic meters for the state forests of Germany and 4.4 for the communal forests.

313 439 Reckoned per head of the population there is in Ukraine a timber increment of only 0.4 cubic meters, which is far lower than in most of the forest countries in Europe. As a result, wood has to be imported for mining and industrial areas.

Wood imports amounted to 1.8 million t in Dnipro-Ukraine in 1913, and the average figures for 1928/29 and 1933/34 are 3.7 and 4 million t respectively. The average imports to Northern Caucasia for the last year amounted to 1.2 million t, while the figure for the Crimea is 250 000 and for the whole of Eastern Ukraine 5.5 million t. The demand for timber is greatest in the Donets Basin, the Dnipro Bend and also in Kharkiv and Odessa.

Imports consist chiefly of soft woods; a certain amount of valuable oak is even exported from areas that are otherwise dependent on imports. In those parts of Ukraine that belong to Soviet Russia there is 0.16 ha forest per head of the population,

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the figure for the Roumanian provinces being 0.25, for the Polish 0.36, and 1.05 for the Hungarian provinces. 313 439

Imports of timber came mostly by water and rail from White Ruthenia and above all from the forests in the middle reaches of the Volga. The wood that was drifted down the Volga was loaded on railway trucks in Stalingrad and transported to its destination.

Hardwoods predominate in the forest stock of Ukraine (59 %). Oak represents 27 %, beech 9 % of the entire forests. Of the 41 % softwoods there is 27 % pine. Pine and oak are the main species in Dnipro-Ukraine, while in Galicia spruce predominates and beech in Carpatho-Ukraine. In the Caucasus species of oak and beech occur most frequently. 313 137

Mineral Resources

135 The distribution of minerals in Ukraine is most favorable. The most important supplies are in the midst of areas that are valuable from the point of view of agriculture: coal and salt in the Donets Basin, iron and manganese ore at the Bend of the Dnipro. Even the minerals in the Carpathians and the Caucasus (oil etc.), in spite of their remoteness from the center of the country, have fertile foreland in the vicinity.

There are secondary deposits scattered throughout the country (lignite, kaolin, peat etc.). In general, the mineral supplies of Ukraine are easy to get at; the problem of transportation is more easily solved than in Russia and there is little difference between geological deposits and those worth exploiting. In the last 30 years much progress has been made in mineral surveys, not that extensive new deposits have been discovered, but investigation of deposits already known has led to intensive operation of these.

In Ukraine, minerals occur over a large area and at no great depth. It is a disadvantage that productive layers are often limited and unevenly distributed; there are "dead" intervals and sometimes impurities that detract from quality; these faults are not present in the most important deposits of iron ore at Kryvyj Rih.

1. Main Minerals and Areas of Occurrence

Ukraine is richer in sources of fuel and power than most European countries. We only need mention the sole great coal deposit in Eastern Europe in the Donets Basin. The oil wells in the foothills on both wings of the Ukrainian territory are exposed from the point of view of strategy. Wood alone must be imported. There are many sources of water power, even if they are not very significant.

Metals are very unevenly distributed. While there is but a small quantity of non-precious metals, the abundance of ores for heavy iron industry assure for Ukraine an eminent place among the ore-producing countries of the world and it is even first as a producer of manganese ore. There are generous deposits of alumina, among others kaolin, salt, graphite and building materials, though one would not think so from the wretched condition of the roads. 135

The mineral wealth of the country is distributed as follows:

1) In the Donets Basin: coal, rock and other salt, some iron and other ores, including mercury, phosphorite, kaolin, fireproof alumina, many small deposits of other metals, limestone, marl, dolomite, chalk, quartz sand, building stone etc.
2) In the Dnipro Bend on Right Bank: iron ore at Kryvyj Rih and manganese ore at Nikopil; also graphite, ochre, brown coal, kaolin.
3) In the foreland of the Caucasus: petroleum, some coal, lead, tin and iron ores, many small deposits of non-precious minerals, largish deposits of cement, rich deposits of iron ore on the Kerch Peninsula.
4) In the Carpathians: petroleum, mineral wax, salt (also on south side), potassium, manganese ore, some iron ore, graphite, brown coal etc.

A small part of the coal deposit on the Donets spreads on to territory that is not Ukrainian. But, otherwise, all this mineral wealth is in Ukrainian soil, even if the influx of foreign labor has led to a decline in the Ukrainian population in some localities.

Such factors determine the place of Ukraine in the world sources of petroleum. The Galician oilfields are in ancient Ukrainian territory, but long Polish pressure has won the upper hand in a small part of the oilfields of Jaslo in the west. The oilfields in the Kuban area lie in territory that was long ago colonised by Ukraine, whereas the colonising process is still active in the Terek areas. The Groznyj petroleum field in North Caucasia has not yet been colonised by Ukrainians and, like many industrial areas, forms a Russian island that is miles away from contiguous Russian territories. If Ukraine claims Groznyj, it is

135 giving expression to a certain territorial theory, but above all to the natural ambition of a colonising nation to penetrate and hold the entire area it has settled.

2. Coal

Coal has recently been discovered outside of the Donets Basin 30 kilometers from Lviv, at Kaminka Strumylova, Sokal and Zadviria; the extent of this coalfield has not yet been determined.

In North Caucasia, where the entire coal has been estimated at 740 million t, 96 millions having beeen definitely established, the deposits south of Batalpashynske on the upper reaches of the Kuban and its tributaries are known to exist though there has been little prospecting. The deposit is usually estimated at 115 million t, while 38 million t have actually been proved to exist (the calorific value is low, viz. 6900 for coal from the best known coalfields and 7900 for those of best quality). The deposits at Koushin, Balaclava and Telenejir in the Crimea, estimated at 340 million t, are not first rate either.

The coal fields on the Don lie on the right bank of the lower reaches of the river from the district of Izium to where it flows into the Don. They have an area of 23000 sq. kilometers compared with the 3000 sq. kilometers of the Ruhr area which is richer in coal. The seams are fairly shallow, practically indeed on the surface (compared to the 350 meters depth in Upper Silesia). The average depth of the mine-shaft is 146 meters while in the Ruhr it is more than 600 meters and in the most important English mines 312 meters. The cost of bringing the coal to the surface is therefore relatively low.

The average thickness of the seams is scarcely $^{3}/_{4}$ meters, twice or three times less than in the Ruhr area or in the Kusnets Basin in Siberia. They run unevenly and are not continuous. The Donets coal contains more impurities and 10—14 % ash, compared with 8—9 % in Germany and 7—10 % in the „Kusbas" and its sulphur content is also greater (almost 2 % compared with 1.2 % and 0.5 % respectively). These are disadvantages for the carbonisation process.

At the Geological Conference in Toronto in 1913 the coal resources of the Donets Basin were estimated at 55.6 milliard t.

Table 4. Coal Resources in Leading Countries

	Anthracite		Coal		Brown coal		Altogether		Europe
	Mrd. t	% World	Mrd. t	% World	Mrd. t	% World	Mrd. t	% World	%
1. USA	19,7	3,4	1956	47,2	1863	64,0	3839	50,2	(480)
2. China	388,0	66,1	607	14,6	0,6	—	996	13,0	(154)
3. Canada	2,1	0,4	284	6,9	948	32,6	1234	16,1	(125)
4. Soviet Union	128,0	21,8	332	8,0	20,0	0,7	480	6,3	(59)
(Asiatic area)	(107,0)	Europe	(284)	Europe	(7,1)	Europe	(398)	(5,2)	—
(European area)	(20,8)	55,7	(48)	(6.7	(12,9)	(25,3)	(77)	(1,0)	9,6
5. Germany	—	—	430	60,0	26,0	51,0	456	6,0	57,0
(Poland)	—	—	(170)	(23,7)	—	—	(170)	(2,2)	(21,2)
6. England	11,4	30,5	178	24,9	—	—	190	2,5	23,8
7. Ukraine	11,8	31,6	43	6,0	5,0	9,8	60	0,7	7,5
8. France	3,3	8,8	29	4,1	1,6	3,1	34	0,5	4,3
9. Belgium	—	—	11	1,5	—	—	11		1,4
10. Spitzbergen	—	—	8,8	1,2	—	—	8,8	0,5	1,1
11. Spain	1,6	4,3	6,4	0,9	0,8	1,8	8,8		1,1
12. Holland	0,3	0,8	4,1	0.6	—	—	4,4		0,6
Europe	37	6,3	716	17,3	47	1,6	800	10,5	100
Asia	514	87,6	978	23,6	12	0,4	1505	29,7	(188)
North America	22	3,7	2240	54,0	2812	96,7	5073	66,4	(634)
South America	1	0,2	31	0,8	—	—	32	0,4	(4)
Africa	12	2,0	45	1,1	1	—	58	0,8	(7)
Australia	1	0,2	133	3,2	35	1,2	169	2,2	(21)
World	590	100	4140	100	2910	100	7640	100	(965)

Table 5. Coal Resources in 9 Largest Coaling Areas of World.

135

Area	Country	Principal kind of coal	mrd. t	% of world	% of total
1. Alberta Saskatchewan	Canada	brown coal	1119	14,6	34,6
2. Shangsi	China	coal & anthracite	714	9,3	22,1
3. Appalachians	USA	coal	551	7,2	17,0
4. Kusnets Basin	Western Siberia	coal	250	3,3	7,7
5. Ruhr	Germany	coal	214	2,8	6,6
6. Upper Silesia	Germany	coal	196	2,6	6,1
7. Donets Basin	Ukraine	coal & anthracite	69	0,9	2,1
8. Cheremkhowo	East Siberia	different varieties	66	0,[illegible]	2,0
9. Yorkshire	England	coal	56	0,7	1,7
Total			3235	42,4	100

Since then newly prospected areas have been added, the process of extension being not yet completed. In 1937 stocks were estimated at 89 mrd. t; but the figure for 1927, 69 mrd. t, calculated for a depth of 1 500 meters is more exact. $^2/_3$ of the coalfields, but much more than $^3/_4$ of the coal supplies (54.3 mrd. t) are in Ukrainian territory. As a producer of coal Ukraine is 7th in the countries of the world and 3rd in Europe.

There are many varieties of coal in the Donets Basin; bituminous, gas and furnace coal are mostly found in the coalfields of the west and the center, while porous coal and anthracite are also found in the eastern fields (the latter represent 30 % of the entire deposit). The 21 mrd. t anthracite here is far more than that found in all the other countries of Europe (17 milliard t). Bituminous coal constitutes less than $^1/_4$ of the Donets deposits.

3. Petroleum

Up to date no great quantities of petroleum have been discovered in Central Ukraine. The natural gas at Melitopil is evidence of petroleum at great depth. During prospective of salt mines in the Left Bank Region, petroleum has also been found.

The Galician oilfields stretch 400 km along the north flank of the Carpathians from Dunajec and the Duklapass to Buco-

vina and cover an area of 10 000 ha. The Jaslo oilfield is west of the Syan, while the main fields of Drohobych with wells at Boryslav, Tustanovychi, Skhidnytsia, Mraznytsia lie east of the same river and the Bytkiv field is in the south-east. /135

The petroleum in these fields lies far below the surface, 1 000 meters deep in Boryslav and often more than 1 300 meters. Geological conditions make it difficult to exploit the wells, although the upper layers are firmer than those in North Caucasia and the deposits are more concentrated. South of the Carpathians there are insignificant deposits which, however, have perhaps not been sufficiently investigated.

The deposits in the Kuban area are distributed over a wide surface in 7—10 fields from the Taman Peninsula via Maikop, the center of the oil industry to the Laba. Up till now this area has only been 1/4 prospected (22.5 % in 1935). The soil is sandy and the petroleum lies 700 metres deep.

The oilfields of Groznyj lie in the north-east slopes of the Caucasus, on the southern bank of the Terek river. Geological conditions are not favorable and have not been adequately prospected (26 %).

Judged by European standards at least, the stores of petroleum in Ukraine are considerable. Resources in Galicia are estimated at 100 million t, and in the Kuban area at 66—82 million t (but also at far more than the Galician figure), the Groznyj fields are estimated to contain 208—1290 million t. It is true that more recent estimates for North Caucasia are more modest (240 million t in all); nevertheless, Ukraine ranks high among the oil producing countries of the globe.

The quality of the petroleum varies. In Galicia it is mostly of medium weight (specific weight: 0.825—0.835 g); it provides 5—12 % of light fractions, mainly benzine, 51—56 of medium, above all gas for lighting and only 24—30 % of heavy lubricating oils, such as masut, vaseline and the oils with up to 6 % paraffin, which are characteristic for Galicia. In many fields the percentage of benzine is much higher. In the Kuban area there is still more variety between the different fields. Maikop petroleum is lighter than Galician (0.805—0.835 g), contains no paraffin,

135 but more benzine (8—15 %) and even 30 % in the newer fields; Groznyj petroleum is particularly rich in benzine.

It also contains paraffin, but a relatively small percentage of the medium fractions. As a comparison we may quote Pennsylvanian oil (0.791—0.812 g specific weight) which, at a first distillation, yields 10—20 % benzine, 60—75 % medium and only 5—10 % heavy fractions. Baku oil has a specific weight of more than 0.870; it provides 5—7 % benzine, 27—33 % medium and 56 bis 65 % heavy fractions. Galician oil is midway between these two extremes while the varieties in North Caucasia belong rather to the lighter oils.

Mineral wax occurs at Boryslav and some other places in Galicia, but is otherwise very rare throughout the world.

Natural gas is found unaccompanied at Melitopil, Kerch, and in many places in North Caucasia, and otherwise it appears along with oil. It contains 70—97 % methane and also naphtaline, sulphur and other substances that can be used. It has, however, been little investigated and is used only in Galicia for long-distance heating and lighting, but otherwise only locally (8 500—9 000 calories).

4. Other Fuels and Sources of Power

In the Right Bank Region which is so valuable from the agricultural point of view, brown coal is the most abundant fuel. South of the Kyiv district there are the well-known deposits at Katerynopil, Jurkivka, Zhuravka, etc. In the Kirovohrad district (Jelizavethrad) there are those at Balashivka, Katerynivka, etc. In the surroundings of Oleksandrija — Semenivka, Zelenove etc, in the Kryvyj Rih district — Saksahan, Veselo-Ternivka, Heylivka etc. These 4 or 5 groups form a chain, which is, however, not continuous.

The group of deposits in Volynia and Podolia (stocks 30 million t) is centered round the Galician towns of Potylych n .r Rava Ruska, Hlynsko and Skvaryava, and also appear at Kremianets in Volynia. There is a group of deposits in Subcarpathian Galicia (27 million t) at Myshyn, Dzhuriv, Novoselytsia etc, the coal being of superior quality and of higher calorific value (4 100 — 4 400). Soviet estimates for 1940, to

be accepted with caution, increase the entire deposit of brown coal in Galicia and Volynia (the Dnister Basin) of not quite 100 million t to approximetely 1 mrd. In Carpatho-Ukraine there are numerous smaller deposits, to give the better known names for instance in Antalivtsi, Bilky, Dovhe, Nerezhnytsia etc. There is brown coal also in other parts of Ukrainian territory, the brown coal deposits in Ukraine probably amount to some (5—6) mrd. tons. But only a part of the 150 deposits has been investigated and up till now scarcely 518 million tons of industrial deposits have been determined there. They lie at no great depth, though mostly between layers of sand which allow water to sicker through. Mining conditions are difficult. On the whole neither the quality nor the calorific value (a little more than 2 000 on an average) of this earthy brown coal is high (lignite is rare). But brown coal is very good for the manufacture of briquettes and the process increases its calorific value considerably (4 500 calories), and makes it far easier to transport. /35

Peat, still more than brown coal, has the advantage of occurring in districts remote from coaling areas, above all in the north-east area of Ukraine. In some districts of Polesya there is peat over 1/3 of the entire surface. In the Kyiv district, the peat bogs on the river Irpen have long been known, as well as the extensive marshes of the Irdyn on the river Tiasmyn etc.

The peat areas in Ukraine have not been intensively studied. It is estimated that in the central area of the Dnipro region, 1.9 million ha of bogland would produce peat and about 0.8 million ha in Western Ukraine. Taking only 3/4 of that area into consideration, 2.3 million ha represent about 4 % of the entire peat land in Europe (56 million ha). Ukrainian figures are very low compared with the peat resources of the northern areas that belong to USSR. The peat in Ukraine was estimated at approximately 4 mrd. t while the corresponding figure for USSR was perhaps 460 million t. But up till 1927 only 1/3 (35.5 %) of the Dnipro-Ukraine peat land mentioned was registered and only 1/6 has really been prospected.

376 Waterpower in Ukraine is estimated at about 12 million HP. Of this some 9.6 million is supplied by the mountain rivers of North Caucasia. The water-power of the Carpathian rivers is much less, but also less utilised. The fall of the rivers in Dnipro-Ukraine is, of course, incomparably less though they carry far more water. Their water-power is estimated at 1.4 million HP, more than $^2/_3$ being utilised while scarcely 10 % of the entire water-power in Ukraine is harnessed to industry. It is not, however, certain that all the power of the mountain rivers could be utilised for industrial purposes.

5. Iron Ores

(See Table 6)

135 Ukraine has small deposits of iron ore in practically all areas, also in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine. In the Kuban area the entire resources amount to almost 100 million t. As an important contributor to the history of production, the Donets Basin must also be mentioned. All those deposits have a local, if sometimes not inconsiderable, significance.

The iron ore deposit at Kryvyj Rih (Russian Kriwoi Rog) is the most important in Eastern Europe, both from the point of view of quality and quantity. The ore lies along the Inhulets, the last tributary on the right bank of the Dnipro, and along its tributaries, the Zhovta and the Saksahan, some 130—200 kilometers from the mouth of the Dnipro. They are found in a hollow some 100 kilometers long but very narrow (2—6—9 km) and are generally only prospected some 320 meters deep, although valuable iron ore was found at a depth of almost 500 meters.

The thickness of the individual layers of ore is, in the least favorable cases, 4—7 meters, but mostly 10—30, 45—65, and more rarely 100—150 meters. Before World War I deposits were estimated at 200—300 million t, which figure rose to 1245 million t by 1932. As this is superior red iron ore, the Kryvyj Rih deposit with a pure metal content of 540 million tons, far surpasses all other iron ore deposits in Eastern Europe, even if they contain more crude ore. The quality of

Table 6. Iron Deposits of Ukraine in Soviet Union

Deposit, District, Country	Iron ores					Quartzite					Total	
	Total Deposits in Mill. t.	% of total Deposits in Soviet Union	A + B Deposits in Mill. t	% of A + B Deposits in Soviet Union	% Share of A + B in total Deposits	Total Deposits in Mrd. t	% of total Deposits of Soviet Union	A + B Deposits in Mrd. t	% of A + B Deposits in Soviet Union	% Share of A + B total Deposits	Total ores and Quartzite in Mrd. t	% of Soviet Union
Kryvyj Rih	1491	13,7	669	14,8	45	51,3	20	10,7	91,5	21	52,8	20
Kerch	2722	25	1638	36,4	60	—	—	—	—	—	2,7	1
North Caucasia	115	1,1	37	0,8	32	—	—	—	—	—	0,1	—
Other Districts	2	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—
Ukraine	4330	39,8	2345	52	54	52,3	20,4	10,7	91,5	20	56,6	21
Kursk	337	3,1	175	3,9	52	203,7	79	0,9	7,3	0,4	204	76
Choper Kalachow	716	6,6	184	4,1	26	—	—	—	—	—	0,7	—
Tula-Lipets a. o.	484	4,5	219	4,8	45	—	—	—	—	—	0,5	—
Central Russia	1537	14,2	578	12,8	37	203,7	79	0,9	7,3	0,4	205,2	76,5
North	1065	9,7	28	0,6	3	0,5	0,2	0,1	0,8	20	1,5	0,1
Transcaucasia	200	1,8	178	4	87	—	—	—	—	—	0,2	—
European area of Soviet Union	7132	65,5	3129	69,4	44	256	99,6	11,7	99,6	4,5	263	98
Ural	2414	22,2	1169	26,1	48	—	—	—	—	—	24	0,9
Kasakstan, Central Asia	119	1,1	11	0,2	9	—	—	—	—	—	0,1	—
Western Siberia	415	3,8	111	2,5	27	—	—	—	—	—	0,4	—
East Siberia, Jakutia	707	6,5	71	1,5	10	—	—	—	—	—	0,7	—
Far East	94	0,9	15	0,3	16	—	—	—	—	—	0,1	—
Soviet Union in Asia	3748	34,5	1377	30,6	37	1	0,4	0,05	0,4	5	4,7	2
Soviet Union total in Mrd. t.	10,9	100	4,5	100	40	257	100	11,7	100	4,5	268	100

135 Kryvyj Rih ores has always been acknowledged. They consist of 95 % haematite, with a minimum iron content of 55 % which, however, has an average of 62 %, and are characterised by their great purity. There are only the slightest traces of sulphur, the phosphorus content is 0.017—0.037 % and in the best qual ty ores only 0.005 %. As one of the ores in Europe with least phosphorus, the Kryvyj Rih iron ore is particularly suited to the Bessemer process. Its lumpiness is also favorable, for it makes preliminary treatment superfluous.

There is a huge deposit of approximately 50 billion t of iron quartz with an average pure metal content of 35 %. Only part can be utilised for practical purposes. A technically and economically progressive and profitable solution of the problem of getting iron from quartzites would enormously enhance the value of the Kryvyj Rih deposits for industry. The iron quartzite deposits in Kursk which partly lie in Ukrainian territory are still more significant (208 mrd. t), while deposits of iron ore only amount to 343 million t.

Kerch in the north of the Crimea has the most important deposit of ore, as far as area (2400 sq. km) and quantity of ore are concerned. It covers almost the entire peninsula, along the Strait of the same name, from the Sea of Oziv to the Black Sea. The layers of ore are not deep (2—20 meters, usually but not more than 4 meters) and can easily be mined on the surface. They are 2—20 meters thick, mostly 8—12, and in some places, however, as thin as 0,2 meters. The iron ore deposits in Kerch have been well-known for some time and have been adequately prospected. Recent estimates put these deposits at 2 722 million t, which would exceed even the rich iron ore deposits in Minnesota USA. But the average pure metal content of the almost exclusively brown iron ore in Kerch is only 34—43 %, often, indeed, less than 40 %. So that Kerch, with 245 million t of pure iron content is far behind Kryvyj Rih, and also behind the Ural deposits (411 million t in 1932, figures in table are more recent).

From the point of view of present day engineering, the quality of Kerch iron ores is not very high. Its average phosphor

content of 1 % means that the Thomas process only can be applied in the manufacture of steel, but it also contains 1.6 % sulphur and what is worse, up to 0.05 % arsenic, which may cause breaks in pig iron when cooled and which makes it worthless for further processes. Treatment is therefore costly. It is also a disadvantage that the ore should be so crumbly and sandy, which means that it must be made into briquettes or mixed. with better ores. In any case the ores must first be roasted. 135

Among the iron ore producing countries of the world, Ukraine comes fifth, along with France (4 mrd. t), USA (83.9 mrd. t), England (6.2 mrd. t), Russia (6—6.5 mrd. t). The iron ores of Kryvyj Rih are excellent in quality, but those of Kerch inferior. If they could be properly utilised, the position of Ukraine would be greatly strengthened, and the solution of the problem of iron quartzite would make it one of the first iron ore countries in the world.

6. Manganese Ores, Tin, Zinc etc.

There are small deposits of manganese ore in Ukraine at the following places: Labynska, the basin of the Bila and the Laba, at Khoshchevatka, district Haysyn in Podolia and in the southeast corner of the Galician Carpathians at the sources of the White and Black Cheremosh, where they were discovered a few years ago in inaccessible mountainous land. But Ukraine's eminent position as a country of manganese ore is due to Nikopil.

Nikopil, which has the richest deposit of manganese ore in the world, lies quite near the right bank of the Dnipro, about 230 km (200 km as crow flies) from the mouth of the river. It covers an area of about 150 sq. km. and comprises two sections, the western having richer deposits of better quality and being less worked than the eastern. Surveying by Prof. Vasylenko and others in the years 1928—1932 brought a great change in the exploitation of Nikopil manganese ore. Estimates of deposits were increased fourfold from about 100 million t. (see Table 7).

Compared with Chiaturi, the famous Georgian deposit of manganese ore in the Caucasus, Nikopil contains much more

Table 7. Most Important Deposits of Manganese Ore in World.

Area of occurrence.	Deposits in Mill. Total	Prospected		Chemical Analysis in % Mn	Fe_2O_3	Ph	SiO_2	H_2O
			Nikopil:					
Nikopil	399	90	for export	1. 48—50	1,5—2	0,19	10—12	10—12
Labynska	38	34		2. 42—43	2 —2,5	0,20	15—16	13—15
Carpathian	10	—	for domestic use	1. 46—48	—	0,20	11	12
Khoshchevatka	8	3		2. 40—42	—	0,20	16	15
Ukraine	455	127		—	—	—	—	—
				1. 52	—	0,16	8—9	6—8
Chiaturi (Georgia)	166	163	Washore	2. 51	—	—	9	—
				3. 50	—	—	10	—
Soviet Union	656	330	crude ore	1. 48	1,5—2	0,18	12	8—10
				2. 45	—	—	15	10—12
% Share of Ukraine	70	40		1. 50—52	3—6	0,11	5—8	0,4—1,2
India	—	100	India	2. 47—48	5—6	0,15	8—10	—
			Shandur	38—42	13—17	0,04	2—3	1—3
Brazil	180	34		48—50	3,5—4,5	0,125	4—5	8—10
Gold Coast	39	13		1. 48—52	5—6	0,14	5—7	3
				2. 44—47	7—10	0,175	5—7	—
South Africa	—	48		1. 48—50	5—9	0,037	2—4	—
				2. 45—48	11—14	0,037	2—4	—
Egypt	—	12		34—37	20—25	0,11	3—4	2—4
Marocco-Algiers	33	2		—	—	—	—	—

ore (399 as against 166 million t), so its total manganese content 135
is higher (143—190) compared with 72 million t, in spite of smaller pure metal content in some mines (35—50 % compared with 47—53 %). But Chiaturi has a considerably higher proportion of ore that can be got at than Nikopil, where 3/4 of the entire deposits come under Category C, "possible ores". So that the Georgian deposit comes first as a result of this fact and of its better quality and the more favorable mining conditions. Conditions of production are less favorable in Nikopil than in the Georgian ore-fields. It is true that the ore does not lie so deep in the earth, the top layer being only 6.5—25 meters thick. But its softness (clay, and also sand) means that mines have got to be built out with wood which must be brought from a distance. The thickness of the layers varies from 1.5 to 4 meters (in Chiatury 2—5 meters). The quality of the manganese ores at Nikopil is inferior to that of the deposits in Georgia and India. The deposits contain 90 % pyrolusit, which is the commonest manganese ore, but its consistency is often too fine, and lump ore is reckoned more valuable. The phosphor content is rather higher than in the two other deposits. On the whole, Nikopil ore is of a quality equal to that in other countries.

As a manganese ore country, Ukraine is first in the world with a quantity of more than 450 million t. Its manganese deposits are about 70 % of those in USSR and about 40 % of the total world resources.

Ukraine does indeed possess an abundant choice of other non-precious metals, but not in any great quantity. The mercury at Mykytivka in the Donets Basin is the only deposit in Ukraine that can be utilised for industry, and till recently, the only one in the USSR. In 1926 deposits were estimated at more than 6 000 t down to a depth of 320 m, an estimate that has recently been doubled. Naholnyj Krjaz where such metals are also found, though in small quantities, is in the Donets Basin, too. Deposits of copper ore are insignificant, while the zinc and lead ores at Sadon and Karachaj on the upper reaches of the Kuban are of importance. They are estimated at more than 3 million t. This figure also contains some silver. The reports of the discovery of rich deposits of nickel on the limans of

135 the Dnister in 1936 have not been seriously confirmed. Northern Caucasia has numerous deposits of non-precious metals, but little surveying has been done. According to what is known now, they do not, as a rule, contain any large quantities, but they might possibly play a certain rôle in the future.

7. Salt and Phosphorites

Cooking salt deposits occur every where in Ukraine, all three varieties of occurrence and of exploitation being present. It is difficult to estimate the total amount; in any case, Ukraine is one of the countries most rich in salt, even if it comes after the USA and Germany.

There is a rich deposit of rock salt in the north-west area of the Donets Basin, near Artemivske (formerly Bakhmut) and Slovianske in a wide hollow, distributed over an area of more than 1 500 sq. km. The thickness of the various strata of salt amounts to 30—40 m, the salt is extraordinarily pure (98 % NaCl), and uniform in composition. Recent estimates put the deposits at 100—120 mrd. t.

The rock salt deposit at Solotvyna, on the Tysa in Carpatho-Ukraine cannot be compared with the enormous deposits at Bakhmut. It is, however, quite extensive — 2.2 km long, 1.7 km broad, the depth being unknown, but at any rate more than 300 m. The salt layers are 8—30 m thick, and the percentage of impurities is low (2—4 %). Rock salt is also found on the Galician northern slopes of the Carpathians, very probably in great quantities, e. g. at Stebnyk, between the Dnister and Stryj; but these deposits have neither been prospected nor exploited.

Table-salt is got near Slovianske, from lakes, wells, and boreholes. In Galicia there are about 180 deposits from Latske near Peremyshl to the Bucovina, divided into six geographical groups. Numerous deposits also occur on the south slopes of the Carpathians.

Brine salt is got in the Crimea from about 300 salt lakes. Another 500 lie on the north-west coast of the Black Sea, round Kinburn. 7 limans between the Dnister and the Boh furnish salt, as did also the salt lakes in the Taman peninsula in the Kuban area.

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The salt lakes at Henycheske on the Sea of Oziv and those at Batalpashynske in the Kuban area contain glauber salt. 135

There are fair quantities of potash salts in Galicia, on a strip 250 km long, stretching from Dobromyl (south of Peremyshl) parallel to the Carpathians to Kosiv. The richest deposits are at Kalish and Stebnyk, over an area of 250 sq. km. The salt strata are usually 4—18 m or 8—10 m thick.

Estimates of deposits vary between 100 million t with a pure content (K_2O) of 10—12 mill. t and 250 mill. t with 20 mill. t pure content. Even disregarding higher estimates (up to 450 mill. t.) this would represent 0.03—0.06 % of world store, of which Germany owns 55 %. The potash compounds in Galicia are sylvinite (18—35.5 % pure potash), kaynite (21.7 % K_2O) and glauconite (7—8 % K_2O) which appear distributed over a large area in Dnipro-Ukraine, at Kamjanets and in the north-east.

There are three or four deposits of phosphorites viz. on the Dnister and its left-bank tributaries in Galicia and in eastern Podolia, in the district of Chernyhiv and on the north-west edge of the Donets Basin, particularly round Izjum. In Galicia most of the phosphorites lie on a strip on the right bank of the Dnister, stretching for 65 km from Dovhe to the Zbruch; deposits are estimated at 33 mill. t. In (Eastern) Podolia they cover a large area (about 5 000 sq. km), particularly on the Ushytsia, a northern tributary, and on the Dnister itself. They extend into the Ukrainian districts of Bessarabia. In 1923 deposits were estimated at 16.4 million t., the pure content amounts to an average of 35.5—36 %, and the excellent quality has long been known.

The deposit at Krolevets, on the right bank of the Desna in the area of Chernyhiv contains 1 million t. phosphorites with a pure content of 20—30 %, mining conditions being more favorable. The deposits in the Donets Basin are more extensive and amount to 30 mill. t., but their low percentage of pure content (17—22 %) detracted much from their value. It is

135 only the technical discoveries of recent years that have restored value to inferior phosphorites.

The entire deposits of phosphorites in Ukraine amount to 62 mill. t. Like the potash, they are used in the manufacture of artificial manure. For a country that has got to produce such great quantities of agricultural produce, these deposits are none too big.

8. Varieties of Earth and Rock

Few countries have as much and as varied alumina as Ukraine. The largest deposit of fire-proof alumina is at Chasovyj-Yar in the Donets Basin, which amounts to 90 mill. t. There are other important deposits at Vladimirivka, Olenivka, Hozdory, Pjatykhatka etc.

Kaolin is the most valuable of all alumina and it is to be found on an enormous strip stretching from the marshes of Volynia in the north-west almost parallel to the Dnipro on its right bank to the orefields at Kryvyj Rih, then crossing to the left bank till to about 60—70 km distance from the Sea of Oziv.

Kaolin is found at about 315 places. On an average it is not more than 10 meters deep. The thickness of the various strata varies from a few meters to 106 m. The deposits are estimated at 120 mill. t. which would correspond to 40—50 mill. t. of pure content. The quality of the different deposits varies very much, but is often high.

9. Other Mineral Wealth

Other minerals to be found include ochre in large quantities and of excellent quality at several places, above all at Kryvyj Rih. Considerable deposits of gypsum, specially in the Bakhmut Hollow and in Podolia, limestone of all kinds from the highest quality to the commonest, is found almost all over Ukraine. Dolomites of excellent qualities are concentrated in the Donets area, marl for Portland cement etc. occurs in the Donets Basin, in Podolia and the Kyiv district and in inexhaustible quantities in the northern hollow, above all at Kupjanske and Artemivske.

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Different varieties of granite are to be found on the Ukraine 135
crystal plateau and also in Carpatho-Ukraine, as are also eruptive rocks in general. We mention labrodit, the largest deposit of its kind in Europe between Korosten and Zhytomir in Volynia, Volynian basalt, andesit in Carpatho-Ukraine, and also feldspat, mica-schist, and quartz, sand for the production of glass etc.

Graphite of good quality occurs in considerable quantities in Podolia on the Boh, there being more important deposits at Kryvyj Rih; and in the district of Mariupil and Berdjanske.

They have not been thoroughly prospected. Deposits have been estimated at approximately 100 mill. t. and mostly consist of slaty kinds of crystal graphite such as are used in metallurgy (fireproof pots etc). The percentage of pure graphite varies between 17 and 25 % (in the better deposits even 60—70 %). In this and in other respects the graphite of Ukraine is like that of Passau and is, in quality, inferior only to few (perhaps to that of Ceylon and Madagascar).

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Industry and Mining

1. Fundamental Facts

433 It lay in the nature of her situation as a colony of Russia that only those branches of industry in Ukraine were promoted which utilised raw materials that were locally abundant and difficult to transport over long distances. It was impossible, for instance, to develop a modern textile industry. Even if it cost twice as much to transport cotton from New York to Moscow via Murmansk as via Odessa and Kharkiv and even if the industrial area in Central Russia had to import coal from the Donets Basin, Ukraine was nevertheless dependent on Russia for manufactured goods.

433 311 464 Labor was originally more plentiful in Russia than in Ukraine. The population on the upper reaches of the Volga and the Oka was more apt to seek employment in trade and industry, as the soil in those areas yielded poorer harvests and the percentage of forest land was higher. In Ukraine, on the other hand, farmers were loth to leave the good Black Earth. And that is why it was long impossible there to make labor a decisive factor in placing industries. This could be done only much later in the larger towns, and even then it made little difference to the general trend. But it is characteristic for Ukraine that sources of raw material have determined the location of industry, coal-mines and hydro-electric works being geographically fixed and altogether there are more industries, the raw materials of which are more difficult to transport than their products. The proportion of plants whose location is determined by the presence of raw materials is three times higher in Ukraine than in the industrial states of Central and Western Europe.

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

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Table 8. Production of

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	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	1878	1879
Donets Basin	256	330	595	617	573	842	957	801	1130	1253
Dombrowa Basin	330	301	298	336	402	408	423	612	1070	1085
Russian Empire	700	830	1100	1200	1300	1700	1900	1800	2500	2900
% of Donets Basin	37	41	54	52,5	44	49	50	44,5	45	43

	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901	1902
Donets Basin	3930	4850	4890	5110	6790	7570	9220	11*	10,9	10,7
Dombrowa Basin	3160	3350	3680	3660	3760	4090	3970	4,2	4,2	4,3
Russian Empire	7600	8800	9100	9400	11,3*	12,3	14	16,2	16,6	16,5
% of Donets Basin	52	55	53,5	54,5	60,5	61,5	66	68	65,5	65

	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
Donets Basin	25,3	27,6	26,6	28,7	25	9	5,6	4,6	5,8	7,2	8,1
Kusnetsk Basin	0,8	0,9	1	1,2	1,1	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,8	0,9	0,8
Soviet Union	29,1	31,8	30,9	34,5	31,3	12	7,2	7,2	8,2	11,3	12,7
% of Donets Basin	87	87	86	83	80	75	78	64	70,5	63,5	64

* From 1900 in Million t total for Empire from 1897.

2. Branches and Areas of Industry

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The Donets Basin is the center of the heavy iron industry, heavy engineering, the non-ferrous industry and the production of chemicals on a large scale. The many electricity and overland generating plants that have sprung up almost contiguously utilise coal waste as a rule and have a considerable capacity, the largest being those at Shterivka and Zujivka with 150 000 KW each. There was a lively demand for machinery, above all for agricultural machinery, while the metal industry never reached the same level. Before World War I Ukraine contributed scarcely 17 % of all those employed in the manufacture of metal wares in Russia, though it supplied $^2/_3$ — $^3/_4$ of the raw materials required by the heavy iron industry throughout Russia. In 1934 the Ukrainian share in the manufacture of iron ore was constantly declining, so that metal goods of even fairly simple nature had to be imported.

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Coal in Donets Basin

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1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892
1414	1495	1740	1758	1665	1883	2110	2060	2500	3110	3000	3140	3570
1285	1400	1400	1600	1665	1800	1990	2050	2420	2480	2470	2600	2890
3300	3500	3800	3900	3900	4300	4600	4600	5400	6200	6000	6200	7000
43	42,5	46	45	42,5	44	46	45	46,5	50	50	50,5	51

1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915
11.6	13	12,9	14,2	18,2	17,9	17,7	16,7	19,9	21,4	25,3	27,6	26,6
4,8	4,8	3,6	4,6	5,4	5,6	5,7	5,5	5,8	6,4	6,9	3,8	—
17,9	19,6	18,7	21,7	26	25,9	26	24,9	28,4	31,1	36	35,6	30,9
65	66,5	69	65,5	70	69	68	67	70	69	70	78	86

1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
11.8	12,5	19,6	24,6	27,3	31	36,5	40,9	44	51	61,4	69,6	77,5	77,5
1	1	1,8	2,6	2,6	3	3,6	5,5	7,3	9,2	11,6	14,1	17,3	17,8
16.3	16,5	25,8	32.3	35.5	40	47,8	56,8	64,4	76,3	93,6	109	126	128
72,5	76	76	76	77	77,5	76,5	72	68,5	67	65,5	64	61,5	60,5

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The largest centers of production in the Donets Basin are Stalino, Makijivka, Kramatorska, Voroshylivhrad, Horlivka, Konstantynivka, Artemivske (Bakhmut), Slovianske etc. Mariupil is the exporting harbor.

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At the Dnipro Bend there are, among others, plants for best quality steel, ship-building yards, electro-technical factories and largescale chemical works. The gigantic power-station at Dnipropetrivske has a capacity of 558 000 KW. The main centers of production are Dnipropetrivske, Zaporizha, Dniprodshershinske, Kryvyj Rih and Nikopil. The exporting harbors are Mykolajiv and, for some products, Kherson.

The Donets Basin and the Dnipro Bend are frequently combined to-day and represent a many-sided economy on a wide basis of raw materials and power. As a combine it is contrasted with the Ural-Kusnetsk Combine (above all as regards coal and iron). Kerch with its ore mines and heavy industry gravitates towards the Donets Combine.

257 The central agrarian section of Ukraine, on both banks of
311 the Dnipro, includes industries producing foodstuffs and luxuries, above all the sugar industry. There are also plants here for manufacturing leather and medium-heavy machinery. Factories are much smaller than in the coal and ore area and the many small power-stations run on brown coal and peat.

381 The Carpathian area is the home above all of the chemical
311 industry and the capacity of the power-stations, usually run by gas and expensive imported coal, seldom by the abundant water power available, exceeds 10 000 KW only in Lviv — Uzhhorod, being used principally for lighting the towns. Industrialisation is densest on the oil-fields of Drohobych.

371 In the foreland of the Caucasus electric plants are run by
311 petroleum only and water power is not exploited at all. The small factories (petroleum, tobaceo, leather and machinery of medium weight) are too scattered to form an industrial area in the strict sense.

392 The large towns form industrial centers that are not dependent
311 on the presence of raw materials. Kharkiv has heavy engineering plants for transportation requirements, factories for agricultural machinery, electro-technical factories, and workshops for precision instruments and machinery. These are large enterprises, built recently and attached to big power-stations (Chuhujiv 25 000 KW), so that Kharkiv may be classed with the industrial area in the vicinity.

39 Kyiv builds ships and produces chemical and electro-technical
311 equipment and has chemical and textile plants as well as sugar and foodstuffs factories. In Odessa the same factories are represented and there are also canneries, leather works and plants for producing cinema installations. In addition, there are workshops that specialise in the structure of motor-cars and planes. In the other towns in the country enterprises for this or that industry have been established.

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3. Production of Coal and Iron

See Table 8 and diagrams 3 and 4

Coal mining in the Donets Basin dates from the 18th century, but at first only in order to supply the needs of the towns on the coast. It was only after railways were built in the sixties that the coal production of the Donets Basin developed. The railway as a wholesale consumer accounted for 28—35 %, and in some years 41—44 % of the production. In 1860, 100 000 tons of coal were mined; but this rapidly increased six to tenfold and soon exceeded the figure for the Dombrova Basin, the rival area in Imperial Russia. 316

The second factor which promoted development was the opening up of the iron ore area of Kryvyj Rih in the eighties. In 1884 the Donets Basin production represented 43.5 % of the production for the whole of Russia, a figure which had risen by 1914 to almost 70 %. During this period Donets Basin coal production was increased six-fold, while that of all other areas in Russia has increased three times, and world production two and a half time. In 1913 the Donets Basin produced 25.3 million t, almost 2 % of world production which placed this coalfield fifth among the coal-producing areas of the world.

In 1927 the pre-war figure was once more reached.

During the Five Year Plans it increased considerably as the remote areas where new industries were founded had to be supplied from the Donets, at least indirectly by exporting the products of heavy industry. The production for 1933—37 was 67 million t, more than two and a half times as much as the pre-war figure and 6 % of the world-production which had only increased $^1/_{10}$ since 1913.

In spite of this great absolute increase, the share of Ukraine in the total production of USSR steadily declined, from 77 % in 1927/28 to 60.5 % in 1937. This was mainly due to the forced increase in non-Ukrainian mines. As a result of shifting industrial centers east, the production of the Kusnetsk Basin alone rose in the period 1913—37 from 0.8 million t. to almost 18 million t., i. e. twenty-two fold while in the Donets Basin it increased only threefold. Capital investments were naturally correspondingly

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

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Diagram 3

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

Diagram 4.

Share of Donets Basin in the coal production of Russia (1884—1937)

higher in the Kusnetsk area, where the output capacity of a mine was 1.44 million t, or twice as much again as the corresponding figure for the Donets Basin (640 000 t).

The production of iron ore was developed from the Donets Basin because of the propinquity of coal. In 1868 Ukraine contributed scarcely 1 % of the total Russian production of 650 000 t. A change took place when the resources of Kryvyj Rih began to be exploited in the eighties. In a short time the figures for Ukraine exceeded those for Russia and Poland and, in twenty years' time, even those for the rich ore fields in the Ural. In the last year before World War I Kryvyj Rih with 6.4 million t. contributed 90 % of the steadily rising iron-ore production of Ukraine, and more than ²/₃ of the amount for

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Table 9. Production of Iron Ore in

	1868	1870	1873	1878	1880	1882	1883	1885	1987	1888
Ukraine	5	22	45	65	74	83	91	115	164	229
Ural	441	467	505	549	629	580	577	655	737	806
Russian Empire	660	800	900	920	1050	1000	1000	1100	1270	1450
% of Ukraine	3/4	3	5	7	7	8½	9	10½	13½	16

	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909
Ukraine	3440	2375	2345	2740	3575	3560	3590	4020	4090	3755
Ural	1650	1765	1300	1105	1035	1380	1240	1105	1080	1155
Russian Empire	6100	4700	4000	4200	5100	5400	5300	5[illegible]0	5500	5100
% of Ukraine	56½	50½	58½	65½	70	65½	67½	72	74½	73½

	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927
Ukraine	350	—	—	10	100	170	450	1280	2300	3800
Ural	400	150	130	90	130	195	400	870	945	940
Soviet Union	1300	180	150	150	260	400	900	2200	3400	5000
% of Ukraine	27	—	—	6	38½	42½	50	57½	67½	76

Russia, almost 6 % of that for Europe and more than 3.5 % of the world production of ore. It stood 4th in the iron-ore areas of the world, though well behind Lake Superior and the Lorraine-Luxembourg area.

In Kerch it was only towards the end of the 19th century that production became noteworthy, but even then it did not reach ½ million t. Pre-war figures were not reached till 1930: but the ratio of this contribution to the entire production declined for the same reason as in the Donets Basin. From 1929—1932 it was about pre-war level (72.5 %), but in 1937 it had sunk to about the level of the Donets coal (60.5 %) though two and a half times as much ore was actually produced. In the years 1933—37 the quantity produced amounted to 14.6 million t, i. e. 10 % of the world production. Kerch therefore came third in the iron-ore areas of the world (after USA with 39 and France with 33 million t., and before Sweden with 8.5 million t and England with 11.5 million t.).

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Ukraine (1868—1937; in 1000 tons and %)

1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	970	1245	1925	2120	3065
—	20	—	26	29½	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
344	376	472	560	650	1210	—	1380	—	1620
—	1007	—	970	1030	2900	—	4100	—	5800
—	1900	—	2100	2200	33½	—	47	—	53

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1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917
4260	5020	5780	6850	4800	6870	4800	4400	5500	3800
1180	1530	1850	1875	1085	1875	1085	—	800	510
5800	7000	8200	9300	6300	9200	6100	5700	6500	4500
73½	72	70½	76	74½	74½	78½	77	84½	84½

1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
4700	5700	7800	8000	8400	9300	13700	17000	17100	17200
1100	1770	1800	2000	3200	4100	6200	7680	(8300)	8700
6500	8000	10400	10700	12200	14500	21800	27100	27900	27800
72½	71	75	75	69	64	63	62½	(61½)	62

1886 marked the beginning of the production of manganese ore in Nikopil which reached 276 000 t in 1913, i. e. 22 % of the production for Russia and almost 12 % of that for the world. Ukraine came third after Georgia and India. In the year 1932/33 it even topped world manganese ore production with 483 000 t (the figure for the world being 1.5 % million, to which Nikopil contributed 32 %, Chiatury 20 %, India 15 %). From 1934 it slid down to the second place, though production actually increased to approximately 1 million in the years 1935—37 (more than a quarter of the world production)

4. Heavy Industry

Heavy iron industry in Ukraine has unparalleled resources of raw material at its disposal. It is true that the coal reserves in the Donets Basin do not reach those of the heavy industries in the Ural and Western Siberia (70 milliard t, of which scarcely ¼ is of good coking quality, compared with 250 milliard t, 327

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Table 10. Nikopil in World

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	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
Nikopil	9	11	29	73	58	51	46	48	60	97
Chiaturi	140	102	170	70	97	170	160	320	280	549
Russian Empire	162	114	200	143	157	222	208	370	342	648
Nikopil %	5,5	9,5	14,5	50	38,5	23	22	13	17,5	15
India	—	—	—	—	12	16	58	75	61	89
Brazil	—	—	—	—	2	5	14	16	26	65
World Production	375	260	375	310	385	395	490	630	590	990
Nikopil %	2.5	4	8	23	15	12,5	9.5	7,5	8	10
Nikopil's place in world production	—	—	4.	1.	2.	2.	3.	3.	3.	2.

	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
Nikopil	239	276	227	187	100	9	0,5	6	42	111
Chiaturi	663	258	258	204	26	55	121	—	53	194
Soviet Union	907	537	472	393	126	66	125	12	103	313
Nikopil %	26,5	51,5	48	47,5	79,5	14,5	0,5	50	40	35,5
India	694	418	665	600	526	547	748	690	482	706
Brazil	184	289	503	533	393	206	354	276	341	236
Gold Coast	—	—	4	32	31	36	44	7	67	142
Egypt	—	—	—	—	—	49	78	55	104	132
World Production	1870	1410	1860	2080	1750	1160	1160	1180	1220	1750
Nikopil %	13	19,5	12	9	5,5	1	—	0,5	3,5	7,5
Nikopil's place in world production	3.	3.	4.	4.	4.	—	—	—	6.	6.

327 practically all excellent coal); nevertheless, they amply suffice for the industrial needs of Ukraine.

135 316 Ore resources, on the other hand, are considerably richer in Ukraine. The first-class deposits at Kryvyj Rih alone are only a little less than the equally excellent deposits in the Ural (1.2 milliard t, compared with 1.4 milliard t), but as the percentage prospected is low (30 compared with 52 %), it has reserves for the future in its thick seams of iron quartzite. The iron content of the Kryvyj Rih ore being higher, it has greater resources of pure iron metal (540 million t) than the Ural (411 million t). To this we must add the iron-ore deposits at Kerch (2.7 milliard t). The manganese resources of the Donets Combine are the largest in the world (400 million t.).

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Production of Manganese Ore.

1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913
90	66	57	34	59	149	162	272	180	151	178	202	239	276
661	370	415	377	332	342	826	678	117	612	554	469	578	966
755	443	479	414	396	498	994	956	302	765	733	674	820	1245
12	15	12	8,5	15	30	16,5	28,5	59,5	20	24,5	30	29	22
130	123	160	174	153	251	579	917	685	655	814	681	643	828
108	100	157	162	208	224	121	237	166	241	254	174	155	122
1330	970	1060	940	920	1140	1920	2360	1290	1690	1900	1640	1740	2350
6,5	6,5	5,5	3,5	6,5	13	8,5	11,5	14	9	9,5	12,5	13,5	11,5
4.	4.	4.	4.	4.	4.	3.	3.	2.	4.	4.	3.	3.	3.

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1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
113	241	478	472	531	580	602	493	443	524	818	1037	(1270)	960
339	544	543	372	172	830	783	390	389	481	914	1180	1502	1650
459	787	1029	844	702	1410	1385	883	832	1021	1822	2385	3000	2750
24,5	30,5	46,5	56	75,5	41	43,5	56	53	51	45	43,5	(42,5)	35
816	853	1032	1147	994	1010	843	546	216	222	413	652	827	—
159	332	261	273	360	316	207	147	37	20	7	42	156	265
259	344	350	375	330	415	424	251	51	269	371	438	417	535
150	81	122	153	137	191	121	102	0,3	1	1	87	—	145
2140	2770	3130	3180	2960	3770	3530	2320	1290	1740	2970	4010	4920	—
5,5	8,5	15,5	15	18	15.5	17	21	34	30	27,5	26	(26)	—
6.	5.	3.	2.	2.	3.	3.	2.	1.	1.	2.	2.	2.	—

Deposits in the Ural only come second or third, even if they suffice for the needs of the Kusnetsk at the moment. The Donets Basin is particularly well supplied with subsidiary materials for heavy industry (limestone, dolomites, fire-proof alumina and graphite), there being deposits of the kinds required at Kryvyj Rih, Mariupil and Berdjanske. The distance between ore and coal is not too great to be unprofitable, viz. 350—450 km to the Donets coal from the iron ore at Kryvyj Rih, 250—350 km from the manganese ores at Nikopil and 50—100 km between the two ore-fields. It is true that in England distances are more favorable, but they are no better than in Sweden, Germany, or France. Compared with the distance between the Ural ores and the Kusnets coal (2 000 km) conditions of propinquity are first-rate in Ukraine. 135

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Diagram 5. Production of iron ore in Ukraine (1870—1937; in mill t)

Diagram 6. Share of Ukraine in the production of iron ore in Russia (1887—1937)





Diagram 6.

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Diagram 7.



Production of manganese ore in Ukraine (1885—1937; in thousand t.)

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

Diagram 8.

Share of Ukraine in the world production of manganese ore (1896—1937)

327 quity are first-rate in Ukraine. Heavy industry in Ukraine
471 was characterised from the beginning by the capitalist features that predominated in European production: protective duties and state orders greatly furthered development without handicapping other industrial centers. Pig-iron in Ukraine gradually rose to 19 % of the amount produced in all Russia. In the period 1887—1899 fifteen blast furnaces were added to the two which had been in operation since 1872. In 1913, ten of these were in the coalfields of the Donets Basin, two in the ore areas at Kryvyj Rih and Kerch and five between them. 48 blast furnaces produced 62 000 t each per year, while the 66 blast furnaces of the Ural only produced 12 800 t each and the 14 in the Central Russian area 12 100 t each and even the 11 modern furnaces in Congress Poland produced only 37 500 t each.

The following features were characteristic for Ukraine in contrast to the industrial area of the Ural:

1) a tendency to large-scale production, 2) an inclination for mass production, 3) a striving for concentration in production,

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

Production of pig iron in Ukraine (1870—1937; in million t).

so that fewer intermediate products were put on the market, 327
4) a tendency to form cartels or trusts, 5) much foreign capital, 471
6) a readier response to the influence of crises.

In 1887 pig-iron production in Ukraine amounted to 67 000 t 327
and exceeded the figures for its two weaker rivals and in 1896 (636 000 t) the figure for the Ural. In 1900 it supplied the half and in 1913 ²/₃ of the production in the whole of Russia and 4% of that in the world, coming fifth in the pig-iron areas. As a producer of steel, Ukraine came fifth with a total production of

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Diagram 10

Share of Ukraine in the production of pig iron in Russia (1878—1937)

2.7 million t, but it lagged farther behind the leading steel producing countries, and its contribution to the production for Russia and for the world was smaller than in the case of pig-iron.

In 1930 pre-war production levels were once more reached: but from 1933—37 pig-iron production increased to 7.5 million t, thus giving Ukraine the third place in world production (76 million t). In the production of steel and sheet iron, it remained fifth. But during the same period, the share of Ukraine in the total Soviet production declined steadily, as a result of the policy of the Five-Year-Plans which diverted more attention and capital to areas outside of Ukraine.

The tendency to increase and concentrate plants persisted after World War I. There were fewer furnaces (44 in 1933), but their average size increased from 382 cubic meters in 1913 to 513 cubic meters and their annual production to almost 100 000 t. The newer furnaces measured even 935 cubic meters. Modern

methods and branches of industry have been introduced, as for instance the production of superior steel and iron alloys. 327

The development of the power-station on the Dnipro entailed a certain change in the location of heavy industry. And the ratio of coal to iron per manufactured unit which was 2.8 : 1 before World War I became 1.6 : 1, though it is still more practicable to transport high quality ores to coal than vice-versa. The Dnipro power-station, however, which is more favorably situated as regards markets and consumption is attracting new foundations of enterprises in heavy industry. This is particularly true of Zaporizha. 371 327

5. Production of Machinery and Metal Goods

Even before World War I, markets were favorable for the production of machinery, above all for agricultural purposes which accounted for the work done for private customers in 126 plants. But modern, large factories were not built till after the war. New branches of production were started, e. g. for motor-cars and tractors (see huge factory in Kharkiv), machinery for mines and precision instruments while the construction of engines and railway trucks increased. The largest factories are in the Donets Combine and in the three large towns; the manufacture of agricultural machines is also distributed over other areas. 392

The non-ferrous metal industry is poorly represented. Between 1914 and 1928 there was practically no increase in the production of mercury (41 000 to 42 000 t). In the Kuban area in 1913 3 000 t zinc and 1 350 t lead were produced; in 1932 these figures were 5 000 and 3 500 t lead respectively. Under the first Five Year Plan zinc factories were erected in connection with the chemical works in Konstantynivka and aluminium works in Kichkas near the power plant on the Dnipro Bend. The annual production of the latter is estimated at 40 000 t. Fuel or power requirements play a greater part than the transportation of raw materials. The production of metal goods is confined to small factories. 328

6. Production of Electricity, Brown Coal and Peat

377 In the production of electric current Ukraine has not made much progress. The figure for 1932 was 2 800 million KWh (Germany 23460 mill. KWh, Italy 10230 million KWh, Switzerland 4 800 million KWh, Belgium 3 800 million KWh). Of the total current produced in Ukraine, 2 045 mill. KWh were contributed by Dnipro-Ukraine, 474 million by North Caucasia, 211 million by Western Ukraine. 80 % of the electric current in Dnipro-Ukraine is generated by coal (3/5 by coal dust), 15 % by petroleum and only 5.5 % by water-power.

In the period from 1927—1933 the great hydro-electric plant was constructed at Dnipropetrovske (Dniprelstan, Russian Dnjeprostroj) with a capacity of 558 000 KW; at the time it was the second largest hydro-electric plant in the world and was built by American engineers. It is a great feat of engineering. And yet scarcely 8 % of the available water-power has been exploited. The plant is of importance for shipping (in overcoming rapids in the river) and for the irrigation of arid areas, but also for industry. All manner of factories have sprung up round it — for the production of pig-iron, best-quality steel, metal and manganese alloys, aluminium, then chemical factories for sulfates, synthetic ammonia, soda etc.

316 The mining of brown coal started in the middle of the 19th century and produced from 1902—11 an annual average of 41 000 t. This figure sank rapidly after World War I. The industry began in the district round Kyiv as a result of the erection of sugar factories and it also supplied several agricultural machinery plants, but it could not hold its own in competition with Donets coal. After World War I, the production of brown coal was systematically promoted and in 1934 had reached 0.3 million t. It is used by power plants and for the manufacture of briquettes. A start has been made to produce benzine by hydro-genetic processes.

The production of peat has also grown from modest beginnings (annual production before 1914 only 23 000 t) to a considerable figure (1.1 million t in 1935). It is confined practically to Dnipro-Ukraine. It is utilised mainly by the agricultural indu-

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stry, but also by power plants. On the whole, however, brown 316
coal and peat have no great importance for Ukraine.

7. Petroleum and Gas

The petroleum industry was founded in Galicia about the 382
middle of the 19th century. In 1909 Galicia (yearly production of 2 million t) contributed 5 % of the world production of petroleum and ranked third. But an uninterrupted decline set in, so that in 1937 its figure of 510 000 t was only 16th in world production.

The reason for this decline was the splitting up of landed property and backward methods of production. Some of the 25 refineries were on Polish territory. The crude oil is transported by rail. As the high paraffin content of Galician oil causes obstruction in pipes and as the oilfields are far from the sea and the market for this oil is in Central Europe, there has been no attempt to lay pipe lines.

In the Kuban area the figure for petroleum production was only 150 000 t in 1912, but this increased under the two first Five Year Plans to 1.8 million t in 1937. Since 1900 the petroleum is conducted by pipe from Maikop to Krasnodar, the pipe being 108 km long and able to send 900 000 t a year. In 1928 it was connected with the main pipe which is 618 km long and connects the Groznyj oil-field with Tuapse, a growing harbor on the Black Sea.

Since 1893 oil-wells have been bored in Groznyj. Shortly 315
before World War I, these wells produced 1.2 million t, and in 1925 double as much, under the first Five Year Plan almost 7 million t yearly, under the second 3.7 million t. These varying yields testify to the wealth of oil, but also to the ruthless methods of exploitation, especially where oil is allowed to spurt out in jets.

In the Kuban area and in Groznyj oil refineries are equipped 382
on modern lines. In the thirties $^3/_4$ of the entire petrol requirements of Russia were supplied from this area. Pipe lines 315
also connect Groznyj with Mahach Kala on the Caspian Sea,

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Table 11. Production of Petroleum in

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	1880	1885	1890	1895	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905
Galicia	32	65	92	215	326	452	576	728	830	802
Maikop	—	18	30	22	4	5	7	5	—	1
Groznyj	—	—	—	463	500	573	527	537	660	707
Ukraine	32	83	122	700	830	1030	1110	1270	1490	1510
Russian Empire and Austria	590	1950	3720	6870	10700	12000	11600	11000	11600	8300
% of Ukraine	5½	4½	3¼	10¼	7¾	8½	9½	11½	13	18¼

	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
Galicia	765	705	715	736	770	813	796	720	745	675
Maikop	18	45	51	44	46	77	72	80	105	155
Groznyj	1207	1440	1504	1640	2014	2410	3022	3360	3690	4570
Ukraine	1990	2190	2270	2420	3830	3300	3890	4160	4540	5400
Soviet Union and Poland	4300	5300	6000	6800	7100	8500	9700	11300	12300	14400
% of Ukraine	46¼	41¼	37¾	35½	54	40¾	40	36¾	37	37½

315 with Armavir (490 km) and thence with Trudova in the Donets Basin (468 km). There is a plan to extend the lines to Dnipropetrovske (242 km).

In 1937 the petroleum produced in Ukraine, including Groznyj, amounted to 5 million t = 2 % of world production.

It is only Galicia that possesses any appreciable quantities of natural gas. During the thirties, production rose to about ½ million cubic meters, the greater part of which was used in the manufacture of gasoline. The longest pipes are from Dashava to Boryslav and Lviv.

8. Chemical Industry and the Production of Salt

385 The chief products of the chemical industry which grew rapidly during the First World War are acids (e. g. sulphuric acid) and bases, soda and artificial manure. In 1934 in Dnipro-Ukraine there were 103 plants employing 28 650 workers, 14 of these plants (12 730 workers) being big businesses. In Western

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Ukraine (1880—1937 in 1000 t and %)

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1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
770	1126	1724	2086	1763	1458	1187	1114	880	750	900	860	820
1	2	3	13	23	129	152	88	74	135	45	58	80
629	642	853	931	1214	1233	1071	1288	1446	1435	1715	1782	610
1400	1770	2580	3030	3000	2820	2410	2490	2400	2320	2660	2700	1510
8900	9700	10400	11300	11500	10700	10500	10300	10100	10100	10900	9700	4400
15¾	18¾	25	26¾	26	26¾	21	24¼	23¾	23	24½	28	34¼

1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	—	20-23	24-28	29-32	33-37
663	631	557	551	530	515	511	500	—	730	770	640	520
462	959	1015	769	1160	1335	1162	1480	—	40	90	640	1180
6955	7700	8078	5160	3520	3300	3447	3000	—	1450	2940	6820	3700
8080	9290	9650	6480	5210	5250	5120	4980	—	2220	3800	8100	5400
19300	22100	22900	22000	24600	25600	27900	27800	—	5600	9700	19700	25600
41	42	42	29½	21¼	20½	18¾	18	—	39½	39	41	21½

Ukraine in 1932 there were 115 small concerns employing 2 700 workers. 385

In 1913 about 950 000 t salt were produced (540 000 t rock salt, 200 000 t common salt, 210 000 brine salt). This figure was double for 1934 (7th in world production) but it was differently distributed (135 000 common salt, 225 000 brine salt, the rest rock salt). 317

Potash production in Ukraine in the years 1924—1932 reached 305 000 t with a K_2O content of 58 000 t which secured the third place in world production. (The corresponding figures for Germany were 9.9 and 1.1 million t, for France 2.5 and 0.4 million t). 385

Big-scale chemical production was concentrated partly in the Donets Basin and recently also round the Dnipro power plant. Sulphuric acid was produced at Konstantynivka (the main plant of the USSR with a production capacity of 30 000 t) and some smaller factories. In 1934, 350 000 t were produced (45 % of the total Russian production). Superphosphates were

385 also manufactured in Konstantynivka (200 000 t), in the Dnipro Combine (140 000 t) and in Kerch (80 000 t), also in Znesinnia near Lviv (capacity of 80 000 t). The total figure for 1932 was 70 000 t = 47 % of total Russian production.

Potash salts were manufactured into artificial manures in Kalush and Holyn while Slovjanske supplied among other products soda for the entire USSR (in 1932 = 375 000 t). By-products from coke and benzol were manufactured in the Donets Basin, the Dnipro Combine (in 1932 = 264 000 pitch, 250 000 ammonia, 132 000 tar) and in Kryvyj Rih, and more recently also synthetic ammonia and aniline dyes. Plants for the dry distillation of wood were erected in Kyiv and Carpatho-Ukraine (Byehkiv, Perechyn, Svaljava).

9. Agricultural Industry

257 The sugar industry is one of the oldest and best developed in the country and comes third after iron and coal in respect of the value of its products. The first sugar factory was built as early as 1825; in 1859/60 there were 250 factories, and before World War I, 197 (compared with 39 in Russia) with an annual production of 1.2 million t (compared with 290 000 t in Russia). Ukraine comes after Germany (1.9 million t) as the second sugar beet producing country in the world.

After a decline caused by the First World War, the pre-war figure was reached only at the beginning of the first Five Year Plan. In 1933/34 170 sugar factories were operating, and they produced 0.8 million t = 8.5 % of world sugar production (USA 1.6, Germany 1.4, France 0.9 million t). Most of the plants are in the Kyiv district and Podolia; 3 are in Galicia. The contribution of Ukraine to the entire production of USSR sank slowly but steadily as the sugar industry was subsidised by the state in the Black Earth district of Central Russia, Siberia and Central Asia. Progress was made in the Kuban area only, where there was not a single sugar factory up to 1914. In 1933/34 20 000 t of sugar were produced there.

256 The many small mills in Ukraine were replaced by big plants after World War I. In 1927/28 there were only 610 mills. Their

development has not been satisfactory. In Western Ukraine 256
small mills continued to operate with an output in 1932 of about 4 million t flour (and 170 000 t barley groats).

The oil industry manufactured native products and is best 258
developed in the Kuban area. In 1934, 90 000 t oil were produced, and in Dnipro-Ukraine 58 000 t = about 40 % of the total production for USSR. Large oil plants have been constructed since then in Slovjanske, Dnipropetrovske and Krasnodar.

More than 3/4 of the canned food required for the whole of 255
Russia was produced in Ukraine. There are plans for a large-scale development of this industry.

Breweries and distilleries are not yet developed; out of a total 274
number of 225 distilleries, 151 are in Galicia, but they supplied about 40 % of the Soviet production before the first Five-Year Plan.

There were about 80 tobacco factories before World War I, 277
with an output of 9 000 t; in 1927/28 there were only 26 factories which produced more than 20 milliard cigarettes, i. e. 360 000 t = 36 — 54 % of the production for USSR.

10. Other Branches of Industry

Slate production in Ukraine increased from 2 000 t in 1913 339
to 14 500 t in 1931; the raw material was manufactured in two plants in Zavalla and Mariupil.

A highly developed cement industry in Novorossijske (10 plants) used to produce 633 000 t annually. In 1934, 5 of the plants there produced 1 million t, and with Dnipro-Ukraine 1.5 million t = 45 % of the total production of USSR. Ukraine must come eight in world production. In Dnipro-Ukraine and North Caucasia in the same year, 940 000 t of fire-proof earthenware and dinas bricks were produced, 924 000 t lime, 220 000 t chalk, 207 000 t alabaster and 37 000 t gypsum.

Excellent kaolin is found in Dnipro-Ukraine. In 1913 34 400 t 323
and in 1931, 78 500 t were produced. In 1928 the 11 porcelaine factories in the country had an output of 18 700 t (1/3 of total

323 Soviet production). These, it is true, were small and old-fashioned factories; an enormous factory with an annual capacity of 40 000 t per annum has been planned and probably also erected in Mariupil. The glass industry is poorly developed, although its produce represents in value one third of the total production for the USSR. A large glass factory with an annual production capacity of 60 000 t was erected in Lysychansk. There is an extensive leather industry and a small production of paper, matches, india-rubber and textiles. The manufacture of soap, fats and chemical and pharmaceutical produce is fairly well developed. Arts and crafts which are largely practised in the family are on a very high level.

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Communications

1. Conditions and Modes of Communication

489 The communication system of Ukraine is far from satisfactory, although natural conditions favor the construction of roads and railways and communication by ship. The defects in the Ukrainian network of communication are due rather to historical causes: the fact that it belongs to a state that has never been able to maintain an orderly system of communication is the main reason for the inadequacy of communication routes and facilities in Ukraine.

As the sea forms only 1/4 of the entire frontier of Ukraine and as the nation was shut off from it for centuries by peoples of other races, it never became a main artery of communication for the country. The rivers, once so important as channels of communication and colonisation have declined more and more with the increasing claims made by modern transportation.

Country roads cannot be included in a system of long-distance communication. Geological conditions in some districts are unfavorable but an incapable policy of communications and economy is mainly responsible for the present situation.

2. Railroads

490 The railway is therefore the most important element in the system of communications; 209 million t were transported by rail in 1934 as compared with 5.8 million t by river and 8.5 million t by sea.

The first railroad was constructed in 1863—65 from Odessa to Balta (260 km) and was extended in 1870 to Kirovohrad. This

496 was due to the initiative of local authorities and to business circles in Odessa. A connection was desired between the centers of grain production and the harbors of Odessa and Mariupil and the Donets Basin. Moreover Odessa wanted to be linked up with Germany's long-distance communication system.

But the business world of Moscow feared an invasion by foreign capital and wanted to secure the Ukrainian market for itself. So the railway network of Ukraine was developed under the influence of Moscow. The main lines were first of all to connect Petersburg and Moscow with remote areas and the sea and to facilitate the export of grain from Ukraine from harbors on the Black Sea. So the railways in Dnipro-Ukraine run mostly north-west-south-east, which only partly corresponds to historical communications (the Viking road from the Baltic to the Black Sea). The west-east line of communication was mainly of importance within Ukraine. Long-distance connections with Central Europe were not taken into consideration at all. There was no provision made even for convenient connections between Kyiv and Kharkiv, Odessa and other large towns. Some lines to the (north) west were intended to afford facilities for transporting grain to the Baltic ports (Kyiv-Berestya; Kyiv-Kowel; Romen-Libau). The most important line connects the Donets Basin with the ore-fields at the Dnipro-Bend and also with the sugar factories in the Right Bank Region.

The development of railroads in the Donets Basin began as early as 1869 and was continued in the seventies. In the eighties the Zaporizha railway was built. If the transportation of grain had originally determined the line of communications, more importance was now laid on the transportation of coal, ore, and iron. In the second half of the seventies 5.1 million t grain, 1.5 million t coal, 0.4 million t iron and steel were transported. Round about the turn of the century (1898—1902) the corresponding figures are 10.2, 10.6, and 2 and in 1913 = 14.6, 14.6, and 3.4 million t, and, in addition, 6 million t minerals, 3.6 million t wood materials, 2.5 million t sugar beet, 1.7 million t industrial wood, 1.4 million t flour, 0.8 million t salt and 0.6 million t sugar.

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The Donets Basin is a great junction, though smaller places are usually selected for the intersection of routes. Kyiv is not a proper junction, as only two lines cross each other here: in Kharkiv, on the other hand, 6 lines meet and make the town one of the most important junctions in Dnipro-Ukraine. 496

But Lviv is the busiest center of communication on Ukrainian territory, 9 lines radiating from it in all directions. 5 lines intersect in Stryj, Stanislaviv and Tarnopil respectively.

The network of railways in Galicia is altogether more centralised and more practically planned for strategical reasons and as a result of the separation from Hungary by the Carpathians. The main-lines run west-east (Cracow-Peremyshl-Lviv-Stanislaviv-Chernivtsi). 5 lines cross the mountains (Popradtal, Lubkovpass, Uzhok, Beskides and the Tatra Pass). 10 lines went to the Russian frontier, but only three were continued on the other side.

The density of the railroad net is also greater in the provinces formerly under Austria-Hungary than in those under Russia, with the exception of the Donets Basin. The figures for the entire Ukrainian territory can be compared with those for the rest of Europe in the middle thirties as follows:

Country	Length in 1000 km	Density per 100 sq. km	Density per 10 000 inhabitants
Germany	54.2	11.5	8.2
France	42.5	7.7	10.1
England	30.8	12.6	6.6
Ukraine	24.4	2.6	4.5
Poland	20.1	5.2	6.0
Italy	17.0	5.5	4.0
Czechoslovakia	13.5	9.6	8.9
Roumania	11.2	3.8	5.9
Belgium	5.0	16.4	6.5
USSR	83.5	0.4	4.9

The intensity of communication by rail was not great. The average speed per hour in Western Ukraine was 60—70 km, in the eastern areas of the national territory 50—60 km, but only

496 on the main lines. On side-lines the speed was about half as much. The distance between stations in Dnipro-Ukraine are far too great (10.8 km); in Carpatho-Ukraine and Galicia they are 4.2 and 3.7 respectively.

497 Travel is constantly increasing in Ukraine. In Dnipro-Ukraine the number of passengers rose from 49 millions in 1913 (5.3 mrd. passenger/km) to 60 millions in 1927/28 and to 200 millions in 1935 (11.6 mrd. passenger/km). Goods traffic increased from 95 million t (19.6 mrd. t/km) to 204 million t (51.4 mrd. t/km) in 1935. This increase of 300 % and 115 % respectively corresponded neither to the extension of the railroad net (23 %) nor to the increase in the means of transportation (engines 25 %, trucks 50 %) even if the traction power of the individual engine had greatly increased. (from 143 000 t in 1914 to 221 000 t in 1933).

3. Country Roads

491 In Dnipro-Ukraine there are mostly country-roads without side-ditches. They are not artificially built, and are often impassable in spring and autumn, and too dusty in summer so that they can only be used in winter. As they also form the approach to railway stations, they are responsible for gluts or shortages of railroad trucks: sugar factories, in particular, suffer from these circumstances during the beet harvest. Before the first World War there were only 2 770 km of paved highways (and 3 500 km of others). In Volynia and Podolia there were 13 or 15 meters respectively per sq. kilometer, in the districts round Kyiv and Chernyhiv, 5.6 meters each, while in France there were 1125 meters and in Germany 560 meters. Under the first Five-Year Plan serious attempts at improvements were made; the proportion of paved highways in the entire network of roads was to be raised from 2.3 % to 4.5 %. In reality the entire length of paved highways in 1935 amounted to 8 500 km. Northern Caucasia had 600 km of paved highways at this time. Things were much better in Galicia, which had 10 100 km of paved highways. After the First World War, however, Poland neglected road construction. In Carpatho-Ukraine, on the other hand, where there were 2 400 km of paved highways, the

491 roads were superior in quality to those in Galicia and the network was denser. The total length of highways in Ukraine was approximately 24 000 km. There was little motor traffic: there was more in Carpatho-Ukraine but in 1937 there were in Ukraine only 13 cars per 10 000 inhabitants (in France 492, England 431, Germany 183).

4. Inland Waterways

133 As regards length and the area of their basins, the rivers of
487 Ukraine are among the largest in Europe, but their navigability suffers from frequent windings, shallows and rapids. In summer variations in the water level are a great disadvantage, while in winter the rivers are frozen for 3—4 months. As the rivers melt from the mouth, there is no danger from ice-floes. 90 % of the rivers flow into the Black Sea, some into the Vistula and two insignificant streams into the Caspian Sea. The Dnipro and some of its tributaries are navigable as are also 4 other rivers:

The Dnipro is 2 248 km long and drains an area of 518 500 square kilometers, so that it is the third biggest river in Europe. By the dam it has been made navigable for 1 250 kilometers. Its tributaries, the Pripyat, the Desna and the Seym are also navigable. The total length of the Dnipro navigable network is 3250 kilometers, while 4 300 km of waterways can be used for shipping and floating rafts, i. e. more than $^2/_3$ of the total waterways in Ukraine (6 200 km).

505 Freight traffic on the Dnipro did not reach the pre-war level of 2.7 million t till 1932 and had increased by 1935 to 3.9 million t. Passenger traffic doubled in those years and amounted to 4.8 millions. $^1/_3$ of the goods transported was wood, and $^1/_4$ mineral building materials, more than $^1/_8$ grain, while coal, ore and metal were poorly represented. The important harbor towns on the Dnipro are Kyiv, Dnipropetrivske, Nishnodniprovske and Kherson.

The Dnister (1 372 km long, draining an area of 77 000 sq. km) has been prevented by geological and political conditions from developing any great shipping. Upper reaches and lower belong to two absolutely different political systems. Before the

505 First World War grain, wood, gypsum and building stone (250 000 t) were transported on the river, while later only wood was shipped on the upper reaches.

133 487 505 The Kuban (800 km long, with a basin of about 60 000 sq.km) has its source in Caucasian glaciers and is navigable all the year round for a stretch of 350 km. It is true that gravel and sandbanks make shipping difficult. In 1935 230 000 t of freight were shipped down the river. The Boh (709 km long, with a basin of 64 000 sq.km) has little water and many rapids. 100 km are navigable, but traffic is negligible. Of the Don (1984 km long, with a basin of 425 000 sq.km) which is the fourth biggest river in Europe, only the navigable lower reaches belong to Ukraine. Goods transported are above all grain, coal, salt-254 000 t in 1935. Conveyance of passengers is negligible.

Its right tributary, the Donets (1 020 km, with a basin of 99 000 km) crosses the Donets Basin and is navigable for a stretch of 350 km. The Buh, Vepr and Syan, Prut, Seret and Tysa are only important for floating down logs.

503 The condition of the Ukrainian waterways is not imposing, though Ukraine comes fourth in Europe with its 6 200 km of navigable rivers. There is no thorough system of regulating the rivers or building canals to connect them, though this has been planned for decades. There are only 200 km of canals. The following artificial systems of communication by water have been planned:

a) reconstruction of the Viking way and the linking up of Leningrad, Kyiv and Kherson (2 canals each 30 km long);

b) a connection between Riga and Kherson, in place of the antiquated route via the Beresina which has existed since 1805;

c) development of the now inadequate route (Oginski-Canal etc. 343 km) between the Dnipro or the Pripyat, Pina and Jasiolda and — via the Shara — the Memel linking Kherson with Königsberg;

d) (Royal canal etc. 233 km) between the Pina and — via the Mukhovets — the Buh and the Vistula, connecting Kherson with Danzig;

e) the construction of a canal from the Dnipro, via the Desna and the Bolva (30 km) to the Zizdra and Oka, and so to Moscow and the Volga; 503

f) a canal between the Dnipro and the Donets, via Samara and Vovcha;

g) a connection between Danzig and the Black Sea via the Vistula and the Syan, linking up with the Dnister and perhaps the Prut;

h) a canal between the Caspian and the Black Sea, via the valley of the Manych, a tributary of the Don and the Sea of Oziv.

5. Sea Traffic

The position of Ukraine like a fan, spreading out from the 133
Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv is particularly favorable for 504
the export of mass products, while the coast of the Black Sea has not many natural harbors. Ports can, however, be built in the limans of the river-mouths. The coast of the Sea of Oziv is definitely unfavorable. It is only recently that harbor equipment has been mechanised and the harbors themselves improved.

Odessa is the third largest harbor in Russia, coming after Riga and Leningrad and lying in a bay 30 km north-east of the Dnister liman which is too shallow for shipping. The harbor is well constructed and freezes only for 2—3 weeks, which is easy to manage. Odessa is the only port in Ukraine where ex- 505
ports practically balance imports (in 1913: 2113 and 2061 t. average for 1930—1934: 1234 and 1550 thousand t). These figures refer to the total turn-over, in which figures for coastal trade exceed those for actual exports. In the former the import figures were higher and in the latter the export figures.

In Odessa grain forms the biggest part of the freight which also includes sugar, wood, methylated spirits and oil-cake. The imports are groceries, fruit, textile raw materials, chemicals etc. The town had become an important financial center with a stock exchange.

Mykolaiv on the liman of the Boh has a well built harbor 504
with good connections with the hinterland. Grain and ore from

504 Kryvyj Rih and Nikopil are the chief exports, imports being much less significant.

[503] Since the harnessing of the rapids of the Dnipro, Kherson has developed quickly. The harbor lies on the Dnipro liman which is 60 km long, 5.20 km wide and 5—9 m. deep. Grain and wood are the most important freights handled.

Novorossiiske, the largest harbor in Northern Caucasia is the port for the grain from the Kuban and the Volga areas, and the wood that is transported by rail and on the Volga from Stalingrad, cement from the local factories etc.

Tuapse, in the most easterly area of Ukraine exports grain and, above all, petroleum from Maikop and valuable Caucasian wood. In Theodosia grain and fruit make up the freight while Sevastopil is exclusively a harbor for warships.

Mariupil, an artificial harbor, is the busiest port on the Sea of Oziv. Donets coal is transported for the Kerch furnaces and to countries abroad, also rocksalt from Artemivske and grain. The return freight consists partly of Kerch iron ore for the Donets Basin.

Rostov on the Don exports grain. It had grown at the expense of Taganrih even before the first World War.

Berdianske — not nearly so important as Rostov — owes its trade to the excellent wheat grown in the neighborhood. Henycheske and 10 other small ports play no great part in sea trade.

501 The Black Sea mercantile fleet was never very big: in 1913 it had only 416 steamers, 22 motor boats and 887 sailing ships with a total tonnage of 473 000 brt-. It only reached pre-war level under the second Five Year Plan. A large proportion of the trade with foreign countries was always carried on foreign ships. In 1934, for instance, there were far more Greek than native ships in the Russian ports on the Black Sea (with the exception of Odessa) — 1 350 000 net registered tons, 37 % of all shipping, compared with 760 000 net registered tons and 21 % native tonnage.

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Trade in merchandise in the Ukrainian harbors was always 505
characterized by the predominance of coastal traffic (cabotage) and inland transportation (more than 70 % of all shipments) over foreign trade (not quite 30 %) and the latter by the excess of exports over imports. Turnovers in Ukrainian harbors increased with swelling exports and reached a peak in the years 1909—1911, but had a disastrous setback after World War I and even under the second Five Year Plan attained only 15 million t, i. e. less than the 17 million t of pre-war years. Foreign trade decreased more than the entire turnover, imports more than exports, so that it was only the excess of the latter that increased.

The following contributed more than 1 % of the entire merchandise passing through the harbors of the USSR alone: in 1913, first of all grain (43.6 %), then a long way behind, coal (20.3 %), then ores (7.7 %), sugar (2.6 %), metals and metal products (2.6 %), salt (1.8 %), building materials (1.7 %), petroleum (products) (1.1 %), fruit (1.1 %), In 1934 hard coal came first (26.9 %), then petroleum (24.8 %) and grain only third (13.4 %), then ores (7.1 %), metals and metal products (6.6 %), building wood (4.4 %), salt (2.4 %), building materials (2.2 %), sugar (1.3 %). A comparison of these statistics shows the decline in the export of grain and sugar.

While the passenger traffic greatly increased after the First World War, there was practically none with foreign countries, but only between Soviet ports. In 1935, 2.8 million people were transported between the Ukrainian harbors on the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv and in 1934 1.8 million between ports of the USSR alone, 29.6 % being contributed by Kherson, 28.9 % by Odessa and 18 % by Hola Prystan, otherwise an insignificant port.

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Trade

Domestic and Foreign Trade

471 It was characteristic of the Ukrainian territory that trade was largely in the hands of aliens. To counteract this an efficient system of co-operative organisations grew up and spread over other provinces than trade. This phenomenon will be treated later as an independent feature.

439 The foreign trade of Ukraine is of great importance for many other European countries. It must not be judged by conditions of recent years when trade between Ukraine and the rest of Europe has been depressed and any considerable trade in merchandise has only existed with the USSR. We must return to the time before the first World War if we wish to get a true picture of the natural possibilities of exchange of merchandise between Ukraine and the countries of Central and Western Europe, though we must also bear in mind the changes that have taken place in Ukrainian economy and in the entire position of world trade.

Balance and Trade before 1914

No exact balance of trade can be calculated for the Ukrainian national territory for the years before the first World War. Statistics were drawn up in Russia for Dnipro-Ukraine, but they only included 9 provinces, viz. Volynia, Kyiv, Podolia, Chernyhiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson, Tauria (the last three names were often combined as the "South Steppe" or "New Russia"). Parts of Ukrainian territory were omitted from these statistics, e. g. the Kholm district, districts in Podlakhia, in the province of Kursk and Voronesh etc., and the Ukrainian part of the Kuban area was quite isolated. So that

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a balance of trade for Ukraine did not even cover the whole of the central part of the Ukrainian national territory, to say nothing of the areas that are linked up with Russia. 439

Nor did Ukrainian Galicia form an independent unit of administration in Austria; it was administered together with a Polish area, as was the same with the Ukrainian part of Bucovina, which was under Roumanian administration, and Carpatho-Ukraine under Hungarian administration. An approximately exact balance can therefore be calculated only for Dnipro-Ukraine; for the remainder, general estimates only can be given. [631]

Kryvchenko's figures for 1909—1911 give the best idea of the balance of trade for Dnipro-Ukraine before World War I. 1909—1911 were the last normal years for export trade via the Black Sea before the wars between Turkey and Italy and the Balkan wars. In the case of Ukraine which was not an independent state, a distinction must be made between export to foreign countries proper and export to other parts of the Russian empire. And the same distinction must be made for imports. The actual volume of Ukrainian imports or exports is obtained by adding these two categories, and the same holds for other sections of Ukrainian national territory. The "Russian exports from the Ukrainian provinces of the empire to foreign countries" would result in a low figure, which is by no means correct but which is sometimes quoted. The following are the characteristic features of the Dnipro-Ukrainian balance of trade before the first World War; the distinction already mentioned between exports and imports both beyond the frontiers and in trading with other parts of Russia, the latter category being a little in excess of the former; the fact that it was definitely favorable, both absolutely and relatively, particularly as regards foreign countries; the predominant share of agriculture in exports; the difference between the volume and quality of manufactured goods exported to foreign countries and those exported to other parts of Russia; the predominance of finished industrial commodities imported. Turnovers in foreign trade varied greatly, according to whether foreign countries or other parts of the Russian empire were concerned. In 1909—1911 the latter ac-

439 counted for 790 million roubles and were higher by 1/3 than the turnovers with countries outside of Russia (470 million roubles). As regards exports, this proportion was not very unfavorable, as exports to non-Ukrainian areas of Russia exceeded those abroad only by 1/6. But imports from non-Ukrainian Russia were three and a half times more than those from foreign countries.

Most of the exports were not sent to Russia proper but to Poland, White Ruthenia and the Baltic provinces. The majority of imports came from Russia itself (cotton products). These facts reflect the political situation.

439 The balance of trade in Dnipro-Ukraine (1909—1911) was
457 favorable expressed both in absolute and relative values. Exports were 350 % of imports in trade with foreign countries and 115 % in trade with areas in Russia, approximately 170 % in all "foreign" trade. The balance in money was 263, 60, 323 million roubles respectively. It was very high (55.5 %) in comparison with the turnover in trade with foreign countries (475 mill. r.). The figure indicating the extent to which the balance of trade was favorable was much lower (7 %) for the larger turnover (792 mill. r.) with non-Ukrainian areas within Russia, while it was approximately 26 % for the entire turnover (1267 million roubles).

In 1913 balance and turnover had increased to 414 (for foreign trade to 272) and 1 600 million roubles respectively for all trade with countries outside of Ukraine but the relation of one to the other remained the same (26 %). The relation of export to import trade also remained the same (170 %) as both had increased to the same extent. The absolute value of the favorable balance of trade for Dnipro-Ukraine had risen, though relatively it had remained the same. In the entire Russian balance of trade before World War I, on the other hand, the favorable balance sank from 429 million roubles (1591—1162) in 1911 to 347 (1519—1172) in the following year and to 146 million roubles (1520—1374) in the last year before the war. Without Dnipro-Ukraine the Russian balance of trade was unfavorable by 268 million roubles.

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The agricultural nature of Ukrainian export trade is clearly 439
expressed in the balance of trade. 86 % of the entire exports are contributed by agricultural products, if partly manufactured (flour 14 % and, above all sugar, 28 %). In trade with foreign countries the 99 % contributed by agricultural produce is more than impressive while the 74 % share of export trade with other parts of Russia is significant enough. Grain was exported above all to foreign countries and flour and sugar to non-Ukrainian areas within Russia. And here we come to another characteristic of the export trade of Dnipro-Ukraine, its lack of uniformity corresponding to its agricultural origin.

The extent to which exports are manufactured varies in the balance of trade according to whether the commodities were destined for foreign countries or for non-Ukrainian areas in Russia. In the first case the share of industrially manufactured commodities is small (sugar 6 %, flour 2 %) even if we take the products of more intense agriculture into consideration and include animal produce (7 %; total 15 %). In export to Russian countries, on the other hand, this share is high: besides sugar and flour (together 65 %), some products of chemical industry are contained in "other produce". "Metals and produce" (21 %) are not raw materials, but half-manufactured commodities. Without being definitely an industrial land, the Dnipro-Ukraine, in comparison with other parts of the Russian empire plays an outstanding part as a source of industrially manufactured commodities. Such merchandise represents about half of the entire foreign trade, and about 60 % if animal produce is included. But the question is, to what extent are these commodities manufactured? "Metals and products" (11.5 %) are partly half-manufactured. In any case the export trade of Dnipro-Ukraine was quite different according as it was directed to foreign or to Russian countries.

Three quarters of the imports to Dnipro-Ukraine came from other parts of the Russian empire and one quarter from foreign countries. These consisted for the most part of manufactured industrial products (about $^{2}/_{3}$ of the entire total) and to a small extent of foodstuffs and luxuries ($^{1}/_{3}$). Textiles from Russia (cotton and linen goods) and Poland (woolen goods) formed

439 40 % of the entire manufactures. Machinery and metal products came principally from Germany, wood from White Ruthenia and Russia, groceries from abroad, but tea partly from or via Russia. Dnipro-Ukraine got petroleum products from Ukrainian areas in Northern Caucasia. Many superfluous commodities were imported (steel, cement, coke, wood and bunker coal, phosphorites and acids), many manufactured goods could be made from available materials.

The balance of trade for the entire Ukrainian territory is in essentials similar to that for Dnipro-Ukraine. In Galicia exports practically balanced imports so that the inclusion of that province in statistics for the entire territory merely increased the turnover figure but not the favorable balance in terms of money. As regards individual items, however, the export of petroleum (products) plays an important part in the balance for the entire territory, for Dnipro-Ukraine imported those commodities, and the same holds for wood which Carpatho-Ukraine also exported in relatively large quantities. The share of animal produce is increased by the addition of Galicia which exported a considerable quantity of cattle, pigs and meat (to Vienna, and partly to Bohemia) and also eggs.

In the Kuban area exports greatly exceeded imports, so that the credit side of the balance of trade for the whole of Ukraine is increased by the addition of this area. It also enhances the position of Ukraine in the world grain market, as grain, and particularly wheat and barley, formed one of the main exports from the Kuban area (86 % of the volume of export trade and probably 60 % of the value in money, though no estimates of money values are available). The export of oil from sun-flowers, oil-cake and tobacco is also characteristic. On the other hand sugar, one of the main articles of export from Dnipro-Ukraine is poorly represented as are also poultry and eggs. Petroleum and petroleum products are among the most important non-agricultural exports which, however, do not include coal, ores and metals.

Balance of Trade after World War I

Changes in the structure of the balance of trade for Dnipro-Ukraine are more important, especially on the export side than

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alterations in volume and turnover. Dnipro-Ukraine formerly used to export a great part of its surplus produce to countries abroad (i. e. beyond the frontiers of Russia); if we remember that other exports were sent mainly to Poland, White Ruthenia and the Baltic provinces, we see that the central area of Russia proper was not much of a market for Ukraine (mostly for sugar). 439

After World War I and particularly as a result of the economic policy of the Five Year Plan, political relations became decisive also for export, as they had formerly been, at least partially, for import. The nationalisation of production and trade forced export into channels prescribed by the Soviet government to effect as close a connection as possible with central areas in Russia. Export from Ukraine to countries abroad existed only in very modest proportions.

Dnipro-Ukraine balance of trade has not changed much as regards volume or the extent to which it is favorable. If we bear in mind the changes in political frontiers that have taken place since 1913 the pre-war figure for exports of 720 million roubles more or less remains the same for 1934. The favorable balance of 335 million roubles also approximately corresponded to that for 1909—1911, the relation of export to import, 190 %, is rather higher, and so is the relation of balance to turnover (335 : 1105 = 30 %).

But marked changes have taken place in the individual items exported. Agricultural produce sank to 30 %, i. e. a little more than $^1/_3$ of the old level. The export of grain, expressed in absolute quantities, sank from 6.7 to 1 million t (i. e. by 85 %) while the export of animal produce practically disappeared.

The 22 % of sugar exports represented about a quarter of the old figure. Mining produce (coal, ores) rose from 1.6 % to almost 21 %, and the quantity exported to almost 21 million t. Metals and metal products, formerly 11.5 % of value of exports, now account for 50 % and are the most important single item. Ukraine is therefore no longer a country for exporting agricultural produce; it supplies industrial raw materials and products of heavy industry and partly also machinery.

Alterations in imports are not so important in principle, but there are marked changes in the relation of the different com-

439 modities imported to one another. Textile products still head the list, they represent 47 % of the entire imports, a higher percentage than before the war. Imports of petroleum and petroleum products in connection with increasing motorisation, is of significance; this item has increased fourfold in percentage from 7.2 to 28.5 % and in volume from less than 300 000 t to almost 2 million t. The figures for the import of wood also show a sharp increase (now 18 %). On the other hand numerous small items of half-manufactured goods and industrial produce, but also of foodstuffs and luxuries have disappeared.

Merchandise Exported and Lands of Destination

The commodities imported into and exported from the Ukrainian national territory have remained essentially the same though changes in volume have taken place. Ukraine is actually or potentially a source of exports, above all of grain, eggs, sugar, salt, coal, iron and manganese ores, heavy iron industry produce, machinery, chemicals etc. Peripheral areas export large quantities of petroleum (products) and wood, while the central area imports them. Ukraine is a market for manufactured industrial produce, specially textiles, also for machinery and tools, partly also for chemical products etc. Central and Western Europe are interested in the export of grain, eggs, coal, iron and manganese ores, and partly also in petroleum (products).

The grain exports from Dnipro-Ukraine must be supplemented by the heavy exports from the Kuban area (1904—1913 = 1.5 million t); the sections of Ukrainian territory included in Austria-Hungary exported very little grain. In the years 1909—1911 eastern Ukraine exported in all 8.6 million t, which represented $^4/_5$ of the entire exports of grain from Russia and $^1/_5$ of world export of grain; this made it first as a land exporting grain in general, first also for wheat, rye and barley, third for oats and fourth for maize (see Table 2).

$^4/_5$ of the volume exported went to countries abroad, and only $^1/_5$ to other parts of Russia, though mostly not to Russia proper but to Poland, White Ruthenia and the Baltic provinces. The main consumers of Ukrainian grain abroad were Germany and

439 Holland, i. e. in reality it was Germany as in Holland it was mostly a case of transit trade. In the years 1909—1911 Germany alone imported 2.7 million t "Russian" barley for feeding every year, which came from Ukrainian territory. Russian exports of wheat to Italy also came from Ukraine and they amounted to approximately 1 million t with smaller quantities of other grain. Ukrainian grain was also exported to England, France, Greece etc. Only very little flour was exported abroad by Dnipro-Ukraine.

After the first World War grain exports sank to a fraction of the pre-war amount (about $^1/_7$). The reasons for this were the increased population, industrialisation, alterations in distribution of ownership, but also backward agricultural methods. But collectivisation and the Soviet form of economy introduced into Ukrainian territory did more than those to nip in the bud the favorable signs that were evident before the Five Year Plan.

And still the good harvests of recent years have resulted in an increase of exports from Ukraine to Russia. In 1937 Dnipro-Ukraine alone is said to have exported approximately 4½ million t. A large proportion of this was due to extremely good harvest conditions and almost as much to the ruthlessness with which Soviet officials collected contributions, no adequate allowance having been made for the population of Ukraine. The further increase in grain exports from Ukraine could not be reckoned as a permanent item in Soviet economy and it would be far too optimistic to conclude that such enormous reserves of grain were actually available. But the export figure given above is at any rate a valuable index of the capacity of Ukraine to export several million tons (about 5—7) when conditions are once more normal.

The individual provinces of Ukrainian territory stood first in world export of eggs. Assuming that the export capacity of Dnipro-Ukraine is unchanged, a higher figure would be reached than even for the best egg-exporting countries. Exports of eggs from Ukraine, which had been 90—100 000 t and 20 % of world export (450 000 t), sank in the years before 1927 to 58 000 t and 12% of world export which had risen in 1927 to 500 000 t. As a result of Five Year Plans and collectivisation no more eggs were exported from Ukraine. Most of the eggs exported from Ukraine used to go to Germany and Austria. Sugar was exported

Table 12. Nikopil's supply of world market with

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Export	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906
Nikopil	21	12	6	14	20	37	91
Chisturi	419	308	444	445	465	334	483
Russian Empire	440	320	450	459	485	371	574
% of Nikopil	5	3,5	1,5	3	4	10	16
Br. India	133	135	158	184	184	331	563
Brazil	108	100	157	162	208	224	121
Gold Coast	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
World Export	925	770	945	955	980	014	1395
% of Nikopil	2,5	1,5	0,5	1,5	2	3,5	6,5

Export	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925
Nikopil	—	—	3	38	38	31	168
Chisturi	5	176	25	168	353	477	433
Soviet Union	5	176	28	206	391	508	601
% of Nikopil	—	—	10,5	18,5	9,5	6	28
Br. India	388	819	539	891	827	779	751
Brazil	206	454	276	341	23[illegible]	159	312
Gold Coast	34	44	7	62	138	237	344
South Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Egypt	—	—	47	—	—	—	42
World Export	775	1570	935	1585	165[illegible]	1760	2070
% of Nikopil	—	—	—	2,5	2,5	2	8
Nikopil in world export	—	—	—	5.	5.	5.	5.

from Dnipro Ukraine to Russia and even to Asia, but not to European countries.

Hard coal was exported abroad even before World War I from the Donets Basin. The countries round the Black Sea and the Mediterranean were the main consumers — Turkey, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and France. But no great quantities were exported to those countries. In 1931 about 1.2 million tons of coal were shipped in Ukrainian ports, almost ½ million t to Italy, a little less to the Middle East etc. Almost half of the exports (45 %) consisted of anthracite, while most of the coal was sent to non-Ukrainian areas in Russia — more than 16 million t in 1934 (only 7 million t in 1913). The industrial centers of European Russia and the railways depend mostly on Donets coal. In 1934 almost 20 million t of hard and coking coal was exported altogether.

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manganese ore (1900 — 1937 in 1 000 t and %).

439

907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
109	51	65	68	49	78	91	44	—	—	—	0,3
509	395	555	616	586	930	1103	708	—	1,5	4,2	32,5
618	446	620	684	635	1008	1196	752	—	1,5	4,2	32,8
17,5	11,5	10,5	10	7,5	7,5	7,5	6	—	—	—	1
659	516	591	685	634	800	818	515	481	663	445	393
237	166	241	254	174	155	122	184	289	503	533	393
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	30	32
1650	1175	1490	1660	1495	2030	2230	1490	805	1245	1130	1025
6,5	4,5	4,5	4	3,5	4	4	3	—	—	—	—

1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
211	206	227	239	220	226	37	159	125	64	8	—
472	555	281	743	570	515	382	490	580	580	606	1001
683	761	508	982	790	741	419	649	705	644	614	1001
31	27	44,5	24,5	28	30,5	9	24,5	17,5	10	1,5	—
623	857	848	980	785	425	306	382	516	879	750	997
320	242	362	293	192	96	21	25	2	61	166	241
350	375	330	426	424	251	51	269	345	405	418	536
—	—	—	—	48	105	3	22	66	81	208	483
48	37	44	22	22	14	8	—	12	7	65	64
2050	2400	2180	2710	2235	1640	830	1390	1715	2120	2260	3450
10,5	8,5	10,5	9	10	14	4,5	11,5	7,5	3	0,5	—
5.	5	5	5.	4.	4.	4.	4.	4.	5.	—	—

The export of iron ore was greatly restricted by the heavy demands of domestic consumption, as most of the ore was utilised by domestic heavy iron industry. In 1908—1915 about 1 million t ore, i. e. 20 % of the amount mined then, were exported from Kryvyj Rih beyond the frontiers of Dnipro-Ukraine. 380 000 t of that amount were sent to non-Ukrainian areas of Russia, mainly to Poland, 870 000 t were exported to foreign countries, 445 000 t by sea.

Germany, the main market for Ukrainian exports in ore, took almost all the quantity sent overland (225 000 t) and also a considerable quantity of the iron ore sent by sea, partly via Holland; it consumed in all 79—99 % of all the iron ore exported from Ukraine, the amount varying with the year.

Before World War I the Georgian deposits in Chiaturi were the main source of the exports abroad of manganese ores. The

439 Ukrainian manganese ores at Nikopil were reserved for domestic consumption. Still in the five years from 1910—1914, 65 700 t were exported abroad, scarcely 7.7 % of the total Russian export and 3.7 % of world export. In the time between 1925—1929 the exports of manganese ore from Nikopil reached a height of 210 000 t annually (30 % of the Soviet and 9 % of the world export) but sank during the next five years to 153 000 t and ceased altogether in 1927 in consequence of the increasing needs of the USSR for domestic consumption.

In the years when it was exporting most (1925—28) Nikopil exported 200 000 t mainly to 6 countries. Germany took 43 % Luxemburg 31 %, Poland 10 %, Italy 8 %, France 5 %, England 3 %. But Nikopil manganese ore was also exported to non-Ukrainian areas of USSR. In the years 1930—1934 Ukrainian production of pig-iron amounted to approximately 54 % of the figure for USSR. During the same five years manganese ore production in the USSR amounted on an average to 1 185 000 t. Of this amount 661 000 t are deducted for export, so that the amount consumed was 524 000 t, in Ukraine 335 000 t. But Nikopil delivered 423 000 t for home consumption, so that Ukraine exported to non-Ukrainian Russia 88 000 t. This added to the figure for exports abroad gives approximately 240 000 t i. e. 15.5 % of world production of manganese ore (5th place). (See Table 12).

Petroleum and petroleum products were exported from Galicia and Northern Caucasia. Only when we include Groznyj Ukraine has a considerable excess of exports over imports, as Dnipro-Ukraine does not import more than 2 million t (in 1934) and only 500—800 000 t more than the amount produced in the Ukrainian territory in the Kuban area. 3—3.5 million t of the oil produced at Groznyj would remain for export, and also the amount produced in Galicia (½ million t). In 1935 Galician oil was exported partly to Poland (about 200—240 000 t) and partly abroad (170 000 t), mostly to Germany.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Co-operative Organisations

The beginning of co-operative organisations in Dnipro-Ukraine and Western Ukraine date from the seventies and eighties of the 19th century. Foreign ideas and organisations supplied the model (especially English — Rochdale) e. g. the German foundations by Schulze — Delitzsch and Reiffeisen for credit co-operative societies. But they developed along other lines, their development being determined by legal and economic conditions which were nowhere the same — in the Russian Empire or Eastern Ukraine, in Austria-Hungary and the states which succeeded it and above all in Poland and therefore in Western Ukraine. In Dnipro-Ukraine the first co-operative society was founded in Kharkiv in 1866. The founder was M. Ballin, a landed proprietor and a man who was animated by co-operative ideals. He also wrote and was altogether a pioneer of the co-operative movement. Other co-operatives followed in the large towns but it was only after 1897 that general progress was marked when the statutes of a new co-operative society did not need to be approved by the Ministry of the Interior but only by the local governor. This is the time when Vasyl Domanytskyj, the Ukrainian champion of the co-operative movement wrote and worked. 474

Before World War I co-operative shops were the commonest co-operative organisation in Ukraine. Of the 6 510 co-operative organisations in existence on January 1, 1914. 1 075 (i. e. 47.2 %) were shops, while the 2 370 co-operative credit societies were only 36.4 % of the total. Dnipro-Ukraine had 31 of all the co-operative shops in pre-war Russia (10 080) while it had only 19 % of the co-operative credit societies (12 995) and an average of only 22 % of all co-operative organisations (29 060) 474 452

474 The formation of unions was difficult and made little progress till 1917.

452 Credit co-operative societies began in Dnipro-Ukraine in 1868 when the first Savings and Credit Society was founded in the town of Hadyach. Two years later Halahan, a big landed proprietor, founded a second in the village of Sokyryntsi and also in the Poltava district. The development of the movement was checked by the restrictions of Russian legislation. The state offered its support through the State Bank which in 1895 opened a special department as an office for the "control of small credit institutes". But the support of the state was not particularly effective and the very bureaucratic methods of control were not adapted to further a genuine co-operative spirit.

By the end of the century 295 organisations for savings and credit had been founded. And then a new form of credit co-operative society appeared. The law of 1895 had permitted the foundation of credit co-operatives without a capital that had first been paid in by members. The basic capital was credited by the State bank and had to be paid back gradually. This mutual loan type of bank appealed to the poor rural population. In 1897 the first Mutual Loan Bank in the whole empire was opened in the village of Ivankivtsi, in the district of Poltava. During the first year of the war 70 % of the credit co-operatives in Eastern Ukraine were of this new type.

Productive co-operative organisations found in Dnipro-Ukraine a new form in agricultural concerns. Since the middle of the nineties they had been founded and promoted by M. Levytskyj, their indefatigable champion and organiser. Each of these co-operative societies was based on a contract, according to which the land of the members was managed in common and the produce divided among the members or their families.

It would be wrong to conclude that the Ukrainian rural population inclined either to communism or to the colkhose form of farming. These societies were formed for concrete purposes and after these were attained and the members — not without the support of the patrons — had enlarged their holdings, the societies were dissolved. Most of the 125 rural productive co-operative societies founded after 1902 scarcely

lasted 2—3 years. A co-operative organisation was also formed in particular when land was to be purchased. 474 452

From 1906 on many productive co-operative societies were also founded in towns and they lasted much longer. World War I was favorable to their development (army orders etc.).

Legislation and administrative authorities in imperial Russia were opposed to the formation of co-operative unions. In 1909 the first union of credit co-operative societies on Ukrainian territories was founded in Berdianske, and this was followed up to the Revolution of 1917 by a few unions, though there was no central organisation.

Co-operative organisations in Eastern Ukraine before World War I were characterised by difficulties of development, especially wherever there was an attempt to extend the scope beyond purely local needs and by the lack of generous legislation. Prominent among the circumstances of that time was the distrust of governing circles against all forms of co-operation, no matter in what nation. The national point of view was therefore disregarded; it was indeed impossible for a national Ukrainian policy of economy to develop under the Tsars. But it was evident soon after the outbreak of the Revolution that strong national powers were behind the co-operative movement. 474

The Revolution and political independence gave a tremendous impulse to the co-operative movement in Ukraine. National and co-operative forces were closely interwoven. Numerous men of the people came from the ranks of the co-operative organisation to take responsible offices in the state; the Ukrainian state, which could not look for support to any national capitalist vested interests, found effective help in the co-operative organisations. In 1917 the "Dniprosojus" was founded as the central body of the Ukrainian co-operative stores and on January 1, 1919, it counted 80 unions with 8 000 co-operative stores and 540 similar organisations (these figures increased later to 200 and 14 000 respectively). The central body operated productive plants of its own, fulfilled cultural functions etc.

The "Ukrainbank" also first saw light in 1917 and on January 1, 1919, it united more than 130 unions with several thousand

474 co-operative societies (in 1920 there were 175 unions). As the central body of the credit co-operative organisations, the Ukrainbank took over all paying and credit transactions, and for other co-operative organisations in Ukraine as well.

The "Central" was founded in January 1918 and formed the central organisation of the Ukrainian agricultural co-operative societies. Its functions were to assure the supply of agricultural machinery and other necessai, commodities, and, on the other hand, to organise the sale of agricultural produce and to increase agricultural production.

Besides these three most powerful central organisations, there were a number of special unions, the agricultural society for culture "Silskyj Hospodar", a central co-operative publishing concern etc.

In April 1919 the co-operative organisations could be summed up as follows: 7 central organisations, 120 unions of co-operative stores, 43 unions of credit co-operative societies, 7 of agricultural societies, 41 of mixed co-operative societies and 42 of other societies. In 1930 the 100 unions comprising approximately 40 000 co-operative societies and millions of members were finally dissolved, after having been re-organised on lines that were contrary to co-operative ideas.

In the Soviet state no real system of co-operation could exist and the movement soon declined. If any organisation still called itself a co-operative, it was in reality a state distribution agency without the slightest claim to independent activity and the spirit of co-operation. It would be wrong, too, to assume the existence of co-operative principles in collective managements.

In form, indeed, these ranked as "Artjel", that is to say as co-operative organisations. But they were communities formed by force, under the strict control of authorities, whose administration was equally rigid, but without the slightest trace of the spirit of co-operation.

A national system of economy could not stand up against a strongly centralised authority of state that was hostile to nationalities. In the last decades of imperial Russia, however, the national system found articulate expression and it received

a great impetus in the years of revolution and political independence. Under the Soviets it became an anomaly and perished not as a result of national competition or of a struggle with the economic forces of other nations but as the victim of a political power that is hostile to all popular movements, and that excluded all national or even co-operative independence. 474

The development of co-operative organisations in Galicia was most interesting from the point of view of national economy. The co-operative organisations in the main area of Western Ukraine which was poorer in national resources and agricultural production, as well as being smaller, were fewer and weaker than in Dnipro-Ukraine. And yet we cannot help remarking the priority of a national economy in purely co-operative ideas.

The Empire of Austria-Hungary was favorable towards the idea of co-operations so that these organisations had not, as in Russia, to fight for their development. And the state exercised no control. In Galicia the apparatus of local government was in the hand of the Poles. But they could not directly suppress Ukrainian economic organisations, even if they hampered their growth. Neither did post-war Poland adopt any positive attitude to co-operative organisations on principle. So Polish measures against Ukrainian co-operative societies were dictated by nationalism, though the state shrank from carrying them out to their logical conclusion, probably out of consideration for international opinion.

An atmosphere of national quarrels and strife against a stronger opponent was therefore characteristic for Ukrainian economic effort in Galicia; this opponent had indeed state authority but was not so overwhelmingly powerful as to hold up the Ukrainian economic and co-operative movement.

The poverty of the peasant population could be relieved only by disinterested activity on the part of educated circles and by the organisation of even the most modest economic forces; big estates and natural wealth were both in the hands of for-

474 eigners. Circles round the "Prosvita", a society concerned with the culture and education of the people and later also with economics, were mainly responsible for the work of spreading economic ideas and forming organisations. This activity increased in intensity after the first national meeting of the Ukrainians in Lviv (1880).

After conducting a public campaign the "Prosvita" proceeded to further and found credit societies, grain silos, stores and trading societies. It also functioned through travelling teachers and courses, it granted bursaries for the study of economics abroad, founded vocational schools, experimental farms etc.

But amalgamation in a universal organisation at that time had also disadvantages for economic development. And as organisations the economic societies were not the most suitable. It was only when co-operative societies were founded that national economic efforts found their final and best form of organisation.

452 Individual credit co-operative societies appeared as early as
474 1873, when the "Vira", the first credit co-operative society, was established in Tysmenytsia (it still exists to-day); but the growth of a sound system was not assured till the central body was organised in Lviv in 1898. At the end of 1911 this union comprised 320 credit co-operative societies, while about 100 were not members of the union. The local government erected an organisation which comprised 723 loan banks, 184 of which were Ukrainian. But this organisation was developed along Polish lines and was never of great significance for the development of a Ukrainian economic system.

It was typical for this "classical home of usury" in the years before the war that the credit co-operative societies far exceeded all other such organisations. After the first World War the central body founded in Lviv in 1898 was called "Centrobank" But credit co-operative organisations had to yield their priority of place to agricultural trading or productive co-operative organisations.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Co-operative stores grew slowly in the towns where there were few Ukrainians. The powerful co-operative founded in Lviv in 1883, the "Narodna Torhovla" assumed the functions of a central organisation in 1907, for all stores. After the first World War, however, it concentrated more and more on the towns and on certain merchandise. Co-operative dairies go back to the local units erected by the "Prosvita". In 1905 a union of dairy co-operatives was organised in Stryj. After the first World War the "Maslosojuz" flourished and became a model, not only of co-operative but also of national economic management. It was far superior to the Polish unions with their large subsidies and even exported butter. 474

Agricultural co-operative societies were amalgamated in the union "Silskyj Hospodar" which was transformed in 1909 in Lviv from the former union for commerce and trade in Peremyshl (1899). After the first World War the re-organised union, under the name of "Centrosojuz" received fresh life and supplied village and district co-operatives, partly with the products of their own co-operative industrial societies, organising the sale and the purchase of grain, cattle, bacon, poultry and especially of eggs, partly exporting them. Its turnover increased in 4 years from 1933—37 by almost 300 %.

Other co-operative societies include above all the insurance society "Dnister" (1891) in Lviv (since 1895 also a co-operative bank). The co-operative bank for trade and industry, the "Prombank" is also worthy of mention. It owed its foundation to the first meeting of Ukrainian engineers (Lviv 1932) and its development was promising. Ukrainian co-operative societies in Galicia are united, both as regards practice and theory, in the "Revision Union of Ukrainian Co-operative Societies". It was founded in accordance with the special Austrian Law of 1903 dealing with co-operative societies (the general law having been passed in 1873) in the next year in Lviv and in 1911 comprised 511 co-operative societies. After the first World War it extended its scope to Volynia, Polesya, Podlakhia and the Kholm district. But these areas as well as the Galician country of the Lemky were withdrawn from it in 1932 and attached to Polish unions.

474 Ukrainian co-operatives in Galicia in 1938 were as follows: Credit co-operatives: 688 (20 % of the entire number, in 1911 60 %), Co-operative stores 126 (not quite 4 %);

Purely dairy co-operatives 143 (more than 4 %), to which, however, must be added the agricultural co-operatives with dairy departments (119 in 1937).

Agricultural co-operatives 2350 (68 %).
Others 16.

Co-operatives of first rank 3423, of second and third (unions) 32.
Members in 1937 = 643 000.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine

III

Cultural life

The General Trends of Ukrainian Culture

When studying the intellectual characteristics of the Ukrainians we come to the conclusion that their often too marked individualism and their ideals, which display themselves in the necessities of everyday life, stamp them as unmistakably western in their attitude to the world, while their geographical position drew them from the very beginning within the orbit of Central and Western Europe and later on made them instrumental in handing on the products of Western culture to the nations of the East. 181

The first mention of the Kyiv empire in history shows it in connection with a western power. In the Annals of Bertinius we read how emperor Ludwig received a Grecian delegation at Ingelheim on May 18th, 839 and how, in the company of the ambassadors sent by Theophilus, the Greek emperor, there were also certain men, "qui se, id est gentem suam, Rhos vocari dicebant." We may assume with great probability that these men were first sent from their home, Kyiv, to Constantinople, and had then accompanied the Grecian delegates on their long journey from Byzantium to the Rhine and that the name "Rhos" is identical with the later Rus-Ukraine. 175

Grand Princess Olga, who had embraced the Christian faith of the West, sent a delegation in 960 to the German Emperor Otto I, requesting that priests should be sent to her country that was so little known. Missionaries under Adalbert set out

175 on this long journey with, however, little practical success. As early as the reign of Volodymyr the Great and Yaroslav, his son, definite attempts were being made to share in the general cultural life of Europe through alliances with the powers of the West. Yaroslav in particular was zealous to form family alliances with western princes. It was also in keeping with this policy that he appointed Hilarion, a native monk of some standing, to be Metropolitan of Kyiv, a position hitherto always held by a Greek; he sought thus to strengthen his position with regard to Byzantium in the ecclesiastical as well as in the political world. Izyaslav, Yaroslav's eldest son, first negotiated with King Henry IV, whose wife, Praxedis, was a daughter of Vsevolod, Grand Prince of Kyiv, and later with his adversary, Pope Gregory VII, in order to establish contact with Rome. These and similar events point clearly to the fact that, in spite of geographical position and distance from Western Europe, in spite of the vicinity and the influence of the Byzantine empire, the Kyiv state and its leaders pursued a policy that was definitely directed towards the west.

175 177 After the Tatar invasion of the Ukrainian steppe, the reins of government in Ukraine fell into the hands of the Galician-Volynian Realm which, as an advanced outpost on the way to the West, became a channel of communication between the "world" of those days and the East. As was natural, western influences here became stronger, the romanesque style dominated in architecture and Latin became the language of public life. But the waves sent out by the West did not stop merely at the country that was nearest in space; they spread further east, where from the outset they counteracted a one-sided influence from Byzantium.

Lithuanian dominion over Ukraine was fundamentally peaceful in character; Lithuania had the upper hand in politics, but Ukraine was superior to her partner in culture, an advantage which was not abandoned when the Union with Poland took place. But this latter historical fact nevertheless brought Ukrainian territory into still closer contact with movements in the culture of Western Europe which, favored by fortunate conditions, spread rapidly eastwards. The Magdeburg Statute which

had been known earlier in Western Ukraine as a privilege of 175
the towns (Volodymyr from 1324 and Syanik from 1339) be- 177
comes the basis of organisation for further settlements in newly acquired areas. German artisans and artists are welcome to these areas and the youth of Ukraine are fired with enthusiasm to attend German and Italian universities in order to acquire learning with which they will subsequently enrich life at home. Thus western cultural movements like Humanism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation penetrated at long length the wide-flung steppe. It is true that they sometimes caused effects there that could not have been expected from experience in other countries. This is seen best in the case of the Reformation.

After the amalgamation of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian state with 795
Poland, the Orthodox Church, though already shaken to its foundations, begins to play an important part in public life; after the loss of Ukrainian independence, it becomes a rallying point for national feeling and the difference in creed between the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches coincides with the political difference between Poles and Ukrainians; it was therefore natural that nationalist circles should be absolutely opposed to every further attempt to weaken the Ukrainian Church. It was well known that grievous abuses had crept into the organisation and life of the Orthodox Church, for those abuses arose from the new position it had been forced to assume. From having been an all-powerful state church it was degraded to become a factor in a strange country that was barely tolerated and was therefore unable to control its own administration, all the more as it had no longer a decisive say in making church appointments. It was common property that Orthodoxy in Ukraine was in a critically weak condition of disintegration, but nobody dreamt of opposing it and still less of replacing it by another creed, its fall would have been a severe, if not fatal blow to the entire life of the nation.

Such were the psychological reasons for the fact that the reformation movement found such a weak echo in Ukraine, though the necessity for a change in conditions, for reform, but from within, was felt by all.

659 The spread of Protestantism from Germany to Ukraine was
795 favored by the mere geographical fact of the latter's inclusion in the Polish empire while Poland, as a result of its close connections with Prussia, the Baltic States and Bohemia was for a considerable time a refuge for all sorts of creeds. Moreover, many of the magnates and some of the kings of Poland had shown themselves to be favorably disposed to the new movement, not indeed from any genuine, religious feeling, nor because they were moved by conscience to adopt new ways, but purely from motives of self-interest; for they calculated that, if the reformation was victorious in Poland, the Catholic Church would forfeit its all-powerful influence on life in general and, further, they hoped to acquire for themselves the enormous property which the Catholic Church would have to abandon. Such reasoning, however, did not apply to the Orthodox Church which had little property and which did not constitute a power that was ambitious of yielding political influence; it was inspired by no desire for sovereignty, but, on the contrary, had constantly to defend itself against encroachments from without.

795 The same trends and sympathy for the West gave rise to the movement for the union of the churches whose leaders did not think only of their personal interest but were also inspired by lofty ideals. When, after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow or the third Rome, as it liked to be called, tried to succeed to the position of capital of the Eastern Church, the Ukrainian bishops were faced with a choice between a Moscow that they held to be still uncivilised and Rome, a center of Western culture, and they decided in favor of the latter.

From the point of view of national interests, the dignitaries who joined the Union represented definitely Ukrainian tendencies in contrast to their conservative colleagues who preferred a connection with Moscow which was also orthodox. In support of this contention, we may mention that the Metropolitan Hipatius Potij, a Greek Catholic who was one of the most energetic champions of the Union, displayed particular zeal for the Ukrainian language in which tongue he recited his creed and took his oath to the Pope, although he was completely at home in Latin. By accepting the protection of the mighty Church

of Rome as the supreme head of their church, the pioneers of 795
the Union and of the cultural independence of Ukraine wished to throw off the cultural yoke of Poland, thinking that they would acquire equal rights with the Poles once the churches were united. The course of events has showed how much they were mistaken; for the Poles have merely exploited this rapprochement in ecclesiastical affairs as an instrument by means of which, with the help of the Jesuits, they aimed at ruling over the entire East and at completely absorbing the Ukrainian nation.

Western influence can also be detected in the guild-like 441
organisations of the Ukrainian middle-classes in towns like Lviv 871
Kyiv, Lutsk etc., organisations which, in addition to promoting the interests of a particular class or trade, also concerned themselves with church affairs. One of their main aims was the foundation of schools which taught Latin as well as Church Slavonic and Greek.

The most important foundation of those so-called Bro- 874
therhood schools was undoubtedly the Kyiv Academy 795
which owed its supremacy as an intellectual center, not 177
only of Ukraine, but of the whole of Eastern Europe .79
to the activities of such an eminent personality as Metropolitan Peter Mohyla. Mohyla, the son of the governor of Moldavia and educated in Jesuit schools, remained a life-long advocate of western culture and the Catholic Church, the organisation of which served him as a model when he was planning the reform of the Orthodox Church. We are scarcely able to-day to imagine what an enormous revolution and what great boldness of spirit was implied in the idea of introducing Catholic principles and methods into the organisation of the Orthodox Church which had been hostile to Rome for centuries. And yet this unique plan succeeded and could succeed only in Ukraine, for it was here alone that history had prepared the way for the adoption of these plans for realising western ideas. The spirit which inspired Mohyla's activities was wholly directed towards the West, as was clearly expressed in his innovations: in dogma, however, he remained a loyal disciple of the "faith

874 of his fathers", of the Orthodoxy. He is thus a concrete symbol
795 of the synthesis of two worlds, of the harmonious and complete
union of two cultures, of the meeting of East and West and of
177 the fertilising of Ukrainian Orthodoxy by the Latin spirit of
.79 the Roman Catholic Church.

795 The seed scattered by Mohyla bore rich fruit. Hundreds of
scholars, writers, politicians and organisers graduated in the
874 course of the 17th and 18th centuries from this unique "alma
mater", the Kyiv Academy, equipped with the modern weapons
of western learning, to fight first of all for the independence
and the honor of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. After completing their studies in Kyiv the Ukrainian patriots of that time go to Germany to appropriate the arguments used by the Reformation against Catholicism, they penetrate to Rome and do not shrink from joining the Roman Church for a season only in order to become better acquainted with their opponent's plans in the very center of his camp. On their return home they develop an energetic campaign in teaching and writing to prepare and train wide circles of less well educated priests for the fight. In order to supply their audiences with intellectual munition, they publish a series of pamphlets directed against the enemy and all manner of apologies in defence of their own cause, utilising the knowledge they had gathered in the West. This leads to an enormous outburst of polemic writing, to an intellectual activity in the country which strikes even foreigners.

177 But the efforts of these champions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy
814 who had been trained in the West, did not stop there; they
performed a still more important function in making European
influence supreme in the state of Moscow, or the Russia of Peter,
as it was then called. Ukraine contributed no mean share
to the work of Peter the Great. The foundation and building
of the modern Russian Empire was the almost unaided work
of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, for the intellectual conditions
for the solving of this task were almost completely lacking in
Moscow itself. In order to carry out his reforms which soon
degenerated into an absolute mania for reform, Peter utilised

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

the powers of the South which, in the 17th and 18th centuries could boast of a brilliant galaxy of scholars while Moscow and the North were still wrapped in darkness. The most important, but by no means all of the intellectual leaders in Ukraine were Herasym and Meletij Smotrytskyj, Christophor Philalet, Ivan Vyshenskyj, Kyrylo Tranquillion Stavrovetskyj, Zahar Kopystenskyj, Jelissej Pletenetskyj, Lavryn Sysanyj, Petro Mohyla, Kassian Sakovych, Taras Zemka, Sylvester Kossov, Lazar Baranovych, Joannykyj Galatovskyj, Dmytro Rostovskyj, Inokentyj Gisel, Stefan Javorskyj, Theophilakt Lopatynskyj, Teophan Prokopovych — and the list is by no means exhausted. The Moscow of these days had very few and not the most prominent names with which to confront this host. It is quite comprehensible that, in these circumstances, Peter I should have had too great a predilection for those products of culture, which had developed in Ukraine under the immediate influence of Western intellectual life. The contribution of Ukraine to the public life of Russia is perhaps best characterised by two men, Stefan Javorskyj and Theophan Prokopovych, both of them students and professors at the Kyiv Academy, the first of whom became "Administrator of the Patriarchal See" after Peter had decided to renounce the patriarchate, while the second was active as a reformer of church administration in Russia and as the Tsar's adviser in all important matters of state.

This process of the mutual penetration of the physical power of the North with the intellectual strength of the South, initiated by Peter the Great's reforms, did not bring lasting blessing to either. It was natural that Ukraine, politically crushed and intellectually exploited to the full by Moscow during the 19th century should have been obliged to lead the shadow of an existence; but neither was Moscow, the fortunate profiteer of this relationship, capable of maintaining the supremacy it owed to the artificial appropriation of European culture, for the products of western culture which had been transplanted from the south as the foundation of public life proved to be too weak to sustain the edifice of the gigantic empire in times of crisis. Even before the catastrophe, in the second half of the

177 19th century, there were numerous intellectuals in Russia who turned from a Europe which they alleged to be disintegrating towards the East, their spiritual home. From their own point of view the leaders of the new Russia are certainly right in postulating the Eurasian solution of this problem. But this natural process brings that part of Ukraine which is still incorporated with Russia into an extremely difficult position as the trends of its development and its sympathies are entirely opposed to such a course.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Education

The history of education and schools in Ukraine dates from the tenth century when Christianity was introduced. The mass of the original native population had little interest in schools and learning so that the real representatives of scholarship were to be found among the higher clergy and at court. Documentary evidence proves that at this time there was a considerable circle of scholars in Kyiv and that Yaroslav the Wise had Greek books translated and founded a library, perhaps the first to be found in the century, in the church of St. Sophia. 871

This work, so important from the point of view of cultural history, accomplished by the Kyiv princes in the province of teaching and education, came to an abrupt end in the 13th century when the Tatar hordes flooded the country. This caused the centers of culture to be shifted still further into the principality of Galicia-Volynia. The same fate overtook the other Ukrainian countries which were annexed to Poland. In spite of the difficulties and unrest prevailing in these areas their level of education was comparatively high, compared with neighboring countries. The Ukrainian language was recognised in the principality of Lithuania as the language of state and court and when the union with Poland took place, original Ukrainian culture was at least equal to Polish. In the course of time, however, this relationship was changed.

Education in Ukrainian territory was exclusively organised by the clergy. This disintegration of the life of the Orthodox Church in the 15th and 16th centuries was therefore of enormous importance for the cultural standing of the country; it was disastrous as, just then, Poland's intellectual life was most

87/ flourishing and the Jesuits began to launch a campaign of religious propaganda on Ukrainian territory as well. They founded schools which attracted the aristocracy of Ukraine so that this section of society of unquestioned importance for the future of the nation became entirely Polish.

The influence of the Reformation in the 16th century was relatively weak in Ukraine. And yet a desire to improve prevailing conditions did exist and gave indeed rise to the first modest attempts to bring about from within a reform of the Orthodox Church and of the educational system depending on it. Thus, towards the end of the 16th century the first Ukrainian college was organised in Ostroh by Konstantin Ostrozhskyj, the greatest Ukrainian magnate.

The brotherhoods, or guilds, now the only leaders of the Ukrainian nation in its continued struggle for religious and cultural independence, since the nobility had become completely Polish, also sought to promote education. Such centers of mental organisation were formed throughout Ukraine, those in Wilno, Lviv, Brest, Lutsk and later in Kyiv playing the main part. They regarded it as their main function to found schools which, organised on western models, should take up cudgels against the Latin schools and Jesuit colleges. The curricula of these schools included in addition to subjects of a religious nature, Old Slavonic and Greek, grammar, dialectics, rhetoric and themes of philosophy; the Lviv school, as an exception, got permission from the king of Poland to include Latin in its curriculum.

The brotherhoods lacked material means of developing more extensive cultural activity. They therefore had to look round for a new power in Ukrainian life to support them in their struggle against Roman Catholicism and Poland. And this power they found in the Cossacks. As a result of a shift in the center of political power, Kyiv, which was very near the Cossack territory, became once more the center of culture. There at the beginning of the 17th century the college founded by the Metropolitan Mohyla was organised and became an institute which has played an eminent part in the education and culture of entire Eastern Europe. Peter Mohyla, himself a product of Catholic Jesuit education, and related to the most important

Polish magnates, was all his life a zealous devotee of western culture and of the Catholic Church. His whole activity was inspired by a spirit which certainly was directed towards the west; but as far as dogma was concerned he remained absolutely loyal to the Orthodox Church. It is comprehensible that the school under his direction should have pursued the same policy of reconciliation between points of view that had been hitherto diametrically opposed to each other. Latin was the basis of instruction; but, in addition, Church Slavonic, Greek and Polish were also taught. The greatest attention was paid to theology, but logic, physics and metaphysics were also on the curriculum. 871

The educational work done by different brotherhood schools with the Kyiv Academy at their head, brought a rich harvest. The general level of education rose considerably. But the state's position of dependence was in those days an insuperable barrier to the development of a system of education in Ukraine and to the growth of national pedagogic ideals. As a result of the disastrous outcome of the Cossack wars Ukraine was divided into two spheres of influence. After the partition of Poland about the turn of the 18th century almost the whole Ukrainian territory was occupied by Russia.

The methods applied by the imperial government in the 19th century to make Russians out of Ukrainians were cruel. The Ukrainians were denied all rights to existence as an independent people in the hope that they would be absorbed by the great mass of Russia. It is obvious that there could be no question of a Ukrainian educational system under such circumstances. It was not till the Revolution broke out in 1905 that an improvement, if a brief, set in. An actual renaissance was only possible when the Russian empire collapsed in 1917. During the short period of political independence (1918—1920), two Ukrainian universities were founded in Kyiv and Kamianets Podilskyj, while a host of secondary schools and thousands of elementary schools sprang into being, in all of which Ukrainian was the language of instruction. At the old universities of Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odessa which had been allowed to retain Russian as the vehicle of instruction, new chairs had been established for the Ukrainian language, history, history of the Ukrainian law, and literature.

871 The professional training of young teachers was already being given in the competent faculties, in pedagogic colleges, training colleges and in the (usually) short courses for training teachers. A large staff of intellectual workers, who would help to educate the people in national culture, was to be trained in a short space of time. By the end of 1918 there existed on Ukrainian territory 47 208 elementary schools, 474 secondary schools for boys, 362 for girls, 91 commercial schools, 9 theological training colleges for priests and 30 church schools. But this natural development was interrupted by the new civil war the final result of which was the creation of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the subjection to Moscow of the entire public life in Ukraine.

In keeping with the principles on which the Bolshevist theory of education was founded, the school had first and foremost to be pressed into the service of a militant communism and thus contribute a good share to the revolutionising of society. Paragraph 12 in the program of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party expressly states that "the school must not merely become a herald of communist principles in general but also an instrument by means of which the organised proletariat could spread ideas of organisation and education among the half-proletarian classes of the population, so that a new generation might arise which would be able to abolish class distinctions entirely and thus finally bring about the realisation of communism."

The basic plan of enlightening the people in the U.S.S.R. included the following: the social education of children, vocational teaching in schools, political enlightenment outside of school, scientific work and an expensive publishing concern as a basic measure for spreading enlightenment. This system of education provided for the needs of communist youth as follows:

1. Social education of children from 4 to 8 years old (children's clubs, gardens, grounds, houses and towns).

2. Social education at school (uniform 7-year school in two sections, one for pupils from 8 to 12, and one for the 12 to 15 years old).

3. Vocational training which started at 15 and included the following stages: 871

a) a vocational school lasting 2 or 3 years giving courses in industrial subjects, machinery, agriculture, medicine and economics, followed by a practical year for the purpose of preparing qualified workers. After graduating from that

b) a technical institute with a course of 3 years for advanced study, the results of which were to be applied to practice. Scientific tasks were performed in

c) institutes with professorial chairs for training highly qualified practical experts and also by

d) academies with a 2 years' course for the purpose of training young scholars and researchers in every province of science.

What cannot fail to strike us in this basic plan is the entire absence of universities and other colleges which are replaced mainly by institutes, academies and faculties for working men. As far as the institutes are concerned, the champions of this system of education maintain that it was only possible to establish them after a severe struggle against the university system, "which preserved important remnants of mediaeval scholastic learning, dissolved scientific research in philosophical thought and had radically reduced the scientific function of the university to a minimum." The universities, therefore, were played out and had to be replaced by another form of higher learning.

The institutes for the education of the public, which were formed out of the old universities with the help of teachers from former teachers' training colleges, are a special group. They possess three faculties, viz. 1. the faculty of social education intended to train teachers for the communal gardens and for the elementary schools, 2. the faculty of vocational training which, as its name implies, had to supply the vocational schools and technical schools with teachers and finally 3. the faculty for political enlightenment; this last faculty trained propagandists and lecturers to enlighten wide circles of the population, teachers 874

874 for party schools, for workmen's clubs and centers of adult education in the country.

871 In the course of years this basic scheme underwent many changes till it was adapted to the general Soviet scheme in 1932; by a resolution passed by the Central Executive of the Communist Party on August 25 of that year the 7-year elementary school in Ukraine was transformed into a 10-year school, a third section being added, and the technical schools which had not yet become institutes were put on the same level as the higher schools; new universities had to be founded in order to cope with the difficult tasks of cultural reconstruction. It is not our place here to criticise this or that measure; in order to evaluate these radical reforms properly one would have not only to examine the plans but also their application in practice and the results they achieved.

We are, however, particularly interested in the national element in the general system of communist education which finds articulate expression in the language used.

195 871 In the original Ukrainian Socialist Republic the Ukrainian language was to have priority as the official language; this point of view was approved even in 1920 after the Revolution and steps were taken to make Ukrainian the vehicle of instruction throughout the schools where this had not already been done. Ukrainian nationalists were quick to seize this opportunity of promoting their native tongue and to aim at positive results at least in this province. But the growth in national consciousness among the broad masses of workmen and peasants due to the intensified use of the Ukrainian language began to make communist leading circles in the country uneasy. Russian was introduced as a second official language, by which the authorities hoped to put a brake on nationalism and to prevent Ukrainian influences from becoming too strong. Thus there were throughout Ukraine schools taught in two, and even three languages in order that Russian and Jewish minorities might enjoy their own rights. This preference shown to national minorities greatly handicapped the proper official language, a fact that was the more striking the higher the level of school investigated. The position of Ukrainian was most precarious at the universities,

as was frankly admitted by the official representatives at the 195
People's Commissariat for education. The shortage of teachers 871
able to lecture in Ukrainian, the lack of Ukrainian text-books and the poor development of Ukrainian scientific terminology were quoted as excuses; sometimes also the hostile attitude of some of the professors.

The same thing could be noticed in the attendance of schools by pupils of different nationality. In all vocational schools there were 53,1 % Ukrainians, 20 % Russians, and 22,5 % Jews while the population was composed as follows: 80 % Ukrainians, 9.2 % Russians, and 5.4 % Jews. Circumstances were even less favorable to the Ukrainians at the universities where the percentage of Ukrainian students sank in proportion as Jewish and Russian quotas increased. The "purges" that were conducted at universities from time to time carried off mainly Ukrainians, thereby still further reducing the proportion of students from the nation to which the majority of the population belonged.

The provinces in Eastern Galicia and Bucovina which had 871
fallen to Austria were incorporated in the general educational system in that country. The efforts of the Ukrainian population in the second half of the 19th century were confined to preserving the national character of the schools. In this they only partially succeeded, as the Poles were hostile to these efforts. To be able to educate their young people along national lines, the Ukrainians founded a series of private schools about the turn of the century which were maintained by public Ukrainian contributions. At the same time a severe struggle arose round Lviv university, which the Polish authorities in Galicia had transformed from an originally German and then Ukrainian-Polish university to an almost entirely Polish center of education. Circumstances were more favorable in Bucovina where the Ukrainians wer tolerated by the Germans to satisfy their national claims.

In consequence of the unhappy outcome of the war between Poland and Ukraine (1919), Eastern Galicia was incorporated in the Polish state, whereby the position of the Ukrainians became much worse than it had been under Austria. According to

871 the last Austrian school statistics there were 2612 elementary schools in Eastern Galicia where Ukrainian was the vehicle of instruction. During the school-year 1927/28 there were only 745 of such elementary schools, and, on the other hand, 2325 taught in Polish and 1635 bilingual schools (Polish and Ukrainian). Matters were worse in the schools in north-western Ukrainian territory, i. e. in Volynia. Polessya, Podlakhia and the Kholm district. In the latter two areas there was not a single Ukrainian elementary school. In the administration of Volynia there were 4 out of 1144 elementary schools taught in Ukrainian, 390 were bilingual and 750 Polish. It is also to be noted that the schools taught in Ukrainian were always inferior schools, for of the 917 Ukrainian elementary schools in Eastern Galicia in 1926, 842 were schools with only one or two rooms.

Following the example of other European states, Poland also developed all kinds of vocational schools. But in the entire Ukrainian territory under Poland there was not a single vocational school taught in Ukrainian and Ukrainians who wished to study at Polish vocational schools met with great difficulties. The Plebiscite Law of July 31, 1924, forbids the Ukrainian population to erect vocational and secondary schools and teachers' training colleges in which Ukrainian is the vehicle of instruction. Bilingual secondary schools only may be founded. In the while on Ukrainian territory under Poland there was not one state Ukrainian vocational school nor one state college for training teachers taught in Ukrainian.

While Lviv was under Austria there were some chairs at the university where lectures were held in Ukrainian, but these were immediately abolished as soon as Poland occupied the town. And it must be recalled that according to the law of September 20, 1922, the Polish government had promised to erect a Ukrainian university within two years, which promise was never fulfilled.

From 1920—1924 there was in Lviv a Ukrainian university with three faculties which was forbidden by the Polish authorities and had to operate secretly. This proved impossible in the long run and the university had to be dissolved. In order to put a stop to Polish penetration the Ukrainian people tried to create a

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private school system of their own within the frontiers of Poland. 871
In 1932/33 there were 15 Ukrainian secondary schools, 6 teachers' training colleges, 4 vocational schools, 5 advanced vocational schools, 4 schools for trades and 31 elementary schools. These schools received no subsidy from the state and were subjected to different methods of persecution on the part of Polish school authorities.

In the Bucovina, too, things took a turn for the worse when this country was occupied by Roumania after the dèbâcle of 1918. In 1919 already, Ukrainian schools were forced to make way for Roumanian and after a few years there were neither any more schools taught in Ukrainian nor any Ukrainian chairs at the Chernivtsi university. It was even forbidden to study Ukrainian and teachers were not allowed to give explanations in their mother-tongue to children who did not understand Roumanian. Ukrainian universities in Czechoslovakia deserve special mention; firstly because they offered a refuge to professors who had fled from their home and secondly because they made it possible for a large number of young people to finish their study which the First World War had interrupted. The first to be founded in 1921 was the Ukrainian Free University in Prague which still exists since 1945 in Munich; it has two faculties, a faculty of law and a falculty of arts which comprises departments for history and languages, mathematics and natural science. This university has many and various functions and aims. The national education of youth comes first and so most emphasis is put on those subjects that cannot be taught at foreign universities on account of their specifically Ukrainian character. In addition, they aim at training scientific workers and the professors of the future capable of teaching at Ukrainian schools to be founded later. Other colleges which sprang up in Czechoslovakia soon after the university was founded, were the Agricultural College in Podjebrady, presently at Regensburg, and the Teachers' training College (liquidated in 1930) as well as the Academy of Fine Arts in Prague.

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Music

533 Ukrainian music did not make an appearance in general European musical literature till the end of the 18th century, a fact which may surprise an outsider in a people of more than 40 millions whose songs enjoy world-wide reputation. Here, too, natural development has been held up by political dependence and subjection to a foreign state.

Christmas, spring and harvest songs are probably among the oldest products of Ukrainian music, but also songs about the most important events in human life, such as birth, marriage, and death. Their archaic character points to an origin in far-distinct, nebulous, pre-historic times. After the introduction of Christianity, these songs were subject to Greek influence which finds expression to a certain extent in their structure. But the golden age of the Ukrainian song is from the 16th to the 18th century, i. e. the heroic age of Ukrainian history. History raises a new voice in the lyrical-epic songs, recitative in character, which glorify the heroic deeds of the Cossacks in their battles against the Turks, Tatars and Poles. — This type of song belonged above all to the repertory of the minstrels (Kobsars = singers) organised in a guild of their own to watch over their interests as a profession. Like the Bards and Troubadours of the Middle Ages these minstrels or Kobsars wander far and wide through the plains of Ukraine, welcome guests not only in the mansions of magnates and landed proprietors, but also in the kitchens of farmhouses and simple Cossacks. In its later development the Ukrainian folk-song approaches more closely the musical products of Europe, with their definite separation of minor and major keys and regular harmonies. But in spite of these concessions, characteristic features which

give it its peculiar stamp, were by no means lost. In a letter to an acquaintance Count Tolstoi emphasises that no other national music — not even that of Russia proper — has proclaimed its peculiar character so insistently as the Ukrainian. When we listen to it, the whole history of Ukraine passes before our inward eye, and we understand the character of the people far better that by reading Gogol and Konyskyj (Ukrainian writers). 533

Church music was introduced into Ukraine after the country had become Christian under Grand Prince Volodymyr the Great, whose consort, the Greek princess Joanna, brought to Kyiv not only priests but also church singers. The old chronicler relates that, at the time of Yaroslav the Wise three Greek singers came to ancient Rus with their families and that the "eight-part angelic singing" originated with them. These church songs were modified in the course of centuries when they were handed on from "ear to ear"; in this way they took on many of the characteristics of the Ukrainian folk-song, including the "subsidiary parts", a special counterpoint feature in this folk music.

The Tatars who destroyed the political structure of Ukraine, left the church in peace. The simple Byzantine forms of church music penetrated into the lives of the people, thereby enriching their still primitive culture. The conquest of Ukraine by Poland and Lithuania and the spread of Roman Catholicism with its polyphonic vocal and instrumental music (mainly organ) forced the Orthodox clergy in Ukraine to cultivate the more complicated choir singing, which, to-day, is still the sole representative of Ukrainian church music. This choir singing, supported by church brotherhoods, was preserved throughout Ukraine till the end of the 17th century. The sons of the rich old Cossack nobility who brought back samples of the music of Western Europe from their tours, also contributed to the music of the country. In Kyiv the peculiar "concerto" form arose in which the tutti of the choir alternated solos. The Italian works of composers as Giovanni Palestrina, Alessandro Scarlatti and their successors, Giuseppe Sarti and Baldassare Galuppi were widely known in Ukraine; under their influence, at the turn of

533 the 18th century a specifically Ukrainian "Italian church choir style" was formed, whose most eminent interpreters, the composers of our older music, were Demeter Bortnianskyj (1721—1825), Maksym Berezovskyj (1745—1777), and Artem Wedel (1767—1806). All three were students at the Kyiv Academy, Bortnianskyj and Berezovskyj finished their studies in Italy, the former in Venice, Rome and Naples, the latter in Bologna. The style of church music created by all three, but particularly by Bortnianskyj, was not only supreme in all classes of Ukrainian society, but also acquired a dominating position in other nations of Greek-Orthodox faith. Bortnianskyj, the greatest of the trio, after finishing his studies in Italy, spent the rest of his life as conductor of the court orchestra in St. Petersburg, which explains why he is known throughout the world as a Russian composer in spite of the obvious indications that he belonged to the sphere of Ukrainian culture.

After the North had drained away the best men and when the political situation of Ukraine had became deplorable under the Russian Empire, all independent activity in the province of culture, and consequently of music, gradually ceased. It is true that in the middle of the 19th century the old musical tradition was transplanted from the Dnipro area to Galicia (M. Verbytskyj 1815—1870 and I. Lavrivskyj 1822—1973) but this did not last long and musical culture finally decayed here, too. The creative power of Ukrainian music in the 18th and 19th centuries also found expression in opera and light opera. Bortnianskyj had already written operas, such as "Creonte" and "Quinto Fabio" which were performed in Italy, but in this case music and libretto were too foreign to appeal to Ukrainian society. But with the spread of the romantic movement and its preference for motives from popular life, Ukrainian composers turned for themes to country life or to the heroic deeds of the Cossacks. Thus arose the light opera by Prince Shahovskyj (1777—1846), "Cossack the Rhymester", and the classical musical comedy by Ivan Kotlarevskyj, "Natalka Poltavka", Hulak-Artemovskyj's (1813—1873) opera, "The Zaporog Cossack beyond the Danube", which is strongly reminiscent of Mozart's "Il Seraglio", the opera-like, though often banal setting of

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Shevchenko's "Kateryna" by Mykola Arkas (1852—1909) and many others. 533

Mykola Lysenko (1842—1912), a musician who was successful in all branches of his art, and his successors created a revolution in music in Ukraine. After graduating from the Leipzig Conservatoire Lysenko returned to Ukraine. He took the folk-song as the basis of his compositions but, while it had hitherto been treated as something primitive, Lysenko seeks in it the essence of the musical ego of the Ukrainian people. He tries first to establish the scale of the Ukrainian folk-song and to develop from it a suitable harmony. He worked like a professor of ethnography and investigated the abundant material at his disposal according to scientific methods, no other nation possessing such a rich treasure of songs, both as regards quality and quantity. Without going into a detailed analysis of the Ukrainian folk-song, we may add that most of them are part songs, where each part is independent, and starts one after the other finally combining with the first voice, which results in an original counterpoint and rich harmonious melody. Lysenko was aware of the great wealth of Ukrainian folk-songs, but also of the great difficulty of studying it in its entirety. But the work had to be done as a guarantee of the further organic development of music in Ukraine. He did not consider it right to graft the music of Western Europe onto Ukrainian products, for he was perhaps the first to understand that Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Wagner and Brahms were first and foremost German composers who constructed their works on a scale derived from the German folk-song and that the roots of this folk-song lie deep in German musical consciousness. 814 533

The impulse given by Lysenko expressed itself first in vocal music; M. Leontovych (1877—1921) and K. Stetsenko (1882—1922) are products of the movement which he initiated. Their works are a synthesis of the impressive technique derived from the old vocal music of the 16th century on the one hand and of the Ukrainian folk-song on the other, from which they drew not only their motives but also their inspiration. This explains the enormous success of the Koshyts choir when it toured Europe from capital to capital, from Vienna to Berlin, Paris and London. 533

533 After the war ot 1914—1918, Lysenko's principles began to make themselves felt in instrumental music too, thereby opening new possibilities of development in all provinces, from trifling compositions to symphonies and operas. Stanislav Ludkevytsh (1879) meant a turning-point in the history of Ukrainian music in Western Ukraine; he created music in the European sense, which, on the basis of his own studies and the researches of Filaret Kolessa (1871—1947), the folklorist, penetrates the real being of the Ukrainian folk-song and tries to utilise its materials. His chief merit, however, lies in his having proved that, contrary to the traditional view, it is possible to express the national character in instrumental as well as vocal music, and indeed, if properly managed, orchestration can preserve the individuality of Ukrainian music better than compositions for the voice. The spirit of our folk-song breathes from his compositions, whether it be his great symphony for orchestra, chorus and solos, the "Caucasus", his "Valse melancolique" his "Rhapsody of the Ukrainian Legion", or his small chorus songs, mostly with orchestral accompaniment.

A group of younger composers in Western and Eastern Ukraine have deliberately chosen instrumental music as their mode of expression in order to fill up the gap in this art and thus contribute something essential to the culture of Ukraine. Vasyl Barvinskyj (1888), director of the Ukrainian Academy of Music in Lviv, a neo-romantic, a master of chamber-music, a pupil of Vitezslav Novak (Prague) whose whole work was founded on the Slovakian folk-song, fully utilises the treasures hidden in the Ukrainian folk-song, in his works for the piano, the celio, in solos and symphonic poems. Similar in style is the work of Nestor Nyzhankivskyj (1893—1940), the son of a Ukrainian composer of the 19th century and a pupil of Marx the Austrian composer and pedagogue. The more radical tendency in this group is represented by Zenon Lysko (1895) and Mykola Kolessa (1898), who have liberated themselves from the finished folk-song and merely try to compose in the same spirit. In his work (piano, chamber-music, symphonies) Anton Rudnytskyj breaks away entirely from national music and tries to being Ukrainian music into

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one line with the extreme tendencies in Europe and with ideals of modern composers. 533

In the Ukrainian Soviet Republic the turn to instrumental music was still more striking than in compositions by musicians in Western Ukraine. The most radical and modern composers, as far as technique and mode of expression are concerned is Boris Latoshynskyj (1895), a professor in the Kyiv Institute of Music and the composer of works for piano, violin, string quartettes, piano trios, symphonies and musical illustrations to films. At first he was under the influence of Russian reformers, but later took to writing atonal music and finally found his way to the source of national Ukrainian music in his overture to 4 Ukrainian songs and his opera, "The Golden Hoop".

Lew Revutskyj (1888) is a strong, rugged personality, though at the beginning he was under the influence of Rahmaninow and Chopin, and later of Scriabin and even of Chaikovsky. These foreign elements, however, were melted in the fire of his individuality to creations which have echoes of the folk-song while providing us with samples of modern Ukrainian music. These include his preludes for the piano, concertos for the piano, symphonies, songs etc. The third representative of great musical forms (sonate, symphony, piano concerto, opera), Victor Kosenko (1896), a professor at the Lysenko Institute in Kyiv, is a more moderate, lyrical nature, Pylyp Kozytskyj (1893), the editor of the review, "Music for the Masses" and Mychajlo Verykivskyj (1896), the conductor of the opera in Kharkiv, form a special group; although both also express themselves in large forms, their special field is the instrumental and vocal miniature. Kozytskyj's forte is vocal music where he continues the glorious traditions of Leontovych. —

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The Fine Arts

1. Architecture

341 The first influences of art began to make themselves felt in
346 the ancient Ukrainian territory in the 10th century when the Christian faith was introduced from Byzantium. Thus the famous cathedral of St. Sophia, a monumental building, was erected at Kyiv in the years 1017—1035 in the reign of Grand Prince Yaroslav the Wise. Formerly the "Hagia Sophia" in Constantinople was thought to be the model for it but probably it was copied from the so-called New-Church (Nea), built by Basil I in the 9th century in the Greek capital. All buildings belonging to the earliest period in Ukrainian history have since then been so often destroyed, transformed, supplemented and changed that we are obliged to fall back on suppositions. The church of the Kyiv Cave Monastery was different from the cathedral of St. Sophia. It was founded in 1075 by Grand Prince Svyatoslav II and served as a model for a whole series of Kyiv monasteries. The church of the Cyrill monastery at Kyiv, dating from 1140, was similar in style as were also the church of the Vydubytskyj monastery (1108), the Trinity Church built over the portal of the Cave monastery (1106), the Cathedral of the Redeemer in Chernyhiv with its well preserved construction, and many more.

The best creation of the Galician school of architecture is the relatively well-preserved Panteleymon Church in Halych, built about 1209 and later transformed into a Franciscan convent.

341 The 14th, 15th and 16th centuries are a transitional period in the history of Ukrainian architecture, when gothic and renaissance influence did probably penetrate into Ukraine, though they were not sufficiently widely spread nor uniform enough to pro-

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duce any acknowledged style there. It cannot, however, be denied that in Eastern Ukraine several gothic monuments of repute have been preserved, e. g. in Kyiv (Church of Peter and Paul), in Lubni, and in Sutkivtsi in Podolia, while traces of gothic even in remote parts of Ukrainian national territory were to be found down to the middle of the 17th century. Gothic style came mainly from Silesia, via Cracow, and by way of western Carpatho-Ukraine and Transylvania and it were German masters who spread it in Ukraine. In the time of the renaissance we find many Italians from Lombardy and Switzerland working in Ukraine. Neither style played such an important part in the architecture of churches as in secular buildings, in town-halls, for instance, or patricians' houses, and fortifications erected in the towns of Western Ukraine such as Lviv, Yaroslav, Zamosts, Peremyshl and Lutsk.

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Baroque style, like renaissance architecture, also came from Italy, and that by two channels: from Rome and from the old Genoese colonies in the Crimea, who, although they had been conquered by Tatars, absorbed their conquerors in time and made them Italian. Thus baroque in Ukraine assumed two forms — Jesuit baroque in Western Ukraine and Cossack baroque in Central Ukraine, a most original form of expression with many national features. Church dignitaries and the higher Cossack leaders were the patrons of this flourishing Ukrainian architecture; Mazeppa alone had five large churches built or restored in Kyiv. The following are the most important examples of this architectural style: The St. Nicholas Military Cathedral, 1690—1694, built by Hetman Mazeppa; the Church of the Assumption of Christ of the Kyiv brotherhood, built in 1695 by the same patron; the Church of the Trinity in Chernyhiv (1679); and the church of the Mharskyj monastery (1682—1694) which owes its foundation to Hetman Samoylovych.

Both of these variants, the Jesuit baroque in Western Ukraine and the Cossack baroque in the central area were, as in the rest of Europe in the 18th century, gradually transformed into rococo which style in Ukraine preserved the national features of its predecessors. The Cathedral of St. George in Lviv is undoubtedly the finest and most impressive example of this

341 style. Classicism, which first appeared at the beginning of the 18th century, finds its most complete expression in the magnificent palaces in Baturyn built for the last Ukrainian Hetman Rozumovskyj (Cyrill, 1728—1803) by Charles Cameron, an Englishman, in 1800 in Potshep, from plans by Vallen de la Motte, and in other mansions of Ukrainian magnates. In Ukraine, the classical style underwent three phases of development, corresponding to what Western Europeans know as Louis XIV, Empire and Biedermeier and marks the end of the efforts to achieve an independent architecture in Ukraine. In 1801, at the same time as selfgovernment was abolished for Ukraine, a law was passed, forbidding the erection of churches in Ukrainian style; finished plans were provided from St. Petersburg from which buildings had to be erected in the time to come.

In the second half of the 19th century, architecture in Ukraine was subjected to historical influences deriving from the romantic movement in Western Europe which resulted in a pseudo-Byzantine style. This was introduced into Ukraine by force and did not succeed in reviving architectural impulses there. Before the war, attempts were made to recussitate the baroque style with its national features in connection with the revival of national architecture in wood which was reconstructed by ethnographical experts and propagated mainly by the architects Vasyl Krychevskyj (1872), Serhij Tymoshenko (1881), and others. In the Ukraine of recent times the functional architecture of the west has gained the upper hand, its main monuments being the building of the State Trust at Kharkiv, the electricity works in Kyiv, the cloth factory in Kreminchuk and the buildings of the Dniprelstan.

2. Sculpture

532 The first traces of sculpture in Ukraine date back to Greek times, but not earlier than the fourth century before Christ. Under the Grand Princes sculpture naturally flourished in connection with the lively building activity of that time; but relatively few monuments have survived and these are not of any particular value. In the 14th and 15th centuries western influences make themselves felt in this province and appear in reliefs as a palimpsest on old Byzantine motives from icono-

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graphy. The sculpture that has survived from the times of the renaissance — mostly tombs — presents figures in complete armor lying or reclining in a fitting architectural setting, similar to Venetian or North Italian sculpture. Among the most interesting are the tomb of the Grand Prince Constantin Ostrozhskyj "the brave champion and protector of the faith of the East" in the Cave Monastery in Kyiv, bearing the date 1534, the monument to M. Herburt in Lviv Cathedral, a creation of the Nuremberg master P. Labenwolf, and many others. The influence of the renaissance is most noticeable in sculptured ornament, above all in the framework of icons, some splendid examples of which have been preserved in Lviv and Rohatyn. 532

Decorative sculpture developed still further in the baroque era and found new forms of expression in ornament in churches, on graves and in icons carved in wood. The baroque icon settings are fairly complicated in structure, sometimes several stories high, richly carved, with marvellous ornament with unmistakably Ukrainian characteristics; they are, indeed, the greatest creations of the Ukrainian people in the province of sculpture.

The collapse of the Hetman State in the second half of the 18th century was naturally not favorable to cultural life in Ukraine. The creations of Ivan Martos (1752—1835) and Michael Kozlovskyj (1753—1802) belong to the annals of Russian art although both were products of Ukrainian culture. Martos, the more important of the two, a pupil of Canova, later a professor and the rector of the Academy of Art in Petersburg, was the real creator of Russian sculpture, for he not only enriched it with his own works, but inspired a large number of eminent students whom he taught. The same is true of Kozlovskyj, although in his case a too early death cut short his development. Ukrainian culture was the loser; it was robbed of its most able representatives and forced to play a secondary rôle, and in time forfeited all individuality in the province of creative art.

Some sculptors with a deep national consciousness must be mentioned among the pioneers of typically Ukrainian sculpture; they were romantics who emphasised the peculiarity of Ukrainian sculpture by choosing popular or historical subjects. Michael Mykyshyn (1836—1896), the creator of the monument to Bohdan

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532 Khmelnytskyj, the well-known illustrator of the books of Gogol and Shevchenko was not outstanding in technique but he was distinguished for the powerful sweep of his artistic imagination. Fedir Kamenskyj (1822) who emigrated to America where he was a professor of sculpture in New York till his death, gave us one of the first busts of Shevchenko. Parmen Zabilo (1830—1890) sculpted a monument to Gogol in Nishyn, busts of Shevchenko in Chernyhiv, and of the Ukrainian artist Borowykovskyj, of Galagan and others. Leonid Posen (1849—1921), was famed as the artist of the monument to Kotlyarevskyj with its well-known reliefs representing the literary creations of the founder of Ukrainian literature. Worthy of mention is Vladimir Beclemishev (1861), who brought new life to academic traditions and created noble forms, as is also Fedir Balavenskyj (1864) whose work is a happy union of classical tradition and folklore elements; he created a number of impressive works among which the best known are "The Olympic Games" and "The Triumph of Phryne". His allegorical figures on the edifice of the Red Cross in Kyiv, "Medicine", "Mercy", "Love", and "Life" are of great artistic merit. Peter Wijtovych (1862), a pupil of Zumbusch (Vienna) and Gregor Kuznevych (1871) were contemporaries of Balavenskyj in Galicia. The latter finished his training in Italy, then went to America where he produced monumental works in Cleveland, Pittsburg and Philadelphia. Michael Parashchuk, (born in 1889), who also worked abroad, is a master of the monumental style in commercial architecture. Michael Havryłko (1882—1919), a late romantic, showed great talent and was the artist of the popular plan for the Shevchenko monument in Kyiv in which mastery over form is combined with imagination of wide sweep and a tendency to romanticism.

Modern Ukrainian sculpture reached a level of excellence which guaranteed it a place in the annals of European culture. Its strength lay in the group of artists who carried on the experimental traditions of the monumentalists. Their most classical representative is Bernhard Cratko (born in 1884), professor at the Art Academy in Kyiv, characterised by a synthetic monumental style and a tendency to neo-classicism. Another member of the same group is Nastja Pysarenko with a distinctively indivi-

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dual style which has inspired a new school that emphasised national elements and permitted of no compromise with regard to style. Konstantin Stakhovskyj, an emigree, is, as a sculptor of animals, a class by himself; his statues from models in the zoos in Berlin, Vienna and London have won general recognition. 532

The neo-romantics, Oksana Laturynska, Fedir Yemets, Bohdan Mukhyn, and Hryhor Kruk form a special group of contemporary sculptors; their works are poems in stone while displaying a most modern understanding and feeling for form. Aleksander Arkhypenko (1887), a Ukrainian sculptor who is known far beyond the confines of his native country, occupies a niche of his own. As long ago as 1913, when he emigrated to America, he managed to arouse great interest in art circles in Europe. He has turned his back on the physical phenomena of the world of nature and tries to express his inner logic and psychology by means of his own and by increased dynamics. But what this sculptor creates is not a product of the Ukrainian spirit; the eccentric, the abnormal, the artificial in his creations has nothing at all to do with the healthy instincts of peasant people rooted in its own soil.

Painting

The actual history of Ukrainian painting, as of Ukrainian art as a whole, begins with the chronicles of the country's history as a state, i. e. at the time when this state first appeared on the stage of the world as a new factor of power. The frescos and mosaics whose brilliant coloring illumined St. Sophia and other monumental churches of the Kyiv state, bear witness to a level of ability that is not often reached in the same province in the Europe of that time. The artists themselves are anonymous, but we may probably assume that the earliest were Greeks whose work was continued by pupils whom they trained on the spot. The best preserved of these monuments are the famous mosaics in the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kyiv, "Pantokrator", the apostles, the evangelists, "Oranta" etc. The most interesting of the frescos in the same church are those depicting secular scenes from the life of the Grand Princes in the 11th century. In the 14th and 15th centuries Ukrainian artists were given

532 commissions, not only in Lithuania, but also in Poland, where they had to compete with artists from Western Europe. It were Ukrainian artists to whom Casimir the Great and Yagello entrusted the execution of the difficult frescos in the churches of Sandomir and Lublin, or in the Royal Castle on the Vavel — to mention only the most important examples. Western influences on the style of the East came from afar. The most certain source was Nuremberg whose artists either personally ventured into Galicia, or sent their creations there. We know that Veit Stoss, Hans Kulmbach, and Dürer's brother worked in Cracow; the picture of the Resurrection in the Lviv National Museum reminds us vividly of a similar composition by Wohlgemuth, the Nuremberg master, and even of an early work in the Munich Pinakothek by Dürer, Wohlgemuth's pupil.

Dutch and Italian influences are also obvious. They are represented in Ukraine above all by Fedushko of Sambir, the most talented artist in the time of the renaissance in Ukraine, whose "Annunciation", painted in 1579, hung in the Ecclesiastical and Archaeological Museum in Zhytomir, (Volynia). This period whose creative impulses were so sensitive to influences from without and so varied in form, prepared the way for the amalgamation of Byzantine and western influences in Ukrainian art that found its finest expression in baroque art. This style, which was spread mainly by the Jesuits, could strike roots in the Cossack areas of Ukraine that were hostile both to Catholicism and Poland only after it had adapted itself to native life; the national features it assumed made it attractive to the taste and the views of ruling circles. Thus arose one of the most interesting and pleasing forms of art in Ukraine: Cossack baroque which developed from Jesuit baroque.

Portrait painting, the subjects of which were originally determined by icon paintings, made great strides towards realism when it included secular subjects and forsook mediaeval traditions for newer forms. While early portraits are characterised by simplicity, but also by depth of psychology, the artists of modern portraits of church dignitaries or Hetmans lay more emphasis on external expression and the representation of power.

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Ukrainian painting flourished in the baroque era and had many important representatives, mostly centered round Mohyla's Academy and the Cave Monastery in Kyiv. The pictures of some masters even found recognition abroad; the portrait of the Polish king Sobieski, for instance which was executed by a Ukrainian court-painter, hangs in the Uffici Galleries in Florence. 532

The rococo era in the 18th and 19th centuries marked the separation of the two worlds which had combined in the earlier period to form a higher synthesis; each now went its own way. The old tendency confined itself completely to iconographic representation, sealed itself hermetically against all new influences and thus gradually froze in a rigid formalism; neither in the 18th nor in the 19th century was it able, with very few exceptions, to arouse any marked interest in the public. Modern painting turned from religious subjects to secular and historical painting, reaching such a high level that foreign critics have judged Ukrainian artists at the turn of the 18th century to be the equals of the best English and French masters. Three important Ukrainian painters spring from this period, viz. Demeter Levytskyj (1735—1822), Anton Losenko (1737—1773) and Volodymyr Borovykovskyj (1757—1825), though their work actually belongs to the subsequent period of classicism. These three artists mark the zenith and, at the same time, the end of the development of Ukrainian painting which has found new and characteristic forms of expression in the baroque era that, however, played themselves out in the rococo epoch. The painters we have mentioned are rooted in recent traditions and develop to the full the heritage of the Kyiv school. But neither were they permitted to work on their native soil; they had to go north and enrich an alien culture and, as teachers, train new generations of Russian artists. This policy of exploitation systematically applied by Petersburg to Ukraine, necessarily brought about the impoverishment of Ukrainian art in time; at the same time it uprooted native art, for when artists were transplanted into strange surroundings and no longer had any direct, organic connection with their own people, they were unable to carry on national traditions and train young native artists at home.

532 But Ukrainian art finally escaped this danger of being uprooted and losing all national content when artists realised that their power and success were founded on their native soil. Mykola Ge (1831—1894), one of the most important and profound of them and a personal friend of Tolstoi's turns his back on Petersburg at the height of success and thus saves his own talent from ruin. An examination of his works reveals no "Ukrainian subjects"; filled with the spirit of Ukrainian universal wisdom, he refrains from the often banal representation of folk-dances and national scenes from Cossack life and devotes all his power to problems of world-wide import. His last picture, the "Crucification", which was banned by the Russian censor on account of "godlessness", attempts to present this universal tragedy with new methods. Illja Rjepnin (1844—1930) a well-known artist, generally considered to be a Russian, continued to work in Petersburg, while Ivan Stanislavskyj (1860—1907), a fine landscape artist, of partly Polish extraction, was a professor at the Academy of Art in Cracow. Ivan Trush (1869—1941) who died recently, was a pupil of his; he does not treat the Ukrainian landscape but prefers strange, exotic subjects. Another of Stanislavskyj's pupils is Mykola Burachek, professor at the Kyiv Academy of Art, a master of color who can create out of nothing whole symphonies of the most delicate tones.

About the turn of the century a group of Ukrainian artists crystallised under the leadership of Mykola Samokysha (born in 1860) and Serhij Vasylkivskyj (1854—1914), who devoted themselves to the study of the monuments of the glorious past and to ancient Ukrainian art. They published a collection entitled "Ukrainian Antiques" with 20 reproductions of Ukrainian types from history and folk-lore and also "Subjects of Ukrainian Ornament in the 17th and 18th Centuries". This group, to which Ishakevych, Slastjon, Pymonenko, Martynovych, and Zhdakha also belong, concerned itself only with Ukrainian subjects. But the younger generation under the influence of the new ideas from Western Europe and of fresh national impulses at home, goes a step further and attempts an original presentation of these subjects. A number of artists of repute belong here as, for instance, Oleksander Murashko (1875—1919),

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who, after having had a great success in Paris, Munich and Venice, returned home with the desire to create a new center of art in the midst of national life and thus to secure a place for Ukrainian art in the cultural life of Europe. Such were also the aims of Fedir and Vasyl Krychevskyj, the latter of whom attempted to create a Ukrainian style in all forms of art, his work being appreciated in Germany, England and America. The so-called neo-Byzantine school was a distinctively original feature of those days; in contrast to the contemporary realist movement, it preached a return to the ancient traditions of Ukraine under Byzantium. The main representative of this idea, Mykhajlo Boychuk (1882—1937), discovered himself and his own style after working for a long time in Paris and later in Kyiv, where he found not only a circle of admirers, but where his activity as a teacher helped a whole generation of artists to find their own expression. Typical of these are Ivan Padalka, Osinchuk, and Sedlar — artists who generally worked in all provinces of fine art, producing graphic art, sculpture and particularly applied art. Impressionism in Ukrainian art is represented by Ivan Trush, mentioned above, whose pictures are inspired by a rich personality, and Oleksa Novakivskyj (1872—1936), who studied at the Academy in Cracow and whose Polish professors, such as Matejko, Wyspianski and Malczewski left permanent traces in his sensitive soul. Vasyl Kryzhanivskyj (1891—1926) and Victor Palmov (1888—1926) are expressionists who strive for individual form and typical coloring. Other modern movements like futurism and cubism have also found disciples without, however, leaving deep traces, while neo-classicism has found a worthy representative in Mykola Hlushchenko (1901), who made a name for himself in Berlin and Paris. Petro Kholodnyj (1876—1930) is a personality who fits into no set scheme; it was only after he emigrated that he devoted himself to art and created a whole gallery of paintings in the last ten years of his life, testifying to his infinite energy and great ability.

4. Graphic Art

Ukrainian graphic art which flourished in the second half of the 17th century and reached its zenith in the times of

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532 Mazeppa had a great influence in the spread of this form of artistic expression throughout Eastern Europe, and particularly in Muscovy, Poland, Roumania and White Ruthenia.

The founder of the Ukrainian school of graphic art towards the end of the 17th century was Aleksander Tarasevych (1972—1720); he was the greatest master of copper-plate etching in the whole of Eastern Europe and was a pupil of the Augsburg Kilian brothers. We owe him not only illustrations and book ornament but also excellent portraits of contemporaries, of the Czarina Sophia, for instance, of the Hetman Samoylovych, and many others. The 18th century was under the influence of Kyiv, though other centers of engraving sprang up in Lviv, Pochayiv, Chernyhiv, and elsewhere. Unfortunately this branch of art degenerated in time into a trade whose main object was to make money.

The publication about the middle of the 19th century of an album entitled "Ukraine in Pictures" marked a turning-point in this development; it was published by Shevchenko, the talented Ukrainian poet, painter and etcher. The value of this publication probably consists in the fact that it was the first collection of plates portraying subjects from Ukrainian history and folk-lore, produced by a national hero. Shevchenko's initiative was continued by another artist, Leo Zemchuzhnikov (1828—1912), who published a large number of etchings by himself and other contemporary artists under the same title.

Ukrainian graphic art played its part in the general renaissance of the art of book production at the beginning of the 20th century, above all in the province of illustration. Vasyl Krychevskyj, who painted charming landscapes in transparent coloring and was an eminent decorative artist, was a pioneer here; in close collaboration with M. Hrushevskyj, the historian, he studied ancient traditions of book decoration in the times of the Cossacks, creating new forms of expression in national art from his analysis. His suggestions were followed by M. Boychuk who himself practised graphic art and founded an art school which counted many graphic artists among its students. The work of this group of artists is marked by its national character, expressed both in natural and conventionalised forms. George

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Narbut (1886—1920), a most gifted graphic artist, opened new prospects for graphic art in Ukraine. Since childhood he had always been particularly attracted by examples of old Ukrainian writing and soon he became an accomplished artist in the art of writing. As a student of drawing, he worked in Holosy's studio in Munich and before the First World War had the reputation of being an excellent black-and-white artist. He found it difficult, however, to create his own style, cut off as he was from the influences of home. It was only after his return to Kyiv in 1917 and through his contact with Vasyl Krychevskyj, Mychajlo Boychuk and their specifically Ukrainian art that his exceptional talent could fully develop. Combining Krychevskyj's subtlety with his own fiery imagination and wild temperament, Narbut found an outlet for all his rich gifts in his Kyiv period. But, just as a meteor suddenly glows and then dies, so he came to a tragic end in Kyiv in 1920. 532

Krychevskyj, Boychuk and Narbut are three stars in the domain of graphic art in Ukraine who will long determine its character. Narbut's pupils are Robert Lisovskyj (1893), who supplemented his studies in Berlin; Leo Lozovskyj (1901—1922) and, perhaps the most gifted of all, Marko Kynarskyj (1893). Boychuk's group includes his wife, Sophie Nalypinska, Olena Sakhnovska (1902), Oleksander Ruban, a master of miniatures cut in wood, and Vasyl Cassian (1896) who studied in Prague and who produces monumental scenes from the lives of workmen and peasants; Krychevskyj counts among his followers M. Aleksiiv, Ivan Mozalevskyj (1890), eminent in black-and-white art and in ivory miniatures. Paul Kovshun (1896—1939) worked in Western Ukraine. He was a many-sided, productive artist who contributed much to the organisation of artistic life. Petro Kholodnyj (sen) and Mykola Butovych (1895), a student of the Leipzig Academy, belonged to his circle. In Bucharest Natalie Guerman-Russova works, in Buenos Aires V. Cymbal, in New York Zubrytskyj, in Paris P. Omelchenko and S. Zarytska who is also a good fresco artist, and Hlushchenko, already mentioned, a black-and-white artist and a water colorist; in Berlin one of the most eminent black-and-white artists, Vasyl Masjutyn, has been working for some years; he is a many-sided

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532 artist whose historical portraits of the Hetmans Khmelnytskyj, Mazeppa, and Skoropadskyj are striking revelations in the province of Ukrainian art.

Museums, Archives, and Libraries

217 The earliest Ukrainian collection of historical documents and prehistoric remains was transferred at the beginning of the 19th century to Russian and Polish collections in order to prove the great ages of Russian and Polish culture. The first historical museum was founded in Chernyhiv by Vasyl Tarnovskyj (1837—1899). His example was followed by Ukrainian professors teaching at Russian universities, by scientific expeditions sent to study the country and by archaeological congresses. The Municipal Museum, the Tereshchenko Gallery and the collection of the Khanenko family which developed into the Museum of Fine Art, were founded in Kyiv. In Lviv the Stauropigian Museum was founded in 1889, the National Museum and the Museum of the Shevchenko Society of Learning in 1905. Smaller collections were opened in Poltava, Kamenets Podilskyj, Sambir, Colomea, etc. The Bucovina possesses a collection in Chernivtsi, Carpatho-Ukraine in Uzhhorod. But, nevertheless, anyone who wishes to see the most important collection of Ukrainian folk-lore, must go to the Ethnographical Museum in Petersburg.

The nationalisation of Ukrainian museums under communist rule has had a favorable influence. Measures of conservation, restoration and concentration have raised museums to a considerable level, whereas conditions are not nearly so satisfactory in Western Ukraine where there was no support from the state. The number of museums has grown from 10 in 1914 to at least 90 to-day. The museum of "The War of Liberation" in Prague is worth mentioning, as it is maintained exclusively by contributions from the Ukrainian population.

The biggest library on Ukrainian territory is the Ukrainian "People's Library" attached to the Academy of Learning in Kyiv; it contains 2 000 000 books and also great collections of newspapers, music and picture postcards. Of all publications printed in the Soviet Union a copy was to be sent to this library. In addition it conducted scientific research work, supported

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research activity and published reviews. The library of the Shevchenko Society of Learning in Lviv was just as important for the intellectual life of Ukraine during the last 50 years. It contained 120 000 books and was specially devoted to all matters concerning Ukraine. The "Ukraine Book Chamber", first in Kyiv and then in Kharkiv has registered book production in Ukraine since 1918. A Scientific Book Institute in Kyiv in 1922 was devoted to the study of printing in Ukraine. 217

Ukraine has had many archives; they are important institutions, since much has to be done towards saving from destruction material relating to the past of the country. In Kharkiv there is the "Historical Archives", the central office of the archives of the Kharkiv province, of Poltava and Chernyhiv, further the Archives of Ukrainian Printing in Poltava, the Historical Archives, comprising material dealing with the Poltava area and finally, the Central Archives of Ancient Documents attached to the Ukrainian Academy of Learning in Kyiv, containing 400 000 documents, and many others.

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Literature and Science

I.

538 The literature of the Kyiv period which was mentioned in another connection found best expression in the "Song of Ihor", in which an unknown author sings of the unhappy campaign of the princes Ihor, Vsevolod, Svyatoslav and Volodymyr against the Polovtsy. This heroic epic, which must have been written before 1187, is composed of a series of short, but vivid, impressionist scenes with a tone, a rhythm and a mood of their own. It is by no means an imitation of Homer or of northern sagas or the Nibelungenlied though it is not difficult to detect marked northern elements in the work.

In addition to extensive translations in different fields of monastic literature, the following are worthy of special note as original works: "Ruska Pravda", an imposing monument of ancient Ukrainian law procedure; the "Chronicles", the most important and richest historical sources for the Kyiv era and later times in early Ukrainian history, the oldest — the Nestor Chronicle — being dated about the beginning of the 11th century. We should like to mention shortly a few original writers of theology: Metropolitan Clemens Smolatych (1147—1154) and Bishop Kyrill Turivskyj (1130—1182), a master of rhetoric.

We must assume that only a tiny fraction of the literary production of those times has come down to us and that the great mass of literature has completely disappeared in consequence of the political catastrophes which befell this country. Judging from the high level of what has remained we can regard the Kyiv era as the golden age of Ukrainian literature.

In the Lithuanian period the language and literature of Ukraine continue to develop without, however, attaining the

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level of the earlier times. Western influences become more 538
prominent; it is a time of transition, nor does the Reformation count for much, for even the Ukrainian translation of the Bible by Dr. Franz Skoryna in 1515 was a response to national needs and cannot be derived from external influences. The first [213]
Ukrainian books, on the other hand, were printed in 1491—93 by Shveipolt Fiol in a German printing-press in Cracow, and that in connection with the first Ukrainian academy (Ostroh 1577—1640), which had been formed for the purpose of publishing a critical edition of the Bible.

Literary and educative activity was really in the hands of 814
the brotherhoods, which naturally were greatly interested in efforts to unite the churches. Polish literature worthy of note arose, important preliminary work was done in the province of language (Smotrytskyj's Grammar of Church Slavonic 1618), but it was only after Mohyla (1596—1647) re-organised the Academy in Kyiv that a cultural center was formed which was to play a decisive part in the literature of Ukraine for about 200 years.

Theological, rhetorical and philosophical works appear, the history text-book "Synopsis" by I. Gisel (died in 1684) goes through 30 editions, and Gregor Skovoroda (1722—1794), the most eminent philosopher of the 18th century in Eastern Europe and a student at the Kyiv Academy, wrote his books, the real significance of which is only being recognised now.

The cultural renaissance in Ukraine due to the brotherhoods and the Kyiv Academy brought new impetus to other provinces of intellectual life, as for instance dramatic art (Jakob Gavatovych 1598—1679, Mytrophan Dowhalevskyj 18th century. Demeter Rostovskyj, 1651—1705, the writing of history Samuel Velychko, died in 1728; Gregor Hrabyanka, died in 1737, and Gregor Poletyka, died in 1784), and also in plastic art which reached a high level of excellence in the Left Bank Region under Mazeppa's hetmanate. Young men in Ukraine were no longer content 871
with native education; more and more they flocked to foreign, and above all, to German and Italian universities. Hetman Rozumovskyj's (1728—1803) intention to found a native uni-

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871 versity in his own residential town of Baturyn was prevented from being realised by pressure from the government of Russia.

538 But in the darkest of days a renaissance sets in, if slowly and scarcely noticeable. 1798 is the date of the appearance of the "Aeneid" by Ivan Kotlarevskyj (1769—1838). It presents actual life in Ukraine, written after a classical model in the form of a satire and in Ukrainian language, which thus becomes the language of literature and culture. Just at a time of greatest oppression, the greatest Ukrainian poet was born: Taras Shevchenko (1814—1861), the national genius, whose prophetic instinct sensed the course of development of native literature and who devoted his entire energy to furthering it. His poems, collected under the title of "Cobzar" (the popular minstrel) became the bible of every patriotic Ukrainian. He was exiled for his views to Siberia by the government of Russia and suffered great hardships which caused his early death. Shevchenko marked a brilliant end to the development of Ukrainian literature up to that onoment but at the same time, the starting-point for a new movement. Pantelejmon Kulish (1819—1897), a most productive writer of many-sided education, was one of Shevchenko's intimates; he distinguished himself not only as a poet, but also as an ethnographer, a historian, a critic, and a translator. In the second half of the 19th century Michael Drahomaniv (1841—1895), a professor at the university in Kyiv, later in Sophia, a follower of socialism and inclined to internationalism, produced much eminent work, though not always of positive value. About the same time in the area of Ukraine that belonged to Austria, Ivan Franko (1856—1916) was working as a poet, a scholar and a politician of renown, being besides Shevchenko the most important personality in modern Ukraine. Round about the turn of the century there was a great increase in the number of Ukrainian writers; among the best known are Lesja Ukrayinka (1872—1913), the author of wonderful poems in dramatic form; Vasyl Stefanyk (1871—1937), whose short stories often portray the tragic fate of Ukrainian peasants; Les Martovych (1871—1916); an accurate observer of life not only among peasants, but also among the educated provincial classes in Ukraine; Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880), a representative of

Ukrainian decadence, wrote not uninteresting dramas, novels and 538
short stories which, however, had no great influence on the public. The following are the most noteworthy members of the younger generation: Gregor Chuprynka (1879—1919), an impressionist who was shot by the bolshevists; Ol. Oles (1878—1943) worked at Prague as an emigrant; the short-story writer Arkhyp Teslenko (1882—1911) who died early after having been banished to the north by the Imperial Government; Petro Karmanskyj (1878), whose lyrics have a delicate, almost exotic tone; Bohdan Lepkyj (1872—1942), who has written historical novels. Olha Kobylanska (1865—1945) was a worthy representative of Bucovina.

Among the many representatives of the world of science we 814
mention Borys Hrinchenko (1863—1910), the editor of a comprehensive dictionary of the Ukrainian language; Agantangel Krymskyj (1871), a famous orientalist, the organiser of the Ukrainian Academy in Kyiv and the supreme head of the newly created state of Ukraine, Michael Hrushevskyj (1886—1934), the most important Slavonic historian of the present day and author of a monumental book on the history of Ukraine.

The literature of Soviet Ukraine which is completely under 538
the influence of bolshevism and Moscow has produced no talent of merit. Out of the great number of prose writers of novel and short story only a few original writers may be mentioned, such as Mykola Khvylovyj (1893—1933) who was driven by the cruelty of real life to commit suicide; Valeryan Pidmohylnyj (1901), Gregor Kosynka (1899—1935), whose end was tragic, too. Khvylovyj is noteworthy because of his desire to enrich Ukrainian culture with western influence and to keep it aloof from northern ideology; pressure from Moscow, however, forced him to abandon his theory. One great master of lyric poetry has appeared, namely Paul Tychyna (1891), though his gift of song has completely dried up in later years. Volodymyr Sosiura (1898) and Eugen Plushnyk (1898) are only worth mentioning for the variety of the rhythms they use; Valeryan Polishchuk (1897) is the founder of a new kind of meter, the so-called "vers libre". One of the most promising and gifted poets of today is Maksym Rylskyj (1895), a neoclassicist, who tried long

538 to uphold his artistic independence in the face of official pressure. But after many years of an unequal struggle his power of resistance broke down and to-day he writes in accordance with instructions from high places. The works of the dramatist Korniychuk, lately awarded the prize of the Union amounting to 100 000 roubles, are of no great artistic value, but only demonstrate a certain obvious tendency.

II.

814 Scientific work of any significance does not begin in Ukraine until the nineteenth century and is confined for the first decades to history and ethnography. This research, in so far as it was done in the Right Bank Region, received a certain support from the Russian government which, after quelling the Polish rebellion in 1831 wished to produce scientific proof that the areas right of the Dnipro have always been what the official language termed "Russian", and that Polish claims were therefore quite unjustified. Governmental circles in the Left Bank Region were not so interested in that question and so it was left to the private initiative of Ukrainian patriots either to preserve the ancient monuments of the glorious past themselves or to hand them over to the safe keeping of the Society for History and Philology at Kharkiv university.

The first proper attempt to organise Ukrainian research activity on a large scale is connected with the foundation of the "South-West Section of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society" in Kyiv, which united eminent Ukrainian scholars of the day for the purpose of working together. In a short time the society had acquired a high reputation in European scientific circles, which it owed as much to the results of its research as to its valuable publications. Then came the unhappy year 1876, when it was forbidden to speak or write Ukrainian and when the Kyiv Geographical Society was dissolved. Thus every possibility of scientific work was closed and scholars were forced by the pressure of altered circumstances to transfer their activity to one of the institutes affiliated to the universities and here, protected by the cloak of officialdom, continue working for Ukraine.

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Thus we find valuable contributions to the history of Ukraine in the collections of scientific works published by the "Society for History and Philology" at Kharkiv university, or in the reports of the "Nestor Society" which was founded at the Kyiv university by Prof. Volodymyr Antonovych (1834—1906). Every student of Ukraine finds a mine of information in the monthly publications of the "Kyiv Antiquities", founded in 1882; for full 25 years this review offered a means of publication to scholars like Mykola Kostomariv (1817—1885), Michael Drahomaniv, Oleksander Lazarevskyj (1834—1907), Orest Levytskyj (1849—1922), Oleksander Potebnia, Ivan Franko, Mykola Sumcov (1854—1924) and many others.

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As a result of the great pressure on scientific life all over Russia, Ukrainian research in the Empire right down to the Revolution of 1905 could not develop freely on a national basis, the consequence of which was that the most important fields of this work, too, were transferred to Eastern Galicia. In 1873 the "Literary Shevchenko Society" in Lviv was founded with the help of contributions from Ukrainian patriots. After its re-organisation in 1893 into a purely scientific institution, it gradually became the real Ukrainian Academy of Learning. The reputation of the institution was greatly promoted by Michael Hrushevskyj, a Kyiv scholar, who was called to the Chair for Ukrainian History at Lviv university and appointed immediately president of the Society, in which capacity he developed a most beneficial activity. The best proof of this is to be found in the 300 volumes published by the Society from 1873—1914, containing essays in Ukrainian in all provinces of learning.

The revolutionary movement after the Russo-Japanese War which helped to introduce constitutional measures in Russia, brought certain relief to the Ukrainian people; this was first expressed by the foundation of the "Ukrainian Scientific Society" in Kyiv. This society was a center for scholars of all ages and, like its elder sister in Lviv, had a favorable influence on the young generation.

814 In the years before the First World War it published 24 volumes in which we also find articles by foreign scholars, mainly Russians, like Shakhmatov, Korsh, Perets, Ilinskij etc.

873 814 The World War had a paralysing effect on the cultural life of Ukraine as a whole. Hrushevskyj, its intellectual leader at that time, was arrested and exiled, all publication of scientific works stopped. But this depression did not last long, for the time was approaching when revolutionary movements in Russia were to lead to the establishment of Ukrainian independence. As a result of various technical difficulties, the universities in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odessa, hitherto Russian, were left as they were except the foundation of new chairs for Ukrainian history, legal history, Ukrainian language and literature. In addition, two exclusively Ukrainian state universities were founded in Kyiv and Kamenets-Podilskyj as well as the faculty of history and philology in Poltava. Steps were also taken to organise the national archives, the Ukrainian National Gallery and finally the foundation of the Ukrainian Academy of Learning in Kyiv.

At first, the Soviet government did not interfere with the Academy of Learning, and even granted it a modest subsidy. Thanks to the devotion and the determination of Ukrainian scholars who did not leave the country, the Academy developed a lively and extensive activity in the years from 1925 till 1930, — though financial conditions were anything but satisfactory — and took a proper place among similar institutions in the world. But a radical change set in when the Academy, which up till then had been fairly independent, was forced into the service of communist theories; as a result nationally minded scholars were removed and bolshevist party ~~functionaries~~ introduced as members. The scientific level of the Academy sank enormously.

In the areas of Western Ukraine which were allocated to Poland, research activity decreased in comparison to pre-war years, which was mainly due to the lack of money.

As a result of the inflation of the Polish currency, the Shevchenko Society of Learning in Lviv lost much of its funds; it had to dispense with state help so that it could only continue a very restricted publishing activity. When Eastern Galicia was annexed

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by the USSR after the fall of the Polish state, the Shevchenko Society of Learning in Lviv was dissolved in December 1939. 873 814

The great hardships which the Ukrainian people has been exposed to in the last decades forced many intellectuals abroad where they attempted to found new centers of intellectual life. Thus the Ukrainian university in Prague, the college of Agriculture in Podjebrady, the Institute of Pedagogy, the Institute of Sociology, the Academy of Fine Art, the Society for History and Philology, the Society of Ukrainian Doctors and Engineers, the Ukrainian National Museum — all in Prague — came into being. The University, the oldest of the existant institutions, published a series of studies by its members, this being imitated with great zeal by other universities. We are justified in saying that, on the whole, Ukrainian emigrants in Prague were exceedingly active. The Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin also became an important center of Ukrainian scientific research abroad, its function being to develop its activity in close cooperation with European science. The publishing activity of the Ukrainian Institute in Varsaw, which published a series of valuable monographs, is worth mentioning.

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Theater

545 When the Jesuits, in the pursuit of their plans of conquest, introduced Polish drama into Ukraine at the beginning of the 17th century in the form of a school-play, the orthodox inhabitants opened a defensive campaign and founded theaters in the schools as a means of promoting their own culture. And these days are not really so far behind us; in the second half of the 19th century, this time under Russian supremacy, the theater was the only opportunity where the Ukrainian word could be heard and the only place where Ukrainian sentiment could express itself without fear of Russian censorship. When in the eighties and nineties of last century the Ukrainian theater could point to a number of great artistic and celebrated triumphant successes not only in Ukraine but also in the large towns of Russia, and was even allowed to give performances in the Tsar's palace — General Drenteln, Governor of almost half Ukraine, forbade all performances in Ukrainian areas under his jurisdiction. To protests the governor replied not untruthfully that while the Ukrainian theater in Petersburg was merely drama, it was first and foremost politics at home. We must bear in mind this national function of the Ukrainian theater if we wish to evaluate its development and achievements in the last three centuries properly.

The theater in Ukraine is characterised further by the revolutionary form of its development. It is on the stage in Ukraine that new ideas are ruthlessly opposed to what is older and what has not perhaps completely forfeited its right to exist. But there is no room for two gods. Determined by such circumstances an organic transition from one period to another seems almost impossible and history itself seems to be merely the sum of

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separate and unconnected periods. This lack of tradition, of a gradual transition, of grafting the new on the old and vice-versa has certain advantages, as well as great disadvantages; it is favorable to the appearance of strong personalities who are not handicapped by obligations to the past and are therefore able to devote their entire energy to realising new ideas. 545

The third special characteristic of the Ukrainian theater is the fact that, during its entire existence, it has always been only a "theater for the people", and not only that the widest circles of the population were greatly interested in the performances and in the work and lives of Ukrainian actors but that, corresponding to the social structure of the Ukrainian people, it has always been a peasant theater, presenting, above all, the problems of peasant life.

As already mentioned, school plays gave a characteristic stamp to the earliest period of the Ukrainian drama. The school which has handed down the oldest examples of this art was the school of the Lviv Brotherhood, famous in its day. The examples we have of those early school dramas are most primitive, being mostly merely dialogues that were spoken at the Holy Grave or, when there was any special occasion in the Brotherhood School, in the courtyard of the church. Besides those dialogues which were always based on religious subjects, interludes have also come down to us, two of which by Jacob Gavatovych, dating from 1619, are distinguished in form and style from their primitive predecessors. A fairly complicated drama of the 17th century, called "A Play about the Destruction of Hell" marks the transition from those dialogues to a more developed form of dramatic art; it is written in verse, in the lively language of everyday and for a large caste, among which Christ suddenly appears as an actor on the stage. The plays belonging to the Kyiv circle which arose in the 18th century in the Brotherhood School that as well as in Mohyla's famous Academy in Kyiv, were transitional in character. In this connection we must not omit to mention a dramatist at the end of the 17th century, Danylo Tuptalo (monk's name Demeter Rostovskyj).

Theophan Prokopovych, a collaborator of Peter the Great and a great scholar connected with Mohyla's Academy in Kyiv,

545 thoroughly reformed the school theater. In his theory of poetry Prokopovych issued set dramatic rules according to which the new plays, called by him tragicomedies, were to be acted. His theories had not such lasting influence as his play "Vladimir", a play that served as a model to all dramatists of the time and whose rules were so slavishly observed by succeeding writers that this entire branch of art was gradually petrified and died.

The second great period in the history of the Ukrainian theater which lasted from the beginning of the 19th century till the present day, began with the performance of a comedy from the life of the people called "Natalka Poltavka" (Natalie from Poltava). It was interspersed with songs and, both as literature and as a stage show, has become one of the classical masterpieces of dramatic art in Ukraine. Ivan Kotlarevskyj, the author, was able to book such a great success because, besides his talents as a writer, he was director of the theater in Poltava and was in possession of considerable stage technique. After this auspicious start, Ukrainian theaters sprang up like mushrooms after rain; talented actors appear, among them Shchepkin, Solenyk, Rekanovskyj, and Marko Kropyvnytskyj (1841—1910) whose genius found outlet in reforming later features of the theater in Ukraine. The repertory of the theater also grows as some of the most gifted writers in the first half of the 19th century begin to write for the stage. Among these are Kvitka (1778—1843), Shevchenko, Kostomariv and others. The subjects that proved most suitable for the stage at that time were characteristic scenes from the life of the people with the Ukrainian landscape as a background and also events from Ukrainian history, but above all the deeds of the Zaporog Cossacks, the heroes of Ukraine.

These national tendencies of the Ukrainian theater could not escape the argus eyes of the imperial government, intent on forcing all the nations within the great empire to become Russians. In 1876 a secret circular was therefore sent round all administrative authorities forbidding the speaking or writing of Ukrainian. The stage was the first position that the Ukrainian language was able to re-take. Under the pressure of public

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opinion the ban on Ukrainian was lifted for the theater after five years. 545

This victory gave the Ukrainian theater a tremendous impetus as the only form of expression open to national life. The stage in Ukraine attracted more talented actors than the Russian theater could count on for the performance of popular plays; we mention only a few of the most important, such as Kropyvnytskyj (1841—1910), Zankovetska (1860), Saksahanskyj (1858), Sadovskyj (1856—1936), then dramatic critics like Starytskyj (1840—1904) who was also an exceptional stage-manager, Tobylevych (1845—1907) and others. Finally composers like Nishchynskyj (1832—1896) and Lysenko utilised this newly opened province of art in order to give expression to their ideas.

The Ukrainian troupes of actors were in those days simply called the "Meininger" in Russia (the famous theater in Meiningen was at that time at the height of its fame). And the epithet was not unmerited. For, in the same way as the celebrated German ensemble, the Ukrainian owed its unparalleled success to its harmonious management and its efforts to achieve truth in the settings of its plays. And the decisive triumph of the national idea was behind this purely artistic success. The Ukrainian language which was completely forbidden rang out unexpectedly, but all the more convincingly, from the advanced outpost of a popular stage. The sound of the Ukrainian language, of the Ukrainian folk-song, the beauty of the national costume, the magic of the Ukrainian landscape, the poetry of national traditions which the higher powers wished to stamp out at all costs, all this was displayed like a pageant to the spectators who were in danger of forgetting that they, too, were children of the Ukrainian people.

Up till the revolution of 1905 the theater in Ukraine was represented by travelling ensembles. New avenues were opened after the Russo-Japanese War and the changes that followed it. All restrictions were removed with one stroke of the pen and theater managers were permitted to extend their repertories beyond subjects from peasant life and to turn their attention to the theater in the West. It was, of course, easy to drop prohibitions that had existed up till now; but it was not so simple to

545 transform suddenly the often gifted actors who had always played peasant and Cossack rôles into players who were capable of giving a satisfactory presentation of a modern play. This aim was not completely attained till the short period of Ukrainian independence in 1918.

At this time there were two theaters in the capital which attempted to win popular support by their whole equipment, the excellence of their castes, and their sympathy with western theaters. "Oedipus Rex" which the "Young Theater" had been preparing for almost two years was an enormous success. Les Kurbas (1887), the manager and the soul of the ensemble became famous overnight. The "Young Theater" was mobile, thoroughly alive and inspired by youthful enthusiasm and a determination to work, though imperfections were bound to appear occasionally. The second modern stage, the "State Theater", was forced by its character to devote its attention to the absolute control of all means of presentation. Its head was Aleksander Zaharov (1877) and its performances were perhaps not always very lively, but they were all the more solid.

After the occupation of Ukraine by the bolshevists, the theater in Ukraine, as elsewhere in the Union, was used as an instrument of wide-spread propaganda. It was greatly extended for this purpose, so that opera-houses and also some ordinary theaters are to be found in several towns. Peasant life, however, was now banned from the stage and replaced by urban life of neutral nationality and to a large extent coinciding with the life of the working classes. The change that took place here may perhaps be briefly summed up by saying that under the influence of bolshevist reality Ukrainian dramatic art has been transformed into dramatic art in Ukraine.

In Western Ukraine the strong Polish interest in the country and the great difficulties imposed by the Polish government prevented Ukrainian dramatic art from establishing itself at first. It was only after Galicia was annexed by Austria in 1772 that the first attempts at dramatic representation were given in Greek-United theological colleges by students, and therefore without female rôles. The Ukrainian theater proper, with secular actors, only saw light in 1848, a year that was as significant

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for Austria as for Galicia. The part which this theater had to play in the renaissance of the Ukrainian people in its western areas was similar to that of the Ukrainian stage within the Russian empire. The difficulties with which actors and stage-managers had to cope were no less great, though of a different nature; for its fate was not determined by the Russian censor or the almighty governor general, but by its empty purse. Ukrainians living in Austria-Hungary had no capital at their disposal for the support of the theater and Polish influence on the government in Vienna was so powerful that it was able to prevent the granting of all subsidies to the Ukrainian theater. This situation is expressed by the fact that the four million tax-paying Ukrainians in the Habsburg Empire had not one single permanent theater, but were compelled to be content with travelling companies up to the war of 1914. It is clear that matters were not improved after the debâcle of 1918, when Galicia was annexed to Poland. When Ukrainians in Lviv attempted to build a theater with their own money on a site that had been purchased before, the Polish authorities managed to prevent the realisation of the plan. 538

In Galicia, too, repertories of theatrical companies consisted mainly of subjects from rural life. It is due to this and to the fact that these companies had no permanent home, but also toured through all the smaller towns in Galicia, that the influence of the theater on the population was greater and deeper than that exercised by urban drama of higher artistic merit. Its direct appeal, its proximity to real life aroused in the mass of the Ukrainian peasants the feeling and the demand for dramatic representations. As a result of the fruitful, if most laborious, detailed work accomplished by Ukrainian artists, amateur theatrical societies were formed in almost every village here as elsewhere throughout Ukraine, which, as they attracted young people, exercised a great educational influence.

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

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Bolshiye Yarki
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[For location of mineral deposits and other raw materials and indications of their importance to the economy of Ukraine, see category 116, pp. 146-188. For location and productivity of various industries, see pp. 164-188.]

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A History

by

W. E. D. ALLEN

Author of

A History of the Georgian People

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To N. M.

Half Ukrainian
Half Angel

Strength and honour are her clothing;
She langheth at the time to come;
She openeth her mouth with wisdom,
And the law of kindness is on her tongue.
Give her of the fruit of her hands,
And let her own works praise her.

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PREFACE

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UNDERTAKEN in more leisured days, this book was unfinished on the outbreak of war.

Three or four scholars, Russian and Ukrainian, have collaborated in the preparation of the material—and in the completion of the maps and index which service abroad compelled me to leave undone. In the circumstances of today these friends wish to remain anonymous. I can only say that it would not have been possible to cover the researches involved without their constant and generous help.

I am deeply indebted to Professor Ellis H. Minns for his kindly and painstaking interest in the revision of the proofs and in the proper transliteration of Ukrainian, Russian and Polish names.

It is a difficult moment at which to produce a book which is intended as a serious contribution to an English understanding of the history of Eastern Europe and which it is hoped may help to clarify the details of the difficult Ukrainian problem. But for the encouragement and friendship of Professor Minns and the enterprising policy of the Syndics of the Press the book could not have appeared in print.

W. E. D. ALLEN

1940

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THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE

The Russian or Eastern branch of Slavonic falls into three divisions, Great Russian, Little Russian or Ukrainian, and White Russian. The last, spoken in the former governments of Vitebsk, Minsk and Mohilev, has only claimed to be a written language since the Revolution: it is very close to Great Russian save for certain points in which it makes a transition to Polish, its Western neighbour, South Great Russian and Ukrainian. The other two branches have always called themselves simply "Russian", the Great Russians calling the South-Western language "Little Russian", which was resented by its speakers. These latter, unable in practice to establish their claim to be called "Russians", have adopted the words "Ukraina" and "Ukrainian" from the part of their country most distinguished in history (v. p. 64). The name "Ruthenian" is simply a foreigner's mishandling of *Rusin* = "one Russian man". It is applied mostly to the Western Ukrainians, but in older usage (e.g. in Latin books) to any Russian. 191

The Ukrainians claim that their language is the true representative of the speech current in Kievan Russia before the Mongol invasion: it has certainly kept certain points, e.g. the use of the vocative case and the distinction between *e* and *ye*, now lost in Great Russian: on the other hand it has changed original *g* into *h* (which does not exist in Great Russian), *o* in certain cases into *i*, *ê* into *i*, "hard *l*" often into *v* or *w*, etc., and has borrowed many words from Polish and even from German.

The Ukrainian language varies greatly in different parts of its wide area, the speech of the Kiev region and, curiously enough, the archaic dialects of "Carpathian Rus" differing less from Great Russian than does that of Galicia. The train of circumstances by which Galician became the foundation of the modern literary language is set forth in Chapter v (pp. 247 sqq.).

The shaded band on Map I shows the extreme limits of Ukrainian speech, but the borders are very vague and within them much Great Russian is spoken: along the sea in "New Russia" and to the East Great Russian is really dominant. In the extreme West the towns mostly speak Polish and the countryside Ukrainian.

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NAMES AND TRANSLITERATION

000 The personal names that occur in this book are mostly Ukrainian, Great Russian and Polish: in the authorities used, written in some ten languages, they are spelt in all sorts of ways and it is impossible to arrive at strict consistency in orthography. Christian names in universal use have mostly been given their English form, Slavonic names in the form most common in English. Polish surnames are written as Polish, Hungarian and Rumanian in their correct forms, Turkish a little haphazard.

For Great Russian and Ukrainian surnames the systems of transliteration recommended by the British Academy have been adopted. The reasons for the details of these systems are set out in *Proc. Brit. Acad.* VIII (1917).

Note that Ukrainian i corresponds to Russian и, и to Russian ы (but not so thick in sound), ї to *yi* which Russian can hardly express: *i* is used for Russian and Ukr. ій at the end of names, and *y* for Ukr. ий.

Certain families began by being Ukrainian or Lithuanian and became Polish (v. p. 52): they have been written as Ukrainian save when the Polish form seemed too familiar to change (but Polish has been rather avoided for typographical reasons), e.g. Ukr. Ostroz'ky, Polish Ostrożski, is better known in the Russian form Ostrozhski; Ukr. Chartoryys'ky as Polish Czartoryski; Ukr. Vyshnevets'ky, Polish, Wiśniowecki; Ukr. Chetvertyns'ky, Polish, Czetwertyński. It seemed right that the great national hero Khmelnyts'ky should keep his Ukrainian form as against the Polish Chmielnicki.

The variations in place names are even greater: the Ukrainian forms are mostly unfamiliar and have only been used for the more obscure places: the Great Russian forms are simpler to render and have mostly been preferred. The case of Lvov is a good example, Old and Great Russian, L'vov; Polish, Lwów (pronounced Lvuv); Ukr. L'viv; German, Lemberg; French, Léopol: or Russian, Chigirin; Ukr. Chyhyryn; Polish, Czehryń.

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TABLE OF ALPHABETS

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Transliteration	Great Russian	Ukrainian	Polish
a	а	а	a
			ą (*nasal*)
b	б	б	b
ch	ч	ч	cz
d	д	д	d
dz	дз	дз	dz
dz′ *or* dzy (*soft*)		дз (*soft*)	dź
dzh	дж	дж	dż
e	э (e)	е	e
ë	ё (*sounds* yo)	ïо	io
			ę (*nasal*)
f	ф	ф	f
g	г	ґ	g
h	(г)	г	h
i	и	і	i
k	к	к	k
l	л (*hard*)	л (*hard*)	ł
l′ *or* ly	л (*soft*)	л (*soft*)	l
m	м	м	m
n	н	н	n
n′ *or* ny	н (*soft*)	н (*soft*)	ń
o	о	о	o
			ó (*sounds* u)

Transliteration	Great Russian	Ukrainian	Polish
p	п	п	p
r	р	р	r
			rz (*sounds* zh)
s	с	с	s
s′ *or* sy	с (*soft*)	с (*soft*)	ś
sh	ш	ш	sz
shch	щ	щ	szcz
t	т	т	t
ts	ц	ц	c
ts′ *or* tsy		ц (*soft*)	ć
u	у	у	u
v	в	в	w
y *consonant*	й	й	j (i)
y *vowel*	ы	и	y
ya	я	я	ia, ja
ye (*Gt.R.* e)	е	є	ie, je
yi		ї	ji
yu	ю	ю	iu, ju
z	з	з	z
z′ *or* zy	з (*soft*)	з (*soft*)	ź
zh	ж	ж	ż
(′) *represents*	ь	ь	(′)

but has mostly been omitted.

In Ukrainian soft дз, с, ц, з (Polish dź, ś, ć, ź) sound almost dzh, sh, ch, and zh

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

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VII c. B.C.	Scythian invasion. Greek colonization.
I c. B.C.	Roman power.
III c. A.D.	Goths.
IV c.	Huns.
V c.	Slavs' expansion.
VI c.	Avars.
VII c.	Khazars. Bulgars.
VIII c.	Magyars.
IX c.	Varangians. 862 Rurik. Kiev.
911	Oleg and Byzantium.
945	Igor and Byzantium.
972	Svyatoslav. Pechenegs.
980–1015	Vladimir the Great, baptized 987.
992–1025	Boleslaw of Poland.
1019–54	Yaroslav the Wise.
1054	Cuman–Polovtsy.
1113–25	Vladimir Monomakh.
1147	Novgorod prosperous. Moscow first mentioned.
1169	Rise of Vladimir-Suzdal. Andrew of Bogolynbovo takes Kiev.
	Shift of population to N.E. and N.W. Foundation of Halych.
1204	Latins take Constantinople.
1224	Battle of Kalka. Mongols.
1240	Batu sacks Kiev. Mongol-Tartar domination.
	Rise of Teutonic Orders.
	Lithuania begins to rise.
	Daniel of Galicia.
1261	Greeks recover Constantinople.
	Moscow begins to rise.
1316–42	Gedymin of Lithuania. Metropolitan of Kiev moves to Moscow.
1333–70	Casimir of Poland.
1345–77	Olgerd.
1349	Galicia absorbed by Poland.
1353	Moscow chief agent of Tartars.
1380	Dmitri Donskoy. Kulikovo Field.
1385	Treaty of Krevo. Jagiello marries Jadwiga.
1398	Invasion of Tamerlane.
1399	Vitovt defeated on Vorskla.
1410	Teutonic Order defeated at Tannenberg.
1413	Union of Horodlo. Crimean Khanate. First Cossacks.
1453	Fall of Constantinople.
1471	Novgorod falls to Moscow.
1475	Fall of Caffa. Turks in Crimea.
1484	Kiev sacked by Crim Tartars.

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1505 Peasants fixed to land in Poland.
1526 Battle of Mohács.
1529 Lithuanian Statute; revised 1566.
1540 Revival of Kiev.
1552 Fall of Kazan.
1557 Foundation of *Sech*.
1569 Union of Lublin between Poland and Lithuania.
Turks defeated before Astrakhan.
1578 First Cossack Regiments in Polish service.
1590 Kosiński's revolt.
1594–6 Nalivayko's revolt.
1596 Church Union of Brest. Cossacks raid Turks.
1603–12 Muscovy. Time of Troubles.
1614 Sahaydachny Hetman.
1617 J. Boretsky Metropolitan of Kiev.
1621 First defeat of Turks at Khotin.
1625 Cossacks in touch with Moscow.
1632 Peter Mohila Metropolitan of Kiev.
1636–8 Pavluk's risings; defeat at Kumeyki.
1648 Great rising of Cossacks under Bohdan Khmelnytsky.
Zborov Agreement.
1654 Pereyaslav Agreement between Cossacks and Moscow.
1657 Death of Khmelnytsky.
1658 Vyhovsky Hetman: Hadyach Agreement with Poles.
1663 John Casimir crosses Dniepr.
1665 Bryukhovetsky's Agreement with Moscow.
1667 Peace of Andrusovo: Moscow stronger than Poland. Doroshenko.
1672–81 Turkish invasions ending in Treaty of Baghchi-Saray.
1683 Sobieski relieves Vienna.
1687 Mazeppa Hetman.
1689 Peter the Great.
1699 Treaty of Karlowitz. W. Ukraine under Poland.
1700 Charles XII defeats Peter at Narva.
1704 Mazeppa rules all Ukraine.
1708 Mazeppa joins Charles. Skoropadsky Hetman.
1709 Peter destroys *Sech*. Battle of Poltava. Death of Mazeppa.
1711 Peter defeated by Turks on R. Pruth.
1722 Little Russian Collegium.
1730 New *Sech*. *Haydamak* revolt.
1750 Razumovski Hetman. New Russia being settled.
1762 Catherine II. Hetman abolished.
1768 Confederation of Bar. *Haydamaks* at Uman.
1770 Zaporogians fight Crimea.
1775 *Sech* finally destroyed.
1783 Crimea annexed. New Russia organized.
1792 Cossacks moved to R. Kuban.
1793 Second Partition of Poland. Ukraine all united with Russia.
1803–23 Adam Czartoryski spreads Polish influence.

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1812 Napoleon's invasion. Ukraine not affected.
1830 Ukrainian movement begins in Galicia.
1831 Polish insurrection. Reaction against Poles.
1848 Peasant risings in Galicia. Ukrainian movement in Kiev. Shevchenko.
1861 Emancipation of the Serfs. Kiev *Hromada*. Antonovich.
1868–72 *Prosvita* and Shevchenko Societies in Lvov.
1878 Laws against Ukrainian books in Russia.
1890 Austria encourages Ukrainians. Hrushevsky, Emigration from Russian Ukraine to Siberia and Far East.
1900 Donets coal-basin being developed.
1905 Russian revolution failed. Ukrainian books allowed.
1905–14 Swift industrial development.
1914 War. Russians invade Galicia.
1915 Retreat from Galicia. Refugees in Kiev.
1917 February, Revolution.
March, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko set up *Rada* at Kiev.
June, Autonomous Ukrainian Republic proclaimed.
August, Bolshevik agitation in S. Russia.
October, Revolution. December, Armistice.
1918 January, Brest-Litovsk negotiations.
February, German and Austrian armies occupy Ukraine.
April, *Rada* gives way to Hetman as Skoropadsky.
November, Armistice in West.
December, Directoria takes Kiev. German evacuation proceeding.
Anarchy in S. Russia. Ukrainian S.S.R. proclaimed.
1919 January, Directoria leaves Kiev. Petlyura.
September, Volunteer Army takes Kiev.
December, end of Directoria. Repulse of Volunteer Army. Kiev taken by Soviets.
Carpathian Rus assigned to Czecho-Slovakia.
1920 April, Poles take Kiev.
June, they retreat. Bolsheviks invade Poland.
October, Armistice. Poland obtains not only Galicia but Kholm and Volkynia with Ukrainian population.
1921 Great Famine and typhus.
Return of Hrushevsky. Period of Ukrainization.
1929 Agriculture collectivized.
1930–1 Ukrainian 'plots' suppressed: persecution of '*kulaks*'.
1932 Second Famine: oppression of peasants.
1936 New constitution of U.S.S.R. as a unified state.
1939 March, Hungary recovers Carpathian Rus.
September, U.S.S.R. seizes Ukrainian districts hitherto in Poland.
1940 June, U.S.S.R. seizes N. Bukovina and Bessarabia.

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XVI (A)

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XVI. (B)

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

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

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XVI (E)

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XVI (F)

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XVI (G)

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

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CHAPTER I

THE RIVER WORLD AND THE KIEVAN STATE (UP TO 1240)

§1. THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR IN RUSSIAN HISTORY

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RUSSIA is a land of rivers. The element of frustration in Russian history comes from the fact that all the rivers of the Great Eurasian Plain debouch into land-locked or ice-packed seas. The fine rivers of Siberia spend themselves in Arctic waters. The Dvina, north-westward artery from the Central Russian river system, flows to the Baltic. Southward the Dniestr, the Dniepr and the Don descend to the warm waters of the Black Sea to find the single outlet to the Mediterranean through the narrow straits which separate Europe from Asia. Eastward the Volga, greatest of Russian rivers, casts its waters into the Caspian, the largest of Asiatic lakes.

The rivers offer to the whole Eurasian Plain the possibility of a close-knit unity. Rapids are rare—those of the Dniepr are famous; the rivers are broad and slow flowing over the vast level plain. Only the enterprise of man was necessary to convert the primeval streams into a system of communications. Geographically, a north-south development of historical life would seem inevitable; and from early times the river routes from the Black Sea to the Baltic were known to the trading communities of the Mediterranean. Yet the very network of rivers which gives promise of a unified and ordered development of life over the Eurasian Plain offers at the same time opportunity for the intrusions of alien elements. So the early history of the Eurasian Plain is the history of the penetration of the region by successive invasions from east, west and north, and of the percolation of the most diverse influences. Regional cultures were created by exterior action, and, so far as there is evidence in historical times, by the fusion of invaders, generally not very numerous, with the conquered inhabitants. This was certainly the case with the medieval states of Novgorod and Kiev, where a Scandinavian warrior and trader class imposed themselves on a primitive Slav population.

The third and youngest cultural growth in medieval Russia was that which radiated from Moscow. Here, owing to the proximity of the Volga and the close relation between the Grand Duchy of Muscovy and the Golden Horde, Mongol and Islamic influences

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131 175* imparted a peculiarly sombre and conservative tone to the reviving Russian state. The 'Asiatic' character of this third Russian culture may be contrasted with the enterprising 'western' complexion of 'Baltic' Novgorod and with the 'Mediterranean' brilliance of southern Kiev.

The Volga had always been a channel through which Oriental influences penetrated towards the north. In the days of the Khazar kingdom in the eighth century Persian, Arab and Jewish elements were strong. Klyuchevski, moreover, has emphasized the significance of the Finno-Ugrian substratum in the primitive population of the Volga basin. Here Voguls, Cheremises, Votyaks and other primordial Finnic tribes were enserfed by the Suzdal princes in the twelfth century. The new Russia which emerged in the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, and which for the first time conquered the river network of the Eurasian Plain from *within*, was a different Russia (less Slav and less European) from the Russias of Kiev and Novgorod.

The north-south trend in Russian history, which should found a unity upon the river network, is countered by a pull east-west. The Great Eurasian Plain has no limit north-westward till it reaches the Baltic and the North Sea; none westward till the Carpathians; while south-eastward it is lost in the Aralo-Caspian desert zone which stretches to the T'ien-Shan and beyond to the Khingan. Thus in comparatively recent times temporarily great powers like Poland and Sweden have exercised a formidable pressure upon the undefined borderlands. In earlier times the Germanic peoples in migration swept through to the Black Sea; the Goths ruled the South Russian land for two centuries. From the east successive waves of the Altaian peoples rode in from the desert zone of Inner Asia. The Hunnish and Avarian invasions of the southern steppelands on the way to Central Europe are very comparable to the later Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century. The Mongols were in fact merely the final wave of the Altaian peoples, who established themselves rather more effectively and for a longer period of time because their ruthless military qualities had been refined by the competence of Chinese and Persian statecraft.

The exposure of the Russian land both towards the west and towards the south-east made chronic the factors of instability and uncertainty which have affected all phases of Russian history. The fluidity of frontiers and the repetition of invasions have introduced complicated racial issues. The Russian state of the Muscovite Tsars was founded upon a real geographical unity, and it was a natural response to the slackening of pressures from the east. But the state which the first Ivans compounded out of Slav, Finnic and Tatar

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material was never a racial unity, and when the Russian Empire expanded *outward* without limit, as its enemies had formerly pressed *inward* without limit, it absorbed into its sphere peoples, Slav and non-Slav, who were historically attached to other regions and who felt the attraction of other cultural worlds. 131 175-*

§2. SOUTH RUSSIA BEFORE THE SLAVS

Many peoples occupied South Russia before the Slavs. Numerous cultures flourished there before the beginnings of written history. The fan of rivers round the Black Sea (from east to west, Kuban, Don, Dniepr, Bug, Dniestr, Pruth, Danube) nourished a vast area which linked the Asiatic with the Trans-Danubian and Mediterranean worlds. At periods in archaeological time a common culture appears to have covered the whole area between the Caucasus and the upper valley of the Danube. This common cultural background of forms and designs does not, of course, necessarily imply a racial uniformity. In fact the remains of different physical types and differing burial practices indicate the movements and settlements of a diversity of peoples. 175 *

The first historical period in South Russia began with the Greek colonization, the origins of which go back to the eighth century B.C. The Greeks themselves were undoubtedly the heirs of older thalassocracies in the Pontus—Minoan and Mycenaean. The Xth, XIth and XIIth Books of the *Odyssey* and the legend of the Argonauts suggest the existence of more ancient cultural epochs, which the archaeological wealth of the Kuban affirms.

The Greek colonial civilization in the Pontus has been well described by Minns and Rostovtsev. The Greek colonists round the northern shores found the Scythians in possession of the South Russian steppelands. The Scythians were probably an Altaian nomad aristocracy with an Iranian language and culture ruling over a variety of subject peoples, many of whom were cultivators. The influence not only of Greece but also of Iran and Upper Asia is to be discovered in the remarkable art which flowered under the patronage of the Scythian princes. The economy of the Scythians, based on stock-raising and agriculture, was complementary to that of the Greek states, and for several centuries both the Greek colonial cities and the Scythian rulers of the Pontic hinterland grew rich on the enormous trade which developed between the steppelands and the Mediterranean. Athens became dependent on Scythian wheat, particularly during the Peloponnesian War, and the Pontus was often an issue in the politics of the Hellenic world. Peisker thinks that the demand

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175 for grain in Greece caused the nomad Scythians to utilize wholesale the agricultural populations who were under their subjection. He recalls that Herodotus includes various peoples, nomads and husbandmen, evidently not of the same origin, under the name Scythian; the latter sowed grain 'not for food, but for sale', and he considers that there can be no doubt that Slav tribes were included among these transplanted agriculturalists.

The fourth century B.C. was the heyday of the Pontic cities, when the Greco-Scythian kingdom of Bosporus, dominating the Straits of Kerch (Cimmerian Bosporus), tapped the rich wheatlands of the Don and the Kuban and controlled the transit trade which passed between the Black Sea littoral and the peoples of interior Asia. Other cities attained great wealth and sheltered varied populations—Tyras by the Dniestr, Olbia at the mouth of the Bug, Chersonesus Taurica in the Crimea, Tanais in the delta of the Don.

The peculiar world around the Pontus, steppeland chieftains, Greek city-states and Anatolian potentates, attained a passing unity under the genius of Mithradates Eupator. Reinach has illuminated the grand mind of Mithradates, who aspired to win in the east when Hannibal had already lost in the west. Mithradates failed, and the Romans became the heirs of the Greek foundations round the Black Sea. But the days of the Helleno-Scythian synthesis were over. In the second century B.C. the relatively long peace of the steppe had been disturbed by the Sarmatians, another nomad people, probably of Iranian speech, living to the east of the Don, descendants of whom are still perhaps to be identified in the Ossetes of the central Caucasus. Dislodging and absorbing the Scythians, the wilder Sarmatians moved over the steppe towards the west. The old economic unity of the south of Russia was disturbed. Chersonesus, Olbia and Tyras could only enjoy security behind strong walls and under the protection of Roman garrisons. In the first and second centuries A.D. the Roman Empire became involved in a difficult struggle with the Sarmatians along the line of the Danube; Trajan's victory over them brought images of these distant barbarians to adorn the reliefs on the column dedicated to him in Rome.

During the second and third centuries A.D. the Sarmatians were mastered by the Germanic Goths and Herules. The kingdom of Bosporus was conquered; Chersonesus Taurica was hemmed in; Tyras and Olbia were destroyed. The Gothic kingdom lasted two centuries and 'was the only non-nomadic episode in the history of the steppe'. The hordes of Asia were in movement. Before the end of the fourth century the Goths had been broken by the Huns—the first of the known Altaian peoples who were to ride against the ancient world.

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After them were to come Bulgars, Avars, Khazars, Magyars, Pechenegs, Kipchaks, Mongols. 'Like the *buran*, the furious tempest of the steppe, each of these hordes drove its predecessor in wild flight over the civilized lands of Europe, extirpated the Slav peasantry which had settled in the grass steppe, and passed over the tree steppe plundering and murdering so that the Slavs were forced to leave this zone too and to withdraw into the marshes of Polesia'.(1) 175*

§3. THE ORIGIN OF THE SLAVS

The nomads played a dominating part in the history of the South Russian steppeland from prehistoric times until the fifteenth century A.D., and in Central Europe their sinister and destructive intervention was to affect the course of European history at intermittent periods between the fifth and thirteenth centuries. In fact not a few of the problems of modern Europe are traceable to the impact of the Asiatic nomads upon the homelands of the Slav and Germanic peoples.

Peisker, in brilliant chapters in the *Cambridge Medieval History*, contrasts the character of the two racial stocks whose compound was to form the basis of the population of Russia and of the greater part of Central and South-Eastern Europe.

'The nomads of the Asiatic background', in the opinion of Peisker, 'all belong to the Altaian branch of the Ural-Altaic race.... Everything speaks for one single place of origin for the mounted nomads, and that is the Turanian-Mongol steppes and deserts. These alone, by their enormous extent, their unparalleled severity of climate, their uselessness in summer, their salt vegetation nourishing countless herds, and above all by their indivisible economic connection with the distant grass-abounding north—these alone gave rise to a people with the ineradicable habits of mounted nomads.'

In contrast to the Altaian nomad the Slav has always been the peaceful tiller of the soil—the natural victim of the rading Asiatic horseman and of the Scandinavian river pirate and trader. In the view of Procopius the Slavs were not malignant and villainous, but harmless and naïve; according to Maurice: 'They are hardened to heat, frost, wet, nakedness and hunger, and are well-disposed to strangers.' Adam of Bremen found that there were no more hospitable people than the Slavs of Pomerania.

The Slavs form with the Balts (the Lithuanians, Latvians and original Prussians) the Balto-Slavonic group of the Indo-European family. Their languages have much in common with German on the one hand and with Iranian on the other. 'The differentiation of Balto-Slavonic into Old Baltic and Old Slavonic, and then of Old

175 Slavonic into the separate Slavonic languages, was caused partly by the isolation of various tribes from one another, and partly by mutual assimilation and the influence of related dialects and unrelated languages. Thus it is not a matter of genealogy only, but partly due to historical and political developments.'

A vast literature exists on the subject of the original homeland of the Slavs. Peisker accepts the view of the Polish botanist Rostafinski, based on evidence from botanical geography, that the differentiation of the Slavs from the Balts took place in prehistoric times in the region of Polesia—the great region of marshes which forms a rough triangle between the modern towns of Brest-Litovsk, Mohilev and Kiev.

Originally the Slavs, like the Germans, had no collective name; in Peisker's view the name of the Slavs is correctly *Slovêne* (sing. *Slovênin*); it is probably a *nomen topicum* meaning roughly 'inhabitants of the *slovy*'. Another view is that Slovêne means the people with the 'word' *Slovo*, as opposed to the Nêmtsy, the Slav word for German, i.e. the 'dumb' people who cannot 'take in' what you say. The name applied originally only to one populous tribe. The East Romans came into contact at first with a part of this tribe and thus named all other Slav tribes north of the Danube *Sklavenoi*, *Sthlavoi*.

Peisker emphasizes how the salt-desert zone of the Asiatic background developed the wild mounted nomad. Just as the mounted nomad was the son and product of the arid salt deserts, so the Slav fisher and husbandman was the son and product of the marsh. 'The Slav and the mounted nomad, like the lands of their origin, are diametrical extremes, and the murderous irony of fate made them neighbours. The one was a soft anvil, the other a hammer hard as steel. A second not less weighty hammer (the Germans) came into play, and the anvil was beaten flat.'(2) Perhaps his metaphor would have fitted better if he had spoken of a steel hammer, a hard anvil and soft iron between them.

Peisker has analysed the fundamental difference in character between the expansion of the Germans and the expansion of the Slavs: 'Dry and tolerably fertile forest land contains so much cultivable soil that it cannot easily be over-peopled: so here men form societies and states arise. But primitive man cannot wrest a foot of land from the marsh; on the contrary, he extends it by making dams, transforming small streams into great fish-ponds. Thus as the cultivable oases become smaller, the population huddles closer together. Dry forest land makes its inhabitants stronger, but the marsh has a degenerating influence. Forest land, however, is not inexhaustible; when what has been reaped from it is not made up by dunging, or by allowing it to

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lie fallow—in short, when the soil is merely worked out—it can no longer support the growing population, and compels migration or expansion at the cost of the neighbourhood. But the unwarlike inhabitants of the marshland can conquer nothing, and can only spread gradually where they meet with no resistance. This is upon the whole the difference between the expansion of the Germans and that of the Slavs. The Germanic migration was eruptive as a volcano, the Slavonic a gradual percolation, like that of a flood rolling slowly forward. Some Germanic people or other leaves its home: in the search for a new home they rouse their neighbours, and they in turn rouse theirs, and so it goes on until a hemisphere is thrown into commotion, strong states fall to pieces, mighty peoples perish, and even the Roman Empire quakes. And the Slavs? They have occupied and thickly populated immeasurable regions unnoticed by the annalists, and even now we ask in vain how this could have taken place so noiselessly, and whence have come the countless millions of Slavs.'

The Slavs thus enter into history during the period of the great migrations—harried and conquered by the Germans, and ravaged and driven by the Altaian nomad peoples. And long before the ninth century the inhabitants of the marshy forests along the great rivers were already suffering from the depredations of Scandinavian pirates. Germano-Slavic and Altaio-Slavic states began to form. The third century A.D. had seen a Germanic state on the Dniepr. But it was the Altaians who formed the great Empires and who swept the uprooted Slav agriculturalists with them into Central and South-Eastern Europe. In the fifth century the Hunnic Empire stretched from the Don to the lower Rhine; in the seventh century the Avars ruled from the Baltic to the Peloponnesus; and the Bulgars and the Magyars successively dominated Central Europe between the Adriatic, the Aegean and the Carpathians. But there remained of the great Altaian Empires, after they had disappeared from history, only the numerous Slav peoples whom they had forced along with them, and who formed peasant states in the lands which the nomads had conquered from the Romans and the Germans. In the Avar Empire, Peisker shows that 'the dominating Avar nomad class was absorbed as a nation and language by the subjugated Slavs, but even after the destruction of the Avar Empire it survived socially with Slav names'. The same social phenomenon is to be observed later in the Varangian-Scandinavian Empire which arose in South Russia.

After the collapse of the Avar Empire in the first decade of the seventh century, following the revolt of the Slav peasant masses against the nomad overlords, the first Slav states emerged in Central Europe, in each case under peasant princes, for the line in Slovenian

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175 Carinthia, the Bohemian Přemyslids, and the Polish Piasts were all of peasant origin. In widely differing geographical environments, subject to a variety of cultural influences, and undergoing processes of racial admixture with neighbouring peoples, the Western Slavs became a part of Europe and grew into distinct nations. Meanwhile those groups which had escaped the great Altaian tempests, and which had remained in the marshes and the forests along the primeval rivers, were multiplying and spreading into the vast untouched lands which held the destiny of Russia. In the seventh century, following the overthrow of the Avar Empire in Central Europe, Slav tribes were settling along the Dniepr. In the following century they are found scattered along its affluents as far as the upper reaches of the western Dvina. At the beginning of the ninth century they had already occupied the lake district which was to form the future territory of Novgorod. (3)

§ 4. THE RIVER WORLD: KHAZARS AND VARANGIANS

The great industrial and commercial revival of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern lands following the social and moral revolution effected through the successful propagation of Islam was undoubtedly an important factor in the opening up of the river world of the Great Eurasian Plain. The establishment of the Khazar kingdom on the Volga was almost contemporaneous with the conquest of Persia and eastern Caucasia by the Arabs. The Khazar kingdom was similar in character to the earlier Scythian and Sarmatian kingdoms, in that a nomad ruling class—in the case of the Khazars certainly of Altaian stock—controlled an area inhabited by a variety of populations, both sedentary and nomadic. And the Arabs had to the Khazars something of the relation which the Greeks had had to the Scythians. In the eighth century the Khazar walled camp, placed where the angle of the Volga approaches closest to that of the Don, had already become transformed into the cosmopolitan metropolis of Itil. Here a varied population lived and traded in peace under the protection of the Khazar Khaqan. People had settled there from the four quarters of Asia—pagan Finns and Slavs, Christian Greeks, Armenians and Georgians, Jews and Muslims from Iran and the Arabian countries. There is a story, based on the second-hand accounts of one or two Muslim travellers, to the effect that the Khazar Khaqans had adopted the Hebrew faith, which has passed into history. Recently Grégoire's researches have challenged interested exaggerations of this tradition. It is clear, however, that the influence of the Jews, who had become the most active agents of the commerce of the Caliphate,

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was substantial in the Khazar kingdom, and it is probable that the commonly observed mongoloid type among East European Jews, particularly in the Ukraine, Poland and Roumania, derives from the conversions and intermarriages which were no doubt frequent in the swarming trading camps of the Khaqans. 175-*

In the eighth century the Khazar kingdom assumed formidable political pretensions; the Khaqans had a preponderating influence in Black Sea politics and negotiated on equal terms with the Byzantine Emperors; marriages were arranged between the courts of Itil and Byzantium. At the same time, in spite of their partial dependence on the traffic with the Muslim cities of Iran, Shirvan and Iraq, the Khaqans did not hesitate to challenge the Caliphs for the control of Derbend and the eastern Caucasus.

The Khazars had established themselves along the river ways which led down to the shores of the Caspian and the Black Sea. The great Volga route apparently was already used in the seventh century. Along the Kama, where the Bulgars had settled, was carried a trade with the Urals and Siberia. By the affluents of the Volga access could be had to the streams which flow north-west into Lake Ladoga. From there down the Neva was the way to the Baltic Sea. (4)

The Scandinavians were aware of this route to the south and east. Scandinavian settlements arose among the Finnish tribes living on the shores of Lakes Ilmen and Ladoga and on the White Lake, and along the upper Volga. Their posts were at the same time of a trading and of a military character. The Scandinavians, the fearless Varangians, afforded protection to the merchant flotillas which went down along the waterways in the direction of the Khazars, or which were proceeding up to the Baltic Sea. The Khazar kingdom, in the days of its prosperity, offered an open market to all trading 'guests'.

The almost simultaneous spread of the Slavs round the shores of Lake Ilmen and along the banks of the Dniepr favoured the search of the Scandinavians for another and more westerly route towards the south which might enable them to trade direct with the Byzantine world without their having to depend upon the Khazar rivers.

During the ninth century the famous way 'from the Varangians to the Greeks' was opened up. From the Baltic the trading flotillas travelled up the Neva to Lake Ladoga, whence they navigated the Volkhov to Lake Ilmen; from Ilmen they went along the Lovat to the region of the affluents of the western Dvina. After conquering all the obstacles of a difficult portage, they proceeded up the western Dvina to the point where it nears the Dniepr. Thence they made use of the smaller rivers to shorten the new short cut, and the way down the Dniepr led into the Black Sea. Immense hardships

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*175 and difficulties must have been overcome before the Vikings looked at last upon the sea which could carry them to the capital of the ancient world. But the 'golden Tsargrad' of the Slavs lay beyond the endless rivers, and drew on the avid seamen, as in another age the legend of Eldorado drove their descendants across the oceans to the conquest of new continents.

The Slav settlements along the rivers had made it possible to penetrate into lands which had been uninhabited before. And the great waterway which the Varangians travelled served as a link between the Slav tribes scattered over the wide spaces of the Great Russian Plain. Along that water road Russia was born.

The system of the Khazar market towns along the rivers served as a ground plan for the Varangians. Cities were built: Kiev on the Dniepr, Novgorod on Lake Ilmen, and others later. And these were Russian towns—the towns of 'Rus'. No one ever called Kiev the town of the Polyane, nor Novgorod the town of the Slavs, nor Smolensk that of the Krivichi. The Finns called the people who crossed the Baltic Sea 'Ruotsi'. The Varangians were called 'Rus' by the Slavs, who had borrowed the name from the Finns. The name was also used by the Khazars and Arabs and by the Byzantines, and penetrated with the same meaning into Western Europe.(5)

Soon after the middle of the ninth century, Varangian rulers appear almost simultaneously in Novgorod, in Polotsk on the western Dvina and in Kiev. Oleg (Helgi), generally recognized as the founder of the peculiar 'Varangian-Russian' state in Kiev, was a typical Viking 'konung' who alternately traded and waged war. He pushed back towards the Don the Khazars who had reached the Dniepr and who were levying tribute on the local Slav population. He continued, however, to trade with the Khazar kingdom, making use of the 'Khazar way'—which followed the Desná, an affluent of the east bank of the Dniepr, then its tributary the Seym, and further the smaller affluents of the Donets, which in its turn falls into the Don.

In the same way Oleg made war on and traded with the Greeks. The campaign which brought him to the walls of Constantinople in 911 was successful not so much on account of the booty secured as in the agreement which he exacted defining the trading rights and privileges of 'Rus'.

After Oleg, Igor (Ingvar), and his talented and energetic wife Olga (Helga), pursued the Varangian undertaking in the south of Russia. In his military activities against Byzantium, Igor was not very fortunate, but he succeeded, in the year 945, in concluding another trading agreement with the Greeks. Among the signatures on this agreement are those of the envoys of Igor and Olga, of

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175 Svyatoslav their son and of other local chiefs, and also those of Russian merchants. Scandinavian names still prevail over names of Slav origin. But the son of Igor and Olga, Svyatoslav, already bears a Slav name. Svyatoslav was in fact the last Scandinavian 'konung'.

Incessant wars occupied the reign of Svyatoslav. He undertook campaigns against the Kama Bulgarians and against the Khazar kingdom, which he ruined. He thereby rendered a poor service to the nascent Kievan state, for the weakened Khazars ceased henceforth to act as a barrier against the Altaian nomads. A new horde, the wild and plundering Pechenegs (Greek, Patzinakitai), probably a mingling of Altaian and North Caucasian elements, appeared in the steppes to the north of the Black Sea. They penetrated as far as the Dniepr and threatened Kiev, while Svyatoslav was away waging war on the Danube, first against the Bulgarians, and then against the Greeks. Having suffered defeat at the hands of the Greeks, who imposed a treaty whereby he undertook the obligation to supply Byzantium with grain, Svyatoslav was making his way back to Kiev when he perished in a Pecheneg ambush.

Such was the Varangian prologue to the Kievan state which was to grow to florescence with an almost incredible rapidity in the course of the eleventh century. (6)

§5. THE KIEVAN STATE

Under Vladimir the Saint (980–1015) and Yaroslav the Wise (1019–54), the Kievan state—a historical phenomenon in the highest degree peculiar and even strange—reached the stage of its full expression in less than a hundred years. Rostovtsev, the historian of the Greek and Iranian synthesis in South Russia, could not resist the temptation of concluding his work with an outline of Kievan Russia. 'The extraordinary difference which existed between Kievan Russia and Western Europe to this day appears inexplicable. In the West—agriculture and feudalism; in Russia—trade and the city-state.'

The study of the Greco-Scythian trading system led its historian to a true comprehension of the state which had arisen, with the help of the Scandinavians, among the Eastern Slavs. Kievan Russia certainly cannot be explained by Greco-Iranian tradition. But it can be explained through the geographical and natural conditions, which had not altered since the Greco-Iranian period. The trade which had called forth to life the Greco-Iranian colonization later created Kievan Russia and determined its peculiar forms of state. The his-

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175 *torian Klyuchevski describes Kiev as 'the Russia of city and trade in contrast to 'the Russia of principalities and agriculture', which, in the fourteenth and the first part of the fifteenth centuries, took form in the north between the upper Volga and the Oká.

Vladimir the Saint and Yaroslav the Wise were Kievan princes of the tenth–eleventh centuries, and were still, to a certain extent, Varangians. And the Varangians, in the opinion of Klyuchevski, were naught else but 'armed merchants'. The city looked upon the prince as on 'a hired retainer' whose duty it was 'to look after the welfare of the Russian land and to fight the pagans'. Already, under Svyatoslav, the citizens of Kiev were displeased with their prince because he did not fulfil his duties. He went off on distant campaigns and left Kiev to defend itself as best it could against Pecheneg raids. 'Prince, thou goest away for foreign lands and neglectest thine own' —these were the words addressed to him. The city, therefore, could approve one prince, and disapprove of another. After Svyatoslav's death, the Kievan people did not wish to have Yaropolk as their prince, but preferred Vladimir to him. At the time of the struggle for Kiev after Vladimir's death, Svyatopolk, fearing that he would be driven away by the Kievans, 'called the people together and began to distribute furs to some and money—of which he distributed great quantities—to others'. The people of Novgorod, on one occasion, asked for a certain prince, saying: 'We have nurtured and fed him for that purpose.'

Relations of this kind between prince and people impose the conclusion that there had grown up in the river cities a powerful merchant aristocracy. The city on certain occasions could take independent decisions—ignoring the prince or even opposing him. Such decisions were taken by the *Veche* or 'general assembly' of the town citizens. Actually the proceedings of the *Veche* were virtually formal and conventional. Decisions were secured before the meeting of the *Veche* by influential groups of citizens meeting together in a more intimate assembly, where were gathered the substantial men of the different quarters of the city. Theoretically the *Veche* was open to all, but in reality the voice of the crowd was seldom effective, and that body functioned under the leadership of a few outstanding citizens. These called the assembly together when they were certain that it would decide what they themselves wanted, or, more definitively, that it would 'approve' decisions which they had already taken. That the *Veche* was becoming the central power of a land is clear from the words of the chronicles: 'The Novgorodians from the very beginning as well as the Smolensk men and the Kievans and the Polotsk men and all those in power go to the *Veche* as though

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they were going to the council, but what the elder towns have in 175 *
their minds the minor towns decide.'

Some Russian historians have yielded to the temptation of considering these *Veche* of Kiev and Novgorod as a strange and far-off echo of the citizens' meetings of the Athenian democracy. But it is not likely that even an obscure memory of the Hellenic Pontic cities lingered on in the south of Russia, after a thousand years of barbarism. The remote analogies between the fluvial city-states of the Russian Middle Ages and the Hellenic republics of the Pontic littoral derive from a similarity of material conditions which tended to produce a similarity in social organization—the merchant oligarchy based on a popular general assembly.

The trade of Kiev and Novgorod, which aimed at the opulent 'Tsargrad' market across two thousand miles of wild forest and steppe, required protection, and hence the Varangian Slav synthesis arose. But this peaceful trade could only for a time be alternated with the raiding tactics of the early Varangian 'konungs' in Kiev. It became increasingly difficult to combine trade with piracy against the Byzantine world—particularly in the tenth/eleventh century, when Byzantium was attaining a renewed strength under the Macedonian dynasty. Already by the middle of the tenth century a thriving Greek colony was established in Kiev. At the same period the first Christian church, of St Elias, was built, since there were already Christians among the merchants of Kiev and among the Varangian warriors of the prince. Princess Olga, herself, was a Christian, and in 957, accompanied by a great following, undertook a journey to Byzantium, where she was received by the Emperor. Vladimir gave expression to the natural tendency of the times. While he was making war against the Greeks under the walls of Chersonesus, he was already dreaming of an alliance with the imperial family. He became a Christian, and imposed the faith as the formal religion in Kievan territories. The other Russian states along the rivers were not slow to follow his example. From his Chersonesus campaign Vladimir brought back with him to Kiev Greek priests, Greek artisans and Greek church ornaments and books. He took also two bronze *quadrigae*—destined to decorate the Kiev of Vladimir, as the 'steeds of San Marco' were later to be carried to Venice after the Latin conquest of Byzantium.

The intentions of Vladimir were very definite; he aspired that Kiev should become a second Constantinople. He relinquished the 'viking' raids of his forbears, and set himself to consolidate, against the Pechenegs, the position of Kiev as a territorial power in order to ensure the security of the fluvial trade routes. He levied tribute from

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*175 the inhabitants of the forest and the dwellers in the steppes in order to strengthen his resources. He was accustomed to repeat: 'A pity it is that there are so few towns round Kiev.' New towns arose, and those which already existed grew. 'Rus' of the eleventh century is not only Kiev and Novgorod, Smolensk and Polotsk, all situated on the great water road 'from the Varangians to the Greeks'. Rostov had risen near the banks of the upper Volga; Murom on the Oka; Chernigov on the Desna guarding 'the Khazar way'; Pereyaslavl on the left bank of the Dniepr in the region of the budding agriculture of the steppelands; Vladimir amid the forests of Volhynia. But Kiev remained the leading city, the capital of the Great Prince, 'the mother of all Russian towns'. The primacy of Kiev has become a part of poetry and legend; but this primacy was real and primordial—in the city life of the Russian rivers and in the transcontinental trade of the Great Eurasian Plain.

Among his sons Vladimir distributed not lands but towns, in order of their likeness to his incomparable dream city of 'Tsargrad'. To his eldest son, Yaropolk, he designated Kiev; to the second, Svyatopolk, Chernigov; to Vsevolod, Pereyaslavl; to Yaroslav, Novgorod; to Boris, Rostov; to Gleb, Murom; and to the youngest, Mstislav, distant Tmutarakan on the Azov Sea. Such is the hierarchy of Russian towns at the beginning of the eleventh century (but from this order must be excepted Smolensk and Polotsk, where princes ruled who did not belong to the family of Vladimir).

Svyatopolk murdered three of his brothers, and the Russian towns rose in revolt against him. He maintained himself in Kiev with the aid of Boleslaw Chrobry, the first powerful Polish king, but Yaroslav came down from the north with his Novgorodians. It is noteworthy that Yaroslav did not lead the Novgorodians so much as that the Novgorodians carried him with them as a leader. Having suffered defeat in his first campaign, Yaroslav lost heart and was planning to escape on barges beyond the sea 'to the Varangians'. But, according to the chronicler: 'His *posadnik* (lieutenant) Constantine the son of Dobrynya with the Novgorodians smashed his barges and said—"We want to fight Svyatopolk and Boleslaw".' The city of Novgorod raised money, hired men from the Varangians, and levied an army in the region; nor did the Novgorodians desist until they had defeated Svyatopolk, taken Kiev and made Yaroslav Great Prince and ruler there. The story bears eloquent witness to the unity of feeling and action of the fluvial city-states in eleventh-century Russia. (7)

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§6. THE GREAT DAYS OF KIEV

The flowering of the Kievan culture came with extraordinary rapidity under Yaroslav the Wise (1019–54). Western travellers of the eleventh century, Ditmar of Merseburg and Adam of Bremen, admired the hundreds of churches there and noted the eight great markets. Kiev had become the great metropolis between north and south—between the Greeks and the Balto-Scandinavian world. Trade also passed from west to east—between Germany and the new Slav kingdoms in Poland and Bohemia and the Volga and Caucasian states and the Muslim world. The Jewish and Polish quarters in Kiev and the existence in the city of colonies of Armenians and other Oriental foreigners indicate the importance of this east-west trade. The cultural connections between Kiev and the thriving Caucasian kingdoms of the Georgians and the Armenians are particularly interesting. In the swarming streets the sounds of the laborious toil of thousands of artisans mingled with the noise and bustle of the trading booths. Trade led to knowledge of the surrounding world, to the accumulation of riches and to the beginnings of a brilliant art. Adam of Bremen could write his eulogy of Kiev: *aemula sceptri Constantinopolitani et clarissimum decus Graeciae.* 175*

Yaroslav was the typical king of an early medieval period of florescence. In the year 1037 Yaroslav began to build the church of St Sophia of Kiev. A few years later Greek masters and their Russian pupils were decorating this church (and many other churches and monasteries) with mosaics and frescoes. On the walls of St Sophia of Kiev can to this day be seen figures of the prince and his family. The walls of the annexes to the main edifice are adorned with wall paintings representing Yaroslav hunting and also festivals at the prince's court. On one of the walls is the portrait of the prince's consort, Ingigerd, a royal princess of Sweden; with her are her daughters Elizabeth, a future queen of Norway, wife of Harald Hardrada who became famous for his adventure in the East and who was destined to fall at Stamford Bridge in battle for the English crown with his equally unfortunate rival Harold Godwinsson; Anne, a future queen of France; and Anastasia, a future queen of Hungary. Yaroslav aspired to the alliance of all the contemporary courts of Europe: he married his eldest son to the sister of Casimir, the Polish king who had himself married a sister of Yaroslav. The Great Prince failed however to achieve the ambition of marrying one of his daughters to the Emperor Henry III.

Kiev was rich and alliances with Kiev were regarded with favour in the Western courts of the eleventh century. When, after Yaroslav's

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*175 death, feuds broke out between his sons, and one of them, Izyaslav, fled and sought help from the German Emperor, he brought gifts with him which by their magnificence astonished the Germans. 'Never', wrote one of the German chroniclers, 'had German lands seen so much gold, so much silver, and such profusion of costly cloth.'

During Yaroslav's life the court of Kiev itself received numerous exiles of high degree; the Norwegian King Olaf and his son were victims of the usurpations of Knut the Great, as also were the Princes Aethelred and Edward—the latter destined to be remembered with doubtful affection in English history as the Confessor. A pretender to the Hungarian throne also found refuge in Kiev—an event by which Yaroslav was quick to profit in marrying his daughter Anastasia to the fugitive.

The cosmopolitan court of Kiev read and enjoyed books and was familiar with foreign languages; the schools gave instruction to both youths and maidens—a novelty to contemporary Europe. The daughters of Yaroslav astonished everyone by their learning. In the monasteries, especially in the famous Pecherskaya Lavra, learned monks translated Greek and transcribed Bulgarian books: the Lives of the Saints; historical chronicles; the so-called *Izborniki* or 'Collections' which constituted the encyclopaedias of the time; the cosmography of Cosmas Indicopleustes; and Greek novels: the Romance of Alexander, the War of Troy, and the Tale of Barlaam and Josaphat (which has been interpreted by modern scholarship as a popularization of the life of Buddha derived from India by way of Iran and Georgia). At the same time were appearing sermons, messages and polemics by the hands of hierarchs of the Russian Church, which was then not a century old.

Under such auspices and into such a world was issued the first written code of Russian laws bearing the name of Yaroslav the Wise and called 'The Russian Right' (*Russkaya Pravda*). The originality of this code reflects the peculiar mode of life for which it was intended. In spite of the great influence of Byzantine legislation on the contemporary world, and in spite also of the close commercial and cultural relations between Byzantium and Kiev, the laws of Kievan Russia bear no similarity whatever to those of the Byzantine Empire, but reflect rather the Norse way of thought. It is not only that Russian law was more humane than the legislation of contemporary East European states: there was no death penalty, and it avoided the brutal forms of corporal punishment of the Byzantine and Oriental worlds. It was legislation adapted to the needs and mode of living of an advanced commercial community. The village, in *Russkaya*

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Pravda, recedes into the shadow; it is of secondary importance. The primary place belongs to the inhabitants of the city; the laws are concerned with their interests and relations to each other. But the possessions of a man are valued higher than the man himself, than his well-being or personal security. Human personality is treated basically in relation to the possession or production of capital. '*Russkaya Pravda* is principally a legislation of capital' (Klyuchevski). Such a code could only develop so early in the history of a cultural organism where commerce had from the beginning been the basis of the social structure and where the interest of the dominant Viking trading oligarchy was paramount.

The Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus describes in great detail the Kievan trade in the tenth century. During the winter the Varangian princes busied themselves in collecting 'the tribute' in slaves and produce which was to make up their cargoes for the coming year. In the spring, along the Dniepr, below Kiev, great flotillas of boats were made ready. From the north, from Novgorod and Smolensk, other flotillas were collecting. All these flotillas floated down the Dniepr to the south as far as the rapids, where they unloaded for the portage, and loaded again beyond. They followed the Dniepr to the sea, and took the direction of the Bosporus, all the time hugging the shore in order to be able to take refuge if forced by inclement weather. Every boat was loaded with more than two tons of cargo, or thirty or forty traders, retainers and slaves.

In the eleventh century trade developed and its methods were perfected. Chersonesus in the Crimea and the settlements in the deltas of the Dniepr and the Danube became intermediary ports. Greek sailing ships, built for the open sea and not obliged to keep close to the coasts, came there to meet the Russian cargoes. It would have been difficult otherwise to maintain the supply of grain for Constantinople, which had now come to depend as much on the South Russian export as Athens had in a former age. Russia also exported immense numbers of slaves to Byzantium and the Levant countries; in an eleventh-century Greek legend of St Nicholas it is related that he who wants to buy a slave must 'go to the market where Russian traders sell rabble'. Thus the age-old slave trade of the Scythian steppe was continued by the Kievan Varangians as it was still to be continued in later centuries by the Kipchaks and the Mongols, using as intermediaries chiefly the Genoese, and the Turks. The slaves of the Kievan epoch were derived mostly from prisoners made from among the nomad peoples of the steppe and, in greater number, from the tributary forest tribes of Finns and Slavs.

Cattle, horses and furs, of which there was a great variety, were

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* 175 important items of traffic; also wax and honey, for which contemporary customs created a large demand. Thousands of barrels of honey filled the cellars of the Kievan merchant aristocracy.

Trade linked the towns of Kievan Russia from north to south, in a 'meridial' sense in accord with the direction of the principal commercial way. The unity between north and south was something greater than racial or geographical unity; it was vital. To analyse separately, in the eleventh century, the historical destinies of the south and the north of Russia would be to distort the evident truth. The unity between north and south could be disturbed by forces acting from west to east or from east to west—that is, in a latitudinal direction—but those forces were not yet of sufficient strength in the time of Yaroslav and his immediate successors. The great days of the nomad imperialism of the Magyars were past, and the power of Poland was not yet developed; it was the Russians, on the contrary, who were pushing west beyond the confines of Volhynia and the Polotsk land. The Pechenegs and the Ghuzz 'Torks' had been rendered comparatively harmless, and new waves of Altaian nomads like the Cuman Kipchaks (Russian Polovtsy) had not yet appeared.

The first threat to the unity of the Russia of Kiev and Novgorod arose from dissensions among the princes after the death of Yaroslav, and these feuds were the product of the peculiar order of succession from which even Yaroslav the Wise did not see fit to depart. Klyuchevski and other Russian historians have devoted much labour to the study of this strange rule of succession to which there was no system comparable in Western Europe. It was laid down by Yaroslav that his sons should reach the foremost position in the state by the process of mounting to the top of a 'ladder' one after the other. Kiev, the capital of the Great Prince, was allotted to the eldest living son. The other sons, according to their age, received towns in hierarchical order; Novgorod enjoyed the rule of the second; then came Chernigov, Pereyaslavl and the rest. On the death of the eldest brother, Kiev went, not to his son, but to the next eldest surviving brother. All the other brothers then moved automatically up the steps of the hierarchical 'ladder', each succeeding his elder in his superior town. This happened each time the Great Prince came to die in Kiev. The sons of each Great Prince started their careers at the very bottom of the 'ladder', and moved up its rungs in the wake of their uncles. The sons of the princes who did not succeed to the Kievan throne (i.e. of princes who predeceased their elder brothers) were altogether excluded from the succession and were regarded as 'outcasts'. It is easy to imagine the quarrels arising from such an unwonted rule of succession. The system had nevertheless a reason

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of its own. It was sought to establish a formula whereby no prince *possessed* a city or land of his own, but whereby he was established there as a sort of lieutenant of the Great Prince of Kiev with the temporary right to the enjoyment of revenues. The 'possessor' (conditionally) was the whole family of princes. Yaroslav established not so much the order of succession to a throne as a system for the filling of vacant posts in the different branches of a commercial firm. The best and most profitable post should go by right to the most competent, and in those days (when survival beyond early middle age was unusual) age was considered as a criterion for competence.

Circumstances, however, proved that age was not sufficient for those who could judge of their princes' competence from their own experience. The Kievans in the year 1068 decided to exile Izyaslav, who was Yaroslav's eldest son; and not only did they not address themselves to his second brother, but they chose Vseslav, who belonged to quite a different princely family ruling in Polotsk. Izyaslav returned to Kiev with the help of the Poles, but five years later he was driven out again by his more capable brother Svyatoslav II. Izyaslav turned for help to the German Emperor Henry IV and even to Pope Gregory VII. After the death of Svyatoslav Izyaslav succeeded in returning for a third time to Kiev, but only for two years. Izyaslav perished in his struggle with the sons of Svyatoslav, who, since their father had only reigned over Kiev in spite of the rule of succession, were considered to be 'outcasts'. During the years 1078–93 the Great Prince was Yaroslav's third son, Vsevolod I, who kept for himself not only Kiev but also Chernigov, Pereyaslavl, Smolensk and Suzdal.

Vsevolod's usurpation of power over the lesser towns in the hierarchy was undoubtedly justified by the necessity for a concentration of force to confront a renewal of the nomad menace from the east. The Polovtsy had already destroyed the remnants of the Khazar kingdom and were pressing their aggressions westwards. As early as the year 1058 the Russians had experienced a first defeat at the hands of the Polovtsy, and by the end of the century the lands of Chernigov and Pereyaslavl were exposed to the annual raids of the nomads.

The strange and forgotten world of Varangian Rus, of Byzantine Asia and of the Caucasian kingdoms was approaching its crisis. The drive of the Cuman Kipchaks (or Polovtsy) north of the Caspian and the Black Sea occurred simultaneously with the overrunning of the Caucasian lands and Asia Minor by the Seljuk Turks. The Altaian nomads from the deserts and grasslands of Central and North-Eastern Asia were again in movement. In 1054 the Kipchaks

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*175 appeared on the borders of Rus; in 1070 they crossed the Carpathians, and in 1090 they were already on the Danube. In 1070 the imperial power of the East Roman Empire received its deathblow from the Seljuk Alp Arslan at Manzikert. Before three decades had passed the Crusaders were coming into the Levant. Turk and Norman Latin became the dominating alien forces in a Ponto-Anatolian world which had already lost its primacy. (8)

§7. THE BYZANTINISM OF VLADIMIR MONOMAKH

Vsevolod I was a cultivated monarch; he enjoyed the reputation of a competence in five languages and maintained numerous contacts with Byzantium and the Western world. He had married a daughter of the house of the Emperor Constantine Monomakh; his son Vladimir married a daughter of Harald Hardrada; and he had achieved a match for his daughter Eupraxia (Adelaide) with the German Emperor Henry IV (although this did not prove a happy union).

Vladimir, who received the second name of Monomakh in honour of his Greek descent, was educated in an atmosphere of Byzantine culture. Father and son shared the political conceptions of the imperial court and between them they elaborated the ideal of a new state which was to replace the old Varangian trading oligarchy of the princes who had grown to maturity during the tenth and eleventh centuries.

During the reign of Vladimir Monomakh, between the years 1100 and 1120, two learned Kievan monks, Nestor and Sylvester, compiled a chronicle which came down to posterity under the name of 'The Record of Passing Years'. The Record is a chronicle of events founded upon older annals as well as on legends which had been transmitted from earlier times by word of mouth. But all this material was systematically co-ordinated in a certain spirit and with certain tendencies. The learned authors had put to themselves the problem of explaining 'from whence came the Russian land'. They introduced into the Record the legend of the Apostle Andrew who had come to the hills of Kiev and predicted their destiny. Indicating the right bank of the Dniepr to his disciples, the Saint is reputed to have exclaimed: 'Look on these hills! On these hills will descend God's blessing.' The blessing of Heaven was in this wise, at the end of the eleventh century, officially attributed to the metropolis of the Kievan Great Princes. The whole account of 'the beginning of the Russian land' is constructed in such a way as to enhance the prestige of the house of Rurik as the only legitimate dynasty. The creation of Russia

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is their work. 'The Record of Passing Years' was the approved 175* documentation of Kievan history. A strong aroma of the 'divinity' attributed to Byzantine Emperors hung about it and began to perfume the robes of the descendants of the piratical trading 'konungs' from the north. Shakhmatov, who more than anyone else has studied the Russian chronicles, wrote that 'the pen of the chronicler was guided by political passions and worldly interests'. Odinets is right when he calls the learned Kievan monks the predecessors of the official political thinkers of the Muscovite monarchy of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries who found that Moscow was 'the third Rome' and that the lineage of the Moscow rulers could be derived from Caesar Augustus. (9)

Thus the political conceptions of the Kievan court at the beginning of the twelfth century were strongly influenced by Roman-Byzantine ideas of the monarchy based on divine right. To this new theory began to correspond new practice. Conferences of the Russian princes at the end of the eleventh century began formally to abandon the complicated 'ladder' rule of succession established by Yaroslav the Wise; different Russian territories were given into the complete ownership of the different princely families and a new order of succession was established, either from father to son or simply according to the will of the departing incumbent of a principality. Kiev passed into the full possession of Vladimir Monomakh, his sons and grandsons—the Monomakhovichi. (10)

At that time Vladimir Monomakh himself was still at the beginning of his career. As a 'travelling prince' under the system of Yaroslav, he had ruled the Suzdal lands, where he founded the town of Vladimir; he had sat in Chernigov and Pereyaslavl and had defended the lands of these towns against the Polovtsy. As Grand Prince in Kiev he showed by his example what was to be the hazardous destiny of the typical Russian prince during the epoch in which he lived. He went to war nineteen times against the Polovtsy and nineteen times he concluded peace with them. Vladimir defended not only Russian trade but also Russian agriculture. He went out into the steppes with a great armed force and harried the camps of the nomads, killing their chieftains, taking thousands of prisoners and driving their herds of cattle and horses before him. The dilettante of the formal and precious culture of Byzantium could beat the riders of the steppe. For a time he smashed the nomads and drove them back eastwards (battle of the Salnitsa, 1111). The same decades saw the Crusaders in Jerusalem; the reconquest of Western Asia Minor from the Seljuks; the repulse of the nomads from the Caucasian lands and the quick rise of the Georgian kingdom of David the Restorer.

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*175 Never before had the Altaians suffered such formidable checks over so wide a front.

Under Vladimir Monomakh the lands of Kiev, Chernigov and Pereyaslavl had respite from the Polovtsy; and he united them at the end of his life under his rule. His state resembled more a real military monarchy than had that of Yaroslav. (11)

In the fourth decade of the twelfth century, following the death of Mstislav, Vladimir's son, the feuds of rival princes revived and anarchy broke loose in the South Russian lands. A struggle for the possession of Kiev began not only between the Monomakhovichi and the Olgovichi (descendants of the adventurous Oleg of Chernigov, son of Svyatoslav II), but also between members of Monomakh's own family. The new order of succession to the throne had been established, but now the throne could be had also by force of arms. To take Kiev it was not now necessary to put forward legitimate or fantastic claims; it was only necessary to find 'allies' or mercenaries to attack it—Russians, Hungarians, Poles or Polovtsy.

The new order of succession had been established with the object of strengthening the unity of the Russian lands, but in practice it had brought about the weakening of that unity. Unity between Russian towns had been attained because that unity had been founded on trade and the use of common trading ways. But when the fluvial towns had acquired lands and these lands had become hereditary in certain princely families, unity gradually became an abstract idea which was frequently found to be in opposition to the practice of princely interests.

Towards the middle of the twelfth century, Novgorod, despairing of the establishment of a firm order in the south of Russia, becoming wary of the increasing uncertainties of 'the way to the Greeks' and doubtless well informed as to the perilous future of the Byzantine Empire, despite the magnificent Comnenian renascence, began to choose another direction for its trading activities. Bold and energetic pioneers, the Novgorodians, undertook explorations and settlements to the north and east—along the northern Dvina, the middle course of the Volga, the Kama and the Vyatka. They founded Nizhni-Novgorod, Vyatka, Perm—all these were originally Novgorodian colonies. In the west they developed intimate relations with the Hanseatic towns; they had lively intercourse with Lübeck, and succeeded in establishing their city as one of the *entrepôts* for German foreign trade of an importance equal to that of Bergen, Bruges and London.

By the second half of the twelfth century Novgorod surpassed Kiev in prosperity. During those decades no less than twenty fine

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churches were built and decorated with frescoes and icons—among them such a jewel of architecture as the cathedral of the Yuriev monastery. The famous little city of Pskov, called 'Novgorod's younger brother', was a product of this Western orientation. Both cities stubbornly adhered to 'the old order' and to southern tradition. Both cities answered the monarchical innovations of the Monomakhovichi by frankly going over to the forms of state of merchant republics. 'The Lord Master City of Novgorod' limited the right of its prince, and he was not even allowed to dwell within the city walls. Without the sanction of the *Veche* the prince could not begin a war —'not to start wars without the sanction of Novgorod's word'; he could not independently appoint lieutenants (*posadniki*) in provincial towns; he could not acquire lands either for himself or for his men; nor was he empowered to introduce any changes into the commercial agreements with the Germans. The Novgorod *Veche* in the year 1156 even refused to have bishops appointed by the Kievan Metropolitan—'the Metropolitan of all Russia'—but elected them itself. (12) 175*

§8. THE END OF THE KIEVAN STATE

In the year 1169 the prince of the Vladimir-Suzdal territories, Andrew of Bogolyubovo, sent a big armed force to Kiev and took the town by storm and gave it over to his troops to plunder. The victors, according to the chronicler, 'did not show mercy to churches or women or children'. As a result of this victory Andrew of Bogolyubovo became Great Prince, but he did not choose Kiev as his residence. He returned to his beloved northern town of Vladimir.

Modern Ukrainian historians (Hrushevsky, Doroshenko and others) who wish to prove that differences existed between the south and the north of Russia at as early a date as possible and who oppose to 'Great-Russian Moscovia' the 'Ukrainian south of Russia' attach too great importance to this event. It really was an event of some importance, but not in the sense which Ukrainian historians attribute to it. 'This struggle showed the national antagonism existing between Ukrainians and Great Russians,' writes Doroshenko. According to Doroshenko, Andrew of Bogolyubovo from his youth 'did not want to live in the Ukraine because he hated the freedom-loving Ukrainian population'. Such interpretations of history can only be considered as strongly biased and founded on misunderstanding and as making no contribution to historical truth.

Russian historians have not been without responsibility for contributing to the Ukrainian view of the relation of Kiev to Vladimir-

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*175 Suzdal. For instance, in the opinion of Klyuchevski, Andrew of Bogolyubovo 'was a real northern prince, a true Suzdalian in his habits, notions and political education....Andrew soon stood out among the crowd of contemporary southern princes in his character and in his political views.' In view of certain features of his activity and on account of some of his political views, it is possible to represent Andrew of Bogolyubovo as a sort of predecessor of the future Great Princes and Tsars of Moscow, but his characteristics can hardly be considered as typical 'northern' traits, nor is it anything but fantastic to speak of a 'Suzdal ideology' in contrast to a 'Kievan ideology'. Andrew, it is true, grew up in the north, but he was the son of Yuri Dolgoruki, one of the sons of Monomakh, and consequently was a real Monomakhovich. For a long time Yuri had been forced to govern the Suzdal lands (where by the way Vladimir Monomakh himself had sojourned) and under his rule those lands acquired a new importance. But all his life Yuri was striving to possess himself of Kiev, and he only became content when he attained the Kievan throne.

Before the time of Yuri population had been gradually migrating from the south to the north, and the civil war between Yuri and his nephew Izyaslav accelerated this tendency. Some of the migrating peasantry went along with the troops, and others left the Chernigov and Pereyaslavl territories on account of the feuds among the princes, always accompanied by Polovtsy raids fatal to the agricultural folk. An intensive colonization of Suzdal lands began; new towns were built, many of which received southern names (there were actually two new northern Pereyaslavls—the Pereyaslavl lands suffered most from Polovtsy raids and yielded the greatest number of migrants). On account of sentimental considerations southern names were given to northern rivers. It is curious that Ukrainian historians should wish to ignore the considerable proportions of this migration; but they appear to refuse to admit that among the inhabitants of the Russian north-east was a strong element from the Russian south.

When Yuri was fighting Izyaslav for the possession of Kiev he numbered among his allies certain southern princes, and troops recruited from southern lands shared in the sack of 'the mother of all Russian cities'. One of Yuri's allies was such a typical 'southern' prince as Vladimirko—the founder of the town of Halych and of the Halych (Galician) principality. Yuri married his daughter to the son of Vladimirko. Thus the Galician prince, Yaroslav Osmomysl, who played such a prominent part in his day in the politics of the extreme south-west, was married to Andrew of Bogolyubovo's own sister. Real friendship existed between these allied princely families, and

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Andrew of Bogolyubovo, while he was sojourning in the south, 175 during the life of his father, was a guest of the Galician court.

Notwithstanding their geographical orientations to north and to south, the Suzdal and Galician lands were united by similar conditions of development. Both the north-east and the south-west were being populated by labourers quitting the Chernigov and Pereyaslavl territories on account of the increasingly severe raids of the Polovtsy nomads. In the case of both principalities the importance of agriculture was growing; the possibilities of trade were declining owing to the fact that the centres of Slav power were being pushed away from the principal fluvial trade routes; the *Veche* was dying out, the commercial aristocracy was disappearing and a landed aristocracy was growing up in its stead.(13)

The Suzdal *boyars* killed Andrew of Bogolyubovo in the end (his body has recently been found with clear traces of their blows); and the Galician *boyars*, for their part, were responsible for many misfortunes which overtook the Halych principality. As for Andrew's political conceptions, they belonged neither to the north nor to the south; they were conceptions which sprang from his grandfather's family, who had not received by accident the name of Monomakh. They were Byzantine conceptions as understood in Kievan Russia following the disappearance of the Varangian way of life. Nor was it by accident that Andrew wanted the Metropolitan to reside in Vladimir on the Klyazma instead of in Kiev, for in accordance with Byzantine notions he required the presence and support of the highest hierarch.(14) Andrew fought against Kiev, not because Kiev was 'southern' but because it was a rebel city. Andrew also fought (very unsuccessfully) against the Novgorodian *Veche*, but it has not occurred to Ukrainian historians to include the Novgorodian territories among Ukrainian lands. Andrew of Bogolyubovo oppressed even the old trading towns of the Suzdal principality (Rostov, for instance) and preferred new towns to them—especially his own Vladimir.

During the reigns of Andrew and of his successors, the Vladimir-Suzdal towns were enriched by frescoes and icons and even sculptural bas-reliefs executed by the most talented Byzantine masters of the Comnenian renascence. But the intentions of this 'Byzantine on Russian soil' proved premature; he did not succeed in uniting the Russian lands; the processes of history did not depend upon his will. The ruinous Polovtsy raids were disintegrating the life of the south and, together with the feuds of the princes, led to a gradual desuetude of the great trade routes and to the downfall of Kiev. Under the pressure of the forces operating against it, the old Kiev-Novgorod

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*175 'meridial' connection was dying by the second half of the twelfth century. Those forces which operated in a 'latitudinal' direction were the wild force of the Polovtsy (the Altaian nomad pressure from the east), and the trading instinct of the Novgorodians which was turning away from the south towards the west and east. The more intelligent among the Russian princes were conscious of the tragic importance which the struggle with the Polovtsy had for the unity of the Russian lands. One of them put forward as an argument for a general campaign against the Polovtsy the consideration that 'now the pagans are getting hold even of our trading ways'.

It is significant also that the most celebrated epic of medieval Russia, 'The Tale of Igor's Host', is dedicated to an unfortunate campaign against the Polovtsy. It tells of the campaign undertaken by Igor, one of the princes of the Chernigov land, together with other princes in the year 1185. Written at the end of the twelfth century, it reflects the dominant conception of its epoch—the unity of Russian lands. This theme lends great pathos to the Tale. The unknown author urges all Russian princes to unite against the common enemy in the steppe—above all those who were most powerful at that time—Vsevolod of Vladimir-Suzdal, 'whose troops could drain the Volga with the splashes of their oars and make the Don run dry in their helmets', and Yaroslav Osmomysl, 'who with his iron troops can prop up the Ugor (Carpathian) Mountains' and 'who had closed the way to the Hungarian king and locked the gates of the Danube'. But 'Thou openest the gates of Kiev to the one whom thou art willing to let in there!'

In speaking of the duty of the Russian princes towards Russian lands, the author makes no distinction between the southern and northern princes. He knows the actual condition of affairs in Kiev. (Kiev was cruelly sacked a second time in the year 1203—on this occasion without the participation of 'northerners'.) But the Kievan idea, the all-Russian idea, remained strong at this period—twenty years before the disaster of the Mongol invasion.

A similar conception had not been alien to a Russian pilgrim of the middle of the twelfth century, the Igumen (Abbot) Daniel, who, having wandered from Chernigov to Jerusalem, petitioned King Baldwin that he might light a lamp at Our Lord's Sepulchre 'in the name of the whole Russian land, for all Russian princes and all Christians'.

'Everywhere talk of the Russian land and the Russian people mentioned nowhere,' comments Klyuchevski in considering the character of the ideal conception of the unity of the Russian land. Between the ninth and the twelfth centuries the Russian land had

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lived one common life in the measure prescribed by geogeaphical and economic conditions. At the beginning of the thirteenth century these conditions ceased to operate in favour of this ideal unity based on the fluvial network and the 'meridial' link of 'the way from the Varangians to the Greeks'. And while the *internal* 'vital nerve', the line Novgorod–Kiev, was weakened, the *external* 'vital centre', which had always magnetized and tended to consolidate the life of fluvial Russia, was overwhelmed by disaster. In the year 1204 the Latins took and plundered Constantinople. The establishment of a Franco-Norman dynasty in Byzantium, ephemeral as it proved, marked a further stage in the disintegration of the East Christian world. Turks and Mongols, French, Catalans, Venetians, Genoese, fought for the spoils of a civilization which was stricken to death. 175*

In the anarchic conditions of the Ponto-Anatolian area the principal export market for the trade of the Russian fluvial towns had disappeared. The Russian princes and the Russian Church had lost the support of 'the Second Rome'. The whole cultural basis of Orthodox Russia as a projection of the East Christian world had been removed. New orientations became inevitable.

The thirteenth century, the brilliant era of the medieval West, was for the Russians the time of their greatest historical catastrophe. About the year 1220 a new thrust of the Altaian nomads began. Under the leadership of Chingiz Khan, the Mongols destroyed the Turko-Iranian Empire of the Seljuks in Turkestan; ravaged Iran; overthrew in one battle the then powerful kingdom of Georgia; and, riding along the sandy foreshore of the Caspian, appeared in the steppe to the north of the Caucasus Mountains.

Spengler has emphasized the essential unity of the Byzantine and Irano-Islamic civilizations. The Seljuk Turks and the Norman Latins, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, had disrupted the civil life of all the western half of the great cultural area which stretched from the Adriatic to the Indian Ocean. In that phase the Seljuks had struck the first blows, and then the Crusaders had come in from the Western Mediterranean and from over the Danube. In the second phase it had been the Norman Latins who had cast down Byzantium; the great ride of the Mongols into the West followed within three decades. Upon that strange civilization which had its roots in the most ancient lands of cultivated living the outer world swarmed in—'the external proletariat' of Toynbee's brilliant thesis. Broadly, over a period of four centuries, it had been two groups of specialized destroyers who had blindly broken down this ancient civilization to make way for some new one; these two groups were the Vikings (specialized sea-raiders, whose successors, the Normans, acquired also

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*175 a 'land' technique) and the Altaians (specialized land-raiding cavalrymen, who never managed to acquire an aptitude for sea-fighting). The stunted remnants of the great Byzantine-Islamic world are to be found to-day in the secondary 'folk states' of the Balkans and the Middle East.

The Russian half of the East Christian world succumbed as its counterpart, the Scyho-Pontic city-states, had succumbed with the collapse of the Hellenistic civilization.

When the Mongols appeared north of the Caucasus, the Polovtsy sent to seek aid of the Russian princes, and the forces of several allied princes were gathered to meet this new enemy. They went along the old trading way which led to the Azov Sea and linked Kiev with Tmutarakan. The horsemen rode along the banks of the Dniepr and the foot-soldiers folowed down the river in boats. The Galician levies took the routeof the Dniestr as far as the sea and then went up the Dniepr. The united Russian forces moved across the steppe, following the left affluents of the Dniepr, which brought them to the vicinity of the river Kalka, now called the Kalmius, which falls into the Azov Sea. In the battle which took place on the banks of that river the Russians suffered an awful defeat in the year 1223.

The significance of this event, however, was lost; the Mongols 'who had seemingly come from nowhere disappeared again in the same way into space'. The Mongols had, in fact, retired behind the Volga, and it was only some years after the death of Chingiz (in 1227) that they decided to renew their movement westward. In the year 1236 Batu plundered the lands of the Kama Bulgarians, and in the following year his hordes appeared in the Ryazan lands. Ryazan was taken and its population almost exterminated. The same fate befell all the north-eastern towns. Yuri, the Great Prince who at that time ruled in Vladimir, was defeated and himself killed in the battle on the river Sit. Owing to heavy snows and the overflow of rivers, Batu was unable to reach Novgorod and Pskov, Smolensk and Polotsk. He turned south and sacked Pereyaslavl, Chernigov and other towns. Inthe year 1240 came the turn of Kiev, which was at that time governed by a certain *boyar*, Dmitri, in the name of a Galician prince. Kiev was almost totally destroyed and for some time forsaken by the few of its inhabitants who had remained alive. The Mongols moved westward; they ravaged Volhynia, Galicia, Poland and Hungary. They were checked only in Silesia, at Liegnitz, by the prowess of German, Czech and Polish knights.

The Russian state which had been formed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries had ceased to exist. 'From that time onward the Russian land became a Tatar *ulus*' (Shmurlo). The Kipchak power,

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a combination of Mongol and earlier Polovtsy elements, was established behind the Volga and on the old ground of the Khazars. 175*

The date of the destruction of Kiev by the Mongols can be considered as the date marking the end of the period when 'meridial' forces linked the north and south of Russia together. In the thirteenth century the pressure from the east had become incomparably greater than it had been during the eleventh and twelfth centuries; it had overwhelmed the Russia of the fluvial states. A reaction against the pressure from the east was coming and it came, naturally, from the west. But the western forces, as those from the east, acted in a 'latitudinal' direction and tended to be destructive of any renewal of 'meridial' development.(15)

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In the St Bertin Annals of the year 839 Bishop Prudentius writes about certain men who accompanied the envoys of the Emperor Theophilus on an embassy to the Emperor Louis the Pious: 'qui se, id est gentem suam, Rhos vocari dicebant, quos rex illorum, Chacanus vocabulo, ad se amicitiae, sicut asserebant, causa direxerat.' When the Emperor Louis began to ask who they were, he gathered from their answers that they were Swedes: 'comperit eos gentis esse Sueonum.' *M.G.H.* I, p. 434.

Luitprand of Cremona, about the year 970, writes: 'Rusios, quos alio nomine Nordmannos appellamus.'

In Arab sources

Numerous Arab writers mention 'Rus' or the 'King of Rus' or the Rus 'Kagan' (e.g. Ibn Rusta and Gardizi). The latter: 'Many men among the Slavs go over to the Rus and serve them in order to be under their protection.'

See A. Harkavy, *Skazaniya Musulmanskikh Pisateley o Rossii* (Statements of Moslem writers concerning Russia), Petersburg, 1870.

Minorsky, V. F. *Ḥudūd al-'Ālam*, London, 1937, pp. 427–438.

Cf. also S. Rapoport, 'Mohammedan Writers on the Slavs and Russians', in *Slavonic Review*, vol. VIII, no. 22.

(7) *On Kievan Russia*

Courses of Russian history by V. Klyuchevski, Moscow, 1923; S. Platonov, Petersburg, 1917; M. Lyubavski, Moscow, 1913; E. Schmurlo, Praha, 1931; also M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraina*, Kiev, 1913 (Ukr.); D. Doroshenko, *Outline of the History of Ukraina*, Warsaw, 1932 (Ukr.).

(8) *On the Nomads and Kiev*

Golubovski, P. *Pechenegi, Torki, Polovtsy do Nashestviya Tatar* (Pechenegs, Turks and Polovtsy before the Tartar Invasion), Kiev, 1884.

Bruce-Boswell, A. 'The Kipchaks', in *Slavonic Review*, vol. VII, no. 16.

Macartney, C. A. 'The Petchenegs', in *ibid.* vol. VIII, no. 23.

175 For an understanding of the role of the Altaian nomads in medieval Russia it is essential to read Boswell's brilliant study. 'The Arabs and the Georgians alone called the Kipchaks by their proper name. It appears in Western sources for the first time in Edrisi, who refers to the original Kipchak in Asia, after a detailed description of Comania. While the Greeks called the Kipchaks "Comans" the Saxons of Transylvania called them Valvi, or Falben, i.e. "sallow people". The Russians called them Pólovtsy, which some philologists derive from *polóvy* (*pálevy*), "sallow", but which is generally taken to mean "steppe folk" from *pole*, "field", i.e. it is a translation of the Turkish "Kipchak". (These Kipchaks should be distinguished from the Golden Horde, V, p. 42.)

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'The main facts of Cuman history are quite clear, and their importance is undeniable. It is difficult to conceive of a successful Mongol penetration of Central Europe, if a great part of Eastern Europe had not been peopled by a Turkish folk not undisposed to welcome distinguished invaders with similar Turanian traditions of nomadic life, of rapacity and of unity under a despot. 175*

'Kiev, Pereyaslavl and Chernigov lay near the southern frontier and were permanently exposed to the incursions of the crafty Turks. For their periodic migrations north and south they found the rich pastures of the Ozu, as they called the Dniepr, most congenial; and on the rich grasslands up the river, they found the Russians firmly established and beginning to practise agriculture. The eternal struggle of settled and pastoral folk was long and obstinate in this region, and the Kipchaks came to regard the capital of this coveted territory, Menkerman, "the great city" (as they called Kiev) as the centre of their world.'

After the victories of Vladimir Monomakh, according to Boswell, large numbers of the nomads left the steppe and transferred their allegiance to the Russian princes. They settled in parts of Chernigov and all over the lands of Pereyaslavl. 'In the usual Turkish fashion these petty tribes soon became merged in a new federation of Turks, who took the name of Karakalpaks or Blackcaps.'

'They even became an important factor in Russian political life; and we find the election of a prince carried out not only by Russians, but "by the Russian land and the Blackcaps". It is a matter for debate whether the exodus of Russian peasants to the north-east was not due to the peaceful penetration of these barbarians, as much as to the external pressure of the Kipchaks. In the bitter civil strife of the twelfth century, a Russian prince found these mobile horsemen more valuable subjects than the peaceful Russian peasants. The changed conditions on the frontier stand out sharply when we find a Blackcap Khan like Kuntuvdey invested with a Russian appanage on the River Ros. Finally at the time of the Mongol invasion we hear of a shadowy Izyaslav of Chernigov who is purely a Turkish chieftain. The process was inevitable, and no one can doubt that the weakening of the Russian element in the south was an accomplished fact before the Mongol conquest.... Apart from ancient cities like Tmutarakan, Oleshye, Cherson and Caffa, which were for a time Slav, and became Greek and then Genoese, we see the rise of a mixed population in the steppes, like the Cossacks of later times. The princes of Berlad and Bolkhov and the Brodniki of the Upper Don and of Moldavia represent semi-Slav communities with an admixture of Turk, Roumanian and other nationalities.'

The latest work is by D. A. Rasovski, *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, vols. VII–XI, 1935–40, 'Polovtsy'. 113

(9) *On the Russian Chronicles*

Shakhmatov, A. *Rozyskaniya o Drevneyshikh Russkikh Letopisnykh Svodakh* (Researches concerning the oldest Russian Corpuses of Chronicles). Also his critical edition of 'The Record of Passing Years', Petersburg, 1916.

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113 Chronicles existed in Russia at a very early date. The most ancient Kievan Corpus dates from 1039, and the Novgorod Chronicle from 1017; the oldest Polish Chronicle from the end of the eleventh century, and the oldest Hungarian ones from the thirteenth century. The most ancient Russian Chronicles are only known in copies of a later period; the Lavrentiev copy of 1377, and the Ipatiev of the first quarter of the fifteenth century. In the Ipatiev copy the chronicle of events in South Russia is continued until 1292.

(10) *On the Right of the Princes*

Presnyakov, A. *Knyazhee Pravo v Drevney Rusi* (The Prince's Right in Ancient Russia), Petersburg, 1909.

The chief Prince, whether of Kiev or later of Moscow or Lithuania, is often called in the west 'Grand Duke', but 'Great Prince' best renders his title of *Veliki Knyaz'*, *Wielki Książę*.

(11) *On Byzantium and the Kievan State*

Schlumberger, G. *Nicéphore Phocas*, Paris, 1890; *L'Épopée Byzantine*, Paris, 1896–1905.

Vasiliev, A. *History of the Byzantine Empire*, vol. I, University of Wisconsin, 1928.

Leib. *Rome, Kiev et Byzance à la Fin du XI Siècle*, Paris, 1934.

(12) *On Novgorod and Pskov*

Kostomarov, M. *Severno-Russkiya Narodopravstva* (The North Russian Republics), Petersburg, 1886.

Nikitski, A. *Istoriya Khozyaystvennoy Zhizni Velikago Novgoroda* (History of the Economic Life of Great Novgorod), Warsaw, 1883.

(13) *On the Rise of the Principality of Vladimir-Suzdal*

In addition to the standard Russian histories mentioned above see:

Lyubavski, M. *Obrazovanie Osnovnoy Gosudarstvennoy Territorii Velikorusskoy Narodnosti* (The Formation of the Original State Territory of the Great Russian People), Leningrad, 1929.

Presnyakov, *Obrazovanie Velikorusskago Gosudarstva* (Formation of the Great Russian State), Moscow, 1923.

(14) *On the Relations between Church and State in Medieval Russia*

Goetz, L. *Staat und Kirche in Altrussland (988–1240)*, Berlin, 1928.

(15) *On the Mongol Invasion*

The Mongol Invasion was described by a contemporary under the title of 'The Tale of the Ruin of the Russian Land'. Unfortunately only a small fragment has been preserved. It is in the spirit of 'The Tale of Igor's Host'.

For a recent summary, see H. T. Cheshire, 'The Great Tartar Invasion of Europe', in *Slavonic Review*, vol. V, no. 13.

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CHAPTER II

THE RUSSO-LITHUANIAN STATE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION (1240–1569)

§1. EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE MONGOL INVASIONS

175 THE Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century produced a revolution in human affairs comparable to the changes occasioned by the rise of Islam and the expansion of the Arabs in the seventh century. But whereas the impact of the Arabs on the ancient civil life of Western Asia renewed the forces which sustained civilization in those lands and assured to those forces a continuing primacy in the affairs of the contemporary world, the Mongol *buran* razed all before it.

The beginnings of the supremacy of Western Europe in world history may be traced to the destruction wrought in Western Asia and in Eastern Europe by the last great ride of the Altaian nomads. In spite of the terror aroused in the West by the campaigns of Batu, the leaders of Christendom were conscious of the opportunities which lay before them when Islam had been stricken and the East Christian world disrupted.

Diplomatic embassies from the Western courts, co-operating with long-sighted Latin-Armenian rulers like Hayton, sought the alliance of the Mongols against the last stronghold of Islamic power in Egypt. The Venetians and the Genoese, always hungry rivals, quickly established a succession to the Greeks in the Black Sea countries conquered by the Mongols, and the ancient *entrepôts* of Russo-Byzantine trade at the mouths of the Dniestr, the Dniepr and the Don became the headquarters of the trading concerns of the Italian cities. The meridial 'way from the Varangians to the Greeks' had disappeared, but new explorations such as those of the Polos showed the way for a latitudinal economic development which by use of the excellent system of communications established by the Mongols was to let trade through from 'Cambalu' to the Bosporus.

The Papacy was not slow to supplement the commercial activities of the Italian trading cities. The effort to convert the Mongol ruling class to the Christian faith failed in the end, and in their decadence the heirs of Chingiz became the protectors of that Islam which they

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175 had broken down and patrons of a brilliant period of Muslim painting which suddenly blossomed like a flower in the ruins of a world.

But, as the executor of East Christendom, the Papacy enjoyed a greater degree of success. While the Bank of St George in Genoa set up an *Officium Ghazariae* (a 'Khazar Office' combining the functions of an East India Company and an India Office) to monopolize the Black Sea trade, the Pope created an archiepiscopal see of Caffa to comprise the whole area between Varna in Bulgaria and Saray on the Volga, and bishoprics in Sukhum (where an early incumbent was an Englishman) and Tiflis for the purpose of bringing the enfeebled Georgians within the Roman fold.

Over the vast expanse of country between the Baltic and the Black Sea the influence of the Latin West began to expand into the areas devastated by the Mongol invasions. In the plains and forests watered by the great streams of the Vistula and the Niemen, the Slav tribes had during the eleventh century been consolidated by the Piast, Boleslaw I, into the loose federation of principalities which made up the kingdom of Poland. In Poland, with her rivers flowing to the Baltic, as in the fluvial Kievan state, the Scandinavian warrior traders had played a certain role, while the Germanic-Latin influence in early Polish history is comparable to the Byzantine-East Christian influence in the development of Kiev.

But the German-Latin influence was much stronger. The Byzantine influence was commercial and cultural; it represented the percolation of a sophisticated and biologically sterile civilization. The German contact with the Slavs was that of frontiersmen; of a young and vigorous people, themselves only newly emergent from barbarism. It was the movement of a people bearing with them some culture; there was no Byzantine trickle of those refined and desiccated dogmas which were to influence Muscovite thought so strongly for centuries after Byzantium had fallen. The Germans sought land and settlement, and their intent was to build a German order. They were more dangerous than the Greeks, who essayed only to augment the wealth of their world city.

In the eleventh century Poland, like Southern Russia, was passing through one of those phases of anarchy which were typical of a certain stage of development in all medieval societies; the unity built by Boleslaw I had proved too new to continue. At the same time social unrest in Germany was fermenting and sending the peasantry eastward into new lands. Parallel with this popular migration, the crusading imperialism of rulers like Albert the Bear and Henry the Lion was carving the German Eastern Marks out of the Slav lands between the Elbe and the Vistula. The pagan Slavs and Balts resisted

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with an obstinacy and ferocity which was only equalled by the pertinacity and ruthlessness of the invading Germans. Out of those several centuries of obscure conflict was hammered that peculiar quality of hardness which characterizes the modern north German. 175*

The Slavs of the Vistula had produced their reaction to German pressure in the foundation of the Polish state. At the beginning of the thirteenth century the more primitive Baltic tribes, harried and harassed by the Germans, reacted in a similar way. The wild Lithuanian tribes in the forests along the Niemen, the last and most determined pagans in Europe, founded a state which was to become a strange and indeed unique phenomenon in the history of Eastern Europe in the following three centuries. During the same period the German knightly orders, Teutonic and Livonian—modelled on the Western orders of chivalry—established themselves on the Baltic seaboard in order to pursue the pagans into their most remote fastnesses. Supported by Emperor and Pope, the rough knights were carrying the German power and Latin Christianity into the illimitable forests of the north Eurasian Plain.

It was at this juncture that the Mongols overthrew the Russian principalities and ravished the lands of Orthodox Christianity which had looked towards Byzantium—itself recently fallen into Latin hands. The Mongol devastations were continued into Poland, and the Polish kingdom, the last important organized Slav state, suffered a depopulation hardly less severe than that which had overtaken the Russian lands.

'The chief result of this wholesale depopulation was an enormous influx of Germans. It appeared as if the Poles would disappear between the grinding pressure of the Germans both in the west and in the north, and the sporadic but ruinous raids of the Lithuanians and the Asiatic nomads in the east' (Boswell, *Poland*).

The Poles were placed in somewhat the same relation to the Germans as were the surviving Russian principalities between the Oka and the upper Volga to the Mongol-Tartar Golden Horde established in the vast region of Kipchak stretching between the Dniepr, the Urals and the Caucasus. The marked differentiation between the Poles and the Eastern Slavs dates from this epoch. For the Poles not only survived the impact of the Germans but absorbed much of the Germanic-Latin culture of medieval Christendom with no small proportion of German blood, while the Muscovite state which rose with the decline of the Golden Horde was built by a people impregnated with Altaian blood and oppressed by Asiatic conceptions of life.

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*175 'The Germans did succeed in absorbing Lower Silesia, but in Poland itself they were gradually assimilated by the Poles. These German peasants introduced higher methods of agriculture, and made definite contracts with the landowners, who allowed them a measure of local autonomy. The Polish peasants profited by the scarcity of labour to imitate them, and a period of prosperity and liberty ensued for the peasants. The Germans also poured into the towns, where they received autonomy under Magdeburg law, which remained in force for centuries. They formed a middle class whose prosperity depended on the Eastern trade through Cracow.... The Germans, in fact, failed to colonize any part of Poland except Lower Silesia; but the Teutonic Order made great advances on the Baltic seaboard, and by 1283 the Prussians were practically exterminated by the Germans, who took their name and formed a state which cut Poland off from the sea' (Boswell, *Poland*).

The first decade of the fourteenth century saw the revival of the Polish kingdom under Vladislav* the Short (Łokietek); and his son, Casimir the Great, made Poland a power in Eastern Europe. 'The great historical events of the reign were the renunciation of all Polish claims to Pomerania and Silesia in 1335, and the annexation of Galicia in 1340. This is one of the turning-points in Polish history. She now definitely retreated before German aggression to an inner line, which the subsequent disorganization of the Empire enabled her to hold till the rise of Prussia in the eighteenth century; and she embarked on a policy which diverted Polish expansion to the south-east, brought under her sway the bulk of the Ruthenian or Little Russian people, and opened the way to contact with Moscow, Turkey and the Crimean Tartars' (Boswell, *Poland*).

Two centuries were to pass before the North Russian princes between the Oka and the upper Volga were to emerge as the successors of the Kipchak-Tartar power which had been established on the Volga as a result of the Mongol invasions. The significance of the Kipchak state of the Golden Horde in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries has been strangely ignored by historians. Founded by Beréké, the son of Batu, it was the most northerly of the succession states which arose out of the Empire of Chingiz. It represented in fact a revival of the ancient Khazar kingdom, and its people, like the Khazars, were an amalgam of the races of the steppe—among which the Turkish Kipchak stock was the dominant factor. Already in 1261

* Vladislav: this name is now spelt in Polish Władysław, appears in Russian as Vladislav, Latin and German usually Ladislaus, French Ladislas, Hungarian László. Vladislav seems the convenient form. So Casimir for Polish Kazimierz.

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Beréké was challenging the supremacy of the Western Mongols, whose state comprised the Iranian and Anatolian dominions of the Il-khans. The close relations of the Kipchaks with the Egyptian Mamluks, whose force was largely recruited by slaves from the Kipchak steppe and from the Circassian tribes of the western Caucasus (Sultan Baybars was a Kipchak), allowed the Khans of the Golden Horde to play an influential part in the politics of the Near and Middle East. A combination of the Golden Horde with the Mamluks always threatened the hegemony of the Il-khans in Western Asia, and while the feeble Crusading states in the Levant with the Armenian kingdom generally leaned for support against Egypt on the Iranian Mongols, the weakened Georgian kingdom, still controlling the Caucasian passes, began to recover place as her kings could play for favour between the Il-khans and the Horde.

Tamerlane was at once the last great Altaian conqueror and the destroyer of the supremacy of his own race in Eastern Europe and Western Asia. He revived the power of the Iranian Mongols and used it to struggle for mastery over the Osmanli Turks in Asia Minor and over the Golden Horde in the northern steppe. In the last decade of the fourteenth century his great campaigns against Tokhtamish effectively broke the nomad state north of the Black Sea. A century and a half later Ivan IV took Kazan, and the Altaian dominion on the Volga was at an end for ever. Tamerlane broke also the strength of the young Osmanli state in his famous victory over Bayazid at Ankara. It is a curious historical paradox that while the Eastern Slavs—first the Poles and later the Muscovites—became the beneficiaries of the ruin of the Golden Horde, the Hungarian and Slav kingdoms in South-Eastern Europe failed to profit from the catastrophe of Bayazid. The explanation is that the Osmanli state was itself partly Slav and partly Greek in its composition, and that the Osmanli, when Tamerlane attacked them, were building that earliest centralized Renaissance state which was to dominate the politics of South-Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean during the following century. The young state had within it the *élan vital* of its age, and it had the strength to survive the disaster at Ankara. But in the Golden Horde Tamerlane dissipated the final projection of a type of community which in essentials belonged to a remote Scythian and Khazar past.

Thus, while the Poles were to recover from the effects of the Mongol invasions a century before the Russian principalities and were to prove to have gained a decisive advantage in the race for control in the wide 'no man's lands' which stretched to the south of both, the Balkan Slavs were to remain for five hundred years in

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*175 durance as the prisoners of that curious synthesis of Byzantine-Saracenic forms and Turkish nomad's force, Slavonic manpower and Levantine competence which was the Ottoman Empire.

§2. THE WEST RUSSIAN STATE IN GALICIA

Plano Carpini, emissary of Pope Innocent IV to the Great Khan at Karakorum, passed through the South Russian lands six years after the sack of Kiev by the Mongols. He saw everywhere traces of fire and mounds of human bones and skulls. In Kiev, in the shadow of the charred walls of St Sophia, he found only two hundred houses standing. Such had been the fate of one of the most populous cities of medieval Europe—at the beginning of the twelfth century Kiev had contained about 100,000 inhabitants. Chernigov, Pereyaslavl and Vladimir-Volynsk had been burned to the ground, and they never really recovered from the catastrophe which had overtaken them. Half the people of Pereyaslavl had been slaughtered and the other half had been led away into captivity. 'In Vladimir-Volynsk not a soul remained alive and the churches were filled with corpses' (Shmurlo). In fact the whole of the Russian population to the east of the Dniepr either had been butchered or had fled into the forests along the upper Desna and the Sozh. The inhabitants of the lands of Kiev and Volhynia had taken refuge in the forests along the affluents of the Pripet and in the swamps of Polesia.

To the end of the thirteenth century and even into the middle of the fourteenth these fertile lands of the south of Russia continued desert. The invasion of Batu was only the first and most devastating of many Tartar raids across the open lands between the rivers. The resistance which Daniel of Galicia opposed to the Golden Horde provoked ferocious Tartar incursions in the years 1259–61. In the year 1285 Telebuga Khan passed twice across the southern steppe in the course of his attack upon Poland, and, in the words of a contemporary chronicler, he 'swept clean the whole of the Vladimir-Volynsk lands'. In the second half of the thirteenth century there were no princes in Kiev—even as nominees of the Horde. Some stray folk began to settle in the city, but the recurrent Tartar raids forced the Kievan Metropolitan Maxim—still 'Metropolitan of all Russia'—to quit the south and establish himself with his retinue and belongings in the north at Vladimir on the Klyazma. According to the chronicler: 'Then the whole of Kiev ran away.'

Conditions in the south were more difficult than in the north. The favourite pasturages of the Horde were along the lower Volga and between the Volga and the Don. The nomads wandered along the

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shores of the Azov Sea and in the winter frequented the coasts of the Crimea. Lesser bands of nomads were scattered all over the steppe—the remainder of the Polovtsy, Torks and Karakalpaks who had been disturbed by the tempest of Batu's invasion. The way to the west, to the Dniestr and the Danube lands, lay open to these plunderers as to the horse of the Golden Horde. In the north, after the first onslaught, the Khans in Saray contented themselves with levying tribute on the settled populations. The long winters, the overflow of rivers in the spring, the forests and the swamps did not make the northern lands attractive to the nomads. For over a hundred years the northern princes did not attempt to contest the overlordship of the Horde, and the princes of Moscow by careful and subservient policy avoided Tartar incursions upon their lands during the nine decades between 1293 and 1381.

In the West Russian lands bordering on the old South, groups of nomads made attempts to effect permanent settlements throughout the latter part of the thirteenth century. The princes of Galicia sustained a struggle with the inhabitants of the so-called 'Bolkhov land' to the north-east of Volhynia; these were part uprooted labourers and part remnants of steppeland tribes mixed with Tartars. A similar half-nomad, half-settled population appeared in the 'new land' of Podolia, which till that time had been relatively thinly inhabited. (1)

The Galician Prince Daniel failed in the end in his struggle with the Tartars. With the decay of the Kievan state, Galicia, under the Princes Roman and Daniel, had gradually become the focus of South and West Russian life. A brief florescence of the Galician principality had been interrupted by the Mongol invasion, and Daniel had been forced to recognize the supremacy of the Golden Horde. The same necessity had overtaken Alexander Nevski in the north. Both princes found that they had to contend not only against nomad incursions from the east but also against continuous pressure from the west. Against the pressure from the west Alexander Nevski was victorious; he held Novgorod and Pskov against the Swedes and the Livonian Order. He had laid the foundations of a future Russian recovery towards the Baltic. But Daniel of Galicia had no possibility of consolidating the existing order of things. That is why, though both princes died about the same time, Daniel belongs to the past; he closed 'the pre-Mongol period' in the south, while with Alexander Nevski began a new epoch in the north.

The achievements of the Galician prince were quite ephemeral. After his death (1264), the Galician principality, that 'last remnant of South Russia', began to sustain the weight of the growing power of the Polish and Hungarian kingdoms. There was a brief period of

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*175 prosperity under Daniel's son, Leo. The towns built and adorned by Daniel, Kholm and Lvov (i.e. 'the town of Lev or Leo'), with their large colonies of Jews and Armenians, attained a considerable prosperity, for they were on the trade route from Regensburg to Byzantium, and some of the traffic which had previously passed down the Dniepr to the Black Sea now went down the Dniestr. The revival of the Pontic trade by the Genoese and the Venetians during the period of Mongol hegemony gave an additional importance to the Galician towns which were placed on the line of the new latitudinal trade route from west to east.

But towards the middle of the fourteenth century the position of the Galician principality became critical. Poland was ruled by the most able of the Piasts, Casimir the Great; in Hungary the new Angevin dynasty was gaining strength; Gedymin was building the Lithuanian power. Conditions in the Galician principality made it easy for powerful neighbours to influence its fate. The Galician princes had never been successful in mastering their unruly *boyars*. Roman, the father of Daniel, had justified the execution of a number of them by the words: 'If one does not kill bees one will not be able to take honey.' But the bees were always swarming angrily round the heads of the Galician rulers. Different groups of *boyars* for varying reasons fell under the influence of neighbouring monarchs, and the foreign enemy found allies in the land itself. In the year 1323 the dynasty of Daniel became extinct, and rule passed to a Polish prince, Boleslaw of Mazovia, who proceeded to adopt the Orthodox faith and to change his name to Yuri. In his time the *boyars* became so powerful that he had to sign state documents not only in his own name, but in that of his entire baronage—*nos una cum dilectis et fidelibus nostris baronibus militibusque*. His amiability did not prevent the *boyars* from poisoning him in 1340. Nine years later Casimir annexed the Galician principality to the kingdom of Poland. At the same time Volhynia passed to the Great Prince of Lithuania.

The north-eastern Carpathians, which form the watershed between the affluents of the Dniestr and the Tisza and divide the South Russian steppe from the Hungarian plain, had been peopled by a steady influx of fugitives from the Kievan lands. Leo of Galicia had taken advantage of the disorders in Hungary which followed the death of Ladislas the Cuman and the extinction of the Árpád dynasty, to occupy this country of 'Carpathian Rus' which depended on the Hungarian county of Munkács. With the extinction of the principality of Galicia, the Russian inhabitants of the high Alpine valleys of Carpathian Rus became the subjects of the Hungarian kings. (2, 3, 4)

Thus the last centres of independent political life in South and

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West Russia were extinguished by the middle of the fourteenth 175*
century. The Galician princes had proved incapable of establishing a new focus for the revival of Russian political life after the catastrophe of the Mongol invasions. The Altaian Kipchak state still dominated the middle and southern reaches of all the great South Russian rivers which flow to the Black Sea. The Polish kings were looking towards the south-east to find compensation for the steady Germanic advance in the west and north-west. The strange Lithuanian monarchy was looming as a new power in the West Russian lands. Only in the north the commercial oligarchies of Novgorod and Pskov survived, and the leaders in those cities, fearful like the Poles of the military power of the Germanic knights and of the Swedes, were attempting to find new sources of strength by expansion into the empty vastness of the north-east. And in the Moscow lands between the Oka and the upper Volga, a house of astute and patient princes, careful vassals of the Golden Horde, were laying their hands year by year on petty territories—and biding their time.

§3. THE RISE OF LITHUANIA

Already in the first decades of the thirteenth century, the Lithuanian tribes inhabiting the forests between the lower Vistula, the Niemen and the western Dvina, had formed a primitive military state. The German pressure, particularly on the kindred Prussians, caused the Lithuanians to move south-eastward. The Lithuanian Prince Mendovg began by conquering the outermost Russian lands, the so-called 'Black Russia', the borders of which extended to the banks of the upper Niemen. The towns of Black Russia, Grodno and Novogrodek, became the first civil centres of the Lithuanian principality. Mendovg then proceeded to take possession of the Polotsk lands, and tried, unsuccessfully, to possess himself of Smolensk.

Daniel of Galicia, uneasy at the new Lithuanian danger, concerted an alliance with the Poles and the Teutonic knights against Mendovg, but the latter showed himself to be possessed of that astute sense of diplomacy which was to characterize his successors. Like the Habsburgs, the Lithuanian house was to develop the matrimonial tactic in politics to the highest degree. Mendovg conciliated the coalition against him by a personal adoption of the Christian faith (which he forsook later for his native paganism); he married his daughter to a son of Daniel, and to another son granted the Black Russian districts.

Under the great Gedymin, the Lithuanian territory was further expanded by matrimonial alliances. The peaceful acquisition of

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*175 Volhynia was secured at the time of the disintegration of the Galician principality as the result of the marriage of one of Gedymin's sons with a Volhynian princess; by the same process the Vitebsk lands were brought within the Lithuanian realm. The Minsk and Pinsk territories also fell into Lithuanian hands through the diplomacy of Gedymin. When he died in 1341 the Lithuanian state was already of considerable dimensions; and of its population about two-thirds were of Russian stock.

The extension of Lithuanian territory to the south made a conflict between Gedymin's heir, Olgerd, and the Tartars inevitable. And the struggle with the Tartars caused a further rapid growth of Lithuanian power, for the prestige of Olgerd attracted to his allegiance wide areas where the Russian population had hitherto been hypnotized by the legend of the invincibility of the Altaian hordes. The terrible memories of the great Mongol invasion of the middle of the thirteenth century seem to have grown dim in the minds of the generation which was living a hundred years later. In spite of the terror of recurrent raids, the Tartars no longer seemed irresistible, and the idea of an armed struggle with them passed out of the domain of dreams into the realm of reality at about the same time in both the Eastern and Western Russian lands. The famous symbolic victory over the Tartars rewarded the arms of the Muscovite prince, Dmitri Donskoy, when he routed the horde of Khan Mamay on Kulikovo Field (1380). The great Olgerd was already dead at this time, but two of his sons and many Lithuanian nobles shared in the victory.

In his life the Lithuanian prince had played the same part against the Tartars in the West Russian lands which Dmitri Donskoy played in the East, and in fact the initiative in the struggle against the Tartars came from the Lithuanian ruler rather than from the princes of Moscow.

Leaving his celebrated brother Keystut to confront the Teutonic knights on the western marches, Olgerd extended his frontiers towards the south in a series of campaigns. Kiev and the lands of Chernigov and Novgorod Seversk passed into his hands, and his writ ran to the shores of the Black Sea. He proceeded to the organization of the 'new' fertile lands of Podolia, after expelling the Tartar khans who had been ruling there with the help of Russian *atamany*. 'New towns' rapidly arose—Smotrych, Kamenets-Podolsk, Bratslav, Vinnitsa and others—defended by castles and governed by royal Lithuanian princes. Hope and life revived in the old Russian lands along the Dniepr. On the shores of the Black Sea, near the mouth of the Dniestr, the port of Belgorod grew up, later the Turkish Akkerman (*ak kerman*, 'the white city'—a literal translation from the

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Russian), and Russian villages appeared in the neighbourhood of the modern Odessa. 175 *

The Russo-Lithuanian state now extended, somewhat fantastically, in an irregular belt of country from the shores of the Baltic to those of the Black Sea. The greater part of the territory of the state was composed of purely Russian lands—Vitebsk, Polotsk, Kiev, Podolia and Volhynia—and nine-tenths of the population of Olgerd's dominions were of Russian blood. In Olgerd's capital of Vilna the majority of the inhabitants were Russians. Sixteen Russian princesses were married to Lithuanian princes, and fifteen Russian princes to Lithuanian princesses. Olgerd had remained a pagan until shortly before his death; but at that time fifty-six Lithuanian princes had already been received into the Orthodox faith. Orthodox churches were being built in Vilna, where, however, the pagan tolerance of the conqueror also allowed the erection of Roman Catholic churches. 'Gradually the Russian language became the official language of the administration and the law. Legislative acts, governmental edicts, were published in Russian. In the capital of Lithuania, at the court of the Lithuanian princes, Russian replaces the language of the dominating race' (Shmurlo). 'The historical process in Western Russia seemed to have found a new unifying centre after the downfall of the former centres, Kiev and Halych (Galicia). It could be hoped that the Lithuanian dynasty and the Lithuanian element would play a role similar to that of the Varangians in the tenth and eleventh centuries, in other words, that they would be capable of cementing the weakened Russian elements, and that later they would themselves become assimilated with Russians. It all turned out quite differently' (Doroshenko).

The Russo-Lithuanian state under Gedymin and Olgerd (1321–1377) grew and extended with such remarkable rapidity that it became impossible to create within it any form of uniform political structure. At the end it became a conglomeration of different principalities, lands and dominions, acquired by all sorts of means. All these territories recognized the supreme authority of Olgerd, but his power over them was in fact based on a community of interests which happened during that period to coincide. Olgerd made wars all his life, and those who recognized his rule did so in order to help him and so secure for themselves his powerful support. Military necessity was the only basis of the Russo-Lithuanian state. The politics of the Lithuanian princes served the interests of the defence and recovery of Russian lands. Therefore the Russo-Lithuanian state became a military federation comprising communities of varying origins and degrees of culture, and little attempt was made by the

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*175 Lithuanian princes to elaborate a coherent state order. In the principalities and lands which came under the authority of Olgerd, the old order was maintained without any change. 'Military organization, the building of the fortified towns, the governmental structure, the economics of the princes, the administration—all was offered ready to the Lithuanians and was easily accepted by them' (Shmurlo). In one of the Lithuanian documents of the period it is stated: 'We do not disturb the old order, and we do not introduce a new one.'

§4. THE UNION BETWEEN LITHUANIA AND POLAND

'After the Mongol invasion and conquest, the Russian lands gathered round two centres, Lithuania and Moscow, and it appeared at first as if the chances of completing the process favoured the headship of Lithuania rather than that of Moscow' (Lappo).

Russian and Ukrainian historians with perfect justice underline the preponderance of the Russian element in Olgerd's Russo-Lithuanian state, but they ignore the influences which tended to associate that state with Poland. It is for this reason that an event which was to have a decisive effect upon the future of Lithuania and the Russian lands united with Lithuania comes as a surprise. This event was the marriage of Olgerd's son Jagiello (Yageylo) with Jadwiga (Hedwig) of Anjou and Hungary, heiress to the throne of Poland. The result of the marriage was the 'union' between Lithuania and Poland. In reality this 'union', which was regarded as an event of great political importance throughout the contemporary world, was less surprising than it seemed and was, in fact, the logical result of processes which had been developing during the preceding half century.

Both Gedymin and Olgerd had made a practice of marrying members of the Lithuanian royal house into Polish as well as into Russian princely families. Himself a pagan married to the daughter of the Orthodox Prince of Tver, Olgerd had some personal inclination towards the Greek Orthodox Church, but he had no antipathy to Rome. As an ally of Tver, Olgerd had supported its prince in his struggle for primacy over Moscow, and he showed himself sufficiently interested in ecclesiastical politics to complain that the Muscovite Metropolitan Alexis was continuing to call himself 'Metropolitan of Kiev and All Russia'. In fact there was at that time no political centre of the Orthodox Church throughout the West Russian lands which were included within the Lithuanian state. On the other hand, the increasing power of the Roman Catholic Church

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in the Eastern Europe of the fourteenth century, operating through the twin but opposed agencies of the Polish monarchy and the Teutonic Order, could not but attract the small and half-barbarous dominant nation in the Russo-Lithuanian state. 175*

At the same time the social order in the lands included within the dominions of Olgerd was gradually beginning to assume Western forms which tended to bring these lands within the Latinized Polish cultural sphere.

Already in the thirteenth century the social structure of the Galician principality had acquired a character quite different from that of old Kievan Rus. The importance of commercial towns had diminished, and agriculture had become the industry in which the roots of society were planted. A somewhat similar development could be observed in North-Eastern Russia; but there, although Andrew of Bogolyubovo had failed to subordinate his *boyars* to his 'byzantine' conceptions of state, the position of the prince was being continuously strengthened until it formed the basis of the early Muscovite monarchy of the fourteenth century.

In the Galician principality, in contrast to the Muscovite, the *boyars* had kept the upper hand, and had not only come into possession of vast territories but had assumed the right to distribute parts of these at their own will among their retainers. In the fourteenth century an important class of great magnates had emerged and upon them was dependent a larger class of agrarian petty 'nobles'. These phenomena bore more resemblance to the Polish order than to the Russian.

The status of the peasants in Galicia developed on lines similar to that of their Polish fellows. The peasants were ceasing to be 'free', in the sense that they were submitting to obligations not towards the state as represented by the monarchy but towards their local lords to whom they paid tribute and for whom they worked. Being without any obligations towards the state, they were deprived of even the most modest rights in the state. The similarity with Polish conditions had been completed in Galicia by the introduction into the town administrations of the Magdeburg Statute—carried into Poland through the influence of the German immigration after the Mongol invasion.

The processes of social development in Galicia were repeated in Volhynia, and in Podolia after Olgerd had driven out the Tartars; there appeared the same classes of territorial magnates, petty nobles (who borrowed even the Polish denomination of *szlachta*) and peasants without civil rights. In 1374 Kamenets-Podolsk received the Magdeburg Statute. (5)

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*175 Such was the social and political background against which took place the marriage of Jagiello and Jadwiga—a marriage which broke the heart of the princess, but which was pleasing at once to the Catholic Church and to the military chieftains in both Poland and Lithuania.

Jagiello had already in 1385 concluded the Treaty of Krevo with the Poles, whereby he agreed to incorporate 'for ever' the lands of the principality of Lithuania with their largely Russian population and culture within the kingdom of Poland, while he himself was recognized as King of Poland and Great Prince of Lithuania. The Krevo agreement was not a mere personal 'union' but something far more definite. The drastic form of the agreement was, of course, dictated by the Church, and its character was such as almost to wreck the political conceptions on which 'union' had been based.

There were still great numbers of Lithuanians who had remained pagan and who might be christened according to the Roman Catholic rite, but there were also, particularly among the nobility, many who had already embraced the Greek Orthodox faith. The attempt in the year 1387 to proclaim a law forbidding marriages between Orthodox and Roman Catholic provoked general indignation, and the Catholic clergy began to find that they were the authors of a growing antagonism between the two confessions which had not existed before. Vitovt (Polish Witold, Lithuanian Vitautas), the son of Olgerd's brother, the famous warrior Keystut, who had fled to Germany some years before on the poisoning of his father by the servants of Jagiello, took swift advantage of the situation. He was supported by the Orthodox princes and magnates of Lithuanian as well as of Russian extraction who feared to lose their rights and privileges on account of their faith. In 1392 Jagiello, under threat of a general rising, was forced to modify the clauses of the Krevo agreement. Vitovt was recognized as Great Prince of Lithuania for life, while Jagiello remained King of Poland; after Vitovt's death all his dominions were to pass to the Polish crown with the exception of certain lands which were reserved for his brother Sigismund (who also promised to serve the Polish crown).

Having become Great Prince of Lithuania and the ally of Poland, the bold and gifted Vitovt now conceived vast plans of dominion in the east. In the first year of his rule he took possession of Smolensk, demanded the submission of Novgorod and promised Pskov to the Teutonic knights. The minor princes inhabiting the lands on the borderland between Lithuania and Muscovy along the upper Oka and its affluents recognized the suzerainty of Vitovt. The Ryazan principality accepted his authority and Tver became his ally.

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In the last decade of the fourteenth century the young Muscovite state was passing through the most critical phase of its existence. The victory of Dmitri Donskoy on Kulikovo Field had had no morrow; a renewed invasion by Mamay Khan had at once devastated the Moscow lands and proved that a latent power of aggression still rested in the Golden Horde. In 1382 a new usurping Khan, the celebrated Tokhtamish—a figure in Altaian history second only to his more famous master and rival Tamerlane—plundered Moscow and exacted from Dmitri a renewal of the tribute. Dmitri's son, who was to succeed him as Vasili I, was carried away to the Horde as a hostage for a time. When Vasili returned to Moscow it was to defend dominions which were threatened by two of the foremost soldiers of the day—by Vitovt, the Lithuanian conqueror on the west, and by Tokhtamish in the east. The Muscovite state was saved by a peculiar combination of events and by the intervention of a force more powerful than Vasili, Tokhtamish or Vitovt. 175*

In the summer of 1395 Tamerlane marched north from the Caucasus to pursue his final and most destructive campaign against the Golden Horde. He defeated Tokhtamish on the Terek, and, advancing through the Kipchak country into Russia, reached Yelets. It appeared as though the weakened Muscovite principality was about to experience the fate of the lands of Kievan Russia a century and a half before. But Tamerlane turned to pursue the destruction of the Kipchak cities of Azak (Azov), Hajji-Tarkhan (Astrakhan) and Saray. At this juncture the Kipchak allies in the Caucasus, the chief of whom was the young Georgian king, George VI, who had already sustained two ruinous campaigns against the Mongols, rose in the rear of Tamerlane. The combined forces of the Georgian king and of the Mussulman dynasts of the Eastern Caucasus attacked Miran-Shah, a son of Tamerlane, who had been installed as governor of Azerbaijan. The Mongols were defeated before Alindjak, and in the spring of 1396 Tamerlane himself hastened south to Derbend to undertake the repression of the insurgent Lesghian tribes of Daghestan, while the terrified inhabitants of Moscow could attribute their salvation to the miraculous intervention of the holy icon of Our Lady of Vladimir.

The double threat from the east had vanished and now a further happy accident was to conjure the threat from the west. The fugitive Tokhtamish had sought refuge with Vitovt and now secured his help to restore him to his Khanate. Hoping to take advantage of the dissensions in the Horde, Vitovt, during the year 1399, led south a great army which contained the flower of the warlike chivalry of Lithuania with large levies from the Western and Southern Russian

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*175 lands. One of Tamerlane's most able lieutenants, Khan Edighey (Idegü), met the Russo-Lithuanian host on the banks of the Vorskla, a left tributary of the Dniepr, and inflicted a crushing defeat. The Mongols failed to follow up their victory with an incursion into the lands of the Lithuanian principality, but Vitovt had lost his best troops and his fighting heart was broken. He abandoned his ambitious designs on Moscow and Novgorod, and subsequently gave his daughter in marriage to Vasili I.

The Moscow state was saved by these events. The defeat on the Vorskla had also, however, the effect of strengthening the ties which united the cousins ruling in Poland and Lithuania. The weakened Vitovt now came to regard the Poles as a protection against both the Tartar and the German dangers. And in the year 1410 the chivalry of Poland and Lithuania, reinforced by numerous Russian detachments, inflicted a decisive defeat on the Teutonic Order at Grünwald (Tannenberg). Tannenberg was the only mighty Slav victory over Germans, but it delayed for several centuries the progress of German conquest in Eastern Europe. The Teutonic Order henceforth ceased to constitute an important political and military force, and the prestige of the Polish monarchy was notably enhanced. (6, 7, 8)

In the first half of the fifteenth century the non-German races, Poles, Lithuanians and Hungarians, were ascendant in Eastern Europe under the leadership of the brilliant Jagiellons. The Hussite movement in Bohemia was another aspect of the Slav anti-German reaction which had received great impetus from Tannenberg. Both Jagiello and Vitovt played with the notion of supporting the Hussites (Ziska had fought with the Poles in the wars against the Teutonic knights) and Vitovt was offered the crown of Bohemia. But the Catholic hierarchy in Poland obstinately opposed the Hussite cause, and refused to confuse the national struggle against the Germans with a Slav crusade against Latinism. Vitovt, who had originally grasped power with the aid of the Orthodox Lithuanian and Russian magnates, had himself come under the influence of the cultural and political ideas which were represented by the Western Church.

In the year 1413, three years after Tannenberg, Vitovt made a new agreement with his cousin, known as the Union of Horodlo, whereby the conditions providing for the incorporation of the dominions of the Lithuanian Great Prince in the kingdom of Poland after Vitovt's death were abandoned. It was provided, however, that a successor to Vitovt would not be chosen without the consent of the King of Poland, while similarly a successor to the Polish throne would not be appointed without the agreement of the Great Prince of Lithuania.

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It is evident that by the Union of Horodlo a situation was created whereby both the Polish and Lithuanian rulers were placed in a position of formal dependence on the magnates of the two realms. 175*

The Roman Catholic hierarchy took advantage of the agreement to strengthen the position of the Church among the ruling classes in Lithuania. To the Russo-Lithuanian nobility who adhered to the Catholic faith were accorded all the privileges enjoyed by the nobility of the kingdom of Poland, including the right to a coat of arms—an attractive distinction to the bucolic magnates of the eastern principality. But these rights and honours were not granted to nobles of the Orthodox confession. In the same way the lesser Lithuanian gentry could only receive the same rights as their fellows, the Polish *szlachta*, on the condition of being received into the Church.

Vitovt began to surround himself with Catholic counsellors and to appoint members of the Catholic aristocracy as governors (*starosty* or *voyevodes*) even in the Orthodox Russian principalities. He pursued at the same time a policy of increasing centralization and suppressed the important regional principalities in the lands of Vitebsk, Polotsk, Smolensk, Kiev, and in Volhynia and Podolia. An administration modelled on Polish forms was established in Vilna, with Polish appellations for the different dignitaries of state. The Russian language, however, continued to be used for official purposes. Vitovt even attempted to sever the administration of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Great Principality from dependence on the Metropolitan in Moscow. In 1416 a Kievan Metropolitan was named, but the experiment did not prove successful, and when the Metropolitan died no successor was appointed.

In the northern provinces of Lithuania, where many of the Russian districts had been but newly detached from a Muscovite orientation and where the cultural influences of Novgorod and Pskov persisted, the Union of Horodlo provoked a certain degree of antagonism between the Russian and Lithuanian members of the nobility—since the latter more easily adhered to the Roman faith. In the south, however, in Volhynia and Podolia, many Russian aristocratic families became Catholic, although the lower classes, townsfolk and peasants, evinced great devotion to the Orthodox faith—the more so since the act of 1413 did not provide for them the advantages which attracted the gentry.

In the last years of his life Vitovt enjoyed the prestige of a great Catholic leader in Eastern Europe. Loyal by interest to his engagements to Jagiello, he at the same time aspired that Lithuania rather than Poland should be the leading partner in the association of the

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*175 two realms. He desired also to be accorded a royal crown. There is little doubt that his ambitions were secretly supported by the Emperor Sigismund and the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order. 'At the famous Congress of Lutsk (in Volhynia) in 1429 Vitovt entertained a brilliant gathering of princes, ostensibly to discuss the question of defence against the Turks. Besides his son-in-law, the Grand Prince of Moscow, the chief guests were the Emperor Sigismund, Jagiello, the King of Denmark, the Grand Masters of both Orders, the Papal Legate, the ambassador of the Byzantine Emperor, the Khans of the Volga and Crimean Tartars, the Hospodar of Wallachia, Princes of Silesia, Pomerania and Mazovia together with all the nobility of the province of Volhynia. At this picturesque assembly, where the guests and their retinues, according to the chronicler, consumed daily 700 oxen, 1400 sheep, and 100 bisons and boars, and drank 700 barrels of mead besides wine and beer, the Turkish question was used as a pretext to cover the attempt of the Emperor to persuade Jagiello to consent to the coronation of Vitovt. This intrigue was frustrated by the determined opposition of the Polish magnates under Olesnicki, and the proposal was dropped on the death of Vitovt in 1430. The tortuous diplomacy in which his position involved him, his failure against the Tartars, and his soaring ambition cannot obscure his greatness as a man. He was the last brilliant soldier of the house of Gedymin, an able diplomatist, and a great influence for progress in a backward area of Europe. He ruled his vast principality with ideals that could never merit the approbation of Polish or Russian patriots, and while enhancing the prestige of Poland, his main work was devoted to his own principality and entitles him to be considered as one of the great men of his age' (Bruce-Boswell, *C.M.H.* VIII, 576).

The death of Vitovt provoked a crisis between the Orthodox and Roman Catholic parties in Lithuania. The Russo-Lithuanian magnates refused to elect as Great Prince the aged Jagiello in whose favour the Poles were intriguing. The majority chose the Orthodox Svidrygiello, a brother of Jagiello and an old rebel in Lithuania against Vitovt. The Catholics favoured Vitovt's brother Sigismund. Civil war broke out, during which Jagiello's brother, as the nominee of the Orthodox party, was supported by the Catholic interests of the Emperor and the Livonian Order. 'The action of (the Emperor) Sigismund was particularly treacherous in that Polish troops were helping him in his Turkish campaigns.' The war continued until 1435, when the combined forces of the Orthodox magnates and the Livonian knights were signally defeated at Wilkomir.

Following the death of Sigismund of Lithuania, the Catholic

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candidate, Casimir, younger son of Jagiello, and brother of the new 175*
Polish king, Vladislav III, was elected Grand Prince of Lithuania. With the death of his brother in battle against the Turks on the famous crusade of Varna (1444), Casimir 'the Jagiellon' became also King of Poland. Casimir IV, whose long reign reached the last decade of the century, was to prove one of the ablest and most distinguished of Polish kings, and the architect in Eastern Europe of those *étatiste* conceptions in public policy which were to dominate the history of the sixteenth century.

With the passing of the two crowns to the person of Casimir IV the union of Poland and Lithuania had been practically effected, but the events of 1432–5, when the Germanic powers had attempted to exploit Russian Orthodoxy against the Catholic Polish state, were not without their influence on the astute mind of the new King. (9) He proceeded to reverse the policy imposed by the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and by an act of 1447 extended to the Orthodox magnates and gentry of Lithuania all rights and privileges enjoyed by their Catholic fellows. Further, the landlords, Orthodox as well as Catholic, received the right to exact from the peasants who had settled in the new lands tribute for themselves payable either in produce or in money. The peasant became the subject, as in Poland, not of the monarch but of his own landlord who now enjoyed the power of life and death over him. By such measures Casimir forestalled all danger of serious opposition from the Orthodox Russian magnates, but he at the same time strengthened their position to the ultimate cost of the crown. His political finesse was such that he even appointed the 'rebel' claimant to the Great Principality, Svidrygiello, as *voyevode* of Volhynia, and in Kiev he named another representative of the Orthodox party, Olelko, a grandson of Olgerd and a son of the Prince Vladimir who had governed Kiev as an 'ally' of his father following its recovery from the Tartars. Casimir then proceeded to found in Kiev a Metropolitan see whose first incumbent was Gregory, one of the sponsors in 1439 of the Florentine Union of the Eastern and Western Churches. This Union, having its origins in a desperate surrender of the Byzantine court in order to secure Papal and Western support against the impending Turkish assault on Constantinople, failed even in its immediate object. But the background of the Council of Florence, where the Metropolitan Isidore was the representative of both Muscovite and Lithuanian Orthodoxy, long continued to influence the religious politics of the Russian lands.

In Moscow the acceptance by Isidore (a Greek by birth) of the decisions of the Council of Florence had aroused a storm of indignation, and he had been forced to flee not so much the wrath of the

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*175 Great Prince as of the people. But in the Kiev lands, in Volhynia and in all the Russian lands of Lithuania, the appointment of a Uniate Metropolitan was quietly accepted. The South Russian magnates were becoming Catholic and allied by marriage to Catholic Polish and Lithuanian families, and they were adopting the customs and fashions of Polish aristocratic life. In Volhynia, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the members of the princely houses of Ostrozhsky, Czartoryski, Vishnevetsky, Verenetsky and Chetvertinsky differed in little respect from their Polish contemporaries (v. p. xi).

Only among the peasantry and the burghers of the small towns did devotion to the old Orthodox confession persist.

§5. THE UKRAINE BETWEEN POLAND-LITHUANIA AND MUSCOVY

000 A consolidation of a series of large centralized monarchies and a general tendency to expansion in a westerly direction were characteristics of the history of the sixteenth century. The establishment of the centralized monarchies was a social phenomenon which followed the final disintegration of the feudal system as the way of life in Western Europe—a phenomenon which found spiritual expression in the Renaissance. The bases of the social transformation were economic, arising from causes which had been accumulating during a long period.

The most typical example of the modernist possibilities of the bureaucratic Renaissance state was to be found not in Christendom but in the Ottoman Empire where Padishahs like Selim I and Suleiman the Magnificent applied all the resources of the new age to the building of a gigantic naval and military power round the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean in the area of Justinian's former 'world-state'. Even the exploratory initiative of the Age of Discovery infected the military bureaucrats newly established in Istanbul when they attempted to extend Ottoman naval power from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean and planned canals to unite the Mediterranean with the Red Sea and the Black Sea with the Caspian by way of the Don and the Volga. The expansion of the Ottomans round the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean and into South-Western and Central Europe met with rather less opposition owing to the preoccupation of the recently constituted Austro-Spanish Empire with maritime politics in the Low Countries and with new dreams of world dominion in the Americas. World politics were taking a vast sweep into the illimitable west, and Hungary and Poland were left by the Germanic Powers to bear the brunt of the

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modern Turkish menace—a strange fusion in itself of the destructive Altaian and the imperial Byzantine traditions. 000

The pressure of the Turks in Eastern and Central Europe certainly weakened the capacity of the Poles and Lithuanians to maintain and extend their hegemony in the Western and Southern Russian lands. As the drive of Tamerlane had saved the Muscovite state of Vasili I, so, towards the end of the fifteenth century, the conquests of Muhammad II favoured the rapid growth of the Muscovite state of Vasili II and Ivan III.

The rise of the Muscovite state and its expansion into the north over the Novgorod and Permian lands, into the east over Siberia, into the south over the former dominions of the Golden Horde, and westward at the expense of the Polish-Lithuanian monarchy, was a phenomenon of the sixteenth century comparable to the building of the Mediterranean empire of the Ottomans and the European and trans-Atlantic world power of the Austro-Spanish Habsburgs.

The Ottoman Padishahs, in the latter part of the fifteenth and throughout the sixteenth century, pursued the ultimate potentialities of the traditions of the East Roman Empire at the height of its splendour. They maintained a steady pressure on the Danube which transformed the politics of Central Europe and destroyed in favour of the Germans the brilliant promise of its varied cultures—the Latin Slav florescence of the Jagiellonid Empire, the strange and fine synthesis of French and Magyar genius in Hungary, and, indirectly, the important intellectual and puritan leadership of the Czechs. In Syria, Egypt and North Africa the Ottomans combined the pretensions of the Byzantine Emperors and the Caliphs. On the Anatolian plateau and in the Armenian highlands they resumed against the Iranian Safavids the old Imperial feud against the Parthians and the Sassanids. In the Black Sea they entered into the ancient heritage of the Hellenic cities, of Rome and of Byzantium. Too late the Venetian Signory and the Papacy, having neglected to succour Byzantium, endeavoured to conjure the danger to the remains of Latin cultural and maritime interests beyond the Bosporus. The celebrated voyages to the east of Barbaro, Contarini and Zeno had as object the combination of the forces of the Georgian petty potentates, the powerful Ak-koyunlu Turkomans and the Persian Safavids with the Mediterranean sea powers in a grand alliance to check the Turk. But while Contarini was waiting for a ship to carry him from Georgia to Caffa, he heard that the great Pontic metropolis for the trade of the Italian cities with the East had already fallen to the Turks (1475).

Turkish sea power was to remain for more than four hundred years the dominant factor in Black Sea politics. Tana (Azak) at the

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000 mouth of the Don, *entrepôt* for the trade of the Italian cities with Muscovy and the Golden Horde; Cherson in the Crimea; Belgorod (Akkerman) serving the trade route from Central Europe which ran from Regensburg through Lvov (Lemberg) to the Dniestr; the Italo-Moldavian foundations at the mouths of the Danube—all these keys to the life of the great fluvial hinterland of the Black Sea were soon in Turkish hands.

The effect on the politics of the Polish-Lithuanian state was almost immediate. Following the Mongol invasions the Tartars had established themselves in the Crimea. In continuous contact with the Italian trading colonies in Caffa and Tana, and as useful intermediaries with the Golden Horde, they had become wealthy and during the first part of the fifteenth century a certain Khan Hajji Giray, after the weakening of the Horde by Tamerlane, had established a court at the beautiful little town of Baghchi-Saray. He maintained friendly relations with his imposing Lithuanian neighbour and with the Muscovite prince with whom he had common commercial interests. At the beginning of the reign of Ivan III the Crimean Khan, Mangly Giray, actually went to the help of the Muscovites when his suzerain Ahmet Khan of the Golden Horde threatened Moscow, and it was the ill-success of this last formidable attack of the Horde on the Muscovite lands which enabled Ivan III in 1480 to finally throw off 'the Tartar yoke'. But with the appearance of a Turkish fleet in the Black Sea and the establishment of a Turkish garrison in Caffa, Mangly Giray accepted the suzerainty of the Padishah, and the Tartars of the Crimea became the principal agents of Turkish hegemony round the shores of the Black Sea from the Roumanian principalities as far as Daghestan and the shores of the Caspian.

At the same time the Crimea became the centre of a portentous revival of the traffic in slaves. The slave trade had existed round the shores of the Black Sea since the most ancient times and had flourished under the Byzantines. It was, in fact, with serfdom, a normal social phenomenon of the medieval world—although condemned by the Churches. It was a factor in piecemeal migration and the basis of the supply of the industrial and domestic labour markets of the Mediterranean countries. It is generally forgotten that the traffic in human beings was regarded as a tolerable if disagreeable condition of economic life among Western communities into the last century. The modern 'liberal' capitalist system has abolished and condemned the theory of slavery but, under varying euphemisms, its practice is widely maintained in the best regulated modern communities.

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Apart from exploiting the commercial, industrial and domestic possibilities of the slave trade, the Turks, with their genius for military organization, used it in war by the establishment of their famous Janissary corps. The conception of regiments of devoted and highly trained slave troops was borrowed from the Mamluk corps of Egypt, where male slaves recruited from the Caucasus and Kipchak had for two centuries constituted themselves the dominant military force in the Levant and had proved the first capable of decisively defeating the Mongols. 000

The population of the South Russian lands was to prove an inexhaustible reservoir for the supply of the camps, the harims and the labour market of the Ottoman Empire. As early as 1484 Mangly Giray undertook his first big raid into the Lithuanian dominions and sacked Kiev. In the following year he ravaged Podolia, which, under the rule of Olgerd and Vitovt, had become a populous and flourishing land. In the year 1490 the Tartars swept through Volhynia and rode north as far as Kholm. In the following years they continually pillaged along both banks of the Dniepr and the Desna and towards the north reached the Pripet.

In these decades hundreds of thousands of men, women and children were driven down to the Crimea and from there distributed to the markets of the Ottoman Empire. About the middle of the sixteenth century the Lithuanian envoy residing at the court of Baghchi-Saray could remark despairingly that 'it seemed that no population would be left in the South' (Doroshenko).

The Turkish pressure in the south, along the Danube, overcame the powerful Hungarian kingdom, which a century earlier under Lewis the Great of Anjou, the father of Jadwiga of Poland, had dominated the politics of Central and Eastern Europe. On the field of Mohács, in 1526, the Hungarians lost two-thirds of their territory, which was to remain for a century and a half under Turkish rule. Between the Danube and the Dniestr and the Dniepr the Turks imposed their suzerainty over the Roumanian principalities and gravely threatened the Polish-Lithuanian dominions. The Poles performed the great service to Germanic and Western Europe of withstanding the brunt of Turkish aggression during the heyday of the great Ottoman sultans, and it was a Polish king who finally broke the Turkish menace under the walls of Vienna in 1683. But the effect of the protracted Turkish wars was to stultify and derange the whole development of Polish political and cultural life and to prepare the way for the revival of a great Orthodox Slav state in the East and for the recrudescence in the West of the old Germanic imperialism of the Teutonic knights under the Prussia of Frederick the Great.

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*175 The period of the preoccupation of Casimir IV with the final phase of the great Northern War against the Teutonic Orders corresponds with the opening years of the expansion of the Muscovite state under Ivan III. Ivan became Great Prince in 1462, four years before the Treaty of Thorn crowned the victory of Casimir over the Orders and brought to an end the great medieval epic of German expansion into the East. In 1471 Ivan, following the battle of Shelon, secured ascendancy over the historic city of Novgorod and the whole of the Russian north-east. In the following year he married Zoë (Sophia) Palaeologu, whose father Thomas, ex-Despot of Morea, was a brother of the last Emperor of Byzantium and whose mother was a lady of the brilliant house of Montferrat. With the heiress to the lost glories of Byzantium in his bed, Ivan began to assume all those vague pretensions which were henceforth to constitute such an important item in the conceptions of Great-Russian statesmanship. Ivan assumed the titles of *Samoderzhets* (Autocrat) and *Tsar* (Caesar), and the learned needy flatterers who accompanied Sophia to Moscow discovered that her rugged husband was 'a descendant of Augustus' who was supposed to have 'divided the world among his brothers', of whom 'Pruss' had received the lands on the banks of the Niemen and from him 'descended in the fourteenth generation the great Prince Rurik'. With less reliance on genealogical fancy, Ivan might himself recall his descent from Vladimir Monomakh and remember that his ancestor had been Great Prince of Kiev and ruler of all the south. Ivan began to sign documents as 'Lord of all Russia', and his successor in 1503 was to apostrophize the Lithuanians in the words: 'Do I not mourn my ancestral lands, all those Russian lands taken by Lithuania, and Kiev and Smolensk and all those other towns?' (10, 11).

The differences between the Orthodox and Catholic nobles in Lithuania which Casimir had tried to temper in the Treaty of Horodlo naturally attracted the intrigues of the Muscovite ruler. Already in 1470 the uneasy Casimir had replaced the Orthodox Olelko by a Lithuanian and Catholic *voyevode* in Kiev. 'The son of the last Kievan Prince, Michael, together with other princes, started secret *pourparlers* with Moscow, promising all sorts of advantages in White Russia for her help against Lithuania. The conspiracy was discovered and Prince Michael had to pay for it with his life. That however did not stop the other princes and only the more clearly indicated to them the road to Moscow' (Doroshenko). Many lesser princes who owned territories along the upper Oka and who had previously been dependent upon the Lithuanian crown 'left' and offered their allegiance to Ivan III. Their example was followed by other lords of small principalities on the borderland between the Seversk and Chernigov lands. The boundaries of the Moscow state

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were suddenly enlarged in the direction of the Dniepr. Finally Chernigov submitted to Moscow. 175*

In 1485 Tver, formerly the rival of Moscow on the upper Volga supported by the Lithuanian Great Princes, surrendered her independence without a struggle. Ryazan and Pskov fell to Ivan's successor, Vasili III.

In the first years of the sixteenth century, following the destructive Tartar and Turkish attacks in the southern provinces of the Lithuanian crown, Vasili conquered Smolensk, while his troops reached the banks of the Dniepr and made their appearance along the rivers Desna and Seym. The Muscovite borders were approaching Kiev; and in that city a West Russian noble, Prince Michael Glinski, raised an insurrection in favour of the restoration of the 'old Kievan monarchy'.

Turko-Tartar aggression had made it easy for the Muscovite rulers to encroach on the eastern frontiers of the Lithuanian state, and neither Ivan nor Vasili were slow in exploiting the sentiments of the Orthodox; at the same time the general reaction of the Russo-Lithuanian aristocracy, with their estates and the welfare of their provinces under the constant menace of the Tartar raids, was in favour of closer union with Poland.

In the year 1529 a law, known as the Lithuanian Statute, introduced throughout the lands of the Great Principality a social order similar in all respects to that existing in Poland. The magnates now acquired the right—which had since the end of the last century been merely a 'privilege'—of participating in the government through the *Rada* (Senate). Without the consent of the *Rada*, the Great Prince could no longer introduce any changes in the laws or government of the country. (12)

In 1566 a further Statute extended representative rights to the numerous class of gentry (*szlachta*) who, meeting together in local *Seyms* (Councils) elected their delegates to the *Seym* of the whole Russo-Lithuanian state.

The *Seym* was representative of the corporate opinions of the whole Russo-Lithuanian gentry, and it sat in general session with the *Rada*. The Great Prince had to swear an oath that he would safeguard the rights of 'the nobility of his nation'. According to the Polish view he had no duties whatever towards the rest of the population of the country. When, in 1592, Sigismund III Vasa was elected King of Poland, he was told that 'he was going to reign over nobles and not over peasants like his father John, King of Sweden'.

The Polish-Lithuanian sovereigns had, since the middle of the fifteenth century, been confronted with the problem of dealing with classes of great territorial magnates. Casimir IV and his successors had endeavoured to base the monarchy on the support of the gentry,

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175 but circumstances, including the elective character of the Polish monarchy, had been against them—with disastrous results, as it was to prove, to the future of the Polish nation.

The Polish kings, in their policies, were always, perhaps, overshadowed by the elective character of the neighbouring 'Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation', and political thought in Poland was influenced by Western forms. The Muscovite Tsars had behind them the dim glamour of the Byzantine autocracy and the shadow of the Golden Horde. Vasili II the Blind was the last Muscovite ruler to be oppressed by the magnates of his realm, and the Church, which supported him, won the Moscow mob to his side. Ivan III intrigued with the leaders of the Novgorod mob before he seized the city; and in the whole process of the acquisition of the smaller Russian princely cities, the people generally showed themselves to be on the side of the 'Autocrator' of Moscow. Something of the flavour of plebeian politics was borrowed by the Muscovite Tsars, together with the dogma of autocracy, from the dead Emperors of Byzantium.

The internal reforms in Lithuania of 1529 and 1566 prepared the way for the Union of Lublin of 1569.

Ivan IV (*Grozny*), having taken Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1555) and established Muscovy as the successor to the Golden Horde on the Volga and the Caspian, turned his attention to the west. In 1558 he began a war against the Livonian Order. The Grand Master appealed for help to the Lithuanians. But the combined forces of the knights and the Lithuanian magnates were unsuccessful, and in 1563 Ivan took the important city of Polotsk.

Confronted now with a serious Muscovite menace, Sigismund Augustus, Grand Prince of Lithuania and King of Poland, succeeded in effecting the complete administrative union of the two states. In the last month of 1568 the Lithuanian *Seym* met at Lublin, and in the middle of the following year the Union of Lublin was declared. (13)

The *Rzecz Pospolita* (*Res publica*), the realm of Poland, which emerged out of the union of the Kingdom and the Great Principality, was a state of several nationalities in contrast to the old predominantly national Polish kingdom. The very conception of *Rzecz Pospolita* laid the state under the obligation to maintain equality between the different nationalities and confessions; but the bases of this strange construction with its elected monarch and generously enfranchized noble classes remained essentially Polish, and moreover traditionally Catholic and therefore alien in spirit to the very large population of Greek Orthodox confession included within its borders. (14)

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(1) *On the Destruction of Kiev and the Devastation of Kievan lands by the Tartars*

Ukrainian historians (e.g. Doroshenko) endeavour to deny the complete devastation of Kiev and Kievan lands after the invasion of Batu in 1240. Here their views are in direct opposition to those of Polish and Russian historians. In 1857 M. Maksimovich went so far as to compose a work 'On the supposed devastation of Ukraina by Batu's invasion'. This tendency of Ukrainian historians is explained by the desire to establish that Ukraina was not re-peopled by newcomers from the west during the sixteenth century, and that the majority of the population of the land is descended from those

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175* who had survived the Mongol devastations. The view is not, however, really confirmed by Ukrainian historians themselves, in that they describe facts concerning the conditions in the Dniepr region during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries which justify the 'immigration theory'.

(2) *On the West Russian State in Galicia*

113 Daslakevich, N. *Knyazhenie Daniila Galitskago po Russkim i Inostrannym Istochnikam* (The Reign of Daniel of Galicia according to Russian and Foreign Sources), Kiev, 1873.

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(3) *On Daniel of Galicia*

175* The personality of Daniel of Galicia appears to have been attractive, although he did not prove to be one of the great leaders of his difficult time. 'Courageous and fearless, generous and kind-hearted to the point of being naive, Daniel was a politician least of all' (Shmurlo). Tomashivsky calls Daniel 'an intelligent, chivalrous, cultured, humane and energetic prince'.

(4) *On the Galician Chronicle*

The principal source for the history of Galicia and Volhynia in the thirteenth century is the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle, an anonymous work which embraces the period from 1209 to 1292. The Chronicle is written in a vivid and rather flowery style. It contains many picturesque episodes, and is ornamented with poetical comparisons and allegories which indicate that the author was familiar with Classical and European medieval literature.

The chronicler writes with sympathy of Prince Daniel and refers thus to his relations with the *boyars*: 'The Galician *boyars* called Daniel their Prince but in reality they ruled the whole land themselves.'

(5) *On the Annexation of Galicia to Poland*

Doroshenko writes: 'In the fourteenth century Galicia was politically disorganized, and, though culturally on the same level as Poland, was much weaker than the latter. She lacked inner stability and suffered from the feuds of the *boyars* and the absence of a strong central power.'

Until 1434–5 the Poles allowed the old order of things to remain (*tempus juris Ruthenorum*). After 1430, however, Jagiello granted to the Galician nobility the same privileges as were enjoyed by the Polish nobility. At the same time the Polish King began to grant wide lands in Galicia to his Polish favourites, and the Galician *boyars* came under the influence of and were rapidly absorbed into the world of their Polish neighbours. 'A great part of them were swept away by the wave of Polish colonization and returned to

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their primary origin—the people' (Efimenko). In the sixteenth century, according to Hrushevsky, there remained no noble Galician families who retained their Russian or Ukrainian nationality. At the same time as the Polish gentry were overflowing the countryside, the towns were being populated by Germans and Jews. Under the Magdeburg Law municipal power was in the hands of the Catholics—Poles and Germans. The former Russian urban population was gradually eliminated from the towns and lost among the peasantry. (See A. Halban, *Zur Geschichte d. Deutschen Rechts in Podolien, Volhynien und Ukraina*, Berlin, 1896.)

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(6) *On the Rivalry between Muscovy and the Russo-Lithuanian State*

The rivalry between Olgerd and Dmitri Donskoy did not prevent Russo-Lithuanian detachments—who were much better trained than the Muscovite militia of the day—from taking part against the Tartars on the famous field of Kulikovo. A decisive role was played in the battle by a certain 'Volhynian *Voyevode* Bobrok', who was the initiator of the manœuvre which decided the day in favour of the Russians.

An original view is taken of the relations between Lithuania and Muscovy by a group of Russian historians and publicists who call themselves 'Eurasians'. The ideology of the Eurasians is based on the affirmation that the Moscow State owed the whole of its interior structure and rapid external expansion to the example of 'the great Mongolian Empire'. Russia is considered only as a projection of the 'Eurasian State' created by the Mongols. In the opinion of the Eurasian school, the Mongols who defeated Vitovt in 1399 rendered Russia a great service because they undermined 'the pressure of Latinism in the East'. (See articles by Trubetskoy, Savitski, Vernadski and others, and for a summary of the Eurasian theory see article by Prince D. S. Mirsky in *Slavonic Review*, vol. VI, no. 17.)

(7) *On Vitovt*

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In *C.M.H.*, vol. VIII, Bruce-Boswell gives a good description of the campaign of Grünwald-Tannenberg. 'The complete army was of imposing size and unusual diversity. Alongside the Polish knights and the clan groups, each with its common arms and slogan, rode thousands of Tartars under Soldan, soon to be Khan of the Golden Horde. Martial Lithuanians marched side by side with sturdy Czech mercenaries who were destined to astonish the world. The model of Polish chivalry, Zawisza the Black, was in striking contrast to the turbulent Russian *boyars* or the rude skin-clad Samogitians.'

(8) *On Tokhtamish and Tamerlane*

Articles in *Encyclopaedia of Islam* under names Tokhtamish and Timur Leng by W. Barthold and L. Bouvat respectively. The latter erroneously states that Tamerlane 'occupied Moscow for over a year'.

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113 * 175 For the influence of events in Georgia and the Caucasus on Tamerlane's movements in Kipchak, see W. E. D. Allen, *History of the Georgian People*, where the connection between Tamerlane's campaigns in Georgia and his policy in Kipchak and Turkey is not sufficiently emphasized, and V. F. Minorsky, 'Transcaucasica', in *Journal Asiatique*, 1930, Juillet–Sept. pp. 41–111.

Tokhtamish, originally a lieutenant of Tamerlane, appeared from behind the Volga with a part of the Kirghiz 'Blue Horde'. He completed the downfall of Mamay after the defeat of the latter at Kulikovo in 1380. In 1382 he sacked Moscow. According to contemporary sources he was a just and vigorous ruler; he is also said to have been a handsome man (Barthold). In the years following his usurpation of the Golden Horde and his defeat of Dmitri Donskoy, he came into conflict with Tamerlane in Central Asia (Khvarism) and in the eastern Caucasus. Tamerlane, in his campaign of 1395, reached the region of the upper Don; and he rendered a signal service to the Muscovites when he devastated the encampments of the Blue Horde and destroyed Saray on the Volga—the old capital of the Golden Horde. The Kirghiz Blue Horde did not rally after the blow, and retired first beyond the Volga, and later behind the Ural.

The empire of the Golden Horde which Béréké established had lasted for a little over a century. In the fifteenth century, following the attacks of Tamerlane, it became divided into three parts governed by three different Khans—The Golden Horde proper (Kazan), the Crimea, and Nogay (with a capital at Astrakhan).

(9) *Casimir the Jagiellon*

He showed tolerance towards the Greek Orthodox Church. In the chapel of the Holy Cross in the cathedral of Cracow—where his grave is—there are frescoes dating from the end of the fifteenth century painted by Russian masters in the Russo-Byzantine style. Similar frescoes can be seen in Lublin, Sandomierz and other Catholic churches in Poland of the fifteenth–sixteenth centuries.

(10) *On the Discovery of 'Moscovia'*

'The Discovery' of 'Moscovia' was first made by Ritter Poppel and other foreigners, mostly military men, during the reign of Ivan III (1462–1505). Until his visit there, Poppel regarded 'Moscovia' as a remote dependency of the Polish kings.

The most celebrated description of the period is that of Sigismund von Herberstein, who was sent on two missions (1517 and 1526) to the court of Vasili III. His book was published only in 1549.

The German powers soon became conscious of the possibilities of exploiting antagonism between Muscovy and Poland. In the first decade of the sixteenth century the Hohenzollern Grand Master of the Teutonic Order was sending arms and military organizers to Moscow; while, at the Congress of Vienna in 1515, the Poles were concerned to secure the withdrawal of Habsburg support from Vasili III. In the seventies of the sixteenth century the intrigues of the city of Danzig with Ivan IV forced the intervention of the Polish king Stephen Báthory, and in 1581, Ivan, after the victories of Báthory in Russia, sought the intervention of both the Emperor and the Pope.

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(11) *On the Muscovite Tsars as 'Descendants of Augustus' and on the Lithuanians as 'Italians'*

The Lithuanians shared with Ivan III a desire to seek ancestors in the Classical world. At Lutsk, in 1429, during Vitovt's entertainment of the Emperor Sigismund, the Lithuanian nobles declared to the Emperor that 'the Poles were not nobles before but just simple folk who had bought their coats of arms from the Czechs, while the Lithuanian nobility was the old Roman nobility, their ancestors having come from Italy'. The chronicler relates that the Emperor replied that 'we know ourselves that you are the descendants of the old Roman nobles'. (*Chronicle of Bykhovets*, cited by Lappo.) 113 175*

(12) *On the Lithuanian Statute*

The first Lithuanian Statute was established in the year 1529. Considerable alterations were introduced into the second version published in the year 1566. It was only then that the political and social privileges of the Lithuanian gentry were definitely confirmed. After the Lublin Union other alterations in the Statute became necessary, and its last and final version was approved by Stephen Báthory and adopted in the year 1588. All three texts of the Lithuanian Statute were written in Russian.

(13) *On the Union of Lublin*

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The Minutes of the Lublin *Seym* were written in Russian.

(14) *On 'Rzecz Pospolita' (= Res publica)*

The Lublin Union of 1569 created out of the Kingdom of Poland and the Great Principality of Lithuania (and the Duchy of East Prussia) one common state 'Rzecz Pospolita'. The fusion of two different states and two different dominant nationalities was completed. A single ruler, the King of Poland, who was at the same time Great Prince of Lithuania, was elected in full session by the *Rada* (Senate), and the nobility of Poland and Lithuania. During his coronation at Cracow he confirmed the rights and privileges of both nations, the Poles and the Russo-Lithuanians, and swore to maintain those rights and privileges. But the Russo-Lithuanian state (with the exception of the Ukrainian provinces which were severed from it and incorporated in Poland) retained a separate administration, its own seal, its Lithuanian Statute, and its separate army and budget. 'One cannot but note the vital contradiction at the basis of which are two absolutely opposite ideas—of a unitary and of a federative state. This was the result of the contradictory tendencies and wishes brought to the Lublin *Seym* by the representatives of Poland and of the Russo-Lithuanian state' (Lappo).

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CHAPTER III

RZECZ POSPOLITA AND THE COSSACK UKRAINE (1569–1654)

§1. THE UKRAINE AT THE TIME OF THE UNION OF LUBLIN: THE COSSACKS

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By the Union of Lublin the direct authority of the Polish crown was extended to the South Russian provinces which had hitherto formed part of the Great Principality of Lithuania. No less than four Russian lands were included within the territory of *Rzecz Pospolita*. But while Black Russia (region to the east of the Niemen including the ancient towns of Grodno and Novogrodek) and White Russia (lands of Minsk, Vitebsk, Polotsk and parts of Smolensk) remained a part of Lithuania, Red Russia (Galicia) and Little Russia (or Russia Minor, comprising the country between the Dniestr and the eastern affluents of the Dniepr) were now ruled directly from Warsaw, whither Sigismund III transferred the capital from Cracow.

The name Little Russia or Russia Minor first became current in the fourteenth century, and is used in the latter and more correct form in a document of Yuri II, the last Prince of Galicia. In a Greek text about 1370 Galicia and Volhynia are named Μικρὰ Ῥωσσία. In this form the conception of 'older Russia' in contrast to 'greater' or expanded Russia was conveyed. The identical conception is to be found in the classical distinction between Asia Minor and Asia Major, and in the application of the name 'Magna Graecia' to the colonies of Greater Greece in Southern Italy and the Western Mediterranean. The form 'Russia Minor' continued to be used by Muscovite scribes writing in the Byzantine tradition, and *Malaya Rossiya* was the Russian translation; this appellation, through some strange misunderstanding, somewhat offends Ukrainian nationalist writers, although it in no way diminishes, but rather enhances, the historical dignity of the South Russian lands.

In relation to Poland the South Russian provinces occupied a special position: *Ukraïna* (more properly *Okraina*) was the 'borderland' (*u* = 'in, at', or *o* = 'round', and *krayu* = 'border') between the inner parts of the Polish realm and the steppes occupied by the Tartars of the Crimea. Here again the use of the name *Ukraina* is of ancient origin. As early as the year 1187 a chronicler, in describing the death of a Pereyaslavl prince, states that 'the whole

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Ukraina mourned him'. At that time the Pereyaslavl lands were the 'borderland' of the earliest Russian state; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the term is used to describe the frontier lands of the Muscovite state—about Ryazan, the Tula lands, and the Don region. The term was used in the same sense to denote the borderland of the Russo-Lithuanian state in White Russia. It is hardly possible then to discuss the question of a distinctive 'Ukrainian' nationality and its origins, before a peculiar combination of historical factors operating between 1590 and 1700 produced a community on the borderland of the Polish realm which became united by common economic and political circumstances, the vast majority of whose members confessed the Orthodox Greek faith, and which made use of a form of Russian speech—itself continuously subject to modification and adaptation in accord with the circumstances of day-to-day social and economic life. 175*

In the decades preceding the Union of Lublin the south-eastern confines of the Russo-Lithuanian state had remained very sparsely populated. The country along both banks of the Dniepr south of Kiev, and the southern part of Podolia, were subject to the intermittent raids of the Crimean Tartars. Muscovite garrisons occupied fortified posts along the Desna and the Seym in the Seversk lands annexed from Lithuania at the beginning of the century. Nominally, Lithuanian rule extended over the former Pereyaslavl lands along the left bank of the Dniepr, but in reality none knew what went on in that part of the world. To the south of the Seym, in the direction of the Donets and in the region of the left affluents of the Dniepr—the Sula, the Psiol and the Vorskla—stretched the so-called 'Wilderness'. Solitary 'bold men' wandered, or perhaps even settled there, whose main occupation was hunting, who lived at their own risk and peril, sheltered by the empty vastness of the steppe and free of obligation to any landlord or government. The Russo-Lithuanian administration paid little attention to the country lying to the east of the Dniepr, where its only 'bastion' was the small and ancient fortified town of Pereyaslavl surrounded by a wall and moat. To the west of the Dniepr the most populated parts were the northern Kiev lands, bordering on Volhynia and the forests of Polesia. 'Undertaking' landlords preferred to settle there within reach of the protection of the forests and marshes. The more fertile but open and dangerous lands of the southern grassland held no attraction for them.(1)

At the beginning of the sixteenth century rural economy had a character quite different from that which it acquired later. Feudal revenues were chiefly dependent on the proceeds of the trapping of beavers and other fur-bearing animals whose pelts found a ready sale

*175 in Central Europe. Fishing was more important than agriculture. Patches of forest were cleared, ploughed and sown, worked out and later abandoned for new clearings. 'Not the fertile black earth was valued, but the marshy and forest districts' (Antonovich).

By the year 1540 Kiev was beginning to become a city again; it numbered about 20,000 inhabitants and possessed six Orthodox churches. A stone castle commanded the upper part of the town; in the lower part along the bank of the Dniepr (the *Podol*) lived a mixed population of artisans and tradesmen, including Poles, Germans, Jews and Armenians. The Cracow canon Mathias a Michov, in his *De Sarmatia Asiana atque Europea*, describes 'the ancient Russian capital which once upon a time was a magnificent and regal city, which is proved by its ruins as well as by what is left standing among its ruins'.

Along the western bank of the Dniepr the small fortified town of Kanev had been built, and still further south was the similar small town of Cherkassy. To the south of Cherkassy stretched 'the Wilderness'; the populated belt of country took a turn to the west, and the southern border of the Kiev lands and the marches of Podolia were marked by the small towns of Belaya Tserkov, Bratslav, Vinnitsa and Bar. In the middle of the sixteenth century the whole of this south-eastern frontier region of the Russo-Lithuanian state did not contain more than 50,000 inhabitants. But from the sixth decade of the century the population began to increase rapidly. The Ukraine was beginning to come into existence.

Two reasons may be found for the spontaneous and natural increase of population in the Ukraine during the latter half of the sixteenth century.

First, a certain measure of over-population had overtaken the neighbouring provinces of the Russo-Lithuanian Great Principality which, up to the beginning of the sixteenth century, had attracted from the Dniepr plains and the land of Podolia great numbers of fugitives from the recurrent attacks of the Crimean Tartars and the invasions of the Turks. Volhynia, for those days, had become relatively densely populated; by the middle of the sixteenth century the province contained not less than 300,000 inhabitants—thus surpassing the density of population in contemporary Prussia and Pomerania.

In these thickly populated regions during the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the peasantry were gradually being transformed into landless workers. The policy of Casimir IV had been to enhance the power of the lesser gentry at the expense of the great magnates, and one of the results of the strengthening of the influence of the *szlachta* in Polish politics had been to worsen the

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statutory position of the peasants. In Galicia in the fifteenth century a peasant had still the right to leave his landlord and go over to another on payment of a fine in money and produce. The *szlachta* suffered under this system, since the big landlords, in need of tenantry to open up new lands, could offer attractions to the discontented. After 1435 the peasant was deprived of his right to transfer his services, except once a year—after Christmas. From 1505 even this right was abolished, and throughout Galicia and other parts of Poland a peasant could no longer leave his landlord without sanction. Legal migration from one place to another was at an end, and the peasant was bound to his cot from birth to death. An epidemic of secret flight of individual peasant families from Galicia to Volhynia soon began; and later from Volhynia the area of refuge was extended further eastward, since, although in Volhynia the peasant was not yet definitely bound to the land, the Russo-Lithuanian *szlachta* showed that it would not be slow to follow the example of its Polish fellows. The agrarian reforms of the year 1557 were based on the abolition of all independent peasant farming and on the absolute regulation of peasant labour. The peasant could 'go away' only if he found another to replace him—which was not always an easy matter.

But beyond Volhynia lay the Dniepr region where 'the old Russian order' still continued—admitting free agricultural labour and the free migration of peasants from one place to another. There was therefore a natural drift of the discontented into the Dniepr lands, where there was no authority to ask whether the newcomers were there 'legally' or 'illegally'. In these frontier settlements the peasant way of life was of course less assured, but with the turn of the sixteenth century the Tartar danger had become somewhat less, for protection was afforded by the growing strength of the Cossack communities.

The appearance of the Cossacks was the second reason for the ever-increasing repopulation of the banks of the Dniepr. This reason was the more vital because it had twofold action: the Ukrainian Cossacks more or less effectively protected the new settlers from Tartar and Turkish raids; at the same time they themselves acted as a magnet to the desperate and the adventurous—to all who were not afraid to try their luck in a new life. Men began to go to the Dniepr, not only 'to be with the Cossacks', but also to become Cossacks. Thus the number of the Cossacks grew rapidly. In a very short time —before the Lublin Union—they had already become a potentially significant force in the politics of the Black Sea river lands.

The rise of the Ukrainian Cossacks was the result of a gradual and

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*175 scarcely noticeable process—scarcely noticeable because it was organic. Ukrainian Cossackdom rose out of necessity, 'by itself', from the submerged classes of the Russo-Lithuanian state, and without any special patronage or encouragement from the administration. This organic growth is the essential characteristic of Ukrainian Cossackdom.

§2. ORIGIN OF THE COSSACKS

The idea of Cossackdom was far from being novel in the sixteenth century, and the word 'Cossack' had a long and not a very lucid history behind it.

The West European form 'Cossack' is, according to Barthold, the result of the Little Russian and Polish pronunciation of the Turkish word *Ḳazaḳ*, meaning 'robber', 'disturber of the peace', 'adventurer'. It is therefore an occupational rather than a racial designation; but the origins of many racial names are, of course, to be found in popular descriptive appellations, often occupational. 'The existence of the word in Turkish can be first shown in the fifteenth century. During the civil turmoils under the Timurids the pretenders, in contrast to the actual rulers, were called *ḳazaḳ*: those who would not accept the verdict of fortune but led the life of an adventurer at the head of their men (cf., for example, the *ḳazaḳ* years (*ḳazaḳlik*) of Sultan Husain, afterwards ruler of Khurasan). The name *ḳazaḳ* is also applied to whole bodies of people who had separated from their princes and kinsmen; in the *Táríkh-i-Rashídi* the Uzbeg, who had abandoned their Khan, are called Özbeg-Ḳazaḳ or simply *Ḳazaḳ*; the latter name has been retained by their descendants as an ethnic to the present day. In Russia the word *ḳazaḳ* first appears about the same time as in Central Asia (in the second half of the fifteenth century) and is probably borrowed from Turkish, although it appears in Russian in a large number of meanings; thus individuals without kinsmen or possessions are called *ḳazaḳ* even although they did not lead a wandering or marauding life; the word therefore had not yet the exclusively military meaning which it had afterwards' (Barthold, *E.I.*).

Barthold concludes that 'no definite etymological explanation of the word *ḳazaḳ* has yet been found'; but it is difficult to concur in his statement that 'the last suggestion by N. Marr (*Zhurnal Min. Nar. Prosv.*, 1913, June, p. 286), according to which the old Caucasian ethnic *Kasog* mentioned in the Russian annals under 6473 = 965 is preserved in *Kazak*, is a hypothesis which can hardly be accepted by the historian'. The Circassians (Turkish, *Cherkess*), after the Slavs

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and the Altaians, were the third—and the oldest—racial factor in Black Sea history. In the eighteenth and first part of the nineteenth century they inhabited the mountains of the Western Caucasus and the country watered by the affluents of the Kuban as far as the Sea of Azov. In the middle of the nineteenth century they were virtually exterminated by the Russians and their remnants scattered throughout the Turkish Empire. In the period between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries they were an important element in the political and military life of Turkey; and in earlier times they had constituted the backbone of the Mamluk corps in Egypt. 175*

The area occupied by the Circassians has continuously contracted with the expansion of the Muscovite Slavs, but in the fifteenth century the Circassians, with the Alans, certainly extended as far as the Manych and the Don, and both peoples were an element in the mixed population of the Crimea (see Markov, *Ocherki Kryma*).

The subject is obscure and merits exact research, but there can be no doubt that the Circassians were among the mixed racial elements which contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian Cossacks. The Circassians are themselves called *Kasah* in numerous sources, and Russian documents of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries frequently use the Turkish name *Cherkass* in writing of the Ukrainian Cossacks. The town of Cherkassy was probably originally a purely Circassian settlement; and some Ukrainian names, like Psiol (Circassian, *psu*, 'water'), Khoper, Kremenchug, betray a Circassian derivation.

The root *kas*, *kaz* is very ancient in the Caucasus. It may possibly be connected with the word for 'horse' (*kaz*, plur. *kaz-ar*) in Svanian, one of the oldest of the languages of Georgia. The Georgian pluralization would be *kaz-eb-i* (Kazbi, Kaspi), the Aryan-Armenian, *kaz-kh(-i)* (Kazakh, Kasog, Kasah, (?) Gaska). It does not seem fantastic to suggest that from the Caucasian root *kaz*, *kas*, may be derived the names of a number of the horse-riding peoples of the ancient and medieval world. The Kassites who established themselves as an alien dynasty in Babylon in the eighteenth century B.C.; the Gaska of the Hittite world; the Caspii, the remnants of whom were living round the south shores of the Caspian in the time of Herodotus; all these were possibly horse-riding peoples whose names had an occupational origin.

If this derivation be acceptable, the name of the mountains of Caucasus can be explained as *Koh* (Persian, 'mountain') combined with the Svanic-Caucasian root *kaz*, i.e. 'the mountain of horses' or 'horsemen', or more probably of the Kaska; the name of the Caspian Sea, based on the same root, is undoubtedly derived from the ancient

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*175 Caspii people—as similarly the Arabs called the sea *Bahr-ul-Khazar*, 'the Sea of the Khazars'.

The borders of the Khazar kingdom ran along the Terek and the Kuban. The Khazars were in constant contact with the Russian principalities on the west and with the Circassian tribes, the Alans, the Georgian kingdom and the peoples of Daghestan on the south. The watch over the frontiers of this very mixed state was given over to mercenaries—Circassians (Kasah), Alans (remnants of the old Sarmatians and progenitors of the modern Os (Russian, *Ossetiny*, from whom is derived the name of the Sea of Azov—'Sea of the Az or As') and Russians. The Don Cossacks consider the Khazar frontiersmen to have been their remote ancestors who, irrespective of tribal origin, had adopted the Russian language and the Greek Orthodox faith. In their turn the Circassian element imported into the life of the Orthodox Russian-speaking Cossacks the typical Circassian dress and arms and many of the customs of the Caucasian mountaineers. When the Kipchak-Polovtsy appeared, the different nationalities who had constituted the population of the Khazar kingdom were driven to the Azov Sea (Tmutarakan) or towards the north. The Tartar invasion of the thirteenth century found their survivors living in the lonely forest region along the left affluents of the Don—the Khoper and the Medveditsa, which in their upper courses run close to and parallel with the Volga. These people, in whom the Don Cossacks see their nearer ancestors, became enrolled as frontier guards of the Golden Horde.

In the fourteenth century Cossacks of Russian and other origins were posted as sentries to guard the fords and convenient crossings along the Don, the Khoper and the Donets. They were considered skilful watermen and undertook the protection of Genoese merchants in the Azov Sea and along the Crimean coast. The Cossacks at that time formed part of the Mongol imperial organization. (2)

In the fifteenth century the Russians adopted the word *kazak* and the conception which it conveyed. In the reign of the Great Prince Vasili II, who had made long sojourns among the Tartars and who had friendly connexions with them, many Tartars of rank were invited with their men to settle on the borders of the Muscovite state and to keep guard against the raids of the wild Finnish tribes of the upper Kama—the Cheremises, Mordva and Meshchera. Thus the mixed Russo-Tartar region of Kasimov on the Oka, east of Ryazan, came into existence. The southern boundaries of the Ryazan lands were protected by settlements of 'Ryazan Cossacks'. (3, 4)

Under Ivan III frontier Cossacks became a regular institution of the Muscovite state. Beside the Ryazan Cossacks who were guarding

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the southern frontier, there appeared Cossacks on the Lithuanian border, for instance, near the town of Toropets south of Pskov, who undertook the same service. In the Seversk land, conquered by Vasili III in 1517, the Seversk Cossacks were organized to settle in the districts of Putivl, Rylsk, Novgorod-Seversk and Starodub. Thus the Tartar system of frontier organization was adopted and developed by the Muscovite state. The neighbouring Russo-Lithuanian Great Principality might have been expected to follow, but after the time of Vitovt the administration became increasingly weak and defective in military matters and the significance of the Cossack system was ignored. 175*

A document of the year 1504 mentions, in the districts bordering on Muscovy, not only 'town Cossacks' but also 'village' and even 'country Cossacks'. In the end all people living along the Dniepr began to be called Cossacks without distinction—whether they were the remains of former populations or newcomers from the west who had arrived of their own free will and not been brought there by some adventurous 'undertaking' landlord.

At the end of the sixteenth century the Dniepr Cossacks formed the country population, owned land—leading a settled life under their *starosty* (elders)—and made up the armed contingents for guarding the border. They made their living by agriculture, fishing and trade. They hunted and tamed the wild horses of the steppe, and were skilled trappers of beavers and other fur-bearing animals. Beekeeping was widely practised in the Bratslav and Vinnitsa districts. Beehives stretched for thirty versts around the town of Bratslav. The Ukrainian Cossacks also served as guides to the Genoese caravans trading between the Crimea and the interior and to Armenian and Jewish merchants out of Turkey. Relations with the government were maintained exclusively through the *starosty*, who invariably were members of the Russo-Lithuanian nobility. These *starosty* resided in Kanev, Pereyaslavl, Chigirin, Belaya Tserkov, Bratslav, Vinnitsa and Bar. It was in the capacity of *starosta*, at Bar, that Prince Ostrozhsky, celebrated for his victory over the Muscovites at Orsha, started his career. Eustace Dashkevich, who went over with Michael Glinski to the service of Vasili III and who later returned to Lithuania, had been *starosta* in Kanev and Cherkassy.

As *starosty* Ostrozhsky and Dashkevich were incessantly occupied with the struggle against the Crimean Tartars. In 1524 Dashkevich and his Cossacks repulsed a raid of the Crimean Khan who was trying to possess himself of the town of Cherkassy. Soon after this event Dashkevich made a proposal in the Lithuanian *Seym* that, following the example of Muscovy, a regular organization should

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*175 be granted to the Dniepr Cossacks, but the government refused. Dashkevich was the first to change Ukrainian tactics in the struggle with the Tartars and from a purely defensive attitude to go over to the attack: he used to lead the Cossacks beyond the Dniepr and capture from the Tartars their herds of sheep and horses.

§3. THE ZAPOROGIAN *SECH;* LANDLORDISM IN THE UKRAINE

A decisive part in the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks was played by the Cherkassy *starosta* Dmitri Vishnevetsky. His exceedingly stormy life did not last long, but it was full of picturesque episodes. Vishnevetsky decided to create a base for those Cossacks who went in search of game and good fisheries in the region of the lower Dniepr beyond the cataracts, and in the year 1557 he secured from Sigismund II authority to build a fortress on the island of Khortytsa. Such was the beginning of the *Zaporózhskaya Sech* (in Ukrainian *Sich*), 'the Clearing beyond the Rapids'. All the bold and adventurous elements among the Cossacks had been dreaming of escaping *za porogi* (Ukrainian *porohy*), 'beyond the rapids', where the labyrinth of small islands in the Dniepr, covered with dense vegetation, was full of game, and where fabulous quantities of fish were to be harvested, but where, owing to the vicinity of the Tartars, life was dangerous. Soon it became the ambition of every Cossack to call himself a Zaporogian.

From his stronghold beyond the cataracts, Vishnevetsky, profiting by the campaigns of the Muscovite *voyevodes* Adashev and Rzhevski, undertook a series of successful attacks against the Tartars of the Crimea. He extended the sphere of his operations also to the neighbouring principality of Moldavia, and began that long epic of Cossack attacks on the Turkish power which was to prove often so embarrassing to the policies of the Polish kings.

In the year 1563, Vishnevetsky was taken prisoner and tortured to death in Istanbul. The memory of Vishnevetsky still lives among the Ukrainian peasantry; there is a famous song about 'Bayda' which is sung to this day.(5)

The activities of the Zaporogians disturbed both the Lithuanians and the Turks. In 1568, the year before the Lublin Union, Sigismund II, anxious lest the Turks should be provoked to war, gave an order for the destruction of the fortifications on the Dniepr islands and forbade the Cossacks to settle beyond the cataracts. The royal fiat was ignored by the Cossacks; the Zaporogian *Sech* continued to

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exist and soon its fame spread far and wide among the whole of the population of the Ukraine. 175

During the decade of the Union of Lublin, along the Dniepr round Kanev and Cherkassy, in southern Podolia and on the confines of the steppes, life ceased to be as full of danger and adventure as it had been fifty years before in the time of Ostrozhsky and Dashkevich. The feats of Vishnevetsky's Zaporogian Cossacks, the campaigns of the Muscovite *voyevodes*, and the attacks of the Don Cossacks—who, about the middle of the century, had settled on the lower Don—all these factors had tended to weaken the Tartars. The theatre of war between the Ottoman imperial power and the peoples of Eastern Europe was spreading from the Danube countries and the Carpathians to the whole of the northern shore of the Black Sea, and the initiative in the defensive against the Ottomans was passing from the stricken Hungarians and the embarrassed Poles to the new communities of frontiersmen on the Dniepr and the Don and to the Muscovy Tsars.

The Turks seem to have been conscious of this development when the Grand Vizier Mehmed Sökölli—himself a Herzogovinian Slav—in the years 1569–71 undertook a great counter-offensive against Muscovy, which was combined with the ambitious plan to build a canal from the Don to the Volga. But a Turkish army was defeated before Astrakhan (1569), and the great raid of the Crim Tartars on Moscow, disastrous as it proved to the Russians, was without any permanent effect. The naval defeat at Lepanto and the subsequent preoccupation of Sökölli in the war with Venice and Spain effectively deferred further operations against Muscovy and the Cossacks; when Sökölli again turned his attention to the Black Sea, in the last year of his life, it was in an effort to substitute Turkish for Iranian hegemony in Georgia and Daghestan (1578).(6)

The Ukraine enjoyed some years of comparative quiet, and this short time allowed the Dniepr lands and Podolia to blossom into prosperity. In these vast and fertile lands the old peasant order, which had long been forgotten in the other parts of the Russo-Lithuanian state, continued to subsist. The system of a landowning nobility did not extend far south of Kiev; in the region round Cherkassy, until the middle of the century, only three estates are known as having been the property of nobles.

Until the Lublin Union the Vilna government had been content to do no more than appoint its *starosty*, who represented the administration, while the people lived in communities which they themselves had freely organized; elected trusted men from among themselves as judges and officials; and protected themselves and

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*175 the frontiers of the state by their own efforts and their own means.

So soon, however, as it was known that the Ukrainian provinces were to come under the direct administration of the Polish crown, the movement of migration from west to east which had hitherto had only an individual character assumed mass proportions. 'When the decision of the *Seym* was published, which bound the peasants to the land after an interval of ten years, the result was a wholesale flight. Peasants escaped without fulfilling the conditions of their contracts; there followed a general migration and pursuit. The further lay the region, the more welcome, since it was easier to hide there. From all parts of the Great Principality peasants were now flying to the steppes which offered them enormous advantages. The ratio of growth of population in the Ukraine during that period exceeded by far that of the growth of population in North America during the nineteenth century. There the population doubled in twenty-five years; here it grew in fifty years from 50,000 to 500,000' (Antonovich).

But the rapid growth of population was not due only to the migration of fugitives. There came also peasants who were transported to the east by 'undertaking' landlords. In this respect the Lublin Union had had the effect of drastically altering the earlier state of affairs, when the Russo-Lithuanian gentry unwillingly settled on estates in the dangerous steppeland zone and when the Polish gentry were prohibited from acquiring lands in the territory of the Great Principality. Under the Union the prohibition was ended, and Poles could now settle in the Ukraine.

The Union coincided also with a decisive change in the conditions of agriculture: uncultivated lands suddenly acquired an attraction for Polish landlords. There was a growing demand for wheat in Western Europe, and the eastern wheatlands were beginning to assume an importance in relation to the general economy of Europe. Trade in cereals by way of the Baltic developed with great rapidity. Danzig became the principal *entrepôt* for this trade, and in Danzig were founded numerous export houses by Dutch, German and Scotch merchants who received and shipped the cereal cargoes which were floated down the Vistula. 'The Polish gentry were now petitioning the government to grant them fertile lands for which there was a great demand in the last twenty-five years of the sixteenth century' (Doroshenko).

Already in the year of the Lublin Union a register had been made of unowned lands in Podolia and Volhynia. On his succession to the throne of the last Jagiellonian King, the Hungarian Stephen Báthory

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had realized that the first problem which presented itself to his government was the distribution of lands in the eastern border provinces and the foundation there of important estates. After the death of Báthory, during the election of Sigismund III Vasa, lands were lavishly distributed among those members of the *Seym* who had voted in his favour. On that occasion the two brothers Vishnevetsky received vast estates on the left bank of the Dniepr, where large settlements arose with incredible rapidity—Lubni, Romen, Piryatin, Pryluka and, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, Poltava. That part of the Ukraine situated to the west of the Dniepr numbered hundreds of villages by the end of the sixteenth century. Along the right bank, on the confines of the steppe, a commission of the *Seym* ordered the *starosta* of Vinnitsa, Kolanovsky, to make a report on the unpopulated region of Uman. Kolanovsky sent in a report to the effect that these lands were no good, and in the meantime himself took possession of the whole of the Uman region—comprising all the southern part of the later Government of Kiev. The Government prosecuted him for this ingenuous action.

The force of attraction which the Ukraine had for that generation of Polish landlords is well illustrated by a literary document of the year 1590. 'The Ukraine is the most precious possession of the Polish crown. Her meadows are as beautiful as the Elysian Fields. They either stretch along plains or are intersected by hills, forests and woods. The prospect is pleasant and suggests abundant harvests. In the Ukraine domestic and wild birds and animals are so plentiful that it makes one think that this is the birthplace of Ceres and Diana. Her beehives are so full of honey that one forgets about the Sicilian Gela and Attic Hymettus. The vine also grows there and wine might easily be made. Italian nuts are so plentiful there that it makes one think that the Ukraine was once upon a time Italian soil. It is impossible to make a list of all her lakes overflowing with fish. Oh, why waste words when one phrase expresses all! This is the Promised Land about which God spake to Israel! Rivers of milk and honey flow here! He who once has been to the Ukraine can never leave her because she attracts men as the magnet attracts iron' (quoted by Doroshenko).

It is easy to imagine how such enthusiastic descriptions appealed to the imagination of Polish landlords eking out their existence on thin sandy soil covered with straggling undergrown pinewoods somewhere to the west of the Vistula or on the borders of East Prussia. It is not surprising that as a result of the migration to the east of both Polish landlords and labourers, the poor and unprofitable lands of Mazovia and Malopolska soon became depopulated. Com-

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*175 plaints on the subject were voiced in the *Seym*. In Volhynia, at the end of the sixteenth century, the population exceeded 600,000; and with the flow of migrants to Podolia, to the Dniepr, and beyond the Dniepr, the numbers of the inhabitants of the whole of the Ukraine (excluding Galicia) had, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, reached 1,500,000.

The Poles were confronted by the greatest opportunity in the history of their race. They were stumbling into the Promised Land at a moment when their enemies and neighbours were not capable of disputing it with them; for the Turks were entering into that first period of decline which has been so memorably delineated by Sir Thomas Roe; the Russians were about to fall into the Time of Troubles; and the Germanic powers, with Sweden, were approaching the decades of the Thirty Years' War. For the Poles it should not have been difficult to have effected a racial fusion with the heterogeneous and uncultured population of the Ukrainian new lands. The religious rivalry between Orthodox and Catholic was the principal obstacle; in a more devout century the astute Casimir IV had succeeded in going some way to reconcile the religious feud which was always latent between the Poles and the Russo-Lithuanians. Sigismund III Vasa, who ruled in Poland during the crucial decades, was not so bigoted as his detractors would hold, but he was sombre and uninspired, and the imperial polities of Central Europe interested his ordinary mind more than the original problems of the new south-east.

The problem was social even more than racial and religious, and the social structure of the Polish realm was such as to make it impossible for any but the autocrat, which Poland never had, to solve the unprecedented difficulties which confronted government in the Ukraine.

Stephen Báthory, the predecessor of Sigismund and the brilliant favourite of the Polish *szlachta*, had been no more suited than the pious Catholic King to curb the gentry and befriend the peasants. His early life as a Hungarian magnate predisposed him to mirror the prejudices of the feudal class and to regard free peasants as mutinous serfs. And on the incorrigible class instincts of the Polish gentry, the future of the Polish nation was wrecked. The Promised Land of the Ukraine became the graveyard of *Rzecz Pospolita*.

The Polish order and Polish law knew only three classes: the nobles (landowners); the burghers of the towns; and the peasants—who were entirely dependent on their landlords, and who had therefore to be governed through the lord who owned the land on which they were living. The Cossacks did not belong to any of these cate-

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gories; but the whole of the rural population of the Ukraine called themselves Cossacks. The intelligent and energetic Stephen Báthory was confronted with the problem of how to deal with the Cossacks, and he attempted to solve it with characteristic directness. He declared as state property all lands which were not owned by nobles. Such lands could be given to a noble in recompense for services to the crown or leased to individuals for their lives. Many of these lands were, however, inhabited by people who stubbornly continued to call themselves Cossacks, and who maintained the right to a free social status which the Polish Government refused to recognize. The authorities pretended to regard these people as tenants of landlords to whom their lands had been nominally granted or of those who had taken up Government leases. It proved, however, impossible to impose this formula during the first decades of the seventeenth century; on the one hand, the Cossacks who had settled independently in different districts were so numerous that interference with them would have proved dangerous; on the other hand, there was still so much unoccupied land that newly arrived 'undertaking' landlords preferred to select districts where they might avoid conflicts. The majority of the Ukrainian population continued to live as of old 'on its own will', subject to little control, and, for the time being, not much troubled by anyone. They were aware that their right to their chosen form of social organization was formally denied, and remained ready to rebel against any attempt to introduce Polish law by force.

Meantime, Stephen Báthory had been attracted by the military possibilities of the Cossacks. Attempts had already been made under his predecessors to register those men who could really be called Cossacks—to enrol those capable of giving effective military service. Special Cossack detachments were created, and in the year 1578 the first Cossack regiments were formed. The number of men included in the lists of 'registered' Cossacks was about 6000; at least this is the figure upheld in the Cossack tradition of the following century. Cossack regiments on campaign formed part of the Polish army. The experiment was, however, developed on a very modest scale owing to the chronic lack of funds in the royal exchequer, and to the objection of the Polish *szlachta* to allowing the King to reward military service (as was usual among 'free' Poles serving with distinction in war) with the status of nobility.

Apart from the few thousands of 'registered' Cossacks, who gradually acquired a privileged position and came to be favoured and relied upon by the Polish administration, there remained the tens of thousands of 'unregistered' Cossacks who claimed the right to a free

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*175 status which the Government did not recognize. It was in the Zaporogian *Sech*—in 'the Clearing beyond the Rapids'—that these 'unregistered' Cossacks, comprising the mass of the Ukrainian settlers, found the natural focus of their discontent and of their love of freedom.

It is very characteristic that the first Government document in which the Zaporogian *Sech* is mentioned is the order of Sigismund Augustus for its dissolution. The numbers of the Zaporogian Cossacks who were living out of reach of the authority of the Polish Government grew very rapidly in the years following the Union of Lublin. 'After the year 1570', as Kulish writes, 'beyond the cataracts, on the islands of the lower Dniepr, far from the Polish gentry, a Cossack brotherhood was founded where all were equal, where the chief who enjoyed the power of a dictator was dressed in the same way as the rest, where fine clothes were of no account unless a bold hand had taken them off some slain Turk or Tartar. This brotherhood, which adopted poverty because it wished to do so, founded the famed Zaporogian *Sech*, which kept large supplies of arms and gunpowder, where chivalry was instilled into young Cossacks and where no women were allowed under any pretext. The *Sech* was the refuge, the home of all Cossacks, and all Cossack troops, wherever they were, called themselves Zaporogians.'

Accounts of foreigners at the end of the sixteenth century give a vivid image of life and customs in the Zaporogian region.

The Italian Gambarini wrote about 1584: 'Some of the Cossacks are in the King's service and live on the islands under the rule of the Hetman to protect the frontiers against the Tartars. Others in the majority are labourers who earn their livelihood by plundering Turkish and Tartar lands and return home with their booty. If one tried one could assemble about 14,000 or 15,000 men who would make excellent troops out of these daring fellows. They are not so much in quest of loot as of glory and are ready to meet any kind of danger. Their armament consists of sabres and guns and they never miss a target. They are excellent both as infantry and as cavalry, and they are called Cossacks because they are as lithe as goats (Russian, *koza*, 'goat'). They live in huts covered with reeds and eat whatever is at hand. Their principal food consists of fish and what they can take from the Tartars. They never eat bread and they drink pure water. There are all sorts of nationalities among them: Poles, Germans, Frenchmen, Italians and Spaniards, who for some reason cannot go back to their own countries. They find a sure refuge here. No hand can reach them. Comradeship is strong among them. They live on small islands if they are few, and go over to larger islands as

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they become more numerous. Wood is plentiful and they build hurdles out of it, so that even in winter when the Dniepr is covered with ice they are not afraid of their enemies attacking them unawares. In summer the river cannot be forded because wide marshes stretch along its banks. No one can possess himself of these islands; not only possess himself of them, but not even find them if he does not know the right way to them. These Cossacks are also good sea-fighters; they have all sorts of craft in which they sail in order to plunder the Turkish coast.' Gambarini's account is based on the narrative of a Cossack who was made prisoner by the Turks and later escaped to Italy. 175*

In 1594 the Hungarian Eric Lassota arrived at the Zaporogian *Sech* as the emissary of the Emperor Rudolf II to persuade the Cossacks to take part in war against the Turks. He met there the envoys of the Muscovite Tsar Theodore, who were concerned to direct the energies of the Cossacks against the Crim Tartars. It was indicative of the growing fame of the *Sech* that the Emperor should have chosen to enter into direct relations with the Cossacks, who were formally the subjects of the King of Poland. Lassota brought with him as gifts from the Emperor 8000 gold ducats, horns, tambourines and imperial standards. He was greeted by an artillery salute.

Lassota found about 6000 men suitable for a regular campaign. He saw great stores of arms on the islands; herds of horses; whole flotillas of varied craft. The *pourparlers* continued for long, for the Cossacks had a love of bargaining. When agreement was reached, horns were blown, guns thundered and fireworks were discharged during the night. Lassota received as a parting gift a hat and coat of black fox. (7)

§4. THE POLISH COUNTER-REFORMATION AND THE CRISIS OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH 000

The first half of the seventeenth century was a period of convulsion and revolution throughout Europe. Emergence from the feudal relationships of the Middle Ages and the development of commercial capitalism was the occasion for a widespread (often subconscious) two-century long struggle for power between the forces of liberal oligarchy and of imperial autocracy. The struggle, like all struggles of principle, was never solved, and eventually was lost in the newer forms of antagonism which grew out of the history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In France the Huguenot Wars, in Germany the Thirty Years' War, in England the Civil War, gave varying results which were to influence the history of the succeeding centuries.

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*175 The history of Eastern Europe during this same period had an important influence on affairs in the West. The first period of decline in the Ottoman Empire (death of Mehmed Sökölli, 1578 to majority of Murad IV, *c.* 1630) undoubtedly allowed time to the house of Habsburg to establish a short-lived hegemony in Germany and to impose the Counter-Reformation in several countries which would otherwise have remained or have become Protestant. In 1576, when Rudolf II succeeded to the Habsburg dominions, 'the whole of Austria and nearly the whole of Styria was mainly Lutheran; in Bohemia, Silesia and Moravia, various forms of Christian belief struggled for mastery; and Catholicism was almost confined to the mountains of Tirol' (*Encyc. Brit.* 11th ed.). Hungary preferred the Zapolyas (Turkish *protegés*) to the Habsburgs, and the Sultan was supporting the Translyvanian Protestants. By 1630, when Turkey was again becoming an aggressive imperial force under Murad IV (whose work during the middle decades of the century was to be continued by the Köprülü viziers), the obstinate and narrow personality of Ferdinand II had combined with the military genius of Wallenstein to impose the Counter-Reformation in Germany, and it seemed that Austria would establish its predominance throughout Germany and that the Baltic would become an Austrian lake' (*Encyc. Brit.* 11th ed.)

During this same time the Slav peoples of Eastern Europe were engaged in a titanic struggle which was to have results as far-reaching as those of the contemporary Thirty Years' War in Germany. This struggle endured for sixty-four years—from the appearance of the first False Dmitri as claimant for the Muscovite throne in 1603 to the Treaty of Andrusovo between a renascent Muscovy and an enfeebled Poland in 1667. It had many dramatic episodes, for it opened with murderous civil war in Muscovy and grew into an epic attempt to impose a Polish Tsar and a Polish hegemony in Moscow. It witnessed the popular revolts of the Ukrainian Cossacks culminating in 'the Deluge' of 1648. It ruined the brilliant culture of the Polish realm and carried the Muscovites to the threshold of world power, which they were destined to cross in the opening decades of the eighteenth century.

The influence of the Slav struggle on the Thirty Years' War may be briefly considered, if only because the Polish struggle for hegemony over the Orthodox Slavs was in many respects an easterly projection of the Counter-Reformation. The check administered to Sultan Osman II at Khotin in 1621 by the Poles and Cossacks had the indirect effect of relieving the position of Ferdinand II on his eastern frontiers at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, and the

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policy of Sigismund III, who at the same time adhered to the Catholic reaction and pressed his own claims to the throne of Sweden, greatly strengthened the imperialists during the first decade of the war. But after the Truce of Stumdorf with the Swedes (1635) the growing pressure of the Cossack revolts (1636 and 1638) weakened the influence of the Poles in German and Baltic politics. The terrible revolt of Khmelnytsky broke out in 1648 when the Treaty of Westphalia was crowning the victory of the Protestant powers in Germany. And the disappearance of Poland as a great power after the Treaty of Andrusovo prepared the rise of first, Sweden and later, Brandenburg-Prussia as the dominant Baltic powers. 175 *

The struggle of the Poles with the Eastern Orthodox Slavs in the seventeenth century had three main aspects.

First, the effort of the Polish kings to subordinate the Greek Orthodox Church in the Ukraine to the influence of the Catholic religion and culture had social and political implications, but it was at the same time a manifestation of the Counter-Reformation in Poland which had received its impulse from the Jesuits who had been introduced into the kingdom by Stephen Báthory—with the original object of assisting him in his educational reforms. It was Jesuit inspiration too which gave some ideal colour to the marauding attempts to establish a Polish nominee in the Kremlin.

Secondly, the struggle between Poles and Russians represented a contest of two differentiated racial groups for control over the whole area of geographical unity contained within the fluvial network between the Baltic and the Black Sea. That it was not impossible of achievement by the Poles is sufficiently proved by the fact that it was achieved by the less advanced Muscovites during the following century. Two centuries before, Vitovt had come near to imposing a Lithuanian hegemony over the whole of the fluvial area of geographical unity. Stephen Báthory, after Henri IV, the first soldier of his age, had shown that the Muscovite military machine could easily be broken by a commander of European experience. Vladislav IV, the second Polish Vasa, was a man of real genius, with a wide popularity among the masses of the Ukrainian Cossacks, and he had been prepared to abjure the Catholic faith in order to secure the Muscovite crown.

The third aspect of the struggle was that of a conflict between two systems of government. It is a paradox that the liberal or rather anti-monarchical individualism of the Polish gentry should have been the factor fatal to Poland when the view of life which they represented was considered to be the modern and the winning force in the

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*175 Protestant West. But an addiction to extremes, an obsession with the ideal, is probably a fatality of the Slav character, the origins of which are to be sought in the whole of Slav history. The individualism of the Polish *szlachta* was a reduction to absurdity of all the principles of liberty on which an ordered social life can be based. Their infatuation with liberty disguised in fact a narrow exclusiveness which was intent to confine all its benefits to their own class. Few countries have produced such wise monarchs as the first two Sigismunds or such royal paladins as Stephen Báthory, Vladislav IV and John Sobieski, commanders so gallant as Chodkiewicz and Żółkiewski, or statesmen of the calibre of John Zamojski. That none of these could win permanent fruits in face of the inherent anarchy and factiousness of the Polish social system is sufficient condemnation not only of that system but of the class who upheld it and of the minds of the successive generations of men who composed that class. Against the anarchic liberalism of the Polish gentry the sombre and in many respects clumsy and primitive despotism of the Muscovite state could not lose; and it was only a ruthless autarchy which had the possibility to master those vast plains between the Urals and the Vistula and to tame the dark-minded millions of their inhabitants. So the pupils of Edighey were victorious over the heirs of Vitovt.

The Reformation—which indeed had its origin in Bohemia—attained a greater strength in Central and Eastern Europe than is generally remembered. In Austria, in Hungary and Transylvania, and in Poland, the forces of Protestantism gained and maintained varying degrees of influence for considerable periods of time. In Poland, in the Hussite times, the Jagiellonian princes had not regarded the early Reformation with disfavour; the extreme individualism of the Polish gentry usually imposed a degree of tolerance in religious affairs (the Jews, for instance, had been treated for centuries with marked consideration). The two Sigismunds, enlightened princes of the Renaissance, held a balance between the numerous Protestant sects and the less tolerant of the prelates of the Roman Catholic Church.

'The rising tide of the Reformation reached Poland from the West. The first distinguished poet in the Polish language, Rey, became a Calvinist in middle age; the first distinguished prose writer, Orzechowski, was a priest who married and quarrelled with his bishop. Parliament after Parliament demanded the Polish language in Church ritual, also civil jurisdiction and state taxation for the clergy, abolition of their celibacy, the Communion in both kinds, and the Convocation of a National Church Assembly. The King himself (Sigismund II) leaned to the reformed side, and quarrelled with the

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Pope over a divorce, like Henry VIII. And yet the ideal of a Polish National Church, which might have given strength to the State, was wrecked on the shoals of unlimited Polish individualism. The Protestant movement at once split up on Polish soil into sheer sectarianism, and even the genius of one of the makers of the Reformation—the Pole, John Łaski, who had won fame in the history of Frisian and English Protestantism—did not succeed in bringing the wrangling factions of the dissenters to a common understanding. On the other hand, the conflicts with Orthodox Russia on one side, and Lutheran Prussia on the other, united the Roman Catholic Poles under the banner of their common faith. It was a symbol of the ultimate victory of Catholic Counter-Reformation over Protestant Reformation in Poland when the King accepted the Book of Decrees of the Council of Trent from the hands of the Papal Nuncio (1564). Soon afterwards the Jesuits, that vanguard of militant Catholicism, came to stay, and a ramshackle alliance of the Protestant sects—the Concord Act of Sandomir (1570)—was no wall against such a disciplined power' (Dyboski). 175*

The Roman Catholic Church had never abandoned interest in the Eastern Slavs since the days of the Archbishopric of Gazaria and the Council of Florence. Ivan IV had even held out the prospect of the mass conversion of Muscovy when he sought to secure the mediation of the Pope after his defeats at the hand of Stephen Báthory.

Now stimulated by the rising force of the Counter-Reformation, and with a devout king upon the throne whom a countryman has with some exaggeration compared to Philip II of Spain, the Catholic hierarchy in Poland set themselves to compass the conversion of the mass of Orthodox people in the south-eastern provinces who had come under direct Polish control as the result of the Union of Lublin. They were the Church of the higher culture and the Church of the ruling race, and the bucolic *naïveté* and ignorance of the Orthodox priesthood was no match for the worldly wisdom and devoted discipline of the soldiers of Ignatius Loyola. But the Catholic Church was also the Church of the Polish landlords, and neither its subtle propaganda nor the real worth of its organization could overcome the suspicious tenacity of the wary Ukrainian peasants.

In the middle of the sixteenth century the Orthodox Church in the Russo-Lithuanian Great Principality had presented a spectacle of utter decadence. The Church had considerable wealth at its disposal, and some of the monasteries owned vast lands. Turbulent and licentious nobles acquired the bishoprics and the abbacies through family influences. Typical of these princely prelates was the Bishop

175 *of Lutsk, Jonas Borzobohary ('the very rich'), who took monasteries by storm with the aid of artillery, and who closed churches until a fine was paid for reopening them. No better was his successor Cyril Terlecki, who was tried for murder, rape and brigandage. The Patriarch of Constantinople had to depose one of the Kievan Metropolitans for bigamy. Many members of the higher hierarchy, although they stopped short at crime, led lives of notorious debauchery. The lower priesthood was entirely under the patronage of local landlords, and their position was difficult where the latter was a Catholic and their flock consisted only of the peasantry. In many cases the landlord simply closed the church or monastery on his land and confiscated its goods in his own favour. Under such conditions the position of the rural clergy was becoming intolerable. Only 'the last of the last', the hungry and ignorant, became Orthodox priests, and the saying was current at that time that one sooner met an Orthodox priest in a tavern than in a church.

Greek Orthodoxy became the religion of 'menials', that is, of peasants, and the nobility of Russian origin who had adopted Polish ways of life and become Catholic were ashamed of the old religion. Among the nobility the number of those who remained faithful to Orthodoxy diminished every year. There were exceptions, but these exceptions were few. The Lithuanian Hetman, Gregory Chodkiewicz, remained Orthodox; so also did the widely celebrated Prince Constantine Ostrozhsky, who was one of the most prominent and active members of the Orthodox Church and who founded the only Orthodox college in Ostrog, where, in the year 1580, the Bible was printed in Slavonic. But even in ancient families of the most distinguished lineage where Orthodoxy was a time-honoured tradition —as, for instance, the powerful and wealthy Vishnevetskys—a turning of the younger generation to Catholicism could be observed at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Jeremy Vishnevetsky became one of the most irreconciliable enemies of Orthodoxy; Constantine Ostrozhsky's daughter became a fervent Catholic and destroyed all her father's work. The lay of Meleti Smotritski called 'The Wail of the Orthodox Church', written on the death of old Prince Constantine, has the ring of one of the Irish laments of the eighteenth century for the lost glories of the Catholic Anglo-Celtic lords, although the influence of formal Oriental metaphors deprives it of the same charm. 'Where is the mansion of the Princes Ostrozhsky, from which the old faith radiated? Where are the other jewels of that crown, the priceless sapphires and precious diamonds and all the glory of the great princely Russian houses?' Meleti then recites the shameful list of the descendants of Russian princes who had

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abjured the faith of their fathers—the princes Vishnevetsky, Slutsky, Sangushko, Czartoryski, Masalsky and many others. 175 *

The younger generation among the Russo-Lithuanian aristocracy and gentry were generally converted to the Catholic faith through the influence of the Jesuit schools, which had spread all over Lithuania, Galicia, Podolia, Volhynia and the West Russian lands since the time of Stephen Báthory. The unworthy mode of life of the higher Orthodox hierarchy, the ignorance and low morals of the priesthood, were contrasted in Jesuit propaganda with the spiritual resurrection and discipline of the Roman Church since the Counter-Reformation. The comparison was not in favour of Orthodoxy and had a strong influence on the more thoughtful members of the younger nobility. The propaganda, however, failed to affect the peasantry, the Cossacks and the town workmen, since it was made through schools and the written word.

It was with the object of bringing members of the higher Orthodox clergy under the influence of the Roman Church and of converting a part of the priesthood who could influence the town populations and the peasantry in the Orthodox provinces that the idea of a Union between the two Churches was promoted by certain leaders of the Catholic Church in Poland. The plan held promise of success, for many of the Orthodox hierarchy were attracted by the prospect of material gain, while others favoured union out of genuine concern for the decadence of their Church. The Union was planned in a moderate and mild form on the basis of the decisions of the Florentine Council of 1439; the Orthodox Church was to retain the Eastern Rite, and celibacy was not to be exacted from the priesthood. The Catholics were not so much interested in dogmatic differences as in the recognition of Papal authority by the Orthodox clergy and congregations. The bishops who recognized the Union were to receive the right to sit in the *Seym* like the Catholic bishops, and all Orthodox who accepted the Union were to be placed on a footing of equality with Catholics in the distribution of governmental posts.

Four Orthodox bishops elaborated a decree concerning the Union which in the year 1594 was laid for approval before King Sigismund III and the Papal Nuncio at Cracow. The Kievan Metropolitan, Michael Ragoza, who was not a strong character, was inclined towards the Union. In the following year Pope Clement VIII formally acknowledged 'the Newly United Church', and, to commemorate the event, medals were stamped with the inscription 'Rutenis receptis'.

The whole affair seemed to have been brought to a successful conclusion, but subsequent events proved that hopeful expectations

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175 were premature. With Prince Constantine Ostrozhsky at their head, the Orthodox gentry came forward with a series of protests; and signs of nervousness were shown among the townspeople of Lvov, Vilna and Kiev, where the Orthodox unions of merchants and artisans, the so-called brotherhoods (*bratstva*), had well-established craft organizations and considerable means at their disposal.

By the King's order the controversy was submitted to a Church Council which met at Brest at the end of the year 1596. There, instead of coming to agreement, the two sides to the dispute within the Orthodox Church came to a definite break. An armed conflict was narrowly avoided, since the noble supporters of the two interests had attended the Council with their levies and artillery. The Orthodox Church was henceforth divided, and a bitter struggle soon developed between 'the Uniates' and those who adhered to the old Orthodoxy. In the course of this struggle the Orthodox Church attained to a certain spiritual rejuvenation. The national consciousness of the Russian-speaking Orthodox masses was aroused, and Orthodox polemists and orators began to emerge who found a degree of material support among the remaining families of the Orthodox gentry and deep moral support in the sentiment of the townsfolk and the peasantry. Even the Uniate Church in the end 'became the very fortress of Ukrainian separatism against Poland' and 'this was largely due to the illiberal narrow-mindedness of Polish Church dignitaries, who grudged to the Uniate prelates the privileges of their rank and thereby stamped the Uniate faith as the Church of the lower people against Roman Catholicism as the religion of the governing class. The nobles who abandoned Eastern Christianity largely became Roman Catholics, and not Uniates, and thereby deepened the social and national gulf' (Dyboski).(8)

§5. EARLY COSSACK REVOLTS: CHRISTOPHER KOSIŃSKI AND SEVERIN NALIVAYKO

A formidable Cossack revolt against the Polish authorities occurred as early as the year 1590. An adventurer named Christopher Kosiński, a Pole by origin, persuaded a number of the Zaporogians to follow him, not for a campaign against the Tartars or Turks nor to go over into Moldavia as had been customary until then, but to plunder the estates and to burn down the manors of the nobility in Volhynia. A sinister feature of the movement was that a good number of peasants who were Cossacks only in name joined Kosiński in his fortified camp at Tripolye, while local agrarian risings broke out in many parts of Volhynia and Podolia and beyond the Dniepr.

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Plundering and arson spread throughout the Ukrainian provinces 175*
during the whole of 1592. In the following year Kosiński again ravaged Volhynia, but now the frightened nobles, Orthodox as well as Catholic, appeared in arms, and near Zhitomir, old Prince Constantine Ostrozhsky and Alexander Vishnevetsky routed the Cossack forces, slaying 2000 men and taking twenty-five cannon. Kosiński himself surrendered, but was allowed to go free and perished soon afterwards, no one knew how.

The revolt of Kosiński did not assume sufficient proportions to attract the attention of the Polish court, particularly since 'registered' Cossacks took no part in it, and it had taken the form of disorders committed by an extraordinarily large gang of malefactors. The revolt indicated, however, that there existed elements in the Ukraine which were capable of undertaking an armed struggle against the régime of the Polish landlords.

In 1594 the outbreak of the Long War, in which the Austrians, the Turks, the Transylvanian Prince Sigismund Báthory and the Wallachian Hospodar Michael the Brave became involved in a desultory but murderous quadrilateral struggle, was the occasion for a further movement among the Cossacks which grew to proportions more substantial than the revolt of Kosiński.

The Cossacks found a new leader in Severin Nalivayko, a young officer in the service of Prince Ostrozhsky. He came of a well-to-do family, knew how to read and write and had the reputation of being a trained artillerist. The massacre by the Wallachian and Moldavian Hospodars, Michael the Brave and Aaron the Tyrant, of all Turkish garrisons and settlers in the two principalities, and the capture by the Transylvanian Prince Sigismund Báthory of Rustchuk, Silistria and other towns on the right bank of the Danube was a signal to the Cossacks to attack the Turkish garrisons in the towns along the lower Dniestr. Nalivayko sent a message to the Zaporogian *Sech* calling for men to join him in Moldavia in a Holy War against the Turks. His appeal was more successful than the elaborate negotiations of the Emperor's envoy Eric Lassota earlier in the same year, and not only from the *Sech* but from the whole region round Kiev several thousand Cossacks rallied under the Zaporogian Hetman, Gregory Loboda, to take part in the war on the Danube.

Campaigns in Moldavia had a special attraction for the Cossacks. They had a certain sympathy for the Orthodox Moldavians, and the frequent hostilities between rival candidates for the succession to the thrones of the two Roumanian principalities offered recurrent opportunities for plunder. In 1577 a Cossack, John Potcoava or Podkova, had actually become Hospodar of Moldavia. The Poles

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*175 generally resented a Cossack intervention which embarrassed their own relations with the Porte, and Stephen Báthory had not hesitated to execute Podkova in order to satisfy the Sultan.

Now 12,000 Cossacks crossed the Pruth, defeated the Turks at Suceava and occupied Jassy; and their intervention was probably a decisive factor in Sigismund Báthory's great victory over the Turks at Mantin, and in Michael the Brave's defeat of Sinan Pasha at Bucarest. Sigismund III had been angered by the Emperor Rudolf's negotiations with the *Sech*, and by the probability that Austrian intrigues were promoting the opposition of the Orthodox nobility to the Union of the Churches which was then under discussion at Brest.

The gifted but half-insane Emperor was playing a fantastical game, for whilst he was pursuing a war against the Turks which was to end in the first definite check to their progress into Central Europe (Treaty of Zsitvatörök, 1606), he was attempting on the other hand to encourage the Orthodox nobility of the Little Russian provinces and the Cossacks against the Catholic Polish monarchy, and to use the brilliant but unstable force of Michael the Brave of Wallachia against the Báthorys in Protestant Transylvania. At the same time Michael, who for a few brief months made himself master of all the Roumanian-speaking lands, was hoping that the twin menace of Boris Godunov and the Ukrainian Cossacks would prevent the Poles from intervening in Moldavia, while the differences between the Habsburg and the Magyar magnates might give him Transylvania (where in 1599 his Cossack body-guard helped him to the victory of Schellenberg).

In the meantime the Poles had struck against the rising Cossack danger. During 1596 a peasant rising had broken out in the town and province of Bratslav. The bands of Nalivayko began to devastate Volhynia where they burnt Polish and Uniate estates, and completely ruined the lands of one of the principal sponsors of the Union of the Churches—the notorious evil-liver, Cyril Terlecki, Bishop of Lutsk. As the champion of Orthodoxy and the Russian-speaking peasantry, Nalivayko himself moved north, and took the towns of Slutsk, Bobruysk and Mohilev, devastating Polish estates and burning down Uniate churches on his line of march. At the same time, Loboda and his Cossacks were making themselves masters of eastern Volhynia and the Kiev region.

While landlords were in headlong flight from all their new lands in the south-east and panic was spreading throughout the country, a small Polish force under the celebrated commander Żółkiewski sought contact with the Cossacks. Nalivayko began to retreat towards the south in the direction of Uman, then turned north to join

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Loboda at Belaya Tserkov. Here the Cossacks formed their usual 175-* camp of wagons covering a formidable park of artillery, and Żółkiewski, after some fighting, was forced to retreat in the direction of approaching reinforcements.

Nalivayko and Loboda, however, did not find the support among the local population which they had recently enjoyed in Podolia and Volhynia. The local Cossacks, who were mostly 'registered', refrained from joining the rebels against the Government.

Nalivayko and Loboda now crossed to the left bank of the Dniepr and entered the Pereyaslavl lands. Żółkiewski moved in pursuit of them. The peasant population, fearing Polish reprisals, accompanied the Cossacks in the direction of the steppe, hindering their march and destroying their military formation. About 12,000 people, including women and children, left their homes to which they were never to return.

Żółkiewski succeeded in overtaking the Cossacks on the river Solonitsa, near Lubni, and surrounded their camp where, owing to the number of superfluous mouths, hunger broke out. Disagreement arose between Nalivayko and Loboda, in the course of which Loboda was killed. The Zaporogians, wishing to avenge his death, consented to the conditions of surrender proposed by Żółkiewski, which provided for the delivery of Nalivayko and all his artillery, upon which the rest were to be allowed to depart as free men. However, when twenty guns and the Hetman's symbolic staff (*bulava*) had been handed over, the Polish troops killed a large number of those who had surrendered. About 4000 Cossacks perished, and a still greater number of the refugees who had followed them into the steppe, including many women and children. Only 1500 Cossacks succeeded in reaching the *Sech*. Nalivayko was taken to Warsaw and put to the torture. A Ukrainian legend says that he was roasted in a brass bull, and another that he was put astride a red-hot iron horse. Actually he was quartered during the sitting of the *Seym* of 1597.(9, 10)

§ 6. THE COSSACKS A POWER ON THE BLACK SEA: SAMUEL KISHKA AND PETER SAHAYDACHNY

The same *Seym* of 1597 which condemned Nalivayko decided to make an end once and for all of the Cossacks and solemnly declared them to be 'enemies of the country'—*hostes patriae*. Orders were given to the Lithuanian Hetman Żółkiewski to exterminate them. That experienced commander, however, refused to move, for he realized the dangers and difficulties inherent in a campaign against the *Sech*. He preferred instead to conciliate the 'registered' Cossacks, who were

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*175 themselves anxious to prove their loyalty and to repudiate association with the leaders of the late rising. The 'registered' Cossacks were taking the lead in trying to eliminate the rebellious elements, and this conservative attitude justified Żółkiewski in refusing to interfere with them in spite of the fact that they had been legally dissolved. The flow of 'unregistered' Cossacks who had taken part in the rising to the regions beyond the cataracts only increased as a result of this policy, and new life came to the *Sech* when suddenly an old and popular leader, a Zaporogian named Samuel Kishka ('The Cat'), reappeared, after having made his escape from a long captivity in Turkey.

Hardly had the Polish *Seym* come to the drastic decision to exterminate the Cossacks, when difficulties abroad forced the King, Sigismund III Vasa, to seek Cossack military aid. In 1598 Sigismund, in an effort to establish his legitimate dynastic claim to the Swedish throne, was ignominiously driven out of Sweden by the Protestant party which supported his cousin, Charles, Duke of Sudermania. The possibility—based on the union of the crowns of Poland and Sweden on the head of Sigismund III as the heir both of the Jagiellons and the Vasas—of founding a dominant alliance of Sweden and Poland in Eastern Europe and the hope of carrying the Counter-Reformation into Scandinavia were lost, and Sweden and Poland became involved in a series of wars which were destined to prepare the way for the establishment of Muscovy as a Baltic and Black Sea power.

The dynastic feud between the Polish and the Swedish Vasas affected decisively the internal struggle in Russia, when the Time of Troubles opened in 1603. United under a single Vasa head the Poles and Swedes might have succeeded in annihilating the Muscovite monarchy, but as it was, the Swedish and Polish policies in the Russian civil war were opposed. While the Catholic Poles supported the False Dmitris and later Vladislav Vasa in an effort to fulfil the ancient dream of Vitovt and to establish a hegemony over the whole Eurasian Plain, the Protestant Swedes, temporarily masters of Novgorod, 'believed, for a moment, in the creation of a trans-Baltic dominion extending from Lake Ilmen northwards to Archangel and eastwards to Vologda', and maintained the pretensions of Vasili Shuyski.

In 1600, while Sigismund III was himself preoccupied with the Swedish war, his great chancellor John Zamojski, was pursuing a minor interest of his own in supporting the claims of his cousin Jeremy Movila to the Moldavian throne. The support of the Cossacks became a matter of importance both on the Baltic and in Moldavia,

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the more so since the Polish armed forces were largely maintained 175*
out of the privy purse of the King or out of the private fortunes of great military aristocrats like Zamojski, Żółkiewski and Chodkiewicz. The continual difficulty of extracting monies from the *Seym* to maintain the armed forces generally limited the army at the disposal of the crown, even in time of war, to twenty or thirty thousand men, and it was therefore convenient to resort to the Cossacks, who would fight 'for the love of fighting' and the remote hope of plunder.

When, in the year 1600, John Zamojski appealed to the *Sech* for help in Moldavia, Samuel Kishka persuaded the Cossacks not to go to the aid of those who had declared them 'outlaws'. A letter under the King's own hand failed to move Kishka unless 'all injustices towards the Cossacks ceased' and their former privileges were restored. The King gave all sorts of assurances and promised that at the next session of the *Seym* the measures instituted against the Cossacks should be formally repealed. Four thousand Cossacks then joined Zamojski in Moldavia, but it was only after the King's undertakings had been fulfilled at the session of the *Seym* of 1601, that the Cossacks rode north to join Chodkiewicz in Livonia where the strenuous—and victorious—campaign of 1601–2 awaited them. 'The Cat' himself was killed under the walls of Fellin.(11)

The occasion of the outbreak of civil war in Muscovite Russia in the year 1603 was the appearance of an individual who claimed to be Prince Dmitri, the younger son of Ivan IV, who had in fact probably been put to death as a boy in 1591 on the orders of Boris Godunov. The candidature of the False Dmitri became a private speculation of some of the great Russo-Lithuanian nobles like the Ostrozhskies, the Vishnevetskies, and the Sapiehas. But complicated historical issues were involved. Sigismund III himself was always an uneasy supporter of an adventure which was ultimately to prove disastrous to the Polish monarchy, but his son Vladislav dreamed dreams of empire and had a genius which might have attained their fulfilment, while the Jesuits aimed, both through Vladislav and through the gifted personality of the first False Dmitri, to secure a Latin-Polish hegemony in Muscovy and to attain the union of the Russian Orthodox Church with Rome. At the same time the Time of Troubles first unleashed the anarchic and terrifying strength of the Russian people which found expression, in the beginning in support of the first False Dmitri as a champion of the poor and an innovator and later in a popular revolution against the foreign invader.

It was natural that in the chaos of the Time of Troubles the turbulent and warlike population of the Polish Ukraine should take a

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*175 blood-stained part. Many Polish, Russo-Lithuanian and Ukrainian nobles were seeking their fortune in the army of the first False Dmitri. With them went numbers of the 'registered' Cossacks, and a far greater number of adventurers and landless men calling themselves Cossacks swarmed into the ranks of the pretender's army. Twelve thousand 'Zaporogian' Cossacks, of whom the majority had never been anywhere near the *Sech*, participated in the defeat of Boris Godunov's forces at Novgorod-Seversk. The Don Cossacks fought for the False Dmitri at Kromy. They had come, 6000 strong, 'to put him on the throne'. During the following years the number of armed men going over from the Ukraine into Muscovy grew in proportion to the growth of anarchy. About 30,000 of them fought under the Polish banners before Smolensk, and at least an equal number were scattered about the country in small detachments, plundering the towns and the rich monasteries and devastating the estates of the *boyars*. Much wealth had been accumulated in Muscovy in the period extending between the reigns of Ivan III and Boris Godunov. During the Time of Troubles it was all plundered, and a considerable part of it was carried into the Ukraine as well as to the Don. To distinguish them from the Don Cossacks, the Ukrainian Cossacks were called by the Muscovites 'Zaporogian Cherkasses'—'the Cherkasses (or Circassians) from beyond the Rapids'.(12)

The processes of civil anarchy in Russia and the vast loot acquired tended both to recruit with great rapidity the numbers of the 'unregistered' Cossacks and to increase the military and political importance of the *Sech*. In the decade between 1606 and 1616 the Zaporogian Cossacks assumed the initiative against the Crim Tartars and the Turks in a number of bold attacks on the Crimean peninsula and the coasts of Asia Minor.

In the year 1606 a flotilla of Cossack craft appeared off Varna, sank nine Turkish galleys and took the town and looted it. A large number of slaves were set free—not only Ukrainians, but also Hungarians, Poles and Germans.

In the winter of 1608–9 the Zaporogians took Perekop, and penetrated into the Crimean peninsula. During the same winter they burnt down the Turkish towns in the delta of the Danube—Kilia and Ismail. In these maritime exploits the Cossacks showed extraordinary ingenuity and courage. They succeeded in their light craft in gliding unseen past the Turkish forts at the mouth of the Dniepr which had been built for the purpose of checking their sorties into the Black Sea. The most difficult part of an expedition was often the return laden with booty, but generally this was happily achieved.

The most fantastic in their recklessness were the raids of the

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Zaporogians under their Hetman Peter Sahaydachny, who became one of the most celebrated figures in Cossack history.

In the year 1614 Sahaydachny appeared quite unexpectedly before the wealthy port of Sinope on the coast of Asia Minor. Sinope was looted, and the Turks could count their losses in millions of ducats. The Turkish fleet sent in pursuit of Sahaydachny did not succeed in overtaking him, and in the following year the light Cossack craft suddenly made their appearance in the Bosporus. Sultan Ahmet I suffered the humiliation of seeing with his own eyes smoke rising from the country-houses fired by the Cossacks in the immediate suburbs of Istanbul. On this occasion a Turkish squadron overtook the Cossack flotilla at the mouth of the Danube, but the Cossacks, taking advantage of a dark night, boarded the Turkish ships and captured their admiral. They then took the captured ships to the vicinity of the Turkish fortress of Ochakov, and maliciously burned them under the eyes of the garrison.

In the year 1616 Sahaydachny, in company with the Don Cossacks, undertook his famous expedition against the Crimean town of Caffa—the principal mart for the slaves captured by the Tartars on the Muscovite and Polish borders. About 14,000 Turks and Tartars perished, and thousands of Christian slaves recovered their liberty. In the same year Sahaydachny made a bold raid on Trebizond, and, before returning to the *Sech*, sailed along the coast of Asia Minor and again made his appearance in the vicinity of the Bosporus.(13, 14)

The fame of the Cossacks spread far and wide. They became the paladins of the Orthodox East, and their feats were bruited to Venice, Austria and Spain. It was with no exaggeration that Sahaydachny's friend whom he had made Metropolitan of Kiev, Job Boretsky, could write: 'When the Cossacks go to sea prayers are sent up to Heaven, for their first aim is to fight the Infidels in the name of the Christian Faith. Their second aim is to free captives. No one in the world showers such benefits on Christian captives as they do; not the Greeks with their ransoms, nor the King of Spain with his powerful fleet. How much have the Cossacks achieved owing to their courage and intentness of purpose? What with other nations ends only with fine words and high-flown speeches, the Cossacks put into action.'(15)

Peter Sahaydachny, with whose name are connected so many Cossack exploits, was from every point of view an extraordinary man. He was born at the town of Sambor in Galicia, and passed through Prince Constantine Ostrozhsky's Orthodox school at Ostrog before, owing to some unknown circumstances, he found his way to the Zaporogian *Sech*. Remarkable even among the Zaporogians

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*175 for his courage and ingenuity, he differed from most of them in his learning. His spectacular services soon caused the *Sech* to elect him as Hetman, and circumstances were such that the Polish Government had to recognize him also as chief of the 'registered' Cossacks. In this wise, in the person of Sahaydachny, the Poles first gave formal recognition to the principle of the unity of all the Ukrainian Cossacks which, up till that time, it had always refused to do.

The different *Seyms* during the second decade of the seventeenth century were still occupied in trying to find a solution of the Cossack question, and in 1614 a special commission was set up with Stanislas Żółkiewski at its head. The commission finally recognized the existence of the Zaporogian *Sech*. The Zaporogians were henceforth to be regarded as Cossacks in the King's service, and were allotted a remuneration as a corps of 10,000 gold pieces a year with a supply of cloth for their wear. The right of the Cossacks to self-government and to their own courts was recognized. Zaporogian administration was not admitted for 'town' Cossacks living on 'royal' territory, who were, however, allowed their own *starosty*. Those who were living on the estates of nobles continued to be considered as peasants.

The recommendations of the commission really remained in the domain of theory, since, in the year 1614, Sahaydachny was virtually ruler of all the Ukrainian Cossacks of the *Sech* and of the Dniepr region from Chigirin to Kiev and beyond the river. The situation could hardly be otherwise, when involved in war on the Baltic, in Muscovy and in Transylvania, the Polish King was under the necessity of constantly appealing to Sahaydachny for military help. In 1616 Sahaydachny went to the rescue of Vladislav Vasa, who had become involved in difficulties in his last Russian campaign; five years later, after the defeat and death of Żółkiewski at the hands of the Turks, Sahaydachny marched with a force of 42,000 men and thirty-two cannon to the relief of Vladislav Vasa and old Chodkiewicz who were surrounded by a large Turkish army at Khotin, and it was this Cossack intervention which brought about the discomfiture and retreat of Sultan Osman II.

Sahaydachny was successful in avoiding sharp conflicts with the Polish Government, which indeed valued him for his worth. At the same time he was not too popular among his own people, since he did not disguise his desire to enforce severe discipline in the 'free' Cossack community. For a short time he was deposed by the Zaporogian *Rada*, but he was restored to the post of Hetman at a difficult moment of the Khotin campaign. Some historians speak of his inclination towards Moscow, but others hasten to deny this. The Muscovite state which Sahaydachny knew and against which he had

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waged war in 1613 and 1616 was not such as could attract a Ukrainian leader in the struggle against Polish rule. Sahaydachny, on the other hand, with his leaning towards the Orthodox Church, may have looked forward to an eventual alliance of Kiev and Moscow against Warsaw. 175*

Sahaydachny was not only an outstanding military chieftain and the hero of legendary Cossack exploits. He led the struggle for the Orthodox Church with the same intelligence and boldness which he showed in his seafaring feats. It was on his initiative that the centre of Ukrainian Orthodoxy was removed from Lvov to Kiev so that it might be under the protection of 'Cossack sabres'. In Kiev was founded a strong 'Brotherhood' similar in character to that already existing in Lvov (1615), and an Orthodox school was established which soon became a college and later an academy. In the year 1617 the energetic *Igumen* of the Pecherskaya Lavra, Elisey Pleternetsky, set up a printing office where liturgical books, dictionaries and scientific and polemical books were published. A close friendship united Sahaydachny and the Rector of the Kiev College, Job Boretsky, and this remarkable son of the Orthodox Church was established by the Cossack Hetman as the 'secret' Metropolitan of Kiev.(16)

At this time the higher Orthodox hierarchs had been completely eclipsed by the Uniates. Out of ten Orthodox bishops only one had failed to recognize the Union, and the Metropolitan Photius was a Uniate. Sahaydachny decided to reinstate the higher Orthodox church administration. He took advantage of the passage through Kiev on his way from Moscow to Constantinople of the Patriarch Theophanes, and persuaded him to secretly ordain Job Boretsky as Kievan Metropolitan and to ordain also several Orthodox bishops. In order that the Patriarch might not be subsequently subjected to any offence from either Poles or Uniates, Sahaydachny ordered a whole regiment to escort him as far as the Moldavian frontier.

It was not the destiny of Sahaydachny to witness the further development of events when the Swedish and Muscovite wars came to an end for a short period and the Polish Government ceased to depend on the military collaboration of the Cossacks. Sahaydachny died from the consequences of a wound received at Khotin and was buried in the monastery of the 'Brotherhood' at Kiev. Ukrainians consider him with perfect justice to have been one of their most prominent men. Sahaydachny never came into conflict with the Polish Government; in his time the activities of the Cossacks were directed into other channels—either against the coasts of Turkey or against anarchic Muscovy in search of plunder, and the position of

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*175 the Polish Government was such that, instead of struggling to check the ever increasing force of the Cossacks, it was obliged to appeal to them for aid. As for Sahaydachny's protection of Orthodoxy, in his lifetime the intervention of the Cossacks in Church affairs had not yet become open. This intervention became open a few years after Sahaydachny's death, and then also became apparent the differences existing between the conditions under which the Cossacks wished to live and the conditions which the Polish crown desired to prescribe for them.

§7. LAST DECADES OF POLISH HEGEMONY: MICHAEL DOROSHENKO, SULIMA, PAVLUK

The growth of a spirit of independence in the Ukraine during the three decades between the death of Peter Sahaydachny and the revolt of Bohdan Khmelnytsky must be considered in relation to the contemporary state of the surrounding world.

Round the whole of the basin of the Black Sea, from the middle Danube to the Caucasus, imperial power, after the florescence of the first century of the Renaissance, was in temporary abeyance. The Habsburgs were involved in the struggle for power within Germanic Europe; Poland was seriously weakened by long and unlucky interventions in the politics of Sweden and Muscovy; and Muscovy was slowly and with difficulty recovering from the Time of Troubles; in the Ottoman Empire, where the events of the brief majority of Murad IV presaged the capacity for recovery which the Turks were to show under the Köprülü viziers in the sixties and seventies of the century, the brief revival of the thirties was directed almost entirely to the recovery from Iran of the conquests made by Shah Abbas I.

Over the vast belt of territory watered by the affluents of the Black Sea, from the middle Danube and the Tisza even to the Don and the Caucasian Rion, old peoples stirred to revival; new peoples began to become conscious of their being. It was natural that the streams of thought which ran counter to the imperial Renaissance should infuse the movements which were taking form. An insurgent Protestantism inspired the Transylvanian gentry as Gabriel Bethlen (1613–29) and George I Rákóczy (1629–48) strove to rebuild the Magyar kingdom a century after Mohács. The trampled splendours of Byzantine Orthodoxy haunted the day-dreams of the Roumanian Hospodars, Matthew Bassarab of Wallachia (1632–54) and Basil the Wolf (Vasile Lupu) of Moldavia (1634–53).

The growing wealth of the Orthodox communities in the Ottoman Empire, the influence of the Phanar in the court life of Istanbul

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and in the policies of the Porte, were significant currents in the contemporary life of the Balkan-Black Sea regions. Corrupt and unstable as they were, the princely régimes in the Roumanian principalities were the centre of the political hopes of the Orthodox Balkan Christians, and the Orthodox culture which was favoured by the princes (the worst of them were often patrons of painting and literature and builders of churches) was the only civilizing influence which could be opposed to the Latin-Catholic ambitions of the Poles and Jesuits. 175*

The relations between the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Moldavians had been intimate since the last quarter of the sixteenth century. One of the Movila princes sat as Metropolitan in Kiev; and there were two Cossack episodes in the chequered history of the succession to the Moldavian throne. The families of George Rákóczy, of Basil the Wolf and of the Hetman Khmelnytsky were allied by marriage. The astute Wolf, a typical 'character' of seventeenth-century Near Eastern history, who was regarded as 'Emperor' by the Orthodox population of Constantinople, was the leading diplomat of his day, and was always intervening—generally on behalf of the Porte—in the dynastic crises of the Girays in Baghchi-Saray and even in the affairs of the Don Cossacks (in 1642 he was sufficiently accommodating to send 3000 Moldavians to work on the rebuilding of the fortress of Azov for the Turks after its evacuation and destruction by the Don Cossacks).

Beyond the Dniestr, the Crim Tartars shared in the tendency to assert regional independence, and in 1624 one of the Girays, who subsequently expelled the Turkish garrison from Caffa, had sent a message to Istanbul that his house was more ancient than that of the Osmanli who ruled the 'womanish' Turks. Even in distant Georgia, ravaged by the invasions of Shah Abbas, the Imerian King, Alexander III, had begun to enjoy an unusually long reign and was astonishing Russian ambassadors and Capuchin friars by the wealth of his court in Kutais.

In the Ukraine and throughout the Russian Orthodox territories of *Rzecz Pospolita* the death of Peter Sahaydachny removed a wise and calculating head from the leadership of affairs. In the Polish *Seymy* which assembled in the years 1623 and 1625 very far-reaching demands were put forward by members of the Orthodox nobility. These demands, although they were never formulated in full, included (1) the abolition of the Union of the Churches, liberty of worship, and the recognition of Orthodox hierarchs ordained by the Patriarch of Constantinople, with the legalization of the 'brotherhoods' and schools founded by Sahaydachny; (2) special law courts

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*175 for Cossacks and mixed courts in cases of disagreement between Cossacks and other classes of the population; (3) the regularization of the position of the 'registered' Cossacks, and the liberty for the people to settle where they chose—which implied the removal of the restrictions on the migration of peasants; and (4) the recognition of the right of the Cossacks to take service with foreign states, with the recall of Polish garrisons from the Ukraine and their replacement by Cossack units.

In opposition to these demands, which threatened at once the supremacy of the Catholic Church and the privileges of the landowning class, Sigismund Augustus and his nobles for once found themselves in agreement; and the Orthodox leader, Laurence Drevinsky, went so far as to declare that while the King lived there was no hope for the Orthodox.

Conflicts between Orthodox and Uniate factions began in many parts of the Ukraine. In Kiev, attempts by the Polish soldiery to take possession of Orthodox churches and monasteries resulted in the killing of a Uniate priest and of a Polish official. The Metropolitan, Job Boretsky, and other bishops ordained by the Patriarch of Constantinople, were only safe under the protection of Cossack guards.

The Orthodox hierarchs made overt appeals to Moscow; Job Boretsky wrote to the young Tsar Michael Romanov that 'our only thought is to be taken under thy powerful hand. We have no one to turn to except thyself.' In 1625 delegates from the Ukrainian Cossacks made their first appearance as suppliants in the capital which little more than a decade before they had delighted to pillage.

Meanwhile, in 1624, Cossack detachments with the Nogay Tartars had helped a Giray pretender to evict the Sultan's nominee from Baghchi-Saray and to oust the Turkish garrison from the important slave port of Caffa. Another Cossack raid on the Bosporus further angered the Turks, and a Turkish squadron, after a hard-fought battle off Kara-Kerman on the Bessarabian coast, annihilated a Cossack raiding flotilla.

Embarrassed by Turkish complaints, Sigismund Augustus was moved to action; and the Crown Hetman Koniecpolski marched through the Ukraine with 8000 men. The Cossacks mustered a force of 30,000, and much confused fighting took place round the Kurukovo Lake (near the Dniepr opposite the modern town of Kremenchug). There were divisions between the prosperous element of 'registered' Cossacks and the ruck of the rebels, and finally, through the mediation of the former, peace was made with Koniecpolski.

The Kurukovo Agreement provided for an increase in the permitted number of 'registered' Cossacks to 5000, and lists of these

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men were to be handed to the Polish authorities within six weeks. 175 * The 'registered' Cossacks were confirmed in the right to choose their own Hetman, who was to undertake to prevent further raids against Turkey, to supervise the burning of all sea-going craft of the Zaporogians and to secure the surrender of their artillery. 'The illegally taken lands' were to be surrendered to the nobles, and all who wished to remain on them were to accept the obligations of serfs under Polish law.

The *Seym* of the year 1626 approved the Kurukovo Agreement, but neither the Polish Government nor the Hetman Michael Doroshenko proved able to carry it into effect.

In 1628 a Tartar raid into the Ukraine as far as Belaya Tserkov provoked Cossack reprisals. Michael Doroshenko crossed the Isthmus of Perekop and penetrated as far as Baghchi-Saray, where he was killed during the fighting. The Cossacks were able to pillage Caffa before they returned to the *Sech*.

The 'registered' Cossacks now elected a certain Chernoy as Hetman, but the Zaporogians found him too yielding to the Poles on Church matters; he was arrested and taken to the *Sech*, where he was tried and condemned to be quartered. The Zaporogians elected as Hetman an old warrior, Taras Fedorovich, and this event became the signal for a new rising.

The 'registered' Cossacks at first joined the Polish detachments near Korsun, but on the approach of the Zaporogians, whose numbers had been swollen by discontented townsfolk and many peasantry, they began to go over to the rebels.

The Polish Government now concerted measures with the Porte to check both the Cossacks and the Crim Tartars, who, in contrast to their alternate raids into the territories of the other, had already shown an alarming tendency to combine action as in the sack of Caffa in 1624. A treaty was formulated by Murtada Pasha, the new Vali of Ochakov, under which the Poles agreed to dissolve the *Sech* and to secure the return of all Muslim prisoners, while the Porte undertook to stop all raids into Polish territory. The Turks on their side drew off from the Crimea large numbers of Tartars for the war against Iran which had broken out in Georgia following the death of Shah Abbas. During the same year (1630) Koniecpolski again marched into the Ukraine, and after some indecisive fighting brought Taras Fedorovich to terms.

By the Pereyaslavl Agreement most of the terms of the Kurukovo Agreement were confirmed; but the numbers of the 'registered' Cossacks were increased to 8000.

The abortive character of the two risings of 1626 and 1628 had in

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*175 many ways strengthened the position of the Polish Government. The increases in the numbers of the 'registered' Cossacks at least enabled the Government to reinforce the element most inclined to favour the established order, and it tended at the same time to accentuate the division of the Cossack mass into two groups whose interests were often opposed. Not all sections of Cossacks and peasants had participated in the risings; but some of the most prominent of the Orthodox clergy had played a provocative hand. Men like Peter Movila (or Mohila), the princely Moldavian Archimandrite of the Pecherskaya Lavra, and Job Boretsky, whose son was a Cossack officer, were suspect (Antonovich).

The lack of a leader of parts, the reluctance of the 'registered' Cossacks to risk their growing prosperity in civil conflict, the absence of foreign aid—all these factors produced a feeling of discouragement in the Cossacks. The bishops who had placed their hopes on Tsar Michael Romanov could not but acknowledge to themselves that Muscovy had by no means recovered from the Time of Troubles. Gustavus Adolphus entered into relations with the Cossacks, but his death in 1632 deprived them of all immediate prospect of Swedish support.

After the death of Sigismund Augustus, his son was elected King of Poland as Vladislav IV by the *Seym* of the year 1632. 'After his cousin Gustavus Adolphus, whom in many respects he strikingly resembled, he was indubitably the most aimable and brilliant of all the princes of the House of Vasa' (Nisbet Bain). A veteran of the Muscovite wars and of the Khotin campaign, Vladislav was a gifted commander who enjoyed the admiration and respect of the Cossacks. His genius had conceived the union of the two Slavonic crowns under the Vasas, and in his willingness to conciliate the Orthodox Church he had displayed a certain liquidity of spirit in doctrinal matters which recalled the flippant opportunism of Henri IV.

In face of the opposition to the election of Vladislav, Cossack contingents entered Volhynia and quartered themselves on the estates of Polish magnates under pretext that they had come to give protection against a supposed Tartar raid.

Immediately following the election of Vladislav, freedom of confession was granted to Orthodox believers, and the right was conceded to build churches, and to found schools, hospitals, printing establishments and 'Brotherhoods'. The cathedral of St Sophia and the Pecherskaya Lavra were surrendered to the Orthodox Metropolitan in Kiev. In the Ukraine and White Russia four dioceses went over to the Orthodox, four remaining in the hands of the Uniate bishops. Peter Movila, a son of a Moldavian Hospodar and a suspect

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of the rising of 1628, was allowed to become Metropolitan on the death of Job Boretsky. A man of talent, who had acquired the Phanariot culture of the Roumanian courts and had studied in Paris, he continued to enjoy the respect of the people while he remained a willing collaborator of King Vladislav. In the newly established Academy of Kiev, which owed the origins of its foundation to Peter Sahaydachny, studies were undertaken, after the contemporary usage of the West, in Latin and Greek.

The Cossacks participated loyally in the successful Swedish and Russian campaigns with which Vladislav began his reign. Twenty thousand Cossacks joined the 8000 troops of the Polish King before Smolensk and assured his resounding victory over the Russians; and the Cossacks came down the Niemen to aid in the blockade of Königsberg.

The years of Vladislav's Russian and Swedish victories saw the resurgence of Ottoman power under the vigorous and ferocious young epileptic Murad IV. In the autumn of 1633 the redoubtable Abkhasian Abaza Pasha crossed the Dniestr to try conclusions with Koniecpolski at the head of an army recruited from the Tartars of the Crimea and the Nogays who had been settled in the previous decades in the coastal districts of southern Bessarabia, called by the Turks, Budzhak. Abaza met his match in Koniecpolski and the fighting was indecisive; in the following spring, while Vladislav was collecting an army in Lvov, Murad moved out to his war capital in Adrianople. But the trial of strength between the royal paladins of the Christian and Islamic worlds did not come to pass. A magnificent Polish embassy was received in Istanbul and the Treaty of Murtada Pasha was renewed; Murad marched into Asia to the bloody conquest of Erivan and Tabriz.

The result of the Turko-Polish treaty was a renewed effort on the part of Koniecpolski to establish order in the borderland. He engaged the French engineer, Beauplan, author of *Description de l'Ukraine*, to construct the fort of Kudak which was planned to interrupt the communications of the *Sech* with the rest of the Ukraine.

This move was the occasion for a renewal of the Cossack revolts. The Zaporogian Hetman, Ivan Sulima, took Kudak by a surprise attack and destroyed its fortifications to the foundations. Sulima then marched against the Poles, capturing on his route the towns of Chigirin, Cherkassy and Korsun. Koniecpolski met him with an army which included a large number of 'registered' Cossacks who were veterans of the recent Swedish campaigns on the Baltic. These latter, desiring to avoid an issue with the Poles, took Sulima by ruse and delivered him who was considered as 'the flower of Cossack

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*175 chivalry' to Koniecpolski. Sulima and other leading Zaporogians were taken to Warsaw, where the old Hetman was beheaded. Taking advantage of the moment which seemed propitious, Koniecpolski decided to consolidate the organization of the 'registered' Cossacks. Seven regiments were formed numbering a thousand men each, divided into *sotni* ('hundreds'); of these five were posted on the right bank of the Dniepr (the Belaya Tserkov, Kanev, Cherkassy, Korsun and Chigirin regiments) and two on the left bank (the Pereyaslavl and Mirgorod regiments).

The spirit of the Cossacks was not yet broken. In the Warsaw prison with Ivan Sulima had been incarcerated his 'adopted brother', the Zaporogian Pavluk, who managed to return to the *Sech* swearing to avenge old Sulima. Pavluk was elected Hetman and he immediately began to prepare a new rising. He called to his aid the Crim Tartars and the Don Cossacks. But the moment was unlucky. Both the Tartars and the Don Cossacks were engaged on opposing sides in the epic battles round Azov where, during the years 1637 to 1641, no less than three powerful Turkish expeditions were despatched to evict the Cossacks from the former Turkish stronghold which dominated the mouth of the Don. Four thousand Zaporogians, the best fighting men of the *Sech*, had gone to the Don to help their 'brothers'.

Pavluk moved into the Ukraine, taking the towns of Korsun and Cherkassy and capturing the artillery park of the 'registered' Cossacks, whose *starosty* he arrested and executed for 'treason'. A part of the 'registered' Cossacks went over to Pavluk, but others joined the Polish Crown Hetman Potocki.

Pavluk published a 'Universal' addressed to all Cossacks; many peasants joined him, while bands burned down Polish and Uniates' manors and slaughtered landlords and their families. Pavluk's army amounted to 23,000 men, but of these 17,000 were peasants armed only with scythes, pitchforks and sticks.

Potocki, with Polish troops and part of the 'registered' Cossacks, came in contact with the rebels near Kumeyki in the vicinity of Cherkassy. The Zaporogians and the peasants fought bravely, but the Polish cavalry penetrated their front, and over 6000 of the rebels were cut down. Pavluk and his lieutenant Gunya succeeded in retreating with their cannon to the village of Borovitsa near Chigirin, where they fortified their camp. But as in the retreat of Nalivayko and Loboda forty years before, the camp became crowded with the families of fleeing peasants and of the frightened townsfolk of Cherkassy. Further resistance became impossible. Potocki proposed surrender and promised quarter if the leaders were delivered up to

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him. Pavluk made a speech to the Zaporogians and himself asked to be surrendered to the Poles; while the 'registered' Cossacks on the Polish side guaranteed his life. 175-X

Potocki, however, behaved with a ruthlessness which had never been displayed by the veteran Koniecpolski, who had spent his whole life in fighting the Cossacks. Pavluk and other Zaporogians were executed immediately after the surrender. Potocki then crossed the Dniepr, where along the left bank in the Pereyaslavl and Poltava regions nearly the whole of the peasantry had risen in revolt, and he proceeded to decorate the roads with stakes on which, after the Turkish fashion, rebels were impaled.

Potocki now prepared for operations against the *Sech* itself. As successor to Pavluk, the Cossacks had elected Hetman Ostranitsa, a colonel of the 'registered' Cossacks. Ostranitsa won a first fight against Potocki at Goltva on the Psiol, but, when the Poles were reinforced, he was badly defeated at Lubni. Ostranitsa, with a few comrades, left his camp and went eastward into the steppe—into that '*Slobodskaya* or new Ukraine' (in the region of modern Kharkov) which was at that time being populated by fugitives from the Polish Ukraine and the Seversk lands.

Gunya, who had taken command after the flight of Ostranitsa, surrendered in the end and received an amnesty.

The rising of 1637–8 had both frightened the Polish Government and inspired in it a certain optimism. The Poles had been frightened by the adherence of the mass of the peasantry to the Zaporogians—particularly on the left bank of the Dniepr. The majority of the 'registered' Cossacks had, however, remained loyal to the Government, and had both helped Potocki to put down the rising and participated in his reprisals against the peasantry. It was decided therefore to allow the organization of the 'registered' Cossacks to continue, but to diminish their number to 6000 and to maintain only three Cossack regiments—those of Chigirin, Korsun and Cherkassy. The Cossack rights of election and self-administration were abolished; colonels were chosen by Potocki from among the local nobility, and the loyalty of junior officers was submitted to severe tests. The rest of the inhabitants of the Ukraine were to be treated as peasants, and in order that they should not be able to escape to the *Sech* the fort of Kudak was rebuilt and provided with a standing garrison and artillery. The *Sech* henceforth ceased to be a safe refuge from the authority of Polish officials. Fugitives had to follow the example of Ostranitsa and go eastward into the steppe. The position of the peasants became intolerable. The lands which had been confiscated from those of the 'registered' Cossacks who had

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*175 participated in the rising were given to Polish 'undertaking' landlords, who in their turn often leased them to Jews. There were many cases where even Orthodox churches on the estates of Polish landlords were leased to Jews, who would charge the villagers a substantial fee before they would allow them to celebrate divine service therein. (17,18)

§8. 'THE DELUGE': VLADISLAV IV AND BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY

The calamitous period remembered in Polish history as 'The Deluge' opened with the great Cossack rising of 1648 and was continued by the invasions of the Swedes, the Transylvanians and the Russians.

This period in Polish history is in many ways comparable to the Time of Troubles in Russia. But whereas the Time of Troubles saw the birth pangs of the Russian state, the Deluge foreshadowed the imminent death of that strange anarchic oligarchy which was *Rzecz Pospolita*.

The nineteen years of the Deluge between 1648 and 1667 may also be characterized as the second period of crisis in the struggle between Poles and Russians for hegemony over the fluvial network which constitutes the geographical unity of the Great Eurasian Plain. In the first period of crisis (1603–13) the Poles were making a national effort to establish their dominance over Muscovy, and the Polish Vasas were pursuing their dream of a union of the two Slavonic crowns. In the second period of crisis, Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich, with more prudence and more sense of the processes of history, was content to consolidate the primacy of Muscovy and to reduce the Polish realm to a condition of weakness which during the following century became one of lingering decline. In each period of crisis Sweden was at once the partner and the rival of the aggressive power. But while Charles IX pursued the comparatively limited aims of acquiring territory on the east Baltic littoral and of preventing the stabilization of Polish hegemony in Moscow, Charles X, by joining in the attack on Poland, cast down *Rzecz Pospolita* to the ultimate profit of the Great Elector in East Prussia and of the Muscovites in White Russia and the Ukraine.

The seventeenth century in Eastern Europe has already been described as a period of growing national consciousness among the peoples, old and new, who found themselves on the peripheries of the great Renaissance states—Turkey, Austria, Poland and Muscovy. Influences of the Reformation, strong in Hungary, varied but sterile

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in Poland, remote in Muscovy in the sect of Judaizers; the tenacious traditionalism of the Eastern Church, reborn with some brilliance in the Greek and Roumanian lands, sturdy and turbulent among the Ukrainian peasantry, dark and mystical among the Russian sectaries; the yearning for justice and freedom which found expression in the frequent *jacqueries* in the Ukraine and in Muscovy during the Time of Troubles—all these factors combined to make up the background of the political and military struggles of the epoch. 175 *

Above all, the gradual disruption of the Polish and Ottoman state structures was characterized by the development of groups and movements whose nature was purely anarchic. The Cossacks of the Dniepr and the Don with an economy based on piracy, the Budzhak and Crim Tartars with their land-raiding and slave-hunting economy, were manifestations of the social phenomenon which Professor Toynbee has described as 'the external proletariat'. Comparably, proletarian movements, internal in operation and contemporary with the great Ukrainian 'peasants' fury' of 1648–51, were the popular Anatolian risings of the two Abazas (1623–4 and 1656) and the celebrated revolt of Stenka Razin on the Volga (1670).

The history of the Deluge of 1648 possesses all the classic features of the disintegration of a state structure which had not been adapted to the social realities of the epoch and of the savage swarming of a submerged proletariat.

Vladislav IV, the brilliant hero of the Muscovite, Swedish and Turkish wars, had become in middle life a weary and sophisticated Machiavellian. He had conceived, not without reason, that the only hope of reforming the Polish state lay in a royalist reaction. In his Order of the Immaculate Conception he had formed a knighthood of seventy-two young Polish nobles who had sworn a special oath of allegiance to the crown and who were to form the core of a national movement hostile to the anarchic usurpations of the *Seym*. He further planned to make the Cossacks the instrument of his reforms, and to use a Cossack army against the *Seym* much as ten years before Strafford had thought to use an Irish army to uphold the prerogatives of the crown against the oligarchs of the English Parliament.

Vladislav's plans were based upon the knowledge of his personal popularity with the Cossacks, and upon the secret collaboration of Koniecpolski, who knew the Cossacks better than any man alive. 'Vladislav proposed to provoke the Tartars to a rupture by repudiating the humiliating tribute with which the Republic had so long and so vainly endeavoured to buy off their incessant raids. In case of such rupture, he meant, at the head of 100,000 Cossacks, to fall upon

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*175 the Crimea itself, the seat of their power, and to exterminate the Khanate. This he calculated would bring about a retaliatory invasion of Poland by the Turks, which would justify him in taking the field against them also with all the forces of the Republic. In case of success he would be able to impose the will of a victorious king upon the discredited *Seym*, and reform the constitution on an English or Swedish model. Events seemed at first to favour this audacious speculation. Almost simultaneously a civil war broke out in the Crimea and the Porte declared war against the Venetian Republic, with which Vladislav at once concluded an offensive and defensive alliance (1645). He then bade the Cossacks prepare their boats for a raid upon the Turkish galleys, and secured the co-operation of the Tsar in the Crimean expedition by a special treaty. Unfortunately, Venice insisted on the publication of Vladislav's anti-Turkish alliance; the Porte, well informed of the course of Polish affairs, remained strictly neutral despite the most outrageous provocations; and Vladislav, bound by his coronation oath not to undertake an offensive war, found himself at the mercy of the *Seym*, which, full of consternation and rage, assembled at Warsaw on 2 May 1647. The Venetian alliance was repudiated and the royal power still further reduced' (David Hannay, *Encyc. Brit.* 11th ed.).

Koniecpolski was already dead, after a last victory over the Tartars at Brody (1646). The King did not long survive discomfiture at the hands of the outraged *Seym*, for he died at his hunting lodge of Merecz on 20 May 1648. But he had conjured up a storm which it is doubtful whether even he could have controlled, and which three weeks before he died had already broken over the heads of those who had thwarted and defeated his designs.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky was the first leader of genius whom the Cossacks had found since Peter Sahaydachny. He was a strange contrast both to the good and sagacious Sahaydachny and to the dying scion of the Vasas and the Habsburgs. 'With all his native ability Khmelnytsky was but an eminent savage. He was the creature of every passing mood or whim, incapable of cool or steady judgment or the slightest self-control—an incalculable weather-cock, blindly obsequious to every blast of passion. He could destroy, but he could not create, and other people benefited by his exploits' (Nisbet Bain).

Bohdan Khmelnytsky came of a family of the lesser nobility of Volhynia; his father had been a 'registered' Cossack who had tried his fortune in the *Sech* and had been killed during Chodkiewicz's disastrous Cecora campaign. About the same time the younger Khmelnytsky had fallen into the hands of the Crim Tartars, from whom he had been later ransomed. He became a unior officer in

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the Chigirin regiment, and inherited the enjoyment of the small hereditary estate of Subbotovo. He attracted the notice of King Vladislav during the Russian war of the early thirties, and at the time of Pavluk's rising occupied the responsible administrative post of *pysar* or 'general secretary' of the Chigirin regiment. A man of some education, Khmelnytsky had passed through a school of one of the Orthodox 'brotherhoods' and had continued his studies at the Jesuits' school at Yaroslav in Galicia. His knowledge of the world was further expanded when he was appointed to command a Cossack contingent which King Vladislav had hired to the Government of Cardinal Richelieu, and he took part in the operations against the Spaniards in Flanders and in the siege of Dunkirk. Khmelnytsky was essentially a 'King's man' and a member of the small nobility, and even when he became leader of the Cossack revolutionary movement he retained the sentiments and prejudices of his caste.

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That a man of Khmelnytsky's record and environment should have been converted into an inveterate enemy of the Polish state well illustrates the shortcomings of the Polish 'ascendancy' in the Ukraine, since the injustices inflicted on Khmelnytsky were only typical of hundreds of similar cases throughout the country during the first half of the seventeenth century. Khmelnytsky came into conflict with one Czapliński, the Polish *pod-starosta* of Chigirin. Some property was in question, and also the possession of Khmelnytsky's beautiful Cossack mistress whom he intended to marry after the death of his wife. Legal proceedings were dragging on, until, taking advantage of the absence of Khmelnytsky, Czapliński sent his men to Subbotovo, where they seized the land in dispute, ravaged the rest of the property, kidnapped the lady and thrashed to death a small son of the *pysar*. Even a man of Khmelnytsky's weight could obtain no redress, either in the local courts or before the Senate in Warsaw—where he was laughed at and told to forget about the estate and to find another beauty.

Khmelnytsky made a personal appeal to the King. Vladislav was already planning to use a Cossack army against the factious *szlachta*, and he is stated by some Polish historians to have reminded his outraged official that 'Cossacks have sabres' (Khmelnytsky had a sabre which the King had presented to him during the Smolensk campaign).

Khmelnytsky returned to the Ukraine, where he took part in Koniecpolski's operations against the Tartars in 1646—operations which were cut short by a decree of the *Seym* which refused to sanction the continuance of what was in fact a defensive campaign. As a 'King's man' and a Cossack, Khmelnytsky was doubly suspect, and

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*175 in the autumn of 1646, after some conversations with the Cossack *starosty*, he was forced to go into hiding.

The exposure of the King's plans in the *Seym* of May 1647 made the position of Khmelnytsky even more desperate. Whether or not the King was privy to his movements, Khmelnytsky now appeared in the *Sech* with an alleged 'writing from King Vladislav'.

The Zaporogian *Sech* had been reduced to a state of complete decadence. Only three hundred Cossacks remained there in the pay of the Polish crown, and Polish guards were posted on the Island of Khortytsa. But the vigorous personality of the distinguished fugitive soon brought the Wilderness to life around the *Sech* and along both banks of the Dniepr. Men began to appear who had been in hiding among the countless islets of the great river; others came in from the steppe on the right bank—called *Velyky Luh* ('the Great Meadow'); and many swarmed in who had gone far to the east of the Dniepr. By the early spring of 1648 Khmelnytsky had gathered several thousand men round him; muskets and gunpowder appeared, and the Cossack cannon, buried in the sands of the river since the days of Pavluk and Ostranitsa, saw the light of day again.(19,20)

During the month of March, the Polish *voyevode* in Bratslav, Adam Kysil, himself an Orthodox Ukrainian by birth, wrote contemptuously to warn Prince Dolgoruki, the Muscovite marcher *voyevode* in Putivl, that 'a certain number, a thousand or more, of self-willed Cossack Cherkasses have escaped to the *Sech* and their leader is a common menial, by name Khmelnytsky', and he requested the Russians, 'should Khmelnytsky escape from the Zaporogian *Sech* to the Don, not to receive him there, not to show him mercy, and not to allow him to go to sea'.

In April Kysil wrote again to inform Dolgoruki that 'should this menial of ours, the Cherkass traitor and his troop, not escape to the Crimea, he will have to pay with his head for his treason, as our army is marching in pursuit of him through the *Velyky Luh* to the Dniepr'.

Meanwhile, Khmelnytsky had proceeded with confidence and caution. While his men took possession of the fort of Kudak by a surprise attack, he himself went to the Crimea to seek the help of the Khan, Islam Giray III. While the Khan still hesitated, the Nogay *Mirza* Tugay Bey, the half-independent chieftain of the Budzhak Tartars, joined the insurgent Zaporogians with 4000 horsemen.

At the beginning of April, on his return to the *Sech*, Khmelnytsky called for war on the Poles, and was acclaimed Hetman.

At Korsun, the Crown Hetman, Stephen Potocki, had concentrated 30,000 men, and was preparing to crush the rising in the

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Sech before the rebels had time to raid into the populated parts of the Ukraine. Barabash, the official Hetman of the Cossacks, was descending the Dniepr with 6000 'registered' Cossacks in boats, to join the royal forces. 175*

In the third week of May Potocki sent forward a corps of 12,000 men into the *Velyky Luh* to meet Khmelnytsky. So certain was the Crown Hetman of an easy victory that he had confided the command to his son in order that he might distinguish himself. But while a Zaporogian band intercepted the 'registered' Cossacks on the river and persuaded them to join forces with the insurgents (the Hetman Barabash being thrown into the water), on May 19 Khmelnytsky attacked Stephen Potocki on the Zhovti (Zhëltÿa) Vody ('Yellow Waters'). The Polish force was taken in front by the Zaporogians and in rear by the Budzhak Tartars, and absolutely annihilated except for one man who escaped with the news to Korsun—where he was at first taken for a madman.

Reinforced by the 'registered' Cossacks, Khmelnytsky advanced on Korsun, while the whole countryside rose in the Crown Hetman's rear. Potocki, in this difficult situation, lost his head and began to retreat; but on 28 May he was overtaken by the Cossacks at Kruta Balka ('Steep Ravine') and suffered an overwhelming defeat. Seven thousand Poles were killed and 9000 taken prisoner; only 2000 cavalry made good their escape. Potocki himself was handed over as a gift to the Tartar Khan and sent in chains to the Crimea, where he was held against a fabulous ransom.

With the news of Khmelnytsky's victories, revolts broke out everywhere throughout the Ukraine. The whole of the region along the right bank of the Dniepr, and all the lands situated along the left bank from Pereyaslavl to Poltava, were swept clean of nobles and of the small detachments of regular Polish troops in an incredibly short space of time. Khmelnytsky showed himself as able a tactician in revolt as he had been in battle. While a great Cossack army was in course of formation at Belaya Tserkov, small detachments of Zaporogians were sent into those districts where Polish landlordism was comparatively firmly established in order to foment revolt among the peasantry. Famous Zaporogian 'colonels' like Bohun, Nechay, Ganza, Perebeynos ('Broken-Nose') and Morozenko penetrated into the Bratslav region and Podolia. Other bands moved into the districts of Nezhin, Chernigov and Novgorod Seversk where—after the re-annexation to Poland of the Seversk lands—Polish landlordism had had a rapid development under the protection of garrisons of regular troops. By July the whole of the Seversk lands from Nezhin to Starodub and Novgorod Seversk had been 'liberated'.

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*175 The slaughter, arson and terror of 'the serfs' fury' (*kklopskaya zloba*) spread throughout the country. Everywhere landlords, Catholic and Uniate priests and Jews were hunted down and blinded, burnt, decapitated or sawn between boards. The rebels took the castle of Bar by storm and put to the sword the thousands of Poles and Jews who had taken refuge there. In Volhynia Prince Jeremy Vishnevetsky was perpetrating reprisals against the peasants with an equal ruthlessness. Executions were carried out in his presence, and he was in the habit of shouting to the executioners—'Let them feel that they are being put to death!' The Zaporogian answer to Vishnevetsky was to slaughter all the nobles, priests and Jews who had fallen into their hands. Near Tulchin, Prince Janus Chetvertinsky was beheaded by his own miller and his wife was raped by the Zaporogian Ostap.

By the end of the summer a new Polish army, 40,000 strong with 100 guns, had been collected on the borders of Galicia and Volhynia to defend the home territories of the Republic against the advancing Cossack horde. The Polish army consisted almost entirely of the noble militia, and was tricked out with a splendour more befitting a bridal pageant than a battle array. For Khmelnytsky and his host these splendid cavaliers expressed the utmost contempt. 'This rabble must be chased with whips, not smitten with swords', they cried. The Polish chivalry were stiffened by a force of German mercenaries; but after a three days' battle near Pilyavtsy the last grand display of the glories of the feudal Republic was scattered to the winds. 'The steppe for miles around was strewn with corpses, and the Cossacks are said to have reaped 10,000,000 guldens worth of booty when the fight was over.'

With its army broken and in flight, the Republic now lay at the mercy of the Cossack Hetman. The Russian peasantry of Galicia rose in revolt, and Khmelnytsky entered Lvov, the ancient capital of the West Russian princes. Cossack bands scattered northwards into the countryside of White Russia and Lithuania, while Khmelnytsky himself laid siege to the fortress of Zamość. But the brilliant commander and astute revolutionary proved to be no statesman. Indeed, a strange spiritual struggle appears to have disturbed the mind of Khmelnytsky during the months before Zamość. The former 'King's man', the petty landowner and easy living gentleman of the days before the Czapliński episode, appears to have been, if not appalled at the enormity of the calamity which he had brought down upon his own world, at least desirous of checking the social implications of the Deluge. His environmental inhibitions corresponded with the direction of his personal ambition. There is a flavour of 'M'lord protests

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too much" in his rhetorical declaration to the Polish peace commissioners that he did not propose to betray the interests of the peasants. 175

While Khmelnytsky delayed before Zamość and the Zaporogians urged him to march to Warsaw, where in the Square of Stare Miasto so many Cossack heads had fallen in the dust—Podkova's, Nalivayko's, Pavluk's, Sulima's—the *Seym* was gathered for the election of a successor to Vladislav IV. To Khmelnytsky, who had spent all his life in the Polish service, the event was one of supreme importance, and he was greatly flattered when emissaries arrived to consult his wishes, since it was considered that the result of the election depended upon him. Khmelnytsky gave his support to John Casimir, Vladislav's younger brother, who had not appeared to have any chance of election since he had accepted a cardinal's hat. But the Pope absolved him from his vows and the last King of the house of Vasa ascended the throne with the support of the Cossack army (the new King immediately married Vladislav's widow, Marie Louise of Angoulême).

The Crim Tartars were dismissed to the Crimea loaded with booty, and the Cossack regiments, now excellently armed and under strict military discipline, began to march back through Volhynia to the Dniepr. In October, at the head of his own Chigirin regiment, mounted on a white charger and arrayed in cloth of gold, Bohdan Khmelnytsky entered Kiev—acclaimed as 'the father and the liberator of the country and the people'.(19,20,21)

§9. 'THE DELUGE': BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY AND TSAR ALEXEY MIKHAILOVICH

Bohdan Khmelnytsky spent the turn of the year 1648–9 at Pereyaslavl celebrating his marriage with the beautiful mistress who had been the cause of his feud with Czapliński. He delighted to entertain at alternate feasts the peace commissioners sent by King John Casimir, with Adam Kysil at their head, the ambassadors of the Muscovite Tsar, and the envoys of the ambitious Transylvanian Prince George II Rákóczy.

The pallid and mediocre personality of John Casimir, though it was to rise to a certain heroism in the following years, lacked the vision and the capacity for sympathy of Vladislav IV. The atmosphere which had won him the support of Khmelnytsky in his candidature for the throne was conducive to a settlement which might have retained the connection between the Ukraine and the Polish state. Khmelnytsky was in relations with both Moscow and Istanbul,

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*175 but the terms which he put forward showed that he had no ambition to sever the Ukraine from Poland and to exchange a master whom he had beaten in the field for a new and untried overlord.

Khmelnytsky demanded the abolition of the Union of the Churches in the Kiev region and on the left bank of the Dniepr; seats in the Polish *Seym* for the Metropolitan of Kiev and all the Orthodox bishops; the promise that Jeremy Vishnevetsky should resign the office of Crown Hetman; the formation, by Whitsuntide, of a commission which was to agree on the number of 'registered' Cossacks and allot to them definite territories; until then Polish troops were not to pass the line Kamenets-Podolsk-river Goryn-river Pripet.

Adam Kysil brought only from the King the *Bulava* or Hetman's Staff and proposals which amounted to an assumption of the restoration of the old order of things with the concession that the number of 'registered' Cossacks should be increased to 15,000.

Standing in a red cloak trimmed with sables, the Hetman received the Polish delegation with every sign of honour and respect, but when Adam Kysil somewhat tactlessly recalled that he himself was a Ukrainian and a member of the Orthodox Church, saying: 'I am flesh of your flesh and bone of your bone', Khmelnytsky gave vent to one of his bursts of ferocious anger. 'The bones are ours, perhaps', he shouted, 'but they are overgrown with Polish flesh.' He continued to declaim: 'I will do as I think best. At first I fought to avenge my personal insult, but now I fight for the Orthodox faith. The whole land from Lublin to Cracow will be subject to my will. I will no longer fight Tartars and Turks; enough for me of Volhynia and Podolia. I will take everything—Lvov and Halych. And on the Vistula I will proclaim to the Poles: "Stay where you are and keep your mouths shut." I will drive all the princes and dukes beyond the Vistula, and if they dare to stir, my will shall reach them wherever they are.'

Adam Kysil returned to Warsaw with the demands of the Hetman which, imperious as they were, were not so immoderate as to have failed to suggest a basis of negotiation to men of the experience and wisdom of Vladislav IV and Stanislas Koniecpolski. But the new King was weak and obstinate and the Crown Hetman, Jeremy Vishnevetsky, was a truculent hater. The demands to such characters provoked refusal, and not only war but the separation of the Ukraine from Poland became inevitable.(22)

John Casimir had levied by the spring of 1649 a formidable army which amounted to some 70,000 men; the Hetman, cautious and impulsive by turns, was uncertain of his position and was negotiating

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for foreign support. In Istanbul, the new Sultan, Muhammad IV, was only eight years old and his grandmother, the Sultana Validé Kosem, was struggling against Sipahi mutinies, street riots and palace plots. The long Cretan War with Venice was exhausting the resources of the Empire, and seven years were to pass before the first Köprülü Vizier was to initiate an aggressive policy on the European frontiers. With the returning Muscovite ambassadors Khmelnytsky despatched his confidant, the Cossack Colonel Theodore Vesnyak, with the gift of a fine horse and a Turkish bow for the young Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich. Vesnyak urged that the propitious moment had arrived for the recovery of Smolensk and the conquest of White Russia.

That a man of the gentleness and patience of Alexey Mikhailovich should have successfully ruled Russia during the turbulent decades of the mid-seventeenth century proves perhaps the practical effectiveness of the Christian ethic in human relations. The mild Tsar had a gift for choosing men; and a succession of capable and gifted ministers—the Patriarch Nikon, Ordyn-Nashchokin, Matveyev—were guiding Russia from the anarchy of the Time of Troubles into the imperial destiny of the eighteenth century. But in 1649 the Muscovite state was in no condition to undertake foreign adventure. Agrarian and religious disorders were rife throughout the country. In the preceding year the Tsar had only himself escaped the violence of the Moscow mob by surrendering some of his officials. There had been dangerous riots in Novgorod, Sol'vychegodsk—seat of the princely merchant house of Stroganov—and in Ustyug. In Pskov rebels had successfully withstood a three months' siege and exacted an amnesty from the Government. The Moscow court had little sympathy for the Cossacks whose excesses during the Time of Troubles were still bitterly remembered; in 1642 the Moscow *Zemski Sobor* had compelled Tsar Michael Romanov to repudiate the Don Cossacks when they had sought his aid to hold Azov against the Turks. And Tsar and *boyars* alike condemned movements against a crown; the execution of Charles I in England was fresh news in Moscow when Vesnyak rode in with the ambassadors from Pereyaslavl, and the Tsar had ordered the rupture of all commercial relations with the regicide Commonwealth.

With no ally but the Tartar Islam Khan Giray, Khmelnytsky moved into Poland in the month of March to measure his strength with John Casimir. The seventeenth century saw the growth of large armies first in the Great Eurasian Plain—owing to the relatively great numbers and restlessness of the indigenous populations; and the Hetman was at the head of a host of 320,000 men—composed

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*175 of Crim and Budzhak Tartars, great herds of undisciplined peasants, and rather less than 100,000 Cossacks.

The Polish forces, numbering about 70,000 men, were divided into two armies—under the King and the Crown Hetman Jeremy Vishnevetsky—which occupied positions in two fortified camps at Zborov and Zbarazh. Vishnevetsky's bold sallies out of the camp of Zbarazh ended in failure, but he continued to hold his lines although his troops were suffering cruelly from hunger. John Casimir was blockaded in the Zborov camp, but Khmelnytsky only passively continued the siege, as though reluctant to force any decisive action which might place his King as a prisoner in his hands. At the same time secret *pourparlers* for a peace were being carried on. These *pourparlers* were advanced when Islam Giray, either weary of the inactive siege or bribed by the Poles, drew off his men. In the end the Zbarazh camp surrendered and the so-called Zborov Agreement was concluded between Khmelnytsky and the King.

'This agreement was made exclusively in the interests of the Cossacks. All the privileges they had ever possessed were recognized. The number of "registered" Cossacks was raised to 40,000. Three *voyevodstva*, Kiev, Chernigov and Bratslav, were cleared of Polish garrisons. The Orthodox dioceses were recognized and the Orthodox hierarchs were given the right to sit in the *Seym*. The administration continued to be Polish as before, but it was to be formed from the local inhabitants who were members of the Orthodox Church. Chigirin and its district became the appanage of the *Bulava* (the Hetman's ceremonial Staff of Office)—in other words was given to the Hetman as his own property. Not a word was said about the peasants, and the estates of the nobles were restored to them. In this fashion, Galicia, Volhynia and Podolia were given back into the hands of the Polish nobility. The Cossacks were limited in their number, which was not to be exceeded by anyone wishing to be put down on their lists' (Antonovich).

Ukrainian historians have condemned Khmelnytsky for the Zborov Agreement, but it is unscientific to judge the men and actions of the seventeenth century on the basis of the social philosophy and standards of the twentieth century. Khmelnytsky was a Cossack officer and a member of the lesser nobility living in a period when the rights of the submerged agrarian population of Europe were scarcely comprehended by the finest minds of the day. Khmelnytsky secured the interests of his own class, peace, and his own personal position; more sophisticated and more modern statesmen have often gone no further. But events, as ever, moved more rapidly than either ambitious men or fine minds.

'For the next eighteen months Khmelnytsky ruled the Ukraine like a sovereign prince. He made Chigirin, his native place, the Cossack capital, subdivided the country into sixteen provinces, and entered into direct relations with foreign powers.' But his position was a difficult one. He was unable to limit the numbers of the Cossacks to be registered to 40,000, when all the 300,000 Ukrainians who had been encamped before Zbarazh and Zborov considered that they had acquired the right to call themselves Cossacks. He essayed a compromise by allowing each 'registered' Cossack family to inscribe 'helpers', so that it became possible to include about 200,000 men in the lists. But the arrangement did not please the Polish Government. On the other hand the peasants bitterly resented the return of landlords to their estates, and Khmelnytsky found himself drifting into an increasingly false position. 175 *

In October 1650 the Muscovite agent Unkovski could write that 'The Hetman receives former retainers of Prince Vishnevetsky and of the Lubni *starosta* Nagorecki and also many other Poles—retainers of Potocki, of Adam Kysil, of Koniecpolski. They all bow down before the Hetman so as to obtain from him the necessary papers and orders that the peasants should now obey them.' But Adam Kysil, who had become *voyevode* in Kiev, complained to the King that 'it appears that the rabble use all sorts of means to avoid being the subjects of their lords. Some forsake their possessions and become the orderlies or servants of Cossacks. Others wander off beyond the Dniepr with all their possessions, and only a small minority bow down before their lords. God alone in His wisdom knows how it will all quieten down and be peaceful.'

Under the Zborov Agreement—which in fact was to prove no more than an armistice—Khmelnytsky had assumed the impossible position of a viceroy of the Polish King, administering a triple state in which existed side by side the two privileged but opposing castes of Polish landlords and Cossack military yeomen with around them a vast and restless peasant proletariat who understood darkly that they had been cheated and betrayed. It was only a matter of months before the frequent local conflicts grew into a renewal of general war.

Abroad Khmelnytsky was becoming a figure of European fame. The marriage of his son Timosh to the beautiful daughter of Basil the Wolf was the occasion for his obtrusion into Moldavian and Transylvanian politics. Admirers compared him to his contemporary Cromwell; he was regarded as the arch-enemy of the Roman faith in Eastern Europe and the Pope granted a plenary absolution to all who should take up arms against him. The Hetman, however, did

*175 not lack ecclesiastical approval. The Archbishop of Corinth girded him with a sword which had lain upon the Holy Sepulchre, and when he at last rode out to battle again against the Poles the Metropolitan of Kiev absolved him from all his sins without the usual preliminary of confession. (23)

In renewing the war against Poland, Khmelnytsky had relied upon the help of his old but always doubtful friend Islam Khan Giray, but the Tartar contingents which came to join him withdrew before the heavy fighting began. Nor were the Cossack Regiments supported either by the 'free' Zaporogians, who were angry at the Zborov Agreement, or by the mass of the peasantry, who remained disappointed and disillusioned. On 1 July 1651 Khmelnytsky was defeated by Stephen Czarniecki at Berestechko. Vishnevetsky was invading the Ukraine from the west, and from the north Prince Jan Radziwill, after putting down peasant risings in the region of the affluents of the Pripet, was advancing on Kiev. Khmelnytsky, who had retreated to Belaya Tserkov (in Ukrainian Bila Tserkva), was obliged to accept any conditions.

The Agreement of Belaya Tserkov replaced that of Zborov. The number of the 'registered' Cossacks was reduced to 20,000 men; the Bratslav and Chernigov *voyevodstva* ceased to be Cossack territories, only the Kiev *voyevodstvo* on both banks of the Dniepr being retained by them.

Khmelnytsky's power was by no means broken and he renewed preparations for a final struggle. *Rzecz Pospolita* had been gravely weakened by the chaotic civil war of the preceding three years. The surplus of grain which produced her means of exchange with Western Europe as well as providing for the extravagant expenditure of the bulk of the great aristocratic families of the realm was derived from the Ukraine. And the peasant labour, as well as the rich black earth, was an essential part of the capital which produced this surplus. Even in Galicia life had not resumed its normal course after the Cossack invasion. Volhynia had been badly devastated, and Podolia with all the country along the right bank of the Dniepr was rapidly becoming depopulated. The landlords who secured the return of their estates in these regions found no peasants to work the land for them. The peasants wished to become Cossacks and not to remain serfs any more, and they moved away beyond the Dniepr. By contrast to the right bank of the Dniepr, the region stretching from Poltava to the Donets and even as far as the Don was becoming thickly inhabited. Ukrainian Cossacks made their appearance in Chuguev, Izyum, Akhtyrka, and even round Ostrogozhsk (to the south of Voronezh), in territories which were outside the boundaries

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of the Polish realm and which were considered to come within the jurisdiction of the Tsar of Muscovy. 175*

Khmelnytsky, after Belaya Tserkov, realized that his own position was perilous; at the same time he knew the exhaustion and the weakness of the Poles. Through the Roumanian princes and the Crimean Khan he had relations with the Turks; during the current period of anarchy in Istanbul he had actually assumed the high-sounding style and title of 'Guardian of the Ottoman Porte'. There was in his entourage a strong party in favour of an understanding with the Turks—which in the following two decades was to acquire a predominating importance. They held that the Turks respected courage; kept their word more often than Christian monarchs; and could be trusted to allow the Cossacks the same loose self-rule which was enjoyed by the Wallachians, the Moldavians, the Transylvanians and the Crim Tartars. The Turkish system, with all its faults, was suited to the taste of rough and simple men. The Hetman negotiated with the Turks and at the same time with the Muscovite Tsar. But the Porte, in the summer of 1653, was not in a position to engage in war. The gallant old Sultana Validé Kosem had recently been strangled with a curtain string during a mutiny of the Janissaries, and the Circassian Ibshir was preparing to grasp the Grand Vizierate.

With his Turkish alternative still in view, Khmelnytsky wrote to the Muscovite *voyevode* in Putivl—'If His Majesty does not take us under the protection of his mighty hand and shield us from our enemies, I the Hetman and the Regiments will have to think of something else.'

'Alexis was thus implored to succour a numerous people, Russian and Orthodox, oppressed by a Polish aristocracy. The Romanov dynasty had not counted this appeal, for the sense of its penury and weakness was always kept before it by constant signs of exhaustion in Russia....But a new dynasty in Russia could not be less careful than the old of that mission of reuniting the Russians which had been so vividly before the minds of the two Johns and the spokesmen of opinion of their time' (Pares).

In Poland, in the spring of 1653, the *Seym*, whose most prominent members were suffering in their own fortunes by the continuance of Ukrainian anarchy, for once took drastic action and voted subsidies of 17,000,000 gulden to provide an army of 60,000 men for the liquidation of Cossack independence.

In the meantime 'a great embassy', including Prince Repnin-Obolenski and the *boyar* Khitrovo, left Moscow. The pretext was the discussion of minor frontier incidents, but in reality the Muscovite ambassadors, who made their appearance in Lvov in the month of

*176 July, had to transmit the Tsar's desire to make peace between the Cossacks and the King. The Muscovite ambassadors declared that during five years the Hetman and all the Cossacks had been making complaints to the Tsar about the oppression of their land, about the persecution and humiliation of the Orthodox Church; and that the Agreements of Zborov and Belaya Tserkov had not been kept. The King and the Polish Senate replied by accusing Khmelnytsky of treacherous dealings; of alliance with the Crim Tartars and negotiations with the Turks.

The Muscovite intervention was in fact ultimative in character. But the shrewd old Patriarch Nikon was playing for time. The Imperial *Prikaz* (Chancellery) was accurately informed of the preparations which Charles X of Sweden was making for war against Poland.

During the summer of 1653 confused fighting was taking place throughout the Ukraine. In August the Cossacks of Khmelnytsky came into contact with the army of John Casimir at Zhvanets, south of Kamenets-Podolsk. For a third time Islam Khan Giray deserted the Hetman on the field of battle. The Tartars drew off to scatter into bands which plundered indiscriminately Polish manors and Cossack villages. The Tartars, taking advantage of the absence of the Zaporogians, appeared on the Dniepr and, as in former days, carried away thousands of men and women into captivity. The Poles suffered similarly; according to contemporary accounts over five thousand women and girls of noble birth from towns and estates in Volhynia and along the affluents of the Pripet were carried off to the slave markets of the Crimea. In these conditions of general anarchy the opposing armies of the King and the Hetman gradually dispersed over their respective territories in abortive pursuit of the elusive Tartar bands.

After the return of the ambassadors from Lvov, on 1 October 1653, Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich assembled the *Zemski Sobor* in Moscow and secured the approval of the *boyars* and the clergy 'to include Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, all his Zaporogian Cossacks, troops, towns and lands within the realm of Muscovy, not only out of respect for the same faith which is shared by Little Russia, but also on account of the danger threatening her from Poland and Lithuania as well as from Turkey and the Tartars'.(24)

On 9 October, the *boyar* Vasili Buturlin, the courtier Ivan Alferiev and the clerk Ilarion Lopukhin received the commission 'to go to the Hetman on the Monarch's most urgent business'. Delayed by the difficulties of travel arising from the Tartar depredations, the mission did not arrive in Pereyaslavl until New Year's Eve. The Hetman,

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who was still on the right bank of the Dniepr, was expected. He 175*
arrived on 6 January, accompanied by the Cossack General Secretary Vyhovsky and many colonels and *starosty*. On the following day Khmelnytsky visited the Muscovite envoys 'quite privately'. On the 8th all the colonels and *starosty* gathered at Khmelnytsky's quarters for a secret council, and later in the day the *Rada* met, when a great number of Cossacks of different ranks and callings were present. The Hetman made a speech at which he stated that a choice had to be made between the four monarchs—the King of Poland, the Sultan of Turkey, the Khan of the Crimea and the Tsar of Muscovy. The decision of the Hetman and the *starosty* was known already, and the *Rada* answered by acclamation: 'We want to go to the Tsar who belongs to the Eastern Orthodox Faith. God help us, God make us strong and united for all time!'

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(1) *On the 'Wilderness' and its Population*

175* 113 Herberstein calls Putivl a frontier town 'from whence travellers sally forth on their journeys through the Wilderness to the Crimea, called Tauris in Latin'. Kursk, which had existed in the days of Kievan Russia, was refounded and rebuilt towards the end of the fifteenth century. The place where it had formerly stood was covered with dense forest.

It is probable that at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries isolated settlements of Russians had been established along the upper courses of the Seym, the Psiol and the Vorskla—where they had intermixed with Turkish nomads. Doroshenko remarks on the Turkish type of the population in certain localities of the Poltava region.

(2) *On the Origin of the Cossacks*

One of the earliest authors who treated of the origin of the Ukrainian Cossacks proved to be nearest to the truth. This was Martin Bielski, a Protestant, the nephew of a Cossack *starosta*, and the author of *Kronika Polska*—written in the year 1597. In Bielski's view the Cossacks were formed from the lower classes of the original Ukrainian population. This idea was shared by the French military engineer Beauplan, author of *Description de l'Ukraine* (seventeenth century). Some fantastic theories on the subject of Cossack origins were adumbrated by writers of the seventeenth, eighteenth and even nineteenth centuries. Pyasetski and Kakhovsky derive the name Cossack from the fact that in battle 'they were as light and agile as wild goats' (Russian, *koza*). Hrabyanka, a Cossack writer of the eighteenth century, held that the Cossacks were the descendants of the Khazars, and another, Simonovsky, affirmed that they originated from the Caucasians on the ground that in the region of the Caucasus is Hyrcania and that *hircus* means 'goat' (*koza*).

The belief that the Cossacks were not of Slavonic origin was widespread in the nineteenth century. Russian historians like Karamzin, Miller and Soloviĕv sought their origin in the Kara-Kalpaks; others from the Torks or from the Polovtsy. Bantysh-Kamenski regarded them as Circassians who had settled on the Dniepr (there was certainly a substantial Circassian element established as far west as the Crimea, see Markov, *Ocherki Kryma*, pp. 417 *et sqq.*). Recently Lyubavski expressed the view that the Cossacks were Russified Tartars.

In the second half of the nineteenth century Antonovich and Kulish elaborated the theory that the Cossacks did not owe their characteristic individuality to any ethnic particularities but to certain special social conditions. This theory is accepted by most of the modern historians of the Ukraine.

Jablonowski, the Polish historian of the Ukraine, came to the following conclusion: 'At the end of the fifteenth century Lithuanian princes who had settled in Kiev attracted to the border regions Tartars who entered their service and who were joined by people who were descendants of "wanderers" (*brodniki*), who had been scattered over the steppe since the twelfth century. Amongst these could have been Torks and Kara-Kalpaks. In the sixteenth century the Slav element begins to predominate decidedly, and

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then was formed the special nationality of the Ukraine which colonized the steppe.' 175 * 113

Ukrainian Cossacks 'appear in history' at a comparatively late date—about 1500. The historians of the Don Cossacks, probably with some justice, attribute the origin of the Don Cossacks to the pre-Mongol period and affirm their service with the Golden Horde. They contend that the parishioners of the Orthodox Diocese, founded by Khan Berké at Saray and called 'the Diocese of Saray and the Don', were mostly Cossacks who had settled along the rivers Don and Khoper. (See Bykadorov, *Istoriya Kazachestva* (History of Cossackdom), vol. 1, Praha, 1930.)

(3) *On the Ryazan Tartars and the Ryazan Cossacks*

Among the Ryazan Cossacks who undertook sentry service along the borders of Muscovy were doubtless many Tartars. In the year 1452 Vasili II invited Tartars to settle along the Oka in the lands of the wild Finnic Meshchera. Along with these Tartars came their *mirzas* or princes, including Kasim, a member of the royal house of Kazan (and founder of the Kasimov principality, see bibliographical note under 'Kasimov' in *E.I.*). During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Muscovite rulers accorded a willing welcome to Tartar nobles and made them grants of land. Between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries official documents mention about 120 noble families of Tartar descent, among whom are the Apraxins, Bakhmetievs, Bibikovs, Golovins, Muratovs, Naryshkins, Saburovs, Turgenevs, Uvarovs, Urusovs and Yusupovs. The prevalent notion in the West that the Tartar element is stronger in the north of Russia than in the south is incorrect. For polemical reasons Polish and Ukrainian propagandists have repeatedly described the Muscovites as 'rather Tartars than Slavs'. Actually in the peasant population of Northern and North-Eastern Russia there is a strong strain of Finnic blood, and in many localities the Finnish ethnic element predominates over the Slav. As for the Tartar strain, it is not so much Mongol as Turk (it is estimated that even in the horde of Chingiz the proportions were one-third Mongol and two-thirds Turk). The Tartar element is more noticeable in the southern than in the northern rural population.

(4) *On the Southern Border of the Muscovite State in the Sixteenth Century*

About the year 1550 the border ran in a north-east to south-west direction from Sviyazhsk on the Volga through Alatyr, Temnikov, Ryazhsk, Pronsk, Epiphan, Novosil, Mtsensk, Novgorod-Seversk, Rylsk, Putivl to Chernigov.

(5) *On Dmitri Vishnevetsky ('Bayda')*

The popular song about 'Bayda'—Prince Dmitri Vishnevetsky, who was the first Zaporogian Hetman—begins with the words: 'In Tsargrad, on the market-place, Bayda sits and drinks his vodka.' It goes on to relate that the Sultan tried to persuade Bayda to become 'his true and faithful knight', promising to reward him by giving him 'a little princess in marriage' and making him the lord of all 'little Ukraine'. Bayda, however, tells the

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175* Sultan that both his faith and his little princess are unclean. The irate Sultan
113 thereupon exclaims: 'Good people, take Bayda and hang him on a hook by the rib.' (Kashchenko, *Opovidannya pro slavne voysko Zaporozhske* (Tales of the Zaporogian *Sech*), Leipzig, 1923 (Ukr.)

(6) *On the Turkish Volga Campaign of* 1569 *and the Raids of the Crim Tartars on Moscow in* 1570–1

The Turks regarded the Tartar Khanates of Astrakhan and Kazan as their vassals, and Mehmed Sökölli appears to have fully recognized the significance of the expansion of Muscovite power down the Volga. Azov, situated at the mouth of the Don, became the base for a formidable Turkish military expedition to Astrakhan. The Turkish army advanced along the Don and the sparse settlements of the Don Cossacks were suppressed. Work on the canal which was to link the Don with the Volga was at the same time begun. The siege of Astrakhan, however, ended in disaster. The moment had been judiciously chosen; the Muscovites had been exhausted by the Livonian War and by the struggle of Ivan IV with the *Boyars*. In the following two years, 1570–1, the Crim Tartars made two raids on Moscow, during which they crossed the Oka and burnt the suburbs of the capital. Many thousands of men and women were carried off to slavery in the Crimea.

For the Turkish campaign on the Don and Volga see von Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, vol. VI; Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. III. For the effect on the internal situation in Muscovy of the Crimean raids of 1570–1, and for their influence on the external policy of Ivan IV, see Pares, *A History of Russia*, chap. VI. The Turkish naval defeat at Lepanto (1570) undoubtedly had a negative influence on Sökölli's Black Sea policy during the following years; but the invasion of Georgia and Daghestan in 1578 was probably in part designed to check further Russian expansion in the Caspio-Volga region.

(7) *On Life in the Zaporogian* Sech

Gogol, the greatest Ukrainian literary figure (who incidentally wrote in Russian), gives an attractive description of the Zaporogian *Sech* in his romance entitled *Taras Bulba*. The *Sech*, founded by Dmitri Vishnevetsky on the island of Khortytsa, was later transferred to other islands in the Dniepr (although for a time it again returned to Khortytsa). The *Sech* was a fortified camp surrounded by trenches and moats. The moats themselves were defended by stockades of tree-trunks (in Russian, *zaseki*, from which the name *Sech* was derived). Stiff hedges built of dried branches and clay constituted an inner line. Two gates gave entry. Within the hedge-wall were built long huts or *kurenyi* (with which it is interesting to compare the communal huts of the Circassians where the English travellers Longworth and Bell found lodging during their travels in Circassia during the second quarter of the nineteenth century). These *kurenyi* were covered with reeds. Here the Cossacks lived—a hundred or several hundred men in each. In normal times there were thirty-eight of these huts, which were named after different Ukrainian towns or after famous Zaporogians. Apart from the living quarters there were a 'chancellery', an arsenal and food magazines;

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and in the seventeenth century the church of Our Lady's Protection was built. Beyond the gates of the *Sech* was a market-place with shops and taverns. There travellers were allowed to lodge—Russians, Armenians and Jews—and, in time of peace, Turks and Tartars. The outer market was a kind of trading centre where the booty won on campaigns could be sold. There was also a small river harbour which was visited by Turkish, Greek and Italian ships. 175-*

Once a year each of the *kurenyi* elected its *ataman*, and all the *kurenyi* together, in other words the *Rada*, elected the Hetman and also all men who had to fill posts in the administration. All important matters were decided by the *Rada*. At the end of the winter lots were drawn to decide who among the Cossacks were to prepare for campaign, who were to remain to defend the *Sech*, and who were to go off on hunting and fishing expeditions. Booty was divided into two equal parts. One part went to the treasury of the *Sech*, and the other, after withdrawing what was destined for the *Sech* Church and for certain monasteries which were supported by the Zaporogians, was divided equally between all the Cossacks—both those who had taken part in the campaign and those who had remained behind for defence and supplies.

Every Zaporogian was free to leave the *Sech* whenever he wanted to do so. He might also leave the *Sech* for a time and return later. Entry into the *Sech* was confined to the following simple question and answer: the Hetman would ask a candidate: 'Dost thou believe in God?' and if the man answered 'Yes', he would be told to cross himself, and if he crossed himself it was considered a sufficient proof that he was a Christian. After that no one asked him who he was, from where he was or why he had come to the *Sech*. The majority of Zaporogians were of Ukrainian origin; but there were many who had come out of Muscovy and White Russia and a certain proportion of all sorts of nationalities.

The *Hetman* was the "headman" of the free Cossacks, but also in Poland and Lithuania the C.I.C. was called Grand Crown Hetman.

Ataman, Ukr. *otaman*, seems to be the same word, but is applied to minor chiefs, e.g. of *kurenyi* or small gangs.

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113 See also two articles in the *Slavonic Review*: K. Gorski, 'Some Aspects of the Polish Reformation', vol. IX, no. 27; J. Mirtshuk, 'The Ukrainian Uniat Church', vol. X, no. 29.

(9) *On the Early Cossack Insurrections*

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(10) *On Ivan Podkova*

175 * In 1574 the Moldavian Hospodar Ion (John) III ('The Terrible' or 'The
113 Armenian') appealed to King Stephen Báthory for help against the Turks. A Polish noble, another John, Swirgowski, with or without the knowledge of the Polish authorities, gathered a troop of Zaporogian Cossacks and entered Moldavia. The Cossacks were at first victorious, but were finally defeated by the Turks and their nominee Peter III the Lame; both Johns were killed. Three years later, the Moldavians called in the Cossacks to help in a revolt against Peter. Among the Zaporogians who rode into Moldavia was a certain Ivan Podkova who gave himself out to be a brother of the deceased Hospodar Ion III (the cognomen of Podkova ('horseshoe' in Russian) was given him on account of his great strength because he could break horseshoes with his hands). With 600 of the Zaporogians Podkova crossed the Dniestr and was proclaimed Hospodar in Jassy, where he established himself in great pomp. But Stephen Báthory, fearing war with the Turks, ordered Podkova to quit Moldavia; he was later arrested in Poland and beheaded in Lvov in the presence of the Turkish ambassador.

Cf. also Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. III, and *Histoire des Roumains et de leur Civilisation*, Bucharest, 1922.

A valuable biography of Stephen Báthory has recently been published as the joint work of the Polish and Hungarian Academies: *Étienne Bathory, Roi de Pologne, Prince de Transylvanie*, Cracow, 1935. See also, *Revue du Sud-Est Européen*, vol. VII, nos. 1–3, 'Moldavie et Pologne au commencement du XVIIme siècle', and other articles on Roumano-Polish relations.

(11) *Samuel Kishka: Popular Songs*

The Zaporogian Samuel Kishka ('the Cat') is the hero of the longest historical song of the Ukrainian people. It relates, with a great many details, how Samuel Kishka, after languishing for long years in captivity among the Turks, seized the galley in which he worked with other Ukrainian prisoners and brought it to the mouth of the Dniepr, where he met a band of Zaporogians about to set out on a sea raid. These songs were composed and sung by the *kobzars*—old men, often blind, who wandered round the Ukraine, going from one village to another, singing, or rather declaiming, about 'deeds done long ago', to the accompaniment of the plaintive notes of the

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kobza, a very primitive chord instrument. These *kobzars* continued to survive in the Ukraine until the Revolution. As a social phenomenon they may be compared to the Irish bards who flourished in the Gaelic-speaking villages and Jacobite country-houses of eighteenth-century Ireland and who survived even into the early decades of the nineteenth century (for the spirit of this late bardic world of the hedgerows, read Donn Byrne's 'Blind Raftery'). 175-* 113

The Ukrainian laments for the bygone glories of the noble Russian Orthodox houses may be compared to the Irish laments for the passing of the Anglo-Irish Catholic families in the proscription which followed the surrender of Limerick.

George Fox's rendering in English of the Irish country poem 'The County of Limerick' is a fine example of a lament for the Jacobite emigration.

On the deck of Patrick Lynch's boat I sit in woeful flight,
Through my sighing all the livelong day and weeping all the night,
Were it not that from my people full of sorrow forth I go,
By the blessed sun! 't is royally I'd sing thy praise, Mayo!

'T is my grief that Patrick Laughlin is not Earl of Irrul still,
And that Brian Duff no longer rules as lord upon the hill,
And that Colonel Hugh MacGrady should be lying dead and low,
And I sailing swiftly from the County of Mayo.

The numbers of blind among the Ukrainian *kobzars* of the seventeenth century is explained by the fact that the Crim Tartars severely punished Ukrainian captives after a first unsuccessful attempt at escape, but after a second attempt they put out their eyes and let them go free. When these men returned to their own districts they usually eked out a livelihood by singing. The recorded songs of the Ukrainian villages contain much valuable historical material. Cf. Dragomanov's *Politicheskiya Pesni Ukrainskago Naroda* (Political Songs of the Ukrainian People), vols. I–II, Geneva, 1883–5; Kashchenko, *Opovidannya pro slavne voysko Zaporozhske* (Tales of the Zaporogian *Sech*), Leipzig, 1923.

(12) *On 'The Time of Troubles': Ataman Zarutsky*

Among the Ukrainian Cossacks who participated in the chaotic events of the Troubled Times was the Zaporogian Ataman Zarutsky. He gained a certain prominence owing to the fact that Marina Mniszek, the Polish lady who had become successively the wife of the first False Dmitri and the second, fell into his hands. When the second Pretender, known to his enemies as 'the Thief of Tushino' (owing to the fact that he had made his camp at the village of Tushino near Moscow), quitted the field of action, Zarutsky carried off Marina Mniszek to Astrakhan together with her son by the second Dmitri—who became known as 'the Little Thief'. 'The Little Thief' continued to be a source of anxiety even after the election of Michael Romanov as Tsar in 1613. The following missive was sent to the Don Cossacks from the new Tsar: 'Write to your brothers the Volga, the Ural and the Terek Cossacks, that if they have the fear of God in them they must not lend their support to the Little Thief.' The *voyevodes* Princes Odoevski and Golovin

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175* 113 descended the Volga in boats, supported by the Don Cossacks, against Zarutsky and the adherents of 'the Little Thief'. Zarutsky disappeared into the steppes beyond the Caspian and perished there.

(13) *On the Raids of the Zaporogian Cossacks in the Time of Sahaydachny*

Many legends and songs about the sea raids of the Zaporogians are remembered to this day in the Ukraine. The Zaporogians acquired great fame through the raid on Caffa in 1617 during which large numbers of captives were liberated. Mansurov, the Muscovite ambassador in Stambul, and the clerk, Simonov, give a contemporary account of the raid when the Cossacks, whose ladders were too short to allow them to scale the walls, commandeered grazing camels on which they proceeded to mount the ladders.

For the Turkish accounts of the sea raids, see von Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, vol. IX.

(14) *On the Relations between the Zaporogian and the Don Cossacks*

Except on a few occasions when the Zaporogians found themselves in the Polish ranks and the Don Cossacks fought under the Muscovite banner, the two Cossack communities never came into serious conflict. Both the *Sech* and the Don were allies in their common struggle against the Turks and the Crim Tartars. The Don annals frequently record occasions during which the Zaporogians came to their aid. Many individuals and groups from the *Sech* fled to the Don to escape from the sphere of Polish authority. A Muscovite report of the seventeenth century states that: 'There are Zaporogian Cherkasses on the Don and many people do not know why these Cherkasses live on the Don. The *atamans* and the Cossacks are in contact with the Cherkasses. The *atamans* and the Cossacks visit them also beyond the cataracts, and the Cherkasses come to the Don' (Bykadorov, *Donskoe Voysko v Borbe za Vykhod v More* (The Don Cossacks in their Struggle for Issues to the Sea), Paris, 1937).

In the year 1621, 1500 Don Cossacks and 300 Zaporogians went off in company on a sea raid. In 1629 the Don Cossacks and the Zaporogians combined in an attack on the coasts of the Crimea. In 1639, 3000 Zaporogians went to the Don to take part in the operations round Azov, thus considerably weakening Pavluk in his rising against the Poles.

(15) *On the Liberation of Captives by the Cossacks*

The desire to liberate their captive compatriots gave a real spiritual background to the exploits of the Cossacks; and the miseries of the thousands of prisoners in Turkish hands form the motive of many Cossack legends and songs (the popular 'propaganda' of those days). For instance: 'There is a fire beyond the river where the Tartars are dividing their prisoners. Our hamlet has been burned and our goods plundered. The old mother has been killed and the wife carried off captive. The tambourines are heard from the valley. People are led to slaughter there, with nooses round their necks and chains that clatter on their feet. I am all done with my grief and despair, with only small children beside me. I will away into the forest along the tracks.'

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Many songs were composed about Ukrainian girls who became the wives of Turks. A usual motive is: a Ukrainian girl is loved by a Turkish Pasha and lives a life of luxury, but her heart is wrung at the sight of the hard lot of her compatriots. A very popular song was one about a girl—'Marusya the priest's daughter from Bohuslav'. Marusya enjoyed the confidence of her Turkish lover, but she stole the key of the prison from him and set the captives free: 'from hard captivity, from the Muslim Faith, to the land of bright dawn where still rivers flow, to the happy land, to the Christian world'.

The Cossacks considered the liberation of captives to be their holy duty, although it imposed on them much onerous trouble, and the keep of the liberated prisoners often cost them much money. The Don Cossacks reminded the Muscovite Tsar of this fact when the pay due to them did not reach them in time. In 1614 we find the Don Cossacks writing: 'My Lord, this year we have sent off three hundred souls, male and female, to Your Majesty's Ukraine, and yet there did not come your high order to send craft and food for these captives. They are dying of hunger; they cannot live, as we live, on grass and water.' The Don Cossacks were accustomed to reproach Moscow, recalling that they served 'not for lucre or lands but only for grass and water' (Bykadorov).

(16) *Kiev as an Intellectual Centre*

Owing to the initiative and influence of Sahaydachny, Kiev became an intellectual centre for the Ukraine. In the time of the Metropolitan Peter Movila the young men who were educated in the Kievan schools and monasteries and in the newly founded Academy of Kiev differed little in the quality of their learning from those educated in the Polish Jesuit schools and colleges. The influences of the Orthodox revival in the Roumanian principalities and at Constantinople also spread to the Ukraine. After the incorporation of the Ukraine with Muscovy, the superior learning of the Kiev Academy and the influences from the Orthodox lands of the south-west were felt in Moscow. Graduates of the Kiev Academy played an important part in the reforms of the Patriarch Nikon during the sixties of the seventeenth century. The Ukrainian factor, with its Danubian and Italo-Greek connections, had a significant relation to the spread of Western influences in Russia half a century before the period of Peter the Great. Apart from commercial contacts with North-Western and Central Europe, these influences were exemplified in the Danubo-Aegean and Romance tendencies to be noted in the sacred literature, church painting and ecclesiastical architecture of the time.

Notwithstanding wars and internal dissensions during the second half of the seventeenth century, Kiev continued to be an intellectual centre. But the intellectual groups in Kiev who showed themselves particularly active in Church politics failed to exercise any important political influence on events because they became and remained alien to the mass of peasants and Cossacks. In this sense, a very characteristic example is the personality of Yuri Nemirich, who completed a very thorough education in Holland (Leyden), where he spent ten years of his life. When he returned to his

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*175 native land he took part in Khmelnytsky's movement and in the subsequent
113 political conflicts. But in spite of the best intentions, his activities were not successful. The Cossacks could never understand him and he perished.

(17) *On the Risings between* 1630 *and* 1638

Shevchenko, the Ukrainian national poet of the nineteenth century, dedicated one of his poems, 'Taras's Night', to the rising of Taras Fedorovich. There is a Ukrainian song about the Hetman Sulima very similar to that about Samuel Kishka. Pavluk, who sacrificed himself in order to save the others, has remained the hero of many legends. Ostranitsa appears to have been one of the most talented of the Cossack military leaders. Despairing of the struggle, he abandoned it in time and withdrew beyond the Donets. (Cf. P. Kulish, 'Ukrainian Cossacks and Polish landlords in the decades before Khmelnytsky's Rising', in *The Russian Review*, vols. I–V, 1895.)

(18) *On the Ukraine after the Suppression of the First Cossack Risings*

The Ukrainian lays picture the period between 1638 and 1648 as one of misery and humiliation. 'Nothing good ever happened in the King's land from the time of the Kumeyki battle till Khmelnytsky. The "undertakers" came down like a swarm of locusts. All the Cossack roads were leased and at intervals of every three miles a toll-house was opened. In dear old Ukraine even churches were leased to the Jews.'

The *Sech* was dead; sea raids and raids on the Crimea had ceased. 'The Dniepr asks the gentle Danube: "Why hast thou no more my own Cossacks on thy banks?" The gentle Danube murmurs: "Father Dniepr, I am myself wondering and guessing why thy Cossacks no longer come my way".'

In spite of the tendency of Polish historians to minimize the intolerable conditions which the Orthodox population endured, some who lived at dates not far removed from the period, as for instance the author of *Three Kings of the House of Vasa*, are not sparing of abuse of the landlords for their oppression of the peasants. Twardowski, a contemporary of Khmelnytsky, frankly admits that all which happened was the fault of the Poles, whose treatment of the peasantry provoked the rising. The French engineer Beauplan expressed the opinion that the condition of the Ukrainian peasantry was only comparable to that of French peasants serving sentences of forced labour. Modern Polish historians do not ignore the true significance of the peasant revolt under Khmelnytsky (cf. Halecki, *La Pologne de* 963 *à* 1914).

(19) *On the Rising of Bohdan Khmelnytsky*

A series of classical works by Russian historians has been dedicated to Bohdan Khmelnytsky's rising. Most important of these are the works of N. Kostomarov (1817–85) and P. Kulish (1819–97). The work of P. Kulish remains of considerable historical value (*Istoriya Obedineniya Rossii* (The History of the Unification of Russia), vols. I–III, Petersburg, 1874–7). Kulish was a contemporary of Kostomarov, but their outlook differs. It is curious that Kostomarov's work—though he was not a Ukrainian by birth—pleased the Ukrainian nationalists of his time; he idealized the 'love of

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liberty' of the Cossacks and sought to see social and revolutionary motives in the movement of 1648–54. Kulish, on the other hand, although he was a Ukrainian, considers that the union of the Ukraine with Muscovy was a matter of historical necessity, and that the Ukrainians, left to themselves, would have been unable to establish an ordered life in their country. At the time Kulish's conclusions called forth indignant protests from Ukrainian nationalists, but at present Ukrainian scholars consider the work of Kulish as more serious than the talented literary essays of Kostomarov. 175* 113

The events of 1648–53 are described in great detail by Hrushevsky in his *History of Ukraine-Rus*, vol. VIII, part 3 (1648–50), Wien, 1922; and in vol. IX, part 1 (1650–3), Kiev, 1928. See also, D. Odinets, *Prisoedinenie Ukrainy k Moskovskomu Gosudarstvu* (The Union of the Ukraine with the Muscovite State), Paris, 1936; and especially the important work of Myakotin, *Ocherki Sotsialnoy Istorii Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII vv.* (Sketches in the Social History of the Ukraine in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries), vols. I–III, Praha, 1924–6.

(20) *On the Internal Policy of Vladislav IV*

For an interpretation of the relations of Vladislav IV with Bohdan Khmelnytsky, summarized in David Hannay's brilliant essay on Polish history in the 11th edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, see the Polish work by Szajnocha (which has not been accessible to the present writer), *Two Years of our History* (1646–1648), Lvov, 1865. See also the Polish works by Czermak: *The Plans of the Turkish Wars of Vladislav IV*, Cracow, 1895, and *Letters and Other Writings of Vladislav IV*, Cracow, 1845.

If, as is probable, the 'Royal Letter' of Vladislav IV to Khmelnytsky never existed, there is little doubt that the King had taken the Hetman into his confidence with regard to his political plans. These plans included an intention to undertake decisive action against the Turks (an action which would have anticipated the Ottoman revival and offensive of the third quarter of the century) in alliance not only with Vienna and Venice, but also, if possible with Moscow. In the event of war, the whole-hearted participation of the Cossacks would have been of the greatest value to Poland and—whether or not the King went so far as to conspire with the Hetman against the liberties of the Polish oligarchy—it is likely that he promised Khmelnytsky to restore all the ancient privileges of the Cossacks.

(21) *On the Polish Army in August* 1648

The Polish troops which were hastily raised after the defeat of the Crown Hetman Potocki at Zhovti Vody and near Korsun consisted of numerous detachments of feudal militia together with a force of trained German mercenaries. The Polish nobles could not agree upon one commander, and three of their number were appointed to lead the troops: Dominic Zasławski, Ostrorog, and the younger Koniecpolski. Khmelnytsky described the Polish command as 'a feather bed, a Latinist, and a babe'; for Zasławksi was known for his luxurious habits, while Ostrorog was renowned for his classical learning, and the son of the veteran friend of Vladislav IV was only eighteen years of age. Like the doomed army of Kara Mustafa, which three 175*

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*175 decades later was to be scattered by a Polish King before Vienna, the host which advanced against the Cossacks was over-burdened with all the appurtenances of a court upon the move. The camp at Pilyavtsy was so gay that people went to celebrate weddings and christening feasts there. The Poles came furnished with thousands of chains for the prospective prisoners, and no one doubted the utter defeat of 'the rabble'. A special prayer was even composed: 'Oh God, do not proffer Thy aid either to us or to the Cossacks, but just witness from above how we will deal with this rabble.'

(22) *On Jeremy Vishnevetsky or Wiśniowiecki*

The Vishnevetskys owned very extensive lands on the left bank of the Dniepr. Prince Jeremy was the only important man who did not lose his head on the outbreak of Khmelnytsky's rising. Having collected a small but well-disciplined troop of nobles, in the summer of 1648, he crossed to the right bank of the Dniepr, and began a counter-offensive against the Zaporogian bands on the borders of Podolia and Volhynia. He was victorious in a number of fights, but all round him the peasants were rising and burning estates.

After the defeat of the Poles at Pilyavtsy, Vishnevetsky began to prepare for a continuation of the struggle. In 1649 he was elected Crown Hetman, and he won fame by his heroic defence of the Zbarazh camp, where he held out for six weeks with 15,000 men against a horde of Cossacks, Tartars and peasants ten times as numerous.

Prince Jeremy was a remarkable man, extremely gifted, and with an iron will; he was very popular among the gentry, but was hated by the magnates and courtiers who surrounded King John Casimir. Though a devout Catholic and a man of culture, Vishnevetsky was brutally cruel towards the peasants. After a rising in his village of Pohrebishcha, he put to death all the men, and ordered all the women to be blinded, but so that there should be some left to lead these crowds of sightless wretches, he ordained that among every hundred women there should be one left who had had only one eye put out. Vishnevetsky was also a ruthless persecutor of the Orthodox Faith. There had never been any Catholics established in the region of Poltava, but during his rule there he organized the construction of Catholic churches and monasteries.

(23) *On Timosh Khmelnytsky: policy in the Danubian Principalities*

Bohdan Khmelnytsky's intervention in the politics of the Roumanian principalities is associated with the romantic story of the love of his son Timothy (Timosh) for Ruxandra, the second daughter of Basil the Wolf (Lupul) of Moldavia.

According to the Deacon Paul of Aleppo, who has left a contemporary account of his travels in Moldavia, Timosh 'really was the most courageous man in the world. The Beys and Pashas who were sent from Constantinople to try and make things go the way the Sultan wished, were astonished by his skill.' The less enthusiastic Moldavs found him pock-marked and uncouth. The lady, who had already enjoyed an affair with the son of a Venetian

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official and had subsequently been affianced to a brother of George II Rákóczy of Transylvania, was noted for her beauty. 175-*

In 1648, during the height of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's successes against the Poles, Basil the Wolf had applied for Cossack support against a pretender, George Stephen, who was a protégé of the Transylvanian prince. Timosh, who had been sent into Moldavia with a detachment of Cossacks, had then met the Princess Ruxandra. After the Zborov Agreement, Khmelnytsky extracted the consent of the Moldavian Hospodar to a marriage only on the threat that 'he would send 100,000 Cossacks to further his son's suit'.

During the course of the year 1650, Timosh Khmelnytsky, after defeating the Polish detachment of Kolinowski which attempted to bar his way, entered Moldavia, and his marriage with Ruxandra was celebrated with great pomp in Jassy.

After the defeat of Bohdan Khmelnytsky at Berestechko in the summer of 1651, the partisans of George Stephen drove the Wolf out of his capital, and he again applied to the Cossacks for aid. Timosh crossed the Dniestr and routed George Stephen, who had raised a mixed force of Wallachs, Magyars, Germans and Serbs. 'Young Khmelnytsky entered Jassy. The town was sacked by his troops. Turks and Jews were slaughtered after they had been questioned as to where they kept their treasures. The bells were ringing in the town. The Patriarch of Antioch offered a Te Deum for the weal of Basil, Bohdan, Timothy and his spouse. Basil came back and the Cossacks welcomed him with an artillery salute.'

The triumph of Timosh was short-lived. The Wallachian Hospodar, Matthew Bassarab, defeated the forces of the Wolf in spite of Cossack support; chased out of Jassy by George Stephen, the old man was forced to take refuge in Bohdan's capital of Chigirin. When Timosh collected a new force of Cossacks and again crossed the Dniestr, he was surrounded by George Stephen at Suceava. Wounded in the knee, he died after a few days. His body was brought back to Chigirin and buried on the family estate at Subbotovo. His wife, who meantime had given birth to twin boys in Chigirin, many years later fell into the hands of Polish troops and was beheaded.

For the complicated political combinations of these five years in which Bohdan Khmelnytsky, with the Transylvanian Prince Rákóczy and the two Roumanian Hospodars, became involved, see Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. III, cap. 4; cf. also his *Geschichte des Rumänischen Volkes*, vol. II, Absch. 6. The Turks, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and George Rákóczy, all from different angles, appear to have envisaged the stabilization of a block of states (including Translyvania, Wallachia, Moldavia, Ukraine and Crim Tartary) which would have constituted a buffer area between the Ottoman dominions and those of the Habsburgs, Poland and Muscovy, and the rulers of which would have been dependent on the Porte. The imperial policy of the Turks in Circassia, the Georgian kingdoms and Daghestan, over against Muscovy and the Iranian monarchy, was based on a similar conception. This policy was pursued during the following three decades by the Köprülüs, and even by Kara Mustafa, in their support of the Hungarian and Transylvanian rebels against the Habsburgs, and of Michael Doroshenko and Yuri

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*175 Khmelnytsky against Poland and Muscovy. This Turkish policy, which implied a wide local autonomy, and a certain toleration as between rival Christian creeds, and which suited the interests of an irresponsible local aristocracy, always found a substantial degree of acquiescence in the countries concerned.

(24) *Muscovy and the Support of Rebels*

For several decades after the Time of Troubles, the Muscovite Chancellery regarded the Ukrainian Cossacks (whom they called generally 'Zaporogian Cherkasses') with the greatest suspicion. The statesmen of the new Romanov monarchy were stern upholders of the monarchical tradition and of the amenities of relations between monarchs (*vide* the rupture of relations with the English Commonwealth after the judicial murder of King Charles I). The advisers of Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich hesitated to accept the advances of Khmelnytsky, whom they regarded as a rebel against his King. In view of the possibility, however, of his coming to an understanding either with the Turks or with the Swedes, they could not afford to ignore his proposals. During the year 1653 the Muscovite lawyers arrived at a compromise which might justify the Tsar's support of the Cossacks. A formula was evolved whereby while it was accepted that subjects were bound by oath to be loyal to their King, the King himself was obliged by oath to maintain the rights and privileges of his subjects. The Muscovite lawyers found that the King of Poland had foriworn his oath to the Cossacks, and that therefore 'the Zaporogian Cossacks with all their lands and towns' were free of their oath to the King.

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EXPANSION OF RUSSIA, 1648-1795

Roman figures denote the order in which the various regions came under Muscovite rule.

Large Arabic figures—the dates when boundaries were constituted.

Small Arabic figures—the dates when towns were founded and their environs settled.

····· Definite, ---- Indefinite, boundaries.

I Muscovy, when the Hetman's Ukraine transferred its allegiance in 1648.
II Smolensk and left bank Ukraine, 1667.
III Duchy of Kurland, 1715.
IV Zaporogian Country, 1750-1775.
V Polotsk and East White Russia, 1772.
VI Coast from Bug to Don (New Russia), 1774.
VII Crimea and the Kuban, 1783.
VIII West White Russia to Podolia, 1793.
IX Lithuania and West Volhynia, 1795.

map facing
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CHAPTER IV

THE UKRAINE OF THE HETMANS (1654–1709)

§1. THE NEW ORDER IN THE UKRAINE

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THE Pereyaslavl Agreement was an historical event of the first importance. Muscovy became Russia in the union of the two principal blocks of Eastern Slavs of the Orthodox Faith. The old meridial line smashed by the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century was restored. Rus had been reborn—from Novgorod to Kiev, 'from the Varangians to the Greeks'. The integration of the Russian lands—of the Ukraine with Great Russia—had come about as a natural historical process rather than as the result of a determined imperial policy. The Muscovite state, still slowly recovering from the period of the Time of Troubles, weak from internal social and religious dissensions, had never resumed the stern expansive policy of the great Ivans. The careful advisers of Tsar Alexey had flinched from compromising the new Romanov monarchy in the turbulent politics of the Cossacks. On his side Bohdan Khmelnytsky—a bold river swimming in the tide of great events—had harboured in his simple flaunting mind no dream of Russian unity. He would have preferred to have played a role as a half-independent prince like the Roumanian Hospodars or the Crimean Girays or George Rákóczy. Never was a great event less planned and determined by men; geographical facts and the unconscious needs of nameless masses imposed an empire of vast possibility on men who at first quite failed to comprehend the significance of what was happening.

The potential of Russian power was enormously increased. The control of the principal rivers debouching to the northern shore of the Black Sea had been shifted from Poland—a state structure based on the Baltic-Vistula-Niemen-Dvina square—to Muscovy, which, until the middle of the seventeenth century, had remained a Volga power with an expansion—the significance of which was as yet not understood in Western Europe—north-eastward down the White Sea rivers and eastward across the Urals.

The prospect of coming Russian military and economic spread now had no limit within the area of the Great Eurasian Plain. Its exploitation was only a matter of time and men; and in a very short time Tsar Peter appeared as the first man to organize power out of

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*175 the immeasurable regions' where 'the countless millions of Slavs' had been swarming 'so noiselessly'—'unnoticed by the annalists'.

But the problems presented to the advisers of Tsar Alexey were formidable. The incorporation of the Ukraine with Muscovy was a challenge to the Ottoman power on the Black Sea and to the very existence of the weakened Polish state. Immediate war with Poland was inevitable; the Russians could not fail to participate in the attempted partition of *Rzecz Pospolita* which was to engage all the predatory powers of Northern and Eastern Europe during the coming two decades, and Khmelnytsky was quick to urge on Moscow the occupation of Smolensk and White Russia. The Swedish King, Charles X, began to aim at balancing the Russian incorporation of the Ukraine by attaching Lithuania to the Swedish crown. The presence of the Muscovites on the lower Dniepr implied the doom of the bandit state of Crim Tartary and provoked the Khans, at the first opportunity, to renew their coursing of the Ukrainian plains with desperate ruthlessness. And when the Köprülü viziers came to power in Istanbul, a revived Ottoman power was to meet the Russian challenge on the Black Sea with a prolonged and determined attempt to substitute Turkish for Russian hegemony between the Dniestr and the Don.

The social problems which confronted the Muscovite Tsar were equally grave. For on the one hand the Cossack military leaders in the Ukraine soon showed that they were intending to establish themselves as a territorial aristocracy in succession to the Polish nobility whom they had slaughtered or expelled, while on the other hand the peasant masses were not only bitterly determined to oppose the growth of a new class of landlords, but their truculent and restless spirit was to spread beyond the Cossack lands into Great Russia and to inspire such movements as the *jacquerie* of Stenka Razin which swept the valley of the Volga in 1670.

Although before the conclusion of the Pereyaslavl Agreement the Tsar had sent an assurance to Khmelnytsky through his envoys that 'all the old rights and customs of the Cossacks would be maintained and confirmed by his signature', and Buturlin had promised that 'the Tsar would grant the Cossacks greater liberties, more riches and privileges than were ever granted to them by the Kings of Poland', no definite agreement as to the future status of the Cossack communities had been reached when the Pereyaslavl *Rada* acclaimed Alexey Mikhailovich on 8 January 1654.

Some doubts appear to have troubled the minds of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Cossack elders when, after the acclamation, Buturlin made a speech in which he stated that 'the Tsar was taking

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under the protection of his high and mighty hand the Hetman and all the Cossacks with their towns and lands'. In the cathedral church of Pereyaslavl, where the elders were assembled to swear allegiance, Khmelnytsky suddenly proposed to Buturlin that he should take an oath in the name of Tsar Alexey that 'he would not betray the Cossacks to the Polish King, that he would defend them and respect their liberties'. To this the imperial envoy made the sharp retort that: 'No one has ever taken an oath in the name of our liege lord and master and no one ever will. It is not even seemly for the Hetman to speak of such things....That Polish Kings swear oaths to their subjects is no fitting precedent because those Kings are heretics and not Autocrats....The Tsar's word is sufficient and cannot be altered.' It was an ill-chosen moment at which to attempt to decide a constitutional issue, and the Hetman and the elders proceeded to declare that 'they would rely in everything on the Tsar's mercy and humbly prostrate themselves before him imploring him to deign to look after their needs'. In this wise allegiance was sworn to the Tsar without his having accepted any preliminary conditions. Two months later the clauses of an agreement which had been elaborated between the Cossack leaders and the imperial representatives took the form of a petition to the highest authority in the land.

It is difficult to understand how this unconditional union of the Ukraine with Muscovy, confirmed by the *Rada* of 8 January 1654 and by the oath of allegiance sworn to the Tsar, could be explained by certain historians of the nineteenth century (Kostomarov, for instance) as 'an act of personal union' between Muscovy and the Ukraine. An examination of the different clauses of the draft agreement which was brought to Moscow in March 1654 by the Cossack judge Samuel Bohdanov and Colonel Teterya does not convey the impression that the Ukraine was then conceived by the representatives of the Hetman as a 'vassal' but independent country (the opinion of Hrushevsky and, in part, that of Myakotin). The statutory position of the Ukraine in relation to the Muscovite state was that of a region forming part of that state, but, by reason of the special character of the Ukrainian territory as a borderland, possessing a peculiar military organization, and, hence, certain privileges of a regional and social order.

The written agreement signed in March 1654 did not create a Ukrainian state and did not put the Hetman at the head of such a state. Nor did Khmelnytsky's preliminary draft for the agreement aim at either of these objects. The draft brought to Moscow by Bohdanov and Teterya contained twenty-three clauses, and only in one of them (15) was there any hint of a 'vassal' relationship

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*175 between the Ukraine and Moscow. In Clause 15, which dealt with the receipt of revenues for the Tsar's Treasury, the authors of the draft proposed that the Tsar should receive a certain tribute from the Ukraine in the same way as the Sultan received tributes from the contemporary vassal states of the Ottoman Empire—Moldavia, Wallachia and Hungary. The advisers of Tsar Alexey did not accept this proposal, and it was dropped—the more easily since it dealt with a question of method and no political importance was attached to it. It was agreed instead that officials appointed locally should gather the taxes and that these should be handed over to *voyevodes* sent from Moscow for their receipt.

Some historians find another indication of the conception of the independence of the Ukraine in Clause 14, according to which the Hetman might receive foreign ambassadors—with the obligation to notify the Muscovite Chancellery of their arrival. But, as Odinets has observed, the right to maintain certain relations with foreign countries was not limited to the Hetman, nor was it regarded by Moscow as a sign of 'independence'. 'Purely technical conditions such as distance, the bad state of the roads, were the reasons why the *voyevodes* of border lands had the right to receive and dismiss the ambassadors of neighbouring states. Envoys sent on account of "unimportant affairs" were usually received and dismissed by the *voyevodes*, who later sent a report to the Tsar. The Novgorod *voyevode* had the right to conduct diplomatic relations with the ambassadors of a country as important as Sweden and in that respect was more privileged than the Hetman.' In fact, the Muscovite negotiators made important additions to Clause 14, stipulating that the Hetman should report to Moscow when foreign ambassadors came to him 'with good intentions', while if they should come 'with bad intentions' he was to detain them until he had received orders from the Tsar. The Hetman was also notified that 'he was to have no relations whatever with the Turkish Sultan and the King of Poland'.

The remaining clauses of the draft were accepted by the Moscow Government without objections and with scarcely any alterations. The most important feature of the agreement was the concession of a wide autonomy to the Cossacks. On the death of the Hetman, the Cossacks had the right to elect his successor and had only to report the result of the election to the Tsar 'so that their choice should not grieve His Majesty'. The estates of the Cossacks' elders became hereditary. The Cossack law courts were to be in the hands of their own men, and *boyars* and *voyevodes* sent from Moscow were to have no right to interfere with them. In the towns, the administrations, which were to be composed of local men, were to be responsible for

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justice and for the collection of revenues for the imperial Treasury. 175* The Orthodox nobility were to retain their special privileges and to choose their officials from among themselves. All privileges and rights granted by the Polish Kings were to be maintained by the Tsar.

No clause in the agreement definitely recognized the Tsar as the liege-lord and master of the Ukrainian land, but the current conception of the position of the Tsar had been adequately indicated during the preliminary negotiations. 'The Hetman and the Cossack elders gave over to the Tsar the lands that had belonged to the Kings of Poland as well as the estates of the Polish landowners and those of the Catholic monasteries' (Myakotin). The Tsar could dispose of this enormous reserve of lands at his pleasure and could grant lands for services rendered. With the draft agreement Bohdanov and Teterya brought with them to Moscow numerous petitions for the imperial bounty, for the Cossack leaders did not disguise their anxiety to assure their positions as territorial magnates.

All serious investigation justifies the conclusion that the principal object of the agreement in the minds of its sponsors was to assure to the privileged Cossack classes the rights which they had enjoyed, or had thought themselves entitled to enjoy, under the Polish crown. Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich was in fact regarded as the heir of the Polish Kings, and he confirmed 'the rights and privileges which were granted by the Kings of Poland and the Great Princes of Lithuania'. Men of the type of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who had grown up in the atmosphere of the libertarian hierarchy of *Rzecz Pospolita*, were incapable of evolving another conception; and the Muscovite statesmen—alien though this loose relationship was to their own system—could not afford to be doctrinaire in the environment of crisis in which the negotiations were transacted.

Special rescripts were granted to the Cossack communities, to the Orthodox nobility and to the clergy of Russia Minor, defining the rights of the respective groups. The Magdeburg Law and other rights and privileges granted by the Polish Kings to the towns were also confirmed.

The number of Cossacks to be registered was fixed at 60,000, and Khmelnytsky undertook, in the event of war, to furnish troops corresponding to that number. It was understood at the same time that if the Hetman could provide more the Government of the Tsar would make no objection; and this understanding could justify the Cossacks in increasing their numbers beyond the figure fixed, without interference, during peace time.

Khmelnytsky's conception of life in the Ukraine under the new

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*175 dispensation was that of a stratified class hierarchy, sanctioned by the authority of the Tsar but based on Polish traditions, with a Cossack and Orthodox class of landed proprietors recruited from among the Cossack officers and substituted for the former Polish Catholic gentry. The Russian Government envisaged a state of affairs in which the Tsar was master of the whole land, and confirmed by rescripts the possessions of monasteries and churches, nobles and Cossacks, and also existing rights of property in the towns. The duty of the Cossack community was to furnish troops, and of the town populations to provide revenues. Taxes were to be paid to the Exchequer also by those peasants who had settled on lands which were the property neither of the Orthodox nobility nor of the Cossacks nor of the Church—in other words by those who lived 'on the Tsar's land'. For the administration of the peasant lands and also of the towns *voyevodes* were to be sent from Moscow who would be responsible for the appointment of officials from among the local inhabitants. The Cossacks remained divided into regiments based territorially on military districts. At the head of the regiment was a colonel, who not only commanded the regiment, but, in time of peace, was responsible for the government of the Cossack population living on the territory of the regiment. Regiments were divided into 'hundreds' (*sotni*), at the head of which, both in war and peace, was a captain.

The achievement of modern historians of the Ukraine (principally Myakotin) has been to show the extent to which the theoretical conceptions both of Khmelnytsky and of the Moscow Government differed from the realities of social relations which had already developed in the Ukraine in the year 1654.

First, the Orthodox nobility, to whom a special status had been allocated, proved to be far from numerous (two or three hundred families). They were already indistinguishable from the commanding element among the Cossacks with whom they had intermingled and in whose ranks they had achieved influence owing generally to the superiority of their education.

But far more important was the absence of any clear line of division between the Cossacks and the peasants. As Myakotin writes, 'the peasant masses, having liberated themselves from the authority of the landlords, had acquired personal freedom and civil rights'. In this connection it must not be forgotten that the agents of the Tsar and the propagandists of the Orthodox Church had for decades been responsible for encouraging a 'revolutionary' outlook in antagonism to the Polish crown and the Roman Catholic Church.

Immediately after the acclamation of the *Rada* on 8 January 1654,

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Buturlin sent to all the towns and villages of the Ukraine Muscovite /75* officials who were to receive the allegiance of the *whole* population, including, of course, townsfolk and peasants (Buturlin himself received the allegiance of the inhabitants of Kiev, Chernigov and Nezhin). The South Russian peasantry had never before participated in such an experience and they naturally regarded it as an imperial confirmation of the revolutionary change in their social status which resulted from the events of 1648–53.

Myakotin continues: 'During the whole period of the rising townsfolk and peasants freely joined the ranks of the Cossacks.... At Starodub, for instance, the Muscovite officials, sent to receive the allegiance of the inhabitants to the Tsar, found no townsfolk; all had registered themselves as Cossacks. However, if people joined the Cossack ranks with such ease they also quitted them with the same ease. Impoverished Cossacks, who no longer had the possibility of doing military service and of going off on campaign, again became townsfolk or peasants without any difficulty. The better elements among the population took upon themselves the obligation of military service, which entailed considerable expense but set them free from other liabilities; the poorer ones either remained peasants or became peasants and bore the burden of taxation from which the Cossacks were free.' There was thus a considerable degree of occupational fluidity among the masses of the population, and conceptions of social organization based on stratified classes were divorced from the realities of a vigorous and expanding life in a new and undeveloped country.

As Myakotin justly remarks: 'If such phenomena could exist, it proves that no special privileges were attached to being a Cossack in comparison to belonging to the peasantry. The peasantry had acquired at that time all civic rights, including particularly that of owning their own pieces of land. The right of owning property became general to such a degree that it spread even to those peasants who were officially dependent upon Orthodox landlords or Orthodox monasteries.' Myakotin gives examples of occasions when, even in the eighteenth century, the peasants sold 'their' pieces of land which theoretically formed parts of the estates of landowners, and were upheld by the law courts.

The conflict between the interests of the mass of the peasant and Cossack population and the leaders who were hungry to profit from the new order soon took form in opposition to the Tsar's grants of land to the more prominent of the Hetman's lieutenants. In March 1654 the envoys of the Hetman petitioned for a rescript of the Tsar confirming the possessions of leading Cossacks. To Khmelnytsky

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*175 himself were granted the Chigirin regiment, the town of Hadyach and numerous estates scattered throughout the country. Bohdanov asked for the town of Imgleev and Teterya for the town of Smela—both, of course, with the adjoining lands. The General Secretary, Vyhovsky, Colonel Zolotarenko, and a flock of colonels and Cossack elders followed with similar requests. Petitions came streaming in for vast lands, whole groups of villages, mills and towns. Most of the petitioners received satisfaction from the imperial authorities. When, however, Teterya again arrived in Moscow in 1657 as envoy from the Hetman and amongst other business produced a petition from Vyhovsky for the grant of estates in White Russia (which land had recently been conquered from the Poles), some astonishment was expressed. Teterya explained that although the Tsar had showered bounties on the General Secretary, his father and his brothers, the Vyhovskys were afraid to claim their rights for fear of 'the Zaporogian troops'. The Muscovite officials promised to confirm through the *voyevodes* in Russia Minor the fact that the Tsar had actually made the grants in question to the Vyhovskys and others; upon this Teterya took fright and admitted that 'if only the Cossacks get to know that himself and others had been granted by the liege lord and master such vast properties they would be beaten... the Cossacks would say that all towns and lands were to be owned by His Majesty and that he (Teterya) and others were to have nothing but their pay'. Teterya confessed that in the Cossack lands they had not the right to own vast property and that even the document he had received granting the town of Smela 'had been buried in the soil'. He begged for a copy of it on parchment 'so that it should not spoil' and that 'nothing about it would be said to the Cossacks'.

While Khmelnytsky and his friends were finding themselves baulked in their desire to establish new dynasties of territorial magnates, the Moscow Government was discovering that its theoretical conception of the new order in the Ukraine did not correspond with the facts of the situation as it continued to develop. A numerous new class of officials was rapidly growing up in the towns and villages of the Ukraine; these officials were not all Cossacks, for many men came in from Poland and White Russia to share in the new opportunities. These included priests' sons and 'people of different callings' whose relative education gave them some standing in the Cossack lands. But the effective political and administrative power remained in the hands of Cossack officers, and no revenues found their way to the Tsar's Exchequer. 'These revenues were to have been collected by the local people on behalf of the Tsar's *voyevodes* sent to govern the town and country population (except of course the Cossacks who

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enjoyed the privilege of self-government). In practice it soon became apparent that the Muscovite *voyevodes* were altogether superfluous in the Ukraine. The peasantry during the rising and after the union with Muscovy continued to be ruled by the captains supervised by colonels—and in the jurisdiction of the Hetman. Cossack officials, even in towns which were governed under the Magdeburg Law, occupied in the sphere of legislation and local government more or less the position which had been designed for *voyevodes* from Moscow. As a result the administration passed into the hands of officials of local origin. The revenues were not delivered into the Tsar's Exchequer. After several unsuccessful attempts, the Moscow Government had to give up sending the Tsar's *voyevodes* to Ukrainian towns' (Odinets). 175*

In this wise it soon became apparent that the actual state of affairs in the Ukraine did not correspond to the conceptions of the Agreement of March 1654. According to the Agreement the Ukraine was to form in reality a province of the Muscovite state, enjoying certain privileges and a wide autonomy on account of its situation as a frontier region and the necessarily military character of its local social structure. In fact, the Ukraine of the Hetman was in process of becoming a separate state united with Muscovy only by 'an eternal alliance', but in essence practically independent. The whole of the administration of the Ukraine was in the hands of the Cossacks at whose head stood the Hetman—freely elected by them. Into the Hetman's, and not into the Tsar's, Exchequer went the revenues from the towns and the taxes paid by those who preferred the life of a peasant free from military obligations to that of a Cossack. It was only after the death of the Hetman that the officials in Moscow came to realize quite definitely that Russia Minor was a country socially and politically quite different from anything which had been represented by Khmelnytsky. But the deliverer of the Ukraine from the Poles had never himself understood the character of the great revolt which he had led nor the implications of the social upheaval which that revolt had precipitated.(1, 2, 3)

§2. FIRST RUSSO-POLISH WAR: REVOLT OF VYHOVSKY

During the Pereyaslavl negotiations, Khmelnytsky, well aware that neither the Poles nor the Crim Tartars would accept the union of the Ukraine with Russia, had asked for a Muscovite diversion against Smolensk and White Russia.

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175* War broke out during the spring of 1654. The Hetman himself took up a position with 30,000 Cossacks on the borders of Volhynia, while Buturlin with a Muscovite detachment was stationed at the point where the Vorskla falls into the Dniepr in order to arrest any Tartar incursion from the Crimea; in his support 3000 Zaporogians were sent to garrison the important fort of Kudak. Another force of 25,000 Cossacks under the Hetman's brother-in-law, Colonel Zolotarenko, joined the Muscovites under the walls of Smolensk, where Tsar Alexey himself was present.

The powerful fortress which Vladislav IV had retaken from the Romanovs, and the possession of which gave to one Slav monarchy the military initiative over the other, fell to the Muscovites on 10 September 1654; and the amiable Tsar—often more successful in war than his more military predecessors and successors—conferred upon all the barbaric captains of Zolotarenko's *sotni* titles of nobility.

After the capture of Smolensk, the troops of Prince Khovanski moved on Vitebsk and Polotsk, while the Cossacks of Zolotarenko, operating further to the south, entered Homel.

Meanwhile in the Ukraine events had taken an unexpected turn. The attention of the Poles had been concentrated on the White Russian campaign, and the Tartars had hesitated to begin hostilities. It was only after the death of Ibrahim Giray that his successor Muhammad Giray, having received generous presents from King John Casimir, suddenly moved against the Zaporogians and inflicted a crushing defeat on them. *Ataman* Tomilo and the Zaporogian hero Morozenko, about whose exploits the *kobzars* composed one of the finest of their songs, were both killed.

During the winter, the Tartars, avoiding Buturlin's Muscovite troops on the left bank of the Dniepr, rode towards Uman, while Polish detachments, coming through Moldavia, combined with them to drive the Cossacks under Colonel Bohun with heavy losses northwards towards Belaya Tserkov.

Khmelnytsky was forced to withdraw from the Volhynian border. The ranks of the Cossacks had thinned perceptibly, and the Hetman appealed for aid to the Muscovite *voyevodes*. The Tartars were devastating all the lands on the right bank of the Dniepr—Chigirin, Uman, Vinnitsa and Bratslav. More than 200,000 of the peasantry were rounded up and sent off into slavery to the Crimea and the Turkish ports between the Bug and the Danube.

But the warlike enthusiasm of the Tartars declined as their booty accumulated, and in the spring Muhammad Khan Giray withdrew beyond the Dniepr. The Swedish intervention in the Baltic provinces during the summer of 1655, which was made more dangerous by the

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defection to Charles X of such prominent Polish and Lithuanian magnates as John Sobieski and the Radziwill brothers, now made desperate the position of the Polish King. Prince Khovanski took and sacked Vilna; the wealthy Lithuanian capital was so devastated that, according to a Russian historian, 'a blow was dealt to Vilna which even the besiegers had not intended'. On 10 September Warsaw fell to the Swedes. The historic city of Lublin was stormed by the Hetman's Cossacks. The inhabitants of Lvov were withstanding a Cossack blockade; and detachments sent by the Hetman took part in the Swedish entry into Cracow, the ancient capital of the Polish Kings. John Casimir fled to Silesia. *Rzecz Pospolita* appeared to be in process of disintegration. 175 *

But the plight of their country roused the proud Poles, and a movement of resistance to the foreign armies, religious in its fervour, swept the country. The famous defence of the monastery of Częstochowa, marking as it did a combination of the heroism of the peasants with the devoted leadership of the Catholic Church, proved to be the beginning of a wave of national regeneration. John Casimir, elderly and inept but brave and kingly, returned from exile, and by the beginning of 1656 Charles X 'had discovered that it was easier to defeat the Poles than to conquer Poland.... For weeks he scoured the interminable snow-covered plains of Poland in purusit of the Polish guerillas, penetrating as far south as Yaroslav in Galicia, by which time he had lost two-thirds of his 15,000 men with no apparent result.'

The Austrian Emperor Ferdinand III regarded the extremity of the Catholic Vasas with alarm, and feared an alliance of the might of Sweden with George Rákóczy and the Protestant dissidents in Transylvania and Hungary and the Turks. He secured a diplomatic combination of the maritime powers in favour of the Poles, and in the following year the armed intervention of the Danes against Sweden in the Baltic was to have the effect almost of extricating Charles X from his Polish embarrassment.

Meanwhile the Russians had been contemplating with mistrust the extension of Swedish power over Poland and Lithuania. The possibility of an alliance of the Swedes with the Transylvanians and the Turks disturbed the advisers of Tsar Alexey no less than those of Ferdinand III. The issue was the more urgent for the Russians, since Khmelnytsky had come into close contact with Charles X during the Polish campaign of 1655, and he was known to have renewed his old relations with George Rákóczy, with the Roumanian Hospodars, with the Girays and the Turks. While the Austrian Emperor set on foot negotiations between John Casimir and Tsar Alexey on the

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175* ground that both should unite their efforts 'against the common enemy of the Christian Faith', Khmelnytsky received orders to withdraw the Cossack contingents which were co-operating with the Swedes. In May 1656 the Russians opened hostilities against the Swedes in Livonia, but the Cossacks were still with the Swedes when, in June, Charles X was compelled to evacuate Warsaw; and about the same time Khmelnytsky himself paid a visit to Muhammad Khan Giray at Baghchi-Saray, where he signed an armistice which relieved his territories of further Tartar incursions. There followed, probably with the approval of Mehmed Köprülü, who in September of this year became Grand Vizier, agreements between the Hetman and George Rákóczy and the Wallachian and Moldavian Hospodars. The diplomatic combinations of the Emperor were well countered by those of Charles X and the first of the Köprülü Viziers.

In the summer of 1657, while Charles X turned to confront the League which the Emperor had conjured against him in the west, Muscovite *boyars* arrived in Chigirin to bring Bohdan Khmelnytsky to account. The ageing Hetman of the Cossacks was now seriously ill, exhausted by the fatigues and anxieties of the three years of war. He was no longer able to leave his couch, and the *boyars* were received by his son Yuri and the General Secretary Vyhovsky.

At first relations were so strained that Buturlin and his suite refused to dine with the Hetman's wife, Yuri and Vyhovsky. At last a table was laid near the bed of the sick Hetman, who raised himself from his pillows to drain a goblet of Hungarian wine to the health of the Tsar and to utter a malediction on 'the cursed and infidel Turkish Sultan'. After a few days Khmelnytsky was somewhat better and was able to answer the reproaches of Buturlin. He defended his right to continue 'his old friendship with the Swedes', claiming that he had been in contact with them six years before his allegiance to the Tsar. Khmelnytsky could not understand the turn of Muscovite policy towards Poland; he also complained of the ruin of the Ukraine, and justified his armistice with Muhammad Khan Giray by the care which he took of the welfare of his Cossacks.

The great services rendered by the Cossacks during the recent war obliged the Muscovite envoys to adopt a lenient attitude towards the dying Hetman. His last day was now approaching, and he hastily summoned the colonels and Cossack elders. These, assembled at the bedside of their dying leader, named as his successor his son Yuri, who was neither a very competent nor a very pleasing youth. Ivan Vyhovsky and Colonel Martin Pushkar were chosen as advisers to the future Hetman, and Paul Teterya was to be his representative in Moscow.

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On 15 August 1657 Bohdan Khmelnytsky breathed his last. His death was a great loss to the Ukraine because Bohdan Khmelnytsky was the only man who had real prestige among Cossacks of all ranks. The Muscovite Government respected and trusted him, and his military reputation stood high in Poland and Turkey, among the Tartars and among the Swedes. Khmelnytsky, who by a freak of fate had played a most important part in the history of his time, was no politician. He had the simple mind of a soldier and a country squire. There was a boyish naivety even in his ambition, and, in spite of his relations with all his neighbours, he was not by nature an intriguer. Khmelnytsky was certainly no statesman, and the fine political instinct which guided the more complicated Sahaydachny was completely lacking in him. It was not through any personal qualities in him but through the force of circumstances that he was the cause of the upheaval which changed the whole course of his life and altered the history of Eastern Europe of his time. He was not in fact capable of directing the destinies of his country into any definite channel, not even into that of agreement with Moscow, although this had been his work and he remained true to the principle until the end of his life. 175 *

Notwithstanding Khmelnytsky's foreign contacts, Moscow had had no serious reason for doubting his loyalty. Nevertheless the general position of affairs in the Ukraine at his death could not fail to arouse the most serious misgivings. Officials sent by the Tsar reported that instead of 60,000 Cossacks there were 300,000 of them; that everywhere the peasants were ruled by colonels and captains; and that there was no question of any revenues for the Exchequer. Neither the Hetman's conception of his right to maintain relations with foreign potentates nor the general interior structure of the Ukraine corresponded to the spirit of the agreement of March 1654. The Muscovite Chancellery, however, decided that it was better to observe and to appraise what was going on in the Ukraine before embarking on any definite measures. An order was given to the official Chirikov sent to Poltava 'to observe in secret, so that no one should know of it, what sums are collected in Poltava and other towns and whether they are given over to the Hetman, or to the colonels or to some others; if the money goes to the troops or somewhere else'. It was proposed to enquire 'how it was all done in the King's time, and what the people liked or disliked, and what are their customs, whether they keep to the old ones or whether the colonels have introduced new ones, and whether people are pleased or displeased and for what reason?'

From these instructions, which were also given to other men sent

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*175 into the Ukraine, it will be seen that the Muscovite Government, no longer believing in the practicability of the clauses of the Agreement of 1654, was acting with great circumspection. Events, however, were progressing at such a rapid pace and soon took such an unexpected turn that these reasonable and serious methods, which needed time, had to be relinquished.

The first surprise awaiting the Muscovite Government was Vyhovsky's proclamation of himself as Hetman a few days after the perfectly 'legal' election of Yuri Khmelnytsky: the formal explanation for this was that Yuri Khmelnytsky was 'too young', and that he had still to complete another three years' studies in Kiev, and for these reasons Vyhovsky had undertaken to become Hetman 'for three years'.

The ex-General Secretary, Khmelnytsky's principal collaborator and the author of the text of the March Agreement, belonged by origin to the lesser Volhynian nobility. In the year 1648, as a registered Cossack, Ivan Vyhovsky had fought under Potocki at Zhovti Vody, had been taken prisoner, and, together with other prisoners, given over to the Tartars. Khmelnytsky, in need of educated men or of men who simply knew how to read and write, had exchanged him for a horse. While Khmelnytsky and he subsequently proved to be the principal leaders of the struggle against Poland, Vyhovsky had, even to a greater degree than Khmelnytsky, engrained within him the traditions and notions of the Polish class régime in which both had grown up and been educated. Vyhovsky nourished no strong enmity against the Poles and regarded the upheaval which had made him his career from a purely personal point of view. During the negotiations in Moscow he had shown great insistence in obtaining lands for himself, his father, his brothers and even his brother-in-law. But most of the Tsar's awards had proved to be worth no more than papers to be 'buried in the ground', because the Cossack masses were proving themselves to be drastically opposed to the creation of a new class of landed proprietors in succession to the expelled Polish magnates. Vyhovsky had then sought compensation in White Russia and had met with a refusal. His disappointment over the distribution of lands was evidently the main reason which prompted him to betray the Tsar and to seek an accommodation with the Polish King. His whole personal history indeed is of interest as indicating the social outlook and the class tendencies of the upper strata of the Cossacks.

Soon after his proclamation as Hetman, Vyhovsky despatched a colonel to Moscow to beg the Tsar to send his *voyevodes* to all important Ukrainian towns to make lists of the Cossacks so that their

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number should not be allowed to exceed the stipulated 60,000— 175*
'that the high and mighty Lord should send men of position and power accompanied by troops so that the Cossacks would be frightened and not revolt and that no one should dare incite them to show insolence'.

The Moscow Government showed, however, no intention of alienating the population of the Ukraine by satisfying the Hetman, whose conduct already appeared suspicious. At the same time they continued to ignore the report of Martin Pushkar to the effect that Vyhovsky was negotiating with the Poles, and the subsequent warnings of the *boyars* Khitrovo and Portomoin. The policy of Moscow towards Poland was exceedingly conciliatory during the years 1657–8; for the Poles had promised that Tsar Alexey should become one of the 'Electors' for the throne of Poland, while the probable abdication and in any case ultimate death of John Casimir encouraged the ambition that within the next decade the crowns of the two Slav monarchies might be united in the person of the Romanov ruler. The Polish *Seym* of 1658 received in great solemnity a pompous embassy sent by Alexey Mikhailovich with gorgeous presents for the principal magnates of the kingdom; and the recognition by this *Seym* of Vyhovsky as Hetman of the Ukraine only affirmed the gracious relations established between the King and the Tsar.

But Vyhovsky soon abandoned all caution. In September of the same year two Polish senators visited him, and in secret discussions with his most faithful elders the so-called Hadyach Agreement was concluded (16 September 1658). This Agreement provided for the abolition of the Union of the Churches in the Ukraine; for the right of the Metropolitan of Kiev and four Orthodox bishops to sit in the *Seym*; for a full amnesty for all past activities; that Kiev should become the official residence of the Hetman; that Polish troops should be sent into the Ukraine only at the request of the Hetman; and that no taxes should be payable to the Polish crown either on the left or on the right bank of the Dniepr. The Cossacks agreed no longer to recognize the Muscovite Tsar as their liege-lord, but in case of war between Muscovy and Poland they retained the right to observe neutrality. 'Friendship' with the Crim Khan was to be permitted; but not with the King of Sweden. Other clauses provided for the right to found two academies and numerous schools and typographies for printing books—an indication of the influence on the drafting of the Agreement of the unfortunate Yuri Nemirich, who wished his compatriots to develop their Orthodox culture in the tradition of the great Sahaydachny. The Hetman also received the

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175 right to present a hundred Cossacks each year to the King for ennoblement. (4)

In the Hadyach Agreement Vyhovsky and his friends sought to secure the support of the Polish crown in establishing the Cossack officer ranks as a governing and landowning class in the Ukraine; they aimed in fact at a reproduction of the *szlachta* system of the Polish state, into which system they had been born and in which they found themselves at ease. Their quarrel with the Poles was that they had not been treated as the equals of the Polish ruling gentry; now they were to return to Poland 'as free men to free men, as equal to equal'. The dislike of the Cossack colonels for the newly established Muscovite administration was the dislike of a feudal oligarchy for an imperial bureaucracy which itself showed tendencies to seek the support of the masses as a balance to check the insubordination of a local ruling class. Vyhovsky knew also that 'the rabble' would support the Tsar, since through its allegiance to the Tsar it had stabilized itself in the possession of new rights which it had itself conquered through revolt.

The Muscovite Government remained to the last moment reluctant to credit the Hetman's treason, the more so since it realized that Vyhovsky had the support of all Khmelnytsky's principal collaborators—men like the Colonels Bohun, Teterya and Hulyanitsky—and of the higher Ukrainian clergy. It remained repugnant to the Moscow officials to lend support to the discontent among the lower ranks of the Cossacks and the peasantry which was voiced by the Poltava regiment and the Zaporogian *Sech*, since they would have been sustaining mutiny against 'the legal authority' of the Hetman. At the same time Alexey Mikhailovich somewhat peevishly withdrew his embassy from Warsaw, and 30,000 Muscovite troops entered the Ukraine—with the assurance to Vyhovsky that they were sent 'to help him to deal with rebels'.

The formidable revolt of Vyhovsky which now broke out was destined to weaken Russia at an important juncture of international politics, as the revolt of Khmelnytsky ten years before had exposed the Poles to disaster.

Aware that he could delay no longer, the Hetman, in September 1658, gathered a force of 15,000 trusted Cossacks, secured the aid of Tartar auxiliaries, and attacked and annihilated the detachment of the unfortunate loyalist Colonel Pushkar.

The Zaporogian *Sech* and some of the regiments on the left bank of the Dniepr rose in revolt against the Hetman, but the lack of a competent leader was a serious impediment to the development of this movement of the Ukrainian lower classes. The Muscovite de-

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tachments which were scattered about the country also lacked 175*
effective command. Vyhovsky's supporters, together with the Tartars, took a number of 'rebel' towns between Poltava and the Dniepr, but they failed in an attack on Kiev. Prince Romodanovski, with a Muscovite corps on the left bank of the Dniepr, compelled Vyhovsky to retire, and with the help of the Zaporogians and Cossack detachments he took Romen, Lubni and Piryatin. These towns were burnt and plundered. 'God will find the guilty ones', observed the prince, 'the troops, meantime, have to enjoy their fun and receive some reward for the hardships of the campaign.' But the Muscovites failed to bring the Hetman to a decisive action and throughout 1659 all left-bank Ukraine was devastated by civil war. In the summer of that year, Vyhovsky, having augmented his forces by 30,000 Cossacks, 15,000 Tartars and 3000 Poles, routed the army of the *voyevodes* Trubetskoy and Pozharski near Konotop. Seven Muscovite regiments were annihilated; Prince Pozharski was taken prisoner; and the Tartars began to raid the border districts of Muscovy proper. The Polish *Seym* of 1659 now solemnly confirmed the Hadyach Agreement, and Vyhovsky's brothers with Yuri Nemirich swore allegiance to John Casimir in the Hetman's name.

The Muscovite position in the Ukraine was saved, not by the efforts of the imperial commanders, but by a general rising of the lower classes of the population on both banks of the Dniepr. While they nourished no special liking for 'the Tsar's soldiers' the Cossacks harboured no enmity towards them, but deep hatred for Poles and Tartars filled the wild Zaporogians and the masses of the Orthodox peasantry. Sometimes circumstances had forced the Ukrainians to fight with the Poles against the Tartars, and sometimes they had gone with the Tartars against the Poles, but now their Hetman required them to combine with both Poles and Tartars against the Orthodox Muscovites. The naive simplicity of the peasantry was tempered by a rugged common sense and it was too much to ask of them. The Zaporogians had found a leader of quality in the popular *ataman* Sirko. Sirko appeared on the right bank of the Dniepr, where he was joined by colonels who had grievances against Vyhovsky. Young Yuri Khmelnytsky, whose interests were pressed by Ivan Bryukhovetsky, a simple Cossack but a faithful servant of the family, was proclaimed Hetman. Vyhovsky crossed to the right bank of the Dniepr, and this part of the country which had hitherto been spared became the scene of bloodthirsty partisan warfare. It soon became apparent that on the right bank the whole population was saturated with hatred of Polish domination and that Vyhovsky's game was lost even before he had fought a pitched battle; his troops dis-

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*175 persed; some of his principal adherents, including Yuri Nemirich, were killed; and the Hetman himself fled to Poland after having surrendered the ensigns of his office to Yuri Khmelnytsky.

Colonel Peter Doroshenko was sent to the Muscovites to inform the *voyevode* Prince Trubetskoy of these events; but the latter demanded that the election of Yuri Khmelnytsky should be officially confirmed by the *Rada*, which he proposed should be convened at Pereyaslavl. Before the new *Rada* assembled, attempts were made both by the Muscovite commissioners and the Cossack leaders to secure modifications of the Agreement of 1654. The Muscovites required that all the Seversk lands, including Novgorod-Seversk and Starodub, should pass out of Cossack jurisdiction and be included in the territory of Great Russia, since these territories had originally been detached by the Poles. This proposal met a firm refusal from the Cossacks; it was these very lands which were becoming the most prosperous in the Ukraine, for on the banks of the Seym and the Desna, far away from Polish and Tartar attacks, new towns and villages were arising almost every year. Peter Doroshenko and other colonels on their side formulated the demand that a Muscovite *voyevode* should reside in Kiev only; but the Muscovite commissioners insisted on appointments also for Pereyaslavl, Nezhin, Chernigov, Uman and Bratslav. Yuri Khmelnytsky undertook to provide Cossack regiments for the Tsar's service, and 'not to offer assistance to anyone' without an order from the Tsar. These negotiations were embodied, on 17 October 1659, in the Second Agreement of Pereyaslavl.

Neither side could afford delay, since another war with Poland was threatened, and the frightened population of the right bank of the Dniepr was fleeing in thousands to the left bank and beyond into 'new Ukraine', where already the towns of Akhtyrka, Sumy, Izyum and Kharkov were growing up.

§3. SECOND RUSSO-POLISH WAR: TREATY OF ANDRUSOVO

In February 1660 the unexpected death of Charles X and the desire of the Regency of the infant Charles XI to liquidate the international commitments of Sweden entirely transformed the situation in Northern and Eastern Europe. The Treaty of Oliva, negotiated through French mediation, at last ended the long feud between the Polish and Swedish Vasas (3 May); the Treaty of Copenhagen between Denmark and Sweden terminated the Baltic War (27 May); and in the following year the Treaty of Kardis which the Regency

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made with the embarrassed Government of Tsar Alexey confirmed the restoration to Sweden of the temporary Russian conquests in Estonia and Ingria (2 July 1661). 175*

In spite of the vicissitudes of the Polish campaigns, Sweden had emerged from the war as a Great Power. 'All the islands in the Baltic, except the Danish group, belonged to Sweden. The estuaries of all the great German rivers (for the Niemen and the Vistula are properly Polish rivers) debouched in Swedish territory, within which lay two-thirds of Lake Ladoga and one-half of Lake Peipus. Stockholm, the capital, lay in the very centre of the empire, whose second greatest city was Riga, on the other side of the sea.' The confirmation of the sovereignty of Brandenburg over East Prussia and the release of the Elector from the nominal suzerainty of the Polish King marked the emergence of Brandenburg-Prussia as a power of some importance.

As in the time of Casimir IV the Poles turned towards the south-east to seek compensation for losses on the Baltic, and the rapid expansion of the market for grain after the end of the Thirty Years' War excited the Polish magnates to restore their shaken fortunes from the teeming produce of the Black Sea river lands. The remarkable capacity of the Poles for recovery was never more evident than in the Russian campaigns of 1661–7; indolence and cynicism prevented the Polish aristocracy from rallying their tenantry for the King's service in the hour of need; but this looseness of social and military organization implied also resilience; defeats in the field shook the Polish monarchy, but they no more than bruised the flexible structure of Polish society, based as it was on the feudal economy of the fortified mansions and monasteries of the magnates and bishops rather than on the royal towns.

In Russia, on the other hand, the effort to establish a modern state structure after the chaos of the Time of Troubles combined with the exhaustion of the Polish, Ukrainian and Swedish campaigns had overstrained the strength of the new monarchy. The confusions in the Ukraine were contemporary with social and religious disorders in Great Russia; the tumults of 1648 were renewed in those of 1661–2; in the latter year Tsar Alexey was faced at Kolomenskoe with an angry mob calling for vengeance on some of his officials, and 'he was saved only by the ruthless action of his guard, by which some 7000 persons perished'.

In the summer of 1660, following the conclusion of the Treaty of Oliva with the Swedes, the Poles resumed the war with Russia; Sapieha and Czarniecki, the veteran of Berestechko, invaded Lithuania and White Russia, and Prince Khovanski was defeated at

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*175 Polonka. The decisive influence of the Ukrainian Cossacks in Russo-Polish campaigns of the period immediately became evident; with Khmelnytsky on their side the Russians had carried all before them at Smolensk, Lublin and Lvov. Now, with the Cossacks divided, the Russian military strength proved incompetent to oppose the Poles.

In the Ukraine, the old Crown Hetman Stephen Potocki, whose defeat at Zhovti Vody twelve years before had precipitated 'the Deluge', was joined by 20,000 Crim Tartars, and moved against the Muscovite *voyevode* Sheremetiev on the borders of Volhynia. The newly elected Hetman, Yuri Khmelnytsky, rode to the help of the Muscovites. But rumours of Russian failures in the north revived the influence of the supporters of Vyhovsky; Peter Doroshenko opened relations with the Poles, and Yuri Khmelnytsky not only recognized the Hadyach Agreement but joined forces with Potocki. Sheremetiev found himself surrounded by the Poles, Tartars and dissident Cossacks, and decided to capitulate on condition that he should be allowed a free passage through the Ukraine with his troops. But no sooner had he surrendered than the Tartars started to massacre the helpless Muscovite soldiery, while Sheremetiev, and his *voyevodes* Princes Shcherbatov and Kozlovski, were carried off to the Crimea, where the unfortunate *boyars* remained in captivity for the next twenty years.

The treason of Yuri Khmelnytsky did not save the lands on the right bank of the Ukraine, for Potocki, ignoring the Hadyach Agreement, set his riders to take vengeance on the peasants for all the excesses committed on the Polish gentry during the preceding twelve years.

On the left bank of the Dniepr the Chernigov, Nezhin and Pereyaslavl regiments decided to depose Yuri Khmelnytsky and to elect as temporary Hetman the Pereyaslavl Colonel Samko. Tsar Alexey sent a recompense to Samko for his loyalty, but in view of the chaotic state of affairs in the Ukraine throughout the year 1662 the Muscovite Government was in no hurry to recognize anyone.

Civil war was flaring up alternately on the left and on the right banks of the Dniepr. Samko was not the only man who wished to be Hetman; there were a good many candidates for the title—the Nezhin Colonel Vasili Zolotarenko (a relation of the hero of the last war with Poland, who had been killed in 1665), Peter Doroshenko, Paul Teterya, and Ivan Bryukhovetsky, the former faithful servitor of the Khmelnytskys, who had now become the favourite of the Zaporogian *Sech*. Yuri Khmelnytsky was losing ground every day,

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and had been defeated in many affrays by the troops of Samko and of the Muscovite *voyevode* Romodanovski. Finally he lost heart and became a monk at Moshnin. The Poles now recognized as Hetman Khmelnytsky's adherent, Paul Teterya; Samko continued to maintain his election on the right bank, while in the *Sech* the Zaporogians acclaimed Bryukhovetsky. Moscow refused to recognize anyone, but two officials who had been sent to investigate, Prince Gagin and Cyril Khlopov, reported that Bryukhovetsky was one of those men who gather harvests where nothing was sown and that 'he is fit to be Hetman because, though ignorant, he is intelligent and as for thieving—none like him. Should he be appointed, we can all sleep soundly in Moscow'.

The Muscovite officials had decided that Bryukhovetsky, ambitious, unscrupulous and capable, who had risen from the lower classes, was the most convenient candidate for the imperial Government, exactly on account of his nearness to the lowest layers of the Ukrainian population. The upper ranks of the Cossacks, the men who had been Khmelnytsky's closest collaborators, like Vyhovsky or Paul Teterya or even his own son Yuri, had all proved traitors, not only to the Tsar, but also to their own people, who desired neither a restoration of Polish dominion nor a class régime.

A description of the *Rada* which assembled at Nezhin during the year 1663 for the election of a Hetman gives an impression of the chaos which reigned in the Ukraine at that time. 'On 18 July the sound of drums assembled the people to the envoys' tent where were Prince Gagin, Khlopov and others. Never had there been such a *Rada* in Ukraine. Bryukhovetsky, standing among the Zaporogians, was gibing at Samko and Zolotarenko. The Pereyaslavl regiment was yelling "We want Samko"; "Zolotarenko" screamed the Nezhin Cossacks. The yells of the Zaporogians, "Bryukhovetsky, Bryukhovetsky", drowned all other sounds. The Tsar's envoys tried to enforce silence; but the noise and confusion was growing, scuffles began, knives glistened; the different factions in the crowd were fighting each other, and it all ended in bloodshed. Samko fled through the tent of the Moscow representatives, but was nearly killed by blows. In the envoys' tent itself and around it many were beaten to death by the Zaporogians. Prince Gagin was nearly thrashed by the surging crowd. The Cossacks of Samko and Zolotarenko, seeing the impossibility of resisting the Zaporogians, joined them; Bryukhovetsky was put upon a table covered by a standard and proclaimed Hetman' (N. Markovich).

Bryukhovetsky was not satisfied with this; having been made Hetman, he arrested Samko, Zolotarenko and several other colonels,

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*175 evidently fearing that the wheel of fortune might turn. In September of the year all the prisoners were executed without any adequate reason, since none of them had ever proved traitors to the Tsar. A contemporary describes the decapitation of Samko carried out by a Tartar executioner. 'Struck by the manly comeliness of Samko's face and his herculean body, the executioner was amazed. He hesitated for a long time to lift his axe, but was forced to do so, and the head of a gallant man rolled in the dust.'

The situation in the Ukraine during the autumn of 1663 seemed to take on a definite shape: on the one side were the Polish troops supported by such prominent Cossack colonels as Paul Teterya, Peter Doroshenko, Bohun and Hulyanitsky; on the other were the Muscovites with 'the rabble'—Bryukhovetsky, the darling of the people, and his Zaporogians.

The Polish successes in Lithuania (where Vilna had been taken from the Muscovites) and White Russia now allowed the ageing King John Casimir to turn his attention to the reconquest of the Ukraine. Forty thousand Polish troops were concentrated in Volhynia; the King himself took command, seconded by such celebrated commanders as old Stephen Czarniecki and John Sobieski. Bearing the title of 'Voyevode of Kiev' Vyhovsky made his appearance in the royal camp. John Casimir crossed the Dniepr, and neither Bryukhovetsky's Cossacks nor the scattered Muscovite detachments dared to meet him in the open field. They fled to the fortified towns, which then surrendered easily to the Cossack colonels with the Polish army. The Poles, with their Tartar auxiliaries, were ruthless, plundering the countryside and burning the villages, while the terrified peasantry trekked in their thousands towards 'the new Ukraine' in the north-east. Only Nezhin held out for the Tsar, and leaving it on their flank the Poles invaded the Seversk lands. But the King sat down before the fortress of Glukhov (Ukr. Hlukhiv) which, garrisoned by the regiments of Chernigov, Nezhin and Starodub, put up a stout resistance. With the approach of spring, bringing the overflow of rivers and increasing difficulties in supply in a devastated country, the Poles were threatened by the advancing army of Prince Romodanovski. John Casimir suddenly left the army (the political situation in Warsaw was becoming critical), and Czarniecki began to retire beyond the Dniepr. Bryukhovetsky followed the retreating Poles, while, on the right bank of the Dniepr, the news of Polish failure helped the Zaporogian *ataman* Sirko to incite the Cossacks and peasants to revolt. Sirko took Uman and Bratslav; but, still faithful to the King, Vyhovsky and Teterya continued to resist in Chigirin and Belaya Tserkov. Dissensions however arose, and

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Vyhovsky, without any grounds whatever, was accused of 'treason to the King' and hastily shot. 175 *

Czarniecki himself proved a match for the Cossack leaders. This old enemy of the Ukrainian Cossacks dealt a series of severe blows to Hetman Bryukhovetsky and *ataman* Sirko. He was conducting a merciless war, destroying all towns and villages which were on the side of 'the rebels'. He ordered Subbotovo, the hereditary estate of the Khmelnytsky family, to be burnt. The bodies of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and of his eldest son Timosh were taken out of their graves and burned and their ashes scattered to the wind. Since the battle of Kumeyki in 1638, Czarniecki had spent all his life in incessant warfare. The campaign of 1664 proved to be his last; he died during the autumn at a very advanced age.

In the meantime while negotiations for a peace between Muscovy and Poland had opened at Durovichi—negotiations which should at that juncture have resulted in a settlement favourable to the Poles—the revolt of the new Grand Hetman Lubomirski had precipitated a dynastic crisis which the failing health of King John Casimir and his lack of a male heir made sooner or later inevitable.

The extinction of the Polish Vasas, like the extinction of the Jagiellons ninety years before, opened the field of Polish politics to all the ambitious dynasts of Europe. Alexey Mikhailovich, as Ivan IV had done, tendered his pretensions, and the project of a union of the Slav monarchies had always its attractions for a section of the Polish magnates; but the resumption of warfare promoted by the defection from Moscow of Vyhovsky and the Cossack leaders had prejudiced the prospects of the Romanovs. The Rákóczys, recalling the fame of Stephen Báthory, had had high hopes of a union of the Transylvanian, Polish and Moldo-Wallachian crowns; but in 1660 the reviving power of Turkey, which was soon to menace both the Habsburg and the Polish dominions, had crushed the sturdy and over-reaching independence of the Translyvanian princes. Since the Emperor Ferdinand III had intervened in favour of John Casimir in 1655, Austrian influences had been ascendant at the court of Warsaw, where the Gonzaga Queen, Maria Ludwika, had influenced the policy of her always hesitant and vacillating husband. So strong was the Austrian interest that 'schemes were entertained for adding the great Slav kingdom to the possessions of the house of Habsburg'. But about 1660 the Queen had been won to the French interest, when the wide conceptions of Cardinal Mazarin, reviving the French policy of the preceding century which had secured passing possession of the Polish crown for a Valois prince, planned to bring Poland again within the sphere of the French system. In 1663 the

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*175 marriage of the favourite niece of the Polish Queen to the Duc d'Enghien, heir of the great Condé, introduced a scheme to persuade the Poles to elect either Enghien or his father during the lifetime of John Casimir. 'As soon as this should be done, John Casimir pledged himself to abdicate and to retire to a more congenial life in France, where rich benefices were allotted for his maintenance.'

The Habsburg Leopold I, 'the little Emperor in red stockings', whose election to the imperial dignity in 1658 had been seriously incommoded by the intrigues of Mazarin, was quick to counter any extension of French influence in Eastern Europe—particularly when that influence might combine again with the military power of Sweden. The help in French troops which enabled Leopold to repulse a Turkish invasion of his hereditary dominions at the battle of St Gotthard (1 August 1664) did not prevent him from sending his agents to stir up resentment in Poland against the project of allowing a reigning King to direct the choice of his successor. But the revolt of the new Grand Hetman Lubomirski against the French court party failed, and John Sobieski, whose wife Marie d'Arquien was a Frenchwoman, received the ensigns of Grand Hetman and identified himself with the project of a French succession.

On the eastern frontiers, the dynastic crisis had at the same time wrecked the Polish prospects in the Durovichi negotiations and betrayed the military position in the Ukraine. Muscovite detachments appeared in Kiev, and with the aid of Bryukhovetsky's Cossacks forced the Poles and their adherents to withdraw from the Ukraine.

Neither the Russians nor the Poles were now prepared, after years of exhausting warfare, to continue the struggle. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1665, Bryukhovetsky was received in Moscow, where he came in order 'to do humble homage to the Tsar on behalf of the Ukrainian towns'. The Hetman was received with many honours and, in spite of his lowly origin, was married to a daughter of the proud house of Sheremetiev. Some of the Cossack elders and colonels in the suite of the Hetman, which according to a contemporary writer 'formed a numerous cavalcade', also contracted alliances with the daughters of Muscovite officials. The whole of September 1665 was spent in rejoicings and marriage feasts. The results of all this junketing were additions to the Agreement of March 1654 which were published on 11 October 1665. According to the new clauses 'all the land belonged to the Tsar and not to the Hetman', and therefore all taxes paid by the townsfolk and the peasantry, were to go into the Tsar's Exchequer; also 'the taxes on taverns where spirits were drunk', the taxes on mills, 'the tribute of honey' and the duties paid by foreign merchants. The right of the Cossacks

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to self-government was confirmed, as also their right of election of 175
their own Hetman and officials; but, in order that the taxes should be duly collected by the Tsar's Exchequer, Muscovite *voyevodes* were sent to many Ukrainian towns accompanied by flocks of officials and troops for permanent garrison duty.

In many respects the terms of the 'additions' merely clarified the Agreement of 1654 and carried into effect the original bases on which that Agreement had been concluded. But the Ukraine received the news of 'Bryukhovetsky's Agreement' as proof of his treason. Very few Cossacks indeed knew the contents of the Agreement of 1654, and those who had known them had forgotten them or wanted to forget them, the practice of recent years having been in absolute contradiction to the theoretical rights of the Muscovite Tsars. Furthermore, Moscow had made a dangerous enemy in the higher Ukrainian clergy, who had been angered by Bryukhovetsky's petition that the Metropolitan of Kiev should be appointed from Moscow.

During the first months of 1666 news spread through the Ukraine about the concessions extracted from Bryukhovetsky in Moscow. The worst rumours were confirmed by the arrival of *voyevodes*, not only in Kiev, Pereyaslavl, Chernigov and Nezhin, but also in many smaller towns where tax-collectors appeared who 'gathered taxes with such zeal that not even a copeck escaped their vigilant eye'. Precise schedules were drawn up of different properties and revenues. Non-payment of taxes was severely punished. As an old Ukrainian historian somewhat naively remarked: 'This innovation, perhaps usual in other lands, in ours seemed cruel, pernicious and unbearable.'

It was no easy task to attempt to establish order in the Ukraine. Bishop Methodi began to preach, calling on the people to rise against Bryukhovetsky and, hence, against Moscow. Doroshenko, who controlled much of the territory on the right bank of the Dniepr, crossed to the left bank, took Pereyaslavl, where a Muscovite official was murdered, and attacked Zolotonosha, where the *voyevode* Prince Shcherbatov and many Muscovites were put to death. The whole of the left bank now flamed into revolt; Nezhin and the towns of the Poltava region recognized Doroshenko. Everywhere Muscovite officials were either killed or driven away. Even the Zaporogian *Sech*, which until then had been friendly to Moscow, dismissed the 'auxiliary' Muscovite detachment stationed there; and the Zaporogians threw into the Dniepr the Muscovite ambassador, Ladyzhenski, on his way home from the Crimea.

The renewal of anarchy in the Ukraine finally decided the Muscovite Chancellery to conclude peace with the Poles on the basis of the

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175* partition of the country, the struggle for the mastery of which had imposed such a long and exhausting trial of strength on both combatants.

In January 1667, in the village of Andrusovo, near Smolensk, a treaty was signed between the representatives of Tsar Alexey and John Casimir. Muscovy retained all the lands in occupation of her troops as far as the line where the course of the Dniepr turns to the south. The right bank Ukraine was recognized as Polish territory; and it was agreed that Kiev should remain for two more years in the occupation of the Muscovites, after which it should be handed over to the Poles. As for the Zaporogian *Sech*, it was clearly stated in the Treaty that the Zaporogians should do military service for both the Tsar and the King. (In this connection it should be recalled that in 1655 Bohdan Khmelnytsky had given a special charter to the Zaporogians—which was always kept on the altar of the church of Our Lady's Protection in the *Sech*—whereby the possession of all lands on both the left and right banks of the Dniepr below the rapids was conceded to them.)

The Treaty of Andrusovo established not only amicable relations but a form of alliance between Muscovy and Poland. In this sense the division of the Ukraine between the two powers must be regarded rather in the nature of a *condominium* than of a partition. Not only the exhaustion of the two Slav states, but also the sudden revival of the Ottoman power under the Köprülüs, must be taken to have formed the common ground on which the two states abandoned the feud which had kept them at war intermittently for more than half a century and entered into a common understanding for the defence of their mutual interests in the fluvial plains to the north of the Black Sea. The significance of the Treaty of Andrusovo is quite clear: to the Muscovites fell the duty of combating the Crim Tartars and to the Poles that of confronting the menacing power of the Ottomans on the Dniestr and in Transylvania. But Muscovy further undertook to support the Poles at any time with 20,000 troops and 5000 'of her own Cossacks'. And the two Governments agreed not to allow Peter Doroshenko to rule in any part of the Ukraine. The policy of Alexey Mikhailovich, developed at Andrusovo by the shrewd Ordyn-Nashchokin, was consecutive and long-sighted. Moscow established her frontier, for the time, along the Dniepr, with the prospect that with the aid of the Poles an issue to the sea in a southerly direction could be secured at the expense of the Crim Tartars, and in a northerly direction to the detriment of the Swedes, who in the recent wars had taken Livonia from Poland and deprived Muscovy of its reversion. Peter I was to continue the policy of his

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father which at Andrusovo, in 1667, had been clearly defined in a meridial direction—after the hopes, which had been inspired in 1655 by the capture of Smolensk, of a wide and rapid expansion towards the west had failed to mature. 175*

§4. THE TURKS IN THE UKRAINE: PETER DOROSHENKO AND YURI KHMELNYTSKY

Peter Doroshenko, outlawed by the Treaty of Andrusovo, proved to be a formidable obstacle to the development of a combined Russo-Polish policy in the Ukraine. He belonged to a family well known among the Cossacks. His grandfather, Michael, had been elected *ataman* in the *Sech* in 1625 and three years later had fallen in battle against the Tartars; and the glamour of the dead hero gave Peter a certain prestige among the lower ranks of the people. Further, although he was a colonel, he did not share the enthusiasm of other Cossack elders for the Polish class régime, and he did not subscribe to the Polish orientation of the adherents of the Hadyach Agreement of 1658.

After the Treaty of Andrusovo Doroshenko became an irreconcileable opponent of the Polish and the Muscovite regimes in the two parts of the Ukraine. The natural consequence was that he reverted to the ideas of collaboration with the Turks which had once attracted Bohdan Khmelnytsky. His Turkish orientation actually gave him a certain moral prestige, since he was basing his plans on a definite political conception in contrast to Vyhovsky, Teterya, Bryukhovetsky and others who had appeared to the Cossacks to be mere adventurers seeking their own personal profit in the post of Hetman. The aim of Peter Doroshenko was that the Ukraine should become a vassal state of the Porte, like Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia, and like those countries should retain an independence subject to tribute, a territorial unity, an autocephalous church, and the right to maintain an army, an administration and a treasury under a 'hospodar'—the Hetman—who might enjoy the international position which the Rákóczys had held in Transylvania until they had over-reached themselves. The fact that Doroshenko's plan was based on the conception of the unity of the Ukraine inspired respect, and it found justification in 'the partition' of Andrusovo; Doroshenko could count on the sympathy of those varied elements who did not wish to see the Ukraine divided, and he had on his side the clergy and the representatives of the new and active intellectual life of the Kiev Academy.

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175* In his way Peter Doroshenko was an honest man; nor was he particularly concerned to acquire the goods of this world. He was firm, patient, reserved and silent. The difficulties of his policy were manifold; for he was on the one hand helping the Turks and Tartars who since 1665 had begun to harass the Poles on the borders of Podolia, and on the other hand he had to hold the support of the Zaporogians who, in the same year, had deposed Bryukhovetsky and named him as Hetman and who, at the same time, under the celebrated Sirko, had resumed their raids against the Crimea and had taken Perekop and burned Baghchi-Saray and Caffa. But so strong was the position of Doroshenko that both the Poles and the Muscovites, before the ink was dry on the Treaty of Andrusovo, made attempts to conciliate him. The former, embarrassed by the dynastic crisis in Warsaw, went so far as to remove Teterya as Hetman of the right bank, and recognized Doroshenko. In Moscow, at the same time, it was decided to depose Bryukhovetsky, whose rapacity, as well as his acceptance of the modifications of the Agreement of 1654, was making him excessively unpopular. Before the deposition had been effected, however, Doroshenko had raised another revolt on the left bank. The Muscovite *voyevodes* were only able to maintain their authority in Kiev, Chernigov and Pereyaslavl; in twelve other towns the officials were either killed or arrested and sold to the Tartars. To save his own head, Bryukhovetsky was actually taking a hand in the slaughter of the Moscow men. The rising spread into the 'new Ukraine' as far as Kharkov. Doroshenko himself appeared on the left bank and his Cossacks seized Bryukhovetsky, who was brought to Doroshenko's camp where he was beaten to death 'with oak sticks'.

For a few weeks the right and left banks were again united. But having received news from Chigirin of some misconduct of his wife, the irate Hetman hurried to the right bank, leaving Colonel Mnohohrishny (Mnogogreshny) in command. Before the end of the year, Mnohohrishny himself made terms with the Moscow Government. In January 1669 Cossack deputies appeared in the capital, and two months later a *Rada* assembled at Glukhov elected him as Hetman. A 'pardon' was sent from the Tsar to the Ukrainian Cossacks, and the old agreements were once more confirmed, with the concession that the presence of Muscovite *voyevodes* should be restricted to Kiev (which under the Treaty of Andrusovo was soon to be delivered to the Poles), Pereyaslavl, Nezhin, Chernigov and Oster. The Hetman's capital was established at Baturin, and (since Moscow apparently feared the spread of the anarchic spirit of the Dniepr Cossacks to the Don) a strong military force under old

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Prince Romodanovski was sent to the Seym and the Desna and permanently stationed in the neighbourhood of the new capital. 175*

The Moscow Government was still trying to conciliate Doroshenko, but meanwhile the latter had definitely committed himself to the Turks. In December 1668 Colonel Portyanka and the judge Bilohrud had arrived in Istanbul as envoys of the Ruthenians and Cossacks, and an agreement was concluded with the Porte whereby Sultan Muhammad IV graciously accepted the petition of the Hetman to take the Ukraine under his protection; the complete autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine was recognized, and a yearly tribute was to be paid to the Sultan. A Hetman's staff and a standard were presented to the envoys, and the Porte undertook to send a force of 6000 men to uphold Doroshenko against his enemies. But the proposal that garrisons of Janissaries should be posted in the Doroshenko's capital of Chigirin and in the Zaporogian fort of Kudak disturbed the equanimity of the Cossack emissaries.

The intervention of the Turks in the affairs of the Ukraine was no accident arising from the personal policy of Doroshenko. The revival of Turkish power under Viziers of the Albanian family of Köprülü influenced the history of the last half of the seventeenth century in many ways as profoundly as did the contemporary expansion of France under Louis XIV. The popular interpretation of Turkish history as a continuous decline from the days of Suleiman the Magnificent reflects the superficial and erroneous studies of West European Liberal historians of the nineteenth century. As the historical and geographical heir of Byzantium, the Ottoman Porte remained throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a prime factor in European politics; the Empire was in many respects more efficiently administered than were any contemporary European states with the exceptions of France and Sweden; indeed Greeks, Hungarians and Ukrainians, who as contemporaries must be admitted to have been good judges, frequently showed that they preferred Ottoman to Venetian, Austrian or Polish rule.

The disorders which rent the Ottoman dominions during the first part of the seventeenth century were no more grave than the commotions of the time, in France during the Huguenot Wars and later during the Fronde, and in England during the Civil War; they were, moreover, far less sanguinary and less disastrous than the Thirty Years' War in Germany, the Time of Troubles in Russia and the period of 'the Deluge' in Poland. The Ottoman army, if it showed at St Gotthard that it no longer retained the ascendancy over European troops which it had enjoyed under Suleiman the Magnificent, at least remained superior in fighting quality to the forces which either

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175* Poland, Muscovy or Venice could put into the field; though it was markedly inferior to those of Sweden and France, and inferior in command to those of Austria. The great campaigns of the Thirty Years' War had in fact vastly improved the military technique of Western armies, while those of Eastern Europe had not yet abandoned the fashions of the sixteenth century; but in this respect even, after the series of defeats which led up to the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Turks showed a remarkable capacity for adapting themselves to the military novelties of a new age. Indeed, in the first decades of the eighteenth century they were able to inflict defeats on the Russians (victors over Sweden) and on the Austrians (who had participated in the overthrow of the French hegemony).

The decline of the Ottoman Empire as a great power may be said to have arisen eventually, not from any inherent defects by contrast with neighbouring Austria and Poland, but from more profound causes—the shift of the centre of world politics from the inner seas to the oceans, from the 'peninsular' basis which was represented by the Mediterranean world to the 'continental' basis which came into being with the expansion of Russia and America into sub-continental powers at the end of the eighteenth century and the trans-oceanic extension of the Western maritime powers over Africa, the Americas and Southern Asia. The stage of history had been immeasurably widened, and the old actors found themselves dwarfed.

In 1661, the year in which Louis XIV assumed the reins of government in France, Ahmed, the son of old Mehmed Köprülü, was at the age of twenty-six called to the office of Grand Vizier. Ahmed Köprülü, in his private life a libertine and a drunkard who died from his excesses at the early age of forty, was at the same time a scholar and a man of taste whom contemporary European writers unite in praising for his infallible judgment and penetrating intellect. For fifteen years Ahmed Köprülü ruled the brilliant and fantastic court of Muhammad IV, giving his master who delighted in great hunts the credit for great victories. With his caustic tongue, his incisive wit, and his superb insolence, the Albanian Grand Vizier was, with Louis XIV, the arbiter of Europe. His policies directed the course of events in Russia, Austria and Poland, and the Government of Louis XIV waited upon rather than influenced their trends.

In 1669, a few months after Doroshenko's mission, Ahmed Köprülü completed the conquest of Crete from the Venetians. At the same time events in the Habsburg and the Polish dominions were engaging the attention of the Porte. In those parts of Hungary which were subject to the Habsburg crown, the Emperor Leopold was confronted by a widespread conspiracy of the Hungarian magnates to

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set up an independent kingdom with Turkish or French support. 175
The position of the Roumanian principalities in vassalage to the Sultan—which later Liberal historians have found so degraded—attracted the Hungarian nobles no less than the Cossack colonels. Contemporary leaders in these border countries found freedom of confession and a real autonomy more easily in Istanbul than in Vienna; and the character and tragic career of Emeric Tököli, the Protestant chieftain of the Hungarian gentry, was strangely similar to that of Peter Doroshenko.

Meanwhile in Poland the pathetic old King John Casimir had finally summoned the courage to abdicate, and the *Seym*, in June 1669, harassed by the importunities of the rival Austrian and French candidates for the vacant thrones, had elected as King Michael Vishnevetsky (Wiśniowiecki), a descendant at once of the old royal Piast house and of the most ancient nobility of South Russia. He was, moreover, a son of the celebrated Prince Jeremy. That King Michael was a poor creature who had none of his father's spirit and wept tears on his election was no doubt almost a recommendation to his peers. The offence to Louis XIV in the neglect of Condé's claims was deepened in the following year by the new King's marriage to the Archduchess Maria Eleonora, a sister of the Emperor Leopold. But the Grand Hetman Sobieski, whose wife, Marie d'Arquien, was the principal agent of French intrigue in Poland, continued to make all government impossible, and in the following year he conspired with the Primate Prażmowski to dethrone the King.

In the Ukraine, towards the end of 1669, the news of Doroshenko's agreement with the Turks provoked a serious rising against him on the right bank. Colonel Khanenko was elected Hetman and appealed to the Poles and Muscovites for aid. Doroshenko defeated his rival and crossed to the left bank, where in his turn he was worsted by the detachments of Romodanovski and Mnohohrishny. The time had come for Kiev to be delivered to the Poles under the terms of the Treaty of Andrusovo, but the Moscow Government, insisting on the threat to Kiev from Doroshenko, persuaded the Poles to leave the city temporarily in their hands so that it should not fall into those of the Turks. At the same time the new King Michael recognized Khanenko as Hetman of the right bank.

Throughout 1670 and the summer of 1671 confused fighting continued. The Muscovite Government was confronted by the rising of Stenka Razin, which, beginning already as early as 1668, had in 1671 assumed the most formidable proportions. Turkish sources indicate that the Porte, both through its own agents and through Doroshenko, was fully informed on the internal situation in Poland and

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*175 Muscovy. In 1671 Ukrainian Cossacks, together with the loyal Cossacks of the Don, were sent to the Volga to fight the hordes of Razin, which themselves contained many lawless elements who had originally come from the Ukraine. While the Muscovites were still trying to conciliate Doroshenko, and envoys from the Tsar were urging the Hetman 'for the weal of the Ukraine to break with Turkey and to become a loyal subject of the King of Poland', Polish detachments, supporting Khanenko, drove Doroshenko's Cossacks out of Bratslav and Bar. At the same time another envoy, Vasili Loboyko, arrived in Istanbul to seek Turkish intervention on behalf of the Hetman. The interpreter of the Polish Embassy was informed by the Porte that the Polish attack on the Hetman had 'caused the Sultan to abandon the plan which he had formed to pass the winter in Asia Minor and not to quit Adrianople', and that unless the King ceased 'to torment Doroshenko' the Sultan would invade Poland in the coming spring. With social war on the Volga and dynastic conspiracies in Poland, the moment was well chosen for a powerful Turkish intervention in the Ukraine. Ahmed Köprülü prepared the ground for his Ukrainian conquest with the same astute competence which he was applying to his struggle for supremacy with the Habsburgs in Hungary. During the spring of 1672 a large army was concentrated on the line of the Dniestr; vast requisitions of provisions were extracted from the Roumanian principalities; and the Crim Khan, Adil Giray, accused of hostile actions against Doroshenko, was replaced by the more pliable Selim.

Meantime, on the left bank of the Dniepr, the Cossack elders had been plotting against the Tsar's Hetman, Mnohohrishny, with whom they were displeased owing to his appointment of near relatives to all important posts. The whole affair ended in a kind of palace revolution. One fine night the Hetman was seized, bound, and put into a peasant cart covered with skins and sent off to Moscow on the charge that 'through Doroshenko he was having secret relations with Turkey'. People in Moscow knew that Mnohohrishny was innocent, but thought it better not to send him back to the Ukraine. He was given a post in Siberia, where he proved himself to be a loyal man.

In July 1672 Ivan Samoylovich, who had been a judge until then, was elected Hetman. He was the son of a priest, astute and intelligent, and he tried to please both the Cossack colonels and the Muscovite *voyevodes*. He was the first Hetman who had not been a military man and he belonged to the class of officials which had grown up since the Agreement of 1654. It was easier for Moscow to have dealings with a man of this type than with some unruly son of the *Sech* or

with some Cossack colonel who could not forget the class traditions of the Polish *szlachta*.

In August 1672 a powerful Turkish army made up of the veterans of the recent Cretan War crossed the Dniestr; Sultan Muhammad IV, with the Moldavian and Wallachian Hospodars and Selim Khan Giray in his suite, accompanied the troops. Under the walls of Kamenets-Podolsk they were joined by 12,000 of Doroshenko's Cossacks. The city fell after a twelve days' siege (31 August); and, although the principal churches were converted into mosques, the inhabitants were treated with consideration, for the Turks meant to stay.

The Grand Admiral Kaplan Mustafa Pasha—'a tiger on the land and a crocodile in the sea' as a contemporary describes him—who was one of the team of turbulent and grasping brothers-in-law with whom Ahmed Köprülü ruled the Empire, moved on Lvov, supported by Doroshenko and his Cossacks. While the ancient city purchased its immunity from a Turkish and Cossack occupation by the payment of a heavy ransom in gold, the Grand Hetman Sobieski, who had been skirmishing in Moldavia, chose the opportunity to renew his conspiracies against the King.

The unfortunate King Michael summoned a national armed assembly (*ruszenie pospolite*), but it failed to assemble in time; and in the middle of October, through the mediation of Selim Khan Giray, he hurriedly signed the shameful Peace of Buchach. Poland ceded to the Porte the whole of Podolia with the fortresses of Kamenets-Podolsk, Bar and Vinnitsa; and Doroshenko was recognized as Hetman of the right bank of the Dniepr and vassal of the Sultan. In addition to the ransom for Lvov, which had not all been paid, the King undertook to remit to the Porte an indemnity of 220,000 ducats.

Aroused by disasters for which he was by his rebellious conduct primarily responsible, Sobieski now prepared to resist the Peace of Buchach. When the *ruszenie pospolite* met at Golenba and ordered an enquiry into the conduct of the Grand Hetman and his accomplices, he frustrated the intentions of his peers by summoning a counter-confederation to meet at Szczebrzeszyn. Unable to oppose the rebels, both the King and the *Seym* submitted, and the rival groups composed their differences on the basis of a repudiation of the Treaty and the indemnity and a renewal of the war.

In the summer of 1673 a large Turkish army was again concentrated on the Dniestr, while the luxurious hunting camp which constituted the court of Muhammad IV took up its quarters on the coast of the Dobrogea. Sobieski, who had been joined by numerous

*175 Roumanian *boyars*, had invaded northern Moldavia, but it was only at the beginning of November that the main armies met on the historic field of Khotin, where half a century before Vladislav IV, with Sahaydachny at his side, had beaten the army of Osman II. The battle began badly for the Poles when the Wallachian Hospodar, Gregory Ghica, who had rallied to the camp of Sobieski, deserted to the Turks; and the impetuous impact of the Cossack and Roumanian horse was broken by the ranks of the Janissaries. But the regiments of Russian dragoons and hussars, who had come to the help of the Poles under the clauses of the Treaty of Andrusovo, followed Sobieski in a charge which overwhelmed the Ottoman left flank, and the army of the Sultan scattered in headlong flight.

The Polish victory was complete. On 3 December their troops entered Jassy to set up as Hospodar Stephen Petriceicu, and in Bucarest the deserter Ghica was replaced by Constantine Bassarab; while in the Dobrogea, where the Turks maintained their winter quarters, the Zaporogian Sirko sacked Braila under the eyes of the Grand Vizier.

The position of Doroshenko now became perilous. At the beginning of 1674, Prince Romodanovski and the Hetman Samoylovich crossed to the right bank of the Dniepr. Doroshenko lost Cherkassy and Kanev. Later Korsun and Belaya Tserkov surrendered, and only Chigirin was left to the Sultan's vassal.

At this juncture Sobieski abandoned the war to return to the intricate game of dynastic politics in Warsaw. The unhappy King Michael had died on the very day of Khotin, and the triumphant Grand Hetman, at once the betrayer of his country's interests and the vindicator of his country's honour, was the obvious candidate for the succession. But, despite the parlous situation of the country, there was no lack of foreign candidates—among them James, Duke of York, who had just been deprived of office in England by his failure to comply with the conditions of the Test Act. Sobieski attended the *Seym* of 1674 at the head of 6000 veterans of Khotin and in the teeth of the opposition of the Lithuanian magnates secured election.

While the ambassadors of Austria and France and the great Polish lords trafficked in intrigue in the drawing-rooms of Warsaw, Ahmed Köprülü in his camp of Babadagh was preparing a new invasion. On 2 July the Sultan crossed the Danube; the agents of France, Austria and the United Provinces were in his train—the first in regular communication with Louis's ambassador in Warsaw, the Bishop of Marseilles. The campaign of 1674 was little more than a triumphal progress; the Roumanian strong places were retaken and the

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Turkophil Hospodars, Ghica and Cantacuzene, restored in Bucarest 175* and Jassy.

The principal Turkish military effort was now directed towards the restoration of their Hetman Doroshenko on the right bank of the Dniepr. Kara Mustafa Pasha, another of Ahmed Köprülü's brothers-in-law, destined soon to succeed him, took Ladyzhin and Uman. The bloodthirsty and arrogant Albanian wreaked cruelties which were in violent contrast to the moderate and far-sighted Turkish conduct of the campaign of 1672—cruelties which had the effect of prejudicing all Turkish prospects in the Ukraine. At Uman the Turks flayed the Cossack elders, and, stuffing their skins with straw, made scarecrows out of them. Thousands of girls and young boys were despatched to the Turkish slave markets. Doroshenko was horrified by the ruin wrought, by the closing of churches and the forcible conversions to Islam. He felt that his own downfall was near and appealed to the Tsar, promising to abandon his Turkish ally if he were recognized as Hetman by Moscow. The Tsar did not even deign to reply. When, in December, the numerous Turkish court with the bulk of the army retired to Adrianople to celebrate the somewhat insignificant victories of the year's campaign in fabulous feasts and mammoth hunting expeditions, the new Polish King, John III Sobieski, invaded the Ukraine and took back Bar, Vinnitsa, Bratslav and Nemirov with little resistance from the scattered Janissary garrisons.

In June 1675 the Turks undertook their fourth summer campaign against the Poles. They captured Zbarazh but were defeated under the walls of Bar, while a march against Lvov was repulsed by the King. Meanwhile John III had concluded a treaty of alliance with Louis XIV, and the weight of French diplomacy was directed towards the conclusion of a lasting peace between the Poles and the Turks which should prepare the way for Louis's designs against the Habsburgs.

'Sobieski was bound to France by early associations, by the influence of his wife, Marie d'Arquien, and by his identification during recent years with the French party in Poland. Louis naturally sought to make the most of what might prove invaluable assistance in the east. He sent the Marquis de Béthune, who had married an elder sister of the new Queen of Poland, to carry his congratulations to Sobieski; and on 11 June 1675 a treaty of alliance was concluded between France and Poland. The Polish King was to receive a subsidy of 200,000 crowns, and French assistance in the design of restoring Polish suzerainty over East Prussia. In return, he was to allow recruiting in his dominions for the French service and to give

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*175 a helping hand to the Hungarian rebels. Thus Louis had it in his power to stir up formidable difficulties which would divert the forces of Austria and also those of the Elector of Brandenburg, who had rejoined the coalition against France.... Great efforts were made by France to bring about peace between Poland and Turkey. So long as the war lasted neither power could give effective assistance to Hungary; but its termination would enable France to bring either the Turks or the Poles into the field against the Emperor. The task was a difficult one because Köprülü refused to surrender any of the conquests of 1672, and Sobieski could only hope to make the Crown hereditary in his family by freeing Polish soil from the infidel' (Lodge, *Camb. Mod. Hist.* vol. v).

In the summer of 1676 a Turkish army under Ibrahim Pasha Shaitan ('the Devil') resumed the offensive on the Dniestr. In October, King John III with 30,000 men was surrounded at Żurawno; the Turks proved unable to storm the camp, but after a twenty days' blockade the Poles were beginning to suffer from shortage of provisions; and a treaty, known as that of Żurawno, was concluded. As Köprülü, a fine statesman but an indifferent soldier in the field, had gained the favourable Treaty of Vasvár after the defeat of St Gotthard, he now, after the disaster of Khotin, retained by the Treaty of Żurawno all Podolia with Kamenets-Podolsk. The right bank of the Dniepr was to remain independent both of the King and of the Sultan, but the Poles were obliged to recognize the Sultan's authority over the Zaporogian territories beyond the rapids. This last condition affirmed the consistent policy of the Porte, which aimed at maintaining direct control of the immediate littoral of the Black Sea (which they now had in a semicircle from the Dobrogea and Budzhak territories, through Zaporogia and the Crimea, to the Kuban and Circassia) and leaving the hinterland to be administered by autonomous vassal potentates (the two Roumanian Hospodars and the Hetman). Ahmed Köprülü, who was almost in the last week of his life, was so delighted with the Treaty that he ordered the courier who brought the news—a Moldavian captain—to be given a purse of 200 ducats.

The victory of the Turks in the five years' war did not save Doroshenko. During the summer of 1676 Romodanovski and Samoylovich had been besieging the Hetman in Chigirin, and in September, a month before the conclusion of the Treaty of Żurawno, he had surrendered and sworn allegiance to Tsar Alexey (who too was approaching the end of his life). The Moscow Government treated Doroshenko with remarkable consideration. After he had been brought to Moscow, he was appointed *voyevode* of Vyatka, and

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to him and his family was granted the estate of Yaropolets (which later became the property of the family of Nathalie Goncharova, the wife of the poet Pushkin). The tolerant attitude of the Moscow Government towards Doroshenko seems strange, for he had not only been the cause of the death of many thousands of Ukrainians but also of thousands of Muscovite soldiers and of hundreds of officials. The Chigirin Hetman had been a traitor to the Orthodox Church, and had become the ally and vassal of the Sultan. When the terrible fates of rebel Cossack chieftains in Poland are remembered, it is surprising that this honourable exile was all the penalty which Doroshenko suffered for his misdeeds. The new Tsar Theodore Alexeyevich was exceedingly tolerant and humane and was free from the fits of rage which later were to characterize his younger brother Peter I. There were deeper reasons, however, for the patient and lenient attitude which the Moscow Government adopted generally towards the refractory leaders of the Ukrainian Cossacks. Moscow men of the seventeenth century were on the whole less inclined towards sanguinary repressions than their Polish contemporaries. The savagery of the Polish reprisals against the rebel Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants was inspired by the feeling of class: fear is always the source of cruelty and the Polish gentry feared 'the rabble' which they were oppressing. Executions were carried out not only in the name of an implacable Nemesis for past excesses but as an example to others. Tortures and executions were also carried out in Moscow after the suppression of the rising of Stenka Razin and for the same reasons. As for Doroshenko, from an official point of view, he could not be treated as a traitor to the Tsar since, according to the Andrusovo Treaty, he was a subject of the King of Poland. In fact everyone knew that, although mistaken, Doroshenko had not been guided by personal motives nor ambitions. The Tsar's Government understood this and treated him accordingly. Peter Doroshenko was no political adventurer of the type of Vyhovsky, Yuri Khmelnytsky, Bryukhovetsky and Ivan Mazeppa. Together with Sahaydachny and Bohdan Khmelnytsky he may be considered as one of the outstanding figures of the history of the Ukraine in the seventeenth century—in spite of the fact that his activities proved unfortunate and brought disaster to his native land.

Ahmed Köprülü had died a few days after the conclusion of the Treaty of Żurawno, and the accession to the Grand Vizierate of his brother-in-law, Kara Mustafa Pasha, caused satisfaction at Versailles: 'In all his actions he displayed that hatred and haughty contempt for the Giaurs which had been handed down from the days of Turkish triumph'; it was known that the new Grand Vizier had long

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*175 nursed the ambition to excel the achievement of Suleiman the Magnificent by becoming the conqueror of Vienna, and that before his accession he had persuaded the Sultan to express to the French Ambassador his willingness to make war upon the Emperor as soon as peace had been made with Poland. 'This momentous decision was formally approved by the French Council of State, and the conclusion of the Treaty of Żurawno was welcomed with enthusiasm at Versailles.'

But events in the Ukraine were to postpone for nearly seven years the great Turkish advance upon Vienna; and the diversion of Turkish power from the Danube undoubtedly modified the ambitious schemes of Louis, who in 1678 gave Europe a short respite in the Peace of Nymwegen.

Repin's famous picture depicts the refusal of the Zaporogians to submit to Turkish authority in accordance with the Treaty of Żurawno. Their humorous truculence found justification in the disaster which they had inflicted on a force of 10,000 Turks sent to subdue the *Sech* in the summer of 1675. Nearly the whole of the Turkish force had been slaughtered before the primitive fortifications of the Cossack camp. In the following year, while King John III. was lying beleagured in Żurawno, the almost legendary Sirko had led his men on foot across one of the shallow lagoons of the Azov Sea and fallen upon the rich towns of the Crimea; Akmechet (now Simferopol) and Baghchi-Saray were sacked, and Selim Khan Giray had only escaped capture by flight into the mountains.

After Żurawno and the defection of Doroshenko, the Turks produced as Hetman Yuri Khmelnytsky, who had found his way to Istanbul, where he had been living in obscurity as a monk. At the beginning of 1677 he was sent with some little pomp into the Ukraine, and in the summer he accompanied the army of the Seraskier Ibrahim which advanced on Chigirin. The siege of Chigirin was, however, interrupted by the converging forces of Romodanovski and Samoylovich and of Prince Vasili Golitsyn. The Turkish army retired in disorder beyond the Dniestr; and so great was the anger of the Sultan that the Seraskier's life was forfeit, while Selim Khan Giray fled to the Caucasus.

In the campaigning season of 1678, Kara Mustafa himself marched against Chigirin; the new Crim Khan Murad Giray and the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia were with his army, which amounted to 100,000 men. On the Russian side troops nearly equal in numbers awaited the Turkish invasion—newly equipped Muscovite regiments trained on the Western model under the veteran Romodanovski; the Dniepr Cossacks of Samoylovich and Cossacks

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from the Don; Kalmucks from the plains of the Kuma and Circassian 175* auxiliaries from the Kuban. After a series of confused and hard-fought battles fortune favoured the Ottoman arms, and the Russian commanders retired beyond the Dniepr. Kara Mustafa took Chigirin and razed the former capital of Bohdan Khmelnytsky to the ground. The issue of the campaign seemed to be in favour of Yuri Khmelnytsky, but his sour triumph was ephemeral. In the spring of 1679 the whole country rose against him and his Turkish garrisons; and when he tried to escape beyond the Dniestr he was overtaken and killed.(5) Throughout the summer of 1679 slaughter raked the Ukraine; flourishing towns like Cherkassy and Kanev were completely destroyed; hundreds of villages and estates were devastated and the whole of the population fled to the east of the Dniepr.

In 1680 another picturesque figure of the Ukrainian seventeenth century disappeared from the scene: old *ataman* Sirko died. His personality was so characteristic of his epoch and surroundings that its study may give some understanding of that amazing and contradictory medley of heroism and treason, of passionate patriotism and indifference, of cunning and naivety which made up the background of the Ukraine of the Hetmans. During the three decades 1650–80 Sirko was on fifteen different occasions elected chief *ataman* of the *Sech*. His victories over the Tartars are countless; he invaded the Crimea several times and twice took Baghchi-Saray, the capital of the Khans. When the Turks built the forts of Kizil Kerman and Aslan Kerman at the mouth of the Dniepr he took them; and once again, as in the days of Sahaydachny, the light Cossack craft attacked the coast of Asia Minor. Twice Sirko repulsed the attacks of Ottoman armies on the *Sech* (the second time was just a year before his death). All knew that Sirko was an honest man, disinterested, loved his country dearly and was a faithful son of the Orthodox Church; yet despite these qualities of character he was incapable of playing a constructive part in the events of the revolutionary times in which he lived. He was too credulous, too impressionable, too impulsive and too obstinate. It was easy to deceive him and to make a fool of him. Thus he, the bitterest enemy of the Tartars, found himself from time to time fighting in their ranks. In the critical months of 1677 he refused to go to the relief of Chigirin although the Sultan's troops were besieging it—and three years before he had been boasting about his insolent answer to the Sultan's emissary.(6)

No one was so skilled as he in waging war against the Turks and Tartars; the successive Ukrainian Hetmans, the Muscovite *voyevodes*, and John Sobieski were well aware of his military talent; and when at one moment the Russian authorities exiled him to Tobolsk, the

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*175 Polish leader quickly asked for his recall. During the whole period of these thirty years, among all the Hetmans and Cossack elders who played more or less important roles, Sirko only respected Bohdan Khmelnytsky and only loved Peter Doroshenko. Bryukhovetsky pleased him at first and he helped him to come to the fore, but later he turned against him. Samoylovich he could not stand at all on account of his cupidity. He could never pardon Vyhovsky for the Hadyach Agreement. In spite of all his regard for Doroshenko he highly disapproved of the Turkish orientation, and for this reason was alternately fighting and becoming reconciled with the luckless Hetman. He considered the union of the Ukraine with Muscovy to be the least of different evils, but he could never admit 'the partition' of the Ukraine under the Andrusovo Treaty. Moscow men considered him unreliable and therefore rather dangerous. Such was Ivan Sirko—a real Ukrainian national hero 'but a great muddler in the eyes of God'. Many of his compatriots were of the same mould and their versatility puzzled both cultured Polish diplomats and experienced Muscovite officials.

The inconclusive and exhausting character of the war in the Ukraine was, during the year 1680, inclining both the Russians and the Turks to peace. Kara Mustafa, after the barren triumph of Chigirin which had been fêted as a great victory in Istanbul, was concentrating on the greatest ambition of his exhalted brain—the conquest of Vienna. In Central Europe Sobieski, whose Queen had become alienated from the French court and who himself desired to maintain rather than to destroy the Habsburgs since he regarded their power as the main bulwark against Turkish aggression, had exchanged a French for an Austrian alliance (1677). Both the hopes of the Porte and of Versailles were centred on the dissident Hungarians, whose chief, Emeric Tökölyi, while maintaining constant embassies in Istanbul, had recognized Louis on his coins as 'Protector Hungariae'.

Russia, still at war with the Turks, was attracted to the Austro-Polish alliance; in June of 1679 ambassadors of the new Tsar Theodore had appeared in Vienna, and in August Polish ambassadors had gone to Moscow to discuss an alliance of the Emperor, the Tsar and the King of Poland against the Ottoman Empire. Large numbers of Muscovite troops were sent into the Ukraine, where the Scot Gordon was engaged in fortifying Kiev after the latest European designs and in building a pontoon bridge over the Dniepr—an innovation which had never before been seen in the Ukraine.

While the negotiations between Moscow and the Western courts were dragging on, Kara Mustafa decided to secure the neutrality of

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Russia in the coming war by proposing an advantageous peace. Tsar Theodore Alexeyevich was not a man inclined to vast military undertakings and he needed peace at the beginning of a reign which was destined to be very short. In January 1681 the Treaty of Baghchi-Saray was concluded for a period of twenty years. It provided that the Crim Khan was to desist from his raids into the Ukraine and to exchange captives with Muscovy and the Ukraine; it was thus that *boyar* Sheremetiev returned from a captivity of twenty years. Muscovite authority over the region on the right bank of the Ukraine in the neighbourhood of Kiev was recognized; while neither Muscovites nor Turks were to send troops or officials into the remaining parts of right-bank Ukraine. After the sanguinary campaigns of 1677–9 all the country along the right bank of the lower Dniepr had been completely devastated and its population had fled to the left bank. The Baghchi-Saray Treaty condemned Zaporogia to remain a kind of wilderness which divided the parts of the Ukraine administered by Moscow from the territory of the Crim Tartars.

§5. HETMAN SAMOYLOVICH: THE RISE OF IVAN MAZEPPA

Ivan Samoylovich, who in 1672 had been elected Hetman by the favour of the Moscow Government, had chosen as secretary and tutor to his sons a certain Ivan Mazeppa, who had attracted the somewhat rough priest's son by his intelligence and knowledge of the world.

Ivan Mazeppa was apparently born about the year 1642 on the small estate of his Cossack parents near Bělaya Tserkov. A candidate for the priesthood, the boy acquired an excellent education at an institution in Kiev, becoming competent in 'clerical Latin'—an advantage which was to stand him in good stead in later life. After the Hadyach Agreement in 1659 or 1660 a hundred young men were sent to Warsaw, probably as representatives of Ukrainian youth who were to be given a Polish introduction to the world and to receive subsequent ennoblement in accordance with the plan of Vyhovsky. Ivan Mazeppa was not only fortunate enough to be accepted, but like some others of his fellows he was made a page at the court of King John Casimir. It is doubtful whether under such circumstances he could have seriously continued his studies, but he learned Polish and a little German and a good deal of the ways of the world.

Mazeppa, heralded into the romantic literature and opera of the nineteenth century by two such distinguished sponsors as Voltaire

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*175 and Byron, now began a life which recalls rather the adventures of the disreputable heroes of the French and English novels of his period. His contemporary Passek gives an amusing account of an attractive and unscrupulous young man whom he describes as 'a liar and a swindler', and whose career at the Polish court ended with his being flogged at the order of an outraged husband, and bound naked to a horse which was set loose 'into the grassy scented wilderness of the boundless steppe'.

The serious admirers of Mazeppa indignantly deny as an invention of 'the spiteful Passek' the truth of an episode which has become famous in European literature and the theatre. But whatever the truth of Mazeppa's Polish romance may have been—and the facts appear more unfortunate than discreditable—the next events in the hero's life were of a definitely unsavoury character.

Mazeppa appears to have returned to the Ukraine in the army of John Casimir in 1663. He is later heard of in the entourage of Peter Doroshenko, with whom he found favour owing to his education and knowledge of languages. He has to do the Hetman's correspondence and is sometimes entrusted with delicate missions. During this period of his life Mazeppa married 'a rich widow', but she soon disappeared from the scene. But even with Doroshenko the enterprising young Cossack was not very successful, and one of his delicate missions nearly cost him his life. During the course of Doroshenko's intercourse with the Turks, he decided to send Mazeppa first to Pereyaslavl for *pourparlers* with Romodanovski and Samoylovich, and afterwards with important papers to Istanbul. Instead of gifts for the Sultan, Mazeppa brought along with him some scores of Zaporogian prisoners—men who had shown insubordination to Doroshenko by attacking the Tartars or Turks. As misfortune would have it, during his journey through the steppe he fell in with a Zaporogian band and was taken to the *Sech* with his papers and the men whom he was to deliver into the hands of the Turks. Nothing, so it seemed, could save Doroshenko's envoy from a most painful death. He was sentenced to the Zaporogian execution 'of the stake', which was carried out in the following manner: the victim was tied to a stake, and a heavy stick, a jar filled with vodka, a cup and a piece of bread were put beside him. Every Zaporogian could have a drink and a bite if, before doing so, he gave a good blow with the stick to the man tied to the stake.

Mazeppa was saved by the chief *ataman* of the *Sech*—the famous Sirko. Mazeppa's admirers pretend that Sirko was struck by the unusual personality of the young man and understood that a great future was awaiting him. Considering what actually occurred, the

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truth would seem somewhat different. Sirko at that time was indignant against Doroshenko on account of his dependence on Turkey, and learned from Mazeppa all he wanted to know. Seeing what sort of a person he had before him, he decided to send this 'trusted secretary' of Doroshenko to Samoylovich in order to report to him the intimate details of the relations between his master and the Turks. It was at this stage that the versatile and erudite young man made his impression on Hetman Samoylovich. 175*

At the end of 1680, during the Baghchi-Saray negotiations, Mazeppa, who had by this time obtained a considerable influence over the Hetman, was sent to represent the Cossack interest in Moscow. With the skill which was characteristic of him he soon unravelled all the intrigues of the Muscovite court. He understood that the ambitious Tsarevna Sophia, sister of the ailing Tsar Theodore, was destined to play a prominent part in the immediate future, and he won the good graces of her favourite, Prince Vasili Golitsyn. Mazeppa returned to Samoylovich a still more necessary man; after the death of Tsar Theodore, Sophia was proclaimed Regent for her infant brothers, and the ascendancy of Golitsyn procured for Mazeppa the post of War Secretary for the Ukraine.

The year 1683 saw the spectacular victory of John III Sobieski over Kara Mustafa under the walls of Vienna. Amongst the conqueror's troops had been a detachment of 4000 Cossacks who had left the desolate region of the right bank of the Dniepr and sought refuge in Poland. (They were commanded by Colonel Gogol.) During the summer of 1684 the Poles and Cossacks cleared Podolia of the Turks, but they were unable to recover the fortress of Kamenets-Podolsk.

The Holy League now formed between Austria, Poland and Venice aimed at the partition of the Ottoman dominions in Europe; John III, having failed to oust the Turks from Kamenets-Podolsk and avoiding the sterile task of recovering the devastated territories between the Dniestr and the Dniepr, reverted to the schemes of John Zamojski, which had comprehended the inclusion of Moldavia and Wallachia within *Rzecz Pospolita* and the extension of the Polish frontier to the Danube.

It was natural that the Western confederates should desire to extend the front against the Turks by including Russia in the League, while the ambitions and the necessities of the Tsarevna Sophia imposed an abandonment of the pacific policy of the late Tsar Theodore. In 1686 Moscow joined the Holy League, reverting thus to the Andrusovo policy of Ordin-Nashchokin, whereby the Poles were to fight the Turks in the Danubian principalities while the Russians confronted the Crim Tartars and the powerful Turkish

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*175 fortresses which covered the approaches to the Black Sea littoral. Sobieski forewent all Polish claims on Kiev and Smolensk against an indemnity (which in reality was rather a subsidy) of half a million gulden, and it was agreed that the territories of the Zaporogian *Sech* lying along both banks of the lower Dniepr would in future be subject to the Tsar only, and not as under the terms of Andrusovo to the Tsar and the King of Poland in *condominium*.

Montecucculi, the greatest commander of his age in Eastern Europe, had once observed that the Emperor should never wage a long war against the Turks, as their power always remained unshaken by defeats in the field; and although the Turks were fighting on all fronts from the Adriatic to the Sea of Azov, neither the Poles nor the Russians in superior force achieved effective success during a series of campaigns which dragged on for a decade. In annual operations which were continued until 1694 the Polish King exhausted his dwindling resources in Moldavia, where Constantine Cantemir, a former Polish officer of Tartar extraction who had been nominated Hospodar by the Porte, proved a difficult antagonist.

Vasili Golitsyn, the elegant favourite of the Tsarevna Sophia who had many of the faults of a Buckingham, was no more successful in the Crimea, which was not destined to become Russian until a century later, when a more manly favourite was to deliver the sunlit peninsula to an even more imperious princess.

In the summer of 1687 an army which, including the Cossacks of Samoylovich, numbered nearly 200,000 men opened the campaign against the Crimea. The Russians moved forward with a huge baggage train in their wake and herds of cattle for the supply of the troops. The Tartar detachments, during the hot summer days, had recourse to their old tactic of setting fire to the steppe. Beyond their encampments the Russian soldiers saw nothing but scorched stretches of steppe; in the parched weather the rivulets were running dry, and men and beasts began to perish from thirst. There was murmuring in the ranks, and disputes broke out among the commanders.

The moment had arrived to provide a scapegoat, and Vasili Golitsyn, who did not wish that responsibility for the disaster should fall upon him, was delighted when the adroitness of Mazeppa supplied the need.

Mazeppa had always been aware of the unpopularity of Samoylovich among the upper ranks of the Cossacks, who envied and detested him. The rapid rise to power and wealth of this 'priest's son', his lordly ways, appeared ridiculous and hateful to the Cossack colonels. Further, it was generally known that Samoylovich had been opposed to the campaign; he was ill, getting old, and had im-

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prudently often spoken in Mazeppa's presence of 'this cursed war which Moscow has forced us to take part in'. 175*

When lack of water and disease, which had begun to spread among the troops, forced Golitsyn to retreat into districts where the rivers had not dried up, Mazeppa decided to act. His wily plot was based on the consideration that by betraying Samoylovich he was saving Golitsyn's reputation and thereby rendering service to the Tsarevna Sophia who was Regent of the realm.

A rumour was spread among the Muscovite troops that it was not the Tartars but the Cossacks who had set fire to the steppe by order of the Hetman, who did not wish to invade the Crimea. At the end of June a group of colonels, Mazeppa's friends (Mazeppa himself had arranged to be absent), presented to Prince Golitsyn a list of twenty-five accusations against the Hetman Samoylovich. Some of these accusations were true, such as the charges of cupidity and other abuses and the statement that Samoylovich had always been opposed to the Polish alliance and the war with Turkey.

On 22 June, in the village of Kolomak to the east of Poltava, the Hetman and his two sons were arrested as they were coming out of church. Brought to judgment before the Cossack elders, the Hetman tried to protest his innocence, but was not allowed to speak; his judges threw themselves upon him, brandishing their sabres, and Golitsyn had to intervene to save his life.

Old Samoylovich was banished to Tobolsk; his son Jacob to Yeniseysk. All their estates, the whole property of the family, were confiscated. This, however, was not enough to satisfy the guilty malice of Mazeppa; the other two sons of the Hetman, Mazeppa's former pupils, Gregory and Simon, who had become colonels by this time, were also arrested and brought to Putivl, where they were tortured and not even allowed to see a priest before they were beheaded. (7)

The dream which Mazeppa had nourished certainly since he had gained the patronage of Samoylovich was realized at last. The *Rada* met at this same village of Kolofnak for the election of a new Hetman. Mazeppa could rely on Golitsyn's support, but he had to make certain of the votes of the elders and had a large recourse to bribes. The election took place on 25 July 1687. According to contemporary stories it cost Mazeppa 11,000 roubles paid to Prince Golitsyn, besides smaller sums distributed among the elders.

Samoylovich, on whose misfortunes Mazeppa had built his triumph, had very few friends; neither does he find any friends among Russian and Ukrainian historians. All accuse him of boundless greed; of not having been very particular about the means

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*175 whereby he acquired his wealth; of having a contempt for the law and of being addicted to favouritism; of a cringing attitude towards Moscow and at the same time of underhand intrigues against the Government. Samoylovich of course had not been a Hetman in the sense in which Bohdan Khmelnytsky had been or in which Peter Doroshenko had tried to be. He bore the title of Hetman, but in reality had been nothing more than a sort of viceroy of Moscow in the Ukraine. The constant presence during the time when he was Hetman of large numbers of Muscovite troops excluded all thought of independent action on his part. However, if such was the case it only goes to prove that the Ukraine of those days needed a man of that kind.

During the fifteen years when Samoylovich was Hetman, 1672–87, life at least on the left bank of the Dniepr had become peaceful again. The Ukraine, when Mazeppa became Hetman in 1687, was even geographically a different country from that which Khmelnytsky had left at his death. Except for Kiev and the surrounding district, life had migrated to the east of the Dniepr, and all the principal vital centres were now situated on the Desna and the Seym, on the Psiol, the Sula and the Vorskla. The Ukraine had spread to the north towards the river Sozh, and to the east far along the Donets and beyond that river. Baturin, not far from where the Seym falls into the Desna, had become the capital of the Hetmans, while only ruins far away to the south-west marked the place where once Bohdan Khmelnytsky had held court in Chigirin.

The growth of population on the left bank had been incessant since the time of Khmelnytsky's revolt, for the region to the east of the Dniepr was regarded as secure from Tartars and Poles. The process had rather slowed down in the sixties, when, owing to the conditions of civil war, Poles, Tartars and Muscovite regiments appeared even in that relatively peaceful quarter. Settlement in the 'new Ukraine' was again reinforced during the Turkish invasions of Podolia and the territories on the right bank of the Dniepr beginning with the year 1672. After 1680 the 'mesopotamian' belt between the Bug and the Dniepr was officially declared by the representatives of Moscow and the Porte at Baghchi-Saray to have become a desert, and a year or two before Doroshenko in a letter to Sirko, in which he referred to Samoylovich as 'a Sardanapalus', had expressed his horror at the utter devastation for which his own policy had been responsible: 'Where once stood towns and villages surrounded by gardens there only remain ruins of single walls and hungry dogs fight each other. The churches are all closed because there is no one to worship in them. All the fields are covered with weeds and our

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native land, formerly so gay and bright, has become a dreadful wilderness.' 175*

'Sardanapalus Samoylovich', indifferent to the troubles of the right bank, was even ready to avail himself of these calamities when they tended to the advantage of 'his' left-bank Ukraine—especially when his own personal interests were also served. When he came to the relief of Chigirin he observed with satisfaction the crowds of peasants who were fleeing to the left bank. Some pretend that he even accelerated this movement by sending his Cossacks to drive away the inhabitants from their homesteads.

During the seven or eight years before 1680 hundreds of thousands of peasants migrated to the east of the Dniepr. These migrants were most welcome to the Hetman as well as to his fellows who were following his example. The Hetman himself, all his relations, all the dignitaries of the Baturin 'court', all elders and judges, all in a word who were able to do so owing to their privileged positions, were trying to possess themselves of the free lands, of which there were still plenty beyond the Desna or along the upper courses of the Sula, the Psiol and the Vorskla. These new landlords preferred a new element to the old settlers who had lived there since Khmelnytsky's time and looked upon their land as their own property. It was much more pleasant and profitable for the new landlords to be able to deal with immigrants who were ready to agree to any conditions so long as they could procure a roof to replace the ruined home which they had left behind them on the right bank. The desperate need of the hundreds of thousands of migrants from the right bank was the real reason why large estates began to flourish on the left bank during the last two decades of the seventeenth century. The social hegemony for which Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky had struggled and intrigued without success was attained almost without effort by Samoylovich owing to the peculiar conditions of his time.

Mazeppa, who succeeded him, found himself not only at the head of the Cossack administration but also the leader of the relatively important group of landowners into which the Cossack elders had managed to transform themselves. This 'inheritance' was of greater importance than all the gold chervontsy and silver thalers which 'Sardanapalus Samoylovich' had accumulated in his coffers.

After the downfall of Samoylovich, Golitsyn's troops wintered in the Ukraine, and in the summer of 1688 the war against the Crimea was renewed. The Russians approached Perekop, but, according to the popular explanation of the abortive outcome of the campaign, 'the Tartars saved themselves by sending sacks full of gold coins half of which were faked'. In reality the accumulating

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*175 difficulties of the Tsarevna Sophia imposed the return of her lover to Moscow.

In the capital the conflict between the factions of the Regent Sophia and of the young Tsar Peter came to a crisis during the following summer (August–September 1689). In the outcome the Tsarevna was incarcerated in a convent, while Golitsyn disappeared into the obscurity of Siberian exile. The reign of the great Peter had begun.

In the circumstances of Golitsyn's fall, Mazeppa might easily have lost all that he had achieved. His enthusiastic biographers ascribe his immunity to his having won the admiration of the young Tsar by his oratory and charm. It is perhaps nearer to the truth to suppose that the men surrounding Tsar Peter thought it wiser at that troubled moment not to make any changes in the Ukraine which might give the pretext for revolt in that tumultuous land. At any rate Mazeppa returned to Baturin at the end of September 1689—the zealous and most loyal and faithful servant of the Tsar.

Moscow needed the support of an artful viceroy. The war with the Turks and Tartars continued and held the country in a state of uncertainty, while the discontents of the praetorian *streltsy* regiments and of the religious dissidents, who found a wide support among the people, had infected the Zaporogian *Sech*.

On the right bank of the Dniepr the Poles had recovered many districts from the Turks, and peasants both from Galicia and Poland and from the left bank were beginning to trickle back into the regions of Korsun, Belaya Tserkov and Bratslav. Colonel Paley, a simple Cossack by origin, was becoming popular and the old Polish pretensions to suzerainty on the right bank were again becoming a reality. At the same time another Cossack, Petrik, appeared in the *Sech* and, taking advantage of the social and religious discontents, began to intrigue, on behalf of the Turks, in favour of a rising against Moscow. 'Moscow gives our people over into slavery to the landlords so as to turn Cossacks into peasants' proclaimed this new evangelist of a Turkish orientation. Tartar bands joined the adherents of Petrik in some dangerous raids, and it was only the political skill of Mazeppa which prevented his movement from becoming formidable during the first five years of Peter's reign.

In 1695 Peter's first Azov campaign brought a Muscovite force under Boris Sheremetiev to the mouth of the Dniepr, and Mazeppa's Cossacks took part in the storming of several Turkish forts along the littoral. Peter's failure before Azov in the summer of 1695 was redeemed next year by the capture of the fortress which both Turks and Russians regarded as the key to power on the Black Sea; Mazeppa, who had been covering the flank of the besieging army

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against the attacks of the Crim Tartars, was able to greet his sovereign 175 A
with the gift of a fine Turkish sabre, the golden hilt of which was studded with precious gems.

In 1697, when Peter went off on his foreign travels, Mazeppa, reposing in the boundless confidence of his young master, was left as absolute lord of the Ukraine. And when, after the Tsar's return and the suppression of the revolt of the *streltsy* in Moscow, Peter commanded his faithful Hetman to meet him in Voronezh, the highest honours were showered upon him. Mazeppa was made the second knight on the roll of the Order of St Andrew, which had just been founded and on which the Tsar himself ranked only as sixth in precedence. Such was the recompense 'for many military labours, constant zeal and loyalty during thirteen years of gallant service to the Tsar marked by incessant victories'.

In 1700 Mazeppa was nearing his sixtieth year. He was very active and full of energy. He used to have amorous affairs one after the other, and sometimes several simultaneously. Around the Baturin 'palace' lived a whole seraglio of adoring women. The old Hetman was always accompanied on his travels by several ladies. Soon, however, his last love affair with Kochubey's daughter was destined to have a fatal influence on his life. The old Hetman led a luxurious life in the Baturin palace, which had been lavishly furnished: it was filled with many beautiful carpets, many costly mirrors, a great quantity of that heavy gilt furniture so characteristic of the epoch; also table silver, pictures, portraits and even books. Mazeppa liked reading and was proud of his knowledge of the Latin classics. For the Ukraine of those days his erudition was really remarkable: when he visited the Kiev Academy he answered the welcoming speech of the Rector in Latin. Those coming ornaments of the Orthodox Church of the time of Peter I, Theophanes Prokopovich and Stephen Yavorski, wrote panegyrics about the cultivated Hetman who at the same time remained a real pillar of Orthodoxy.

Owing perhaps to the remote memories of his youth, Mazeppa had a sincere liking for theological books and solemn church services. He liked architecture also, and built the wall round the Pecherskaya Lavra in Kiev and the church of St Nicholas in that city, and the cathedral in Pereyaslavl as well as churches in other Ukrainian towns—all in that Ukrainian baroque which is sometimes called the 'Mazeppa style'.

A special etiquette was elaborated by the Hetman for his receptions in the Baturin palace of the Tsar's envoys and of notable foreign guests. Samoylovich had already founded a sort of Hetman's Guard, the *Serdyuky*, who were constituted in paid regiments and

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*175 wore gorgeous uniforms—scarlet jackets, white dolmans and wide blue trousers. Three of these Serdyuky regiments, each consisting of men of a different nationality, were paid out of the Hetman's personal revenues.

In his old age Mazeppa became incredibly rich. Part of the taxation in the Ukraine went not to the Hetman's Exchequer but to him personally—as for instance all the income from the Hadyach regimental territories. He left behind him, after his flight, millions of gold and silver rubles, scores of estates, hundreds of mills. The Tsar petted and spoiled his old Hetman and liked giving him costly presents—robes made of cloth of gold, sables, yards of satins and velvets, barrels of Rhine wine; he even sent him on occasion baskets filled with lemons—a great delicacy in those days.

There is no doubt that the young Tsar had a sincere affection for Mazeppa. He liked his shrewd intelligence and domineering character, his leaning towards reading and his 'European ways'. Peter was always more than condescending to the morals of those around him: adventurers, Russians and foreigners, surrounded the young Tsar, and he preferred that type to men of strict morals who were opposed to his policies. Mazeppa on his side showed great finesse in his understanding of Peter and realized that one of his leading traits was an insatiable curiosity. Knowing that the young Tsar took an interest in everything, Mazeppa never forgot to send him things which might interest him—sometimes strange Oriental arms and sometimes ancient 'Assyrian' coins found somewhere near Kiev. A man who could always tell Peter something new or which he did not know was ever welcome at his court.

§6. THE GREAT NORTHERN WAR: PETER THE GREAT AND MAZEPPA

The turn of the century saw dramatic changes in the distribution of power in Eastern Europe. Within the span of two decades the three historic empires between the Arctic and the Mediterranean succumbed in varying degrees to the new state structures which were to dominate Eastern Europe in modern times. The north-to-south belt of Sweden, Poland and the Ottoman Empire failed to sustain the pressure of the Germanic powers from the west and of the Muscovite state from the east.

As early as the middle of the fifteenth century both Vienna and Moscow had been conscious of the common interest of Germany and Muscovy against the states which occupied the vast area which intervened between their respective borders. And in no period was that

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common interest—which has now become a sinister factor in world 175*
politics—more clearly followed than in that phase which opened at the turn of the seventeenth century when the established empires of Turkey, Poland and Sweden were successively struck down. The Austro-Russian combinations against Turkey and the partitions of Poland which took place during the course of the eighteenth century merely served to complete the process which had already been decided by the long wars against Poland in the seventeenth century, by the signal weakening of the Ottoman imperial power after the defeat of Kara Mustafa before Vienna and by the waning of the Swedish Empire during the Great Northern War.

It is a paradox that the last Polish paladin, King John III Sobieski, should have brought about the Ottoman overthrow which definitely tilted the balance of power in Eastern Europe in favour of the Germanic and Muscovite states.

Three years before the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) brought to an end the predominant influence of Turkey in South-Eastern Europe, the death of Sobieski had marked the abandonment by Poland of any pretension to place as a Great Power.

Louis XIV, whose system of checks on Germanic Central Europe was damaged by the weakening of Turkey, made serious efforts to sponsor first Condé and Conti princes and later Stanislas Leszczyński for the Polish throne; and a majority of the Polish magnates, conscious of the danger of their growing dependence on Muscovy, favoured the candidates of Versailles. But 'Tsar Peter even went so far as to threaten the Polish Senate with an invasion if they dared to choose a Frenchman'; and Augustus of Saxony (whose cognomen of 'the Strong' was derived from his remarkable proficiency in bed rather than from any qualities of character) imposed his own election with a Saxon army and Austrian support.

Poland was now ruled by a German dynasty dependent on Russian goodwill. Augustus had a certain restless brilliance, an itching need for money and a big dynastic appetite. He was a predestined tool for the ruthless politics of Tsar Peter and an appropriate victim for the cold violence of Charles XII of Sweden.

In the conflict of singular personalities which has always given an epic character to the Great Northern War, a Livonian noble, John Reinhold Patkul, played the fatal role of the over-intelligent intriguer—and it eventually brought him to the wheel. Patkul was a slighted Swedish subject who professed to represent the discontent of the Livonian nobility with Swedish rule, and he negotiated an alliance of the impressionable Augustus and the calculating Peter (in which the Danish King Frederick IV also took a hand), aimed at the

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*175 partition of the Swedish dominions, which appeared an easy prey under the minority of the unknown boy, Charles XII.

In November 1700 the crushing defeat of the Russians at Narva revived the old Vasa dream of the extension of Swedish hegemony over Poland, and at the same time seriously threatened the position of Tsar Peter, whose reforms were exceedingly unpopular.

The news of Narva was received not without a certain spiteful satisfaction in Baturin, in the Zaporogian *Sech*, on the Don and beyond the Volga among the Old Believers—and even in Moscow, for the Tsar had many enemies everywhere. When Peter's Chancellor wrote to Mazeppa urging him not to believe the exaggerated and lying rumours about the battle at Narva, the old Hetman replied with a message of vague consolation. Mazeppa had spent his youth in Poland in the days of 'the Deluge' and he had a healthy respect for Swedish arms; at the same time he shared the poor opinion of most Cossacks as to the worth of Peter's 'new model' regiments.

In the summer of 1702 the capture of Warsaw and Cracow made Charles XII master of Poland, and the 'French party' of Stanislas Leszczyński rallied to the support of the Swedes.

Events in Poland necessarily reacted on the whole situation in the Ukraine, and the covetous interest of Ivan Mazeppa was at once attracted to those provinces on the right bank of the Dniepr which had reverted to the Polish crown as a result of the Treaties of Andrusovo and Karlowitz.

The Treaty of Karlowitz had restored to Poland Podolia with Kamenets-Podolsk, and the first care of the Polish *szlachta* had been to restore 'law and order' in right-bank Ukraine. A simple Cossack, Samus, had been appointed Hetman of the right bank, but a certain Colonel Paley, who enjoyed a greater influence among the Cossacks, constituted himself the leader of the peasants in their opposition to the return of the Polish landlords and continued to send messages to Baturin urging Mazeppa to take advantage of the unpopularity of Polish rule and of the weakness of the garrisons in the country. The subordination of Poland, however, to Peter's larger plans excluded any intervention in the dominions of King Augustus.

In 1699 the *Seym* proceeded to abolish all Cossack privileges in the Polish Ukraine, and even the 'loyalist' Samus joined Paley in open revolt. The Polish Cossacks declared themselves subjects of Tsar Peter and Mazeppa, and the Muscovite resident in Warsaw sent despatches to the Chancellor Golovin urging that it was of the greatest importance to persuade Mazeppa to refrain from giving aid to Paley.

At the beginning of 1703 the Tsar indited a stern letter to

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Mazeppa ordering him to post patrols and not to allow any help to cross the Dniepr; he was to influence the rebels also 'to desist from their vile plans'. Peter also sent a special emissary to Paley and Samus urging them to help their King against the Swedes. 175*

But the Tsar was far away on the Baltic shore and Mazeppa began to play an intricate game.

During the year 1703 Polish troops under the command of Adam Seniawski came into the Ukraine to put down the rising. Paley, who had established himself in Belaya Tserkov, offered a stubborn resistance. The situation was complicated by the fact that Paley was not only in contact with Mazeppa but also with the Crown Hetman Lubomirski, who was head of the faction supporting Stanislas Leszczyński against King Augustus, the ally of the Tsar. Mazeppa must have been well aware of the dangerous character of the chain of personalties which was beginning to connect him with the policies of Charles XII, for he had numerous agents in Poland—amongst them a mysterious 'Princess Dolski'. The muddle became further complicated by the intrigues of Seniawski's wife, who had connections with the Lubomirski faction; and by the appearance of Patkul, who arrived on an abortive mission to persuade Paley to make his peace with Augustus.

At this time, as a modern Ukrainian historian (M. Andrusyak) has justly pointed out, Mazeppa's relations with Paley do not afford any indication that the Hetman was already plotting against the Tsar; in fact Mazeppa, who may have seen in Paley a possible future rival for influence on both banks of the Dniepr, was not slow in reporting Paley's relations with Lubomirski to Moscow.

Early in 1704, when Lubomirski was putting himself forward as a candidate for the Polish throne, Mazeppa reminded the Tsar of Paley's close relations with the pretender, and he then received authority to put an end to the rebel, who was still holding Belaya Tserkov.

In April 1704 the old Hetman crossed the Dniepr, warily stalking his game. The Swedes were in Lvov and Augustus had taken refuge in Volhynia, where he was desperately awaiting aid from the Tsar or the Cossack chieftain. Mazeppa's aid was limited, however, to harrying and plundering the estates of any Polish nobles who could be said to be supporters of Leszczyński or of Lubomirski.

At the beginning of August Mazeppa induced Paley to visit him and arranged a feast to celebrate 'their fifteen years' old friendship'. During the night the drunken Paley was seized and taken first to Baturin and later to Moscow. Peter was very pleased at the clever trick of his old henchman. The Hetman had anticipated the im-

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* 175 perial wish; Paley had bored the Tsar by 'his stupid obstinacy' and he was packed off to Siberia.

All right-bank Ukraine was now effectively in Mazeppa's hands. During the existing state of war it could scarcely be handed over to the representatives of the fugitive Augustus. As 'Hetman of all Ukraine', Mazeppa returned in triumph to Baturin in October 1704.

He now became involved in his 'old man's love' for Maria Kochubey; a passion which, like the better known affairs of Lassalle, Parnell and Boulanger, really seems to have influenced history—at least to a degree.

The daughter of the chief judge and wealthy landowner Kochubey, Maria appears from all accounts to have been a really lovely girl. The rascally old roué sued for her hand in marriage, but the parents refused their consent—apparently owing to the fact that their other daughter was already married to a nephew of Mazeppa. The romantic Maria, who was already the mistress of the Hetman, then left her paternal roof and took refuge in his palace. The scandal outraged the Orthodox population of the Cossack capital. The despair and shame of the parents that 'such disgrace and dishonour should befall them' knew no bounds; the father ordered the bells of the church to ring as for a funeral. The Hetman himself appears to have feared popular outcry, in particular the wrath of the clergy.

Finally Mazeppa took the contemptible course of turning the girl out of his palace—not without some difficulty. Maria's grief was pitiful. 'Whatever happens, our love can never cease. Let God punish me—and whether thou lovest me or not I will love thee until death.' To judge by the letters which Mazeppa wrote to Maria and which have come down to posterity, the old Hetman was genuinely grieved. His hard old heart ached for his beloved who was being regularly whipped at her father's house. The embarrassment of the Hetman was further increased by the necessity which official duty imposed on him of having to continue to visit the house of the grim and vindictive Kochubeys.

The Kochubey affair marked a turn in the luck of the fantastic old man. His Cossack elders were reported to be openly complaining at the continuance of the war, while Peter's generals—many of them foreigners—with their modern ideas were frequently expressing their contempt for the military qualities of the Cossacks. The rumoured conversion of some Cossack regiments into dragoons shocked and displeased the Hetman and all sections of the Cossack community.

At the beginning of 1706, after the Swedish victory at Fraustadt, the Tsar, who feared a Swedish drive through Volhynia against Kiev, arrived in the city to supervise its fortification. Peter's fear of

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a Swedish invasion undoubtedly created a strong impression on the Hetman, who shared the general view that the Tsar would never overcome the invincible Swedish King. The visit in no way improved the relations between master and vassal. About this time Mazeppa began to play upon the discontent of the Cossack elders by confirming their suspicions that the Tsar's entourage planned to abolish 'the old Cossack privileges'. He gave currency to rumours that his rival Menshikov, 'Fortune's nameless favourite', was plotting to be made Hetman, and that Peter was offering the whole of the Ukraine as a principality to Marlborough as a reward for securing English mediation with Charles XII.

Actually there was some justification for the Hetman's nervousness, for at the end of the year 1706 the Duke, who had been approached by Peter's Dutch agent Huyssens, promised to meet the Tsar's wishes if a principality in Russia were granted to him, and the Tsar replied by giving him the choice between Kiev, Vladimir and Siberia, besides promising him, in case a peace with Sweden was concluded by his efforts, 50,000 thalers a year, 'a rock ruby such as no European potentate possesses', and the Order of St Andrew in brilliants (*Camb. Mod. Hist.* v, 595).

But the curious intervention of Marlborough in the affairs of Peter took another turn, when in the summer of 1707 he visited Charles XII at the Saxon castle of Altranstädt in order 'to endeavour to penetrate the designs of the King of Sweden'. The great Duke, who was certainly the superior of both the King and the Tsar in diplomacy as in war, satisfied himself that Swedish arms were not about to be turned against Austria, and returned to the Low Countries while Charles made preparations for his fatal Russian campaign.

Peter, during the autumn of 1707, had to contend with a formidable Bashkir rising on the Volga and with the revolt of the Don Cossacks under Kondrati Bulavin 'against the innovations'.

From the beginning of 1707 the Zaporogians had also been showing signs of insubordination. Mazeppa, who had a great nose for his own popularity among the Cossacks, was attentively studying their opinions.

When the news arrived in January 1708 that the Swedish armies were invading Russia, Mazeppa began to utter open doubts concerning 'Moscow's strength'. He gave free rein to his defeatist views and did not refrain from expressing them in the house of his worst enemy Kochubey.

The mind of the old Hetman was so intricate that it is difficult to determine whether at this date he had already entered into treasonable relations with Charles XII or whether he was merely trying to

*175 trap Kochubey into denunciations which he would not be able to substantiate. Some of his biographers affirm that at the beginning of 1706 he had already entered into treasonable relations with Charles XII, who was then in Saxony, through the Jesuit Zieliński. This does not seem probable. But the agents of Charles XII were working in Turkey and had penetrated to the Crimea and the Zaporogian *Sech* and it is possible that one or more of them had been in Baturin.

Open to doubt also are the theories of those biographers who affirm that in September 1707 the Hetman was inviting the Swedish King to enter the Ukraine and undertaking at the same time to destroy all the Muscovite garrisons stationed there. During Easter 1770 Mazeppa had been present at Peter's great War Council at Żolkiew, while his favourite nephew Voynarovsky was with Menshikov at Lublin. During the summer and autumn Cossack regiments were with Peter's General Baur in observation on the Lithuanian frontier; 3000 Cossacks were sent to the Volga to put down the Bashkir rising; and at the moment when the Don rebellion was causing serious embarrassment to Peter, support for Bulavin was forthcoming neither from the Hetman nor from the *Sech*. None of these facts confirm the proposition that in September 1707 Mazeppa was in relations with the Swedish King and already plotting treason. (Nordberg, the spiritual adviser and biographer of Charles XII, is cited as authority for the treasonable correspondence of Mazeppa with the King at this time, but he is a biased apologist for the whole of the Ukrainian campaign, the wisdom of which was much criticized in contemporary Sweden.)

All the evidence goes to show that pique, panic, and, above all, the sequel to the ugly feud with Kochubey hustled the ageing Hetman into ill-considered and ill-prepared treason.

In the late autumn of 1707 Kochubey had already made an unsuccessful denunciation of Mazeppa, which was treated as ridiculous by the Tsar, who had in mind the enmity between the two old men on account of Maria Kochubey.

The unfortunate Kochubey, however, not satisfied with his first blunder, hurried to make a second and more fatal one. Spurred on by his wife, and after asking the advice of the Poltava Colonel Iskra, Kochubey decided to send another messenger to Moscow repeating his accusations against the Hetman. This messenger was a certain Poltava schoolmaster—a converted Jew named Yatsenko. When Yatsenko reached Moscow he obtained by some sort of means an interview with the Heir to the Throne. The Tsarevich Alexey told the informer to put down on paper all he had heard from Kochubey. The only part of Yatsenko's accusation which could be taken

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seriously were Mazeppa's interviews with King Stanislas Leszczyński's 175 *
intermediary, the Jesuit Zieliński, who was always introduced into the Hetman's presence by his confidant and secretary, the Czech Orlik. The rest was but idle rumour. Yatsenko quoted Kochubey as saying that 'he would tell all when he would stand before the eyes of the Tsar'.

Yatsenko's denunciation was made in January 1708. In February the Cossack Osipov wrote to Prince Dmitri Golitsyn in Kiev that 'Kochubey and Iskra advise your Lordship to tell the Tsar to beware of Mazeppa, who might cause trouble to you and the good town of Kiev'. Kochubey and Iskra had told Osipov that Mazeppa intended passing the Dniepr and joining King Stanislas at Belaya Tserkov, from where he would begin to wage war against the Tsar. Kochubey and Iskra affirmed that 'all the colonels and elders know of the Hetman's intention but keep silent—some because they are devoted to him and others out of fear'.

Tsar Peter now got angry and ordered an investigation to be held by Golovkin and Shafirov. The Hetman himself, having heard of the accusations against him, was clamouring for this investigation which should establish 'his spotless life' and 'thirty-eight years of faithful and unblemished service'. Peter answered graciously, saying that there could be no question about an investigation into the conduct of the Hetman, who 'need have no sorrow or doubts on that score'.

Kochubey, Iskra, Osipov, Colonel Apostol and others who were involved were summoned to head-quarters at Vitebsk, where they duly arrived in April. The Tsar had already left for Petersburg.

During their trial neither Kochubey nor Iskra could produce any proofs. All was vague talk about 'criminal things' having been uttered by Mazeppa. Aware that the Tsar really wanted to find out who was the real author of the plot against 'his faithful Hetman', the investigators ordered first Iskra and then Kochubey to be put to the torture of the knout. Kochubey was weak and old and could not hold out for long; he owned that he knew of no disloyalty on the part of the Hetman and that his accusations had been made under the influence of his anger on account of his daughter. But Kochubey could not own to having had any 'relations with the enemy'—as suspected by Peter—because there had never been any. Torture and questionings continued for a whole month, until at last Golovkin and Shafirov understood that they could extort no further confessions. Kochubey and Iskra were sentenced to death; Yatsenko was set free; Osipov was rewarded and Apostol cleared of all suspicion.

Both Kochubey and Iskra were delivered to Mazeppa. The Het-

* 175 man ordered their execution on 14 July 1708 in the neighbourhood of Belaya Tserkov; their estates were confiscated and their wives and children sentenced to imprisonment for life.

Thus ended the sad tale of the Kochubeys. Rumour accused Golovkin and Shafirov of having been bribed by Mazeppa. Peter's two satellites were by no means incorruptible and it is possible that the Hetman found a way to give them presents which would have been gratefully accepted. But at least the fearful investigation established that there was no solid evidence for denunciations which seem to have originally been stimulated by old Kochubey's unhappy wife. The usually perspicacious Peter suspected rather that the informers were being used as tools to secure the removal of the Hetman with a view to creating difficulties in the Ukraine at a critical moment of the war. Kochubey paid by a ghastly death for his accusations against the Hetman, but in his agony he avenged himself on his old enemy. Mazeppa now found himself involved in the intricacies woven by the deviousness of his own character. Having kept open too many roads, he could in the final crisis of his life find no road which offered safety. His courage faltered and his judgment failed. He had lost his flair for events as a man loses his sight, and he had lost his confidence in his own luck.

§7. MAZEPPA AND CHARLES XII: POLTAVA

The legend of the invincibility of Russia derives from the disastrous invasions of Charles XII and of Napoleon. Poltava and Moscow are beacons in history which seem to proclaim the supreme folly of a military advance into the vast spaces of the Eurasian plain. Yet the Polish Kings Stephen Báthory and Vladislav IV, with the inadequate resources of a feudal state, each succeeded where two of the world's greatest commanders ended their careers in disaster; and in modern times, in the War of 1914–18, the Germans secured the effective mastery of great areas of European Russia during a period when they were simultaneously confronted with the combined forces of the Western Powers—and it was the victory of the Allies in the West and no military recovery in Russia which finally imposed the retirement of the German armies.

In the case of both Charles and Napoleon a late start involved the invaders in natural difficulties of transport and supply which could have been avoided if full advantage had been taken of the summer months. The over-confidence of the Swedes and the madly adventurous character of their monarch impelled an advance with wholly inadequate forces; on the other hand, Napoleon attempted

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to manœuvre unwieldy masses of men over great spaces deficient in communications. 175 *

Above all, lack of adequate political preparation characterized the Swedish and French invasions as compared with the sixteenth-seventeenth century Polish campaigns and the modern German. Napoleon's anxiety to conciliate Alexander induced in him always a very cautious policy towards the Poles, and he failed to exploit the Ukrainian possibilities and the Caucasian difficulties in the Russian Empire of that day. Forty years later in the Crimean War the Western Allies also neglected the chances of combining political with military action, although Palmerston showed himself conscious of the chances inherent in promoting Finnish, Polish and Georgian interests, and Omar Pasha—too late in the War—pressed for a strong intervention in Caucasia.

Charles XII was indifferently served by his political agents. His Frenchified Polish ally, King Stanislas Leszczyński, had no adherents of the quality of Jeremy Vishnevetsky or Stanislas Koniecpolski; he relied in his contacts with Mazeppa, with Hordienko (Gordêenko) the Zaporogian *ataman*, and with the Don leader Bulavin, on the correspondence of dubious women of the type of 'Princess Dolski' and on Jesuit and Orthodox Balkan priests.

Delays in Poland during the summer of 1707 deprived Charles of the advantages which might have been gained by attacking Peter during the Bashkir and Don Cossack risings. He had relations with the Ukrainian Hetman as his grandfather had had with Khmelnytsky, but his agents had failed both to estimate the worth of any aid which might be forthcoming from the discontented Cossack elements in the Ukraine and to make clear the issue which confronted the Hetman.

Charles XII crossed the Vistula on New Year's Day 1708 and on 28 January he entered Grodno. 'His plan was, apparently (for even now it is largely guess-work), first, after crossing the Dniepr, to unite with the army-corps of Löwenhaupt, which was advancing from Riga to join him, and then to winter in the fruitful and untouched Ukraine, whose fortresses were to be held at his disposal by the Cossack Hetman Mazeppa. Simultaneously the Finnish army under Lybecker, with the help of the fleet, was to take St Petersburg and recapture Ingria, while Stanislas, aided by a third Swedish army under Krassow, was to quell all disaffection in Poland. In the summer of 1709, the three Swedish armies, reinforced by the Poles, the Cossacks and the Crimean Tartars, were to attack Muscovy from the north, south and east simultaneously and crush Peter between them. The realization of such a scheme, which absolutely disregarded

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*175 difficulties, and was to build upon nothing but the most fantastic hypotheses, lay far beyond the bounds of possibility' (Nisbet Bain, *Camb. Mod. Hist.* v, 697–8).

On 4 July 1708 Charles defeated the Russians at Holowczyn (Golovchino) and, marching through White Russia, reached the upper course of the Dniepr. The King stayed at Mohilev till 6 August, waiting for the arrival of Löwenhaupt. The Tsar's headquarters were at Smolensk.

'The Swedes now began to suffer severely, bread and fodder running short, and the soldiers subsisting almost entirely on captured bullocks. The Russians, under Sheremetiev and Menshikov, would not risk another general engagement, but slowly retired before the invaders, destroying everything in their path, till at last the Swedes had nothing but a charred wilderness beneath their feet and a horizon of burning villages before their eyes.'

By the time the Muscovite frontier was reached at Michanovichí (1 October) 'it was plain to Charles that he could go no further eastward through the devastated land'. At Tatarsk he held his first council of war. His generals advised him to wait for the reinforcements and supplies which were expected with Löwenhaupt and then to retire to Livonia, where he might winter in his own lands. But Charles, relying on the legendary abundance of supplies in the Ukraine and the expected adherence of Mazeppa to his cause, took the fatal decision of marching south instead of north.

Meanwhile the executions of Kochubey and Iskra had not procured any peace for the troubled soul of Mazeppa and on the Cossack elders they had produced an awful impression: all who disliked Mazeppa were indignant with the whole proceeding, and they understood well that the Hetman would not for a moment hesitate to sacrifice any of his old comrades in order to curry favour with the Tsar and to prove his loyalty to him.

Mazeppa himself was becoming increasingly uneasy at the dangerous game which he was playing. His agents were in the Swedish camp making facile promises of revolt, while his colonels still continued to consider him the Tsar's obedient servant. He was conscious of the thought that any day his ill-considered intrigues might be betrayed, and at the same time he could not convince himself that the Swedes, on entering the Ukraine, might not be welcomed by a spontaneous revolt which would sweep the unpopular Hetman away had he not already declared himself in favour of the invaders.

The defeat of Sheremetiev at Golovchino seems to have decided Mazeppa to show his hand. He began to compromise others and

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confided his intended treason to Colonels Apostol, Horlenko and Lomikovsky (who commanded the Cossack artillery). He knew these men to be opponents of Peter's régime and was aware that they had been slighted by the Tsar's generals during different campaigns. They all swore an oath to participate in the plot and to join the Swedish King. 175*

Later Mazeppa's Czech secretary Orlik gave some details concerning the clauses of a secret agreement concluded between 'the King of the Swedes, Goths and Vandals' and the Hetman of the Ukraine. Orlik pretends that according to the terms of this agreement the Ukraine was to become an independent state with Ivan Mazeppa as its legitimate ruler. That such an agreement would have been signed by Charles XII before his arrival in the Ukraine and before Mazeppa had committed himself is unlikely. It is probable rather that Mazeppa and Orlik showed the draft of an agreement to the conspiratorial elders in order to convince them of the reality of their dreams.

At the beginning of September Charles XII appeared on the borders of the Ukraine. Each day was now precious to Mazeppa, since Peter expected him to take immediate action against the Swedes. The Hetman had promised to deliver the fortified town of Starodub, but this first treason did not succeed, for the Swedish General Lagerkron was late and Muscovite reinforcements arrived before the town had time to surrender.

On 29–30 September the army of Löwenhaupt, advancing to a junction with the King, was severely mauled in the sanguinary battle of Lesnaya. Löwenhaupt, however, managed to join the King, and in the first weeks of October the exhausted Swedes, emerging from the Severian forest, advanced into the northern districts of Ukraine, where they secured some provision for both horses and men.

But the promised Cossack rising was not forthcoming. At the same time Mazeppa was evading Peter's order to start on campaign with the excuse that he was ill.

In the middle of October Peter decided to go to the Ukraine to take over personal command of the army there. Protasiev was sent by the Tsar to Borzna to visit the ailing Hetman, whom he discovered to be 'seriously ill', in fact 'at death's door'; he had already asked the Kievan metropolitan to come to him in order to administer the Holy Sacrament.

Protasiev had not long departed before the sudden arrival of Voynarovsky, his favourite nephew, frightened the Hetman into taking an irrevocable step. The Muscovite cavalry under Menshikov had been reconnoitring in the region between Starodub and Cher-

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* 175 nigov, impatiently awaiting the arrival of the Hetman with his Cossacks. When instead Voynarovsky had come with the message that his uncle 'was dying' Menshikov had refused to believe it, and from conversations overheard among Menshikov's staff Voynarovsky understood that the Tsar's favourite was planning to march on Baturin and Borzna and force the Hetman's hand. Voynarovsky had had to take flight by night in order to warn his uncle.

'The dying Hetman' immediately ordered his horses and galloped off to Baturin. During the night the old man and his secretary packed all they could take away from the palace. (Mazeppa had already taken the precaution of transferring part of his money and valuables to Belaya Tserkov.)

At daybreak on 4 November the Hetman, at the head of his troops, rode off to join the Swedish King, leaving Colonel Chechel and the Serdyuky Guard to defend Baturin against the Russians. On the north bank of the Desna Mazeppa ordered his Cossacks to form a circle and made a speech. Until that moment the Cossack ranks had been under the impression that the Hetman was leading them to fight the Swedes. But Mazeppa now tried to persuade them that if they did not immediately join Charles XII the latter would, after his inevitable victory over the Tsar, deliver the whole of the Ukraine to the Polish King. The Hetman's words roused no enthusiasm among the ranks. About 5000 crossed the Desna with him, but less than half that number followed him further.

This trifling aid was a great disappointment to the Swedes. However, still hoping for better things in the future, Charles received the Hetman with all the honours due to his rank in the little Severian town of Horki on the Desna. The learned *Dux militum Zaporoviensium* addressed the King in his famous church Latin; and out of respect for his age the monarch bowed low before his visitor and offered him a seat while he himself remained standing.

When he heard from Menshikov of the Hetman's treason Peter wrote to Apraksin: 'Though it is quite against my principles to answer your good tidings with bad ones, necessity obliges me to tell you what the Judas Mazeppa has done. For twenty-one years he has been faithful to me and now on the brink of the grave he has turned traitor to me and his people.'

Exactly a week after Mazeppa had joined the Swedes Menshikov attacked Baturin and took it by storm. One of the Hetman's officers came to the Muscovites and showed them the easiest way into the town. The fall of the place was followed by a fearful slaughter of the Hetman's pampered Serdyuky Guard. Menshikov's soldiery did not even spare the peaceful inhabitants. Mazeppa's palace was plundered

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and burnt, and the unfortunate commandant Chechel was put to the wheel. 175-a

Such were the first not very pleasant consequences of the Hetman's fatal action. Peter now with his usual energy began to combat the repercussions which the treason of their chieftain might have amongst the Ukrainian population. The Hetman's unpopularity among the people made that object easy to attain. The Tsar, in a solemn proclamation, annulled all the taxes introduced by Mazeppa. 'The ex-Hetman in his low cunning laid heavy taxes on the people without our knowledge, pretending they went for the needs of the army, but in reality they only served to augment his riches.' The Tsar also tried to calm the fears of the Cossack elders which had been aroused by Mazeppa's excuse for his treachery—that the Moscow Government intended to abolish all the rights and privileges of the Ukraine.

It was still November when Peter assembled the *Rada* in Glukhov for the election of a new Hetman. The first candidate was Colonel Polubotok, an excellent soldier. Peter, however, declined his candidature, remarking not without humour: 'Oh, he is too witty for me; he might turn out a second Mazeppa.' The modest and loyal Starodub colonel, Skoropadsky, was elected. The ceremony was made the occasion for the reading of a message from the Tsar to the Cossacks in which he confirmed 'all liberties, rights and privileges granted by his august father which it was his holy duty to keep unchanged and indestructible'.

Peter's wise and vigorous policy brought the expected results; assurances of loyalty flowed in from all sides. Even the closest participators in Mazeppa's conspiracy, Colonels Apostol and Halahan, sued for pardon.

Mazeppa was left with about a score of elders and fifteen hundred Cossacks—many of whom were not even Ukrainians. His game seemed lost. He still rested hopes, however, on help from the Zaporogians and the Crimean Tartars; and it was these hopes which encouraged the Swedish army to move more to the south. In the beginning of 1709 Charles' troops occupied Romen, Hadyach, Priluka and Lubni in the region of Poltava.

Peter was concentrating important forces in the neighbourhood of Sumy and Kharkov. On the right bank of the Dniepr Golitsyn occupied Belaya Tserkov, so that all the treasure which Mazeppa had carefully transported there was lost.

The Great Frost of 1708–9, the most severe which Europe had known for a century, imposed terrible hardship upon the Swedes. Peter was waiting for the spring to finish with the invaders. In

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175 February he spent some time in Voronezh and from there went to Azov.

The frost broke at the end of February, and the spring floods put an end to all active operations between the main armies for some months. But spring had unexpectedly brought with it new hopes for Mazeppa and the King.

Peter, after the election of the new Hetman, had concentrated his diplomacy on keeping the Zaporogian *Sech* in subordination. He had sent a message to the *ataman* Hordienko with a gift of 500 *chervontzy* for himself, 2000 for distribution among the elders and 1200 for the ranks. At the same time Mazeppa was pressing the *ataman*, an irreconcilable opponent of Muscovite *voyevodes*, to come over to the King.

About New Year's Day of 1709 Hordienko sent a sort of ultimatum to the Russian command demanding the evacuation and destruction of the Moscovites' forts in the *Sech* country, the banishment of all Russian and Ukrainian landlords, and the distribution of their lands 'among the people'. Aware of the intimate links between the Zaporogians and the peasant class throughout the Ukraine, Hordienko was playing for a peasant rising in which he might appear as the leader of the revolutionary mass and play for high stakes between the Tsar and the King. The social basis of his policy made him a far more formidable antagonist than the wealthy and disreputable old Hetman.

Hordienko's demands were of course ignored by the Russian authorities and he took the field with 6000 Zaporogians. Menshikov sent small detachments along the river Orel and along the line of the Vorskla. But Hordienko defeated the Tsar's dragoons at Tsvichanka and took Perevolochna on the Dniepr. The peasants began to rise in the neighbourhood of Poltava and Mirgorod. Fifteen thousand of them joined Hordienko, but the Zaporogians had no arms to distribute to them. In April Hordienko met Mazeppa's small detachment at Dikanka, the family seat of the Kochubeys. There followed the meeting with Charles XII at Budishchi, where the Zaporogian *ataman* was able to rival the Hetman in addressing the monarch in Latin.

In the beginning of May the King despatched the two Cossack leaders to open the investment of Poltava, which he proposed to capture and hold pending the arrival of the Swedish corps under Krassow which was with King Stanislas in Volhynia. The advance of a Russian detachment under General Renne threatened the Zaporogians, but a reinforcement of 3000 Swedish infantry under General Kruze enabled Hordienko to defeat Renne at Sokolno.

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In the meantime Peter had decided upon the destruction of 'the accursed nest', as he called the *Sech*. During May Colonel Yakovlev was sent in ships down the Dniepr, while the 'pardoned' Chigirin Colonel Halahan followed along the right bank. Yakovlev retook Perevolochna, and with Halahan occupied the *Sech*, where only 1000 Zaporogians had been left in garrison. The historic stronghold which had played such a formidable role in the southerly expansion of the Eastern Slavs was destroyed to its very foundations; not only all the *kurenyi* but even the *Sech* Church of Our Lady's Protection were burned by the Tsar's soldiers (who, however, proved sufficiently pious to see to the prior removal of all the icons). The destruction of the *Sech* was a great blow to the followers of Hordienko. 175 *

With the beginning of June the contending armies concentrated in the region of Poltava and it became evident that a decisive action was imminent. Peter preferred to avoid pitched battle with 'the invincible Swede', but the extremity of the garrison of Poltava compelled him to take the initiative. The news that Charles had been wounded in the foot encouraged Peter to accept battle if it were offered. Such was the confidence of the Swedes, even after the incredible hardship of the preceding eighteen months, in their reputation and their leadership that, with a serious inferiority both in infantry and guns, they did not hesitate to attack the Russians in an entrenched position. The battle opened at dawn on 27 June 1709. By 9 a.m. all hope of victory for the Swedes had gone. Hordienko's Cossacks played no part in the bitter contest which the Swedes put up before they accepted defeat. The Zaporogians simply left the field and scattered all over the country. Mazeppa, Orlik, Voynarovsky, and the inevitable following of Ukrainian ladies, were among the foremost fugitives. The old Hetman succeeded only in rescuing two barrels of gold coin from the wreck of his magnificence.

The remains of the Swedish army capitulated at Perevolochna on the left bank of the Dniepr. A sad fate befell the Zaporogians, who were not included in the terms of Löwenhaupt's capitulation. Those who were not drowned in trying to swim the river were butchered at the order of the Tsar.

The wounded King and Mazeppa, with Hordienko in their suite, took refuge across the Bug in Turkish territory. At the beginning of August they reached the small Moldavian town of Tighin (Bendery) on the right bank of the Dniestr; here they were interned on orders from Istanbul.

Misfortune had greatly aged Mazeppa and Orlik had become the leader of the small band of Ukrainian refugees; their position was a dangerous one, for the Russian ambassador to the Porte was

175* demanding their delivery, and to secure it Peter had written a letter in his own hand to the Grand Vizier which was accompanied by a substantial sum in gold. However, on Swedish intercession and also on instructions from Versailles, the French ambassador, the Marquis de Ferrioles, took up the defence of the wretched Hetman.

Soon the illness and death of Mazeppa delivered the Porte from further anxieties. He died on 2 October 1709 and was buried in the Orthodox Church of Tighin; but later the coffin with his remains was transported to the monastery of St George at Galatz.

A year earlier in Glukhov 'the state burial' of Ivan Mazeppa had taken place. With his love of macabre horseplay the Tsar himself was the author of this uncanny ceremony, which was called 'Mazeppa's speeding to Hell'. An effigy representing the dead traitor wearing full Hetman's dress and all the orders which he had received during his life was hung from a gallows. The hangman pulled down the effigy and dragged it into the cathedral, where Theophan Prokopovich, the former eulogist of Mazeppa's classical learning and taste in architecture, pronounced a curse. Menshikov and Golovkin then tore up all the Tsar's letters which had been addressed to the Hetman and ripped the decorations from the effigy. Clergy and choir, clad in black garments with black candles in their hands, intoned curses and spluttered black wax over it. Finally, Theophan Prokopovich hit the Hetman's effigy with his episcopal staff and pronounced 'anathema'. The effigy was then again hung on the gallows and afterwards burnt. 'Anathema' on Mazeppa, False Dmitri and Stenka Razin, all of whom had attempted to shake the foundations of the Muscovite state, continued to be proclaimed every year in all the churches of the Russian Empire. (8)

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND ADDITIONS TO CHAPTER IV

Sources and General Bibliography for the Period of the Hetmans

175* 113 A great mass of original documents concerning this period is preserved in the Russian Archives; notably the *Archives concerning Little Russia*. Originally Ukrainian affairs came under the control of the *Posolski Prikaz*—the Muscovite Foreign Office; later they were transferred to a special *Malorusski Prikaz* or Little Russian Office; and finally, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Little Russian Collegium was set up, and to the offices of this body were transferred all documents and archives concerning the Ukraine.

The most important papers were edited by D. Bantysh-Kamenski and were published in 1858 under the title of *Istochniki Malorossiyskoy Istorii* (Sources for the History of Little Russia). Valuable materials have also been published in *Arkhiv Yugo-Zapadnoy Rossii* (Archives of South-Western

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Russia), a periodical edited in Kiev from 1860 onwards by the well-known Ukrainian historian and political leader, Professor Antonovich. 176→ 113

Ukrainian chronicles concerning events at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries contain much original material on the history of the country. Of these the most important is 'The Eye-Witness's Chronicle'; the author, Roman Rakushko, was a contemporary and participator in the events of the Khmelnytsky period. His Chronicle was edited in Kiev in 1878 under the title *Letopis Samovidtsa po novootkrytym spiskam* (Eye-Witness's Chronicle according to Recently Discovered Texts). Two other chroniclers, Velichko and Hrabyanka, wrote during the eighteenth century of the events of the epic period of Ukrainian history of which they themselves were not contemporary: S. Velichko, *Letopis Sobytiy* (Chronicle of Events), 3 vols. Kiev, 1855; *Letopis Grabyanki* (Hrabyanka's Chronicle), Kiev, 1854.

Based on these chronicles, an early history of Little Russia was written towards the end of the eighteenth century, but it only appeared in print in the middle of the nineteenth century. *Istoria Russov ili Maloy Rossii* (History of the Rus or of Little Russia), Moscow, 1846, was ascribed to Yuri Konisski, Archbishop of White Russia, but it is now generally attributed to Gregory Poletika, a Ukrainian political figure of the days of Catherine II. To the same category belongs General Riegelmann's *Letopisnoe Povestvovanie o Maloy Rossii i eya narode i kazakakh voobshche, sostavlennoe v* 1786–1795 (Chronological History of Little Russia and her People and the Cossacks in general, composed in 1786–1795), 4 vols. Moscow, 1847.

In addition to the standard works mentioned in the Bibliography to Chapter III, the following biographical works are of value for the history of the Hetman period:

Antonovich, V. *Istoricheskie Deyateli Yugo-Zapadnoy Rossii* (Historical Figures of South-Western Russia).

Kostomarov, N. *Sobranie Sochineniy* (Collected Works): vol. II, *Getmanstvo Vigovskago* (*Vyhovsky Hetman*); vols. IX–XI, *Bogdan Khmelnitski*, Petersburg, 1903–4.

The following works should also be consulted:

Vovk Karachevski, V. *Borba Polshi s Kazachestvom vo vtoroy polovine XVII i nachale XVIII veka* (Poland's Struggle with the Cossacks in the second half of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth century).

Doroshenko, D. *Narys Istoriyi Ukrayiny* (Outline of the History of the Ukraine), vol. II, Warsaw, 1933.

(1) *The Agreement of* 1654 *and the Actual Position in the Ukraine during Khmelnytsky's Lifetime*

One of the most valuable works on this subject is Baron Nolde's critical essay: *L'Ukraine sous le Protectorat Russe*, Paris, 1915 (a Ukrainian translation has been published in Lvov). See also D. Odinets, *Prisoedinenie Ukrainy k Moskovskomu Gosudarstvu* (The Union of Ukraine with the Muscovite State), Paris, 1938.

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*175 An old but authoritative analysis of the Agreement is to be found in
113 G. Karpov's 'Peregovory o Prisoedinenii Malorossii k Velikoy Rossii' (Pourparlers on the Union of Little Russia with Great Russia), published in *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosveshcheniya* (Journal of the Ministry of Public Instruction), no. 11, 1871. According to Karpov, only a copy of the draft of the Agreement has been preserved in the Moscow Archives. When, in 1709, Peter I asked for the original, it could not be found.

For an appreciation of the actual social conditions existing in the Ukraine at the time of the Union, Myakotin's book is of great importance: V. Myakotin, *Ocherki Sotsialnoy Istorii Ukrainy v XVII–XVIII veke* (Essays on the Social History of the Ukraine in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries), 3 vols. Prague, 1924–6.

(2) *The Population of the Ukraine at the Time of the Union*

During the Cossack campaigns of 1648–53 Volhynia was terribly devastated. The Polish register of the year 1657 gives a detailed account. The town of Kremenets was entirely destroyed and not a soul was left alive in the scores of villages which lay in the surrounding countryside. The estates of the Vishnevetsky princes seem to have suffered most: in the borough of Monachin and twenty-two surrounding villages only six houses were left standing; in the town of Zbarazh and its thirty-five villages only nineteen houses remained, and in twenty-two other villages not even an empty house was left. In the town of Vladimir-Volynsk, 'rich and flourishing before', only two houses remained standing in 1657. In another formerly prosperous Volhynian town, Lutsk, only fourteen houses were left: 'the inhabitants had either fled or died of the plague'. The greatest part in this work of destruction was played by the Tartars, but the Cossacks and the Polish soldiery also ravaged wide stretches of country. The Jewish population was either slaughtered or fled to Galicia and Poland. The Tartars did not take the Jews prisoners but slew them on the spot. Only 10 per cent of the Jewish population of Volhynia, Podolia and the Ukraine survived. The Russian population suffered most in Podolia in the region of Bratslav; less in other parts of right-bank Ukraine.

As a result of these calamities there was a great increase of population on the left bank. In 1654 about 128,000 men were brought to swear allegiance to the Tsar's commissioners: this number represented apparently between one-third and one-half of the total grown male population. In the last years of Khmelnytsky's life the population of that part of the Ukraine which was under his rule numbered about a million and a half.

A curious feature of the Hetman's Ukraine was the unusual number of 'towns' for the period: in the district of the Bratslav regiment, 20; in that of the Nezhin regiment, 16; in that of the Poltava regiment, 15. There was one town to every three or four villages. But every strong place in which there was a fort surrounded by a wall and moat was called a 'town' (*gorod*). In the agitated period of the seventeenth century the inhabitants preferred these 'towns' to defenceless villages. In this wise and for similar reasons the old [redacted] Rus was renewed in the Ukraine; in the twelfth century

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the inhabitants of the Pereyaslavl, Chernigov and Kiev lands had had a distinct preference for living in towns. 175 * 113

See M. Vladimirski-Budanov, *Peredvizhenie Yuzhno-Russkago Naseleniya v epokhu Bogdana Khmelnitskago* (Migration of the South-Russian Population in the time of Bogdan Khmelnitsky), Kiev, 1888.

(3) *The Ambassadors of Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich in Warsaw in* 1658

The ambassadors sent to Warsaw, and at first very graciously entertained by King John Casimir, complain in curious terms about the Poles to Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich: 'In Warsaw the Poles often whisper in each others' ears; they also wink at us and make fun of us. When we are walking round the town or sitting in taverns, their soldiers make such a noise with their swords that we are often terrified. The whole countryside, they say, swarms with troops, and little Polish drunkards among each other speak of our Cossacks as belonging to them and they say that Smolensk will soon be theirs. As for our dignity as ambassadors no one gives it a thought, and they have also forgotten all about Thy Polish inheritance, My Lord. When we try and discourse with them about it, they answer us with grins and by clicking their heels together. And O My Lord, if truth be said, we are simply the Polish laughing stock.'

(4) *The Title of Hetman in the Hadyach Agreement*

'Russian Hetman and First Senator of the Voyevodes' Districts of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernigov.'

(5) *The End of Yuri Khmelnytsky*

Colonel Samko defeated Yuri Khmelnytsky in July 1662. Among the latter's troops were Don Cossacks and a thousand German mercenaries. Yuri fled to his friend the Archimandrite Tukelsky and, after resigning the Hetmanship in favour of Colonel Teterya, became a monk. When King John Casimir embarked on his campaign on the Dniepr, Yuri went to him. The King proposed to make him Metropolitan, but Yuri wanted to be Hetman again. Tukelsky became Metropolitan instead of him. Together with Tukelsky Yuri was arrested by Czarniecki in 1664, and sent to the fortress of Marienburg. After two years' imprisonment, they were set at liberty through the intercession of Peter Doroshenko. During his residence in the Moshnin monastery Yuri received information about the relations existing between Doroshenko and the Turks. When the Poles again wanted to arrest Yuri and his friend Tukelsky, they took refuge with Doroshenko. At the end of the year 1667, the Muscovite envoy with Doroshenko, going to church, found that the officiating priest was none other than Yuri Khmelnytsky, who was now known as the Archimandrite Gideon. However, when Doroshenko's position became insecure, Yuri Khmelnytsky joined Khanenko. Khanenko was defeated by Sirko and some Tartar friends of Sirko's took Yuri to the Turkish fort at Akkerman. Doroshenko, who did not desire the return of Yuri to Ukraine, asked the Pasha to send him to Istanbul. This was done, and Archimandrite Gideon was incarcerated in the

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175* 113 castle of the Seven Towers, where he remained until 1677, when he was set free and taken by sea to the Crimea.

(6) *Ataman Sirko*

Unreasoning and brave, Sirko was chaotic in all his actions throughout all his life. He is the most fantastic of all the fantastic figures in the Zaporogian *Sech.* Indifferent to booty, lucre and honours, Sirko was the very pattern of the wild Zaporogian chivalry. However, owing to his childish imagination and trusting disposition he was quite incapable of understanding the tortuous men and difficult circumstances of his time. There is an episode which well illustrates the simplicity of the Zaporogian hero. One day a young man appeared in the *Sech* who had been brought there by Don Cossacks. This young man gave himself out to be 'the Tsarevich Simeon', the son of Tsar Alexey Mikhailovich, who, on account of some dark plot, had been banished to the Solovetski monastery, whence he had managed to escape. Sirko tried to persuade the impostor 'not to fool the Zaporogians' but in the end believed his tale. In 1674 envoys came from Moscow to demand the delivery of 'the Tsarevich'. Sirko called the *Rada* together and persuaded the Zaporogians not to surrender their guest. The Zaporogians agreed and nearly drowned the Muscovite envoys. On second thoughts, however, Sirko asked the Muscovites to procure him a 'writing' from the Tsar himself to tell him whether Simeon was his son or not. Tsar Alexey had the graciousness to send him such a writing. Simeon was then sent off to Moscow, where he was executed.

There are many legends about *ataman* Sirko. In the spring of 1675, with 20,000 Zaporogians, he undertook his celebrated campaign to the Crimea. Having defeated the Tartars and taken Baghchi-Saray and Ak-Mechet (Simferopol), the Zaporogians were returning home with about 7000 liberated captives who had lived for years among the Muslims. Sirko noticed that by no means all of them were delighted to return to the Ukraine; many of them had married Tartar women and had really settled down to the Muslim way of life. Sirko decided to give a lesson to those 'who go over so easily not only to the Moscow people and the Poles but even to the enemies of the Christian Faith'. Having reached a place called the Black Valley he ordered his men to halt and declared to the liberated captives that he did not want to force anyone to go to the Ukraine and that those who wished to do so could return to the Crimea. About 3000 of them took him at his word and formed into a column to return to the south. Sirko sent young Cossacks after them with the order to slaughter them all. Later, looking round on all the heaps of corpses, he observed: 'Pardon me, brothers, but it is better for you to sleep here until the Day of Judgment than to settle in the Crimea and beget children and be damned to all eternity.'

Though the most bitter enemy of the Tartars, Sirko was respected by them for his fairness. During periods of armistice, these children of the steppe often asked him to act as an arbiter in their own quarrels. Hetman Samoylovich rebuked him once for allowing the Tartar herds to graze over the Cossack pastures. Sirko replied: 'Lord Hetman, if myself would help people in their dire need, it is not well to look down on that. There is a saying that need

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changes law. We and the Tartars are neighbours and help each other in a neighbourly way.' Legend ascribes to Sirko 'the answer to the Sultan's letter'. In his letter, according to the tradition, Sultan Muhammad IV called himself the Vice-Regent of God upon Earth, the King of Kings and so forth. Sirko is reputed to have begun his answer with the words: 'Thou art nought but the Turkish Shaitan, brother and comrade of the accursed Satan, Lucifer's own secretary.'

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(7) *The Disgrace of Hetman Samoylovich*

All the property of the disgraced Hetman was confiscated to the Muscovite Exchequer. A touching love affair was taking place during the downfall of Samoylovich. His daughter was engaged to young Prince Chetvertinsky. 'For three years the young people hid in the village of Dunaytsy. A local tradition shows the deep wooded valley where they took shelter. Having fallen in love with a brilliant young woman, the Hetman's daughter, the fiancé did not desert her when events deprived her of rank, riches and even decent clothing. He was able to marry her only in 1690' (N. Markovich).

(8) *Mazeppa*

Hetman Ivan Mazeppa has not yet found a critical and unbiased biographer. Even in the nineteenth century Russian historians were inhibited from objective study by the fact that Mazeppa was considered as 'one of the greatest criminals against the State' and by the continuing anathema of the Church. This background influenced such works as, for instance, N. Kostomarov's *Mazeppa i Mazeppintzy* (Mazeppa and the Mazeppans), Petersburg, 1885.

On the other hand the idealization of Mazeppa by the Ukrainian nationalists as a hero who pursued a far-sighted policy against the Muscovite hegemony in the Ukraine is equally unscientific. As a sample of this school see E. Borshak and R. Martel, *Vie de Mazeppa*, Paris, 1931.

The Kiev professors of the latter half of the nineteenth century, as for instance Antonovich, formed a more objective view of Mazeppa as an adventurer in the grand manner who would stop at nothing to attain rank, pomp and wealth. The 'treason' of Mazeppa against Tsar Peter was almost accidental, and doubtless no great moral issue disturbed the mind of the old Hetman who, it must be remembered, had spent his youth at the Polish court where no sanctity surrounded the office of monarch, and where 'treason' was indistinguishable from faction. Like old Simon Lovat in the '45, Mazeppa at the end of his life was the victim of his own calculating brain, and his love of intrigue and combinations led him into a position from which he found it impossible to escape.

For Mazeppa's relations with Colonel Paley, see M. Andrusyak, *Mazeppa i Pravoberezhye* (Mazeppa and the Right Bank), Lvov, 1938.

The same author has written an essay in which he establishes that, until 1705, Mazeppa had never thought of going over to Charles XII. (See M. Andrusyak, 'Zavyazky Mazepy z Stanislavom Leshchinskim i Karlom XII', in *Zapysky Naukovoho Tov. Shevchenki* (The Relations of Mazeppa with Stanislas Leszczyński and Charles XII, in *Proceedings of the Shevchenko*

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*175 113 *Scientific Society*), vol. CLII, Lvov, 1933). See also for this period: J. Feldman, *Polska w Dobie Wielkiej Wojny Północnej* (Poland in the Great Northern War), Cracow, 1926; *Trudy Imp. Russkago Voenno-Istoricheskago Obshchestva*; *Pisma i Bumagi Petra Velikago*; *Dokumenty Velikoy Severnoy Voyny, Poltavski Period* (Works of the Imperial Russian Society for Military History, Papers and Letters of Peter the Great, Documents of the Great Northern War, Poltava Period), vols. III–VI, Petersburg, 1893–1907. See also Swedish biographies of Charles XII by Frixell and others and the series of memoirs in *Karolinska Krigares Dagböcker*, Lund.

Mazeppa has acquired a wide celebrity in international literature through Passek's Memoirs and Voltaire's *Histoire de Charles XII*. These works were the origin of Byron's poem and of Horace Vernet's well-known picture. Chaykovski also dedicated one of his operas to Mazeppa. The hero of the great Russian poet Pushkin, in his poem *Poltava*, is not Mazeppa but Peter the Great. Pushkin, in relating the tragic fate of Kochubey, represents Mazeppa as he really was: a man of violent passions who knew how to hide not so much his thoughts as his feelings. Pushkin rightly guessed the motive which led the old Hetman to his ruin: the fear, which tortured him, that, in remaining loyal to Tsar Peter, he might be supporting the losing side.

Some letters have been preserved which are considered to be Mazeppa's letters to Maria Kochubey. These letters are supposed to have been found in Kochubey's house after his arrest and to have been produced during the trial. It is related that Count Golovkin returned these letters to the Hetman with assurances that he had not shown them to anyone and that he had not had them copied: but he had in fact had copies taken. Even if these letters may be regarded as genuine they give no clue to the character of their author. Their theme is love, forced parting, the sufferings of lovers, and indignation against Maria's parents. The promises never to forget Maria are accompanied by explanations as to why the Hetman could not keep her in his house. Some of the later letters speak of 'the change in Maria's heart' and of the Hetman's grief on account of it. But it is possible that the melancholy lines of the old reprobate were only the considered epilogue to a love affair which was too perilous and which had lasted too long. Before Maria and after Maria, Ivan Mazeppa continued to be surrounded by 'Ukrainian ladies'.

For the comparative history of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe during the period of the Hetmans, the relevant volumes of von Hammer's and Jorga's great Histories of the Ottoman Empire have been consulted. The former, though over a century old, is based largely on original Turkish, Venetian, Dutch and Austrian sources, and contains a mass of material not otherwise available. The more modern and more critical work of Jorga is the best general history for South-Eastern Europe. Reference has also been made to the following excellent surveys in the *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. V: Prof. R. Lodge, chap. XII, 'Austria, Poland and Turkey'; chap. XVII, R. Nisbet Bain, 'Peter the Great and His Pupils'; chap. XIX, *idem*, 'Charles XII and the Great Northern War'.

The *Revue du Sud-Est Européen*, published in Bucarest by Professor Jorga, contains a number of papers covering this period, notably: vol. X, nos. 1–3, M. Kasterska-Sergescu, 'L'expédition de Sobieski en Moldavie en 1686';

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vol. x, nos. 7–9, N. Jorga, 'Sobieski et les Roumains'; vol. xiii, nos. 7–9, O. Halecki, 'Relations Polono-Roumaines'. 175-* 113

A valuable article by the Ukrainian writer E. Borshak in the *Slavonic Review*, vol. x, no. 28, p. 138, surveys the 'Relations of England and the Ukraine' from the visit of Yuri Nemirich to the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge to the correspondence of Orlik and later Ukrainian leaders with English statesmen and private individuals. The writer gives numerous details about the mysterious Scotsman 'Krivonos' ('Broken-Nose') who was prominent in the immediate entourage of Khmelnytsky and who was believed by many to have been an agent of the Commonwealth Government.

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CHAPTER V

THE UKRAINIAN LAND WITHIN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE (1709–1914)

§1. AFTERMATH OF POLTAVA: HETMAN SKOROPADSKY

*175 POLTAVA marked the end of the epic period of Ukrainian history. But like most great events it was the symbol of change rather than the cause of it.

The gallant and fantastic world of Eastern Europe in the seventeenth century was passing. The splendid Polish camps which had held the field against Cossacks, Tartars and Kalmucks; the half-Arabian, half-Byzantine panoply of the Turkish Sultans hunting and campaigning over all the lands between the Adriatic and the Caspian; the Zaporogian pirates; Transylvanian Princes, Crim Khans, Roumanian Hospodars and Georgian Kings were becoming spectres in the dim past with the Mongols, the Byzantines, the Pechenegs and the Kipchaks.

Even Charles XII, commander of the most efficient army in contemporary Europe, had in him some streak of the archaic; he pitted himself against realities which he did not comprehend and he went down. Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, were successful because they expressed the spirit of an age in which war was ceasing to be the finest blood sport and was manifesting itself the instrument of that blind automatism of natural forces which was to take form in the national state. The Age of Enlightenment as interpreted by the successors of Peter the Great cast its artificial and rather macabre glimmer on the century which saw modern forms of capitalist society burgeon over the steppes of Eastern Europe. While the tribes of Indian hunters withered before the prairie fire of new civilization in the Americas, mining camps and oil towns rose up in the Caucasian Mountains and industrial cities came to life in the swamps and creeks of the Zaporogians. The untamed savagery of the Eurasian soul which had pillaged with the Horde and slaughtered with Khmelnytsky and Razin was canalized in the gutters and alleys of a new synthetic life.

No roots of culture nor of hierarchic ways, no inhibitions of religion nor of settled ordered life tempered the raw nomad mass which was swept into the mechanism of the capitalistic epoch. The modern spiritual nomadism—the patternless mass psychology—of

the population of the Communist state is the logical expression of 175 *
this transformation of primitive humanity by the ruthless processes of economic determinism. So at the other end of the world, the Mexican *peon*—one of a mass uprooted from its primal culture—stumbles and grunts in the arc-light of modernity.

When the Polish *szlachta*, numerous and sturdy, and the imperious Hungarian magnates failed to resist the impact of the new states which were taking form in Europe, the inexperienced and parvenu class of Cossack colonels was doomed to extinction by the Moscow autocracy.

The absence of a governing class in the Ukraine, with traditions and usages hallowed by time and possessing also a certain culture of its own, was one of the reasons why the experiment of a more or less independent Ukraine could not succeed. V. Antonovich, the distinguished Kiev historian of the second half of the nineteenth century, though a sincere Ukrainian patriot, did not have any illusions as to the Hetman period, and his judgment of the situation after Khmelnytsky's death is worth recalling: 'The downtrodden peasant masses had shaken off the yoke but they did not know what to do with what had fallen into their hands.... When politically undeveloped masses become conscious of their power they put forward those who favour their instincts.' After Khmelnytsky, in the view of Antonovich, the Hetmans of the Ukraine were either shameless demagogues or clever adventurers; each type was guided by personal or venal interests.

Against the background of the naïve rascality and impetuous incompetent ambition of the local leaders it is easy to understand the preponderant part played by the Tsar's officials, particularly in a Ukraine which at the turn of the century had been exhausted by two decades of Turkish wars. The Muscovite official was the product of a bureaucratic system which was already old and tried and which dated back to the days of the first Ivans; something indeed of the Byzantine tradition had given it a hoary fibrous strength.

The Muscovite officials now came into the Ukraine as the intendants and organizers of a vast new royal domain, and while there was little of the haphazard enterprise of the nobles and Jewish middlemen of the Polish colonization there loomed behind the imperial administration the executants and profiteers of Peter's policy—the Menshikovs and Golovkins and Shafirovs greedy for lands and mills.

Mazeppa's successor, the Starodub Colonel Skoropadsky, had the reputation of being an honourable man but of no special account, entirely under the influence of his wife 'Nastya'. All the same he was

*175 Hetman, and on the occasion of his election Tsar Peter had promised that it would be 'his holy duty to keep unchanged and unaltered all rights and privileges granted to Russia Minor'. However, at the Glukhov *Rada* (November 1708) the clauses of the Agreement of 1654 had not been read aloud as was customary on the election of a new Hetman. A few months later Skoropadsky had thought it his duty to remind the Tsar to confirm the clauses of the Agreement which from the time of Khmelnytsky had been looked upon as a sort of Ukrainian constitution. Golovkin had answered that His Imperial Majesty had already 'confirmed in general' the existing order in the Ukraine, and that as for the confirmation of the detailed Agreement of 1654, this 'would be given to the Hetman later when circumstances allowed'.

Soon after the Chancellor's ominous reply a confidential emissary of the Tsar, an official named Izmaylov, was attached to Skoropadsky with instructions to see that 'quiet and law and order should reign in Little Russia through the suppression of all agitators and rebels'. The Hetman was warned that he was not to dismiss Cossack elders without the Tsar's order and that their election must have the Tsar's approval. Peter continued to distrust the Ukrainians in the highest degree. Mazeppa's treason had made an indelible impression on his mind. And it was not only Mazeppa: the Hetmans Vyhovsky, Yuri Khmelnytsky and Bryukhovetsky had all proved traitors; and Mnohohrishny and Samoylovich had been removed from their posts on account of accusations of treason. 'Treason had become a sort of political tradition for Hetmans' (Nolde).

Throughout the winter of 1708–9, in the town of Lebedin, the commission investigating the affairs of Mazeppa and Hordienko continued its grizzly work. Trials, tortures and executions were the order of the day. According to local tradition about 900 persons are buried in the cemetery of Lebedin who were done to death on suspicion of having been connected with Mazeppa.

At the end of 1709 Mazeppa was no longer among the living, but Peter was extremely irritated by the presence in Turkey of the dead Hetman's secretary, the Czech Philip Orlik, and the Zaporogian *ataman* Hordienko. During May 1710 the rumour spread that the group of Ukrainian refugees in Tighin had elected Philip Orlik as their 'lawful Hetman'.

The remnants of the Zaporogians who had followed Hordienko were meantime seeking pardon through the intervention of Hetman Skoropadsky, but the news that thousands of Ukrainians were being transported to the north for work on the construction of the new capital of Petersburg or for the digging of the Ladoga Canal scared

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these doughty sons of freedom into migrating to the Crimea, where they became the subjects of the Khan.(1) 175*

In March 1711 a war broke out between Russia and Turkey which had been promoted partly by the able intrigues of Charles XII in his internment at Tighin and which was inspired also by the desire of Peter to repeat on the shores of the Black Sea the triumphs which he had already gained on the Baltic.

On the outbreak of war the Crimean Tartars began to raid into the Ukraine. Hordienko put himself at the head of the Zaporogians who had settled in the Crimea and 'Hetman' Orlik also joined them.

At first the population of right-bank Ukraine received the invaders with sympathy and Uman and Korsun were captured. The Russian garrison of Belaya Tserkov, however, put up a stout resistance and the depredations of the Tartar bands soon cooled the enthusiasm of the malcontent peasantry.

The humiliating defeat of Peter on the Pruth in 1711 might have been the occasion for an attempt to revert to the days of Doroshenko had the Cossacks possessed a leader of mark or had sentiment adverse to the Muscovites retained any real strength.

As it was, the Peace of the Pruth reversed the results of Karlowitz as between Russia and Turkey: Azov was restored to the Porte and Peter's new fortress of Taganrog was dismantled, while Turkish suzerainty over the no-man's-land of the lower Dniepr was re-established. Peter's titanic effort to open the 'meridial' way 'from the Varangians to the Greeks', begun with such signal success in the north, had proved abortive. When in the following decade he diverted his enterprise from the Black Sea to the Caspian he met with little better luck: in fact, the Russian drive to the south-east was delayed for half a century by the disaster of the Pruth; the historical results were important, for when at the turn of the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century Russian armies began to appear on the Danube the new world-power of Britain (which first became concerned in Black Sea and East Mediterranean politics during the Napoleonic Wars) barred the way to the neo-Byzantine dreams of the Panslavists and to the rival (continental) capitalism which aspired to straddle the Varangian Way.

There is an element of pathos in the epilogue of the legendary Zaporogians—so long the scourge of Islam—now fallen to the condition of unwanted clients of the Crimean Khan. The Khan settled them at Aleshki at the mouth of the Dniepr opposite modern Kherson and they began to complain of all sorts of oppressions. The adherents of Hordienko were losing ground and there was a general desire 'to return to the Tsar'. The Russian Government would not

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*175 have them; nor would it have been possible to accord them asylum without violating the terms of the recent Treaty of the Pruth. About 1500 Cossacks were leading a wretched life at Aleshki; the rest had gradually disappeared into the steppe.

In the meantime 'Hetman' Orlik, with Mazeppa's nephew Voynarovsky and several Ukrainian refugees were in Istanbul. Two of these refugees, Colonels Horlenko and Lomikovsky, who had been among the first to participate in Mazeppa's conspiracy, decided to return to the Ukraine. They received a pardon, although they were ordered to live under police surveillance in Moscow. Orlik, later, went to Sweden, where he continued to be treated as 'Hetman' and was accorded a pension. Voynarovsky was made a colonel in a regiment of Swedish Guards. However, his old friendship with Aurora Königsmarck, the favourite of Augustus the Strong and the mother of Maurice of Saxe, proved fatal to this able and bold adventurer. He met her in Hamburg in 1716 and gave credence to her promises of pardon made on Peter's behalf. Relying on Peter's magnanimity he went to Petersburg, where he was thrown into prison and subsequently exiled to Siberia. Orlik ended his days more agreeably; after the death of his patron, Charles XII, he settled down in France. (2)

In the Ukraine, after the Pruth campaign, Hetman Skoropadsky was trying to consolidate his position and to give no cause for displeasure to his formidable and exacting monarch. After Izmaylov another resident appeared in the person of Protasiev. Skoropadsky decided to win the good graces of these confidential agents of the Tsar by making them grants of Ukrainian lands, but he did not do so without the prior knowledge of his master. There were still enough free lands left in the Ukraine for this purpose; the properties which had been confiscated from Mazeppa and his adherents formed a large fund. At the time of the Hetman's election, Prince Dolgoruki, the Tsar's representative, received lands; and, a little later, Golovkin and Shafirov. The next year Field-Marshal Prince Sheremetiev also applied to Skoropadsky for lands. Following this distinguished example, a whole series of officials petitioned for lands, and some of these petitions, like for instance that of General von Weisbach, were accompanied by threats that in case of refusal application would be made direct to the Tsar.

In this sense a particular and insatiable greed was shown by Menshikov. Already in 1709 the Hetman had hastened to present him with Yampol near Nezhin and Pochep in the district of the Starodub regiment. In this latter estate alone 'his Serene Highness' came into possession of over one hundred and fifty villages. That did not suffice: by 1721 he had rounded off his properties in such a

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manner that he was lord of six thousand peasant farms. Menshikov availed himself in an original manner of the tracing of the new frontier with Poland—which passed in the vicinity of some of his domains. For the first time in their lives the village folk were shown an awful instrument called 'Astrolabia', and when the needle pointed straight at their lands this supernatural phenomenon awakened in them such awe that they no longer had the courage to raise complaints. Menshikov also wanted to be lord of Baturin, but here he met with the Tsar's refusal. 'The Duke of Izhora' had to wait for the reign of Catherine I before he got all he wanted; this however happened, as such things often do, just before his banishment to Berezov in the gloomy north of distant Siberia.

Under Skoropadsky private landowning developed rapidly. After the Muscovite officials appeared other more humble suppliants for free lands—Serbs and Wallachs who had been obliged to quit Turkey as a result of the failure of their insurrections at the time of the Pruth campaign. Cossack elders whom Skoropadsky thought useful and those individuals who, like Polubotok and Halahan, enjoyed the Tsar's favour, also profited. (Polubotok, by the way, was generously compensated for his failure to become Hetman.)

As the number of important landowners grew, the smaller landowners became progressively impoverished. Some of the poorer Cossacks were no longer able to appear fully equipped each with his horse for military service. They became peasants, and mostly no longer free peasants but dependent upon some newly established big landowner.

The Ukraine was passing through hard times. The years of war or military occupation, with the accompanying requisitions, whether Swedish or Muscovite, had depressed and discouraged the cultivator. New forms of service which began to weigh on them filled the people with resentment. Whole regiments were despatched to the Caucasus or to the shores of the Caspian, where they were decimated by fever. In 1725, 12,000 Cossacks with three colonels were simply sent to work on the Ladoga Canal. Only 10,000 returned to their native homesteads. But if Peter treated the privileged Cossacks so brusquely, the common peasantry were used with even less consideration. Owing to his manifold and varied activities the Tsar was always in need of workers: on the building of the capital and of the Ladoga Canal, on the abortive project of a Don-Volga Canal, and on the erection of fortified lines in Finland and the Northern Caucasus. According to the estimates of Ukrainian historians, between the years 1720 and 1725 over 20,000 men died while employed on these works.(1)

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175-* Tsar Peter continued to treat Skoropadsky graciously, and received him with all honours due to his rank when he visited Moscow in the years 1718 and 1722. At the same time he was planning a complete change in the system of government in the Ukraine. During the year 1722 the 'Little Russian Collegium' was set up, composed of Major-General Veliaminov and six other officers. The functions of the Collegium were to assist the Hetman in 'looking into procedure and investigating fairly all cases'; to control the collection of all taxes destined for the imperial Exchequer; and to supervise the activities of the Hetman's Chancellery. All Little Russian affairs were transferred from the Foreign Office to the Senate.

In July 1722 Skoropadsky died, and the Tsar, on the excuse that he was preoccupied with his Persian campaign, deferred the election of a new Hetman. In the following year Polubotok was rash enough to sponsor a petition for the election of a Hetman in accordance with the terms of the Agreement of 1654. He begged for the intercession of the Empress Catherine. Peter's answer put an end to illusions if anyone still had any. The Tsar wrote on 23 May 1723: 'Taking into consideration that except for the first Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky and the late Hetman Skoropadsky, all Hetmans were traitors and did great harm to our realm, especially to Little Russia where Mazeppa is still well remembered, and taking into consideration also that a perfectly reliable and honest man must be found to be elected Hetman and that a firm government is needed now so that affairs should not come to a standstill, I do not think it fit to trouble me any more with this question.'

Meanwhile, relations between Polubotok and the Cossack elders on the one side and the members of the Collegium on the other were rapidly deteriorating. Major-General Veliaminov was a rough man well known for his bad temper. During the sittings of the Collegium he used to shout at Polubotok: 'What are thy services compared to mine? Thou art simply a nobody compared to me!' He used to say to the Cossack elders: 'I will curb you so that you will feel it in your bones. The order is already given to change your old usages and to treat you quite in a new way!'

Having received notice of these dissensions, Peter made Polubotok and others of the Cossack elders come to Petersburg. They appealed there to the Emperor, to the Empress, to Chancellor Golovkin and to the Senate. It all ended for them in the fortress of Peter and Paul. Colonels Apostol and Miloradovich, who had formerly been respected by Peter, joined them there. After a year's incarceration some had died and Polubotok himself fell seriously ill. Peter in his way was fond of his old Cossack, and according to tradition he sent

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his own physician to the fortress. When Polubotok refused these offices, the Tsar went himself and promised to forget the past. Polubotok, knowing anyhow that his days were numbered, assured the Tsar that he bore him no ill-will. The old man exclaimed: 'Soon Peter and Paul will stand on the same board before the Almighty!' Paul Polubotok was not mistaken, for Tsar Peter only outlived him by a few months. 175 *

§2. UKRAINE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: HETMAN RAZUMOVSKI

Catherine I, Peter's widow, once a Lettish peasant girl, and the all-powerful Menshikov, whose servant she had been when the Tsar's fancy fell upon her, now ruled Russia.

The Ukrainian prisoners in the fortress of Peter and Paul were set at liberty. It was their luck that 'the half-sovereign potentate' had his own account to settle with the Little Russian Collegium.

The Supreme Privy Council founded by Catherine I was inclining towards the restoration of the Hetmanship at the beginning of 1726. After Catherine's death and the downfall of Menshikov it was accomplished by an *Ukaz* of the boy Tsar Peter II in June 1727. On this occasion one of the highest officials of the Imperial Government, Naumov, was appointed 'Minister Resident with the Hetman', and Ukrainian affairs were transferred back from the Senate to the Foreign Office.

In October 1727 Naumov arrived in Glukhov. The *Rada* (including, in the words of Naumov, 'all those who wished to come') elected as Hetman the Mirgorod Colonel Daniel Apostol. Although the colonel, who was a greatly respected man nearly seventy years of age, appears to have been 'indicated to me by Your Majesty', his election found popular approval. His son Peter, a remarkably well-educated young man, received the Lubni regiment, and the son of the unfortunate Kochubey, married to a daughter of Apostol, the regiment of Poltava.

According to ancient custom 'the rights and privileges' of the Cossacks were confirmed during the ceremony of installation, although, as Baron Nolde points out, the significant phrase that 'His Majesty graciously permits a Hetman in Little Russia' was introduced.

It was probably the influence of the conservative Prince Ivan Dolgoruki which induced a return to the 'old order' in the Ukraine; but a change from the policy of Peter I had already been envisaged under Catherine I and Menshikov. The necessity of conciliating the Cossack leaders and maintaining peace in the Ukraine was imposed

*175 by the prospect of war with the Turks and new changes in Poland. Furthermore, the internal situation in Russia following the death of Peter the Great was exceedingly precarious. 'Three women, a boy of twelve, a babe of one and an idiot' were successively elevated to the imperial throne in the course of twenty years. Power was centred in 'the barrack capital of St Petersburg, situated outside Russian soil and cut off from the life of the Russian people'. Adventurous groups made up of foreign officers, aristocrats and officials, dependent on the uncertain tenure of the passing occupant of the throne and on their popularity with the Guards regiments, were in control of the machinery of government. In the first year of Catherine I even Menshikov discovered that the peasants' burdens were intolerable and that 'they were simply dying out'. Under the German favourites of the Empress Anne it was alleged that 'the people were treated like dogs'. 'In this reign great storms swept over Russia; vast famines, particularly that of 1733 when the peasants came in crowds to beg in the towns, were followed by widespread epidemics; great fires broke out. Meanwhile the country was traversed by punitive columns trying in vain to levy the enormous arrears of impossibly heavy taxes.... Peasant elders were knouted and peasant farmers were sold up wholesale' (Pares, *History*).

With the accession to the throne of Anne, Duchess of Kurland (the daughter of Peter I's sickly elder brother Ivan), in 1730 began the heyday of the German Balts who flocked to the un-Russian capital on the Neva. But with all their greed and ambition, favourites like Osterman and Münnich were not without great quality. Under the influence of Münnich, sense and foresight were shown in the organization of the frontiers of the Empire. In all those regions like the Ukraine, the northern Caucasus and the Orenburg Steppe where no natural boundaries existed the system of fortified lines and Cossack settlements was developed; and particularly on the Caucasian and Asiatic frontiers the value of the Cossack in mobile defence was realized.

The restoration of the Hetmanship in the person of Daniel Apostol had filled with joy the remnant of the Zaporogians who lingered on at Aleshki as clients of the Khan. When Hordienko, an old man now, appeared among the Zaporogians in order to persuade them to continue on their lands, they put him in chains; and setting fire to their settlement, they went back to their former homes on the islets of the Dniepr. Thus the so-called 'New Sech' came into existence.

In 1731 General von Weisbach took in hand the project of Peter I of building a fortified line between the rivers Dniepr and Donets (along the line of the affluents Samara and Orel). The Zaporogians

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received a friendly message from the General that 'their services would soon be needed', and in 1734 General Tarakanov arrived in the 'New Sech' with presents. 175

While the military favourites of the Empress Anne thus continued their leisurely preparations for a resumption of the struggle between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, events in Poland again provided the occasion.

After the defeat of Peter on the Pruth, the Turks had continued to control all the belt of territory along the Black Sea littoral, and with the retrocession of Azov the Russians had been deprived of their only access to southern waters. At the same time all right-bank Ukraine had remained under the feeble domination of the Polish King Augustus the Strong, and, as in the time of Mazeppa, it was not possible for the Russians to make encroachments in this direction without sacrificing the advantages which the friendship of Augustus afforded them in the north.

The policy of the Imperial Government in regard to the Ukrainian lands which remained under Poland had been confined to encouraging a migration from the right to the left bank of the Dniepr. But this policy met with scant success, for the fate of the Cossacks and peasants in Russian territory who had been sent off to labour on the shores of the Baltic and in the northern Caucasus had filled the population of the left bank with horror. Compared to forced labour the service of Polish landlords appeared preferable; and those who in preceding years had migrated to the east of the Dniepr began to seek means of 'going back to their native land'. A movement of the agrarian population from east to west set in and the previously deserted districts of Chigirin, Uman and Bratslav began to receive a numerous immigration. The Polish landowners, returning after the Great Northern War to the fertile lands situated between the Dniepr, the Bug and the Dniestr, were in need of workers and offered the peasants all sorts of inducements to come back. As they had to deal with illiterate people, the Poles put up boards with holes in them on their estates, the number of holes indicating the number of years during which peasants could settle and live on the estates without having any liability towards the landlord. This was done to impress the mind of the Ukrainian land labourer who had gone through so many changes and who had lost the habit of thinking of the future. When a privileged year passed a hole was filled up, and when all the holes were filled up the settler became the serf of the landowner. It might have been supposed that he could foresee this eventuality when he settled on the landowners' property, but he looked upon it as the greatest injustice to himself. After fifteen or twenty years of

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*175 comparatively free and easy life in right-bank Ukraine many of these 'silent' agreements came to an end, and peasant discontent began to mount.

The so-called War of the Polish Succession which broke out on the death of Augustus the Strong when Stanislas Leszczyński, with French support, opposed the elevation, at the instance of Petersburg and Vienna, of another Saxon King to the Polish throne, was the occasion of widespread peasant risings throughout the lands to the west of the Dniepr.

In support of the new Saxon Augustus III, the Empress Anne sent troops into Poland under the command of the Irishman Lacy—one of those 'Wild Geese' who were so plentiful at her eccentric court. At the same time about 20,000 Cossacks, under the command of Colonels Lizohub and Halahan, rode through right-bank Ukraine and into Volhynia in order to give help to the adherents of 'the lawful King'.

The rival Polish factions distributed arms to their peasants, who proceeded to burn and plunder 'enemy' estates. The appearance of Russian troops accompanied by the Hetman's Cossacks and the Zaporogians was understood by the peasants to signify that 'the Tsaritsa has sent troops to rid us of lords and Jews'. The destruction of towns and manors was undertaken with a joyous hand, whether they happened to belong to the adherents of Stanislas Leszczyński or of Augustus III—the ally of the Empress.

Bands of armed peasants, *Haydamaky*, roamed about the country. The Polish gentry and the Jewish population of the towns fled in terror—especially in the neighbourhood of Bratslav and in the eastern parts of Podolia. Peasant risings spread further into Volhynia and Galicia. When at last Stanislas Leszczyński gave up the struggle and went abroad, Russian forces had to undertake the repression of the *Haydamaky*—many of whom fled for refuge to the 'New Sech'.(3)

The Crim Tartars had helped Leszczyński or had been expected to come to his assistance, and in 1735 the Russians had sent 'a punitive expedition' to the Crimea which had met with no success.

The conclusion of the War of the Polish Succession provided the ideal occasion for the attack on Turkey which the comprehensive military preparations in the Ukraine during the preceding years had foreseen. The close co-operation of Austria in Polish affairs was extended to South-Eastern Europe; while the recent victories which Nadir Kuli Khan had gained over the Turks in Armenia and Iraq seemed to indicate that their armies were in poor condition and that they would fall an easy prey to the combination of Germanic and Muscovite power.

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It was natural that a strong régime in Petersburg should resume the struggle where Peter had failed—to re-establish the 'meridial line' from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the economic independence of the fluvial network of the Great Eurasian Plain. /175 *

The Turkish fortresses at the mouths of the Great Russian rivers and the Tartar stronghold in the Crimea stopped the main arteries of trade, and Turkish sea-power on the Black Sea was the arbiter of the economic life of South Russia. 'The Crimea at this time was very rich. The Steppes poured the inexhaustible wealth of their flocks and herds into it, and the trade between the peninsula and Turkey was enormous. Kozloff, the chief port on its western side, exported 200,000 head of cattle and an incalculable quantity of grain to Stambul every year, while the still more prosperous Caffa on the east coast was, perhaps, the largest slave-mart in the world.'

During the spring and summer of 1736 Marshal Münnich forced the lines of Perekop and took the Tartar capital of Baghchi-Saray, while Lacy, after a hard siege, compelled the surrender of Perekop. In the following year the Turkish fortress of Ochakov—the situation of which dominated the embouchures of both the Dniepr and the Bug—fell to the Scots General Keith; and in the campaign of 1738 the Russians invaded Moldavia.

But the terrible losses suffered by the Russians, more by disease than in battle, and the continued determination of the Turks, who had effectively repelled the Austrian invasion of the western Balkans, had wearied the Petersburg court of the war. French mediation secured the Peace of Constantinople, whereby Russia agreed to sacrifice all her conquests except Azov and the surrounding district, while the fortress of Azov itself was to be dismantled. 'On this occasion the Porte was induced to change the old title "Muscovy" into "Russia", but refused to concede the imperial title to the Russian Empress.' The recovery of the fortress on the stagnant Azov Sea which the Don Cossacks had offered to Alexey Mikhailovich a hundred years before was all that the Russians secured from this costly war—while the Turks still remained masters of the mouths of the South Russian rivers.

The ascendancy of Anne's German favourites had reversed the sympathetic policy towards the class of Cossack colonels which had been favoured by the Russian aristocrats, like the Dolgorukis and Golitsyns, who surrounded the boy Tsar, Peter II. The overbearing Münnich, at the height of his Crimean triumph, had actually solicited the Empress to make him 'Duke of Little Russia'. 'The Field-Marshal is far too modest,' the Empress had replied, 'I thought he would ask me for Moscow.' Even before the death of Apostol in the

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*175 middle thirties, Prince Shakhovskoy had been sent to Glukhov 'to watch the conduct of the Little Russian people severely and incessantly.'. These suspicions were already of a pathological order, since there were no signs of any sort of opposition to the imperial rule in Little Russia. The Cossack regiments were performing their military service with regularity and loyalty; the peasants were working on the Ukrainian Line without any of the murmurings which had accompanied their former transference to works outside their own land; and the colonels were only interested in enlarging their estates.

On the occasion of the death of Daniel Apostol, the Empress's advisers decided that it would be preferable not to appoint a successor 'under the circumstances', and the Little Russian Collegium was revived in the form of a Directory, to be known officially as 'The Hetman's Board of Government', consisting of three Little Russians and three Great Russians under the presidency of Prince Shakhovskoy. The Directory was placed under the authority of the Senate, thus again removing the affairs of the Ukraine from the sphere of the Foreign Office. At the same time Shakhovskoy was warned that he should act in such a way as 'not to awaken any suspicions among the people or give pretext for undesirable talk'. As it was, the 'temporary' absence of a Hetman passed more or less unnoticed, since the six members of the Board happened to be rather peacefully inclined people who desired to avoid all unpleasantness (they included General Keith, 1740–1).

In 1740 social relations in the Ukraine differed widely from those at the beginning of the eighteenth century. 'A general Survey' of Little Russian lands was carried out under the authority of Shakhovskoy in 1729–30. Documents concerning eight regimental districts out of ten on the left bank of the Dniepr have been preserved. The number of peasant farms amounted to about 56,000. Out of that number about 20,000 were in the full ownership of Cossack troopers or peasants. About 10,000 were situated on lands belonging to monasteries or towns. The remaining 26,000 formed part of lands belonging to landowners or temporarily allotted to colonels and judges by reason of their office. Thus, in 1730, only 35 per cent of small farms were the property of those who worked them; the rest belonged either to landlords, monasteries or towns. Seventy years before, after the rising of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, at least 90 per cent of Cossacks and peasants in the Ukraine had regarded themselves as absolute masters of their farms, and their most prominent chiefs had not dared accept grants from the Tsar which might intrude upon the ownership of the rank and file.

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The fatal character of the tendencies which were dispossessing smallholders of their farms is seen when the figures of 1752 are compared with those of 1730. In 1752 the number of independent owners of farms had fallen from 20,000 to 3000; another 3000 Cossack troopers owned their own houses but not the adjoining farms. These figures date from ten years before the beginning of the reign of the Empress Catherine II, to whom popular tradition attributes the abolition of independent peasant proprietorship in the Ukraine. Catherine II merely legalized conditions which had been working during a whole century and which were due, not to the policy of the Imperial Government, but to the natural economic processes and human factors which tend to favour a landowning as opposed to a landworking class. 175*

The military weight of the Cossack regiments was seriously affected. Myakotin estimates that, although regiments and companies continued to exist in the Ukraine as administrative Divisions, the number of Cossacks ready for military service in terms of the original obligations of free Cossacks had been reduced to about 15,000 by the year 1730. It is clear that Tsar Peter was aware of the ultimate effects on Cossack military strength of the changes which were taking place in the Ukraine. By an *Ukaz* of 16 April 1723 the Little Russian Collegium was instructed to give satisfaction to all petitions of 'Ukrainian inhabitants' who desired to resume the status of Cossack and who could prove that they or their fathers or grandfathers had served as Cossacks. The violent differences between the Hetman and Veliaminov undoubtedly had their origin in the efforts of the Major-General to frustrate the land greed of the Cossack notables. Polubotok succumbed in this struggle with Veliaminov, who had the support of the Tsar. However, 'neither the disappearance of Polubotok nor that of the prominent colonels who were with him nor the removal from office of numbers of elders and even captains ordered by Peter could weaken the stubborn opposition of Ukrainian landlords to the *Ukaz* of the 16th of April 1723' (Myakotin). The Cossack upper ranks proved faithful to the tradition of their class which they had inherited from Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Vyhovsky, Samoylovich and Mazeppa.

The weight of social tendencies combined with the fact that the development of the technique of war in the eighteenth century was diminishing the value of the Cossacks as a military instrument in European warfare, to weaken the interest of the Government in the maintenance of the Cossack system in the Ukraine. Where masses of ill-disciplined horsemen had served in the days of Romodanovski and Sobieski, Münnich employed armies trained on the German

*175 model and dressed in German uniforms even against the Crim Tartars and the Turks on the Dniestr. There was still a use for the Cossacks on the Caucasian Line against the Circassians and the Chechens or in the Orenburg Steppe against the Kirghiz. And bold spirits preferred to depart to the Asian outposts which continued to know no landlords. The Ukrainian Cossacks under the Empresses Elizabeth and Catherine II came to be looked upon as a picturesque element in the life of the South of Russia and, accordingly, they were given by the capricious Elizabeth 'a picturesque Hetman'.

The son of a simple Cossack of the Chernigov regiment, Alexey Razumovski began life as a shepherd; owing to his fine voice he was taken to sing in the church choir, and his good looks attracted the notice of Peter's daughter Elizabeth—the only real Russian among the Empresses of the eighteenth century. It all ended by Alexey Razumovski becoming a count and a field-marshal and the secret but lawful husband of Elizabeth Petrovna. His younger brother Cyril was sent to be educated abroad. The Cossack elders found all these circumstances extremely favourable to their aspirations and they took advantage of Elizabeth's sojourn in Kiev in 1743 to petition for the restoration of the Hetmanship. When Cyril Razumovski reached his twenty-second year in 1750 he was 'elected' Hetman of the Ukraine and held that post for fourteen years. The whole ceremonial of election was revived, and as part of the proceedings the clauses of the Agreement of 1654 were read aloud and confirmed. No one, of course, took this picturesque revival of old customs seriously. Cyril Razumovski was very young, fond of pleasures and court fêtes and had rapidly acquired expensive tastes. In Glukhov, his capital, he was bored to death and he did not miss an occasion when he could escape to Petersburg. He was of a kindly and extremely lazy disposition; affairs of state wearied him and soldiering did not interest him. The Empress presented him with vast estates: Hadyach with its surrounding lands; also Baturin and the district of Pochep which had once belonged to Menshikov. On the domains of the new Hetman were ten thousand peasant farms. However, in this respect he never competed with the records of Mazeppa and Skoropadsky, who had each accumulated between nineteen and twenty thousand peasant farms. Razumovski lavishly distributed lands; in the first place, of course, to his relatives and then to anyone who could gain admittance to him or to a certain Teplov who had been appointed to act as his 'tutor'.

The social processes already mentioned received a powerful impulse in Razumovski's time. All Cossack elders were able to acquire lands, not in temporary possession on account of the offices they

filled, but in full proprietorship. A great many lands were also distributed among Russian officials and military men. In 1754, following a report of the Chancellor Bestuzhev, even the open-handed Empress expressed concern: 'The Hetman distributes whole towns and villages in full and hereditary property and the owners of these domains take away the lands of Cossacks who fill official posts. This is why the number of Cossacks diminishes compared with former times.' The Empress gave an order 'to stop such disorder', but no one paid any attention to it. When Catherine II ascended the throne there were scarcely any lands left to distribute in the Ukraine. 175*

The Razumovski period was the happiest time in the Ukraine during the whole of the eighteenth century; it is comparable in many ways to the contemporary Golden Age of the Anglo-Irish gentry who were the beneficiaries of the huge redistributions of Irish lands which followed the Treaty of Limerick.

The landowners were rapidly becoming rich and civilized; they visited Petersburg and sent their children to be educated there. Many of them even sent their children to be educated abroad. When a certain Kulyabko, quartermaster of the Lubni regiment, asked the Hetman to grant him fifty farms, he put forward as a reason that he was sending three of his sons to foreign schools and that the other three were 'studying Latin and German in Kiev'.

In the middle of the eighteenth century the Ukrainian landowning class was acquiring Western ways more rapidly than were their contemporaries in Northern and Central Russia. The Ukraine took pride in the claim that it was the most advanced part of the Russian dominions in the cultivation of the arts. Levitski and Borovikovski, the most celebrated Russian portrait painters of the Age of Catherine, were Ukrainians by birth.

The landowners built country houses and churches. The Kiev cathedral of St Andrew is a remarkable monument of that period. When Razumovski resigned his post of Hetman he went to live in Baturin, where he built himself a *palazzo* in the Classical style to the plans of Catherine's favourite architect Cameron.

The general prosperity of the Razumovski period was not without benefit to the lower classes of the community. There were no wars on the frontiers of the Ukraine; and the Cossacks only took a modest part in the campaigns in Germany against Frederick the Great.

During this time the Zaporogians, not satisfied with their return to their old territory, spread over all the lands which they regarded as having been 'granted' to them by Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The *Sech* founded 'stockades' (*palanky*) on the Bug and the Ingulets to the west of the Dniepr and along the Samara and the Kalmius to the

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*175 east. The 'possessions' of the Zaporogians stretched from the mouth of the Dniepr to the Azov Sea. Tartar raids had almost entirely ceased and men began to settle in the wild steppe to the north of the Crimea across which Münnich had marched 330 miles without finding human habitations. The Zaporogians, who still offered a refuge to miscellaneous fugitives and were thus increasing in numbers all the time, began to abandon their traditional pursuits of hunting and fishing and to take to stock-raising and even to agriculture. These Zaporogians 'of new formation', who included several scores of thousands of new-comers, began to take measures to protect the lands they claimed from passing into alien hands. Animated disputes with the Don Cossacks began concerning the lands along the river Donets around Lugansk and Bakhmut. In the west the arrival of several thousands of Serbian immigrants who had fled from Turkey was not welcomed. The Russian Government therefore allotted them lands round the fort of St Elizabeth, and these territories became known as New Serbia. The small town which later received the name of Elizavetgrad was destined to become the first centre of 'New Russia'.

§3. CATHERINE II: THE PASSING OF OLD UKRAINE

In 1762 Catherine II, a German princess, ascended the throne as the result of a *coup d'état*. Russia had already played a decisive role in the Seven Years' War and it was Catherine's aim to make her one of the leading powers of the Continent. 'The Empress was beautiful, witty and pleasure-loving; her views on matters of private morality were most free, but she kept unbroken control over her heart and reason, if not over her senses. It was thus easy for her to beguile men, to play them against each other, to lower them while she appeared to raise them to her own level, and to subjugate them by the very magnificence of the favours which she showered upon them' (Sorel). Like Frederick the Great she enjoyed the friendship of Voltaire, and the ideas of the French Encyclopaedists had no little influence upon her singular genius; but she understood the Russian people as perhaps it was only possible for a brilliant and impressionable foreign woman to understand them, and she enhanced a mystical matriarchy by a talent for romantic politics, intrigue and spectacular campaigns. 'It was with the Greek cross in her hand that she summoned her people to the two great enterprises which her predecessors had prepared, the achievement of which constituted in her eyes the historic mission of the Tsars—namely, the conquest of Poland which should

open the road towards European civilization; and the conquest of 175 * the harbours of the Black Sea which should open the road to that Byzantine Empire whose greatness Holy Russia was summoned to renew, both by popular superstition and by political speculation' (Sorel).

The chief Zaporogian *ataman* Kalnyshevsky, who went to Petersburg to assist at Catherine's coronation, was graciously received by her. This was not the first occasion on which Kalnyshevsky had appeared in the capital. He had been to Petersburg to see Razumovski in 1755 and again in 1759, and each time it was to press those territorial claims of the Zaporogians which so greatly annoyed the Russian Government.

Catherine's attitude towards particularist interests within the Empire was soon made clear in the instructions under her own hand which she addressed to Prince Vyazemski, the General Attorney of the Senate.

'Little Russia, Livland and Finland are provinces possessing special privileges which were granted to them. It would not do to encroach on them or abolish them at once. On the other hand, to look on these provinces as foreign lands would not only be a mistake, but stupidity. They must be dealt with in the same way as Smolensk Province. They must gradually, by the most delicate means, be put into the position of Russian regions so that they cease to be like wolves yearning for the woods. It should not be difficult to achieve this object if only intelligent men are appointed to the head of these provinces. As for Little Russia, when there will be no more a Hetman there, it will be necessary to make her forget the very title of Hetman and the period of the Hetmans. That will be better than constantly observing the persons who fill this post.'

The first step taken in the direction indicated by Catherine was the summons to Petersburg of Cyril Razumovski. His arrival was heralded by that of his faithful Teplov, whose report on the existing state of affairs in the Ukraine did not fail to correspond with the views of the Empress. When Razumovski came to the palace Teplov threw himself into his master's arms; Gregory Orlov, present at the scene, quoted aloud the words of the Gospel—'he betrayed Him by a kiss'. Count Razumovski resigned his post of Hetman—'the last Hetman'. He was granted Hadyach in full ownership, part of the Menshikov estates and Baturin, where he continued to live until his death forty years later.

Little Russia was again transferred from the Foreign Office to the Senate, and governed by a Collegium composed of four local notables and four officials from the north delegated to assist the

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*175 Governor-General, whose residence was to be in Kiev. Count Rumyantsev was appointed to this post. He had the reputation of being a severe administrator and an excellent soldier.

The change did not evoke any protests. When in 1767 the Cossack elders and landowners were called upon to elect deputies to sit on a Commission which was to revise the legal code, only the mild complaint of a certain Gregory Poletika was recorded; he demurred at the danger of 'introducing into Little Russia an order which did not correspond to her rights and privileges and of violating thereby the sanctity of agreements' (Nolde). The Glukhov District instructed their deputies to 'ask the Empress to treat us like the rest of the Russian nobility so that we may take up service where we wish and enjoy the full possession of the estates which have been granted to us or which we have acquired.' The Commission was more or less forgotten in the course of the Russo-Turkish War of 1769–74, but after the conclusion of peace the Cossack elders and Little Russian nobles again petitioned Rumyantsev 'to bring their most pressing and vital needs' to the attention of the Empress. These needs were confined to questions of equality of rank and the confirmation of the title of landowners to their estates.

While the ancient 'rights and privileges' of the Ukraine were disappearing under the centralist policy of Catherine, the death of Augustus III, the last Saxon King of Poland, had precipitated the crisis which was to grow into the long agony and partition of the Catholic monarchy. Catherine imposed as King in Warsaw her former favourite, the pliable and rather liberal Stanislas Poniatowski. But in 1768 the exacerbated nobles formed the Confederation of Bar, which sought too late to redeem the country from the tutelage of the Russians.

The programme of the Confederates 'pro religione et libertate' sought amongst other reforms to the taste of the outraged gentry to reverse the concessions to Dissenters (Orthodox and Protestant) which the rulers of Russia and Prussia had lately extracted from the new King of Poland. A war, at once national, social and sectarian, flared up in Galicia, Volhynia and the Ukraine and all the horrors were renewed of the *Haydamak* risings of a quarter of a century before.

The agrarian revolts in the Polish Ukraine had never really ceased from the days of the *Haydamaky*, and recently the mutinous peasantry had found a leader of force and passion in the *Igumen* (Abbot) of the Chigirin Monastery, one Melchisidek Znachko-Yavorsky. In May 1768 a numerous detachment of *Haydamaky* gathered in a deep wooded valley in the neighbourhood of Chigirin, called Kholodny

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Yar. Their chief was a Cossack, Maxim Zaliznyak, who had lived in 175 *
the *Sech* and had spent some time in the monastery of the blood-thirsty Melchisidek. The latter looked upon Maxim as his disciple. In this wild spot the Abbot blessed the coming struggle and distributed to the *Haydamaky* a document 'written in gold letters'.

After butchering all Poles and Jews in the region who had not time to escape into the towns and fortified mansions, Zaliznyak moved on Uman, where some 10,000 fugitives had gathered.

Uman was a wealthy town with a numerous population of Jews, Greeks and Armenians. The Basilian monks (Uniates) had a school there where four hundred pupils carried on their studies. The whole town was the property of Count Potocki, who had in his pay a detachment of a thousand Cossacks under the command of Captain Ivan Gonta. The hopes of the fugitives were centred on these Cossacks rather than on the regular Polish garrison, which consisted only of some sixty men with a few old cannon. Gonta actually marched out to meet Zaliznyak but only to join forces with him. The combined forces of the insurgent peasants and the Cossacks took the town by storm and there followed what is still remembered as 'the Uman slaughter'. According to tradition about 18,000 people, refugees and local inhabitants, were put to death. The greater part of the victims were Jews, but there were also members of the Polish nobility among them and all the pupils of the Basilian school.

After the Uman horrors, Zaliznyak was proclaimed 'Hetman' by the *Haydamaky* and Gonta was appointed 'Colonel'. The latter, however, felt that his achievement boded no good and was heard to say: 'We have brewed a strong beverage but I do not know how we are going to drink it.'

The Uman slaughter shocked the Empress Catherine and she did not approve of popular outbursts of emotion such as that represented by the movement of the *Haydamaky*. General Krechetnikov, who was then operating against the Bar Confederates, was ordered to turn his arms against the Orthodox crusaders, which he did in conjunction with the Polish detachments of Stanislas Poniatowski. The rabble, still sating themselves on the spoils of Uman, surrendered after scarcely any resistance and Gonta and others, as Polish subjects, were handed over to the Poles for execution. Zaliznyak escaped—no one knew where. Ukrainian legend holds him to have been a sorcerer who 'could put mist into the vision of the Muscovites'. Reprisals against the Orthodox peasantry, under the protection of the imperial troops, were carried out by the Poles in the region of Lisyanka and Chigirin. The *Haydamak* rising and its terrible end became the theme of many Ukrainian songs. Shevchenko, the

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*175 great Ukrainian poet of the nineteenth century, wrote a poem about it.

The misdeeds of the *Haydamaky* reacted unfavourably on the Zaporogians, who were becoming increasingly unpopular with the Russian authorities owing to their violence against Russian and Serbian settlers in the territories which they claimed as theirs. The Zaporogian petition of 1767 'for the confirmation of their ancient liberties', for the return of lands occupied by Serbs, Russians and Don Cossacks, and for the transfer of Zaporogian affairs from the Senate to the Foreign Office, was regarded as an intolerable insolence by the Empress, who not unreasonably associated in her mind the peasant insurgents of the right bank of the Dniepr with the turbulent freemen of the Black Sea littoral. Only the outbreak of the Turkish War preserved for a few more years the anarchic liberties of the 'New Sech'.

There was an inevitable and profound connection between the Polish and Turkish Questions. The Germanic and Muscovite powers had a common interest in breaking up and undermining the two state systems which lay between their respective frontiers. Only at the beginning of the twentieth century when the Ottoman power had been finally destroyed by the wars of 1877–8 and 1912–13 did the two major beneficiaries of the process of decomposition come into conflict, and this was when the Slav power threatened the control of the Germanic power over minor Slav peoples. The result was fatal to both Germans and Muscovites.

Western Europe, represented in the eighteenth century by the Bourbon Monarchy, had pursued a policy of intervention—not generally successful—in favour of the states constituting the belt which separated the German powers from Muscovy. French diplomatic influence in Poland had been a tradition since the days of the Valois; in the eighteenth century the defeat of Sweden in the Great Northern War made French military intervention necessary if the 'belt states' were to be maintained. The French military rebuff at Danzig in 1734, when Russian troops under the command of the German Münnich first exchanged shots with the soldiers of a Western state, cast strange shadows before. To support their hazardous diplomacy in Poland the French made use of their political and commercial influence in Istanbul; and the Turks, in the war of 1736–9, on the Black Sea and in the Balkans administered an effective check to both the Austrians and the Muscovites.

Again, in the 'sixties, the French supported the Confederation of Bar and sent officers and munitions to the Poles. Again they used their important influence at Istanbul to exploit the latent conflict of

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interests between the Turks and the Russians in order to bring the former to the aid of the hard-pressed Poles. 175*

The Russians on their side had been busily and not very effectively pursuing that policy of rousing the religious and social discontents of the Christian peoples of the Balkan peninsula which had first attracted the interest of the court of Alexey Mikhailovich and which had since been pursued without notable success by the advisers of Peter I and the Empress Anne. (The Turks were not behind in conducting a Pan-Islamic and anti-Russian propaganda among the Mussulman tribes of the northern Caucasus and the Tartars of the Volga—a by-road of history which has never been adequately studied.)

In view of the difficulties of the situation in Poland, however, the Russians were not planning for immediate war with Turkey, when, in the autumn of 1768, Sultan Mustafa, irritated by reports of Russian support of insurrection in Montenegro and Bosnia and encouraged by the French Ambassador, suddenly began hostilities—after a manifesto in which he declared that 'Russia had dared to destroy the liberty of Poland'. 'The rhetoric of the chanceries, which had made the Russians the defenders of liberty of conscience, now made the Turks the champions of political freedom' (Sorel).

The cynical Choiseul was of the opinion that 'the rottenness of the Turks in every department might make this trial of strength fatal to them; but that matters little to us provided the object of an immediate explosion be attained'. Frederick the Great in his Memoirs expressed the view that 'this war changed the entire political system of Europe'. 'There were', he felt, 'two alternatives, either to stop the course of Russia's gigantic conquests, or, which was the wiser plan, to endeavour by adroitness to profit by them.'

The Cossacks played only a modest part as auxiliaries of the regular Russian armies which took the field against the Turks; but their knowledge of steppe warfare was useful and made their part conspicuous. In the first year of the war (1769) the Zaporogians were engaged in bitter conflicts with the Crim Tartars who raided their *palanky*. In 1770 the Zaporogians fought gallantly before Ochakov and participated in Rumyantsev's crushing victories over the Turks in Bessarabia (Larga and Kagul).

At the beginning of 1771 a special *Ukaz* of the Empress thanked the Zaporogian troops 'for their gallant actions against the enemy'. The famous light craft, which had made Sahaydachny the scourge of the Black Sea a century and a half before, infested the mouths of the Danube in support of the Russian troops in Moldavia; while in the Azov Sea they were used to take the lines of Perekop in rear.

*175 The soldiers and courtiers who returned to Petersburg from the theatre of war talked a lot about the Zaporogians—their courage, their strange customs and their picturesque apparel. The Zaporogians became the fashion in Petersburg society. Count Panin and Prince Prozorovski registered themselves as Zaporogians; and one of their greatest enthusiasts was Catherine's new favourite, Gregory Potëmkin, the future 'splendid Prince of Tauris'. He also had his name put down on the *Sech* register; was warmly welcomed there and received the nickname of 'Gritsko the Dishevelled'. Potëmkin wrote several times to the chief *ataman* asking for small favours, signed his letters with his Zaporogian nickname and addressed the *ataman* as 'father' (*batko*). All this, of course, was looked upon as a huge joke, but the Zaporogians took it seriously; they were counting very much on Potëmkin's support and were deeply hurt when Gritsko the Dishevelled turned out to be one of the chief agents in the abolition of the *Sech*.

Gregory Potëmkin was a remarkable statesman of outstanding intelligence and character; one of the foremost builders of the Russian Empire of the nineteenth century. He became the first Governor-General of New Russia. All the future of the South of Russia went the way which had been traced for it by Gregory Potëmkin. When, in 1774, the Treaty of Küchük Kainardji crowned the triumph of Catherine's arms, the Crimea, although nominally an independent state, passed virtually under Russian control together with the mastery of the fortresses of Kerch and Yenikale which gave free access from the Azov Sea and the Don basin: Ochakov remained in Turkish hands, but the cession of Kinburn assured the Russian exit from the mouth of the Dniepr. The life of the South of Russia immediately began to flower: new towns were planned; Ekaterinoslav ('Catherine's Glory') on the Dniepr, Kherson near its mouth, and Pavlograd on the land-way to the Crimea.

The Zaporogians considered the building of these towns to be encroachments on 'the *Sech* territory' which they claimed to have been allotted them by Bohdan Khmelnytsky. In 1774, at the close of the Turkish War, new dissensions arose between the Zaporogians and their Russian, Serbian and Don Cossack neighbours, and a Zaporogian deputation visited Petersburg to demand the confirmation of 'the ancient liberties' of the *Sech*. The dangerous Pugachëv rising on the Volga formed a sinister background to the insolence of the Zaporogians and Catherine abandoned all hesitations. In April 1775 she gave the order to Potëmkin to confiscate all the arms of the Zaporogians and to abolish the very existence of the *Sech*. It had in fact become quite impossible to admit the rights of an armed com-

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munity inside the Empire which did not recognize Russian laws and chose to discuss when it should and should not obey the authority of the Government. 175*

On 4 June 1775, without any warning, a strong force under General Tökölyi (a Hungarian by origin) surrounded the *Sech*. The chief *ataman* Kalnyshevsky was invited to attend upon the General. Later he proceeded to call the *Rada* together—'the last Zaporogian *Rada*'. There was a lot of noise and shouting during that last meeting. The *ataman* was trying to persuade the Zaporogians to offer no resistance, but at first none would listen to him. Some were already placing cannon on the mole and others were distributing muskets when Father Vladimir, the priest of the *Sech* church, made his appearance and began to adjure the Cossacks 'not to spill their brothers' blood and to surrender to the Will of God'. Shouts were heard among the crowd—'To the Danube', 'Back to the Turks'. A certain inclination for the Turks had never completely disappeared from the *Sech* since the days of Doroshenko: that night about three thousand die-hard souls made their way out of the *Sech* and scattered over the steppe, taking the direction of the Turkish frontier. The rest, about the same number, surrendered. General Tökölyi, for some unknown reason, arrested Kalnyshevsky, the judge Holovaty and the secretary Hloba. On the following day all arms were confiscated; all the archives of the *Sech* and all the standards and emblems of the Zaporogian troops. The funds and the whole of the property of the *Sech* were escheated to the imperial Exchequer. The Don Cossacks began to plunder the *Sech* church and to rip off the richly embossed silver frames of the icons. Old Zaporogians were silent witnesses of all this and tears ran down their weather-beaten cheeks. A garrison was left in the *Sech* and an order was given to the Zaporogians 'to disperse to the four corners of the world'. This sad episode was the end of the old order in the Ukraine.(4)

In a less spectacular way great changes took place six years later, in 1781, in what had been the Ukraine of the Hetmans. As a result of the new administrative division of the Empire introduced in 1775, the lands which had formerly been governed by the Hetmans were divided into three Governments: Kiev, Chernigov and Novgorod-Seversk. Two years later Little Russians found themselves called upon to pay taxes on the same basis as the rest of the inhabitants of the Empire: 1 ruble 50 copecks for townspeople and 70 copecks for peasants. The unification and centralization planned by Catherine when she ascended the throne was completely realized when, in 1793, the Second Partition of Poland united the Ukrainian lands on both banks of the Dniepr. These two parts of the Ukraine, which had been

*175 divided for more than a century, were united when every vestige of Ukrainian independence had disappeared and when even the word 'Ukraine' had lost its historical significance. Many decades were to pass before the name was used again in a quite different sense—in the sense in which it is used in the present period of history.

Catherine's second Turkish War, like the Second Polish Partition, was in fact an organic continuation of the first. The Crimea had been annexed in 1783, but the Turkish frontier still ran along the Bug and the redoubtable fortress of Ochakov could threaten the exit from the Dniepr lands.

Catherine, further, had not relinquished the ambitious schemes which, 'particularly after Potëmkin's rise to favour, became almost reckless in their scope. She dreamed of breaking up Turkey in order to form a new Greek Empire, which was destined for her second grandson, significantly named Constantine, while Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia were to constitute a kingdom of Dacia, to be ruled by an Orthodox Prince—Potëmkin to wit'.

The German powers split on the issue of the partition of the Ottoman Empire, for, while Joseph II moved his armies in alliance with the Empress, Frederick, having abandoned the hope that differences would arise on the Danube which might promote a conflict between the Austrians and the Russians, entered into an alliance with Poland and Turkey (1790). Finally, in 1792, confronted with the prospect of a general war, Catherine accepted the Treaty of Jassy, which gave Ochakov with complete control of the embouchures of the Dniepr and Bug to Russia and fixed the Turkish frontier on the Dniestr.

On the eve of the war the Empress had made her famous voyage to the south in order to acquaint herself with her new dominions in Tauris and New Russia. The indomitable woman was approaching her sixtieth year as she made her gorgeous progress through the steppe. At Kanev on the Dniepr, the lover of her youth, her puppet King in Poland, Stanislas Poniatowski, came to pay his respects; and at Ekaterinoslav the Emperor Joseph II was her guest.

The ambassadors of the powers who accompanied Catherine on her progress sneered at 'the Potëmkin villages' which the Governor-General of New Russia had erected on the route, like theatrical scenery, in order to impress all eyes with the prosperity of the new dominion. But if Potëmkin did try to enliven the steppe scenery with decorative effects it was done, not to deceive his mistress, but to illustrate in picturesque manner the scope of his 'five year plans' and of his building projects. This fancy was quite natural in the eighteenth century when ephemeral architectural *ensembles*

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were erected and artificial scenery which pleased the taste of the 175* period.

The colonization of New Russia was really a rapid and remarkable success and could certainly justify, in the view of the Empress and Potëmkin, the destruction of the *Sech*. In the decade after 1775 4,400,000 hectares of land were distributed. Enormous estates were granted to old Prince Vyazemski (about 200,000 hectares, including the islands on which both the old and the new *Sech* had stood). Potëmkin laid his hands on 150,000 hectares; Prince Prozorovski got the whole area round Ekaterinoslav; and even the former Hetman Cyril Razumovski was not forgotten with 35,000 *desyatins* of new land. A little later, a French emigré, Prince Polignac, received wide grants on the banks of the Bug. Fifteen hundred hectares could be had by any landlord who would undertake to settle thirteen peasant families and pay to the Exchequer 2½ copecks a year on each hectare. Potëmkin also encouraged the settlement of efficient small farmers—from the Baltic provinces and even from the Islands of Dago and Oesel. There was also a continuous and widespread immigration of Serbs, Moldavs, Czechs and Germans. In particular, every German settler received 65 hectares from the state in addition to a money grant and timber for building purposes.

Gritsko the Dishevelled even found a way to make his peace with the Zaporogians whom he had so cruelly offended in 1775 and at the same time to serve the interests of a wider colonization.

When, in 1783, a certain ferment occurred among the Crim Tartars, Potëmkin began to recruit the remnants of the Zaporogians who had scattered all over the steppe. A regiment of about 1000 men was formed with the former *Sech* elders Isidor Bily and Antony Holovaty in command. These Cossacks of Potëmkin met the Empress at Kremenchug on her journey to the south and performed aquatic feats to the admiration of the court. In view of the coming war, Potëmkin took advantage of the opportunity to secure an order to free all Zaporogians (the majority of whom had become serfs on the large estates following the dissolution of the *Sech*) for Cossack service. He set the example by freeing 247 former Zaporogians who were working on his own estates. In the vicinity of Ochakov on the lower Dniepr an organization resembling another 'New Sech' rapidly came into being—with Bily and Holovaty and Colonel Chapyga, as the official representative, at its head. The Empress stipulated only that the new Cossack formations should not have the name of Zaporogians. However, Suvorov, in 1788, granted to 'chief *ataman* Bily's gallant Zaporogian troops' their own standard—a blue cross on a white field. In May of the same year the traditional small

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175 *Zaporogian skiffs took part in the great sea battle off Ochakov. Bily was mortally wounded and Chapyga was elected *ataman* in his stead. Holovaty with his men captured the island of Berezan—one of the principal forts covering the fortress of Ochakov; and when that indomitable stronghold was finally taken by storm Potëmkin with his own hand pinned the Cross of St George on the breast of the Zaporogian leader.

As a result of their heroic services, the Empress issued a special Rescript granting the 'new Zaporogians' the name of 'Black Sea Cossacks' (*Chernomorskie Kazaki*), and Potëmkin himself assumed the style of their Hetman. Through his powerful intercession, the 'Chernomortsy' were granted all the lands conquered between the Bug and the Dniestr, to which was later added the newly conquered Taman region in the northern Caucasus.

The bloody assault of Izmail in December 1790 added to the battle laurels of the *Chernomortsy*; and in June of the following year they had their share in Repnin's great victory at Machin. Three months later, the genius who had presided over the creation of New Russia, the Hetman of the Black Sea Cossacks, the old Zaporogian Gritsko the Dishevelled, was lifted out of his carriage and laid on a rug to die in the steppe.

It seemed obvious, following Potëmkin's death, that the newly granted lands of the Black Sea Cossacks were destined to go the way of the lands of the Zaporogians. When Antony Holovaty went to Petersburg with a Cossack deputation he did not even mention the lands between the Bug and the Dniestr but turned all his efforts to securing the confirmation at least of the new lands in the northern Caucasus. As a result, the Empress, who loved and revered the memory of Potëmkin, granted, in July 1792, 'to the troops formed of loyal Cossacks of the Zaporogian *Sech* by the late Field-Marshal Prince Potëmkin of Tauris' vast lands between the Azov Sea, the Kerch Strait and the river Kuban. Such was the beginning of the Kuban Cossacks. By the following year the last Ukrainian Cossacks had left the South of Russia. A song tells how 'now the Cossacks received reward for their services from the Tsaritsa' and how in the Kuban 'they must serve loyally, the frontiers defend, fish catch and vodka drink'.

§4. POLISH INFLUENCES UNDER PAUL AND ALEXANDER: THE ROMANTIC REVIVAL

As a result of the Second Partition of Poland all those parts of the old Russo-Lithuanian state which had, since the Union of Lublin in 1569, formed part of Poland were incorporated in the Russian Empire. Of

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the West Russian lands only Galicia—which passed to the Habsburgs —remained outside the frontiers of the Tsar of All the Russias. But in the lands to the west of the Dniepr Polish institutions, the Polish and Catholic way of life, had taken strong root. At the same time, at the end of the eighteenth century, it had not become fashionable to regard the patois of a peasantry as the basis of claims to political authority. Thus, not only the Polish clergy and officials living in the territories ceded to the Russian crown, but also Russian officialdom, continued to ignore the Lithuanian, White Russian or Ukrainian character of the peasantry of different districts and to regard the 'territories annexed from Poland' as essentially Polish regions. Several decades passed before the Russian state and Russian society began to notice that the lower classes of these 'Polish Governments' consisted of Lithuanians, White Russians and Ukrainians and that there were very few Poles among them. 175 *

The Polish cultural ascendancy on the right bank of the Dniepr rapidly spread to the left-bank lands as the Polish nobility now subject to the Tsar began to influence both the Russian court and the upper ranks of Russian society.

In his Memoirs, which are such a valuable source for the history of Russian society in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, Wiegel relates how 'in my childhood I witnessed a great metamorphosis. The ancient capital of the Russian Great Princes, which even under Polish dominion had proved immune to Polish influences, suddenly became Polonized.' Thus he described Kiev in the last years of the eighteenth century during the short reign of the Emperor Paul I.

Paul I was inclined to encourage tendencies opposed to those of the Catherinian era and was in no way disposed to favour further measures of 'unification' and 'centralization'. He became the protector of the Roman Catholic Church in these Governments which had been annexed from Poland and he even re-established the local *Seyms* of the nobility which were nearly entirely Polish.

Catherine II had greatly strengthened the position of the nobility throughout Russia, and in those provinces where no real noble class had previously existed one had quickly grown up under her magnanimous auspices. In the Ukraine, the nobility, originating largely from the parvenu Cossack upper ranks, only came into legal existence in 1781 when the Little Russian Governments were definitely included in the social structure of the rest of the Empire. The Little Russian nobility then received the rights and privileges enjoyed by their fellows in other parts of the Empire and, when, after the Second Partition of Poland, right-bank Ukraine was incorporated in the

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*175 Empire, the same rights and privileges were extended to the Kievan, Volhynian and Podolian nobility which was either Polish or under the influence of Polish culture. The more ancient culture and infinitely more civilized way of life of the noble families who owned lands to the west of the Dniepr naturally exercised a strong influence on the new Ukrainian nobility to the east of the great river. Kiev was the place where the old Polish or Polonized nobility came into contact with the representatives of the Ukrainian upper class of recent formation, and the city therefore became the centre of a process of Polonization of the landed gentry of Little Russian origin. The Russian authorities of the end of the eighteenth century had no thought of checking this process. On the contrary, after the accession of Alexander I to the throne, the Government strongly supported Polish influences in the west and south of Russia.

A close friendship united the young Emperor to Prince Adam Czartoryski and the young Empress Elizabeth was romantically attracted to him. For some time Prince Adam Czartoryski directed the foreign policy of Russia, but the main work of his life was the creation of the Vilna educational district, at the head of which Prince Adam remained for twenty years (1803–23). The district was centred on Vilna University, an old centre of Polish culture founded at the end of the sixteenth century by King Stephen Báthory. The activities of the Vilna educational district extended not only to Lithuania and White Russia but also to Volhynia, Podolia and even to the Government of Kiev. In all the schools founded by Czartoryski's energetic collaborators lessons were given in Polish and according to Polish conceptions. In 1805 a gymnasium was opened at Kremenets in Volhynia, which became a sort of branch of Vilna University.

Later, in his Memoirs, Prince Czartoryski wrote: 'Vilna University was Polish in the full sense of the word and existed for the Polish provinces. A few years later all Poland was covered by a network of schools where Polish national feeling could develop freely.' The full significance of these words is evident when it is remembered that at this time Warsaw and nearly all the Polish-speaking provinces were incorporated in either Prussia or the Austrian dominions, and that in speaking of 'Poland' Czartoryski was referring to lands of which at least two-thirds of the population was Russian-speaking.

With the approval of Alexander, who remained under the influence of Czartoryski, another university, which was intended to become the educational centre of Little Russia, was opened in Kharkov. Count Severin Potocki was appointed Curator; he was a brother of the well-known Polish scholar, John Potocki, who was the first to study the question of the origin of the Ukrainian people.

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In this wise, not only the capital of the right bank, Kiev, but also the new centre of the left bank, Kharkov, became the dispensaries of that peculiar Polish nationalism which had its source, not in the idea of a national state, but of a state which found its true and veritably 'catholic' expression in the *Rzecz Pospolita*. This somewhat strange form of nationalism sought support among various nationalities—Poles, Lithuanians, Russians, Ukrainians—all those peoples who were supposed to be united by a common historical tradition and by the Roman confession or its variant, the Uniate Church. 176 *

As a result of the activities of Prince Adam Czartoryski and his disciples a situation was created whereby 'the forces and means for the resurrection of Poland were being concentrated not in Poland itself nor even partially so, but in the lands of the ancient Russo-Lithuanian state, which had once so jealously insisted on its independence. These lands had now become the reservoir of Polish nationalism—a movement which denied the historical importance of the Russo-Lithuanian state and substituted for that idea the conception of a great and united Poland from sea to sea' (Lappo).

It is evident that the Polish interpretation of *Rzecz Pospolita* had an attraction for certain intellectual groups in Russian society. Alexander I himself came under its influence at the end of the period of his struggle with Napoleon. When, after his return from the West, he visited Warsaw for the opening of the *Seym*, he made no secret in conversation with members of his immediate entourage of his intention to re-establish Poland 'in her former boundaries'. The oscillations in policy of this exalted and impressionable mystic were a source of continual uneasiness to the Russian statesmen who represented the continuity of Muscovite policy. On this occasion the historian Karamzin did not hesitate to protest in an imperative tone. In a Memorandum which he addressed to the Emperor in 1819, he asked: 'Would it be compatible with Your sacred duties, Your love for Russia and with justice itself? Could you with a clear conscience take away from us old Rus, Lithuania, Volhynia and Podolia?' Taking advantage of the high esteem in which the Emperor held him, Karamzin did not mince his words: 'We should not only be deprived of excellent territories but of our love and reverence for our sovereign, and in our souls would be extinguished the flame of patriotism if we had to realize that our country was nothing but the plaything of autocratic caprice.' Confronted with opposition of such stern quality, Alexander abandoned plans which might have formed the basis of a dual Russo-Polish monarchy and which might have changed the whole history of Slavdom during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

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*175 Certain events had already gone to show that hopes for the restoration of *Rzecz Pospolita*, even with the support and approval of the Romanovs and under their patronage, were but the idle illusions of Polish romantics. In the years 1792–4, during the heroic struggle of Kościuszko and Dąbrowski against the armies of Prussia and Russia, it had become evident that, the moment the theatre of war was transferred to territories where the peasants were not of Polish origin, the sympathies of the population were not on the side of the defenders of Polish independence. For instance, in 1792, Prince Joseph Poniatowski, the future Marshal of France, wrote to the King that the Volhynian peasants were taking the part of the Russian troops and that 'the rabble was as usual on the side of Moscow'. In the month of June of the same year he wrote from his camp: 'The peasants, and sometimes their owners, were my enemies; my adversaries always knew my plans, receiving information about all that went on in my camp from spies of every kind and description, who were easy for them to find, while it was extremely difficult for me to do so.'

This undertone among the peasantry explains why the enthusiasm for 'Napoleon's epic' in the higher circles of Polish society could find no echo in those former territories of *Rzecz Pospolita* which had been annexed to Russia. Austria had been defeated in 1805; Prussia in 1806; Russia in 1807. The moment appeared to have arrived when Napoleon might re-establish *Rzecz Pospolita* in the frontiers which had been abolished by the three Partitions. Dąbrowski, who was serving with the French, sent an address to the populations of the lands severed from Poland calling upon them to rise. The appeal, however, evoked no response, and Napoleon himself took a practical view of the conditions existing to the east of the Vistula when, to the disappointment of the Poles, he concluded the Treaty of Tilsit. He thought it wiser to be content with 'the Grand Duchy of Warsaw', which had a purely Polish population, and to put at its head a member of the Saxon dynasty. Napoleon wanted to stabilize this new Polish state by granting rights and privileges to the middle classes and freedom to the serfs. But this latter measure met with such stubborn opposition on the part of the Polish aristocracy that it was never carried out.

After the Austrian defeat of 1809 the Grand Duchy of Warsaw received Cracow and Malopolska, but Galicia continued to form part of the truncated Empire of the Habsburgs. Napoleon seems to have well understood the complications which were implicit in the Polish claims to the Russian and Lithuanian lands of former *Rzecz Pospolita*. Even in 1812, when 100,000 Polish troops were serving

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in the ranks of the Grand Army which had occupied Polotsk, Mohilev and Smolensk, the Emperor maintained his prudent reserve in respect of Polish aspirations. In Warsaw the Grand Ducal *Seym* passed a resolution in favour of re-establishing Poland in her historical frontiers, but Napoleon withheld his approval from this decision—postponing it until he had obtained a clear idea of how it would be received in the territories which had at one time belonged to Poland and had been annexed to the Russian Empire. At the same time he never abandoned hope, until the eve of the evacuation of Mosoow, of an accommodation with Alexander, and he seems to have hesitated to exacerbate the Russian court by promoting Polish—or, as he might have done, Turkish—claims. 175*

The legend that Napoleon contemplated a campaign in the Ukraine has no foundation. His war with Russia was at no stage 'total', and his conceptions were quite different from those of Charles XII a hundred years before. The strong patriotic sentiment called forth in Great Russia by the French invasion was also shared in the Ukraine. When, at the beginning of the retreat from Moscow, the Grand Army took a south-westerly direction it was only to avoid the devastated belt along the Smolensk road. Kutuzov barred the way at Maloyaroslavets and, in spite of an ephemeral success, Napoleon did not dare to take the risk of forcing his way into the rich and fertile, but relatively isolated, regions of the south and west.

After the Congress of Vienna the Grand Duchy of Warsaw again became the Kingdom of Poland with the Emperor Alexander as King. The internal structure and 'Napoleonic' boundaries of the kingdom were preserved; and not only Russia but Austria and Prussia guaranteed 'Polish national particularities'. In the Poland of Alexander the whole administration remained Polish; the kingdom had a royal Polish army, and, with the aid of the senior establishments of Cracow and Vilna, a university was founded in Warsaw.

The period after 1815 was the heyday of Polish literature and science. But the intellectual movement of this period continued to be inspired by romantic notions of re-establishing a Polish state with the structure and boundaries of *Rzecz Pospolita*.

Forty years later, in 1867, the impractical idealism of Polish nationalist romanticism was vividly expressed in the address issued by the Polish emigration protesting against the Slavonic Congress in Moscow. The survivors of the risings of 1831, 1848 and 1863 proclaimed themselves 'the representatives of the one and indivisible great *Rzecz Pospolita* created by God and history'. 'In the ancient *Rzecz Pospolita*', they claimed, 'Rus and Poland, united to Lithuania by unbreakable ties of history and moral needs as independent states

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*175 and equals, formed a union which alone could realize the happiness of the nations. We will always remain true to this principle of which our standard representing the Archangel Michael, the Eagle and the Chase (the arms respectively of Kiev, Poland and Lithuania) is the symbol.'

In 1867 this manifesto was an extremely antiquated expression of political romanticism which found no justification in the tragic events of the preceding four decades. In the years which led up to the armed struggle of 'the Congress Kingdom' with Romanov Russia, these notions concerning the Polish past and aspirations for the future had been prevalent among historians like Lelewel and Szajnocha and politicians of the school of Adam Czartoryski. Mickiewicz voiced all the pride and passion of the national yearning in his *Litania Pielgrzymska*. In Lithuania, White Russia and the Ukraine this Polish Messianism found many adherents among the lesser nobility who had received their education in Roman Catholic schools. Typical of their generation were the poets Goszczyński and Zaleski, both belonging to families of small Polish landowners. They were Polish poets, but they represented the so-called 'Ukrainian school' in Warsaw, and the two of them took an active part in the rising of 1830–1. From the Polish point of view of that period Goszczyński and Zaleski were looked on as 'Ukrainians', but in reality they were impoverished Polish nobles who had grown up in right-bank Ukraine and had received their education in the Polish school at Uman and later in Warsaw. Even in 1830–1 the revolutionary Polish Government failed to free the serfs in its own territories; and in the south the Polish detachments of Dwernicki and Romarino secured no support among the peasantry of Volhynia. For the representatives of the political romanticism of the time social questions were practically non-existent.

After 1830–1 the Polish emigration, which enjoyed a certain weight because it belonged to the aristocracy and gentry and therefore had many connections in the upper circles of European society, because also it was well-educated and sometimes gifted and had considerable financial resources and was supported by the Vatican, soon became extremely popular in Western Europe. The sympathies of European liberals were the stronger in that 'Poland's misfortunes' remained no longer the theme of poets and an unreal memory of days before the Napoleonic Wars but had become a grim reality of the present.

The Emperor Nicholas I was not a cruel man, but he was violent and unbending. Following 'the Polish mutiny' the Constitution was abolished; military courts were introduced; the administration of the country was completely changed; the Universities of Vilna and

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*175 Warsaw, the Gymnasium of Kremenets and all the schools founded by Adam Czartoryski were shut down. There were of course also executions and banishments, but these were not so systematic as after the rising of 1863. Europe rang with sympathy for Poland, but these sympathies did not go further than newspaper articles and rhetorical speeches. In the years between 1830 and 1848 the world was already seeking for ways and ideals other than those which had inspired the Italian Carbonari, the Decabrists and the Polish patriots. Social ideas had penetrated even the vague enthusiastic dreams of those who wept for their 'crucified country'; these ideas began to form a solid basis for new movements which were to take the form of a conscious or half-conscious struggle between the classes.(5)

Only fifteen years had elapsed after 1830–1 and the Polish political romantics seemed already 'prehistoric' in their beliefs and hopes. Europe in 1846 was on the verge of national revolutions in which the social factor was assuming a supreme importance; these new movements had infinitely deeper roots and wider possibilities than the risings of 1830, which had taken place generally through the initiative of officers' and students' 'secret societies', the members of which mainly belonged to the petty noble or middle classes.

In 1848 a conspiracy was formed in all the three parts of divided Poland, but unfortunately its gifted leader, Mieroslawski, happened to be a native of the Prussian provinces. Mieroslawski was arrested in Poznań, and Russian Poland did not respond to the movement. Only in Austria did the rebels succeed in taking control of Cracow, which at that time was a Free City. A 'Republic' was proclaimed there with a Directory at its head. The Republic was defended by a badly armed detachment which had been brought into the city by local landowners who were privy to the rising. The Habsburg administration, pressed throughout the Empire by dangerous national and revolutionary movements, had recourse to the stratagem of spreading rumours amongst the peasants to the effect that the Polish landowners were rebelling against the Government because it would not allow them to oppress their tenants and treat them as serfs. Peasant risings immediately flared up throughout all the countryside between Cracow and Lvov. A wholesale slaughter of the Polish gentry took place; about 800 families perished, of whom 180 were butchered in the vicinity of Tarnów alone.

As Russian and Prussian troops were marching into Cracow to dispose of the unfortunate Directory, Galician peasants were shouting across the small stream which divided the Austrian from the Russian provinces: 'We are killing off our Polish lords! When are you going to begin to kill yours?'

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* 175 §5. THE BROTHERHOOD OF ST CYRIL AND ST METHODIUS: RISE OF UKRAINIAN LITERARY NATIONALISM

It was just prior to 1848, in 1845 or 1846, that the Brotherhood of St Cyril and St Methodius was founded in Kiev. There were about thirty members of this secret society, the originator of which was a student named Hulak who had studied at Dorpat University, where he had been initiated into the ways of some of the Polish secret patriotic societies. (Many young Poles pursued their studies in Dorpat after the closing of the University of Vilna.)

Among the members of the Brotherhood of St Cyril and St Methodius were several personalities who afterwards became well known: the historian Kostomarov (not a Ukrainian by birth), the author Kulish, and the painter and poet Shevchenko. The members of the Brotherhood were united by their common interest in the history of the Ukraine. At this time the mind of the Ukrainian people still had vital connection with the past of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The popular beliefs of the peasants, their songs and legends and much of their common way of life continued to reflect the days that were not yet dead in the memories of old men. It was this background which had inspired the genius of Gogol (Hohol), a Ukrainian in his being but a Russian in his mastery of Pushkin's language. A love of the past which was still so near united the brilliant essayist Kostomarov, the profoundly erudite Kulish and the poet Shevchenko who 'thought in verse'. There were also other men in the Brotherhood who partook of those national revolutionary aspirations which were so characteristic of the time. They doubtless had their connections with that Petersburg secret society where, for the first time in Russia, Petrushevski was preaching 'Utopian Socialism' and young Dostoyevski was listening with rapt attention to these idle speeches.

The police soon became aware of both the Petrushevski Society and of the Kievan Brotherhood. Arrests followed: Kostomarov was banished to Saratov, Kulish to Tula. Both, however, were able to continue their historical studies. No criminal intentions could be attributed to the majority of the members of the Brotherhood. At the same time they were suspected of revolutionary tendencies. The poems found among Shevchenko's papers left no doubts as to the young poet's antagonism to the established order and, less fortunate than his more learned fellows, he found himself despatched as a private soldier to the fortress of Orsk in the Orenburg Steppe.

Shevchenko was a revolutionary in temperament rather than in thought. The principal points in the indictment against him were

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not so much the political programme of the Brotherhood (liberation of the serfs, a union of Slav Republics in which the Ukraine was to be included) as the terms which he used in speaking of 'crowned persons' and his generally inimical attitude towards the authority of the state. This attitude, and his great poetical gifts, account for the high importance attached to his personality by later generations of Ukrainian politicians, but it was his origin which made him a fashionable cult among the liberal intelligentsia of the Russia of his time. In the Decabrist decades poets and revolutionaries had generally been of noble origin, but Shevchenko was a son of the people. 175*

Shevchenko was born in the year 1814 into a peasant family living on the right bank of the Dniepr in the Government of Kiev. His family were the serfs of a landowner called Engelhardt. Having become an orphan in early childhood, he was taken into the Engelhardt family as an under-servant; and in due course he accompanied his *barin* to Warsaw, to Vilna, and at last to Petersburg. Having noticed the boy's inclination towards drawing, good-natured Engelhardt, during his sojourn in Warsaw, sent him to study under the well-known portrait-painter Lampi the Younger. In Petersburg the painter Łosenko, a Ukrainian by birth, took a fancy to him. Łosenko showed Shevchenko's drawings to the celebrated Academician Karl Brüllow, who immediately became interested in them. A serf could not enter the Academy of Art, but Brüllow found a way out of the difficulty: he painted a portrait of the poet Zhukovski who was tutor to the heir to the throne. The portrait was bought by the imperial family for 2800 rubles, and this sum was paid in 1838 to Engelhardt as the price of Shevchenko's freedom.

Such wise and generous friends in the capital seemed to hold promise of a successful future for the young artist. Petersburg opened its doors hospitably to 'this son of the people'. Gogol had set a literary fashion for the Ukraine and the customs and legends of her country life. All was going well for the young man until Martos the sculptor found his first attempts at verse. In company with the writer Hrebenka, another Ukrainian, Martos began to occupy himself with this newly discovered talent of the student of the Academy of Art. After this Shevchenko very nearly gave up his painting. In 1840 he published his first collection of poems entitled *The Kobzar*, and the book had a great and merited success.

Shevchenko in his poems tried to keep to the Ukrainian dialect in which legends were related and songs were sung. This was by no means an attempt to create a special Ukrainian language in opposition to Russian. Russian readers could easily understand the Little Russian dialect and were charmed by its sincerity and brightness. The dialect

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*175 transported the reader to the Ukraine more readily than Gogol's stories written in Russian. One of the attractive facets of Shevchenko's talent was his vivid recollection of all he had heard during his childhood in the land of his birth. One of his contemporary biographers writes: 'Folklore furnished an endless source of subjects and motives for the poet. Besides this fantastic world of folklore, Shevchenko was also haunted by the glorious and tragic memories of the past history of his native land.'

In the Russian literary circles of the time there circulated fragments of a history of the Ukraine entitled *History of Rus*, which was probably the work of the eighteenth-century Ukrainian political figure, Gregory Poletika, who had protested against the Catherinian reforms of 1767. The romantic and picturesque pages of this work were known to Pushkin and Gogol and also to Shevchenko. The latter dedicated his poems to the risings of Nalivayko and Taras Fedorovich and to the Zaporogian campaigns against the Turks. But the most popular of them all was '*The Haydamaks*' which is an epic description of the peasant rising of Zaliznyak and Gonta and of the taking of Uman. The Pole, Severin Goszczyński, born like Shevchenko in the region of Kiev, chose the same subject for a poem which was published about the same time as '*The Haydamaks*'. But in Goszczyński's work were described all the horrors of 'the Uman slaughter'. Thus the two different outlooks are mirrored: that of the Ukrainian peasant and of the Polish noble and rebel of 1831.

Of course neither Shevchenko nor his fellows of the Brotherhood of St Cyril and St Methodius ever gave a thought to the restoration of *Rzecz Pospolita*—particularly at a moment when the *Haydamaks* were again making their appearance in Galicia and killing off Polish landowners and plundering their estates.

When the young but already well-known author of *The Kobzar* returned to the Ukraine in 1843 he found many admirers among the landowners of the Kiev and Poltava Governments, who were cultivated and often very wealthy men. There were Ukrainians among them: Lizohub, Tarnovsky and General Kukharenko; but Shevchenko's most devoted friends were the family of the former Governor-General of Kiev, Prince Repnin, Count de Balmain and Countess Anastasia Tolstoy. During his exile in the Orenburg Steppe Shevchenko never ceased to correspond with Princess Barbara Repnin, who lived on her beautiful estate of Yagotin in the Poltava Government. Countess Anastasia Tolstoy also proved her friendship by procuring the poet an amnesty immediately after the death of Nicholas I. In 1857 Shevchenko returned to Petersburg, but he died four years later. His friends brought his body back to the

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Ukraine and buried it on the high bank of the Dniepr near Kanev. 175*

Shevchenko's success in Russian society of the forties is explained by the humanitarian movement of the period which considered the abolition of serfdom as its principal and immediate aim. People tried to like and be sorry for Shevchenko, not because he was a Ukrainian, but because he had been born a serf and had through his talent as a painter and a poet gained his liberty. There were many social motives in Shevchenko's verses, many eloquent and bitter words concerning the peasant doomed to be a serf and especially on the hopeless fate of the peasant woman. The life of the serf was not, of course, a particular Ukrainian theme, for many Russian writers of the period wrote about it, like Turgenev and Nekrasov, who knew even better than Shevchenko how to arouse indignation and compassion. But having come in contact with the Brotherhood of St Cyril and St Methodius the impressionable artistic nature of Shevchenko was influenced by the national and revolutionary tendencies of its members. Among his banned poems the best known is 'The Dream', where the poet, recalling the inscription on the monument of Peter the Great, exclaims: 'To Peter I from Catherine II—the First crucified our Ukraine and the Second finished off his victim.' In the poem 'Prometheus' Nicholas I is abused as 'the persecutor of liberty over the whole stretch of the Empire from Finland to Moldavia' and the state is denounced as 'only capable of building prisons and forging chains'. In 1847, if a man allowed himself the luxury of such flights of poetic fancy he was liable to wake up one fine day in some very distant region.

During Shevchenko's lifetime few people were familiar with his political pamphlets. But with the opening of the reign of Alexander II and the period of the great reforms the position of literary revolutionaries became far easier. In 1860 a group of Ukrainian historians and writers was formed round the journal *Osnova*. The group included Kulish, Kostomarov, Belozersky, Kistyakovsky, Antonovich and others. Shevchenko, after his arrival in Petersburg, joined them and published in *Osnova* fragments from his diary. The journal gave to the public a great deal of valuable historical material; as to its political background, it advocated, after the teaching of the Kiev 'Brotherhood', a federation of 'the Slav family of nations' in which the Ukrainian people were to be included on the same footing with the others.

The Emancipation of the Serfs in 1861 produced a revolution in social relations throughout the Empire and strongly influenced the Ukrainian movement, especially as it coincided with the Polish

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* 175 insurrection of 1863. The hopes of the Polish patriots had been stimulated by the Near Eastern War of 1854–5, and they were influenced also by the success of the Italian nationalist movement and by the general ferment of nationalities throughout Europe. Even in 1863 the Poles had not altogether given up hope of securing support among the populations of the former territories of *Rzecz Pospolita*, and they tried to make contact with the Ukrainian circles and with the Russian revolutionary groups in the capital of the Empire.

The rising of 1863, however, ended in complete failure. The Polish peasantry and a great part of the townsfolk regarded the movement with indifference and scepticism. This attempt, so obviously doomed to failure, was not even very enthusiastically supported by the strongly nationalistic class of Polish gentry. Technically badly organized, small detachments, after their first encounters with Russian troops, either scattered or crossed the Austrian frontier. Neither were the hopes of aid from England and France—encouraged by ill-advised friends among the publicists and politicians of London and Paris—nor from the Pope or Garibaldi, realized. The most serious result of the insurrection was the end of the Polish dream of a restoration of *Rzecz Pospolita*.

In the localities populated by Russian peasants who had just been liberated from serfdom by the Tsar the rising was represented as an attempt on the part of the Polish nobles 'to enslave again' the Russian Orthodox people. At the end of the rising the Government of Alexander II availed itself of the prevailing unpopularity of the Poles to limit as far as possible Polish landownership in White Russia, Lithuania, Volhynia and Podolia. The reprisals in Vilna carried out by Muraviëv were particularly severe. The executions and banishments ordered by him aroused the indignation of Europe and in Russian society he was called 'The Hangman'. The essential, however, in Muraviëv's activities was not in his brutalities but in his confiscations of Polish estates and the restrictions he imposed on the Roman Catholic Church. 'The Western Provinces', in his opinion, 'are part of ancient Russia, the majority of the population are Russian exceeding in numbers all other nationalities. Therefore every kind of Polish influence, whether national or religious, must be excluded.'

The Polish rising of 1863 finally removed all illusions which might have existed concerning the possibility of collaboration between the Ukrainian national groups and the enthusiasts of a Polish revival. In reality the Ukrainian intellectuals had nothing in common with the dreams of the romantic protagonists of *Rzecz Pospolita* of the epoch of Adam Czartoryski, Mickiewicz and Lelewel. With a few

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individual exceptions no Ukrainian joined the rising. There were many discussions in a certain *milieu* on the right bank of the Dnieper where Russian and Polish families had become related to each other or were united by long-standing friendships. The conflict of outlook which arose has been described by a Polish author, Sawiński, in his drama *Na Ukrainie*. In the end the tendencies of the principal group of Ukrainian nationalists triumphed. This group, originally centred round the periodical *Osnova* in Petersburg, had now gathered in the congenial atmosphere of Kiev University and founded a society called 'The Kiev *Hromada*'. When the appeal of the Polish rebels was received, Kostomarov, a member of the *Hromada*, proposed 'to send them all to the Devil'. Kostomarov, however, though an old friend of the Ukraine, was Russian, and a far more important part was played in defining the direction of Ukrainian nationalism by Antonovich, who was the most prominent figure in the Ukrainian movement during the years between 1860 and 1890.

Antonovich, while not a Pole, belonged to the local nobility, which had been Polonized for a long time; his father was a Catholic. After having passed through the University of Kiev, he began to study Ukrainian history with all the energy and persistence in his nature. He worked mostly in the Kiev Central Archives. Even during the early years of his researches he reached the conclusion that the Polish romantic interpretation of *Rzecz Pospolita* did not correspond with the ascertainable facts of history. The materials he found in the Archives enabled him to prove to his own satisfaction that social relations in *Rzecz Pospolita* were something quite different from what Polish historians of the first half of the nineteenth century, like Lelewel and Szajnocha, had represented them to be. On the eve of the rising of 1863 Antonovich wrote an ardent article under the title 'Confession' which was published in *Osnova*, in which he explained with absolute sincerity his reasons for opposing all Polish claims to territories inhabited by Russian peasants. He not only pointed out the mistakes made by Polish historians but accused them of deliberately falsifying historical facts. He ended his 'Confession' with a Ukrainian proverb: 'You can get to the end of the world with lies, but you will never be able to come back.'

The views of Antonovich were shared by other members of 'the Kiev *Hromada*' (Kistyakovsky, Zhitetsky, Hubinsky, Belozersky) and his example gave an impulse to the collection of historical materials concerning the Ukraine. The publication of *The Archives of South-Western Russia* was begun and continued during many years. During the period 1860–90 an enormous amount of historical research was carried out by the universities of the Ukraine. From the

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k 175 year 1882 the periodical, *The Past of Kiev* (*Kievskaya Starina*), began to appear in which, in addition to the historians already mentioned, the collaborators included Levitsky, Shulgin, Lazarevsky, Efimovsky, Skalkovsky, Dushevich, Golubovsky, Bahalia (Bagalêy), Storozhenko and Vladimirsky-Budanov.

Basing their theories on these historical researches, Ukrainian political leaders of the latter part of the nineteenth century elaborated an ideology of a clearly defined 'democratic' character which was in general accord with the tendencies of Russian educated society of the period. Going back into the past of their country, they came to the conclusion that from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century nationality had been exclusively represented by the Ukrainian lower classes, while the upper classes had either been Polish or absolutely polonized until, in the seventeenth century, they had come under 'Muscovite' and later under 'Russian imperial' influences.

Research into the fate of the Ukrainian people inevitably led historians into becoming 'democrats', but in a specific sense of that word. Antonovich and Lazarevsky opposed 'Ukrainian democracy' to 'Polish aristocracy', or rather to the rule of the nobles in Poland. To this kind of ideology the Ukrainian Cossacks were the expression of 'the Ukrainian social idea', which was contrasted sharply with the Polish one. The former *Radas*—the tumultuous assemblies where more often than not unpopular leaders were done to death—were idealized as the freely elected assemblies of a rural population consisting of small farmers and knowing no distinctions of class; and these *Radas* were held by the more fanciful of enthusiasts to have been a continuation of the ancient Kievan *Veche*.

Having adopted these conceptions, Antonovich and his adepts saw the expression of 'the Ukrainian national idea' in the half-conscious efforts of the lower layers of the Cossacks and the peasants during the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and they strongly disapproved of the anti-social ambitions of the Cossack elders of the Hetman period.

In all these affirmations of the Ukrainian 'national democrats' there was much that was mistaken—particularly their idealization of the Zaporogian *Sech*, which in their view was struggling for the attainment of political freedom and social justice. It is unscientific to explain the actions and men of a distant past from the point of view of the emotions and aims of political groups of the present day. Kulish, an old Ukrainian historian and politician and a veteran of the Brotherhood of St Cyril and St Methodius, who had been the first to try to give a literary character to the Ukrainian dialect and to Ukrainian peasant songs, considered it his duty to refute these

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exaggerations. He demonstrated the chaotic and destructive part 175 played by the Cossacks and even went so far as to acknowledge that the Polish nobles had been the bearers of culture into the steppe regions on both banks of the Dniepr. Kulish also held that the union of the Ukraine with Muscovy had been an act of historical necessity which was confirmed by the whole history of the Hetman period when the Ukrainians proved themselves incapable of organizing a stable system of life in their country at a period when it was half independent. A storm of vituperative criticism was raised against the old scholar who proposed these ideas to political agitators who merely regarded history as material for propaganda, and many years passed before his serious and conscientious historical work received the appreciation which was its due (see Doroshenko, *P. Kulish*, Berlin, 1922).

The Slav Congress which was held in Moscow in 1867 proved to have had an important influence on the development of Ukrainian nationalism. At this Congress gathered representatives of all the Slav peoples of Central and South-Eastern Europe—Kashubians from Prussia and Lusatians from Saxony, Galicians, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes and Croats from the Habsburg dominions, Serbs and Bulgars from the Balkans. Only the Poles were absent, because they considered 'this demonstration of Slav solidarity under Russian protection to be a historical lie'.

The Austrian and Hungarian press denounced the Congress as a 'conspiracy' against the Habsburg Empire; and, although it had no immediate practical results, the Congress may be held to have influenced the direction of Russian foreign policy over the period between 1867 and 1914. Taking leave of the Slav visitors, Lamanski, one of the initiators of the Congress, announced that 'the Slav Question has been transferred now from books and private studies to the street, to public squares, to churches and to theatres'. Subsequent events were to prove that it had been transferred also to the battlefields of 1877–8, 1912–13 and 1914–18.

§6. AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA AND THE GROWTH OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

The Slav Congress in Moscow had indicated to the Habsburg court that the Tsar's protection of the Western Slavs might not always be confined to the Balkan Peninsula. The Congress in fact had given an impetus to the dangerous Pan-Slav movement within the Russian Empire. Official circles in Petersburg, in encouraging this movement, without doubt intended to canalize all the social passions of the

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*175 period into an emotional stream which should overflow to the greater glory of Holy Russia. Within ten years, however, the Pan-Slavists succeeded in compromising the whole of Russian foreign policy and in forcing the Government into the war of 1877–8. Though the war was successful, the burdens it entailed made worse the discontent and consequent repressions which brought the imperial system nearer to its end.

The House of Austria, weakened by the events of 1848 and by losses in Italy, and finally deprived at Sadowa of all pretensions to any further leadership in the Germanic world, was driven to an ultimate dependence on the rising power of Prussia (from which the friendship of either Russia or France might have saved it). The Habsburgs had their revenge on Louis Napoleon by leaving him to the mercy of the Prussians in 1870. In the east they prepared to face the Pan-Slavism of Petersburg by pursuing an independently predatory policy in relation to the Ottoman Empire (by contrast with the agreed policy which they had accepted in the Partitions of Poland); and along their common frontier with Russia they countered the Tsarist support of the Habsburg Slavs by undertaking a long-sighted exploitation of the differences in culture and psychology which were to be found among the Russian Slavs.

At the Slav Congress a small group of grey-haired men, who had dedicated their lives since 1830 to the task of awakening the Russian-speaking peasantry of Galicia to a consciousness of their nationality, shed tears as they listened to that part of Prince Cherkassky's speech which dwelt on the position of their compatriots under Austrian rule.

The new Constitution of Austria-Hungary, which was promulgated about that time, granted, however, a wide autonomy to the different regions which formed part of the Empire. Galicia was reckoned among these regions, and there the supremacy of the Polish element was recognized. At the same time the Central Government in Vienna, which adhered to an ingenious policy of upholding the lesser nationalities of a region against the dominant element, did not neglect to acknowledge the existence of the Russians, to whom was accorded the official denomination of 'Ruthenians' (a term generally used in old Vatican documents when referring to the Russians subject to *Rzecz Pospolita*, and in some cases to the inhabitants of 'Moscovia').

As a result of this new situation, as early as the following year (1868), a cultural society was formed in Lvov which was called *Prosvita* (Ukr. 'Enlightenment'). Four years later Lvov rejoiced in the Shevchenko Society for which Elizabeth Miloradovich (*née*

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Skoropadskaya) furnished the funds from Russia. In this wise a link was formed between the Ukrainian political intellectuals grouped round the Universities of Kiev and Kharkov and the new Ukrainian centre of Lvov outside Russia. 175*

The extremely unfortunate policy of the Tsarist Government soon created a situation in which Lvov came to play the leading role in the life of the Ukrainian national movement; and the Austro-Hungarian Government was not slow to avail itself of the opportunity of encouraging the Ukrainian movement to develop on lines agreeable to the policy of Vienna.

The Ministers of Alexander II who had recently passed through the anxious times of the Polish rising of 1863 conceived a profound distrust of the Ukrainian national renascence, and they failed to understand that the rising had been the occasion for a real break between Ukrainians and Poles.

The Secretary of State for Public Instruction, Valuev, thought it necessary to issue a circular in which it was stated that 'no Little Russian language exists nor has it ever existed' and that 'it is but bad Russian spoilt by Polish influences'.

It was further forbidden to print anything in Ukrainian except verses, stories and plays. This order did not trouble Ukrainian historians who had published their works in Russian. However, it evoked a certain irritation among Ukrainians who considered themselves loyal subjects of the Empire and saw no reason for this attempt at 'russification' on the part of the authorities.

This blunder of the Government of Alexander II had serious consequences. Until that time all attempts at creating a Ukrainian literary language had been confined to the Russian provinces. Kotlyarevsky in his jocular *Travesty of the Aeneid*, Kvitka in his stories, Shevchenko in his *Kobzar*, and Kulish in his articles, all availed themselves of the Poltava and Kiev dialect and, in order to make it sound more literary, borrowed words and expressions from pure Russian. Valuev's circular stopped all this sort of work, and in 1876 the Imperial Government issued measures which were still more severe. A law was promulgated which forbade the printing of any books, pamphlets or even plays in Ukrainian.

Very soon in Lvov the production of books and periodicals in the Ukrainian language was largely increased. Naturally the language elaborated in Galicia was based on the local dialect which differed from that spoken on the banks of the Dniepr. Furthermore, owing to local cultural conditions, many Polish and German ways of speech were introduced into this new language. Later, when this Galician Ukrainian reached the Russian provinces, it sounded much

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*175 more foreign in relation to Russian than the Ukrainian which had been originated in the homeland of Gogol and Shevchenko.

The law of 1876 was among the restrictions which the Government of Alexander II considered necessary for the preservation of existing conditions in the South of Russia. At the same time the South-Western Section of the Imperial Geographical Society was closed because it was considered to be a centre of Ukrainian national propaganda. Yet no special Ukrainian national activities which could be regarded as subversive or separatist existed in the South of Russia in the seventies.

During this period there was developing in the Ukraine, as well as in Central and Northern Russia, a revolutionary movement among the youth and intelligentsia based on 'agrarian Socialism'. This agrarian Socialism was supposed to be a purely Russian conception of revolutionary Socialism entirely different from Socialist movements in Western Europe. The idealization of the peasant, which was a characteristic feature of this movement, naturally found adepts among the members of the Kiev *Hromada* who, owing to their cultural and historical studies, had conceived an almost religious admiration for the toiler. The spectacle of the sedentary intellectual 'fetishizing' the manual worker is a peculiar phenomenon of urban life which is undoubtedly pathological in its origins. Amongst many of the Ukrainian intellectuals their appreciation of the qualities of the peasant took the form of their modelling their own mode of life on peasant conditions, and they made a practice also of marrying peasant women.

In these fluctuating conditions of clumsy governmental repression and fluttering intellectual reactions it fell to a young Kiev professor, Michael Dragomanov, to be the first to start real political activity. Dragomanov proclaimed his sympathy not only with Russian agrarian Socialism but also with Socialism at it was understood in the West.

In the summer of 1875 Dragomanov decided to go abroad in order to have the opportunity of openly pursuing his propaganda against the Imperial Government. One of the first stages on his travels was Lvov, where he made friends among the local politicians. Dragomanov took up his abode in Geneva, where he began publishing the Ukrainian periodical *Hromada*, just as ten years previously Alexander Herzen had founded *Kolokol* ('The Bell') in the same city.

Michael Dragomanov's ideas soon began to penetrate to Russia. They also greatly influenced the Ukrainian movement which, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, had become definitely centred in Lvov.

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In his political views Dragomanov was a Socialist of mild tendency and a Republican. The literary activities of Antonovich, Lazarevsky, and other Kievans, always seemed to him to be mistaken. In his opinion none had so 'misrepresented' Ukrainian history as the 'demophils' (the historians who painted in such dark colours those whom he regarded as the true champions of Ukrainian political freedom) Vyhovsky, Mazeppa, Polubotok, and yet were silent concerning such oppressors of liberty as Peter I and Catherine II. In his writings Dragomanov declared himself drastically opposed to Russian absolutism and he had no sympathy for any sovereign of the Romanov dynasty. 175*

The strong views of Dragomanov left their imprint in the eighties on the Ukrainian politicians of Galicia. At the same time relations were strained between Petersburg and Vienna, and the Austrian administration was prepared to condone an Ukrainian revolutionary propaganda which had acquired an extreme anti-Russian character.

In 1890 the Austro-Hungarian Government decided to give active support to the Ukrainian political movement so as to direct it in accordance with its own aims. The direction favoured by Vienna was quite contrary to the teaching of the founder of Ukrainian nationalism. Dragomanov (who died in 1895) had never been a separatist. 'The Moscow state has done us much harm,' he once wrote, 'but bad weather is better than no weather at all.' And, again, he wrote in 1882: 'There are no grounds whatever and never will be for political separatism. Little Russians and Russians have the same historical traditions, the same creed and, concerning many things, the same notions. Our languages are extremely similar; we have no natural boundaries, and after all we are united by common economic interests. All talk of separatism is simply to be laughed at.' Dragomanov favoured the creation of a federation of autonomous national Slav republics; Galicia and Russian Ukraine being united, while the Slav countries under the domination of Austria-Hungary and in the Balkans would also form part of the federation. In his opinion 'this federation would have to decide the question of Constantinople and the Straits'.

Such an outlook could scarcely be approved in the Empire of the Habsburgs; but after 1890 Ukrainian political activity in Lvov completely departed from the teaching of the original prophet and acquired a totally different aspect which was not out of accord with the views of Vienna. The principal instrument of this change was Michael Hrushevsky, a man who lacked the depth and vision of Dragomanov, but who was superior to his elder in persistence and in political skill.

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*175 Hrushevsky's father was an important official in the Ministry of Public Instruction; he received his early education at the Tiflis Gymnasium and subsequently attended Kiev University. At the University young Hrushevsky became one of the most brilliant pupils of the historian Antonovich. When, after 1890, the Austro-Hungarian Government instituted a Chair for the History of South-Eastern Europe at the University of Lvov, Hrushevsky, on the recommendation of his master, was invited to fill it. In 1898 he published the first volume of his extensive *History of Ukraine-Rus*. The Shevchenko Society was, during the whole period between 1892 and 1914, extremely active, publishing 120 volumes of *Mémoires* besides a number of other works. The presiding genius was Hrushevsky and his numerous pupils became his fervent adepts.

Michael Hrushevsky, a man of serious and unquestioned erudition, understood the possibilities of furthering political work in Galicia through the instrument of historical research in such a way as to ensure the continued support of the Austro-Hungarian authorities. His magnificent *History* was to build a sound foundation for Ukrainian separatism. He succeeded in representing 'Ukraine-Rus' as something entirely different from 'Moscovia'. According to his thesis Kievan Russia was the cradle of 'Ukraine-Rus', but the Russian state which was later constituted round Novgorod and Vladimir-Suzdal and subsequently spread from its new centre round Moscow, was in no way the true successor of Kiev.

It was the easier for Hrushevsky to preach his original theories because the field of his activity happened to be Galicia which really was, since the thirteenth century, a fragment of Kievan Rus. Annexed to Poland in the fourteenth century, Galicia had been severed from the historical life of other Russian regions, but had retained her Russian population, Russian customs and Russian language.

Hrushevsky's versatile and insistent genius contributed also to the creation, out of the peasant dialect of Galicia, of a real Ukrainian literary language which others, under more favourable circumstances, had failed to create on the banks of the Dniepr.

All this work of Hrushevsky, both historical and linguistic, formed the basis for the activities of the Lvov politicians who, from the end of the nineteenth century, had declared themselves adherents of 'political separatism'. In this wise, only fifty years after the first attempt to create a Ukrainian national movement had found its expression in the Brotherhood of St Cyril and St Methodius, something entirely different took form—outside the boundaries of Russia. This movement had abandoned the comparatively moderate and

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really logical line propounded by Dragomanov and had become an extremely anti-Russian brand of separatism. 175*

At the turn of the century the conception of Ukrainian separatism which was being propagated from Galicia had roused little interest among the people of Russian Ukraine. Like the Kievan movement of the second half of the nineteenth century, the Lvov movement was confined to a relatively small band of intelligentsia. The rural masses were hardly aware of the existence of a 'Ukrainian movement'—with a few exceptions who might have accidentally come in contact with members of the town intelligentsia. Neither of these movements had had the least influence on the vast changes which had been taking place in the Ukraine, particularly during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

In the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky there were not more than two and a half million people over the whole of the area of the modern Ukraine including Podolia. In 1897 there were three and a half million inhabitants in the Government of Kiev alone; in the three Little Russian Governments (Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava) and the three New Russian Governments (Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, Tauris), together with Volhynia and Podolia, the population in the last years of the nineteenth century amounted to about twenty-five millions. At the end of the eighteenth century the density of population in the southern steppes was reckoned at about 1 to the square kilometre; a hundred years later it had risen to between 40 and 50 to the square kilometre. The process of colonization of the rich lands of New Russia had assumed truly 'American' proportions. According to the Census of 1897 the population of the three New Russian Governments was made up: 50 per cent of Ukrainians, 20 per cent of Great Russians, with the remaining 30 per cent composed of German colonists, Jews, Tartars, Moldavians, Bulgarians, Serbians and Greeks.

By the last two decades of the nineteenth century there were already signs of over-population in relation to the productive capacity of the country under the existing economic system. Between 1890 and 1914 about 1,700,000 peasants migrated from overcrowded districts to new lands beyond the Volga, to Siberia and the Far Eastern provinces; very large numbers, also, crossed the ocean to Canada and the United States.

Between 1860 and 1870 the beet-sugar industry had been developed in the densely populated countryside of Podolia. It soon expanded into the Governments of Kiev, Chernigov and Kharkov. The intensive development of the coal industry in the Donets Basin began in the eighties. Ten years later the exploitation of the rich deposits of

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*175 iron ore in the Krivoy Rog (to the west of the lower Dniepr) was undertaken.

By the beginning of the twentieth century the steppes of New Russia had come to be regarded as one of the most important industrial regions of the Empire.

With the growth, particularly, of the mining and metallurgical industries of the Donets and the Krivoy Rog, both the social composition and distribution of the population began to change with great rapidity. The incoming labourers from the north became more numerous in the industrial regions than the Ukrainian natives. Old towns grew and new towns rose until, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the urban population represented 20 per cent of the whole. In Kharkov and other industrial centres and in the great ports of the Black Sea Ukrainians were in a minority. In Volhynia and Podolia and in the Kiev and Chernigov Governments Jews formed 40 per cent of the town population. All these important changes in the social and economic structure of the Ukraine tended to weaken particularist tendencies and to strengthen the ties with the rest of the Empire. (6)

The raw new industrial population of the Ukrainian cities was naturally infected by the revolutionary movement which culminated in the outbreak of 1905. But the national colour which was given to the social outbreaks in Finland, the Baltic Provinces, Poland and the Caucasus was not evident in the Ukrainian Governments. Revolutionary manifestations in the Ukraine were extremely violent, both in the industrial centres and in the country districts, where attacks on landowners were frequent. But there was no national motive in the fury of the people and, except among some small university groups, nothing was heard of Ukrainian national aspirations. In the subsequent trials staged during the reprisals of the imperial authorities against the revolutionaries accusations of separatist or autonomist tendencies were lacking. (7)

But the reforms which followed the period of repression after the revolutionary crisis gave new opportunities for the peaceful development of a cultural nationalism such as had not existed before. The Constitution of 1905 permitted the printing of books and periodicals in the Ukrainian language. Michael Hrushevsky immediately availed himself of the situation and transferred the scene of his activities from Galicia to Kiev. Here he continued the publication of volumes of his *History*, while the Ukrainian Scientific Society with the enterprising Professor at its head began the publication of the fourteen volumes of *Mémoires* which appeared within the next seven years.

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An Indian summer of liberalism was illuminating the last decade of the autocracy. In 1906 the Imperial Academy of Sciences initiated a discussion on the subject of whether Ukrainian was to be considered as one of the Russian dialects or as a separate language, and by a majority of one the learned members approved the linguistic independence of the Ukraine. This decision opened wide possibilities for the Galician version of the Ukrainian idiom which had been so ably nurtured by Hrushevsky. A spate of print now began to appear in the newly recognized language. In Kiev appeared the daily paper *Rada*, which soon achieved a fairly wide circulation. Ekaterinoslav and Poltava also had their Ukrainian dailies. A special bookshop for Ukrainian editions was opened in Kiev, and in Kiev and Lvov the simultaneous publication was arranged of a periodical entitled *The Literary-Scientific News*. At the same time there appeared (in Russian) another periodical called *Ukrainian Life* on which Simon Petlyura and Vinnichenko (destined subsequently to become famous on a more lurid field) were collaborators. 175*

Such a liberation of the Ukrainian movement could not help influencing its growth. The movement began to find many recruits, principally amongst the city intelligentsia and also amongst the so-called 'half-intelligentsia'—country schoolmasters and small officials of the local administration (*Zemstvo*). At the same time, not only did the separatist ideas which had been introduced from Galicia have little success, but the tension in the international situation and the intensification of the antagonism between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments had the effect of impelling the Galician Ukrainians to take part with the other Slav groups of the Habsburg Empire against the Germanic enemies of Slavdom. The anti-Russian separatist Ukrainian movement sponsored by the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Lvov rapidly lost ground in face of a new local movement which aimed at the union of Galicia with Russia. Sympathy for Russia was particularly strong in Carpathian Rus, where the majority of the people considered themselves Russian and refused to hear anything in favour of the 'Ukrainian ideology' of Hrushevsky or of the 'Ukrainian language' elaborated in Lvov. In this remote and backward region of the Carpathians a revival of national consciousness had begun about the middle of the nineteenth century and it had been stimulated by the Russian occupation of Hungary during the Revolution of 1848. On the eve of the war of 1914–18 the Hungarian Government staged a state trial at Marmaros-Sziget where a number of inhabitants from Carpathian Rus were accused of secret relations with Russia and of high treason.

Professor Milyukov summed up the state of the Ukrainian Question

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*175 when he spoke in the Duma on the occasion of a debate (spring of 1914) during which Russian members of conservative and nationalist tendencies were opposing the holding of festivals in Kiev on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Shevchenko. 'A Ukrainian movement exists', he affirmed, 'and it cannot be stopped.' He went on to declare that: 'As yet there is no separatist movement in the Ukraine. Even if it exists in an embryonic state it is very weak. But it can be brought to life—and that is what Russian Nationalists are doing.'

As it was, when in the summer of 1914 the crisis of the Slav world approached catastrophe, the Ukrainians showed themselves prepared to submerge their own national individuality in the cause of All the Russias.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND ADDITIONS TO CHAPTER V

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(1) *Ukrainians on Forced Works During the Reign of Peter I* 175 *

Many folk songs recall the memory of these forced works:

'Oh! They gave the boys large spades,
And they sent a young lad to dig ditches.
Oh! And a raven flew from the foreign land,
He flew and crowed
That the lad is sitting by the ditch,
Sitting and crying bitterly:
"I am only a lad so young,
And Oh! So strange am I here!
Oh father! Sell the black steed,
Pay ransom for me,
Then back to dear freedom again."'

Kashchenko's *Opovidannya*.

(2) *The Fate of Orlik and Voynarovsky*

Until the death of Charles XII and the end of the Great Northern War, Philip Orlik continued to entertain hopes that his services might prove of profit to one or other of the Great Powers. The Swedes had recognized him as the lawful Hetman of the Ukraine, and the Turks continued to allow him to remain in Istanbul in case they found themselves in need of his help in the Ukraine. The English even took some interest in him, since the Government of George I was irritated by Peter's passing patronage of the Jacobite cause (see Borshak, *Slavonic Review*, vol. x, no. 28, p. 138). 175* 113

In 1722, however, Orlik found it necessary to leave Istanbul, and he wandered about Europe for some time. In Hamburg he was successful in marrying off his daughter to a French nobleman; and he ended his days peacefully at the Château de Dinteville near Chaumont.

Hamburg turned out to be a more tragic halting place for Mazeppa's favourite nephew, Andrew Voynarovsky. The old Hetman appears to have had a genuine and fatherly affection for his sister's son. Good-looking, gifted, courageous and adventurous, Andrew Voynarovsky appeared to the Hetman to have all the qualities which he may have imagined himself as possessing as a young man.

Voynarovsky had been sent to study abroad in Dresden where, owing to his uncle's friendship with Augustus the Strong, he was received into the most initmate circle of the court and became acquainted with the celebrated Aurora Königsmarck.

During his sojourn in Tighin and Istanbul, Voynarovsky found himself involved in quarrels with Philip Orlik in respect of the considerable sums of treasure which remained in the hands of the fugitives after Mazeppa's death. In 1715 Voynarovsky took up his abode in Vienna and from there removed to Sweden, since included in his inheritance was the enormous debt amounting to about a million *kröner* from Charles XII for monies borrowed after Poltava. In Stockholm he found difficulty in securing settlement from the hard-pressed King, but otherwise he was treated with consideration.

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175* From Sweden Voynarovsky found occasion to visit Hamburg, where he again met Aurora Königsmarck, at that time living in the Free City which in those days was a centre for the fashionable international world, since it had a reputation for political intrigue, high play and agreeable life. In the salon of his old friend he met an English diplomat named Mattison, whom he tried to interest in 'the freedom-loving Ukrainian people': it was not an unfavourable moment, since the British Government were unquiet at the possible disturbance of the balance of power in the Baltic and the Black Sea as a result of the Russian successes in the Northern War. But Voynarovsky's advances, like Orlik's, had no result; and Mazeppa's nephew, possibly as a result of his failure in this direction, began to play with the idea of a reconciliation with the Russian authorities through the mediation of Aurora Königsmarck.

Peter I, however, being informed of Voynarovsky's presence in Hamburg, ordered his Resident there, Frederick Bettichger, to kidnap him, and to forward a demand at the same time to the Senate of the Free City for the delivery of 'the criminal'. Several Russian officers were sent to Hamburg to help Bettichger in these plans. At that time Russian troops were quartered in Mecklenburg under the command of Rumyantsev, who later was to have a hand in 'bringing back' the Tsarevich Alexey Petrovich from Naples. An ambush was arranged and Voynarovsky was kidnapped in the street and taken to Bettichger's house, where he could be held a prisoner owing to the extra-territorial status of the Resident. The Hamburg Magistrates protested and the Swedish envoy demanded the release of Voynarovsky on the ground that he was a 'Colonel in the Swedish Royal Guard'. It is difficult to say how this affair would have ended if Aurora Königsmarck had not intervened. She persuaded Voynarovsky to avail himself of the visit of the Russian court to Altona to go there on 5 December, the name-day of the Empress Catherine, and throw himself on the Tsar's mercy. The Swedish envoy, for some unknown reason, also advised him to do so. Voynarovsky imprudently yielded and was immediately sent off to Petersburg 'in order that the case might be investigated'. There he was incarcerated in the fortress of Peter and Paul, where he remained until 1723, when he was sent to Yakutsk in the far north-east of Siberia. He died there in 1740. The traveller Miller saw him in Yakutsk—a complete moral and physical wreck. This meeting became the theme of the poem 'Voynarovsky' composed by a Russian author at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This poet was himself involved in the Decabrist movement—so many of the participators in which ended their days in Siberia. (See Ilya Borshak, *Voynarovsky*, Lvov, 1938.)

(3) *The Haydamaky*

175* The *Haydamak* movement, beginning in the thirties of the eighteenth century, acquired ferocious and anarchical proportions during the sixties when Gonta and Zaliznyak took Uman. The movement has been idealized by Ukrainian nationalists—even by such eminent historians as Professor Antonovich (*Izsledovanie o Gaydamachestve po Aktam* 1700–1768 (Researches on the Haydamaks based on Documents 1700–1768), Kiev, 1876). Kulish, however, protested against this idealization, on the ground that the movement was the most vivid expression of the anarchic elements in the character

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of the Ukrainian people: in his view the movement demonstrated all those instincts of destruction and criminality which were exposed again in the Pugachev revolt. The author of a study of the eighteenth-century Polish Ukraine, Fr. R. Gawroński, found that 'the *Haydamak* idea was a consequence of the Tartar-Turkish, altogether Turanian, education received by the Russian people'. He proceeds to emphasize the idea propagated by Polish politicians in the nineteenth century when he adds that 'humanitarian and cultural elements among the Slavs only begin to predominate where they come in contact with the Catholic Church'. However that may be, the persistence of a wildly savage strain in the population of South Russia was again emphasized in the different environment of our epoch during the Civil War and the operations of Makhno and the *atamany* (v. p. 314). 175*

(4) *The Zaporogians after the Destruction of the Sech*

After the destruction of the New *Sech* on the orders of Catherine II, the Chief Ataman Kalnishevsky, together with Paul Holovaty and Hloba, were arrested and taken to Moscow. Although there was really nothing against Kalnishevsky, he met with severe treatment: he was exiled to the Solovetski monastery, where he was held until 1801. Alexander I offered him his freedom, but he refused to leave the quiet haven of the monastery and died there at the age of 112.

A typical Ukrainian song describes the destruction of the *Sech*:

'The world is so wide and the land is so vast
And yet it seems there is nowhere to go!
This is why they want to send the brave Zaporogian troops to their doom.
The Tsaritsa has thought it and Gritsko has done it.
They want to drive the Zaporogians far far away,
Far away where the Danube flows.'

After the destruction of the *Sech* the more turbulent among the Zaporogians decided 'to go off to the Danube'. During the year 1775 about 5000 left for Turkey, of whom only about half were genuine Zaporogians, the rest being outcasts who were in fear of falling into the hands of the Russian Government. All the Cossacks who had decided to become Turkish subjects gathered at Akkerman, from where they sent a deputation to the Sultan. The Porte decided to take them into service, and the Island of St George situated in the Sulina channel of the Danube delta was allotted to them, so that they might be able to organize a new *Sech* there. In the meantime they received orders to do frontier guard along the river Bug, which at that time was the limit of the Ottoman dominions.

These Cossacks who had gone over to Turkey received a standard, on one side of which was a golden cross on a white background, and on the other a silver crescent on a black background. Many peasant fugitives from over the Russian border joined them during the following years and their number increased to between 8000 and 10,000.

Potemkin, having decided to form the Black Sea Cossacks out of the remnants of the old Zaporogians, sent emissaries to persuade them to come back. This attempt was partly successful, since the Zaporogians had had a difficult time in their settlement in the delta of the Danube, where they had come

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175 into conflict with other Russian fugitives who had already settled and appropriated the best sites and the best fisheries. These Russians were Don Cossacks, named after their first chief, 'Nekrasov's men'. 'Nekrasov's men' had left the Don after the failure of the revolt of Bulavin during the reign of Peter I. Numerous quarrels started between the new-comers and the old settlers which soon grew into skirmishes and, later, pitched battles for the possession of meadows, lakes and creeks.

At this time, then, a few of the Zaporogians returned to Russia, but a much greater number accepted the invitation of the Austrian Government to migrate and settle along the banks of the river Tisza. The flow of peasants escaping from the Ukraine was, however, so great that the number of 'the Sultan's Cossacks' did not diminish. 'Going off to the Danube' became an every-day occurrence in the Ukrainian countryside. Many songs still recall this migration:

'There across the Danube,
Yea, the peaceful blue Danube,
A boy is feasting and drinking and calling:
"Hey! A boat and row me across
For another look at my native land,
For a last look at my own Ukraine!"'

A curious situation arose during Catherine's Second Turkish War, when the old Zaporogians recruited by Potëmkin fought in the Russian Army, while those who had gone beyond the Danube had to fight in the Turkish ranks. Both sides had recourse to all sorts of subterfuges so that 'brother should not fight against brother', but they were not always successful, particularly when, in 1790–1, the delta of the Danube became the main theatre of the war. In the end Chapyga, the *ataman* of Potemkin's newly formed Black Sea Cossacks, had to give the order that 'the Sultan's Cossacks' were not to be looked upon as Christians but were to be treated as Turks.

After Potëmkin's death, when orders came from Petersburg that the Black Sea Cossacks were to be transferred to the Kuban, about 8000 of them obeyed, and the rest, about 4000, elected to join 'the Sultan's Cossacks' across the Danube. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1806–11 a considerable number of these late-comers deserted to the Russians. At the end of the war Bessarabia was annexed to Russia and the Turkish frontier withdrawn to the line of the Pruth and the Danube delta.

The former Zaporogians who remained in Turkish territory now had to fight a war of extermination against 'Nekrasov's men' for the control of the fisheries. The Turks were at first rather astonished at this civil war between the two groups of Cossacks, but the Turkish authorities did not interfere and used to say to the contending sides: 'If you are strong enough kill and drive away your enemies!' Finally the Ukrainian Cossacks got the better of 'Nekrasov's men' and the Turks transferred the remnant of these to Asia Minor. In the twenties of the present century one or two villages of the descendants of these Don Cossacks from the delta of the Danube were to be found in the neighbourhood of the Asiatic shore of the Sea of Marmara; the villagers retained the old style of dress and many of the customs of their ancestors.

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In the nineteenth century the former Zaporogians gradually died out, and the Danube delta became a refuge simply for peasants escaping from over the Russian frontier; about 1820 these fugitives had become rather numerous; there were about 15,000 to 20,000 of them. The Russo-Turkish War of 1828–9 put an end to this situation. When the Russian Army crossed the Danube the last *ataman* of the Danube Cossacks, Hladky, went to the Emperor Nicholas I at Izmail to implore his pardon and mercy. Hladky was given the rank of colonel and later that of general. The Danube Cossacks went back to Russia; the majority of them joined the descendants of the Zaporogians on the Kuban. 113 175*

For some interesting details on Polish military refugees in the Ottoman Empire, particularly during the nineteenth century, see Thadée Gosztowt, *La Pologne et l'Islam*, Paris, 1907.

(5) *Decabrists in the Ukraine*

The Decabrists had numerous supporters among the young officers in garrison in the Ukraine. The movement found scarcely any support among the people, but many landowners in the Ukraine, Polish, Ukrainian and Russian, favoured the aims of a constitutional monarchy in Russia, a liberal régime and the abolition of serfdom. Colonel Pestel, probably the most determined and gifted of the Decabrist leaders, was stationed in the Ukraine, and at the time of the attempted coup in Petersburg, a mutiny of officers took place at the small town of Tulchin in Podolia. (See Bagaley, *Povstania Dekabristov na Ukraine*, Kharkov, 1926.)

(6) *The Development of New Russia during the Nineteenth Century*

The fashionable intelligentsia who liked to sneer at 'the Potëmkin villages' at the beginning of the nineteenth century were fond of repeating the phrase: 'One can hear the steppe winds howl where Catherine's favourite built his ephemeral towns.' As a matter of fact, of the four towns founded by Potëmkin, Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, Sevastopol, Nikolaev, each already had a population of 100,000 or over within a century of his death. Potemkin did not live to supervise the building of Odessa, but the site was chosen by him. Odessa was built by French *émigrés*—de Ribas, Langeron and the Duc de Richelieu. During the reign of Alexander I it had already become a flourishing commercial town with a busy port and broad boulevards and buildings in the French 'Empire' style. The *Lycée* founded by Richelieu was transformed later into the New Russian University. Pushkin, who visited Odessa in the twenties of the nineteenth century, describes the gay and busy life of this cosmopolitan city which had arisen on the site of a forlorn Turkish hamlet. It had become a great centre for merchants and tradesmen of different nationalities—Greeks, Jews, Armenians, Italians, Moldavians, Germans and Poles—who streamed there from all parts. 175*

After the Vienna Congress which marked the end of the period of wars, the South Russian grain trade began to develop on a prodigious scale and Odessa became the main port of export. The cultivation of the virgin soil of New Russia gave fabulous results; but there was a great lack of labour, which was not adequately supplied by the migrant population of fugitive peasants

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*175 which was always on the move on the peripheries of the old settled Governments. In the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century the peopling of South Russia assumed more regular forms when Ukrainian and Russian landowners who had acquired estates there began transferring a proportion of their serfs to the new regions.

The land fever and the speculation which accompanied this process have been described by Gogol in his novel *Dead Souls*. He relates how a small landowner named Chichikov made the round of his fellows in the remoter parts of Central Russia and for a few copecks bought 'dead souls', that is, serfs who were dead but who had not been struck off the rolls on account of carelessness or for some other reason. Acts of sale were registered, and on the strength of these the enterprising Chichikov became the owner of a number of 'souls', thus becoming entitled to acquire lands in New Russia on favourable conditions—lands which he could sell later at a good profit. Gogol was not particularly interested in this land swindle, but used it as a vehicle for describing in a most vivid and entertaining manner the different types of provincial Russia of that period, their customs and their lives. However, not all purchasers of serfs were swindlers, and many did really buy living serfs from landowners in order to transport them to the South. The efforts of these 'pioneers', in pursuing their own private interests, proved more effective in a short space of time than a systematic colonization of the South under the auspices of the Government might have proved.

This epic has, unfortunately, produced no Gogol to describe it. Danilevski, the author of three novels which depict the life of the settlers in New Russia, was a writer of no particular talent. Yet his works abound in picturesque and curious pages describing this 'Russian America' of the fifties of the nineteenth century. Like Gogol, Danilevski was a Ukrainian, the descendant of a Cossack captain who had taken up his abode in the neighbourhood of Izyum at the end of the seventeenth century. In 1849, in his student days in Petersburg, Danilevski was arrested together with Dostoyevski on account of the affair concerning the secret society founded by Petrushevski. He was, however, found not guilty and was set free after two months' imprisonment. His later service in the Ministry of Public Instruction gave him plenty of opportunity for travel in the South of Russia, where he was engaged on the collection of historical and archaeological material. In 1860 he wrote *Fugitives in New Russia* and later two other novels in which the scene is laid in the South Russian steppe. One of Danilevski's characters puts the question: 'But who and what are these fugitives?' Another answers: 'It is here that Russian serfs have found a refuge. Here is their Kentucky and Massachusetts. If there had not been fugitives there would have been nothing —neither the Don, nor the Black Sea region, nor the good and fertile lands beyond the Rapids. All is the work of the fugitives: Rostov, Taganrog, Mariupol. All these prosperous tradespeople and wealthy exporters are the descendants of fugitives—serfs owned either by private landowners or by the Government.' Another character praises the fugitives: 'They are peaceful hard-working people, they don't drink, they are just like Liverpool Puritans.' Comparisons with the emigrants to America frequently occur in Danilevski's novels. Full of energy and not over particular about infringing the law, 'the pioneers' built their fortunes in the New Russian steppe.

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(7) *Jews in the South of Russia*

175*

The Jewish Question, which became so acute in Russia at the turn of the nineteenth century, originated in the Ukraine. Before the union with Little Russia, there were very few Jews living within the territory of the Moscow state.

All the rebellions of Cossacks and peasants during the seventeenth century were always directed, not only against Polish landlords but also against the Jewish population which was regarded as the instrument through which the Polish *szlachta* oppressed the Ukrainian peasantry. According to Ukrainian historians, after the stormy years of the middle of the seventeenth century, not a Jew was left on the left bank of the Dniepr, and on the right bank and in Volhynia only one-hundredth part of the former Jewish population remained.

Nevertheless, as soon as relatively peaceful conditions returned to the Ukraine the Jews swarmed back into the country; nothing seemed to check the process, neither 'the Uman slaughter' nor the sanguinary feats of the *Haydamaky*. The development of big estates in left-bank Ukraine was accompanied by the appearance of Jews in the numerous towns and villages of the Governments of Chernigov and Poltava. Just as in Poland, a large Jewish urban population seemed to be a phenomenon which characterized a rural economy based on serf-worked *latifundia*. In both cases and for the same reasons the result was similar. Important estates implied trade on a large scale in country produce—grain, cattle, leather, timber. Neither in Poland nor in the Ukraine had any strong native commercial class had the opportunity to develop—as had been the case in Novgorod and even in Moscow. The Polish and Ukrainian aristocracy needed middlemen for the profitable transaction of their affairs, and the Jews were ideally suited to fulfil the functions of middlemen. At the same time both in Poland and in the Ukraine the increasing wealth of the landowning class created a market for artisans, for these lands lacked the exclusive class of skilled craftsmen which had come into existence at an early date in the North Russian capitals. Furthermore, the increasing rigour of the legislation which bound the Polish and Ukrainian peasantry to the soil prevented enterprising young men from coming into the towns to learn crafts and trades. These conditions became more acute as the development of 'the new lands' in the Ukraine and New Russia during the eighteenth century accentuated the shortage of available labour.

After the First Partition of Poland a mass migration of Jews set in from White Russia, itself a poor land, into the rich and fertile provinces on both banks of the Dniepr. These new immigrants found plenty of opportunities for proving their peculiar commercial talents. After the Second and Third Partitions of Poland there followed a real 'transplantation' of the Jewish population of Galicia and Poland to Volhynia, to Podolia, to the Dniepr and to the towns of New Russia. Odessa proved a particular focus of attraction to these needy and capable Israelites. While the process of populating New Russia was going on, the institution of serfdom still subsisted in all its rigour and the peasants themselves had no chance of leaving their villages and founding a middle class of their own in 'the new lands'. The Government had for a long time been aware of this Jewish movement from west to east,

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*175 but in view of their desire to encourage the colonization of the South of Russia, they regarded this flow of Jews as rather a useful phenomenon which favoured the development of 'crafts and trade'. Indeed, in view of the pressing need for agricultural labour, the Government made an effort to utilize the overflow of the Jewish population of the towns for purposes of land development. As early as the reign of Paul I, the senator and poet, Gabriel Derzhavin, had been sent on a mission to White Russia in order to investigate the famine which was ravaging that region. As a result of his tour, Derzhavin had made a proposal to found Jewish agricultural colonies in New Russia. The Law of 1804 granted Jews the right to acquire or lease land in the South, and in 1806 seven Jewish colonies were founded in the Government of Kherson. The Russian authorities continued to approve Jewish agricultural colonization during the whole of the first half of the nineteenth century. The Emperor Nicholas I hoped to accelerate the assimilation of Jews to the local population by inducing Jews to do military service, after a preliminary training beginning at the age of twelve in special schools. The Emperor patronized, at the same time, Jewish traders and artisans and encouraged his Governor-Generals, Prince Paskevich in Warsaw and Count Vorontsov in New Russia, to continue the experiment of the Jewish agricultural colonies.

The experiment was destined to end in complete failure. The Jewish inhabitants of these colonies were drawn by an irresistible attraction towards the towns. In the reign of Alexander II, when Jewish agricultural colonization ceased, it was found that in thirty-seven Jewish colonies in the South of Russia there were only 40,000 people. Such was the miserable result of an experiment which had been supported by the Government for forty years. Trotsky, who was brought up in one of these colonies which still existed during his childhood, describes it in the following way: 'On both banks of a small river were situated two colonies; one was Jewish and the other German. On the German side well cared for houses stood with tiled and thatched roofs. The horses were big, the cows well fed. On the Jewish side dilapidated houses, leaking roofs, cattle in a pitiable state.'

The end of Jewish agricultural colonization in 1865 was a result not only of its entire failure to that date but also of the abolition of serfdom. The new structure of peasant life required that large land reserves should be available. New land was needed for allotment to the liberated serfs overcrowded on the landlords' estates in the old settled lands of Russia; there was certainly no longer any sense in giving land into the hands of very poor farmers, as the Jews had proved themselves to be.

Twenty years after the liberation of the peasants there were already many signs of over-population in the South of Russia under the economic conditions of that period. The development of the phenomenon of over-population corresponded with the first wave of *pogroms* in South and South-Western Russia. The reason for these pogroms was purely social: an overflow of the liberated peasantry into the towns was increasing all the time, and in the towns the peasants found that many of the most profitable occupations were monopolized by Jews. During the years 1876–89 Jewish pogroms took place in Elizavetgrad, Kiev, Pereyaslavl, Balta, Ekaterinoslav, and many of the smaller towns of Podolia and Volhynia and the Chernigov and

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Poltava Governments. These pogroms represented a purely instinctive movement among the Ukrainian peasantry which had nothing new in it; in the towns of Poland pogroms had occurred from time to time for centuries past. These riots were seldom accompanied by any actual slaughter of Jews, and in the majority of cases the Jews were not even beaten; only their property was plundered and destroyed. It was not the prosperous Jews who were chosen as victims but generally the poorer classes—artisans and small shopkeepers: the wealthy quarters of a town would be better guarded by the police. 175*

It was as unjust to abuse the Imperial Government as the accomplice and instigator of the mob as it would have been to blame the British Government for the sectarian riots of the same period in the North of Ireland. No doubt some of the police who were recruited from the local population sympathized with the mob; but the movement itself emanated from the masses. The illegal Social Revolutionary paper wrote as follows on 6 October 1881: 'Pogroms are a revolutionary movement of the masses which, owing to local conditions, is tinged with Anti-Semitism. Landowners are considered an antiquated institution and this is why the people now have no enmity towards them and regard them even with a certain benevolence. The Jews are looked upon as the chief enemy.'

The international relations of Russia both with Germany and Austria and also with Great Britain were not cordial during that period, and the pogroms served as a pretext for violent attacks in the Press of Western Europe and America. At the same time the emigration of Russian Jews to America was accelerated, and influential Jewish groups were formed in New York and other American cities. A pogrom in Kishinev in which forty-seven persons were killed aroused a storm of indignation in America. When the Imperial Government had disappeared and the Ukrainian masses were, under the leadership of their *atamany*, giving vent to their natural instinct for savagery, the figure of forty-seven killed was destined to appear a very modest one.

Another consequence of the period of the pogroms was the tendency which they seem to have encouraged in the Jewish youth to turn to the more extreme revolutionary parties. At the same time the obligatory settlement of the Jewish population in the South-Western Governments of Russia tended to overcrowd the Ukraine and New Russia with Jews. Their number attained 2,000,000 by the end of the nineteenth century. According to the Census of 1897 the Jewish population amounted to 41 per cent in the towns of Volhynia and Podolia and in the Governments of Kiev, Poltava and Chernigov. In the big centres like Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa and Ekaterinoslav, a real Jewish proletariat took form and proved extremely accessible to revolutionary propaganda. On the other hand, the educated Jews who belonged to the free professions filled the ranks of the revolutionary intelligentsia.

Jews took a most active part in the revolutionary events of the years 1900–6; as a result, during the counter-revolutionary phase which followed in 1905–6 pogroms took a far more violent form than those of the eighties. During this period there is no doubt that the authorities sometimes supported the counter-revolutionary organizations which were the instigators of these pogroms. At the outbreak of war in 1914 Jewry remained a dangerous explosive element in the life of South Russia.

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CHAPTER VI

NATIONALITY AND COMMUNISM IN THE UKRAINE (1914–1939)

§1. THE AUSTRIANS AND RUSSIANS IN GALICIA (1914–17)

000 THE Great War of 1914–18, having its immediate origins in the complications arising out of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, was a consequence of the history of the two preceding centuries in Eastern Europe.

So long as intervening states separated the frontiers of the Teutonic and Muscovite powers, those powers had a common interest. In Poland, at the end of the eighteenth century, Prussia, Austria and Russia had compromised on a division of territories, and their common concern to perpetuate the dismemberment of Poland had been a factor in averting mutual antagonisms and in maintaining a balance which found its most emphatic expression in the *Dreikaiserbund*.

But in the partition of the European territories of the Ottoman Empire, which was the inevitable sequel to the dismemberment of *Rzecz Pospolita*, the parties failed to agree. In the 'grand alliances' of the eighteenth century against Turkey, Austria had once failed (1736–9), and had later faltered (the Wars of Catherine), while Frederick of Prussia had in the end shown his inclination to oppose indefinite Russian expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.

When for a brief period Napoleon formed a great continental power in Western Europe and became, in a way, the heir and executor of Central European policy in the Slavonic East, at Tilsit, anxious as he was to conciliate Alexander, he proved unwilling to satisfy Russian ambitions. His famous 'Constantinople! Never! That means the Empire of the World' expressed in a phrase the reasons why the Central European and Muscovite powers, who could agree to partition the Baltic coasts and the plains of Poland, could neither of them forego the mastery of the Straits which divide Europe and Asia.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries France had not succeeded in upholding the Polish barrier in the east against the Germanic power.

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In the nineteenth century the three Western powers whose interests or ambitions were maritime and colonial combined in the Crimean War to check a Slav hegemony in the Balkans. The Sardinian kingdom aspired to revive the Genoese and Venetian traditions of earlier centuries, while France had historic memories of Latin-Norman rule in the Levant. England, which had rivalled, and was during the rest of the century to continue to rival, France in the Eastern Mediterranean, recognized a communion of interest and declared for the first time a continuing challenge to the control of the Straits and the Aegean by a great land power. In the Crimean War the Germanic powers adopted a neutrality rather hostile to Russia and in 1854–6, as in 1877–8, waited to take their profits from the action of the maritime powers.

As events accumulated to the catastrophe of 1914, it was obvious that the ultimate policies of the Germanic and Russian powers, which in Poland had had a common basis, were mutually exclusive in the Balkans and the Near East. A Russian advance to the Straits and hegemony in the Balkans must block for ever German plans of dominion in the Near and Middle East; while if Germanic power were to straddle the Straits Russia would be confined within the land-locked Black Sea, and both her political structure and her economy would become more and more subordinate to the master of a belt which might stretch from the Kattegat to the Persian Gulf.

Weakened by the Japanese War and dependent for financial support upon the capitalist groups of the West, Russia was the natural ally, in the impending conflict, of the maritime powers which were in need of the alliance of great land armies capable of exhausting the man-power of Germany.

In the event both the Russian and Germanic power-machines succumbed to the strain of world conflict, and the maritime powers, passing masters of the Straits, by the restoration of Poland and the exploitation of East European nationalist tendencies, re-established in a new form the old belt of states from the Baltic to the Black Sea which had until the end of the eighteenth century separated the Germanic world and Muscovy. The new states were weak and their policies were divergent; it was inevitable therefore that the old Muscovite-Germanic pressure on the intervening belt should revive. It was inevitable at the same time, in a world where the space factor had really disappeared and where processes of thought and emotion were accelerated, that the community of interests which was to attract Germany and Russia together should be criss-crossed by the old German desire (expressed through the centuries in the activities of the Teutonic knights and the Baltic barons) to dominate Russia

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000 and by the Russian Messianism which had transmuted Panslavism into Communism.

175* On the outbreak of war in 1914, the Ukrainian Question occupied a relatively minor place in the minds of political and military chiefs in Berlin and Vienna. At the same time both Berlin and Vienna contemplated an ultimate solution favourable to their respective views—views which differed in important essentials.

The course of events during the war obliged the Habsburg Monarchy to abandon all ambitious plans and to concentrate on the preservation of existing territory. The Germans, on the other hand, as the war developed, began to take the greatest interest in the Ukraine, especially after 1916 when German troops made their appearance in Podolia and Volhynia and when a year later, the Russian Revolution opened the way wide to the Dniepr and even to the Don. If at the beginning of the war the Ukraine was of interest primarily to Vienna, by the end it had been transferred into Berlin's field of vision.

Despite the drift towards Russia which had been noticeable among both Galician and Russian Ukrainian intellectuals after the Liberal reforms following the Revolution of 1905, Vienna had been encouraged by the weakness of Russia to supplement a more active policy in the Balkans by a more intense interest in the Ukrainians. The Slavs who remained 'loyal to the Habsburg Monarchy' and who were considered to have a historic aversion to Moscow—Poles and Ukrainians—assumed a certain importance.

668 A special periodical was founded in Vienna, *Ukrainische Rundschau*, and the Austro-Hungarian Government gave unofficial support to the so-called 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' which openly proclaimed the struggle against Russia and promised in case of war to contribute to Russia's defeat 'by internal upheavals'. The leaders of this Union were certain Ukrainians of some ability—Skoropis-Zholtukovsky, Zhuk, Doroshenko and Zaliznyak. The organization conducted a propaganda on a considerable scale and could dispose of adequate funds which were provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government and supplemented by contributions from prosperous Ukrainians in America. It was proposed that, in the case of war with Russia and the invasion of Russia by the Austrian armies, representatives of the Union, with the help of their supporters in the Russian Ukraine, should organize a form of government which would be acceptable to Vienna. Some hotheads were even talking of a 'Ukrainian kingdom', and named as candidate for the 'Ukrainian throne' Archduke Wilhelm of Habsburg 'Vasili Vishevaniy'.

000 German political circles took a more prosaic view of the Ukrainian

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problem. The lightning rapidity of the economic development of the South of Russia, which even the revolutionary events of 1905 could not stop, attracted the attention of German specialists. 000

Two years before the war a commission of German economists and technicians under the presidency of Professor Auhagen visited Southern Russia and made a report to the German Government. The members of the commission were particularly impressed by the progress of the metallurgical and beet-sugar industries. The large investments of French and Belgian capital in the coal and metallurgical industries did not escape their notice, and they anticipated a flow of British capital following the Anglo-Russian Agreement. Professor Auhagen came to the gloomy conclusion that 'if some untoward event does not stop this rapid Russian development, Germany will soon be faced by a neighbour more powerful than herself'. 433

This economic development attracted the attention of the promotors of German *Weltpolitik* to the possibilities of Ukrainian separatism. Very exaggerated hopes of revolutionary and separatist movements in Russia inflated the mind of the Emperor William, who was encouraged in his miscalculations by the German Ambassador in Petersburg, Count Pourtalès. 000

In his memoirs (*Aus meiner Dienstzeit*, IV, 197 *et sqq.*), Field-Marshal Conrad recalls a meeting at which the Emperor William refused to listen to the objections of the Austrian Chancellor, Count Stürgkh, and insisted on 'revolutionizing' the populations of Russian Poland and the Ukraine. The Emperor proposed 'to use all means for this purpose and to send there tracts, emissaries and large funds'. The Emperor's amateurish excursion into the technical problems of organizing separatist diversions formed the basis of the so-called 'Pontus Expedition' (which was to include within its scope the raising of an insurrection among the Kuban Cossacks and the formation of a 'Georgian Legion' for action in the Caucasus). The Emperor urged that the Austro-Hungarian fleet should join the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in the Black Sea where, after panic had been spread among the population of the South Russian coasts, agents should be landed 'in lonely places', well supplied with money and revolutionary literature, with the object of organizing riots in the Ukraine in the rear of the Russian armies. The objections of Field-Marshal Conrad and of the Austrian Admiral Haus prevented this fantastic 'embryon' of the future 'manœuvre' of sending Lenin and Trotsky into Russia from being carried into effect (see also the memoirs of the Austro-Hungarian military attaché in Istanbul, General Pomiankowski, *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches*, pp. 80 *et sqq.*).

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175* The outbreak of war dispersed alike the Emperor William's hopes of internal troubles in Russia during mobilization and the plans of 'The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'. Austrian cavalry raids on Kamenets-Podolsk and Vladimir-Volynsk proved abortive, and two strong Russian armies invaded Galicia.

The 3rd and 8th Armies of Generals Ruski and Brusilov, with the Reserve Divisions attached to them, were recruited almost entirely from the Ukraine; they proved their loyalty to the Tsar and their moral ascendancy over the enemy by defeating the Austro-Hungarians, first on the Zlota-Lipa, and later on the Gnila-Lipa.

Ruski marched on Lvov and Brusilov on Halych. The former town was reputed to be strongly fortified, but these fortifications proved to exist only on paper. While the Russians were preparing to bombard the Lvov 'forts', an Orthodox priest arrived at the headquarters of General Sherbachev, commanding the 9th Army Corps, with the information that the Galician capital had been evacuated and the unfinished fortifications abandoned. The occupation of Lvov on 3 September, exactly a month after the beginning of the war, was not only a spectacular triumph for the Russians but a serious blow to the prestige of the Habsburg Monarchy.

During the following two weeks the Russian armies (the 9th, Lechitski; the 4th, Evert; the 5th, Plehve; and the 3rd, Ruski) administered a crushing defeat at Rava Russka and south of Lublin to the main Austro-Hungarian forces (the 1st Army of Dankl; the 4th, Auffenberg; and the 3rd, Boroevich). At the same time Brusilov at Gorodok was beating back the desperate attacks of the 2nd Austro-Hungarian Army under Böhm-Ermolli. In the last week of September, the Russians crossed the San and, masking the great fortress of Przemysl, pressed back the demoralized Austro-Hungarian troops to the forts of Cracow, while simultaneously they occupied the most important passes of the Carpathians.

Russian Cossack units and regular cavalry spread over the Carpathians into the valley of the upper Tisza and the forests of Carpathian Rus and along the edges of the Great Hungarian Plain. By the end of November 1914 the whole of Galicia was effectively in the hands of the Russians. Difficult problems faced not only the military but also the civil authorities.

The population of Galicia (including the region of Cracow) numbered seven and a half million inhabitants; of these, apart from half a million Jews, four millions were Poles and about three millions were of Russian origin—of the same blood and language as the inhabitants of the Ukraine. In Eastern Galicia the Russo-Ukrainians equalled the Poles in numbers, but in the western districts the Poles

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predominated. The elections of 1907 had sent sixty-nine Polish deputies to the local *Seym*, and thirty-two Ukrainians. The results of the elections had been regarded as unjust by the Ukrainian political activists, and the struggle against the local Polish hegemony had been intensified; terrorist outrages had culminated finally in the assassination of the Viceroy of Galicia, Count Potocki. Finally, following the intervention of the Central Government in Vienna, the Ukrainians had secured an agreement whereby 27 per cent of the seats in the *Seym* were guaranteed to them in the future. The position was further complicated by the fact that a third of the Ukrainian deputies were stigmatized by their colleagues as 'pro-Russians' (*Promoskovity*). 175*

The five years preceding the war were marked by an acute and growing antagonism, not only between Poles and Ukrainians, but also between the two sections within the local Ukrainian movement. Supported by the Vienna Government, and having at their disposal ten chairs in the University of Lvov, several gymnasiums, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the educational organization of *Prosvita*, libraries, museums, publishers and several daily papers, the anti-Muscovite 'separatists' were always the stronger; but now the movement which had been created by Hrushevsky and his followers was only defending its former positions. The *Promoskovity*, in spite of difficulties, were gaining ground; they had founded their own scientific institute, formed their own academic group, established their own daily papers and their own political 'Russian Organization'. In their struggle with the *Promoskovity* the separatists appealed to the Austro-Hungarian authorities, and in 1912 elaborate lists were prepared of persons suspected of sympathies for Russia. 175*

The events of the war changed in a most decisive manner all the relationships which had been established in Galicia. Simultaneously with mobilization began arrests of 'pro-Russians'. A few weeks later the defeats of the Austrian armies were attributed to 'the treacherous behaviour' of the Galician population. When complete units of Galician Landsturm surrendered without resistance to the enemy, repressions followed throughout the whole province: mass arrests and transportations, and executions—with or without the formality of military courts. All persons of any local importance who were considered 'pro-Russian' were sent to concentration camps—deputies of the *Seym*, priests, schoolmasters, business men and prosperous peasants. The Lvov prisons were filled with hundreds of prisoners who did not know why they had been arrested; and at the notorious camp of Telerhof 7500 unfortunates were interned. 175* 668

The commander of the 8th Russian Army, General Brusilov, 175*

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*175 wrote in his memoirs (subsequently published in Soviet Russia): 'I must say that, not only in Eastern Galicia, where the majority of the population is Russian and has been well disposed towards us for a long time, but also in Western Galicia where the population is Polish, not only peasants, but even the clergy of the Catholic Church, showed signs of sympathy and in many cases helped us as much as they could. As for the Jewish population, numerous in both parts of Galicia, it played an important part under Austrian rule: there were many Jewish landowners and they were disliked by both Poles and Russians. Nearly all wealthy Jews took flight and only the poor remained. On the whole the sympathies of the Jews were on the side of the Austrians for very comprehensible reasons.'

Immediately after the Russian occupation the desire of the *Promoskovity* to avenge themselves on their neighbours found expression in a flood of denunications. The Russian Governor-General, Count Yuri Bobrinskoy, proved incapable of confronting the difficulties of the situation. A humane and cultivated man, he failed to master all the intricacies of intrigue in the Galician capital. The *Promoskovity*, avenging themselves for former oppressions, influenced the Russian authorities to close down not only the separatist political organizations, but also all newspapers, clubs, educational societies, bookshops and certain schools. Ukrainian separatist politicians who had not had time to leave were sent off to Russia. Professor Hrushevsky was ordered to take up his abode in Nizhni-Novgorod, although later he was allowed to visit the capital 'to work in the libraries'.

Such measures could be explained by the war, but the moment was really ill-chosen for beginning a struggle against the Uniate Church. Count Bobrinskoy, with the help of several Orthodox bishops, began without delay the thankless task of bringing back the Galician peasantry into the fold of pure Orthodoxy, and he completely ignored the fact that, although the Union had originally been imposed in Galicia and was in its origin an artificial institution, it had centuries behind it.

In a great many cases the people had become attached to their Uniate churches and Uniate priests. The drive against the Uniate Church vitiated the relations between the population and the authorities of the military occupation and produced the strangely paradoxical situation that in Western Galicia the Russian administration experienced fewer difficulties with the Poles and Catholics than in Eastern Galicia, where the population was of Russian origin and 'half Orthodox'. The Russians finally succeeded in alienating a man who stood above all his compatriots in moral stature. The Uniate Metropolitan Count Szepticki had never belonged to any of the

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Galician political factions, but his authority was great among the peasantry of Galicia and that authority might have been used to support the Russian administration had it shown more tolerance in Church affairs. But the Metropolitan was treated with more severity than the known separatist Hrushevsky; he was banished to Russia, where he had to live under provincial police supervision. 175*

In Lvov, at the head of 'The Russian Committee', was a rather anaemic personality, a certain Dudkevich. Owing to the blunders of the Russian administration 'pro-Russian' tendencies did not make any progress during the period of the occupation. As for the Ukrainian separatist movement it was annihilated as a result of the war. 'The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' collapsed, and Doroshenko and Zaliznyak abandoned it. The attempt to form a Ukrainian Legion on the pattern of Pilsudski's Polish Legion had no success. Although the military importance of the Polish Legion was insignificant, the legionaries fought well and it served to form a nucleus for a future political organization. But no one ever heard anything about the military feats of the Ukrainian Legion of Austrian formation. Certain members of 'The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' found, however, new means to induce the Germans to take an interest in them. 668 175*

When in 1915 the Germans captured enormous numbers of Russian prisoners an attempt was made to 'sort' them according to their national origins. Those who called themselves Ukrainians were sent to a special camp at Rastatt where lectures were read to them on Ukrainian subjects by a certain 'Professor' Bezpalko. At the beginning of 1917 about 15,000 Russian soldiers, who had qualified in German eyes as Ukrainians, were assembled in the camp at Rastatt and went through a sort of school of propaganda. A regiment even was formed, called the Taras Shevchenko regiment, numbering about 2000 men, but it did not have time to prove its valour on the German side before the Revolution broke out. When it is remembered that by the beginning of 1917 the number of Russian prisoners in the hands of the Germans was about 3,000,000, of whom between 700,000 and 800,000 were of Ukrainian origin, the success attained by the Germans in exploiting Ukrainian nationalism in the concentration camps does not appear very brilliant.

In the spring of 1915 the Emperor Nicholas II, after the surrender of Przemysl, visited Galicia and made a speech at Lvov in which he spoke of 'an indivisible Russia' reaching as far as the Carpathian Mountains. There were already signs, however, that the Russian dominion in Galicia would not last long. In the early summer a heavy German concentration pierced the Russian front at 175*

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175 Gorlice, and the Russian armies, after heavy fighting and enormous losses, began to retreat from Galicia into the Ukraine.

By the beginning of autumn the front had been established on a new line; the Russians continued to hold only a strip of Eastern Galicia and had been compelled to abandon to the enemy part of Volhynia with the towns of Kovel, Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynsk.

Anxiety was very great at that time and even Kiev seemed to be threatened. Podolia, Eastern Volhynia, right-bank Ukraine, had become regions in the immediate neighbourhood of the front. The evacuation of Galicia had been a difficult and painful proceeding. The Russian armies had been accompanied in their retreat by thousands of Galician peasants evidently in fear of the reprisals awaiting them at the hands of the Austro-Hungarian troops. They went on foot, and some in carts with their households, driving their cattle before them. Over a hundred thousand of such fugitives crossed the Russian frontier. Numbers of Jews followed the retreat in order to escape from the scene of war; and the Russian military authorities deported with them also all people who were considered 'suspicious' from the political point of view and such Ukrainians, Poles and Jews as were supposed to harbour 'criminal intentions'.

For the latter elements prisons were hastily improvised in Kiev, but no one knew what to do about them nor why they had been brought there. Charitable institutions had to feed and clothe them as though they were the most peaceful citizens. There were days when at the Kiev Central Station as many as 60,000 meals had to be provided for these swarms of unwanted 'guests'.

The Russian Committee from Lvov, with its chief, Dudkevich, also came to Kiev. Such an agglomeration of demoralized peasants and Jewish crowds in the rear of the South-Western Front was dangerous in every respect, and to begin with from a sanitary point of view. Beginning with the end of 1915 and all through 1916 the clearance of these 'new-comers' from Kiev went on. Dudkevich's Committee and other organizations were sent to Rostov-on-Don and later to Turkestan—whither was directed the main flow of fugitive peasants. Jews were allowed to go beyond the Dniepr into the Governments of the interior and the limits permitted them for settlement were temporarily abolished. Many of them remained in left-bank Ukraine and the towns of New Russia; and this migrant Jewish element, combined with the 'suspicious characters' who gained their liberty after the outbreak of the Revolution, constituted an unsettled and disintegrating factor during the period of social dissolution.

During 1916 life in the Ukraine approached normal conditions

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again, after the offensive of General Brusilov had broken the Austro-Hungarian Front at several points. Part of Volhynia was cleared of the enemy and the Russians again invaded Galicia, occupying Stanislavov and also Czernowitz and the whole of the Bukovina. The Front was again removed from the region of Kiev. 175

Under the influence of the Russian victories the Roumanians entered the war, but they proved to be unprepared for serious conflict. A Russian army was sent to check the German invasion in Moldavia, and a new 'Roumanian Front' was created, so that the battle-line now ran from the Baltic to the Black Sea. During the winter of 1916–17 the South-Western Front was stabilized. Headquarters were planning a new offensive in the spring against Lvov and believed in its ultimate success. Peace and quiet reigned in Kiev and in the neighbourhood of the Front.(1)

§2. HRUSHEVSKY AND VINNICHENKO: THE UKRAINIANS AT BREST-LITOVSK

When the news of the February Revolution (February according to the Old Style, March according to the New) in Petrograd reached Kiev neither the authorities nor the populace would at first credit the truth of it. However, it was not long before the events which had taken place in the northern capital were repeated in Kiev and the cities of the Ukraine. 669 208

The process of decomposition which was destroying the armies of the North-Western and Western Fronts infected somewhat later the forces on the South-Western and Roumanian Fronts. As for the Ukrainian national movement, no one thought about it during those first days of revolution. With the exception of Finland, where the revolutionary movement was accompanied by a wave of feeling in favour of national independence, in no part of the Russian Empire were nationalist aspirations the motive of the Revolution. The first impulse of the masses, irrespective of their nationality, was to look upon the Revolution as a means of ending the war which had lasted too long. The other motives which soon made themselves apparent were everywhere of a social nature.

The state of mind of the masses found expression in the institution of 'Councils (*Soviety*) of Soldiers', Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates', in the creation of which all the leading socialist groups and parties took a hand. People of all nationalities participated in these Soviets; Georgian politicians, who for a generation had played a leading role in Russian radical movements, made themselves par- 208 623

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ticularly prominent (Chkheidze, Tsereteli and Chenkeli really dominated the first Petrograd Soviet).

At this early period the great majority of the Ukrainian population were really more indifferent to 'the Ukrainian movement' than they had been before the war. The soldiers in the trenches were only interested in two things: in an immediate return to their homes and in their participation in the land distribution which was to be a feature of the agrarian reforms in the new Russia. If in a comparatively short time 'the Ukrainian movement' became a factor of importance in revolutionary Russia, it was only owing to the exceptional energy and insistence of the small group of men who were leading the Ukrainian nationalists.

Already in March Professor Hrushevsky had made his appearance in Kiev; he was joined by one of the activists of 1905, Vinnichenko, who during that earlier phase had called himself a 'Ukrainian Social Democrat'. The journalist Simon Petlyura, who was destined to become the most picturesque of the Ukrainian leaders, also turned up in Kiev.(2) At the beginning of 1917 Petlyura had found himself in the modest post of accountant in one of the branches of the 'Union of the Towns' which, together with the 'Union of Zemstvos', had been largely concerned with the supply problems of the war. These two Unions became the stronghold of the Ukrainian nationalists; in Kiev alone there were 6000 people employed on the 'Union of Zemstvos' and 2000 on the 'Union of the Towns'. Branches of the two Unions existed in all the towns of the Ukraine and the staffs consisted for the greater part of 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'—just the social strata where, before the war, the Ukrainian nationalists had been gaining recruits.

Without losing any time, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko gathered round themselves in Kiev an active group who shared their ideas, and they began to organize a 'Ukrainian Conference'. The sponsors of the Conference sent 'invitations' to 'elect delegates' from the nine Governments which they considered as constituting the territory of the Ukraine (three Governments on the right and three on the left bank of the Dniepr and the three Governments of New Russia). The elections were held 'according to the Revolutionary ways': in other words, delegates arrived in Kiev on the authority of some small 'circle' or club or of a 'Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' which might have consisted of five or six people. There appeared also 'self-appointed delegates'—deserters from the Front and 'new-comers' from Galicia.

No one was particularly astonished at this strange assembly, since 'revolutionary enthusiasm' reigned supreme throughout the whole

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country. The Soviets and all sorts of other similar organizations 668
which were supposed to voice the aspirations of 'great masses' had been organized in the same way. Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, [646]
however, attained their first object, since 'the Ukrainian Conference' elected from its midst members of 'the Ukrainian *Rada*' which was to constitute a sort of Parliament for the Ukraine. These events caused considerable displeasure to the Provisional Government in Petrograd and it was not long before a struggle developed between the Provisional Government and the Ukrainian *Rada*.

'Self-determination of nationalities' had always formed part of 668
the moral and political stock-in-trade of the various brands of 642
'liberals', 'democrats' and 'socialists' who composed the Provisional Government. But the realities of the situation in which they found themselves imposed on these ideologues a certain moderation in the application of their super-liberal principles. Harassed on all sides by self-constituted revolutionary and nationalist groups and factions, and themselves clinging nervously to the forms of an authority which was being rapidly dispersed by the cold winds of rising anarchy, the Provisional Government had recourse to their usual method of 'persuasion' and they asked the *Rada* to await the end of the war and the decisions of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

'Persuasion', however, was hopeless with opponents so skilled in political struggles and intrigue as Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko. Aware of the weakness of the Petrograd Government, the politicians of the *Rada* based their tactics on manœuvring for a gradual enlargement of the powers which they had attributed to themselves, while they avoided provoking the cabinet of Prince Lvov by premature demands of too drastic a nature. The *Rada* secured, for instance, the consent of the Provisional Government to the formation of Ukrainian national troops. In this case they could appeal to the precedent which had been created by the formation of Lettish, Georgian and Armenian national detachments.

Professor Paul Milyukov, a prominent member of the Provisional Government, describes the relations of Petrograd with the *Rada* in the following words: 'The Provisional Government was still continuing to plead with the Ukrainians not to detach themselves from the Motherland, not to go the fatal way of dividing liberated Russia, and not to introduce dissensions into the Army at a moment of great national danger. Weak and devoid of backbone, having itself laid down its arms, the Government could not but register *post factum* the triumphs attained by the Ukrainians. Hrushevsky's tactics consisted in proving that "nothing decisive" was taking place. The fiction that the Government was sanctioning the *Rada's* doings was

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kept up to the end. Summing up all the *pourparlers* one sees how false they were at the core: an enforced fiction on one side and deliberate deception on the other.'

Hrushevsky, according to his own words, put forward only a moderate programme: wide national and territorial autonomy within the Russian Federative Republic; but it was not long before he was shifting his ground and declaring that 'the adherents of an independent Ukraine consent to remain on a common platform with Russians' but that 'the colours of an independent Ukraine would be folded only for a time'.

With the resignations of Milyukov and Guchkov, who were regarded as the firm adversaries of Ukrainian separatism, 'the colours of an independent Ukraine' were duly unfolded. The *Rada* chose from among its members a 'General Secretariat' which was to function as a sort of Ukrainian cabinet. Always in pursuance of their tactics, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko declared that the authority of both the *Rada* and the Secretariat was of a 'purely moral order' and that the organs set up in Kiev were purely 'national organizations'.

Soon, however, Vinnichenko, who had taken upon himself the role of 'Ukrainian Prime Minister', judged that the moment had arrived to proclaim that 'the limits between moral and public legal authority had been effaced' and that 'our moral authority has grown to such an extent as a logical result of events that painlessly, without a struggle, it has transformed itself into the legal rule of a national republic'.

All these manœuvres culminated in the publication of the first 'Universal' of the 'Central *Rada*' on 23 June 1917, according to which the 'Autonomous Ukrainian Republic' came into being, and the 'Central *Rada*' arrogated to itself the right to formulate legislation which would require the sanction of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly only as 'a matter of form'. In this way two authorities came into being claiming sovereign rights in the territory of the Ukraine: the 'moral' authority transformed into the 'legal rule' of the *Rada* on the one side, and on the other the former legitimate authority of the Provisional Government—which was losing ground every day, but which had not completely disappeared.

Under these circumstances several members of the reconstructed cabinet of the Provisional Government hastened to Kiev—Kerenski, Tereshchenko, Nekrasov and Tsereteli. At the time Kerenski was preoccupied with the South-Western Front, where a renewed Russian offensive was to prove to the Allies that the Provisional Government remained faithful to the idea of 'war to a successful end', and it is probable that the *Rada* had chosen this conjunction of

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circumstances to extract the maximum concessions from the harassed liberal leaders who could not risk a political crisis in the rear of the South-Western Army. 668 642

When the offensive ended in catastrophe with a loss of over 100,000 casualties and 47,000 prisoners, the complete demoralization of the Front and the appearance of thousands of fugitives in Kiev, the ministers of the Provisional Government had no alternative but to capitulate to the *Rada*. On 17 July, in the presence of Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, the existence of 'the General Secretariat' was proclaimed and legalized. 721 642

The disaster at the Front was followed during July by the outbreak of riots and disorders in the interior of Russia. The Soviets openly declared themselves against the Provisional Government, while the Bolshevik faction, after the arrival of Lenin, began to gain strength and made their first attempt to gain power by armed insurrection. 669

The *Rada* began to concentrate what Ukrainian military elements it was able to attract round Kiev; two regiments, named respectively 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky' and 'Polubotok', were in process of formation. Both regiments consisted of undisciplined and disorderly deserters and mutineers. An attempt by the Russian Command to send the 'Ukrainian Regiments' to the Front provoked a real mutiny in the ranks of the 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment', who considered their presence in Kiev 'for the protection of the *Rada*' more necessary than in the firing line. After an encounter at the Central Railway Station at Kiev with a squadron of the Cuirassiers of the Guard, the Ukrainian troops surrendered and were deprived of their weapons. 642 669

Petrograd in the meantime was rejoicing over the suppression of the Bolshevik rising; Lenin had fled to Finland.

This success of the Provisional Government tended to calm both troubled and conspiratorial minds and, under the influence of the German offensive which had begun and which threatened both Kiev and Petrograd, the ministers of the Kerenski Government adopted a firmer attitude in their discussions with the representatives of the *Rada*, who had come to Petrograd to discuss the terms of the Statute which was to regulate the position of the Ukraine. Instead of the Statute only new 'instructions' to the General Secretariat were conceded. The territory of the Ukraine was to consist now of only five Governments: three on the right and two on the left bank of the Dniepr. The Government of Kharkov and the three New Russian Governments were excluded, although the delegates had tried to insist that, in addition to the nine Governments already claimed, Bessarabia and the greater parts of the Governments of Kursk and Voronezh should also form part of the Ukraine. 642 634

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668 When the delegates returned to Kiev there was a regular storm of indignation in the *Rada*. Hrushevsky, however, was receding into the background, and most of the decisions of the *Rada* were now inspired by Vinnichenko. It was he who insisted on acquiescence in the 'instructions' of the Provisional Government. 'The right to possess something', he explained to his disgruntled followers, 'is not given on bits of paper; it is the result of the balance of the forces in conflict, which balance can always change in different circumstances. Let us take what is given to us and let us go on. After all, this is not a peace but an armistice.'(3)

'The different circumstances' which instilled caution into Vinnichenko developed with alarming rapidity. In August, Kerenski, quailing before the spectre of 'counter-revolution', applied to the Bolsheviks for help in order 'to safeguard the conquests of the Revolution'. Taking advantage of this fatal move, the Bolsheviks immediately intensified their propaganda throughout the country in favour of the immediate cessation of the war, and they spread the demand that all power should be transferred to the Soviets of Soldiers, Workers and Peasants as the only true defenders of the Revolution. The Bolshevik agitation, fed upon a progressive disintegration of the social order, ran through the cities of the Ukraine, and Vinnichenko could not help realizing that the ephemeral tactical victories of the *Rada* were nothing compared to the devastating victories of the Bolsheviks and of the extreme left wing of the Social Revolutionaries. After bitter experience, he wrote in his daily paper, *Novaya Rada*, that 'national questions at that time did not have the overwhelming importance which the Central *Rada* wished to ascribe to them'. He even went so far as to avow that the *Rada* and its members were hated and laughed at by the population. 'Everything Ukrainian was laughed at: songs, schools, papers, books. The son was cynically and resentfully making fun of his mother.' The former head of the General Secretariat continued: 'We did not have a strong proletariat conscious of its nationality because, in most cases, it had been denationalized and russified in most of the big towns.' As for the peasantry, according to Vinnichenko: 'We found our principal support among the peasants, not among the poor ones, but among the wealthier ones.' This fact, recognized by Vinnichenko, deserves to be noted.

Notwithstanding the blatant defects of the self-appointed 'organ of moral authority' in Kiev, there were some decent elements upholding the Central *Rada*. Among its six hundred members were men who hoped to build something even on the shaky foundations of Ukrainian autonomy. True, as Vinnichenko himself owns: 'We

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spoke of our success at the elections, but let us be honest amongst ourselves and to others: we availed ourselves of the ignorance of the oppressed masses. It was not they who elected us, but we who imposed ourselves on them.' But among these 'self-elected' were men who were acting in the hope of creating a dam against the raging revolutionary sea. Certain elements of sanity and order were to be found in the *Rada*: men who despaired of finding salvation in the weak and passive Provisional Government, and who hoped to achieve something themselves under the Ukrainian flag. 668

The candid Vinnichenko goes on to mention that the Central *Rada* 'had dreamed of founding its authority on the support of foreign bourgeois states and on the existing social order'. But if there was no real force on the side of the Provisional Government, there was also none on the side of the *Rada*. 'Our Ukrainian soldiers were not content with the gold-and-blue standard and with new red caps. When they saw that the *Rada* was on the side of the propertied classes, they naturally turned to those who offered them more tangible goods—the Bolsheviks. Not Russian but Ukrainian regiments took Kiev later for the Bolsheviks.'

In August and September 1917, under the growing pressure of Bolshevism, those political tendencies in the *Rada* which were represented by Hrushevsky and his group lost ground seriously. Hrushevsky and his followers had remained true to their 'Austrian orientation' which by 1917 had become an 'Austro-German orientation'. These defeatists in relation to Russia had been counting on Austro-German support because they were aware that the Ukrainian separatist movement could facilitate the attainment of the objectives of the Austro-German Command. But even in defeatism the *Rada* could not compete with the Bolsheviks, for the modest defeatism of the separatists was of little value to the Germans compared with the really gigantic defeatism of the Soviets, which were now entirely in the hands of Lenin and his adherents. The Bolsheviks had worked so successfully for the disintegration of the Front that Riga had now fallen to the Germans and the way lay open to Petrograd. The Germans were already within reach of their objective of a separate peace with Russia, and while the Soviets could answer for the whole of the Russian Front the romantics of the *Rada*—who could not even control the mutinous mobs in the Ukrainian cities—must continue to fail to inspire the interest of the German General Staff.[4]

In September, as the fatal autumn of 1917 approached, Kiev was preoccupied with almost academic activities. Surrounded by a certain amount of pomp, a Congress representing all the nationalities

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668 of the Russian Empire was holding its sessions. About a hundred delegates representing thirteen nationalities and twelve Cossack lands were in attendance, and another six nationalities which had not sent delegates declared their 'adherence to the decisions of the Congress' without taking part in it. The decisions consisted of a plan for converting the structure of the Empire into a federation of autonomous states which were to have common internal and foreign policies. Apparently the Ukrainians were not entirely pleased with the moderate claims of the Congress, and delegates of the *Rada* proceeded to Petrograd to demand that all authority in the Ukraine should be exercised exclusively by the *Rada* and its General Secretariat. They also required the recognition of the right of all nationalities within the Empire to dispose of their own destinies and called for the meeting of a 'Sovereign National Constituent Assembly'. While still waiting in Petrograd for the satisfaction of their demands, the delegates had the exciting experience of being present at the taking of the Winter Palace by the Bolsheviks.

The October Revolution (November by the New Style) did not produce an armed struggle in Kiev as in Petrograd and Moscow. In Kiev Bolshevik elements were neither numerous nor strong: there were no important industrial plants in the ancient city by the Dniepr, and the few thousand proletarians were scattered round the arsenal and the railway workshops. The *Rada* could also rely on a certain number of obedient troops. The downfall of the Provisional Government did not result in the transfer in the Ukraine of its somewhat shadowy authority to the Soviets; such authority as there was remained in the hands of the *Rada*. This fact was underlined in the third 'Universal' published by the *Rada*. It was affirmed that the *Rada* would continue as the organ of power until the convocation of 'the Ukrainian National Constituent Assembly', freely elected, which would form a Government for the whole territory of the Ukrainian Republic. The *Rada* also confirmed its readiness 'to help Russia to become a Federative State of Free and Equal Nations'.

This 'Universal', published on 7–20 November, was regarded as a declaration of war by the newly established Soviet power. There was little chance for the Central *Rada* to emerge victorious from any armed conflict. In November 1917 the authority of the *Rada* only covered the agricultural districts adjacent to Kiev on both banks of the Dniepr. At the Front soldiers' Soviets ruled supreme, and in Kharkov and the big industrial towns of New Russia the Bolsheviks were gaining ground. Scarcely a month had elapsed before the authority of the *Rada* was overthrown in Kharkov, where on 27 December the Bolsheviks proclaimed a 'Provisional Ukrainian

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Soviet Government'. A few days later Red troops took possession of Ekaterinoslav; by the first half of January Mariupol, Odessa and Nikolaev were in Bolshevik hands, and Red detachments were marching from Kharkov through Poltava on Kiev. Foreign intervention remained the only chance for the Government of the Central *Rada*. 668

Although the third 'Universal' had not definitely proclaimed the Ukraine to be an independent republic, the Kiev Government informed the Austro-Hungarian and German authorities of their wish to participate in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations as an independent state. 668 728

At Brest-Litovsk all parties were in a hurry. Lenin was anxious to conclude a peace at any price and as rapidly as possible in order to fulfil the promises he had made to the Soviets of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Delegates; the Germans were concerned to accelerate the liquidation of the Russian Front in order to be able to transfer greater numbers of troops to the Western Front; and they, and more urgently the Austrians, were in desperate need of the supplies which they considered the conclusion of peace would make available to them in Russia. Now the Ukrainians appeared upon the scene in no less haste to secure the salvation of the Kiev Government before it should have been liquidated by the forces of the Russian Revolution.

Representatives of the new Soviet power had crossed the German lines on 27 November, but an armistice had not been signed until 16 December; two days later the Armistice of Focşani had concluded the fighting on the Roumanian Front immediately adjacent to the Ukrainian lands. During the negotiations for an armistice the *Rada* Government had been virtually ignored, for the Bolshevik delegates had been at pains to persuade the Germans that the Ukrainian Republic was nothing more than a fiction which would be swept away by 'the workers and peasants'. But when the news reached Kiev and it became known that negotiations for the signature of a general peace would immediately begin, the *Rada* hastened to declare its wish to participate and, as a reinforcement to its request made by wire, sent emissaries to Vienna in order to take advantage of the old and long-standing connections between the Austrian Government and the Ukrainian separatists.

Peace negotiations started on 8 January 1918 in Brest-Litovsk; Trotsky was at the head of the Soviet Delegation; von Kühlmann and General Hoffmann were the German representatives; and Count Czernin was in charge of Austro-Hungarian interests. Ottoman and Bulgarian Delegations also attended.

Without any special invitation, three young men soon put in their

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appearance—'the three students' they were nicknamed by the representatives of the Russian Revolution and of the two Germanic Empires. Levitsky, Lubinsky and Sevryuk, who declared their wish to take part in the proceedings as the representatives of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic', were three of old Hrushevsky's pupils who had hardly had time to finish their schooling. 668 728

The aspect of the delegates with whom the representatives of the two great Empires had to treat had ceased to astonish anyone in Brest-Litovsk. Compared to the 'Delegates of the Sailors, Soldiers, Workers and Peasants' with whom General Hoffmann and Prince Leopold of Bavaria had been obliged to sit at the same table during the discussions about the armistice, these 'three students' seemed quite ordinary decent young men. They were invited to lunch and dine with the Delegations of 'the bourgeois states'—an amenity which Trotsky forbade to his Soviet comrades.

Count Czernin, although a little 'shocked' by the youth of the Ukrainian delegates, was obliged by the force of circumstances to enter into friendly relations with them. As for the German delegates, they were frankly pleased with the presence of the representatives of the *Rada*, considering that it might make Trotsky more amenable.

Trotsky continued to deny the existence of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic'. Levitsky and his colleagues produced documents which showed that during the last elections in the Ukraine (November 1917) the *Rada* had polled 75 per cent of the votes and the Bolsheviks only 10 per cent. It was difficult to realize in Brest-Litovsk that those were the elections about which Vinnichenko wrote 'it was not they who elected us, but we who imposed ourselves on them'.

Owing to the importance of the negotiations, there also arrived in the wake of 'the three students', the new Prime Minister of the Ukraine, Vsevolod Holubovich, also quite a young man (thirty-four years of age), a sincere enthusiast of the 'Ukrainian national cause'. During the session of 10 January the presence of the Ukrainians at the Conference was officially recognized and Trotsky, 'with a sore heart', had to give his consent to their participation in the discussions.

The Ukrainian delegates soon began to astonish Hoffmann and Czernin by their immoderate demands. They had instructions to exact the annexation to the 'Popular Republic' not only of the Kholm district, which had been allocated to the proposed new Polish state, but also of Galicia and Bukovina which formed parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hoffmann almost yelled at Lubinsky and Sevryuk, who were not much abashed and declared that they would ask for new instructions from Kiev: they felt a certain amount of strength to be on their side. A few days later Count Czernin

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wrote in his diary: 'The Ukrainians no longer lead the negotiations: they dictate their conditions.' 668 728

The situation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire had become critical about 15 January. 'The people are suffering from hunger', pleaded the Archbishop of Cracow; 'bread rations have been cut down by half', wired the Governor of Trieste; 'there is flour in Vienna only till next Monday', came from the Burgomaster of the capital. On the 17th the Emperor Charles wired to Czernin: 'The fate of the monarchy and of the dynasty depends on how soon you will be able to conclude peace in Brest-Litovsk....If peace is not concluded a revolution will break out here.'

It was Czernin's good fortune that at this juncture the Ukrainian delegation received news which obliged it to adopt a less extravagant attitude. The 'Popular Republic' had lost in the first weeks of January all New Russia and nearly all left-bank Ukraine. Trotsky smiled sarcastically when he met 'the three students' and Radek wrote in the Soviet press: 'Let those who want bread scream death to the *Rada*!' Radek's aimable outburst against the Kiev *Rada* indicated that Ukrainian supplies were as badly needed in the Soviet capitals as they were in Vienna. This aspect of affairs was duly appreciated by the Germans, and Hoffmann suddenly became more interested in making peace with the *Rada*. When the Kiev *Rada*, under pressure of a Soviet threat to Kiev, relinquished their claims to Galicia and Bukovina, Hoffmann persuaded Czernin to accept the other conditions, including the demand for Kholm.

On 18 January the negotiations were temporarily interrupted. The Delegations left in quest of fresh instructions from their respective Governments. When after a few days they returned to Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky brought along with him new visitors: the representatives of the 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic' which had chosen Kharkov for its capital. Trotsky warned von Kühlmann and Czernin that the 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic' 'did not recognize any agreements which might be entered into by the *Rada*'.

The German and Austro-Hungarian Delegations came to the decision not to pay any attention to Trotsky's manœuvre. Hoffmann calmly noted in his diary: 'At any time we could support the Ukrainian Government and establish it again.'

On 1 February dissensions were renewed in Brest-Litovsk in a somewhat chaotic atmosphere. The Germans and Austrians had to carry on discussions with three Delegations at the same time: those of the Soviet Government, of the Ukrainian *Rada* and of the Ukrainian Soviet Government. The *Rada* Delegation produced the fourth 'Universal' from Kiev, according to which on 22 January the

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668 728 existence of 'a free and sovereign Ukraine' had been proclaimed. The Government of this new independent state had instructed its delegates to conclude peace 'without paying attention to any obstacles which might arise from other parts of the former Russian Empire'.

In the meantime, on 30 January, 'Red bands' commanded by Muraviëv had approached Kiev and had begun to bombard the city from the left bank of the Dniepr. During the session of 1 February Trotsky could not resist the pleasure of reading out a telegram which announced that some of the Ukrainian regiments of the *Rada* had gone over to the Bolsheviks, and which claimed that the days of the *Rada* were numbered. The Ukrainian delegates, Sevryuk and Lubinsky, responded with sharp denunciations of the Bolsheviks. 'Lubinsky retorted with an hour-long speech which for pure vitriolic opprobrium far exceeded anything that had been heard at this strangest of peace conferences' (Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, p. 210).

But Trotsky's triumph partook only of the theatre, for at the end of this same sitting Count Czernin announced the recognition by the Allied Empires of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' 'as an independent free and sovereign state'.

After this there remained only the technical side of the agreement with the Ukrainians. If Czernin and Kühlmann waited a few days longer it was only in the hope that the threat of a separate peace with the *Rada* might oblige Trotsky to come to his senses. On 8 February the principal clauses of a treaty were established. The basic condition was an obligation on the Ukraine to furnish not less than a million tons of supplies to the Allied Empires. To ensure the fulfilment of this condition an Austro-German Commission was to proceed to Kiev. But it had not been quite in vain that Trotsky had gloomily affirmed during these days that Czernin and Kühlmann were making an agreement with 'legally non-existent persons'. The battle for Kiev was taking place now in Kiev itself. After having signed peace with the Ukraine, Count Czernin wrote in his diary: 'I wonder if the *Rada* is still sitting in Kiev!'

On 10 February Trotsky made his famous declaration, 'Neither peace nor war', which caused Hoffmann to exclaim 'Unerhört!' The Soviet Delegation left Brest-Litovsk the same day. The only tangible result of all the negotiations had been the peace signed with the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic'. But Kiev had now been occupied by the Red Army; the *Rada* had fled to Zhitomir and was getting ready to flee farther west. The small detachments which had remained true to the *Rada* and which had been organized by Simon

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Petlyura (who had constituted himself a specialist in military affairs) were resisting fairly well in northern Podolia, but were certainly unable to secure the return of the *Rada* to Kiev. Trotsky's dramatic gesture had, however, simplified the problem. On 17 February the German Government denounced the armistice and ordered the armies of the Eastern Front to begin their advance. It was the only way of breaking the stubbornness of the Bolsheviks and of saving the *Rada* and the peace which it had signed with the promise of a million tons of supplies. (4, 5)

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§3. THE GERMANS IN THE UKRAINE: HETMAN SKOROPADSKY

On 18 February, the German troops, without meeting any resistance, occupied Dvinsk on the road to Petrograd and Lutsk on the road to Kiev.

But it was no easy matter for the Austrians to resume the offensive. The Austro-Hungarian armies had been broken during the first two years of the war in the great battles with the Russians; in 1917 it had only been with German aid that they had succeeded in throwing back the Italians. No danger from without threatened the Habsburg Monarchy, but within the Empire dangers were growing with each day that passed. Hence on 17 February the Vienna Government had informed Berlin that Austro-Hungarian troops would take no part in the renewal of the war on the Eastern Front.

In the meantime, the Poles and Bohemians were in a state of agitation on account of the cession of the Kholm region to the Ukrainians. When the twenty-nine year old 'student' Sevryuk, who had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Czernin and Kühlmann, made his appearance during a session of the Reichsrath on 19 February, Polish and Bohemian deputies met him with hoots and shouts of 'Clear out of here!' The Austro-Hungarian Government was compelled to put forward 'new conditions' in respect of Kholm.

The German troops continued their march through Volhynia in the direction of Kiev, and the Emperor Charles, fearful that the Austrians might fail to secure their share of the promised Ukrainian supplies, changed his mind. On 24 February the Austro-Hungarian divisions on the Eastern Front received the order to advance into the Ukraine. The Austrian decision had, however, already come too late, for on 1 March Kiev was occupied by the Germans and they alone reinstated the *Rada*.

By 3 March the rapid attainment by the Germans of the line Narva-Pskov and their seizure of the districts of Vitebsk, Mohilev

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642 728 and Homel, enabled Lenin to impose what he cynically described as his 'shameful peace' on his colleagues of the Soviets. Clause 6 of the Treaty obliged the Soviet Government 'to conclude peace at once with the Ukrainian People's Republic and to recognize the Treaty of Peace between that State and the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance'.

727 The occupation of the Ukraine was organized on the basis of a special agreement between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Germans left about 500,000 men on the whole of the Eastern Front. Of these, apart from the troops which were stationed in Poland and Lithuania to protect lines of communication, there were about 12 Infantry and 2 Cavalry Divisions occupying the Front against Soviet Russia from Narva to Homel (the 8th and 10th Armies). The remaining 15–16 Infantry and 4 Cavalry Divisions were quartered in the Ukraine (with the exception of a few battalions which were sent to Poti for the protection of the new Georgian Republic from Germany's ally Turkey). The troops in the Ukraine constituted the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* and consisted of the 1st and 20th Army Corps, the 27th (Saxon) and the 22nd and 41st Reserve Corps, together with several independent divisions and detachments. These troops had little in common with the magnificent German armies which had invaded Russia in the first years of the war. The *Heeresgruppe Kiev* contained a veritable mosaic of different battalions—the majority of which consisted of elderly men belonging to Landwehr and Landsturm formations. During the whole period of the German occupation of the Ukraine there was a continuous process of transfer of single battalions and even of small detachments to the Western Front—and this became more noticeable after 8 August, the day which may be said to have marked the turning-point in France. Only the Cavalry Divisions and Artillery approached the standards of the German armies which had formerly been held on the Russian Front. Thus the legend that the military occupation of the Ukraine was 'a mistake', in the sense that important forces were engaged there which might have been decisively employed on the Western Front, seems to be without foundation. Out of all the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* it would have been difficult to select three or four fighting infantry divisions, and less could have been found among the miscellaneous collection of elderly and invalid troops which constituted the so-called 8th and 10th Armies.

The Austro-Hungarian forces in the Ukraine amounted nominally to 250,000 men; but their total in reality was far below this and the number of deserters grew every day.

The Germans from the first began to play the leading role in Kiev.

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All authority was vested in the hands of the Commander of *Heeresgruppe Kiev*, Field-Marshal Eichhorn. To Kiev was sent also General Groener, who had a great reputation for his organizing capacity (amongst his collaborators was 'enigmatic' Meissner, who later was to play a certain role in the entourages of President Hindenburg and of the Führer Hitler). The representative of the German Foreign Office was Baron Mumm. Vienna sent as minister Count Forgacs, who, as minister in Belgrad in 1914, had his share of responsibility for the events which immediately preceded the outbreak of war. 727

Dissensions began between the Allies from the very first moment. Hoffmann, who was in Kovno, kept himself well-informed about what was going on in Kiev. He wrote in his diary: 'Endless troubles with the Austrians in Ukraine. They are behaving with their usual meanness when the knife is not at their throat. It is a pity that the Italians do not attack.' Quarrels broke out on account of the delimitation of the respective German and Austrian zones. The role of the Austrians in the advance into the Ukraine had been modest enough, since they arrived too late to take part in any operations with the exception of 'the capture' of Odessa. Nevertheless, their zone of occupation spread over all the south. At the end of March an agreement was at last reached. On the Black Sea the Austrians retained Odessa and Kherson; the Germans Nikolaev and Sevastopol. Three Governments, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, Podolia and the southern strip in Volhynia, were reserved as the Austrian zone. In this wise, the Crimea, which shortly passed into German hands, was separated by the Austrian zone from the rest of the territories in German occupation.

The gradual advance eastward of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* continued. The 22nd Reserve Corps remained in Volhynia: the 27th Reserve (Saxon) Corps was in Kiev: the 41st Reserve Corps, after crossing the Dniepr, occupied the Government of Chernigov, the 20th Army Corps that of Poltava: the 1st Army Corps marched into Kharkov on 20 April. General Groener, who was concerned to collect coal supplies, gave the order in May for the 215th Infantry Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division to march into the south-east into the Donets coal basin as far as the boundaries of the Don Cossack region, where an independent Government had been set up. At the same time the 212th Infantry Division occupied Melitopol and the northern part of the Government of Tauris, while the 15th Landwehr Division was sent to the Crimea and Sevastopol. By the middle of May the occupation had been accomplished.

The Government of the *Rada* had returned to Kiev with the German troops. An interesting light is thrown on the characters of 645

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645 the principal persons in this Government by the correspondence which passed between the Austrian and German authorities and their Governments—a part of which subsequently fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks and has been published by them (*The Crash of the German Occupation in Ukraine*, 1936, inf. p. 335). In his reports to Vienna the Austrian Chief of Staff, General Waldstetter, found Vsevolod Holubovich, the President of the Council of Ministers, 'eloquent, imaginative—a man of theories with no character at all; put there by the Germans'. Lubinsky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was 'a beardless young man extremely well read in Socialist and revolutionary literature; entirely in the hands of the Germans'. Zhukovski, the Minister for War, 'seems to me pro-Russian; he is an ex-Colonel of the General Staff and tries hard to appear before his colleagues as an untainted Socialist and revolutionary from head to foot; in reality a German puppet'. The same source gives a curious characterization of Hrushevsky. 'Hrushevsky—President of the *Rada*, a frightened old man all of a tremble; his old bones are supposed to give the *Rada* a noble patina worthy of so august an assembly. Holds on for all he is worth to the German Command and shows no sympathy at all towards Austria.' Hrushevsky had certainly changed with the times.

646 The *Rada* was composed of several hundred deputies, belonging to different Ukrainian parties; amongst them were National Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, Social Democrats and Social Federalists. Separatist tendencies prevailed, but among the more definitely Socialist groups it was possible to observe a more or less veiled distrust of and hostility towards the Austro-German authorities and the obedient cabinet which they had installed in Kiev. The more prominent representatives of these sentiments included Vinnichenko and Petlyura.

668 After its return to Kiev the *Rada* embarked on the purely academic task of elaborating a constitution for the Ukraine. The Occupation authorities were not much interested in this 'august assembly' and had 'no illusions about its importance'. General Hoffmann wrote at the time: 'The difficulty in the Ukraine is that the Central *Rada* has only our rifles behind it. The moment we withdraw our troops their authority will collapse at once' (Hoffmann, p. 207). The historian of the Brest-Litovsk peace, who has studied the documents of the period with great thoroughness, comes to the conclusion that: 'The separatist movement had no roots in the country and the people as a whole were completely indifferent to national self-determination; this had been thrust upon them by a group of political dreamers whose power was derived from the presence of German bayonets.'

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But if the Occupation authorities were not much interested in the *Rada*, they could not help being interested in the Government which depended upon the *Rada* and which had undertaken, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, to procure supplies and raw materials for Germany and Austria. In order to comply with the formalities of diplomatic etiquette, the all-important clause of the Treaty had been worded in a somewhat vague and delicate way. Clause 7 ran as follows: 'The contracting parties mutually undertake to enter into economic relations without delay and to organize the exchange of goods on the basis of the following stipulations: until 31 July of the current year a reciprocal exchange of the surplus of their most important agricultural and industrial products for the purpose of meeting current requirements.' It proceeds to lay down that 'the quantities and classes of products shall be decided in the future by a special mixed commission'. It had only been in private conversations between the respective Delegations that the million tons had been mentioned.

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The energetic and experienced Groener was entrusted with the realization of Clause 7, and for this purpose he established in Kiev the *Deutsche Ukrainische Kaufmännische Wirtschaftstelle*. This institution elaborated a detailed and rational mode of action. The Mixed Commission set up under the Peace Treaty sat for a long time before it could assess the classes and quantities of goods to be extracted from the Ukraine. At last, on 8 April, a Protocol was signed which formed a special Appendix to the Peace Treaty, and according to which the Government of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' undertook to send to Germany and Austria-Hungary a million tons of grain, 400 million eggs, cattle to the weight of about 46,000 tons, a great number of horses, a considerable quantity of coal, manganese, fodder, sugar, lard, etc. After the Protocol was signed it was not long before it became apparent that the theoretical calculations of General Groener would not be easy to realize in practice.

Field-Marshal Eichhorn himself gave vent to his scepticism when he grumbled that 'the whole trouble is that we have to treat this Ukraine as a friendly country'. But Baron Mumm hastened to retort: 'In my opinion it is absolutely necessary to keep up the fiction that the Ukraine is a friendly and independent country; otherwise we shall completely destroy the already shaky authority of the *Rada*.' General Hoffmann had no great confidence in all the methodical plans of General Groener and expressed the view that it would have been much better to have entrusted the whole business to Jewish intermediaries. By March, instead of the promised 300 train-loads of grain, only one train had arrived for Vienna and one for Buda-

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728 439 Pest. In April the situation somewhat improved, but it was evident that there was no hope of receiving by the end of July any substantial proportion of the goods which had been stipulated under the Peace Treaty. It became clear that the enthusiastic delegates of the 'Popular Republic' had greatly exaggerated the agricultural wealth of their country. They had had in view 'potential possibilities', but they had quite failed to take into account the actual state of affairs in the spring of 1918. During the whole of the preceding year agrarian disorders had been taking place. The peasants had appropriated lands, and the countryside had been swarming with ex-soldiers who had completely lost their morale and who, although they had quitted the front, had no wish whatever to return to peaceful occupations. Under such conditions the harvest of 1917 had not been gathered as it would have been in normal times; and, furthermore, no one knew to whom what had actually been gathered really belonged. The cattle of the landowners had been in great part slaughtered or driven off when the Red Guards made their appearance in the Ukraine during the winter of 1917; the sugar factories were standing idle. At the same time, the well-to-do peasants had quickly learned to hide their grain and other produce, and they were no more willing to deliver to the Germans than they had been to the Bolsheviks.

As a result of all this, during the whole period of the Occupation, the Germans only succeeded in exporting 9293 wagon-loads of grain; 23,195 wagon-loads of fodder, sugar, cattle, eggs and other products; and 4567 wagon-loads of minerals (coal, manganese)—as a whole 37,000 wagons under the auspices of the *Wirtschaftstelle* and 5000 through 'private initiative'. This tonnage amounted to scarcely a fifth part of what had been expected before 31 July 1918. And even the quantities which Germany succeeded in securing were delivered after the Government of the *Rada* had given place to that of Hetman Skoropadsky, and for the most part during the first three months of the latter régime.

[642] 727 The failure of the *Rada* in 'the economic collaboration' with the Germans was the reason for its downfall. When the Germans came into the Ukraine their inspection of stocks of supplies not only revealed the relative scarcity of these stocks but also the chaotic state of Ukrainian economy at that moment. The estates of the landowners had almost completely disappeared, and the peasants had appropriated the land. This action of the agrarian proletariat had, however, received no legal sanction, and the *Rada* had not yet elaborated any land laws. To the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* the practical and not the legal state of affairs was important. Field-Marshal Eichhorn therefore issued an 'Order to the Ukrainian popu-

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lation', calling on them to resume agricultural production 'to the maximum extent'. The harvest was to belong to him who would plough and sow, whether he was the legal owner of the land or the peasant who had taken possession of it. If the peasant proved unable to sow, the landowner was to do it, and the peasant was to put no obstacle in his way. Persons guilty of disobedience to this Order were to be brought to trial and punished, not by the Ukrainian civil courts but by the military tribunals of the Occupation.

Not only was this Order issued without the knowledge of the *Rada*, but the *Rada* heard of it only two weeks later. The German authorities were well aware that Eichhorn's Order would arouse opposition among the peasants and also among numerous groups in the *Rada* itself. Such opposition, however, would afford a suitable pretext to put an end to a Government which had proved its incapacity for 'economic collaboration'.

A month's experience of the country had been enough to indicate to the Occupation authorities the only section of the population which was likely to help them to fulfil General Groener's plan with efficiency and rapidity. It did not require much perspicacity to observe that the stocks of sugar, vegetable oil and spirit on large estates where the landlord had owned the factories were greatly in excess of those accumulated by the peasantry. Furthermore, it always proved much more difficult to extract grain from peasants, who were guiltily conscious of having recently pillaged neighbouring granaries. The liberal Government of the *Rada* had not refused to sanction the formation of a landowners' union when the latter proposed to organize to defend their interests. Of course this union, in accord with the spirit of the times, had to be called a Union of Corn-raisers (*Khliboroby*); but it was recruited not only from prosperous peasants who owned 20–30 hectares of land, but also from many middle-class and even aristocratic landowners. The Union maintained an aspect sufficiently 'democratic' to avoid provoking the radical majority of the *Rada*, but it had close connections with Russian conservative circles whose influence was beginning to make itself felt in Kiev.

The terms of the Soviet-Ukrainian 'peace' were still under negotiation, but the armistice imposed by the Germans continued in force, and the situation provided favourable opportunities for the higher classes of Russian society to leave Petrograd and Moscow and make their way to the Ukraine. Furthermore, after the chaotic demobilization of the army, thousands of Russian officers had gathered in Kiev. These officers were certainly in no hurry to go back 'into the hands of the Soviets'. Kiev presented a very strange picture in

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727 April 1918. The capital of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' had all the appearance of a big Russian town living an animated and even boisterous life owing to the presence of large numbers of Russian and foreign 'guests'. Except for the names of certain shops which were written up in Ukrainian and the picturesque uniforms of the *Rada* regiments, there was no indication of 'the beginning of a new life'. Ukrainian was only spoken in Government offices and during the sittings of the *Rada*. This official language imported from Galicia was not always easily understood by the inhabitants of Russian Ukraine.

In the environment of the Union of *Khliboroby* and of the fashionable fugitives from the north the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* easily found a convenient person who could be the head of the administration which was to replace the Government of the *Rada*.

General Paul Skoropadsky had the advantage of being a descendant of that amiable and pliable Hetman who had been chosen by Peter the Great to succeed Mazeppa. An officer of the Chevaliers Gardes Regiment, he had distinguished himself during the war, first in command of a Guards Brigade and later of a Guards Division. Of Ukrainian origin and property, he belonged to a wealthy and distinguished family. Furthermore, General Skoropadsky was endowed with the necessary ambition, and had no objection to undertaking an important political role even if it should be a difficult one. He had many connections with the Union of Cornraisers and had established excellent relations with the German Command, which now designated him as their chosen 'Head of the State' when the propitious moment for his elevation should arise.

727 642 [579] That moment arrived when at last the *Rada* learned about the Order issued by Field-Marshal Eichhorn, and peasant riots—provoked by the Order—broke out in the southern parts of the Governments of Kiev and Poltava. The members of the *Rada* were in a state of agitation; not only Petlyura and the extremists were urging opposition to the German measures, but also some of the cabinet ministers—including Lubinsky, that incorrigibly eloquent 'student' of the Congress of Brest-Litovsk. The German Command was well aware of the movement of opinion in the *Rada* and on 24 April they signed a formal agreement with Skoropadsky. Lüdendorff approved the choice of 'a man with whom one can work well' (Lüdendorff, *War Memoirs*, p. 624). On the same day the *Rada* declared the Order of Field-Marshal Eichhorn to be illegal and non-existent. Two days later, during a sitting of the *Rada*, a detachment of German soldiers entered the hall under the command of an officer who gave the abrupt order, 'Hands up!' The outraged deputies were searched for

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arms, after which they were allowed to go home with the exception of a few of their number, including several cabinet ministers, who were arrested on the spot. On the following day, during a meeting of the Union of Cornraisers, Paul Skoropadsky was proclaimed 'Hetman of the Ukraine'. 727 642

Skoropadsky remained Hetman for about seven-and-a-half months and resigned when the Germans were evacuating the Ukraine. Those seven months can be divided into two distinct periods: the first until the middle of August and the second until the end of November. 727 439

During the first period the Germans found that their manœuvre had been crowned with comparative success. In July, particularly, supplies of grain and coal were delivered at a regular and rapid tempo. The Germans, again, succeeded in securing thousands of horses of which they were badly in need, not so much for the cavalry as for the artillery and transport services. In Berlin and Vienna bread reappeared and meat and sugar was to be had in considerable quantities. Skoropadsky's Government turned out to be much more capable than that of the *Rada*, perhaps for the reason that the Hetman did not bother about any ideology whatever. The Foreign Minister, Doroshenko, was not over-burdened with work, but the energetic Minister of the Interior, Igor Kistyakovsky, and the Minister of Commerce, Gutnik, had plenty to do. Berlin and Vienna placed at the disposal of the Government the quantity of Marks necessary to cover the issue of 400,000,000 *karbóvantsi* (about 300,000,000 Marks) issued by the Hetman; and for this reason the *karbóvantsi* enjoyed a greater credit with the people than had the 'paper' of the *Rada*. In the meantime 'a real General', General Ragoza, formerly commanding the 4th Russian Army, undertook the task of organizing the Hetman's army. Not only officers of Ukrainian origin, but officers from all over Russia freely enlisted in it.

The historian of Brest-Litovsk justly remarks that in June 1918 'the Ukraine became for a short time a bourgeois Mecca and thither flocked thousands of refugees from Soviet Russia' (Wheeler-Bennett, p. 323). Kiev rapidly lost even that 'shade of Ukrainism' which it had worn in the *Rada* days. Baron Mumm, the German Minister Resident, was depressed by this aspect of affairs when he wrote to Groener: 'I tried to insist with the President of the Council of Ministers Lizohub that the German Government desires his cabinet to have more of *couleur locale*.' Mumm altogether was not particularly pleased with the *coup d'état*, since the military men had not asked his opinion about it and had not even troubled to let him know before it was accomplished. In another report Mumm suspects the Hetman's Government of being 'pro-Russian', but adds that 'this should 727 642

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727 642 not be taken too tragically as the Hetman's Government is under my control and that of the German Staff'. The Austrian Command, which did not like the Hetman on account of his 'independent tone in relation to Vienna', accused Skoropadsky himself of being 'pro-Russian'. Compromising documents were produced from somewhere according to which the Hetman had, in July 1914, denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation, while in July 1917 he was supposed to have spoken of Kiev as a centre of Russian and not of Ukrainian culture. He had also been guilty of advocating the union of all Russian lands in a federal state. The position of the Hetman, however, was then very firm, because he had the sympathy of the military Command who had no interest in the ideological side of the Ukrainian Question.

Baron Mumm and the Austrians were of course very near the truth in their views on Skoropadsky's Government. The Hetman and his cabinet, even if they were Ukrainians by origin, were of less than moderate tendencies in relation to separatism. They only 'tolerated' the separation of Ukraine from Russia while Russia remained in the hands of Lenin and Trotsky. At this time Kiev not only looked forward to the early downfall of the Bolsheviks, but was certain that the excellent relations existing between the Hetman and the German Command was the prelude to German support for the restoration of the Russian Monarchy.

At this time the Ukrainian and Russian conservatives in Kiev were not the only elements who were anticipating a German march on Moscow. The success of the German offensive in France in the spring of 1918 had convinced the Russian factions of the invincibility of the German power. Even Paul Milyukov, the protagonist of the Triple Entente, got into touch with the German Command in Kiev through the Ukrainian Premier Lizohub, who had been a member of the Cadet Party. But the Germans continued to stand where they were, and even the murder of the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Mirbach, did not induce them to expel from Berlin the Soviet representative Joffe, whose staff was at this time propagating 727 Communism in Germany with relative immunity.

Meantime a curious situation had been created on the Don, where the Germans had recognized the Don Cossack *ataman* General Krasnov as head of a separate state. In the north the *ataman* was fighting the Bolsheviks, while on the south he was collaborating with the Volunteer Army in process of formation by General Denikin, who was the favoured protégé of the Entente Powers as the allies of Imperial Russia. Skoropadsky, notwithstanding his dependence on the Germans and the German anxiety to conciliate the Soviet

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Government, managed, with the connivance of German officers, to send some support in men and supplies to Krasnov and, through him, to Denikin. 727

As the summer advanced a serious deterioration took place in conditions in the Ukraine. The German and Austrian troops, weary of the war and in continuous contact with the anarchic and revolutionary incidents of the countryside, were becoming demoralized. After the German disasters on the Western Front at the beginning of August, their mood became mutinous, although it was not until October that open disorders broke out among the German troops in Kharkov, when certain battalions refused transfer to the Western Front.

The German official source (*Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*), published in 1936 with a Preface by Generals Blomberg and von Beck, describes the gradual demoralization of the Occupation troops in the Ukraine. The police functions which fell to the lot of the German troops undermined their morale in the existing situation. Too great temptations existed for soldiers employed in the collection of supplies. 'Illegal commerce and speculation flourished, and it was exceedingly difficult for the military authorities to prevent this on account of the troops being scattered over a vast territory and on account of the necessity of maintaining innumerable small posts. The conduct of isolated German detachments destroyed the prestige of the Occupation troops in the eyes of the local population. Even the authorized trading, the object of which was the despatch of parcels of food to their homes, brought the soldiers into undesirable contact with the population—especially with Jews who had most of this commerce in their hands. Jews were frequently the transmitters of Bolshevik propaganda' (*Rückführung*, pp. 5–6).

The same source gives a gloomy description of the Hetman's Government: 'Unfortunately Hetman Skoropadsky ruled in the Ukraine only with the support of German bayonets. His Government had neither the required authority nor the energy to take drastic measures for restoring law and order in the country. The majority of the population distrusted him on account of his monarchical and pro-Russian tendencies and on account of his support of important landowners. That population stood either for a Republic and friendship with the Entente or simply for the Bolsheviks. The peasants were clamouring most of all for a solution of the agrarian problem, the decision of which the Hetman's Government could not take upon itself. To judge by the beginning made, it was scarcely possible to form a Hetman's army. There were too many officers and too few soldiers—especially too few of those soldiers who later turned out trustworthy' (*ibid.* pp. 8–9). 642

642 727 Already in the month of April, before the *Rada* fell, peasant risings had flared up in the Governments of Kiev and Poltava in answer to German expeditions in search of supplies. Under Skoropadsky the execution of Eichhorn's Order was carried through in a firmer fashion—with the aid of German detachments; but it was accompanied with extremely dangerous moral consequences, not only for the Occupation troops but also for the Ukrainian Government. In many cases landowners applied to the Hetman for the re-establishment of their rights of property or for the restoration of order in their localities, but the Hetman, who had no trusty police force nor army of his own, had to ask the Occupation authorities for the aid of their troops. This was not refused, since the interest of the landowners coincided with that of the German Command. Among the peasants were many ex-soldiers who had left the Front, but who had taken their rifles with them. Shots were fired sometimes, and harsh reprisals followed on the spot, or at least arrests and military tribunals. There is nothing more perilous for any Government than 'to enforce order' with the aid of foreign soldiers. After two or three months the rural population, including the more prosperous peasants, were unanimous in their hatred of the Hetman and the Germans. Attacks on small German posts guarding railway stations, bridges and depots became more frequent. German soldiers disappeared through shots fired round a corner or the sudden thrust of a knife. These incidents caused fear and anger among the German soldiers—not so much against the local inhabitants as against their own commanders. The Hetman's Government contributed to the 'revolutionizing' of the Ukraine and, indirectly, to that of the Army of Occupation. (6)

727 Eichhorn and Skoropadsky were criticized in some Austro-German circles. The Austrians were displeased in part that a Russian general and not an Austrian Archduke should have been put at the head of the Ukrainian realm. They were also suspicious of ultimate German designs on the Ukraine, since they considered that this territory should properly be regarded as within the sphere of Habsburg policy. On 13 June General Waldstetter wrote in a secret report to Vienna that 'Germany pursues in the Ukraine definite economic and political objectives. She wants to keep for ever a safe way open to Mesopotamia and Arabia through Baku and Persia. The way to the East goes through Kiev, Ekaterinoslav and Sevastopol and from there by sea to Batum and Trebizond.' Somewhat later the Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Occupation troops, General Kraus, reported to his Government: 'On the one hand the German Command is consciously upholding the Mon-

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archical movement, and on the other hand the German Minister Resident Mumm is doing all he can to democratize the Ukraine. On the whole they want to isolate from us both the conservative and left elements and enforce their own influence.' In his turn Mumm complained of the Austrians to Berlin: 'They are trying to secure the complete independence from the Kiev Government of that part of the Ukraine which is occupied by Austro-Hungarian troops.' 727

It is difficult to ascertain what in reality were the German plans for the future of the Ukraine during the summer of 1918. The High Command did not look very far ahead and believed with justice that the future of the Ukraine was being decided on the battlefields of France. When, in August, Lüdendorff ceased to believe in ultimate victory, he lost all interest in the Ukraine. Of course in those circles whose function it was to study the political and economic problems of the war (typical of which was the noted economist Dr Rohrbach who had been in Kiev) were discussed those theories which linked the destinies of the Ukraine 'for ever' with Germany. The Emperor William, in his missive to the *ataman* of the Don Cossacks, General Krasnov, expressed his own views on the future of Russia, which was to be divided into four independent states—'the Ukraine', 'the South-Eastern Union', 'Central Russia' and 'Siberia'. These views, by the way, were very far from what the patriotic advocates of a 'Russia one and indivisible' were at that time hoping for from the German Emperor.

In September the Emperor received the Hetman at his Headquarters in Spa with all the honours due to 'the head of an independent state'. The visit, however, did not contribute to raise the prestige of Skoropadsky.

Eichhorn, Skoropadsky and Mumm were also criticized by General Hoffmann and Dr Rohrbach. In their opinion, the policy of Eichhorn, supported by Lüdendorff, was pushing the Ukraine back into the arms of Russia. These critics, however, failed to take notice of the more evident danger of the presence in Kiev of a Soviet delegation, with Rakovski or Manuilsky at its head, which had appeared on the pretext of concluding the peace negotiations between the Soviets and the Hetman's Government. Professor Mohilansky writes in his memoirs (*Archives of the Russian Revolution*, vol. XI) that the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior 'possessed numerous documents which testified with absolute certainty that the Bolshevik delegation in Kiev was spreading Bolshevik propaganda in the Ukraine and spent millions in organizing railway strikes and armed revolts. At the beginning of September the Minister of the Interior made a report to the Council of Ministers to the effect that

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727 the Germans put obstacles in his way when the question came to arresting Bolsheviks well known for their activities and even demanded that he should set at liberty those who were under arrest.'

The assassination of Field-Marshal Eichhorn by a Ukrainian terrorist on 30 July failed to sting the Germans into modifying the cautious and even conciliatory policy which they had adopted towards the Soviets. At the same time the Field-Marshal's successor, General Kirchbach, lacked his personal influence and had not the prestige necessary to counter the doubtful intrigues of Baron Mumm. The latter continued to have relations (directly or through the German Consulate) with the representatives of the *Rada*. He insisted that the Hetman's Government should set at liberty Simon Petlyura and other politicians who had been arrested. (7)

727 668 Intently watching and stimulating the growing unpopularity of the Hetman among the peasantry, the representatives of the Ukrainian Socialist parties organized themselves in the 'National Union', to the head of which Vinnichenko was elected. When this had been done, the Union, acting through the German authorities, began to try to secure the admission of some of their members to participation in the Government. Baron Mumm evidently very much doubted the solidity of Skoropadsky's position. At last the German Foreign Office, convinced by his reports, sent Mumm, on 10 October, categorical instructions to support 'the National Ukrainian Movement' and to 'ukrainize' the Government.

727 668 In October, however, it was plainly evident that the Austro-German Occupation could not endure for many weeks. In that month tempestuous national risings broke out in different parts of the Habsburg Monarchy and the ancient Danubian Empire appeared to be on the verge of dissolution. When the news reached the Austro-Hungarian troops in the Ukraine an irresistible movement swept the ranks for immediate return to their own country. The official German source describes how at the beginning of November disorderly crowds of Austrian soldiers in trains and on foot were going west selling their arms and munitions to the local population. 'A regiment consisting of Italians arrested the Commander and Staff of its Army Corps and declared them to be prisoners of war.' The Germans hastily sent the 7th Landwehr (Württemberg) Division to Odessa in order to clear the town of mutinous Austrian soldiers.

But the officers of the German Army of Occupation did not have to wait long to drain their own cup of bitterness. On 9 November came the news by radio that the Emperor William had abdicated; on the next day that Ebert had formed a Government and that the

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soldiers were electing Soviets; and on the 11th that an armistice had been signed on the Western Front. 727 668

The question of the evacuation of the German troops immediately arose and it was clear that this would present enormous difficulties. Lvov was seized by Galician Ukrainians; Lublin and Warsaw by the Poles: neither were willing to let troop trains through. From Kiev only one line of railway remained: Kovel-Brest-Litovsk-Belostok.

The news of the crash of the German Front in the West and of the impending evacuation of the Ukraine by the Germans was naturally the signal for a Ukrainian movement directed against the Hetman's Government. On 20 November, during street riots in Kiev, twenty people were killed. A whole Ukrainian Division declared itself against the Hetman and began to march from Konotop on Kiev; it was stopped by German troops. Large bands of 'Reds' appeared near Kharkov. New Russia was swarming with brigands who had armed themselves with what the Austrians had left behind. This was only the beginning.

The principal politicians of the 'National Union' were also on the alert and each of them acted according to his disposition. Vinnichenko formed a 'Directoria' of five members from the different Ukrainian Socialist parties, while Petlyura hastened to Belaya Tserkov, where he easily raised a mutiny against the Hetman in the crack regiment which had been christened with the romantic name of 'The Zaporogian Sech Rifles' and which had been recruited largely out of the Russian war prisoners from Rastatt who had been given the 'special education in the Ukrainian spirit'.

§ 4. *DIE RÜCKFÜHRUNG DES OSTHEERES*

Between Petlyura and Vinnichenko dissensions immediately arose not only on questions of principle: they were personal enemies. Vinnichenko wanted the Ukraine to be proclaimed a 'State of Workers and Peasants', but not subject to Moscow. Petlyura turned out to be a politician of a more practical turn of mind: he understood well enough that it would not be long before the Moscow Soviets would swallow up Vinnichenko's Ukraine. He also understood that it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to conciliate the sympathy and interest of the Entente powers if the Ukrainian nationalists were to gain sufficient time to establish any sort of stable régime. Petlyura was not a bad organizer and his firmness made him popular with the soldiers. Therefore he was the master of the situation. 642

Partly in consequence of Petlyura's 'Universal' and partly in response to Vinnichenko's proclamations which were plastered all over 669

669 the Ukraine—even in the streets of the Hetman's capital, but most of all because of the peasants' overwhelming desire 'to get rid of the Germans', armed groups and detachments appeared everywhere. These bodies paid no particular heed to the self-appropriated authority of the 'Directoria' but obeyed their improvised *atamans* and 'colonels'.

642 Skoropadsky could not help realizing that his position had suddenly become desperate. His cabinet was powerless in every respect, and the last hope that remained was to get into touch with the victors in the war through the leaders of the 'White' Volunteer Army to which they were according their support. General Denikin had already issued an Order to the Volunteer Army in which he proclaimed that he assumed command 'of all the forces in the South of Russia'. This Order of course was intended to apply to 'the armed forces' in the Crimea and the Ukraine, and it was inferred that the thousands of Russian officers in Kiev and Odessa were now under the command of General Denikin's unofficial representative in Kiev, General Lomnovski. A 'South Russian Centre' consisting of several conservative professors and fugitive politicians who were all hoping and working for a united Russia was set up in Kiev. The trouble was, however, that neither the officers nor the politicians were able to protect the Hetman against the rising anger of the armed peasantry. The Volunteer Army was far away in Rostov-on-Don and the northern Caucasus and the Allied forces in Roumania were no nearer to the scared remnants of Skoropadsky's class régime in Kiev. In Odessa, it is true, the French Consul Hainnot soon made his appearance as the representative of the victorious Entente. He came in touch with Prince Dolgoruki, the Commander-in-Chief of the Hetman's troops, and promised him the speedy intervention of French forces in the Ukraine. At the same time Hainnot warned the German Command in Kiev that any leniency on their part towards the mutinous Ukrainian elements, 'especially any sort of agreement with them, would not be tolerated'. Hainnot went on to threaten the Germans with reprisals 'should any arms or munitions be given to the Ukrainians or if Kiev were surrendered to them' (*Rückführung*, p. 40). The French Consul, however, had no force at his disposal, and his promises and threats were made on his own initiative and on the advice of his Russian friends rather than as the result of instructions from his Government.

Skoropadsky and all the Russians in Kiev found themselves, as before, defended only by German bayonets. To make the situation still more paradoxical these German bayonets were now as a matter of fact at the disposal of the German 'Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies'

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which had been set up in Kiev and which openly sympathized with the Bolsheviks. Finally, on 28 November 1918, Skoropadsky, gambling on Hainnot's promises and on the understanding between the Entente and the Volunteer Army, issued a proclamation in which he declared the Ukraine to be a part of 'the great Russian realm'. He was too late to save either himself or the conservative interest in Kiev. 642

Ukrainian detachments were approaching Kiev from all sides. As early as 15–20 November all sorts of *atamans* and 'colonels' had occupied Kharkov and Poltava and even Rovno to the west of Kiev. On 19 November remnants of the army which remained loyal to the Hetman were defeated at Vasilkov by the 'Petlyurians'. Kiev would have been taken if the Germans had not been ready to defend it. 669 727

Notwithstanding the almost complete collapse of discipline among the troops of the German Occupation, some grounds for collaboration had been found between the Soldiers' Soviets and the Command. 'Only one impulse reigned among the troops, every soldier had only one thought: "Home! Home! Home!—at any price!"' (*Rückführung*, p. 40). The winter had set in, snow had fallen and the horrors of Napoleon's retreat haunted the minds of the Germans. The officers had little difficulty in persuading the men that it was necessary to hold Kiev for the time being as a centre from which the evacuation could be organized.

But the defence of Kiev and other large towns and important railway junctions by the Germans was interpreted by the population as a continued support of the Hetman. By spreading its propaganda against Skoropadsky the 'Directoria' was exciting the people against the Germans; in fact the association and exploitation of the two hatreds secured the maximum number of adherents for Petlyura. The peasants had many accounts to settle with the Germans, while considerations of a material order were eloquent enough. The rumour circulated that the Germans who were leaving the Ukraine were taking away with them a lot of money and great quantities of goods. There was an overwhelming desire not to allow them to do this and to take away from them all that they had appropriated. A logical development of this train of thought was the decision to deprive the Germans of their weapons and munitions: their artillery and machine-guns, rifles, lorries, carts, horses—and finally even their warm clothing and their money.

Attacks on railway stations began in many districts with the object of preventing the evacuation of the German troops. The German Command soon realized that under such conditions it had become an utter impossibility to organize the evacuation even along the lines

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669 which were still available after the events in Poland: Kiev-Kovel-
727 Brest-Litovsk (for the 20th Army Corps and the 22nd and 27th Reserve Corps); and Bakhmach-Pinsk-Brest-Litovsk (for the 1st Army Corps and the 41st Reserve Corps). It became an absolute necessity to come to an agreement with Petlyura, and such an agreement was concluded on 2 December in Kiev. An 'armistice' was arranged during the duration of which the 'Directoria' undertook to make itself responsible for the organization of transport facilities. But with all the goodwill in the world Petlyura and the members of the 'Directoria' were able to give little real assistance in that direction —and that little only in the immediate neighbourhood of Kiev. In other parts of the Ukraine the struggle against the retreating Germans continued to assume more and more violent forms. In Kharkov *ataman* Barbashev and his staff had to be arrested before the Germans could board the promised train. At the important junctions of Bakhmach and Kasatin, the gangs in control continued to refuse to allow trains to pass through *en route* for Kovel and Homel. 'It was simply by a miracle that, up to 12 December, we succeeded in despatching 126 trains' (*Rückführung*). By this time skirmishes between German detachments and the local population had spread all over the Ukraine.

The numerous Ukrainian bands in Volhynia became a real danger to the Germans. Fighting took place 'with changing luck' in Berdichev, where a Bavarian Brigade beat back successive attacks by strong 'Petlyurian' forces. At the station of Zhmerinka the 'Petlyurians' defeated two Landwehr cavalry regiments with a loss of more than 200 killed and wounded. The disorganized Germans were disarmed and driven away from the railway line in the direction of the Galician frontier. On 7–8 December hot encounters took place for the stations of Sarny, Iskorost and Birzula. The Germans took several thousands of prisoners, but it was difficult to know what to do with them for, if set free, they would join new bands and reappear in a few days.

On 6 December *pourparlers* with Petlyura were renewed, and on the 11th, at the station of Kasatin, a definite agreement was concluded. Petlyura insisted with some reason that if his troops were to obey him it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to return to its capital —Kiev. A peaceful continuation of the German evacuation could only be procured by the immediate surrender of Kiev to the Ukrainians.

642 The first consequence of the Kasatin Agreement was the resignation of the Hetman and his Government. On 14 December, after a short affair with the remaining troops of the Hetman, the ragged

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bands of the 'Directoria' under the command of Colonel Konovalets entered Kiev. In their wake, on the 19th, arrived the 'Directoria' with Petlyura and Vinnichenko at its head. 642

During the Kasatin *pourparlers* the German Command had considered it a question of honour to stipulate that the Russian officers and men who were serving the Hetman should be allowed to go free after surrendering their arms. This condition was only partly kept. Some officers, among them General Count Keller, who had tried to organize resistance in the town itself, were shot on the spot. Another five hundred officers were arrested and kept prisoners in the Kiev Museum. Later they were divided into groups and distributed among different prisons; a number of them, under pretext that they had tried to escape, faced firing squads; after 29 December those who remained alive were sent off to Germany (*Rückführung*, p. 52). 669 727

The surrender of Kiev resulted in a change for the better in the conditions of the German evacuation. The Germans had to accept certain limitations on the disposal of military stores: the troops were allowed to take with them only machine-guns for one company in every regiment; guns for three batteries in every artillery regiment, etc. The balance had to be 'delivered to the Ukrainian Army'.

By the end of December the Command of the former *Heeresgruppe Kiev* had migrated first to Kovel and then to Brest-Litovsk. The evacuation was proceeding almost normally, although in some localities the troop trains were attacked and disarmed, and often the Germans could only secure uninterrupted passage by the payment of large sums of money. By the middle of January the bulk of the Army of Occupation had quitted the territory of the Ukraine, and was concentrated in the railway triangle: Brest-Litovsk-Pinsk-Kovel. But troops in left-bank Ukraine were still having a difficult time because the Bolsheviks had appeared there as rivals to the 'Directoria'.

On 9 November, when the first news arrived of the German Revolution, Lenin had denounced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. As a result, both the Ukraine of the Hetman and the Ukraine of the 'Directoria' found themselves in a state of war with the Soviets. The Bolsheviks had adherents enough in left-bank Ukraine and the industrial centres of New Russia: already in November they tried to take Poltava; at Ekaterinoslav, after the Austrians left, the Red Republic was proclaimed; and Soviets were set up in the mining towns of the Donets upon the departure of the Germans. At Kharkov the Staff of the 1st Army Corps and a certain number of German troops remained, but these could not protect the officials of the 'Directoria' when, on 3 January 1919, 8000 armed 'Reds' entered the city. The Germans in Kharkov found themselves in a parlous

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position, since they could no longer move westward owing to the state of war between the Soviets and the Ukrainians which existed all along the railway lines. There was talk about taking a south-easterly direction and going to the Don Cossacks. At last the Soviets gave permission for the Germans to go by a round-about way passing through Kursk, Orel, Polotsk. The Soviet authorities and the population of the 'Red' towns through which the Germans passed inundated the homing soldiers with propaganda and plagued them with organized 'fraternizing'. The morale of these men suffered far more than had that of their fellows from the anarchic attacks of the 'Petlyurians', and the dissolution of discipline and general demoralization reached a pitch unknown among the troops who had had to fight their way out through hundreds of miles of hostile country.

§5. ANARCHY IN THE UKRAINE: SIMON PETLYURA AND 'BATKO' MAKHNO

Having entered Kiev on 19 December, the 'Directoria' did not enjoy its triumph for long. Just as a year before in the anxious but not unprofitable days of Brest-Litovsk, 'Red' forces were moving on the Ukrainian capital. They were converging from three directions: through Konotop, through Poltava, and along the right bank of the Dniepr. At the same time the Poles—the most ancient enemies of Ukrainian nationality—with their own independence scarcely two months old were threatening all the western provinces.

Early in December an armed conflict had broken out between the Galician Ukrainians who wished to exercise the widely proclaimed right of self-determination and the Poles who looked upon Galicia as 'historically a Polish province'. The Poles had possessed themselves of the district of Kholm, promised once upon a time at Brest-Litovsk to the Ukrainians, and they were taking advantage of the opportunity of broadening its boundaries by infringing on the territory of the former Russian Government of Volhynia. Polish detachments had encounters, towards the middle of January, in the neighbourhood of Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynsk with 'Petlyurian' bands who until then had been more agreeably employed in holding up returning German troop-trains.

During the same weeks the 'Western Ukrainian Republic', proclaimed two months earlier in Lvov, got into a very critical position. The relatively weak Polish forces, collected in former Russian Poland after the Armistice, had now been reinforced by the highly trained and excellently disciplined army of General Haller

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formed in France out of prisoners of war who had been captured or 669
who had deserted from the German and Austrian Armies. The 727
armed forces at the disposal of the Polish Government now amounted to some 80,000 men. The whole of Galicia was occupied without much resistance, and after some street fighting the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' was driven out of Lvov.

The fugitive Government of this 'Republic' sought the aid of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic', and on 23 January the 'Directoria' proclaimed in solemn session 'the union' of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' with the Ukraine. But on the evening of the same day the first mounted patrols of Antonov-Ovseenko entered Kiev. The 'Directoria' surrendered its capital without a struggle and fled to Vinnitsa. This body, on which so much eloquence had been expended and which had shown always such little capacity, now went completely to pieces. When it left Vinnitsa and established itself in Rovno until the arrival of the Bolsheviks there in April, Vinnichenko used to say jokingly: 'The Directoria is a railway carriage and under that carriage is all its territory!' Petlyura, however, went to Kamenets-Podolsk, and at this point on the former Russian frontier the remnants of the Galician troops of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' concentrated after their expulsion from Lvov.

The commanders of the Bolshevik forces did not take much interest in them, since at that time they were occupied in trying to gain possession of the ports along the Black Sea coast.

An extraordinary medley of events had been taking place in Odessa. The 7th German Landwehr Division, sent there in November to take over from the absconding Austrians, was duly cut off from Kiev and found that it could not fight its way through the swarms of 'Petlyurians' who were occupying the station of Birzula. Marching was out of the question owing to the snow-storms and the horrible state of the roads. British and French warships appeared in the harbour rather later in the month, but without disembarking any troops. Encouraged by their presence, the numerous Russian and Polish ex-officers in the city formed national detachments; but on 11 December important Ukrainian forces appeared in the suburbs. The Russian and Polish detachments took refuge in the port under the protection of the Allied naval guns. A week later transports arrived and landed a corps of French troops under General Borius. Hot street fighting began, and the French, with the Russians and Poles, drove the 'Petlyurians' out of the city.

Meantime the Germans were trying to remain strictly neutral. During the previous week the bulk of the Landwehr Division had

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669 succeeded in getting away, but there still remained in Odessa
727 about 1600 German troops and a battery of field artillery. The 15th Landwehr Division in Nikolaev was in the same position: it too was cut off from communication with the German Command in Kiev.

French troops were now quartered in Odessa as well as all sorts of national volunteer formations—Russian, Polish and even Roumanian. Greek troops had disembarked at Kherson. The command was vested in the French General d'Anselm, who proceeded to entrust the 15th German Landwehr Division with the maintenance of law and order in Nikolaev.

'Petlyurian' troops and all sorts of *atamans*' detachments and brigand bands had cut off the cities of the coast from the rest of the Ukraine. After the flight of the 'Directoria' from Kiev, the 'Petlyurian' Colonel Grigoriev, who had gone over to the Bolsheviks, became for a time the dominant figure in that strange hinterland of anarchy. In the second half of February all the attempts of the French and the Volunteers to drive away Grigoriev's men from the immediate vicinity of Odessa and to enlarge the zone of occupation ended in failure. During the fighting at Berezovka the French soldiers of the 156th Division showed very little taste for a conflict which they did not understand. Seven tanks which had got stuck in the New Russian mud were left on the battlefield.

This event lent courage to Grigoriev's Bolsheviks, who on 3–5 March made an attempt to attack Nikolaev and Kherson, but were beaten back by a German armoured train. On 9 March Kherson was again attacked by 'Red' forces; the Greek troops in occupation hastened to evacuate the town and embark in their ships and Kherson fell to the Soviets. On 10 March began the evacuation by sea of the 7th Landwehr Division from Odessa and of the 15th Landwehr Division from Nikolaev. In the latter city the bands of Grigoriev entered the burning suburbs while the Germans were still embarking. No one knew what fate would befall Odessa, but on 2 April General d'Anselm received orders from Paris to evacuate. *Ataman* Grigoriev then 'took Odessa'. His troops did not amount to more than 2000 men. An enormous booty of military stores fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

669 These easy triumphs in the ports of the Black Sea did not consolidate the position of the Soviets, which was becoming really critical during the months of May and June 1919. It is true that beyond the Volga the imprudent advance during the spring of Admiral Kolchak's Siberian troops had ended in the defeat of the 'White' forces; at the same time, however, the Volunteer Army

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of General Denikin had occupied the Donets coalfields and was 669
nearing Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov, while General Wrangel was advancing into the Volga basin from the northern Caucasus and on 30 June entered Tsaritsyn.

The Poles were taking advantage of the Russian Civil War by advancing into White Russia and Volhynia where, since April, they had been fighting with Bolshevik detachments which had been sent into the western Governments after the capture of Kiev from the 'Petlyurians'. Petlyura, also, had not exhausted his resources: his retreat into Podolia only served to renew his potentialities. At Kamenets-Podolsk, Petrushevich, 'the Dictator of Eastern Galicia', under pressure from the Poles, gave over the command of his own forces to Petlyura, and the latter now found himself at the head of about 40,000 men, of which some half were ex-soldiers of the old Austrian Army who had either come from Galicia or who were returning there from captivity in Russia. Among these former soldiers of Austria was a considerable number of officers, who were an important factor, since Petlyura's own men consisted only of armed peasants. Owing to the complete ruin of these lands and the impossibility of finding peaceful employment, service even in Petlyura's army had become a profession which at least procured food from day to day. Petlyura's troops were well armed out of the military stores which the Germans had abandoned or of which they had been deprived.

Some fighting with the Bolsheviks took place along the railway line Zhmerinka-Birzula, but what made the 'Petlyurian' campaign for ever memorable in Podolia was the extent and cruelty of their pogroms against the Jewish population. Pogroms began in January during the retreat of the 'Petlyurians' from the Kiev region when a particularly brutal slaughter took place at Belaya Tserkov. They continued in Podolia throughout the months of February, March and April, and what was probably the greatest pogrom of all time was enacted in the frontier town of Proskurov. The killings somewhat abated when the more disciplined Galician ex-soldiers became numerous in Petlyura's ranks.

All the combatants in the Civil War of 1919 took part in Jewish [563]
pogroms—the bands of the 'free' *atamans*, the 'Petlyurians', the 'White' Volunteers, the Bolsheviks and the Poles, but the 'Petlyurians' undoubtedly distinguished themselves most in this direction. According to official Jewish sources (*Ostjüdische Archiven*, Berlin) the 'Petlyurians' killed off 17,000 persons; the 'free' *atamans* 8000; the Volunteer Armies are accused of having 5000 to their score; the Soviet troops 1000; and the Polish Army several hundreds (Autumn

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669 1917—April 1921). The 'Petlyurians' also occupy first place for the number of organized pogroms—493, or together with the 'free' *atamans*—852; the Volunteers follow with 233; the Soviets with 106; and the Poles with 32. How far Petlyura himself was guilty in the organization of these pogroms it is difficult to say. Arnold Margolin, himself a Jew, relates that Petlyura was extremely depressed by pogroms, and 'with tears in his eyes implored his men not to commit them'. But to persuade these 'last of the *Haydamaky*' to any moderation was no easy task.

648 668 Petlyura can scarcely be accused of having seriously favoured pogroms as part of a considered policy, since both he and the 'Directoria' were making every effort to attract the favourable attention of the representatives of the victorious Entente powers. Immediately after the Armistice a report had been addressed to Consul Hainnot, which was subsequently forwarded to General d'Anselm in Odessa and to General Berthelot, who was at that time in Jassy. This report was intended to establish the fact that the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' was a quite normal, strictly democratic, and independent state. Although the French did not hesitate to drive away the detachments of the 'Directoria' by force of arms from the vicinity of Odessa, in January 1919 they went so far as to send a representative to Kiev in the person of General Tabouis. The British, at the same time, contented themselves with the despatch to Kiev of a member of the Consular Service. Altogether the impression gained ground in Kiev that the Ukraine had been reserved as a zone of French interest, while the British were more concerned with the Caucasian area and with the Volunteer Army.

The 'Directoria' viewed the question of its representation at the Paris Peace Conference as a matter of particular importance. A Delegation was hastily formed which included the 'Western Ukrainians' of Galicia with the engineer Sidorenko at their head; the 'Directoria' was represented by their 'Foreign Minister', A. Shulgin; and the numerous Jewish population of the Ukraine had a spokesman in Arnold Margolin. This Delegation, together with others of Governments which had been formed or which had tried to form themselves out of different parts of the Russian Empire, had not been invited to Paris by anyone and was recognized by no one. The Secretary of the Ukrainian Delegation, I. Borshak, summarizing the results of the work done between January and March 1919, reported to the 'Directoria': 'All asked us for information about the Ukrainian Question, but none gave any positive answer. No one promised to recognize our independence. The usual answer was: "Wait till the Conference discusses the Russian

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Question!" There was talk on general topics—the territory, the numbers of the population, our relation with the Bolsheviks and General Denikin. Official French circles were against the Ukraine. Other states, the U.S.A., England and Japan, were on their guard and were only interested in the means at our disposal for struggling against the Bolsheviks' (I. Borshak, *Ukraine at the Peace Conference*). 648 668

The French were mainly concerned for the interest of Poland and the 'Directoria' undoubtedly made a serious tactical mistake when they involved the fate of Galicia with that of the Russian Ukraine. Furthermore, so soon after the recent hard struggle with Germany, the representatives of the Allies were not inclined to regard with favour envoys from the *de facto* succession states of the Russian Empire the Governments of which had owed their origin to German diplomacy and German bayonets.

Another member of the Ukrainian Delegation, Arnold Margolin, complains of 'the influence of Russians' who, from the monarchist groups to radical leaders like Kerenski, Avksentiev and Chaykovski, were all united in the belief that Russia 'one and indivisible' would be resuscitated. Margolin proposed that all 'the oppressed nationalities of the former Empire—not only Ukrainians, but also Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, the Cossacks of the Don and the Kuban, the Mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus and the White Russians adjoining the Polish provinces—should be invited to the Conference'. But when Margolin obtained an interview with Lansing, the latter told him frankly that 'he knew only one Russia which might perhaps become a federative state after she had got rid of the Bolsheviks'. Margolin betook himself to England, but there he found that people were only interested in the successes of the 'White' Armies of Denikin and Kolchak and believed in their ultimate victory. After having failed to raise interest in the fate of the 'oppressed nationalities' of the Russian Empire, Margolin broached the question of the fate of the Jews, but here too he found that people were not interested. In 1919 it was well remembered that the Jewish population of Poland and the Ukraine had been on the side of the Germans and that German Jews had taken upon themselves the role of intermediaries between the German High Command and the Bolsheviks.

The only practical result of the 'diplomatic relations' between France and the 'Directoria' was a categorical demand on the part of the French that Vinnichenko and another minister, Shakhovsky, should retire—because they were suspected of 'Bolshevism'.

The representatives of the Entente powers appear to have made every effort to unite all the forces which were struggling against

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648 668 the Soviets, but they had no easy task. The Volunteer Army regarded the 'Petlyurians' with scarcely less distaste than it did the Bolsheviks, while the 'Directoria' considered the 'White' movement to be monarchical and reactionary, and the Ukrainian nationalists aimed at separation rather than at federalism. The relation between the Volunteer Army and the Poles was outwardly correct, but each grudged the other success in their 'common struggle' against the Soviets. The Russians were nervous about the Polish campaign in White Russia and Volhynia; the Poles feared the resurrection of a great Russia. The Poles went so far as to hold their advance against the Red Army when this advance could have dealt a decisive blow to the Soviets at the moment of Denikin's greatest success. These dissensions, which were natural enough, in the end allowed the Bolsheviks to extricate themselves from a position which, as Trotsky relates in his memoirs, Lenin at that time regarded as hopeless.

669 In July the Volunteer Army occupied Ekaterinoslav; then Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa; and on the 3rd Kharkov had been taken after some fighting. Regardless of General Wrangel's proposal to halt on the line Tsaritsyn-Ekaterinoslav and to put some order into the disorganized rear, Denikin pressed the advance in a northerly direction towards Moscow and westward on Kiev. As a result his none too numerous forces were widely scattered over an enormous territory.

669 648 648 At the same time Petlyura had begun his advance on Kiev from the west, and this circumstance was one of the reasons for the false manœuvre undertaken by the Volunteer Army. In the end the Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' came up to Kiev at the same time, and the ancient city was taken on 1 September, from the east by the 'Whites' and from the south by the Ukrainians. No good could be expected to result from this simultaneous but separate occupation of Kiev by the rival armies. *Pourparlers* did not result in an agreement. It only became clear that the Galicians were ready to come to an understanding with the 'Whites', but the 'Directoria' was jealous, and stubborn. Petlyura demanded complete independence and vast territories. In his blind hate of 'the Russian monarchists and reactionaries' he secretly appealed for help to the Poles. When in the second half of September armed conflicts between the Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' broke out and the latter were driven out of Kiev towards the west, rumours of Petlyura's negotiations with the Poles set the Galician regiments against him. On 7 November the Galicians, tired of the lack of discipline and inefficiency rife among the 'Petlyurians', decided to desert their leader and to go over to the

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Volunteers in order to continue a joint struggle against the Bolsheviks and, if need be, against the Poles. 669 648

The remnants of the 'Petlyurians' went off into Podolia, where they renewed their brutal pogroms against the Jews. During the latter part of November and December they were decimated by a serious epidemic of black typhus which overtook them in the neighbourhood of Zhmerinka. 642

Having lost his army and almost alone, Petlyura betook himself to the Polish lines, where on 2 December he put his hand to a secret agreement, in the name of the 'Directoria', whereby he abandoned all claims on Galicia and 'recognized' Polish rule over Kholm, Polesia and Western Podolia—regions which were already in occupation of the Polish Army. On 24 December the 'Directoria' ceased to exist and gave over its phantom authority to a 'cabinet' formed by one Isaac Mazeppa, an ex-employee of the Union of Zemstvos.

In the meantime catastrophe had overtaken the Volunteer Army. 669 Having occupied Kiev and Chernigov during September, the 'Whites' had reached Kursk and even Orel by the end of October. Their line was now dangerously extended and the advance succumbed to a sudden flanking attack delivered to the north of Kharkov. A serious defeat at Kromy to the south-west of Orel forced them out of the whole area between Kursk and Kharkov. Their collapse was now even more rapid than their progress had been. Kiev was evacuated, and within a few weeks all the Ukraine, in circumstances which grew more perilous every day.

The Volunteer Army had never been popular among the peasantry. During the preceding three years the peasants had lived through an evil nightmare of change and upheaval. They distrusted 'the officers' army' and suspected it, not without reason, of being the instrument whereby 'the former order' would be restored. In many cases the officials hastily appointed by General Denikin had contributed to this distrust by an ill-considered restoration of the rights of property in districts which they had been sent to administer. Though the peasant had never found any benefit from 'the new order' he was stubbornly opposed to a return to 'the old ways'. This frame of mind was the principal cause of the chaos which reigned in the rear of the White Army and it was more conducive to the catastrophe of the autumn of 1919 than either the unfortunate strategy of General Denikin or the superior abilities of the Red Army chiefs.

'The struggle which in 1919 drenched the Ukraine in blood recalled by its cruelties the Cossack risings of the seventeenth

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century. Thousands of peaceful citizens, principally landowners, Jews and German colonists, were ruthlessly put to death by "Petlyurians" and *atamans*. In their turn the Soviet authorities revenged themselves in the towns and villages on the hostages taken by the Bolsheviks and ordered mass executions of the bourgeoisie, intelligentsia and priests. The "Whites", too, had introduced the custom of hanging Communists' (Brégy and Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, p. 211).

The ultimate expression of rural anarchy during this grim period were the bands of armed peasants which roamed the country, slaughtering, looting and burning. Some of these bands called themselves 'Petlyurians', but most of them were acting on their own risk and peril. The *ataman* or *batko* ('father') was the head of a band consisting of several scores or several hundreds or even several thousands of armed men. The *batky* ruthlessly warred against any kind of authority, and their operations harmed the White Army most. The presence of this evil alone ought to have restrained the Volunteers from advancing too rapidly north, for as the area of occupation expanded and as little attempt was made to provide for adequate administration and policing, the number of the bands grew. Scores of important gangs were engaged in committing every kind of atrocity wherever they went. Zeleny devastated the Governments of Kiev and Poltava; Angel, Poltava and Chernigov; Grigoriev chose the lower course of the Dniepr; Tyutyunnyk, the region of Cherkassy; Struk and Sokolovsky, southern Polesia; and the famous Makhno became the terror of the whole of New Russia. Some of these fellows pretended to some kind of ideology: they were adherents of 'Communism without Jews' or, like Makhno, 'Anarchists'. These 'brigands with a social background' had some remote likeness to the *Haydamaky* of the eighteenth century, but then the *Haydamaky* in their own peculiar way had faith; they put religion before everything, and 'sought justice', not only social justice but also national justice, because they were believers and fought 'for the Ukrainian people oppressed by Polish landlords'.

In the course of the year 1919 *batko* Makhno rendered great services to the Soviets by seriously embarrassing the White Armies during the height of their advance on Moscow. Makhno belonged to what was called the 'half-intelligentsia' of peasant origin and was born in the big village of Gulyay-Pole to the north of Melitopol in New Russia. In 1907 he was exiled to Siberia, where he had to do hard labour for the murder of a policeman. Returning in 1917, owing to the wide amnesty at that time granted to numerous categories of common criminals, he had been cunning enough to

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assume a deep red coloration. Makhno returned to Gulyay-Pole, not as an ex-convict but as an 'anarchist'. The times were not for discussing anarchist theories but rather for applying anarchist practice. Soon the fame of the Gulyay-Pole *ataman* and his feats spread over the steppes between Melitopol and Taganrog. After the Bolshevik *coup d'état* Makhno alternately waged war or made peace with the local Soviets. In the spring of 1919 the Bolsheviks, retreating under the pressure of Denikin's army, had the brilliant idea of providing the *batko* with arms in order that he might harass the advance of the Volunteers.

During the advance on Kharkov the rear of the White Army became a promising field for Makhno's operations. It soon became an urgent necessity to put an end to him. This was done on 5–7 June, when the Caucasian Cossack Division of General Shkuro defeated at Gulyay-Pole great bands of 'Makhnovians'. They scattered but gradually gathered again in August in the neighbourhood of Elizavetgrad. Makhno reappeared as their chief; provided arms which he had secured from Petlyura; gained new recruits, and between 26 September and 7 October undertook his astonishing raid. He moved a distance of 600 kilometres in eleven days, twice defeating detachments of 'Whites' and plundering all the villages and towns which lay on his way. He turned up once more in the vicinity of Gulyay-Pole and thousands of uprooted peasants, deserters and brigands flocked to his standard. He was soon able to take Melitopol, Berdyansk and Mariupol, to make three raids on Ekaterinoslav and even to threaten the Headquarters of General Denikin in Taganrog. Two Army Corps of the Volunteers had to be detached to contain Makhno. The 'Whites', however, did not succeed in putting an end to the 'anarchist *batko*', who proved to possess great talents as a cavalry leader and who even invented 'new steppe-war tactics' (he put all his infantry in peasant carts and transported his machine-guns in wheel-barrows).

The Red Army finally liquidated Makhno's bands in 1920 at the same time as their last campaign against Wrangel in the Crimea. Nestor Makhno himself did not perish, but turned up in Paris, where he learned to earn his livelihood in the peaceful occupation of a cinema studio *figurant*; he died a few years later.

On 20 December 1919 Kiev was evacuated by the Volunteers, and the unfortunate city, about New Year's Day, fell for a third time into the hands of the Soviets. At the end of January the Red Army occupied Nikolaev and Kherson, and on 7 February Odessa fell. A large part of the 'White' forces crossed the border into Roumania and Poland, where they were disarmed.

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Meanwhile Petlyura had not exhausted his resources. He had the skill to persuade Piłsudski that the situation in the Ukraine offered great possibilities for the re-establishment under new conditions of the ancient structure of *Rzecz Pospolita*, which should now spread to the Dniepr and the Black Sea. Petlyura for the moment refrained from raising the issue of left-bank Ukraine, but he persuaded the Polish leader that should he appear at the head of Ukrainian troops in right-bank Ukraine the whole country would rise against the Soviets. To strengthen his influence with the Poles, Petlyura succeeded in forming one Ukrainian Division under the command of Colonel Bezruchko, which was stationed on the confines of Volhynia with the Polish troops who were destined for the campaign.

In the middle of April 1920, when the Red Army was engaged against the Volunteers in the Crimea, Piłsudski concentrated between 50,000 and 60,000 men on the Volhynian border and struck suddenly at Kiev. On 7 May the Poles entered the hapless city on the Dniepr. Petlyura was following in their wake and he fixed his headquarters at Zhitomir from where, with the aid of numerous agents and a flood of proclamations, he hoped 'to mobilize all Ukrainian forces'.

Petlyura's effort was a failure. Not more than 2000 or 3000 needy vagabonds answered the call to arms. The people were utterly weary and exhausted after the events of the last three years, and they fled in terror from any kind of mobilization—'Petlyurian' or Bolshevik. Further, they were not inspired by the appeal to come forward to the aid of the Polish military authorities so suddenly established in their capital.

Piłsudski's adventure in any event had been undertaken six months too late. The Volunteers in the South of Russia were only holding the Crimea, while in the far north General Miller's front had collapsed, and General Yudenich had failed to drive home his attack from Estonia, even though it had reached the suburbs of Petrograd. At the beginning of June the Bolsheviks concentrated considerable forces to the south of Kiev while the new 'Red Mounted Army' numbering 16,000 sabres threatened the long and thinly held line of Polish communications.

On 11 June the Polish retreat began. After some hard fighting in the region of the river Teterev, Colonel Smygly-Rydz succeeded in extricating his army and retreated through Volhynia with heavy losses in men and material. 'The last of the Petlyurians' also left the territory of the Ukraine with numbers greatly reduced—not so much on account of losses in battle as of desertions.

The 'Red Mounted Army' of General Budenny invaded Galicia;

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occupied Lvov, and advanced on Warsaw through Zamość by the same route which the Cossack hordes of Khmelnytsky had followed nearly three centuries before. But the Russians were checked at the gates of Warsaw (15 August), and their subsequent retreat was almost as rapid as their advance and the preceding Polish advance and retreat had been. 721 669

On 12 October an armistice was signed, and in the following year the Peace of Riga was to stabilize conditions on the Russian borderlands for nearly twenty years. Poland retained most of the Ukrainian territory of which she had been in occupation prior to the attack on Kiev—large parts of Volhynia and Polesia as well as about half the area of White Russia. The much disputed Kholm district and all Galicia also remained in Polish hands, although the temporary occupation of these territories had only been authorized by the Paris Conference 'pending the solution of the Russian Question'. As a result of the activities of the tenacious Petlyura and the visionary politicians of the 'Directoria' the Poles received, therefore, about 150,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory and about 5,000,000 Ukrainian-speaking subjects. 728

Simon Petlyura, like so many of the picturesque figures of the Russian Revolution, retired to Paris where, some years later, he was killed by a revolver shot in the Boulevard St Michel. The shot was fired by a young Jew named Schwartzbrod, who stated at his trial that he was taking vengeance on Petlyura for the pogroms committed by the 'Petlyurians'. (8, 9, 10)

§6. THE SOVIETS AND THE GROWTH OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

'The Ukrainian Soviet Republic' had been declared on 18 December 1918 in a proclamation of 'the Military and Revolutionary Committee of the Red Southern Army' signed by Stalin and Rakovski; the proclamation conferred all authority in 'the liberated territory' on 'the Ukrainian workers and the Ukrainian peasants'. On 3 January 1919, the day on which the Red Army entered Kharkov, then still occupied by part of the 1st German Army Corps, a proclamation of 'the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' announced that all authority in the Ukraine was vested in this Committee which had 'the confidence of the working and peasant masses'. This document was signed by the President of the Committee, Manuilsky, and by the following members: Rakovski, Grinko, Zatonsky and Skrypnik. Rakovski was a professional revolutionary, a Bulgarian or Roumanian Jew by origin, 642 669 635

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642 who had always lived in the *Quartier Latin* in Paris; Zatonsky and
669 Skrypnik were the first Ukrainian politicians to go over to the
635 Bolsheviks.

This same Committee, on 14 February, two or three weeks after the occupation of Kiev, announced the federation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with 'the All-Russian Republic of Workers and Peasants'. Subsequently, on 9 March, 'according to the Revolutionary order' 'the First Ukrainian Congress of Soldiers', Peasants' and Workers' Delegates' was called together. This body received for approval 'the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic'. Seven months had not elapsed before nine-tenths of the territory of this first Ukrainian Soviet Republic had fallen into the hands of the Volunteer Army.

In spite of the ephemeral character of the first Ukrainian Soviet Republic it is worth considering the theoretical basis on which this state was founded, since its structure illustrates Lenin's conceptions as to the treatment of nationalities within the Communist State.

656 Following the November *coup d'état* two documents were
563 published in Russia which had an 'ideological' importance in relation to the formation of national republics. The first was a 'Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the Nations Forming Part of Russia'; it concluded as follows:

'According to the Will of the Congress of Soviets, the Council of People's Commissars has decided to adopt as a foundation for its activities in the question of nationalities the following principles:

(1) The equality and sovereign rights of all the nationalities of Russia;

(2) The right of self-determination of all these nationalities, including the right to form independent states;

(3) The abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations;

(4) The free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.'

The document bears the signature of Dzhugashvili-Stalin, Commissar for Nationalities, and of Ulianov-Lenin, President of the Council of People's Commissars.

The second document is a 'Declaration of the Rights of Oppressed Nationalities', dated 24 January 1918 and approved by the 3rd Congress of All-Russian Soviets. The setting up by this Congress of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was based on the following principles: 'Russia is proclaimed the Republic of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. The Soviet Republic is constituted on the basis of a free union of free

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nationalities as a Federation of Soviet National Republics. Striving to create the really free and voluntary union of the working classes of all the nationalities of Russia, the 3rd Congress of Soviets will limit itself to the establishment of the principles only on which the Federation of the Soviet Republics in Russia will be built, allowing the workers and peasants of every nationality to take independent decisions in their own Soviet Congresses as to whether and on what conditions they wish to take part in the Federal Government and other Federal institutions.' 656 563

The Federation, having been accepted by the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee in February 1919, was approved by the 1st Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the following month. It is clear that this declaration remained in force when, after the collapse of the Volunteer movement and the failure of the 'Petlyurians', the Soviets were restored in the Ukraine. And it is a notable fact that, notwithstanding the considerable changes in the constitution of U.S.S.R. which were introduced between the years 1920 and 1936, the Ukrainians together with the other 'minority nationalities' retained the right, in theory, to opt out of the Union. Only at the 8th Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, summoned to discuss 'the Stalin Constitution' of 1936, were certain limitations (not included in the published texts of the Constitution) introduced by Stalin himself. 'So that the right [of a Republic] to leave the Union shall not be an ephemeral right it is necessary:

(*a*) that the Republic should not be surrounded on all sides by territories of the Soviet Union, but should lie on its boundaries, because in the opposite case it would be impossible for her to leave the Union;

(*b*) that the population of the Republic should not be less than a certain minimum, because in the opposite case she would not be able to defend herself against the attacks of Imperialist beasts of prey;

(*c*) that in the population one nationality should form a compact majority.'

During the years 1921–2 the Ukrainian Soviets were otherwise engaged than in studying constitutional questions. The liquidation of the Volunteer Army in the Crimea and the suppression of the numerous bands of the *atamans* prolonged the period of warfare and the Red Armies terrorized the exhausted countryside. Many towns were becoming deserted, and vast stretches of land were left fallow by a peasantry which had neither the courage nor the security to sow or to reap. Black typhus decimated the destitute population, and in the winter of 1920–21 a serious famine developed which became worse during the spring and summer months. Although the 731

731 conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

656 The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

656 563 669 The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

656 642 The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

668 656 In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

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who had been associated with the *Rada* and the 'Directoria'. Both 668
parties had their reasons for conciliation. So far as the Soviet 656
authorities were concerned the appearance of prominent non-Bolsheviks in the administration enabled them to improve their relations with the peasantry and to convince them that Lenin's New Economic Policy was indeed, in his own words, 'in earnest and for long'. It does not follow that the peasants had ever been particularly enthusiastic for the nationalist ideology of the *Rada* and the 'Directoria'; but the Ukrainian nationalist leaders, owing to their social origins, were nearer to the peasantry than the men at the head of the various Committees of the Communist Party and the Soviet administration. The latter were either 'new-comers' from the north or representatives of the local Jewish 'intelligentsia' or men drawn from the 'proletariat' of industrial centres. They owed their rise generally to their revolutionary services in the streets of the great cities. The former collaborators of Vinnichenko and Petlyura, on the other hand, were either peasants by origin or they belonged to the typically Ukrainian 'half-intelligentsia' of the countryside.

In encouraging these men to work with the Communist Party, the Soviet authorities did not contemplate allowing them to play a part in the political life of the country, and in this respect they kept them under the strictest control. On the other hand, they were allowed wide scope in the field of 'cultural work', because the Bolsheviks understood that these people would interpret 'cultural work' in the form of hasty 'ukrainization' which in its tendency to supplant the remnants of 'the imperial culture' in the Ukraine would serve purposes which the Bolsheviks themselves had in view. 'Ukrainization' was, in the view of the Bolsheviks, a harmless occupation for the active intellectual element in the Ukraine during a difficult period of transition—an occupation which at the same time would tend to tone down past bitterness and to divert renewing energies into a comparatively harmless channel. In Caucasia, where the Bolsheviks had to do with tougher men among whom the national idea had deeper roots, they were to find that within ten years the same policy was to produce formidable difficulties.

The first to set the example of going over to the Soviets was none [557]
other than the patriarch of the Ukrainian movement himself, Professor Hrushevsky, who was rewarded with the Presidency of the newly founded Ukrainian Academy in Kiev. Hrushevsky was followed by the former President of the Council of Ministers of the *Rada* Government, Holubovich, by the General Secretary to the *Rada*, Khrystyuk, and a number of other prominent radicals and separatists.

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871 Ukrainian schools were again started; a number of Communist newspapers began to appear in the Ukrainian language; and generally the usual 'Galician technique' of opening Ukrainian publishing centres, museums, libraries, theatres and so forth was followed (incidentally many Galicians made their appearance in Soviet Ukraine 626 during this period). The official 'state ideology' of Marxism was of course made obligatory for everyone, and the new volumes of Hrushevsky's fundamental history of the Ukraine which were now published in Kiev revealed that in his old age the distinguished professor had come to appreciate the truth of the doctrine of historical materialism.

The population remained as indifferent to measures of 'ukrainization' as it had in the *Rada* days, although now there were more numerous manifestations of it than in the past. Although Ukrainian had become a kind of official language, few appeared to have any taste for its use, either in the administration or in private life. One of the authors of *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, who occupied an administrative post in one of the Soviet institutions in the Ukraine between the years 1921 and 1924, confesses that he never once wrote a line in Ukrainian during the whole course of his employment.

665 In 1925 Kaganovich made his appearance in the Ukraine in the role of leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Stalin's future brother-in-law was also one of his most intimate friends, and at that time Stalin had already secured almost absolute power in the Soviet Union. Kaganovich's mission was to make a thorough inspection of the personnel of the Party in the Ukraine and to eliminate the 'unreliable and opportunist elements'.

At the same time Kaganovich had an opportunity of coming to the conclusion that Communism in the Ukraine was not at that date an overwhelming success. According to statistics published some time later by the Central Committee of the Party, out of every 10,000 inhabitants of the Ukraine the ratio of Communists was as follows: Jews, 155; Great Russians and 'new-comers', 88; Ukrainians, 39. About 15 per cent of women had joined Communist organisations—a far lower proportion than in the north. The proportion of Ukrainian students in the high schools which had been opened to form 'responsible Ukrainian workers and specialists' was disappointingly low in comparison to the number of their Jewish fellows: in the Social-Economic Faculty there were 1500 Ukrainians to 1000 Jews; in the Industrial-Technical Faculty, 2600 Ukrainians to 2200 Jews; in the Medical Faculty only 2000 Ukrainians to 2200 Jews; whereas the proportion of Ukrainians to Jews in the whole population was 10 to 1.

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The predominance of the non-Ukrainian elements in the organs of administration and in educational institutions is of course explained by the fact that the Ukrainian people remained overwhelmingly peasant, and there had been in the nineteenth century, and even earlier, a large and heterogeneous alien element in the towns. Nevertheless Kaganovich, in his speech to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in 1927, was at pains to demonstrate the success of 'ukrainization'. 'Among us', he said with that graceful Jewish facility for identifying himself with the people among whom he had come, 'our Ukrainian culture has developed on a grand scale. Ukrainian culture has made such progress in all branches in these last years that even the most eager Ukrainian nationalists never dreamed of such rapid development. In primary schools Ukrainians are taught by Ukrainians in the Ukrainian language. The high schools are gradually becoming completely "ukrainized"; Ukrainian books and press are at present developing to an extent unknown in all the history of the Ukraine. In our Council of People's Commissars, which is the supreme administrative organ of our government, 13 out of 20 members are Ukrainian. In our Party's Executive Committee, 66 per cent are Ukrainians, 25 per cent are Russians, 14 per cent are Jews.' 665 563 178

Kaganovich's emphasis on the predominance of Ukrainians on the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party is, of course, meaningless, since in the Soviet hierarchy all power is vested in the Secretaries of the various regional and local Committees of the Communist Party, who are themselves responsible not to the members of the Committees but to the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. Stalin filled this latter position, and Kaganovich himself was his nominee sent from Moscow with complete power over the regional and local Committees in the Ukraine. Kaganovich's successor, 'the dictator' Postyshev, who only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was another importation from Moscow—as is Khrushchov, who is at present (1939) governing the Ukraine.

While Kaganovich was praising 'the achievements of "ukrainization"' he was already considering means of putting some limit on these achievements. In this same year when he made his genial speech before the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party under his influence issued a decree making Russian the second official language in the Ukraine. The First Five Year Plan was then beginning, and one of the most important features of this Plan was the wide development of industry in the Ukraine. The coal and metallurgical industries 665 178 191

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665 were to be modernized, and the construction of the great power
178 station of Dnieprostroy was in view. Thousands of engineers,
191 technicians and specialized workers were being sent into the Ukraine and these people not only had no knowledge of the Ukrainian dialect but they found that dialect most inappropriate for correspondence between different Government departments on complicated technical questions. The intensified industrialization of the Ukraine was obviously destined to strengthen greatly all connections with the north and linguistic differences gave promise of frequent and annoying difficulties. Very soon the Ukrainian language came only to be used in the sphere of 'cultural relations'.

Meanwhile Kaganovich, in surveying the various aspects of 'ukrainization', began gradually to investigate the part played in different branches of the administration by 'Ukrainian nationalists' or those suspected of being such.

§7. 'THE REVOLUTION AGAINST THE PEASANTS': REPRESSION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

665 In 1929 the Communist Revolution was approaching its second
423 and decisive stage: Marxist principles which had conquered the life of the cities were to be imposed on the countryside. But the process of 'collectivizing' agriculture was to prove even more difficult in the Ukraine than it was in the provinces of Great Russia. Individual property in land had always been traditional in the Ukraine, and the background of the social history of the country had been the unending struggle of the peasantry to maintain their right to own the land they worked—against Polish landlords and Cossack and, later, Great Russian landlords. The strength of the Ukrainian peasantry had always been their stubborn determination that each should own his plot of land, and their weakness had been a love of individual freedom degenerating often enough into libertarian anarchy.

423 The outlook of the Ukrainian peasant differed widely from that
474 of the Great Russian. The *obshchina*—the old Russian form of possessing (but not of working) land collectively—was unknown in the regions of Chernigov and Poltava and in all right-bank Ukraine. The creation of *kolkhozy* (collective farms) was from the beginning opposed, generally passively and sometimes actively, by the peasantry. And Kaganovich hastened, so soon as peasant opposition developed, to deprive the Ukrainians of the weapon which the national idea might provide. (In Caucasia and Turkestan, during the same period, opposition to collectivization was combined with a renascence and strengthening of local nationalist movements directed

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against the Great Russian hegemony.) The Ukrainian enthusiasts of 423
'cultural acheivements' so recently lauded by Kaganovich himself 474
were now accused of 'maintaining relations with nationalist political organizations in Galicia'. And it was not difficult to prove their connections with open or secret organizations 'suffering under the yoke of Poland'. The existence of such connections had been tolerated and even favoured by the Soviet administration to the extent which they furthered Communist propagandist activities in Poland, but there could be no difficulty, if necessary, in treating them as treason.

In 1930 the first Ukrainian political trial took place in Kharkov. 668
A group of individuals were accused of having relations with 'the 674
Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'—the same organization 661
which had been created before the war under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian Government and which was now supposed to be functioning in Galicia. In the following year, as a result of the growing resistance of the peasants to collectivization, action against Ukrainian 'suspects' became more violent. The peasants were bitterly opposed to the *kolkhozy*, but certainly not on 'national' grounds. Faced with the imminent danger of a peasant revolt, the Soviet administration decided to eliminate all persons who through their origins could be considered to be connected with the peasantry and who might organize this revolt and become its leaders. Regardless of their loyalty to the Soviet régime during the preceding years, there now began a systematic destruction of Ukrainians belonging to the 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'.

In 1931 the Bolsheviks professed to have 'discovered' a Ukrainian 661
organization called 'the National Centre'. Holubovich (former 687
head of the *Rada* Government and participator in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations), Shershel, Mazurenko and other 'ex-politicians' were accused of being the leaders of this secret organization. They were shot. Thousands of arrests followed, the victims of which suffered execution or exile to labour camps which were themselves living cemeteries. Two years later, in 1933, the political police (G.P.U.) declared that they had discovered a real military conspiracy on the part of 'a secret military organization'. After a theatrical trial, Kotsubinsky (Vice-President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars), Kovnar (Commissar for Agriculture), and scores of other persons who had all occupied important posts in the army or the administration were shot. One of the most prominent figures in Ukrainian political life, who from the beginning had associated himself with the Communist Revolution and who had for a long time been an influential member of the Council of People's Com-

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66/ 68/ missars, Skrypnik, committed suicide in July 1933 in order to avoid arrest.

In that same year Postyshev replaced Kaganovich as 'dictator' in the Ukraine (he only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party). He arrived with orders 'to make an end of the counter-revolution that had woven itself a nest in the Ukraine'. The speech which Postyshev delivered at the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party, soon after entering on his office, indicated the new line of Soviet policy.

'In Ukraine our leading Party members and Comrade Stalin himself are specially hated. The class enemy has been to a good school in this country and has learned how to struggle against Soviet rule. In Ukraine have settled the remnants of many counter-revolutionary parties and organizations. Kharkov has gradually become the centre of attraction for all sorts of nationalistic and other counter-revolutionary organizations. They have all been drawn to this centre and they have spread their webs all over the Ukraine, making use of our Party system for their own ends. You remember, Comrades, when twenty Secretaries of Party Regional Committees dared to declare that it was impossible to fulfil the Harvest Plan' (nos. 15–21 of the *Proletarian*, Kharkov, 1934). At the same Congress the chief of the Ukrainian G.P.U., Beletsky, read a report in which he declared that 'Imperialists, through agents and through the remnants of the inimical classes which we have not destroyed and to which belong all the *kulak* and 'Petlyurian' elements of the Ukrainian villages, will yet prepare in the country criminal activities and diversions against the principal objects of our Ukrainian Economic Plan' (*ibid.*). Beletsky then proceeded to read aloud a proclamation which was supposed to have been seized by the G.P.U. and according to which Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries were 'dreaming about the denationalization of the whole of Ukrainian industry and the re-establishment of large landownership'.

Accusations of this type were of course inventions of the G.P.U., but the speeches of the head of this grim organization and of his political chief Postyshev indicate that the new policy of the Soviets was directed to the destruction both of the institution of private property among the Ukrainian peasants and of their national characteristics of stubborn individualism and love of freedom.

Postyshev had been given two problems to tackle: the first was to root out 'the counter-revolution' alleged to be lurking in the Soviet administration and in the Communist Party in the Ukraine;

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the second was to crush the will of the peasantry. In the first he succeeded as best he could and added to the sensational trials of 1931–3 the discovery of 'a secret Ukrainian organization' which was accused of being in direct touch with the Ukrainian separatists who were working abroad under the leadership of Colonel Konovalets. It was, however, beyond the strength of Postyshev to cope with the chaos which reigned in rural Ukraine during the years 1932–4 as a result of the policy of forced collectivization. Despite the fact that Postyshev 'eliminated' from the Ukrainian Communist Party over a quarter of its total strength, and in spite of thousands of arrests and hundreds of executions, the Party Secretary was accused of 'weakness and lack of energy' and was replaced by a certain Kossior. The late 'dictator' was, after a lapse of time, himself arrested and probably shot together with many of his closest collaborators.

But all the cruel personal dramas which took place under the Secretaryships of Postyshev and Kossior were as nothing compared to the terrible miseries which overtook the Ukrainian countryside during the five years 1930–35 as a result of the introduction of the *kolkhozy*. In their very essence *kolkhozy* were organically opposed to all the traditions and ways of life of the Ukrainian peasantry. Collective farming on a large scale was carried through at the cost of ruining small and 'average' peasant farms through the instrument of the ruthless pressure of the administration. The very rapid development of 'the *kolkhoz* movement' so much admired by Communists all the world over was the result, not of the peasants voluntarily joining the collective farms, but of their being driven on to them often by the use of military force—a fact which Stalin himself acknowledged in his article 'Head-turning from Success' (*Pravda*, 2 March 1930). The immediate consequence of the *kolkhoz* policy was seen in the lowering of agricultural production throughout the whole country which quickly led to the increasing misery of the peasantry, famine and terrible mortality. One of the principal reasons of all this was the *mania grandiosa* which always characterizes the policy of extreme ideologues; having become convinced of the low productive capacity of the smaller *kolkhozy* already set up, the enthusiasts of the Communist Party, in 1930, demanded their enlargement on a 'gigantic' scale. According to the reliable testimony of a member of the Communist Party (the Ukrainian agronomist Mirkevich, the initiator of tractor stations) 'this measure, in a series of regions, was realized in an exceptionally bureaucratic and senseless manner. *Kolkhozy* of 55–100 hectares were suddenly transformed, without any adequate technical preparation, into

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474 661 423 *kolkhozy* covering some tens of thousands of hectares; as, for instance, the *Kolkhoz* of "Chervony Perekop" in the Government of Kherson which was set up to comprise 50,000 hectares. In some cases, "to simplify matters", a whole region containing hundreds of villages was declared to constitute one *kolkhoz*. All the boundaries between village lands were abolished; then the whole expanse of land arbitrarily included in the *kolkhoz* was divided into farms of several thousand hectares each—without any regard as to where the villages actually lay. Cattle and agricultural machinery were scattered about over scores of kilometres' (*Pravda*, 3 April 1930).

Nevertheless Stalin declared that: 'The time has come to finish with every kind of camouflage: we must destroy the *kulaks* and deprive them of the possibility to work on the land.' At that moment anyone who owned three cows or the equivalent in sheep, pigs, or even chickens, was considered to be a *kulak*. As a result of this policy it was not long before all the larger and more prosperous peasant farms were destroyed. These farms, since the disappearance of the large private estates, had been the principal producers of the agricultural surplus, since it was only the better-off farmers who had a surplus in excess of their needs for disposal in the towns.

474 661 423 668 As early as 1930 the policy of forced collectivization provoked open resistance in the Ukraine, and attempts were made at armed revolt; but geographical conditions did not favour the type of guerilla warfare which was undertaken with considerable determination and success by the peasants in Georgia, and particularly in the Armenian district of Karabagh and by the Tartars of the Daghestan foothills. These agrarian risings in the Ukraine were suppressed with the greatest cruelty and were followed by mass executions and by the transportation of tens of thousands of peasants. The Soviets applied methods which were then almost new in their struggle with the Ukrainian peasantry; they put them into concentration camps where they had to do forced labour. In the region of Odessa, near Tiraspol, a large and prosperous colony of 'Old Believers' completely disappeared. All the men, with the exception of a few youngsters who managed to cross the Dniestr into Bessarabia, were transported, and the women and children simply scattered over the steppe. The construction of the White Sea Canal, so much advertised by the admirers of Soviet methods in Western Europe, cost the lives of many tens of thousands of peasants, as the vast cemeteries along the banks of the northern lakes and rivers bear witness.

Very often the prospect of transportation to the far north or to Siberia caused the peasants, as in old time, to abandon everything

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and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the 474
Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian 661
peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their 423
women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and 668
more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization 731
in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, 166
and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the 661
enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign corre- 731
spondent who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

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731 South-Eastern Russia died of hunger in the first months of 1933. As in 1921–2 numerous cases of cannibalism were recorded.

665 In spite of this vast tragedy, self-satisfied and triumphant speeches were a feature of the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets which met at
661 Kharkov in 1935. 'For glorious Ukraine the last years have been, as in the rest of our country, a period of brilliant unheard of achievements. The rapacious rural *kulak* class has been completely destroyed, annihilated. Never will the heroism of those days be forgotten! Never will the loathing against the oppressors disappear! Those were not idle words which Lenin wrote when he affirmed that the principal enemy of our Bolshevism is the peasant! Thousands of the best sons of our country have lost their lives in the great and ruthless struggle.' 'Against this enemy', in the words of *Pravda*, 'the economic structure which carries along with it joyous culture and a happy life to millions of Ukrainians suffering for centuries from privations has at last triumphed in the country.' Stalin's revolutionary Communist régime proved, as ever, logical. If 'thousands of the best sons of our country' had really lost their lives in 'the great and ruthless struggle' against the peasantry, the peasants had to count their losses in millions.

000 But notwithstanding the brilliant victory proclaimed on the internal front in 1935 the Soviet Government had new reasons for anxiety in the radical change which had taken place in the European situation as a result of the attainment of power by the Nazi Party in Germany. The official doctrine of the Nazi Government was based on 'the right of the German people to an adequate living space', and the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler, in search of a better and happier future, was taking a dangerous interest in the east and south-east of Europe. It was now nearly twenty years since *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*; and the glib attribution of the military catastrophe of Germany in the last war to the evils of Marxism had had the result of reviving in a new generation of Germans all those vague aspirations after world dominion which recur from time to time to compensate that unfortunate people for the frustration which has been their historical lot.

In glowing passages in *Mein Kampf* Adolf Hitler had waxed lyrical on the subject of the Ukraine and the Urals, and the Führer seemed prepared to abandon the oceanic and colonial dreams of William II in favour of a continental imperialism which might carry the Germans into Asia in the first great movement in history of a people from west to east. In 1934 the ten years' Non-Aggression Pact concluded between Germany and Poland appeared to Soviet statesmen to be the first step towards a collaboration in the east at

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the expense of the Soviet Union in which the dream of a revived *Rzecz Pospolita* (never absent from the mind of the ageing Pilsudski) might be combined with a German *Drang nach Osten* which could give to the Third Reich effective predominance over a great economic land empire stretching beyond the Don and the Caucasus to Turkestan and the Altai. At the same time the German understanding with Japan threatened the Far Eastern dominions of the Soviet Union.

'The Ukrainian Question' began to be discussed in the German Press, and from 1934 'the foreign danger' ceased to be only a conventional formula at Soviet political trials. The uneasy masters of the Kremlin began to believe in its reality. The memoirs of the ex-Chekist Krivitski have made it clear that from an early date after Hitler's accession to power Stalin was planning to create a situation in which he might be able to arrive at a compromise with his adversary in Berlin—an event which was eventually consummated between the two parties in August 1939.

A direct collaboration with the Russians, as an alternative to joint aggression with Poland, had always attracted influential circles in Germany—circles which included the majority of those soldiers, technicians and business men who, during the Rapallo period, when many Germans were employed as specialists in Russia, had had excellent opportunities for forming a clear appreciation of realities in the Soviet Union. Many connections, direct and indirect, existed between these men and high officials in the Soviet armed forces, administration and industry.

The unsurpassed genius of Stalin for political manœuvre was never better illustrated than when he succeeded in annihilating all those elements most likely to be in—or in the future to enter into—relations with the Germans. Thus, at the same time, he was able to deprive the Germans of their potential collaborators, and was himself able to assume the position which his victims had intended to occupy vis-à-vis the Germans. From Stalin's point of view the execution of the 'Red' generals in 1935 was a preventive rather than a punitive measure, as were the subsequent widespread 'purges' in the armed forces and among the Communist officials in the national republics in the Ukraine, Caucasia and Central Asia. It was not by accident that the first to be eliminated were those who owed their revolutionary careers to their capacity for enterprise and daring action: the Marshals Tukhachevski, Uborevich and Yakir.

A Jew by origin, Yakir had distinguished himself in Budenny's 'Red Mounted Army' during the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in the summer of 1920, and later during the liquidation of the *atamans*'

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661 bands in the Ukraine. At the time of the 'purge' he occupied the highest military post in the Ukraine: that of Officer Commanding the Kiev Military District. The drama in the Ukraine did not end with the execution of Yakir; during the years 1935–7 several thousands of persons occupying important posts in the Red Army and in the Soviet administration were arrested and shot or exiled to concentration camps in Siberia and the North of Russia. This whirlwind of arrests and executions even carried away with it Postyshev and Kossior, the former instruments of 'the Revolution against the peasants'.

[701 186] In the meantime the last remnants of the national Ukrainian Army, which had flourished in the years 1923–9, disappeared. Units of the Ukrainian Army, based on the system of 'territorial Divisions' in the Red Army, had been quartered in the Ukraine alongside the troops 'of the Union'. The struggle with the peasantry had made it desirable to abolish the territorial system in the Ukraine as well as in other parts of the Union. The Ukrainian units were broken up and distributed to other parts of the country and their place was taken by regiments recruited in Great Russia. After the execution of the staff of the Kiev Command and the senior personnel of many of the Ukrainian regiments, nothing remained of the Ukrainian Army except the names of certain 'Red' regiments which were retained for the sake of form; but the Ukrainian language continued to be used in units where the rank and file were predominantly of Ukrainian origin.

Stalin's Constitution of 1936—which evoked such enthusiasm 642 among European Communists and which was even hailed in the capitalist Press of Western countries as a laudable 'return to democratic institutions' in contrast to the dictatorships of Central Europe —was a cynical accompaniment to the slaughter of so many thousands of Party members which was going on at that time within 'the Soviet Paradise'. Stalin's Constitution marked the final abandonment of the theory that the minority nationalities ranked as equal partners with Great Russia within the Soviet Union. The 'union of different states' was now transformed into one integral state (Paragraph 13: 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a unified state'). According to Paragraph 14 all authority on questions relating to international affairs, the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, the organization of defence and the command of the armed forces, foreign trade, the safety of the state, the management of all banks, all forms of transport, the principles of land distribution, the basis of public instruction, hygiene, and criminal and civil laws, was reposed in the Central Government.

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Section (*c*) of the same Paragraph reserved all questions of finance, including the local budgets of the constituent republics, to the discretion of the Central Government. 642

Paragraph 60 provided that the Parliaments of the Republics could make changes in their respective constitutions, but that these changes must correspond to the spirit of the Constitution of the Union. Under Paragraph 69 the Central Government retained the right to veto any decisions taken by the governments of the local republics. As has already been stated, Stalin did not consider it necessary to deprive the national republics of the illusory right of opting out of the Union. At the same time he not only retained the conception of the Constitution of 1923 which provided for a special representation of the minority nationalities in the central legislature, but his pleasing sense of the ridiculous in regard to the automatic reactions of his admirers in foreign countries induced him to give orders for the members of this body to be elected. In this Chamber of Nationalities the Ukrainians have rather less than 200 representatives out of 574—a figure which corresponds probably to the relative numerical importance of their population in relation to the other nationalities in the Union. Any advantage which might theoretically accrue from this representation is lost at the joint sittings of 'the two Chambers of the Superior Council', when the delegates of the nationalities find themselves in a minority among 1143 of their colleagues.

Stalin would have been but a poor Marxist if he had forgotten that the laws regulating the political existence of the Soviet Ukraine would only correspond to the actual state of things if they expressed 'economic realities'. Though strengthened by the new Constitution of the Union, the link between the Ukraine and Great Russia would still remain only theoretical, in the Marxist view, if the Soviet Government had not succeeded in absorbing the economic life of the Ukraine into that of the rest of the Union and welding out of the two an indestructible whole. (11, 12)

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND ADDITIONS TO CHAPTER VI

(1) *The Austrians and Russians in Galicia*

A full documentation of the Austrian repression of the *Promoskovity* in Galicia is to be found in the Telerhof Almanack published in several series by the Galicians after the war (*Telerhofsky Almanakh*, 1–4, Lvov, 1926–9). 113

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113 Telerhof was the largest concentration camp for 'pro-Russians'; at times their number reached 10,000, and about 2000 died during the typhus epidemic. The Austrian authorities later acknowledged that 'among the people arrested in the war zone were many who were arrested by mistake or upon false denunciations'. (See also D. Yavorsky, *Dumy o Rodine* (Thoughts about my Native Land), Lvov, 1923.)

For the relations between the Russian troops and the population, see General A. A. Brusilov, *A Soldier's Note Book*, London, 1930; also Bernard Pares, *My Russian Memories*, London, 1925.

Russian blunders have been described with many exaggerations in Ukrainian 'separatist' literature. For a more balanced view see D. Doroshenko, 'Voyna i Revolutsia na Ukraine', in the periodical *Istorik i Sovremennik* ('War and Revolution in the Ukraine,' in *The Historian and Contemporary*), vols. I–V, Berlin, 1923.

(2) *Biographical Note on Vinnichenko and Petlyura*

643 *Mark Vinnichenko* belonged to the Ukrainian intelligentsia. He failed to complete his studies on account of revolutionary activities which he started when a boy at a Gymnasium and on account of which he had to leave the University of Kiev after his first year.

During the period 1906–14 Vinnichenko wrote novels (in Russian) which were quite widely read. The themes were not political but rather romantic, and the author delighted in the delineation of psychological conflicts which were intended for the imagination of readers who were not too exacting. Vinnichenko had tuberculosis and he seems to have been consumed by an 'inner fever' which can often be observed in persons who are suffering from that malady.

People who knew Vinnichenko do not deny that he possessed a certain honesty of purpose which was generally not one of the distinctive traits of his colleagues in the *Rada*.

Simon Petlyura was quite a different type. He was the son of a simple cabman, but received his education in the Poltava Gymnasium. Later he became a book-keeper in a commercial undertaking in Moscow, and collaborated in a periodical which appeared before the war called *Ukrainian Life* (in Russian). Petlyura belonged to a milieu which produced many capable and energetic men in the years preceding the war. It was such men, for instance, who had created the widespread co-operative movement in Russia. Many representatives of this class worked successfully during the war in the Unions of Towns and the Unions of Zemstvos. In contrast to Vinnichenko, Petlyura was eloquent neither in his speech nor with his pen. He was a man of action and practical capacity rather than a propagandist of ideals. However, unlike many of his more vocal and emotional collaborators, he maintained an irreconcilable attitude towards the Bolsheviks to the end; his assassin, Schwartzbrod, may well have been a (possibly unconscious) agent of the G.P.U.

(3) *The Conflict Between the Rada and the Provisional Government*

113 See Paul Milyukov, *Istoriya Vtoroy Russkoy Revolutsii* (History of the Second Russian Revolution), vols. I–III, Sofia, 1921; Bernard Pares, *The Downfall of the Russian Monarchy*, London, 1939; and other works dealing

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with the period March–November 1917. A series of interesting articles on the subject from the pen of Milyukov has been published recently in the Parisian Russian daily newspaper *Posledniya Novosti* (The Latest News), 19 March–1 April 1939. For the Ukrainian point of view see D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy* (1917–23), Uzhhorod, 1935; Vinnichenko, *Vozrozhdenie Natsii* (The Resurrection of a Nation), vols. I–III, Vienna, 1925. 113

(4) *The Ukrainians at Brest-Litovsk*

A vivid description of the course of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and of the part played by the delegates of the *Rada* is given in the scholarly work of J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*, London, 1938. An Appendix gives the text of the Peace Treaty with the Ukraine, and a valuable Bibliography is included.

The reminiscences of the leading personalities at Brest-Litovsk have been published in English translations: Hoffmann, *War Diaries and Other Papers*, London, 1929; Czernin, *In the World War*, London, 1919; Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk*, London, 1919; *My Life*, London, 1935.

(5) *The First 'Siege' of Kiev by the Bolsheviks*

This 'siege' continued for about ten days—from 30 January to 8 February 1918. The first Bolshevik detachments approached the city from the left bank of the Dniepr. The city is situated on the high right bank and presented a perfect target for the Red artillery. Most of the damage was done by an armoured train mounting naval guns, which destroyed, among other architectural features, the block of flats built by Professor Hrushevsky when he decided to settle in the city. When other Bolshevik detachments and the 'Ukrainian regiments' which had gone over to them appeared on the right bank, further resistance became impossible. The brunt of the defence was borne, not by the supporters of Holubovich and Vinnichenko, but by volunteer detachments consisting of officers, students and even schoolboys; many young lives were lost. 669

(6) *The Austro-German Occupation of the Ukraine and the Régime of Skoropadsky*

Most interesting material is revealed in the documents published by the Soviets in an anonymous book entitled *Krakh Nemetskoy Okkupatsii na Ukraine: Sbornik Dokumentov izdannykh Gosizdatom* (The Crash of the German Occupation in the Ukraine: Collection of Documents published by the State Publishing Organization), Moscow, 1936. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of these documents which fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks after they occupied Kiev (some of the documents are reproduced in facsimile). It will be difficult, however, for the reader to agree with the deductions made by the Soviet editor. He affirms, for instance, that the Occupation troops were unable to deal with the resistance of 'the great popular masses', and that whole German divisions were employed in putting down workmen's strikes and peasant risings. These assertions are not confirmed by any document. In the documents reference is only made to the assassination of 727 642 113

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727 isolated landowners and to the sending of punitive detachments to certain districts.

642 The principal reason for the downfall of the German occupation of the
113 Ukraine was, of course, the defeat of the German Armies on the Western Front. The 8th of August is the date which marks a break in the frame of mind of the German Command in Kiev. This can be noted in the documents published in Germany: *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*, Berlin, 1936.

Wheeler-Bennett describes the situation in the Ukraine in these terms: 'The early months of the Skoropadsky regime were marked by a substantial economic revival; the landowners, industrialists and bourgeois being anxious to co-operate with the new government and the agencies of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.... Passive resistance in certain districts was coupled with acts of sabotage in others. In Odessa an aeroplane factory was set on fire, numerous munition dumps were exploded and trains wrecked.'

See also on the same subject: Pierre Brégy and Prince Serge Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, Paris, 1939, pp. 207–8. (Eng. translation, London, 1940.)

(7) *Activities of the Bolshevik 'Peace Delegation' in Kiev*

727 The German authorities were well informed of the subversive activities of the Soviet 'Peace Delegation' in Kiev, but they ignored them—as they ignored the assassination of their Ambassador, Count Mirbach in Moscow, and of their Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Eichhorn in Kiev, in order to avoid the precipitation of a further conflict with the Soviet Government at the moment of crisis on the Western Front. In order to produce incontrovertible proof of the Soviet activities, the Hetman's Minister of the Interior, Igor Kistyanovsky, had recourse to a very original mode of action. With the aid of the Ukrainian police, he arranged 'a brigands' attack on the train in which Rakovski and Manuilsky were returning to Moscow. In order to give reality to the attack 'the brigands' confiscated all the valuables and personal possessions of the two delegates, together with the mass of compromising documents which Kistyanovsky desired to lay hands on and which he afterwards presented to Baron Mumm for perusal. The revelations failed, however, to change the German attitude.

(8) *Revolution and Civil War in the Ukraine*, 1919–20

113 Ukrainian historians of the Revolution and Civil War are often exceedingly biased in their accounts of military operations; see, for instance, Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy*, quoted above. General Denikin, also, cannot set aside his prejudices in writing of the 'Petlyurians' who not infrequently fought on his side against the Soviet forces; see General A. Denikin, *Ocherki Russkoy Smuty* (Sketches of the Russian Trouble), vols. I–V, Berlin, 1925–9.

Much interesting material concerning the Volunteer Army is to be found in the almanack published in Berlin: *Beloe Delo* (The White Cause), vols. I–VI, 1924–7. In the Soviet periodical, *Voyna i Revolutsia* (War and Revolution), 1932–5, many episodes of the fighting against the 'Whites', the 'Petlyurians' and the Poles are described.

For the Anglo-French intervention see James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia*, 1918, Baltimore, 1936.

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Not devoid of interest are the reminiscences of 'Batko' Makhno which were published after his flight to Paris, evidently with the help of someone: Nestor Makhno, *Russkaya Revolutsia na Ukraine* (The Russian Revolution in the Ukraine), vols. I–II, published by the Anarcho-Communist Group of North America and Canada. 113

(9) *Jewish Pogroms in the Ukraine*, 1918–20

Jewish organizations in Western Europe have thoroughly studied this question and a series of works has been published which give a good deal of information: Schechtman, *The Pogroms of the Ukraine and the Ukrainian Government*, 1917–21, London, 1927; by the same author, *Pogromy Dobrovolcheskoy Armii na Ukraine* (Pogroms of the Volunteer Army in the Ukraine), Berlin, 1922; I. Cherikower, *Antisemitizm i Pogromy na Ukraine*, Berlin, 1923.

(10) *The Ukrainian Delegation at the Peace Conference*

The disappointment of the Ukrainian delegates on account of the reception which they met with in Paris from the representatives of the Great Powers is minutely described in I. Borshak's *Ukraintsy na Mirnoy Konferentsii* (The Ukrainians at the Peace Conference), Lvov, 1928; interesting also is Arnold Margolin's book: *Ukraina i Politika Antanty* (The Ukraine and the Policy of the Entente), Berlin, 1922.

(11) *The Soviet Régime in the Ukraine*, 1920–39

Owing to the control exercised by the authorities over all publications, particularly of a political character, in U.S.S.R., Soviet sources concerning the Ukraine are of a strictly official nature. Therefore, if these sources have a considerable importance for assessing economic conditions or cultural phenomena (science, art, even past history), they always describe Ukrainian conditions from a very definite point of view. For the first period of the Soviet régime in the Ukraine, the sources are the official newspapers, *Izvestiya* and *Pravda* (1918–20), *Konstitutsia Sovetskih Respublik* (The Constitution of the Soviet Republics), the daily *Visty* (in Ukrainian), Kiev, 1919, another daily *Kharkovski Rabochi* (in Russian), Kharkov, 1920. A publication of the Communist Academy should also be consulted: *Natsionalnaya Politika Vserossiyskoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii* (National Policy of the All-Russian Communist Party), Moscow, 1930. Information on political trials can be culled from a perusal of the files of the daily *Proletari*, Kharkov, 1934, in which the speeches pronounced at the Twelfth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party are reproduced. Stalin's Constitution was published in Moscow in 1937.

The works of Russian and Ukrainian refugees, some of whom occupied official positions under the Soviet régime, offer a second important source of information. See, for instance, Isaac Mazeppa (an associate of Petlyura), *Ukrayina pod Chervonoy Moskvoy* (Ukraina under Red Moscow), Lvov, 1935; M. Slavinski, *Natsionalno-Gosudarstvennaya Problema S.S.S.R.* (The National Problem as a State Problem in U.S.S.R.), Paris, 1938; V. Sadovski, *Natsionalnaya Politika Sovetov na Ukraine* (The National Policy of the Soviets in

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113 the Ukraine), Warsaw, 1937; Pierre Brégy and Prince Serge Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, Paris, 1939.

A third group of sources is to be found in the accounts of foreign travellers who have visited the Ukraine during the last two decades. Although few of these would claim to have had a proper opportunity of forming a true impression of the political and social struggle which has been going on in the Ukraine, there are some foreign newspaper correspondents whose knowledge and contacts gave them certain facilities for securing information which no passing tourist (however enthusiastic) could acquire. The most distinguished of these correspondents (up to 1934) was Paul Scheffer of the *Berliner Tageblatt* and Dr Basseches of the *Neue Freie Presse*.

The writer of an article in the *Fortnightly Review* of October 1934 gave an important account of the famine in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava and Kharkov. He confirmed the fact that cases of cannibalism had occurred. One of these cases later became known from Soviet sources, in consequence of a trial which took place in the town of Izyum in the region of Kharkov. A female shopkeeper named Kovaleva was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment for selling human flesh. She confessed that she had also done so during the famine of 1920–21.

648 (12) *The Diplomatic Representation abroad of the Ukrainian S.S.R.*

A curious evolution in the views of the Soviet Government concerning the degree of independence to be enjoyed by the Ukrainian S.S.R. can be traced in the history of the diplomatic representation of the Republic abroad. After the first Constitution of the Ukrainian S.S.R. had been legalized in March 1920, a Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was established in Kharkov—which city had been made the capital of the Ukraine. The first Commissar for Foreign Affairs was Kovalev, who within a month was replaced by Rakovski—at that time also President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. In April 1920, Rakovski appointed his first diplomatic representative abroad in the person of M. Levitsky, who was sent to Prague, although the new Czech Republic had not yet recognized either the Soviet Union or the Ukrainian S.S.R. A little later a certain Aussem arrived as Ukrainian Ambassador in Berlin. In the autumn of 1921 a third Ukrainian diplomat appeared in Warsaw in the person of Shumsky. Not one apparently of the unfortunates who decorated the Ukrainian Foreign Office is alive to-day; all, including Rakovski, were 'eliminated' later—either with or without trial.

In 1920–21 Ukrainian representatives abroad were officially independent of Moscow, but they were under the orders of Rakovski. There existed, however, a secret decision of the Politbureau, according to which the Foreign Office of the U.S.S.R. had the right to send instructions to the Foreign Office of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and could interfere in the activities of the Ukrainian diplomats in the Central European capitals.

This situation continued until the new Constitution of the Union, proclaimed on 6 July 1923. The Ukrainian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was then abolished. The Ukrainian representation abroad was fused with that of U.S.S.R.; but it was agreed that an Ukrainian Communist should be

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appointed as First Counsellor in the four capitals (Vienna was included) where the Ukrainians had had independent representation. This arrangement continued until 1925, when such appointments began to be considered only as 'desirable'. Ukrainian Communists soon vanished from important positions in the Soviet embassies and legations, and for the last thirteen years the Ukrainian S.S.R. has had not even the shadow of formal representation abroad. 648

(13) *The Ukrainians in Poland*

The Paris Conference, in 1919, only recognized the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia pending a solution of 'the Russian Question'. The Polish position in Galicia was finally affirmed by the Council of the League of Nations (15 March 1923), but the Polish Government undertook to establish a 'gradual' autonomy for the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia. 563 668

The Ukrainians claimed that not less than three and a half millions of the population of Eastern Galicia were of Ukrainian stock, and they reckoned another three millions in Western Galicia, the Kholm region, and the Polish districts of Polesia and Volhynia.

The Polish census of 1939 admitted only 1,600,000 Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, while the population of Russian origin in other regions of Poland was not allowed to be even in part Ukrainian. This great disparity in estimates can be explained by the fact that the Poles described as 'Russians' all those elements, formerly 'pro-Muscovite', who were lukewarm in their support of the separatist version of the Ukrainian national movement.

The Polish Government had some success in detaching from the Ukrainian nationalists a section of the rural population who were flattered by the discovery that they were in fact 'russified Polish *szlachta*'. It was affirmed that during the preceding two centuries many families of the lesser Polish nobility had become so impoverished that they had disappeared into the mass of the peasantry and had become the victims of systematic methods of russification. The movement of the so-called 'Szlachta Zagrodowa' (Smallholder Gentry) had great success, and the journal of the association, *Pobudki*, claimed recently that the number of 'russified *szlachta*' who were expected 'to return to the bosom of their mother Poland' amounted to 700,000 persons. Thus, if those who desired to remain Russian and those who desired to become Poles (together with real Poles, Jews, Armenians, and Germans) are deducted from the Ukrainian estimate, it will be found that the total number of *conscious* Ukrainians in all Galicia did not exceed two millions.

These two millions remain, however, an important factor in the Galician borderland where Polish, German, Russian, Roumanian and Hungarian interests are in dangerous conflict, and the energetic activities of Ukrainian groups and political parties continued to exercise a disturbing influence on the life of the Polish State during the whole period 1919–39.

The most important Ukrainian party is U.N.D.O. (The Ukrainian National Democratic Union (*Obyedinenie*)), which rose to importance about 1925 under the leadership of Dmitro Levitsky. The party could claim a membership of over one million, and it published a series of papers of which *Dilo* (Action) in Lvov was the most important. The ultimate aim of

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U.N.D.O. was a united and independent Ukraine; but working within the structure of the Polish State the party refrained from advocating 'separatism at home' and claimed independence only for 'enslaved' Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet Government regarded U.N.D.O. as the most dangerous, because the most serious, of all Ukrainian political groups.

Relations between the Polish Government and U.N.D.O. were far from cordial during the years 1925–30. Both sides, however, were seeking compromise and the U.N.D.O. leaders, though they failed to acquire legalized autonomy, appeared temporarily satisfied with the position of *de facto* autonomy which they had attained through their social, educational and co-operative organizations (*Selsky Hospodar* (The Country Farmer), *Dnistr*, *Maslosoyuz* (Butter League), etc.). The policy of 'peace with Poland' was supported by the Ukrainian Catholic and Uniate organizations under the leadership of the Uniate Metropolitan, Count Szepticki with the periodicals, *Meta* (Aim), *Nedilya* (Week). On the other hand, certain fractions of U.N.D.O. maintained a hostile attitude towards the Polish Government, voiced in the papers *Nash Prapor* (Our Standard), *Nash Klych* (Our Warcry). Communist influences were noticeable in the propaganda of these fractions.

Abroad the U.N.D.O. was on the best of terms with the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic. Antagonism to Poland had become a tradition in Prague since 1920, when the passage of arms to Poland during the war with the Soviets had been refused. Ukrainian refugees, from both Soviet Ukraine and Galicia, were sure of a kindly reception in the Czech capital, which between the years 1925–35 became, if not the Ukrainian political centre, at least the cultural and educational focus where the idea of a Greater Ukraine, independent and sovereign, was openly preached in the high schools (in many of which special Ukrainian courses were available for students).

The intense interest shown by the leaders of the Third Reich in the Ukrainian problem—an interest which provoked the series of trials, banishments and executions in Soviet Ukraine—aroused the anxiety of the Polish Government. By no means confident of the loyalty of the population of Eastern Galicia, Kholm, and Volhynia, the Poles decided to accelerate the 'polonization' of these regions. This 'polonizing' process took unfortunate and sometimes arbitrary and violent forms: prohibition in some districts of the use of the Ukrainian or Russian languages, and the revival of the old struggle against the Orthodox and even against the Uniate Churches. A great number of Orthodox and Uniate churches were closed or 'turned back' into Catholic ones.

It would have been difficult to discover methods more likely to revive the age-old historic struggle 'for land and faith' between Poles and Ukrainians. A hatred of 'the Polish orientation' was quickly roused among the Ukrainian peasantry, and the moderate sections of U.N.D.O. with their policy of compromise began to lose ground. The U.N.D.O. party organization was forced to denounce the basis of conciliation reached in 1930 and confirmed in 1935. At the moment of the German attack on Poland, U.N.D.O. announced its loyalty to the Polish state, but the foundations of this loyalty had been sapped by the mistakes of the Polish politicians. It was Stalin, not Hitler, who reaped the benefit.

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From time to time the struggle between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia took an acute form and was accompanied by industrial strikes, peasant riots and acts of terrorism against the administration. These methods, violent and illegal, were not approved by U.N.D.O., but they were stimulated both by secret Communist organizations and by the unofficial Ukrainian Party which called itself the Ukrainian National Union (U.N.U.). U.N.U. repudiated all compromise with Poland, and proclaimed an armed struggle against her. Comparable in its organization and tactics to the I.R.A. (on which it was probably modelled to carry on a struggle in geographical and social conditions in some ways similar to those of Ireland), the U.N.U. organized a network of secret militarized groups all over Galicia. Galicia was looked on as a territory where the 'Army Corps' of U.N.U. was 'quartered': the territory was divided into four districts corresponding to 'Divisions', which were further divided into 'Regiments', 'Battalions' and 'Companies'. Some scores of thousands of men, young for the most part, and fanatically devoted to 'the cause', joined U.N.U.

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At the head of the movement stood the bold and adventurous figure of Colonel Konovalets. A former officer of the Austrian Army, Konovalets had led the troops of the 'Directoria' which drove Skoropadsky from Kiev in December 1918. Later he had quarrelled with Petlyura on account of the latter's 'Polish orientation'.

Already in the twenties Konovalets had sought favour and aid in Germany. He was not the only one: about 1924 a certain Poltavets-Ostranitsa, who called himself 'Hetman', appeared in Munich with the same object. Konovalets, however, was much more successful than his rivals, and, towards 1930, he established firm relations with German political and military circles, and at the same time made really effective the secret organization of U.N.U. in Galicia. A newspaper of U.N.U., *Ukrainske Slovo* (Ukrainian Word) was published in Paris; other publications appeared in Germany.

The keen interest with which the Nazi leaders regarded the Ukrainian problem lent a serious meaning to the conspiratorial activities of Colonel Konovalets, who was not ashamed to express openly his 'German orientation'. In 1933 negotiations were set on foot between U.N.U. and representatives of the Nazi Party concerning 'preparatory measures' which were to be taken for the creation of a future 'Ukrainian, White Russian and Lithuanian State'. The German negotiators were principally interested in the organization of a potential 'Ukrainian Government'. The lack of suitable candidates for political office among his own supporters led Konovalets to make contact with the remnants of Petlyura's followers, among whom several 'ex-cabinet ministers' were to be found. There was a project to open relations with Ukrainian nationalists who had remained in Soviet Ukraine, and Konovalets was also in touch with the former Hetman Skoropadsky, who was living at Wannsee near Berlin. Konovalets obviously aimed at organizing a 'united Ukrainian front', and the Ukrainians undoubtedly lost one who might have proved a resolute national leader, when the colonel was killed in a café in Rotterdam by the explosion of a bomb in the form of a cigarette-box which was handed to him by a man presumed to have been a Soviet agent.

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For U.N.U. the death of Konovalets was an even greater blow than it first appeared. Deprived of leadership, the organization began to go to pieces. The Polish police succeeded in arresting numbers of leaders of the regional organizations, and the movement's German supporters began to lose confidence in the conspiratorial method.

Both the moderate and the extremist Ukrainian political parties in Poland, the U.N.D.O. and the U.N.U., were born in Galicia in the atmosphere of the local political struggle. Distinct from these parties were the representatives of the erstwhile Ukrainian Popular Republic who had settled in Poland. This group continued to consider itself as the 'legal government' of Russian Ukraine with Andrew Levitsky as 'president' and several 'cabinet ministers' and 'diplomatic representatives' in different countries (Mazeppa, Prokopovich, A. Shulgin, General Salsky and others). Part of these 'Petlyurians' lived in Poland, others in Prague and Paris, where they published their periodical *Trizub* (Trident, the emblem on Vladimir's coins). Contrasting in this respect with the Galician political parties, which did not put their social programme in the first place, these former adherents of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic', faithful to the traditions of the *Rada* and *Directoria*, had retained their socialist tendencies but in a very moderate form.

It is a curious fact that this group of 'the Ukrainian Popular Republic' enjoyed until recently not only the support of the Czech Government, with whose ideology it had much in common, but also that of the Polish Government, which at the same time was incapable of establishing normal durable relations with the Galician Ukrainians. The politicians of the U.P.R. kept themselves apart not only from the extremists of the U.N.U. but also from the moderates of the U.N.D.O. They did not of course preach separatism in regard to Poland, and as the years passed they became much more tolerant on the subject of the exact status of the Ukraine in the event of the downfall of the Soviet régime and the revival of a Russian state. Konovalets had tried to enlist them for 'the United Ukrainian front' patronized by the Third Reich, but such an orientation could scarcely attract the 'Petlyurians', penetrated by democratic and even socialist tendencies. Some of them remained faithful to the 'Polish orientation' of Petlyura himself, others struck up friendship with the Parisian group of *La Revue de Prométhée*—a periodical published by the representatives of different nationalities which had formed part of the Russian Empire and are now under Soviet dominion. *Les Prométhéens* are drastically opposed to the Soviet régime, denounce the absence of real autonomy in the Soviet Union and stand ultimately for a 'federal state of nationalities'. The Ukrainians who participate in this movement therefore abandon the idea of 'integral separatism' and profess opinions in the spirit of those expressed once upon a time by Michael Dragomanov.

Former 'Petlyurians' are at present less opposed to the ideas of which Hetman Skoropadsky was the symbol than they were at the time when they began their armed struggle against him. The ex-Hetman has retained a certain influence on Ukrainians and admirers of his title can be met in many parts of the world—in Paris and London, in Canada and the United States. His son Danylo is considered by them as 'the lawful successor' of the now ageing Paul.

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Outside Poland, Ukrainians are to be found in many European and American countries. Political and academic circles of Ukrainian intelligentsia are grouped round periodicals of varying views, but these circles consist of scores, perhaps, of persons out of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian land labourers who have migrated from over-populated Galicia. After the war and revolution thousands of fugitives from the South of Russia and Volhynia joined them. In the Ukrainian press from time to time appear statements that the number of Ukrainians in Western Europe reaches 500,000, in Canada over a million, in the United States about 700,000 and in South America 200,000. These figures are undoubtedly exaggerated. In France the number of refugees from the South of Russia who can be considered 'Ukrainians' did not exceed a few scores of thousands, and the same must be said about Czechoslovakia and Balkan countries. However, among the Polish agricultural workers and miners in France (900,000) a third came from Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. And there is no doubt that hundreds of thousands have migrated from Galicia to the United States and especially to Canada where, owing to hard work and a certain capacity for organization, brought over from their native land, many have attained prosperity. America is the land where emigrants from Europe keep together according to their nationality more than anywhere else. The Ukrainian emigration in Canada and the United States has retained a vivid interest in everything pertaining to Ukrainian nationality. It has its own press, publishes its books, teaches its language and history in its schools. The Ukrainians in America consider it their duty to respond to the appeals of the different Ukrainian parties and groups which have remained in Europe. Therefore echoes of all the different tendencies of Ukrainian political life can be found in Canada and the United States: 'pro-Russians' who do not wish to be called 'Ukrainians', adherents of U.N.D.O., followers of Colonel Konovalets, partisans of Petlyura and the 'Petlyurians', admirers of 'the young Hetman' Danylo Skoropadsky. However, purely ideological discussions are not so acute there as among the different 'fractions' in Europe. 'The united Ukrainian front' would have a better chance in emigration, because its basis would not be so much political activity, as a common historical tradition and a common love of the Ukrainian land.

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(14) *Literature on the Ukrainian Question*

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Numerous papers, mostly by well-known Ukrainian writers and political leaders, have appeared in the *Slavonic and East European Review*. These papers have made available to English readers information on various aspects of the Ukrainian Question. The following should be noted:

Vol. v, No. 13, p. 169, Kolessa, A., 'Bibliography of the Ukrainian Language'.
ix, No. 27, p. 367, Paneyko, B., 'Galicia and the Polish-Ukrainian Problem'.
Ibid. p. 88, Skorowski, S., 'The Ukrainian Problem in Poland'.
x, No. 28, p. 116, Loś, S., 'Ukrainian Question in Poland'.
Ibid. p. 138, Borshak, E., 'Relations of England and Ukraine.'
xii, No. 35, p. 323, Mazepa, I., 'Ukrainia under Bolshevist Rule' (valuable, based on careful study of the Ukrainian Soviet press).
Ibid. No. 36, p. 622, Doroshenko, D., 'The Uniat Church in Galicia'.

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113 XIII, No. 37, p. 139, Kirkconnell, W., 'Ukrainian Poetry in Canada'.
Ibid. No. 38, p. 350, Shulgin, A., 'Ukraine and Its Political Aspirations'.
Ibid. Nos. 38, 39, pp. 363, 611, Krofta, K., 'Ruthenes, Czechs and Slovaks' (the official Czech view of the position of the Carpathian Ukrainians by the distinguished Czechoslovak politician).
Ibid. No. 38, p. 372, Voloshin, A., 'Carpathian Ruthenia' (the view of the luckless leader of the Carpathian Ukrainians).
XIV, Nos. 40–41, pp. 163, 372, Andrusiak, N., 'The Ukrainian Movement in Galicia'.
XVI, No. 48, p. 654, Doroshenko, D., 'Mykhailo Dragomanov and the Ukrainian National Movement' (a study of permanent value).

La Revue de Prométhée published in Paris and *East Europe* published in London have contained a number of topical articles on the Ukraine, many of which are of a polemical character. The former review is the organ of the Promethean League which professes to represent all the 'minority nationalities' of the former Russian Empire (i.e. Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Don and Kuban Cossacks, North Caucasia, Turkestan, Idel-Ural, the Ukraine, the Crimea, Ingria, Karelia, and the Komi (Zyryan) Region; the Armenians are, or were, not included). The League, which numbers among its members many notable political emigrants and writers of talent, held a 'First Promethean League Linguistic Congress' in Warsaw in the spring of 1936 (see *Baltic and Scandinavian Countries*, vol. III, no. 1 (5)).

The principal source for the contemporary history of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia is the work of the leader of U.N.D.O.—Dr Kost Levitsky: *Historiya Politichnoy Dumky Halytskykh Ukraintsev*, 1848–1914; *na Podstavi Spomynov* (History of the Political Thought of the Galician Ukrainians; on the basis of (the author's) Reminiscences), Lvov, 1926. See also A. Shulgin, *L'Ukraine contre Moscou*, Paris, 1935; A. Martel, *La Langue Ruthène*, Paris, 1938.

The period between 1914–18 and 1939 can be studied in the Ukrainian periodical press: *Dilo, Zhive Slovo* (Lvov), *Nash Klych* (Peremyshl). See also the newspapers published in Russian in Podkarpatska Rus: *Russki Golos, Russki Vestnik* (Uzhhorod).

The different political orientations of Ukrainian groups in emigration are illustrated in the pages of *Svit* (America), *Trizub* (Petlyurian), *Ukrainske Slovo* (the organ of U.N.U.), and *Ukraina*, also in *La Revue de Prométhée* (all published in Paris).

For the views of Russian polemists on the subject see: Shchegolev, S., *Ukrainskoe Dvizhenie kak Sovremenny Etap Yuzhno-Russkago Separatizma* (The Ukrainian Movement as the Modern Stage of South Russian Separatism), Kiev, 1912; Volkonski, Prince A., *Istoricheskaya Pravda i Ukrainofilskaya Propaganda* (Historical Truth and Ukrainophil Propaganda), Turin, 1920 (also in an Italian translation); Tsarinny, A., *Ukrainskoe Dvizhenie* (The Ukrainian Movement), Berlin, 1922.

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CHAPTER VII

THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

§1. AGRICULTURAL HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

In the political mythology of the twentieth century the legend 439
about 'the vast riches of the Ukraine' has played, and is destined to play, a certain part. In history the Ukraine will take place with the Route to the Indies, the North-West Passage, Golconda, the Empire of Prester John, and other phantasmagorias of the human mind which in their time have inspired the nations to the drama of effort and the tragedy of conflict.

In the modern world where generalization has displaced religion and where the generation made literate by popular education has thrown up 'Leaders' who are adepts in the exploitation of generalized ideas, it was inevitable that movements based on facile and false scientific, geographical and ethnical conceptions should become fashionable. 'The wheat-fields of the Ukraine' form a roseate hinterland to the Nordic Race and the Classless State in the dream-world of the masses of Central Europe. Apart, therefore, from the intrinsic interest of the subject, it becomes a matter of current importance to analyse the extent of the real resources of the Ukraine and their actual and potential relation to the economic problem of Europe.

There exists a widespread idea that the Ukraine was 'the granary 433
of the Russian Empire', but in reality it would be difficult to 311
indicate the period to which this idea could be applicable. Certainly, during the eighteenth century, as the Tartars and Turks were driven from the mouths of the Ukrainian rivers, a period of progressive prosperity set in. But under Alexander I, during the Napoleonic Wars, the bulk of the grain supply of the Empire was drawn from the southern regions of Central Russia—from the Governments of Orel, Kursk, Voronezh and Tambov. This source of supply was adequate in view of the numbers of the population at that period, and the state of the roads between the Black Sea provinces and Central Russia put a prohibitive cost on transportation from the south.

During the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I export abroad 439
developed through Odessa and the Azov ports—Taganrog and

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439 Mariupol. The supply came from the big New Russian estates and from the German, Moldavian and Serb colonies founded in the eighteenth century. Towards the middle of the century the agricultural production of the Ukraine and the New Russian Governments began to form an important proportion of the general production of the Empire, but still these regions could not be called 'the granary of Russia' on account of the continuing lack of proper means of communication with the central provinces. The upper Dniepr and the upper course of the western Dvina were too shallow to serve adequately the needs of modern transport, and as late as the Crimean War the Russian railway system had not been extended south of Moscow.

496 The first important imperial trunk lines were constructed during the sixties and seventies: Moscow-Kursk-Kharkov-Rostov-on-the-Don (with branch lines from Kursk to Kiev and from Kharkov to the Crimea); Moscow-Voronezh-Rostov-on-the-Don (with extensions to the northern Caucasus); Petersburg-Vilna-Rovno-Kiev-Odessa; Kharkov-Kremenchug (on the Dniepr)-Nikolaev. Railway construction had taken the 'meridial' direction: the economic axis of the Empire during the three decades 1860–90 ran from 'the industrial north' to 'the agricultural south'.

The new railway system improved the conditions for the export of Ukrainian and New Russian grain through the Black Sea ports. At the same time access to the north was provided by the railway 'diagonal' connecting Orel (on the Moscow-Kursk line) with Riga: this 'diagonal' continued to the south-east through the northern part of the Don region to Tsaritsyn on the lower Volga. Further, a special 'grain line' linked the Ukraine with the Baltic: starting from Kremenchug on the Dniepr, it passed through the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov, White Russia and Lithuania to the new ice-free port of Libava (Libau).

311 It thus began to appear that the Ukrainian and New Russian provinces were indeed to become the granary of the Russian Empire. But the colossal economic potentialities of the outlying [496] quarters of the Empire, which began to come into development during the second half of the nineteenth century, very soon overwhelmed this comparatively modest conception. In the seventies the first 'latitudinal' railway threw a bridge across the Volga at Samara and was continued as far as the southern Urals. The steppes beyond the Volga offered immense new space for agricultural exploitation. In the meantime the conquest of the Caucasus had been completed, and the rapid expansion of the economic life of the Kuban and Terek regions had begun. Soil conditions in the northern

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Caucasus were not inferior to those of New Russia and climatic 311
conditions were much more favourable: rainfall, owing to the proximity of the great Caucasian ranges, was more regular. The Kuban region did actually become a granary. Rostov-on-the-Don grew and flourished in true 'American style'. A new grain port, Novorossiysk, was built and soon became a rival to Odessa.

Further railway development accompanied the exploitation of 496
the Donets coal-mines and the growth of a metallurgical industry 135
centred on the Krivoy Rog iron-ore deposits located to the west of 311
the Dniepr. Two parallel lines were constructed to pass through Ekaterinoslav and the old district of the Zaporogian *Sech*, connecting the Donets basin with Krivoy Rog. Thus, simultaneously with the industrial development in the south and the flowering of the North Caucasian region, a new 'granary' and new regions of great mineral potential began at the turn of the century to impose a 'latitudinal' direction on railway construction: the opening of the great Siberian railway gave almost a priority to the possibilities of agricultural production in western and southern Siberia, and connected Chelyabinsk, through Ekaterinenburg, Vyatka and Vologda, with the Baltic ports. At the same time 'diagonal' development was proceeding far to the south-east through Turkestan to the frontiers of Afghanistan and the Chinese Empire.

The importance of the natural riches of Asiatic Russia came to be 311
realized with an ever-growing force during the reign of Nicholas II 648
(1896–1917). The principal economic axis of the Empire was evidently changing direction from the 'meridial' to the 'latitudinal'. The political policy of the Empire during the same period, with its emphasis on the Balkan Slavs and on the 'Byzantine' dreams of the epoch of Catherine II, was certainly archaistic in tendency and bore no relation to the fundamental realities of Eurasian geography.

The War of 1914–18 brought down in destruction that peculiarly hybrid cultural synthesis which was Romanov Russia; it obliterated at the same time the neo-Byzantine plans of the Pan-Slavists and weakened the whole position of Russia as a European power. The loss of a wide belt of territories (the whole inheritance of two hundred years of Romanov autocracy) between the Arctic and the Black Sea imposed on the new Soviet state the sheer necessity of a 'latitudinal' rather than a 'meridial' development. During the last two decades new efforts have been made to open up the agricultural and mineral wealth of the steppes beyond the Volga and the Ural in western and southern Siberia and of the valleys of the Altai and the Tien-Shan; and, while historic Russian ambitions in the Balkans

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311 and the Middle East have been left in suspense, a territory the size of
648 Europe and new routes into the heart of China and ultimately to the Pacific have been brought under Soviet control. Under these circumstances 'the wheat-fields of the Ukraine' receded again into the background and became of only local importance: the more so since, in the two Soviet 'Economic Plans', interest in South-Eastern Russia has been concentrated on the industrial development of the New Russian region. These conditions are illustrated by the growth of industrial centres like Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Lugansk, Zaporozhie, and the decline of the great grain port of Odessa.

311 The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine has never in fact justified the enthusiasm which it has inspired from the time of the seventeenth-century Polish poet quoted in an earlier context to the more recent period of Herr Hitler and his apostles of *Lebensraum*. The natural conditions of the Ukraine are such that they really generously reward agricultural labour, but they exact always patient, strenuous and systematic toil.

Natural conditions differ greatly over the expanse of the country which Michael Dragomanov considered to constitute 'Greater Ukraine'. The agricultural 'age' of these territories differs in the extreme. In New Russia agriculture is only a century old, while Galicia has supported a numerous population of husbandmen for nearly a thousand years.

162 *Galicia* is one of the oldest agricultural lands of all Europe and conditions there have hardly altered since the days of Daniel and his
134 *boyars*. The Galician earth, black in the eastern part, is tired old soil,
311 impoverished by incessant labour, itself prompted and intensified by
167 the ever-growing care of an ever-growing population to acquire its daily bread. Owing to the density of the population (110, and in some regions 132, inhabitants to the square kilometre) the area of holdings had been reduced to a minimum: 46 per cent of the farms comprise 2 hectares of land and sometimes less; 37 per cent comprise from 2 to 5 hectares. In a countryside where urban life has remained relatively stagnant live 75 per cent of the total population; while all commerce and crafts remain in the hands of the Jews in the large towns and in many of the villages, there is a 50 per cent surplus of hands among agricultural labourers. The peasants, Poles and Ukrainians alike, used to migrate to Germany and France as casual labour; before the last war they emigrated also in large numbers to Canada and the United States.

474 These arduous conditions of peasant life gradually developed a capacity for organization. Driven by necessity, the Galician peasantry set up a network of co-operatives for production and

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distribution. These co-operatives formed the basis of a certain national unity which found expression in the political field. 474

Volhynia, partitioned after the war of 1920 between the Poles and the Soviets, is nearly as old an agricultural country as Galicia. Here the strips of rich black earth alternate with sandy and wooded country. Although density of population is not so great as in Galicia, poverty is perhaps even greater, owing to a lack of that capacity for organization which helps the Galician labourers to survive. The large estates of the Polish nobility have long disappeared; after the last war the Polish Government divided up the land. Numerous strips were allotted to Polish soldiers on the expiration of their service—with the intention of strengthening the Polish ethnic and cultural element in the region. The disappearance of the large estates, as in Transylvania and Roumania, had a deleterious effect on agricultural production and on the proper exploitation of the forests. The majority of the people lead a half-starved existence, and the young men dream of emigration to South America. In 1937, 25 per cent of the population of Polish Volhynia had neither bread nor wood. 311 134 241 735

Podolia has been a land of cultivation since the Middle Ages, although the soil was broken up two or three hundred years later than in Galicia and Volhynia. Now, as before the period of war and revolution (1914–20), Podolia remains in a close economic relationship to the other parts of the Ukraine. The black earth of this favoured province is really fruitful and well watered by numerous small rivers; climatic conditions are better than anywhere throughout the Ukraine—rain is plentiful and regular and the winters are short. It was probably the fields and pastures, the hillocks and woods of Podolia which the Polish poet had in mind when he wrote lyrically of 'the birthplace of Ceres and Diana'. Horticulture and apiculture have long flourished there. 311 134

In the past social conditions varied with the political situation according to whether the small landowners (Ukrainian Cossacks) or the Polish landlords were in the ascendant. During the eighteenth century Polish elements had the upper hand and for some time Podolia remained the last refuge of the Polish aristocracy. Polish social influences survived the Three Partitions, and it was only after the Polish Insurrection of 1830 that conditions began to change in favour of the Russian majority in the population. 177

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century this rich land with its soft climate had become very densely populated. By the end of the century Podolia ranked second in density of population of all the regions of the Russian Empire. The Government of Moscow took 162 311

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162 first place, but in its population was included the million inhabitants
311 of the second capital of the Empire, while in Podolia there was no single town which numbered more than fifty thousand inhabitants. Density of population in Podolia reached the figure of 100 to the square kilometre, but the province was saved from the problems of over-population by the development of the large estates on capitalist lines. This process began about 1830 and developed on a large scale [178] after 1870. The beet-sugar industry with its subsidiary alcoholic distilleries, flour mills and horticulture provided a variety of livelihood for a population which by 1897 had attained to nearly four and a half millions. Between the years 1896 and 1933 more than a million and a half peasants migrated from other districts of the Ukraine to Siberia and the steppes beyond the Volga, but in Podolia emigration was scarcely perceptible.

[134] *The southern part of the Government of Kiev* along the right bank of the Dniepr enjoyed conditions somewhat similar to those in Podolia, while the northern districts resembled rather Volhynia. In the south a rich black earth supported a number of large estates where the beet-sugar industry, distilleries and mills flourished. In these southern districts were many well-to-do peasant farms covering up to 20 and 30 hectares apiece. Wheat was grown in sufficient quantities to satisfy local needs and to supply the six hundred thousand inhabitants of the city of Kiev. At the beginning of the century the population of the Government of Kiev amounted to over four and a half millions. At that time the three Governments of right-bank Ukraine (Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia) contained fourteen million inhabitants with an average density of 70–80 people per square kilometre. Such numbers were quite 'European' in their proportions and should have tended to discourage those Western dreamers who were even then casting envious eyes on the 'vacant lands' of the Ukraine.

It was almost equally difficult to discover 'vacant lands' in the [134] Governments of *left-bank Ukraine*. In Poltava, Chernigov and Kharkov the density of population amounted to 60–70 people per square kilometre. The uninterrupted belt of black earth in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov had been under the plough only since the seventeenth century—and many parts of it not before the eighteenth century. This was the land of which Alexey Tolstoy wrote: 'Know ye the land where all breathes plenty and content, where rivers flow as silver clear.' There were scarcely any towns of importance in this rural elysium. The characteristics of the Government of Kharkov, on the other hand, were quite distinct from those of the two adjoining left-bank provinces: in the north-west,

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Kharkov, in its scenery and social conditions, resembles rather the 311
neighbouring districts of the Government of Kursk, while in the 162
south-east it is already really part of New Russia.

Climatic conditions on the left bank are rather less favourable 132
than on the right bank of the Dniepr: there is a lighter rainfall which is not so evenly distributed; the winters are more severe and the region of Kharkov endures a distinctly 'continental' climate. Prince Shcherbatov, a former minister of the Imperial Government, writes that: 'One of the most important factors in agriculture is rainfall, which does not always occur under favourable conditions in the Ukraine. Most of the rain comes in summer and often takes the form of downpours which impede work in the fields and harvesting; and in the spring there is often not enough rain. Rainfall is better distributed on the right bank of the Dniepr than in other parts. The difficult climatic conditions in the Ukraine liken the average black earth harvests to average harvests in Central Europe on an average soil.'

During the nineteenth century conditions in left-bank Ukraine 311
tended to favour the growth of a prosperous class of small farmers who supplanted the big landowners of the period of Peter I and Catherine II. These conditions derived from the shortage of labour on big estates which followed the opening up of the New Russian territories and from the wave of speculation which induced landowners to sell out their properties on the left bank of the Dniepr in order to participate in 'the rush' for the new lands. Left-bank Ukraine became a country of large peasant farms covering 10, 20, 30 and as much as 50 hectares, while a number of smaller 'working' landowners retained estates up to 100, 150 and 200 hectares. Land was worth in these parts 500 rubles (about £50 sterling on the pre-war exchange) a hectare.

At the same time the growth of these large farms in the Governments of left-bank Ukraine combined with a natural increase in the population to create a serious problem of 'over-crowding'. In the eighteenth century a numerous class of peasantry had existed who did not own any land of their own at all, but who merely possessed cottages and vegetable gardens and the right to graze their stock on common pasture lands. Following the Emancipation of the Serfs in 566
1861, the number of landless peasants showed a rapid increase. The small parcels of land allotted to the liberated serfs were soon redistributed between the thrifty and the shiftless; and the division of large estates did not contribute to the establishment of agricultural industries which might have provided a living for the less fortunate. Already in the eighties symptoms of over-population were noticeable 000

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166 ALREADY IN THE EIGHTIES SYMPTOMS OF OVER-POPULATION WERE NOTICEABLE in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. The peasants continued to move on into New Russia, but by this time that region was itself becoming fairly thickly populated. Migrants pursued their way to the newer lands in the northern Caucasus and beyond the Volga. From 1890 onwards the Government took a hand in the organization of this migratory movement. According to the Emigration Department, set up at this period, the greatest number of migrants over the whole Empire came from the 'rich black earth regions' of Poltava, Chernigov, Kursk and Kharkov. However, between the years 1907 and 1913, the Poltava and Chernigov Governments, from being first and second in this respect, ranked only third and fifth. This fact is explained by the initiative of important landowners and industrialists like Kharitonenko, Tereshchenko and others who built up the sugar-beet industry on a large scale. Notwithstanding this factor, between 1906 and 1914, according to the statistics of the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia*, 1,610,000 peasants migrated from the Ukrainian Governments, while migration was also taking place from different districts of New Russia. The Ukrainians mostly went to settle the steppe area in western Siberia and the region of Orenburg; others reached the Amur and the shores of the Pacific Ocean, where the Ukrainian settlements came to be known as the Green Wedge (*Zelëny Klin*) and where the names of the wealthy villages of Novo-Kievskoe, Poltavskoe and Chernigovskoe piously recalled the origin of those who had come from the banks of the Dniepr and the Seym.

311 433 At the beginning of the twentieth century the classical 'three-field system', already prescribed as a law in the Lithuanian Statute of the sixteenth century, prevailed in left-bank Ukraine. This system answered the requirements of the small landowner or well-to-do peasant who farmed 20 to 100 hectares. Few troubled to produce more than a small surplus, the sale of which might cover their current wants. Horticulture, apiculture and some stock-raising served to supplement income. On the larger estates all the energies of the owners were directed to the lucrative exploitation of the sugar-beet industry. Stretches of land were bought or leased from peasants or small landowners in order to increase the acreage under beet. The rapid development and excellent management of the sugar-beet industry impressed and disturbed the German Commission of Professor Auhagen in 1912. By this time the industry had assumed a certain international importance. In 1914 433 there were over 190 sugar factories in the Ukraine out of 226 for the 244 whole Empire (the bulk of the balance was produced in Poland). As against 2 million hectares under wheat in the Ukraine (excluding

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the New Russian Governments) there were over 1 million hectares 433
under beetroot. Just before the last war the annual production of
beet in the Ukraine reached 150 million quintals: i.e. 18 per cent of 244
world production. The production of Ukrainian beet sugar ranked fourth—after that of America, Germany and France. In 1913 the Ukraine produced 11 million quintals of crystallized sugar. This output, together with that of the Polish factories, covered all the needs of the internal market (which during the preceding twenty-five years had augmented fourfold) and provided substantial surplus for export to the Baltic and the Middle East.

In addition to the beet processing plants, about 60 per cent of the alcohol refineries (corn, potatoes) of the Empire were located in the [274]
Ukraine. The production of vegetable oil (particularly from sunflower seed) was also important.

It has been estimated by the Soviet paper *Pravda* that approximately 1 milliard of rubles a year was paid for services on the semi-industrialized estates of landowners throughout Russia: of this sum a considerable proportion was paid for the hire of horse transport (since landowners did not maintain a large number of draught horses but hired from the villages). Of this milliard, about 300,000,000 were paid out in the Ukraine. As the peasant population of the [511]
Ukraine numbered about fifteen millions, some 20 rubles a year per head of the population was earned on 'supplementary' work on the large estates. 'Only owing to the sugar and other agricultural industries could the dense population of the Ukraine exist in such comparatively well-to-do circumstances.'

Thus the agricultural economy of Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, [241]
Chernigov and Poltava was based only partly on the production of cereals. With a population which reached nearly twenty millions, only about 2 million hectares were under wheat, while in New Russia, with a population about half that of the Ukrainian Governments, there were 4 million hectares under wheat. The Ukraine [439]
exported only small quantities of wheat to Poland and White Russia, which provinces drew the bulk of their supplies from New Russia. The real 'granaries' of Russia which supplied the whole [134]
Empire and exported a surplus abroad were the regions of the northern Caucasus and Trans-Volga with western Siberia and New Russia (including the Governments of Kherson and Ekaterinoslav with the northern part of Tauris and the southern part of Kharkov) In those regions the black earth really had a virgin quality during the first half of the nineteenth century; and its richness remains exceptional even now.

As a rule, the climatic conditions in the *New Russian Governments* 000

132 AS A RULE, THE CLIMAC CONDITIONS IN THE NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTS are much less favourable than in left-bank and especially right-bank Ukraine. They become worse going from west to east: the region of Odessa has the most equable climate and the shores of the Azov Sea the worst of all. In the east rainfall is insufficient, attaining in good years 50–40 cm. and in bad years not exceeding 20 cm., while in central and southern Ukraine it is 80 cm. and 40 cm. respectively. There is, furthermore, in the New Russian Governments an unbalanced distribution of rainfall: the country suffers from a shortage of rain in the spring when it is most needed, and from violent downpours in the summer. The climate of New Russia clearly inclines to aridity. In the old days the Black Sea steppes were covered for a short time in spring by a luxurious growth of high grass and wild flowers which disappeared in the following months. The steppe dries up completely during a period when the temperature reaches from 30° to 40° Centigrade and even the rain-storms of July and August cannot give new life to the parched ground.
241 Under such conditions field labour calls for special methods. The soil has to be ploughed deep, and great layers of earth have to be lifted—'the black fallow' which has not been dried out. The weak peasants' horses of the northern Ukraine are useless for such work. Ploughing in New Russia requires either two pairs of strong oxen or, better, mechanical traction. Before the last war, only wealthy landowners or agricultural colonies working on a co-operative basis could afford the latter method, which was introduced into New Russia as early as the end of the nineteenth century.

By force of circumstances farming in New Russia acquired quite a different character from that which had evolved in the historic countryside of old Ukraine: it even created a different landscape. 'Fruit-trees, especially cherry-trees, lend a charm to the Ukrainian landscape in the neighbourhood of Kiev and Poltava which recalls the rural landscapes of France. In New Russia, on the contrary, the lack of trees, the dryness of the climate, clouds of dust driven by the wind, lonely hamlets—all this goes to create an austere landscape which recalls rather the high plains of northern Castile. Only the endless cornfields with their undulating golden sea of wheat lend a
[361] lyric note to these flat unwooded spaces. Villages there are not picturesque and in agricultural colonies practical considerations take precedence over the desire to beautify the environment. The houses, however, are more modern, more spacious and better built. Thatched roofs have given place to tiles or sheet-iron' (Brégy and Obolensky).

Wheat forms the basis of the agricultural wealth of New Russia. Before the last war, wheat covered 25 per cent of all the farmed

land in the Ukraine and New Russia: of 25 million hectares of 241
arable, 6½ million were under wheat, and of these 4½ million were
in New Russia. Ukrainian and New Russian production attained 433
90 million quintals a year, of which 70 million came from the New 241
Russian Governments. (In addition, the Ukraine produced for internal consumption about 30 million quintals of rye—in the northern districts—nearly as much barley, and about 20 million quintals of oats.) The wheat crop of the Ukraine and New Russia represented 8 per cent of the total world, and 18 per cent of European, production. With an average production of 70 million quintals a year, the New Russian Governments could throw an important surplus on to the world market. Before the Revolution about 76 per cent of the crop was retained in the villages for food, storage and seed (on the larger mechanized estates and co-operative colonies the average was round 70 per cent). The balance, about 20 million quintals, went on the market: of it about one-quarter was absorbed by the towns and industrial centres of New Russia. [439]
Under these conditions the three New Russian Governments had available for export abroad 15 million quintals of wheat, i.e. about 1½ million tons. The crop of New Russia and the northern Caucasus was exported to the Ottoman Empire, Greece and particularly to Italy, where the 'hard' types of grain were appreciated as an ingredient of macaroni and other *paste*. Even after the last war and all the ruin of agriculture resulting from the Revolution, the Soviet Press, in 1929, could boast that about 1½ million tons of wheat had been exported through the New Russian and North Caucasian ports (Professor Brutskus holds that this export—the relation of which to total production greatly exceeded pre-War proportions—was one of the factors in preparing the way for the terrible famine of 1932).

'From remote times the Ukraine and New Russia were famous 231
for their draught oxen. Further, many landowners possessed herds of foreign cattle, principally Swiss breeds. All the German colonies bred good milkers' (Shcherbatov). In 1914 there were estimated to be over 9 million head of cattle, 6 million sheep (numbers of them of valuable breed) and 5 to 6 million pigs in the Ukrainian and New Russian Governments (the pigs predominated in northern and western Ukraine and sheep in the New Russian steppes). South Russia, an ideal horseman's country, possessed also a vast number of horses. Before the last war there were reckoned to be 5½ million horses in the Ukraine and New Russia (1 horse to every 5–6 people, and one-sixth of all the horses in the Empire). Government studs, and those of private landowners and of certain *zemstva*, maintained

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231 a high standard of breeding—particularly of draught horses. The Army Remount Department fulfilled a third of its requirements in the south, and there was a considerable export abroad. As a result of the Revolution, breeding suffered probably more than any other branch of rural production. Statistics for 1922 illustrate the disastrous effect of the Revolution on livestock throughout the whole Empire. In 1916 the total head of cattle was about 60 million: in 1922, 23 million. The number of horses in 1916 was estimated at 35 million: in 1922 at 20 million. Sheep numbered 120 million in 1916: 46 million in 1922. In view of the fact that South Russia was the principal field of the Civil War, it is probable that about 50 per cent of the horses and cattle destroyed were lost in this region. It is reckoned that in the Ukraine and New Russia only one-third of the pigs remained and one-quarter of the sheep. Losses in domestic animals are much more difficult to recover than losses in other branches of domestic industry; further, the special conditions of field labour in New Russia required a large proportion of draught oxen and horses.

[656] 433 One of the principal reasons which compelled Lenin to formulate the New Economic Policy was the necessity of restoring the food production of the Soviet Union.

'"War Communism" and attempts to introduce "integral socialism" into the countryside ended in 1922. At that date began the period of "liberalism" in Communist policy in relation to the villages. The peasantry were allowed freedom in the choice of land labour and almost complete freedom in other economic activities. The years between 1922 and 1929 produced excellent results: the lost sowing area was recovered and breeding was resumed. The food question in the country was improving' (Prof. 113 Markov, *Socialist Economy in U.S.S.R.*, Part 2, *Agriculture*, Paris, 1937). By 1929 agricultural production approached pre-war standards (150–160 million quintals of cereals compared with 200 millions average for the years 1909–13). In spite of the fact that, following the break-up of large estates, the peasants had expanded the sown area at the expense of pasture (and according to the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia* were showing a diminishing average on arable of 15–20 per cent as a result of more primitive methods of farming), the breeding of cattle and horses was nearing pre-war figures and the production of pigs was improving.

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§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revo- 000
lution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the 565
years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that 665
the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable 661
adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was 183
therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. 423
The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to 661
a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this 565
case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely 474
ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were [668]
unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

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423 1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political
661 and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding
565 chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the
474 redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution
[433] against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable: during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to
475 the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the
474 new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—
661 including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

474 As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really
423 serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the
656 Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32, and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

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had been based. '"Liberal" tendencies began already in 1932 in the sense that *kolkhozniki* (individual members of the *Kolkhozy*) were allowed to keep their own cattle (Decree of 4 February 1932). Subsequently, in 1935, *kolkhozniki* were accorded the right to farm their own private allotments within the boundaries of the *Kolkhozy*.

These modifications in policy soon gave positive results. It is difficult to say whether the *Kolkhozy* have come to be accepted by the peasantry as the permanent basis of rural life. At the same time there can be no doubt that the grant of certain rights of private farming to the *kolkhozniki*, combined with a relatively free market, has tended to a notable improvement in the conditions of peasant life. In consequence food production throughout the whole country has again increased.

There are now four forms of farming in existence side by side in the Soviet countryside:

(*a*) *Sovkhozy* (State farms);
(*b*) Individual farms;
(*c*) *Kolkhozy* (Collective farms);
(*d*) Allotments belonging to the *kolkhozniki* within the area of the *Kolkhozy*.

The relative importance of these different types of farm can be judged from the areas allotted to each in the 'sowing plan' of 1936: *Sovkhozy* covered 16 million hectares; individual farms, 5 million; *Kolkhozy*, 108 million; *kolkhozniki* holdings, 8 million.

Obviously, the *Kolkhozy* constitute the most important source of agricultural production. On an estimated yield of 8·3 quintals per hectare, the *Kolkhoz* pays 1·7 quintals to the state in taxes; 3·3 to the governmental 'machine stations' which provide and maintain plant; the balance goes to the *kolkhozniki*. The *Kolkhozy*, with a sowing area of rather over 100 million hectares and a yield of 7 quintals per hectare, supply the state organizations with about 150 million quintals (approximately 15 million tons) surplus over the consumption of the rural population. This reckoning is, of course, purely theoretical, but, in 1934, when bread rations existed for the town population, the administration did distribute about 10 million tons of bread.

The importance of the *kolkhozniki* (who are allowed to cultivate from ¼ hectare to 1 hectare each) lies in the production of vegetables and fruit and, to a certain extent, of livestock. The Plan for 1937 estimated that individual farmers and *kolkhozniki* possessed 29 million head of cattle as compared with 4½ million owned by the *Kolkhozy* over their vastly greater acreage. The private farmers and

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423 *kolkhozniki* were reckoned to be even richer in pigs, of which they
471 counted 15 million against 5 million on the *Kolkhozy* and an even
433 lesser number on the *Sovkhozy*. The tiny bits of land which belong to the *kolkhozniki* personally, as well as their domestic animals, have become a school of individual farming which has grown up in the middle of 'the Socialist experiment' as a compromise with the dictates of economics and human nature. In twenty-eight towns in 1938, 82 per cent rye flour, 74 per cent wheat flour, 86 per cent beef, 93 per cent milk, 97 per cent eggs, 87 per cent potatoes, and 72 per cent cabbages, were brought to market by *kolkhozniki* and individual farmers, and only the balance came from the state and collective farms. True the official statisticians could find comfort in the fact that as against the general balance of state commerce which amounted to 100 milliards of roubles the free market only absorbed 16 milliards: but the free market shows a definite tendency to grow and in four years has doubled its transactions.

656 The successful private initiative of the *kolkhozniki* has already
423 begun to weigh upon the minds of the protagonists of the integral Revolution. In the spring of 1938 a Government Decree proclaimed that 'abuses are observed on those allotments of land which are given over to *kolkhozniki* for the personal cultivation of kitchen-gardens or other domestic needs. These abuses consist in the fact that the allotments are sometimes not situated next to the habitations of the *kolkhozniki*, but lie in the middle of *Kolkhoz* lands and exceed the size allowed by the law. The worst part of it all is that these allotments have become the principal care of *kolkhozniki*, and that they show negligence in the accomplishment of their duties in collective farming. It has also been affirmed that these allotments are sometimes cultivated by people who are not members of *Kolkhozy*. A stop has to be put to this state of things as it leads to the development of bourgeois tendencies. The dangerous influence of *kuláki*, who have succeeded in escaping, is suspected.' As a result of this situation, Stalin, by a Decree of 15 August 1939, ordered a 'verification' of all allotments taken over by *kolkhozniki* for personal cultivation: he took the opportunity to recall the law which provided that such allotments were not to exceed ¼ or ½ a hectare. It was also declared that all allotments in isolated situations in the middle of *Kolkhoz* land were illegal and should be abolished: special attention was directed to *Kolkhozy* lying in the Ukraine and Western Russia. *Kolkhozniki*, whose individual allotments were to be abolished, were themselves to be expelled from their *Kolkhozy* and united in new *Kolkhozy* in regions where 'new land' could be found. For this purpose attention was directed to the lands beyond the Volga, in

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western Siberia, the Altai and the Far East. The execution of Stalin's commands is to be completed by September 1940. It is not to be anticipated that the acute conditions of 1929–34 will be repeated as a result of this new drive against the human nature of the Russian rural masses: the Communist machine has broken the strength of peasant society. At the same time, there is little doubt that the harvest of 1939–40 will not be as abundant as those of 1936–8.

The influence of the Revolution and of the Soviet régime on forestry in the South of Russia has been no less baleful than on other branches of rural industry. At the end of the nineteenth century woods covered 20 per cent of the whole area of the Ukraine; in 1928, according to the most optimistic estimates of Soviet statisticians, they did not occupy more than 7 per cent. Even in such a 'half-steppe' region as Poltava, owing to the care of the Imperial Government and of large landowners, woods had covered 10 per cent of the total area. 'Destruction of forests is one of the greatest evils because it is followed by the formation of deep ravines which drain the district of underground waters. The consequence of the formation of such ravines is that streams carry away valuable soil to the rivers and the sea. Every year thousands of hectares of good black earth are lost to the labourer and only serve to make the Dniepr and its affluents more shallow. The destruction of forests, the formation of ravines, the drying up of underground waters, threaten the future of the Ukraine with the gravest consequences.'

The Soviet Government is well aware of the dark side of its 'achievement' in the agricultural life of the South of Russia. But, as is well known, the Soviet leaders intend to effect a radical change in the balance of productive forces within the Union. Their reasons for this intention are both political and ideological: political because they realize that their dictatorship rests upon the industrial proletariat and has always aroused the antagonism of the peasants; ideological because they are the apostles of the mechanistic conception of life and, hypnotized by the material achievements of the capitalist world, they ape it in their attempt to transform it and can seek nothing more profound than the realization of Stalin's dream 'to catch up and surpass America'.

In 1913 the relation of agricultural to industrial production in Russia was 59·4 to 40·6. Under the original Five Year Plan formulated in 1928 the Soviets aimed at the attainment of a balance which should allocate 80·2 to industry and only 19·8 to agriculture. This fantastic aim was based obviously on the possibilities of bringing into exploitation the vast mineral resources which were known to lie under the soil of the Soviet Union. And all the political ruthless-

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433 ness and ideological fanaticism which are so characteristic of Com-
185 munist psychology—itself a manifestation of a certain state of spiritual sterility—were brought to bear to achieve ultimate objects, which on the American continent during the preceding century had been attained by more balanced, hardly less heroic, and certainly less catastrophic methods.

§ 3. INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

135 The industrial development of the Ukraine has been based on the
131 exploitation of the coal deposits of the Donets basin and of the iron-ore and manganese fields situated west of the Dniepr. Abundant layers of coal are found along both banks of the Donets. The eastern part of the carboniferous region lies within the territory of the Don with its Cossack population. The western part, which constitutes about two-thirds of the whole region, is situated within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine.

Whether the Donets region properly belongs to the Ukraine is a question which has never been definitely settled. Historically, the lands along the right bank of the river Donets in its northern part belonged to that 'New Ukraine' which began to be populated in the second half of the seventeenth century by settlers from Muscovy and by fugitives from Hetman's Ukraine—at that time devastated by the Turkish invasions of Ahmed Köprülü and Kara Mustafa. Subsequently, these lands were incorporated in the Government of Kharkov. The lands along the southern course of the Donets formed part of the extreme eastern angle of New Russia where settled life only really began in the eighteenth century after the Tartar Nogay Horde, which roamed over this region, had retired beyond the Volga.

In 1917 the Provisional Government, in admitting five Ukrainian Governments as the legitimate area for the exercise of 'the national and cultural influence of the Kiev *Rada*', excluded the Government of Kharkov for the reason that the Donets coal area lay within it. The Ukrainian language is not commonly spoken in the coal-fields, and even if the large numbers of temporary labourers who come in from the north are ignored, not more than half the population of Donbass (the Donets coal area) can boast of their Ukrainian origin. In general, this region has nothing which unites its mixed industrial population to the essentially Ukrainian rural population of adjoining regions to the west. The only real link which connects the Donets coal-fields with the industrial districts along the Dniepr and the manganese and iron-ore regions is a purely economic one.

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According to both German and Soviet geological calculations, the reserves of coal in the Donets area amount to about 55 milliard tons. The deposits are largely anthracite—inferior in quality to Welsh.

Donets coal was the basis of the early industrial development of the South of Russia. Exploitation was begun in the middle of the nineteenth century; the construction of railway lines speeded up development during the seventies, and in the eighties Donets coal was already in use in the industries of the Moscow and Petersburg regions. After the discovery, about 1890, of abundant iron-ore deposits to the west of the lower Dniepr, the Donets coal industry acquired a rapidly growing importance. Between 1900 and 1913 output was increased at the rate of 17 per cent per annum. In 1913 the Ukrainian part of the coal-field delivered 23 million tons: in 1916, 29 million. During this period the Donets fields supplied all the southern industries with coal, and its contribution to northern industries became important with the construction of a new line direct from the mine area to Moscow. More than half the coal industry, before the Revolution, was financed by French capital.

For some time after the Revolution the output of the mines was relatively insignificant: during 1919 the area was the scene of desperate battles between 'Whites' and 'Reds', and later it was devastated by the raids of Makhno and other anarchic *atamany*. The famine of 1921–2 accentuated the terrible conditions. During the period of the New Economic Policy, output of coal gradually revived, and in 1929 fell little short of that of 1913. The First Five Year Plan prescribed the accelerated industrialization of the Ukrainian mineral-bearing areas. The social struggle which formed part of the 'Revolution against Peasantry' did not particularly affect the Donets, but the famine of 1932–3 had its influence there. Nevertheless, if Soviet statistics are to be credited, the Government succeeded in coping with the difficulties, and in 1934 a production of 68 million tons of coal and anthracite was claimed—representing an output in excess of that of France. Ukrainian production occupied fourth place—after U.S., Great Britain and Germany. For 1938, Soviet statistics gave a production of 74 million tons out of a total of 104½ million tons for the whole of the Soviet Union. The average annual increase in production for the last five years, 1934–9, is substantially less than that for the preceding five years, 1929–34. One of the reasons for this is stated to be the difficulty of retaining labour which was available during the period of social conflict in the countryside, but which has drifted back to the farms following improvement in the conditions in the *Kolkhozy*. Labour

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464 labour is very fluid in Donbass; an annual turnover of 40–50 per cent is estimated.

Soviet official information concerning the iron-ore industry 135 of Krivoy Rog is probably more reliable than that concerning 316 Donbass. The reserves of iron ore of high quality (40 per cent iron) are reckoned at 1100 million tons; some Ukrainian economists put these in excess of 3000 million tons. Mining in the Krivoy Rog (south-west of Ekaterinoslav and south-east of Elizavetgrad) began in the nineties and attained considerable proportions by the beginning of the present century. For the years 1913–16 average output was about 5 million tons per annum. According to Soviet statistics, output for 1938 was round 18 million tons.

Conditions for the development of metallurgical industry are extraordinarily favourable in New Russia: on one side of the Dniepr coal, and on the other iron. This is not all: along the banks of the Dniepr itself, round Nikopol and Khvochevatka, to the south of the old ground of the Zaporogian *Sech*, are rich mines of manganese, the quality of which is little inferior to that of the Georgian deposits at Chiaturi. According to the estimates of Ukrainian economists, reserves on the Dniepr amount to about 400 million tons: even if these estimates are exaggerated, there can be no doubt that the deposit is one of the most valuable in the world.

The production of the Dniepr manganese mines has risen from 260,000 tons in 1916 to over 1,000,000 tons in 1938. If the U.S.S.R. is the principal world producer, the Ukraine alone ranks before British India and South Africa (from which two latter countries it is worth recalling that Germany imported 585,000 tons in 1937).

The deposits of coal in Donbass, of iron at Krivoy Rog and of manganese round Nikopol are connected by railway lines which function probably more efficiently than any others in U.S.S.R. The juxtaposition of the mineral deposits and the metallurgical plants ensures full loads both ways. Only 18 per cent of Donets coal is exported outside the Ukraine, and only 5 per cent of the iron ore; the balance is consumed by the South Russian industries. Manganese, on the other hand, is exported abroad in large quantities.

325 Important metallurgical plants (70 per cent of the capital of 103 which had been found by French and Belgian houses) existed in the South of Russia prior to the Revolution. In the 'Eastern' (Donets-Azov) group were included the following works: 'The New Russian' (station, Yuzovka, recalling the name of the Welshman Hughes); 'The Russo-Belgian' (Enakievo); 'The Kramatorsky' (Kramatorskaya); 'The Konstantinovsky' (Konstantinovskaya); 'The Donets-Yuriev' (Alchevskaya); 'The Nikopol-Mariupol'

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(Mariupol); 'The Russian Providence' (near Mariupol); 'The Kerch' (near Kerch). In the 'Western' (Dniepr) group the principal works were: 'The Gdantsev' (Krivoy Rog); 'The Dniepr' (near Ekaterinoslav); 'The Alexandrovsky' (near Alexandrovsk). Almost all these works have continued to function under the Soviets; during the course of the last twenty years some have been considerably enlarged and others modernized. Some have been renamed: e.g. 'Alexandrovsky', now 'Zaporogian Steel'; 'Gdantsev', 'Krivoy Rog'; 'Russian Providence', 'Azov Steel'. These three, particularly, have become very important plants. 325 103

The Ukrainian and New Russian metallurgical industry comprises 45 blast furnaces and 118 open-hearth furnaces. In the twenty-five years between 1913 and 1938 the output of pig iron has been expanded from 3 million to nearly 8 million tons; rolled iron from 1 million to 3 million; steel from 2 to 5 million tons. Thus, the metallurgical industry of Ukraine and New Russia (excluding the rest of U.S.S.R.) ranks fourth in world production of pig iron (after U.S., Germany and Great Britain) and fifth in the production of steel and rolled iron (after U.S., Germany, Britain and France). In 1938 the Ukrainian and New Russian industries produced 55 per cent of all Russian pig iron, 35 per cent of all steel and 25 per cent of all rolled iron. Concentrated within a comparatively limited region the heavy industry of New Russia and the Ukraine constitutes the most highly developed industrial area of the Soviet Union. 327

The Revolutionary régime was fortunate in inheriting a wide area of industrialization which, in the immediate pre-Revolutionary period, had been expensively equipped with modern plants by West European capitalist groups. The régime cannot be considered to have achieved anything remarkable in further development, and had the capitalist system of promotion been allowed to survive it is probable that progress would have been more rapid.

The most spectacular (and widely advertised) achievement of the Soviet régime in the Ukraine has been the construction of the grandiose hydro-electric plant in the neighbourhood of the rapids of the Dniepr (Dnieprostroy). A new source of energy (about 600,000 kilowatts), equivalent to a third of the electric energy produced in the Ukraine, has been made available for industry. Dnieprostroy may, however, be considered as a somewhat redundant reinforcement of the power sources of the country which could only have been undertaken by a régime which was not hampered by considerations of productive yield on capital investment. In view of the vast deposits of coal and anthracite to hand and of the as yet unexplored reserves of lignite, the development of a new source of 377

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377 energy was not of urgent importance. Dnieprostroy supplies neighbouring towns and industrial plants with light and power (including the new 'Dniepr Electrical-Metallurgical Works' and the 'Dniepr Aluminium Works'), but the electrification of the railways of Soviet Ukraine has not yet been undertaken, nor does this appear necessary in view of the cheap supplies of fuel locally available.

397 As for machine and other mechanical works, there were in existence before 1916: 'Hartmann's Locomotive Works' at Lugansk; 392 the more modern 'Kharkov Locomotive Works' and 'The Electro-103 Mechanical Works', also at Kharkov; and a series of smaller machine works (particularly for the manufacture of agricultural machinery) at Sumy, Alexandrovsk, Berdyansk, Odessa and Kiev. The Soviet Government considerably enlarged the 'Lugansk Locomotive Works', and recently machine and locomotive works have been in process of construction and subsequent enlargement at Kramatorskaya (in the Donets region). New 'Tractors' Construction Works' have been built in Kharkov. Machinery plants have been founded in Berdyansk and Cherkassy; the old Kiev and Alexandrovsk works have been enlarged; and new agricultural machinery works have been built in Elizavetgrad, Melitopol and Kherson. The shipbuilding works in Nikolaev continue to supply the Black Sea fleet as before the Revolution. There, during the last war, ships were in construction for the Imperial Navy; armour-plate being manufactured in the 'Nikopol-Mariupol Works'.

381 Some progress has been made in the development of a chemical industry based on the abundant supplies of coal in Donbass. There are chemical processing plants at Slavyansk and Lisichansk, and near the railway stations of Gorlovka and Konstantinovka. The industry is still in the experimental stage, but Soviet 'Plans' envisage the supply of 30 per cent of the needs of the home market.

433 The Soviet emphasis on the development of Ukrainian heavy industry and a parallel neglect of the possible expansion of light industries has produced a badly balanced economy in Soviet Ukraine and the country remains dependent on other and often distant parts of the Union for the satisfaction of many of the needs of the people. Political considerations which aim at establishing the complete interdependence of the various parts of the Union are at the basis of the particular direction of the Five Year Plans in the Ukraine. The emigré Ukrainian economist, V. Sadovsky, writes: 'In 1934, 69·4 per cent of industry went to the production of materials and of the tools of production, and only 34·6 per cent for general needs. In this sense the relations existing in 1913 were

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different: 51 per cent and 49 per cent.' It is necessary to add that Sadovsky includes in production intended 'for general use' in both periods the output of agricultural industry: i.e. sugar, spirits, flour and sunflower oil. If these figures for rural industry are excluded, those for so-called 'light industry' remain practically negligible. For example, only 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in U.S.S.R. are derived from the Ukraine; and there is no manufacture of cloth or leather goods.

As Sadovsky justly remarks, the policy of exclusively encouraging heavy industry has resulted in the neglect of the economic interests of the western and central Ukraine. In effect, with the policy of industrializing eastern and south-eastern Ukraine, the Soviets have shown a tendency to de-industrialize the wide and rich western provinces. Here the basis of their policy is probably strategic as well as political. 'In a series of towns of right-bank Ukraine such as Zhitomir, Berdichev, Zhmerinka, Mohilev-Podolsk, Uman, Smela, signs of decadence can be observed during the period of the Five Year Plans.'

The 'Economic Plans' of the Soviet Government are subordinated to a general political policy which, as has been explained in the preceding chapter, aims at the complete fusion of the Soviet Ukraine with the rest of U.S.S.R.; and according to Communist theory political unity can only be based on economic fusion. In forcing the pace of the development of heavy industry in the south and south-east to the detriment of the light and agricultural industries of the rest of the country, the Moscow Government pursues two objectives. First, the importance of the Ukrainian national element in the Ukraine is reduced. 'The Ukrainian people are an old people of agricultural civilization and have never shown any inclination for industrial work and life in big towns. The Ukrainian prefers the country if he can earn his living there, and if it is necessary he finds work in the different branches of rural industry' (Brégy and Obolensky). According to official Soviet statistics on the nationality of workers in the Ukraine, the coal industry employs 75 per cent Russians and 25 per cent Ukrainians; the metallurgical, 73 per cent and 22 per cent respectively; the building trades 56 per cent and 37 per cent (*The National Policy of the Russian Communist Party Expressed in Figures*, p. 177). About 50 per cent only of the people in the Donets region are Ukrainians, and among the urban population of the whole of Soviet Ukraine 70 per cent are not Ukrainians. In two big towns like Odessa and Kharkov only 25 per cent of the inhabitants are Ukrainians. The same phenomenon can be observed in centres like Mariupol and Lugansk. In this wise the

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185 development of industrial centres in the Ukraine and New Russia
433 leads to a preponderance of 'new-comers'—in fact, of that social element on whose support the Soviets could rely in a political struggle with the forces of Ukrainian nationalism.

The second political objective which the Soviet Government has pursued is the strengthening of the economic dependence of the Ukraine on the rest of the Union. 'The Soviet Government systematically and intentionally binds Southern industry with strong bonds to the industries of other parts of the Union. This conclusion is imposed by a study of the categories of goods which are transported by the Soviet railways in a "meridial" direction. A considerable part of rail transport in Soviet Ukraine is engaged on the carriage of the half-finished products of industrial works by the most complicated and lengthy routes, e.g. from the banks of the Dniepr to the Urals or from the Moscow district to the Donets region and back. If a comparison is made of goods transported from south to north and from north to south, it will be seen that the machine works of the Ukraine do not "finish" their products, but that these are sent for the final processes to different and sometimes distant parts of the U.S.S.R. The motor industry, in particular, strongly binds the Central Russian region, South Russia, the Volga region and the Urals. Tractors and different agricultural machines can only be "finished" in Ukraine after being sent to receive certain parts from the north or north-east. The Soviet Government evidently is ready to make heavy sacrifices in finance and efficiency in order to attain its political ends which are to bind with strong economic ties all the different parts of the Union' (V. Levitsky).

433 Under such conditions, therefore, it is not possible to speak of 'Ukrainian economy' as an independent whole. Partly through natural causes and partly as a result of the political policy of the Soviet Government, the interdependence of the Ukraine and Great Russia has become even more definite than it was twenty years ago. The development of heavy industry, which has far exceeded the needs of the Ukrainian land itself, and the decline of agriculture has led to a strengthening of the 'meridial' tie (while at the same time Moscow, by somewhat similar measures, is strengthening the 'latitudinal' tie with the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia and is even extending it in this last direction into the outlying provinces of the former Chinese Empire).

The possibility of a wholly independent 'Greater Ukraine' (including present Soviet Ukraine with the additions of eastern Galicia (now incorporated in Soviet Ukraine), Bukovina and Carpathian Rus, may certainly be considered (as Ukrainians some-

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times do) from the angle of the 'economic potentialities' of the country regarded as a unit separate from Great Russia. Neither over-populated Galicia nor the poverty-stricken Carpathian valleys could contribute to increase the sum of the wealth of a 'Greater Ukraine'. (The oil-fields of Kolomiya and Stanislavov, with their modest production of 500,000 tons a year, are not an important factor.) But the addition to the population of Soviet Ukraine (34 millions) of the 10 million poor peasants of the outlying provinces should not strain the resources of the Dniepr lands, and the new human material should, in fact, provide increased wealth. 433

The most remarkable feature of Ukrainian 'economic potentialities' is the fortunate balance between agricultural and industrial riches. Such a fortunate balance cannot be found in any country in Europe except France. The population of 'Greater Ukraine' rather exceeds that of France, as does the total area (588,000 sq. km. in Ukraine against 563,000 sq. km. in France). The average density of population (70.6 inhabitants per sq. km.) is also about the same as in France. 'Economic potentialities' are curiously comparable. The capacity of the Ukrainian harvest is about 200 million quintals (although this is not attained under the Soviet system of agriculture), double that of France which is not quite self-sufficient, but the French output of coal is about 55–60 million tons; the Ukrainian about 70 million. France produces 7–10 million tons of pig iron and from 8–10 million tons of steel. The corresponding figures for the Ukraine are 8 million tons of pig iron and 5 million tons of steel.

Ukrainian patriots who dream of a wholly independent 'Greater Ukraine' claim that the 'economic potentialities' of their country prove that this conception is not utopian. And in that sense, of course, they are right. 'Economic potentialities', in relation to the general complex of conditions which are required by the independent life of a country, are, however, to borrow an expression from mathematics, 'necessary' but not 'sufficient'. These 'economic potentialities' may promise a happy balance between agriculture and industry, but it is only in theory that the harmonious development of economic life remains possible, in practice it can encounter different obstacles in the political, social and cultural conditions which are determined by the course of history.

Ukrainian nationalists claim, for instance, that, should an independent 'Greater Ukraine' become established, life would arrange itself in the natural course of things and that light industries and crafts would arise to satisfy all the immediate needs of the population. Here, however, lies a far more difficult problem than would appear at first sight. Neither the Soviet nor the Imperial Governments can

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433 be held to have been primarily responsible for the backwardness of craftsmanship in the Ukraine nor of those 'light industries' which may be said to have taken the place of the crafts in the modern world. Crafts are created as a result of a long historical process which marches with the cultural development of a country. In the Ukraine a modern capitalist heavy industry was superimposed upon the structure of a rather backward rural economy in the latter half of the nineteenth century. By contrast France is the living embodiment of cultural processes which have produced a harmonious economic life where agriculture and both 'heavy' and 'light' industries are blended in such happy combination and where the work of craftsmen has reached perfection. But then France has a long independent historical past behind her, the political and social experiences of a nation of genius and great achievements in all the domains which challenge the human mind and human activities.

In this wise even 'the economic problem' of 'Greater Ukraine' is not limited by simple figures concerning her 'economic potentialities'. Therefore 'the political problem' which the present and future of the Ukraine represents becomes even more complex. With all the assets of her 'economic potentialities', with all the positive features which can be observed in her economic life even under present conditions, the Ukraine is still very far, as regards herself and other countries concerned, from a satisfactory solution of 'the political problem' of her form in the present and the future. The 'Ukrainian problem' is, perhaps, one of the chief reasons for the absence of balance in continental Europe.

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113 Any attempt to acquire an objective view of the course of economic life in the Soviet Union calls for an attentive, prudent and critical survey of the vast material published on the subject in Soviet periodicals during the past two decades. A work of this kind is beyond the resources of a single student and requires the corporate study of whole institutions, as for instance: the International Agricultural Institute in Rome; the East European Institute in Breslau (under the direction of Professor Auhagen); the Ukrainian Academy of Podebrady (Czechoslovakia); the Economic Cabinet of Professor Prokopovich in Prague; the Society for the Study of Modern Russia in Paris; the Bureau for Researches on Russia in Birmingham.

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Soviet Statistics

No less a person than the President of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party, Orzhonikidze, during the Moscow Regional Congress of the Party in 1929, said: 'It would seem that no one should be more trustworthy than persons employed in statistical work, conscientiously adding up their figures—and that is all. But no! These people with us have become a political factor and are well aware of it.' Orzhonikidze further affirmed that: 'The Statistical Bureau makes a terrible muddle of all its materials.' In 1930 Syrtsov, who was then President of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, found that: 'The pace of production in Soviet statistics is ordered beforehand and is not a result of calculation' (*Ekonomicheskaya Zhisn*, 2/18 December, 1930).

Dr Albrecht Kaysenbrecht is of opinion that: 'Among the staff of the statistical workers are very experienced and scientifically well-qualified persons. The whole misfortune consists in the fact that Soviet statistics are the slave of the Government and are dominated by purely political considerations' (*Die Entwicklung der Agrärfrage in Soviet Russland*, Schmöllers Jahrbuch, 1926). In 1927 Trotsky expressed the opinion that intentionally faked statistics had begun to alter the whole outlook on the actual situation. 'The figures of Soviet statistics are very doubtful' is the view of Professor Auhagen (*Ost-Europa*, Breslau, June, 1931).

As for agriculture, there is no doubt that the reports which come in every five days during the spring sowing season 'according to law' are frequently faked. 'The sowing area is often reckoned according to the quantity of seed which has been given out for this purpose without any assurance as to

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whether it has been properly used. For instance, one of the Ukrainian *Kolkhozy* reported that it had accomplished 50 per cent of the Sowing Plan when in reality it had only accomplished 2 per cent of it' (*Pravda*, 14 June, 1932). The harvest is continually assessed 'by the look of it in the fields' before it has been gathered in. Over a series of years the harvest has been between 20 and 30 per cent less than reports showed it to be. 113

The comparisons between Soviet actuality and pre-Revolutionary conditions are often unconvincing because Soviet statistics do not take quality into consideration. For instance, according to Soviet statistics, the output of peat has risen by 30 per cent. In reality, only the percentage of moisture retained in the peat accepted for delivery has risen.

In the *Times* article on 'The Plight of the Plan' (29 January, 1938) this question of quantity being the chief concern, irrespective of quality, in all the most important branches of industry in Soviet Ukraine, is discussed: 'The coal-mines show impressive figures but quantity is the chief concern. This has risen threefold or fourfold in the last decades, but recent disclosures indicate that the calorific value of the coal leaving Soviet mines is less even than that of the output in old Russia. The production of iron ore has gone up at a similar rate, but the final result is similar.' Cf. Makcheef, Th. (Maksheev), 'Heavy Industry in the Soviet Union,' *Contemporary Russia*, II, 2, London, 1938.

The Territory of Soviet Ukraine

Out of the 588,000 sq. km. claimed for 'Greater Ukraine', Soviet Ukraine occupied (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia in September 1939) 452,000. This area represents 2·1 per cent of the whole extent of the U.S.S.R. Soviet Ukraine occupies the territory of eight former Governments of the Empire: Kharkov, Chernigov (less five northern districts), Poltava, Ekaterinoslav (now renamed Dniepropetrovsk), Kherson, Podolia, Volhynia (excluding, until September 1939, the western districts annexed to Poland in 1921), Kiev. Three northern districts of the former Government of Tauris (Berdyansk, Melitopol, Dnieprovsk) are also included. The Putivl district of the former Kursk Government as well as some villages of the former Orel Government are also deemed to form part of the Ukraine. 131

In 1924 an 'Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic' was formed out of the Podolian districts of Balta and Tulchin along the Dniestr in order to give a semblance of self-government to the Roumanian-speaking villages of that region. The area of A.S.S.R. Moldavia is 8288 sq. km. and the population 572,000. The capital is located at Tiraspol.

The capital of the Ukrainian S.S.R. until 1934 was Kharkov; it is now Kiev.

In 1925 the administrative divisions of the area occupied by the Republic were reorganized into 40 Districts, 662 Regions, and 10,733 village and town Soviets. In 1929 the Districts were abolished out of economy and 7 *Oblasti* (Provinces) were established, roughly equivalent in size to the former Governments. These are: Vinnitsa (formerly Podolia), Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkov, Chernigov and Donets. Seven 'National Minority' Regions have been set up, and also 366 'National Minority' village Soviets 631

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63/ in localities where non-Ukrainian elements predominate—Great Russians, White Russians, Greeks, Germans, Moldavians, Jews.

The largest towns of Soviet Ukraine are Kiev (625,000), Kharkov (650,000), Odessa (550,000), Dniepropetrovsk (former Ekaterinoslav, 325,000). Lvov, in 'Greater Ukraine', recently annexed to Soviet Ukraine, has 375,000 inhabitants. It is characteristic of current economic trends that the population has grown in Kharkov and decreased in Odessa (700,000 in 1916). Industrial centres have grown rapidly: Lugansk, Mariupol, Zaporozhie (formerly Alexandrovsk) have each of them over 100,000 inhabitants; Nikolaev and Kherson have each about 100,000. There are no large towns in Central and Western Ukraine: the most important of them, Vinnitsa and Poltava, have not more than 80,000 inhabitants each. Now we have Czernowitz (Chernovtsy), Kishinev and Jassy, each about 120,000.

The Population of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

161 The Census of 1 January 1933 gave the population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. as 31,901,000 persons. The figures for the more recent Census of 1937 are not sufficiently clear. (It is well known that the Government was displeased at the incompetent way in which this latter Census was carried out, and Stalin himself has expressed his dissatisfaction.) At any rate it is not denied that the increase of population in the Ukraine during the five years 1933–7 was at a rate lower than that for the whole Union calculated (with obvious exaggeration) at 16 per cent. The rate of increase in the Ukraine was considerably lower than in many of the eastern parts of the Union, notably Turkestan and the Kirghiz steppe—for which the obviously fantastic figures of 30 per cent and even 40 per cent were given. For the Ukraine the official increase was 6·6 per cent. On the basis of the figures for 1933, therefore, the population, allowing for increase, amounts to about 34,000,000 for 1938–9.

On the same territory about 30,000,000 people lived in 1917. In view of the fact that the normal increase in Russia before the Revolution was reckoned at 1·5 per cent p.a. and in some localities at 2 per cent p.a., the population of the Ukraine, under the social and political conditions existing under the Imperial régime, should have reached about 40,000,000 by the present day, even had there been a continuance of the movement of migration to Asiatic Russia which marked the turn of the century.

The history of the growth of population in the Ukraine during the last twenty years is of course far more complex than the bare figures would indicate. There was a terrible mortality, owing first to the Revolution and Civil War, and secondly to the two periods of famine and to the general deterioration in social and sanitary conditions. Again, parallel to a considerable migration of the peasantry, particularly during the famine periods, there was a constant flow of industrial workers from the north as a result of the Economic Plans. It is difficult therefore to avoid the following conclusions: that the growth of population during the two decades since the Revolution has been abnormally slow, but at the same time the change in the *composition* of the population has been rapid. The Ukrainians were continually disappearing or leaving their homeland while new elements were replacing them, mostly 'new-comers' from Central and Northern Russia.

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It is important to ascertain the number of Ukrainians who remain in the 161
territory of S.S.R. Ukraine. According to Soviet statistics the urban popula- 369
tion, amounting to 8,000,000, numbers only 30 per cent of Ukrainians. Among the rural population Ukrainians are in a majority, though they are not everywhere equally distributed: in some regions there are over 80 per cent; in others (like Odessa) 60 per cent; in the Doners rural areas a little over 50 per cent. In 1926, during the period of 'ukrainization' encouraged by the Government, 24,000,000 out of 30,000,000 registered as Ukrainians, but even 15 per cent of these 'native' Ukrainians gave their mother tongue as Russian. Since that date catastrophes have befallen the rural folk of the Ukraine: about 3,000,000 are reckoned to have perished during the famine of the early thirties, and another 2,000,000 certainly have migrated as a result of conditions which they found intolerable. These losses have not been wholly replaced by natural increase, and there is every reason to think that the number of 'native' Ukrainians in the rural population of the Republic has decreased since 1930 by at least 4,000,000. If at that time the number of persons speaking Ukrainian and considering themselves to be Ukrainians amounted to 20,000,000, there can scarcely be more than 16,000,000 peasants left now. If to these are added the number of Ukrainians living in the towns, the total probably amounts to about 18,000,000. In other words, the Ukrainian population of Soviet Ukraine (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia) amounted to little more than half of the total population.

This figure is eloquent: the Soviet Government has gone a long way to achieve the result towards which its policy was directed, and in the Ukrainian S.S.R. Ukrainians can no longer be considered to be in a great majority. It follows therefore that nearly half the population (16,000,000 to 17,000,000) are not Ukrainians. Among these alien elements a little less than 2,000,000 are Jews; about 1,000,000 are Moldavians; another million belong to different nationalities—White Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans. The remaining 12,000,000 to 13,000,000 consist either of people born in the Ukraine who do not wish to consider themselves Ukrainians or of 'new-comers' from other parts of the Union. The number of these 'new-comers' must amount to 8,000,000 to 9,000,000.

It is notable that in the last years (since 1930) the Government has used every 474
means to encourage the settlement of these 'new-comers' not only in the in- 166
dustrial areas but also in the purely rural districts. It is obvious that Moscow does not desire vast rural areas with an entirely homogeneous Ukrainian population. The Government prefers groups of *Kolkhozy* on Ukrainian territory to be constituted on the mosaic principle. Each year, from all the Military Districts of the Soviet Union, soldiers who have finished their military service and who have sent in petitions that on account of lack of land they do not wish to return to their original homes are drafted to the new Red Army *Kolkhozy*. These *Kolkhozy*, recruited from the variety of nationalities throughout the Union, are being scattered over some of the best land of the Ukrainian countryside. In some regions there are as many as ten of these military collectivized farms. Reference has already been made to the measures taken by the Government against the bourgeois *kolkhozniki* during the summer of 1939. A new 'movement' of the population is in view in

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474 U.S.S.R., and there is no doubt that one of the results will be a further
166 weakening of Ukrainian elements where the Government considers them to be still too strong

Secondary Branches of Ukrainian Agriculture

241 In addition to wheat, *rye*, *barley*, *oat* and *maize* crops are important. *Millet* is also grown and forms the base of the broth (*psheno*) which is a favourite dish in the South of Russia (in the North this broth or porridge is made from buck-wheat).

Clover and *lucerne* are comparatively little cultivated, and almost exclusively in right-bank Ukraine and Galicia.

About a million hectares are under *potatoes* in right-bank Ukraine; the bulk of the crop goes to the alcohol distilleries.

Sunflower-seed is important in the production of oil; *hemp* and small quantities of *linseed* and *mustard-seed* are produced for the same purpose.

The cultivation of *hops* was always traditional in Volhynia; in pre-Revolutionary days half of the hop production of the Empire came from Volhynia and right-bank Ukraine. In late years production has greatly declined.

Tobacco, the cultivation of which was introduced by Greek immigrants in the eighteenth century, is a speciality of the districts of Nezhin and Romen. The quality is not good and the cultivation of tobacco has no future in the Ukraine.

Particularly in Podolia and the region of Uman, *kolkhozniki* take great interest in horticulture; about 200,000 hectares are under orchards. On many *Kolkhozy* the *kolkhozniki* occupy themselves on the private cultivation of *tomatoes*, and the Government has set up canning plants in order to encourage this branch of production.

The *vine* grows well on the banks of the Dniepr and the southern Bug, in the neighbourhood of Berdyansk and Odessa, and along the Dniestr. But wine production has not been developed on the scale which it has attained in Bessarabia and the Crimea.

The Soviet Government favours agricultural experiments, and some *Kolkhozy* in the South have tried to cultivate *rice*—so far with little success.

An experiment on a large scale was made in the cultivation of *cotton*. 190,000 hectares between the mouth of the Dniepr and Perekop were reserved, but it is not likely that cotton cultivation in the Ukraine will prove the success which it has in the more suitable climates of Azerbaijan and Turkestan.

Secondary Mineral Resources in the Ukraine

Reserves of different qualities of *lignite* are distributed over many parts of
135 the Ukraine. In view of the abundance of other resources of calorific power, exploitation has not been greatly developed, but output of lignite in the region of Elizavetgrad attains 300,000 tons a year.

A million tons of *peat* is cut annually in Ukraine—about 10 per cent of the output of U.S.S.R.

Bauxites in the Dniepr region are utilized for the Aluminium Works near Dnieprostroy.

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Mercury is mined near Nikitovka Junction in Donbass.

Graphite deposits in the vicinity of Uman have recently been prospected. /135

There are important deposits of *salt* in north-east Donbass.

Search has been made for *copper*, *tin* and *petroleum*. Indications of petroleum deposits have been discovered in the region of Poltava and on the shores of the Azov Sea. In different places deposits of high quality *clay* (*kaolin*) are found.

'*The Mystery*' *of Soviet Production*

A Russian mining engineer has contributed this note: 'It is quite impossible to ascertain where and how the enormous quantities of calorifics and metals which figure in Soviet statistics disappear, when one takes into consideration the absence of these products in the every-day life of the population. It is quite a usual occurrence that the simplest tools, common nails, sheet iron, are found to be unobtainable in U.S.S.R. Sometimes old roofs are torn off houses in order to cover new buildings.... Further, the greatest consumer of iron, railway construction, so active before the Revolution, is practically non-existent in these days. During the Five Year Plan only 5000 km. of railway lines were laid; and in general, under the Soviet régime, railway lines begun before and during the war have been left uncompleted. 000

'Soviet officials have never been able to give a satisfactory explanation of what happens to the metals produced in U.S.S.R. In conversations with foreigners they speak of "military needs", but these do not explain in full the destination of the vast alleged production, nor does the consumption in tractor and motor factories, nor the building which has been proceeding in expanding industrial towns like Lugansk, Zaporozhie and Kharkov. There has also been great construction work undertaken in the Moscow area, but no exact statistics for the consumption of metals in the building trades have been forthcoming which can adequately explain the use made of the vast output alleged to have been mined.'

Th. Makcheeff (*op. cit.*) thinks that in the Soviet statistics of output in heavy industry is included a large proportion of "shoddy" products. The 1913 figures excluded goods not up to standard; for the metallurgical factories were private concerns and not consumers as well: shoddy products were accordingly not taken into account. The Soviet Government being at once consumer and producer puts all its shoddy products into circulation, and these, according to the Soviet press, amount to 90% and are referred to as "Second Quality Products."

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CHAPTER VIII

POSTSCRIPT: UKRAINE AND EUROPE, 1939–40

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A STUDY of the history of the Ukraine has, it is hoped, made clear the importance of this area in relation to the history of that half of Europe which lies between the Vistula and the Urals. At the same time the relation of the history of all Eastern Europe to the West—to Atlantic and Mediterranean Europe—has been examined; and the conclusion has been emphasized that West European history can only really be understood when considered against the background of the Great Eurasian Plain.

European civilization was originally Mediterranean and not Continental: it was based on the islands and peninsulas of the Middle Sea and expanded with difficulty to its natural desert marches in Africa, to the Euphrates in Asia and in the north to its fluvial frontiers along the Rhine and the Danube. We may hope that once again the armies of Britain and a resurgent France will re-establish these lines as did the Roman Legions after the disasters that befell the arms of Crassus and of Varus.

There have been contractions and expansions and shifts of the centres of power within the world of Mediterranean civilization. The failure of the Italo-Roman stock to sustain the imperial leadership during the third and fourth centuries A.D. was followed by the phenomenon of an Arabo-Mediterranean Empire which stretched from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and from the Red Sea to the Caspian: Mediterranean civilization thus expanded from a basis on the Middle Sea over an oceanic background, and the Franco-British dominion of the twentieth century was anticipated by a thousand years. The neo-Roman Empire reconstituted by Justinian, drawing its strength from the highland zone between the Danube and the Euphrates, failed to keep the hegemony of the Mediterranean world from passing to the Arabs. The emphasis shifted westward, where Charlemagne, a German ruling Gallo-Romans, designed at once to revive empire in Italy and the Mediterranean and to conquer the European hinterland. The great Rhineland king—the barbarian champion of young Christendom—began where the Romans had halted and carried the Sword of Christ to the Elbe and the Baltic. The Carolingian Empire was essentially Mediterranean and West European as was the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation which followed: it thrust down the barbarian hordes of the Hunnic

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and Avaric nomad empires and beat Slav and Finn and Turkic tribes into German-speaking Christians. The epic period of the Crusades was born of the Carolingian dawn: to the South and East the Mediterranean world was half won back from the Arabs—who were of the old civilization so infinitely more "Mediterranian" than Latin-Norman Christendom: to the North and East the Teutonic Crusaders pressed on into the wastes of the Great Eurasian Plain.

The counter-stroke from the steppes between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries was much more formidable than the earlier Hunnic and Avaric invasions had been. The Turks who beat down Arabian Islam and overran the eastern kingdoms of the Mediterranean had acquired the military and administrative talents of their victims: in the same way the Mongols who came later had been apt pupils of the Chinese. The Mongol and later Ottoman states were the most advanced of their day.

The capture of Constantinople and the conquest of Syria and Egypt by the Ottoman Turks—which events virtually closed the Black and Red Seas to the trading peoples of the Western Mediterranean—occurred during the very decades when the discovery of the American and African sea roads was giving a new oceanic background to the life of Western Europe. With the occupation of large regions of Africa and the Americas during the course of the sixteenth century, "Mediterranean" civilization became definitely West European and "Atlantic" in character. At the same time with the closing of the Black Sea by the Turks and the final repulse of the German Orders from the shores of the Eastern Baltic, the Great Eurasian Plain became more isolated from the influences of 'Mediterranean' and 'Western' civilization, while the influences of 'East Christian' or Byzantine civilization had been almost entirely eliminated.

From the middle of the fifteenth century Muscovy began to emerge as the latest and greatest expression of steppeland ('Eurasian') power. In the Muscovite state and in the political genius of the Muscovites were combined the imperial traditions of the old Byzantine civilization with the military qualities (and, as important, *lack* of cultural weaknesses) of the Asiatic nomads. In the way of Muscovite expansion lay the feudal oligarchy of Poland (representing a transplanting of the already outmoded institutions of medieval Christendom on to Slav soil) and the Protestant militarism of Sweden (which held promise of a new Varangian hegemony over the Slavs of the Great Eurasian Plain). To the South, controlling the mouths of the great Pontic rivers, was the neo-Byzantine

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Ottoman Empire. The Balto-Swedish Empire, *Rzecz Pospolita* and the Ottoman Empire formed a belt of states which separated the Germanic and Muscovite power centres. From the times at least of Ivan IV and Rudolf II there was a broad community of interest between the Muscovite and Germano-Habsburg powers. French statesmen of the Valois period appreciated the ultimate dangers, and in the days when France was coming to represent the principal focus of power in Western civilization the considered policy of French statesmen was to support Sweden, Poland and Turkey in Eastern Europe.

The great period of French power in the seventeenth century, the florescence of the Swedish and Polish Vasas and the revival of Ottoman power under the Köprülü viziers—all these phenomena had their origin in the check to Muscovite and Germanic expansion due to the Time of Troubles and the Thirty Years' War.

In the following century the consolidation of Germanic power under Frederick the Great and of Russian power under Catherine brought about the fall of *Rzecz Pospolita* and foreshadowed the end of the Ottoman Empire. The elimination of the states of the meridial belt—Sweden, Poland, Turkey—made inevitable also an ultimate struggle between the Germanic and Muscovite powers for mastery over all the lands between the Baltic and the Bosporus.

Prussia in the eighteenth century was a new phenomenon—a national state within the Holy Roman Empire with peculiar pretensions to modernity. With its submerged population of Finnic and Slavic serfs east of the Elbe, and its materialistic bias in current state philosophy, it had little of the old Germany about it. It was a new reality, ruthless and not a little sinister—born of all the stony sterility of the frigid Baltic wastelands. The historical function of the Prussian state was to force Western civilization, Catholic, oecumenical, Gallo-Italic and old Germanic, back across the Rhine and the Alps and to impose a new Balto-Prussian *ethos* over the plains between the Rhine and the Vistula.

Russia, again, as it arose before the uneasy eyes of our forefathers in the eighteenth century, had little of the European character of the medieval Varangian states of the Great Eurasian Plain. Novgorod and Pskov were mercantile oligarchies which might have evolved into something between the Hansa city-states and the Scandinavian kingdoms. Kiev had the potentialities of a more civilized Poland or Hungary—with a Byzantine instead of a Latin over-culture. But Muscovite Russia was in many respects a projection into the eighteenth century and into Eastern Europe of the nomad Turko-Mongolic Empires of an earlier epoch.

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The *Grand Monarque* conceptions of the contemporary West gave a semblance of modernity to a structure which was essentially Asiatic. To the 'Phanariote' and 'Janissary' elements corresponded the Balt and Jacobite and other foreign adventurers who flocked to the service of the Romanov monarchs; and the two great waves of conquest under Peter I and Catherine II at once subjected large European populations to Muscovite rule and introduced the peruked favourites of German-born Empresses into the councils of Europe. The parallel may be taken further between the Muscovite and Ottoman societies. The Liberal elements in Russia during the nineteenth century were no more successful against the 'asiatism' of the Muscovite bureaucracy than were their Turkish prototypes in the Ottoman Empire. Both state-structures, the Muscovite and the Ottoman, were used by the rival capitalisms of Western Europe, first in the phase of Britain *versus* France, later in the phase of the two Western Powers *versus* the Germanic Powers. Both state-structures became involved in the World War, and while Pan-slavism served the purposes of London and Paris, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism were hitched to the policies of Berlin and Vienna.

The Prussian national state founded by Frederick the Great and expanded into a Germanic national state under his successors down to Adolf Hitler must be contrasted with the 'state of nationalities' which was the Russian Empire. The Prussian state was a late copy of the French national state of the Louis. But in the nineteenth century, the French national state, as the result of the acquisition of vast transmarine possessions, and of the interplay of liberal and non-national influences in French politics, was becoming transformed into an oecumenical empire. At its best, too, French political culture stood for something extra-national, if not inter-national. No gross pretensions to racial divinity sullied the grace and enlightenment of a culture which was free for all the world to take. The French political culture, like the British with which it ran more and more parallel during the period following the Four Years' War of 1914–18 (probably because the two derive from the oldest traditions of the Roman Mediterranean and the 'Atlantic' West), had qualities which have adapted it to the needs of the world. Both the British and French political cultures, with all their faults and differences, give expression to the spirit and feeling of the modern West—as the Greek and Roman synthesis declared the genius of the varied populations of the Mediterranean world. The German conception of the national state, already a belated conception in the history of ideas, is irreconcilable with the spiritual and material needs of modern Europe.

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000 As contrasted with the German national state, the Russian 'state of nationalities' represented also an antiquated conception comparable to the contemporary Habsburg and Ottoman 'states of nationalities'. All the European national movements of the nineteenth–twentieth centuries were mutinies against the conception of the 'state of nationalities'. The consolidation, with Soviet Moscow as a power centre, of the bulk of the territories which formerly comprised the Romanov Empire, was only achieved after a grim struggle with the many national groups who were finally coerced into remaining within the Soviet Union. But Lenin, like Napoleon before him, like the Entente war-statesmen contemporary with him, and like Hitler after him, was quick to harness the forces of nationalism in the interest of his particular brand of power politics. The right of self-determination of the national minorities within the former Russian Empire was cynically enough proclaimed at a moment when the Red armies were everywhere engaged in the bloody repression of national movements. At Baku, in 1922, a Congress of the Peoples of the East was convened. Social Revolution and Nationalism were combined in China, in India and the East Indies to further the policies of the new group of Asiatic conquerors who had established themselves in the centre of the Great Eurasian Plain and who called themselves alternately the Russian Government and the Communist International (giving expression thus to a typical Asiatic manifestation of the combination of the kingly and the priestly functions). With Caucasian and Jewish adventurers substituted for the Baltic German bureaucrats and Europeanized noblemen of the Petersburg Court, the Soviet Union emerged rather clearly as the successor of earlier Eurasian steppeland powers. The wig of a Potemkin could no longer conceal the skull of a Lenin. And the all-conquering and all-destroying nomadism of the Eurasian soul began to dream new dreams of world dominion in the decades which followed the Revolution 'against Europe'. Indeed the fire that had burned in Attila and Chingiz lit the devoted evangelism of Lenin and the doomed Caesarism of Tukhachevski.

It is a tragic fact in human affairs that political thought is generally half a century or more behind events, and that active political thought is directed almost always by interpretations of history which are themselves already outmoded. Thus while conceptions derived from the Ludovican national state influenced German statesmanship right down to the Four Years' War, the leaders of the nations at Versailles were themselves under the influence of those 'liberal' conceptions of revolutionary nationalism which reached their maximum expression in 1848.

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Few Polish historians will deny that 'the Ukrainian problem' 000 proved fatal to the old Polish state. Yet the Polish politicians at Versailles were infatuated by the tradition of the Polish revolutionaries of the preceding century who had been the prophets always of a resurrection of *Rzecz Pospolita*. After the Russian War of 1920, the frontiers originally conceded to Poland by the Great Powers were extended to include territories inhabited by nearly fifteen million Russians and Ukrainians. The historic frontiers of the old *Rzecz Pospolita* were by no means restored, but the Poles found themselves in possession of wide lands which were barren and overpopulated, and in which they were confronted with the necessity of imposing the Polish conception of the national state by force. The Polish nationalists had in fact constructed another 'state of nationalities', and the ageing Marshal Pilsudski, far from content, did not abandon ideas which envisaged the inclusion of Lithuania and at least right-bank Ukraine within reborn *Rzecz Pospolita*. An effective federal association of the Baltic states with Poland, and a close alliance between such an association and the succession states in the Danube valley could alone have stabilized the congeries of independencies whose territories intervened between Germany and the Soviet Union. But the infatuation of the Poles with the conception of a revived *Rzecz Pospolita* was only equalled, to the south of the Carpathians, by the sterile dogmatism of the Liberal leaders of the Czech state—another 'national state' which had become a 'state of nationalities'—who proved ideologically incapable of coming to a compromise with the Catholic and Conservative elements in Austria and in Hungary. It was obvious, since no Slav power showed the capacity to constitute a focus in Eastern Europe for the consolidation and ultimate federation of the smaller states, that in time a renascent Germany would appear either as a dominant power or as a rival to Russia for the old hegemony between the Baltic and the Black Sea.

After Versailles Germany had not only lost weight as a national state within the European comity, but the Germans had lost also all possibility of filling an imperial role as the protector of the Austro-Hungarian 'state of nationalities'. Those different groups in Germany who, even before the rise of Adolf Hitler, had been looking for the revival of an imperial policy in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, were fully conscious that since Austria-Hungary had ceased to exist, it had become necessary to seek some new power which might act as the 'auxiliary' of the German *Drang nach Osten*. No one expressed these notions more clearly than Adolf Hitler in *Mein Kampf*. Like the revolutionaries of 1848, and their successor Bismarck,

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000 Hitler looked on the German state as a national and even 'racial' state and excluded the possibility of transforming the Reich into an Empire or 'state of nationalities'. At the same time it was necessary for the German national state to discover on its eastern and south-eastern frontiers a 'state of nationalities', agricultural in the economic sense, militarily weak, and destined politically to depend on the Reich. Another Austria-Hungary, in fact, must be brought into existence; but with the new conditions in Europe it was not possible to select a state in which a sufficiently strong German element was available to act as the directing and organizing force. The choice of Adolf Hitler therefore fell on Poland, and as early as the composition of *Mein Kampf* he speaks of the Poles as the only Slav nationality capable of organizing a state. An alliance with Poland would open the way to the Ukraine, the Black Sea, and those routes to the East which the Austrian General Waldstetter had divined when he wrote that 'Germany wants to assure for ever the safety of the ways leading to Mesopotamia and Arabia through Baku and Persia: the ways to the East lead through Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Sevastopol, from where starts the way by sea to Batum and Trebizond'.

The conception that Poland might be substituted for Austria-Hungary as the vehicle of a new German *Drang nach Osten* was the motive which directed Adolf Hitler's 'pro-Polish policy' during the first years of his dictatorship. A Ten Years' Pact of Non-Aggression was signed, and solemn assurances were given to Poland that no questions existed between the two countries which could not be settled in a peaceful manner. The Germans began to take an interest in the condition of the Polish armed forces and of the roads leading to the Soviet frontier. The death of Pilsudski, however, removed the last Polish leader who seriously cherished the idea of a revived *Rzecz Pospolita*. At the same time the group of men who succeeded him displayed no wish whatever to undertake a campaign in the East. They were sceptical of the widely canvassed hopes of risings in U.S.S.R., and they were more inclined to fear Communist movements in Galicia and Volhynia. Furthermore, the Warsaw Government looked with extreme distrust on the relations which existed between the Nazis and the Ukrainian terrorist organization of Colonel Konovalets.* The principal factor which influenced the development of events was, however, the view of the Polish Government that any solution of the Ukrainian question profitable to Germany would prove extremely dangerous, if not fatal, to Poland. From 1936 onward, while the Poles maintained their 'friendship' with Germany, they made every effort to renew and improve their

* *V. supra*, p. 3[illegible]

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former connection with France and even to establish an amelioration in their relations with the Soviet Union.

In the spring of 1938 the success of the bloodless coup in Austria greatly strengthened the position of Germany as against both Poland and Russia. At this time a book by a certain Sanders—a Georgian by origin—had a considerable vogue in Nazi official circles. In *Um die Gestaltung Europas* a pseudo-scientific historical background was given to German plans for expansion round the Black Sea. In the view of Sanders, neither the Mediterranean area (which was reserved for Italian hegemony), nor France, nor 'the island' Britain entered into the structure of 'continental Europe'. European space, for Sanders, is limited by the two 'perpendicular' great European rivers—the Rhine and the Danube. But the boundaries of this 'true Europe' are not clearly defined in the East—the result of 'the disorder of history'. The European river system is continued, in the view of the Nazi publicist, beyond the Black Sea to the Rion and the Kura and the Caspian Sea. With an ingenuity which is only equalled by his ingenuousness, Sanders constructs a cultural area, based on a community of trading ways, historical relations and art influences, uniting the northern seas through the great Russian rivers with the fabled streams of Caucasus. He even finds in the Scandinavian saga of Snorre Sturleson evidence for locating the first abode of Odin in the highlands between the upper waters of the Kuban and Terek. It is interesting to observe that the Ukraine is only a country of transit and not a final objective in the view of Sanders, and he recalls the prognostications of Waldstetter when he finds that 'the line Tiflis-Kiev-Warsaw-Berlin would serve as the new economic axis'.

Munich had a double significance for Adolf Hitler and his advisers. It not only marked the end of the real independence of the Czechoslovak Republic and of the system of Anglo-French checks and balances in the Danube-Carpathian area: but in his judgment untrained in history and in international politics, the compromise accepted by the Western Powers appeared to concede him a free hand in Eastern Europe as far as the Black Sea and, by implication, beyond to the east.

The Germans were impatient to exploit the fruits of a victory which might have been theirs for the waiting. In January 1939, when Field-Marshal Goering met Colonel Beck at the hunting-box of Białowice, the Poles were confronted for the last time with the offer of collaboration with Germany against the Soviets in the Ukraine. Colonel Beck still maintains silence on the details of discussions which do not appear to have attracted the Polish Government. Within a month or two of that ill-omened house-party, the campaign

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000 against Poland had begun on the diplomatic field. On the Baltic the Danzig question had become 'actual', and in the Carpathians the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Republic had brought German regiments to the southern frontiers of Poland.

The establishment of a separate Slovak Republic gave the Germans control of Bratislava (Pressburg), the first important Danube port, but the attempt to set up a 'Ukrainian Piedmont' in Carpathian Rus was finally abandoned in view of the opening of secret discussions with the Kremlin.

The majority of the population of the area of *Podkarpatska Rus* as constituted within the Czechoslovak Republic had in fact adhered to the 'pro-Muscovite' persuasion which had been so widespread in Galicia before and during the Four Years' War of 1914–18: in the Czechoslovak elections of 1937, the Rural Russian Union had received 120,000 votes as against the 4000 polled by the Ukrainian fractions. After Munich, the President of the R.R.U., Brody, had been entrusted by the Czechs with the formation of a Government at Užhorod; but two Ukrainians had been included in the 'cabinet' on instructions from Berlin. During October, however, Brody was replaced by the adventurous Roman Catholic Father Voloshin who declared Carpathian Rus to be henceforth 'Carpathian Ukraine'. The new state immediately became the focus of Ukrainian politicians and adventurers of all kinds: the U.N.U. established its headquarters there,* and the organization of 'an Ukrainian army' was undertaken with the formation of such detachments as the romantically named 'Zaporogian Sech Sharpshooters'.

'The Carpathian intrigue' of the Nazis seriously disturbed the Poles—as was intended—and it must have contributed to the tension and mental discomfort of the Białowice house-party. But with the occupation of Prague and the final partition of Czechoslovakia, the Hungarians were allowed to establish themselves (after a short but gallant resistance on the part of the 'Sech Sharpshooters') in the mountain cantons which they now renamed Ugro-Rus, and while Mussolini had the satisfaction of procuring, for a few short months, a common frontier between Hungary and Poland, the abandonment of the Ukrainians proved for Ribbentrop a graceful prelude to the conversations which were already being undertaken between the representatives of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union.

These conversations had already been begun, through the intermediary of confidential individuals, as early as February–March 1939. 'The incredible *volte-face* of Adolf Hitler' was less incredible than it at first appeared. German army leaders had not excluded the possi-

* *V. supra*, p. 341.

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bility of an understanding with the Moscow Soviet even during the 000
period of the German occupation of the Ukraine; and the Rapallo *rapprochement* between the Weimar Republic and the Soviets in 1923 had had the approval of influential conservative circles in Germany. Historically, as has been shown, there has been a traditional community of interest between the Germanic and Muscovite powers as against the nations of the intervening 'meridial belt'. Ideologically, there was nothing in the cynical practice of power politics in the Wilhelmstrasse and the Kremlin which could exclude an understanding if such were convenient and profitable to both parties. And fear, as well as the prospect of advantage, impelled both parties to an expeditious transaction: the fear of the Nazis that they might be attacked from west and east as in 1914; the fear of the Soviets that the Western Democracies might be satisfied to see 'the new German dynamism' engaged in an exhausting, even if victorious, attack on Russia.

The first result of Adolf Hitler's understanding with Stalin was the fall of the Polish Republic, and the occupation of the Polish districts of White Russia and Galicia by the Red Army. The Soviet occupation of Galicia was a severe blow to the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Too late did the leaders of U.N.D.O. and U.N.U. come to appreciate the relative tolerance of the Polish system of government. At the same time both the Polish and Ukrainian questions have been potentially simplified. A revived Polish state will be a national state in federal relation to its neighbours rather than an outmoded 'state of nationalities'. The fate of the Ukrainians becomes altogether a part of the obscure destiny of the nationalities at present under the rule of the Communist Government in Moscow. And the destiny of all these peoples must be a Russian destiny in the sense that the fluvial network of the Great Eurasian Plain is one geographical and economic whole out of which it is impracticable and would be unreal to attempt to carve separate and politically independent national units.

In the present moment of history the old oecumenical civilization of the Mediterranean and of the West—a civilization of variegated peoples broad based on the oceans and spread over all the southern hemisphere—confronts the old menace. The tests of strength remain the same: they are moral and spiritual—a problem of the self-consciousness of civilization; they are also material—a problem of organization. There is too the strategic problem which remains classical—based on the great rivers and the Alps. But the bases of the strategic problem have been vastly extended. Sea-power is a relatively modern form of war power: it was only used by the

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000 Romans for their lines of interior communication across the Mediterranean. If the Romans had been a great sea-faring people they would have mastered the Baltic and imposed civilization on the Germans from the north: and the whole history of the world would have been different; there would have been an easier, quicker flowering of the civil life of a united Europe.

NOTES TO 'POSTSCRIPT' CHAPTER

(1) *Father Voloshin and the Fate of Carpathian Rus*

See Scrimali, A., *La Ruthènie Subcarpathique et l'État Tchécoslovaque*, Paris, 1938.

An interesting account of an interview between Father Voloshin and the Croat leader Dr Maček was published in the Yugoslav Press.

The ex-head of the Government of 'Carpathian Ukraine' thus retails his misadventures:

'When I understood that the Czechoslovak Federation, which had been created under the Munich Agreement, was doomed to disappear, I communicated to Berlin an interesting proposal made to me by Hungary. Budapest proposed to include Carpathian Ukraine within the Realm of St Stephen and to grant us autonomy similar to that enjoyed by Croatia and Slovenia under the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. I was in favour of accepting this advantageous proposal, but could not do so without the permission of Berlin. This happened in the first half of March. Berlin forbade an answer to the Hungarian proposal on the grounds that it was not in the spirit of the Vienna Arbitration. Germany would not admit the existence of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. Consequently, on the 14th of March, I proclaimed the independence of Carpathian Ukraine. I was again informed that we were indispensable to the Reich for the creation of a Greater Ukraine, the formation of which would begin by the annexation of the Polish Ukrainian provinces to be followed by that of the whole of the Russian Ukraine. In view of such a state of things, nothing was left for me but to defend the new independent Ukrainian state from Hungarian claims....This is why, when the Magyars crossed our border, I gave the order to resist, not doubting for a moment that I was acting according to the wishes of the leaders of the Reich and that the German Army was hastening to our aid. Otherwise, counting only on our own forces, I would never have taken such a decision. Finding that the German troops were not hastening to our aid, I again applied to Berlin asking for the necessary assistance to be despatched for our defence. But the German reply was diametrically different from what I had heard only a few days before. I could no longer contain my indignation when I was casually told: "All is changed! Surrender! Make the sacrifice!" What could I do then but flee? Those who but yesterday had been my protectors had left me to manage in the best way I could, without even bothering about explanations.'

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As for the subsequent fate of Carpathian Rus, when it ceased to be 'the Ukrainian Piedmont' and was reincorporated in Hungary, the Budapest Government, owing to the dangers of the international situation, was obliged to act with a certain caution. The inhabitants of the annexed cantons—renamed Ugro-Rus—did not participate in the elections for the Hungarian Parliament in May 1939; nor has the promised autonomy so far been granted. Nevertheless, the 'Zaporogian Sech Sharpshooters', who had opposed the advance of the Hungarian troops, were amnestied, and Ukrainian nationalists who reappeared in Užhorod were allowed to publish a daily paper there. The former opponent of the Ukrainization of Podkarpatska Rus and the leader of the Rural Russian Union, A. Brody, has now appeared as the protagonist of the *fait accompli*. 'Ugro-Rus must have ten deputies in Budapest', he informed a correspondent of *Posledniya Novosti*, Paris, 24 August 1939. 'The Ukrainian cultural movement will not be persecuted, but all political activities will be forbidden to Ukrainians....The representatives of Ukrainian organizations in Hungary and abroad have recently made a declaration of loyalty to the Hungarian State. If behind this declaration there still lurks a hope of beginning their intrigues again, that hope is quite vain. It is not at all true that Russian autonomist tendencies have been set aside by Budapest. Only technical reasons and the international situation have prevented a decision concerning the legal rights of Ugro-Rus from being taken. There is no reason whatever to doubt that autonomy will be granted to the land in due course, as Regent Horthy and Count Teleki have promised.'

It remains to be seen what influence the appearance of the Red Army on the frontier of Ugro-Rus (September 1939) will have on the sentiments of the peasants who inhabit the mountain cantons which give access from Galicia into the Great Alföld.

(2) '*The Italian Orientation*' *among Ukrainians*

The last, in point of time, of different Ukrainian political 'orientations' has proved to be an Italian one. This phenomenon arises out of the changes which occurred in Eastern Europe following the war of 1914–18. In many respects 'New Italy', particularly Fascist Italy, has come to assume certain pretensions to the succession to the role of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Italian Fascism gave expression to an 'anti-Slav ideology' during the early years of the dictatorship, and this ideology was manifested in a sharp antagonism to Yugoslavia. The 'Austrian role' of Italy seemed to be more clearly emphasized during the 'thirties when Italy became the junior partner in the Nazi-Fascist Axis. At the same time the position of Italy as a maritime rather than a continental power made Rome fundamentally less dependent on Berlin than the Habsburgs had been. So far as the Balkans were concerned, ultimate German and Italian imperial ambitions were irreconcilable. The independence of Italian policy was expressed, first in the unsuccessful support of the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg régimes against Berlin, and contemporaneously and later in the more fortunate support of Hungary and Yugoslavia against the formidable weight of German pressure. The anti-Slav tendencies of the

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000 Fascist Government during the 'twenties gave place to other views which admitted the desirability of collaboration with the Balkan Slavs in face of the common dangers of Pan-Germanism and Bolshevism.

So far as the Ukrainians are concerned, the improvement in relations between the Roman Government and the Vatican facilitated contacts between the Italians and Ukrainian Catholic and Uniate groups in Galicia. Until recently, representatives of the Ukrainian movement have been scarce in Italy; but during the last year Italian interest in the Ukrainians, as in the Caucasian national groups, has become marked. Ukrainians have met with an amiable reception in Rome, and a special press office has been placed at their disposal—*Ufficio Stampa Ukraina*.

In all these circumstances, it would not be surprising if 'the Italian orientation' assumed a certain importance among Ukrainian political groups.

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

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

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[For historical data on Ukraine from pre-historic times until the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, see cat. 116, pp. 1-275. --Analyst]

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Foreword

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It was not many months after the downfall of the tsarist regime in Russia in 1917 that that great empire began to disintegrate. The subject peoples began to demand their own states and showed themselves willing to fight for them. The significance of this was lost upon most of the leaders of the Western democratic powers and they tried to explain it as some new device of the German General Staff, instead of recognizing it as a part of a democratic procedure.

Three and a half years of war had then passed and the attention of the democracies was focussed on the Western Front. They were aware of the contribution in manpower the Russian Empire had made to the common cause and they looked forward with apprehension to the campaign of 1918 without the aid of the imperial Russian army. They had greeted the disappearance of the tsars in a bloodless revolution as a sign of the triumph of democracy and they were ill prepared to face the strange events that followed the fall of the Romanovs.

They could not believe that the government of Lenin and the Communists who seized control of the city of Petrograd late in 1917 could long endure. Its methods they could not understand and they sought to interpret them in terms with which they were familiar. They did not try to fathom the reasons why, within a few months, the Russian Empire fell apart and they sought instinctively to bring it once more together.

They watched without understanding the downfall of the Ukrainian National Republic, the rise of Soviet rule in Ukraine and elsewhere, the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics and the events of the next years. The rise of Nazism 000
seemed to them the all-important menace and the opening of World War II convinced them of this even more strongly. The sudden understanding between the Soviets and the Nazis and then the equally sudden attack of the Germans upon the USSR still did not clear up the situation. The West aided the Soviets and, despite one difficulty after another, they willingly conceded the Soviet demands as a contribution to a common victory and sought in the United Nations a common meeting place for all anti-Fascist states. With some misgivings they admitted the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic as independent states to the United Nations.

In the meanwhile, as Soviet armies pushed westward into the heart of central Europe, they spread out what has since been termed the iron curtain to mask from the eyes of the world the nature of their government. Step by step, information from the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, from Rumania and Bulgaria has grown increasingly difficult to secure. When China and North Korea passed within the same veil, the world began to awake.

The scanty reports from Ukraine today receive more attention than did the neglected information of thirty-five years ago. Yet that is still not enough.

It is no exaggeration to say that the Russian Communists have used the Ukrainian land and the Ukrainian population as the laboratory for their future conquests. It is there, among the Ukrainian people, that Lenin and his associates worked out their program of disintegration, infiltration, conquest, exploitation and russification that they have employed so successfully since the end of World War II. It has cost the Ukrainians dearly to serve as this laboratory. By the millions they have perished of starvation, execution, and deportation, and the other peoples of central and eastern Europe are meeting the same fate.

The object of this work is to study that process insofar as it 128
can be known. Other books have told the story of the Ukrainian

1/1 [Process of Ukrainians serving as laboratory for later Soviet conquest -- Analyst]

struggle for independence, the efforts of the Ukrainian people to 121
set up their own free and independent state. That story is not retold here, for this book is concerned with the reverse of the picture—the efforts of the Ukrainian people to protect themselves, their mode of life and their culture, against the extension of the Soviet Russian influences, against that system which, starting from a declared policy of internationalism, has turned into a rigid, Russian imperialistic policy which weighs heavily upon every form and department of life.

It is not only a study of the past. What happened in Kiev and Kharkiv is happening to-day in Warsaw, in Budapest, in Bucharest and Sofia, in Ulan Bator, Peking and Pyongyang. It is the story of a process and it is from that point of view that we must view the developments in Ukraine and the methods of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Once that is grasped, much that is obscure in the history of the last years will become clear and we can see the process in its development and in its completed form. We will know what to expect and what methods can best be devised to check this creeping paralysis of civilization and bring back to mankind its hope for a civilized future.

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Acknowledgments

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Dm. Sv.—The Partisan Struggle in Ukraine
Ivan Koval—The Ukrainian Communists
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Kost Pankivsky—Western Ukraine under Bolshevik Rule, 1939-1941
. . . —The Ukrainian Lands under Bolshevism up to World War II
Ol. Yurchenko—The State Legal System
Mykola Vasiliyiv—The Soviet Economic System
. . . —The Agricultural Exploitation of Ukraine
V. Marchenko—Social and Economic Conditions
K. Kononenko—The Agricultural Economy
. . . —Changes of Population in Ukraine
Y. Sherekh—Principles and Steps of the Soviet Linguistic Policy
M. Hlobenko—Ukrainian Literature
Ol. Ohloblyn—The Humanities under the Soviets
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N. Makhiv—The Natural Sciences in Ukraine
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CHAPTER ONE

The Background of the Communist Triumph

No idea could be more erroneous than that the triumph
642 of Communism in Ukraine and the destruction of the Ukrain-
648 ian National Republic, which had declared its independence on January 22, 1918. was the choice of the Ukrainian people themselves. It did not suit their desires or their interests, and the methods which Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin adopted to master Ukraine were essentially the same as those by which the iron curtain has been pushed steadily to the west. Ukraine was the testing ground for the development of the Communist methods of conquest, just as it has been the testing ground for all the Communist methods of control of their helpless satellites.

From the moment when he arrived in Petrograd in April, 1917, Lenin commenced a policy of disintegration. The collapse of tsarist Russia had destroyed all of the organized forces of law and order throughout the empire, and it was no easy task to restore these in an area where there had not been allowed for centuries a popular government resting upon the will of the people and staffed by experienced democratic administrators. Under such conditions, Lenin's propaganda of self-determination for all the peoples of the empire fell upon ready ears, as did his efforts to promote class conflict on every hand. At the same time his promises to the Great Russians constantly called, under one guise or another, for the restoration of Russian unity even while his talk of internationalism and the Communist International seemed to imply a world Communist regime in which all peoples would be equal. It was this policy of lying and deceiving until the moment for successful armed intervention came that gave him the dominating position.

642 He enjoyed an immense advantage in the fact that the civil war
648 between the Whites and the Reds was largely fought on Ukrainian territory and thus compelled the young Ukrainian government to fight upon two fronts throughout the entire period, while for some time the new republic was forced also to oppose the Poles in the
[131] west. Lying as Ukraine did on the shore of the Black Sea, the armed forces of General Denikin, who was heading the effort to create an anti-Communist monolithic Russian government, could only reach Moscow by crossing Ukrainian territory. It was only across Ukrainian territory that the supplies sent to him by the Western nations after the ending of World War I could be delivered and it was his policy to allow no manifestation of Ukrainianism in any form, for he intended to continue that denial of Ukrainian existence that had characterized the old tsarist regime.

His efforts in this direction were aided by the unfortunate failure of the Western democratic powers which had triumphed in the war to understand either the nature of Bolshevism or the desires of the various national movements. At the same time his success was rendered impossible by the refusal of the West to back him in his efforts to restore all or most of the social and political order which had vanished with the abdication of the Tsar.

Thus with the White Russians and the Ukrainians locked in a desperate struggle, the way was open for Lenin to move with relative freedom on his path of disintegration and of conquest. He did not fail to take advantage of every opportunity, and the advances and retreats during the period from 1917 to 1920 and even later were but a preliminary for the later tactics of Communism.

On the other hand it cannot be denied that there existed in Ukraine certain factors which also worked to his advantage. The political and social system prevailing up to 1917 had not given any training in self-government to the Ukrainian people and in the midst of war and revolution they had to start on the most elementary tasks of popular education, while at the same time they corrected fundamental abuses in the economic situation and created and administered a government. Let us, therefore, look briefly at

The Background of the Communist Triumph

Let us, therefore, look briefly at 175
the outstanding elements of the situation as they were at the beginning of the revolution.

From the time of the organization and Christianization of the Kievan state at the end of the tenth century to the eighteenth century, Ukraine, whether independent, or subject to Poland-Lithuania, or to the Russian Tsars, had remained as a political unit, even though divided. However, in 1775 Catherine II destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich, the centre of the Ukrainian Kozaks, and in 1783 she abolished all Ukrainian political institutions and privileges. From that time the area was divided into *gubernias* as the rest of the Russian Empire and the full Russian methods of administration were introduced.

From that moment, too, the Russian government spared no efforts to destroy every vestige of Ukrainian national and cultural consciousness. The Ukrainian language was treated as a peasant dialect of Russian; the name Ukraine was forbidden and even the substitute Little Russia was treated as a generic term for the area north of the Black Sea, but it did not figure on the political map of the Russian Empire as a distinct entity. The Ukrainian revival in the nineteenth century beginning with the publication of Kotlyarevsky's parody of the *Aeneid* in 1798 was confined to the [536] cultural sphere and could offer little or nothing in the way of administrative experience to the Ukrainian people. Those Ukrainians who entered the Russian service were usually sent to distant areas, while the administrative personnel in Ukraine was chiefly Russian in origin and feeling.

The great estates were largely owned by Russians or by Poles 186
and even many Ukrainian landowners who had succeeded in retaining their holdings were so thoroughly Russianized that they [423] felt little sense of kinship with the peasants on their estates. Ukrainian life was lived chiefly in the villages. The Ukrainian language was not taught in the schools or used in the courts, for all education and administration were in the Russian language. Still the peasants continued their own manner of living with their own traditions and their own tastes and desires.

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186 The cities of Kiev, Kharkiv and Odesa had a large Russian
563 population. The administrative, commercial and financial institutions were largely in Russian hands and the directors and leaders of these, whatever their political disagreements, were united in opposing the efforts of the Ukrainians to secure even that minimum of rights that they were guaranteed by Russian imperial law. The Russian element in Ukraine, radical or conservative, acted as a
[316] unit during the fateful years 1917-1920. On the other hand, the miners and workers in the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih, the centre of the Ukrainian coal and iron industry, were in very large part likewise Russian and the ideology of St. Petersburg, especially in its radical aspects, was dominant throughout this part of the Ukrainian territory. Many of the most bitter opponents of Ukrainian rights were, in fact, Russian radical miners and workers from this area.

The Jewish population of Ukraine, a large minority, was little interested in the Ukrainian problem. Insofar as they were not actively sharing in the movement for special Jewish institutions, the majority, with certain conspicuous exceptions, were strong supporters of Russian unity, either conservative or radical or, like Leon Trotsky, they were at the service of any government which was opposed to the Ukrainian demands.

186 Thus in 1917 the strength of the Ukrainian movement was to
668 be found in the villages. Here Ukrainian life was lived, Ukrainian thoughts and ambitions were sponsored and it was here that the vision of an old and a future independent Ukraine found its chief support. Even so, that population was itself divided, not according to the class principle but on an ideological pattern which included members of all classes and walks of life.

186 When the revolution broke out in 1917 or, to be more precise,
565 when the tsarist regime collapsed, there were four main divisions in
668 Ukrainian society and they were made clear within a very few months.

The first of these were the nationalists and the advocates of the restoration of order in the country. At the very beginning of the

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century Mykola Mikhnovsky had issued a call for an independent state and for a while he had exerted a strong influence upon such future Ukrainian leaders as Symon Petlyura, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Volodymyr Chekhovsky, but his ideas of placing national liberation in the forefront seemed too extreme for his adherents and by 1917 many of these had in a sense fallen away from his advanced position.

On the other hand, two and a half years of war had shown to many of the Ukrainian officers and men in the Russian army the need of a disciplined force to uphold the national cause. Some of the Ukrainian regiments had early joined the forces of the Revolution, had adopted the Ukrainian flag and introduced Ukrainian as the language of command. Now at the Military Congresses which were held in Kiev in 1917, they took a strong stand in their demands that the Ukrainian National Rada adopt a firm policy toward St. Petersburg and the Provisional Government and they were willing to go much further than the Rada in the setting up of independent governmental machinery.

Opposed to this group were the great mass of the peasants. They were little aware of the involved task of governing or even maintaining order. It would be hardly fair to say that they were anarchistic in temperament. They had rather maintained almost unconsciously their Ukrainian character. Few of them had been further from their villages than the nearest administrative centre and they could not see the necessity of substituting another regime on a broad scale for the fallen tsarist system. For decades they had attributed all their hardships and difficulties to the tsar, the bureaucrats and the police, and with all three vanished, they had no desire to replace them. It seemed to them that the land was intended by God for their use, and once the landlords were dispossessed, they were ready to forget the past and live in peace and quiet with their neighbors. Two and a half years of war had taught them the folly of organized destruction and they willingly accepted the position that a new world had come into being in which there was no need for complicated forms of government, for the collection of taxes and the enforced maintenance of order.

186 565 668 They believed that the Revolution had almost automatically given them all that they desired—the right to use their own language, to have that language placed on a par with Russian and the right to secure their own land and to live peacefully upon it.

186 565 668 665 Between these two groups stood the bulk of the Ukrainian intellectuals grouped in the Social Revolutionist and Social Democratic Parties, each of which was modelled on its Russian equivalent. Yet we must not delude ourselves into thinking that these were political parties in any sense known to the Western world and America, where there has been a long record of political activity. They were before the Revolution rather conspiratorial and debating groups, busied with theorizing about all manner of political questions and (except where they had an opportunity to take part in the work of the zemstvos) without practical experience. A few of their members had served in the First Duma in 1906 but this had been dissolved within a couple of months by Tsar Nicholas II and each succeeding duma had become less representative. Thus the number of those intellectuals who had had practical political experience even in the conduct of elections was very small, while the debators, students, theoreticians, etc. in these parties cared more for the proper solution of ideas than for their application to practical life.

Neither of these groups existed as distinct Ukrainian parties. They tended largely to follow the leadership of the similar Russian groups; they had learned to employ the same methods, listened to the same leaders, and their demands as Ukrainians were loosely connected with their social and political theories. They were conscious, but only potentially active, nationalists and at the moment when it was necessary to make rapid decisions, they hesitated and splintered on the importance which they assigned to national and to economic and social measures.

The Social Revolutionists, largely intellectuals from the villages, were at first the more important. They were populists and non-Marxian socialists who voiced the desires of the peasants for the ownership of their land. They called for the confiscation of the large estates, for they did not believe that any one should have

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larger holdings than he and his family could work. Since the land in Ukraine was held individually and the village community was only a figment of Russian law, they differed sharply from the Russian Social Revolutionists who stressed the existence of the community with an emphasis on the almost annual redistribution of land. Finally, they set themselves up as a Ukrainian party but still grouped around the journal *Narodnya Volya* (The People's Will), the traditional name for a Social Revolutionist paper.

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By the autumn of 1917 this party had definitely split. The left, which stressed the economic and social aspects of the party, established another journal *Borotba* (The Struggle). This was soon followed by a formal schism and the creation of a new Social Revolutionist Party (Borotbisty) with the name taken from their paper. It was only natural that the relations between this group and the Bolshevik Great Russians tended to become closer as radical ideas gained strength in the country.

The numerically smaller Social Democratic Party was purely Marxian and it spoke primarily for the Ukrainian factory workers. Like the Russian Party, it was divided between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, with the latter drifting steadily toward the Social Revolutionists and even some of the bourgeois groups. On the other hand, the efforts of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks to establish their own party met with continual opposition. The Marxian theories of the withering away of the state had long been used by Lenin and some of the German Social Democratic leaders as weapons against the Poles in both the Russian Empire and Germany, and the same ban was now applied to the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. If they wished approval by the central authorities, they were told to become merely a Ukrainian section of the Russian Party. If they persevered in their efforts, they were read out of the party which in Ukraine was dominated by the Russian factory workers and the Russian miners from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih.

The position of the Ukrainian Social Democrats and especially the Bolsheviks was thus much more difficult than that of the less organized and more spontaneous Social Revolutionists. Strict party

186 discipline hampered them at every turn and ardent Ukrainians as
565 Mykola Skrypnyk, a personal and trusted friend of the Russian
668 Bolshevik leaders, refused to make any schism in the party, even
665 though he and his Ukrainian friends quite regularly appealed for recognition as a separate party, especially after the Bolsheviks recognized the existence of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

He, as an old Bolshevik, however, refused to cooperate with those Ukrainian Bolsheviks who dared to risk a fight with the central committee in Moscow and who finally tried to set up a Ukrainian Communist Party.

[648] The greatest weakness of both of these intellectual groups was their lack of appreciation of the importance of foreign policies. It was with great hesitation that their representatives in the Central Rada in the summer of 1917 approached the Russian Provisional Government to include a Ukrainian representative in all Russian diplomatic missions. They had had few or no representatives in the pre-revolutionary Russian diplomatic service; relatively few of them had been abroad, even to Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; they had no distinguished Ukrainian emigrants abroad who could speak to the world with the great authority of Ignace Jan Paderewski, Thomas G. Masaryk or Michael I. Pupin and during the crucial early months they largely neglected any consideration of foreign policy.

They wasted precious time in futile negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government over questions of federalism and they turned rather slowly toward the idea of independence. At each move of the more nationally conscious toward this goal, a certain portion of the more leftist members drew away toward the appropriate Russian camp in the name of internationalism and thus became the unconscious tools by which both the Provisional Government and later the Bolsheviks hoped to retain their control of the wealth of Ukraine.

It was this vagueness on the part of many of the intellectuals which kept them from being true intermediaries between the nationalist and military groups and the great mass of the peasants. It weakened the energy and zeal of some of the Ukrainian regi-

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ments which had declared for the Ukrainian cause immediately after the outbreak of the revolution and facilitated the development of pacifist opinion in the rank and file. So when, at the end of 1917, actual fighting started between the Russian Communists and the Ukrainian Central Rada, the armed forces of the new state were not as well prepared as they had been some months previously, and it was necessary to start again under almost new and more unfavorable conditions.

The pressure of events and the necessity for defense against the Red and the White invaders brought together the more consciously nationalist elements, first to declare the independence of Ukraine and then to organize, but the economic and social divergences were never solved. The dissolution of the Central Rada by the Germans and their support of a conservative government only embittered the political feuds and encouraged the rise of peasant leaders who were content to operate in their own areas and switched sides as questions of the moment moved them. All this weakened the sounder forces of the state and created the bewildering succession of such forms of government as the Rada, the Hetmanate of Skoropadsky and the Directory under Petlyura and gave the struggle at times a bizarre appearance as the different forces raised by the different political groups now combined against one or other of the invaders, only to separate when the other became the more pressing danger.

Under such conditions the central authority was finally overwhelmed and those people who were most strongly committed to a free and independent Ukrainian state withdrew from the country. The Soviet regime was able to take control. This did not, however, end the difficulties for there soon came a revelation that all was not yet well and harmonized. The peasants continued to be restless. The guerilla leaders did not at once cease their activity. Above all, the country was ruined but the relations between the Russians and the Ukrainians were not yet solved.

CHAPTER TWO

The Foundation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

186 642 665 As the power of the Provisional Government in Petrograd declined and more and more responsibility was assumed by the Central Rada in Kiev, relations between Petrograd and Kiev grew rapidly worse and the conception of Ukrainian independence gained strength in all circles, except among the Russian population of Ukraine. The seizure of power in Petrograd by Lenin could not fail to hasten the progress of separation.

During the summer and autumn of 1917 Lenin had advocated the widest application of the principle of self-determination and encouraged the non-Russian peoples to demand separation from the Provisional Government. He and his friends had hardly come into power, when he showed at once the cynicism and hypocrisy of his entire policy. The Central Rada in Kiev and the vast majority of the soviets in Ukraine repudiated the demand for the confiscation of all property, the expropriation of the land and the turning over of the control of all industry to the workers, although in the Third Universal it did provide for "state control over production in the interests of Ukraine and Russia" and declared that all land not worked directly by the owners was to become the property of the workers. For all intents and purposes, the Third Universal which was issued on November 20, 1917, did its best to separate Ukrainian affairs from Bolshevik control without as yet resorting to a declaration of formal independence.

This produced a very unsatisfactory situation, for the Bolsheviks attacked the efforts of the Secretary of the Rada for Military Affairs to effect an understanding with the old Russian Army

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186 Headquarters at Mohylev and with the other national groups which
642 were rapidly making common cause with the Central Rada in
665 their opposition to the extreme measures of the Petrograd Soviet. The Council of Commissars in Petrograd claimed to speak for the whole of the former Russia in its efforts to make peace with the Germans. When the Rada denied this and approached the other non-Russian peoples, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd formally accused the Rada of withdrawing Ukrainian troops from the front, of disarming Bolshevik units in Ukraine and of allowing the Don Cossack forces to retire to their homeland across Ukrainian territory. On December 17, it hypocritically recognized the right of Ukraine to independence but threatened war on the Rada if it did not meet the conditions of the Council of People's Commissars.

At the same time the Bolsheviks in the Kiev Soviet arranged an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the hope of putting pressure on the Rada. The attempt missed fire for the Congress proved to be under the influence of the anti-Bolshevik parties and adopted resolutions declaring that the Ukrainians had not thrown off the power of the Tsar to accept the domination of the Commissars. The Bolshevik spokesman Zatonsky was unable to make himself heard above the opposition and only 80 members supported the Soviet demands.

As a result of this failure Vasili Shakhray and Zatonsky left Kiev for Kharkiv where they joined a Congress of Soviets largely from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih. There, on December 20, they established a new Ukrainian Rada under Russian Communist control and set up a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were joined by a group of Ukrainian Bolsheviks including Neronovych and George Kotsyubynsky, the son of the well-known Ukrainian author who had been a friend of Gorky.

[701] The so-called Ukrainian army loyal to this new regime was composed almost exclusively of Russian troops and was under the open command of a Russian officer, Michael A. Muravyev. This force occupied Kiev on February 7, 1918 and held the city for about three weeks. Its actions showed clearly the nature of the government. Under the pretext of liberating the Ukrainians from

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the control of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and the Rada, it abolished 186
all Ukrainian newspapers and its disorderly elements not only 642
executed members of the Ukrainian and Russian bourgeoisie but 665
also Ukrainian Communists and radicals who used the Ukrainian language in their hearing.

In the meantime the Bolsheviks had opened negotiations with 648
the Germans in Brest-Litovsk where Trotsky claimed to speak for 186
the entire former Russian Empire. To circumvent this, the Rada 642
formally declared the full independence of Ukraine and sent dele- 665
gates to the peace conference. As a balance to this, Trotsky intro- [728]
duced into the conference the representatives of this new Ukrainian Soviet Republic who claimed to be the spokesmen for the Ukrainian peasants and proletariat. Their arguments did not convince the Germans and Austrians, who saw greater possibilities of profit by recognizing the Ukrainian National Republic, so as to secure without fighting a large part of the Ukrainian grain supplies. The Ukrainian National Republic signed this agreement with misgivings, for, in fact, it threw the Rada into the power of the Germans and ended all chance of assistance from the Allied democratic powers which had previously regarded Lenin as the tool of the German General Staff. Now, with the conclusion of this peace, they extended their ill-will to the Ukrainian Central Rada.

The immediate result was German assistance to the Rada and the Soviet forces were quickly forced out of Ukraine and back into Great Russian territory. The leaders of the Ukrainian Soviet government were members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and could not raise the question as to whether or not their new state was actually independent, and whether it could be, if it did not have its own Communist Party associated on a par with the Russian Party in the Communist International.

This brief Communist interlude in Ukraine should have been most instructive to both the Allied powers and the Germans, but neither drew the true lessons from it. The Allies, who were still opposed to the principles of Bolshevism and were annoyed by the speeches of Zinovyev and Chicherin, became more friendly disposed to the Russian Whites and gave up their efforts to win through

648 invoking the democratic principles of self-determination the support
186 of any of the non-Russian peoples. The Germans, on the other
642 hand, after aiding the Rada to return, dispersed it on the ground
665 that it was too radical, but when a more conservative regime was set up under Hetman Skoropadsky, they did not give this honest support. They sought only for Ukrainian supplies and by their actions they weakened the power of the Hetman and strengthened discontent against his regime without allowing him to do anything that would weaken the power of the Communists.

The situation became almost ridiculously complicated. Germany, anxious to secure troops for the Western Front, was, by the spring of 1918, at peace with both the Commissars of Moscow and the government of Ukraine. It was therefore opposed to both the White Russians and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Even the Czechoslovaks on their way to Vladivostok, thanks to the negotiations between President Masaryk and Muravyev, were on friendly terms with the Ukrainian Communists and had difficulties with the Ukrainian government and the Germans. As soon as they crossed into the Russian Soviet Republic, they had difficulties with the Russian Communists and the Germans and found their support among a part of the White Russians. It was the same situation as in the far north where the Germans backed the White Finnish forces under Mannerheim against the red Finns who were the favored party of their friend and associate, Moscow. Yet all the time there was no Ukrainian Communist Party, for the Ukrainian Communists owed their prime allegiance to the Russian Communist Party which was, in theory at least, on the opposite side in the general disturbed situation.

To the Communists, as Skrypnyk, Shakhray and George Pyatakov who had played an important role in the Communist occupation of Kiev, this seemed a serious gap and at a meeting in Tahanrih in April they triumphed over the Communists from Katerynoslav who had insisted upon remaining merely a part of the Russian Communist Party. Their victory was of short duration, for when there came an organization meeting in Moscow on July 5, the Russian authorities definitely made it clear that they would not tolerate

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the existence of a Ukrainian Communist Party. Bela Kun warned 648
that in the international civil war that was to be begun, great 186
efforts were to be made not to allow it to assume anything of a 642
national character, but to keep it restricted and fought on class 665
lines. They were also informed that they could in this new struggle have no relations with Mensheviks or any Ukrainian Social Revolutionists or Social Democrats. A few months later Stalin was elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian party as a symbol of the dependence in which the party was to be kept.

The first people to appreciate fully the dilemma in which the Ukrainian Communists found themselves were the Ukrainian Communist leaders who had established, with Russian help, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were quickly taught that as long as the control of their Party was not in their own hands, they were completely helpless and at the mercy of the Russians.

Shakhray, who had endeavored to argue at Kiev in December, 1917 that the Ukrainian Communists were to be counted as Ukrainians, very soon in Russia became so disgusted that he resigned from the Russian Communist Party and retired to Saratov to establish a Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He criticized the extreme policy of centralization carried on by the Russian Communists.

Along with S. Mazlakh, he published a book entitled *The Wave—What is being done in Ukraine and with Ukraine.* This book, which was often quoted later by Skrypnyk and his associates, was the theoretical basis for Ukrainian Communism. Shakhray tried to foster discontent against the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky by stressing his relations with both the German forces in Ukraine and the White Russian refugees who had taken shelter in that country. He declared that Ukrainian independence could only be consistently won by the Ukrainian Communists, for they, as the Ukrainian proletariat, were the only people who could advocate and carry through a real revolution in view of the treachery of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, he attributed the Communist failure in Ukraine to the fact that the Party was entirely under

648 Russian control and looked at the cause of the Communists through
186 the eyes of the Russian colonists in Ukraine who were, in accord-
642 ance with the Russian imperialistic tradition, working not for
665 Ukraine but for Moscow.

He soon left Saratov for Kuban and here he was captured and killed by the Denikin forces. Mazlakh, who had remained a member of the Russian Communist Party, was later shot by them for nationalism. The third Commissar for War, Neronovych, became disillusioned and on the entrance of German troops into Ukraine he gave up politics but he fell into the hands of the Ukrainian National Army and was shot. Thus, the first attempts of the Russian Communist Party to seize Ukraine and expel the Ukrainian National government ended disastrously and relatively few of the early leaders survived. Most of them paid the penalty for their actions to one of the contending forces, with the Bolsheviks executing then or later the larger number.

During the summer of 1918 while Hetman Skoropadsky remained in power, the chief work which the Communists could hope to do in Ukraine was through their mission in Kiev under the leadership of D. Z. Manuilsky. This was ostensibly engaged in negotiations for a definite peace treaty between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. In reality, Manuilsky was almost openly intriguing with the tacit consent of the Germans who had no desire to see their own position in Moscow jeopardized, as their armies were being driven back on the Western Front. Manuilsky was also able to notice the constant splitting of the leftist Ukrainian parties, which, in their hostility to the policies of the Hetman, tended to move nearer to the Communist position.

The disintegration in both the Social Revolutionist and the Social Democrat ranks became steadily more marked during the summer of 1918. When the German armies collapsed and the Hetman could no longer retain his post, a Directory of five men, including Petlyura and Vynnychenko, set themselves up at the news of the abdication of the German Emperor and they soon recovered Kiev. At the same time the left wing of the Social

Revolutionists (Borotbisty) refused to recognize the new Directory and drifted rapidly toward the Bolshevik position. 648 186

The Kremlin, sensing the great change in the Ukrainian situation, at once refurbished the idea of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. 642 665 Its real head was now Christian Rakovsky, a Rumanian with Bulgarian citizenship who had never been in Ukraine, but its nominal leaders were Pyatakov and George Kotsyubynsky. These moved from Kursk along the railroad lines into Ukraine at the end of December but Chicherin, in his telegrams to the Directory, categorically denied that the Russians were supporting this movement in any way. He laid all the responsibility upon the Ukrainian Communists. The ruse did not work and finally on January 16, 1919, the Directory, in which Vynnychenko's star was sinking, declared war.

This was opposed by the left wing of the Social Democrats who were very influential in the Directory. On January 10-12, the two wings definitely parted and the left adopted the name of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Independent) and insisted upon the establishment of a non-Communist Soviet Republic. The right wing, in view of the weakness of the Ukrainian proletariat, advocated instead a Congress of Workers which would include both peasants and the city proletariat. When war actually started, the left wing split again between those who were willing to stand for an independent Ukraine and those who refused to act against Russia under any circumstances. The latter took the name of USDRP (Independent Lefts).

It was not long before the Borotbisty and the USDRP (Independent Lefts) began negotiations for merging. Both were convinced of the superiority of the Soviet form of democratic government and both were convinced that any Communist government would inevitably recognize the essential rights of the Ukrainian people. In this respect they were far more naive than were the leaders of the first Ukrainian Communist regime who had already become completely disillusioned at the contrast between the theories and the practice of Lenin and his associates. They refused to cooperate with Petlyura and the Directory and, in effect, they with-

648 drew from its support a considerable section of the Ukrainian in-
186 tellectuals at a crucial moment.

642 On the other hand, with their own armies they fought against
665 the White Russians of Denikin, because they saw in these merely an attempt to restore the old order. Yet they declined to be included in the organized army of the Directory and by their independent actions they made more difficult the burden of the army commanders. They encouraged the formation in the country of independent military bands which added to the growing chaos. To emphasize their position they again changed their name to the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and constantly sought to ingratiate themselves with the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party which had again succeeded in reoccupying Kiev and in forcing the Directory to flee.

On the other hand, the USDRP (Independents), almost as true admirers of the Soviet system but far more critical of the Russian influence, did merge their forces for the fighting against Denikin with the forces of the Directory. In the summer of 1919, this group, under the influence of the Khmelevtsevs of Kobilyaky in Poltavshchyna, commenced again to review their position. After the death of their leaders in a crossing of the Dnieper and after the defeat of Denikin, they decided to adopt the appellation of Communists and to rename themselves the Ukrainian Communist Party without any additional description title. Thus, they took the name of Ukapisty and as such they dragged on an independent existence for some years, confidently expecting that they would ultimately receive national and international recognition from the Comintern, the Communist International.

This endless splitting and regrouping of the various parties proved a headache to the Directory which was trying to organize the country for defense against both of the Russian invaders. The individual armed forces, acting independently, aided in wrecking the economy and this inspired peasant leaders of various kinds to seek the control of their own native regions. Some of these men proved themselves able, if short-sighted, leaders. Some, as Nestor Makhno, were unadulterated anarchists who saw no need of any

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central regime. Others were mere adventurers thrown into prominence by the course of events and willing to shift their principles for the sake of a momentary personal advantage. Others were patriots with no broader vision than their home districts. 648 186 642 665

As a result, throughout 1919 there were some 328 revolts against the extending power of the Russian Communist forces which were fanning out over Ukraine, slaughtering and robbing as they went but still unable to secure a definite control of the villages.

As opposed to this welter of conflicting ideals, the policy of the Russian dominated Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party was simplicity and clarity itself. This supported the paper independence of the Ukrainian Soviet regime and openly avowed its intention of subjugating the country and of exploiting it for the benefit of Moscow. Their purposes were even openly avowed at the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies on March 22, 1919, when Shlikhter, a Ukrainian German and one of the commissars appointed by Moscow to collect grain, declared: "You all remember how Ukraine began to become Soviet; with every day of the advance of the Red Army, we and you felt more easy; the rich grain-producing Ukraine is ours. We have four central military divisions collecting and on them we rest all our hopes. We have a mass of workmen sent in (from Moscow to Ukraine), who know how to search all the Ukrainian villages. We always remember that the eyes of the proletariat of Russia are turned toward Ukraine."

These remarks represented the cynical attitude of Lenin and the Communists. They ignored the statements as to a Ukrainian Soviet Republic that were being made by Lenin and others to woo the various leftist Ukrainian parties. They were safe speeches made to reassure the Great Russians that the Bolsheviks still had a monolithic outlook, even though they were prepared to go to almost any lengths to create a paper regime which would insure and facilitate the plundering of the rich grain-producing Ukraine. They told, more or less, the truth, that was not recognized by the more idealistic theoreticians, that the Ukrainian Communists were, in fact, the dupes and victims of the Moscow regime which cared nothing for the Ukrainian people, or even the Ukrainian proletariat.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

648 186 642 665 By the end of 1919 the Ukrainian Soviet regime was so satisfied with the success of its raiding and collecting parties that it felt able to proclaim an amnesty and to disarm the population completely. To accomplish the latter purpose, new Russian forces were sent into the country, the villages were thoroughly searched and disarmed. The peasants were tiring of the apparently endless exactions of the independent commanders and they turned against many of the patriotic partisan bands and declined to give them further support. This broke the movement and even the alliance of Petlyura with the Poles and the short occupation of Kiev by the combined armies in the spring of 1920 did not suffice to restore the old enthusiasm for the hard-pressed Directory.

By the end of 1920, when the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet delegations met the Poles in Riga in October, 1920, the fighting was nearly over. The Poles signed a treaty of peace without consulting their Ukrainian allies of the Ukrainian National Republic. There was nothing for the forces of the Directory to do but to retire abroad and continue their unsuccessful efforts to secure Western assistance. This was not forthcoming. The French were interested in aggrandizing Poland as a bulwark against Germany; the other allies were openly supporting Denikin through a misinterpreted friendship with the Russian people and there did not seem to be left even a spark of the principles enunicated but a short time before in Wilson's attitude toward self-determination and the rights of people to govern themselves. The struggle was ended and the Ukrainians were left at the mercy of their Russian overlords, now back in a new guise.

CHAPTER THREE

The Period of Militant Communism

Any interpretation of the so-called period of Militant Communism which extended from the Soviet seizure of power to the spring of 1921 must rest upon the individual estimation of the sincerity and idealism of Lenin and his associates. If we assume that they had a real belief in the principles of Marxism as it developed into Communism, the period must seem one of disillusionment on the world, national and regional scale. If, on the other hand, the stress is to be laid upon their seizure and maintenance of power, the period becomes a further step in the total disintegration of society in the former Russian Empire and in the destruction of all those institutions and conceptions handed down from the past or developed by the democratic Ukrainian National Republic. 000

On the world scale it became almost immediately obvious that the world revolution as projected and preached by Lenin and Trotsky in 1918 was not going to occur in the immediate future. The failure of the Communists to secure control of Germany and the defeat of Bela Kun in Hungary reduced the Communist International from an association of revolutionary representatives of Communist nations and governments to a gathering of exiled and embittered conspirators totally dependent upon the will of the Russian Communists in the Kremlin. This, even had Lenin been sincere, would have inevitably inspired him with the idea of collecting the territory of the Russian Empire for his own advantage.

In the first heat of enthusiasm[1] the Petrograd Soviet had confiscated all property, nationalized land and industry and embarked on a series of far-reaching changes. They thought of the land question in terms of the use of land by the village community and of 471

[1] [After Soviet seizure of power -- Analyst]

471 industry and factories by the workers and they did their best to inflame the workers and peasants against the great landlords and the factory owners and administrators. In this they succeeded admirably and the already low standard of living in the Russian Empire began to drop lower and lower.

Under such conditions it became more and more necessary for the Soviet leaders in Moscow to make renewed efforts to master Ukraine and to inject some apparent vitality into their puppet, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. In this they were finally successful, but even though the Communists came back into Ukraine, they did not venture to destroy the fiction of Ukrainian independence, although they had no intention of allowing it to develop.

642 648 From the moment of its formation and adoption of a Communist Constitution on March 14, 1919, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic declared itself an independent and sovereign state. It was recognized with all due pomp and formality by Lenin, who again stressed it in his *Letters to the Workmen and Peasants of Ukraine* in his efforts to strengthen the opposition to Denikin. The Ukrainian Soviet Government was represented at the Conference in Riga that ended the Soviet-Polish War in the fall of 1920. The travesty was continued when, in December of the same year, Lenin concluded with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic a formal treaty of alliance in which Ukraine, for purposes of defense, graciously handed over to Moscow the commissariats of war, navy, foreign trade, railroads, finances, labor, posts and telegraphs and the Supreme Council of National Economy. It still retained the right to have its own diplomatic representatives in Poland, Germany and Austria, countries which had recognized the Ukrainian National Republic, and there were still preserved Ukrainian military schools to train officers for the Ukrainian army in both Kharkiv, the capital of Soviet Ukraine, and Kiev.

Still all this was merely a sham arrangement, for the bulk of the forces that fought against the Ukrainian National Republic were Russian and they operated with no regard for the feelings even of the Ukrainian Communists. They moved at will over Ukrainian territory, collected supplies at will and shipped them

to Russia and they behaved in every way as if they were in their own territory. 642 648

The key to this enigma[1] is to be found in the fact that the Ukrainian Communist Party was not regarded as an independent Communist Party with a seat in the Comintern, but was merely a branch of the Russian Communist Party. Its officers were therefore appointed at will and changed at the pleasure of the Russian Party. Its discipline and actions were controlled by Moscow and any independent Ukrainian development could be countermanded by a mere word from the centre. By this extremely simple device Lenin could maintain his hold over the Ukrainian Communists, even in the unlikely case that the Comintern was revitalized by the Communist seizure of power in another of the large states. 665

The policy did not fail to arouse criticism, even during the wars, by some of the Ukrainian members of the Party. In 1920, a "fraction of the federalists" was formed under Yu. Lapchynsky with the aid of S. Kirychenko, P. Slynko and E. Kasyanenko. It was naturally dissolved as soon as its importance was recognized, and its leaders were expelled from the Party. They accordingly joined the Ukapisty and only returned when that voluntarily liquidated itself some years later.

There were thus at the moment of the ending of the Civil Wars three Communist Parties in Ukraine, the official KP/b/U, the branch of the Russian Party, the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and the Ukapisty, i.e. the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The Borotbisty were the first to go. They had been formed out of the Left Social Revolutionists and were less sure of their Marxian knowledge but they contained many of the leftist Ukrainian intellectuals who valued the development of Ukrainian culture. The group had been praised by Lenin for its great part in the defeat of Denikin. In the spring of 1920, the proposal was made that they fully join the Ukrainian Branch of the Russian Communist Party. Shumsky and Blakytny led the affirmative. The spokesmen for the opposition were Poloz and Panas Lyubchenko, who was later to be the head of the UkSSR and to commit suicide in 1937. The

1 [sham independence of Ukraine from 1919 on -- Analyst]

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665 affirmative triumphed, and the Borotbisty were dissolved as a separate group. They were given the nominal right of choosing two members for the Executive Committee of the KP/b/U but this was, of course, an empty phrase, since that Executive Committee was itself but an agent and tool of the Executive Committee in Moscow.

The Ukapisty offered a more serious threat, for they were trained in Marxian dialectics and they knew the weak points in the program of the Moscow centre. They accepted the Marxian analysis of capitalist society and the Leninist theory of imperialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet regime. As regards the question of nationality, they shared the Marxist-Leninist conception but in contrast to the Russian Communist Party they [186] adapted this to suit a non-ruling and enslaved nation. The Ukapisty[1] theoretically based the difference between its attitude and that of the Russian Communist Party on the fact that the latter represented the proletariat of a dominant nation, while they stood for the proletariat of an enslaved nation. Thus the one considered the question of nationality as a question of tactics connected with the spreading of the proletarian revolution; for the other it was a question of program connected with the liberation of the people and itself not only from capitalistic but also from national enslavement. They condemned the Russian Bolshevik practices in Ukraine and, in contrast to the Bolshevik idea of spreading the revolution by armed force (an idea which collapsed with the defeat of the Red Army at Warsaw in 1920 and which was then condemned by Lenin himself), they believed in the "internal forces", i.e. that the revolution would only be organic and lasting if it was carried out by the internal forces of each nation and not if it was introduced by bayonets from abroad. They stood therefore for an independent Ukrainian Soviet state, with its own red army, its own independent economy, and its entrance into the Comintern on an equal footing with all other Communist parties.

The Ukapisty were allowed to exist until 1925 and it was not until the Comintern was willing to declare that it was Muscovite to the core and that all foreign Communist parties were of right

[1] [Ukrainian Communist Party -- Analyst]

subordinate, that the Ukapist appeal for inclusion was definitely 665
rejected and that the group was offered the choice of suppression or of self-liquidation. They accordingly accepted the voluntary decision and signed thus their own death warrants as had the Borotbisty by their early submission.

All three parties had the same general attitude toward all non-Communists and bourgeois groups. They were in general agreement that these had to be destroyed and driven from political and social importance. Thus, all adopted a hostile attitude toward the nationalists who had supported Petlyura and the Ukrainian National Republic. They attacked the remains of the Social Revolutionists, the Social Democrats, and all the non-Marxian or Marxian groups that did not accept a strict Communism. They dissolved the organizations and seized their property, while they imprisoned many of the older leaders and tried to humiliate them in the eyes of the Ukrainian public.

Thus in 1921, they staged in Kharkiv a public trial of the [687]
members of the Executive Committee of the Social Revolutionists. The list included V. Holubovych, the Prime Minister at the time of Brest-Litovsk, N. Petrenko, P. Hubenko (Ostap Vyshnya), Lyzanivsky and many others. They were charged with hostility to the "government of workers and peasants" but apparently the regime was not too sure of its ground and merely sentenced them to relatively short terms in prison.

It was not only the politicians who suffered, for the new regime[1] 661
attacked every institution which it did not control. In 1920 575
it abolished all Ukrainian professional organizations and trades unions, including such as the Poltava Society of Workers in Co-operatives and similar groups in Kiev, Kharkiv, and other cities. Then, by arrests of the leaders of the cooperative societies, it forced new elections and put into power only those persons who had the direct approval of the Russian Bolsheviks.

It was next the turn of the purely cultural organizations. All the societies of the Prosvita (Enlightenment) which operated a chain of reading rooms, schools, libraries, theatres, etc. were disbanded on the ground that they were connected with the Rada

[1] [Ukrainian Soviet Republic -- Analyst]

661 of the old Ukrainian National Republic. The regime arrested and
575 shot as chauvinist counter-revolutionists many of the active workers. Those who were spared at the moment were treated as members of the proscribed classes and were punished by the exclusion of their children from schools, the denial of food cards, etc., all the traditional devices to eliminate the counter-revolutionary and suspected classes.

At the same time the government confiscated all the funds of educational institutions and the private organizations which had, during the Ukrainian National Republic and earlier, been interested in educational and scientific work. It closed the Ukrainian scientific societies in Kharkiv and Kiev and it put an end to all of the pre-Soviet journals, newspapers, and magazines. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been planned during the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky but had not commenced its work, was treated somewhat more leniently and it was allowed to open largely to support the pretext that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was an independent state, although it was made clear that Communist influence would be exerted on its statutes and organization.

517 Such a period of intellectual disintegration could not fail to leave its mark on all aspects of Ukrainian culture and art. The older writers who had achieved some prominence before 1914 either retired again into the emigration or they became silent. The younger generation, which was just rising into prominence, was either driven into temporary seclusion or, for the most part, swept into the surging current of events. They felt the leftward urge of many of the intellectuals and tried in one way or another to catch the spirit of the times in their works.

Yet it must be realized that, as in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, there still did not exist a predominant party line in the field of literature and the arts. Writers, painters and dramatists of widely differing tendencies accepted the revolution and loudly protested that they and they alone were the true mouthpieces of the times and greedily sought for support from the commissars.

They were the more fortunate in this because the bulk of the

[Eradication of pre-communist cultural organizations in 1920 -- Analyst]

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517
Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645]
through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669]
and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642
munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661]
as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423
tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation.[1] 369
It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

[1] [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

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423 The natural result was the growing depopulation of the cities.
369 Peasants who had gone into industry now flowed back to their native villages and demanded their share of the land in the hope that they might be able to raise food for themselves and their families. This increased the already overcrowded rural population and intensified the bitterness that was felt among all classes.

The hatred thus aroused was increased by the formation of committees of poor and landless peasants to take over the estates. Yet in Ukraine there was an important sector of the population who had been the owners and proprietors of from two to nearly one hundred acres of land. In some districts these included nearly a quarter of the peasant families and in an attempt to propitiate them the Soviets were frequently inclined to favor them and allow them to retain their holdings instead of dividing them among the more idle and shiftless of the population.

651 Yet this did not serve to maintain agricultural production[1] for
661 the crying demand of Moscow was for food. The Communists had abolished all markets and taxes but they substituted for them a rule that the peasants were to turn over their entire crop to the government and should retain for themselves only 31 pounds of grain per month for each member of the family. This naturally dissatisfied the peasants who had been won to the support of the new regime by the promises of the government that they could secure for their own use the land of the state and of the landlords. Each year, as the Soviets tried to enforce the collection, they planted less and less acreage and resorted to more skilful methods of hiding what they did produce in the hope that they might somehow exchange it for those manufactured products of which they were in urgent need.

To counterbalance this, the Russian detachments made more and more extensive raids and they were not satisfied to take merely the legal surplus. They seized everything in the way of food and supplies on which they could lay their hands and, in case of opposition, they ruthlessly shot the peasants without any trial or investigation as counter-revolutionists. In a sense they succeeded in their mission, for the food collectors in 1920 secured in Ukraine 2,560,000

[1] [Expropriation of landowners, distribution of land to peasants, 1919-21- Analyst]

tons of grain or about 75% of the total amount that they secured 651 661
in the whole of the former Russian Empire.

This led to new clashes and with the suppression of the larger armed partisan bands, there grew up a new feeling of ugliness that boded ill for the security of the whole regime. The success of the Communists in the industrial centres was thus balanced by their failure to win over any substantial part of the rural population.

In the cities the new regime[1] met with problems of another 433
kind. The workers in the great coal and iron industry where Com- 369
munism was strongest had at a very early date expelled the managers [327]
and foremen and had taken over themselves the operation of the plants, many of which had been ruined in the civil war. Now they found that they were not able to restore production. Industry practically came to a halt and by the end of 1921 there was only one blast furnace operating in Ukraine. The production of pig-iron dropped to 11,300 tons, or barely 3% of the pre-war production. The railroads suffered the same fate. There was no way of repairing them and without a trained administrative staff, they almost stopped functioning. This, in turn, increased unemployment and a lack of food in the cities and once more the city dwellers began to stream out into the country districts.

As a final blow there came in 1920 one of those periods of 731
drought which have recurred sporadically in Ukraine throughout the centuries. In view of the general decay in transportation and the ravages of the war, this became serious and the situation grew even worse when the same phenomenon was repeated in 1921. Between the drought and the raiding detachments, the peasants had no reserves of grain and a famine broke out which cost the lives of several million Ukrainians.

This famine was very definitely the result of Communist mismanagement, plus the drought, but the Soviet regime was unable to take any effective counter-measures. When its extent was realized, the regime allowed through the League of Nations the organization of the American Relief Administration under Herbert Hoover. This collected and sent to the stricken areas large quantities of grain but it carried on its work with such impartiality that

1 [Ukrainian Soviet Republic established 1919 -- Analyst]

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73/ it ignored for humanitarian motives the discontent of the peasants and its operations enabled the Soviet regime to master a storm which would otherwise have endangered its very existence. It is interesting in this connection that the Soviet regime only with the greatest reluctance allowed relief work to be carried on in the Ukraine, where the famine conditions were the worst. Their only interest was in the Volga area inhabited by Great Russians and they tried to use the assumed independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as an excuse for refusing to allow help to be extended.

ooo Thus by the spring of 1922 the policy of Militant Communism had broken down at every point. The system had shown its political, economic and cultural bankruptcy and its sole success had been among certain groups of idealists abroad who were infatuated with the resolution with which the Soviets had broken with the old order. Yet this was a poor foundation and it was obvious that something drastic had to be done, if the Soviet system was to be saved.

CHAPTER FOUR

The New Economic Policy

With the cities prostrate, the land untilled and the people 185
starving, not only in the Ukraine but elsewhere on Soviet-controlled territory, Lenin suddenly changed his policies and introduced various measures which rapidly relieved some of the most glaring defects of the Soviet system. The general term for the new arrangement is the New Economic Policy which more or less remained in force until 1929.

The basis of these measures was a change in the method of 185
collecting taxes and income. Whereas, during the period of Militant 651
Communism, the peasants had been compelled in theory to hand over their entire production to the state with the exception of what they were allowed to retain for their own personal use, they were now assigned a fixed amount which they were to contribute, and the balance they could retain or even sell in the local markets. The decree providing for this was signed March 21, 1921. This gave the peasants a new inspiration to work, for they could begin to make plans rationally and intelligently and could hope to receive some reward for their diligence and industry. This measure was supplemented by others which made it appear that the Bolshevik regime was in some degree returning to the philosophy or the practices of capitalism.

That was undoubtedly the impression that Lenin wanted to 000
convey abroad. There had been signs that some of the European countries were willing to renew commercial relations with the Soviets, and the introduction of the New Economic Policy strengthened these desires. People began to speculate glibly and naively that the practical realities of existence had forced Lenin to admit much that he had previously denied and they predicted that in

000 the coming years the form of Soviet life would steadily approach that in the Western world.

185 The same reaction was to be seen at home. Many of the more sincere and convinced Communists greatly disliked the concessions to the old order that were made at this time. It seemed to them that their revered master was turning his back upon his old position and they scoffed at the new Nepmen, who were growing wealthy under the new regime.

Lenin was not to be shaken in his policy. His motives in these concessions to capitalism are well expressed in the remarks in the *History of the All-Union Communist Party.* "Militant Communism had tried to take the fortress by frontal assault. It advanced too far and risked being cut off from its base. Lenin made the proposition to retire a few steps, to retreat for a while further to the rear, so as to pass from an assault to a siege, and then, after gaining strength, to return to the assault."

The later sequence of events showed the correctness of this explanation. The New Economic Policy in Lenin's mind was a temporary move which was made in the hope that the economic life of the country would revive. He made no lasting concessions and a careful reading of all the measures shows that they were not motivated by the sense of failure that was ascribed to them by the capitalistic world. Lenin did not put the measures in any form that would definitely bind himself or his successors. They did not provide any guarantees of their permanence, nor did they state any principle that was in contradiction with the basic philosophy of Communism. They were, obviously, a mere tactical manoeuvre in the difficult situation in which the Soviets found themselves.

185 The basic decree was signed in Moscow[1] and was, of course,
665 only applicable to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. It could not therefore be valid without further action in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic which was, by hypothesis, a completely independent and sovereign state. Yet so closely knit together was the fate of the Ukrainian Communist Party with that of Russia that it was not necessary for the Ukrainian Soviet regime to issue immediately any new decree on the subject. It was automatically

1 [New Economic Policy, March 1921 -- Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

assumed that it was equally binding in Ukraine and without any further ado, the Ukrainian peasants were given the right of selling any surplus products exactly as if there had been no independent Ukrainian Soviet government. 185 665

The legal aspects of this decree did not interest the bulk of the Ukrainian peasants. They saw only the relief which it afforded them and the opportunities that it gave. They immediately took advantage of it, and its first effects were to be seen in a surprisingly short time. Of course, there could be no improvement in the national well-being until the harvest and the harvest of 1921 was again reduced by drought, so that with the best of intentions, it was not until 1922 that conditions began to improve.

A new Russian land code was finally adopted on March 3, 1921, and it was, of course, the model to be observed in the Ukraine. Yet this did not suppress the discontent of the Ukrainian peasants. 423 671

In an effort to suppress this smouldering discontent, D. Manuilsky, who was then the Commissar for Agriculture of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee (the revolutionary centre and the provisional government of the country), summoned to Kharkiv a gathering of agronomists from all parts of Ukraine in the First All-Ukrainian Agronomical Congress. He found the more than one thousand present practically united in their assertions that the agricultural laws as developed by the Bolsheviks were inapplicable to the Ukraine. They had been drawn up and approved on March 6, 1919 and they were entirely based on the spirit of the Russian land commune which provided usually for a redistribution of the land every three years, with the supplemental provision that the redistribution should take into account the number of persons in each family. This was all very good when it agreed, as it did in Russia, with the general spirit of the people who were vitally interested in the commune as such. Conditions were different in Ukraine and the purely artificial Land Society was developed. Of course, all the peasants had to become members but the land was divided by households rather than on an individual basis. Furthermore, it was provided in the Ukrainian Code that "The right to land handed over for labor use is without term and

423 can be taken away only in accordance with the provisions of the
671 law." This insured the individual household in possession of its own piece of land and made it possible for the more industrious to undertake the improvement of the soil.

By the time that the final form of the Labor Code was established on November 22, 1922, it had become almost essentially different from the Russian Code, although it paid a lip service to the principle of nationalization through the actions of the Land Societies. A further sign of submission was the establishment of maximums on landholding. No household in the densely settled areas could have more than fourteen hectares or, in the less thickly populated areas, forty-eight hectares. The Land Society had the right to decide on the form of exploitation of the land to be carried out but if a family disagreed with the form established, it was entitled to demand the same amount of land but not necessarily the same land that it had contributed. Furthermore, outside of the requirement that all members of household were compelled to labor personally on the land, the provisions dealing with hired labor and the renting of land were left purposely vague or were omitted for further study.

The new code, which was more liberal than that in Russia, was devised in the interests of the landless peasants and also the poor and middle peasants, and definitely ratified the seizure of the estates of the large landowners. Sixty-eight per cent of the landless peasants received small tracts of land and fifty-two percent of those with holdings from two to four hectares were settled under more favorable conditions, or received additional land. On the other hand, 27.2% of those with more than sixteen hectares, the normal holding, and 56.8% of those with more than twenty-five hectares, saw their additional land removed and handed over to their less fortunate neighbors. In a sense this might seem to have been a solution of the crying need of the peasants for land but it brought with it some unexpected results.

423 The civil war had completely destroyed any free capital, and
427 without capital the peasants could not buy the tools, the fertilizers, etc., which they needed to prosper. This made little difference in

the very beginning, for at the moment the primary need was for 423
food and the peasants were compelled to live upon what they could 427
raise. It was not long before the returning prosperity commenced new differentiations in the villages. The poorer peasants began to take advantage of the provisions that they could lease their newly acquired land, and while the Russian law provided that a lease could run for only three years, the Ninth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets soon lengthened this term to 13 years and liberalized the laws for hired labor.

The result was that by 1926, the poor peasants had leased 1,181,000 hectares and 53.9% of the peasants who had at least ten hectares rented additional land.

In a word, under the New Economic Policy conditions began, 185
in fact, to return to what had been the situation prior to the 423
revolution, with the exception that the great land owners had disappeared, but as they had been largely Russian or Polish, their departure only increased the Ukrainian influence in the villages and made them more homogeneous than they had been before.

The Commissariat of Agriculture endeavored during these [645]
years of reconstruction[1] to maintain as independent a position as possible. It established its own independent services, its own research stations which were concerned with Ukrainian agricultural problems, its own breeding stations and its own bureaus for study and development of the various branches of agriculture, and it did its best to separate these from the similar services directed by Moscow and not concerned with the particular problems of Ukraine.

The peasants responded to this with their own efforts. In 1922, [452]
with the famine still raging, they secured permission from Moscow to establish the so-called Selo-Pomich (or Village Aid) to provide credit for the peasants. This finally persuaded the Cheka to hand over part of the golden objects which they had stolen from the churches, and it used the capital thus secured to buy seed corn in America. It then loaned this to the peasants and when the harvest came, the loan was repaid in kind and more credit was then extended.

1 [During NEP -- Analyst]

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185 474 241 The peasants also revived and breathed new life into the co-operatives which had been broken up during the period of Militant Communism. In 1923 they established another cooperative organization, the Selo-Tekhnyka (Village Machines) which purchased more expensive agricultural machinery and rented it out to the peasants for the appropriate agricultural work. These points became the centre of mechanization and were in effect the first [453] tractor stations. In 1924 they established the First Agricultural Bank, a sort of private institution which at one time had more loans outstanding than had the Ukrainian State Bank which was, of course, closely supervised by Moscow.

185 369 All these efforts[4] met with marked success and agriculture speedily began to revive. The peasants became more prosperous and their holdings of livestock rapidly increased, although they did not reach the pre-war level. This, in its turn, created a new demand for manufactured products and restored the factories to operation, and with them the conditions in the cities began to improve.

185 471 [475] Similar concessions were made to industry, but with one important difference. The larger and more important industrial plants were not turned back to their former owners who were, as before, allowed no voice or influence in their direction. They were taken from the workers who had seized and abused them during the period of Militant Communism and placed under the supervision of government trusts. These were either regional in character or confined to a single branch of industry. In either case, they were under the control of a more or less trusted group of men among whom Communists were in the leading positions, but while they received certain credits from the state, they were more or less autonomous and they were allowed to go through regular commercial transactions and encouraged to show profits in their annual reports. There was thus again a source of encouragement both for the directors and the workers, and slowly but surely the level of industry began to rise.

The smaller plants were very often leased to individuals who were allowed to employ hired labor and the hope was given to these that their taxes would be at such a level that they, too, could

4 [NEP attempts to restore peasant prosperity -- Analyst]

show profits. The very small shops and plants were in some cases 185
taken back by their former owners when they had survived and any 471
provisions about the use of hired labor were tacitly forgotten in the first flush of the New Economic Policy.

All of these measures were interpreted by the great mass of the Ukrainian people as a recognition of the validity of human experience. There were, of course, keen realists who gave full credence to the declarations of Lenin that the Soviets had never wavered in their objections and were using these concessions only as a means of reviving the life of the country and strengthening their own position. At first this did not seem to be true and it was only as conditions really settled down and a semblance of prosperity returned that it became possible to note the steadily increasing pressure which the government exerted.

In the same way the currency reforms were not without their 185
own influence. In 1923 the government introduced a new cur- 652
rency, the chervonets, which was ostensibly based on a gold stand- 435
ard, to take the place of the old depreciated paper. Nevertheless, the latter was allowed to circulate in the rural districts with the result that its value continued to fall and it became more and more difficult for the peasants to satisfy their needs for manufactured goods which were priced in the new currency. This produced the so-called "scissors," for with the restoration of industry, the value of manufactures continued to rise, while the prices of agricultural products continually fell.

The political system was still not clear. The new regulations 642
were introduced in the Council of Commissars in Moscow and it 665
was emphatically stated that they were for the Russian Soviet 645
Federated Socialist Republic, but Ukraine and also the other Soviet Republics put into practice the same resolutions, often without any decree by the ostensibly independent government.

The key to this enigma lay in the nature of Communist discipline. In theory and on paper the Soviet regime was thoroughly democratic in the broad sense of the word. There was an elaborate scheme of elections to the village and the higher Soviets, and even though this was weighted very heavily to provide increased repre-
[During NEW ECONOMIC POLICY -- Analyst]

642 sentation for the city proletariat where the Communists felt them-
665 selves strongest, it was always possible to defend the system.
645 Yet this does not tell the full story, for though non-party men were elected to the lower and local Soviets, the number of Communists increased steadily in the higher. These Communists were themselves classified as members of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party and they were bound by party discipline to obey all the instructions given by the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

There was thus, in reality, two governments in both Ukraine and the Russian Republic. There was first the republic government theoretically responsible to the people and thus transmitting the wishes of the people upward, even though the highest republic authorities were the direct appointees of Moscow. There was likewise the domination, more or less veiled, of the Communist Party, a government which only transmitted instructions from the top down. In the early days, and indeed for a considerable period, it is often difficult to determine whether certain measures came into effect because they had been approved by the Council of Commissars in Moscow or because they had the backing of the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party which was a monolithic organization, responsible only to its chiefs. It was in a sense a theoretical question for, by the period of the New Economic Policy, the Council of Commissars, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the control of the Communist International rested in the hands of the same men who functioned in three different capacities but still formed a well-knit body. Even though the legal relations between Ukraine and Russia rested on the vague treaties and agreements made during the period of Militant Communism and the civil wars, the Ukrainian Soviet government could be practically overruled at any moment and on any point on which it disagreed with the wishes of Moscow.

665 Since all non-Communist organizations had been dissolved[1] the only possible opposition could come from the Ukapisty, the Ukrainian Communist Party. This was composed of a small number of brilliant men, confirmed Communists, who insisted upon preserving

[1] [After establishing Ukraine Soviet Republic, 1919 - -Analyst]

the independence of the Ukrainian Communist regime in the hope 665
that sooner or later they would be admitted to the Communist International as an independent national Communist Party. They therefore willingly accepted the doctrines of the International, which was little more than the third facet of the ruling block. By 1925 the situation had so far developed that their aspirations for this were definitely checked and even this theoretical opposition was eliminated by compelling the Ukapisty to enter into the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party, or else.

This situation makes clear the relations that existed between 661
Ukraine and Russia during the early years of the New Economic Policy. As agriculture and industry revived in Ukraine, it was suggested that the Ukrainian government send aid to its Communist brothers. That suggestion was a command, and just as the Muscovite bands under Militant Communism scoured Ukraine for food, so under the New Economic Policy, the so-called Ukrainian government began to drain off the wealth of the country for the charitable purpose of helping its Russian brothers.

The vagueness and the ambiguity of this system was partially 631
cleared up by the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty establishing this was signed on December 30, 1922, just as Lenin was becoming paralyzed and unable to function efficiently. It bound together the various Soviet Republics, while at the same time it paid lip service to the right of any of these Republics to secede. Of course, this was from the beginning an empty phrase, for the only people who had the power to declare the secession was the Council of Soviets of the Federal Republic and they were Communists assigned to their posts by Moscow and bound to obey the orders of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In addition to this, a surprising number of the ruling group of the Russian Soviet Republic now took over the corresponding posts in the Union and thus added still a fourth facet to their varied activity.

The Constitution, which was formally adopted at a Union 631
Congress of Soviets on July 6, 1923, went still further in providing 642
for the government of the Union. The Commissariats were divided 645

631 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of
642 Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications,
645 Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent
327 exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that
185 the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

432 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921,
241 which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the
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payment of a specific amount of tax in kind and left to the peasant 432
the rest of his crop. In an endeavor to get this grain into Russia, 241
the government offered to buy it but it did not have the funds or 185
the inclination to pay for it at the market price. The financial reforms connected with the introduction of the chervonets could, to a certain degree, make it expedient for the peasant to sell to the government for cash, and as time went on the peasant gained the power of selling his crop for cash but the Moscow control of transportation and the prohibition of large scale trading left him helpless and he saw himself forced to dispose of it locally or to the government. Then the government made a fixed price which was far [435] below that of the free market, and was often scarcely a third of the amount that the peasant could have secured. This sale of large quantities of agricultural products at a fixed price gradually became the rule and was one of the signs that the period of toleration for private income was coming to an end.

In 1925, the government began to clamp down on the small 656
traders, the Nepmen, who had profited by the opportunities which 661
they had had. Again it had a large choice of measures. Thus, depending on the situation, it could invoke laws against the hiring of labor; it could order the state agencies to refuse to buy from or sell to an obnoxious individual and thus isolate him; it could suspend his ration cards and perquisites, take away his right of voting and thus make him a pariah in the community; it could levy prohibitive taxes which would put him out of business and confiscate his property; or it could find some violation of some other law or regulation and imprison or exile him.

The degree of pressure which was put upon the peasants and 439
the workers varied from year to year. Each year Ukraine was 241
compelled to export more to Russia without regard to the needs of the local population. Thus, the amount of grain rose from 1,050,000 tons in 1924-5 to 3,165,000 tons in 1926-7, when there was a bumper crop, but in 1927-8, when the harvest partially failed and there were signs of need in the country, the amount collected and exported rose to 4,353,000 tons. At the same time, the continually increasing demands aroused again a spirit of oppo-

439 sition and of indifference among the peasantry and a resentment
241 against the growing exactions of the Soviet regime in Moscow.

Still these were years of relative peace. With the introduction
000 of the New Economic Policy, the government became more tolerant of differences of opinion and the OGPU (the Organization of the State Political Administration, the new name for the old Cheka) was relatively inactive. There were few political arrests, imprisonments, executions and deportations and the bulk of the population began to breathe more easily. There were men, however, who saw the straws in the wind. For example in 1924, Mikhnovsky, who had been one of the early Ukrainian nationalists, committed suicide and so did Syrotenko, a prominent Social Revolutionist, but these were in a way exceptional cases.

It is far more likely that this lull was part of the Moscow policy of preparing to eliminate in one swoop all persons who might prove to be dangerous, but it was also affected by the confusion and the intrigues that were going on in Moscow. With the death of Lenin, there was no clear successor to his post and prestige. There were many claimants, notably Stalin and Trotsky. When Lenin died, the power passed into the hands of a small group of leaders with Stalin, the Secretary of the Communist Party, and Trotsky as Commissar for War as the main contenders for the supreme power. The struggle between these two men lasted for several years, with the star of Stalin rising over that of Trotsky who favored a far more rigorous policy toward both the Nepmen and traders in the cities and the kulaks or kurkuls (the richer peasants) who had profited materially by the opportunities for private trade and production. It was not until that conflict was over that any one dared to risk the internal upheaval that might come with a change from the avowed outlines of the New Economic Policy and a reintroduction of more rigorous socialist or communist practice.

CHAPTER FIVE

Ukrainization

The period of the New Economic Policy was likewise the 186
time when the movement for the Ukrainization of the state reached its highest point. This was a complicated political, cultural and scholarly movement which aimed to develop the Ukrainian self-consciousness in every possible way and to establish the proper role of the Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It took many and diverse forms, and while it developed into a definite opposition to Russian influence and Russian methods, it was not primarily so much an anti-Communist as an extra-Communist movement, even though most of its outstanding leaders were tried and tested members of the party.

The basis for the entire movement is to be found in the slight attraction that Communism as a doctrine possessed for the Ukrainian people. As late as 1927 there were only 122,928 Ukrainian Com- [665]
munists, that is, about thirty-nine for each ten thousand of the [162]
Ukrainian population. The bulk of the Communists in Ukraine were Russian and the vast majority of these belonged to the urban proletariat or to the workers in the Donets Basin and Kryvy Rih.

The general period of disintegration during the civil war and [369]
the period of Militant Communism had greatly strengthened the power and self-confidence of the peasants and had weakened the power of the city workmen. This showed Lenin and the dominant group that some method had to be found to win at least the passive support of the countryside if new troubles were to be averted.

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the tenacity with which the 186
Ukrainian peasants, whether they were literate or illiterate, clung 191
to their native language. Lenin had used this characteristic with 665

186 skill and success in encouraging the Ukrainian opposition to the
191 Russian Provisional Government. The proper recognition of the
665 language had been one of the most insistent demands put forward by all groups which had later come together in the Ukrainian National Republic. The failure of the Bolsheviks in their early occupation of Ukraine to recognize the Ukrainian language had been one of the surest means of arousing opposition to their course and this time with their power established, the Bolsheviks decided to change their policy. As early as December 6, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party had declared: "In carrying out absolutely the principle of the self-determination of peoples, the Central Committee considers it necessary to repeat again that the Russian Communist Party maintains the recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic." It encouraged the Russians in Ukraine to learn Ukrainian and to aid in developing this as a weapon for the Communist education of the laboring masses.

Yet all was mere verbiage and even Vynnychenko who, at this moment, was sympathetic to the Bolsheviks in his "Letter to the Ukrainian Workmen and Peasants," published in *Forward* (Lviv, 30.10. 2-3, II, 1920), lamented the fact that, despite this, the Ukrainian language did not receive its just due and that many Russian Communists were inclined to look upon even Ukrainian Communists as potential counter-revolutionists.

On the other hand, there was one group of Communists who were sincerely devoted to this goal. They were the former Borotbisty and the Ukapisty who had stressed the need for Ukrainian Communism and who had never lost an opportunity, while stressing their Communist feelings, to express the hope that the Ukrainian Communists might some time be formed into a special party and be duly admitted to the Communist International on a par with all the other Communist parties of the world. They took advantage of the situation offered by the formation of the Union of Soviet Republics and eagerly sought posts in the Commissariat of Education, which was one of the independent republic commissariats. This gave them a very good opportunity to work for the develop-

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

ment of Ukrainian and Ukrainian culture in a field where there could be little expressed opposition. 186 191

On the other hand, every step for the fostering of Ukrainian or its development was met by the Russian Communists, and especially by those in Ukraine, with the greatest hostility. This went so far that Dmytro Lebid, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the KP/b/U, declared that there was a conflict of two languages and cultures in Ukraine and that it was not the duty of the Communist Party to interfere in this but to allow the dominant culture to win. In this he was actuated as a Russianized Ukrainian by his hostility to his native language and culture but he failed to win support, for it was very obvious that his policy of favoring Russian was only deepening the gulf between the Party and the Ukrainian peasants, the thing that the Moscow authorities were endeavoring at the time to bridge. 665

On August 1, 1923, the Communist Party passed a new decree which said: "The government of the workers and peasants regards it as necessary in the immediate future to concentrate its power on the spreading of a knowledge of the Ukrainian language. The former equality existing hitherto between the two most widely used languages in Ukraine, Ukrainian and Russian, is insufficient. Life, as experience has shown, causes the actual superiority of Russian. To remove this inequality, the government of the workmen and peasants will introduce a series of practical means which, respecting the equality of the languages of all nationalities on Ukrainian territory, must assure to the Ukrainian language that place which corresponds to the number and economic importance of the Ukrainian people in the territory of the UkSSR."

It further provided that Russian officials in Ukraine should learn Ukrainian within a definite period. All this sounded well on paper but the date by which Russian officials had either to learn Ukrainian or be recalled was constantly postponed further into the future, and the highest men who came for but short periods and who represented Moscow in the Ukrainian capital stubbornly refused to make any effort to obey these decrees.

On the other hand, every declaration to this effect was eagerly

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186 snapped up by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty in the Commis-
191 sariat for Education. In a short time they worked so effectively
666 that nearly all the books published in Ukraine and about 85% of the newspapers were put out in Ukrainian. The circulation of these Ukrainian publications in the villages increased rapidly and aided in producing a sense of relief among the peasants and a tolerance of the situation which was in sharp contrast to the prevailing mood of a few years before.

[871] A network of Ukrainian schools was set up throughout the country with instruction in the native language and the number of students grew rapidly from among the peasant classes. It had been centuries since the Ukrainian language had reached such a state of popularity. The theatres produced plays in Ukrainian as the chief part of their repertory. The cities assumed a markedly Ukrainian appearance and the leaders could look with satisfaction on their results.

871 The one difficulty was the low level of the instruction in many
186 places but this was equally characteristic of the Russian terrain.[1] The revolution and the Bolshevik laws had abolished the old Russian system of education and had eliminated from the schools the bulk of the older intelligentsia and their children who, on one excuse or another, were excluded from all opportunities for study. The old disciplines were abolished and the Soviet school entered upon a chaotic period. Nevertheless, the changes which the former Borotbist Hrynko introduced, including the establishment of seven year schools which gave the students the right to enter upon a three year course in various technical schools, served to increase rapidly the number of young and partly trained Ukrainians who were available for posts in the government service and who thereby freed the organization from its dependence upon Russian-trained people.

645 In 1925, he[2] was succeeded in the post of Commissar by O.
871 Shumsky, likewise a Borotbist, who had held the post of Ukrainian
186 Minister in Warsaw. He had come back in 1923 to become the
665 Director of Agitation and Propaganda for the Central Committee of the KP/b/U. An ardent believer in the Ukrainian cause, he

[1] [1923 -- Analyst]

[2] [Hrynko, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

opposed very strenuously all the Russifying influences in the Party and insisted, as a matter of principle, that only Ukrainian Communists should be promoted to prominent posts in the Ukrainian Communist organizations. He even went so far as to insist, when Kaganovich was sent from Moscow as Secretary of the Ukrainian section of the party, that he be removed and replaced by Chubar, an old Bolshevik, and he recommended that Hrynko should be made the head of the state. 645 871 186 665

Kaganovich, who had been rather on the side of Shumsky in many of his enterprises, now turned against him on the ground that he was breaking Communist discipline and, in a short time, Shumsky was removed and transferred to Moscow, where he received a post as head of the trade unions. From there he was moved to Leningrad to become head of a school of economics, but by this time his star was setting. Shumsky, on more charges, was sent to a concentration camp near the Finnish border. According to the story, he was assured that he had a chance to escape. He tried it and was shot. His leading assistants, Maksymovych, Vasylkiv and Turyansky, were branded as Shumkyists and punished accordingly. [681]

His successor, M. Skrypnyk, took up his work as Commissar of Education under even better auspices. Unlike his predecessors, who had entered the Communist Party from the ranks of the Borotbisty or the Ukapisty and who thereby risked the charge of being Ukrainian nationalists and having bourgeois-nationalist sympathies, Skrypnyk had been an old member of the Russian Social Democratic Party (Bolsheviks). He had been a personal friend of Lenin long before the Revolution. He had been arrested several times by the tsarist government, had taken an active part in the October Revolution of 1917 and was a disciplined member of the party. He was thus above reproach so far as his party standing was concerned.

From the time of the foundation of the Ukrainian National Republic, Skrypnyk had been one of the outstanding Ukrainians in the Communist Party. From the beginning he had taken the definite stand that the Communist organization in Ukraine should be thoroughly Ukrainian, independent of the Russian Communist Party and with a seat in the Comintern. He believed that Ukraine

645 should naturally have a Soviet government and be an indepen-
871 dent state with all the rights and perquisites of the RSFSR and
186 he regarded the war between the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and
665 the Ukrainian National Republic as a civil war in which the Soviet Russians naturally came to the aid of the Soviet Ukrainians. At the same time he believed equally strongly that this assistance should be that of a brother-nation and should have no elements of a foreign occupation.

He was a disciplined Communist and he always acted in accordance with the strictest Communist tradition. He never joined any faction or questioned the vote of his superiors but he remained firm in his convictions, and while he was always in the minority and was willing to yield superficially, he always seized the next opportunity to advance substantially the same points but in a somewhat different form. He was on friendly terms with Stalin and he came to his post after a definite interview with Stalin and with instructions that put him in a position second only to Kaganovich.

The appointment of Skrypnyk with his Communist record showed very well that in 1927 the VKP (the All-Union Communist Party) was still playing with the idea of making the Communist International a real gathering of supposed equals, united under the leadership of a central body in Moscow. It was a tacit recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a political entity, but it was equally the recognition of a Marxian Socialist culture which might lead to some of the later developments of Stalinism. The appointment insured Stalin of the aid of the true Ukrainian Communists in the coming battle between him and the left deviationists.

Once in his own mind Skrypnyk had answered the problem, he did not waver. He accepted the Marxian doctrine that by the development of an urban proletariat he could develop the Ukrainians to the point where they would be justified in demanding an entrance into the Comintern as an independent nation. He interpreted the cases of Czechoslovakia and Latvia as exactly that, since the proletariats of Prague and Brno, as well as Riga, had forced

national independence and he set himself to do the same in Kiev and Kharkiv. 645 871

Without wavering in his devotion to the principles of Communism, he attacked the problem in the broadest possible way. He stimulated derussification by supporting the Ukrainian press, theatre and schools. Under his influence and work, the cities, including Kharkiv, where Ukrainian influence had been relatively weak, came to be predominantly Ukrainian and in smaller places it became very rare to hear Russian spoken. The State Printing House and the smaller cooperative publishing houses produced almost nothing that was not in Ukrainian and during the few years that he remained in control, there were more Ukrainian books published than in the preceding century and a half. 186 665

Skrypnyk was still not satisfied. He extended his activity and patronage of things Ukrainian to all those areas in the RSFSR where Ukrainians were living in compact settlements. He provided Ukrainian papers, books and theatres for those who were living in Kurshchyna, Voronizhshchyna, along the Volga, Kuban, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan and the Far East. He sent educated men and women to establish schools and other cultural institutions and, for the first time in history, efforts were made to establish a real community of interests among all the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

More than that, he held out a friendly hand to Western Ukraine, which was under Polish rule. Although by this time the entire control of foreign affairs was concentrated in Moscow, Skrypnyk was allowed to arrange for a Ukrainian consul in Lviv and Yur. Lapchynsky, a former Ukapist, was appointed to the post. The consul's duty was to win support for the Communists in Eastern Galicia and, in pursuance of this purpose, Skrypnyk, too, paid a visit to Lviv. He had a certain success in his work and a few Western Ukrainians, as S. Rudnytsky, who came from Prague to become the head of the Ukrainian Institute of Geography and Cartography in Kharkiv, and the mathematician Chaykivsky, entered the UkSSR. They formed a special club in Kharkiv and had their own literary organization "Western Ukraine." Skrypnyk [648]

645 871 186 665 even worked out a plan to recruit 8,000 teachers in Western Ukraine to undertake Ukrainian work in the Donbas where the Russian influence was strongest.

At the same time Skrypnyk was a determined Communist and he lost no opportunity for advancing the doctrines of the movement, even at the risk of doing violence to those Ukrainian ideals in which he believed. Thus, in 1928, he demanded a reformation of [815] the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been working feverishly in the same cause of Ukrainization but which, from his point of view, was insufficiently Marxist and Communist. In 1929 he won his point and the Academy was forced to elect to membership seven Communists who were chosen for their knowledge of the subject and not for their scientific ability. One of the seven was Skrypnyk himself, and among the others were O. Shlikhter and Zatonsky, the veteran from the earlier Ukrainian Communist movement. He soon promoted Shlikhter to a prominent position and refused to confirm the election of the non-Communist scholar, Krymsky, to the post of secretary. At the same time he forced the election of several Western Ukrainian members, so that for a few years the Academy did become a real centre to represent all Ukrainian scholarship.

Thus, in this complex process Skrypnyk played at times a curious and often contradictory role. He was at once the head of the Ukrainian movement and of the Communist movement in the country and he never realized or noticed the contradictory character of his actions, like Tito in the early years of his dealing with Moscow. Still, during his term of office the Ukrainian movement reached its height and seemed to be flourishing.

CHAPTER SIX

The Literary Renaissance

At the beginning of the Ukrainian struggle for independence, the time was ripe for a new period in the literature. There were still living some of the old masters of the nineteenth century as Ivan Levytsky-Nechuy, who died shortly after the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic. Lesya Ukrainka and Kotsyubynsky, the two foremost of the writers of the next generation, had died in 1913 and Oles, the representative of the generation of 1905, was in retirement. 538

This cleared the way for a younger group, as Tychyna and Rylsky, who were already testing their abilities when the First World War broke out.

The outbreak of the struggle in 1917 called back into life such publications as the *Literary-Historical Journal* which had been suppressed in 1914 by the imperial Russian government. It attracted to its pages the leading men of the older generation who were largely populist in their political views and in it appeared the writings of such men as Prof. M. Hrushevsky, Vynnychenko, Samiylenko, Oles, Vorony, G. Chuprynka and L. Starytska-Chernyakivska. The list of contributors includes most of the people who had already established their reputation and the journal had a short but distinguished career.

When the Ukrainian National Republic finally was overthrown and the Soviet regime established, many of these older writers disappeared from Ukraine. Oles retired to Prague, and Vynnychenko and many others made their way to Western Europe. Even those who remained in Ukraine found themselves out of sympathy with the new government and relapsed into silence, but even this

538 did not save them for many were arrested and executed at various times.

It was only natural that the period of the civil war was not conducive to the production of artistic literature. For those who were willing to cooperate, there were many posts open in the government, but the pressure of public affairs distracted them and left them little time for belles-lettres. For others who had less taste for political and public life, the obvious course was to retire to the villages and there meditate and work in silence with scanty hope for the immediate publishing of their works. This was the course largely pursued by Tychyna and Rylsky and their friends, together with many of the Symbolists.

However, during 1917 and 1918 new almanacs and journals put in an appearance and these could hardly fail to express the political struggles, for some of them, as *Mystetstvo* (Art), were definitely leftist in character and others were the product of various groups and schools of writers.

[626] With the final establishment of Soviet power, the literature lost most of the freedom which it had acquired in the years of struggle. The Communists lost no time in suppressing all the old publications and in establishing their own. These were more or less strictly censored, and it was impossible from the beginning to publish any work which might awaken the suspicions of the new regime.

At the same time in Ukraine, as in the RSFSR, the Communist attitude toward literature was not clearly defined. The new authorities spread over the country a whole chain of Proletkult (Proletarian Art) centres with the idea of a speedy development of a new proletarian art. Yet the experiment was not too successful and, as an outcome of the similar developments in Petrograd and Moscow, these were soon suppressed but not until they had created a taste for writing in many of the younger and often uneducated generation, who were attracted by the slogans and the hopes inspired by the Communists.

This marked a definite break with the past and it was sufficient to eliminate from their commanding positions most of the older

men. However, there was no official attitude adopted toward 538
literature, no definite command to write in accordance with a definite style, provided that the authors stayed away from subjects that seemed to be openly anti-Communist.

The authors who were closest to the new regime were those that had approached Communism through the Left Social Revolutionists (the Borotbisty) and who considered themselves a "proletarian" group in the new terminology. Many of the earlier members of this group, as the impressionistic poet Vasyl Chumak and the prose impressionist Andry Zalyochy and also Hnat Mykhaylychenko, were killed during the civil wars or in various uprisings. In a sense they were fortunate and so was the outstanding novelist, Vasyl Blakytny, who died in 1925. Blakytny's death was widely lamented as the death of a distinguished author of revolutionary romanticism, but it was only a few years later when he, like the other Borotbisty, was accused of "unreliability," his works were officially banned and the plaque which marked the house where he died was removed.

Artistically, the Symbolists, as Tychyna, were technically the most advanced on the literary side. They were consciously trying to adapt the Western, and especially the French, conceptions of Symbolism to Ukrainian and without going into the decadent features of French Symbolism, they sought to acclimate in Ukrainian many of the devices and the metres that had been worked out in the West.

Close to them was the group of the Neo-Classicists headed by Mykola Zerov. The members of this group, too, endeavored to produce high art with as few political overtones as possible. The group, which also included the poet Maksym Rylsky, sought to draw their inspiration from the classical world and they stressed the ancient connections between the Black Sea and the classical world of the Mediterranean.

Both the Symbolists and the Neo-Classicists were in their hearts more or less hostile to the revolution, in so far as it was a destroyer of cultural values but they were anything but reactionaries or anti-Communists in the ordinary sense of the word. They were

638 rather far removed from the developments of the present, interested in literature and literary criticism and standing for the preservation of cultural values.

In view of the relations between the Communists in Ukraine and those in the RSFSR, it was only natural that all of the literary debates that went on in Moscow should find an echo in Ukraine. This was the period when Bukharin, Trotsky and Lunacharsky were debating very seriously the relations between the Communists, the proletarian writers and the so-called "fellow-travellers" who sympathized more or less sincerely with the revolution but who had not taken the full step and become members of the Communist Party. It was in this latter group that the greater Russian writers of the day were to be found and many of them had already achieved fame before the revolution. In 1925 they succeeded in obtaining what seemed to be a certain recognition by the party and it was on the basis of these decisions and this standard that both the Symbolists and the Neo-Classicists continued to be able to publish.

At the same time Ukrainian literature could not be considered as a mere reflection of any of these groups. There was still too much consciousness of Ukrainian independence to make the more able authors merely blind imitators of a foreign literature. Besides, [177] the contacts which still existed with Western Ukraine under Polish rule[1] brought it about that even the Eastern Ukrainians were influenced both by the Polish and Austrian developments and writers as Stefanyk were read almost as much in Kiev and Kharkiv as they were in Lviv and Stanislaviv.

The taking over by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty of the Commissariat for Education could not fail to have a definite effect upon the leftist writers who dreamed of establishing not only a proletarian literature but also a Ukrainian proletarian literature, and with this purpose in mind there developed at the capital of Kharkiv and also in Kiev and elsewhere a new series of literary schools and movements, each of which based itself upon its own interpretation of the revolution. They started in general from two contradictory positions, depending on whether they stressed

1 [after Communist rule was established in Ukraine -- Analyst]

the revolutionary ardor of the peasants or that of the proletariat 538
and this was roughly parallel to the division between the peasant and the factory writers in the RSFSR.

Thus the organization, the *Plough,* as its name implies, was the organ of that group which emphasized the role of the peasants and their connection with the proletariat. They admitted to membership every one who wished to write, provided he belonged to the "laboring element." Naturally, with such a slogan, much of their work was not of a high order but the leaders considered their work as educational and they did not object when the more competent and trained writers dropped away or joined other organizations.

Opposed to them was the *Hart* (the Tempering of Steel) which existed from 1923 to 1925. This based itself far more solidly on the proletarian writers of the cities. It stressed urban and factory life and saw the triumph of Communism transforming the peasantry into a type far more like that of the city proletariat than that of the old, independent farmer. Yet this group, too, was very soon torn by questions over the relations between the Russian and Ukrainian Communists and it split up after the publication of its first almanac.

The sharpest defender of a definite Ukrainian line in the *Hart* was Mykola Khvylovy and he very soon split away from the more moderates and those seeking a closer alliance with the Russians. He formed the group *Urbino* in 1925 and out of this grew the *Vaplite,* the Free Academy of Proletarian Literature, which became the rallying ground for all of the more consciously alert members of the leftist and Communist groups. It was with the *Vaplite* that there were associated most of these men, as Arkady Lyubchenko, Yury Yanovsky, Petro Panch, the dramatist Mykola Kulish, the theatrical producer Les Kurbas and such poets as Tychyna, Mykhaylo (Mike) Yohansen and Mykola Bazhan. This was the outstanding literary development of the period of Ukrainization and under the leadership of Khvylovy, they took a definite political stand on all the questions of the day.

There were similar groups in Kiev. Thus there was formed

538 the *Aspis* (Association of Proletarian Writers) in 1923 and from this, in its turn, was developed the *Lanka* or Link in 1924-6 and later the *MARS* (the Workshop of the Revolutionary Word), 1926-8 with such members as Evhen Pluzhnyk, Dmytro Falkivsky and T. Osmachka. They sought to keep themselves somewhat free from excessive flattery of the government and in general shared the general attitude of the *Vaplite* in Kharkiv.

Another movement which had appeared just before the revolution was Futurism which, in the person of its leader, Mykhaylo Semenko, denied totally the artistic value of all preceding literary schools. The revolution gave this, too, the possibility of boasting that by its denial of the past it was the true mouthpiece for revolutionary art, even though its successes were relatively slight and many of its productions were almost unintelligible to the general public. The Futurists, too, engaged in the usual process of splitting and recombining during the height of this period, when the authors were still relatively free to express their own thoughts.

Beyond these again was the great mass of the proletarian authors. These were men, usually of less artistic ability, who listened eagerly to the general slogans put out by the Communists in Moscow and Kharkiv. They followed blindly the established formulas for the production of Communist literature. They had, in fact, the general attitude of the Russian On-Guardists and they were more renowned for their reliability and skill in following the general line of the Party than they were for their literary originality or their moral and artistic integrity. They were in general the literary hacks of the day, often with slight preliminary education, and proletarian in more senses than one.

Thus during the period of Ukrainization, the literature moved along two distinct planes. Leaving aside those authors who endeavored to work in an anti-political world, there were those who blindly followed the political line and those men who ventured to think for themselves but along the lines of Communist thought. These latter were the logical outcome of the ideas of the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty and the proclamation of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. At times they could even

be critical of the actual developments of the day but in their hearts 638
they accepted the general articles of belief and sought to give them
a fuller significance. The way was open to make them a loyal
opposition to the regime and for several years they seemed to be
attaining the position which they desired.

[P. 72 blank]

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Scholarly Revival

814 The third great field of development was in the realm of study and research, especially in such fields as concerned Ukraine, its history and culture. This was connected especially with the foundation and development of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and its subordinate institutions.

Ukrainian studies had developed during the nineteenth century and from the very beginning they had played a great part in the arousing of the national consciousness. While the scholars under the tsars were not allowed to touch the fundamental problems in the relation of Moscow and Ukraine and their results, of necessity, were compelled to stress the official line of the tsarist government as to the desire of the Ukrainian people to lose their identity in the Russian Empire, still studies in folklore and in folk-songs could not fail to bring home the great differences in the mentality and aspirations of the two peoples. Ethnography could not fail to show that the customs and the manners, the architecture and the decorations differed in Ukraine from the Great Russian territory and the scholars, if they were sincere and careful, could not fail to notice it and to publicize it.

As soon as the Ukrainian National Republic was set up, the situation changed, for now there was a Ukrainian regime which was not afraid to speak out. There began, despite the hardships and the destruction of the civil war, a new flood of publications in all these fields. By 1918, under the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky, plans were made for the establishment of an Academy of Sciences, its statutes were drawn up, and a few members selected as a nucleus.

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814 The changing fortunes of the war compelled the postponement of its realization but the work was not really lost. Soon after the definite formation of the Ukrainian Soviet government, the work was resumed, with those men who had survived leading in the work.

Despite some slight interference of the Soviet authorities, who demanded that history should be treated along the lines of Marxo-Leninism, the Academy succeeded in remaining almost completely autonomous. The period of the New Economic Policy, which seemed to restore the financial position of the country and the more peaceful life, provided a fairly favorable atmosphere. As a result the Academy flourished and in 1924, it was even able to invite Prof. Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, the recognized dean of Ukrainian historical studies, to return to Ukraine and take a position in the Academy.

Hrushevsky accepted the invitation and on his return to Kiev, he renewed the work of the old Ukrainian Scientific Society which had been united with the Academy. As head of the Historical Section, he fostered the creation of a large number of commissions in various branches of study and from 1924 to 1930 he edited a journal *Ukraine* which speedily became the outstanding journal in the field of historical and cultural studies. There was no period of Ukrainian history, no section of Ukrainian archaeology, art, and ethnography which was not assigned to some commission or group in the Academy.

At the same time the Academy was put in charge of most of the libraries, collections and resources of the older universities on Ukrainian territory. This had its good and its bad sides. It materially increased the resources of the Academy and the material at its disposal. On the bad side, it rendered more difficult the position of the younger scholars who were seeking to start upon a career.

814 The various Soviet Commissars of Education had made these
813 changes with the idea of securing large numbers of half-trained men and women who would occupy positions in the new state and take

the place of the old bureaucrats. They therefore turned the universities into technical schools of a rather inferior character, unlike the situation in Russia, where despite all the changes there was still preserved the fiction of university teaching and research. It was made clear that the teachers were not supposed to busy themselves with more advanced subjects for these were now the province of the Academy. Still there was a steady stream of young people into its influence and for several years it could well be said that there had never been a time when Ukrainian scholarship was so free and untrammeled. 814 873

The Academy in Kiev was, of course, the highest organ of scientific studies but it was not isolated, for some of the academicians, like Dmytro Bahaly, set up in Kharkiv a Chair of Scientific Research like an institute and Slabchenko did the same in Odesa. The example of these were followed in smaller cities and similar research centres were opened in Poltava, Chernihiv, Nizhin, Dnipropetrovsk, Kamyanets Podilsky, Vinnytsya, Zhytomir, Mykolayiv and Luhansk. 814

In the early years there was a constant effort to establish closer relations with the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the other scholarly institutions in Western Ukraine, and for some years there was an active interchange of views between the scholars of the two sections. Several outstanding Western Ukrainians were elected to membership in the Kiev Academy and the scholars went back and forth across the boundary with considerable freedom and cooperated in the development of Ukrainian studies.

In the field of history and of economics, it was necessary for the scholars[1] to pay some slight attention to the Marxo-Leninist ideas. They could not too openly contradict them but it was usually possible, by the addition of a few official quotations, to speak quite plainly with regard for scientific truth and accuracy. [626]

Even these restrictions were far laxer when it came to studies of language and material culture. The All-Ukrainian Archaeological Society and the Society for the Preservation of the Antiquities of Ukraine sent out expeditions to all parts of the country.

1 [of Western Ukraine--Analyst]

814 The studies for the enrichment of the language developed two opposing tendencies. There was one group, including Evhen Tymchenko and Olena Kurylo, which championed a puristic development. They rested their studies on the older forms and the peasant dialects and sought to remove from the language features which they felt had been erroneously added by the literary men and the colloquialisms of the day. The opposing school, including Ol. Synyavsky and many of the younger men, took the opposite attitude and welcomed the innovations which had been introduced into literature, especially from Western Europe. The discussions revealed the wealth and the variety of the literary resources of Ukrainian and, on the whole, broadened the appreciation of its independent character, even though in their use of terminology many of their words failed to come into common usage owing to the position of scientific Russian.

At the same time the scholars endeavored to coordinate the orthography of the language in the east and in the west, for previously there had been considerable variation in the Galician and Russian Ukrainian. Thus the eastern, following the Russian tradition, did not separate *g* and *h* and there were other differences, especially in the transliteration of European names into the Cyrillic.

To carry this work through there was held in 1927 a special conference in Kharkiv. Scholars were invited from all parts of the Ukrainian world, and after lengthy discussions there was worked out a standard system which represented the general consensus of scholarly opinion and opened a new period in the writing of the language.

At the same time there were published over thirty technical dictionaries and a group of academicians including A. Krymsky, V. Hantsov, K. Holoskevych, M. Hrinchenko and S. Yefremiv, began work on a great Ukrainian dictionary, six volumes of which, from A to P, were published. This was intended to be a general dictionary of the language and to represent all regions where Ukrainian was used, without stressing either archaism or reformation.

The Scholarly Revival

The development during these years[1] was not only in the humanities but it extended to all fields of science, especially those that had to do with the study of the Ukrainian resources and agriculture. Young geologists, biologists, etc. found convenient opportunities for the use of their talents, and their studies revealed new and often unsuspected potentialities in the country. 815

All this work, which was under the Commissariat of Education, was treated kindly by the former Borotbisty and Ukapisty who were in control of the Commissariat. At times they grumbled that more was not being done in the field and under the principles of Marxo-Leninism, but they did not use their power to suppress or hinder the work. In a sense they looked at it with a certain lack of comprehension and criticism. It is not too much to say that this intellectual and scholarly activity proceeded outside the range of Communist interests and was allowed far more free scope than was possible in the case of the writers or the administration. 815 626

The only answer which the more rigid Communists found was the establishment of a large chain of Marxo-Leninist Institutes which were ostensibly devoted to the study of the philosophy of Communism and to the working out of Communist sciences on the same pattern as those in Moscow. These reflected the actual state of Communist thinking and were really schools for propaganda and not for scientific study in any sense of the word. They were liberally supported and they were frequently able to secure their pick of the more talented and ambitious scholars who were willing to rise through the established channels of Communism, rather than by the more exacting service of true knowledge.

It was not until 1927 that Skrypnyk, with all of his Ukrainian patriotism, hearkened to the Communist protests that there were no Communists in the Academy of Sciences and he insisted that a certain number of prominent Communists should be admitted. It was, of course, done but not without grumbling, for the members of the Academy had been very careful as to the type of man whom they elected and as to his scholarly abilities and reputation. They felt, deservedly, that the addition of these new members would lower the standards of the Academy but there was no way out.

1 [after establishment of Ukrainian Soviet Republic--Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

815
626 This was to be the signal for the ending of the old system of relatively free thought. It was the first step in the approaching changes that were to wreak havoc on every form of Ukrainian life and bring to an untimely end the rapidly developing Ukrainian Renaissance.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Mykola Khvylovy

Shumsky and Skrypnyk, as Commissars for Education, defended the position of the Ukrainian language in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and among the Ukrainians in the entire USSR. They worked to break down the anti-Ukrainian attitude that had existed from the beginning in the Communist Party of Ukraine, but as men holding public office and busied with the political and administrative problems that were thus raised, they did not go further. The additional step to point out the road for this newly conscious Ukrainian Communism was taken by Mykola Khvylovy. 538 186

Khvylovy, who was born in 1891, was already well known as a Communist writer. A fearless author of strong convictions, he had worked his way early in the Civil War to the position of the Communists and had served as a commissar in the Ukrainian Communist Army. He was now one of the recognized Communist writers and moving spirit of the leading literary group, the *Vaplite* (the All-Ukrainian Academy of Proletarian Literature), the members of which were devoted to him.

Khvylovy was an ardent admirer of Trotsky and when the break came between Trotsky and Stalin, he took the side of the former and held, with him, that the cause of counter-revolution had triumphed and that the rise of a Soviet bureaucracy was merely a return to the old unhappy state. Khvylovy had become a Communist solely because of his belief that it was only through Communism and Communist teachings that humanity could achieve its goal of liberation and self-development and he was impatient with anything that seemed to contradict this theory.

538 He was at the same time an ardent Ukrainian. He could
186 not bear to see the subordinate position which Ukraine and the Ukrainian Communist Party held in the USSR and he resented the already obvious attempts to present Moscow as the supreme representative of Communism and of a general Communist culture.

In 1925, he began to publish a weekly pamphlet as a supplement to the central newspaper *Visti* under the title *Culture and Life*. In this he advocated the development of an independent Ukrainian Communist culture which would be distinct from that of Moscow. His first articles, which were purely literary in character, started a lively controversy in the press and in public meetings. It was difficult to attack him, for he based his arguments entirely upon the official statements of the Communist Party and he revealed the inconsistency which existed in these official statements. The entire Ukrainian section of the KP/b/U was aroused and so was the whole of Ukrainian society. Here was a popular writer who dared, in the name of Ukrainian Communism, to take the statements of the Communist Party (KP/b/U) seriously and to draw the logical conclusions from them. These articles he then republished in book form, *Quo Vadis* (1925), *Thoughts against the Current* (1926) and *The Sociological Equivalent* (1927).

Khvylovy's original arguments had urged the necessity for the new Communist Ukrainian literature to assimilate and build itself upon the great European cultural and literary tradition as exemplified in its greatest and noblest writers and thinkers and not to confine itself to being, as it had been too often in the past, a mere appanage and colony of Russia. He deplored the already evident tendency of Ukrainian Communist literature to base itself on the pronunciamentos of Moscow without testing and analyzing them and this led him to proclaim as his slogan "Away from Moscow."

"The ideas of the proletariat we all know without the guidance of Moscow. Only the young Ukrainian nation, the Ukrainian proletariat and its Communist intelligentsia are the true bearers of the great revolutionary socialist ideas and they must not orient themselves on the centre of All-Union Philistinism, on the Moscow sirens. They need to orient themselves on themselves and Europe, but not

on the Europe of Spengler, which is declining and which we all 538
hate, but on the Europe of the great civilization, the Europe of 186
Goethe, Darwin, Byron, Newton, Marx, etc. That is the Europe that the first legions of the Asiatic Renaissance cannot dispense with."

In another article he wrote. "Russia is an independent country. Independent. We too are independent. Insofar as our literature has its own path of development, we must ask ourselves the question as to which of the world literatures it is to follow. It is not the Russian in any case. This is positive without any reservations. Ukrainian poetry must flee from Russian literature as rapidly as it can. The reason is that Russian literature has dominated us for centuries as the master of the situation and has trained our psychology to slavish imitation. To base our young art upon it means the halting of our development.

"The time has come to put an end to all Little Russianism, to Ukrainophilism and to Prosvitaism (an allusion to the net of elementary Ukrainian educational institutions existing before the Communist Revolution), and also to ragtag Moscophilism."

The ideas which Khvylovy expressed about literature had a far wider significance, for they could be applied to every aspect of Ukrainian life and activity. As the discussion shifted to the broader questions that were involved, Stalin, who was engrossed in the struggle with Trotsky, interfered personally. He wrote in April, 1926, as general secretary of the VKP/b [the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] to the KP/b/U: "If the Western European proletariat look with longing on the banner which waves in Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvylovy has nothing else to say in favor of Moscow but to urge the Ukrainian workers to flee from Moscow. What is to be said about the other Ukrainian intellectuals of the non-Communist camp, if the Communists begin to speak and not only speak but write in our Soviet press in the words of Khvylovy?"

This was the signal for a new series of attacks on Khvylovy by the complacent russifiers in the Communist Party of Ukraine. All the members of the Executive Committee except Shumsky joined

538 in the attack and so did their satellites, but Khvylovy stood his
186 ground and reiterated more strongly his demands for an independent Ukrainian cultural development and repeated Trotsky's attacks on Moscow as the centre of the new Philistinism which had devoured the revolution.

By the end of the year, Khvylovy and the *Vaplite* found it necessary to prepare a formal letter of apology and self-accusation for publication. However humble and self-accusing he was in this letter, he was thoroughly insincere, for he had no intention of changing his course and in a few weeks he resumed his hammering at the forces and advocates of Moscow. He merely sought to gain time to let his words sink in more deeply into the consciousness of the Ukrainian people. His opponents recognized this and throughout 1926 and 1927, they ceaselessly attacked him. In fact, at the end of 1927, at the Tenth Congress of the KP/b/, Kaganovich declared that Khvylovy was an "echo of the bourgeois and kurkuls who base their hopes for the restoration of a bourgeois government in Ukraine on the forces of an armed foreign imperialism."

Khvylovy's article on *Ukraine or Little Russia* was refused publication by the *Visti* on the orders of the party authorities and renewed efforts were made to silence him. This it was impossible to do decisively until the final expulsion of Trotsky from the Communist Party, for the leading representatives of Moscow could not be sure until that time that many of the expressions used by the daring writer would not be incorporated into the principles of the party itself, even though Trotsky had never been known for any pro-Ukrainianism.

To make his cause more vocal, Khvylovy began to express his basic ideas not only in his publicistic articles but in his artistic stories and novels which were very popular among all classes of literate Ukrainians. The climax came with his *Woodsnipes,* the first part of which appeared in 1928.

This was strictly a propaganda novel written with all of Khvylovy's artistic skill. In this he depicts types of his Ukrainian opponents, the Russian Bolshevists, the typical careerists, and the character of Aglaya, the new Ukrainian type who speaks in the words

and with the views of the author. She denounces the gloomy devils 538
in the Moscow chauvinists who were bent upon the enslavement of 186
Ukraine in the name of the International. "It is the same Russian intelligent-internationalist, who willingly talks about the self-determination of nations . . . only not of those which are in the Soviet Union. Here it sees only followers of Petlyura and does not notice its own interference. It here thinks that Ukrainian culture exists . . . as an Austrian intrigue. He points out to Europe the achievements of the Russian genius and leads out into the arena the other peoples of the Union, as the Russian tsarism maintained its own zoo for the people it had conquered. In a word, he is an internationalist who, behind his cosmopolitanism, preserves his own zoological nationalism."

The second part of the novel was completed and Khvylovy went abroad. As a result of the storm that this novel aroused, the journal of the *Vaplite* was suppressed. The moment was apparently chosen in the hope that Khvylovy would maintain his position and be forced into emigration, from which his influence in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic would be lessened, if not destroyed. Instead, Khvylovy promised to have the manuscript of the second part destroyed and returned to Ukraine.

"By destroying the *Woodsnipes* and thus buying the right to return home . . . and to continue the struggle in more limited forms," wrote Yur. D., in the introduction to the Salzburg edition of the book,—"Khvylovy assured the possibility of the appearance of a numbers of plays by Kulish, of the pieces of the Berezil, his own compilation of the *Literary Fair,* the Ukrainian films of Dovzhenko, the Ukrainization of the higher schools,—in a word he postponed for five years the assassination of the great cultural renaissance."

The other members of the *Vaplite* joined in their own way with Khvylovy in painting the contrasts between the high ideals set forth in the decrees of the Communist party and the sordid reality of the Bolshevik bureaucracy in the Ukraine, who were making no attempt to turn the visions of the party principles into the life of the people. All of the writers were attacked as Khvylovy and

538 sooner or later silenced, even though for some time they worked
186 with him in publishing the *Literary Fair,* a medley of works of all kinds with pungent introductions and comments.

This tendency became so marked that in 1927, Andry Khvylya, one of the most faithful supporters of the official line of the Party declared of the story of Valeriyan Pidmohylny, the *Third Revolution,* "It makes it seem as if Makhno was at the head of the revolutionary movement, that the villagers were with him, as their earth bore them, and that the Bolsheviks were running after Makhno and collecting cream, . . . that the Communist Party were a group of plotters, who had no connection with the masses but through espionage were profiting by the great deeds of other people." Khvylovy found another Communist ally in the person of Volobuyiv. He was a young Ukrainian economist who utilized the materials on the Ukraine prepared by Prof. V. Dobrohayev and published in the central organ of the KP/b/U, the *Bolshevik of Ukraine,* a series of articles which showed the extent of the exploitation of Ukraine by Moscow. He proved clearly that Moscow was carrying out a colonial policy in respect to Ukraine, instead of treating it as an equal republic. This was a sensational revelation for the twenties. Later the works of both Volobuyiv and Khvylovy were condemned by Moscow as anti-Communist and Volobuyiv, shortly after 1933, was exiled to a Siberian prison.

The growing pressure upon Ukraine, the forced collectivization which was beginning and the beginning of the great famine of 1932-3, completed the disillusionment of Khvylovy, who up to this time had maintained a stubborn faith in the principles of Communism and its aspirations for a better future for the common man. His later works made it clear that he had lost all hope that the revolution would accomplish anything except a continuation of the streams of blood that were beginning again to flow throughout Ukraine. Yet there was nothing for him to do but to continue his work.

CHAPTER NINE

The Five Year Plan

Lenin and the Communists had never made any concealment of the fact that the New Economic Policy was only a passing concession to put an end to the stagnation and demoralization which had resulted from the civil war and the period of Militant Communism. It was not the adoption of a definite plan for the future nor was it a sign of a growing rapprochement with capitalism or a gesture toward the rest of the world, as the partisans of the Soviets abroad tried to make it appear. [185] 656 471 661

With each step of the recovery of the economy of Ukraine and of the Soviet Union as a whole, unobstrusive steps were taken to remove the various concessions which had been made. Year by year, from about 1925, new regulations were introduced by the Commissariat of Finance, one of the All-Union Commissariats which had the definite object of suppressing not only the concessions but of tightening up the restrictions on individual life and preparing the way for socialism and communism. By one device or another, the Nepmen were broken. Now the government forbade the state trusts to sell to them as individual traders either raw materials or finished or semi-finished products. Agreements which had been freely made by the government were either suddenly cancelled or were perverted. Obviously false charges were brought against the various individuals and they were fined exorbitantly or they were arrested and deported. By the fall of 1927 the sector of private trade had been almost completely liquidated and the way was open for the central government to do what it would with the situation.

With the Nepmen disposed of, the way was open for a similar attack upon the wealthier classes of the peasants and those who

656 had profited by the operation of the Ukrainian land code which,
471 as we have seen, was less rigid than were the similar arrangements
661 in the RSFSR, where the land society was organized far more on
[427] the lines of a collective than it was in Ukraine. It was always possible to apply individually any of the laws against the leasing of land or the employment of hired help, for in both cases the provisions had been left vague and indefinite, so that the authorities could act whenever they so desired. As a matter of fact, as one of the first measures the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic reduced the period on which a lease could be made from thirteen to six years and thus it was easily possible to upset many of the calculations that had been made by the richer and more progressive landowners.

At the same time the closing of the official markets rendered
[435] it possible for the government to force the peasants to dispose of their grain at the officially pegged prices which in the grain-growing districts were considerably lower than they were in the less fertile areas of the north. If this did not produce the desired results, it was equally possible to demand the grain tax in kind and to compel the peasants to turn over, free of charge and under the guise of payments, additional supplies. All these measures, which were introduced in many cases personally and not by districts, caused the peasants to feel themselves becoming steadily more impoverished and less able to resist the demands of the government.

631 On the other hand, the All-Union Commissariats which took
642 precedence over those in the individual Soviet republics and which were, in reality, staffed only by Russian Communists, effectively broke the power of the localities or of the republics to have any special voice in the management of their own affairs. This was, in its turn, skilfully explained by stressing the superior requirements of the Union which, on any closer analysis, turned out to be the interests of the Russian area. Thus, at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a Russian who was at the time the chief of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission remarked in an unambiguous manner: "It seems to me that we must assign perfectly clear tasks, to emphasize that the national

[1925, during relinquishment of NEP -- Analyst]

republics are to fulfill certain functions in the economic system of 631
our Union, and that on the basis of the fulfillment of a certain 642
mission, which is to be a part of the joint mission—the industrialization of our Union—is to be founded the growth of the economy of the national republics."

In the next few years the sense of these remarks was to become perfectly clear, although it was apparently not noticed even by the more ardent Ukrainian Communists. It was to the effect that the economy of the national republics was to be fitted into the general picture of the Union and that the planning committees were to coordinate their work in such a way that there would be little or no place left for the initiative of the authorities of any republic. This did not require any action by any of the various republican governments, for step by step the central regime in Moscow gradually made more and more of the local Commissariats mere operating agencies under the control of All-Union Commissariats as these were increased in number and in scope by the vote of the Presidium of the Union or by the decisions of the All-Union Communist Party.

In this connection the final liquidation of the Ukapisty as a 665
group in 1925 was significant. They had definitely cherished the hope that sooner or later they would be able to win recognition as a special Ukrainian Communist Party with their own seat in the Communist International. That was now becoming merely a subsidiary organ of the Russian Communist Party and there was no longer any reason for maintaining the fiction of an independent existence. The foreign Communist Parties had definitely sunk to being poor relations of the Russian Party or the All-Union Party. Their representatives were exiles from their native lands under Russian protection and under those conditions they speedily ceased to have any voice in the work of the Comintern, which existed only as a Russian propaganda organ abroad. It was therefore unrealistic for the Ukrainian Communists to build any real hopes on the Comintern or on the building of a separate Ukrainian Communism and the abolition of the Ukapisty was but a formal recognition of this fact.

186 Yet this obvious truth apparently was overlooked by Skrypnyk
631 and, to a lesser extent, even by Khvylovy, who was absorbed in his everwidening discussion of the cultural significance of Ukrainian Communism and the role and mission of the Ukrainian Communists. While these were talking and arguing about certain ideas, the central authorities in Moscow were cleverly laying plans for removing from the field of practical politics and administration the very basis of local government for which they were fighting.

631 In the same way, reform of the administrative divisions was under way with the concealed purpose of changing the boundaries of the local sub-divisions, so that they would have a purely economic basis. This was done by the elimination of the central areas, the *gubernias* and the *okrugs* and the introduction of a two-step system of administration, the *kray* or *oblast* and the *rayon* or region, which was designed on a purely economic purpose and was admirably adapted for the elimination of local and even republic feeling.

By these and other administrative measures the essential features of the New Economic Policy were eliminated but they were done so gradually and locally that a large part of the population only realized the situation when the process was too far advanced to be affected by any scattered protests.

665 At the end of 1927 Trotsky was expelled from the Communist
642 Party and this ended the long feud between him and Stalin for the control of the Party. Trotsky had quite consistently fought the New Economic Policy as a needless concession to capitalism and within a few months of his rival's defeat, Stalin reversed his policy and openly adopted a more rigid system of controls similar to those which he had attacked Trotsky for urging.

As a matter of fact the pretext for a distinction between the Soviet government and the Communist Party was wearing thin. It was a needless piece of propaganda, once the regime felt itself sufficiently strong. There was no longer the need of maintaining non-party men in places of apparent authority and with his practical sense, Stalin speedily allowed the system to lapse into the limbo of obscurity and made the Communist Party openly what it was, the dictatorial party dominated directly from Moscow.

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment 642
of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely 631
in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to ad- [475]
minister industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine 423
they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new 474
philosophy[1] looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and 661
determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force 425
them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

1 [1927- Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

423 policy was now changed and the middle and the richer peasants
474 were grouped together and opposed to the poor peasants. This
661 multiplied enormously the hostile and unsympathetic elements of
425 the population but by holding out tempting offers to the poor peasants, the Communists succeeded in fanning anew the flames of class hatred in the villages and in producing the desired effects.

[651] Along with the adoption of the Five Year Plan, the All-Union Congress called for the strengthening of attempts at collectivization. As a result, the amount of grain demanded and the amount of taxes were rapidly raised with the avowed purpose of ruining the kulaks and kurkuls, as they were called in Ukraine. Increased pressure was put upon all classes of the rural population to join collective farms and in some districts this was so effective that almost seventy per cent of the land was turned over for organization on a "voluntary" basis.

As a further step in the same direction there began in 1928 and also in 1929 a furious attack on the richer and middle peasants and a growing insistence on the need of "dekurkulizing" the villages. This meant nothing more or less than the elimination from the countryside of all those people who had prospered under the New Economic Policy. The property of the richer and more prosperous peasants was completely confiscated and they with their families were deprived of all their rights, often including the house where they had lived or the shacks into which they could crawl for shelter. With superb inhumanity the Bolsheviks would drive formerly wealthy peasants and their families from their homes in the middle of winter and leave them without food or clothing and would threaten any of their relatives or friends who dared to give them any relief.

In the first stages of the process, cases were known where some of these richer people were moved out of the Ukraine with their goods and cattle, but as the Communists settled down to their work, they simply seized everything for their own use and that of the collective farms and contented themselves with shooting or deporting their enemies, often to the far north for work in the

forests or to northeastern Siberia for work in the mines and in the more remote parts of the wilderness.[1] 423 474 661 425

1 A graphic account of this dekurkulization was given in a DP camp by Sh., a former peasant of the district of Kharkiv:

"On May 22, 1929, all my property, tools, cattle, building and clothing were confiscated. I and my family (my wife, six small children and my mother), were left without means of livelihood; we stayed with people like old folks, ate what we were given, although people were forbidden to give to us. On November 27, in spite of the fact that there was snow on the ground and 15 degrees of frost, I and my entire family, without clothes and half-naked, were put out of the house. Until February, 1930 I lived in another house which was half fallen down. On February 28, I, my wife and six children (my mother had disappeared; I do not know where) were arrested and with other dekurkulized persons were sent to the railroad station. There we were packed into freight cars as sardines in a barrel and travelled for 11 days, without knowing our destination. We were fed once every two days. Many perished from cold and exhaustion. We finally reached the station of Makarikha near Kotlas, district of Archangel, and in 40 degrees of frost, we were detrained in the woods in the snow.

"Then all those able to work were driven to forest operations 300 kilometers from Kotlas. They drove us half shod in the intense cold. They fed us on the way 300 grams of bread, 5 grams of barley and 3 grams of salt per person a day. Many died on the way. Many, unable to walk further, were shot on the spot. There we cut wood and they treated us very badly. The norms of work were abnormally high. We lived in huts which were holes we dug ourselves. Of the many thousands of people who came there more than half died of exhaustion, hunger and cold.

"Of the members of the families of kurkuls who remained at the station of Makarikha, more than half froze. Among these were my sons Ivan and Fedir; a third son Hryhory died of exhaustion. Later all the children up to 14, including three of mine, were returned to Ukraine but I have no further news of them. They probably perished. In 1932, first my wife and then I escaped by hiding in cars loaded with wood. I found work in the Don Basin. In 1937 my wife was arrested suddenly and shot in the prison of Artemivsk in the Don Basin. I escaped because I was living under an assumed name. Now I am a DP and living in Germany in an IRO camp."

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423 They followed this up at the end of 1929 by providing for the
474 compulsory collectivization of all the land. Private holding of land
661 was abolished and so was private use. The peasants were forced
425 into collective farms to which they had to contribute all of their livestock, agricultural implements and tools. Then they were left nothing that they could call their own except a small garden plot that was assigned to each family for the purpose of raising those types of vegetables that it was not profitable to raise in large quantities, because the collective farms were occupied with those types of agriculture that were selected for them by the central authorities in Moscow.

The immediate result differed in different places. In Great Russian territory, where the principle of the community ownership of land had definitely taken root, the peasants complied without too much hesitation. In Ukraine and Kuban, where the older style of Ukrainian agriculture had been long in vogue, the peasants became sulky. They killed off large numbers of their cattle and livestock of various kinds. The government, seeing this tremendous loss, then tried to eliminate from the collectives and liquidate in one way or another all of those who had been guilty of disobedience to the order requiring the peasants to contribute all their wealth.

There developed almost a civil war in some sections of the country as discontent rose and the peasants were prepared to die rather than to yield. Nevertheless, this time the government was not prepared to concede anything, as it had in 1921, and despite remarks by Stalin that in some details the Communists had become dizzy from success, the regime held its course and even continued to apply the screws more tightly. The result was the famine of 1932 and 1933.

CHAPTER TEN

The Famine

In 1921, the great famine which had swept over Ukraine 731
had been the result of a failure of the crops, a prolonged drought and the excesses of Militant Communism which had demoralized the country. The Soviets, more or less unwillingly, allowed the despatch of foreign assistance and this saved the lives of millions. There was to be no interference in the punishment of the obstinate peasants this time.

In the fall of 1929, just as compulsory collectivization was being 641
introduced, the government in Moscow made an important change 645
in the agricultural set-up, for it transferred the Commissariat of 631
Agriculture to the central group by establishing an All-Union Commissariat which was to be in control of all agriculture in the Soviet Union. This meant that in Ukraine all of the work which had been previously done by the local authorities was now transferred to Moscow. The republic commissariats ceased to have the power to pursue individual plans for improving the conditions of the soil, for varying the crops as their own advisers decided or as the population felt it necessary. Everything was to be done from the centre and the Ukrainian Soviet Government was compelled to hand over all of its research stations and other institutions to Muscovite control. This put a stop to the intensive development of Ukrainian agriculture which had been fostered by the Ukrainian land code and introduced the new system in which the peasants were in the same position as the workers in the factories.

At the same time the central regime ceased to make public the 433
actual figures of production on the ground that they might betray to outside nations important facts as to the Soviet development. From this time on estimates and achievements were given only in

[1929 – All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture was established 93 -- Amlyst]

433 terms of percentages in reference to a prior date. Still the already published data were so scanty and incomplete that it became increasingly more and more difficult to secure an actual picture of the progress in the Union as a whole and still more so in any of the separate Soviet Republics, for the central regime rarely broke down what little information it gave out among its constituent parts.

651 It was not long before another change was made in the methods
241 of collecting the products from the collective farms. Under the new
661 system, the farms did not contribute according to their crop but according to the amount of land which they proposed to sow. This amount was due to the government, even in those cases where there was a complete failure of the harvest not under the control of the workers. In other words, if a crop failed because of bad weather conditions, the peasants were compelled to hand over just as much produce as if they had had a bumper crop.

It can be easily seen that such a measure was merely another device for weakening the economic position of the village and the independence of the collective farm. At the same time the establishment of official tractor stations in place of the old locally controlled centres which sent crews and machines into the countryside gave the government another weapon for the exertion of pressure upon the peasants and even the Communists who were in charge of the farms and these crews likewise were paid not on the basis of their work but of the theoretical area which was to be sown. Later this was again changed to the total area of the farm whether it was suitable for any special kind of agriculture or not.

These measures only increased the discontent among the peasants who once again began to limit their work to the minimum necessary to maintain themselves on a steadily dropping scale of living. To counter-balance this the Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a decree in February, 1930 allowing the local authorities who were, of course, handpicked by Moscow to resort to extreme measures against the kurkuls, to confiscate their property and then to dispose of them by sending them and their families to concentration camps, to special settlements in the far north or eastern Asia or merely by expelling them from their home district.

4/1 [after establishing All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture, 1929 --Analyst]

These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown. These were naturally the more 661
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw ma- 433
terials had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood. This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It concentrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in military preparations. Even when petitions were made by the Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR. Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transportation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932 they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 -1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

651 missars issued a decree for the "protection of socialist property."
685 Under this law the stealing of a single ear of grain from a kolhosp
241 granary could be punished by confinement for ten years in a con-
511 centration camp. It was so interpreted that if a peasant picked up a single stalk from the field after the harvest, he was liable for the same punishment. In other words, the peasant could only secure his grain legally from and through the administration of the kolhosp.

With this law on the books, the Ukrainian collective farms could be punished either for failing to protect "socialist property" or they could be attacked for failing to present to the government crops and grain in an amount equal to that foreseen by the plan. This was the easier because there were few of the kolhosps that had been able to sow the area required of them. Lack of intelligent and competent leadership on the farms and the exigencies of the weather made it almost inevitable that there would be deficiencies, especially since the schedules were made up in Moscow and took no account of the local conditions.

As the grain deliveries lagged, the demands increased and on January 24, 1933, the Central Committee of the VKP/b issued a new resolution that "it was regarded as proved that the party organization of Ukraine had not carried out the tasks assigned to it in organizing grain deliveries and executing the grain plan."

To remedy this, the central authorities ordered the formation of political detachments in the machine tractor stations, "the chief basic tasks of which were the insuring of the unconditional and immediate execution by the kolhosps and their members of all their obligations to the state and especially the decisive struggle with the stealing of kolhosp property, the struggle with the manifestations of sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the sharing of the grain supplies and the meat products of the kolhosps."

The leaders of these detachments were given the obligation "to secure the constant lawful and accurate fulfilment of the laws of the Soviet government by administrative and criminal measures against the organizers of the stealing of Soviet property and the

sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the branch of village agriculture." 651 685

The machine tractor stations were staffed by men largely alien to the Ukrainian countryside. The more fanatical Communists were placed in these political detachments and were, in effect, told to supplement or replace the local administration in the exercise of pressure and terror upon both the heads and the members of the kolhosps. To aid them in their work Moscow sent to Ukraine a Russian Pavel Postyshev as a special plenipotentiary of the Central Committee with 7,000 party workers from the Russian Republic. 241 511

The work of these special "commissions" and "brigades" was marked by the utmost severity. They entered the villages, and made the most thorough searches of the houses and barns of every peasant. They dug up the earth, broke into the walls of buildings and the stoves in which the peasants tried to hide their last handfuls of food. They even in places took specimens of the fecal matter from the toilets in the effort to learn in that way by analysis whether the peasants had stolen government property and were eating grain. Wherever they found any, the peasants were severely punished, while the detachments carried off not only grain but everything edible.

The same reports came from every corner of Ukraine. "They requisitioned everything that could be eaten" was the report from the village of Zorich in the district of Poltava. In one village in the district of Odesa, "they collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram" and in other places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove. In at least one of these commissions, Molotov, then head of the Council of Ministers, took a personal part.

The natural result was a famine of unprecedented severity. The villages had been hungry in the autumn. After these searches commenced, they literally starved. An Englishman, M. Magridge, wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1933: "During a recent visit to Ukraine, I have seen a little of the war which the Soviet government is carrying on against the peasants. The fields were 731 661

[result of excessive grain requisitions in 1933 -- Analyst]

731 waste as in a real war and the poverty had spread still further.
661 On one side there were millions of peasants with bodies swollen from hunger; on the other side, soldiers, members of the GPU, carrying out the orders of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They hurled themselves on the region like a pack of locusts and seized everything edible. They shot and hung thousands of peasants, sometimes whole villages; they made of the richest country in the world a melancholy wilderness."

Reports from all sections of Ukraine have listed with depressing regularity the articles of food that were eaten. They included grass, weeds, bark, dead animals, field mice, dogs, cats. Finally, cannibalism broke out and in many places sausages were found that were made of human flesh, either of people who had died or who were killed for food. The extent of this last is shown when in 1936, among the prisoners of Solovki, there were three hundred twenty-five persons guilty of cannibalism, seventy-five men and two hundred and fifty women.

An observer in the spring of 1933 gives this picture of a Ukrainian village: "In the centre of the village, beside the ruins of the church which had been blown up was the bazaar. All the people in it had swollen faces, they were not talkative, but were silent and speechless. Their movements were unsteady, for their legs and arms were swollen. They sold or bought cornstalks, pounded corncobs, a black powder made of Russian thistle, roots, and the lower parts of water plants. This assortment of village wares was a diet which did not save the people from death by starvation but merely by increasing their sufferings, postponed it a little."

The agronome A. S. who in March and April, 1933, was in the villages of Izbinske and Starytsya, Vovchansky region, Kharkiv district, wrote: "The people daily died in dozens. The corpses lay in the houses for several days for there was no one to bury them. Pits were dug in the cemeteries with great difficulty, large enough to hold several persons. The corpses were piled on carts like wood and carried to the pits and thrown in like logs without any of the customary or religious rites. They fell as they would,

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

head down, or on their side or standing—a terrible sight. The gravedigger of to-day might be a corpse to-morrow." 731 661

The bodies of the dead lay in all the villages, along the roads and in the fields. Special brigades were formed in the villages to bury the dead but they were too weak to collect all the corpses and these were devoured by those dogs which had escaped being eaten and had gone savage. The roads were deserted for it was dangerous for one or two people to walk together because of the danger of attack by robbers who sought to rob them or to kill them for cannibalistic purposes.

Under such conditions many of the people closed up their huts tightly, lighted their stoves and inhaled the fumes to commit suicide.

In the spring, when those who had survived broke from the fields the unripe ears of grain, they were seized by the government agencies on the charge of stealing socialist and government property, while the "light cavalry," the armed Comsomols and the members of the Communist Party, shot these "barbers," as they were called in the press contemptuously, like hares.

Thousands tried to secure work in the state agricultural enterprises (the radhosps). The agronome B. B. wrote: "In going around the experimental station in Poltavshchyna, I saw under a haystack a number of people. To my questions, the manager of the station, a Russian in origin, told me that they were peasants of the neighborhood who had come in large numbers to the radhosp, hoping to find work and thus have the money to buy food. Since they did not have the strength to return home, they lay down under the haystack. Many died there and he added, pointing to fresh earth,' There are the mounds where we buried those individualists. What trouble the Khakhals have been.' "

The younger and more venturesome fled to other Soviet Republics in search of work and food. Thousands departed from Ukraine without permission, for this was not given, and crowded the offices of the railroads, the wharfs and the junctions. They often found a tragic end. Prof. O. O. tells of a case of which he was a witness. "In March, 1933, at the station in Vladikavkaz (Caucasus) there gathered a mass of peasants with bags on their

73/ backs, waiting for a freight train. Agents of the NKVD held them
66/ up and took away their grain. They begged together and singly and prayed but it did not help. Then one peasant climbed out on a high tree near the station and began to cry out about all the horrors of the famine in Ukraine. He cursed the party, the government, its leaders and the NKVD. A crowd quickly gathered and soon came the agents of the NKVD who began to harangue the hearers and urged the "orator" to come down quickly, threatening him with life imprisonment. He was immovable; then the NKVD called for the local fire department who were told to turn their hoses on the tree. The peasant climbed higher and then suddenly threw himself down like a stone."

In the spring of 1933 the starving masses with their gray faces moved into the large cities. They formed lines for the "buying of bread"* or, begging, they surrounded the mills. They died by thousands in the streets of Kharkiv, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, and the other cities. In many cases the police cars simply picked up the dead and dying every morning and carried them out of the city where they were thrown into pits. There were established in the cities and their environs "therapeutic hospitals" near which were vans covered with tarpaulins. These were used to collect the sufferers and the hospitals were simply places to separate the dead and the dying.

The children suffered terribly and thousands were picked up on the streets. Parents often abandoned their children, usually near police stations, in the hope that they would be picked up and taken to refugee camps but here they were little better off. Prof. M. M. testified that near Kharkiv the "NKVD opened a large children's concentration camp, the 'Barracks of death' as it was

[435] * In the beginning of 1933 at the height of the famine in Ukraine, the USSR opened shops in the cities where grain was sold at a doubled price, i.e. commercial prices—4 karb. for 1 kg. of white and 3 karb. for 1 kg. of black bread. The peasant received from the government for the obligatory "sale" of grain 90 kop. for 16 kg. of wheat. These commercial prices had to be paid for in foreign currency or in gold or silver.

termed" and here by poor treatment at least forty percent of the 731
ten thousand gathered in, died. 661

The urban population felt the shortage because of the reduction of the bread ration for the unemployed to two hundred grams a day. The majority could not patronize the commercial shops for they had nothing with which to pay and the legal allowance of other products as fat, sugar and barley were either reduced or omitted. Even the more highly qualified of the intelligentsia were obliged to sell all their trinkets and gold teeth to secure some food. The prices allowed were ridiculous. One teacher at these stores received for a silver dollar "500 grams of sugar, a piece of soap and 200 grams of rice."

Physicians were forbidden to enter "hunger" in the records of illness and death. They were ordered to give as the cause of death "BBO" (absence of white corpuscles). Sometimes it was recorded as "childish" or "old age" weakness, "paralysis of the heart," "diarrhea," all symptoms of death by starvation.

It is impossible to estimate accurately the number of deaths, 165
for even the indefatigable NKVD gave up the attempt to list the 731
deaths along the roads, in the fields, and in the streets of the cities. 661
Villages died out and this was indicated by the use of black flags on certain houses. In these cases no attempt was made to keep the records in order. The so-called "therapeutic hospitals" did not turn over their records or admit to their files the workers of the ZATS (The Records of the Acts of the Civil Population), who were the collaborators of the NKVD. Thus, in one of these therapeutic hospitals in Kiev there were at least 5,000 deaths from starvation that were not recorded in the official statistics.

Of course, none of these hardships[1] were felt by the highly placed [554]
Communists and party officials. They received their food through party channels which were not accessible to the ordinary residents of the city or the kolhosps.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the number who perished in the famine, but it was approximately 4,800,000. This is certainly an underestimate, although certain other calculations will place the number between five and six million.

1 [-famine in Ukraine, 1933-- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

731 There is the frequent idea that the famine was specifically
661 directed against the rich peasants and the kurkuls. This is utterly
[565] false, for these had been liquidated earlier. The blow of 1933 fell chiefly upon the poorer classes who had always supported the Soviet regime and who regarded their suffering in the beginning as a mistake which Moscow would do its best to correct. In the same way it was the Ukrainian workmen of the smaller cities who bore the brunt of the hardships. It was the direct triumph of the Russian Bolsheviks over the Ukrainian poor.

185 Another proof that the famine occurred in connection with
731 the plans of Moscow was the fact that Postyshev, besides his official post, held that of general inspector of the Ministry of Grain Production for resettlement. It turned out later that he was given the general task of preparing a plan for an immigration into Ukraine from various portions of the Soviet Union. The dislocation of the population was worked out in detail. Millions of Russians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, etc., were to be sent in to complete the work of rerussification. Especial pains were devoted to the regions close to Russia on the Left Bank of the Dnieper and there was talk at one time of annexing to the Russian Republic the Kharkiv-Donbas industrial region, but this did not fall in with the plans of Stalin.

The result of the famine was the final stabilization of the collec-
[423] tive system of agriculture and the breaking of the old mode of life throughout the whole of Ukraine. More than that, it established the fact that in the economic sphere Moscow could direct Ukrainian life as it would. It overawed the population for the moment but it did not reconcile them to their fate and it went hand in hand with the attempt to exterminate the old Ukrainian cultural life.

[Ukraine, 1933 -- Analysis]

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Famine, the Soviets and the World

It is impossible to overestimate the significance of this 731
artificially induced famine in what had been one of the richest portions of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Taken in connection with the collectivization of agriculture which had served already to uproot and exile or liquidate many of the most industrious and successful parts of the population of the Ukraine, it was distinctly noticed that the history of the Soviet Union had entered a new phase which might be glossed over for public consumption but still represented a formidable menace to the general development of the entire area.

During the years of the New Economic Policy and the period of [178]
Ukrainization, much had been accomplished, not only to repair the damages of the Civil War and the period of Militant Communism, but great strides had been made in the development of Ukrainian culture. The collectivization of 1929-31 had, in a sense, menaced some of the economic gains but while the menace of Moscow was being felt on the material field, it had not hitherto been regarded in the same way culturally. It is true that there had been going on a great debate between Khvylovy and his rivals but it is doubtful if either Khvylovy or Skrypnyk had fully appreciated the forces that were now unleashed.

There had never been any question that every few decades Ukraine had undergone severe droughts which had produced local famines, especially in the Ukrainian steppes. The disorders of Militant Communism had coincided with one of these periods and had produced the situation in 1921-2. Still, at that time, for his own purposes, Lenin had allowed relief to be sent from abroad to the victims. The agricultural situation in 1931-3 was not so serious and

731 the country might have escaped, had it not been for the methods of the government in draining off from the population the last possible reserves of food.

731 185 There can be no doubt that this was done deliberately, for every measure taken by the government was intended to increase the difficulties of the population and to prepare for the final crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance that had been proceeding with ever [648] increasing force. Every measure, too, was intended to render it more difficult for the outside world to secure any actual knowledge of the conditions in the country until it was too late for the world to do more than register vain protests, for it was very definitely at this period that the censorship methods of the government and its apprehensions of what knowledge might bring to the world actively commenced to draw an iron curtain around Ukraine. Foreign correspondents were forbidden to visit Ukraine on one pretext or another and they were forced to send out such news as the government wished or to leave the Soviet Union.

[661] The collectivization and the famine had coincided with the beginning of the attack on Ukrainian scholarship and the arts, as we shall see, but these attacks by their very choice of victims had been directed against those men who had not been closely connected with the Communist Party in the past, even though they had not been entirely hostile. Along with the famine the tide turned, and soon the victims were those persons who had dared to hope for an equality of treatment (with the Great Russians) in the Soviet Union.

The famine was obviously intended not only to crush the population already impoverished by the collectivization but to administer a sound chastisement to all classes who were interested in the preservation and development of local and republic interests.

731 648 The famine was at its height in the winter and spring of 1933 and was only somewhat alleviated after the harvest of that year was brought in. It was only natural that, despite the efforts of the authorities, word of it would gradually seep out, in spite of the censorship. The news was most accessible to the Western Ukrainians, for as yet all communications had not been satisfactorily broken, and early in the summer they began to seek permission to organize relief

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

abroad for the benefit of the sufferers. On July 14, 1933, such a 731
body was already formed in Lviv and soon in the other sections of 648
Western Ukraine, while their appeals were heard by the Ukrainian emigrés abroad.

In August, Theodore Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna had been convinced of the truth of the famine and he appealed for aid for the starving. In the same month the General Secretary of the Congress of European Minorities published his summary of the conditions, as gleaned from all available sources, and the League took action at its meeting in September. In the same month the matter was brought up before the League of Nations in Geneva and relief was referred to the International Red Cross.

The movement spread to the Ukrainians in North America and on November 3, 1933, the sixth convention of the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States appealed to the government of the United States, urging that an impartial commission be sent to Ukraine to report on the truth of these reports.

This growing wave of protests among the Ukrainians and the [208]
emigrants from Ukraine was met by a stony silence on the part of the Soviet authorities, by absolute denial or by charges of unfriendly propaganda. The Soviet government refused to lift its barrier on any visits to Ukraine by foreign journalists or by any foreign visitors until after the harvest of 1933 was brought in and then they induced such journalists as Walter Duranty to recant previous statements as to the extent of the famine and report on September 18, 1933, that the harvest of that year was excellent "and all talk of famine now is ridiculous."

Almost the first detailed account of an American journalist was 731
given by William Henry Chamberlin on May 29, 1934, on his 185
return from the Soviet Union, when he estimated that between four and five million peasants were starving and he also quoted the speech of President Kalinin of the Soviet Union, made the year before, "The collective farmers have passed through a good school. For some, this school was quite ruthless."

This was a polite hint again that it had been the policy of the government to allow the famine to run its course in the hope of

731 breaking any possible opposition on the part of the collective farms
185 and the individual peasants.

The famine then on the domestic scene marked a definite turning point, a definite shift of emphasis in the relations between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, and that shift was extended to the individual Ukrainian. Yet, the very reports that emanated from the stricken country were not without their significance for the world.

731 1933 was a fateful year for Europe. The order to apply the
648 maximum pressure on the Ukrainians came on January 24th. On January 28th, just four days later and before the news could have leaked out, Kurt von Schleicher resigned as Chancellor of Germany and was succeeded by Adolf Hitler. Within a month came the Reichstag fire and all the turmoil connected with the advent of the Nazis to power.

A world that had still not been fully convinced of the dangers of the Communist regime was only too ready to magnify its benefits and its possibilities for good as compared with the apparently more pressing menace of Hitler. The period of the popular fronts began in all the European countries and it coincided with the coming into power of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the American bank crisis.

Under such circumstances, the rumors of the Ukrainian famine were heavily discounted by all except the most bitter anti-Communists and they obtained short hearing before world public opinion. No one wanted to believe these reports, and the troubled conditions when the reaction to the right seemed the menace to a world desirous of peace made it seem logical that the democratic world could secure some aid in its struggle from the Communist regime. All the old talk of the artificiality of the Ukrainian struggle that had circulated in 1918 was now reburnished and repropagandized.

The result might have been expected but it showed Stalin and the Soviet leaders that they had played their course well. They secured recognition by the United States in November of the same year, just as the real news of the extent of the tragedy was beginning

to leak out. Anger and disgust at Hitler was the dominant mood 731
and behind that veil, the Soviet leaders were able to plan their 648
further actions.

It is hard to tell what might have been the result, had the 000
world awakened in that year to a realization of the dangers from the two totalitarian leaders, who were later to unite and start World War II. Yet already the evidence was there, if men would only understand.

In the period of Militant Communism the victims had been chosen more or less at random and the world was largely aghast at the results, even though they did not understand. Now, by deliberate action the same thing was being done on a larger scale and under the guise of law and order. This method proved successful and advanced the Soviet Union to a place of preeminence among nations, while it enabled the authorities to dupe many idealists in other countries.

From this point of view the deportation of the kurkuls in 1930-1 and the famine of 1932-3 represented the use of new methods of terror as an instrument of national policy. That policy was continued in the massacre of the Polish officers in Katyn and the Ukrainian peasants in Vinnytsya. It was continued in the purges that marked the thirties and in the show political trials that have marked the history of Communist rule in the satellite countries. They were the inauguration of a new policy that was not to meet with failure until its extremes began again by their ruthlessness to disturb an uneasy world in the days of the new cold war.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Early Trials

517 The change of economic policy which had ushered in the
186 collectivization of agriculture seemed at first to offer no threat to the cultural movement which was going on in Ukraine. Despite the open criticisms that had been made of Khvylovy and the more secret opposition that Skrypnyk was meeting, the cultural work continued in all its aspects. Politically the Commissariat of Education was still continuing its work, the new literature was proceeding with more and more important works being produced, and outside and somewhat apart from the political life of the day, Ukrainian scholarship was producing ever more serious works.

No one openly thought of overthrowing the regime although latent discontent could be discovered among the entire population. It had been years since there had been any open opposition. The unruly leaders who had appealed to arms had either gone abroad or quieted down and there was no one who was even suspected of the kind of disloyalty that had been widespread during the period of Militant Communism.

186 Then, in 1929, just as the compulsory collectivization was being
814 prepared, the Ukrainian Soviet government announced that it had
687 discovered the evidence of the existence of a secret society, the
661 Society for the Liberation of Ukraine, and it commenced a series of arrests of some of the outstanding intellectual leaders of the scientific world. This resulted in a public trial and condemnation of the accused but for the most part they received relatively light sentences.

Who were involved? For the most part they were individuals who had played more or less important roles in the Ukrainian

186 National Republic, who had gone abroad after its collapse and
814 who had been invited back to take part in the work of the Ukrain-
687 ian Academy of Sciences. The government produced what seemed
661 to be definite evidence against these people but the curious fact
[538] was that this evidence was strangely inconsistent with all of their previous activity. On the prisoner's bench were such men as Serhey Yefremiv, the leading scholar of Ukrainian literature and a relative conservative, the academiciam Mykhaylo Slabchenko, a former Social Democrat, Prof. Joseph Hermayze, a former member of the Executive Committee of the same party, and the well-known writer L. Starytska-Chernyakivska, who was close to Efremiv and who had more or less dropped out of the modern literary movement and was living in practical retirement.

The Soviet record of the trial strongly suggests that all those factions which, during the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic had utterly failed to come to any agreement, had somehow or other composed their differences in the days when Ukrainian sentiments seemed to be dominant in the ranks of the Communist Party and when there were outstanding Communists, like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, pleading the Ukrainian cause. Yet, as was to be the case in almost all of the later trials, the court record based upon the testimony of the NKVD did not give any clue to the treasonable acts of which the defendants were accused and if they did, the stories passed belief. There was, likewise, no indication of the serious plans on which the organization was working or any details of its formal organization.

All the information that was revealed suggested that it was a definitely anti-Communist movement engineered by a group of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who objected to the Communist program of Ukrainization. There was no hint that the accused had any connection with the derussification program of Skrypnyk or the demand of Khvylovy and his friends of the *Vaplite* for the development of a definite Ukrainian Communism. The Society for the Liberation of Ukraine appeared like a ghost from the past and the prosecution seemed to have the tacit support of even those elements which were working for Ukrainization.

Up to this moment the only open manifestation had been the demand of Skrypnyk that Communists be included in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences but this had apparently been answered satisfactorily and, with slight changes, the Academy was working as before. The most that could be said was that the leaders of Ukrainian thought in the Academy had not properly in their old age kept pace with the development of Marxo-Leninist thought but even this was hardly sufficient for the outburst which was loosed against a group of widely respected scholars. 186 814 687 661

Another curious aspect of the situation was that the most severe sentences were not given to the announced ringleaders and chief culprits but that there was unearthed on the occasion another society, the SUM, the Society of Ukrainian Youth, which consisted of relatively obscure students, village intelligentsia, peasants and workmen who were shot by the hundreds and thousands without being brought before any tribunal. The head of this group, Mykola Pavlushkiv, was involved in the trial but once again there was no indication that any members of the SUM had been engaged in any form of sabotage or anti-governmental work. Members of the organization who have escaped abroad have testified that the SUM was organized only on the basis of personal friendships and never undertook or planned any deliberate acts of sabotage. [883]

The discovery of the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine with its assumed anti-Communist tinge was the signal for the opening of a campaign against the most respected older non-Communist members of the Academy. The usual method was by the device of demanding Communist self-criticism, and criticism. Its practice was brutally simple and effective.

The Communist organs, especially the GPU-NKVD, decided which of these scholars were to be broken ideologically (and morally) and which were to be removed without fanfare. The latter disappeared. The former group were forced to appear for public "self-criticism." This was preceded by a series of attacks in the newspapers as to the mistakes in Marxo-Leninism which the victim had committed.

186 Then, on an appointed day, a meeting was arranged in a large
814 hall to which the public was invited by the display of large
687 placards and other notices. Selected speakers attacked in the most
661 scurrilous and abusive language various aspects of the work of the accused and ascribed to him the grossest errors. Then came the (obligatory) speeches of those who "wished to speak," i.e. his collaborators and students. These were carefully prepared by the Communist nucleus in the Academy or the Committee. The accused was then compelled to admit his mistakes and promise hereafter to work "in the spirit of Marxo-Leninism and the decrees of the Communist Party." These performances usually lasted for two or three sessions and then the critical "testing" of the work went on in special scientific meetings or scientific publications or in the torture chambers of the GPU. If the accused did not humiliate himself sufficiently or if the collaborators showed themselves insufficiently critical, "rotten liberal," "compromising," "opportunistic" or leaving "ideologically (or class) hostile loopholes," the process was repeated with still more bitterness against the main culprit and his collaborators or witnesses who had attempted to defend him were attacked with equal ferocity and their testimony was sent to the proper places for "consideration."

This was the treatment accorded to Prof. Hrushevsky who, in 1930, was criticized publicly and then arrested and deported to Moscow where he was prevented from doing any work and only after he was completely broken was he sent to a rest-house in the Caucasus to die in 1934. With his removal, the old historical studies almost came to an end. The Academy was reorganized as the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and nearly all the work in the humanities were stopped. The Historical-Philological Section was combined with the Social-Economic Section and nearly all of its special fields were abolished, while at the same time there disappeared a large number of valuable books and collections which were ready for publication.

This destruction of the older scholars in the Academy was justified by grouping Hrushevsky with his historical studies in the same

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

category of public enemies as Mazepa and Petlyura, and the three came to form a trinity subject to constant attack. Their leading crime was declared to be bourgeois nationalism, the object of which was to separate the Ukrainian from the Russian people and to deny the great significance of the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

In 1931 the Soviet authorities found traces of another organization, the Ukrainian National Centre. This is even more mysterious than was the preceding case, for it involved a number of apolitical figures who were living in retirement, as Holubovych, but at the same time it commenced the liquidation of the leaders of the former Borotbisty and Ukapisty. Still heavier sentences were imposed upon these men and large numbers were deported.

Then came an announcement of the extension to Soviet Ukrainian territory of the work of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Colonel Konovalets, and a number of more prominent Ukrainians were executed or deported for reasons that were never satisfactorily explained.

At the same time the Soviets seem to have spread rumors in connection with collectivization that there were movements for an uprising against the regime. They endeavored to have pseudo-Ukrainian patriots from Poland establish contacts with former officers of the Ukrainian National Republic who had dropped into obscurity and then, at a given signal, called for a revolt and easily overpowered their dupes.

Thus these trials eliminated from Ukrainian life the older scholars who had been trained before the period of Communist rule. They justified in the minds of the emigrés the correctness of their position in refusing to listen to the blandishments of the Ukrainian Soviet government during the apparently rosy years of the New Economic Policy, when it seemed as if there was to be a rapprochement with the West. How far the activity of these men, who had put themselves into the lion's mouth and perished, served to renew the Ukrainian courage and self-reliance has been much debated, especially in view of the fact that they were all destroyed as bourgeois, long before any serious danger seemed to

186 threaten the position of the various groups of Ukrainian Com-
814 munists. Khvylovy, despite the attacks upon him and Skrypnyk, still
687 continued to work for the greater Ukrainization of the population
661 and of the cities and, so far, he had not been subjected to any too severe criticism. That was to come next.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Turning of the Cultural Tide

The Ukrainian Communists did not realize what they were 786
doing when they launched their campaign against the bourgeois 814
intellectuals and the aged scholars in the Academy of Sciences. For the first time since the period of Ukrainization had started, they had definitely called the attention of Moscow to the existence in Ukraine of a survival of the old independent mode of thinking which had animated the Ukrainian leaders in the struggle for an independent state of their own and they had coined a name for it, bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism. That was to recur again and again and lead to their own ruin.

It is remarkable that neither Skrypnyk nor Khvylovy realized [829]
this earlier. Both men in their own way were seriously threatening the unity of the Soviet Union, to which as an ideal they were loyal. Both men, Skrypnyk in the political field and Khvylovy in literature, realized the danger to Ukraine of substituting Russianism for Communism. Both men accepted in different senses the basic ideals of Communism and both believed in a Communist International which would offer all peoples full rights of cultural and political development. Neither one understood that the Comintern was a shadow structure which was totally dependent upon the forces operating in Moscow and that the situation in 1928 and 1929 was basically different from that ten years before.

In the RSFSR the charter of liberty for the fellow travellers 626
which had been promulgated in 1925 was practically abolished by 538
the granting of extreme power of control to Averbakh and the RAPP (the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) which, to all intents and purposes, was issuing orders as to how the writers should support the Five Year Plan.

626 It was perfectly natural that a similar situation should develop
538 in Ukraine. The various schools of serious writing, as the *Vaplite,* stood out against this regimentation and ably defended their position, but that position was indefensible in the face of political pressure and without being conscious of any inconsistency, Skrypnyk, as a good Communist and a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was willing to exert pressure to bring the literary organization of Ukraine in line with that of the All-Union Communist Party at the very same time when he was deliberately thwarting the unifying tendencies of that party.

[186] The first sign of the changed order came with the arrest and
[68] deportation of M. Ivchenko for his novel *Working Powers* because it endeavored to express in a concrete form the problem of fitting the ideals of the various national groups into the stereotyped formula which was now fashionable. Next came the difficulties of Khvylovy over his novel *Woodsnipes,* despite his willingness to secure an opportunity for further work by the destruction of the second part of the novel.

It must be remembered that the groups which were now being attacked were not by their essential declarations anti-Communist. They reflected, rather, the disillusionment of many people with the prevailing manifestations of Communism, the growing realization that the Communist regime was not giving the people that ideal reality which its teachings indicated they should easily win.
[536] That was the gist of the drama by M. Kulish, the *People's Malakhy,* which reflected the contrast between the ideals of a high-minded but somewhat simple village Don Quixote and the realities of life on any particular level. This, as other of his plays, was well presented in the Berezil Theatre, directed by Les Kurbas, a Western Ukrainian who had developed in Kiev into one of the great producers and had pushed the Ukrainian theatrical art to its highest development. Writings of the same character had marked some of the early Russian works of A. N. Tolstoy after the revolution but, being a Great Russian, he was not involved in the endless controversies over the national questions and, like most of the Russian authors, he was able to work out a satisfactory agreement with the

Stalin policies. This was not true of the Ukrainian authors who felt a steadily increasing pressure from the Communist authorities. 626 538

The vast majority of the more mediocre authors who had sought to follow unhesitatingly the party line found it very natural to form themselves into the VUSPP (the All-Ukrainian Society of Proletarian Writers) in 1927. They published a monthly journal, *Hart* and the *Literary Journal,* and to show their real internationalism they supported a Russian proletarian journal, the *Krasnoye Slovo* (the Red Word) and a Jewish paper, *Di Royte Welt.* It was only natural that this group should seek support by applying for membership in the VOAPP (the All-Union Society of Proletarian Writers) which, of course, was completely under the domination of the Russian Section, the RAPP. They thus became the thinking or unthinking agents by which the Russians could direct their blows against Ukrainian literature.

On the other hand, there came during these years a similar concentration of those writers who rejected bourgeois ideas but who still were working to develop a Ukrainian Communism in the true sense of the word. Yet they were forced to shift their positions constantly and hence there came a hectic but yet vital series of publications.

The Futurists who denied the value of the past and worked in experimental efforts were naturally the opponents of Khvylovy and the *Vaplite* and finally, in 1927, they united with some of the other radical groups (in the literary sense) to form the *New Generation* which continually published declarations of policy and of adherence to Communist ideas, but this group also drew upon itself the criticism of the VUSPP because it aimed for the adaptation of literature to the Ukrainian scene.

On the other hand, the *Vaplite* was very soon compelled to disband. It did so voluntarily but the bulk of the abler writers immediately started to publish the *Literaturny Yarmarok* (The Literary Fair) in which, under the guise of apolitical writing, they poured out scarcely veiled criticism of their opponents. This, too, was soon under attack and then it was reorganized as the *Prolitfront* (the Union of Studies of the Proletarian Literary Front). This

626 device was also too obvious, for the new journal continued to
538 criticize the Russian policy and in 1931 it was forced to disband and most of the members who wanted to continue to write passed into the VUSPP, which, with all its rigid adherence to the party line, could not be too sure as to what that party line really was.

At one point in his career Skrypnyk, who was in many ways opposed to Khvylovy, dreamed of the establishment of a Federation of the Unions of Revolutionary Writers of Ukraine. He succeeded in forcing this upon the Futurists and many smaller leftist groups and also the *New Generation,* but his failure to make this real in 1931 was but a sign of the future.

By this time the VUSPP, along with the RAPP, had become the dominating force politically and Skrypnyk was forced to give up his endeavors and to allow most of his Federation members to join the VUSPP. This was but another step in the decay of all literary schools and it reflected the period of uncertainty and of a definite degree of opposition to the domination of the RAPP.

By the end of the twenties, the opportunities for independent thinking in literature had grown exceedingly few and scattered. There were still, in general, only the two currents of Ukrainian and Russian Communism, and the former was definitely beginning to wane under the continual attacks that were delivered both by its opponents and the Communist Party through its official organs.
[186] Still, up until 1931, Ukrainian literature continued to develop and the literary disputes, often over minor points of literature, thought and culture, animated society and lent a zest to the various writings. These now more than ever began to reflect a growing apprehension over the conditions as they were and the impossibility of equating the ideals of Communism and the realities of the Russian domination of the country.

[656] A more decided blow was given by the decree of April 23, 1932. This ended all literary discussions and abolished all literary societies and groups throughout the entire Soviet Union. In place of these, Stalin announced the establishment of a single society throughout the entire Union, the All-Union Association of Soviet Writers, and turned this over to Maksim Gorky, perhaps the most prominent

Russian writer of the day but a man who was bitterly anti-Ukrainian 636
and scornful of the national cultures of all the Soviet Republics. 538
His object seems to have been in Ukraine to force the literature to accept the Russian pattern. The new doctrine of socialist realism was promulgated and it was very soon made clear that the destruction of the VUSPP and all the old groups was not a step toward the restoration of freedom for creation but a new move to strengthen, on a somewhat different basis, the government's control over everything that was published.

It was highly significant for this that at the early meetings of the Ukrainian Section, its organizer, I. Kulyk, appeared in the uniform of a frontier guard of the NKVD as a silent warning to all of those who might be regarded as heretical in any sense. Furthermore Zhdanov as a member of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party, explained the situation. In his keynote speech, he declared:

"Comrade Stalin has called our writers engineers of human souls. What does that mean? What obligations does it lay upon them? It means first that they must know life, so as to represent it faithfully in artistic works, to represent it not scholastically or in a dead way, not simply as an objective realism but to picture reality in its revolutionary development. In this the truth and historical concreteness of artistic representation must coincide with the tasks of the ideal reworking and development of the working people in the spirit of socialism. This method of artistic literature and of literary criticism are what we call the method of socialist realism."

Whatever might have been the effect of the new organization on Russian literature, which had been handicapped by the domination of the RAPP, its effect on Ukrainian literature could not fail to be disastrous. In effect, it standardized all literature on the Russian model and it indicated that henceforth literature and literary men were to be treated as organs of the Communist Party and of the Moscow regime. It was the definite answer to the efforts of the Ukrainian writers of nearly all the conflicting schools to adapt literature to their own purposes and ideals. It took away from the writers all inspiration and desire to use their talents for their own

626 artistic enjoyment and it rendered it possible for the central govern-
538 ment to abolish that sense of republican patriotism which had been so marked during the preceding period in all the non-Russian republics.

626 In place of the ideas of the old Ukrainian life which was being
538 brought to an end by the compulsory collectivization and the
178 establishment of the collective farms, in place of the old visions of the unity of the Ukrainian people and those ideals of a new national life that had dominated Ukrainian literature from the time of Shevchenko, in place of the efforts to establish in Ukrainian literature all those branches of art and culture which were stirring in Western Europe, there was now given to the writers, young and old, the command to celebrate and to glorify the actual process of socialist construction in Ukraine, as elsewhere. By 1934 Kulyk, as the organizer of the Ukrainian section, could write of the definite end of the old bourgeois nationalist sentiment as preached by Yefremiv and of the efforts of Khvylovy to reorient the psychology of Ukrainian literature on that of Europe. In his article on the modern Ukrainian literature in a volume on the *Literature of the Peoples of the USSR* published in 1934, he could pass over in silence, for obvious reasons, all of the great names which had appeared during the preceding ten years and shower his praise upon the young proletarian writers who were willing to follow blindly and, to the best of their ability, the new course.

There were, of course, some of the older and even of the more prominent men who were willing to compromise with the new regime. Among them the outstanding figures were Tychyna and Rylsky. Both of them, after consideration and treatment by the authorities, tried to bend their works to the new ideas but there were many who were unwilling or unable to be untrue to their artistic faith and for them there was not even the choice of silence or writing. They were compelled to conform or vanish and it was not long after the organization of the All-Union Society of Soviet Writers when this was made abundantly clear.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The Debacle

The Ukrainian Communists, as Skrypnyk and Khvylovy, could not fail to be horrified at the spreading famine which broke out in the autumn of 1932 and raged throughout the winter. Whatever they might have thought in the beginning of the compulsory collectivization, they were aghast at its results. They could not fail to recognize that it meant the end of the old Ukrainian life which they had tried to remodel in accordance with their own ideals and that it meant a widening breach with the outside world. They could not fail to see that it meant the ending of that world Communism in which they had tried to believe and in which they saw the hope of humanity and justice.

They could hardly fail to recognize almost immediately how they had played into the hands of the enemies of Ukraine by their attacks on the older scholars, for they were now to learn that they had unwittingly forged the tool that was to be used against them.

Postyshev arrived in Ukraine in January, 1933, to superintend and make more rigid the rules for the collection of grain. He brought with him his own staff, his own detachments of the NKVD, and while he nominally had the post of second secretary, he had the instructions from Stalin that made him the complete dictator. He soon showed what that meant.

Among his earliest acts was the removal of Chubar from his post as head of the Soviet of People's Commissars and he replaced him with the more pliable P. Lyubchenko, a former Borotbist. Skrypnyk was forthwith demoted from Commissar of Education to Chairman of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission, a position of no special importance, once the conduct of all Ukrainian life

661 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in
558 Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist
[665] Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which
[814] had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

Postyshev's[1] object was the rerussification of the country, for it
191 had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many
626 of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian news-
[871] papers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

basis with Ukrainian. He established Russian theatres in the larger 191
cities and sent them Russian companies from Leningrad and Moscow 636
to show the greatness of Russian art, while at the same time he had [545]
Les Kurbas arrested at the end of the year and closed the Berezil Theatre, the leading company in Ukraine, and even abolished its name as Catherine the Great had abolished the name of the Zaporozhian Sich one hundred fifty years before.

The fundamental object was to re-Russianize Ukraine as rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this idea, Zatonsky even suggested that the students should be encouraged to talk a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian in the hope that they could thus be more quickly induced to accept the alien tongue. That was a rash thought, for as soon as it was reported to Moscow, there came a strong protest from Gorky that such a procedure could only injure the purity of the Russian language by mixing foreign elements in it. Zatonsky hurriedly withdrew his suggestions but it was too late and only a few years later he was to pay the penalty for his rash proposal.

It was small wonder that Khvylovy, who knew well that he [762]
was threatened with arrest and execution, committed suicide in despair on May 13, 1933 and he was followed on July 6, by Skrypnyk who was too familiar with the workings of Russian Communism not to realize that he would be steadily demoted until he could be finished off without comment as a fallen idol.

The terror and the destruction proceeded apace[1] and after the 661
murder of Kirov in Leningrad on December 21, 1934, new in- 538
vestigations were ordered and it was discovered that the bulk of the Ukrainian authors were involved in the conspiracy. In a very short time their ranks were almost completely decimated. In the same month H. Kosynka, O. Vlyzko, I. Krushelnytsky, K. Burevy, and D. Falkivsky were shot on various pretenses. Nearly all the former members of the *Vaplite,* the Neo-Classicists, the groups connected with the MARS in Kiev and the *New Generation,* were liquidated in one way or another, either by execution or deportation and deportation was practically the equivalent of death, for scarcely one of the deported ever returned to the Ukraine or made

[1] [reference to forced Russification of Ukraine, 193? --Analyst]

661 538 his presence or his present place of dwelling known to any of his friends.

It would be too long to mention the list of names, but among them were all the outstanding names of the preceding years, Kulish, Yalovy, Yohansen, Epik, Zerov, Dray-Khmara, Kosynka, Pidmohylny, Semenko, Vuzko, etc. These men were not only put out of the way but every attempt was made to prove that they had never existed. Their books were removed from the libraries and bookstores and, so far as possible, even references to them and their work were expunged from encyclopedias and reference books and the movement which they represented and which, but a short time before, had been patronized by the Commissariat of Education was rendered non-existent. Only the name of Khvylovy remained as an example of anti-Russian work and he was presented as a pupil of Petlyura, Hrushevsky and the Western imperialists and a believer in bourgeois nationalism, a term which was now extended to cover anything hostile to the general line of the Party.

626 538 Faced with the certainty of sharing the fate of their colleagues, some of even the more prominent authors began to waver. Among this number were Tychyna and, a little more reluctantly, Rylsky. In fact, it required a term in prison to bring the latter to an appreciation of the beauties of the new order. Both proved themselves valuable converts, even if they were compelled to forget all their old mannerisms and perfections of style and produce tasteless propaganda poetry, while the official organs boasted of their slow but steady growth in realism. Thus, in 1934 Kulyk could say of Tychyna, "The collection of *The Party Leads* represents an unquestionable achievement. Nevertheless we should be rendering poor service to Tychyna himself if we failed to point out the uneven tenor, and sometimes even hesitation, in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to him. Stronger organizational ties with the realities, emancipation from artificial, at times purely bookish culture, such are the conditions on which depends further progress by Tychyna along the new road chosen by this great Ukrainian poet." Rylsky and Bazhan were treated in the same way, while such writers as Panch and Holovko were told it was their task to get over the

[Persecution, during Russification of Ukraine, 1933 --Analyst

old notion that "Mother Ukraine" had the same interest in all her 626
sons, whether they were working men, peasants or intellectual 538
nationalists. Both of them later revised their works under the kind leadership of the Party.

The proletarian writers and those who were content to write upon the prescribed or recommended themes were in their element. Kyrylenko and Mykytenko wrote glowingly and woodenly about collectivization and the elimination of the kulaks, "the dregs of society." Korniychuk, a young dramatist, presented in his plays all the appropriate Five Year plan subjects and gloried in the defeat of the old in the factories and on the collective farms. Everything in the literary field that glorified the Communist Party and rejected those ideas which had flourished under the preceding regime was applauded and the successful received honors and wealth and Stalin prizes for literary achievement.

The same development or retrogression[1] was to be noted in the 626
more purely scientific fields, especially where they touched studies 814
dealing with the Ukrainian language, history or culture. Skrypnyk had removed some of the more distinguished members of the Academy of Science. Postyshev purged most of their followers and then he went on to reorganize the institution in the Communist way. The Academy was changed into a series of separate institutes, each of which was subject only to a carefully chosen Presidium.

Then, at the end of 1934 all of those institutes connected with the old Historical Section and which dealt with such subjects as Ukrainian archaeology, history, history of law, Western Ukraine, etc. were abolished. The study of the humanities was practically ended and the old staff was excluded. There were left only institutes of language and material culture to care for the past and all other subjects were handed over to the network of the VUAMLIN, the reorganized and strengthened network of Marxo-Leninist institutes, which could serve as a more reliable means of spreading Communist doctrine in a pseudo-scientific form. They created a new complex of societies as the Society of Marxist Historians, all of which had the avowed purpose of glorifying the regime at the expense of any form of scientific truth.

[1] [1933-- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

626 814 191 In the field of studies in the Ukrainian language,[1] under the leadership of A. Khvylya who had already distinguished himself by his attacks on the entire process of Ukrainization, new steps were taken to counteract all that had been gained by any school of thought.

In the beginning Naum Kaganovich had tried to show that the scholars of the preceding period had worked under the influence of "populist" theories of language. He was soon forced to change this to a statement that the work had been "bourgeois nationalist," the favorite slogan for anything that was not Russian. In his article, *The Language Theory of Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism,* he wrote: "Here under the conception of the people emerge the kurkul circles; the bourgeois nationalists have shaped the development of the Ukrainian language on the speech of the kurkuls." In another passage he declared: "By this approach to the people the bourgeois nationalists understand the removal from the language of everything that is connected with the October revolution, the removal of all features which bring it closer to the language of the Russian proletariat and the workers of the other republics of the USSR and the implanting of everything that is outmoded, conservative and permeated with the nationalist bourgeois spirit."

It was easy to see at what these new "scholars" were aiming. The old arguments as to whether the local dialects of the peasants or the newer literary language which had been developed for over a century was the better Ukrainian were now replaced by the definite statement that the proper form was that which was the language of the more "advanced" classes, i.e. the Communists and their sympathizers, who were the least connected with any special area and were the least affected by any considerations of locality or traditional culture or usage. Even during Ukrainization the Communists of high rank coming from Moscow had been officially relieved of the task of learning Ukrainian. Now this was expanded and those who, of their own volition, learned a few words were adjudged the best authorities on Ukrainian because of their Communist knowledge and standing.

The new authorities set themselves the task of rooting out those

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

attempts which the "bourgeois nationalists" had made to bring 626
together the Ukrainians of the east and of the west. They declared 814
that the preceding group had sought to bring back capitalism and 191
to separate Ukrainian from the "brotherly" Russian and to remodel it on Polish and German standards. They attacked any system of orthography and transliteration which differed from that used in Russian and in their attacks on Polonisms in Ukrainian they went so far as to call Polish any Ukrainian form which differed from the Russian, even when the Polish word in fact had the same form as the Russian and differed from the Ukrainian.

In the small dictionaries that were printed only those words were admitted that revealed Russian relations and the academician Krymsky once remarked of one of these that it was merely a Russian-Russian dictionary, so far had the process been carried.

In 1933 Khvylya published a new orthography for Ukrainian. This repudiated the work that had been done earlier to bring together Eastern and Western Ukrainian and sought to take as the standard those Ukrainian dialects that had been most thoroughly russianized, although at the same time he carefully avoided explaining the policy on which he was working.

Thus, during these years there developed a definite policy of disintegrating the language from within. It was based very definitely upon the old theories of the nineteenth century, that Ukrainian was merely a corrupt form of Russian and could not have any independent development, but such a statement which would have satisfied Nicholas I and Belinsky was not expressed clearly. It was enveloped in a mass of Communist jargon which appealed to the great names of Bolshevik ideology and covered a complete ignorance of any of the facts of language or of popular usage.

At the same time in another field Postyshev saw the opportunity 633
to deliver further blows under the guise of progress and of satisfying Ukrainian aspirations. He moved the capital of the Ukrainian Republic back to Kiev from Kharkiv.[1] There were good reasons for this. The Soviet regime had been established at Kharkiv, because it was nearer to the Russian boundary and hence could more easily receive support from Russian military sources during the

[1] [1933 -- Analyst]

633 civil war. Kiev, as the centre of traditional Ukrainian life, was more liable to sympathy with the Ukrainian national movement, as the Russians had found on more than one occasion. Now, with the country prostrate, it seemed advisable for the Communists to mark their triumph and endeavor to identify themselves with the masses by recognizing Kiev.

Yet, it brought with it another blow to Ukrainian prestige. Of all the cities in Ukraine, Kiev was the richest in the monuments of the past. Therefore, to mark the Communist triumph, they decided to rebuild large portions of the city and to erect buildings that would be worthy of the new regime. It was easy to find as the proper sites the areas where the old Kiev had stood.

From the very first days of Bolshevism and Communism, the
346 regime, with its atheistic trends, had devoted itself to the robbing
661 of the churches. Even the ikonostasis of St. Sophia had been melted
633 down to recover the gold ornaments with which it had been decorated. The museums had been largely pillaged. Some of the contents had been removed to Moscow on various pretexts, but still more had been wantonly destroyed.

Now work began in earnest to wreck the surviving monuments of the past. In quick succession the Communists ruined, blew up or levelled a large number of churches which spoke too strongly of the past greatness of Kiev and the Ukrainians. These included the Cathedral Church of the Golden Domed Monastery of St. Michael of the twelfth century, with a bell-tower of the seventeenth, the Church of the Three Saints of the twelfth century, the cloisters of the Monastery of St. Irena of the eleventh century, the finest monuments of the period of Mazepa at the end of the seventeenth century, including the Cathedrals of the Theophany of the Brotherhood Monastery and the "Great Nicholas" of the Ustyno-Mykolayiv Monastery, the work of the architect Joseph Startsev, with a bell-tower of the late eighteenth or the early nineteenth century, the "Little Nicholas" and the Church of St. George of the eighteenth century, a large number of structures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of the Kievan-Mezhyhirye Monastery of the Transfiguration, the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Podil of

[1933 - Ukraine Capital was moved to Kiev from Kharkiv -- Analyst]

the eighteenth century, the bell-tower of the Kiev-Kiril-Troitsky 346
Monastery of the eighteenth century built by the architect Ivan 661
Hryhorovych-Barsky, the Church of Sts. Borys and Hlib of the 633
eighteenth century, the Church of the Birth of Christ and the "good Nicholas," built by Andry Melensky at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Church of the Tithes, the celebrated statue of Samson by Hryhorovych-Barsky, and a long series of other monuments and buildings.

Almost all of these buildings came from those periods when the Ukrainians were the most free from Russian influence or, as in the case of the Mazepa baroque, had the closest contacts with the West. It was a deliberate part of the Communist attempt to rewrite the Ukrainian past.

Of course, their excuse was that the old primarily ecclesiastical culture stood in marked contradiction to the modern era of industrialization and collectivization, the "glorious age of Stalin" which called for the development of a new type of architecture. Still, in a surprising number of cases these new buildings did not make their appearance and the ground was left empty or covered with insignificant structures which could better have been placed on the site of those half-ruined shacks and hovels which were the real expressions of the Communist paradise.

The primary object was the annihilation of the Ukrainian spirit 626
and represented part of the broad general movement which had 186
been launched for the rerussification of the country and the stopping in every way of that spontaneous outburst of development which had been called into being by the downfall of tsarism and the founding of the Ukrainian National Republic. The general debacle was now complete.

Within four years, before the ending of the first Five Year Plan a situation had been brought about which seemed to the Soviet authorities a guarantee of their final victory over what they were pleased to call bourgeois nationalism but which was, in realty, the logical outgrowth of the Ukrainian aspirations throughout the centuries.

[in destruction of churches & monuments of past in Kiev--Analyst

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

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The Thirties

631 With the completion of the compulsory collectivization, the
642 ending of the famine and the destruction of the Ukrainian cultural renaissance, the country entered a new phase. The position in which it found itself was almost the opposite of the twenties. As, at the end of Militant Communism, the land was ruined and exhausted, so it was again. The number of domestic animals had dropped almost to the level of the earlier period, agriculture had been rendered prostrate, and material well-being had disappeared as the peasants were forced to labor on the collective farms.

On the other hand, there was none of that excitement and desire for work that had accompanied the introduction and development of the New Economic Policy, when the relaxation of the restrictions and the end of the lawlessness of Militant Communism had restored the possibility of profit to the people and when they could hope to see the results of their own labor.

More than that, the earlier period had been marked by the belief of the Ukrainian Communists that they could find an independent place in the Communist International. Then there was a conflict between those who wished a development of Ukrainian ideals and traditions, a union of the old and the new, and those who adopted a strictly Russian point of view. Now there was only one dominating force—the Russian. It had been made clear that there was to be no open antagonism. The Russian point of view was the only one that could hope to find acceptance in Communism, the Communist International had become a mere adjunct of the Russian Communist Party, all Ukrainian sympathies and expressions were banned, and the Ukrainian spirit was forced on the

631 defensive and compelled to fight a rearguard action for maintaining
642 its existence.

Step by step, Stalin and the Russian Communist Party was changing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into a Russian empire with its non-Russian dependencies and, despite the Constitution of the Union and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, it was becoming ever more and more clear that the latter was to be treated merely as a geographical colony of the new Russian-dominated union, with no attention to its wishes or its needs.

This had been evident from almost the first days of the Five Year Plan. Whatever might have been the original blueprint of this, it early became evident that the Soviet Union could only carry out its work of industrialization and collectivization, if everything were forced into a single plan. In connection with this, the various republic commissariats had been reduced to All-Union commissariats and all independent power of judgment or planning had been removed from the local organs. If it were a question of developing a mine, of building a new factory, of introducing a new and more profitable crop, of constructing a new road or railroad, the authorities of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had to refer the matter to Moscow and receive the permission to act from the central authorities of the Union. How could it be otherwise?

The central government had assumed the responsibility for the development of the country and it could not carry this on, if the local communities or republics had the power to meet any but the most primitive needs without consultation and permission. Moscow had decided how industry was to be developed, which branches were to be built in the RSFSR, which in Ukraine, which in the other republics. That plan was almost absolute and, warned by the fate of the fallen Communist leaders, the new successors were ultra-cautious in venturing to express an opinion.

[625] The OGPU had been remodelled into the NKVD, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but this was placed under the same Yagoda who had been the head of the OGPU and he merely assumed greater powers and greater responsibilities for the safeguarding of the Soviet order.

[1930's - After famine -- Analyst]

The crying need of the Ukrainians was for consumer goods. 433
Odesa and Kharkiv requested that they might be given the power 185
to build textile mills to supply the needs of the local population. 656
The request was denied, for the authorities had decided that the textile industry was to be concentrated in the RSFSR. The iron and steel cities requested that they might be given the permission to build factories to complete the fabrication of certain delicate types of machinery. The request was refused because it was to be only in the Moscow area that such articles were to be made. It was to be the task of Ukraine to furnish the raw material, the iron ore from Kryvy Rih, the coal of the Donbas, and to prepare the semi-finished pig-iron and other forms of semi-fabricated material that were needed by the central plants.

The plan not only provided for construction. It went even further and specified the exact amount of products that were to be turned out by each individual plant. While it was possible to secure some profits from the over-fulfillment of the plan, regardless of the effect that this might have upon the plan as a whole, any under-fulfillment was treated as a gross failure of obligation to the state.

This led, in turn, to additional restrictions on the freedom of [466] the workers. Punishments were ordered for tardiness, for absence from employment even for a single day without a satisfactory reason, for an attempt to change the place of employment. These regulations were not the product of the governing bodies of the republics but of the Union authorities themselves and they were transmitted from Moscow to the national republics through the liaison between the All-Union commissariats and their subordinate organs.

It was the same with agriculture. Moscow knew what each collective farm, each kolkhoz, each sovkhoz was to furnish, and woe to the group that failed. The famine had been the result and that had been used to break the spirit of resistance of the Ukrainian villagers. The government specified the acreage that was to be devoted to wheat, to barley, to all of the crops that could be raised and it did no good if the local agronomists pointed out new

1/1 [1930's - after famine -- Analyst]

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

166 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the
626 village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past.* Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

* [after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

country for less populated districts in the east, while, on the slightest 166
suspicions, whole families were deported, separated and exiled, and 626
their places taken by people from other Soviet republics who were brought in to destroy the racial unity that formerly existed in the villages.

To appreciate the difficulties of the peasants on the collective 241
farms, we must remember that the involved bureaucratic system 651
had ample opportunities for extorting the grain for little or no 474
payment. Thus the Motor Transport Stations which controlled 465
all the machinery were supported by payments from the collective farms of grain and other products in kind and this usually approached 21.5% of the total yield, while the Stations took over 23% of the crop for the government. Another 15% was retained by the kolhosp for sowing and for various insurance funds that were prescribed by law and another 18% was kept for fodder and for the compensation of the full-time administrators. Thus, there was barely a quarter of the produce left to be distributed among the working population and this was the variable quantity since all of the payments and collections were based not on the actual harvest but on the harvest as planned by the central authorities. Thus, in the case of a bad harvest, the share allotted for distribution was the part that was cut and the government, so far as possible was provided with its expected supply.

This amount was divided among the individuals and families on the basis of the labor days which they had worked. In the beginning a labor day meant labor for a day, no matter how many hours of labor were required, but even before World War II, this simple definition was replaced by a specification that it covered a definite amount of work and it might very easily happen that a slow or poor workman would have to work more than one day to make a labor day. Thus, there was the possibility of still further exploitation of the workmen, who could not know accurately until the end of the year on what they could count.

There was also distributed, likewise in proportion to labor days, a certain sum of money which the kolhosp received from the government in return for the sale of grain over the amount col-

[I after 1933 famine - - Analyst]

341 lected for the tax in kind. This was a negligible sum and the
651 average member rarely received more than one ruble per labor
474 day. This sum was, of course, insufficient to provide for the
465 goods which the family needed to purchase, and since their share
[511] of the grain was rarely sufficient to feed them, their situation became hopeless, while of other products the individual received about one litre of oil, fifty kilograms of potatoes, thirty-five kilograms of fruit, and five-tenths kilograms of meat and fat.

[435] The real significance of these figures is shown in the prices that were charged in the state stores.[1] There a kilogram of bread cost ninety kopecks, ten eggs brought eight rubles, a kilogram of beef twenty-four rubles, and a pair of boots four hundred and fifty rubles, while a farmer's suit of clothes cost five hundred rubles.

[422] It made the peasant really dependent upon his individual plot of land if he was to secure any necessities.[1] This was far too small and its use was bound with many restrictions. Thus, no family was allowed to hold more than one cow and two calves, one sow, up to ten goats, an undefined number of chickens and up to twenty beehives. In the beginning it was possible for the peasant to secure a certain amount of food for these animals from the common store. He was allowed to retain the manure and it was thus possible for him to improve his own individual plot and thus to secure larger returns. It was a liberal application of such principles that had rendered possible the general improvement which was noticeable during the years 1934-6, when the government was endeavoring to make the system of collective farms workable.

It can be easily seen that the system of allowing individual incomes was based on a principle opposite that of the New Economic Policy, for it would require scarcely a legislative enactment to reduce these amounts while the New Economic Policy presented a norm of profit to the workers. Yet with each year, once the government was convinced of its success, it found it possible in various ways to tap this new source of income for its own purposes.

The favorite method was by taxation. Thus, by 1939 if we should assume that the average family received in cash four hun-

1 [Ukraine - after 1933 famine -- Analyst]

dred and eighty karbovantsy, they would be required to pay 241
twenty-two and a half karb. in taxes, twenty in rent, fifty as a 651
special tax and they would be required to volunteer to take at 474
least two hundred in government bonds. 465

Even this did not cover the total payments to the government. With its usual love of double-talk and subterfuge, the government, which controlled every branch of human activity in the USSR, talked of the establishment of socialism and levied indirect taxes on all transactions so that the actual cost to the villagers of any manufactured article was about three times what it cost the government as producer. The whole subject was carefully veiled as a state secret to protect the Soviet Union against capitalist intrigues but the unfortunate population were the unwilling contributors to this new order of life.

Under such conditions it is extremely difficult to pierce the veil [652] of percentages as to cost and production and give a reliable estimate as to the amount of money received for the government or the relationship between the sums spent in maintaining the operation of the Moscow-controlled factories in Ukraine and the amount spent upon the needs of the population either individually, as families or as citizens of the UkSSR or of the UkSSR as a governmental unity within the Soviet sphere. From those figures which the Soviet has let out, it is possible to see that the yearly budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has run from 2½-5% of the budget of the USSR while the population has been at least 18% of the total population.

With the villages compelled to yield the last pound of grain, 369
etc., that could be extracted by force, and receiving in return 511
almost no manufactured goods, the position of the city workmen and the intelligentsia was little better. The wages of the workmen were always insufficient, the housing conditions were hardly endurable, and the only point of betterment was that the larger places and some of the plants especially favored by the regime received more manufactured goods of a poor quality and at a high price which the fortunate people might be able to secure.

369 They could also, if they still had preserved any valuables, dispose
511 of them through the Torgsin stores which sold imported wares for foreign currency and precious metals.

[554] Of course, neither in city or village did any of these restrictions apply to the more important Communists who possessed their own stores at which the government supplied them with the necessary articles to allow them to live in comfort and luxury as a welcome investment for the regime. The line of demarcation between the poor and the rich, the ordinary people and the Communists, became steadily greater, until it was often wider than it had been in the old tsarist Russian empire.

642 All these measures which had been adopted in Moscow were
631 in theory supposed to apply to all sections of the USSR equally, but it was not long before the natives of Ukraine realized that however impartial the laws might seem, they were not sufficiently flexible to take account of local and republican differences. The central regime was interested in advancing and developing the Moscow industrial area and it expended on this in various grandiose efforts, as the Moscow subway, enormous sums of money. It is safe to say that the expenditures in that one area alone equalled the entire budget and money spent by the central government in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It classified Ukraine as one of the regions where the supply of manufactured goods was less necessary.

The crushing of the Ukrainian Communists, the suicide of Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, no less than the complete altering of the land code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the substitution of the new policy of collectivization, showed perfectly well where the real power of the USSR lay in the thirties and it was accompanied by such acts as the introduction of Russian as the
[701] standard language of instruction and of the army. This was followed by the formal transfer of the Ukrainian divisions to the Red Army and a number of other acts which completed the subordination of the UkSSR. Already in 1930, during difficulties on the Soviet-Manchuria borders, the Red Army had not hesitated to

[after 1933 - measures dealing with production, supply etc. - [illegible]]

greet the Communist Party with news of its victories and allowed 631
this even to take precedence over a notice to the Soviet govern- 642
ment which had hitherto claimed to be predominant.

To regularize all these changes of practice, Stalin ordered a new constitution and this was approved on December 5, 1936. It was a marvel of inconsistencies, for it was drawn up to express all of the old slogans and the modern facts.

Here was, in Article 17, the old talk of the right of free withdrawal of any Union Republic from the USSR but there was also a provision that the Supreme Soviet could annul any action of any Union Republic contrary to its wishes. There was a careful definition of the three classes of Commissariats but when the book is read critically it is easily seen that the only subjects within the competence of the Union Republics were Education, Local Industry, Communal Economy and Social Security and their decisions could legally be upset by Moscow. Article 15 provided for almost full independence, subject to Article 14, which made the Presidium of the Moscow Communist Party and of the USSR the almost undisputed master of the Union Republics, and Art. XIII, read in conjunction with this, made it possible for the Presidium to amend or change any article of the entire Constitution.

Along with all the democratic phrases in many articles was the confirmation of the unified state budget and the provision that any act of any subordinate Soviet could be easily nullified.

At the moment the democratic nations of the west were so preoccupied with the threat offered by the Nazis that they were thinking only of efforts to make a common popular front with the Soviets. They found a convenient possibility in the new Constitution and they were little disposed to pay any attention to all those phrases which formally and almost explicitly nullified all that they wished to see.

Thus, the legal basis was provided for the extension of the power of the Moscow government. Once the new Constitution was adopted and in force, the last rights of the Union Republics were nullified *de jure* as well as *de facto* and the central government was

631 given a free hand in its work of bending all the Union Republics to
642 its will. The stamp of state approval was set upon the new system of administration and with that accomplished, there was small reason why the regime should not go further with its work of russification and unification.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Ukraine in the Late Thirties

With the power of Moscow thus defined and reasserted by 668
the free vote of the Moscow-controlled Communist representatives of the various independent republics that formed part of the USSR, the way was open for the next step. Stalin had not only prepared himself legally at home by a clever use of contradictory expressions but he had taken advantage of the good will of the liberals and progressives of the rest of the world by exploiting the distrust which they felt for Hitler and the Nazis and had infiltrated Communists through the media of popular fronts into nearly all the governments that boasted of their democracy.

Next came the bewildering series of trials which were now held 661
in Moscow. In quick succession Yagoda, the dreaded head of 687
the NKVD, was removed from his post, arrested and shot by his successor Yezhov, whose name was soon to become even more detested. Then, in a series of three public trials which extended from the end of 1936 to 1938, nearly all of the old Bolshevik leaders who had played important roles in Soviet life during the period of Lenin's domination were condemned for counter-revolutionary activity and either shot or sentenced to long terms of deportation, from which they did not return. The list included such names as Bukharin, the former theoretician of the Party, Zinovyev, the master of the Leningrad Soviet, the leading supporters of Trotsky, Rykov, etc. At the same time Marshal Tukhachevsky, the commander of the Red Army in its unsuccessful drive against Warsaw in 1920, Marshal Yegorov, the leader of the southern wing of that army with which Stalin himself had served as political commissar and most of the other leading officers were removed and

661 suffered the same fate on the ground that they were intriguing
687 with Hitler or with the capitalist imperialists.

The Yezhovshchina, as it was called, raged over the entire territory of the Soviet Union and was directed with especial fury against all the leading men in all walks of life, directors of government offices, directors of factories, directors of collective farms, and army officers, if they could possibly be suspected of being disloyal to the Stalinist regime or of having independent thoughts.

The world looked on in amazement, for the Moscow regime seemed to have gone completely mad in its accusations and suspicions. The charges that were made against the outstanding personalities seemed fantastic and contradicted everything that any one knew of the character and actions of the outstanding Communist leaders. To some it seemed as if the revolution were devouring its own children, for Stalin was executing men for proposing policies which he had later adopted himself, as he had in the case of both the right and left deviationists from the general line of the party. To others it seemed an alarming example of the infiltration of all forms of life by the agents of Nazism. All agreed that the actions were extreme and far reaching.

As the purge of the administrative machinery went on, its range increased. Once the head of a bureau or a factory were implicated, the way was open to charge all of his subordinates who had not denounced him with being accessory to his crimes and they were called up and punished or, in rare cases, were acquitted and promoted. The storm continued until late in 1938 when Yezhov himself was removed and suffered the same fate at the hands of the Georgian Beria, who guided the NKVD through World War II.

If such was the fury in the RSFSR, it can well be imagined what were the results in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian Communists had set the fashion of accusing their opponents of bourgeois nationalism. When the storm broke, Postyshev, who had been sent down in 1933 to wipe out bourgeois nationalism, to organize the famine and to break the Ukrainian renaissance, was among the first to go. He was removed and disappeared at the hands of Kaganovich, who reemerged for a while as the strong man of the

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Lyubchenko, who had been appointed the Prime Minister of the UkSSR on the single program of suppressing Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, was called to Moscow to confront the self-confessed leaders of the nationalists and, on his return to Kiev, he shot himself. His successor, Bondarenko, disappeared without a trace. 661 687

Who were these self-confessed leaders? Prominent among them was A. Khvylya, who had been the champion of the general line against Khvylovy and Skrypnyk and who had been the dominant figure in the attack on the Ukrainian literary men and scholars. For years he had resorted to all kinds of attacks to bring Ukrainian grammar and language closer to Russian. He now "voluntarily" confessed that he had worked against the "elder brother" and had joined and aided in developing a secret military force several million strong for the sole purpose of separating Ukraine from the USSR and he swore that in this he had the active aid of Lyubchenko and most of the officials of the UkSSR. Finis.

Zatonsky, the Commissar of Education, was accused of another crime. He had drawn years before the fire of Gorky for suggesting that a mixed language be introduced into Ukrainian schools as the means of absorbing Ukrainian into Russian. He had speedily withdrawn his recommendations under fire and all had seemed forgiven. It was not, and Zatonsky disappeared in the holocaust.

It then came the turn of the writers. Men like Kulyk, who had run roughshod over the older writers and had called for their liquidation, were now found guilty of bourgeois nationalism and with them most of the authors who had emerged during the shattering of the Ukrainian renaissance and who had celebrated the turning of the Ukraine into a collectivized and industrialized state. Each and every one of them confessed that they had been guilty of bourgeois nationalism and they received the due reward for their crimes. [538]

There was hardly a family in Ukraine which did not suffer the accusation of at least one member. The survivors who have escaped abroad have given lurid tales of the extent to which the feeling of distrust and suspicion spread among all classes of the

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
687 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
166 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

[During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

simply Russians was constantly increased. It was almost forbidden 626
to mention the name Ukrainian in connection with the older settlers 186
in Kuban, along the Don, in the Green Wedge along the Amur, etc. [191]
and it was a matter of perplexity as to what language they could be said to speak or what dialect in connection with later studies of the dialects of the Russian language. It was inadmissible to regard them as speaking a peasant dialect in view of the attitude of the authorities in recognizing some sort of Ukrainian, but it was even worse to believe that Ukrainian could exist in those regions and so they were simply passed over and forgotten, while the newcomers, usually being under some kind of a ban, were simply treated as Russian deportees.

Even this was not the whole story, for in such cities as Vinnytsya 661
during these same years[1] the population was slaughtered by the thousands and buried secretly in carefully hidden burial places which were then turned into parks and playgrounds to conceal the extent of the crimes. This was repeated in many places but the situation in Vinnytsya attracted especial attention because during the War, the Germans found the places of burial and revealed the thousands of bodies of the victims, many of whom had been buried alive. The extent of these massacres was as great as was the killing of the Polish officers in Katyn, which was likewise brought to light during the war.

By the time the census of 1939 was taken and this was the last 162
one published, the growth of the number of Russians and the diminution of Ukrainians showed clearly that there was a large scale transfer of nationality which completely reversed the figures in some sections of Asia without regard for the natural laws of reproduction and mortality.

In this atmosphere the nature of the intellectual and literary 626
work in the UkSSR can well be imagined. The Ukrainian scholars 814
were forced to accept the full Russian theories of the Ukrainian 661
past. This led to a complete revaluation of all the "outstanding figures." In 1933 the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was condemned on the ground that he was a typical representative of the noble classes. By the outbreak of World War II he became a Rus-

1 [1936-1938 -- Analyst]

626 sian patriot for signing the Treaty of Pereyaslav and bringing the
814 Zaporozhian Kozaks under Muscovite domination. It was so in
661 every branch of historical study. In back of the conception of the Soviet man and Soviet patriotism began to emerge with ever greater clarity the conception of Russian patriotism, as the doctrine of the "elder brother" who had given culture and civilization to the other nations of the Soviet Union became clearer and clearer.

626 It was the same thing in language. Khvylya and his friends
814 had been working on a Ukrainian-Russian dictionary but this was
191 immediately criticized by *Pravda* for its divisive tendencies, and the guilty compilers were liquidated. A new edition was started in 1938 on still a new principle. The Ukrainian and Russian words were to have the same number of synonyms and these were to have identical value. If, in any particular case, this did not prove to be true, it was so much the worse for the Ukrainian. If there were more words in Ukrainian to express various shades of one idea that there were in Russian, the words were banned. If there were fewer, the Russian words were supplied in order to show the influence that Russian had had upon the cultural development of Ukrainian.

The result was the reverse of what Zatonsky had proposed. He had suggested a mixed language with the idea that the Ukrainians would develop by practice toward the use of standard Russian. Now the new Commissariat of Education was introducing Russian into Ukrainian, forbidding the use of Ukrainian syntactical constructions which had no parallel in Russian in order to train the Ukrainians to speak Russian by infiltrating it into their native speech. The result would have been perhaps the same, but the important difference was that it preserved the supremacy of the Russian language in a pure form and corrupted the Ukrainian beyond recognition.

538 This procedure was too violent, even for many of the poets
191 and writers who were most ardent in their support of the Stalinist
626 regime. Men like Bazhan, who had put his pen entirely at the disposal of Moscow, continued to use some of the forbidden words and even obtained rewards for their obsequious phrases couched in

this taboo language. It was necessary if the whole theory of the USSR was not to fall by the wayside and the authorities in Moscow were becoming aware of the growing danger of Nazism. 538 191 626

They encouraged the writers, as Tychyna and Rylsky, to write narrative and other poems on themes of the old hostility of the Ukrainians to the Polish nobles and to stress the assistance which, in those ancient days, the Ukrainians had received from the Muscovite authorities. They fanned again the fires of the civil war when the Ukrainian Communists, backed by their Muscovite friends and masters, were warring against the Ukrainian National Republic and Petlyura. 538 626

In fact, during these fantastic years, Tychyna, Rylsky, Yanovsky and similar writers, as well as Korniychuk, found it easier to maintain their freedom by this fanning of Ukrainian chauvinism into flame than did those authors who, following the narrow interpretation of socialist realism, sought to trace the transformations in the contemporary life and the growth of confidence in the Russian ideas of industrialization and collectivization. Again and again these men were called to account for allowing their local and national sympathies to run away with them and to include descriptions which were perhaps nostalgic but which could be twisted in the perverse logic of the NKVD into hidden criticisms of the great Stalin, the leaders of the people, and the all-wise and beneficent rule of Moscow.

By 1939, the situation in the Ukraine had changed entirely from what it had been in 1929 when the first five year plan was getting under way. The salient features of the Ukrainian economic life had been destroyed. Yet Moscow was not yet satisfied. 651

Despite the increased taxation and the reduction in the income of the average dweller on a collective farm, the Communist Party demanded each year a larger part of the grain and of the cash income. The voluntary donations for the benefit of the armed forces were increased and steps were begun to demand taxes in kind from the returns which the peasants received from their individual plots. Thus a peasant was required to contribute so many eggs per year to the government, which did not concern itself as to

651 whether or not that peasant was raising hens. The government demanded its share of the manure from the private cattle and it made no difference as to whether or not the individual raised cattle.

423 685 At the same time[1] the heads of the Communist Party sought high and wide for misuse of state property. Again and again they discovered that on collective farms the administration and the peasants were in agreement that the best way to allow some improvement in the general economic situation was to permit the peasant to cultivate and have the income from a slightly larger plot of land. The increased productivity in this way often more than covered the apparent use of state income from the operations of the farm but to the leaders of the Communist Party this was as severe an offence as was the failure to fulfil obligations, for it dared to question the superiority of the policy of collectivization. During 1939, the Party made strenuous efforts to stop such abuses and they even went further in urging and commanding a reduction in the individual allotments of land, which had been the only means of winning even a grudging approval of the Ukrainian peasants for the idea of collectivization.

Of course, with the outbreak of World War II there came a slight relaxation of this pressure, for Stalin and his friends apparently became aware that an excessive attack upon the peasantry might lead them to make common cause with the opponents of the Soviet Union. Yet, this relaxation of pressure was very slight during the years 1939-1941, when the alliance of Stalin and Hitler seemed to be firm and steady and when the Soviet Union was expanding in accordance with its own powers and its own intrigues. In all this the Ukraine remained aloof, closely guarded against the importation of new ideas and the population dragged on their weary existence, scarcely daring to dream that anything could happen to change their unhappy lot.

1 [1939 -- Analyst]

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

After the expulsion of the Soviet Forces from Western 636
Ukraine in 1920, the territory, including Eastern Galicia and Lviv, 563
had remained under Polish rule and had been subjected to a policy of Polonization and colonization by a Polish population. There had been during the period between the wars many clashes and much unpleasantness between the two nationalities and the ill will thus generated promised disastrous consequences for Poland in case of a new war. At the same time the Polish domination had never threatened the fundamental forms of Ukrainian social life, as had been the case in the UkSSR; the Ukrainians had a certain representation in the Polish Parliament, and they had been allowed, despite hindrances, to develop their own economic life. With the possible exception of the one district of Boryslav, there was very little Communism among the population, who were well aware of the handicaps under which their brothers in the UkSSR were living. At the same time the Nazi refusal to support the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine in the spring of 1939 had placed them on their guard against the Nazis.

Thus, when World War II broke out on September 1, 1939, [661]
the revolt of the Ukrainians which many Poles expected did not [726]
take place. However, the Polish government in the first days arrested and placed in concentration camps many of the Ukrainian leaders but they were freed by the rapid advance of the German forces and the Polish retreat, which forced into Lviv and the neighborhood many thousands of refugees.

On August 23, 1939, when the Nazis and the Soviets signed a 728
non-aggression treaty, it was provided that if Poland were disintegrated, Germany and the USSR would divide the territory

728 roughly along the line of the Narev, the Vistula, and the San. This gave to the USSR the bulk of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian territories included in pre-war Poland and Germany also expressed her disinterest in the fate of Bukovyna and Bessarabia, where there was a Ukrainian population under Rumanian rule.

The collapse of the Polish forces before the German onslaught was so rapid that by September 17, 1939, the city of Lviv was practically in German hands. Then the Soviets, hiding their aggressive designs under the pretext that they were liberating their Ukrainian and Byelorussian brothers from the rule of the Polish lords and capitalists, declared that the Polish government had come to an end and that the Red Army was crossing the Polish border to restore and unite the population with the Soviet republics. At the approach of the Red Armies the Germans withdrew, and Lviv and the old Eastern Galicia remained in Soviet hands.

The Soviet army had advanced with either anti-Polish or anti-capitalist slogans without any opposition, but it was met with little real enthusiasm, for the Western Ukrainians were apprehensive as to what the future might bring. Some of the more openly anti-Communist leaders dropped out of sight or made their way into German-occupied territory. The bulk of the population remained passive, for they remembered the Russian invasion of 1914 and knew what those Ukrainians who had cooperated suffered when the Austro-Hungarian government returned the next year, and they could not believe that this time the Soviets would be any more fortunate.

The first days of the occupation were devoted to a conscious Ukrainization of the territory. The bulk of the population assisted in rounding up of the Polish police and security forces which had made themselves objectionable during the Polish domination, and without any hesitation unfurled the old Ukrainian blue and yellow national flag. The co-operation of the old Ukrainian political leaders was politely rejected but there was a large number of young, educated Ukrainians without special political experience whose aid was welcomed.

ooo The old newspapers ceased at once to appear, but the new

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The old newspapers ceased at once to appear[1] but the new occupants started in all of the main cities new Communist newspapers as the *Free Ukraine* in Lviv and the *Soviet Ukraine* in Stanyslaviv. They allowed also a Communist Polish newspaper the *Red Flag* and a similar paper in Yiddish. 728 [204]

The old officials were at first encouraged to return to their posts, whether they were Polish or not but in a very short time they began to disappear and they were replaced by Ukrainian-speaking persons, some from the neighborhood and some from eastern Ukraine. At almost the same time, while preparations were begun for the proposed plebiscite, the authorities quietly picked up and incarcerated most of the old political leaders, especially those of the UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic League, the representatives of those parties that had sought a normalization of relations with the Poles. [661]

In the same slow and unobstrusive way the Polish police of the different cities were replaced by a "national militia." This was composed of armed groups of young men who more or less volunteered for the work of maintaining order. The Ukrainian and the Jewish organizations tried to bring these self-appointed groups under control but this proved a difficult task for, in many cases, the new Soviet authorities had encouraged some of the more lawless and tumultuous elements to undertake the work so as to profit themselves by the resultant chaos and to facilitate the calling in of their own people. [625]

This era of anxiety on the part of the population and of extreme moderation on the part of the occupying forces lasted for almost a month, while preparations were being made for the election of representatives of all organizations, factories, and groups to a National Assembly for the consideration of reunion with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Meetings were held everywhere, at which attendance was compulsory, and everywhere there was expressed by selected speakers the gratitude of the people for their liberation from the Polish lords and the imperialistic capitalists. Khrushchov and other high functionaries arrived from Kiev to conduct these elections and to superintend the preparation of the lists of delegates. Yet it was almost at once noted that while there 728 666

[1] [1939, Russian occupation of Poland -- Analyst]

728 were a few well-known persons on the various lists of delegates,
666 the vast majority were either completely unknown or were definitely recognized as representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic or of the occupying forces.

The election on October 22[1] was carried on in the regular Bolshevik fashion with no opportunity for any choice of candidates. Over 90% of the people were marshalled to the polls and it was made clear that they had no choice but to approve the selected list. The response was, of course, practically unanimous and the next step was then in order.

728 On October 26[1] the National Assembly met in Lviv. The dele-
[185] gates, acting under definite orders, elected a presidium which included Stalin and the officials of the UkSSR. The first act was to pass a resolution of gratitude to Stalin and the Soviet leaders for their liberation of the country. Then there were a few laudatory speeches and the resolution was adopted to apply for membership in the USSR, to nationalize trade, industry and the banks, to divide the land of the state, the large landowners and the church among the landless and poor peasants, and to send a delegation to Kiev and Moscow to ask for the incorporation.

All this was a cut and dried performance to satisfy the Communist love of paper democracy and to justify their occupation of the country under the guise of liberation. There was no discussion allowed and once again the resolution was accepted unanimously.

On November 1[1] the selected delegation met Stalin, and the Presidium of the USSR in Moscow formally welcomed the liberated brothers and annexed their territory to the UkSSR. It was noteworthy that the action of Moscow completely overshadowed any reception at Kiev but this was only natural in view of the nature of the entire enterprise. There were none of those demonstrations that had marked the union of the two sections in the Ukrainian National Republic in 1919, when the vote and the union represented the will of the people.

Once these formalities had been accomplished, the Soviets felt free to act and, at a steadily increasing tempo, they went through in a few months a refined version of what they had accomplished

[1] [1939 -- Analyst]

in the eastern Ukraine in the course of twenty years. At first their 728
actions were moderate but with the passage of time they began to develop and to reveal those tendencies which had marked their course in the east.

The first task was the reorganization of the country geographically. On September 28,[1] they had come to a new agreement with [648]
the Germans, whereby Germany had given up her claims to Lithuania in return for the area between the San and the Buh Rivers. So the Soviets assigned Wilno and its territory to an independent Lithuania; they annexed the region further south to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the rest to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This left to the Germans four sections of Western Ukraine, Kholmshchyna, Pidlyashshya, Posannya, and Lemkivshchyna, which were included in the Polish Government General and were governed directly by the Nazis, who allowed the appointment of a Ukrainian Central Committee to represent the Ukrainians before the higher authorities, especially in question of relief, etc.

The Soviet territory[2] was divided into six districts with their 728
centres at Lviv, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil, Rivne and 631
Lutsk. Each of these was then divided into rayons or regions with about 25,000 population. The centres of these regions were often small towns but the division was made quite arbitrarily and each centre was amply provided with bureaucratic machinery.

The economic condition of the country was extremely bad and [433]
the only saving feature was that the harvest had already been gathered, so that there was a good chance for a large part of the agricultural population, even of the poor, to survive during the winter. Yet the influx of refugees fleeing before the German advance filled the cities and the severance of connections with the west prevented the arrival of any more manufactured goods or supplies and, of course, none came from the east.

On the contrary, there came a new swarm of Soviet officials who 436
were themselves amazed at the wealth of goods in what, to the natives, seemed impoverished markets. They brought with them liberal sums of money to buy whatever they wished and they were

1 [illegible]
2 [of occupied Poland -- Analyst]

436 the more favored because the Soviets equated in value the Polish zloty and the Soviet karbovanets. When we take into consideration the fact that prior to the war a pound of meat in Poland cost four zloty and in the UkSSR twenty-five to thirty karbovantsy, the vast purchasing power of the Soviet officials can be seen. Then in December,[1] to ruin the native population, they arbitrarily stopped the zloty as legal tender, so that the Ukrainian population lost everything, except those fortunate persons who had succeeded in exchanging their Polish money for German marks by clandestine trade across the border.

191 This swarm of officials was of various kinds. Those who were attached to fields like military affairs, the railroads, the posts and telegraphs, etc., i.e. those branches which were directly under the All-Union Commissariats, made no concealment of the fact that Russian was from now on to be the chief language. Other sections which were under the Commissariats in Kiev first adopted Ukrainian as their official tongue, but by the middle of 1940 they, too, had passed over to the use of Russian, exactly as had been done in all the offices in Kiev.

661 471 By the end of November,[1] when the supplies in the stores were already becoming exhausted, the actual work of nationalization commenced. The former owners were often thrown out, if their establishments had been of any size, and as former wealthy individuals they were refused food tickets and other privileges on the ground that they belonged to the non-laboring element and were enemies of the people. This meant that they were compelled to sell upon the black market everything that they had been able to save or which they possessed and which had not been confiscated, and during the winter many of them, like the Polish landlowners and the police who fell into Communist hands, were deported under atrocious and inhuman conditions to Kazakhstan and Central Asia to disappear.

[665] On the other hand, the Soviets introduced at once the idea of dining halls for the workers and special stores for Communists and higher functionaries where they could secure easily and cheaply whatever there was to be obtained in Western Ukraine.

[1] [1939--Analyst]

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At the same time the nationalization of the land was commenced 423
and this gave a good excuse for the elimination of another class 471
of formerly prosperous people, whether they were Poles or Ukrainians. At first this was carried out along the lines of the Ukrainian land code of 1922, for the authorities were eager to get crops in when spring came. Still, during the summer of 1940 they began to urge the formation of collective farms. The peasants in some of the more backward regions listened to these ideas willingly, but in the better areas where agriculture was on a far higher and more efficient plane than in large sections of eastern Ukraine, they were very cool and meetings had to be postponed again and again if disorders were to be averted in the middle of the war. Still the Soviet authorities felt that they could waste some time until a real peace was restored and their hands were definitely free.

In regard to the educational establishments and all questions 661
of organization, they acted without delay. In the first days of the 814
occupation, the Soviet commissars seized the property of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and prevented all further work by confiscating the building and its contents and preventing all further publications. On January 14, 1940, they forced the complete self-liquidation of the Society. The president, Prof. Rakovsky, at once fled to the west and during the next uncertain months a large part of the active members made their way to Krakow in the Polish Government General, where they endeavored to resume their work. The Society was then turned into a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR and was placed under the control of the administration in Kiev, while part of its collections and its work was placed under the University of Lviv, which was now ostensibly Ukrainianized and given the name of Ivan Franko, the great Western Ukrainian scholar and writer. This was not for long, for very soon here, too, the lecturers to win Soviet approval began to switch over from Ukrainian to Russian.

All other societies of every kind were abolished and fitted into 655
the Soviet scheme of things. The cooperative network, especially such great societies as the Maslosoyuz (Dairy Cooperative Society) and the People's Trade were made governmental organs. Various

655 firms were turned into branches of one commissariat or another. By the spring, while there had not yet been a full communization of the country, the process was well advanced and no resident of Western Ukraine could doubt as to the future of the area.

659 In Eastern Galicia, where the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite was the predominant religion, the Metropolitan Archbishop Andry Sheptytsky was not personally touched.* He was placed under more or less surveillance and found it impossible to exercise his normal activity. However, all the religious schools and seminaries under his charge were closed, the church and monastic lands were seized, and all ecclesiastical printing was suppressed. Finally, the clergy were compelled to hand over to the representatives of the government all the baptismal and other records which were incorporated in the work of the ZATS, the Soviet bureau of vital statistics. The clergy were treated as a non-working class [661] and were thus deprived of all means of livelihood, except for the free-will offerings of their impoverished parishioners.

In the eastern sections, where the Orthodox Church predominated, the same regulations were put into force with the additional proviso that the clergy had to transfer their allegiance from the Polish Orthodox Church to the locum tenens of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow. This was a first step in improving relations between the locum tenens and the Soviet government and in making the authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church a definite instrument of the government in the spreading of Russian Communism.

545 On the other hand, there was a considerable patronage of Ukrainian art. Certain scholars were rather favored. The Ukrainian theatre was supported on a more liberal scale than it had been under the Polish rule and there were in some quarters hopes that there might be a happy future. It was again a short dream, for [626] as 1940 came to a close, there began again the insistant but unobtrusive attempts at russification. Russian theatrical companies began to visit Lviv and other cities. The publications of the publishing firms of Lviv fell off and once more they found it necessary 000 to produce Russian books. The libraries were carefully purged of

1 [1940 -- under Russian occupation -- Analyst]

The libraries were carefully purged of
those authors who had fallen under the displeasure of Moscow 538
during the crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance and their works 626
were forbidden, just as in Eastern Ukraine. The books that were sent from Kiev were chiefly in Russian. Furthermore, those authors, poets, and artists who were still in Western Ukraine now found themselves regimented. They were given elaborate projects but they found that their success depended upon their ability not to express themselves freely but to satisfy the demands of the Soviet authorities. As a result many of them endeavored to get, in one way or another, to the west where even if they were under Nazi rule they still had more possibilities at the time than they did under the highly organized system sponsored by Moscow.

It was thus abundantly evident that the "liberation" of Western 661
Ukraine was but the exchange of one master for a still sterner rule. The realization of this fact came quickly and it very soon evoked a corresponding reaction which began to unite the entire population, the more so as even those few Communists in Western Ukraine who had remained true to their convictions were now seized by the Soviet authorities and punished on the ground that they were Trotskyists or were believers in one of the various deviations from the general line of the party. There were to be no Communists except those who had passed through the Soviet training school and those people who had believed that their Communist faith would be of profit to them found themselves in as wretched a position as had Eastern Ukrainian Communists like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk who had gained nothing by their independence, except death and destruction.

Thus, by the spring of 1941 conditions in Western Ukraine were rapidly assuming the same form that they had taken in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Any hopes that there would be any exception or any toleration for the area were once and for all annihilated when the Soviets attacked Finland and, still more, when, in the summer of 1940, they absorbed and turned into Soviet Republics the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Soviets were shown clearly to be on the march and it was for the people to protect themselves as best they could.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

The Western Ukrainian Reaction

000 To appreciate the next step in the relations between the Western Ukrainians and the Soviets, it is necessary to go back and look briefly at the conditions that existed under Polish rule. The two peoples were distinctly hostile but their relations were very different from those between the Eastern Ukrainians and the Russians.

563 The old Austro-Hungarian Empire, unlike the Russian, had not denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, even though it had not favored their development save as a counterbalance to the Poles in Eastern Galicia. Yet there was a considerable number of Western Ukrainians who had been trained to fill the lower offices in the old Hapsburg system. They had the right of voting for the provincial diets and when the Hapsburg Empire disintegrated, they immediately voted for the establishment of a Western Ukrainian Republic. When this failed to establish itself and to win recognition by the Western powers and the League of Nations, the vast majority of the Western Ukrainians under the leadership of the UNDO voted for representatives to the Polish Parliament and continued the struggle in a legal and parliamentary manner to win rights for themselves.

668 A minority which was finally organized into the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Col. Evhen Konovalets continued the illegal and revolutionary struggle through sabotage and terroristic attacks on outstanding anti-Ukrainian Poles. It was in vain that the Polish government endeavored to suppress this group by the forced pacification of Eastern Galicia and by other violent tactics and, after the murder of Colonel Konovalets, his place was taken by Colonel Melnyk.

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Ukraine Under the Soviets

668 In 1932, in connection with the suppression of the Ukrainians in the UkSSR, the claim was advanced that the OUN had commenced work in eastern Ukrainian territory. However that might be, the small group continued to operate in Poland. It trained young men in secret military organizations, in operating without detection, and in undercover political education. In this work it was opposed and imitated by some of the legal political bodies, usually of a more leftist but still anti-Communist type, which likewise prepared their own cadres of semi-trained men who would be ready to act, if need arose.

The events of 1939, with the rise and fall of the independent Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine, won many adherents to these groups and organizations, and after the outbreak of the war and the occupation of Western Ukraine by the Communists, the latter advertised their existence by their talk of an active Ukrainian underground.

With the first months of the occupation the network of these groups spread throughout the country but even under these conditions there was little or no cooperation between them and similar Polish groups which persisted in maintaining the Polish supremacy and waited only for the Soviet defeat to reassert their hegemony in the area. Some of the leaders went abroad and there was considerable confusion aroused in their ranks but, by the spring of 1940, when the full weight of the Soviet changes was beginning to be felt by the population, the attitude changed toward these groups and they began to be looked upon as the leaders of the Ukrainians who objected to the introduction of the Communist regime.

The general turmoil that existed with anti-Nazis fleeing to the east, the outstanding Ukrainians trying to get to the west, the sending of members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to the villages as teachers and the general disorganization, gave them relatively good conditions for developing and making their principles and knowledge available to the villagers. These were made aware of the fact that any opposition to the new regime would be instantly punished and as their normal pre-war life was now converted into

a criminal existence, they showed themselves more ready to co- 668
operate.

Unfortunately, during this preliminary period discord broke out [578]
in the OUN. One faction under Stepan Bandera objected to the leadership of Colonel Melnyk and demanded the change of several prominent leaders. When this was refused, a split came in the organization with Melnyk at the head of one faction and Bandera in control of the other. It is very possible that this split was the result of German intrigue to prevent the formation of a strong Ukrainian movement but it had the result of weakening it, even though both Bandera and Melnyk fell into German hands and were imprisoned during the rest of the war. Their followers continued and intensified the feud and even came to armed clashes.

Both factions of the OUN and similar groups strengthened themselves first along the borders and commenced to smuggle arms and ammunition from the west, so as to be prepared to act in case there came an armed clash between Germany and the USSR. Then, as the months passed, the network extended further into the country and the OUN became organized on a territorial basis under a Country Executive and the Country Leader, who were assisted by expert advisers on military affairs and propaganda.

While the two imperialistic powers were still friends, there was little possibility for open sabotage. The chief work of the Ukrainian patriotic underground was the spreading of the national spirit, the encouraging of the spirits of the oppressed, and the secret education of the masses in the hope of later action. They sought to counterbalance the Soviet propaganda and their efforts to enlist the young people in the Komsomols and train them as Communists. They worked upon some of the eastern Ukrainians who were moved by the Soviet regime to the west and they brought it about that some of these remained behind and joined their ranks when the break finally came in 1941.

Despite the efforts of the leaders to hold their followers in check, they were not always successful for some of the younger members were so enraged by the Bolshevik tactics that they could not be restrained from attempting individual acts of reprisal. These

668 usually failed and involved not only the punishment of numbers of the innocent but also called the attention of the Communist leaders to the existence of the organizations and made them more vigilant in tracking down suspects.

Some of the members, to secure more adequate military training, even enlisted in the Red Army, sometimes with the approval of the heads of the underground but this proved an expensive process, for the alerted Communists usually moved these candidates for training well to the east where they would be harmless in case of a general conflict. Numbers of them were sent to the Bashkir ASSR and to the central Russian areas.

By the spring of 1941 there were many members of these underground associations hiding in the forests of Eastern Galicia and Volynia and the Soviets sent out armed detachments to pursue them and to locate the caches of arms which they had not only smuggled in but had taken from the Poles during the last days of the Polish opposition and which they had seized from small and often unsuspecting Soviet detachments. These searches often resulted in armed clashes in which the Red forces often emerged victorious, thanks to the ever greater numbers of soldiers who were assigned to them.

The work of the courriers between the different units and sections became more arduous and dangerous as the Soviets tightened their control over the population and strengthened the border guards on one pretext or another. What had once been a relatively open border, the area between Sokal and Turka, was now guarded by barbed wire and the Ukrainian population, which was suspected of complicity with the underground, was removed.

In the same way, the Soviets prepared one device after another to attack the Executive of this underground movement. They succeeded three times in capturing and trying many of the leading members and in the spring of 1941 they were starting a fourth trial in which they hoped to assert their power and to crush the movement finally. Yet, their plans for this were finally upset by the opening of hostilities between Germany and the USSR.

It was no easy task to organize this movement under the very

eyes of a ruthless invader. Many of the agents who were engaged 668
in it fell into the enemy hands and were executed ruthlessly. It was still harder to bring together the groups that were working for the various Ukrainian parties and to arouse them to a realization that, in the face of the threat from the east, those differences which had seemed so important during the parliamentary struggle against the Poles were to be forgotten in the face of the common danger to all those things which the various parties had in common. Yet they persevered despite heavy losses and by the spring of 1941, while their position still seemed hopeless, they had succeeded in creating a nucleus of organized opposition to Soviet rule which was really widespread and had some repercussions in the ranks of the Red Army, especially among the eastern Ukrainians and some of the other non-Russians who had been mobilized and sent for service in the area.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

The Soviets and the Ukrainians in Rumania

648 563 The agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union[1] had stated that the former was not interested in the fate of Bukovyna and Bessarabia, both of which contained a large Ukrainian population. It was therefore obvious that once the Soviet hands were freed from the Soviet-Finnish war, they would endeavor to acquire these additional territories.

In both Bukovyna and Bessarabia the Ukrainian cause had been less developed, although there had been far more work in Bukovyna than in Bessarabia, which had been under Russian rule. The Ukrainian uprising in Chernivtsy had not been successful in 1918 and when the territory was added to Rumania, that country put a stop to all Ukrainian work, including education although a Ukrainian theatre had developed and there was considerable secret work being done.

As a result, there was a sense of stagnation which was very different from the situation in the lands under Poland. There was less sense of coordination and when in June, 1940, the Soviets requested Rumania to hand over the new provinces, Rumania had only to submit. Most of Bukovyna and the part of Bessarabia inhabited by Ukrainians were annexed to the UkSSR. The rest of Bessarabia was added to the Moldavian ASSR, which was later raised to the dignity of a Union Republic and intended for propaganda use against Rumania.

648 631 The Soviet policy was then much the same as it had been in the area taken over from Poland. There was the same amount of propaganda declaring the "liberation" of the country from the Rumanian nobles and from international capitalism. There was

1 [1939--Analyst]

[164 blank]

648 the same voting for annexation to the USSR, the same enthusiastic
631 reception in Moscow, and the same process of nationalization, of the arrest of outstanding figures, and the same destruction of the established forms of life in both areas.

The Soviets were, however, less advanced in these provinces for the application of their system required time and their stay in the area was eight months less than it was in the territory taken from Poland.

The anti-Communist leaders fled either into Rumania proper
[668] or Germany or made their way to the Polish Government General in Krakow. On the other hand, despite the attempts to seal off the country, the OUN found ways of extending its influence into Bukovyna and appealed to the more alert classes of the population.

In general the Ukrainians in these two areas formed rather a
563 secluded enclave in the general mass of Ukrainian history and they did not play a role in proportion to their numbers. They thus scarcely enter into the account, although for a while, in 1941, there was organized a force of some 2,000 who sought to impede the Rumanian return to the country. Yet, their opposition was fruitless and when they endeavored to cut their way out, they were either destroyed by the Germans or dispersed.

CHAPTER TWENTY

The German Attack on the Soviets

During the period from 1939 to 1941, the German 648
policy toward those Ukrainians who had escaped from the Soviet 563
occupation into the Polish Government General was not too severe. It was possible for the Ukrainians in Krakow and elsewhere to carry on a considerable amount of educational work, to form themselves into relief organizations and, in general, to work for the establishment of normal relations.

When the breach between the two totalitarian states came on 721
June 22, 1941, the Germans pushed ahead rapidly not only in the Baltic area but also in Ukraine. By June 30, they had occupied Lviv with the aid of some Ukrainian units, both from Carpatho-Ukraine and from Galicia.

During these days the Ukrainians had high hopes that the Germans would seriously liberate them from Bolshevik tyranny and wherever they had the slightest possibility, they endeavored to seize the cities so as to put a stop to the massacres which the Communists were perpetrating before they fell back. In some places they were successful but in Lviv, the Communists killed over [661]
10,000 prisoners, before their bloody regime could be brought to an end.

In the first days of the war, although there were no clear 642
promises made to the Ukrainians, the impression grew that there would be established some form of a Ukrainian administration. The political leaders set up a Ukrainian government and appointed Yaroslav Stetsko as the first head of the state on June 30, 1941. A short time later this was broadened by the appointment of a Committee of Seniors under the leadership of Dr. Kost Levytsky, who had been the Prime Minister of the Republic of Western

642 Ukraine in 1918. These developments had the support of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, although he knew that they did not yet rest on organized public sentiment.

It was well recognized by the influential Ukrainians that the situation was very different from what it had been at the end of the Hapsburg monarchy, but they went through the motions of setting up a government on the possibility that the Germans would allow them some real concessions and that it would be mutually advantageous to be already prepared for all eventualities.

721 648 It is perhaps possible that a part of the German armed forces looked with a certain toleration at these developments, for at least a part of the officer class realized that the task of the German government would be greatly facilitated, if they were able to normalize the situation and win some support from the population, as they had in the Polish Government General. This did not suit the Nazi element who believed that the advance of the German [661] forces was only to secure more *Lebensraum* for Germany. This faction struck and struck hard at the new regime and secured the arrest of Stetsko, Levytsky, Bandera and Melnyk, all of whom were taken to prison in Germany where they were kept for nearly four years.

The arrest of the leaders, while it was a crushing blow, still was not completely fatal. The advance of the German troops was so rapid on the way to Kiev that the Ukrainian leaders continued for some months to inspire the population not to resist the Germans, the more so as the western regiments of the Red Army surrendered in large masses. Thus when Kiev fell, some 675,000 of the Red Army surrendered with scarcely a blow.

On the other hand, the Soviets attempted to devastate the country before they withdrew, shooting the Ukrainian intelligentsia indiscriminately and trying to seize as many as they could for evacuation beyond the Urals. They demolished factories, tried to remove finished articles and mined the cities before they abandoned them. Then, when they exploded the mines, they spread the story that the total work of demolition had been carried on by the Germans.

On August 1, the Germans made a new division of the country 648
and assigned the whole of Galicia to the Polish Government General. 727
At the same time they returned Bukovyna and Bessarabia to Rumania and then set up a new section around Odesa under the name of Transdnistria which they likewise placed under Rumania. It was in vain that the Ukrainians who tried to organize their own national rada in Kiev protested against such actions, for their protests were not received and the Nazis went on with their policy of ignoring all the wishes of the population.

Later in the month, the Germans established the Reichskom- 727
missariat of Ukraine and placed it under the control of a fanatical 661
Nazi, Erich Koch, who set himself during the next years to crush anything and everything that was done to aid the Ukrainians and to win for himself the detested title of the butcher of Ukraine.

In the early months of the German occupation and especially [727]
during the period of rapid military movements, much was done for the rebuilding of the country after the ravages of the Bolsheviks. Nearly 115 Ukrainian newspapers were established, plans were made for the opening of schools and during the transition from the military rule to the rule of Koch, the Ukrainian agents were in the front ranks of the German army, spreading their propaganda and trying to rouse the population against the Bolsheviks.

Yet this work did not please the Germans. Everywhere in eastern Europe the old governments that had been suppressed by the Bolsheviks tried to recreate themselves but everywhere there came the arrests of these leaders and their deportation, so that it was not many months before the sober thought of the liberated peoples turned against the new occupants and the people realized that their hopes were going to be in vain. By the end of 1941, it had been made clear to them that there would be no relaxation of the pressure exerted upon them.

In the Reichskommissariat which, in fact, represented little more than the right bank of the Dnieper area, for the army retained the control over the regions to the east of the river, it speedily became impossible for the Ukrainians to improve their own condition. The Germans were guided by a strictly logical program.

727 661 [241] Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

[538] [466] By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

668 These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba—Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

668 725 This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

menacing their lines of communication and rescuing young Ukrainians who were being deported for labor service in Germany. It was during this year that the leaders came to feel the need for closer cooperation and a unification of their efforts. This was hard to achieve and there were even clashes between different groups of Ukrainian patriots. Yet, toward the beginning of 1943 the more important groups had effected a rough union in the U. P. A., the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which took on the characteristics of an organized military force. 668 725

By the middle of 1943 this army had acquired considerable strength and it was able to deal shattering blows to isolated German detachments and to drive out both the local German administration and any Red partisans that tried to operate in the area around the Pripet marshes. In May, 1943, they were even strong enough to ambush and kill the head of the Nazi S. A., Viktor Lutze, in the neighborhood of Kowel-Brest Litovsk.

The policy of the U. P. A. was to destroy the local German administrations which were scattered in the smaller communities and to avoid battle with the greater concentration of forces in some of the leading centres. In this way the Ukrainians were able to take over the practical administration of large parts of the Ukraine and to restore a considerable amount of normal life, while they checked the deportation of thousands or released them from the slave trains. The U. P. A. during these years had its own training schools, it set up on a small scale its own factories for arms and some of the most necessary manufactures, and it governed with the approval of the Ukrainian population.

At this period it had its own printing presses and put out a large number of journals and books of various kinds. These were not only in Ukrainian but, as the U. P. A. grew in size and strength, it attracted the attention and won the sympathies of all the other nations oppressed by the Russians. It formed units of [648] Byelorussians, Azerbaijanians, Uzbeks, etc. and finally on November 21, 1944, it called the First Conference of the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia, which was attended by some thirty-nine delegates representing thirteen peoples. The Germans

668 tried to break this up but they were unsuccessful and the police
725 battalion which was assigned to the operation was destroyed. Out of this Conference developed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations which adopted as its program, "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual."

[701] It would take too long to describe the actual nature of the military operations which the U. P. A. carried on. At the height of its power it controlled more than 200,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory and numbered some 220,000 soldiers divided into four main bands: the U. P. A. North, operating in Polissya and northern Volynia; the U. P. A.—West in Eastern Galicia and Kholmshchyna; the U. P. A. —South in northern Bukovyna and the provinces of Kamyanets Podilsky and Vinnytsya; and the U. P. A.—East north of Kiev and Zhytomyr. There were separate detachments in most of the cities and important towns.

[661] To oppose its operations, the Germans resorted to mass executions and on more than one occasion detached forces of one or two divisions to try to destroy its centres. These attempts failed and the U. P. A. by its constant efforts played an important part in isolating the German forces, upsetting their communications and sapping their strength. All this was very costly, for after every major blow the Germans executed large numbers of innocent Ukrainians as their one weapon against the movement.

At first there was relative peace in Galicia, but in the summer of 1943 a Soviet partisan detachment entered the province. The Germans took little action and the U. P. A. came to the support of the population and soon had established strong centres in the Carpathian Mountains, where the difficult terrain facilitated their maintenance of strong positions.

[727] The Germans in the beginning did not want to admit that their policy toward the Ukrainians had evoked such a strong response. Koch and his associates were only too willing to believe that the Ukrainians were an inferior race, undeserving of education or of consideration and they went out of their way to label the U. P. A. the product of Communist intrigue and a movement of support for the Jews, etc.

In general, the military unification of the armed groups proceeded more rapidly and favorably than did the political concentration. Here the followers of Bandera established in March, 1944, a temporary committee and at a general assembly in June appointed a Supreme Council of Ukrainian Liberation (the UHVR) which assumed the functions of a government. At the same time, through the agreement of the representatives of the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev, the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv and the National Council of Carpatho-Ukraine, there was formed in September in Kiev the All-Ukrainian National Council (rada) which appointed as its president Prof. Mykola Velychkivsky, the Rector of the Kiev Poytechnic. This was rather under the control of the Melnykivtsy, and was opposed to the UHVR. Yet these differences tended to become academic, in view of the strengthened position of General Taras Chuprynka, the commander of the U. P. A. 668 725

The opposition of the U. P. A. to the German forces was therefore in a sense an opposition behind the lines. It had been facilitated by the German tendency to base their hold on the country through various strong points, while their main forces were advancing to the east and fighting against the Red Army. With the German defeat at Stalingrad in the RSFSR, they began a new retreat and this brought the Soviet forces back into the picture and placed new burdens upon the U. P. A.

In Galicia there had been formed with German toleration a regular Ukrainian division, the Galician Division, on the condition that it would only be employed against the Bolsheviks and would be maintained as a distinct unit. Yet the Germans had no intention of allowing this division to gather strength. They soon replaced the higher officers with Germans and officially called it the 14 Waffen Grenadier Division der Waffen SS., even though in no other case were Slavs of any kind assigned to the SS. This division took part in some battles with the Bolsheviks in the Carpathians. With the breaking of the German front, the German military men made renewed efforts to enroll this division and to create other units in a regular Ukrainian army under General Shandruk but 721

721 it was already too late. There had been too much bad blood created during the earlier years when the Nazi commanders expressed their contempt for everything Ukrainian to accomplish anything in the hour of German defeat. Germany had lost her chance and in the last days of the war, the Galician Division made its way to the west, surrendered, and was interned in Italy.

000 The development of the U. P. A., with its constant warfare against the Germans, was a clear result of the German fantastic attitude, with all of its arrogance. Had they been willing to cooperate in the first days of 1941, they might easily have secured considerable resources in men and supplies from these people who had been suffering under the Bolsheviks. They avoided any such action and it was their own stubbornness that kept them from receiving the help which they might have had. For years they did not want any assistance from the Slavs and by the time that they had learned their lesson the war was so nearly over that they could not profit.

Yet the German defeat did not produce peace. No one of the Ukrainians doubted that the receding of the German wave would produce a new Soviet invasion and as the Germans retired to the west, the U. P. A. and its associated organs prepared for a new struggle.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

The Return of the Communists

The struggle of the U. P. A. against the returning Communists was no less bitter than the struggle with the Nazis but it was under very different conditions and the forces involved were more unequal. In the first place, the bulk of the fighting came after the conclusion of the hostilities of World War II and at a time when the Sovietophilism of the Western democratic powers was at its height. 725 668

The Nazis were during the entire period engaged with the Soviet forces beyond the borders of the Ukraine and while they attempted to maintain their position in the Ukraine, they frequently counted upon their ability to hold the chief road junctions and communities and exerted less effort to keep their garrisons in every separate village. The Soviet policy was to master the entire country and subject every aspect of Ukrainian life to their own power and control. They could therefore the more easily rely upon the use of overwhelming forces and endeavor to maintain a steady and never-ending pressure, while at the same time they could invoke every weapon in their propaganda arsenal to blacken their opponents in the mind of the democratic world.

Then, too, with the ending of formal hostilities there was no longer the possibility that the U. P. A. by its attacks upon one of its enemies could secure the weapons that would serve it in good stead against the other. This had been a marked feature of the earlier campaigns, for the Soviets had reconquered Kharkiv in the late fall of 1942, only to lose it in early 1943 and to recover it again later in the year. The Red Army recovered Kiev on November 6. In the spring of 1944 the Germans were forced to evacuate Lviv but they recovered the city and held it until the end

725 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A.
668 had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrain-
[208] ians were loyal to the Soviet Union. This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided
[186] to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army.

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

[651] The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West.

728 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of
648 the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

in 1939, now received a new master. As soon as the Soviet forces 728
entered the region in the autumn of 1944, they immediately began 648
a campaign to liberate this area from Czecho-Slovakia and reunite it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was the same old story carried on in the same way as in 1939. There was a mass of petitions apparently prepared by the native population asking for liberation, but these were in reality the work of a handful of carefully selected Communists.

They speedily reached their goal and on June 29, 1945, President Benes of Czechoslovakia recognized the justice of their claims and by an agreement handed over the entire province which was duly reunited with their brothers in Moscow. This brought together under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic nearly all the Ukrainians, except a few who were still living in Poland and in a small stretch of territory which the UkSSR voluntarily ceded to Poland to satisfy the increasing claims of the Polish Communists and their needs in their efforts to cement their power in that state.

At the same time the realization by the Soviet authorities of the seriousness of the situation offered by the U. P. A. and the unrest among the Ukrainians led them to act on both the foreign and the domestic front. On the former they mobilized all of their [208]
friends and dupes abroad to stress the connection of the U. P. A., [725]
the "Bandera bandits," and the Nazi criminals and they achieved considerable success in closing the eyes of the west until they had won considerable victories over the various U. P. A. groups, for too many Western leaders failed to see the inconsistency that they preached. At one and the same time the Soviet authorities boasted of their complete control of the territory of Western Ukraine, thanks to the love of the population for the Red Army and in almost the same breath they declaimed against these armed forces which were holding up the advance of the Red Army and the NKVD in the very areas where the people were thirsting for liberation.

On the domestic front in the autumn of 1945 they sent a large 661
force of men into the Carpathian area under the command of 668
Khrushchov as Premier of the UkSSR and General Ryasny, the 725

661 Minister of War, to endeavor to suppress these bands. Despite
668 unprecedented torture of the population, the Soviets found that
725 their progress was not so great as they had expected, for few of the Ukrainian units in their forces were enthusiastic about the campaign, when they saw the measures that the government was taking against their own families.

In the spring of 1946, they made another attempt, this time using some fifteen divisions of NKVD troops from the Far East, Siberia and Leningrad under the direct control of General Colonel Moskalenko. The authorities had been goaded to this renewed demonstration of force by the fact that the town of Stanislav in the Carpathian area had been seized by five battalions of the U. P. A. on October 31, 1945 as a discouragement to the Ukrainians to participate in the Soviet elections called for February 10, 1946. Despite the efforts of the Soviet guards, a considerable portion of the population failed to vote and when the attacks upon them were pressed, a detachment of the U. P. A. succeeded on May 3, 1946, in ambushing Moskalenko and killing him and his chief aids. This ended another campaign and still left the U. P. A. in control of parts of the Carpathian area.

668 In addition to these operations on purely Ukrainian territory,
725 the U. P. A. undertook several raids across the borders in order to encourage dissatisfaction with Soviet rule among some of the neighboring peoples. Thus they established contact with similar groups in Slovakia, Byelorussia and Lithuania, while others cut their way across Hungary into Yugoslavia to join forces with the opponents of Communism in that area.

The raids into Slovakia were especially successful throughout 1945 and 1946 and were continued on a smaller scale during the next years. They served as an encouragement for the anti-Communist elements of the population and, of far more importance in the long run, they attracted the attention of Western journalists who for the first time began to realize the extent of the discontent that prevailed in the Soviet Union. More than that, with every step to the West, they were brought closer to the Western Zones of Germany and Austria and several well-armed detachments have

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during the past years fought their way into the American Zone, laid down their arms and surrendered. These brought the first really definite information to the West and while they have not received the attention that they deserved, they have undoubtedly encouraged the almost frantic desires of the Great Russian emigrés to pretend that they have an efficient underground operating at home.

The result of these raids produced an impression even upon the Czechs. Before the Communist coup d'état which placed the Communists in control of that country, the Czech Minister of War under Dr. Benes was approached by the Soviet authorities and asked for joint action with the Soviets and the Communist Poles to check the opposition to Soviet rule and to project joint operations on a large scale.

On March 29, 1947, General W. Swierszczewski, the Communist Polish Vice Minister of War, was killed near the town of Baligrod. This again was too startling a revelation of the discontent and on May 12th of the same year, the three governments of the USSR, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia concluded a treaty of mutual assistance against this movement.

Faced by the increasingly organized power of the Communist regimes, the U. P. A. has been obliged to proceed with more caution and it has largely replaced mass movements with operations on a smaller scale with the idea of keeping alive a spirit of resistance within the country. It is becoming increasingly difficult for it to publish and circulate pamphlets but it is still able, in case of necessity, to impede seriously the Soviet attempts at deportation of the Ukrainian population and again and again it is able to damage severely the Motor Tractor Stations.

On March 5, 1950, General Chuprynka, the commander of the U. P. A., was tracked down and killed in the village of Bilohorska in the very neighborhood of Lviv. He had proved himself a more than competent leader and had been the soul of the U. P. A. since its foundation in 1943. His parents, his wife and his children had all perished in the struggle but he had never wavered in his belief in a final victory and he had become an almost legendary figure.

668 His death did not end the fighting, for he was succeeded in
735 command by Colonel Vasyl Koval. Even operations were not suspended, for it is known that late in September of the same year, a detachment of the forces seized the town of Mukachiv in the Carpathians and retired to the mountains with the records of the MVD office there and two prisoners who had made themselves particularly obnoxious by their cruelty and their abuse of the local population.

Thus under the present circumstances the primary task of the U. P. A. is to maintain itself in being as an armed underground, to encourage the population, both of the Ukraine and the other groups oppressed by the Russian Communists, and to carry on certain types of propaganda and of terroristic work which will serve to keep on the anxious seat the masters of the Kremlin. At the moment it does not have the possibility of undertaking by itself those extensive operations that it has done in the past but it is not idle and in the well-hidden bunkers and the forests, it is fostering those traditions which can be again galvanized into activity, if the moment for action arrives.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Soviet Ukraine During World War II

In the preceding chapters we have briefly traced the efforts 722
of the Ukrainians to profit by the clash between the two totalitarian 661
powers of Germany and the USSR and the Ukrainian hopes of 538
being recognized as an independent state. These hopes had been thwarted by the Nazi refusal to treat the Ukraine as anything except a field for German expansion and the Western refusal to recognize the Ukrainian struggle for independence.

This, of course, does not tell the entire story. From the earliest days of the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine, many of the leading Ukrainian patriots, writers, artists and scholars, including a large part of the staff of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in [814]
Lviv, had seized the opportunity to retire to the west into the Polish Government General but there were many more who were picked up in the early deportations and deposited along with the Poles in Central Asia. Some of these, during the brief period of friendship between the Poles and the Soviets, were again able to make their way to the west along with General Anders and found themselves again at freedom, while those who had retired to the west were forced to undergo increasing persecution at the hands of the Nazis as these became more desperate.

On the other hand, when the break finally came in 1941 and the Ukrainians, including those mobilized in the Red Army, began to surrender in masses, the Soviets began to deport to the east all of the outstanding people on whom they could lay their hands and whom at the first moment they did not wish to exterminate. In this number there were such Ukrainian writers as Tychyna, Rylsky and others who had showed their loyalty to the regime by their tasteless flattery of the regime in Moscow.

722 In the same way, the authorities gathered up in frenzied haste machinery, finished products, and records and started them likewise to the east with the hope of setting them up somewhere in a safe place and using them to increase the Soviet war potential. All this was a hurried and confused process, for it was contradicted by the Soviet orders to reduce the Ukraine to a heap of ruins and to leave nothing available for the invaders.

[814] [661] The clash between these two ideas was vividly reflected in the destruction of Kiev. Some sections of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR were hurriedly packed on trains and moved to Ufa. Other sections for little better reasons were abandoned in the general confusion or were mined for immediate destruction. Priceless books and records, no less than boilers and lathes, shared the two fates, while Kiev, thoroughly mined, was exploded and set on fire without regard for the needs of the people. The Soviet authorities, well aware that they could not evacuate the entire population, destroyed the food supplies of those who were left behind while other detachments massacred the helpless population indiscriminately.

The situation at Kharkiv and Odesa was far better and far more logical for the Soviets had a few days longer to sort out what they wished to remove and what they wanted to destroy, but even in these places there was the same wanton destruction which conflicted with the avowed aims of the Soviet authorities.

Then ensued a series of mutual recriminations, and it is still not clear in regard to many buildings and institutions whether the bulk of the damage and the losses were caused by Nazi or by Communist actions. Some 3500 carloads of machinery were shipped alone from the city of Zaporyzhzhya and most of this material was packed at night in utter darkness with no special care as to where it was being sent.

[466] The same situation confronted the workers, some 5,000,000 of whom were evacuated from the Ukraine and landed in rough factories that were hastily erected somewhere in Asia. These sometimes lacked even roofs and means of heating when the mercury dropped to 45° below zero.

Under such conditions, if the chaos and the disorder were not 722
to be allowed to spread further, it was obvious that something had to be done to improve the morale of the population. This was particularly evident and necessary during the early months when it seemed as if the Nazis might decide to make some concessions to the people. As a result, there were a series of developments undertaken which superficially, at least, offered some concessions to the spirit of the various non-Russian nationalities.

Thus, in 1943 the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR was [814]
allowed to celebrate its twenty fifth anniversary at Ufa in the Bashkir Autonomous Republic and to list its institutes which were scattered throughout Asia. Such an event rendered it possible to blame the Nazis for the destruction of what had not been evacuated. It furnished good propaganda for the Western powers who were already sending copious supplies to the USSR and receiving in return from it only condemnation and criticism.

In the same way, the various writers who had passed the 722
approval of the government were assigned posts as newspaper 538
correspondents in the Red Army where they could sing the praises 626
of Stalin. Yet, at the same time, they were encouraged to write articles and poems which would reflect the hostility to the Nazis and again and again the censorship was relaxed for men like Sosyura to write poems in praise of the Ukraine, of its past, its present and its future.

Others like Yanovsky and Bazhan were allowed to emphasize [198]
the separation between the traditional Ukrainian speech and the
jargon that had been put out in the various Ukrainian-Russian [814]
dictionaries after the breaking of the Ukrainian Renaissance. They were allowed to assemble collaborators to compile a more conservative dictionary and to revamp the system of orthography which had been the work of such pronounced Russian sympathizers as Khvylya during the preceding period.

Yet, these concessions were more apparent than real, for under 722
the wartime conditions, those Ukrainian scholars that had the 814
apparent confidence of the government were scattered far and wide. They were living perforce under abnormal conditions and

722 no efforts were made to bring them together or to conduct a
814 revival of the Ukrainian work that had been so ruthlessly and needlessly shattered. It was a wartime device adopted for a passing situation and the masters in the Kremlin well understood that the fury of the war had done more than they had ever dreamed possible for the disintegration of the various Soviet Republics. Once, therefore, the evacuation had taken place, the Soviet leaders had only to sit by and to reap the profits. There would be plenty of time for that later and so the war years seemed an intermission in the relentless pressure that had been exerted in the past.

648 It was for the Soviet leaders a far more vital problem to
661 recover the masses of the people who had fled to the west or had
[167] been carried away by the Germans and who might, even in case of a victory of the democratic powers, reveal the full force of the Soviet pressure. That was why they welcomed the Yalta Agreement which provided for the compulsory return to the USSR of all refugees and deported persons and why, once peace was restored, they showed such devilish ingenuity in trying to recover the control of every one who could testify from personal experience as to the nature of the Soviet rule.

It was with the greatest surprise and lack of comprehension that the Western leaders became aware of this situation. They had listened eagerly to the Soviet siren songs that it was only Nazi sympathizers and criminals and traitors who did not want to return under the Soviet rule and it required some months before supposedly serious statesmen recovered their equilibrium sufficiently to understand the way in which they had been duped in the middle of the war.

Yet, no sooner had Soviet rule been reestablished than the old processes were revived with even greater energy and vigor. The last masks of independence or of free thought in the cultural or economic fields were torn away and the old persecution and charges were pressed with every increasing zeal.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Ukraine After World War II

At the conclusion of World War II, Stalin and the officials 000
of the USSR were ready for the next step. They had satisfactorily fooled the Western powers, they had entered the UkSSR and the Byelorussian SSR in the United Nations and they had secured from the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the British Commonwealth of Nations the right to return (by force, if necessary) persons with USSR citizenship. They had decorated the Allied leaders with medals commemorating the Russian conquerors of the past and they were ready to move ahead. They were sure that no one would care to ask about the fate of the unfortunate victims of the German slave camps because every American and Western civil or military authority of high rank had become convinced of the humaneness of Stalin and his group.

The Ukraine had been thoroughly devastated, as we have seen. 433
Its factories and its fields had been laid waste. That part of its 642
machinery which had not been wantonly destroyed by one of the 727
two contesting invaders had been carted to work outside of the UkSSR. But even so, Ukraine was not quiet.

The population, even that part which had been more favorably disposed to the Soviets because of the persecution by the Nazis, had hoped that with the return of peace and the Soviet victory there might be an improvement in living conditions, an increase of consumer goods, a relaxation of some of the austerity that had marked the years before 1941. They were almost at once to be disillusioned, for they very soon found that out of the scanty stores of food which they had preserved from the greedy Nazis they were supposed to make generous gifts for the benefit of Stalin and the elder

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.
727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "warmongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representa-
[701] tive in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

Western world, the Soviet Union conferred upon the Ukrainian 631
Soviet Republic the right to have its own anthem and its own 648
national flag.

These actions were not to be interpreted as a concession from Moscow, although they were presented in that guise. They were rather intended to strengthen the Soviet position in international affairs and by an appearance of generosity to facilitate the reduction of the satellite states to the same position as that held by the Union Republics. In this sense they were a response to the centralizing tendencies which were now to be expressed in a still stronger form.

As soon as hostilities ended and even before the Soviets were 665
assured of all their hopes, they began to purge again the Ukrainian 661
Communist Party and within a few months some 38% of the high officials were removed on the ground of bourgeois nationalism. All those who had not retreated to the east or could not show that they were working throughout the war as zealous Soviet partisans were summarily exiled as bourgeois nationalists. In the same way, when the enforced return of displaced persons began under the Yalta Agreement, very few were allowed to return to their homes. The vast majority were either executed for surrendering to the Germans or were sent to the labor camps in the far north and east for reeducation.

The Fourth Five Year Plan which was commenced in 1946 727
was very definitely devoted to the restoration of the country after the ravages of the war and to the increase of the Soviet capacity for defense. It was only in Ukraine and Byelorussia that the restoration had to absorb the energies of a considerable majority of the population, for while there were areas in the neighborhood of Leningrad and Stalingrad which had been badly devastated, the situation in the Ukraine was far worse. The cities and factories had been destroyed, the mines had been flooded and the population were living as best they might among the ruins which had been left by the two invading armies.

At the same time the work of restoration went very slowly. [316]
Less than one third of the miners of the Donbas had returned to

727 their posts and the vast majority of those who were Communists
316 received more or less sinecures above ground. Their places were
[466] taken by forcing the Ukrainian peasants, including a large percentage of young girls, to work in the pits with the minimum of safeguards. Little money was appropriated for the restoration of the damaged housing, for as the writer Korniychuk declared in one of his works, "Ukraine was so thankful for the success of Stalin that they did not care how they lived, for if he had perished, life would not be worth living under any circumstances."

727 With this attitude prominently emphasized by the leading propagandists, it is easy to see that the resources and energies of the population were directed by force rather toward those items that would advance the importance and the convenience of Moscow, than those that would be of advantage to the local population.

[496] The one exception was the necessity for rebuilding immediately and strengthening the railroad communications between the Donbas, Moscow, Leningrad and the Black Sea ports—in other words, the extreme eastern part of the Ukraine which was slated for a special development with roads and railroads linking the country up with the Russian centres rather than with the other Ukrainian centres to the west for these were regarded as exposed centres in case of a new outbreak of hostilities and were to be neglected until they were masked by the extension of Soviet power over the satellite countries.

474 The collectivized agriculture was in little better shape. In
341 that part of the Ukraine which had been under Soviet control before 1939, the authorities revived the collective farms but they had been so badly ruined that at first the authorities were often willing to be more considerate of the members. Immediately after the war they allowed them to group themselves into links or permanent sections of some eight to ten people who would thus come to feel themselves a distinct unit in the collective farm. It did not take long for the more rigid Communists to decide that this sense of permanence was in a way a defiance of the principles of collectivization, for very often members of the same household, if it were at all numerous, would group themselves into a link. In such cases the link became more prosperous, for it was in a way

a revival of that form of family agriculture which had long been popular in the Ukraine before the collectivization. Furthermore, it was soon suspected that the links varied in their delivery of supplies to the government, sometimes in inverse proportion to their own readiness to work. The peasants likewise as in the early days of the NEP devoted more attention to their own private plots of land, a phenomenon that had been noticed even before World War II. 474 241

The Soviet authorities had several answers to such developments. On the one hand, they finally forbade the operation of the permanent links which had developed to the point where they threatened the objective of collectivization, the turning of the peasant farmer into a paid proletarian worker in agriculture. On the other hand they reduced the size again of the individual plot of land and they forced the peasants to give up animal raising on their plots by charging them for even the straw from the collective farms and the wild fodder that grew in abandoned places. Then again, they levied a tax on the products of these plots and this, plus the reduction of the allotment, rendered it impossible for the peasant to improve his lot except through increased work on the collective farm. In the meanwhile the steady raising of the quota of work required for one labor day made it impossible for the average peasant, unless he was a Stakhanovist (i.e. a person who cooperated with the central regime and thereby received favorable assignments) to complete one labor day within one calendar day, no matter how long hours he worked. This had been a favorite device of the Russian landlords as we learn from Radishchev's *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*, a famous Russian radical work of the end of the eighteenth century but a modern version of it was adapted by the Russian Communist leaders and used effectively. 474 241 466 [423]

Even these measures were not the desirable solution. This was first proposed by Khrushchov in 1947, and while it was at first looked upon with some disfavor, it was finally deemed suitable by the slave-drivers of the Kremlin, and Khrushchov, after a period of mild disfavor, was promoted to the Politburo, and another Russian, Melnikov, placed in charge of Ukraine. This was the 474 241 665

474 creation of great "agro-cities" or "agro-settlements" which would
241 unite several collective farms in one great centre which could be
665 more easily controlled by the Communist Party with a smaller number of qualified party members in charge. By the end of 1950 the number of kolhosps (collective farms) had been reduced from 33,653, as at the end of the war, to 14,443. The number of households in one had grown from 163 households to 277. At the same time the number of collective farms in which there were definite party leaders had increased from 42% to 78%. This does not imply a growth in Communist membership, for the number of Communist authorities might, under the new ratio, be reduced by almost 3,000 in personnel. This would be hardly likely but it explains at a glance the increased control that the Communists could exert over the larger groups. It also made it easier by destroying the separated villages to prevent as effective help being given to the U. P. A. and the other anti-Communist movements which lingered on, as the peasants saw that the new era was to be not one of peace but of increased hardships. At the same time, the
423 peasant was made more helpless for his holdings in the neighbor-
241 hood of his home were reduced to 0.15 hectare or approximately a third of an acre.

This area is roughly equivalent to the average American suburban lot of 150 x 100 feet and on this the average peasant family was supposed, no matter how many members it contained, to raise all the vegetables, eggs and milk which the family required for the year and also any other plant or animal requirement which was needed as a cash crop. Even this was now burdened with taxes and the peasant was forbidden to secure anything from the collective farm to assist in his economy, outside of what he secured in his pay for a steadily diminishing number of labor days and the accompanying cash and kind receipts which were apportioned to him for his work.

474 Estimates based on figures from some collective farms show
434 that the average family receives for its year's work, if three or four
241 members work, something in the neighborhood of three hundred pounds of grain, four hundred pounds of potatoes and about one

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a 474
result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred 434
karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one 241
thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on [554]
these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for [665]
show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satisfactory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer is little better, although he 465
receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, 731
there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 con- 185
tinued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

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185 are a few large projects planned in the eastern part of the country which can be made immediately accessible to the Moscow Industrial area but which will be of little value to the Ukrainian population, for even the resorts along the coast of the Black Sea have now been definitely placed under a Union Commissariat and are being improved to accommodate the higher officials from the centre. The whole strength of the Soviet Union is being exerted to build up the industrial centres in the Urals and further to the east.

During these years there has been little progress made in many fields, and few or none of the evacuated personnel which formerly managed the factories have been returned. It is the same with machinery.

[166] On the other hand, where factories have been restored, the new directors have usually been sent down from Moscow to administer them, and so have the responsible workmen. The deportation from the villages still continues as the native population are removed to Siberia or elsewhere and non-Ukrainians are sent in, in accordance with a definite scheme for breaking up the homogeneity of the population.

665 626 Despite all this, there has scarcely passed a month in which the central authorities in Moscow have not stressed defects in the working of the Ukrainian branch of the party. They have found continued failures to perform the required deliveries, a lack of ideological work and definite wrecking and deliberate sabotage due to bourgeois nationalist feelings on the part of the party leaders in the Ukraine. There has been a consistent and unrelenting attack on everything that has been done in the country, while the heads of the collective farms and the other institutions have been attacked and changed for nationalist deviations.

000 The conclusion is irresistible that it is not the intention of the central authority in Moscow to relax its pressure until it has annihilated the last point in the UkSSR which differs in the slightest degree from the rules prevailing in the RSFSR and that in the meantime it, despite its lip service to the cause of a federation, is working for a complete standardization, not only in the field of economics but in every other field as well.

The Ukraine is regarded as a profitable colony from which the 000
wealth is to be drawn in the manner of the old imperialism. It is to be absorbed and assimilated to the last degree and, at the same time, the RSFSR and the USSR, built around the elder brother, are working in desperation to prepare within its own boundaries new sources of supply. Within the last fifteen years, while the 433
resources of the Donbas and Kryvy Rih have increased, according to the five year plans, some 10-15%, the actual percentage which the fundamental products of the Ukraine bear to the total production of those same products in the USSR has significantly dropped more than that.

Thus at one and the same time the Kremlin is planning to 000
annihilate all of the salient characteristics of the economy of the Ukraine and its population, on the ground that the Ukraine is a necessary source of raw material for the USSR and is striving to free itself of as much dependence on that raw material as it can. This is typical of the double-faced tactics of the leaders of the Union and it easily explains the still smouldering discontent among the Ukrainian people.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

The Soviet Cultural Policy in the Ukraine After the War

000 The Soviet cultural treatment of the Ukrainians after World War II is an inhumanly logical imitation of the making of the Russian Empire during the course of centuries. As such, it is eminently sensible and as an imitation it is unpardonably reactionary and resembles nothing so much as the rise and flowering of Hitlerism.

There was something obscene about the Third Reich. The gatherings at Nuremberg, the use of slogans that were progressive in the time of Charlemagne, the sense of the unity of the Christian world, all were prostituted to serve the cause of a narrow racism which could find no better outlet than the extermination of the Jews and the barking at Europe.

In the same way the liberation of Moscow from the Tatar yoke, the marriage of Ivan III with Sophia Paleolog, a member of the Byzantine imperial family, gave the tsar and the Muscovite Great Russians the notion that they were the Christian people par excellence and that Moscow was the Third Rome. Peter I secularized that religious conception and drove Mazepa as Hetman of Ukraine, to a revolt.

Lenin, a descendant of the old aristocracy and of the Tatars, turned Communist and dreamed of a Communist International. The defeat of his armies before Warsaw and the failure of other plans for world revolution turned the Communist International as a gathering of equal Communist leaders into a Communist RSFSR supporting a group of discredited plotters.

Skrypnyk and Khvylovy did not see this and it was their tragedy as it was the tragedy of the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty, the Ukrainian Communists who had sought independent membership

[194 blank]

000 in an ideal organization. Stalin, by his policy in the thirties, blew away that mirage but it required a World War for him to annihilate it.

Soon after the Germans attacked, Stalin dissolved the Comintern to please his Western allies and to dupe them. He substituted the Slav Congress and when he secured the assent of the Big Three to liberate the Slavs, he highly developed this.

186 As the Red Army, now transformed by fiat of the Council of
728 Commissars of the USSR into the Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies, "liberated" one Slav capital after another, they were followed by cultural missions who talked to the enthusiastic multitudes on the Slav Brotherhood of Nations in terms of 1848, Peter, the Third Rome and Stalin. Rylsky and Tychyna, Korniychuk and Yanovsky, all the outstanding Ukrainian writers who had yielded to the Russian cause and survived the purges, spoke. They praised the new situation and the democratic powers admired this.

665 It was only a sham because soon there was established the Cominform. Its seat was not in Moscow but its spirit was there. The object of the Cominform was not to create a new and equal gathering of Communist humanity, not the ostensible idea of the Comintern but it was to inform the Communists among the Slavs and elsewhere of the approach to Communism by the elder Communists of the world, the Muscovite Great Russians.

In the purely cultural sphere the answer was the condemnation
[538] of formalism, and still more of internationalism. Formalism was a technical school of literary criticism which had contributed something to the study of literature and culture. It was an attempt to put technique above content, or rather to judge content by technique and its advocates, sometimes great scholars in a narrow field, basked in the light of the admiration of their friends, until they considered themselves great.

814 Internationalism was something else. Its content had been ex-
665 pressed by the Protopope Avvakum in 1666 when he announced at his trial in Moscow that all Orthodox Christians had to come to Moscow to learn. Now it was the same. History was to be periodicized between A. M. and P. M. (Ante Muscoviae and Post

Muscoviam, Before and After Moscow). If the before was leading 814
up to a Moscow discovery, it was good; if not, it was bad. 665

This was proclaimed by Zhdanov of the Politbiuro in 1946 [546]
when, under the highest auspices, he began his attack. On September 4 of that year, at a meeting of the Umiom of Soviet Writers in Moscow, he lashed out at various films which had been recently produced and at several Russian authors, especially Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova, for not producing a true picture of Soviet reality. Then, warming to his task, he explicitly declared that literature 538
had to be entirely at the service of the Communist Party and that 626
it was the duty of every Soviet writer to lash and scourge the 665
decadent bourgeois west. He berated many of the authors for wishing to learn from the bourgeois writers at the very moment when Soviet literature, the most revolutionary literature in the world, was a hundred times higher and more beautiful than the literature of the bourgeois west.

The speech of Zhdanov was the open proclamation of war against all foreign influences in Soviet literature and it was directed against some of the most respected figures, who were apparently silenced. Even Tikhonov was removed from his post at the head [558]
of the Union of Soviet Writers for not having exerted himself more strongly against these dangerous heresies.

Yet this speech was not really the beginning, for some weeks before the question was fully brought into the open, at a meeting of the KP/b/U, Khrushchov, the Russian who held the post as First Secretary of the KP/b/U, had received from the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow full and definite instructions as to the means to be adopted for purging Ukrainian literature and science and for suppressing all traces of bourgeois nationalism. His remarks were reprinted in part by *Pravda* in Moscow, which summarized them in these words.

"The TsK KP/b/U had not paid sufficient attention to ideological work, does not give enough weight to the selecting and the ideological and political education of the cadres in the fields of science, literature and art, has not organized in the press a wide criticism of the hostile bourgeois-nationalist ideology. As a result

538 in some books, journals and newspaper articles and in the lectures
626 of some Ukrainian historians and literary men there are ideological
665 mistakes and perversions, and efforts to revive the bourgeois nationalist conceptions of the historian Hrushevsky and his 'school.' "

[814] The weight of the attack fell upon the Institute of Language
538 and Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR for two
626 books which it had published. One was the first volume of a *History of Ukraine* which had appeared in 1943 and the other was *An Outline of the History of Ukrainian Literature* which had appeared in 1945. The authors of both books were accused of having failed to periodicize Ukrainian history and literature according to the Marxo-Leninist tradition and of having followed Hrushevsky and Yefremiv in being deceived by external political events. They were charged with remarks that could be interpreted as maintaining an early separation of Ukrainian culture from Russian, when it was a fact that the three brotherly nations, the Great Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, had had a joint culture until the fourteenth century, after which the Great Russians became the truest heirs and interpreters of the whole. They were charged with idealizing the old bourgeois nationalists as V. Naumenko and O. Levytsky, of admiring the old state of patriarchal private property and of failing to realize the great ideological gulf between Shevchenko, who stood in the tradition of Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, etc., and Kulish who was a liberal and not a revolutionist. They were condemned for having a good word for such nationalist counter-revolutionists as Vynnychenko and Oles and for calling a competent poet, I. Steshchenko, who had been a minister under Petlyura. They forced their own flatterer, Rylsky, to leave his post as head of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukraine for not having taken a sufficiently firm stand in condemning the mistakes of the other writers, and for a while he was in disfavor.

The accusations penned in Moscow and printed in *Pravda* and the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* were reprinted in the Ukrainian papers with even more vulgarity and abuse. They poured out their venom at nearly all the writers and historians who regarded the use of the Ukrainian language as expressing the feelings and the

culture of the Ukrainian people. They condemned nationalist 638
praise of Kotlyarevsky for introducing national pride and feeling 626
into his *Eneida,* the first book in the Ukrainian vernacular published in 1798. They accused the writers and scholars of deliberately trying to drive a wedge between the Russian and Ukrainian people and of refusing to see, because of their bourgeois nationalist prejudices, that the great Ukrainian writers of the nineteenth century had always drawn their inspiration and been close to the progressive Russian writers, as Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, and they denied the existence of any Western European influence on Ukrainian literature, since all the influence had come from the Russians. They found influences of Gorky on Lesya Ukrainka and cited as her models Russian works which appeared after her works were in print. All this made no difference, for the Marxo-Leninists were in sole possession of the truth and their word was law.

Stalin had declared that the new Soviet literature and culture was to be Communist in content and national in form but it was very soon realized that even this was to be interpreted in a special sense. Any excessive attention paid by writers to descriptions of the Ukrainian landscape which did not bring a glorification of the new factories was treated as an antiquated sympathy with the old patriarchal Ukraine and its bourgeois nationalism. Any mention of the Zaporozhian Sich and the Kozak past, unless it was connected very definitely with the union and longing of the Kozaks for Muscovite rule, was declared to be treasonable and bourgeois nationalist in essence. Thus, step by step the authorities in Moscow and their mouthpieces in Ukraine limited more and more closely the possibility of describing or singing of any of the characteristic features of Ukrainian life and the historic past, while the Great Russians were given free rein to glorify the past of Russia even under the tsars, for it was there that the seeds of the Communist Party were planted and flourished.

This process of tracking down bourgeois nationalism perhaps reached the limits of its absurdity in 1951 when the Soviet critics discovered dangerous thoughts in the war poem of Volodymyr Sosyura, *Love Ukraine.* It was a graceful, but hardly a great poem.

538 It had been enthusiastically received in 1944, when it appeared,
626 and the poet was awarded for it a Stalin Prize. The poem was published and republished by the state publishing houses and then it was suddenly discovered that it was untrue, bourgeois nationalist, etc. and the unfortunate author was forced to repent of his errors. As a matter of fact, even before this, many of the Russian translators had gone out of their way to insert in it various passages celebrating the Volga and the Kremlin as part of the love of Ukraine, but they, too, were reprimanded for trying to improve the work instead of condemning it for its real quality.

In every field of scholarship, literature, art, and music, the same charges have been brought with logical consistency. Anything which would remind the readers of the old pre-Communist life is treated as dangerous, but none of the authors, no matter how they have falsified history or the present, has been able to express the great achievements of the new Soviet Ukraine and to catch its spirit and show how it can in any degree differ from Moscow. At the first sign of any independent judgment, the cry is raised of bourgeois nationalism and the work is suppressed.

545 At the same time the Ukrainian scene is being overloaded with
532 things Russian. Russian theatrical companies are continually travel-
626 ling around the republic so as to show the real charity and achievements of the elder brother and inspire a desire for imitation of its life and thought under that all-time world genius, Joseph Stalin. Russian musical ensembles and exhibitions of the works of Russian artists are constantly sent to all the chief cities of the non-Russian republics, not only to acquaint the people with Russian achievements but still more to give them the necessary patterns by which they should plan their lives and work.

538 There are constantly published masses of Ukrainian translations
626 of Russian works and books translated from the other languages used in the USSR and it is almost essential for an author to allude to these and especially to the Georgian people as the people of Stalin, if he wishes to avoid the charge of bourgeois nationalism and the attempt to sow hostility between the brotherly peoples.

000 The situation is even more severe in the field of language.

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The situation is even more severe in the field of language. 191
Korniychuk after World War II emphasized that Ukrainian bour- 626
geois nationalism was not to be sought only by a consideration 538
of the contents of books and paintings. It was reflected in a still more dangerous form in the language of the books themselves. Any author who showed a predilection for the use of the older forms of the language or sought to develop it in any way other than the Communist Party desired was thereby convicting himself of holding nationalistic sentiments and of being dangerously reactionary. He thus accused of bourgeois nationalism even those writers as Yanovsky who had been most rigorous in following the party line in content.

The real significance of this statement of Korniychuk's is 191
shown by the *Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary* which finally appeared 626
in 1948 under the editorship of L. A. Bulakhovsky and M. F. 814
Rylsky. The work was published in Moscow, although it bore the stamp of the Institute of Language Study of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR.

In this the authors made no concealment of their program, for [198]
they definitely stated that their work was based upon the "spoken" Ukrainian of the government offices (where it was the most corrupted by Russian words), and not the older Ukrainian language as spoken before the introduction of the Bolshevik reforms. They added, too, that they had supplied from Russian whatever was lacking in Ukrainian, for "thanks to the Russian language, the Ukrainian has been able to acquire the capacity to respond to the needs of socialist construction and to satisfy the cultural needs of the Ukrainian people."

Stripped of its Communist jargon, this passage merely means that the Moscow authorities have decided to carry on their policy of russification in a new way. They have recognized the gap between the older Ukrainian language and the hodgepodge which they have produced and they are now insisting on using the words of the older usage in their most narrow and restricted sense, and by refusing to recognize any possibility of development in Ukrainian or any changes in it, they are forcing Ukrainian to become a dead language and by an inverted purism are planning to compel

191 the Ukrainians to recognize that Russian and Russian alone is in
626 a position to grow and develop.
814 This is entirely in line with the new philological policy dictated by Stalin after his repudiation of the late Prof. Marr and what was commonly known as Marrism, a theory that Stalin had sponsored for many years. Now he was willing to argue that Russian as the language of the USSR was not only the Russian language as the language of the Russian people but it was also in a new sense a zonal language, the approved language of Socialism and Communism and, as such, it had already absorbed all that it needed and its mission was to replace all those languages which were spoken by people who had awaked to the truth of the Moscow doctrines.

626 Thus the new theories of language study that were officially
814 accepted in Moscow opened new vistas for cultural oppression and perversion of the Ukrainian masses. They were a signal for renewed efforts, not only to control the Ukrainian cultural life in the present and the future but their efforts were extended to the past and the scholars were set to carry out an artificial restatement of Ukrainian history, literature and culture from the earliest known periods.

538 It is small wonder then that the modern post-war Ukrainian
626 literature is becoming more and more a pallid and bloodless imitation of the stereotyped patterns required for Great Russian and that even those authors who have sold themselves to the Stalinist regime are unable to produce anything of real value or of even mediocre excellence. They are turning out the average propaganda material against the imperialistic Americans on the lines ordered by the Politiburo with never a thought except the income and perquisites which they are slated to receive and the constant terror lest at some moment by an unfortunate slip they may be accused justly or unjustly of that terrible crime of bourgeois nationalism and lose in an instant all that they have worked for years to win.

The cultural pressure exerted on eastern Ukraine is spread likewise with even more force over those portions in the West which had been formerly under Poland or Czechoslovakia. Here, as former parts of the old Hapsburg monarchy, the writers had had

more opportunity to absorb the current thought of the west than 538
they had had in eastern Ukraine. Therefore, the pressure against 626
them has been applied even more strongly and still more Russians have been sent to remodel the life in Lviv than was necessary for Kiev. The process of russification was started later but it has been pushed more energetically. The net result is the same,—the impoverishment of Ukrainian culture as a whole and the substitution for it of a shabby form of Russian Muscovite Communist culture, which is to be tolerated only until there can be a full absorption.

Yet that process has not been so easy. Hardly a week passes 661
that some of the higher units in the Soviet service do not discover a new nest of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, and most frequently among the members and officers of the KP/b/U. It has been made evident that the Russian Communists cannot hope to achieve their goal until they have eliminated the entire Ukrainian population. They are trying to do it, but despite the millions of their victims and their attempts to separate the Ukrainian children from their parents and to rear them as slaves for Russian factories, they have not succeeded in winning the population to their views.

From the cultural point of view, the post-war period has been even more depressing than were the thirties. It has been drabber, like the lives of the people, but it has not served as yet to eliminate that spark of hope which alone preserved the Ukrainians during the hard periods of tsarism when they were subjects and slaves on their own territories, which were not their own to govern or to develop.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

The Soviet Religious Policy

000 In any discussion of Soviet Russian-Ukrainian relations, the religious problem is important for it touches many issues which are but dimly understood in the Western world. The latter has been too long content to think of the east of Europe only in terms of power politics, the Eastern Question, and similar problems to bother about the details of a discussion which has been often a matter of life and death to the people involved and which might throw a real light upon the present situation.

795 659 One fact stands out. Rus'-Ukraine was Christianized before the division of the Eastern and Western Churches and the full results of that division were not made evident until the dawn of the modern era. The dominant religious type of religion was that of the Orthodox East and the important See was that of Kiev. Yet Kievan Christianity was never bigoted or exclusive and even after the great Schism of 1054, the princes of Kiev continued to intermarry equally with the noble families of both east and west.

After the Metropolitan, under political pressure, took up his residence in Moscow, Kiev and the Western Ukrainian lands secured a new Metropolitan from the Patriarch of Constantinople. Moscow became the seat of a patriarchate but it was only in 1648 that the Patriarch and the Tsar of Moscow became willing to have any contact with the Orthodox Christians of Kiev. Already in 1596 this attitude had culminated in the establishment of a Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, acknowledging the papacy but maintaining the Eastern Orthodox forms of worship.

In 1686, while the Tsar of Russia was beginning to absorb the Zaporozhian Kozaks, he exerted pressure upon the Patriarch of Constantinople to abolish this new Metropolitanate of Kiev, and in 1686, by the act of Moscow but not of Constantinople, this was done. Once Moscow secured control, it applied the

795
659

Muscovite usages and as its power grew in Ukraine, so did its pretensions. The cultural power of Ukrainian Orthodoxy disappeared in the Russian Sea, while the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite became the dominating religious power in Western Ukraine. Nothing shows more clearly the Muscovite attitude than the fact that it gave a lower rank to the Metropolitan of Kiev than it did to the head of the Georgian Orthodox, when they, too, passed under Russian sovereignty.

As Rus'-Ukraine under tsarist control became only a collection of "Little Russian" gubernias, so the Ukrainian Orthodox became a collection of "Little Russian" diocess, in which there was nothing Ukrainian and so it remained until 1917, while each time that the tsar acquired more Ukrainian lands, the same form of coercion was applied not only to the Ukrainian Orthodox but also to the Catholics whose Byzantine Rite under the Hapsburgs and then under Poland and Czechoslovakia, had developed into a distinct Western Ukrainian religion. Under the leadership of Metropolitan Andry Sheptytsky, a giant physically and intellectually, this process went on rapidly, much to the annoyance of the Poles in the old province of Eastern Galicia.

Finally we must note that when Western Ukraine passed under Poland in 1920, that country forced the establishment of a Polish Orthodox Church for the several million Ukrainians and Byelorussians who were in the revived state. The language of this was Polish and its organization was adopted to the Polish system as it developed in the revived state.

With these preliminary notes, we can now turn to the relations between the Ukraine and the Soviet Russians.

A. The Orthodox

With the Revolution of 1917 and the revival and development of the independence movement among the Ukrainians, there arose also a demand for the revival of an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This was stubbornly opposed by the Provisional Government, Patriarch Tikhon and the Russian Orthodox in Ukraine, the same forces that had haggled and debated the develop-

ment of a Ukrainian independent state throughout the period, 795
until the Russian Communists secured control and were able to 659
maintain their assumption of power.

In the first stages, while the Communists still hoped for the success of the world revolution, they emphasized their doctrines of atheism and they stressed the conception that "religion was the opium of the people." At the same time they endeavored to disintegrate the Russian Orthodox Church from within by giving their support to the various schemes of reform as the Living Church, etc. They also gave especial favor to various Protestant bodies, as the Baptists, who sought to introduce their ideas, often with marked success.

It was a crucial period for eastern Europe, for the Western 648
nations and America which had been victorious in World War I were not inclined to cement their victory. No matter what they thought of the Communist regime, Great Britain and the United States were still convinced that the victory of a democratic Russia was a certainty and they refused to take any steps to help the non-Russian peoples who were being over-whelmed by the Soviets, lest it prejudice their future relations with Russia. France, obsessed with the fear of Germany, was seeking to restore a greater Poland which would absorb as much as possible of Ukraine. The memory of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk blinded everybody to events as they were taking place.

It was no less critical for the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Allies sympathized with his position but the successful revolt of Mustapha Kemal against the Treaty of Sèvres produced a situation where the Western powers had to fight or surrender. They wished to do neither and with a certain Bolshevik sympathy for Turkey, the Patriarch was obliged to be cautious, until his hands were in a way freed by the settlement of Lausanne.

Hence the leaders of the movement for a Ukrainian Autocephal- 795
ous Orthodox Church were in a way powerless to regulate their relations with Orthodoxy as a whole. They had been unable to secure the support and assistance of any Russian bishops. They

795 were turned down in an appeal to the Bulgarian Church and they obtained no response from the Patriarch of Constantinople.

[793] Impressed by the sense of urgency and the justice of their cause, the leaders of the movement held a synod in Kiev on October 11, 1921 and proceeded to elect as bishops Father Vasyl Lypkivsky and Father Nestor Sharayevsky. Then, as they had no bishops available for their consecration, the members of the Sobor laid their hands upon them and consecrated them bishops without the participation of any bishops save relics of the saints preserved in Kiev. Lypkivsky was then made Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and he and his associate soon consecrated some 27 other bishops.

Yet the uncanonical nature of this original action drove a wedge between the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the other Orthodox Churches and made certain that it would not later attract any validly consecrated bishops who would regularize the succession. On the other hand, other reforms, as the introduction of Ukrainian into the services in place of the old Church Slavonic, enabled the Russian opponents to classify it with the various movements as the Living Church which the Bolsheviks had fostered in their endeavor to disintegrate the Russian Church from within.

Still later, when the Orthodox in the succession states began to organize and came under the influence of the Patriarch of Constantinople, whose position had grown less critical with the strengthening of the new Turkey, it was too late for him to extend aid to the Ukrainian Orthodox as he did to those living under Polish rule by the recognition of a Polish Autocephalous Church in 1924. Thus the Ukrainian Orthodox were left almost completely isolated to face alone the atheistic Communist and imperialistic Russian Orthodox pressure.

Metropolitan Lypkivsky showed himself a very competent leader. The number of parishes under his control multiplied rapidly and by 1927 the Church had nearly 3,000 parishes and some 10,600 priests. It was no small achievement to establish and develop this under the harsh conditions of Soviet reality and for several years during the height of the movement of Ukrainization,

the Church flourished and bade fair to restore the traditions of the 795
old Ukrainian Orthodox Church and there were high hopes that sooner or later it would be able to heal the defects in the original consecration.

This was not to be, for after the death of the Patriarch Tikhon 795
the power in the Russian Church passed into the hands of the 659
Metropolitan Sergy who showed himself willing to effect such a compromise with Stalin and Communism as might be necessary. His offer was, to a certain degree, accepted and the Soviet regime, without changing its policy of persecuting all religious activity, began to throw a few crumbs of favor to the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate in Moscow. Slowly but surely, the various Russian divisions, like the Living Church, slipped back into the general organization, and the Soviets soon grasped the possibilities of using Sergy and the Russian organization as a political weapon in their struggle for world domination.

Even before the ending of Ukrainization, the Communists began to put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. The Metropolitan was refused permission to visit the various parishes under his control and to publish journals and other material for his flock. This was followed by more active measures. Metropolitan Lypkivsky was arrested and imprisoned. So were all of the other bishops and by 1930 there was not a single one of the bishops still in Ukraine who was not in prison or dead. The church was broken up and all of its activities stopped, but the spirit that had animated it continued to lie hidden.

When the Germans and the Soviets occupied Poland in 1939, a 795
new possibility was sensed. The so-called Polish Autocephalous [793]
Church was composed overwhelmingly of Ukrainians and Byelorussians, with but a few anti-Communist Russians. Even before 1939, some of these Ukrainian clergy and laity had begun to take steps for the Ukrainianizing of the Church, even though they had been forced to introduce Polish into the services. When the storm broke, Russians like Bishop Sava made their way abroad and joined the Russians in exile. Bishop Oleksy (Hromadsky) in Kremyanets and Bishop Polykarp (Sikorsky) in Lutsk were forced

795 to recognize the Moscow organization, which was coming into favor with Stalin because of its increasing subservience to the Soviet regime. On the other hand, Metropolitan Dionysy, who had been in that part of Ukraine that was included in the Polish Government General, now threw off any attempt at concealment and revived the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, which this time was provided with canonical orders in all grades. He consecrated two new Ukrainian bishops, Ilarion (O. Ohienko) for Kholm and Podlyasie and Palady (Vedybida-Rudemko) for Krakow and Lemkivshchyna.

This marked a new period and when the Germans attacked the USSR in 1941 and occupied it, Polykarp joined them, while Oleksy set up still another group, the Ukrainian Autonomous Church, for he refused to break his connections with Moscow.

795 659 [727] The German permission for the formation in 1942 of a central organization was frankly ambiguous. On the one hand, they were glad of any movement that would rouse the people against Moscow. On the other, in religion as in politics, they were opposed to any movement which would prevent them from carrying out their policy of treating the Ukrainians as a subject and inferior race. As a result, they put every obstacle in the way of a reconciliation between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous groups and threw their support to whichever was the weaker in any given area.

The open support of the Soviet government by Sergy and his associates now under the pressure of war paid off. His protestations of sympathy for Stalin and the Russians were rewarded with medals and other honors. Then, in the autumn of 1943, as the final step in the process, Stalin gave permission for the restoration of the Patriarchate in Moscow and Sergy was duly installed. On his death in 1944, he was succeeded by Aleksey, the former Archbishop of Leningrad, the present Patriarch, and under his leadership the Russian Orthodox Church has embarked upon a policy of securing control for the Soviets of all other Orthodox Churches.

795 In the meanwhile, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church during the war displayed great activity in the occupied Ukraine. It speedily won the support of most of the clergy who were not in

the Soviet service. It reopened churches that had been closed by 795
the Soviets and it cooperated with the Ukrainian patriotic movement.

With the return of the Soviet forces, the leaders of the Church retired to the west with a large part of the priests, and the others joined the underground. The Ukrainian Church was again suppressed and brought directly under the Patriarch of Moscow and it is to be noted that the head of the Orthodox Church in the UkSSR, does not hold any special point of honor as does the Catholicus of Georgia, who is still recognized as the head of a satellite Church.

It is thus safe to say that despite the continued existence of the UkSSR as an independent nation for the purposes of the United Nations, there is now no distinctive Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It has been swallowed, as in the days of Peter I, by the great Moscow religious imperialism. It has no independence and it is thoroughly and in all points independent upon the Russian Patriarch in Moscow.

B. The Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite

When in 1939 the Soviet forces by their understanding with the Nazis occupied for the first time Eastern Galicia and the Western Ukrainian lands, they at once set to work to remodel the area on their own standards and to eliminate all the characteristic features of Ukrainian life and culture. This process was, however, rudely interrupted by the German attack in 1941.

The dominant religion in the area was the Greek Catholic 795
Uniat Church, or, to be more precise, Catholicism of the Byzantine 793
Rite. The Metropolitan of this Church, Andry Sheptytsky, was the most respected figure in the entire area and he was a religious and cultural leader in every sense of the word. During this first occupation, Archbishop Sheptytsky was not personally disturbed but he was deprived of his liberty and forced into a semi-retirement. His schools and other institutions were closed, the Church was deprived of its property and a considerable number of priests were punished on various charges. Yet there was no general holocaust.

In 1941, Archbishop Sheptytsky was one of the leading figures

795 in the attempt to revive a native and independent Ukrainian
793 government. This was, of course, prevented by the Germans and the Archbishop remained at Lviv scarcely more free during the German occupation of Ukraine than he had been under the Soviets. He continued his efforts to unite both the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Churches without effect, but he was able to do considerable for the well-being of his people. Still he was no longer free to act openly, although his advice was sought whenever and wherever it could be.

The Soviets reoccupied Lviv on July 27, 1944 and at once set to work more vigorously to introduce their system. Archbishop Sheptytsky did not long survive for he passed away on November 1 of the same year. He was succeeded in his post by Joseph Slipy, who had been one of his outstanding assistants and the rector of the Theological Academy which Metropolitan Sheptytsky had founded in the late twenties, when it had became evident that the Poles would not allow the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviv.

659 Metropolitan Slipy had barely been installed in office, when
795 the Soviets showed their hand and began to call for a condemnation
793 of the Vatican by the Ukrainian Catholics and for their union
661 with Moscow. It did not take long for words to turn into actions.

On April 15, 1945, the NKVD surrounded the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv and arrested the Metropolitan, Bishop Budko and Bishop Charnetsky together with many other leaders. They arrested all of the students of the Theological Academy and they likewise seized the Cathedral and turned it over to the Patriarch of Moscow as a Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, they informed the professors of the Theological Seminary that the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite had ceased to exist.

At almost the same time the NKVD gathered in the other Catholic bishops in Western Ukraine, Bishop Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv and his vicar, Bishop Lyatyshevsky, while at the same time the Polish Communist regime seized Bishop Kotsylovsky of Pere-

myshl and his auxiliary bishop, Lakota. Bishops Khomyshyn and 659
Kotsylovsky soon died under the treatment that they received. 795

The others were kept in prison and then in 1946, according to 793
the best available information, Metropolitan Slipy and his asso- 661
ciates were sent to labor camps in the far north in the Vorkuta coal mines. From that time they have disappeared from sight.

In 1947, the last Catholic bishop of this rite, Bishop Romzha of Carpatho-Ukraine, while travelling through his diocese "collided" accidentally with a Soviet tank and was killed and this ended the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in their own lands. The following year the Rumanian government followed suit and likewise annihilated the hierarchy of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite in Transylvania. In 1950 the Czech Communist regime arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment Bishop Hoydych and his coadjutor Hopka of the diocese of Prashev in Slovakia.

These actions were followed in each case by attacks upon the lower clergy, who were ordered to accept the supremacy of the Patriarch of Moscow. This was fully in the tradition of the old Russian Church, for each time that the tsars had bitten off a slice of Ukraine, they had applied the same methods to the Catholic hierarchy in the section, to the intent that the Byzantine rite could be performed only under the supervision of the Russian authorities.

In this case in 1945, on July 1, when the Soviet Ukrainian Commissar for Religion, Khodchenko, called on the clergy to recognize the new situation, the professors of the Theological Academy met in Lviv in the Cathedral of St. George and presented a request that they be given the liberties accorded to them on paper by the Stalinist Constitution. The answer was their arrest and imprisonment.

Then the government set to work. They secured the apostasy of one of the foremost of the Ukrainian Catholic priests, Father Kostelnyk, who willingly put himself at the service of the Patriarch and presided over a "sobor" which was called to ratify the switch from the Vatican to the Patriarch. Many of the priests who attended were apparently members of the NKVD in disguise. They willingly applauded Stalin and the Patriarch and armed with this authority,

659 the Soviet regime set to work to seize all the churches and property
795 of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite and preempt it for
793 their own use.

661 This marked the end of the open existence of the Church. There were still priests who escaped and took refuge with the U. P. A. (the Ukrainian underground) but open worship was at an end. There has been enforced at least a superficial agreement with the Kremlin on all matters of religion. Nevertheless, the latent hatred still exists and it can flare up at any moment when the situation warrants it.

The movements represented by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite still flourish in the emigration, where alone there is any opportunity for free thought. In the meanwhile, the Kremlin is maintaining its position in its traditional Muscovite manner and applying its savage punishments and deportations and executions to prove that Ukraine is happy and contented in following the example of the "elder brother." Yet even so, the number of episodes when Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism appears make it seem as if the officials of both church and state were not too sure that the Ukrainian people fully sympathize with the Patriarch Aleksey in his deification of the foremost man of the ages, who still forbids Communists to have anything to do with the Orthodox Church. That has sold its soul for as little real value as did the Ukrainian Communists in the early years of the struggle.

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Conclusion

On March 5, 1953, Joseph Stalin, who had been the dominant 000
force in the Soviet Union for 29 years, died in the Kremlin of a stroke. The man who had superintended the transformation of the country, the Georgian revolutionist who had espoused the claims of the Great Russians as had none of the Russian tsars, died peacefully in his bed, almost the only one of the Communist leaders since Lenin who has not died violently or in the slave camps of the north and the east. It was the end of an era.

The next day, his successor, Georgy Maximilonovich Malenkov, was installed in office with a complete realignment of the governmental organization and a large number of shifts, promotions and demotions among his associates. The announcement emphasized that the new regime would follow closely the lines promulgated by Stalin. In this new setup, Khrushchov, the former Russian tyrant over Ukraine, was confirmed in his position in the Presidium of the Communist Party, and his successor, another Russian, Melnikov, the present head of the Ukrainian Communists, was made an alternate in the same Presidium.

The day before, as Stalin lay dying, the Kremlin government issued a statement urging unity upon all the peoples of the Soviet Union and reiterated the statement that success in carrying on the policy was due to the loyalty to the Soviet regime of the Great Russians, the leaders of the Union. They were the only one of the Soviet peoples or the peoples under the Soviets mentioned by name.

Nothing in the careers of Malenkov or of Beria, who emerges with increased powers as the head of the Ministry of the Interior (including National Security), or any of the men mentioned for

000 high office gives any indication that the old process of russification and centralization will be changed. Everything points to an intensification of it and perhaps an intensification that will be less original and even more mechanical. There seems little likelihood that there will be any diminution of pressure or any return toward the relative liberalism of the early years. We can only wait to see whether the transmission of power can be handled without any of the discords that followed the death of Lenin and whether Malenkov can succeed to the deified position which was demanded for Stalin during his later years.

The mystery that the Kremlin has thrown around itself has succeeded in hiding from the world the personal relations of the new leaders. Yet, the almost immediate attacks on American and British planes in all parts of the world reflect the determination of the new regime to continue the militant policy of its predecessor. On the other hand, the peaceful speeches of Malenkov and a few isolated acts of apparent diminished hostility have served to revive the hopes of many of the Western nations in the possibilities of better relations with the USSR. This is quite in accordance with Soviet plans to split its opponents, who still do not want to realize that gestures of friendship to the peoples beyond the Iron Curtain mean nothing more than gestures of friendship to the foreign Communists already dependent upon Moscow for their support and guidance.

By Soviet definition, the Communists are the peace-loving leaders of all the peoples of the world and the only ones entitled to speak for those peoples, while non-Communist governments are something to be deceived and overthrown from within, if possible. This has been the cardinal principle of Soviet policy since 1917 and explains the repeated failures of the free world to reach any definite settlement with Moscow. It should lead the West to reexamine its relations with the Kremlin and also those with the Great Russians who are now, in the Kremlin language, practically equated with the Communists.

It should compel the West to forget the dream of a Russian unity and the speeches and writings of the Russian emigrés should be considered critically in view of their attitude toward Ukraine

and the other non-Russian peoples that were conquered by the 000
tsars, reconquered by the Soviets and now in the name of Great Russian Communism subjected to a new period of russification.

At the same time, there is no new evidence that the regime of Malenkov is any more tolerant of the national differences or feelings of the non-Russian peoples than was the previous regime. The steady rise in influence of Khrushchov suggests the opposite and a still greater pressure upon Ukraine.

Since World War II, the attitude of the Kremlin toward the 642
Ukrainians has perceptibly hardened. The Ukrainian Soviet Social- 631
ist Republic is a member of the United Nations. It has its own government, its own flag, its own national anthem. Yet, by the orders of the Kremlin, no diplomat from outside the iron curtain is admitted to its capital of Kiev. Its government conducts all of its affairs through Moscow.

The Ukrainians are to-day the slaves of Moscow in their own country. They are liable to be deported across its boundaries at any moment and their places taken by Russians or persons from anywhere within the Soviet orbit. They are compelled to think Russian thoughts, to interpret their past, their present and their future in terms acceptable to their elder brothers, the Great Russians. The slightest deviation from that path is met with the grim charge of bourgeois nationalism, the gravest offence in the entire list of crimes.

That same process in earlier stages is taking place in all the 000
Soviet satellites. Step by step, the culture of the other countries is being remodelled on the Russian Soviet pattern. The Russian language is being introduced and forced into the dominant place. Step by step, their national traditions are being spurned, corrupted and altered, so that they will be worthy members of the Soviet Union under Russian Communist leadership. Their contacts with the outside world are being cut off, while the Moscow radio blares out day and night the statements that the Russians are the friends of peace while the nations outside are warmongers and imperialists.

We might be tempted to believe that Moscow is right but we

000 can scarcely with normal intelligence and sanity believe that the millions of Ukrainians who have been condemned for bourgeois nationalism are anything but victims of a mania of persecution and of cruelty. We can hardly believe in the criminality of the increasing role of victims throughout the satellite states. We can hardly believe in the stability of a regime which can find itself menaced by the flight of a single citizen from its paradise.

When we add to this, the constant Soviet warnings of the danger of espionage, their secrecy as to all matters of economics, their isolation of foreign representatives, their unwillingness to let travellers and observers view their great achievements, we must become still more doubtful. We cannot give credence to the benign character of a state which proclaims almost every day that it has discovered new acts of disloyalty, of sabotage and of almost open revolt, which annihilates whole groups and nations for disloyalty.

One thing is obvious. The situation calls for a firm and progressively growing interrelation between the world outside, an interrelation in arms and in economics and in culture. It needs an awareness of the process by which this Soviet system has been built up. Then, perhaps in time, we may secure the answer to the question whether the Soviet Union will sweep the whole of humanity within its stereotyped laws because of its real strength or whether the power of the Soviet Union is based upon the disunion of the democratic world, its mutual jealousies and antagonisms. Will the successors of Stalin dare to risk a war or will their artificial structure fall apart, if it passes under too great a strain?

Yet, to answer such a question, we must know as much as possible of the methods by which that system is built up. It is here that the fate of the Ukrainians comes in again, for we can follow in their sad experiences the methods which the Russian Communists have ever employed.

In a very real sense Ukraine and the Ukrainians are the touchstone of the system. If the Kremlin can win a lasting victory, it has a chance of success. If it can persuade the Ukrainians to be happy in their new slavery, it may win out. If it cannot stop

their opposition except by their total extermination, then we can 000
be sure that the world can save itself if it awakes.

There is only one thing certain. Before the United Nations can function as it was intended, its members must be independent states and peoples. That means that the Ukrainian representatives must be free representatives of a free Ukraine who can contribute their part to the common welfare. In one way or another, that must come and the Muscovite domination must be ended. May it come soon and in a peaceful manner! Then, with that, will come of necessity the ending of the process, the restoration of liberty to the countries within the Iron Curtain and the possibility of the cooperation of men for the elimination of suffering, want, injustice and fear and the opening of a new and enlightened period in human history.

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UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

1939–1945

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UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM
1939–1945

STUDIES OF THE RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

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THE RUSSIAN INSTITUTE was established by Columbia University in 1946 to serve two major objectives: the training of a limited number of well-qualified Americans for scholarly and professional careers in the field of Russian studies, and the development of research in the social sciences and the humanities as they relate to Russia and the Soviet Union. The research program of the Russian Institute is conducted through the efforts of its faculty members, of scholars invited to participate as Senior Fellows in its program, and of candidates for the Certificate of the Institute and for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Some of the results of the research program are presented in the Studies of the Russian Institute of Columbia University. The faculty of the Institute, without necessarily agreeing with the conclusions reached in the Studies, believe that their publication advances the difficult task of promoting systematic research on Russia and the Soviet Union and public understanding of the problems involved.

The faculty of the Russian Institute are grateful to the Rockefeller Foundation for the financial assistance which it has given to the program of research and publication.

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

000 THE SYSTEM used in this study for the transliteration of Ukrainian and Russian words is that employed by the Library of Congress, except that the diacritical marks used there to indicate the substitution of two English letters to represent one Ukrainian or Russian letter have been omitted. For ease in reading, Russian and Ukrainian words appearing in the text have been given English plurals (i.e., they end in "s"). Consequently, an exception to the usual scheme of transliteration has been made in the case of the word *oblast* (a major territorial administrative unit in the Soviet Union). The apostrophe which would ordinarily be used to indicate the "soft sign" following the "t" in Russian, has been omitted altogether, because the "s" in the plural preceded by an apostrophe could easily be confused with the English genitive.

When common English equivalents of Ukrainian and Russian first names exist, these equivalents have been used in the text. The monastic names of members of the Ukrainian ecclesiastical hierarchies have been given in the Latin or Greek forms familiar to Western readers, except in the case of names derived from Slavic saints. In the case of both lay and ecclesiastical authors, the Russian and Ukrainian forms of the first, or monastic, names have been given when referring to their works; but when an author so cited has been mentioned in the text as well, the English equivalent of his name is placed in parentheses after the first citation of each of his works.

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PREFACE

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BECAUSE this study is based primarily on widely scattered and little known sources, it would have been impossible for me to have undertaken it without the advice and assistance of many persons and institutions. At the same time, of course, I alone must take full responsibility for all conclusions and opinions expressed.

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Alexandria, Virginia
June, 1954

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

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000

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM
1939–1945

p. 3

I. THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM

[127] DURING the summer and autumn of 1941 the German armies rolled across the plains of the Ukraine; by November the entire Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was in their hands. Observers everywhere were aware of the significance of the conquest of [241] this huge area with its thirty-five million inhabitants. The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine, famous as the "granary of the USSR," the gigantic industrial complex of the Donets basin, and the rich mineral deposits were weighed in appraising the loss of the Soviet Union and the gain of Germany. While the political effects of the conquest received less attention at the time, in some ways they were even more important than the economic effects.

186 While there is a tradition of separate political development in the Ukraine,[1] modern nationalism—the doctrine that persons of a distinctive culture should constitute an independent state—came late to the area. To a close observer, the first stirrings of nationalism among educated groups in the Ukraine would have been apparent early in the nineteenth century, and by the middle [538] of that century Taras Shevchenko, the greatest name in Ukrainian literature, was giving poetic expression to nationalist aspirations. It was considerably later, however, that definitely political [668] organizations were formed to establish the claim of the Ukraine to nationhood.[2] For the student of contemporary politics, it is precisely this late emergence of Ukrainian nationalism which

[1] The term "Ukraine" is used throughout this study (except in cases when another meaning is clearly implied) to refer to the territory comprised in the Ukrainian SSR in 1945. Essentially the same area (with the exception of the Carpatho-Ukraine, which is discussed briefly at several points in this study) was included in the Ukrainian SSR in 1941. This territory corresponds fairly closely—except, as noted in Chapter XI, in the east—to the Ukrainian "ethnographical" territory, the area in which the indigenous population speaks Ukrainian.

[2] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 12.

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186 endows it with peculiar interest. Few subjects are of greater importance for the understanding of the political forces shaping contemporary society than the interaction of nationalism, in its numerous manifestations, and socialism, in its divergent branches. Ukrainian nationalism is especially significant in this regard because it took form at the same time that Marxian socialism became influential as an ideology in the Russian Empire. As Ukrainian nationalism acquired definitely political aims and the dominant element of Russian Marxism took on the political form of Soviet Communism, the interrelationship between these two forces became increasingly complex.

121 This circumstance, together with the intrinsic importance of Ukrainian nationalism as a force directed toward securing the support of one fifth of the population of the Soviet Union,[3] appears to justify a detailed study of Ukrainian nationalism, even though it has never attained its primary aim, the establishment of a truly independent state. Moreover, the importance of the interaction of nationalism and Communism suggests that the study be focused upon that part of Ukrainian ethnographical territory which between 1920 and 1941 was under Soviet control. This region, commonly known as the "East Ukraine," was subjected to the full impact of the Soviet system prior to the period covered in the present study, while the "West Ukraine" was divided among non-Communist Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia during most of the period between the two world wars. While the East Ukraine is emphasized, the West Ukraine is also considered at some length as the region in which nationalism was most vigorous and as that which served as a base for nationalist activities.

The present study is primarily political in theme, being directed to nationalism as a movement aiming at the establishment of an independent state. It is not limited to the political aspect in the narrow sense of the term, however. Since the Ukrainian

[3] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946) furnishes a comprehensive analysis of available Soviet census information. Some non-Soviet analyses, based of course on considerable extrapolation of available data, place the Ukrainian portion of the population of the USSR as high as one fourth.

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nationalists did not succeed in organizing a state apparatus, there /181/ is little scope for the study of constitutional or legal structures. As will become apparent shortly, the nature of the various nationalist ideologies makes intensive study of Ukrainian political philosophy of limited value. Consequently, an effort has been made to follow the approach sometimes described as the "sociology of politics." The history of the nationalist parties has been traced and, insofar as possible, the diverse social elements of the nationalist movement have been described.

Many efforts have been made to analyze the nature of national- /186 ism and to determine the sources of its vitality. None have been entirely successful, for, like all dynamic movements which spread far beyond their original habitats, nationalism has been colored and transmuted by the varied milieus in which it has become established. It is a problem of peculiar difficulty to determine what has caused the movement to take root at all in many countries; this is especially true of the Ukraine. One of the most frequent stimuli of the nationalist spirit is religion, but the establishment of a separate Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy was the result of growing nationalist feeling rather than its cause.[4] Another stimulus of nationalism is the existence of distinctive customs and ways of living. In addition to distinctive popular art forms, which will be referred to later, there was a marked difference between the pre-1917 social organization of most Ukrainian peasant communities and their Russian counterparts. The people of the Ukraine, for example, did not usually follow the predominant Russian system of "repartition," or periodic redistribution of farmlands, with all its implications of subordination of the individual peasant to the community.[5] In 1905, before this people was generally recognized as a distinct nation, that shrewd observer of the tsar's dominions, Mackenzie Wallace, made these remarks:

[4] See Chapter VIII.

[5] Cf. Geroid Tanquary Robinson, *Rural Russia under the Old Regime: A History of the Landlord-Peasant World and a Prologue to the Peasant Revolution of 1917* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 35, on the comparative absence of the practice of repartition.

6 Emergence of Nationalism

188 The city [Kiev—Kyïv][6] and the surrounding country are, in fact,
184 Little Russian rather than Great Russian, and between these two sections of the population there are profound differences—differences of language, costume, traditions, popular songs, proverbs, folk-lore, domestic arrangements, mode of life, and Communal organization. In these and other respects the Little Russians, South Russians, Ruthenes, or Khokhly, as they are variously designated, differ from the Great Russians of the North, who form the predominant factor in the Empire, and who have given to that wonderful structure its essential characteristics. Indeed, if I did not fear to ruffle unnecessarily the patriotic susceptibilities of my Great Russian friends who have a pet theory on this subject, I should say that we have here two distinct nationalities, further apart from each other than the English and the Scotch. The differences are due, I believe, partly to ethnographical peculiarities and partly to historical conditions.[7]

197 As Wallace observed, linguistic differences between the Ukrain-
186 ians and Russians were significant. The factor of language has indeed been used very frequently as the decisive criterion for distinguishing the two ethnic groups.[8] During the nineteenth century a distinctive, though still evolving, Ukrainian literary language arose based on the speech prevalent among the peasantry. This speech is a member of the East Slavic linguistic group and therefore is closer to Russian than to any other major language, although Russian is not readily understood by most of the peasants. Russian was already established as the literary language of the East Ukraine before literary Ukrainian became prominent, however, and it continued to be familiar to nearly all educated Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

[6] The second form is the Ukrainian. Usually the place names cited in this study are given in the forms generally used by the power which since 1945 has controlled the area in which they are located. This means that places now in the USSR are designated by the Russian forms, and the few now in Poland by Polish forms. Where the Ukrainian name is different, it is given in parentheses after the first citation. In a few cases (especially rivers) where another form is already familiar to the English reader, this practice has not been followed, and in the case of the city of Mariupol' (Mariiupil'), which has recently been renamed Zhdanov, the old name has been used.

[7] Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1905), p. 347.

[8] In this study this general usage of referring to those who speak Ukrainian as their native tongue as "Ukrainians" has been followed, although it should be constantly kept in mind that use of the language in childhood does not necessarily imply a belief in Ukrainian independence, or even a consciousness of national distinctiveness.

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Fundamentally, though, it is not to the criteria of religion, 186
folkways, or language that the adherents of Ukrainian nationalism have appealed; more basic has been the evocation of a common historical tradition, the claim that the Ukrainian people, once great and independent, had lost its heritage. In the Europe of the turn of the century there were, to the superficial observer, two classes of nations, those which were embodied in independent states and those which were not.[9] Actually, the second group was almost as sharply subdivided into the "historic" nations, which had the memory of having possessed within modern times a stable state form, and those which were not so fortunate. Among the former may be mentioned the Poles, whose republic had vanished only a century previously, and the Czechs, who still preserved a vestige of their ancient state in the Crown of Bohemia. For groups like the Latvians, the Slovenes, and the inhabitants of the Ukraine, however, no such obvious rallying points of statehood existed; hence, the pages of history had to be searched to provide a comparable symbol of unity.

Since it was vital to the emerging nation that its language and 186
its history be embodied in works which could inspire loyalty, it 668*
was only natural that the leaders of the nationalist movement 538
should have been writers. The national poet Shevchenko has already been mentioned, and he was but one of many writers, such as Nicholas Kostomarov and John Franko. Historians, headed by Michael Hrushevs'kyi, who perhaps more than any other deserves the title of father of Ukrainian nationalism, were equally important.[10] The early leaders of the movement were almost without exception intellectuals—men more at home with words than deeds—a fact which was to have great significance for the future development of Ukrainian nationalism.

Part of the effort to stimulate the historical sense of the people 186
of the Ukraine centers around an endeavor to demonstrate that 668*
their ethnic and spiritual ancestor was the people of Kievan "Rus" and to deny that the Russians were descended from the medieval state of Kiev. Much greater energy is devoted, however,

[9] This concept is expressed in Hugh Seton-Watson's *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), pp. 268–69.
[10] Cf. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution*, p. 9.

186 to studying the Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Sich (the Stronghold
668* beyond the Rapids—of the Dnieper River) and to attempting to show that their struggles with Poland and Russia were in fact efforts to set up an independent Ukrainian state.[11] In this connection, the astonishing success against Poland of the seventeenth-century Cossack leader Bohdan Khmel'nits'kyi, who led his armies to the banks of the Vistula, is given special prominence. The subsequent story of how Khmel'nits'kyi became a vassal [12] of Moscow in order to maintain his independence of Poland, and of how the tsars then gradually absorbed his successors' realm, furnishes the chief historical basis for the allegation that union with the Russians was forced upon the Ukrainians.

While it could in all probability never have taken root without the existence of distinctive historical traditions, language, and customs, modern Ukrainian nationalism developed in the nineteenth century in a dual imitative-defensive reaction to foreign nationalisms. The German nationalist movement of the early nineteenth century, with its romantic emphasis on glorification of the national past and the language and customs of the common people, had a strong influence on nascent Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover, within the Austro-Hungarian Empire a culturally advanced segment of the Ukrainian people was in close contact with the intense nationalism of the Galician Poles. In Austrian Galicia the Poles occupied a privileged position, constituting in effect the ruling class of the area, which had once been part of the Polish kingdom. The Ukrainian-speaking half of the population of the province had never lost all awareness of its distinctiveness, since a considerable gap separates the Ukrainian and the Polish languages, and the ethnic division coincided with an ecclesiastical

[11] Compare the proportion of space devoted to the two periods in easily available histories by nationalist Ukrainians, such as Mykhailo (Michael) Hrushevs'kyi, *A History of the Ukraine,* ed. O. J. Frederiksen, Introduction by Professor George Vernadsky (New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Ukrainian National Association, 1941), and Dmytro Doroshenko, *History of the Ukraine,* trans. Hanna Keller (Edmonton, Alberta: The Institute Press, Ltd., 1939).

[12] The relationship of vassal is the one accepted by Hrushevs'kyi; see *Pro stari chasy na Ukraini* (Concerning the Olden Days in the Ukraine) (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Narodna Vol'ia, 1916), pp. 90 ff. Less moderate Ukrainians and Russians have described the agreement between Khmel'nits'kyi and Moscow in sharply contradictory terms.

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separation. The Poles were Latin Catholics, while the Ukrainians, [162] though also in obedience to the Pope, were nearly all of the Greek 186 (i.e., Byzantine-Slavonic) rite. Consequently, it is not surprising 668* that the ranks of the clergy provided a large proportion of the 793 awakeners of Galician Ukrainian national feeling. Most prominent of such priests was Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi. He was the scion of a family which was counted among the Polish nobility, but he felt himself to be Ukrainian; his career embraced almost the entire span of Ukrainian nationalist activity, from the turn of the century to the close of the period covered in this study.[13]

The reasons why a Ukrainian nationalist movement arose 186 within the Russian Empire are not so obvious. By the beginning 668* of the twentieth century, the great bulk of prominent men of 177 Ukrainian ethnic origin appear to have been Russified in culture and feeling, even if they occasionally gave signs of remembering that there were different cultural elements in their family backgrounds.[14] That the Russian Empire could have carried out such a large-scale assimilation is a tribute to the degree to which it was supranational, avoiding the narrower concepts of ethno- 186 centrism. Although a strong current had set in since the sixties, 668* when N. T. Danilevskii's *Rossiia i Evropa* (Russia and Europe) heralded the advent of Pan-Slavism based on ethnic Russian hegemony, for many, especially for officials in the governing bureaucracy, the rule of the tsars remained an expression of the ecumenical tradition of empire, a "Third Rome," but one which

[13] See Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora, Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), and Il'ko Borschak (Elie Borschak—this author is better known by the French form of his name), *Un Prèlat Ukrainien: Le Metropolite Cheptyckyj (1865–1944)* (Paris: Editions Franco-Ukrainiennes, 1946). The fact that the parish priests of the Greek Catholic rite were allowed to marry meant that their nationalist feeling could be passed on from generation to generation, a factor of considerable significance in providing a continuing body of bearers of the "national ideal."

[14] Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution.*

Two of the best Ukrainian sources for the period are Izaac Mazepa, *Ukraïna v ohni i buri revoliutsiï, 1917–1921* (The Ukraine in the Fire and Storm of the Revolution, 1917–21), 3 vols. (Munich: Prometei, 1950–51), and Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsiï: Istoriia ukraïns'koï revoliutsiï, marets', 1917 r.—hruden', 1919 r.* (The Rebirth of a Nation: A History of the Ukrainian Revolution, March, 1917–December, 1919), 3 vols. (Vienna, 1920).

186 based its authority on symbols of universality rather than national
668* exclusivism.[15]

186 The claims of the Russian Empire to acceptance, however,
665 were weakened by its failure to solve social questions. However
565 much cultural differences and historical memories may have contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, it is difficult to conceive how it could have arisen had it not to a large extent corresponded with a basic cleavage in the social structure of the Ukraine. There, to an unusual degree, nationality coincided with economic class. The Ukrainians were, with the exception of a small intelligentsia, almost entirely peasants; the landowners and officials were Poles or Russians, while the commercial bourgeoisie was largely Jewish. Under such circumstances, any nationalist movement was likely to become a class movement as well, a movement whose leaders would stress agrarian reform and liberation of the peasant from "exploiting" groups.

186 It was in this way, of course, that Ukrainian nationalism be-
668* came a rival of Communism. Basically, Communism[16] in the Russian Empire in the period before and during the Revolution of 1917, was a movement of townspeople. Both its ideology and its practical possibilities induced it to seek especially the support of the urban industrial workers, led and inspired by a group of dissident intellectuals. The latter were drawn from all the nations of the tsarist realm, but were predominantly Russian and Jewish. The workers were predominantly Russian, and those few Ukrainian laborers who had settled permanently in the cities prior to 1917 had for the most part become Russified in speech and consciousness. But the Communist leadership, with its sharp insight into the real social conditions of the country, realized that no purely urban movement could succeed in a country four-fifths peasant; hence, it sought, especially after the March Revolution

[15] An especially interesting treatment of this aspect of the Russian Empire is presented by Hans Rothfels in *Reich, Staat und Nation im deutsch-baltischen Denken: Vortrag bei der öffentlichen Sitzung der Gelehrten Gesellschaft zu Königsberg am 12 Januar 1930, Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, 7. Jahr. Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse, Heft 4* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1930).

[16] Actually the "Bolshevik" faction of the Social Democratic Party in Russia did not adopt the designation "Communist" until 1917. To avoid confusion, however, the latter term has been used throughout this study for the essentially continuous movement.

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in 1917, through the instrumentality of the soviets, to draw the villager into the revolutionary movement. At this point the Communists encountered the opposition of the Ukrainian nationalists. In the confusion and disorganization following the overthrow of the tsar in March, the Ukrainian nationalists had been able to pass from the stage of a quasi-legal group of parties, intent primarily on arousing an attachment to cultural nationalism, to a real, if shaky, political force. From the spring of 1917 to the summer of 1920, this force, though now no longer representing a single "movement," was able to maintain a series of Ukrainian governments on the soil of the Ukraine.

It is no purpose of this study to detail the nature of these governments which have been described elsewhere in comprehensive fashion.[17] For future reference, however, it is necessary at least to list them. The first, formed in April, 1917, was known as the Ukrainian Central Rada (*rada* means council and is the equivalent of the Russian word *soviet*), but during the first months of its activity it was really a semiautonomous administrative organ admitting the supremacy of the Provisional Government in Petrograd. Democratic and strongly socialist in its ideology, the Rada was the creation of the leftist intellectual groups which had predominated in the national movement before the war. It declared Ukrainian independence in January, 1918, but when it collided with the demands of the Germans, who occupied the Ukraine in February, 1918, the Rada was ousted. It was replaced by a quasi-monarchial regime under a member of the landowning aristocracy, Paul Skoropads'kyi, a descendant of a *het'man* or chieftain of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. After the armistice of November, 1918, this government, no longer supported by German troops, fell, and was replaced by a new regime, known as the Ukrainian People's Republic (Ukraïns'ka Narodna Respublika—UNR). This government lasted nearly two years, but was subject to extreme vicissitudes because of the strength of the Communist effort to conquer the Ukraine, attempts of the White anti-Bolshevik armies to reincorporate it in Russia, and the desire of Poland to extend her sphere of influence to the Dnieper. The administration, known as the "Directory," soon came under the

[17] Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution.*

The administration, known as the "Directory", soon came under the
642 control of its most forceful member, Simon Petliura, who, through
186 his military command, acquired such fame in this period that
668* among the less educated elements of the Ukrainian population his name has since been synonymous with the struggle for national independence.

Because they represented a measure of stability, the successive Ukrainian governments attracted the support of many persons who desired a regime independent of Communism. To be sure, many persons in the Ukraine who desired the establishment of a firm authority supported the conservative military commands of Denikin and Wrangel, the White generals. Before the latter became prominent, however, the equally conservative authority of the Het'man attracted the support of a considerable section of the upper classes of the tsarist society, including a number of military officers.[18] Once they had accepted the idea of an independent Ukraine, several of the officers, like Generals Vsevolod Petriv and Michael Omelianovych-Pavlenko, remained adherents of the nationalist Ukrainian regime which succeeded Skoropads'kyi, and were of valuable assistance because of their professional skill.[19]

186 On the other hand, except for Skoropads'kyi's group, the leader-
668* ship of Ukrainian nationalism remained predominantly in the hands of intellectuals throughout the revolutionary period, and even many of the Het'man's followers were writers and scholars. The educated youth of the Ukraine was divided between those who desired to join in the Bolshevik movement and those who chose the way of a left-wing nationalism. Victor Prykhod'ko, a

[1918-1920 --Analyst]

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 158–59.

[19] The biographies of these officers are extremely interesting because of the light they throw on the process of Ukrainization of tsarist aristocrats. Thus General Petriv had more Norwegian and Finnish than Ukrainian ancestry, but his family had been settled in the Ukraine for several generations; it is said that "his national consciousness was awakened" by association with ardently nationalist Finnish and Swedish officers from the grand duchy of Finland while on duty in Warsaw in 1904. Actually, the fact that the division of which he was chief of staff when the October Revolution took place was 80 percent Ukrainian may have decided him to throw in his lot with the national movement (cf. *Za Ukrainu*, January 28, 1945, p. 2, and February 1, 1945, p. 2). Omelianovych-Pavlenko was the son of a Don Cossack general and a Georgian princess, but being stationed in Odessa when the Bolshevik Revolution took place, he joined the Ukrainians. See Myroslav Martynets', "Gen.-Polk. M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko," (Colonel-General M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA*, August–September, 1952, p. 1).

nationalist who lived through the period, describes the former as 186
persons who thought on a "planetary" level, desiring to solve 668*
all the world's problems at once and regarding the claims of national affinity as "parochial." One, his schoolmate, was Volodymyr Zatons'kyi, who was later to become one of the most implacable of Communist officials in the Ukraine. Even before the war, he, according to the writer, refused to have anything to do with Ukrainian cultural activities, like the Prosvita [enlightenment] [575]
society in the city of Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamianets-Podils'k), where they were students. Rather, he associated with "foreigners," Russians and Jews, and was rapidly drawn into the revolutionary socialist movement.[20] The basis for a choice in this generation of young intellectuals appears to have been chance, or the psychological make-up of the individual, which was reinforced increasingly by the cumulative impact of associations formed after the initial choice was taken. Thus by the time the revolutionary conflicts drew to a close, the educated classes in the Ukraine were deeply split. Even more divided was the real foundation of any 565
independence movement, the peasants. They—or at least those 668*
who were somewhat more prosperous than the average—had 641
initially welcomed the Ukrainian governments. The increasing impotence of the new regimes and their preoccupation with factional strife and unrealistic programs instead of practical measures caused much indifference or disaffection among the peasants. In the judgment of one of the ablest students of the revolutionary period, however, the Ukrainian peasant preferred a nationalist government to either a Red or a "White" administration supporting a central regime.[21]

That the Communists were victors in the physical struggle is 642
no proof of greater popular support, for much of their strength

[20] Vyktor (Victor) Prykhodko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[21] William H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944). Moreover, one of the best Communist historians of the revolutionary period in the Ukraine, M. G. Rafes, a former adherent of the Jewish Bund, says the "natural" development of the peasants (and workers, especially in the sugar refineries in the small towns) was to "national socialism," "the Ukraine for the Ukrainian peasants," although he of course adds that they were inspired by the "reactionary bourgeois intelligentsia"; see *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine: Evoliutsiia i raskol "Bunda"* (Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine: The Evolution and Division of the "Bund") (Moscow, 1920), p. 8.

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642 came from the Russian workers of the cities, or from outside the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government under Petliura was to a considerable extent discredited, because it had failed to devote sufficient attention to the needs of the peasantry and to [648] establish law and order. Moreover, by an eleventh-hour alliance with Poland, it had compromised its claim to represent the entire Ukrainian nation. This resulted from the fact that Galicia, which, upon the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy had formed its own West Ukrainian Republic, was surrendered to the Warsaw regime as a price for aid in the east, a solution in which most Galicians refused to acquiesce. Nevertheless, Poland and the Soviet Union made peace, and shortly afterwards the remnants of the Ukrainian army and bureaucracy retreated across the border for internment in Poland. From this sanctuary a group of a few hundred under Colonel George Tiutiunnyk sortied in October, 1921, for a last desperate raid into the Soviet-occupied Ukraine.[22]

30 After that the East Ukraine lay under Communist rule, which 665 could no longer be challenged by military force. For a time, however, it appeared as if the rising tide of nationalist sentiment—it rose even among those who had long been adherents of Marxist doctrines—might bring about what arms had failed to accomplish. To understand this situation it is necessary to recall that the Communists under Lenin had modified their original stand in order to appeal to the nationalism of the non-Russians. In January, 1918, soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Third Congress of Soviets asserted a theoretical right of all the nations of the tsarist empire to go their several ways, to secede from the Bolshevik government in Moscow. At the same time, it deprived this right of any content by insisting that it be exercised only by the "toiling masses." Although the Communist Party's stand was more ambiguously phrased, its insistence that the interests of the toilers were represented only by the Communist Party and that the non-Russian Communist Parties formed inseparable parts of the central Bolshevik organization, in fact rendered self-determination a fiction. During the following years, the central Party [661] leadership used armed force when possible to insure that these local Communist Parties, thus reduced to mere branches of a

[22] Mazepa, III, 96–105.

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186 [661] [665]

unified Party, should "rule" within each smaller nation which had formed part of the tsarist empire.

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Having provided for the initial objective of substantial Communist control, however, the Bolshevik leaders made sweeping statements against "Great Russian chauvinism," and directed that the culture of each nation be "national in form, socialist in content." Encouraged by this apparent desire for development of the national culture at the expense of the Russian cultural supremacy, which had been grafted on their peoples in tsarist days, many of the Communist leaders of the non-Russian nations set about vigorously promoting an independent cultural life as soon as Communist control was established. In the Ukraine, the major leader in the effort during the early twenties was the commissar of education, Alexander Shums'kyi; after his deposition in 1927 he was succeeded by Nicholas Skrypnyk, an even more devoted Communist, but a firm adherent of Ukrainian cultural nationalism.[23] To what extent these men were sincere adherents of Ukrainian nationalism and to what extent the favor they extended to it was motivated by a desire to secure popular support and to curb the overweening power of Moscow in the interest of an internationalism which, to them, was in closer accord with original Communist ideology, it is hard to say. At any rate, they went to very considerable lengths to encourage specifically Ukrainian traits and traditions, especially in scholarship, literature, and the schools. While these Communist supporters of Ukrainian nationalism always formed only one segment of the ruling group in the Ukraine, and hence could not completely eradicate Russian permeation of

[23]No thorough treatment of the Ukraine under Soviet rule exists. Among the best brief analyses in English are John S. Reshetar, "National Deviation in the Soviet Union," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XII (April, 1953), 162–74; Michael Pap, "Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine," *Review of Politics*, XIV (April, 1952), 204–32; and an older but generally accurate account by Lancelot Lawton, "Ukraina: Europe's Greatest Problem," *East Europe*, III (Spring, 1939), 28–45. The continuation of Hrushevs'kyi's *A History of the Ukraine* by Professor O. J. Frederiksen, based on notes by Luke Mishuha (Chapter XXV) is also useful, as are more general works on the Soviet system, such as Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), Chapter IV, and Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1950), I, 289–307. The sources are, of course, voluminous and highly scattered. I can claim no special mastery of them, although my limited acquaintance leads me to the conclusions cited in the text, which are approximately those of Reshetar and Pap.

186 Ukrainian cultural life, they nevertheless developed a generation of young people who were accustomed to think and write in the Ukrainian literary language, although many continued to regard the use of Russian as a sign of culture.

Perhaps the Communists of the Skyrypnyk group remained at heart more devoted to Communism than to nationalism. Such was certainly not the case with a very large group of intellectuals, some from the rising generation, others from the group which had supported the national governments of the revolutionary period but later accepted the Soviet regime. Foremost among the latter was Michael Hrushevs'kyi; although he had served for a time as president of the Rada, he decided to return to the Soviet Ukraine when it appeared to offer an outlet for nationalist activity. For him and his group, which consisted predominantly of scholars and men of letters, the real aim was to reverse the Communist prescription by building a culture "socialist in form, national in content." Thus Hrushevs'kyi, who had always accepted a certain amount of socialist doctrine as the basis for needed reforms in the Ukraine, occasionally made room for Marxist ideology in his historical writings but left it clear that the real apex of his values was the Ukrainian nation. Moreover, he and his group persistently maintained that historical and economic links bound the Ukraine more closely to Western Europe than to Russia.

From the Communist point of view, such ideas were dangerous enough in themselves; while Communism could tolerate for a time basically antipathetic forms, it could not allow its own forms to be used as a cover for developing an independent ideology. It 186 661 appears that Stalin, the most ruthless insister on conformity, moved to crush the "national deviation" of the Ukrainians as soon as his power was sufficient; indeed, the first steps in this direction were taken as early as 1927. The great attack came in 1930, however, with the dismissal of Hrushevs'kyi from his academic post and the suppression of his scholarly organ *Ukraïna*. Along with this attack, which was carried out against all elements of intellectual life—including some obviously devout Marxists like the historian Iavors'kyi—which favored independent development of the Ukraine, went trials of suspect scholars who were

accused of having belonged to a subversive League for the Liberation of the Ukraine.[24] That this campaign of suppression coincided with the drive for the collectivization of agriculture in the Ukraine is hardly coincidental. In many respects the Ukrainian peasant was much more profoundly affected by the establishment of the kolkhoz (Ukrainian *kolhosp*), or collective farm, than was the Russian. The former was frequently more prosperous, hence had more to lose; moreover, the lack of a traditional communal agricultural organization in the Ukraine made the new system more alien and repugnant.

It appears certain that the Ukrainian peasantry formed a disproportionate, if not predominant, part of the hapless millions deported as "kulaks" to Siberia or Kazakhstan or driven by famine to the primitive slums of the expanding Soviet cities. Very probably this situation created a potential basis for a national rebellion based on economic and social oppression by alien rulers, just as had the Polish and Russian preponderance in governmental and landowning groups before the war. The Communists were frequently forced to use non-Ukrainians, Russian and Jewish intellectuals, workers from the towns, where they had real support, or persons imported from Russia itself, in order to carry out collectivization. Consequently, it is probable that the suppression of the nationalist intelligentsia at this time was at least in part a precautionary step to destroy a group which was of limited danger in itself yet might have presented a real threat to the Communists if it could have utilized the discontent of the peasants to turn them to nationalism. To what extent the Soviet regime succeeded in eliminating the nationalist intellectuals is one of the principal topics which will be dealt with on the basis of the evidence provided in this study. It should be noted at this point,

[24] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166; T. Skubyts'kyi, "Klassovaia bor'ba v ukrainskoi istoricheskoi literature" (The Class Struggle in Ukrainian Historical Literature), *Istorik-Marksist*, No. 17 (1930), pp. 27–40 (one of the principal Communist assaults on the Hrushevs'kyi school and other "deviationists"). The whole question of the purge of intellectuals, with special reference to historians, is discussed at length by Boris Krupnyts'kyi in "Die Ukrainische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion 1921–1941," in *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas*, 194[illegible], pp. 125–51. For Skrypnyk's official statement, see his *Statti i promovy* (Articles and Speeches) (Kharkov: Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo Ukrainy, 1930), Vol. I: *Spil'ka Vyzvolennia Ukrainy* (The League for the Liberation of the Ukraine), pp. 413–36.

[661] however, that their resistance was undoubtedly crushed between
517 1930 and the closing series of purge trials in 1937–38.[25]

While articulate nationalism was being crushed in the Soviet
186 Ukraine, a somewhat different development was taking place in
[563] the West Ukraine. In Poland the extreme policy of the ruling nationality, which had been chauvinistic enough under the Austrian empire, became still more violent toward the Ukrainians after the reestablishment of the Polish national state. As was previously noted,[1] Petliura's agreement with the Poles had been deeply resented by the Galician Ukrainians. While most nationalists endeavored to smooth over criticism of Petliura personally, especially after his assassination in Paris in 1925, most West Ukrainians gave no support to the émigré UNR government. The West Ukrainians, on the contrary, tried their own approaches to the problem of carrying on Ukrainian life under conditions of oppression by non-totalitarian, but intolerant, alien nationalist governments.

186 One attempted solution was the formation of legally recognized
665 parties which carried on electoral campaigns and sent representatives to the Polish Sejm or parliament where they attempted to protect the interests of their group within the framework of means permitted by the ruling nationality. This type of political activity, together with a wide variety of cultural work aimed at developing Ukrainian culture and maintaining the national distinctiveness of the masses, absorbed the efforts of a very large proportion of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia during the twenties and thirties. In particular, most of the older generation which had been reared under the relatively peaceful and stable conditions of Austrian rule, circles closely associated with the Greek Catholic Church, and most of the liberal professions engaged in this activity. Although there were a number of minor parties, some of which had authoritarian leanings, the majority of this segment of Ukrainian political workers was grouped in the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychne Ob''iednannia—UNDO), which was definitely democratic in character, with varying amounts of Catholic, liberal, and socialist ideology embodied in its program. Its efforts met

[25] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166.

1 [see category 116, p 14 -- Analyst]

with very uncertain success, fluctuating from periods of relatively 186
satisfactory cooperation with the Poles to embittered boycott of 665
an unbearably oppressive regime.[26]

Some West Ukrainians soon rejected the road of accommoda- 186
tion to the Polish government; in the early twenties they turned 668 *
to Communism as the champion of both nationalist aspirations and social needs. While the Ukrainians of Galicia were not so badly off economically as were those in the East Ukraine before and after the war of 1914, they suffered from a high ratio of population to available land, from inadequate agricultural productivity, and above all from the fact that the vast majority of [464]
bureaucratic and urban jobs which would have served as the natural outlets for their sons, compelled by ambition or lack of employment to leave the land, were absorbed by Poles and Jews. In Volhynia, conditions were much worse; probably they were as bad, as far as purely economic circumstances went, as those within the Soviet Ukraine prior to 1930. Consequently, a broad economic basis for Communist propaganda existed; under the circumstances in which a nationalist Ukrainian Communist regime appeared to be taking form in Kiev, this propaganda appealed strongly to the nationalist element among West Ukrainians as well. As a result, two Communist-front organizations, the [665]
Ukrainian Party of Labor (Ukraïns'ka Partiia Pratsi) and the Peasants-Workers Association (Selians'ko-Robitnycha Partiia—Sel-Rob) had considerable success, especially in Volhynia. More serious from the strictly nationalist point of view, a large number of the students, the backbone of the new generation which would have to carry on national life, was attracted to the Communist program.[27]

At the same time, an extreme movement of a different type attracted wide support. The movement which is commonly known in American scholarship as "integral nationalism" arose in Western Europe at the close of the nineteenth century, considerably before Communism became a factor of any real political importance. It is generally recognized that one of the first exponents

[26] See Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939).

[27] See especially Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

186 of the ideology was Charles Maurras, who, together with a group
668* of extreme French nationalists and advocates of political reaction, established the Action Française at the turn of the century. Integral nationalism never had much appeal in France or other Western European countries, but in modified forms it became a dominant force in the "dissatisfied" countries of Central and Southern Europe in the twenties. Here it was one element which provided an ideological platform for Mussolini's Fascism and for the rising Nazi party in Germany. Its influence was also felt strongly in the extreme nationalist parties of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Because integral nationalism is by definition a movement of individual nations rather than a universal ideology and because its adherents reject systematic rational programs, it is difficult to define its precise nature. The following characteristics, however, stand out: (1) a belief in the nation as the supreme value to which all others must be subordinated, essentially a totalitarian concept; (2) an appeal to mystically conceived ideas of the solidarity of all individuals making up the nation, usually on the assumption that biological characteristics or the irreversible effects of common historical development had welded them into one organic whole; (3) a subordination of rational, analytic thought to the "intuitively correct" emotions; (4) expression of the "national will" through a charismatic leader and an elite of nationalist enthusiasts organized in a single party; (5) glorification of action, war, and violence as an expression of the superior biological vitality of the nation.[28]

In the twenties these concepts came to permeate much of European—and to a much lesser extent American—thought, even when they were not accepted explicitly as a political program. Among the suppressed nations of Eastern Europe, where conditions were different from those in the Central European states in which the new ideology eventually won control, the new ideas were readily received, but in a somewhat modified form. This was the case in the West Ukraine in the twenties, where two essentially distinct groups prepared the ground for integral national-

[28] For a discussion of integral nationalism, see Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948).

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ism.[29] One drew its strength from the resentment of the Galician soldiers who had borne a heavy part of the burden of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, only to be consigned to second-class citizenship by Poland. The most active were veterans of the Sichovi Stril'tsi (Sich Sharpshooters), a unit which had operated under Colonel Eugene Konovalets' in the East Ukraine. After the collapse of the UNR, the unit disbanded in Galicia; many of its members united in forming an illegal, para-military organization known as the Ukraïns'ka Viis'kova Organizatsiia (Ukrainian Military Organization—UVO). In the bitter struggles with the Poles in the twenties, this group was harshly treated and retaliated with some deeds of violence. Basically, however, it was a military protective group rather than a terrorist underground.

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As a reaction to Communism, more radically nationalist groups arose. As has been noted, Communist influence threatened to win the bulk of the Ukrainian student population in the early twenties; this was true not only in the legally recognized universities, but also in the underground university established illegally in L'vov by Ukrainian scholars to give academic training to hundreds of the young people to whom the Poles denied admission to institutions of higher education. One of the principal factors in turning the students from Communism to a nationalist movement, which was organized as the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth (Soiuz Ukraïns'koï Natsionalistychnoï Molodi—SUNM), was the work of Dmytro Dontsov. Dontsov, an East Ukrainian by origin, had been an active propagator of nationalism even before the First World War. By the early twenties his teachings had come to resemble those of the integral nationalists, although apparently he derived most of his ideas from the Ger-

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[29] The following account is based on numerous oral and written sources. Three which may be mentioned in particular are V. Martynets', *Ukraïns'ke pidpillia vid UVO do OUN: Spohady i materiialy do peredistoriï ta istoriï ukraïns'koho organizovanoho natsionalizmu* (The Ukrainian Underground from the UVO to the OUN: Memoirs and Materials Concerning the Prehistory and the History of Organized Ukrainian Nationalism) (Winnipeg, 1949), a voluminous though overly sympathetic account; a series of articles in *Ukraïnets'-Chas*, June 10, 1951, p. 4, June 17, 1951, p. 4, July 1, 1951, p. 4, and August 8, 1951, p. 5, by Bohdan Kravtsiv; and Vasyl' Rudko ("R. Lisovii"), "Rozlam v OUN" (The Split in the OUN), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, May 23, 1949, p. 3.

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man nationalists, like Fichte and Herder, rather than from Maurras or Italians like Pareto and D'Annunzio. Space does not permit any real analysis of the ideology which Dontsov propagated with great success among the youth of Galicia. Insofar as it deviated from the general pattern of integral nationalism, however, it stressed especially the following features: (1) the emphasis on force inherent in the ideology was largely expressed, in the absence of the possibility of sustained open opposition to the dominant group, in advocacy of terrorism; (2) since a state which could be glorified as the bearer of the "national ideal" did not exist, enormous stress was placed on securing absolute adherence to the "pure" national language and culture; (3) absence of the tradition of a state which, through its institutional and legal structure, had supported the national aspirations, and opposition to existing states, led to extreme glorification of "illegality" as such; (4) in close connection with the two preceding points, the essential irrationalism of the ideology was expressed by fantastic romanticism, which was, however, among the comparatively unsophisticated Ukrainians more spontaneous and genuine than the cynical rejection of reason by Germans and Italians; (5) the failure of the efforts of the older generation, and its tendency to compromise with the Polish "occupiers," enhanced the natural tendency of integral nationalism to rely on youth and reject the moderation of its elders.

How these elements in the ideology of the dominant nationalist parties influenced the course of events during the Second World War forms a major topic of this study. Here it should be stressed, however, that integral nationalism was not the only foreign influence on the ideology of the nationalist parties between the two world wars. Also of great importance was the tradition of revolution which had its field of development so close at hand in the tsarist empire. In their terrorist underground activity during the late twenties and early thirties, which included especially assassination of Polish officials and Soviet representatives, the Ukrainian groups modeled themselves on movements like the Russian Narodnaia Volia of the 1870s. In other respects they (and indeed other integral nationalists like the German Nazis) copied Bolshevik methods, especially the organization of a secret political

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police to maintain the "purity" of the party and the ruthless 186
methods of intraparty strife. The stridency and lack of regard for 668*
the truth in propaganda show similar influences. There remained, however, strong elements of liberal and democratic, as well as Christian, principles, even when the participants in the movement verbally rejected them. Formal learning, respect for established authority, individual decision, and popular choice were never completely absent from the real workings of even the most radical groups. Integral nationalism was a fever which gripped some of the most active elements of the Ukraine in the generation after 1918, but it is easier to understand and perhaps to condone in this nation than in others which have had more opportunity for self-expression through the development of a state based upon law.

During the twenties the Ukrainian Military Organization and the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth gradually won over nearly all politically active elements in the West Ukraine, except those which adhered to the moderate legal parties. Moreover, there were always close connections between the veterans' organization and the students' group; in 1929 these connections were formalized by the establishment of the OUN (Organizatsiia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv—Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) which joined both groups into a single party which was to carry on the struggle both by political means and by force against all oppressors of the Ukrainian nation.[30] Through its appeal to the frustrated youth living under Polish rule and through its attraction for many of the embittered émigrés from the East Ukraine, the new movement rapidly attained considerable strength. For eight years it was directed by the former commander of the Sichovi Stril'tsi, Konovalets'. His assassination, almost certainly by a Soviet agent, on May 23, 1938, was a severe blow to the OUN.[31]

Before the new leadership of the organization could fairly estab-

[30] Most Ukrainian writers apply the term "nationalist" (*natsionalist*) to the OUN alone. Non-integral nationalists strongly reject its application to their parties. While I have felt it necessary to conform to the usage current in Western studies when using the term "nationalist" without capitalizing, I have begun the word with a capital letter whenever referring to the OUN.

[31] Stephen Davydovych, "Colonel Eugene Konovaletz," *Contemporary Russia*, II (August–October, 1938), [illegible].

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lish itself, it was confronted with a situation which would have severely tried the capacity of a much more experienced body. The agreements made at Munich in October, 1938, had weakened the Czechoslovak republic; the Ukrainian nationalists of the small and backward province of Carpatho-Ukraine began to agitate for autonomy. In this they were encouraged by the Nazi regime, which wished to use Ukrainian nationalism as an element tending to disrupt the Czechoslovak state, facilitating subsequent domination by Germany. Apparently the Germans also wished to encourage Ukrainian nationalism in the Carpatho-Ukraine as a potential threat to the Soviet Union and to Poland. In October, 1938, the nationalists declared the Carpatho-Ukraine to be a "free, federated [in Czechoslovakia] state," and eventually Prague recognized its autonomy, although the economically most valuable part was ceded to Hungary. Local Ukrainian nationalists, most of whom were members of, or sympathetic to, the OUN, were organized and excited to more extreme action by OUN leaders who had been living as émigrés in Germany and who had been dispatched to the Carpatho-Ukraine by the OUN directory on the advice of the German intelligence service.[32] A major part of their activities was devoted to forming a para-military organization, the Carpathian Sich, which, they hoped, would form the nucleus of an army of an all-Ukrainian state.

When the Germans occupied Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939, they agreed to permit Hungary to occupy the remainder of the Carpatho-Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists were informed of this decision and advised to submit to Hungarian rule;[33] they resolved, however, to take the desperate course of proclaiming the

[32] For accounts by participants in the early development of the Carpatho-Ukrainian "state," see Vasyl' Veresh-Sirmians'kyi, "Zakarpats'ka Molod'" (The Transcarpathian Youth), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, March 16, 1947, p. 6; Stepan Rosokha, "Karpats'ka Ukraïna v borot'bi za derzhavu" (The Carpatho-Ukraine in the Struggle for Statehood), *ibid.*; and Iurii Tarkovych, "Sontse iz zakhodu" (The Sun from the West), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, March 17, 1948, p. 5. On the role of the OUN see also Rudko (*Ukraïns'ki Visti*, May 23, 1949, p. 3) and Seton-Watson, p. 395.

[33] German Consul in Hust [Carpatho-Ukraine] to Foreign Ministry, March 14, 1939, and Staatssekretär von Weizsäcker to German Consul in Hust, March 15, 1939, Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, ed. Raymond J. Sontag *et al.*, Series D, Vol. IV (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 210, 237.

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independence of the Carpatho-Ukraine under a government headed by a priest, Monsignor Augustine Voloshyn. This "independence" lasted only a few days, however; the Carpathian Sich was unable to offer any effective resistance to the heavily armed Hungarian forces. The first major attempt of the nationalists in nearly two decades to liberate Ukrainian soil from foreign rule had failed. It was the forerunner of many such disappointments for the OUN and for all nationalist Ukrainians.

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II. THE UKRAINIANS AND THE POLISH CATASTROPHE

186 FEW GROUPS in the Europe of 1939 had more to gain from a change in the *status quo* than did the nationalist Ukrainians. All who dreamed of an independent and united Ukraine realized that it could arise only out of a series of catastrophic changes in Eastern Europe. The only event likely to initiate such upheavals was a major war.

For many years the most probable war of this nature had appeared to be one between Poland—perhaps with the backing of one or more Western powers—and the Soviet Union. Later, after Hitler's accession to power and the phenomenal increase of German strength, the likely antagonists appeared to be Germany and Poland on the one hand and the USSR on the other. Either contingency, the Ukrainian nationalists felt, would probably lead to a liberation of the Soviet Ukraine, since both Polish and German leaders had long included detachment of this area from Moscow among their major aims in the East. The end of the Polono-German *rapprochement* of the the middle thirties dispelled the hope of an immediate Central European combination against the Communist oppressor, but it opened up the prospect, scarcely less attractive for many Ukrainians, of German destruction of the hated Polish state. Consequently, in spite of the severe disappointment suffered when the Germans failed to support the embryonic Ukrainian "state" in the Carpatho-Ukraine, most nationalist circles were prepared in late 1939 to go along with German policy as they had in the preceding years. While the shock of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact in August caused considerable questioning of the validity of this course, it did not deter

the more active elements from maintaining their collaboration 186
with Germany. Few, if any, could foresee that Germany would actually allow the Soviet Union to absorb the West Ukrainian lands.

Perhaps of all Ukrainian nationalist movements the least pre- 168*
pared to cope with the startling changes which took place after August, 1939, was that of Paul Skoropads'kyi. As was previously indicated, this movement had never been strong numerically, even in its days of dominance in the Ukraine. In emigration it was further weakened by the fact that many of its original followers had really been adherents of the Russian monarchy at heart, and saw little advantage in supporting a Ukrainian "monarch" unless he was the only ruler available. It is true that, following these defections, the Het'man and his remaining followers had become much more nationalist in their outlook; it was, however, scarcely possible for them to compete with the OUN in this respect, and they lacked the prestige of the UNR, which could claim lineal descent from those who had first endeavored to realize the dream of a modern Ukrainian state. With the exception of a small group in Great Britain, the bulk of Skoropads'kyi's émigré followers were organized in the Ukraïns'ka Hromada (Ukrainian Community) in Greater Germany, where they claimed some 3,500 members in 1940.[1] Most were middle-aged or older.

What the Het'manites lacked in numerical strength and youthful vigor they had in part made up through the prestige of their
adherents. Foremost among these, until his death in 1931, was [212]
Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, a talented historian and philosopher who is widely acknowledged to have been the most original and profound Ukrainian thinker of the post-1918 era. In the period now under consideration, his influence in the Hromada was continued by a group of able historians headed by Dmytro Doroshenko. The official ideology of the movement was a compromise between the

[1] See the first issue of *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1940, p. 1, the organ of the Het'man group. For a succinct but generally accurate and penetrating summary of the position of this and other Ukrainian groups in mid-1941, see a memorandum from the files of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Occ E-4 (5), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [5]). Since the signature is illegible, I have not been able to determine the name of the author of this memorandum.

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668* philosophical reflections of such men and the exigencies of practical politics, particularly the need of adjustment to the emerging New Order.

A "catechism" for the Het'man followers, published in 1940, strongly emphasized the continuing theme of the movement—territorial rather than ethnic patriotism as the basis for a future Ukrainian state.[2] The Ukrainian nation was declared to be the organized collective of the Ukrainian people belonging to the "Aryan" race[3]—an ambiguous statement which was at once a concession to Nazi doctrine and a hint of willingness to accept as part of the Ukrainian nation the Russian and Polish "Aryans" living on Ukrainian soil. The remainder of the program was frankly conservative: a class society based on the orders of the "plow," the "work bench," and the "word" is advocated, with all subjects being guaranteed the right to live, to work in their proper calling, and to have due process of law.[4] The church was to be independent but allied to the monarchy.[5] It is fairly obvious that in the fierce turmoil which was to grip the Ukraine during the war years, doctrines derived from reflection on a long course of Ukrainian history would be understood and appreciated only by the most reflective members of the new generations reared under Stalinism or those attracted by the advance of extreme nationalism. The Het'manite ideology in itself would probably have proved an insurmountable handicap to the fulfillment by the Het'man group of its aspirations for power.

Somewhat paradoxically, in the light of its ideological position, which differed fundamentally from National Socialist teachings, Skoropads'kyi's movement had many close links to the rulers of the Third Reich. There was, of course, a strong precedent for this position in the heavy dependence of the Het'man on the forces of Kaiser Wilhelm; moreover, the Het'man is reported to have been on terms of personal friendship with Hermann Göring.[6]

[2] A. M. Andriievs'kyi, *Katekhyzys abo nastavlennia v derzhavnii nautsi dlia ukraïns'koho Het'mantsia-Derzhavnyka* (A Catechism or Position on State Science for the Ukrainian Adherent of the Het'man State) (Berlin, August 15, 1940).

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 21 f.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[6] Joachim Joesten, "Hitler's Fiasco in the Ukraine," *Foreign Affairs*, XXI (January, 1943), 334.

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The conservatism of the Het'manites, while differing in important respects from Nazism, was useful to the German leaders as a factor which could be used against Communism. Yet, because of its tendency to avoid violent action, it was less likely in practice to interfere with their aims than was the position of the Nationalists (OUN), which was so much closer to theirs ideologically. At times the conservative caution of the Skoropads'kyi followers almost reached the dead center of passivity. In December, 1940, for example, their organ argued that the Ukrainian question was not going to be settled at the moment and condemned "agitators" who were trying to "form ministries and imagine international combinations" in which such a settlement could take place.[7] Later it was to lead to an almost incredible complacency in the face of German ruthlessness in the Ukraine. For example, as late as August 30, 1942, Het'man Skoropads'kyi himself advised his followers to exercise caution, to collaborate with the Germans against the Bolsheviks, and to wait for peace. He concluded by asserting that "the Germans must be convinced that the Ukrainians are honest people."[8]

From the point of view of ideology and political orientation, the UNR was at the opposite pole of Ukrainian politics. In many ways, however, its development had closely paralleled that of the Het'man movement. The UNR was, of course, the "legitimate" successor of the republic of 1918–1920. As was previously mentioned, the first president, Simon Petliura, had been succeeded by Andrew Livyts'kyi, who continued to regard himself as chief of state of a government-in-exile and, consequently, above parties. Actually, by 1939 the bulk of his followers were members of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, though the aura of legitimacy kept many others, especially Social Revolutionaries, in lose allegiance to him. Furthermore, the ideology of the group was unquestionably socialist and democratic—though of a somewhat

[7] Editorial in *Ukrains'ka Diiznist'*, December 1, 1940, p. 1.

[8] *Ukrains'kyi derzhavnyk al'manakh na 1943 rik* (Ukrainian Statist Almanac for 1943) (Berlin, n.d.), p. 8. As a result of the weaknesses outlined above, the Het'man organization played a comparatively insignificant role in the development of real political forces in the Ukraine during the period of this study. Hence it will not be useful to interrupt a discussion of more important activities to mention its stand on developments.

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668* dated type, namely, the rather loosely formulated and Utopian theory of the pre-1917 era.

In practice, certain disquieting developments had taken place in the outlook of the UNR. Doubtless, no democratic group could survive eighteen years of émigré existence without certain signs of deterioration. The very strength of democratic government itself—frequent renewals of support through submission of policies to popular verdict and recruitment of new forces from the masses of the people—are rendered inoperative by emigration. The democratic government—an essentially dynamic phenomenon—is rendered static by its severance from the masses, and its members are turned in upon themselves. Personal feuds, factionalism, and striving for outside support replace the more healthy characteristics of democratic politics. Such was the development in the UNR. When the war began, the "government" was dispersed in three European capitals. Several of the lesser ministers were in Prague, where, until a short time before, the democratic atmosphere and the encouragement of the Czechoslovak government had created a favorable climate for Ukrainian cultural development. In Paris were Viacheslav Prokopovych, prime minister, and Alexander Shul'hyn, foreign minister. The chief center, however, was Warsaw, where President Livyts'kyi and his ministers Sal's'kyi and Smal'-Stots'kyi resided.[9]

This distribution of the personnel of the government corresponded roughly to its ties with the European governments. The basic commitment was to Poland, in line with Petliura's policy in the final months of his regime. In exile, the government's ties with the Polish state had become still closer.[10] At the outbreak of the war a considerable number of former officers of the Ukrainian Republican Army were serving as professional soldiers ("contract officers") with the Polish army. Moreover, the Promethean movement, which had been founded by Ukrainians in the twen-

[9] Roman Smal'-Stots'kyi is well known in the United States as Smal-Stocki, a Polish form of transliteration of the Ukrainian; Shul'hyn is equally well known under the Russian form of his name, Shul'gin.

[10] At least they had become closer after Petliura's assassination. As noted previously, he had left Poland because of the difficulty of his position in a country which stifled Ukrainian life within its borders. Livyts'kyi, however, found it possible to continue to reside in Warsaw, and the resultant hostility of the Galician elements drove him still closer to the Polish regime.

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ties and was headed by Smal'-Stots'kyi, leaned heavily on Warsaw. 668*
This movement, which endeavored to unite the émigré leaders of the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union, played a large part in Polish aspirations for the development of a bloc of states in Eastern Europe, stretching from Finland to the Caucasus, in which Poland could become a true great power by exercising her "natural" position of leadership. The Ukrainian leaders of the Promethean movement were, of course, aware of the Polish aims, but in their overwhelming desire for liberation of their peoples from the Communist yoke they accepted the assistance of the Warsaw government.[11]

From the point of view of practical politics, the dependence of the UNR leaders upon Poland is readily understandable. Unfortunately, the Polish environment did much to accentuate the naturally unwholesome condition of exile. The tendency to chauvinism in the Polish state, its rapid abandonment of democratic principles in the thirties, and the atmosphere of military factionalism were reflected to some extent in the parallel development of the Ukrainian movement.

As corollaries of their ties with Poland, and also of their democratic ideology, the UNR leaders preferred to carry on their activities in France and Rumania where they received some encouragement from official circles. There was a large group of republican émigrés in Rumania, but the political environment deteriorated rapidly there in the same fashion as in Poland. Conditions in France were far more favorable, and the Ukrainian republican community there, which included a number of persons who had been prominent in the UNR government, remained basically democratic in its outlook. The Franco-Soviet pact appeared to destroy any hope of real assistance from France, however. At the same time, as has been noted, the prospect of Polono-German cooperation against the Soviet Union was strengthened. This prospect was so attractive to the UNR leaders that many, including, it is said, President Livyts'kyi, refused to accept the reality of the deterioration in German-Polish relations as late as

[11] For a sympathetic account of the Promethean movement by its leader at the outbreak of the war, see Roman Smal'-Stots'kyi, "The Struggle of the Subjugated Nations in the Soviet Union for Freedom: Sketch of the History of the Promethean Movement," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, III (Autumn, 1947), 324–44.

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668 *the summer of 1939, and hoped desperately for a reversal of the German policy even after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was announced.[12]

When war broke out dozens of Ukrainian officers faithfully carried out their assignments in the hopelessly outmatched Polish army. In return, the Polish government apparently gave little attention to the safety of the UNR members in Warsaw. Nevertheless, Livyts'kyi was finally able to leave the city and to reach the Ukrainian ethnographical area of Poland. There his party received news of the rapid approach of Soviet forces which were cutting across eastern Galicia between them and the Rumanian border. They decided that German captivity was preferable to falling into the hands of their archenemies. Before surrendering to the Germans, however, the President was able to send word to Prokopovych that, in accordance with the constitution, he should assume the office of president, and that Shul'hyn should in turn become premier.[13] The Prometheans, headed by Smal'-Stots'kyi, had reached L'vov (L'viv), and were in even greater peril from the Soviet approach, but they, too, succeeded in reaching the German lines and were safely evacuated, probably through special efforts of Admiral Canaris, the German chief of intelligence, who hoped to preserve the group for future use against the Soviet Union.[14]

Once they had reluctantly accepted the protection of the German forces, the Ukrainian republicans were treated as enemy prisoners. Their organization was declared illegal, and the leaders were subjected to close surveillance and restriction of movement. Their treatment, however, was soon made less severe. A number of the "contract officers," while nominally prisoners of war, were allowed to move about in German-occupied Poland, while several political leaders were even given employment in writing studies on the Ukraine for the Germans. Undoubtedly this moderation was in part facilitated by the willingness of Livyts'kyi and other leaders to maintain unofficial contacts of a friendly nature with German representatives. As will be shown, however, they were

[12] Interview 14.
[13] Interview 23; *Nastup*, March 9, 1940.
[14] Cf. Karl Abshagen, *Canaris, Patriot und Weltbürger* (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1949), p. 217; Interview 14.

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by no means willing to become pawns of the Germans and took what occasions arose to endeavor to regain their freedom of action.[15] 668*

For a certain time, the "successor government" in Paris was able to pursue an independent policy. Prokopovych and Shul'hyn were active in aiding the Allied cause, especially in efforts to secure the enlistment of the considerable number of workers of Ukrainian origin for a hoped-for legion to aid Finland in her struggle against the Soviet Union. Before these plans could materialize, the rapid German invasion of France also enveloped them. Shul'hyn was sent to a concentration camp, Prokopovych died a few months after the French surrender, and all significant activity in this quarter ceased.

The OUN, which had rapidly increased in influence in the thirties, followed a still different course. The assassination of Konovalets' was a severe blow, but its most injurious consequences were not felt immediately. Soon afterwards the OUN was deeply involved in the attempted formation of the Ukrainian "state" in the Subcarpathian province of Czechoslovakia. The collapse of this project in March caused extreme disappointment. It did not, however, discredit the OUN in the eyes of most nationalist Ukrainians. After all, they pointed out, the Ukrainians had put up a determined, if brief, struggle against overwhelming odds, while the other nationalities of the Czechoslovak republic had submitted to the dictates of the surrounding powers without offering any resistance at all. Thousands of young Carpatho-Ukrainians went into exile (mostly to Greater Germany), thus expanding the ranks of the OUN. The Carpathian Sich, the military organization which fought the Hungarians, took its place in the Ukrainian legend along with the Zaporozhian Cossacks, the Sichovi Stril'tsi, and Tiutiunnyk's band. The net result was an immediate increase in the prestige of the organization, although doubts of the wisdom of the course it had followed were to come to the surface later.

At the outbreak of war, the leadership of the OUN was very much the same as it had been prior to the death of Konovalets'. Aside from its chief, Andrew Mel'nyk, there were eight members

[15] See Chapter IV.

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668* of the Provid, or directorate. The importance of these men in the events which are to be described warrants a somewhat detailed consideration of their backgrounds and personalities. Two were generals of the revolutionary period; the OUN, like most Ukrainian organizations, felt it desirable to ornament its directing organ with personalities who recalled the days of the active struggle for liberation, thus serving to connect the organization more closely with the nationalist myth. General Kurmanovych's role seems to have been largely confined to this contribution of prestige; the same cannot be said concerning General Kapustians'kyi, who was to play a courageous and active role in nationalist organization in the East Ukraine after June, 1941. Neither, however, appears to have exerted major influence on the development of the policy of the organization. Also of limited importance in policy formation were two of the younger members of the Provid, Iaroslav Baranovs'kyi and Dmytro Andriievs'kyi. Baranovs'kyi, only thirty-three when war broke out, was of a different generation from that of most of the members of the Provid. Of Galician background, he had been an active member of the underground student organization in L'vov and had been imprisoned by the Poles. Later he continued his law studies in Austria.[16] His age and background would seem to have made him a natural link between the Provid and the Galician nationalist youth, and indeed, up until 1940 his influence in the latter group was considerable. Unfortunately for him, his reputation was in constant danger of being brought into question by the fact that his brother, Roman, had acted as an agent for the Polish police, although Iaroslav was, from all evidence, quite innocent in this connection.[17] Andriievs'kyi, though only a few years older than Baranovs'kyi, had quite a different background and function in the organization. He had left the East Ukraine as a young man, had followed a brief career in the diplomatic service of the republic, and then had been trained as an engineer in Belgium. Joining the movement, he took over a considerable part of its external relations, though the chief contacts were carried on with Germany through other chan-

[16] Obituary in *Nastup*, May 30, 1943, p. 5.
[17] Interviews 52, 75; Bohdan Mykhailiuk, *Bunt Bandery* (Bandera's Rebellion) (1950), p. 50.

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nels. His moderation and talent as a writer made him a valuable asset to the organization.[18] 668*

Next in the scale of importance in the Provid were two military men, much younger and more active, however, than the generals previously referred to. Richard Iarii was unique among members of the Provid in that he was Ukrainian only by adoption. It is uncertain whether he was of Czech or German origin; he had served as an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army, along with numerous Galician Ukrainians, and upon the dissolution of this force had cast in his lot with the struggling Ukrainian Republican Army. He served loyally and well, and, after the failure of Ukrainian efforts, continued to collaborate with his comrades in the UVO. As Germany became stronger, he established close ties with German military intelligence circles. To the other members of the Provid he was a good comrade, a talented supporter of a cause desperately in need of help, and a welcome intermediary in dealing with the Germans. At the same time, he was regarded as ambitious, and it has been suggested that he was not overscrupulous; some of his associates felt that his allegiance was not wholeheartedly to the Ukrainian nationalists.[19] Colonel Roman Sushko, like Iarii, had served in both the Austro-Hungarian and Ukrainian armies; he, too, was in close contact with the Abwehr. Unlike Iarii, however, he was a typical West Ukrainian of Galician peasant stock.[20]

Of greatest influence were Nicholas Stsibors'kyi and Omelian Senyk. Stsibors'kyi was born in Zhitomir in 1897, the son of a tsarist army officer, and spent his youth in Kiev. Thus he was familiar with the East Ukraine as it had existed prior to the Revolution. After serving in the Ukrainian army, he had emigrated to Prague, where he studied engineering and economics.[21] Joining the UVO and the OUN during this period, he rapidly rose to the position of official theorist of the latter group; in this capacity, he exerted great influence. Senyk, in contrast to Stsibors'kyi, was the practical organizer of the party. Of Galician origin (his father was an official in L'vov), he was also a veteran of the

[18] Interviews 48, 67.
[19] Interview 67.
[20] Obituary in *L'vivs'ki Visti*, February 2, 1944, p. 2.
[21] Obituary in *Nastup*, September 27, 1941, p. 1.

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668 revolutionary struggle, as well as of the Austro-Hungarian army.[22] He had taken part in underground work in Poland in the twenties, but was generally regarded by the younger generation as too moderate and too conservative. He appears, however, to have enjoyed the confidence of Konovalets' down to the latter's death, and he took over practical direction of the organization immediately after this event. In this capacity, he was instrumental in carrying out the transfer of authority to Colonel Andrew Mel'nyk.

Mel'nyk was in a position to assume a role of unique importance in the Ukrainian Nationalist movement. In many respects his natural qualities admirably fitted him for this role. He was a man of fine bearing, dignified yet friendly, exceptional in his moderation and composure among a group where dignity and balance tended to be submerged by bitterness and extremism. Born of peasant parents in Eastern Galicia, he was somewhat older (forty-eight) than most of his colleagues. After receiving an engineering degree in Vienna in 1912,[23] he had served in the Austro-Hungarian army. There, it is said, he was referred to by his brother officers, Austrian and Ukrainian alike, as "Lord Mel'nyk"—this not in sarcasm, but as a sincere tribute to his embodiment of the English concept of the gentleman, then still an ideal in Central Europe.[24] His later career, while not exceptionally distinguished, did nothing to impair this reputation. He was chief of staff under Konovalets' in the Sichovi Stril'tsi, and later served a term in a Polish jail for activity in the UVO. In contrast to most of the other leaders, however, his career in the thirties was placid. Pursuing his profession of engineer, he worked as director of forests on the huge estates of the Metropolitan of L'vov.

Whether it is accurate to describe Mel'nyk as a devout Catholic may be questioned, but there is no doubt that he was far more friendly to the church than nearly all of his associates. For a number of years prior to Mel'nyk's assumption of leadership, he was chairman of the Catholic youth organization in Galicia, Orlo,[25]

[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *Nastup*, December 12, 1940, p. 3.
[24] Interview 62.
[25] *Entryklopediia Ukraïnoznavstvo* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 959.

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which was regarded as anti-Nationalist by the great bulk of the OUN youth in that area. It seems probable that his elevation to the post of director of the Provid was very gratifying to Greek Catholic church circles, which thereby hoped to dispel the anti-clerical tendencies of the OUN and to prevent further unfolding of the anti-Christian elements in its ideology. At the same time, Mel'nyk's church ties and moderate attitude were doubtless welcome to many members of the Provid, especially to Senyk. Conditions inside Poland were highly unfavorable to the development of a secure base for a Ukrainian nationalist party, regardless of its ideology. The terroristic response to drastic and bloody Polish suppression of all national aspirations was understandable. It was adopted from time to time by all elements in the OUN and countenanced by even broader circles of Galician society. Over a period of years, however, this tactic tended to get out of hand, to defeat the purposes of the organization by inducing still harsher repression and by alienating those members of the Ukrainian community who still hoped to lead normal lives. The latter danger was becoming especially acute during the late thirties when the legal Ukrainian parties in Poland were tending more and more to separate themselves from the underground and were attempting to normalize their relations with the Polish government. To stem this tendency, more prudent and moderate leadership was needed in the OUN; connections with the church, especially the fabulously influential Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, could be invaluable.[26]

The real difficulty in this approach was that it was fundamentally incompatible with the development and ideology of the OUN. Officially, the Provid adhered to a credo of integral nationalism. In the political context of Central Europe in the 1930s, this meant that it was strongly attracted by Fascist totalitarianism. The totalitarian element in the ideology of the OUN consisted in its emphasis on the nation as an entity valued above all others,

[26] This analysis is a deduction from the circumstances of the OUN and from the backgrounds and connections of the persons involved. It cannot be documented directly, but appears to fit all the known facts. For comments on the suspicions raised by Mel'nyk's association with the church and Senyk's sponsoring of him, see Vasyl' Rudko ("R. Lisovyi"), "Rozlam v OUN" (The Split in the OUN), *Ukrainsʼki Visti*, May 23, 1949, p. 3.

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668* to be served by whatever means might be required. OUN adherents maintained that the state was merely the most convenient form of national life, not an absolute value in itself, as was the nation.[27] This position was necessary tactically in order to distinguish sharply the OUN from the Het'man movement. Putting the state in a secondary place, however, tended to drive the movement still further in the direction of deification of the mystic concept of the nation, even to the point of racism. "Nationalism is based on feelings, which are carried by the racial blood."[28] The incompatibility of such doctrines with Christian teachings could not be concealed, even in the atmosphere of misty romanticism prevalent in many Nationalist circles. Thus, the Catholic leader of the Carpatho-Ukraine, Monsignor Voloshyn, in praising Mel'nyk, pointed out that he was a man of typically European culture, with an ideology based on Christianity and differing from that of many Nationalists who placed the nation above God.[29]

This statement was probably true, but it made Mel'nyk's position still more anomalous. He was the leader of a movement whose official ideology was totalitarian; moreover, all the circumstances of the period and of the movement itself tended to intensify the totalitarian element. He was trying to work against this tide, to moderate, even if only slightly, its violent philosophy. To be successful, he was compelled to assert his authority as autocratic director of the movement. Now, it may be true historically that totalitarianism and autocratic authority are separable. In the Central Europe of 1939, however, it was difficult to maintain the distinction.

As a matter of fact, Mel'nyk himself was reluctant even to attempt to assert a claim to dictatorial power. Writings which deal with him primarily, and which he may be assumed to have

[27] "Maksym Orlyk" in *Nastup*, August 17, 1940, p. 3. For the most part I have relied on periodicals of fairly large circulation (about 6,000 in the case of *Nastup*) as the principal sources for ideology of the OUN in this period. The more philosophical treatises on Dontsov and especially of Stsibors'kyi (*Natsiokratiia*) are of a great deal more interest to the student of political theory. For the purposes of this study, however, it seems preferable to utilize sources which, though less profound, had a more immediate impact on the rank and file of the membership and followed the currents of changing ideological emphasis.

[28] "Sigma" in an editorial in *Nastup*, March 23, 1940, p. 1.

[29] Interview for *Nastup*, December 21, 1940, p. 3.

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controlled, refer to him more frequently as "director of the Provid" than as "leader." Attempts to build Mel'nyk up as a mystic exponent of the national will are present, as in a reference to the leaders who embodied the genius of the nation—"Shevchenko, Konovalets', and now Mel'nyk" [30]—and in one to Mel'nyk's "monolithic character." [31] On the whole, however, the more prominent theme is that of military subordination to a *body* of hierarchical superiors, rather than unrestrained submission to the will of a charismatic leader. 668*

> The leadership [Provid] bears a responsibility to history, to future generations, to the nation (including those who were and are to be), to God, but never to its subordinates! This would lead to anarchy as surely as would questioning of orders in an army.[32]

As the need for suppressing factionalism grew stronger, however, this more moderate position tended to be abandoned in favor of outright adherence to the *Führerprinzip*.

It is evident from the above discussion that there was a deep conflict between the "natural" tendencies of the ideology of the movement and the personal temperament and conviction of its chief. Had the matter been confined to the émigré section of the OUN, a compromise might have been reached, or Mel'nyk might have even come out the victor. It will be noted that of the nine members of the Provid (including Mel'nyk himself), all but two had been military officers. Moreover, the great majority of them had served not only in the somewhat irregular Ukrainian army, but also in the tightly disciplined officer corps of the Russian or Austro-Hungarian Empires. Standards of military discipline and honor prevented them from fully subscribing to the principle that all means are legitimate, at least when this principle was to be applied in factional struggles within their own group against their acknowledged superior. Moreover, with the exception of Baranovs'kyi, all were past forty, and it may be supposed that the passage of years had immunized them against impulsive and violent action.

If, however, the OUN had been confined to the emigration, it

[30] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, February 1, 1941, p. 2.
[31] *Nastup*, December 14, 1940, p. 1.
[32] Editorial in *Nastup*, February 1, 1941, p. 1.

668* would have had scarcely greater influence than the UNR or the Het'man group. As a matter of fact, unlike these two groups, it was predominantly West Ukrainian in membership. It is true that of the nine Provid members, three were East Ukrainian émigrés. Of these, however, two had very limited influence, while Stsibors'kyi owed his prominence primarily to his ability as a theoretician. Moreover, the Provid did not accurately reflect the composition of the rank and file of the membership. In the first place it provided no representation for the very important groups of OUN members in or from Volhynia, the Carpatho-Ukraine, and Bukovina.[33] More significant was the difference in age; the great bulk of the membership, and its most active component, was drawn from the youth of Galicia. As discussed in the preceding chapter, this generation, living double lives, studying in the underground university, liable to arrest by the Polish authorities at any moment, had had recourse to violence, and many had suffered terribly for their deeds. There was a constant tendency to suspect that the émigré leaders were shirking the hardships and dangers of the fight, or at least were unable to understand its demands.

This feeling was greatly accentuated by the age difference between the leadership and the bulk of the members in Galicia. There was a gap of about ten years between the average member of the official émigré leadership and the average unofficial leader at home; the rank and file members in Galicia were still younger. In itself, this difference was significant enough; lack of maturity was bound to lead to extremism among members of an organization like the OUN. There were, however, additional factors of great importance. The younger group had lacked the experience of growing up in a stable, prewar society. Furthermore, the older generation had had an opportunity to fight for Ukrainian statehood openly and in a recognized manner. In establishing a state and an army, if for only a brief period, it had escaped from the frustrating sense of inferiority which was the result of living in a state governed by another nationality. While the older genera-

[33] It should be pointed out that there were several other leaders (of the older generation) whose influence probably exceeded that of some members of the Provid. In these unofficial groups the Carpatho-Ukraine (but not Volhynia and Bukovina) was adequately represented. East Ukrainians were considerably overrepresented in proportion to their number among the rank and file.

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tion had had its peaceful years, followed by a retrospectively glorious fight, the younger generation had known only the bitter, ambiguous struggle against Polish repression. Thus, the latter harbored a feeling of tension, a sort of inferiority complex vis-à-vis the formal leadership.

Nor was the directorate entirely guiltless in this situation. It is true that most of its Galician members had shared the hardship of the struggle against Poland (three had been imprisoned) and that a life of exile is not much preferable even to underground existence in one's native country. The generation which had come to maturity during the war, however, tended to view itself as a closed elite, entrance to which was unattainable by the younger men. The unwillingness to permit full participation in this elite may be understood from the following expression: "I don't mind playing politics, but I object to playing it with my children." In this connection a ready, if understandably infuriating, device was at hand: the constant use of the military titles acquired during the war, and hence not attainable by the younger men, whose only military service (when it could not be avoided) was as conscripts in the Polish army.

While Konovalets' lived, his great authority and, it is said, his skillful handling of the problem of the different generations had prevented it from assuming serious proportions, although there were rumblings of protest from the younger group. Mel'nyk was faced with a far more difficult set of problems: he had to try to unify the Ukrainian population of Galicia behind the organization, but any modification of ideology or tactics would be regarded as treason by the younger men; he had to try to bargain for Ukrainian ends with powers which were enormously superior, a process in which any yielding to impulsive action might be fatal. In addition, the very factors which inclined Mel'nyk to exercise a moderating influence in the OUN made him incapable of keeping the revolutionary youth in hand. His association with the church was like a black flag to their anticlericalism. His calmness and dignity made little impression on men whose ideal leader was an iron-willed conspirator. His refusal to raise the nation to the level of the absolute was simply taken as a sign of weakness, if it was comprehended at all. In a stable community, Mel'nyk

668* would doubtless have been a highly useful citizen, or even a successful statesman, but his character ill equipped him to become the leader of a terroristic conspiracy. Thus, the basis was laid for a catastrophe within the most powerful Ukrainian organization.

First, however, came the greater catastrophe of war. For many years the OUN had been closely tied to German policy. This alignment was furthered by the semi-Fascist nature of its ideology, and in turn the dependence on Germany tended to intensify Fascist trends in the organization. All considerations of power politics led the OUN to seek German aid, since Germany was the only power which had either the will or the means to attack its archenemies—Poland and the Soviet Union. The great problem, as was hinted in the previous paragraph, was that of dealing with the Germans without becoming their helpless puppet, since the disparity of strength between the parties was obviously enormous.

Up to 1939 the Ukrainian Nationalist leaders had been confident that Germany was really interested in securing the independence of the Ukraine, and felt that she would deal fairly with them. To an extent, however, they were less dependent on Germany than this trustful attitude might have implied. Unlike the Het'man group, which was concentrated largely in the neighborhood of Berlin, the OUN was more evenly spread over most of Central and Western Europe. Both Konovalets' and Mel'nyk traveled frequently and avoided settling within the German-dominated area. Nevertheless, in Richard Iarii they had a constant channel of communication to that section of the German regime which was represented by Admiral Canaris and the Abwehr. In the summer of 1939, Colonel Sushko was also collaborating closely with the Germans, preparing a group of some two hundred men in Wiener-Neustadt, Austria, to act as an auxiliary to the Wehrmacht in its approaching attack on Poland and to provide an armed nucleus for an uprising which the OUN hoped would lead to independence for the Ukrainians in that country.[84] Moreover, *de facto* dependence of the OUN on Germany had been greatly increased by the large immigration of its members

[84] Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (June-July, 1952), p. 4; Abshagen, p. 217.

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to German territory in 1939, especially to the "Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia," where a major center of the Carpatho-Ukrainians with the important pro-OUN organ *Nastup* was soon to be established.[35] 668*

In spite of these growing ties of dependence, when the Provid decided to hold the Second Congress of the organization in August of 1939, Rome instead of a German city was chosen as the meeting place. At this congress it was decided that Mel'nyk should maintain his headquarters in Switzerland, and a policy generally cautious in regard to Germany was envisaged.[36] Shortly after its adjournment came the impact of the news of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, with its implications of concessions to the Soviets in the offing. The agreement was openly denounced by the official organ of the OUN.[37] With war actually beginning almost at the same time, however, it was impossible, even had the Provid so desired, to withdraw from the arrangement for military collaboration with the Germans.

After a period of hesitation arising from his uncertainty concerning Soviet intentions in eastern Poland,[38] Canaris permitted Sushko's group to proceed from its base in Slovakia as far as the Ukrainian ethnographical territory on the San River, but at this point it was obliged to turn back because of the advance of Soviet troops.[39] Within Galicia proper, at least one small uprising,

[35] *Nastup* had actually been founded in the Carpatho-Ukraine by Dr. Stephen Rosokha, but after the destruction of the Ukrainian government there Rosokha proceeded to Prague, where he was able to begin publishing around the beginning of 1940. Though not himself a member of the OUN, he was a fervent supporter and admirer of Mel'nyk, and his pages were always available to OUN writers. In addition to this paper, which labored under a comparatively mild German pre-censorship until its suppression in 1943, there was *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk* in Berlin which, as it nominally was not a newspaper but a bulletin for members of the Ukrainian National Union in Germany, escaped pre-censorship. Like *Nastup*, it was officially non-OUN but followed the OUN line closely and appears to have been more influential than the formal organs of the OUN which, however, are now largely unavailable for the war period.

[36] In addition, he himself was confirmed as head of the Provid, and its membership was ratified. Interviews 61, 67.

[37] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, pp. 24–28, citing *Natsional 'na Presova Sluzhba* (an OUN "press release" service not available to me) for September 1, 1939.

[38] Abshagen, pp. 208–9.

[39] Interviews 8, 14, 67; Nykon Nalivaiko, "Legioni v natsional'nykh viinakh" (Legions in National Wars), *Narodna Volia* (October 27, 1949), p. 2.

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668* doubtless inspired by Nationalists, occurred against the Polish regime.[40] From the OUN point of view, the one advantage of the Sushko expedition was that it served as an armed escort for Iaroslav Baranovs'kyi, who came as a delegate from the Provid to the local groups. His mission was to give the latter information on the delicate situation arising from the Soviet occupation and to warn them to exercise caution in coming out into the open.[41] This was undoubtedly necessary since, had rebellions been carried out on a large scale, they would have served no purpose in destroying the tottering Polish authority, while they would have revealed the identity of the underground members to the approaching Soviet forces.

One further result of the brief Polish campaign, of still greater significance for the development of the OUN, must be mentioned. As the Germans closed in on Warsaw, the Polish authorities were confronted with the problem of disposing of the political prisoners, especially the Ukrainians, whom they held there. After various efforts to evacuate them, the most important prisoners were allowed, either through deliberate intent or through the humane action of their guards, to go free.[42] Thus the leaders of the Galician group, embittered by years of confinement, were once again free to pursue their activities.

The brief Polish war, which was the opening chapter of a struggle of tremendous consequences for the world at large, was of great indirect importance for Ukrainian national life. For the first time in modern history, the Galicians were really united with the East Ukrainians in a single state. However, this state was the most dreaded enemy of the Ukrainian nationalist movements. These circumstances were bound to have a considerable effect on the development of the nationalist movements, and in

[40] *Nastup*, March 16, 1940, p. 3, describes the formation of a group of three hundred partisans near L'vov in the week of September 11–17 to fight Polish police who had been committing atrocities and to drive off Polish partisans and troops.

[41] Interview 67.

[42] For an interesting description of the way in which some of these Ukrainians secured their freedom, see Mykola (Nicholas) Klymishyn, "Smertnyi pokhid" (The Death March), *Nastup*, February 24, 1940, p. 3; this account was confirmed by Interview 76.

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fact a radical process of realignment of the Ukrainian forces was already under way; during the twenty months following the Polish collapse this intraparty conflict was to occupy almost as much attention in the Ukrainian émigré community as did the larger events of world politics. 668*

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III. RETRENCHMENT AND REVOLT

563 By the end of September, 1939, it appeared that Germany had definitely abandoned the Ukrainian nationalists. The agreement which allowed the Soviet Union to occupy the territory of Poland up to the line of the Bug and the San meant in effect that the compact Ukrainian area in Galicia, the Ukrainian land which possessed the strongest nationalist feeling, had passed under the control of the Soviet regime. There remained, however, a few small areas of Ukrainian settlement under German control in what was now designated as the Generalgouvernement Polen. Aside from several minute border districts, these were the Lemko region and the Chelm (Kholm) region. The Lemko area is a rugged stretch on the northern slope of the Carpathians, extending from Przemysl (Peremyshl') almost to Cracow. The majority of its population was a hardy if impoverished group of mountaineers who spoke the Lemko dialect of the Ukrainian language. Under the Polish regime this group had been subjected to the same repression which was exercised against the population of eastern Galicia, but the low economic potential of the area discouraged the Poles from expanding significantly into the hill region.

563 795 In the Chelm district, on the other hand, a violent policy of denationalization had been carried out. This area, which had always contained a mixed population, was further complicated ethnographically by changes in religion. Originally a large part of the population, including the great majority of the Ukrainians, had been Greek Catholic, as were their brothers in Galicia. Under Alexander II, however, a harsh policy of repression had prevailed, the aim of which was the destruction of the Greek Catholic Church and strengthening of the Orthodox Church. Numerous Greek rite parishes were forcibly transferred to the Orthodox Church,

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and a number of Latin rite churches which were accused of 563
ministering to Greek Catholics who resisted transfer to Ortho- 795
doxy were also seized.[1] Either because they originally had some sympathy for Orthodoxy, or because they became accustomed to it over the decades, many of the "converted" congregations had retained some ties with it after the area had become a part of Poland. Stimulated by part of the Latin clergy (the Greek Catholic hierarchy opposed the step), the Polish government seized many of the churches or, in some cases, even burnt them to the ground. The Orthodox priests were expelled and replaced by Catholic pastors of the Latin, not the Greek, rite. The small supply of intellectuals made it difficult for other Ukrainian communities to aid the Ukrainians of Chelm, and, as a result, the policy of denationalization had considerable success.[2]

For over twenty months these small and handicapped areas[A] 668*
were to serve as the principal territorial base of Ukrainian nationalist efforts. The reason that they were able to fulfill this function arose from the deliberately ambiguous nature of German policy toward the Ukrainian movements during this period. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which was a formal barrier to the use of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment to disrupt the Soviet Union, was, indeed, merely regarded as a truce by the Nazi leaders, but the duration of the truce was viewed as indefinite. Any overt encouragement of the Ukrainian nationalists would be looked upon by the Soviet Union as an unfriendly gesture, if not as preparation for an attack; consequently, Hitler was determined to use extreme caution in dealing with the Ukrainians as long as he felt that amicable relations with the Soviet Union were in his interest.[3] At the same time, the Machiavellian strain in Nazi

[1] Adrien Boudou, *Le Saint-Siège et la Russie: Leurs Relations Diplomatiques au XIXe Siecle* (Paris: Editions Spès, 1925), II, 440.

[2] Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 335; Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), p. 279*n;* and especially Volodymyr Kubiiovych, "Die ukrainische Volksgruppe," *Das Generalgouvernement,* I (December, 1940), 14–19.

[3] This is shown not only by Hitler's express order to exercise caution in dealing with the Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement in order to avoid difficulties with Russia (Memorandum for the files concerning the session of the RVA [Reichsverteidigungsausschuss], Warsaw, March 2, 1940, EC 300; hereafter referred to as EC 300), but also by the fact that even much later he requested Bormann

A [Lemko and Chelm regions -- Analyst]

668* thinking impelled the German rulers to regard Ukrainian nationalism as an ace in the hole for future contingencies. In order to maintain its vigor, it was necessary to give it a certain minimum of encouragement, however indirect and covert.

563 Moreover, the presence of several hundred thousand Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement offered the opportunity to put into practice another favorite maxim of the Florentine theorist: *Divide et impera.*[4] The aim of this principle as adapted to Nazi policy was the destruction of the national consciousness of the peoples of the Generalgouvernement, so that they might be absorbed in the "higher" German nation if "racially suitable" or maintained as docile Helots if they were "biologically inferior." The first step in this policy was to splinter the nationalities by promoting a feeling of ethnic distinctiveness in each subgroup and by favoring the smaller groups in the appointment of local civil and police authorities.[5] In line with this policy, the small Ukrainian group in the Generalgouvernement was to be favored at the expense of the Poles, who were regarded as the most dangerous opponents of German interests in this area. In March, 1940, Hitler expressed his personal eagerness to utilize the anti-Polish attitude of the Ukrainians. In order to avoid difficulties with the Soviet Union, however, he directed that no "Ukrainian national party" or similar wide representation be formed but that their role be confined to a consultative one within the Generalgouvernement.[6] In line with this dictum, Frank, the chief of the Generalgouvernement administration, told his subordinates a month later that, while he would by no means permit the founda-

to see that Leibbrandt's work UdSSR (which was strongly pro-Ukrainian) not be spread even among Nazi members, since it might fall into the wrong hands with bad results for German-Russian relations (Bormann to Rosenberg, November 25, 1940, CXLIII 258, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine; hereafter referred to as CXLIII 258.)

[4] The exact phrase employed by Governor Frank to describe his policy toward the nationalities in the Generalgouvernement (Extracts from the diary of Hans Frank, Abteilungsleitersitzung, Cracow, April 12, 1940, p. 6, USSR Exhibit 223; hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit 223.)

[5] Memorandum containing the general policy outlined by Himmler and approved by Hitler on the treatment of the Eastern Peoples, May, 1940, NO 1880 (hereafter referred to as NO 1880). Actually, Himmler wanted to split the Lemkos off from the main body of Ukrainians; there is no evidence that any substantial effort was made to do so, however.

[6] EC 300.

tion of an extensive national community organization by the 563
Ukrainians, he could allow the formation of a self-help and welfare organization.[7]

The Nazi tactic envisaged using Ukrainian national feeling as a counterweight to Polish sentiment to bolster German rule in the Generalgouvernement. After the Poles had been destroyed as a national entity, then the Ukrainians, too, would be absorbed by the Germans or reduced to Helot status. Because the first stage 668*
of the process required a lenient attitude toward the Ukrainians, however, it was possible for nationalist groups in the Generalgouvernement to carry on limited but significant activity. Several months before Hitler had made his decision concerning the formation of a Ukrainian welfare body, the Ukrainians of the Generalgouvernement themselves proceeded to create a rudimentary national organization. This step was not prevented because a number of the subordinate officials, particularly Dr. Fritz Arlt, the chief of the nationalities section in the Generalgouvernement, realized the need for securing the friendship of the Ukrainians and endeavored to use their superiors' purely tactical leniency toward this group to grant the Ukrainians a measure of national expression.[8]

The organizational work was begun with the construction of a [623]
wide variety of community organizations wherever considerable numbers of Ukrainians were found. For example, a Ukrainian National Council was formed in the San River area, a Ukrainian National Committee in Jaroslaw (Iaroslav), and a Ukrainian Central Committee in Chelm.[9] At first there appeared to be a certain amount of rivalry between these centers, which were evidently improvised by local groups without much consideration of broader political interests.[10] The more far-sighted elements of the Ukrainian group in the Generalgouvernement were anxious, however, to establish as strong a position as possible, and realized

[7] USSR Exhibit 223.

[8] This statement is based on interviews with German officials concerned and with Ukrainians who were the beneficiaries of their temperate policy toward the Ukrainian community. Interviews 8, 11, 36, 46.

[9] *Krakiw'ki Visti*, March 29, 1942, p. 3.

[10] I have no substantial evidence that the incipient conflict in the OUN created any difficulties at this stage of the development of community organization.

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668* that unity was necessary. Various elements cooperated in working toward this unity, including members of parties such as the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, which had been prominent in legal life under Poland, and persons who had previously played no active part in politics. Among the latter was Dr. Volodymyr Kubiiovych, recognized as a leading geographer and ardent patriot, but unfamiliar with politics. In addition to these elements, however, the OUN also played a prominent part. Its chief representative was Colonel Sushko, who, after his forced retreat from the San, remained in the German-occupied part of Poland where he continued his collaboration with Wehrmacht authorities, especially in the development of police units. Through the efforts of these disparate groups, a meeting of the community organizations was held in Cracow in mid-November, 1939. This conference sent a delegation to Governor Frank.[11]

Kubiiovych was the natural leader of this mission. While he was politically inexperienced, he had enjoyed excellent contacts with German scholars before the war and spoke fluent German. Unlike many of the other leaders, he was not a refugee from the Soviet-dominated territories but a native of the Lemko area, hence one of the few available Ukrainians who would not afford grounds for Soviet protest. Most important, he was able to maintain his initial prestige as a patriot standing above parties because of his tact, moderation, and good judgment, and was also to carry out the difficult task of negotiating with the Germans without losing his—and his fellow Ukrainians'—self-respect. At this stage, however, it is doubtful whether the project of forming a unified organization could actually have been carried through, in spite of Kubiiovych's ability, had it not been for the support of Colonel Sushko, with his Nationalist organization and his close relations with the German authorities.

At any rate, it was Kubiiovych and Sushko who secured permission for the establishment of an association headed by a central committee.[12] The process of organizing the Ukrainian groups into one association lasted a considerable time. This was due probably to the natural difficulties encountered by the Ukrainian leaders

[11] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 29, 1942, p. 3.
[12] *Ibid.*; Interview 9.

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in working out a complex organization after twenty years of near-exclusion from public administration, as well as to delay in securing the approval of Frank and Hitler. On April 13–15, 1940, however, representatives of Ukrainian groups were able to meet openly in Cracow as a steering committee, and in early June this body was formally recognized by Frank as the Ukrainian Central Committee.[13]

The accomplishment was a considerable one, although on paper the new body was extremely limited in its function which, in accordance with Hitler's injunction, was defined as the improvement of the welfare of the Ukrainian population of the Generalgouvernement. For this purpose, the committee was granted the right to prepare a budget covered in part by allocation of funds from the treasury of the Generalgouvernement and was allowed to direct a network of Aid Committees throughout the Ukrainian ethnographical area. Among the more important formal functions of the organization was the distribution of aid received from philanthropic agencies in the United States and from the International Red Cross.[14] As is usually the case with Ukrainian organizations working under the shadow of arbitrary foreign regimes, however, the formal aspect of its activity was not the most important. Officially, the committee had no control over education, but through its relations with the German authorities it was able to exert great influence on the selection of teachers and the provision of instructional facilities. Through its control of welfare funds, it was able to facilitate the attendance of numerous children at the Ukrainian schools.[15] Thus it rendered an important contribution to the reinvigoration of Ukrainian cultural life throughout the area.

This educational activity was carried on in close connection with the development of a Ukrainian press. The November conference, in addition to laying the groundwork for a central representative body, had founded (also under Dr. Kubiiovych's direction) a large-scale publishing agency which issued a series

[13] *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstvo* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), pp. 580–82.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Interview 9.

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[214] of new school texts in Ukrainian, as well as popular editions of
204 Ukrainian works.[16] Still more important, it began the publication
668 of a newspaper which stood head and shoulders above any other Ukrainian publication in the German-dominated areas. *Krakivs'ki Visti* (Cracow News, as it was named after the Germans forbade the use of "Ukrainian" in the title) was one of the few papers which did not become a party organ but consistently served as a forum for a broad variety of Ukrainian viewpoints. Moreover, it was the only paper of this nature which possessed considerable material resources and attracted numerous contributions from writers of real talent. It was subjected to a censorship stricter than that inflicted on Ukrainian papers in Greater Germany (although much less severe than that of the papers later established under German rule farther east); nevertheless, it was able to reflect a considerable range of Ukrainian life and thought. As a result it is an invaluable witness of the events of the war years.

563 From the standpoint of Ukrainian national interests, the favor-
178 able policy of the Germans toward the group's cultural develop-
871 ment was particularly valuable in enabling it to regain some of the ground lost under the Polish repression. It would take a lengthy volume to detail the ways in which the Ukrainians were able to improve their situation in this respect during the early war years. A single statistic will suffice, however, to indicate the general nature of the gains made. In the school year 1942–43 there were 4,173 Ukrainian-language schools in the Generalgouvernement,[17] while on the corresponding territory before 1939 there were only 2,510—of which only 457 were exclusively Ukrainian.[18] The most marked advance took place in the Chelm area, where, in the autumn of 1939, a large influx of intellectuals fleeing Soviet rule in eastern Galicia brought a new vigor to the cultural life of the Ukrainian community.[19]

[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 2, 1942, p. 3.

[17] This refers of course to the enlarged Generalgouvernement, which included eastern Galicia. It is, however, indicative of an extension of the Ukrainian educational system which was if anything even more pronounced in the areas west of the San and the Bug.

[18] P. Isaiïv, article on Ukrainian schools in the Generalgouvernement during the Second World War, *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva*, p. 952; Buell, p. 279. The remainder were "mixed" schools which Buell says were given over to Polish teachers.

[19] Iurii (George) Tarkovych, "Zabuti Zemli" (Forgotten Lands), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

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To round out the picture, however, one must add that the methods employed by the Ukrainians to win ground back from the Poles were not limited to cultural development. In line with the policy described above, the Germans frequently appointed mayors of ethnographically mixed towns from among the Ukrainian element, thus giving the latter a decided advantage in the civil administration. The separate police system was also staffed in a manner favorable to the Ukrainians, although the Germans closely supervised this force. Nevertheless, in numerous cases their position in the police detachments enabled the Ukrainians to harass and even to attack the Poles.[20]

While the Ukrainian nationalist forces were being strengthened by the creation of a new base in the Generalgouvernement, the OUN was being gravely weakened by a fierce internal conflict. The fundamental causes of this conflict have been examined in the preceding chapters. Its catalytic element was the liberation of the most active leaders of the younger generation from the Polish prisons.

In Cracow, where most went, they came into contact with the comrades with whom they had fought and suffered before their imprisonment, and a new grouping rapidly coalesced. The nominal leader was Volodymyr Lopatyns'kyi, who was the official director of the *krai* OUN—i.e., the organization on Ukrainian ethnographical territory in Poland.[21] Along with him came other young men who had long been active in the struggle against the Polish authorities—John Gavrusevych, Iaroslav Horbovyi, Leo Rebet, and many others. For the most part these men, vigorous as they were, had been confined, by the nature of their conspiratorial work, to Poland, and consequently were not very familiar with the broader aspects of the OUN. They were a hardened group of rebels, remarkably courageous and inured to a life of insecurity, but deprived by this very training of

[20] Activity report of the chief of the Ordnungspolizei, November 11, 1940, Occ E-2 (11), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-2 [11]). This German official reported that "lack of proper training" enabled the Ukrainian auxiliary police to take a partisan, even a vicious attitude toward the Poles, and gave as an example the necessity of arresting two Ukrainian officers who had failed to hinder attacks on Poles by armed Ukrainians.

[21] Interviews 24, 75.

668* the opportunity to consider theoretical and complex questions. 578 There were among them, however, two young men who had recently had the opportunity of observing the workings of the organizational headquarters at first hand. One was Dmytro Myron, who was later to prove to be a talented organizer of undergrounds in the East Ukraine. The other was Iaroslav Stets'ko.[22]

Among the entire group, Stets'ko (a priest's son) was distinguished by his quick intelligence and ability to generalize his experiences in the form of political prescriptions. Like most of the others, he had been sentenced to imprisonment in connection with the mass trial of OUN members in 1936. However, he had not been proved to have been as deeply implicated as many, and consequently was released before the outbreak of war. Taking an active part in the organizational work of the OUN, he was called to Rome by Mel'nyk in the summer of 1939 to help in preparation of the Second Congress. Stets'ko's role in Rome is not entirely clear. According to one version, he was relieved of his preparatory duties by Stsibors'kyi when he proved unable to carry them out satisfactorily;[23] if this is true, the implied rebuke was hardly likely to increase his love for his supplanter, and might indeed have sown a seed of resentment against the entire leadership. At any rate, it appears clear that the Provid was not prescient enough to seize the opportunity to secure the lasting loyalty of this brilliant young OUN member.

668* In retrospect, at least, Stets'ko was doubtful of the wisdom of the policy he saw being implemented by the older men. It was a cautious policy, and a particularly distasteful aspect of its caution, according to Stets'ko, was the care taken to maintain good relations with Germany, in spite of the repeated disappointments which that power had inflicted on the Ukrainians. Before the close of the Rome meeting, however, Stets'ko had a reassuring conversation with Mel'nyk; after this, he temporarily threw his support behind his chief. Mel'nyk might have had some qualms about exalting himself as the chief of the Provid. In his youthful enthusiasm Stets'ko was willing to accept—at least in theory—

[22] Jaroslaw Stecko.
[23] Interview 67.

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the full implications of the authoritarian strain in OUN ideology. 668*
In an enthusiastic speech he praised Mel'nyk as a great leader, a heroic fighter, and called for unswerving loyalty to him such as had been accorded Konovalets'—"The leader is dead, long live the leader!" [24]

By the beginning of 1940, Stets'ko, under the impact of the 668* fresh defeat of the OUN policy of alignment with the Germans 578 and the stimulation of more impatient members of his group, had begun to express grave doubts concerning the official leaders of the party. His abilities made him a valuable member of the emerging faction, but it was not the kind of body which seeks its leader among intellectuals. The basic charge which it made against the older generation was that it was timid, lacking in determination; consequently, it was fitting that the rebel group chose a leader who possessed to an unusual degree the qualities of inflexible will and readiness for desperate action. This leader was found in the peasant-born chief of the terrorist group which had carried out the attacks on the Polish officials—Stephen Bandera.

By January, 1940, the new alignment was sufficiently solidified for Bandera and Lopatyns'kyi to be able to go to Mel'nyk in Rome with a series of demands.[25] It is not clear precisely what these demands were, for the participants in the clash have held to opposite versions. According to Bandera's supporters, the kernel of their declaration was a demand for a change in orientation of OUN policy to make it less dependent on the Germans. In particular, they say their leaders demanded that Mel'nyk take the headquarters of the organization to a neutral state, and from this vantage point bring about cooperation between the OUN and the Western powers in forming a legion composed of Ukrainians in France to aid Finland in her defense against Soviet

[24] Text in *Nastup*, December 13, 1941, p. 3. This article was of course published long after the break, in order to discredit the Bandera followers. There is no doubt that an article of this general tenor was written, however. The discussion of this opening phase has been based primarily on interviews (24 and 67) with Ukrainian leaders particularly well acquainted with both sides of this early stage of the controversy.

[25] Stepan (Stephen) Bandera, "V desiatu richnytsiu stvorennia Revoliutsiinoho Provodu OUN" (On the Tenth Anniversary of the Creation of the Revolutionary Directorate of the OUN), *Surma* (February-March, 1950), p. 6

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668 578 attack.[26] While these contentions have a certain air of plausibility, in view of the past and future collaboration of the group around Mel'nyk with the Germans, the adherents of the official leader point out that Bandera himself cooperated with the Germans when it suited his purpose and that Mel'nyk followers in France worked with zeal for just such a legion as Bandera's supporters assert *they* proposed.[27]

While the content of many of the demands presented by Bandera and Lopatyns'kyi is disputed, it is generally agreed that the most precisely formulated item concerned a change in the composition of the Provid. The *krai* leaders demanded the dismissal of Baranovs'kyi,[28] Senyk, and Stsibors'kyi. Because of the influence exercised by the two last-named leaders, compliance with this demand would have meant a real revolution in the direction of the OUN, especially since Bandera and his companion urged that they be replaced by adherents of the younger group. Aside from the intrinsic importance of this element of the dispute, however, the reasons presented by the two emissaries do much to reveal the psychology of the young rebels.

The charge made against Senyk harks back to the earliest stages of dissension between the two generations in the Nationalist organization. When Bandera, Stets'ko, and the other Galician terrorists were arrested for attacks on Polish government officials, they were confronted with a mass of written evidence of conspiracy which made their defense hopeless, under the conditions prevailing in Poland. This material was obtained by the Poles from Czech officials, who had in turn obtained it in some unknown manner. What is clear, however, is that Senyk, in his capacity as administrative assistant to Konovalets', had initially prepared the documents. The *krai* group was bitter over this occurrence, attributing it to Senyk's negligence in preparing such dangerous documents and then in failing to safeguard them prop-

[26] Unlike the projected UNR legion mentioned in the preceding chapter, the OUN plan called for an armed unit entirely separate from the émigré Polish forces.

[27] Interview 52.

[28] For the involved charges against Baranovs'kyi, see *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 37; Interview 75.

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erly. Whether they were correct in this judgment is hard to determine, but one can readily understand how such a feeling could develop into hatred during the harsh years in prison. More fundamentally, however, the accusation indicates the difficult position of those who endeavor to direct a fanatic underground movement from outside the country where the movement must exist and suffer. It also sharply illuminates the basic tension between the man of action, of revolutionary *élan*, and the administrator who is never quite regarded as pulling his share of the load. 668* 518

The accusation against Stsibors'kyi is even more revealing. Several years previously, when he was an editor of *Ukraïnske Slovo*, the OUN organ in Paris, Stsibors'kyi had been approached in the newspaper office by a Communist agent who tried to persuade him to betray the national cause. Instead of throwing the man out, so the story goes, Stsibors'kyi had engaged him in an ideological debate. The Bandera group now alleged that Stsibors'kyi had failed to act promptly because he was really considering the Communist's proposal, and bolstered their charge by asserting that the presence of Stsibors'kyi's sister in Kiev gave the Soviet network a grip on him. In view of Stsibors'kyi's vigor in the anti-Communist cause, before and after the incident, this accusation appears highly implausible. The emphasis on the culpability of his arguing with the Communist is, on the other hand, highly illuminating. As has been indicated, Stsibors'kyi was a born theorist, a man who served the movement primarily by words. Paradoxically, his own theory emphasized will, the need for action, and the primacy of the *Volkgeist*. It remained—a sort of poetic retribution—that his most extreme disciples, trained to condemn the rationalist, turned first against his reputation, and then in deadly earnest against his person.[29]

* The preceding discussion of the reasons for the split has been based primarily on interviews (especially 24, 52, 67, 75) with several of the principal protagonists and their close adherents. Published sources which deal with the controversy include Bandera and *OUN u Viini*, pp. 34–35, which represent the opposing viewpoints. Somewhat more impartial (though leaning toward the Mel'nyk side) is Vasyl' Rudko ("R. Lisovii"), "Rozlam v OUN" (The Split in the OUN), *Ukraïns'ki Visiti*, May 23, 1949, p. 3, and October 27, 1949, p. 3. Rudko also avoids attributing too much importance to the ostensible grounds of the split emphasized by both sides and correctly stresses that the principal source of conflict was a difference in temperament and background between the two generations.

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668* 578 Whatever discussion may have taken place over the *krai* representatives' other proposals, there is no question but that Mel'nyk firmly rejected the demand to dismiss his colleagues. His critics assert that this action is evidence of his inflexibility, or even of his haughty attitude toward the younger members of the organization. His admirers maintain that it is convincing proof of his devotion to principle, his loyalty to faithful companions. Whichever judgment is correct, the failure to reach an agreement soon led to open conflict. Bandera and Lopatyns'kyi returned home, and on February 10, at a secret conclave of the Galician youth leaders in Cracow, Bandera was designated the chief of a new, "revolutionary" Provid.[30]

Most of the remainder of 1940 was spent in a sharp struggle of the opposing factions to consolidate positions and win over uncommitted elements. At first the contest was conducted with some restraint on both sides. There remained some possibility of reconciliation.[31] Antagonism between the rival factions was greatly exacerbated, however, by efforts of the *krai* group to win over some of the senior members of the organization. Nearly all of the latter felt it was the height of presumption for the younger men to form a counter-directorate. Moreover, they asserted that the attempts of the Bandera followers to gain their sympathy amounted to urging them to betray their comrades; thus they felt the proposals were dishonorable as well as impertinent.[32] On the other hand, the young generation felt that it was merely attempting to overthrow an inflexible and arbitrary leadership in order to carry out the true aims of the organization. Consequently they bitterly resented the scornful rejection accorded them by the older men.

Matters came to a head with a series of coups and counter-coups in midsummer. For example, a group of young Bandera adherents tried to take over the headquarters of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow. The administrative officials, most of whom were not affiliated with the OUN, regarded them with more annoyance than outright hostility, but when Colonel Sushko

[30] Bandera, p. 4.

[31] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, October 19, 1941, p. 2; Bohdan Mykhailiuk, *Bunt Bandery* (Bandera's Rebellion) (1950), pp. 52 ff.

[32] *OUN u Viini*, p. 37.

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returned he quickly ejected them.[33] Then, in August, he led a small group of his followers, probably drawn from the auxiliary police units in which he was active, in a raid on the Bandera headquarters in Cracow, which resulted in the disruption of their clandestine press and the seizure of a number of documents.[34] By that time all negotiations for reunion had been broken off, and by November the conflict flared up in open violence in the streets of Cracow.[35]

The conflict constantly grew more bitter, not only in the Generalgouvernement, but also in Greater Germany. Here all Ukrainians (except the adherents of the Het'man's Hromada, who, as has been pointed out, were in the great majority East Ukrainians) were supposed to be joined in the UNO (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Ob"iednannia—Ukrainian National Union) which was accorded semiofficial recognition by the German authorities. Officially the organization was nonpartisan; it recognized nationalism as the guiding ideology, however, and in practice was a social and welfare adjunct of the OUN.[36] At the head of this group stood Colonel Tymosh Omel'chenko who, like the other leading members, was a strong supporter of the Nationalists. Like most of their generation, these men sided with Mel'nyk and the "legitimate" Provid when the younger generation broke away. They ordered all members to report attempts at "disruptive work"[37] and eventually cleansed the organization of active supporters of Bandera.[38] Their stand was of importance, for the UNO was constantly growing in numbers and strength in this period, due to the heavy influx of Ukrainians from the areas occupied by Hungary and the USSR. Whereas in 1937 it had only a few score members, nearly four hundred were added in 1938, about two thousand in 1939, and almost eleven thousand in 1940.[39] Since the Ukrainian immigrants were largely factory and agricultural workers, branches were formed in numerous towns throughout

[33] Interview 9.
[34] *OUN u Viini*, p. 33n; Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 4.
[35] *Nastup*, November 16, 1940; *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, December 1, 1940, p. 1.
[36] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, January 10, 1943, p. 3.
[37] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, September 10, 1940, p. 2.
[38] Cf. Occ E-4 (5).
[39] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, January 10, 1943, p. 8.

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668 578 Germany proper, the Protectorate, and the districts newly annexed from Poland.[40] As they were unable to control the accepted organization, however, Bandera's supporters rapidly set about forming cells of their own. Thus by 1941 there were parallel and antagonistic centers of Ukrainian life in many towns and industrial establishments in Greater Germany.[41]

In their efforts to win control of the nationalist movement, both parties resorted to arguments as well as organizational pressure. Much of this was oral, especially on the part of the *krai* group which, in comparison with the Mel'nyk following, possessed neither the physical plant nor the experienced polemicists for a press contest. They stressed the hesitancy and failures of the older Provid, argued that it was dependent on foreigners, and asserted that the other generation of leaders wished to revert to a purely military, tactical organization of the UVO type, leaving political and ideological questions to the legal parties like the UNDO.[42] Fundamentally, however, as previously indicated, the rebels' appeal was to youth, will, action.

The rebuttal offered by Mel'nyk's supporters is easier to follow because it could be expressed in openly published periodicals, although in a somewhat veiled form. Part of the defense was provided by nonmembers, especially by church leaders. Bishop John Buchko, who was considered to be a close associate of Sheptyts'kyi, and who later headed the entire Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, was vigorous in his praise of Mel'nyk. The bishop was at the time in America, where he was making a pastoral visit to Ukrainian immigrants; in an interview in New York he was reported to have declared that the Ukrainian Nationalists represented the flower of the nation and to have said they possessed in Mel'nyk an outstanding personality as

[40] That is, Posen and West Prussia; the UNO did not exist in the Generalgouvernement.

[41] As was indicated somewhat later by the ability of Bandera's followers to obtain from groups of Ukrainians working in Germany the submission of numerous petitions for his release from imprisonment. These documents may be found in Occ E-4 (9), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [9]). See also the denunciation of "diversive work" among Ukrainian workers in Germany in *Ukraïns'kyi Vismyk*, March 30, 1941, p. 1.

[42] Bandera, p. 2. Unfortunately, I have not been able to secure any of the semiclandestine publications of this period. Substantially the same arguments are repeated in a clandestine publication of April, 1942 (*Biuleten'*, No. 4, pp. 5–7).

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leader.[43] As previously noted, Monsignor Voloshyn likewise chose this time to praise Mel'nyk above other Nationalist leaders. In spite of the prestige of their authors, however, it is questionable whether such statements were conducive to strengthening Mel'nyk's position in view of the pronounced anticlericalism of the youthful circles.[44]

A major part of the Mel'nyk adherents' argument, however, consisted of emphasis on the duty, in an authoritarian organization such as the OUN, of subordination to the leadership. As has been shown, Mel'nyk's own character and views rendered this line somewhat ineffective. Nevertheless, the party organs came to carry more and more eulogies of the director, and theoretical discussions of the nature of his position became more frequent.[45] A major problem for any authoritarian organization is the establishment of the legitimacy of the leader. If force cannot quell doubts, appeal must be made to his sanction by some figure of the past who is held in veneration by all. Therefore it was firmly asserted that Konovalets' had designated Mel'nyk as his successor, and that Mel'nyk had called the Rome congress in compliance with his long-range instructions.[46] Those "calling themselves nationalists" yet falling into the "democratic-liberal vices" of individual defiance of authority and party intrigue were roundly denounced.[47] Somewhat later, in stressing the military duty of members of the OUN to observe discipline, one spokesman of the "legitimate" group declared that exclusion from the organization meant "moral death."[48]

There remained yet another area in which the struggle for power was waged. It has been noted that nearly all of the in-

[43] *Nastup*, October 19, 1940, p. 3.

[44] Other influential elements supported Mel'nyk, or at least condemned the tactics of Bandera's followers, but were more guarded in their criticism. Kubiiovych wrote an article deploring the political rashness and violence of the youth (*Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, March 30, 1941, p. 1). A number of professors addressed an appeal for national unity above party interests to Ukrainian youths in the higher schools in Greater Germany (*Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 10, 1941, p. 1).

[45] E.g., on December 14, 1940, *Nastup* devoted the entire first page to Mel'nyk on the occasion of his birthday; again, on December 21, almost all of page 1 was devoted to him.

[46] *Nastup*, October 5, 1940, p. 1.

[47] *Nastup*, October 12, 1940, p. 1.

[48] *Nastup*, May 24, 1941, p. 4.

668* 578 fluential older members rejected the proposals of the Bandera group for alliance. There was one exception—Iarii. The adopted Ukrainian had for some time been at odds with Mel'nyk concerning, it is said, financial accounting and his own desire for freedom from Mel'nyk's control in negotiating with the Germans.[49] In the emergence of a new center Iarii evidently saw an opportunity to escape distasteful subordination to what he considered an émigré clique which was hopelessly confused as to its real aims. Consequently, he broke completely with the old Provid and brought his valuable contacts to the *krai* group, in whose youthful energy he saw the only hope for developing a liberation force.[50] In so doing, however, he helped turn many Ukrainian elements against the new movement, for it appeared strange that among members of the Provid the foreigner alone should have joined Bandera's group. Almost from the beginning this circumstance appears to have given rise to the suspicion that foreign powers—the Soviet Union as well as Germany—had inspired the rebellion to weaken the Nationalist movement.[51] Just what Iarii's relationship to the Germans was is hard to determine, but it appears fairly certain that rumors that he was connected with the Communists are unfounded.

668* Such suspicions did not, however, prevent the *krai* group from proceeding with its organization. As will be shown, a strong network of underground workers was maintained in Soviet-occupied Galicia under authority of the insurgent Provid. In the Generalgouvernement, too, considerable progress was registered. In March, 1941, a general conference of the "OUN-B[andera]" was held in Cracow, called, in rejection of the Rome conference, the "Second Congress of the OUN."[52] By this time, a large part of the younger generation was included in the new movement, and already sub-factions were beginning to appear. On the one hand, the "activists," Bandera and his first lieutenant, Stets'ko, remained

[49] Interview 67.

[50] According to a letter which Iarii wrote to me, dated Easter, 1953.

[51] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, September 10, 1940, p. 2.

[52] Mykola (Nicholas) Lebed', *UPA: Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia* (UPA: The Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) (Presove Biuro UHVR, 1946), p. 14; Petro Mirchuk, *Akt vidnovlennia ukraïns'koï derzhavnosty, 30 chervnia 1941 roku* (The Act of Renewal of Ukrainian Statehood, June 30, 1941) (New York: Holovna Uprava Organizatsiï Oborony Chotyr'okh Svobid Ukraïny, 1952), p. 17.

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in complete control of the organizational framework. They were 668*
powerfully aided by Nicholas Lebed', one of the original group of *krai* leaders, who was now confirmed as third in command. More important, Lebed' began the organization of the Sluzhba Bezpeky, the security service. Like all organizations, be they underground or in full power, which demand monolithic conformity to a leader and a casting aside of scruples in the choice of means, the OUN-B was obliged to have its secret police. In Lebed'—small in stature, quiet, yet determined, hard—the S.B. found a well-qualified leader, but one who was to acquire for himself and his organization an unenviable reputation for ruthlessness.

Apparently somewhat apart from the leading group stood a number of young men whose chief interest in the organization was military. They were not yet very important, but their most typical representative, Roman Shukevych, was later to rise rapidly. Still farther from the guiding nucleus was a group whose aims tended to include social as well as national aspects of the hoped-for revolution. Their leader was John Mitrynga, son of Galician peasants, who had been designated by Konovalets' as a special "referent" for social questions. He and his companions were too obscure to secure a place of power in the organization, but it is claimed that they exerted a certain influence on the formulation of its platform. This program, indeed, while it reiterated the "voluntarist" elements of will, action, discipline, contempt of reason and the "nationalist" element of supremacy of the nation (the decalogue of the movement is said to have required its members to place the interests of the Ukrainian nation above all else), gave some room to consideration of social matters. While the Communist system was denounced, liberal capitalism was condemned and an ill-defined socialism advocated.[58]

While the strongest Ukrainian party was being torn by factional conflict, its members, along with those of less authoritarian groupings, were trying to maintain a vestige of independent life in the

[58] Borys Levits'kyi, "Istorychne znachennia rozlamu v OUN" (The Historical Significance of the Split in the OUN), *Vpered*, No. 2 (11) (1950), pp. 5–6. The discussion of the trends and personalities in the newly formed OUN-B has been based primarily on interviews (24, 31, 75, 76) with several of its most active members.

668 areas acquired by the Soviet Union. Galicia, the real base of organized Ukrainian nationalism, had passed under Communist control in September, 1939. At first the leaders of the legal parties appeared not to realize the full implications of this transfer. Most of them had been brought up under the relatively tolerant Austrian regime, and even under Poland they had been able to maintain a position of strained association with the sovereign power. A considerable number of them felt, or at least hoped, that this might also be possible under the Soviet regime. It must be emphasized that they were thoroughly anti-Communist; most of them had fought Communism when it was a strong force in Galicia in the twenties. The party they knew then, however, with its emphasis on Ukrainian nationalism and its still incomplete totalitarianism, represented an entirely different opponent from the Communist Party which ruled the Soviet state in 1939.

On September 22, as the Soviet troops approached L'vov, the octogenarian Constantine Levits'kyi, once a major leader of the West Ukrainian Republic, began the formation of a Ukrainian nonpartisan committee to deal with the occupier. With the help of Dr. Stephen Baran, a prominent leader of the UNDO, whose account furnishes most of the details of this episode, some twenty community leaders were brought together. This group chose a seven-man delegation to deal with the Red army. It was two days before they could obtain an audience with General Ivanov, the Soviet commander, who received them courteously but referred them to one Mishchenko, "director of civil affairs on the western front." [54] The latter spoke fair words in fluent Ukrainian; he promised that there would be no repression, that all that had taken place before the Soviet occupation would be left in oblivion. When it came to detailed requests, however—the emissaries were especially concerned to secure the safety of the cultural society Prosvita and the Greek Catholic Church—Mishchenko in turn referred them to the specialized officials charged with these "details."

The aged Dr. Levits'kyi returned home, evidently satisfied that his mission to the new *okkupant* had been successful. His more

[54] There were at least three high-ranking officials of this name in the Ukrainian Communist Party at that time.

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cautious aide, Dr. Baran, however, in his capacity as a director of the largest Ukrainian newspaper, *Dilo,* went with the editor of *Novyi Chas,* Zenon Pelens'kyi, to confer with A. T. Chekaniuk, head of the newly installed press affairs office, concerning continuation of Ukrainian journalistic activities.[55] Then the true nature of the Soviet conquest began to reveal itself. Chekaniuk was already installed in the editorial offices of *Dilo* and evidently perfectly acquainted with the views and backgrounds of his petitioners. He showed them a staff of twenty newly arrived Soviet journalists who were already preparing the publication of *Dilo*'s successor, the Communist *Vil'na Ukraïna.* Then he made it perfectly clear to his "guests" that while some use might be found for their talents if they were properly directed, the direction itself was already, and would remain, completely in the hands of the Communists.[56]

Within a week, several leading figures in the Ukrainian community, including Constantine Levits'kyi and the secretary of the representative committee, John Nymchuk, had been arrested. For the time being, however, the actual members of the delegation to Soviet headquarters were spared, and several managed to escape to German-occupied territory.[57] The leaders of the UNDO were also arrested; Dr. Dmytro Levits'kyi, the head of the party and of the Ukrainian delegation in the Polish parliament, was arrested on September 28 and so were his most important colleagues about the same time. The arrested leaders were sent to Moscow—it is said to the infamous Lubianka prison—and with rare exceptions have not been heard of since.[58] The Communists, after getting rid of the principal nationalist politicians, quickly proceeded with their own political organization of Galicia and Volhynia. Even the official Soviet version indicates that a minimum

[55] Chekaniuk, a specialist in political journalism, was editor of the major Kiev newspaper *Komunist,* and in 1940 became a candidate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

[56] The preceding paragraphs are based largely on Stepan Baran's article, "Zustrich z bol'shevykamy" (Encounter with the Bolsheviks), *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 12, 1942, p. 2, and April 14, 1942, p. 2, confirmed in all essential aspects by Interviews 41, 78.

[57] Baran, "Zustrich," *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 12, 1942, p. 2.

[58] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* March 22, 1942, p. 4. In one town at least, participants in the revolutionary struggle for Ukrainian independence also seem to have been singled out for arrest or execution (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 3, 1941, p. 6).

time was allotted to the process of registering "popular approval" for incorporation of the occupied lands in the Soviet Union. A "Ukrainian National Congress," "elected" immediately after the Soviet invasion, met on October 26; on November 1 the head of its plenary committee, M. I. Panchyshyn, sent a request for admission to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; on November 15, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet) of the latter division of the Soviet state approved the request; thus East and West Ukraine were "united."[59]

In spite of the complete replacement of independent press and political organizations by Communist agencies, however, a strong effort was made in the early months to attract support for the new regime. Perhaps one reason for this attempt was the desire to influence Ukrainians still outside the enlarged Soviet Ukrainian Republic, especially in the Generalgouvernement. In a protocol to the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, which had defined the frontier between the parts of Poland annexed by the two totalitarian powers, it was provided that the government of the USSR should place no obstacles in the way of migration of ethnic Germans from eastern Poland to Germany. This secured for the Nazis the right to "bring home" the tens of thousands of German-speaking Volhynians. In return, Germany acknowledged an equal right of Belorussians and Ukrainians to migrate to the Soviet Union.[60] In accordance with a further provision of the protocol, a Soviet "repatriation" commission was allowed to travel through the Lemko region in early 1940;[61] by the end of June, it had induced only thirty-five hundred Ukrainians to cross the border into the Soviet Union, however.[62]

[59] S. M. Belousov and O. P. Ohloblyn, *Zakhidna Ukraïna* (The West Ukraine) (Kiev: Akademiia Nauk URSR, Instytut Istoriï Ukraïny, 1940), pp. 108 ff.

[60] Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*, eds. Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington: Department of State, 1948), pp. 104–5.

[61] *Krakauer Zeitung*, February 18–19, 1940, p. 6, reports the departure of one thousand Ukrainians from this area after a visit of the Soviet commissioners.

[62] According to *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, pp. 2–3. In an article which was remarkably hostile to the Soviet regime, in view of the latter's publicly cordial relations with Germany at that time, the Nationalist paper stated that the "intensive propaganda" of the Soviet commission, aided by "the pro-Russian intelligentsia" but combatted by "healthy Ukrainian elements," had resulted in the meager migration

The campaign to win friends in Galicia and Volhynia was in part negative; measures which were most likely to inflame anti-Soviet sentiments were avoided. The church was not entirely suppressed, though it was sharply criticized.[63] Its real property was confiscated and the religious orders disbanded.[64] The Soviet authorities weakened the influence of the church on the youth by liquidating the Catholic school system and forcibly inducting the children into Communist organizations.[65] However, the person of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was respected.[66] The part of the intelligentsia which was not prominent in politics was allowed to remain at large, although persons in callings such as the law sometimes found it necessary to turn to nonprofessional work.[67] On the more positive side, the Ukrainian language was given a far greater scope than it had enjoyed under Polish rule. In particular, the University of L'vov was formally Ukrainized in language and personnel, although it is said that the resistance of remaining Polish professors to lecturing in Ukrainian was not harshly dealt with.[68] Students from the East Ukrainian universities were brought on tours to the West Ukraine, and L'vov students made Communist-sponsored trips to Kiev.[69] Other ele-

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cited. Either this is one of the not too infrequent examples of ability of the Prague publication to print items contrary to German policy, or someone in authority gave the signal for an anti-Soviet attitude even at that early date. In the latter case it may have been a subtle riposte in the hidden conflict over Soviet demands for Bukovina. On the other hand, as early as March the *Krakauer Zeitung* printed a report by a German who had visited the villages of the Lemko area. He praised the young Ukrainians, noting that they wore the national blue and yellow colors and greeted him with "Heil Hitler!" and "Slava Ukraïna!" (Glory to the Ukraine) (*Krakauer Zeitung*, March 7, 1940, p. 5). [167]

[63] See F. Iastrebov, "Uniats'ke dukhovenstvo na sluzhbi u polskoho panstva" (The Uniate Clergy in the Service of the Polish Aristocracy), *Komunist*, October 9, 1939, p. 2.

[64] "Die Tragödie der ukrainisch-katholischen Kirche," *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, January, 1952, p. 14.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 18, 1942, p. 4; Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), p. 112.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] Interview 36.

[68] For the official Soviet version see M. Marchenko (the new rector of the University of L'vov), "L'vivs'kyi Universytet na novykh shliakhakh" (L'vov University on New Paths), *Komunist*, December 16, 1939, p. 2.

[69] Interview 51; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, on a trip of about forty students of the L'vov veterinary school to Kiev in the spring of 1940.

ments of the Galician population—teachers, physicians, artists—were brought to Kiev to participate in Ukrainian cultural activities.[70]

After a comparatively short time, however, the Soviet administration appears to have become convinced that this "generous" treatment of Ukrainian national aspirations was unrewarding. About the middle of 1940, the Ukrainian occupation troops, which had evidently been on too friendly terms with the local population, were withdrawn and replaced by units recruited in Central Asia.[71] A strip along the border with the Generalgouvernement was cleared of its population to a depth of several miles, and crossing was made almost impossible.[72] A start was made in the collectivization of agriculture.[73] No less important than these deliberate measures perhaps was the sending of tens of thousands of "carpetbagger" Soviet state, party, and army officials to the West Ukraine, where by their alien aspect (many were Russian) and their sheer numbers they severely irritated the local population.[74]

While it is impossible to know what the Soviet motives for introducing a harsher policy were, one may guess that the negative reaction of the population to the "tolerant" epoch played a part. The Soviet authorities probably discovered soon that the student exchanges had an effect opposite to that intended, for the West Ukrainian students were disagreeably surprised by the material

[70] Arthur W. Just, in *Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5.

[71] Mykhailo Kohut, "Iak zhylo halyts'ke selo pid bol'shevykamy" (How a Galician Village Lived under the Bolsheviks), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; Report of interview with Dr. H. J. Beyer (a German official who had been active in Galicia), *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, July 16, 1941, p. 3.

[72] *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, p. 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 10, 1940, p. 3, based on an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

[73] Kohut in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 25, 1941, p. 2, and May 17, 1942, p. 4.

[74] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 13, 1942, p. 4, states that, due to the influx of Polish refugees from the German military campaign and the arrival of Soviet officials, the population of L'vov increased from 318,000 to 450,000 under Soviet occupation. On August 14, 1941, it printed a letter from L'vov stating that Soviet officials and their families in L'vov had numbered 100,000. Just (*Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5) concludes from the number of votes cast in the Soviet election in Stanislav in the summer of 1940 that the population of that city must have increased by over 40,000, 1,000 of whom, he says, were NKVD officers.

poverty of the East Ukraine and the predominance in many 186
nominally Ukrainian places of the Russian language and cul- 626
ture.[75] East Ukrainian students coming to L'vov, on the other hand, had their first opportunity to become infected with the "virus" of "bourgeois nationalism." [76] Aside from producing these 668*
undesired ideological results, the earlier policy failed to prevent underground work by the Nationalist youth of Galicia.

Most of the members of the OUN were not able, of course, to [486]
leave the Soviet-occupied area. It is impossible to secure reliable
evidence concerning the exact extent to which those who re- 668*
mained could carry on their activities, but it is certain that they 661
carefully refrained from open opposition. Nevertheless, late in 1940 the NKVD succeeded in tracking down a large number of Nationalists; they were sentenced to death or prison after a proceeding in L'vov known in the OUN accounts as the "trial of the fifty-nine." Among those sentenced to death was Krymins'kyi, the chief of the OUN movement in Soviet-occupied territories.[77] In all likelihood, he and his companions had sided with Bandera in the dispute with Mel'nyk. Certainly, the remaining members who, in spite of severe losses, were able to continue as an organized underground, were firm adherents of the new leader. The new underground director, John Klymiv, was in fact one of the most fanatical supporters which this fanatical movement of the younger generation could boast.[78] While there were undoubtedly many supporters of Colonel Mel'nyk in Galicia, it is doubtful whether they were active—or rash—enough to form what could be called an underground, although apparently agents kept up sporadic contacts with headquarters in the Generalgouvernement.

The situation in Volhynia was less favorable to Nationalist 668*
activity than that in Galicia, since the OUN had never enrolled such a high proportion of the youth there. Throughout most if not all of the area, Mel'nyk and Bandera apparently had no

[75] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, p. 3.
[76] Interview 51.
[77] See, for example, Mykhailiuk, p. 4. Cf. *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, August 17, 1941, p. 4, reprinting an article from *Ukrains'ki Shchodenni Visti* (L'vov).
[78] Interview 43.

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668* organizations, though agents were probably present.[79] The UNR, on the other hand, as will be described, was able to establish loose connections with a group which had been formed by nationalist youths in the remote Kostopol' (Kostopil')-Liudvipol' (Liudvypil') area near the former border between Polish and Soviet Volhynia.

626 The situation in Bukovina prior to June, 1940, had in many
668* respects closely paralleled that which existed in Galicia before
[161] September, 1939. The small Ukrainian population (about one quarter of a million persons) was subjected to a denationalizing policy by the Rumanian government, which included severe limitations on the use of Ukrainian in education and restriction of the press and of cultural activities. As in Galicia, there was a legal press and party, however, which endeavored to work within the scope permitted by the Rumanian authorities. There was also a fairly large section of the OUN, working underground. Corresponding —less closely—to Volhynia, was a considerable area of Ukrainian settlement in southern Bessarabia. This section of the Ukrainian ethnic group, however, was so backward culturally and so cut off geographically from contact with districts in which nationalism was strong that it appears to have played almost no role in the nationalist movements of the war period.

648 In June, 1940, while Germany was still occupied with the final phases of the French campaign, the Soviet Union began to press claims for territorial cessions from Rumania. It had long been recognized that Moscow would seize the first favorable moment to secure the retrocession of Bessarabia, the annexation of which by Rumania it had never recognized. Demands for Bukovina, however, apparently came as something of a shock to the German negotiators who were preparing a settlement of the Russian demands. They objected on the grounds that Bukovina had never been a part of the Russian Empire and that it contained a large

[79] Mel'nyk adherents have since claimed that their organizers who had been in Volhynia for a considerable time were killed by Bandera followers shortly before or after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war; see Mykhailiuk, p. 88; O. Shuliak, *V im'ia pravdy: Do istorii povstanoho rukhu v Ukraini* (In the Name of Truth: On the History of the Insurrectionary Movement in the Ukraine) (Rotterdam, 1947), p. 10.

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German colony. Molotov countered that it was the last "missing piece" of the Ukraine, though he agreed to limit his demands to the northern, predominantly Ukrainian part and offered to permit the repatriation of the ethnic German minority.[80] 648

Germany was not ready for a break with the USSR; consequently Rumania was forced to give way. On June 28, her forces evacuated Chernovtsy (Chernivtsi),[81] the Bukovinian capital, and the Red Army took over. The sequence of events was similar to that which had occurred nine months previously in L'vov, but the tempo was quicker. The leading newspaper, *Chas,* was Sovietized and a new Communist organ, *Nova Rada,* founded, though a number of Ukrainian books forbidden under Rumanian rule were authorized.[82] The Ukrainian People's House and other national cultural societies were closed. At the same time, the Soviet press assailed the repressive measures which the Rumanians had taken against Ukrainian cultural life. Soviet writers were indignant at the difficulties experienced by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Chernovtsy, although they denounced the Petliurist elements among them.[83] Numerous leading Ukrainians were not allowed to enjoy their new "intellectual freedom," but were arrested or shot as nationalist "counterrevolutionaries." It is said, however, that the German consul and the commission for evacuating the ethnic Germans succeeded in taking out numerous Ukrainian political leaders and priests of the Orthodox Church.[84] In any case, many thousands of refugees, mostly young people, found their way to Germany, where a large proportion provided an invigorating element for the segment of the OUN which had remained under Mel'nyk.[85] 661 [204]

The subjection of the West Ukraine to Soviet rule brought death or imprisonment to a considerable number of prominent Ukrainians; the entire population was oppressed by a heavy

[80] Ambassador von der Schulenburg in Moscow to Auswärtiges Amt, June 26, 1940, *Nazi-Soviet Relations,* p. 159.

[81] Rumanian Cernăuţi; German Chernowitz.

[82] *Nastup,* August 3, 1940, p. 3.

[83] "Besarabiia i pivnichna chastyna Bukovyny" (Bessarabia and the Northern Part of Bukovina), *Komunist,* June 30, 1940, p. 2; S. Zhurakovych and Ie. Patner, "Misto pod Prutom" (City on the Pruth), *Komunist,* July 5, 1940, p. 3.

[84] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* September 7, 1941, p. 3.

[85] See Chapter IV.

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661 weight of fear and by severe limitations on its freedom. These factors were to be of great importance, for they created a state of mind in which the Ukrainians of the area would at least initially welcome any force which opposed the Soviet Union, without close examination of its nature. Soviet occupation covered a relatively short period of time, however, and the policies prescribed by Moscow were tempered in the first months by a desire to avoid 668 alienating the inhabitants. Consequently, the severity of the Communist rule was not sufficient to destroy the material or psychological base for future revival of nationalist strength. In this respect, the severe factional strife which had arisen during the same period in the areas subject to German control was more important, for it meant that at a decisive moment in their history the Ukrainian nationalists could not speak with a single voice.

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IV. THE OPENING OF THE UKRAINE

LONG BEFORE the Western world guessed his intentions Hitler had begun preparations for a campaign against the Soviet Union. As early as 1940 the Germans surreptitiously formed military training units for Ukrainians. Their enlistment was concealed by official statements that the units were for *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans) only, and the purpose of the units was disguised by designating the Reichsarbeitdienst (Reich Labor Service) to be the supervising agency in the Generalgouvernement. Under this camouflage large numbers of Ukrainians were trained for police duty. More advanced training was carried out in Germany under direction of the Wehrmacht. In a number of camps instructors for future Ukrainian police units and interpreters for liaison with the German army were prepared.[1] At first, the chief Ukrainian organizer of this work was Colonel Sushko, and the training units were under the influence of the Mel'nyk group. After the split had fully developed, however, Bandera elements secured the upper hand in many of the groups, which were predominantly composed of young men fitted for active field service.[2]

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Either because they were naturally interested in employing the young and physically qualified Ukrainians in the Bandera party for the forthcoming campaign, or because they were dissatisfied with the previous efforts of the OUN-M (Mel'nyk group) to pursue a somewhat independent course, the Germans turned more and more to the insurgent faction. This was especially the case when, in the early spring of 1941, the comparatively unconcealed development of Ukrainian units was begun by the Wehrmacht.

[1] Stepan (Stephen) Huliak, "Polk im. Kholodnoho Iaru v Rivnomu" (The Kholodnyi Iar Regiment in Rovno), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (August-September, 1952), p. 7.

[2] MS D.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

704 The first such unit was known by the code name "Nachtigall" 668* and was organized in the Generalgouvernement. Nominally, only 735 its enlisted personnel were Ukrainian, while all officers were German. Actually, as the Germans well knew, there was a whole staff of "unofficial" Ukrainian officers, headed by the leader of the "military tendency" in the OUN-B, Roman Shukevych. At first "Nachtigall" had only about one hundred and fifty men, but at the outbreak of war it was expanded to battalion strength.[3]

A second unit, larger but of less political significance, was formed in Austria. Ukrainians were allowed a greater degree of formal authority than in "Nachtigall." In *de facto* command was Colonel Iarii, the dissident member of the old Provid, who was at once highly esteemed by his young subordinates and on the closest personal terms with the Abwehr officers charged with the formation of the units. John Gavrusevych, one of the top leaders of the Bandera group, was in charge of recruitment; his source of manpower lay in the large Ukrainian colony in Austria. Up to 1940, the chief Ukrainian organization in the latter territory was the student Sich in Vienna, which was dominated by the OUN. This association continued loyal to Mel'nyk, but most of the numerous Ukrainian factory workers turned to the new movement. It was among the latter that Gavrusevych secured the majority of his recruits, although about one quarter were secured from among the students, particularly those in the medical school in Graz. Care was taken to keep the force—which was called by the organizers Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists)—in the hands of the Bandera group, although only half of the members actually belonged to [714] the new party. Unlike "Nachtigall," which was clad in Wehrmacht *feldgrau,* "Roland," as the military unit composed of the Druzhyny was called, wore uniforms similar to those of the Galician section of the Ukrainian army of revolutionary days.[4]

668* As is apparent from the above description, the Wehrmacht units were prepared on a rather *ad hoc* basis, with the active

[3] Nykon Nalyvaiko, "Legiony v natsional'nykh viinakh" (Legions in National Wars), *Narod'na Volia* (October 27, 1949), p. 2.

[4] Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (June-July, 1952), p. 4; MS A.

cooperation of several important leaders of the OUN-B but 668*
without the utilization of the organizational framework of this group. However, Bandera and his principal lieutenants were well aware of what has going on; they approved of the formation of the units as a means for enhancing the power of their movement.[5] Moreover, it appears that in the spring of 1941 an understanding was reached between the directors of the OUN-B and certain Wehrmacht officers especially concerned with the utilization of Ukrainians in the coming war. This agreement was extremely vague and informal. As far as can be determined from cursory mention in a contemporary German document and from the accounts of Ukrainians and German officers involved in the arrangement, it provided that the Germans would allow the Bandera party to carry on political activities in the Ukrainian areas which were to be conquered, while the Reich would be left completely free to organize the economy of the region in accordance with the needs of its war production.[6]

Aside from the difficulty of defining economic and political spheres, this rudimentary agreement was vitiated by several misunderstandings. Bandera's followers, untutored in legal formulas, and indeed lacking experience in precise formulation of any kind, assumed that they had been granted a free hand in the political realm. The Wehrmacht representatives evidently believed that Germany really would support Ukrainian independence, but the Nazi leadership which controlled them never envisaged such a course. On the other hand, the army officers felt that they could control the new Ukrainian party at least as long as hostilities lasted, and envisaged political activity by the Bandera party as taking place only in a local, auxiliary fashion until the fighting ended.

[5] Interviews 24, 76.

[6] The whole question of an "agreement" between the Germans and the Bandera group is hotly disputed, with some OUN leaders denying that any real agreement took place and the Germans insisting that the Ukrainians broke their word by proclaiming their "government" in L'vov (Interview 62). A contemporary German police report, which may be judged to be comparatively disinterested in making such an assertion, maintained that an agreement embodying the conditions cited in the text had been made (Activity and Situation Report of the SP and the SD in the USSR, January-March, 1942, PS 3876; hereafter referred to as PS 3876).

668* When war broke out, the fragility of these arrangements was quickly demonstrated. The news of the outbreak of hostilities had scarcely reached Cracow when the Bandera followers organized a Ukrainian National Committee to serve, according to their proclamation, as an instrument for organizing all Ukrainian national forces for the liberation of the homeland. A highly respected former officer of the UNR army, General Vsevolod Petriv, was designated president; prominent members of most of the Ukrainian parties were secured as members, along with representatives of the OUN-B itself, headed by Dr. Horbovyi.[7] This startling emergence of the new party as the leader in consolidating Ukrainian forces in the Generalgouvernement was due to two factors: its unhesitating determination to take command, implemented by speedy action; and the widespread impression that the Germans were supporting it. The real plans of the directing group were not disclosed, however, to the more prominent Ukrainians who trusted to its guidance.[8]

Having secured a semblance of broad backing in the emigration, the Bandera group rapidly advanced toward its goal of "organizing" the territories being conquered by the German armies. Meanwhile, however, fearful events were taking place beyond the Soviet border. In the first hours after war broke out, the underground rose in a number of places and secured distinct successes against Soviet forces in some of the more remote districts where the difficult terrain made it possible for lightly armed guerrillas to act effectively against Soviet security units. Such uprisings took place in the Sambor (Sambir) area within forty-eight hours after the war started,[9] and farther east, in the Podgaitsi (Pidhaitsi) and Monastyris'ka districts, Ukrainian militia took over police functions and dissolved the kolkhozes before the

[7] Petro Mirchuk, *Akt vidnovlennia ukraïns'koï derzhavnosty, 30 chervnia 1941 roku* (The Act of Renewal of Ukrainian Statehood, June 30, 1941) (New York: Holovna Uprava Organizatsiï Oborony Chotyr'okh Svobid Ukraïny, 1952), pp. 18–20. It is claimed, however, that Petriv did not even know about his appointment as he was in the Protectorate at the time; cf. G. Polykarpenko, *Organizatsiia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv pidchas Druhoï Svitovoï Viini* (The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists during the Second World War) (4th revised ed. of *OUN u Viini*, ed. B. Mykhailiuk) (Canada, 1951), p. 69.

[8] Interview 24.

[9] *Nastup*, August 30, 1941, p. 2, quoting *Sambirs'ki Visti*, August 10, 1941.

German arrival.[10] In the less sheltered districts, however, Soviet repression was horrible. According to German secret reports, four thousand Ukrainian political prisoners were butchered in the NKVD cellars of L'vov alone, and several times as many were deported eastward. Many of the latter were killed later when their captors could no longer hurry them on ahead of the German advance.[11] Meanwhile tens of thousands of Soviet officials and their dependents, along with a considerable portion of the large Jewish population of Galicia, streamed eastward to escape a similar fate at the hands of the German totalitarians.

On June 30, in the midst of the disorganization caused by these events, the advance units of the Wehrmacht reached L'vov. With them came the first groups of Bandera's followers. Some of these came legally in "Nachtigall"; others, including Iaroslav Stets'ko, came illegally, though with the incidental assistance of some German front-line units.[12] Having arrived in the Galician capital, the OUN-B was in a favorable position. The months of isolation from the world outside the Soviet Union had prevented most of the citizens of L'vov from hearing of the internal conflict of the OUN. Moreover, the horror of the last days of Soviet occupation made the Germans seem like providential deliverers; the close contact enjoyed by the Bandera leaders with uniformed Wehrmacht soldiers greatly enhanced their prestige in their compatriots' eyes.

Just what assurances the Bandera adherents gave of their backing by the Germans, just how far they themselves believed they could rely on German support, is impossible to determine. Whatever inducements they used, immediately after their arrival the OUN-B group named Dr. George Polans'kyi, a prominent citizen, mayor, and succeeded in having a national representation "elected"; this they called together the same evening. They had hoped to secure the L'vov state theater, a hall of appropriate size and dignity for the gathering, but, finding it requisitioned by the German army, they were forced to resort to the small meeting

[10] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 6, 1941, p. 3.

[11] Report of the SP and the SD *Einsatzgruppen*, July 31, 1941, p. 13, NO 2151 (hereafter referred to as NO 2151).

[12] Interview 24.

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

PENETRATION OF NATIONALIST GROUPS INTO THE EAST UKRAINE

SUMMER AND AUTUMN, 1941

Routes of principal groups:

- OUN-B(andera) task forces (*pokhidny hrupy*)
- Wehrmacht auxiliary units under influence of OUN-B(andera) ("Roland" and "Nachtigall")
- OUN-M(el'nyk) groups
- Bukovinian groups adhering to the OUN-M(el'nyk)

The boundaries shown are those of the pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine.

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668* 642 room of the Prosvita society.[13] When the group assembled, Stets'ko addressed it, saying that the congress of émigrés in Cracow had already laid the foundation for a Ukrainian government. He then proceeded to proclaim the Ukrainian state. It is worth presenting the contents of this proclamation in full since it provides an excellent indication of the thinking of Bandera's group.[14]

Act of Proclamation of the Ukrainian State

1. By the will of the Ukrainian people, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the direction of STEPHEN BANDERA proclaims the renewal of the Ukrainian State, for which a whole generation of the best sons of the Ukraine spilled its blood.

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which under the direction of its creator and leader EUGENE KONOVALETS' during the past decades of bloody Muscovite-Bolshevik subjugation carried on a stubborn struggle for freedom, calls upon the entire Ukrainian people not to lay down its arms until a Sovereign Ukrainian State is formed in all the Ukrainian lands.

The sovereign Ukrainian government assures the Ukrainian people of regularity and order [*lad i poriadok*], multi-sided development of all its forces, and satisfaction of its demands.

2. In the western lands of the Ukraine a Ukrainian government is created which will be subordinated to a Ukrainian national administration which will be created in the capital of the Ukraine —Kiev.

3. The Ukrainian national-revolutionary army, which is being created on Ukrainian soil, will continue to fight against the Muscovite occupation for a Sovereign All-Ukrainian State and a new, just order in the whole world.

Long live the Sovereign Ukrainian State!

Long live the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists!

[13] *Ibid.*; Mirchuk, p. 30; Interview 21.

[14] The translation is from an early typewritten copy of the proclamation furnished me by Volodymyr Stakhiv. A printed version in Mirchuk (p. 32) is entitled *Act of Renewal of the Ukrainian State*, a significant change in view of the frequent ridicule of the proclamation by writers opposed to Bandera as an effort to "proclaim" a Ukrainian state which had been in existence since 1918. Other differences are not important.

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Long live the director of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—STEPHEN BANDERA!

The City of L'vov, June 30, 1941, 8 P.M.
Head of the National Congress
Iaroslav Stets'ko

The meeting at which the *akt*—as this proclamation has come to be known in Ukrainian polemics—was made was of comparatively small importance because of the hasty manner of its calling and the small number of people present. Nevertheless, the gathering was immediately dignified by the title of "National Assembly." Considerably more important than the initial proclamation was the fact that, in the confusion attendant upon the Red army's withdrawal and the German entry, the Ukrainians had been able to secure access to the L'vov radio station.[15] Consequently, soon after the *akt* was proclaimed, Stets'ko was able to broadcast it. Moreover, during the day, certain of Stets'ko's followers, including in particular the Reverend John Hryn'okh, chaplain of "Nachtigall," were able to gain access to the bedridden Metropolitan. Without going into details concerning their relations with Mel'nyk (they later asserted that Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi "must" have known about the conflict), they informed him of their plans for proclaiming the Ukrainian state and asked his support.[16] Apparently convinced that the group had the backing of the Germans, and hoping for a quick establishment of Ukrainian independence, the Metropolitan wrote a pastoral letter in which he exhorted the people to support the newly proclaimed government, saying that "the sacrifices which the final attainment of our goals require demand above all dutiful obedience to the just orders of the government which do not conflict with God's laws." Moreover, he declared:

We greet the victorious German Army as deliverer from the enemy. We render our obedient homage to the government which has been

[15] Interviews 21, 24, 63; Mirchuk, p. 30; Vasyl' Rudko ("R. Lisovii"), "Rozlam v OUN" (The Split in the OUN), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, November 3, 1949, p. 3.

[16] Interviews 24, 63. They base their statement on the fact that Sheptyts'kyi was in close touch with Klymiv, the OUN-B chief in east Galicia.

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erected. We recognize Mr. Iaroslav Stets'ko as Head of the State Administration of the Ukraine.[17] 668* 642

The pastoral letter was read over the radio by Father Hryn'okh the same morning. It appears to have removed any doubts which may have been lingering in the minds of most of the prominent Ukrainians in L'vov concerning the authenticity of the Stets'ko government.

The Bandera leaders went ahead rapidly to consolidate their victory. They felt the need of a name which would carry greater prestige than that of the young enthusiast Stets'ko, who had, as Bandera's deputy, already declared himself chief of state. Consequently, they prevailed upon the aged Constantine Levits'kyi, who had been released from prison several months before the war broke out, to accept the post of president of a parliament or Council of Seniors. At the same time, the Bandera group prepared to establish a "cabinet," which was to have included men from a wide group of parties. Stets'ko himself was to be "premier," since he feared that a nonparty man might give way to German pressure. Bandera adherents were to be placed in such key posts as deputy war minister, which was to be held by Shukevych; minister of security, to be held by Lebed'; and minister of political coordination, to be held by Klymiv.[18] 668* 642 645

The Bandera government, however, was not to live long enough to bring these plans to fruition. The proclamation of the government in the Prosvita hall had deeply disturbed the Wehrmacht officers who had organized "Nachtigall." They knew that it would induce a violent reaction among the ruling Nazis in Berlin, whereas the Wehrmacht group had hoped that by careful procedure they could secure the gradual development of a friendly, autonomous Ukrainian regime, at least in Galicia, without high party circles' realizing what was happening. Some of them were also alarmed at the possibility that the wide publica- 668*

[17] This quotation is taken from a contemporary leaflet copy of the pastoral letter.

[18] Interview 24; Mirchuk, pp. 35–36. Mirchuk lists Petriv as war minister, while a contemporary German SD report (NO 4529) has Iarii in that post. The same report lists Klymiv as minister of security, but the evidence available to me makes it appear probable that Lebed' held the post; possibly the latter's clandestine role made it necessary to keep his appointment secret.

tion given the *akt* might arouse Russian patriotism against German-supported Ukrainian separatism, thus strengthening Soviet resistance.[19]

The Bandera group, on their side, maintain that they anticipated an unfavorable reaction from the Germans but felt that it was necessary to go ahead with the proclamation so as to confront them with a *fait accompli*. They felt it would be difficult for the Germans to take overt action against a widely proclaimed "Ukrainian government," since such action might lead to a great loss of support for the German campaign by the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union. At any rate—so they argue—these nationalities would know what to expect from the Nazi regime if it suppressed the Ukrainian state. As a matter of fact, Bandera and his followers appear to have had a fairly correct understanding of the attitude of the Wehrmacht officers with whom they were dealing. In spite of their dismay over the proclamation, the latter were very hesitant to take countermeasures. They "looked the other way" when possible, while quietly working to convince influential circles in L'vov of the inadequacy of the Stets'ko regime.[20]

The Bandera group, however, was quite unable to fathom the real nature of high German policy. In view of what happened later in the Ukraine, it is probable that a severe repression of any form of self-administration for the Ukraine as a whole would have been ordered by Hitler and his henchmen, regardless of whether the *akt* had been proclaimed or not. However, the proclamation immediately produced the reaction feared by the Wehrmacht group. About three days after the *akt,* an SS *Einsatzgruppe* [task force] arrived in L'vov. It was accompanied, significantly, by several Ukrainians in the role of interpreters or "political reporters," including at least one prominent follower of Mel'nyk, Chuchkevych. After a few days of feeling out the ground, this force waited upon Stets'ko and his friend Rebet

[19] Interview 62. The danger of arousing Russian patriotism was especially feared by the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) officers, according to one of Stets'ko's assistants (Interview 29).

[20] Interview 62.

when they came to the city administrative building on July 9 668* and placed them under "honorary arrest." [21]

About the same time,[1] Bandera (who had never been allowed 668* to leave the Generalgouvernement), Gavrusevych, Bandera's rep- 661 resentative in Berlin, Volodymyr Stakhiv, and Stets'ko's assistants, Stariukh and Ilnits'kyi, were arrested.[22] All were assembled in Berlin and questioned thoroughly by both police and Wehrmacht officers. The Germans, however, were obviously proceeding with caution. They realized that at that moment considerable trouble could be caused the advancing German armies by disturbances in Galicia, which would probably be the result of drastic action against the OUN leaders.[23] At the same time, they warned the group of the possible serious consequences of their actions, and urged the leaders to withdraw the *akt* and accept a status in eastern Galicia similar to that of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow. Bandera and his followers refused; however, they were not imprisoned. On the contrary, while nominally under house arrest, they were allowed to carry on their political activities in Berlin; Stets'ko was even able to go to Cracow, where he consulted with Lebed', whom he had secretly delegated to take command of all activities in the Ukrainian lands.[24]

Meanwhile, the tide started by the proclamation was still 668* running in Bandera's favor in Galicia. Several non-OUN administrators who had accompanied Stets'ko and Rebet at the time of their arrest were sick with humiliation to see Ukrainians, who had created the impression that they were responsible leaders acting in agreement with the Germans, thus treated as naughty boys who had stepped out of bounds.[25] The majority of the population, on the other hand, was not aware of the real nature of the departure of the Bandera party's leaders. In town after

[21] Interviews 24, 36, 44, 67.

[22] Mirchuk, pp. 38–39.

[23] As the chief of Vineta, the Propaganda Ministry's bureau for dealing with eastern affairs, later wrote: "Bandera and his closest supporters were arrested, but by clever treatment an insurrection was avoided." Taubert to Rosenberg, February 17, 1944, Occ E-4 (1), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [1]).

[24] Mirchuk, p. 39; Interviews 24, 75.

[25] Interview 36.

1 [July 1941 -- Analyst]

668* town in the eastern part of Galicia the citizens, rejoicing over the overthrow of Soviet rule, assumed that the independence of the Ukraine had really been established and greeted the new "government" with enthusiastic expressions of loyalty.[26]

From the very beginning of the war, the Bandera group had been putting into operation still another ambitious plan. Far from being content with the establishment of a government in the former Polish territories, the OUN-B was determined to extend its scope to include the East Ukraine. Bandera's followers realized that it would be an extremely slow process for the organization to spread from town to town and that in case of opposition by the Germans such a development could be quickly interrupted. Consequently, in the last months before the outbreak of war they had secretly developed a number of groups of young men (and women) to act as propagandists and organizers in the eastern area. In the final days of June these bodies, which were known as *pokhidny hrupy* (literally "march groups," but translated hereafter as "task forces") assembled (doubtless with some toleration by the Wehrmacht) at convenient points along the eastern border of the Generalgouvernement.[27]

Two of the task forces were to cross the northern Ukraine. One, under Nicholas Klymishyn, who had accompanied Lebed' in his escape from the Polish prison convoy, had Kiev for its destination.[28] A second group under Nicholas Senishyn had Kharkov as its goal. A third task force, which was expected to break up into several subgroups, was to organize the southern Ukraine.[29]

[26] *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Stanislav), July 22, 1941, p. 1; *Kremianets'kii Visnyk*, August 9, 1941. These papers were furnished me by an erstwhile leader of the Bandera group, Volodymyr Stakhiv, but they appear genuine.

[27] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 4; Mstyslav Z. Chubai, *Reid organizatoriv OUN vid Popradu po Chorne More* (The Raid of Organizers of the OUN from Poprad to the Black Sea) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 4; "E. Pavliuk" (Ievhen [Eugene] Stakhiv, a brother of Volodymyr Stakhiv), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: Spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), p. 37.

[28] Matla, p. 4; Ievhen Stakhiv (p. 37) says that the leader was Dmytro Myron, but Matla appears to have been in closer contact with these operations.

[29] Matla, p. 4.

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The tasks outlined for the groups were ambitious indeed. They were to proclaim the *akt* of L'vov, to organize the "state apparatus," and to construct a Ukrainian army from former soldiers of the Red and Polish armies.[30] The resources available for carrying out these projects in the vast reaches of the Ukraine were hardly commensurate with the scope of the tasks. The groups varied in size, but all could be counted in scores of men. To cover the great distances they were equipped with bicycles and wagons; a few lucky ones had motorcycles, and for the entire force there was—one automobile. Printed propaganda leaflets, which had been secretly prepared in Cracow by workers in the legal presses, were available, but hardly in the millions of copies needed.[31]

What the expeditions lacked in material resources, however, they made up for in self-assurance. After the first few days, they realized that the Germans were not going to welcome them cordially; consequently, they carefully skirted large towns and concentrations of German troops. When they were unable to avoid encounters with the latter, they adopted a bold front, in some cases even declaring that they were "emissaries of an independent Ukrainian state." The Wehrmacht commanders, like all field soldiers, were annoyed at the presence of unauthorized civilians in their zone of operations. However, most had heard of the cooperation of the youthful movement with the Germans. Moreover, in many cases they undoubtedly had real sympathy for Ukrainian nationalist aspirations, for they had seen the touching gratitude with which the Ukrainians welcomed their supposed deliverers from Soviet tyranny and their readiness to cooperate against the Bolshevik regime. Consequently, while the front-line officers told the youths to go back to Galicia, they did not invoke the harsh letter of military law against them. The reckless young men agreed to go home—but once out of sight took other roads to the east.[32]

As a result, in the bright summer months, the little groups trudging in the wake of the mighty Wehrmacht were able to make some progress in carrying out their program. In August the

[30] Chubai, p. 6.
[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 14 ff.; Matla, p. 4.
[32] Chubai, p. 29.

668* northern task force reached Zhitomir, where it helped a group of local people set up a very impermanent administration, and aroused an equally transitory wave of enthusiasm among some of the younger citizens.[33] The southern force covered an even greater distance; it traveled across Galicia during July, carrying on propaganda work; reached Vinnitsa by the end of the month; and on September 2 was in Dniepropetrovsk (Katerynoslav or, more romantically, Sicheslav), five hundred miles from its starting point.[34]

668* 704 725 Less picturesque, but of potentially greater value, were the military units under control of the Bandera group. As was previously noted, "Nachtigall" had taken part in the occupation of L'vov, where its leaders were of great value in organizing the city for the Bandera party. Although the Wehrmacht officers accompanying the group were aware of the roles of Father Hryn'okh, Shukevych, and Lopatyns'kyi in the *akt,* they protected them from the arrest.[35] The unit continued eastward with the Wehrmacht, in late August reaching Vinnitsa where its members made secret contact with the southern task force.[36]

"Roland," on the other hand, had no direct connection with the activities in Galicia. Before the outbreak of war, it was sent across Hungary to the Rumanian part of Bukovina. There were considerable difficulties with the Rumanians because of efforts of the Ukrainian nationalists to establish contact with local Ukrainians who were Rumanian subjects. After the outbreak of war, however, the unit was sent with the German advance through Bessarabia, across the Dniester, and into the Ukrainian ethnographical territory north of Tiraspol' where it remained until early September.[37]

668* While the newest Ukrainian nationalist party was achieving widespread, though transitory successes, its chief rival was not idle. The defection of the bulk of the Galician youth had indeed dealt a heavy blow to the "legitimate" OUN under Mel'nyk. Nevertheless, it retained several very important assets. In the first place,

[33] Ievhen Stakhiv, p. 39.
[34] Matla, p. 9.
[35] Interview 63.
[36] *Ibid.;* Matla, pp. 9–10.
[37] Ortyns'kyi, p. 4; MS A.

not all of the young men had joined the rebellion; a fairly large 668*
number of the youths of Galicia and Volhynia remained with their elders, and probably a majority of the younger generation in the Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovina did also. Secondly, the older group embodied a great deal more experience than did the young rebels; this was to be particularly valuable in operating in the East Ukraine, where most of the older men had lived during the revolutionary period, if indeed they were not natives of the area. Along with experience went contacts, for Konovalets' had managed to maintain a few tenuous lines of communication with sympathizers in the East Ukraine.[38] Fourthly, the OUN-M, although it appeared temporarily to have been replaced by its rival in the Wehrmacht's plans, never lost contact with the Germans, and was in a position to profit from this contact when the Bandera group lost favor.

On July 6, 1941, a number of the leading Ukrainian national- 668*
ists who had served as officers in the Ukrainian Republican Army 186
joined Mel'nyk in addressing an appeal to Hitler through the Abwehr. The signers of the appeal, besides Mel'nyk, who signed simply as "retired colonel," were Generals Omelianovych-Pavlenko and Kapustians'kyi, Colonels Sushko, Stefaniv, and Diatchenko, and Michael Khronoviat. Their appeal read as follows:

The Ukrainian people, whose century-old struggle for freedom has scarcely been matched by any other people, espouses from the depths of its soul the ideals of the New Europe. The entire Ukrainian people yearns to take part in the realization of these ideals. We, old fighters for freedom in 1918–1921, request that we, together with our Ukrainian youth, be permitted the honor of taking part in the crusade against Bolshevik barbarism. In twenty-one years of a defensive struggle, we have suffered bloody sacrifices, and we suffer especially at present through the frightful slaughter of so many of our compatriots. We request that we be allowed to march shoulder to shoulder with the legions of Europe and with our liberator, the German Wehrmacht, and therefore we ask to be permitted to create a Ukrainian military formation.[39]

[38] Cf. Iurii (George) Boiko, *Ievhen Konovalets' i oseredno-skhidni zemli* (Eugene Konovalets' and the Central-Eastern Lands) (1947), pp. 34–50.

[39] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 15, July 7, 1941, NO 5154 (hereafter referred to as NO 5154).

668 The willingness to hitch on to the Nazi chariot expressed in this appeal was fruitless, however, for the confident Nazi leaders were in no mood to accept allies which might prove troublesome later. Less than a month after Mel'nyk's appeal, the UNO was forced to announce that the Germans were allowing Ukrainians who had been Soviet citizens, but not those (constituting the great bulk of the emigration) who had never lived under the Soviet regime, to enter police units to serve in the east. It warned its members that some of their number who had attempted to go to the East Ukraine had been "interned" and released only by intervention of the Berlin headquarters of the UNO.[40]

Mel'nyk himself reacted to the new situation in a characteristic fashion, which revealed once more the moderate nature of his policy and the doubtful effectiveness of his approach. Shortly after war began, he addressed all "nationalists," calling for unity for the great new tasks ahead, and asking for the end of activities of "partisan factionalists." He continued by urging all to "be true to the tasks of nationalism so that a satisfactory account may be made to the Third Great Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists."[41] The last statement was an obvious hint that, however much the Bandera followers might be dissatisfied with the Second Congress, they would have another chance to carry out their program in a new meeting, if only they returned to the fold. In view of the reckless yet energetic way in which the *krai* group was pushing ahead during the first week of war, such an appeal was almost certain to be taken as a sign of weakness, rather than as the genuine expression of a desire for reconciliation which it probably was. Very likely the situation was not helped by Mel'nyk's issuing, a few weeks later, a further call to "all Ukrainians," declaring his readiness to forget all that had taken place if all would return to the OUN and demonstrate their good will.[42]

Even if such sentiments could have influenced men of the insurgents' temperament, their effect was nullified by the way in which the Mel'nyk supporters reacted to the German measures against the Stets'ko coup. It is probably true that any direct co-

[40] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, July 24, 1941, p. 4.
[41] *Nastup*, June 28, 1941.
[42] *Nastup*, July 19, 1941.

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operation given the German police was furnished by individuals like Chuchkevych, without the assent or even the knowledge of the Provid. It is understandable, however, that the presence of such men with the *Einsatzgruppe* led Bandera's adherents to conclude that their opponents were in league with the occupying power. Moreover, if the Mel'nyk group as such did not collaborate with the Germans against the other OUN faction, it certainly rejoiced in the latter's discomfiture. On July 16, the OUN organ reprinted an account of an interview of Beyer with a *Krakivs'ki Visti* correspondent in which the German official, who had just returned from L'vov, denied reports circulated by the Ukrainian National Committee that a "West Ukrainian regional government" under Stets'ko had been formed there, and that the Wehrmacht officer, Dr. Hans Koch, had recognized "a Ukrainian administration" at a "gathering" in L'vov.[43]

OUN-M supporters also hurried to east Galicia to secure a share in the control of the area. The Bandera party, of course, rapidly lost its power in L'vov, although, as has been pointed out, the impetus of their coup was felt for some time in areas distant from the Galician capital. When it became apparent that the Germans were not really backing Stets'ko, his Ukrainian support rapidly diminished. At the end of July the Council of Seniors which he had set up was expanded by the addition of seventeen new members and renamed the National Council.[44] Apparently German influence played a part in this; along with the change of name, a certain amount of change in composition took place, Mel'nyk adherents being permitted to replace OUN-B sympathizers.[45] Constantine Levits'kyi sank into obscurity; with considerable reluctance, Dr. Constantine Pan'kyvs'kyi, who had been a minor UNDO politician before the war, and was not associated with either branch of the OUN, assumed the direction of the "secretariat" which acted as executive organ.[46] Some weeks later,

[43] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, July 16, 1941, p. 3.

[44] *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 587.

[45] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 34, July 26, 1941, p. 11, NO 2954 (hereafter referred to as NO 2954).

[46] *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva*, p. 587; *Nastup*, November 1, 1941, p. 3; Interview 36.

the organization was renamed the Ukraïns'kyi Kraievyi Komitet (Ukrainian Regional Committee) with Pan'kyvs'kyi retaining direction.[47]

That its role in the reorganization of administration in eastern Galicia after the downfall of the Bandera leaders was somewhat more restricted than its part in the creation of the Ukrainian administration in Cracow in 1940 probably did not greatly disturb the OUN-M at the time, since its primary desire was to seize the long-anticipated opportunity to invade the East Ukraine. Two types of penetration were utilized. Through their long association with the Germans, the Mel'nyk followers had secured a large number of posts as interpreters, advisers, and so forth in Wehrmacht units. These posts now provided an opportunity for reaching the east in a legal manner. Because they feared that the Germans would restrict nationalist activity, however, the Mel'nyk group did not rely on legal means alone. In a fashion similar to that of the Bandera group, but evidently with greater reliance on cooperation of the German authorities, to be obtained by their contacts with the Wehrmacht, the Mel'nyk leaders organized a number of groups to go into the East Ukraine without authorization. Like the Bandera group's plan, the OUN-M project provided for three principal groups. The northern group was to go across Volhynia through Zhitomir to Kiev; ultimately, however, it was to reach Kharkov. The central group was to follow the route of the OUN-B southern task force through Vinnitsa to Dniepropetrovsk and then was to go on to the Donbas. Finally, corresponding to an OUN-B subgroup, the Mel'nyk southern group was to branch off at Vinnitsa for Odessa and Nikolaev (Mykolaïïv).[48]

All these groups, and especially the southern one, were much weaker in numbers than their OUN-B counterparts. They were handicapped by the fact that many of their members were beyond the most active age. Fortunately for the success of the Mel'nyk enterprise, however, they received an unplanned but extremely valuable reinforcement in the form of over five hundred

[47] Interview 36.

[48] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, pp. 52–54.

Bukovinians, mostly young and energetic men. The OUN underground in Bukovina had become active as soon as war broke out, and, after the Rumanian and Hungarian forces freed the province, it was able to maintain an open organization until the middle of July. Then the Rumanian authorities, anxious lest their recovery of the area be threatened by a Ukrainian independence movement, repressed the Nationalists with great severity. In some districts actual fighting took place between the Ukrainian nationalists and the Rumanian gendarmerie. The latter proved to be much too strong for the OUN-led forces. Many of the young men among the Ukrainian resistance groups fled to the north. Some went directly to the East Ukraine, others through Galicia to Vinnitsa.[49] Here, with the help of OUN-M members working with the Germans, a large number were recruited for the auxiliary police force; still others went on to Kiev and Zhitomir where they formed a large part of the cadres for pro-Mel'nyk police organizations. Another group, a much smaller one, succeeded in crossing the southwestern Ukraine to Nikolaev, where it established an OUN-M center.

The great base of the Mel'nyk party's activity in the East Ukraine in the late summer of 1941, however, was Zhitomir. The situation in Zhitomir was especially significant. The first base of OUN-M activity in the eastern Ukraine, it was also the first important city east of the pre-1939 Soviet border open to nationalist activity. The developments in Zhitomir help to explain the role of the Nationalist movement in the East Ukraine in its "honeymoon" stage.

The embryonic OUN-B "administration" was quickly set aside; apparently the Nationalist sympathizers among the townspeople who had greeted the Bandera organizers now passed over to the OUN-M without much knowledge or concern about the differences between the factions. Although Mel'nyk organizers served as the stimulating force, by far the greater part of the work of building the new administration was performed by local people,

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 51; Report No. 10 of the Representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Süd, Captain Dr. [Hans] Koch, October 5, 1941, PS 053 (hereafter referred to as PS 053); Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, July 1, 1941, pp. 21–22, NO 2950 (hereafter referred to as NO 2950).

668* such as the head of the *oblast* (district) administration, Alexander Iatseniuk, the chief of the city administration, Pavlovs'kyi, and nearly all of his department heads.[50] A wide variety of nationalist organizations sprang up, including Prosvita, churches, and an active theater. Local artists appeared on Ukrainian programs permitted by the German-controlled broadcasting station. [871] Schools, including two *gimnaziias* and a pedagogical institute, were reopened, and a local school administration was established.[51]

[369] The population of the city sank to forty-two thousand (including seven thousand Poles and two thousand Russians) after the [438] deportation of the Jews. However, economic life was stimulated by the reopening of a sugar refinery and other industries; markets were reopened and private trade was encouraged.[52] One hundred [795] and seventy-nine physicians were present, a very high number in [883] proportion to the population.[53] An extremely active youth organization, known, like its counterparts in the West Ukraine, as the Sich, was formed; its activities included sports, choral singing, theatricals, and development of an orchestra.[54]

All of these organizations were under the control of nationalist Ukrainians, although the emphasis appeared to be on the formation of a Ukrainian territorial state which would include all persons, of whatever ethnic origin, living on Ukrainian soil. Thus one of the chief administrative officials, the head of the *raion* administration (i.e., the rural area outside the city) was a Pole, and the director of the economic section of the city administration was a Russian.[55] There appears to have been a large measure of cordiality between the local groups and the OUN representa-

[50] Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2; 454th Sicherungsdivision, Section VII, Report of October 4, 1941, NOKW 2129 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2129).

[51] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 1, 1941, p. 1; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24 and 26, 1941, pp. 2 and 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 25, 1942, p. 5; *Nastup*, September 6, 1941, p. 5.

[52] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1, based on *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Zhitomir), August 3, 1941; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[53] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24, 1941, p. 2; many, however, were apparently Jews who were temporarily spared because of their usefulness (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2).

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 2, and *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2.

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tives coming from the west. Numerous local citizens, mostly 668*
young men but including also several administrative officials, joined the Nationalist organization. Support was so strong, in fact, that a new district organization (Kraieva Ekzekutyva) of the Mel'nyk party could be formed, headed by the son of the chief of the *oblast* administration and another local leader.[56] Generally speaking, OUN-M influence was predominant in the civic life of Zhitomir as the summer of 1941 drew to a close.

The first OUN-M organizers appear to have arrived with the 668*
Wehrmacht. Foremost among them was Bohdan Konyk, a Gali- 625
cian, who was especially concerned with police organization. At the end of July, with the help of a young Carpatho-Ukrainian journalist, George Tarkovych, whose numerous articles are a major source for this period, he went with German authorization to a nearby camp of Soviet war prisoners and selected volunteers for the police force.[57] Zakhvalins'kyi, an East Ukrainian by origin who had once been a member of the Ukrainian Republican Army but who had lived for many years as a common worker in France, was made commander. He was an adherent of Mel'nyk. As his deputy, a local nonparty man, Kalenda, was chosen, while the commander's adjutant was a Bukovinian member of the Mel'nyk party.[58]

A major task of the police force was to prepare an organization
for installation in Kiev, as soon as the capital should fall into 668*
German hands. The same purpose was evident in the formation [204]
of a newspaper, *Ukraïns'ke Slovo;* this organ was destined for transfer to Kiev as soon as possible. Consequently, the chief propaganda workers of the eastern group of the OUN-M were active in its creation. Among them were John Rohach, a Carpatho-Ukrainian, Iaroslav Chemeryns'kyi, one of the leading émigré writers, and Peter Oliïnyk. Under their direction, a number of able local journalists were recruited, though not all of them were adherents of the Mel'nyk party.[59]

All of these preparations served as a backdrop for the most

[56] Interviews 12, 65; cf. V. Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 10, 1941, p. 2; *OUN u Viini,* p. 53.
[57] Cf. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 21, 1942, p. 2; Interview 35.
[58] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 10, 1941, p. 2; Interview 65.
[59] *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, pp. 3-3; Interviews 3, 65.

668* important event in the development of the Zhitomir base—the arrival there of the major leaders of the party, who came to take personal direction of the campaign to win the east. Mel'nyk himself remained behind, perhaps because his departure would have aroused German mistrust, but the top level of the Provid was represented by both Senyk and Stsibors'kyi. With them came Dr. Kandyba, the son of a famous East Ukrainian poet, then still living in emigration. Kandyba, best known as "Ol'zhych," was a young man, still in his thirties. Though trained as an archeologist, for several years he had been very prominent in the ranks of OUN leadership just below the level of the Provid. He was now placed in direct charge of all the advance groups in the East Ukraine.[60]

The three leaders had crossed Galicia in the middle of August, stopping briefly in L'vov. They were careful not to advertise their journey; apparently neither here nor in crossing the border into Volhynia—where a special pass was officially required—were they molested by the Germans. The OUN-M has always denied that there was any agreement with the latter concerning this expedition, but it is highly probable that the Wehrmacht officials in control knew about it, at least unofficially. At any rate, once they had reached Zhitomir, in the last days of August, the OUN leaders acted quite openly. However, their mission came to an abrupt end.

668* 578 At seven thirty on the warm summer evening of August 30, as Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, returning from a gathering of the regional police, were approaching the main street intersection of Zhitomir, a young man approached them from behind and fired two or three pistol shots. One penetrated the back of Senyk's neck; he died instantly. Stsibors'kyi was shot through both cheeks and bled to death a few hours later.[61]

The assassin was shot down by Ukrainian and German policemen as he attempted to flee; a vehicle from the German police command came up immediately afterwards and removed the body. Consequently it was difficult to determine who had insti-

[60] *OUN u Viini*, p. 54.

[61] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3; and the report of an eyewitness to the crime, Interview 35.

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gated the murder. The man's passport, however, indicated that his name was Stephen Kozyi, and that he was a West Ukrainian.[62] Almost at once the Mel'nyk adherents accused the OUN-B of having ordered the assassination, asserting that Kozyi was a member of their group. Strong support was given to their allegation by the following circumstances: (1) the bitter attacks leveled by the OUN-B against the two murdered leaders;[63] (2) the fact, attested in a secret report by one of the most competent German specialists on the Ukraine, that Bandera followers distributed leaflets in Kiev justifying the assassinations shortly after they had occurred;[64] (3) the existence of a secret directive by the OUN-B Provid stating that Mel'nyk leaders were not to be allowed to reach Kiev. Mel'nyk adherents at the time referred to a "death sentence" passed on the two leaders "long before" by the Bandera leadership. Discussing entirely separate events, a pro-Bandera writer has recently declared that the rules of the "Second Bandera Congress" of the OUN forbade "Mel'nyk divergentists" working in the Ukraine.[65] That the OUN-M leaders knew the Bandera supporters might resort to violence is fairly certain. OUN-M sympathizers reported soon after the murders that Senyk and Stsibors'kyi had been warned by friends against the dangers from the rival faction.[66] After the war an official OUN-M source quoted a general warning issued by Mel'nyk in the spring of 1941 concerning his opponents' plans to kill OUN-M leaders.[67]

The OUN-B, on the other hand, has always denied complicity in the crime. It asserts that the deed was the work either of German agents, who intended to weaken the OUN-M by depriving it of leaders who had occasionally opposed German policies and who at the same time intended to arouse Ukrainian opinion against the Bandera group, or of Communists intent on causing conflict between the two Nationalist parties. Some credence is given to the latter theory by the fact that immediately after the

[62] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3; Interview 35.

[63] An article by a "nonparty correspondent" in *Nastup*, October 11, 1941, p. 4, declared that Bandera had proclaimed long before that Senyk and Stsibors'kyi would be the first whom he would destroy "in the Ukrainian lands."

[64] PS 053.

[65] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 1; Chubai, p. 54.

[66] Mykola Halahan in *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, September 28, 1941, p. 2.

[67] This is quoted in *OUN u Vinni*, p. 43.

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668* 578 event the OUN-M accounts described Kazyi as a "hardened Communist," who had, however, turned to the Bandera party.[68] It is difficult to tell whether there was any basis for this statement, for the Mel'nyk adherents were endeavoring to link Bandera's followers to Moscow, which, they assert, had inspired these murders as it had those of Petliura and Konovalets'.[69] Since then, however, there have been rumors that a Ukrainian who was admittedly a former Communist had been in touch with Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, leading to the suspicion that Soviet agents may have planted a betrayer in their entourage.

In view of these discrepancies, it is impossible to be sure who the real authors of the crime were. Knowing the principles and temperament of the Bandera group, however, one must admit that such a deed might not have been repugnant to them. The issuance of a categorical order like that mentioned above, in the heated atmosphere of the period, could very well have led a reckless young member of the OUN-B to the commission of murder. Whether a direct order for the act was given, or whether the consequences of the general order were envisaged by the Bandera Provid at the time it was issued, are questions which can scarcely be answered.

The bloody deed had two immediate results. In the first place it enormously increased the tension between the two factions of the OUN. The Mel'nyk group immediately launched a violent press campaign against the opposing party. It alleged that the OUN-B had carried out a whole series of assassinations of Mel'nyk members in the preceding three months. These are supposed to have included the regional director John Mitsyk and his deputy, Alexander Kuts, in Volhynia, and two leaders of the OUN-M advance groups, Shul'ha and Shubs'kyi.[70] An editorial in *Nastup* declared that "the time of amnesty for them [the Bandera adherents] is past, their sins cannot be forgiven." [71] Mel'nyk, however, refused to countenance violent reprisals. In the same

[68] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3.

[69] *Nastup*, October 4, 1941, p. 4; cf. Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 101, October 2, 1941, pp. 3–4, NO 3137 (hereafter referred to as NO 3137).

[70] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3; *OUN u Viini*, p. 48.

[71] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3.

issue of *Nastup* he laid full responsibility for the crime on the "divergentists," but merely ordered all Ukrainians to refrain from contact with them and expressed the hope that the tragedy would purge Ukrainian life of crime and anarchy.[72] 668* 518

Whatever responsibility they may have borne for the assassinations, the Bandera followers were quickly visited with retribution. The Germans arrested all OUN-B members in Zhitomir itself, and a number were executed. During the early part of September, SS *Einsatzgruppen* arrested and executed most of the members of three of the subgroups of the southern task force, at Balta, Nikolaev, and the Crimean city of Dzhankoi.[73] In Nikolaev at least, the OUN-M adherents denounced their pro-Bandera rivals to the Germans.[74] The expedition to the southern peninsula had been a favorite project of the OUN-B, and its complete annihilation was a severe blow to their hopes. Moreover, although some members were able to go underground, OUN-B activity in Kirovograd and Krivoi Rog (Krivyi Rih) and other places in the south-central Ukraine was seriously crippled. Still more disheartening, the sections of the northern task forces which had been heading for Kiev to "proclaim" the Ukrainian state there, as had been done in L'vov, were broken up by the Germans in Vasil'kov (Vasyl'kiv) and Fastov (Fastiv).[75] Some of the members fled to Polessia, where they hid in the forests; a few apparently slipped by secretly into the capital. Significantly for the direction of future operations, the chief remaining center of the OUN-B was in Dniepropetrovsk. 668* 661

That indignation over the murders prompted this far-reaching repression of the Bandera party is improbable in view of the contempt in which the SS at least held all Ukrainians. Neverthe-

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[73] Matla, p. 22. That the arrests were not all part of a concerted plan is indicated by the fact that part were carried out by the Rumanians in their area of occupation. The latter warned the Ukrainians to get out of this area but told them they did not care what they did on the other side of the line of demarcation (cf. Chubai, p. 56). The executions in Zhitomir evidently took place immediately after the assassinations (Ie. Stakhiv, p. 39). On the destruction of the Crimean groups see also Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the *Einsatzgruppen* of the SP and the SD in the USSR, December, 1941, NO 2659 (hereafter referred to as NO 2659).

[74] The accusation to this effect in Matla, p. 22, is confirmed by NO 3157.

[75] PS 053.

[Killing of Senyk & Stsibors'kyi, August 30, 1941 -- Analyst]

668* less, SS and security police reports for this period explicitly state
661 that complete suppression was not undertaken until after "the murders of numerous Mel'nyk supporters" by the OUN-B.[76] Apparently the feeling that drastic action would have to be taken against the Bandera party had been building up in SS circles for some weeks. Indignation over Stets'ko's coup, openly placarded appeals of Klymiv for the secret gathering of arms to be used by a future Ukrainian army, and the stubborn persistence of the task forces in heading east undoubtedly played a role. In addition, the SS had gathered a variety of rumors concerning the group, including the plausible one that they were planning a revolt against the Germans and the implausible story that they were inspired by Communist agents. The basic reason for the occurrence of the repression at this time appears to be the desire of SS *Einsatzgruppen* to make a thorough sweep of the East Ukraine in order to bring it completely under German control and to prepare the western part for the introduction of civil administration.[77] The indignation aroused among Mel'nyk supporters by the assassinations and sympathy shown them by many other nationalist Ukrainians were in all probability merely utilized as support for the ruthless destruction of the other Nationalist party.

668* While the two powerful Nationalist parties were engaged in feverish activity in the newly opened Ukraine, the UNR was forced to play a secondary role. As was noted in the preceding chapter, the Livyts'kyi group had established contact with an underground group in the eastern part of former Polish Volhynia. This group, which was formed in loose association with the UNR before the outbreak of war as the Ukraïns'ka Natsional'na Vidrodzhennia (Ukrainian National Rebirth), went underground when the Soviet forces arrived. In 1940 one of its members, Taras Borovets', an operator of a stone quarry in the Kostopol' (Kostopil') area, consulted with Andrew Livyts'kyi, whom he regarded as chief of the Ukrainian state. Following a conference with the

[76] PS 3876.

[77] An analysis by the office of the Reichsaussenminister of the contents of the Activity and Situation Reports Nos. 1–5 of the *Einsatzgruppen* of the SP and the SD in the USSR, July 31–September 31, 1941, NO 2650 (hereafter referred to as NO 2650).

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president and three of his military advisers (Colonels Valiis'kyi, Sadovs'kyi, and Lytvynenko), in which plans for the development of a partisan organization were laid, Borovets' returned to Volhynia and began preparation for active operations.[78] The little underground was to be the nucleus of a Polis'ka Sich (Polessian Stronghold) which in turn was to be a territorial subdivision of a Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army (Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia —UPA).[79] It could not begin real activity, however, until the German advance removed the terrible burden of Soviet repression. Then Borovets'—who now assumed the *nom de guerre,* Taras Bul'ba, after the legendary leader of a Ukrainian peasant uprising—made contact with the Wehrmacht, securing authorization to develop his Polis'ka Sich as a force to combat Soviet stragglers and partisans.[80] Starting with a single company recruited in the Liudvipol' district, he rapidly developed an irregular force of several thousand men.

The great need was for experienced officers. Borovets' himself, like many Ukrainians of his age, had had military service in the Polish army, but only as a noncommissioned officer. Consequently, when a fellow Volhynian member of the OUN-M, Oleh Shtul', offered to put him in touch with the leaders of the latter movement, he willingly accepted. Whether he secured authorization from his nominal superiors in the UNR is doubtful, but at this period tension between them and the OUN-M in Poland had greatly declined. At any rate "Bul'ba" went with Shtul' to L'vov in mid-August. There he met Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, who

[78] Oleksander (Alexander) Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy" (An Army without a State), *Ukraïns'ki Visti,* December 28, 1950, p. 2; Taras Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba Ukraïny (1917–1950)* (The Armed Struggle of the Ukraine [1917–50]) (1951), pp. 7–10; Interview 37.

[79] Borovets' and his followers (see articles cited in the preceding note) have always insisted it was they who originated this term, which later acquired such honor among the Ukrainians. Borovets' himself has shown me a pass issued by his group in 1941, bearing a stamp which reads "Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia." Certain former Bandera adherents (such as Mykola [Nicholas] Lebed', *UPA: Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia* [UPA: The Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army], [Presove Biuro UHVR, 1946], p. 26) maintain that it was the OUN-B which originated it, although at the present time former Bandera leaders tend to acknowledge Borovets' claim (Interview 76).

[80] Chief of the SP and the SD, Reports from the Occupied East, No. 4, May 22, 1942, PS 3943 (hereafter referred to as PS 3943, with the date of the individual report).

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agreed to send him a number of trained officers from their organization.[81] Apparently, however, it was a considerable time before this aid materialized. In the meantime, as best they could, the guerrillas of the Polis'ka Sich cleared the Polessian and northern Volhynian woods of Communist supporters. Since the Wehrmacht had at this point no time to spare for this remote region, it was left almost altogether in Ukrainian hands. A triangular region stretching from Pinsk to Olevsk and Mozyr was informally organized by Ukrainians into what was known as the "Olevsk Republic."[82]

In November, however, the Germans decided to send in civil administrators; they ordered the dissolution of the "Republic" and the Sich. Borovets' and his men were bitterly disappointed, but they were in no position to offer resistance. Formally, the guerrilla organization was dissolved, but the commander secretly retired with a group of a hundred or so men to his wooded home area between Kostopol' and Liudvipol'. Here an illegal camp was maintained, but evidently the only overt action was against remaining scattered Soviet partisans. The Germans were aware of the existence of the band and of the fact that it was illegally gathering abandoned Soviet arms, but evidently they did not consider it worth while to undertake the dangerous task of entering the woods to crush it as long as it was primarily engaged in fighting their Soviet enemies.[83]

As will be described later, "Bul'ba" and his band were to play a significant role in the development of the nationalist forces at a later stage of the war. In 1941, however, few nationalists paid any attention to the tiny group of sylvan guerrillas. At that time the only active elements appeared to be the two factions of the OUN.

[81] Interviews 12, 72.

[82] Borovets', *Zboroina Borot'ba*, p. 10. While there is no direct confirmation of the claim of Borovets' to control of this extensive area, German reports indicate that the area west of the Ovruch-Zhitomir line and north of the Novograd Volynsk (Novgorod Volyns'k)—Korosten' line was the last to be brought under German administration (NOKW 2129). Since the Soviet army withdrew from this area sooner than from areas farther east and south, the claim that it was controlled for a considerable time by the Ukrainian forces under Borovets', which were engaged in mopping up Soviet stragglers, seems plausible.

[83] Borovets', *Zboroina Borot'ba*, p. 10; Interview 12; PS 3943, No. 4, May 22, 1942.

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V. REPRESSION AND REICHSKOMMISSARIAT

THE DRASTIC MEASURES taken by the Germans against the Bandera forces seemingly had cleared the field for the activity of the OUN-M. Like the apparent advantage gained by Bandera's group in the early summer, this opportunity soon proved to be an illusion. For some two months, however, Mel'nyk's adherents were able to carry on far-reaching activities in the central Ukraine. Since the beginning of this period coincided with the capture of Kiev by German troops, and the Ukraine's second city, Kharkov, fell before it ended, the interlude was of great importance in enabling the OUN-M to spread the doctrine of Nationalism in the former Soviet area. 668*

On September 19, 1941, the Germans occupied Kiev. Two or three days later, the first groups of Mel'nyk adherents arrived from the base in Zhitomir, and rapidly set about organizing national life in the city.[1] This was a difficult task at best because the Soviet forces had inflicted severe injuries on the city before leaving. A large part of this damage consisted of physical destruction, especially of industrial facilities and means of communication.[2] Even more serious from the point of view of rebuilding an anti-Communist, national civil life was the wholesale deportation of intelligentsia. For example, only five of the members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences were left, the others having been evacuated to what the Communist government called the "new cultural capital" of the Ukraine, Ufa, in the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.[3] 727 668* 167

[1] Interview 65.

[2] Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), pp. 21–23.

[3] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 16, 1941, p. 2, and February 25, 1942, p. 4; *Ukrains'ke Diiamist'*, November 1, 1941, p. 1.

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727 In addition to difficulties presented by the great gaps in material and human resources, there was a continued danger from the "booby traps" of hidden explosive mines and camouflaged Communist agents. The latter were not discovered for some time, but on the fifth day after the German occupation, a large number of mines blew up a considerable section of the center of the city, thoroughly disrupting the work of the Germans and Ukrainians in reestablishing an ordered pattern of life.[4]

633 727 Immediately after arriving in Kiev, a council of the Mel'nyk leaders—Konyk and Captain Soretits'kyi, who came in the Wehrmacht service, and Iaroslav Haivaz and Roman Bidar, who apparently came without official authorization—decided to install a *Hilfsbürgermeister,* or chief of the municipal administrative apparatus. They chose Alexander Ohloblyn, a well-known historian of the Soviet period. The Wehrmacht authorities readily accepted the council's nomination,[5] an indication of the close cooperation of the OUN-M with the army authorities in the East Ukraine at that time.

Ohloblyn's authority, however, was soon to prove illusory. Volodymyr Bahazii, an instructor from the pedagogical institute, had been appointed as his deputy. Unlike Ohloblyn, Bahazii had greeted the Nationalist leaders and immediately sought to identify himself with them. They soon learned that he was highly ambitious and that he did not stop at attacking his nominal superior, whom he accused of Russophile tendencies.[6] Apparently Bahazii's loyalty to the OUN and his energy in carrying out the reorganization of city life made him indispensable. At any rate, Professor Ohloblyn was soon pushed into the background,[7] and at the end of October, after a disagreement with the German authorities concerning measures to be taken to enhance the welfare of Kiev's citizens, he resigned.[8] Bahazii then became the

[4] Forostivs'kyi, p. 24; PS 053.

[5] Interviews 56, 65.

[6] Interviews 56, 65.

[7] This is evident even in contemporary published accounts. Cf. *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, pp. 3–5, containing an article written by Petro (Peter) Oliïnyk earlier in Kiev, in which Bahazii is described as the "business manager." *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* October 26, 1941, p. 6, describes a meeting of the department heads of the city administration which Ohloblyn opened, but over which Bahazii presided.

[8] Interview 56.

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chief of administration.[9] Having achieved this post, he repaid the 727
organization which had assisted him by using his influence to 633
secure the adherence to the OUN-M of the most important officials.[10]

While most of the economic and cultural divisions of the city 668*
government were left in the hands of local men, the OUN forces 208
took care to organize the most important branches—propaganda 625
and police—under their own followers. Zakhvalins'kyi was 727
brought from Zhitomir to take command of the police units, but after a short period, in which his alleged incompetence and dissolute life made him objectionable to his party, he was replaced by one of the Galician leaders, Roman Bidar. Kandyba soon arrived to take charge of propaganda activity. With him came the staff of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* headed by John Rohach. The newspaper was to be printed in Kiev, but the destruction of the principal press by the explosions forced the editors to continue publication for some weeks in Zhitomir.[11]

Having captured Kiev, the German armies rapidly pushed on 668*
to the east, taking with them most of the interpreters and advisers 727
who had formed an essential part of the OUN-M "conquest" of Zhitomir and Kiev. By the end of October, they had reached Kharkov, where Konyk took the lead in propaganda work. He and his assistants succeeded in recruiting a considerable number of the local intelligentsia for their organization but, as will be shown later, failed in their attempt to attain a high degree of success similar to that in Kiev.[12]

Lest repeated reference to collaboration of the Mel'nyk forces with the Wehrmacht lead to an exaggerated conception of the role of the OUN-M in the operations of the German army, it should be pointed out that the latter employed many Slavic interpreters and advisers in addition to the Mel'nyk followers. Some of these were Ukrainians, of all political persuasions, including Bandera supporters. Strong efforts were made to get rid of the latter after the decision to suppress their party, but for a

[9] Bahazii assumed the post on November 1 (*Nastup,* December 20, 1941, p. 2).
[10] Interviews 53, 65.
[11] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 21, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, p. 3; Interview 65.
[12] See Chapter X.

668* considerable time this aim was not fully achieved. Moreover,
727 there were numerous Het'manites and followers of the UNR. Among the latter, for example, was Peter Sahaidachnyi, who had charge of the initial operation of the most important Ukrainian newspapers.[13] Others were Russian émigrés, and many were Baltic Germans who had a command of the Russian language. The aim of the Wehrmacht was to establish a peaceful, orderly area behind the front as quickly as possible; employment of qualified persons, regardless of their political orientation, was necessary in order to do this. It is of course true that certain individual officers favored the Ukrainians,[14] but the ascendancy of the Mel'nyk group in this period was primarily due to its ability to profit from the absence of any other organized party with regular contact with the local population.

727 The real fate of Nationalist activity in the Ukraine, however, was being decided in Berlin, in quarters remote from the Wehrmacht officers who pursued the policy just described. Months before the outbreak of war, Hitler had decided to form a special agency for the affairs of the territories to be conquered from the Soviet Union. This department was called the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete (Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories); it was placed under the direction of Alfred Rosenberg. Rosenberg, a Balt by origin, and the principal theoretician of the National Socialist Party, had long been interested in the peoples of the Soviet Union. He was a strong believer in the policy of weakening Russia, whether it remained Communist or not. Consequently, he regarded with favor Ukrainian nationalist efforts to separate from Russia, so long as the groups involved did not threaten other German aims.

At the same time that the Ostministerium, as the new department was often called, was initiated, Hitler decided to create a number of huge satrapies in the eastern area; chief among them was the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. This region was to be under the supervision of an official with a large measure of authority,

[13] Interview 79.

[14] Notably Dr. Hans Koch and his collaborator in the Abwehr, Professor Oberländer.

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but subject to Rosenberg in matters of broad policy.[15] Rosenberg 727
realized that this vague directive would mean little unless he could count on the cooperation of the man chosen to head the Reichskommissariat. Consequently, he voiced an alarmed protest when Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia, and already widely known for his stubbornness and brutality, was suggested for the post. Since Hitler, evidently regarding Rosenberg as an impractical dreamer, wanted a determined and ruthless man in the Ukraine, Koch was nevertheless appointed.[16]

This appointment was the harbinger of worse defeats for Ros- 727
enberg's "mild" policy toward the Ukrainians. Another aspect of 631
Nazi policy, however, aroused immediate indignation among the Ukrainian nationalists. This was a decision to keep east Galicia in the "German settlement area," i.e., to attach it to the Generalgouvernement rather than to the future Reichskommissariat. The immediate ground for this partition of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory was the desire to maintain a direct connection between the Greater Reich and Rumania, about whose continued loyalties the Nazi leaders harbored strong doubts.[17] However, a few weeks later the "unreliable" Danubian kingdom was permitted to administer all of the Ukrainian territory between the Dniester and the Southern Bug.[18] The Rumanians obviously intended eventually to incorporate the area, which they called Transnistria, into their state. Since most Ukrainian nationalist circles already hated Rumania, it is understandable that this second amputation of Ukrainian ethnographic territory was especially painful, even though the region was near the bottom of the scale of definitely Ukrainian areas in cultural development and national consciousness.[19]

[15] Chancellery Director Lammers to Rosenberg, July 18, 1941, transmitting Führerbefehl of July 17, 1941, NG 1280 (hereafter referred to as NG 1280).

[16] Memorandum, Führerhauptquartier, July 16, 1941, PS 1221 (hereafter referred to as PS 1221).

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] PS 197. At the conference of July 16 (*ibid.*) it had been tentatively decided to give Rumania only a slight territorial increase east of the pre-1939 border of the Dniester River; the decision was altered sometime within the next six weeks.

[19] On August 31, *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk* had the temerity to attack the decision openly, raising the question, "Is it possible that Ukrainian land beyond the Dniester, soaked with Cossack blood, can be transferred to Rumanian administration?" On the same page the UNO organ criticized the annexation of Galicia to

727 While Ukrainian territory was being partitioned, a still more serious danger for the nationalist cause was shaping up. An exception to the authority of the Ostministerium in the occupied areas was the police power, which was lodged in Heinrich Himmler's hands. From the beginning of the campaign the Reichsführer SS had been charged with "establishing order" in the conquered areas in the east. The instruments employed for this task were *Einsatzgruppen,* task forces consisting of specially selected, ruthless police officials, headed by SS officers from Himmler's inner circle. During the stabilization period, these commanders were given powers within the broad range of "pacifying activities" in the rear areas, superseding those of all military commanders. These activities included especially the extermination of the Jewish population and the liquidation of all Communist organizations; "kommissars" and NKVD officials were to be shot outright.

661 The causes for conflict between the *Einsatzgruppen* and the
668* Ukrainian nationalists have been suggested in the preceding chapter. At first the Mel'nyk group was spared because it was thought to be politically impotent.[20] During the summer the SP claimed that "the splinter group under Colonel Andrew Mel'nyk, predominantly émigrés, no longer has any political significance," and regarded the OUN-M as a useful counterweight to Bandera's organization. By early November, 1941, however, SP reports were warning that Mel'nyk's group could become dangerous if it was left entirely unwatched because of the struggle against the Bandera party.[21] As soon as the OUN-M revealed ability to build an organization in the East Ukraine, it too was crushed.

668* The first major incident of repression against the Mel'nyk
661 forces occurred on November 21, an important anniversary for
186 Ukrainian nationalists. On that date, in 1921, Tiutiunnyk's band,

the Generalgouvernement, as not corresponding to "the principle of nationality" (*Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* August 31, 1941, p. 3). Within the next week, several branches of the UNO in Germany sent petitions directly to Hitler, protesting the transfers of Ukrainian territory; for petitions from the groups in Pilsen, Berlin and Luxemburg, see Occ E-4 (8), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [8]).

[20] NO 2650.

[21] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report of Events in the USSR, No. 133, November 14, 1941, p. 31, NO 2825 (hereafter referred to as NO 2825).

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one of the last important nationalist forces to penetrate the Soviet Ukraine, had made a "last stand" near the little town of Bazar on the edge of the wooded region north of the Kiev-Zhitomir line. The OUN-M now decided to make this anniversary the occasion for a great patriotic demonstration, which a participant has since described in considerable detail.[22] A large group of organizers was sent in from Zhitomir; on the appointed day many thousands streamed to Bazar for commemorative ceremonies. This demonstration of the strength of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment greatly alarmed the Germans, especially since the affair had been the work of an organized group which had secured the complete cooperation of the local Ukrainian authorities. The chief of the Bazar *raion* addressed the crowd, the police under the command of an old Ukrainian officer stood guard, and the police band provided music. All of these features must have indicated to the suspicious German police authorities that the Ukrainians had deliberately flaunted their independence. The reprisals were quick, and crushing. An inquiry was instituted at Bazar, which led to the arrest of several of the organizers; the trail led back to Zhitomir, where about two dozen OUN members, including one of the leaders of Ekzekutyva, were shot. The younger Iatseniuk and Anthony Baranivs'kyi, the remaining OUN leaders there, escaped only by fleeing to the woods. OUN-M influence in Zhitomir was sharply reduced, although few, apparently, of the administrative officials who had sympathized with it were molested.[23]

In the absence of direct evidence, it would be unsafe to conclude that the Bazar demonstration was the cause of the further attacks which were now carried out against the Mel'nyk group. At about the same time, however, drastic repressions of the Nationalists occurred in numerous cities, resulting in the destruction of the small Bukovinian expedition in Nikolaev and of groups in Kamenets-Podolsk (Kam'ianets'-Podil's'k), Chernigov (Chernihiv), and Poltava.[24] The chief repressive campaign was

[22] P. Dub, "V rokovyny demonstratsiĭ v Bazari (spomyn)" (On the Anniversary of the Demonstration in Bazar [In Memoriam]), *Za Samostiinist'* (November, 1946), pp. 8–11; see also *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, pp. 69–72.

[23] Alexander Iatseniuk, for example, remained chief of the *oblast* administration.

[24] *OUN u Viini*, p. 72.

661 reserved for the capital. A number of OUN-M activities there,
668* without being considered important enough to require drastic action, had contributed to a feeling of irritation on the part of the
[204] Himmler henchmen. A famous poetess, Olena Teliha, had created an unauthorized Nationalist literary periodical, *Litvary*. A youth group Sich was considered potentially dangerous. A Ukrainian National Council (Rada) had been formed by the Mel'nyk group to act as a symbol of unity in the East Ukraine and, they hoped, eventually to become the central organ of nationalist activities. The risks involved in such activity, in view of the attitude of the real rulers of Germany, were fully understood by the Wehrmacht officers, one of whom advised the Ukrainians to transform the Council into a more innocuous Aid Committee. When this advice was refused, the Council was formally dissolved (November 17), and went underground.[25] The SP authorities were aware of the organ's continued existence, and while they regarded it as too insignificant for immediate suppression, it increased their distrust of the Nationalists.[26] With this background, one can understand why the first blow fell upon the legal, but extremely Nationalist, *Ukraïns'ke Slovo*. Its large circulation—over fifty thousand [27]—gave it, in the eyes of the police, the potentiality of dangerous influence. Moreover, the editorial staff of this organ, as was previously noted, was composed very largely of West Ukrainians and old émigrés; these elements were regarded as especially dangerous by the SS leadership.

668* Unfortunately for the Nationalist cause, during their two
578 months' activity in Kiev the newcomers had also lost ground in local opinion. Some of the antipathy which they aroused stemmed from the fact that they were outsiders; even those who had been born in the East Ukraine or, like Kandyba, whose father had been born there, had long been out of touch with the local population. With some justification, because they were better organized, had clearer concepts of what they wanted, and were used to displaying initiative, the OUN group took a leading, oc-

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[26] PS 3876.
[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 15, 1942, p. 5.

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casionally a monopolistic part in municipal activities. As was 668*
inevitable, they sometimes exhibited an attitude of superiority; 578
even when they behaved more tactfully, many local inhabitants nevertheless were inclined to suspect that they harbored such an attitude. Their presence in municipal offices, even when they were on a plane of equality with local officeholders, was bound to lead to some friction. Moreover, emphasis on the principle of integral nationalism meant the neglect of social welfare and civil rights questions which were of great concern to the local population after twenty years of Soviet rule. The "leader principle," which was expressed in the East Ukraine in as extreme terms as Mel'nyk ever permitted it in the emigration, was alien to the native inhabitants. The slogan "Petliura, Konovalets', Mel'nyk—three names, one idea" was at first meaningless to the average East Ukrainian, since the second and third of these names were unknown to him. When their meaning was explained, the phrase signified to many that after Petliura's death the nationalist movement had fallen into the hands of leaders from the half-alien West Ukraine.[28]

All of these irritations might have been accepted, however, had 668*
it not been for an ideological theme which resulted in more prac- 186
tical discomfort. The Nationalist creed required emphasis on the "purity" of the Ukrainian people. According to the OUN leaders' belief, this "purity" had been endangered by the intrusion of Russian elements—the physical immigration of Russians, who had become especially numerous in Kiev bureaucratic and intellectual circles, and the penetration of Russian influences into Ukrainian culture and speech. The extent of this penetration will be discussed in a later chapter; it is necessary to point out its importance here, however, in order to understand the Kiev reaction to OUN policy. The Nationalists set about radically "purging"

[28] Surviving OUN-M publications of this period are rare, many existing only in private collections. *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk* of September 28, 1941, p. 3 contains a reprint of a leaflet distributed in the East Ukraine describing Mel'nyk as the successor of Konovalets', who in turn was a successor of Petliura, "killed by the Jew Shvartsvart." For a criticism of OUN propaganda in the East Ukraine during this period, and notes on the reaction of the local population, see the account of the East Ukrainian émigré Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2.

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668* alien aspects of life in the city. A certain number of local Ukrain-
182 ians accepted this campaign enthusiastically, sometimes carrying it further than the newcomers themselves. Others, although Ukrainian by background, had long been used to employing the Russian language and associating freely with persons of Russian ethnic origin. Consequently, the "purifying" process meant in many cases serious disruption of their accepted way of living and social relationships.

Because of the extreme importance of this factor it is worth describing in some detail a case which provides a striking illustration of the Nationalist psychology during this period. It is contained in the diary of a prominent Kiev author, Arkadii Liubchenko, who was evacuated by the Soviet forces but managed to remain in Kharkov until the German arrival. He then made contact with the Mel'nyk groups (which, as was previously pointed out, pursued the same policy there as in Kiev). Always nationalist, he soon became an enthusiastic convert to the creed of integral nationalism. In December, through his association with the Nationalists, he obtained a post on the Kharkov newspaper, *Nova Ukraïna*. Shortly afterwards, a Kharkov writer named Filipov appeared in the editorial offices; he told Liubchenko that he had prepared an article on the evils of the Communist regime which he wished to publish. When Liubchenko turned it down because it was written in Russian, Filipov protested that his mother had been Ukrainian and that he would submit the article in Ukrainian, as the question of language was indifferent to him. This brought the sneering reply that real Ukrainians, such as those dominating *Nova Ukraïna*, could have nothing to do with one who could not make up his mind whether he was a Ukrainian or a Russian, since such a person was an "internationalist" just like the Bolsheviks.[29] It may easily be imagined what effect such ideas had upon the rebuffed applicant. This is especially the case, since work for an organ like the newspaper was for many not merely a matter of prestige, or even of expression of opinion, but of life
511 and death. With the rapidly deteriorating food situation in Kiev
668 and Kharkov, employment by an agency which was recognized by

[29] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 25.

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the Germans, and hence able to issue ration cards and provide a small income, was indispensable for most intellectuals.[30] [51] 668*

In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that the German enemies of the Nationalist movement felt that the time was ripe to destroy its prestige by an attack on its principal organ. On December 12, 1941, the SP force seized *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and arrested all the leading editorial workers, including Rohach, Chemeryns'kyi and Oliïnyk.[31] Kandyba, too, was arrested, but by native police in a city *raion* (ward) controlled by the OUN-M; this circumstance allowed him to escape.[32] 204 668* 661

Two days later the newspaper reappeared, as *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* but with a quite different editorial policy. The new editor was Constantine Shtepa, acting rector of the University of Kiev. Of Ukrainian origin, he had been an officer in the tsarist army and, although strongly anti-Soviet, remained a pronounced Russian patriot, desiring the acceptance of the Russian culture and language throughout the Ukraine and the maintenance of governmental ties with Moscow. Consequently, he was a bitter enemy of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.[33] The first issue of his paper contained an article, inspired by the Germans, but acceptable to Shtepa, in which the Nationalists were vigorously attacked for turning what "should have been an informational journal into an organ of their group." The Nationalists, it explained, had refused to heed German warnings that the paper must serve the whole community; consequently Shtepa had taken charge to "popularize" it. What this meant, was clarified by an article on the second page which demanded "work instead of politics." [34] 626 204 668*

Under Shtepa's administration, *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* became extremely subservient to the Germans. In part this was due to the extreme severity and alertness of the German censorship; the edi-

[30] Interview 59. Liubchenko himself (Liubchenko, pp. 60 ff.), when the shoe was on the other foot and he was compelled to seek work in Kiev, found this to be the case.

[31] *OUN u Viini,* p. 73.

[32] L. Dniprova in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.

[33] Record of interrogation of an editor in Kiev, early 1943, who was a specialist in ancient history, the author of *Die Völkerwanderung* and *Das römische Recht* (CXLVa 78, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine) (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 78). The only person fitting this description is Constantine Shtepa.

[34] These articles are reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diiinist',* January 5, 1942, p. 2.

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204 626 668* tor himself was compelled to publish over his own signature articles composed by the German propaganda section, although German records show that he vigorously and courageously criticized Nazi policy in private discussions with German officials.[35]

The nationalists were deeply antagonized by these articles which attacked the foundations of their movement by denying the historical equality of Ukrainian culture with the Russian. Shtepa apparently went far beyond even the Communist newspapers in this respect, reverting to the "Little Russian" tradition which was so abhorrent to all nationalist Ukrainians.[36] However sincere his Russian nationalism may have been, for a man of Ukrainian origin, writing in the Ukrainian language, in the Ukrainian capital, to denounce the Ukrainian nationalist movement could only be regarded in nationalist circles as an act of high treason.

727 During the late autumn, while the *Einsatzgruppen* were crushing the OUN-M groups, the administration of the Reichskommissariat was being established throughout the "Right Bank" Ukraine, while the area east of the Dnieper remained under Wehrmacht control. According to the plans laid in the Ostministerium, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was eventually to include all of the pre-1941 Soviet Ukraine except Transnistria, Galicia, and the areas acquired by the USSR from Rumania in 1940. In addition, it was to have its boundary extended roughly due east in a line passing south of Kursk to the Volga, where it was to embrace the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.[37] In the northwest the Reichskommissariat was to embrace approximately two tiers of *raions* in the southern part of the pre-1941 Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, including Brest, Pinsk, and the greater part of the railroad connecting these towns with Gomel.[38]

By the end of August, the process of pacifying the western

[35] CXLVa 78.

[36] *Biuleten'* (Bulletin), No. 9–10 of the OUN-B (late 1942), pp. 14–15. This clandestine publication was furnished me by Nicholas Lebed'.

[37] Memorandum, Die neuen Ostgebiete, June 16, 1941, PS 1033 (hereafter referred to as PS 1033); Rosenberg to Alfred Meyer, October 20, 1941, PS 1057 (hereafter referred to as PS 1057).

[38] PS 1057; Memorandum, Die Zivilverwaltung im besetzten Osten, Part II, Reichskommissariat Ukraine, PS 702 (hereafter referred to as PS 702).

part of this vast area had gone so far that a conference between 727
Koch's and Rosenberg's officials on the one hand, and representatives of the army on the other, could plan the transfer to the Reichskommissariat.[39] This was accomplished gradually in the next three months.[40]

The introduction of the Reichskommissariat did not change the 727
general basis of the provisional organization established by the 631
Wehrmacht.[41] However, it introduced an entirely new spirit. It brought under strict control many aspects of Ukrainian life in which the Wehrmacht had left a relatively free hand to the inhabitants. The entire "Right Bank" was divided into five *Generalbezirke* with headquarters in Rovno, Zhitomir, Kiev, Nikolaev, and Dniepropetrovsk.[42] Under each *Generalkommissar* were about twenty *Gebietskommissare,* each of whom governed a *Kreisgebiet,* comprising an average of four *raions.* The Ukrainian administration operated in general only at this lowest level.[43] There were elders or *starostas* in charge of each village and a Ukrainian chief of the *raion* administration. While there were Ukrainians above this level in consultative or specialist posts,[44]

[39] PS 197.

[40] Former Polish Volhynia was transferred as early as the end of August (*Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* January 24, 1942, p. 3).

[41] There had already been set up an army administration composed of *Ortskommandanturen* (local commands) and *Feldkommandanturen* (regional commands). These military government offices had established order and begun the work of rebuilding economic and social life. Alongside them had already been installed police groups, recruited and directed by the Wehrmacht Abwehr but composed primarily of Ukrainians, as previously described. These, however, were being brought under the control of the SS police agencies. Moreover, the Wirtschaftstab-Ost had installed a Wirtschafts-Inspektion Süd, with a network of economic officers including especially the *Landwirtschaftsführer* (*La-Führer,* agricultural director) in each *raion,* who were charged with directing the economy in accordance with German needs. Cf. PS 053.

[42] PS 702. The initial organization of areas west of the Dnieper included the Soviet *oblasts* of Rovno, Volhynia, Kamenets-Podolsk, Zhitomir, Vinnitsa, Kiev, Kirovograd, and parts of Nikolaev, Dniepropretrovsk, Poltava, Zaporozh'e, Pinsk, and Brest. On September 1, 1942, the remaining parts of the Dniepropetrovsk, Poltava, and Zaporozh'e *oblasts* east of the Dnieper were transferred to the Reichskommissariat. Somewhat earlier a sixth *Generalbezirk,* Taurien, had been formed, to include the southern parts of the Zaporozh'e and Nikolaev *oblasts* (cf. *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* September 2, 1943, p. 3).

[43] There was, however, an advisory council at the *Generalbezirk* level in at least one instance—Zhitomir (cf. *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* February 25, 1942, p. 2).

[44] The adjective "Ukrainian" is used by the Germans to describe these officials, but it refers merely to persons resident within the territorial limits of the Ukraine. Actually, many were Russian, and a special effort was made by the

727 there was no unified framework of native administration, with the
631 exception of the towns where there was a Ukrainian chief of administration, regardless of the size of the place involved. In the larger cities, which were not included in *Kreisgebiete,* the Ukrainian "mayors," however, were closely subjected to German *Stadtkommissare.*

727 Just as important as his administrative structure, was Koch's
668* personal attitude toward the Ukrainians he was to govern. To him, they were simply an inferior race, a colonial people to be
661 exploited for Germany's interests. "They are too inferior to be compared with Germans,"[45] and "the least German worker is worth a thousand times more than the population there"[46] are typical expressions of his attitude. Consequently, this former petty railway official felt highly offended when the Ukrainian intelligentsia endeavored to organize a national life of its own. The whole tone of his administration implied that the Ukrainians were a sort of child-people, which could not achieve any degree of culture worthy of consideration; those who endeavored to do so were simply half-educated émigré agitators who must be dealt with severely, so that the simple but useful "peasants" (i.e., all non-agitators) would not be disturbed in their task of producing for the Germans.

One of the first results of Koch's determination to crush all centers of autonomous life was the destruction of the Nationalist forces remaining "above ground" in Kiev. After the suppression of the West Ukrainian force, there was still a large group of East Ukrainian supporters of the Mel'nyk organization who openly

Wehrmacht to recruit ethnic Germans (PS 197; Extracts from the Situation Report of the commander of Heeresgebiet B, Abteilung VII, October 10, 1942, PS 051; hereafter referred to as PS 051), although the latter turned out frequently to be Communist spies deliberately left behind by the Soviet regime (Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte, December 15, 1941, PS 1682; (hereafter referred to as PS 1682). Even when the *Volksdeutsche* were anti-Communist, they were frequently disliked by the Ukrainian Nationalists as Russophiles.

[45] Koch to Rosenberg, March 16, 1943, PS 192 (hereafter referred to as PS 192).

[46] Report of Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe B to Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Generalquartiermeister, Abteilung Kriegsverwaltung, April 1, 1943, PS 1130 (hereafter referred to as PS 1130), is based on an oral report of Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Classen who was present at the Nazi Party meeting in Kiev (March 5, 1943) in which Koch made the remark.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

carried on a limited activity. Its chief, Bahazii, was just as nationalist as the arrested West Ukrainians. A characteristic instance of his enthusiastic lack of caution occurred about the time that he became mayor. A group of foreign journalists, including several Germans, visited Kiev. In their presence, he expressed his loyalty to the OUN, praising Konovalets' and Mel'nyk as totalitarians, and saying, "The eyes of all Ukrainians are turned toward Mel'nyk." A German officer who was present begged the journalists not to report this remark, knowing it would inflame the Nazi chieftains.[47]

Although Erich Koch and his assistants were in many respects ridiculously ignorant of the true nature of Ukrainian life in Kiev, in view of Bahazii's frankness it was inevitable that they should come to see that he was working for Ukrainian ends, rather than docilely following German orders. Very probably the anti-Nationalist forces on the staff of *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* played a part in stirring up antagonism to the city administration. For example, the paper printed an article by an employee of a municipal office criticizing the émigrés who had returned to Kiev. He complained that thirteen out of forty employees in his section were émigrés who were paid higher salaries than the local officials, although the former were no better qualified and had smaller families.[48] In view of Koch's and his minions' bitter hostility toward émigrés, such remarks must have encouraged them to feel that the Germans would lose no popularity by extinguishing the remaining outside influence in Kiev life.

They were, however, scarcely the real motives behind Bahazii's arrest in early February, 1942. Apparently the German official responsible for the Ukrainian leader's downfall was Generalkommissar Magunia, one of Koch's closest collaborators among the officials of the Reichskommissariat. He worked, of course, in close coordination with the *Sicherheitspolizei;* the charges against Ba-

[47] Whether they ever actually saw the report is questionable since it was apparently printed only in an Italian paper and by the Ukrainian press (*Nastup*, December 6, 1941, p. 1, quoting *La Stampa* [Milan], November 1, 1941).

[48] *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*, January 3, 1942 (reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diiusnist'*, February 1, 1942, p. 2). A major charge against Bahazii was that he maintained too large a staff in the city administration and paid them too much (PS 192).

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661 hazii in the police report revolve entirely around his nationalist
727 activities.[49] For example, the head of the section on Religious
Confessions is alleged to have threatened the Russophile bishop
668* of Kiev, Panteleimon. Another charge concerned Bahazii's "misappropriation of German property," but the specific act seems to have been his sale of petroleum products (probably of Soviet origin, confiscated by the Germans) to aid the nationalist cause. He was charged, correctly, with being a leader of the underground OUN-M, and a number of organizations controlled by the Nationalists were declared, also with apparent accuracy, to be working under his direction. Probably the charge which carried the greatest weight in the minds of the German officials, however, was that he had endeavored to secure control of the Ukrainian police. As has been previously indicated, the OUN-M did indeed control most of the Ukrainian police in Kiev, but Bahazii was scarcely responsible personally for this. Altogether, the motives behind the overthrow of Bahazii were those which prevailed everywhere in the destruction of Nationalist groups in the Reichskommissariat. The action suited Erich Koch's policy completely; he defended it vigorously against Rosenberg's criticism, displaying his own arrogant stupidity by adding a few incredible charges of his own to the grounds presented in the SP report.[50]

The repression of Nationalist forces in Kiev extended far beyond the person of Bahazii. The arrests were concentrated in two groups: the surviving literary leaders of the OUN-M League of Ukrainian Writers, headed by Olena Teliha and a young Carpatho-Ukrainian writer, John Irliavs'kyi; and the Sich, headed by a young East Ukrainian journalist, John Koshyk, also an OUN-M member.[51] Altogether, the executions (which followed quickly after the arrests in most cases) accounted for about forty persons,[52] a large number of whom were medical students organized in the

[49] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 191, April 10, 1942, NO 3256 (hereafter referred to as NO 3256).

[50] PS 192.

[51] *OUN u Viini*, p. 74; T. Iak, *Hryb* (The Mushroom), p. 43, a clandestine OUN-M brochure, probably published at the end of German occupation in the East Ukraine.

[52] Iak, p. 43.

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Sich.[53] In addition, several of the principal agencies of national 661
life in Kiev were forced to cease operation, including the Ukrain- 727
ian National Council. Even Prosvita was suspect and was closed 668*
for a while.[54]

These arrests did not completely stamp out the efforts to develop nationalism in Kiev. The underground OUN-M (as well as remnants of an OUN-B conspiratorial group) did what they could to stimulate nationalist feeling. Likewise, the city administration was by no means so drastically altered as had been the editorial staff of the newspaper. The Germans were probably not anxious to destroy all outlets for Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. Rosenberg, in spite of his minor influence, exercised some restraint in this respect, and Koch himself denied being anti-Ukrainian.[55] Undoubtedly his contempt for all Slavs led him to place the Ukrainians and the Russians on an even plane; his favoring of the Russophile element in the journalistic field had very possibly been accidental, or at least merely an effort to establish between the groups a balance which could be manipulated by the Germans.

The drop in prestige of the OUN-M was both sharp and sus- 668*
tained, however, since repression of its groups continued throughout the Reichskommissariat. Moreover, as will be discussed at length later, strong Ukrainian nationalist groups opposed to the OUN ideology appeared in several places; these forces kept up the fight for development of nationalism, thus inhibiting a growth in influence by the OUN. In other areas, news of the suppression of the Kiev group—the dissolution of the National Council appears to have been especially important—caused the cautious to refrain from endeavoring to build up nationalist organizations. Consequently, after February, 1942, the work of the two OUNs was only a relatively small part of the total stream of nationalist and antinationalist forces which must be studied in their geographical, social, and ideological context rather than as parts of a developing narrative.

[53] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi, 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev, 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 19.

[54] PS 192.

[55] *Ibid.*

727 In order to understand the development of nationalism during the remaining twenty months of German occupation of the East Ukraine, it is necessary to give some attention to the effects of German policy on aspects of life not directly connected with nationalist feeling. A number of volumes of extremely unpleasant reading could be devoted to the misery which the blind actions of the German rulers inflicted on the long-suffering peoples of the Soviet Union. Here only an extremely brief description of four ill-conceived policies which did most to disrupt the lives of the people of the area, and in particular to affect indirectly the character of the nationalist movements, can be attempted.

727 697 The first, and in many respects the most horrible failure of German policy, resulted in the death of innumerable Soviet prisoners of war. In the summer and fall of 1941, hundreds of thousands of Red army soldiers fell into German hands. Most captures took place because of the swift German advance and the great ascendancy of German arms; but at least in part they resulted from a lack of will to fight for the Communist system and the hope that German imprisonment would soon be followed by a freer life for the Soviet peoples. The German army was quite unprepared for the extent of the surrenders. However, no amount of difficulty in caring for the prisoners can excuse the horrible consequences of their neglect which, unlike most other atrocities committed in the east, was primarily the fault of the Wehrmacht. Inefficiency or brutality of subordinate *Etappentruppen* [rear area troops] was partly to blame, but the basic ruthlessness of many higher officers also played a major role, for it placed a premium on calloused inhumanity on the part of subordinates.[56] Countless thousands of prisoners were shut in barbed-wire enclosures in the open plains. Food was so insufficient that the captives were rapidly reduced to living skeletons; by fall cannibalism had made its appearance.[57] "Gaunt yellow faces protruding from the collars of greatcoats—unabashed human misery," as a Ukrainian visitor to

[56] Cf. the views of high Wehrmacht commanders cited in Chapter VI in connection with suppression of partisans.

[57] Report of Armament Inspector for the Ukraine to Armament Division Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Zur Lage im Reichskommissariat Ukraine, November 29, 1941, PS 2174 (hereafter referred to as PS 2174).

one of the camps put it.[58] As colder weather approached, typhus combined with starvation to bring about hundreds of thousands of deaths. 727 697

Since many of these camps were located in the Ukraine the population soon became aware of the conditions in them, even though a substantial portion of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were separated out and released by the Germans.[59] Moreover, the inhabitants could scarcely avoid noticing the corpses of prisoners of war shot (perhaps as "kommissars" or Communists) and left lying in the villages.[60] Consequently, a belief that the Germans intended to destroy the Slavic peoples soon became widespread.

A second German failure was less shocking than the treatment of the prisoners of war, but in the long run it had an even more deleterious effect on relations with the Ukrainian population. This was the policy in relation to agriculture. As was noted previously, the major objective of the Nazi leadership in its occupation of the Ukraine was the acquisition of food and raw materials to increase Germany's war potential. This objective involved the necessity of dealing with the question of the kolkhoz, which was the predominant form of agricultural organization in the Soviet Union. 423 727

The problem posed for the German occupiers was not an easy one by any standards. It will be recalled that the chief reason for the introduction of the kolkhoz by Moscow was the prevalence of the "scissors crisis" during the late twenties; this emergency arose fundamentally because the Soviet rulers were unable or unwilling to supply enough consumer goods to induce individual peasants to deliver large quantities of agricultural products. The Germans were faced with the same dilemma, because the needs of their

[58] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 21, 1942, p. 2.

[59] Interview 51; Directive of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Abteilung Kriegsgefangene, June 16, 1941, PS 888 (hereafter referred to as PS 888); *Nastup*, July 12, 1941, p. 2; Amt Ausland Abwehr to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Annex, September 15, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 338 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 338).

[60] Memorandum by First Lieutenant Oberländer, Abwehr II, Heeresgruppe Süd, November 28, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 278 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 278). Oberländer significantly points out that pro-German sentiment in the population had greatly diminished within a few weeks of conquest—i.e., while the Wehrmacht was still the occupying authority.

423 fighting forces required that very little production be diverted to
727 consumer goods. Moreover, their situation was in many respects more difficult than that of the Kremlin in 1929, for the material basis for the reconstruction of individual farms—buildings, equipment, livestock—was often lacking. Under these circumstances, a return to individual operation of agriculture would probably have meant a sharp net decline in productivity and a still greater decline in surpluses available for delivery.

On the other hand, the Germans had strong reasons for favoring the dissolution of the collective-farm system, as a salient feature of the Soviet system which they affected to despise. More than any other aspect of the Soviet system, the kolkhoz appears to have been hated by large numbers of the peasants. While it is questionable whether this hatred was universally felt, it was undoubtedly a very strong sentiment among the older groups of the population, those most ready on other grounds to cooperate with the Germans.[61]

Faced with this dilemma, the German rulers followed a tactic of compromise and deceit. They promised to dissolve the kolkhoz, stipulating reasonably enough, but in opposition to the desire of the peasant for immediate acquisition of land, that the process be gradual. First, the kolkhoz was to be transformed into a *Gemeinwirtschaft* (*hromads'ke hospodarstvo*) or community enterprise; the only signficant immediate effect was the increase in the *dvor* or garden allotment permitted each household. In a second stage, to follow in the near future, the *Gemeinwirtschaft* was to be transformed into a *Landbaugenossenschaft* (*khliborobs'ka spilka*) or agricultural association. At this stage each household was to receive a definite section of land, and be rewarded in proportion to the harvest from this land, although many of the major agricultural operations were to be performed in common to overcome the extreme dearth of draft animals, tractors, tractor fuel, and implements.[62]

Where the program was carried out without proscrastination,

[61] PS 3876.

[62] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, February 28, 1942, p. 3. A final stage, the *Einzelhof*, or individual farm, was envisaged by the planners, but very rarely, if ever, instituted.

most of the peasantry seem to have responded favorably.[63] Frustrating delays ensued throughout a large part of the Ukraine, however, especially in the Reichskommissariat. In part they were due to misplaced German thoroughness in requiring exact surveys of the land before proceeding to its division among the households in the *Landbaugenossenschaft*. More serious was the deliberate obstruction of Koch and others who, feeling that the program would leave some small segment of life free of their control, argued that it would result in reduced deliveries. As a result, only 10 percent instead of the planned 20 percent of *Gemeinwirtschaften* were converted to *Landbaugenossenschaften*.[64] In spite of the meager practical results, the de-collectivization program was a favorite theme of Koch's propaganda, doubtless because he allowed so little else of a positive nature even to be discussed. In the end, however, the constantly broken pledges unquestionably caused a loss of faith in the Germans, even a willingness to return to the known evils of the Soviet system. The peasant's saying, "A bad mother is still better than a step-mother who makes many promises," indicated his judgment of the German agricultural policy.[65]

The problem of securing agricultural supplies was closely connected with that of supplying the Ukrainian urban population with food. One way in which the Germans sought to obtain most of the farm products for their own use was to make practically no provision for feeding the city dwellers. This was especially true during the first winter. The concept was simple: the starving urban population would find some means, through barter or otherwise, of inducing the peasants to part with an extra, hidden supply of food beyond that which the Germans had been able to

[63] Cf. for example Report of Ortskommandantur Melitopol', July 8, 1942, PS 1693 (hereafter referred to as PS 1693); Report No. 7 of Representative of Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte and Stab des Befehlshabers des ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte Captain Müller, March 24, 1942, to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, PS 1686 (hereafter referred to as PS 1686).

[64] Memorandum by Bräutigam, October 25, 1942, PS 294 (hereafter referred to as PS 294).

[65] Situation report, Wirtschaftinspektorat Süd lc, April, 1942, NG 1089 (hereafter referred to as NG 1089); Memorandum of Generalkommissar for the Crimea, Alfred Frauenfeld, to Himmler, February 10, 1944, NO 5394 (hereafter referred to as NO 5394).

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727 extract from them.[66] To a certain extent, of course, this was true.
262 Private individuals, as in the days after the Revolution, traveled
about the countryside endeavoring to get something to eat in
[746] return for whatever they had to give the peasant. The city administrations and welfare committees did what they could to secure food for their clients; indeed this was one reason the Germans allowed these suspect organizations to function at all, for they were thereby relieved of the necessity of attending to such matters. The resources at the hands of these organs were, however, infinitesimal compared to the needs.[67] This was especially true since the most valuable materials left in the cities were requisitioned by the Germans.[68]

The peasants in turn had little to sell. They had lived under the regimented planned economy of the Soviets, which prevented the individual from accumulating a private stock of agricultural products, rather than the loose system of tsarist days, when the more prosperous peasants could usually find a little more to sell if the price was attractive enough. Extremely heavy requisitions by the Wehrmacht, especially in the form of unauthorized seizures, had also depleted the supplies available. The result was a severe shortage of food in the cities, especially in the larger ones such as Kiev and Kharkov, which brought famine and the pestilences associated with it in the winter and spring of 1942.[69]

Like the agricultural policy and the starvation of the cities, the *Ostarbeiter* program was the result of ruthless efforts to increase the German war potential. Unlike the former policies, however, its evils do not even have the excuse of short-run expediency. The concept of bringing foreign workers to the armaments factories was, in itself, reasonable enough. Moreover, properly handled, it might very well have resulted in an increase rather than a

[66] PS 2174.

[67] During the terrible winter of 1941–42, the social welfare department of the Kiev municipal administration dispensed only about 100,000 *karbovontsi* (i.e., rubles; nominally the equivalent of 10,000 RM or about $4,000) per month; at the time, milk was 20 *k.* a liter, potatoes about 250 *k.* a hundredweight (*Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1). This monetary outlay may, of course, have been supplemented by food obtained by barter.

[68] For example, a charge brought against the Bahazii administration was that it had used newsprint to barter for food with the small towns (Interview 59). Cf. also p. 116 above.

[69] According to Oberländer (USSR Exhibit No. 278).

decrease of popular support for Germany in the Ukraine. There is good evidence that the population was at first sympathetic to the German efforts to recruit labor voluntarily.[70] Moreover, a large number of nationalist Ukrainians supported the measure; they not only wanted to help Germany win the war against the Soviet Union, but believed that it would be a valuable cultural experience for young Ukrainians to come into contact with advanced German technology and with Western European culture in general. To them it was means of drawing the Ukrainian nation away from its too-close association with the Russians and the "Asiatics" of their empire and of establishing a European orientation for their country.[71] 727 466 167

Unhappily for these visions, the methods used by the Germans in dealing with the volunteer workers soon dried up the supply. They were frequently given miserable transportation and poor accommodations on arrival in Germany. Highly trained workers and professional men who had volunteered in order to increase their technical ability by experience in Germany were assigned to common labor.[72] Most important, however, the Ukrainians, like other *Ostarbeiter,* were forced to wear a humiliating badge distinguishing them from Western Europeans; they were forbidden social contacts with the latter and, in order to implement this decree, were excluded from motion-picture theaters, restaurants, and other public places. The erstwhile willing worker felt that the Germans regarded him (as many did) as nothing but a Bolshevik prisoner.[73] 727 466 167 523

When this policy of segregation resulted in lack of volunteers, force was used; mandatory labor service for young men and women was officially introduced in the Reichskommissariat on September 21, 1942,[74] but in practice compulsion had long been employed. In reply to the inevitable evasion of this order, the most demoralizing of tricks—such as seizure of worshippers at 727 466 167

[70] Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete in Heeresgebiet B, First Lieutenant Theurer, October 7, 1942, PS 054 (hereafter referred to as PS 054).

[71] E.g., *Krakivs'ki Visti,* February 6, 1942, p. 2.

[72] PS 054.

[73] Opinion report for period June 12–July 14, 1942, Auslandbriefprüfstelle, Gruppe VIII, PS 302 (hereafter referred to as PS 302).

[74] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* September 22, 1942, p. 3.

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church services and invitations by German authorities to theatrical performances at which all were arrested—were utilized. Force and brutal retaliation, such as burning of villages from which the potential workers ran away, were frequently applied.[75] The conscripts were sent a thousand miles to Germany in unheated cattle cars, sealed with barbed wire. Still worse, there was no just selection of those most suited for departure, no systematic registration.[76] Mothers of small children were sometimes taken; sons and husbands who were the only support of their families were conscripted without adequate provision for the families' maintenance.[77]

The horror of such treatment was perhaps the single most important cause of popular revulsion against the Germans. In addition to all its material hardships, the mere idea of forced transportation to a distant and unknown land recalled the generations-old terror of banishment to Siberia.[78] The extent of the program was so enormous that every family was touched; it became a universal evil. Of the total population of Kiev, thirty-eight thousand persons (over 10 percent) were delivered to the *Ostarbeiter* program within the first ten months of German occupation.[79] In the southern *Generalbezirke* somewhat smaller numbers appear to have been involved[80] but in the crucial *Bezirk* of Zhitomir, one hundred and seventy thousand (about 6 percent of the population) were taken by mid-1943, and thirty thousand more were to follow.[81] In all, as early as August, 1943, one out of every forty inhabitants of the Ukraine had been deported to Germany as forced laborers,[82] and by the end of the occupation the number of

[75] Auslandbriefprüfstelle, report for September 11–November 11, 1942, PS 018 (hereafter referred to as PS 018).

[76] Landesbauernführer Körner, Die neue deutsche Ukraine-Politik, PS 1198 (hereafter referred to as PS 1198).

[77] Occ E-4 (1); PS 054.

[78] Oral report of Generalkommissar Leyser (Zhitomir) to Rosenberg, June 17, 1943, PS 265 (hereafter referred to as PS 265).

[79] Commander of the SP and the SS, Kiev, to Commander of the SP and the SS, Ukraine, July 20, 1942, NO 1603 (hereafter referred to as NO 1603).

[80] Only about 1 percent from *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev by mid-1942 (Conference of Sauckel and Reichskommissariat officials in Kiev, August 12, 1942, NO 1606; hereafter referred to as NO 1606).

[81] PS 265.

[82] According to Sauckel, director of the *Ostarbeiter* program, at a Führer Conference, August 20, 1943, NO 1831 (hereafter referred to as NO 1831).

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Ukrainian workers in Germany totaled one and one-half million.[83]

The suffering caused by the actions of the Germans described above did not directly affect the activity of the nationalist elements, as did their repressive attitude toward education, religion, culture, and local administration. Indirectly, however, it played an enormous part in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine during the German occupation. One effect was a general subordination of all thought, all activity, to the demands of self-preservation. The constant struggle to keep alive resulted in a reduction of the energy and attention which could be devoted to all political questions, including nationalism. On the other hand, the sheer impossibility of coming to terms with the German authority, regardless of how ready one might be to sacrifice all independence to do so, led many to seek a political movement which promised deliverance. A vast number, of course, turned back to Communism, hoping that the experience of near-defeat would lead to a modification of Moscow's policies. For others, however, the only rational solution appeared to be the nationalist parties. 668*

Weak as they were after the waves of suppressions during the six months from September, 1941, to February, 1942, the two OUN groups endeavored to meet this challenge. Of the two factions, the Bandera group appears to have made the easiest, but not the most thorough-going adjustment. Its ability to adjust at a rather shallow level was due to several factors. The members of the OUN-B were nearly all young, and their movement placed little emphasis on systematic ideology. When they went to the East Ukraine, they carried a large number of slogans and romantic pledges as baggage.[84] These either attracted or antagonized

[83] PS 1198.

[84] One of these oaths, as discovered by the German police, reads:

"On my honor, for the fame of the fallen heroes, for the holy blood spilled, for my Ukrainian earth and the majesty of my Ukrainian homeland, I swear that I will struggle with all my strength and with my life for a free and Ukrainian state. With my heart, my soul, and my whole being I confess that only the Ukrainian revolution can give power to the Ukrainian state and the people. Unto death I will stand on the battlefield in order to build a national Ukrainian State. No one and nothing at all can hold me back from the path of the Ukrainian national revolution, neither difficulties nor death. I will carry out every command of my leader. I swear on the Ukraine, that I will loyally and honestly carry out

[See category 116, pp. 118-124 -- Analyst]

668* the local population. In the latter case, the Bandera organizers frequently resorted to violent denunciations, or even force. By these tactics they alienated a large part of the intelligentsia. The latter group, moreover, tended either to form groupings of its own or to adhere to the Mel'nyk party. Hence the Bandera adherents, if they found support at all, were forced to go to the less educated classes, the workers and the peasants.[85] Thus they were brought into contact with the aspirations of the masses of the people. Since they were led by destruction of their northern forces to concentrate on the southern Ukraine, where the potentially nationalist intelligentsia was weak, this tendency was reinforced.

Throughout this period, from the end of 1941 to the retreat of the Germans from the East Ukraine in the fall of 1943, the emphasis of the leadership of the OUN-B remained on the "voluntarist" elements of the program (underground publications of this period are filled with discussions of the role of underground movements, the nature of terrorism as a political tactic, and the role of the future Ukrainian army). At the same time, as early as April, 1942, the slogan of the *akt*—"Hail to the Ukraine, Hail to the Heroes"—was accompanied by the slogan advocated by the left group in the Bandera "Second Congress"—"Freedom for the Peoples and for the Individual."[86] Moreover, a conference of leaders in the same month decided to oppose the newly proclaimed "land reform" of the Germans.[87] Correspondingly, the underground press pointed out that the dissolution of the kolkhozes, while in line with Ukrainian nationalist aspirations, had up to then been carried out on paper only, not in reality. Therefore, it warned, with considerable perspicacity, that the whole program might be merely a device for getting more work out of the peasant. The same article advised the Nationalists to

all duties to the Ukrainian government which the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stephen Bandera lays on me. I will strive with my whole strength and my life for a Ukrainian government dependent on no one, and strive for its strength and honor. Hail to the Ukraine, Hail to the Heroes!" (PS 3943.)

[85] Interviews 18, 66.

[86] *Biuleten'* (Bulletin), No. 4 (April, 1942), a clandestine publication made available to me by Nicholas Lebed'.

[87] Lebed', p. 18.

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extend their work to all spheres of life, thus not falling into the error of clinging, as had the UVO, to purely military means of struggle. Significantly, a comparison from the development of the Communist Party was used; the "correct" line was likened to that of the Bolsheviks, who took a universal approach to the problem of revolution, while that of the Narodnaia Volia (of late nineteenth-century Russia) failed because it relied on terrorism alone.[88]

In the final analysis, however, the main stream of OUN-B ideology could not be diverted at this time. The leaders (those out of prison, that is) were in Galicia and Volhynia, in an environment comparatively unaffected by the Soviet stimulation to consideration of social and economic questions. The members who were in the underground in the east, and their new recruits, had rapidly changed, but they were too uninfluential and isolated to alter the body of the party. Such a change could only come about when the West Ukrainians, too, were thrown into intimate contact with reinforcements from the Soviet world.

For the OUN-M organizers in the East Ukraine, the initial process of adjustment was much more difficult because of the age of the members and the comparative depth of their ideology. Moreover, most of their recruits in the East Ukraine were intellectuals. While affected by Soviet conditions, the latter by no means represented a cross section of the Soviet world, but rather a special group which placed national above social consciousness. Eventually they did bring about a measure of change in the ideology of the party. Some new members, as was noted in the case of Liubchenko, became more violently and exclusively nationalist than their tutors. Of these, a few retained their "purity" until the end of the period under consideration, and beyond. Thus one pamphlet by an East Ukrainian professor in the OUN-M underground, printed at the close of the German occupation of the East Ukraine, stressed the racial "unity of blood" in Stsibors'kyi's doctrine. Even this pamphlet insisted on the opposition of this doctrine to Fascism, and stated that Stsibors'kyi's theory is democratic in that it gives the maximum opportunity to each while demanding the maximum from him.

[88] *Biuleten'*, No. 4, pp. 5–7.

668* On the social side, however, while a mixed economy of state capitalism, cooperatives, and private capital was advocated, the concept of the class struggle was denounced and the abolition of the kolkhoz demanded.[89]

Some of the OUN-M members who had first seen the East Ukraine in 1941 were inclined to go much further in forming an amalgam between their concept of nationalism and the socialistic system to which the masses of the East Ukrainians had become accustomed. On May 24–25, 1942, a conference of OUN-M leaders near Kremenets resolved to attack the German policy of colonialism. An All-Ukrainian Congress of Ukrainian Independentists was held by the organization in Kiev on August 14–15, 1942. It brought together not only OUN members from many parts of the East Ukraine, but members of many other nationalist organizations, whether or not in tune with the old ideology of the OUN. Thus the circle of experience constantly broadened.[90] Leaders like Kandyba found that their converts who had joined in the first wave of enthusiasm were essentially realists who wanted deeds not words.[91] When the Mel'nyk group could no longer present itself as the delegate of German power, its strength had to be revived by a program which contrasted with the reality of German oppression. Kandyba became convinced of the necessity of advocating the maintenance of state control of industry and commerce. Moreover, the Mel'nyk followers decided, contrary to all their preconceptions, that the only way to avoid alienating much of the East Ukrainian youth was to abandon denunciation of the kolkhoz in favor of a program which left to its members the decision to retain or abolish the collective.[92]

That such a sweeping revision of ideology was necessary for the OUN factions if they were to make converts in the East Ukraine is an indication of the great psychological differences which had developed between that region and the West Ukraine during the preceding twenty years. On the other hand, the fact that such a large segment of the party organizers, including even the older men in the OUN-M, could make the adjustment leads

[89] See the clandestine booklet by Iak previously cited.
[90] *OUN u Viini*, p. 78.
[91] Interview 65.
[92] *Ibid.*

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one to conclude that the integral nationalist ideology was not so deeply rooted in the thinking of the West Ukrainians and émigrés but that it underwent a rapid broadening of content once its adherents were brought into contact with the real conditions of the East Ukraine, and even the limited opportunities for action presented by these conditions. This does not mean, of course, that the nationalist goal was cast aside by those who modified their propaganda themes; the attainment of Ukrainian independence remained their central value. They realized that for the bulk of the East Ukrainian population independence could be presented as a means to the attainment of other values, but not as the ultimate value in itself. This acceptance of independence as a part rather than the whole of the nation's life was in itself the negation of the basic dogma of integral nationalism. The inherent flexibility of the Ukrainian nationalist outlook was demonstrated by the fact that it underwent a similar change at a somewhat later date under the impact of changing circumstances in the West Ukraine. To understand these circumstances, it is necessary to examine one of the most interesting aspects of Ukrainian nationalism in the Second World War—the nationalist partisan movement.

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VI. FROM UNDERGROUND TO RESISTANCE

133 For groups carrying on open resistance to an occupying power, the Ukraine as a whole is a highly inhospitable region; throughout most of its extent it is an open plain without natural places of concealment. Aside from the mountainous areas of the Carpathians in Galicia, the Carpatho-Ukraine, and Bukovina, which remained for a long time outside the scope of open resistance activities, sheltered retreats for bands of any considerable size are difficult to find. They are limited almost entirely to the belt of woods and swamp on the northern border. Originally, forest vegetation prevailed north of a line reaching from a point on the Polish border not far to the southwest of Kremenets almost due east, through Zhitomir and Kiev, to the boundary of the Ukraine and the Russian Soviet Republic some fifty miles northwest of [311] Sumy.[1] In the course of the centuries, a large part of this region has been cleared for cultivation; the presence of numerous swampy areas prevented all the forest from being cut down, however, so that there are frequent wooded areas, which become more common and less separated by open spaces the farther north one goes. In the Ukraine, as it was administratively defined prior to 1941, this wooded strip rarely exceeds one hundred miles in width, although it is almost four hundred miles long. The Reichskommissariat Ukraine, however, included an additional strip annexed from Belorussia, averaging about forty miles in width, and containing still more impenetrable swamps than the more southerly wooded area. Of the forested region, the southern part, which has been partly cleared, is valuable agriculturally and is thickly settled; it forms an integral part of the

[1] Cf. *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznastva* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 106.

historic Ukrainian lands of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov. The 133
northern part,[1] appropriately known as Polessia, or the "forest [313]
land," is of little value for crop growing but contains the only timber industry of significance in the Ukraine.

As the German armies rolled into the Ukraine in 1941, they 727
tended to advance along the main lines of communication, avoid- 725
ing the difficult, swampy regions. For weeks, or in some cases 668
even months, the less accessible areas were not brought under German control. This circumstance made possible the development of partisan bands which carried on resistance to the occupation authority.

Although, since 1945, Soviet writers have maintained that the 725
plans for guerrilla warfare against the conqueror had been 665
secretly prepared before the outbreak of hostilities, they assert 669
that these plans were known only to the top level of Communist Party officials. It is fairly certain that the order to develop a partisan movement came as a surprise even to most devoted Communists.[2] In July, 1941, after the decision to form partisan detachments was announced, preparations were pushed forward at a rapid rate by the local authorities. The rapidity of the German advance to the line of the Dnieper, however, rendered largely ineffective systematic attempts to form a partisan movement in the Ukraine west of that river. Even east of the Dnieper the panic produced by the seemingly irresistible German drive played havoc with the organization of guerrilla warfare. Many of the secretly selected leaders were swept along, willingly or unwillingly, in the retreat of the Red Army, while others were discovered and executed by the Germans. In a few places, however, small groups made good their escape to forest or swamp hide-outs. In the southern Ukraine one such group of about five hundred men, trained and directed by the Red Army, but largely composed of local Communist and NKVD officials, established a center of opposition in the swamps formed by the Dnieper south of Nikopol' (Nikopil').[3] This group was destroyed by the German forces in

[2] Oleksii Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet* (The Underground *Oblast* Committee in Action), literary editor Evg. Bosniatskii (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950), pp. 12–14.

[3] Report of Feldpolizeidirektor at 444. Sicherungsdivision, November 5, 1941, NOKW 1519 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 1519).

[1] [of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine -- Analyst]

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725 October, but a group of similar size and composition in the Novo
665 Moskovsk-Pavlograd (Novomoskovs'k-Pavlohrad) forest east of
669 Dniepropetrovsk was able to hold out until January, 1942.[4]

While the partisan bands in isolated shelters in the southern steppe Ukraine could not survive the first determined German attacks, those in Polessia were more fortunate. The chief areas of operation were the northern sections of the Chernigov and the Sumy *oblasts*. In the Chernigov *oblast* the partisans were led by the first secretary of the *oblast* committee of the Party, Oleksii Fedorov, a veteran of the revolutionary period. Though a hardened Communist, Fedorov had been born in the Dniepropetrovsk area and considered himself a Ukrainian.[5] He, like many other Party leaders, was temporarily swept from his territory by the rapidity of the German advance but returned in the late summer of 1941 and gathered the scattered remnants of his Party apparatus for a struggle against the Germans.[6] In the Sumy *oblast* the underground Party machinery was completely disrupted, but some of the *raion* officials succeeded in forming small partisan groups.[7]

It is clear from the preceding summary that the initial organization of the Red partisans of the Ukraine was carried out by members of the Communist Party and the Soviet state apparatus. These men were impelled both by their interest in maintaining the *status quo* and by the fear of violent death should they fall into German hands, since all "kommissars" and Communist officials were destined for execution by Hitler. Since the war, Soviet authors have admitted, and even exaggerated the role of the Party in the partisan movement, apparently because they wish to emphasize its "guiding role" in all spheres of Soviet life.[8] During the war, however, and especially in its early stages, while some attention was given to the activity of the Communist Party, an

[4] War Diary No. 2 of 213. Sicherungsdivision, Abteilung Ia, January 1–March 31, 1942, NOKW 2872 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2872); Report of Feldpolizeidirektor to Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets 103, January 9, 1942, NOKW 2911 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2911).

[5] Fedorov, p. 31.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 40 ff.

[7] Sidor Kovpak, *Vid Putivlia do Karpat* (From Putivl' to the Carpathians), literary ed. Ie. Herasimov (Kiev: Ukraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1946), pp. 3 ff.

[8] E.g., in Fedorov's work cited earlier in this chapter.

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PARTISAN ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN UKRAINE

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The following set of maps is intended to present schematically the development of partisan activity in the northern Ukraine from the beginning of the German-Soviet war until the reconquest of the major part of the area by the Red Army at the end of 1943. Territorial divisions indicated, from west to east, are the *Generalbezirke* Volhynia-Podolia, Zhitomir, and Kiev, and the Chernigov *oblast* of the army rear area.

The following symbols are used throughout:

- Major centers of Red Partisan groups
- Area in which Red partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control
- Direction of major drives of Red partisans
- Major centers of Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups adhering to Borovets' or Mel'nyk
- Major centers of Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups adhering to Bandera
- Area in which nationalist partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control
- Direction of major drives of nationalist partisans
- Direction of major German counterdrives

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

JULY, 1941–JUNE, 1942

This map represents a number of developments which were not closely related. The nationalist Ukrainian partisan groups represented were irregular forces in the German service used to combat Red partisans, rather than insurgent partisan forces, and the area represented as controlled by them is the area in which the Germans did not install a civil administration prior to November, 1941 (the "Olevsk Republic").

$_1$ The Polis'ka Sich after it went underground in November, 1941

$_2$ Ukrainian nationalist police (Polis'ka Sich) headquarters, prior to November, 1941

$_1$ Major centers of Red partisans in winter and spring of 1942

$_2$ Chief recruiting area for Kovpak's Red partisan force in summer, 1942

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JULY–DECEMBER, 1942



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

JANUARY–MAY, 1943

- Major centers of Bandera groups during the winter and early spring of 1943
- Extension of Bandera partisan activity in April and May, 1943
- Major centers of "Bul'ba" and Mel'nyk groups throughout the period
- Major centers of Red partisan activity in winter and early spring of 1943
- Additional centers of Red partisan activity in April and May, 1943
- Route of Kovpak's Red partisan band (Actually the band began its raid in November, 1942, being driven beyond the northern border of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in December, as shown on the map, but for the sake of simplicity all of the band's activities during this first period of its invasion of the "Right Bank" Ukraine have been shown on this map.)

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

JUNE–DECEMBER, 1943

- Major centers of Bandera partisan activity, May–July, 1943
- New headquarters of Bandera group in late summer and autumn, 1943
- Major Mel'nyk and "Bul'ba" bands, May–July, 1943
- Last stronghold of "Bul'ba" group before its dissolution
- Chief points of contact of Red partisan groups with nationalist groups, May–July, 1943
- Route of Kovpak's Carpathian raid
- Major areas of Kovpak's activity in Galicia, July, 1943
- Area to which remnants of Kovpak's band returned in September, 1943
- Approximate lines of combat between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, with the Roman numerals referring to dates as follows:

I October 1, 1943
II November 12, 1943
III December 10, 1943
IV February 15, 1944

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effort was made to give the impression that the partisans represented a spontaneous popular uprising against the foreign invader; the "common man" of the occupied areas of the Soviet Union was pictured as a patriot voluntarily assisting the Red Army to overthrow German rule.[9]

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It is this aspect of the Soviet partisan movement which makes it of particular interest to this study. The partisans in the Ukraine were pictured as motivated by local patriotism, while their leaders were described as successors of Khmelnits'kyi and other legendary heroes. The primary effort in this direction centered about the person of Sidor Kovpak, who became the chieftain of the partisans of the Sumy *oblast*. Kovpak claimed to be a descendant of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. While his enemies declared he was a gypsy—the disarray of his bivouac led even admirers to compare it to a gypsy camp—it appears likely that he was of native Ukrainian origin. He was an old Communist, a veteran of the civil war of 1918–20, but was quite uneducated, and had occupied only minor posts in the Soviet hierarchy. Apparently, however, his rough and earthy manner endeared him to considerable elements of the Ukrainian population, while his evident skill in conducting his partisan operations won him respect.[10]

Kovpak's personal qualities and the fact that his band was formed on Ukrainian soil, made it possible for Soviet propagandists to give some color to their assertion that his partisan organization was a manifestation of Ukrainian patriotism. Closer examination of the groups operating in the northeastern *oblasts* casts considerable doubt on this contention. In the first place, whatever the origins of its members, Kovpak's band was almost certainly formed initially, as were the other partisan groups in 1941, of members of the ruling machine. The commissar Rudnev, said to be the real "brains" of Kovpak's band, for example, was

[9] See, for example, Timofei (Timothy) Strokach, *Partyzany Ukrainy* (The Partisans of the Ukraine) (Moscow: Ukrvydav Ts. K. KP[b]U, 1943). The title sheet of this work describes Strokach as a "deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR."

[10] On Kovpak cf. his memoir previously cited; P. Vershigora, *Liudi s chistoi sovest'iu* (People with Clean Consciences) (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel', 1951), pp. 39, 49, 181, 412; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 23, 1943, p. 3 (for the nature of this source see n. 15 below); V. Andreev, *Narodnaia voina: Zapiski partizana* (The People's War: Sketches of a Partisan) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1952), p. 228.

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a professional army political officer, who had been engaged in Party work in the Sumy *oblast*.[11] Moreover, it is at least a peculiar coincidence that its nucleus was formed in the Putivl' *raion* which, with parts of the neighboring districts, forms the only enclave of Russian-speaking peasantry in the northern Ukraine.[12]

Although Party and governmental functionaries formed the original nucleus of the partisan movement, they were soon joined by large numbers of Red Army soldiers who had been cut off from the main body of Soviet troops by the German advance. Such soldiers were, of course, drawn from all parts of the USSR, and were not specifically Ukrainian. Moreover, those soldiers who, in the first stages of the war, cared to take the desperate course of joining partisans were frequently adherents of the regime, led by officers of the political section of the army (commissars and *politruks*) or by NKVD men. Such, for example, was Alexander Saburov, who was to be exceeded in fame only by Kovpak among the partisans in the Ukraine. Saburov had, to be sure, been an NKVD official in Kiev at the outbreak of the war, but he was a native of the Ural region.[13]

Soviet sources are much more reticent concerning the nature of the group directing the Red partisans from outside the occupied areas. Nikita Krushchev (then first secretary of the Party in the Ukraine, although born in the Kursk *oblast*, probably of Russian origin) is said to have played a major part, while Demian Korotchenko, a Ukrainian (then second secretary) even visited the partisan bands on German-occupied soil.[14] The chief direction of the movement was, however, in the hands of the Ukrainian Staff of the Partisan Movement. Little can be gathered from Soviet sources concerning this body. It is known, however, that

[11] Vershigora, p. 39.

[12] Putivl' is the only town in the Ukraine, with the exception of the Donbas and Kiev, in which the Germans allowed the publication of a Russian-language newspaper. Since the Wehrmacht made a practice of maintaining newspapers in other Ukrainian areas where there was a danger of disaffection (e.g., in Polessia in the autumn of 1941), it appears that they felt the need for propaganda to *Russians* in the Putivl' area.

[13] Anatolii Shyian, *Partyzans'kyi Krai* (Partisan Territory) (Kiev: Ukrains'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1946), pp. 19, 32.

[14] Fedorov, p. 475; Vershigora, p. 397. A prewar source (Lancelot Lawton, "Ukraina: Europe's Greatest Problem," *East Europe*, III [Spring, 1939], 39) maintains that Korotchenko was a Russian whose real name was Korotchenkov.

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725 its chief was Timothy A. Strokach, a high-ranking veteran of
668* years of service in the NKVD frontier troops. In 1943, Strokach's adjutant, Alexander Ruzanov, was captured by the Germans, and according to articles published in the press of the occupied territories, described the channels through which the NKVD controlled the partisan movement.[15] While such a propaganda story must be viewed with considerable suspicion, the numerous details of the account attributed to Ruzanov lend it plausibility, and many can be checked against independent evidence. For example, he is said to have revealed that M. S. Spivak, "a typical civilian Chekist," was second in command of the partisan movement. This seems plausible, since Spivak's post as secretary for cadres of the Communist Party of the Ukraine was closely associated with NKVD work, and Spivak is described by a recent Soviet partisan memoir as one of a group of leading officials who greeted the Ukrainian partisan leaders when they arrived in Moscow in late 1942.[16]

While the above evidence concerning the composition of the central directing body of the partisans of the Ukraine is not entirely conclusive, taken together with other evidence from Soviet memoirs and German documents concerning the role of NKVD officers in the partisan movement,[17] it suggests very strongly that the NKVD played a major role in the development of the Red partisans. This suggestion supports the view previously expressed that the partisan movement was an artificial creation of the Soviet regime and that its leaders were tested adherents of the regime, drawn from all the geographic regions and ethnic areas of the Ukraine. It appears safe to conclude that the formation of the Red partisan movement offers no proof of a "rallying" of Ukrainian patriots to the side of the Soviet system.

[15] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 23, 1943, p. 3, contains one of these articles, which states that it is based on accounts in *Ukrains'kyi Dobrovolets'* and *Nova Doba*. A German-language version was published in *Der Deutsche in Transnistrien*, November 28, 1943, p. 2. Strokach was a candidate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, and is said (by Ruzanov) to have been deputy People's Commissar of the Interior of the Ukraine. After the war Strokach became Deputy Minister of the Interior of the Ukraine, and later (1953) Minister.

[16] Fedorov, p. 474.

[17] Cf. NOKW 1519.

This does not, however, imply that in its later stages, after it had been organized and developed by the Party cadres, the partisan movement was unable to obtain some support among the Ukrainian people. The partisans were frequently much weaker than the total forces which the Germans could employ against them; consequently, it was essential that they secure the aid of local men for scouting, concealment, and sabotage of German offensives. While some of their arms and ammunition, as well as medical supplies, could be flown in, they had to rely on the inhabitants of the area in which they operated for food and for replacements for men lost in action. Moreover, a primary function of the units was political as well as military: they were intended to maintain a vestige of Soviet authority in areas far away from the direct control of the rulers in the Kremlin. 725 668*

In order to secure local support both compulsion and persuasion were employed. Compulsion was used to requisition food and equipment needed, to draft men into the guerrilla units, and to inhibit collaboration with the Germans. Methods employed frequently included killing the families of those who entered the German police or administrative organs, as well as the collaborators themselves.[18] The mere fact that the partisans could move about in force induced the cautious peasants to believe that Soviet victory was possible and that, consequently, it would be dangerous to side with the regime's enemies. Persuasion, however, would probably have been ineffective had it not been for the atrocities practiced by the Germans, especially the *Ostarbeiter* agencies, which led thousands of persons, mostly young and fit for partisan service, to flee to the woods.[19] The German failure to carry out the land reform, by depriving the peasants of a motive for resisting the return of the Soviet forces, was also a major cause of partisan success. The partisans made strong efforts to win over the peasants, in some cases even paying for requisitioned food supplies. According to a German report, one Red [727]

[18] Report of Gebietskommissar Steudel in Kazatin, November 8–December 28, 1943, PS 1702 (hereafter referred to as PS 1702); PS 3943, February 12, 1943.

[19] Those who obeyed the order to report for the *Ostarbeiter* program were threatened by the partisans, while the order itself often served as a pass to join a partisan unit (Occ E-4 [1]).

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partisan band even distributed land to the peasants in the area it controlled.[20]

The early development and continued strength of the Red partisans, arising in part from reinforcements sent them from the chief power base of the Soviets in the unconquered areas, enabled them to dominate the only regions suitable for guerrilla warfare east of the Dnieper. Therefore the nationalists could not have established partisan forces there unless they had possessed overwhelming popular support.[21] The possibility of such support was decreased by the fact that many elements opposed to the Germans were drawn into the Communist underground and partisan units before the nationalists could develop their organizations. Moreover, the nationalist groups were too small, too harried by the Germans, and too remote from their base in Galicia to constitute cadres for a large-scale partisan movement. It took months of struggle to maintain a bare existence underground and to find a program which appealed to the masses before the nationalists were ready for activity of any importance. By then the Germans were in full retreat; guerrilla warfare against them would have had little value.[22]

Volhynia, close to the main base in Galicia, and more penetrated by nationalist ideology, offered a more favorable field for Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups. The people of Volhynia suffered almost as much as did those in the German-occupied East Ukraine. However, the Bandera organizers, who were predominantly Galician, needed much preparation to acquire real strength in the area. Consequently, for more than

[20] PS 1685; PS 051.

[21] There are unsubstantiated accounts of a few small groups. See, for example, the description of a band supposed to have been wiped out by Red partisans in the Chernigov region in early 1943, in "Persha Ukraïns'ka Partyzanka" (The First Ukrainian Partisan Group), *Vpered* (January, 1950), pp. 13–14.

[22] Most of these deficiencies were not present in Galicia. To the majority of the people of Galicia, however, the release from Soviet tyranny was so welcome that the thought of conflict with the "liberators" appeared ridiculous; see Mykola (Nicholas) Lebed', *UPA: Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia* (UPA: The Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) (Presove Biuro UHVR, 1946), p. 17, which hints at this lack of support. Moreover, the tranquility of the area and the comparative freedom of movement of nationalist elements made Galicia a valuable base of organization and recruitment for the nationalist forces, which they long hesitated to disturb by violent action.

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a year they confined themselves to surreptitious propaganda, 725
penetration of the police units, and preparation of secret arms 668*
caches.[23] What the Bandera organization was unwilling to risk, in spite of the large number of its youthful adherents and the proximity of its Galician base, the Mel'nyk faction obviously could not attempt, even when its break with the Germans might have made resistance desirable. Consequently, the only Ukrainian nationalist organization which could remotely be described as a partisan group during the first year of the Reichskommissariat's administration of Volhynia was the Polis'ka Sich (Polessian stronghold) under Borovets'.

It is extremely difficult to ascertain just what activities the UPA carried out during 1942. That it fought sporadically with small groups of Red partisans in the winter and spring appears certain.[24] It is also certain that it existed illegally, in defiance of a German order for its dissolution,[25] and that it gathered arms surreptitiously, and it is reasonably sure that some of its members from time to time had armed encounters with German security forces. It is, however, by no means certain that the group carried out open attacks against the Germans, or that the latter were entirely dissatisfied with the state of affairs in which the illegal band kept a region of difficult terrain and low economic potential from serving as a Red base behind the German lines. Moreover, as Borovets' himself has pointed out, it was never the intention of his movement to engage in a large-scale military campaign, but rather to retain a small staff which could draw support and recruits from the sympathetic Polessian peasantry.[26]

That the group was of some importance within these limits is indicated by the fact that in the late summer of 1942 the Soviet partisans in Polessia felt it worth while to send an emissary, Alexander Lukin, to negotiate for common action against the Germans.[27] The mere fact, however, that such negotiations could be

[23] PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

[24] At least all its critics, as well as its adherents, agree on this point.

[25] PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

[26] Taras Borovets', *Zboroina horot'ba Ukraïny (1917–1950)* (The Armed Struggle of the Ukraine [1917–50]), 1951, pp. 10–11.

[27] Dmitrii Medvedev, *Sil'nye dukhom* (The Strong in Spirit) (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Soiuza SSSR, 1951), p. 83; Taras Borovets', "Dva Khresty" (Two Crosses), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, Christmas issue, January 7, 1949.

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725 undertaken is an indication of the uncertainty of the ideology
668* and objectives of the little group. "Bul'ba" Borovets' himself, a man of little schooling, apparently was not sure what direction the movement should take, although he had a deep-rooted love for his native country. He continued to maintain ties with the UNR; there were UNR officers with the group much of the time, advising on military matters on which few of the younger members had had experience. Borovets' kept up a precarious line of communication with Andrew Livyts'kyi himself through an old UNR member, Captain Raievs'kyi, who ostensibly carried on the functions of *raionchef* in the Rovno district.[28]

665 These connections were too discontinuous to provide much
668* guidance, however, even if the enfeebled Warsaw headquarters
727 had had a clear line to offer. At the same time, the group under Borovets' was acting as a refuge for extremely diverse elements seeking an escape from German suppression. As was previously described, Borovets' had made an agreement with the OUN-M by which he was to be sent a number of officers. Apparently this help was slow in arriving. By summer, 1942, however, a few men had appeared; one was the Zhitomir journalist Anthony Baranivs'kyi, who became the Mel'nyk representative at the headquarters of Borovets'.[29] He, of course, adhered to the OUN-M line. A quite different group consisted of the former "left wing" of the Bandera party. Its leaders, Mitrynga, Turchmanovych, Ryvak, and Boris Levits'kyi, were with the task forces destined to proclaim the *akt* in Kiev. When these groups were broken up by the Germans before reaching their goal, the young men escaped arrest but were forced to go into hiding. Then, since the whole tendency of the OUN-B indicated to them that they could no longer hope to secure the adoption of their left-wing program, all except Levits'kyi (who went into hiding in Galicia) fled to Volhynia, where they found a protector in the Polis'ka Sich.[30] There, apparently, they attracted to their ideology a young as-

[28] Oleksander (Alexander) Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy" (An Army without a State), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, December 28, 1950, p. 2.

[29] Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 1, 1951, p. 4; *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 92.

[30] Interview 43.

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sistant of Borovets', Leonidas Shcherbatiuk, son of one of the generals of the Republican army. With his support they founded in the midst of the untutored woodland peasants yet another Ukrainian party. Known as the Ukrainian Popular Democratic Party (*Ukraïns'ka Narodna Demokratychna Partiia*—UNDP), it advocated a program centering on maintenance of ownership of industry, means of transportation, and other large-scale enterprises by the state, with operation in the hands of the workers. At the same time, it condemned authoritarian control and violation of the rights of individuals.[31] 665 668* 725

It was this motley group which carried on negotiations with the Soviet partisan Lukin in the autumn of 1942. While differing in details, the Soviet and the nationalist accounts of these discussions agree that the Red emissary demanded formal submission of the nationalist band to Soviet control, while Borovets' and his advisers were united in insisting on limiting an agreement to cooperation against the Germans.[32] Moreover, the Soviet sources frankly admit that the Red partisans were very weak in Volhynia at this time. They were confined almost entirely to the extreme nothern part of the region, where they received support from the powerful Soviet bands in Belorussia. There was one band near Kovel', but it was under the command of a Pole, and apparently was composed of Poles rather than Ukrainians.[33] It is therefore quite understandable that the Soviet leadership may have wished to gain the support of the group under Borovets' until more "reliable" Soviet forces could be formed in Volhynia. It is significant that one of the alleged Communist demands was for an open campaign against the Germans, including particularly the assassination of the Reichskommissar. It is likely that the reason Borovets' gives for rejection of these demands is accurate, for it is in line with the whole tactical policy of his move- 725 668*

[31] Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 14, 1951, p. 2, maintains that the "proclamation" of the UNDP was made in June, 1943; other sources set the *founding* of the party in 1942, however, and it is certain that the group had a developed ideology before 1943; see Borys Levits'kyi, "Istorychne znachennia rozlamu v OUN" (The Historical Significance of the Split in the OUN), *Vpered*, No. 2 (11) (1950), p. 6.

[32] Medvedev, pp. 83–86; Borovets', "Dva khresty".

[33] G. Lin'kov, *Voina v tylu vraga* (The War in the Rear of the Enemy) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1951), p. 384.

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668* 725 ment. He maintains that such action at that time would have been suicidal for the group and that it would have brought extreme suffering on the Volhynian people.[34]

When Borovets' could protract the negotiations no longer, Lukin flew back to Moscow; then the Red partisans began to move against the band they had hoped to use as an ally. In the late summer of 1942 the number of Soviet partisans sent in by air to northern Volhynia, or crossing the Pripet swamps from Belorussia, increased to the point where they became a real threat both to the nationalist group and to the German administration. By autumn the entire forest area west of the Dnieper was within their field of operation.

The unrest was soon increased by the arrival of the arch-guerrilla, Kovpak. In August he had flown from his Briansk hide-out to Moscow, to confer (by his own account) with Stalin himself. The Soviet dictator asked him—according to his memoirs and those of other Red partisans—whether it would be possible to make a raid in force on the "Right Bank" region, west of the Dnieper. Apparently the small, scattered partisan forces there were not contributing enough to the Soviet war effort; moreover, Stalin felt the need of convincing his former subjects of the reality of Red power by sending in a force of real strength. Kovpak agreed to make the expedition, and set off late in October.[35] His passage across the Chernigov *oblast* was easy because of the strength of Fedorov's partisan forces there; on November 10 the mobile force crossed the Dnieper into the Reichskommissariat. The point at which the crossing was made was in the extreme north of Erich Koch's domain, above the confluence of the Pripet and the Dnieper,[36] in what had formed part of the Belorussian Soviet Republic. Throughout the first half of the winter, Kovpak was careful to keep within this extreme northern strip, which had the advantage of containing the most inaccessible terrain. His activities at this time could scarcely include showing the Soviet flag to a real Ukrainian population, though in late

[34] Borovets', "Dva khresty."
[35] Kovpak, pp. 78–82.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 85–87, and map at end of that volume. Apparently a considerable number of Red partisans were sent about the same time by air to the western area.

November the group penetrated southern Polessia near Olevsk, the former headquarters of the Polis'ka Sich.[37] The greatest single victory of Kovpak's group in this period was the temporary capture of the *Kreisgebiet* capital, Lelchitsi, on November 26.[38] After that, German counterattacks became extremely heavy, and Kovpak's men appear to have spent a miserable two months evading the Germans in the frozen swamps along the middle course of the Pripet River.[39] In February, however, he headed south, cutting across a corner of "Bul'ba's" territory, then striking eastward through *Generalbezirk* Zhitomir. 668* 725

While Red forces were pushing down from the northeast, the Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement was beginning to acquire real significance, although the nationalists were compelled to give some ground in northeastern Volhynia to the stronger Red partisans.[40] The SS and the Wehrmacht were agreed on the necessity of harsh measures to combat the Communist partisan threat. From the beginning, even those Wehrmacht generals who generally took a reasonable attitude toward the peoples of the east advocated the harshest measures toward partisans. For example, Field-Marshal von Reichenau based his policy on the concept that the Germans must be more feared than the partisans; he ordered that all who did not aid the fight against the latter be regarded as enemies, and that men who did not hinder or report partisan activities be "draconically" treated.[41] This policy was 668* 725 727

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 88; this corresponds with reports of a shift of Red partisan activity to the Stolin-Sarny-Olevsk triangle in PS 3943, February 12, 1942.

[38] Reichskommissar Ukraine to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, December 10, 1942, CXLV 488, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLV 488).

[39] Report of Höherer SS und Polizeiführer Russland-Süd, Ukraine, und Nordost, December 26, 1942, NO 1128 (hereafter referred to as NO 1128); PS 3943, February 12, 1943. According to one of the leaders of the Soviet partisans in Belorussia, Kovpak established an airport on one of the frozen lakes of the region. With the help of the Soviet Belorussian partisans he was able to defend it until German bombing finally broke the ice (Lin'kov, p. 386).

[40] Cf. Lin'kov, p. 375.

[41] Directive Verhalten der Truppe im Ostraum, October 10, 1941, USSR Exhibit 12 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit 12). See also a memorandum by Chef des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Field-Marshal Keitel, which stated that security troops in the rear areas would suffice only if they were allowed to proceed "draconically" without the requirement of juridical process, to convince the population that resistance would have terrible consequences (PS 459, July 23, 1941, hereafter referred to as PS 459).

rigorously carried out in the fall of 1942.[42] The drastic reprisals carried out in western Volhynia and Polessia injured the patriotic Ukrainian peasantry as frequently as they did Communist sympathizers. Consequently, the Ukrainian police were reluctant to take part in such suppression of their own compatriots, and especially in the brutal conscription for the *Ostarbeiter* program. The only alternative was desertion; in the fall thousands joined the forest refugees from burned villages and forced labor drives.[43] Unlike the latter, however, the police deserters were trained and frequently already organized by nationalists for opposition to the Germans. The command of the OUN-B in Galicia was reluctant to destroy its grip on the legal forces and risk a campaign of open resistance to the Germans at this time; but when they saw that the police units they dominated were breaking up anyway, and were in danger of passing over to the Communist guerrillas, they decided to begin a large-scale partisan movement. This step was taken in late November; by the early part of 1943 the activity of the Bandera groups was already considerable.[44]

There were two major centers of OUN-B activity. The first comprised the western part of the area which had been most ravaged by fighting between Red partisans and Germans, especially after Kovpak's passage to the southeast. Its extent may be defined by the quadrilateral formed by the towns of Kovel', Vladimirets (Volodimirets'), Kostopol', and Lutsk, although the chief operations were evidently carried out in the eastern section of this area.[45] A poor, woodland area, where the peasant popula-

[42] How drastic these measures could be in practice is shown by the reprisal burning of nine villages in the Petrikov area, leaving the peasants to shift for themselves in the dead of winter, although the *Gebietskommissar* himself asserted they were innocent of aiding the partisans (Occ E-4 [1]). The main "pacifying" campaign was carried out in Volhynia in September and early October, 1942 (NO 1128); cf. Lebed', p. 24, on the slaughter of nationalist adherents due to Communist provocation.

[43] Lebed', p. 26.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 24; the extent of German repression and Communist activity, which threatened to serve as an outlet for popular indignation, led the OUN-B to start operations before it really wished to do so (Interview 76).

[45] Lebed', pp. 24–25; PS 3943, March 19, 1943, ascribes (probably incorrectly, since the Germans were not fully informed of the nature of the nationalist bands) the attacks east of the Rovno-Lutsk road to a "Bul'bist" group. The western section of this area was partly controlled by large Polish police forces recruited to take the deserting Ukrainians' place. A savage struggle between them and the nationalists (especially the Bandera partisans), inflicting fearful hardships on the civilian population, was carried on all through 1943.

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tion, while not extremely nationalist, appears to have viewed the nationalists with favor after the brutalities inflicted by the Communists and Germans, it made an ideal base for the nationalist activity. 725 668*

A second base was established in Volhynia proper, southwest of Rovno. The activities there, however, were much more circumscribed than those farther north, because the wooded areas were smaller and the possibility of counterattack by the Germans greater. The nucleus of the Bandera forces in this area appears to have been a group of about one hundred men under a leader whose pseudonym was "Kruk." Evidently a small police unit which had broken away from its German command, it was encamped in the forest near Kremenets. Living near it on amicable terms, was a group under the command of a Mel'nyk officer known as "Khrin."[46] Both groups were really underground rather than partisan bands; they carried on such activities as raids on German convoys, "jail deliveries," and attacks on small German detachments to secure arms. It appears that they endeavored to maintain an appearance of subordination to German orders, or at least lack of hostility, for their position was too exposed to permit the luxury of open warfare.[47] They were of some importance, however, because they were in a section where the peasantry was very sympathetic to the nationalist cause, and because they formed a natural link between the headquarters in Galicia and the zones of more intense activity farther north.

In addition to the OUN-B centers just described, and the Mel'nyk group under "Khrin," there were several other small groups scattered over the area southwest of a line extending from Rovno through Lutsk to Kovel'. Little bands of Mel'nyk supporters hid in the woods near Dubno, Lutsk, and Vladimir Volynsk (Volodymyr Volyns'k); a group of dissidents who had been members

[46] The most detailed account is in MS D, which gives the strength of "Khrin's" group (with which the author of the manuscript served) as 140 in the spring of 1943, 500 in early June, and 200 a month later when Kovpak arrived. Apparently "Kruk's" group was weaker until June, when it began to forge ahead.

[47] The nature of these groups is of course a highly controversial subject. Cf. especially O. Shuliak, *V im'ia pravdy: Do istorii povstanoho rukhu v Ukraïni* (In the Name of Truth: On the History of the Insurrectionary Movement in the Ukraine) (Rotterdam, 1947), p. 18; Oleh Lysiak, "Volyns'kyi Batalion" (The Volhynian Battalion), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (March, 1951), p. 2; Vershigora, p. 400.

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735 of the OUN-B, known as the Front of Ukrainian Revolutionists
668* (Front Ukraïns'kykh Revolutsionistsiv), was allied to them, while an *Otaman,* Voloshyn-Berchak, led a group of Free Cossacks in the Kremenets region.[48] By far the most important detachment, aside from the Bandera group, however, was that of Borovets', which had automatically (somewhat against the desires of its leader) swelled in numbers as the fugitives and police not affiliated with the Bandera forces sought a rallying point. Moreover, as the general confusion in Volhynia led the Mel'nyk OUN to take more open action, support from this quarter increased. One of the chief Mel'nyk leaders in Volhynia, Oleh Shtul', had for a long time been carrying on surreptitious resistance activities while ostensibly acting as an agent for a Ukrainian newspaper; now he permanently attached himself to the "Bul'ba" headquarters as representative of the OUN-M.[49] Moreover, young Iatseniuk, who had lived in Volhynia illegally for more than a year after his escape from Zhitomir, took the name "Volynets'" and formed a group operating southeast of Borovets', with a base a short distance inside the frontier east of Korets. It was the only nationalist partisan group based within the frontier of the pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine; as it was led by a man familiar with Soviet conditions who had wide connections in the Zhitomir area, it was useful for carrying out "propaganda raids" in the *Generalbezirk* Zhitomir.[50]

It was only natural that the dispersion and lack of unitary direction of the nationalist partisan forces aroused concern; the first proposal for a single command was evidently made by Borovets'. The Bandera forces sent negotiators to him. Both parties were agreed that some higher center was necessary, for the lack of such authority might lead to the degeneration of the nationalist partisan movement into mere banditry. "Bul'ba" wanted the creation of an all-party front comprising UNDP, UNR, OUN-M, and OUN-B. The Mel'nyk followers agreed to his proposals, no doubt feeling that they already had the "inside track" with the partisan commander. The Bandera group, on the other hand, in

[48] Shuliak, p. 25; MS D; Interview 60.
[49] Interview 12.
[50] *Ibid.*; Shuliak, p. 27.

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accord with the guiding principle of their movement, demanded 725
political direction by their Provid, although in return they were 668*
willing to recognize Borovets' as over-all commander of military operations. They offered as ground for rejecting the proposal the obvious impracticability of associating the UNR, whose leadership in Warsaw could be reached only infrequently, in a political directorate which had to control so shifting a force as the partisans. Of equal importance—at least according to Borovets' and his supporters—was the latter's insistence on maintaining the "conspiratorial" nature of the movement, i.e., the use of a nucleus staff with most of the followers carrying on their normal activities. The Bandera group, on the other hand, unquestionably desired a large-scale movement of open resistance, which would have meant "deconspiration," the revelation of the identity of the adherents of the nationalist partisan movement. In May, when no agreement could be reached, the negotiations were broken off.[51]

This severance of contacts, however, had no immediately serious consequences, for shortly afterwards a dramatic change in the situation in the whole western area took place with the arrival of the major Red partisan force. After he turned away from former Polish Volhynia, Kovpak pushed across the northern parts of the Zhitomir and Kiev *Generalbezirke*. Although German attacks forced him to keep on the move, the whole area north of the Zhitomir-Kiev line was so infested by Red partisans that it never again came under effective German control.[52] By May, however, Kovpak's own band was back in the northern swamp area. Then came orders from Moscow for a still more extensive operation, a penetration of Galicia.

The shortest route for Kovpak's forces lay directly across western Polessia and Volhynia, passing slightly north of Rovno. At a point in the neighborhood of Liudvipol', in the heart of "Bul'ba's" territory, however, the Kovpak group turned sharply to the northeast, traversing the Tsuman' area, which was a section dominated by the Bandera group.[53] Having reached the

[51] Cf. Lebed', pp. 41–43; Shuliak, pp. 20 ff.; Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba*, p. 12.
[52] PS 265.
[53] Kovpak, map; MS D.

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725 668* Tsuman' area, Kovpak turned south. His route from that point would have taken him directly through the Kremenets centers of the Mel'nyk and Bandera bands, but again he made a detour, this time to the east, skirting the Kremenets area and entering Galicia south of Ternopol' (Tarnopil').[54] The entire march across the area of operations of the nationalist partisans—over 250 miles—took the Red force about three weeks.[55]

725 669 When Kovpak's force entered Galicia in early July, it was only partially successful in achieving its primary objective, disruption of the Drohobich petroleum production.[56] It did, however, cause a severe disturbance of the peace of Galicia. For a long time the OUN-B had been preparing an underground armed force there. When Kovpak's arrival turned the extreme eastern part of the province into a battlefield, this organization (Ukraïns'ka Narodna Samooborona—Ukrainian Popular Self-Defense, a name chosen to conceal its identity with the Volhynian forces) came into the open to fight the Communists.[57] As they had long had numerous scores to settle with the occupation authorities, the young warriors also began sporadic fighting with the Germans.[58] What is most interesting as an indication of the state of feeling in Galicia, however, is the speed with which Kovpak's group melted away

[54] MS D; Kovpak, map. It will be noted that, although a distinct shift in route was made, the deviation was not very great—perhaps twenty miles. One source maintains that Kovpak sent emissaries to the groups at Kremenets to propose cooperation or at least neutrality, but that while they refused, the largest ("Khrin's") numbered only two hundred, and so was quite incapable of attacking Kovpak's more than two thousand men (MS D).

[55] While the force left its swamp headquarters on June 12, it evidently did not enter western Polessia until about the twentieth and was deep in Galicia by July 9 (Kovpak, p. 109, and map).

[56] According to Kovpak the aim was the destruction of the oil fields around Ternopol', the second largest petroleum production center under German control (Kovpak, p. 107). While this is plausible enough, Ukrainian sources have always claimed that the aim of the expedition was disruption of the tranquility of Galicia, and especially interference with recruitment of Galician youths for the German armed forces. Probably the latter purpose occupied at least a secondary place in the minds of the Soviet leaders, since they would scarcely be willing to admit that it was necessary to send a partisan group which had been founded five hundred miles away in order to prevent their former subjects in Galicia from joining the "Fascist" forces.

[57] Lebed', p. 49.

[58] *Ibid.*; Report of "Dr. Frédéric" to Auswärtiges Amt, September 19, 1943, CXLVa 60, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 60); cf. Chapter VII, n. 25.

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in the unfavorable environment. When the raid on the oil fields failed, the group headed for the Carpathians. It is apparent even from Kovpak's own account that the powerful force disintegrated within a few weeks of its arrival there. In the latter part of August, Kovpak himself, with part of the band, headed north, reaching the swamp region on September 1 with about three hundred men. His second in command remained behind and was killed, apparently with the majority of the band.[59] Since the Carpathians contain at least as favorable terrain for guerrilla operations as does the Polessian area, where Kovpak's group maintained itself and even grew during months of heavy German attacks, it appears that a decisive factor in the rapid destruction of the band was the hostile attitude of the Galician population.

Kovpak's force had scarcely left Volhynia before the Bandera partisans began to seize control of the nationalist resistance movement. The failure of negotiations with Borovets' induced their commander, Dmytro Kliachkevs'kyi, to adopt the title UPA in an apparent effort to secure the prestige attached to it by "Bul'ba's" earlier start.[60] At the same time, the Bandera partisans regained the services of the most experienced of their commanders, Roman Shukevych, who had been the chief Ukrainian organizer in "Nachtigall." After the dissolution of Stets'ko's government, this unit had been withdrawn from the front, together with "Roland." Both detachments were thoroughly reorganized, certain nationalist members were arrested and the remainder sent as a detachment to fight Red partisans in White Russia.[61] When it appeared likely that the Germans would also suppress this anti-partisan unit, Shukevych escaped to Galicia, arriving in L'vov in the spring of 1943. There the Provid appointed him commander of all OUN-B partisan forces.[62] Moreover, the leaders decided that the refusal of Borovets' and the Mel'nyk forces to accept their proposals for union required forceful action to see that the nationalist partisan struggle did not degenerate into the private

[59] Kovpak, p. 124.
[60] See Chapter IV, n. 79.
[61] Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (June-July, 1952), p. 6; Lebed', p. 22.
[62] Interview 76.

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enterprises of numerous *otamans* or war lords, as had the Ukrainian movement in the last days of Petliura's regime.[63]

Consequently, on July 6, shortly after Kovpak had passed through the area, "Kruk's" force suddenly appeared fully armed before the Mel'nyk detachment of "Khrin" and demanded that it submit to Bandera command. Lack of preparation made resistance impossible; apparently, too, OUN-B propaganda had prepared the ground for the coup. At any rate, the majority of the Mel'nyk group accepted the ultimatum and enrolled in the Bandera force.[64]

Shortly afterwards, Iatseniuk's group was similarly compelled to join the rival forces.[65] After these incidents, the remaining Mel'nyk and independent groups rapidly melted away; they were destroyed by Communists or Bandera partisans, or joined the latter. In mid-August, "Bul'ba's" main force, which had also been seriously weakened, in part because of continued fights with Red partisans, was attacked by an OUN-B group. Two of his principal advisers from the UNR were captured and forced to join the OUN-B group; his wife was also taken prisoner.[66] He himself, together with Shtul', Mitrynga, Raievs'kyi, and other leaders, but with only a handful of fighting men, was driven eastward into Communist-infested territory. Here in November the group encountered a stronger Red force. In the resulting fight, Mitrynga and Raievs'kyi were killed, but Borovets' and Shtul' again managed to escape.[67] This time they took the only course which they felt remained open: they left Volhynia altogether, going to Warsaw to seek German assistance to rebuild their scattered forces.[68] Shcherbatiuk remained as commander of the tiny, demoralized group in Volhynia (which had been renamed the Ukraïns'ka Narodna Revoliutsiina Armiia—Ukrainian People's

[63] Lebed', pp. 41–43.

[64] Shuliak, p. 25; MS D; I. Hirniak, "Tse bulo 6. lypnia 1943. roku" (This was July 6, 1943), *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), July 1, 1951, p. 3. All three sources assert that numerous Mel'nyk adherents were executed by the OUN-B.

[65] Shuliak, p. 27.

[66] *Ibid.*; Hrytsenko in *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 14, 1951, p. 4.

[67] Interviews 50, 72.

[68] Lebed', pp. 41–43, confirms the general nature of these attacks on the "Bul'bist" groups, although he emphasizes their lack of organization and the "bloodless" nature of the OUN-B compulsion.

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Revolutionary Army—UNRA, to distinguish it from the Bandera usurpers of the original title).[69] 669 725

The rapid loss of strength of the Mel'nyk-Borovets' forces presents something of a puzzle. The explanation offered by the representatives of the latter is that they deliberately decided to refrain from entering into a fratricidal struggle. In part this appears to be correct. A major objective of both Borovets' and the Mel'nyk chiefs was to avoid creating a large-scale partisan organization, yet this is what would have been necessary to counter the Bandera group, which was bent on forming just such a powerful force. On the other hand, the assertion of adherents of the defeated party that the first attacks came unexpectedly, yet resulted in a complete surrender, itself implies that it was not calculated avoidance of an internecine struggle which alone led to the defeat. While the Bandera adherents were tightly organized, capable of sudden, prepared action, the other nationalist forces suffered from lack of central organization and competent leadership, since Borovets' was himself inadequately trained to conduct a campaign which required political as well as military experience and yet was unable to secure advice from a single, unified advisory body. Moreover, the very dynamism and *élan* of the Bandera party appear to have attracted popular support; in spite of the comparative lack of military ability of "Kruk," for example, he is said to have been more popular than "Khrin." No doubt, too, their program of mass uprising, while of doubtful wisdom, was, like all forthright action, appealing to active spirits. It is noteworthy that nearly all of the members of the other partisan groups, when compelled to join the OUN-B movement, did so without taking a favorable opportunity to desert. Ukrainians in general have frequently been in the unhappy position of having to choose the lesser evil, which was unquestionably the Bandera movement, ruthless as many of its adherents were. The main concern was to fight on against the alien occupiers.[70] A third factor was the geographical location of the opposing forces. The group under Borovets' occupied excellent terrain, but an

[69] Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba*, p. 12.

[70] This feeling was expressed in a letter from Iatseniuk to Borovets' explaining that he accepted the OUN-B coercion only so that he could continue to fight against the Soviet and German forces (Interview 50).

669 extremely exposed position, subjected to constant pressure by
725 the Red partisans coming down from the northeast. Probably "Bul'ba" suffered as much altogether from attacks from them as he did at the hands of the Bandera partisans. The latter, on the other hand, occupied a somewhat more sheltered position in northern Volhynia and had a fairly clear line of communication to their large base in Galicia. Finally, the possession of the Galician source of manpower and leadership, very much larger than any outside source available to the rival groups, gave the OUN-B a decisive advantage, which had been consolidated by the early infiltration of the Volhynian police forces by Bandera organizers.

By fall of 1943 the Bandera group was in substantial control of the country districts of Volhynia and southwestern Polessia.[71] The Germans, of course, held the towns and with difficulty maintained movement on the principal roads, but it was even possible for OUN-B agents to penetrate the Reichskommissariat capital, Rovno, and to kill several of Koch's principal officials in broad daylight.[72] Such a large area east of Rovno was under full control of the insurgents that they set about constructing a "state" apparatus, including military training camps, hospitals, and a school system.[73] The total number of persons involved in the movement —including medical, administrative, and instructional personnel, as well as fighting men—was tens of thousands. Looked at in this fashion, the nationalist claim of a hundred thousand members of the UPA is perhaps not incredible, since a fairly trustworthy source describes one village in which the total personnel reached two thousand. Probably a German estimate of forty thousand (at the end of 1943) is more nearly accurate, however.[74] Included in the forces, according to nationalist accounts, were a number of non-Ukrainian elements—Jewish physicians and deserters from German police units recruited from prisoners of war representing many of the nations of the Soviet Union. The great weakness of the movement, however, was lack of trained officers. For a long time the Bandera partisans had been forced to use as chief of staff an elderly UNR officer ostensibly in command of a Rovno

[71] Occ E-4 (1).
[72] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, November 23, 1943, p. 3; Occ E-4 (1).
[73] Lebed', pp. 29–30.
[74] Occ E-4 (1).

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police regiment.[75] Each additional UNR officer from the "Bul'ba" forces, aging though he was, was a treasure who was given a post of great importance by his new masters.[76] Similarly, Soviet officers who escaped from prisoner camps or deserted from Red forces were eagerly welcomed. The lack of trained military personnel greatly limited the partisan organization's value as a fighting force.

The presence of many men who had lived under the Soviet system at first acted as a disturbing influence in the organization. The Bandera leadership, having carried the policy of one-party direction to a temporarily successful conclusion, was determined to maintain this position and to prevent the development of an East Ukrainian opposition, which they suspected was infected with Communist attitudes. Their instrument was the SB or Security Service, forged by Lebed' years previously. Though the extent of the "purges" of "unreliable elements" (primarily East Ukrainians, but including some former Mel'nyk partisans, although apparently no old UNR émigrés) is uncertain, there is little question that it was sufficiently great to arouse extreme disaffection among the non-OUN-B elements in the enlarged partisan movement.[77] At the same time, however, the East Ukrainian elements apparently had sufficient influence—or compelling arguments—to secure the adoption of a program calculated to secure support from former Soviet citizens.[78]

At the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN partisan forces on August 21–25, 1943, both Germany and the "Muscovite" Soviet Union were criticized as not really socialist or progressive, while a future national and social revolution or subjugated peoples was prophesied.[79] Greatest emphasis was still placed on armed struggle, rather than on social policy; but a long series of measures evidently calculated to broaden support among the East Ukrainians was proposed. They included destruction of

[75] MS D.

[76] E.g., Colonel Treiko and Colonel Lytvynenko, chief adviser from Andrew Livyts'kyi to Borovets'; MS D.

[77] Shuliak, p. 30; MS D.

[78] See report of a press conference of the UHVR by M. Stiranka in *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, October 11, 1947, p. 3.

[79] *Za samostiinu Ukraïnu: Boiovyi organ OUN* (For Ukrainian Independence: The Military Organ of the OUN) (clandestine), No. 9, December 10, 1943.

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668 the kolkhoz system but state control of heavy industry, with "genuine" participation of workers in management; freedom of cooperatives and of small private production; freedom of press, thought, belief, and *Weltanschauung* (*svitohliad*); equality of citizens irrespective of national (ethnic) origin; and free cultural rights for cultural minorities.[80]

The weakness of the insurgent structure became apparent in February, 1944, when the Red Army advanced into Volhynia and reached the Lutsk-Rovno line. Since there was no question of the inadequately led and lightly armed partisans' offering resistance to a force which the Wehrmacht had been unable to stop, the UPA was forced to go underground until the wave of fighting had passed. Its plan was to avoid fighting with Red Army units, but to attack NKVD units and other Soviet repressive forces after most regular Soviet military formations had left the area.[81] The UPA attempts to resume activity were severely hampered, however, by the fact that the Soviet security forces were far more capable than the Germans of organizing a network of informers which revealed the identity of the opposition group. Now "Bul'ba's" warning against "deconspiration" was proved accurate, for the organization and the individuals who had worked openly in the autumn could no longer conceal from the Communists' local agents their own affiliations.[82]

The extremely interesting period of UPA which followed in 1944 and 1945 cannot, unfortunately, be described in any detail because the accounts by nationalist writers of activity behind the Soviet lines cannot be checked against independent evidence. It appears clear, however, that the pressure of the Soviet forces upon the "deconspirated" underground resulted in great losses, though

[80] Lebed', p. 31; *Za svobodu narodiv: Iz dokumentiv kraievoi borot'bi* (For Freedom for the Peoples: From Documents of the Struggle in the Homeland) (Prague, Vienna: Ukrainian Representation in ABN, 1946), pp. 2 ff.

[81] Lebed', p. 59. For an interesting Soviet confirmation of this UPA account, see Vasyl' Behma, "Zakliatye vragi ukrainskogo naroda" (The Mortal Enemies of the Ukrainian People), *Pravda Ukrainy*, November 15, 1944, p. 2. Behma, who was first secretary of the Rovno *oblast* committee of the Communist Party at the time, quoted an order of "Enei" (the pseudonym of the commander of one of the major forces of the UPA) providing that his partisans should let the Red Army units pass, then attack isolated groups of military personnel, NKVD, and police.

[82] Shuliak, p. 32.

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for some time opposition was maintained, especially in Galicia.[83] 668*
Eventually, there was a return to strictly underground activity, with raids and sabotage taking the place of large-scale partisan operations and maintenance of an independent administration in the villages. In this third period of UPA, it also appears likely that East Ukrainian elements, including numbers of persons who fled from the terrors of the Soviet purge policy, won a more influential place in the organization, since they not only became proportionately more numerous, but were better equipped by experience to survive under Soviet conditions.

Although most of the activities of the nationalists in Ukrainian-inhabited areas cannot be traced in detail after early 1944, reliable information is available concerning a very significant conference held by the UPA in eastern Galicia in early June, 1944, a few weeks before the area was reconquered by the Soviet armies. The documents containing the resolutions passed by this conference indicate striking changes in the program of what was by then the major nationalist group.[84]

Although it is highly probable that the leaders of the OUN-B, who were at this time in *de facto* control of the UPA, were responsible for calling the conference, the previous claim of this faction to monolithic control of all Ukrainian nationalists was at

[83] MS C; Interview 15. The Soviet press, by its urging of recalcitrant nationalists to surrender or be destroyed, also indicates that the problem was a substantial one as late as 1945; see Ol. Kasimenko, "Ukraïns'ko-nimets'ki natsionalisty—nailiutishy vorohy ukraïns'koho narodu" (The Ukrainian-German Nationalists—the Fiercest Enemies of the Ukrainian People), *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 10, 1944, p. 2.

[84] The documents in question, entitled simply UHVR, are among the uncatalogued captured German materials in the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace. I am indebted to Dr. Alexander Dallin for the use of a microfilm reproduction of them. Since the change in program was in the direction of greater emphasis on individual rights, social progress, and democratic principles, one would be inclined to suspect the authenticity of the documents, except for the fact that they were evidently obtained by German agents whom the Ukrainians could scarcely have hoped to please by such expressions. It seems highly improbable that an enemy of the UPA forged the documents to arouse German enmity for the Ukrainian partisans. For many months the groups associated with the UPA had not only printed bitter denunciations of the Germans, but had carried out physical attacks on their officials. Such denunciations are repeated in the documents in question; consequently, it would scarcely have been worth while to insert points contrary to Nazi ideology to indicate the hostility of the nationalists toward the German regime.

668 least overtly abandoned. A considerable number of East Ukrainians in the partisan bands attended the conference and apparently were able to express views diverging from those of the Bandera faction. Moreover, a new body, known as the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukraïns'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada—UHVR) was formed and was declared open to all parties which accepted the aim of Ukrainian national independence. The "Universal," as the proclamation issued by the new body was entitled, emphasized the following points:

> Representatives of the Ukrainian revolutionary liberation forces, and various political groups from all the Ukrainian lands, which have acknowledged the independence platform to be the only correct one in the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people for an independent Ukrainian state embracing all the Ukrainian lands, have united in the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council.
>
> The Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council is the supreme and only guiding organ of the Ukrainian people for the period of its revolutionary struggle, until the formation of the government of an independent Ukrainian state embracing all the Ukrainian lands.

An accompanying resolution entitled "The Provisional Structure of the UHVR" provides interesting clues to the background and outlook of the founders of the new organization, although the complex apparatus which it envisaged could scarcely have had any real existence under conditions of partisan resistance. The resolution declared the supreme legislative authority of the Ukrainian liberation movement to be the Great Assembly of the UHVR. This body was to have twenty-five members, comprising apparently the representatives of the "various political groups" who had created the UHVR.[85]

The executive power was assigned to a General Secretariat consisting of a Chairman and General Secretaries, for internal affairs, external affairs, military affairs (the commander of the armed forces), and financial and economic affairs. Additional secretaries could be named in the future. While the General Secretariat was to act in a "collegial" fashion, deciding questions by vote, the

* The initial membership was not specified, very likely to gloss over the fact that the Great Assembly was self-appointed. This is one of numerous points where the UHVR proclamations are apparently intentionally obscure. On the other hand, repeated confusion in reference to the "UHVR" and the "Great Assembly of the UHVR" evidently reflects poor drafting of the documents.

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Chairman was actually given a dominant position. He was elected by the Great Assembly, and could be dismissed by it alone. The Chairman, however, was given broad appointive powers, subject only to confirmation by higher authority. He nominated all other members of the Secretariat and proposed their dismissal; he nominated the diplomatic representatives of the UHVR. Significantly, his powers extended to the legislative branch, for he could nominate new members of the Great Assembly.

Nominally an eight-man Presidium and its president occupied positions above the General Secretariat. The Presidium was an interim legislative council, the organ which "acts between sessions of the Great Assembly." It was to "advise on the political strategy, the tactics, and practical activity of all the organs of the UHVR and inform them of its supplemental decrees and proposals." Otherwise, its functions were primarily ceremonial and procedural; for example, the President was declared to "stand at the head of the UHVR and to represent it externally." The President was also to confirm officials nominated by the Chairman, except for the new members of the Great Assembly, who were to be elected by the Presidium as a whole upon the proposal of the Chairman.

In many of its functions, as well as in its title, the Presidium recalls the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established by the constitution of 1936. Very probably this feature of the UHVR framework was introduced by the East Ukrainian representatives at the conference who drew on their knowledge of the Soviet system. The provision of a Control Collegium to supervise the "financial-economic activity of all the organs of the UHVR, in particular . . . the financial-economic policy of the General Secretariat" also suggests the influence of the Soviet constitutional structure, which until 1940 included a Commission of Soviet Control.[86]

In contrast to the Soviet constitutional provisions, though not to Soviet practice, individual officials were assigned positions of great power, however. The scope of the Chairman's authority has

[86] On the features of the Soviet system mentioned in this paragraph see Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 172–73, 263–72.

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already been outlined. The other heads of branches of the government were given comparable, though lesser, powers. The President was given a more important position than the Soviet President, who is confined to ceremonial duties. Similarly, the Comptroller General was permitted to nominate the two other members of the Control Collegium, while the General Justice of the General Court nominated the two remaining justices. These provisions suggest that the *Führerprinzip*, the "organizational pattern that operates from the top to the bottom," [87] had not been wholly forgotten by the nationalist leaders.

If the structure of the UHVR reflected the constitutional principles with which its members had become familiar through their association with the Nazi and the Soviet systems, the social-political principles proclaimed at the same time represented in considerable measure a reaction to these regimes. Because these principles represent a culmination of the development of the Ukrainian nationalist ideology toward greater emphasis on economic and social welfare, and upon the securing of individual rights, it is worth quoting them at some length:

(a) Assurance of popular-democratic procedures in the accomplishment of the political development of the Ukrainian State by the general assembly of the people

(b) Assurance of freedom of thought, of *Weltanschauung*, and of belief

(c) Assurance of the development of the Ukrainian national culture

(d) Assurance of a just social order in the Ukrainian State, free of exploitation of classes and suppression

(e) Assurance of the rule of law in practice, and of the equality of all citizens before the law in the Ukrainian State

(f) Assurance of civil rights for all national minorities in the Ukraine

(g) Assurance of the right of equal educational opportunities for all citizens

(h) Assurance of free initiative in creative economic activity, regulated by the requirements and needs of the entire Nation

(i) Assurance of a free form of creative use of the soil, with specification of the minimum and the maximum limits for individual use of the soil

(j) Socialization of the principal natural resources of the country:

[87] Franz Neumann, *Behemoth* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1943), p. 74.

soil, forests, water, mineral deposits; at the same time, the arable land is to be turned over to the creative peasant economy in permanent usufruct 668

(k) State ownership of heavy industry and transport; turning over the right of free extensive cooperative activities by small producers to the cooperative associations in light industry and food industry

(l) Assurance of free trade within the limits set by law

(m) Assurance of the free development of artisanry and the right to the formation of individual artisan establishments and undertakings

(n) Assurance of the right to free work for physical and mental workers and assurance of the protection of the interests of the workers by social legislation.

Although the above quotation indicates considerable attention to concrete problems, it must be emphasized that many practical deficiencies continued to obstruct the development of a coherent nationalist political theory. A much greater portion of the "Universal" was devoted to romanticized history and emotional appeals for action than to the proposal of clearly defined steps to be taken. The formulation of the other UHVR resolutions is frequently unclear, and the provisions are often inconsistent. These obscurities may sometimes have been inserted for deliberate tactical purposes, but in many cases, especially in the provisions for the governmental structure, they appear to have resulted from insufficient training in law and logic and from lack of real interest in constitutional questions. Moreover, it is evident that UHVR members had not undertaken the careful study on which to base real solutions to major problems, such as the agrarian question. In place of carefully worked-out programs, broad principles were proclaimed which indeed pointed the way to new systems but failed to indicate how they would be implemented.

Most important, nationalism remained the central point of the ideology, about which all else revolved. As the introductory paragraph of the "ideo-programmatic principles" put it: [186]

The protection of the life of the nation, of national unity, and culture is the first and highest goal of every healthy national organism. The national sovereign state is the chief guarantee of the preservation of the life and the normal development of the nation and the well-being of its citizens. Therefore the Ukrainian nation must at the present time devote all its forces to obtaining and strengthening its own state.

668* It seems quite clear that a great many, at least of the leaders of the UHVR, like the leaders of the OUN in the East Ukraine many months earlier, were only partly convinced of the value of the new program of political, social, and economic gains. They had, however, come to see that vast numbers of East Ukrainians, by this time heavily represented in the partisan movement, would accept no ideology which failed to embrace such a program. Consequently, nationalist leaders were determined to win popular support for nationalism by presenting it as the surest road to political liberty and social welfare. Regardless of the motivations of the West Ukrainian leaders, however, it is clear that by 1944 contact with East Ukrainians had resulted in a sweeping change in the ideological position of the dominant nationalist group.

[725] From the strictly military viewpoint, the activities of the Ukrainian nationalist partisans were of slight significance. Even from the immediate political standpoint, it is questionable whether they achieved anything of importance, for by the time the Germans were inclined to make concessions, their authority was already on the verge of being overthrown by the Red Army. The "deconspiration" of the UPA undoubtedly inflicted considerable suffering upon the people of Volhynia, since it exposed the nationalist elements to the Soviet authorities. On the other side of the ledger must be placed the facts that the nationalist partisan movement undoubtedly prevented the spread of Red partisans to Volhynia and demonstrated that neither in that province nor in Galicia was there widespread sympathy for the Soviet guerrilla groups. Moreover, the fact that the Ukrainians, almost alone among east European nations, were able to carry on an armed struggle, even to a limited extent and for a comparatively short time, against both the German and the Soviet forces was an important psychological stimulus to nationalist feeling.

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VII. SALVAGE EFFORTS

AT THE VERY TIME when partisan activity was reaching its peak in Volhynia, Ukrainian nationalist elements began the last chapter of their collaboration with the Germans. Strange as it may appear, in this final period, cooperation between these disparate forces was closer than during the abortive "honeymoon" of 1941. The key to this apparent paradox lies in the Ukrainian psychology—a better term than attitude in this case—toward the creation of a national military force and in the German policy toward securing the military collaboration of Eastern Europe. 668*

Few political movements in this century have been as thoroughly obsessed as the Ukrainian nationalist movement with the idea of building military strength. This obsession is readily understandable as far as the OUN parties were concerned, for their ideology emphasized will, force, action. While there was a persistent trend in the senior branch of the OUN toward shaping the movement in a military mold with an emphasis on order and discipline, the younger group was inclined to cast aside all inhibitions to secure the immediate application of violence. To both, however, the army—insofar as it represented sheer power—was a high ideal. Non-Nationalist circles, such as the UNR and the legal parties in Galicia, also placed enormous emphasis upon military organization. When one reflects that in 1919–21 the nationalist movement in both the East and the West Ukraine had been bloodily suppressed by superior organized force, the roots of this concern become discernible. During the revolutionary period the lack of a substantial nucleus of trained military units, similar to those of the Poles, the Bolsheviks, and the White Russian forces had been a terrible handicap to the Ukrainian cause. In the Second World War nationalist leaders were willing to exact great material sacrifices of their people in order to overcome this critical lack. 668* 701

The Ukrainian hopes for the formation in 1941 of a military 000

000 force under German aegis were frustrated by the Nazi contempt for the peoples of the East. Somewhat later, even as the organized nationalist forces were being suppressed, renewed hope arose that the Wehrmacht would insist on the building of a Ukrainian army. These Ukrainian expectations were not wholly unfounded, for the bitter experiences of the winter battles around Moscow and Kharkov and the growing Red partisan threat convinced many high army commanders that if the Soviet system was to be defeated help must be secured from the Kremlin's former subjects. A leader in this group was General von Schenkendorff, who proposed as early as March, 1942, that a national "Russian government" dependent on Germany should be formed to act as a 704 rallying point for native armed forces.[1] With the aid of officers moved less by sympathy for the aspirations of the East European peoples than by a willingness to grasp for promising expedients, *Hilfswillige* ("Hiwis," auxiliary) units and *Ostlegionen* were recruited by the Wehrmacht from among prisoners of war to carry on service operations for the army and to combat partisans. In the late winter of 1941–42, some of these units were used as independent detachments in the front line. The success of this experiment induced Wehrmacht circles to plan extensive employment of former Soviet troops.[2]

Men from the Caucasus and Central Asia were preferred as recruits by the Germans, but Slavs were also enlisted. The chief Slavic detachments seem to have been the "Cossack hundreds." These groups were linguistically and ethnically heterogeneous, for the name appealed at once to the traditions of the Ukrainians and to the Russian-speaking Cossacks of the Don and the Kuban. News of their employment spread quickly, and by May Ukrainian circles as far away as L'vov were convinced that the Germans had employed "Ukrainian" forces in the front line on the Isthmus of Kerch and that they would soon use Ukrainian troops in large numbers.[3] Closer to the zone of operation the stories were more

[1] PS 1685.

[2] PS 1686.

[3] Report from L'vov for week of May 22, 1942, contained in summary of Hauptabteilung Propaganda, Cracow, May 30, 1942, Occ E-2 (2), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-2 [2]). Cf. also a citation from *Vil'ne Slovo* (Drogobych), January 15, 1942, in *Nastup*, February 15, 1942, p. 4.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

precise; the Ukrainian newspapers in Kiev and Mariupol' reported that several Ukrainian detachments were fighting on the Crimean front, and even mentioned the name of a commander, while they observed that preparations were being made for training 150,000 Ukrainian soldiers.[4] 704

The ambitious plans of the Wehrmacht group soon encountered a most formidable obstacle. Hitler had a deep-seated antipathy toward granting the "inferior" and "untrustworthy" Slavs the right to bear arms. In August, 1942, he intervened personally to limit military utilization of volunteers from the Soviet nationalities to small anti-partisan formations.[5] The Wehrmacht officers did not abandon their long-range intentions of forming an army of former Soviet soldiers to help fight Stalin, but these leaders were forced to move cautiously. In the fall of 1942, their efforts became centered around Andrew Vlasov, an officer well known among the second echelon of Soviet generals, who had been captured a few months previously. The German officers envisaged him as the spokesman of all the anti-Communist elements from the Soviet Union. For a time they were successful in securing some support for Vlasov even in the Ostministerium, although Rosenberg never fully trusted him, since he knew Vlasov, a Russian, would not endorse the Rosenberg plan of partitioning the Soviet state.[6] 000

During the winter of 1942–43 Rosenberg and the army felt, though mistakenly, that there was a chance of gradually winning Hitler's sanction for a limited program of quasi-autonomy for the peoples of the occupied USSR, a step which would secure their active support for the war against their former rulers. At the same time that he was bolstering his shaky prestige by collaboration

[4] *Nastup*, February 15, 1942, p. 4, quoting *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* for January 14, 1942; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 30, 1942, p. 3, quoting *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta*, No. 32.

[5] Directive No. 46 to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht on partisan fighting, from Führerhauptquartier, August 18, 1942, PS 477 (hereafter referred to as PS 477).

[6] Various aspects of the Vlasov movement have been thoroughly discussed in Jürgen Thorwald's *Wen sie verderben wollen* (Stuttgart: Steingrüben Verlag, 1952), George Fischer's *The Soviet Opposition to Stalin* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), and in a forthcoming study on German policy toward the occupied USSR by Alexander Dallin. Consequently, no effort has been made to discuss this movement except insofar as it came into direct contact with the Ukrainian nationalists.

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000 with the Wehrmacht, Rosenberg also sought allies in the SS. His contacts there were utilized in March, 1943, in a scheme to form a "Ukrainian national representation" which, as envisaged by Rosenberg, would evidently have the dual purpose of securing greater Ukrainian support for the German war effort and preventing Vlasov's obtaining too important a role. Probably with the help of SS Brigadeführer Ohlendorf, Dr. Kinkelin, one of the higher officials of the Ostministerium, composed a list of four Kiev officials. A special effort was made to secure "pure Ukrainians" who were in close contact with the peasant. Remarkably enough, however, all four appear to have favored the Russophile element in Kiev municipal life.[7] The question of how such a "national committee" would have been received by nationalist Ukrainians went unanswered, for it remained a paper scheme. Whether its lack of reality was due to obstruction of the SS, which desired an instrument to reduce the partisan danger but continued to despise all Slavs, or whether it arose from Hitler's direct intervention is difficult to say.[8] At any rate, by the summer of 1943 the project had been dropped, along with the more grandiose plans for Vlasov's political activity.

704 668 The Ukrainians, however, who had looked with deep suspicion on the rise of Vlasov, now found in an unexpected quarter new encouragement in their hopes for a national army.[9] Although the SS continued to oppose the larger plans for arousing the Slavs against Communism, SS officers, extremely powerful in the Generalgouvernement, persuaded Himmler's coterie to authorize the large-scale recruitment of Galician Ukrainians for the Waffen SS. The continued outward loyalty of the population of Galicia, which made the province, prior to Kovpak's incursion, one of the most peaceful of Germany's conquests, was a powerful argument in favor of concessions to the West Ukrainians. Europeans

[7] They were Vadym Maikovs'kyi, Theodore Babak, Volodymyr Labuts'kyi, and George Kandiïv. Temporary list of members for a Ukrainian National Committee, by Dr. Kinkelin, CXLVa 77, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 77).

[8] The latter's decision to restrict Vlasov operations was made about this time. See George Fischer, "Vlasov and Hitler," *Journal of Modern History*, XXIII (March, 1951), 64.

[9] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, May 30, 1943, p. 3.

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classified as "Nordics" were already enrolled in special military formations under Himmler. This new departure in SS policy, made at a time when the higher SS officials were toying with the idea of backing a Ukrainian national representation, enabled the "inferior" Slavs to secure a footing in the ranks of the elite troops. 704 668*

The creation of SS Division Galicia, as the unit was called, was hedged about with restrictions. The word "Ukrainian" was excluded from the designation. Overt reference to "political" implications of the formation was rigorously forbidden.[10] Nevertheless, the creation of the division was supported by most of the leading elements in Galicia. Formation of the division was officially announced on May 4, 1943, when the president of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Kubiiovych, issued a proclamation urging its support.[11] While Colonel Sushko was not active in the new project,[12] General Kurmanovych spoke in favor of the division on the L'vov radio.[13] Other Mel'nyk supporters like Michael Khronoviat played leading roles in its development, and pro OUN-M organs gave it great publicity.[14] The position of the rival nationalist group was less clear. Being illegal, the OUN-B could not take part openly in the drive to establish the military unit even had it desired to do so. Since the war, Bandera supporters have used this circumstance to maintain that they always opposed this form of collaboration with the Germans, and have denounced the other nationalist groups for supporting it. It is fairly clear, however, that while the OUN-B did not officially countenance the project, or lend extensive support, it did not really work against the creation of the division. Shukevych is said

[10] Interview 70. A letter (in the possession of Dr. Liubomyr Makarushka) from Bauer to Schenk and Bisantz (all officials in the Generalgouvernement), dated August 18, 1943, states that Makarushka should be warned against ascribing political importance to the "military council" formed in connection with the organization of the division.

[11] This proclamation was printed in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 6, 1943, p. 1. It recalled the heroic feats of the Ukrainian Galician Army and the students who defended Kiev at Kruty; at the same time it appealed to realism and national interest and emphasized the Bolshevik danger. It warned that the matter was a case of "now or never."

[12] Evidently out of pique because he was not given a leading role (Interview 36).

[13] *Nastup*, May 16, 1943, p. 2.

[14] *Ibid.; Nastup*, May 23, 1943, p. 6, and May 30, 1943, p. 3.

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704 to have felt that it offered a valuable opportunity for Ukrainian
668* youths to secure military training.[15] This would be in accord with his well-known proclivity for emphasizing the technical military needs of the nationalist movement, and it is the more plausible because just at that time his efforts to build up the UPA were being severely hampered by a dearth of young officers. In order to obtain cadres for future operations, and in order to prevent the new unit from falling into the hands of those opposed to OUN-B aims, he ordered a considerable number of his followers to enter its ranks, where they occupied prominent positions;[16] other Bandera adherents, attracted by the opportunity for active service, joined without such authorization.[17]

The Galician Division, however, never came under the control of either OUN party to the same extent as had the earlier German-organized Ukrainian formations. The prime organizer and highest ranking Ukrainian officer in it (the commanding staff was German) was Dmytro Paliïv, formerly a leader of one of the smaller legal parties in Poland.[18] With him were associated a large number of UNDO members like Liubomyr Makarushka,[19] while numerous old UNR officers like Generals Petriv[20] and Omelianovych-Pavlenko[21] lent their moral support.

The almost universal support given to a creation of the SS, the very organization which had done most to suppress Ukrainian nationalism, was reinforced in the spring of 1943 by the view which most Ukrainian nationalists took of the future course of events. Much as they hated the Nazis, and little as they hoped for real help from them, they hated and feared the Communists still more. That the prospects of German victory, never very high after the failure to take Moscow, were extremely remote was apparent to all after the winter of Stalingrad. Many Ukrainian

[15] Bohdan Pidhainyi, "Dva shliakhy—odna meta" (Two Routes—One Goal), in Oleh Lysiak (ed.), *Brody: Zbirnyk stattei i narysiv* (Brody: A Collection of Articles and Sketches) (Munich: Bratstvo kol. Voiakiv Pershoï UD UNA, 1951), p. 59.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] Interview 58.

[18] Interviews 36, 58.

[19] Interview 70; *Nastup*, May 16, 1943, p. 2.

[20] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 9, 1943, p. 1.

[21] Myroslav Martynets', "Gen.-Polk. M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko" (Colonel-General Omelianovych-Pavlenko), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (August-September, 1952), p. 1.

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leaders hoped for a protracted struggle in which both of the totalitarian powers would be so weakened that they would be forced to surrender their domination of Eastern Europe. They thought that Great Britain and the United States, in accordance with either the plain meaning of the Atlantic Charter or elementary principles of the balance of power, would prevent the complete subjugation of this area by the Soviet Union. What they anticipated was a period of anarchy in the area between Russia and Germany, like that of 1918, in which the nation which possessed organized military forces would be able to assert itself. Some felt that the UPA could fill this need, but many felt that in view of the UPA's low military value the nationalist movement must seize the chance to form a real army under German auspices which could later be used independently, even against its sponsors.[22]

668* 704

The nationalist leaders were also encouraged to support the Galician Division by certain favorable conditions which they exacted from the Germans. According to Nationalist accounts, the unit was to be used only against the Soviet forces and never against the Western Allies; thus it would be in a position, they thought, to come to terms with the latter when the opportunity arose. Whether or not the Germans officially agreed to this stipulation, it is certain that the condition was observed. More significantly, the political training and indoctrination of the soldiers, instead of being in the hands of Nazi ideologists, was left to the

[22] See especially Nykon Nalyvaiko, "Legiony v natsionalnykh viinakh" (Legions in National Wars), *Narodna Volia*, October 27, 1949, p. 2, and November 3, 1949, p. 3; Ivan Hryn'okh, "Dyviziia Halychyna i ukrains'ke pidpillia" (The Galician Division and the Ukrainian Underground), in *Brody*, pp. 52 ff.; and the clandestine publication, *Za Samostiinu Ukrainu*, No. 9, December 10, 1948, which gives the official position of the "Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN [B]" on the role of Ukrainian forces in the event of German collapse. The Bandera followers stated that the Western Allies (especially Britain) wanted a prolongation of the war on the eastern front with mutual weakening of Germany and the Soviet Union, so that they could have a free hand on the continent. They continued that Moscow, being discredited in the eyes of the eastern nations, could not maintain its imperialism, a circumstance which gave the Ukraine an opportunity to become the natural leader of these peoples. It is significant that, while the report of this conference called for struggle against Germany and glorified the UPA, in other places it emphasized repeatedly the need for armed forces without specifying that they be insurgent. There was no condemnation of the Galician Division.

704 nationalist leadership. Moreover, in contrast to the usual Waffen
668* SS practice, each detachment was allowed its chaplain.[23]

000 The considerations just discussed played a considerable part in securing the support of both the Autocephalous Orthodox Church[24] and the Greek Catholic Church for the formation of the Galician Division. Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi had originally greeted the German army as a liberator from Communist tyranny. He soon discovered that the Wehrmacht officers, with whom he at first established cordial relations, were not the real representatives of German power. The horrible excesses of the SP, especially its massacre of thousands of Jews, caused a sharp change in Sheptyts'kyi's attitude. He was especially alarmed by the SP use of Ukrainian police for their murders, and is said to have sent a direct demand to Himmler that this practice be stopped. At any rate, a secret report to the German foreign office provides almost conclusive evidence that the Metropolitan was adamantly opposed to the Nazi anti-Semitic outrages and that by late 1943 he had come to regard Nazism as even a greater evil than Communism.[25] Nevertheless, he personally favored the creation of the Galician Division, and sent one of his clergy, Dr. Laba, to act as chief chaplain.[26] Bishop Joseph Slipyi conducted a service in St. George

[23] Interviews 46, 58, 63.

[24] The son of Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), the vicarial bishop of Kiev, joined the division; see Report by an unidentified official of the Ostministerium to Rosenberg, June 30, 1944, CXLVa 66, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 66).

[25] CXLVa 60. This document was submitted as a secret report, under the pseudonym "Dr. Frédéric," to the German foreign office by a fairly well-known French student of East Europe, who had become an active collaborator with the Germans. On a visit to L'vov in the late summer of 1943 this man talked with a number of Ukrainians, including the Metropolitan. The report appears to reflect the Metropolitan's attitudes accurately, and in large measure substantiates accounts such as those of Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), pp. 114–115, and Father Mykhailo Sopuliak, "Pam'iati velykoho Mytropolyta" (Memories of the Great Metropolitan), *Chas*, December 14, 1947, p. 3. This, and the following paragraph, is also based on Il'ko (Elie) Borshchak, *Un Prélat Ukrainien: Le Metropolite Cheptyskyj (1865–1944)* (Paris: Editions Franco-Ukrainiennes, 1946), pp. 55–56; and on Interview 63.

[26] SS Obergruppenführer Berger to Himmler, July 26, 1943, HH 263, in Hoover Library. The same file contains a sermon delivered by Father Laba in which he calls upon the Galicians to help "Hitler and the German people" destroy Bolshevism. An accompanying letter from Berger to another SS official, Brandt (July 22, 1943), notes that Laba's sermons contain "dangerous expressions," but that "we will soon pull this tooth." Himmler's own attitude is indicated by Brandt's

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Cathedral in L'vov, celebrating the inauguration of the division.[27] 000

German permission to provide chaplains and the absence of Nazi indoctrination among the soldiers helped make the unit acceptable to the church. The chief reason which induced the Metropolitan to sanction the project, however, was similar to that which motivated other nationalist leaders. He felt that German defeat was only a matter of time and that the small military support which the division could provide for the faltering Wehrmacht could not be decisive. At the same time, he thought the existence of a nationalist military force of some strength would be invaluable in the chaos which would succeed a German collapse and might even be necessary to preserve the lives of a considerable portion of the Ukrainian population of Galicia. Sheptyts'kyi's chief concern in this connection was aroused by extremist elements among the Poles who were killing their opponents among the Ukrainians, just as the OUN-B was slaughtering Poles in Volhynia.

More than twelve months were spent in recruiting and organizing the division. The response of the young men to the call for enlistment was so great that the quota set for the unit was overfilled many times, and tens of thousands had to be rejected.[28] 704 Nevertheless, the SS officers in control appear to have been suspicious of the loyalty of their command and hesitant to use it. Meanwhile, the Nazis' vast conquests in the Ukraine were falling into the hands of the Red Army. In March, 1943, the Soviet forces took Kharkov, only to lose it in May. They captured Kharkov once again, and September, 1943, brought them from Kharkov to the gates of Kiev. There they halted a month, but the remaining fall and winter of 1943–44 ended with the reconquest of practically all of the pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine, plus most of Volhynia.

It was not until the summer of 1944 that the real battle for Galicia was joined. At this point, the SS command finally decided to commit the new Ukrainian division to battle. The front

statement that his chief was willing to use the influence of the clergy in the division, but that if they began to agitate they would be thrown out, and the Metropolitan himself would have to bear part of the consequences.

[27] *Nastup*, May 16, 1943, p. 2.

[28] Interview 44.

704 ran from just east of Kovel to a point in the Carpathians south of Ternopol'; a key point was the little town of Brody, on the main highway from Rovno to L'vov. Here, in late June, the SS division was put into the line to assist in covering the Galician capital. For three weeks it maintained its position, in the face of fierce Soviet attacks and encircling operations, but by July 20 was no longer effective as a fighting unit. Perhaps 20 percent of its complement fell back with the German armies toward the Carpathians, and half of the remainder escaped to join the UPA or to filter back to the German lines.[29]

661 798 After the victory of Brody, the Red Army rapidly conquered east Galicia, Bukovina, and the Carpatho-Ukraine. By fall, substantially all of the Ukrainian lands were again under the dominion of Moscow. This time the repression exercised by the Communist rulers was harsher and less disguised than it had been five years before. The Greek Catholic Church was attacked ruthlessly. Bishop Slipyi, who had succeeded Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi after the latter's death in late 1944, was arrested and deported to the interior of the Soviet Union. Most of the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church, as well as hundreds of its clergy, were likewise banished. Orthodox priests subservient to the Patriarch of Moscow enlisted the aid of a minority of the Greek Catholic clergy, who renounced their allegiance to Rome and joined in constructing a new hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Galicia. The same tactics were pursued in the Carpatho-Ukraine.[30]

[702] 661 According to reports of refugees from the area, very severe measures were taken against the population at large. Men from the ages of eighteen to fifty are said to have been drafted into the Red Army in a mass, without regard for their state of health.[31] Once enlisted, they were said to be watched over by special *politruks*, given inferior arms, and sent into battle after eight

[29] See numerous contributions to *Brody*, and *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv I. UD UNA*, for detailed descriptions of military operations of this battle and of the other Ukrainian forces serving with the Wehrmacht.

[30] Cf. Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 137 ff.; Mykola D. Chubatyi, "Russian Church Policy in the Ukraine," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, I (Autumn, 1945), 51–53.

[31] SS war reporter Oleh Lysiak in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 2, 1944, p. 3.

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days' training.[32] In addition, there was a renewed collectivization of agriculture and Sovietization of all phases of life. 661

A strong effort appears also to have been made to overcome the nationalism of the West Ukrainians, which the Communists recognized as a danger to their regime. Several months before the Red Army reconquered Galicia, Krushchev, the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, addressing the sixth session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, denounced the nationalists in vitriolic terms. He concentrated his attack upon the nationalist partisans: 661 668x

> If one asks the Ukrainian-German nationalists how many of the German occupiers they destroyed, how many German formations they wiped out, how many bridges they blew up, in order to prevent the aggressors from transporting arms for subjugating and annihilating the Ukrainian people, they can make no reply.[33]

His remarks served to set the theme for Soviet propagandists, who condemned the adherents of Bandera, Mel'nyk, and "Bul'ba" as agents of the Germans, in contrast to the "true patriots of the Soviet fatherland."[34] An obvious effort to split the peasantry and the laboring class from the intellectuals was made. The former were declared deceived, while the latter were said to be the chief propagators of the dangerous doctrine.[35] Soviet propagandists promised that "special attention" would be given to the West Ukrainian intelligentsia, who did not have the "advantage" of having been brought up in Soviet schools, but had been, rather, in "bourgeois" schools, which inculcated "bourgeois ideology," and who, as a result, had aided the "Ukrainian-German nationalist bandits."[36] In view of the usual fate of social elements so

[32] Oleh Lysiak in *Krakauer Zeitung*, November 30, 1944, p. 6.

[33] Dmytro Manuïls'kyi, *Ukraïns'ko-nimets'ki natsionalisty na sluzhbi u fashysts'koi Nimechchyny: Dopovid' 6-ho sichnia 1945 roku na naradi uchyteliv zakhadnykh oblastei Ukrainy* (The Ukrainian-German Nationalists in the Service of Fascist Germany: Report of January 6, 1945, to the Conference of Teachers of the Western *Oblasts* of the Ukraine) (Kiev: Ukraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1945), p. 21.

[34] Ol. Kasimenko, "Ukraïns'ko-nimets'ki natsionalisty—nailiutishi vorohy ukraïns'koho narodu" (The Ukrainian-German Nationalists—the Fiercest Enemies of the Ukrainian People), *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 10, 1944, p. 2.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] "Ideino-politychne vykhovannia inteligentsii" (Idea-Political Education of the Intelligentsia), *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 12, 1944, p. 1.

668* violently denounced by the Soviet rulers, it is likely that a large [661] part of the intelligentsia was "liquidated as a class."

At the same time,[1] a certain outlet was offered to nationalist 186 feeling, with a class-conscious twist, by emphasizing the heroic 208 feats of certain Ukrainian leaders of Red partisan units in the L'vov area.[37] This theme was relatively subdued, however, probably because there were not enough Ukrainian subjects suitable for glorification. In the Carpatho-Ukraine, where the Red partisans had evidently attracted genuine support as liberators from the de-nationalizing Hungarian regime, the tactic was employed much more extensively. Whole lists of partisan leaders, including at least one priest, were published. Moreover, one partisan was explicitly declared to speak "pure Ukrainian," and apparently all bore Ukrainian names.[38] This propaganda was followed up by the customary practice of forming a People's Committee which requested union of the province with the Soviet Union.[39] Even after the war was ended and the new acquisition securely incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine, however, an article was published which, had it been written by a non-Communist, would have been denounced as "racist." It was stated that some villages in the Carpatho-Ukraine spoke only Magyar, but that their "purely Ukrainian" character was shown by the family names of the inhabitants and their "Slavic appearance."[40]

661 Fortunately for them, the majority of the West Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia did not stay behind to enjoy the benefits of Soviet "re-education." It is one of the strange paradoxes of German-Ukrainian relations during the war, however, that at the very period when Germany was most in need of securing Ukrainian support, and when a minimal amount of such assistance was being developed in the form of the Galician Division, a new wave of repression fell upon the nationalist leaders. This occurred in the fall of 1943; its immediate causes cannot be determined, but it appears that it was basically a result of that tendency to strive for large results by employing force and trickery which marred

[37] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 26, 1945, p. 3.
[38] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 14, 1944, p. 2.
[39] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 23, 1944, p. 2.
[40] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 28, 1945, p. 3.

[1] [after the Ukraine was conquered by the Red Army in 1944-- Analyst]

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so much of German relations with the eastern peoples. One of the first Ukrainian leaders to fall a victim to these methods was Borovets'. About a month before he started on his forlorn trip to Warsaw to obtain help in rebuilding his guerrilla force, German officials interested in the matter had decided that it was necessary to negotiate with the partisan leaders, so that they might discover who they were and arrest them during the course of the negotiations if this appeared to be desirable.[41] Whether there was any direct connection between this plan and the fate which overtook Borovets' is unknown; the procedure used toward him, however, closely paralleled that outlined. After the Wehrmacht had started conversations with "Bul'ba," the police suddenly intervened, arrested him and his assistant Oleh Shtul', and incarcerated them in Sachsenhausen concentration camp along with Bandera and his deputies.[42]

The group was soon joined by the most prominent members of the OUN-M. After Mussolini's overthrow, Eugene Onats'kyi, spokesman of the Ukrainian nationalists in Italy, had written an article criticizing Fascism as a form of government, stating that it sheltered a privileged class. This essay was indiscreetly printed by *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk* and thus came to the attention of the German police, which arrested Onats'kyi on September 29, 1943, but did not transfer him to Sachsenhausen from Regina Coeli prison in Rome until December 12.[43] Throughout his period of confinement, he was closely questioned concerning connections of Mel'nyk and Konovalets' with Ukrainians in Allied countries.[44] Apparently these connections, at least in the forms of inspiring anti-German material in the Allied press and contacts with Ukrainian organizations outside the German orbit, were one reason for the arrest on January 26, 1944, of Mel'nyk himself, together with the Berlin representative of the OUN-M, Dmytro Andriievs'kyi.[45] Apparently the chief grounds for the arrest of the

[41] Memorandum by Taubert, Occ E-4 (1).

[42] Interviews 12, 29, 72; Taras Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba Ukraïny (1917–1950)* (The Armed Struggle of the Ukraine [1917–50]) (1951), p. 12.

[43] Ievhen (Eugene) Onats'kyi, *U babylons'komu poloni (spomyny)* (In Babylonian Captivity [Memoirs]) (Buenos Aires, 1948), p. 15.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[45] Interviews 52, 67; *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 101.

661 OUN-M leaders was the discovery of anti-German clandestine publications of the OUN-M in the East Ukraine and in Kandyba's quarters in L'vov.[46] Kandyba and numerous other members were arrested about the same time, and *Nastup* was suppressed. Three members of the Provid had been killed within the preceding fourteen months, so that of the directorate only the aged generals Kapustians'kyi and Kurmanovych were left at large.[47]

727 Most of the OUN leaders were kept in close confinement throughout the crucial months when the West Ukraine was slipping under Communist domination. By October, when they were released,[48] virtually all of the Ukrainian lands had passed out of German control. There remained, however, some two million persons of Ukrainian origin in the hands of the Germans—thousands of refugees, over a million *Ostarbeiter*, several hundred thousand prisoners of war, and about a quarter of a million auxiliary troops.[49] A few thousand of the last category constituted a remnant of the Galician division, but most of them were scattered throughout various small units of *Osttruppen*, totaling about seven hundred thousand.[50]

[46] *OUN u Viini*, p. 103.

[47] Kandyba and Chemeryns'kyi had replaced the murdered Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, but Chemeryns'kyi was killed by the Germans in the execution of the *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* group in Kiev. Baranovs'kyi had been killed by the OUN-B in Galicia in May, 1943, while Sushko was assassinated, probably by Bandera followers, or possibly by Communists or German police agents who were dissatisfied with his conduct, just thirteen days before the arrest of the other leaders.

[48] Bandera, Mel'nyk, Borovets', and all of their principal adherents were set free, except Kandyba and Gavrusevych, who had died in prison.

[49] Rosenberg wrote Bormann on September 7, 1944 (NO 2997), that there were then one million "legionnaires and volunteers," one million prisoners of war, and two million *Ostarbeiter* drawn from the eastern peoples. It is safe to assume that at least one third of the prisoners of war were Ukrainian (see n. 64, this chapter, below). The figure of two million *Ostarbeiter* appears to be rather low, in view of the total of one and one-half million given for the Ukraine alone (see Chapter V), but it is certain that a considerable majority of the workers from the Soviet Union were drawn from the Ukraine, for it had the bulk of the population which was under German control for a long period, and was, moreover, more completely exploited in this regard than were the army areas and the Reichskommissariat Ostland. Taubert, in a memorandum printed in B. Dvinov, *Vlasovs'koe dvizhenie v svete dokumentov* (The Vlasov Movement in the Light of Documents) (New York, 1950), p. 110, estimated the proportion of Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter* as 60 percent. The figure for military personnel appears a bit high, but it is fairly clear that the Ukrainians totaled at least one quarter of this group (Interview 22 referred to a total of 220,000 Ukrainians in the German forces). Refugees not enrolled in any of these categories were not numerous.

[50] NO 1068.

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The Nazi leaders wished to use this considerable reserve of manpower to bolster their collapsing defenses. The major part of their efforts centered around Vlasov, who at last was given a comparatively free hand to organize an anti-Soviet political center and military units of division size. Vlasov was backed by Himmler and a number of the other high officials of the SS, who were by now ready to seize any possibility of staving off defeat. At the same time, other Nazi circles, including SS officers as well as the Ostministerium officials, endeavored to form a central Ukrainian political body. A major motive, after the evacuation of the West Ukraine in the summer of 1944, was to establish liaison with the nationalist partisans.[51] Dr. Fritz Arlt, the Waffen SS officer who had played a prominent part in dealing with the Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement in 1939–41, was a central figure in the efforts to form a Ukrainian national committee. Apparently both Mel'nyk and Bandera refused to discuss such proposals while they were in prison.[52] Soon after his release on September 27, 1944, however, Bandera suggested to Arlt that he approach Dr. Horbovyi, an OUN-B member who had played a leading role in organizing the Ukrainian National Committee in Cracow in June, 1941. Arlt could reach no agreement with Horbovyi, however, and turned to Mel'nyk, who had been released on October 17. Mel'nyk was apparently able to secure an agreement among all important nationalist leaders, including Bandera, Livyts'kyi, and Skoropads'kyi, on the stand to be taken in relation to the German proposals, but the demands which the nationalists made could not be accepted by Arlt and his collaborators.[53]

Unable to induce the major Ukrainian nationalist leaders to take the lead in forming a national committee under conditions acceptable to the Nazi rulers, Arlt turned to elements which had

[51] The intentions of Arlt and the Ostministerium are outlined by Berger in the memorandum in Dvinov (pp. 109–11). Although Dvinov's work is highly tendentious, this document appears to be authentic.

[52] *OUN u Viini*, p. 106; Interview 51. The Mel'nyk and Bandera accounts agree —except that each side says that it persuaded the other not to form a committee to cooperate with the Germans.

[53] Arlt to Rosenberg, November 21, 1944, NO 3039 (hereafter referred to as NO 3039); apparently the demands correspond to those contained in the petition quoted below on p. 182.

668* so far been less active in politics during the war. The first two
727 Ukrainian leaders offered the post of chairman of a national committee, General Petriv and Professor Mazepa, declined, in view of the risks which, with German defeat almost certain, such a position involved. Finally, however, General Paul Shandruk, a UNR officer and a close associate of Andrew Livyts'kyi, accepted, with the blessing of the latter, Bandera, and Mel'nyk.[54] As Shandruk and his associates saw the matter, it was absolutely necessary to have a Ukrainian committee recognized by the Germans, not only to avoid subordination of all Ukrainians in Germany to Vlasov, which would prevent their seizing an opportunity for independent negotiations with the Allies, but because the sheer existence of the *Ostarbeiter* and prisoners required that their compatriots be in a position to exercise influence in their behalf. To them, the loss of prestige involved in collaboration with an infamous and moribund power was not sufficient to outweigh these considerations.[55]

668* At the same time, Vlasov and his associates were busily endeavoring to secure a Ukrainian representation which would accept their claim to leadership and would agree to postpone any decision on independence for the Ukraine until after the Soviet rulers had been overthrown. Most Ukrainians whom they approached refused to cooperate, being convinced that if a predominantly Russian group such as Vlasov's ever succeeded in replacing the Communists in the Kremlin, it would create conditions which would make impossible a free expression of the wishes of the Ukrainian people on the question of union with Russia. Nevertheless, Vlasov succeeded in securing the support of a certain number of prominent Ukrainians for a Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (Komitet Osvobozhdeniia Narodov Rossii—KONR), which met in Prague on November 14, 1944. It is remarkable that practically all of these were from the single city of Kiev.[56] In part this appears to be due to the fact that

[54] Interviews 9, 22. One informant (Interview 24) states that while the Bandera followers would not give their approval officially, they felt that Shandruk performed a highly useful and patriotic function.

[55] Interview 22.

[56] These included Theodore Bohatyrchuk and George Muzichenko, who signed the Manifesto of Prague; Constantine Shtepa and Eugene Arkypenko, chief editor

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certain highly respected Kiev leaders, like Professor Theodore Bohatyrchuk, were convinced of the need of continued union with Russia, and through their influence secured the adherence of their friends to the new body.[57] Unquestionably, however, the reaction in Kiev to the mistakes of the Nationalists and the somewhat unusual social and cultural background of the capital played their part. 168*

The Ukrainian nationalist groups immediately reacted violently against the KONR proclamation, which claimed to express the aspirations of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. Four days after the Manifesto was issued, ten of the non-Russian national groups addressed a vigorous appeal to Rosenberg for help against this undermining of their position. Perhaps because there was no officially recognized committee for the Ukraine, Mel'nyk signed the petition "for the Ukrainian national political groups." [58] After reciting the history of the struggles of their nations for independence from Moscow, and asserting that the Russians alone had not shown any zeal in combatting Bolshevism, the nationalist leaders stressed their claim to German gratitude:

> It is therefore not astounding that these [non-Russian] peoples greeted the outbreak of the German-Russian war with the greatest joy. They placed themselves at the side of the German army from the first day on, helped where they could, welcomed the troops with open arms, and with cordial friendship. Standing shoulder to shoulder with the German soldiers in battle, they proved their loyalty to the national idea.[59]

At the same time, the signers of the protest did not hesitate to criticize German policy. They asserted that the failure to recognize the striving of the peoples of the Soviet Union for independence had presented Stalin with an opportunity which he had utilized by granting independent diplomatic representation to the "so-called Soviet republics" the previous spring, thus pre-

of the peasants' paper, *Ukrains'kyi Khliborob;* and the four officials of the Kiev administration whom Kinkelin had proposed in 1943 as members of a Ukrainian National Committee. Apparently Forostivs'kyi, the mayor, collaborated with the group for a time at least.

[57] Interview 19.

[58] The text of the protest is contained in NO 2998.

[59] *Ibid.*

668* tending to offer more scope to national aspirations than did the Germans. Rejecting all claims of Vlasov to speak for their nations, they demanded in categorical terms, backed up by the threat that otherwise they could not "accept responsibility for the consequences which may result among our compatriots from the Vlasov action," that the Germans make the following concessions:

1. Forbid any claim of General Vlasov to the leadership of our peoples;
2. Recognize the right, to take effect immediately, of our peoples to independent states and to pronounce a definite recognition of our national representative bodies;
3. Organize our national military formations under unified command of their own leaders, subject to the German Wehrmacht in operative matters, for the fight against Bolshevism, and turn over the political leadership within these formations to our national representative bodies.[60]

Whether Rosenberg turned over this document to Hitler is questionable, in view of its uncompromising terms, but it is certain that on the same day it was presented he himself sent a very strong protest to his Führer against Vlasov's committee.[61]

Either because neither faction among the German leadership could secure Hitler's unequivocal approval, or because the most powerful Nazi leaders still desired, at the eleventh hour, to pursue their customary tactic of *divide et impera,* no definite choice was ever made between Vlasov and the Ukrainian leaders. The latter were allowed to continue with their efforts to organize their compatriots. At the same time, Vlasov was free to attract those Ukrainians whom he could prevail upon to join his movement.

668* 204 The Ukrainian-language press was left under nationalist control. The principal paper for the *Ostarbeiter* and other workers in Germany, *Holos,* remained under the editorship of Bohdan Kravtsiv, a determined nationalist, while a leading East Ukrainian journalist, George Muzichenko, left its staff shortly after he joined the Vlasov information bureau.[62] Two other papers, *Ukraïns'kyi Dobrovolets'* (the journal of the military units) and

[60] *Ibid.*
[61] NO 1815.
[62] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 8, 1944, p. 3. A few weeks earlier the Vlasov group had made a strong effort to secure control of these and other Ukrainian papers in Germany. Cf. NO 3039.

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Za Ukraïnu, were kept in the hands of nationalist editors, who were able to direct oblique attacks on Vlasov.[63] 668* 204

Nevertheless, it is certain that Vlasov was given some advantages, and secured considerable success, in his efforts to recruit prisoners of war of all Soviet nationalities for his Russian Liberation Army (Rossiskaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia—ROA). Even according to Ukrainian nationalist sources, only half of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were fully "nationally conscious," and many could not even speak the Ukrainian language.[64] Moreover, Vlasov was able to secure a number of high-ranking ex-Soviet officers of Ukrainian origin for his staff, including the commander of the first ROA division, General Buniachenko. Altogether, units, in various stages of integration in the ROA, totaled three hundred thousand by January, 1945, and of this number perhaps 35 to 40 percent were of Ukrainian ethnic stock.[65] 727 704

Apparently no direct threats or compulsion were used to secure adherence of civilians to the KONR.[66] On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalist sources maintain that the apparent German favor enjoyed by Vlasov was a powerful inducement to the de-

[63] For example, the latter newspaper published the translation of an article from *Das Schwartze Korps* (an SS organ) harshly criticizing Russian émigrés, on January 18, 1945, p. 2.

[64] M. Les', "Chomu ia buv 'Vlasovtsem'?" (Why was I a "Vlasovite"?), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (October-November, 1952), p. 3, states that 50 percent of the Ukrainian prisoners were "nationally conscious," 40 percent somewhat so, and 10 percent not at all. A contemporary account (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 23, 1941, p. 2) states that many of the letters addressed by Ukrainian prisoners to the newspaper which the Germans had established for them (*Nova Doba*) were in Russian, but notes that they were sent to the Ukrainian rather than the Russian paper, *Klich.* The latter also carried material evidently intended for a Ukrainian audience. Other contemporary accounts of the prisoners differ as to whether they could speak the Ukrainian language. One insists that 80 percent were "nationally conscious," and that the Russian prisoners accepted the fact that the Ukrainians were "separatists" without anger, for while the latter wanted an independent state they had always lived peacefully with the Russians and other minorities in the Ukraine (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 5, 1941, p. 2).

[65] Unsigned list of units from the eastern peoples, January, 1945, NO 5800 (hereafter referred to as NO 5800). For the percentage of Ukrainians see Les', p. 3, and MS H, which states that Vlasov told Shandruk that 70 percent of the first ROA division were Ukrainians. If so, this figure must have been reached by including persons with very little Ukrainian nationalist feeling whom the Russian National Socialist leader, Bronislav Kaminskii, recruited in the Lokot' area on the border of the Ukrainian and Russian Soviet Republics, since (according to Thorwald, p. 44) Kaminskii's brigade alone formed more than a third of this division.

[66] Interview 45.

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704 moralized and physically worn-out prisoners to accept his invita-
727 tion as a way out of confinement. They assert that a number of the units formed from prisoners or from the auxiliary units brought back by the Wehrmacht in its retreat abandoned the ROA, even without German permission, to join nationalist Ukrainian forces.[67] To a certain degree, this assertion is supported by one of the German officers most closely associated with the eastern military units, who states that difficulties were experienced in subordinating Ukrainian or mixed Ukrainian-Russian units which had been under German commanders to Russian officers from the ROA, although there was generally no objection to attachment to Vlasov's over-all command.[68]

704 In addition to this struggle for influence within groups which were subordinated to General Vlasov, there was an entirely separate military organization for the Ukrainians. The Galician division was reformed as the First Ukrainian Division, and organization of a second division to be composed of East Ukrainians was begun.[69] These and a number of other units, totaling seventy-five thousand men, were classified as the Ukrainian Liberation Army (Ukraïns'ke Vyzvol'ne Voisko—UVV) under command of General Shandruk, though each unit was actually commanded by a German officer.[70] In contradistinction to the ROA units, which wore the St. Andrew's cross, a centuries-old Russian symbol, the Ukrainian units were permitted the *trizub* [trident] as their national emblem. Borovets', who had been released from prison after a few months, was commissioned to form a parachute detachment to land behind the Soviet lines to aid the partisan struggle.[71]

000 The final days of the war brought no substantial change in

[67] A. Kovach, *Ukraïns'ka vyzvol'na borot'ba i "Vlasovshchyna"* (The Ukrainian Liberation Struggle and the "Vlasov Affair") ("Germany," 1948), p. 51, states that 65 percent of the trainees in the Dabensdorf officers' school of the ROA were of Ukrainian origin.

[68] Interview 15; MS C.

[69] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 8, 1944, p. 3.

[70] General Shandruk has in his possession a mimeographed copy of an order from the German general, Freitag, turning over command of the First (Galician) Ukrainian Division to him, but only on April 27, 1945. See also Oleh Lysiak, "Volyns'kyi Batalion" (The Volhynian Battalion), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv I. UD UNA* (March, 1951), p. 2.

[71] Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba*, p. 15; Interview 37.

The final days of the war brought no substantial change in this situation, in which the Ukrainian nationalists were able to maintain their independence of the Vlasov movement, although without being able to gain control of even a majority of the men of Ukrainian ethnic origin in German military service. While there were some efforts, such as a personal meeting between Vlasov and Shandruk, to find a modus vivendi between the two groups, these came to nothing. On the contrary, the Ukrainians went ahead with the setting up of their own national committee. Shandruk became president and the vice-presidents were Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Alexander Semenenko, mayor of Kharkov under the occupation. Thus the "old emigration" (Shandruk was born in Lubny), the West Ukraine, and the Soviet Ukraine were represented.[72] Aside from a certain moderation in German treatment of the Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter,* however, the group was able to accomplish little. In the last weeks of Germany's hopeless struggle the organization was officially recognized and allowed to issue a proclamation in Weimar on March 17, 1945, as the Ukrainian National Committee. The deterioration of German power enabled the Committee to take a strong stand for an independent Ukrainian state, without giving even lip service to alliance with the Germans. However, the document made it clear that the main practical objective was care for the interests of the Ukrainian refugees, workers, and soldiers in Germany.[73]

The proclamation also announced that the Ukrainian soldiers were henceforth to be united in the Ukrainian National Army. Under the circumstances, this could mean little. Nevertheless, in the final days of the war General Shandruk was able to go to the First Division of his forces, and the German general in command formally surrendered his powers to him.[74] Of more practical importance was the fact that Shandruk and other Ukrainian leaders had been able to get in touch with Allied military quarters even before the surrender of the division. While its personnel were of course treated as prisoners of war, their commanders were able to convince the Western authorities that the unit was composed wholly of Galicians. As West Ukrainians, they had thus never

[72] Interviews 9, 22.
[73] From a printed copy furnished me by General Shandruk.
[74] Interview 22, and order by General Freitag already cited.

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668 been *de jure* citizens of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Western powers. Consequently, they were spared the disastrous fate, which overtook so many who had resisted the Soviet regime, of being turned over to the Soviet repatriation authorities.[75]

It is difficult to appraise the value to the Ukrainian nationalist movements of their military collaboration with the Germans. As in the case of the nationalist partisan activity, the ends sought were not attained, for the calculations of the Ukrainians in regard to the international situation were not fulfilled. Instead of a balance of power in the East which would have enabled even feeble military forces to assume importance, there ensued complete Soviet victory. The Ukrainian contingents were unable to prevent the conquest of Ukrainian ethnographic territory by the Soviet Union. They were, however, of some value in enabling a number of young men to escape to the West. More significant, perhaps, for the future of the nationalist movement, the military units and their political committee offered a rallying point for Ukrainians who might otherwise have attached themselves to the Vlasov movement as the only available anti-Soviet organization.

[75] Interview 22.

p. 187

VIII. NATIONALISM AND THE CHURCH

THE PRINCIPAL propagators of Ukrainian nationalism in the occupied Ukraine were political groups. They were, however, not the only bearers of the concept of Ukrainian distinctiveness. Religious organizations also played an important role. The relation of the Greek Catholic Church to the nationalist parties has already been discussed.[1] Unlike the political parties, most of which at least claimed to represent the entire Ukrainian nation, however, the Greek Catholic Church was almost wholly confined to Galicia, since the great mass of the East Ukrainian Christians were members of the Orthodox faith. 795 [668*]

In the Orthodox lands, religion and national affiliation have always been closely related. Most of the East and South Slavic peoples identify their church with their national existence. Some of the same characteristics which have enhanced the distinctiveness of these peoples have also formed the basis of divisions among the Orthodox Slavs. One such feature is the lack of a supreme authority within the Orthodox Church. Each body of the church, existing in a given territory in a given period, has a well-defined hierarchy, usually governed by a council of bishops and frequently headed by a patriarch or metropolitan. There is, however, no pope at the head of all Orthodoxy. It is true that the Orthodox Church, like the Roman Catholic Church, recognizes the authority of an ecumenical council, but such a council has not been held in the East for a millennium. [182]

A difficult question arises at this point: how is the "body of the faithful" or "territory" of each group to be defined? This problem has, in fact, been an extremely troublesome one in the history of the Orthodox Church, for in the absence of a central ecclesiastical authority there can be no final solution. In practice an answer has been provided by another characteristic feature 795 659

[1] [See category 116, pp. 36-38 -- Analyst]

795 of the Orthodox Church—its close dependence on the secular
659 authority. Historically, the Orthodox Church has been the official church par excellence; union of church and state is not only a legal expression but a vital reality in the history of Eastern Europe. Consequently, the actual extent of authority of each body of the church has usually coincided with the boundaries of the state in which it exists. A corollary of this coincidence of state and ecclesiastical authority has been the establishment of, or the endeavor to establish, a new hierarchical authority whenever a
[668] major change in state sovereignty has taken place. Moreover, as nationalist movements became powerful in the Orthodox lands in the nineteenth century, they often demanded a separate church organization as a consequence of their growing sense of national distinctiveness, and as a preparation for their separate statehood.

795 Until 1917, almost all Orthodox East Slavs were united in a
659 single state, the Russian Empire, with a single church, the Rus-
186 sian Orthodox Church. Since the seventeenth century this church had lacked the customary patriarch or primate, and was connected to the secular power, and to a considerable degree controlled by it through an imperial official, the Procurator of the Holy Synod. The October Revolution destroyed the formal links between these historically intertwined institutions. At this point, the growing strength of Ukrainian national consciousness gave rise to a demand for state independence. It was in accord with the history of Orthodoxy that this demand should have been accompanied by a parallel movement for the establishment of a church organization independent of Moscov, for that seat of ecclesiastical authority had lost its preeminent prestige through the disestablishment of the Russian Orthodox Church, while its role as a symbol of East Slav unity was necessarily repudiated by those who saw the Ukrainian future as distinct from that of Russia.

000 Had the group desring continuation of the Russian state (whether as an empire or a constitutional democracy) won out, it is probable that ecclesiastical unity would have been restored, since the Russian church, while it lost many of its privileges after the February Revolution, stood to gain in prestige through the reconstitution of the ofice of Patriarch of Moscow. Had, on the contrary, an independent Ukrainian state been able to maintain

itself for a few years, very likely a separate Ukrainian hierarchy 000
would have been generally recognized. In the situation which followed from the Bolshevik triumph, neither clear-cut solution was achieved. Instead, a large body of the lower clergy and the faithful 795
split off from the Russian hierarchy in the Ukraine. When no 798
member of the episcopacy could be found to consecrate a new bishop for the dissident group, the Ukrainian church body resorted to the "laying on of hands" by priests as a method for consecrating Father Lypkivs'kyi as prelate of their organization. Thus a new Orthodox Church was formed, which rapidly came to embrace the great majority of organized Orthodox believers in the Ukraine; by 1923 it had no less than three thousand parishes and thirty-five bishops, headed by Lypkivs'kyi, then known as Metropolitan Basil.[1] In spite of this apparent prosperity, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, as it was called, lay under the shadow of two great weaknesses. In the first place, it was not recognized by any other body of the Orthodox Church, for the method of consecration of the new bishops was regarded throughout the Orthodox world as uncanonical, a violation of the essential principle of apostolic succession. From the point of view of the traditional believer, the bishops of the new church were illegitimate; consequently, priests ordained by them (but not those who had joined the Autocephalous Church after ordination by a validly consecrated bishop) were not truly endowed with sacerdotal functions. Secondly, and of more immediate significance, the phenomenal growth of the new church was possible only because of the comparatively indulgent attitude shown by the Communist authorities who, at that time, were more antagonistic to the Russian church than to dissident bodies. When the Soviet [661]
power turned to restriction of Ukrainian national activity, as a potential threat to the unity of the USSR, the Autocephalous Church also came under attack. Its entire hierarchy and the great bulk of its clergy were executed or banished in 1929–30.[2]

In view of the close connection between church and state in 659
the Orthodox world, it was only natural that, when the Russian 795

[1] John S. Reshetar, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox Church," *American Slavic and East European Review*, X (February, 1951), 43–45.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

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659 Empire collapsed and a considerable body of Orthodox believers
795 came under Polish dominion, an effort was made to establish a separate hierarchy in Poland. The leader in this effort was Dionysius, a Russian bishop who, with recognition from the Patriarch of Constantinople, became Metropolitan of Warsaw and head of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in I oland.[3] In addition to the Belorussian archbishop of Pinsk, there were four bishops in Volhynia: Archbishop Alexius, with his residence in the famous Pochaïvs'ka Lavra (monastery), and his vicars Polykarp, bishop of Lutsk; Anthony (Martsenko), bishop of Kamen Kashirsk (Kamin Koshyrs'k); and Simon, bishop of Ostriz. These bishops were Ukrainian but subject to Dionysius.[4]

795 When the Soviet Union acquired Volhynia in September, 1939, its efforts to convert the Russian Orthodox Church into an auxiliary of the Soviet government were already well under way. A special deputy of Patriarch Sergius of Moscow, Nicholas, Exarch of the West Ukraine, was sent to coordinate the church of the newly occupied area with the government-approved ecclesiastical organization. The existing bishops were not deposed, with the exception of Alexander of Pinsk. The latter was not molested physically, but his ecclesiastical jurisdiction, now in the Belorussian Soviet Republic, was divided between a bishop of Brest and a bishop of Pinsk sent from Moscow.[5]

While it is not likely that Alexius or his adherents (including Polykarp) were pleased with the subjugation of their province by Moscow, they appear to have conformed to the Orthodox tradition of submission to the secular power, even when the latter is not basically sympathetic to the Orthodox religion. Although it
[626] did not suppress the Orthodox Church, the Soviet government imposed severe restrictions and onerous financial obligations upon it, as well as upon the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. As a result, many of the priests fled, or took up secular occupations.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48; Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1.

[4] *UAPTs (Ukrainskaia Avtokefalnaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov')* (UAPTs [Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church]), by "A. V." (Pravoslavnyi Beloruss, 1951; mimeographed), p. 2; cf. Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1. There was also a Bishop Timothy (Shreter) in a monastery in the Generalgouvernement, but he played no role in the controversies which followed, and appears to have been burned to death when Germans destroyed his monastery (Occ E-4 [1]).

[5] Occ E-4 (1); *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3.

In order to satisfy the resulting need for clergymen, Alexius is said to have consecrated a large number of new priests, many of them persons unfitted by background or training for the performance of clerical duties.[6] Thus the fabric of the church was to some extent weakened and demoralized. At the same time, however, the Soviet-allied church in Moscow endeavored to extend its influence into an area which had had few Orthodox communicants since the seventeenth century, by consecrating as bishop of L'vov, under the name of Panteleimon, a priest, Rudyk, who was a native Galician but had always favored a union of the province with Russia.[7]

That there was nothing inherently agreeable in their enforced submission to Soviet control is indicated by the fact that the Orthodox bishops in the West Ukraine, both those who had exercised episcopal functions in Volhynia prior to 1939 and those who owed their status to the Moscow-inspired endeavors to reorganize the Ukrainian church, failed to evacuate with the Red Army when the Germans invaded the region. The sole exception was the Exarch Nicholas, who soon assumed an active role in appealing to the patriotic and religious sentiments of the peoples of the USSR to secure support of the Soviet regime. Under the title of Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, he issued numerous statements against the Germans and the Ukrainian nationalists.[8]

As the German armies drove on beyond the pre-1939 Polish border into areas which had been under Soviet control for twenty years, they discovered that there remained considerable numbers of Orthodox clergymen. For example, there were one hundred in the Zhitomir area alone, and two small churches had remained open in Kiev under Soviet rule.[9] There were also Archbishops

[6] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1941, p. 2; Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1.

[7] *UAPTs*, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1941, p. 2.

[8] For a report on clandestine propaganda against the Germans in the Ukraine issued over Nicholas's signature, see PS 051. There are a number of reports of Orthodox priests, especially in Kiev, who acted as Soviet agents (cf. Occ E-4 [1]). One of Nicholas's wartime writings was even distributed abroad by the Soviet Union—i.e., Nikolai (Nicholas), Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia (ed.), *The Russian Orthodox Church and the War against Fascism* (Moscow: The Patriarchate of Moscow, 1943). At a later period, Nikolai frequently employed the title Mitropolit Krutitskii, pertaining to the Moscow monastery of which he was titular head.

[9] PS 053.

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795 Anthony (Abashidze) in Kiev, who was, however, too old and crippled to exercise any considerable degree of influence; Anatole in Odessa; Theophilus in Kharkov; and Bishop Damaskin in Kamenets-Podols'k.[10]

As soon as conditions had become somewhat stabilized in the West Ukrainian lands, Alexius and his associates proceeded to call a meeting of all Ukrainian bishops in areas liberated from the Soviet regime. This gathering, known as the Sobor of Volhynian Bishops, met in the Pochaiïvs'ka Lavra in mid-August, 1941, and on August 18 proclaimed the reorganization of the Autonomous Orthodox Church in the Ukraine.[11] Subordination to the Patriarch of Moscow was declared to be in abeyance so long as the Communists maintained control over him, but a nominal canonical adherence of the Ukrainian church to the Patriarch was recognized. At the same time, two new bishops were consecrated to carry out the task of reorganizing church life.[12]

This task was already under way, at least in the Zhitomir area. All surviving priests were registered and their status examined by two archimandrites (monastic archpriests), one sent by Alexius and one from the famous Monastery of the Caves in Kiev.[13] The great majority of the surviving clergy had been consecrated in the old canonically recognized Russian church, since Soviet persecution had greatly reduced the Autocephalous ranks. Some of the latter remained, however, and had to accept reconsecration at the hands of the bishops of the Volhynian Sobor before receiving appointments to parishes. Understandably, this demand for repudiation of the position on the validity of the Autocephalous consecration taken by their deceased leader, Lypkivs'kyi, was deeply resented, especially since many of the priests previously consecrated by Alexius were not, as has been pointed out, models of devotion to the sacerdotal vocation.[14]

[10] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 15, 1941, p. 4.

[11] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[12] *UAPTs*, p. 3, names eight appointed at this time. Contemporary sources refer to two only, and it appears likely that the others were consecrated somewhat later, probably for the most part at the *sobor* in December. Cf. *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3, and *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, January 20, 1941, p. 1.

[13] Fedir S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24, 1941, p. 4; the archimandrite from Kiev, Leontius Fillippovych, was consecrated bishop (as Leontius) at the August *sobor*.

[14] *Ibid.*

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Whether the greatly weakened "Lypkivites," as the Autocephalous adherents were known, could have made any effective objections by themselves is doubtful. There was, however, a powerful ally at hand. During the time when the Soviet authorities were bringing the Volhynian church under their control, Ukrainian influence in Orthodox ecclesiastical life in the Generalgouvernement was greatly increasing, particularly in the Chelm area. As part of the restoration of the Orthodox Church to a position of strength, Dionysius, in October, 1940, consecrated Professor John Ohiienko, who had long been active in religious affairs as a church historian and philologist, as Hilarion, Archbishop of Chelm.[15] Two months later he consecrated a bishop, Palladius, for the small Orthodox population in the Lemko region.[16] Both of these men were strong nationalists. Hilarion in particular had long desired to see the separation of the Ukrainian church from Moscow.[17]

When the Volhynian Sobor was called, Alexander, the archbishop of Pinsk, was not invited, for, it was explained, he was a Belorussian.[18] Nevertheless, his Moscow-appointed successor, Benjamin, was not only present but acted as secretary of the conference. In view of the fact that Alexander's opposition to the Communists had been the cause for Benjamin's appointment, it is understandable that this arrangement excited discontent. Moreover, the position of Dionysius, who had been the superior of all the Volhynian bishops before the Soviet occupation, was unclear.[19] If Soviet occupation of Volhynia had been illegitimate, presumably his authority had only been suspended by physical barrier of the frontier which had separated German-controlled Warsaw from Soviet-occupied territory. Nevertheless, after Soviet evacuation, Alexius had proceeded to reorganize the whole Ukrainian church on the assumption that a reunion with Moscow had been legally constituted, although publicly holding the posi-

[15] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 24, 1940, p. 1.

[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 12, 1941, p. 3. Palladius became bishop of Cracow; this move was viewed by some as an unwarranted invasion by the Orthodox Church of a predominantly Greek Catholic section of the Ukrainian territory. Cf. Mykola Andrusiak in *Nastup*, October 12, 1940, p. 4.

[17] Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 17, 1942, p. 3.

[18] *UAPTs*, p. 3; *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[19] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3, expresses the indignation felt at the exclusion of the Autocephalous bishops in the Generalgouvernement.

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795 tion that this union was inoperative because of continued Soviet control of the church in Moscow. Doubtless influenced by these considerations, Polykarp, the bishop of Lutsk, declined to attend the *sobor*, presenting the excuse of "difficult conditions of communication," although his episcopal see was less than fifty miles from the Pochaïvs'ka Lavra.[20] Shortly afterwards Dionysius appointed Polykarp "vicar" of the Vladimir Volynsk and adjacent Gorukhov (Horukhiv) areas; at the time, apparently neither explicitly rejected Alexius as head of the Orthodox hierarchy in Volhynia.[21]

During the fall of 1941, opposition to Alexius's predominance gradually mounted. In addition to the friction over the investiture of the Lypkivite priests, great resentment arose from the fact that the bishops of Alexius's group were either predominantly of Russian origin or were known for past adherence to the [186] church of Moscow. The acceptance of continued subordination to Moscow, however theoretical the tie might be under the prevailing conditions, was of course resented by the Ukrainian nationalist elements. Moreover, many among the latter, especially the intelligentsia, strongly desired the replacement of the Old Slavonic liturgy by services in the living Ukrainian language, while the Volhynian *sobor* had merely provided for certain prayers in the latter speech.[22] As these points of friction accumulated, prominent Orthodox laymen like Stephen Skrypnyk, the publisher of the newspaper *Volyn'* in Rovno, rallied to the side of the Autocephalous group.[23] On November 28, Polykarp definitely broke with Alexius, declaring the Archbishop's group "anarchical," and repudiated him as ecclesiastical superior.[24] Shortly afterwards, Alexius replied by proclaiming himself Metropolitan of the Ukraine, in accordance with a decision of a second *sobor* of Volhynian bishops.[25]

[20] *UAPTs*, p. 3; *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[21] *Ukrains'ka Diisnist*, November 15, 1941, p. 3. In a move evidently designed to conciliate Polykarp, the *sobor* had named him bishop of Kamenets-Podolsk (*ibid.*).

[22] *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[23] Cf. Skrypnyk's article in *Volyn'*, reproduced in *L'vivs'ki Visti*, January 11–12, 1942, p. 5, and an article from the Kremenets *Kremianets'kyi Visnyk*, cited in *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, October 15, 1941, p. 4.

[24] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, January 11–12, 1942, p. 5. (Skrypnyk's article cited).

[25] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3.

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While the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine was splitting into 195
two antagonistic factions, the leader of the Greek Catholic Church was endeavoring to effect an ecclesiastical union of all Ukrainians. The separate development of the Greek Catholic Church has been sketched already. It may be pointed out, however, that what had originally been regarded as an instrument of the Poles for consolidating their dominion in the western Ukrainian lands had long since developed into a truly national church, in the sense of being independent of any foreign secular power, although it [186]
was largely confined to one province of the Ukraine. Since the Greek Catholic Church of the Ukraine possessed a rite and a body of ecclesiastical regulations quite different from that of the churches of the neighboring Catholic nations, which were of the Latin rite, the mere fact of adherence to it tended to set the Galicians apart as a national entity. As was pointed out, Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi had long been a vigorous supporter of the Ukrainian nationalist movements, although he had tried to turn them away from an extreme nationalism incompatible with Christianity. His influence was naturally greatest among his own coreligionists, but extended also to Ukrainians of the Orthodox faith. Hence Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi felt that the Soviet retreat offered an opportunity for bringing about the union of all Ukrainians in a single national church within the framework of the universal church in which he believed. The immediate opportunity for advancing this desire was a letter, October 21, 1941, to Archbishop Hilarion, congratulating him on his elevation to the episcopacy; Sheptyts'kyi explained that he could not do so before because of the severance of communications between the Soviet- and the German-dominated areas. Together with cordial felicitations, the Metropolitan expressed his hope that Hilarion would play a leading role in cleansing the Ukrainian church of "uncanonical" "Muscovite" influences introduced by Peter the Great, and hoped that this process would prepare the way for union of all the Ukrainian churches.[28] Two months later he addressed a

[28] The text of the letter is printed in Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukrains'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), pp. 123–24.

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795 letter of similar import to all "Orthodox archpriests in the Ukraine and in the Ukrainian lands." [27]

The replies were courteous, but not encouraging. Hilarion answered in a cordial, even humble fashion, but he did not fail to point out that, while the liturgy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had indeed suffered from Russian infiltration, that of the Greek Catholic Church had been permeated with Latin elements, and he suggested that the latter body also needed purification from foreign influences.[28] Alexius likewise replied to the second letter in a friendly fashion, but said that unification could come about only through a change in human nature, perhaps at the end of the world, and expressed the view that, after all, diversity had its advantages in promoting the search for the good.[29] Still not giving up hope, Sheptyts'kyi appealed in an open letter of March 3, 1942, for the support of the Ukrainian Orthodox intelligentsia, who, he said, exerted great influence in their church.[30] This effort was also fruitless. Probably its only result was to play a part in inducing the Autocephalous Church in the Generalgouvernement to present a final reply to his overtures by an uncompromising resolution of the *sobor* of bishops in Warsaw, in May, 1942, to the effect that his wishes could easily be fulfilled, if only all Greek Catholics would join the Autocephalous Church.[31]

000 The failure of the Metropolitan's efforts was doubtless due fundamentally to the deep cleavage which separates Orthodox from Catholic, the former viewing submission to the authority of the Pope as a renunciation of the valid tradition of the Christian church, which they believe that their body has maintained. An additional compelling reason for the rejection of Sheptyts'kyi's overtures in the winter and spring of 1942 was the incontestible fact that gestures of reconciliation with Rome would have been regarded by many of the Orthodox laity as treason, and would therefore very probably have weakened the church which

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 127–28.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 124–27.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 128–30; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 15, 1942, p. 3.
[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 5, 1942, p. 3; Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 130–31.
[31] Baran, *Mytropolyt*, p. 132.

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participated in such measures. This was a vital consideration, for 000
by midwinter the conflict between the two tendencies in the Orthodox Church represented by Alexius and Polykarp had turned into an active struggle for supremacy.

On December 24, 1941, after the second *sobor* of Volhynian 795
bishops had endowed Alexius with the title of metropolitan, Dionysius appointed Polykarp administrator of all Volhynia. Six weeks later, Archbishop Alexander who, it will be recalled, had been left out of the Autonomous Church conference, joined with the Autocephalous Church in Poland in calling a new *sobor* in Pinsk.[32] While Alexander was not a Ukrainian by origin, he now had a fairly clear title according to Orthodox usage to participate in Ukrainian church affairs, since his archiepiscopal see had been included in the territorial limits of the Ukraine, as defined by the boundaries of the Reichskommissariat. He was a welcome support to the group opposed to Alexius, and they made no difficulty about recognizing his authority to call the *sobor*. Since, however, the other authority for calling the conference was Dionysius, the constitutive assembly of the new Ukrainian church was established by non-Ukrainian prelates. The moving spirits, however, were the strongly nationalist Ukrainians, Polykarp and Hilarion. With them went Palladius, the third Ukrainian bishop of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland. Together they decided to form a new ecclesiastical body to be known as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Ukraïns'ka Avtokefal'na Pravoslavna Tserkva—UAPTs), which was to unite as quickly as possible with the remnants of the church of the same name founded by Lypkivs'kyi.[33] Somewhat later Damaskin of Kamenets-Podolsk rejected Alexius and adhered to the new group.[34] Their ranks were also augmented by the consecration as bishops in February of two Volhynian priests, Abramovych and Huba, who became members of the hierarchy as Nikanor and Ihor.[35]

[32] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 22, 1942, p. 4.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 22, 1942, p. 4. Apparently Damaskin later returned to the Autonomous Church.
[35] *Ibid.*; and *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 28, 1942, p. 1.

795 While the basic reason for the foundation of a new church,
727 and its rapid growth at the expense of the body under Alexius, was the nationalist feeling of the Ukrainians, which demanded a fully national church divorced from any connection, however theoretical, with Russia, German policy had also played a role in division of the Orthodox communion. Fundamentally, Nazi policy was permeated with violent hatred of all religion. The guiding principle for selection of German officials for the east ensured that this basic theme would persist in the application of policy: "The whole Christian outlook makes one incapable of carrying on work in the east, for the community of the hymnbook is put ahead of the needs of the Reich."[36] Within this blanket opposition to the church, however, even the fanatical anticlericalism of Rosenberg and his staff permitted compromises to secure tactical advantages. In their eyes, Catholic Christianity was the chief religious danger in the east. The leaders of the Catholic Church had long hoped for an opportunity to bring their doctrines to the peoples of the Soviet Union. On the outbreak of war, they attempted to send a number of priests, including several trained in the Ukrainian College in Rome, as missionaries. The Ostministerium rigorously opposed this endeavor, and with the exception of a few clergymen who were able to penetrate the Ukraine as chaplains in the Italian army, the Vatican's efforts were thwarted.[37] Similarly, the efforts of Polish Catholics to conduct activities in the East Ukraine, even among the considerable body of communicants of the Latin rite in Volhynia, were quickly suppressed.[38]

In contrast to the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church was not to be opposed openly, provided it was not Russian dominated but Ukrainian in character. Moreover, any other purely Ukrainian sects were to be permitted. It was hoped that by allowing a multitude of religious bodies, the Orthodox Church as such

[36] Memorandum on personnel for the east, from the Rosenberg files, July 9, 1941, PS 1040 (hereafter referred to as PS 1040).

[37] Directive by Alfred Meyer, "Die Frage der konfessionellen Verbände," July 29, 1941, PS 1047 (hereafter referred to as PS 1047). On the training of missionaries of the Greek Catholic rite for missionary work in the USSR after the conquest, see also Aldo Valori, *La Campagna di Russia* (Rome: Grafica Nazionale Editrice, 1951), I, 244.

[38] PS 053.

would be weakened, for "the corruption and cultural backwardness of the clergy prepared the ground for Bolshevism."[39] When, however, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was founded as a distinctively national church, it appeared to the Ostministerium to be a useful means of furthering its aim of strengthening Ukrainian nationalism and driving a wedge between the Ukrainian and the Russian elements. Consequently, it felt that the Autocephalous Church under the leadership of Polykarp should be recognized and accorded a position of distinct superiority in comparison to the Autonomous Church headed by Alexius.[40] 795 727

As was frequently the case, the policy formulated in Rosenberg's ministry failed of all practical results in the Ukraine. The Reichskommissariat decided to pursue a diametrically opposed course. Thus it proclaimed confessional freedom in June, 1942, but ordered all ecclesiastical organization limited to individual *Generalbezirke*.[41] In particular, it decided a little later to order the dissolution of the governing bodies of both the Autonomous and the Autocephalous Churches, the *sobors* headed by Alexius and Polykarp respectively.[42]

One reason for this decision to restrict religious organization was undoubtedly the fact that the Autocephalous Church had shown great vigor in organizing a new hierarchy. In May a second *sobor* of Autocephalous bishops had gathered in Kiev and consecrated no less than seven new bishops. The majority had been Volhynian priests, but two were laymen who had played prominent roles in the development of the new church body: Stephen Skrypnyk, who became bishop of Pereiaslav as Mstyslav, and a Kiev professor, Haievs'kyi, who became Bishop Sylvester.[43] Strong 795

[39] PS 1047.

[40] Draft of a directive of Rosenberg to the Reichskommissare Ostland and Ukraine, May 13, 1942, CXLVa 15, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 15). I do not know whether the directive was ever actually sent, but it certainly expresses the opinion of the predominant group in the Ostministerium, as opposed to that of Koch's officials.

[41] Report by an unidentified official of the Ostministerium to Rosenberg, June 30, 1944, CXLVa 66, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 66).

[42] Directive of Reichskommissar Ukraine (signed by Dargel, head of the political section) to the Generalkommissare, October 1, 1942, CXLVa 20, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 20).

[43] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 28, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup*, July 12, 1942, p. 2.

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795 efforts were made to secure the support of all the surviving Lypkyvites, with great success, apparently because there was no demand for reconsecration, although at first there was friction between the new and the old Autocephalous bodies.[44] The new consecrations raised the total number of the higher clergy to fourteen: two archbishops (Polykarp and Alexander, Hilarion being still a member of the hierarchy of the Polish church, i.e., that in the Generalgouvernement) and twelve bishops, with five hundred parishes and a still greater number of priests under their author-
727 ity.[45] The vigor and unity of the church alone was sufficient to
795 make it repugnant to those Germans who feared any independent center of Ukrainian life. For example, the Generalkommissar in Nikolaev wrote Erich Koch expressing his fear that the Autocephalous Church, which was strong in the northern part of his area, was becoming a "national church," and said that all priests were being closely watched.[46] Koch himself conceived a violent antipathy for Mstyslav, whom he described as "Skrypnyk, a prominent Ukrainian politician in Kiev," asserting that the bishop was trying to turn the Wehrmacht against the Reichskommissariat officials.[47]

As a result of these feelings of distrust, the Reichskommissariat refused to follow the policy of favoring the Autocephalous Church as against the Autonomous Church. With the desertion of the nationalist Ukrainians, the latter was coming more and more to be the confession of Russophile elements in the Ukraine, or at least of those elements which favored equality between Russians and Ukrainians in cultural and political life. In an effort to build up a counterweight to the nationalist forces, the Reichskommissariat officials began to favor the Autonomous Church. First the Reichskommissar decided that a balance should be maintained

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 3; Dmytro Doroshenko in *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 10, 1942, p. 1.

[45] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 1, 1942, p. 4, based on information from Bishop Mstyslav. Apparently in addition to the bishops I have referred to as adhering to the Autocephalous Church, a new member of the hierarchy, Korenistov, was consecrated as bishop of Brest and auxiliary of Alexander of Pinsk. Doroshenko in *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 10, 1942, p. 1, also refers to fourteen members of the UAP hierarchy.

[46] April, 1942, CXLVa 474, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 474).

[47] PS 192.

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between the two churches.[48] Later his henchmen used the Autonomous Church as a means of weakening the Autocephalous Church when the latter threatened to become powerful. The reverse tactic was also used occasionally, but the general tendency appears to be that taken by the Stadtkommissar of Kiev, who openly indicated the preference of the German officials for the Russian-oriented church by transferring to it in a public ceremony the principal cathedral of the city, St. Vladimir's (St. Volodymyr's).[49] 727 795

The general policy of the Reichskommissariat toward union of the two Orthodox bodies was governed by the same principle of doing everything which would weaken forces which might slip beyond its control. In May, when it appeared that the nascent strength of the Autocephalous group might be curbed by securing its subordination to Alexius, this line of action was favored, though in a tentative way, because the specter of a single united church, whatever its stand on the national question, was also abhorrent to the autocratic Nazi group.[50] By October, when the Autocephalous Church had become so strong that Alexius was obliged to seek unification on terms favorable to it, the Germans intervened to render abortive all attempts at conciliation.[51] Actually, the negotiations between Alexius on the one side and Polykarp, Mstyslav, and Nikanor on the other, proceeded so far that on October 8, 1942, an act of union was signed. A new synod of bishops, consisting of Polykarp and Alexius as metropolitans, with Alexander, Simon (an Autonomous bishop) and Nikanor as members, and Mstyslav as secretary, was to be formed. Thus the Autocephalous group would have obtained a clear majority in the directing body. The episcopal sees were to be so rearranged as to allow places for all or most of the bishops hitherto consecrated by both groups.[52] The strong German inter-

[48] CXLVa 20.

[49] *Volyn'*, May 2, 1943, p. 4.

[50] On May 4, 1942, at a conference in Rovno, an official of the Reichskommissariat expressed the wishes of the German authorities that the two churches unite, but declared that the Germans would maintain neutrality and not intervene at that time to secure union (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 14, 1942, p. 3).

[51] The directive of the Reichskommissar Ukraine to the Generalkommissare previously cited (CXLVa 20) provided that all efforts at union should be opposed.

[52] *Nastup*, November 15, 1942, p. 2; *Ukrains'ka Diiesnist'*, December 10, 1942, p. 2.

727 vention, however, combined with the opposition of a number
795 of Autonomous bishops, headed by Panteleimon, forced Alexius to retract his signature.[53]

795 From what has just been said, one would assume that there
668* would be a close connection between the Autocephalous Church, which within a few months had come to be the church of most believing Ukrainian nationalists, and the nationalist parties. To a certain extent this is true, for many members of the latter, who were prevented by the danger of violent death from pursuing any national political activities, turned to the cultivation of the church as a means for expressing and propagating their feelings. A number of the leading members of the Autocephalous Church were affiliated with the UNR, and the Het'man group also displayed great interest in religious development, in line with its conservative and traditionalist principles. More particularly, Mstyslav, the member of the UAP hierarchy who was most intimately acquainted with and interested in political affairs, was an old adherent of the UNR.[54]

668* As has been previously indicated, however, the really active parties in the East Ukraine were the two factions of the OUN. Hence the fact that the church leaders tended to associate with other groupings acted as a certain impediment to close collaboration. Moreover, a strong element in both wings of the OUN was opposed to religion in principle. This ideological bias against utilizing the church as a major instrument of national expression was undoubtedly given greatly increased weight by the experience
668* of the nationalists in the East Ukraine. The churches—both Au-
771 tonomous and Autocephalous—had no difficulty in attracting communicants, for there were many millions who had longed for the remembered solace of religion throughout the years of Communist oppression. These adherents of the church were, however, drawn very largely from the lower classes, the less educated elements of the population, especially the peasantry.[55] Since the OUN groups—as will be shown—concentrated their efforts on the intelligentsia, they placed comparatively little emphasis on

[53] *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, December 10, 1942. p. 2.

[54] Interview 69.

[55] See Chapter IX for details and sources on the attitude of the social classes and age groups toward religion.

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aspects of nationalist feeling which were prevalent only in the village. More important, the younger generation everywhere, even in the rural areas, was hostile or at least indifferent to religion. Both OUN groups were intent upon winning the allegiance of youth; they soon came to see that any close connection with the church would be interpreted by a large segment of the latter as "reactionary." Hence they abandoned or played down their contacts with the clergy, rather than jeopardize their success with the youth.[56]

While the factors just described prevented any wholehearted collaboration between the church and the nationalist political movements, there were numerous cases in which the two nationalist tendencies moved in parallel paths. This was especially the case in Kiev, where Panteleimon, the most outspokenly pro-Russian of Autonomous bishops, and hence the most obstinate foe of Ukrainian national independence, was opposed to Mstyslav, the most active nationalist among the Autocephalous bishops. Nationalist Ukrainians abstained from any contact with the Autonomous Church there; they had the support of a number of prominent figures in the city administration, including the mayor, Forostivs'kyi, who had himself been a priest under Lypkyvs'kyi. The anti-Nationalist element around Shtepa and Bohatyrchuk was perhaps not so enthusiastic about Panteleimon's church, and appears to have maintained a modicum of good relations with the Autocephalous clergy, but in general the alignment of political groups closely corresponded to confessional differences.[57]

This was even more the case in Dniepropetrovsk, where a strong proponent of a revived Russian Empire, Dimitrius, was installed as Autonomous bishop. The nationalist elements were violently opposed to his policies, and apparently considerable popular opposition was awakened by his efforts to revive the pomp of the old Russian Orthodox Church.[58] On the other hand, strong Russian nationalist elements, encouraged in all likelihood by the strongly Russophile city administration and press, vigor-

[56] Interviews 18, 65, 76.
[57] Interview 19.
[58] Interview 18 supported the statement in *Nastup*, August 22, 1942, that about thirty churches in the Dniepropetrovsk area joined the UAP church when a bishop was named by it for Dniepropetrovsk.

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795 ously supported Dimitrius. This support resulted in several cases
668* of actual vandalism directed against rival churches. The leader of the Autocephalous Church, Genadius, enjoyed good relations with both Mel'nyk and Bandera groups in the Dnieper city. Genadius aided the Bandera underground workers to escape from the German authorities, while one of his principal assistants was affiliated with the OUN-M, and the university faculty, which was strongly influenced by the Mel'nyk group, taught courses to prepare aspirants for his clergy.[59]

It is necessary to stress the extent—and the limits—of collaboration between the nationalists and the Autocephalous Church because of two incidents which have been widely taken as proof that the latter institution was involved, to an extent that could hardly be compatible with Christian principles, with some of the more violent elements of the OUN. The first incident concerned the head of the Autonomous Church, Archbishop Alexius. Early in the morning of May 7, 1943, the prelate started on a trip from his monastery near Kremenets.[60] He was in a German vehicle, part of a small convoy; why he chose this means of transportation is unclear, but it seems likely that the Germans would have urged a man of his prestige to accept such an accommodation, for as will be remembered the Volhynian roads at this time were in danger of attack from Red partisan bands or from nationalist bands disguised as such. At eight o'clock, as the little convoy was passing through a wood, it was suddenly attacked by a section of "Khrin's" partisan group; in the volley of shots, the occupants of the archbishop's automobile were all killed, and the wrecked vehicle was seized by the partisans. They were shocked to discover the prominent clergyman in a group which they thought included only German officials. Afterwards, however, they asserted that their remorse was dissipated by the finding of papers indicating close collaboration between the archbishop and the German police.[61]

If the above account, which appears to be highly probable, is

[59] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 19, 1942, p. 2; Interview 18.
[60] *UAPTs*, p. 5.
[61] *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, June 1, 1943, p. 2; Baran, *Mytropolyt*, p. 122; Interview 12.

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true, it is certain that the killing was unintentional and unpre- 668*
meditated and consequently does not indicate any plan of the 795
nationalists to aid the Autocephalous Church by destroying the chief prelate of the opposing group. That such a plan is even more unlikely is shown by the fact, attested by a source not involved in the dispute, that Alexius was the chief moderating influence in the Autonomous Church.[62] As has been shown, he tried to bring about union, and was on terms of friendship with at least one of the chief Autocephalous churchmen. These circumstances also go far to refute the charge that Alexius was in the service of the German police or, as has also been alleged by nationalist writers, in the service of the NKVD.[63] His personal character, as evidenced by his writings,[64] and the respect in which he was held even by opponents militate against such an accusation, even had not his conciliatory tendency refuted the main burden of the charge that he had fostered the disruption of the church to further the ends of the Germans and the Soviets. The whole incident was in all probability a tragic accident, utilized afterwards as propaganda for the rival groups.

So clear-cut a judgment cannot be offered concerning the sec- 668*
ond incident involving the slaying of an Autonomous bishop. In 687
the late summer of 1943, Emmanuel, then Autonomous bishop of 795
Vladimir Volynsk, was seized by a band of the UPA (controlled at that time by the OUN-B), taken to one of their forest headquarters, and there, after a "trial," executed as a traitor and a spy. Charges similar to those made against Alexius were the basis for the accusation against his colleague, and, in addition, Emmanuel is supposed to have confessed to having acted as an agent for the German police in betraying underground members.[65] Whether this is true cannot be determined, but certain factors cast considerable doubt upon it. The fact that the same charges were made against Alexius, who was very likely innocent, renders suspicious the accusations made against Emmanuel. The latter

[62] CXLVa 66.
[63] Mykola Selez', "Iak diiut stalins'ki agentury?" (How Do the Stalinist Agent Systems Operate?), *Vpered*, May, 1949, p. 11.
[64] See his letter to Sheptyts'kyi in Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 128–30.
[65] Selez', p. 11; Interview 63.

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687 was regarded, for another reason, as a traitor, for he had originally
668 been consecrated as bishop of Belaia Tserkov' by the Auto-
795 cephalous Church, and his subsequent defection to the Autonomous Church, on grounds of the dubious canonical validity of the nationalist religious body, must have been a sore blow to Ukrainian nationalist feeling.[66] He had also issued public statements calling for all the faithful to avoid aiding the nationalist partisans; while nearly everyone in a public position in Volhynia (including an OUN member like the editor of *Volyn'*) was forced to make such statements, it appears likely that Emmanuel may have been rather more vigorous and sincere than others in his circumstances.[67] On the other hand, there is no really trustworthy evidence that he engaged in spying, or other indisputably dishonorable activity, and those who knew him best tend to doubt the charge.[68] Consequently, it appears that his death was due to the fanatic and ruthless spirit which dominated the OUN-B in Volhynia at the time.

On the other hand, there is no evidence to implicate the Autocephalous Church in his killing, and all appearances point to its having been decided upon independently by the partisan forces. It is true that Emmanuel's position was especially distasteful to the UPA because of the contrast it offered to the stand of the most active Autocephalous prelate in Volhynia, Bishop Platonius of Rovno, who actively aided the underground, and is said even to have gone to the UPA camp in Derman to offer his support.[69] It should be pointed out, however, that Platonius was comparatively uninfluential in Autocephalous Church councils. The more typical attitude was that of Polykarp—also resident in Volhynia—who offered vigorous protests against German attacks on the clergy and against the brutal treatment of his people,[70] yet never gave open support or encouragement to the rebels. In this policy of submission to the secular power, even to an evil one, Polykarp

[66] Selez', p. 11; *UAPTs*, p. 5.
[67] Cf. his address to the Ukrainian population, in *Volyn'*, August 8, 1943, p. 3.
[68] Interview 38.
[69] *UAPTs*, p. 10; Interview 18.
[70] CXLVa 66. See also the sharp but respectful protest of Hilarion against the shooting of Autocephalous priests in the Generalgouvernement for contacts with escaped prisoners of war in the spring of 1942—long before there was any widespread nationalist partisan activity (Occ E-2 [2]).

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was, according to his own statement, following the tradition of Orthodoxy.[71]

A few months after the tragic episodes just described, nearly all of the East Ukraine was reconquered by the Red Army. The great majority of the Orthodox bishops, of both the Autocephalous and the Autonomous groups, did not await the vengeance which could be expected to follow their opposition to the Soviet plan for using Orthodoxy as a propaganda weapon but fled to the Generalgouvernement. Here they were given considerably more courteous treatment than had been their lot in the Reichskommissariat.[72] Moreover, the Ostministerium felt able at last to push forward its plans for formation of a national church. The project envisaged by Rosenberg's ministry called for union of the two rival branches. Ostensibly this union would have been a compromise, but, like the abortive agreement signed by Alexius, it would have favored the Autocephalous group. The Ostministerium officials in charge of the negotiations were obviously sympathetic to Mstyslav and Hilarion, though somewhat cooler toward Polykarp.[73] On the other hand, they viewed Panteleimon, the real leader of the Autonomous group, as a "Russian" and obstinate; they proposed to induce him to leave the Ukraine altogether by offering him the vacant Orthodox see of Riga.[74] The Autocephalous desire for a union in which there would be for a time "Russian bishops for the Russian minority," who would later be absorbed into the "Ukrainian church," obviously envisaged a relegation of the Autonomous bishops, or at least of those who persisted in favoring Russian cultural and ethnic elements, to an inferior position, yet it was apparently not opposed by the Ostministerium.[75]

[71] CXLVa 66.

[72] *Ibid.*

[73] *Ibid.*

[74] *Ibid.* The nominal leader of the Autonomous Church, elected to succeed Alexius, was Damaskin of Kamenets-Podolsk, who appears by this time to have returned to the Autonomous fold (cf. *Volyn'*, July 1, 1943, p. 3).

[75] CXLVa 66. Although this project could not be carried out, the Ostministerium continued to favor to the limit of its capacities the Ukrainian national group in religious as well as political affairs. Cf. Memorandum of Rosenfelder (specialist in the Ostministerium) to Chef des Führungstabes Politik, December 14, 1944, concerning plans for increasing the influence of the Autocephalous Church among

795 The plans for a nationalist church were frustrated, however, by the refusal of the Autonomous bishops to accept the role assigned them by the Ostministerium and by the impotency of the latter agency to enforce its wishes. Instead of uniting with the other bishops from the Ukraine, the surviving Autonomous hierarchs adhered to the émigré Russian Orthodox Church represented by the Karlovtsi Synod. At least two of them had done so by the beginning of October, 1944, and the remainder soon followed.[76] The coincidence of these steps with the adherence of certain prominent Ukrainians to the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia suggests that the same German forces which encouraged the Vlasov movement may also have supported the decision of the church group. The fact that such a step was taken, however, confirms the appraisal of the Autonomous Church as an organization closely linked to those elements which desired the continuance and the prevalence of Russian culture in the Ukraine and the maintenance of political ties with Russia.

795 668* The organization, tactics, and specific objectives of the Autocephalous Church were distinct from those of the nationalist parties during the war period. The very concept of an independent Ukrainian church served to promote a feeling of Ukrainian national distinctiveness, however, and since the Autocephalous clergy were usually propagators of nationalism, no consideration of the nationalist movements in the Orthodox East Ukraine under German occupation which failed to take into account the role of 795 the Autocephalous Church would be complete. Since the rival

the *Ostarbeiter* at the expense of the Russian Orthodox Church, CXLVa 76, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 76).

[76] Rosenfelder to Chef des Führungsstabes Politik, October 4, 1944, CXLVa 74, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 74); *UAPTs*, p. 6. At least one Autocephalous and three Autonomous bishops remained behind when the Red Army reoccupied the East Ukraine. Two of the former Autonomous bishops, Anthony (Martsenko) and Hiob (Kresovych), were apparently permitted to exercise episcopal functions under Soviet rule. Cf. Wassilij Alexeev, *Russian Orthodox Bishops in the Soviet Union, 1941–1953: Materials for the History of the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR* (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954), pp. 134 ff. (mimeographed, with Russian language text).

Autonomous Church sought to maintain ties with Moscow, it is especially illuminating to compare its influence with that of the nationalist church. Consequently, the activities of the two rival churches will be noted frequently in the following chapters on the East Ukraine.[77] 795

[77] An important recent work on the church in the Ukraine, Friedrich Heyer's *Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945* (Köln-Braunsfeld: Verlagsgesellschaft Rudolf Müller, 1953), reached me too late for notice in the body of this study. Heyer, who served with the Wehmacht in the occupied Soviet Union during the Second World War, had numerous personal contacts with leaders of both the Autonomous Church and the Autocephalous Church; in addition, he has apparently been able to utilize notes or othe documents concerning ecclesiastical affairs acquired in the course of his military service. In general, his account of church developments corresponds to that which I have given above and in succeeding chapters, and his conclusions are similar except that he ascribes somewhat greater success to the Autonomous Church. While much of his discussion of the wartime period is devoted to purely ecclesiastical affairs which I did not attempt to cover in detail, his work is extremely valuabe from the political and sociological standpoint as well. Particularly interesting are his abundant details on the extent of reorganization of religious life in the occupied territories, and his comments on the response of the population to the efforts of the churches.

IX. CHANNELS OF NATIONALIST ACTIVITY

[795] 668* THOUGH the church did in some measure provide an institutional framework through which nationalist sentiment could be expressed, its usefulness for the propagation of a political doctrine was necessarily limited. Such organizational channels were essential to the nationalist movements if they were to achieve large-scale results in the occupied East Ukraine. To be sure, the underground parties themselves provided a network of contacts and a minimum of central direction. In comparison with the vast area to be covered—populated in 1941–43, even after wartime dislocations, by thirty millions—resources under their direct control [208] were microscopic. Clandestine publications could be issued by mimeograph machines or small hand presses and circulated from one trusted individual to another. Such propaganda could, however, reach only a few thousand. As underground groups, the nationalist parties necessarily had extremely small memberships. For example, a group of twelve members of the OUN-B in Kramatorskaia (Kremators'ka) in the Donbas is referred to by one of the leaders of the party in that area as a "big" cell.[1] Again, the entire number of active OUN-M workers in Kiev in late 1942 never exceeded thirty.[2] It is certain that the members of each of the OUN organizations in the chief cities after early 1942 could be counted in dozens and that the total number of active workers in the East Ukraine numbered only a few hundred.

For a conspiratorial organization, however, the number of members is not necessarily a criterion of effectiveness. By infiltrating key positions in public institutions, the nationalist parties might obtain influence out of all proportion to the number of their adherents. Moreover, even when centrally organized parties like

[1] Interview 66.
[2] Interview 65.

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the two factions of the OUN were unable to penetrate institutional channels, it was sometimes possible for nationalist groups limited to specific localities to do so. No appraisal of the strength of nationalism in the East Ukraine during 1941–43 would be complete without an examination of this penetration of the institutional framework by nationalists. In such an examination it is essential to proceed with great caution, for it is all too easy for adherents of Ukrainian nationalist groups to ascribe in retrospect an exaggerated importance to their influence during the years of occupation. It would be tedious to describe the complicated and frequently unsatisfying ways in which the element of fact in inflated postwar accounts has been sought. Suffice it to say at this point that the basic approach has been the testing of the details of proper names, place names, and dates contained in each narration (whether in the form of printed memoir or oral testimony) against the abundant but superficial material contained in the Ukrainian press during the war years. In addition, the available wartime underground publications and German reports have been utilized. In this fashion, at least the extent of the real acquaintance of the narrator with the area he describes can be estimated, and frequently the validity of his assessment of the role of persons and events can be surmised by reading between the lines of descriptions published legally—but with a trace of "Aesopian" language—during the war.

668* 127

Primary targets for the efforts of nationalist elements in their campaign to win access to the East Ukrainian masses were the administrative apparatuses existing at the local level throughout the area of German occupation. The general outline of the machinery of government established by the Nazi regime in the occupied eastern territories has been described, and the policy of the officials in charge traced. The ruthless policy pursued made open activity of the OUN groups impossible, and their failure to understand this fact in time resulted in the slaughter of many of their adherents. The extent to which nationalist administrative officials could survive in the capital has already been indicated, however, and what was true of Kiev was true to a more marked degree of many of the smaller centers of the Ukraine. In spite

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727 of the determined efforts of Erich Koch and his cohorts to bring
634 every aspect of life under their control, the sheer extent of the Ukraine and the size of its population prevented complete success. For example, in the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev, there were only five hundred Germans on the administrative staff, charged with governing a population of 1,920,000, in an area of nearly seventeen thousand square miles.[3]

191 The limitations on control arising from the small number of
634 German personnel available were made yet narrower by the
727 language barrier. The extent to which the Wehrmacht was dependent on nationalists as interpreters has already been described. Since few Reichskommissariat officials knew the Slavic languages and yet in general rejected the use of émigrés or West Ukrainians as aides, they were thrown back on local interpreters and assistants as intermediaries between themselves and the masses. Supposedly
626 reliable persons, often ethnic Germans, were employed. These
634 physical limitations, however, compelled the German officials to
727 concentrate on keeping the "commanding heights" of the administration—economic controls, armed force, and means of communication—in their hands, while turning over most other aspects of public affairs to administrators drawn from the native population. In these fields they could lay down policy and occasionally intervene brutally to punish real or fancied violations of their directives. They could play one group against another and thereby secure a check on the development of movements threatening to pass from German control. They could place all aspects of life under a crushing weight of fear and material deprivation. Lacking a body of supporters extending down to the smallest units of society, however, they could not enforce a positive program of indoctrination and—except in an intermittent and incomplete fashion—they could not prevent those who were in contact with the masses of the population from imparting their own ideological tinge to their activities.

634 The physical limitations of German power meant that the
727 local administrative machinery in the East Ukraine was to a large extent left to the inhabitants. Local men were of course especially predominant in the administration of rural areas, but

[3] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, December 2, 1942, p. 1; *Volyn'*, February 25, 1943, p. 4.

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for reasons which will be discussed in the next chapter, little is 634
known about their activities in connection with nationalism. The 727
city administrations were more closely supervised by the Germans, but their size prevented them from being completely controlled. In spite of the fact that the populace soon realized that only the shadow of power was permitted the local administrations, the concept of the omnipotence of state control was so well established that even the outer signs of authority behind the nationalist cause were of some importance in winning support for it. Throughout the occupied Ukraine, except for the Donbas, which [191]
was very mixed ethnically, the languages of administration were German and Ukrainian only. Although it is said that the officials who carried on the governmental work in the prescribed language frequently spoke Russian as soon as they had left their desks, and sometimes even wrote their reports and orders in that language,[4] having them translated into Ukrainian, the prestige value of the change was considerable. The same was true of the wide- [186]
spread use of national symbols, which had been forbidden under Soviet rule, such as the trident and the blue and yellow colors; they appeared on the uniforms of the police, as banners decorating the administrative buildings, even on the streetcars. On the other hand, the removal of these symbols, when Russophile elements were introduced into the administration to replace the nationalists, was equally important as a negative token of loss of prestige; the official language, however, always remained [191]
Ukrainian.[5]

Some indication of the influence exerted upon the overt atti- 186
tudes of the inhabitants of the East Ukraine by the apparent ascendancy of Ukrainian nationalism is furnished by nationalities statistics obtained from censuses taken by various city administrations in late 1941 and early 1942,[6] since each citizen was usually

[4] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3.

[5] When the *Ukrains'ke Slovo* group was arrested, the cultural department of the Kiev city administration was ordered to remove all tridents and Ukrainian flags; see Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukrains'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 11. In Dniepropetrovsk, the Germans followed up the destruction of the Ukrainian *oblast* administration by removing the trident from the masthead of *Vil'na Ukraïna* (The Free Ukraine), the city's newspaper, and changing its name to *Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta* (Interview 77).

[6] See Appendix.

186 permitted to determine his own nationality. There was an enormous increase in the proportion of persons claiming Ukrainian nationality as compared to the Soviet census of 1926, which had been conducted in the same fashion. That many factors were involved in the shift is indicated by the extreme variations from city to city, which will be touched upon in a later chapter. There [626] is, moreover, little doubt that pressures, ranging from fear of the nationalist-dominated police (which, in Zhitomir at least, took the census) to desire to obtain material benefits reserved for Ukrainians only, were significant. There is no question, however, that a large number of those who claimed Ukrainian nationality in 1941–42 were influenced by a desire to "climb upon the band wagon" by obtaining affiliation with the national group which they thought would be in favor in the future. The nationalist mayor of Kiev, Leontii Forostivs'kyi, during whose administration the census in the capital was taken, freely admits the importance of this factor.[7]

633 From a material standpoint, too, the municipal administration played a considerable role in the provision of support for nationalist activity. The funds at its disposal were not inconsiderable, the Kharkov city budget amounting to the equivalent of some eight million dollars annually.[8] The number of municipal employees was also sizable. In Kiev the total under Bahazii's direction, evidently largely dependent on the central municipal authority for their positions, was twenty thousand.[9] This figure was regarded as so excessive by the Germans that it figured in the charges made against him, but several months after his arrest the number employed by the city—apparently the purely administrative branches only, exclusive of education and manufacturing and commercial enterprises—was still 1,138, and 1,065 more were working for the *raions*.[10] Even the smaller figures are quite significant in a city whose total population had by that time sunk to 350,000, an extremely small percentage of which consisted of

[7] Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), p. 50.

[8] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, May 23–24, 1943, p. 2, quotes Mayor Semenenko as saying the budget for the last quarter of 1942 totaled 50,000,000 *karbovontsi* (10 *k.* = 1 RM = $0.40).

[9] PS 192.

[10] *Ukraïns'ka Diiamist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

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employable men. From the point of view of political sentiment, 633
as will be shown, the composition of the administrative force [565]
made it even more significant, for over one fourth were of the upper levels of the intelligentsia—those having a higher education—while another 35 percent were probably of the Soviet "intelligentsia," since they possessed secondary educations.[11] The city administrations, with their appurtenances of schools and publications, thus served as refuges for the intellectual class in general, which was shorn of its customary economic role by the terrible dislocations of war. Consequently the orientation of the structure in which they found a place could play a vital role in determining the direction this group's sentiments would take.

At least two East Ukrainian mayors,[12] in addition to Bahazii, 186
lost their lives for too ardent devotion to the nationalist cause. 633
Even when they were not in conflict with the occupying power, the mayors knew that their positions singled them out for Communist vengeance, from either secret agents or the returning Red Army. That a considerable group of officials was found to remain true to the nationalist cause—even if a bit timidly at times—is an indication that a considerable reservoir of leadership for nationalism existed in the East Ukraine.

While the city administration as a whole was both a symbol 727
of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy and an instrument for ad- 633
vancing the nationalist cause, the individual departments were frequently of equal or greater significance. Their importance derived in large measure from the fact that administrative divisions entrusted with very important functions were frequently operated in considerable independence of the central municipal administration.

In practice the amount of authority exercised by any major official depended more on his own character and his relations with the German authorities than upon any formal apportionment of power. This was especially the case in the large cities, where in addition to the *Stadtkommissar* who stood above the native mayor, there were German officials in charge of each of

[11] *Ibid.*
[12] In Kamenets-Podolsk and Poltava.

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727 the departments of administration. In such cases the department
633 heads who were on good terms with their German superiors seem to have been able to pursue courses substantially independent of the mayor, and this was also to an extent true of the firmer or more clever of those who wished to exert their own authority even without special German support. Consequently, it sometimes happened that one or more sections of a municipal administration were strongholds of nationalist activity, while the city as a whole was administered by elements opposed to Ukrainian independence.

Under the Soviet system, the municipal administrations had included departments of finance, communal economy, internal trade, health, popular education, social security, and cadres, as well as a general department, a planning commission, and sometimes departments of local manufacturing and agriculture. In the city administrations under German occupation, there was evidently some consolidation of departments, but in general the Soviet division was little changed, except for the elimination of the planning commission. On the other hand, several new departments were added for functions which had been performed by higher Soviet administrative levels but which the Germans wished to allocate, under their own control, to the cities. One was the propaganda department, which will be discussed somewhat later. Another was the juridical department, which operated a system of lower courts.[13] It was, however, of little or no importance as a channel of nationalist activity. Much more significant in this
625 respect were the police departments. Some indications of their
727 activity in nationalist affairs have already been given. The Ger-
633 mans, of course, exerted great efforts to keep this element of authority, the only branch of the local administration which could have offered armed resistance to their rule, under firm control. Since the police power was regularly in the hands of German SP officials, who frequently maintained only a nominal subordination to the *Stadtkommissar,* the Ukrainian chief of this department was correspondingly independent of the mayor.

[13] On the legal system in the Reichskommissariat, see Nicholas Laskovs'kyi, "Practicing Law in the Occupied Ukraine," *American Slavic and East European Review,* XI (April, 1952), 124 ff.

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Moreover, since there were several German police authorities— 727
ordinary security police, secret police, railway police—operating 625
in the same area, unified at the top but having different Ukrain- 633
ian subchiefs operating under them, the possibility of several competing or antagonistic influences existed. In spite of the special concern of the Reichskommissariat to root out all OUN members in the police, the latter were able for many months to maintain their positions in several cities. For example, while the city administrations of Vinnitsa and Dniepropetrovsk were in the hands of Russophile elements opposed to Ukrainian nationalism, the police chief in the former city[14] and the Ukrainian in charge of the secret police in the latter[15] were supporters of the OUN. Close as was the supervision of the German police authorities, it was obviously impossible for them to watch every action of their subordinates, so that possession of such support within the police force was of great value to the nationalist groups.

In the wave of repression in Kiev in December, 1941, the fact 186
that his sympathizers controlled the police in the *raion* in which 625
he was arrested allowed the chief of the OUN-M in the East 727
Ukraine, Dr. Kandyba, to secure his release, thus enabling him to prolong his activities for more than two years.[16] Moreover, the presence of nationalist elements in the police force served to prevent the control of these groups by secret Communist agents, who were successful in penetrating the police in a number of places in the southern Ukraine, and for a while in Kiev itself, through the German practice of retaining the Soviet *militsiia* as a matter of convenience.[17] Whatever value the nationalist penetration of the police force may have had in this connection was largely offset by the odium which attached to the nationalist groups when it became known to the population that they were collaborating with the Germans in this fashion. Moreover, the ill repute of the police was sometimes increased by the actions of the nationalists themselves who used the police as an instrument for terrorizing non-Ukrainians.[18]

[14] Interview 1.
[15] Interviews 1, 18.
[16] L. Dniprova, article in *Ukrains'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.
[17] Interview 59.
[18] It is said that the Ukrainian police in Kiev, when ordered to secure hostages

747 Of less obvious importance than the police sections, but never-
737 theless of great significance were the agencies concerned with health, social security, and welfare. The extreme limitations placed upon the efforts of the local administrations to maintain their starving citizens have already been described. Nevertheless, the fact that they could carry on activity was of some importance, both from the practical standpoint and from that of providing the population with token participation in administration. The Germans were undoubtedly content to leave this arduous and thankless task to the local leaders. Welfare activities were in part the responsibility of municipal departments, in part the function of volunteer organizations. This duplication gave rise to the possibility of conflicting political trends in the same field of operation. In Kiev the head of the welfare department, until his consecration as an Autocephalous bishop, was Professor Haiévs'kyi,[19] and even after his resignation the department seems to have been in the hands of nationalist elements. The paucity of the resources available to this section has been indicated in a preceding chapter; nevertheless, it was able to arrange for the provision of buildings for care of the distressed.[20] At the same time, the Ukrainian Red Cross, which had been formed as an organ of the city government and which had carried on extensive operations in relieving the horrible conditions in the prisoner-of-war camps, had been dissolved by the Germans. Apparently this action was due in part to its use by Nationalist elements as a screen for their activities, but more particularly to its humane exertions. Its leader, Professor Theodore Bohatyrchuk, who, after having welcomed collaboration with the OUN-M group, had become disgusted with its excesses in Kiev, now turned to support of the Russophile element.[21] His organization, which was reformed as the All-Ukrainian Aid Committee (Vseukraïns'kyi

after explosions set off by Communist agents in Kiev in the autumn of 1941, arrested only Russians, scores of whom were then shot (Interviews 19, 59). However, a German order provided that Ukrainians were not to be taken as hostages while Russians were to be arrested for this purpose (Order of Befehlshaber des Ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiet Süd, August 16, 1941, NOKW 1691; hereafter referred to as NOKW 1691).

[19] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Interviews 19, 71.

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Komitet Dopomohy), was able, even on the eve of German evacuation, to provide meals for 36,000 persons (children and others unable to work),[22] one sixth of the city's population; its great popularity[23] was of tremendous importance in enabling Bohatyrchuk to secure support for his stand in favor of coalition with anti-Soviet Russians. On the other hand, in Dniepropetrovsk, where the city administration was largely in the hands of pro-Russian elements, the Ukrainians, inspired by an OUN-M organizer, formed a Red Cross organization which acted as a center for nationalist forces.

The nationalist element was more successful in the field of cooperative organization. While each city administration contained a department of trade, the cooperatives, as quasi-public bodies, appear to have been considerably more important as channels of local initiative. Far from being a product of the Communist regime, the cooperative movement was indigenous to both East and West Ukraine, having played an important role before the First World War, when it was already imbued with nationalist overtones.[24] In the NEP period of Soviet rule, and until the late twenties, the cooperatives had been able to maintain a considerable degree of independence and had, at least in the Kharkov region, served as a center for nationalist elements which worked with the Republican government.[25] In the Five Year Plan periods, the urban cooperatives had become adjuncts of the state trading systems, and other cooperatives had been closely integrated into state commercial operations.[26]

[22] *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo*, September 19, 1943, pp. 4–5; see also *Volyn'*, January 28, 1943, p. 3.

[23] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 4.

[24] For abundant details on the complex system of cooperatives developed in the Ukraine prior to 1917, see Eugene M. Kayden and Alexis N. Antsiferov, *The Cooperative Movement in Russia During the War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), a volume in the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, ed. James T. Shotwell, Russian Series, compiled for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. Cooperatives were far more developed in the Ukraine than in most other heavily populated areas of the Russian Empire (*ibid.*, pp. 40, 41, 266–69, 357), and served educational as well as economic development. Kharkov was the chief cooperative center in the Ukraine and was largely independent of the Russian centers.

[25] Interview 73.

[26] Alexander Baikov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 253; Arthur C. Arnold, *Banks, Credit, and Money in Soviet Russia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 477.

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727 When the Germans arrived, surviving leaders of the former
474 independent cooperatives were again able to assert themselves. As early as the winter of 1941–42, there was a total of 643 cooperative organizations in the Kiev region, including forty-eight *raion* food societies which bought agricultural produce and carried on economic organization;[27] in the city of Kharkov there were 150 cooperatives, which maintained close contacts with their sources of food stocks in the countryside.[28] There were, in addition to numerous distributing cooperatives, twenty-eight producing cooperatives in Kiev, in such diverse fields as transport, printing, and haberdashery.[29] The Ukraïnbank (All-Ukrainian Cooperative Bank), which had been formed in 1922 for financing all types of cooperatives, but incorporated in the Soviet central Torgbank in 1936, was revived.[30]

727 Moreover, there were more direct links to the nationalist move-
474 ments. An effort was made, with German approval, to organize
186 a general center for the food cooperatives, known as the All-Ukrainian Cooperative Society (Vseukraïns'ka Kooperatyvna Spilka), which coordinated local organizations, published a bulletin, and restored the museum of the history of cooperative development, an institution of considerable significance for nationalist sentiment.[31] Under an old officer of the Ukrainian army, Professor Perevertuna, a close collaborator of the OUN-M, it carried out activities on a large scale in the Kiev area, especially training replacements for the diminished ranks of cooperative workers.[32] In addition to more indirect fostering of nationalist sentiment, its aid to the nationalist cause included employing persons whom the Germans had dismissed from the municipal administration.[33] In early 1943, however, such activities resulted in the execution of the director.[34]

[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.
[28] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 24, 1942, p. 2.
[29] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 5, 1942, p. 2.
[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 10, 1942, p. 4. Cf. Baikov, p. 86, and Arnold, p. 477, for the background of this bank.
[31] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.
[32] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, July 11, 1942, p. 3.
[33] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75.
[34] *Ibid.*; *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 585.

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Like the cooperative movement, popular education had long been a cornerstone of Ukrainian nationalism, more important in many respects than direct political action. In the conflict between the national Communists in the Ukraine and the Stalinist centralists, it was especially the commissars of education, such as Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk, who had led the fight for Ukrainization of cultural life. Consequently it was natural that nationalist Ukrainians were determined to control the municipal departments of education under German occupation. 727 658 871 626

A major aim of the Reichskommissar and his henchmen, however, was to prevent the development of a cultured Ukrainian class, to convert the people into a race of submissive peasants. Rosenberg's vision of a university in Kiev went by the board, and the standard schooling for every Ukrainian child was set at four years.[35] Few material injuries were as deeply resented as this drastic curb on the opportunities for education. Since there were real shortages of materials, books, and teachers, the Ukrainians held to the hope that the restriction did not represent a permanent policy, even in the face of the closing of *gimnaziias* which had been reopened under the army administration through the efforts of the local population itself.[36]

To a limited extent the ban on secondary and higher education was evaded by the extensive use made of a loophole in the German regulations which allowed the reopening of technical schools. The enormous loss of artisans and professionally trained persons incurred by the annihilation of the Jewish inhabitants compelled even the power-mad Nazis to recognize the need for training Ukrainians in such occupations. A large number of technical secondary schools, agricultural schools, and even institutes of higher education like medical faculties, were permitted. The extent to which these facilities were utilized by the Ukrainian population is indicated by the fact that the enrollment of the Kiev medical institute reached 2,000 in 1943 when the total population of the city was only 300,000, while Kherson, with a fifth 874 717 186

[35] Report of Rosenberg to Hitler, August 11, 1942, PS 42 (hereafter referred to as PS 42); PS 1198.

[36] E.g., in Berdichev (*Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3, quoting *Nova Doba* [Berdichev] for September 1), Zhitomir (Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941), and Belaia Tserkov' (*Nationalist*, December 20, 1941, p. 2).

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874 that number of inhabitants, had 541 students in its medi-
727 cal school.[37] Medical institutes were also reopened in Stalino,
186 Dniepropetrovsk, and Vinnitsa, and perhaps in other cities, although it is doubtful if any of these were the centers of nationalist youth organization which the faculty in Kiev became under the leadership of the OUN-M.[38]

The educational structure described in the preceding paragraph was designed for adolescents or young adults, and thus could be used for direct propagation of nationalist concepts. It was, of course, partly for this reason that the Germans confined advanced training within such narrow limits. Even these restrictions were not the end of the difficulties faced in inculcating a nationalist type of education in those about to assume the role of citizens,
[466] for the technical schools were frequently emptied of their students and faculty to meet the demands of the *Ostarbeiter* recruiters. The elementary schools were also drained of teachers by the *Ostarbeiter* program, and the pupils, though too young for forced labor, were decimated by famine and plague. If the task of building national consciousness had to be viewed as a long-term one, then the four-year elementary school offered a considerable field for cultivation.[39]

191 The problem confronting the nationalist leaders in education
727 was twofold: they had to ensure a basis for the development of an independent Ukraine by making certain that all instruction
872 was in the Ukrainian language, so that the rising generation
186 would be fully at home in this speech; and they had to replace the Communist ideology by a positive nationalist concept. The first task was relatively uncomplicated, though far from easy in practice. In line with their policy of encouraging the purely nonpolitical aspects of Ukrainian nationality, the Germans ordered all instruction to be in Ukrainian. The nationalist directors enthusiastically supported this rule, but it was sometimes difficult to enforce it, since even teachers who were themselves nationalist in sentiment were not always able to conduct classes in Ukrainian.[40]

[37] Occ E-4 (1); *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, October 10, 1942, p. 1.
[38] See Chapter V.
[39] In Kiev alone there were fifty elementary schools with 17,000 students (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2).
[40] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 4; M. Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki*

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It was much more difficult to secure a predominant place for 727
the nationalist ideology in the schools. As is usually the case in 186
nationalist indoctrination in the schools, the efforts were concen- 872
trated upon the teaching of history.[41] This was especially important, since the justification of the Ukrainian independence movement is largely based upon the conception of a proud history distinct from that of the people of Moscow. Naturally enough, no Soviet textbooks were acceptable for the teaching of history from this point of view or from the general standpoint of eradicating Communist indoctrination. To some extent the gap was filled by [214]
books published in the year preceding the Soviet war by the educational press of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow.[42] Some texts were printed by the cultural department of the Kiev city administration. An amateurish effort was made also by certain OUN-B organizers to print locally a new version of Ukrainian history with an introduction of their own composition.[43] In view of the great material shortages and the brief time available, however, the lack of printed materials could not be made good. Consequently, a great deal depended on securing the proper teachers. To what extent the many thousands employed in the schools adhered to the nationalist doctrine is of course impossible to determine, but a number of purely indigenous formulations of nationalist concepts to be inculcated in the schools attest to the strength of nationalist feeling. The head of the Mariupol' school system proposed to stress the native language, love of the fatherland, and respect for elders; the educational ideology advocated by the group of young men who reorganized life in Krivoi Rog was instillation of Cossack ideals, the code of the Zaporozhian Sich, which was to lead to a spiritual, moral, and physical regeneration.[44]

Since the formal school program was largely confined to young 186
children, great efforts were also concentrated on developing a 517
voluntary system of adult education. The Prosvita societies had 515

Visti, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 27, 1943, p. 4, quoting D. Nitsenko in *Nova Ukraïna* (Kharkov).

[41] Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4.

[42] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 10, 1941, p. 2.

[43] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 28.

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 29, 1942, p. 2; November 15, 1941, p. 2; and November 18, 1941, p. 3 (referring to an article in *Dzvin* [Krivoi Rog], September, 1941).

186 been founded by the nationalist intelligentsia of the East Ukraine
517 many years before the Revolution. They were now revived, after
575 long suppression by the Communist regime, to carry on the work of developing national culture and inculcating a feeling of national identity. The two aims could be combined because all nationalist Ukrainians felt it essential to instill a love of the indigenous popular arts and customs, emphasizing their distinctive nature. That this effort had a political as well as a cultural sig-
[661] nificance is indicated by the fact that not only the Soviet regime (both before 1941 and upon reconquest, as in Kharkov)[45] but the German police as well attacked the Prosvita societies, and in the Reichskommissariat they were able, for varying periods, to lead only a clandestine life. The desire for national expression was shared by so many, however, that the Germans felt it was impossible to dam up all outlets; therefore the Prosvita was generally permitted, though under close observation.[46] Together with the church (and a few local societies not using the Prosvita name but having the same function), it was one of the few organizations of a nationalist character which was not under direct German control.

533 The work of the Prosvita groups, although arranged in various
517 ways in different localities, may be classified under four general
186 headings. Playing a major role everywhere were musical activities,
575 particularly choral groups, in which the Ukrainians had always excelled, and which served as a powerful intellectual and emotional stimulus to nationalist feeling, since most of the songs were distinctively Ukrainian. In addition, groups of *bandura* players (the *bandura* is a small lute-like stringed instrument indigenous to the Ukraine) were sponsored, and orchestras were
545 trained. In the larger centers, Prosvita collaborated with regular
517 professional musical organizations, such as conservatories and
575 operas, to produce nationalist-inspired performances. For ex-
186 ample, operas were reopened in Kiev and Kharkov, and offered a considerable repertoire of native Ukrainian pieces (*Taras Bul'ba, Natalka Poltavka,* etc.) as well as traditional Western

[45] Cf. *Nastup,* September 26, 1943, p. 3 (based on *Vinnyts'ki Visti,* August 29, 1943), on the destruction of Prosvita and its personnel in Kharkov during the Soviet interlude in February-March, 1943.

[46] MS E; PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

operas such as *Madame Butterfly* and *Les Cloches de Corneville*. 545
Like other forms of national expression, however, operatic per- 517
formances ran afoul of the Nazi hatred of independent activity. 575
At first, the desirable places in the Kiev opera were reserved for 186
Germans, and then, in December, 1942, the performances were suspended altogether, an action which aroused the indignation of all elements of the population.[47]

Within a matter of days after the Red Army was driven out, active theatrical groups likewise sprang up, usually with Prosvita sponsorship, even in the smaller cities of the East Ukraine. For example, a theater had been started in Zhitomir before the first month of German occupation was past.[48] Even in cities like Chernigov and Simferopol' (in the Crimea), where evidences of nationalist activity were scanty, the theater was soon in full career.[49] Since the players were generally amateurs interested in using this medium of expression of their nationalist feeling, the performances were nationalist in content as well as language (evidently to a greater extent than the opera which, being composed largely of professional performers, was imbued with an "all-Union," i.e., Russian, character, at least behind the scenes).[50] Some presentations were so strongly imbued with nationalist ideology that they were censored by the Germans; the author of one of the most popular, Constantine Hupalo, was arrested for nationalist activity.[51]

Prosvita and related groups sponsored a wide variety of more 517
directly educational activities. These included lectures, valued 575
as a means of propagating knowledge of the language as well as 186
for their content; libraries and reading rooms, vital to the spread of the printed word in view of the extreme scarcity of even periodical literature; nationalist cultural work in the schools; and research and discussion on themes of national history and ethnography. In the more vigorous and less restricted societies, like the

[47] Interrogation of Shtepa, CXLVa 78; PS 1198.

[48] *Ukraïns'ka Diïsnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1 (from *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* [Zhitomir], August 3, 1941).

[49] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 6, 1941, p. 4 (based on an interview with Theodore Pipa, the Chernigov editor).

[50] Cf. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 15, 1942, p. 3.

[51] His play, entitled *The Triumph of Procurator Dal'shii*, was a drama of the Ukrainian nationalist movement under Soviet rule (*OUN u Viini*, p. 74).

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186 Prosvita in Kharkov, these activities were greatly extended. The
515 latter group operated a House of Popular Culture which served
517 as a center for most nationalist organizations in the city, and came close to developing into an unofficial government.[52] Moreover, under the leadership of the energetic Professor V. V. Dubrovs'kyi, it undertook economic as well as purely cultural activities, such as book publishing and the provision of material aid for needy teachers and students.[53] Some indication of the scope of Prosvita's activities in Kharkov is provided by the fact that membership reached one thousand, while four thousand persons attended one of its concert series.[54]

In most places *Prosvita* and other cultural activities appear to have developed quite independently of the Nationalist party organizers from the west. To a certain extent the ideology of the Nationalists, especially that of the OUN-B, made them contemptuous of such gradual and unspectacular methods of developing nationalist strength.[55] To be sure, in centers such as Kiev and Zhitomir, which were strongly permeated by the OUN-M forces, cooperative relations existed between the latter and the local founders of Prosvita, but the Nationalist party did not have the personnel to carry on cultural work itself and apparently did

[52] Cf. Serednopolets'kyi in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 24, 1942, p. 2, on organizations operating in the House of National Culture. Erich Koch, in his letter to Rosenberg of March 16, 1943 (PS 192), complained that the Wehrmacht permitted the Kharkov Prosvita to become a sort of national government, and its role as a political as well as a cultural force is confirmed by Interview 73.

[53] *Nastup*, September 26, 1943, p. 3, based on an interview with a leading member of the Kharkov Prosvita, Professor P. Petrenko, in *Vinnyts'ki Visti*, August 29, 1943.

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 10, 1943, p. 2.

[55] For example, Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: Spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), p. 40, writes that it was necessary for OUN-B members to withdraw from Prosvita, amateur groups, etc., as these (after the introduction of the Reichskommissariat) were only tools of the Germans, and nationalist participation in them gave color to the Communist propaganda which represented the OUN as an agency of the Germans. On the other hand, the clandestine *Biuleten'* (No. 4, previously cited), in calling for an extension of OUN-B activity to all fields of life, criticizes those who condemn activity which is not of a strictly terroristic, revolutionary nature as "Prosvitanstvo."

not find the Prosvita organization well adapted to its tactic of 517
underground work after German suppression.[56] On the other 575
hand, the extremely important Kharkov Prosvita was organized 186
almost entirely by local residents who had in many cases been associated with the Prosvita of pre-Soviet days, and who were unassociated with, or even to some extent hostile to, the OUN-M.[57] Here again there is strong indication of the survival in the East Ukraine of leadership capable of taking direction of important aspects of national life. That this leadership was directed to such a considerable extent to the less aggressive aspects of national development, however, indicates that a certain gap existed during the war years between nationalism in the East and the West Ukraine.

The means employed in the educational systems and in the 186
cultural societies for propagating the national ideology can be 208
classed for the most part under the heading of oral propaganda. The face-to-face type of communication has a long history of effective use in the east Slavic countries and, under the name "oral agitation," has been widely cultivated as a means of strengthening the Communist regime. Hence the population was used to this type of propaganda. Moreover, it was especially suited [227]
to the work of the nationalist groups, which were seeking to spread ideas frowned upon by the German authorities. The latter could suppress a performance or dissolve a society, arrest or execute a leader, but with their small number of personnel, their ignorance of the language, and their lack of sufficiently numerous and reliable local agents, they could not overhear everything and thus prevent the clever teacher or cultural worker from communicating political concepts to his audience. Since nationalist propagandists were so few and ill-equipped by organization and training to cope with the gigantic task of indoctrinating a population of thirty million, however, the problem of securing access to mass communication media under control of the propaganda departments of the municipal administrations was vitally important. Through such media nationalism might reach thousands

[56] Interview 61.
[57] Interviews 57, 73.

186 where oral methods by the same number of agitators reached
208 scores and live theatrical performances reached hundreds.

204 The principal activity of the propaganda department of a
727 Ukrainian municipal administration under German occupation
186 centered around the local newspaper, for other media such as the radio and motion pictures were under complete German control. It is worth devoting considerable attention to journalistic activity throughout the East Ukraine because of the value such study can have in elucidating the whole problem of the extent of nationalist activity in that area. Newspapers not only reached large numbers, but represented a symbol of authoritative pronouncement to a people accustomed to viewing the statements of the Soviet press as announcements of policy not subject to question.[58]

However much the German authorities may have feared the existence of a Ukrainian press, it was absolutely essential for them to authorize and support it for their own purposes. Under the Wehrmacht administration, especially in the early days, a very nonrestrictive policy was pursued, as was indicated by the ideologically independent nature of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* in Zhitomir and Kiev. General ground rules laid down included prohibition of the term "Ukraine" in the sense of a state, rather than as a territorial expression; insistence on reference to Germany as the "protector" of the Ukraine, rather than as an "ally"; and designation of the Wehrmacht as "saviors" rather than "occupiers."[59] Under army control newspapers sprang up in scores of towns, including all of the important cities of the East Ukraine, although in at least one (Poltava) the establishment of a paper was considerably delayed by the unwillingness of any officer to accept the responsibility of censoring it.[60] One reason for the Wehrmacht's

[58] There is considerably more information available on newspaper activity than on other politically significant aspects of the East Ukraine. Since many of the observers who have written accounts of the war period were themselves journalists, they naturally paid considerable attention to this field of activity. Moreover, the West Ukrainian newspapers published during the same period, which furnish the principal source of material on the East Ukraine, were also especially interested in journalistic enterprises. Consequently, one must guard against the assumption that the real importance of these newspapers was as great as the attention devoted to them indicates. Nevertheless, they were unquestionably very significant as means of transmitting nationalism and reflecting national feeling.

[59] PS 053.

[60] USSR Exhibit 278.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

liberality was a desire to carry propaganda to the numerous de- 727
serters who, if they were afraid to submit to German authority, 204
might join the Red partisans. Consequently, papers were fostered 186
in the swamp and wooded regions, even in small towns such as Ovruch, Olevsk, and Shchors. Indeed, the propaganda section of the army itself played a major role in founding newspapers, and even provided for the journalistic staffs in Zhitomir, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov the services of a competent and comparatively neutral Galician journalist, Peter Sahaidachnyi.

However, as was previously noted, the OUN-M took a leading role in establishing the papers in Zhitomir and Kiev. Its importance was also considerable in a number of the smaller cities. In Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, and Krivoi Rog, on the other hand, the initiative was taken by persons who had been journalists under the Soviet regime. In Krivoi Rog, Michael Pronchenko, a writer and poet who had been imprisoned by the Soviet regime, but later worked for the local Communist paper, upon Red army evacuation, took over the Communist press and, with the aid of other young men, began publishing a paper called *Dzvin* (The Bell).[61] In Kharkov, it was a former member of the staff of the defunct *Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna* who proposed immediately after the German arrival to start a newspaper under the name of *Novyi Chas* (The New Times).[62] It was some weeks before the paper could actually be started; the name then became *Nova Ukraïna,* and a large number of Mel'nyk adherents were on the staff. The chief editor and a majority of his subordinates, however, were local persons unaffiliated with the OUN. In a number of places Bandera organizers, too, assisted local men to establish papers.

When the Reichskommissariat took over the bulk of the East 626
Ukraine, a quite different policy was pursued; the outspokenly 204
nationalist organs were suppressed, their staffs executed. Even 186
the official policy of the Reichskommissariat, presumably ap- 727
proved by the Ostministerium, provided that all matters concerning newspapers in the native language should be submitted to the Press and Enlightenment Division of the Reichskommissariat.

[61] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 15, 1941, p. 3; Interview 7.
[62] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), pp. 7–9.

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

PLACES HAVING UKRAINIAN NEWSPAPERS 1941–45

- ● Daily
- ◉ More than once a week
- ● Weekly
- ○ Unknown

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204 Newspapers were to be held to the minimum necessary to satisfy
626 the Ukrainian desire for news, and they were to be founded only
727 where "politically unobjectionable" journalists and adequate cen-
186 sorship machinery were available.[63] Nevertheless, as even this directive indicates, the need for a Ukrainian press could not be questioned. It was absolutely essential to have some means of reaching the population with directives, of quieting rumors, and of playing up the few positive features of the German administration. Since there were very few German personnel who could write Ukrainian, local men had to be turned to, although strong requests for newspapers were frequently refused when the Germans felt the burden of providing censors outweighed possible gains in propaganda or administrative convenience.

204 While important as a symbol of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy, the newspaper had certain severe limitations as a vehicle for nationalist ideology. Its frequency and size limited its utility. There were a few dailies, but the vast majority of newspapers appeared much less frequently, as the following figures on East Ukrainian newspapers show:[64]

Papers issued	
daily	5
three times a week	18
twice a week	25
weekly	9
unknown	41
TOTAL	98

Moreover, none exceeded four pages, and a large number could print only one page (being printed on the back of Soviet posters, etc.). This sharp curtailment was due primarily to the extremely severe paper shortage, especially in the south. *Nova Ukraïna* in Kharkov was forced to reduce its printing from fifty thousand to twenty-five thousand daily;[65] the daily *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* had to limit publication to three times a week; one paper in the Taurida *Generalbezirk* had to issue one copy of each number to each commune in the area, rather than to individuals.[66]

[63] PS 702.

[64] Figures compiled from numerous sources. It is very probable that the papers marked "unknown" appeared infrequently.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 21, 1942, p. 3.

[66] PS 1693.

204 If all the limited space available had been at the editor's dis-
636 posal, it would have sufficed for the expression of a wide range of
737 political comments. Actually, a large part, usually the front page, was taken up with "news," mostly military or concerning the allegedly superior attributes of the Germans.[67] Another large body of material consisted of notices and orders of the German administration. Furthermore, the editors were frequently compelled to write, or to print over their signatures, editorials prepared by the German propaganda officers stressing some point (usually fictitious), such as the joys of the *Ostarbeiter* program or the rapid progress of land distribution, which the authorities desired to have propagandized. There was also a considerable number of articles of a factual nature, designed to "educate" the Ukrainians on some topic such as agricultural technique, in which the Germans thought them to be deficient; these were frequently translated from the German press. A certain number of notices of the activity of Ukrainian agencies—the local administrations, the church, cultural activity—was permitted under close surveillance against political propaganda. A very small number of articles on history, literature, and other cultural topics was allowed.

204 These limitations came close to placing the Ukrainian editor in
737 a strait jacket. It is almost universally recognized by persons who
636 were active in journalism at this time, however, that there were
186 a few points at which the jacket might be stretched enough to justify the effort to use the newspaper as an outlet for nationalist expression. The few literary articles permitted, while deprived of overt political content, could be used to a certain extent to

[67] With the exception of a few issues of *Ukrains'ke Slovo* and *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo* from Kiev, the actual copies of these East Ukrainian papers have uniformly disappeared, so that it is impossible to make an investigation based on direct inspection. Their disappearance is readily explained by the hasty evacuation of the Ukraine by the German forces, the danger of having German organs on one's person in a flight to the West when one might fall into Soviet hands, and above all by the desperate need for paper of any kind for ordinary household uses. As a matter of fact, extensive, but by no means complete sets were gathered by the Institute for the Study of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Prague, as well as by certain émigré newspapers. The former collection, however, remained in the Czechoslovak capital after the end of the war and eventually fell into Soviet hands after the Communist coup (Interview 30). As a result, the presentation followed here must be based almost entirely on postwar information, and especially upon the numerous descriptions of East Ukrainian newspapers and reprints of their articles contained in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

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stress themes which were basic to the formation of national pride, themes such as the nobility of Ukrainian literature, the separate development of Ukrainian and Russian history, and the value of Ukrainian folkways. Articles ostensibly directed against Communists or Jews could contain oblique thrusts at Moscow and the Russians as well; sometimes such articles did indeed represent extremes of xenophobia. Even the articles giving purely factual accounts of Ukrainian activity were prized by the nationalists, since they brought to the public's attention phases of national life which had been prohibited by the Soviets. The fact that a considerable number of such items could be found for reprinting in the relatively free West Ukrainian and émigré presses (although of course the articles so treated were far from representative) indicates that the censorship barrier was not insuperable, and simple a priori consideration of the difficulty of securing alert and reliable censors for such a large body of publications substantiates this assertion.

While it was therefore true that the newspapers could be used, to a limited extent, for nationalist propaganda, the fact that they were edited by writers known to be nationalists had a certain negative effect on the regard in which the nationalist cause was held by the population, since the newspapers were obviously tools of the Germans. Communist propaganda—and Bandera propaganda after the OUN-B workers were forced from editorial posts—made a great deal of this fact. The most courageous nationalist editors tried to overcome this accusation of serving German interests by occasional sly attacks on the Germans, using the "Aesopian" language which the subjects of the Soviet empire had been forced to learn. Thus one editor, when ordered to write an article glorifying the *Ostarbeiter* program, described in glowing terms the luxurious dining cars on the trains to Germany; few Ukrainians observing the miserable cattle cars actually provided could miss the irony.[68] Not a few editors were willing to pursue such dangerous tactics.

As far as can be detected, the only papers which were controlled by pro-Russian elements (aside from the Russian-language papers) were *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo, Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta,*

[68] Interview 3.

204 and possibly one or two of the Ukrainian-language papers in the
727 Donbas. A number of papers in the latter area and a few in the
186 southwest Ukraine were influenced by Bandera agents, although
626 edited by local people, and maintained a semblance of independence from German control. The important papers in Vinnitsa and Proskurov remained under OUN-M editors, who, however, had to exert the utmost care to avoid arrest. Some papers, like a group in the area northwest of Poltava, which were led by a young resident of Mirgorod (Myrhorod), Michael Voskobiinyk, who was the editor of the paper there, did what they could to propagate nationalist sentiment, while others in the same district were completely subservient to the Germans.[69]

It is probably safe to say that the majority of editors would have liked to insert nationalist themes in their papers, and did so in the early days before the repression. The terrible danger to which they were exposed, however, seems to have induced most to go even further than was necessary for safety's sake in eliminating every vestige of independent writing and in slavishly following the German line. This was, as some of them were ready to admit, largely a heritage from the spirit-crushing Soviet regime, for West Ukrainians in similar positions were willing to display more initiative even though exposed to greater risks.[70] It was also very probably due to the fact that the editors lacked any experience in journalism, for many had been teachers or had followed other professions which left them ill-prepared for their new tasks. The suspicion which attached to any who had worked for the
727 Soviet press, and had thus been compelled to write anti-German
186 material, forced journalists with Soviet experience to be especially
204 cautious.[71] Whatever the reasons, on the whole the East Ukrain-

[69] Interview 47.

[70] This was admitted by an East Ukrainian in *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk* in a sharp criticism of the editorial staffs who continued the Soviet tradition of complete subservience to authority in journalism, so that in some cases the Germans themselves had to urge them to be more enterprising (March 22, 1945, p. 1).

[71] One of the causes for the dismissal of Pronchenko from directorship of *Dzvin* was the accusation by his enemies that he had written an article against Hitler in a Soviet paper (MS E); Liubchenko feared that a similar charge would be made against him, and wrote that Shtepa told him outright that persons active in the Soviet press could not be employed on *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*, although this may simply have been an excuse to avoid hiring the nationalist writer (Liubchenko, pp. 26, 64).

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ians, when deprived of Nationalist support, made a rather poor showing as journalists. With some notable exceptions,[72] they did not measure up to the standards of the West Ukrainians or of old veterans of the Republican period like Nicholas Stasiuk, the editor of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta*. As will be shown, the administrative officials were also generally drawn from the intelligentsia, especially those of the academic or teaching profession, and had not been trained for the roles they assumed. That they nevertheless made a better showing of independence and devotion to national aims may possibly be explained by the fact that the Soviet regime had encouraged an attitude of limited self-assertion in local administrative bodies, so long as no questions of policy were at stake, while newspaper staffs were much more rigidly confined to transmission of Communist Party-inspired material and even more minutely controlled. Many persons of initiative must have felt it was better to take posts in which real service of a nonpolitical nature could be rendered, rather than assume the unattractive function of mouthpiece for a repressive regime. The question of the characteristics of the East Ukrainian intellectual can be considered in a larger context in the next chapter.

[72] Among these were Voskobiinyk, Hrynenko (Zhitomir), and a number of editorial writers in Kharkov, as well as those mentioned earlier as founding newspapers, although their careers were generally limited to a few weeks.

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X. NATIONALISM AND THE EAST UKRAINIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

369 THE STUDY of the role of Ukrainian nationalist groups in admin-
186 istration and educational life has shown that urban-centered activities played a preponderant role in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine under German occupation. The more highly developed urban educational systems were primary targets for nationalist organizers, while the cities served as centers from which the nationalists sought to secure popular support by controlling cultural activities and the press. This emphasis on urban activity has a long history in the development of nationalism in both the East and the West Ukraine. Since the rural districts in both areas were strongly Ukrainian in all linguistic and cultural attributes, many felt that it was not immediately necessary to cultivate nationalist sentiment there; they felt these attributes would maintain the national distinctiveness of the villagers. Whether this was a wise view can be more adequately discussed a little later.

During the Second World War, however, this tradition did result in the nationalist groups' devoting a great portion of their limited resources to the East Ukrainian cities, where it was necessary to start almost from the bottom in building national life.
177 An impressive number of accounts by nationalist Ukrainians tes-
369 tify to the predominance of Russian speech and manners in the
186 cities of the East Ukraine throughout the war period.[1] The ex-

[1] In addition to numerous remarks of this nature already cited in relation to particular situations, see *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3; November 27, 1942, p. 4; March 2, 1943, p. 2; T. Liakovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 17, 1942, p. 3; Iu. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3. It may appear surprising that so many convinced adherents of the nationalist movement should have admitted and even stressed the non-Ukrainian cultural character of the cities, since usually

planation is, of course, that a vast number of city dwellers were [177] Russified Ukrainians. Naturally enough, the nationalist leaders 369 felt that no secure basis for their program could exist as long as 186 the municipalities of the country were islands of foreign culture.

Within the urban group, nationalist efforts and nationalist 369 sentiment were largely concentrated in one social stratum. Na- 186 tionalist movements throughout the world have usually been the 565 work of the middle class. Since there had been no East Ukrainian capitalist middle class of any significance before 1920, and since there was no possibility that one could arise under Soviet conditions, except for a few traders carrying on a precarious business under the NEP, a commercial class continued to be lacking. The 475 counterpart to private commercial enterprise which existed under 565 the Soviet regime, the state trading system, was apparently largely operated by Jews and other non-Ukrainian elements.[2] Unfavorable appraisals of the activity of this system, plus distasteful memories of the "profit-and-run" techniques of the nepmen had produced an unattractive image of the private businessman in the minds of most East Ukrainians.[3] Although, under German occupation, a few gestures were made by some city administrations toward encouraging individual enterprise, the chief factors in production and distribution, insofar as the appalling economic conditions made such activities possible at all, were public and

nationalist movements endeavor to claim as large a proportion as possible of the inhabitants of a disputed area as members of their national group in origin and attitude. It must be remembered, however, that the OUN, and some other Ukrainian nationalist groups, were not democratic in ideology; hence the wishes of a majority at a particular time were of little importance in their eyes. Rather, this failure to possess the adherence of the inhabitants of an area which they regarded as theirs through the "rights" of history and blood served as an additional proof of the iniquities of the Soviet regime and of Russians in general and as a stimulus to more strenuous efforts to "correct" the situation.

[2] Some Ukrainians today (Interview 35) state that many wartime ascriptions of all the evils of the Soviet system to the Jews were highly exaggerated, in most cases a forced concession to Nazi racism, but insist that there was a good deal of anti-Semitism in the Ukraine because Jews predominated in retail distribution, and in the conditions of extreme shortage used their positions for selfish purposes. In view of the occupations of most Jews before the Revolution, their numerical predominance in the state distributive system is probably a fact, and it is fairly obvious that any recognizably alien group in such a position would be resented when they could not satisfy the consumers' wants, whether or not peculation played a role in their activities.

[3] Interview 65.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[475] cooperative enterprises. Hence the development of a middle class
565 on the traditional Western model did not take place.

Actually, in the Ukraine, as in many other countries in which
517 nationalist movements have developed, it was other components
186 of the middle class which played the leading role. These were the intellectuals, the professionals, and the bureaucrats, together with the student body from which they were recruited. All four of these categories, together with a vast number of persons who would in Western usage be classified simply as clerks, technicians, or even custodial personnel, are lumped together in Soviet classifications as "intelligentsia"—i.e., all whose work does not involve a large measure of manual labor.[4] The leaders of the nationalist movements came from a narrower stratum however. The majority of this leadership consisted of intellectuals par excellence; that is, it was drawn from the academic or literary profession.

This crucial statement requires some proof, which is difficult to present in the absence of statistics or the possibility of sampling, both of which are unavailable for obvious reasons. However, the preponderance of intellectuals is indicated indirectly by figures previously cited on the extremely high proportion of persons with higher or secondary education employed in the Kiev city and *raion* administrations in 1942,[5] and by the statements from well-informed participants that these and other administrations, as well as editorial staffs, served as refuges for intellectuals displaced from their normal occupations.[6] Furthermore, the efforts of nationalist groups, whether OUN or local, were directed very largely toward assisting and encouraging the teachers and writers, a factor which suggests that they were closely tied to these segments of the population. For example, Mel'nyk organizers in Kiev in the winter of 1941–42 made special efforts to secure work in the cooperatives for teachers in order to enable them to avoid forced labor for the rebuilding of bridges.[7] Similarly, the strong

[4] For a discussion of the concept in Soviet usage, see Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 324 ff.

[5] See Chapter IX.

[6] See Chapter V.

[7] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 16. According to one account, the Red Cross in Kiev also aided the intelligentsia (along with prisoners of war) to a special degree (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 4, 1942, p. 2).

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East Ukrainian nationalist group in Kharkov took the unusual 517
step of utilizing Prosvita as a relief organization for educators.[8] 186
In addition, the very ability of nationalist elements to maintain themselves in the educational systems when other departments of administration had passed from their hands indicates that the staffs of these branches of administration were especially imbued with nationalism. The comparatively small number of cases and lack of availability of any sampling technique precludes generalization solely on the basis of cases known to the writer of this study. It may be noted, however, that of some sixty East Ukrainians prominent in the nationalist movement whose occupational background is known, about three fifths were either instructors in higher schools, teachers, journalists, or writers. As examples, some of the most prominent may be mentioned. All three mayors of German-occupied Kiev were educators. The chief of the *oblast* administration in Dniepropetrovsk, organized with OUN-B help, was the dean of the electro-technical faculty of the university; later, a member of its medical faculty played the leading role in organizing a "national council" for the OUN-M.[9] The great majority of the Kharkov group, including all of the major organizers of Prosvita, as well as at least two of the OUN-M Ekzekutyva, were university professors; so were the editors of the nationalist-oriented papers in Stalino and Voroshilovgrad (Luhans'k).[10] Among the new Autocephalous bishops, the single East Ukrainian who did not have a clerical background, Professor Haievs'kyi, was also an educator. Writers, while much less prominent, were important. Arkadii Liubchenko, perhaps the best known of all who joined the OUN, has already been described. Most of the nationalist editors were drawn from trained writers, although as in the case of the poet Pronchenko in Krivoi Rog, they appear to have been more often men whose careers were in belles-lettres than professional reporters or editorial workers.

That such a high proportion of available leadership for the nationalist movement came from educators and writers is probably due in part to the leading role played by "national Communist" educational commissars like Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk more

[8] *Nastup*, September 26, 1943, p. 3, referring to *Vinnyts'ki Visti*, August 29, 1943.
[9] Interviews 1, 48.
[10] Interview 66.

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517 than a decade earlier in fostering national culture. Evidently even
186 the repeated Communist purges could not wholly eradicate the permeation of the educational system by nationalist ideas. Indeed, Skrypnyk and other Communists of that period were praised openly by writers in the war years as defenders of the Ukrainian "national idea," [11] and Skrypnyk's plan for an orthographical commission to set standards for Ukrainian publications was formally revived. It should be noticed, however, that direct links between nationalist leaders of the war period and the Skrypnyk group were very few. Moreover, the Russophile leaders were also predominantly intellectuals.[12] The general conclusion appears to be that the intellectuals (using the term in the Western sense) as a group were the most disaffected stratum in Soviet society capable of assuming a leadership role. Of great significance is the fact that a very high proportion of all those who were active in nationalist life under the German occupation had direct reasons for resentment against the Soviet regime, either because they had been barred from intellectual work or because they had been imprisoned for anti-Soviet activity. Also they had a wider historical perspective and hence were quicker to react to the new situation.

463 The second most important group was composed of engineers
186 and other technical specialists like agronomy experts and chemists. Several of these were closely associated with academic life. Others seem to have been drawn from the operating staffs of Soviet industrial establishments, as in the great metallurgical center of Krivoi Rog, where a group of young men composed predominantly of engineers took over the rebuilding of city life soon after the Soviet troops withdrew.[13] One of their number became mayor, was active in nationalist work, probably in connection with the OUN-B, and as a result was executed by the Germans.[14] The most active local recruit of the OUN-M in Kiev, who

[11] Victor Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[12] Although two of their most prominent leaders (Bohatyrchuk and the mayor of Vinnitsa) were physicians, they were also occupants of academic chairs.

[13] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 22, 1941, p. 3.

[14] MS E; Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), p. 39.

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led the organization after the West Ukrainian and émigré leaders had been forced to withdraw, was an engineer. On the whole, however, it may be said that engineers were more concerned with material reconstruction than politics, and did not play proportionately as significant a role as did engineers in the nationalist movements abroad and in Galicia.

The predominance of intellectuals and technical specialists in the nationalist movement imparted a certain specific color to the activities. In the first place, from the purely administrative point of view, the lack of trained men was a serious handicap. While the purely material aspects of city life were carried on about as well as might have been hoped in view of the destruction, shortages, and German obstruction, the conduct of public administration was far from adequate. This was, indeed, one of the major causes of the downfall of the OUN-M regime in Kiev, whether the worst defects consisted of favoritism and speculation by officials, or simply poor organizational and human relations. Nationalist fervor, enthusiasm, facility in the use of literary Ukrainian, were no substitutes for managerial skills and personnel psychology. Yet it was precisely these abilities which intellectuals who were excluded from public life, as were Soviet Ukrainian educators suspected of adherence to the Skrypnyk group, could not acquire. At the same time, so much of their energy had been turned in upon their academic and cultural cultivation of things Ukrainian, such as language and history, that the intellectuals failed to place the emotional and abstract aspects of the nationalist cause in a balanced framework when the opportunity for action arose. It cannot be said that the intellectuals were less courageous than others might have been in striving for national ends in the face of German terrorism; many lost their lives, although, as has been pointed out in the case of some of the small-city editors, others were sometimes found to act as pliant tools for the occupiers. It does, however, appear that persons more inclined to take a functional instead of an emotional approach to administration might have been more successful in evading German demands.

Very striking is the almost total lack of legal expression among almost all participants in administrative work. Probably the basic reason for this omission was that lawyers were few and far between among non-Communist elements in the Ukraine. A con-

693 fidential Wehrmacht report ascribes to this lack the difficulty experienced in getting the court system started,[15] and one Ukrainian account states that of two hundred and fifty lawyers in the Kharkov *oblast* under Soviet rule only thirty-five were not Jews.[16] While an anti-Semitic bias in this statement may need to be discounted, it does appear likely that the vast majority of a professional group which was already very small (there are few Western cities where there is only one lawyer per four thousand population!) was largely non-Ukrainian.

Of the few prominent legally trained Ukrainians, none had been able to practice his profession for many years. Alexander Semenenko, the mayor of Kharkov, had been educated as a lawyer under the tsarist regime and had practiced for a time in the early years of Communist rule. In the thirties, however, he was imprisoned for a number of years, and was a fugitive from the NKVD when the German army occupied the city.[17] Volodymyr Dolenko, who with Professor Dubrovs'kyi was the principal organizer of the strong nationalist group in Kharkov, had also been trained as a lawyer under the old regime, and he too had been prevented by the Communists from practicing.[18] Alexander Iatseniuk, head of the Zhitomir *oblast* administration, a judge under Nicholas II, had been relegated to the position of lecturer in a higher school by the Soviets.[19] His administration included a number of other jurists.

693 The want of training in the law was particularly striking in the
186 Ukrainian nationalist movements. The failure to attempt to form a codified set of principles of either a legal or an administrative nature, the frequent arbitrary action in allotting positions on a basis of partisan enthusiasm rather than objectively determinable qualifications, the frequent tendency to accept an extreme nationalist position and then to push it even further, might all have been curbed by a stronger legal tradition.

[15] PS 1693.
[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 4.
[17] *Krakauer Zeitung*, May 14, 1944, p. 4.
[18] Interview 73.
[19] Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2; the reporter states that the directives of the city administration were "precise and factual," not full of "romantic phrases."

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been curbed by a stronger legal tradition. Perhaps by coincidence 633
the administrations in Zhitomir and Kharkov were comparatively 563
tolerant of minority groups, and awakened no such violent opposition from Russophile elements as in Kiev. Indeed, as has already been pointed out, the Zhitomir administration in 1941 included a Pole and a Russian in prominent posts, apparently working in harmony with other officials, while the nationalist group in Kharkov during the occupation attracted the lasting support of at least one academician of Russian origin. These groups were also able to avoid destruction by the Germans, in spite of considerable harassment, perhaps because their activities were not so violent as to arouse the public outcry which served as an excuse for the attack on the Kiev group.

The severe shortage of lawyers was paralleled by an even 633
greater lack of administrators with experience in posts of great 186
responsibility. This deficiency doubtless arose primarily from the fact that persons holding high administrative posts were almost universally strong adherents of the Communist regime. In a number of cases, leading Soviet officials such as chairmen of city soviets organized underground sabotage against German installations or led partisan groups for the Communist cause, and the large majority no doubt evacuated with the Red Army. It would have been difficult in any case for such a highly placed member of the Soviet regime to join the nationalist cause, as he would probably have been executed in short order by the *Einsatzgruppen*, whose tasks included the killing of all "kommissars." Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that no Soviet military, party, or state official of any importance, as far as is known to the present writer, ever joined the Ukrainian nationalist cause, either through the local groups in the East Ukraine or through the prisoner-of-war camps, although several from these groups did join the Vlasov movement.

What the East Ukraine lacked in trained legal and administrative personnel, the West Ukrainian organizers failed to supply. Indeed, they appear not to have seen the need. They recognized the desirability of sending in journalists (the West Ukrainians were more effective as editors, although the extremely propa-

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633 gandistic nature of much of their work exacerbated the defects
182 already existing in the intellectual nationalist tendencies in the east).[20] They also recognized the need for trained military officers to lead the police units, as well as for organizers of cooperatives, merchants, and other personnel to reorganize economic life.[21] Since the Galicians, unlike their East Ukrainian fellows, had been brought up under the influence of the Roman law tradition transmitted by the Austrian administration and the Catholic Church, one might have thought that they would provide a balancing ele-
[693] ment of legal thought. Actually, although there were numerous lawyers in the legal parties in Galicia, lawyers were even rarer among OUN leaders than among prominent East Ukrainians. Moreover, the whole current of revolutionary romanticism and the glorification of "illegalism" necessarily militated against the development of legalistic elements in the thinking of the nationalist factions. At the same time, of course, underground oppositional work had afforded the western group no experience in the responsibilities of public administration; the older émigrés who might have provided a modicum of such experience were kept out of the East Ukraine by the Germans. As the following statistics on the émigré group in Bohemia-Moravia indicate, however, the possible supply was not great, even if one accepts the figures which were obtained by listing, presumably at their own valuation, persons available to return to the East Ukraine in 1941.[22]

[20] Iu. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 6, 1941, p. 2.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] From a registration by a Ukrainian community organization in Prague, September 28, 1941 (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 4, 1941, p. 3). For comparison, the occupations of the postwar emigration (largely West rather than East Ukrainian, in contrast to the interwar émigré group) may be given:

ÉMIGRÉS IN GERMANY

	U. S. Zone (*total 85,646*)	*British Zone* (*total 44,987*)
Peasants	30 percent	44 percent
Workers	16	21
Artisans	18	14
Intellectuals	23	8
Miscellaneous	13	13

(Michael Pap, *Die Probleme der ukrainischen Staatlichkeit und der Emigration*, Inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde vorgelegt der Hohen Philosophischen Fakultät der Ruperts-Carola Universität zu Heidelberg, 1948 [Typescript available in the Library of Congress]).

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Workers of various skills	1,788
Students	560
Liberal professions (journalists, writers, merchants, artists, etc.)	313
Teachers	252
Engineers	343
Administrators	178
Jurists	11

Compared to the occupational differences in nationalist activity, differences of age and sex played a minor role. There is little information on the activity of women. Evidently they carried on most of the welfare work; one German report states that a major reason for permitting the functioning of the Ukrainian Red Cross was a desire to absorb the energies of the women intellectuals, who had been highly "politicized" by the Soviet regime.[23] There are a few cases of prominent nationalist work by women, for example, by the poet Olena Teliha who headed the OUN-M literary circle in Kiev until its suppression by the Germans. In general, nationalist observers agree that the women were less active politically than the men. While there is too little evidence to warrant a firm conclusion on this score, it is just possible that the nationalist movements neglected a useful source of support, which was certainly tapped by the Communist underground.[24] 462 186

Youth, on the other hand, played a prominent part in nationalist work. While a large number of Mel'nyk supporters were drawn from the older generation, and the OUN-B made special efforts to capture the younger group, there was here no "conflict of generations" in respect to adherence to the two factions. Since only physically active persons were useful in the east, even the Mel'nyk organizers were predominantly youthful, and thus could approach their contemporaries more readily. The strength of the youth organizations dominated by the OUN-M in Kiev and Zhitomir has already been described. Other young men, of course, rejected both nationalist groups as too extreme, and formed centers of their own, while still others appear to have arisen in complete independence of outside stimulation. Thus the whole administra- 186 883 [668*]

[Occupation specialization of Ukrainian émigré group in Bohemia - Moravia--Analysis]

[23] USSR Exhibit 278.

[24] PS 3876.

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186 tion and cultural life of Pavlograd, a small town east of Dniepro-
883 petrovsk on the way to the Donbas, was organized by a group of graduates from the local *gimnaziia*.[25] They owed their nationalism, according to reports by visitors, entirely to the work of an inspiring teacher (who had in turn received his nationalist indoctrination in Kharkov University) who had taught there until caught by the NKVD some years previously.[26]

[668] The division of nationalist youth among both factions of the OUN, and locally formed groups, parallels closely the division of their elders in the East Ukraine. In one respect, however, the younger generation was different; there was a considerable number of youths who had been active adherents of Communist organizations but who now joined the nationalist movements.[27] The most prominent ex-Komsomol was the son of Alexander Iatseniuk who, after an extremely active career in OUN-M organization in the Zhitomir area, fled to the Volhynian woods where as "Volynets'" he became an important nationalist partisan leader. On the other hand, large numbers of young people were daring enough to praise the Soviet openly, or took part in underground activity, while condemning the Ukrainian language and customs.[28]

On the whole, in their reaction to nationalist political activity, there does not seem to have been any marked difference between the younger and the older generations, at least not nearly so sharp a difference as in Galicia. It is fairly certain that a large percentage of the youth who joined nationalist activities were influenced by their parents. Others—sons of kulaks, priests, and intellectuals who had been persecuted by the Soviet regime—resented the Soviet order because of their parents' misfortune.

Apparently whatever advantage the nationalist movement may have enjoyed among the older generation because of the latter's memory of Petliura and the nationalist activity of the twenties was at least partly offset by the greater appeal of a romantic,

[25] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 12, 1942, p. 3; *Novu Dobu* (Berlin), July 5, 1942, p. 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 3, 1942, p. 2.

[26] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 3, 1942, p. 2.

[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 23, 1941, p. 2, based on an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti*.

[28] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1942, p. 3.

activist movement like the OUN to youth, or by the latter's desire in other cases to rearrange life to suit themselves. There is a faint suggestion that the Soviet regime may already have become the "old order" against which revolutionary youth is wont to rebel. On the other hand, these very qualities which made the nationalist *political* movement attractive to the younger generation had the effect of keeping it antagonistic to religion. As has already been pointed out, there is almost universal agreement that youth in the East Ukraine was cool, even hostile, to the churches.[29] In the south, the Protestants and dissident Orthodox groups seem to have been somewhat more successful, but they had no direct relation to the nationalist movement.[30]

The OUN-B, it will be recalled, placed special emphasis on securing the allegiance of youth, since its young agitators were unable to attract the support of the intelligentsia.[31] There is a small amount of evidence to indicate that the nationalist movements attracted a broader occupational group from the youth than from among its elders. So little is known concerning the role of the laboring classes, however, that no conclusions can be offered. Historically, the working class in the East Ukraine had been predominantly Russian or Russified. The working class was also generally more loyal to the Soviet system than most of the other social groups. Even if the Ukrainian claim that a large influx of dispossessed peasants and their children during the thirties had resulted in a Ukrainization of the urban laboring class be accepted, there is no evidence that such persons became interested in politics or had any important part in nationalist activity. Probably those who were mature when they left the village continued to be peasants in outlook, while a few rose into the intelligentsia, acquiring its coloration.

As frequently observed in this study, the disproportion of material available is no sure indication of a corresponding difference in the importance of factors involved. Since in many instances only fragmentary evidence is at hand, what is presented may be

[29] Cf. articles in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 12, 1941, p. 3; October 3, 1942, p. 2.

[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 3, 1942, p. 2; PS 1693.

[31] See the clandestine leaflet from the Odessa area previously referred to for sharp OUN-B criticism of the intelligentsia as tools of the Germans.

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000 drawn too heavily from particular sources or may too greatly concern special aspects. In the case of urban-rural differences in nationalist activity, it is certain that such a bias exists in the character and extent of the evidence. For one thing, any single activity in a city of some size, such as the development of a Prosvita society, or the control of an administration, is sufficiently important to merit a place in contemporary reports, while a similar rural activity, conducted on a much smaller scale but equally important in its limited area, would probably pass unrecorded. Since the main channels of communication—newspapers and personal contacts of West Ukrainian and émigrés with local figures—were predominantly urban, they would naturally leave behind many more reports on city developments. Perhaps most important is the fact that the higher degree of articulateness of urban dwellers, in the Ukraine as elsewhere, tends to give them a disproportionate share in the written expression which later becomes the historical record.

565 186 369 In the cities, there was no positive goal to compete with the nationalist movements for the hopes and enthusiasms of the populace. The terrible deprivations, the German executions, the *Ostarbeiter* program, the fear of Communist agents, were factors which had a far greater significance for the average urban person than did the efforts of the nationalist movements; but a general effect was to promote passivity and resignation. On the land, however, a positive goal was before all eyes, which for a large segment of the peasantry far outweighed any prospect of national independence, however desirable that might be in itself.[32] This transcendent goal was the destruction of the collectivized system of agriculture and its replacement by a system in which individual initiative and the demands of the peasants would play a greater part. The nature of the agrarian question and the Germans' fumbling efforts to use the peasants' desire to gain support, while retaining the old restrictive kolkhoz system to make exploitation of the peasant easier, has already been described in general terms; it would exceed the scope of this study to treat the subject itself

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[32] This is implied even by nationalist writers; for example, Iurii Tarkovych notes that the first question of peasants in the area between Kiev and Chernigov was, "When will the land be divided?" (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3).

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in greater detail. It is absolutely essential to stress the key nature 565
of this problem, however, for it is almost beyond doubt that any 186
movement which had offered a fully satisfactory solution to the agrarian problem would have won the adherence of the mass of the peasantry, regardless of its stand on the national question.

Superficially, the situation in the countryside was satisfactory 186
from the nationalist standpoint. It is true that certain peasant 369
traits of a distinctively national character had been subjected to erosion by the developments of the Soviet period. The handicrafts, including making of the national costume, had almost vanished under the joint impact of material shortages and growing availability of factory products.[33] The physical appearance of the villages had been altered too and much of their distinctiveness lost through the Soviet destruction of the cemeteries.[34]

In the more basic matter of language, the changes had not been 191
so great, although in some areas at least many "town words" in 369
the "all-Soviet" (i.e., Russian) tongue had been introduced.[35] 186
From the point of view of developing replenishments for the intellectual elite from peasant stock, the situation was worse, however, for the Ukrainian tongue was frequently scorned as the speech of "Ivany i Maryny z kolhospu"—"Johns and Marys off the farm."[36] Even more significant, the mere fact that the peasants spoke Ukrainian, and even had a certain affection for the language as their mother tongue, did not necessarily prove that they possessed any consciousness of nationality. A Ukrainian visitor to one of the villages in the Taganrog district of the lower Don, just beyond the border of the Ukrainian SSR, reported that all the inhabitants spoke pure Ukrainian and retained Ukrainian customs. When addressed as Ukrainians, however, they denied the appellation, insisting that the "Ukrainians" lived over to the west, across the border. The nationalist reporter pointed out the identity of speech and manners with the population to the west, but they replied, "Yes, they are our brothers," yet persisted in denying that they were themselves Ukrainian.[37]

[33] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 26, 1942, p. 3.
[34] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 15, 1942, p. 4.
[35] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1942, p. 3.
[36] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3.
[37] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 22, 1942, p. 2.

186 The means at hand to stimulate a sense of nationality among
565 the peasants were rather meager. Most important, undoubtedly,
795 was the church. Within a few months after the Communists were driven out, many hundreds of parishes had been reestablished.[38] Undoubtedly the older people who had received some religious training welcomed the reappearance of the clergy. Baptisms and marriages took place in large numbers, and the churches were well attended. Since the Germans forbade the use of public funds for payment of the salaries of the clergy, the latter had to depend on the generosity of their flocks or the produce of their own land. Apparently the parishioners responded by furnishing their pastors with sufficient income in kind.[39] In most areas, there developed a conflict between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous clergy. At first, the latter (or, in the "Left Bank" region, simply the clergy consecrated in the orthodox fashion who used the Slavonic liturgy) predominated in the villages, but as more Autocephalous priests were consecrated, and more of the older priests came to accept the Ukrainian language service, they evidently won the support of the peasantry. Strange as it may seem in view of reputed village conservatism, the living language was apparently more popular as a religious vehicle in the country than in the town,[40] and cases are recorded in which the peasants actually drove out the priest who persisted in the use of Slavonic.[41]

793 Religion as a stimulus to nationalist feeling was, however, sub-
186 ject to severe limitations. One was the inadequate background of the clergy. Many were simple peasants up to the time of their consecration, although an effort was made to train them in short courses. Where such a man was of sound character and good common sense, as was the case in one Podolian village, he could accomplish a good deal. There, according to the report, the priest, one of the local peasants until his recent consecration, was highly respected for his good example. His sermons stressed brotherly love, the importance of industriousness, mutual assistance, proper

[38] See Chapter XI.

[39] PS 1693.

[40] Report from a *gimnaziia* teacher in Poltava (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3); *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

[41] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

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education of children, and self-control.[42] Generally, however, the clergy was unable to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in several villages the latter even objected to returning the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs.[43]

One of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. How effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of more detailed evidence, but in some cases it evidently did at least provide reading material and some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. There is considerable difference of opinion as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were imbued with Communist ideas.[44]

The great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmitters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for example, the physician, who had been a UNR officer, played the chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. He was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village *feldsher* (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. These constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, who were described as having "no unified outlook," being still "under the influence of Bolshevik ideology." [45] This criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not uncommon in nationalist

[42] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.
[43] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3.
[44] Cf. *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 18, 1941, for favorable reports; and Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28–29, for some criticisms of the rural teachers.
[45] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

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186 writers.[46] To a certain extent it may be due to resentment against
565 the clerical workers' unresponsiveness to nationalist propaganda,
369 or even to simple snobbery toward those aspiring to the title of
517 "intelligentsia" without a formal education. In part it appears, however, to correspond to a real lack of breadth of mind among this lowest group of the Soviet intelligentsia, a deficiency which would have made it difficult to use them for any political or social movement not tied immediately to their customary frame of thinking.

On the other hand, there were often elements in the villages which were available for some sort of political activity. The memory of Petliura was still present; some refused to believe that he was dead, thinking the story to be Communist propaganda.[47] In another area, both the president of the village soviet and the head of one of the collective farms remained behind and organized life in cooperation with nationalist elements.[48] Yet, in another case, a man of some education in one of the villages, who was related to an émigré minister of the UNR, after expressing fervently nationalist sentiments, recoiled with horror at the idea that his auditor might recommend him to the Germans for an official post, fearing the vengeance of Communist agents.[49] The presence of the latter was, indeed, a great handicap to nationalist organization in the rural areas, where the protection of the police force was not so great (especially in partisan-infested areas) as in the towns, and where the naturally cautious peasant hesitated to commit himself until assured the Soviet administration would never return.[50]

186 Since the organized nationalist forces were so few in members,
369 they could not undertake any direct or continuous indoctrination
208 of the rural population, unless they abandoned their efforts to win the cities. They had to rely primarily on the Prosvita branches, the country schools, and the village administrations. Printed material was also used whenever it could be controlled

[46] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 23, 1941, p. 2, reprinting an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti*.
[47] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.
[48] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[49] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.
[50] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

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by nationalist Ukrainians. As a matter of fact, a large proportion 186
of the newspapers in the smaller towns were directed principally 369
at rural readers; the extreme shortage of papers[51] in many areas 208
prevented their being of great influence even when they had [204]
some nationalist content. Moreover, the central periodical for farmers, *Ukraïns'kyi Khliborob,* with a weekly printing of seventy thousand, was edited by Eugene Arkypenko, who later joined the Vlasov movement.[52] While this publication was not used against the nationalist cause, it was devoid of positive nationalist material, being confined entirely to technical agricultural articles.

The less-than-lukewarm supporters of the nationalist move- 186
ments who constituted the bulk of the personnel in positions 369
which provided access to the rural population apparently did not do a great deal to convert the dormant cultural nationality of the peasants into active nationalism. There is no question that the cities inevitably constituted a prime target for nationalist efforts. Probably, in view of the severe limitations imposed by lack of time and nationalist personnel, by Red partisans and German restrictions, the enormous task of overcoming village inertia toward a purely political movement could not have been carried out in any case. Nevertheless, the initial failure of the nationalist groups (at least the OUN and others coming from the west) to grasp the overriding importance of the land question, and the necessity of making this a prime means by which the rural population could be won to the nationalist cause, must certainly be ranked as one of the great lost opportunities of this period. If the nationalists had from the beginning used all their energies to present a positive program of agrarian reform as the heart of their message, they might not have left any tangible organization to withstand renewed Soviet occupation, but they might have left behind a concept of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a defender of the interests of the peasantry. This, along with the vaguer memories of the Republican era, might have left an enduring imprint on the peasantry.

[51] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[52] *Volyn',* June 17, 1942, p. 4; Interview 45.

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XI. GEOGRAPHICAL VARIATIONS OF NATIONALISM

000 IN COMPARISON with the contrasts in nationalist feeling and nationalist activity disclosed by an examination of city and countryside in the occupied East Ukraine, variations by geographical areas are minor. Nevertheless, even when not highly pronounced, these variations help to identify some of the features of Ukrainian nationalism in the recent past which illuminate its role in the complex history of the country. Since, to a certain degree, class structure varies from district to district, examination of differences in nationalist feeling in relation to these variations is useful. By indicating the complexity of the factors involved in nationalism, it helps avoid leaving an impression of the East Ukraine as a uniform entity.

668* The northernmost region, Polessia, is the forest belt described in connection with the discussion of partisan warfare. In the section east of the Dnieper nationalist activity was scanty, for the rapid growth of the Red partisans made the rural areas which comprise the great bulk of the region unsafe for anti-Soviet elements. That there was some nationalist penetration, apparently by Mel'nyk supporters working in close collaboration with the Germans, is attested both by Soviet sources, which denounce "West Ukrainian nationalists" in the rural administration, and by OUN-M sources, which claim contacts with the editors in Konotop and Chernigov, the largest cities of the area.[1]

West of the Dnieper, nationalism was somewhat more evident. The short-lived "Olevsk Republic" established in 1941 by Borovets' introduced a local administration composed for the most part of West Volhynian nationalists.[2] The Bazar section farther east was temporarily controlled by Mel'nyk sympathizers, as was

[1] Interview 50.
[2] Interview 54; see Chapter IV.

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previously described.[3] Under the conditions of German repression 668*
the nationalist parties could not afford to devote their limited strength to maintaining the initial advantage gained in these comparatively unimportant areas. By 1943, under the impact of rapidly growing Soviet partisan operations, nationalist activity seems to have ceased in Polessia west of the Dnieper.

South of Polessia runs a broad band of territory which falls into 133
the natural vegetation region of the wooded steppe, i.e., a region of mixed prairie and woods. In contrast to the rather poor gray soil of most of Polessia, it is a land well suited for intensive agriculture, and as a result has supported for centuries the densest agricultural population of the East Ukraine.

As in the case of Polessia, the principal dividing line within the 631
wooded steppe region is the Dnieper River. The area west of the river forms the heart of what have been known in Ukrainian history as the "Right Bank" lands. Kiev and the surrounding district had been acquired by the Russian tsar in the eighteenth century, but most of the area west of the Dnieper remained under Polish rule until 1792. The section closest to the river had had a considerable share in the Cossack tradition, but the more westerly sections, which were included in the historic provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, were deeply affected by the independent Cossack movement only during the height of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's career. This meant that serfdom had a longer and more [566]
oppressive history there than in the regions to the south and the east. While the peasants were thoroughly Ukrainian in language [563]
and customs, the cities included many Poles and Russians and an especially high percentage of Jews, who comprised from one third to one half of the urban population. This concentration of Jews, too, was a result of the historical background of the region; Poland had tolerated them, while the tsars had forbidden them to leave the Pale formed by the lands acquired in 1793 and later.[4]

Since the "Right Bank" was immediately contiguous to the 668*
nationalist bases in the West Ukraine, it was natural that the na-

[3] See Chapter V.

[4] Actually, the Pale included all the Ukraine in the nineteenth century, but Jews were less numerous on the "Left Bank."

668* tionalists made a strong effort to extend their influence to the region. A large part of these efforts were concentrated on Kiev and Zhitomir. In Vinnitsa, the largest city of Podolia, on the other hand, the situation developed unfavorably for the nationalists soon after the German arrival. When the Germans captured the city, they were impressed by the activity of the director of the medical institute and his ability to speak German, learned while a student in Germany. Consequently, they appointed him mayor. Of mixed Russian and Ukrainian descent, the new mayor considered himself Ukrainian, but favored the continuance of ties with Russia. His administration contained other pro-Russian elements, while the Vinnitsa *oblast* administration was headed by an ethnic German said to have had Russophile tendencies. The police, on the other hand, and the newspaper were controlled by OUN-M adherents, although both were men of exceeding caution.[5] Vinnitsa played only an indirect role in stimulating Ukrainian nationalism; the unearthing in June, 1943, of enormous mass graves of victims of NKVD executions in 1937–38 and during the retreat of 1941, including, it is said, a number imprisoned for nationalist activities, served to increase the dread felt of the rapidly materializing prospect of Soviet reconquest.

668* 186 If Vinnitsa was the chief anti-nationalist stronghold, Proskurov, a smaller city to the northwest, was the headquarters for the OUN-M in Podolia. There the Mel'nyk group counted the mayor and the police chief (a Carpatho-Ukrainian trained in the [304] Czechoslovak army) among its members.[6] It also controlled the newspaper, *Ukraïns'kyi Holos,* which had a circulation of thirteen thousand, said to have been more than double that of the Soviet paper which had been published in Proskurov.[7] Farther east, the districts west and southwest of Kiev were under strong nationalist influence. While the OUN-M was establishing its headquarters in Kiev, newspapers and local administrations were being formed in a number of small cities such as Vasilkov, Belaia Tserkov', Tarashcha, Korsun', Smela (Smila), Cherkasy, and Uman'. The formation of the National Rada by the Mel'nyk group made a great

[5] Interview 1.
[6] Interviews 1, 50.
[7] *Nastup,* December 25, 1941, p. 4, citing *Ukraïns'kyi Holos.*

impression on the intellectuals of the smaller towns. OUN-M 668*
writers and propagandists appear to have maintained regular con- 186
tact with them for several months in 1941, and it is apparent that
the Kiev *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* served as a model for many of the new [204]
editors.[8] Schools were opened under the direction of nationalist
educators, Prosvita and theatrical groups were formed, coopera- [658]
tives linked with *Vukospilka* were active. Apparently, too, the
town administrations were largely in Ukrainian hands; the mu- [191]
nicipal authorities in Uman' issued a sweeping order forbidding
the use of the Russian language in any office, school, or enter-
prise under their jurisdiction.[9]

The influence of the nationalists in the towns penetrated to some degree to the countryside in the area west of the Dnieper. For example, nationalist papers like *Nova Doba,* published in [204]
Berdichev, seem to have had a moderately large circulation in the villages. There also seem to have been nationalist influences of a purely local character in some places, aside from those brought in by the nationalist parties. Zvenigorodka, a small town about a hundred miles due south of Kiev had been the home of the Free Cossacks, a nationalist organization of the wealthier peasants during the revolutionary period. The group was revived by some of the villagers under the German occupation, and, together with a mimeographed newspaper, served as a focal point for local nationalism.[10]

The influence of the church, especially in the rural areas, was 794
not entirely on the side of Ukrainian nationalism.[1] The Auton- 186
omous clergy under Alexius made an early start in reorganizing religious life in this region. They established a diocese of Vinnitsa and Zhitomir, and during most of the period of occupation were supported by the influential Bishop Damaskin (Maliuti) of Kamenets-Podolsk. Damaskin's diocese included nearly five hundred churches, with a hundred and sixty priests.[11] Apparently most of this large organization, which was overwhelmingly concentrated in the rural districts, had no objection to Damaskin's allegiance to the Russophile church. The Autocephalous Church

[8] Interview 30.
[9] *Nastup,* May 3, 1942, p. 2.
[10] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[11] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 13, 1942, p. 2.
[1] [After Germans had occupied this territory--Analyst]

794 established its own organization, installing a bishop in Zhitomir,
186 as well as the energetic Ihor in Belaia Tserkov'. Ihor was replaced for a time by Emmanuel, but when the latter passed over to the Autonomous Church, he took a new post in western Volhynia, perhaps because he found the rather strong nationalist atmosphere in Belaia Tserkov' unpleasant. The fact that the Autonomous Church was able to maintain such a strong organization indicates that sentiment in the rural areas was not always ardently nationalist, even in the most "pure" of Ukrainian lands.

631 The wooded steppe region east of the Dnieper, the "Left Bank," constituted the second half of the traditional Ukrainian heartland. The western part had been for centuries under Polish and Lithuanian rule, coming under Moscow in the late seventeenth century, together with Kiev. The eastern part, roughly equivalent to the Kharkov *oblast,* had never been under Polish rule, but had owed allegiance to the tsars. It served as a refuge for serfs escaping from their Polono-Lithuanian masters, and hence was known as the "Slobozhanshchyna" or "Free Land." Since even the western part of the "Left Bank" had been annexed by the Russian Empire long before the partitions of Poland, however, its history diverged considerably from that of the "Right Bank."

668* The most interesting nationalist developments in this region during 1941–43 took place in Kharkov. While Kharkov was always claimed as the second city of the Ukraine, it never occupied the place in nationalist thinking which Kiev held, and the fact that the Russian ethnic and linguistic element there was strong aroused less indignation. Some account of the differences in the nationalist movements in Kiev and Kharkov has already been given. The essential divergence arose from the fact that the OUN-M organizers reached the latter city only in November, when their period of grace was already running out. Enthusiasm was great enough for them to secure powerful support from local people. A strong *ekzekutyva* was formed with a mayor of one of the city *raions,* an ardently nationalist professor, George Boiko, and several other local people, in addition to Kononenko, the chief West Ukrainian organizer, as members.[12] The adherence of

[12] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75; Interview 57.

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

REGIONS OF THE EAST UKRAINE

- Polessia
- Volhynia-Podolia
- Kiev area
- "Left Bank" (wooded steppe)
- Steppe industrial area
- Southern coastal area
- Donbas

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668* Arkadii Liubchenko (really a citizen of Kiev, but known throughout the Ukraine) to the OUN-M added considerable prestige. The *raion* mayor, Semenenko, who was later to become city mayor, was also sympathetic to the Mel'nyk group, as were a number of journalists, including the brother of the editor of *Nova Ukraïna*, the daily newspaper.[13] At the same time, or even before the Mel'nyk group's arrival, however, a local organization, comprised primarily of old adherents of the Republic who had managed to survive the Soviet regime, was formed under the leadership of V. V. Dubrovs'kyi and Volodymyr Dolenko.[14] The background of these men and their group and the instrumentalities through which they exerted influence have been described. It should be stressed here that the group was formed independently; although there were certain sympathies for the old UNR, there were no contacts with Andrew Livyts'kyi's émigré regime.[15] While the movement was never able to attain power at all comparable with that exercised by the Mel'nyk group in Kiev during its period of predominance, it was able to exert steady influence of a moderate nature.

Affected perhaps by the fact that Kharkov was less Ukrainian than Kiev, as well as by the different background and tactics of the nationalist movements there (its late start and quick loss of prestige after the Kiev debacle forced the Mel'nyk group also to use restrained tactics, although some of its adherents were every bit as extreme as those in Kiev), a quite different situation developed in the eastern center. There was no sudden reversal of fortune; no prominent Ukrainian aligned himself then or later with Russophile movements. Perhaps, too, the famine, which was probably worse there than in any other Ukrainian city in the winter of 1941–42, and the comparatively tolerant regime of the army combined to conciliate the ethnic groups or at least to divert their energies from open conflict.

The nature of the nationalist movement in Kharkov was important, not so much because the city was representative of the

[13] Interviews 47, 73.

[14] *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 584.

[15] Interview 73.

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surrounding areas, as because it exerted influence upon them. The 668*
chief channels by which it did so were the Prosvita organizations, the newspaper, and the church. A leader of the independent nationalist group estimates that its influence, exercised primarily through the Prosvita, reached as far west as Lubny and Poltava,[16] and there is evidence that it also played a part in organization as far south as the northern Donbas.[17] *Nova Ukraïna* was also widely known, serving as a model for nationalist editors in the "Left Bank" region who wanted to pursue as independent a line as possible and hence rejected the guidance of *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo.*

The special role played by the church of Kharkov merits more 793
than passing mention. When the Germans arrived, they found 578
that an elderly prelate, Archbishop Theophilus, had survived the 186
Soviet period. Seventy-six years old, a native of a village of the Khoral (Khorol) region in the heart of the "Left Bank" Ukraine, he had become a priest in 1885.[18] With the aid of local clergymen, he reassumed control of ecclesiastical life in Kharkov in late 1941 and claimed to be in charge of the entire "Left Bank" as Metropolitan of the Ukraine.[19] Many—especially in the Autocephalous Church—criticized him because he was consecrated bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church (in 1923) and because he continued to use Old Slavonic in the liturgy.[20] Others, however, saw him as a Ukrainian patriot, since he was Ukrainian by birth, spoke pure Ukrainian, celebrated a service in commemoration of Kruty, and praised the Ukrainian newspaper.[21] At any rate the dissidents were able to make little progress against him; only two Lypkivite priests had survived, while Theophilus's clergy numbered more than one hundred.[22] However, the latter appear to have been subjected to very loose control by the archbishop and

[16] *Ibid.*
[17] Interview 68.
[18] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* May 15, 1943, p. 3.
[19] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* March 5, 1943, p. 2; March 6, 1942, p. 3.
[20] Interview 69. A letter to Archbishop Hilarion from one of his former pupils in the Kharkov area, asking his advice on reorganization of the church, suggests that all were not satisfied with Theophilus' ascendancy, even at an early date (*Ukraïns'ka Diïsnist',* February 10, 1942, p. 4).
[21] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* May 5, 1942, p. 4; January 24, 1943, p. 2; May 15, 1943, p. 3.
[22] *Ukraïns'ka Diïsnist',* February 10, 1942, p. 4; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* March 5, 1943, p. 2.

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793 to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services accord-
578 ing to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of
186 the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left" as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

668* It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

727 Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor
661 were shot by German police; the city passed under the control
204 of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.
[24] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.
[26] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.
[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.
[28] Interview 47.

German authorities; in a few other places, including the important towns of Lubny and Akhtyrka (Okhtyrka), editors continued their endeavors to stimulate national feeling.[29] Remarkably, the editor in the former town was a Russian who, after his pro-Ukrainian work brought him to the verge of arrest, was able to secure a new post as editor of a Russian-language paper in the Kursk *oblast*.[30] Most active of all this group, however, was the young editor of the Mirgorod paper, Michael Voskobiinyk, who pursued a line independent of the Nationalists yet modeled on the work of the *Nova Ukraïna* group.[31] 727 661 204

In general, nationalism in the "Left Bank" region under German occupation can be said to have been characterized by more influence of locally led and organized ecclesiastical and political bodies than the area to the west of the Dnieper. Moreover, it was marked by somewhat less friction between the Ukrainian and Russian elements and a willingness of some of the latter group to cooperate with the effort for Ukrainian nationalist revival. Probably the basic reason for this difference is the fact that both OUN groups were suppressed in this area before they could become very influential, and the nationalist structure which was built up afterwards was formed of persons who feared the extremist program of the integral nationalists. It may be also that the history of the region, with its lack of comparatively recent memories of oppression by Polish lords and the relative independence with which nationalist life could develop, created an atmosphere of self-confidence which militated against the more violent aspects of nationalist egoism. 668*

To the south of the wooded steppe belt just discussed lies a broad region of more open steppe; in general the agricultural population of the area is considerably less dense than that of the region just described. The open plain with its very rich black soil and somewhat lesser rainfall lends itself to the cultivation of cereal crops which require smaller amounts of manpower, in contrast to the mixed sugar beet, dairy, potato, and grain agri- 133

[East of the Dnieper -- Analyst]

[29] Interviews 47, 50.
[30] Interview 47.
[31] *Ibid.*

[133] culture of the more northern region. The reasons for the smaller
176 farm population are historical rather than purely economic, however. Most of the area was fully settled many generations later then the more northern regions, for it was the principal area of conflict of the Slavic settlers moving down from the north and the Tatar warriors based on the Crimea. The major instrument of colonization was the Cossack fortress settlement or *sich*. In the mid-seventeenth century the Cossacks accepted the suzerainty of the Orthodox tsar, but it was only in the late eighteenth century, after the Russian conquest of the Crimean Tatars, that the steppe
[563] was fully opened to peaceful development. These new lands, frequently called "Southern Russia," came to include considerable bodies of non-Ukrainian settlers, mostly Russians, but also large numbers of Germans and Serbs. In 1917 the Provisional Government in Petrograd strongly rejected demands of the Ukrainian Rada for the extension of its authority to the *guberniias* of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida, the last three corresponding roughly to the southern steppe region, since it felt they were not Ukrainian in character.[32]

369 The northern section of the steppe region, comprising the northern halves of the *Generalbezirke* Nikolaev and Dniepropetrovsk, did contain a preponderantly Ukrainian peasantry. The presence of two very important natural resources—the iron mines of Krivoi Rog and the water power of the Dnieper rapids—had led to rapid industrialization of this area during the period of the Soviet Five Year Plans, with a consequent large increase in the urban population. According to the census of 1939 five of the fifteen Ukrainian cities of over one hundred thousand population
369 lay in this region.[33] At the start of the period of industrialization,
563 in 1926, the city population was very largely non-Ukrainian. For example, Ukrainians formed less than half the total in Kirovograd (then Zinovevsk), Jews being the next largest ethnic group, closely followed by Russians.[34] In Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'e the

[32] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 72–73.

[33] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 250–53.

[34] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Recensement de la Population de l'URSS*, XIII (Moscow, 1929), 13–14.

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proportion of Jews was somewhat lower, but the Ukrainians were 369
even fewer, numbering scarcely more than one third of the popula- 563
tion.[35]

The figures for Kirovograd in 1942 are hardly enough upon 186
which to base generalizations.[36] Apparently, however, a great shift to Ukrainian national affiliation, much larger than that which took place in the average northern city, had occurred. As in the case of the other figures, it is not certain that this represents a real change, although it is probable that a large part of the interwar growth was composed of Ukrainian peasants. A number of circumstances suggest, however, that part of the difference arose from a real shift in allegiance of numerous elements of Russian origin, i.e., a shift induced not so much by expectation that persons classing themselves as Ukrainians would have a favored position in a new Ukrainian state, as by a sincere feeling of belonging to a "Ukraine" defined on a geographic rather than an ethnic basis. The readiness of technical specialists, who took the lead in Krivoi Rog, to adopt with enthusiasm Ukrainian symbols, while devoting their major attention to economic reconstruction, suggests that this acceptance of a territorial basis of national identity may have played a role, while the support of Russian cultural and political tendencies by a similar group in Dniepropetrovsk indicates the instability of this choice. Apparently the situation was something like this: as long as the Ukrainian state which the Germans seemed to favor appeared to be an instrument for the overthrow of Communism and the rebuilding of new life, it was readily acceptable; when it became a romantic creed of ethnocentrism it was repugnant as an obstacle to the satisfaction

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] See Appendix. The necessity for caution in interpreting the extremely great shift in Kirovograd is indicated by the fact that the only other large city in the area for which data are available, Dniepropetrovsk, showed a comparatively small shift. It will be recalled, however, that the latter city was under a Russophile administration. Unfortunately, there is no information available concerning the tendencies of the city administration in Kirovograd for the time the census was taken. It is mathematically demonstrable, however, that the decline of the Russian group can be accounted for in Kirovograd only on the basis of a shift of persons formerly classed as Russians to the Ukrainian group, unless one of two rather unlikely assumptions is made, namely that (1) the Russian population actually declined between 1926 and 1941, or (2) numerous Jews later exterminated listed themselves as Russians in 1926.

186 of down-to-earth needs and the development of smooth human relations.

668* There were, however, many variations on this theme. Both the initial stimulation and the ensuing withdrawal from nationalist ideology on the part of many persons in the area was due, according to numerous and consistent reports of eyewitnesses, to the activities of Bandera organizers. The great predominance of Mel'nyk adherents in the northern Ukraine was matched by the ascendancy of the younger faction in the south. In part this circumstance was accidental. Both OUN parties had planned to send organizing groups into all areas of the Ukraine. The Mel'nyk group destined for the south, however, was evidently weakened intentionally to permit a concentration on the northern area, where historical tradition and experience in the revolutionary period led the older men to expect greater success.[37] For the most part, the Bandera groups in the north were wiped out by the SP, while their emissaries in the south got off to an early start and were well entrenched by the time the slower acting Mel'nyk group arrived there.[38] Although a certain amount of rivalry persisted in the largest city in each of the two main areas—Kiev and Dniepropetrovsk—after the Mel'nyk group was also proscribed by the Germans, there was for the most part a tacit acceptance of the territorial division of activity which had developed in the early months.[39]

This circumstance renders the investigation of the southern region more difficult. While the Bandera followers have been active since the war in describing their exploits, the fact that at no time, even in the early months, could they engage in large-scale open activities makes it difficult to check their accounts with contemporary journalistic reports. For example, German police reports state that in early October, 1941, a group of fifteen West Ukrainians, all or most of whom were Bandera adherents, tried to secure control of the administration and newspaper in

[Northern part of the steppe industrial area -- Analyst]

[37] Interview 61.

[38] The headquarters of the Bandera group remained in Kiev, where Myron, the director of its work in the entire East Ukraine, resided until he was killed (evidently by a German police agent) in the summer of 1942; after that OUN-B headquarters were in Dniepropetrovsk.

[39] Interview 1.

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Zaporozh'e.[40] Apparently these men were executed by the Germans; no further reports on nationalist activity in Zaporozh'e are available. This obscurity surrounding OUN-B activities makes itself felt especially in any effort to trace the relationships between OUN-B organizers and locally active groups. In Krivoi Rog, the mayor, Sherstiuk, the editors, Pronchenko and Potapenko, and a number of other local figures were strongly nationalist in sentiment, but whether they were ever adherents of the Bandera movement, or were brought into its organization, is a matter of dispute between the survivors of the Krivoi Rog group and OUN-B members familiar with the area.[41] What appears most likely is that an initial "honeymoon" of cooperation was succeeded by strife arising from the uncompromising demands of the OUN-B for adherence to the integral nationalist line.[42] 668*

In the case of Dniepropetrovsk, some corroboration of postwar accounts is furnished by a German police report. An OUN-B group arrived soon after the German army entered the city. Under the Galician organizer Rehei, who was helped by the Wehrmacht commander, a new *oblast* administration was established to offset the locally formed city administration.[43] Apparently the local group was at first neutral on the Russo-Ukrainian question, but the fanatic demands of the OUN-B and its efforts at counter-organization drove the local group completely into the Russian alignment, which was tolerated by the German police authorities after they dispersed the Bandera group. At least one prominent 668* 727

[40] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 143, December 8, 1941, p. 5, NO 2827 (hereafter referred to as NO 2827).

[41] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 29–31; Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: Spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), pp. 39, 41, 45, 53; MS E; Interviews 7, 66.

[42] That this was the case is indicated by an article in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 15, 1941, p. 2, evidently based on discussions with Pronchenko and Potapenko. It contained the complaint that the newspaper *Dzvin* would have little space left for the news of the day if it was necessary to print "catechisms on the *trizub* or the national name," essays on the development of National Socialism, the New Europe, etc. See also MS E.

[43] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 152, November 12, 1941, pp. 10–11, NO 3830 (hereafter referred to as NO 3830).

member actually joined the Natsional'no-Trudovoi Soiuz (NTS—National Workers' Union), the Russian counterpart to the OUN. When the OUN parties, including a relatively important Mel'nyk group which was especially active in educational circles, continued their work underground, they were able to gain or regain some support, partly as a reaction to the lengths to which the Russophile element, especially the Autonomous Church, went, and partly also because of an increasing moderation in their own ideology.[44]

No simple conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of these complex situations. The picture is further complicated by a tendency, illustrated in a number of instances, for Russians living in the Ukraine to accept a moderate Ukrainian nationalist position when not exposed to the pressure of an extreme Nationalist and strongly anti-Russian ideology. One strong adherent of the Ukrainian ethnic nationalist position was much impressed on finding in Novomirgorod (Novomyrhorod), near Kirovograd, a young teacher and his wife who both felt themselves to be Ukrainian, although born in Russia, and who "hated the Bolsheviks just as much as we do."[45] In another small town in the area (Novo Ukrainka) a nationalist organizer found most of the teachers to be "still under the influence of Communist ideology," which probably meant among other things that they did not consider the "purity" of Ukrainian culture of the greatest importance.[46] There seems to have been a fairly widespread tendency on the part of many Ukrainians and of many Russians living in the Ukraine, to reject any ethnic national creed in favor of some ideology based on territorial identity. It would not do to overemphasize this factor, however, for there was considerable support, especially in the northwestern area around the see of Kirovograd, for the Autocephalous Church,[47] which stressed the Ukrainian language, and isolated smaller places like Pavlograd were real centers of devotion to all things Ukrainian. Even such

[44] Interview 1.
[45] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 2, 1942, p. 3.
[46] Matla, p. 28.
[47] On the question of language to be used in church service, cf. Chapter VIII.

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a large center as Dnieprodzerzhinsk had a nationalist mayor and a 186
nationalist editor.[48]

The extreme south, the coastal strip along the Black Sea and 361
the Sea of Azov, from Odessa to Osipenko (Berdianka), had had a still shorter history of settlement than the area immediately to the north. Best suited of all Ukrainian lands to large-scale wheat farming with a small agricultural working force, it had a relatively sparse rural population, very mixed ethnically, with many German villages and some districts of Russian majority. The cities were still more heterogeneous, with Ukrainians forming a small minority in the larger ones, according to the census of 1926.

The study of conditions in this area is seriously hampered by 727
the fact that the western third fell to Rumanian-occupied Trans- 573
nistria. To prepare the way for the annexation of Transnistria, and, in addition, to gratify the desire of high officials for loot and profiteering, the Rumanians sent in a large number of their own administrators.[49] Since the rather backward Moldavians comprised only a small proportion of the total population, one of the Slavic elements had to be tolerated. Believing that German victory would lead eventually to the creation of an independent Ukraine, which would inevitably demand the land west of the Dniester as an irredenta, the Rumanians favored the Russians; the position of Russian nationalist elements in Odessa resembled that of the Mel'nyk group in Kiev and Zhitomir before their suppression by the Germans. Russian was an official language, along with Rumanian and German; a Russian theater was opened; several Russian publications were started.[50] The guiding organization of the Russians was a group called the Union of Russian Officers, which had the St. George cross as its emblem and evidently was strongly tsarist in its ideology.[51] It is said to have maintained contacts with émigré groups in Serbia and elsewhere and to have refused cooperation with the Vlasov movement.[52] At any

[48] Interview 10; *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, June 14, 1942, p. 7.

[49] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, February 7, 1943, p. 1, based on a Zentraleuropa agency report.

[50] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 17, 1943, p. 3; Interview 18; Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 122.

[51] Clandestine publication from Odessa region previously cited.

[52] *Ibid.*; Interview 18.

737 rate, with Rumanian encouragement, it was bitterly anti-Ukrain-
523 ian, adopting the slogan, "The Ukraine never was, is not, and never will be." [53]

668* Since this group and its Rumanian backers controlled all aspects of cultural and public life, any open Ukrainian nationalist activity even of a cultural nature was suppressed. A clandestine publication and a considerable amount of postwar testimony indicate that the OUN-B maintained a strong underground organization, started by a division of the southern task force even before Rumanian occupation began and later reinforced from the headquarters in Dniepropetrovsk.[54] They are said to have been able to operate an illegal printing press in Odessa and to have kept a nucleus group there.[55] A great deal of their attention was directed to the Rumanian-occupied rural areas to the north, and especially to southern Podolia, where they conducted a propaganda effort to induce the Ukrainian villagers to resist colonization by Moldavians.[56]

To the east, the southern part of the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev was more open to Ukrainian activity. The mayor of Nikolaev was a Mel'nyk adherent.[57] In the second-largest city of the area, Kherson, the Bandera group built a considerable organization, including the assistant mayor and the police chief, but was apparently liquidated by the SP by the end of 1941.[58] Nevertheless, the mayor, apparently an ethnic German, assisted the Ukrainian intellectuals in organizing cultural activity many months after the OUN-B had been suppressed.[59] The newspaper, too, is said to have been edited by a nationalist journalist.[60] In this city and the *Bezirk* capital, the Autonomous Church was active, having formed

[53] Interview 18.

[54] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 45; Mstyslav Z. Chubai, *Reid organizatoriv OUN vid Popradu do Chorne More* (The Raid of the Organizers of the OUN from Poprad to the Black Sea) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 48 ff.; Interview 18; clandestine publication from Odessa area previously cited.

[55] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 45.

[56] Clandestine publication from Odessa area previously cited.

[57] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, October 2, 1941, pp. 3–4, NO 3137 (hereafter referred to as NO 3137).

[58] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, January 14, 1942, p. 30, NO 3279 (hereafter referred to as NO 3279).

[59] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, September 5, 1943, p. 6.

[60] Interview 42.

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an archdiocese of Kherson at an early date.[61] As was related previously, the *Generalkommissar* was suspicious of the Autocephalous Church and urged that steps be taken against it when it grew strong in the north of his area. Later, Michael (Khoroshyi), bishop of Kirovograd, was to come to Nikolaev as archbishop, and was recognized by the *Generalkommissar*,[62] but the pro-Russian ecclesiastical group seems to have maintained a strong position. On the other hand, the extremely large shift in national affiliation in Kherson indicated by the city census suggests that the same factor of adoption of loyalty to the Ukraine as a territorial entity may have been at work here as well as farther north.[63] Farther east along the coast, in the *Generalbezirk* Taurien (Taurida), with its capital in Melitopol' (Melitopil'), there appears to have been little effort at nationalist organization; the newspapers, police, and other agencies were Ukrainian, but seem to have been completely subject to German control.[64]

Beyond the coastal strip just discussed lies the most easterly section of the Ukrainian SSR, the Donbas. This area, in which agriculture takes the form of large-scale wheat farming, as in the far south, is known as the "Ruhr"—or better, one of the "Ruhrs"—of the Soviet Union. Its industry, which grew at a tremendous pace in the interwar period, is based primarily upon rich coal deposits. Its five cities of more than one hundred thousand population in 1939 had nearly tripled their total number of inhabitants since the previous census. It is probable that this increase resulted in a substantial gain for the Ukrainian ethnic component, which previously had been very small, as the surrounding peasantry is largely, though not overwhelmingly, Ukrainian. As far as the technical staffs, which composed the bulk of the educated class, are concerned, however, Ukrainian nationalist observers themselves admit that the great majority was drawn from

[61] *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, January 20, 1942, p. 1. The archbishop was Anthony (Martsenko), who received his appointment in 1941 from the Sobor of Volhynian Bishops. Up to the time of the definite split between the Autonomous and the Autocephalous churches he was apparently still sympathetic to the Ukrainian nationalists as his secretary is reported to have been an OUN member (NO 3279).

[62] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, March 6, 1943, p. 5.

[63] See Appendix.

[64] PS 1693.

"all over the Union." Consequently, the area could be expected to be very lukewarm in its reaction to the nationalist movements. This tendency was reinforced by the great distance of the region from the stimulation center in the West Ukraine—Stalino is nearly one thousand miles from L'vov—and by the lack of strong historical ties with the Ukraine. Two special factors also played a role: the suppression of the Kiev OUN-M group came before a nationalist revival could get under way in the area, and the news frightened the few nationalist Ukrainians away from public life; and the German army authorities who were in charge were reluctant to permit even the formal and linguistic ascendancy permitted Ukrainians elsewhere.[65] Finally, even according to an OUN organizer active in the area, the Ukrainians were inclined from long habit to allow the Russians priority.[66]

As a result, in a large number of cities in the Donbas, including Slaviansk, Artemovsk (Bakhmut), Debal'tsevo, and Snezhnoe, the Russians succeeded in establishing a cultural ascendancy without, however, its taking on much political significance. This ascendancy included, in particular, the publication of Russian-language newspapers, which as a rule were not allowed in the former Ukrainian Soviet Republic.[67] A number of Ukrainian-language papers were also founded, some expressly designed for the rural population. In Stalino, with the help of OUN-B organizers, a nationalist editor was able to transform an originally Russian paper into a Ukrainian organ, while for a time Ukrainian-language papers with nationalist tendencies were published in Voroshilovgrad and Kramatorskaia (Kramators'ka).[68] In Enakievo an administration of Ukrainians was installed with the aid of Italian troops which occupied the town, while Ukrainian officials were also found in other city administrations.[69] All efforts at nationalist organization were hampered by the fact that the area was not conquered until late 1941, and, except for a brief period in 1942, they lay within a short distance of the front. A few OUN-M organizers were active in the area, and a considerable Bandera net-

[65] PS 051.
[66] Interview 66.
[67] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 23, 1942, p. 3.
[68] Interview 66.
[69] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 12, 1942, p. 3.

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work directed by Eugene Stakhiv did what it could to encourage national tendencies among the local Ukrainians.[70] 668*

The city of Mariupol' was an outstanding exception to the conditions prevailing throughout most of the area. While Mariupol' was administratively part of the Donbas, lying in the Stalino *oblast,* it is over fifty miles from the Donets basin itself, on the shore of the Sea of Azov. Like the other cities of the Donbas, however, it had grown enormously, more than tripling in size between the two Soviet censuses. Even after the losses of war, its population numbered 178,358, placing it not far below the largest Ukrainian metropolises.[71] What is remarkable for a city in the Donbas, or indeed in the whole southern area, is that it was under full Ukrainian control. Its well-developed Prosvita society and Ukrainian educational system have already been mentioned. The Orthodox Church is said to have been active and oriented toward Ukrainian nationalism, although here as elsewhere in the far south Protestants and dissident Orthodox sects played an important role.[72] In addition, the mayor was outspokenly nationalist, encouraging the formation of a Ukrainian military force.[73] Probably the guiding spirit in the nationalist development in the city, however, was Nicholas Stasiuk, minister of supply under the Rada in 1918, who had managed to survive the Soviet period by working as a park attendant.[74] He took over the editorship of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* which, although restricted by the paper shortage especially acute in the treeless south, was the second most influential Ukrainian paper on the "Left Bank" (next to *Nova Ukraïna*). While necessarily cautious, its tone was strongly nationalist. Moreover, in addition to Stasiuk, there were a number of nationalist journalists to aid in carrying on the newspaper's work. Stasiuk himself is said not only to have carried on this legal pronationalist activity, but to have assisted the OUN-B underground which made its area base in the city.[75]

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[70] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 50; Interview 66.

[71] *L'vivs'ki Visti,* August 27, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 24, 1942, p. 2.

[72] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 3, 1942, p. 2.

[73] Cf. Chapter VII.

[74] Interview 66; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 7, 1942, p. 2.

[75] Ie. Stakhiv, pp. 52–54; Interview 66. The nationalist tone of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* is apparent from the considerable number of its articles reprinted in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

668* It is uncertain just why Mariupol' was so different from the Donbas as a whole in the extent of nationalist activity. Very likely, as was so frequently the case, the presence of a few strongly nationalist and yet temperate and resourceful men was sufficient to turn the balance in a situation in which the vast majority was neither able nor willing to engage in political activity. Of course, the city was also under the comparatively lenient German army regime; it may well be that the army deliberately fostered a center of Ukrainian nationalist activity at this point, so close to the front, especially to the hard-fought Kerch Peninsula battlefield, in order that it might serve as a rallying point for Ukrainian feeling and a possible base for the development of a Ukrainian fighting force.

The Ukrainian nationalists have always claimed as Ukrainian ethnic territory large areas beyond the eastern frontiers of the Ukrainian SSR, principally the southern part of Kursk *oblast*, the area around Rostov on the lower Don, the Crimea, and the Kuban' river valley. As far as the Kursk area is concerned, the war period yields no evidence, for the district was almost constantly a battlefield between the Red Army and the Germans. One clear indication concerning the Rostov district is the report cited in the preceding chapter of the Ukrainian speech but lack of nationalist feeling among the peasantry.[76] Another report by a nationalist Ukrainian confirms this, saying that 90 percent of the children spoke Ukrainian, but most of the older people spoke Russian habitually, and there was very little national feeling.[77]

[162] In 1941 Ukrainians comprised only a small proportion of the population of the Crimea. The Ukrainian nationalist claim to the peninsula was based primarily on geographical proximity and the lack of any clear majority for another ethnic group, since the prewar Crimea also had large numbers of Russians and Tatars, as well as smaller settlements of Italians, Greeks, and Germans. Hence it is not surprising that in 1942 the capital, Simferopol', should have had a Russian rather than a Ukrainian

[76] See Chapter X.
[77] *Krakiv'ki Visti*, September 18, 1942, p. 2.

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newspaper and that the only Ukrainian activities were cultural and educational.[78] 668*

The Kuban', the large and fertile region to the northwest of the Caucasus, undoubtedly has a larger Ukrainian ethnic component, but its distinct historical development—the area was settled by groups of the Cossack type recruited by the tsars to further expansion against the Moslem tribes—had apparently led to a different ethnic affiliation. During the war period the area was occupied only a short time by the Germans. In this period, five newspapers were founded in the principal cities, all in Russian.[79] That this may not be an indication of Russian predominance is suggested by a German official concerned with the area during the war who says that the army censorship authority was in the hands of an extremely pro-Russian Balt.[80] At any rate, there is practically no evidence of Ukrainian activity.[81]

Ethnic nationalist feeling—which included support of the OUN-M, large-scale development of Prosvita, Ukrainian cultural activities, Ukrainian newspapers, emphasizing national history, and above all a tendency to condemn and discriminate against all non-Ukrainian elements—was most prevalent in the old northern centers of Ukrainian life, especially in the northwest. In these areas the historic struggle against Polish overlords, the difficult position of the rising Ukrainian intelligentsia because of the predominance of Jews, Russians and Poles in the towns, the contrasting strength of Ukrainian popular culture in the village, appear to have led to bitterness or at least to a strong feeling of ethnocentrism among the nationalist intellectuals. 668* 186

The south, on the other hand, had long been recognized as less

[78] For a description of Ukrainian cultural, educational, and religious activity in Simferopol' see Iaroslav Savka in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 18, 1942, p. 4.

[79] They are listed in *Nastup*, January 10, 1943, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 14, 1943, p. 2, also lists the paper in Krasnodar', the capital, as Russian, and says the Russian language also predominated in the theater.

[80] Interview 33.

[81] The Krasnodar' paper (*Kuban'*) published an article by "A. Kuban'skii" on December 20, 1942, telling of the Ukrainian cultural revival in the early days of the Soviet regime (*Nastup*, February 20, 1943, p. 4). There were also a few OUN organizers in the area, probably with German units.

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668 186 Ukrainian by all who were familiar with the country. Yet, while the manifestations of Ukrainian cultural activity were sparser and the influence of the OUN groups much less, there seems to have been a fairly strong tendency for a large portion of the inhabitants, of whatever ethnic origin, to accept the Ukraine as their motherland because they lived in it and were attached to it. Moreover, if earlier experiences of the nationalist movements are a trustworthy guide, this feeling represented a change from the conditions of the "South Russia" and "New Russia" of imperial days. Hence there is strong ground for suggesting that territorial patriotism has grown under the Soviet regime. The significance of this observation, and other evidence which supports it, must be treated in a larger context in the concluding chapter.

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XII. PERSPECTIVES

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM is but one thread in the immense 000 tapestry of the Second World War. In following the intricate pattern of this thread it is easy unconsciously to magnify its importance. One must constantly remind oneself that the active participants in the nationalist struggle were pitifully few and weak in comparison with the powerful forces which fought for control of Eastern Europe. In the six years covered by this study numerous events took place in the Ukraine which were of far greater immediate significance for the course of history than those described here. In order to follow the single thread of nationalism, many others which frequently formed the dominant pattern were given only brief mention, or neglected altogether. The vast military campaigns, the fantasies of German policy, the network of Communist espionage and terror, the complex agricultural problem, are but a few of these other aspects of the wartime Ukraine.

The question of national identification, however, is more basic, because less transitory, than problems imposed by foreign forces. Nationalism strikes deep into the psychological substance of a people, and is capable of stimulating an enthusiasm not easily aroused by most other influences. The goals set by nationalism may not attract the pure rationalist, but they often have a profound emotional appeal. In the past century the world has seen numerous political programs, which for many years attracted only a small, fanatical following, suddenly become powerful when circumstances permitted them to capture the emotions of the "common man." If a movement appears to possess such potentiality, it is not wise to disregard it, even though its present manifestations be limited.

A major purpose of this study has been to inquire whether Ukrainian nationalism possessed the potentiality of arousing such emotions, and to determine the circumstances under which such

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000 potentiality, if it existed, could become reality. From this point of view, the examination of developments in the West Ukraine is of restricted significance. There is little doubt but that a large majority of the Ukrainian population of Galicia opposed both German and Soviet occupation, and would have preferred its own government to a return to Polish rule. During the first years of German occupation, when conditions were comparatively bearable, the Ukrainian Central Committee, working as an auxiliary administration, was undoubtedly supported by most of the inhabitants. The constructive and orderly operation of this body is an indication, if a limited one, of the possibilities for the existence of a stable Ukrainian administrative organization under more favorable circumstances. Even the radical OUN elements, which publicly demanded complete independence, were reluctant to disturb the operation of the Galician administration, for they knew that they would not secure popular support in that fashion and would only destroy their own secure base of operations.

While less evidence concerning the Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovina could be presented, it seems evident that the Ukrainian populations of those areas would have preferred a nationalist administration to that of Hungary, Rumania, or the Soviet Union. The situation in Volhynia was less clear, for it was possible for Communist partisans to recruit substantial numbers of followers, especially in the northern region. The widespread support given the various groups of nationalist partisans indicates, however, that nationalist feeling was strong in Volhynia. Evidently the moderate, though somewhat indecisive tactics of the "Bul'ba" partisans were at first preferred by the peasants, who desired a leadership composed of their own countrymen, yet not highly doctrinaire or radical in its demands. Later, the depredations of the German administration and the general unrest prevailing in Volhynia appear to have led large numbers of the younger peasants to support the more extreme course taken by the Bandera followers.

This tendency of sizable elements of the population to support radical nationalism is a very important feature of the nationalist movements in the West Ukraine. According to Western democratic standards, there was a marked deterioration in the

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quality of Ukrainian nationalist political thought between the two wars. The generation of 1918 had thought in terms of a state based on parliamentary institutions and concerned primarily with the civil rights and social welfare of its citizens. To a limited extent this tradition survived in the UNR, although even there it was obscured by personal and factional ambitions. It was revived in a rather primitive form by the group around Borovets', and might have achieved a new synthesis of democracy and socialism had the Mitrynga faction been able to develop its theories. The older generation which had controlled the legal parties in Galicia was basically democratic. The really dynamic force in Ukrainian politics during this period, however, was the OUN.

The theory and teachings of the Nationalists were very close to Fascism, and in some respects, such as the insistence on "racial purity," even went beyond the original Fascist doctrines. In order to understand Ukrainian integral nationalism, however, it is necessary to examine the environment in which it developed. Probably it is safe to say that there was a general deterioration in the quality of political groups in Eastern Europe during the period between the two world wars. The victory of Communism in the Russian Empire led some elements to resort to extreme measures to prevent its further spread and to ape its tactics in combatting it. The post-1918 peace settlement was an attempt to satisfy the national aspirations of certain groups, but seemed only to exacerbate the nationalism already growing among the peoples of the area. The West Ukrainians—and the East Ukrainian émigrés who were associated with them—suffered from both these developments. The denial of moderate demands for Ukrainian national expression by the ultranationalist governments of Poland, Rumania, and later Hungary produced an extreme reaction. For a few years Communism appeared to present a vehicle for the expression of national resentment; consequently it was able to attract the temporary support of many Ukrainians.

Even those who were never directly moved by the Communist appeal were frequently impressed by the success of Communist tactics. Again and again in the course of this study, features of the OUN have been mentioned which recall the organization of the Communist Party. To some extent these features are, of course,

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000 older than Communism, having been part of the tradition of revolutionary movements like the Narodnaia Volia in Russia and of various nationalist organizations in Eastern and Southern Europe. The triumph of Communism gave these tactics a new vogue, especially among those who declared themselves to be the most vigorous opponents of Bolshevism—the Fascists. Basic to the new fashion of party conflict was the assertion that the end justifies the means; this tenet was not only tacitly followed but deliberately exalted. The same step was taken by integral nationalists like the followers of the OUN. It soon proved impossible to limit the application of the principle to non-Ukrainians, however. First Polish officials and Soviet representatives were assassinated; then the Nationalists turned on one another; finally even nominally nonpolitical figures like the clergy fell victims to the new fashion of ruthlessness. To some extent, of course, this resort to violence was due to the fearful circumstances of the time, when in the midst of the mass executions carried out by Nazis and Communists alike the sacrifice of a few more lives to attain important results seemed of little consequence. Yet the general blunting of moral sensibility, the willingness, even eagerness, of men to undertake such actions could hardly have progressed so rapidly had they not been indoctrinated beforehand by an ideology which purported to furnish an idealistic justification for their violence.

Conspiracy, too, had its models in both Communism and Fascism. The underground system contained obvious imitations of Communist and Fascist practices, such as the elite secret police, the Sluzhba Bezpeky, which served as the control agent in the OUN-B. Moreover, the split in the OUN had its parallels in the Nazi and the Bolshevik parties. Unlike these movements, however, the OUN did not control a state apparatus; hence neither faction could forcibly restore monolithic control. Instead, a deadly internecine struggle sapped the strength of the Nationalist movement and discredited it in the eyes of the people. In other ways, too, the lack of opportunity for experience in responsible political activity was harmful to the underground party. "Voluntarism," the emphasis on action as opposed to thought, will as opposed to reason, was given an extreme interpretation; in prac-

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tice it was frequently confounded with sheer egoism. Where authority, nominally exalted, was not backed by force, it was readily flouted by ambition. Those who were least inhibited by doubts of their own capacity to rule, and who were ready for the most extreme action, triumphed in the struggle for support of the younger members of the party. This circumstance placed a premium upon ruthlessness. 000

It also led to a dangerous lack of caution. Probably the reckless challenge to German authority in June, 1941, had little long-range effect, since the Nazi rulers would not in any case have sanctioned Ukrainian autonomy. The "deconspiration" of the partisan movement in the face of imminent Soviet occupation was much more serious; it almost surely resulted in the uncompensated loss of many of the most vigorous nationalist fighters, who might have been saved had the movement adhered to its previous tactic of operating in small bands, which could disappear among the peasantry in the face of approaching danger. If the younger element in the OUN-B was responsible for these actions, the Mel'nyk group—or at least its advance units—must bear the major portion of the responsibility for extremist activities in the East Ukraine. The lack of a positive program of social and political reform during the early stages of penetration of the east was intimately connected with the excessive emphasis on the "purity" of national culture and the subordination of rational planning to romantic phrasemaking. At this stage the Nationalists called themselves revolutionists, but, lacking a coherent concept of a new social and political order, they were at best only rebels.

The failure of the OUN to present a constructive program adapted to the needs of the East Ukraine makes it difficult to approach the major question posed in this study: How strong was nationalism in the East Ukraine? To a considerable extent, the initial experience of the East Ukrainians with propagators of nationalist doctrines was negative. In addition to its lack of concern for civil rights, economic progress, and social reform, the OUN and its more extreme adherents recruited locally repelled many East Ukrainians by their insistence on the elimination of non-Ukrainian cultural elements and on the removal of the non-

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000 Ukrainian members of society themselves. Naturally enough, many East Ukrainians confused nationalism itself with the extreme brand offered by the OUN.

In addition to the confusion arising from the activity of the OUN, several other factors make it difficult to judge the extent of nationalist feeling in the East Ukraine. The scarcity of information, the impossibility of direct observation or measurement, are great handicaps. The constant pressure of German occupation and the furtive but equally constant threat presented by Communist agents militated against the open expression of nationalist sentiments. Moreover, the extreme hardships of the war period drove the national question into the background just as, according to many accounts, the terror of Soviet rule had induced a feeling of solidarity among oppressed persons of all nationalities. It is hazardous to attempt to estimate the relative importance of the preoccupations of the population during the war, but probably the following order is fairly correct:

1. Physical survival—avoidance of starvation or death at the hands of the Germans or the Red partisans
2. Economic welfare—elimination of exploitation by the government or by individuals, especially in agriculture
3. Stable and orderly government, including a measure of freedom for the individual
4. Equality of persons, with some form of popular participation in government
5. National expression in culture and perhaps in government

Many will argue that the attainment of the first three aims listed is dependent upon the securing of the last two, but to the average East Ukrainian any party which was excessively concerned with the last alone appeared remote and unrealistic.

The preceding paragraphs have stressed the numerous defects of the wartime nationalist movement. They are, however, only one side of the picture. On the other side are the energy and bravery of the members of the Nationalist parties, exhibited both in the underground and partisan activities in the West Ukraine and in the propagation of OUN doctrines in the east. If ever a group was prepared to fight against seemingly hopeless odds, it

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was the OUN. A few thousand inexperienced and ill-equipped young men not only set out to supersede the gigantic Communist apparatus, but dared to challenge the apparently indomitable German war machine as well. In a world in which timidity in the face of advancing tyranny is often the rule, such courage offsets many shortcomings.

The OUN—both its factions—was youthful not only in its willingness to face great odds, but in its flexibility. While many of the old elements of autocratic control, scorn of rational planning, and ruthlessness persisted in the Nationalist groups, the evolution of their thinking on social and economic questions is striking. Even under the extreme pressure of the struggle for survival in the underground or in guerrilla warfare, many members of the OUN were able to profit from their contact with East Ukrainians to revise their program. The demand for national independence continued to occupy a central position, but it was supplemented by provisions for an agricultural order to be based on the wishes of the peasants, an organization of industry preserving public ownership while eliminating centralized direction, guarantees of civil liberties, and many other features which appealed to the East Ukrainians. Unquestionably the diminished opportunity for propaganda in the later stages of the war prevented the new program of the OUN from reaching a majority of the population, but small groups, at least, became aware that a program based on nationalism could also serve as a foundation for a new social order.

The West Ukrainian and émigré parties were not the only propagators of nationalism in the East Ukraine. The role of the churches, especially that of the Autocephalous Church, was important. Like the OUN, the Autocephalous Church had its base in the West Ukraine; the church, however, was much closer in many respects to the mentality of the east, which had been formed by centuries of Orthodoxy, than was the predominantly Galician political movement. Religion in general, however, was a doubtful ally of nationalism in the East Ukraine. Undoubtedly the church's appeal to the older elements of the population, especially in the village, was considerable; to the extent to which it awakened their feeling of national identity, it was valued by the na-

000 tionalists. For very many of the younger generation who had grown up under the Soviet system, religion was a matter of indifference, or even of hostility; hence any identification of nationalism with religion tended to deprive the former of numerous potentially useful recruits.

Religion reached down to the less-educated strata of the population, but the predominant support for nationalism in the East Ukraine was found among the intellectuals. At the same time, this group, together with technical specialists, played the leading role in reorganization of life under German occupation. While in practice the Germans retained many of the lower Soviet administrative officials because they were apparently tractable, although often really in sympathy with the Communists, in principle all those prominently associated with the Soviet regime were eliminated from the administration. The gap was filled by teachers, engineers, university professors, and professional men. The limitations of these elements as organizers of a new administration were considerable; to what extent they could have successfully established order and maintained essential services without the framework of German control is hard to say. Certainly the difficulties encountered in establishing security forces, combatting Communist infiltration, and utilizing the press indicate that the East Ukrainians alone would have found completely unassisted operation of the administrative framework to be an almost impossible task. Under the circumstances which actually existed, however, with valuable assistance from West Ukrainian organizers in key tasks such as the development of police units, the East Ukrainian administrations were able to perform such essential functions as the Germans permitted.

After discouraging experiences with the OUN many of the intellectuals became hostile to Ukrainian nationalism as a political movement; still more were indifferent. In most areas, however, a sufficient number were attracted to nationalism to give a stimulus to the movement, and in several cities nationalist elements were dominant. The reasons for this attraction are complex. In the East Ukraine nationalism had always secured most of its active adherents from among intellectuals; many of the older generation remembered with nostalgia the brief and turbu-

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lent period of national independence during the Revolution, or 000 were sons of men who had been active at that time. Under the Soviet regime, intellectuals had been influenced by the "national Communism" of the Skrypnyk period, and the encouragement given Ukrainian culture had stimulated the nationalist feeling of many persons educated during that period. Intellectuals had suffered especially during the succeeding period of Stalinist repression, and many were ready to embrace any anti-Soviet movement.

The nationalist movement gained incalculable advantage by the fact that the Germans permitted its propaganda in the crucial months immediately following Soviet evacuation. Moreover, even after they had suppressed the OUN, they continued to favor the Ukrainian language and culture. To the very end of the occupation many East Ukrainians assumed that the Germans would eventually support some form of Ukrainian state, and were consequently eager to be classified as Ukrainians. Although elements which indirectly furthered continued union with Russia were sometimes favored by the Germans as an offset to the Ukrainian nationalists, explicit propagation of such an alternative to independence was not permitted until almost the end of the occupation. Since intellectuals under the Soviet system had been habituated to conformance not only to the existing official policy, but also to that which they anticipated would be pursued in the future, even the limited support given Ukrainian nationalism by the Germans was highly significant. That such a large contingent of Ukrainian intellectuals who had occupied administrative positions in Kiev and elsewhere joined the Vlasov movement when it was finally authorized indicates that, during the occupation, many had given merely surface allegiance to the concept of Ukrainian independence. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that numerous intellectuals continued to be strongly nationalist even after they were disillusioned by the excesses of the OUN and by the discovery that it lacked the German backing which it had claimed. Sometimes, as in Kharkov, they formed vigorous and successful local nationalist organizations independent of, and even hostile to, the OUN. A considerable number of the members of these organizations, as well as East Ukrainian adherents of the

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000 OUN, proved their devotion to the nationalist cause by running grave risks to further it, in spite of the extreme penalties imposed by the Germans upon all suspected of unauthorized political activity. A withdrawal from political life, a reluctance to take the initiative, seem to have been inculcated by life under the Soviet regime, but once the East Ukrainian intellectual had become really convinced of the values of the nationalist movement, he was frequently as devoted a follower as the West Ukrainian, although much more cautious.

Reluctance to take part in public affairs was much more prevalent among the less educated elements of the population, especially the peasantry. What action such groups took was generally limited to matters of direct concern to the individual or the intimate group, such as the division of kolkhoz land. In spite of this passivity, numerous observers reported that there was a widespread desire for positive programs, a demand for a clear-cut solution to the vacuum left by the removal of Communist direction. The people rejected the Communist regime as such, yet they were accustomed by years of propaganda and planning from above to the existence of a fully formulated program which offered a long-range goal, an explanation of the course of events, and a series of immediate instructions. Unexplained orders, vague slogans, were insufficient substitutes. Above all, a program which offered satisfaction of the basic interests listed earlier in this chapter was desired.

The German authorities were unable to present such a program because of the ill-concealed determination of the Nazi leadership to convert the Ukraine into an exploited colony. Russian anti-Communist organizations were hampered by the initial advantages secured by the Ukrainian Nationalists, and in any event appear to have had neither the vigor nor the organizing personnel necessary to achieve any significant penetration of the Ukraine. Ukrainian nationalism was, therefore, in the most favorable position to act as a galvanizing force and to overcome the passivity of the population liberated from Soviet rule. By securing the support of a large portion of the East Ukrainian intelligentsia, its chances were considerably enhanced. This was the only elite group which was overwhelmingly opposed to a return of Com-

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munism and was the only medium by which nationalist ideas could be brought to the bulk of the population.

Nationalism, however, as propagated by the West Ukrainian and the émigré organizers, and as understood by most of the East Ukrainian intelligentsia, was based primarily on ethnic and cultural factors. To be sure, the East Ukrainians were generally much milder in their interpretation, recognizing the value and rights of other cultures, and seeking to secure a dominant, not an exclusive place for the Ukrainian cultural pattern. To both groups, however, the Ukrainian was born, not made. To most of the people, even to those with some degree of education, on the other hand, the question of the predominance of the Ukrainian language and culture was of minor significance, although, as the spread of the Autocephalous Church shows, there was a certain feeling of satisfaction, at least in rural areas, in having their mentors use the native language. There does seem, however, to have been a real though undefined attachment to the Ukraine as a territorial entity within the boundaries established by the Ukrainian SSR. This feeling in some cases led even persons of known Russian origin to consider themselves Ukrainian. Moreover, an equally vague preference for local administration seems to have been aroused by the decades of overcentralized oppression directed from Moscow.

That the mass of the population was attracted by the concept of territorially decentralized government, while the intellectual elite was concerned primarily with independence based on cultural distinctiveness suggests that a considerable gap separated the two elements. Where the nationalist concept, even when containing a moderate emphasis on cultivation of the Ukrainian language and arts, was combined with a vigorous program of social and economic reform, and was promoted by realistic men well acquainted with the local situation, however, it secured considerable support. The success of the Prosvita group in Kharkov is a good example of such popularity, but it should be remembered that this group directed the economically beneficial cooperative organization as well as purely cultural activities.

Ukrainian nationalism was the only dynamic anti-Communist movement which was able to carry on extensive propaganda in

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the East Ukraine under German occupation. It possessed a body of devoted followers to serve as its organizers; it was capable of arousing enthusiasm and exacting sacrifices. Lack of experience and judgment cost its adherents dearly. The movement proved, however, to be flexible enough to adapt its program to the demands for social measures which the Soviet experience had instilled in the East Ukrainian population. It attracted a large proportion of the intellectuals and technicians who comprised the only group capable of reorganizing life after the Soviet evacuation, but it was unable to penetrate the mass of the population to any great extent. The galvanizing force was present; the cadres which might have transmitted it were half-formed; but the essential mass remained uncommitted.

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APPENDIX

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POPULATIONS OF UKRAINIAN CITIES

(in thousands)

	1926[a]			1939[a]	1941–42			1926	1941–42	Ratio of increase of proportion of Ukrainians to Russians (Column 8: Column 7)
	Total	*Ukrainians*	*Russians*	*Total*	*Total*	*Ukrainians*	*Russians*	*Ratio of Ukrainians to Russians*	*Ratio of Ukrainians to Russians*	
Kiev[b]	513.8	216.6	125.5	846.3	352.0	282.0	50.2	1.73	5.6	3.2
Kharkov[c]	417.3	160.2	154.4	833.4	450.0	290.0	150.0	1.04	1.9	1.8
Dniepropetrovsk[d]	232.9	83.8	73.4	500.7	234.2	164.1	52.0	1.14	3.16	2.8
Poltava[e]	92.0	62.8	8.1	130.3	68.7	64.0	4.7	7.75	13.6	1.8
Kirovograd[f]	66.5	29.6	16.6	100.3	68.1	62.4	4.0	1.78	15.6	8.8
Kherson[g]	58.8	21.1	21.2	97.2	61.4	50.7	8.4	.99	6.0	6.1
Zhitomir[h]	76.7	28.5	10.5	95.1	40.1	24.5	2.5	2.71	9.8	3.6
Vinnitsa[i]	58.0	23.9	8.0	92.9	35.6	24.1	3.8	2.99	6.34	2.1
Kamenets-Podolsk[j]	32.1	14.4	2.3	72.4	12.0	10.6	0.5	6.30	21.2	3.4
Chernigov[k]	35.2	20.1	3.6	67.4	30.0	27.0	3.0	5.58	9.0	1.6
Uman'[l]	44.8	19.3	2.0	....	20.0	18.9	0.5	9.65	38.2	4.0
Pavlograd[m]	18.8	11.5	2.6	....	....	(94.1%)	(5.3%)	4.43	17.8	4.0

[a] Statistics for 1926 are from Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Recensement de la Population de l'URSS*, XI, XII, XIII (Moscow, 1929): XI, 76–77 (Zhitomir) and 162–63 (Chernigov); XII, 27 (Kiev), 20–21 (Vinnitsa), 204–5 (Kamenets-Podolsk), 210–11 (Uman'), 299 (Poltava), and 310–11 (Kharkov); XIII, 13–14 (Kirovograd), 36–37 (Kherson), 248–49 (Dniepropetrovsk), and 308–9 (Pavlograd). The 1939 figures are from Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 250–53.

[b] *Nova Doba*, September 6, 1942, p. 3; *Nastup*, September 6, 1942, p. 2 (from *Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta*); Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), p. 44. All of these reports are based on the city administration census of April 1, 1942. After that date, the population declined still more, but no later breakdown by nationalities is available.

[c] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 24, 1942, p. 2, based on a census taken by Professor Sosnovyi in December, 1941, evidently at the instance of the city administration. Only the proportion (65%) of the Ukrainians in the total population is given, but it has been assumed that the great majority of the remainder was Russian. The total population declined rapidly in the succeeding years, reaching a low of 200,000 after the German reconquest in March, 1943, of which 80 percent were Ukrainian according to their own declaration (interview with Mayor Semenenko in *L'vivs'ki Visti*, May 23–24, 1943).

[d] *Nastup*, February 22, 1942, p. 2, based on a city administration census. The figures include the suburb of Amur-Dniepropetrovsk. See also *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 17, 1942, p. 5. Another report (*Ukrains'ka Diiusnist'*, February 1, 1942, p. 1) gives a total of 350,000, of which 300,000 were Ukrainian.

[e] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, November 1, 1942, p. 7. Only the proportion of Ukrainians in the total (93.1%) is given, but, as in the case of Kharkov, it may be assumed that by the date of the count the vast majority of the remainder was Russian.

[f] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, June 14, 1942, p. 7; *Ukrains'ka Diiusnist'*, July 10, 1942, p. 1; *Nastup*, July 12, 1942, p. 2, all based on census of the city administration.

[g] *Deutsche Pug-Zeitung*, July 22, 1942, p. 2; *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, September 6, 1942, p. 6.

[h] *Nastup*, December 27, 1941, p. 3. About 15.5 percent of the population was Polish; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24, 1941, p. 2, based on a count by the police passport division, lists 2,000 Russians and 7,000 Poles in a total of 42,000.

[i] *Nastup*, February 1, 1942, p. 2, based on a census of January 1, 1942. About 6 percent of the total was Polish.

[j] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 25, 1942, p. 2, based on a census of the local administration.

[k] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 3, 1942, p. 4; *L'vivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2, based on the first statistical reports of the city administration.

[l] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, November 1, 1942, p. 7.

[m] *Ukrains'ka Diiusnist'*, February 10, 1943, p. 1.

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ABBREVIATIONS

113 THE CODE LETTERS preceding the documents in the various collections listed in this bibliography have the following significance:

CXL	(The numerical designation of the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine documentary series on Eastern Europe)
EC	Economic (referring to Nuremberg collection on cases arising in connection with economic matters)
NO	Nuremberg, Organizations (referring to documents collected for proceedings against Nazi organizations)
NOKW	Nuremberg, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (referring to documents collected for trial of German army officers)
Occ E	Occupation, East (referring to documents in the Yiddish Scientific Institute pertaining to the German occupation in Eastern Europe)
PS	Paris—Storey (referring to documents collected at Paris for the Nuremberg Trials by Colonel Robert G. Storey, an American officer)
USSR Exhibit	(Referring to documents presented by the Soviet prosecution staff at Nuremberg)

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NOTE ON SOURCES

SOURCES for the study of Ukrainian nationalism during the Second World War are extremely varied. Published personal narratives are important. Ukrainian memoirs, like most others, however, have serious defects as sources for the history of political events. On the nationalist side, memoirs are usually highly colored by the views or prejudices of the authors, since the tempestuous Ukrainian nationalist politics have rarely been conducive to impartial reflection. Moreover, the flight of the nationalists from Eastern Europe as the Soviet armies advanced resulted in the loss of many of the documents which might have enhanced the reliability of their memoirs. In many cases the personal circumstances of the writers have made it impossible for them to check their narratives against documents available since the war. Soviet memoirs of wartime events, on the other hand, suffer from the distortions resulting from adherence to the official line. 114 127

Fortunately, it is in many cases possible to check postwar narratives against contemporary records. In this respect documents from German archives made available to the public in connection with the Nuremberg trials are extremely valuable. Some of these documents, composed by Ukrainian nationalist leaders themselves, provide direct evidence of nationalist activity. Most of the documents concerning aspects of Ukrainian nationalism are reports by German political, military or police officials; they are of course subject to error due to misinformation or negligence of the authors. Occasionally the desire of an official of the Nazi dictatorship to put himself in a better light before his superiors, or to advance a policy he preferred, led to intentional distortion. Since the reports were for official use only, and as a rule were written by officials who were personally not deeply involved in Ukrainian affairs, the element of intentional coloring is comparatively minor, however.

A second very important body of contemporary sources consists of published material. Some publications were issued clandestinely; while the authors may have had numerous reasons for distortion, they were at least not subject to German censorship. By far the larger amount of available contemporary published material, however, was published under German censorship. Consequently, numerous facts had to be omitted and many views colored to make them acceptable to the Germans. German censorship was not iron-clad, however; the numerous ways in which publications in territories occupied by the Germans

114 could express real views and present facts have been touched upon
127 throughout this study. Because of censorship contemporary published sources present comparatively little material of direct political relevance. They do, however, present valuable information on the closely related topics of religious, cultural, and economic activity. Moreover, they describe the overt activities of individuals in specific places at specific times; it is often possible to check such facts in postwar descriptions of covert political activities against the framework obtained from contemporary sources. The extent to which facts cited by the postwar informant conform to the contemporary sources permits one to make a partial evaluation of the reliability of the informant. Contemporary Soviet sources on nationalist activities are much sparser, but for some events they provide valuable information which shifts in Soviet policy have caused to be deleted from postwar publications.

124 Important as are the contemporary sources, a rounded picture of the wartime nationalist movements could not have been obtained without the aid of unpublished accounts of the participants. Some of these are in the form of manuscripts made available to the author of this study, but most were obtained through oral interviews. For reasons which should be clear to the reader of this study, it has been necessary to preserve the anonymity of the informants. The code system adopted makes it possible for the author to determine the source of each statement, however, and in many cases it will be possible for him to suggest persons whom an inquirer might approach for further information on a given topic.

The interviews were conducted during 1952–53 in Europe, Canada, and the United States. Before beginning the interviews, the author made a thorough examination of the greater part of the German documents and the published materials, contemporary and memoir. He was also fortunate enough to secure advice and information from a number of scholars who had worked on related studies of the Ukraine and of wartime Eastern Europe. These preliminary investigations enabled him to form an over-all picture of the topic. For many sections of the study, he could establish a reliable account lacking only a limited number of details. This approach was essential for the success of the interviews. Prospective informants were more inclined to furnish information when they learned that the author had acquired the background knowledge of subjects which were of intense personal interest to them. The preliminary investigation also enabled the author to determine some of the key questions, or at least to know which areas of his topic needed probing. An equally useful result of this investigation was that the knowledge acquired enabled the author to assess the validity of many statements while the informant was still available, so that dubious statements could be questioned or further information elicited.

Before the stage of interviewing was reached, however, prospective informants had to be selected and located. If a number of interviewers with ample time had been engaged in the study, it might have been desirable to interview *all* or a considerable portion of émigrés from the East Ukraine and large numbers from the West Ukraine. Such an approach might have yielded valuable information of a statistical nature. Since the émigrés are in many respects an atypical selection from the entire population, and since it is difficult if not impossible to evaluate present-day responses of a large number of interviewees on such matters as wartime attitudes, such an approach would at best have been a most delicate one. It would have been quite impossible for an individual investigator with a limited number of months at his disposal. 124

Under the circumstances, the only practical approach was to concentrate on interviewing persons who had had key roles in the events studied. As described above, the preliminary investigation enabled the author to determine the principal areas on which information was needed. It also enabled him in many cases to determine who had held a position which enabled him to acquire such information. The postwar Ukrainian press frequently indicated whether such persons were still alive and gave some hint concerning their present whereabouts. With this information, exact addresses could usually be obtained. Worth-while informants, whose value the author had not previously recognized, were provided directly by interested organizations and individuals. It is felt, however, that it would have been most unwise to have relied exclusively or predominantly upon such second-hand channels for obtaining a list of informants. Few persons, even among active nationalists, were familiar with all or most of the aspects of the study and were rarely acquainted with a very large proportion of the possible informants. Reliance on interested organizations and individuals for contacts would also, at least to some degree, have resulted in a slanting of the approach, since such channels consciously or unconsciously select informants sympathetic to them.

In addition to a number of Germans, Russians who had lived in the Ukraine and Ukrainians who desired continued union of the Ukraine and Russia (both categories are referred to in subsequent paragraphs as "Russophiles") were interviewed. Both Germans and Russophiles were chosen and located in a manner similar to that employed in the case of Ukrainian nationalists, although of course German and Russian individuals and organizations, rather than Ukrainian nationalist ones, usually served as intermediaries.

Because informants had been selected on the basis of their probable ability to provide information on specific aspects of the study, no generalized questionnaire was employed. Where possible a "non-directive" approach, designed to induce the interviewee to volunteer information

124 he thought important, was used during the first stage of the interview. When specific information desired was not furnished spontaneously, however, detailed questions were put, and if necessary cross-examination employed. If the initial discussion had convinced the informant that the author was engaged in an impartial effort to establish the truth, and that his investigation made it necessary for him to be detailed and persistent in his inquiries, such "detective" methods were not usually resented, although of course some informants avoided revealing desired information.

The informants were frequently busy persons who could not spare an indefinite amount of time. This was especially the case since all rendered their assistance without financial compensation. In some cases an informant could give only a half-hour to answer a few especially important questions, in others several meetings totaling many hours could be arranged.

It would be impossible to give the total number of informants, since frequently at a gathering or in an organizational office a very large number of persons were encountered who furnished a useful hint or an impression of the wartime scene. In the case of seventy-three informants, however, it was felt worth while to conduct more or less systematic interviews and to prepare summary records of the information furnished, classified under the names of the interviewees. A large majority of these records are cited by code number in the footnotes of this study; since one informant frequently furnished more than one interview, the total number of code numbers exceeds seventy-three.

Of the seventy-three informants referred to above, fourteen were former German officials who had been involved in Ukrainian affairs during the war. Of these eleven had been active in the East Ukraine (and in some cases in the West Ukraine as well, and frequently in Berlin in connection with policy toward the Ukraine); three had significant experience in the West Ukraine only. Nine Russophiles were interviewed. Two were pre-1939 émigrés who did not visit the East Ukraine during the war but were active in politics concerning it. The other seven were residents of the Soviet East Ukraine until 1941 or later. Twenty-nine of the interviewees were West Ukrainian nationalists. Of these nineteen were not active in the East Ukraine; their information concerned the background of political activity in the West Ukraine and among the emigration. The remaining ten had extensive experience in the East Ukraine during the war. Seven of the interviewees were East Ukrainian nationalists who had emigrated before 1939. Of these only one was active in the East Ukraine during the war, but the others had important information on nationalist political developments in the emigration or in the West Ukraine, and several were able, through extensive contacts, to gather much information on the wartime East Ukraine. Finally, there were fourteen East

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Ukrainian interviewees who had remained in the East Ukraine until 1941 or later. 124

Information obtained from interviews and unpublished manuscripts constitutes an essential, although not a predominant part of the material used in this study. Among the informants were a considerable proportion of the leading personalities mentioned in the text. Moreover, in a very large number of cases information could be obtained from all or several of the conflicting groups concerning events in which they participated. A special effort was made to obtain all sides of a controversial issue, when adequate published sources were not available for one or more groups of participants, and as a rule this effort was successful. It is regrettable that the names of the informants cannot be given in connection with specific items of information which they provided. In many cases, even indication of the point of view represented by the anonymous informant would have provided a clue to his identity because the number of possible witnesses is frequently very limited.

While the use of oral informants for the study of recent political situations involves the disadvantage of inability to cite sources, there are numerous compensating advantages. Subjects, like the present one, which involve widespread clandestine activities, can scarcely be analyzed unless the participants themselves furnish information. Moreover, even when a published memoir exists, it cannot be called to account for discrepancies or asked for additional information as can the living witness. Beyond these advantages, there is the intangible but very real asset of contact with the actors of the drama studied, a contact which gives the author a "feel" for the situation and insights into the psychology of his subjects which would be difficult to achieve in any other fashion.

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[For a detailed account of nationalism treated as a political movement both within and outside of the Ukraine during the years of 1939 and 1945, see category 116, entire source]

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000 THE UKRAINE—A RUSSIAN LAND

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THE UKRAINE— A RUSSIAN LAND

PIERRE BRÉGY
AND
PRINCE SERGE OBOLENSKY

TRANSLATED BY
GEORGE KNUPFFER

SELWYN & BLOUNT
PUBLISHERS LONDON

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

000 THIS book was written before the war, in the summer of 1939. Nothing need be changed in the text. It describes all the aspects of the historical, geographical, economic, and religious background of that part of Eastern Europe which has been a battle-field for centuries.

This year's manifestation of the German *Drang nach Osten*, which has led to such world-wide repercussions, is seen, on reading this book, to be only a phase in an ancient struggle.

The role of Russia as the only factor which can ultimately bring balance and peace will be realized. Light is shed on the Russian annexations of the districts of Eastern Poland. They are seen to be not just wanton aggression, but in tune with centuries of history. So much has Russia changed already, and the process is by no means complete, that the one-time internationalist regime is also in some respects carrying out a national policy.

Russia has wisely left all purely Polish districts to Germany. A Poland that has repeatedly risen after so many disasters will rise again and will, with a strong new Russia of to-morrow behind her, be a bulwark against German aggression.

The Ukraine, that rich land which was the ultimate object of Hitler's struggle, should be safely protected.

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CHAPTER I

WHAT IS THE UKRAINE?

THE transformation of Czechoslovakia after the Munich agreement into a federal state has placed a poor and mountainous country formerly known under the name of 'Sub-Carpathian Russia,' later baptized 'The Autonomous Sub-Carpathian Ukraine,' into the front rank of European events.[1]

It is thus that the Ukrainian problem appears in Europe, made important by the number of the population which it concerns, by the extent of the territories which are affected, and by political and economic complications of immediate interest to four different States: the U.S.S.R., Poland, Rumania, and Hungary.

The importance of this problem is furthermore underlined by the role which it seems destined to play in the dynamic development of the German nation, in possibly guiding its future manifestation after that of the *Anschluss*, the annexation of Sudetenland, of Bohemia, of Moravia, and of Slovakia. In this the problem clearly has an international character.

. . . . .

121 The aim of this book is to explain the Ukrainian problem to British readers both in its entirety and in all its particular aspects; geographical, historical, ethnographical, economic, and political.

[1] Reannexed on 20 March 1939 by Hungary, this country has readopted the name of Sub-Carpathian Russia or Ruthenia.

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000 Usually when undertaking any study whatever, one has at least the advantage of dealing with a well-defined subject.

This is not the case with regard to the Ukraine.

101 Actually, from a purely political point of view, no independent state ever bore this name except during a very short period in 1918–1919, a period which coincided almost entirely with an occupation of Ukrainian territory by Austro-German military forces.

To-day, too, no independent state bears this name, as the 'Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine' is an integral part of the Soviet Union.

Consequently it will be necessary that we should first define our subject in order to indicate to our readers the significance of the word 'Ukraine' as used in this book.

It will, therefore, be well first to give some information about this term itself and about its philological origins. The word Ukraine (*Oukraina* or *Okraina*) means 'March,' 'Borderland,' 'Outskirts,' and 'Landsend.'

Formerly it had been applied by the Russians to the southern borders of the old Muscovite State, which now include the eastern districts of the present Soviet Ukraine. One of the articles of the *Sobornoie Oulojenie*, the Russian code of laws of the twelfth century, provides for condemnation to deportation to the 'Ukrainian Lands' (*Oukrainya Zemli*) giving this name to all far-away lands, not necessarily Ukrainian. The Poles used the same name for their south-eastern frontiers. The hypothesis that the name 'Ukraine' comes from a Slavonic tribe of Pomerania, the so-called *Ukres* or *Ukranes*, cannot be accepted.

It is the warriors of those frontier regions, the Cossacks (Horsemen, in the Tartar language), who, in the sixteenth century, have brought this name with

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them to the right bank of the Dnieper. Some French 101
documents of the epoch which mention the name Ukraine confirm this, as for example: 'The description of the Ukraine, which are several provinces of the Polish Kingdom,' by Le Sieur de Beauplan (Rouen, 1660). Other, more ancient documents used the terms 'Russia,' 'Land of the Cossacks,' or 'Tartary' for these regions.

If one keeps to the word 'Ukraine' in its strictly philological sense, this name could not be applied to the western part of the country, and especially to Galicia, and never to Sub-Carpathian Russia, which has for centuries and in all languages used the name of Russia. In Czech and Polish it was *Rus Podkrpatska*, in Hungarian *Ruska Krajna*, in Old Russian *Ougorskaia Rous* (Hungarian Russia).

Nevertheless it is in Galicia, while existing among foreign peoples and differing religions and cultures which were politically dominant (Germans, Poles, and Hungarians), that the intellectual movement and the Ukrainian language had most developed in resisting denationalization.

One could not, impartially, take advantage of this confusion of terms in order to deny the existence of the Ukraine as a political entity, as we have other examples such as another Slavonic country, Jugoslavia, where such a situation does not allow one to deny the existence of a nation and a State.

From a strictly official point of view there exists a 000
frontier, more administrative than political, which separates the Soviet Ukraine from the rest of Russia. The term 'administrative' seems to us quite correct, as one cannot apply the description of 'political' to this frontier since it has been determined unilaterally by the central government of Moscow in accordance with

000 vaguely ethnographical and linguistic data and, especially, by taking into account the economic considerations which decided the division of the U.S.S.R. into 'industrial regions' and which accord with the general plan of organization of the Union.

This purely administrative and arbitrary character of the factors which determined the internal frontiers of the U.S.S.R. is confirmed by the creation, in the interior of the Ukraine, of an 'Autonomous Moldavian Republic.'

This territory includes the regions of Tiraspol, Ananiev, and Balta on the left bank of the Dniester, opposite Rumania.

It is of a demagogic character and serves only to menace the unity of Rumania by creating a national base of an important branch of her population outside her frontiers.

As for the Moldaves, this new republic only has an insignificant minority of them, which are almost entirely assimilated, especially in the two last-named regions, where their numerical importance does not exceed that of the German colonists.

101 The administrative frontier of the Soviet Ukraine begins on the shore of the Sea of Azov between Marioupol and Taganrog, runs along the Donietz, the tributary of the Don, turns towards the north-west, follows the border of the Central Russian plain, then points to the west and reaches the Polish boundary at about latitude fifty-one degrees north, about one hundred kilometres south of the Pripet, a tributary of the Dnieper.

The political frontier which separates the western parts of Polish Volynia and Galicia from the Soviet Ukraine are the direct result of the defeat of Russia during the Russo-Polish War of 1920, and have no geographic, ethnographic, strategic, or other justification, a fact which also applies to the rest of the frontier



MAP No. 1

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101 between these two countries right up to its northern extremity.

Officially the Ukraine is limited to-day to the territory of 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic' which corresponds in some districts to the territory of 'Little Russia' or 'Russia Minor' of the time of the Tsars and to New Russia, conquered by the Russian Empire at the end of the eighteenth century (the districts of Odessa, Kherson, and of Northern Taurida).

But from the historical and linguistic point of view this territory stretches a considerable way towards the west and includes the departments (*voievodstva*) of Volynia, Lvov, Stanislavov, Tarnopol, and some districts of the departments of Polesia (the districts of Stolin, Kamien-Koszynski), and of Lioublin (the districts of Kholm, Bialgoraj, Hrubeiszov, Tomaszov, and of Zamoscie) of the Polish Republic, as constituted before the present war.

To this territory one must add Rumanian Bucovina ('Black Russia') and the northern section of Bessarabia up to the banks of the Dniester—the actual frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania—down to its mouth on the Black Sea. As for Sub-Carpathian Russia, we also include it in the 'great Ukraine' solely *because of the name which it has been given by the Government of Prague after the Munich agreement, while insisting on the complete absence of the existence of any linguistic or other reason for doing so.*

The frontier thus determined has, as we have said, only a linguistic and administrative basis, for within that line the greater part of the population speak the various Ukrainian dialects, and the territory which is enclosed by it bears to-day the name of the Ukraine.

From this Polish-Soviet frontier this line roughly follows the River Pripet, and then descends towards the town of Kholm, then to follow the Rivers Wieprz, San,

the Vistula, Wislok, Poprad, the latter in Sub-Carpathian Russia, and finally in Hungary the High Tissa, a tributary of the Danube right up to the former Czecho-Rumanian border. Then this line cuts across Rumanian territory to the south of Tchernovitz (Cernauti) and follows the little river Reout, a tributary of the Dniester, right up to the latter. 101

Speaking geographically, that which we will decide to call the 'Ukraine' in this book has only one natural frontier: the southern inclines of the western part of the Carpathians. We do not speak of the coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov which officially forms its southern frontier, as this is above all the boundary of the Russian continent in its entirety. [131]

Actually, in the north-eastern basin of the Danube rises the immense semicircle of the Carpathians, dominating the Hungarian Plain. 133

The summits of these mountains reach to more than two thousand metres and are covered by beech, oaks, ash, and some fir trees—typical European forests. They have changed much less than those of the Alps or the Sudeten ranges. Here, in the western part of the Carpathians, in Sub-Carpathian Russia, the forests are still in an almost virgin state. They are still inhabited by bears and wild boar, and are but authentic vestiges—even because of the fact of their primitive state—of the great forests of Central Europe.

The Uzok Range, which has seen the passage of so many invaders in the course of the centuries, has all the characteristics of the high mountains of Central Europe.

From the geo-physical point of view Sub-Carpathian Russia, which stretches along the southern slopes of the Carpathians, is still part of the hilly country, divided by ranges of mountains, with a temperate climate typical of the whole of Central Europe, which has

133 always favoured the formation of national groups, distinct from one another, and of States of relatively restricted size more or less dependent on their neighbours. Their development fills the whole history of Central Europe and they are only menaced by the German drive.

If we proceed in a north-easterly direction into Eastern Galicia, to the old 'Red Russia,' to-day *Malopolska* ('Little Poland' or 'Poland Minor'), we enter imperceptibly into the plains as the mountains become, little by little, hills which in turn are slowly obliterated. The hilly country becomes flat. Only the rivers, winding in the plain, interrupt here and there the monotony of the landscape. Advancing more and more towards the east, we always see the same plain without anything which resembles a natural limit, a plain which extends for hundreds and thousands of miles. We notice nothing at the frontier which separates Polish Galicia from the plain of Southern Russia (the Soviet Ukraine), but we also do not notice anything, when going towards the north, between the Ukraine and Russia proper.

Here we can go towards the ocean in the north and meet but rarely some chains of hills whose height is seldom more than three hundred metres.

Beyond the Carpathians, in the Ukraine, we enter the great plain which stretches, with only one interruption, the Urals, to Eastern Siberia.

132 The climate, too, changes almost imperceptibly and becomes a little colder and more continental towards the north and the east. However, the shroud of snow which covers the soil remains intact during three to five months in the whole of this immense part of the Continent, except, perhaps, along the shore of the Black Sea, where the climate is a little softer and where winter snow is rarer.

Apart from the severer climate of the Carpathian summits, that of the whole Ukrainian territory is nearly the same and can be characterized by the average temperature at Kiev, which is almost in the centre of the Ukraine, and which is an average of 7·3 degrees C., with an average minimum of −4·5 degrees C. and an average maximum of 20 degrees C. 132

This solid carpet of snow and these frozen rivers during long months are unknown in Western Europe.

The length of uninterrupted winter increases as one advances towards the north and the east. But on the whole extent of the Russian plain the average temperature in January does not rise above −4 degrees C. Human existence has to adapt itself to this fact. All the civilizations which have developed on the Russian plain have necessarily been influenced by it.

This aspect of the winter already tells us that from a climatic point of view the Ukraine belongs to a world quite different from the West and is connected with the great Russian continent. In the summer torrid and endless heat, broken by rare thunderstorms, such as are unknown in the West, confirms this statement. This very high summer temperature is not typical of the Ukraine alone but of the whole of Russia.

Beyond the frontier of the 'Soviet Republic of the Ukraine,' in the direction of the Volga and the Caspian Sea, the periods of heat are so long and intense that vegetation, which is progressively poorer, becomes almost non-existent. We enter a zone of semi-desert. But again we do so almost without noticing it, as the change of flora takes place slowly and imperceptibly from the Carpathians to the Caspian Sea.

In the greater part of the Ukraine the heat and dryness are sufficiently pronounced to hinder the growth of trees, but nevertheless insufficiently so as to kill all vegetation. 137 132

137 Between the zone of the forests and that of the deserts, a geographical zone which enjoys a rich vegetation of corns and grasses stretches across the Russian plain. It is the Steppe, which begins on the shores of the Black Sea and almost immediately behind the Carpathians, a little to the east of Lvov, in Polish Galicia, along longitude 22 degrees east, and which continues from west to east, growing gradually wider beyond the frontiers of the Ukraine, and passing the official and conventional limit of Europe without interruption into Siberia.

134 Treeless since time immemorial, the plain is here exceptionally fertile. The grasses which grow here since prehistoric times have formed a thick layer of humus by their organic remains, which particularly favours the growth of all cereals, close relations of the wild species of the Steppe, the *pyrei*. The fertility of the soil is not only due to its organic composition but also to its porous structure whose capillary qualities facilitate irrigation.

This famous 'black earth,' the *tchernoziom*, is nowhere so rich as in the Ukraine. It forms, while becoming somewhat poorer towards the east, the typical soil of the whole Steppe both in the Ukraine and in Siberia.

137 The transition between the region of the forests and the Steppe is also not sudden. Before disappearing definitely in the ocean of corn and grass, the forests become lighter and sparser and here and there, especially along the rivers, they advance into the Steppes.

131 Yet the frontier between the zone of the forests and that of the Steppe is the only natural border which one can find in the immensity of the Russian plain. Formerly a stable political boundary—as we shall see when studying the history of the Ukraine[2]—it represents nothing to-day either from the ethnical or the political point of view.

2 [see category 116, pp. 27-106 --- Analyst]

This frontier runs in an almost straight line first towards the east to the Dnieper, which it reaches near the old City of Perejaslavl, then it runs towards the north-east and cuts through the present frontier of the Soviet Ukraine in the neighbourhood of Poutivl (approximately fifty degrees latitude north). 131

The forest reigns to the north of this line, which cuts the territory of the Ukraine into two unequal parts. The bigger part of Western Ukraine, Polish Galicia and the north-western part of Soviet Ukraine, lie in the forest zone and it is there, in about a quarter of the total territory, that the historic cradle of the Ukraine is to be found, as well as that of the whole of Russia, with the ancient towns of Halitch, Vladimir-Volynsk, Kiev, and Tchernigov.

The other and greater part of the actual Ukrainian territory includes the Steppes, now almost entirely under the plough, which reach down to the Black Sea. This is a country of relatively recent colonization.

In the Ukraine, as in the whole of Russia, the two principal zones are always present.

To sum up, if there is a geographic line between the Ukraine and Europe in the Carpathians, it is impossible to trace a geographic frontier between the Ukraine and the rest of Russia.

Geographically, Ukrainian territory is part of the great Russian Plain and has all the essential characteristics of the latter, and we can do no better than to refer to the dictionary of Larousse which gives the following excellent definition: 'Vast country of the south-west of the Russian Plain.'

Historic evolution alone, directed by the will of men, could, when encountering natural factors, give a distinctive character to this territory. 000

It is therefore this evolution of the Ukraine which

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000 will occupy us particularly in order that we should be able to disentangle the historical factors which oppose her union with Russia, as well as those which tend to maintain this unity.

But before coming to this, let us try to consider one more geographical circumstance which underlines the unity of the Ukraine and Russia. This is the system of rivers. Here, too, the principles which apply to the
133 Ukraine also apply to the whole of Russia. The whole
[487] plain is a region of great rivers, which flow from south to north, or from north to south. It is in the latter direction that the rivers of the Ukraine flow. Their waters are emptied into the Black Sea. Chief among them is the Dnieper, which, owing to its length of 2500 kilometres, occupies third place in Europe, after the Volga and the Danube. It crosses Ukrainian territory from north to south, dividing it into two almost equal parts, while its sources lie in the north, in Great Russia, beyond Ukrainian territory. Thus it forms a natural link between the north and the border regions of the Black Sea. And it is to this great mercantile route, represented by this river, that the Ukrainian territory owes in great measure the rôle it has played in Europe since the tenth century of our era.

The river, too, was a great route of colonization. The first agriculturalists followed the routes which nature herself had provided in the Ukraine as well as in the whole Russian Plain.

000 As we have seen, it is impossible, geographically speaking, to fix the frontiers of the Ukraine. But we have also said, that to determine the subject and to reach the aim of this book, we have to establish approximately the territory which we will call by this name. Having also accepted the Carpathians as the only geographical frontier, we shall keep to this with regard to the whole

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western part of the Ukraine, and we shall confine ourselves to the boundaries as determined on pages 16–19.[1] 000

We will accept the administrative Soviet frontier as being the northern and eastern boundaries. The coast of the Black Sea and of the Sea of Azov completes the boundary. /31 /01

Thus the Ukraine, as determined by us, forms a territory whose extreme points are:

In the west longtitude 19 degrees east: the town of Uzhgorod in Hungarian Sub-Carpathian Russia;

In the east longtitude 37.5 degrees east: the town of Lougansk, in the oil-basin of the Donietz;

In the north latitude 52 degrees north: the town of Novgorod-Severski;

In the south latitude 48 degrees north: the town of Ovidiopol, at the mouth of the Dniester. This is within latitudes which are familiar to us, as those of Kiev and of Calais, of Odessa and of Nantes, of Poltava and of Paris correspond with each other.[2]

The maximum extent of Ukrainian territory in a west to east direction, from Uzhgorod to Lougansk, is, as the crow flies, a distance of 1375 kilometres, while in the north to south direction, from Novgorod-Severski to Ovidiopol it is 675 kilometres.

This territory occupies a space of 588,000 square kilometres (about 25,000 square kilometres more than France) of which

Soviet Ukraine has . . .	452,000 sq. km.
Poland (Volynia, Podolia, Galicia)	107,000 sq. km.
Rumanian Bucovina and Bessarabia	17,000 sq. km.
Sub-Carpathian Russia (Hungary)	12,000 sq. km.

[1] See Map No. 1.

[2] See Map No. 2: the map of France superimposed on that of the Ukraine.

162 The population on the whole of this territory reaches about 43,000,000 inhabitants of which there are:

In the Soviet Ukraine . .	33,500,000
In the Polish part . . .	8,000,000
In the Rumanian part . .	900,000
In the Hungarian part . .	600,000

The average density of this population is about the same as that of France, being 70·6 inhabitants per square kilometre and varying between 45 and 100 inhabitants per square kilometre in different regions, the density being a little less than that of Poland (85) and a little greater than that of Rumania and Jugoslavia (48).

If one accepts the figures of official Polish and Soviet statistics, one can estimate that of this population of 43,000,000, 36,000,000 are Ukrainians and the rest Polish, Great-Russian, White-Russian, Jewish, Moldavian, German, Hungarian, and other minorities and small groups scattered throughout the territory.

These figures are, moreover, almost exactly confirmed by the religion of the population: 85 per cent are Orthodox or Catholics of the Eastern rite, of which all without exception are Ukrainians.

000 It is obvious that, owing to its size and its population, the Soviet Ukraine is far more important than the other parts of the Ukraine. Its economic potential is proportionately still greater, which forces us to allot it a predominant place in that part of the book which will deal with the economic geography of the Ukraine.

[see category 116, p. 25--- Analyst]

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CHAPTER II

THE UKRAINE OR 'RUSSIA MINOR'?
(An historical explanation)

FROM time immemorial and until it was finally conquered by the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century, the Steppe has been the stage of most extensive migrations. 175x

From the borders of China to the Carpathians, nomadic peoples wandered freely without encountering natural obstacles and brought traces of Far Eastern civilization, 'barbaric' but not unrecognizable, to the Danube. These elements of the most ancient civilizations of Eastern Asia were mixed with those of the Middle East and of classical Greece, and penetrated into the Steppe, the forest by the Black Sea, and its border countries: the Balkans and the Caucasus.

What has been the first ethnical foundation of that which is to-day called the Ukraine? According to the researches of the academician Marr, the well-known Russian linguist, who has created an entirely new classification of languages and whose work was continued and completed in Paris by the eminent Russian paleontologist, M. Alexander Bashmakoff, one can be certain, from the point of view of language, civilization, and race, that this primitive foundation dates back to the 'Japhetic' or 'Aloroge' peoples of outer Asia, who have created the most ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia and Elam and that of the Hittites of Asia

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×175 Minor. The Iranian Scythians succeeded this Cymmerian ethnical element and created on the shores of the Black Sea, in assimilating the influences of classical Greece, a 'barbarian' civilization, already rather brilliant, which had been grafted on to the primitive Aloroge foundation. Then, at the beginning of the Christian era, the pressure of the Germanic Goths, coming from the west, met in the Steppes of the Black Sea with that of the Alans, probably Caucasians and Aloroge, before being crushed by the assault of the Huns who came from the borders of China. After this, during many centuries other Asiatic hordes of Turkish or Ugro-Finnish origin, such as the Bulgarians, the Avars, the Hungarians, swept all the settled populations which had tried to take root there from the Steppes.

Is it possible to believe that all these elements have disappeared without leaving any traces? Certainly not, as, to mention only one example, the name of Kiev, the 'mother of Russian towns,' the historical capital of the Ukraine, seems to be derived from an Aloroge root and thus dates back to the most ancient layer of the populations which have passed to the north of the Black Sea.

We need not lose further time over the details of all the migrations of the prehistoric period of the Eastern Slav peoples. That which is important is to note how intense the mixture of the races was and to observe the mutual penetration of different civilizations, at all times, to the north of the Black Sea.

Yet the conquerors of the Steppe did not stop at its borders. They penetrated far towards the north, into the zone of the forests. One has only very vague data about the happenings in this zone. The different peoples of the Steppe seem to have possessed the country of the far north and to have exercised a direct influence upon

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the Finnish populations whom the Slavs were to encounter in the northern part of Russia. 175x

It is at the beginning of the sixth century of our era that the Byzantine historians discover a group of Slavs, distinct from others, whom they call the 'Ants,' in the extreme south-west corner of the Steppes near the Black Sea, a little beyond the mouth of the Danube, on the lower course of the Dniester and the Boug. It seems that this was a confederation of some already settled Slavonic tribes who had advanced into the Steppe. In a perpetual struggle with the nomads, as well as with peoples of their own race, the Southern Slavs of the Balkans, the 'Ants,' were able to maintain their existence on the territory they had occupied for a considerable time.

In the middle of the seventh century they were conquered by new people, the Khazars, who founded, for almost three centuries, a powerful empire on the lower Volga and Don, controlling almost the whole territory of present-day Ukraine.

The existence of this great State, which was relatively civilized and guarded all the East to West routes and maintained close relations with Byzantium and the Near East, deeply influenced the destiny of the 'Ants,' who became themselves a part of this empire. Enjoying relative peace and security, they were able to assimilate the various elements which had intermingled in the Steppes of the Black Sea, and at the same time they were able to undertake a vast movement of colonization which, finally, changed the face of this part of the world.

If one admits, as did the Ukrainian historian Hrouchevsky, that the 'Ants' were the direct ancestors of the Ukrainians, which is probably true, one also has to consider them as the ancestors of the Russians

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×175 generally; the White Russians, the Great Russians as well as of the Ukrainians.

Having separated from their kinsmen of the west and south, the eastern branch of the Slavs settled first, as we have seen, a little to the east of the mouth of the Danube. And it is from there that the whole Slavonic colonization in Eastern Europe started, favoured, at first, by the Khazar domination.

This colonization quite naturally developed along the great rivers which crossed the western part of the Steppe. In again moving upwards along the Dniester and the Boug, the Eastern Slavs first penetrated into Galicia and Volynia. One of their groups even crossed the Carpathians into Sub-Carpathian Russia, this strange little country of Central Europe which, though it never participated in the political destiny of Russia, retained, during a thousand years, the psychological bonds which tie it to the great world of the Eastern Slavs.

To the east of the Dniester and the Boug the great route of the Dnieper became the principal axis of Slavonic colonization.

In again moving up this river towards the north, the 'Ants' occupied the centre of present-day Ukraine, where they founded the town of Kiev, to spread next along all the tributaries of the Dnieper without stopping at the borders of modern Ukraine, which do not form a geographical obstacle.

In always following the course of this great river, they came to its source and reached the ancient mercantile route which united it with the rivers of the north-west, and thus penetrated into the Dvina Basin as well as into that of the Ilmen, where they founded the town of Novgorod. They only stopped when they reached the shores of the Gulf of Finland.

It is possible that on their way they might have

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encountered and assimilated other Slavonic tribes on the 175x
territory of present-day Poland. But these were only local details of small importance which did little to change the fact that the whole Russian world was born of the great current of Slavonic colonization which, from the seventh to the ninth centuries, crossed through Eastern Europe, starting from the extreme south-west of the territory of modern Ukraine.

During the ninth century, when the Slav-Norse State of Kiev was formed, the colonization of the north-eastern territory enclosed between the Volga and the Oka (destined to become the nucleus of Great Russia) is already well advanced. The towns of Rostov and Mourom already exist under the princes of the Norse dynasty. It is irrelevant whether the colonization of this territory developed exclusively starting from the upper reaches of the Dnieper or if it met there another current of Eastern Slavs who had first made the detour up to the upper reaches of the Don before entering this territory from the south. In one as in the other case it was the Eastern Slavs which moved towards the north and the north-east.

Spread over this immense territory, they divided into many tribes, each having their own customs, their laws, and their ancestral traditions. 'Each according to his own custom,' said the most ancient Russian chronicler of the ninth century. The vastness of the occupied country and the distances between the sites chosen by the different tribes were to favour the development of their particular traits. But the same chronicler explicitly speaks of all these tribes as being of one single 'Slavonic people.'

The Union was especially influenced by the geographical form of the country. The colonists inhabited the banks of a river which served them as a means of

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X/75 communication quite naturally adapted to the defence of their common interests. It is thus that the Volynians held the upper reaches of the Boug and a part of the basin of the Pripet, the Drevlians the course of the Teterev, the Dregovitches that of the Pripet, the Polianes the central part of the course of the Dnieper, and the Severianes the basin of the Desna. Farther to the north were the Krivitches, the Radimitches, the Viatiches, and the Slovenes of the Ilmen, and other Slavonic tribes as near to but as distinct from one another as those of the south.

Having been forced by the nomads to leave the Steppe, all these populations had to crowd into 'the forest.' During many centuries the history of the Eastern, Southern, and North-Eastern Slavs developed almost exclusively in the zone of the forests. The Steppe of the Black Sea, the greater part of present-day Ukraine, remained closed to them.

In the north, in Great Russia, the Slavonic element mixed strongly with the Finnish element, so much, in fact, that one is sometimes apt to believe that a new nation was formed which was quite different from the 'Ukrainians' of the south who, therefore, had better preserved the purity of the race.

Nevertheless we have seen that since their advent in Eastern Europe, the Slavs had made contact with the most varied elements of the peoples and civilizations that had come to the Steppes of the Black Sea. In assimilating these, the current of Slavonic colonization had carried them towards the north and had incorporated them into the whole Russian world, including Great Russia. On the other hand it seems very likely that there were some still Finnish tribes whom the Slavs found in the forest part of the Ukraine of to-day. Otherwise it is impossible to explain certain peculiarities of

the Finnish language which show that during very 175x remote epochs they were already in contact with the Western Slavonic populations on the one hand and the peoples of the Steppe on the other. Thus the Slavs are supposed to have found an ethnically Finnish foundation on the middle reaches of the Dnieper and its tributaries, perfectly similar to that which later contributed to the formation of North-Eastern Russia.

In summing up, one has to believe that the contribution of the Finnish elements was probably greater in the north than in the Steppe. But this is only a question of percentage which varies slowly without break, as one moves along the old routes of Slavonic colonization on the territory of modern Russia.

. . . . .

The formation of the first larger political unit could only be effected according to the same geographical laws which had determined the Slavonic colonization in Eastern Europe. The principal axis of this unit again had to be the main route which connected the Black Sea with the Baltic by the Dnieper and the Ilmen basins in a north-to-south direction, from the Gulf of Finland to the lower Dnieper, cutting perpendicularly across the northern frontier of present-day Ukraine. This great waterway alone was able to overrule all the local centres of crystallization and to unite the various Slavonic tribes for the first time into a single State.

The immediate political impetus nevertheless came from the other side of the Baltic, from Scandinavia. The Norsemen, near relations of those who founded modern England, Portugal, and the kingdom of the two Sicilies, greedy of domination, had first seized Novgorod and the whole basin of the Ilmen. From there they were able to follow the great water-route in

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×/75 a direction opposite to that of the Slavonic colonization. In descending towards the south, they took Kiev at the end of the ninth century and occupied the great central Ilmen-Dnieper route.

Having installed themselves there, the Norsemen (or Varengians, as they are called in Western Europe) easily extended their domination towards the west and the east in using all the secondary water-routes which flowed towards the main central route. At the two extremities Novgorod, in the north, which looked towards Scandinavia and, in a broader sense, towards Western Europe, and in the south Kiev, which looked towards the Black Sea, Byzantium, and the Near East, were clearly discernible.

These two poles derived all their importance from the great merchant route which united them. From the tenth to the twelfth centuries the masters of the country had to give it their constant attention. Their power depended on the control which they exercised directly over the whole route from Novgorod to Kiev. But one difference existed, however, between the two extremities; the west, towards which Novgorod is turned, is a poor country, still semi-barbarian. It could supply valuable military forces. But this advantage could not be compared with those of Constantinople, the centre of the world's most powerful empire, immensely rich, cultured, and in full literary and artistic bloom.

And it is thus that Kiev, situated on the southern section of the axis and looking towards Byzantium, began to play a role which surpassed in importance that of any other Slavonic city in Eastern Europe, including Novgorod. It is there, on the 'Amber route,' that the Varengian princes definitely installed themselves, attracted by the commercial advantages and particularly

by the sale of amber, which they were transporting 175x
from the region of Königsberg, on the Baltic, to Byzantium. It is there that the great metropolis developed, whose influence will be felt throughout the Slavonic lands dominated by the Norse dynasty. The new Slav-Norse State is known in history under the name of 'the State of Kiev,' although it never officially bore this name.

Another name has certainly, from the eleventh 101
century, been applied to the whole of the territories and 175x
populations which were grouped round Kiev under the power of the Norse dynasty, which had already become entirely assimilated by the Slavs and one with the subjects it dominated. This name is 'Rouss,' the same which continued, throughout the centuries, to apply to the whole of Russia and her people.

We will not concern ourselves here with the extremely difficult controversy which exists concerning the origins of this term. It may have been Scandinavian or, on the contrary, Aloroge, it may originally have served to describe the Norse conquerors (the Finns called them *Rouotsi*) or it may have been used before them to name the country surrounding Kiev (as the name 'France' was originally applied only to the 'Ile de France'). We only have to remember that during the most flourishing epoch of the 'Kiev State' it was already applied to the basin of the Dnieper as well as to Novgorod, to Galicia and to the north-eastern territory in which Great Russia was formed. One said 'Russian Land,' *Roussk Zemlia*, to describe the whole of the country. The Metropolitan of Kiev, whose jurisdiction extended to the north and to the south, was designated as 'Metropolitan of all Russia' (*Vseia Roussi*). All the members of the dynasty were called Russian princes, *kniazi rousski*, both in the south and in the north. The territory of

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Novgorod disputed the title of 'the most ancient of Russian lands' with that of Kiev. The chronicler says that the language of the Eastern Slavs is the 'Russian language.' The most ancient code of law and customs, which applied to the whole land, is called 'Russian justice' (*Roussk Pravda*), etc. Prince A. Wolkonsky has estimated how many times the word '*Rouss*' and its derivatives is met with in the Lavrentievsky code of the original Russian chronicles. Up to the year 1110 one meets it no less than two hundred and fifty-one times. There is no other word to describe the whole of the territory and the new, developing nation.

The inhabitants of the country call themselves like this, in using the substantive in '*Roussin*' or the adjective '*Roussky*.' It is this latter form which prevails, like the adjective '*Français*' has supplanted the substantive '*Franc*.' It remains no less true that the substantive form '*Roussin*,' still used to-day in the West of the Ukraine, in Galicia, and in Sub-Carpathian Russia, is the somewhat archaic synonym of the current expression '*Roussky*' (Russian). It is precisely this antique form, '*Roussin*,' which has given birth to the Latin form of '*Ruthenus*' or '*Ruthenian*' which one still sometimes meets to-day. In the Middle Ages the west vaguely used the expression 'Russia' or 'Ruthenia' ('*rex russorum*' or '*ruthenorum*') in speaking of all parts of Russia, and it is still the form '*Imperator ruthenorum*,' which, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, was the Latin title of the pseudo-Dimitrius, who reigned only in Great Russia. Later, in the nineteenth century, the Austro-Hungarian authorities used the word 'Ruthene' to describe only the population of Western Ukraine and of Sub-Carpathian Russia, which were under their domination.

In speaking also of the 'State of Kiev,' of its territory

and its people, we cannot, historically, call them otherwise but 'Russia,' 'Russian land,' 'Russian people,' as these are the expressions used by them, to the exclusion of any other, to describe themselves. 175x [101]

Hemmed in by the forest zone, the Russia of Kiev was condemned to a perpetual struggle with the nomads of the Steppes.

First she had to protect the Slavonic agriculturalists against these enemies. She was, moreover, obliged to control the commercial routes which, after emerging from the forest, crossed the Steppe before reaching Byzantium and the markets of the Near East. These were the essential functions of the political power which had established itself in Russia at the end of the tenth century.

While taking advantage of the final disintegration of the Khazar Empire, the Russian princes tried to occupy the whole course both of the Don and the Volga by military force. But this conquest, the work of Sviatoslav, about 964–71, remained nominal, as the lasting occupation of such vast and remote territories surpassed the means of Russia at that time.

On the other hand the State of Kiev, though it had never succeeded in permanently occupying the course of the lower Dnieper, did succeed, in the eleventh century, in assuring this route the necessary security to make it usable. From the time they established themselves at Kiev, the Varengian princes used this route for the commerce with Byzantium.

Towards the month of November, when the snow tracks could be used, the Prince, accompanied by his *drouzhina*, left the capital to make a tour of the towns and villages in order to receive tribute in kind. This lasted almost the whole winter and only ended in March. During the same time it was the period at which trees

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were felled in the wooded parts of the country. The clearing finished towards the month of January and the timber was then transported to the centre of the country, where the construction of boats took place. Towards the middle of March a sort of boat fair took place at Kiev and the months of April and May were given to the organization of caravans destined to take the route to Byzantium. At the same time, thanks to the opening of the river traffic on the Northern Dnieper, other already loaded ships arrived from Novgorod, Smolensk, and Tchernigov. In June this enormous flotilla, loaded with furs, skins, honey, amber, and, in the years of good harvest, even with grain, began their voyage in going down the Dnieper under the vigilant protection of the soldiers of the Prince. The horsemen of the Prince dispersed the nomads that menaced the priceless cargo and, a few days later, the caravans reached the rapids, a granite plateau on which seven rapids obstructed the passage. By means of the *volok*, or dragging, the ships were brought to the other end of the rapids where the voyage continued under the same conditions as before up to the island of Beresan at the mouth of the Dnieper, where there was a stop of several days. There religious ceremonies took place to thank the numerous gods for their protection.

Then began the crossing of the Black Sea, often accompanied by many dangers, which ended at the Bosphorus, on the shores of which the quarter of St. Mamo was reserved for the Russians. After a stop of several weeks the caravans, loaded with gold, fruit or wine, and silk, returned by the same way to Kiev. It is curious to note that nearly two-thirds of the ships were abandoned at Constantinople, as the small volume of the merchandise taken in exchange only required a limited space and the price of construction did not enter

into account. The vision of the great riches of Byzantium fired the imagination of the pagan princes and the occasions were not rare when the peaceful merchants became pirates who even tried to seize the imperial city. Nevertheless peaceful relations between the two countries were always again established, thus facilitating commerce. Several treaties were concluded in the ninth and tenth centuries. From the ninth century Christianity began to penetrate among the Russians. This penetration contributed a great deal to the improvement of these relations and removed more and more amongst the Russians the taste for piracy and their aims of conquests of the capital which had become the source of their new religion. 175x

From the beginning of the tenth century a bishop of the Byzantine rite was installed at Kiev. From this moment the influence of Constantinople on Russia continued to grow, and with it the rise of Christianity. In becoming converted to the Greek religion in 988, St. Vladimir laid the permanent foundations of Russian civilization, in the Ukraine as in Great Russia. 779 175x

The princely power, inspired by Christianity, felt obliged to make the new religion accepted by the whole country. It is the Christian spirit which inspired the 'testament' of Vladimir Monomachus to his sons (at the dawn of the twelfth century). When, while engaged in internal quarrels, such a prince offended this spirit, the Church felt compelled to remind him of his duties of loyalty and of Christian charity. In facing the 'pagans' of the Steppe, the Russians are conscious of being a Christian people and this adds considerable strength to their national solidarity. "Let us henceforth be of one heart and let us defend the Russian lands . . . and if anyone recommences the quarrels he will have all of us against him as well as the Holy Cross," said the princes summoned by Vladimir Monomachus to organize the common defence against the Polovets nomads.

x175 princes summoned by Vladimir Monomachus to organize the common defence against the Polovets nomads.

177 With Christianity the letters and the arts of Byzantium
x175 make their appearance in Russia. From the eleventh century Kiev adorns itself with magnificent churches. Soon afterwards great monasteries were founded and became the centres of learning in Russia. During the twelfth century the splendours of Kiev astonished the travellers coming from the west who, at this time, had not yet a town culture in the full sense of the word. The princely court became transformed by contact with Constantinople. The princes themselves spoke Greek and many other foreign languages, indulged in literary studies and encouraged the development of civilization
197 in their country. In introducing the Slavonic language
177 to Russia as the language of the liturgy, the Eastern
x175 Church laid the first foundations of a literary Russian language, common to the whole country. Slavonic (originally the language of the Slavs of Bulgaria) is still very nearly related to the language of the Slavs of Eastern Europe. In Russia it changes slightly by contact with local dialects, but the written language remains, in its essential features, the same in the whole country. During the centuries to come the Slavonic liturgy and the fundamental similarity of the written language helped the different parts of Russia to preserve their national character and the consciousness of their unity.

177 Although the Russia of the eleventh and twelfth
x175 centuries took the essential elements of her civilization from Byzantium and recognized, in ecclesiastical matters, the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople, she nevertheless remained in permanent and very close relationship with the West. The breach between Rome and the Eastern Church was not quite completed at the time of the conversion of St. Vladimir, and when it

became a *fait accompli* (in 1054) its repercussions in Russia were at first very small. 175x 177

Before as after, the Russian princes maintained the most intimate relations with the Western courts to which they are bound by marriages. One cannot detect any trace of enmity towards the Western Christians. Quite on the contrary the Igumen Daniel, who goes from Kiev to Jerusalem to pray on the tomb of our Saviour, feels himself fraternally connected with the Francian crusaders who are fighting in the Holy Land. In Kiev itself there are Latin monasteries and the Russian princes make donations to them. The hour has not yet arrived when the aggressive attitude of the western neighbours of Russia will arouse her enmity.

The relations which, at this epoch, existed between Russia and the West were all the more natural as their way of living had many features in common. The princely courts of Russia, with their *drouzhina* (their retainers), their military character cemented by the personal loyalty towards their overlord, their love of feasts, the songs, accompanied by the sound of the *gouslis* and by characteristic gestures, and their chivalrous idealism, all this brought them near to those of the West.

On the other hand, also like the mediæval kingdoms of the West, the Russia of Kiev, although united under St. Vladimir and Yaroslav the Wise, is still far from being a fully united State, such as had existed in Byzantium and as we know it to-day.

Under the protecting power of a prince, who kept outside enemies at bay and maintained order in the interior, the country is composed of a federation of lands and cities who have their rights and privileges and are ruled by their elders and by their popular assemblies, the *vetchi*, which deal directly with the 175x 631 643

×175 prince or with his lieutenant, the *possadnik*, giving this
631 or that assistance in return for various protections.
643 These autonomous territories, *zemli* and *volosti*, are related to the ancient Slavonic federations which existed before the creation of the State of Kiev. The local dynasties which made their appearance here and there have all disappeared at the moment of the coming of the Varengians. There is not, in the whole of Russia of Kiev, another princely house but that of St. Vladimir. But the regional peculiarities could not be eliminated so easily. And it is thus that the territory of the Polianes becomes the 'Land of Kiev' as such, that of the Severianes the 'Great Land of Tchernigov,' in the west the 'Land of Volynia' retains its own characteristics, while at the foot of the Carpathians, in 'Galicia,' the elements of several tribes are fused. In the north the *volosti* correspond roughly to the old territories of the tribes. Blood relationship definitely ceased to play a role. Instead of the ties of relationship, common interests alone, resulting from being territorial neighbours, are the only ties between the inhabitants of a 'Land.'[1]

On the other hand the economic development of the towns has increased their political importance. It is they who are now at the head of the 'Lands.' The largest city of each of these territories becomes the spokesman of the whole *volost*, although all the inhabitants of the latter can, if they have the means, participate with equal rights in the deliberations of the chief city.

×175 The princely power in Russia is therefore in no way
643 absolute. The conception of a monarchical, unitarian, and hereditary power is not yet born.

The dynastic position is attuned to the customs which

[1] See Map No. 2.

MAP No. 2

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rule the private life of the Slavonic populations in Eastern Europe. The *whole* land of Russia is the property of the *entire* princely house descended from St. Vladimir, as every Slavonic family which occupies and cultivates a plot of land owns it in common.

The senior of St. Vladimir's descendants will occupy the throne of Kiev and will be, in some ways, the first amongst equals of this family community of princes, as the eldest of a family presides at its discussions and represents it generally. Not the hereditary right, descending to the eldest son, but solely the age of the individual counts, one brother succeeds another, to make room for the oldest among the nephews.

This system, which was established in Russia in the middle of the eleventh century, after the death of Yaroslav the Wise, foresees the breaking up of the country among the members of the reigning house and an almost continuous redistribution of domains, just as in the Slavonic agricultural communities, where redistribution of individual lots took place almost every year. The change of management will be general if the oldest member of the family, the Grand Prince of Kiev, dies. His place will be taken by any prince, even of younger lines, who is the oldest at that moment. In going to Kiev, he cedes the domain which he possessed to the one who is next to him in age, etc.

This typically Slavonic method of government maintained the idea of the unity of the 'Russian Land.' While it was applied, no one branch of the princely house could take root in any given territory and so become the local dynasty of any single part of Russia. That prince who had first received a domain in the far north-east, exchanged it after some years for a richer territory in the south, finally to reach the throne of Kiev, bringing with him his *drouzhina* (retainers), his

boyars (nobles), and his armed men, who also moved from one end of the country to the other. A town, on the contrary, which was dissatisfied with its present master, called on a prince whose domains were at the farthest confines of Russia, but whose father, formerly having been in their country, was well remembered there. 175x 643

As long as the old centre of the Russian Land, Kiev, remained prosperous, no princely branch was anxious to enclose itself on its territory and to prefer its interests, except a few more distant branches, who were already for some time localized in far-away territories which had been granted them as permanent domains. All the other princes hoped one day to obtain possession of the best parts of the country and even to reach the throne of Kiev.

This system had the drawback of fomenting various dynastic discords. The princes fought without respite against each other in order to enforce their rights. The ruin of the southern part of Russia, which began in the territory of Kiev, was the inevitable result of these discords. It was this that was understood by the unknown author of the 'Tale of the Companions of Igor'[1] when he implored all the Russian princes to unite their forces against the pagans. In order to keep the commercial routes across the Steppe open and to drive back the nomads, always ready to invade the Russian lands situated in the forest zone, the united forces of the whole of Russia were indispensable. It is thus that St. Vladimir assembled his troops in the north to resist the incursions of the formidable Petcheneges, fierce warriors of the Steppe. 175x

During the twelfth century the routes of the Steppe became more and more dangerous and the incursions

[1] Famous epic poem of the twelfth century which inspired the Opera, *Prince Igor*, of Borodin.

x175 of the nomads more frequent. The commerce of Kiev dies down and its territory, as well as those of Perejaslavl and of Tchernigov, become depopulated. The inhabitants, left undefended on the side of the Steppe, escaped farther into the forest and looked for refuge either in the north-east, in the land of Souzdal, in Great Russia, or in the west, in the lands of Galicia and Volynia.

It is only then, when the old centre, Kiev, is already in full decline, that the princes who reign in the more far-away parts of Russia begin to notice the advantages which they could gain by the possession of these territories if they made it hereditary in the senior line.

In Galicia the heredity of the princely powers through the senior male line existed in early times, these princes having been excluded from the throne of Kiev and having been permanently given these domains in the extreme south-west of the Russian Land. The result was that in the second half of the twelfth century Galicia, being left outside the continuous divisions and dynastic wars, became one of the most prosperous and the most envied lands.

During the same epoch the senior branch of the descendants of Vladimir Monomachus, which had employed this country in order to mobilize the forces necessary for the struggle for Kiev, had entrenched itself in neighbouring Volynia.

The descendants of Sviatoslav also fight for Kiev, while entrenching themselves in the land of Tchernigov, already completely ruined.

But suddenly a new territorial power appears in the north-east of Russia, in the land between the Volga and the Oka, into which the refugees from the devastated centre are flocking. The junior branch of the house of Monomachus, which reigns here, begins to take less interest in Kiev and to prefer this northern country

which is becoming inhabited and is developing. It aspires to convert the 'Land of Souzdal' into a new centre of political power which will now assure it the domination of the whole of Russia. In 1169 a coalition of almost all the princes of the south is entangled with the powerful Mstislav of Volynia, who has seized Kiev. The allies are obliged to rely in this struggle upon the support of power of the the Prince of Souzdal, Andrew Bogoliubsky. The army which he sends to their assistance effectively changes the balance. Kiev is taken and plundered for the first time. Mstislav is driven back into Volynia, while the Prince of Souzdal is acclaimed by his allies as Prince of Kiev. But, although claiming this pre-eminence in the house of Russian princes, Bogoliubsky does not go to Kiev. He remains where he is, engaged in consolidating the land of Souzdal, the Great Russia, the new base of her power. 175x

From this moment Kiev remains in a dangerous position. In 1203 the 'mother of Russian towns' is conquered for the second time and terribly plundered by a coalition of several southern princes, with the assistance of the nomads. The banks of the Dnieper become more and more depopulated.

Meanwhile, after the defeat of Mstislav, the princes of Volynia, following the example of the Prince of Souzdal, begin to install themselves more securely in their territory and to take progressively less interest in the affairs of Kiev. Under Roman, the son of Mstislav, this new territorial power is definitely established in Volynia. In 1198 he finally unites the two largest 'Lands' of the south-west, Galicia and Volynia, under his domination.

Henceforth two great political organisms exist in Russia: the principality of Souzdal-Vladimir in the north-east, in Great Russia, and the principality of

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*175 Galicia-Volynia in the south-west, in that part which is now Western Ukraine. Kiev is now governed by powerless princes, vaguely dependent on one or the other of these principalities.

But the consolidation of the dynastic power was more difficult to bring about in the south-western region than in that of the north-east.

Under the influence of Polish and Hungarian neighbours and their example, the political role of the boyar aristocracy was greater in Galicia than in any other part of Russia. The suzerain prince was constantly obliged to struggle against this spirit of excessive independence, and in this he was not always successful. Bloody plots were frequent and the boyars had no scruples in calling foreign neighbours to assist them by their intervention in their quarrels with the princes, of whom many were overthrown and put to death. Such a situation was inconceivable in the principality of Souzdal.

The Galician prince Daniel, son of Roman, came, however, in 1232 to reconstitute the heritage of his father.

But five years before this, in 1227, all the armies of the princes of Southern Russia, including those of Galicia, had suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of a new enemy who had lately appeared in the Steppe—the Mongols.

Eight years after the accession of Daniel the whole of Russia, the south as well as the north, the land of Souzdal like that of Galicia, was conquered by the Tartars.

. . . . .

The agony of the Russia of Kiev was terrible.

In the lands of Kiev, as in those of Tchernigov, in Great Russia as in Galicia, the populations and their princes fought heroically against the 'pagans,' preferring

death to slavery with that chivalrous spirit that distinguished the old mediæval Russia. 175x

But until the last moment the princely quarrels continued. When the Mongolian advance guards were already investing Kiev, Daniel of Galicia still disputed the possession of the ancient capital with the princes of Tchernigov. Having obtained it, he only had enough time to leave a lieutenant there who, aided by the whole population, defended the city to the last.

Plano Carpini, who visited the country of the Dnieper in 1245, five years after the disaster, tells that it was nearly a desert. The population had been massacred, taken as slaves, or was in flight. In Kiev itself there did not remain more than two hundred inhabited houses. All around the town one found human skeletons. The downfall is such that the second half of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth century have left almost no documents about this country. So little is known of this period that it is often impossible to establish which princely lines were then in power.

The north-east, Great Russia, was also devastated by the Tartars but continued to absorb a part of the fleeing population. Even the Metropolitan of all Russia ceased to reside in the devastated Kiev and established himself farther north-east in Moscow, the new capital of the land of Souzdal. But the greater part of the population withdraws towards the north-west into the principality of Galicia-Volynia which, although conquered, remains more sheltered and enjoys a stable and wise government.

In the vast space which now remains between the land of Galicia-Volynia and Great Russia a new external enemy appears—the Lithuanians, who penetrate here from the north-west.

Henceforth the great historical question is whether the State of Galicia-Volynia can maintain itself between

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X175 the Tartars, the Hungarians, the Poles, and the Lithuanians, and continue the Great Russian tradition in the south-west.

Daniel of Galicia, ambitious, educated, courageous, and chivalrous, brilliantly continues the tradition of the senior branch of the House of Monomachus. After the departure of the Asiatic conqueror, who had not spared his hereditary land and had forced him to seek temporary refuge in the west, he rapidly regains lost ground and becomes a very powerful prince who is respected by all. Galicia-Volynia is, under him, at the peak of its power.

But there are great differences of conception between the princes of the south-west and those who, under the yoke of the Tartars, laboriously watch over the patrimony of St. Vladimir in the Great Russian north-east.

From the twelfth century the princes who begin to lose their roots in the south are more interested in their honour, the success of their arms, and their personal prestige than their kinsmen of the north-east.

They are more civilized and humanly more likeable than the latter. Nevertheless their qualities are historically a source of weakness, especially in the extremely difficult position in which they find themselves.

The great Russian historian, Sergei Soloviev, has shown the difference which existed between the popular reactions to the Tartar yoke in the south-west and in the north-east; having been obliged to be the vassals of Batou, the Tartar Khan,[1] Daniel is received by him with honours, as were all the princes who declared themselves ready to recognize the supremacy of the conqueror. But Soloviev reveals that the chronicles o Northern Russia give an impression of satisfaction regarding this relatively respectful treatment, while those of the south bitterly complain: "Worse than the

[1] Grandson of Ghengis Khan.

evil is the honour that comes from the Tartars!" 175x
Daniel cannot bear the shame to be, notwithstanding his power, the vassal of the Mongol Khan. The princes of Moscow in the north-east, on the contrary, eager to derive direct advantages from their condition of vassals, bow, during a century and a half, before the 'Golden Horde.'

Daniel of Galicia works without respite to free himself. He invites foreign colonists to the country which has been devastated by the Mongols. Poles, Hungarians, Jews, and Germans are settled. He seeks Western alliances and hopes for a crusade as a result of negotiations with Pope Innocent IV. This is the first attempt at a union of the churches in Southern Russia. In return for the aid against the Tartars the Russian Church would recognize the papal supremacy but would maintain its Eastern rite and its Slavonic language. Nothing concrete came of this. In spite of the promise of the Pope, the crusade was not organized. Daniel consoled himself by accepting the crown of *Rex Russiæ* (King of Russia) from the hands of Innocent IV. Meanwhile, however, the Tartars, on the alert, once again devastated his lands and definitely prevented the enlargement of his domination over the other Russian lands. All these attempts led only to the interference of the West in the affairs of South-Western Russia, whose national characteristics had already become changed by the influx of foreign colonists.

Exactly at the same period the Prince of Novgorod, St. Alexander Nevsky, is fighting in the north with the Swedes and the German knights who had themselves started an effective crusade . . . against the Russians.[1]

While Prince Daniel looked for support in Western

[1] The brilliant victory of the Russians over the Knights of the Sword, in 1242, took place on the frozen Lake of Tchoudov.

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975 Europe, Prince Alexander Nevsky realized that, notwithstanding their great military force, the Mongols were less to fear than the West. The cultural level of the Tartars being actually much lower than that of the Russians, the denationalization of Russia was absolutely excluded. On the contrary the danger of the West was very great because, by its civilizing evolution and by the assistance given by Roman Catholicism, it presented a real menace to the national existence of Russia.

In thus rejecting these enemies, capable of permanently subduing the country and therefore in politically consolidating the Tartar domination, the Russia of the north created the elements of a new evolution which will make it a great power and the nucleus of an empire.

This unifying role remains beyond the possibilities of the south which, on the contrary, prepares the elements of the drama which is destined to make the Russia of the south-west the plaything of powerful foreign neighbours.

The might of the kingdom of Galicia-Volynia lasts for about a century after the first Tartar invasion. It continued to play a certain role between Poland and Hungary. During the first years of the fourteenth century its princes were granted a metropolitan by the Patriarch of Constantinople to replace the one of Kiev who had escaped to the north-east. This prelate takes the name of the Metropolitan of 'Russia Minor.' Thus the term appears which will be later applied to all the old Russian lands of present-day Ukraine. But the unifying role which the State of Galicia seemed to be destined to play in the whole of Russia is definitely excluded. The endeavours of Daniel to submit Lithuania to his influence, a country still quite barbarous and pagan, ended in failure. During the last years of the thirteenth century a new dynasty arose in Lithuania and unified all the tribes into one State. The Lithuanian

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drive into the old Russian territories immediately became irresistible. In 1307 Polotsk fell and in 1318 Vibetsk. Eight years later Minsk was taken. The old land of the Krivitches, the White Russia of to-day, then the lands of Brest and of Dorokhytchin, which were dependent on Volynia, are conquered one after the other by the Lithuanians. In 1324 the first direct descendant of Daniel dies. A few years later, thanks to the quarrel fomented by the always turbulent boyars, the State of Galicia ceases to exist, having been transformed into the battle-ground between Lithuania and Poland (1340). Kiev is finally annexed in 1362. At the same time the Lithuanian domination extends to the old land of Tchernigov, thus reaching the north-eastern frontier of modern Ukraine and then passing it a considerable distance in the direction of Great Russia.[1]

The whole east and south of the old State of Kiev is swallowed up by a great State whose political origin is no longer Russian.

. . . . .

From this moment the White Russian and Ukrainian national groups will develop under a foreign domination, though during the first half of the fourteenth century it was not felt very strongly.

The Lithuanian princes were neither sufficiently civilized nor powerful enough to change the Russian character of the country which had become theirs. Quite on the contrary, Lithuania herself became more and more influenced by the Russian elements, and it was in fact a Great Russian State which developed under the domination of the 'Princes (or Kings) of the Lithuanians and the Russians,' as they called themselves.

Nothing changed after the conquest. Somehow it is

[1] See Map No. 3

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even difficult to talk about a conquest; the Russian population and their princes, tired of the Tartar domination and of internal disorders, sometimes co-operated liberally with Lithuania in exchange for her protection.

A number of old Russian domains were left to the princes who had formerly possessed them and who were willing to recognize Lithuanian suzerainty. The administration, laws, and customs remained such as they had formerly been. The Lithuanian princes would not have been anxious to change anything here. At that time a written Lithuanian language did not even exist!

Later, mostly married to Russian princesses, they assimilated this civilization. Many amongst them were converted to Russian Orthodoxy. The others, while remaining pagans, protected the faith of their subjects.

The political equality between Russians and Lithuanians, confirmed by all the princely 'privileges,' became transformed into a clear and, so to say, inevitable predominance of the Russians, who were more numerous, more civilized, and more conscious of their nationality.

One can say that at the end of the fourteenth century two great Russian States are about to be formed; the Russo-Lithuanian State, which had re-united all the actually White Russian and Ukrainian lands, with the exception of Galicia, which had fallen into the hands of Poland, and the State of Moscow, which is about to unify Great Russia.

The struggle between them for the leadership of the whole of Russia already seems inevitable and nothing seems to indicate that the chances of the south-west should be less than those of Moscow.

But at this moment an event takes place which will result in the elimination of the Russian character of the young Lithuanian State and the transformation of

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MAP No. 3

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X175 South-Western Russia into a nation oppressed on its own territory.

The Lithuanian Grand Prince Yagaylo succeeds to the throne of Poland by his marriage with Queen Hedwiga, daughter and heiress of Louis II of Anjou. By the Act signed in 1385 at Krev he promises, in return for this marriage and the crown of Poland, to 'incorporate' the Russo-Lithuanian State in the kingdom of Poland and to become a convert to Catholicism with his whole family.

The immediate political effect of the Act of Krev was almost nil. The 'incorporation' was not recognized by the Russo-Lithuanian State as, moreover, the Russians had the eloquent example of Galicia before them, where the Polish domination had already taken on the character of an oppressive colonization.

Some years after the Act of Krev, the personal union between Poland and the Russo-Lithuanian State was dissolved. The latter elected a prince of its own in the person of Vitovt, a cousin of Yagaylo, who continued the Russian mission, which seemed to be one of his State, with the greatest energy.

Under Vitovt the struggle between Lithuania and Moscow for leadership is at its fiercest. Vitovt goes far beyond the confines of modern Ukrainian and White Russian territories. He seizes Smolensk in 1405, encroaches, far to the north, on the territories of Pskov and Novgorod and intervenes everywhere in the affairs of Northern Russia whenever the occasion arises.

But new historic factors are working against Lithuanian leadership at this time.

Lithuanian power no longer appears as a liberator from the Tartar yoke in the eyes of the Russian population whom it tries to subject, whereas Moscow, already

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sufficiently strong, unites the whole of Great Russia for the first struggles of liberation. Less than twenty years after the first brilliant victory of Moscow over the Tartars,[1] the armies of Vitovt sustain a veritable disaster at the hands of the same Tartars at Vorskla in 1399. The national prestige of Moscow grows while that of Lithuania diminishes. 175x

Another essential fact favours Moscow: the Grand Princes of the north-east have kept the 'Russian faith,' the Orthodox religion, common to all the lands of ancient Russia, intact. Vitovt himself had been baptized as a Catholic at the same time as Yagaylo. He is, therefore, a prince of a foreign faith, of the religion of the *liakh* (Poles) which now tries to subdue the whole of Russia under its domination.

At the last moment all the disputing lands—Pskov, Novgorod, and Ryazan—come to their senses. Rather than submit to the 'Latin' Vitovt, they call the Grand Prince of Moscow to their aid. Some princes of Tchernigov, vassals of Lithuania, cross the frontier, preferring to serve a genuinely Russian sovereign.

This is all the more so as within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which is struggling for the leadership of the whole of Russia, the forces are far from being balanced.

The once dominant Russian majority, which still furnishes the State with the greatest part of its troops and which pays with its blood for the debacle of Vorskla and the triumph of Tannenberg (a Polish-Lithuanian-Russian victory which stopped the German advance for centuries), is at present menaced by the Lithuanians, who had developed and become more independent as a result of the infiltration of Western elements.

From the end of the fourteenth century, Catholicism, which had become the religion of the princes and of the

[1] The battle of Koulikovo Polie in 1380.

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×175 Lithuanian aristocracy, is more privileged than Orthodoxy. The children born of mixed marriages must become Catholics. The nobles adopt this religion in order to gain more influence at the Court.

After the death of Vitovt the national antagonism became apparent. The Russian party raises the brother of Yagaylo, Svidrigaylo, considered as being in favour of the Russians and the traditional Orthodox Church, to the dignity of Grand Prince. Expelled from Lithuania as such, Svidrigaylo maintains his power at Kiev until his death, as well as generally in the greater part of the Russian territories of the Grand Duchy. After this a union of the Russo-Lithuanian States is re-established under the son of Yagaylo, Casimir, who also inherits some years later, in 1444, the crown of Poland, thus re-establishing the personal union between her and the Russo-Lithuanian State.

But although disputing the leading role in their common State, Lithuanians and Russians are together opposing any attempt to incorporate their State into Poland. Here they all agree. They jealously watch the maintenance of the integrity and the independence of the Grand Duchy. Notwithstanding the existence of a common sovereign, they cling, as in the past, to the use of the Russian language as the sole language of the State and they seize every opportunity to break the personal union with Poland which, in order to maintain that union with the Grand Duchy, is each time obliged to take the reigning Prince of Lithuania as her king.

The actual Ukrainian and White Russian lands always form a single national entity, which always bears the same name. All the official Acts speak of Russia (*Rouss*), the Russian Land, the Russian people, and the Russian religion. From the southern borders of the Ukraine to the Dvina a single Russian people struggles within the

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Grand Duchy of Lithuania for the maintenance of its national character, of its faith and of its language. 175X

Are we to think that, in the thoughts of these populations, 'Russia' is no more than the lands of the Grand Duchy and that they no longer consider 'Muscovy' a 'Russian land'?

The contrary is true; the Russo-Lithuanian chronicle tells us that in 1401 a 'great terror reigned in *the Russian land: Moscow and Smolensk have been burnt.*'

Conversely also the Grand Prince of Moscow makes it clearly understood that the Russia of the north-east and that which is under the Lithuanian domination, are in reality one whole. 'There can be no durable peace between the Grand Prince (of Moscow) and that of Lithuania,' said an instruction to the ambassadors sent by Moscow to the Crimea at the end of the fifteenth century; 'the Grand Prince wishes to have his whole patrimony, the whole Russian land.'

In 1493 Ivan III began to call himself 'Sovereign of all Russia.' The Grand Princes of Lithuania refused for a long time to recognize this title, which tended to acquire a singularly realistic meaning in view of the growing tension in the Grand Duchy.

Putting aside the historical memories, the universality of the 'Russian religion' was entirely to the advantage of the Grand Prince of Moscow. Ivan III wrote to the Grand Prince of Lithuania: 'You employ violence towards the Russian princes and towards all Russia which is of the Greek faith, in forcing them to accept the Roman faith. Under your forefathers there was never such affliction. How can I view the fate of Orthodoxy with indifference?'

The movement which drew the neighbouring princes, vassals of Lithuania, towards Moscow became more and more acute. The principality of Tchernigov,

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*175 fearing the persecution of the Russian faith during the last years of the fifteenth century, went over to Moscow. The loyalty, too, of the Russian princes and population of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to Greek Orthodoxy determined the destiny of the Ukraine and linked her to Russia, making her a refuge of the Russian faith.

Here it is necessary to insist on the very important role which the religious question has played in the struggle between the two Grand Duchies.

In 1437 the Metropolitan Isidor, an extremely educated man and much esteemed by Pope Eugene IV, arrived in Moscow from Constantinople. After having visited Moscow he left Russia, in the same year, to go to Ferrara in order to participate in the Œcumenical Council which was to arrange the union of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches. On 6 July 1439 at Florence, despite the resistance of the Byzantine clergy, the union of the two Churches took place. Isidor became one of the most fervent partisans of this union and received the dignity of Cardinal for his pro-Catholic actions. Immediately after this he went to Kiev, where he was received as the Metropolitan of all Russia. From there he went to Moscow as the bearer of a message from the Pope to the Grand Prince Vassili. The Grand Prince did not receive Isidor, but proclaimed him the 'killer of souls' and a 'heretic,' and imprisoned him. He escaped to die in Rome in 1463. Thus the attempt to submit the Russian Church to papal domination failed.

While Moscow appointed the Bishop of Riazan, Ioannes (a prelate of Russian origin), a Metropolitan, Rome appointed another Metropolitan to Kiev—Gregory the Bulgarian, a disciple of Isidor and a partisan of the Union of Florence. Certain documents indicate that the Grand Prince of Moscow was again pressed to recognize the Bishop of Kiev as Metropolitan

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of all Russia. But he maintained the independence of the Church of Moscow and refused submission. At Kiev itself the resistance of the lower clergy to Gregory was so strong that he was obliged to leave the capital in 1472 and to establish himself at Vilna, where he was invested with the title of Bishop of Lithuania. 175X

After the death of Ioannes (1461), the Metropolitan See of all Russia, having remained independent of Rome, officially divided itself into two Sees, that of 'the Metropolitan Church of Moscow and all Russia,' whose Metropolitans, resident in Moscow, were elected from the Russian clergy, and 'the Metropolitan Church of Kiev and all Russia,' whose Metropolitans were appointed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, and who resided at Kiev while being consecrated at Vilna.

The Metropolitan See of Kiev is a direct successor of the Byzantine Church and of all its priceless theological heritage, both scientific and cultural, which serves it as a redoubtable weapon against Catholicism, with which it is in a state of permanent struggle.

On the contrary the Church of Moscow, left to itself and still semi-barbarian, with its austere and monastic but ignorant clergy, leans entirely upon the powerful authority of the Grand Princes of Moscow. It is only later, being strengthened by the power of the Muscovite State, that it succeeds in attracting the scholarly theologians of Kiev and thus raising its spiritual level by degrees. The growing influence of Kiev will determine in future the radical transformations which the Orthodox Church will undergo during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The parallel existence did not continue after the fall of Constantinople (1453), which became the culminating point in the development of the Orthodox Church on a purely Russian base. The Orthodox Grand Prince of

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×175 Moscow resolutely took up the role of protector of the Russian faith in the Russo-Lithuanian lands, which were menaced more and more by the Latin penetration, which grew as the dynasty of the Jagellons became more and more Polish.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century a determined attempt was made to reverse the state of affairs in the Russo-Lithuanian Grand Duchy and to make the Russian element again preponderant. In 1507, on the death of the Grand Prince Alexander of Lithuania, Prince Glinsky attempted to snatch all the Russian lands from Lithuania. According to Polish sources, the insurrection, certainly supported by Moscow, was aiming at the restoration of the 'old Monarchy of Kiev.' This attempt failed and Glinsky was obliged to seek refuge in Moscow.

But from this epoch dates the idea of breaking the ties with Poland by giving the throne of the Russo-Lithuanian State to the Grand Prince of Moscow.

During the sixteenth century Polish pressure increases. On every favourable occasion the Poles wanted to realize the old promise of Yagaylo, the 'incorporation' pure and simple of the Russo-Lithuanian State into Poland.

But the opponents held fast. The Diet of the Grand Duchy solemnly protested against the Polish propaganda which tended to deride the sovereign character of the Russo-Lithuanian State. In 1566 the 'second Lithuanian statute,' to which Sigismund II had sworn loyalty, once more recognized this sovereignty and promised to safeguard all the customs of the Grand Duchy. Nevertheless the nuncio of the Holy See in Poland, Commendone, wrote in 1564 that the entire population of Kiev hoped, because of their religion, that after the death of Sigismund II, the throne of the Russo-Lithuanian State would pass to the Tsar of Moscow, the guardian of the Russian faith.

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Incited by Polish noblemen, the last Jagellon (descendant of Yagaylo) strikes the great blow in 1569. The common Diet of the kingdom of Poland and the Russo-Lithuanian State, convoked at Liublin, had at last to pronounce the 'incorporation'! 175X

Lithuania tried to resist. Engaged in an extremely difficult war with Moscow and ravaged in the south by the Tartars of the Crimea, she did not agree to be intimidated. The Diet of the Grand Duchy even left Liublin.

Sigismund II then declared the separation of all the Southern Russian territories from Lithuania and their attachment to Poland.

The Russo-Lithuanian State prepared to go to war with Poland. But it did not have the means to do so. And so the Diet finally had to yield.

Although deprived of half her territories, Lithuania retained a certain autonomy within the new unified State and maintained White Russia within this autonomous frame.[1]

The lands of Dorokhitchin, of Volynia, of Podolia, of Kiev, and the Lithuanian parts of the land of Tchernigov rejoined Galicia under direct Polish domination. This took place under the name of 'Principality of Kiev' according to the terms of the Royal Decree.

The whole of these Russian lands which came under Polish domination after the Act of 1569 is, however, the Ukraine who, at this epoch, continued to call herself Russia.

The decree itself proclaimed by the King regarding the adherence of the Russian lands to Poland declares: 'The *Russian* lands and the principality of Kiev with all their inhabitants and all their lands, are liberated by us for eternity from all dependence on the Grand duchy of

[1] See Map No. 3.

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175 Lithuania, and we rejoin them to the kingdom of Poland as equals to equals, as the faithful and inseparable members of our own body, and we solemnly promise to give advancements and the dignity of senators to all men of Roman as well as of *Russian* faith.'

It is not without interest to note that after this tolerant proclamation the rivalry between the two Churches seemed to weaken provisionally, especially under Stephan Batory, the successor of Sigismund II.

But this situation did not last long. From the end of the sixteenth century Poland became transformed into an aristocratic republic. Besides the great noblemen, whose power had been long since established, there appeared the *shlachta* (petty nobility), which soon enjoyed a political influence which was growing daily. These two elements alone formed the *Rzecz Pospolita*,[1] that strange 'Polish Republic' in which all the other classes were excluded from the direction of the State.

This gives rise to two consequences of importance to the Russian lands annexed by Poland. Firstly the denationalization of their native aristocracy, which tried to resemble the Poles in order to be able to enjoy all the political privileges, and secondly the subjection of the lower people, deprived of their higher national supports, who were left absolutely undefended in this State which existed solely by the nobles and for the nobles.

In Galicia, united with Poland for nearly two centuries, the Russian aristocracy had long since been supplanted by a Polish nobility and its remainders had been absorbed by the latter. Beside the Polish laws and the Russian serfs there only remain, in the old land of King Daniel, some towns which, with a very mixed population from a national point of view, still preserved a certain

[1] A Polish translation of *Res publica*—republic.

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independence and a somewhat privileged position. But even this autonomy of the towns, endowed with the German law called that 'of Magdeburg,' treated the non-Catholics, that is to say the Russians, as citizens of the second order, not enjoying full civil rights. 175x

Presently this rule was established in the whole vast Russian land annexed in 1569. First it appeared in all the already long prosperous and inhabited territories of Volynia and the land of Southern Kiev. The nobles spread in great numbers and are invested with lands by the royal power, whose authority depends on the favours which are accorded to the nobility. These nobles, Poles, or Russians, small or great, become unlimited masters of their subjects and the property of the latter.

The first reaction of the peasant was to leave in search of new territories which were not under the arbitrary power of the *pans*.[1]

The second half of the sixteenth century is an epoch of intense colonizing activity. There is a return of the populations to the old lands of the south-east of the State of Kiev, which had remained more or less deserted since the Tartar debacle in the thirteenth century. Rather than endure slavery, the Russian peasant, immigrated to Galicia and Volynia about three hundred years ago, again goes to find the ancient eastern route, to face the Tartar danger which still exists and to re-inhabit the lands which of old were the cradle of the whole of Russia.

Vaguely protected by the military cordons of the Polish State, this country, which commences at the gates of Kiev and extends towards the south and east, appears at this epoch as very remote, scarcely pacified, and situated on the borders, the extreme limits of

[1] 'Lord,' in Polish; is used to-day in the sense of 'Mister.'

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*175 Christianity. It was again given the Russian name which, from the eleventh century, one applied to the whole frontier province: 'edge land,' 'march,' '*Oukraina*,' 'Ukraine' as one will call it later in the West. Neither Galicia nor Volynia nor the north of the Kiev territory are the 'Ukraine' in the real sense of the word. From the end of the sixteenth century one uses this name exclusively for the frontier-land which, on the middle Dnieper and farther towards the east, include the Tartar Steppe, the 'savage Steppe,' the 'Dikoie Pole.'[1]

But as the Russian colonist advances towards the east, into the territories belonging to the Polish domains of Bratzlav, of Kiev, and of Tchernigov, the noble follows him. Serfdom also moves towards the east, extending throughout the whole territory subjected to the sovereignty of the Polish State.

Then the Russian colonization ventures beyond the Polish 'cordons,' beyond the last protecting forests, into the open Steppe right up to the domain of the nomads.

There no ordered life is yet possible. The Russians who ventured there ceased to be peaceful agriculturalists. They also begin to live by war and booty. They entrench themselves on the small islands which are formed by the branches of the Dnieper, beyond the rapids, especially on the island of Khortitza. (According to certain documents, the fugitives found small communities of warriors on these islands, who had come from the north of the Caucasus, from the land of the Tcherkesses or Circassians—a small mountain people who had embraced Christianity and who had themselves fled from the persecutions of the Mohammedans. Moscow gave these Caucasians the name of '*Tcherkasses*,' from which

[1] Literally the savage field, the savage steppe, as one said at Moscow.

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the name of the town of Tcherkassy, on the middle Dnieper at the mouth of the Don, derives. It is curious to note that among many descendants of the Zaporoge Cossacks one still finds the clearly Caucasian type.) /175x

The fugitives live there as a community of warriors without any other laws or other discipline than that of war. They set out to pillage the Mohammedan coasts and those of the Turks or Tartars on the Black Sea, always ready for any adventures and dangers. They give themselves a borrowed name—Cossacks—taken from the Tartars.

In this coarse existence, full of violence and battle, one sentiment dominates: the consciousness of being Christians, a consciousness of crusaders who defend without respite the peace of Christianity against the unbelievers.

It is true that the Christians will sometimes have to complain of the Cossacks as much as of the Tartars. It is almost a devilish deception which induces men to sin. The reason for being members of the 'army of the Cossacks' is the defence of the Christian religion. Therein lies its ideology. (It is interesting to note that the first organizers of the Cossacks as military communities were two lords, the first of Russian and the second of Polish origin: Dashkovitch and Lanckoronski. These two adventurers found among the Cossacks, in exploiting their hate of the unbelievers, a sure means of realizing their personal ambitions.) The life of war and independence of the Cossack army gave it a consciousness of caste and chivalry which made it always extremely rebellious towards its masters, the Poles, the Muscovites, or the Tartars.

All the Cossack communities were named according to the geographical position of their principal entrenchments. In Great Russia, on the borders of the Moscow

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×175 State, there was, for example, a powerful military community, that of the Don Cossacks, which closely resembled the Ukrainian Cossacks and lived with them as 'brothers and sisters,' according to the expression of that period. The last named founded their assizes, the *Zaporojska Sitch*, behind the rapids (in Russian '*za porogami*'), whence their name of Zaporoge Cossacks.

The Cossacks are a constant preoccupation of the Polish State. Extremely turbulent subjects, they have shunned the normal duties of the *khlopy* (serfs). They deserve, however, some consideration as a military force, very useful as auxiliaries in the difficult struggles against the Grand Turk and his vassals, the Tartars of the Crimea. It is in Poland's interest to agree with these merciless warriors, sometimes troublesome (as in the case when the kingdom made peace with the unbelievers, because they did not recognize either peace or a truce), but good to have in reserve in case of need. The Poles also try to discipline them and to bring them into the service of the State, while according them in return a certain autonomy and certain privileges.

The number of Zaporogs, as such, is not very great —some tens of thousands at the most. But there is an enormous mass of peasants who inhabit the Ukraine beyond the official limits of the Polish State. Half agriculturalists, half soldiers, always on the alert, they do not settle fully in the 'savage Steppe,' but unite voluntarily from time to time with the Zaporogs for an incursion which might bring profit, only to return again to their homes to await the next occasion.

In this borderland, too, without well-defined frontiers, the distinction between the peasant who inhabits the territory of the State and the free man, the Cossack, who goes off to Tartary, remains all the more confused, as, in order to evade the obligatory work, it is in the

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interest of the peasant to call himself a Cossack. Therefore the Polish Government has continually to fight this tendency without ever being able to suppress it. 175x

The Government of Moscow is in an almost similar position with regard to its Cossacks. It also tries to utilize them as a military force, at the same time keeping them at a distance from the internal affairs of the State. But finally it is always able to direct these excessive energies, as, between it and the Cossacks, there will never be another but a social opposition. In the Polish kingdom, on the contrary, the Cossack question becomes very acute as it represents the mortal struggle of two great peoples: the Russians against the Poles, and of two great religions, Orthodoxy against Catholicism.

After the interregnum which followed the extinction of the house of the Jagellons and the short intermezzo of King Henry of Valois (Henry III of France), the reign of Stephan Batory (1575–86), the first elected king of Poland, seemed to promise a good future, as we have already shown, for the cohabitation of the two peoples, based primarily on religious tolerance.

Being engaged in the difficult war with Moscow, Batory had great need of the loyalty of all his subjects, whoever they were. Therefore a certain equality of rights between Russians and Poles, Orthodox and Catholics, became forcibly the essential principle of his policy. Although the Roman clergy were more favoured, the Russian national element was not generally the victim of any exceptional measures.

But this comprehensive and tolerant policy was not continued. Beginning with the accession of Sigismund III (1587) less than twenty years after the attachment of Southern Russia to the Crown, the counter-reform became definitely victorious in Poland. Henceforth the Russian lands had to suffer the assault

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475 of a militant Polonism which identified itself with the Latin Church. The excesses which the local authorities permitted themselves before that, now became the policy of the King himself.

From 1585 the Russian nobles, assembled at the Diet of Warsaw, wrote to the Metropolitan of Kiev: 'A great misfortune has befallen our faith: the closing of Holy Churches, the prohibition of the ringing of church bells, the dragging of the priests from the altars as evil-doers, and the prohibition of prayers by laymen in the churches are taking place. A similar violence did not even take place under the pagan kings. . . . Still worse, one breaks up holy crosses, one carries away church bells and gives them to the Jews. . . . One transforms our churches into those of Jesuits, the property of the Church of God passes to the Catholics.'

Nevertheless the existing law did not permit an open attack of the Russian element as such, well organized in its church and enjoying guarantees by charter.

The aim of the Polish counter-reforms was to latinize the Russian population which lived in Poland and Lithuania by degrees, which would lead to its gradual absorption by the Polish element. The famous Polish Jesuit, Peter Skarga, rector of the College of Vilna, published in 1577 at Vilna his work, *O Jednosci Kosciola Bozego* (*Of the Unity of the Church*), in which he declared that to benefit from the good of the instruction the Russians should forsake their national language. 'It never was and never will be possible in the world of the Academies or Colleges, that theology, philosophy, and the other sciences could be taught and understood in any other language than Latin or Greek.' But he recognized at the same time the difficulty of converting the Russians 'who are so concerned about their forefathers and their past.' Skarga was the first to have the

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idea that, before approaching a possible latinization of the Russians, it would be wiser to make them accept the supremacy of Rome while leaving them their national rite. He may be considered as the inspirer of the so-called Uniat Church. 175X

During this epoch the sustained struggle to safeguard the National Church was almost exclusively maintained by the Russian laity, the clergy and ecclesiastic discipline in the ancient lands of the Russo-Lithuanian State having fallen into decadence.

Prince Constantine Ostrojsky, the most powerful of the Russian lords and considered the 'chief of Orthodoxy and of the Russian people,' spent his whole life in extending education among the people, founding schools, and editing books in ordinary Russian and in Slavonic. It is in his land, at Ostrog, that the first printing press in South-Western Russia was founded. It was destined to play an important role in the struggles which followed.

On the other hand the Russian citizens organized themselves into 'brotherhoods' which expected their members to practise the Christian virtues, to found and maintain charitable institutions, and to spread knowledge and instruction. These brotherhoods soon had their own schools and they even gave themselves the right of controlling questions of ecclesiastical discipline, which gave rise to conflicts with the episcopate.

Despite these efforts, the difficulties became such that the Russian episcopate, in order to escape the Polish persecutions and to re-establish order in the affairs of the Church, considered the idea of recognizing the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff while maintaining the national rite within the framework of Catholic unity.

In 1590 the work of Skarga, *Of the Unity of the Church*, was translated into Russian. Its first part discussed the causes of the decadence of the Orthodox Church in

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x/75 Western Russia. Skarga cites in the first instance the marriage of priests, the use of old Slavonic, which he considers undesirable as being a 'barbarian' language, and, above all, the interference of the lay authorities in the affairs of the Church, thus aiming at the brotherhoods. To remedy this and to prepare the ground for a union, Skarga puts forward, in the second part of his work, propositions concerning the first measures to be taken, such as the acceptance by the Russians of the Latin Credo, the transfer of the investiture of the Metropolitan of Kiev from Constantinople to Rome, and, of course, the recognition of the supremacy of the Pope. It is curious to note that in the Polish edition he foresees the progressive abandonment of the national rite and its replacement by the Latin rite. This suggestion is abandoned in the Russian edition of 1590 in view, undoubtedly, of the attachment of the people to the national rite.

This work had an enormous influence on the Orthodox clergy of Western Russia and strengthened its tendency towards the establishment of a union with Rome.

The effort of Skarga was supported by strong diplomatic activity of the Apostolic Nuncio, Antonio Possevino, also a Jesuit and a politician of note, who published in Venice, nearly at the same time, the works *Bibliothecha selecta de ratione studiorum* and *Moscovia et alia opera*, translated into Polish and Russian, which discuss the union of the Churches. He succeeded in converting the Metropolitan of Kiev, Michael Ragoza, the Bishop of Luck, Cyril Terletsky, and the Bishop Hypatius Potiy to the idea of union. They signed an Act of adhesion to the Holy See and deposited an address of submission at the feet of Pope Clement VIII in December 1595. A commemorative medal was struck on this occasion. It was Antonio Possevino who persuaded

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King Sigismund to put this into practice, in demonstrating to him the political advantages of the realization of the union of his Russian subjects with the Roman Church. M5X

The union of the two Churches was proclaimed in Rome in 1596 and at the local council of Brest-Litovsk in the following year.

Nevertheless this union met with the resolute opposition of the Russian people in Poland and Lithuania. Prince Ostrojsky, who was himself a partisan of the reconciliation of the Churches, became a pillar of this resistance.

According to the ideas of the Prince, as explained in his letter of 21 June 1593 to Bishop Potiy, saying: 'I am prepared to give my support to the union of the Churches,' this union ought to have been a definite reconciliation between Rome and the entire Eastern Church, a return to the primitive state of the indivisible Church. He insisted particularly on the necessity of agreeing first of all with the Grand Prince of Moscow and the clergy of his land—with, as he said, 'our co-religionists.'

But the union, as realized in 1596 (as it only affected Polish-Lithuanian Russia), severed the ties of the Russian people with those of the rest of the Orthodox world and, in isolating them, it placed them fatally at the mercy of the Poles and of the Latin clergy. It was nothing but a scholarly political combination of some eminent members of the high Orthodox clergy who had acted without the knowledge of the people and decidedly against them.

Therefore this union was never recognized by the majority of the Faithful.

But from the point of view of the Polish authorities, the union was reached and confirmed. On the whole

×175 territory of the Polish-Lithuanian State the Government no longer recognized the existence of the non-uniat Russian Church, opposed the nomination of bishops other than uniats, and had resource to administrative force to destroy the 'schism.'

Henceforth the struggle became an open one; it was extremely violent from the beginning.

The non-uniat Russians redoubled their efforts to teach the people their own language. Polemical literature flourished in the common language, more easily understood by the popular masses than the old Slavonic. As the nobility succumbed more and more to Polonization, the brotherhoods became the real centres of resistance.

The authorities, on the contrary, closed the Orthodox churches and suppressed the schools and the printing presses if they did not happen to be under the protection of a powerful lord.

The worst excesses were perpetrated. On 12 March 1622, after twenty-five years of political experience, the great Polish statesman Sapieha writes to the uniat Bishop Kuncewicz:

'It is certain that I worked for the union and I still think that it is unreasonable to abandon it. But I never had an idea that you would try to realize it by such a display of violence. . . . At the Diets there is no want of complaints from the whole Ukraine and the whole Russia. . . . You say that you are permitted to drown, and to massacre the non-uniats. No! Because the commandments of God condemn vengeance and you are not exempt from them. You write that at the Diets one not only discourages the union, but the whole Roman Catholic clergy. But who is to blame for this? When you violate the human conscience, when you close the churches and allow people to perish without Christian rites, without the holy prayer, as unbelievers,

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you do this over our heads (the public authorities). 175x
But when the people become agitated as a result of these atrocities and one has to subdue them, then it is we who have to close the breach. . . .

'You have transformed the sheep into goats, you are endangering the State and possibly even bringing ruin to us, the Catholics. . . . If the Holy Father knew what disorders occur in our State as a result of your union, he would certainly have ordered the opposite of that which you are doing.'

The national and religious struggles were intimately bound up with the social dissatisfaction of the popular Russian masses, doubly oppressed both as peasants and as schismatics. For this reason the compact and armed force at the further limits of the Ukraine, the Cossacks, began to acquire such importance. Drawn from the lower people, the Zaporogs are quite naturally in favour of the popular faith and are opposed to the religion and the social oppression which made them flee to the wild Steppe. Having always considered themselves a type of crusaders, who fight for their faith, they now thought it their duty to defend their oppressed Church.

A first Cossack insurrection, supported by the Ukrainian peasants, already broke out during the same years when the union was brought about. It ended in disaster and in the death of its principal leaders.

But the revolt persisted. The Cossacks support the non-uniat ecclesiastic hierarchy and protect it with all their power. It is reinstated, at first secretly, at Kiev. The King, Ladislas IV, son and successor of Sigismund III, who has much broader views than his father, tries to normalize the situation by legalizing the non-uniat clergy. But things have already gone too far. The more so since the royal power has become almost an illusion and is unable to prevent the excesses of the

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x/75 officials, the nobility, and the Polish clergy. Thus the troubles continue. An ever growing number of Ukrainian peasants wants to free itself by having its status of Cossacks recognized.

In 1628 it is the great insurrection of Taras Triasilo which forces the Poles to make big concessions. Then, in 1637, 1638, and 1639 the Zaporogs and the peasants again revolt. After a desperate struggle the insurrection was suppressed, this time with the greatest severity. The leaders sought refuge in Moscow.

The more the Polish persecution asserted itself, the more the people of Western and Southern Russia looked to Moscow, especially when she had succeeded in maintaining her national existence, so menaced at the beginning of the seventeenth century by the Polish invasion and the great *Smouta—Smoutnoie vremia*—'the times of trouble,'[1] preceding the establishment of the Romanov dynasty in 1613. In 1625 the new non-uniat Metropolitan of Kiev, Job Borestsky, sent the Bishop of Luck, Isaac, to Moscow with the message: 'We wish to be under the power of the Tsar. If the Poles march against us, we shall have no other refuge but the mercy of the Tsar,'. but Moscow was still too weak to intervene in Western Russia.

After the defeat of the insurrection of 1639 the Zaporog army was submitted to a commission appointed by the Polish Government. 'The Poles cooked Cossack children in boiling water and cut off the breasts of their women,' says a Cossack chronicler of that epoch.

But ten years after the defeat of 1639 the Zaporogs and the whole Ukraine again rose, having Bogdan Khmelnitsky at their head.

The situation in the Ukraine was such that, beginning

[1] The period between the death of Boris Godounov and the election of the Tsar Michael Romanov (1605–13).


POLAND OF XVII CENTURY
NOTES:
Boundaries of Poland at the beginning of XVII century
Provinces ceded by Poland at the end of XVII century
Boundaries of the Ukraine as known in Chapter I
Boundaries of Polish State in 1938
Regions of Poland where the Poles represent less than 25% of the population
Regions of Poland where the Poles represent from 25% to 50% of the population
Mixed Regions where Ukrainians represent more than 25% of the population
RUSSIAN STATE
Novgorod
Moscow
SWEDES
GRAND DUCHY OF COURLAND
Riga
Kovno
Vilno
LITHUANIA
Smolensk
Andrussovo (Treaty of)
Minsk
WHITE RUSSIA
Gdansk (Danzig)
Poznan
Warsaw
Cracow
VOLYNIA
Vladimir Volynsky
Chernigov
Putivl
Kiev
Pereiaslavl
Poltava
SLOBODSKAIA UKRAINA (FREE UKRAINE)
DON
PODOLIA
GALICIA
Lwow
Halicz
Chigirin
Bratslav
DIKOIE POLIE
ZAPOROGS
Khortitza (Siech)
DON COSSACKS
HUNGARY
TRANSILVANIA
MOLDAVIA
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
KRIM TATARS

MAP No. 4

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X175 from February 1648, the commander-in-chief of the Polish troops, Potocky, considered the insurrection imminent. The Polish troops had penetrated into the Ukraine so as to maintain order. But in vain. The Zaporogs first annihilated their advance guard at Joltye-Vody and then the main Polish army at Korsoun. This was the signal for a general uprising of the whole Ukraine. Everywhere the people massacred the Polish lords and the Jews, principal beneficiaries of the economic regime, and putting the Latin and uniat priests to flight, while burning the Catholic churches. The peasants joined the ranks of the army of Khmelnitsky in large numbers. According to the stories of contemporaries, there were no peasant families a member of which was not serving in the army. Often men took up arms, 'with the exception of a single one who remained to guard the house.' The debacle of a new Polish army at Pilavtsi gave Volynia and Podolia to Khmelnitsky, which opened the road to Galicia and to the land of Kholm. Kiev received him in triumph. He found himself at the head of a great land—'unexpectedly,' as he said himself—of all the Russian lands of the Polish crown, which had just broken away from her in overthrowing the whole political, social, and religious order.

As the results had by far exceeded the objectives which one originally had in mind, the Cossack chiefs found themselves face to face with an absolutely new situation which they found it somewhat difficult to conceive and to master.

Let us briefly summarize the principal factors which made the brilliant success of the insurrection possible and which were to influence the further development of the country.

At first the Zaporogs were concerned to re-establish their rights and liberties abolished after the suppression

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of the preceding insurrections, and to augment them if 175x possible.

They struggled to obtain the right which had been enjoyed by the *szlachta* (petty nobility). Khmelnitsky, who was himself linked to the aristocracy by his origin, started the whole affair as the result of a simple quarrel with a Polish nobleman who had robbed him by profiting by his privileged position as compared with that of a Cossack. Generally the Cossack chiefs, while fighting for their own privileges, essentially shared the Polish point of view: 'The Cossacks should be Cossacks and the peasants should be peasants.'

The insurrection triumphed, thanks to the rising of the whole mass of the peasants. They swelled the Cossack army and for them there was no question of returning to the ancient serfdom. Henceforth the Cossack chiefs had to reckon with their own troops and consequently also with the mass of the lower people. "I shall not betray the lower people," said Khmelnitsky to the Polish commissioners sent to negotiate after the battle of Pilavtsi; "after having crushed the peasants you will march against the Cossacks."

The bond between the Cossack chiefs and the popular masses was traditionally the same: 'The Russian Faith of the Greek obedience.' As in all the preceding insurrections, the aim of war was the deliverance of the non-uniat Russian Church. And the chiefs, leaving aside their specifically Cossack interests and speaking for the 'whole Russian people,' required the total abolition of the union, the equality of rights for the Orthodox clergy, and the exclusion of non-Orthodox officials from all the Russian lands.

The rising had, therefore, a national character. Being effectively the leader of the Russian lands, Khmelnitsky could no longer be the chief of only a fraction of the

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Russian people, as whose master (*vlastelin*[1]) he was already described. Almost in spite of himself he began to play the role of a sovereign and to envisage something like a Russian State, consisting of all the 'Russian lands' formerly Polish-Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and, perhaps, White Russian. He was able to say: "I shall deliver the whole Russian people from the Polish yoke. I began by making war after having been personally offended. Now I shall continue for our Orthodox Faith. Right up to Liublin and to Cracow all the lower classes of this religion will support me. . . . I have sufficient means in the Ukraine, in Podolia, in Volynia, and in my own land, as in the principality which will extend to Lvov, Kholm, and Halytch." The insurrection of Khmelnitsky had great repercussions in Europe. Cromwell invited him to join in a holy war against Catholicism. On his part a French diplomat, a contemporary of Khmelnitsky, Pierre Chevalier, called him the 'Russian Cromwell.'

In any case the Polish domination of the Ukraine had outlived itself. The old order of things could no longer be restored. That was plainly shown by the Treaty of Zborov, which, for the time being, put an end to hostilities. The Poles had agreed to all the demands of the victors: the increase of the number of 'registered' Cossacks up to 40,000, the prohibition of the penetration of Polish troops into the territories assigned to the Cossacks, the nomination exclusively of Orthodox officials in the domains of Kiev, Tchernigov, and Bratzlav, and the recognition of all the political rights of the Orthodox clergy.

Notwithstanding these concessions the treaty was not long lived. The hostilities recommenced and this time to the disadvantage of Khmelnitsky.

[1] Literally translated as 'potentate,' he who exercises power.

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In this merciless struggle, accompanied by massacres and terrible atrocities on both sides, there was only one help on which the Russian people of the Orthodox faith could clearly rely in advance: it could only be Moscow. 'Moscow and the Cossacks—one blood and one religion,' wrote the Polish Commissioner, Adam Kissel, a Russian and an Orthodox himself but a vassal of the Poles at the very beginning of the insurrection.

In fact Khmelnitsky had, from the start of the troubles, made the Muscovite authorities aware of their border territories. Then, immediately after his first victories, he wrote on 8 June 1648 directly to the Tsar: 'We should like to have an autocratic sovereign in our land such as your Tsarist Might, oh Christian and Orthodox Tsar!'

Following this, the appeals to the 'Russian Light' did not cease. For a long time Moscow retained a reserve. Khmelnitsky even threatened to join the Grand Turk and to go to war with Moscow, if the Tsar 'whom he was ready to serve' would not receive him. He was particularly insistent after the defeat of his first ally, the Tartar Khan of the Crimea. When the Poles took the initiative, Khmelnitsky persuaded the envoys of the Tsar that, if Moscow should intervene, all the Russian lands, including White Russia, would range themselves on her side. Moscow accepted, and the Union of the Ukraine with Great Russia was proclaimed at Pereiaslavl on 8 January 1654.

The Act of Pereiaslavl stipulated that the Hetman,[1] Bogdan Khmelnitsky, and the whole Zaporog army 'with its lands and its towns' would submit for all times to the power of the Tsar and would swear loyalty to him and to his successors.

[1] The word 'Hetman' means the chief, or general, and is derived from the German '*Hauptman*'—colonel.

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X175 The representatives of the Tsar definitely refused to swear to the maintenance of the ancient rights and liberties which the Cossacks demanded. But they said that the Hetman and his Cossacks ought to trust the grace of the Tsar, who would not fail to do justice to their demands. And that actually took place. After the submission to the Tsar had been proclaimed by the *Rada*[1] (Cossack assembly), and the Hetman and his people had sworn allegiance, they sent a petition to Moscow which contained their principal requests. Most of these were agreed to by Moscow, some with certain restrictions.

These demands (a recent work by Professor D. M. Odinetz explains them very well) primarily aimed at the confirmation of the ancient privileges, given to the Cossacks by the kings of Poland. Did not the sovereign of Moscow appear in the Ukraine as the successor of these kings, with this difference, however, that the religious question would not exist as such in an empire in which Orthodoxy was the religion of the State?

But all these old privileges in the Ukraine always applied to a social class (the nobility, clergy, Cossacks, and the middle class), but never to a territory which had a national language or an autonomous status.

Therefore Moscow did not have to deal with an autonomous State which wanted her protection, but with various social classes, previously endowed with certain privileges and eager to retain them. The Hetman of the Zaporoge army spoke in the name of the 'State,' the social class of the Cossacks, while Moscow had direct dealings with the clergy, the confirmation of whose rights and possessions it demanded.

The question of territorial autonomy had not been raised and it was understood that the sovereignty of the

[1] '*Rada*' means 'council,' 'Soviet' in Ukrainian.

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175X

Tsar extended over the whole territory. It was understood that the Tsar would send his *voievodes*[1] to the Ukraine, that all the public revenues of the country belonged to him, and that he could distribute the land. For this reason, all the more, the Cossack chiefs were the first to ask for them as a reward for their services.

The Cossack army, as a military caste placed on the borders of the State, succeeded in maintaining their privilege of negotiating directly with foreign powers. But Moscow insisted on important restrictions. The Zaporoge army was not allowed to negotiate either with Poland or with Turkey, its most powerful neighbours. Professor Odinetz notes, with good reason, that the *voievode* of Novgorod, who had the right to maintain direct relations with such an important State as Sweden, had more extensive powers than the Hetman of the Ukraine and that, according to Muscovite customs, this so-called autonomy in matters of foreign policy was in no sense a proof of the recognition by Moscow of the existence of a Ukrainian State as such.

In short, from a judicial point of view and according to the letter of the Act of Pereislavl and the supplementary documents which followed it, the Ukraine became an integral part of the Russian State, placed under the sovereignty of a single Tsar.

On the other hand Moscow understood that her position changed from the moment that the 'Great Russian' State, such as it had hitherto been, was transformed into the State of all the Russians in general.

This was the aim which she had in view when engaging in the war with Poland over the question of the Zaporoge army. The *Rouss* which had formerly been Polish and the Muscovite *Rouss* united under a single sceptre. The old expression, already employed by the princes of

[1] Military chief, civil or military governor.

x/175 Galicia and by the Church, Russia Minor, or 'Little Russia,' to describe the Russian lands which had been taken from Poland, was used.

And, to underline the now imperial and complex character of this State, the Tsar of Moscow now took the titles 'Tsar of all the Russias, Great, Little, and White.'

This was not an empty formula. When the theological scholars of Kiev appeared at the beginning of the seventeenth century, drawn by the power of the Tsars, Moscow was literally flooded, in the years which followed the Act of 1654, by elements originating in Russia Minor. The State printing press of Moscow (the only one that existed) soon passed into the hands of these scholars. The ecclesiastic and lay *élite* began to acquire books edited at Kiev. A new, more Western, spirit began to appear in the old capital of the Tsars.

Undoubtedly the Southern Russians were more advanced than those of Moscow from a cultural point of view, especially in the matter of religious instruction. The merciless struggle of the non-uniat Orthodox Church against Catholicism, which was supported by the Polish royal power, had not only forged an Orthodox consciousness in the upper layers of the Russian population of the south, but it had also drawn them into the orbit of the philosophical and social movements of the west. The brotherhoods took over the direction of religious affairs, of instruction, and of the spiritual formation of the clergy. The Theological Academy of Kiev, founded early in the seventeenth century, was reorganized a short time before the Act of Pereiaslavl by the great Metropolitan of Kiev, Peter Mohila. Apart from some Greek contributions, the instruction which was given there was modelled on that of the Jesuit schools of that epoch. Nothing similar could exist at

Moscow, influenced as it was by a fierce nationalism. 175X
In taking the place of the Byzantine institutions, the Academy of Kiev became the centre of high theological and philosophical studies, and took the role of the only light of Orthodoxy. Only a few years were required after the union of the Ukraine with Moscow to bring the Church of Moscow under the direct influence of the learned and cultured theologians of Kiev, which soon brought about the reforms of the Patriarch Nikon (the correction of the Holy Scriptures, the liturgical books, and the revision of the rites according to the original Greek sources). This resulted in a psychological crisis among the Great Russian people, perhaps the most acute in their history, which not only led to an upheaval in Russian religious life, but led to a long period of struggle between the Government of Moscow, which supported the reforming clergy, and the traditionalist party of Moscow, violently nationalist, which actively opposed the innovations and refused to recognize them. This was the *raskol*, the schism of the Russian Church, or rather the insurrection of the people against the clergy who accepted the new spirit and the new methods. The partisans of the pure traditions of Moscow struggled with heroic abnegation in defying the anathema and the stake. Extraordinary in its literary setting, *The Life of the Arch Priest Avvakum*, written by himself,[1] gives us an idea of the depth of this religious crisis.

But victory remained on the side of reform and of the spirit which came from Kiev. At the end of the seventeenth century the scholars of Kiev founded the first schools in Moscow, which were a replica of the Kiev Academy. A little later, under Peter the Great, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the whole Russian

[1] An excellent French translation of which has been made by M. Pierre Pascal.

x/175 Church is directed by people from Russia Minor such as Stephan Yavorsky and Theophan Prokopovitch.

The embryo of Muscovite literature and art, as well as of the written language, became inspired by Kiev models. The Polish novel, the polyphonous song, and the new iconography, all strongly Western, triumphed over the special Great Russian particularism. An imperial civilization arose which was a synthesis of the national and *etatist* spirit of Moscow and the supple South Russian culture, itself the product of the influence of the old Slavonic civilization with its Byzantine spiritual traditions and those of the Western Renaissance.

But while the spirit of Kiev began to influence Moscow and laid the civilizing foundations of the Russian Empire, the Ukraine herself was in the throes of many troubles.

In concluding the Act of Pereiaslavl, the Cossack chiefs had not been able to rise to a clear understanding of an autonomous Ukrainian entity within the framework of the Russian State.

Nevertheless this autonomy did exist in fact. The Hetman who had negotiated with the Government of the Tsar solely by virtue of being the chief of a social class (the Cossacks) was in reality the Regent of a vast territory. All sorts of clashes were to result from this fact.

The right of the Tsar to nominate *voievods* (military governors) in the Ukraine had been legally recognized in the course of the negotiations at Pereiaslavl. But on the day when Moscow actually appointed officials in 'Russia Minor,' this naturally irritated the Hetman.

Another cause for conflict was the incompatibility of the political principles of Moscow with the regime of social privileges so dear to the Cossacks. The so to say democratic despotic egalitarianism which had been the

foundation of the Muscovite monarchy could not easily be reconciled with the Polish idea of an aristocratic oligarchy, an idea which the Cossack chiefs wanted, at present, to exploit to their advantage. In this the policy of Moscow naturally found much support among the popular Ukrainian masses, who generally preferred the Government of the Tsar to the oligarchy of the *starchina* (the leading class among the Cossacks). An agent of the Government of Moscow, Ragosine, reported the opinions expressed to him by members of the lower masses: "We are happy to be under the Great Sovereign, but unfortunately our chiefs are restive."

Standing between the popular masses and the Government of Moscow, the Cossack chiefs, imbued with Polish political ideas, tried several times to renew contacts with Poland, which, after the catastrophe, was ready for all concessions. The immediate successor of Khmelnitsky, the Hetman Vyhovsky, induced Poland to recognize the territory under his authority as the 'Russian Grand Duchy,' placed under Polish sovereignty. But the people were too violently opposed to a new union with Poland for the Ukraine not to remain within Russia, despite the restrictions which were imposed by the Tsar on the liberties originally accorded. Two years later the attempt of Vyhovsky was repeated by Youri Khmelnitsky, the son of Bogdan, but with no more success. The Hetmanate had now passed to Brioukhovetsky, a partisan of the union with Moscow. Nevertheless these struggles horribly devastated that part of the Ukraine which lies to the west of the Dnieper.

On the other side of the river, in the eastern part of the country, where the Polish power had always been only nominal, the hold of the Russian State proved to be much stronger and tolerable order was established. The population of Western Ukraine took more and

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X/75 more refuge in this part. In 1658 the Polish general, Andrew Potocki, who was fighting on the right bank of the River Dnieper, wrote to King John—Casimir: 'All the inhabitants here will soon be Muscovites, because they intend to move to the land on the other side of the Dnieper. That is what they wish and they only await the occasion when they can attain this aim conveniently.'

The idea of evacuating the western part of the Ukraine and of ceding this 'land without inhabitants' to the King of Poland became rife among those Cossack chiefs who had remained faithful to the union with Moscow.

On the other hand Moscow could not, after a series of reverses, contribute the same military effort as at the beginning of the war.

Also, in 1667, the armistice of Androussovo put an end to the Russo-Polish war which had lasted no less than thirteen years. The Ukraine on the left bank and Kiev on the right bank were retained by Russia. On the other hand she lost the greater part of Western Ukraine. This retreat meant very little, as the Western Ukraine had almost become a desert during the rule of the Turks and Tartars.[1]

After the treaty between the son of Khmelnitsky, Youri, and the Poles had intervened, the latter maintained a Hetman under their obedience on the right bank of the Dnieper. In 1666 the third of these Hetmans, Doroshenko, submitted to the Turks. The Turko-Tartar invasion led to the total ruin of the Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnieper.

A year after the armistice of Androussovo a revolt took place in the eastern part of the Ukraine. The relations between the Government of the Tsar and the Hetman always remained confused. Moscow tried to

[1] See Map No. 4.

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govern the Ukrainian towns (*tcherkass* towns, as one said in Moscow) directly and to collect taxes there through their *voievods* and their officials. This exasperated the *starchina*. 175×

In 1668 the Hetman Brioukhovetsky, until now faithful to Moscow, allied himself with Doroshenko, who had become a vassal of Turkey, and rose against the Tsar. Finally he was supplanted by Doroshenko. The latter made himself recognized as Hetman of the whole Ukraine, under Turkish protectorate. But as soon as he had reached the right bank of the Dnieper, Eastern Ukraine again rallied to Russia. The lower clergy, speaking in the name of the townspeople and the lower masses, informed Moscow: "The whole people shout and cry; no more than the Jews under the Egyptian yoke do we wish to live under the Cossack yoke." Western Ukraine was again ravaged by Turkish troops, led by Doroshenko, and the Poles finally ceded the greater part to them. Then the Turks turned against the left bank and, for the first time, Muscovite Russia was fighting with the Ottoman Empire. But they did not succeed, as the Eastern Ukraine resisted and definitely joined the side of the Orthodox Tsar against the Infidel. The Russian troops even operated with some success on the other side of the river, but they were unable to hold their positions and evacuated the remaining population of the left bank.

After ten years of hostilities Russia, by the Treaty of Bakhtchisarai (1681), had to abandon the right bank except, of course, the territory of Kiev, which remained under the Tsar.

Five years later Poland also definitely renounced Kiev. The east and the centre of the Ukraine were definitely joined to Russia.

After the alarm of 1668, the Government of Moscow

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X/175 adopted a more careful policy and one that was more moderate towards the Cossack chiefs. It kept the right to maintain the troops commanded by the *voievods* of the Tsar in the more important centres of the country. But it abandoned all internal administration of the Ukraine to the Hetman. That which the Act of Pereiaslavl had not foreseen became a reality: the Ukraine, under her Hetmans, became an autonomous entity, a kind of vassal State with its own local legislation.

On the contrary, while recognizing this autonomy, the Government of Moscow henceforth began to control more closely the accession of the Hetmans to power. Contrary to the stipulations of Pereiaslavl, which provided for the election of the Hetman by the Zaporoge army, Moscow herself appointed and deposed him.

The Act of Pereiaslavl was not broken; it was necessary to go beyond its stipulations in installing a regime of real territorial autonomy which, on the other hand, one restrained in establishing a more effective control over the nomination of the person who became chief of this autonomous region.

The new formula had at least the merit of functioning some time. The Hetmanate was consolidated, while enjoying a relatively stable internal peace. The population flocked from the Western Ukraine. Monasteries and schools were again founded and Kiev, having been spared by the wars, began to adorn herself with buildings of the Western baroque style and her Academy again extended her influence over the whole of Russia.

The influx of the population did not, however, stop at the frontiers of the Hetmanate. Farther on, towards the south-east, on the borders of the State of Moscow, in the real wild Steppe, the *Dikoie Pole* of former days, the Russian colonists established themselves. More or less protected by the Muscovite military cordons, a land

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of free colonization was formed on the Worskla, the Donietz, and the Oskol. It was also called the *Slobodskaia Oukraina*[1] ('Free Ukraine') (actually the departments of Kharkov and of the Donietz). The colonists also came here from Russia Minor and from Great Russia, on whom this country was politically dependent. It is this which gave it, from an ethnical point of view, a mixed character, which it has kept to our day. 175x

During the wars which devastated Russia Minor in the second half of the seventeenth century, the current of colonization in the 'free Ukraine' naturally became intensified. One after another towns were founded, such as Soumy, Izioum, Tor (to-day Slaviansk), Akhtyrka, and Kharkov, which became in time the chief towns of the country. The exodus of the population from the land of the Dnieper gave predominance to the Ukrainian ethnical element, but the 'free Ukraine,' directly administered by Moscow, never became a part of the Hetmanate which, during the first years of the eighteenth century, had to sustain heavy blows.

Under pressure of the West, first felt at Moscow through Kiev, the old Russia became definitely transformed. Peter the Great had taken power. Breaking with the old patriarchal habits, he imported the scientific and technical civilization of Europe, and political ideas of enlightened absolutism, which he grafted on the semi-amorphous body of the old Muscovite State. He thus created a hybrid State and a monster civilization, which dominated Russia during the eighteenth century up to the beginning of the reign of Catherine II. But he also created a powerful empire whose outbursts of progress and enlightenment astonished and still astonish the world.

[1] '*Sloboda*' is a place inhabited by 'free men,' not serfs. *Slobodskaia Oukraina*. See Map No. 4.

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×175 He pursued unrelentingly, on the Baltic as on the Black Sea, the great aims of a true imperial policy, and subjected the whole country to a pitiless dictatorship which was, however, necessary for the attainment of his aims. Peter was not a man who took human susceptibilities into account, whatever they were, not even his own. That which he expected of Great Russia he also expected of Russia Minor.

The Ukraine, too, had to furnish him with the necessary troops for the distant campaigns of the nascent empire. Like the Great Russians, the Ukrainians also perished in great numbers on the marshes of the Baltic, where the untiring Tsar was building the new town of St. Petersburg.

Convinced of the necessity of having the support of a regular army, Peter could not tolerate the independent and undisciplined Cossack troops in his new military organization. On their part the Cossacks, forced to fight in the far north, feared that their traditional organization might be destroyed and that they might be transformed into ordinary regular troops. They grumbled and thought Peter a tyrant and oppressor. But the Tsar had full confidence in their chief, the Hetman Mazeppa, by origin a Polish nobleman, brought up in the Western school, who, after having served Poland and Turkey loyally, served Russia.

Energetic, cultured, very intelligent, sly and unscrupulous, Mazeppa had the appearance of a learned alchemist of the Renaissance period. He followed the changing fortunes in the mortal war which began between Russia and Sweden with anguish. For him it was a question of maintaining his own power. But, possibly, in this complex soul personal ambitions were mixed with cares about the fate of the country which he governed. In prose and in poetry (he sometimes

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indulged in poetry) he liked to lament the fate of the Ukraine—undoubtedly an ambitious demagogue but saturated with a lyric mood. . . . 175×

As long as the result of the war between Russia and Sweden seemed undecided, Mazeppa was careful not to break with the Tsar.

In Poland as well as in Sweden one realized, however, that in order to strike a mortal blow at the power of the Tsar it was necessary to detach the Ukraine from Russia. Advantageous offers to Mazeppa were not wanting and here, for the first time, the Ukraine was named as being an autonomous geographical entity. The Swedish emissaries (the idea of independence had then already appeared as a foreign inspiration) had printed maps of the Sovereign Ukrainian State, which the 'Paladin of the north,' Charles XII, proposed to create.

Logically the cause of Peter seemed lost. The suffering which the Reformer had imposed on the whole country which he governed seemed to increase the chances of the Swedish victor. Swedes and Poles flattered the ambition of the old Hetman in promising him the creation of a semi-independent Ukraine of which he would be the absolute chief.

Mazeppa, having been persuaded, rallied to the cause of Charles XII and succeeded in bringing the Zaporogs on his side. This insurrection differed from all the previous risings against the Tsar. This time a part of the Cossack mass, angered by the taxes, by the requisitions of labour and the military conscriptions, joined the cause of their chiefs. It is the co-operation of the Cossacks and the lower people which could make Peter fear a general insurrection in the Ukraine.

Nevertheless this general rising did not take place.

Mazeppa had negotiated with the old enemy: Poland. Peter knew very well what he was doing when publishing

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the letters of Mazeppa to King Stanislas Lescinski (a king forced on Poland by Charles XII), with the following comments by himself: 'We had already told you—wrote the Tsar in his manifesto—that the renegade (Mazeppa) has brought the Swede to the Ukraine in order to subject her again to the old Polish yoke. Now his lie, abominable before God, has become obvious; he announces himself as the faithful subject of Lescinski and he says that the Ukraine is the patrimony of Lescinski.[1]'

Some weeks later Peter could already write to General Apraxine: 'The people of Russia Minor, with God's help, is so firm in their loyalty that one could expect no more.' The majority of the Cossacks, having remained faithful to the Tsar, immediately elected a new Hetman who was entirely devoted to Peter. The Ukrainian clergy joined those of Moscow in proclaiming a curse upon Mazeppa. At the same time the troops of the Tsar acted with great energy against the two remaining centres of separatist resistance which remained in the country. The capital of the Hetman, Batourin, was taken by assault. Then, in turn, the *Sitch* of the Zaporoges was completely devastated.

After the total suppression of the insurrection, Mazeppa, who had tried in vain to renew his ties with the Tsar, was obliged, like Charles XII, to seek refuge in Turkey following the defeat of Poltava on 27 June 1709. This battle decided the fate of the Russo-Swedish War as well as that of Eastern Europe.

The unsubdued Zaporoges emigrated to Turkey, where they founded a Hetmanate in exile. But later on they again submitted and returned to their former territories.

The defeat of Mazeppa put an end to the short period

[1] In calling King Stanislas by his surname, Peter underlined that he did not recognize a king imposed by Charles XII.

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of Ukrainian autonomy. The Hetmanate still continued 175x officially for some time. The new Hetman, Skoropadsky (a forefather of the General Skoropadsky who was proclaimed Hetman in 1918), controlled by Russian Ministers who governed the country, had in reality no power. After the death of Skoropadsky the Tsar deliberately left his office vacant. As a result of certain reactions against the political policy of Peter the Great which triumphed immediately after his death, the Hetmanate was re-established in 1724 in favour of Daniel Apostol, who was entirely loyal to the Imperial Government. The Ukraine had yet another Hetman, the last one, in the person of Cyril Razoumovsky, the brother of the favourite of the Empress Elizabeth, who while completely dependent on St. Petersburg, contributed much to the economic and cultural development of the Ukraine.

Catherine II, after her accession to power, proceeded to bring about the disappearance of the last vestiges of Ukrainian autonomy. Razoumovsky was dismissed for having attempted to make his position hereditary.

The second half of the eighteenth century settled, on the other hand, two great historical questions: the return of the Ukraine of the right side of the river (the western lands of Kiev, Podolia, and Volynia) to Russia, and the definite conquest of Tartar Steppe by the Russian Empire.

Let us remember that, by the Treaties of Androussovo and of Bakhtchissarai, Russia had been obliged to renounce the Ukraine of the right bank for the benefit either of Poland or of Turkey.

During the years that followed she tried to regain a foothold in this completely devastated country. But the disaster which overtook Peter the Great in 1711, in his war against Turkey, forced him once again to

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X/175

abandon this attempt. Under the terms of the Russo-Turkish Treaty which was then signed, the Ukraine of the right bank was to remain empty and uninhabited under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.

This was the last victory of the Steppe over the settled Russian world. The withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire allowed Poland to retake this territory.

The same process, already seen so often, repeated itself; the populations which had been driven back to the extreme north-west of the Ukrainian territory, in Galicia and Polesia, again poured into the lands abandoned by the Tartars of the Steppe. At the end of several decades the whole country lying north of the line Balta–Tchigurin became covered with villages and towns.

And again, as during the sixteenth century in Western Ukraine, the Polish lord, serfdom, and national and religious intolerance closely followed the Ukrainian colonist, who was precisely attempting to escape them. Once more, in the middle of the eighteenth century, the country was divided into immense lordly domains which were veritable feudal principalities. The memory of the vengeance of the Ukrainian people, led by Khmelnitsky, had made the Poles more intolerant than ever. Any political position was forbidden by law to non-Catholics. The Orthodox Russians did not have the right to restore their churches nor to construct new ones. Those which were left to them, as well as the exercise of their cult, were at the mercy of the fanatical and vindictive Polish nobility. This was all the more so as at this epoch there were no longer any nobles of the Orthodox religion in Poland. The Russian faith, 'the religion of the serfs,' was deprived of every legal safeguard. Let us note that this happened in the same eighteenth century which saw Russia give refuge to Jesuits after the dissolution of the company in all the countries of the West.

But the wars of the second half of the seventeenth century had already decided the result of the secular rivalry between Russia and Poland. After the loss of the Eastern Ukraine the Polish State weakened more and more, whereas the Russian power increased continually. Peter the Great treated Poland almost as a vassal. He sent his troops there whenever he thought it wise. He made full use of the right which had been given to him by the treaties, of defending the position of his co-religionists in Poland. The repeated protests of Russia against Polish excesses, strengthened by a formal pact with Prussia which had the defence of non-Catholics in Poland in view, succeeded in remedying the immediate abuses without being able to change the essence of the Polish administrative system. 175x

The relations of the Western Ukraine and White Russia with the Russian Empire were all the closer as, since the end of the sixteenth century, their Church was no longer dependent on the Patriarchate of Constantinople but on that of Moscow, and later on the Holy Synod of St. Petersburg, which was substituted for the patriarchy by a decree of Peter the Great. The coming and going of ecclesiastics was now continuous. The Russian clergy, persecuted in the Polish Ukraine, readily took refuge on Russian territory, where it found all kinds of support.

The Russian influence on the affairs of Poland, a little weakened after the death of Peter the Great, again became stronger under Catherine II.

Almost immediately after the accession of Catherine II in 1762, the most notable prelate of Polish Russia, the Archbishop of Mohilev, George Konisky, presented a memorandum to the Holy Synod declaring the position of the Orthodox Russians in Poland as absolutely intolerable. As a result, two years later, at the elective

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×175 Diet of 1764, Russia demanded equality of rights for the 'dissidents,' that is to say the non-Catholics, from Poland. She obtained the simple tolerance of the cult, but was refused the demanded civil rights.

The struggles which ensued ended with the intervention of Russian troops in 1768. But while these troops were fighting with the 'Confederation of Bar' (composed of Polish reactionaries) an appalling insurrection broke out in the Polish Ukraine.

At the news of the approach of the Russian Army the peasants and the lower clergy of Western Ukraine believed that this would be the end of Polish domination. And so the scenes of the times of Bogdan Khmelnitsky were repeated. The whole Polish and Jewish population was massacred with unimaginable cruelty, insurgents and repressors rivalling in atrocities.

But the times had changed. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg, which had patiently worked for the emancipation of South-Western Russia, was unable to realize it according to the methods of the *haidamaks* (Ukrainian insurgents). The Chancellor, Count Panin, explained, in a letter of 1 September 1768 to the Bishop of Pereiaslavl (on Russian territory), the whole inexpediency and the horror of such political methods. The Russian troops were used against the *haidamaks* who, however, claimed an apocryphal 'golden bull' by Catherine II. Nevertheless the troubles in the country subjected to the Poles did not cease.

The greater part of White Russia had already been annexed by Russia since the first division of Poland in 1772. In May 1792 the Russian troops again penetrated into the Western Ukraine. On 3 June Prince Joseph Poniatowsky, who commanded the Polish troops which opposed them, wrote to King Stanislas that all the Ukrainian peasants and the petty nobles of the Orthodox

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Faith were openly the partisans of Russia: 'The adversary had knowledge of my intentions, was informed of all that went on in my camp through benevolent spies of all sorts, whom he could easily procure, whereas I had the greatest difficulties in obtaining any.' M5x

In the following year, according to the terms of the second partition of Poland, the domains of Kiev, Bratzlav, and of Podolia and a part of those of Brest and Volynia were annexed by Russia, the rest of the latter domains being taken by her only as a result of the third division of Poland in 1795. With Eastern Ukraine united to Moscow since the time of Khmelnitsky, it was the whole of the Southern Russian lands which had been taken by Poland in 1596, which were rejoined to the Russian Empire.

Only the 'Russian Palatinate,' that is to say Galicia, which had belonged to Poland from the middle of the fourteenth century, remained outside the frontiers of the Russian Empire. She was annexed by Austria, which explains the violent nationalism of the Galicians and the development of their native language (called the Ruthenian language), opposed to Polonization and Germanization.

We must also note that at none of the partitions of Poland did Russia take an inch of ethnically Polish territory, which was entirely absorbed by the two great Germanic States (Prussia and Austria). Only later, after the Napoleonic wars, did Russia annex the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

At the same time the two wars which Russia waged against Turkey under Catherine II carried her southern frontiers to the Black Sea. After a thousand years of struggle with the Asiatic world of the Khazars, the Petchenegs, the Polovetses, the Tartars, and the Turks, the Steppes of the Black Sea ceased to be a perpetual

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x/75 menace to the Russian world and were conquered by it. The annexation of Bessarabia, taken from the Turks in 1811, completed this conquest. Russian colonization developed in this at last pacified country with an unbelievable rapidity. One can only compare it with the colonizing movement in Siberia, which started some forty years ago with the inauguration of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Potemkin heralded this pact some years in advance by constructing false villages, a piece of theatrical stage dressing intended to impress the Emperor Joseph II. A few years passed and these villages surpassed in quantity and in importance the ambitious imagination of the favourite of the great Catherine. One after another towns were founded in this ancient Tartary, which had now become 'the New Russia': Pavlograd in 1764, Alexandrovsk (to-day Zaporojie) in 1770, Nikopol in 1775, Kherson in 1784, Marioupol and Voznesensk in 1789, Tiraspol in 1791, Odessa and Lougansk in 1795, and then, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Melitopol, Berdiansk, and others of lesser importance. This colonizing fever equally overtook Bessarabia, whose indigenous Moldavian population was small. This explains the large ethnically Russian majority in certain regions of Bessarabia.

The Imperial Government favoured this movement with all means in attracting colonists from the Ukraine, from Great Russia, and even from abroad, particularly Alsatians, Thuringians, Polish Jews, Greeks, and Bulgarians. It is this which gave these territories an ethnically very mixed character. According to the figures of the census of 1897, the three departments of the New Russia, Kherson, Dniepropetrovsk, and Taurida of the north, had 56 per cent Ukrainians, 21 per cent Great Russians, and the rest (23 per cent) being composed

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of Jews, Germans, Tartars, Moldavians, Bulgarians, Greeks, etc. (we mention them here in the order of their numerical importance). 175

The imperial colonization of the New Russia has thus assured the predominance of the ethnically Ukrainian element, though only in a weak degree. But economically and strategically everything now changed in relation to the Ukraine, since in the empire and as a result of the power of the empire, she became the borderland of the Black Sea.

With the creation of the New Russia the Zaporoge *Sitch* had to disappear. This vast country having, at last, been pacified, there was no longer any need for the maintenance of a military outpost. By its nature it became the source of all sorts of political and administrative complications affecting the Central Government. In 1775 Russian troops occupied the *Sitch* and destroyed it without meeting with any resistance. It is permissible to regret it from the romantic or sentimental point of view, but one cannot reasonably deny that it was a question of political necessity.

Those Cossacks who were most ardently attached to their privileges emigrated to Turkey, some to Asia Minor and others to the principality of Moldavia. The first still inhabit a village near Constantinople, retaining their faith and their traditions. The second were soon repatriated and directed to the Northern Caucasus, to the fertile region of the Kouban River, where they formed, up to the time of the appearance of the Soviet power, units organized on a military basis like those of their brothers, the Cossacks of the Don. These units were economically very prosperous. They took the name of the 'Cossacks of the Kouban,' while the people called them the *Kourkouls*. They distinguished themselves by their merciless struggle against Bolshevism

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X/175 during the Civil War, when they formed one of the most important kernels of the White Army.

All the lands of Russia Minor, the ancient *Slobodskaya Oukraina*, Podolia, Volynia, the land of Kiev, and the New Russia, were not more than simple provinces of the Russian Empire, divided into *goubernii* (governments, departments, counties), and they remained such until the Revolution of 1917.

During the nineteenth century no political event took place in the Russian Ukraine. No actual political struggle happened there, despite some endeavours to draw certain Ukrainian circles into the Polish insurrectionary movement. Never did any Ukrainian compromise himself in this anti-Russian movement.

Neither did any special police or military measure become necessary in Russia Minor, such as had taken place on those territories of the empire the ethnical majority of which was non-Russian: the Baltic lands, Finland, Poland, and the Caucasus. The calm which reigned in the Russian Ukraine was never troubled but by agrarian revolts and by different workers' movements, of which neither the one nor the other had in the least a national Ukrainian character, either autonomist or separatist. The autonomist movement was limited to cultural aspirations, tending to preserve the language, literature, and the consciousness of local patriotism. Therefore the analysis of this movement will become clearer in the following chapter, which deals with the intellectual movement, the language, the literature, and the Ukrainian folk-lore.

Galicia is still to-day the only Russian land of the ancient State of Kiev which had fallen under Polish domination in the fourteenth century, and had never rejoined the Russian unity. After the third partition of Poland her whole territory was annexed by Austria and

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therefore her political, cultural, and religious life 175x developed under different conditions than those in the Russian part of the Ukraine. The uniat Church, which was definitely installed since the beginning of the seventeenth century, facilitated the detachment of the Galician people from the Russian culture and spirit.

Before concluding our historical chapter we should like to say a few words about Sub-Carpathian Russia, which, we must again repeat, we have included in the 'Great Ukraine' contrary to our conviction. The indigenous Russo-Carpathian people speak a Russian idiom which is full of medieval archaisms, and rather removed from the Ukrainian language and more nearly approaching the Great Russian tongue.

Formed by a western branch of the Eastern Slavs, the Carpatho-Russians established themselves on the southern slopes of the Carpathians and began to descend, towards the twelfth century, into the Danubian Plain. Here they met an already existing political and military organization, the Hungarian State, which rapidly submitted this Russian tribe to its authority.

Since then Sub-Carpathian Russia has lived under Hungarian domination (with an interval of eighteen years, from 1921 to 1939, during which it was a part of Czechoslovakia) without, however, losing her cultural and linguistic traditions.

Being a poor country she was unable to develop her cultural life and was incapable of spreading it beyond her frontier.

The cohabitation, which lasted nearly seven centuries, had naturally introduced certain traditions and certain spiritual tendencies into the life of this small people which, at least in appearance, bring them near to the Magyar people.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century a

×175 cultural renaissance of Russian tendencies makes its appearance in Sub-Carpathian Russia.

It was the epoch of the 'Vormaerz' in Austria, during which the revolution of 1848 developed. The national awakening of all the Slavonic people of the old Danubian Monarchy was in full development, while at the same time Hungarian nationalism, which found itself immediately in conflict with all the Slavs in general, was also awakening.

The Cabinet of Vienna was often more liberal towards the claims of the Slavonic people than was the Hungarian nationalism. Even at the last hour, when the Emperor Charles, during the World War, made the supreme effort to save the empire by federalizing it, it was still the Hungarian intransigence which made this manœuvre of salvation fail at the eleventh hour.

Now Sub-Carpathian Russia was definitely a Hungarian territory, and for that reason the intention of Russia in suppressing the Hungarian revolution in 1849 had brought about consequences in the small Carpathian country which the St. Petersburg Cabinet was certainly far from discounting. The population of Sub-Carpathian Russia quickly recognized blood brothers in the Russian troops of General Paskewicz, come to deliver them from Magyar oppression.

The Imperial Austrian Commissioner attached to the Russian armies, Dobryansky, himself a native of Sub-Carpathian Russia, saw things just from this angle. His contacts with the Russians during the intervention induced him later to become the mouthpiece and the organizer of the Russian national renaissance in his native land.

One knows that, during the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, the help of the Slavs in general was of small value to the Austrian Government. For

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this reason Vienna could see no objection to forming the four northern *comitats* (districts) of Hungary into an autonomous Carpatho-Russian 'land' of which Dobryansky became governor. 175*

This autonomous regime lasted some twenty years, a time which sufficed for a definite orientation of the Carpatho-Russian people towards the Russian civilization. The first schools, teaching only in literary Russian, appeared, and a Russian literature began in the Carpathians and even produced a poet of real merit, Doukhnovitch, whose name has remained for ever a part of the tradition and Russian consciousness of the people of the Carpathian mountains.

In 1867, at the moment of the compromise with Hungary, the Government of Vienna nevertheless sacrificed the autonomy of Sub-Carpathian Russia, which became an integral part of the Hungarian State, now centralized and extremely nationalist.

It is then that a magyarization began, supported by all the forces of the Hungarian State. Almost the entire thin layer of Carpatho-Russian intellectuals became its prey. Instruction was only given in Hungarian, the popular masses, now remaining without leaders, were abandoned to poverty and ignorance. The percentage of illiterates in the country rose, until the beginning of the twentieth century, to 60 per cent. There were entire villages in which not a single inhabitant could read or write.

Nevertheless the national spirit did not become extinguished. Some priests, faithful to their nationality, made great efforts to edit Russian pamphlets and leaflets for the benefit of the peasants. Gradually a new layer of intellectuals was formed. Beginning with the eighties of the last century, there were circles of Carpatho-Russian students in Vienna who were conscious of their

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x/175 nationality. Russian periodicals, *Nauka* and *Russkaya Pravda*, were published. We will see how, on the eve of the Great War, the consciousness of belonging to the Great Russian world and the national sentiment were stronger than ever in the Carpathians and have remained intact there to this day. If Communism has had a certain amount of success in Sub-Carpathian Russia, it is only because it was Russian and came from Moscow. The rustic simplicity of the Carpathian peasants could not distinguish between the national and the social idea, but accepted them because they were Russian.

It is well to note that no cultural or other Ukrainian movement existed in the territory of this small country until its inclusion, by the Treaty of Saint-Germain in 1921, in Czechoslovakia. There is no serious documentation concerning the rarest traces of this movement.

Lately it has experienced an insignificant development and has become known to the world only after the Munich agreement.

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CHAPTER III

THE LITERARY, INTELLECTUAL, AND ARTISTIC UKRAINE

IT becomes apparent from the preceding chapters that the influences of the western neighbours, due to the geographical position and to historic development, have always been more pronounced in the Ukraine than in Northern Russia. We also find Polish and even German influences in the Ukrainian language, literature, folk-lore, and art, which had developed on the foundation of the old indivisible mediæval Russia.

The Ukrainian idiom belongs to the Russian family and even to the Eastern Slavonic family, which is almost the same thing. One of the most characteristic features which distinguish all the Russian idioms and the literary Russian language from other Slav languages, both western and southern, is the appearance of a new vowel between two or more consonants. For example, *gorod* (town) instead of *grad*, *molod* (young) instead of *mlad*, is constantly met with in Ukrainian. One could even say that it is Ukrainian which has encouraged this evolution, which was somewhat retarded in literary Russian by the stronger influences of old Slavonic.

Certain grammatical peculiarities of old Russian, greatly simplified in Great Russian, have been preserved in Ukrainian, such as the 'i' at the end of the infinitive. For example, to give *davat'* in Russian, *davati* in Ukrainian. There are also some peculiarities in the pronunciation. It seems that the 'g' was pronounced as an 'h' in old Russian, very strongly exhaled in the

197 German manner, as one pronounces it in the Ukraine. In Great Russia it has become a 'gu' quite similar to the Latin 'g.' The two ways of pronouncing this letter immediately allow one to recognize the southern or northern origin of Russians. The *yat* of old Russian, fused with the plain 'e' in Great Russian, has in all cases become 'i' in Ukrainian. Thus *khleb* (bread) in Russian is *khlib* in Ukrainian. In this case we witness a very clear geographical differentiation of a formerly identical pronunciation.

On the other hand a large number of words which still exist in the Great Russian tongue and in literary Russian have been replaced in Ukrainian by words borrowed from Polish or, through it, from German. The Polish domination in the Ukraine and the many and prolonged contacts between the Ukrainians and the Poles have led to the direct introduction of many Polish words, pronounced in a slightly different way, into the Ukrainian language.

Notwithstanding all the differences between Great Russian and Ukrainian during the whole nineteenth century, the latter was considered simply a Russian dialect. German scholars, who were then authorities in philological matters, and even Polish scholars like Siarczinski, were the champions of this point of view. Yet on 20 February 1906 the Russian Imperial Academy, true to its tradition of impartiality and independence in scientific questions, decided, by a majority of one, that Ukrainian was really a special language and not simply a Russian dialect. It is well to remember that during the sixteenth century the old Slavonic began to be replaced by more modern forms and such that were nearer to the local dialect, in Southern Russia, which formed a new written language. The evolution of the written language in Muscovy, on the contrary, where

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the old archaic Slavonic still continued to exist during the seventeenth century, took place much later, and it is Kiev which had given the start to this evolution which ended only in the nineteenth century. 197

Leaving Sub-Carpathian Russia aside, where the idiom is very similar to ordinary Russian, with only a few peculiarities of pronunciation and where the written language is quite simply the Russian literary language, one can distinguish three different dialects in the Ukraine : that of the north, that of the south, and that of the west. The first, spoken in Polesia and in the wooded parts of the old lands of Kiev and Tchernigov, is that which is most nearly related to Great Russian. The dialect of the south used in all the territories of the Steppe, colonized during the last centuries, is the one which has become the foundation of literary Ukrainian. Finally the dialect of the west, spoken in Galicia and the territories which lie along the border of the old Russian Empire (the land of Kholm, in Volynia and in part of Podolia), has been the most corrupted by the Germano-Polo-Latin influences and has borrowed the greatest number of words to replace the corresponding expressions in old Russian.

But since Galicia has become the real centre of the Ukrainian movement, with a pronounced tendency of escaping as much as possible from all that which is Russian, the literary Ukrainian language has become more and more related to the Galician dialect of the west, which has, as a result of the abundance of Polish expressions, made it more difficult to understand not only by Great Russians but also by Russian Ukrainians.

One has seen, during the period of the German occupation of 1918, that the peasants of Central Ukraine had some difficulty in understanding this Galician idiom. To make themselves understood by the Eastern

197 Ukrainians, the German and Austrian authorities had to use Russian interpreters instead of Ukrainian ones from Galicia. Trained at the Ukrainian University of Lvov, founded by the Austrian Government, and belonging to another religion, being 'uniats' and non-Orthodox, the Galician men of letters, scientists and politicians who invaded the Ukraine after the Revolution of 1917, appeared as foreigners to the native population.

538 In popular Ukrainian poetry one finds no trace of the epic poem of the Russia of Kiev, of which the 'Tales of the Companions of Igor,' written in a language which was still very close to old Slavonic, is a magnificent example. The epic songs of the flourishing epoch of the State of Kiev, still bearing traces of the mixture of Christian and remnants of old pagan conceptions, have been perpetuated far into the north. They are the *byliny*, songs of St. Vladimir and his companions, which were accompanied by some acting, and which the popular *skazitels* still sing in the most distant North Russian lands in the forests on the shore of the White Sea. In the Ukraine a popular epic poetry of a new kind, based on subjects which have not been published, has appeared, inspired by the Cossack struggles. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have left us a few examples.

This poetry is highly lyrical, noble, and melancholy and has developed especially in the following century. It still lives to our days, known under the name of '*doumy*.' Although it speaks of epic deeds, this poetry is profoundly distinguished by that lyricism which characterizes the whole popular Ukrainian poetic art.

[533] 177 Like all the languages of the Russian family, Ukrainian adapts itself wonderfully to song. It is the Ukraine which has taught the whole of Russia the polyphonic song, which even penetrated to the remotest corners of the Russian land. It is possible that this song itself was early influenced in the Ukraine by certain elements of Western music.

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early influenced in the Ukraine by certain elements of 000
Western music.

We already know that the beginnings of Ukrainian 533
literature, during the epoch of the State of Kiev, are completely interwoven with those of Russian literature. It is at the end of the sixteenth century that one should look for the first example of a literature already written in a noticeably vulgarized form and which approaches modern Ukrainian.

The struggles which followed the religious union of 197
1596 were accompanied by an intense literary activity in the Ukraine which served almost exclusively polemic ends. The cause of Orthodoxy being that of the lower classes after the defection of a great part of the clergy and of the old aristocracy, it was of necessity that its defenders had to turn to the people. We can also note a broad democratization of ideas in the writings emanating from the Orthodox camp, which favoured the use of a language which one tried to make as intelligible as possible to the masses.

The Orthodox were at first fundamentally opposed to the use of Latin, which their adversaries wished to impose upon them. 'It is because the Slavonic language is the most fertile and the most loved by God, that the devil rises against it, since, by means of simple and diligent reading, it leads towards God, without pagan malice, such as the grammar, the rhetoric, and the dialectic,' wrote the defender of Orthodoxy, the monk of Mount Athos, John Vichinsky, in revolting against the literary code of the Jesuits who were quite strange to the popular soul. He appealed to the people:

'It is better for you to go to church without bishops and priests influenced by the devil, and to guard the purity of Orthodoxy, rather than to blaspheme it and to trample upon it in going to church with bishops and

197 priests who are no longer those of God' . . . and he called upon the high clergy to preach the Evangelical Fraternity of all men: 'Have you the right to call yourselves pastors of the Church and even to consider yourselves simply the faithful, if you despise your brother who is born, like you, of the baptismal water and devotion? Be he a serf, a skinner, a sadler, or a tailor, he is your brother, your equal.'

The old Slavonic, so much defended, was not after all sufficiently acceptable as a language of the 'serfs, skinners, sadlers, and tailors' for whom it was meant. Vichinsky was really among the first who brought their Slavonic nearer to the popular idiom. Others followed his example, among them Smotritsky and Zizany.

These beginnings of a broadly popularized literature in a language which was already being called 'Russian' and which we can consider as the old Ukrainian, nevertheless had no future. The intellectual evolution of Southern Russia took another course. Orthodoxy emerged victorious from the struggles which she had to endure, but at the same time she widely adopted, in the Ukraine, the literary forms and the ambiguous style of her adversaries, which excluded or strongly hindered the popular influences.

793 It is the name of the Metropolitan Peter Mohila, one of the most remarkable representatives of Orthodoxy in the seventeenth century, which remains bound up with the new tendency of influencing intellectual Orthodox life by Latin scholasticism. Himself a descendant of a noble family of Moldavia, Mohila did not have the same bonds with the popular Ukrainian masses as the Orthodox preachers of the first heroic struggles. Very energetic, haughty, extremely violent in the method of his actions (according to his contemporaries he never hesitated to expel those monks who angered him from the monasteries,

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nor to beat the superior of a monastery to such an extent 793
that the unfortunate one died a short time after), Mohila was the personification of the reaction against the democracy of the preceding epoch in the bosom of Orthodoxy. When still an Archimandrite of the 538
Monastery of the Caves at Kiev, he established there, at his own expense, a school which was afterwards to become the famous Kiev Academy. It was to Rome that he sent those monks to study who were destined to become the first teachers, and it was from Latin that he translated his *Ritual*, a book which was read throughout Russia. As a result the people of Kiev became disturbed on learning that the teaching of the Academy was that of Latin scholasticism, and that the Latin language occupied a predominant place.

Greek and Latin naturally remained subjects of teaching, but the whole religious literature suffered from the effect of the forms of eloquence which were then being used in the Catholic world.

We know the role which was played by the Academy [874]
of Kiev in the development of Imperial Russian civilization, and it was Mohila himself who first proposed, though prematurely, in 1640, to found a school on the Kiev model in Moscow. But the artificial character of the religious literature, of which the Academy was the centre, delayed for long the blossoming of literary genius in the Ukraine.

The current of popular inspiration having been slowed down, that which was printed in the eighteenth century had almost no literary or national value. The famous printing press of the Monastery of Potchaiev, in Western Volynia, generally limited itself to editing the books required for divine service in old Slavonic. Amongst its other publications only the collection of religious poems, the 'Bogoglasnik,' presents some

538 interest owing to the traces of popular influences which bring them nearer to the lyrical Ukrainian poetry.

536 It is only in the domain of dramatic art that the national originality could still find expression. For example, the Mysteries and the Fables of the West, the first Ukrainian theatre, is in the beginning the work of clergy who want to edify the people while entertaining them. The students of the Academy of Kiev are its first dramatists, playwrights, and producers. And, just as in the West, it soon loses its serious and strictly religious character. The element of entertainment becomes more and more pronounced. The people acquire a taste for these marionette performances which soon become a truly national amusement. At first they usually represented the Crib of the Nativity and all the events which took place around it. The name of 'Crib' (*vertep*) remained connected with them for ever. But the Madonna and the Child Jesus were soon supplanted by comical characters such as the Devil, the Vagabond Priest, the sly peasant, and the schemer. The social satire, a direct product of popular feeling, became the real purpose of these marionette performances and on holidays and at fairs the people crowded to see them. The Dwarfs Theatre in the Ukraine so pleased the Tsar Alexis of Moscow that he ordered the establishment of 'Comedy Plays' in the theatre of his summer residence, and this despite the protestations, the indignation, and the anathemas of the Muscovite clergy.

538 It is at the end of the eighteenth century that the intellectual and cultural movement in the Ukraine first appears. Ivan Kotliarevsky, considered the 'Father of Ukrainian literature,' called himself 'a simple amateur of the Little Russian tongue.' In reality it is the love of poetic folk-lore which characterizes modern Ukrainian literature, and it is that which labels it among local

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Russian literatures. It is in this spirit that Kotliarevsky 538
published his comic poem, the *Travesty of Aeneid*, in 1798, the first great Ukrainian literary work, followed by a light comedy, *Natalka Poltavka*, which had a great success in Russia during a century and which is played to-day in all the countries of the Ukrainian language. Under the influence of German romanticism a particular interest arose in the Russian literary world for all that which was connected with the folk-lore, the language, and the customs of the people, as well as for their traditions and their art. Thus the first efforts of Kotliarevsky were well received by the literary circles of St. Petersburg and his *Travesty of Aeneid* remained one of the favourite readings of several Russian generations.

Encouraged by the great Slavophile movement which broke with all exaggerated Westernization, Russian writers turned to all the manifestations of the popular genius and, quite naturally, also to that of the Ukraine.

Just as in the eighteenth century the religious language and culture of Southern Russia had brought about the literary awakening of Moscow, in allowing the Russian language to free itself from its archaic forms, so, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ukraine, her romantic past, the charm of her nature, and of her popular life, inspired Russian literature and poetry. The same period saw the birth of two Ukrainian geniuses who for ever occupy places of a high order in universal literature: Gogol (1809–52) and Chevtchenko (1814–61). Nicholas Gogol wrote only in Russian, not because he 538
was forced to do so by some exterior factors, or because 192
he ignored Ukrainian, but because the greatness and the diversity of his talent passed beyond the possibilities of expression of the literary Ukrainian language. Despite the picturesqueness and the indisputable richness of its forms, this language never went beyond the literary

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538 form of popular idiom. Thus, in the domain of literary,
192 scientific, philosophic, and technical vocabulary, it is incomparably less developed than the Russian language. The pictures of town life, of the life of the upper layers of society, which dominated, during the whole of the nineteenth century, as the subject of imaginative writings and particularly of the novel, are not easily expressed in the Ukrainian language. Some expressions and words, necessary for this, are missing. We even take the liberty of expressing the opinion, which may seem bold, that the reading of *Crime and Punishment*, of *War and Peace*, of *Oblomov*, or of *Dead Souls* in Russian would be of greater value to a Ukrainian than the translation of these works into his mother-tongue. Moreover, the translations of these immortal works into other great European languages seem to us to be closer to the form, the contents, and the ideas expressed by them than their translations into the Ukrainian language, which so much resembles Russian. Therefore every work of Gogol belongs, without any doubt, to the Russian literature without being, for this reason, foreign
538 to the Ukrainian world. A traditionalist, profoundly pious, to a point of being irritated by the Russian 'Intelligentsia,' already imbued with positivist ideas, he loved the whole Russia with an ardent and passionate love. He was hurt by the spectacle of desertions and cowardice which characterized the Russian life of his time, of all those open wounds which he was able to distinguish and to depict with an unrivalled sarcasm. Like the Slavophiles and later Dostoievski, he hoped that the salvation would come from the deeper forces dormant in the Orthodox Church and in the Russian Monarchy. The Ukrainian chauvinists of our day sometimes describe him as a renegade, an opinion which it is unnecessary to contradict. One only has to re-read

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his works consecrated to the Ukraine to feel the love 538
Gogol felt for his native land, for the popular Ukrainian soul, and for her heroic and romantic traditions. Rather let us allow the present-day Ukrainian politician, M. Alexander Shoulgine, to speak, who has written in his book, *The Ukraine against Moscow*, the title of which already indicates his hostility to Russia: 'Could I ever remember without a pang what I felt each time in my childhood, on hearing or reading *The Vigils of the Ukraine* or the history of the tragic struggle of *Taras Boulba*.' And he added that many Ukrainians have confessed to him to the 'awakening of their patriotic feeling' when reading these works. Does not this remark, coming from a convinced separatist, confirm that Russian language suffices to awaken in a Ukrainian his most intimate, most secret passions of the soul? If the Ukrainian language is dear and indispensable to a Ukrainian, he is equally in need of Russian. It opens to him the broader spiritual and intellectual horizons and unites him with the community of great peoples. In this the closeness of Russian and Ukrainian literature gives the Ukrainians a position far superior to that of the small Slavonic nations such as the Slovaks, Serbs, or Slovenes. And the fanatics who make themselves ridiculous by treating Gogol as a renegade, are they not similar to the French Provençals, admirers of the Mistral, who would reproach a Jean Giono for writing in French and not in Provençal?

On the contrary, Taras Chevtchenko, who was considered the model of Ukrainianism, wrote in Southern Ukrainian. Born of a family of serfs and himself a serf in his early youth, he has carried the force of poetic expression of the Ukrainian language to a point which had not been reached before and which has not been equalled since. The sadness of the life of the peasant

538 serfs, the dreams of past glories, such as they live in the popular songs, are the principal themes of Chevtchenko. We find in them both romanticism and a strong expression of social aspirations. In placing Chevtchenko on the level of the greatest European poets we are obliged to state that the subjects which inspire his poetical works are more limited than those of a Poushkine or a Mickiewicz.

Chevtchenko, the peasant and man of the people, was an instinctive revolutionary in the political sense of the term. He revolts against autocracy and against the lords, and with all his force he appeals for aid for his oppressed brothers and for the struggle for freedom which fascinates him. Though his poetic feeling was high and his lyricism rich, his subjects never go beyond the limited circle of the struggles of the serfs with the lords. One can easily imagine the effect which his poems produced in the circles of the Russian intelligentsia, in which he had been triumphantly received, as they were also dreaming of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.

668 The Universities of Kharkov and of Kiev, founded
538 by the Imperial Government, one in 1805 and the other in 1834, were the rallying centres of the intellectual movements of Southern Russia. They produced the celebrated historian Kostomarov, who became the spokesman of Liberalism and of the cultural awakening of the Ukraine.

The active enthusiasm of these young intellectuals with revolutionary tendencies led to the creation of a secret society in Kiev, the 'Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius,' which was almost immediately discovered by the police. The conspirators took the road to Siberia. In 1847 Chevtchenko was condemned to seven years of service as a simple soldier in a far-away garrison. This relatively light sentence—followed, it is true, by the prohibition of writing and painting (he was a painter of talent at the same time as a poet)—was

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imposed on a revolutionary with destructive ideas and 668
not on a nationalist Ukrainian. It is only after the 538
accession of the Emperor Alexander II in 1855, when a more Liberal mood became apparent in Russia, that the deportees of Kiev were able to return to Europe.

Some years later Chevtchenko died. Kostomarov, on the contrary, settled at the University of St. Petersburg where, during long years, he wrote his great historical works. Having become a well-known historian and, with age, more moderate, he nevertheless remained, during the whole of his life, a regionalist patriot of the Ukraine, which he wanted to see included in the framework of a great Russian Federation governed by Liberal principals. Even the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, despite its revolutionary extremism, had had no more than federalist ideas and had never dreamed of the separation of the Ukraine from Russia. This is confirmed by the Ukrainian historian of note, M. E. Borschak, in his interesting study, published in the *Slav World*. He writes that 'the Ukrainian movement was then free of any ideas of separatism, of which we did not find any traces when analysing its ideology.'

Let us repeat again: The struggle, in the Ukraine as in the whole of Russia, was begun in the name of Liberalism and of Social Reform against an existing political and social order, not against Russia in the name of the Ukraine, and in this the Ukrainian movement differed deeply from the national movements of the ethnically non-Russian groups. At the time when thousands of Poles, poor and rich, peasants and aristocrats, socialists or monarchists, were being deported to Siberia for wishing to separate Poland from Russia, *not a single Ukrainian* joined the convoys of political deportees as a partisan of the autonomy or the independence of his country. If thousands of Ukrainians settled in the

668 Siberian *taiga*, it was for having been republicans or
538 socialists or for having struggled against Tsarism but not against Russia.

538 Sometimes it is claimed that Chevtchenko was personally hostile to everything Russian. But he seems to have been nothing of the kind. An admirer of the 'noble spirit' of Gogol, Chevtchenko himself wrote his personal diary in Russian and he has left us no less than eleven novels and some poetry written in the same language, of which two poems were written before his exile. By conviction and by temperament a revolutionary, Chevtchenko felt himself intimately united with the opposition circles in Great Russia and belonged, as such, to the great family of Russian men of letters.

[609] On the other hand, always true to the popular feelings and sharing with the Ukrainian peasants the hostility towards the German and particularly towards the estate-owners and the school-teachers, he vituperates, in his *Epistle to Compatriots*, against their subjection to German intellectual and cultural influence. When speaking of his young compatriots he says that they blamed their parents 'as they have not taught them to chatter in German in their childhood.' And Chevtchenko laments that 'Ukraine, such are your sons, your young flowers, watered with ink in the German hothouses.' He equally revolts against the vanity of Ukrainian youth, taught by German scholars of whose infallibility they are convinced:

> 'I have seen everything, I know everything.
> There is no hell nor paradise,
> Nor God:
> There is nought but I,
> And the small angular German,
> And nothing more. This is enough, little brother,
> But what do you represent in reality?
> . . . As the German says: we do not know.'

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Sometimes these laments bear a character of bitter irony. The pretended infallibility of German opinion concerning the fate and the history of the Ukrainian people exasperates him. 'The German will tell you: You are Mongolians. Yes, Mongolians, nude descendants of Tamerlaine clothed in gold. The German will tell you: You are Slavs. Yes, Slavs, unworthy great-grandsons of glorious ancestors.'

While ironizing about the faithful pupils of the German school he continues: 'They spoke according to German precepts in such a way that the German himself, though a great professor, could understand nothing of it . . . at Sitch the German, full of wisdom, grows the potato and you buy it and eat it for your health and you glorify the Zaporoges . . . but by whose blood has this earth been fertilized to produce the potatoes? . . . Her own children have led the Ukraine to the edge of the precipice, they have crucified her worse than the Poles, they want to teach them, at least they pretend it . . . they want to train this blind old man which is the Ukraine under German influence.' (*Kobzar.*)

For him the German question was not only one of literature since he, his sister, and his two brothers were serfs of the German estate-owner Engelhardt, who was noted for his coarseness and the absence of any culture.

The Liberal era which began in Russia with the accession of Alexander II gave broad satisfaction to the aspirations of the circles of the former opposition. The liberation of the serfs in 1861, the inauguration of municipalities elected by the people, the radical reforms based on the permanence of judges, and the establishment of juries and judicial guarantees, eliminated the major reasons for the old revolutionary leanings. A wide movement of reconciliation began to develop which would probably have benefited the Ukraine as

668 well as the whole empire. The Imperial Government
175 was clearly inclined to the idea of a regime of constitutional monarchy, based on the cultural autonomy of the various Russian territories and on the application of sufficiently broad systems of political autonomy to the ethnically non-Russian majorities.

As before, the Government was in no way opposed to the publication of books and journals in the Ukrainian language.

000 This whole evolution was compromised by the Polish insurrection of 1863. One knows that in 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, Alexander I committed the mistake which the great Catherine had taken care to avoid at the moment of the partition of Poland. He annexed the greater part of the ethnically Polish territory, the Grand duchy of Warsaw. Despite all the attempts at the establishment of an autonomous regime, the 'Polish question' became henceforth the most vulnerable point of internal Russian policy. During the Liberal era of Alexander II the autonomous political regime was naturally intended to be applied first of all to Poland. Nothing came of this attempt except a new and violent Polish insurrection. The insurgents, traditionally attached to the old conception of the Great Poland of former times, maintained the old pretensions to the Ukraine and White Russia. The programme of Prince Adam Czartoryski, the forerunner of the Polish insurrectionist movement, envisaged the co-ordination of the Polish and Ukrainian movement, the latter to be included in the plan of the Polish insurrection, in order to shake the omnipotence of the Russian Empire and to create a Slavonic federation under the direction of a Great Poland on her ruins! The efforts to draw the Ukrainian and the White Russian peasants towards her were to experience a fatal check; the peasants did all they could to facilitate the task of

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the Government in the struggle with their secular enemy —the Poles. The attempt of the insurgents to join hands with the Ukrainian intellectual circles also led nowhere. Kostomarov answered them by literally telling them to go to the devil. It confirmed a complete ignorance of the Poles of the true history of the Ukraine and of White Russia.

But the Polish insurrection, although checked, warned the Imperial Government. Russian historians generally agree in recognizing that it was the Polish insurrection of 1863 which made it abandon its plans of reform and awakened its mistrust of Liberal ideas and also of any autonomism.

On 8 June 1863, when the Polish insurrection was at its height, the Minister for Internal Affairs, Valouiev, issued the famous circular which declared that the Ukrainian language was 'only Russian, corrupted by Polish influence.' From this he deduced that 'there had never been a Little Russian language, that there is none and that there never could be one.' He ordered that nothing further should be published in Ukrainian except, however, purely literary works.

There can be no doubt that the Government committed a fundamental mistake, in our judgment inexcusable, in employing an arbitrary measure which was so grossly a police one and so short-sighted. Nevertheless, if it could not be excused, the Government could find an explanation in its distrust of the plan of Polish-Ukrainian collaboration which was inspired by the programme of Prince Czartoryski. Yet the Russian Government had every opportunity of leaning on the support of Ukrainianism, essentially hostile by its tradition and its instinct to Poland, against militant Polonism. But it did the contrary, it became more and more hostile to Liberal ideas. The Government soon

0 00 lent its other ear to the Polish landowners who described the Ukrainian peasants as fomentors of trouble, aiming at the overthrow of the existing agrarian order, which offered great advantages to the Polish nobility.

204 As a result of the circular of Valouiev[1] publications in the Ukrainian language almost ceased in Russia. The review *Osnova*, which had been the rallying centre of Ukrainian intellectuals, was closed. As a result there was an almost total eclipse, for several decades and almost until the Revolution, of the Ukrainian journalistic movement in Russia. Nevertheless some periodicals appeared, among which *Ukrainskaia Jizn* (Ukrainian Life), edited in Russian at St. Petersburg by that same Simon Petlioura who later became the chief of the insurrectionary Ukrainian movement against the forces of the Austro-Hungarian occupation, and who was assassinated in Paris in 1926. But now, in the place of a cultural Ukrainianism, there formed, on the other side of the frontier, in Galicia, a political Ukrainian movement which was openly anti-Russian and even aimed at the separation of the Ukraine from the rest of Russia.

175 Henceforth Galicia played the role of the Ukrainian 'Piedmont.' We know that during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Galicia had been the real centre of Russian resistance in Poland. But after the armistice of Androussovo which, in giving Kiev to Russia, had nevertheless left the land of Halytch under Polish domination, many things had changed there. At the beginning of the eighteenth century Poland had reached the aim never yet achieved before: the definite union of the Orthodox Church in Galicia with Rome was introduced. The last attempts at resistance of the old Russian brotherhoods, now fallen into decadence, did not suffice to prevent it. The direction of religious affairs passed to the Poles and to Polonized Russians who

[1] i.e. the circular which declared that the Ukrainian language was 'only Russian, corrupted by Polish influence'.—Analyst

were so detached from the popular masses that often 175
they did not understand the Slavonic language in which, however, they had to read the liturgy of the Eastern rite. This led immediately to a terrible decadence of religious instruction among the people, an instruction which had, during centuries, been the backbone of national resistance.

The later evolution which followed soon showed that the Polish State had never been concerned with religious unity in the matter of dogmas but much more with the total denationalization of the Russian people. The Church of the Eastern rite remained in Poland in a position of political and social inferiority, even after its union with Rome. The Poles wanted to achieve a complete latinization of the Church, that is to say a total Polonization of their Russian subjects. As a result the Uniat Church, remaining a more or less persecuted Church because it maintained that ancient national rite, was gradually transformed into a guardian of national traditions in general and became in Galicia the last bastion of resistance to the invading Polonism, thus reassuming the role of the Russian Orthodox Church of former times.

But, dogmatically separated from the Russian Church, she could not direct herself towards Moscow and, later, towards St. Petersburg as easily as the Orthodox Church of Eastern Ukraine had done it. This was all the more so as the Empire continued to consider her as being suspect of Polonism to such a point that she was interdicted on Russian territory (decree of Nicholas I of 1839). This suspicion did great harm to the Russian cause in Galicia even during the Great War. Only a new and violent Polish persecution was required—that which raged in Galicia just before the present war—to induce the Orthodox and the Uniats to unite in a common

175 wish for resistance. We shall return to this question later.

Nevertheless the hopes which were founded on the power of the Russian Empire never ceased entirely to manifest themselves in Galicia. They were alive at the moment when Austria seized this territory during the partition of Poland. That was understood at Vienna, and to ward off this danger the Austrian Government adopted a clever policy of attempting to favour the development of a separatist national consciousness among the Russians of the 'Kingdom of Galicia.' Vienna immediately displayed a Liberalism towards the Uniat Church such as Poland had never shown. This had the effect of raising the level of religious instruction among the clergy and the people. In putting the difference which existed between the Uniat Church of Galicia and the Russian Orthodox Church into relief, the Austrian Government tried to give the word 'Ruthenian' a meaning which opposed it to the conception of 'Russian.' It did not prevent publications in the local language, especially religious ones, but it did not allow the penetration of the language and the influence of the immense empire of the east.

The struggle between the Poles and the 'Ruthenians' continued, however, in other forms under the Austrian domination. The Polish element had always been represented by the great landowners, the clergy of the Latin rite, and by a great part of the middle classes of the towns, whereas on the other side were the peasant masses and the Uniat clergy of the Slavonic rite. The first great political shock in Galicia, the Austro-Hungarian revolution of 1848, could, therefore, be nothing but a new episode in this region of the now four times secular struggle with Polonism.

The Danubian Monarchy, frightened by the rising of

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the Germans, the Hungarians, and the Poles, allied itself 175
at this moment with the anti-Polish Ruthenian movement, just as it allied itself at the same time with the Czechs and the Croatians. The greater part of the promises of the Austrian Government, given under the pressure of revolutionary events, were not kept afterwards. This applied particularly to those promises which concerned the partition of Galicia into two provinces, that of Polish Cracov and of Ruthenian Eastern Galicia.

Nevertheless this 'springtime,' although of short duration, did not fail to awaken the hopes which had survived so long and which helped the task of Austrian policy. An important social consequence emerged from the events of 1848: the abolition of serfdom thirteen years before the emancipation of the serfs in Russia.

In the following decades Austrian policy developed cleverly between the Poles and the Hungarians, although more inclined towards the first who were more conservative from the social point of view and, consequently, more in tune with the general lines of the policy of Vienna.

The Ruthenian language and instruction continued to enjoy a certain liberty on condition that they did not fall under Pan-Russian influences.

Austrian policy at least had the merit of allowing the 517
Ukrainian language and culture to develop and thus to give birth to an imaginative literature and to a journalistic movement of some importance, having its centre at Lvov, which became the nucleus of Ukrainian intellectual life. Numerous cultural institutions appeared one after another; journals, reviews, literary circles, and finally the Ruthenian University of Lvov.

After the measures of restriction which were taken against Ukrainianism in Russia, the intellectual circles of

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517 the Russian Ukraine had resource to Galician publications and, from time to time, they published their own works in that country. It is as a result of this that the Chevtchenko Society was founded at Lvov, which has since held the predominant place in the Ukrainian movement.

Following the example of Chevtchenko, another influence joined the popular so to say 'folk-lore' tendency of the literary Ukrainian movement: it was the social question, identical with that which dominated the literary spirit of the whole of Russia.

565 668 The second half of the eighteenth century, which had seen the union of Western Ukraine with Russia and the colonization of the shores of the Black Sea, was at the same time the epoch of the greatest development of the privileges of the aristocracy. We shall not be able to go into the details of this evolution, which would go far beyond the purpose of this book. Let us only note that after the death of Peter the Great in 1725 the new nobility, of military origin, became the greatest political force in the State. This nobility definitely emancipated itself from its old bondage to the State and at the same time transformed the dependence of the peasants, which had hitherto not been unconditional, into a real servitude. Thus Catherine II established in Russia, as also in the Ukraine, a new political and social order which was founded on the privileged position of the aristocracy which had carried her to power, and on the servitude of the peasants. She conferred similar rights on the Ukrainian nobility as those of the aristocracy of the whole empire and, moreover, liberally distributed the new lands to the landlords. Since that time the question of the servitude of the peasants, a distant but direct prelude of the Revolution, became an open wound of the Tsarist regime.

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One knows that the movement of ideas aiming at the abolition of servitude began to appear in the higher layers of society at the epoch of the Napoleonic War. Quite naturally it appeared together with an interest for everything popular and was, at the same time, inspired by the ideas fashionable in the West: on the one hand encyclopædism and voltairianism and on the other freemasonry and carbonarism. It could not fail to spread in the Ukraine, as elsewhere. 668 186

Thus a secret society, the 'United Slavs,' was formed, among whose members were not only Ukrainian officers and officials, but also actual Great Russians. A naïve romanticism reigned—oaths were sworn on swords and speeches made in the style of Plutarch, associated with a passionate love of popular traditions and with the desire to lighten the destiny of the peasant masses under the burden of servitude. Following the example of the romantic revolutionaries of the West, the young conspirators dreamed of the epochs of the past and of the Cossack epics, the heroes of which appeared to them as champions of liberty. Kotliarevsky himself, without belonging to the 'United Slavs,' was intimately connected with masonic circles, and his amazing pamphlet, *Travesty of Aeneid*, already denounced the social weaknesses and injustices of the epoch.

Conforming to the ideas of romantic and revolutionary nationalism, the 'United Slavs' aimed at a republican and democratic federation of all the Slavs. Their pro-Ukrainianism represented only a link in the Pan-Slav revolutionary chain, and it was diametrically opposed to a rupture between the Ukraine and Great Russia. One of the principal chiefs of the Ukrainian movement, Gorbatchevsky, wrote in his memoirs, in Russian, that the success of the insurrection 'might have signified a new era in the history of the Russian people.'

668 186 The society of the 'United Slavs' was only one expression of the great liberating movement, and its failure was the logical consequence of the suppression of the Decembrist insurrection at St. Petersburg on 14 December 1825, which gave it its name.

This failure checked for a long time the attempts of political revolt in the whole of Russia. Nevertheless the intellectual movement continued, always inspired by the same sources and the same ideals.

538 The genius of Chevtchenko determined the path which the whole Ukrainian literature was to follow. It clung especially to the description of popular life, of the peasant life with its sadness and its injustices. Deeply steeped in folk-lore, it was especially inspired by the pity of the disinherited, by this social pity which is a feature of its affinity with the great Russian literature. In the writings of Marko Vovtchok (pen-name of Marie Vilinska Markovitch) in the *Popular Tales*, approved by Chevtchenko himself, we find again the touching picture of the peasant miseries. Later, in Galicia, Franko, Martovitch, and Stefanik give some pretty examples of this literature, more social than national. Parallel to this, in Russian Ukraine, this tradition was pursued until the revolution by Kotsiubinsky, Tobilevitch, and, above all, by Lessia Oukrainka, the niece of Michael Dragomanov, to whom we will presently return.

536 545 The Ukrainian Theatre experienced a remarkable development towards the end of the nineteenth century. We have already considered the taste of the Ukrainian people for dramatic art, a taste which had already found expression in the old marionette plays. The rise of the new Ukrainian literature could not fail to bring about the development of a modern theatre. As a result a troupe of Ukrainian actors, that of Kropivnitzky, was formed at Kiev and had a great success. The Imperial

Government authorized the creation of a Ukrainian 536
language theatre, limiting, however, the subjects which 545
could be treated. In conforming to the official point of view, according to which Ukrainian was only a local Russian dialect, it forbade the showing of plays other than those which bore a popular and local character. But this restriction could not seriously hinder the development of Ukrainian dramatic art, as it was the chief aim of the whole Ukrainian literature to treat subjects taken from the popular life. The success of the Ukrainian Theatre of Kiev did not fail to find imitators. Amateur troupes were formed almost in all parts of Russia and especially in the country, which successfully exploited the artistic qualities of a people so richly gifted.

As for Galicia, the political movement always 668
continued to develop rapidly here.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century a new figure appeared on the Ukrainian political arena, that of Dragomanov (1851–95), whose role was to become enormous.

Born in Russian Ukraine, he soon joined the intellectual revolutionary circles. Following the example of other revolutionary organizations in Russia, that of *Stara Gromada* of Dragomanov sent him abroad to spread there, as a political *émigré*, the ideas of a revolutionary Ukrainianism. Dragomanov at first allied himself with the Galician circles and settled in Austria, but he could not remain here as a result of his 'too red' ideas. After this he took the road to Geneva, the rallying centre of political *émigrés* from the old Russia. There he founded a political review, *Gromada*, and undertook, from his exile in Geneva, the direction of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia. The impulse which he gave it was extremely vigorous. It led to the formation of a new party, tinted

668 with radicalism, the Popular Ukrainian Party, which broke with the old clerical traditions of Galician Ukrainianism.

Dragomanov was a republican and, consequently, above all anti-Tsarist. He had developed under the influence of positivist and socialistic ideas which were strongly tinted with syndicalism in him. He shared fundamentally the leading ideas of the revolutionary movement as it appeared in the west.

Republican and socialist, Dragomanov was the champion of the free existence of the people. These themes, in the spirit of the epoch, were indissolubly united. But Dragomanov was not anti-Russian. He only had a contempt for the chauvinists who, to glorify the Ukraine, wanted to belittle Russia at all costs. 'The Ukrainian Nation,' he writes, 'cannot obtain political liberty by taking the path of separatism, but only together with the other nations and territories of Russia, along the path of federation.' In this he continued the federalist tradition which had been that of the whole Ukrainian political movement. Dragomanov saw the 'Free Russia' as a federation of several national entities, themselves divided in their turn into autonomous territories.

. . . . .

In Galicia, however, the movement was to go far beyond the aims which had been intended by its spiritual fathers. A pronounced hostility to everything Russian appeared in Ukrainian political circles. And the Austrian Government, more and more convinced of the inevitability of a conflict with Russia, began to take an interest in the Ukrainian movement and to give it its support.

The penetration of Ukrainian separatism in Russia met at first with great difficulties. Ukrainianism as a cultural, regionalistic, and even federalist movement had not ceased to exist in Russia. On the eve of the

first Russian revolution, that of 1905, one realized at 668
St. Petersburg and began to understand that this movement was not in itself a danger to the unity of the empire. The Governor-General of Kiev, Kleigels, in a good position to judge it, explained it in precisely this sense in his reports to the Imperial Government. But at the same time the Tsarist police, generally very well informed of everything which concerned it, was convinced that the Ukrainian *separatism* was but a weapon of the Austrians; it considered, moreover, that its success in Russia was almost insignificant.

Among the other expressions of the cultural life of the 177
Ukraine, western influences have been particularly strong 341
in the artistic domain and especially in architecture and in decorative art.

The architecture of Kiev, at the period when it flourished most, had above all been a simple branch of byzantine art, transplanted without any modification to Russia. In the north, however, architectural art, although of byzantine inspiration, soon developed original forms of a purely national character.

Kiev, close to Byzantium, was too profoundly impressed by the splendours of Constantinople to be quite independent of them. The celebrated historian of Russian art, Grabar, notes that at the end of the twelfth century architects from Novgorod were invited to Kiev in order to replace the Greek masters by native Russians and to build churches and palaces in the national style. The people of Kiev were amazed by it.

Besides the more important assimilation in the north, the style of religious architecture (the only which was of importance in the old Russia) was quite similar throughout the whole extent of the old Slav-Norse State.

Later, when the centre of gravity of Southern Russia was moved towards the west to the lands of Galicia and

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177 341 [531] Volynia, Western influences became more pronounced. Even at Kiev we find churches in the gothic style, modified, however, by national and above all by byzantine traditions. A salient feature of byzantine art especially survives. These are the magnificent frescoes, in which this art excels as does, too, the art of the old Russia of Kiev.

During the sixteenth century the influences of the Renaissance were already felt in Galicia, which was still at this epoch the principal centre of Southern Russia. But they were soon supplanted by those of the baroque, which, from the beginning of the seventeenth century, leaves its mark on the whole Ukrainian architecture. It forced the traditional forms of Russian architecture of the byzantine type to recede more and more, to a point at which Grabar asks himself if the Ukrainian art had not undergone a complete denationalization.

Nevertheless a peculiarity belonging to the whole of Russia was responsible for a revival of the national style: the old Russia, a land of forests, overlooked any other constructional material but wood. That which is built of stone obviously cannot be built in the same way as wood. Thus there developed in the Ukraine the special baroque style of the wooden churches, just as the original 'gothic' style in wood had appeared in the north. This exquisite style was most probably created without any Western influences.

The wooden churches not only protected the Ukrainian art from complete denationalization, but their original and national style began to fuse little by little even into the baroque architecture in stone. At the end of the seventeenth century, and in the first years of the eighteenth, this baroque, called 'Cossack,' was almost exclusive to the Ukraine.

In the eighteenth century the 'Cossack baroque' loses itself in the magnificent bloom of the Imperial

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Russian baroque. At the end of the century it is replaced 171
by an equally imperial rococo. The churches built in 341
Kiev by Rastrelli clearly cannot be considered monuments of Ukrainian art. The empire style, originally transformed in Russia into the so-called 'Alexander' style, afterwards dominates in Kiev as in St. Petersburg.

As much as the old Ukrainian architecture has cer- 177
tainly contributed to the later development of the 531
imperial baroque, Ukrainian painting, open to all the Western influences from the seventeenth century onwards, has played a very important part in the development of modern Russian painting. Here the Western influences were often transmitted through the Ukraine and were assimilated there before dissolving in the civilization of the empire. The Ukrainian portraitists Levitsky, Borovsky, and Venetzianov, working at St. Petersburg, had a strong influence on Russian portraitism.

It was also the painter Lossenko and the sculptors Kozlovski and Martos, equally Ukrainians, taught by the Academy of Arts of St. Petersburg, who illustrated the century of Catherine II with their works.

The national originality was also maintained in the popular art, especially in iconography, thanks to the deep traditionalism of the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless Ukrainian iconography had lost much of its austerity in comparison with that of Northern Russia, under the influence of that levelling which came from Poland.

Eastern influences still make themselves felt in the popular art, in the taste for richness of ornamentation, and in the magnificence of colours. Embroideries, tapestries, jewellery, glassware, crockery, and sculptures in wood witness the rich artistic aptitudes of the Ukrainian people and have the just reputation of their value both in Russia and in the whole of Central Europe.

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CHAPTER IV

UKRAINIAN ECONOMICS

000 AS we have seen, the most important part of the Ukraine has developed, during more than two centuries, within the Russian State, that same State of which it had been the cradle at the most distant period of the mediæval epoch.

Thus, on the eve of the Great War, the Ukraine, with the exception of her few western provinces, formed an integral part of the Russian Empire, geographically and administratively as well as from the point of view of culture, religion, and economics.

This last-named link became especially important at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the rise of industry, the advent of capitalism, the development of communications, and the commercial intercourse between various countries, which were so characteristic of that epoch.

The rapid growth of the population, due to a diminution of infantile mortality and the beginning of the agrarian over-population in the centre of the empire, brought about a rapid extension of the colonization of the New Russia, conquered by the empire at the end of the eighteenth century and which forms to-day the southern districts of the Ukraine.

The economic unity which, since that time, closely links the Ukraine with the rest of Russia, develops more and more, not only as a result of geographic and climatic identity, but, above all, thanks to the increase

of the productive power and to the direction given to it by the general policy of the empire. Moreover, this policy, paradoxical though this may seem, is continued in its broad outlines by the Soviet Government, and this despite the radical transformation of the social, political, and economic order.

It would be difficult to undertake the study of Ukrainian economic conditions without, each time, taking the economics of the whole Russian territory into account, especially as two economic factors come into question, both very important, that of the distribution of production and that of communications.

The aim of this book would be to study this question, not in the form of an analysis of figures of the economic position in the Ukraine on the eve of the last war or after twenty years of Soviet rule, but of guiding the English reader in the analysis of the economic potential of the Ukraine, of the conditions in which this potential would be able to develop, and of the role which the Ukraine plays and could play in the economics of the world as well as an independent organism or as a link of the Pan-Russian economic system.

We shall not give much time to a discussion of the economic transformations which this country has experienced under the Soviet regime, but rather to the new perspectives which these transformations have opened while they have checked, destroyed, or disorganized the different branches of the already existing economic activity.

Thus the figures which will appear in our exposé will be drawn from pre-war (1914) statistics as well as from those of more recent years. Our only aim is to clarify the question of the economic potential of the Ukraine, which seems to be to-day an attraction for those countries whose economic potential is exhausted or naturally poor.

000 It seems to us that the method of economic geography is the most suitable as giving our study the required direction. Thus, after having defined a geographical basis of the whole, we shall successively study the most important factors in the economic geography of the Ukraine in the following order:

1. Man. (Population, its density, its aptitudes, and its level of economic culture.)

2. Agricultural riches and their exploitation. (The soil, plants, forests, and breeding.)

3. Riches beneath the soil and their extraction, heavy industry and light industry.

4. Communications on land, river, and the sea.

The fact that economic geography is a science which deals with two essential factors, man and the soil, whose relative importance varies in different regions and different epochs, but which is determined by the existence of man on the land, forces us to choose man as the first subject of our study.

The other factors will follow it in the order of their exploitation by man; the exploitation of the surface soil, of the subsoil, and finally the transformation of the products of this exploitation—industry.

As to the means of communication, we shall leave them to the end because they assure the distribution and the exchange of the products of the soil and of the subsoil, reflect the sites of industry, and, being able to create a new economic geography of the land, appear as the last link of the economic system.

Therefore the geography of the Ukraine appears to be relatively simple.

133 The whole territory has approximately the same altitude. Therefore its profile is uniform. Its geological origins are absolutely identical. The river system is poor and equally uniform; the three important rivers,

the Dnieper, the Boug, and the Dniester, all flow from /133
north to south, to empty into the Black Sea.

The climate is similar on the whole territory, with an /132
average 'multi-annual' temperature slightly higher in the south and south-east, due to the great heat of the months of July and August in these parts, with the exception of a narrow border of the Black Sea, between Odessa and the isthmus of Perekop, where the winter and the autumn are very mild, which explains the presence in this region of such plants as cotton (a plant with a long period of growth) and trees so delicate as those of the peach.

On the whole territory of the Ukraine the month during which the average temperature is always the highest (20 degrees C.) is July, and that during which it is lowest (minus 4·5 degrees C.) is January.

The average rainfall varies between 25 and 80 centimetres per annum, with the dampest climate in the north-western part. Everywhere there is more rain during the summer.

This uniformity of the whole, which makes the task of geographical description an easy one, seems at first sight to make the division of the Ukrainian territory into different zones impossible, while giving each zone some original characteristics in the sphere of economic geography.

Nevertheless, when going deeper into an analysis of /131
the question, we establish a division of the Ukraine into two agro-climatic zones.

This separation is determined by climatic and agrarian factors. There are differences of rainfall, of the soil, and of flora.

The border of these two zones begins at the western frontier of the Ukraine, on the 48th degree latitude north, and rises in an almost straight line up to the

131 eastern frontier at the 50th degree latitude north, while cutting the territory into two almost equal parts.

132 In the northern zone (Zone 1) the rainfall is everywhere greater than 50 centimetres, while in the southern zone (Zone 2) it is less than 50 centimetres and varies between 25 and 50 centimetres.

134 The predominant soils of Zone 1 are poor *tchernozioms*, that is to say somewhat exhausted by the currents of water which have deprived them of their humus to a varying extent in different regions, and have brought to them some sand and clay from their sources.

On the contrary, the lands of Zone 2 are rich and complete *tchernozioms*.

137 Zone 1 comprises a vast forest region which, while spreading along the courses of the river becomes little by little a land of light woods, is yet characterized by the general presence of forests.

Zone 2 has no forests and is the true Steppe.

131 This separation is in practice nothing else but the frontier between the Steppe as such and the *lesso-steppe* (a Steppe with occasional woods)—a geographical term which has been accepted by Russian scientists for a long time.

This border is also that which defined the cradle of Russia, the ancient principality of Kiev, separating it from the savage Steppe of the nomads. Therefore, already at that distant epoch, the separation between these two agro-climatic zones existed in practice. Thus justified from a geographical point of view, the border between these two zones is all the more acceptable, as it is in tune with an historic reality since the establishment of settled populations.

000 Each time when we treat the question of populations in our study (the difference of density, of social distribution, and of ethnical composition), of agriculture

[see category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

(the northern or southern limits of certain cultivations 000
and of different methods of agricultural exploitation), of cattle-breeding (the predominance of cattle and of pigs in Zone 1 and of horses and sheep in Zone 2), of industry (metallurgy and other heavy industries in Zone 2 and light industry in Zone 1), or of communications, this border corresponds with undoubted economic realities.

Chance, or rather its geological structure, has decreed 135
that Zone 2 should possess all the mineral riches of the Ukraine while Zone 1 has none except, however, an insignificant deposit of oil in Polish Galicia, near Stanislavov.

I

Population

As we have previously said, the population of the 161
Ukraine is about 43,000,000, of whom 33·5 millions live within the frontiers of the Soviet Ukraine in the 11,500 parishes, 95 hamlets, and 90 towns.

Among all the Russian lands the Ukraine, with the industrial region of Moscow, is one of those with the densest population, especially in the region of Kiev and of Vinnitza, where the density reaches about 100 inhabitants to the square kilometre.

The average density of 70·6 inhabitants per square kilometre for the whole territory is almost the same in both zones, though a little higher in Zone 1, being from 65 to 87 with an average of 76 inhabitants per square kilometre, while Zone 2 has only 43 to 76, with an average of 65.

The least populated districts are the provinces of the south-east, the districts of Melitopol, Mariupol, and Lougansk, all in Zone 2.

Despite the small differences in the density of the

2 [see category 116; pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

161 population in the two zones, the character and origin of this density are not the same.

162 361 The density in Zone 1 is characterized by an agrarian over-population, resulting from a long feudal period and the servitude of the lands. The population is concentrated there in a large number of hamlets, in small towns and in small villages, the inhabitants adding to their agricultural revenues those of artisans, of small commerce, and of small industries.

There is almost a complete absence of large towns. Actually the whole of Zone 1 within Soviet boundaries, contains only one town whose population exceeds 100,000—Kiev, the administrative capital of the Ukraine (625,000 inhabitants).

Even if one adds Polish Galicia to this territory, as it is wholly part of Zone 1, we find only one other big town—Lvov, with 325,000 inhabitants, an administrative and cultural centre.

In Zone 2 on the contrary, we find three big towns: Kharkov (650,000 inhabitants), Odessa (550,000 inhabitants), and Dniepropetrovsk (375,000 inhabitants).

Apart from these three large towns, Zone 2 possesses a further four towns whose population exceeds 100,000: Nicolaiev, Mariupol, Zaporojie, and Lougansk.

The greater part of Zone 2 is a land of recent colonization. It is the New Russia and the free Ukraine, colonized during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Great Russian and Ukrainian elements.

The agricultural population is of a lesser density, and if the average number which expresses it is the same for the whole territory as for Zone 1 this is only a result of the greater number of large towns.

162 It would not be useless to point out that before the last war Odessa with her 700,000 inhabitants was the largest town of the Ukraine. But since the beginning

[see category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

of the Soviet regime and the quasi-disappearance of the export of cereals and the importation of coal and of colonial products, Odessa has given up its place to Kharkov and then to Kiev, the first an industrial centre and the second an administrative one. 162

On the whole territory of the Ukraine 25·5 million human beings live in the country and obtain their means of existence from agriculture and allied trades and only 8,000,000 live in towns.

The latter thus form 24 per cent of the population, representing 19 per cent in Zone 1 and 27 per cent in Zone 2.

The principal occupations of these 8,000,000 town-dwellers are the following: workers, 6·5 million; military, officials, and free professions, 1 million; artisans, ½ million. As these figures are taken from Soviet statistics, the professions of traders, industrialists, and people of independent means are not represented.

It is interesting to note that of the 8,000,000 town-dwellers, 70 per cent are not Ukrainians but national minorities, which are less numerous in the country-side. Nevertheless their average proportion is much greater in Zone 2 where it sometimes reaches 40 per cent, as, for example, in the district of Odessa, and nearly 50 per cent in the Donietz basin.

The natural outlet for the surplus agrarian population of Zone 1 seems to be the great industrial centres such as the oil basin of the Donietz and the mines of Krivoi-Rog, where the landless peasants can find work. And yet the majority of the working mass has come from districts outside the Ukraine, whereas many of the farmers of these regions have emigrated to Eastern Siberia, where they have founded whole villages. Others have gone to the United States or to Canada, where they have founded prosperous agricultural communities. 167

[see category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

369 The Ukrainian people, being an old nation with an agricultural civilization, is not attracted by industry and by large concentrations of population. It prefers to live in the country, when its material life is assured, seeking to supplement its revenues by semi-agricultural professions such as those of artisan, or small trade, or finally the service of the State.

241 The Ukrainian agriculturalist, especially in the regions of the south, is conscious of participating in the general economy of the country. He takes a great interest in the choice of plants to be developed, in the organization of co-operatives for trade and credit, and in the construction of the means of communication. He is a civilized peasant, a quite European farmer. Without disparaging the intellect and the practical sense of the Great Russian people, it is necessary to recognize that the Ukrainian is more Western in all his conceptions, and more European, than his brother of the north.

163 On the other hand, the Ukrainian people have a great vitality. Among the peoples of Europe they have the greatest rate of increase, which reaches 2·3 per cent per annum. The fecundity of the women is astonishing: between twenty and thirty years it is 23 per cent, while in France it hardly reaches 8 per cent at the same ages.[1]

142 The average height of the men at the period of military service is about 1 m. 69½ cm.

137 342 Ukrainians are very clean and their houses very neat, mostly whitened with whitewash and surrounded by gardens. Fruit trees, particularly cherry trees, give the villages an attractive appearance, especially in the districts of Kiev and Poltava (Zone 1) 2/1 where the rich and green nature resembles the landscape of Southern England.

[1] That is to say that for a 100 women between twenty and thirty years one meets 23 expectant ones.

7 [see category 116, pp. 139-140. ---Analyst]

On the contrary, in Zone 2 the absence of trees, the 137
drier climate, the dusty soil, and the isolated farms make the landscape more severe and more similar to the barren table-land of Northern Castile. Only the immensity of the cornfields with their golden ears introduces a lyrical note, vision-like, into this flat and treeless country. The villages of the Steppe are not 361
very picturesque and look mostly like colonies in which 342
the spirit of calculation dominates over the care of beauty. The habitations here are more modern, bigger, and better planned. The thatch here gives place to tiles and to corrugated iron. On the other hand, the poor people, deprived of wood, live in primitive hovels built of clay.

In the extreme north, in the forest region with its 133
sandy soil, the picturesque landscapes gradually disappear to resume the severe and sad monotony of the White Russian country-side.

The Ukrainian is very adaptable to civilization, that 181
is to say to the improvement of everyday life, and very quickly adopts all practical inventions, without any spirit of routine.

The Ukraine is the most literate part of Russia. Even 212
Soviet statistics, which cannot be assumed to be well disposed to the Tsarist regime, show that the percentage of the generation which was of a school age in 1914, which could read and write was, in 1923, 90 per cent in the towns and 73 per cent in the country, which, by the way, is a vigorous reply to the generally accepted opinion that in the pre-war Russian Empire the population stagnated in a condition of utter ignorance.

In the other parts of European Russia the percentage for the same generation was respectively 82 per cent in the towns and 57 per cent in the country-side.

It seems to us opportune to give an idea of the Ukraine 000

2 [See category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

361 It seems to us opportune to give an idea of the Ukraine by describing the urban populations which are, from the point of view of European town life, to a great extent among the best organized Russian towns.

The most European town is Odessa. Founded at the end of the eighteenth century, it has broad and straight avenues and streets bordered by plane trees and acacias and built according to a plan, very well paved, with the most perfect modern drainage systems, with very comfortable houses, and finally with its port which is constructed in accordance with the technically most advanced principles. Odessa can easily compete with the great European towns of the same importance. It is curious that the first governors of Odessa, who have done much for the embellishment of the town, were two French *émigrés*, the Duc de Richelieu and the Comte de Langeron, whose names have been given to two [874] important streets. The University of Odessa, called that of New Russia, has been the cultural centre not only of the southern region of the Ukraine but it also attracted the young people of the Crimea and the Caucasus. Its great commercial activity, its external night life, and its [162] cosmopolitan population, having 43 per cent Jews, 42 per cent Russians (Great Russians and Ukrainians), 6 per cent Greeks, 3 per cent Germans, 2 per cent Poles, 3 per cent Italians, Armenians, Georgians, Tartars, and others, gave it before the Revolution the appearance of a Mediterranean city.

Kharkov, also a University town, is to-day a European city, but, unlike Odessa, it owes its modern appearance to the Soviet regime. During fifteen years it had been the capital of the Ukraine and it has taken advantage of this position by completely changing its appearance which, before the last war, was very poor.

Kiev is a picturesque town lying on the hills of the right bank of the Dnieper. It is undoubtedly the most

attractive town not only of the Ukraine but of the whole 361
of Russia. Its magnificent public gardens amaze the visitors. It is excelled by Odessa from the point of view of town organization but excels it by far from the æsthetic point of view. Its [2]University of St. Vladimir and its [874]
Polytechnic School enjoyed a great reputation in Russia.

Among the other towns with a European appearance one can mention Nicolaiev, the port at the mouth of the Boug; Vinnitza, the capital of Podolia, and to-day perhaps Dniepropetrovsk, which has the School of Mines, founded some years before the Great War. These cities have modern public buildings, up-to-date railway stations, good networks of tramways, etc.

In the domain of the organization and the appearance of the towns and the houses, the difference between Zone 1 and 2[2] is great. In Zone 1 the country-side is better organized and possesses better roads, while the telephone system had appeared there before the last war, etc. On the other hand the towns which, as we have already shown, are almost all small, can hardly be called such at all.

The towns of Zone 2[2] are new towns which have had the benefit of modern organization, while the country-side still has a colonial appearance, without roads, with numerous isolated hamlets and farms, far removed from each other.

Now a few words about the ethnical composition of 162
the population of the Ukraine. The most important 583
minorities living on Ukrainian territory are the following:

First of all the Great Russians; workers, officials, and some colonists in the eastern and southern parts, especially in the New Russia. Then the Jews, very numerous (about 2,500,000), almost all traders, artisans, or members of the free professions before the Revolution; to-day employees in commerce, in the State co-operatives

[2] [Kiev--Analyst]
[2] [see category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

162 where they represent 30 per cent of the employees,
563 artisans, and workers in heavy and light industry.

The Germans, mostly agriculturalists, very rich before the Revolution, are concentrated in the districts of Odessa, Kherson, and in Northern Taurida.

According to information from German sources, and especially according to articles which had recently appeared in *Deutschtum im Auslande*, the number of German colonists in these regions had been, in 1914, about 750,000, of whom only 50,000 to 60,000 inhabited the great towns. Before the Revolution 2,500,000 hectares belonged to them. It is after 1840 that German colonization became intensified in the New Russia. Originally the Imperial Government had granted 600,000 hectares of excellent land to the colonists. Thanks to their labour and to the favourable economic conditions after 1840 and right up to 1914, the German colonists were able to acquire nearly 2,000,000 hectares at the expense of private owners descended from the nobility.

563 The German colonists always lived quite apart from the peasant community, enjoying a special legislation which granted them very important privileges in economic matters, especially in all that concerned the rights of succession. They had powerful economic organizations such as the Land Bank of Kherson (with a branch at Odessa) and numerous credit and trading co-operatives. In cultural and religious matters the German colonists also remained separated from their Ukrainian and Great Russian partners. Catholic and reformed parish schools were to be found in almost every German village, of whom some even possessed secondary schools and especially *Realschulen* based on the German schools of the same name, in which, though the general teaching was in Russian, German history and German geography had a predominant place.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Nevertheless, if the economic level of the German colonists was much higher than that of the Ukrainian peasants, their cultural level always remained very low. The majority among them were distinguished by coarseness and extreme obscurantism. 563

That which remains of this important minority, partly repatriated to the fatherland, dispersed by the Civil War, or exterminated as *koulaks*,[1] belongs to-day to the community of collective peasants.

The Poles are not numerous in the Soviet part of the Ukraine. The landowners have left the country. There remain the farmers, the workers, and the employees, especially in the service of the railway.

In Polish Galicia the Ukrainian population is, as everywhere, almost entirely agrarian. The Poles are the landowners, the officials, and the military. The Jews are traders, industrialists, and members of the free professions.

This division of activity according to the ethnical groups has played a very great role in the political struggle which had developed in the Ukraine during the period of the civil war of 1917–20. The native population had always been hostile to other non-Russian nationalities, not as a result of an instinctive or infused xenophobia, but for reasons of a purely social order. The Poles were landowners to them, the Jews traders and bankers, and the Germans privileged foreigners to whom one had granted the lands to the detriment of the native population.

Besides these important minorities it is equally necessary to note the Bulgarian colonists, as well as the Moldavians and Macedonians, whose most important occupation was the cultivation of vegetables and especially the growing of melons, as well as sheep rearing,

[1] Rich peasants.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563 and the Greeks who competed with the merchant Jews in the great ports, where they formed very united and wealthy autonomous communities which to-day have been repatriated or dispersed.

II

Agriculture

241 Fundamentally an agricultural land, the Ukraine is particularly the land of cereals.

The incomparable richness of these lands, her temperate climate, and the aptitude of her population have made this branch of human activity the fundamental wealth of the country.

134 311 With the exception of the forest regions of the north-west, where sandy soil is met, nearly all the lands of the Ukraine are arable and actually only a few tens of thousands of hectares of waste land remain, which serve as natural pasturages and give an excellent hay which is very well suited for horses.

243 About 25,000,000 hectares are sown, of which 20,000,000 are growing cereals.

The abundance of nitrates in the surface layer of the earth, and its capillary structure, perfect for irrigation, allow the cultivation of the most valuable of cereals—[311] wheat. The area that has been sown with this cereal occupies more than 35 per cent of the worked land of the Ukraine and its production rises to 90,000,000 quintals, representing almost 8 per cent of the world harvest and 18 per cent of the European harvest.

The cultivation of wheat seems to develop from year to year at the expense of barley and of rye, cereals of inferior quality.

From the end of the nineteenth century wheat has

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

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7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

243 experienced a great extension and has acquired an industrial and commercial character. Millions of hectares are sown with it, and a special selection of seeds has been undertaken for its development and for the production of new varieties which would resist drought, with a view to bringing about a stabilization of harvests. Considered best on the world markets for the production of fine flours and of nourishing bread, the well-known Russian 'hard corn' had, especially at the time immediately before the last war, a very good price in the world markets. Powerful elevators had been built in the ports of the Black Sea where the grain was stored before being loaded on the boats.

This crop occupies the great majority of the fields of Zone 2,[1] where the lands are richer and suffice adequately for the increased production of this cereal. More than 4,000,000 hectares are producing wheat in this zone of a total of 6,500,000 in the whole Ukraine.

Farther to the north, and especially towards the relatively poor lands of Volynia and of the region of Tchernigov, rye, the production of which is as high as 30,000,000 quintals, begins to replace wheat, but it only serves, unlike the latter, to supply the internal consumption as it has not yet reached a level of export production.

Apart from wheat and rye, the Ukraine produces an important quantity of barley, about 35,000,000 quintals; of maize, 22,000,000 to 25,000,000; of oats, 20,000,000; and finally great quantities of buckwheat and millet.

Wheat, the harvest of which can easily reach 100,000,000 quintals and more, is an excellent export commodity.

Its extensive exploitation had not only benefited the great landowners, but equally the average farmers who have the good sense to increase their revenues by

1 [See category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

applying improved methods of working and in engaging 243
in a selection of varieties as demanded by the mills and the exporters.

The State and local organizations equally try to come to the aid of the cultivators in order to improve the quality and raise the production of this precious grain.

The Soviet State, wishing to substitute itself for all [474]
former capitalist enterprises, organized the *sovkhoses* (State agricultural enterprises), where it tried to return to the pre-war traditions of exploitation. The general system of Soviet economy does not, however, permit the organization of the exploitation of wheat on a commercial scale. The figures which we have just cited cannot be applied to the Soviet Ukraine in its present state. Actually agricultural decadence during the Civil War and the period of militant communism and the collectivization of the peasants had disorganized all that which had been done during the preceding epoch for the rational exploitation of this important resource. The widespread utilization of tractors has not yet compensated for the losses which have been sustained. Nevertheless wheat remains and will remain the essential product of Ukrainian soil. It is its most important agricultural potential.

Although the cultivation of maize, almost entirely concentrated in Zone 2,[1] only occupies the fourth place among the cereals of the Ukraine, its importance is great owing to the fact that this country alone produces 65 per cent of the maize of the Soviet Union. On the other hand this crop is a very recommendable phase in the enrichment of the soils, whose supply of water and chemical salts is pitilessly exhausted by the growing of wheat, more so, as in order to replace them the utilization of manure in the southern regions sometimes presents a certain danger owing to the possible droughts.

1 [see category 116, pp. 139-140 --- Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

243 Quite recently one has experimented in the Ukraine with two crops formerly unknown in that country—soho and rice—which have given good results. The experience is especially interesting in the case of rice, a very important cereal unknown in Europe, except in Italy, and the cultivation of which may well open new agricultural perspectives.

. . . . .

249 Beside the cereals, the most important sown surface (2,500,000 hectares) is occupied by the so-called technical cultivations, the products of which serve as raw materials in industry, both food and general.

These are the sugar-beet, oil-bearing plants, linseed, hops, and tobacco. The beet, the sown surface of which covers nearly 1,000,000 hectares, occupies the predominant place.

This cultivation expects concentrated exploitation by the great enterprises, furnished by an appropriate agricultural organization and abundant labour, in order to give big harvests.

Thus, before the advent of the Soviet regime, the harvest of beet in the Ukraine reached 150,000,000 quintals, representing nearly 18 per cent of the world's production. At present, notwithstanding the increase of the utilized surface, the harvest only reaches a maximum of 110,000,000. This diminution must be considered as being temporary and solely due to the new system of State capitalism which cannot fully replace private initiative.

One cannot, however, expect a new increase of production in this direction because the cultivation of sugar-beet exhausts the land, hinders the rational system of agricultural exploitation, and requires an enormous outlay on chemical manure, which has to be set off as a

capital investment against a revenue which does not surpass the normal revenue of a well-organized production of wheat. 249

The cultivation of sugar-beet is concentrated in the region of Kiev, Kharkov, and in Podolia (Zone 1).[1] The harvest is almost everywhere made into raw sugar on the spot. The refineries, however, are dispersed over the whole territory; 95 per cent of the sugar industry of the Soviet Union is in the Ukraine and owes its expansion to the general Pan-Russian economic organization.

The oil-bearing plants are represented in the Ukraine by the sunflower, linseed, hemp, and mustard.

The cultivation of sunflowers occupies about 800,000 to 850,000 hectares. This is the only source of consumable vegetable oil. Sunflower oil is very nourishing and much appreciated by the native population. It has only one fault—it cannot be preserved for a long time and must be used from harvest to harvest.

Linseed and hemp furnish machine oil and that which is used for the manufacture of paint. Linseed also furnishes the seeds for the northern regions, in Great Russia, where it is cultivated for its fibres. Mustard grains give, apart from the well-known seasoning, small quantities of oil which is used in some food industries.

Among other non-food cultivations, the surface and the harvest of which are more or less important, let us mention tobacco, hops, and cotton.

The production of tobacco in the Ukraine is considerable. 60 per cent of the tobacco plantations of the U.S.S.R. are to be found in the region of Tchernigov and of Romny (in the district of Poltava).

These are tobaccos of an inferior quality, furnishing the partial requirements throughout Russia, and which

1 [See category 1/6, pp. 139-140--- Analyst]

249 are known under the name of '*makhorka*.' Fine tobacco is only cultivated in the southern region, near the Crimea, and only in small quantities.

243 As to hops, they are spread over the relatively poor lands of Volynia. Since the end of the nineteenth century this crop has experienced a great development in the Ukraine, which has furnished more than 50 per cent of the hops on the markets of the Russian Empire. This, as is well known, is an indispensable product in the manufacture of beer.

Owing to their utilization in the breweries oats can equally be considered as being not only a direct food crop. This would also apply to a part of the potato harvest (total of 1·2 million hectares), which supplies the most important material for the production of alcohol.

248 The cultivation of cotton which was begun five or six years ago in the extreme south of the Ukraine, between the mouth of the Dnieper and the isthmus of Perekop, is a recent industry. We have little information about its possible future and cannot dwell on it. Actually cotton plantations occupy about 150,000 hectares. The employment of a new variety, called the 'non-irrigated cotton,' seems to give satisfactory results.

241 In all that concerns agriculture, the division into agro-climatic zones seems to be entirely justified.

Actually the northern limit of the cultivation of maize and sunflower corresponds almost entirely to the border between these two zones. On the other hand 95 per cent of the land occupied by sugar-beet is to be found in the southern part of Zone 1.[1] This separation is also not quite so definite for the cultivation of cereals, but nevertheless it exists. The greater amount of wheat is grown in Zone 2.[1] Rye and oats, on the contrary, occupy a greater surface in the north. In the case of the two less important cereals, buckwheat and millet, the separa-

1 [see category 116, pp. 139-140.---Analyst]

tion is very clear, buckwheat growing in Zone 1.[1] and 241
millet in Zone 2.[1]

The great development of agriculture has created a 392
growing demand for agricultural machinery, which brought about the appearance and the rapid development of this branch of industry, concentrated to-day especially at Kherson, at Zaporojie, and at Kharkov.

Parallel to this a very important industry of food 241
products has developed. These are the great and highly perfected mills, the sugar refineries, the distilleries, the breweries. and the tobacco factories which cover the whole territory of the Ukraine. As auxiliary products of agriculture, apart from vegetables of all kinds, known in Europe, the production of which is difficult to estimate, one can mention the melons, water-melons, cucumbers, and tomatoes, to the cultivation of which important tracts have been given.

The production of fruit and grapes has not experienced 245
so great a development. The surface given to fruit trees (cherries, apples, apricots, and pears) reaches about 250,000 hectares. The most important horticultural centres are to be found in the region of Ouman, on the banks of the Dniester, at the mouth of the Dnieper, and equally in the surroundings of Odessa, which are famous for their peach trees. The town of Ouman has a horticultural school and an experimental station which had already long before the Great War a great agricultural reputation throughout Russia.

The marketable harvest of fruit reached 80,000 tons before the Great War.

The surplus production of fruits and especially of vegetables (tomatoes) have brought about the rise and the rapid development of a food tinning industry which seemed to offer great possibilities in the future.

As to the vineyards (about 60,000 hectares), they are

1 [see category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

245 found in the extreme south of the Ukraine, on the banks of the Dniester and the Boug (Voznessensk), in the region of Odessa, at the mouth of the Dnieper, and in the region of the rapids near Zaporojie.

Despite the small importance of the vineyards in the agricultural economy of the Ukraine, a great effort has been made by Russia in this sphere. An experimental station for vines has been established near Odessa which has a laboratory for the analysis of the harvests. Highly qualified specialists have made researches there on the growth of native and French varieties for the creation of species adapted to the soil and to the climatic conditions of the Ukrainian vine region.

246 The cultivation of fodder, such as clover and others, are relatively little known in the Ukraine. The lands which are given up to them are almost entirely in the western part of Zone 1,2 which is over-populated and provided with natural pastures. Their surface does not exceed 1,000,000 hectares. In the Ukrainian Steppe only the natural pastures are of importance. (It is to be hoped that the culture of fodder will develop in the Steppe as it is necessary for the rational enrichment of the land.)

241 Before going on to the question of forestry and to breeding, let us say a few words about the state of agriculture in the lately Polish part of the Ukraine.

Being a natural continuation of Zone 1,2 with a poorer soil, this country produces a large proportion of rye, which occupies more than a third of the sown surface.

The other crops are barley, wheat, oats, and potatoes, all of which are used by the native population. The cultivation of sugar-beet is very limited.

246 On the other hand the cultivation of fodder is more extensive in Polish Galicia than in the Soviet part of the

2/1 [see category 116, pp. 139-140--- Analyst]

Ukraine, where, as we have seen, it is only intensive in the western part of Zone 1. 246

. . . . .

Both from the point of view of numbers and of quality, the Ukraine is of little interest in forestry. Its production is even insufficient to satisfy the local needs. 137

The forests are mostly concentrated in the districts of Volynia, Kiev, and Tchernigov and are mainly fir trees. Their surface does not exceed 3,000,000 hectares.

Apart from the forests one meets, in the western part of Zone 1, oases of oaks and those light woods which are familiar to the rest of Europe, excepting, however, the beech tree, the geographical distribution of which is the best justification of the division of our continent into Western and Eastern Europe.

As to Zone 2, it is completely treeless with the exception of some oases to the east of Kharkov.

Towards the west the forest region increases and its exploitation becomes more intense. Already in Galicia, near the Carpathians, they represent an important part of the production of the country without, however, playing the role of an important export.

. . . . .

A land of great size and magnificent pastures, the Ukraine occupies an important place in Europe in the sphere of cattle-breeding. 231

The Ukrainian Steppes provide excellent conditions for the breeding of horses, the number of which before the last war reached 5,500,000.

It would be unjust not to note that the German colonists have contributed much to the improvement of the horses in Southern Ukraine, especially in the region of Kherson, where many great enterprises were devoted to them.

The years of collectivization and the extermination

231 of the wealthier peasant have, unfortunately, struck a terrible blow (as elsewhere throughout Russia) at the total number of horses, which has fallen by 50 per cent and amounts to-day to only 2,750,000.

Cattle have experienced the same disaster.

The number of cattle, which reaches 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 to-day, was 9,000,000 in 1914.

The position is still more serious with regard to sheep—from 6,000,000 they have fallen to 2,500,000.

Only the breeding of pigs has been able to remain at approximately the same level. It only shows a fall of 10 per cent to 15 per cent and the number of these animals reaches 4,500,000 at the present time.

Cattle-breeding is characterized in the Ukraine by the predominance of pigs in Zone 1.[1] and of horses and sheep in Zone 2.[1] As to cattle, the milk-producing species are more numerous in Zone 1.[1] and the beasts of burden in Zone 2.[1] The Ukrainian breed of oxen is one of the best in the world. It provides excellent meat, but the cows of this breed give only just enough milk to feed their calves. The raising of oxen for the drawing of ploughs and carts is very seriously menaced by the introduction of tractors for agricultural work.

It is interesting to note when studying cattle-breeding in the Ukraine, that it is certain that under other political, social, and economic conditions it could become a very important branch of the economic activity of the country. Pre-Great War statistical figures show us that the number of domestic animals increased at a greater rate than that of the people who owned them.

The Ukraine consumes almost entirely, in the form of meat and milk, the products of her own cattle-breeding, and does not export to the industrial regions beyond her frontiers, except some horses, beasts of burden, skins, wool, and pig-bristles.

1 [See category 116 pp. 139-140---Analyst]

The milk industry, too, is relatively undeveloped in 234
the Ukraine and might even become insufficient to supply the needs of the big towns and the industrial centres if the breeding does not increase in order to be able to overtake the other branches of economic activity.

The general opinion which considers the Ukraine an 000
inexhaustible source of meat and milk seems to be unfounded, at least at the present time. This is all the more true as, while the purchasing power of the native population rises, the insufficiency of the resources in this respect becomes more and more noticeable.

The transformation which the Ukraine has undergone in the sphere of the exploitation of the products of the surface soil since the establishment of the Soviet regime, while leaving aside the crisis in cattle-breeding, has undoubtedly not led to progress.

The trial plantations of cotton, of soho, and of rice, 242
the mechanization of the working of the land by the extensive employment of tractors, seem to be the only advantages which have been given by the new regime to the development of Ukrainian agriculture.

It would seem necessary to note another wealth of the 529 757
Ukrainian soil which does not enter into any of our economic categories—these are the various spas.

In the first instance there are, in the environs of Odessa, two lakes, the Kouialnik and the Khadji-Bey, ancient bays which formed when they were the mouths of rivers since dried up and which are to-day completely separated from the sea. The medicinal value of these two lakes is appreciated by all Russia. Tens of thousands of invalids, especially rheumatics and paralytics, flock there every year for the mud baths which are very rich in iodine salts.

Many parts of the coast of the Black Sea are very 529

529 popular for sea bathing, although the beaches still lack a good tourist organization.

000 Nevertheless this branch of the activities of the country could, under more favourable circumstances, give a stable revenue to the population and thus contribute towards the enrichment of the Ukraine.

III

The Subsoil and Industry

135 Among the mineral riches of the Ukraine the first place belongs to coal and to iron ore.

These two important raw materials are to be found in Zone 2 coal in the Donietz basin and iron ore on the left bank of the Ingouletz (a tributary of the Boug) at Krivoi-Rog.

Besides these two fundamentally important resources the Ukraine possesses important deposits of manganese and aluminium in the surroundings of Nikopol, graphite and soft coal mines, recently discovered in the centre of the country, salt in the Donietz basin, and finally peat and oil wells in Polish Galicia, in the surroundings of Stanislavov. Geological researches recently carried out have led to the discovery of oil on the shores of the Sea of Azov.

433 In order to give an idea of the potential reserves awaiting exploitation in the subsoil of the Ukraine, let us indicate that before the last war production represented 135 gold francs per annum per inhabitant.

316 As a result of its naturally very rich geological structure and of the organization of the extraction of its resources, the basin of the Donietz could be compared with the best coal-producing centres of Europe. Its reserves may be less important than those of Siberia (Kouznetsk),

[see category 116, pp. 139-140 --- Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

but they are estimated as having a depth of 1000 metres 316
according to the most recent work undertaken by the Soviet Government, and the information given by German sources estimate them at 55 milliard tons, which makes these deposits almost inexhaustible.

By their quality the coals of the Donietz are among the very best, having a very high calorific value.

They give excellent varieties for heating and furnish coke for the metal industry, gas and liquid fuels. Rich in volatile substances, they are a raw material of the chemical industry.

The exploitation of the Donietz basin is relatively recent, beginning as it does only in the second half of the nineteenth century. This field has not known the methods of exploitation of the pre-mechanical kind which characterized the European pits and those of the Moscow region.

In the greater part of the mines the technical organization has already reached a high degree of perfection and continues to progress rapidly. This progress results in a great increase of extraction, the annual figure of which rises to-day to 75,000,000 tons (12,000,000 in 1900 and 31,000,000 in 1914), representing 65 per cent of the total production of the Soviet Union and exceeding that of France by 15,000,000 tons.

The application of mechanization to the extraction, an exploitation which is commercially more rational, and a better organization of labour in the sense of stabilization, of its specialization, and of the raising of the standard of living of the workers, could increase the production further by many million tons.

Two very important factors are favouring the rapid growth of the production of coal in the Ukraine. First it is the relative nearness, of 500 kilometres in a straight line, of the whole basin of the Donietz from the iron

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

316 mines of the Krivoi-Rog and secondly the presence between these two centres, in the surroundings of Nikopol, of important deposits of manganese, whose annual extraction exceeds 1,000,000 tons.

Actually the proximity of the mines of Krivoi-Rog, the resources of which, according to the exact estimates of geologists, are considerable (1 milliard 100 million tons of mineral which contains 40 per cent of iron), has allowed the distribution of the whole iron industry of the Ukraine between these two regions—that of the
316 Donietz and that of Krivoi-Rog. This centralization
489 allows one to utilize on the spot the enormous quantities of coal and of employing the railways in the most economical way, thus reducing the transport charges which are a heavy item in relation to a material.

The whole traffic between these two regions goes in two directions. The coal of the Donietz is loaded on trucks which are directed towards the Krivoi-Rog. These trucks return with a load of minerals. Thus a continual exchange takes place between these two centres, resulting in a very small circulation of empty trucks and thus creating one of the essential conditions of a rational exploitation of the railways.

316 The centralization of the Ukrainian metal industry
433 strongly favours its development. The Ukraine to-day occupies one of the leading places in the production of pig-iron (the fourth place, with 6,500,000 tons annually), of steel (third place, with 5,000,000 tons annually), and of sheet-iron (fifth place, with 3,000,000 tons annually).

327 The shaping of the metal and its transformation into metallic manufactured objects is equally concentrated on the borders of these two producing regions. Thus only 18 per cent of the coal of the Donietz and 5 per cent of the raw mineral of the Krivoi-Rog are exported from the Ukraine. The rest is shaped and worked on the

spot and leaves the country in the form of special steels, 327
of sheet-iron, of all sorts of machines and tools, as well as of chemical products.

The two mining regions and the regions of Dniepropetrovsk possess forty-five furnaces having a volume of 25,000,000 cubic metres and more than 110 Martin ovens. Russian industry still depends to-day in great measure on the factories of the Ukraine.

As we have seen, the state of industry in the Ukraine, especially of heavy industry, is conditioned by the geographical position of its raw materials and of the sources of energy. All the metal is concentrated at Krivoi-Rog and the source of energy is represented in the first instance by the coal of the Donietz.

The peat bogs dispersed over the whole territory and 316
whose extent does not exceed 400,000 hectares and the production 500,000 tons, and the brown coals the extraction of which is only 300,000 tons, can enter into the calculation only as auxiliary fuel of a definitely local importance.

The Ukraine, on the contrary, is well supplied with 377
hydro-electric plant. This energy is mainly given by the station of *Dnieprogues*, better known under the name of '*Dnieprostroi*,' which means 'Construction on the Dnieper.' This name was especially valuable during the building of the station which, having been finished, has taken the name of '*Dnieprogues*,' an abbreviation of '*Dniepro*vskaia *Gu*idro-*E*lectritcheskaia *S*tantsia,' which means 'hydro-electric station on the Dnieper.' Built by the Soviets on the rapids of this river, it employs the energy and the power which reach 600,000 kwh.

In the other regions of the Ukraine the network of hydro-electric stations is relatively poor, as the rivers do not provide the necessary resources in this respect. The existing stations serve the mills, the oil mills, the sugar refineries, or the town stations of small power.

377 The functioning of the *Dnieprogues* station, which could open enormous possibilities of development of all kinds of industries and of the electrification of the railways, has nevertheless, despite its enormous power, failed to change the industrial geography of the Ukraine because it is just half-way between the Donietz basin and Krivoi-Rog and thus does not bring about any alteration in the distribution of the sources of energy.

438 Thus the heavy industry of the Ukraine remains, in its greater part, concentrated around this region, round Nikopol and along the northern edge of the Donietz basin.

325 Kharkov and its surroundings are the greatest metallurgical centres of the Ukraine. There great factories of turbines, of generators, of electrical machines, of tractors, of locomotives, of railway trucks, and of factory equipment, etc., are to be found.

327 The production of sheet-iron and of steel rails, tubes, plates, beams, wire, etc., is distributed among many factories of the Donietz basin, at Nikopol and at Dniepropetrovsk.

Zaporojie (not far from Krivoi-Rog and near the *Dnieprogues*) produces nearly 60 per cent of the special steels of the Union. The Soviets intend to create a new powerful centre of metal industry there.

397 Apart from Kharkov, factories producing all the
392 heavier machines such as locomotives are to be found in the Donbass (abbreviation of Donietz basin which we will now use), at Lougansk, and at Kramatorski, where an enormous newly constructed factory is one of the largest in the world.

402 The equipment for the light industry—the mills, wine-presses, oil mills and elevators—is chiefly manufactured at Berdiansk (Donbass), Melitopol (Northern Taurida), Tcherkassy (centre), Kiev, and Odessa.

392 Agricultural machinery comes from the factories of

Zaporojie, Ielisavetgrad (region of Odessa), Berdiansk 312
(on the Sea of Azov), and Kherson (at the mouth of the Dnieper).

The marine docks in which the ships of commerce 396
and of war are being built are at Nicolaiev (at the mouth of the Boug), and river constructions of all types at Kiev. There are important repair shops for railway stock at Odessa and Kiev.

We enumerate here only the districts in which the 000
larger metal industries are concentrated, the production of which exceeds local needs. The greater part of the 325
large Ukrainian towns, especially of the seaports, possess 438
small metal factories, the total production of which is not negligible.

It suffices to consult the economic map[1] of the Ukraine to realize that the heavier the products of the metal industry are, the more its centres are removed from the mining regions, a fact which gives a clearly rational character to the geography of Ukrainian metallurgy.

Besides metallurgy, heavy industry is represented in 385
the Ukraine by the chemical industry and in the first 382
instance by that which is based on coal. Such is the industry which produces azote, benzole, nitro-benzine, and sulphuric acid. Important factories engaged in the production of volatile materials have been built at Gorlovka, Lissitschansk, Konstantinovka, and Slaviansk (in the Donbass). This industry, which is still in its very early stages, already meets 30 per cent of the needs of Soviet Ukraine.

The factories producing superphosphates, whose annual production reaches 250,000 tons, are distributed between Konstantinovka (Donbass), Odessa, and Vinnitza, in Podolia.

Kharkov possesses great dye factories and those 386
producing paints, varnish, and enamel.

1 [see category 116, p. 151---Analyst]

339 To finish with heavy industries, let us still mention the production of building materials—600,000 tons of cement (in the region of the Sea of Azov) and 1 milliard of bricks are annually manufactured in the Ukraine.

258 As for light industry, it is that of food production which occupies the first place.

257 The sugar industry of the whole of Russia is to be found almost entirely in the Ukraine. 12,000,000 quintals of crystallized sugar and 4,000,000 quintals of refined sugar can be produced here annually.

256 The milling industry also occupies an important place. Very important mills, many of which are supplied with highly perfected means of sifting and straining, specialized in the manufacture of fine flours for export before the last war. This industry is concentrated in the ports or in the towns near these or near river ports and in the surroundings of important railway junctions of the southern region. This industry represents 35 per cent of the whole milling industry of the Union and produces, despite the fact that it is not working at full pressure, 2,500,000 tons of wheat flour per annum.

249 The oil mills of the Ukraine produce 40,000 tons of sunflower oil, 3000 tons of linseed oil, and 3000 tons of mustard oil.

274 70 per cent of the alcohol distilleries of the Soviet Union are also in the Ukraine, manufacturing all types of alcohol: from corn, for drinks such as vodka and other liqueurs, and from potatoes, for the dye industry, for pharmaceutical products, and for perfumery.

271 The very important tobacco industry is distributed throughout the great centres of the territory.

255 As for the production of tinned foods, 78 per cent of the production of the Union originates from the Ukraine. Important quantities of vegetables (especially of tomatoes) and of fruit are tinned and exported from the territory.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The possibilities of the development of this industry 255
are enormous. The excellent quality of the vegetables and fruits and the big supplies of fish at the mouth of the Dnieper would have been able to give this industry a great importance, but in this respect the Soviet Government has shown especial incompetence.

Light industry in the exact sense of the word is 000
relatively little developed in the Ukraine. Apart from a few saw mills, soap factories, skin and leather works, furniture works, perfumeries, and porcelain factories, there is little which would attract our attention. We will limit ourselves to simply mentioning them. One cannot really speak of a textile industry. The whole Ukraine has only three factories and only produces 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in Russia.

If agriculture is in a state of curtailment since the 433
appearance of the Soviet regime, if neither light industry 327
nor the means of communication have made any progress (which is equivalent to an absence of progress), the production of minerals and the metal industry show great development, especially since 1932, to which must be added the construction of the *Dnieprogues*.

This progress is not only manifested by the increase of production, but by the centralization of the metal industry in the districts in which the raw materials are extracted. Before the last war the Ukraine was a country of a great surplus of corn, iron, and coal. To-day the 433
surplus of her production is represented by manufactured metal goods and in this her economic potential is found to be radically changed.

The displacement and the development of the industrial potential of the Ukraine ought to have resulted in the increased welfare of her population. Nothing like that has been achieved.

Neither the aim nor the object of this book allow us

433 to enlarge upon the reasons which have determined the destruction of the favourable results which ought to have appeared in this direction. We shall only limit ourselves to enumerating the more important points.

1. The defective distribution due to frequent failures of transport which are expressed by the accumulation of unused manufactured goods in the great industrial centres and by the irregularity of furnishing the factories with raw materials.

2. The very inferior quality of the manufactured goods, the enormous percentage of rejects, the continuous shortage of spare parts required for the normal functioning, and the upkeep of the machines. These defects are due to an insufficient technical staff, to low wages and salaries, and to the police system introduced into the administration of the industries.

3. The lack of co-ordination between the different branches of industry, the poor condition of State commerce, due to the incompetence of the staffs and to the very complex and very slow bureaucratic procedure.

Nevertheless, imperfect though they may be, the new mines and factories exist and under other political and economic conditions, accompanied by the revival of agriculture, of foreign commerce, and of a better functioning of transport, the Ukraine would be put on the same economic level as the best organized and the richest countries of the world.

IV

Means of Communication

496 In no other sector of economic activity does the link
489 between the Ukraine and the rest of Russia become so clearly apparent as in the matter of the organization of

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the railway system. At a superficial glance at the map[1] we immediately see that the main railway lines follow the ancient riverways which unite the Black Sea with the rest of Russia. Towards the north, however, they divide into two important branches, that of Leningrad, the old direction to Novgorod, and that of the new direction to Moscow. The Russian railways radiate from these two centres, Moscow and Leningrad, to end in the numerous ports of the White, Black, or Caspian Sea or the Pacific Ocean or at the western and eastern frontiers of the State.

1/A 496 489

In this Russia does not differ much from, say, France where, too, the railway network converges towards Paris as a centre.

Forming a part of the Russian railway system, the Ukrainian main lines are only sections or continuations of the Russian main lines, starting, as we have said, from Leningrad or Moscow.

These are the lines : (Leningrad–Jlobin)[1]–Sarny–Kiev. (Leningrad–Vilno–Rovno)–Kazatyne–Odessa. (Moscow–Koursk)–Kharkov–Sinelnikovo (Sebastopol) and (Moscow–Koursk)–Kharkov–Marioupol–(Rostov-on-Don–Caucasus). (Moscow–Briansk)–Koupiansk–Lougansk.

The Ukrainian network, including the continuations of the great Pan-Russian lines, whose length totals 14,500 kilometres (31 kilometres of rail for each 1000 square kilometres and 4·6 kilometres per 10,000 inhabitants), can be divided into four distinct classes :

1. *Lines for the export of corn* uniting the agricultural regions with the ports of the Black Sea. The direction of these lines can only be justified by the conditions of a normal expansion of grain export and the importation of colonial produce, to which the advent of Soviet rule has brought an unfavourable change.

[1] The towns put in brackets are outside Ukrainian territory.

1/A [see category 116, p.151. --- Analyst]

000 The import and export were characteristic of the pre-Great War Ukrainian economy. To-day these factors are almost absent.

496 At the beginning of the twentieth century a railway called the corn line had been constructed, with termini at Romny and Libava, a port on the Baltic now belonging to Latvia and recently partly given back to Russia by special treaty, for the corn export trade. It is clear that to-day its Ukrainian section, which does not exceed 250 kilometres, has only a very restricted local interest. Recent events may bring some changes here.

The movement of merchandise on the network which, before the Great War, had been most important in the direction from north to south, takes to-day an opposite direction and brings the surplus of cereals from the southern region towards Kharkov and Moscow. As to the most recent grain line, the construction of which had been begun in 1913 and had been completed after the Revolution, connecting Kherson and Nicolaiev to Kharkov via Zaporojie, it has to-day acquired a purely industrial character and serves to transport metal and coal to the factories of Kharkov on the one hand and to those of Kherson and Nicolaiev on the other.

489 496 2. *Means of communication* which serve the mines of Krivoi-Rog and the coal basin of the Donietz. The region of the Donietz has a sufficiently close network and is provided with many lines with a double track which connect the different mines. Nevertheless this network was clearly insufficient already before the last war, when the annual production of coal was only 40 per cent of that of to-day. The enormous accumulation of unused coal at the stations, as a result of the weakness of the transport system, had forced pre-Great War Russia to import coal from England.

The network of the Donbass is linked with the Krivoi-

Kog by a main line which is devoted to the continual 489
exchange of coal for mineral. The stock of this mine 496
is the most powerful of the Union and the average loading per axle (about 4·5 tons) is the highest in Europe. The system of the coal network is characterized by the working of the raw material in the proximity of the districts of extraction. Numerous branch lines are prolonged into supplementary lines which radiate towards the outer regions, to end at the great centres at which the metals are worked. This whole network, destined for the transport of heavy materials, and which dates from the last decades of the nineteenth century, is in general very well constructed and even partly reinforced by electric welding.

The only railway of importance constructed since the 496
October Revolution, which joins the industrial network, is that which links Moscow to Lougansk. The direction of this line confirms the continuation by the Soviet Government of the traditional economic policy, in tending to organize the Russian railway system on the Imperial plan.

3. *Strategic lines* are represented by the line Odessa–Kiev, with a double track and with numerous branches towards the Polish and Rumanian frontiers, some of which continue in a direction of Lvov, others to Kovel, to end at Warsaw.

The exploitation of these mines, since the establishment of the Russo-Polish frontier after 1920, was fundamentally changed. As a result of being cut by the frontier, they had lost their importance as strategic lines, since the principal junctions, such as Kovel or Rovno, specially intended for this purpose, were recently outside the frontiers of the Soviet Ukraine. Parallel to this they had experienced a diminution of traffic owing to the most complete disappearance of trade with Poland.

496 4. *Local railway lines*, of which the most important are those which link the large towns and join them to the agricultural regions.

Although certain strategic lines now function as lines of local importance, owing to the change of the frontier, this fact has not remedied the insufficiency of such railways.

The reinforcement of industrial lines, the entire rebuilding of the stations on the strategic lines in the sense of increasing the number of storage lines, as well as the construction of new local lines, must be considered a task of immediate importance so as to avoid the slowing down of the economic development of the country. Actually if the economic potential of the Ukraine is greater or at least equal to that of France on roughly the same extent of territory, the Ukraine only possesses one-third of the rail network of France (14,500 kilometres as compared with 44,000 kilometres). If one adds the almost complete absence of roads to this, especially on the left bank of the Dnieper and in the south of the Ukraine, the inactivity and unproductiveness of the Soviet regime in the sphere of the construction of new lines seems difficult to explain.

491 In reality the Ukrainian network of roads before the Great War was in practice limited to a single road which was maintained in a satisfactory condition and which linked Kiev with the Austrian frontier via Jitomir. As far as we know that was the only motor-car road before the last war in the whole of Europe. This main road had several important local branches leading towards the south and ending at Kamenetz-Podolsk, and leading towards the north in the direction of Korosten and Kowel. Several very narrow carriage roads, whose foundations and surface were very poor, were to be found in the region of Kiev and in Podolia and they were being

maintained by the Zemstvos (local organizations somewhat similar to County Councils, elected by citizens with a certain property census). 491

Quite recently the planning of the organization of the road system of the Soviet Union was put in the hands of the planning commission. It seems that important sums are to be spent on this project. It is almost unnecessary to mention that great economic transformations could be brought about by the construction even of a few thousand kilometres of roads, especially in New Russia where the composition of the soil makes the present tracks absolutely impassable after the slightest rain. Many villages still remain almost isolated from the rest of the world during periods of bad weather and are only connected with their respective centres by telegraph and, in case of their defect, by postmen on horseback.

The question of roads which we have approached allows us a small diversion. We can say a few words about the Zemstvos. This organization was distinguished after the abolition of serfdom as a factor of the first order in the development of the economic organism of the country, of the raising of the well-being of the population, of public hygiene, and of instruction. Having resources resulting from taxes on the land, the Zemstvos were able to cover Ukrainian territory, as also that of the whole of Russia, with a dense network of hospitals, veterinary centres, agricultural advisory bureaux, of experimental fields, of credit and trade co-operatives, and insurance offices, and finally of primary and even technical schools. The personnel of the Zemstvos, recruited among the intelligentsia often belonging to the popular classes, was always conspicuous by its devotion to the cause and did not lack in highly qualified specialists who did not hesitate to sacrifice 647 744 657 657 647

647 their career and the assurance of a good income for the meagre appointments as an official. It is sufficient just to glance at the statistics of the Russian Empire in order to realize what a gigantic increase in the development of civilization was reached by the effort of the Russian [871] intellectuals and specialists. Public instruction had developed in these fifty years to an enormous extent, [165] infant mortality had fallen by more than 60 per cent, [164] epidemics had experienced a great fall, as also cattle diseases, and the yield of the land had increased in the [232] southern regions by more than 30 per cent. The improvement of the different breeds of horses and cattle was already evident on the eve of the Great War.

206 The backward country which Russia was supposed to be in the eyes of Westerners, including also the Ukraine, had in 1912 a big network of telephone lines in the country and especially in the region of Vinnitza, where the organization of the Zemstvos was especially active.

505 As to the river system, as we have already seen, it is very poor and is limited to four rivers, the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Boug, and the Donietz, of which the Dnieper alone is of any interest. The transport capacity of this one important river has been for ever spoiled by the rapids which make navigation impossible along a [503] considerable distance. It is only after the building of the *Dnieprogues*, whose gigantic barrage had submerged the rapids along a distance of about one hundred kilometres, that an uninterrupted river route was established, linking the upper Dnieper with the Black Sea.

This river drains the greater part of the Ukraine and has left its mark upon the whole historic and economic evolution of the country.

Before the Great War the annual tonnage of transports

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on this river was more than 80 per cent of the river tonnage of the whole country. The ports of the Dnieper had, before the Great War, 360 steamers and more than 1800 other boats. Timber, salt, and corn composed, and still composed to-day, the predominant part of the goods carried by the Dnieper. 505

The insufficient and incompetent management of the river ports and the small tonnage of the ships still do not allow one to-day to increase the river transport of the Ukraine to any noticeable extent.

On the other hand the geographical possibilities of sea transport are enormous. Excellent ports like Odessa and Nikolaiev, lying 600 kilometres from Constantinople and 1000 kilometres from Batoum, can assure the transport of export and import goods on a big scale and especially that of petrol from the Caucasus. Beside [504] Odessa and Nikolaiev, the Ukraine still possesses other ports which are also favoured from a geographical and technical point of view, among them Marioupol, Berdiansk, and Kherson and some smaller ports of local interest.

We have noted that under normal conditions of 433 economic exploitation the Ukraine, thanks to its agricultural and industrial potential, could be put on the level of the richest countries of the world. The continuation of the economic development of the Ukraine is conditioned by the existence of a stable outlet. If it is a question of a surplus of wheat, sugar, and other produce of the land, or of the products of industry, this surplus is to-day dependent on the consuming regions of the rest of Russia. The Ukraine, which consumes 85 per cent of its resources of energy and almost all its minerals in order to transform them locally into manufactured articles, is not only a source of raw materials, as is usually imagined.

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433 241 German economists who foresee a perfect collaboration between the Ukraine and Germany ("Germany and the Ukraine supplement one another economically,' wrote the *Volk und Reich* in 1933) make a great mistake or even deceive the public intentionally in continuing to consider the Ukraine an agricultural land. If one compares the national agricultural revenue of the Ukraine with that of her industry, the first is certainly inferior to the second.

000 If one day the Ukraine should enter into the German economic system, and if Germany were to export the mineral which she lacks from the Ukraine, what would one do with the immense machine factories, and the coal mines which supply the metal industries, and with the quarter of a million workers of that industry? Let us admit that the Ukraine should become independent and that she should become detached from the Russian economic system, and that by this fact she should become hostile to Russia, who would cease to absorb the surplus of her economy, what would happen then?

Russia would, perhaps, create a new Ukraine in her Asiatic possessions. The wealth of the subsoil of Western Siberia is far greater by many times than that of the Ukraine. Metal is also more abundant. The soil of Siberia is more fertile and the possibilities of agricultural development are immense. That is not all. What would the Ukraine do with the surplus of her agricultural population, whose average density is greater than that of Germany, and which could emigrate, to-day, to Siberia and found colonies as it pleases? Is there another country in the world which will accept so great an emigration?

If the Russian Empire, backward though it is supposed to have been, has been able, during hundreds of years, to transform the wild Steppes into an industrial and

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prosperous country, why then could not the present Government, or another which would succeed it, do as much with Western Siberia? What would, in such a case, become of the economy of the Ukraine, which is based on her common economy with that of the rest of Russia? Let us take the example of Poland, a country with an equally rich subsoil and agriculture and equally over-populated. During the nineteenth century, thanks to plentiful and cheap labour, Poland had become one of the most important industrial centres, especially of the textile industry, the whole production of which was absorbed by the Russian market. Since the separation of its economy from that of Russia, Poland has shown a fall of more than 30 per cent and in some spheres even of 60 per cent of her industrial production and a strong rise of unemployment. Would such a situation be desirable in the Ukraine?

To begin an independent existence it would be necessary that the Ukraine should transform her whole economic system. One can easily imagine that such a transformation would entail expenses which would be such a heavy charge on the population that it would be threatened with ruin for many years to come, that every chance of prosperity might be endangered, not to mention the great outlay on defence which would then become necessary along the whole frontier with Russia, which has a length of several thousand kilometres and lacks every natural obstacle.

By this we do not want to say that economic reasons could be invoked to deny the right of a nation to an independent political existence. But if the motives, whether geographical, historical, ethnical, cultural, linguistic or others, are insufficient or even do not exist to justify this independence, then the economic element should not be neglected.

CHAPTER V

THE UKRAINE AFTER THE GREAT WAR

000 BEFORE undertaking a short exposé of the events which have affected the Ukraine since the Great War, we must first admit one fact: Russia before 1914, with the exception of her recent acquisitions (the Duchy of Warsaw, the Caucasus, and the Baltic lands), was endowed with a national, spiritual, and cultural unity. The existence within her frontiers of different Russian peoples (Great Russians, White Russians, and Ukrainians) in no way destroyed this unity, of which the Ukrainians were the most important, the most valuable, and the most active part. Thus the term 'russification' cannot reasonably be applied either to White Russia or the Ukraine. The 'russification' in the exact sense of the word only took place in ethnically non-Russian territories.

The idea of Russian unity was also fostered beyond the borders of the empire in Austrian Galicia and Bucovina and in Sub-Carpathian Russia. A Russian movement, very popular among the peasant masses, existed there on the eve of the war, a movement supported by the non-Uniat Orthodox Church which, by virtue of its national essence, was at all times the bastion against latinization and denationalization. The Russian organizations of Galicia had an important number of cultural centres and edited many journals and pamphlets. The Russian movement gave concern to the Austrian

authorities by its rapid development and by its hold on 000
the people. Some months before the declaration of war a monster trial took place at Marmaros-Sziget, in which the adherents of the russophile organizations were tried for high treason. Most of the accused were peasants, which confirms the success of Russian ideas among the popular masses. Many were condemned to long terms of imprisonment. Immediately after the beginning of the war arrests again took place among the same Russian circles. These measures led to another trial at the beginning of 1915, but this time the tribunal sat at Talerhof under martial law and pronounced several death sentences. The account of these repressions against the Russian circles of Galicia by the Austrian Government was brought back by Count Bobrinsky, who served as a liaison agent between the Russian organizations in Kiev and those of Galicia and who was a witness at the first trial.

We have seen that the anti-Ukrainian police measures 648
taken by the Russian Government after the Polish 175
insurrection of 1863 were politically directed against the eventual possibility of Polish-Ukrainian collaboration, which was incidentally unrealizable. These measures did not bring about any political reaction in Russian Ukraine. They only brought the Ukrainian intellectual circles into evidence by their brutality and lack of justification. On the contrary they helped to crystallize the anti-Russian Ukrainian movement in Galicia, which found a loyal supporter in the Austro-Hungarian Government. The ideas developed in the plan of Prince Adam Czartoryski, despite their being out of tune with the whole history of the Ukrainian-Polish relations, were later adopted by certain Austrian circles which, as one knows, had become masters of Galicia after the last partition of Poland. Austria-Hungary

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648 175 intended to put itself in the place of the Great Poland of other days and to create, under the sceptre of the Hapsburgs, a federation of Slavonic lands. In the immediate entourage of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne, the idea of transforming the Austro-Hungarian Empire into a federal State found great favour. The idea of taking advantage of the anti-Russian Ukrainianism of Galicia as a counterweight to Russian power and, at the same time, to Polish pretensions to cultural and political direction of the Ukrainian movement, was quite in tune with this plan. It was the intention of the Austrian politicians to use Ukrainian separatism as a means of creating difficulties behind the Russian front in case of war, and of securing some allies on the other side of the frontier.

In order to attract the sympathies of the Ukrainian intellectuals the Austro-Hungarian Government showed great tolerance towards the cultural institutions of the country, readily authorizing the creation of Ukrainian schools and putting no obstacles in the way of the development of political societies and institutions which, as we have already said, also served to eclipse the Polish influence over the leading circles of Galicia. The Austrian Government did not only authorize the creation of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine,' but gave effective assistance to its development in granting it the means of action, which it did not grant to the political organizations of the other Slavonic minorities. Skoropis-Ioltoukhovsky, Jouk, Dorochenko, and Salisniak, all convinced separatists and extreme anti-Russians, were placed at the head of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine.' The Russian general staff became alarmed by this movement, whose principal aim it suspected—the disorganization, in case of war, of the foundations of the army which would be formed in the

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south of Russia. Later on, in 1917, the bulletin which 648
was published at Stockholm by the members of the 175
'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine' confirmed the justified anxiety of the Russian military authorities. This bulletin declared that the 'Union' had taken up a clear-cut position in all that concerned the relations with Russia, in basing all her hopes on the military defeat of the latter. It hoped for the occupation of the Ukraine by the troops of the countries at war with Russia, in order to attain a national independence with the aid of the central empires. Thanks to the great ability of her propagandists and to the continual support of the Austrian Government, the 'Union' was able to obtain considerable financial assistance consisting, apart from the contributions of the Galician and Bucovinian peasants and the Ukrainian colonists in America, of the grant of the 'Friends of Ukrainian Independence,' who belonged to those nationalities who were prepared to go to war with Russia. The accounts of the financial organization of the 'Union' were brought, in 1917, to the Russian military authorities by one of its former collaborators. One can say without exaggeration that the initiative and the elaboration of the programme of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' can be traced to Austria, which proposed, in case of an offensive in Russian-Ukrainian territory, that the members of this organization should follow her army with the aim of finding supporters of separatism among the native population of Russian Ukraine, and on the other hand for creating the new administration in the conquered country. But the Austrian advance did not take place. The Russian troops invaded Galicia and the most active members of the 'Union' had to take refuge in Vienna. Many of their number simply entered the Austrian secret service after this failure. That which remained of the 'Union'

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175 continued to receive subsidies from the Austrian Government and engaged in cultural work and autonomous 648 propaganda among the Russian prisoners of Ukrainian nationality.

This propaganda began immediately after the Austrian defeat in Galicia in 1914. Special camps were organized in which Galician instructors tried to subject the Ukrainian peasants to their influence and to the idea of Ukrainian autonomy. The conditions under which these prisoners lived were better than those of Russian soldiers from other parts of Russia. But soon, owing to her continual military and political defeats, Austria began more and more to make way for Germany, who finally took over the affairs of the 'Union.'

The idea of a confederation of vassal States carved out of the Russian territory developed in Germany in certain intellectual and political circles since the end of the era of Bismarck. The decisive role in the development of these ideas was played by Baltic Germans originating from the Russian Baltic provinces, whose influence, at first purely cultural, became progressively stronger in the Reich.

000 The short-sighted policy of crude and superficial russification, inaugurated in the Baltic provinces in the reign of Alexander III, had exasperated a part of the Baltic nobility and especially of the intellectuals. Their national pride, encouraged by the great rise of Germany in 1870–1, was deeply offended by the policy of russification. Thus these barons and these intellectuals began to turn more and more towards the Reich. Some of them even tried to find a new home in the at last united Reich. They took with them a hate of Russian politics, their contempt of all the native peoples of Eastern Europe and their historical traditions, full of reminiscences of those struggles which the Teutonic order

had experienced against the Slav world during many 000 centuries. Writers and journalists, many tied by bonds of relationship to the Prussian aristocracy, these German nationalists of the Baltic played the role of experts in East European matters and of the Russian question (*Russlandkenner*) in Germany.

Bismarck still had too great a personal respect for the power of Russia to attach any importance to the persevering propaganda which already aimed at popularizing the idea of the dismemberment of Russia. At all times he only had contempt for the 'oppressed brothers' of the Baltic and treated the first apostles of the *Drang nach Osten* as dreamers. Everything changed with the accession of William II, who personified the enormous conceit of that generation which had been brought up under the influence of the German triumphs of 1870–1. The prophets of German revenge on the coasts of the Baltic were quick to rally the various Pan-Germanist elements and to become in some respects their inspirers.

Recent events, which forced Hitler, under Russian pressure, to evacuate the Balts of German origin, have removed the chance of ever reviving these policies in the Baltic.

It is thus that Rohrbach, a Balt himself, could, during long years and with more or less brilliant success, lead his campaign for the deliverance of all the 'European peoples oppressed by Asiatic Russia' and for the 'civilizing mission,' the *Kulturtraegertum* of Germany in the East European world. The perspectives grew more and more. Attracted first by the vestiges of Teutonic domination over the Baltic provinces, the eyes of Germany looked farther towards the east and southeast. It is not Rohrbach who has made the discovery of the Ukraine in Germany. But by his persevering activity as a propagandist he has contributed more than any other

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000 to make the Ukrainian idea one of the principal pivots of German claims.

175 If, under Austrian direction, one did not dare to speak
668 of separatism to the prisoners, the German general
701 staff, the new master of the Ukrainian movement, thought of the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State, under German control, and gave its propagandists directions in this sense. From 1915 the Little Russians who agreed to declare themselves Ukrainians and not Russians were sent to the camp of Radstadt. In this camp specialists of the Ukrainian question, under the direction of Professor Bezpalko, undertook a series of lectures in which they drew pictures of the independence and liberty of the Cossacks for the benefit of their hearers, appealing to them to reject the 'heinous yoke of Asiatic Muscovy.' Towards the beginning of 1917, that is to say after two years of assiduous work, the German general staff succeeded in recruiting, in the camp, 15,000 prisoners. The regiment of 'Taras Chevtchenko' was created. This regiment consisted of eight companies and had about 1600 men. The soldiers of this regiment, looked upon as undoubted partisans of the independence of the Ukraine under German protection, were armed and equipped in readiness for being used in a possible offensive in South Russian regions. The remainder was divided into four groups:

1. About 1500 men formed the *Sitch* (the name of the ancient Cossack community) and enjoyed the complete confidence of the German authorities with regard to their loyalty to the new Ukrainian cause, without yet being entrusted with arms.

2. The 'apprentices,' about 3000, still considered as not absolutely reliable but already somewhat influenced by the propaganda.

3. The 'candidates,' about 3000, those who were

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neutral or indifferent to the question but without marked hostility. 175 668 701

4. Finally the 'opponents,' about 6000, who, although they had agreed to take the name of 'Ukrainians,' were actively opposed to separatist propaganda. They were continually sent to penal work and had to undergo severe and frequent punishments.

Thus of the 15,000 men who, enticed by the promise of an improvement of their lot, had agreed to join the Ukrainian units, one could only rely with difficulty on 3000 (the Chevtchenko regiment and the *Sitch*) who had been really affected by the propaganda. At this period the number of Russian prisoners exceeded 3,000,000, of whom at least 700,000 were Ukrainians, which confirms the absolute failure of this movement.

It would be interesting to remember that from the Russian side the same policy was inaugurated with respect to the prisoners of war of Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Croatian, etc., origin. This move enabled one to establish whole divisions composed of Slavonic minorities. From the beginning of the war Austro-Hungarian military units formed of Slavs, and especially of Czechs, went over to the Russians with their officers, arms, and baggage. Not a single similar case occurred in the Russian Army, which included many entirely Ukrainian regiments. On the contrary, according to the evidence of high Russian and German officers, the Ukrainian regiments were among the best troops, often used as shock units, the most famous of which was the 'Iron Brigade' commanded by General Denikine, future commander of the White Army.

To sum up, the political movements of autonomy and of Ukrainian separatism gave no tangible results despite a subsidized propaganda having the support of such powerful organisms as the central empires.

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When the February Revolution broke out in St. Petersburg no political Ukrainian movement developed in the early stages. Quite naturally the intellectual circles obtained more liberty to spread their ideas, which were not anti-Russian.

The municipal elections undertaken at Kiev almost immediately after the February Revolution, and which had undoubtedly taken advantage of all the liberties which characterized the first days of all revolutions, gave a result which clearly shows the almost complete non-existence of a Ukrainian political movement. In fact, of ninety municipal councillors the so-called Ukrainian parties obtained only six places, and that was in the capital of the Ukraine itself.

All classes of society hoped that the Provisional Government which replaced the Monarchy would be able to maintain the front and would allow the country to convoke a National Assembly which would decide the future political regime on the whole territory of the former Russian Empire. As soon as the active members of the Ukrainian political organizations of Galicia entered the Russian Ukraine they organized a kind of Ukrainian committee at Kiev, which started its autonomist political work. On 24 March 1917 the Ukrainian Associations spread over the whole territory were called upon to send their representatives to Kiev to form the first nucleus of a future Ukrainian Parliament. Although only the representatives of such Associations which had declared themselves Ukrainian were invited to this assembly, and although the direction of the assembly was entrusted to Galician Ukrainians, under the Presidency of Professor Hrouchevsky, not only was the idea of separatism absent, but the autonomous aspirations were of the most mild kind. This first assembly of Ukrainian deputies took the name of 'Rada' (the name

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of the Cossack Assembly of the time of Bogdan Khmelnitsky), which means 'Diet' or 'Council' in Ukrainian. Once installed, it tried to establish relations with the central Provisional Government, whose power became more and more fictitious. The menace of a Bolshevik *coup d'état* hung over the Government of St. Petersburg, a fact which allowed the Rada to justify its own establishment in declaring itself alone capable of protecting the Ukraine from Bolshevik invasion. This political manœuvre had many chances of success. The Ukrainian peasant was fundamentally hostile to Bolshevism, to the social levelling, and to the collectivization of the land. Nevertheless, anxious for the peace which the Bolsheviks had promised, the Ukrainian peasant lent them his ear. The leaders of the Rada, loyal to the principles of the 'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine,' were also not opposed to the idea of an immediate peace and their promises to preserve the Ukraine from Bolshevism and to conclude peace with the central powers was their most important trump card. The Provisional Government, in a state of complete disintegration and without any remaining support, hastened to recognize the Rada as a political organization, although no election in the proper sense of the word had taken place at the time of its formation. A statute, known under the name of 'Universal,' was instituted on Ukrainian territory. After the agreement between the Provisional Government and the Rada, Ukrainian autonomy was recognized but was limited to questions of language and culture and to the organization of local administration.

All other important questions, including the agrarian question, were left to the future National Pan-Russian Assembly. The administrative activity of the Rada was, at the beginning, limited to the town of Kiev alone, where its assemblies took place. During the summer of

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1917 the propaganda agents of the Rada covered the whole country where they organized meetings and distributed pamphlets. They tried to persuade the proprietors of land that their aspirations would be more easily realized within the framework of an autonomous State and underlined the impotence of the Central Government in the face of a Bolshevik attack. The Ukrainian peasant, like that of the Volga and of Siberia and like the Cossacks of the Don, opposed the revolutionary theories, and it is in these countries that they met with the strongest opposition. The Rada could not have a better justification of its authority in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasant than the statement that the Bolshevik movement, of Great Russian origin, was imported into the Ukraine from the outside, which, moreover, was true. The title which the Ukrainian anarchist, Nestor Makhno, gave to his book on the Civil War, *The Russian Revolution in the Ukraine*, is singularly significant. The leaders of the Rada were careful not to proclaim their separatist ideas openly, knowing that such ideas would never find the support of the popular masses. Profiting, however, by the decay of the Provisional Government, they formed, with its consent, a sort of Ministry which took the name of 'General Secretariat,' and which declared itself the supreme power in the Ukraine on 29 July of the same year. The agrarian movement which spread over the whole territory of the Ukraine aimed especially at the great landowners, most of whom, especially in the west, were Poles. Thus the real popular movement took the form of the ancient quarrel between the peasants and the lords and developed quite independently of the Ukrainian movement represented by the Rada. When, in October 1917, the Provisional Government fell as the result of a Bolshevik insurrection, the only official

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authority existing in the Ukraine was represented by the General Secretariat of the Central Ukrainian Rada. 175 668 642

The peasants, hostile to Bolshevism, did not find any other political organization on which they could lean. Mistrusting the organizations of the Right (which were later to form the political nucleus of the White Armies) and equally fearing the local democratic municipalities where the intellectual and Jewish elements dominated, openly hostile to the working class which was almost entirely Bolshevized and consisted of non-Ukrainian elements, the farmers seemed to tend more and more towards the support of the Rada which seemed to be the only force capable of realizing their aspirations. Nevertheless the first clash between the elements which accepted the idea of an autonomous Ukraine and those which rallied to Bolshevism, was not to the advantage of the first. The agrarian question meant much to them. The Ukrainian Rada was unable to formulate a clear policy with regard to this most important question. Its resistance to the anarchical division of the lands, supported by the Bolsheviks, rapidly reduced the number of its supporters and the already small authority enjoyed by the General Secretariat in the eyes of the peasant mass. Nevertheless, on 20 November, the Rada proclaimed a democratic Ukrainian Republic. It is at this period that the allied military missions then resident at Kiev recognized *de facto* the Ukrainian Republic. At the same time the fourth 'Universal' was promulgated, one of the articles of which declared that the independence of the Ukraine was considered indispensable only because the rest of the Russian territory had fallen to the power of the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to remember this detail because it again proves that, even in politically favourable circumstances, the Rada did not dare openly to declare its separatism. This act did not increase the

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175 authority of the Ukrainian Government. No local
642 municipal or other organization took the slightest note
668 of its existence. Every department, every district, and every town governed itself and tried to resist the advance of the Bolsheviks. Not having any military forces or police organizations at their disposal, these local governments were unable to resist the attacks of the Red Guards and the armed soldiers, returned from the front and supported by Moscow. Soon the whole Ukraine elected local Soviet governments and the Rada, which hastened to proclaim, on 22 January 1918, the independence of the Ukraine, was obliged to flee on the 29th of the same month, seeking refuge at Jitomir. One of its most active members, Simon Petlioura, tried to organize anti-Bolshevik troops composed of peasants and prisoners of Galician origin. He succeeded in forming several units which, although unsatisfactory from a military point of view, cut a better figure than the bands of soldiers which were leaving the front. These military units, known under the name of '*haidamaks*,' formed small nuclei of resistance in the towns and villages and halted the Soviet offensive here and there. The more the Bolsheviks advanced towards the west, the more this resistance became effective, especially in Southern Podolia, where the Ukrainian organizations, supported by Galician prisoners, by Polish legionaries, and even by certain circles of purely Russian sympathies but hostile to Bolshevism, still retained some vestiges of power.

648 The insufficiency of technical, administrative, and
127 intellectual personnel did not allow the Ukrainians to give their civil and military organizations the force necessary for defeating the revolutionary movement directed by the Communist Party. On 9 February the Ukrainian Government, acting as a sovereign government, and despite the firm opposition of a large part of

its members, especially of Petlioura, decided to send its 648
representatives to Brest-Litovsk to conclude a peace 727
with the central empires. This idea met with the sympathy of the Austro-German authorities whose negotiations for a peace with the Soviet Government had already lasted a long time.

The peace which was dictated by the German general staff was signed by the Rada. As compensation for the efforts of the central empires, who promised to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism, the Rada accepted German occupation and agreed to supply 1,000,000 tons of grain of which Germany and Austria had immediate need. Under the threat of German bayonets the representatives of Lenin also had to recognize the independence of the Ukraine. Already the Austro-German troops were making their entry into Ukrainian territory while meeting with only a feeble resistance of the armed units of the local Soviet governments and the remnants of the fleeing Imperial Army.

The only aim of the Austro-German military command was to obtain the stores of grain and of other food products which they hoped to find in abundance in the Ukraine. Yet, for political reasons, the Governments 727
of the central empires decided to support the fiction of Ukrainian independence under their protection. The entry of the troops was followed by the proclamation composed more or less in these terms: 'At the request of your Rada we have decided to enter your country in order to protect you from Bolshevik anarchy and to give you the possibility of developing in complete alliance with our two empires.'

One can say that no citizen took this declaration seriously and that the occupation was considered as an invasion by enemy troops. The Ukrainian Government 642
was established at Kiev and was composed of three 727

[i.e. in 1919--- Analyst]

642 727 political groups: the separatists of the right, the national democrats, and the federalist social democrats. Thus, as these names show, the Ukrainian Government formed by the Austro-Germans was not homogeneous in the matter of its partisanship of independence.

727 The Austro-Germans did not take this farce of political independence any more seriously than did the population. Their attitude was simply that of conquerors. 'For every German soldier killed, ten *Russian* soldiers, chosen among the population of the district where the crime has been committed, will be immediately shot,' the terrified inhabitants of Kremenetz (town of Volynia) (Order No. 2, town of Kremenetz, 28 February 1918) read on the posters signed by the commandant of the Austrian division a few days after the proclamation of official friendship. The 'friendly country' closely resembled a colonial conquest. The general staff of the army of General Eichhorn reported to the commander of the eastern front on 4 May 1918: 'The Austro-German troops would have no difficulty in maintaining order and public tranquillity from the moment we renounce the fiction of a friendly country. We are still obliged to obtain the permission of the Ukrainian commissioners, who are confused and irritated, for some of our actions.'

Meanwhile two points of view existed in Austro-German circles concerning the subject of the independence of the Ukraine. The army considered the Ukraine a conquered enemy country which had to furnish, with the least possible delay, agricultural produce in accordance with the terms of peace.

On the other hand diplomatic circles saw in the independence, fictitious though it was, the future of German diplomacy, based on the partition of the succession of the dismembered Russian Empire. Parallel to

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thus, rivalry began between Austria-Hungary and Germany concerning the question of the predominance of one or the other in the direction of Ukrainian policy. The resentment of Austria, outstripped by Germany in the political and military spheres, has allowed us to have, to-day, possession of genuine documents which reveal the point of view of the central empires on the organization of the Ukrainian State and of its principal leaders.

Disappointed by the lack of success of the policy of its Government, the general staff of Austria-Hungary reported, on 16 April 1918, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna the characteristics of the principal Ukrainian statesmen, whose subjection to Germany caused alarm:

'Holoubovitch—Premier—a fanciful theorist, eloquent but without character, appointed by the Germans.

'Lioubinsky—Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—a clean-shaven young man, well versed in Socialist and revolutionary theories. Entirely in the hands of the Germans.

'Joukovski—Minister of War—in my opinion russophile, former Colonel of the Russian General Staff, does all he can to appear a hundredper cent Socialist-revolutionary to his colleagues. Effectively a "German puppet."

'Khristiouk—Secretary-General of the Rada—an intelligent young man, outwardly very smart, apart from that of German sympathies.

'Hrouchevsky—President of the Rada—an old man in the grip of fear and of tremblings, whose decayed old body is intended to give the Rada the noble rust of an honoured senate. He anxiously clings to the German authorities and expresses no sympathy for Austria.'

Despite the cynicism of this document, one must admit that its author, General Waldstatten, did not lack humour or intelligence.

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148 The Minister of the Reich at Kiev, Muhm, a subtler man, expressed himself differently though in the same sense: 'I am convinced that it is necessary to maintain the fiction of a friendly independent country in the Ukraine. . . . We shall completely destroy the little authority which remains with the Ukrainian Government if we were to show too coarsely that it is only a toy in our hands.'

191 177 Disarmed, enslaved by the great force of the army of the central empires, the Ukraine was not in the position of an independent State. The Ukrainian language, imported from Galicia, was not spoken in the country. Only official documents and administrative notices were written in Ukrainian. Not a single private business ever used this language either for correspondence or advertising. In the schools and universities Russian continued to be used. The circulation of newspapers in the Ukrainian language was very small, while the Russian papers which agreed not to carry on open propaganda against the troops of occupation appeared everywhere and were actually the only ones read by the population.

727 642 The Ukrainian Government, composed of politicians having absolutely no administrative experience, soon proved to be incapable of organizing the supply of grain as promised to the armies of the central empires. The Germans then decided to change the regime. The organizations of landowners, small and big, which supplied corn and other agricultural produce to the forces of occupation, were favoured by the Austro-German authorities. It is unnecessary to point out that no Ukrainian political idea influenced the creation of these organizations. The Germans selected their association, known under the name of '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*,[1]

[1] '*Khliborobiv*' means farmers in Ukrainian. '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*' means association of farmers.
-i.e. in 1919. --- Analyst]

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as a base for the new Government which had to replace 727
the Rada and which, in their opinion, would be better 642
capable of organizing the supply of agricultural produce. On 29 April 1918, on the day after the proclamation of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Republic, the German troops interrupted the session of the Rada in the building which it occupied and forced the deputies to leave the hall. The Rada was dissolved. The landowners, the *khliboroby*, in agreement with the Austro-German general staff, elected the Hetman of the whole Ukraine in the person of General Pavlo Skoropadsky, the leader of the popular Democratic Party and descendant of the genuine Hetman of the Ukraine, but in fact a brilliant officer of the Russian Imperial Guards.

The German authorities thought that the new Govern- 727
ment, from which the politicians were excluded, would 645
be more in tune with their interests. In agreement with the General Hetman they appointed the new Cabinet. This Cabinet was composed of landowners, some experts, and a representative of commercial and industrial circles of the country in the person of a rich Jewish industrialist of Odessa, Goutnik. All the Ministers were people of openly Russian sympathies. Thus the bluff of the independent Ukraine received the approval of the same State which had invented it. The German Minister in Kiev, Muhm, wrote in his report to the chief of the German general staff, Groener: 'I insisted, when speaking to M. Lizogoub, the Premier, on the fact that the German Government wanted to see a Cabinet with a greater *couleur locale*.[1] In another report Muhm says that the greater part of the Ministers of the Hetman are not far removed from russophile ideas. 645
'Nevertheless,' he added, 'one must not take this too much to heart as the Government is continually under

[1] In French in the original text.

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645 my control and under that of the German general staff.'

An amusing, but true, story described the political position of the Ministers of the Government of the Hetman. The anecdote concerns the General Ragoza, the War Minister, whose sympathies were in no way Ukrainian. In October 1918 the Russian newspaper *Goloss Kieva* published a so-called order of the day of General Denikine, Commander-in-Chief of the White Army, declaring himself supreme chief of the armed forces on Ukrainian territory. His representative Colonel B., adorning himself with the uniform of the Imperial Army, presented himself without the slightest regard for etiquette to General Ragoza to inform him of the order of General Denikine and requested that the War Minister of the Ukraine would put himself at his disposal. The Minister was so taken aback that he began to assure the envoy of his loyalty to Russia and hastily gave his signature to prove his sincerity. The Russian officers living in Kiev took advantage of this incident to appear in the streets in their most brilliant uniforms of the old Russian Army and invited the population to decorate the city with the Imperial colours. It is unnecessary to say that the order was enthusiastically received by the population. The joke is that it was only a trick played by a Russian newspaper in Kiev, as this order of General Denikine had never existed.

648 642 The personality of the Hetman himself was also not very reassuring to the idea of Ukrainian independence. Here are the informations which were sent to Kiev on 30 May 1918 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich: 'In June 1914 Skoropadsky presented an *aide-mémoire* to the Imperial Government in which he denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, identifying them with the Russian people.' 'The whole Ukrainian

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movement is only the product of Austrian intrigues,' 648
he explained in this document. In July 1917, we are 642
also informed by this document, Skoropadsky published an open letter in which he called Kiev 'the centre of *Russian* culture,' and concluded that it would be necessary to take the initiative to 'unify all the *Russian* lands in a federal organism.'

All these testimonies show the illusory independence of the Ukraine under German occupation.[1] It is easy to understand that the Russian reactionary circles in the first place, and even other more moderate circles, should have considered the establishment of the Government of the Hetman, whose separatist convictions were more than doubtful, a happy event. The superficial Ukrainization, which continued more or less effectively under the fictitious power of the Rada, ceased almost completely under the Hetman. Only the official journal and some insignificant leaflets continued to be published in Ukrainian. Russian again became if not the official at least the semi-official language and the only one actually used in the administrative offices. The Russian circles considered the Government of the Hetman a provisional one which, supported by the Austro-German military forces and entrenched behind the fiction of an independent Ukraine, was able to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism. In their eyes the Government of the Ukraine was only a political and economic base for the future anti-Bolshevik movement in the whole Russian territory, able to serve as a springboard to the White

[1] All the documents which we quote here are contained in the book that appeared in Moscow in 1936 under the name of *The Failure of the German Occupation of the Ukraine*, a book which contains the secret correspondence of the Austro-German authorities in the Ukraine with their respective Governments. The Soviets of the soldiers of the Austro-German units in flight transmitted these documents of enormous value to the Soviet Government.

648 Army which was being organized in the territory of the
[642] Don Cossacks and in the Northern Caucasus. They were not far wrong. The Government of the 'Independent Ukraine,' considered to be anti-Russian, supplied the Volunteer Army,[1] on whose standards the device 'the one and indivisible Russia' was inscribed, with arms and ammunition. Entire trains proceeded to Rostov-on-Don, transporting officers, cadets, and civilians wishing to serve in the Volunteer Army. Even at Kiev the White military organization enjoyed a certain amount of liberty. A tacit collaboration developed under the half-sympathetic eyes of the central empires, between the command of the White Army and the Ukrainian Government of Kiev. This tolerance on the part of the Austro-Germans found its explanation in the imminence of their defeat on the western front. Thus Ukrainian politics and especially the support of Bolshevism which they considered an involuntary ally, having ranged Russia among the neutrals, no longer had any sense. The Austro-German authorities began to take an interest in the opponents of Communism and of Ukrainianism and even looked to the Don Cossack, with a view to collaboration, those same Cossacks who, though well organized since the October Revolution as an independent State, had never expressed the desire of separating from the Russian Empire.

642 The internal policy of the new Government, com-
727 pletely at the service of the forces of occupation, was
423 characterized by the support of private property and particularly of the landowners. This policy led to the proclamation of new laws regarding the return of estates to the landowners, of which they had been deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles of 1917.

[1] The name which was officially used by the White Army which, at the beginning, did not resort to any mobilization and only filled its ranks with volunteers.

deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles 642
of 1917. The application of these laws was followed 727
by violent repressions on the part of the Austro-German Army. Punitive expeditions against the peasants became very frequent and summary executions became general throughout the country. The hate of the peasant population was directed against the Austro-Germans and soon reached its peak. The soldiers of the armies of occupation no longer dared to go out after sunset, except in groups. Knives, directed by mysterious hands, frequently found the backs of Austro-German infantry men. The Civil War was in full blast. The Government, incapable of acting without looking for the support of the military forces of the invader, did not escape either hate or contempt and could only maintain itself until the complete reversal of the situation, which was not slow to come. The defeat of the German forces and the armistice forced the troops of occupation to leave Ukrainian territory. It is unnecessary to say that, hated by the popular masses, deprived of all support, and with a doubtful ideology of Ukrainian independence, the Hetman could not continue to govern. Also, as 668
soon as the Austro-German forces began to retire, revolutionary propaganda began to flood the Ukrainian country-side. The former Ukrainian politicians, dismissed from their posts after the establishment of the Hetmanate, put themselves at the head of this movement and received, at first, the unconditional support of the peasants and even of certain military units of the Austro-Germany Army in which the Galician element predominated. Thus, led by Simon Petlioura, the peasants 669
marched on Kiev in order to depose the Hetman. Received everywhere with enthusiasm, they had no difficulty in precipitating the retreat of the Austro-German troops, and rapidly occupied the greater part

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669 of Western Ukraine. On 14 December the Hetman had to flee from his capital, after having proclaimed, in an absolutely Platonic way and without achieving any concrete results, the re-incorporation of the Ukraine in Russia! At the same time the Soviet Government 726 annulled the peace of Brest-Litovsk and began troop movements, invading Northern Ukraine on their part. A third force, the White Volunteer Army and the Don Cossacks, also made their appearance on Ukrainian territory. These three forces fell upon the Ukraine and made her a battle-field.

Supported by the remainders of the Austro-Hungarian troops and supplied with war material abandoned by the retreating invaders, the forces of the Directorate (new name of the Ukrainian Provisional Government) seemed to be beginning to be in a privileged position. But the lack of officers, the bad administrative organization and, above all, the unpopularity of separatist Ukrainian ideas, tended to give success to the side of the Soviets, who were able to take control of the popular insurrectionary movement which had so far been in the hands of Petlioura. Soviet military historians, while recognizing the high qualities of the Russian counter-revolutionary army, note that among all the opponents of the Red Army the troops of the Directorate were distinguished by their low fighting effectiveness. On the other hand the rigid policy of General Denikine, chief of the Volunteer Army, prevented its union with the adherents of Petlioura, so as to form a single front against the Soviets. Thus the White General was fighting on two fronts, in the north against the Soviet troops and in the west against the Ukrainian troops. On their side the Ukrainians fought both against the Whites in the east and against the Reds in the north.

At the beginning of 1919 the Soviet offensive took

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place, which succeeded, towards the end of March of 726
the same year, in clearing the Ukraine of the troops of the Ukrainian Directorate.

Following closely after the routed Ukrainian troops, the Red Army penetrated into Volynia where it met the Polish troops commanded by General Haller. From the month of July the Soviet Army slowly began to retreat from Polish territory. At the same time, encouraged by the retreat of the Soviet forces, the troops of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' (Galicia), defeated by the Poles and united with Petlioura, made an incursion into Ukrainian territory. Though not friendly to the Poles, these troops had also no great desire to fight against the Russians, Red or otherwise, but the Directorate of Petlioura, which hoped to obtain a foothold in the Ukraine, ended their indifference by promises and threats.

At the same time the great offensive of Denikine was developing with amazing rapidity. In August Kiev was taken by assault, in the east by the Whites and in the south by the troops of Petlioura. The discussion between the two armies led to nothing and finally the Whites displaced the Ukrainians and pursued them towards the south-east. At the beginning of October 1919 the victory of the Whites seemed more and more probable. General Denikine held Kharkov, Odessa, and Kiev, while Petlioura, under pressure of the Whites, was fighting a retreating action in the direction of Galicia. He hoped for the support of Poland, which cost him his popularity in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasants. The struggles which, in 1919, soaked the 727
Ukraine in blood, crealled the Cossack insurrections of the seventeenth century by their atrocities. Thousands of inhabitants, and especially landowners, Jews, and German colonists, were massacred in a frightful manner

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727 by the troops of Petlioura. On their part the Soviet authorities took their vengeance in the towns and the country districts on hostages, in proceeding with mass executions of members of the middle classes, intellectuals, rich peasants, and clergy, while the Whites inaugurated the mass hanging of Communist leaders. The interval of the French occupation of Odessa, in April 1919, 669 changed nothing in the situation. The second counter-727 offensive of the Soviets, followed by still more atrocious massacres, ended in putting the whole Ukraine under Soviet domination at the end of the winter of 1920. The Whites, under the command of General Wrangel, entrenched themselves on the Crimean peninsula. The troops of Petlioura were again driven back towards Poland. From this moment a new phase of the Civil War begins in the Ukraine. Guerrilla fighting, led by chiefs of Ukrainian bands such as Makhno, Kosak, and others, known under the name of the *bat'ki* (the fathers), began. They had important forces at their disposal. Under the cover of political ideologies (Makhno was anarchist, the others 'Communists without Jews,' etc.) they devastated the rear of the Soviet front. The personnel of these bands was undoubtedly of peasant extraction. They were mostly the remnants of the Army of Petlioura which had succeeded, after his defeat, in filtering to the rear of the Soviet front. Until a long time after the establishment of the Soviet regime, these bands menaced the communications and disorganized the life of the country. Full-scale military operations would have been required to deal with the *bat'ki*. The Ukraine did not easily submit to Bolshevism.

648 In 1920 a last attempt of foreign intervention in Ukrainian affairs was undertaken by Marshal Pilsudski.

The defeat of the Central Powers led to the unchaining of the eternal struggle between the Ukrainians and the

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Poles. First the Galician question was raised immediately 648
after the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy (in October
1918). Following the example of all the nationalities
which had been a part of it, the Ukrainians of Galicia [642]
formed a national council at Lvov, which proclaimed the
independence of the Western Ukrainian Republic. After
the fall of Skoropadsky this new republic was eager to
unite with the Directorate of Petlioura. The Act of
Union was proclaimed in January 1919. But the Poles
did not think on the same lines. During the same 726
January 1919, Poles and Ukrainians already fought 648
each other furiously in the streets of Lvov. The arrival
of the Polish troops of General Haller, formed in
France, quickly turned the tide. A regular army of
80,000 men represented a very important force in
Eastern Europe where, from the Carpathians to the
Pacific, an immense territory was plunged into anarchy.
For General Haller there was no question of a Western
Ukrainian Republic, but only one of a Little Poland, a
simple province of the reborn Great Poland. As we
had already seen, the detachments of the Polish Army
of Haller threw themselves, in April of the same year,
against the vanguards of the Red Army. Recently
restored, the Polish State already claimed the frontiers
applying before the first partition, that is to say the
annexation of White Russia and the Ukraine up to the
Dnieper. While the Petliourians, the Reds, and the
Whites faced each other on both sides of the Dnieper,
the Poles seized the greater part of Volynia and of
White Russia and entered Minsk. But the Poles did not
seem to exploit their success, most probably in order
to give the Red Army the chance to destroy the White
Army which, in case of victory, might transform itself
into a national Russian Army, dangerous from the
point of the territorial pretensions of Great Poland.

648 While awaiting further developments, Poland occupied herself with the Ukraine.

While the Polish sympathies of Petlioura became more precise, an important, if not the best, part of his troops, recruited among the Galicians of the former Austrian regiments, united, in November 1919, with the Russian Volunteer Army. Later the Galician Army was involved in the general collapse of the Whites. But it had tried the only chance of rescuing the Western Ukraine from Polish domination. Petlioura, safe behind Polish bayonets, appeared as an instrument completely in the service of the new Poland and of her chief, Marshal Pilsudski.

728 648 In December 1919 the representative of Petlioura signed, in the name of the Ukraine, a first declaration which recognized the Polish sovereignty over Galicia, Podolia, and Volynia, a declaration which, on 21 April 1920, was supplemented by a secret treaty of alliance according to the terms of which the popular Ukrainian Republic confirmed the cession to the complete sovereignty of Poland of these lands, in all more than 150,000 square kilometres with almost six million inhabitants, in return for the recognition of Petlioura by Poland as chief of the Ukrainian Government. Poland promised, amongst other things, to support the creation of a Ukrainian State, which had become very small and only included a very narrow territory between the new Polish frontier, very advanced to the east, and the old Polish-Russian frontier of the time before the first partition. This secret treaty was supplemented by a military agreement, which was signed three days later. Its terms guaranteed the formation of allied Ukrainian units, which would be under Polish command, in the territory ceded to the Poles. The railways of the Ukrainian territory were to be entirely at the disposal

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of the Polish troops. No more than the secret convention did the military treaty foresee Polish help, except in the Ukraine on the right bank, which alone interested the Poles. The authors of these agreements were so well aware of the incompatibility of this treaty with the national sentiments of the Ukrainian people that they never dared to publish these acts. Even the members of the Directorate, apart from a few exceptions, were not informed of it. It is only in 1926 that this document was published by Professor S. Cheloukhine, a Ukrainian monarchist and former President of the Law Tribunal of Odessa under the Tsars.

After the signature of the military treaty on 7 May 1920 the Polish troops, followed by Petlioura, entered Kiev. The Polish domination over a large part of the Ukraine seemed re-established. But soon the divisions of the Red Cavalry, commanded by Boudenny,[1] marched towards the east and the Ukrainian peasants, despite their dislike of the Soviet regime, supported them with all means. The former Commander-in-Chief of the south-western front at the time of the Tsar, General Broussilov, proclaimed a national war against Poland and published an appeal to which, raised by a wave of patriotism, many thousands of Tsarist officers replied, though they would never have, till then, agreed to serve in the Soviet Army. We will be unable to study the details of the Russo-Polish War which saw Poland escape from disaster at the decisive battle under the walls of Warsaw.

After the defeat of Warsaw, Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Riga in 1921 and abandoned to Poland that Ukrainian territory which had been ceded to her by Petlioura—Eastern Galicia, Western Volynia, and Polesia. There can be no doubt that only the Soviet

[1] Former Cavalry Adjutant, to-day Marshal of the Soviet Union and Commander-in-Chief of the Moscow Military district.

728 Government, hostile in principle to everything connected with Russian national tradition, could put its signature on such a document, considered as an even greater national humiliation than the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Ukrainian separatist movement, doubly compromised by its agreements with the central empires and with Poland, foundered as a result of general contempt.

648 728 Soon the Allied Powers recognized the Polish domination over the whole of Galicia, at first as a temporary measure. It became definite on 15 March 1923. Poland agreed to establish an autonomous regime here, but this promise had never been honoured. From this date, too, Poland exercised her absolute power over a considerable part of the Ukrainian people.

000 The Soviet attitude to the Ukrainian question at that time is not of great interest and does not furnish new factors which could throw new light on the problem.

If Soviet policy with regard to this problem seems confused and inconsequent, this is so because it is not determined by a firm and well-established point of view, but by two factors which are outside this question: by the reaction of the Ukrainian population to the 'social experience' to which it is subjected and by the attitude of Germany and Poland to the Ukrainian problem.

642 Immediately after the establishment of Soviet rule on Ukrainian territory, and in full agreement with Marxist theories, the right of peoples to determine their own fate was proclaimed and naturally also affected the Ukraine, as every other member of the Soviet Union. Thus the Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine was founded. The Constitution even gave it the official right of ceding from the U.S.S.R. This is the official aspect. In practice the Ukraine became an integral part of the Soviet Union and completely dependent on the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

An important group of Ukrainian politicians, who had formerly supported Petlioura, joined the Bolshevik cause after his defeat. The Soviet Government inaugurated a policy of Ukrainization from the beginning in order to satisfy their ambitions and to show the world their nationalistic Liberalism. But, as under Petlioura, it was a superficial one and never penetrated in fact either into the private life of the citizens or into the sphere of education, or even into the administration.

Although Ukrainian had become the official language, nobody used it and correspondence between official institutions continued, with rare exceptions, in Russian. One of the authors of this book, who held an administrative post in a Soviet enterprise in the Ukraine from 1921 to 1924, had never written a single word in Ukrainian and had never been prosecuted for this defection. It is not because the word 'Odessa' is now written with one 's' instead of two and the word '*plochtchad*' (in Russian a town square) is to-day replaced by the word '*maidan*,' that the Ukraine has ceased to be Russia.

The policy of Ukrainization continued without great changes and in spite of the lack of common sense until 1927, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party suddenly decided to introduce the Russian language as the second official language. One can explain this sudden change by the development of separatist anti-Soviet propaganda, undertaken by secret organizations, formed under the protection of Poland. There occurred in the Ukraine the first wave of purification which was directed against the 'Nationalistic Chauvinists,' accused of spiritual connection with Galician 'counter-revolutionary' elements, which had been affected by the propaganda of Polish 'Fascists.'

The people's commissar for education of the Ukraine,

661 Choumsky, and a group of his friends had opposed this policy of the Central Government. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine accused Choumsky himself of 'spiritual connection' with the counter-revolutionaries of the Polish Ukraine and especially with the U.N.D.O., the most important among the Ukrainian political parties in Galicia and working under Polish influence. At that period one still didn't shoot Soviet Ministers. But Choumsky was forced to leave the Ukraine and to accept a small administrative post in Moscow.

186 To regain the initiative in the Ukrainian question, the
177 Executive Committee of the Comintern passed a resolution in November 1927 directing the Communist Party in the Polish Ukraine to struggle resolutely for the separation of this country from Poland and for its re-inclusion in the Soviet Ukraine.

On the other hand the inauguration of the first five-year plan, which strengthened the economic ties between the Ukraine and the rest of the Soviet Union, and the creation of the Red Army on a basis of discipline and of modern military science, made the use of Russian necessary throughout the whole Soviet territory.

669 This pro-Russian tendency did not last long. The forced collectivization of the land, undertaken in execution of the five-year plan, turned the Ukrainian peasantry against the Soviet Government. This resistance soon changed into a kind of civil war and became underlined by hundreds of thousands of deportations, by thousands of executions, and by a terrible famine.[1]

The resistance to collectivization, which was incompatible with the spirit and the vital interests of the

[1] See the work of Calvin B. Hoover: *Economic Life in Soviet Russia*, M.R.S., Paris, 1934, in which many pages are given to the question of collectivization.

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peasant proprietors, was so violent and seemed so 669
justified that it carried certain Communist circles of peasant extraction with it, and especially the former *borot'bistes* (Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries of the left) who had accepted the Soviet programme in 1917. A new and violent purifcation followed.

Fearing a connection between the discontent of the 186
peasants, the opposition within the party, and the 661
nationalist movement supported from abroad, the Soviet Government took Ukrainianism under its control in order to prevent its use by the opponents of collectivization as a weapon against the Soviet regime. This time Ukrainization was pushed to the extreme and was maintained by the huge apparatus of repression. In all the enterprises, and in workers' syndicates, special cells were formed for the propaganda of the Ukrainian language and for the rigorous control of the knowledge of Ukrainian, which had become the obligatory language, established by the officals. The number of Ukrainian teachers was increased, new Ukrainian theatres, clubs, and libraries were created in industrial centres. Russian newspapers were almost completely suppressed. Those who resisted Ukrainization were mercilessly expelled from the administration and everything was put under the direct control of a special commission of the Council of People's Commissars. To all the countless suppressions to which the Soviet citizens were subjected that of the Ukrainization was added.

The attempt to snatch Ukrainianism from the hands of circles socially opposed to the Soviet regime was not successful. A veritable nationalistic anti-Soviet propaganda spread everywhere, supported by the officials of the regime. Then came the second change of policy. 661
Two trials, one of the 'Union for the Deliverance of the Ukraine' and the other of the 'National Centre'

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661 took place. From the darkness which characterizes all the Soviet political trials came a beam of light showing the anti-Ukrainian reaction of the general line of the party.

Nevertheless the XVIth Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. had still declared in June 1930 that the 'Pan-Russian Chauvinism' was always 'the principal danger during the present phase.' This declaration was voted for by the Congress after the long speech of Stalin himself, a speech consecrated to 'Soviet Culture,' 'proletarian at its foundation and national in its forms.'

It was in 1933 that the great purification of the Communist Party of the Ukraine took place, with the object of eliminating 'Ukrainian chauvinism.' The instigator of the nationalist opposition, the people's commissar Skrypnik, committed suicide in July, preferring an honest death to a bullet in the back of the neck, preceded by 'spontaneous confessions.' In November, at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the question of the direct relations between the group of Skrypnik and the 'Polish Fascists' was openly discussed. Kossior had even declared that the 'Ukrainian nationalists hidden within the Communist Party' had been in contact with the U.N.O., the terrorist group of Ukrainian *émigrés* led by Colonel Konovaletz (recently assassinated by the G.P.U. at Rotterdam). The question of a Ukrainian organization (U.V.O.), which was said to have been discovered some months before in Soviet territory, was also raised. According to Postychev, the forced Ukrainization of the schools, carried out by Skrypnik, had opened the way for the 'chauvinists' who had profited by it in order to penetrate into various branches of the Soviet administration in pursuing the aim of detaching the Ukraine from the U.S.S.R.

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And for the first time it was said, at this plenary assembly of November 1933, that 'for the moment' the enemy No. 1 in the Ukraine is no longer Pan-Russian chauvinism but Ukrainian chauvinism. 661

The suicide of Skrypnik brought hundreds of his collaborators to the cellars of the G.P.U. at Kharkov. The leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party was given to Postychev, a man in the confidence of Stalin, and of Great Russian origin. He was given two tasks, to purify the Communist Party of elements suspected of sympathies with Ukrainian nationalism, and to check the sabotage by peasants in the *kolkhoses* (collective agricultural enterprises), the new forms of agricultural exploitation. Postychev successfully achieved the first task. More than a quarter of the Communists were expelled from the party and nearly the whole leading personnel was replaced.

As for the second task, despite the bloody suppressions, the war between the Ukrainian peasants and the Soviet Government continued, taking the form of a definite refusal to collaborate with the Soviets. This refusal led to a fall of agricultural production and to a famine, formerly unknown.

As the so-called 'Nationalist' movement was nothing else but an expression of the anti-Soviet social movement, the 'chauvinism' of which was only a pretext, the effects of the purification undertaken by Postychev were soon reduced to nil. Again executions were resumed, followed by very many suicides of Ministers, among whom were two Presidents of the Council. Finally Postychev himself was dismissed, being accused of a lack of energy and vigilance.

In November 1933 Kossior, the successor of Postychev at the head of the Ukrainian general secretariat of the party, declared that Ukrainization had given the National

661 Oppositionists of the party the opportunity of releasing a veritable 'Petliourization' of the peasant class and of the small town-dwellers, aiming at the separation of the Ukraine from the U.S.S.R.

648 Since 1936, as a reaction to the policy of the Reich, which tended to unite the different Ukrainian movements under its guidance, the Soviet Government adopted a new Ukrainian policy the official thesis of which was the *brotherly union of the Ukrainian and Great Russian people, as bequeathed by history.*

197 To-day we observe an attempt at bringing the Ukrainian and Russian languages closer together. Ukrainian is being purged of its Polonisms and its Germanisms, imported from Galicia, which 'the enemies of the people' had tried to implant in the Soviet Ukraine. A system which tends to awaken and to maintain Russian national pride has been inaugurated. The victory of Poltava is no longer the victory of a Tsar who oppressed his people, but the liberation of the Ukrainian workers from the Swedish and Polish aggressors.

000 To sum up, among all the countries subjected to the 'social experiments' by the heirs of Lenin, the Ukraine bows to them with far greater difficulty than the others. In this she seems to be the obvious prey of separatism, led by foreigners, the declared enemies of her people.

The Soviet Government is alone responsible for the existence of this separatism, which cannot be justified from any point of view and is foreign to the spirit and the interests of the Ukrainian people.

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[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

CHAPTER VI

THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM TO-DAY

IF before the Great War Galicia was the home of the Ukrainian movement, and if since 1917 the first landmark of the new Ukrainian State was erected in the Russian part of the Ukraine, it is since 29 September 1938 that the tiny Sub-Carpathian Russia was invested with the role of a 'new Ukrainian Piedmont.' How did this come about? How could a country, linked with Hungary during seven centuries, though sentimentally tied to Russia, become this new 'Piedmont'? /175

We know that during the Great War the Carpatho-Russian people showed their attachment to the Russian cause almost openly, which exposed them to the severest repressions on the part of the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The inter-allied agreements of the time of the war, in giving Russia full liberty of establishing her new frontier with Austro-Hungary, seemed to have prepared the annexation of this small country by Russia.

The Russian Revolution, and the anarchy which followed, rendered these arrangements void. President Masaryk mentions the following in his memoirs:

'The collapse of Russia made the annexation of Sub-Carpathian Russia by the Czechoslovak Republic possible. First it was only a hope, but when I was in Russia, and particularly in the Ukraine, I was forced to give my attention to this plan.'

Immediately after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary the Czech legions were eager to occupy the western

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[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

175 part of Carpathian Russia—the district of Priachev. On 9 January 1919 this district was purely and simply annexed by Slovakia, which had herself become an integral part of the young Czechoslovak Republic.

In the other, the greater part of Carpathian Russia, power had fallen into the hands of the Russian national committees which remained in constant contact with the representatives elected by the Carpatho-Russian *émigrés* of America. This American delegation played a decisive role in the events which followed. Greatly attached to the national Russian cause, it nevertheless bowed to circumstances in recognizing the impossibility, owing to the situation in Russia, of uniting the Carpathian country to the Russian State. And it is thus that the Carpatho-Russian committees accepted, on 16 May 1919, the decisive resolution :

'Sub-Carpathian Russian forms an autonomous State within the Czechoslovakian Republic.'

It was this solution—the inclusion of Sub-Carpathian Russia as an autonomous entity in the Czechoslovakian State—which was expressly ratified by the peace treaties. Articles 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Treaty of St. Germain established in effect the international status of Carpathian Russia :

Czechoslovakia accepted the proposal of the powers of the *entente* which aimed at endowing Sub-Carpathian Russia with the largest possible autonomy (Article 10). She undertook to give her a Diet freely elected by the population as well as a local administration responsible to the Diet (Article 11). The officials of the State in Sub-Carpathian Russia were to be natives of the country and the Carpatho-Russian people were to be fairly represented in the common Parliament of the republic (Articles 12 and 13).

This statute, guaranteed by the powers of the *entente*,

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was never put into operation, notwithstanding the repeated demands of Carpatho-Russian organizations which even tried, but in vain, to seize the Secretariat to the League of Nations. 175

Unfortunately for the Czechoslovakian State and for Europe, the Government of Prague showed itself extremely distrustful of all Russian national tendencies. Not only was the autonomous Diet never summoned, but the Czech authorities neglected, moreover, the international obligation to recruit the administrative staffs among the native population. According to an *aide-mémoire* presented to the League of Nations in 1923, there were 1213 Czech officials of the Ministry of Finance in Sub-Carpathian Russia against only 77 Russians, 272 Czech officials of the Ministry of Interior against 45 Russians, and 14 Czechs of the Ministry of Health against 2 Russians, etc.

Such a situation made collaboration between Russians and Czechs very difficult. It soon ended in the resignation of the first governor of the country, M. Jatkovitch, of Russian sympathies, who had played a very important role in the inclusion of Sub-Carpathian Russia in Czechoslovakia.

But it was not only the Czech officials who made their appearance in large numbers in the land of the Carpathians. Distrusting the Russians, the Government of Prague clearly favoured Ukrainian tendencies. Masaryk himself mentioned in his memoirs that he viewed with 'the greatest sympathy the efforts which aim at the introduction of the Little Russian language in the schools and the administration' of Sub-Carpathian Russia. The popular masses were completely strange to this Ukrainian movement and one attempted to implant it in the Carpathians with the help of *émigrés*, mostly from Galicia. The Russian Press of the Carpathians never

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175 ceased to disclose the favourable conditions enjoyed by these foreign elements to whom the Czechoslovakian Government was quite ready to entrust public education in preference to Russians.

Thus Ukrainization nevertheless remained without appreciable results, when in 1937 the Czechoslovakian Government undertook a referendum in Sub-Carpathian Russia in order to establish the desires of the population concerning the choice of the language of instruction in primary schools; 82 per cent of the votes were given for the Russian language and only 18 per cent for Ukrainian. Even if we admit that this referendum had no political character, one would have to believe that the figures which resulted correspond to the facts.

A few days before the events of September 1938 the Czechoslovakian Government decided to inaugurate a federal policy and appointed the President of the 'Russian Agrarian Union,' Brody, as chief of the Government of Sub-Carpathian Russia. But as soon as the Munich agreements were signed the German Government demanded a change of political direction of this Cabinet. For a short while yet Brody remained at the head of the Cabinet of Sub-Carpathian Russia, but he was supplemented by two Ukrainian Ministers. In October a new change put an end to the power of the Russian party.

Under the growing pressure of the Reich, Czechoslovakia established a new Government in Sub-Carpathian Russia, presided over by Monsignor Volochine, of Ukrainian sympathies and with pro-German tendencies. Volochine proclaimed an 'Autonomous Sub-Carpathian Ukraine,' thus conforming to the German plan which tended to the creation of a Ukrainian springboard which was required by the policy of the *Drang nach Osten*. The installation of this Government was

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in clear contradiction to the aspirations of the people. 175
Actually, in 1937, during the last relatively free elections to the Czechoslovakian Parliament, the Russian block, called the 'Russian Agrarian Union,' had obtained 120,000 votes against 40,000 Ukrainian votes of the party of Monsignor Volochine.

Always pursuing their anti-Russian policy, the agents of Monsignor Volochine denounced Brody to the Government of Prague, accusing him of high treason to Czechoslovakia, and insinuated that he had had the intention of uniting Sub-Carpathian Russia to Hungary. Brody was imprisoned, but had to be freed in February 1939 as the tribunal had pronounced his case not proven. But Volochine was already strongly in power, supported by Revay, a partisan of the close union with Germany and a former social democratic deputy of the Hungarian Parliament, who had become one of the active members of the 'Ukrainian National Union,' 'U.N.O.,' a terrorists' organization whose headquarters are at Berlin.

Prague and Berlin already sheltered numerous Ukrainian *émigrés*, since the union of Galicia and Poland, and especially the members of the U.N.O. who, as soon as the New Ukraine was proclaimed, moved to Ujhorod, an ancient medieval city, the capital of Sub-Carpathian Russia, to reinforce the ranks of militant Ukrainianism. The population, poor and often inert and illiterate, did not participate in any Ukrainian political movement.

The installation of the Ukrainian Government was immediately followed by the inauguration of Hitlerist methods in the country. Semi-military organizations, formed on the model of the S.A., took over the direction of public affairs. The new methods were applied to the elections to the Ukrainian Diet, the results of which were astounding: 92 per cent of the votes were given to the Ukrainians, whose candidates figured on the one

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175 and only list, that of Volochine. It seems to us superfluous to insist on the impossibility of so rapid a change of public opinion, especially as no serious propaganda whatever had taken place before the installation of the new Government.

In order to have an idea of the new regime it is curious to note that the land, whose population does not exceed 600,000 people, saw itself endowed with three concentration camps in which all those were locked up who were Russians at heart and did not want to submit to this political farce.

During the period which passed between the Munich agreement and the annexation of Czechoslovakia by Germany, Sub-Carpathian Russia underwent the amputation of a narrow strip of her territory, along the Hungarian border, which was given to the latter together with the ancient capital, the town of Ujhorod.

As a reaction to the policy of Ukrainization of the Czechoslovakian Government, the Hungarians were eager to adopt a pro-Russian policy in the parts of Sub-Carpathian Russia which fell to them. The Russian schools were re-established and Ujhorod and Mukacevo returned to their ancient role of Russian cultural centres.

The Russian deputies of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, who represented the regions given to Hungary, and, in the first instance, Fenczik, the leader of the Russian Fascist Party, automatically became deputies of the Magyar Parliament.

It is curious to note that at the same time as the blue and yellow flag of the Ukraine was raised over the new autonomous Ukrainian republic, the tricolour flag of Imperial Russia is the only one authorized in the Hungarian part.

Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, deprived of the only big town, Ujhorod, had to establish a provisional capital at

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[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

Chust, a place which is no more than a hamlet, and 175
which has not even got a railway station. In this improvised capital the innumerable manifestations of the military force of the Ukrainian movement were displayed every day with the habitual pomp of Hitlerist mass meetings.

The scandal and the abuses of the last elections, the arbitrariness and brutality of the men of the *Sitch* (the name of the Ukrainian S.A.), obliged the Czechoslovakian Government to undertake measures for curbing the too clamorous activity of the blue-yellow Hitlerists, which was becoming too compromising.

The Czech general, Prhala, known for his Russian sympathies, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Czech troops stationed in the Ukrainian territory and entered as such into the Cabinet of Monsignor Volochine. At the same time Revay was dismissed. This operation did not please the German Government, which saw one of its most fervent adepts in Revay.

It is only after the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia and the establishment of the protectorate by the Reich in Slovakia and the occupation of Sub-Carpathian Russia by the Hungarian Army, that Ukrainian activities ended on its territory.

To-day we do not know yet what the immediate future of this country will be. It is more than probable that, once rejoined to Hungary, every expression of the Ukrainian movement will be suppressed, and the partisans of the Russian culture and spirit will again return to the direction of the land.

This seems to us the more likely as the Ukrainian movement was severely suppressed in Poland, the loyal ally of Hungary. This latter will never allow the inauguration of a movement on her territory which could one day be considered as being against the interests of Poland.

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[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

175 At a first glance the pro-Russian movement seems equally dangerous in the eyes of the Poles. But if the Ukrainian movement has a clearly political character the russophile movement in Sub-Carpathian Russia never raises the question of the return to Russia, but limits itself to the expression of its cultural aspirations.

The official indifference of the Reich to the suppression of the 'Sub-Carpathian Ukraine,' which had been created by it, seems astonishing. Is it because Germany has acknowledged that the 'Piedmont' had been badly chosen and had no chance whatever of becoming a serious Ukrainian springboard? Recent events would seem to indicate much wider plans. Or is it because for the moment she considers it inconvenient to take up an openly hostile position towards Hungary? It seems that the influential members of the U.N.O., disconcerted by the attitude of the Reich, hurriedly left Germany to find refuge elsewhere. The near future will throw light on this enigma. The scale of events is growing.

. . . . .

000 The following three factors have put the Ukrainian problem in the forefront of to-day's international politics:

1. The development of the German dynamic initiative which seeks to assure a new living space and to open a path towards the east.

2. The Soviet power which finds itself to-day the master of Russia, but which shows itself of being incapable of sufficiently influencing the situation in Eastern Europe by its actions and of giving it permanent equilibrium.

3. Polish events.

The idea of a German hold on the Ukraine was inaugurated during the Great War, if not earlier, and has

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survived the downfall of the Central Powers in 1918. 000 During the session of the Peace Conference, Erzberger declared to the Constituent Assembly at Weimar:

"We need Lithuania and the Ukraine, who are destined to become the vanguards of Germany. If, on the other hand, we keep Poland, we shall be able to close all the doors which lead to Russia. Russia will be ours. Is there anyone who would not understand that it is there that the future of Germany lies?

That was already the programme which was later again taken up and amplified by National Socialism.

We have seen the role played by the German intellectuals of the Baltic Provinces in the elaboration of the plans of the dismemberment of pre-Great War Russia. It was also a Baltic *émigré*, a former Russian subject, Alfred Rosenberg, who is the real inspirer of *Ostpolitik*, 'the eastern policy' of the Third Reich.

Born in 1893 at Reval, he began his studies at the Technical University of Riga, which was evacuated to Moscow during the Great War. Having thus lived in the old Russian capital during the first years of the Revolution, he left Russia in 1919 and settled in Munich. There he soon joined the National Socialist movement which was only just beginning to form.

During the first years there were only two men in the immediate entourage of the Fuehrer capable of influencing the formation of his views on international politics. One was Scheubner-Richter, his most brilliant lieutenant during the whole early period, a European who was widely open to all ideas and was deeply pro-Russian. The other was Rosenberg. Scheubner-Richter was killed by a bullet at Hitler's side during the attempted insurrection of 8 November 1923 at Munich. Rosenberg remained.

Director of the *Voelkischer Beobachter*, the official

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000 paper of the party, since 1925, and chief of the Foreign Affairs office of the party after the capture of power, and entrusted since with the national education of the German people, Rosenberg is considered to-day in Germany as the most eminent representative of the National Socialist philosophy. His writings formed part of the school instruction, and the whole of German youth is thus impregnated with his ideas.

Rosenberg hates Russia, both in her Christian as well as her Bolshevik form. He hates her traditions, her history, her literature, her statesmen, and her poets. And he considers the Ukraine the key to all international questions. In all his writings he constantly returns to this. Charles XII of Sweden, who was the first in the West to have the idea of detaching the Ukraine from Russia, is his favourite hero.

In his book, *The Paths and the Aims of the Foreign Policy of Germany*, published by the party in 1925, Rosenberg devotes a leading place to the Ukraine. He speaks of her as the principal bastion which the 'Nordic race' needs against 'mongoloid' Russia and as an essential economic base required by Germany as a support against 'negroid' France. He affirms that the Ukraine is an integral part of Central Europe and at the same time a natural agricultural adjunct of industrialized Germany. According to him the Ukraine must serve as a link between Germany and Great Britain. 'British India has to be protected on the western frontier of Russia,' and it is Germany which, in seizing the Ukraine, would take the responsibility of administering the mortal blow to Russian power.

This book of Rosenberg was accepted as the official programme of the foreign policy of the party by the National Socialist Congress at Nuremberg in 1926.

'Germany, as a racial and national State, will be the

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central power on the Continent and will protect the whole south and south-east of Europe,' he writes in his other book, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*. 'As to Russia, she has to content herself with a reduced role, while moving her centre of gravity towards Asia.'

In the chapters of *Mein Kampf* consecrated to international policy, Hitler is the echo of the ideas of Rosenberg. This is the essential proposition :

'When we speak of new territories in Europe, we first of all think of Russia and of the border countries which depend on her. It seems that fate shows us our path. Delivered over to Bolshevism, Russia has fatally lost the intellectual layer which had founded and which safeguarded her political existence. Because the organization of a Russian State is far from being the result of the political talents of the Slavonic element in Russia, it is only a striking example of the constructive political activity of the Germanic elements active among an inferior race. It is thus that many empires in the world were founded. During the centuries the power of Russia was supported by the Germanic element which constituted its ruling upper layers. This racial kernel can be considered as almost completely destroyed. The Jew has put himself in its place. The immense empire of the east is ready to fall and the end of the Jewish domination in Russia will be the end of the Russian State.'

Long before the advent of power, the National Socialist Party closely followed the evolution of the Ukrainian movement. In 1924 Rosenberg put a new pretender to the crown of the Ukraine forward in the person of M. Poltawetz-Ostranitza, a former colonel of the Russian Army, who willingly lent himself to the German schemes. After having caused a small stir, the affair was compromised by some rather doubtful

000 financial affairs which must have involved the National Socialist Party in expense rather than profit. In the course of the following years contacts were established with various separatist groups who were active in Polish Ukraine. Here the personality of M. Motz, collaborator and intimate friend of Rosenberg, was often in the forefront. He was active in the Ukrainian Press of Galicia.

It was particularly difficult to realize a union between the different Ukrainian separatist groups. The attempts which emanated from Berlin failed all the more as the Ukrainian democrats, traditionally the most influential in Galicia, regarded the German 'Fascism' with some distrust. After some hesitation the hopes of M. Rosenberg and those of the National Socialist Party were centred on the ex-Hetman Skoropadsky, who was living in Berlin since his flight from Kiev.

After the seizure of power the National Socialists were still more preoccupied with the Ukrainian question. Since the spring of 1933 lectures are being held at the villa of General Skoropadsky at Wannsee, at which the most important personalities of the party such as Rosenberg, Goebbels, and Kube, who was the chief of the eastern section of the propaganda office and who has since committed suicide, attend. Roehm was amongst the most frequent guests, which made one think, after the drama of 30 June, that the eclipse of Skoropadsky was at hand. But it did not happen, as his connections with the National Socialist Party were sufficiently strong.

All the meetings did not, however, end in the reconciliation of the different Ukrainian tendencies. The primitive plan of bringing about Skoropadsky's acknowledgment by all the other groups was abandoned. But the Government of the Reich nevertheless obtained the

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assurance of collaboration from most of these Ukrainian groups.

Far more important were the talks which the Government of Hitler began with Poland and which ended in the German-Polish agreement of January 1934. According to the official Note recently published by the Polish agency 'Iskra' (May 1939) one can have no further doubts about the purpose at the time of the propositions which the Third Reich suggested to Poland—the partition of Russia into spheres of influence including White Russia, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus.

At the same time the Reich played the role of mediator between the Ukrainians of Galicia and the Polish Government. In fact there was a possibility of a common German-Polish action, aiming at the separation of the Soviet Ukraine from Russia. This made the Ukrainians of Galicia forget the floods of blood and the centuries of struggle which are such a barrier between them and Poland. Thus the official paper of the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, *Dilo*, wrote in November 1936 on the subject of a Polish-German agreement:

'The Soviets are endangered by the partition. Poland is faced by the following dilemma: She must either be a passive observer of the play of forces which work for the bringing about of a change of balance in the east of Europe, or she must associate with those who aspire to establish a new balance. As for us other Ukrainians, we are proved and intransigent revisionists. We only wish for an international agreement which would eliminate the Soviets.'

Moscow realized clearly that the German-Polish agreement of 1934 was based on ambitions directed towards the Soviet Ukraine. Henceforth the policy of the U.S.S.R. aimed at detaching the Ukrainians of Galicia from their chiefs, who had become pro-Polish and

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000 pro-German, in order to raise a Ukrainian movement in Poland which could have the support of the Soviet Ukraine. This question was openly discussed by the Soviet Press and even by the VIIIth Congress of the Communist International in August 1935.

On the German side one also did not make any mystery of the real aims of the German-Polish agreement. Thus a book which was especially recommended by the Ministry of Propaganda at Berlin, and whose author was Hermann Stegemann, contains this remarkable sentence:

'Thanks to this agreement, Poland has obtained a greater liberty of political action in the east. As for Germany, she is at present able to inaugurate a mutual movement towards the east and south-east. This perspective is of great importance.'

German writers, such as Paul Richter, have already published books devoted to the 'Enlarged Third Reich,' which groups around it and under its rule a federated Central Europe. According to M. Richter, the eastern frontier of this 'Mittel Europa' would begin at the Lake of Ladoga, east of St. Petersburg, would descend towards the south, then a little to the west of Moscow, and would then go on towards the south-east, to finish at the mouth of the Don. The whole of White Russia, enlarged up to Smolensk and, naturally, the whole Ukraine, would thus be included in the German 'living space.'

Even such a considered thinker as M. Schacht has spoken semi-openly of the division of the Ukraine between Poland and Germany as a natural and imminent thing, during his negotiations at Basle in November 1936.

We will cite two statements made fifteen years ago, one in the review *Deutsche Politik* of 19 April 1918: 'Agricultural Ukraine can become an excellent adjunct

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to the highly developed industry of the central empires,' 000 and the other in August 1933 in *Volk und Reich*: 'If one admits that the idea of the decomposition of the giant empire of the Tsars is of profit to Germany, one must pursue this idea to the end and dismember Eastern Europe in accordance with its ethnic elements.' These two extracts serve to illustrate the German point of view on the Ukrainian problem very clearly. The hostility of the Ukrainian people to the Soviet regime, which was imposed against their will and by force on the one hand, as well as the impossibility of intervention by the Soviet Government as permanent protector of the Russian people from the German attack, for military and social reasons, as had been the case under the Tsars, on the other hand favour the hopes of the Reich of becoming the master of the Ukrainian movement and of directing it in its own interests. Germany favours the idea of a Great Ukraine, from the Caucasus to Hungary, allied with her in economic and military matters.

The attitude of Poland to the Ukrainian problem was far more complex than that of Germany. Since 1920 Poland became a big State, placed between the Russian and the German worlds, and could not, despite its promise and international treaties, give autonomy to her minorities which represented more than 30 per cent of her population, of whom 6,500,000 were Ukrainians. Praiseworthy though Polish national sentiment may be, as also its military and civic virtues and its heroic past, the role of a great power is beyond the strength of this brave nation. Poland could not retain the minorities within her frontier without applying a police regime of repression in their territories, which absorbed a part of her national energy, whose real aims ought to have been economic restoration and the resistance to German pressure.

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000 If the Polish State at the beginning of its existence had supported the Ukrainian movement of Russian origin (Petlioura), it was only in order to assure an ally against Russia and to establish the path which would lead to the creation of the Great Poland within the frontiers which applied before the first partition of 1772.

As a result of the rigid centralization of the Polish State, and of the continual suppression, cultural and religious, of the Ukrainian people, as well as a result of the historic atavism which prevented the cohabitation of Ukrainians and Poles (as long as the world is the world, a Pole will not be brother to a Ukrainian, the chronicler already said in the sixteenth century), the tolerance which was shown from time to time in the Polish policy in Galicia could change nothing in the general state of affairs.

In 1935, under pressure of the Reich, the coalition of a Ukrainian parliamentary block composed of members of the 'U.N.D.O.' (Ukrainian Popular Democratic Union), a moderate party, and of the Polish National Party called the 'Party of the Colonels,' was brought about in tune with the principle of the complete loyalty of the Ukrainians within the framework of the Polish State.

Nevertheless this coalition did not last long as the popular Ukrainian masses did not agree to any loyal collaboration with the secular oppressors. It is especially interesting to note that as soon as the regime of oppression exercised with regard to the Ukrainian population was slightly slackened, the ethnical frontier between the Ukrainians and the Poles in mixed regions[1] (as, for example, the region of Kholm) immediately moved towards the west and cut into the Polish part.

The Munich agreements, the accentuation of the

[1] See Map No. 4.

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German menace as well as the rapid depolonization of the mixed regions, forced the Polish Government to return to the policy of repressions. This time, applied with an unheard-of violence, it was not only directed against the Ukrainian organizations but equally against the Orthodox Church and even the Uniats.

The military authorities of the frontier guard (KOP) everywhere took precedence over the civil administration of the eastern regions of Poland, the most moderate representatives of which were obliged to resign, as for example the *voievode* of Volynia, Jozefski, who had exerted himself during many years in establishing confident co-operation between the native population and the Polish State.

At the same time, by an agreement signed with the Vatican on 20 June 1938 and ratified on 6 July of the same year, the Polish Government made a present of 12,000 hectares of agricultural land and of an undefined number of churches belonging to Orthodox religious communities to the Catholic Church of the Latin rite. This mass expropriation was legally only aimed at the churches which had once belonged to the Latin Church. But the protest formulated last summer by the Russian deputies of the Polish Parliament has established beyond doubt that not less than ninety-eight Orthodox churches, expropriated according to this agreement, were never formerly dedicated to the Latin cult.

On the other hand, while expropriating a great number of Orthodox churches, the Polish authorities also started to demolish others. According to the protest of the Russian deputies mentioned above, not less than a hundred Orthodox churches were thus demolished by the Polish authorities in Western Ukraine during the course of June 1938. These demolitions were sometimes undertaken under the pretext that an 'excessively

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000 large' number of buildings of the Orthodox Church were said to exist. In other cases the churches were destroyed without any pretext. To sum up, the Orthodox population of the palatinate of Lioublin did not keep more than 54 churches of the 340 which it had previously possessed. The Orthodox priests were imprisoned or condemned to fines for no other reason than that they had preached in Russian or in Ukrainian (instead of Polish).

But let us allow the Polish Press to speak for itself. After having accomplished a journey of study in the Polish Ukraine, Mme Emzet tells us the following in the *Kurjer Powszechny :*

'I have returned morally shattered. If someone would have told me a few years ago that such things could happen in Poland, I should have treated him as a despicable slanderer. We have returned to a far-away past. The trials of dissenters (non-Catholics), which one thought had been buried for ever, are about to be revived. Those who ought to be most concerned about the welfare of the Polish Republic are raising two enemies against each other within these frontiers. . . . The civic peace of our State depends at this moment on the maturity and the moderation of the Orthodox agriculturalist. You can only imagine what will happen when this almost illiterate peasant will repay with the same coin for the " good " which one has done for him.'

This is also the opinion of M. Cat-Mackewicz, the director of the daily Ultra-Nationalist Polish *Slovo* (of Vilna). He shows that, apart from the official demolishing of Orthodox churches, a certain number of them were destroyed by dynamite by 'unknown persons' who have never been found. He has himself visited the district in which one of these 'incidents' took place. This was at Molodetchno where an Orthodox chapel

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had been destroyed during the night. 'On leaving for Molodetchno,' he writes, 'I was convinced that this was the work of a Bolshevik rascal. My indignation and shame were deep when I heard the inhabitants of Molodetchno say, with a strange smile: "No, these were certainly not Bolsheviks. . . . For nearly a year there has been much talk of depriving the Orthodox of this chapel."'

The indignation of the population and of the clergy which was provoked by the closing of the Orthodox parish schools, by the destruction with dynamite of the Orthodox churches, and by the mass arrests of the Ukrainian clergy, spread over the whole country.

Even a Uniat-Orthodox block was formed against this Polish policy.

Monsignor Szepticki, Uniat Archbishop of Galicia, has published a circular which was later confiscated by the Polish authorities, against the religious repressions undertaken by the Polish Government.

The U.N.D.O. was eager to denounce collaboration with the Polish Government party, but it could no longer regain its old authority in the eyes of the population, which made the position of the extremist parties stronger, among them the 'U.N.O.,' all under German direction.

Disturbances spread over the whole Galician territory and especially to Lvov, where a state of siege was proclaimed. Troops were massed in the frontier regions. The situation remained tense.

Thus, unfortunately, Polish duplicity in the Ukrainian question, a duplicity which was manifested by the violent repression of everything Ukrainian in Poland and by the support of the Ukrainian movement in Russia, characterized Polish policy during twenty years.

Since the annexation of Sub-Carpathian Russia by

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000 Hungary and the suppression of the artificial 'Ukrainian Piedmont,' there is no longer a Ukrainian problem in Hungary. As for Rumania, the Ukrainian problem is only a simple one of minorities, much less important than that of the Hungarian and above all the Russian minorities. The Russian question is at the same time that of Bessarabia, which is in no way linked with Rumania and which is a simple province of the New Russia and the indisputable patrimony of the Russian State.

Poland was a natural and declared enemy of the independence of the Ukraine, and if she supported the Ukrainian movement beyond her frontiers it was with the aim of preparing the possibility of establishing herself, at a suitable moment, on the right bank of the Dnieper and of giving herself an outlet on the Black Sea. This outlet could have been a counterweight to the instability of her possessions on the shores of the Baltic, coveted by the Germans.

Ukrainian politicians who look for German or Polish support in the realization of Ukrainian independence cannot be sure of serving the interests of their country.

The Ukrainian movement does not exist in Polish Galicia as a national movement, although it is clearly justified there by reason of the unbearable oppression of religion, culture, and dignity to which the Ukrainian people were subjected. The new Poland will be stronger without this thorn in its side.

. . . .

To conclude let us glance at the various Ukrainian groups which exist to-day. There are very many, in Galicia and especially among Ukrainian *émigrés* 'conscious of their nationality.' And the relations between these various groups leave much to be desired.

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It is the U.N.O., the National Ukrainian Organization, already mentioned several times, which is distinguished among the others by its pronounced fighting spirit. It sprang in about 1925 from *émigré* circles which originally hoped for an active struggle against Soviet Communism. Colonel Konovaletz, who re-grouped these activist circles and became their chief, gradually gave them another objective and one which was essentially anti-Polish. Galicia became the special preserve of this new activity of the U.N.O., which was only able to exist illegally on Polish territory. The greater part of the terrorist attempts executed by Ukrainians against Polish political personalities in Galicia were its work. From the beginning the U.N.O. was inspired by Fascist ideas and long before 1933 it was looking for German support. After the advent of Hitler to power the U.N.O. derived great advantage from the new political situation. It was this organization which played the decisive role in the ill-founded 'Sub-Carpathian Ukraine.' And when the Reich authorities were in search of a 'Fuehrer' for the Ukrainians living in Germany, it was this organization which again succeeded in bringing about the choice of one of its members by the Germans. It was M. Souchko who, since, has the official privilege of controlling his compatriots by police methods.

The U.N.O., an organization of Fascist tendencies, is fiercely hostile to the 'Monarchists' who group themselves round the Hetman Skoropadsky and more especially round his son, the young 'Hetmanytch' Danilo, whose political role is becoming increasingly more active. The U.N.O. and the partisans of the Hetmanate are competing for the favours of the German Government which, while supporting the U.N.O., had not dropped Skoropadsky in the summer of 1939. The 'Ukrainian Monarchist movement,' which had no real

000 adherents abroad before 1933, enjoys to-day a noticeable success among Ukrainian emigrants. The journey which the 'Hetmanytch' Danilo had undertaken last year to Canada and the United States, as well as recent visits to other countries, seem to have secured him a certain amount of help among Ukrainians in America who, mostly emigrated from Galicia long before the war, form numerous and prosperous colonies in that country.

An ugly story had, however, harmed the reputation of M. Skoropadsky outside Germany. Those who have read the law reports in London in 1935 will remember the trial which took place in connection with an English philanthropist, Mr. Tufnell, against Mr. Korostovetz, who, coming from Berlin, made propaganda in London in the name and for the benefit of the Hetman. It concerned the question of a big enterprise which aimed at the collection of the necessary funds for the deliverance of the Ukraine—an enterprise of which Mr. Tufnell became a leading champion and which, in 1933 and 1934, gave, it is believed, not less than £30,000. The trial apparently resulted from an inquiry which, so it seems, Mr. Tufnell had instituted in Berlin in order to make sure of the purpose for which the money was used and which seemed to have led to further steps in court against Messrs. Skoropadsky and Korostovetz at the instance of some creditors. No verdict was, however, given, as the case was withdrawn during the course of the trial and a settlement was reached out of court.

Apart from the Ukrainian opinion of the right, represented by the U.N.O. and the 'Hetmanists,' there still exist a large number of Ukrainian groups of more or less democratic tendencies. They are particularly strong among Ukrainian organizations which functioned legally

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in Galicia. Generally the democratic tendency originated with Petlioura and his Directorate, whose relations with Poland we have already noted. Although having been strongly compromised by these tactics, the members of the Directorate have continued to be politically active in the emigration. After the death of Petlioura, who was assassinated in Paris by a Jew, Schwartzbord, who wanted to avenge the pogroms of 1919, the presidency of what remained of the Directorate passed to M. Lewitzky, who settled in Poland and continued to look for Polish support against Russia.

In Paris the remaining parts of the Directorate are represented by the group of the monthly journal *Trizoub*, as well as by the dissident group of M. Alexander Choulguine (the group of the monthly journal *Promethee*, published in French).

The semi-official German monthly journal *Osteuropa*, which is valued among those best informed on East European questions, published, in its issue of December 1938, interesting details about the character of these groups. According to *Osteuropa* the Polish Government had never ceased to finance the circles, and especially the *Promethee*, in the hope of preparing a sufficient number of propagandists capable of supporting the aims of the dismemberment of Russia. *Osteuropa*, which (in December 1938) considered this policy sound and as being the 'only possible one' from the Polish point of view, underlined, moreover, the role played by a Polish publicist, M. Baczkowski, whose anti-Russian activities were the specific link between the entourage of Colonel Beck and the Ukrainian *émigrés*.

One can understand that during the German-Polish flirtation Germany could safely rely on the various Ukrainians in the service of Poland. The position of the latter now became decidedly more complicated and

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000 more delicate in so far as German-Polish relations were becoming strained and Poland had commenced a *rapprochement* with the U.S.S.R., while abandoning for the moment at least the plans of the partition of Russia.

Despite all the different points of view and the internal quarrels the pro-German and pro-Polish Ukrainian politicians are united in a strong hate of Russia and in an exaggerated and extravagant idea of their own national possibilities. Far beyond the limits of the Great Ukraine, such as we have defined it in Chapter I, the territory of which already includes the six to seven non-Ukrainian minorities, this ultra-nationalist propaganda claims the greater part of the Northern Caucasus (where, in reality, there exists only a Ukrainian minority in the sole region of the Kuban) for the future Ukraine, as well as an outlet to the Caspian Sea in the Crimea and the Great Russian territories of Koursk, Voronej, the lower Volga, and finally colonies in the Far East. Thus we come to the idea of a Ukrainian State extending over some 800,000 square kilometres and having 80,000,000 or 90,000,000 inhabitants.

In order to find an historic justification for the complete rupture with Russia, this propaganda produces arguments of which the least one can say is that they are absolutely fantastic inventions. One goes so far as to say that St. Vladimir called himself Prince of the Ukraine, that the Great Russians are not Slavs, but Tartars or Ugro-Finns, having stolen the old name of 'Rous',' and that their own language is, unlike Ukrainian, an Asiatic language. Finally we were able to read, not long ago, in an article published by a French review, that at the time of Peter the Great, when the Ukraine had already been Christian for many centuries, Muscovite Great Russia still continued in the darkness of paganism.

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. . . We only mention these absurdities to show where one can be led to if one allows oneself to be carried away by one's own passions or by deception.

In December 1938 a statement was made in the Press of the world that a vast enterprise was being prepared in Germany with the aim of allowing the Head of the Imperial House of Russia, the young Grand Duke Vladimir, who had inherited the legitimate rights to the Imperial Throne of Russia from his father, the Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirowitch, to ascend the throne of an independent Ukraine. This misleading statement, which resulted from a journey of the young Grand Duke for family reasons, was immediately contradicted by him with great energy and precision.

After having personally expressed his 'astonishment to see his name linked with the question of German negotiations in connection with Ukrainian problems' on the wireless, the Grand Duke Vladimir published a declaration through his Chancellery which stated that neither directly nor indirectly had any person asked him to give his name to a political enterprise whose object was the dismemberment of the Russian Empire and that he would never give his consent to plans of this nature.'

This attempt to determine which way the wind was blowing, for such it was, and not simply a sensational scoop of an unemployed journalist, remained without consequences. But in any case it shows what can sometimes be expected in connection with the Ukrainian question which has been so tremendously extended and poisoned by propaganda which has no longer anything in common with the real interests of the Ukrainian people.

It would, however, be wrong to pretend that all those outside the frontier of the U.S.S.R. who call themselves

000 Ukrainians, want to fight Russia at any price with the help of any external adversary, be he German or Pole. Decidedly the opposite is true. We already know that the popular masses in Galicia are traditionally anti-Polish. And it is this that strongly influences the attitude of very numerous Galician emigrants in the United States and in Canada.

Despite the slight success which the 'Hetmanytch' Danilo Skoropadsky had had during his propaganda tour in the New World, it remains true that the great majority of the Galicians of America, influenced though they are by Ukrainian nationalism, of which Galicia is the cradle as well as the principal base, remain openly hostile to Poland and more or less distrustful of Germany. The independence of the Ukraine is certainly a dogma to them which could not be easily upset, but in everyday life a close and confident collaboration is always easily established between the cultural and economic organizations of the Ukrainians in America on the one part and the Russian organizations on the other.

Many Ukrainian nationalists ask themselves inwardly if a federation with Russia would not be worth more than Polish domination, the consequences of which can be noted in Galicia, or to a German protectorate, of which one had had some experience in 1918.

It is just twenty years ago that the Directorate of the Ukrainian Republic plotted, with the utmost secrecy, the cession of Western Ukraine to Poland. The agent of the Ukrainian autonomous Government of Eastern Galicia at the Peace Conference, M. B. Paneyko, wrote on 28 August 1919:

'Two days ago the head of the Russian office of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me, in the presence of another high official, the following: I

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cannot understand your Ukrainian policy. You ally yourselves with secondary States such as Poland and Rumania, you pay them with such valuable provinces as Galicia, the territory of Kholm, Volynia, and Bessarabia when, alternatively, by joining the Russian federation you could keep all your provinces.' 000

While agreeing completely with the truth of this argument, M. Paneyko continued:

'Galicia will therefore be handed over to Polish discretion. If our malicious compatriots think that after having created the Ukraine with Polish assistance they will be able, later on, to take Galicia from Poland by force, they are childishly mistaken. Such a Ukraine, fearing Russia with her 100,000,000 inhabitants, will always be dependent on Poland and will receive nothing from her.' And Paneyko concludes in underlining the necessity for creating a 'large Russian federation in which all the Ukrainian lands, including Galicia, would be re-united. Such a federation would give the Ukrainians the same position in world politics which Hungary had formerly enjoyed in the Austro-Hungarian federation. This federation would not only preserve Galicia for the Ukraine, but also the Ukrainian colonies of Asia and would allow the Ukrainian people to develop their spiritual and material forces in peace.'

And it was undoubtedly a similar argument which induced the Ukrainian Army in Galicia, some weeks later, to link its fate with that of the Russian Volunteer Army.

After twenty years, and at the height of Polish repressions in Western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Press of Galicia thought it a convenient moment for reopening the door to the Russians and to make, for the moment, an allusion to the possibility of reconsidering that anti-Russian dogma which it usually so readily underlined.

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000 Thus, in January 1938, the *Lvivski Visti* of Lvov, published under the heading of news, but nevertheless published, a most curious article in which, amongst other things, we read:

'It is now time to stop renouncing Gogol, Potapenko, and Korolenko and the large number of scientists, poets, writers, statesmen, and military leaders, only because they wrote in Russian instead of Ukrainian. Despite all that, they did not become Great Russians and we, the Ukrainians, are not yet rich enough to transfer their civilizing work solely to the account of Moscow.

'The White Russian and Ukrainian separatisms are, on the one hand, the result of external influences and, on the other hand, that of the Great Russian rule in Russia—a rule which hindered the manifestation of the Russian spirit in its Ukrainian and White Russian forms. It is clear that we have the right and the duty to fight the Great Russian element if it tends to destroy our own existence as Ukrainians. But for this we must practise free competition and not desert the field of activity common to all the Russians. In detaching ourselves from the Pan-Russian soil we are obliged to use all our forces in the struggle for our national existence. We know that the West does not recognize and does not notice our hopes as they are still too weak. The West, however, is itself interested in exporting its own values. On the other hand the Great Russian east forcibly rejects all that which, among us, bears the sinister mark of the negation of Russia.'

It is true that soon afterwards the allusions to a possibility of collaboration between Ukrainians and Great Russians in the Ukrainian Press of Galicia were again swept away by a flood of anti-Russian propaganda, this time caused by hopes which were founded on Germany and on the creation of a Sub-Carpathian

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Ukraine. But these pro-German hopes, let us repeat it, 000 never failed and do not fail to provoke the energetic protests of numerous Ukrainian nationalists who tend neither towards Poland nor towards Germany.

The solution of the Ukrainian problem on the path of the federation with Russia, a solution which has never ceased to be considered, openly or otherwise, by certain Ukrainian nationalist circles, who were at least compromised by intrigues with opposing forces, seemed realizable at a given moment within the already existing system of the Soviet federation. The largely federal Constitution of the U.S.S.R., as it was promulgated in 1923, attracted a certain number of Ukrainian nationalists, even abroad, who believed to find there the guarantees of a free development of their people. Ukrainian politicians who were very far from being Marxists, such as M. Paneyko, whose opinion of the Russo-Ukrainian problem we had already mentioned, and even M. Vinnitchenko who had formerly presided, before Petlioura, over the Government of the Ukrainian Republic, supported this pro-Soviet movement.

Yet their hopes were destroyed by the external evolution of the Soviet Union. The federal system, such as it exists to-day according to the letter of the Constitution, could never have been applied, as the whole of Russia was in reality subjected to the Dictatorship of the Communist Party, which in turn had become the personal Dictatorship of Stalin. The persecutions of the peasants and the miseries of the collectivization which had descended upon the Ukraine, could only alienate the sympathies which already seemed acquired. The religious intolerance, and the militant atheism which shocks the most sacred and the most deeply rooted feelings of the Ukrainian popular masses, could only bring about similar results. Abroad the pro-

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000 Soviet movement among the Ukrainian intellectuals was almost completely eclipsed.

But it would be childish to deny that amongst the peasantry of the Polish Ukraine the pro-Soviet sympathies are still of considerable force. As always in the course of Ukrainian history, the bad economic position and the national oppression coexisted. The peasants are pro-Russian because they are Communists, and they are Communists because they are pro-Russian. (In Sub-Carpathian Russia even more than in Galicia, this confusion of ideas sometimes takes on quite comic forms; whole villages become converted to Orthodoxy and at the same time begin to give a 100 per cent vote for Communism, Orthodoxy being Russian and Communism also.)

And, if the Dictatorship of Stalin, authoritarian and centralist in extreme forms, could not actually support the dream of a free federation of brotherly peoples, it is also certain that very Liberal tendencies exist in Soviet Russia, especially in that privileged layer which administers the country to-day and determines its destinies. One day the revolution will come to an end and then it will be necessary to pass from an internal state of siege to more human forms of existence. During the past two or three years, in displaying before the eyes of the people Liberal reforms such as the 'most Liberal Constitution in the world,' which, for the moment, are but mirages, Stalin nevertheless shows that they are the real popular aspirations. One day it will be necessary to satisfy these aspirations in practice. It will be necessary to give more freedom in all spheres of life and it will be necessary to democratize and to decentralize. Such, without doubt, are the ideas of a number of Soviet leaders, who, while submitting to the Dictatorship of the moment, see a little further than to-morrow.

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And then federalism, which is to-day only a dead letter, could easily pass into the sphere of realities. 000

These same ideas, which have yet no means of free expression in the U.S.S.R., become more and more manifested by certain currents of opinion among Russian *émigrés*. Here a new conception of the Russian Empire is forming, a conception which seems to come near to Ukrainian federalist ideas.

The Young Russians, while remaining attached to the formula of a Monarchist State, are inspired by a modernism which is not of a type to please the Russian Conservatives of the pre-Great War period, declare themselves partisans of a Federal Empire whose principle, although definitely Russian, would in many ways approach that of the British Empire. The hereditary Crown would become the symbol of Imperial Unity and would, in the political sphere, become transformed into those moral links which unite the different federated States and the different peoples who are members of the Empire. The interlinking of economic ties on the whole immense extent of the Eurasian plains and the common interests of national defence, gives each nationality the feeling that it is in its own interest not to become detached from the Empire. On the contrary, all the liberties for developing their own national characteristics, promised but not realized by the Soviet Constitution, will be effectively guaranteed after the elimination of the present Dictatorship. In a truly democratic Monarchy all the organisms of self-government, which are subjected to-day by the omnipotence of the Communist Party and its Secretary-General, will have freedom of development. This will assure the Ukraine, as well as any other part of the Empire, the means of organizing according to their own tastes on their own traditional territory everything that concerns

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000 them, without losing the enormous advantages which flow from the fact of belonging to one of the largest and most important empires of the world.

The Great Ukraine would thus become a reality within the framework of the Russian Empire, and the federal solution would save her the necessity of spreading and maintaining her national forces with a great effort to protect herself from one side against Great Russia, with whom her north-eastern frontier is extremely long and difficult to defend, and on the other side from the dangers which threaten her from the west, dangers which would be dispersed by the united forces of the Empire. And, while assuring her free national development, the Ukraine, like Great Russia, would always dispose of immense territories for colonization in Asia which are a vital necessity to her.

It is clearly understood that the equality of rights of all the nationalities would be the main principle of the Federal Empire. But, putting aside formal statutes, there is nevertheless an organic difference between the national territory of, say, a people of Central Asia, less numerous and backward and living in a dry semi-desert, and the Ukraine, the old land of Russian culture, prosperous and thickly populated. The Dictatorship of Stalin itself has been forced to recognize that the Russian people are the 'first among equals' in the Soviet federation. With the Great Russian people its brother, the Russian people of the Ukraine, is the second largest force within this commonwealth in which all the other members cannot be compared with it in importance.

The Young Russians thus insist upon the fact that the Ukrainian people, different though it is from the Great Russian people, is nevertheless a Russian people and thus has the right to a certain degree of primacy on the whole territory of the federation. "We recognize the

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rights of the nationality which inhabits the ancient Russia Minor, the cradle of our Empire, the present-day Ukraine, as we also recognize the rights of all the nationalities of the Empire," declared last March the leader of the Young Russian Party, M. Alexander Kasem-Beg. "But there is a difference between all these nationalities and the Ukrainian people. The Ukraine is inhabited by one of the three branches of the great Eastern Slavonic trunk. Russia Minor, which became the Ukraine, is the cradle of all that which makes our character, our destinies, and our power. Among the peoples of our Empire the Ukraine has not only an equality of rights, but she also has as many duties as the Great Russian people."

And also: "The adventures of Konowaletz have nothing in common with the reality of the Ukraine, no more than the plans of foreign centres of espionage. Ukrainian separatism has been educated and instructed by the enemies of the Great Ukraine. . . . We can only oppose unconditionally every separatism in our empire, and every attempt of detaching the Ukraine as well as every attempt of forcing Great Russia to renounce the duties which fell to her in the Imperial organism. But this opposition does not mean in the least that we are disposed to deny the right of nationalities to self-government. Just on the contrary, in opposing separatism, we also oppose as much all forms of centralization in our huge country. . . . Far from bargaining with Ukrainian nationalism, Russian nationalism is destined to give it most effective support. In acting in the name of Imperial Unity, Russian nationalism must accept as its own all the claims of the Ukrainian people and must struggle with them for the realization of its aspirations."

Federalist ideas similar to those which we have just described become more and more evident, even among

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000 Russian intellectual circles of pre-Great War Liberals, who generally do not seem to be particularly predisposed to them. It is curious to note that the old Russian intelligentsia was almost as centralist as the Imperial Government. Inflamed by social problems and by the struggle against the autocracy, it attached little importance to the problem of the nationalities of the Empire and took very little interest in it. The national consciousness, whether Russian or Ukrainian, was never a factor of the first importance to these moderate Socialists and these rather cosmopolitan Liberals. At the utmost it happened that if the Russian Social Democracy considered it necessary, it would maintain a branch in the Ukrainian language, but only in order to facilitate its own revolutionary propaganda and not in order to support the 'awakening of the nationalities.' In the enormous literary production of these intellectual circles there was, before the Revolution, nothing, or almost nothing, that could assist a solution or even a study of the problem of nationalities and of the Ukrainian problem in particular. There was the question of the development of the Revolution, of the new political and social order, but the solutions one had in mind were always based on the same class of ideas of high centralization, and the majority of these intellectuals had never thought that there was a Ukrainian question which was even capable of compromising the existence of the Russian State.

Nevertheless, since the Revolution, and especially since the German menace has become so obvious, these Liberal circles, Socialist revolutionaries, and former Constitutional Democrats who have become Republican Democrats of the new Milioukov direction, now also tend more and more towards a federalist solution.

Professor P. N. Milioukov himself, a former Minister

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of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government and certainly the biggest figure of moderate Liberalism in pre-Great War Russia and who, while representing the centralist imperialism of the Russian upper middle classes, was never distinguished by an excessive liking for autonomist movements, seems to have modified his point of view noticeably with regard to this subject. At least he writes, in a series of articles published in February and March 1939 in his newspaper *Latest News* (in Paris):

'The Ukrainians are a special people with a national type, a language and a history which are their own. With this we must agree. But this is not a particular privilege of the Ukrainians. Statements of this kind have a sense when one opposes them with the negation: there are no special Ukrainian people, no language, and no Ukrainian history. To-day only the uninformed or perhaps the "patriots" of a special type could deny this. Consequently there is no need to affirm things which are self-evident, if one did not accompany them with exaggerations "*ad majorem gloriam* of Ukrainian intellectuals" conscious of their nationality.'

And M. Milioukov continues:

'The terminology of the supporters of the Ukrainian idea is not new, we know it well. It has not changed since the time of Tsarism. Then as now it does not favour an honest understanding on the subject of "federation." Then we were not ready by a long way to accept this formula; to-day the Ukrainians seem to have gone far beyond it. The realization of the epoch of Ukrainization seems only to have brought about the rebirth of separatism in its old form. The Ukrainians must find a way out of this vicious circle. As for us, we should like to see a solution that would be as painless as possible and that might guarantee for the future the

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000 maintenance of stable and durable relations between the two parties.'

Thus, contrary to all that has been said before the Revolution, M. Milioukov and the section of Russian opinion which follows him are also to-day quite willing to accept the federal formula, though in a narrower sense than that which is put forward by the Young Russians.

On the contrary the old moderate Russian Right, that which included the members of former Governments, both Tsarist and those of Denikine and of Wrangel, and which remained 'pro-ally,' always refused to recognize the existence of the Ukraine under any form whatever and kept strictly to the principles of the 'one and indivisible' Russia. The weakness of its position, which was nevertheless quite sincere, lay in the fact that despite the enormous changes which have taken place since the Revolution in Russia and in the whole world, the Right perseveres in its dreams of the past and even applies them to the future.

In other circles of the Russian Right, in so-called 'Fascist' circles, those which M. Milioukov describes as 'ignoramuses' and as 'patriots of a special type,' foreign aims, and more especially German ones, concerning the Ukraine, and a hate of certain layers of the population within the Soviet Ukraine, have brought about the hope of delivering the whole of Russia from the Bolshevik yoke with the assistance of a foreign intervention, of which the most probable seems to be a German action in the Ukraine.

These circles see involuntary allies in the Ukrainian separatists, and especially in the 'Hetmanists,' capable of initiating a German intervention against the Soviet regime in the name of an independent Ukraine. As to the Ukrainian question as such, they see it almost from the same point of view as the Russian Right.

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Thus they would even be willing to admit a separation of the Ukraine which, in their opinion, would not last long and would only be a stage towards the establishment, on the heritage of the Soviet regime, of the New Peasant Russia, totalitarian, anti-semitic, and anti-democratic in the European sense of the word. They are anxious to instal themselves on Russian territory in order to create a base for the struggle with the Soviets.

If they doubt the sincerity of the anti-Communist ideology of Hitler Germany they also cannot imagine the new independent Ukraine, delivered from Soviet power thanks to her intervention, other than as a new 'Hetmanate' of 1918 which actually favoured, as we know, the counter-revolutionary Russian movement, the leaders of which were of an openly Russian orientation.

Briefly these circles, which one calls 'defeatists,' would admit the possibility of a provisional separation of the Ukraine, but do not see in this a great danger for the future of Russia and they affirm that in no case will the Ukraine remain detached from Russia when the latter has established a national power. In support of this the Press of these circles cites two examples: Finland and Hungary. One was freed from Bolshevism by the German intervention and the other by allied troops, yet both countries have not become dependent on anyone and have remained quite free.

To sum up, the Ukrainian question, despite its obvious importance, only occupies a secondary place in Russian *émigré* circles after that of the Communist Dictatorship, the actual master of the destinies of their country.

. . . . .

How can the problem be solved? An independent Ukraine? The independence of the Ukraine is not

000 justified in itself and is contrary to the interests and the aspirations of her people. It cannot be realized without the help of the Germans—an eventuality which ought never to be wished for by any Ukrainian who loves his country. The re-attachment of Galicia to Russia? That has taken place. As offensive as the Polish domination may have been to the Ukrainians, are they glad to exchange it for Soviet oppression?

In order that the Ukraine may live and may enjoy her riches, her culture, and her genius, and in order that she may not become a prey to German imperialism and that the Ukrainian problem ceases to be an international problem, it would be necessary that Poland should become a nationally homogeneous country, strong in her unity which has been so often proved. It would be necessary that she should cease to play the ungrateful role of a bastion against Bolshevism in order to become the advance post of the Slavonic world against Germanism and that she should dispose of her minorities, with whom she is incapable of finding a *modus vivendi*.

It would be necessary that Russia should be endowed with a national regime, capable of assuring to all the Russian countries, including the Ukraine, economic well-being, and cultural and religious liberty, and that she should re-unite these countries and thus resume her place of honour—to be the fortress against German expansion and the guarantee of equilibrium and peace in Eastern Europe.

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[For a summary of the history of the Ukraine from ancient times through the eighteenth century, see category 116, pp. 27-106.]

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ooo UKRAINE: HER STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

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About the author

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Panas Fedenko is a historian, politician, journalist and novelist. He is author of works on Ukrainian history. In 1917 he was elected to the Ukrainian Central Council, the first Ukrainian Parliament in Kiev, and in 1919 to the Ukrainian Congress as member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party. As member of the Central Ukrainian Partisan Committee he was concerned with the guerilla war against Russia in 1919—20. He edited Ukrainian Socialist newspapers at home and in exile, where he had to go in 1921. In exile Panas Fedenko taught at the Ukrainian Pedagogic University and the Ukrainian Free University in Prague. Now he is member of the Ukrainian National Council in exile.

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UKRAINE

HER STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

PANAS FEDENKO

With one map

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INTRODUCTION

The author of this book is a historian. He has taken part in the Ukrainian national revolution from 1917 on. The book has been written to fix facts that are very often forgotten in the world, or are given a false interpretation in the various books on the Eastern European problem. U 114

The principal fact from which the whole fatal conflict between Ukraine and Soviet Russia arises is that Ukraine has a democratic tradition created by the preceding historical evolution. Modern Russia is a continuation of the Muscovite Tsardom that has grown on the foundations of eastern despotism. For this reason Russia has not created a democratic tradition of its own up to this day and has a "considerable lack of European tradition", as it has been stated by the well known Russian historian Klyuchevsky. Therefore Communist dictatorship so easily seized power in Russia after the revolution of 1917, while the other peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, Ukrainians, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians, etc., created democratic states of their own. U 181 SU 181

The tragedy of the unhappy neighbours of Russia is that Russian imperialism in the past and present times has been principally directed against them, has enslaved and even exstirpated them.

The Ukrainian nation occupies a particular place in Eastern Europe both by its number, circa 35 millions, and by its geographical position, and especially by its large natural resources*). The famous British political writer Professor R. W. Seton-Watson states that the Ukrainian problem has been one of the reasons for World War I 1914—1918. It is generally known that the conquest of Ukraine was the principal aim for Hitler's 'Pressure to the East'. Thus World War II had the struggle for Ukraine as one of its reasons too. U 161 135

We are living in a time when imperialism is being condemned as one of the greatest evils to mankind, but we see at the same time U 181

*) The most important natural riches of Ukraine are: coal (Donets Bassin), iron ore (Krivoy Rog), oil (Boryslaw), manganese (Nikopol). The export of grain from Ukraine to Western Europe until 1914 was higher than 5,5 mil. tons per year. The production of sugar and spirit was very important. The export of agricultural products from Tsarist Russia came in its great part from Ukraine. U 439

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181 how various peoples are enslaved and perish through the ruthless despotism of Soviet Russia. Russian Communist dictatorship has ruled the Ukrainian nation for more than 30 years. But the Ukrainians do not want foreign rule and wish to live in freedom and independence. The Ukrainian nation has been the first to fight against the renewed Russian imperialism, strengthened by Communist dictatorship, from December 1917 on. This struggle is little known to the world, though it had in some of its stages universal importance.

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CHAPTER I

IMPORTANT FACTS FROM UKRAINIAN HISTORY

The ancient name of the Ukrainian nation was 'Rus' (as a collective name) and 'Rusyn' as the name of the individual. 103

The name Rus was used in the beginning for the tribe of the Polyans near the city of Kiev on the Dnieper River. When the rule of the 'Russian' Princes had spread over other territories inhabited by the ancestors of the Ukrainian nation between the Don River and the Carpathian Mountains, this name was accepted for the whole state. The Finnish tribes on the Oka and Moskva Rivers that were later colonised, gradually took the name 'Rus' as subjects of the 'Rusyns', the Kievan Princes. Usually these territories, united under the rule of the Princes (later Tsars) of Moscow, were called the 'Muscovite State', and the subjects of the Tsar the 'Muscovite people'. The state of the Tsars of Moscow was known in the world as 'Moscoviae Ducatus, Moscovia, Regnum Moscovitarum' etc. At the beginning of the 18th century Tsar Peter I. forbade the official use of the name 'Muscovite State' and ordered his state to be called 'Russia' (from 1721 on 'Russian Empire').

The Ukrainian patriots refused to recognise the name 'Rus' for the Muscovite State for a long time. Thus we read in the anonymous 'Istoriya Rusov' (History of the Ruthenians), written in the second half of the 18th century:

"It is known that we were formerly what the Muscovites are actually (ruling nation, *P. F.*), government, priority, and even the name Rus have passed from us to them, and we are for them like a byword among the heathen".

The word 'Ukraine' is very old. The name 'Rus' was of political origin, it was brought into the territories subordinated to Kiev by the rule of the Princes and the Church hierarchy. The name 'Ukraine' is truly popular. It can be traced back to ancient times in Ukrainian popular songs, in historical tales and legends. In written memorials we find the name of Ukraine in the Hypatian Chronicle, for the first time in 1187: The Prince of Pereyaslav Volodymer died from the wounds he received in a battle against the Polovets (Kuman)

103 nomads "whom Ukraine mourned very much." This popular name gradually supplanted 'Rus'. The nearer to our times, the more the names 'Ukraine', 'Ukrainian' are used*). The name 'Little Russia', which had been used as the official name of Ukraine in Tsarist Russia, was not accepted by the Ukrainian people**).

175 The Ukrainian problem is not new in European history. The Ukrainian nation (Ruthenians), which had lived for millenniums on the territories between the Don River and the Carpathian Mountains, and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, has rendered Europe a great service. The knight armies of the Princes of Kiev, Chernigov, Galicia and Volhynia, in heroic exploits defended their country against the nomad hordes, and for centuries did not allow the wild Asiatic tribes to enter Western Europe. A poetical picture of this struggle gives us the famous 'Discourse of the Campaign of Igor' from the 12th century, in which is described the campaign of the 'Rusychi' of Prince Igor against the steppe horde of the Kumans. The powerful Tartar Horde coming from the interior of Asia destroyed the Ukrainian capital Kiev and other cities, and devastated the country in 1240.

After the destruction by the Tartars in the 13th century the Ukrainian public life was concentrated in Galicia and Volhynia. In the 14th century Galician territory was annexed by the Poles after the dynasty of the Galician Princes, the descendants of Vladimir the Saint, had died out. Volhynia and other parts of the Ukrainian territory weakened and devastated by the Tartars, came under the rule of Lithuanian Princes. The Lithuanian state was the immediate continuation of the political and cultural tradition of the Kievan state. The official language of the Lithuanian state was White-Ruthenian and Ukrainian.

With the coming of the Tartars the complete separation of the northern principalities of the former State of Kiev (Suzdal, Ryazan, Moscow, Tver) from Ukraine took place. Under the rule of the Princes of Moscow who 'collected the country', a peculiar system of a centralised despotic state arose. Of the liberal constitu-

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*) The famous Czech scholar Jan Amos Comenius who had lived for a long time in Poland, wrote in a letter dated 24, 5, 1655: "Polonia nostra tota bellis ardet ... tacebo de remotioribus oris Lithuania et *Ukraina*". *The Correspondence of Comenius. Treatises of the Czech Academy of Science,* Class III, Ann. 1, No. 2, p. 179: Prague 1892.

**) The name 'Little Russia' for Ukraine is of scholarly origin. For the first time (1303) it was used in a paper of the Patriarch of Constantinople for the designation of Ukraine as the Metropolis *(μικρὰ 'Ρωσία)* in contrast to Moscow *(μεγάλη 'Ρωσία)* which formerly was hierarchically subordinated to Kiev.

tion of the Kievan State, where the Prince was only a servant of the state and had to reckon with the will of his subjects, — knights and townsmen ('viche'), in Muscovy there was not the slightest trace. The Government of the Princes of Moscow imitated the despotic system of the Tartar 'Golden Horde'. Some Russian historians reject the legend of the taking over of the Kievan traditions by Moscow, and point out the peculiarity of the social and political order of the Muscovite state*). The Princes of Moscow did not tolerate the existence of the Republic of Great Novgorod on the Volkhov River at the side of their despotic state, and after having conquered that country they destroyed by bloody terror the freedom of the Republic of Novgorod (end of 15th century). The liberal traditions of Great Novgorod were definitely wiped out in 1570 by Tsar Ivan the Terribie, who carried out a cruel massacre in this city, and deported a great part of the population to the East. The Muscovite State, which had grown under the protectorate of the Tartar Khans, created a political and social order of its own, after the pattern of the eastern despotisms. 175

In an article published in the *Review of Politics* (July 1948) the well known American historian Hans Kohn says that the state of the Princes of Kiev, i. e. Ukraine, "looked toward Byzantium, whence it received its Church and toward Scandinavia, from where its dynasty came. When Kiev succumbed to the Mongol invasion, modern Russia was created by the will of the ruthless cunning of the great princes around Moscow. [177]

The new capital grew up, . . ., far from the old cultural centres to the west, on recently colonial land where traditional urban liberties were unknown. Its people were no longer the Slavs of the Dnieper but a new race in which Slav, Finnish, and Mongol blood freely intermingled. From Moscow, no roads led to the West, the rivers pointed to the steppes and deserts of Asia; the political, cultural, and economic ties were with the great empire of the Tartars to whom it was tributary." [144]

The oriental despotic features of the political and economic order of the Muscovite State gave the central government a tremendous power that was used for the enslavement of all social classes and for the seclusion of the Muscovite people from Western Europe. Until the end of the 17th century the Government of the Tsars did not permit its subjects to visit the countries of Western Europe and tried to prevent foreigners from entering their country. The Tsar

*) Prof. Presnyakov, *The Creation of the Great-Russian State:* Moscow 1918; various works of the historians Lyubavsky, Miliukov and others.

175 was not only the unrestricted lord over the freedom and lives of his subjects; he was also the greatest merchant and contractor in his country (monopoly of foreign trade, monopoly of public houses a. s. o.). Even for the land that was cultivated by the Muscovite people a formula was stated: "The whole land belongs to God and the Tsar."

The Muscovite aristocrats had no power to use against the rule of the Tsars and signed in official papers with deminutive names 'Petrushka', instead of Peter, 'Ivashka', instead of Ivan, and called themselves 'Kholopy' (slaves) of their Tsar. The foreigners from the free Western European countries were impressed by the unlimited submission of the Muscovites to the Government of the Tsars, the lack of personal dignity among them, and their simultaneous enthusiasm for the absolute power of their Tsar, who had not to take an oath on the observation of the laws and the consideration of the liberties of his subjects as was the case in the free Western countries. The learned Scotsman Buchananus writes in his book *De iure regni apud Scotos*, in 1579, that Muscovy rejoices in tyranny ('Moscovia tyrannide gaudet').

[181] The present Communist Government has received the tyrannical tradition from the Tsars of Moscow. Soviet propaganda consequently glorifies one of the most cruel tyrants of universal history — Ivan the Terrible — in its press, literature and radio*). No less is the glorification of Tsar Peter I., the founder of modern Russian imperialism, by the Russian Communists. Here the Bolsheviks have found their corresponding Russian national tradition.

After the destruction of the Kievan State and the down-fall of the Principality of Galicia and Lodomeria the development of Ukraine and White Russia (Byelorussia) under the rule of the Lithuanian princely dynasty went in the general European direction. The nobility and the city population had their rights guaranteed by the laws in Lithuania and Poland, and the Monarch had to consider the will of his subjects. The Ukrainian nobility and the townsmen enjoyed these rights alike. However, after the Union of Lublin of 1569 between Lithuania and Poland almost the whole of Ukrainian territory was incorporated by Poland, and a strong pressure of the Polish State on the Ukrainian people began. The Polish authorities restricted the rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox nobility and, on the other hand, gave those who abandoned the Greek Orthodox Church and turned Catholic all possibilities of career and enrichment. An

*) Comp.: R. Wipper, *Ivan Grozny:* Moscow 1948 (An official glorification of the 'progressive and democratic' Tsar Ivan the Terrible).

even harder pressure was applied against the Ukrainian townsmen. 175
In those times the conversion of an Orthodox Ukrainian to Catholicism meant Polonisation. Since the end of the 16th century a large number of the Ukrainian nobility having accepted Catholicism left their Ukrainian nationality. The same pressure led to the Polonisation of a great part of the Ukrainian townsmen.

The neighbourhood of the Tartars was an obstacle to the normal development of Ukraine.

On the territory between Kiev and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov the stubborn struggle of the Ukrainian nation against the Tartars was carried on for centuries. The Tartars captured people from Ukraine and sold them into slavery in the oriental markets. The last invasion of the Crimean Horde into Ukraine was in 1769.

In spite of this permanent danger from the steppe and under these extremely difficult conditions the Ukrainian nation did not abandon its cultural activity.

Schools, literature, printing, developed in Ukraine. The learned [212]
Arab Paul of Aleppo, who visited Ukraine in 1654, wrote in his memoirs that education was common among the Ukrainian people, and that even the Ukrainian women were literate. Academies had also been founded in Ukraine, and were the models and sources of education for all Greek-Orthodox Slav peoples. Ukrainians studied at the Universities of Italy, France, Germany and other countries.

Against the Tartar hordes, the Ukrainians created an organisa- [701]
tion of its own — the Cossack Army. From the middle of the 16th century, the centre of the Ukrainian Cossack Army was in the fortress 'Sich', southward of the Dnieper Cataracts. From this the name of 'Zaporovian Army' arose ('porohy' are the rocks in the Dnieper). The Zaporovian Army performed great deeds in fighting the Tartars. The Ukrainian Cossacks under the leadership of Petro Sahaydachny saved Poland from a terrible Turkish force in the battle of Khotin (Bessarabia), in 1621.

When in 1683 Central Europe was threatened by the Turks, the Ukrainian Cossacks were the force without which the Polish King Jan Sobieski could not dare to begin the decisive battle against the Turks before Vienna.

After the Union of Lublin of 1569, the Polish nobles wanted to take possession of the territory the Ukrainian people had defended against the Tartars. The Polish Government planned to abolish the Ukrainian Cossack Army, and to make the Cossacks serfs of the nobility. The nobility wished to lay their hands on the free peasants of Eastern Ukraine who had not known serfdom. The relations between the Polish Government and the masses of the Ukrainian

175 people deteriorated also in consequence of the religious persecutions of Ukrainians by the Polish State. For these reasons, in 1648 the great Ukrainian revolution against Poland broke out under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—1657), the Hetman of the Cossack Army.

[642] 175 648 In consequence of the revolution of 1648 the Ukrainian Cossack Republic was created headed by an elected Chief of State (Hetman). The official name of this State was 'Zaporovian Army' (Exercitus Zaporoviensis) with Tchyhyryn as Capital. Leaning upon the Cossacks and the free peasantry, the Ukrainian Republic could defend itself against the united forces of Poland and the Crimean Horde for several years. Having lost the hope for a settlement with Poland on the principle of equality, the Ukrainian Government concluded a treaty with the Muscovite Tsar in Pereyaslav, in 1654. The Muscovite Tsar promised the Ukrainians assistance against Poland and the Tartars. The treaty of Pereyaslav secured for Ukraine its own army, administration, and an independent foreign policy.

The transition of Ukraine towards Moscow in the 17th century provided the basis for the rise of the Muscovite state. The Ukrainian revolution of 1648 weakened Poland considerably.

Under the protectorate of the Tsar of Moscow Ukraine did not find security for its liberty, prosperity and progress. The Swedish King Charles X. Gustav understood this well when he wrote to his Ambassador to the Ukrainian Government, in 1657: "Moscow does not tolerate a free nation"*). When it had become evident that the Tsar of Moscow tried to reduce or to abolish the rights of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Government of B. Khmelnitsky planned the annulment of the alliance with Moscow, and concluded treaties with Sweden and Transylvania to secure the independence of Ukraine (1656 and 1657). The Ukrainian Government put forward the demand for the frontiers of the Ukrainian State as '*iuk totius Ukrainae antiquae vel Roxolaniae*' up to the Vistula, the Ukrainian ethnographic frontier of that time. In the treaty with Sweden of 1657, Ukraine was recognised as a free nation dependent on no one (*'gens libera, nulli subiecta'*).

Against the Ukrainian aspirations for independence Poland and Moscow acted in common. By the treaty of Andrusov of 1667, Ukraine was divided among these countries on the Dnieper line. Turkey and the Crimean Horde interfered with the struggle in Ukraine. In these wars, lasting nearly 30 years, Ukraine on the western bank of the Dnieper River was disastrously devastated. In

*) *Archives of South-West Russia*, Part III, Vol. VI: Kiev 1908.

a treaty between Turkey, Moscow, and Poland of 1681, it was 175
determined to depopulate Ukraine between the South Bug and 648
Dnieper Rivers to the Black Sea. The western Ukrainian territories (Volhynia, Galicia etc.) remained under Polish rule. Ukraine to the East of the Dnieper remained under the protectorate of the Muscovite Tsars, preserving restricted autonomous rights, with an elected Hetman as the head of the Government.

Tsar Peter I. planned the abolition of the remains of the autonomous order of Ukraine on the Eastern bank of the Dnieper. In order to defend the freedom of Ukraine, Hetman Ivan Mazeppa concluded an alliance with the Swedish King Charles XII. against Russia in 1708. The battle of Poltava (1709), fatal for Ukraine and Sweden, put an end to the plans of the Ukrainian patriots to restore Ukrainian independence. Nonetheless, for decades even in the second half of the 18th century, the members of the Ukrainian Government which went into exile in 1709, continued in various countries their diplomatic action for the defence of the Ukrainian independence. They were headed by Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, the successor of Mazeppa, and included the son of Hetman Orlyk, Hryhor Orlyk, General in the French service, Fedir Myrovych and others.

After the battle of Poltava the Russian Government restricted [661]
the autonomous rights of Ukraine considerably. Tsar Peter I. 175
deliberately destroyed Ukraine in order to oppress her people the more easily, as we are informed by Weber, the Resident of Brunswick-Hannover in Moscow, a contemporary of Tsar Peter I.*). Ukraine was forced to pay heavy contributions, Ukrainians were sent in masses to the North to build Petersburg, the new capital of the Tsars. Many thousands of Ukrainians died from exhaustion while working for the strengthening of Russian Tsarist despotism. At the same time Moscow took from Ukraine its best cultural workers — scholars, artists, artisans. Western civilisation was introduced to Russia principally by Ukrainian intellectuals. (See K. Kharlampovich, *Little Russian Influence on the Great Russian Ecclesiastical Life:* Kazan, 1912; and Pekarsky, *Science and Literature in the Time of Peter* — I — II).

The Tsarina Catherine II. abolished the autonomous Ukrainian Government in 1764. Ukraine was brought to the level of the other provinces of the Tsarist Empire.

The Russian Government decided also to destroy the Zaporovian Army, the nest of democratic liberty in Ukraine. In 1775, Russian

*) Weber, Das veränderte Rußland: Hannover 1729.

175 troops conquered the fortress of the Ukrainian Cossacks — the Zaporovian Sich. The remainder of the Zaporovian Cossacks migrated to the Turkish province at the mouth of the Danube, and founded there a new centre under the protectorate of the Sultan. The lands of the Zaporovian Army, that had been defended against the Tartar hordes in a fierce struggle lasting for hundreds of years, the Russian Government granted to its magnates, first of all to favourites of Catherine II.

175 648 The Western Ukrainian territories, which, by the Polish-Muscovite treaty of 1667, had remained in the Polish State after the dismemberment of Poland at the end of the 18th century, were incorporated partly by Russia and partly by Austria (Galicia 1772). Bukovina too, which had formerly belonged to Turkey, became a province of Austria in 1774. Carpatho-Ukraine had belonged to Hungary since the Middle Ages (cities Užhorod-Ungvar, Mukačevo-Munkacs).

181 175 [566] The struggle of the Ukrainians for independence under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—57) had abolished serfdom in the greater part of Ukraine. It was the ideal of the masses of the Ukrainian people to live free, independent like the free Ukrainian Cossacks. After the abolition of the autonomous rights of Ukraine at the end of the 18th century serfdom for the Ukrainian peasants was introduced in Ukraine in the Muscovite way. But against this oppression the masses of the Ukrainian people rose often in revolt.

Historical evolution has developed in the Ukrainian people an aspiration for freedom and defence of human dignity. Voltaire wrote in his *History of Charles XII.*: "L'Ukraine a toujours aspiré à être libre" (Ukraine has always aspired to be free). "This is a nation that wants freedom," wrote the prominent Ukrainian writer of the 17th century, the Archbishop of Chernigov, Lazar Baranovych, to the Muscovite Tsar Alexey Mikhaylovich.

The conviction prevailed among the Ukrainians that Ukraine was not dependent on Russia but was only associated in the person of the Monarch. In the political dialogue *Dispute of Little Russia with Great Russia* at the end of the 18th century we read the following words of 'Little Russia' addressing 'Great Russia': "Do not think thou art my lord, but thine and mine sovereign is our common master."

175 648 The Ukrainian patriots could not forget the loss of liberty and independence, and looked for understanding of the Ukrainian case to foreign countries. In 1793 the well known Ukrainian patriot Vasyl Kapnist tried to persuade the Prussian Minister Hertzberg

that it was in the interest of Prussia to help the Ukrainian people 175
to cast off the chains of Muscovite slavery. During the Great French 648
Revolution the person of Napoleon was very popular in Ukraine. Ukrainian patriots were pleased by the victories of the French Emperor, and hoped that, after the defeat of Russia in a war with France, the time for the liberation of Ukraine would come, and the odious serfdom would be abolished. But Napoleon had no understanding of the Ukrainian problem. He planned the creation of two states 'Napoléonides' in Ukraine under his protectorate . . .*)

Ukrainian history has gone its own way, different from that of Russia. This has created the peculiar national character of the Ukrainians.

The foreigners who had visited Ukraine in the 17th and 18th 175
centuries pointed out the higher level of civilisation among the 181
Ukrainians in comparison with the Russians, and the highly deve- 517
loped feeling of personal dignity of the Ukrainian people. This love of freedom of the Ukrainian people appeared also in the fight against Tsarist absolutism in Russia, where revolutionaries of Ukrainian origin occupied the first places, Zhelyabov, Kybalchych, Konashevych, Osynsky, Kravchynsky (Stepnyak), Popko, and many other members of the party '*Narodnaya Volya*'.

In the 19th century, under the influence of the ideas of that time (the Great French Revolution, romanticism) the regeneration of the so-called unhistorical pepoples (Serbians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Baltic peoples) began; in the beginning it was the interest for the language and history of the peoples among the educated classes, and the attempt to write in the 'common people's' language. In Ukraine the regeneration of the popular literary language began [538] with the publication of the satirical poem of Ivan Kotlyarevsky *Aeneid:* 1798. In this poem the author underlines his dislike of serfdom and the lords

> "who did not give the people freedom
> and treated them like cattle."

Democratic ideas were widespread in Ukraine; the representatives 175
of the Ukrainian educated classes took an active part in the 186
revolutionary organisations directed towards the fall of the Tsarist régime (the uprising of the 'Decabrists', 1825—26, was most active in Ukraine, near Kiev).

In 1846 a Ukrainian political organisation, *The Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius,* was founded in Kiev. Many prominent representatives of Ukrainian culture like Taras Shevchenko (the

*) *Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes:* Paris 1922.

175 186 greatest Ukrainian poet), Mykola Kostomarov, historian, Panteleimon Kulish, historian and poet, Mykola Hulak, and others, took part in this organisation.

In the declarations of this society the idea of an independent Ukrainian democratic republic was promulgated: "And Ukraine will resurrect from her grave ... And Ukraine will be an independent republic" *(The Books of the Being of the Ukrainian Nation,* the work of the Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius).

The Russian Government punished the members of this society severely and acted rigorously against Ukrainian political and cultural regeneration.

[191] In 1863 the Russian Minister Valuyev declared that "the Ukrainian language did not exist, does not exist and cannot exist." In 1876, by a secret order of the Tsar, the printing and circulation of Ukrainian books, periodicals etc. in the Russian Empire was prohibited. Even the Bible in Ukrainian was forbidden. Ukrainian could not be tought in schools. The Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire was forbidden until 1905. Only the revolution of 1917 made the introduction of Ukrainian in schools possible. This prohibition of the living language of a considerable nation, the instrument of its culture, had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people and is a feature absolutely unique in universal history.

[871] 175 517 The prohibition of the Ukrainian language in the schools and in the press hindered the development of education in Ukraine. The statistics show that the number of schools and the level of education in Ukraine were higher in the 18th century than in the 19th*). On the other hand, the Russian schools separated the educated classes of the Ukrainian nation from their nationality, and put the intelligentsia of Ukrainian origin into the service of Russian culture. Thus, besides the economic exploitation to the advantage of the Russian Empire, Ukraine was deprived of her best intellectual forces which were drowned in the 'Russian Sea'. We can quote here only some names of prominent Ukrainians who, by virtue of circumstances, helped to create the Russian civilisation, and gave their talents for the increase of the Russian Empire: Archbishop Theophan Prokopovych, the deputy of the Patriarch of Moscow Stephan Javorsky, Bishop Dmytro Rostovsky — were prominent Ukrainian scholars of the time of Tsar Peter I. who were forced

*) Thus there were in 1748 in four regiments (Ukraine had a military Cossack administration) of the Hetmanate (for three regiments the figures are missing) 866 elementary schools, i. e., one school for 1000 inhabitants. From this, little or almost nothing remained in the 19th century.

to leave Ukraine and to serve the Muscovite State. The Ukrainian, 175
Prince Alexander Bezborodko, directed for many years Russian 517
foreign policy in the time of Catherine II. (1762—1796) and of Paul I., who is known, however, to have disliked Russia and to have dreamt of a free Ukraine. The greatest talents of modern Russian literature, Gogol and Dostoyevsky, were of Ukrainian origin; Gogol did not master Russian exactly until the end of his life, it was strange to him. Far-famed scholars — Maxim Kovalevsky, sociologist; the philosophers Lesevich and Yurkevich, Vladimir Vernadsky, geologist, the famous painter Ilya Repin, — were Ukrainians of whom Russian culture is proud.

The Ukrainians in the provinces of Austria, Galicia and Buko- 175
vina had lost their educated classes under the rule of the Poles and 186
Turks. Here, as well as in the Ukrainian territory to the West of [668]
the Carpathian Mountains, Carpatho-Ukraine, which was under Hungarian rule, the Ukrainians were principally peasants; the cities were mostly not-Ukrainian. During the 'Spring of the Peoples' in 1848 the Ukrainian national movement in Austria and Hungary also appeared. In Galicia the Ruthenian Supreme Council — a political representative of the Ukrainians in Austria — was created. At the elections for the Austrian Parliament the Ukrainians secured a considerable number of mandates. The national rebirth began also in the Ukrainian territory on the western side of the Carpathian Mountains. But the reaction which occured in Austria hindered the Ukrainian national development. The Vienna Government put the Ukrainians in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine under Polish and Hungarian rule respectively in order to make the Poles and Hungarians loyal towards Austria. This enabled the Poles and Hungarians to conduct a policy of denationalisation against the Ukrainians. Only at the end of the 19th century, in spite of great hindrances on the part of the Poles, a Ukrainian political and cultural life developed in Galicia. In connection with this, [517]
Ukrainian science and literature, prohibited in Kiev, Kharkov, and [814]
Odessa, found a home in Galicia (Lviw), and Bukovina (Chernivtsi). Ukrainians from Tsarist Ukraine published here their periodicals and books; here, under the direction of the famous Kievan historian Michael Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian Shevchenko Scientific Society developed. It was by its energy a real Ukrainian Academy of Science.

Gradually the Ukrainians in Austria were overcoming the obstacles created by the ruling class of the Polish nobility, and secured new mandates in the Austrian Parliament and the Galician Diet.

186 The development of Ukrainian political and cultural life in
665 Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians condemned to ruthless Russification under Tsarist rule. When the first modern Ukrainian political organisation in Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, was founded in 1900 (from 1905 this party was named Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party) its first publication *Independent Ukraine* was printed in Austria, in Bukovina.

186 The Ukrainian patriots under Tsarist Russian Government,
668 morally and materially supported the fight of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights; these territories were a Ukrainian Piedmont. For not even the revolution of 1905 gave the Ukrainians in Russia their national rights. Of course, the Ukrainians had their deputies in the Russian 'Duma' who demanded autonomy for Ukraine. But the Ukrainian language was not admitted in the schools, the rights of the Ukrainian press were restricted, and active Ukrainians were persecuted by the Russian authorities. Among the Ukrainians in Russia the fight of the Austrian Ukrainians for the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviw roused great interest. The Russian Government regarded the creation of a Ukrainian University in Galicia as a great danger for the 'indivisible Russia' and sought an agreement with the Polish nationalists in Galicia against the Ukrainian movement. The Russian nationalists regarded the opening of a Ukrainian University in Lviw as a 'casus belli' for Russia against Austria.

668 The Russian Government closely watched the Ukrainian move-
661 ment in Austria and was much alarmed by its successes. In consequence, the Petersburg Government prepared to annex Galicia and Bukovina long before the war of 1914, in order to wipe out 'Mazeppism'. When, in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, a Ukrainian delegation visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to protest against the new prohibition of the Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire, the Minister replied cynically:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once for all . . .".

727 The suppression of the Ukrainian movement was one of the main
661 aims of Tsarist Russian policy in World War I. The occupation of Galicia and Bukovina by the Russian armies in 1914-1917 brought heavy damage to the Ukrainian movement; the Ukrainian schools, press, co-operative societies, scientific and educational institutions
727 were destroyed. Thousands of Ukrainians, Austrian citizens, were
659 deported to Siberia. In the occupied territories a ruthless Russifica-
661 tion was started, and in Galicia the forced conversion of the Greek-

Catholic Ukrainians to Greek Orthodoxy was taking place. The 727
Ukrainian Metropolitan of the Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia, 661
Count Andrew Szeptycki, was arrested and deported to the interior 657
of Russia, and with him numerous Ukrainian clergymen. This
policy of oppression of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina was
cynically referred to by the Russian Government as 'liberation of
subjugated Slav brethren' . . .

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CHAPTER II

UKRAINE DURING THE REVOLUTION 1917—1920

1. *The Ukrainian Central Council*

000 In March 1917, the revolution overthrew the Tsarist Government in Russia. This enabled the oppressed peoples of the former Tsarist Empire to declare their rights for political self-determination. These were: the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, White Ruthenians (Byelorussians), the Caucasian peoples (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidjanians), the peoples of Turkestan and above all the most numerous nation after the Russians, — the Ukrainians.

668 63 646 In March 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council in Kiev was formed from the representatives of the Ukrainian political organisations as representative of the Ukrainian nation. Ukrainian congresses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, also elected their deputies to the Central Council, and thus this organ became a provisional Parliament of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council tried first to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine through an agreement with the Russian Provisional Government of Prince Lvov-Kerensky.

But the Ukrainian efforts to attain autonomy met with the resolute opposition of the Russian Provisional Government and of the Russian political parties. The centralist tradition of Tsarist Russia continued to live in Russian political parties with the same vigour even after the fall of the régime. The delegates of the Central Council applied to the Russian Provisional Government in Petersburg to recognise by a public act the right of the Ukrainian nation to autonomy within the Russian state. The Russian Government refused this demand, declaring that the problem of autonomy for Ukraine should be decided by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. This reply could not satisfy the Ukrainians. For it was evident that the Russian Constituent Assembly, with the centralist efforts of the Russian parties having a majority would refuse the autonomous rights of non-Russian peoples.

Thus the Ukrainian Central Council began to realise the necessity for Ukraine to establish an autonomous order itself, without taking into notice the threats of the Russian political parties and

the Russian Government. Under these conditions the Ukrainian Central Council issued its '*Universal*' (Declaration) to the Ukrainian nation on June 10, 1917 (old style), which contained among other statements the following words: 668 631

"Ukraine shall be free ... The Ukrainian nation shall have the right to organise its life itself. A Ukrainian Assembly of the Ukrainian nation (Diet), elected in general, equal, direct and secret ballot, shall secure order in Ukraine. All laws securing this order here, in Ukraine, can be issued only by our Ukrainan Assembly".

The policy of the Ukrainian Central Council, of which the great majority was composed of the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties, met with strenous attacks on the part of the Russians. Only the leader of the Russian Communists, Lenin, for tactical reasons seeking support among the Ukrainians in the struggle of his party against the Provisional Government, made the following hypocritical statement:

"No democrat can deny the right of Ukraine for a free separation from Russia (*Pravda* 15. 6. 1917). In reality, Lenin and his party were enemies of the national self-determination of Ukraine and other nations oppressed by Russia. The Russian Communist Government showed it immediately after having seized power in Russia on November 7, 1917.

The development of the Ukrainian political movement forced the Russian Provisional Government to begin negotiations with the Ukrainian Central Council. In summer 1917, an agreement was reached, and the representatives of the parties of all national minorities sent their delegates to the Ukrainian Central Council. But the policy of Kerensky's Russian Government continued to hinder the creation of an autonomous order in Ukraine. The Petersburg Government recognised the rights of autonomy only for the northern part of Ukraine and kept the whole of southern Ukraine under its administration. But even for the realisation of this restricted autonomy the Russian Government put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Central Council. At the end of September 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council passed a resolution to call a separate Constituent Assembly for Ukraine. The Russian Provisional Government, for this reason, began a legal prosecution against the Central Council. But at this time a revolt happened in Russia, the Bolshevik Party seized power (November 7, 1917). This created a new situation in the relations between Ukraine and Russia.

2. *Soviet Russia and Democratic Ukraine*

668 Bolshevism was the consequence of the previous development of the Russian people, who never had had in their history any free political order. Soviet dictatorship did not meet with any serious resistance in Russia proper. The Russians showed in their attitude towards the Communist rule their traditional 'sense of obedience', as it was expressed by a Russian publicist (Guber, *On the Change of the Sign-Posts:* Prague, 1922)*). Another situation arose in Ukraine and other non-Russian regions of the former Tsarist Empire. The Russian Communist organisation in Ukraine was weak and had no support among the Ukrainian population. Among the Russian and Jewish workers in Ukraine the influence of Democratic Socialism, '*Menshevism*', also predominated. Thus, under the leadership of the Ukrainian Central Council all parties, Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish and Polish, acted together against the plans of the Russian Bolsheviks to establish dictatorship in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council blamed Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia, and began to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine, independent of the Soviet Russian Government. In its '*III. Universal*' from November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed Ukraine a democratic republic. In this document we read:

668 631

"In the Ukrainian Democratic Republic all liberties will be guaranteed: freedom of speech, printing, religion, meetings, associations, strikes, inviolability of person and domicile, the right to use local languages in intercourse with all offices. The Ukrainian nation had fought for long years for its national liberty, and now having attained it, will firmly protect the freedom of national development of all nationalities remaining in Ukraine; therefore we announce to the Russian, Jewish, Polish and other peoples in Ukraine a national and personal autonomy to secure their right and liberty of self-government in matters of their national life . . ."

[563]

In the III. Universal the Ukrainian Central Council fixed the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly for December 27, 1917.

The Ukrainian Government did not want to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers which the Russian Communist Government under Lenin's direction was aiming at. Therefore the Ukrainian Central Council in its '*Universal*' of November 20, 1917,

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*) The well known Russian writer Maxim Gorki wrote on the passivity of the Russians towards their oppressors that the "Russians could suffer more than work consciously and honestly" (*Communist International*, No. 3, Moscow 1919).

declared: "Until the peace every citizen of the Ukrainian Republic, together with the citizens of all peoples of the Russian Republic, shall stand firmly on their positions at the front and in the hinterland". u 668 631

The Soviet Russian Government was from the beginning hostile to the national claims of Ukraine and other peoples. Relying on its own military force and the support of Communist groups among the various peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Russian Government was planning the conquest of Ukraine and other territories that did not recognise Soviet dictatorship.

3. Elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Russia and in Ukraine

At the end of November, 1917, in Ukraine and Russia, elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly took place. These elections in Ukraine were free, with full freedom of press and propaganda for all parties, among them the Communist. These elections showed the great difference between the political situation in Russia and in Ukraine. In Russia the adherents of Soviet dictatorship (the Communists and the party of the Left Socialists-Revolutionaries), especially in the big cities like Moscow and Petersburg, had considerable gains. This gave the Communists and Left Socialists-Revolutionaries the basis for holding power in Russia; for they had the masses of friendly workers and peasants behind them. In Ukraine at these elections the Ukrainian Socialist parties, opponents of Soviet dictatorship, won (the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries got together approximately 3/4 of all cast votes). The Russian Communist Party, in spite of the immense resources from Russia for propaganda, gained in Ukraine less than 10% of the votes. In the big cities, among the workers, the Russian Communists were in a minority too; this explains the uncertainty of the Communists in Ukraine at that time in the struggle for the dictatorship of their party. u [666] 665 SU 665

The historian of the Communist movement in Ukraine, M. Popov, remarks that even in the big industrial centres in Ukraine "the local Communists had a lack of determination to take power into the hands of the Soviets", *History of the Communist Party 'Bolsheviks' of Ukraine:* Kharkov, 1929.

4. The Problem of Peace with the Central Powers

At the end of 1917 the Russian front against the Central Powers was decaying in a catastrophic way. This decay was hastened by the ruthless Communist propaganda for an immediate peace. In u. 648

648 order to secure the country, the Ukrainian Government began to concentrate in Ukraine the troops that had been separated from the Russian Army. The Ukrainian Government was against a separate peace with the Central Powers, as it was afraid to come under the influence of these nations. Thus in the session of the Ukrainian Central Council on December 25, 1917, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Choulguine, declared:

"The Bolsheviks are preparing to conclude a separate peace. We do not agree with this, we cannot permit that the Germans and Austrians move their regiments against the French and British. We stand for a general peace that would be welcomed by the democracy of the whole world".

[665] Against this policy of the Ukrainian Government the Russian Communist Party acted with demagogic propaganda.

On January 13, 1918, the newspaper of the Russian Communist Party in Kiev *The Proletarian Thought* wrote:

"The Central Council tries to destroy the struggle for peace... The Council is working in this direction by order of the 'allied' imperialists. The workers, soldiers and peasants of Ukraine and Russia know and remember well that, in their struggle for the immediate ending of the slaughter, the Central Council is their determined enemy and a faithful servant of the sharks of capital and of international robbers...".

5. *Great Britain and France Recognise Democratic Ukraine*

The position of the Ukrainian Government in the question of peace attracted the attention of Great Britain and France. At the beginning of December 1917, General Tabouis entered into relations with the Ukrainian Government as Commissioner of the French Republic to the Ukrainian Government. On January 11, 1918, General Tabouis handed to the Ukrainian Government the following declaration:

"Wishing to confirm its friendly intentions towards the Ukrainan Republic, the Government of the French Republic informed me by telegraph, the only present means of communication, that it appointed me as Representative of the French Republic to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic. It will soon be a year that I have been on the territory of Ukraine. In this time I had the opportunity to study the history of Ukraine, I watched with attention the development of its national movement, and I could observe the efforts the Ukrainian Republic had made in order to create and to strengthen the moral and physical forces necessary for the organisation of the state. I have watched all this with

interest that grew steadily and I am happy and proud, President, to 648
see that to-day this interest is not only personal, for, appointing me as its Representative, the Government of the French Republic approves my efforts and charges me to continue officially the excellent relations that have developed between us. I bring you the official assurance that France, which as the first country is undertaking this decisive step, will support with all her power the Ukrainian Republic in those endeavours she will undertake to continue to walk on that road the Allies had chosen, and on which they will march without hesitation, thoroughly conscious of their rigths and their duties towards the democracy of the whole world and of humanity... From this day forward France has entered into official relations with Ukraine".

The Government of Great Britain appointed likewise its representative to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic, Sir Picton Bagge. In his letter to the Ukrainian Government Sir Picton wrote:

"My Government has charged me to assure you of its best intentions. It will support with all its strength the Ukrainian Government in the task it will undertake in creating an efficient administration, securing order and fighting the Central Powers".

6. The War of Soviet Russia against Ukraine

In December 1917, the Russian Bolshevik organisations in Uk- 669
raine, leaning on the Russian armed forces stationed in the Ukrainian cities, tried to overthrow the Government of the Ukrainian Central Council and to set up the dictatorship of the Communist Party. The Ukrainian Government disarmed the Russian armed forces and sent them over the boundaries of Ukraine. After this the Soviet Russian Government put to the Ukrainian Government an ultimatum to stop in Ukraine the disarming of Russian troops, which were friendly to Communist dictatorship, and to return the arms to the troops already disarmed.

"If after 48 hours no satisfactory reply will be given, the Council of the People's Commissars will consider the Ukrainian Central Council to be at war with the Government of the Soviets in Russia and Ukraine", so ended the ultimatum of the Russian Communist Government.

For fighting the Ukrainian Democratic Republic the Russian Soviet Government created its puppet 'Government of Soviet Ukraine'. This 'government' took up its residence in Kharkov, captured by troops sent from Russia. The Kharkov 'Ukrainian

669 Government' was window-dressing for the further advance of the Russian Communist troops in Ukraine.

At this time the Russian and Jewish Socialist parties in Ukraine issued protests against the attack of the Soviet Russian troops on the democratic Ukraine. In December 1917, a conference of the Russian Social-Democrat organisations in Ukraine (the so-called Mensheviks) in Kiev declared that it "brands with indignation the new infamous deed of the Bolshevik Government, that in its blunt fanaticism and irresponsibility came to declare war on Ukraine".

In the session of the All-Ukrainian Congress of the Councils of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies in Kiev on December 18, 1917, the delegate of the Jewish Social-Democrat 'Bund', Zolotarev, declared that "the Jewish proletariat will defend Ukraine together with the Ukrainian nation against the attack of the violators".

At the same Congress the leader of the Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Schatz, in his speech laid stress on the fact that "now in Russia only one organising force has remained — the Ukrainian democracy and its organ — the Central Council"

Ukraine refused to accept Soviet dictatorship and entered an unequal struggle with overwhelming Communist forces invading [642] from Russia. The Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed the independence of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic by a special Act (*'IV. Universal'*) of January 22, 1918. It is significant that even some Russian Communist organisations in Ukraine declared against the attack of Soviet Russia on Ukraine.

One of the commanders of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the Communist Antonov-Ovseyenko, writes in his memoirs that in December 1917, the leader of the Communsit organisations in Kharkov demanded that he should not make war against the Ukrainian Government, with regard to the "special situation in Ukraine in connection with the national problem" (*Comments on the Civil War*, vol. I, p. 55). On this disposition of the Communists in Ukraine Antonov remarks:

"The local Communists are very irresolute, are looking for coalition with opportunists, do not want and do not try to give our troops any assistance" *(Comments on the Civil War)*.

Another commander of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine, Colonel Muravyev, wired Antonov from Odessa on February 21, 1918, about the disposition of the workers: "I do not want to carry responsibility for anything that is happening here, if the local Soviets do not want to defend the revolution, their own government" (Antonov, *Comments*, p. 169).

7. *The Policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine in 1918*

The behaviour of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine was extremely hostile towards all that was Ukrainian. After the conquest of Kiev in February 1918, the Soviet commander Muravyev in his order Nr. 14 wrote: "We bring this government from the far North on the points of our bayonets, and where we set up our rule we support it with all means by the strength of these bayonets . . ." 669

In the Ukrainian capital Kiev, the Bolshevik troops made a terrible pogrom of all Ukrainian cultural institutions: Ukrainian books, the pictures of Ukrainian writers were destroyed: people who had documents written in Ukrainian were shot, etc. This policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine is attested by the statement of a Communist of Ukrainian origin, Vasyl Shakhray, who was in spring 1918, Commissar of War in the 'People's Secretariat' (this was the name of the Government of Soviet Ukraine appointed from Moscow):

"What a 'Ukrainian Government' is this whose members do not properly know and do not wish to know Ukrainian? . . . What a Ukrainian Minister of War am I, if I have to disarm all Ukrainian troops, for they do not want to go with me to defend the Soviet Government? We have only one military support in our fight with the Central Council — the army that was brought into Ukraine by Antonov, which regards all that is Ukrainian as hostile, counter-revolutionary" (*Annals of the Revolution*, No. 1, p. 162: Kharkov, 1928).

The campaign of the Russian Communists against Ukraine had not only political reasons: it was the desire of the Moscow Government to seize the food resources, grain, sugar and other agricultural products, and the natural resources of the Ukraine, iron ore, coal, etc. With the Communist 'Red Guards' the organisers of requisitions of food for Russia came to Ukraine. The commander of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine, Antonov-Ovseyenko, wired to one of the Russian Commissars in charge of supply on January 23, 1918: "You must appoint your representatives for the Gubernias of Kharkov and Poltava . . . who shall conduct the requisitions of grain according to a fixed plan . . . leaning upon an armed force that has been appointed by Moscow and Petersburg for this front particularly". (*Comments on the Civil War*, vol. 1, p. 184).

The Soviet Russian troops exported from Ukraine to Russia everything they regarded as necessary in masses, even the machines and outfitting of factories. Of course, this pillage roused great discontent among the masses of the Ukrainian people. Even greater

669 indignation was caused by the bloody Communist terror that took thousands of innocent people as its victims. The war of Soviet Russia against Ukraine and the terror by the Russian 'Red Guards' in Ukraine, still strengthened among the Ukrainians the will to fight for their national independence. This was expressed in an essay by the President of the Ukrainian Central Council, Professor Hrushevsky, the most authoritative personality of Ukrainian political life of that time. Hrushevsky wrote:

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"The first matter I have to lay stress on is that from now, in our relations with Moscow, a radical change has taken place. It is vain to look for a possibility of living with the Russians in the boundaries of one state. We had sincerely believed that in a new Russia the Ukrainian nation could find the necessary conditions for its manifold development. Now we have lost this belief. We have convinced ourselves that our ways differ from those of a reactionary or a revolutionary Russia. After the unprecedented barbaric atrocities of the Russian Bolsheviks against the Ukrainian people, after the cruel shelling of the Ukrainian capital by the Soviet Russian troops, in our relations with Russia a new period begins. Ukraine has to continue her struggle for liberation in order to create an independent state. Our social and political ideals must be based not on the examples of oriental despotism, but on the principles of the life and development of civilised Europe, where, before all, human dignity is valued. Ukraine has always stood in her history culturally and politically nearer to Western Europe. If we want to liberate ourselves from foreign violence, we have to conform to the civilised West" (*On the Threshold of New Ukraine:* Kiev, 1918).

8. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

728 The Soviet Russian Government had by its ruthless propaganda for an immediate peace treaty definitely disorganised the front against the Central Powers. Thus the representatives of the Ukrainian Government took part in the peace negotiations with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk. The diplomats of the Central Powers gave the Ukrainian Government in the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegates various facilities in order to secure a 'grain treaty' with Ukraine. For the food situation of the Central Powers at that time was fatal. The peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers was concluded in Brest-Litovsk on February 9, 1918. As at that time a great part of Ukraine was occupied by the Soviet Russian troops, it was in the interest of the Central Powers to interrupt the export of grain to Russia, and to use the food

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728
Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669
of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrai- 665
nian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185
Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed 423
simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discon- [563]
tent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727
exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The represen- 565
tatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

727 state. On the contrary, they wished to suppress the Ukrainian move-
565 ment and to make Ukraine a centre for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia', of course, headed by a Tsar. About these plans Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs after World War I. He hoped that a restored Russian Empire would be a reliable ally of Germany out of gratitide for the abolition of the Bolshevik régime.

642 On April 28, 1918, a detachment of German troops entered the
727 hall where the sessions of the Ukrainian Central Council took place
565 in order to arrest some Ukrainian Ministers. On the next day, on April 29, under the protection of the German troops, a congress of big landowners was called. At this congress General Paul Skoropadsky was declared Hetman of Ukraine, with the prior consent of the German authorities.

Skoropadsky belonged to the class of the big landowners, and, though he was of Ukrainian descent, had had no connections with the Ukrainian national movement before the revolution of 1917.

In his first order Skoropadsky wrote: "I declare myself Hetman of the whole Ukraine". He announced the abolition of the Ukrainian Central Council and replaced the name 'Ukrainian Democratic Republic' by 'Ukrainian State'. Skoropadsky repealed all laws and orders of the Ukrainian Central Council and the Russian Provisional Government; thus Ukraine had in this respect returned to the conditions before the Revolution.

The reactionary ways of the Skoropadsky Government that favoured the big landowners had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people; the masses of peasants and workers, that recently had fought with arms the terror of the Russian Communists under the banner of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic, were placed by the policy of the Skoropadsky Government into
[661] a desperate situation. The big landowners who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities organised 'punitive expeditions' against the Ukrainian peasantry with their armed gangs having support from German and Austrian army detachments. Heavy contributions, looting, and destruction of the peasants' property, together with mass executions of Ukrainian peasants and workers, caused immense indignation against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austrian occupation forces among the Ukrainian people. Against the reactionary régime which dominated in Ukraine, Communist propaganda met with approbation among the Ukrainian masses, unexpected even by Moscow.

727 The Chief of Staff of the German armies in Ukraine, General
642 Groener, in order to appease Ukrainian public opinion had declared after the putsch of April 29, 1918, that "the Hetman was given in-

structions that the government he formed had to stand entirely by the principle of a Ukrainian state, without any orientation towards Moscow or Poland". Nevertheless, Skoropadsky's Government consisted in its majority of Russians of reactionary trends who distinguished themselves by a hostile attitude towards the Ukrainian national movement. 227 642

The Ukrainian political parties had no confidence in the Skoropadsky régime, they considered it to be an outrage upon the Ukrainian national independence.

Against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austro-Hungarian troops which supported it, mass uprisings began in order to restore the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. Of course, the reaction in Ukraine was 'water to the mill' of Communist propaganda. Moscow knew how to use this situation for its advantage. [669]

At the end of the summer of 1918, the members of the Skoropadsky Government prepared to restore 'indivisible Russia'. Skoropadsky issued an order on November 14, 1918, in which he stated that Ukraine "had the duty to fight first for the creation of an All-Russian Federation, the principal aim of which will be the restoration of Great Russia".

10. The Restoration of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1918) — The Government of the Directory 669

Against the federation of Ukraine with Russia proclaimed by Skoropadsky, and against the reactionary régime in general, the masses of the Ukrainian people arose under the leadership of the Directory, which was elected by the Ukrainian National League (15. 11. 1918). The Ukrainian National League was created by the Ukrainian democratic parties in summer 1918. The principal aim of the League was the struggle against the Russian reaction in Ukraine which prevailed there under Skoropadsky's rule. When the League received news on Skoropadsky's plans for the 'Federation' with the Russia of the White Generals, it began to prepare armed forces in due time. The National League and the Directory had as their members prominent leaders of the Ukrainian Central Council like V. Vynnychenko, S. Petlura, both members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party, M. Shapoval, Socialist-Revolutionary, and others. Summoned by the Directory, hundreds of thousands of the Ukrainian population in cities and villages joined the uprising. Only in Kiev the Skoropadsky Government held out for some time, leaning upon small detachments of Russian Monarchists and the decisive support of the German troops. On

669 December 12, 1918, a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as [661] against 'Russian followers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parliament and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian 668 National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians 186 in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the 642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

tories that had been formerly under Russian and Austrian rule. 186
The Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic issued a 642
special Act on January 22, 1919, in Kiev which declared:

"From this day, the parts of Ukraine — the Western-Ukrainian Democratic Republic, Galicia, Bukovina and Hungarian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) and the Great Ukraine on the Dnieper, unite. The ancient hopes which the best sons of Ukraine had lived and died for become reality. From now there is one indivisible independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic".

Relying on this Act, the delegation from Western Ukraine, numbering 65 people, took part in the Congress of Ukraine which had been called to Kiev on January 23, 1919.

The Western-Ukrainian Republic, from the first days of its [726]
existence, had to fight in a heavy struggle against the Poles who 728
pretended to rule in Galicia even after the dissolution of Austria. The Poles invaded the Western Ukrainian Republic after having concentrated large forces on this front. The Ukrainian Government asked the Entente Powers and the Paris Peace Conference for mediation in the Polish-Ukrainian war. In February 1919, a Mission of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia headed by the French General Berthélemy, and with the participation of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy. This Mission presented to the Poles and Ukrainians a plan for an armistice on February 28, 1919. According to this plan, until the final decision of the Peace Conference, the territory of Galicia eastwards of the Bug and Stryj Rivers should remain under Ukrainian administration, while the Western part of Galicia should be administered by the Polish authorities. The Galician territory which remained under Ukrainian administration should be recognised by the Big Powers 'de facto' as an independent state, and the Ukrainian Army should be recognised and trained with the assistance of the Entente Powers. The Ukrainian Government did not accept the demarcation line proposed by the Mission of General Berthélemy as unfavourable for Ukraine. In May 1919, a new Mission of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia, headed by General Botha (South Africa). General Botha's Mission altered the previous armistice draft, and the Ukrainian Government agreed to accept it. However, the Poles rejected this plan.

The small country — Ukrainian Galicia — had to strain all her 726
forces in order to hold the front against the whole might of Poland. From Eastern Ukraine Galicia could not receive any considerable help, because the Ukrainian forces had to fight the Skoropadsky

726 régime and were at the same time threatened by the advance of the Russian armies — the 'Red' from the North and the 'White' from the South-East. But the Galician Ukrainians showed even under these unfavourable conditions a considerable talent for organisation, a high level of patriotism and sacrifice. Galician Ukraine weakened by four years of war, isolated from the outside world and alone, could without foreign help, defend herself for more than eight months against an enemy several times stronger (Poland), could organise efficient administration, and secure order and legality on her territory.

The Poles started a new offensive in May 1919 with the forces of General Haller's army which had been organised in France and sent to Poland for the defence against Soviet Russia. The Polish Government used this army against the Ukrainians. Against the fresh Polish forces the Ukrainians with their poor equipment could not stand and had to leave Galicia retreating to Eastern Ukraine.

12. Ukraine in Her Struggle against Soviet Russia in 1919

669 The revolution of the Ukrainian democrats against the Skoro-
726 padsky régime met from the very beginning with the irreconcilable enmity of the Russian Communists. It was well understood in Moscow that the reactionary Skoropadsky régime, in 1918, had weakened the Ukrainian national movement and brought confusion into the masses of the Ukrainian people. It was decided in Moscow to conquer Ukraine once more and for this reason an immense propaganda machine was set going. As soon as the Directory had declared the uprising against Skoropadsky, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party appointed a 'Provisional Workers' and Peasants 'Government of Ukraine'. This 'Government' had the task of making war against the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. In one of its first acts this 'Ukrainian Government' outlawed the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as 'enemies of the people'. Of the five members of this 'Ukrainian Soviet Government' only one, Zatonsky, knew Ukrainian, others were people completely strange to Ukraine.

Against the Soviet Russian troops who invaded Ukraine, the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic fought by military and political means. But the Communists were assisted at that time by the shortsighted policy of the Entente Governments. In December 1918, the French navy landed troops on the shores of the Black Sea to help the army of the Russian Volunteers under General Denikin in the fight for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia'. The appearance of foreign troops in Ukraine caused great

confusion among the masses of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrai- 669
nians who had overthrown the reactionary Skoropadsky Govern- 726
ment installed by the Germans, looked at the French troops with great distrust, for they might renew the rule of the big landowners in Ukraine. In the meantime the policy of the leaders of the French Army in Ukraine was hostile to the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The attempts of the Ukrainian Government to come to an agreement with the French were fruitless. These negotiations produced only material for Communist propaganda, that the Ukrainian Government 'sold the interests of the Ukrainian nation to the Western imperialists'. The Communist propaganda spread among the Ukrainian Army too. The consequences of this propaganda were disastrous; Ukrainian soldiers deserted the front against the Russian Red Army and some detachments even went over to the side of the Soviet Army. *Thus the French intervention supported only the growth of Communist influence in Ukraine.*

The Government of Ukraine also made attempts to come to an agreement with the Soviet Government. But Moscow remained, as always, hostile to an independent democratic Ukraine and had only one aim — to take possession of the rich Ukrainian territory. The [642]
Ukrainian Government, formed in December 1918, was headed by the Social-Democrat Volodymyr Chekhivsky. This Government consisted predominantly of Socialists and had also a representative of the Jewish Social-Democratic Party (Poale-Zion), A. Revutsky, as Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority. All that did not restrain Moscow from calling the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic 'capitalist'.

To the protests of the Ukrainian Government against the attack of the Russian Red Army on Ukraine the Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin replied hypocritically: "The military actions on Ukrainian territory are a matter for the Army of the Directory and the Army of the Ukrainian Soviet Government which is entirely independent."

Against this statement the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in its wire of January 9, 1919, declared.

"The Directory sees clearly the aim of the Government of the People's Commissars; it wants to bring Ukraine, rich in grain, coal and other products, with the aid of the 'Bolshevik Soviets', under its rule and turn her into its colony."

Before the advance of the Russian Red Army the Ukrainian 726
Government was forced to leave Kiev, its capital, at the beginning 669
of February 1919. In Vinnitsa the Socialist members of the 642
Directory quitted the Government. The member of the Directory

669 and Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army, S. Petlura,
726 Social-Democrat, retired from the Party. He was elected President of the Directory in place of Vynnychenko. A Government was
642 formed without the participation of Socialists with Prof. Serhy Ostapenko as Premier. In Ukrainian political circles there was a hope that Ostapenko's 'bourgeois' Government might more easily succeed in coming to an agreement with the French Command in Odessa than a Socialist one. But these hopes failed. The French representatives offered the Ukrainians the choice to become a part of the front of the 'White' Russians against Bolshevism. They refused to discuss the national rights of Ukraine.

The disregard of the Ukrainian national movement revanged itself gravely in the fate of the Franco-Greek troops landing on the coast of the Black Sea. The parts of the Ukrainian Army which had joined the Soviets under the command of Hrihoriev and J. Tyutyunnyk, attacked the Franco-Greek landing forces. These detachments took, on March 1, 1919, Kherson, and on March, 15, Nikolayev, and in the first days of April, Odessa, forcing the French to embark. Thus, because of not fully understanding the Ukrainian problem, the French representatives, through their orientation towards 'White Russia', in spring 1919, helped actually Soviet Russia to occupy Ukrainian territory. By this they strengthened the hopes of the Russian Communists for 'world revolution'. Russian Communists thought that in Ukraine 'the fate of world revolution is being decided' ;the title of a book published in 1919 in Moscow was *Where the Fate of World Revolution Is Being Decided.* From Ukraine the Soviet Russian Government planned to send aid through Rumania to the Hungarian Communists, who had proclaimed a Soviet Rupublic in Budapest on 21. 3. 1919. These plans of the Soviet Russian Government failed, for a that very time mass risings and the struggle of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic stopped the advance of the Soviet Russian troops to the West.

642 The Government of Ostapenko, without the participation of
669 Socialists, called 'Cabinet of Agreement with the Entente', was replaced on April 9, 1919, by a new Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic composed of Socialists headed by the Social-Democrat Borys Martos. This Government announced its intention to depend on the own forces of the Ukrainian nation itself. At that time, when the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic remained in the Western provinces of Ukraine (Podolia, Volhynia, Galicia), in Central Ukraine, on the Dnieper River mass uprisings against the Russian Communists developed. Even groups of Ukrai-

nian Communists who wished to create an independent Soviet Ukraine participated in these uprisings. The policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine had a clearly predatory character. The Communist Commissar Schlichter said of the tasks of the Soviet Russian campaign at a session of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919: 642 669

"You all remember that when Ukraine was becoming Soviet with every day of the advance of the Red Army we became easier in our minds; the rich-in-bread Ukraine is ours! . . . We have four central supply detachments. We set all hopes on them. We have a lot of workers we have sent out who will be able to overflow all Ukrainian villages. We shall always remember that the looks of the proletariat of Russia are turned towards Ukraine" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 2: Kharkov, 1928).

Not only by the ruthless pillage were the Ukrainian people put against the Russian Communist dictatorship; by its nationalist policy, too, it roused great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians. The Rumanian Communist Rakovsky, who was appointed by Moscow as Premier of the Soviet Government of Ukraine, declared that the Ukrainian language and culture were 'petty bourgeois' and that the use of the Ukrainian language in public institutions was necessary only for 'Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries'. [186] 656 191

For this reason the 'dictatorship of the Russian culture' was introduced in Ukraine by the Russian Communists as a 'proletarian' one. "The Soviet Government in Ukraine in 1918 made in fact Russian the official language", — writes the Communist N. Popov in his *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine* (1929). Against the declarations of an 'independent Soviet Ukraine', the Rakovsky Government proclaimed the 'federation' of Ukraine with Russia. There could not be free elections to the Soviets in Ukraine. The power in the villages was given to the 'Comittees of Poor Peasants' consisting often of people sent from Russia. According to the instruction these Comittees were given they had the duty — "to fulfil precisely and relentlessly all orders of the supply authorities . . ."

13. Risings in Ukraine

In spring 1919, when the Soviet Army had reached the Dniester River, Moscow prepared its forces for the support of Soviet Hungary. But at that time the same troops who had fought against the Franco-Greek forces under the command of Hrihoriev, Tyutyunnyk and others, started the fight against the Russian Communists. Of the strength of this movement Rakovsky, Premier of 669

669 the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine', gives testimony in a book published in 1920 under the title — *Struggle for the Liberation of the Village:*

From April 1, until May 1, 1919, there had been 93 risings against the Soviet Russian regiment in Ukraine; from May 1, until May 15, — 28 risings; from June 1, until June 19, — 207 revolts.

Thus, instead of a 'march on Europe', the Russian Communist army had to fight stubbornly with the masses of the Ukrainian people for the Ukrainian grain.

"Every Pud (36 lbs.) of the requisitioned grain was sprinkled with drops of blood", the Communist Commissar Schlichter wrote later on his supply activities in Ukraine in 1919. The risings in Ukraine happened under the banner of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had permanent contacts with them.

The Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, reorganised on Galician territory, started an offensive against the Communists at the end of May 1919. The Soviet Russian troops pressed by the Ukrainian Army, and under the blows of the Ukrainian partisans, were forced to retreat. Soon the Ukrainian Galician Army joined the fight against the Russian Communists.

14. The Polish Army Occupies Western Ukraine in 1919

726 The hundred thousand strong Ukrainian Galician Army fought against the forces of the whole of Poland from November 1918, until summer 1919. At the end of May 1919, the Rumanians who had seized Bukovina on November 11, 1918, occupied Southern Galicia. On June 25, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Entente passed the following resolution regarding Galician Ukraine:

"In order to protect the persons and the property of the peaceable population of Eastern Galicia against the dangers it is threatened with by the Bolshevik gangs, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided to authorise the forces of the Polish Republic to go on in their military operations as far as the Zbrucz River"*).

Under the pressure of the Polish Army several times stronger than the Ukrainians the latter were forced to leave the territory of Galicia and went over on the territory of Eastern Ukraine. The Polish-Ukrainian war ceased, and between the armies of both states a demarcation line was drawn. However, the Polish Government used every opportunity to extend its occupation over other Ukrai-

*) The former Russo-Austrian frontier.

nian territories. This Polish policy held the Ukrainian 726
military forces that were fighting against the Russian Red Army constantly in tension, and hindered the work of the Ukrainian Government.

The Ukrainian Galician Army took part in the struggle against the Soviet Russian occupation immediately after the termination of the war with the Poles. The Galician Ukrainians wanted to strengthen the Ukrainian state on the Dnieper, together with the forces of Eastern Ukraine, in order to decide later the historic quarrel for Galicia with Poland.

15. Ukraine between 'Red' and 'White' Russia (1919)

In June 1919, the Ukrainian Government, headed by the Social- 642
Democrat Martos (from August Isaac Mazepa, Social-Democrat, 563
was Prime Minister), took up its residence in Kamenets in Podolia. The united Ukrainian Armies were under the command of General Yunakiw, former Professor of the Military Academy in Petersburg. The Government of Ukraine made efforts to secure legality and order in its territory, particularly it resolutely fought the excesses of various dark elements against the Jewish population. In the Government of theUkrainian Democratic Republic there was a special Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority — Pinkhos Krasny (Jewish People's Party); the deputy Minister of Labour was the Jewish Social-Democrat Prof. Salomon Goldelman.

The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against Russian Bolshevism 669
as well as the entire Ukrainian problem were in 1919 unknown to the world. Against the Ukrainian liberation movement Communist propaganda was made throughout the world, trying to describe the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as a reactionary state. On the other hand, the propaganda of the Russian 'Whites' and of the Poles permeated decisive political circles abroad resulting in the conviction that the Ukrainian movement was the same as Russian Bolshevism. Therefore the Ukrainian Republic which had led a heroic struggle against Soviet Russia was blockaded by the Western Great Powers as 'infected by Bolshevism'. Because of this [705]
blockade the Ukrainian Army was in want of arms, supplies, medicaments. Only by contraband from Rumania was it possible to receive something for the Ukrainian armed forces. Under these circumstances it happened frequently that the Ukrainian Army fought with arms captured on the front from the enemy. But in spite of all these difficulties the united Army of the Ukrainian Republic had considerable successes in the battles with the Soviet Russian troops and, on August 31, 1919, took Kiev, the capital of

669 Ukraine. The 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' headed by Rakovsky left Ukraine and was abolished by order of Lenin. This was a new proof of the complete failure of the Russian Communist policy in Ukraine.

But at the same time the Ukrainian Republic met a new enemy who had claims on Ukraine. This was the Russian Volunteer Army under Denikin. The leaders of this army regarded the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as more dangerous for themselves than the Soviet dictatorship in Moscow. Therefore, in its struggle against the Russian 'Red Army', the Russian 'White Army' attempted before all to take possession of the Ukrainian territory in order to [648] prevent the strengthening of 'Ukrainian separatism'. In vain the Ukrainian Government appealed to the Western Great Powers that they should not admit the attack by the Russian Volunteer Forces on the Ukrainian Army and that they recognise the Government of democratic Ukraine. If in 1919 the Government and Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had been given the least support by the Western Powers, the development of Eastern Europe and even the whole world would have taken another course than happened in fact. In any case, by securing an independent Ukraine, Russian imperialism would not be such a menace to the world as we see it to-day.

[731] When Denikin's troops met the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in Kiev they attacked Ukrainian armed forces weakened by the struggle with the Russian Red Army and decimated by a disastrous typhus epidemic. This epidemic had spread principally in consequence of the blockade of the territory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army had no medicaments, no clothing nor sanitary equipment, the Ukrainian soldiers died in thousands, and there was no help. From the army the epidemic spread among the population of Ukraine.

[727] But even under these incredibly hard conditions the Army of the Ukrainian Republic and the masses of Ukrainian people did not abandon the fight against the new oppressors — the Russian Volunteers — who had abundant support from the Entente Powers. The Russian 'Whites' forbade the Ukrainian language in schools, offices and the press in the Ukrainian territory they had seized. Russian authorities ordered the burning of Ukrainian books. The Denikin Government cruelly persecuted Ukrainian patriots. Even the word 'Ukraine' was forbidden; the expression 'Little Russia' was used instead. The Denikin Government restored the estates of the big landowners in Ukraine.

Against the Denikin régime in Ukraine extensive risings of the

people took place. The Ukrainian Government and Army were 669
forced under the pressure of Denikin to leave the temporary capital of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, the city of Kamenets in Podolia, on November 15, 1919. The Ukrainian Army marched into the hinterland of the enemy. The enormous partisan movement in Ukraine in autumn 1919, stopped Denikin's offensive on Moscow. Of this the Russian Red Army took advantage, broke through the front of Denikin and marched into Ukraine again. The front of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, brought into disorder by the war with Denikin, could not be restored at once, and the Soviet Russian troops seized almost the entire territory of Ukraine again.

When the leaders of the Russian Volunteers saw the coming of their definite defeat, they offered the command of the Ukrainian Army which was carrying on a partisan war against the oppressors of Ukraine, an alliance against the Russian Communists. The delegate of the Russian Volunteer Army, Colonel Popov, wrote in January, 1920, to the Ukrainian Supreme Command: "We have what you want — arms, but you have that we have not — the confidence of the population". The Ukrainians declined this offer of the Russian 'Whites' convinced that any alliance with them would bring only damage to the Ukrainian struggle for liberation.

The Army of the Ukrainian Republic began its 'Winter-Campaign', famous in the history of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, in Lubar in Volhynia on December 6, 1919. This army, by order of its Government, made partisan war on the territories of Ukraine against 'White' and 'Red' Russia until May 5, 1920. Only leaning upon the confidence and the active support of the population could this army cover distances of thousands of miles carrying the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of equipment did not allow the Army of the 'Winter Campaign' to accept in its ranks many thousands of Ukrainians who wished to fight actively for the independent Ukraine.

16. The New Tactics of the Russian Communists in Ukraine

The failure of the Soviet Russian policy in Ukraine in 1919 656
caused much discussion among the Communists themselves. By 182
order from Moscow, in October 1919, not only the 'Government of 668
Soviet Ukraine', headed by Rakovsky, was abolished, but also the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Among the Communists who had worked in Ukraine in 1919 a group of the so-called federalists appeared that demanded from Moscow more rights for Ukraine. The leader of this group,

656 G. Lapchinsky, explained that Ukraine must be an independent state
186 and not a Russian colony.

The powerful Ukrainian movement forced the Russian Com-
668 munists to alter for a certain time their tactics in Ukraine. The Soviet Russian Government ordered the Communists to pay attention to the national peculiarities of Ukraine. In December 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution on the recognition by Russia of the independent Soviet Ukraine. Among other matters this resolution states that the "members of the Communist Party in Ukrainian territory are obliged to realise the right of the working masses of learning their mother language in schools, and speaking it in all Soviet institutions".

The resolution recommends the restriction of the requisition of food from the Ukrainian peasants. Besides, this resolution of the Russian CP pointed out that the principal task of Soviet construction in Ukraine was the requisition of arms from the population.

The President of the Soviet Russian Government, Lenin, wrote in *The Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victory over Denikin* on January 4, 1920:

"The independence of Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party. Only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can decide the question on their Soviet Congress — whether Ukraine should be united with Russia or left an independent Republic . . . We want a voluntary union of nations, a union that would not permit violence of one nation against another".

All these declarations of the Russian Communist Party leaders had the aim to lull the vigilance of the masses of the Ukrainian people. In reality the Soviet Russian Government did not even intend to change its imperialist course against Ukraine. Moscow feared the armed Ukrainian people and distrusted them. Therefore, for instance, a conference of the members of the Russian Communist Party in Homel passed the following resolution in October 1919:

"The advance to the South and the organisation of Soviet administration in Ukraine are possible only with the aid of regular disciplined troops, who, in any case, must not be of local origin" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 6: Kharkov, 1926, p. 4).

669 The Soviet Russian troops, after having seized the Ukrainian
661 territory until the spring of 1920, began at once the struggle against

the Ukrainian partisan movement. New requisitions of grain and the taking of arms from the population caused an even greater disappointment among the Ukrainians. The partisan movement which had overthrown Denikin's power turned with new vigour against the Russian Communists. These risings were carried on under the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of arms and supplies did not permit the Ukrainian partisan movement to develop and to attain decisive results in the struggle with the overwhelming forces of the Russian Red Armv. 669 661

17. Poland — Ukraine — Russia 1920—21

At the end of 1919, the regular front of the Ukrainian Army broke down. The Ukrainian Army continued the fight against 'White' and 'Red' Russia as guerilla war. The diplomatic Mission of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic headed by Andriy Liwycky, Cabinet member, started negotiations with the Polish Government about the relations between Poland and Ukraine. The consequence of these negotiations was a Convention signed in Warsaw on April 21, 1920. In that time the Government of the Ukrainian Republic headed by Isaac Mazepa was remaining in Ukraine. 648 669 728

According to this Convention a new frontier between Ukraine and Poland was established: those Ukrainian territories Poland had seized in 1919 in the war with the Ukrainians (Galicia, Volhynia etc.) remained on the Polish side. The Polish Government undertook to support the restoration of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic on the territories occupied by Soviet Russia.

The war of Poland and Ukraine against Soviet Russia, which was carried on with changing fortunes did not bring the expected results to the Ukrainians. The Polish leaders thought it more advantageous for themselves to come to an agreement with Soviet Russia after having divided the Ukrainian territories with Moscow (Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921). Poland recognised in Riga the Government of the 'independent' Soviet Ukraine and broke off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army which in fighting against the overwhelming Russian forces, had entered Polish territories together with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1920) was interned. The soldiers of this army, who had fought against Soviet Russia not only for Ukraine but for Poland alike, were placed by the Polish Government in camps in such conditions that many of them died there, or acquired serious diseases.

CHAPTER III

UKRAINE UNDER SOVIET RUSSIAN RULE SINCE 1920

1. The Soviet Régime in Ukraine 1920—21

[656] 668 186 After the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and Lenin's letter to the Ukrainian workers and peasants announcing a new approach to the Ukrainian problem (December 1919; January-1920) the policy of Moscow towards Ukraine did not change in substance. Soviet Russia did not trust even the Communists of Ukrainian nationality or those Russian Communists who wished to meet the Ukrainian national demands even partly. The group of Communists-Federalists headed by G. Lapchinsky published in February 1920, a pamphlet entitled *Project of a Resolution on the Party Policy.* The authors of this pamphlet protested against the rule of the Russian element in Ukraine. They wrote on the "mad, and, for the cause of the revolution, disastrous plan of the occupation of Ukraine by the military and political forces of Soviet Russia. After the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation in the times of the Romanovs and Hapsburgs, every attempt to direct the fate of the country from outside will arouse the growth of nationalism".

[665] In the pamphlet, facts on the full dependence of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Central Committee of the Russian CP are quoted: thus the Communist organisation in Ukraine — "had to fulfil all demands of the Central Committee of the Russian CP, even, if it regarded them injurious to the cause of the revolution in Ukraine".

656 666 Moscow deported the opposing Communists from Ukraine or expelled them from the Party. The Soviet Russian régime in Ukraine thereto was strengthened. For this purpose Moscow gave preponderance to the Russian element in the Soviet administration in Ukraine. For instance, the election system for the 4th Congress of the Soviets in Ukraine in 1920 was the following: from 1000 soldiers of the Red Army one deputy was elected, from 10,000 workers one deputy, and one deputy from 50,000 peasants. It should be remembered that 1920 in the ranks of the Red Army in Ukraine

there were 85% Russians and only 8% Ukrainians. With this 656
election system the representatives of the peasants, the most 666
numerous part of the Ukrainian population, made only 12,7% of the members of this Soviet Congress. Finance, national economy, railways, labour — concisely all foundations of the economic life of Ukraine — were concentrated in Moscow. All Ukrainian co-operative organisations were subordinated to Moscow. During [651]
1920 Ukraine had to deliver to Russia 160 million of Pud of grain (1 Pud is 36 lbs.), 6 million Pud meat, 30 million Pud potatoes, 255 million eggs, big consignments of sugar, etc. The Russian Red Army made requisitions for its needs separately and confiscated in the last months of 1920 about 30 million Pud grain in Ukraine (*Collection of Reports of the Government of the USSR:* Kharkov 1921).

No wonder that in consequence of this exploitation the Urkrai- 669
nian partisan movement was spreading. At the end of 1920 there were not less than 40,000 Ukrainian partisans in Ukraine who fought against the Russian Communists as an organised force. Evidence of the extent of this struggle is given to us in the trophies of the Soviet Russian troops seized in the war with the Ukrainian partisans 1920—21: 43 guns, 1,812 machine-guns, 31,788 rifles etc. (*Collection of Reports*). In the course of only one year, 1921, the Soviet Secret Police in Ukraine suppressed 6,000 partisan organisations. (*Communist:* Kharkov, February 11, 1923).

2. The Famine of 1921/22 and the Policy of Soviet Russia in Ukraine 731

The Soviet Russian Government took advantage of the horrible 656
famine of 1921/22 in Ukraine and succeeded in strengthening its rule there. A drought in the fall of 1920 and spring 1921 was followed by a bad harvest, and a great dearth of food arose. A real famine began. However, the policy of the Russian Government in Ukraine, intending to get as much food as possible, did not change. Before the outside world the Russian authorities tried to hide the hunger catastrophe in Ukraine, and directed all foreign aid coming from America and Western Europe into Russia. Though in Ukraine in autumn 1921, millions of the Ukrainian population were starving the Russian Government, nevertheless, took away from the hungry regions the rest of the food stocks, and exported them to Russia. This roused the attention of foreigners who stayed at that time in Ukraine. The American historian H. H. Fisher writes in his book on the famine of 1921/22 that the representatives of the Soviet Russian Government demanded resolutely that it was

731 "necessary to request the ARA (American Relief Administration) not to split its forces, *but to concentrate them entirely on the Volga*
656 *area*" (p. 248).

Professor Fisher remarks in his book:

"The policy of the Communist Party with respect to the Ukraine famine presents many curious aspects. Not only did the Moscow Government fail to bring the Ukrainian situation to the knowledge of the American Relief Administration as it did other regions much more remote, but it actively discouraged... anything likely to bring the Americans in contact with the Ukraine... Before the ARA had begun its operations (January, 1922) the Moscow and the so-called Kharkov Government did not undertake anything serious for the aid to the hungry people of Ukraine" (H.H.Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia:* New York, 1927). Further, Prof. Fisher says in his book:

"From the first the Moscow Government had discouraged all proposals which tended to bring the ARA into contact with the Ukraine. Litvinov (at that time Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, *P. F.*), had described the port of Odessa, back in the fall of 1921, as out of the question for ARA operations, although it was subsequently used very successfully. It is also significant that, until the ARA had investigated and established outposts in the south, Moscow virtually ignored in its press the famine conditions along the Black Sea..." (p. 252).

731 Prof. Fisher states that the Russian Communist Government
656 exported food from the hungry regions in Ukraine:
439 "It is astonishing enough that these trainloads of food have been loaded in Kiev and Poltava and sent hundreds of miles to the hungry along the Volga, instead of being transported a score or so miles across the Gubernia line to Odessa or Nikolaiev, where there was a first class famine in swing. It is even more astonishing, when one learns... that Odessa Gubernia, with a crop of only seventeen per cent of normal and with people dying of hunger in the streets of its principal town as well as in the huts of its villages, sent sixty-five cars to Central Russia, while Nikolaiev, with a crop only four per cent of normal, and containing in the city of Kherson the most desperately afflicted spot in South Russia, in fact, one of the worst in the entire country, sent eight cars to the Volga" (p. 261).

On the export of grain from Ukraine during the famine of 1921/22 the American historian brings the following facts:

"The Gubernia of Podolia produced a considerable food surplus. The adjoining Gubernia of Odessa had a deficit, and many people were doomed to starve if food were not brought in. According to

the scheme officially outlined for the good of Russia, the surplus 731
food in Podolia should not be used to save the lives of the peasants 656
in Odessa, a few miles away, but should be carried through the 439
starving regions, placed on board a steamer and sold in Hamburg . . ." (p. 323).

A representative of the Relief Committee of Fridtjof Nansen who was in Ukraine at the beginning of 1922 gives the following facts on the famine:

"Eight million souls are starving in the south of the Ukraine, 731
2½ millions of them have absolutely nothing to eat. A further 656
2½ millions are feeding themselves on substitutes, such as hay, 261
dried plants, etc., but are not getting any normal meals; three millions have some supplies, but in such small quantities that they will soon be reckoned in the first and second categories. It may be said that before the end of April 7 million souls will come under these two categories. About 700,000 little children who have been brought into municipal asylums do not receive more than one fifth of the normal portion. Child mortality is tremendous. It reaches 50%. In Zaporoje one million souls are litterally starving. 60% are children. Cannibalism is spreading. Ten thousand people die in Zaporoje daily. All the cattle and the horses have been devoured". (*La famine en Ukraine:* Genève, 1922).

The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee gives a picture of the famine in Ukraine as follows:

"The country side is parched, without trees or plants, almost entirely black. The straw of the roofs is being used to nourish men and animals. People relate that they first ate up all dogs, cats, crows that they could catch and then took to the starving cattle, to boot-leather and furniture wood. You hear accounts and find evidence of necrophagy and cannibalism. You speak with people who have devoured their children, their brothers and sisters. You see skeleton-like human forms lying in the peasant's huts, dying, or waiting without hope, to be rescued by death . . . Usually no one takes the trouble, or no one has sufficient energy to bury the dead".

In the time when the Ukrainian people were starving in masses, 731
the Russian Government took care only of the aid for the hungry 656
along the Volga. The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee in Ukraine wrote in his report of 1922:

"At the beginning of this year one could have seen in famine-stricken districts of the Gouvernement Nikolaiev such proclamations: 'Workers of Nikolaiev: Come to the assistance of the famine-stricken of the Volga region!' This happened at a time when this

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
652 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Congress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

is looked at by the majority of the Communist Party in Ukraine, 186
and here in Russia even more, as some sort of strategy, a diplomatic 668
game".

Rakovsky explained that, through the proclamation of the Soviet Union, Moscow had gained ten and twenty times more power in comparison with the previous state. Therefore Rakovsky demanded that the Government of the whole Union in Moscow should surrender 9/10 of its competence, and that this be transferred to the separate Soviet Republics. Together with the Commissar of the Interior of Soviet Ukraine of that time, Skypnyk, Rakovsky demanded that the relations between Ukraine and Russia should be these of a confederation.

Skrypnyk protested at the Congress of the Russian CP against the disregard of the national and cultural rights of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army that led to a forced Russification of Ukrainians. He regretted that Ukrainian schools were not allowed [162]
for the 7 millions of Ukrainians in the Russian Soviet Republic, outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Skrypnyk sharply criticised the nationalism of the Russian Communists in Ukraine who did not admit the Ukrainian language in public and Party institutions.

The Russian Communist N. Bukharin stated in a speech at the 12th Congress of the Party that the Communist organisation in Ukraine had a Russian-Jewish composition with a very small number of Ukrainians. And in the meantime, Bukharin said, — "in Ukraine there is a very strong national movement" (*Records of the 12th Congress of the Russian CP*).

However, the demands of those Communists who wished to re- 631
strict Russian centralism and enlarge the rights of the separate Soviet Republics did not attain a majority at the Congress of the Russian CP. In July 1923, the strictly centralist Constitution of the USSR was ratified. Besides the theoretical declaration of the equality of rights of nations and the 'right of separation' of the peoples from Russia this constitution actually concentrates all power in the hands of Moscow, so that the acts and orders of the 'All-Union Government' are valid even then if the separate Soviet Republics would protest against them.

The policy of Soviet Ukrainisation was limited mostly to those 186
institutions which had to deal with the peasants. But in the towns 665
and industrial centres the Russian Communists tried to prevent the admission of the Ukrainian language by every means. For this reason quarrels between Ukrainian and Russian Communists arose in the ranks of the Communist Party in Ukraine. Thus the Communist Alexander Shumsky, the Commissar of Education in

[In the year 1922 -- Analyst]

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine
687 the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 1/3 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres (*The Bolshevik of Ukraine,* No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the
517 Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan (1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy industries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, 83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia.

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peasants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property was taken into the collective farms (*Communist*, Kharkov, December 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater.

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administration, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc.

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

871 every teacher in the schools in Ukraine had orders to spread Com-
656 munist propaganda, to fight the appearance of national discontent with the Russian rule by every means, and was obliged to insult the
[814] struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation. In schools, Ukrainian history was falsely interpreted as well as in literature and in films. For instance, clinging to the tradition taken from Tsarist Russia, the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa who at the beginning of the 18th century wanted to free Ukraine from Muscovite dependence, has in Soviet historiography the epithet of a 'traitor' and 'reactionary'. But Tsar Peter I. and Tsar Ivan the Terrible, are glorified by Soviet school and science as 'progressive democratic rulers'.

659 The Ukrainian religious life under the régime of Soviet Russian
661 occupation had to suffer from special persecutions. In 1921, in Soviet Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Autocephal Church, independent of the Moscow Patriarch, was organised. This Church, headed by its idealistic leaders, the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier of the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1918—19 and others, completed a great task for the cultural and moral improvement of the Ukrainian nation. Moscow attempted to destroy the strong organisation of the Ukrainian Autocephal Church with the help of its agents, but did not succeed in this. Then the Soviet Government ruined by bloody repressions the Ukrainian Church after having destroyed its entire hierarchy and masses of its followers (1929).

661 In connection with the 'General Line' which had placed unbear-
517 able burdens on Ukrainian economy, a mass discontent against Moscow increased among the Ukrainians. The ruthless economic
815 exploitation and political oppression by Russia caused, among the Ukrainian people, a permanent oppositon which appeared in various forms. Therefore, the Moscow Government decided to terrorise the Ukrainian intelligentsia which bore the brunt of the political efforts of the Ukrainian nation. For this purpose a number of trials against the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian science and social life were arranged; the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine with the participation of the prominent member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, Serhy Yefremov, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier, Professor Osyp Hermayze and others in Kharkov, in spring 1930. Thousands of innocent people, especially students, perished in the prisoners' cells of the GPU without any trial. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Academy of Science was exposed to repressions. In place of the imprisoned or expelled members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, the Communists appointed their own people though without scientific merits,
46 but politically faithful to Moscow.

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but 000
politically faithful to Moscow.

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also 661
by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of 651
forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though 243
terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists.

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet 661
Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the 665
CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others.

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion 687
from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commis- 186
sar of Education in Ukraine from 1027—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the

687 national problem and encouraged others to do likewise. In Moscow
186 Skrypnyk's theoretical works on the national problem were treated with distrust: for in the CP one is to believe that Lenin and Stalin have given unchangeable dogmas an orthodox Communist is not expected to discuss. In the meantime Skrypnyk in his speeches and articles summoned the Ukrainian Communists to a 'national construction not restricted by anything'. He pointed out that national consciousness should be developed among the masses of Ukrainian people, and that through the development of the national culture certain values should be given to the Ukrainian workers and peasants.

Skrypnyk described the practice of the Russian Communist Party in the national question in the following words:

"For the majority of our Party, Ukraine as a national element did not exist. There was only 'Little Russia', as a part of the indivisible Russia, something uncertain both in its relations with Russia and with regard to its territory and even its language" (Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches*, vol. I, p. 291; Kharkov 1932). Frequently, in the Congresses of the Communist Party, Skrypnyk demanded the organising of Ukrainian schools in the territories of the Russian Soviet Republic inhabited by Ukrainians. These views and demands of Skrypnyk Moscow recognised as 'nationalism', he himself was declared as an 'instrument of intervention'. In order to avoid being the principal figure in a new trial Skrypnyk thought it better to end this life by suicide. This happened on July 6, 1933, on the 10th anniversary of the ratification of the first constitution of the USSR, of which Skrypnyk was one of the co-editors.

661 Moscow's fears of the Communist opposition in Ukraine are
665 shown by the dimensions of the 'purge' which had been made among the Communists in Ukraine in 1933. During 1933, 35,5% of the members were expelled from the CP of Ukraine (*Communist:* 1, 2, 1934). In some regions, for instance in that of Kiev, half of the members were expelled from the Communist Party. Many Communist organisations in villages ceased to exist and were replaced by 'political detachments' sent from Russia. In the course of 10 months in 1933, in Ukraine, 237 secretaries of Rayon Committees of the Communist Party, 279 Presidents of Rayon Executive Committees, and 158 Presidents of Rayon Control Commissions were dismissed (*Izvestia:* Moscow 28, 11, 1933).

The purge in the public institutions of Ukraine was directed principally against the Ukrainians. The Communist Mykolenko,

the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933: U 661 665

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

6. The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation. U 731 656

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*). SU [474] [423] U [474] [423]

Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

731 the Moscow Government, in 1933, forbade foreign journalists to
056 enter Ukraine.

Back in the summer of 1932 the Ukrainian farmers in Canada addressed the Soviet Red Cross with the proposition to send their grain for gratis distribution among the hungry in Ukraine. But Moscow resolutely refused to accept this gift. The hunger catastrophe of 1932/33 was so great that the population of Ukraine died in masses, and cannibalism and necrophagy spread among the people. The peasants of Ukraine, weakened and decimated by the famine, were forced to enter 'voluntarily' the Soviet collective farms. Though the harvest of 1933 was good, millions of Ukrainians did not live to see it.

The dimensions of the devastations of Ukraine by the famine 'organised' by Soviet Russia were carefully concealed by the Russian Communist Government, and are even now kept secret. Only by chance some foreign correspondents learned about the results of this famine in Ukraine. W. H. Chamberlin writes in his book, *The Confessions of an Individualist:* New York, 1941, on the famine of 1933 as follows:

"There were many rumours of mass starvation, especially in the normally rich farming regions of Ukraine and the North Cau-
[486] casus. The impression that something very abnormal was taking place in the villages was strengthened by the fact that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had introduced a new rule forbidding journalists to travel in Russia without special permission — a permission which was never granted when Ukraine and the North Caucasus were mentioned as destinations. The official explanation of this ruling would have deserved an international mendacity prize. It was that the presence of foreign correspondents would disturb the harvesting operations . . . The ban on journalistic travel was suggestively lifted after the new harvest had been gathered in — after there had been an opportunity to bury the corpses and to remove the outward signs of the famine —".

The same author writes about his visit to the Ukrainian part of the North Caucasus — the Kuban Region:

"This had been one of the richest and most smiling agricultural regions in Russia . . . There was an amazing lack of domestic animals; one saw none of the dogs that had formerly rushed out barking when we entered Cossack villages. In the first house we entered at random we found that seven members of the family have died of hunger. Three had survived. We did not meet any peasant who did not tell us of the loss of relatives or friends".

On the famine in Ukraine Chamberlin writes:

"Poltava had acquired a particularly bad reputation; more than once we heard in Moscow of the carts that moved through the streets in the early morning, picking up dead bodies ... In Moscow it was easy to glib officials to deny to credulous foreigners that there had been any starvation. In Poltava famine could not be denied, although its extent was minimised ... While we were visiting a village called Zhuke, near Poltava, two local officials were carefully steering us into the homes of the petty officials of the local collective farm. Suddenly we decided to go into a house at random. We found a girl of fourteen huddled up on the bench which ran around the wall of the house. Had she a father? Yes, he was at work in the field. A mother? No, her mother and her four brothers and sisters had died during the last winter and spring. And her father, as we found, was still an edinolichnik, a peasant working his own land. Marvellous fatalistic stubbornness of a man who would see almost his whole family starve to death and still refuse to accept the new servitude of the collective farm!" (pp. 154—157). 731 656

In talks with the population and the reprensentatives of the administration, Chamberlin learned that in 1933 there had died of hunger in the Poltava region almost 15%, in the district of Cherkasy in Ukraine about 30%.

Stanley Richardson, correspondent of the American 'Associated Press' sent on September 22, 1933, the following telegram from Moscow to America:

"Soviet Russia has this year such a good harvest that a repetition of the undernourishment which had recently caused heavy losses of people and domestic animals is imposible. These losses one could see during a journey lasting a week through Ukraine and the Caucasus, the granaries of Moscow".

Owing to the Soviet censorship, Richardson could not give any figures about the victims of the famine in Ukraine. He quotes only the words of a Soviet Commissar in Ukraine named Asatkin:

"A great number of cattle and horses had perished. An exceptionally great number of peasants left the famine-stricken territory, looking for better living conditions. Many of them did not return" (*Ukrainian Voice:* Winnipeg, 27. 11. 1933).

A correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* who had been in Ukraine in the fall of 1933 gave a report on the Ukrainian hunger catastrophe, according to official Soviet sources:

In 1932 in Ukraine there had been 5,543,000 horses, in autumn 1933 only 2,772,000 remained — loss of 50%; the number of hogs diminished in the same time from 3,472,000 to 1,390,000; the number of sheep fell from 6,652,000 to 1,543,000. The top Communist

731 officials in Ukraine confirmed to the correspondent of the *Man-*
656 *cher Guardian* that in this country there had been a great mortality from hunger. Comparing the situation of that time in Ukraine and the North Caucasus with the situation in Russia, the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardin* came to the following conclusion when he said:

"It can be definitely stated that no provinces within a radius of several hundred miles of Moscow experienced the Ukrainian and North Caucasian extremities" (*Manchester Guardian:* October 19, and October 21, 1933).

The correspondent of a Jewish Socialist journal in New York, Lang, gave a description of the situation in the summer and autumn of 1933 in Ukraine: he saw how grown-ups and children were starving to death, he had been in totally depopulated villages where the inhabitants had died of hunger or fled from their homes (*Forwards:* 27. 12. 1933).

The American journalist Walter Duranty 'optimistically' estimated the number of the victims of the famine in USSR in 1933 as 5 million people. Of course, the principal part of these victims were in Ukraine, against which the Russian Communist régime was carrying its special policy of exstirpation.

In consequence of the famine and the repressions in Ukraine, principally men had perished. Therefore for instance, in 1932—33 the women in the collective farms in Ukraine were 60—70% of the total (*Communist:* Kharkov, 26. 1. 1934). The extent of child mortality was shown clearly in 1940; in the fall of 1940, the lack of births in 1932/33 forced the authorities to close parallel classes or abstain from opening first classes in many Ukrainian schools, for there where no children! The consequences of the famine in Ukraine could be seen in the decrease of the cultivation plain of the winter crops in autumn 1933: one million hectars less than in 1930 (*Izvestia:* Moscow, 16. 11. 1933).

661 Fully to realise the hypocritical policy of the Russian Commu-
731 nist dictatorship in Ukraine, one must add that Moscow tried to lay the responsibility for the famine in Ukraine on the Ukrainian Com-
656 munists, who, as they pretended, 'had overstepped the Party line'. Many prominent Ukrainian Communists were arrested and shot under the pretext that they had caused the famine in Ukraine as 'agents of foreign capital'.

In the first years of their rule in Ukraine, the Russian Communists dreamt of world revolution and regarded the Ukrainian Western territories under the rule of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia as a bridge for their armed 'march on Europe'. In connection

with this, to a certain degree, was the policy of 'Ukrainisation' directed in Soviet Ukraine: Moscow intended to gain sympathy for the Soviet régime among the population of the Western Ukrainian territories in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The famine of 1932/33 in Soviet Ukraine roused great distrust and dislike of Soviet Russia among the Western Ukrainians. Therefore Soviet Russia destroyed thousands of intellectuals coming from the Western Ukrainian territories, among them Communists as 'agents who had worked for the money of foreign big landowners and capitalists' . . . 731 656 661

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER IV

THE UKRAINIANS OUTSIDE SOVIET UKRAINE AFTER 1920

I. The Ukrainians in Poland

563 After the signing of the Treaty of Riga (1921) between Soviet
186 Russia and Poland, about 6 million Ukrainians remained under Polish rule (Galicia, Volhynia, Polissia, Pidlyasha, Kholm Region). The case of Galicia as that of a former Austrian territory appeared from time to time in international policy. The members of the Ukrainian National Council of Galicia remaining in Western Europe demanded the right of free self-determination for this territory. In February 1921, the Council of the League of Nations stated in its resolution: "Galicia lies outside the borders of Poland", "Poland is only the actual occupant of Galicia". But this and other resolutions could not remove the Polish rule in Galicia. Poland did not care for the resolutions of the League of Nations. However, in order to appease foreign public opinion, the Polish Diet passed in September, 1922, a bill on the autonomy of the Counties into which Galicia had been divided in 1920, and a bill on the creation of a Ukrainian University. In November 1922, elections to the Polish Diet took place. The Ukrainians, having regard to the special situation of Galicia, did not take part in these elections. In other Ukrainian territories under Polish rule, particularly in Volhynia, the Ukrainian political parties attained at these elections a great victory.

On March 15, 1923, in a resolution of the Conference of the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan in Paris, the frontiers of the Riga Treaty between Poland and the USSR were recognised "with regard to the fact that Poland had admitted with respect to Eastern Galicia that the ethnographic situation demanded unconditionally an autonomous order".

563 But the Polish authorities had no intention to grant political
661 autonomy to the Ukrainians. Even the rights of the Ukrainians for cultural development were narrowly restricted in Poland. Against the Ukrainians in Poland, a police régime was introduced. In 1920 there were in the Polish concentration camps many thousands

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and 563
disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the 661
Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. [871]
In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories, the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet [665]
and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre (UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on 727
the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the 474
Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form
of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative 563
Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz)*. The Ukrainian co-operative movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Co-operation *(Maslosoyuz)*, supplied dairy products, not only for the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in 563
the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

563 unity to move into the towns or to emigrate the Ukrainian peasants were pauperised.

These conditions were favourable to the growing of extremist trends in Ukrainian political life: communism on the one hand and nationalism on the other.

668 The policy of 'Ukrainisation' in Eastern Ukraine was exploited
661 by Communist propaganda: the 'Ukrainisation' in Soviet Ukraine, adversited by Moscow, did not remain without influence on the
563 population of the Western Ukrainian territories. The Communists of Western Ukraine served Soviet Russia as a 'fifth column' among the Ukrainians in Poland.

The Polonisation of Ukrainian schools, the colonisation of Ukrainian territory with Poles, the refusal to admit Ukrainians to Government service, the persecutions of the Ukrainian press, of educational and economic organisations — all this gave the basis for the creation of illegal Ukrainian groups which began the fight
[725] against the Polish régime with terror. In 1920 the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) was created in Galicia and organised attacks on the representatives of the Polish Government. Later UVO fused with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded at a Congress in Vienna in 1929 under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets. The Polish Government took advantage of the terrorist acts and sabotage attributed to the members of OUN to destroy the Ukrainian cultural and economic life. In September 1930, Polish troops and police undertook a terrible 'pacification' among the Ukrainian population in towns and villages. Polish soldiers and policemen severely beat more than 15,000 Ukrainians, mostly cultural and economic workers, who had not anything in common with the terrorist activity and often were resolute opponents of terror. Many victims of this 'pacification' died after terrible sufferings. A great number of Ukrainian economic and educational institutions — co-operative societies, schools, reading halls and libraries were destroyed.

After the 'pacification', the oppressions against the Ukrainians in Poland grew worse and the Polish colonisation of Ukrainian territories was increased by state funds. In September 1934, the delegates of the Polish Government declared at the Session of the League of Nations that Poland did not have any obligations towards the resolutions of the peace treaties regarding the protection of the rights of the national minorities in Poland.

By this action the Polish Government violated even formally the obligations accepted by Poland in the Peace Treaties in regard to the national minorities.

The Polish policy aimed at the disintegration of the national life 563
of the 6 million Ukrainians through attempts to divide them into 661
different 'tribes' which were given various names in official sta- 798
tistics: 'Polishchuk', 'Hutsul', 'Ruthenian', 'Boyko', 'Lemko', and even 'Orthodox' and 'Aborigines'. Against the Orthodox as well as against the Greek Catholic Ukrainians a policy of systematic Polonisation was applied by forcible conversion of the Ukrainians to Roman Catholicism which in the conditions of the Polish State was equivalent to Polonisation. In Ukrainian regions the Poles organised on the eve of World War II 'dragonnades' in order to convert the Greek Orthodox Ukrainians to the Roman Catholic Church: armed Polish gangs drove through the villages, destroyed the Orthodox Churches, beat the Ukrainians, looted their property, and forced them by this terrorism to turn Catholic. Thus the Polish Chauvinists protected by the Polish Government destroyed in 1938 more than 100 Ukrainian Churches, among them many medieval and of great artistic value and forced many Ukrainian communities to accept Roman Catholicism. In vain the Ukrainian deputies to the Polish Diet protested against this Polish violence, in vain the Metropolitan of the Greek Orthodox Church in Poland Dionysios and the Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church in Lviw Count Szeptycki rose their voices. The Polish oppression caused a strong opposition and resistance among the Ukrainians in Poland, which the Polish Government tried to suppress by new persecutions.

In the entire Polish policy between the two World Wars the fear 000
of the Ukrainian national movement is undoubtfully apparent. The Polish Government did not wish the creation of an independent Ukraine, fearing that a Ukrainian state would later demand union with the Ukrainian provinces of Poland. Even the small Carpatho-Ukraine, which had proclaimed its autonomy in autumn 1938, seemed dangerous to Poland as giving a 'bad example' for the Ukrainian population in Poland. This was one of the reasons why the Polish Government helped to destroy Czechoslovakia and supported the Hungarian claims on Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939.

In September 1939, the Ukrainian territories which after the 661
Treaty of Riga were under Polish rule, were occupied by the Soviet 563
Army in accordance with the German-Russian Pact of August 23, 1939, signed in Moscow. This 'liberation of Western Ukraine' brought to the population of these territories a time of terror and oppression. Thousands of Ukrainians of all classes were deported to the East, many of them did not come back.

The local Ukrainian Communists also were suspected by the Soviet authorities, they were not admitted to influential positions
and were [illegible] as 'infected by nationalism.'

563 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the
423 Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the
474 big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the masses of the people.[1] It should be pointed out that between the Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR.
661 The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

[1. In Western Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

though this population had accepted in a friendly manner the Soviet 728
rule, hoping for an improvement of their situation. When Rumania 661
in alliance with Germany joined the war against USSR in 1941, the [726]
Rumanian authorities on their part terrorised the Ukrainian population of Bukovina and Bessarabia. At the end of the war Bukovina and Bessarabia were joined with USSR again. The Communist terror turned with even greater vehemence against the Ukrainians there. Especially from Bukovina a great part of the Ukrainian population had been deported into the Eastern regions of the USSR. The cities were filled with foreign elements, colonists from Russia were brought into the villages.

3. *The Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine)*

After 1919 Carpatho-Ukraine, which had been for centuries 563
under Hungarian rule, was attached to Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian population of this country consists mostly of peasants. The towns had a Jewish and Hungarian population. The Czech authorities in Carpatho-Ukraine (official name Carpatho-Ruthenia) favoured for some time the development of Ukrainian schools. But [191]
from 1925 the Prague Government began to support the Russophile group that despised the Ukrainian language as 'peasant' and used a strange mixture of the Church-Slavonic, Ukrainian, and Russian languages. In reality, these 'Russophiles' were adherents of Hungary and received support from Budapost too. The entire administration in Carpatho-Ukraine came into the hands of the Czech bureaucracy. According to the Treaty of Saint Germain, Carpatho-Ukraine was guaranteed autonomy inside the boundaries of CSR, but the Czechoslovakian Government permanently deferred its realisation.

At the end of 1938 Germany launched strong pressure against Czechoslovakia exploiting the national problem of this country, (Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians). The Prague Government changed the centralistic Constitution to a federative one. For the Carpathian Ukraine the Prague Government recognised an autonomous statute with a separate Diet and Government. Against this the neighbour states — Hungary and Poland — reacted vehemently. In February 1939, the elections to 642
the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine took place. After the separation of 726
Slovakia from Bohemia the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed the independence of this country (March 16, 1939). But with Hitler's and Mussolini's consent the Hungarian troops occupied Carpatho-Ukraine after stubborn fighting against the Ukrainian volunteers.

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under 162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation 423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the [517] Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Russian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist 186 631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

which was led by General Kornilov, later by Denikin. In the summer 669
of 1918 the Kuban Region fell into the hands of the Russian Volunteer Army. The leaders of this army wished to make the Kuban Region a base for the restoration of Tsarist Russia. Among the population of the Kuban Region and in the State Council a strong opposition to the Russian Volunteers arose. But Russian influence was stronger: under the pressure of Denikin's army an alliance of the Cossack territories — the Don, Kuban and Terek regions — for the fight against the Russian Communists was formed at the end of 1918. Against those Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks who defended their independence the Russian Volunteers used terroristic methods: President of the Kuban State Council Mykola Ryabovol was murdered in June 1919 in Rostov, prominent members of the State Council were arrested and hanged. This terror by the Russian 'Whites' was the reason that the Kuban Cossacks left the front against the Russian Red Army and repealed the alliance with the Russian Volunteers. At the beginning of 1920 the Kuban State Council according to the will of the population took the Government of the Kuban into its hands. Vasyl Ivanys was appointed Premier. The Kuban leaders wished to get rid of the protectorate of the Russian Volunteers and to continue the struggle against the Soviet Russian Army in alliance with Ukraine and the peoples of the Caucasus. But in April 1920, under pressure of the Soviet Russian Army, the Kuban Government was forced to leave its territory and to move to Crimea, where at that time the Volunteers' Army of General Wrangel was. Being pressed between two forces, both of which fought for domination in Russia, the 'Red' and the 'White' Russians, the Ukrainian Kuban Government could not attain any agreement with them and went abroad.

The Kuban Region was occupied by the Russian Red Army. 656
Soviet Russia refused recognition of the Ukrainian nationality 19
in the Kuban Region for a long time, and carried on a Russification line through the school and press. Only on August 30, 1929, the Commissariat of Education in Moscow decided that the literary language of the Ukrainians inside the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Republic was the language of Ukraine.

But even after this the Russian Communist bureaucracy hindered [891]
the development of schools among the Ukrainians in the RSFSR. In December 1933, in the Kuban Region and on other territories of the RSFSR, with a Ukrainian population of 7 millions, all Ukrainian schools, press etc. were abolished by order from Moscow. During the collectivisation and the famine of 1932—33 the population
of the Kuban Region had enormous losses. Attempts on a rising 000

Attempts on a rising

661 were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.[1]

6. *The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East*

167 The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

668 Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrai-
186 nians, mostly farmers, were numbered. At that time a Ukrainian national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops, theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revolution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national, political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrainian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy. The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the develop-
656 ment of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the
191 development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrainians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow,* 1931, p. 33).

7. *The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars*

167 In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

[1] [During collectivization and famine in the Kuban Region and the NCFSR, 1932-33 -- Analyst]

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest: to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czechoslovakia met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrainian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Economic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrainian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrainian emigration developed. 167 563 873

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed a considerable activity. [815]

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name of their enslaved brethren. 563 186

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western territories of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily *Svoboda*. The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton, Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will*. There are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools, from American and Canadian Ukrainians. 563 575

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, farmers. The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about 1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest political organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Communist Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian [162] 563 575 668

[668] like *Ukrainian Daily News* in New York. However, the Com-
573 munist agency in America and Canada did not attain the success it
575 had hoped. Among the Ukrainian emigration, the democratic organisations have decisive influence.

In South America too, in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and other countries, there are Ukrainian emigrants. These are mostly workers and farmers. They have their cultural and political organisations and publish periodicals in Ukrainian.

The central organisations of the Ukrainians in USA, Ukrainian Congress Committee (UCC), in Canada, Canadian Ukrainian Committee (CUC) and of the countries of South America, created in 1948 the Pan-American Ukrainian Conference for the co-ordination of their activities in the interest of the oppressed Ukrainian people.

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER V

WORLD WAR II AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

1. Ukraine During World War II.

During World War II, two totalitarian forces contended for domination over Ukrainian territory: Russian Communism and German Nazism. In the first phase of the war the Moscow and Berlin Governments divided Poland between themselves. The USSR occupied the Western Ukrainian territories of Galicia, Volhynia etc., and the Ukrainian territories of Rumania, Bukovina and Bessarabia. By the war with the USSR in 1941, Hitler planned to acquire Ukraine for German colonisation. The German Nazis tried to weaken the Ukrainian population. During the German occupation Galicia was joined with the Polish territories — *Generalgouvernement* — and isolated from the other parts of Ukraine. Hitler gave the territory between the Dniester and the South Bug with Odessa to Rumania. The rest of the Ukrainian territories was put under the rule of Erich Koch as *Reichskommissariat Ukraine.*

The great majority of the population of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality, as well as the population of Russia and the Baltic States hoped that, in consequence of war, the Soviet régime would fall and the time for a free life would come. Completely separated from the outside world, the Soviet citizens did not know anything about Hitler's aims in Eastern Europe, and did not believe the Soviet propaganda. Therefore hundreds of thousands of Jews remained in Ukraine at the beginning of the war, being against the Communist dictatorship and hoping that the German régime would not be worse than the Soviet. The German authorities systematically exstirpated the more active elements among the Ukrainians; especially they terrorised the Ukrainian intelligentsia. A crude description of the rule of the German occupation in Ukraine in 1941—44 we find in the memorandum of A. E. Frauenfeld, the General Commissar of the Crimea, written for Hitler's staff on 10. 2. 1944. Frauenfeld saw the absurdity of the German policy in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine sooner, but dared to write about it only when Hitler's catastrophe became inevitable.

On the policy of Erich Koch in Ukraine Frauenfeld writes in his memorandum:

727 "The course of ruthless brutality in treating the inhabitants of
661 the country by principles and methods used in past centuries against coloured slave peoples, and the fact sneering at every sound policy that the disregard of this nation found its expression not only in the treatment of the people but was expressed at every possible and impossible opportunity again and again and was in addition printed and published in pamphlets, is a proof of the complete lack of instinct in handling of foreign peoples, which, with regard to its consequences, cannot be called other than shocking and catastrophic".

Frauenfeld shows this 'policy with the blacksmith's hammer' which would not see the inevitable reaction of the Ukrainians on such barbarism:

"There must be a naivety bordering on narrow-mindedness to believe that in the 20th century a nation having a shocking tragic history but, however, having a historical past, even if it is of another breed than the German people, — undoubtedfully has certain qualities of race and character, will permit itself to be degraded and insulted permanently and will also delightedly place its working power and capacities at the service of the tyrant".

Frauenfeld quotes the words of the Reichskommissar Erich Koch, who during a journey from Rivne (Rovno) to Kiev said to his staff:

"If I should find a Ukrainian worthy to sit with me at one table I must shoot him".

Frauenfeld cites examples from the work of the German administration headed by Erich Koch: the closing of schools, theatres, libraries, inattentiveness to epidemics among the Ukrainians, deliberate furtherance of the dying out of the Ukrainian people. As Frauenfeld witnesses, his collegues were very satisfied with the spreading of epidemics in Ukraine: "The Ukrainian needs no physicians; if an epidemic breaks out, thousands and tens of thousands will perish".

466 For the needs of the German economy the German Nazi Govern-
727 ment took working power from Ukraine. Frauenfeld writes about this:

661 "There was, for instance, the enlisting for work in Germany. That was carried out in a way that bears close comparison with the Bolshevik deportations to Siberia. From camps surrounded by barbed wire, from grated waggons to the encircling and searching of villages by surprise, and nocturnal levying in which people were taken in GPU manner out of their beds, the whole technique of the Arab slave hunters among the negroes of Africa in past centuries was used".

727 661 The Germans did not touch the Soviet collective farms, because they regarded them as the best method for exploiting the peasants. On the other hand, the German authorities did not wish to permit the partition of the land, for they prepared Ukraine for German colonisation.

[181] Frauenfeld points out the high physical and moral qualities of the Ukrainians, their highly developed consciousness of personal dignity and their aspiration for education. He witnesses that the closing of schools by the German authorities in Ukraine roused the greatest dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian people:

"The Ukrainians, especially the women, are very desirous of learning, and one could hear from them: 'Under the Bolsheviks we were starving, but we could learn something at least. Under your rule we cannot even learn. This proves that you are our enemies' . . .".

The author of the memorandum comes to the conclusion that the Ukrainians should not be exstirpated in the interests of Hitler's 'racial policy'; on the contrary "the often genuine blond and blue-eyed as well as brunette population" should be assimilated for such an assimilation "would be without doubt more desirable and advantageous than many we had absorbed during our history, or are even trying to suck up . . ."*).

725 668 Against pillage, terror, oppression and humiliation the Ukrainian people reacted with great vehemence, in spite of the extraordinary weakening by the previous Soviet terrorism, the famine and the war. In all parts of Ukraine risings broke out. This Ukrainian partisan movement helped to a great extent to defeat the German armies in Ukraine. But this was not a proof of affection of the Ukrainians for Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian partisan movement took place under the banner of an independent Ukraine. The initiative for the creation of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) came from officers of the army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1941.

The Ukrainian Partisan Army turned its weapons after the defeat of Germany against the new oppressor — Soviet Russia.

2. Ukraine after the War

727 In the course of World War II the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians from the Caucasus to the Carpathian Mountains came 000 under the rule of Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian nation, from the

*) Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld, *Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete: 10. 2. 1944* (Document No. 5394, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes).

661 The Ukrainian nation, from the famine of 1921/22 and later years, suffered under the Soviet terrorist régime great losses of its biological substance. To this were added the enormous losses in World War II, in the risings and from the terror of both totalitarian régimes.

931 In 1946 Ukraine had to suffer from a new famine in consequence of a bad harvest, and it must be stated that the policy of Moscow with respect to hungry Ukraine had not changed; the Ukrainian people received aid from the Communist Government only in a minimum degree. The principal aid came from America.

165 The statistics count the losses of the Ukrainian people during the Soviet Russian rule in Ukraine in millions. In 1917 approximately 30,000,000 people inhabited the territory of Ukraine within the frontiers of Soviet Ukraine before the outbreak of war in 1939. The Soviet statistics gave the figure of 31,000,000 inhabitants of Ukraine in 1933. The census of January 1939 counted a population of only 30,960,000 in Ukraine. These figures show clearly the consequences of the Soviet Russian policy of exstirpation in Ukraine. If a normal increase of population had taken place, the population of Ukraine should have reached at least 40,000,000. Thus Ukraine had had from 1917 to 1939 a loss of 10,000,000 inhabitants! (comp. Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union — History and Prospects:* Geneva, 1946).

An entirely different picture statistics show in Russia: from 78 million in 1926 the Russians grew to 99,3 million in 1939. These figures speak for themselves.

000 After World War II, the Russian Communist dictatorship is playing on the strings of the traditional Russian nationalism and imperialism more than before. 'The great Russian nation', 'the great Russian language' and similar epithets doubtless inspire the Russians and make them an obedient instrument of Moscow's imperialistic policy.

During World War II a new political trend appeared among the Russian emigrants who had fought at the beginning of the revolution in the 'White Armies' against the Communist dictatorship. This was the movement of so-called 'Soviet Patriots', who began to return in masses to Russia, especially from France, inspired by the prospects of the growth of the Russian Empire under Communist leadership.

In the Soviet Union the national movements of the subjugated peoples are officially regarded as the 'principal danger'. Therefore, the Soviet Government is making haste in 'liquidating' entire nations which Moscow has recognised as 'reactionary' — Crimean Tartars, the peoples of the North Caucasus, etc. Of course, the

Of course, the 656
Ukrainian problem has remained from old times for Soviet Russia 661
the basic problem of its internal and foreign policy. The unceasing Russification policy against the Ukrainians is carried on by particularly cunning methods: the Ukrainian language is not yet [191] abolished definitely in the offices of Soviet Ukraine. But that official who speaks Ukrainian also in his family and in private relations becomes in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suspicious, and has to suffer repressions.

The Communist theory of the national problem worked out by Lenin preaches the 'fusion of nations'. Basing on this, the Russian Communist Government is trying to 'fuse' the nations of the Soviet Union with the Russians. Against peoples who oppose forced Russification, ruthless repressions are used by Moscow. Even the mentioning of the national rights of the non-Russian peoples is condemned in the USSR as 'bourgeois nationalism'.

There is a great principal difference between the situation of the 000
Russians and the peoples united by force with this state: though the Russians are not satisfied with the Communist dictatorship, they do not, however, feel national oppression. Even in the new anthem of the USSR it is said that this state was rallied by Great Russia. We can state the efforts of Russian political groups opposing the Communist régime to maintain the rule of the Russian state over the territories conquered by Soviet Russia, even after the eventual fall of the Soviet régime.

As a curious fact we can quote the view of the well-known Communist L. Trotzky, who was assassinated in Mexico during World War II, on the Ukrainian problem. Trotzky demanded in 1939 the full separation of Ukraine from Russia. But Trotzky thought of an independent Ukraine in the form of a Soviet Republic. This naturally deprived his thesis of all seriousness, for Trotzky needed the slogan of an independent Ukraine only as a political argument in polemics against Stalin (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 77/78, 1939).

As the facts prove, the Ukrainian nation has to endure the heaviest oppression in the USSR. Unfortunately, the words of the famous historian of France Charles Seignobos written in 1913 on Ukraine, can be used emphatically to describe the outstanding feature of the present state of the Ukrainian nation: "Here is the most oppressed nation" ("Voici la nation la plus opprimée", *Les Annales des Nationalités:* Paris, 1913).

In its equalising policy, the Soviet Russian Government retains, 659-
also, traces of the Tsarist régime in the affairs of Church and reli- 79c
gion. Thus, after having seized Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine dur- 661

ing World War II, the Soviet Government abolished the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church by force, against the will of the population, and destroyed the hierarchy of this Church. The Ukrainian Greek Catholics who were in union with Rome were ordered to become subordinate to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow, who is backed by the Soviet Government.

The struggle of the Ukrainians against Russian imperialism did not cease after World War II. It is being conducted in various forms. In this struggle other peoples who are oppressed by Russia, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkestan, participate. Thus a common front of freedom-loving peoples against despotic Russia is being created.

In 1949, Moscow has permitted Ukraine to use an own flag and an own different anthem. However, this cannot be regarded an extension of the rights of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. It seems to be more an attempt to bring the so-called satellite countries to the Ukrainian level.

Moscow is watching attentively every expression of Ukrainian political thought and national sentiment, and wants to have everything under its control. The Decade of Ukrainian Culture held in Moscow in July 1951, ended with rebukes and threats against the participants of the Decade, and a 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists whom Moscow imputes 'bourgeois nationalism'. Only the Russian Communists have beeen beyond any doubt as regards their 'internationalism'; there was no case that the manifestations of nationalism among the Russian Communists had been condemned by the Communist Party. On the contrary, Moscow is cultivating an exaggerated national pride among the Russian people. The Ukrainian Communists are under a especially heavy control of [554] Moscow. No Ukrainian has been General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This position has always been occupied by people sent from Moscow: Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Khrushchev, finally Melnikov.

'Titoism' is no isolated phenomenon in the relations between imperialist Russia and Yugoslavia. Similar trends hostile to Russian imperialism have existed among Ukrainian Communists since the first days of Soviet Russian occupation in Ukraine. The Russian terrorism prevented these trends, however, from getting strong. Nevertheless, they exist clandestinely. Moscow's persecution of 'bourgeois nationalism' among the Ukrainian Communists gives an eloquent proof of Ukrainian opposition against Russian imperalism.

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3. *The New Ukrainian Political Emigration*

In consequence of the occupation of all Ukrainian territories by the armies of Soviet Russia, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had to remain outside the borders of their fatherland. In the first years after the termination of the war, the Ukrainian emigrants lived in Displaced Persons' Camps in Germany and Austria. Now the Ukrainians can be seen in all European and American countries, in Australia and New Zealand. These are all people who, for national and political reasons, opposed repatriation into a Ukraine oppressed by the Communist Government. They declared repeatedly, when they were threatened with forced repatriation, that they would sooner commit suicide than fall into the hands of their oppressors. 167 186 668

The Ukrainian emigrants in Europe and America are developing a considerable political and cultural activity. The central institutions of the Ukrainian political parties are remaining in exile where their press is being published, the elementary, secondary and academic schools are being operated — the Ukrainian University in Munich, the Ukrainian Technical University in Germany, until 1945 in Bohemia, and others.

After World War II the Ukrainian émigrés have created more scientific institutions: The Scientific Shevchenko Society, a continuation of the identical Society which had existed in Lviw since 1874, and had been destroyed by the Communist régime, and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science. These Ukrainian Scientific Societies are working effectively and have their branches in Europe and in America. [815]

Under these circumstances, when in Ukraine enslaved by Soviet Russia, the Ukrainian political life is suppressed and cannot show itself freely, the Ukrainian emigrants think it their duty to speak in the name of their nation in the defence of its rights before civilised mankind. For this purpose the leaders of the Ukrainian parties created the Ukrainian National Council in July 1948, as the political representation of the Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainian National Council continues the tradition of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic which had been created through the will of the Ukrainian nation in 1918—1919. Many of the participants of the Ukrainian fight for liberation and many of the leaders of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic are still living. These men believe firmly that the time for the free state existence of the Ukrainian nation will come.

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4. *Conclusions and Prospects*

000 In this book the most important features of the history of the Ukrainian nation and the most important events of its struggle for liberty in the 20th century have been set forth.

For centuries the Ukrainians had to make enormous efforts in order to ward off the attacks of the steppe hordes. This nation living on the border of Europe and Asia, could, besides its unceasing centuries-long struggle for its existence, simultaneously create great cultural values from which, in the 14th—18th centuries, Poland and Moscow profited.This is a proof of the inexhaustible creating forces of the Ukrainian nation, and gives the ground for believing that this people, under favourable circumstances, would develop their abilities to the highest level.

The struggle of the Ukrainians for liberty in the 17th century against the Polish rule with the assistance of despotic Moscow, did not bring Ukraine the desired results. The Tsarist state destroyed the traditional forms of Ukrainian democracy and autonomous order, and changed Ukraine at the end of the 18th century into its province.

The independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic, created after the downfall of Tsarism in 1917, found its most resolute enemies in 'Red' and 'White' Russia. The short-sighted Polish policy too, with respect to Ukraine, favoured the strengthening of Soviet Russia. It remains an undisputable fact that the Communist dictatorship was enforced on Ukraine by the Russian military power. Without the Russian military force the Communist régime would not be able to attain the rule over Ukraine.

Communist Russia well knows this weakness of her régime in Ukraine. This explains the specially grave terrorism of the Russian Communist Government against the Ukrainian nation.

As we saw, there were no means Russia would not use in order to enslave Ukraine, even if millions of Ukrainians should die in consequence. This bitter experience under Russian rule convinced the Ukrainians even more that, in future, the ways of Ukraine and Russia must lie apart. The Russian imperialim must fall. The nations oppressed by Soviet Russia must regain their independence in the form of democratic states. From Russia must be taken all possibility of power to enslave foreign peoples or endanger their freedom. Unfortunately, it must be stated that imperialism is a phenomenon common to all Russian political trends — dictatorial, monarchist and democratic. These would like to preserve 'indivisible Russia', created by the conquests of the Tsars and renewed

by those of the Russian Communists. This is what the democratic world cannot consent to. A state which oppresses foreign peoples cannot preserve its own internal liberty. Militant imperialism excludes democracy. 000

Among the Russian émigrés, there are only individual voices making public the deadly danger for democracy in Eastern Europe from Russian imperialism. Thus R. Abramovich, one of the leaders of the Russian Social-Democrats in exile, wrote in the monthly *The Socialist Courier* of October, 1948, published in New York:

"Every responsible politician who thinks of the prospects of democratic development and the overthrow of Stalinism must answer the question, what will the future Russian state, liberated from Bolshevik dictatorship, lean upon? Some authors ... insist on the creation of a 'strong central government' which could check the centrifugal efforts of all the national minorities. These authors do not evidently know what they are speaking about. The creation of a central government after such a terrible shock as the transformation of the whole political order of the country will be, is, of course, a very difficult affair ... To make the government so 'strong' that it could, in addition, take over the task of holding those national minorities by force inside the boundaries of the agitated country who are going to separate themslves, is a completely Utopian endeavour. Those who think it possible do not consider the enormous difficulties of this task and the resistance power of the separatist-minded minorities who, however, on their own territories are forming majorities.

Only a cruel dictatorship, which will not be inferior to the Bolshevik one, will be able to master this task. Even if it would be possible to create such a dictatorship, — a scarcely probable prospect, this would mean that the democratisation of Russia should be buried for ever, and that in Russia one dictatorship would be replaced only by another, and there would be no way for a democratic solution of the problem of nationalities. Or should there be expected, with respect to a future war, protection of the indivisibility of Russia through intervention of the allies, USA and Great Britain, who would use their armed forces in order to destroy eventual separatist movements? It is enough to put this question that the answer comes spontaneously".

This quotation gives us an exhaustive picture of the situation in Eastern Europe.

If the British Government after World War II gave its consent for the free self-determination of the peoples of its Asiatic colonies,

000 what right can have Russia then to rule over Ukraine, the Baltic States, the Caucasus etc.?

'The last imperalists' the late British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin called the Russian Communist Government. Against this imperialism the whole civilised democratic world must take common action.

The problem of the relations between the Ukrainian and Polish peoples should also draw the attention of the political world. By their intolerance the Polish authorities had produced in the 17th century the Ukrainian revolution of 1648. The inability and malevolence to find a compromise in the relations with Ukraine led to such a sharp struggle that the Ukrainian Government of B. Khmelnitsky was forced to look for aid from the Tsar of Moscow: not from affection towards Moscow but from hate of the Polish oppression. In consequence, Moscow became a Great Power which took part at the end of the 18th century in the dismemberment of Poland. Unfortunately, even after the downfall of independent Poland, the value of the Ukrainian national movement was not realised by the Polish leaders, though it could have secured the balance of power in Eastern Europe.

"There is no Ukraine, there are only Poland and Moscow", — was the slogan of the Polish nationalists in the 19th and 20th centuries. Therefore the Polish leaders made a fatal mistake in attacking in 1918 independent Ukraine and wishing to annex the Western Ukrainian territories. Through this they helped to destroy the Ukrainian independent state and laid the foundations for strengthening Soviet Russia. The results of this short-sighted policy the Polish nation, enslaved by Soviet Russia, has to endure now. The Ukrainians think that Polish-Ukrainian mutual relations could be solved, provided there was good will, to the adavantage of both peoples: the boundary line between Ukraine and Poland should be drawn on the only correct ethnographic principle. Such a boundary could support the good-neighbourly relations among the Polish and Ukrainian peoples.

We cannot hope very much for a fast success of a democratic development of Russia after the downfall of the Communist dictatorship. The tradition of absolutism, tyranny and imperalism, created through centuries of Russian history, cannot be forgotten so easily and replaced by a democratic ideology. For this reason the peoples living in the vicinity of Russia should unite their forces for the common defence of their liberty, and their independence from the Russian threat.

In case of down-fall of the Communist régime in USSR a great responsibility will lie upon those peoples who have reached a higher level of political culture, especially the nations of the Anglo-Saxon world. All the peoples who are now under Communist rule will need a friendly help of the democratic countries for the creation of a democratic order and for economic reconstruction of the liberated countries. The organisation of democratic political parties, Trade Unions, the reeducation of youth poisoned by Communist propaganda, the organisation of education on new democratic principles, etc. will regard active support on the part of the democratic nations. Otherwise, the danger of a reconstitution of dictatorship and Russian imperialism in another shape will arise, and Moscow can again lay its heavy hands on the neighbouring peoples. It should be remembered that Russian imperalism will not end with the downfall of the Communist régime as it did not end with the break-down of the Tsarist rule.

Russian imperialism which after World War II devoured a great part of Central and Southern Europe, has not stopped in its campaign, but is ready to 'liberate' other peoples and territories in Europe, Asia and other continents alike. The hope of some statesmen that Soviet Russia might be appeased by negotiations and concessions, and that in this way her ambitions would be restricted, has disappeared. Only force and resolution on the part of the democratic Great Powers can stop the pressure of Russian expansion and save civilised mankind from the terrible danger of an everlasting enslavement in the Soviet world state. For the defence of their national and democratic rights against Russian imperialism all freedom-loving peoples of the world should unite their forces, especially with the peoples of Europe in the forefront.

The Ukrainian nation which has been the first to fight under the banner of democracy against Russian Communist dictatorship from December 1917, wants to take part in the democratic transformation of Europe in the interest of world peace with equal rights. Those who desire peace among the peoples must favour their free development in independent democratic states. 'Pax est tranquilla libertas' (peace is quiet liberty). These words of the famous Czech émigré J. A. Comenius who fought for the liberation of his people have the same importance now they had 300 years ago.

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

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

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HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 52

THE UKRAINE

LONDON:
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1920

EDITORIAL NOTE

121 In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

121 It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

Ukraina or Okraina (meaning 'border') appears originally to have formed the 'limes Rossicus' or 'Polonicus', i. e. borderland between the Russians, Poles, Turks, and Tatars, the centre of which lay in the lower reaches of the Dnieper valley. The connotation of the word has varied widely. When in process of time this borderland was colonized, and with the rise of Great Russia was extended in many directions, the old name Ukraina or Ukraine was loosely applied to the whole of the enlarged area where the Little Russians (Ruthenians) were in an increasing majority. This extension of the term was facilitated by the modern rise of Little Russian literature, especially in Austrian Galicia, where the use of the Little Russian language was permitted, and 'Ukrainian' rapidly passed from archaeological into literary currency as the equivalent of Little Russian in general.

The connotation of the Ukraine adopted here is that of the General Proclamation of the Ukrainian National Council, issued November 20, 1917, in which it is definitely stated: 'Therefore we announce: to the territory of the National Ukrainian Republic belong the lands where the majority of the population is Ukrainian—Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov, Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida (without the Crimea).'[1]

The Ukraine as thus constituted consists of three provinces, the South-west Territory (*Yugo-Zapadny*

[1] On March 29, 1918, the German Government recognized, in accordance with the Treaty of February 9 and the Ukrainian Proclamation, the nine Governments mentioned above as belonging to Ukraine proper, as well as parts of Cholm and Grodno.

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131 *Krai*), Little Russia (*Malorossiya*), and part of South or New Russia (*Novorossiya*). The South-west Territory is formed by the three Governments (*gubernii*) of Volhynia (area, 27,700 square miles), Podolia (16,219 square miles), and Kiev (19,686 square miles); Little Russia by those of Chernigov (20,233 square miles), Poltava (19,265 square miles), and Kharkov (21,035 square miles); and New Russia contains the Governments of Yekaterinoslav (24,478 square miles), Kherson (27,337 square miles), and Taurida (23,312 square miles, of which 9,704 belong to the Crimea). It should be noted that the Ukraine by this definition excludes Bessarabia, the Don Cossacks' Territory, and the Crimea, all of which are included in New Russia.

131 101 The Ukraine thus occupies an area of more than 190,000 square miles. It is bounded on the north by the Governments of Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, Smolensk, Mohilev, Minsk and Grodno; on the west by the recently created Russian Polish Government of Cholm, Eastern Galicia, and Bessarabia; on the south by the Black Sea, the Crimea, and the Sea of Azov; on the east by the Don Cossacks' Territory.

Except on the west and in the south the boundaries can hardly be said to coincide with natural divisions. Nor are they completely ethnographical, for the ethnographical area extends into Kursk, Voronezh, Grodno, Minsk, Cholm, and Eastern Galicia.

(2) Surface, Coast, and River System

Surface

133 The Ukraine falls naturally into three divisions: Polyesia in the north, the Black Sea plateau, extending from the western boundary to the Dnieper, and Little Russia on the left bank of the Dnieper.

Polyesia (of which only the southern part actually falls within the boundaries of the Ukraine as claimed by the Little Russians) occupies primarily the basin of the Pripet, a right-bank tributary of the Dnieper. The central portion consists of an almost unbroken

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series of marshes, generally known as the Pinsk marshes, which form one of the most impassable, unfertile, and unhealthy areas in Russia. There is, however, higher ground both to the north and south of the marsh region. In the south there are the Volhynian Heights, running from Cholm (in Russian Poland) through Lutsk, Rovno, and Dubno to Novograd Volynsk, a plateau rising to a height of over 1,000 ft. near Dubno. The high country is well wooded and suitable for agriculture. 133

The *Black Sea plateau* falls into four sections. The first or northern section is practically equivalent to the southern part of Volhynia. The highest point (over 1,200 ft.) occurs at Krzemenietz, from which the northern edge of the plateau extends east at a lesser elevation, passing north of Staro Konstantinov to Berdichev and Kiev.

The second section is that of the area between the Southern Bug and the Dniester, occupying a large part of Podolia. This section consists of a high plateau gradually declining from north-west to south-east, and includes along the western frontier the Miodobory Hills, running in a southerly direction into Bessarabia. The highest point is in the Proskurov district, 1,186 ft., and in this region there are also some marshes. Over the whole section are scattered numerous deep valleys, intersected by rapidly flowing watercourses at the base of well-wooded hills. The southern boundary of this section is formed by the Rivers Kedyma and Yagorlik, tributaries of the Bug and Dniester respectively.

From this river line the third or maritime section of the Black Sea plateau extends down to the Black Sea. This section contains various small rivers flowing roughly parallel to each other in a south-westerly direction, such as the Tiligul and the Kuyalnik.

The fourth or Zaporozhki section is the largest of the four. Its northern part is divided into two by the River Sinyukha, a tributary of the Bug. The western half rises to 800 ft., the eastern to 750 ft. Towards

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133 the north this plateau slopes down into the plains of Polyesia around the Pripet, Irpen, and Teterev; on the west it is bounded by the Southern Bug; on the east by the Dnieper. The southern part of the section, in which the plateau levels down to 300 ft., assumes the uniform shape of flat steppes, and the rivers flow for the most part sluggishly in shallow, extensive, marshy valleys, rich in ponds.

Little Russia is a continuation of the heights in the Governments of Smolensk, Orel, and Kursk, and in general slopes from the north-east to the south-west. The Governments of Chernigov and Poltava form undulating plains, of which the former varies from 750 ft. in the north to 370–600 ft. in the south, and the latter has a somewhat lower altitude. The Government of Kharkov in general is a table-land with an elevation of 300–400 ft., though heights of over 850 ft. are reached. It is divided into two by the valley of the Northern Donets. Marshes abound in all parts of this section except in the Government of Kharkov. The rivers flow in deeply excavated valleys, of which the right banks have the appearance of hilly tracts, while low plains extend along the left.

Coast

The Ukrainian coast, though small in extent, is of the very greatest importance, not only to the Ukraine but to the whole of Russia. It forms an outlet for a vast amount of commerce, a great deal of which is dealt with by the port of Odessa.

A very characteristic feature of this part of the Black Sea coast is the existence of *limans*. These *limans*, which are similar in formation to the Venetian Lido and to the *haffs* of the Baltic coast, consist of small or large inlets at the mouth of a river, e. g. the Dnieper and the Bug, separated from the main body of the sea by a strip of land (*peresyp*) with a narrow entrance. The shore is in places fairly high, but is everywhere easily disintegrated by the action of the weather.

River System

The Ukraine as a whole consists of portions of the basins of the Rivers Dnieper (with its tributary the Pripet), Dniester, Bug, and Donets, the last named being the largest affluent of the Don. 133

The *Dnieper*, which rises in the Government of Smolensk, has a total length of about 1,410 miles, and drains an area of 202,140 square miles. It first touches Ukrainian territory at Loyev on the western border of Chernigov, and thence flows in a south-easterly direction to Yekaterinoslav, in a shifting channel which varies greatly in depth and breadth. At Yekaterinoslav the river turns south and then south-west, forming a succession of rapids, so that navigation in this part is only possible when the river is in flood. Artificial canals enable small vessels to proceed when there is low water in the channel. The Dnieper enters the Black Sea below the town of Kherson, by a *liman*, into which the Bug also discharges. 133 487 [504]

The chief tributaries of the Dnieper are: on the right bank, going from north to south, the Berezina, which runs through the Government of Minsk; the Pripet, with its many affluents, among them being the Styr and the Strumen, all of which overflow their banks and help to form the system of marshes which is more fully described in *Russian Poland*, No. 44 of this series (p. 15), and the Ingulets, which flows a little above Kherson into the Dnieper near its outlet to the Black Sea. 133

On the left bank the chief tributaries are the Sosh; the Desna, which flows through Chernigov into the Dnieper just above Kiev; and the Samara, which joins the river at Yekaterinoslav.

There is a regular service of passenger steamers on the Dnieper both above and below the rapids, and also along the Pripet as far as Pinsk. [505]

The *Dniester* rises in Austrian Galicia, and only the last 515 miles of its course, with a drainage area of 16,500 square miles, belong to Russian territory. It reaches the Ukraine provinces near Kamenets Podolsk,

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133 and then forms the frontier line between the Governments of Podolia and Kherson and the neighbouring province of Bessarabia. It receives no very important tributaries in the Ukraine, though there is a fair number of smaller ones. Navigation is interrupted by the [502] Yampol rapids. For ordinary river craft an artificial canal affords a passage here, but steamboats cannot pass upstream. The depth of the water has lately been increased by a more scientific system of regulation.

The *Bug* rises in Russian Poland and reaches the Ukraine near Vlodava, to the north-west of Volhynia. It forms for some distance the boundary between the Ukraine and Russian Poland, and then flows through Austrian Galicia into the Ukraine at Volochysk. Its winding course follows a south-easterly direction, entering the Black Sea by a *liman*.

The chief tributaries of the Bug within the Ukraine provinces are, on the right bank, the Kedyma and the Chichekleya; and on the left bank the Ingul.

The *Donets* rises in the Government of Kursk, and enters the Ukraine to the north of Kharkov. It then flows to the south-east, leaving the Ukraine at the extreme north-eastern corner of Yekaterinoslav.

(3) Climate

132 Climatic statistics should generally be regarded as approximate.

The following recent figures are available for the South-west Territory—Tarnopol, although actually in Galicia, being taken as typical of the south-west of Volhynia, Berdichev of the south-east of Volhynia and the central part of the Government of Kiev, and Volkovints and Kamenets Podolsk of the Government of Podolia:

	Average Temperature (Fahrenheit).		
	January.	*July.*	*Year.*
Tarnopol . . .	22·5°	66·0°	44·1°
Berdichev . . .	22·3°	65·5°	45·0°
Volkovints . . .	20·5°	65·9°	44·4°
Kamenets Podolsk .	26·1°	68·5°	47·5°

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The climate of Volhynia is more moderate than many eastern parts of Russia in the same latitude. Relatively mild winters are so common that the winter crops remain entire, and the climate is very beneficial for agriculture. Spring comes early (March), summer (at the end of May) is cool, autumn lasts long, and settled winter only begins in December. There are few droughts or periods of excessively wet weather.

The average annual rainfall in Volhynia varies from 20 to 24 in., in Podolia from 15 to 24 in., and is 20 in. in the Government of Kiev. July is the rainiest month, and after that June, May, and sometimes March.

The following are recent climatic statistics for Little Russia:

	Average Temperature (Fahrenheit).		
	January.	*July.*	*Year.*
Chernigov	20·9°	68·0°	44·8°
Poltava	19·4°	70·3°	45·7°
Starobyelsk	18·7°	73·6°	46·0°
Kharkov	18·7°	70·7°	45·1°

The climate of Little Russia is closely connected with that of Central Russia, with its conflict between east and west winds. Winter tends to be long, though not so severe as in Central Russia, with frequent thaws, which sometimes greatly damage the winter wheat. The arrival of spring is apt to be uncertain, and is sometimes accompanied by a return of cold weather. Summer is moderately warm, and in the south-east sometimes hot. Autumn, with east winds, is remarkably dry.

The annual rainfall is inadequate, averaging 22 in. in the Government of Chernigov and 20 in. in that of Poltava, and varying between 21 in. in the west and 16 in. in the east and south-east of that of Kharkov. Droughts are common in the latter Government.

The climate of Odessa may be taken as more or less typical of New Russia, the mean temperature in January being 25·3°, in July 72·7°, and that for the whole year

132 49·3°. Drawbacks for agriculture in New Russia are the prevalence of north and east winds and an irregular and insufficient rainfall. The average rainfall at Yelisavetgrad is 17 in., at Odessa 16 in., at Lugansk 15 in., and at Nikolaev 14 in. The rains in April and May decide the harvest. June is the rainiest month, but from May to September there are droughts. Most places are largely dependent upon wells and ponds constructed in the ravines, which are frequent on the steppes.

The climate of the Ukraine, as a whole, is therefore continental, i. e. the variation between summer and winter temperatures is very great. Sudden variations of temperature are frequent. The rainfall is by no means abundant, and there is a progressive decline towards the south and south-east. The fact, however, that the bulk of the rainfall occurs in the summer favours agricultural operations, even where the annual amount of rainfall is comparatively low. It is only in New Russia that the country suffers seriously from drought.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

The Ukraine is very backward in regard to sanitary conditions. Less than half the towns have a satisfactory water-supply, and a very small percentage of them a regular drainage system.

Typhoid, diphtheria, and malaria are very prevalent. To the great majority of the people in the country, doctors are inaccessible, and even in the towns good hospitals and adequate medical attendance are very rare. In the matter of cleanliness, however, the Little Russians compare favourably with the Great Russians.

(5) Race and Language

Race

The population of the Ukraine is composed of a mixture of various races and nationalities, those chiefly represented being Little Russians, Poles, Jews,

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Germans, Moldavians, and Bulgarians. There are also a certain number of Cossacks, but these are of Little Russian origin. The large majority of the inhabitants of the Ukraine are Little Russians, as will be seen by the tables given below. The origin of the Little Russians and their precise relation to the other branches of the Slav family are still a matter of dispute, but it is possible that they are of purer stock than the Great Russians, though they have assimilated Polish and Tatar elements, while the Great Russians have been largely influenced by the Finns.

The *Poles* live chiefly in the western Ukraine, occupying the Governments of Volhynia and Podolia, and the Kiev and Berdichev districts in the Government of Kiev. The large estates are chiefly in their hands, and they are tenants of many others, while they also fill important positions in the sugar trade and in general carry much weight in the social and economic life of the western and central Ukraine. They are Roman Catholics.

The *Jews*, who form a most important commercial, industrial, and political group, are found in the Governments of Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev (except in the capital), Chernigov, Poltava, Kherson, Yekaterinoslav (except in Yalta), and Taurida. The town of Berdichev, in particular, is a Jewish stronghold. Many of the largest estates are mortgaged to the Jews, although they tend to live in the towns, where they succeed as good business men and middle men. Statistics for the Jewish population in the Ukraine given in the *Recueil de matériaux sur la situation économique des Israelites de Russie, d'après l'enquête de la 'Jewish Colonisation Association'*, 1908, do not show a large increase over the figures of 1897.

As regards the *Germans*, Swabian colonies have existed at Odessa since 1803, and the famous Liebental agricultural colony between the Dniester and the Black Sea was founded in 1812. Below the falls of the Dnieper and in Taurida there are Mennonite colonies from West and East Prussia. There are also German agriculturists

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162 563 in Volhynia, who have done excellent work in draining the marshes. The Germans make their agriculture pay, and commercially they have penetrated to every town in the Ukraine. They also control many of the large estates and possess considerable financial influence. Their religion is Lutheran, Roman Catholic, or Mennonite. From a comparison of the table on p. 11 with figures for 1915 given by Dr. Max Friederichsen, it appears that the Germans in the Ukraine have decreased by about 50,000 since 1897. Many have emigrated to America; others have been assimilated.

There are many *Moldavians* engaged in agriculture in the districts of Tyraspol, Yelisavetgrad, Ananiev, and Kherson. They form 6 per cent. of the population in the Government of Kherson, and 0·2 per cent. in that of Yekaterinoslav. Their religion is Orthodox Greek, as is also that of the *Bulgarians*. The latter are to be found chiefly in the districts of Berdyansk, Melitopol, Tyraspol, and round Odessa, and make excellent farmers. Though they speak Bulgarian, most of them understand Russian.

The *Cossacks* are energetic farmers, and have extensive farms. In their methods they are far in advance of the ordinary Little or Great Russians.

Among other nationalities are some *Czechs* in southwest Volhynia, and a certain number of *White Russians*, chiefly in the northern part of the Government of Chernigov.

The following are the figures given by the official Russian census in 1897 for the different races in the governments composing the Ukraine:

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Government.	Total.	Little Russians.	Great Russians.	White Russians.	Jews.	Germans.	Moldavians.	Poles.	Bulgarians.
1. Volhynia . .	2,989,482	2,095,579 (i. e. 70 per cent. of total population)	104,889	3,794	394,774	171,331	—	184,161	—
2. Podolia . . .	3,018,299	2,442,819 (81 per cent.)	98,984	—	369,306	4,069	26,764	69,156	—
3. Kiev . . .	3,559,229	2,819,145 (80 per cent.)	209,427	5,389	430,489	14,707	—	68,791	—
4. Chernigov . .	2,297,854	1,526,072 (66 per cent.)	495,963	151,466	113,787	5,306	—	3,302	—
5 Poltava . . .	2,778,151	2,583,133 (93 per cent.)	72,941	—	110,352	4,579	—	3,891	—
6. Kharkov . .	2,492,316	2,009,411 (81 per cent.)	440,936	10,258	12,650	9,080	—	5,910	—
7. Yekaterinoslav .	2,113,674	1,456,369 (69 per cent.)	364,974	14,052	99,152	80,979	9,175	12,365	—
8. Kherson (rural) .	2,733,612	1,462,039 (54 per cent.)	575,375	22,958	322,537	123,453	147,218	30,894	25,685
Odessa . . .	403,815	37,925 (9 per cent.)	198,233	1,267	124,511	10,248	488	17,395	600
9. Taurida [1] . .	1,447,790	611,121 (42 per cent.)	404,463	9,726	55,418	78,305	—	10,112	41,260

[1] The Little Russians only claim the mainland of the Government of Taurida. Allowing a third of the population in 1897 to represent residents in Taurida without the Crimea (which is an under-estimate), a total of about 22,867,000 is reached for the population in the whole of the Ukraine. Out of this total the Little Russians in the Ukraine amounted in 1897 to 17,043,613 or 74 per cent.

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161 Since the official census of 1897 various official estimates of the population in the Ukraine have been issued; they do not distinguish between the different branches of Russians. According to the official estimates of January 1912 and 1915 the totals for the nine Governments in the Ukraine were as follows:

	1912.	1915.
Volhynia	3,995,700	4,241,800
Podolia	3,882,700	4,127,600
Kiev	4,635,700	4,988,000
Chernigov	3,083,500	3,148,900
Poltava	3,673,100	3,906,200
Kharkov	3,329,700	3,452,000
Yekaterinoslav	3,214,900	3,537,300
Kherson	3,547,500	3,806,900
Taurida (without the Crimea)[1]	982,800	1,066,650
Total	30,345,600	32,275,350

163 It is well known that the birth-rate of the Little Russians is higher and steadier than that of the Great Russians. But, even allowing for a mere continuance since 1897 of the same ratio between the two, the total of Little Russians in the Ukraine in 1912 can be fairly estimated at 23,500,000.

There are also large numbers of Little Russians in other Governments of Russia. Figures for these Governments in 1897 were as follows:

Government.	*Total Population.*	*Little Russians.*	*Percentage.*
Grodno	1,603,409	363,000	23
Kursk	2,371,012	527,778	22
Voronezh	2,531,253	915,883	36
Bessarabia	1,935,412	379,698	20
Kuban Province (Caucasus)	1,918,881	908,818	48
Stavropol (Caucasus)	873,301	319,817	37

In the same year there were also 719,655 Little Russians in the Don Territory, 133,115 in the Government of Astrakhan, 76,928 in other parts of the Cau-

[1] The birth-rate has been more rapid on the mainland than in the Crimea; hence 50 per cent. of the population is allowed to Taurida alone.

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casus, and 304,261 in parts of the old Governments of Lublin and Syedlets (now incorporated in the single Government of Choïm). Thus in 1897 there was in European Russia a grand total of at least 21,692,766 Little Russians. 161

Austria and Hungary also contain considerable numbers of Little Russians, or as they are often called in these parts, Ruthenians. Official figures of 1910 give 3,208,092 in Galicia, 305,101 in the Bukovina, and 472,587 in certain north-eastern counties in Hungary, i. e. a total of 3,985,780 Little Russians.

Accurate statistics for the full, up-to-date total of Little Russians are not available. Reliable German figures estimate the present total of Little Russians as at least 30,000,000, which is also borne out by unofficial Little Russian and Polish figures. 161

Language

The whole language question has been somewhat exaggerated owing to its inevitable connexion with politics. It is asserted by many that Little Russian is a separate language from Great Russian, though on the other hand many declare that it is only a dialect. It should be noted that in 1905 the Petrograd Academy of Science recognized the value of the study of the Ukraine dialect. 197

(6) Population[1]

Distribution and Density

The *Russian Year Book* for 1916 gives the following estimate for the total population in the towns and in the country respectively on January 1, 1913: 162

Government.	*Town Population.*	*Country Population.*
Volhynia	293,300	3,777,200
Podolia	308,900	3,646,400
Kiev	744,500	3,919,100
Chernigov	321,100	2,787,700

[1] See also Appendix I, p.

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Government.	Town Population.	Country Population.
Poltava	363,500	3,352,900
Kharkov	516,200	2,851,500
Yekaterinoslav	406,500	2,883,600
Kherson	1,017,500	2,592,800
Taurida (with the Crimea)	447,200	1,559,300

It is apparent from these figures that a large proportion of the population of the Ukraine is still engaged in agricultural pursuits.

161 Many parts of the Ukraine are very thickly populated. The most densely populated Governments are as follows: Podolia, 243; Kiev, 236; Poltava, 192; Chernigov, 154; Kharkov, 160; Volhynia, 146; Yekaterinoslav, 135; and Kherson, 132 persons per square mile.

Movement

163 165 The population of the Ukraine increases more steadily than that of Great Russia. The following figures are given by the official statistical annual (1914) for the year 1912:

	Births, total.	Births, per 1,000.	Deaths, total.	Deaths, per 1,000.	Increase, per 1,000.
Volhynia	154,685	39·0	72,287	18·1	20·9
Podolia	145,401	37·4	73,254	18·9	18·5
Kiev	182,024	39·3	92,109	19·9	19·4
Chernigov	116,411	37·8	59,972	19·5	18·3
Poltava	136,951	37·3	64,801	17·6	19·7
Kharkov	15[illegible],064	45·4	73,349	22·0	23·4
Yekaterinoslav	159,233	49·5	72,995	22·7	26·8
Kherson	157,622	44·4	92,227	26·0	18·4
Taurida	86,913	43·7	44,080	22·4	21·3

165 The average mortality is lower in the towns than in the country, owing to the fact that the more robust elements of the population are attracted to the towns, leaving the old men, women, and children behind.

165 758 Infant mortality is often as high as 50 per cent.; this is due to ignorance, insufficient feeding, and the fact that mothers return to work in the fields or factories within a few days of child-birth. The imperfect system of medical aid prevents many cases of births and deaths from ever being officially reported.

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II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

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859. Invasion of the Variags.
880. Power concentrated at Kiev.
988. Vladimir, prince of Kiev, accepts Christianity.
1015. Death of Vladimir and division of his dominions.
1169. Title of Grand Duke assumed by the Prince of Suzdal.
1315. Kiev, Volhynia, and Chernigov pass to Lithuania.
1340. Halich passes to Poland.
1386. Marriage of Prince Jagiello of Lithuania with Queen Yadviga of Poland.
1569. Union of Lublin; establishment of Polish domination.
1648. Beginning of Cossack wars.
1654. Treaty of Pereyaslavl.
1667. Treaty of Andrusovo.
1686. Conquest of Zaporogia.
1708. Rebellion of Mazeppa.
1709. Battle of Poltava.
1734, 1764. Powers of Cossacks curtailed by Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.
1763, 1783. Ukrainian peasants made serfs.
1768. Rising of the Koliivshchina.
1772. First Partition of Poland; Halich-Russ ceded to Austria.
1793, 1795. Second and Third Partitions; division of the remainder of the Ukraine between Russia and Austria.
1825. Liberal propaganda commenced.
1831. Polish rising.
1846. Beginning of Nationalist movement.
1861. Abolition of serfdom.
1900. Formation of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party.
1917. Proclamation of Ukrainian Republic.
1918. Government of General Skoropadski.
Establishment of a Directory.

General Sketch of History

The history of the Ukraine is not, until the seventeenth century, a connected chronicle of events which happened to one people of one culture, language, and religion; it is rather the story of events which have taken place in the land which is now called the Ukraine.

175 The Eastern Slavs, with an admixture of Norman blood, who inhabited the Ukraine from the eighth to the thirteenth century, almost lost their contact with the Slavonic world after 1239, the year which saw the beginning of the Tatar invasions. Owing to the nature of the country—mostly level steppe—there was a more permanent assimilation of the invaders with the inhabitants here than in the Slavonic forest country to the north and west. After the invasions the literary language of the country became amalgamated with the Great Russian literary language; and the educated classes became polonized or russified. From the Tatar invasions to the middle of the seventeenth century the land appears in history as the territory or colony of its various neighbours, chiefly Poland. About the middle of the seventeenth century, however, the masses of the people, fully amalgamated with the Asiatic invaders, began, largely through Cossack influence, to feel a difference between themselves and the foreign ruling class. From this time onwards, an Ukrainian nation may be said to have existed.

The whole history of the Ukraine may be divided into the following four periods:

(A) The Kiev-Russ State (not Russia), 850–1340, organized by the Scandinavian conquerors.
(B) Lithuanian and Polish dominations, 1340–1795.
(C) Russian domination, 1795–1917.
(D) Ukraine since the Russian Revolution, 1917–19.

(A) First Period: Kiev-Russ; the Tatars (850–1340)

The territory of the Ukraine has been the scene of many short-lived dominations, such as the Scythian, the Sarmatian, the Gothic, and, in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., the Hunnic. The Slavs appeared shortly after the Huns. Just before the appearance of the Scandinavian Variags on the Dnieper, between the seventh and tenth centuries, a powerful

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Turkish Khanate of Khazars on the Don and lower Volga subjugated from time to time some of the Eastern Slavs, while other branches of them on the San and Dniester were subdued by the Avars and the Lakhs (Poles). In 859 the Variags appeared under the leadership of Rurik. They had already organized the Slavonic state of Novgorod in the north (852); and they brought with them the name of Russ (Ruotsi), which had been given to them by the Finns. The organization of the various states which originated in towns set up by these Scandinavians was mainly directed towards opening up and protecting trade communications between Constantinople and Scandinavia through the then already well-known commercial town of Kiev. 175

But already, in 880, Oleg, the successor of Rurik, and Igor, Rurik's son, had concentrated their power in Kiev itself, whose prince assumed the title of Grand Duke. From this centre they not only enlarged their territory by the addition of Slavonic lands, but even threatened Constantinople. Thence onwards the history of the Scandinavian invaders is blended with that of the Eastern Slavs, whose national consciousness was not very strong at that time. The Scandinavians adopted an East Slavonic language but a Byzantine culture, and formed a privileged class of warriors (*druzhina*) and princes. The princes of Kiev extended their power over the Eastern Slavs of the Dnieper and Bug, and occasionally over the Eastern Slavs of Halich (Red Russ or Ruthenia), who otherwise paid tribute to the Poles or were ruled by their own princes. Until the time of St. Vladimir, the first prince of Kiev to accept Christianity (988), there were certain small independent East Slavonic princes in the neighbourhood of Kiev. Vladimir kept the control of the government in his own hands, in so far as external affairs, i.e. trade and war, were concerned; but otherwise the princes ruled in their own towns. Thus the Kiev principality was rather a confederation of states than one united state.

After the death of St. Vladimir in 1015, his dominions were divided among his children; and thenceforward

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175 the central government tended to become weaker and the power of the separate duchies to increase at its expense. Yaroslav, under whom the 'Russ Land Codex' (*Russkaya Pravda*) was compiled, united for a short time all the Russ lands; but, after his death in 1054, dynastic strife undermined the political and commercial importance of the Kiev state.

Several independent duchies overshadowed Kiev after the reign of Yaroslav; and still more was this the case after the death of Prince Vladimir Monomakh in 1125. The Scandinavian upper class had by this time become slavonized; and the cultural influence of Byzantium was stronger than that of Scandinavia among the Eastern Slavs. Three political centres replaced Kiev. In the north Novgorod recovered its old importance and developed its colonizing activity in the direction of northern Europe and Asia. In the south the Prince of Halich assumed the headship of Halich, Volhynia, and, to some extent, Chernigov; until in 1315, Kiev, Volhynia, and Chernigov passed to Lithuania, and Halich, in 1340, to Poland. The third political centre was formed by the princes who emigrated from Kiev-Russ and formed principalities along the Upper Volga and Oka, in Finnish lands. The leadership of these lay first with the Prince of Suzdal, who, in 1169, tried to subdue Kiev, and assumed the title of Grand Duke; then it passed to Vladimir-Suzdal, and finally to Moscow.

(B) Second Period: Lithuanian and Polish Domination (1340–1795)

(*a*) *Division between Poland and Lithuania* (1340–1569).—During this period Poland possessed Halich-Russ, where the Poles built a line of fortresses, proclaimed religious toleration for the Greek and Latin churches in 1447, brought Lvov to pre-eminence, and introduced the Magdeburg law into the towns. The Lithuanian dukes, who since 1315 had acquired the duchies of Chernigov, Volhynia, and Kiev, were the

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rivals of the Poles in Podolia. The success of the Lithuanian conquest was due partly to the fact that the conquerors often adopted the language of the Ukraine (White Russian dialect), and in many cases joined the Greek Orthodox Church. In this way the Poles and Lithuanians succeeded to the Tatars. While the north-western Ukraine remained in actual fact the property of the local princes, under a Lithuanian or Polish central government, the southern steppes were nominally claimed by the Polish Crown; actually, however, the half-nomadic population of Volhynia and Podolia had migrated to the steppes and colonized them along the Lower Dnieper (Nizh). The Black Sea littoral was still dependent on Turkey. The keenness of the rivalry between the Lithuanians and the Poles in the Ukraine was blunted by a common fear of the Germans and of the growing power of Moscow. In 1386 the Lithuanian Prince Jagiello married the Polish Queen Yadviga, so that the union between Poland and Lithuania originated in a purely dynastic arrangement. The Union of Lublin (1569) consolidated this dynastic connexion, united Lithuania and Poland into a bipartite state, and attached Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev, and Podlasia to the Polish state. In these newly acquired Ukrainian lands the Poles recognized, in spite of Cossack opposition, both the Latin and the Greek Churches.

(*b*) *Polish Domination* (1569–1772).—To protect the frontiers of the enlarged state, the Polish kings arranged the 'registration' of the Cossack communities living in the Nizh (Lower Dnieper), called also Zaporogia, i. e. the 'country beyond the rapids', and in the Northern Ukraine. The Cossacks who were placed on the register were paid by the King, and recognized the authority of the Crown 'hetman' (chief), but otherwise lived in almost complete independence in villages and military camps, and were unwilling to adopt any permanent state ties. A series of rebellions under local Cossack leaders against the Polish administration from 1592 onwards secured reforms from the Polish Crown, while the Polish attempts to colonize the Lower Dnieper

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175 and to control Zaporogia were more and more vigorously opposed by the Cossacks. The Muscovites meanwhile colonized the eastern steppes, now called also Ukraine (between the Dnieper and the Don), and gave support to all Cossack refugees from the Polish Ukraine.

The Cossack Wars (1648–1712), known also as 'The Ruin', differed from the previous rebellions in that they were better led, and that the Cossacks under Chmielnicki had the support of the Ukrainian peasants, who rose against their Polish overlords, and of some of the Ukrainian *szlachta* (landlords), who, although favoured politically by the Polish Government, joined the others on the ground of religious fellowship. The year 1648 marks the beginning of a national consciousness among all the Ukrainian people. Chmielnicki was, however, in 1653 compelled to apply to Moscow for protection. The Treaty of Pereyaslavl between Chmielnicki and the Tsar Alexis in 1654, while recognizing a certain amount of self-government for the Ukrainian and Zaporogian armies, brought the people of the Ukraine, as well as the military communities of Zaporogia, under a control from Moscow stricter than that formerly exercised by the Poles. The Ukrainian Cossacks retained their own system of government, and were allowed to receive foreign envoys from anywhere except Poland and Turkey, but they swore allegiance to the Tsar; while, from the beginning, the Tsar's envoy to Pereyaslavl, Buturlin, refused to confirm by oath the Tsar's allegiance to the treaty. Hence sooner or later most of the Hetmans, including Chmielnicki himself, rebelled against Moscow, in which revolts they were invariably supported by Turkey and Poland.

The failure of Moscow to subjugate the Ukrainians permanently, Turkish interference, and various dynastic reasons, led Poland and Moscow to make the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667). According to this treaty, Moscow obtained the country on the left side of the Dnieper (Trans-Dnieper and Kiev) and Poland the country on the right side of the Dnieper (Cis-Dnieper). Zapo-

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rogia or Nizh was left in theory under the protection of both, but in practice it served as a land of refuge for those whose plans for autonomy had been defeated. These defeated rebels organized the famous *Sich*, a kind of military and ascetic order, from which women were absolutely excluded, and which involved complete social equality, adherence to the Orthodox Church, and allegiance to the Zaporogian community. The Ataman (Hetman), or head of the organization, was elected for a year, and had the power of a dictator in time of war. In peace the supreme authority rested with the Rada, or Council. Zaporogia formed an obstacle in the way of Russia's obtaining the Black Sea littoral, and was therefore conquered by Moscow in 1686. Soon afterwards the Cossacks rose for the last time, under Mazeppa (1708–9), and received help from Sweden, then at war with Russia. But the Russian victory at Poltava in 1709 decided the fate of the Cossacks. Their privileges were suppressed; and, though in 1710, by the Pact of Bendery, Sweden promised independence to the Ukraine and Zaporogia, the country was again divided between Poland and Russia, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Andrusovo. The *Sich* was suppressed, and was finally abolished in 1775.

When the victorious Peter the Great moved to the left (i.e. Russian) bank of the Dnieper, he brought with him the majority of the population of the right bank. The Cis-Dnieper or Polish Ukraine thus became depopulated; and the Polish administration, by granting special privileges to the colonists from Poland, Halich-Russ, and Trans-Dnieper, fostered the growth of *slobodas* (land-holdings with special privileges). The power of the *szlachta* was now limited by national Ukrainian risings against the Catholic Polish landlords and the Jews, as well as by pillaging expeditions from the Lower Dnieper. The most eventful rising was that of the Koliivshchina in 1768. It was cleverly manipulated by Catherine the Great; but after some 200,000 Poles, Jews, and Uniat Ukrainians had been massacred, the Empress intervened in favour of the Polish land-

115 lords, who cared more for the interest of their houses than for the Polish State.

After the Treaty of Andrusovo the Trans-Dnieper country was known as Hetmanshchina, i. e. the country dependent on the Hetman. The Ukrainians in the Hetmanshchina were grouped into ten regiments, in which the colonels had full administrative power, In 1734 Peter the Great withdrew the self-governing privileges of the regiments, abolished the dignity of the Hetman, and organized a kind of Ministry for Cossack affairs, called the Malorossiyan (Little Russian) Collegium, in which all colonels had to be Great Russians. Peter II and Elizabeth restored the dignity of the Hetman, but it was finally suspended by Catherine the Great in 1764. The country was colonized with Kalmucks, Serbs (in 1732 and 1753), and Germans, to whom important privileges were granted in 1763 and 1764. In 1775 Catherine distributed large quantities of Zaporogian territory among Russian nobles and officials.

(c) *The Ukraine during the Partitions of Poland* (1772–95).—In the First Partition (1772), Austria received Halich-Russ, i. e. the *voyevodstvas* of Russ and Belza, called by the Austrians Galicia, and occupied northern Moldavia. Russia took the eastern part of White Russia. In 1786 Austria acquired the Bukovina. The Cis-Dnieper Ukraine, or the *voyevodstvas* of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov, protested against this partition. Between the First Partition and the Second (1793) a great economic, intellectual and political revival in Poland led to reforms in the Polish Ukraine. The Jesuit schools, which had been dissolved in 1773, were replaced by State schools under the Polish Minister of Education; Krzemenietz and Winnica were the two intellectual centres around which the schools and industries were grouped. But all these reforms in the Polish Ukraine were made with a view to the retention of the country as a Polish province. At the same time, in the Trans-Dnieper country, the Russians, in spite of local protests, had carried out a ruthless russification.

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After the final victory over the Turks in eastern Europe and the annexation of the Crimea in 1783, Russia surrounded the Ukrainians on all sides. By the decrees of 1763 and 1783 the Ukrainian peasants were made serfs; and in 1785 the Ukrainian nobles were raised to the privileges of the Great Russian nobles. In the same year, Cossack regiments were organized on the model of the Imperial regiments; and, from 1780 onwards, the administrative division into Imperial 'Governments' was introduced. General education suffered a marked relapse. Thus in 1768, shortly after the suppression of the last Hetman, in the districts forming the present Chernigov Government, there were 134 schools, or one school for 746 people, while in the same districts in 1875 there were only 52 schools, or one school for 6,730 people.[1]

At the Second Partition in 1793, Russia obtained most of the Cis-Dnieper Ukraine, i. e. the *voyevodstvas* of Kiev, Braclav, Podolia, and the eastern part of Volhynia, as well as the rest of White Russia and half of Lithuania. In the Polish insurrection which followed that partition, the *szlachta* and many peasants of the Cis-Dnieper Ukraine supported the Polish leader, Kosciuszko. In the Third Partition, Russia took the remaining part of Volhynia and the eastern part of Choĭm, as well as the rest of Lithuania, while the greater part of Choĭm was taken by Austria. By the Treaty of Paris (1815), all the Choĭm land and Podlasia passed to Russia; and Eastern Galicia and the Bukovina were the only lands inhabited by Ukrainians retained by Austria.

(C) Third Period: Russian Domination, 1795–1917

(*a*) *Protests against Russification* (1795–1846).—After the Third Partition of Poland in 1795, the Russian Government of set policy favoured the aristocracy,

[1] M. Hrushevski, *Sketch of the History of the Ukrainian Nation*, 3rd ed., Petersburg, 1911, p. 417.

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175 whether Polish or Ukrainian, who were loyal to the Tsar, and to some extent also the Ukrainian peasants, at the expense of the Polish-Ukrainian middle class of landowners (*szlachta*), or the middle-class urban *intelligentsia* of Ukrainian nationality, who generally used the Russian language. Hence it was in these two latter classes that the spirit of protest still existed in 538 spite of its apparent hopelessness. The expression of this spirit of protest is to be found in the literature it produced, though this has obvious traces of Polish and Great Russian influence. Ukrainians such as Kapnist, Gogol, Velichko, Hanenko, Artemenski, and Hrebinka, were educated at the universities of Moscow and Kharkov, and wrote in the Russian language. To the same literary school belong Ivan Kotlarevski (1769–1839), the 'father' of Ukrainian literature, the first to write in Ukrainian as well as in Russian, and the Pole, Chodakowski, who was the first to study and collect the folk-lore of the Ukraine.

In the west of the Russian Ukraine a school of Ukrainian Polish poets arose, who wrote in Polish, but took as their subject the Ukraine and her liberation from Russia. Eminent among these were A. Malczewski, S. Goszynski, 175 B. Zaleski, and M. Czaikowski. Between 1803 and 1825, Adam Czartoryski and Tadeusz Czacki, two Polish Liberal nobles, acting for the Polish Education Committee under the then Liberal government of Alexander I, started numerous schools radiating from two chief centres—Krzemenietz, where a Catholic lyceum, and Human, where a Uniat college was founded. In 1818 a Masonic Lodge was instituted in Poltava, with the object of bringing about an understanding between the Liberals of Poland, the Ukraine, and Russia; and in 1825 an important meeting was held at Jitomir (*Slovyanskoye Sobranie*) of Dekabrist Russians, Poles, and Ukrainian *intelligentsia*—the latter still using the Polish and Russian languages. From 1825 dates the propaganda of the *lirniki* or Liberals, who wandered with their harps among the people like mediaeval bards, instilling into the Ukrainian peasants the ideas

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of the abolition of serfdom and of freedom from Russia. 115
Most of these Liberals, as for example Rzewuski and Padurva, were Poles, or the products of Polish culture.

The Polish Rising of 1831.—This rising received much active support from the *intelligentsia* in the part of the Ukraine concerned; and the greatest of Ukrainian [538] poets, Shevchenko (born 1814), was influenced by Polish middle-class Liberalism and Polish literature. The University of Kharkov, founded in 1805, had until 1831 many Polish professors lecturing in their own language. But this Polish cultural and political influence was checked when the Polish colleges in Vilna and Krzemenietz were suppressed in 1832, and a Russian university was founded at Kiev in 1834. This latter was at first distinctly governmental and official in character, but by the middle of the nineteenth century it had produced a new school of writers of far more active revolutionary tendencies than were ever manifested by the Kharkov circle. Apart from the Polish and Dekabrist risings and the literary attempts of polonized and russified Ukrainians, the first part of the nineteenth century is marked by a passive submission of the masses to the military and autocratic regime of Russia.

(*b*) *Russian, Polish, and Austrian Rivalry; Growth of Nationalism in the Ukraine* (1846–1914).—The modern nationalist movement in the Ukraine began with the foundation of a purely Ukrainian society called the 'Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood' in Kiev about 1846. This society had not merely the literary object of promoting the Ukrainian language, until then only in oral use among the peasants, but also a far-reaching political programme. Friendly feelings towards Polish and Russian Liberals still existed, and a federation of autonomous Slavonic states was aimed at. In this federation the Ukraine was to form two states, West Little Russia and East Little Russia. The creators of the society were the most prominent Ukrainian literary men, the poet Shevchenko, the historian Kostomarov, and the journalist Kulish.

175 In 1847 they and many others were arrested by the Russian Government; and the society, which never was legal, was suppressed. At the same time in the Austrian Ukraine the Government, following for the time being an anti-Polish policy, was popular with nationalist Ukrainians. Supported by the Government, the Galician Ukrainian peasants rose and massacred the Polish landlords. In 1846–7 serfdom was abolished in Galicia and Bukovina; a measure which was naturally received with favour by the Ukrainians, of whom a great majority were peasants. Count Stadion, the Austrian Governor of Galicia, organized in Lvov (Lemberg) the *Holovna Rada Ruska*, a nationalistic Ukrainian body, anti-Polish and anti-Russian, but supporting the Austrian Government. The same year brought, as a reaction against Austrian manœuvres, a short-lived Ukraino- (Ruthen) Polish agreement, made at the Slavonic (Pan-Slav) Congress in Prague. This again displeased the Russian Government, which hurriedly organized a society, the *Galitsko-Russkaya Matitsa*, in Lvov, with the object of beginning an anti-Austrian and anti-Polish, but Russophil, propaganda among the Galician Ukrainians. This society was especially active in 1866, when the Poles obtained autonomy in Galicia, with control over the Ukrainians. Russophil propaganda in Galicia had begun with the visit of Pogodin, the Russian Pan-Slavist, in 1835; but the Russophils organized themselves only after the 'mission' of T. Lebedyntsev, who, as the agent of the Russian Government, came to enrol Ukrainians for anti-Polish propaganda in Cholm in the Russian Ukraine.

While encouraging the Ukrainians in Austria in their nationalist feelings, Russia tried to suppress the Ukrainian movement in her own territory. The result of this was seen during the Crimean War, when an Ukrainian Pole, M. Czaikowski (Sadyk Pasha), tried, with the help of Turkey, to revive the *Sich* and organized his 'Cossacks' to fight against Russia. Nevertheless the call to the colours during the recent war

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roused in the Russian Ukraine a spirit demanding the abolition of serfdom and the restoration of old Cossack freedom. The chief centre of Ukrainian propaganda during the period 1860–90 was in East Galicia, though the 'Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood' received more support among the *intelligentsia* of the Russian Ukraine, and proceeded on more nationalist lines. In the East Ukraine appeared the journal *Osnova* (1862–3). Sunday schools held in the Ukrainian language were established (1861) in Russia, and societies were founded which called themselves literary, but were really political and nationalist in their aims. The most prominent of these were the 'Prosvita' on both sides of the Ukraine (1868), the 'Gromada' in Kiev (1870), and finally the 'Shevchenko' (1873) in Lvov and Kiev, which, under the leadership of the Ukrainophil *intelligentsia*, started the movement for establishing a uniform Ukrainian language throughout the Ukraine and bringing about democratic reforms. The founders of the 'Shevchenko' Society, not unlike Hrushevski some twenty years later, tried to spread a uniform propaganda on both sides of the frontier, but the Russian Government frustrated their endeavour to influence the Ukrainian peasant by severe police restrictions on the *intelligentsia*, and by decrees suppressing Ukrainian books and language (1863 and 1876).

On the other hand the abolition of serfdom in 1861 made the Russian Government popular with the peasant. The Abolition Law gave to the peasants allotments of between three and eight acres, though a minimum of sixteen acres was necessary to support a family. From the beginning, therefore, the Ukrainian peasant felt a grievance against the large landowners rather than against the central government; and, as agricultural industries became centralized in the hands of capitalists, the economic problem grew yearly more acute. The unions of landowners, the *zemstvos*, had no Ukrainians among them, while the Ukrainian peasants, among whom the village community (*mir*) of the Great Russians was very little developed, were also behind

175 other provinces of the Empire in co-operative and self-organizing capacity. There was, then, little hope that economic betterment would be brought about by the evolution of peasant communities, as in Great Russia and Siberia. This situation was used by the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Austrian Government, which supported them. The expectation of economic advantages underlay the nationalistic movement; and the villages afforded much better ground for it than the towns, which were mostly Russian. In order to counteract the influence of the Ukrainian 'Prosvita', the Russian Government supported the 'Society of the Kachkovski' in Lvov (1875), which had a Russophil tendency.

In 1898, under the leadership of the Ukrainophils Hrushevski and Franko, the language reform campaign began. The Ukrainophils accepted the Podgorski dialect spoken in the Carpathian valleys as far east as the Dniester as the standard language, and proposed a phonetic orthography; while the Russophil Ukrainians took the northern branch of the Russian Ukrainian dialect, called Little Russian, as the standard language, and proposed an 'historical' orthography based on etymological spelling. The Ukrainophils were supported by the Austrian Government, which in 1874 introduced the Ukrainian language into the elementary schools of East Galicia, and subsequently recognized in 1895 the phonetic orthography of the Ukrainophils as the standard orthography of the Ukrainian language in Galicia and the Bukovina.

After 1890, however, the Austrian Government altered the Ukrainian policy inaugurated by it in 1848. Acting partly in his capacity as an anti-Russian Austrian Premier, and partly as a Pole, Count Badeni, helped by Professor Antonovicz of Kiev, brought about in 1889–90 an understanding between the Nationalist Ukrainian *intelligentsia* and *szlachta* and the Conservative Poles on the ground of a common anti-Russian feeling. As a result of this understanding, Professor Hrushevski, a pupil of Antonovicz, went in 1894 from Kiev to Lvov to fill the chair of Ukrainian

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history. Another representative of the Ukrainian *szlachta*, Paulin Swiecicki, tried to rouse Polish sympathy with Ukrainian irredentism. 175

But these measures were the last conciliatory steps. In the last ten years of the nineteenth century the anti-Polish parties, the Radicals, led by Dragomanov (1895) in the Austrian Ukraine, grew in strength; and relations between the Poles and Ukrainians in the Russian, and still more in the Austrian, Ukraine became worse and worse. This was undoubtedly connected with the fact that after 1866 the Austrian Government subjected the Ukrainians to the Poles, while in the Russian Ukraine the Government favoured the large Polish landowners, who occupied high positions at Court. The Galician elections of 1897, when Badeni's Polish policy was victorious, finally made a gulf between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia which affected relations between them in the Russian Ukraine as well. For the first time the Russophils and Ukrainophils united in opposition to the Poles.

In 1900 there was a further important change in Austrian policy in the Ukraine. The visit of the Emperor Francis Joseph to Berlin in that year was understood to have had the object of reconciling German and Austrian opinion in regard to the Ukraine. Shortly afterwards the Ukrainian Radical, M. Sembratovych, published an anti-Polish book, *Polonia Irredenta*, which was cordially welcomed by the German press.

Growth of Political Parties.—About the same time various Ukrainian political parties began to organize themselves. Of these the most important was that of the 'National Democrats', founded in 1899 by Professor Hrushevski in Galicia to fight for rights equal to those of the Poles in Galicia and for the autonomy of the Russian Ukraine as a federate Russian state. This party resembled the Polish National Democrats; and their half-gymnastic, half-military organizations, called *sokoly*, were similar to the Polish and Bohemian *sokoly*. In 1900 the first Revolutionary Ukrainian Party was organized in Lvov; in 1905 it assumed the name of the

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175 'Ukrainian Social Democratic Working-men's Party', and their gymnastic-military societies were called *sich*. Both these parties were in constant communication with the Russian Ukraine.

The Russian Revolution of 1905.—As a consequence of this revolution, the restriction upon the Ukrainian language in Russia, partly cancelled (with regard to theatres and public lectures) in 1881, was entirely withdrawn; and in 1910 the Russian Academy of Science published a report by seven academicians in which they supported the just demand of the Ukrainians to have their school text-books in their own language. This was taken by the Ukrainians to be a recognition of Ukrainian as a separate language. In 1906 the Ukrainian members of the first Duma joined the Autonomist-Federalist Group, but scarcely any separatist movement was noticeable. The second Duma had an Ukrainian club, which worked for the autonomy of the Ukraine; their organ was the *Ridna Sprava*. But in the third Duma, owing to manipulations of the franchise, the Ukraine was represented by very backward members, uneducated priests and peasants.

The Russian Ukraine turns to Austria and Germany.—Between 1907 and 1914 new anti-Ukrainian measures were passed by the Russian Government, much to the discontent of the Russian *intelligentsia*. After 1909 the Ukrainian Social Democratic party in the Russian Ukraine, which was connected with the Social Democrats in Galicia, grew stronger, and formulated a programme of autonomous government. The Ukrainian university students agitated in favour of Ukrainian chairs in Russian universities in Ukrainian territory; and Bishop Parthenius made an attempt to introduce the Ukrainian language as the medium of instruction in church schools. The attitude of the Poles towards this movement in the Russian Ukraine varied according to their connexion with one or the other of the two great political groups. The Conservative Polish landowners in the Ukraine, as for example Count Joseph Potocki, supported the Russian Govern-

ment by building on their estates schools for Ukrainian /175
peasants in which the Russian tongue was employed; and the leader of the Polish National Democratic Party in the Duma used his influence with Conservative Polish opinion in Galicia to support the Russophil propaganda carried on there by the Russian Government. As a result of these efforts, in the Galician elections of 1907 ten Russophils were elected to the Reichsrat as opposed to eleven Ukrainophils. This was followed by the murder of the Polish Viceroy, Count A. Potocki, by a Ukrainophil Radical in 1908.

Meanwhile in Galicia the Russophil propaganda of the Russian Government was rousing much opposition; and the Russophil party itself split up into two sections. The Pro-Russian Party, supported by the Pan-Slavist Count Bobrinski, and led by the Ukrainian Dudykievich, edited the *Prikarpatskaya Rus*; while the Moderate Russophil or Old Ruthenian Party, under the leadership of the Ukrainians Davydiak and Korol, published the *Halychanin*. The growing power of the Radicals also opposed the Russophils; and in the Galician elections of 1913 only one Russophil was elected. At the same time, German as well as Austrian influence began to assert itself among the Ukrainians of Galicia. This has been proved through the disclosure by a Polish journalist, Krysiak, of 97 documents exchanged from March 1903 onwards between the Prussian Anti-Polish Society (*Ostmarkenverein*) and the Ukrainian National Committee (*Ruthenisches National-Komitee*). The Prussian institution encouraged and materially supported the Ukrainian National Committee. Since both these institutions were nominally non-official, and the anti-Polish propaganda could not be treated as treason, because the State after all was Austrian, the Poles were unable to take direct measures against these intrigues; but in the trials of Russophil Ukrainians in Galicia for high treason the Polish Conservative jury acquitted the Russophils.

(*c*) *From the Outbreak of War to the Russian Revolution* (1914–17).—In the autumn of 1914 the Russian

175 army occupied Eastern Galicia. Russian public opinion, hitherto ignorant of the existence of 'Ruthenians' in Eastern Galicia, was then instructed, and now became very Pan-Slav. The attitude of the first Russian Governor, Count Sheremetyev, was the outcome of circumstances that preceded the war. The small Russophil party of Ukrainians in Galicia and the Poles were left fairly undisturbed, while the Ukrainian Nationalists were persecuted. But with the appointment of Count George Bobrinski, cousin of the Pan-Slavist Vladimir Bobrinski, as Governor, and the Pan-Orthodox bishop, Eulogius, as Bishop of Galicia, all the Ukrainians in Galicia as well as the Poles began to suffer religious and political persecution. Polish schools were closed and the 'Prosvita' was suspended. From August 1914 the Ukrainian leaders, W. Wassilko, E. and K. Lewicki, and L. Baczynski, carried on negotiations with the Austrian and German authorities, aiming at the partition of Galicia and the union of Eastern Galicia with Volhynia and other parts of the Russian West Ukraine. The russifying policy of the Russian Administration furthered this agitation.

In the spring of 1915 the Russian retirement began, and by the autumn Galicia was cleared of Russians. Under the pressure of the Ukrainophils, Count Sturgkh assured K. Lewicki at a secret interview on September 7, 1915, that Eastern Galicia and such part of the Russian Ukraine as was or might be under Austrian occupation would be united in an autonomous Ukrainian state attached to Austria, with, at the outset, Austrian officials and language.[1] The Russian policy in Galicia was severely criticized by the Liberals and even by the Central party in the Duma on August 28, 1914, and September 10, 1915. N. Bobchev and T. Romanchuk, in the Russophil Ukrainian press, accused the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine (Ukraino-

[1] 'Documents Ruthéno-Ukrainiens', in *Extraits du Journal de M. Olesnyckyj* (pp. 7, 8), published by the Bureau polonais des publications politiques (Paris, May 1919).

phils) of being the result of German intrigue.[1] This again gave rise to a pamphlet, by L. Tschelski, issued in Sofia (1915) by the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, entitled *Is the Ukrainian Movement a German Intrigue?* The Russian Government took severe measures against the members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, who, including the chief leader, Hrushevski, were banished to Siberia, or were forbidden to enter Russia from abroad. 175

(D) Fourth Period: Since the Russian Revolution of 1917

(*a*) *The Ukraine becomes independent.*—One of the first questions which faced the Provisional Government at the beginning of the Russian Revolution was the demand for an amnesty for the Ukrainian Nationalist offenders, who were allowed to return from Siberia and abroad. Next came the demand for Ukrainian autonomy and the appointment of a special Minister for Ukrainian Affairs, presented by a deputation sent from Kiev to Petrograd on April 6, 1917. Soon afterwards the first Ukrainian National Congress was convened at Kiev (April 19–22), at which some 800 members representative of the *intelligentsia* and the Social Revolutionaries were present. They elected a Central Rada, and declared for an autonomous Ukrainian republic under a Russian federal republic. Professor Hrushevski was elected President. The territory claimed for the Ukrainian state corresponded roughly to the western parts of the Governments of Lublin and Grodno, and the whole of the Governments of Kiev, Poltava, Kherson, Volhynia, Kharkov, Podolia, Yekaterinoslav, and Chernigov, and excluded the Austrian Ukraine. The Congresses of the Ukrainian Soldiers (May 5–7) and of the Ukrainian Peasants (May–June) supported the Rada at this time. But the Petrograd 662 642 [646] [131]

[1] In answer to a pamphlet by Tschelski, *No Liberator, but an Oppressor of Nations: How Russia freed the Ukraine.* L.L.U., Sofia, 1914.

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668 Government refused to recognize the decisions of the
64 Rada, and thereby strengthened a group of separatists hitherto supported only by the second Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress (June 7). The Rada now issued (June 24) a *Universale*, proclaiming that henceforth the Ukrainian Rada would control Ukrainian affairs and work in federation with the All-Russian Parliament when this should be established; and on June 30 an executive body of the Rada, called the General Secretariat, was appointed.

This step caused anxiety to the Petrograd Government; and on July 12–14 two members of the Duma, Tereschenko and Tseretelli, and subsequently Kerenski, went to Kiev. While granting most of the Ukrainian demands, Kerenski opposed the demand for the formation of a Ukrainian army on the ground that it would mean the break-up of the Russian army. The favourable attitude adopted by Kerenski towards Ukrainian demands caused a split in the Provisional Government of Petrograd; and the Cadets left the Cabinet on July 16.

The reorganized Provisional Government decided to
[669] grant autonomy to the Ukraine, but on July 19 a social revolution broke out in Kiev, and the help of the Provisional Government was sought by the Rada for the restoration of order. But before the formal recognition of Ukrainian autonomy by the Provisional Government, which took place on August 17, other riots broke out in Kiev, this time among the Russian or russified town population, who protested against the 'ukrainization' of South Russia. The recognition of the Provisional Government meant that, until the summoning of the Constituent Assembly, the General Secretariat of the Ukraine was the recognized authority controlling finance, commerce, industry, agriculture, labour, and other domestic affairs. All measures had to be submitted to the Provisional Government. The Ukraine was to consist of the Governments of Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Poltava, and Chernigov; the other Governments mentioned above could be included if

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their *zemstvos* so desired. But this measure of autonomy was not accepted. The Rada on August 24 declined to send representatives to the National Council at Moscow, expressed the wish for a separate Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, and asked the Provisional Government to define more clearly its own position.

Meanwhile Russian public opinion, even in revolutionary circles, strongly resented the Ukrainian movement. The resentment was expressed in the communication of the Russian War Office to the *Russkoye Slovo* of September 2, 1917, in which it was alleged that the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine was conducting espionage in Russia on behalf of Germany, and a separatist Ukrainian propaganda among the Russian prisoners of war, that it was in the pay of the German Foreign Office, and that it was giving help to the German armies. To this communication a reply was given by MM. Melenevski and A. Skoropis-Yolturovski, members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, on October 25, 1917, in Stockholm, in which it was stated that the Austrian and German Governments had no part in the foundation of the League, which had been created in Eastern Galicia with the help of the Ukrainian immigrants; that the League based its hopes on the victory of the Central Powers over Russia; that they expressed the wish that the Central Powers should occupy the Ukraine; that they hoped the Ukraine would be fully independent and essentially democratic; that they carried on a cultural war among the Ukrainian prisoners of war in Germany without the help of the Germans; that the German spy of Ukrainian nationality, Yermolenko, had no connexion with the League; and lastly, that the League accepted money from all friends of the Ukraine, including the German Government, and intended to raise a loan from the German Government.

Then came the fall of the Provisional Government. In the Kerenski-Kornilov affair of 1917 the General Secretariat as well as the Soldiers' and Workmen's Councils of the Ukraine sent their loyal assurances to

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the Provisional Government. The idea of forming part of a Russian federal republic was still powerful in the Rada; and on September 26, 1917, a conference of forty different nationalities had met at Kiev to discuss the question of local autonomies under a federal system. Preparations for a Constituent Assembly, which was to include 22 members from the Ukraine and 17 from the Don Cossacks, were set on foot; while propaganda was carried on by the ultra-nationalists and the internationalists, i.e. the Soviets, with a view to boycotting the Russian Constituent Assembly.

In November 1917, after Kerenski's Government had been replaced by the Bolshevik Soviets, the Ukraine on the whole was much more in favour of the latter than were the Don Cossacks, who formed on November 9 a confederation of a more conservative character. To save its position among the masses, the Rada underwent a rapid process of evolution, and on November 20 published a *Universale* of a radical character. It proclaimed the 'Ukrainian People's Republic', abolished all private ownership of land, introduced State control of production and an eight-hour day in all factories, removed the death penalty from the statute book, and finally expressed a hope that the Ukrainian National Republic would be federated with the Russian Republic. By doing this the Rada hoped to check Soviet interference; it failed to do so; and from December 19 serious differences between the Rada and the Soviet Government in Petrograd became apparent. The Soviet Government at Petrograd accused the Rada of giving support to the Cadets and of siding with the Don Cossacks in their hostility to the Bolsheviks; while the Rada declared itself a body elected by Revolutionary Democrats in the Ukraine, and refused to co-operate with the Bolsheviks or to send delegates with them to Brest-Litovsk. It finally declared, on December 24, that, as the Russian army was disorganized, it would take military measures for the defence of its borders. Some of the Ukrainian forces mobilized at that time joined

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the Russian armies on the Rumanian and south- 642
western fronts. The Soviet Government therefore 728
began to organize the Red Guards against the Rada, which by that time had completed its negotiations with Germany, and on December 27 had sent the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada to Brest-Litovsk. The delegation was composed of Hrushevski, Holubowich, Vinnitchenko, and Petlura, while the intermediary between them and the Austro-German authorities was Wassilko, a member of the Reichsrat and Count Czernin's adviser on Ukrainian affairs.

On January 11, 1918, the delegates of the Ukrainian Republic were formally recognized at Brest by the Central Powers. This recognition was interpreted by the Rada as meaning the recognition of Ukrainian independence. Vinnitchenko boasted that the French Government had made a gold loan and printed paper money for the Ukraine, and that the Western allies would soon recognize its independence. (The Allied Mission to the Ukraine, sent in December 1917, was interpreted by the Ukrainians as implying such a recognition.) But, while successful at Brest, the Rada's authority in Kiev was shaken by the frequent risings of the Ukrainians of the Soviets (especially at Odessa on January 17 and 28); and the Petrograd Soviets supported the latter, demanding that they should be represented in the Ukrainian delegation. On January 26 the Government at Petrograd broke off relations with the Rada, 'until it is replaced by a Rada of Soviets'. To strengthen its position at Brest, the Rada, on January 28, declared, by 508 votes to 4, for the complete independence of the Ukraine.

(*b*) *German Occupation.*—On February 9 the 'Bread' 727
peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Germany, 642
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one hand, and the 'Ukrainian People's Republic' (the Rada) on the other. At the same time, however, the report arrived that the Rada had been suppressed by Soviet troops, who declared it to be 'but a sad memory'. On February 20 the British Chargé-d'affaires in Russia

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denied that Great Britain had recognized the Ukraine as an independent state; while Mr. Balfour gave the same assurance to a member of the Polish National Committee in London, that body having protested against the boundaries of the new state, and against the assigning of Cholm to the Ukraine.

Meanwhile the Russian Soviet army was supporting the Ukrainian Soviets; it forced the Rada to take refuge (March 1) in Jitomir (Volhynia). The Rada now sought protection from the Central Powers. Dr. Seidler made a statement to this effect on March 2 in the Austrian Reichsrat, and soon afterwards the Germans occupied the north-eastern and the Austrians the southern Ukraine. On March 14 the *Vossische Zeitung* declared the Rada to be re-established at Kiev, and ready to ratify the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. But in fact, although the Rada wanted German support in their fight against the Soviets, they could not act against their own people and agree to all the German demands. From the end of March the Germans fought the Soviet troops in the Ukraine, while on the other hand they seized the food supplies of the non-Soviet Ukrainians. The food crisis reached its climax in the middle of April, when the Rada ceased to support the armies of occupation.

Consequently, on April 28, the Ukrainian Rada Government was overthrown by the armies of occupation; and General Skoropadski, a Russian of Ukrainian descent, was placed at the head of affairs, with the title of Hetman. The Rada having refused to abdicate, the Germans on May 7 arrested its members, and attempted to secure the support of the great landowners in their efforts to obtain food. The German Field-Marshal von Eichhorn published a decree re-establishing private ownership of land on a large scale, disarmed the Ukrainian regiments, and organized an army obedient to himself. The opposition to the Germans and to the Hetman Skoropadski, who had dictatorial power and was supported by all who were in favour of the pre-revolutionary regime or were afraid of social

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strife, inspired such desperate acts as burning stores of grain, and aroused Socialist protests in the Austrian Reichsrat. Meanwhile the Moscow Soviet Government came to an agreement with the Ukrainian Rada (May 23), and recognized the Ukraine as an independent state. On June 13–14 the Russo-Ukrainian armistice was formally signed.

On May 24 a peasant rising broke out all over the Ukraine owing to the drastic measures of the German military officials, who declared the country in a state of siege; the rising was directed against the Germans and the big landowners, who regarded the German army as militia to be used against social disturbances and anarchy. The objects of this rising were stated in the manifesto of the Peasants' Congress at Kiev on June 7. The congress demanded (1) that a Hetman chosen by landowners should be deposed; (2) that the Ukraine should be a 'People's Republic'; (3) that no land should be returned to proprietors; and (4) that a Legislative Assembly should be convoked. This assembly the peasants agreed to support, appealing to the Germans not to oppose the People's Republic. However, the German troops in occupation continued to suppress strife among the peasants and to collect food by severe means, the result being that Von Eichhorn was assassinated in Kiev on July 30.

The Ukraine now became the battleground of five propagandist forces—pro-German, pro-Ally, pro-Russian Federalist, Bolshevik, and Separatist-Nationalist. The Austrian authorities arranged for the evacuation of Lvov by the Polish troops, and the Ukrainians (Ruthenians) seized the city (October 31) and held it for about a month, during which they are said to have had the help of the Ukrainians from Volhynia as well as of the Austrian officers. The Ukrainian (Ruthenian) National Council stated that it had taken over the administration of Eastern Galicia. The Polish Galician Liquidation Commission, established after the retirement of the Austrian authorities, opposed the Ukrainian claims.

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(c) *The Ukraine since the Armistice.*—The government of Skoropadski lasted for a short time after the signing of the armistice in Western Europe; and the conservative elements in the Ukraine, whether Ukrainians, Poles, or Russians, wished that the Western Allies should support Skoropadski and send a fresh army of occupation to replace the German army. Hoping for an Allied recognition, and under pressure from the peasants, Skoropadski introduced some democratic reforms, and dissolved the Germanophil cabinet of Lyssogub. The old Rada, however, reorganized itself into a Directory with Vinnitchenko and Petlura at its head, and replaced Skoropadski's government on December 14, 1918.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(A) Religious

(*a*) *Christians.*—Prince Vladimir of Kiev (972–1015) accepted Christianity in its Byzantine form. The first Bishop of Kiev, Michael, a Syrian by birth, was sent by the Patriarch of Constantinople, on whom Kiev was dependent. After the final separation of the Eastern and Western Churches in 1054, the Church of Kiev kept up relations with the Pope for nearly a hundred years. Eventually, however, owing to the influence of Nicephorus, a Greek by birth, who was Metropolitan of Kiev, 1104–20, it followed Constantinople. After the Ukraine passed under Lithuanian and Polish rule, her church history became independent of that of the Great Russian Church. In 1354 the Patriarch of Constantinople appointed Alexis, a Russian by birth, as Metropolitan of Moscow; and in 1362, complying with the request of the Lithuanian prince (a pagan), he appointed another Metropolitan in Kiev for those Ukrainians who were subjects of Lithuania.

The idea of a Graeco-Roman national Church had been occasionally entertained in Western Ukraine; and in 1594 a Synod of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops, led by Rahosa the Metropolitan of Kiev, laid the foundation of the 'Uniat' Church, i. e. a Church of Byzantine ritual and Slavonic language, recognizing the jurisdiction of the Pope. The movement had a double character—national, for it originated with educated and patriotic clergy; and moral, for it aimed at improving the character of the clergy. The Synod of Brest in 1595–6 proclaimed the Union, which was supported by most of the Orthodox bishops, the bishops of Lvov and Przemysl being the last to join it. From the very beginning the Union had to face opposition on the one hand from the educated Ukrainian laymen,

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795 led by Prince Constantine Ostrogski and the Cossacks, and on the other hand from the Polish Catholic bishops, who did not wish to recognize the Uniat bishops as their equals in rights. On the demand of the Orthodox part of the Ukraine, the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophanus, ordained new bishops for the Ukraine to take the place of those who had joined the Uniat Church. At first these were not accepted by the Polish kings; but, under the pressure of Cossack demands, Ladislaus IV divided the bishoprics of the Ukraine between the Uniats and the Orthodox. The Orthodox bishops were installed in Przemysl, Lvov, and Lutsk. In their opposition to the Uniat Church, the Cossacks united with the Russians.

795 At the Polish Partition of 1795, all the sees were
798 Uniat except Lvov and Przemysl, and there were about 12,000,000 professing Uniats. In spite of the fact that all treaties between Poland and Russia (1773, 1775, 1788, 1793, 1795) had expressly guaranteed the toleration of Catholics of both rites, the persecution of Uniats by Russia began almost at once. In 1827 the four Uniat bishoprics of Vilna, Brest, Polotsk, and Lutsk were made into two, the Lithuanian and White Russian. In 1833 forcible conversion was introduced; and in 1839 a sham petition was addressed to the Russian Government by a Uniat priest, Joseph Siemaszko, asking that the Uniat Church should be restored to communion with the State religion. Wholesale massacres and banishments to Siberia began; the last Uniat Bishop of Choĭm, Kalinski, was exiled, and a Galician apostate, Popiel, was installed in his place. In 1875 the Union was officially suppressed.

The attitude of the Poles to the Union was changed after the Polish Partitions. The Catholic clergy and people in Russian Poland supported the Uniats in their refusal to attend the Orthodox Church; the Uniats were officially known as 'non-Christians', though unofficially their spiritual needs were attended to by the Uniat or Catholic clergy. The Uniat Church in Galicia supported their countrymen across the

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frontier. After the proclamation of religious toleration in 1905, about 200,000 Ukrainians immediately declared themselves Uniats, so that the Russian Government soon found it necessary to restrict the scope of the proclamation. Though the Uniats in Russia were forbidden to join the Catholic Church, many of them became Catholics or sectaries. The last Russian persecution of the Uniat Church took place during the Russian occupation of Galicia in 1915, when the Russian bishop, Eulogius, started a regular campaign to replace Uniat priests by Orthodox clergy, and Uniat Ukrainian by Russian Orthodox schools. Many Uniat priests were banished to Siberia; and the Uniat Metropolitan, Szeptycki, was exiled to a Russian monastic prison. It is uncertain whether the Uniat Church has been gaining ground outside the provinces of Choĭm and Polesia. As no statistics have been taken in Russia since the decree of religious toleration in 1905, it is difficult to give a correct estimate of the number of members of the Russian Orthodox Church, but their percentage varies from 75 to 93 in the various Governments of the Russian Ukraine. The Great-Russian sect of the *Raskolniki* (Old Believers) found refuge in the Governments of Kharkov (0·1 per cent. of the population) and Chernigov (0·9 per cent.).

The number of Roman Catholics, chiefly Poles, is higher in the west (in Volhynia the Poles in 1897 formed 6·16 per cent. of the population), but they are only slightly more numerous than the Lutheran Protestants (in Volhynia 5·73 of the population), who are German colonists.

Of great social importance are the peasant sects, of which the chief in the Ukraine is the *Shtunda* (from *Stunde*, since they gather at a definite hour). The doctrines of this Lutheran sect, which originated in Württemberg in 1705, were brought to South Russia by the Württemberg merchants, as the Danzig merchants, who came here after the partitions of Poland, brought with them the teaching of the Mennonite sect. Since 1870 it has been oppressed officially by the Russian

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795 Government. The centres of the Shtundists are in the
798 Kherson Government (the districts of Yelisavetgrad and Odessa), in the Kiev Government (the districts of Tarashchansk, Skirsk, and Zvenigorodsk), in the Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Poltava Governments, and to a less extent in Chernigov, Podolia, and Bessarabia. In their boycott of official churches, ikons, and priests, of military service, and to a great extent of the Government itself, the Shtundists are akin to other sectaries. One branch of Ukrainian sectaries combines the teaching of the Shtundists and that of the Baptists, and are called Neo-Baptists. The sectaries in the Ukraine, as elsewhere, were suppressed by the Russian Government, but those who have studied the question (e.g. Prugavin[1]) state that they number more than 20,000,000.

793 *Position of the Clergy.*—On the whole it is true that the Uniat clergy in Eastern Galicia, Choïm, Polesia, and wherever the Uniat Church is found, as well as the leaders of the sects in the other parts of the Ukraine, exercise enormous influence over religious and social
554 life. The persecutions they have undergone have strengthened their prestige among the peasants and even among the *intelligentsia.* The influence of the Russian Orthodox clergy, though many of them have been of Ukrainian nationality, has been limited to the religious sphere, since socially they have been generally regarded as Government officials by the peasants and still more by the *intelligentsia.*

The clergy in the Ukraine are on the whole less educated than in Great Russia, i. e. they are mostly 'seminarists', not 'academicians'. The Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, once known for its learning, has degenerated into a monastery in which some of the monks are illiterate. For the last twenty-five years the highest positions all over the Empire have been in the hands of the monastic clergy; and there was acute hostility between them and the secular clergy, who in

[1] See V. Anderson, *Old Believers and Sectaries*, Petrograd, 1908 (Russ.): also T. I. Buthevich, *Survey of Russian Sects and their Creeds*, Kharkov, 1910 (Russ.).

the Ukraine were mostly of the 'seminarist' type and often of Ukrainian nationality, and hence of peasant descent. In the Ukraine the secular clergy were, if anything, more popular than the monastic. 793

(*b*) *Jews.*—Next in number to the Orthodox are the Jews. Records make it clear that since the seventeenth century the Ukraine has been the centre of the Jewish 'pogrom' movement, and is more anti-Semitic than any other East-European country. A Hebrew-Jewish scholar, Nathan of Zaslavl, has left a document[1] containing the record of terrible atrocities perpetrated by the Ukrainians and Cossacks on the Jews during the Cossacks' War against Poland. The 'pogroms' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may appear less cruel; but, though they were organized by the Russian secret police, it has been proved in the law-courts that the local population was quite ready to fall in with the suggestions of these agents.[2] The reasons for this hatred are partly economic—for the Jews are very successful middlemen between the Ukraine and other countries, and hence in possession of capital, which they lend at a high rate to the peasant—but are also racial, since the hatred between these two races is stronger than that between either Poles or Great Russians and the Jews. All the traditions of the steppe-country peasant are opposed to those of the Jewish townsman. This is shown by the facts that there is hardly any mixed Jewish-Ukrainian population, and that the Jews live chiefly in the towns and industrial settlements where Russians and Poles predominate. The Jews came to the Ukraine on the first wave of colonization from Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 795 798 186

According to data obtained in 1897, the percentage of the Jewish population in the Governments of the Ukraine was as follows: Volhynia, 13·2 per cent.; Podolia, 12·24 per cent.; Kiev, 12·09 per cent.; Kherson, 12 per cent.; Chernigov, 5 per cent.; 795 162

[1] *Jawein Mesula: a Chronicle of Events from 1648 to 1652.* First printed in Vienna, 1656.

[2] I. Luchitski, *Legal Speeches concerning the Jewish Pogroms*, Kiev, 1908 (in Russian).

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795 Yekaterinoslav, 5 per cent.; Poltava, 4 per cent.;
162 Taurida, 4 per cent.; Kharkov, 0·5 per cent. only.

Like the Orthodox Church, the Jewish community has its sects. There are two such sects in the Ukraine; and their members exercise a great moral influence, and form a bridge between the Turkish and Jewish populations of the Ukraine. They are called Karaimy and Krymchaki, and live chiefly in the towns of the Taurida and Kherson Governments. They number about 12,000. These people, using mostly Tatar dialects, are supposed to be descendants of Jewish pre-Christian colonies in the Crimea and the Turkic Khazars of the Middle Ages, who were of Jewish faith. The Karaimy disapprove of the Talmud, and base all their beliefs on the Law of Moses. They differ from other Jewish
577] communities in their cleanliness, their absolute honesty in business, and their great sense of social duties. Hence their wealth is evenly distributed in their communities.

(c) *Mohammedans.*—The largest Mohammedan colony is found in the Taurida government (187,940, or 13 per cent.), but their schools are less efficient and their culture is much lower than that of the Mohammedans of the Volga or of Turkestan.

(B) Educational

161 The last census, taken in 1897,[1] gives the following
212 figures:

Name of Government.	*Total population in 1,000's.*	*No. of literates in 1,000's.*	*Per cent. of literates.*
Podolia . .	3,018	450	14·5
Kharkov . .	2,492	384	15·4
Poltava . .	2,778	446	16·1
Volhynia . .	2,989	493	16·5
Kiev . . .	3,559	598	16·8
Chernigov . .	2,298	402	17·5
Yekaterinoslav .	2,114	433	20·5
Kherson . .	2,734	657	24·1
Taurida . .	1,448	380	26·2
	23,430	4,243	average 18·2

[1] From *The Ukrainian Movement as a Stage in South Russian Separatism*, Shchegolev (Kiev, 1912), p. 364.

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The high percentage of literates in Novorossiya (Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav) is due to the presence of German colonists. In ten Great-Russian Governments (Pskov, Penza, Simbirsk, Tambov, Smolensk, Orel, Kaluga, Riazan, Tula, and Nijni Novgorod) there are 16,302,000 inhabitants, of whom 16·9 per cent. can read and write. Since the census of 1897, education in the Ukraine has been rapidly spreading, thanks chiefly to the *zemstvos*, who supported about half the existing schools. In the Government of Poltava the *zemstvos* spent in 1900 as much as 20 per cent. of their income on education. According to the statistics of Yasnopolski, who bases his calculations on the reports of the Central Statistical Committee in Petrograd, and brings his figures down to 1910, the percentage of literates is as follows: Taurida, 38 per cent.; Kherson, 35; Yekaterinoslav, 29; Chernigov, 25; Kiev, 24; Kharkov, 23; Poltava, 23; Volhynia, 23; Podolia, 20.

Within the territories of the nine Governments which form the Ukraine, there are three universities and several higher educational institutions in Odessa, in Kiev, and in Kharkov. The language and administration are Russian, though Kiev has Chairs of Ukrainian Language and History, recently instituted; and they all gather, especially at Kiev, a fair number of Ukrainian scholars. The three university towns form centres round which other schools are grouped. Kiev is the centre for the South-west Territory, i. e. the Governments of Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia; Odessa is the centre for Novorossiya, i. e. the Governments of Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav; and Kharkov is the centre for Malorossiya, i. e. the Governments of Chernigov, Poltava, and Kharkov. On the whole, education is most advanced in Novorossiya, and Odessa has the greatest number of schools (420), secondary and primary. The Government of Kharkov is very poor in schools, though Kharkov itself possesses about 111; next come the Governments of Podolia, Poltava, and Volhynia.

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172 In the primary schools only Russian was taught until recently, but in those kept by the *zemstvos* and Ukrainian societies Ukrainian is now also taught. In the secondary schools, which exist only in the larger towns, French and German instruction is given. In the German colonies there are German local schools (private), mostly primary. In the large towns of the western Ukraine and in the Polish colonies and on the large estates there are Polish private schools, which have been officially recognized since 1905. It is impossible to estimate the number of Ukrainians who went to universities, because many of them went to Russian universities outside the Ukraine or to foreign universities; but they can only have been a small percentage of the total number of literates.

204 The majority of the newspapers in the Ukraine were Russian. Each Government and each district had its own *Viedomosti*; and there were many Russian papers in Kiev. There were fewer Polish papers, chiefly in Kiev and the western Ukraine. The Germans had local papers in their colonies. The Ukrainians had, up to 1917, some eighteen newspapers, but some of them were printed abroad. In Kiev there were twelve Ukrainian papers, the most popular of which, *Rada*, was started in 1906; in Mohilev one, in Kharkov one, in Yekaterinoslav one, in Moscow one. One of the earliest Ukrainian papers printed abroad was the *Ruthenische Revue*, subsequently called *Ukrainische Rundschau*, started in 1903 in Vienna. This list does not include the Ukrainian newspapers printed in Eastern Galicia in a slightly different language and character.

(C) Political

171 Political conditions in the Ukraine were very much like those in other parts of the Russian Empire, except for special restrictions aiming at russification, e. g. the refusal to appoint the inhabitants of non-Russian districts to important Government positions. But the russification was not so thorough as in Finland

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or Poland, because before 1905 opposition to the Russian Government was less marked. Besides, many Russian Liberals, even of official position, treated the Ukrainian movement as an interesting variation of Russian life. 177

(D) Social

The class divisions into titled aristocracy, nobles, townsmen, merchants, and peasants, existed as in other parts of the Russian Empire, but, roughly speaking, a different ethnic element corresponded to each social division. The titled aristocracy was mainly Polish in the western parts (with the name Polish Ukrainians) and Russian in the eastern. With but few exceptions, the same could be said of the class of landed nobles, in which the Great Russians formed the majority; Poles, Germans and others were the minority. The Ukrainian landed noble was almost unknown; and the townsmen of the large towns were also in a great majority non-Ukrainian, being chiefly Great Russians and Jews (in Berdichev the Jews form 78·4 per cent. of the population; in Yekaterinoslav, 40 per cent.), and, in the western Ukraine, Russian, Polish, German, Greek, &c. The Jews were mainly traders and shopkeepers, while the Great Russians and the foreigners were manufacturers. 565 563 184

But few of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia* took part in the industrial life of the country, about one-third of them belonging to the professional classes, i. e. doctors, Government officials, lawyers, and teachers. The Ukrainian professional classes originated from the ex-Cossacks and the townsmen rather than from the peasants, since there is a great distinction between the peasants and other members of the community. The Ukrainian nobles, it must be remembered, have in most cases become russified, and partly also polonized. The distinction between the peasant and other classes is not based on economic grounds, for some peasants in the Ukraine are very rich. It lies chiefly in their cultural condition, in their education, or rather lack 565 [463]

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565 of education, and in their occupations. The bulk
[162] (86·4 per cent.) of the Ukrainians are peasants and agriculturists. The percentage of people living in the country is in the Government of Kharkov, 85; in Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 88; Chernigov, 91; Taurida, 80; Kherson, 70. The percentage of peasants is almost the same, e. g. Kharkov, 90; Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 87; Chernigov, 86; Taurida, 73;
[163] Kherson, 61. The average increase in population is higher than in any other province in European Russia; consequently, though many peasants have become, during the last twenty-five years, workmen in the newly started industries, the general number of agricultural peasants remains unchanged.

421 *Land Tenure*[1].—While Great Russia is at present
428 a country of communal land-ownership (*mir*), in the
177 Ukraine or Little Russia individual or, strictly speaking, family ownership and communal ownership exist
[556] together (cf. p. 78). The *mir* in Great Russia appears to have been introduced in the sixteenth century, when the Moscow Government established serfdom and imposed heavy taxation, for it was easier to make the whole village responsible for the taxes than the separate families. However, in the north or, properly speaking, Novgorod Russ. the land, as a general rule, belonged to one large family or clan, composed of from two to six houses (the owners of which bore the same name), and called *pyechishche* (large stove). The ownership was hereditary, and hence the land became more and more subdivided, so that families owned more or less according to the number of children. There was no readjustment of the land as in the case of the *mir*. The *pyechishche* of Novgorod was known in Kiev-Russ as *ognishche* (meaning a large fire); and the term *ognishchanin* (meaning a member of the *ognishche*) is found in the Kiev law (*Russkaya*
428 *Pravda*). Connected with that form of tenure is a custom, which even now is found sometimes in the Ukraine, of minorate, according to which the younger

[1] See also p. 77.

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son inherits his father's house, since the elder son has 428
started a new house and received his share during his father's life. If a member of the *ognishche* had not enough land, he migrated.

This old custom of family ownership was the basis 421
of the Cossack communities, which differed from the 177
mir in that, as the Cossacks gave little attention to 525
cultivation and paid no taxes, the re-allotment of their lands was not necessary, though in theory every Cossack had the same right to the land. However, towards the end of the seventeenth century, the 'elders' of the Cossacks began to appropriate more land than the commoners. After Russia had subdued the Ukraine, the commoners were turned into peasants (in 1763 and 1783), and the 'elders' were given titles of nobility in 1785. After the final introduction of serfdom into the Ukraine, the taxes were equally imposed, and therefore communal ownership on the Moscow lines was introduced, though it never had such success as in Great Russia. Remnants of *ognishches* still exist in the Governments of Chernigov and Poltava, whither it was brought by the Ukrainian colonists, though individual ownership is now predominant. In some cases, though each house owns some land privately, there are other lands, meadows, and fishing rights which belong to all the village community, and are re-allotted from time to time.

In the Ukraine, as it was immediately before the 421
war, all the land was divided into individual and communal property. The individual property consisted of (1) State lands, (2) Imperial family appanages, (3) Church and monastery lands, (4) town lands, (5) nobles' lands, and (6) lands belonging to others than nobles. The communal property was held by the peasant and village communities. Individual ownership prevails in the Governments of Yekaterinoslav (50·4 per cent. in 1905), Kherson (51·5 per cent.), Taurida (52·6 per cent.). Then come the Governments of the south-west, Volhynia (48·9 per cent.), Kiev (45·2 per cent.), Podolia (44·4 per cent.). The eastern

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421 Governments have the smallest percentage of private ownership. Thus, in Kharkov, which contains the greatest number of Great Russians, only 35·8 per cent. of land is privately owned, and in Chernigov 41·7 per cent. The Poltava Government forms an exception; and, as it is a Government in which the Ukrainian population forms between 93 and 95 per cent., it is worth noticing that individual property still forms 45·1 per cent., even though the Stolypin reforms tended to give every facility for the introduction of communal ownership. But, though the Taurida, Kherson, and Yekaterinoslav Governments have the highest percentage of land individually owned, it is owned mostly by the nobles, especially in Yekaterinoslav (67·2 per cent.) and Kherson (63 per cent.), and less by the peasants (Yekaterinoslav, 23·7 per cent., and Kherson, 13·8 per cent.).

Taking into account both the individual and the communal land of the peasants, we find that only in the Governments of Kharkov (59 per cent.), Chernigov (53 per cent.), and Poltava (52 per cent.) do the peasants own above half of the arable land. In Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev, they own between 40 and 48 per cent.; in Yekaterinoslav, 45 per cent.; while in Taurida and Kherson, where only about half the population is Ukrainian and town life is well developed, the percentage is 37.

The amount of land assigned to each family by the
[671] Emancipation Law of 1861 was between three and eight acres, though sixteen acres are necessary to support a family. Since then the population has increased by 43 per cent., but the land available for peasant owners has only increased by 20 per cent. (in 1910). This fact has compelled the peasants to rent land, and lies at the bottom of all economic unrest. In the Government of Poltava, where the situation is most acute, some 60 per cent. of the peasants own only from one to three *desyatines*[1] of land, and as few as 4 per cent. have more than five *desyatines*. In the Governments

[1] One *desyatine* = 2·7 acres.

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of Volhynia and Podolia conditions are better, and the peasants have larger holdings, though only 16 per cent. own above five *desyatines*; in Kharkov, 33 per cent. own above five *desyatines*. In no place do the Ukrainian peasants equal in land-ownership the German and Czech colonists. The average holding among the German colonists is from 10 to 12 *desyatines*, and they specialize in cattle-breeding. The Czechs are concentrated in south-western Volhynia (in the districts of Dubno, Rovno, and Lutsk); and their average holding is 13 *desyatines*. The peasants' holdings are in a striking contrast to the big estates. In the Kiev Government there are some 43 estates of above 5,000 *desyatines* each, mostly owned by the nobles (some of them descendants of the old independent dukes, *knaz*) of Russian, Polish, or German nationality. 421

About 10 per cent. of the inhabitants of the Governments of Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, Taurida, Kiev, and Chernigov are occupied in industries other than agricultural. Trade occupies between 6 and 7 per cent. of the population in the Governments of Kherson, Kiev, Podolia, and Taurida. 162

General Observations

Ukrainian Nationalism.—The feeling of nationality, as it exists to-day, dates from Chmielnicki's rising in 1648. The old history of Kiev-Russ is common to Great Russians, White Russians, and the Ukrainians (Little Russians), and has been continued after the Tatar invasions chiefly in Great Russia, while the Ukraine ever since has been subject to one of her neighbours. Since Chmielnicki's time, the Ukrainian nationality has made progress only in one direction, i.e. in producing a small but energetic *intelligentsia*, which does not consider itself Russian or Polish in addition to being Ukrainian, though it is obliged to seek its higher education in Russia, Poland, and other foreign countries. The national feeling of this class is 136 565

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186 different from that of the bulk of the peasants, whose
565 local differences in dialects and customs are sufficiently great to obscure the idea of national unity understood by the *intelligentsia*. Not only has the Dnieper peasant no conception of a Ruthenian in Eastern Galicia, but he knows very little more about the Don or Kuban Ukrainian. But all these peasants, now as in the time of Chmielnicki, are conscious of their social and economic disabilities, and also of the fact that all the business and management of the country is in the hands of rich and educated foreigners.

Hence, the so-called feeling of nationality of the Ukrainian peasant is based on social unrest; and nationalist enthusiasm was aroused on that ground by the Rada and the Soviets of 1917, as it had been by Chmielnicki 250 years before. As soon as Chmielnicki's rising became political rather than social in aim, it failed, and even its foreign supporters did not save it. The same can be said about the nationalist movement of the Rada Directory of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia*. It went down before the Soviets because it was too political, while the Soviets are more intent upon social conditions.

The military strength of the Ukrainian nationalists is less now than it was in the time of Chmielnicki, since the strong military class of original Cossacks on which Chmielnicki relied either disappeared through successful Russian repressions or else amalgamated with the present Cossack community of the Don and the Kuban, which is only partly Ukrainian and has different political and social predilections. On the other hand, the rivalry between Russia, Austria, and the Poles, and the respective propaganda of the three rivals, have created among the *intelligentsia* of the Ukraine a feeling of self-confidence and a political programme that surpass Chmielnicki's and Mazeppa's dreams. In the struggle between Nationalist and Socialist interests, the bulk of the population has in the last three years given precedence to the latter; and it is still uncertain whether the peasants will care to support the

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ideals of the *intelligentsia*, if the latter cannot provide them with the economic advantages to which they aspire. 186 565

The *Ukrainian territory* claimed by the propagandist literature, i. e. from San to Don, never formed a political unit, either independently or under the sway of any empire. It is a well-defined geographical unit with most favourable economic conditions, but the people living in these lands do not form a homogeneous nation of one linguistic, social, and cultural type. The essentially Ukrainian country lies on both sides of the Dnieper. In the Don and Kuban regions, the Ukrainian colonists were preceded by the Great-Russian colonists, in Eastern Galicia by the Poles. But it is true that during the time of the greatest Russian oppression Eastern Galicia played the part of Piedmont for the *intelligentsia* from the Russian Ukraine. The nine [illegible] Governments grouped by the Russian Administration into (1) South-west Territory (Podolia, Volhynia, and Kiev), (2) Malorossiya (Chernigov, Poltava, and Kharkov), and (3) Novorossiya (only Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav out of the five Governments of Novorossiya), have a population which is preponderantly Ukrainian in the rural districts; in the towns the Ukrainians are outnumbered by Jews, Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans, Italians, &c.

It is remarkable how small a part is played by the *intelligentsia* in industry and trade, in the Church, and in legal and educational institutions. All Ukrainians are agriculturists, but in most cases they are merely labourers, not concerned with the management of agricultural industries. Since 1905, however, the co-operative societies have brought to the Ukrainian peasant the social education which the *mir* gave to the Great-Russian peasant in the two last centuries. The claim, therefore, that these nine Governments are Ukrainian means that people speaking various Ukrainian dialects and having similar customs inhabit them, though, so far, they have not managed it politically, socially, or culturally, and are hardly likely to do 184 565

565 so efficiently without the help of educated foreigners
184 for some generations to come.

The Ukraine and Great Russia.—The future of the Ukraine affects Great Russia in the first instance. If the Ukraine is permanently severed from Great Russia, the latter will have to limit itself to the 'Moscow-Siberian' Empire, for it is hardly likely that any other native states formed within the limits of the former Russian Empire (Azerbaijan, Esthonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, the North Caucasian Republic, White Russia) would then belong to her. There seems to be a similarity between these states and the Ukraine, in that they all refuse to recognize Russian suzerainty, though they may possibly join Russia as states with equal rights. The Ukraine is the largest and richest of these states, so that she might play a determining part in their negotiation with Great Russia if she produces the necessary statesman. On the other hand, small as these other states are, they are more homogeneous ethnically and more advanced culturally than the Ukraine, and are able, with the exception of White Russia, to carry on political and economic affairs by themselves.

The Ukraine and Poland.—Poland and the Ukraine are neighbours who supplement each other in the economic sphere; and Poland has many men of education and enterprise. But good relations depend largely on the issue of the political conflict within the Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists claim Galicia as far as the River San, while the Poles, especially the Galician Poles, claim it all for Poland. The ethnic boundary is roughly along the River Bug. In the Eastern Galician problem lies the most serious danger of quarrel.

563 The next interest of Poland is in her minorities in Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev. They consist of noble landowners or professionals in the towns, some of them men whose families have lived there for the last four or five centuries. The reverse is the case of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. The Polish minorities in the Russian Ukraine are much smaller, but in

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education and social standard they have a more important position. The satisfaction of the claims of the Polish 'historic minority' will depend on the form of the future Government in the Ukraine, and is bound up with similar claims on the part of the Great-Russians and other nationalities. 563

The Ukraine and Rumania.—The Ruthenians of the Bukovina and of Northern Hungary are more closely related to the Eastern Galicians than to the Russian Ukrainians. Though their number does not reach much more than a quarter of a million, the Ukrainian propagandists have, from 1914 onwards, claimed the Bukovina and also parts of Northern Hungary. Their claims conflict here with those of the Rumanians. The desire of Rumania and Poland to have a common frontier is thus opposed both by Galician Ukrainians and by Russian Ukrainian nationalists. 100

The Ukraine and the Jews.—Though hating the Jews, the Ukrainian nationalists need them economically as people of superior financial capacity and economic education. As there is no class of Ukrainians which could rival the Jews in these respects (though other countries with large Jewish minorities, e. g. Poland and Rumania, have evolved such a class in the last fifty years), the Ukrainians have so far given in to the the Jewish demands[1] for racial autonomy. 563

[1] After the Congress of the Representatives of the peoples of former Russia (September 27–30, 1917, at Kiev), the Rada issued on January 9, 1918, a 'Law concerning National Personal Autonomy', in virtue of which Great-Russians and Poles and Jews have been offered such autonomies. Skoropadski suppressed it, but the Directory revived it in December 1918.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

000 In general the internal means of communication in the Ukraine are in a defective and backward state. They all require heavy expenditure and extensive works to bring them up to a standard approaching that of Western Europe.

(a) *Roads*

491 The Ministry of the Interior groups the roads under three heads: (1) metalled roads, (2) roads paved throughout their length, and (3) non-paved or soil [653] roads. The metalled roads are constructed and kept up by the State. There are 2,254 miles of first-class road in the Ukraine, of which 923 miles are in the Government of Yekaterinoslav.

The principal lines of first-class roads are as follows:

From Kiev *via* Jitomir, Rovno, and Lutsk to Kovel, 260 miles. This road continues to Brest-Litovsk. There are branch roads from Rovno and Lutsk to Dubno, each about 30 miles in length, and from Dubno a road leads to Krzemenietz, some 20 miles distant.

From Kamenets Podolsk in a northerly direction to Proskurov and Staro-Konstantinov.

From Kiev in a northerly direction to Chernigov, thence to Mohilev and Vitebsk. The length from Kiev to the boundary of the Government of Chernigov is 150 miles.

From Kharkov northwards towards Kursk and Moscow. Thirty miles of this road are in the Government of Kharkov.

The remaining lengths of metalled road are mostly

in the Government of Yekaterinoslav in the Donets 491
coal and iron region.

The second-class roads, described as 'paved throughout', have a mileage of 953. They are under the care of the *zemstvos*, but the expenditure bestowed upon them is small.

The third class of roads, described as 'soil' roads, has by far the greatest mileage, their length being 54,148 miles. In no country of western Europe would they be classed as roads, being merely tracks from point to point, worn by the traffic of the district. They are under the care of the *mirs*, or communes, whose budgets admit of the expenditure of very small sums on their upkeep.

As other means of communication are also few and 491
unsatisfactory, the lack of good roads would be a fatal 489
drawback to any development of the country, were it not for the fact that during three or four months of the year traffic by sledge is almost everywhere possible without special regard to the existence of a road or even a track. As during this period agricultural operations are suspended, an opportunity is afforded of transporting a vast quantity of goods.

(*b*) *Rivers and Canals*

The rivers of the Ukraine include the middle and 487
lower courses of two large rivers, the Dnieper and the [133]
Dniester. Both are navigable for long distances, and should be of great importance as means of communication. Each, however, suffers from a serious natural defect which much curtails its usefulness, and to remedy which no adequate measures have been taken.

For purposes of navigation the river *Dnieper* falls into two sections known as 'above the rapids' and 'below the rapids'. Between Yekaterinoslav and Alexandrovsk are ten rapids, which are very dangerous and completely prevent navigation. Timber rafts are floated down, but the occupation of steering them is considered most hazardous and is entrusted to local pilots specially trained. Some attempt at improving

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487 the channel was made early in the nineteenth century, but proved abortive. Proposals to canalize this section
487 have so far had no result. From Loev to Yekateri-
505 noslav, above the rapids, there is passenger traffic, some goods traffic, and a vast traffic in rafted timber. Though some of the timber is floated down the rapids to Kherson, most is brought ashore at Yekaterinoslav, which receives annually some 160,000 tons of building timber, besides other classes of wood. Below the rapids the river is navigable from Alexandrovsk to the mouth.

487 Some of the tributaries of the Dnieper are navigable for some distance from their junction with the main stream—the Pripet (Pripyat) for a short stretch; the Desna, which joins the Dnieper at Kiev, as far as the boundary of the Ukraine near Novgorod Sjeversk; the Psiol to a point west of Poltava; the Ingulets for about 25 miles.

501 The vessels employed in the Dnieper basin are of
487 small tonnage (maximum about 300 tons), and the steamers are almost all either for passenger traffic or for towing the barges in which goods traffic is mainly carried. The maximum loaded depth below the rapids is 12 ft. 10 in.; above the rapids it is considerably less.

The *Dniester* is navigable for the whole of its length in the Ukraine from the Galician frontier to the mouth at Akkerman. There are many dangerous rapids, and the vessels used on the river are small, with a maximum draught of 3 ft. 9 in. The lagoon at the river mouth is so shallow that most vessels discharge at Varnitsa near Bender for carriage by rail to Odessa.

The *Southern Bug* is navigable from Vosnesensk to the mouth at Nikolaev. There is passenger traffic, and the size and draught of vessels is the same as on the Dnieper, below the rapids.

There is some navigation on the river *Styr* in Volhynia from Lutsk to Borobaza, also on the *Western Bug* from the Galician frontier to the point where it leaves the Ukraine, but in both cases only for rafts and vessels of very light draught.

The navigable length of the principal rivers is as follows: 487

	For Shipping. Miles.	For Rafting only. Miles.
Dnieper . .	1,250	136
Desna . .	537	166
Dniester . .	521	35

All the above-mentioned waterways suffer in common from four serious defects. (1) They are frozen for a considerable period of the year. In the basin of the Dnieper traffic was only possible in the first ten years of this century for an average of 230 days above the rapids and 250 below. Other rivers are in a similar case. (2) The volume of water falls rapidly in summer, and in dry seasons lack of water impedes navigation seriously. (3) Wholesale cutting down of the forests on the banks has led to alteration of the beds of the rivers and the splitting up of the channels. (4) Works for the improvement of navigation scarcely exist, not even the most urgent having been undertaken. 487 502

The principal cargoes carried are breadstuffs, wood, and coal. Cereals are embarked in great quantities on the lower Dnieper and Southern Bug for shipment abroad from Kherson and Nikolaev. The upper Dnieper and the Dniester carry timber. 505 439

Navigable canals do not exist in the Ukraine. Should the scheme for a Dvina-Dnieper canal materialize, it would have a noticeable commercial effect upon the towns of Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Alexandrovsk, and Kherson. 503

(c) *Railways*

Railway System.—There are in the Ukraine three great railway centres, viz. Kiev, Kharkov, and Yekaterinoslav. 496

1. From Kiev a line runs in a westerly direction to Sarny and Kovel, continuing thence to Choĭm and Warsaw.

A second line goes in a north-easterly direction to Bakhmach, thence *via* Kursk and Orel to Moscow.

496 From Bakhmach an alternative line runs *via* Bryansk to Moscow.

In a south-south-east direction a third line goes to Yelisavetgrad, Nikolaev, and Kherson.

A fourth line runs eastward to Poltava and Kharkov.

Lastly, a line in a south-west direction goes to Vinnitsa, whence a line runs westward to Proskurov and Kamenets Podolsk (with two short branches to the Galician frontier), and another line runs southward to Odessa.

2. From Kharkov a line runs northward to Byelgorod, Kursk, Orel, and Moscow.

Another goes in a south-east direction to the Donets coal and iron region, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-Don, and the Azov ports.

A third line goes east and north-east *via* Kupyansk to Voronezh and Tambov.

A fourth goes southward to Pavlograd and Yekaterinoslav.

3. From Yekaterinoslav a line runs in a north-west direction to Alexandria, Byelaya Tserkov, Fastov, and Kiev.

A line to the Donets coal and iron region goes eastward, with branches to the Azov ports, Berdyansk, Mariupol, and Taganrog.

Another line runs south to Alexandrovsk, Melitopol, and the Crimea.

None of the three great railway centres, however, is touched by a long new line which runs from Bakhmach in the Government of Chernigov, *via* Piryatin, Cherkassi, and Vosnesensk, to Odessa, thus giving to a badly-served district an outlet for its share of the cereal export trade.

A network of short lines serves the Donets coal region and the Krivoy-Rog iron region, with connexions to Yekaterinoslav and the ports.

471 *Finance; Relations to Government.*—Five separate concerns are interested in the Ukraine railways—the South-Western Railway, the Southern Railway, the Yekaterininsky Railway, the Moscow–Kiev–Voronezh

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Railway, and the South-Eastern Railway. The first three belong to the State, and almost the whole of their mileage is in the Ukraine; the other two are privately owned, and some portion of their mileage is outside the Ukraine boundaries. 471 496

It is not possible to procure figures for the working of that proportion which is inside the limits of the Ukraine, and the figures for 1912, given below, are for the entire systems:

	Length of line. Miles.	*Gross receipts. Million roubles.*	*Nett receipts. Million roubles.*	*Weight carried. Million tons.*
South-Western Railway	2,604	73	30·4	15
Southern Railway	2,042	66	30·5	22
Yekaterininsky Railway	1,871	60	26·9	26
Moscow–Kiev–Voronezh Railway	1,652	37	16·2	10
South-Eastern Railway	2,168	55	24·6	11
Total	10,337	291	128·6	84

The Yekaterininsky line was constructed by the State; the Southern and South-Western lines were recently purchased from private owners.

The Moscow–Kiev–Voronezh Railway is a private concern with a share capital of £1,500,000. Debentures to the value of £35,000,000 have been issued at 4–4½ per cent. at different periods. The State has power to take over the line at any time on a basis agreed upon in the original concession. There is a State guarantee on the loan capital.

The South-Eastern Railway has only a portion of its line in the Ukraine, mainly in or near the Donets region. The share capital is about £3,000,000. Debentures and other loan capital amount to about £18,800,000. The State has power to purchase the line at short notice on terms fixed in the original concession. There is no State guarantee on the capital or loans. A number of lines in the Donets region,

496 formerly belonging to the South-Eastern Railway,
471 have been recently acquired by the State.

The money markets of Paris, London, and Amsterdam appear to be those principally interested in the loans of these railways; the financial circles of Berlin and Vienna are concerned in a lesser degree.

655 Up to the year 1889 railway rates in Russia were in
497 a state of chaos. The Government then took the matter in hand, and during the years 1893–4 inaugurated a system which, with modifications, has remained in use. The zone method is applied to both goods and passengers, with a diminishing rate for each additional zone entered by the traffic. Cereal rates received special consideration, and differential tariffs exist for the carriage to Black Sea and Azov ports of cereals destined for export. Preferential rates are also granted on coal, iron and manganese intended for export.

496 *Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Expansion.*—Taken as a whole, the railways of the Ukraine are not adequate to the needs of the country. In the Donets region railway extension by private enterprise has kept fairly level with industrial needs, and new projects were recently being actively promoted. In the agricultural portion of the country, however, the lack of railways is a serious handicap to all kinds of industry. The greater portion of the mileage is single line, and the rolling stock is of poor capacity and not kept in good repair.

499 A number of lines are under construction in the Donets basin to link up existing ones or to serve new mines recently opened, and a new line is being constructed to connect Yekaterinoslav with Kherson and Nikolaev by a direct route.

000 A projected line is the Podolian Railway, which would run from Shepetovka to Kamenets Podolsk, a distance of 149 miles. By another project a railway running due north from Jitomir *via* Mosir and Mohilev to Vitebsk would give a direct main line between Petrograd and Odessa, which does not at present exist, a detour *via* Kiev being necessary.

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The construction of light railways in agricultural districts would be of great benefit to the country, but no steps have as yet been taken towards this end.

(*d*) *Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones*

In organization the Russian postal system much resembles that of other European countries, but in extent it is considerably below the average standard. Rural districts are poorly served, although a special effort to improve their facilities has recently been made. Russia is a member of the Universal Postal Union.

Owing to delay and loss of ordinary correspondence, an immense quantity is sent by registered post, especially commercial correspondence, but also newspapers and periodicals.

Parcel post and the sending of goods 'cash on delivery' are in working, but the regulations as to packing, &c., are minute and very vexatious, though necessary to prevent theft in transit.

The facilities for transmitting money through the post are freely made use of, particularly by peasants working at a distance from their homes. In 1910 there were over 40,000,000 dispatches of this kind, their total value being upwards of £200,000,000.

Telegraphs.—Of the total length of telegraph wire for public use in Russia, more than one-third is owned by the private railway companies, the remainder by the postal department. Charges are low, but the service is moderate. Much use is made of 'urgent' telegrams at triple rates to ensure prompt and correct delivery.

Telephones.—The telephone system is fairly well developed in towns in the Ukraine. Private enterprise first entered the field, a company worked by the Bell Telephone Syndicate obtaining a concession for an installation at Odessa in 1895. Shortly afterwards the State established systems at Kiev, Kharkov, and other towns. Still later the *zemstvos* in certain districts interested themselves, and many systems

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206 471 have been opened and worked under their auspices and control. The most notable development has been in the districts of Bakhmut (Government of Yekaterinoslav), Lebedyenski (Kharkov), and Lokhivitski (Poltava). Mariupol and district has communication with Bakhmut and other places on the Donets coalfield. Otherwise trunk communication is confined to a line connecting Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson.

The instruments of private telephone installations are usually of the Bell Co.'s make. The State and the *zemstvos* have generally installed instruments made by Ericsson, Stockholm.

(2) External

(a) *Ports*

504 *Accommodation.*—The Ukraine is not lacking in good natural ports on the Black Sea: Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson are capable of handling great quantities of traffic. On the Azov Sea, Berdyansk and Mariupol share the trade, but in their case purely artificial harbours have had to be constructed at great expense, as the coast has no natural harbour.

There are no tides, any variations of depth of water being caused by wind of great force or long persistence from one quarter.

Odessa is the most frequented port of the Russian Black Sea coast. There is a good depth of water in the bay, but it is much exposed to the two most dangerous winds which blow on the coast, viz. the south and the south-east. The outer harbour is formed by a mole known as the eastern mole, which has a curve to the eastward, and a detached breakwater 1,400 yds. in length parallel with the shore. The eastern entrance has 24–30 ft. of water, and the western 17 ft., and both have an entrance width of 300 yds. This outer harbour is safe from all winds, and gives commodious anchorage.

The inner harbour is formed by five moles which divide it into four parts. The two western moles

form the Imperial or Pratique port, the two eastern 504
moles the Quarantine port, the intervening spaces forming the New and Middle harbours. Three-quarters of a mile to the northward is the Petroleum harbour, sheltered by a long mole. Vessels can load up to 26 ft. in the New harbour, up to 21 ft. in the Middle harbour, and up to 24 ft. in the Petroleum harbour.

There is quayage of 4,550 ft. in length in the Pratique harbour, 3,245 ft. in the New harbour, 4,550 ft. in the Quarantine harbour, and 900 ft. in the Petroleum harbour. There is adequate crane-power and railway accommodation alongside the quays, with extensive warehouses and two large grain elevators. There are two floating cranes, each of 25 tons capacity. The port has a floating dry-dock, 381 ft. long, 63 ft. wide, and 19 ft. 6 in. in depth, with a lifting capacity of 4,800 tons. There are two patent slips for small vessels and a repair yard for light repairs.

Many improvements have been projected, including an additional breakwater for the outer harbour and longer quayage in the Middle and Petroleum harbours.

Nikolaev is a river-port situated on the east[illegible] bank of the Southern Bug. There is a depth of 25 ft. in the river channel up to the town. The granite quay of the commercial harbour is 3,850 ft. in length, and has 26 ft. of water alongside. There are two grain elevators and a good number of cranes. The Cabotage harbour is dredged to a depth of 17 ft.; it is only used by coasters or vessels wintering in the port. A petroleum pier, 900 ft. long, with reservoirs adjacent, is situated above the town.

A new commercial quay, 2,400 ft. in length, was almost completed in 1914. Another, 1,650 ft. in length, was then in construction, but progress on it was reported to be slow.

The naval port and arsenal are situated on the [704]
northern side of the town on the banks of the River Ingul. There is a depth of 25 ft. in the naval port. The heaviest marine repairs can be undertaken.

Kherson is situated on the Dnieper, some 15 miles

504 from its mouth. There are two entrances from the sea, the Rvach and Zbarev channels, the former being 22 ft. deep, the latter only 10 ft. There are three loading berths at a quay, respectively 420, 125, and 425 ft. long, but vessels mostly load in the stream from lighters by means of floating cranes, of which there are 22, or by using their own winches. Vessels are allowed to load up to 23 ft. owing to a recent improvement in the channel. A new quay to accommodate 18 steamers is under construction.

Berdyansk roads are protected by a long semi-circular sand-spit from all winds except the south-west. There is 14–16 ft. of water in the roads. The harbour is protected from all winds by a breakwater 700 yds. in length, parallel with and half a mile distant from the shore line in front of the town. A dredged channel, 1½ miles in length and 10½ ft. deep, leads up to the western end of the breakwater. Quay space is at present deficient, but a first-class port is projected and partially under construction. The harbour is being dredged to increase its general depth to 20 ft.

Mariupol harbour consists of an area on the open foreshore enclosed by two moles. The entrance channel is dredged to a depth of 24 ft., and the depth in the anchorage inside the moles is 22–26 ft. Within the harbour, 440 yds. from the shore line and parallel with it, is a breakwater 500 yds. long. The inner harbour inside this breakwater is reserved for vessels loading coal Against the quays, where rails run alongside, there is a minimum depth of 12 ft. and a maximum of 24 ft. There are two hydraulic elevators for loading coal, but much coal and all grain is loaded by hand, and mechanical appliances are greatly needed. Mariupol is considered a harbour of first-class importance, and extensive improvements of all kinds are projected.

505 431 *Nature and Volume of Trade.*—Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson export cereals and other agricultural products; Nikolaev also exports great quantities of iron-ore and Kherson timber. Many vessels arrive in ballast

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to carry these goods. The imports consist of machinery, manufactured goods, colonial and tropical products, and chemicals; Odessa also imports coal from the Donets region, which is shipped at Mariupol or Taganrog. 505 439 [438]

The export trade of Berdyansk is chiefly coal, iron-ore, and grain. Mariupol principally exports Donets coal. The imports of both places are general, but a large proportion consists of chemicals and particular minerals required in the iron and steel industry in the Government of Yekaterinoslav.

The number and tonnage of the vessels entering the above-mentioned ports in 1910, and the amounts of the exports and imports, are shown in the following table:

	Total vessels entered.	*Tonnage.*	*British vessels entered.*	*Tonnage.*	*Imports (tons).*	*Exports (tons).*
Odessa	848	1,596,217	174	388,136	566,743	1,736,029
Nikolaev	544	1,126,441	315	676,834	178,790	2,070,419
Kherson	152	330,260	131	288,789	104,693	844,919
Berdyansk	180	269,365	38	65,492	28,693	416,451
Mariupol	231	394,451	67	119,242	266,693	1,587,161
				Total	1,145,612	6,654,979

The respective values of the exports and imports are more difficult to ascertain, but the difference in value is certainly not so great as that in weight. For some years before the war, the value of the exports of the whole of Russia exceeded that of her imports by about 40 per cent., and the proportion for the Ukraine ports is probably about the same.

Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Development.—The Ukraine Black Sea ports would appear, on the whole, to be equal to the demands put upon them; in fact, there is severe competition between Odessa and Nikolaev. The recent improvements at Nikolaev have inspired the Odessa authorities to apply for powers to carry out great extensions, but so far these have not been granted, as the central authorities held that there was no prospect of a good return on the capital that would be required. 504 155

504 The port of Kherson is handicapped by the expense and difficulty of keeping open a good channel from the mouth of the Dnieper to the town.

The two Azov ports are in a somewhat congested state, and need additional quay space, loading appliances, and powerful ice-breakers. Their importance for the export of coal and iron-ore as well as of grain is recognized, and it is understood that large sums would be forthcoming to effect improvements.

Two other ports in the Ukraine which are very suitable for development are Ochakov, on the north bank of the Dnieper–Bug estuary, and Shadovsk, which is situated in a land-locked bight a few miles west of the isthmus of Perekop. At present neither is touched by any railway, and they offer no facilities to shipping; but they are so favourably situated that their development at reasonable cost would probably be more beneficial to the Ukraine than expensive improvements at Odessa and Kherson.

(*b*) *Shipping Lines*

505 Before the war Odessa was visited by regular lines of steamers with passenger services, and the other ports by 'tramps' exclusively.

There are several Russian-owned lines. The Russian Volunteer Fleet Association, a subsidized undertaking, made regular voyages between Odessa and Vladivostok with a view to developing trade between Russia and her possessions on the Pacific. This line, which has a fleet of 70 vessels, with a tonnage of about 150,000, is not a commercial success.

The Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Co. provided passenger services in the Black and Azov Seas, and had other lines to Mediterranean ports. Its fleet consisted of 65 vessels, with a tonnage of 150,000.

The Russian Transport and Insurance Co. had a fleet of ten vessels, mostly tramps, with a tonnage of 12,000.

Peter Regier & Son had nine tramp steamers, of a total tonnage of 22,000.

The Russian Danube Steam Navigation Co. traded from Odessa to Danube river ports. It had a fleet of eleven vessels, with a tonnage of 9,000. 505

The following foreign lines had regular sailings to Odessa: Thos. Wilson, Sons & Co., thrice weekly, from Hull; J. R. Ellerman, Ltd., fortnightly, from Liverpool; James Moss & Co., every four weeks, from Liverpool; the Messageries Maritimes, fortnightly, from Marseilles; and the Deutsche Levante Linie, monthly, from Genoa.

Tramp steamers of many nationalities are attracted in great numbers to Ukraine ports in the autumn for the shipment of the cereal crop, and there is seldom any lack of cargo space.

The foreign lines with regular services appear capable of meeting the normal demand on their cargo space. The Russian lines require Government support, as shipping under the Russian flag is not as a rule commercially successful.

(c) *Telegraphic Communication*

Telegraphic communication with foreign countries is dependent mainly on cable lines not situated in the Ukraine, which has only one cable, from Odessa to Constantinople, the joint property of the Indo-European Telegraph Co. and the Eastern Telegraph Co. Telegrams for the East are sent *via* the Kertch station of the Indo-European Telegraph Co.; those for northern Europe or America, *via* Petrograd and thence by various cable lines.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(a) *Supply of Labour; Emigration and Immigration*

The line of cleavage between agricultural and other labour is not so sharp in the Ukraine as in most other communities. The claims of agriculture are the greater by far, but the increase in the number of landless peasants who find it difficult to live in the country

464 districts through the long winter has led to the crea-
[166] tion of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the
[563] country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel,
[511] Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful,
221 but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any
511 branch of industry. The State makes no effort to
565 regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

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this class are often compelled to accept badly-paid 466
work in the towns, and both men and women have 511
often to make long and laborious journeys on foot in 565
search of employment.

A large class engaged in domestic industries, whether as masters or as servants, make a very poor living, frequently working very long hours under bad sanitary conditions.

In the coal and iron industries there are some concerns, 466
particularly those capitalized from abroad, which look well after their work-people, provide housing, secure good supplies of provisions at moderate prices, and take other measures to ameliorate labour conditions. In consequence, however, of works and mines being often situated on land rented on short-term leases, many employers cannot afford to lay out money on such objects, and conditions for labour are generally bad. So difficult is it to attract labour, that mine-owners have sometimes sought to secure convict labour from the Government.

The peculiar characteristic of labour in the Ukraine 166
is its mobility, which often occasions unexpected 464
crises. Superstition, epidemics of disease, and more obscure causes lead to vast movements of labourers from a district at very short notice.

The *artels*, which are labour organizations peculiar to 467
Russia, have an important influence on the supply and quality of certain labour. An *artel* is an association of workers, the general principles of which are: (1) all members must be actual workers; (2) all have equal rights in the organization; and (3) every member is responsible for the obligations contracted by the *artel*. The organization is usually non-capitalistic or has a very small capital.

In general there are two classes of *artels*, those of workers in producing trades and those of workers who provide service. The former are engaged in carpentering, cabinet-making, printing, linen-weaving, dairy-work, fishing, &c. The second group comprises stevedores, packers, customs agents, bank porters, com-

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467 missionaires, dock and wharf labourers, outdoor servants, &c. The members of *artels* in the second group always receive employment in preference to other workers, as their trustworthiness is guaranteed by the *artel*, and the fact of their membership is some guarantee that they are efficient.

The *artels* are democratic and useful institutions, and, in a country where promptness and trustworthiness are somewhat rare qualities, they play a most valuable part in giving a measure of confidence and security to both employers and workmen.

(2) Agriculture

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

243 The agricultural industry is the largest in the Ukraine, and employs the great majority of the [134] population. The black-soil region extends over most of the area, only the Governments of Kiev, Podolia, and Chernigov, and the borders of the Black Sea, lying [433] outside it. It follows that the suitability of the Ukraine [439] for cereals is equal to that of any part of the world, and its surplus crops form a considerable proportion of the world's food-supply.

243 The mean area under cultivation in the period 1901–5 433 was 52,000,000 acres, producing 20,700,000 tons annually. Of this total, 45,600,000 acres were under breadstuff crops, and produced 15,000,000 tons. For the year 1914, the figures were 56,300,000 acres, producing 23,000,000 tons. Of this 50,400,000 acres were under breadstuff crops, with a return of 15,900,000 tons.

243 *Rye* is the principal crop, and is produced on the 439 peasants' lands more largely than any other cereal. It is the staple breadstuff of the country, and the internal consumption absorbs a large part of the crop, a minor quantity only being exported. In some years the crop is not sufficient for the home demand, and the peasants have to use imported flour or substitutes.

Wheat is next in importance, and provides the largest surplus for export. It is mainly grown on

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privately-owned lands. The failure or success of the 243
Ukraine wheat harvest has its effect upon the corn 439
exchanges of the whole world, and its shipment from the Black Sea is the occasion of much anxiety and speculation every season.

Barley is largely grown and exported, being principally raised on privately-owned land. *Maize* comes next in value; the greater part of the crop is consumed locally, but a moderate quantity is exported in good years. The *oat* crop is valuable, and a proportion remains for export after the supply of local needs. *Millet* and *buckwheat* are grown for local use.

Of the non-cereal crops, *potatoes* take the first 244
place, exceeding all others by a large margin. They 437
are used not only for food and the manufacture of potato flour, but for the distillation of spirits, a flourishing industry in many districts. Small crops of *peas*, *beans*, and *lentils* are also grown.

The *sugar-beet* is raised in great quantities, especially in the governments which have not the black soil. Kiev produces most, Podolia and Kharkov come next; the remaining Governments have only small crops, and Taurida and Yekaterinoslav none. There is usually a large surplus of refined sugar for export, in addition to a valuable internal trade in sugar and manufactures thereof; the by-products of cattle food and spirit distilled from molasses increase the value of this crop.

Tobacco used to be widely cultivated except in the 247
black-soil zone, but its cultivation is steadily decreasing everywhere. It still remains important in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. Only the coarsest qualities are raised, the leaf being known as *makhorka* and used solely by peasants and labourers.

Volhynia grows a large quantity of *hops*, about half the total yield of all Russia. The product is mostly sold locally, but occasionally a surplus is exported to the Warsaw market.

The *grape vine* is cultivated in Podolia, Kherson, 245
and Yekaterinoslav. The wine produced is of inferior quality, and has only a local market.

Of the crops producing vegetable oils, *linseed* and

249 Of the crops producing vegetable oils, linseed and *sunflower* are the principal. A great deal of sunflower seed is eaten raw by peasants and labourers all over Russia. These two crops are decreasing.

244 *Fruit and vegetables.*—The orchard districts are in the
139 Governments of Podolia, Chernigov, Poltava, and Kiev.
245 Apples, pears, plums, cherries, mulberries, and apricots grow freely, and the surplus goes to northern Russia, great quantities being preserved. Vegetables succeed well in the alluvial soils near the rivers. They are mostly grown by summer immigrants from Bulgaria (cf. p. 72), who use a primitive system of irrigation. The surplus supply all goes to northern Russia.

231 The live-stock of the Ukraine is very numerous, but of late years has tended to decrease.

Horses are much in demand for agricultural work, especially as the use of oxen as draught animals is being gradually abandoned. There is also a strong demand for horses in the coal and iron region for haulage. As a result the stock of horses has considerably increased in six out of the nine Governments, Volhynia, Podolia, and Chernigov alone showing decreases.

Cattle have decreased in numbers in five Governments and increased in four, but the total shows a serious falling off.

236 *Sheep* are divided roughly into two classes, fine-woolled and coarse-woolled, the former producing wool known as 'Spanish', the latter being killed for their skins. There is a general decrease of stock in every province of the Ukraine. The great increase of population and the demand for land, with rising rents, make sheep-farming not sufficiently profitable under present agricultural conditions.

231 The stock of *pigs* is, on the whole, maintained, and even shows a good increase in some Governments.

The *goat* was formerly of importance, and there was a considerable stock in the country, but it has dwindled latterly at a very rapid rate.

235 *Poultry* are kept in considerable numbers, but poultry-farming on modern methods is very rare and of small economic importance.

000 *Apiculture* is common in the northern Ukraine, and

Apiculture is common in the northern Ukraine and 231
vast quantities of honey are produced, but its quality suffers from the prevalent ignorance of scientific methods of bee-keeping, and it does not command a good price.

Disease among domestic animals causes great ravages. 232
Cattle-plague epidemics are of annual occurrence and cause heavy losses, the proportion of fatal cases being very high. The other most prevalent troubles appear to be anthrax, frounce in horses, and pneumo-enteritis amongst swine. The last disease has made great inroads of latter years, a large proportion of cases being fatal. The proportion of live-stock per 100 inhabitants shows decrease under almost every head, a slight increase in horses or pigs in some Governments by no means counterbalancing the all-round continuous shrinkage.

(*b*) *Land Tenure*[1] *and Methods of Cultivation*

As regards tenure, land in the Ukraine falls into 421
three main classes: (1) land owned privately, mainly 471
in large estates, but a small proportion in farm-holdings by successful peasants; (2) land termed *nadyel*, owned almost entirely by peasant communes; and (3) land owned by the Orthodox Church or the Crown, or granted as appanages to members of the Imperial family. The following table shows the total acreage, and the proportion belonging to each of these classes:

		Percentage of		
Government.	*Total area in millions of acres.*	*Private property.*	*Nadyel.*	*Church and Crown land, &c.*
Volhynia	15,484	48·9	39·8	11·3
Podolia	9,873	44·4	48·0	7·6
Chernigov	11,836	41·7	53·1	5·2
Kiev	12,484	45·2	45·6	9·2
Kherson	16,591	51·5	37·3	11·2
Poltava	11,331	45·1	52·3	2·6
Kharkov	12,141	35·8	59·2	5·0
Yekaterinoslav	15,041	50·4	45·4	4·2
Taurida	7,099	52·6	37·2	10·2
Total	111,880	Average 46·2	46·4	

[1] See also p. 50.

421 425 Land tenure in the Ukraine is at present in an unstable state. The principal factors affecting it are two legal enactments, the first being the law of 1861 abolishing serfdom and providing for the ownership of land by peasants, who previously had held none, and the second being the Stolypin law of 1906 modifying the principle of communal ownership in peasant lands. The law of 1861 provided for land to be taken from private estates and handed over to peasants on a deferred purchase system. The land was not assigned to individuals, but to *mirs* (local communes), which divided it up for cultivation. The law also provided for periodical redistributions of this land, which is known always as the *nadyel* or endowment land. At the present time a good deal of *nadyel* land in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov is held by individual peasant owners, but elsewhere it is all owned by communes. A peculiar principle of this system is the mutual responsibility of all members of the commune for its legal and financial obligations, even should a member have forsaken the locality and the practice of agriculture.

425 511 The great defect of the distribution of 1861 is that it is based on the rural population of that date, with no machinery for providing additional land in proportion to the natural increase of population, which has been very rapid. Two evil results have followed. First, at the periodical redistributions of *nadyel* land the amount available per head has steadily decreased. The holdings have therefore tended to become uneconomical, and a consequent impoverishment of the peasants has taken place, with the natural concomitants of arrears of rent and taxes and an increased burden of debt on the land. Secondly, efforts to purchase or rent further land from private proprietors, in order to increase the available *nadyel* land or supply the wants of prosperous peasants who wish to buy new farms, has led to an enormous increase in the price and rent of land, a rise of three times being frequent and a tenfold rise occasional. To

alleviate these conditions various measures have been 425
adopted, such as the easement or complete extinguish- 511
ing of the burden of the purchase-price of the *nadyel*, the prevention of its frequent redistribution, and the founding of the Peasants' Land Bank by the State to facilitate further purchases of land by the communes. Nevertheless, a result not looked for by the framers 565
of the law abolishing serfdom has followed, namely the creation of a large landless agricultural proletariat, which tends to sink in the social scale, to live partly by industry in the towns, and to be migratory in its habits.

The law of 1906 introduced for the first time the 421
general principle of individual and permanent ownership of *nadyel* lands. It aimed at the breaking up of the *mirs* as no longer fulfilling a need, in the expectation that security of tenure by the individual would lead to a more rational and successful system of cultivation. The period since the promulgation of the law is too short to allow of sound conclusions as to its effect.

The *nadyel* lands are almost entirely cultivated 241
on the three-field system, each unit of land being 311
planted one year with a winter-sown grain, the following year with a spring-sown grain, and lying fallow in the third year. This method causes a disastrous impoverishment of the land, especially as in many cases the minimum of manure, whether animal or chemical, is used. An alternative method must be introduced, or the productiveness of the black-soil land under peasant ownership will continue to shrink as heretofore.

The land held by private owners is in general their 425
perpetual freehold, and can be roughly divided into that 563
held by the nobility in large estates and the smaller holdings purchased from them since the abolition of serfdom by prosperous peasants and others desirous of embarking on agriculture on their own account. There are also a number of foreign colonists, chiefly Germans, descendants of those introduced into the country

425 by the Government at various times between the middle of the eighteenth century and 1861, in the hope that their superior methods of agriculture would be copied by other cultivators. This effect, however, was not produced, and the colonists form compact communities with little or no influence on their neighbours. Land in private ownership is usually farmed on more modern [241] and rational principles than the *nadyel* land, and produces almost the entire surplus of cereals which is sent abroad and to other parts of Russia.

421 The land owned by the Church, Crown, and members of the Imperial family is absolute freehold, and is generally well managed and productively farmed.

407 412 Up-to-date agricultural machinery is becoming more common all round. It is of course most in vogue on the large estates, especially in the case of expensive machines involving the use of power; steam-ploughs on the cable system are much in use on the large sugar-beet estates, and tractor ploughs with single engines are becoming numerous. By the help and enterprise of the *zemstvos* the peasants are now beginning to use modern machines and implements. The traditional *sock* or wooden plough, the flail, and other such primitive tools are disappearing, although it is hard to induce the peasant to abandon his old methods.

(c) *Forestry*

137 [311] A large portion of the Ukraine is totally denuded of trees at the present time. The Governments of Podolia and Volhynia, and the northern parts of Kiev and Chernigov, are well wooded, the area covered by forest being about 15 per cent. of the whole. In the remaining provinces the forest area averages 3–4 per cent. of the total. The State controls certain areas north of Kiev on both banks of the Dnieper, and in Volhynia on the south side of the Pripet marshes, as well as smaller scattered tracts in Podolia. In the Government of Yekaterinoslav the State has lately done much

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planting, principally of sand-willows and pines, the main object being to arrest the movement of drift-sand. 137

The principal Ukraine timber trees are oak, maple, elm, ash, willow, aspen, lime, and wych-elm.

The art of forestry would appear to be almost entirely neglected. Systematic replanting of timber is hardly known, and wholesale destruction of woods on the river banks has had disastrous results in the splitting up of the channels. The lime is frequently denuded of its bark to make bast, the tree subsequently perishing as it stands. 313

(3) Fisheries

The fisheries of the Ukraine can be divided into three classes: those of the upper reaches of the rivers, those of the lower reaches and the lagoons at the mouths, and those of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea. 228

In the upper reaches of the principal rivers, fishing can scarcely be called an industry, being carried on by individuals mainly for their personal needs; the stock of fish is everywhere decreasing at a regrettable rate, and much alarm is caused by this depletion.

The fisheries of the lower reaches of the Dnieper, Dniester, and Southern Bug have considerable value. The principal fish taken are sturgeon, of which there are several varieties, carp, bream, fresh-water herring, and sander. The fisheries are the property of the riparian owners, who let them to syndicates. The State owns a considerable stretch on the Bug from Nikolaev to Novaya Odessa. The fishing seasons are from February to April and in the autumn, when the fish revisit the rivers to spawn. At this time they are taken for the roe, from which caviare of various qualities is made. 228 136

In the Black Sea the principal fish are mackerel, anchovy, and flounder. The fishing here is also carried on by syndicates, and is done close to shore with rather primitive appliances. The bulk of the fish is preserved

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228 either by salting, smoking, or sun-curing. Fish-curing
[136] is carried on in factories at Odessa and Ochakov.

The fisheries in the Azov Sea are important, but the principal grounds are not in Ukrainian territory, those which lie within its limits being of insignificant value.

(4) Minerals

(a) *Natural Resources*

135 The principal mineral resources of the Ukraine are coal, iron, and salt.

135 The *coal* is all in one large field usually known as
316 the Donets basin, which extends from west to east for a distance of 300 miles. It is considered the largest coalfield in Europe, but owing to peculiarities of the geological strata it is split up into several areas with varying qualities of coal. Roughly the flame coals are on the western end of the field, the coking and semi-anthracite coals in the centre, and the anthracite in the east, though coking coals are also found towards the north-east corner. Very little pure anthracite is mined on Ukraine territory, as the beds are mainly in the Don Cossack district. Throughout the field the seams vary much in thickness. Some are too thin to be worked. The average thickness of those worked is 21 to 35 in.; seams of 5 ft. are moderately common, and the maximum thickness is 7 ft.

316 The output of coal from the Donets field is variable.
433 This is chiefly due to labour difficulties, which arise in unexpected ways. Nevertheless if the figures of several years are considered together, a great increase is shown, and new pits are being opened every year. The average production for the years 1908 to 1912 was over 14,000,000 tons, the proportion of bituminous coal to anthracite being as 8 to 1. The figures include the whole field, as separate statistics for the portion over the Don Cossack border are not issued.

Iron.—The Ukraine is fortunate in having in close proximity to its coalfield a district rich in iron ore. The deposit, which is of excellent quality and easily worked,

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is near the small town of Krivoy-Rog on the borders of the Governments of Yekaterinoslav and Kherson, between the town of Yekaterinoslav and the port of Nikolaev. This district has produced 95 per cent. of the iron ore mined in European Russia in recent years, and after supplying the needs of the numerous iron-works on the Donets coalfield and dispatching great quantities to other parts of Russia, it exports a large surplus through the ports of Nikolaev and Mariupol. This supply is eagerly taken up, principally by Great Britain and Germany. 316 433 [433]

The Krivoy-Rog iron is a brown non-phosphoric ore, containing about 70 per cent. of pure iron. The output is steadily increasing: the ore mined amounted in 1906 to 3,000,000 tons, and in 1910 exceeded 4,000,000 tons. There have been further increases since.

Deposits of *manganese* ore are found in the Government of Yekaterinoslav at Nikopol on the lower Dnieper, a few miles east of the Krivoy-Rog iron district. Exploitation began in 1886, and has been very successful.

The production, of which 75 per cent. is exported, fluctuates greatly according to the price of manganese abroad, and a maximum output of 300,000 tons in 1907 was succeeded by a fall to one-half this amount in 1909, with a slight recovery in the following years.

Mercury has been exploited since 1879 at Nikitovka, in the Government of Yekaterinoslav. The mineral is found in the coal measures near the surface. After being successfully worked for thirty years, the mines were closed about 1909.

Salt.—The Ukraine has valuable deposits of salt. There is an important mine of rock-salt near Bakhmut in the Government of Yekaterinoslav. Boring has been continued to a depth of 760 ft. without passing through the entire thickness of the salt bed; of this 340 ft. consists of pure salt. 317 433

On the edge of the Kouyalnitski lagoon, north-east of Odessa, there is a salt lake which produces enough

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317 salt for the domestic needs and preserving industries
433 of the neighbourhood.

Brine springs are worked at Bakhmut and at Slavyansk in the Government of Kharkov. The brine is pumped to the surface and the salt evaporated.

The salt production is increasing but slowly, and not in proportion to the needs of the preserving and curing industries of Russia; prices are rising and imports increasing. The average output for the years 1905–9 was 1,326,000 tons of pure salt, which was over 50 per cent. of the production of all Russia.

316 *Building stone.*—Quarrying for limestone is a great industry near Odessa, which is built of the local stone. Granite is quarried on the banks of the larger rivers, and Yekaterinoslav and other towns are largely built of granite, which is also used for harbour works and railway bridges.

317 *Pottery clays.*—Kaolin is found in the Ukraine, the entire output of Russia being produced within its boundaries. Clays of good quality exist in the Governments of Poltava, Kharkov, and Kherson, and supply material for the local domestic industry in earthenware.

(b) *Methods of Extraction*

316 There is nothing new or striking in the methods used for extracting the minerals mentioned; on the contrary, except where foreign capital is interested, they are on the whole not equal to those followed in western Europe and America. The greatest drawback is the low producing power of labour, for which no immediate remedy is to be found. There is room for improved machinery on a large scale, but unless the habits of the people change, the output per head will remain comparatively small.

(5) Manufactures

433 Manufacturing industry plays a relatively small
439 part in the economic life of the Ukraine, the country not producing sufficient for its own wants and import-

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ing both from abroad and from other parts of Russia. 433
The two principal exceptions to this rule are manu- 439
factured food-stuffs, and heavy iron and steel products.

Sixty-eight per cent. of the manufactured products 433
of the country consist of food-stuffs. The industries 252
contributing to this output are various, including flour- 257
milling, sugar-refining, and those dependent wholly or partly upon sugar, such as confectionery, fruit-preserving, distilling from molasses, brewing, and wine-making. Most of the undertakings concerned have only a small capital, and are situated near the source of their raw material. In the neighbourhood of Kiev, however, sugar-refining and its dependent industries are carried on in large works, many of which are capitalized from abroad.

The close conjunction of the Donets coalfield and 327
the iron and manganese deposits has enabled the 433
Ukraine to be almost entirely self-supporting in iron and steel manufactures of the first categories, and to supply the wants of the remainder of Russia as well. Pig-iron, bar-iron, roof-iron, steel rails, axles, tubes, and assorted merchant iron are all made in the iron-works which have been established in increasing numbers on the coal and iron fields. These works are seldom in large centres of population, but as a rule in small towns and villages, some of which owe their existence to the need of housing for the labour employed.

The output of raw iron and steel in the first stage of manufacture under the headings of Bessemer and Thomas bars, Martin-process bars, cast-iron and steel billets, and cast-iron tubes, was in 1906 1,300,000 tons, and in 1910 1,900,000 tons. The output of iron and steel in the second stage of manufacture, under the headings of T and H beams, rails, sheet-iron, rolled wire, roof-iron, trusses, springs, assorted merchant iron and axles, was in 1906 1,010,000 tons, and in 1910 1,602,258 tons. In the former year the output in both stages was equal to about 45 per cent., and in the latter year to about 55 per cent., of the total Russian output.

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433 The development of the industry on a large scale
327 dates from the year 1870, when a British subject named Hughes received from the Russian Government a concession for the manufacture of iron rails. The company founded by him exists to-day under British management at a place called Hughesovka, and is known as the New Russia Co., Ltd. It has been followed up by a great number of other enterprises, some Russian, but most founded by British, French, and Belgian capital, which has been freely invested in the industry during the last forty years, particularly between 1880 and the end of the century.

392 Agricultural machinery is in constant demand.
433 When first used in the country, it had all to be imported, but of late it has been manufactured in the Ukraine in increasing quantities. Although the customs duties on agricultural machinery are low—certain types in fact are admitted free—the machinery made in the country finds more favour every year. For certain complex machines the Ukraine is still dependent upon imports, but, apart from these, it will probably be able in time to produce all the agricultural machinery it needs. In 1913, out of a total of 770 agricultural machinery factories in Russia, 271 were situated in the Ukraine. The value of their output was 31,000,000 rubles, that of the whole of Russia being 54,000,000 rubles. In addition to the production of the factories, large quantities of tools and machinery of the simpler sort are made by domestic workers, working single-handed or in small syndicates.

The principal agricultural machinery works are in the Governments of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Taurida, and Kharkov. The firms John Greaves & Co. and E. L. Mathias & Sons (Berdyansk), Hartmann Machinery Co. (Lugansk), H. A. Klassen (Sofiesk), R. & E. Elworthy (Yelisavetgrad), I. I. Hoehn (Odessa), and Franz & Schroeder (Neu-Halbstadt), are among those doing the largest business, and the names of the concerns show how largely foreign enterprise has entered this field, none having a Russian title. At Kiev and Kharkov

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there are several large factories which specialize in every kind of machine necessary for the sugar industry. 392 433

Several other industries, while of small account in comparison with those described above, deserve mention.

Manufacturing enterprises dependent upon animal products divide themselves principally into tanneries and woollen factories. The centres of the leather industry lie in the northern portion of the country, especially in the Governments of Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, and Podolia. This industry accounts for 4·5 per cent. of the total manufacturing output of the Ukraine. The woollen industry is centred in Kharkov, which has two large cloth mills, and in the town of Klintsi in the Government of Chernigov, where not only cloth but knitted goods, yarns, rugs, shawls, and other woollen goods are turned out from eight considerable factories. The production of woollen goods represents 3·5 per cent. of the total Ukraine output of manufactures. 282 288 433

The timber-working industry is chiefly found in the riparian towns, especially on the Dnieper. Yekaterinoslav takes first place, and Kremenchug, Alexandrovsk and Kherson also have saw-mills. Much of the timber shipped abroad is in an unworked state, and manufactures of the better sort are poorly represented. The industry accounts for only 4 per cent. of the value of the Ukraine manufactures. 313 433

The chemical industry is of minor importance. It is concerned chiefly with the products and by-products of coal gas at Odessa and Kharkov, but there is also a soda factory in the Bakhmut district and there are a number of match-factories in the Novozibkovsk district of Chernigov. The products of the industry represent only 3·5 per cent. of the value of the manufactures of the Ukraine. None of the more advanced branches of the industry is established in the country. 382 433

The industries enumerated account for 90–95 per cent. of the manufactures of the country. The remainder, grouped under the headings of paper, linen, cotton, and fibre industries, are of negligible account. 433

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438 [655] In addition to factory industries there exists in Russia a group known as *kustarni* or domestic industries. They are considered so important by the Government that measures are taken by the various authorities to improve their output and conditions, to revive old ones and even to found new ones. Their range is wide, and they are carried on by families, by working syndicates or *artels* (cf. p. 73), or by individuals. In the Ukraine these industries are less well developed than in most parts of Russia, and in some provinces are hardly represented. There are three branches well established. Pottery is manufactured in the Governments of Kiev, Chernigov, and Poltava, where suitable clays are found, and the *kustarni* earthenware of these districts has a good reputation all over the country. Shoes, harness, and other leather goods are produced in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. Combs, buttons, and other objects made from animal horn are also a noted product of Poltava.

(6) Power

371 In the Ukraine power is almost exclusively produced by steam. Electric power is used for the tramways in Odessa and Kiev, but water-power is neglected, and electric drive for factory work is not employed.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(a) *General Characteristics; Markets, Fairs, &c.*

438 441 The trade of the Ukraine consists almost entirely in the movement and marketing of the produce of the land in one form or another. One of its noticeable features is the passage of commodities through several hands before they come into use. Nowhere are found so many middlemen, salesmen, and agents. This is caused principally by the lack of capital in the hands of the producer and a general encumbrance and hypothecation of land, crops, machinery, &c. There is

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a very large population of Jews, who have become general tradesmen and brokers to the community. 438 441

The cereal crop is the subject of elaborate commercial transactions, and much of it is sold two or three times before it is harvested. The lack of proper storage leads to the rapid dispersal of the bulk of the surplus crop. Odessa and Nikolaev have corn exchanges where the export of the crop is financed, and there is an exchange for internal cereal trade at Yelisavetgrad.

The sugar trade is subject to Government control. A committee fixes annually the amount of sugar to be placed on the home market and the distribution of supplies to the refineries, the quantity so dealt with paying the minimum excise. After this allocation any surplus remaining is disposed of according to the general state of the market and the stock held over from the previous season, and is allotted for internal use or export. Russia was a signatory to the Sugar Convention of 1907, and agreed that, during the six years from the date of the convention, she should not export in all more than 1,000,000 tons. This specially affected the Ukraine as the principal sugar-producing area in Russia. 438 433 655

The sugar and alcohol markets are at Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa. 438

Wool of the finer sorts called 'Spanish' is dealt in principally at Kharkov, which is also the chief market for leather.

There is a flax market at Novozybkov in the province of Chernigov.

The principal timber markets are Yekaterinoslav and Kherson.

Odessa is a market for a great number of commodities produced in the interior, especially food-stuffs, cattle, tobacco, and vegetable oils.

The custom of transacting important business at fixed fairs is of very long standing in the Ukraine, and, while the importance of every fair tends to decrease at present owing to the adoption of other methods of trading, the fairs continue to be held, and, especially 438 443

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438 in petty classes of trade, are still the occasion of much
443 buying and selling. The principal ones are as follows:

At Kiev the so-called Kontraktovaya fair is held from February 5 to 29. The goods dealt in are carpets, woven materials, silk, ready-made clothing, wooden goods, preserved fish, groceries, sugar, flax, iron, machines, coal, and salt. The real importance of the fair lies in its being the meeting-place for traders of all sorts from the neighbouring provinces. Bankers, agriculturists, and manufacturers meet to settle old and to make new contracts (hence its title), to liquidate or renew bills, &c. The turnover is about £250,000.

Poltava has a fair called Illinskaya from July 1 to 31. It is exclusively for the sale of skins, leather, and manufactures thereof. The turnover averages about £100,000.

Kharkov has four annual fairs, named after the religious festivals at which they are held: (1) Kreshenskaya (Epiphany), January 6 to February 1, for trade in manufactured goods, groceries, peltry, and leather. The turnover is about £1,250,000. (2) Troitskaya (Trinity), June 1 to 30, for trade in wool, sheepskins, and manufactured goods. Turnover, about £500,000. (3) Uspenskaya (Assumption), August 1 to 31, for manufactured and colonial goods. Turnover, about £900,000. (4) Pokrovskaya (Intercession of the Virgin), October 1 to 26 for general trade, as at Kreshenskaya. Turnover, about £1,250,000.

Jitomir has a hop fair from September 6 to 14 for the sale of the season's crop, the value of which fluctuates widely from year to year.

A large annual fair, principally for the disposal of wool, is held at Kakhovka.

438 The internal trade of the Ukraine is generally
452 conducted on the basis of a long credit, six to nine months by bill; and the fairs and exchanges give opportunity to gauge the general financial state of the country, which is almost totally dependent upon harvest conditions, and to provide for liquidation or renewal of the floating credit as circumstances require.

(b) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

Organizations to promote trade in the Ukraine are not numerous. The true traders of the country are the native Jews, and to trace their involved dealings is impossible. 441

The sales of the coal and iron are almost wholly controlled by rings and cartels. The most powerful one, the *Prodamet*, or metal sales combine, controlled recently over 80 per cent. of all the iron and steel produced in South Russia and threatened to absorb the entire output. 477

The activities of the *zemstvos* in trade call for mention. These organs of local government actively enter into trade in agricultural machinery, improved seed, and pedigree live-stock, and endeavour to improve the facilities for selling the products of domestic industry. Their aim is to lift the internal commerce of the country from the condition of dependence on speculating middlemen, into which it has almost irretrievably fallen, but their achievements so far only touch the fringe of a deep-seated social trouble. 441 185

There are chambers of commerce at Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Berdyansk, and Mariupol, and there is a branch of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce at Odessa. Odessa, Nikolaev, and Yelisavetgrad have corn exchanges, and coal and iron exchanges exist at Kharkov. 441

(c) *Foreign Interests and Methods of Economic Penetration*

The present state of commerce in the Ukraine provides a wide field for economic penetration from abroad. Agriculture in its first stages is not much affected, but in one case, that of the production of sugar from beet, the secondary stages of manufacture have been much exploited by foreign capital and management. The coal and iron mining industries and the iron and steel manufacturing industries owe their foundation in great measure to foreigners, by whom they are still largely 471 433

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471 managed and financed. Russia has not been able to
433 find capital for new projects, with the result that within the last twenty-five years numerous undertakings have been started with foreign money. Official lists show that the nation most largely interested is France, Belgium and Great Britain coming next. The fortunes of these enterprises have varied, but in general their success has not been great in proportion to the original capital.

453 The last quarter of a century has also seen the
471 foundation of a number of trading banks with Russian titles and boards of directors at least nominally Russian. Their resources, however, are largely provided and completely controlled from Germany. These institutions have admittedly acquired a controlling interest in most of the concerns above mentioned, often at a very moderate outlay, and have supplied additional loan capital at profitable rates of interest. One and the same bank has in many cases obtained control over every stage in the production of a manufactured article, from the winning of the raw material onward, of course drawing its profit from every undertaking concerned. Certain British concerns have held out and kept their shares in their own hands, but financial institutions governed by German capitalists have a preponderating hold on those industries of the Ukraine which are large enough to repay their attention—that is, on the coal, iron, and allied industries of the Donets, and the sugar industries of the Kiev district.

The foreign interests in the Ukraine lie principally in the industrial concerns above mentioned. British interests are not strong, and are chiefly represented by some collieries and ironworks at Alexandrovsk and the general properties of the New Russia Co., Ltd., at Hughesovka and elsewhere (cf. p. 86).

(2) Foreign

(a) *Exports*

No separate figures as to exports from the Ukraine are given in official statistics, which in every case refer to the Empire as a whole. Owing, however, to the nature of the exports, it is possible to draw some general conclusions. 439

The total exports of Russia for several years of the twentieth century have averaged £100,000,000 in value. Considerably more than half at all times, and frequently as much as two-thirds, come under the heading of food-stuffs. Of these, cereals and sugar are certainly almost entirely of Ukrainian origin. Butter and eggs, the two other most notable items, are not exported from the Ukraine in any quantity, but the total value of these exports does not approach a quarter of the value of the exports of wheat alone.

The following figures show how the export of cereals, especially wheat, varies according to the harvest. Of the years quoted, 1908 was poor, 1909 good, and 1910 excellent:

	1908.	1909.	1910.
	£	£	£
Wheat	11,200,000	38,400,000	40,500,000
Rye	2,500,000	3,400,000	2,900,000
Barley	13,200,000	16,500,000	15,800,000

Wood and prepared timber are largely exported from Russia, and a small proportion comes from the Ukraine.

Of hides, another important export, the Ukraine furnishes a good share, and the same remark applies to oil-seed products.

Iron-ore exports are almost entirely of Ukrainian origin, coming from Krivoy-Rog.

The above headings cover the most important articles which the Ukraine has for export. The wheat goes principally to Great Britain, Holland, and Germany; the rye to Austria, Germany, and other

439 destinations; and the barley chiefly to Germany. The iron-ore goes mainly to Great Britain and Germany.

(b) *Imports*

As in the case of exports, exact figures for the Ukraine imports cannot be given. In the long list of Russian imports, only three stand out conspicuously —raw cotton, wool, and machinery. Neither imported wool nor cotton is worked in the Ukraine, and the importation of agricultural machinery, though still considerable, is declining. As for commodities under the headings of colonial produce and manufactured goods, the share taken by the Ukraine cannot be estimated, but it is probable that more than half the amount imported through Ukraine ports is consumed beyond the Ukraine boundaries, as the adjacent parts of Russia have greater purchasing power. It may safely be said, however, that the imports of chemical manures, which are increasing rapidly, are largely destined for the Ukraine.

Germany is the principal source of Russia's imports, her share being usually 45–50 per cent. of their total value. Imports from Great Britain represent only 12–14 per cent. of the whole. The rest of the import trade is divided among many countries, none of which contributes as much as 10 per cent. of the total.

(c) *Customs and Tariffs*

651 The Russian tariff is on the whole highly protective, particularly in reference to manufactured articles. As far as possible the duties are levied on weight, only occasionally on value. The tariff contains 218 sections and many sub-classifications.

There is a short free list which includes many kinds of agricultural machinery, live cattle, horses, and cattle food consisting of by-products of manufacture. Certain fertilizing substances and chemicals necessary for tanning and other industries are imported under low duties.

The conventional tariff is modified in favour of various nations in respect of specified items according to the commercial treaties mentioned below. 651

(d) *Commercial Treaties*

The Ukraine having hitherto formed part of the Russian Empire, the commercial treaties of the Empire have had full force there. Up to the year 1893, notwithstanding any treaties existing, all European nations were on the same footing in relation to the Russian tariff. Since then the following special conventions as to tariffs have been concluded: 648 439

With France.—A treaty of 1893 provides for a reduction of Russian duties on 52 articles of French origin, in exchange for a reduced French tariff on naphtha and its products.

With Serbia.—A treaty of commerce and navigation, signed in 1893, agrees to a decrease of the Russian duty on Serbian fruits, in exchange for Serbian concessions on fish and mineral oils.

With Germany.—By a treaty of commerce signed in 1894, Russia lowered her duties in favour of Germany on 135 articles, in consideration of which she obtained most-favoured-nation treatment from Germany.

With Portugal.—A general convention of 1895 arranged that Russia should benefit by certain reductions of the Portuguese tariff, and that Portuguese cork and cork products should be allowed a 20 per cent. reduction of duty on entering Russia.

With Japan.—A general treaty, signed in 1895, placed Japan, in respect of her commercial relations with Russia, on a similar footing to that of European countries.

With Bulgaria.—In 1897 the Russian tariff on dried meat, eggs, and undressed leather was lowered in favour of Bulgaria, and attar of roses was admitted free of duty. In return, certain general concessions and most-favoured-nation treatment were accorded by Bulgaria to Russia.

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648 439 Asia generally has peculiar commercial relations with Russia, the duties on both sides being as a rule low, while numerous arrangements for reciprocal concessions have been made, notably with Persia, the Turkish Empire, and China.

(D) FINANCE

(1) Public Finance

652 The Russian Imperial revenue is largely raised in indirect taxes. The budget for 1911 shows the following revenue figures:

		Roubles.
Direct taxes		210,000,000
Indirect taxes:		
Liquor	42,000,000	
Tobacco	69,000,000	
Sugar	123,000,000	
Petroleum	44,000,000	
Matches	18,000,000	
Customs	289,000,000	
		585,000,000
Duties:		
Stamps, fees on transfers, harbour dues, railway dues		169,000,000
Royalties:		
Mines, mint, posts and telegraphs, and spirit monopoly		849,000,000
State property, including railways		765,000,000
Remainder		122,000,000
Total		2,700,000,000

The principal spending departments were the Ministries of Ways and Communications, War, and Finance, and the Public Debt service. These accounted for three-fourths of the expenditure.

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In 1910 the revenue receipts from the respective Governments of the Ukraine were as follows: 652

	Roubles.
Volhynia	24,400,000
Podolia	24,300,000
Kiev	128,900,000
Chernigov	18,400,000
Poltava	24,900,000
Kharkov	46,200,000
Yekaterinoslav	37,300,000
Kherson	80,400,000
Taurida	12,800,000
Total	397,600,000

The total revenue of European Russia for the same year was 1,522,800,000 roubles. In the period 1906–10 the revenue showed a good expansion in the Governments of Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, and Kherson. Elsewhere in the Ukraine it appeared to be stationary.

After the Imperial authorities, the *zemstvos* are the most important bodies authorized to raise taxes. 651 652 Their revenue comes from taxes on land, houses, and factory buildings, and from licences for distilleries, 69 per cent. being derived from the land tax. Their expenses are (1) obligatory: local civil administration, upkeep of district roads, bridges, &c., and health service; (2) facultative: public instruction and provision of medical attendance in rural districts. Their functions have gradually spread in a somewhat irregular manner, and vary very much according to the degree of energy shown by the committees. Some have embarked on commercial schemes, such as the installation of telephone systems or trade in agricultural machinery; others perform only the minimum of their duties. 634

Five Governments of the Ukraine have a *zemstvo* organization, and their budgets of receipts and expenses, which appear to balance exactly, are as follows for the years 1906 and 1910: 652 634

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Government.	1906.	1910.
	Roubles.	*Roubles.*
652 634 Yekaterinoslav . .	5,210,000	8,241,000
Poltava . . .	6,737,000	8,750,000
Taurida . . .	3,599,000	4,576,000
Kharkov . . .	5,753,000	9,168,000
Kherson . . .	3,808,000	5,542,000

652 652 Thirty-one towns in the Ukraine have municipal administrations, and can raise taxes and contract loans for purposes similar to those of the *zemstvo* budgets. A considerable debt has been incurred. The towns of Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa have borrowed money for municipal purposes in foreign markets; of a total debt of 53,000,000 roubles, these three towns account for 35,000,000 roubles.

652 632 651 The *mirs* or local communes can also raise some taxes for purely local purposes. Obligatory taxes are levied for local communal administration, provision of granaries for storing food-stuffs, upkeep of local roads on peasant lands, and insurance against fire and inundations. Facultative powers of taxation are in the hands of the *mirs* for the building and maintenance of churches, schools, and hospitals, and other special local needs. There is a great deal of irregularity in the levying and administration of these taxes.

(2) Banking

453 652 The banks of the Ukraine fall into several well-defined groups. In the first place come banks which are State or semi-State institutions. These are the Imperial State Bank, the Land Bank of the Nobility, the Peasants' Land Bank, and the State Savings Bank.

The Imperial State Bank is a Government institution with a wide sphere of activity. It controls the currency and note issue, being the only bank issuing notes. It undertakes general banking and bill broking, besides having close relations with the Treasury for revenue, loan, and other purposes. It makes large loans to private banks; up to 1910 the total amount was £189,000,000. It also advances money on merchandise, principally on

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grain. The bank's net profits in 1904 were £1,200,000, 453
and in 1910 £2,400,000. The capital is £5,000,000, 652
and the reserve £500,000.

The Land Bank of the Nobility was founded after the liberation of the serfs to make advances on land, to finance the nobility involved in the transfer of part of their estates to the peasants, and to prevent the ruinous hypothecation of their land elsewhere.

The Peasants' Land Bank, founded in 1883, renders similar services to the peasants, advancing money on land to increase peasant holdings, to purchase agricultural machinery or live-stock, and for other objects.

The State Savings Banks carry out the function their title suggests, and also undertake certain minor insurance business. Branches can be opened in all towns and villages. The management is supervised by the Imperial State Bank. The banks were started in 1862 with 140,000 accounts and £850,000 in deposits, and in 1907 had 6,940,000 accounts and £128,000,000 in deposits.

Joint-stock land banks form the next group of 453
important banks. There are four in the Ukraine, with resources as follows:

Bank.	*Share Capital.*	*Reserves.*	*Bonds in circulation.*
	£	£	£
Kharkov . . .	1,170,000	200,000	12,000,000
Poltava	800,000	600,000	11,000,000
Bessarabia–Taurida . .	700,000	500,000	11,000,000
Kiev	600,000	400,000	9,500,000

These banks advance money on agricultural security on a business basis, and make considerable profits.

Mutual credit associations form another group, and 452
are spread all over the country, their aggregate turnover being very great. They vary very much in size and extent of operations, but in general their rate of interest is high.

Trading banks form the last great group. They 453
are usually joint-stock concerns, and are carried on according to the German model, their foundation being

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453 often due to German enterprise. They interest themselves in all sorts of industrial concerns, and even promote new ones. The following banks of this class have branches in the Ukraine: Discount Bank of Petrograd, Petrograd International Commercial Bank, Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, Union Bank, Volga-Kama Bank, Bank of Commerce and Industry, Azov-Don Bank, Russo-Asiatic Bank, and Commercial Bank of Siberia. One or two Moscow banking firms also have a few branches. The Russo-French Bank and the Russian and English Bank are joint-stock concerns founded specially to look after the Russian trade of the two countries in question. The Crédit Lyonnais appears to be the only purely foreign bank which has branches in the Ukraine.

(3) Principal Fields of Investment

000 The lack of capital in Russia, and the backward state of the industrial and commercial life of the Ukraine, offer innumerable openings to the foreign investor. The rivers should be canalized and systematically used for traffic; more railways and tramways are needed, and at least some water-power could be industrially used. Lastly, the iron and steel trades could be developed greatly. Unless, however, labour problems can be simplified, and the quality of native labour much improved, a great risk will always attach to the investment of capital in the Ukraine.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

A Ukraine proverb runs: 'The harvest is the Almighty!' This gives the clue to the whole economic situation of the country. Great as are the industries in the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions, these are a foreign growth, largely dependent on capital and management from abroad, and worked mainly by immigrants from Great Russia. Agricultural problems, therefore, are the chief concern of those interested to see the Ukraine prosperous. The task before them is

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to pilot agriculture from its present phase to another 000
with the minimum of friction and waste of effort.

The Ukraine has long emerged from the first phase of agriculture—that of purely extensive cultivation of a fertile belt, where unoccupied lands are sown with successive cereal crops as long as they yield a sufficient return, and afterwards deserted. The second phase, during which a slightly more intensive system is in vogue, but more is continuously taken from the soil than is returned to it, should now be near its end. The third, which should soon begin, is that of intensive mixed farming with wide rotations and frequent fertilization by animal manure produced on the farm and chemical manure brought from industrial districts.

At present agriculture in the Ukraine is stationary, pending the move towards the last stage indicated. The area under crops is increasing, but the average crop per acre is stationary or decreasing. The population is growing, but it would appear that the wealth per head is diminishing. On the whole the country is not now so rich as it was formerly. Its soil is partially exhausted; its live-stock shows a tendency to decrease; other natural sources of wealth, such as the forests, have been trenched upon and no replacement has been attempted. Its large cereal exports are more a sign of necessity than of surplus, the population often subsisting on inferior bread-stuffs.

The problems presented for solution before the transit to the third stage of agriculture can be effected and economic prosperity assured, are those of ownership, methods of farming and supply of labour—whether holdings shall be small or large farms prevail, and whether the land shall be cultivated by peasant proprietors or wage-paid labour, or (as at present) there shall be a mixture of both systems. The country is inhabited by Little Russians, who seem designed by nature to be peasants, and do not appear likely to engage in any industry other than agriculture, except on a small scale and of necessity. If they can live by the land, and if they are suitably educated and aided

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000 by the State, they should become a prosperous peasant people.

The mining and manufacturing industries are of recent development in the Ukraine, and, in view of the excellent coal and iron in the country, are destined to flourish. But, as the native Ukrainian does not take kindly to any but an agricultural life, these industries are likely to remain in the hands of the foreigner and the immigrant from Great Russia.

Although the Ukraine has a seaboard and important overseas trade, it does not seem likely to produce a maritime population; and navigation and seafaring will probably continue to be left to peoples better suited to them.

For commerce the activities of the huge Jewish population can be relied upon; but there remains the task of solving the acute social problems arising from its existence side by side with a peasantry inclined to thriftlessness, in a backward state of education, and influenced by religious bigotry.

The question of capital is a paramount one. It can only be said that, if the country is to progress, capital must be found. Whether such capital will be brought in from abroad in the first instance, or produced from surplus profits at home, only the future can show.

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APPENDIX

I

NUMBER OF THE UKRAINIANS[1]

ACCORDING to the census of 1897, there were 23,430,000 Ukrainians in the nine Ukrainian Governments of Russia. The number accepted by the Russian Academy of Science in their report relating to the Ukrainian language is 22,700,000 (also based on the census of 1897). Prof. Hrushevski in his popular history of the Ukraine in Ukrainian ('How the Ukrainian People live'), published in 1915, says that there are altogether some 30,000,000 Ukrainians, of whom 25,000,000 are—or were—Russian subjects. According to Dr. Paul Ostwald (*Die Ukraine und die Ukrainische Bewegung*, 1916, p. 8), who takes his statistics from the *Revue Ukrainienne*, August, 1915, there are

4,220,000	Ukrainians	in	Austria-Hungary.
29,435,000	,,	,,	Russia.
760,000	,,	,,	America.
34,415,000			

This means that out of every thirty-eight Ukrainians, thirty are Russian. The two following tables give an idea of the distribution of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian Governments of Russia :

	1897.[2]		1910.[3]	
	Per cent. of Ukrainians.	*No. of Inhabitants.*	*Per cent. of Ukrainians.*	*No. of Inhabitants.*
Volhynia	70	2,989,000	70	3,850,000
Podolia	81	3,018,000	81	3,030,000
Kiev	80	3,559,000	79	4,570,000
Chernigov	66	2,298,000	86	2,980,000
Poltava	93	2,778,000	95	3,580,000
Kharkov	80	2,492,000	70	3,250,000
Yekaterinoslav	69	2,114,000	69	3,000,000
Kherson	54	2,734,000	54	3,450,000
Taurida	41	1,448,000	42	1,880,000

[1] See also p. 12. [2] Shchegolev, p. 364.
[3] Rudnyčkyj, p. 91.

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II

648 ## TEXT OF THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK, BETWEEN THE UKRAINE AND THE CENTRAL POWERS, FEBRUARY 9, 1918

A TREATY of peace between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one part, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other part. The Ukraine people having, in the course of the present world-war, declared itself independent and expressed the wish to restore peace between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Powers at war with Russia, the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey have resolved to agree on a peace treaty with the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic. They thereby desire to take the first step towards a lasting world-peace, honourable for all parties, which shall not only put an end to the horrors of war, but shall also lead to the restoration of friendly relations between the peoples in the political, legal, economic and intellectual realms. To this end the plenipotentiaries of the above-mentioned Governments, namely, for the Imperial German Government, the Foreign Secretary, Baron von Kühlmann; for the joint Austro-Hungarian Government, the Foreign Minister, Count Czernin; for the Bulgarian Government, the Premier, Mr. Radoslavov, and the envoys, Mr. Andrea Toschev, Mr. Ivan Staia Stoyanovitch, the military plenipotentiary, Colonel Peter Gantchev, and Doctor Theodor Anastassov; for the Imperial Ottoman Government, the Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, the Foreign Minister, Nessimi Bey, Hakki Pasha, and General Izzet Pasha; for the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Messrs. Alexander Siewrjuk, Mykola Ljubynsjkyj, and Mykola Lewytsjkyj, members of the Central Rada, have met together at Brest-Litovsk for the inauguration of peace negotiations, and, after submitting their credentials, which were found to be in good and proper form, they have reached agreement on the following conditions:

ARTICLE I.—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one hand, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, declare that the state of war between them is at an end. The contracting parties are resolved henceforth to live in peace and friendship with one another.

ARTICLE II.—(*a*) Between Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, in so far as these two Powers border upon one another, those frontiers will exist which existed before the outbreak of the

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present war between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Russia; (*b*) farther north, the frontier of the Ukrainian People's Republic commencing at Tarnegrad, will, in general, follow the line Bilgoraj, Szoezebrzszyn, Krasnostas, Pugaszow, Radin, Meshireyschie, Sarnaki, Melnik, Wysckolitowsk, Kamenietzlitowsk, Pruschany, Wydonovskojcsce. These frontiers will be fixed in detail by a mixed commission according to the ethnographical conditions and with regard to the desires of the population; (*c*) should the Ukrainian People's Republic still have common frontiers with another of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance special agreements will be made thereupon.

ARTICLE III.—The evacuation of occupied territories will begin immediately after the ratification of the present peace treaty. The manner of carrying out the evacuation and the transfer of the evacuated territories will be determined by plenipotentiaries of the interested parties.

ARTICLE IV.—Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties will be entered upon immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty. The widest possible admittance of the respective parties' consuls is to be reserved for special agreements.

ARTICLE V.—The contracting parties mutually renounce reimbursement of their war costs (that is to say the State expenditure for carrying on the war) as well as indemnification for war damages (that is to say those damages which have been suffered by them and their subjects in the war areas through military measures, including all requisitions made in the enemy's country).

ARTICLE VI.—The respective prisoners of war will be permitted to return home, in so far as they do not desire, with the approval of the State concerned, to remain in its territories or proceed to another country. The regulation of questions connected herewith will follow by means of the separate treaties provided for in Article VIII.

(ARTICLE VII is a long clause covering the economic agreements made between the Ukraine and the four enemy Powers. *Inter alia* it provides for 'a reciprocal exchange, until July 31 of the current year, of the surplus of the most important agricultural and industrial products . . . for the purpose of meeting current requirements', and it revives the Russo-German Commercial Treaty of 1894–1904.)

ARTICLE VIII.—The restoration of public and private legal relations (Rechtsbeziehungen), the exchange of prisoners of war and interned civilians, the amnesty question, as well as the question of the treatment of merchantmen in the enemy's

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648 hands, will be regulated in the separate treaties with the Ukrainian People's Republic, which form an essential part of the present peace treaty, and, so far as is practicable, will enter into force simultaneously therewith.

ARTICLE IX.—The agreements made in this treaty constitute an indivisible whole.

ARTICLE X.—For the interpretation of this treaty the German and Ukrainian text is authoritative for the relations between Germany and the Ukraine; the German, Hungarian, and Ukrainian text for the relations between Turkey and the Ukraine.

Final prescription. The present peace treaty will be ratified. The ratified documents shall be exchanged as soon as possible. So far as nothing therein prescribes otherwise, the peace treaty comes into force on its ratification. (Here follow the signatures.)

A supplementary treaty of twenty-eight articles was signed between Germany and the Ukraine on the same day. It deals with the resumption of consular relations, the revival of 'treaties, arrangements and agreements which were in force between Germany and Russia before the war', exchange of prisoners, compensation for damage, &c. (*The New Europe*, February 28, 1918.)

III

THE GERMAN COLONISTS IN S. RUSSIA (from F. Stach, *Survey of the History of the Colonists in S. Russia and their Present Life.* Moscow, 1916.)

175 563 REALIZING that in the southern territories acquired by Russia in the eighteenth century only colonists with a certain amount of culture could introduce a settled life and develop the resources of the country, Catherine the Great published a manifesto on December 4, 1762, inviting foreign colonists. As a result, 102 colonies were established on the Lower Volga in the Saratov and Samara Governments, 6 in Chernigov, 1 in Voronezh, 2 in Lifland, and 6 in the Petrograd Government. A further manifesto followed on July 22, 1763, enlarging the privileges of the colonists, which were very considerable.

This manifesto was the basis of the colonies of Russia. On March 19, 1764, a supplementary act was issued granting 30 desyatines of land to each family and prescribing the method of settling and rights of inheritance. The land was to pass to youngest son; this measure would force the father to teach

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elder sons various industries. Another manifesto of July 19, 1785, promised freedom from all taxation for 6 years. 175 563

The first party of settlers from Danzig, many of whom were Mennonite sectaries, arrived at Kremenchug in 1787. On September 6, 1800, Paul I proclaimed special privileges to the Mennonites of Novorossiya (Governments of Kherson, Taurida, Yekaterinoslav, and the Don Cossacks' Territory); 65 desyatines were granted to each family, and it was promised that they would never be called up for military and other duties against their wish. Further regulations concerning the colonists appeared in 1804.

In the reign of Alexander I, in 1818, a new Care Committee for South-Russian Colonies (Governments of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Taurida, and Bessarabia) was established in Yekaterinoslav 1818–22; it migrated to Kishinev a little later. On July 1, 1833, the Committee was limited in power and transferred to Odessa. It existed till July 4, 1871, when it was cancelled and all Russian colonists were placed under the general law. In 1874 they, together with the others, were made amenable to conscription.

Relations between the colonists and the Russians.—Before the Crimean War, and even down to 1860, the Russian towns had very little to do with the colonists, except in the case of those colonies which were situated in the neighbourhood of Odessa, Yekaterinoslav, Nikolaev, Simferopol, Chernigov, Voronezh, Samara, Saratov, and Petrograd. At first intercourse arose from commercial relations. But the influence of colonists on the Nogai was much greater after about 1809 and 1835 when the Nogai received land for permanent settlements. T. Kornis, a colonist of Orlovo, was responsible for helping some 17,000 Nogai to settle down. When the *dukhobors* of Tambov and Voronezh migrated to the neighbourhood of the Mennonites, they were greatly helped by them.

The Ministry of Public Property published in 1846 a report showing that at that time the colonists occupied 1,424,619 desyatines of land (1,309,945 arable). Their number was 95,342 men and 88,293 women, and they were chiefly engaged in agriculture, then cattle-breeding, butter-making, fruit cultivation, tobacco plantation, vegetable-growing, silk industry, wine plantation, and various applied industries.

In agriculture, so early as 1870, they used harvest machines, and in 1905 steam and electrical agricultural machines. In the sixties the Russian, Serbian, and Bulgarian colonists began to imitate the Germans, so that now their methods in agriculture are very much alike. During the last 50 years many colonists bought large private landed estates, especially in the Dneprovsk

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district; but for the last 25 years there has been a tendency to sell all land to the Russian colonists and migrate to the towns.

The Russian language was introduced in the schools of the colonists in 1860; and in 1871 their schools were taken over by the Ministry of Education.

The German colonies are chiefly found in the Governments of Taurida, Volhynia, and Yekaterinoslav.

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Maps

The Ukraine is covered by eight sheets (Bucarest, L. 35; Odessa, L. 36; Rostov, L. 37; Krakau, M. 34; Jitomir, M. 35; Kiev, M. 36; Kharkov, M. 37; Smolensk, N. 36) of the International Map (G.S.G.S. No. 2758) published by the War Office on the scale of 1 : 1,000,000.

A special map of the Ukraine, on the scale of 1 : 4,500,000, has been issued by George Philip & Son (London Geogr. Institute).

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LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE[1]

By HAROLD R. WEINSTEIN

000 One of the most painful lessons mankind has learned since the rise of nationalism in the last hundred years is that language diversity fosters conflicts between states and among peoples living within one state but speaking different languages. Conversely, language uniformity makes for unity. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries most governments have strongly desired such uniformity. In some countries, as in America, assimilation into one language has been achieved by allowing national groups the free use of their native languages, and by relying upon the advance of education and of commercial and industrial development to break down the barriers those languages erect between various linguistic groups. In the period before the First World War, many governments sought language uniformity by forcibly repressing the languages of minorities, by Germanizing, Magyarizing, Russifying their national minority groups. Of no government was this more true than of that of the old Russian Empire, in which the "minorities" — that is, the groups other than the Great-Russians — constituted over half the population. But by attempting to suppress the languages of the Ukrainians, Georgians, Tatars and so on, the Tsarist régime did not achieve its goal of unity; rather, it aroused a host of nationalist movements which put language repression first on the bill of grievances against the government and which helped drive Tsarism to its death.

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u 829 191 SU 829 191 Lenin believed that the Tsarist method defeated its own ends and that the goal of unity had to be approached by other paths. First of all, literacy would have to precede any attempt to obtain language uniformity: as long as none other than oral means of communication existed between the minorities and the Russians, the Russian language could not really permeate the minorities and break down their national horizons. Literacy, of course, could be most easily reached by universal education in the minority languages themselves. Then, once the art of reading was mastered and great cultural vistas were opened to the minorities, they would be in a position to go ahead and adopt Russian as a second language. The Russian language would appeal to them because it is the language of a stronger culture than

122 [1] This study is based on material gathered for a book on the policy of the Soviet Union with regard to national minorities. The book is being written under a grant from the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, and it is being sponsored by Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes and Geroid Tanquary Robinson of Columbia University.

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those the minorities possessed; and the necessity for knowing Russian would be heightened by drawing the minorities into the industrial, commercial and political life of the country as a whole. Meanwhile, literacy in the minority languages would facilitate the spread of communist doctrines stressing the international solidarity of the working-class against capitalism. To achieve unity while allowing the free use of minority languages might be the long — and perhaps very dangerous — way around, but Lenin believed it would be the only effective way in a backward, heterogeneous country like Russia.

The Soviet leaders were so certain that eventual lingustic uniformity could be attained only through temporary diversity that they went further in emphasizing minority languages than any state has ever gone: they made vigorous attempts to foster the actual use of the minority languages, to "nationalize" (i.e., "Ukrainize," "Armenianize," "Tartarize") political organizations, administrative apparatus, factory managements, trade-unions, military units, newspapers, books, theatres and schools, among the minorities. In their desire to retreat from the old Imperial policy of Russification, they leaned over so far backward that they introduced the element of compulsion in the opposite direction: they forced the national minorities and the Russians living among them to use the local languages in political, economic and cultural life, stopping short only at the threshold of the individual's private world. The ultimate effect of this policy upon the increase or decrease of nationalism among the minorities is not yet apparent, and the fate of such nationalism may hinge upon such factors as economic prosperity, political liberty and developments in the field of international relations; but the process of nationalizing the political, economic and cultural life of the minorities is an experiment which deserves more attention from the non-Soviet political and scholarly world than it has received.

In the field of education, the Soviet régime has followed a four-fold policy: first to establish a school system embracing all children; secondly, to promote the spread of communist doctrines by integrating them into the curriculum; thirdly, to nationalize the school system by introducing the languages of the minorities as the languages of instruction in schools attended by children of the minorities; and, fourthly, to pave the way for eventual assimilation by providing for the study of Russian as a separate subject in the schools of the minorities. The first two aspects of this policy are complex subjects, each of which deserves a separate study. The present discussion will therefore treat only of the linguistic phases of the Soviet educational policy: the nationalization of education — that is, the use of minority

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languages as the media of instruction; and the study of Russian as a separate subject.

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In setting out to nationalize education, the Soviet régime has encountered many obstacles: Russian nationalists — and there were some even among the Communists — opposed the policy; text-books and teachers were scarce; and the more backward minorities did not even possess a written language of their own. As the exigencies of space prevent the investigation of all the problems encountered in the nationalization of education, this study will be limited to examining the policy as applied in the Ukraine; that is, to the Ukrainians and to the other minorities — Poles, Jews, Germans and others — living among them. The Ukrainians, it may be noted, are the largest minority in the Soviet Union; they are the most significant from the point of view of current international relations; and the difficulties encountered by the nationalization policy in the Ukraine were sufficiently complex to provide some insight into the policy as a whole.

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Among the Ukrainians, as among the other minorities, the nationalization of education has stemmed from the program on the national question which Lenin formulated before the overthrow of the Tsarist régime. This program, intended to overcome minority nationalism, had to assign a conspicuous place to the language question. To many Ukrainians the treatment of their language by the Imperial government appeared even more onerous than the political oppression which was meted out to Russians and Ukrainians alike. The Ukrainian language was regarded by the government as an uncouth dialect of the Russian language; it was harried from the schools; and it was badgered throughout the literary, scholarly and theatrical worlds. The resulting Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin believed, was a threat to the international unity of the Ukrainian and Russian masses, a unity he regarded as essential for the achievement of socialism; and this Ukrainian nationalism would have to be met with the promise of linguistic equality for the Ukrainians and for all other nationalities. This conception was written into the program on the national question adopted by the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party in 1913, a program which was first intended to apply to a period of "capitalist democracy" but was retained after the establishment of the Soviet government in 1917. The first point in the program stated: "Insofar as national peace is possible in a capitalist society, which is based on exploitation, profits and wrangling, such peace is obtainable only by means of a thoroughly, consistently democratic, republican governmental structure, guaranteeing complete equality to all nations and languages, and by the inclusion in the con-

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stitution of a basic law nullifying every kind of privilege of one nation and every kind of violation of the right of the national minorities."[2] 871 191

While defending this point in the program, Lenin explained that he did not desire to turn Russia into a "Babelesque confusion" in which one national group could not communicate with another; and he thought that sooner or later the minorities of Russia would become assimilated, probably through adopting the Russian language he cherished so highly and which he expected would be taught as a subject in the schools.[3] However, Lenin argued, such assimilation could be achieved not by compulsion, not by the Tsarist method of repression, but by the natural process of commercial and industrial development and intercourse. To force the minorities to study the Russian language by "the use of the stick" merely estranged them and turned them against that language. If, on the other hand, the minorities were allowed to use their own language in education, they would willingly accept the study of Russian also and would, as in America, voluntarily use it because of its advantage in economic intercourse. Hence, wherever minorities lived compactly, their languages would be used as the medium of instruction in the schools; and where members of minorities were isolated among other nationalities, they would be given the opportunity to study the language of their nationality. 186 829

Although the Provisional Government, ushered in by the February Revolution in 1917, intended to alter the policy of Russification and proclaimed linguistic freedom for the minorities, it did not succeed in overcoming the hostility of the minority nationalists who were then rapidly extending their influence among the peasantry. The Provisional Government, for example, wrangled with the Ukrainian nationalists not only on the question of political autonomy, but also on the expediency of Ukrainizing some of the army units; and in the Ukraine itself the former Tsarist officials remaining at their posts obstructed the Ukrainization of the school system. As the discontent of the peasantry with the land policy of the Provisional Government fed the flames of Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin was more than ever resolved to overcome minority hostility by, among other things, establishing linguistic equality.

After the October Revolution had put the Bolsheviks in control, the Soviet régime introduced into the schools the policy of national

[2] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach i Rešenijach S'ezdov, Konferencii i Plenumov Ts.K., 1898–1932* (Moscow, 1933), I, 238–240.

[3] For the views of Lenin contained in this paragraph, see Lenin, V. I., *Sočinenija* (Moscow, 1935), XVI, pp. 509, 551–554, 595–596; XVII, pp. 66, 89, 114–115, 133, 139–154, 178–181, 361.

871 languages as the medium of instruction. Lenin stigmatized as "Great-
191 Russian Chauvinists," those people in the Commissariat of Education
186 who favored teaching only in the Russian language; and referring
529 specifically to the Ukrainians in a resolution he wrote for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, he stated that if the Bolsheviks wanted to overcome the hostility of the Ukrainian peasants (a hostility quite clearly evident during the Civil War from 1918 to 1920), the Ukrainian language could not be pushed into the background of either educational or political life.[4] Stalin argued that education in the minority languages would facilitate the raising of the cultural level of the minorities to that of the Russians and would thereby forge bonds of union between them.[5] The educational policy for the minorities, he stated, must have it as its aim: "to develop national culture; to build up a wide network of courses and schools for both general education and vocational and technical training, teaching in the native languages, for the purpose of training Soviet, party, trade-union and economic cadres from among the native people."[6] These views of Lenin and Stalin were incorporated into party resolutions, adopted in the decade after 1919, on education and on national policy generally.[7]

871 It was, of course, much easier to make speeches and pass resolutions than to realize the aims set forth therein. Even in the relatively advanced Ukraine it promised to be very difficult to establish a "wide network" of schools giving instruction in the national languages. The heritage of buildings, school supplies and qualified teachers bequeathed by Tsarism was meager in comparison with the needs of a régime aspiring to universal education: in the Kiev Educational District, for example, only twenty-two of every thousand people attended school in 1913.[8] Educational facilities, moreover, were reduced by the disastrous Civil War, during which constant fighting, famine, typhus, cholera, economic collapse and bankruptcy levied a high tax on the educational system; and the lack of funds and personnel long hampered its recuperation.[9] By 1924 the system approached its status

[4] *Ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 155, 552–554.

[5] J. Stalin, *Stati i Reči ob Ukraine* (Kiev, 1936), pp. 111–112, 194–195.

[6] J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (New York, 1935), p. 208.

[7] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach* . . . I, pp. 155, 637.

[8] The Kiev Educational District comprised the provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Podolia, Volhynia and Chernigov. The number of pupils is from Ministerstvo Narodnogo Prosvieshcheniia, *Vsepodanneiši Otčet, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1915), p. 196. The estimate of the population is from Centralny Statističeski Komitet, *Ežegodnik Rossii, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 33–59.

[9] For the condition of the educational system up to 1924, see *Urkainska Socialistična Radianska Respublika. Zbirnik Spravozdan Narodnich Komisarijativ i centralnich ustanov U.S.R.R. ta Upolnivaženich Narodnich Komisarijativ R.S.F.S.R. 5-mu Vseukrainskomu Z'izdovi Rad Ukraini. Otčet Narodnogo Komisariati Osviti U.S.R.R. za 1920 rik* (*Kharkov*,

under Tsarism, but a long road had to be travelled before all children 871
would have an opportunity to attend schools. Buildings would have to be constructed, teachers trained, text-books written and published. The Ukrainian government first endeavored to provide "ele- 871
mentary" or four-year schools for all children from eight to twelve 658
years of age, then to expand these schools into "incomplete middle" or seven-year schools, and finally to replace these with "complete middle" or ten-year schools; and, in the meanwhile, the government established technical schools and higher educational institutions to train engineers, doctors, actors and other types of "socialist cadres." This quantitative growth of the school system was matched by its growth qualitatively, as measured from the point of view of the language policy. In spite of the shortages of teachers knowing Ukrainian [191]
and the languages of the other minorities,[1] the almost complete absence of text-books in these languages, and the appearance of considerable opposition on the part of political leaders, of teachers and even of parents, the Russian language was gradually replaced as the medium of instruction by the other languages.

As early as March 1919 an order of the Commissariat of Education 871
of the newly re-established Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic de- 191
clared that the Russification policy was abrogated; that the Commis- 656
sariat would aid in the development of the long-repressed Ukrainian language; and that "in view of the elimination of a governmental language as such, and of the declaration that all local languages are equal, the Commissariat of Education gives the local population the right to determine in which language teaching must be carried on in the schools, safeguarding simultaneously the interests of [other] national groups."[10] Wherever the language of instruction remained Russian, a second language — also chosen by the local population itself — was to be taught as a special subject. In September 1920 this [671]
provisional order was strengthened by a law of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. The law instructed the Commissariat of Education to draw up a plan for schools of all grades and categories with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.[11] Ukrainian was to be studied as an obligatory subject in all teacher-training institutions and was to be used as the language of instruction in some of them. The law also ordered the Government Publishing House to issue "a sufficient quantity of text-books as well as *belles-lettres* and other publications in the Ukrainian language."

1921), pp. 3–6; *Zbirnik Uzakonen ta Rosporiadžen Robitničo-Seljanskogo Urjady Ukraini za 1924 rik*, 1924, part 1, sec. 271, pp. 800–803; Sojuz Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R., *Pjatysesojuznyi S'ezd Sojuza Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R. Stenografičeski Otčet* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 172–174.

[10] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1919, sec. 260, p. 347.

[11] *Ibid.*, 1920, part 1, sec. 509, pp. 712–713.

[1] [Prior to 1924 -- Analyze]

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871 191 656 During 1923 and 1924 several laws designed to provide elementary education for all children specified that this education was to be conducted in Ukrainian where that nationality predominated, and in the languages of the "national minorities" (minorities within the Ukrainian nationality — Poles, Germans, Jews, Czechs and so forth) wherever these minorities formed compact groups.[12] The laws outlined a series of practical measures to make this rule effective: teachers knowing Ukrainian were to be assigned to schools in which they were needed; text-books and other reading materials in Ukrainian were to be increased; pedagogical schools and courses were to be transferred to Ukrainian; pedagogical journals were to be Ukrainized; and all classes for teaching illiterates and semi-literates, except those for the non-Ukrainian minorities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian. Provision was also made for the obligatory study of Ukrainian as a separate subject in all schools being conducted in other languages.

These laws gave impetus to the process of Ukrainizing the "general" (elementary, incomplete middle and middle) schools; and the process was aided by the presence of many nationalists who had formerly opposed the Soviet régime but who had been pardoned and put to work in the Commissariat of Education. In 1923, according to a newspaper report, 47 percent of the general schools had been Ukrainized, while plans had been made to provide the Ukrainian pupils with Ukrainian schools by 1925.[13] During the years from 1923 to 1925 the realization of these plans was proceeding most effectively in the rural areas, where the largest proportion of the Ukrainian population was to be found. In the province of Kharkov, for example, 20 percent of the general schools in the school year 1923–24 were still using Russian and 49 percent were "mixed schools" — schools using Russian in some classes and Ukrainian in others; but 69 percent of the schools in the city of Kharkov were still using Russian exclusively.[14] A picture of the manifold difficulties encountered in this transitional period was presented by the district of Krolevetski in the province of Chernigov.[15] In 1924 instruction in the elementary schools was supposed to be given in Ukrainian; but a majority of the teachers hardly knew the language, and they actually used a jumble of Ukrainian and Russian. In the middle schools the situation was worse: a majority of the teachers not only did not know Ukrainian, but considered themselves exempt from learning it because they had been former

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[12] *Ibid.*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–899; 1924, part 1, sec. 272, p. 801; 1924, part 1, sec. 300, pp. 932–933.

[13] *Visti* (organ of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Executive Committee), Oct. 28, 1923.

[14] *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1923; see also *ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1924. [15] *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1924.

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teachers in the gymnasium and therefore possessed "higher qualifications"; and these teachers showed "active or passive resistance" to Ukrainization. In this district, as in many others, the complaint was made that the schools lacked Ukrainian text-books and other such reading materials.[16]

These difficulties were gradually being overcome. By 1924 the publication of text-books and children's literature in Russian had almost ceased in the Ukraine, and the publishing houses were concentrating on Ukrainian materials.[17] Ukrainian was being taught in all pedagogical schools and teacher-training courses.[18] The results of this step were apparent in 1925. In Chernigov province, for example, 67 percent of the teachers had mastered Ukrainian, and the proportion of Ukrainian schools — which then stood at 54 percent — was being raised as rapidly as the teachers who had recently learned Ukrainian could be transferred to the districts where they were needed.[19] [214]

During 1925 and 1926 the whole process of Ukrainization was raised to the status of a "high-pressure (*udarnaja*) campaign. "Attention was directed even to the *crèches* because, as one writer explained, the early years of a child's life are of the utmost significance in his linguistic development.[20] But a report from Chernigov in 1926 stated that the teachers were agitating among the peasantry against the Ukrainization of the schools; they were "striving with all their forces to discredit the Ukrainian language, to arouse the peasants to adopt resolutions against Ukrainizing the schools, and so on."[21] This was denied by the school officials in the region from which the report emanated,[22] but similar items of news came from other regions. One writer cited a specific teacher in the Don Basin: although she was supposed to teach the Ukrainian language as a separate subject, she could hardly speak it and she referred to it as "a terribly ugly and crude language."[23] Another reporter, again from Chernigov, produced evidence to illustrate the hostility of both parents and teachers: because of this hostility a region with an overwhelmingly Ukrainian population contained thirty-five Russian schools, one Ukrainian and one mixed school.[24]

[16] See *ibid.*, Mar. 4, 1924, Mar. 5, 1924.

[17] *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1924. [18] *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1923.

[19] *Kommunist* (organ of the Central Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine), Mar. 21, 1925.

[20] *Proletarska Pravda* (organ of the Kiev Regional Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, of the Kiev Regional Executive Committee and of the Kiev Regional Trade-Union Council), Aug. 26, 1926.

[21] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926. [22] *Ibid.*, July 25, 1926.

[23] *Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1926. [24] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926.

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871 However, the Ukrainization of education slowly approached its
191 goal. It is impossible to determine the actual number of Ukrainian
656 children studying in Ukrainian schools, for the school statistics contained only the total number of children studying in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish and other schools; and while some Ukrainian children studied in non-Ukrainian schools, many non-Ukrainian children studied in Ukrainian schools. However, an approximate idea of the extent of Ukrainization can be gained by comparing the proportion of school children in Ukrainian schools with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. According to the school census of December, 1927, ten years after the Bolshevik Revolution, 75.8 percent of all pupils in elementary schools were in schools conducted entirely in Ukrainian; 6.9 percent were in schools in which some classes were conducted in Ukrainian and some in other languages; and 10.6 per cent were in Russian schools.[25] As the Ukrainians in 1927 were estimated at 80.1 percent of the total population and the Russians at 9.2 percent, the elementary schools might be considered to be nearing the goal of Ukrainization. The seven-year schools, then the predominant type of middle schools, lagged behind the elementary schools because they were relatively more numerous in the Russianized cities; of the pupils in these schools, 60.7 per cent were in Ukrainian schools, 14.7 percent in mixed schools and 15.5 per cent in Russian schools.

In some places, particularly in some cities, the Ukrainization policy overshot its mark. Whereas the Ukrainian population of Kiev was estimated at 41.1 percent of the total population in 1927, 49.8 percent of its school children were attending Ukrainian schools, 5.9 percent mixed schools and 30.6 percent Russian schools.[26] The proportion of pupils in Ukrainian schools was also greater than the proportion of the Ukrainian population in Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk. This situation, as shall be noted below, was regarded unfavorably by some writers in the newspapers, but the charges of "over-Ukrainization" received little attention from the government until after 1933. During the period from 1923 to 1933 the government was concentrating its efforts upon suppressing Russian nationalism and upon providing the Ukrainian and other non-Russian nationalities with schools conducted in their own languages.

874 In this period much attention was also given to the Ukrainization
191 of technical and higher educational institutions, but in these institu-
656 tions the lack of teachers knowing Ukrainian, of text-books and of good-will was an even greater handicap than in the Ukrainization of

[25] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini na 15 Grudnja 1927 (Peperedni Pidsumki Škilnogo Perepisy)*, Kharkov, 1928, pp. 20–21. [26] *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

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the general schools. As early as 1923 the government ordered the gradual Ukrainization of various technical schools ("technicums," "workers' faculties," etc.) and of higher educational institutions (medical, art, pedagogical, engineering and other "institutes").[27] Vacancies in their teaching and administrative staffs were to be filled preferably with people knowing Ukrainian; some courses were to be conducted in Ukrainian immediately; all students were obliged to study Ukrainian history, literature, economic geography and language; Ukrainian dictionaries and lists of Ukrainian equivalents for Russian scientific terms were to be issued in order to hasten Ukrainization. After the promulgation of this law the process of Ukrainizing technical and higher educational institutions proceeded under the constant prodding of the Commissariat of Education;[28] but by the summer of 1926 only a small proportion of these schools were considered fully Ukrainized, the chief obstacle being that the faculties did not know Ukrainian: in Odessa and Kharkov, for example, only six percent of the professors in the higher educational institutions had mastered that language.[29] At this time the Central Committee of the Party stepped into the picture and ordered an intensification of efforts to Ukrainize these institutions.[30]

A lively flurry of activity to bring the technical and higher schools into line followed the Central Committee's directive, which was passed along by the local committees.[31] The Commissariat of Education ordered the Ukrainization of all technical schools, except those serving national minorities, by the beginning of the school year 1927–28.[32] The Scientific-Pedagogical Society of the Ukrainian Academy of Science held a series of conferences to improve the teaching of the Ukrainian language, literature and history; to work out and distribute lists of Ukrainian scientific terms; and to establish Ukrainization courses for faculty members.[33] Finally, the Ukrainian government took a long step toward the Ukrainization of these schools when its basic statute on education, adopted in 1927, formulated a series of definite rules pertaining to technical and higher schools.[34] All students entering these institutions were to be examined in their knowledge, unless they had graduated from Ukrainian middle schools. Professors, other teachers and scientific workers were to possess a knowledge of Ukrainian equivalent to that demanded of government officials, and

[27] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . ., 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–897.

[28] E.g. *Kommunist*, Mar. 6, 1925; Mar. 20, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, July 6, 1926.

[29] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 6, 1926. [30] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1926.

[31] This was done, for example, by the Kiev Regional Committee of the Party.—*Ibid.*, July 15, 1926. [32] *Ibid.*, July 14, 1926. [33] *Ibid.*, July 4, 1926, July 22, 1926.

[34] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . ., 1927, part 1, sec. 157, pp. 626–628.

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no professor or other teacher could be appointed unless he could conduct his courses in Ukrainian.[35] Institutions for scientific research and for preparing research workers, including the universities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian; and candidates for degrees in such institutions were not to be accepted until they had passed an examination in that language.

Progress in Ukrainizing the technical and higher educational institutions was indicated by the school census of 1927. The Ukrainian language was used for instruction in educational establishments embracing 14.2 percent of the students in the higher institutes, 33.7 percent of the students in the technicums and 47.4 percent of those in other types of technical schools.[36] Although the actually Ukrainized institutes and technicums were not numerous, many of the others were then undergoing Ukrainization. Establishments using both Ukrainian and Russian contained 74.8 percent of the students in the institutes, 43.7 percent of those in the technicums and 33.3 percent of those in other types of technical schools. Only 7.1 percent of the students in the institutes, 17.7 percent of those in the technicums and 13.7 percent in other technical schools still studied exclusively in Russian.[37]

After 1927 the process of Ukrainization proceeded steadily, but in 1929 the Party and the government still regarded the condition of the higher and technical schools pessimistically. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, stated that a considerable part of the teachers and professors in these institutions were hostile to Ukrainization;[38] and newspaper reports bore him out. In Odessa, for example, Professors Tolstoi and Demetz refused to teach in Ukrainian and considered that all lecturers who did so were "renegades."[39] In 1929 the Commissariat of Education was forced to rule that all students intending to graduate from higher educational institutions would first have to pass an examination in the Ukrainian language equivalent to that demanded of government officials.[40]

[35] Only students and professors coming to the Ukraine from other republics were to be permitted additional time to fulfill the requirements.

[36] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–51. In this period technicums were classified with higher educational institutions rather than with other types of technical or "professional" schools, which were in turn classified as middle schools. The other technical schools included "workers' faculties," "workers' evening professional schools," "schools of the working youth," "long-term courses," "schools of brigade apprenticeship," and "trade-union schools."

[37] This data was given in a speech by Kossior, published in *Proletari* (organ of the central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine and of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade-Unions), July 17, 1930. [38] *Ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1929.

[39] *Komsomolec Ukraini* (organ of the Central Committee of the Leninist Communist Union of the Youth of the Ukraine), Mar. 16, 1929. [40] *Proletari*, Apr. 25, 1919.

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At this time, when the whole problem of Ukrainizing the highly 874
Russianized Don Basin and other industrial regions in the Ukraine 191
was being attacked, the failure to Ukrainize the school system was 656
frequently mentioned.[41] Even a directive of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in January 1930, stated that in the industrial regions only the schools for general education and for extirpating illiteracy had been Ukrainized; and the directive ordered the Commissariat of Education to examine the faculty members of the technical and higher schools on their knowledge of Ukrainian, and to take steps to insure that these people possessed such a knowledge.[42]

During 1930 and 1931 the reports on the Ukrainization of technical and higher schools were limited largely to items of "self-criticism" which pointed out obstacles or found fault with specific institutions and individuals. The professors in the Medical Institute in Kharkov now knew Ukrainian, but the process of Ukrainization was being retarded by the lack of Ukrainian text-books.[43] In the Lisenko Theatrical Institute in Kiev the classes were conducted in Ukrainian, but the reporter complained that extra-class work was still being carried on in Russian.[44] An investigation of the Institute of Consumer Coöperation and of the Veterinary Institute revealed that the majority of the students still spoke Russian among themselves and that two professors of the former institution refused to instruct their classes in Ukrainian.[45] Both professors and students in the Construction Institute and the Chemical Institute were reported to be hostile to the use of Ukrainian: one of the professors had been discharged for this reason, and the students had declared Ukrainization to be proper only for the middle schools. Because the library lacked Ukrainian books and only three of the hundred and twenty-two journals received were in Ukrainian, the administration of the Chemical Institute was upbraided for opposition to Ukrainization.[46] The Textile and Mining Institutes were also cited as examples of the failure to Ukrainize properly.[47]

The years up to 1933 constituted the high-pressure period of 871
Ukrainization; after 1933 the government concentrated its attention 563
chiefly upon suppressing the tendency to "over-Ukrainize," where 652
such a tendency was discernible, and upon rectifying the results of this tendency which had already appeared. This was not a new pol-

[41] E. g., *Komsomolec Ukraini*, May 16, 1929, June 26, 1929.
[42] *Proletari*, Jan. 3, 1930. [43] *Ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1930.
[44] *Proletarska Pravda*, Sept. 22, 1931. [45] *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1931.
[46] *Ibid.*, June 30, 1931. [47] *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1931.

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icy; it was, rather, a change of emphasis from one part of the linguistic policy to another. Ukrainian schools for Ukrainian children remained, but now the stress was placed upon schools for the national minorities within the Ukrainian majority, and particularly for the Russian inhabitants of the Ukraine.

The Ukrainization of education, it has been noted, was not intended to apply to schools in areas where there were members of non-Ukrainian nationalities living compactly. On the contrary, the educational policy anticipated that every child should have an opportunity to study in his or her mother tongue. This was stated in all of the important legislation on the languages in the school system, beginning with the preliminary order of the Commissariat of Education in 1919.[48] A law of 1924 had altered the rule on the required size of classes, in order to facilitate the establishment of small schools serving scattered groups of the minority peoples.[49] Other laws and directives in the period from 1924 to 1928 contained clauses ordering increased funds for general and technical education for the minorities, the preparation of teachers for their schools and the publication of textbooks in their languages.[50] Steps were frequently taken by the Commissariat of Education to expand the network of schools serving these peoples.[51] The Commissariat contained a special Council of National Minorities, consisting of Jewish, Latvian, German, Polish, Bulgarian, Czech and Moldavian bureaus; and the provincial departments of education had inspectors for minority education, sometimes separate inspectors for German, Jewish, Polish or Czech schools.[52] Finally, the Communist Party itself, through its directives and the speeches of its leaders in the period from 1924 to 1928, constantly warned that during the process of Ukrainization the interests of the minorities were to be protected.[53]

Efforts to provide schools for the minorities received much publicity between 1924 and 1928. Only a few reports can be cited. In

[48] See especially *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1919, sec. 260, p. 347; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, pp. 626–627. See above pp. 129–130. [49] *Ibid.*, 1924, part 1, sec. 300, p. 933.

[50] E. g. *Visti*, Dec. 10, 1924; *Kommunist*, July 3, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, Apr. 8, 1928.

[51] E.g. *Visti*, Mar. 9, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, July 23, 1927.

[52] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1925, part 1, sec. 218, p. 587; 1925, part 1, sec. 285, p. 10; 1926, part 1, sec. 106, p. 221.

[53] E.g. the directive of the Central Committee of the Party in *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925; the resolution of the Kiev Regional Party Committee in *Proletarska Pravda*, July 15, 1926; the speech of Liubchenko (chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars) in *ibid.*, May 11, 1926; speeches of Kaganovich (secretary of the Central Committee of the Party) and of Skripnik (Commissar of Education) and the resolution of the 10th Congress of the Party in *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii (Bil'ševikiv) Ukraini, 20–29 Listopada 1927 p. Stenografičnii zvit* (Kharkov, 1928), pp. 126, 444, 574; the resolution of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade-Unions in *Proletarska Pravda*, Apr. 7, 1928.

Chernigov the school assigned to the Jewish language — which in the Soviet Union means Yiddish rather than Hebrew — was using that language even before the schools for Ukrainian children were using Ukrainian.[54] A report from Kiev described a campaign undertaken to draw Polish students into the Polish Pedagogical Institute, into the Polish departments of the technical schools, and into other Polish educational units.[55] In the meanwhile, the Jewish Pedagogical Institute in Kiev was being moved into a new building provided by the Commissariat of Education, and elementary schools were being established for Czechs and Assyrians.[56] Dnepropetrovsk reported that its German school was being enlarged.[57] The city of Kharkov found it could not open a school for Koreans (!) because no teachers were available, and the Kharkov City Committee of the Party asked the Vladivostok City Committee and the Communist University of the Toiling East to supply a few Korean teachers.[58]

No evidence that Kharkov ever succeeded in opening a Korean school has come into the hands of the author; but in 1926 the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. complimented the Ukrainian Republic on its attention to the educational needs of the minorities; and the school statistics for 1927 indicated that a considerable number of children of the minorities were studying in their own languages. Of all the pupils in general (four and seven year) schools, 2.9 percent studied in Jewish schools; 1.4 percent in German schools; 0.9 percent in Polish schools and 0.8 percent in schools using other minority languages: Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Tartar, Swedish, Greek, Assyrian and Moldavian.[59] Schools using both Ukrainian or Russian and some other language or languages embraced 2.1 percent of all the pupils. Since Jews composed 5.4 percent of the total population, Poles 1.6 percent, Germans 1.4 percent and other minorities 2.1 percent, it is evident that many of the children of the smaller nationalities went to Ukrainian or Russian schools. This fact can probably be accounted for in part by the lack of buildings and teachers, by the scattered distribution of the smaller minorities and by the indifference of the smaller nationalities themselves. The Jews, for example, have tended to assimilate into the Russian nationality in the large cities and into the Ukrainian nationality in the smaller towns and villages. The younger generation of Jews favor Russian or Ukrainian as their social language, and many Jewish parents prefer to put their

[54] *Visti*, Oct. 2, 1924.
[55] *Ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1926.
[56] *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925.
[57] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 24, 1926.
[58] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1926.
[59] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–25.

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871 563 656 children into Russian or Ukrainian schools. One reporter in 1933 gave evidence to show that some Jewish parents had desired their children to attend non-Jewish schools, but that pressure had been brought to bear upon them by zealous officials to send their children to the Jewish schools newly constructed for them.[60]

As an illustration of the attitude of the children themselves, an experience of the author may be pertinent. Upon visiting a Jewish school in Kiev, he observed that some of the pupils were carrying Russian text-books; and to the enquiry as to whether no Yiddish books existed for those subjects, several pupils replied: "Oh, yes; but we like to read the Russian texts better than the Yiddish." The school happened to be located in the old Jewish section of Kiev, and undoubtedly the children were sent to this school either because they spoke Yiddish at home (but not amongst themselves) or because of the superior facilities offered by a new institution; and if they had been able to decide for themselves, it is possible that many of these children would have chosen to attend Russian or even Ukrainian [191] schools. Russian is the language of a culture stronger than the secular non-Hebrew culture conveyed by the Yiddish language in the Soviet Union; Russian is also the language spoken in Moscow and generally throughout the U.S.S.R.; and all those pupils, and parents, too, who ever expect to move freely about the Union must have complete mastery of the Russian language. What is true of the Jews is also true of the Poles, Germans, Czechs and others.

874 563 191 That the children of the minorities had to master the Russian and Ukrainian languages if they desired to continue their education on the higher levels is indicated by the nature of the technical and higher educational institutions in the Ukraine. It was impossible to set up an electrical engineering institute for a handful of Poles or Assyrians, or to establish every type of higher educational institution for the Jews. Hence, as the statistics for 1927 indicated, most of the technical and higher educational institutions taught in Ukrainian, Russian or a mixture of the two. Of the students in the lower technical schools (technical schools other than technicums) only 1.4 percent studied in Jewish schools, 0.1 percent in Polish schools, 0.3 percent in German schools, 0.1 percent in the schools of other minorities, and 3.0 percent studied in schools that had one or more of the minority languages together with either Russian or Ukrainian or both.[61] There were no institutes using exclusively the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian minority languages, although 3.9 percent of the students studied

[60] *Proletarska Pravda*, Mar. 29, 1933.

[61] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 48–51.

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in institutes that conducted part of their work in Russian or Ukrainian and part in other languages. Of the students in the technicums, 1.5 percent studied in technicums using the Jewish language, 0.5 percent in those using Polish, 0.7 percent in those using German, 0.5 per cent in those using other non-Russian minority languages, and 0.5 percent in technicums using Russian or Ukrainian and one or more of the other languages. These figures do not signify that the Jewish, Polish or German children were deprived of a chance to study in technical and higher schools; on the contrary, the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian student body in these establishments, as will be noted below, was relatively larger than the Ukrainian and Russian student body.

The work of establishing schools using the languages of the smaller nationalities continued after 1927; in fact, it was given additional impetus by the campaign of 1933–35 against nationalist influences in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education. But before examining the effects of this campaign, it is necessary to note the attitude toward Russian schools. At the core of the process of Ukrainization was the transformation of Russian into Ukrainian schools; and it was not surprising that there appeared in at least some areas a tendency to deprive the Russian-speaking population of an opportunity to study in Russian schools. This was, to be sure, not at all the intention of the government. In its decree in expanding general education, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee ordered that "special attention be directed toward assuring schools with instruction in the Russian language for all children of the Russian nationality."[62] But, as has been noted above, the proportion of pupils studying in Ukrainian schools in some places — especially in the larger cities — was greater than the proportion of Ukrainians in the population. A writer in *Proletarska Pravda* (*Proletarian Truth*) claimed in 1926 that the general schools in Kiev were being over-Ukrainized.[63] He was answered by another writer, who argued that whereas the criticism was based on an examination of the number of *schools*, there was still a larger proportion of *classes* being held in Russian than the proportion of Russians in the total population; and the second writer denounced the first for bringing grist to the mill of the enemies of the Soviet national policy.[64] The criticism was proven correct by the school statistics for 1927; but since the process of Ukrainization was in full swing and since at this time the Party considered the Russian nationalists

[62] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1926, part 1, sec. 453, p. 1246.
[63] *Proletarska Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1926. [64] *Ibid.*

871 in the Ukraine more dangerous than the Ukrainian variety, no addi-
191 tional attention was given to the problem of Russian children.
656 In 1933, however, the offensive against Ukrainian nationalism occasioned a review of the Ukrainization process. Ukrainian nationalism had been considered a dangerous force since 1926, when Shumskii and Khvilovoi — two important figures in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education — were censured for desiring "to orientUkrainian culture on capitalist Europe rather than on socialist Moscow." The Party became still more alert to signs of nationalism after the uncovering in 1929 of the Society for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, a secret organization headed by such outstanding nationalists as Efre-
[474] mov, Germaize and Nikovskii. But it was the campaign against the collectivization of agriculture which occasioned the intensive campaign against the nationalists. The Party regarded the opposition to collectivization as the result in large part of the nationalists, and it set out to remove them from every branch of political, economic and
[687] cultural activity. The central figure in the campaign was Nicholas Skripnik, an "Old Bolshevik" who was accused of having fallen under the influence of his nationalist colleagues and was removed from his position as Commissar of Education in March 1933. Even before his removal, however, the Commissariat of Education and all of its activities were under fire.

Charges of over-Ukrainization of the school system were first launched in an editorial appearing in *Kommunist* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party) in February 1933, and reprinted in other newspapers. The editorial said: "The mistakes and perversions in realizing the Ukrainization of the schools led in a considerable number of places to neglecting and ignoring the interests of the national minorities and especially the needs and requirements of the Russian toiling masses living in the Ukraine. Among responsible circles of the Commissariat there was concocted the 'theory' that the majority of the children in the cities, small towns and other labor centers speak a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon, and that therefore the majority of these children should study in the Ukrainian language. As a result, a significant part of the Russian toiling masses were deprived of schools in their native language and actually subjected to the forced Ukrainization which the Party had
[563] condemned in all of its directives."[65] Shortly after this editorial appeared, an article in *Proletarska Pravda* stated that in Kiev only 49 percent of the Russian children and 30 percent of the Jewish children studied in schools conducted in their native languages; that although

[65] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1933.

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some of the others studied in mixed Ukrainian-Russian or Ukrainian-Jewish schools, they were "mechanically transferred" after the first four years to classes using Ukrainian.[66]

Zatonski, who replaced Skripnik as Commissar of Education, stated that the Ukrainization of Russian children had taken place in Kharkov and in the Don Basin as well as in Kiev; and he pointed to Krasnolutzki District, where the number of Russian schools had dropped from twenty in 1930 to twelve in 1932.[67] He also declared that in Kherson and Makiivitz there were no Russian elementary schools at all; and that in some places there had been a voluntary Ukrainization of Russian children because the buildings and equipment provided for the Russian schools were greatly inferior to those of the Ukrainian schools.[68] Additional evidence was forthcoming in 1934 and 1935 to show some enforced Ukrainization of Polish children and of those of other minorities, as well as of some of the Russian children; and this situation was denounced as an example of "deliberate nationalist wrecking."[69]

This campaign against over-Ukrainization, however, was not intended to lead to a revival of the Russification policy. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was adamant on this point. He explained in 1933 that the results of over-Ukrainization would have to be eliminated because this was demanded by internationalism, "by the brotherly interests of the toilers of all the nationalities in the Ukraine."[70] But, he went on, the Russian nationalists would not be allowed to take advantage of mistakes already committed in order to reverse the policy of Ukrainization; on the contrary, there would be a further drive for "Bolshevik Ukrainization." A similar view was taken in 1934 by Postishev, the assistant secretary of the Central Committee and the official most actively engaged in hunting down the Ukrainian nationalists.[71]

According to the latest available material, the Ukrainization of education has kept pace with the expansion of general education, and a greater proportion of pupils were studying in Ukrainian schools in 1937 than in 1927. By 1937 the general schools embraced 5,364,800 children as compared with 1,678,100 in 1913 — an increase of 319 percent over the pre-War year; and whereas twenty-two of every thousand people attended elementary school in the Kiev Educational District in 1912, in 1937 the figure for all of the Ukraine had risen to

[66] *Ibid.*, Mar. 29, 1933. [67] *Visti*, May 1, 1933. [68] *Ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1933.
[69] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1934 (speech of Zatonski); Aug. 22, 1934, Jan. 5, 1935.
[70] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1933. [71] *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1934.

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871 one hundred seventeen of every thousand people.[72] The middle schools
162 had expanded greatly by 1937; the fifth to tenth grades embraced
212 1,927,100 pupils in 1937 as compared with 347,900 pupils in 1928, an increase of 554 percent in ten years.[73]

871 While the school system was expanding quantitatively, the number
191 of children studying in Ukrainian schools was also increasing. During the school year 1935–36, the year that marked the end of the campaign to check over-Ukrainization, 83.0 percent of the pupils in the general schools were studying in the Ukrainian language. This percentage coincides roughly with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. It also represents a higher percentage of pupils in Ukrainian schools than attended such schools in 1927, a fact which resulted from the expansion of middle schools in the rural areas and from the decline in the number of children attending schools in some of the other languages. During the school year 1935–36, 12.7 percent of all the pupils in the general schools studied in Russian, 1.4 percent in Jewish, 1.3 percent in German, 0.5 percent in Moldavian and 0.5 percent in Polish schools.[74] In absolute numbers, there had been an increase between 1927 and 1935–36 in the pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Greek languages; there had been a decline in the number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Swedish and Assyrian languages; and schools had been established for Uzbeks, Belorussians, Kirghiz, Kazaks, Turkomens and Latvians.[75]

874 With regard to the technical and higher educational institutions, the author has no figures on the number of students in the Ukrainized

[72] The figure for the number of pupils in 1937 is taken from *Socislističeskoe Stroitelstvo Sojuza S.S.S.R., 1933–1938* gg. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1939), p. 163.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[74] *Socialistična Ukraina. Statistični Zbirnik* (Kiev, 1937), p. 222.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 222. *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–26. A comparison of absolute figures for 1927 and 1935–36 must take into account that the statistics for 1927 gave the total number of pupils in mixed schools but not the number studying in various languages used in these schools. The number of pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Czech languages in 1935–36 was greater than the number studying in their own schools in 1927 plus the total number in mixed schools using these languages for some classes. The conclusion that there was a decline in the total number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Assyrian and Swedish languages is arrived at by considering roughly the number of pupils in mixed schools studying in these languages. For example, in 1927 there were 68,836 pupils in Jewish schools; in 1935–36 there were 69,211 pupils studying in the Jewish language; hence, there were 375 more pupils *studying in Jewish* in 1935–36 than had been *attending Jewish schools* in 1927. But in 1927 there were 11,603 pupils in mixed schools using Jewish and either Russian or Ukrainian; in all probability there were more than 375 pupils in these schools who were being taught in Jewish; and by 1935–36 the surplus above 375 had been lost to Jewish classes, indicating a decline in the total number studying in Jewish.

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schools for the years after 1927; and one might conclude from the lack of such figures in the important statistical collections that Ukrainization has ceased or has been reversed. However, this conclusion would not be consistent with the continued stress on the preparation of "Ukrainian cadres," which was the primary purpose of Ukrainizing these institutions. The need for Ukrainian engineers, agronomists, writers and scientific workers was emphasized both by Kossior and by the resolution of the Thirteenth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1937.[76] Kossior, moreover, stated that there had been a large increase in the number of Ukrainian professors, instructors, scientific workers and candidates for higher degrees. Finally, the number of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technical and higher schools had grown absolutely and relatively. Between 1927 and 1936 the total number of students in the technicums had increased from 29,300 to 133,300; in the workers' faculties, from 7,400 to 53,500; and in the institutes from 28,200 to 108,200.[77] The increase for the technicums was 455 percent, for the workers' faculties 722 percent and for the institutes 384 percent. In the meanwhile, the proportion of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technicums had risen from 58.0 to 75.3 percent; in the workers' faculties from 57.9 to 65.0 percent; and in the institutes from 48.8 to 53.7 percent.[78] The number of students from among the minorities had increased absolutely but had fallen relatively. Since the increasing proportion of the students were Ukrainians (probably chiefly graduates of Ukrainian general schools and therefore favorable to and easily adaptable to courses conducted in Ukrainian), and since the number of Ukrainian faculty members had risen, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the process of Ukrainizing the technical and higher institutions had continued even after the intensive campaign against the nationalists was undertaken in 1933.

As for the obligatory study of the Ukrainian language in the schools of the other nationalities — provided for in laws of 1920 and 1927[79] — no change has taken place. An order of the Commissariat of Education, issued in December 1940 and just received by the author, clearly indicates this fact. The order is designed to facilitate the study of Ukrainian by children who have come from other republics and, having entered non-Ukrainian schools, are handicapped in the study of

[76] *Visti*, May 30, 1937; June 6, 1937. [77] *Socialistična Ukraina* . . . , p. 133.

[78] The percentages for 1927 are taken from *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii (Bilšovikiv) Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–52. The percentages for 1936 are from *Socialistična Ukraina* . . . , p. 152.

[79] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1920, part 1, sec. 509, p. 713; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626.

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this subject.[80] Declaring that the mastering of Ukrainian is obligatory for these children as well as for all other pupils in non-Ukrainian schools, the order states that the younger ones shall be sent to lower grades to study Ukrainian; the older ones may continue along with their classmates, and are to be marked leniently in this subject; and all are to be given special assistance in their study of Ukrainian so that by the time they graduate they may be able to fulfill the requirements demanded of the other pupils. Hence, the campaign against nationalism has not altered this aspect of the Ukrainization policy.

Perhaps the most significant result of the campaign against the Ukrainian nationalists was the effort to point up the importance of the Russian language and the value of Russian culture for the Soviet Union's minorities. One aspect of this effort was the greater emphasis placed on the study of the Russian language in the non-Russian schools of the Ukraine. A thorough mastering of Russian, regarded as a "second" and not as a "foreign language," had long been intended by the Party leaders, and had been provided for in the legislation on education. The important law on the Ukrainization of education in 1923 stated that "because the Russian language has all-governmental and all-Union significance and because it joins the Ukrainian people to the culture of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," the study of Russian as an obligatory subject was to be retained in all Ukrainian schools.[81] In the schools of the non-Ukrainian minorities in the Ukraine, either Ukrainian or Russian was to be selected by the population as a subject for obligatory study. The basic statute on education issued in 1927 went still further: both the Ukrainian and the Russian languages were to be taught as obligatory subjects in *all* schools.[82] In explaining the purpose of this clause, Skripnik stated that "now — since the proletarian revolution — the Russian language, once a language of oppression, is the language in which are written the works of Lenin; now the Ukrainians regard it as a brotherly language containing great revolutionary compositions; and in order that after leaving school the Ukrainians may be able to make use of Russian culture, the Russian language is taught as an obligatory subject."[83] This statement, coming from the Commissar of Education, was of considerable importance; but it was later revealed that interest in the Russian language had been lost in the whirl of Ukrainization.

[80] *Zbirnik Nakaziv ta Rosporiadžen Narodnogo Komisariaty Osviti Ukrainskoi R.S.R.*, 1940, sec. 355, p. 14. [81] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, p. 900.
[82] *Ibid.*, 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626. [83] *Proletarska Pravda*, May 9, 1926.

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In 1933 Zatonski censured the nationalists in the Commissariat of Education for neglecting the teaching of Russian which, because it was the means of all-Union communication, "should be taught in all the Ukrainian schools and in the schools of other nationalities."[84] But the real interest in the teaching of Russian appeared in 1937 and 1938, when the Commissariat was again over-hauled. During these years there was another intensified drive against Ukrainian nationalism, as well as against other varieties of opposition to the Party's policies and against every manifestation of inefficiency. Even Zatonskii was removed from his post. And while the renewed attack on nationalism in general was proceeding, a large amount of criticism was directed against the Commissariat of Education for its neglect of the Russian language as a subject of study. The critics — one of whom was E. N. Postnikova, a teacher and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. — stated that because of "the wrecking activities of the bourgeois nationalists," there was a higher percentage of failures in the courses on Russian language and literature than in any other subject.[85] In the first place, not enough time was being allotted to the study of Russian. Secondly, there was a dearth of text-books and of Russian literature in the school libraries: even such works as Gorki's *Mother*, Tolstoi's *War and Peace*, Goncharov's *Oblomov* and the collected works of Lenin were to be found only in Ukrainian translations. Thirdly, the Commissariat had not devoted sufficient attention to methods of teaching Russian and had failed to provide methodological programs for the guidance of teachers. Finally, the knowledge of Russian possessed by the teachers themselves was entirely inadequate; even the graduates of the pedagogical institutes did not know the language well enough to teach it. Since, the critics argued, the pupils themselves were strongly inclined to study Russian, the Commissariat should provide more thorough preparation of teachers, assign more time for this subject, provide more text-books and more Russian literature.

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As a result of these criticisms the re-organized Commissariat provided new programs, several of which are in the hands of the author, and it increased the time allotted to the study of Russian. The number of hours specified for the study of languages during the entire period of attendance in the various types of schools, according to the

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[84] *Visti*, Aug. 23, 1933.

[85] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), May 16, 1937; *Učitelskaia Gazeta* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), Feb. 27, 1938, Mar. 19, 1938, Mar. 29, 1938.

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871 teaching plans for the school year 1939–40, is contained in the fol-
191 lowing table:[86]
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I. Schools with Ukrainian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Ukrainian Language	1130 hours	1187 hours
Russian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Ukrainian Language	2068 hours	1994 hours
Russian Language	1131 hours	1221 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

II. Schools with Russian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Russian Language	1130 hours	1147 hours
Ukrainian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Russian Language	2150 hours	2111 hours
Ukrainian Language	955 hours	1022 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

III. Schools with Jewish or Moldavian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Jewish or Moldavian Language	993 hours	989 hours
Ukrainian Language	196 hours	252 hours
Russian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Jewish or Moldavian Language	1383 hours	1350 hours
Ukrainian Language	586 hours	618 hours
Russian Language	1131 hours	1221 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

[86] Narodni Kommissariat Osvita U.R.S.R., *Navčalni plani. počatkovoi ta serednoi školi* (Kiev, 1939) pp. 8–9, 11, 13, 15–17, 19, 21, 23. It may be noted that the plan for the rural elementary schools contained 36 more hours and for the rural middle schools 54 more hours than was assigned to the corresponding urban schools.

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In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both with and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.
[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . . ,* 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

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in spite of efforts to produce films and to broadcast programs in the Ukrainian language — potent forces for assimilation to Russian culture. To the goal of assimilation, moreover, much is contributed by the industrialization of the Ukraine: new factories bring rural Ukrainians into the cities where Russian still predominates in social life, and the younger Ukrainians in the city easily adopt the prevailing language. But these forces for assimilation, even though coupled with the inculcation of communist doctrines through the media of education and culture, may be cancelled by a growth of nationalism; and such nationalism may thrive on the shocks of economic disorders and unsuccessful foreign war. The language policy itself promotes the process of assimilation by encouraging bi-lingualism; but by stressing the use of minority languages, it furthers at least a greater temporary diversification. The question of whether the forces of unity are now stronger or weaker than the forces of division can be answered only by the future.

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

000 Editor's Note: Since this book is translated from German, the titles of books are translated from German also - instead of from original Ukranian or Russian. Therefore, the original titles are not given, only the translation.

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Foreword

[114] The present work was written in the years 1938/39, - in the period when the West Ukrainians in the, however brief, existence of what was then Poland, were very much excited by an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine, the present-day Hungarian Carpathia. It was not only the West Ukrainians who in those days believed the hour of Greak Ukraine had come.

/2/ The book represents an attempt, based on a journalist's personal knowledge and a thorough study of the country, to acquaint the German reader with the Ukrainian people, their country, their history, their culture, their way of life and their character.

In spite of the fact that since the book was completed in August 1939, fundamental changes have occurred in the eastern part of Europe as a result of the defeat of Poland and the struggle against Bolshevik Muscovite rule, the book can be published almost unchanged. For there was no 000 change in the terrible fate of the East Ukrainians in the old Soviet Ukraine up to the day of their liberation by German troops. The West Ukrainians in eastern Poland, in Bukovina and Bessarabia - regions which Moscow appropriated more or less forcibly after the collapse of Poland - had to learn during the brief period of

000 the Soviet regime what it means to live in a "workers' paradise". /6/ Not only was its entire intelligentsia deported or physically annihilated, its very highly developed cultural institutions were also completely destroyed.

Now Soviet-Muscovite tyranny over the
121 Ukrainian people has come to an end. We aim to show in this book the state of development of the Ukrainian people and of their economy at the moment of liberation. I am indebted especially to
000 Dr. Olena Kuschnir of Vienna and Professor Panas Fedenko of Prague for their collaboration and reading the manuscript.

Berlin, April 1942 The Author

UKRAINE
Land of Black Earth

/7/

The Outpost

000 Reaching the first villages of a different people, the stranger stands helpless. The great unknown of this world fills him with awe, with the wish to fathom its essence, and with vague expectations. Velykyi Lypnyk is such a village on the edge of a large community ruled by other laws. It is the most westerly outpost, the spearhead, as it were, of the self-contained settlement area of a people whose often grandiose history bears
181 out the truth: Woe to the vanquished! This race of Ukrainians is the largest on earth without its own state. Often the Ukrainians were chosen by providence for great deeds; for a long time they protected the West from the wild Asiatic hordes, then history made them dead quiet. They were forgotten and almost abandoned to extinction. But the people refused to be "a branch of the large Russian tree; they wanted to be a tree themselves, with roots, trunk, branches and leaves, drawing its nourishment from its own soil". Again and again they rose up against ruling peoples, they fought, won and - lost. /8/

131 A two- to three-hour drive by automobile separates the self-contained German settlement in Silesia from the Ukrainian spearhead in eastern Slovakia at the foot of the High Tatra. In between lies the settlement of the Zips Germans. It is a mere weekend excursion from Breslau or Vienna to the border of the Ukrainian realm. For the inhabitant of Breslau it is no farther than Berlin and for the Viennese it is as far as Munich. It takes six hours by car from Vienna or Breslau up the Oder and the Waag along the quiet, dreamy woodland slopes of the Slovakian mountains to the High Tatra. Between it and the Lower Beskid the

131 crystal-clear Poprad eats it way toward Galicia. Along this small stream live Ukrainians; near it lies Velykyi Lypnyk. Its neighbors are Germans, Gorals and Slovaks.

771 Here lies the border of a strange world, a world whose other edge reaches almost to the Caspian Sea on the threshold of Asia. In it birth, life, death, time and many other things have a different value than elsewhere, other criteria obtain, and every stranger who would attempt to apply his own measure would fail. Even Christ has become different; he does not wear the crown of thorns, but the emperor's crown on his brow. Thus he sits in judgment over mankind. Here other altars are built, not the puritanically strict ones of the evangelical church nor the ostentatious ones of the Catholic, but the magnificent ones of the Byzantine church. The mysticism of this world between the peaks of the High Tatra, the glaciers of the Caucasus and the glistening mirror of the Caspian is already revealed here where Rome, Constantinople and Moscow are an equal distance away. True, the church steeple has an onion-shaped cupola, like any Bavarian one, but beside it two smaller cupolas adorn the roof and the altar conceals a magnificent painted screen, designed to wrap the service in still greater mystery. Like pure gold this iconostasis with the pictures of six prophets /9/ and twelve apostles is spread out before the sanctuary. Its basic tone is blue and yellow, the Ukrainian colors.

776 With God these people communicate through the priest, with the devil, directly. Even though they believe in Christ with deep religiosity, they by no means wish to be on a bad footing with the Evil One. It is not good to have him for an enemy; it is better not to say his name, or he might think he is being called and is expected to come. These people are also on good terms with spirits. The latter must be respected, feared,

776 appeased, exorcised. When the priest of Velykyi Lypnyk consecrates the water of the village brook on the sixth of January, the people believe that the demons are thus driven away.

326 The men of Valykyi Lypnyk are tinkers, a
221 trade which in many places has a bad flavor. It is easy to say that they travel about the country like gypsies. But even though they wander from village to village, a small bundle of tools on their backs, repairing stoves and mending pots, they are, nevertheless, not homeless. As soon as spring comes, poverty drives them out on the road, and only late in the fall when the first white flakes begin to fall, they return to their wives and children with the few groschen they have saved.

241 For land is scarce, the clod of earth small, the soil is poor and the climate harsh.* The women work like drudges for their bit of barley bread and potatoes. With their small cows and a wooden plough they till the lower slopes of the mountain ridges. They sow by hand, harrow, and in the fall they cut off the barely ripe ears of grain with a sickle.

286 In their "spare time" these women* with their
291 strangely narrow faces sit barefoot in their full pleated skirts and pale pink blouses, a charming little cap on their heads, at their looms and tirelessly ply their shuttle back and forth between the taut threads, or press wool into felt for the jackets and trousers of their husbands.

342 The rooms of these "tinkers"* are surprisingly large and clean; the kitchen, living room, /10/ bedroom and work room are all in one. The whole structure with adjoining stable and wagon shed is built of wood, the inside unfinished, the outside [789] covered with loam. In order that there be no lack of magic, carpenters carve three suns into the central roof beam.

184 How rich these "tinkers" of East Slovakia were with their little plot of free earth, their two or three cows, their barley bread and their loom, compared to their brothers in Carpatho-

* [In the village of Valykyi Lypnyk, Western Ukraine -Analyst]

184 Ukraine, to the small farmers in the Polish Ukraine, helpless and oppressed by the Poles, to the Soviet Ukrainians working in factories or on collective farms, or even to the exiles! They[1] all [242] speak the same language, albeit in different dialects, they write the same Cyrillic script, regard the good fortune of one among them as a common possession, while the misfortune that strikes one is felt by all.

101 The thousand souls of Velykyi Lypnyk belong to the westernmost tribe of Ukrainians, the Lemki. [197] They apeak a Slovakian-Ukrainian border dialect. Ukrainian scholars maintain that the Ukrainian settlements formerly reached almost to Cracow, but that the Lemki were pushed back into the mountains by the Poles in the North and the Slovaks in the South. Until the collapse of Poland a bitter nationality fight went on for this small spearhead, especially on the part of Poland, and in the process the Lemki, as the weaker ones, were obliged to yield step by step. The Magyars, no less than the Poles, oppressed the Ukrainian neighboring tribes of Boyki and Huzul and even more than the Slovaks oppressed the Lemki. The Magyar clergy added close to 160,000 Ukrainian souls to their ethnic group. In the census the word "Magyar" stands under the heading of "nationality", and "Greek Orthodox" under the heading of "religion". They are the denationalized Ukrainians who have, for the present, still remained true to their faith. All this began when, at the /11/ end of the last century, the Magyar clergy introduced Magyar hymns, and when in 1912 the Bishop of Haydudorog invented and decreed a Hungarian liturgy in place of the Old Slavic one. (1)

1. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 33.

1 [The Carpatho-, Polish-, Soviet-, and East Slovakian Ukrainians — Analyst]

/12/

Come Along, Friend

101 The Ukrainian country has been given various names. It is called the "largest meadow", and this implies the blossoming steppe in springtime and the nomadic herds numbering hundreds of thousands of cattle and sheep. But it is also called "cornhouse", and this recalls the huge granaries in the harbors of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. It is said to be the easternmost Mediterranean country, because its people are dark-haired and gayer than the thick-blooded Russians in the north, because the sun beats down as it does on the shores of the Mediterranean, and because in the Crimea cypresses and cedars tower into the heavens, figs and almonds ripen. Then, too, it is called a "peninsula of Asia" because the steppes of this continent reach over as far as the Dniestr and the delta of the Danube, and for two thousand years one Asiatic horde after another have pitched their tents in these wide spaces. Still others say that the Ukraine is the "bridge to India", for up to the Middle Ages the large trade routes from the West to the Far East and Asia Minor intersected here with those of the northern countries to Byzantium. Napoleon was of this opinion when he wanted to destroy the British Empire through the conquest of India. Czar Paul III[2] was supposed to carry out this plan, and had declared himself prepared to do so. His well-timed murder, however, in those days saved the British rule in India. (2)

2. Trietsch, Russia, page 24.

131 Geographers have established the fact that the Ukrainian national territory extends from 43 to 53 degrees northern latitude and from 21 to 45 degrees eastern longitude. /13/ They say

2 [sic--Analyst]

131 further that the boundaries of the Ukrainian nation may be divided into southern boundaries (Black Sea and Caucasus), southwest boundaries (Rumanians and Magyars), western boundaries (Slovaks and Poles), northern boundaries (White Russians and Russians) and eastern boundaries (peoples of the Don and the Caucasus). For these scholars Ukraine is the southern part of the vast Sarmatian lowland between the Carpathian arc, the Finnish highland, the Urals and the Caucasus. They certainly go to great pains to reduce to a common denominator the censuses of the various states in which the Ukrainians have been forced to live. They have added up the square kilometers of all Ukrainian countries and the people living in them, and have reached the following maximal result for 1933: (3)

162 3. Kubyievych: The Distribution of Population in the Ukraine, page 6.

Ukrainian provinces on January 1, 1933 within the states:	Surface in 1000 sq. kilometers	Surface area of total Ukrainian territory in percentage	Inhabitants in 1000	Proportion of inhabitants of total Ukrainian populated area in percentage
Soviet Union.....	773.4	82.4	43,658	79.6
Poland.....	132.2	14.1	9,198	16.8
Rumania.....	17.6	1.9	1,258	2.3
Czechoslovakia.	14.9	1.6	746	1.3
	938.1	100.0	54,860	100.0

The maximal result means that the Ukrainians in /62 these maximal boundaries have partly an absolute, partly a relative majority. The Ukrainians have an absolute majority in a total of 718,300 square kilometers on which there are 47,657 million inhabitants. (4)

4. Kubyievych: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 19.

Within the wider boundaries there are 30.2% foreign minorities, and in the narrower boundaries, 24.7%. (5)

5. Kubyievych: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 305 ff.

In 1933 there was a total of 43,360,000 Ukrainians throughout the world; of these 34.43 million were in the Soviet Union, 5.87 million in Poland, 1.1 million in Rumania (including Bessarabia and Bukovina), and 590,000 in Czechoslovakia. The remainder were Ukrainians living outside the country. (6) According to the well-known Ukrainian[101]

6. Ibid., page 325.

geographer Kubyievych, the Ukrainian racial /11/ boundary is difficult to determine in the eastern part of the Caucasian foreland where, besides Ukrainians, there are also Russian and Caucasian peoples, and on the northern boundary, where in the region of Chernigov the question is disputed as to whether the inhabitants are Ukrainians, Russians or White Russians. If we distribute the /61 54,870,000 inhabitants of the entire Ukrainian settled area over the 938,000 square kilometers of surface, 58.5 souls accrue to one square kilometer, while the number is 67.3 if we do not include the thinly populated mixed area of the eastern

161 Caucasian foreland. (7) This corresponds roughly

7. Kubyietych: The Distribution of Population in the Ukraine, page 11.

to the density of population in the Balkan countries.

133 The geographers have investigated the surface of the Ukrainian provinces and found that only 1.5% of the entire surface is more than 1000 meters high, barely 3.5% over 500 meters and 68.5% between 100 and 300 meters. Scarcely 1% of the Ukrainian population live in actual mountains, and surely more than half of all Ukrainians have never seen any mountains. (8)

8. Kubyievych: The Geography of the Ukrainian and the Bordering Areas, page 65.

132 For decades scholars studied the climate, measured precipitation, heat and cold, and did not forget to check from what direction the wind blows. When they had made sufficient investigations, they established the fact that the Ukraine has an "oak climate", specifically in the damp, moderately cold northern and central Ukraine. Adjacent to this in the south is the "dry climate" zone with little precipitation, where there is less rain the farther southeast one goes. Moreover, geographers feel that it is significant that the Ukraine, along with the Carpathians, the Yaila Mountains in the Crimea, and the Caucasus have a mountain climate and that the southern shore of the Crimean Peninsula and the eastern coast of the Black Sea have a Mediterranean climate. Whereas the Ukrainians of the north would gladly renounce some of the 600 millimeters and more of precipitation which annually flood their fields, those of the south call upon God and all the spirits to send them a little more than their 200 millimeters of rain. But it need

132 not be one of those terrible thunderstorms which
/15/ hover threateningly over the villages for half a day at a time, sending down ghastly lightning or cloudbursts which wash away the humus. Nor should the moisture be accompanied by one of those icy snowstorms in which man and animal, shepherds and herds numbering in the thousands easily come to grief if they are caught by the impenetrable swirl of flakes on the open field.

133 The geographers who like to divide up the earth into zones studied Ukrainian soil with regard to its flora and found that north Ukraine down to Kiyev belongs to the region of north European forests where, besides oak, alder and birch, the spruce flourishes. In the south and southeast the dense forests open up into park landscapes and forest glades. The farther south one goes, the more scarce and sparse the islands of mighty oaks, lindens and elms become. This is the region of the wooded steppe which finally passes over into
134 the open, almost treeless grassy steppe. Seventy million hectares of Ukrainian soil is fertile black earth. It has erroneously been considered inexhaustible. Even though today the soil does not yet tolerate any artificial fertilizer, scholars are already racking their brains over the sad prospect that the natural fertility of black loam, the ideal of all farmers the world over, will be exhausted in about 50 years. Already at the time of the last czar, model farms and experimental stations sought ways and means to meet this danger.

*

000 Come along, comrade, and wander to the east toward the rising sun, into the land which at its greatest expanse is as long as the distance from Barcelona to Memel and as wide as the realm between the Brenner Pass and Kiel. Climb up from the merrily babbling Poprad through beech forests,

along the gentle slopes of the Lower Beskid and, crossing the Hungarian border, proceed up the mountain range from peak to peak as far as the High Beskid. You will touch famous passes which lead from the Hungarian lowland /16/ to Galicia, and will pass many a lonely warrior graveyard where German heroes lie buried. Thus you will reach high crests, and if you are lucky and the east wind has swept the sky clean, you will see toward the south the silver ribbon of the puszta, and in the north the endless waves of hills disappearing into the horizon. Now the primeval forests of the Gorgany Range receive you, and you must make your way laboriously through thick brush and also climb down to well-nigh impenetrable spruce forests, cross sunny alpine meadows, and pick your way eastward on narrow hunters' paths. You will wander through a region where the brown bear looks for berries and honey, and, if he is terribly hungry, might also pounce upon a calf on a lonely pasture; where the lynx lies in wait for booty; where grand gentlemen hunt stags, and the royal eagle circles high above the valleys. Where the Tisza is but a tiny brook you cross over to the Black Mountains of Bukovina. You are standing on Rumanian soil. The silver banners of torrential waterfalls greet you, and quiet deep-green ravine lakes say: Rest yourself! Small unkempt Huzul horses that graze freely like cattle and sheep on the wide alpine meadows on the nearby slopes will keep you company.

Now turn toward the north, toward Galicia, and descend with the clear brooks and the young rivers across wide meadows into the foothills of the Carpathians. In their reaches lie the oil wells of Drohobych and Borislav. Now you are at the Dniestr and therewith on the edge of that grandiose Sarmatian landscape that knows no mountains. You will go hundreds of kilometers and the character of the landscape will not change; its boundless space will fascinate you again and again, as it does

11: Obermaier--13 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Podolia] [Volhynia]

everyone else from among our ranks. 000

Before the First World War it was said of 101
Podolia, which you will reach if you wander farther 181
north and which lies like a plateau over the Dniestr 311
Valley, that bread grows on fence posts there,
/Facing page 16: Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. [000]
View of the lower part of the city/; /Facing page
17: The old fortress of Feodosiya on the Crimea/;*
/17/ and that the fences are woven out of sausages. For the first time there lies before you an immeasurable sea of surging grain. Not a house far and wide, rarely a small wood. A groundless, dusty field road, surprisingly seems to lead into empty space, but where you think it ends, it leads you straight as a die, by means of steep turns into one of those deep valleys which the rivers in the course of thousands of years have carved into the plateaus. Down there the Podolians build their loam huts, the whitewashed walls of which have already greeted you from a distance through the green of the plum and cherry trees. If you follow the river upstream, it will more and more often lead you around ponds, marshes and swamps the nearer you come to its sources. You will see more storks than you have ever seen before in your life.

Almost imperceptibly you will reach Volhynia, 101
the western part of which belonged to Poland up to 491
1939, but was subject to the czar before that. You 361
will notice this immediately by the lack of good roads. For, as everywhere in former Czarist Russia, there are only a few paved roads, but all the more are there roads on which in dry weather you sink into the dust and in wet weather into mud. You will
notice it also by the cities and towns which are 361
even dirtier and more neglected than those of Galicia. You are in the midst of the ghettos of the world. These cities are a jumble of houses, "with an ugly traffic artery in the middle". They are spread out with a total absence of form, as though they had been

*[For plates, cf. pp. 215-216, category 116 — Analyst]

11: Obermaier--14 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[volhynia]

361 tossed down on the land, without any relationship to it. "The absence of public buildings alone had [342] a depressive effect. These wooden huts on a slope, supported by stakes as though by high stilts, seemed merely to have been set down as chance would have it, less secure and permanent than nomad tents which the next day perhaps might already be taken down again. It scarcely seemed worthwhile to lay out a few roadways provisionally. For the rest, there was not a trace of a city plan, of a systematizing, architectural hand. Everything seemed temporary and unfinished, simply amassed, never shaped. The expression "shanty town" applied in a special /18/ sense to these places. Our criteria of beautifully compact city plans do not apply. Never concentrated within the area most difficult to attack, never held together by walls and moats, these Russian clusters of houses and courtyards which can scarcely be called cities any more, gradually become lost in the distance, without shape or outline: mirror images of the landscape that bears them, of the language that echoes in them, of the way of thinking of the people they house." (9)

9. Tintrup: War in the Ukraine, pages 23 and 24.

If you would now turn east in the direction
101 of Kiyev, you would come through numerous rambling
361 villages with streets. They contain attractive
563 farms where until recently you would have been warmly welcomed with German sounds. The Volhynia Germans lived here. But you continue northward
101 until the Volhynia plateau with a gradual incline
133 sinks into the Polesian swamps. You avoid this marsh land by turning northeast, and thus come to the extreme northwest tip of the Ukrainian area of settlement, Podlakhia, whose waters flow toward the Baltic. The primeval forests of Bila Vesha are gloomy, but even more gruesome are the deep

101 swamps of Polesia. Faggot and fascine paths lead
133 you from village to village, from settlement to settlement. If you visit this swamp land which extends almost to the central Russian plain and is about at large as Hungary including Carpatho-Ukraine, in spring during the time of thaws or during the floods of early summer, people will row you in a boat to their neighbor's. For at these times the rivers creeping in countless bends through lakes, ponds and tributaries of this country, which is only 170 meters above sea level, flood their banks for many weeks, even months. This landscape is unutterably sad, and, it has deprived of laughter the few people it scantily nourishes with fish,
[136] potatoes and oats. Polesia is a land of spooks without equal, where, across the bog through which elk and bison, sure-footed, make their way, there
[137] rises the "pillared hall of centuries-old oaks, lindens, aspens, ash trees, firs, spruces and pines." /19/ The sun rarely shines into this twilight where at night there are mysterious will-o'-the-wisps in this world of mold. Deathly silence prevails in this accursed land which even the birds avoid. You are standing on the border of the Soviet Union.

133 Descending the navigable Pripyat, and traveling eastward halfway to the central Russian plain, you reach, friend, the Dniepr, which comes from the north. You have come to the sacred river of the Ukrainians. They chant its praises in countless songs. This third largest river of Europe flows 2100 kilometers until, exhausted, it empties into the Black Sea. If it happens to be flood time, you will not be able to see from one bank to the other, the river rises to such an extent. It gets to be six, eight, even ten kilometers wide. Herodotus already compared it with the Nile.

505 If you now sail south[1] on a Dniepr steamer you will reach Kiyev. Do not be surprised at the numerous vessels which you meet on the river, for

1 [From the confluence of the Dniepr and the Pripyat - Analyst]

505 the mercantile fleet which it carried was, even long before the war, as large as the total mercantile tonnage of the Austro-Hungarian fleet.
346 Even from far off you will see on the hills of the city lying on the right bank the strange cupolas of the Byzantine churches and monasteries. Kiyev was formerly the "Rome of the East", and even today it is the "mother of all Russian cities". Hundreds of thousands of devout pilgrims
788 annually visited the famous cave monastery of Pecherska Lavra, the cathedral of St. Sophia, the Golden Gate and other sacred spots.[1]

133 The churning steamer which you again board in the sprawling, pounding and shrieking harbor section[1] will take you farther downstream. On the west bank the high plateau of the Dniepr Plain rises steeply. If you should wander over this undulating hill country with its fields of wheat and sugar beets, you would see everywhere the traces of Ukraine's past: mighty grave mounds of nomad chieftains, and embankments with which in early times the Ukrainian people protected themselves against Asiatic brigands. /20/ To the left of the stream, in the east, you see nothing but wild thickets of reeds, dense, impenetrable green meadows behind which the Dniepr Plain is hidden.
361 You would find villages there[2] which have as many inhabitants as a medium-sized city and which equal a metropolis in surface area. However, they have remained villages in which peasants live on their homesteads; it is almost a day's journey to their fields. Khar'kov, a small Cossack hamlet in the seventeenth century, and today the second largest city of the Ukraine, is situated on the eastern edge of this plain.

133 In Dniepropetrovsk where formerly the rapids began, you turn eastward, friend, and now reach the steppes. The earth which is swept bare by the eternal east wind and by the dust storms, is completely naked as soon as you ascend the Donets

[1] [i.e. In Kiev — Analyst]
[2] [i.e. In the Dniepr Plain — Analyst]

133 Plain where lie the coal districts of the Ukraine. The more bleak and unfriendly this industrial country with its black chimneys appears to you, the friendlier the quiet, pale yellow Donets beckons yonder, with its broad, green valley and the white chalk precipices crowned by dark green forests. Now your journey takes you south to the Sea of Azov, across the mouth of the Don to the Caucasian foothills. Immeasurable fields of sun-
101 flowers accompany you into this "second Ukraine".[1]
133 Here you feel the refreshing breath of the snowy mountains of the Caucasus. You are on the shores of the Argonauts. Virile and full of strength is this untouched land at the foot of the Elbrus. Like the mountains, the people, too, are giants. You have before you the descendants of the flower of the Ukrainian people, of the Zaporogian Cossacks who were settled here by Catherine II.

137 And now turn west, start homeward! The way
[133] leads across the Pontic Plain which extends north of the Black Sea as far as the Danube. On this "racial meadow" you will look in vain for the much-praised wild uncultivated steppe. You are in the land of Taras Bulba. Gogol, a Ukrainian, erected an imperishable monument to the bold Cossack in his tale. /21/ In those days the grass and shrubs of the steppe grew taller than a man, but today you will find only the knee-high herbs of the temporarily fallow fields, and here and there a thicket of wild cherries, mahaleb and thistles. Perhaps you will also come to one of those meadows that have become rare, which in a brief whiff of spring changes its color like a rich woman her clothes, wrapping itself in silver gray during the summer, and adorning itself in moss-green in autumn, when rain finally quenches the cracked earth. Smooth
133 and flat, amorphous as a calm sea, the Pontic Steppe stretches out before you. Burial mounds as
764 large as houses, called kurgany, point the way to the Dniestr. What ghastly secrets may they not

[1] [i.e. the Caucasian foothills — Analyst]

764 harbor! Some kurgany were opened and Scythian princes were found who had taken with them under the earth a retinue of more than 200 riders on horseback and in full armor.

000 You must not overlook the Crimean Peninsula, the Tauris of the Greeks! You pass through a narrow isthmus and find yourself on the Peninsula. Gradually the steppe mounts up to the Yaila Range from the peaks of which daring roads climb down the steep coast to the blue-green Black Sea. Crimea, ancient land of the Tatar! Christ was driven out of the Ukraine; but Mohammed has entrenched himself under the flat roofs of these Tatar villages and cities, in order to receive the prayers of his believers when the sun flames up over the Caucasus or sinks across Bessarabia. Thus southern Crimea with its Tatars, its marble palaces of past Russian grandeur, its groves of olives, mulberries and figs, and its Bolshewik sanatariums, leads a special existence which, in its timeless diversity, will affect you strangely.

361 The mouth of the Dniepr is behind you and Odessa lies in front of you. Catherine II, the great colonizer, erected this city on the bare ground of the steppe. The yellow shell-limestone coast drops steeply into the sea. Straight as a die, quite after the modern European pattern, the third largest city of Ukraine /22/ is laid out. You will miss trees and parks and perhaps you will say it is a cold heap of stones. You forget that Odessa in summer does not have enough water for its inhabitants to drink. The earth is saline and rain extremely sparse.

000 There are still fifty kilometers separating you from the Rumanian border. Beyond the Dniestr you are on Bessarabian soil, and here, too, you will meet Ukrainians. Travel up the imperceptibly rising Bessarabian plain between the Dniestr and the Prut, in the course of which you repeatedly touch on Rumanian soil, and you will reach green Bukovina where the hospitable Huzul will present

000 you with a strong drink of spirits after your long journey.

/23/ Grand-Princes

101 174 A song attributed to Mazepa compares the Ukrainian people to a bird that builds its nest in a tree on a much-frequented street, and is therefore often startled and obliged to live in a state of constant unrest. Today it has been proved that the ancestors built their nest very early along the much-traveled road from Asia to the lower Danubian plains. According to the most recent research (10), the Ukrainians settled as

10. According to verbal statements of the Ukrainian archaeologist Pasternak of Lwow.

early as the Bronze Age between Carpathia, San, Pripyat and Dniepr. Even at that time they were obliged to shoulder a foreign yoke. At all times nomadic peoples with their herds of many hundreds of thousands of sheep, horses and camels were attracted to the succulent grasses of this endless steppe. A thousand years before our era the Cimmerii rode into the Ukrainian settlements at the head of restless peoples. Whether they were nomads or farmers, and whether they came over the Danube or the Volga has not yet been made clear. At about the same time the Thracians in the west sought their way from the Balkans across the Carpathians to East Galicia. To them the native population owes its ceramic art. The period of nomadic invasions occupies 2600 years of the country's history. The Scythians follow the Cimmerii about 800 B.C. Herodotus tells of their battles. Through him and through excavations we learn of the culture of this Mongol-Iranian people. The goldsmith's work with its magnificent ornaments, mostly of Greek origin, found in their

101
174

graves, calls forth our admiration. Their aristocratic kingdom of the steppes was rigidly organized. For 400 years /24/ their kings accompanied by their retinues rode through the Pontic Plain until they were driven out by a stronger people, the Sarmatians. Scythians as well as Sarmatians repeatedly broke into Hungary on their marauding expeditions. In the second century of our era it is assumed that the Goths arrived in this plain of peoples. They came by way of the water route from the land of the Baltic and were the first river navigators in the Ukrainian countries - according to one group of investigators. Others say they are aborigines, and still others, have them come from the west or even the east. They allegedly dragged their boats on rollers across the flat watersheds between the rivers which flow toward the Baltic or the Black Sea. The fact that in the southern lands they did not sever connections with their homeland is proved by the military and commercial points of support which they established along these waterways. Their neighbors in Galicia were the Vandals. It was in 370 A.D. that the flood of Huns from Mongolia reached the dwellings of the Goths and swept away the latter. This was only the first wave of later mixed Finno-Turkish tides. This inexhaustible stream of humanity, at times slower, at other times torrential, engulfing everything, flowed along. Unpredictable was the will of these hordes which through many generations led a hunter's and shepherd's existence, only to plunge suddenly, like wolves, into the dwelling-places of foreign peoples.

It was not long before the Huns exhausted these ideal pastures and rode on in order to threaten western peoples. Along their trails the herds of the Bulgarians and after them the herds of the Turkish Avars passed across the Pontic Steppes. Finally, the Finno-Turkish race

101 174 of Khazars established a kingdom here, which extended from the Volga to the Danube. The Khazars were nomads who became domiciled, founded cities and carried on trade. At their court the Jews obtained predominating influence, and it sounds almost unbelievable to say that the khans adopted the faith of Moses. /Facing page [000] 24: Character study of a Ukrainian head/*/Facing page 25: A Ukrainian girl with pronounced nordic features/*/25/

[101] [174] 181 Kiyev, the center of the Polyani, was tributary to the Khazar. The Slavic tribes of the Antae, the ancestors of the Ukrainians, were divided and fought one another. In the establishment of their society they scarcely developed beyond the formation of a district with several peasant communities. Fields and pastures belonged to all jointly. Family life was a patriarchy, and unanimity was demanded at the village and district meetings. These Slavs built compact houses of loam, and placed embankments around their towns. They cultivated their fields, made pottery and bartered their goods for swords, knives and various handicraft products. They offered sacrifice to the sun god Dashdboh, the wind god Stryboh, the thunder god Perun and other deities.

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175 It was the Swedish Vikings, called Varangians, who in the ninth and tenth centuries unified the Slavic tribes and established a kingdom with Kiyev as the capital, which, during its most flourishing period, extended from the Carpathians to the Volga and from the Caucasus to the White Sea. They rowed in boats to Lake Ilmen, founded Novgorod and from there, about the middle of the ninth century, conquered Kiyev. Rurik was the name of the Viking king of Novgorod; his warriors were called Rus', meaning "rowers",

*[For plates, cf. pp. 217-218, category 116 - Analyst]

nd the state as a whole: "Kiyev Rus", after Rurik's successor Oleg moved the capital to Kiyev. The princes still took their wives and members of their retinue from Sweden.

Soon the Kiyev Rus were known in Constantinople. The splendor of the imperial city dazzled the Vikings who came to plunder or to be enlisted as mercenaries. Even in ancient times they had come before the gates of Byzantium with 200 sailboats and 6000 men, and a few years later there were 14,000 of them who plundered its suburbs. /26/ They carried on their marauding expeditions as far as the wealthy settlements of the southern Caspian up to the border of Persia. Contemporary Arabian and Greek writers say of the warlike Rus': "They are bold and courageous. When they attack a strange people, they do not desist until they have completely annihilated it." (11) Georgius of

11. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 46.

Amastra writes that at the beginning of the ninth century "the race of the Rus' which is disastrous in name as well as deed" laid waste the coast of Asia Minor as far as Sinope. (12)

12. Ibid., page 67.

Oleg was a conqueror's figure of the following type. He subjected all Slavic tribes, and when he had sufficiently consolidated his kingdom, he sailed, as the chronicles maintain, at the head of 80,000 men and 2000 boats to Byzantium, in order to extort a tribute from the Greek emperor. Not all of his warlike expeditions succeeded; the fleets of his followers were more than once destroyed by Greek fire. Prince Sviatoslav the Bold was "more a vagabond knight than the head of a state". Persistent wars led him from the Don to

175 the Danube. He defeated the Khazar Kingdom, plundered the "White City" on the Volga, and in 968 set out with 60,000 warriors against the Bulgarians along the Danube. He was already preparing to engage them in a tremendous battle when the news reached him that Kiyev was being harrassed by the bloodthirsty Pecheneg hordes. Sviatoslav liberated his capital and returned to defeat the Bulgars and to plunder their chief city of Prislav. "It almost looked as though a mighty Slavic empire was to arise from Novgorod to the very gates of Byzantium." (13) Byzantium was well aware of

13. Reeb: Russian History.

this danger; it gathered all its forces and defeated the Viking who had grown used to victory. On his way back to Kiyev he ended his life under the saber blows of the Pecheneg.

The states of these Kiyev princes were loose structures. The military forces were divided into aggregates of tens, hundreds and thousands, and the king stood at their head. His retainers were regarded as associates, not servants. Whenever they pleased, they could leave their king and follow /27/ another. There were plenty of principalities, for they were occasionally divided after the death of the ruler. But Kiyev always remained the chief principality to which all the partial principalities were subject. The rights of the ancient people's assemblies of the Slavs in part passed over to the princes in the course of time. In the government the council of boyars supported them. Slavs and Vikings swore allegiance to one and the same prince - the former by the god Perun, the others by Thor. The administration of the prince's court was at the same time that of the principality; it was not unusual that the ruler and his followers personally levied the tribute.

175 Joint military campaigns and marauding expeditions and the power of the grand-princes was what constituted the cement which held together the many principalities of the Kiyev Kingdom.

Vladimir, whom history has surnamed "the Great", a contemporary of Otto the Great, was not only a fearless general, but also a wise, farseeing statesman. The weakness of this kingdom which he conquered only by means of fratricidal war, was clear to him. Thus it seemed that the adoption of Christianity might prove a strong unifying tie between the ofttimes divergent, warring factions. Statesmanly insight persuaded Vladimir to adopt the Greek Orthodox, Byzantine form of Christianity. The papal legates of Rome tried in vain to win Vladimir over to the Roman Catholic faith. Byzantium was nearer, easier to reach, and there existed old, albeit often hostile, relations with it. For a baptismal present, as it were, the grand-prince obtained the hand of the Byzantine princess, a near relative of and from the same house as, Princess Theophano who was wedded to Emperor Otto II.

The adoption of Byzantine Christianity was one of those great historical events whose import could not have been foreseen at the moment when it was accomplished. /28/ Thus this decision of Vladimir was to influence East European history in the most enduring manner up to this very day. As a result of it, all of east Europe, with the exception of Poland, entered into the Byzantine cultural orbit. A country whose population as such bears a certain leaning toward passivity was joined to a cultural sphere which had already become rigid with formal doctrine. This world was on the way toward decline, whereas the West Roman world still awaited its flowering. In this way the east of Europe was to assume a position of great disadvantage as against the West.

The most immediate result of the adoption of Eastern Christianity was the transmission of

175 this Byzantine culture which was far superior to that of Kiyev, to the far-flung kingdom of the Rus'. For a good 200 years Byzantine knowledge, literature and art, as well as commercial goods were carried north. Bulgarian monks and teachers came, bidden and unbidden, into the country and taught reading and writing in the monastery schools. The learned documents they brought, spiritual essays, edifying sermons, historical treatises and geographical descriptions, exerted a great influence on their students. Greek master builders "brought architecture into the land which had seen its greatest accomplishment in fortifications by means of embankments". The chief attribute of the intellectual life of that time was the aversion toward Christian ideas and customs. If the adoption of Christianity was already very halting among the higher classes, the country people continued to worship their heathen gods to whom they offered sacrifices in forest and meadow, along streams and swamps. People did not want to renounce old customs, such as the freedom of love and marriage.

The kingdom of Kiyev reached its greatest efflorescence under Iaroslav the Wise, a son of Vladimir the Great. Both grand-princes were obliged to maintain their position and that of their kingdom by means of constant wars, and both succeeded at the same time in expanding their territory. Iaroslav, even more than Vladimir, built schools, monasteries and magnificent churches. Under /29/ his rule an exact copy of Hagia Sophia was built on the Dniepr by Greek architects. The type of church edifice with a triple nave and a central cupola made its triumphal entry into East Europe. Adam von Bremen called the Kiyev of Iaroslav "a rival of Constantinople". No less than 400 churches and numerous monasteries, proud edifices, decorated at that time the "Rome of the East".

The race of Kiyev Rurikians was so esteemed

175 that it was possible for them to fetch their wives from all the royal houses of Europe and to marry their daughters into these houses. Anna, the daughter of Iaroslav the Wise married Henry I, King of France. When he died she reigned until her son, Philipp I, came of age. Iaroslav's second daughter Elisaveta married King Harald Haardraade of Norway, and he himself had Ingegerd, the daughter of King Olaf Skotunung of Sweden as his spouse. Emperor Henry IV chose Evpraksia, the sister of Grand Prince Vladimir Monomakh, as his wife. The kings of Hungary, of Poland, of Denmark, of Norway, of Sweden, of Bulgaria and the emperors of Byzantium wooed women of the Kiyev court.

Within Iaroslav's kingdom there reigned a state of prosperity and freedom which was easily comparable to conditions in the western countries. A decree issued by the Grand Prince himself, the famous "right of the Rus", guaranteed lawful peace throughout the land. The nucleus of the population consisted of independent peasants who plowed their own land and slept in their own huts of loam or wood. Legally they were equal to the boyars. They planted wheat, oats, rye, barley, millet, peas, poppies and flax and gathered honey in the woods. They were not unfamiliar with domestic poultry. Besides that there were day laborers and peasants without land who were nevertheless free. Handicrafts reached a state of excellence which was to be sought for in vain 900 years later. In the few cities of the Kiyev Kingdom the boyars set the fashion. As wealthy landowners or merchants, /30/ they shipped grain, honey, wax, hemp, skins, amber and similar things on the Dniepr to Constantinople and imported precious fabrics, spices, wine and other rare items. They carried on a lively trade with Regensburg where they had their own settlement, with the Transcaspian cities and the Varangian country. Half merchants, half warriors, they also did not scorn the profit of occasional marauding

expeditions - slaves were at that time a desirable item. Kiyev resembled a huge fair. The forest dwellers in the north built boats in the winter which, as soon as the rivers were free of ice, they took to Kiyev and sold to the merchants. Goods arrived ceaselessly from Smolensk, Novgorod and Lyubech and from other directions, only to be carried each year in June from Kiyev to Constantinople "in well-armed formations of ships along the coast of the Black Sea".

The life of the free citizens of the Kiyev Rus seems to have been an altogether tolerable one. Jolly festivals with long-drawn-out feasts were not rare, and it is said of Vladimir the Saintly One that he was a great tippler. In spite of the adoption of Christianity, no one wanted to renounce such tried and true customs as the ritualistic drinking bouts, especially at festivals in commemoration of the dead where people settled down on the grave of their dearest and there happily consumed around twenty jugs of beer or mead. The tax collectors, at that time still princely agents, led a wonderful life. Their provisions for the day consisted of: "A loaf of bread daily, millet and peas for the making of porridge, cheese, two chickens, a small lump of salt; a calf and a bucketful of malt for beer on Sunday; on fast-days a fish instead of meat." (14)

14. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 45.

An unfortunate law of inheritance was only one reason, but a very important one, for the downfall of the Kiyev Kingdom which began after Iaroslav's death in 1054. According to the existing practice of seniority succession, each of the brothers of the Grand-Prince and each of his sons was heir apparent to the highest rank. The Grand-Prince in turn ruled over the parts principalities that were being vacated. /31/ If one man

175 man moved up, many others moved with him. The higher the prince stood in rank, the more comprehensive was the change in the princely seats. The princes divided up their domain in order to make it possible for their sons to live as befitted their rank, and this in later times caused many principalities to be no larger than rather imposing hereditary estates. The only favorable thing about it was that the small princes were obliged to establish princely residences, in other words, to found small cities along with warriors, merchants and monks.

Iaroslav's total lands were split up into six autonomous territorial formations. Inasmuch as each change of grand-princes was accompanied by violent struggles for seniority, the chain of eternal feuds was never broken. From then on the history of the Rus of Kiyev was a chronicle of princely fraternal struggles, as a result of which the cities and the open countryside were made to suffer greatly. During the two centuries between Iaroslav's death and the downfall of Kiyev, there arose and fell "64 principalities, 83 civil wars ravaged the country, 293 princes engaged in a struggle for Kiyev during this time." (15)

15. Reeb: History of the Ukraine, page 22.

Once again, before the Kiyev Rus, outrageously weakened by fratricidal strife, internal dissention, indifference of the Church, passivity of the citizens, went under with the first great assault from without, a superior figure of a prince appeared. It was Vladimir Monomakh, the last grand-prince of Kiyev who succeeded in holding the local princes under control. He was highly esteemed. Once again splendid churches and monasteries were built, once again the country experienced a late cultural flowering. Monamakh himself is a famous writer; his "Precepts to my

children" exert an important influence on the public. But Monomakh is also a general.

Again the swift horses of hostile hordes appear before the walls and palisades of Kiyev. Wherever there is no high grass on the steppes for protection, they break through the midst of the grain fields. They belong to the Polovtsi, also called Kuman, who, no less warlike and greedy for spoils /32/ than the Pecheneg, roam through the land. Since the time of Sviatoslav when the Pecheneg had invaded the country, driven the farmers from the Pontic Steppe and destroyed entire Ukrainian tribes, the land lay devastated almost up to Kiyev. Vladimir had had long walls, palisades and wooden towers coated with loam, built to protect the boundary. The Pecheneg and after them the Turks were repeatedly defeated by the princes and thrown back across the Danube. But like a magnet to iron, the fertile steppe with its spicy herbs attracted the vast herds of peoples who drank sheep and mare's milk and tenderized their mutton by carrying it under their saddles.

The Polovtsi, greedy for spoils, had crossed the Danube and invaded the country after the Turks, venturing upon the Kiyev of Monomakh and the princely city of Pereiaslav. Thereupon Monomakh united the rulers of the southern principalities in a military expedition against the wanton horde. The Polovtsi suffered a serious defeat. He also waged war against the Circassians and the rest of the Pecheneg. In his "Precepts" the Grand-Prince gives the following report of his combats to his sons: "I have waged 83 battles, I have signed 19 peace treaties with the Polovtsi, captured at least 100 of their princes whom I again liberated, and killed more than 200 of them by having them thrown into the river." The same Monomakh warns his sons: "Do not forget the poor, be a father to orphans! Always strive to learn, that is a wonderful thing! My father spoke five languages." (16)

16. Tisserand R.L.: The Ukraine, Life of a People.

175 The wars which broke out among the local princes after Monomakh's death belong to the darkest chapter in the history of the Kiyev Rus. Actually the kingdom ceased to exist. Nothing remained to hold it together, neither dynastic ties nor marauding expeditions, nor the church, which was powerless. For 35 years, from 1146 to 1181 there were ceaseless struggles for the throne
728 of Kiyev, and an almost /Facing page 32/ /Map 1:
631 Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938. The Ukraine was divided between four states as a result of the Peace of Riga on March 18, 1921 between the Soviet Union and Poland, the transfer of Bessarabia to Rumania, and the edicts of St. Germain and Trianon. In the west Poland was given West Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia), Carpatho-Ukraine passed from Hungary to Czechoslovakia, small parts of Carpatho-Ukraine, Bukovina and Bessarabia went to Rumania, while the major portion of Ukraine was left to the Soviet Union which established the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic on one part of Ukrainian national soil./ /Keys to the map: -.-.-. state boundaries, ——boundaries of the Soviet Republics, ---boundaries of the autonomous Soviet Republics, -..-..- boundaries of the autonomous territories, ... boundaries of the territories (oblasts), administration centers underlined./ /33/ uninterrupted war was waged for
175 sovereignty within the leading principality. The princes of Suzdal in the north waged the most bitter and brutal fight of all for supremacy. They whose descendants are to become the princes of Moscow do not shrink from an alliance with the khans of Polovtsi against Kiyev. More than once these hordes devastated the unfortunate country. Finally in 1155 Georgii Dolgorukov, Prince of Suzdal, was victorious over Kiyev, and fourteen years later the splendor of this city which had not seen its equal throughout eastern Europe melts away in the flare of Suzdal-Polovtsi pillage. (17)

17. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 91.

11: Obermaier--30A J-3(no date)1942RD1 Ukraine RD1

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631

[Map I: Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938, cf. complete legend p. 30]

728
631

[MAP 1 UKRAINE at the BEGINNING of the year 1938]

175 It is Nestor's chronicle, the oldest literary monument of the Ukrainian people, which tells us about the Rus of Kiyev. It was written by many monks but bears the name of Brother Nestor, a contemporary of Monomakh. The three chronicles from which he obtained his knowledge of earlier events within the kingdom have been lost. Preserved to us, besides the Nestor chronicle, is the lofty "Song of Igor's Expedition", the Nieblungenlied of the Ukrainians and their first patriotic song. It narrates in extremely poetic form the military expedition of the Novgorod prince Igor Sviatoslavovich against the Polovtsi. Heaven and earth and animals and the entire animate world take part in the battle which is narrated quite in the spirit of the Nordic epics.

Scarcely was this beautiful song ended when in the east peoples began swarming in "of whom it was not known whither they came and what gods they worshiped". Jenghis Khan was their emperor and Mongolia their homeland, the same Jenghis Khan who had said to his son when the latter wanted to grant mercy to a city: "Compassion is proof of a weak character." His hords coming from Persia conquered the northern Caucasian and Crimean countries in 1222. When the Polovtsi learned of the approaching mighty army from their scouts and from captured Tatar, they called upon the princes of Halicz (Galicia), Kiyev and Chernigov for help. The entire militia of the southern /34/ principalities were called out in order to stave off the impending danger. The armies clashed at the Kalka, on the Sea of Azov, where the 100,000 Tatar of the Mongolian emperor annihilated the flower of the Ukrainian people. "The heads of the Rus fell under the sabers of the Tatar like stalks on the field under the sickle." (18)

18. Reeb: History of the Ukraine, page 14.

175 Vae victis! Mountains of corpses, burning villages and cities, smoldering ruins, - these were the tracks left by the Tatar on the march to Moscow, Vladimir and Suzdal. In 1240 Kiyev is overtaken by the same fate; the men and women of the free Rus are dragged to the Asiatic slave markets.

/35/ **Poland Colonized**

To be one's own master or to be a slave: that is the fate of peoples! Poles, Lithuanians and Tatar are now the ones who, for four hundred years after the fall of Kiyev, determine what is right and what is criminal in the Ukrainian countries. Kiyev Rus sinks to the lowest level; its principalities become provinces of Poland, Lithuania and the Tatar tent city on the Volga, while the inhabitants become serfs.

It sounds ironical that at the moment when the wings of a dire fate already cast their shadow over the Ukraine, a member of the Rurik dynasty should adorn himself with a king's crown. Danilo Romanovich, grand-prince of Halicz-Volhynia, in 1253 receives the crown from the hands of the legates of Innocence IV.

Under his predecessors the principality extended from the mouth of the Danube up to San, a tributary of the Vistula, and since 1199 as far as Volhynia. But this imposing kingdom was internally dismembered. It even happened that princes and aristocrats hanged one another. "In the character of this aristocracy there is a streak of anarchism which expresses itself in a tendency to unbridled despotism, in imperiousness and lack of consideration toward subjects, in rebelliousness and treason against the princes, along with servile forms of social intercourse, all of which was bound to bring misfortune to any kingdom." (19) Danilo also

19. Kaindl, R.F.: Poland, page 64 and 65.

175 fought against these insubordinate boyars. To break down their defiance, entire cities with all their inhabitants are destroyed. Ambitious Danilo has far-flung plans. He, the tributary prince of the Tatar khan in Sarai on the /35/ Volga, who has a king's crown from the papal city on the Tiber, wants to stretch out his hand to Kiyev, in spite of the fact that his plans of a crusade against the Tatar failed, and that only legates in cowls came instead of well-armed warriors. The khans, however, had long since seen through him; at their command he was obliged to burn down his own fortifications in 1259. Poisoned by the boyars, Danilo dies, and with him ends the Rurik dynasty of Halicz, exactly one hundred years after the destruction of Kiyev.

The history of the Ukraine, the territory on the border*, as the southern regions of the

[103] *The name "Ukraine", meaning "borderland", appears for the first time in the chronicle of Nestor, which tells of a prince of Pereiaslav who is killed in 1187 in a battle with the nomads. The chronicle reported that "the Ukraine mourned him a great deal". In the year 1198 there is mention of a "Galician Ukraine" on the Polish border, and in 1215 of a "Ukraine" near Brest Litovsk. In the ceaseless wars of the principalities of the Rus', the various border countries gradually shrink to a single frontier country, the "Ukraine". This name which bears witness to the life of constant danger in these regions, is also in the course of time applied to the indigenous population.

Kiyev Rus began to be called, is from now on for long periods a history of its bondage. Foreign peoples dictate its laws. The country is completely exhausted as a result of the eternal wars of the

175 princes and the devastations of the Tatar expeditions. Fortunately, the Mongols are milder rulers than the princes and the Poles. After they have subjected the Ukrainians, they are content with tributes in the form of young women, grain and cattle, and for the rest do not interfere with the affairs of the former principalities which have been split up into numerous communities. The people of the Ukraine are tired of eternal wars, and loosen the bonds toward their rulers wherever possible. They have had enough of compulsory labor; they would rather plow the land for wheat and millet for the Tatar.

The hunger for land of the Polish szlachta - aristocrats -, the greed for spoils of the heathen forest princes of Lithuania, /37/ and the rapacity of the newly-emerging Crimean Tatar after the destruction of the Golden Horde of Sarai, - these are the historical forces which the Ukrainian people are to feel during these centuries.

After the death by poison of the last member of the Rurik dynasty at Halicz-Volhynia, the glistening silvery Black Sea is already mirrored in the covetous Polish eyes. The Moldavian principality between the lower course of the Danube and the Dniestr, is a vassal state of Halicz-Volhynia. Casimir the Great now occupies Halicz and Lubart of Lithuania from the dynasty of Gedymin occupies Volhynia. The Lithuanians are more successful than the Poles in gathering up what was left behind by the Kiyev Rus. After they have defeated the Golden Horde in 1362 at the Blue Waters, the way to Kiyev and into the Dniestr basin lies open to them. The discipline and order which the new masters introduce into the resurrected principalities are weak, but at any rate they are better than the former anarchy. Like the khans of Sarai, the grand-princes of Lithuania are also gentle masters, and the subject principalities are given a sort of national autonomy, frequently under the rule of the old families.

175 But the most amazing thing is the triumph of the olf Kiyev culture at the heathen court of the Gedymins. The grand-prince and his retinue speak the language of the Rus, take over their laws and in most cases even their Greek-Orthodox faith. The influence of the culture of the Rus at the Lithuanian court, as exercised by the Ukrainian princes and scholars, makes it seem not impossible that, under the leadership of the energetic Gedymin, the Kingdom of Kiyev might rise again.

But the ambition and vanity of Grand-Prince Iagailo is fateful for the Ukrainians. Deluded by the deceptive splendor of the Polish throne, he signs the blood alliance in 1385 and hands Lithuania and the Ukraine over to Polish despotism. The conditions imposed by the Polish szlachta are beyond all measure. In order to obtain the hand of the /38/ fifteen-year-old Polish queen Jadwiga, Iagailo is obliged to have himself and his people baptized in the Catholic faith and to promise to reconquer Poland's lost countries at his own expense, to guard and respect the privileges of the aristocracy, to release all Polish prisoners, to pay 200,000 guldens forfeit, and, above all, "to unite all his Lithuanian and Russian lands with Poland for all time." (20) Lithuania, White

20. Brandenburger: Polish History, page 37.

Russia, Black Russia and the Ukraine - at that time a territory three times as large as Poland - is debased to the status of a province of Cracow by the signature of the prince who was seized by Polish megalomania.

Iagailo's resolve was a decision against the Ukraine.

It is now all over with Ukrainian influence at the court of the Gedymin. The personal union, the identity of the person of the grand-prince of Lithuania and the king of Poland was to be of far-reaching significance for all of eastern Europe.

125 But the Iagailo family were not to lead the Poles to the Black Sea, but into the Bohemian cauldron, and while they were holding court in Prague on the Vitava, the Turks entrenched themselves north of the Danubian estuary in the principality of Moldvia, only to afford from there a constant threat to the Poles. The rise of the Muscovite princes was to be of even greater significance. While the Iagailo family ruled in Prague and Cracow, these princes laid the foundations of a kingdom that in the end was to devour them all, the Lithuanians, the Poles and the Ukrainians. Moscow united the North Russian principalities in the Kingdom of Muscovy and shook off the Tatar yoke. Ivan III conferred upon himself the name "Czar of all the Russians" and thus formulated Moscow's claim to all "Russian" countries for the first time.

The extinction of the Iagailo dynasty at last gave Polish nobility the opportunity to annex the Lithuanian and East Ukrainian countries altogether. They met at Lublin in 1569, three years before the death of the last member of the Iagailo family, in order to receive the application given to their Ukrainian and /39/ Lithuanian mercenaries for the annexation of these countries. Since the Lithuanians, meanwhile, failed to come, their country was, in contumatiam, placed into the arms of Poland, while the Ukrainians signed the alliance. What booty for the impoverished Polish szlachta, for whom the gates of the Ukrainian provinces, which had in part still stood under Lithuanian dominion, now opened wide! In endless hords these debt-ridden panowie, accustomed to living from the proceeds of the labor of others and to regarding everything Ukrainian with condescension, journeyed beyond the Dniepr. They begged for land from the king, seized offices and positions and on flimsy pretexts snatched huge pieces of land from the Ukrainian aristocracy.(21)

21. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 193.

175 The Ukraine is "blessed" with the culture of Polish aristocracy. Polish law is enforced first of all in Galicia and, with the advance of Polish rule, also in the remaining territories. The Polish nobility culture - this means the greatest distinction between the two strata of society, the szlachta and the common people; it means omnipotent nobility and impotent peasantry, deprived of rights. In Galicia this culture begins with the introduction of one-day service to the master. At first compulsory labor is required only a few days during the year, then one day a week, two days, finally every day. And still more is squeezed out of the unfortunate ones, for the master's life in Warsaw and Carcow costs a great deal of money. Toward the end of this development the peasant is nothing more than a work horse on the estate of the squire, at whose mercy he stands together with his family. "The Poles and the natives who have become Poles seize all power and might, all proceeds, all land. The native Ukrainian population is forced into a position of complete servitude, is converted into a thoroughly impoverished, deeply humiliated and despised mass of slaves and drudges of the Poles, divested of everything. Their culture and religion, their judiciary and economic life are brought to a state of complete ruin /40/ by this Polish rule." (22) The despotism of the Polish starosta

22. Ibid, page 180.

(elder) and his friends prevails in the cities. All positions are closed to non-Catholics, that is to say, to the Greek-Orthodox Ukrainians.

In this state of deepest affliction the marvelous power of the spirit is revealed. Vladimir's faith and scanty remnants of Byzantine culture separated the Ukrainians from the Poles, from Polish-Latin culture. "The faith of the fathers formed the elementary, albeit unconscious substructure of

175 national sentiment." (23) The Jesuits worked hard

23. Zalotzieckyj: The Spiritual Life of The Ukraine, page 45.

to combat the Reformation in Poland. They erected schools and raised considerably the general level of education. Many Ukrainian gentlemen, enticed by superior Jesuit knowledge and the privileges of Catholic Polish nobility, adopted the Roman faith. But the people stubbornly clung to their religion. Then, in the period of greatest national danger, there developed the brotherhoods among the commoners of the cities. They founded schools, built churches and in this way, together with individual noblemen who had remained faithful to their people, they laid the foundation for a Ukrainian renascence. The contact of Byzantine-Ukrainian culture with that of Roman-Polish also showed its good sides: the Ukrainians learned from the Jesuits. The first Ukrainian books appeared, but were immediately banned by the Polish clergy. In his princely residence of Ostrog in Volhynia, Prince Constantin Ostrozhskyj set up the first printing press.

Nevertheless, the Poles and Jesuits and those bishops who had been placed by them in the vacated orthodox sinecures, did not give up their plans of uniting the Orthodox Church with the Roman-Catholic Church. Actually they succeeded in winning over a number of Ukrainian bishops to the Union which was agreed upon in Brest Litowsk in 1595. "But when, in the following year, a new synod of Brest Litovsk was supposed to ratify the union, Jesuit zeal which did not want any special position, and the selfishness and arrogance /Facing page 40/ /Map II: The Ukraine in the 11th to the 13th centuries. The independent Kiyev Kingdom at the height of the Middle Ages with its local principalities in the period before its destruction by the Mongol-Tatar invasion./ /Key inside map: -o-o-o National boundary. .....Boundaries of the

175 principalities. ------Boundaries of the temporary annexations./ /41/ of the Roman prelates, who opposed the admission of the Greek bishops into the Senate, spoiled everything. Two parties were formed which excommunicated each other." (24)

24. Brandenburger: Polish History, page 72.

Indignant, the princes of the Church departed, and the tension between their camps was discharged in violent polemical treatises. Against every attempt to win them over by force to the fold of the supreme Roman shepherd, the Ukrainian populace offered stubborn resistance. A fresh breeze blew through the Byzantine churches and monasteries and swept away the despairing mood of penitence.

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Between 1250 and about 1500 whole swarms of Jews immigrated into Poland and Galicia. They came from Spain and France, from Germany and Holland and later also from Italy. At the time when in Brest Litovsk the bishops were consigning each other to hell, the haughty Polish magnates were already deep in Jewish debt. Jews were the bankers of royal marriages and of warriors. Wholesale trade was predominately in their hands, and there was a large class of Jewish tenant farmers with their quick profits, retail dealers and tradesmen. The Jews had, of course, assumed intimate connections from the beginning, "With the higher nobility as well as with the king, on the basis of credits, rents, and so forth. But the more the gentry retired from the management of their estates, in order, in their feeling of liberty, to carry on politics on a grand scale in the provincial and national diets and in the confederations, or to lead a life of enjoyment..., the more money they naturally required for all these purposes. Only the Jew was capable of providing

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[Map II: The Ukraine in the 11th to 13th centuries, cf. complete legend pp. 38-39]

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[Map II: the Ukraine in the 11th to 13th (centuries)

U 175 this money, and thus he became the creditor but at the same time, in order to protect himself, the administrator of the large as well as the small estates of the gentry." (25) There was scarcely an

25. Seraphim: The Jewry in the East European Area, page 45ff.

estate without a Jewish manager. The Jews migrated from the city to the country as administrators, innkeepers, /42/ tenant farmers, tax collectors and even as colonizing promoters in order to entice new farmers into the depopulated regions. The more money the gentlemen needed, the more the Jew wrested from the peasant serfs. Whatever amount was above that which was demanded by the lord of the manor, disappeared into the Jew's pocket.

These were the social, cultural and religious conditions at the beginning of the new era, the era of the Republic.

/43/ The Republic of the Steppes

C. 648 "Theodatus Chmielnicki, Dei gratia generalissimus ecclesiae Graecorum, imperator omnium Cosacorum zaporoviensum, terror et extirpator nobilitatis Poloniae fortalitiorumque expugnator, exterminator sacerdotum romanorum, persecutor ethnicorum, Anti-Christi et Judaeorum", which translated means: "Theodatus Chmielnicki, by the grace of God head of the Greek Church, emperor of all the Zaporogian Cossacks, terror and extirpator of the Polish nobility and conqueror of their fortifications, destroyer of the Roman clergy, persecutor of heathen, the anti-Christ and Jews." (26)

26. Borshchak: The Ukraine in Western Literature, page 309.

Cromwell was the one who sent the document

648 which bore the above address to the hetman of the Cossacks Bogdan Chmielnicki. It was the wish of the English Puritan that the emperor of all the Cossacks should assist him in combating the Roman Church. (27) Unfortunately, we do not know

27. Tisserand, ibid.

487 Chmielnicki's answer. But we do know that the route of the English couriers* led through the
621 "wild field", the steppe, along the Dniepr. Below the thundering rapids where the mighty stream seems to lose itself in numerous branches, on a swampy island difficult of access, behind an impenetrable wilderness of reeds and woods, the princely residence, the sech of the Cossack
621 hetman lay hidden. In Taras Bulba, Nikolai Gogol describes the life that went on there. When the old Cossack and his two sons arrived at the sech "they were deafened by the rumble of 50 blacksmith's hammers pounding the anvils of 25 half subterranean, sod-covered smithies. On the street under its projecting roofs sat powerful tanners /44/ smoothing ox skins with their calloused fists; shopkeepers stood in the shelter of their tents with piles of steel, flint and powder; an Armenian was spreading out costly fabrics; a Tatar was turning a lamb on the spit; with bent head a Jew was drawing horilka from a cask. But what attracted their attention most of all was the sight of a Zaporogian asleep in the middle of the street, arms and legs spread out wide...His mop of hair, proudly tossed back, covered half an ell of the ground, his trousers of beautiful red cloth were smeared with tar, so that all the world might see how little he cared about them. After he had inspected him closely, Bulba continued on his way through a narrow street filled with artisans of all kinds and with people of all races. This suburb resembled a market which fed and clothed the sech, for the latter knew

* [Sent to the Zaporogian cossacks — Analyst]

621 only how to drink and to shoot."

"At last they had the suburb behind them and saw several scattered houses of Cossacks, covered partly with sod, partly with felt after the Tatar manner. Cannons were set up in front of some of them. Nowhere were there fences to be seen or the small, low houses with projecting roofs on wooden piles, such as were to be seen in the suburb. A small bulwark and a barricade not guarded by anyone was sufficient proof of the incredible unconcern of the inhabitants. A few robust Zaporogians who lay about on the streets, their pipe in their mouths, looked at them rather indifferently and did not budge from the spot. Taras rode carefully in between them with his sons and said, 'Good day, Gentlemen!' - 'The same to you,' answered the Zaporogians. Everywhere they met picturesque groups of people. From the tanned faces of the Cossacks they could see that these men had often been under fire and were accustomed to dangers of all kinds. This is the sech! This is the nest from which they all fly, proud and strong as eagles. This is the place from which the invincible power of the Cossacks pours out over all of the Ukraine." Inasmuch as the sech[1] did not like to lose time in /45/ military training, it brought up its youth in the dust of battle and "for this reason combats were ceaselessly renewed. The Cossacks found it boring to fill in the few periods of idleness with excercises other than target-shooting, horse races and hunting wild animals in the steppes and fields. All the rest of the time was devoted to entertainment, to the tavern and to dancing. The sech presented a curious spectacle. It was, so to speak, an uninterrupted drinking bout, a festival that began noisily and never ended. A few worked at some kind of handicraft, others ran stalls and carried on retail trade. But the great majority of the inhabitants drank and amused themselves from morning till night as long as their pockets still jingled and

621 [702] 182

[1] [Headquarters of the Zaporogian cossacks on the Dnieper River - Analyst]

C
621 their share of spoils had not yet wandered into
182 the hands of shopkeepers and innkeepers. There was something very tempting about these universal drinking bouts. The sech did not consist of a bunch of drunkards who were bent on drowning their sorrow in the bottle; it was a jolly, carefree company of men who lived from day to day in a mad delirium of joy. Everyone who came there forgot and threw off everything that ordinarily concerned him; for he enthusiastically gave himself up to carefree camaraderie with people, like himself, who had neither parents nor a home nor a family..., who did not own a thing except the free breath of heaven and an indestructible serenity of spirit."
C No woman was permitted to enter the sech.

Besides the Zaporogian Cossacks (Zaporogian
101 comes from "za porogamy" meaning "beyond the
182 rapids") on the fortified island in the Dniepr, there were free Cossacks who lived on their farms scattered throughout the country, and these were by far in the majority. But in case of war or in general insurrection they appeared mounted and completely equipped at the place of assembly within a few days. When the campaign was ended, the warrior and farmer, whichever he chose to be, returned "to his meadows and fields /46/or to the banks of the Dniepr, spent his time fishing and trading, brewed beer and spirits and lived as a free Cossack...There was not a trade that he was not familiar with. He distilled spirits, built wagons, ground powder, was a forger and locksmith, and was above all adept at loafing, drinking and carousing as only the Slav knows how to be. No matter what he did, he was always in his element."

U This description of the peaceable side of
136 Cossack life would be incomplete without a contem-
C porary account of the hunting grounds of the
136 Cossacks. "The Ukraine is so rich in wild game that avrochs, wild horses and deer are hunted only for their skins. Of their meat only the most suc-

culent ribs and loins are used, everything else is discarded. The female deer and wild boar are not hunted at all. In winter roes and wild boars wander in large herds from the steppes into the forests, and in summer they return to the steppes. ...The bird world is so marvelously rich that in spring vast quantities of eggs and fledglings of wild ducks, wild geese, cranes and swans are gathered in. In spring such large schools of fish swim up the river that a spear thrown into the water comes to rest upright." (28) U 136 C 136

28. Rudnytskyj: Ukrainians, the Country and the People, page 123.

This, then, was the kingdom of Chmielnicki, the Emperor of the Cossacks. As soon as the hordes of the Pecheneg and Polovtsi had driven the agricultural Ukrainian population out of the fertile South Ukrainian territory with scimitars and with fire, the first gangs of freebooters, fishermen and hunters from among the homeless banded together. On one of the more inaccessible islands of the Danube Delta a troop of no less than 6000 exiled Ukrainian farmers settled. There could scarcely be any question of their clinging to their native soil in regions where the farm population was obliged to withdraw into certain areas of swamps and virgin forests to avoid the constantly roving Asiatic nomads. For generations /47/ peasants ventured out into the open field only at the time of sowing and reaping. And in spite of that, millions of men, women and children fell victims to the "organized slave hunts" of these hordes. U 175 C 178 621

Around the middle of the sixteenth century there developed small and later large militarily organized bands made up of homeless aristocratic and bourgeois refugees and the peasants who had escaped serfdom. As a result of a constant influx and integration, a regular army was formed which, C 621 642 182

11: Obermaier--45 J-3(no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine
Cossacks RD2

under the leadership of hetman Dmitro Visnievecki, 621
('hetman' comes from 'Hauptmann' and means command- 642
er-in-chief of all troops) built a strong fortifi- 182
cation, the sech, on an island of the Dniepr. By freeing from every other jurisdiction and supreme power, from taxes and feudal services all those who submitted to the power and legal authority of the sech, the Cossacks declared themselves an independent power. It was the strangest state of modern history which these people who were previously outlawed and defenceless built for themselves here. In this Republic of the Steppes* there was complete 642
freedom and equality of all warriors. The Gener- 643
al Assembly of Cossacks held supreme power within the state. At this assembly they elected the head of the state, the hetman who could at any time be deposed. As his first official act he was obliged to smear his face with mud, in order that he should not consider himself a superior being as a result of his election. In war, however, he was sole dictator. His assistants were the otamans who were also elected and who administered the individual districts. The General Council consisted of the hetman as the head of the government and army, the otamans, the general secretary, the military judge and a few other high officials. The cities which belonged to the Cossack state were granted self-administration after the manner of German municipal law.

For the serfs the free Republic of the steppes* had a great attraction, and they poured ceaselessly 178
into the kingdom of the Cossacks, became warriors 186
or domiciled farmers, /48/ or hired themselves out on the farms of those who merrily caroused in the sech. In everlasting wars against the "infidels", the Cossacks succeeded in gradually pushing back the Asiatic brigands and making room for the colonization of the steppes which now began. At first the Polish kings encouraged the "association of warriors" on their southeastern frontier; in fact, they were even granted special privileges, in

* [i.e. the Zaporogian cossacks - Analyst]

C 178 order to win over the audacious swashbucklers as
186 allies in the wars with the sultans who were also their mortal enemies. For the Cossacks were proud of their Christian Greek-Orthodox faith, and were ready to die for it at any time. "Whoever is willing to be put on the rack for his Christian faith, to be quartered, to endure all kinds of tortures for the sacred cross, whoever does not fear death, let him follow us. You should not fear death; you cannot avoid it. This is the life of the Cossacks." (29) With these promising words

29. Puluy: The Ukraine, Prague, 1915, page 7, quoted from Istoriia Vossoiedineniia Rus. /History of the Unification of Russia/

they invited their troops to join the military campaign. And they all came.

C 726 Wild, death-defying daredevils were these
181 Cossacks, typical landsknechts by nature who
648 enjoyed combat for its own sake, who fought under the banner of "freedom and Christianity", who today have a skirmish with the heathen hordes and tomorrow with the Catholic Polish armies, and then again are willing to protect the Poles from their enemies. Twice within four years they saved the Polish army from destruction: in 1618 from a threatening Muscovite siege and in 1621 at Khotyn from the Ottoman army which, allegedly 300,000 lances strong, was ready to overrun Poland. Nevertheless, four years later the Cossacks once again matched their strength against the Poles.

C 726 The fame of the warriors of the sech spread
648 to all lands. It was the time of the Thirty Years' War and brave riders were sought after in all camps. Pope Clement VIII had already sent messengers into the sech at the end of the sixteenth century, with the message that they "form an anti-Turkish

U 631 /Facing page 48/ /Map III: The Ukraine at the time
C 712

11: Obermaier--47 J-3(no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Cossacks RD2

of the Union of Lublin (1569)/ /Key: Nation- U
al boundaries. Boundary between Lithuania and 631
Poland before 1569. Boundary between Poland C
and Lithuania after 1569. Boundaries of 712
provinces. Western boundary of the Ukrainian
voivodeship. Regimental command of the registered C
Cossacks./ /49/ league" (30) Emperor Rudolph II 726
648

30. Borshchak: The Ukraine in Western Literature, page 132.

likewise ordered couriers to be sent to the hetman to persuade him to fight against the Turks. (31)

31. Ukraine and the Church Union, page 26.

In 1620 the "Nieuwe Tijdinghe", a Dutch newspaper, prints the report that the Cossacks are fighting their way through Hungary and Moravia and have captured the city of Trenčin for the emperor; 4000 people were killed. (32) The fact that the

32. Borshchak: The Ukraine in Western Literature, page 140.

Cossacks fought on the side of the emperor in the first period of the Thirty Years' War is also confirmed by the English in the Calendar of State Papers 1910. A small Cossack division fought with C
Ferdinand II against the Protestants in the battle 726
of Bila Hora (White Mountain). Again, Mazarin 648
fetched himself a corps of Cossacks which, under 181
the command of Chmielnicki and under the banners of Condé, even took part in the famous siege of Dunkirk. (33) Pierre Chevalier, the agent of the

33. Borshchak: The Ukraine in Western Literature, page 313.

French cardinal, tells us about it in his history

[Text resumes here — Analyst]

11: Obermaier--47A J3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Cossacks RD2

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

[Map III: The Ukraine at the time of the Union of Lublin (1569), cf. complete Legend pp. 46-47]

11: Obermaier--47B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Cossacks RD2

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[Map III Ukraine at the time of the union of Lublin (1569)]

C 726 648 181 of the Cossack wars. Everywhere the daredevils of the sech "are in great demand as combatants..., especially in the Prussian army where they often attain the rank of officers." (34) An altogether

34. Kuschnir, W.: The Ukraine and its Importance in the Present War with Russia, page 23.

adventurous characterization of the Cossacks is given by Nicolas de Bartenon, Sieur de Monsacré in his general history of the wars of the Turks, which appeared in Paris in 1608. "These men are loath to work like the Scythians, hardened against all difficulties like the Huns, devoted to arms like the Goths, tanned by the sun like the Indians and cruel like the Sarmatians...lions in the hunt, equal to the Turks in craftiness. They remind one of the Scythians in their cruelty and of the Christians in their simple faith." (35)

35. Borshchak, The Ukraine in Western Literature.

U 175 C 177 There was ample cause for disputes with the Poles. After the Union of Lublin the Polish nobility "greedily" rushed into the Ukraine on the right of the Dniepr, and attempted to introduce there also the rule of the szlachta. The Jesuit and the Jew belonged to its entourage, the one in order to win over the Orthodox for Rome and therewith for the Polish nation, the other as estate manager and often even as - gatekeepers of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Jews who, according /50/ to the Orthodox Ukrainian conception were "damned" because they belonged to the race that had crucified Christ, the Jews who were despised in the city, here very quickly rose to the position of masters of the Ukrainians. As leaseholders of the estates of the Ukrainian nobility seized by the

Polish szlachta, they were also not rarely in charge of the keys of the church. Thus if some poor little farmer wanted to christen his newborn child or if a young couple wanted to be married, they were obliged to pay a fee to the Jew before he would unlock the church. And this at a time when the "Zaporogian league of knights" set itself up as the patron of the Greek Orthodox Church and reaffirmed the rights of the hierarchy in Kiyev. U 175 C 177

Repeatedly, -in 1592, in 1596, 1630 and 1637 - the Cossacks rose up against Polish arrogance. The result was bloody, extremely cruel reprisals. They pilloried one another, scalded, burned, quartered, excoriated, hanged, broke each other on the wheel and beheaded one another. U 175 C 669

From 1637 on the uprisings of the suppressed peasants in the Ukraine west of the Dniepr against the Polish masters and their Jesuit and Jewish executors went on ceaselessly. The hatred of the Ukrainian people assumed such proportions that the slightest provocation caused the lust for revenge, which had been suppressed with difficulty, to flare up into madness. The Jewish historian Graetz in his history of the Jews characterizes the days before the purgatory of the great Ukrainian insurrection in the following words: "The Polish Jews were sorely deluded when they offered assistance to the nobility and the Jesuits in suppressing the Zaporgian Cossacks in the Ukraine and in Little Russia. The magnates desired to make profitable serfs out of the Cossacks, the Jesuits, Roman Catholics out of the Greek heretics; the Jews who had settled in the territory wanted to enrich themselves in this way and lord it over these humblest pariahs. They advised the owners of the colonies as to how they might most /51/ thoroughly demean, torture and maltreat the Cossacks. They presumed to set themselves up as judges over them, and offended them in religious matters. No wonder that the enslaved Cossacks hated the Jews almost more than their aristocratic and spiritual U 175 C 669 563

11: Obermaier--50 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
cossacks RD2

U 175 enemies." (36)

C 669 563

36. Quoted by Seraphim: The Jewry in East-European Area, page 51.

C 669 The rock started rolling when the Poles took away the estate of the Cossack chieftain Bogdan Chmielnicki, when they abducted his wife and killed his son. In vain the Cossack sought justice, and when he failed to find it, he galloped into the sech where he, the rebel, prepared to do anything, was elected hetman by the general assembly of warriors. The insurrection of all free Cossacks and all serfs became thus an accepted fact. With the cry: "death to the nobility, death to the Jesuits!" a mighty Cossack army set out from the sech in 1648, in order to fling the torch of rebellion into the land. The flames of rebellion leapt up everywhere, and soon the Ukraine was ablaze. Estates along with their masters, cities along with their inhabitants were reduced to ashes. Nearly 300,000 rebels took bloody revenge. The Polish armies were devastated or fled in the night before the Cossacks, like the troops at Pilavce which were 230,000 strong. Chmielnicki reached the gates of Lwów. All of Poland trembled at the thought of the day when the Cossacks will be lords of the land. But the hetman did not seize the opportunity - he made a compromise for 70,000 gulden and marched to the gates of Zamosc in order to besiege it. In Warsaw a king was being chosen. Chmielnicki's word sufficed to put Jan Casimir, the cardinal of the Jesuits, on the throne. With craft and cunning and grandiose promises the king succeeded in pacifying the insurrection. The long baggage train of rebels with their heavy cannons drawn by oxen and their booty-laden carts slowly rolled back to the Dniepr. The hetman did not know then that, just before reaching his goal, he thus gambled away Ukrainian freedom.

11: Obermaier--51 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine
cossacks RD2

The Poles had no intention of fulfilling the peace terms which had been agreed upon. Nothing 669
remains for the hetman /52/ but to take up the struggle anew in the following year, to wage new battles with variable luck, and to set up new peace terms which are now flatly rejected. In 1651 Poles and Ukrainians again met on the field of battle. The hetman's gunpowder gradually ran out and he found it difficult "to accomplish the task of liberation alone". At his request, therefore, the sultan came to his aid by sending forth the Crimean Tatar hordes with whose help two Polish armies were destroyed. But then the khan rode back to the Yaila Mountains and left Chmielnicki to his fate.

Now it became evident that the Republic of 669
the Steppes, constantly fighting without a politi- 648
cal goal, and waging war now with the Poles against the Tatar and Turks, then with the latter against the Poles, then again alone against the other two, has shed too much blood to be able to maintain its sovereignty even temporarily. The Cossack state felt a strong desire for support and turned anew to the sultan. Negotiations failed, and so the hetman was obliged to send his emissary to the czar in Moscow. Alexei hesitated for a long time before he assumed the protectorate over the Ukraine of the Cossacks. Finally in 1654 a feudal contract is signed at Pereiaslav in which the "knights of the sech" recognized the supremacy of the czar whereas they retained the power of maintaining their own army, administering their finances and their legal system and arranging their own contact with foreign courts. The voivode of the czar were not far behind; they made Kiyev the leading fortress of the Kingdom of the Muscovites in the Ukraine. Moscow will always defend to the last this wealthy land which so unexpectedly fell into its hands. Poland, which in its shortsightedness did not accept the peace terms of the hetman,

11: Obermaier--52 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
cossacks RD2

and the Ukraine itself thus paved the way for Moscow to the Black Sea and thus helped it attain decisive superiority in eastern Europe. /53/ C 669 648

In the following decades many attempts were made to alter this fact. There were three parties in the Ukraine, one of which wanted to join with Moscow, the other with Poland and the third with the Turks. All three felt that a protectorate was necessary. And all three of them had their turn, one after the other, without any effect on the fate of the Ukrainian people, except to divide it up like the spoils of war between the Russians and the Poles in the Peace of Andrusiv in 1667: Ukraine on the left bank fell to the Muscovite Kingdom, on the right bank to the Poles, except for Kiyev which went to Moscow. A later protectorate of the sultan over the right-bank Ukrainians lasted only a short time. The attempt of hetman Doroshenko to enter into an alliance with the Elector of Brandenburg in 1671 failed. U 175 C 648

*

The Ukrainian people look back with pride to the Cossack Period and celebrate it in many songs. Perhaps an independent state would have grown up for the Ukrainians in that heroic epoch if there had been but one great statesman among the victorious generals, the hetmans. Death-defying warriors and the joyous shedding of blood were not enough, and there was no political, but only a religious idea at the basis of the "struggle against the infidels". Thus from a national political point of view the tremendous energy of the Cossacks was simply wasted and at the end of an epoch which might have led to the formation of a state important in world history, the mission that sought protection from two foes found itself faced with a third, Moscow.

In spite of the continual unrest, the cultural achievements were significant. From the time U 175 C 517 178

11: Obermaier--53 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
COSSACKS RD2

The Zaporogians took over the patronage of the Orthodox Church, Kiyev experiences a new cultural flowering. Metropolitan Mogila, himself a Jesuit scholar, reformed the famous Kiyev monasteries and schools after the Jesuit pattern. Under him the /54/ Academy, which still follows the old Byzantine tradition, also came into contact with western culture. Seven years after the death of Mogila, the Arabian author Paul of Aleppo, after a journey through the Ukraine, writes: "The Ukrainians are informed people; they love the sciences and the study of law. They know rhetoric, logic and philosophy. They like to carry on controversies. Beginning with Rakhov, all through Cossack territory we unexpectedly met with something very nice: Almost all the inhabitants can read and write, even their wives and daughters who know the liturgy and religious songs. Children are as abundant as grass, and all of them have learned to read, even orphans who are taught by clergymen." (37)

37. Tisserand: The Ukraine, the Life of a People.

During the era of the hetman Mazepa, around the turn of the 17th and 18th century, under Muscovite rule, the cultural life of the Ukraine experienced its greatest upsweep. Almost every village had a school, which was never again to be the case. This period found its most splendid expression, however, in the Ukrainian baroque, the union of Byzantine with the baroque style. The fund of knowledge and culture which had accumulated from the time of Mogila's enthronement in 1632 up to the tragic flight of Mazepa, was so rich that Peter the Great and his successors were able to draw abundantly from it. The Kiyev scholars and their students had a significant share in the Europeanizing process of the Muscovite Kingdom which up to that time was buried in obscure barbarism.

175 Under the two friends, Peter the Great and Ivan Mazepa, the protector and the hetman, the cultural development of the Ukrainian people came to an abrupt end. Peter waged bitter combat with the Swedes for access to the Baltic which lay in Swedish hands. The Czar's difficulties made it seem urgent to the hetman to shake off Moscow's dominion by means of an allegiance with the Swedish king Charles XII. The alliance was formed and Charles XII, coming from devastated /55/ Saxony, attacked the Muscovites. Meanwhile Peter, setting fire to his own land, retreated far into the interior and in one attack destroyed an army of reinforcements amounting to 18,000 men of the Swedish king. Amid dreadful deprivations, exhausted from hunger and cold, young Charles wandered about with his main forces of 33,000 landsknechts on the devastated trail of Peter. He got within 300 kilometers of Moscow when Mazepa persuaded him to turn off to Ukraine. There 30,000 Cossacks were supposed to be ready to come to his aid. However, the hetman promised too much. The mobilization of the Cossacks was only partially successful because Peter was occupying large areas and because, moreover, many Cossack chieftains were not cooperating. Near Poltava in Central Ukraine Czar Peter attacked King Charles and the hetman and destroyed both armies in 1709. Charles and Mazepa fled to the sultan; the one destroyed Sweden's chances of becoming a great power, the other defrauded the Ukraine of its autonomous rights.

The Muscovite meted out dreadful punishment on the followers of Mazepa. There were confiscations, banishments and trials. The hetman state became the province of "Little Russia", the Ukrainians became "Little Russians", the Muscovites "Great Russians" and the entire kingdom: "Russia". The suspension of the autonomous rights of the Ukrainians in 1764, the abolition of the sech by Catherine II in 1775, and the introduction of feudalism in 1783 struck the Ukrainians simply as the affixing of a seal to their defeat at Poltava. The

U 175 situation in the Ukraine under Polish rule, where the rage of the Ukrainian pariahs vented itself in the extremely violent hajdamak /robber/ rebellions, was hopeless. Bishops consecrated the knives which were "destined to become sated with blood". Hundreds of thousands of Poles, Jews and Jesuits were mercilessly massacred, and on the gallows along the streets hang, in groups of threes, a Pole, a Jew and a - dog, "all of one faith". The insurrections are quelled in a no less bloody manner. Even the /56/ partitioning of Poland, as a result of which the part of the Ukraine on the right bank fell to Russia, did not change the hopeless situation of the Ukrainian peasants.

000 Peter the Great attained his goal: Moscow's power was firmly anchored on the Baltic and the Black Sea. The significance which was to accrue to the Ukraine in the Muscovite Kingdom is summed up by Napoleon in the ominous "Will of Peter the Great" in the following words: "To come as close as possible to Constantinople and East India! Whoever rules there will be the true master of the world. To this end incite continual wars, alternately against the Turks and against Persia; build wharfs on the Black Sea. The latter, like the Baltic, to be taken possession of step by step; both are essential for the attainment of that goal. To hasten the downfall of Persia. To push forward to the Persian Gulf. If possible, to restore the old trade route to Syria and set out straight for India, the market of the world. Once there, we shall be able to dispense with the gold U 175 of England". (38) /Facing page 56/ /Map IV: The

38. Trietsch, Russia, page 61, 62.

C 712 726 Ukraine Around the Middle of the Seventeenth Century (At the time of Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki). From the territory of the Zaporogian Cossacks there arose a first "Ukrainian" hetman state with Chigirin

as its center. It dealt heavy blows to the Polish-Lithuanian state in the middle of the seventeenth century. The arrows leading from Bazadenk to Lwów point out the direction taken by the army of Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki to Poland./ /Key inside map: ⁚⁚⁚⁚ National boundaries. ---- Provincial boundaries. ++++ Western boundaries of the Ukrainian voivodeships in Poland. ←←← Campaign of Bogdan Chmielnicki against Poland in the year 1648. ◇ Cossack regimental command. * Seat of the military order "sech".

/57/ In the "Death Quadrangle"

"In a piercing, frosty north wind" on November 16, 1919 there marched passed each other in the quadrangle of death, silently, without a military salute, the fragmentary, wretched, barefoot detachments of the West Ukrainian supporting troops and the likewise fragmentary, wretched, barefoot East Ukrainian front-rank troops. The former were going east into the East Podolian area of concentration where the remnants of the West Ukrainian army were to capitulate before the 'Pan-Russians'; the others were going west to Central Volhynia where they were to surrender to the Poles. Both left behind the same landmarks along their way: frozen corpses in the ditches." (39) This was the

39. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism in the Years 1918 to 1923, page 389.

funeral march of the last soldiers of the West Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic.

The episode of the new Ukrainian statehood began with the March Revolution in Russia in 1917. In March 22, 1917, a few days after the revolution in Moscow, the "Ukrainian Central Council" was formed in Kiyev, consisting of representatives of

11: Obermaier--56A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Cossacks RD2

[MAP IV: Ukraine around the Middle of the Seventeenth Century, cf. complete Legend, pp. 55-56]

11: Obermaier--56B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Cossacks RD2

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[Map IV. the Ukraine around the middle of the seventeenth century.]

668 the parties. At the same time the process of making
642 Ukrainians of the various divisions of the troops on
the front began, so that within a few months the
175 Central Council had about one and one-half to two
million Ukrainian soldiers at their disposal. But
in spite of this enormous army, the Central Council
by and large yielded to the orders of the Kerenskii
government of Moscow. Its further policy is characterized by the four manifestoes which it issued up
to the time of its dissolution in April 1919. On
June 23, 1917 the first manifesto of the Central
Council announced the autonomy of the Ukraine. It
was to maintain its own parliament, the Central
Council, and a /58/ government, the general secretariat. On July sixteenth the second manifesto followed, giving particulars as to what was meant by
autonomy, and containing an emphatic declaration
for confederacy. In its manifesto of November 19,
1917 after Lenin had already stepped into power, the
Central Council still clung to the union with Moscow.
Again in this "Universal"-that was what the manifestoes were called - which proclaimed the Ukrainian
People's Republic, there was mention of federation
with Moscow. On December fourteenth the Council of
648 People's Commissars in Moscow recognized "the
175 Ukrainian People's Republic and its right to separate
completely from Russia or to enter negotiations for
a federation or similar relationships." But in the
same document of recognition the Council of People's
Commissars laid down the condition that the disarming
of Red troops in the Ukraine would have to cease and
that the Central Council would have to desist from
its "counter-revolutionary activity". Should the
People's Commissars fail to obtain a satisfactory
answer to this demand within 48 hours, "the Council
of People's Commissars would assume that the Central
Council was in a state of open warfare against the
Soviet government." A few days after this recognition coupled with an ultimatum Bolshevik troops
broke into the Ukraine. In Khar'kov there was formed
a Ukrainian-Bolshevik counter-government, and Moscow's

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war against Kiyev began.

Straightway Bolshevik propaganda made itself felt in the Ukraine. It was easy to unleash revolutionary energies, after the Central Council had prepared the ground with the same arguments, albeit in a weaker form. In the country unbridled peasant rebellion against the squires raged. It was arable land and fine cattle and horses on the farms that the peasants wanted; they did not care who ruled in the cities. This was the state of affairs in the Ukraine when on January 22, 1918 the Central Council in Kiyev in a fourth manifesto proclaimed the sovereign "Ukrainian People's /59/ Republic" and put into effect separation from "indivisible Russia". However, at the same time it did not forget to announce that after the overthrow of Bolshevism, there should again be cooperation with Russia. The manifesto which was meant at last to arouse national passions suppressed for so long, was not heard in the noise of general rebellion. A few days after the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the parliament and the government at Kiyev were surprised by a revolt of Bolsheviks and its members were arrested. If they had not been freed by the Ukrainian sharpshooters of the sech who became the nucleus of the later Ukrainian armies, and the corps of free Cossacks consisting of workmen, these parliamentarians would have faced certain death. It was precisely in those days that the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk recognized the independent Ukrainian People's Republic on February 9, 1918. Vienna was facing a famine and needed grain, so the peace was favorable to the Ukraine. For the adjudication of national sovereignty they were obliged to furnish a half million tons of grain. The "peace for bread" had been signed one day when the Bolsheviks drove the Central Council out of their capital. In March the situation became so threatening for the Ukrainian government that it was obliged to appeal to the Central Powers

64 for occupation and riddance of the Ukraine from
668 Bolsheviks. Thereupon German and Austro-Hungarian
175 troops occupied the country. In Kiyev the Central Powers established military, diplomatic and political representation. In order to take the wind out of the sails of the vigorous Bolshevik agitation, the Central Council nevertheless saw itself forced to continue its revolutionary activity. Thus, against their will, they led "the country toward a complete social-revolutionary dissolution in which East Ukraine had inevitably to fall victim to the Bolshevism of Moscow." (40)

40. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism.

It is obvious that the conservatively-minded German authorities had no understanding of such governmental tricks as would seriously jeopardize /60/ the furnishing of grain. Therefore they supported the attempt of the former aide-de-camp of the Czar and Russian general of Ukrainian origin, Pavlo Skoropadskyj, to introduce the monarchical office of hetman instead of the Republican Central Council. On April 29, 1918 Pavlo
668 Skoropadskyj, the offspring of a hetman family,
175 proclaimed a new hetman state in the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the indigenous props of this monarchical regime were very weak. If he had not been protected from the beginning by the authority of the army of occupation, the revolutionary masses would have driven him out along with his few dozens of landowners, industrialists, merchants and officers on the very first day. Skoropadskyj's first efforts were directed toward restoring the pre-revolutionary social conditions in the country, during which process his men did not shrink from severe penal expeditions and from the use of the "traditional Russian wisdom" - the club. This led to repeated bloody rebellions on the part of the embittered peasants. An uneducated, fermenting,

668 destitute mass of humanity, as yet incapable of
175 self-administration, a much too small middle class and a corrupt reactionary society at the head,- these were the elements of the hetman state. But it was the hetman's doom that, for lack of a national Ukrainian conservative stratum, he was obliged to lean more and more on the old domiciled Russian circles who in the end completely won over the Ukrainian head of the state to their reactionary plans. On November 14, 1918 Skoropadskyj set
642 up an Old Russian government in Kiyev and announced
648 the federation of the Ukraine with a czarist Russia
175 which, however, was never again to arise. Twenty-four hours after the announcement of the annexation of the Ukraine to this fictitious czarist Russia, the revolt of the "Ukrainian National League" against Skoropadskyj and the Old Russian counter-revolutionaries broke out. There begins the period of the second Ukrainian People's Republic, at the head of which is a five-man governing board. At the end of the /61/ seven-month rule of Skoropadskyj, after his flight from the new Ukrainian government, he made the following confession in his last manifesto of December 14, 1918: "God did not give me the strength to attain my goal."

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In the meantime Austria-Hungary also approached its dissolution. On October 10, 1918 in the Imperial Council of Vienna, the Ukrainian parliamentarians from Galicia demanded the right of self-government for the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary; it was only a few days before the collapse of the Empire. On the eighteenth of October the Ukrainian members of the Imperial Council and the Diet in Lwów founded the Ukrainian National Council which on the following day proclaimed the union of all Ukrainian territories in Austria-Hungary. The National Council set up three executive committees and therewith imagined it had done all that

was necessary. Then they believed a telegram of the Western powers containing the confirmation or the order to make use of self-government and found the West Ukrainian state would come fluttering into the house. The parliamentarians who received their political education in the lobbies of the Imperial Council building had complete faith in the magic formula of self-government and were waiting to see what the Western powers would have to say. Action was taken only by several companies of East Galician-Ukrainian troops who in the night of the first of November seized Lwów in a surprise attack. The Galician capital was predominantly inhabited by Poles and Jews, and the Poles immediately countered with a revolt. The Ukrainian National Council was still waiting patiently; it had made no real preparations to take over power in Galicia. Thus its appeals must be directed to the anonymous masses, "To everyone", with the request that they lend a helping hand everywhere and intervene everywhere. Finally on November ninth the government, the temporary state secretariat, was formed and the division of governmental power very neatly handled. The /62/ National Council was to make the laws, the State Secretariat was to see that they were enforced. Then the order was given that all "necessary steps be taken to unite all the Ukrainian provinces into one state". The new state called itself the "West Ukrainian People's Republic". Its alliance with the East "Ukrainian People's Republic" was solemnly announced on January 22, 1919 in Kiyev. The West Ukrainian People's Republic was given the name "Western Territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic". In reality, however, conditions remained as before between the West Ukrainian and the East Ukrainian state, in spite of formal amalgamation. Both states continued to be independent allies, small West Ukraine being the stronger.

The West Ukrainian state was obliged from the beginning to reckon with opponents who were

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642 bent on the most extreme measures. Roman Dmovski,
648 chairman of the Polish National Committee founded
175 in Paris during the war and leader of the Polish delegation at the peace negotiations, was the most bitter enemy of any kind of Ukrainian state. He countered the partition of Great Russia at Brest Litovsk with the partitioning of the Ukraine. It was completely in accordance with his ideas when as early as February 28, 1918, after Brest Litovsk, the Paris National Committee decided completely to destroy Ukrainian state in East Europe at any cost. To this end Polish agents in Paris, London and Washington used all their powers of persuasion on leading politicians and newspapers. They wisely suppressed the fact that Polish plans secretly included the entire Ukraine west of the Dniepr which had fallen to Russia in the partitions of Poland. These opponents of independent Ukrainian state were augmented: the Polish army of General Haller, which was formed in the summer of 1918 on French soil and which was recognized as the "confederate army" on the twenty-eighth of September, arrived in Poland.

West Ukraine could be nothing more than booty or a tool in the hands of the Allies. Inasmuch as France /63/ wanted to build up against Germany a Poland that was as strong as possible, it was best that Poland subjugate West Ukraine and thus exclude any threat from the rear. Only Foch for a time entertained the plan of erecting a Ukrainian vassal state and of throwing in its soldiers against the Bolsheviks. For the English Liberals, West Ukraine was an object of barter which could be used as an extortionary measure against the French, or, if there was no other way, could be made into a mandate state under the supervision of the League of Nations.

The fiercest enemies of the East Ukrainian
648 statehood, however, were the Bolsheviks who, fully
175 aware of the fateful significance of a loss of the

648 Ukraine for the Muscovite realm, strained every
175 effort to fight for the country. The Pan-Russian counter-revolutionary armies also proved themselves opponents not to be underestimated. "The campaigns of Denikin, Kolchak, Iudenich and other Russian generals clearly proved that there were only two forces fighting in the Russian civil war: the old Czarist absolutism against the new Bolshevik despotism. And both of them fought with equal ferocity against the Ukraine." (41)

41. Danko: The Nation in Soviet Chains, page 25.

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726 A surprise attack of the Ukrainian troops
on Lwów set off the Polish-West Ukrainian War.
175 For weeks wild fighting raged in the streets of the city; finally the Poles succeeded in bringing in troops and forcing the Ukrainians out of Lwów during the night of November 22, 1918. The victors exercised bloody reprisals on the Ukrainian population; they destroyed Ukrainian property and dragged many respected citizens into concentration camps from which they were never to return. The Jews expiated for their neutrality with a three-day pogrom, during which whole blocks of houses went up in flames.

[631] After the loss of Lwów, the West Ukrainian
state included about 40,000 square kilometers with
642 four million /64/ inhabitants, among them three
648 million Ukrainians. To destroy this dwarf state
was the firm intention of the leaders of the Polish
726 state of eighteen million. The Ukrainian govern-
175 ment now had its seat at Stanislawów; Dr. Ievgen Petrushevych was the head of the state. He and many other men who were responsible for the fate of West Ukraine still regarded it as "an incident, a misunderstanding, an error" that there was any fighting at all between Poles and Ukrainians. Heedless of the front which was expanding day by

642 day and of the increasingly bloody battles, they
649 abandoned themselves to the illusion that these
726 misunderstandings would merely have to be cleared
175 up and all would be well. They believed that patience was required until the Allies carried out the right of self-government for which the Ukrainians alone were obliged to fight with weapons. "The fact that individual destinies must be determined by the will of the individual - such points of view which are so familiar to conquering nations, were completely foreign to the 'Ukrainian National Council', all the more since there was not a single, in any way outstanding, personality in leading political circles, who would have been capable in a critical situation to grasp the reins and direct events." (42)

42. Kuchabskyj: West Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 52.

175 The war which at the beginning was carried
726 on with a few thousand men on both sides was in full force by the end of December. At this time the Ukrainians successfully mobilized their fighting manpower up to 35 years of age. Then, however, they made the mistake of abandoning warfare in the open country and of leaving the initiative to the Poles who, in keeping with their reckless methods, made use of it. In spite of the fact that the Ukrainian front which ran northward from the Carpathians presented considerable deficiencies along its approximately 250-kilometer length, that the battalions, for example, were strung together loosely and without a unified supreme command, nevertheless the Polish troops which arrived from mid-January on suffered heavy defeats. Thus Gen-
000 eral Romer /Facing page 64/ /Above: A typical Ukrainian church made of wood, in the Carpathians. Below: Ukrainian peasant woman baking bread./1 /Facing page 65/ /The Ukrainian landscape is full

1 [This plate not processed for files — Analyst]

000 of unique charm. - In spite of their poverty, Ukrainian peasants keep their loam huts clean.[7]
726 /65/ along with 5000 men was defeated and shortly
175 thereafter other Polish detachments north of Lwów were destroyed.

And now the Ukrainians fell into a situation which was somehow reminiscent of the siege of Lwów by hetman Chmielnicki in 1648. It was again Lwów that was besieged and cut off from the rest of the world. The city seemed hopelessly lost, there was even no water. At this point when the war was developing favorably for the Ukrainians and when it could only be a few days before Lwów fell into their hands as a trump which might even overtrump the Western Powers, they ceased hostilities as a result of the promises of a French military mission. "...If, in turn, you accept our proposal we shall take steps toward the recognition of your sovereignty...". But the peace terms of the French General Berthelemy seemed so severe to the Ukrainians that after three days they resumed the fight. The brief pause sufficed for the Poles to recover. Morale in the Ukrainian army was also no longer of the best after the prospects of peace had been shattered. The soldiers lived through a severe winter. Some of them were in need of coats, and even more, or a corps of officers which might have served as a moral support to them during the long months of life in the trenches. Five hundred soldiers and one officer! That represents a catastrophic dearth of officers. Gangs of East Ukrainian peasants sent to help, caused mutiny and plunder so that they were decimated and sent back over the border.

To what extent the Ukrainian general staff had already lost the leadership of its troops was proved by the vote which it took among the individual battalions upon the armistice command of the Entente of March 19, 1919. Whereas the Ukrainian army, in response to it, declared itself

7 [For plate, see p. 219, category 116 - Analyse]

for the armistice, the Poles who started a general 126
offensive on March eighteenth, paid no attention 175
to the wishes of their allies /66/ in Paris. On the contrary, without running up against any opposition worth mentioning, they built up a favorable starting point for a new offensive, extending from the Carpathians to Volhynia. General Haller worked out the plans, unconcerned over the fact that the Supreme Council in Paris was already preparing the armistice terms. For the Council attached importance to a rapid ending of hostilities in order that Bolshevik Moscow may be all the more rapidly and positively destroyed. Polish attacks on the first and second Ukrainian army corps announced the impending catastrophe. The Ukrainian soldiers were tired of war; they marauded, mutinied, plundered, left the trenches and simply went home. No wonderthat the two army corps were defeated in "wildest flight". At this point General Haller prepared for what he considered would be the mortal blow. The disintegrated Ukrainian front was faced with nine Polish infantry divisions, among them two Haller divisions equipped in the best possible manner by the French. In most cases the Poles stormed empty ditches and deserted villages; occasionally they broke up local resistance. The defeat of the Ukrainians was complete.

At this moment, slowly, guardedly, two Rumanian divisions pushed across the crests of the Carpathians into southeastern Galicia and captured the only infantry supply base still left the Ukrainians.

The remnants of the exhausted West Ukrainian army marched eastward with its baggage and accompanied by fleeing civilians toward an unknown destination, while in East Ukraine Bolsheviks drove the remnants of the East Ukrainian army westward. Ievgen Petrushevych rose up to become dictator of his wandering West Ukrainian state.

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Another page was turned. General Haller 726
was obliged to throw his divisions onto the 175
western frontier of Poland. The Treaty of Versailles
was to be signed. No /67/ one knows whether the
Germans may not refuse to sign, ally themselves
with the Bolsheviks and enter a desperate struggle.

It does not seem impossible that a surprise attack of the Ukrainians may be successful. Petrushevych named the Russian General A. Grekov, who had staked everything on the Ukraine, supreme commander of the West Ukrainian forces. He is the author of the plans for an offensive which, under his name, was to enter Ukrainian military history as one of the most daring deeds.

In the early morning of June 8, 1919 the Ukrainians began the assault on the town of Chortkov which had been captured a few days before by the Poles. "The effect of this advance was baffling. Several Polish battalions who were defending the town dispersed and took to wildest flight. Almost the entire enemy artillery of this division, all their baggage and several hundred prisoners fell into the hands of West Ukrainians. In the market-place of the town a national parade of the Polish inhabitants of the entire countryside had just gathered in order to celebrate the 'burial of the Ukraine'. The fleeing soldiers fell upon this crowd: 'Run! The Ukrainians are already here!' - and the entire festively-clothed multitude fled with the troops, just as they were, abandoning everything. Then something improbable happened to the Ukrainians under General Grekov when the news of the battle of Chortkov reached them. On the entire West Ukrainian front of 35 kilometers the 726
8000 men whom West Ukrainians engaged in combat 703
pushed forward, and there followed a sudden, pos- 175
itively miraculous transformation in the attitude of the entire nation. Suddenly they became aware that they were being led, that they were being

ommanded by a real general. The soldier who 726
only yesterday was unable to halt an enemy advance 703
now dashed ahead recklessly. The divisions which
throughout the war did not know how to cooperate 175
with their neighbors /68/ now functioned with a
baffling tactical assurance. They attacked, they
pushed through, they rolled up enemy flanks, they
pursued, they marched into the roar of enemy guns
to help their neighbor to victory. The higher
staff officers who up to that time had known
nothing but caution, suddenly learned how to seek
out the enemy, to find him, to attack, to pursue,
to break into the enemy's rear. The ones who
only yesterday were deserting, those who were
barely able to carry arms, young and old, all now
joined the advancing West Ukrainian troops. A
crowd marched into a village, only to leave it as
a company." (43)

43. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 302.

From the beginning an extreme shortage of 175
infantry munitions imperiled these brilliant 726
victories of West Ukrainia. There were only
enough weapons to equip a bare 20,000 men. On
June ninth and tenth the Ukrainians overran two
Polish divisions who fled in wild panic along with all
the inhabitants. Ten days later they put to
flight five divisions, and on June 27 a new Polish
line of resistance became shaky. It, too, was
destroyed. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians did not
succeed in capturing the badly needed arms and
munitions. At last, only two days' march from
Lwów the offensive was halted. New Polish divisions were thrown in and Pilsudski himself, who
had previously already taken over the supreme
command but had been unable to avoid the last
breakthrough, now gave the command for a counter-
offensive...In its extremity Poland mobilized the

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Supreme Council in Paris which on June 25 already drew up the following decision which was to be communicated to West Ukrainia: "In order to protect life and property of the peaceable inhabitants of East Galicia from the dangers which threaten them at the hands of the Bolshevik mobs, the 'Supreme Council' ...has resolved to empower the forces of the Polish Republic to carry on their operations as far as the Sbrucz River."

With new, completely equipped divisions the /69/ Poles began their offensive on June 28, 1919, exactly half an hour before General Grekov also ordered a new attack. The proportion of forces was too unequal, a Ukrainian victory became impossible. The Ukrainian army retreated amid constant counterattacks. Various positions could not be defended at all, because whole divisions had not a single cartridge. Thus the Ukrainians reached the river which forms the boundary between Galicia and East Ukraine. "A giant baggage train dragging the entire supplies of the army into the uncertain future, columns of civilian refugees, more than a hundred thousand people, left their homes. Among them was an army of over 60,000 men comprising the quartermaster corps, over 20,000 of these fighting forces." On July 16 the rear guard crossed the Sbrucz.

An eyewitness dramatically described the end of the Polish-West Ukrainian War: "These were dreadful days! From one side came Poles, from the other Bolsheviks. The territory of both Ukrainian states now comprised only a narrow strip along the bank of the Sbrucz River. In this area could be heard the booming of guns from the east and the west...Endless files of West Ukrainian army service corps marched past...From afar cannon boomed: this was the West Ukrainian artillery which held off the Polish attack with greatest bravery to give the service corps time

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175 to retreat with the sick and wounded and with the supplies. There was still some ammunition for the cannons, the foot soldiers had none left. The latter helped their artillery wherever they could hold off the Poles with blank weapons, and they defended with their bodies the last fields of their West Ukrainian homeland." (44)

44. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 319.

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175 The same tragedy accompanied the battles of the East Ukrainians. Shortly after the summons of the Directorate which was secretly elected by the "Ukrainian National League" and was headed /70/ by the writer Volodimir Vynnychenko and the former bank official and journalist Simon Petliura, the army of the Directorate marched from Bila Cerkva to Kiyev. It consisted of 4 companies of infantry, 1 battery of field guns, 12 heavy machine guns and half a squadron of cavalry. Hetman Skoropadskyj threw all the forces he could spare at that moment into the troops of the Directorate: 3 battalions of infantry. At Fastiv, not far from Kiyev, the sech sharpshooters of the Directorate, after a heroic struggle, turned the tide of the battle in which a battalion of Russian officers was annihilated up to the last man, in their favor. "The effect of the battle was tremendous. With one blow, as though suddenly paralyzed, the counterrevolution in the Ukraine, specifically in Kiyev, gave itself up as lost. On the other hand, the entire East Ukraine arose at the first report of this victory as though at a magic word. Hundreds of thousands of peasants from all over stormed the cities and towns. The entire East Ukraine resembled a storm-lashed ocean." (45)

45. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 109.

However minute the battle of Fastiv may have been, it was nevertheless of decisive historic importance. With the hetman-Ukraine the Russian counterrevolution lost its strategic basis from which no lesser person than Marshall Foch was planning to launch the destructive campaign against the Bolsheviks. Fastiv destroyed the foundations of his plans which had seemed feasible and the success of which would have resulted in a system of government other than the Bolshevik. But the victory of Fastiv was also the condition for the subsequent battles for freedom of the Ukrainians against the Russians and the all-Russian counterrevolution; as a result of them Ukrainian national sentiment was to gain unexpected strength.

As one of its first official acts the Directorate signed the agreement about the annexation of West Ukraine. On December 14, 1918, "supported by a hundred thousand armed peasants", it made its triumphal entry into Kiyev. Nevertheless, the mood of the people and appearances were deceptive. Aside /71/ from the fact that after the hetman administration was driven out, the forces absolutely necessary for the establishment of a new apparatus of government were lacking, a radical socialistic trend forthwith began to undermine the prestige of the Directorate in a fatal manner. When the Central Council sent out feelers to the Supreme Command of the French intervention troops which had landed at Odessa, Kherson and Mikolaiv, it was accused of negotiating with the intruders in order, like Skoropadskyj, to reinstate the Polish and Russian large landowners. The Bolshevik agitators coming from Moscow maintained the very same thing, and pointed to the counterrevolutionaries who were gathering together among the intervention troops. Mistrust of the Central Council finally became so great that many Ukrainian officers, with Grigorijev and Tiutiunnyk at their head, deserted in order to fight with their own troops

115 against the Entente intervention. It was the army of Grigorjev, that had joined the Bolsheviks, which so disgracefully threw the invading army into the sea. When Lenin wanted to send his allies to the Hungarian Communists, Grigorijev refused to obey and proclaimed a separate independent Soviet Ukraine.

In this way a realm larger than Germany drifted into anarchy. Outside of Kiyev armed mobs of peasants constituted the supreme authority. Plundering, they marched into the cities, and woe to the landowner, woe to the Jew who fell into their hands. They deprived the homeward-bound German and Austrian troops of their weapons; they also made the railroads unsafe. From Austria and Germany the completely dilapidated prisoners of war wander back. "Headmen arose among the armed masses as well as among the country people who called themselves otamans - meaning approximately "commander" -, and the bands of the 'People's Army of the Directorate' soon largely turned into actual gangs. It was a matter of chance as to which side these bands joined - whether the 'Directorate', the /72/ Bolsheviks or the socialist-revolutionary 'pedocrats' who were opposed to everything. It all depended on what happened to please a headman. Here the 'social-revolutionary' circles rebelled against the Directorate, there a vulgar mob carried out bloody pogroms against the Jews, either under national-Ukrainian, Bolshevik or, as happened even more often, under anarchist slogans..."

In the middle of January, 1919, the West Ukrainian delegates arriving in Kiyev in order to attend the proclamation of the Great Ukrainian state, happened upon this unbelievable chaos.

This celebration was scarcely over when Bolshevik troops already approached the Great Ukrainian capital and, on February fourth, drove out the Directorate along with the West Ukrainian guests. Soon Lenin's hosts which were joined by revolutionary peasants as well as Jews and poor workers became

175 masters of the cities which were decisive for possession of the country. The Directorate, however, wandered about in Podolia and Volhynia with dwindling fighting forces, one day set up its quarters in railroad coaches, the next day in one of the horrible Jewish cities. The People's Republic "resembled a barricade of chariots on the march".

The Directorate now consisted of only three members. Simon Petliura, war minister in the Central Council of the Ukrainian Republic before the hetmanship of Skoropadskyj was chairman. His modesty and his brilliant eloquence fascinated his people, especially the sech sharpshooters. He was "a tribune, not a statesman; not a general but only a leader", (46) yet always imbued with

46. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 119 ff.

an unshakable faith in the victory of the Ukrainian national idea.

The thing which in March 1919 had called itself in Volhynia the "Ukrainian People's Republic" was no longer a state. Nor did it carry on any foreign politics. Petliura's idea of it is that it /Facing page 72/ /Harvest time. From 000 early morning until late at night the mowing machines, formerly drawn by horses, now by mighty tractors, are driven over the endless fields./1 /Facing page 73/ /The hut in which a Ukrainian worker's family lives in Krivyi Rog.2 Below: These are specialists - tractor drivers and tractor assemblers of a collective farm near 175 Uman./2/73/ supplied the troops with war material. There could no longer be any question of a fixed front. In April the East Ukrainian army numbered 15,000 men all told, half of which are West Ukrainians. These 15,000 are what is left of the

1 [This plate not processed 3 or files - Analyst]
2 [For plate, see p. 220, category 116 - Analyst]

175 100,000 volunteers with whom the Directorate entered Kiyev after the battle near Fastiv, four months before. The majority of these hosts were lost, joined wild bands, or went home. The ones who were faithful to Petliura, however, were like the Cossacks of earlier times, freedom-loving rebels, brave and fearless in the face of death.

In view of the situation which became ever more threatening, Petliura from the first saw his only hope in incorporating his troops into the Foch Plan. The Marshall wants to destroy the Bolsheviks - the Directorate has the same desire. As early as February, even before Petliura assumed dictatorship, the emissaries of the Directorate implored the supreme commander of the intervention troops of the Entente, which had landed in Odessa, to give them armaments. On February sixth the French officers delivered an "ultimatum" to the representatives of Greater Ukraine, by means of the fulfillment of which the Ukrainians would be able to attain the right of dying a hero's death under French supreme command - other privileges were to be discussed later.

French demands were simply incredible. The French, in possession of only a tiny area around Odessa, still drunk with victory in the west, set up conditions which completely overshadow anything the Central Powers demanded when they held in a firm military control all of Greater Ukraine. The president of the Directorate, the war minister and another member of the Directorate which, according to orders of the French supreme commander is to be reorganized, were supposed to withdraw. Railroads were to be put under the control of the French supreme command, the troops of the Directorate under the leadership of the French supreme commander. /74/ Russian officers were to be placed side by side with the Ukrainian ones, and the Ukrainians, finally, were to address a document to the French government in which they were to

175 repent of their shortcomings - friendship with Germany and attempts at socialization -, promise to continue the war against the Bolsheviks, and ask France's support in mobilizing a Ukrainian army and in building up the entire "economic, financial, military and political life of the Ukraine. All of this was crowned by the demand that the petition to the French government must emphasize how very much the plea of the Ukraine to France "arose primarily from its confidence in the French people, their magnanimity and their historical renown".

The sech sharpshooters, the backbone of the army of the Directorate, protested against every attempt to remove Petliura, and since the Grigorijev army, allied with the Bolsheviks, drove the army of intervention into the Black Sea on April 3, 1919, the Ukrainians were spared the trouble of making use of French magnanimity. Thus the plans of the all-powerful Foch of rearranging east Europe according to French ideas failed. After the defeat of the army of intervention in Odessa, the prospects of its troop movements to Moscow being financed were very slight.

With this the East Ukrainian army lost all value as far as Foch's plans were concerned, and he therefore turned his wrath toward the West Ukrainian army which was causing trouble to his Polish protégés. "All that was left in the end of the world-shattering plans of Foch was the concentration of his forces for the terrible blow which was supposed to have brought 'occidental civilization' as far as the Volga, on the tiny country of West Ukraine which was no more than 200 kilometers wide and 200 kilometers deep. Like a hungry lion not scorning even a mouse, the mighty marshall discharged his terrible wrath on the little heap of misery which represented West Ukraine in combat with world powers." (47)

47. Kuchabskyj, Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism. page 214.

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175 /75/ After its withdrawal from East Galicia,
726 the West Ukrainian army joined the remnants of the army of the Directorate. "Quadrangle of death", this is the name given to the region between the Polish border and Kiyev and southward toward the Dniestr. There was no longer any escape for the Ukrainians; they were encircled by enemies from whom they either became isolated, as from the Rumanians in the southwest and the Poles in the west, or else are engaged in combat as by the Bolsheviks and the all-Russian, counterrevolutionary Denikin army. In spite of the union of West and East Ukraine on January 22, 1919, the West and East Ukrainian ministers rule side by side wherever the "capital" happens to be. Petrushevych still believed in the necessity of an independent West Ukrainian government. He was convinced that the Entente will surely give authority to such a government upon the expected rebirth of the West Ukrainian People's Republic. The dictator was possessed "of that firmness which is commonly called character". As though the supreme council of war had not already on June 25, 1919, when Grekov's victorious troops were still standing at the gates of Lwów, pronounced the death sentence over West Ukraine! Dmovskij remained the victor. The Ukrainian peace delegation whose members were at variance with one another, and who had even had difficulty entering the country, had been given no opportunity whatsoever to speak. Other peoples were given to states in which they never grew up; the Ukrainians were strangled in the midst of the fight for their state.

After the various divisions of their armies were united, the dictators Petliura and Petrushevych decided on an offensive against Kiyev. Once again with their fight for the capital of the country,

175 they wished to prove to all the world the Ukrain-
176 ian will for independence. By the middle of July 1919, one month after the tragic crossing of the Sbrucz, the entire country between the Pripyat swamps in the north almost to Odessa in the south, from Sbrucz halfway to Kiyev, was conquered, and the outlines of the "quadrangle of death" pushed forward and extended. /76/ The influx of volunteers and rich spoils made possible the establishment of an army of 100,000 men with whom the assault on Kiyev could most probably be risked.

Once again Petliura tried to lead his strange form of a state out of its dreadful isolation. He offered to cover the flanks of the army of Denikin, the all-Russian counterrevolutionist. The general whom England supported in return for the tacit surrender of the oil fields of Baku, had just begun an impetuous course of victory which was to lead his armies made up primarily of Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks and Russian-Ukrainian Don Cossacks, east of the Dniepr to Moscow. Bolshevik rule seemed to be nearing its end. Supported by America and Japan because of prospects of concessions, Admiral Kolchak was fighting in Siberia against Lenin's troops. The nucleus of Kolchak's army consisted of the Czech Legion. North of the Arctic Ocean, with Archangel as the port of embarkation, English, Americans and Italians under the leadership of General Gurko threatened the Bolshevik state which was being attacked from Esthonia by the army of intervention under General Iudenich. - No, Denikin with his 200,000 victorious soldiers did not need to have his flanks protected by the Ukrainian separatist and rebel leader! Denikin instructed General Bredov to push on toward Kiyev in forced marches. Meanwhile Petliura pushed ahead a part of his now quite respectable army against the Fourteenth Army Corps of the Bolsheviks concentrated north of Odessa and

175 threatened - what a chaos! - in the east simul-
176 taneously by Denikin and by rebellious peasants. On this occasion the Ukrainians destroyed one Bolshevik division completely. Their offensive against Kiyev also hit the mark; the capital was occupied during the night of August 31, 1919 by the Ukrainian armies.

In a state of mad delusion Denikin, on the following day, snatched /77/ Kiyev from the Ukrainians who in their hatred of Bolshevism were certainly a match for the all-Russian reactionary general. What a fateful day! From the east Denikin's troops caught the guards on the Dniepr bridge unawares and entered the city when the Ukrainians were just making their solemn entry. With the salvos which were breaking in the midst of the parade of the unsuspecting victors, a simply grotesque battle began. The war which Petliura always wanted to avoid, broke out. Lenin can triumph - he got a breather while his enemies were murdering each other, and he threw the forces that were relased in this way into the front, which was most seriously threatened. The crime of the reactionary was punished on the spot. His victorious troops advanced to within 300 miles of Moscow when the Bolshevik Cavalry General Budienny attacked them and literally ran them down. The catastrophe which thus broke over the proud general and his world was crushing. Budienny destroyed corps after corps of the Denikin army, whose chaotically retreating soldiers, moreover, perished in the deluge of a wild peasant insurrection.

The physical and spiritual resistance of the Ukrainians was broken by the cowardly attack on Kiyev. Upon the ranks of discouraged and despairing soldiers who retreated into the "quadrangle of death" there descended a new enemy: spotted typhus. Without food, without underwear, without shoes, without clothing, without sanitary supplies, without weapons, without medicine - the Entente had forbidden the importation of drugs - they

175 dragged themselves away from the pursuing enemy.
726 Whither? No one could answer this question. "In the railroad stations along the front hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers lay dying, without any kind of human help; and hundreds marched and fought while they were infected and broke down in the camps." By the end of October 1919, the two armies numbered 6000 men, of which 4000 were West Ukrainians. They were concentrated in the region of Kamenets in Podolia. /78/

The end was ghastly, like a vision of inferno. The "scourge of God", typhus, also lashed down upon the troops of Denikin which, exhausted by the epidemic and discouraged by the defeat at the hands of Budienny, had gathered together southeast of the remnants of the Ukrainian army. "Then suddenly the phantom of the 'all-Russian' counter-revolution loomed up: ruins of Denikin's army ignored the West Ukrainian frontal troops and everywhere pushed on only against the East Ukrainian divisions, in order to wreak revenge on the East Ukrainians at the last minute, before the victorious Bolshevism was to banish to the grave that 'all-Russian' ghost. This 'assault' of a few hundred pestilence-stricken 'all-Russians" against an equally few pestilence-stricken East Ukrainians was horrible. Everywhere the wreckage consisting of East Ukrainians surrendered, almost without a struggle, just as the 'all-Russians', who [illegible] in a state of even greater disintegration than [illegible] East Ukrainians, would surely have surrendered [illegible] if it had occurred to the East Ukrainians to [illegible]m their positions."

[illegible] this way the Greater Ukrainian state perished. "In a piercing, frosty northwind there marched in the 'quadrangle of death', silently..."

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After the victory of the Bolsheviks over their

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enemies Warsaw trembled at the thought of the moment when the Muscovites would begin their assault on young Poland in order to take it back into the folds of "indivisible Russia". Pilsudski awaited the attack which he would have liked to forestall, in the spring of 1920. For this preventive war Petliura, with the remnants of the East Ukrainian army which were sitting in concentration camps - the remnants of the West Ukrainian army put themselves under Bolshevik protection and were in part fighting on that side against the Poles, - is just good enough. With blissful confidence the head of the erstwhile Ukrainian People's Republic signed an alliance with the Poles. Petliura renounced /79/ West Ukraine, although it was precisely the West Ukrainians with their undeniable talent for organization and their picked troops who had made possible for him the unprecedented fight for freedom. In return the Poles promised him the formation of a new East Ukrainian state under their patronage. On April 17, 1920 Pilsudski's divisions and the faithful followers of Petliura set out for the east, and, as a matter of fact, they reached Kiyev. Petliura's troops were the bait with which they endeavored to catch the West Ukrainians fighting on the side of the Bolsheviks; they actually succeeded in catching them. A large number of West Ukrainians who had become Bolsheviks went over to the Poles and were disarmed. The Bolsheviks took this occasion to shoot the officers of the Ukrainian divisions that have remained faithful to them.

Polish rule in Kiyev lasted only five weeks, until June eleventh. Then Budienny followed close on the heels of the Poles, as he did previously on Denikin's troops. The honor of covering the headless retreat of the Poles with Ukrainian blood fell on Petliura. The elite of the French general staff finally halted the Russians not far from Warsaw, and then caused them to retreat. The

175 "miracle on the Vistula" took place: the Bol-
726 sheviks turned around and halted beyond the Sbrucz.

175 At the peace negotiations in Riga the part-
726 ners of Andrusov met after two and a half cent-
728 uries for a partition of the Ukraine. The Russians conceded the Poles the western parts of Polesia, Volhynia and Podolia, Lublin and Podlakhia in the Riga Treaty of March 18, 1921. The protest of Petliura who was not admitted to the negotiations remained unheard. Was it blind hatred of the Bolsheviks, a commission of the Poles or burning patriotism, which, after this bitter disappointment, again drove him across the borders with a small band of followers? Whatever it is, the guerilla war which the ex-dictator unleashes in East Ukraine does not change anything in his country's fate, which was definitively sealed at Riga. /80/

175 Driven out of his home for the last time and
726 again disarmed by the Poles, he was nevertheless permitted to kindle rebellions in East Ukraine from within the Polish state. If the East Ukrainians bled to death and the Bolsheviks had internal difficulties, this could only please Warsaw. When the Bolsheviks finally cruelly quelled these uprisings - according to accounts in the Communist of February 23, 1923, 6000 groups of rebels were discovered and destroyed in 1921 -, Petliura, the ally of Pilsudski at the conquest of Kiyev, was now merely a troublesome foreigner in Poland. As such he was banished. /Facing page
728 80/ /Map V: The Ukraine Before the First World
631 War (1914). At the end of the eighteenth century the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom disintegrated. From that time on the main part of the Ukraine belonged to the Czar's realm. Parts of West Ukraine in so-called East Galicia and Bukovina, along with Chernovtsy went to Austria, Ukrainian territory in the Carpathians to Hungary./ /Key inside map: -.-.-. National boundaries. ...Provincial boundar-

[Ruthenians]

728 ies in Austria and boundaries of the various gub-
631 ermyas in Russia./

/81/

Fair Play

186 In the winter of 1938/39 the Ukrainian peasants in Poland were no longer recognizable. If after the pacification of 1930 they went about for many years bent and timid like beaten dogs, they now carried their heads higher. It was as though they felt a fresh breeze, and whenever they had business with Polish officials they omitted expressions of due respect, in fact they became cynical. They stood around in groups, talked in the most animated fashion, nudged each other meaningfully and sometimes laughed out loud.

[186] What happened? Since the end of October
101 1938, there was the "Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy"
642 beyond the Carpathians. There on the southern slopes of the Carpathians live the Ukrainian tribes of Lemki, Boyki and the Huzul. On poor soil they eke out a precarious living as small farmers, woodsmen and shepherds. In the warmer season many of them hire themselves out as harvest workers in the fertile Hungarian lowlands, and there they also trade in carriage grease. Before the First World War they shipped salt to Warsaw and fruit even as far as Moscow. Ruthenia, as their little country was once called, always belonged to the Kingdom bearing the crown of Stephen. After the downfall of the Hapsburg monarchy Czech insatiability succeeded in having "Carpatho-Russia" - that is what Ruthenia was now called - assigned to the Czechs by the edict of Saint-Germain. The "autonomy" which the little country was promised on paper in the edict remained an unfulfilled dream for its inhabitants. "Carpatho-Russia" was a province abounding in forests, which Prague could and would exploit. It was only after the solution of the Sudeten

11: Obermaier--82A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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[Map IV: The Ukraine before the First World War (1914), cf. complete legend, pp. 81-82]

11: Obermaier--82B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

[Map V the Ukraine before the First World War (1914)]

[Ruthenians]

101 crisis when the centralistic /82/power of the
642 Czechs slackened and the Slovaks stubbornly insisted on their autonomy, that the "Carpatho-Ukrainians" - this is the name they henceforth adopted - were also granted a certain autonomy.

186 This seeming independence, nothing more than a weak, short-lived light which the Hungarian storm was to blow out only a few months later, in March 1939, sufficed, however to nourish vigorously the hopes of West Ukrainians north of the Carpathians. Therefore Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy was more important to them than sunshine and rain. This was the great event which they were discussing and on account of which they even neglected their fields. Just as all Ukrainians from the Kuban to the Carpathians honor the same heroes in their common folksongs, the seafarers of the Rus and the Cossacks of the sech, just as they shared the experience and the suffering of the wars of liberation between 1917 and 1923, so they now regarded as their own good fortune the fact that a piece of land, if only a small one, was apparently under independent Ukrainian administration.

In Ruska Lane and on the "Ring" in Lwów the newly-awakened Ukrainian self-awareness made itself felt in demonstrations. In the middle of October and the beginning of November 1938, the Ukrainians of Lwów protested against the foes of the "Silver Land". Not only in the Galician metropolis, but also in Przemysl, in Stryj, in all of West Ukrainia, the Ukrainians mustered: cries of abuse against Poland and cries of "Slava Ukrajini!" - "Glory to - the Ukraine!" - were heard, and the national anthem was repeated innumerable times. It did not cool the hot passions to have Poles on these occasions beat to death a few Ukrainians or shoot them down. The fever of hope that they might shake off Polish domination seized them. Ukrainian daily papers filled their front pages exclusively with reports from Carpatho-Ukraine.

11: Obermaier--84 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Volhynia] [Ruthenia]

186 Nothing happened there which their special reporters did not describe in detail. In neighboring Volhynia which, for easier Polonization, was separated from Galicia by a Chinese wall, /83/ and where Ukrainian newspapers from Lwów were forbidden, people paid two zloty, the equivalent of two marks, for the smuggled papers. Radios were 186 much in demand[1] and the cooperatives which ordinarily sold shoelaces, underwear and soap, were 208 suddenly supposed to furnish radio sets. The members wanted it. They brought their zloty, and when these did not suffice they paid in chickens and eggs. Half the village listened to the reports from a friendly broadcasting station in the Ukrainian language, picked up by a common receiving set. The people did not mind at all that they were obliged to stand or squat as close together as sardines in a can.

The "audition" cost five groschen which amounts to two and one-half pfennig. Anyone who had no money paid with an egg for news taken from the ether. What they heard on these occasions were sometimes their own wish-dreams. The autonomous government, which set up its residence first in Uzhgorod and then, until the country's reintegration into Hungary, in Khust, had great plans. The listeners discussed this with great animation.

648 The peasants who could write set down on 186 paper the result of long deliberation about exist- 208 ing conditions as well as their wishes for the future, in the form of letters and sent them to the Polish President as well as to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Prime Minister Voloshyn and to a foreign statesman from whom they hoped to get help. Most of these letters got only as far as the office of 648 the voivode. Thereupon Poland's fist became day by day more oppressive. The autonomy of the neighboring small country, however meager it was, was a violent shock to Polish power. Warsaw desired the quickest possible disappearance of Carpatho-Ukraine. On December third the head of

1 [i.e., 1938-39 among the Ukrainians in Volhynia - Awly]

11: Obermaier--85 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Ruthenia]

648 the "Camp of National Unity", General Skwarszynski, said in the Sejm: /the Polish parliament/ "... The common boundary with Hungary as a Danubian state and as a people traditionally friendly to us, corresponds not only to our feelings, but also to our interests. Therefore Hungary's aim to /84/ obtain Carpatho-Ukraine must be energetically supported by our foreign policy." The speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Mudryj protest-
186 648 ed against this Polish policy at the same meeting: "We must not forget that the Ukrainian people, on the basis of common blood, common tradition and a common spirit feels itself to be a unified national organism, regardless of what state it lives in and under what governments it falls. No power will crush this feeling of national unity." (48)

48. "Osteuropa", January issue, 1931, page 260.

When Mudryj referred to the devastation caused by the "diversional detachments" in Carpatho-Ukraine, he was silenced.

000 Poland had a bad conscience. The Carpatho-Ukrainian question, unimportant though it was, made it nervous. The great power grew unsure of itself and from old habit tried to set force against the right to live. According to the Polish political thesis only "another dialect" is to separate the Ukrainians from the Poles. If one took away their Greek Orthodox religion and their Cryillic script, they would differ from the Poles merely by reason of their dialect.

111 However, the Ukrainians have changed tremendously since the days when Emperor Joseph II said, at the end of his journey through Galicia, which was freed after hundreds of years of Polish domination: "The peasant is an unfortunate creature possessing nothing but a human exterior and physical life." In the 150 years that Vienna was their capital, the Ukrainians experienced an ex-

[i.e., 1935-39, to aid Hungary to obtain Carpatho-Ukraine - Ainslie]

[Ruthenia]

177 traodrinary national, economic and cultural advance, and the war of liberation from 1918 to 1919 became indelibly fixed in their national consciousness. Volhynia, too, awakened as a nation.

186 648 N wonder, then, that after a mock autonomy was granted by the Polish parliament on September 22, 1922 - in accordance with the request of the Supreme Council of June 25, 1919 - and after the conference of the Parisian emissary /85/ of March 15, 1923, which adjudicated Galicia to the Poles, no wonder that the Ukrainians in Poland have continued to fight against Warsaw's rule with other means. The Ukrainians are helpless against drastic measures such as the introduction of Polish civilian administration or the closing of Ukrainian schools. They suffer national losses especially in the parcelling of large estates, which brings new Polish settlers into the overpopulated country and which leaves the Ukrainian small farmer out in the cold. The Poles have already succeeded in pushing back the western Ukrainian boundary by about thirty kilometers; they are successfully Polonizing Polesia where, because of the extreme backwardness and poverty of the inhabitants, hunger is a stronger motivating power than anything else. In 1905 the Ukrainians already lost 250,000 citizens in Lublin, which was then Russian, and which, after the first World War, became Polish. These people who were forcibly converted to the orthodox faith in 1870 went over to the Roman Catholic Church 35 years later; for their return to the Greek Catholic Church to which they had belonged before that was denied them. But becoming Roman Catholic means becoming Polonized. Once the Polish clergyman has set foot in a town, he is soon followed by the teacher, Polish societies are founded and the village is isolated from the Ukrainian neighborhood as from the area of infection.

11: Obermaier--87 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[Galicia]* [Volhynia]

Galicia and Volhynia bore the main burden of 668
the struggle of nationalities. The fight was carried on in a legal manner through self-supporting organizations such as economic cooperative societies, private schools and societies of public interest, and illegally through revolutionary secret organizations threatening the state. The first of these secret societies was the "Ukrainian Military Organization" (UVO). Its members were primarily soldiers of the former West Ukrainian army. A second sabotage organization, that of the Communists, worked hand in glove with the UVO. The UVO was /86/ dissolved in 1928 by Polish agents, which was not a particularly clever achievement, considering the poverty of its members. The same happened to the Ukrainian Communists at the hands of delegated Jews who acted upon orders from the Warsaw office of the Komintern. Meanwhile a new terroristic secret society had been formed, the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN), which has caused the Polish authorities the greatest concern, especially since October 1938. All attempts to dissolve the OUN from within or to neutralize it by creating groups of Polonophiles have failed. Elements that could be bought were often enough obliged to pay for their treason with death.

Two years after the founding of the OUN* in 668
late summer of 1930, the farms and estates of Polish settlers in Galicia went up in flames and 579
in some places the harvest burned up in the fields. Also, telegraph wires were cut. Since it was hard to sell grain, Polish landowners used the terrorist methods of the OUN in individual regions as an excuse to collect insurance fraudulently; they set fire to their own buildings. The answer of the Poles to the wave of sabotage of the OUN* 558
can be read between the lines of the petition of 60 members of the British House of Commons to the

* [i.e., Ukrainian Terroristic Secret Society - Analyst]

11: Obermaier--88 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Galicia] [Volhynia]

558 League of Nations: "With special reference to recent uprisings in East Galicia, we recognize the right and the necessity of the Polish government to maintain order within its boundaries. However, we should like to point out the fact which, coinciding as it does with an eye-witness account, seems indisputable, namely, that penal expeditions were sent out to at least 700 villages, even though against the majority of them no evidence of terroristic or unconstitutional action could be produced, that hundreds of men, women and children were beaten - some of the procedures were so cruel that the victims were bedridden for weeks thereafter, some were crippled for life and some were killed. Thousands of people were arrested and many libraries, clubs /87/ and cooperative shops were plundered and destroyed. The fourteenth cavalry regiment in particular seems to have loosed its reins in the villages; they punished the peasants indiscriminately. These actions against the Ukrainian minority seem to be a violation of Article One which states: 'Poland agrees to guarantee all inhabitants without distinction as to birth, nationality, language, race or religion, full and complete protection of life and liberty...'"

An investigation on the spot by the International Women's League showed the following: "...One terrible feature of the whole procedure was the refusal to grant medical attention to the victims. The doctors were forbidden to leave the cities and go into the villages. The peasants who undertook to travel to the cities for medical treatment were sent back by the police. In many cases the wounds became gangrenous and death or lifelong suffering were the results." The Chicago Daily News observed at that time: "Under the guidance of an iron hand Poland is steering toward its magnificent future." (49)

49. Quoted by Svystun: Ukraine, the Poorest Spot of Europe, pages 32, 20, 26.

11: Obermaier--89 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Galicia] [Volhynia]

668 The Ukrainians bowed to Polish supremacy in helpless inward wrath. They again covered with straw the torn-up roofs of their houses and they built new libraries to replace the ones that had burned, new dairy farm equipment in place of that which had been destroyed. When in 1934 there was a danger of national Ukrainian institutions being abolished, as well as cooperatives, schools, general educational institutions and so forth, the largest Ukrainian party, the "Ukrainian National Democratic Association" (UNDO), whose members ran the cooperatives, decided to give up the opposition against Warsaw and to begin a "policy of normalization". The UNDO became "loyal" in return for which it received seventeen parliamentary mandates. This did not prevent it, however, from calling attention in the very first session of the Sejm to the Polish Law of Autonomy of 1922, and to continue to point this out at the beginning of each new session of the Sejm. Besides the /88/ representatives of the UNDO, there were two other representatives of the clerical group of the Bishop of Stanislav, Khomyshyn, who tried to represent Ukrainian interests in the Sejm. The remaining Ukrainian parties were not admitted to the elections and in turn boycotted them.

The period of normalization of Ukrainian-Polish relations lasted not even four years; this policy was not popular among the Ukrainians. The old hatred between the two nations broke out anew the moment the Carpatho-Ukrainians won their autonomy. Under pressure of public opinion, the UNDO was obliged to go over again to the opposition. "The policy of normalization brought no results because it was not adhered to by the Poles. The Poles trample on their own constitutional laws. Their constitution guarantees to all citizens equal rights and privileges before the law. But in practice there is no equality. It is almost out of the question for Ukrainians to be admitted to official posts, either in the postal system or on

[Galicia] [Volhynia]

668 railways or in the courts, to say nothing of their being made officers in the army. Private enterprises controlled by the state operate on the same principle. Of the 4000 Ukrainian teachers, one-fourth of them are scattered outside the Ukrainian national territory. Three-quarters of our intellectuals are unemployed. There is the additional fact that it is made impossible for our peasants to acquire land; even in cases where there is a partitioning of a large Ukrainian estate, the land is sold to Polish colonists. Our national banks and cooperatives get practically no credit and the little money lent to us is on a short-term basis. Moreover, the Polish government has created two frontier zones from which it can banish every Ukrainian without stating its reasons. In these frontier zones the voivode is sole ruler. Even the district captain can at any time dispossess any priest, teacher or a cooperative official whom he suspects of being nationalistic. In the end, the present

728 /Facing page 88/ /Map VI: Ukraine in the Years 1917-20. At the end of the first World War the Ukrainian People's Republic was created and lasted for a short time. Finally, after involved struggles against three fronts, the Poles in the West, the Bolsheviks in the North and East and the troops of the reactionary generals Denikin and Wrangel, it perished./ /Keys inside: Region of the Ukrainian state. Temporary annexes. Boundaries of territory occupied by Ukrainian nationals. Boundaries of the predominantly Ukrainian zone./ /89/ appeasement actions which are being carried out exactly after the 1930 pattern, will force us to give up the normalization policy." (50)

50. Statements made by a leading member of the UNDO party in February, 1939.

11: Obermaier--90A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

[Map VI: Ukraine in the years 1917-20, cf. complete Legend, p. 90]

11: Obermaier--90B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

[Map VI: Ukraine in the years 1917-20]

11: Obermaier--91 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Galicia] [Volhynia]

668 The least that the UNDO had to do after the establishment of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy was to formulate the nature of Ukrainian claims to autonomy. At the beginning of December 1938, the proposal for autonomy signed by fifteen representatives was introduced into the Sejm under the title of: "Constitution of the Province of Halicz-Volhynia". According to the title, the proposal refers to the principality of Halicz-Volhynia of the 13th and 14th century. Territorially all areas inhabited by a Ukrainian majority were to belong to the "Province of Halicz-Volhynia", that is to say, East Galicia, Volhynia, Polesia as well as parts of the voivodeship of Lublin, Bialystok and Cracow. According to this, the autonomous territory would have included about one-third of Poland and contained nine million inhabitants. The aim of autonomy was to be "full political equality with the Polish people and the free cultural and economic development of the Ukrainian people within the boundaries of Poland". The proposal provided for the formation of a legislative diet and a provincial office at Lwów. The laws made by the Ukrainian diet were not to extend to external affairs, the army, the national budget and taxes, currency, customs, postal system, communication systems and matters concerning citizenship and the national police. The proposal was so modest that in practice the Ukrainians were to make laws pertaining only to the school system and judicial affairs. But even these minimal demands were refused by Warsaw with the written reply that the proposal is of such a nature that it changes the constitution and would in this case have to be supported by one-fourth of all the representatives.

As early as December 1938, the Ratification Committee of the UNDO, decided in spite of the rejection, to continue the struggle for autonomy. In a subsequent session in April 1939 /90/, the party which was obliged to steer between the Scylla

[Galicia] [Volhynia]

668 of Polish agitation for dissolution and the Charybdi of Ukrainian nationalism, declared itself willing to work with Poland provided autonomy was granted and a status of "legal competence" was established. On May ninth the UNDO in the Sejm adopted the authorization law for the president of the state, in order not to give Poland an excuse for dissolving the cooperatives.

558 In the summer of 1939 the Polish-Ukrainian relationship resembled a sort of guerilla war. Here and there a house was set on fire, a bullet through a window found its victim, Polish colonists or officials were driven out of a village, a police raid was shot down - and in turn, the Polish bayonets raged mercilessly. To take only two cases at random: on May 8, 1939 Ukrainian representatives in the Sejm placed an interpellation before the Minister of the Interior, according to which the Polish police had seriously injured 16 persons, among them 8 women and girls, with blows administered with the butt end of a gun, at a funeral in an East Galician village. On the same day police officials in the district of Polyana killed a Ukrainian peasant and an eleven-year-old boy by shooting. Several Ukrainians were injured. In a second interpellation there was a complaint that in Libukhora in East Galicia a first lieutenant, a sergeant major and a soldier coerced by means of blows, the cashier and acting head of the Ukrainian library to burn the library which consisted of 300 volumes. On May ninth the Polish Prime Minister, General Skladovski, replied to another Ukrainian interpellation of April twenty-ninth. There were three incidents mentioned: a military assault on the dwelling of the Ukrainian pastor Tustanovich in Komarnyky, a military attack in Zalisci on 63 Ukrainians who were maltreated, and the maltreatment by the police of 17 Ukrainian peasants in Cholhyni. In all three cases the Polish Premier's answers were evasive.

11: Obermaier--93 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

/91/ [Galicia] Self-Aid [Volhynia]

555 Galicia and Volhynia are parts of the ghetto of the world, lying between Cracow and Odessa. There is no question about the fact that anyone who can here compete commercially with the Jews and politically with the Poles has certain abilities. The Ukrainians of Galicia have a talent for organization. If their business methods are often primitive according to our conceptions, it is not their fault. Where proper money is scarce, as is the case among all small peasants of the East and Southeast, it is replaced by some marketable goods: people unhesitatingly deal in eggs. Ukrainian cooperatives tried very hard to change these conditions; they were equally adept in ancient barter as in international business involving clearing and regulations pertaining to payments and foreign exchange.

555 [436] 476

Jews and cooperatives waged a bitter fight against each other. But where usury and chain businesses of ill repute flourish, cooperatives have an easy time of it. Before the First World War the usurers demanded a 100% interest. Now they say: "I am giving you money; good, - but you must sell me your calves, your geese, your chickens and your eggs." For a zentner of seed they demand two zentner of produce from the harvest. In the gin shops they manage to obtain, by fraudulent means, the best pastures of the Huzul country, only to rent them to the former owners. If the cooperative makes its way into such villages which are under Jewish domination, it soon has the peasants on its side, and since no one buys from the Jew, no one sells to him and his inn is avoided, he must sooner or later pack up his belongings. /92/

[452]

For the Ukrainians the Jewish problem is a problem of food. Wherever people have ambitions and where they desire to improve their basic way of living, they run up against Jews. Jews

563

11: Obermaier--94 J-3(no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Galicia] [Volhynia] European Jews E14

U 563 are found in the villages and cities, everywhere
E.J. 162 except at hard peasant labor. As early as 1900,
74% of all Jews earning a livelihood in Russia,
Poland and Galicia were in commerce, in the credit
system, in crafts and in industry. In 1931 there
U [463] were 158,400 Jews living in villages in East
Galicia alone, that is 3% of the people living
in the country; in the cities, on the other hand,
there were 454,900 Jews or 37.3% of the urban population. (51) In 1929 the various trades were

51. Seraphim, Jewry in East European Area, p. 340.

50% in the hands of Jews, and in Volhynia a total of 73% of all tailors, shoemakers, tanners, bakers, furriers, blacksmiths, watchmakers and other artisans were Jews.

U 563 In spite of the fact that the Ukrainians lived in such close proximity to Jews, they kept their cultural life free of Jewish influence and their race free from Jewish blood.

*

U 476 "More important than selling and profit is the community which has become happy and morally strong as a result of proper training by means of cooperative work and self-aid." These words were not, as might be supposed, spoken at a major assembly of German cooperatives; they were coined at Lwów by the head of the Ukrainian cooperatives. They were addressed to the West Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian cooperatives were of unusual national significance; they improved the wretched condition of the peasants and educated the latter to think in terms of the common welfare; and they offered to Ukrainian intelligentsia a real, albeit meager possibility of existence. How can conditions in the country be anything but miserable if
U 162 60% of the peasants own dwarf farms with less than

162 five hectares of land, if overpopulation is so great that in 49% of the country there are between 80 and 100 /93/ people and in 51% there are more than 100 persons per square kilometer. (52)

52. Kubiyovich: The Distribution of the Population, page 35.

476 The ideological center of the Ukrainian cooperative system was the "Revised Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives" with its center in Lwów. At the beginning of 1939 it controlled the four departmental provincial centers with a total of 3455 cooperatives and 673,000 members. The four departmental centers were the "Centrobanka" for credit cooperatives (1889 members at the end of 1938, with an annual sale of 70.5 million zloty); the "Centrosoyuz" for the agricultural buying and selling cooperatives, the "Maslosoyuz" for dairy farmers' cooperatives and the "Narodnya Torgovlia" for urban consumer societies. The private capital of the Revised Union amounted to 23 million zloty at the end of 1938, the savings came to over 12 million zloty. The sales receipts of all cooperatives amounted to 159 million zloty.

One is almost tempted to speak of a "Ukrainian autarchy" if one hears how much business the buying and selling cooperatives carried on. Galicia and [241] particularly Podolia with its rich black earth and sheltered valleys is rich in fruit, vegetables, legumes, hemp, grain. Cattle-raising is also [233] intensively carried on, especially in the Carpathian foreland. The peasant brought all these products to the cooperative which was ready to serve him and not to profit by him. The cooperatives maintained collection and sorting centers where the products were turned into "standardized" goods. The same cooperative furnished practically everything a farm household needed: shoes, chicory, sugar, kerosene, headgear, candles, seeds, artificial fertilizer and machines. Much of it

476 was made in the cooperative society's own factories. The society owned cement factories, lime plants, mills, cloth-weaving factories, bakeries, oil presses and even a factory that made boot polish and cosmetics.

439 Whither did Ukrainian goods go? Peas, beans and poultry to England and Belgium, clover seed to Holland, /94/ pigs to Germany, beef cattle via Constanta to Greece, poultry to Germany, Switzerland and to - Palestine, eggs to many countries and, in cans, as far as Buenos Aires.

[545] Sociologically noteworthy is the growth of an urban stratum of artisans, merchants and small industrialists. The Ukrainians who, much to their 369 own disadvantage, neglected the cities because of 476 their love for quiet village life, now gradually pushed into the cities, and the credit cooperatives supported them in this.

*

741 Of greatest significance for the advancement of Ukrainian culture were the societies for edu- 517 cation and public health. The society for popular 217 education, "Prosvita", was even older than the Ukrainian system of cooperatives, reaching back to 1883. It was a veritable national sanctuary of the Ukrainians. The people are indebted to it for a large part of their cultural advance. The "Prosvita" was an actual school for advanced studies in the country. In 3214 village libraries with 700,000 volumes, two instructive monthly magazines and with inexpensive editions of books, it enabled the village inhabitants who were cut off from all urban culture to obtain the knowledge which alone made it possible for them to assert themselves against their enemies. Besides that, 741 "Prosvita", which on January 1, 1938 numbered 517 360,000 members, and owned 1457 club houses with rooms for meetings, promoted group singing, music, the community theater and folk art. It helped

741 illiterates to learn to read by means of special
517 courses, and it gave scholarships to worthy students. So, it is not surprising that the Poles did not care for the "Prosvita". Thus in the last ten years all of the 600 local groups in Polesia and Volhynia and 70% of all local groups west of the Shan were dissolved. In 1938 Warsaw intensified its war against the "Prosvita"; in that year 104 local groups /95/ were dissolved and in the first five months of 1939 the same happened even to two district centers with 168 local groups. In spite of that, the Ukrainians organized 375 new local groups from 1936 to 1938.

575 Peasants and agriculturists numbering 160,000
874 united in the "Silskyj Hospodar" ("farmer") in order to arrange for or to obtain agricultural training. The "Silskyj Hospodar" employed approximately 150 social agronomists, that is, agriculturists with diplomas, who supervised improvement of the soil, methods of cultivating, seed production and whole farm establishments. They conducted courses and competitions in which the young farmers who were eager for knowledge actively participated. Special veterinarians of the society and of the dairy farm cooperatives supervised the livestock.

562 The Ukrainian women of Galicia were anxious
575 not to be second to the men. Their society "Soyuz Ukrayinok" numbered 60,000 members in 1200 village circles. In the national life of the people the Ukrainian woman occupies a high position, as is the case among all healthy races. In times of national misfortune the mothers are the preservers of the old manners and customs; the children learn the language and the traditional songs from their mothers, to whom the rising generations are entrusted. Their glowing patriotism is not surpassed by the men. At the same time the West Ukrainian woman is deeply religious and tirelessly industrious; she excels in the household.

000 Everything in West Ukraine is education work.

11: Obermaier--98 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Everything in West Ukraine is education work.

462 The woman, too, is brought up in order to play her
512 part properly within the family: she must see
515 to it that everyone eats from his own plate, that everyone sleeps in his own bed - not eight on a wide chest -, that clothing is taken off at night and that shirts are changed; airing the rooms is not to be forgotten, and it is unhealthy for children not to get out of the house a single time the whole winter long. Fresh air does no harm. But where to get the shoes and warm clothes for the little ones?

575 A further, very important society was the
871 "Ridna /96/ Shkola" ("National School"). It closed the worst gaps which the Poles had hewn into the Ukrainian school system. There were 3662 Ukrainian public schools in Galicia when the Poles took over undivided rule. In 1937/1938 there were only 496 left. All the rest of the schools were Polonized, so that in the academic year 1937/1938 only 59,300 of over one million Ukrainian school children were able to attend purely Ukrainian schools. Among 307 state secondary schools in Poland, there were only five Ukrainian classical schools in the academic year 1936/1937. All of the 1094 state technical schools were Polish and naturally also all higher institutions of learning. The means at the disposal of the "Ridna Shkola" - needless to say - were not by any means adequate to teach all Ukrainian children their mother tongue. Nevertheless, by means of the savings of its 104,000 members, it was able to maintain 540 kindergartens, 33 public schools, 12 classical schools, 11 colleges, 16 schools for specialists and professionals and 4 boarding schools. (53) The

53. Taken from the respective annual reports of the West Ukrainian cooperatives and self-aid organizations.

tension between Poland and the Ukraine in the

575 first half of 1939 threatened the educational
871 work of the "Ridna Shkola" just as it did that of the women's society, the society of agriculturists, the "Provista" and the cooperatives.

The efforts of the Ukrainians to raise the
871 level of popular education are admirable. When
873 at the beginning of their rule in Galicia the Poles deprived the Ukrainians of their few professorial chairs, the Ukrainians forthwith founded a "Secret University" which gave its lectures during 1922 and 1923 in private houses. At the end of each lecture the professors who were taken partly from universities of East Ukraine, partly from Austrian universities, announced to their listeners the time and place of their next lecture. In the end this "university" collapsed and the lecturers were arrested.

873 Two years after the enactment of the Ukrain-
ian law of autonomy of 1922 a Ukrainian univer-
178 sity was supposed to have been founded - but in the summer of 1939 there was not yet a single Ukrainian professorial chair. In Lwów a Polish professor lectured on Ukrainian literature in the
241 Polish language, in /Facing page 96/ /Map VII: Agricultural Zones Under Cultivation. In the wooded zones of the north rye, oats and potatoes predominate. In the northern zones of steppes, wheat and sugar beets are added (winter wheat in the west and summer wheat in the east). A third zone on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and in the foreland of the Caucasus produces wheat, corn and barley. Adjoining this toward the west there is a corn-growing zone (with wheat in the north and barley in the south), whereas toward the northeast there is a zone extending to the middle part of the Volga with summer wheat and rye. Around the Caspian Sea is the pasture area of desert steppes, in the mountains, woodland and grasslands with some barley cultivation. The cultivation of cotton which has been recently undertaken along the coasts of the Black Sea and

241 the Sea of Azov also deserves to be mentioned./ /Key inside map: I Rye, potato and oats region. II Wheat and rye region; sub-zone of rye, wheat, potatoes; sub-zone of rye, winter wheat, sugar beets; sub-zone of summer wheat, rye, sugar beets. III Region of wheat, barley, corn; sub-zone of winter wheat, corn, barley, sunflowers. IV Summer wheat and rye zone; cotton. V Region of corn; sub-region of corn, wheat; sub-region of corn, barley. VI Oats and potato region. VII Forest region. VIII Grassland (pastures, alpine pastures, natural meadows). ⊥⊥⊥⊥⊥ Area with abundant millet cultivation. ⊞ Area with abundant buckwheat cultivation. ....Northern boundary of region growing abundant amounts of corn. ⌇⌇⌇⌇⌇ Intensive horticulture./ /97/ Cracow a Ukrainian
873 professor lectured in Polish on Ukrainian liter-
178 ature, and in Warsaw Polish and Ukrainian professors lectured in Polish on Ukrainian literature and "History of the East" which meant history of the Ukraine under Polish rule. Moreover, study in Lwów was made very difficult for Ukrainian students. Warsaw wanted the Ukrainians to study in Cracow and in the capital of the country, and to have them taken out of the Ukrainian environment and drawn into the Polish one. In this connection a secret numerus clausus proved very useful: the Ukrainians, in contrast to their smarter Polish colleagues often failed.

*

101 How was the situation in Bukovina? This little country of 5000 square kilometers on the northeast slope of the Carpathians in between the three countries, Poland, Soviet Union and Rumania, was, until its transfer to the Habsburg Kingdom in 1776, purely a colonial country of the Sublime Porte. Under Austria it experienced a rapid rise, and its chief city Czernovits (now Chernovtsy) was given the epithet "Vienna of the

11: Obermaier--100A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

MAP VII: Agricultural zones under cultivation, cf. complete Legend, pp. 99-100]

11: Obermaier--100B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

[Map VII Agricultural zones under cultivation]

101 East". The region was very fertile, with the exception of the western part which was overgrown with beech forests. It was thickly settled by Germans, Walachians and Ukrainians. In the cities there were a great many Jews. As a result of a secret agreement between the countries of the Entente, it was transferred to Rumania August 18, 1916 and on November 11, 1916, it was occupied by troops. Up to this day the Ukrainians enjoyed practical autonomy. Neither their compatriots in Czarist Russia nor in Galicia, where the Poles, thanks to their predominance at the Viennese court, had secured the upper hand, nor in Hungarian Carpathia were in possession of so many rights and institutions as they were, beginning with the public schools and on up to university chairs and to their own government. Bukovina was the "pet" of Vienna. It could not maintain this privileged position under Rumanian domination. /98/

Merely a Poet

000 Solemn, like a religious service, was the first performance of Ukrainian concert music in the Old Municipal Theater of Lwów on a Sunday in March, 1939. Magnificent choirs of many voices swayed humbly, rose up exultantly as though heaven should hear them; light sopranos twittered, deep basses rolled, and finally the song died away like a breath of the steppes. It was a strangely moving music in an echoing language. But the world knew little about it. There was no station that might broadcast it, no disk that might reproduce it. The art of this people, talented in song and music, experiences the same fate as the manuscripts of its scholars which molder in drawers because they do not find any publishers. And yet there is tireless work going on in all fields of art and science.

The first performance was the great event which no one must miss who had a good opinion of himself.

000 All the Ukrainian intelligentsia of Lwów and its environs, men and women, were represented, the consulates of Great Britain and France and many foreigners who love Ukrainian music - all but the Poles.

Intelligentsia - that is, students of the
577 classical schools and universities, teachers, professors, lawyers, the heads of the cooperatives, editors, writers, painters, politicians, architects, graduate agriculturists, engineers, physicians, clergymen. They were all there.* One saw remarkably many clergymen, fine men who have both feet planted firmly on Ukrainian soil. Many of them were Austrian officers in their younger days who also fought for West Ukrainian freedom. They told friends that they were prepared at any time /99/ "to exchange the cassock for a coat of mail". This is no empty talk, for most of them had already paid for their national sentiments in Polish prisons. Their metropolitan, Count Andrei Sheptyckij, is cut from the same pattern. He incurred the hatred of the Poles when he blessed the autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine and half a year later its dead. Before he was drawn to the church, he, the cavalry captain of his Majesty, hunted bears, lynxes and wild boars. The trophies from that gay time are now hanging in the anteroom of the archbishop. Today he is an old man who has been in ill health for a long time. Years ago the tall, vigorous man was often compared to Michelangelo's Moses.

Count Andrei Sheptycki was a member of the Polonized Ukrainian high nobility. Like many Polish aristocrats with Ukrainian coats of arms, his brothers belonged to the Polish szlachta; he alone found his way home to the Ukrainian people. Neither the Poles nor the Ukrainians have a dearth of nobility. In Volhynia "the 16th and 17th centuries fairly seethed with princely houses". When-
556 ever the Polish kings needed warriors for their
565 expeditions, they raised the wealthy peasants to

* [At a Ukrainian concert in Lwów, incidental to the information - Analyst]

the peerage and gave them rights and privileges 556
for which the newly-created peers were obliged to 565
pay with military service. In this way the lower szlachta increased to many hundreds of thousands of knights and barons who were often not much richer than the ordinary peasants. In the purely Polish regions and in West Ukraine there are still whole villages in which every peasant belongs to the nobility. Whoever was able to present his patent of nobility in Galicia after the partitioning of Poland was recognized as a peer by the Viennese court. In this way arose the Ritter /knights/ von Vitvicky, von Mogylnicki, von Kultshycki and whatever the rest are called.

Whereas the high nobility, with the exception of people like the former Princes Ostrozhsky 565
does not play any part in promoting culture in 517
modern times in the Ukraine, the lesser nobility 793
were for a long time practically the only bearers of Ukrainian culture. They made up the clergy almost exclusively. /100/ The pastors with their numerous children were often the only and the inexhaustible source of Ukrainian intelligentsia. Otherwise there were no intellectual professions open to the Ukrainians. Only the Catholics, that is to say, the Poles could become officials.

The Poles held to the old traditions of the lower nobility in their "Union of village szlachta". 565
According to the latest Polish conception, the lower Ukrainian nobility are Ukrainized Poles. By promising them additional land and other material advantages, Warsaw wanted to catch the 400,000 "aristocratic souls". If this had succeeded, the Poles would have come a good deal closer to a majority in Galicia.

*

"In this cottage, in this grove 559
A hell I saw! Nothing but slavery 538
And bitter servitude, that never justice knows

539
538

Are there. No time remains for God.
There pain and sorrow
Spent my mother's strength
And drove her, young, into the grave...
And helplessly among his brood -
For we were naked then and young -
My father worked himself to death
And died a slave...And we, orphaned now,
Abandoned our little hut
And moved away..." (54)

54. Quoted from Ukrainian Literature in the Service of its Nation, page 8.

538 Taras Shevchenko is the author of this poem. With him begins a new period of progress for the Ukrainian people after the end of Cossack glory and the period of greatest decline. One of the first to lay the foundation for this development which has not yet ceased, is Ivan Kotliarevskyj with whom begins the period of modern Ukrainian literature freed from Byzantinism and religion bonds. /101/ This was toward the end of the eighteenth century. His travesty of Virgil's Aeneid appeared in 1798 and was the first work to be printed in the Ukrainian popular tongue which from then on becomes the literary language of the Ukrainians. In 1818 the first grammar [177] follows. Around this time the ideas of the German Romanticists also come in and enduringly influence the Ukrainian intellectual world. People study their native language, tradition, folklore and history and in doing so, discover a past whose richness was scarcely imagined.

But the national impulses of the Ukrainian romanticists remain a "melancholy national feeling" until, around 1840, Taras Shevchenko stirs up the slumbering spirits. "The song of this poet had truly the effect of the resurrection trumpet of the archangel." Thus Panyko Kulish, the versatile brain of the Ukrainian in-

538 tellectual world at that time, characterized the influence of Shevchenko. His landlord had had him educated as a painter in Warsaw and Petersburg. By means of a lottery, the friends of the 24-year-old artist obtained the 2500 rubles necessary to buy off a serf. Shevchenko enjoyed his freedom from 1838 to 1847. Then he was arrested in Kiyev along with many other Ukrainian poets, authors and scholars. They all belonged to the "Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood" which inscribed on its banner the federation of all Slavic republics on a democratic basis. Taras Shevchenko was exiled to ten years of labor on a fortress in the Kirghiz steppes. "Writing and painting are prohibited!" the Czar noted in his own handwriting on the margin of the sentence. Four years after he was released the artist died far from home in Petersburg.

Merely a poet! And yet the nine years of freedom between serfdom and exile sufficed this tremendous spirit to build a bridge across the centuries - from the age of the Cossacks up to the new Ukrainian nationalism. Merely a poet, but what an explosive force was hidden in his /102/ ballads and poems, what effects were produced by his conjuring up of the past, his song of songs on freedom and his call to action! His "Kobsar" ('kobsar' was the name of the singers of famous folk epics from the time of the Cossacks) clothed all the national-political demands of the Ukrainian people in a sweeping poetic form and by this very means reached all classes of people.

*

539 "Hills upon hills, cloud-encircled,
Sown with sorrow, drenched in blood...
There, full of mercy, We shackled
Freedom and pursued her as she wandered
About the land, hungry, naked...Here lie

539

Untold hosts of hirelings.
And tears? Blood? Verily enough
To sate all czars,
To drown them and their progeny
In widows' tears... The tears of maidens
Shed throughout full nights of longing,
The burning pain of mothers' tears,
Our hoary fathers' tears of blood
No stream could hold, - ah no,
A sea, a fiery sea!... Oh honor
To all dogs and tyrants
And to the Czar, our little father."(55)

55. "Taras Shevchenko" in Beiträge zur Ukrainekunde, Number 6, Berlin 1937.

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The political concept of an "indivisible Russia" suggests the suppression of all Ukrainian movements toward independence, even if they be merely of a cultural nature. In accordance with this, and on the basis of the principle followed by the Russian Minister of Education Valuiev: "There is no separate Little Russian language, there never was and never can be", Moscow issued a general printed statement prohibiting all /103/ Ukrainian writings. Ukrainian culture which is 700 years older than the Muscovite culture based on it was simply declared invalid. Belletristic works by Ukrainian pens may appear only in Russian spelling. All writing was sharply censured, concerts, lectures and theatrical performances were forbidden. Later the theatrical prohibition was relaxed a bit, but for each Ukrainian play a Russian one of equal length had to be performed. Since members of the higher classes would be unrefined if they spoke Ukrainian, actors portraying persons from cultivated circles has to speak only Russian even to Ukrainian plays.

517 While the Ukrainian language was being banned from Kiyev, a new flowering of Ukrainian culture was beginning in the West Ukrainian metropolis
[741] of Lwów. In 1873 Ukrainian men of learning founded the "Scientific Shevchenko Society", a free academy. The number of Ukrainian chairs at the University grew. Now that all scholarly activity in the Ukrainian language was curtailed in East Ukraine, professors and writers transferred their field of activity to Lwów where a number of different cultural organizations arose. Kiyev as the intellectual hub of all Ukraine was outstripped by Lwów, in fact, even by Czernovits /now Chernovtsy/. Each of these two cities published more than one hundred Ukrainian works in 1894, whereas Kiyev published only ten works of so-called "literature for the home".

The revolution of 1905 only temporarily
177 eased the pressure on Ukrainian cultural life. Freedom of the press and freedom of assembly remained only promises, and the "unity and indivisibility" of the Russian people was nothing but lifeless dogma until in 1917 its defenders were swept away by the seceding peoples.

Despite all difficulties, Lwów remained the
517 cultural center of West Ukraine even after the
668 first World War. Its focal point was the "Scien-
[741] tific /104/ Shevchenko Society" which published its own periodicals and scholarly works. The spiritual trend of West Ukrainian intellectuals, in so far as they were not obliged to emigrate, was directed against traditional sentimentality. Young people were reared to think politically, to be ready for action and for dedication. In accordance with the political aims, the subject matter of present-day West Ukrainian literature shows a preference for the re-awakening of the Ukrainian people, for the heroic struggles of the last few decades, and for the heroic in the Ukrainian landscape.

517 156 [214] Kiyev, Khar'kov and Odessa are the most important centers of East Ukrainian intellectual life. It is there that most of the Ukrainian books, periodicals and newspapers are published. Besides that, the Ukrainian tongue is also printed in many smaller cities. Many of the Soviet Ukrainian authors glorify present conditions; these are the interpreters of Communism, the worshipers of machines and idols. But there are also others, like Khvylovy, who in truthful pamphlets derided the state of affairs, the proletarian wirepullers, their ingenuousness, their venality and their eagerness to work their way up, authors who write with a nationalistic purpose, who are "exposed" and then, like Khvylovy, come to an unfortunate end. "Experts maintain that even in the works of the Ukrainian Communist writers, especially the younger ones, the national feeling cannot be hidden, that an inner schism appears in their works. They do not actually belong to proletarian literature which has remained inwardly foreign to them. How could it be otherwise with such a past!" (56) /Facing page 104/

56. Zalozieckyj, ibid.

439 /Map VIII: Grain Export from the Soviet Ukraine and North Caucasus (Average for 1927/1928) This map differentiates between actual Soviet Ukraine and the North Caucasus regions. Export to foreign countries is insignificant compared to supplies sent to the Greater Russian areas of the Soviet Union situated in the forest belt./ /Key: Grain: ● from Soviet Ukraine, ● from the North Caucasus./

/105/ <u>Trapping Souls</u>

798 On Sunday, May 29, 1939 a unique event took place in the church of St. Peter in Rome:

11: Obermaier--108A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

Map VIII: Grain Export from the Soviet Ukraine and North Caucasus (average for 1927/1928), cf. complete legend, p. 109]

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

[Map VIII: Grain Export from the Soviet Ukraine and North Caucasus (Average for 1927/1928)

798 at the papal altar under the mighty canopy the former Imperial Russian diplomat at the court of the sultan and at present Byzantine-Slavic suffragan Monsignor Yevreyinov celebrated a solemn high mass in the Byzantine-Slavic ritual. Pius XII, the cardinals of the Vatican, the Collegium Ruthenum and the Collegium Russorum devoutly attended, and the casual churchgoers marveled at the strange choirs in the ancient Slavic tongue. The Pope ordered this high mass in honor of the same Vladimir the Great and Most Holy who approximately 950 years before had refused to receive the legates of his predecessors on the throne of Peter and who had been baptized in Byzantium.

A new attempt, therefore, to unite the East Roman Church with the West Roman one, a distinct gesture to the 180 million souls of Orthodox Christianity who are to be won over! The goal was often in sight, but again and again reintegration failed. The attempts of the Vatican to convert East Rome, or at least some of its believers, are as old as the separation of the two churches itself. Even the legates who had deposited the papal bulls of excommunication in the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople had returned to Rome via Kiyev. The efforts at reconciliation were never completely given up. In 1418 at the Council of Constance it was the metropolitan of Kiyev who had offered the submission of his followers on condition that the retention of the Slavic liturgy and /106/ ritual be granted. His offer was rejected. Twenty years later many bishops of the East and West Roman Church put their signatures to the solemn reconciliation which was then confirmed in the bull "Laetantur coeli". But this union also failed as a result of the opposition of the Muscovite Grand-Prince Vassily the Blind and the Orthodox believers. Toward the end of the same century the Orthodox Church was close to complete dissolution. Its

798 collapse seemed inevitable when in 1595 seven Orthodox bishops had approved the Brest Union in principle. But Polish-Jesuit intolerance, unfulfilled promises and disregard of the rights of those who were ready to enter the union made some of the bishops mistrustful and again estranged them. The arrogance with which the Catholic party treated the Orthodox, their public mockery, indeed even maltreatment of the Orthodox priests at that time, caused a chasm so great that to this day it has not been bridged over. At the same time, those who were already Uniats were not much better off. Their "complete equality" with Polish citizens and the Catholic clergy remained an empty promise which it was not in the power of the Uniat bishops to enforce. If the lower priests did not belong to the nobility "they were often seen in torn clothing walking along, whip in hand, beside their horses and oxen, furnishing relays for the state or performing compulsory services as serfs to their master." (57)

57. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 24.

Conditions in the Uniat church improved in those regions that had come under Austrian rule after the partitioning of Poland, whereas in congressional Poland a ukase of the Czar again forcefully opened up the Orthodox heaven to the Uniats. With Peter the Great, who in 1721 had transferred the rights of the patriarchy of Moscow to the Holy Synod, the Czar had become the head of the Orthodox Church.

184 795 Since the serious crisis of Orthodoxy in the 15th and 16th /107/ century, the opportunity for a reunion of both churches[z] has never been as favorable as it is at present. The "defender of all Orthodox believers" is dead. The Synod in Moscow as well as the Ukrainian church, which

z [i.e., Catholic-orthodox - Analyse]

184 795 became autocephalous during the Revolution, have dissolved. In the wide realm of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics there is no visible ecclesiastical authority whatsoever. No one knows how many priests are secretly carrying on their duties. Churches are closed and have been transformed into "godless museums" or clubs. East Rome is without power and without priests.

648 795 It was said of Pius XI: "The Holy Father is much concerned about the re-unification of the East. It may be said that he has made this the goal of his life." (58) Pius XII, as may be

58. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 38.

seen by the honor bestowed on Vladimir, cherishes the same plans.

But the Soviet Union remained closed to the emissaries of the Vatican. Everything was done that could be done. In 1918 the Vatican hastened to send an ambassador to Kiyev. But before he arrived the addressee of the credentials, Hetman Skoropadsky, was already fleeing to the West. In 1922 to 1923 papal aid to the starving is supposed to "prepare the ground" for the seed which none other but Nuntius Pacelli scattered when in all secrecy in Berlin, he consecrated a Jesuit organizer as bishop of this charitable work; the Jesuit who is passing through must be consecrated secretly, in order that the Bolsheviks do not become suspicious and that the "simple" father who is apparently only concerned about apportioning the food that is handed out, can unostentatiously appoint five bishops. In this manner the first Catholic prelates are installed in the Ukraine. How often they have made use of their sacred powers and how many Catholic bishops and priests there are today in Soviet Ukraine is not known even in the Vatican.

Vatican.

000 Many hundreds of Catholic priests trained in the Orthodox ritual are waiting for the moment when the frontiers of the Soviet Union will be opened to the missionaries of Rome. /108/ They have been educated in the numerous special seminaries for priests which were erected at the wish of Pius XI in many dioceses of various countries.

First of all, however, the Orthodox of Poland were to be converted, of which, according to the last census, there were 3.8 million. The overwhelming majority of them were Greek Orthodox after the Brest Union and before their adoption into the Russian Empire. Now they were to be united anew with the Roman Catholic Church, not all at once, by force or from above through the conversion of bishops, but gradually and from below by winning over laymen and the priests. Pius XI who was for many years nuncio in Warsaw and got along well with the Poles, used for this purpose a more recent ritual, the Byzantine-Slavic one, which is more nearly like the purely Orthodox than is the Greek Orthodox, known as Ruthenian
795 in Rome. Externally the Byzantine-Slavic priests
798 with their long beards, their long hair and the klobuk (priest's hat) resemble their Orthodox colleagues. The dogma of this evolving church has not been definitively established. The Roman ecclesiastical congregation of the East is still uncertainly feeling its way along this difficult terrain. The orthodox love the form and even more the profound mysticism of their service which is rich in symbolism. The Vatican has learned from previous mistakes; it does not want to be hasty and arouse distrust. It is necessary to tread softly in places where the figures of saints are shunned as idols and demons and where the pope is regarded as the personified Antichrist. The fathers of the Byzantine-Slavic ritual are open to reason in matters of dogma, but the pope must

be recognized as the supreme shepherd and as infallible in ecclesiastical matters. This is their first condition. The dogma grows shaky on the doctrine about purgatory. The Orthodox Church knows only heaven and hell; and it is not always easy - in spite of the comforting prospect - to convince laymen and priests who are willing to be converted that there is also a purgatory./109/ The question as to whether the new ritual could not get along without this place of purification is at present still being considered in Rome. The problem of the origin of the Holy Spirit who, according to the Roman-Catholic conception forms a unity with God the Father and the Son, and according to the Orthodox belief originates only in God the Father, causes the least difficulties. The Byzantine-Slavic ritual is here permitted to adopt the Orthodox dogma.

Even though the 2000-year-old Roman Church had time carefully to prepare the matter of union, this was not the case with the fast-moving Polish state. Since Misika, a contemporary of Vladimir, introduced West Roman Christianity into Poland, the latter has always been at a disadvantage in its battle over the countries of the Slavic peoples with Orthodox religion, and it has always tried to compensate for this defect by Catholisizing in a headlong fashion. Polish missionary methods have done more harm than good as far as the Vatican is concerned. More than once the Papal See was obliged to curb Polish nationalism; four papal decress forbid the conversion of members of the Union to the Roman Catholic faith. In spite of this the Poles blithely went on "converting".

The most recent attempts at union by Pius XI and Pius XII were from the beginning sorely impeded by the preference shown the Poles by the deceased pope. Pius XI who gave Byzantine-Slavic ritual a new impulse excluded the Greek-Catholic clergy of Galicia, that is to say the Ukrainian priests, from their work of converting their

775 brothers in Volhynia, in Lublin, in Polesia and
998 in Podlakhia. He placed the clergy of the growing church under the jurisdiction of Polish Roman-Catholic bishops. Instead of Ukrainian priests, the French, Dutch and Poles, Redemptorists, Jesuits and Polish secular priests began missionary work in the Ukraine. It was supervised by an apostolic inspector who could pronounce no ecclesiastical judgment. The seminary for priests in Dubno was directed by Jesuits. /110/ But the thing that embittered all Ukrainians, whether Orthodox or Uniat, most of all against Rome, was the way the Orthodox Ukrainian ecclesiastical possessions seized by Warsaw were wasted on the Poles. The long fight between Ukrainian and Polish clergy about this property was settled by Pius XI in favor of the weaker party. Polish pastors received Ukrainian prebends and Polish colonists 100,000 hectares of land. The metropolitan of Lwów in a pastoral letter which was confiscated, described the papal procedure with regard to Poland as "robbery".

It cannot be denied that the Poles carried on a clever ecclesiastical policy toward the Vatican. Their strongest pressure instrument was probably the autocephalous Polish Church with Russian hierarchy which was subject to the Byzantine patriarch. A separate Orthodox faculty had been provided for it at the Warsaw University. In this way the Papal See could be threatened and its plans thwarted without incurring punishment.

The violent Catholisizing actions of the Poles, known as the "revindication of souls" made the Roman efforts at union extremely difficult. In the process of Polonizing Orthodox Ukrainians, the churches were often the only obstacle that needed to be taken seriously, for where the cultured stratum of society was so thin, the pope and the church were the only national prop the people had.

795
798 The removal of this national stronghold has been systematically carried on for many years by the Poles through methods which could probably be compared with those of the "revindication" of Catherine II.

As early as 1928 the Warsaw government closed approximately 400 Orthodox churches and liquidated the church property belonging to them. The "Ukrainian Self Reliance League of Canada" in a petition to the League of Nations asserted that by closing the Orthodox churches or by transferring them to the Roman Catholic Church "the members of the Greek Orthodox Church are deprived of the right of free /111/ exercise of their religion". The Poles dropped the last controls in the summer of 1938. They banished the few Ukrainian intellectuals from the border region; mounted corps of frontier guards with army chaplains at their head entered the Orthodox villages and a few hours later left the communities which had now become "converted" to Rome. Finally, Warsaw also carried on its missionary work with powder and quickmatch. About this the confiscated "Kuryer Wilenski" of August 26, 1938 reports among other things: "The destruction in the past month of a hundred and more Orthodox churches in the eastern districts of the voivodeship of Lublin at the command of the administrative bodies produced, as we know, first a reaction on the part of the bishop's council of the Orthodox Church in Poland and then also a reaction of the head of the Greek Uniat Church in the form of a manifesto to all believers, as well as incitement of the population in a few towns in which these 'riots' occurred... The Greek Orthodox clergy maintains that in the voivodeship of Lublin 114 Orthodox churches were destroyed by order of the authorities... It cannot be denied that people of the Greek Orthodox faith were profoundly stirred by the fact that their sanctuaries were destroyed."

795
198 This is a picture of the beginning of the new Union.

/112/ Moscow Educates

000 In one thing Lenin proved superior to his enemies and predecessors: he knew how to utilize the social-revolutionary and nationalist-revolutionary forces in the vast Russian Empire for his own ends. With the explosive material which Hetman Skoropadskyj and the counterrevolutionary general Denikin had piled up anew through their forcible restoration of large estates, he destroyed both opponents. He met the collapse of the idea of a Pan-Russian Empire with the slogan of the revolutionary proletarian unified front of non-Russian peoples of the former czarist realm against the capitalist states. It was only for appearances' sake that he complied with the national wishes of the peoples gathered together under Moscow.

668 In Russian Ukraine, where at the beginning of the Revolution the national consciousness of the great masses of peasants was not yet deeply rooted, Lenin's tactics did not run against insuperable difficulties. The cultured stratum, already not too large, was divided into two camps, one of which sympathized with Bolshevism, while the other regarded an autonomy within the democratic realm of Great Russia as the most favorable solution of the problem of nationalities. Thus from the beginning Lenin had a part of the Ukrainian people on his side, and he subjugated the rest with the help of Muscovite troops during years of bloody civil wars. True, in November 1917, in the "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia" sovereign rights "including the right of severance and of formation of an independent state" /113/ were promised, but toward the end of the period of the Communist war there was no force left which might have made use of it.

After this first chapter of Muscovite national policy was completed, the second one began: the "New Economic Policy" (NEP). The Soviet Union was urgently in need of composure, of a breather and recuperation. The Bolsheviks in Moscow, therefore, loosened the reins and introduced the semi-free economy in which land, large enterprises and the banks remained the property of the state, the peasants obtained the usufruct of the land, and a free market could regulate
648 the distribution of goods. Simultaneously with the NEP, Moscow launched a second enterprise: the nationalization of non-Russian peoples. For it was necessary to administer in small doses and in as attractive a form as possible, Bolshevist ideology to the Ukrainians, the White Ruthenians, the Caucasian and all other peoples who were under Moscow's rule. With the XII Congress of the Communist Party in 1922 the policy of Ukrainization was adopted, to be sure only in the area of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic with its 443,000 square kilometers of surface and approximately 23 million Ukrainians, while the many millions of Ukrainians in the White Ruthenian Soviet Republic, the Russian Soviet Republic including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in the Kuban area, on the Volga and in Siberia were at that time already being de-nationalized. During that XII Congress in 1923, the following words were spoken about the Ukraine: "This is one of the problems which threaten to involve Soviet Russia and the Party in the greatest complications. It is one of those problems which, we must admit frankly and honestly, will promulgate civil war if we do not approach it with delicacy and understanding."

The Ukrainian Communists adopted Moscow's
661 slogan without hesitation. To Ukrainize - that
648 meant to give Ukrainians leading positions in the government, in the Party, in the cooperatives, in economy, in the press and in the school system; /114/ it also meant using Ukrainian as the offi-

661 cial language and promoting Ukrainian culture in
648 all its aspects, in science and art. The process was carried on so eagerly in all fields that in the course of it the task of converting people to Bolshevism seemed almost to be forgotten. In fact, a Ukrainian national Bolshevist movement was started, which soon ran into opposition with Moscow. It was headed by the People's Commisar for Popular Education, Shumskyj, whose group openly opposed the "exploitative colonial policy of Moscow". The situation was not too good within the Communist Party of the Ukraine. Shumskyj divulged this in his speech of May 12, 1926: "Within the Party, the Russian Communist prevails; he does not trust the Ukrainian Communist and is hostile toward him." (59)

59. Fedenko: Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R., page 12.

648 How weak the position of Moscow was after the subjugation of the Ukraine is shown by the Constitution of the Soviet Union of 1923, in which the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as well as the remaining national republics of the Union had to be formally recognized. The defense system, the transportation system, finances and foreign policy were declared to be affairs of the state. The Foreign Commissariat in Moscow established a branch in Khar'kov, which at that time was the Soviet Ukrainian capital.

The process of Ukrainization reached its
661 external climax with the visit of the Ukrainian
648 champion of liberty Colonel Konovalets who in 1918 and 1919 had carried on the bitterest battles against the Bolsheviks and now visited Kiyev at the invitation of the President of Soviet Ukraine, Petrovskyj. Like so many other emigrants he, too, had let himself be dazzled by Muscovite nationalist policy. That Petrovsky was able to show his West Ukrainian guest was indeed astonishing com-

661 pared with that which remained to the Ukrainians
648 in Poland. The old cultural city on the Dniepr was experiencing a new efflorescence; 70% of all students in Soviet Ukraine were attending Ukrainian schools. There had been nothing like
[214] it since the days of the Cossacks. /115/ Between
[217] 1918 and 1928 the Academy of Sciences published 888 works and numerous libraries were founded. (60) Hundreds of newspapers, periodicals and

60. Tisserand: The Ukraine, Life of a People, page 283.

pamphlets enlightened Ukrainians eager for knowledge in their mother tongue, and poetry and belles-lettres had reached a very high level. But soon black shadows were to fall on this brilliance.

Not yet satisfied with the results of the
661 policy of Ukrainization - in 1929 only 36% of
665 the officials were Ukrainians, the rest Jews and Russians (61) - the Central Committee of the

61. Fedenko: Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R., page 17.

Communist Partv of the Ukraine decided at the end of December, 1929, to intensify the process of nationalization. Especially the working classes were to take an active part in Ukrainian cultural life; Ukrainian theaters were to put on regular performances in the industrial areas; there were to be "Ukrainization cells" formed in the factories, the high union posts and the leading positions in the cooperatives were to be held by Ukrainians, and adherence to the course of nationalization of the administrative system was to be supervised. In this manner the cities were to be Ukrainized. The Commissar of People's Education, Skrypnyk, the successor of Shumskyj, successfully sought both to disseminate Ukrainian literature

665 and raise its standard and to do the same for the
661 theater and films. He even intended to impede the sale of newspapers and books written in Russian. When the first Five Year Plan was drawn up the Ukrainian Economic Council had its own demands to make to the state planning commission. It requested the establishment of industries which should make the Ukraine economically independent of the rest of Russia, as for example, textile factories, leather factories, paper mills and chemical plants.

665 The Pan-Russian Communists had repeatedly warned of such a development. Even in 1927 when Shumskyj was transferred to the north for disciplinary reasons, the Communist Party drew up a memorandum to the Executive Committee of the Comintern /116/ which, among other things, stated: "Before the Revolution we had almost no Ukrainian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia in the cities, now they are increasing every year, they multiply through influx from the villages, they strengthen their positions in the economy and the apparatus of government and endeavor to bring a certain proportion of Soviet officials, workers and Party members under their influence." (62) In this

62. Zaliznyak: The Struggle Between the Ukraine and the Soviet Union, page 669 ff.

memorandum the great danger of nationalistic deviation within the KPU (Communist Party of Ukraine) was emphatically pointed out. "The Disquieting Signal" was the title of a review of Vaganian's book On National Culture, in the official organ of the Russian government publication: The Reader and the Author. To Vaganian's warning of national cultures the government publishing firm adds the remark that there is danger in the fact that in recent times a number of Ukrainian authors have published works which the

665 Ukrainian population prefers to read, whereas the works of Russian authors remain completely unknown in the Ukraine. It goes on to say that this is a very detrimental phenomenon, for Russian culture is important for the entire Soviet Union and for the whole world, while Ukrainian culture is of merely local significance.

Conversely, the Ukrainians accused the Muscovites of chauvinism. Stalin, the Georgian, tried to pronounce a Solomonic judgment at the Sixteenth Party Congress in June 1930 by condemning both Great Russian and Ukrainian nationalism: "Great Russian chauvinism under the communists reflects the efforts of the ruling classes of former Russia to reconstruct their lost privileges of domination over other peoples. As a result, the chauvinism of Great Russia is the chief danger in the national policy of the Communist Party." In accordance with these ideas, the Sixteenth Congress adopted the resolution that the Party should /117/ intensify its fight against Great Russian deviation and the deviations of "local nationalism".

648 As a matter of fact, Ukrainian nationalism* was indeed becoming a danger to Bolshevik Moscow.
182 As compared to the period of war-communism, the Ukraine was living in remarkably comfortable circumstances. The fact that the majority of the
[369] Ukrainian people, the rural population, enjoyed an adequate subsistence, must have had a positively irritating effect on the urban masses in their wretched circumstances.* Was not this an open refutation of the communist doctrine? There was the additional fact that the Ukrainians became more and more importunate with their varied demands, and that the power of the Ukrainian government had increased so much during the NEP period, that finally it headed the opposition of non-Russian peoples in the Council of Nationalities (the second chamber next to the Supreme Council) and forced Moscow several times to change its

* [During the NEP period in the Soviet Union — Analyst]

648 budget plans. If things went on in this way the
162 social system of communism would face serious crises as a result of the flourishing peasant economy of the Ukraine - in the regions of Great Russia communal ownership of fields has prevailed since ancient times - and the Muscovite conception of national unity might be seriously threatened by the increasing power of "assembled peoples".

In order to avoid these dangers and also in view of other considerations, Stalin discontinued the New Economic Policy and introduced the period of the Five Year Plans. In spite of the decision of the Sixteenth Party Congress, the way to Russianization was opened, and Ukrainization discontinued; Ukrainian nationalism received a hard blow when free peasant farming was immediately liquidated. There have been untold victims of these revolutionary processes which were attended by violent upheavals from the time Stalin announced his principle of "socialism within one country".

"Socialism within one country" demanded
648 industrialization as the presupposition for the
185 independence of the socialistic /118/ state. This industrialization had to take place throughout the realm and according to a unified plan. Every form of particularism could only be detrimental - the Ukrainian form doubly so; for in the Ukraine are the coal and metal and the water power reserves of the Dniepr from which horsepower by the millions can be obtained. Such considerations led to the First Five Year Plan, in the course of which Ukrainian economy, heavy industry, finance and particularly agriculture were subordinated to orders from Moscow. The division of private economy was "liquidated".

The new system* introduced the purging of the
661 Pan-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the year 1930, where members of the "League for the Liberation of the Ukraine" had entrenched themselves; they were now "unmasked". In a monster trial in

* [i.e., Beginning of the Five year Plans — Analyst]

661 Khar'kov, Ukrainian scholars were sentenced to many years' imprisonment and exile - shooting was not yet customary at that time. In 1931 a second national Ukrainian organization, the "National Center", was uncovered, to which members of the Communist Party also belonged. Two years later about 4000 persons were arrested, of whom it was said they belonged to the "organization of Ukrainian revolutionists". Everywhere the GPU - state political division - discovered dangerous Ukrainians. The Secretary of the Central Committee of the KPU, Kossior, stated in this connection at the conference of the active section of the Party in Khar'kov the end of 1932: "The nationalistic elements became particularly active in 1931 and 1932 when every day they penetrated new areas of socialistic development." (63) In the course of the de-

63. The Ukraine and the Nationality Policy of Moscow, page 54.

nationlization of the Ukraine, the People's Commissar Skrypnyk was also obliged to resign. Stalin called to account this collaborator of Lenin, who had been Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet government, because of "nationalistic deviation". Thereupon Skrypnyk committed suicide. In his place the enemy of Ukraine Zatonskyj and the Jew Khait, undertook the task of disciplining and educating the Ukrainian people. /119/

In its desire utterly to exterminate Ukrainian nationalism, the Moscow regime spared no one, neither the peasants who defended themselves against the loss of their property, nor the scholars whose eyes saw beyond Karl Marx' horizon, nor such supernumerary mouths to feed as poets, are in a land of production. Soviet poets in general never had an easy time of it. Whether they wrote love poems and poems about spring, or

661 whether they remained silent, both could be interpreted as "sabotage against socialistic progress". In this situation an author "steers his boat like an adroit sailor through the stormy waves of Stalin's Party policy and takes care only to save himself." (64) What could be in-

64. The Ukraine and the Nationalities Policy of Moscow, page 82.

terpreted as a crime against Party policy in these purging actions against Ukrainian nationalists is shown by the fate of Grigory Epyks. In his book The First Spring "the true nationalist unmasks" himself in the following words: "He became lost in thought as he pictured to himself Vassa's full bosom, her slender, straight legs that tapered down to her ankles in a gentle curve. Serge feasted his eyes on this picture and began to conjure it up distinctly in his imagination. Vassa's legs did not seem thin, neither were they heavy. Their firm curve began gently at the chiseled knee,descended gradually, swelling proportionately toward the calves, by no means puny, and terminating in the thin, seemingly chiseled ankles. For such legs heavy servitude was probably many a time imposed on the Ukraine by the people of the Orient, and eyes and a soft, deep voice such as Vassa Polubotko had doubtless gave the Ukraine the right to be proud of their daughters." "In this nationalistic admiration of a racy Ukrainian woman," the critics of Epyk stated, "within a theory of national biology, which is actually the theory of race, crass nationalism is revealed." Epyk saved himself from spending his life in a labor camp by writing an appealing letter to the /120/omnipotent Postyshev, from which the latter communicated the following: "By planning terroristic attempts at assassina-

661 tion we have for many successive years carried on actions, in comparison with which the deeds of a highway robber may be called a model of honesty and humanity. I understood that the sentence of the proletarian court must be the following: to deal with me as with a mad dog, to do away with me as with a sick horse, to remove me from the social organism. The Communist Party has magnanimously accepted my penitence. The Party has given me life and the joy of work." (65)

65. The Ukrainian Literature in the Service of its Nation, pages 47 and 48.

661 It was Postyshev whom Stalin sent into the
665 Ukraine at the end of 1932 with a small army of GPU men and whom he ordered to destroy the "national counterrevolution", while Tsatonskyj and Khait were to discover, unmask and correct "national aberrations". After approximately a year's activity Postyshev reported his "successes" to the plenary meeting of the Party actives of the city of Khar'kov in November, 1933. According to this report, 27,400 of a total of 125,000 members of the KPU were expelled in 1933; 1000 nationalists were removed from the People's Commissariat for Public Education and its subordinate organizations in the province, nearly 2000 from the cooperatives and economic organizations, and approximately 300 professors and assistants from scientific institutions. 2500 Ukrainian nationalists were rounded up by Postyshev's agents in central positions of Soviet Ukraine in Khar'kov alone. Finally, 237 Party secretaries of the peripheral administrations, 249 chairman of the executive committees and 158 chairmen of the controlling commissions, as well as 1300 members of the Association of Communist Socialist Youth (Komsomol) were victims of this purge. (66) The

66. Report of Pstyshev at the Party meeting in Khar'kov in November 1933.

661 general secretary of the KPU, Kossier, was appar-
665 ently justified in saying: "The fact that we have
000 shattered nationalism, /Facing page 120/ /Ukrainian girl drawing water./*/Facing page 121/ /What a wealth of imagination and highly developed skill is disclosed in these pretty handmade national costumes!/*/121/ that we have organized our work properly in the country, this has determined our successes in the year 1933." (67)

67. Izvestiia" Number 19 and Number 20, 1934, in Nation und Staat, page 107.

000 Several years later these fierce foes of the Ukrainian people were themselves to be "unmasked". They were, for example, the friend of Postyshev, Ioina Iakir, at that time supreme commander of the Red Army in the Ukraine who had raged furiously against the nationalists at the Seventeenth Congress, and the People's Commissar Tsatonskyj who was shot in 1937 because of counterrevolutionary activities. Tastonskyj's successor, Khomenko, was relieved of his office on April 9, 1939.

642 From the time that Moscow once more obtained for itself, with bullet and bayonet, a separatist Ukraine, the freedom of the country has been constantly curtailed. When the period of "integral centralization" with the Five Year Plans, began the branch office of the Foreign Commissariat in Khar'kov was eliminated, the Ukrainians were removed from leading positions in economy and the government, and the individual commissariats and whatever important commanding positions there were, were little by little turned over to Moscow.

The democratic Constitution of November 1936 tops the skyscraper of integral centralism. Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution are merely a gesture, according to which "every Soviet republic exercises supreme power quite as a matter of course"

*[For plates, cf. pp. 221-222, category 116 - Analyse]

642 and "every republic of the Union has its constitution which takes into consideration the peculiarities of this republic..."; and Article 17 which avers that "every republic of the Union retains the right of voluntary withdrawal from the USSR" is merely an empty phrase, for the laws of the entire Bolshevik realm have equal power in all the federated republics and take precedence over the laws of the federated republics. Anyone who would dare to put into effect in his federated state the "right of voluntary withdrawal" from the Union, would be presented with Article 133 of the same Constitution, which says: "Defending his country is the /122/ most sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Treason like violating an oath, going over to the enemy, damaging the military forces of the state and espionage will be avenged as the greatest crime with all the force of the law." If it should occur to a Ukrainian to agitate for the right of voluntary withdrawal from the Union of his federated republic, which is "guaranteed" him in Article 17, Article 123 could be cited to prevent him from doing so, which makes punishable "any propaganda of a racial or nationally exclusive nature".

642 645 Now, what is the "independent exercise of supreme power" in the Ukraine like? Article 77 of the Constitution[1] clarifies this point, the People's Commissariats of Moscow are alone competent in matters pertaining to defense, foreign policy, foreign trade, traffic, the entire postal system, heavy industry and defense industry. But since the Constitution went into effect further commissariats of the Federated Republics have been subordinated to the Moscow offices, so that only education, local industry, municipal economy and social welfare have remained in Ukrainian hands. These are subject to the supervision of the national office. Under such circumstances it does not matter how the administrative system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is built up,

[1] [i.e. of November 1936 — Analyst]

642 inasmuch as the entire governmental hierarchy
645 from the village council /soviet/to the head of the state is merely a body of sheriffs whose duty is to see that the orders from Moscow are carried out.

000 In place of the nationalization of non-Russian peoples, which was given up in 1930, there have come up since 1936 the slogans about the "common socialistic fatherland", the "great Soviet people", the "love of the Soviet homeland". Besides that, the theory of the Russian people as the "leading people of the Revolution" is being quite systematically disseminated. The chauvinism of Great Russia which Stalin so mercilessly exposed to shame at the Party Congress of 1930 bids fair /123/ to recapturing for the Great Russian people the same position it had at the time of the White Czars.

*

871 Since Ukrainization was discontinued,[7] the education of Ukrainian youth goes on strictly according to the principles of the Marx-Lenin doctrine. Woe to the educator against whom it can be proved that he is departing from this course. Thousands of scholars and pedagogues had to give up their lives because of such mistakes.

The basic type of school in Soviet Ukraine, just as throughout the Soviet realm, is the "seven-grade work school" which roughly corresponds to an elementary school. Attendance in the four lower grades is obligatory, in the three higher ones, voluntary. The young Ukrainian, after he has graduated from the work school, may enter the "professional school" (a sort of technical school) or the "workers' school" for factory apprentices. The adult worker may enroll as auditor in the "workers' academy". There are also "Party schools", such as the "Pan-Ukrainian Institute for Communist Education", and, in place

7 [At the 16th All-Union Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union in June 1930 - Analyst]

871 of the universities which were for a long time forbidden, the "technical institutes" and the more advanced type of these, the "institutes for popular education". In recent times universities have again been revived.

In this connection it may be said that the obligation to attend elementary school begins at the age of eight and ends at the age of twelve. Two-thirds of the elementary pupils leave school before their four years are up. The subjects of instruction of the first few grades of the workers' school include, among other things: 1. Lenin - revolutionary, Communist, protector of workers and peasants; his death, short biography. 2. The Czar and the workers in the year 1905. 3. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. (68) - The "professional schools" are regular

68. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Union, page 40.

schools for fifteen- and eighteen-year-olds, corresponding somewhat to our German agricultural and business schools. The "workers' schools", on the other hand, are attended only at certain hours by factory apprentices. /124/ The "workers' academies" are somewhat like the former German people's universities. The course of study lasts four years; it entitles the graduate to register in universities without having to take any kind of entrance examinations. The Party schools train agitators and propagandists; the technical schools and institutes train engineers, chemists and specialists in various fields in a three-year, and in some cases a four- and five-year course of study. While the process of Ukrainization was [563] going on in 1928, there were among all university students in the Ukraine 15.8% Russians, 23% Jews, 56% Ukrainians and the rest students of other nationalities. (69) In 1933 and 1934 universities

69. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Union, page 98.

87/ were established in Kiyev, Khar'kov, Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk.

No research is being carried on either in the institutes or the technical schools or the universities; they are all purely teaching institutions. There are special institutes, so-called research chairs, for research which can be carried on only within the framework of historical materialism. "The researcher is advised to limit his activity to collecting and systematizing material and to avoid drawing conclusions." (70) Since

70. Zalozieckij: Ibid., page 31.

there is only one publisher, the state, scientists often have difficulty publishing their works at all. Thus they often have no choice but to have individual studies lithographed and published in a collected edition of 50 to 100 copies. The students for their part have other worries: they live mostly in dormitories, usually very poorly. To a large extent they also lack the necessary educational equipment.

177 The Russianization of the Ukrainian language
197 is part of the nationality fight between Russians and Ukrainians. Forgotten is the time when the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences in the year 1905 emphatically pointed out that the Russian and the Ukrainian language were separate languages. According to the opinion expressed at that time, the Russian literary language should not be imposed upon the Ukrainians, since they have at their disposal a "completely /125/ developed literary language of their own". In 1933 the State Publishing House of Moscow issued textbooks for Ukrainian schools in the new "unified" language. "Unification" means reintroduction of numerous Russian words with Ukrainian endings; it also means the use of Russian phrases which are completely foreign to the Ukrainian language. If a teacher should object to this corruption of the mother tongue of his pupils or not use it, there would be

177 sufficient grounds to deal with him in summary pro-
197 ceeding as a "separatist". Pravda of October 16, 1937 even accuses non-Russian students of "mutilating the great Russian language with all kinds of local linguistic rubbish".

The Russian State Publishing House in Moscow is playing a leading role in the language fight. Of 20 monographs which were published up to midsummer 1939 as a result of the great Shevchenko celebrations, no less than 16 were written in Russian and only 4 in the Ukrainian language.

Finally, a favorite method of Russianization is the granting of prizes, free journeys, and privileged places of work and study to young Ukrainians.

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645 Young people are supposed to spend their
883 leisure time in the Party organizations of the "Yellow Bills", the "Pioneers" and with the
867 "Communistic Socialistic Youth" (Komsomol). /This
857 is an erroneous reading of the Soviet abbreviation of Komministicheski Soiuz Molodiozh; which means Communist League of Young People. Editor/ There they are divided up into "groups of various interests" where they "can develop and satisfy their most urgent needs". There are those interested in the theater, music, sports, politics, the army and similar things. "From the outposts, from groups, from the clubs, from schools, the young people of talent come into the guardianship of the Pioneers every day, every evening, and there they develop, for they are under the supervision of experts..." (71) What "urgent needs" means is

71: H. Furman: Activity and Life of the Pioneers in the Ukraine.

explained by the Kiyev Visti of March 27, 1939, which says that the children conversation hours

665 in the movies and the /126/ theater are "dedicated
883 to the historic Party Congress". According to
867 Proletarska Pravda of January 5, 1938, popular
857 conversations "about the difficult life of children in capitalist countries, about the international youth movement and the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Council of the USSR are carried on" at such gatherings.

875 The teaching personnel in Soviet Ukraine consists largely of Russians and Jews. In the "pedagogical technical schools" and the "pedagogical institutes" in which educators are trained, the main emphasis is put on a sound knowledge of the Communist doctrine. It is obvious that in the process other subjects, such as language, spelling, history and the like, are neglected. If even in Leningrad "the struggle against illiteracy among the teachers is being intensified", (72)

72. Kommunistische Aufklärung of December 16, 1935, quoted from Richthofen: Bolschewistische Wissenschaft und Kulturpolitik /Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy/, page 75.

what may one expect to find in the provinces! In a single Ukrainian rayon 400 teachers had inadequate knowledge of orthography. (73) The profes-

73. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Ukraine.

sion of the Soviet Ukrainian teacher is certainly
[665] not enticing. The pay is very small; the village schoolmasters are often paid only in kind, and if they wander off into the factories and the teacher shortage becomes too great, the Komsomol sometimes comes to the rescue and "quickly mobilizes 50,000 members as substitutes". (74)

74. Kommunist of May 19, 1931, quoted by Danko; The Nation in Soviet Chains.

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876 All these things could be temporary inconveniences.[1] But the evil is more deeply rooted; for the educational principles are decisive in the rearing of the young Ukrainian generation. And in this field conditions are sad, as Pravda in an article of March 23, 1938 on the problems of Soviet schools confesses: "...Our network of schools of which the country can be proud, presents in its pedagogical division a scattered mass of teachers - individualists - and in the student division a mass of scattered classes which are joined purely mechanically by reason of their being under one roof. School as a collective, unified institution is /127/ unknown to the teachers, the children, the family or the Soviet public. And this is precisely the root of a great deal of misfortune... Only in a unified school body can the powerful force of public opinion as a regulatory and disciplinary-educational factor be created in the child's consciousness. Without it the pupils become lazy, break windows, call each other names, besmirch each other and with their boorish conduct demoralize not only themselves but the teachers as well... And then the family, the teachers, in fact even the various organs of the militia reproach each other, or they lay all the blame on the Komsomol, on the organizations of Pioneers and finally on the director of the school."

It must be admitted that the Bolsheviks lacked any kind of example as well as long years of experience in educating their youth according to the theories of Karl Marx and his numerous interpreters. From the beginning there were too few schools and too few teachers, and these shortcomings have even today not been removed. But the "success", as Pravda characterizes it, of the now twenty-year-old Bolshevik education, is primarily the result of the educational ideal

1 [i.e., educational inadequacies; cf. pp. 131-132, cat. 116 — Analyst]

876 which consists of "training a human being technically so that, equipped with the latest achievements in science and technics and full of creative initiative, he would be able, within the framework of collective endeavor, to conquer nature, to utilize its treasures and its forces in the broadest sense for the benefit of society as a whole, which, consciously and systematically shall carry the struggle for the Communist ideal to its victorious conclusion." (75)

75. Silberstein and Yastrzembsky: System of General Education, Ukrainian Government Publication, 1929. Quoted by Richthofen: Bolshevik Science, page 53.

Where the main task of the school is to educate the perfect technical human being - not the righteous one - training must begin at the nursery school age. The four-year-old child is already told about scientific things, and five- and six-year-old children learn the secrets of politics, of the work /128/ process and of technics. The fairy tales told by grandmother are forbidden; in their place a Bolshevik decorated with medals tells about the success of the Five Year Plan. The Catechism and the Bible are replaced by the Lenin dogma in which "finding favor in the sight of God" is synonymous with meeting production figures. The school, too, is merely a tentacle of the polyp "production process". It has the special task of "reproducing qualified man power" - precisely in the sense in which a machine factory furnishes replacements for worn-out tools of production. (76) It is necessary to

76. Hessen S. and N.Hans: Fünfzehn Jahre Sowjetschulwesen, Langensalza 1933. Quoted by Richthofen, ibid., page 51.

rear human beings who will work with the precision

876 of a machine and who, like a machine, heedless of personal concerns, unencumbered by spiritual impulses will produce the maximum number of revolutions for as long a time as possible. Only when the entire production of the educational factories is standardized does the individual product adapt itself without friction to the process. If the education of children were left to the families as it was before, the entire experiment would be jeopardized from the beginning, the more so since the Soviet Union is still primarily an agrarian country. For this reason the Bolsheviks replace the irreplacable educational force of the family with children's and young people's homes. This has its advantages: family ties are loosened and finally severed, the poison of Ukrainian nationalism is staved off and God is eliminated.

Thus young people are reared, homines technici who "perform their tasks purely automatically like machines, devoid of any moments of emotion, detached from any family ties and from ethnic groups, free from religious prejudice, merely on the basis of a rationally determined plan. But the machine is cruel; it destroys and crushes everything that stands in its way, for it knows no feelings, no former merits, it does not perceive individual greatness. Everything that towers above the measuring rod of the official pattern is mowed down, has its head cut off".(77)

77. Richthofen: Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy, page 76.

000 /Facing page 128/ /A typical workers' settlement near Krivoy Rog. Everywhere around the industrial cities which have sprung up like mushrooms, such loam huts are built as workers' cottages./A/Facing page 129/ /Richelieu Terrace in Odessa/A/129/

665 883 876 The head of the Komsomol, Kosarev, was justified in making the following statement at the

A [For plates, cf. pp 222-223, category 116 - Analyst]

665 23rd International Youth Day in Moscow in 1937:
883 "Never in the history of the world have there been
876 and are there such conditions for growth, education and training of the younger generation as have been created for young people among us by the Soviet government, by the Communist Party..." There are countless proofs of the fact that the basic principles of Bolshevik education are refuted by the products of this education.* The Komsomolskaja Pravda, number 83, 1935 admits "that the criminal elements in schools developed more actively than the Komsomols and the Pioneers, and therefore drew a large number of students into their sphere of influence", and Pravda of
[681] February 19, 1935 reports that the following punishments are administered to combat hoodlumism among children of from 8 to 12 years: "The expulsion of the hoodlums from school, legal persecution of their parents, the formation of special divisions of militia to combat youthful criminals, and so forth." (78) This picture is

78. Richthofen, Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy, page 75.

rounded off by the introduction on April 7, 1935 of the death penalty for children beginning at the age of 12 for those of them who can be shown to have committed theft, banditry, murder or to have contemplated murder, and by the purges which began in the autumn of 1937 against the members of the Komsomol, especially in the Ukraine.

/130/ In the Village

181 During the years in which Shevchenko stands watch in the searing heat of the Kirghiz Steppes, his friend Kostomariv formulates for the first time the contrasts between Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups. According to this, a tendency toward spirituality prevails in the social and

* [For a discussion of Bolshevik educational theory and methods, cf pp 133-135, category N6 - Analyst]

181 political life of the Ukrainians, in that of the Great Russians a tendency toward materialsim prevails. The Ukrainians incline toward federation, the Russians toward absolutism; the Ukrainians have a tendency to prefer personal freedom, the Russians despotism. As a result of these contrasts, he says, there is an eternal battle between the two peoples. (79)

79. Zalozieckij: The Spiritual Life of the Ukraine in the Past and Present.

144 The difference between Russians and Ukrainians are racially conditioned and historically substantianted. The hemotogenetic basis of the Russian people are the aboriginal Finno-Ural-Altaic peoples. These mixed with the advancing Slavs and later, at the time of the sovereignity of the Asiatic hordes, also with Tatars. In Ukrainian blood Slavic as well as Nordic components - Goths, Varangians - predominate. But Armenoids and Mediterranean races have gained influence, and a dash of Tatar blood cannot be lacking. The 142 Ukrainian is in general tall. He has broad shoulders, a round or semi-round skull, straight nose, high forehead, small mouth and small ears. His skin is slightly dark, his hair abundant, straight and predominantly dark. The Kubans in the East and the Huzuls in the West are the tallest, with an average height of 170 centimeters.

174 Historically the differences between the two /131/ peoples were revealed even at the time the Golden Horde subjugated them both. To this day the Russians boast of the fact that at that time they had carried on a more clever Tatar policy, that they had yielded and voluntarily paid the head tax - in contrast to the Ukrainians. While in that century Ukrainian high nobility played the leading cultural role at the court of the Lithuanian Gedemins, the Muscovite grand prince

174 Ivan Kalita destroyed the power of the nobility and therewith laid the foundation for Muscovite despotism. A further example of historically proved contrariety is furnished during the time of Ivan the Terrible. The most sinister force rules at that time in Moscow, while in the Ukraine the Cossacks are preparing to found the freest state that probably ever existed in East Europe.

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101 Among the Ukrainians there are, in turn,
184 tribal differences. The inhabitants of the dark forest region of Podlakhia and Polesia, who are obliged to wrest all fruits from the earth, can scarcely be as gay as those of the sunny spaces of the south. Those are melancholy and oppressed people who up there carry on the struggle for existence. Farther south, from the fertile hills of Podolia way over to the foothills of the Caucasus, there are fields of golden grain, fruit grows of its own accord, the sky is blue for many months, and on the Kuban there is paradise itself. Cheerful, candid people live here.

181 The Ukrainians are a peasant people and more than 90% of all children first see the light of the world through the small window-panes of a straw- or shingle-covered cottage. They are peasant souls - that is, quiet, good-natured, placid human beings who cling to the sod, to their own farm, who want to plow, sow and reap. They are poor, but honest and at the same time hospitable and positively ceremonially polite. People like to call them "Southerners" because of their cheerful disposition and their humor. They love that contemplative life which /132/ is hard to combine with constant hard work. It has not been a blessing to the Ukrainian that the soil yields richly and effortlessly, that his daily bread need not be obtained amid constant toil and hardships. If that were the case, perhaps he

181 would possess the favorable characteristic of obstinate perseverance; stubborness cannot replace it.

By nature the Ukrainian is an Easterner, that is to say he prefers the irrational, and his emotion outweighs his will. "The Eastern nature is characterized by rapid unexpected transitions from unprovoked and therefore short-lived enthusiasm and activity to complete, likewise unjustified quietism and apathy, which in history often expresses itself in a sudden transition from an imposing advance to epochs of complete deterioration." (80)

80. Zaloziecky: The Spiritual Life of the Ukraine in the Past and Present.

562 The Ukrainians are proud of their women. The Ukrainian woman is slender and tall, usually with black hair and black eyes. Folksongs sing of her thick eyebrows and her beautiful legs. The Ukrainian gynecologist Yuriy Lypa says of the Ukrainian woman that she never comes under the domination of a man; that like no other woman of Europe she is associated with things warlike. For, according to tradition, the Amazons lived between the Dnieper and the Don. Her relationship to man is strictly regulated, in spite of great passion and hot blood. It is based on pride and a consciousness of dignity. She must exert strong will power in order to keep herself within the bounds she sets for herself. She is cruel toward herself, but especially toward other women who overstep these bounds. Kulish, an outstanding Ukrainian historian, author and ethnographer, attributes to women the creation of those tender Ukrainian love songs which are so full of harmony and restraint. It is said that the actual realm of the Ukrainian woman is her family, where she occupies the dominating position as mother. The Ukrainian woman is more prac-

562 tical than her husband. She cares for the family as an entity, /133/ which is why Ukrainian common law knows no divorce. The so-called mother's inheritance which may not be touched by her husband is proof, it is said, of her material independence. In critical moments of his life the man consults with his wife or his mother. It is said that the Ukrainian woman has a considerable share in the development of the new Ukrainian nationalism. As early as the turn of the century the women's periodical Rodnij Krai (place of publication Poltava) contained demands for a purification of the nation and the race from foreign elements; the racial unity of the Ukrainians was particularly emphasized. (81)

81. Yuriy Lypa: "The Ukrainian Woman" in Die Frau, April 1938.

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361 About the villages of the Russians and the Ukrainians Shevchenko wrote in his Turkestan diary - he kept it hidden in his boot tops - that the Russian, in contrast to the Ukrainian, is born with a dislike of everything green. "A village of Great Russia, according to a statement of Gogol, is a heap of rough beams piled one on top of the other, with black holes in place of windows, surrounded by eternal dirt and eternal winter. There is not a single green twig to be seen. Behind the village there extend impenetrable forests - but it seems as though the village had purposely crept out of this impenetrable garden onto the highway and spread out in two rows along the road, built inns and on the village square a little church and a pub, and that was all it needed. Such an antipathy against the beauties of nature is inconceivable. How different the Ukraine! The white friendly little houses in town and city nestle in

361 the shadows of cherry and mahaleb trees. There every poor farmer adorns his dwelling with lovely, ever-smiling nature..."

Where there is no local building commission, where the street finds its own way, where the four corner posts of a house are set in humus, where no cellar is dug, there/134/the houses and villages grow out of the ground willfully like mushrooms. These are the cluster villages. The villages built in rows with streets are found in the newly settled regions of the Ukrainian steppes and the Kuban. In this new country the Ukrainians, [369] who otherwise love villages, also live on isolated farms. In the north and along the rivers they build wooden houses, and in the steppes, houses of loam. Even in the cities stone houses are rare. Flowers, hollyhocks and sunflowers are to be found in front of every cottage. As a rule, the Ukrain-
342 ian farmhouse has two to three rooms. Whether it houses a poor family or a rich one, the ground plan is always the same; only the size varies. There is the vestibule with the summer kitchen and one half of the stove that extends through the wall; the other half stands in the large livingroom where cooking takes place in the winter, where the family lives, where they receive guests and where everyone sleeps. Then there is also a small storage chamber. The furnishings of the large room are simple and clean: there is a bench running all the way around the large, decorated clay stove and around the room; a rough table and a few chairs stand in the corner, also a sleeping platform for the parents, and a chest. Many icons, "the gods", decorate the wall. Since the barns are very primitive and draughty, a new-born calf or a young lamb that needs warmth is sometimes brought into the room when the winters are cold.

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000 Seventeen ingredients are supposed to go into

Seventeen ingredients are supposed to go into
262 the favorite dish of the Ukrainians, borscht, a soured beet soup. The Ukrainian cuisine also favors porridges made from various cereals, cooked in water and served with milk, cream or fat. The Ukrainian also loves his boiled vareniki, thinly rolled dough filled with pot cheese, chopped meat, cabbage or fruit. In West Ukraine the poor farmers must be content with potatoes, rye bread and turnips. The gentlemen farmers among the Ukrainians are the wealthy Kuban Cossacks who /135/ consume bacon and milk for breakfast, borscht, groats, fowl or fish for dinner, and fruit, cold borscht, melons and bacon in the afternoon, and vareniki in the evening. This is how it was in the Kuban paradise in the good old days.

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512 When the cold east wind silently passes through the steppes or the west wind brings snow and wraps the Ukraine in white, when communication practically ceases between the villages, and nights and sleep are long, then the women sit down to their spindles and the men fetch their looms from
463 from the sheds. All the family clothing, the underwear and linen for the house that is needed
286 throughout the year, is made by hand during the long cold winter months, just as it was in our country /Germany/ in medieval households before the days of urban craftsmen. They make rope shoes and shoes of leather in regions where the ground is stony; they weave linen and woolen fabrics, sew shirts - during the hot summer often the only article of women's clothing except for their narrow aprons - and cut winter jackets from sheep
[53] skins. They embroider lovely bright-colored patterns in endless variety on the shirts and the smooth skins of the furs, on tablecloths and towels, for the artistic talents of the Ukrainian people are incomparable. They carve in wood, Model in clay and paint it, and weave carpets.

model in clay and paint it, and weave carpets.

574 The long winter days pass pleasantly when people visit each other and work in a neighbor's house for a change. They tell each other legends of epic proportions from the nation's past, ghost stories and village gossip.

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776 The life of the Ukrainian people is full of profound symbolism. As is the case with many other things in this country, religion still has many primitive elements. There is no other Christian people that has preserved as much pre-Christian, heathen ideology down to our own day as the Ukrainians have. /136/ For, besides God and the devil, the world beyond is inhabited by many good and evil spirits that also move about in our world, crossing the path of man in hundreds of ways, and bringing him good things or bad. One must be on one's guard against these mighty foes; one must keep away from them and not anger them. The good spirits should be offered thanks and sacrifices. Primitive magic! For the spirit of the field which can be a bird or some other animal, a swath of ripe grain must be left untouched, otherwise it might take its departure. The spirit of the field can also be a female creature, a rusalka or nymph. In spring, when the rusalki dance in the grain field, one may not cross the fields.

The domestic spirit is a faithful friend of the house who has picked out a place for himself beside the warm stove. He protects the house; danger is near when he whimpers or groans. If people move they manifestly invite him to go along by offering him bread and salt.

You protect yourself from the forest spirit who rules over the beasts of the forest and can turn into a fox or wolf by swearing loudly. You protect yourself from the whirlwind by exorcism

or by making signs with your fingers. This giant with the full lips can be seen in the bridal procession of the "impure forces". Impure forces are the suicides, the condemned, dead witches and magicians, dogs, cats, mice and human beings who have died unbaptized. It is dangerous to offend the whirlwind. He is a violent spirit, he pulls apart haystacks and stacks of grain, destroys roofs and uproots trees. On St. John's Night the witches ride toward the bare mountain near Kiyev. They are the ones who are responsible for droughts, they disperse clouds and steal stars.

If children are malicious the devil has surely exchanged their souls for an evil spirit; he has exchanged their skin and they become changelings /young imps/.

Female forest spirits, mauka, entice the lonely wanderer to dance and then tickle him to death. No less /137/ dangerous are the vampires who suck a sleeper's blood from his veins. In the case of people who are suspected of being witches, sorcerers or vampires, one cuts their tendons after death, puts a padlock through their lips and binds their hands and feet, in order to prevent them from returning. A custom which probably goes back to the time when the Greeks founded cities and carried on trade along the north coast of the Black Sea, is that of giving passage money to the dead. To this day in the Ukraine, coins are placed on the eyes of the deceased for his journey into the other world.

A spirit is always held responsible for every pain, whether it be in the infected root of a tooth or in the small of the back. Wormwood is the best protection against evil spirits.

The litany of these popular beliefs, which are not merely memories of times long past, but were in daily use in pre-war Ukraine, could be carried on for a long time.

000 The living faith of pagan times occupies

The Living faith of pagan times occupies among the people, a position which is equal with the Christian belief. The Orthodox Church, doubtless recognizing how deeply rooted the popular customs are, has tried to reconcile the two.

789 The ancestor cult is particularly important. The Ukrainian people entertain their ancestors on Christmas Eve. The table is set and the whole family are seated at it. Only a few seats are unoccupied - for the ancestors. Their bowls are filled with the traditional Christmas food: cooked wheat with honey and poppy, cooked fish and a cooked fruit mixture. "Little Father Frost" is also invited on Christmas Eve by the master of the house. The peasant steps in front of his house and calls: "Frost, frost, come and have supper with us!" Every guest, even the beggar, is welcome on Christmas Eve, for he might be an ancestor or Father Frost whom even the priest [789] does not forget specially to invite. Hay is laid under the tablecloth on the nights around the winter solstice, for all green things /138/ drive away the evil spirits. The place of honor in the house belongs to the "grandfather", a 533 sheaf of grain, symbolizing the ancestor. In the twelve magical nights between Christmas Eve and the Three Kings the famous koliad, pagan songs about the solstice, with a Christian flavor, exorcise all evil. Jesus Christ, Dazhdboh the sun god, and the Virgin Mary, all three are conjured up in one and the same song, in order to protect these worthy Christians.

527 The carnival belongs to the women; the men 789 have nothing to do with it, although on other occasions they do not scorn merry revels. On a Monday morning the married women of the village gather in the pub in order to begin a week of jolly drinking. This, too, of course, cannot pass without magic. The sorcery revolves about the "koloda", a stick which symbolizes a child. It is wound with tow and is now "born". The women congratulate each other on the "birth" with horilka,

527 789 grain whiskey. The revelry lasts all week just as in the case of a real birth.

527 771 789 The spring festival, the resurrection of nature, has for a long time coincided with the Christian Easter, the resurrection of the Lord, and the burial of Christ with the burial of winter. On Easter Sunday the Christian service and the pagan cult complement each other in a strange way. Scarcely has the priest prayed for the blessing of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost to descend upon his congregation, when the women join hands and dance around the church. It is a custom dating from ancient times to announce to the ancestor the beginning of field work at the spring festival, so that he can give them help and support. "Oh, ancestor!" the women sing on this occasion, "we plow the field, oh ancestor, we announce to you that we plow, that we sow, that we reap!" (82)

82. According to a verbal communication of the Ukrainian ethnographer and archaeologist V. Shcherbakivskyj, Prague.

789 527 The custom of "plowing-under", observed even before the First World War in East Ukraine when the field work begins, is probably unique. Again it is the women who, stark naked, exorcise the magic forces /139/ by drawing a plow over the nocturnal fields, and furrowing the earth amid a great deal of noise. Woe to the man who might eavesdrop on this grandiose fertility rite! The mischief-maker would have to pay dearly for it. (83) The drinking bout which the naked peasant

83. Zelenin: Russian (East Slavic) Folk Studies.

women celebrate near the church after they have finished their magic rite is called "lightning".

533 These are the same women who sing the lovely Ukrainian songs while they are working in the fields in spring and summer; for the Ukrainian be-

533 lieves that song is a part of work, and he has special symbolic songs for every type of work.

527 769 The Monday a week after Easter is dedicated to the ancestors. Well supplied with food and drink, the whole families set out for the cemeteries, just as in the days of Vladimir, in order to observe the death cult. They sit down on the graves of their ancestors, eat the food they have brought, share it with the dead by placing the latters' portion beside the Christian cross made of wood, and they do not forget to empty a small glass of horilka over it. The dead are honored if the visitors leave their graves in an elevated mood.

776 Summer passes by with the customary field work. It is a glorious time, the pumpkins and the melons ripen, the hollyhocks bloom again and people sleep out in the open. The harvest begins not without symbolic rituals; for the spirits must be thanked and one must pray for good weather. When the grain has been stored in the barns, the priest consecrates the harvest wreath, the grains of which are mixed among the seed the following year.

793 In the midst of this strange pagan-Christian world, the priest lives and works as the representative of Christ on earth. He knows the customs of the people from the time he is a child, and he joins in on many occasions. It is not sacrilegious when during a difficult birth he places the church key on the belly of the woman in labor, when he administers the Holy Sacrament to sick cattle or seals graves so that the dead may not /140/ return. Both shepherd and flock most earnestly believe that such deeds are efficacious and pleasing in the sight of God.

771 178 The First World War, the civil wars and finally the Bolshevist cudgel have destroyed this world; faith and superstition, holy mass and the spirit cult were no longer tolerated.

/141/ Hunger Overcomes Resistance

178 Bolshevism tore the Ukrainians away from their past and hurled them, as it were, into a dark, unknown future. They were thrown from one extreme into the other, not only with regard to religion, but also in a social, economic and political respect. They were thrown from unlimited individualism into a society where all are supposed to be equal.

When Bolshevik slogans spread through the Ukrainian villages there was a great deal that was
423 ripe for oblivion. Czarist Moscow, the great princes of the Church and the wealthy gentry had exerted themselves precisely to keep the populace in a state of ignorance and to prevent any kind of enlightenment. The masses were thus more tractable and the existing order was not endangered. Nevertheless, with thrift and industry the peasants had succeeded in considerably enlarging their land after serfdom was abolished in 1861, to the detriment of the landed proprietors. In 1861 the
[162] peasants owned 45.7% of 48.1 million hectares, in 1916 they owned 65%. (84) The rest was the property of the lords of the manor, the church and the state.

84. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 360.

423 With the rapid increase in population there
241 was a great land shortage, especially in North Ukraine, even after the distribution of land in 1861. Conditions had not improved much since 1830, when the representative of the nobility of the Poltava district reported in the Senate that in his district "there was a perceptible shortage of land and dire poverty". (85) In Podolia,

85. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of South Ukraine, page 32.

423 Volhynia, and in the northern guberniyas more than
241 half the land belonged to large estates before the First World War, and the rest was divided among the small /142/ farmers with many children, who barely earned a laborer's living. Since the small farmers could not live from the yield of their one- to four-hectare fields, they tried to supplement their income by doing other work. They hired themselves out as day laborers to the estates and rented land from the lords of the manor - in the part of the Ukraine on the right bank of the river especially from Jews who, for their part, were tenants on a large scale - for a wickedly high rent.

In the South Ukrainian steppe, which was not settled until late, conditions were different. This steppe occupies about three-sevenths of the surface of present-day Soviet Ukraine. When Catherine II had cleared the steppe of Crimean Tatars and the Caucasian peoples, she sent for foreign colonists, especially Germans to settle the land. The influx of settlers from all sides was so great that in some parts there was a shortage of land even at the beginning of the 19th century, and the descendants of the first settlers were in turn, obliged to emigrate in the middle
241 of the century. But in general there was enough land. Steppe farming which was once pasture farming, underwent a basic transformation. Since grain was well paid, the farmers and estate owners turned the scar of the steppes into arable land; thus what was once rich pastureland became in the end, poor pastureland. In terms of territory, no less than 75 to 90% of the entire soil was arable, so that there was a shortage of feed for the draft animals. People were forced to limit the number of oxen and horses they kept and return to extensive farming, plowing the soil with four light horses and a light plow, rather than with eight heavy oxen and a heavy plow.

241 In the Kuban region the farmers made things particularly easy for themselves. There, around the turn of the century you could see the Cossack riding over the stubble field, not for pleasure, but with a bag of wheat slung around his shoulders, from which he scattered seed between sheer stubbles or even on fallow ground.

A wild grazing culture, the most primitive form of agriculture, in which a field is sown with the same type of seed /143/ until it is exhausted and then is left fallow, was still customary around 1850 in South Ukraine. The next higher stage of agriculture, the three-fallow system, where the soil is alternately cultivated with winter grain followed by summer grain and a year's fallow, has been preserved to this day in Podolia, Polesia and parts of Central Ukraine, in spite of the agrarian revolution. The modern crop rotation system which has long since been introduced in the western and central European countries was not adopted until before the war when it came from Galicia to Volhynia and into Central Ukraine.

The steppe demands its own method of cultivation. Where soil moisture is so slight that clover and potato cultures do not thrive, our crop rotation system is from the start impossible to carry out. Experiments in growing a drought-resistant steppe clover have not yet brought the desired results. Thus for the time being the old method of agriculture is retained in the steppes: winter grain, summer grain (wheat or barley), fallow. Experience has shown that the fallow could be successfully replaced by corn, but the farmers did not want to take up the new culture even at the time of the New Economic Policy, "because of indifference". (86)

86. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of South Ukraine, p. 93.

241 It is almost unbelievable that in many regions of the steppe the planted surface is not ploughed up, or in any case only superficially with a land-parer. The purpose is to conserve soil moisture. Often the entire sowing, the entire spring work of the farmer consists of a single process. A light land-parer scratches the surface; it has a box attached to it containing the seed, and the harrow is attached to this "ploughing and sowing machine". With this type of sowing one necessarily reaps a lot of weeds.

243 438 Nevertheless, before the war the Ukraine enjoyed the reputation of being a granary. During the years 1909 to 1913 the country produced on an average of 8.6 million more tons of grain annually than it consumed. The annual export amounted to /144/ an average of 4.3 million tons of wheat alone and 2.7 million tons of barley. (87) Surplus and export dropped considerably

87. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 390.

under Bolshevik rule. In 1934 only one million tons of grain were exported.

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425 669 In 1917, when the Bolsheviks became active, the general feeling in North and Central Ukraine was extremely favorable to an agrarian revolution. The land-hungry peasants were deeply convinced of the fact that the "right of the landowner was an injustice". Whoever promised the peasants that they were to receive all the land they could themselves cultivate, had won them over to his cause. As a matter of fact, in 1917, at the beginning of the revolution, the lands of the estate owners and the large farmers were immediately divided up, in the process of which the estates often went up in flames and

425 669 the cattle were burned. However, the glorious state did not last long. The farmers lacked seed, machines and draft animals in order to cultivate the land they so easily obtained. Besides, the men who came back from the war and the landless village farmers wanted to have a share in the booty. In the guberniyas of Kiyev and Khar'kov the government claimed the forests and the extensive beet fields. Civil wars, drought and epidemics carried off hundreds of thousands of peasant families during the years of the Bolshevist war. Thus ended the first chapter of the agrarian revolution, so eagerly awaited.

423 241 The New Economic Policy with its tolerance of a "bludgeoned private economy" constituted the second chapter. The peasants obtained their land and their farms on long leases; they could cultivate their land as they pleased, except that the farm could not be carelessly run, otherwise the management of the establishment could pass over into other hands. Nothing was gained by the fact that all the land belonged to the community. The "communal fields" were a Russian form of possession which had found favor at the time of Catherine II in the steppes and in the part of the Ukraine on the left bank of the river. Even though the farmer could not dispose of his land 497 at any time like a free /Facing page 144/ /Map IX: Railroad Communications. The main lines of communication run in a north-south direction, whereas the east-west lines have always been neglected./ /Key: Number of daily passenger trains 423 in 1935./ /145/ estate owner, even though he was 241 obliged to acquiesce to the fact that the entire community property was redistributed every 10 to 20 years, nevertheless, he could do as he pleased on his section of land. No less than 88.9% of peasant land in the Ukrainian steppes belonged to the communities, and in North Ukraine, 80.4%. The czars had condoned this form of ownership, because it simplified administration, facilitated

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

[Map IX: Railroad communications, cf. complete legend, p. 152]

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

[Map IX: Railroad communications]

423 tax collection and, finally, also corresponded
241 to the patriarchal order. It was only in the former Polish Ukraine on the right side of the river that purely private ownership was retained. The Bolshevik NEP now very cleverly fastened on to the community field system.

241 With the restoration of peace and order during the NEP years the social life of the peasant country again attained its equilibrium. The families which before that were broken up or dismembered now came together again. At the same time, great efforts were made to raise the productive capacity of the new family farms by means of technical education, and in this the young farmers were particularly eager to join. At that time, a German observer wrote: "In the activity of the youth organizations in the villages we see an expression of the deep longing to be freed at last from 'the power of darkness' and not always to stand apart while the civilized races divide up the treasures of the earth among themselves." (88)

88. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of the South Ukraine, page 69.

423 This hopeful development was abruptly inter-
241 rupted by the subsequent third phase of the agra-
474 rian revolution, the transfer of the individual
185 peasant farm to communal ownership of all village inhabitants. It was only by means of collectivism, the coordination of the farms with the communes in the other economic fields, that the Bolshevik regime could last; it was only in this way that one could strike at the root of Ukrainian nationalism, and only thus carry out the Five Year Plan. For industrial development with the purchase of foreign /146/ machines had to be paid for by exporting agricultural products. All that was needed now was a command, in order to maintain the export of the necessary amounts of grain at the prescribed price.

the prescribed price.

According to ideas in Moscow, the score had to come out even. It could not be difficult at last to introduce more modern agricultural methods along with the collective farms. The tractors, it was believed, would surely bring it about. However, Moscow made its figures without consulting the Ukrainian farmer whose individualistic bent and stubborn adherence to private property were to cause the equalizers the worst difficulties imaginable.

Collectivism began in the year 1928 with wonderful promises. In 1929 only 2% of the planted surface of the Ukraine was communal and cultivated according to a plan. In other words, there was resistance along the whole front! Now extortionate taxation was applied. Unlimited taxation in money and grain made the peasants ripe for the "voluntary" adoption of the collective. Hotbeds of resistance were exterminated. There was now no turning back in this agrarian revolution from above, for the Five Year Plan was at stake. A Ukrainian victory would have had incalculable consequences for Moscow. Not in vain had the Muscovites been trained from the time of Ivan the Terrible and particularly by Peter the Great and Catherine to break down stubborness. The methods which the Bolsheviks now used to assert their will were old; it was only the technique that was new.

Compulsory collectivism on a large scale began in 1929 with the suppression of free sales of products from the individual farms with the removal of surplus and with political persecution. There was almost nothing left over from the 1929 harvest. Planting in 1930 was inadequate, for the work of those who were exiled had to be added to the regular work. In 1931 conditions worsened. The lack of draft animals was simply catastrophic, for the farmers had /147/ slaughtered all the cattle that should have been

474 given to the collective without compensation. The
475 country people carried on sabotage wherever possible. The Bolsheviks retaliated with relentless and merciless war. The Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Skrypnyk complained in July 1932 at the Party Conference in the presence of Molotov and Kaganovich: "Absolutely everything has been taken away from us. That is why we are without bread, that is why we are suffering from hunger." (89) There was not enough manpower to bring in

89. Visti for July 11, 1932.

the harvest, so the authorities combed the streets of the cities and forthwith transported in trucks to the villages everyone who could not give a satisfactory account of himself. The gipsy bands - some of them had German passports - escaped toward the west. In the spring of 1933 famine took its toll of countless peasant families in one of the most fertile regions of the earth, and those that remained alive nourished themselves on roots and grass or fled into the cities of stone and wood in order to find bread there. According to accounts of the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, Kosior, at the Party Conference in Kiyev, about 300 million pood of grain was lost in the 1932 harvest, because it was not harvested but it rotted in the fields or at the collection centers. (90) For a long time now it

90. Kovalevskyj: Chervony Terror na Ukraini, p. 123 ff./Red Terror in the Ukraine/

was not the individual farmers who practiced sabotage in order to escape the collective, it was the Kolkhoz (collective farms) themselves that bitterly resisted Moscow's demands. The Ukrainian communists and Soviet officials were

474 accused of collaboration in preventing the ware-
425 housing of grain. As early as December 6, 1932 the Council of the People's Commissars came to the following decision: "The resistance of those communists who in reality have become leaders of the sabotage, as well as the passive and favorably disposed attitude of various Party organizations toward this sabotage shall be liquidated." (91)

91. Salisnyak: "The Struggle Between the Ukraine and Moscow in the Soviet Union" Nation und Staat, July-November, 1937.

In 1933, after a four-year struggle, the resistance of the Ukrainian people against that new order which seemed to the Muscovites to be the purpose of the state, was broken. Moscow, /148/ without any regard for the victims among its opponent, had fought a hard battle of nationalities and won. The Communist of December 11, 1934 gives a faint picture of the extent of this catastrophe when it reports that during the period of collectivization 200,000 Ukrainian farms were destroyed and their owners along with their families were exiled to North Russia.

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563 The Bolshevik agrarian revolution with all its consequences also did not spare the descendants of those German emigrants who had moved to the Ukraine between 1789 and 1842. The promise of abundant arable land and freedom of religious worship had at one time attracted these sectarians to this country. They were industrious, capable people who rapidly increased their possessions and multiplied. In 1914 there were 600,000 of them in the region of the Black Sea, 100,000 in the North Caucasus and 200,000 in Volhynia,

563 which at that time belonged entirely to Russia. (92) These 900,000 German colonists cultivated

92. Stumpp: Achievements and Importance of the German Colonists in Russia, in Deutschtum im Ausland, Number 5, 1939, page 251.

4.9 million desiatiny*/desiatina, pl. desiatiny: Russian measure of land = 2.70 acres. Editor/ of land or an area as large as Alsace Lorraine, Baden and Württemberg combined. They had been given 700,000 desiatiny as colonization land, and bought an additional 4.2 million desiatiny since then.

These Germans achieved important things in agriculture. They introduced the iron plough and agricultural machinery into the Ukraine. Their attempt to plant forests in the steppes in order to check the eternal wind of the steppes and the severe dust storms did not bring the success desired. But they magically produced vineyards and orchards on soil that no one cared to cultivate. In the North Caucasus, on the other hand, they tried in vain to cultivate grapes and silkworms, before establishing tree nurseries which were to become famous throughout the realm of the czars. In 20 years they sold 20 million of the finer sorts of fruit trees from these nurseries and an equal number of berry bushes and /149/ ornamental trees. Besides that they developed the breeding of Ardennes horses and valuable beef cattle. (93) But this does not exhaust

93. Strumpp: Achievements and Importance of the German Colonists in Russia, page 256.

the achievements of the German colonists. They invented a special way of weaving light cotton fabrics which are very well adapted to the climate.

563 German wheelwrights (Ukrainian: "stelmakh"), carpenters, smiths and locksmiths (Ukrainian:"sl'usa[illegible]) were very much in demand. Before the First World War there were 100 German shops in Odessa, among them two bookstores. Factories for agricultural machines arose from small beginnings, and they sent their products as far as Siberia. From 80 to 90% of all Bolshevik factories for agricultural machinery were founded by Germans.

The Germans were not spared their toll of blood in the Ukraine. At the beginning of the First World War they had to suffer in the persecutions of the Czarist regime. Then they fought with Denikin and Wrangel against the Bolsheviks and were defeated. Finally the "death taxes" began, which were followed by a new civil war and the famine. No one knows how many of our compatriots lost their lives in these catastrophes. Many emigrated to Canada and the United States as long as they were still able to do so.

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474 Thus after the Ukraine was prostrate, Moscow could without danger loosen the noose. This was also dictated by the instinct for self-preservation, for bread and meat were urgently needed for the growing industrial areas. The process of making collectives out of small private properties was abandoned. When at the Seventeenth Party Congress in January and February 1934 an urgent recommendation was issued for people to lead a "joyous and happy life", those who had been murdered or who had died of hunger no longer heard it, and for the ones who were exiled it sounded like bitter sarcasm. At the same time concessions were granted in the household and horticultural economy of the members of the collectives. The new collective economy statute of 1935 permits the individual farmer to own /150/ 1 hectare of land, 1 cow and 2 heifers, 5 pigs, 10 sheep or

474 goats and poultry, whereby allowance was made for regional variations. Thus Kuban Cossacks may also keep a horse, and their individual property around the farm can be two hectares in size.

474 233 The census of cattle in 1935 showed that these concessions were necessary. This census showed that livestock in the Soviet Union had been reduced to about one-half from 1928 to 1935. At the same time the minimum during the summer of 1933 had already been overcome, and there was a gradual increase in cattle-raising noticeable. From 1928 to 1935 the number of horses had decreased from 5.5 million to 2.5 million, that of horned cattle from 8.5 to 4.9 million, the number of pigs from 6.9 to 4.8 million, and that of goats and sheep from 9.8 to 1.8 million. Conditions were similar in the Kuban region. (94) The Kolhosp /abbrev. for 'collective farm' in Ukrainian; Kolkhoz in Russian. Editor/ had completely failed

94. Kubiyovich: Atlas of the Ukraine and the Bordering Areas, page 38.

in cattle-raising.

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241 What is it that grows in the region of the Soviet Union settled by Ukrainians? Individual cultures have always been subject to considerable fluctuation. During the NEP period the cultivation of wheat receded and rye cultivation increased. The land was extensively farmed, few horses were kept and more sheep. Then came the Bolsheviks and introduced their "rational method of cultivation". That the result of it is not satisfactory was admitted by Stalin at the Eighteenth Congress in March 1939, when he stated that collectivism in the Soviet Union had, it is true, embraced 93.5% of the entire peasantry, but that he could not

241 conceal the fact that the grain harvest of 1938 was only one-sixth larger than that of 1913, whereas the population had increased by nearly 30%.

According to the latest statistics, 80% of the entire arable soil is cultivated, while 20% of it is left fallow. Of the total cultivated surface of all Ukrainian provinces, 76% is planted to grain, 57% of which consists of wheat /151/ and rye, 33% of barley, oats and corn, 10% of millet and buckwheat. Of the entire cultivated area 9% is occupied by industrial plants, chiefly sugar beets and sunflowers, 8% by potatoes, vegetables and legumes, and 7% by fodder. Of the 160 million hectares of land planted to wheat throughout the world in 1933, 12 million hectares fell to the Ukrainian provinces. This gave them third place after the USA with its 17 million hectares and British India with 14.6 million hectares. (95) But the hectare yields in the

95. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas.

Ukrainian provinces are uncommonly low according to German ideas and in view of the excellent soil. They amount to 9.2 doppelzentner /two hundred weights = 100 kilograms = 220.50 lbs./of wheat (Germany: 22 doppelzentner) and 9.2 doppelzentner of rye (Germany: 17.5 doppelzentner). (96) The

96. Deminskij: "The Economy of the Ukraine" in Deutsche Berufserziehung, Number 15 and 16, page 135.

careless method of cultivating the soil, on the one hand, and the insufficient amount of precipitation on the other, are to blame for these low yields.

249 The sunflower is a cultivated plant that is little known in our country. Its region of cultivation begins in eastern Podolia, runs along

249 the coast of the Black Sea, divides into two wide branches at the Sea of Azov, one of which extends up to the Volga and the other down to Ciscaucasia. In the Kuban region the sunflower occupies up to 30% of the entire cultivated land. The lovely blossoms with their coffee-brown centers and their wreath of yellow rays are improbably large in the Kuban country. Oil mills press out the seeds and manufacture table oil from them. The Kuban "dessert varieties" are valued as a delicacy, the seeds of which are eaten like nuts and are as large as dates. In the last few years the cultivation of cotton has been newly introduced all around the Sea of Azov. But its yield is very small, and the surface cultivated fluctuates from year to year. Between 1931 and 1935 an average of about 300,000 hectares was planted. The attempts to grow rice in the Dnepr plains are also new.

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474 /152/ What is a collective farm? The Bolsheviks distinguish between the so-called Soviet farms, the communes and the artels, both also called kolhosp. The Soviet farm is a government estate in which land, buildings, livestock and goods belong to the state. The Soviet farms are supposed to be model farms for agricultural research; their average size is 1000 to 1200 hectares. They are run by "government officials".

The commune is a composite of peasant farms; the individual farms do not have a particular share of land, and it is cultivated according to a general agricultural plan. Its inventory, buildings and products are the property of the community. The members of the commune receive only a share of the yield which they need to cover their living requirements. The commune did not survive as an organizational form of Bolshevik agriculture, but the artel did. In the latter,

474 the inventory of goods, buildings and land are likewise property of the community, but the agricultural products are distributed on a share basis according to work performed, after expenses and reserves have been deducted. In contrast to the commune, the farm produce consumed by the family and the family's household economy are private. Nominally the farmer is co-owner of the kolhosp which the law describes as "agricultural common property on a cooperative basis". The rights and privileges of the farmer who has "voluntarily" joined are set forth in the statute. No compensation is paid for agricultural property brought in by the individual farm. If a farmer withdraws from the kolhosp, what he has brought in is not returned to him, but he can demand an allowance which, however, is very small and in no wise corresponds to the actual value.

162 Of the total of 44.5 million hectares of land in the Soviet Republic in 1938, 29.7 million hectares fell to the kolhosp, 1.8 million to the separate property of the kolhosp farmers, /Facing
439 page 152/ /Map X: Export of Coal and Sugar from Soviet Ukraine. (Average 1927/1928). The Ukrainian supply to the Great Russian areas of coal and sugar shows a similar development as the distribution of grain. In these products, too, export to foreign countries was small./ /153/ 1.5 million hectares to individual non-collective farmers, 4.2 million hectares to Soviet farms and 7.3 million hectares to other properties. (97)

97. Deminsky: "The Economy of the Ukraine" in Deutsche Berufserziehung, No. 15 and 16, p. 135.

474 From a practical point of view the kolhosp represents a large estate whose land lies round about the estate. All the members of the commune are the estate owners. Since the kolhosps are forbidden to employ outside manpower, a stranger cannot

11: Obermaier--162A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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Map X: Export of coal and sugar from Soviet Ukraine. (Average 1927/1928, cf. complete legend, A 1Cd]

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

[Map X: Export of coal and Export from Soviet Ukraine (Average 1927/28)]

474 find work in the villages. All able-bodied men and women and also young people are required to cooperate in the kolhosp. These forces are divided into so-called work brigades. Thus there is a brigade for field work, another for the grooming of horses, a third for cattle-raising and dairy farming. The farmer has turned into "comrade fieldworker", the hired man into "comrade groom", and the servant girl into "comrade milkmaid". The brigades are divided up into "lanky" (links of a chain). Since the entire system of co-owners gives ample opportunity to shirk and to blame others for one's negligence, individual "links" are now given the entire cultivation of one section of a field, from ploughing to harvesting. In this way one has, quite unintentionally, gone back more or less to the old order in which the individual farm cultivated its land in a similar manner.

The Bolshevik village community has many shortcomings. Love of work and productivity are negligible, for individual industry scarcely effects the amount of wages. But peasant industriousness cannot be dissociated from a good harvest. Therefore, efforts have been made in recent times to spur on Comrade "farm worker" by means of prizes. Distant Moscow determines the plan for sowing; the political board appoints the supervisor of the farm, although according to the statute he should be elected by the members of the kolhosp. A
475 further source of constant trouble, constant bungl-
474 ing and therefore irrevocable losses are the "machine-tractor stations" (MTS). It was precisely with these state organizations for /154/ agricultural machines that Moscow intended to remove all difficulties in the process of modernizing agriculture. Thus the kolhosp were ordered to deliver all their agricultural machinery there. The MTS were to keep it in order and at the same time constantly enlarge their stock of machines by the purchase of new tractors, ploughs, harrows, mowing

475 machines and threshing machines. At the time of
474 sowing and reaping the MTS with all their machines were to be at the disposal of the kolhosp.

474 Let us now imagine a large estate without draft animals and without machines. Before planting time messengers must be sent to a station that is perhaps 40 to 50 kilometers distant, with the request that machines be sent on a certain day for plowing and sowing and in fall for mowing and threshing. After long months of rest the machines of the central station were suddenly supposed to be in all villages at once. The unreliability of this arrangement is even more evident when climatic conditions demand the quickest possible execution of sowing and reaping. Within a few days the sprouting of the new seed can become decisive. The kernel can be laid into the black earth only when the rich humus is dry enough so that wagons and horses can drive over the field roads without getting stuck. But sowing must take place before the warm wind has dried out the ground. Again, at harvest time, one must take advantage of the proper moment. The grain must be sufficiently ripe but not over-ripe, otherwise it will drop out of the ears. This is the time when the German farmer goes to the field every day in order to test the ripeness of his grain. In the collective farm the idea is to be more progressive. There the agronomic supervisor of the distant MTS knows exactly when the grain at kolhosp XY has reached the proper firmness and when he can send forth his tractors and harvesters.

475 In 1935 there were 873 machine-tractor-stations in the entire Soviet Ukraine. In 1936 it was estimated that each /155/ MTS had 70 tractors, 16 mowing-threshing machines, 50 threshing machines, 15 traction engines, 15 motors and a crew of 400 men. The supervision of an MTS consists of a technical director, his political representative, a supervising agronomist - there

475 are eight agronomists all together working at an MTS - , the chief bookkeeper and the leading mechanic. These five comrades are the actual lords of the kolhosp of their district. The local leader of a kolhosp is merely the inspector who must follow the directions of the MTS and who all too often has no idea of how to run a farm.

474 As to what these large agricultural projects
475 are like in practice, we have the following reports in the Soviet newspapers: The Communist Khar'kov) of January 8, 1939 announces that in the region of Dniepropetrovsk 82,211 doppelzentner of seed grain are lacking and that in the Khar'kov region 38.5% of the necessary seed is lacking. Visti (kiyev) of March 28, 1939, under the title of: "Sowing and not waiting for the ground to dry out", published the following report by its regional correspondent in Odessa: "After the bad weather field work has begun in the Odessa region. The sun and wind dry out the soil quickly, and the kolhosp of the southern districts of the region have begun sowing individual crops... The kolhosp of 'Spartakus' district have entered the contest in honor of the Eighteenth Plenary Assembly of the Communist Party, and are carrying on their spring sowing on a large scale. More than 1000 hectares of spring crops have already been sown in the district. Comrade Shlef and Comrade Wakker who run the tractors are performing 150% of the average of work per day. During the noon recess the kolhosp agitators help the members of the kolhosp study and memorize the speech of the leader of peoples, Stalin, delivered at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party....But in spite of the present very favorable weather at present, not all the MTS of the Odessa region are ready to plant. In this region /156/ 112 tractors have not been repaired, 69 of which are caterpillar tractors. At the MTS of Andrei-Ivanov, for example, only one out of six caterpillar tractors is repaired; in the Ianiv MTS only one out of four;

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in the Vradiyiv MTS not one of three. As far as the supply of seed grain is concerned, all is not well. As a result of the inactivity and lack of management of the regional office for grain supplies, only 85% of the kolhosp are supplied with select grain. It is incomprehensible why there is a lack of seed grain precisely in those kolhosp that so industriously set about planting. Every day several dozen vehicles drive up to the grain provisioning center of Golovanevsk in order to exchange grain that is unsuitable for planting, and are forced to return without seed grain. In the granary at Golovanevsk there are 2000 doppelzentner of barley which for some reason is not cleaned. The precious spring days are wasted on trips to the elevator...The leaders of those rayons which have in part begun sowing fail to readjust the kolhosp immediately to field work... The MTS are not supplied with fuel quickly enough. As a result of an insufficient supply of fuel field work can come to a standstill even during the first few days of mass sowing. The leaders of the districts and rayons ought to head the contest for a superior Stalin-harvest in honor of the Eighteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party, in which the great masses of kolhosp have determined to take part."

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On June 7 and 8, 1939 a meeting of the active committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine was held in Kiyev. Khrushchov, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the KPU stated that the harvest for this year promised to be a very good one, "but in the Bile Pole district only 18 out of 39 mowing-threshing machines were repaired, and the same was true of 19 out of 64 threshing machines and 2 out of 16 hauling machines. The situation in the /157/manufacture of sugar beets is alarming. The Odessa factory 'The Red

474 Signal' did not...deliver 100 threshing machines.
475 In the Chernigov region 70% of the necessary machine rakes are lacking; there is also a great lack of scythes... It is necessary to train 4000 persons in the handling of mowing-threshing machines, but the proper courses have not yet been organized..."

The "Sotsialistychna Zemlia" Number 114, 1939 complains: "Many kolhosp have no bags. The Storehouses in which the grain is to be kept are not rain-proof. In many kolhosp the repair of agricultural implements had to be suspended and in many others it could not even be begun because of the lack of forge coal. The shops have neither harnesses nor tar nor wagon-grease. In the region of Zhitomir only 160 out of 544 threshing machines were put into working order, and the same was true of only 143 out of 1475 motors." From the report of the representative of the Dnepropetrovsk region, Zadyonchenko, at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, "Izvestiia" of April 6, 1939 says that in 3000 kolhosp there are only 195 Communist organizations; that there were 8 repair shops for 66 MTS, which did not suffice to repair all broken-down tractors. We could fill a book with similar complaints taken from the Soviet press.

The beneficiary of the kolhosp is first of all the Muscovite state that takes as its share up to 25% of the estimated yield at a ridiculously low price. The MTS are paid in kind for their services. Of the rest of the harvest yield the seed grain and animal fodder are segregated and about 10 to 15% of the harvest is set aside as iron reserves, - before the First World War the cautious farmer always stored up the yield of an
474 entire harvest. Finally, the members of the kolhosp receive a certain annual share of provisions, aside from current provisions; what is left over is divided up in proportion to the number of days that have been worked. For some time now an

474 attempt has been made to increase the /158/comrades' interest in the kolhosp by means of prizes.

The most recent development of the Communist village group is characterized by the fact that the farmers tacitly divide up the collective land among themselves. Such a thing is possible only if the kolhosp officials and the village Soviets are in collusion, and if there are free acres besides the lands that are cultivated by the MTS. The Communist is January 29, 1939 confirms this development when it says that in the district of Shmerynka 145 farmers owned more animals than are permissible according to law, and 135 farmers more land than is allowed. The farmers work very industriously on their own land, whereas they neglect the collective farms. At the conference of the Central Committee of the KPU the law passed in April 1939, limiting the ownership of property of the collective farmers - "law against the waste of land" - was discussed, and it was noted that in many districts collective land was divided up. It was said that in this way private ownership of land had reappeared in hidden form. Finally the Visti of June 22, 1939 announced that the "regulation of peasant property" was to take place by November 15, 1939; "regulation", however, means a recent curtailment of peasant private ownership which had been permitted since 1934. This curtailment was also in the interests of the industrial section of Soviet economy, after many workers, mostly peasant sons, went back to their native villages from the industrial areas, because they found better living conditions there.

/159/ Coal, Ore, Petroleum, Workers

42 All the conditions which, according to the teachings of Karl Marx, ought to contribute to the happiness of the workers are fulfilled in the Soviet Union and therefore also in Soviet Ukraine.

642 On one-sixth of the world all the treasures within the earth and all that grows on top of it belong to the workers, as well as all mines, factories, and means of communication. The workers distribute the goods, they make the laws, determine the working hours, wages and prices; they also establish the deductions from wages and salaries and make out the taxes. Everyone must work, there are no persons of independent means and no capitalistic employers who can fatten on profits. The workers are the sovereign lords in the Soviet Union, and nothing prevents them from enjoying the enormous wealth of their country. Stalin had this theory in mind when he stated in his introduction to the new constitution in November 1936: "... in the field of political economy of the Soviet Union we now have a new socialistic economy which knows no depressions and no unemployment, no misery and no profit, and which grants its citizens every possibility for a life of comfort and civilization."

According to this definition, life in the Ukraine should be the most attractive; here is the country richest in natural resources in eastern Europe, with a pleasant, sunny climate. The raw
B5 materials are happily balanced and are found within favorable distances between each other. There is coal, iron ore, manganese ore, water power, oil, turf, salt, potassium salts, phosphate and kaolin. There is lacking, with the exception of a certain amount of mercury and nickle, only colored metals.

361 /160/ The exploitation of Ukrainian natural resources is comparatively recent. The Englishman Hughes John established industry in the 1870s in the Donets region, and shortly thereafter Frenchmen and Belgians founded the ore industry near Krivoy Rog. The present-day industrial cities developed from the barracks of the first workers'
000 settlements. The tremendous increase in popula-

11: Obermaier--170 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

464 The tremendous increase in popula-
361 tion which the Ukraine showed after the liberation of peasants in 1861 found employment in the growing industry and in railroad construction, insofar as the surplus population did not prefer emigration to Siberia and eastern Asia. When there was less work on the farms, the farmers and farmers' sons traveled into the industrial regions, only to return to their villages at planting and harvest time. Thus a stock of Ukrainian industrial workers could not be formed; foreign Russian manpower immigrated and remained for good. In 1918 and 1919, when the Muscovite Bolsheviks broke into the Ukraine and the Russian industrial workers reinforce their ranks, the absence of a Ukrainian industrial working class was to make itself disastrously felt.

316 The world thinks of the Ukraine more as a granary than as asource of valuable raw materials. And yet, there are considerable treasures buried in Ukrainian soil. The reserve of iron ore in the Ukraine is the third largest in the world. At Krivoy Rog, 250 kilometers northeast of Odessa, according to the latest calculations there are deposited 1.25 billion tons of high percentage Bessemer ores (60 to 61%, iron content) and also considerable quantities of ferruginous quartz. In Kerch on the easternmost spur of the Crimean Peninsula there are 2.7 billion tons of phosphorous ores with an iron content of 38 to 42%, and in the northern Caucasus there are smaller deposits. The following table shows the importance of Ukrainian ore extraction for the Great
439 Russian realm: /Facing page 160/ /Map XI: Iron Ore and Steel Export from the Soviet Ukraine (Average 1927/1928). The Ukraine was the great source of steel for the industrial works around Moscow and Leningrad./ /161/

316

	Iron Ore Extraction in million tons		
	1913	1932	1935
Krivoy Rog.....	6388	7925	16,594

11: Obermaier--170A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

439

[Map XI: Iron Ore and Steel Export from the Soviet Ukraine (Average 1927/1928), cf. complete Legend, p. 170]

11: Obermaier --170B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

439

[Map II: Iron ore and steel Export from the Soviet Union (Average 1927/28)]

316

Iron Ore Extraction
in million tons(contd)

	1913	1932	1935
Kerch.....	0.480	0.516	0.136
Ural.....	1.778	3.054	7.684(98)

98. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 447.

Well-known are the largest manganese ore deposits of the world between Krivoy Rog and the Dniepr with a reserve of approximately 400 million tons and a net content of mostly 36 to 48%. The amount of copper and mercury mined in the Donets Basin is insignificant, but the nickle deposit newly discovered in 1936 at the mouth of the Dniestr near Akkerman is very promising.

Ukrainian heavy industry is based, furthermore, on important deposits of hard coal and brown coal. There are smaller deposits along the Kuban River, but more extensive coal mines are in the Donets Basin, also called "Donbas". The total reserves of this region are estimated at 70 billion tons. The coal is deposited in three layers, at the bottom anthracite, in the middle stone coal and on top brown coal which in part can be mined in open diggings. About 58% of the Donets coal is anthracite; this is 70% of the European anthracite reserves. Only 25% of the Donets coal is brown coal and suitable for heavy industry. (99) The

99. Deminskiy: The Economy of the Ukraine, page 136.

entire extraction of coal in the Donbas amounted to 25.2 million tons in 1913, 45.1 million tons in 1932 and 61.7 million tons in 1934. The amount mined in the rest of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, was only 32.3 million tons, and in Germany (including the Saar) in the same year, 136

316 million tons. The beds in the Donets Basin have the advantage of being shallow and the disadvantage of being unevenly distributed and not very large. They are only three-quarters of a meter in diameter. Besides, the coal is impure and also has a high ash content. In spite of the fact that more is produced, the method of mining is antiquated.

Besides the incidence of brown coal in the Donets region, there are 120 smaller deposits in the right-bank region of the Ukraine, but they /162/ are scarcely exploited. It is presumed that there are larger deposits in this region also. In 1935 the total reserves of brown coal in the Soviet Ukraine were estimated at 550 million tons. (100) The mining of this coal is very much neg-

100. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 442.

lected and ore-dressing is unknown. In 1935 a total of 300,000 tons of brown coal was extracted in all the Ukrainian provinces, 240,000 tons of which came from eastern Ukraine. (101) The ex-

101. Deminskiy: The Economy of the Ukraine, page 137.

tensive peat bogs are merely of local importance.

315 When it comes to oil, the Ukrainian earth is
135 not niggardly. Well-known as the oil fields of Drogobich and Borislav on the northern slope of the Carpathians, the reserves of which are estimated at 58 to 100 million tons. Extraction reached its height as early as 1902 when it amounted to 2 million tons or 5% of world production. Since then it has constantly decreased, amounting to 1.2 million tons in 1913 and an annual average of 500,000 to 600,000 tons from 1932 to 1936. (102)

102. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 443.

135 The third oil region lies close by the Ukrainian border, many hundreds of kilometers distant from the compact Russian area of settlement, not far from the Caspis on the Terek. These reserves are estimated at 900 million tons. In 1925 2 million tons were extracted, in 1932 over 8 million tons, and in 1933 somewhat more than 5 million tons. (103) From the occurrence of inflammable and

103. Kubiyovich: Atlas...,page 53.

earth gases, oil reserves are suspected to be present on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov and along the Dniestr. The salts in the Donets Basin and along the Carpathians, and the sea salt near Odessa round off the wealth of natural resources. Potassium salts are deposited in Galicia, potassium gluconites in East Podolia, at the Dnepr and near Isyum; phosphates in Podolia along the Dnestr and in northern Ukraine near Chernigov; excellent kaolins are found in the region between Volhynia and the Black Sea, and graphite near
312 Krivoy Rog. The entire water-power reserves of the Ukrainian provinces are estimated at 9 million horse power; of this only one-tenth was utilized in 1932. /163/

329 Two industrial regions are connected with local natural resources. These are, first, the Donets Basin, rich in coal and salt, with coal mines, coke plants, foundaries and steel works. Here ore from Kerch and Krivoy Rog is smelted. Secondly, there is the mining district of Krivoy Rog and Mykopil on the Dnepr with iron and manganese mines, smelting factories, foundaries and metallurgic factories. With the completion of the large Dnepr power plant at Zaporishea - the normal water level was raised 37.5 meters by the construction of a mighty cofferdam and sluice along the entire rapids, which made the river navigable throughout - the industrial region of Krivoy

327 Rog received an important complement. Supplied by the 436,000 kilowatts of the power plant, a new industrial combine was established in this region, with iron and steel works, with factories for aluminum, alloys, for cement, soda, ammonia, sulfurous acid and similar chemical products. In this district agricultural and heavy machinery is also built. The pig iron production of 47 Ukrainian blast furnaces amounted to 3.1 million tons in 1913, 4.3 million tons in 1932, and 6.7 million tons in 1934; steel production during the same years came to 2.7 million tons, 2.2 million tons and 5.4 million tons, and the production of malleable iron in each case came to 2.3 million, 2.2 million and 2.9 million tons. (104)

104. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 455.

402 The manufacture of heavy industrial raw products for machines and implements of all kinds occurs in the scattered industrial cities, especially in the part of the Ukraine on the right bank of the river. Khar'kov, with its construction of heavy machinery, agricultural machines, precision instruments and transport machines such as locomotives, railroad cars and tractors, stands at the head of Ukrainian industrial cities. In Kiyev ships, heavy machinery and chemical and electrotechnical machines are built, and in Odessa agricultural machinery, precision instruments and motor cars. Here canning and leather industry is also carried on. In Mariupil /164/ and Taganrog there are foundaries. In almost all larger harbors of the Black Sea coast, ships are built. In the Crimea there are canning and tobacco factories.

433 After Ukrainian industry suffered severe reverses as a result of the First World War and the Revolution, a wave of industrialism set in with the first Five Year Plan in 1928. The wealth of

433 the Soviet Union was to be increased according to the most modern methods. The industrialization of the agrarian country was based on existing industrial plants which were enlarged, on the opening-up of new sources of power and the establishment of large industrial combines. Foreign enterprises and above all foreign specialists assisted in a decisive way in the carrying-out of the first Five Year Plan. But the first and still fresh impulse of industrial development was broken even in 1932 at the beginning of the second Five Year Plan, the increased production figures for iron and coal to the contrary notwithstanding. Meanwhile, systems of stimulating production were introduced, such as the Udarniki Movement in 1933 (shocktroop workers) and the Stakhanov Movement of 1936, whereby production was actually increased. During the second Five Year Plan the number of industrial workers in Soviet Ukraine increased essentially more slowly than during the first.
[44] In 1929 there were somewhat over 600,000 "independent workers" in the entire Soviet Ukraine, more than half of whom were coal and metal workers. In 1931 their number had increased to 900,000, in 1933 to over 1 million, and in 1935, to barely 1.2 million workers - female workers not included. (105)

105. Kubiyovich: Atlas of the Ukraine and the Area Bordering it, page 46.

By far the greater number of industries of the present Soviet Ukrainian economy still stem from the pre-war period, as for example almost all factories for agricultural machines. The only revolutionary step in this branch of economy is the merging of individual enterprises and the changing of names. The firm "Heim, Odessa" became the Bolshevik factory "October Revolution", "Fuchs, Kleiner, Berger and Zagorelin, Katerynoslav"

433 became /165/ "Red Progress, Dnepropetrovsk", and so on. The giant tractor factory in Khar'kov was newly erected, an accomplishment which is proudly shown to every foreign visitors. Important, however, is not only the number of tractors that leave the factory, but also their serviceability and durability. The significance of the industrial plants which have remained from the pre-war period is also evident from the invested capital, according to which, just as before, the iron industry ranks first, coal second and the sugar industry third. In these three industries half of the entire capital invested in Ukrainian industry is combined. Only after that come machine construction and the chemical works which to a certain extent have arisen only in most recent times. (106)

106. Kubiyovich: Commentary to the Atlas, page XXXIII.

257 The sugar industry forms only a part of the food and luxury industry which was a very important branch even before the war. Its center is in the beet-growing region between Podolia, Kiyev and Khar'kov. In 1913 200 Ukrainian sugar factories produced 1.2 million tons of sugar, in 1933 170 factories produced 0.8 million tons. (107)

107. Deminskiy, The Economy of the Ukraine, page 140.

258 Besides that there is, also dating back to the pre-
274 war period, a considerable mill and oil industry, the latter in the Kuban region, as well as distilleries.

*

369 The increase of urban population is a natural concomitant of industrialization. The Ukraine has

369 always belonged to the countries of the world that have the least number of cities. In 1897 only 3% of the population of the entire Ukraine lived in large cities, and as late as 1926, only 6.7%. In 1931 Greater Ukraine had 12 cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. In the almost thirty years between 1897 and 1926 the village population increased by 41.5% and the urban population, also as a result of immigration, of course, by
162 85.4%. (108) The natural increase of the Ukrain-

108. Kubiyovich: Distribution of the Population in the Ukraine, page 30.

ian population belongs to the largest of Europe, in fact is often the largest. True, mortality is high - about 20 deaths annually per 1000 inhabitants -, but /166/ the birth rate is still essentially higher - about 40 births annually per 1000 inhabitants. The lowest population surplus is shown in densely populated Galicia with 11.5 per thousand, and Carpatho-Ukraine with 16.1 per thousand. In 1927 the natural increase in Soviet Ukraine amounted to 22.5 per thousand and in the Crimea to 26.8 per thousand. (109)

109. Kubiyovich: Distribution of the Population in the Ukraine, page 26.

369 The new period of growth of the Ukrainian cities, however, is limited to the Central Ukrainian industrial areas and the Donets Basin. The West Ukrainian cities are unsuitable for industrialization on account of the proximity of the border and the lack of larger power sources. Besides, traffic communications are extremely inadequate. These cities even decreased in population, just like the seaports, where today commerce and export
369 support fewer people than before the First World
162 War. During the first Five Year Plan the urban

369 population in the right-bank section of Soviet
162 Ukraine decreased by 4.2%, whereas in the left-bank section it increased by 44%, in the Donets region alone by 93.5%. (110) Kiyev which was

110. Kubiyovich: Distribution of the Population in the Ukraine, page 32.

the quiet city of scholars and monasteries before the First World War shows 846,000 inhabitants according to the census of 1939; Khar'kov, the industrial and barracks city with its over-sized ostentatious buildings and skyscrapers shows 833,000; Odessa, where before the First World War 620,000 people lived and in 1923 324,000, houses 604,000 people in 1939. This seaport which was built by Catherine II suffered most in the famine of 1920.

According to the census of January 17, 1939 the entire population of Soviet Ukraine amounted to 30,960,221 souls, of whom about 19,764,000 lived in villages and about 11,195,000 in towns. In the census of 1926 the proportion of the urban population was 16.5%, whereas in 1939 it was said to be about 36%. According to these figures, Soviet Ukraine has, in the space of 13 years, changed from an agricultural country to a decidedly industrial country. Such a revolutionary process taking place within such a brief period, should be considered as out of the question, for similar developments in /167/ the central and western European countries took many decades under more favorable conditions. In order to be convinced of this analogy between Soviet Ukrainian urban development with that of Central Europe, one would have to be more familiar with the basic principles of Muscovite statisticians. For example, one might find an explanation for such an inorganic growth of the urban population in the fact that all settlements of over 2000 inhabitants

369 were counted as towns, whereas in former times
162 even the huge peasant villages of 30,000 and 40,000 inhabitants were placed in the category of villages.

The result of the new census becomes particularly interesting if one brings in for comparison the Statistique de la population de l'Oukraine contemporaine published in 1929 by the statistical office of the Soviet Ukraine in Khar'kov in both Ukrainian and French. In this publication the population figure on January 1, 1929 is given as 30,363,547. According to that, the population of Soviet Ukraine increased from January 1, 1929 to January 17, 1939 by only 596,674 souls. From the beginning of the Five Year Plan period, however, the normal annual increase amounted to 600,000 souls, according to the birth surplus of 20 per thousand; this would be 6 millions in 10 years. Thus the population decreased by about 5.4 million souls from 1929 to 1939. In an evaluation of these results we must keep in mind the fact that since 1936 abortions have been punishable by 10 years imprisonment, and that a large immigration of Russian and Far Eastern elements has taken place, which was particularly promoted by Moscow.

162 No less serious than these factors is the
167 decrease of village population since 1926 by 4.41 million souls. Even if the largest part of these 4.41 million village inhabitants should be counted city dwellers, the decrease thus being only apparent, what has happened to the increase of the peasant population? The census of 1939 reveals the silent tragedy of the "dead frontier", the strip of land about 50 kilometers wide /168/ at the former Rumanian and Polish boundary, which had to be cleared of Ukrainian inhabitants. It betrays the famine from 1931 to 1933, the exiles
167 to the frosty North and the dislodgments. On this point the Komsomolets Ukrayiny of May 21 and 22, 1939 wrote that the Ukrainians were being

161 sent as farmers to the Far East and to Kazakstan, and as laborers to the construction of the railway lines Donets Basin-Moscow and Akmolinsk-Kartaly. The railway Akmolinsk-Kartaly crossed the desert of Kazakstan in an 806 kilometer stretch. The Visti of June 3, 1939 complete this picture when they write: "The Soviet Ukraine annually furnishes the newly-arisen industrial centers in the other Soviet Republics with hundreds of thousands of laborers. At Magnitogorsk, Kutsbas, in the Far East and on the Turkish Railway there are thousands of construction workers who come from all different parts of the Ukraine."

369 This policy of splitting up the Ukrainian people must in the long run have all the more fateful consequences since the cities in the Ukraine are primarily in foreign hands. "The Ukrainian people remained peasants and villagers; they left their cities in the hands of foreigners, Russians, Jews, Germans, Poles." This was the complaint even before the First World War of the Ukrainian geographer Rudnitskyj: (111) The Ukrain-

111. Rudnitskyj: ibid., page 162.

ian peasant son did not want to go to the city where people spoke in foreign tongues. Village tranquility and quiet romanticism he recaptured only in the country. And thus the Ukrainian peasant youth wandered by the hundreds of thousands to the Kuban, the Volga, to Siberia and yonder to the shores of the Pacific Ocean in order to colonize new land there, while foreigners took possession of the Ukrainian cities. The result was
162 that from 1926 to 1931 in the cities of all Ukrain-
369 ian provinces there were 38.8 Ukrainians per 100 inhabitants, 28.1 Russians, 21.6 Jews, 6.9 Poles, 0.8 Germans and 3.8 of other nationalities. (112)

112. Kubiyovich: Georgraphy of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 307 and 308.

11: Obermaier--181 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

In 1926 there were 42.1% Ukrainians in Kiyev, 38.3% in Khar'kov, 17.4% in Odessa, /Facing page 168/ /Map XII: Balance of Trade in the Soviet Ukraine. The diagrams on this page permit a comparison of import and export during the periods before and after the First World War. Note the decrease of exports in agricultural products and the increase of industrial exports/ /Captions:/ 369 162 439

Diagram of
Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union in
1909/11, 1913 and 1934
(in million rubles)

1.
Export, of this trade with Russia
/In circle marked 795:/
Grain 222
Metal and metal goods 90
Products of animal husbandry 56
Other produces 28
Other agricultural products 399

2.
Import
/In circle marked 472:/
Metals and machines 34.5
Naphtha products 33.5
Groceries 33
Leather & leather goods31
Fish 29
Wood products 17
Other products 17
Other finished products 217

3. Export
/In circle marked 744:/
Grain 235
Metals & crude metals 116
Products of animal husbandry 53
Coal 50
Other products 25
Sugar 265

4. Import
/In circle marked 331:/
Wood products 37
Naphtha products 13
Metal goods
Other products 74
Other finished goods 197

5.Export
/In circle marked 720:/
Sugar 160
Coal 140
Grain 50
Ores 10
Metals and machines 360

11: Obermaier--182 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

439 6. Import
/In circle marked 380:/
Naphtha 110
Wood products 70
Fish 20
Products of animal husbandry 5
Other finished products 180

7. Export of various goods from the Soviet Ukraine in 1913, 1928, 1932 and 1934 (in million tons).

8. Coal
9. Ores

10. Iron & steel

11. Grain

12. Sugar

13. Wood

14. Naphtha & naphtha products

15. Various finished products

000/ Also facing page 168/ /Where tractors are worn out harrowing is now done with horses/ /Facing page 169/A/At planting time the seed must be got into the ground within a few days. The tractor is particularly adapted to the cultivation of large
369 areas/A/169/ 35.9% in Dnepropetrovsk, 16.2% in
162 Lwow (1931), 28.9% in Stalin, 29.9% in Krasnodar (chief city of the Kuban region), and 17.8% in Chernovtsy.

*

563 The Jews immediately seized what the Ukrainians had passed by. During the wars with the Turks Catherine II had opened to them the south Ukrainian guberniyas of Taurien, Kherson and Katerinoslav, the present-day Dnepropetrovsk. In 1835 the right of settlement of the Jews was extended to the entire right-bank section of the Ukraine with the exception of the city of Kiyev. The rest of Russia was almost completely free of Jews until 1917. From that time on all of Russia was open to them, and immediately the emigration

A [For plates, cf. pp. 224-225, category IIC-Analyst]

439



7. Export of various Soviet Ukraine in 1934 (in million tons)

[Map XII: Balance of trade in the Soviet Ukraine, cf. complete Legend, pp. 181–182]

439



goods from the
1913, 1928, 1932 and

10. Iron + Steel

12. SUGAR



and Naphtha products



15. various finished products



[Map XII: Balance of trade in the Soviet Ukraine]

563 of Jews who had been crowded together in the Ukraine began into the interior of Russia. The process of urbanization of the Jewish population was in full swing even before the First World War. Al-
[162] ready by the year 1897 77.4% of the 1.2 million Jews in Russian Ukraine lived in cities, where they made up 22.7% of the population. (113)

113. Seraphim: The Jewry in East European Area, page 322.

Meanwhile the urbanization continued. The proportion of Jews in the total urban population of the district of Kiyev came to 28% in 1926, in the Odessa district it was 31%, in Dniepropetrovsk 32%, in Podolia 54.7%, in the highly industrial Donets region only 9.1%. (114)

114. Seraphim: The Jewry in East European Area, page 333.

000 Even though the Jews controlled almost the entire wholesale and retail trade in the Ukraine before the First World War, and were extremely influential in banking, this was not true of the apparatus of government. Gone today are the traders who realized fat profits on the 4000 Ukrainian fairs, who bought from wholesale dealers and wandered through the country as barterers; private trade has been shattered and the banks are state-controlled, but the influence of the Jews is greater than ever. As early as 1926 they had established themselves in government positions far beyond those that were open to them, and ruled over the Ukrainian and Russian people. In the municipal Soviets they had 20.1% of all positions, in the trade unions 38.1%; in /170/ the judiciary they had 18.9%, in finance administration 19.4%, in the cooperatives 26.8%, in the credit system 35.1% and in public affairs even 44.2% of all

000 available positions. And yet the proportion of Jews in the total population amounted to -7.1%. (115) On the board of the Commissariat of Inter-

115. Seraphim: The Jewry in East European Area, page 263.

nal Trade in Moscow there were at times 49 Jews among 124 members, and in the foreign trade commissariat there were no less than 55 out of 106. In the finance commissariat "Judaization was complete". With the constant change of leadership in the commissariats, the number of Jews active in the commissariats for communications, for inland and ocean shipping, for heavy industry, agriculture, the food industry and in many other commissariats the Jews occupy the key positions. (116) From there they direct the "mass invasion"

116. Seraphim: The Jewry in the East European Area, page 642 ff.

of the members of their race into the middle and top-rank positions of the administrative and economic system of the Union.

*

476 Today there are only meager remnants left of the East Ukrainian system of cooperatives which was still performing tolerable services during the time of the collectives, - in 1930 there were 40,081 cooperatives with 5.5 million members. (117)

117. Zalotzietskiy: The Spiritual Life of the Ukraine, page 143.

The distribution of goods is handled up to about 80% by state stores;the cooperatives are on the same footing with them. Where the state regulates

11: Obermaier--185 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

4B where the state regulates everything, there is no longer any room for self-maintenance. State commerce is supervised by the various commissariats, which fact does not facilitate its smooth running. The commissariats for internal commerce, for the food industry, for local industry, the "Division for the Welfare of Workers" and other offices also have a voice. In 1935 there were 310,300 workers employed "in the service of Ukrainian commerce". Of this crew the Jews represented 42.8% and the Ukrainians 38.1%. (118)

000

118: Soviet Trade, Kiyev 1937.

/171/ The Soviet press sometimes tells tales out of school about how Soviet business has developed under the leadership of the Jews who reputedly have a talent for business. Pravda of November 16, 1936, writes of a "fantastic flood of rules and regulations". During the first nine months of 1936, they said, the people's commissar Weizer issued 42,000 orders, decrees and resolutions. Izvestiia of March 14, 1937 writes: "In Rostov on the Don the demand for light articles of clothing is great, but the shops are empty. Summer clothing, suits, underwear, sport clothes, bathing suits, there is nothing of this kind in the fifty-nine shops of the city. There is unbelievable disorder in supplies." On the subject of profiteering Pravda reports on May 25, 1937: "In 1936 deficits, embezzlements and divestments amounted to an enormous sum: in government business 217 million rubles, in the consumer cooperatives 203 million rubles. But these represent only the deficits and embezzlements that were discovered!" Za Industriializatsii of July 17, 1937, gives an interesting glimpse into how the Donets region is supplied with food. "In the regulation of April 29 of this year," writes the periodical, "the council of the people's commis-

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433 sariats of the Soviet Union decided that very shortly a reform in the methods of supplying food and articles of everyday use to miners of the Donets Basin is to take place. Since the time this decree was issued more than two months have elapsed, but nothing has changed. - We have visited the pits of all the different districts of the Donets Basin and have spoken to the men and women workers. We were obliged to conclude that in none of the districts has there been any improvement worth speaking of in the matter of food supply, that, on the contrary, conditions have grown worse to a large extent. We mention as an example the coal mines in the district of Rovenechky. Here there is a working population of 30,000 people; and every day one can see how /172/ long lines form outside the food stores already early in the morning. After these people have patiently waited, usually for several hours, they are told that no food supply whatsoever has arrived, so that they return home without having received anything. We asked a number of leading union officials how the food supply trade is organized. Trade union official Kondratov gave us the following explanation: In our store there is neither sugar nor salt nor groats. Meat is very seldom sold, and is usually of poor quality. Since February of this year we have had salt herring only one single time, other fish we have not even seen." (119)

119. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in This Way, page 44ff.

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491 Like trade, the system of communication is poor in the Ukraine. In 1880, there were in the Northern Ukraine, 210,000 chumak, that is carters and dealers who took care of long-distance trans-

491 portation by land with ox teams. In the three South Ukrainian governments in 1897, 100,000 such ox carts lumbered along on the ancient, worn-out chumak roads which were many hundreds of meters wide. Neither the Polish nor the Russian administration bothered about road building. Even today there are large cities in the Ukraine which are connected with one another only by means of enormously wide country roads. While Galicia during Austrian rule had about 10,000 kilometers of paved roads, and the Czechs built 2400 kilometers of roads in the Carpatho-Ukraine, the Soviet Ukraine succeeded in raising the figure to a full 8900 kilometers of highway in 1935, and the Kuban region to 600 kilometers. In 1935, there were 25,200 kilometers of improved natural roads which approximately correspond to our field roads, and 168,000 kilometers of "natural earth roads" which are impossible during the rainy season and in thaws. (120)

120. Kubiyovich: Geography, page 479 ff.

496/173/ There are only 24,400 kilometers of railways running through the entire Ukrainian area from the Carpatho-Ukraine to the Kuban, from the Black Sea up to the Pirpyat Swamps (in Germany there were 68,548 kilometers of railroads in 1935). The only actual railway junction in this large country is Lwów, from which nine lines emanate. Kiyev and all the other cities are merely intersections of two lines. In the twenty years of their rule the Bolsheviks have built only 1000 kilometers of railroads. (121) They, too, did not

121. Kubiyovich: Geography, page 484.

alleviate the main deficiency of the Ukrainian railway network the lines of which run north and south, toward Moscow and the Baltic: the important

496 lateral connections are still wanting. Anyone wishing to go from west to east in the Ukraine is obliged to reckon with a circuitous route and a long period of travel. For instance, you travel 32 hours from the capital of Kiyev to Taganrog on the Sea of Azov which is 700 kilometers distant, even though you go forever over flat steppes; from Kiyev to Kherson 450 kilometers to the south you, travel 16 hours. (122) More-

122. Kubiyovich: Atlas, page 50.

over, the Ukrainian railway network is so wide-meshed that there are large districts which are 40 to 60 kilometers away from the railroad line, as on the lower Dnieper north of the Bug estuary and in the Kuban region. The most traveled stretch is the Moscow-Khar'kov-Donets Basin-Kuban line with more than 10 passenger trains a day. Between Kiyev and Odessa there are five to six passenger trains a day, as well as between Kiyev and Moscow. There is not a single serviceable cross connection except the line between the industrial regions of Krivoy Rog and Donets, which was built in 1884. Between two such important cities as Kiyev and Khar'kov there are only one or two passenger trains a day. Odessa can be reached from the Donets region only by a very roundabout way. Through the lonely reaches of the Western Soviet Ukraine only one or at best two passenger trains run daily. (123)

123. Kubiyovich: Atlas, page 49.

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505/174/ The most important trade and communications route of the Ukraine until the pre-war period was the Dnieper. It and its tributaries take up 4300 kilometers of the total of 6000 kilometers of navigable rivers in the Ukraine. Shipping is not very important on the rest of the rivers, such

505 as the Dnester, Bug and Donets, because it is not regulated. The Donets has too little water to assume the importance it could have as the only river in the industrial area.

504 Odessa is the most important seaport of the Ukraine, and next in importance comes Novorossiysk on the Caucasian coast. Both of them turn over more than two million tons of goods annually. Next come Mykolayov at the mouth of the Bug and Maryupil on the Sea of Azov, with a turn-over of more than a million tons annually, as well as Kherson at the mouth of the Dneper and Theodosia in the Crimea with more than half a million tons each.(124)

124. Kubiyovich: Atlas, page 48.

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000 When workers are satisfied with their jobs and the general living conditions of their dwellings, they do not like to change. Constant change of a crew of workers of an enterprise is a definite sign that something is wrong, that the workers are not satisfied. For the employers it is no pleasure constantly to be obliged to train new
464 people and test their reliability. In the Ukraine workmen very often leave factories and pits in order to find employment in other enterprises. The official organ of heavy industry 'Za Industriyalizatsiiu' writes about this on December 15, 1936: "The fluctuation of workmen in the Donets Basin is enormous. It even exceeds that of former years. In eleven months of 1936, 231,000 new workmen moved to the coal pits, while 233,000 moved away; again in 1935, 210,000 came, 219,000 left. The crew changes all the time... People also leave the mines because of low wages. /175/ In pit number 18 many of the workers hired, earned only 100 to 200 rubels a month. Disorganization

464 cuts wages." A few days later 'Za Industriyalizatsiiu' deals with the same subject: "The fluctuation of workers in the Molotov automobile factory is great, especially among those who have been newly employed. In the course of eleven months in 1936 over 12,000 workers have moved away. The shortage of housing is often given as the chief reason for the mass flight. Inasmuch as the machines are idle, the wages of the workers are greatly reduced... The workers wait for the machines eight to ten days a month. The management succeeds in providing normal or semi-normal working conditions for only a few of the workers - for the famous Stakhanov-workers." (125) Very

125. Quoted by Keyserlingk, The Russian worker lives in this way, page 22.

similar are the conditions in the new combine "Zaporishstali" where in 1935, 9151 workers were taken on and 7675 released; this is reported by Visti on May 22, 1939. The same paper reports on May 17, 1939 that 331 young farmers from the region of Chernigov were sent into the coal mines of the Donets Basin.

433 At the beginning of the second Five Year
461 Plan, Bolshevik employers with the help of the erstwhile farmer Isotov refuted those false prophets who, like Marx and Lenin, maintained that people would lead a secure, carefree and enjoyable life in the socialist state with little work and high wages. After special preparations the miner Isotov turned out 40 to 60 percent more than he had previously averaged. Isotov's first effort was particularly celebrated and propagandized. It served as a pretext for the introduction of the Udarnik or shock-worker movement. Two years later, when this impulse had abated just as had the previous enthusiasm of the first Five Year Plan, the big, powerful peasant boy Alexei Stakhanov fell

433 into the same trap. Instead of extracting 7 to
461 8 tons from a pit, Stakhanov now came up with 105 tons of coal. /176/ The familiar Isotov propagandistic fireworks were repeated, and as before many workers suddenly discovered how much more they could have been producing. They suddenly worked so fast that their hands grew hot. Instead of 590 crank shafts a forger could now mold 1027 in one shift, instead of 15 to 20 spindles women workers now managed 140, and instead of 320 pairs of shoes a shoemaker now made 3000 pairs. What good did it do that many refused to play the game any longer? Their achievements were measured according to the records set by the Stakhanov workers, and their wages decreased. In February 1936, the record-establishing frenzy reached its climax in the so-called Stakhanov Month when the world was to be shown what the Soviet Union was capable of achieving. Pravda gave an account of the results of this month of superior achievements on March 19th, 1936: "During the Stakhanov Month industry stood under the sign of bungling. Often the quality of the products decreased, defective products increased, and in many factories the state plan was not carried out..." The hatred of the workers toward the Stakhanov workers who were contemptuously regarded as ambitious yes men, went so far that they were sometimes even put out of the way. Nevertheless, the authorities continued to organize Stakhanov days, weeks and decades throughout the year, until the fever finally abated. Apparently the efforts had not resulted in favorable experiences. Mashinostroenie of December 23rd, 1937 gives a small picture of the expenses incurred during this time by a Soviet factory proprietor: "In the course of a week of the Stakhanov decade, 18,765 pistons had to be discarded as defective in the piston workshop alone of the factory 'Red Trade Union International'. The management of the factory has resigned

438 itself to such an extent to the mass production of
461 discards that it regards this condition as an unavoidable fact and builds up its production program on the score of 35 percent discards." (126)

126. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 32.

000 /Facing page 176/ /An important agricultural product: sunflowers. The seeds are removed from the receptacle with small sticks, and are then taken to the oil mills/7/Facing page 177/ /Picture of a village in the more well-timbered West Ukraine where the houses are built of wood/7/177/

465 In the spring of 1937, two years after the introduction of the Stakhanov System, the average gross wages of the Soviet worker, according to the official figures of the Moscow Statistical Office, amounted to 212 rubles monthly. (127) In the

127. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 33.

meantime there has hardly been any change in these figures. From these 212 rubles about 10 percent are deducted (128) so that the worker has 191 rubles left over per month to cover his living expenses. If he had no rent to pay, with this amount he could buy 106 kilograms of white bread or 44 kilograms of groats or 119 liters of milk or 29.5 kilograms of sweet cherries; or he could consume 24 canteen meals a month or buy 19 kilograms of margarine. He could also acquire three pairs of sneakers or a pair of cheap men's shoes, provided they are even available in a normal size, - usually there are only outsizes in stock in the state stores and cooperatives, for the Jews have shifted the marketable goods to the open market where their cost is multiple. There would not be enough for a man's suit of the cheapest

7 [For plates, cf. pp. 226-227, category 116-Analyst]

465 quality. For this the worker, if he does not spend any kopeks for food and housing, must work one and one-half months, and two months for the cheapest winter coat. Three colored shirts eat up a month's wages. For the same amount he could buy his wife three summer dresses of poor quality or three sets of underwear or three blouses. (129)

129. Statement of a German specialist in Kiyev.

"Far too often the life of the Soviet Ukraine worker is exhausted in the struggle for his daily bread, for clothing and shelter, and yet before the war he was the best paid in Russia. Undoubtedly
345 the Bolsheviks have done a great deal of building,
466 but they neglected the building of houses in favor
185 of the building of clubhouses and palaces for cultural purposes, veritable giant structures of cement and steel where in the evening the locksmiths and metal founders then assemble "in order to hear lectures on Shakespeare". "For in human history there is an urge that has never before been recognized in the great masses...for art and literature. The famous tractor brigade of the Pasha Angelin comes forth with songs, and the workers of the Khar'kov tractor factory organize their own opera. Hundreds of groups of worker and kolhosp newspapers flaunt poems, stories and essays written by forge and tractor workers."

He whose thoughts take flight on the wings of Pegasus will find his hands only mechanically at
433 work. Among the construction workers the "never-before recognized urge of the great masses...for art and literature" expresses itself in the following way, according to Pravda of July 16, 1937: "The brick production program for the year could only be 19 percent accomplished in the first five months of the year, and the two subsequent months have also brought no change. The construct-

433 tion of factories and dwellings is therefore held up and interrupted. Building costs rise a great deal... The shortage of bricks is increased by the fact that the bricks that are delivered are to a large extent useless. The imperfection comes to 25 to 30 percent by the time the bricks are laid. But even these bricks that are laid do not as a rule measure up to the prescribed
361 durability test." (130) In the finished settle-

130. Quoted by Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in This Way, page 26.

ments life is described thus in Visti, January 10th, 1939: "The settlement of Rudchenkovo in the Donbas has changed its aspect completely under the Soviet government. Large sections of many-storied houses have arisen and streets with lights and 10,000 square meters of asphalt sidewalks. Street car tracks were laid which connect the settlement with the center of the city of Stalin. There is also a bus connection here; the water system was improved, and the building of the cultural center for miners of the Donbas was erected aswell as a polyclinic, schools, clubs and shops. Nevertheless: 1. For three years now there have been talks in the district councils of the region and even in the regional executive committee about the opening of a sales center for heating material; 2. in /179/ Rudchenkovo a bath house does not yet exist; 3. the street car stop is out on the open steppe one-half mile from the clinic, and there is not even a small shelter at the car stopl 4. there is no public pharmacy; 5. lighting in the houses is unsatisfactory - the electrical plants have almost generally become useless; 6. there is no dairy; 7. there is no shop for children's goods; 8. the book business is very poorly organized. - The leaders of the trust 'Stalin Coal' and of the district council

361 of Kirovsk must finally take note of the needs of the workers and do away with the inadequacies which constitute the dark side of the tremendous economic development of the population of Rudchenkovo."

Soviet bureaucracy is working with unbelievable assiduousness on city planning. The building plan of Rostov, for example, according to Izvestiia of August 5th, 1937, had been under construction for eight years at that time, and the reconstruction plan of Nizhne-Tagilak, a small city in the Urals, is a book of 10,000 pages. The men who drew up the reconstruction plan of Gor'kiy must have been Stakhanov bureaucrats, for its pages are no longer numbered but - weighed; and it weighs two tons.

433 It sounds somewhat exaggerated when the Moscow Review of June 3, 1937, maintains that the Five Year Plans determine the course of future Soviet economy "with the accuracy of a time table". Not the only reason why these time tables cannot be adhered to is after all the fluctuation of the workers, which, in turn, is caused by the shortage of food and housing. Along with many other journals, 'Za Industriializatsiiu' of August 23rd, 1937, confirms the fact that the workers suffer considerable wage deficits because of the disorganization of Soviet economy: "The large companies of heavy industry are suffering from a great scarcity of oxygen. Thus, for example, the Martin furnaces of the plant 'Red October' in Stalingrad had to be allowed to go out because of lack of oxygen. /180/ A similar situation occurred in quite a number of other Soviet cities such as Khar'kov, Dnepropetrovsk and Rostov. In front of the oxygen factory of Khar'kov there are a great many trucks waiting every day, in order to get at least a few bottles of oxygen. This factory is extremely inefficient, which can in part be traced back to the frequent interruptions caused by accidents. Thus the Khar'kov plant was idle 28 percent

433 of the working time in July of this year...The Stalingrad plant presents a similar picture." (131) Where there is no needle there are no

131. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 25.

clothes. Pravda of May 8, 1939, criticizes the decrease in coal mining in the Donbas as follows: "The mine which determines the fate of the entire trust is behind schedule. It would seem as though the scandalous production which has lasted for a considerable time now would have been given serious consideration. The management of the mine is now trying to explain the poor production by the fact that the workers are leaving in order to attend to their spring planting." Visti of June 10, 1939, supplements this by reporting that the constant decrease of coal mining in the Donets Basin is forcing the economic management of Soviet Ukraine to increase the production of brown coal and turf.

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562 By reason of the Soviet Constitution, the
461 East Ukrainian woman has an equal position with
594 the man. This means that she has the same meager
[465] rights and the same heavy duties. Since the wages of the man are not adequate to support the family, the woman must also earn some of the daily bread. Thus the woman is a worker. The elimination of Sundays and holidays, the long trips to work, the standing-in-line for hours to get food, the shifting of days off in the different plants, the incredible housing shortage, the rearing of children in institutions, the easy divorces of "couples living together" - all this disrupts the family.
594 The devastating consequences which are bound to
161 result from the disregard /181/ of the family,

594 161 this seed of all political life, may be surmised from the census of January 1939. On the basis of the estimated increase during the period of the New Economic Policy, the Soviet Union should have had 183 million inhabitants. Instead there were 170 million all told. There are 13 million souls missing - twice the number of the Czech nation!

462 The book entitled 'Woman in Socialistic Ukraine which appeared in Kiyev in 1937, tells of the triumphs of the Ukrainian woman, not in love and not in the family, but in the field of industry. According to this book, the Ukrainian woman has already "conquered" her position in all branches of industry, coal mines not excepted. In 1936, women comprised the following percentages of the total number of workers: in the building industry 18.3 percent, in the mining industry 26.3 percent, in the chemical industry 26.3 percent in the iron-industry 20.9 percent, and in the construction of machines 21.1 percent. There were 14,274 women engineers and technicians in 1936, and nearly half of the total number of physicians were women (9398). Moreover, the woman of Soviet Ukraine - always according to this book - takes an active part in the defense of the state as pilot, teacher, auto technician, as members of the parachute troops and so forth.

[29] On the subject ot the wardrobe of these industrious workers it is divulged that 37 percent of all Ukrainian women own two or more coats, 24.4 percent own two or more cloth or silk dresses, 40.5 percent have five changes of underwear and 38.7 percent have two or more pairs of leather shoes. It is taken for granted that all the other women have only one coat, one cloth or silk dress, one pair of shoes and no more than four changes of underwear.

And their feminine ambition? "Hanna Bondarenko, railroad engineer on the line 'Voroshilov',

462 an her train 900 kilometers without changing engines. The train personnel consisted entirely of women." This according to Izvestiia of November 21, 1938. Pravda /182/ of May 4th, 1939 has a report of the modern types of feminine desires of the Ukrainian women in the Donets Basin: In the Voroshilovgrad region the number of housewives who express a desire to work in the mines increases every day. Recently 190 housewives were taken on in the mines of the Krasnoluky district. In Shaft Number 151 the women mine workers challenged their husbands to a competition. Comrade Khodonovich entered into competition with her husband who works as a locksmith in the same pit. Twelve of the housewives employed, systematically produced 130 to 150 percent of the norm." Under the pseudonym "sundries" behind which a Jew may be hiding, an enthusiastic admirer of this womanly existence writes: "Women, their work-blouses stretched tight over their breasts, their checked cap with a visor pulled over their short hair, with hard eyes that know no maidenly dreams, drive the motor trucks madly from one hall to another through long avenues that seem to meet in perspective. Women with hands that do not know how to hold children grasp red-hot rods with iron tongs and let them send forth sparks under pneumatic hammers. Is it a man or woman, this human form in leather here at the clattering mold, there in the hellish concert of the grindery?"(132)

132. Sundries: Russia Close Up, page 140.

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185 At the beginning of the third Five Year Plan, the Moscow Review of June 10th, 1937 wrote among other things: "The rapid development of mass well-being and culture will in general be one of the distinguishing features of the third Five Year Plan. At this point every possibility of comparison with America ceases. For that sort of thing

185 exists only in socialism." At the Party Congress in 1939, Stalin corrected these and similar expressions of conceit. He turned against the "fancifulness" of the advance estimates of the last Five Year Plan. The hopes of the proletarian masses of the Union for the promised paradise, nourished for more than twenty years, /183/ were abruptly destroyed by the "father of the people" with his allusion to the sacrifices which are still necessary in order to catch up with the most progressive states. There was still time for that, Stalin said, "and not a little time".

/184/ Emigrants

668 Although the Ukrainian people do not have a state (the Soviet Ukraine is merely a province of Moscow), they have three governments which have their seat in some foreign European country. There is the government of hetman Skoropadskiy which resigned in 1918 and was later revived in exile; then the directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic which originally consisted of five presidents. Its chairman Petliura is dead and its members have scattered. Finally there is a West Ukrainian government. The political emigration [162] from the Soviet Union, Bessarabia, Bukovina and Poland resides almost altogether in Europe. Here it numbers 150,000 souls including the emigrants. Of these about 50,000 East Ukrainians alone are living in what was formerly Poland, 50,000 Ukrainians are living in France, 15,000 without protectorate and 5000 under aprotectorate in Germany, 8000 in Belgium and 5000 each in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The rest are divided up among twelve countries.

The world knows little about the former goverments, nor do they stand out. All of them cling tenaciously to the fiction of their legality. The most active among them is the Petliura govern-

668 ment, although it is the very one which suffered the most annihilating military and diplomatic defeat. Around it cluster the remaining supporters of the East Ukrainian dictator who, in spite of Polish betrayal and the most outrageous treatment, convulsively clung to the talons of the White Eagle. Petliura was murdered in Paris in 1926 just as he was preparing, after Pilsudski's coup d'état, to concoct a new scheme with the Polish dictator. In Ukrainian emigré circles not related to the Petliura group /185/ which consists almost primarily of older people, these gentlemen are regarded as Polish agents. In contrast to the rest of the political emigrants, the Petliura followers lived, as a rule, in tolerable circumstances.

It is worth while to examine the program of the Petliura group more closely, for the latter, together with the Poles, followed the political plans of Pilsudski and Petliura. The goal was to smash the Russian colossus and establish an East Ukrainian state under a Polish protectorate. The means to this end was to be a common front of East Ukrainians with the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, preferably with the peoples of the Caucasus, the Don Cossacks, who regard themselves as a separate people, and the Karelian Finns. The White Ruthenians were to be excluded from this alliance;they, as well as the seven to eight million West Ukrainians, were to be left to the Poles. This Polish-Petliura school of thought regarded the neighboring states "that know what the Soviet Ukraine means", that is to say Finland, the Baltic states and primarily the former Poland, as additional allies against pan-Russian Moscow. In case the Soviet Union was to become involved in a war, there was provision made in Warsaw for the raising of an "army of the Ukrainian people's government" which, as far back as 1919 to 1920, was probably to have the honor of conquering Kiyev,

668 the pearl for the Poles. The difficult lot of the West Ukrainians under Polish rule left this group completely indifferent, for "they, of course, have their own parliamentary representation in the Polish sejm", as one of the leading men of the group told the author in February 1939 in Warsaw.

The followers of Petliura were anxious to be regarded as liberal democrats. Their adherents resided primarily in Warsaw and in Paris. Here the group published a fortnightly periodical and a monthly information bulletin with Polish intelligence, in which one could occasionally read that "the cabinet held a regular session". /186/

There were only individual West Ukrainians who belonged to the Petliura group. On the other hand, many East Ukrainians belong to the two other political trends of the Ukrainian emigration. These are, first, the conservative followers of the ex-hetman Skoropadskiy, who have in mind some kind of Ukrainian confederacy with a non-Bolshevik Moscow and aim at a monarchy, and secondly, the adherents of the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN). The hetman followers publish a paper in Chicago; some of them also live in the Reich. The "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" counts among its followers the most active national revolutionary elements of the emigration. The OUN is the only important group with an ideological basis. This young Ukrainian generation formulates modern Ukrainian nationalism on a popularist basis. It is trying to "create a vigorous Ukrainianism, uncompromising in the realization of its national idea". Its goal is an independent state embracing all Ukrainian territories. (133) The leader of this group, until his

133. The Ukraine and the National Policy of Moscow, page 58.

slaying in Amsterdam in 1938, was the head of the

668 sech sharp shooters, Ievhen Konovalets who, after Petliura reached an understanding with the Poles separated from the dictator. Konovalet's successor is the former chief of staff of the Ukrainian army, chief of the sech sharp shooters Andrey Melnyk who was obliged to flee from Poland in 1938. The OUN has its strongest support in the Ukrainian emigrants in the USA - "Organization for the Political Revival of the Ukraine, New York" -, in Canada and South America. But also among the 150,000 European political refuges and emigrants it has the most adherents of all groups large and small. There are Ukrainian nationalists in almost all Central and West European capitals, among others in Rome, in Paris and in London where the "English-Ukrainian Society" establishes contact with the Ukrainian emigrants in Canada.

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167 /187/ When in the second half of the past century economic conditions became more and more unbearable in the Ukraine, many Ukrainians emigrated; from the Russian Ukraine to East Russia, from Galicia, from Carpatho-Ukraine, and from Bukovina overseas. In 1926, 771,000 Ukrainians lived outside the Ukraine proper in small and large linguistic islands, within European Russia, and 2,138,000 lived in Asia. In the United States there were about 700,000 Ukrainians, primarily workers; in Canada there were 300,000 mostly farmers; in Brazil 50,000 to 60,000, in Argentina 50,000, in the rest of the South American countries 10,000 to 20,000. (134)

134. Kubiyovich: Geography, page 321.

517 Organizations of compatriots of various kinds keep the Ukrainians together overseas. The closest ties are those between the farmers in

517 Canada. But the numerous Ukrainians in northern America have only insignificant cultural facilities. All the more highly developed is Ukrainian intellectual life among the emigrants in Central Europe. When the Poles, the Rumanians and the Bolsheviks arrived, the Ukrainian professors fled from Lwów, Czernovitz and from the universities of Russia, chiefly to Vienna. This Danubin city had an important Ukrainian tradition at that time. Its position in relation to Galicia was favorable. Many ties bount it to this country which under Austrian rule had experienced an unusual growth.

Thus it was in Vienna that the Ukrainian intellectual world gathered in 1920 to 1921; the scholars had an urge for activity. And so the "Free Ukrainian University" opened its doors on January 17, 1921, solemnly and in the presence of the officials of German Austria. It had two departments, philosophy and law.

Meanwhile the former Sorbonne student Eduard Benevs, at the time secretary of foreign affairs of "Czechoslovakia", knew well what was meant by cultural propaganda. He soon managed to cut off the "Free Ukrainian University" in Vienna. First of all he lured the /188/ poor homeless Ukrainian students to Prague with scholarships and later also attracted their professors. In Prague an active Ukrainian academic life unfolded in the years that followed.

In 1939, the Ukrainian men of learning who lived in foreign countries were active at ten scientific institutes. Six of these are in Prague: the Ukrainian Academic Association, the Ukrainian Historical-Philological Society, the Ukrainian Juridical Society, the Ukrainian Sociological Institute, the Ukrainian Historical Cabinet and the "Museum of the Wars of Independence of the Ukraine". There are two in Warsaw: the Ukrainian Scientific Institute and the Mazepa-Mogyla Academy of Sciences. One is in Paris, the

[Berlin]

517 Petliura Library. Finally, there is the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin.

/189/ Epilogue

181 After their liberation from the Soviet-Muscovite yoke the Ukrainian people have, for the first time in their recent history, had an opportunity to develop their talents and their natural resources freely and unimpeded for their own benefit. The tremendous amount of work that remains to be done can be estimated only by someone who is familiar with the incomparable misery which war-communism, more than two decades of Bolshevik rule and finally liberation from this rule have brought upon the Ukrainian country and its people. Reconstruction will necessarily be all the more difficult since the Ukrainians have to this day remained a peasant people, without their own artisans, without a merchant class, without officials and almost without a so-called intelligentsia. This fact has been very important for the biological survival of the Ukrainian people, for its seed thus withstood the most dire distress of centuries of suppression. Nevertheless: peasants are not statesmen! Peasants want to plow, sow, reap and tend their cattle. Thus it is not a matter of chance that, aside from its historical struggle against the Asiatic hordes, the most important achievement of the Ukrainian people is of a rural character: in the colonization of the steppes, of Siberian and far-eastern lands the Ukrainians have achieved great things. "In fact," says the well-known Ukrainian geographer Rudnickiy, "the entire life force of the nation was directed toward the one single problem of occupying new areas and cultivating them according to old customs." Nevertheless - "the political idea suffered thereby, as well as Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian city." /190/

181 The innermost feelings of the Ukrainians in the days of their liberation is described by a German war correspondent a few weeks after the Bolsheviks were driven out of Kiyev, in the following words of a Ukrainian physician in Kiyev: "You Germans must be very patient with us! You must help us as though we were schoolchildren to whom one must teach the most elementary aspects of life step by step! You must give us strength once more to believe in humanity! For we are not ourselves. We are pitiful, down-trodden, homeless creatures, human beings deprived of all that was sacred, who night and day have lived in the fear of being deported, exiled or shot because of our very existence." (135)

135. "Kiew - der Blutegel der Ukraine," Kiyev, the leech of the Ukraine, by the war correspondent, Erwin Kirchhof.

OBD What, therefore, is to become of this country where intelligent men voice such shattering words? Now that the Bolsheviks have been driven out, there will first of all have to be a thorough stock-taking of the Ukrainian people to determine the presence of living cells capable of growth and development, in order that we may then, with careful consideration, be able to build, stone by stone, a new and better future. Too much in the way of diversified wealth and talent in the Ukraine has been destroyed or stunted by Muscovite imperialists, beginning with Peter the Great down to Stalin, the strangler, to make possible the achievement of such a tremendous task of reconstruction within a few years.

/Map in pocket of book/

The Peoples of the Ukraine

583 162 The distribution in 1939 of peoples and ethnic

563 groups living in Ukrainian territory. For each
162 race there are two, sometimes even three degrees of density shown: a highly concentrated area of 90 percent (however without regard to Jews who in some areas constitute 10 percent and more of the population), then a majority area of 90 percent, and finally an area where no group has the absolute majority and where the relative majority is shown. The Ukraine is most compactly settled in the center as well as toward the west, north and south, whereas in the east it is loosely settled. Here a motley aspect of ethnic intermingling appeared; peoples live next to each other who racially, culturally and in matters of religion belong to the most diverse ethnic groups: Ukrainians and Great Russians, Central European Germans, Turko-Tatars, Mongolian peoples, as well as those small, heterogeneous mountain tribes of the Caucasus, that represent remnants of peoples in areas of regression.

11: Obermaier J-3(no date) 1942
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P.214	P.210
P.213	P.209
P.212	P.208
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Schematic diagram to end map

p.206 (2)

11:Obermaier--207 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563
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/Key/

1. Ukrainians over 90 percent
50-90 percent
relative majority

2. Russians over 90 percent
50-90 percent
relative majority

8. Greeks 50-90 percent
relative majority

9. Hungarians 50-90 percent
relative majority

11:Obermaier--208 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563
162

Rumanians
over 90 percent
50-90 percent
relative majority

Germans
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

Tatars
50-90 percent
relative majority

Kalmuchs
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

11:Obermaier--209 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Slovaks
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

Ruthenians
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

Caucasian Mtn. tribes
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

Bulgarians
50-90 percent

Armenians
50-90 percent

11:Obermaier--210 J-3 (no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563
162



Poles
over 90 percent

50-90 percent

Nogai
50-90 percent

Kirgiz or Kazakh
50-90 percent

11:Obermaier--211 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563
162



11:Obermaier--212 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563
162



11:Obermaier--213 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563
162



11:Obermaier--214 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563
162



11: Obermaier--215 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

Kiev, the capital of Ukraine

11: Obermaier--216 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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The old fortress of Feodosiya on the Crimea

11: Obermaier--217 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

141



Character study of a Ukrainian head

11: Obermaier--218 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

A UKRAINIAN GIRL WITH PRONOUNCED NORDIC FEATURES

11: Obermaier --219 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

Ukrainian peasant loam huts

11: Obermaier--220 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

342

The hut in which a Ukrainian worker's family lives in Krivyi Rog.



Tractor drivers and tractor assemblers of a collective farm near Uman.

11: Obermaier--221 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

(a)

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Handmade natimal costumes

11: Obermaier--221 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

(b)

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Ukrainian girl drawing water

361

WORKERS' SETTLEMENT NEAR KRIVOY ROG

349



Richelieu Terrace in Odessa

11: Obermaier--224 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

0801

Harrowing

11: Obermaier--225 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

401



planting

249

An important agricultural product: sunflowers.

312



A village in West Ukraine

11: Obermaier RD1 Ukraine RD1
162

[For Magyar denationalization of the Boyki and Huzul Ukrainian tribes, see category 116, page 6]

11: Obermaier RD1 Ukraine RD1
162

[For statistics on Ukrainians living outside the Ukrainian frontiers, see category 116, pp. 199 and 202]

12:Buraček--1 R-4, 5 (no date) 1930 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Fine Arts in the Ukraine

By M. Buraček

532 /401/ Ukrainian literature had important representatives already in the first half of the nineteenth century whereas the fine arts did not produce any names of importance till the end of the century. But the actual development of the fine arts in the Ukraine started only in the twentieth century, the years after the revolution being the most decisive ones for the further development of the fine arts.

[208] During the civil war art played an important part in propaganda and agitation. Millions of posters, slogans, and illustrations flooded the country. Demonstrations, theatrical performances, manifestations of all sorts of programs of the various "fronts" -- fronts of the industrial areas, of the rural areas, of the educational realm, of sanitary measures -- all these required the cooperation of the artist. A number of "peasant homes" in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk and other cities as well as soldiers' barracks, clubs, etc. were ornamented with fresco paintings, ornaments and decorations.

Easel painting was virtually unknown. This was proved in 1918 in the "Exhibition of Ukrainian Artists", where the paintings exhibited were small in number and had no special qualities. In 1920, in a small room in Kiev, another exhibition of paintings was shown, and once more it had no broad character. Only at the beginning of 1925, at the opening of the so-called Fair of the 'Kontrakty' /a special section of the city of Kiev/ in Kiev, a rather interesting exhibition was shown in which not only painters but also graphic artists and sculptors participated.

When, after the civil war, attention was paid to economic reconstruction, the role of the artist in social life also changed. Draftsmen were employed as illustrators and caricaturists. The publishing houses ordered dust jackets, book illustrations, original type, and the like, from the artists. Painters went to work on portraits of statesmen and theatrical designs. Since that time, art for art's sake is on its way out, and the artists are entering more and more into the service of everyday life and economy. The gap between art and life becomes smaller and smaller. Of course, art is not exclusively dedicated to utilitarian purposes. At the same time, the artists are in search of a new language, of a new style. And eventually the time came when this search brought about a grouping together of the artists in a firm organization.

In 1926, upon the initiative of the artists, F. Krycevs'kyj, Kozik,

532 and B. Pylypenko a group was formed in Kiev under the /402/ name of "Asocijacija Khudozhnykiv chervonoi Ukrainy -- AKhChU" (Association of the Artists of the Red Ukraine). At the same time a second organization was founded, the "Asocijacija revol'ucijnych mytciv Ukrainy -- ARMU" (Association of Revoluationary Artists of the Ukraine), upon the initiative of the President of the Kiev Art Institute, Vrona, and of the artists, M. Bojchuk, Sedl'ar, M. Burachek and others. Finally, in 1927, still another Kiev society was formed, the "Objednann'a suchasnych mytciv Ukrainy -- OSMU" (Association of Contemporary Artist of the Ukraine), founded by the Kiev artists, Taran, Kramarenko, and others.

To the AKhChU belong artists who live in various cities of the Ukraine. In 1927, this Association opened its first exhibition in Kharkov under the title "Chudozhnyk-s'ohodni" ("The Artist of Today"). The purpose of this exhibition was not to show artistic achievements, but to show how the artist works under the new conditions and what possibilities were open to him. The exhibition included paintings, drawings, sketches for scene designs, sculptures, puppets, even artistically woven materials, and embroideries. The exhibition indicated that we do have artistic talents in Kharkov, who must be supported and who create works that are in tune with our present-day society.

The first exhibition of the ARMU took place in March 1927 in the halls of the Museum of Art History in Kharkov. Most of the artists belonging to this Association came from Kiev; some were from Kharkov and Odessa. They represented various styles and were not bound together by a common stylistic principle. There was expressionism (Eleva), constructivism (Ermilov), stylization following old old Ukrainian art and primitivism (Schlechtmann, Misin, Lepkivs'kyj, Padalka), pure painting of the academic style (the dry, colorless but sure draftsman Prof. Saronov), subject-conscious imitators of past masters (Prokhorov with his "Council of Women" and the "Sten'ka"). Moreover, there were the outstanding landscape paintings of Prof. Simonov, impressionistic landscape by M. Burachek and Cerkas'kyj, strong still-life pictures by Taran. The graphic arts and scene designs were likewise represented. Most of the interest focused on the expressionistic scene designs by V. Meller and O. Khvostok.

Next followed an exhibition by the AKhChU which featured the representatives of stylization (Ivanov, Zhuk) and of expressionism (Tkachenko). In general, this exhibition, though weaker than the preceding one, showed more uniformity.

532 The fourth exhibition took its cue from the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution. It took place in the newly erected Palace of State Industry, a large edifice in honor of economic socialization. A greater number of works of art were exhibited than in the previous exhibitions. It was an all-Ukrainian exhibition, and all styles of art were exhibited, styles that had hitherto been shown in isolation.

As early as November 1917, when the Ukrainian Academy of Arts was founded, the professors were divided into two stylistic groups. /403/ One group was orientated toward western Europe. These artists found the essence of Ukrainian art in genre pictures and Ukrainian landscapes to which they brought national coloring and the mood of intimacy. The artist used the techniques which general European art had used in the past and is still using today. Members of this group were O. Murashko, M. Burachek, F. Krychevs'kyj, and, in part, T. M. Zhuk as well as J. Narbut. Narbut's talent had a retrospective flavor, and he felt, unlike any other artist, the beauty of ancient popular Ukrainian art. Endowed with a wonderful gift of intuition, he resurrected the Ukrainian graphic arts. He learned by studying the treasures of old Ukrainian art, though he managed eventually to make each of his works of art, which he based upon traditional motives, so unique that the well-known motif appeared renovated. Hence Narbut succeeded in reviving and continuing traditional Ukrainian art.

Aside from this decidedly retrospective school, which attempts to make the present conform to the past, there is still another movement which falls back on the past though it pays stronger tribute to the present time. This movement is represented by Prof. M. Bojchuk. The artists belonging to this school are ardent admirers of the ancient icons, portraits and woodcuts, and they introduce these elements of ancient Ukrainian art into their works of art of today. They use the forms (patterns) of the past and fill them with contemporary content, especially with dynamic forceful revolutionary subjects, subjects that are essentially different from the saints of the icons. This school attempted to express the idea and emotional world of the Ukraine of the revolutionary period, and in doing this the artists adopted all too rigid forms and paid almost no attention to color. To be sure, this school has many healthy roots, but it is rather hopeless to squeeze such subjects as "Execution by a Firing Squad" or "Defense of a City" into ancient molds. It is permissible to start from the saints of the icons and the patterns of our ancient art, but one has to use these elements in an entirely new manner.

In the life system of the USSR art must not be the product of a special group of individuals, but the product of a collective, a work of the total working-class and peasant-class society. Soviet art not

532 only faces the task of serving the masses, but the masses themselves must be drawn into the process of artistic creation. This is the reason why, in addition to the above-mentioned "control" exhibitions, migratory exhibitions are being organized which are shown in the factories and settlements of the provincial cities and serve to make the fine arts popular among the workers and peasants. Such exhibitions are accompanied by lectures and explanations.

At the present time the tasks of our art lie not in the field of formalistic search. The path for our creative efforts lies in the organic relationship with the creative process of the proletariat and of the working peasantry.

12: Buracek RD1 Ukraine

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I.

Die darstellende Kunst in der Ukraine

Von M. Buraček

Während die ukrainische Literatur bereits in der 1. Hälfte des 19. Jhs. namhafte Vertreter hatte, kann die bildende Kunst erst gegen Ende des Jahrhunderts einige Namen von Bedeutung aufweisen. Ihre eigentliche Entwicklung beginnt aber erst im 20. Jh., wobei die Jahre nach der Revolution von besonderer Wichtigkeit für ihre weiteren Schicksale waren.

Während des Bürgerkrieges spielte die Kunst eine bedeutende Rolle in der Propaganda und Agitation. Millionen von Plakaten, Losungen, Illustrationen überfluteten das Land. Demonstrationen, Theateraufführungen, Manifestationen, allerlei Kampagnen an den „Fronten" — des Industriegebietes, des Landbaues, des Bildungswesens, der gesundheitlichen Fürsorge — all diese erforderten Künstlerkräfte. Eine Reihe von „Bauernheimen" in Kyiv, Charkiv, Odessa, Dnipropetrovs'k und anderen Städten, Kasernen, Klubs u. dgl. wurden mit Freskogemälden, Ornamehtik und Dekorationen ausgestattet.

Staffeleiproduktion war eigentlich unbekannt; das zeigte im Jahre 1918 die „Ausstellung ukrainischer Künstler", die erstens Werke in keiner großen Anzahl zusammengebracht hatte und zweitens keine allgemeine Physiognomie hatte. Im Jahre 1920 ist in einem kleinen Raume in Kyiv eine Gemäldeausstellung eröffnet worden, die wiederum keinen breiten Charakter trug. Erst zu Beginn des Jahres 1925 wurde zur Eröffnung des sog. „Kontrakten-Jahrmarktes" in Kyiv eine recht interessante Ausstellung veranstaltet. Hier war sowohl Malerei als auch Graphik und Skulptur vertreten.

Als nach dem Bürgerkriege der Aufbau der Wirtschaft an die Reihe kam, änderte sich auch die Rolle der Künstler im Aufbau des sozialen Lebens. Die Zeichner wurden verwendet als Illustratoren, Karikaturisten; die Verlage gaben Buchumschläge und Illustrationen für Bücher, Originaltypen u. a. in Auftrag. Die Maler arbeiteten an Bildnissen der Staatsmänner, an Entwürfen für das Theater. Die „reine Kunst" stellt sich seitdem immer mehr in den Dienst des praktischen Lebens und der Wirtschaft, die Spannung zwischen Kunst und Leben wird immer geringer. Natürlich beschränkt sich die Kunst nicht ausschließlich auf praktische Funktionen. Gleichzeitig sucht sie nach einer neuen Sprache, nach einem neuen Stil. Zur gegebenen Zeit hatte dieses Suchen eine Vereinigung der Künstler zu einer geschlossenen Organisation zur Folge.

In Kyiv bildet sich im Jahre 1926 auf Veranlassung der Künstler F. Kryčevs'kyj, Kozik und B. Pylypenko eine Vereinigung unter dem

Namen „Asocijacija chudožnykiv červonoi Ukrainy — AChČU" (Vereinigung der Künstler der Roten Ukraine). Gleichzeitig entsteht auf Initiative des Rektors des Kyiver Kunstinstitutes Vrona, der Künstler M. Bojčuk, Sedl'ar, M. Buraček und anderer auch die zweite Vereinigung: „Asocijacija revol'ucijnych mytciv Ukrainy — ARMU" (Vereinigung revolutionärer Künstler der Ukraine). Schließlich organisierte sich im Jahre 1927 gleichfalls in Kyiv noch eine Gesellschaft namens „Objednann'a sučasnych mytciv Ukrainy — OSMU" (Vereinigung zeitgenössischer Künstler der Ukraine) auf Anregung der Kyiver Künstler Taran, Kramarenko u. a.

Der erstgenannten Assoziation gehören Künstler an, die in verschiedenen Städten der Ukraine leben. Ihre erste Ausstellung veranstaltete sie 1927 in Charkiv unter dem Titel „Chudožnyk-s'ohodni" (Der Künstler von heute). Die Ausstellung hatte nicht die Absicht, künstlerische Errungenschaften vorzuführen, sondern den Künstler unter den neuen Verhältnissen zu zeigen, wie er gegenwärtig arbeitet und welche Möglichkeiten ihm bevorstehen. Die Ausstellung brachte Gemälde, Zeichnungen, Entwürfe für Dekorationen, Plastiken, Puppen, sogar Kunstwirkerei und Stickereimuster. Sie zeigte, daß wir in Charkiv Künstlerkräfte besitzen, die man unterstützen muß und die Werke schaffen, die unserer Gegenwart entsprechen.

Die erste Ausstellung der „ARMU" fand im März 1927 in den Sälen des Charkiver Kunsthistorischen Museums statt. Die Mitglieder der Vereinigung, hauptsächlich aus Kyiv, dann aus Charkiv und teils aus Odessa, vertraten verschiedene Richtungen, die durch kein einheitliches Prinzip verbunden waren: Expressionismus (Jeleva), konstruktive Gebilde (Jermilov), Stilisierungsversuche im Charakter der altukrainischen Kunst und Primitive (Schlechtmann, Misin, Lepkivs'kyj, Padalka), reine Malerei akademischen Stils (der trockene, farblose aber gute Zeichner Prof. Šaronov), auf das Stoffliche eingestellter Epigonismus (Prochorov mit seinem „Frauenrat" und dem „Sten'ka"). Ferner stachen hervor die herrlichen Landschaftsbilder von Prof. Simonov, impressionistische Landschaftsbilder von M. Buraček und Čerkas'kyj, kräftige Stilleben von Taran. Graphik und Theatermalerei waren ebenfalls vertreten. Das meiste Interesse lenkten auf sich die expressionistischen Bühnenausstattungen von V. Meller und O. Chvostov.

Hernach wurde eine Ausstellung der AChČU eröffnet, die Vertreter der Stilisierung (Ivanov, Žuk) und des Expressionismus (Tkačenko) zu Worte kommen ließ; im allgemeinen sah diese Ausstellung bereits nach etwas Einheitlichem aus, obwohl sie schwächer als die frühere war.

Die vierte Ausstellung wurde dem 10jährigen Jubiläum der Oktoberrevolution angepaßt. Sie fand im neuerrichteten Palaste der Staatsindustrie statt, einem mächtigen Bauwerke der sozialistischen Wirtschaft; die Zahl der ausgestellten Werke war größer als die der früheren Ausstellungen. Die Ausstellung war allukrainisch und führte sämtliche Kunstrichtungen vor, die vereinzelt auf den früheren Ausstellungen zu sehen waren.

Bereits zur Zeit der Gründung der ukrainischen Kunstakademie (November 1917) waren unter den Professoren 2 Richtungen vertreten.

Die eine war europäisch orientiert und suchte das Wesen der ukrainischen Kunst in Bildern des täglichen Lebens, im ukrainischen Landschaftsbilde usw. durch ein nationales Kolorit und intime Stimmungen wiederzugeben. Äußerlich sollte dies mit Hilfe derjenigen technischen und kunstmalerischen Mittel zustande gebracht werden, deren sich die allgemein europäische Kunst bediente und noch jetzt bedient. Zu dieser Gruppe gehörten O. Muraśko, M. Buraček, F. Kryčevs'kyj, zum Teil T. M. Žuk, sowie J. Narbut. Narbut war seiner Begabung nach Retrospektivist und fühlte wie kein anderer die Schönheit der ukrainischen altertümlichen und volkstümlichen Kunst. Mit wunderbarer Intuitionsgabe ausgestattet, rief er die ukrainische Graphik neuerdings ins Leben. Er verstand es, sich den Schatz der altukrainischen Kunst zunutze zu machen, doch war jedes seiner nach dem Vorbilde der alten Kunst geschaffenen Werke stets so eigenartig, daß das bekannte Motiv wieder erneut auflebte. Narbut hat demnach die Tradition der altherkömmlichen ukrainischen Kunst gewissermaßen wiedererweckt und fortgesetzt.

Neben dieser ausgesprochen retrospektiven Richtung, die darauf hinausgeht, die Gegenwart der Vergangenheit anzupassen, setzte sich eine ebenfalls auf die Vergangenheit zurückgreifende Richtung durch, die mit dem Namen Prof. M. Bojčuks verbunden ist und die der Gegenwart mehr Rechnung trägt. In der begeisterten Bewunderung des altertümlichen Heiligenbildes, des Porträts und des Holzschnittes führen die Künstler dieser Richtung Elemente der altukrainischen Kunst in die Gegenwart ein, indem sie deren Formen für die Behandlung zeitgenössischer Sujets verwenden, namentlich der dynamisch kraftvollen Revolutionssujets, deren Inhalt ein wesentlich anderer ist als der des Heiligenbildes. Indem diese Richtung bestrebt war, die Idee und die Gefühlswelt der Ukraine der Revolutionszeit auszudrücken, verschloß sie sich bis jetzt in allzu unbewegliche Formen und verzichtete fast auf Farben. Gewiß hat diese Richtung viele gesunde Wurzeln, aber eine „Erschießung" oder eine „Verteidigung der Stadt" den altertümlichen Kunstformen anpassen zu wollen, ist eine hoffnungslose Sache. Vom Heiligenbild und den Vorbildern unserer alten Kunst kann man wohl ausgehen, aber in ganz neuer Weise.

Im Lebenssysteme der Räterepublik darf die Kunst kein Erzeugnis einer besonderen Gruppe von Individuen sein, sondern ein Erzeugnis des Kollektivs, ein Werk der gesamten Arbeiter- und Bauerngesellschaft. Die Rätekunst hat nicht bloß die Massen zu bedienen, vielmehr müssen die Massen selbst in den künstlerischen Schöpfungsprozeß hineingezogen werden. Aus diesem Grunde werden außer den erwähnten Kontrollausstellungen noch Wanderausstellungen für Fabriken in den Provinzstädten und Ansiedlungen veranstaltet zur Popularisierung der bildenden Kunst unter den breiten Arbeiter- und Bauernmassen. Solche Ausstellungen werden von entsprechenden Referaten, Lektionen und Erläuterungen begleitet.

Die Aufgaben unserer Kunst liegen gegenwärtig nicht auf dem Gebiete des formalen Suchens. Die organische Verwandtschaft mit dem Schöpfungsprozesse des Proletariats und des werktätigen Bauerntums ist die Bahn für unsere Schöpfungsarbeit.

Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine

By Michael Pap

175 THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN controversy over the status of the Ukraine[1] dates as far back as 1654. In that year, Bohdan Khmelnitzkyj, Hetman of Ukraine, taking into account the constant dangers of Polish and Tartar aggressions, concluded a mutual assistance treaty, called "Perejaslavka Uhoda," with the Moscovite Tsar Alexej. The treaty provided for stationing a small military detachment of Tsarist forces in the Ukraine. The Russian Tsar pledged to respect the sovereignty of the Ukraine by not interfering in the internal, political and social life of the country. However, after the occupation of strategic military bases, these solemn vows were gradually ignored and forgotten. Tsarist agents, sent to the Ukraine under various pretexts, conducted themselves as conquerors rather than as allies of an independent power.[2] Recognizing his historical error in voluntarily submitting the Ukraine to Russian rule, Khmelnitzkyj mad vain preparations to drive out the Tsar's forces. His sudden death on August 6, 1657, interrupted his plans, and gave the Russian officials the opportunity to impose, without consulting the local government, more and more of the Tsar's laws and decrees upon the Ukraine. After Khmelnitzkyj's death, the Moscovite rulers found themselves in a very favorable situation. There was no leadership in the Ukraine capable of combatting the Russian occupation policy and of inspiring the Ukrainian people, exhausted in wars with the Tartars and Poles, to resist the forcible restrictions governing the Ukraine's independence.

Fifty-five years later, Hetman Ivan Mazepa, esteemed by Ukrainians as the most loyal servant of Tsar Peter I, concluded a secret agreement (1708), aimed at shaking off the Russian rule, with the Swedish King Charles XII. When the Swedish forces entered the Ukrainian frontiers, Mazepa issued a proclamation to his Cossacks to join the

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1 Ukraine is the second largest of the Soviet republics with a present population of approximately 50 millions of which about 42 millions are Ukranians. After World War I, the country was divided between the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. As a result of World War II, all Ukrainian territories came under the rule of the Kremlin, and were made parts of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which is a member of the United Nations.

2 For the detailed story see G. Vernadsky, *Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1941).

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175 King and to regain their lost independence. However, his appeal was distrusted because of his loyalty to the Tsar. As a result, only a small Cossack force joined the King's army; and it was defeated in the battle of Poltava on July 10, 1709. Russian military units occupied the entire territory of the Ukraine and made it a province of Russia. Gradually, even the existence of a separate Ukrainian nationality was denied by the Russians; but the spirit of lost liberty could not be completely destroyed. The opposition against the Tsar's oppression was felt and later promoted by the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) who, because of his courage, was forced to spend a considerable length of time in exile. The Russian reaction to the stirrings among the Ukrainian masses inspired by Shevchenko was a more severe and inhuman suppression. The lowest point of Russian chauvinism was reached when the Minister of the Interior, Count P. Valuev, issued on June 21, (June 8, old style) 1863 a ukase in which he angrily stated that "a Little Russian (Ukrainian) nationality never has existed, does not exist and cannot exist."[3] On May 18, 1876, Tsar Alexander II signed in Ems a special order prohibiting the use of the Ukrainian language in literature.[4] This order was remitted in 1905 but reimposed in full force in 1914 at the beginning of World War I. The Tsarist policy of oppression of non-Russian peoples was among the factors which contributed to the collapse of its regime in March, 1917.

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668 After the fall of the monarchy, the non-Russian peoples availed themselves of the first opportunity to regain their freedom.[5] In the Ukraine, a National Central Rada (Council) was spontaneously organized in April, 1917 under the presidency of a well known historian, Mychajlo Hruschevskyj. This National Rada was recognized and welcomed as the representative organ of the Ukraine by the Congress of Ukrainian soldiers in Kiev in 1917, by the Peasants Congress of Ukraine, and by the Worker's Congress, July 1917. The political

3 T. G. Mazaryk, *The Spirit of Russia* (New York, 1919), p. 304.

4 D. Doroshensko, *History of the Ukraine* (Edmonton, 1939), p. 591.

5 The major non-Russian nationalities in the former Russian empire such as the Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians, Georgians, Azerbaijans, Armenians, Kasakhs, etc. have a long history of struggle aaginst Russian imperialism and oppression. However, former historians and Tsarist representatives abroad refer to them as Russians, despite the difference of culture and languages. This oversimplification of the real facts caused much confusion in the Western world in the past. Even today many responsible individuals refer to the Soviet Union simply as Russia.

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668 parties which came into legal existence sent, together with national minorities, their representatives to the Rada.

At the beginning, the Rada did not aim to separate the Ukraine as an independent state from Russia, but asked, during the negotiations with the Provisional Government, a territorial autonomy in federation with Russia. It further demanded that the Russian Government abstain from interference in Ukrainian internal affairs. However, this modest demand was first rejected by the Provisional Government in Petersburg, and led the majority of the Ukrainian people into believing that the new Government in Russia was prepared to continue the policy of the Tsars regarding the non-Russian people. As a result, the possibility of establishing peaceful and friendly relations among the various nationalities was jeopardized by the Russians themselves.

Taking note of the strong determination on the part of the people, the Ukrainian Central Rada issued, on June 23, 1917, its first universal "declaration" in which the "Autonomous Ukrainian Republic" was proclaimed. Informing the Ukrainian people about the unsuccessful negotiations with the Provisional Government in Petersburg, the Rada declared that "from this day on, we ourselves will create our own destiny." [6] Simultaneously, a General Secretariat, with Wolodymyr Winnichenko at its head, was formed. It took shape as the Ukrainian Government while the Central Rada was reorganized as the revolutionary parliament.

648 During the short life of the Provisional Government, only the Bolshevik Party took the existing facts into account. Lenin, who previously did not believe in a Bolshevik victory in Russia during his lifetime, recognized, after his return from Switzerland in April, 1917, that administrative incapacity and the political blunders of the Provisional Government offered a reasonable chance immediately to seize political power in Russia. Analyzing the situation, Lenin introduced the program of the Bolshevik Party which promoted such revolutionary slogans as self-determination of nations within Russia and their right

6 M. Hrushevsky, *The History of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1945), p. 526.

7 The Seventh (April) Conference of the All-Russian Social-Democratic Labor (Bolshevik) Party, held on May 7-12, 1917 adopted a resolution on the National Question in which the policy toward non-Russian peoples was formulated. Among other points, the resolution stressed: "The right of all nations forming part of Russia to freely secede and form independent states shall be recognized. To negate this right or to fail to take measures guaranteeing its practical realization, is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure and annexation. . . ."

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to secede from Russia.[7] At the beginning, these revolutionary slogans 648
won many sympathizers for the Bolsheviks among non-Russian nations, since it was believed that the Bolshevik Party was the only political group in Russia which would not oppose the creation of the national States. For example, Stalin, whom Lenin deemed an expert on the national question, went so far as to openly denounce the methods of the Provisional Government in dealing with the Ukrainian problems. He declared that the accusation of treason levelled against the leaders of the Ukraine only concealed the plan to destroy the idea of national liberation. Shortly before the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, Stalin wrote:

> No one has the right to interfere in the internal life of nations and to correct their mistakes by force. The nations are independent in the question of their internal life; therefore, they have the right to determine freely their own destiny.[8]

Only at a time of crisis, when the Provisional Government began to lose control over the developments in Russia, did its representatives I. G. Tsereteli, M. Tereschenko and A. Kerensky resume negotiations with the Rada[3] in Kiev. A compromise agreement was concluded on July 11, 1917 in which the Provisional Government recognized "without delay" the autonomy of the Ukraine and the General Secretariat as the governing body of Ukrainian affairs. The result of this agreement was proclaimed in the second universal "declaration" to the Ukrainian people on July 16, 1917. Even then, many representatives of the Provisional Government were reluctant to recognize the existing facts. Prime Minister G. E. Lvoff as well as his Cadet Ministers (Constitutional Democrats) resigned on July 16, 1917 in protest against the "concessions" granted to the Ukrainians.[9]

While the Provisional Government continued the struggle against the Ukraine, the Bolshevik Party recognized, without hesitation, the Ukrainian Rada as the legal government. However, later develop-

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8 J. V. Stalin, "Counter-revolution and the People of Russia," *Sotchineniya*, Vol. 3 (Moscow, 1946), p. 207.

9 The American Ambassador in Russia, Francis, informed the Secretary of State on July 16, 1918: ". . . Cause (of the resignation of the Cadet Ministers) attributed is that Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Posts and Telegraphs who returned yesterday from Ukraine had granted that province concessions with which Cadet party unable to agree. . . ." Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia 1918*, Vol. II (Washington, 1932), p. 646.

3 [the National Central Rada (Council) organized in 1917 — Analyst]

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648 ments proved that this was only a formal recognition of existing facts and a desire to win confidence among non-Russian people. The Provisional Government's mistakes and incompetence resulted in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, which led to the establishment of the Soviet regime.[10]

648 After the revolution, Stalin was appointed Commissar of Nationalities. Lenin believed that the appointment of the non-Russian Dzugashwili to this post would make the Bolshevik slogans even more acceptable to the non-Russian peoples. He had ready plans for the occupation of the Ukraine and other semi-independent countries but did not have the military might needed to crush their national Governments. Therefore, Lenin turned to the method of infiltrating destructive forces into the Ukraine in order to weaken its independence from within. The Bolsheviks were aware of the fact that, if the Ukraine remained independent, Soviet Russia would have tremendous difficulties in carrying out the plan of "liberation" of other countries in the future. Therefore, the declaration of the right of nations to self-determination, officially proclaimed by the Bolsheviks, proved to be valid only as long as it served the purpose of strengthening the Soviet regime. Once the Bolsheviks were in power, they openly demonstrated that between the policy of white and red Moscow toward the Ukraine there was little or no difference. Recognizing this fact, the formerly subjugated nations were even more determined to promote their liberation from Moscow. On November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian National Rada proclaimed independence by issuing the Third Universal. The Government still believed in an eventual federation with a free Russia, which would recognize Ukrainian independence and would abstain from interference in its internal affairs. This viewpoint was expressed in a note to the Allied powers.[11] Again, the Russian anti-Soviet political and military leaders refused to accept such

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10 Professor Masaryk, former President of the Czechoslovakian Republic and a well known authority on Russia, comments on the easy Bolshevik victory: "The way for Lenin's regime had been prepared by the Provisional Government and by Kerensky, both of whom showed administrative incapacity and entrusted wide spheres of action to bad and incompetent men. . . . Lenin was a logical consequence of Russian illogicality." *The Making of a State, Memories and Observances, 1914-1918* (London, 1927), p. 176.

11 On December 12, 1917, the Secretary of State for International Affairs of the Ukraine, Shulgin, despatched notes to the Allied powers informing them about the desire of the Ukrainian Government to enter into friendly relations with the free States as an independent power. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 630.

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a solution. At a later date, these anti-Soviet forces indirectly helped the Bolsheviks to remain in power.[12]

On December 17, 1917, Lenin dispatched an ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada in which he demanded: recognize the Soviet Government within forty-eight hours or take the consequences of an open war. With this action, the Soviet Government inaugurated the policy of "persuasion" by force. The Rada rejected the Soviet ultimatum in an answer on December 19, 1917, and urged the Ukrainian people to be prepared to defend their freedom.[13] The determination of the Ukrainian people to defend their liberty forced the Bolsheviks to change their tactics. They decided to postpone their open aggression and instead to appeal directly to the Ukrainian masses.

The Bolsheviks inspired a Congress of workers and peasants to meet at Kiev on December 18, 1917. Contrary to their expectations, a large majority of the delegates took an energetic stand for the right of the Rada to represent the Ukrainian people. Only 80 out of a total of 2,000 delegates supported the Bolsheviks. This small minority proceeded to Kharkov, where the Congress of Proletarians (radical elements from Donez Basin, mostly non-Ukrainians), was held. At the session of Decemer 27, 1917, this group proclaimed itself the "only representative body" of the Ukraine and issued an appeal for help to the Soviet Government of Russia. Two days later, the Sovnarcom welcomed, in a special resolution, this "new revolutionary Govern-

12 In his report "On National Factors in Party and State Development" Stalin stated: "Do not forget such reserves as those constituted by the oppressed peoples, who remain silent, but whose very silence exerts pressure and decides much. This is often not felt, but these peoples live, they exist, and they must not be forgotten. Yes, Comrades, it is dangerous to forget them. Do not forget that if in the rear of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel and Yudenich we had not had the so-called 'aliens,' the oppressed people who disorganized the rear of these generals by their tacit sympathy for the Russian proletarians —comrades, this is a specific factor in our development, this tacit sympathy, which nobody hears or sees, but which decides everything—if it were not for this sympathy, we would not have nailed a single one of these generals. While we were advancing on them, their rear was disintegrating. Why? Because these generals depended on the colonizing elements among the Cossacks, they held out to the oppressed peoples the prospect of further oppression, and the oppressed people were therefore *forced* into our arms while we held aloft the banner of the liberation of these oppressed peoples. That is what decided the fate of these generals; those are the factors which, although thy are obscured by the victories of our armies, in the long run decided everything. This must not be forgotten." *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), Stenograficheskij otchet, April 17-25, 1923* (Glavpolitprosvet, Moscow, 1923), p. 455.

13 Both the Soviet ultimatum as well as the answer of the Ukrainian Government is cited in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918* (New York), pp. 437-438.

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648 668 ment" of the Ukraine and promised it unlimited help.[14] On December 29, 1917, the Red Army under command of former Tsarist Colonel Muraviov invaded the Ukrainian frontiers. The open war between Soviet-Russia and the Ukraine was a reality.[15]

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648 Despite many internal and external difficulties, the Ukrainian Government offered sufficient evidence that the people were capable of governing themselves and of defending their freedom. The Ukraine, by opposing and fighting Bolshevism—increasingly regarded as the new danger to civilization—won the sympathy of many free countries. On January 11, 1918, the French High Commissioner in Kiev, General Tabouis, was instructed by the French Government to accord in its name de-facto recognition of the Ukrainian Independent State. The British Government on January 12, 1918 delegated Bogge, its High Commissioner in Kiev, to wait only for the proper moment to recognize, together with other Allied powers, the Independence of the Ukraine. The United States also considered the recognition of the Ukrainian State after the American Consul General at Moscow informed the Secretary of State of the necessity for such a step.[16]

The Ukrainian Government's efforts to establish friendly relations with foreign countries caused the Bolsheviks to conclude that, despite their promises and changes in method, they were in no position to destroy the power of national revolutions in border countries. Lenin undoubtedly realized that in order to occupy the Ukraine, he must first make peace with external enemies. For this reason he hastened the armistice negotiations, already in progress, with the Central powers at Brest-Litovsk. During the previous negotiations the Soviet delegation, under Joffe's and later under Trotsky's leadership, entirely ignored the existence of an Ukrainian state. They acted as if the Russian delegates were the legal representatives not only of the Rus-

14 Stalin's article, "What is Ukrainian Rada?" *Pravda*, December 29 (15 old style), 1917.

15 At the time when Bolshevik forces terrorized and looted the people of the Ukraine, Stalin wrote: "The people of Russia should know, that the idea of invasion of a foreign territory is strange to the Russian revolution. All people should know, that in contrast to the imperialist policy of national oppression, the Soviet government practices the policy of total liberation." *Pravda*, December 31 (old style), 1917. Cf. J. V. Stalin, *Sotchineniya*, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 25.

16 *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia, op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 655-657.

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sian but also of the Ukrainian people. This Soviet attitude reached Kiev, capitol of the Ukraine, at a time when Bolshevik forces were launching a new attack against the Ukraine with the goal of occupying Kiev at all cost. To combat the Soviet tactics at the peace Conference, the Central Rada immediately sent its plenipotentiaries to Brest-Litovsk. For ten days, the Ukrainian delegates demanded a place at the Conference table and were finally admitted to negotiations as an independent power on January 12, 1918. 648

In order to clarify the Ukraine's position in international relations as an independent state, the Central Rada on January 22, 1918 proclaimed total independence in the Fourth Universal.[17] On February 9, 1918, the plenipotentiaries concluded and signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers who officially recognized the sovereignty of the Ukraine.[18] Meanwhile, the Bolshevik forces succeeded in occupying large areas of the Ukraine, including Kiev.

On February 12, 1918, the Ukrainian Government formally requested the Central Powers to intervene and to help in driving out the Bolsheviks. As a result, German and Austrian armies entered the Ukraine and were welcomed by the population as liberators from Red terror and oppression. The swift advance of these forces on the whole front forced the Soviet Government in Petrograd to sign the previously-rejected peace treaty with the Central powers on March 10, 1918, the treaty in which the Bolsheviks also recognized the Ukrainian Independent State. The Ukrainian Government, having resumed full activity, trusted that the Central powers' military command would respect its independence and would not interfere in internal affairs. However, these expectations did not materialize. The Germans not only interterfered in the internal life but, gradually, conducted themselves as conquerors of the country. When the Central Rada protested against the open violation of the treaty by the occupation forces, the German Military command under General Eichorn dissolved the Ukrainian Government on April 26, 1918 and arrested the majority of its members.[19] Even the proclamation of General Pavlo Skoropadskyj as

17 The full text of the Fourth Universal is cited in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 444.

18 For a detailed story on the Brest-Litovsk Peace, see John W. Wheeler, *Brest-Litovsk, The Forgotten Peace* (New York, 1939).

19 For an official report on the Ukrainian-German conflicts as read by German Deputy Scheidemann in the Reichstag Committee in Berlin, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 684.

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648 Hetman of the Ukraine (April 29, 1918) did not change the situation, since a large majority of the people considered him head of a puppet government created with the help of German bayonets and, therefore, subservient to German dictation.

After the defeat of the Central powers by the Western allies at the end of 1918, the German sponsored Government was replaced by a new Ukrainian Government called "Directorium" under the leadership of Simon Petliura. At the same time, the Soviet Government annulled the Brest-Litovsk treaty and ordered its military forces to enter the Ukraine. A new war between the Ukraine and Soviet Russia began. Since the Germans had prevented the formation of a Ukrainian army, the Bolsheviks were at an advantage. In desperation, Petliura made a last attempt to combat Bolshevik aggression by concluding a very unfavorable military alliance with the Polish Government under Pilsudski's leadership.[20] The advance of the United Polish-Ukrainian Army during the summer of 1920 was reversed by a Bolshevik counter offensive. As a result, the allied forces were driven out of the Ukraine. Subsequently, the Soviet and Polish Governments agreed, in the treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, to divide the Ukrainian territories between themselves.

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642 668 After the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, Bolsheviks formed an "independent" Soviet Ukrainian Government, the members of which, directly appointed by the Kremlin, were totally subordinated to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. At this time, Stalin was in a position to openly reveal the true meaning of the Bolshevik proclamations concerning the right of non-Russian nations to self-determination when he wrote:

> We are in favor of the separation of India, Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, and the other colonies from the entente, for here separation implies the liberation of these oppressed countries from Imperialism, thus undermining the position of Imperialism and strengthening the position of revolution. We are against the separation of the border regions from Russia since separation would here involve Imperialist servitude for the border regions, thus undermining the revolutionary power of Russia and strengthening the position of Imperialism.[21]

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20 Winston S. Churchill attached great importance to this alliance as is obvious from his book, *The Aftermath* (New York, 1929), pp. 277-278.

21 Stalin's preface to his "Sbornik statei," 1920. Cf. *Sotchineniya*, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 372.

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This explanation of self-determination irritated even the Ukrainian Communists who trusted the Bolshevik slogans and supported Soviet plans during the revolution. Consequently, many of them recognized the new dangers for the Ukrainian people and decided to oppose Russian Imperialism by using the Ukrainian Communist Party as a stronghold against the Centralist attitude of the Russian Communist Party.

The open conflict between Ukrainian and Russian Communists which endangered the unity of the proletarian dictatorship arose during the sessions of the 10th Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party. At this Congress, Ukrainian Communist Zatonskyj, delivered a lengthy speech, accusing the Russian Communists of leaning on traditional Russian chauvinistic forces which ignore the gravity of national movements that had arisen during the revolution. He warned that the Ukrainian masses are aware of their national consciousness and would not tolerate a new Russian oppression.[22]

The Ukrainian Bolshevik Skrypnyk, an old friend and co-worker of Lenin, also accused the majority of the members of the Russian Communist Party of chauvinism. He courageously emphasized that the national question was one of the most dangerous problems, one which should be solved if the Soviet Government were to secure its power. Answering these warnings, Stalin bluntly replied that the Bolshevik Party had taken final leave of obsolescent views on self-determination and was not willing to return to this question.[23] However, he advised the Party members to be cautious in dealing with the national problem since the existence of the non-Russian nations could not be denied. The Soviet leaders openly demonstrated that the formal recognition of the Soviet Ukraine as an "independent" state was only a Kremlin maneuver to soften anti-Communist feeling among

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22 Zatonsky further declared: "At present, Russianism received even more rights and began to flourish with a new strength. It exists everywhere and especially among the masses of our Party members; it exists not only in the border regions such as Turkestan among the Russian colonizing elements, who were forced to accept Communism, but it exists here in Moscow in our Central administration. . . . We have to erase from the minds of our comrades the image of the Soviet Federation as a Russian one, since the question is not whether it is a Russian but whether it is a Soviet Federation. When for example, Rumania or Germany or any other country becomes a member of the Soviet Federation will it also be called 'Russian?' Of course not! . . ." *X. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partipi (B), March 8-16, 1921*, Stenograficheskij otchet (Moscow, 1921), p. 110.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

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668 the Ukrainian people. This was especially obvious when the Congress adopted a resolution calling for the liquidation of the "independence" of various Soviet Republics because, the Soviet leaders claimed, "not a single Soviet Republic, taken alone, can regard itself as secure against economic exhaustion and military destruction on the part of world Imperialism." [24] In order to eliminate the potential opposition and distrust among the non-Russian Communists, the Congress formally condemned Great Russian chauvinism as harmful, because of its colonizing spirit, to the cause of Communism. This condemnation, however, did not have any practical significance. The Soviet Commissars in the Ukraine continued the policy of strict centralization and Russification. The Ukrainian Communists could not tolerate this policy without losing face; and they demanded that the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party recall its Commissars. This demand was flatly rejected by the Kremlin with an admonition: the Soviet officials in the Ukraine must be accepted as the only executive force. Much to Lenin's surprise, the Ukrainian Communist Party at the end of 1921 dismissed the Kremlin-appointed Commissars from their duties and elected members from their own ranks for the important positions. This independent attitude of the Ukrainian Communists annoyed the Russian leaders so much that Lenin was obliged to intervene personally in the matter. In his speech at the eleventh Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party, Lenin warned that, despite the recognition of the Ukraine as an independent Soviet Republic, the Bolsheviks would not permit Ukrainian leaders to deviate from the Party principles. Lenin further informed the Congress that he had assigned "Comrade" Ordzonikidze and the Central Committee to investigate the whole matter. He admitted that, according to them, it would require ten years to compile a detailed report on the events in the Ukraine. "One thing," Lenin said, "is clear, that despite the unanimously-adopted instructions of the Central Committee, the group (appointed by the Kremlin) was replaced by the local group." [25]

642 668 The internal difficulties and independent attitude taken by the non-Russian Communists forced the Soviet leaders in Moscow to press their original plan of more centralization. On December 29, 1922, the plenipotentiary delegates of the Russian (R.S.F.S.R.), the Ukrain-

24 "The Immediate Tasks of the Party in Connection with the National Problem" Resolution adopted by the Tenth Congress.

25 *XI. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B) March 27-April 1922*, Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow), p. 31.

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ian (UKR.S.S.R.), the Byelo-Russian (W.R.S.S.R.) and the Transcaucasian (T.S.F.S.R.—Georgia, Azerbaidzan and Armenia) Socialist Republics concluded, under Moscow's auspices, a treaty providing amalgamation into a single federated state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The terms of the treaty gave the Central Soviet Government in Moscow practically unlimited power.[26] The Russian Communist Party secured its legal right to intervene in the internal affairs of the member States and to suppress the opposition against Moscow among the non-Russian Communists. However, the non-Russian leaders of the Soviet Republics were reluctant to surrender their positions and the struggle between Russian and non-Russian Communists continued with even more fervor. 642 668

The controversy over the national policy reached its climax at the twelfth Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party. In his report, Stalin spoke at length on the internal and international significance of the national question.[27] For the first time he attacked not only Great Russian chauvinism but also local nationalism as an equal danger to the Soviet regime. Referring to the penetration of elements with a Great Russian spirit into the highest ranks of the Communist Party, Stalin said: 668

> It is not accidental, comrades, that the Smenovekhists[28] have recruited a large number of supporters from among the Soviet officials. That is by no means accidental. Nor is it accidental that Messrs. the Smenovekhists are lauding the Bolshevik Communists, saying, as it were, 'You may talk as much as you like about Bolshevism, you may prate as much as you like about your internationalist tendencies, but we know that what Denikin failed to do, you will do; that you, Bolsheviks have resurrected, or at least are going to resurrect the great idea of a Great Russia.'[29]

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26 The Russian Communist Party was in a position to adopt any resolution, since the great majority of the Party members were Russians. At the eleventh Congress, for example, when the question of amalgamation of the republics was raised and the resolution for strict centralization approved, the delegates consisted of 341 Russians, 77 Jews, 10 Tartars, 12 Armenians, 9 Georgians, 19 Latvians, 8 Kirghizs and 46 others.

27 *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), op. cit.*, p. 441.

28 ". . . Smenovechovzy—former members of the White Army who now recognized the victory of the Red Army as a national victory, the deliverance of Russia from western Europe, and the birth of a new Russian empire of Asiatic orientation . . . (p. 137). . . . The name 'Smenovechovzy' has been coined after a collection of essays entitled 'Smena Vech,' 'the change of signposts' (Prague, 1931). A collection of essays published in 1909, called 'Vechi' advocated a change of policy by the Russian intelligentsia. In the 'Smena Vech' the change was to take the form of recognizing Bolshevism as a national government." (pp. 386-387) W. Gurian, *Bolshevism: Theory and Practice* (New York, 1932).

29 *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), op. cit.*, p. 442.

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668 Stalin further stressed that the promotion of the idea of a single and indivisible Russia would forever forfeit the confidence in Russia of the formerly oppressed people. He admitted that hostile tendencies towards Moscow among non-Russian peoples were growing rapidly, and urged the Congress to adopt every possible measure which would win for the Soviet Government respect and "love" in the Republics and which would also make the Soviet Government not merely Russian, but international.

Russian chauvinism had also been bitterly attacked by Skrypnyk, who emphasized the inability of Russians to recognize existing facts. He insisted that not one single point of the resolutions adopted at the tenth Congress had been put into effect. He complained that Ukrainians, living in Russia outside the border of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic and numbering approximately 7,000,000 were left in a cultural and educational void and that Ukrainians in the Red Army were under the pressure of forcible Russification. Skrypnyk further declared:

> There exists only a theoretical admission of the national question; when it is time to act, we show neither will nor force. Great state fictions imbibed at the mother's breast have become instinctive among many comrades. We need only to recall how many of our comrades were painfully touched when our Congress accepted the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and not Russian Soviet Socialist Republics.[30]

In addition, Skrypnyk denounced Stalin's attempt to compare Great-Russian chauvinism with the local nationalism of the non-Russian peoples. He claimed that such an interpretation of the problem would encourage the Russians, employing the excuse of fighting local nationalism, to continue their policy of Russification. Even Rakowskyj, the Kremlin-appointed president of the Soviet Ukraine, who previously rejected the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination, changed his mind after facing reality in the Ukraine and declared that the national question, if it remained ignored, was one which could cause Soviet Russia and the Party tremendous difficulties. He warned that, should the Russians continue the policy of oppression, civil war would be resumed, with even firmer effort on the part of the non-Russian peoples to secede from Russia. Rakowskyj energetically besought a practical solution, based on factual equality, of the

30 *Ibid.*, p. 522.

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problem. With regard to the Ukrainian language, the President stated: 668

> I heard talks among our comrades, that the Ukrainian language is nothing but a fiction of the Galicians (Western Ukrainians). Does this not demonstrate the Great-Russian power feelings of the Russian men, who never experienced a national oppression but on the contrary oppressed other nationalities for hundreds of years?[31]

Answering these warnings and accusations, Stalin replied:

> Besides the right of nations to self-determination, there exists also the right of the working class to consolidate its power and to establish the dictatorship, and to this latter right the right of self-determination is subordinate.[32]

The twelfth Congress passed another resolution on the "National Question," in which the Russian Communist Party pledged to free itself from Russian chauvinism. However, the most important decision of the twelfth Congress was the adoption of the so-called Ukrainianization policy. According to this policy, all Party and State institutions in the Ukraine were advised to use and to promote the Ukrainian language in dealing with the people. The reason behind the acceptance of this policy, was obvious: the Communist Party in the Ukraine could not win influence among the Ukrainian people, since the peasants referred to it as a Russian Party, interested only in the exploitation of their country.[33] By introducing the new policy the Soviet leaders hoped to establish closer contact with the masses. But Ukrainianization became national and revolutionary in substance. In 1925-26, a well-organized opposition group of Ukrainian Communists, led by Shumskyj, Maximovich, Khvylovyj, Volobuyev and others, advocated a type of national Communism which in today's language could be labeled as "Titoism." Volobuyev went so far as to declare that the Soviet Russian economic policy was nothing but a colonial exploitation of the Ukrainian people.

The Kremlin was alerted. The Soviet Russian leaders were aware of the growing dangers of this opposition in the Soviet Republics but were unable to take effective action to combat it. The Russian Com-

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31 *Ibid.*, pp. 528-534.

32 Cf. J. V. Stalin, *Sotchineniya*, Vol. V (Moscow, 1947), p. 265.

33 At the twelfth Congress the delegates were composed as follows: 60.8% Russians, 11.3% Jews, 7.1% Latvians and Estonians, 4.7% Ukrainians, 2.7% Georgians, 2.4% Armenians, 1.2% Byelo-Russians, 1.7% Kirghizs, 1% Tartars, 7.1% others.

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munist Party was itself in a very serious crisis. After Lenin's death on January 21, 1924, the top Party officials struggled among themselves for political leadership. For this reason, the national question was not even raised at the fourteenth Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party held on December 18 to 31, 1925. The Congress was entirely occupied with ironing out the sharp split within the Party. Despite the strong opposition lead by Sinoviev and Kamenev, who fought for a collective responsibility of the Politburo, the Congress made Stalin the individual dictator of the Party, giving him unrestricted authority.[34]

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Utilizing this struggle between the Russian Communists, Ukrainian writers and historians wrote and published new literature about their past and inspired resistance to Moscow's domination. One of the most influential among these writers with the courage to reject openly Moscow's right to dominate his people was Mykola Khvylovyj. During the revolution he was among the Ukrainian Communists who were misled by Bolshevik slogans and took active part in the struggle against the "bourgeois" national Government of the Ukraine. He believed in the international program of the Russian Communist Party which promised the people "land, liberty and friendship among nations." Under the impact of existing developments, however, Khvylovyj realized that the Russian Bolsheviks nurtured the idea of the "single and indivisible Russia" and that only the forms of oppression were changed. His conclusion was based upon the fact that the Bolshevik recognition of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic was composed of empty phrases and deceptions since the real political force in the Ukraine was concentrated in Russian hands. Khvylovyj now openly declared that his people could survive as a nation and live in freedom and peace only if they are able to secede from Russia. His appeal, "Away from Moscow, back to Europe," was received by Ukrainians with enthusiasm and by the Soviet leaders with considerable anxiety. Referring to the dangerous influence of Khvylovyj's writings, Stalin wrote:

> Khvylovyj's demand for "The immediate russification of the proletariat" of the Ukraine, his opinion that "Ukrainian poetry must get

34 For the story of Stalin's seizure of power see: *XIV. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), December 18-31, 1925*, Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow, 1926), pp. 207-298.

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> away from the Russian literature and its style as quickly as possible," his assertion that "the ideas of the proletariat are known to us without Moscow art," his enthusiasm for a sort of Messianic role of the "young" Ukrainian intelligentsia and his ludicrous and non-Marxist attempt to divorce culture from politics—all this, and much like it, in the mouth of a Ukrainian Communist now sounds (must sound) more than strange. Whereas the proletarians of Western Europe and their Communist Parties are full of sympathy for "Moscow" the citadel of the international revolutionary movement and of Leninism, whereas the proletarians of Western Europe turn with joy toward the banner waving over Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvylovyj has nothing better to say for "Moscow" than to appeal to Ukrainian public men to get away from "Moscow as quickly as possible!" And this is called internationalism! What can we say of other Ukrainian intellectuals, not belonging to the Communist camp, if Communists begin to talk, and not only talk, but also to write in our Soviet press, in the language of Comrade Khvylovyj?[35]

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Despite the fact that the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic secured for Moscow centralized power, internal developments in the Ukraine were at first not affected as much as many Russian Communists anticipated. On the contrary, the first years of Union status were marked by the promotion of Soviet Ukrainian statehood. Alongside the Kremlin's appointed Commissariats, the Ukraine possessed a well-organized administration of its own and its "Government" took very seriously the creation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. Kharkov and later Kiev defended the interests of the Ukraine with steadfast determination. The growth of a Ukrainian culture national in substance, fostered by Khvylovyj, progressed so rapidly that Stalin was again stirred to an open admission of its danger when he said in 1929:

> If we had nothing else but these discussions about Khvylovyj, which have become so wide and heated in the Ukraine, there would already be enough for profound alarm.[36]

The national question was once again raised at the sixteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party. Stalin proposed a new Nationalities' policy which would promote a culture socialistic in sub-

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35 J. V. Stalin's letter "To Comrade Kaganovich and other members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (B) of Ukraine," dated April 26, 1926, first published in a complete form in *Sotchineniya*, Vol. VIII (Moscow, 1948), pp. 149-154.

36 Cf. Mykola Sciborsky, *Ukraine and Russia* (New York, 1940), p. 43.

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stance and national only in form. He demanded severe punishment of the advocates of national cultures with hostile tendencies toward Moscow. Postishev, Stalin's deputy in the Ukraine, informed the Congress about the already successful suppression and persecution of the Ukrainian national movement. But he added that many Russian intellectuals in the Ukraine, encouraged by this new policy, suggested that even the Ukrainian language should be supplanted in schools by some kind of new language, possibly Esperanto.[37] He also stated that under the pressure of the Communist Party, the deviationists, Shumskyj and Khvylovyj, admitted their errors and acknowledged the correctness of the Party policy.

At this Congress, new factors relating to Ukrainian-Soviet difficulties were introduced. For the first time in the existence of the Soviet regime, Postishev reported that the O.G.P.U. had uncovered a counter-revolutionary organization in the Ukraine called the "Ukrainian National Socialist Party." Many of the members of this organization, according to Postishev, were Ukrainian Communists. Its primary aim was to form an Independent Democratic Republic. Kaganovich, another Kremlin deputy in the Ukraine, revealed the existence of a second conspiratory counter-revolutionary organization with headquarters in the Ministry of Agriculture.[38] Skrypnyk made a vain attempt to rescue the situation. He blamed Russian chauvinism for the rebirth of Ukrainian nationalism and made clear that the continuation of Soviet-Russian policy in the Ukraine would force more and more Ukrainians into the underground. Skrypnyk complained that the declaration of the right of nations, set forth on November 15, 1917, proved to be for many Russians merely a screen behind which Moscow had hidden a plan for further oppression. For many Russians, he stressed, it was only a tactical maneuver, but for the non-Russian nations, it was a most important document. No wonder, Skrypnyk added, that some Russians go so far as to declare that this important declaration of our Party was valid only until the October revolution, and that after October, it should be considered as a counter-revolutionary slogan. Skrypnyk concluded, "There cannot even be a discussion about any revision of Lenin's policy, nor of any

37 *XVI. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), June 26-July13, 1930,* Stenograficheski otchet, Partizdat (Moscow, 1930), p. 108.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 109.

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restrictions, and still less about liquidation of the national federative and autonomous republics." [39]

Aware of the dangerous position in which he placed himself by accusing Russian "Comrades" of chauvinism at a time when Stalin already belonged to that camp, Skrypnyk could not afford to fail to attack the deviationist tendencies of some Ukrainian "Comrades" in the Party. He pledged to help persecute without mercy all elements with nationalistic leanings.

At the beginning of 1930 the Soviet Secret Police uncovered the existence of another Ukrainian conspiratory organization called "Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukrainy" (The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine). The forty-day trial that followed in one of Kharkov's largest theaters disclosed that the organization's political aim was the restoration of the Independent National Ukrainian State and that it was in contact with the Ukrainian political emigrees.[40] More than forty-five well known Ukrainians, among them members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. In addition, some 4,000 members of the Youth Organization, Comsomol, were arrested. But in 1931 the OGPU uncovered still another revolutionary organization called the "National Center." The anti-Soviet underground activities in Ukraine were supported by peasants who opposed the forcible collectivization of land introduced by Bolsheviks with the five year plan in 1928-29.

In spite of all these crises and belligerent relationships between Kiev and Moscow, Skrypnyk continued to advocate the conception of Soviet Ukrainian Statehood, an idea which by now was entirely in contradiction to the official Soviet viewpoint. When he finally demanded the formation of a special Ukrainian Red Army, and the incorporation of the Ukrainian territories still under Russian administration into the Ukraine, Stalin lost his patience and summoned Skrypnyk to Moscow for an explanation. After his return in July, 1933, Skrypnyk (a member of the Communist Party since 1897, coworker of Lenin, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, head of the Council of Nationalities of the U.S.S.R. and Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic) committed suicide, according to the official anouncement. After his death, he was accused of Ukrainian nationalistic leanings and of treasonable disloyalty to

39 *Ibid.*, p. 243.
40 *Ibid.*, p. 243.

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668 the cause of Leninism. Only a few weeks before Skrypnyk's death, Khvylovyj, long the subject of refined persecution by the Soviet authorities, had been driven to commit suicide (May, 1933). According to information provided by his close friends, Khvylovyj left a note saying "I am dying because I love life."

668 661 Acting upon Stalin's order to persecute Ukrainian "nationalism," Postishev stated, in a report to the plenary session of the Ukrainian Communist Party, November 19, 1933, that the discovery of Skrypnyk's deviation? led to the purging from the Ukrainian Socialist culture of any adherence to Petliura's, Machno's and other national elements. He also declared that within a few months 27,000 members, out of a total membership of 125,000 were expelled from the party, along with 1,300 members of the Comsomol. Relieved of their posts were 240 secretaries of regional committees of the Communist Party, 250 heads of "Ispolkoms," 150 heads of controlling committees, about 1,000 officials of the Commissariat of Education, about 2,000 co-operative workers and 300 professors of various educational institutions beginning with the Ukrainian Academy of Science.[41]

Despite the increase of physical and moral terrorism, Moscow did not succeed in eliminating resistance to its rule in the Ukraine. Early in 1933 the Soviet Secret Police reported the existence of a new well-organized and disciplined underground organization, this time the "Ukrainian Military Organization," whose large membership included commanders of the Red Army, scientific workers and young intelligentsia. The aim of this group was similar to that of the ones previously uncovered, excepting that the Ukrainian Military Organization was preparing a military revolt against the existing order.

The Soviet difficulties in the Ukraine were again illustrated at the seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party. In his report on the dangerous developments in Ukraine, Stalin stated:

> The fall of Skrypnyk and his group in the Ukraine is not exceptional. Similar 'dislocations' are observable among certain comrades in other national republics.[42]

Describing the spread of local nationalism and labeling it as far more perilous for the Soviet rule than Russian chauvinism, Stalin continued:

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41 Sciborsky, *Ukraine and Russia*, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

42 *XVII. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B). January 26-February 10, 1934*, Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow, 1934), p. 30.

? [cf. category 116, pp. 220-222 — Analyst]

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> Only very recently, in the Ukraine, the deviation towards Ukrainian nationalism did not represent the major danger; but when we ceased to fight it and enabled it to grow to the extent that it joined forces with the interventionists, this deviation became the major danger.[43]

The discussion of the national question was brought to a final halt at the seventeenth Congress and the Soviet Government decided to use police terror against the opposition.[44] Following this policy, new purges were instigated and every sign of dissatisfaction with the Bolshevik order was simply suppressed by Stalin's GPU.

The various stages of Soviet tactics in regard to the national policy—the recognition of the independent National Republics, the formation of the Soviet Republics, the amalgamation of the Soviet Republics into a single Union on the basis of a "free" federation, and the liquidation of the formal "Independence" of the Republics—practically places the Russian Communists in the role of promoters of the idea of a "single and indivisible Russia" despite the Bolsheviks' attempts to demonstrate the Soviet regime as an inter-nationalist one The Soviet leaders started from the point where the Tsarist and Provisional governments ended and gradually arrived at the stage of strict centralization and oppression—with only the provision that the Kremlin was no longer in a position to deny, at least theoretically, the existence of the Ukrainian nation and language. The Soviet Russian press, however, was given, as far back as 1936, a green light to recover from the archives of the past such names as Ivan Kalyta, Ivan the Terrible, Tsar Peter the Great, Katherina II and others.

The struggle against the Ukrainian "nationalists" was carried out until "all" independent elements, including many members of the Ukrainian Communist Party, were executed or silenced. Only after the employment of total terror could the Soviet regime officially "boast"

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43 Stalin's report, *ibid.*, p. 32.

44 Describing the tactics of the Ukrainian opposition, Postishev concluded: "The Ukrainian nationalists have an interesting system of distributing their units. Take for example the People's Commissariat of Education. Its director was Yavorsky; Yavorsky went, then came Ozersky; Ozersky went, then came Konyk; all of them proved to be members of the Ukrainian Military Organization, and its leaders at that. Or take the case of the one with the power of attorney in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. There you had Maximovich; Maximovich went, then came Petrenko; Petrenko went, then came Tur—again all members of the UWO (Ukrainian Military Organization), even of its directing clique. It was the same in all the places which they controlled. They maintained the principle of always substituting their own people. Once they got control of a responsible department, they would not let it out of their hands." Postishev's report, *ibid.*, p. 70.

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668 661 of the triumph and success of "brotherly" cooperation among various nations under the leadership of the great Russian people and the "wisest" Stalin. Nevertheless, these proclamations of co-operation were soon negated by existing facts. Again *Pravda* reported new anti-Soviet activity of the "enemies of the People" in the youth organization (Comsomol) in the Ukraine:

> There is uncovered again the unseemly sight of the work of counter-revolutionaries and spies within the Comsomol of the Ukraine. Masking themselves in a base fashion, they carry on disruptive counter-revolutionary work. They consciously fouled the cadres of the Comsomol and the propaganda apparatus and they ruined political education. They served the fascists, conducted spying activities and prepared sabotage and terroristic acts. . . . These enemies of the people placed their own men in executive posts. When these men fell at one post they were immediately transferred into another region.[45]

The resistance of the Ukrainians to Moscow's domination could not be denied. However, such statements had double meaning and were produced by the Soviet press in order to justify the policy of strict centralization and Russification in the Ukraine. Even such a loyal Moscow servant as Liubchenko, President of the Soviet Ukraine, was by now considered as a dangerous and undesirable individual since he was a Ukrainian and could hinder, as Skrypnyk did in the past, the realization of the Soviet Russian policy. For this reason he was compelled to commit suicide on September 11, 1937. In the familiar Bolshevik manner, the Soviet press informed the people that Liubchenko was involved in anti-Soviet connections and, "evidently" afraid to face his responsibility before the Ukrainian people for betraying their interests, had ended his life. Such an interpretation of Liubchenko's death—who in 1934 had praised the GPU for its successful work in "totally" destroying the "nationalist" groups within the Ukrainian Communist Party—gave the Soviet regime the "legal" right to replace most Ukrainians holding higher positions in the Soviet administration by Russians whom the Kremlin could trust. Nevertheless, passive resistance to the existing order was continually felt and could not be wiped out entirely.

186 In 1938 world tension and fear of World War II increased. Therefore, even the rise of national consciousness in the small Carp-

45 *Pravda*, July 25, 1937.

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atho-Ukraine (which after 1918 became a part of Czechoslovakia and gradually developed into an autonomous entity with its own national Ukrainian Government) caused great concern in the Kremlin. 186

In order to diminish the fear of insecurity, Khruschev, Stalin's new deputy in the Ukraine, declared that Soviet patriotism prevailed in the Ukraine and that the people were filled with hatred for all bourgeois nationalists, all those "spies, Liubchenkos, Khvylovists, Zatonskis and other evil spirits."[46] In reality, however, Khruschev was not certain of Ukrainian loyalty to the Kremlin. For this reason, he considered it necessary to remind the people of their indebtedness to Moscow for the realization of their dreams:

> Ukrainian people had struggled for many years with the Tsarist autocracy, landlords and capitalists, demanding their right to develop their own culture, to possess their own schools, publish their own literature and to learn in their own language. Only as a result of the October Socialist revolution, as a result of Lenin-Stalin national policy and Stalin's personal interest in the development of the Ukrainian culture, did we win a world-wide historical victory in the field of cultural achievements.[47]

The invasion of Carpatho-Ukraine by the Hungarian Army on March 15, 1939 was received by Moscow with relief. Stalin interpreted Hitler's approval of the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine to mean that Germans had abandoned their plan to invade the Soviet Union in the near future. On August 23, 1939, the Soviet Government concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany. This pact was followed by the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 and the Red Army invasion on September 17 of Eastern Poland, which was inhabited mostly by Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians. The old and practically abandoned Soviet declaration of the right of nations to self-determination was once again proclaimed as valid so as legally to justify the right of the Soviet Union to intervene and to "liberate brothers", Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians, from Polish oppression. 000

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On June 22, 1941, the German Army invaded the Soviet Union.

46 *XVIII. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), March 10-21, 1939*, Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow, 1939), p. 169.
47 *Ibid.*, p. 173.

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000 Now for the first time Stalin and his Politburo felt the full impact of the people's hatred toward the Bolshevik regime. Stalin realized that all demonstrations of unity and patriotism on the part of the Soviet peoples were void of sincerity. Much to Stalin's distress, the German Army was greeted as the liberators of the oppressed people from Communist tyranny. Within a few months, his position as dictator was shaken to such a degree that the Soviet regime was on the eve of collapse. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers refused to fight for the survival of the Soviet order, and surrendered to the Germans with the hope of living in freedom and in security in their own countries after the defeat of Bolshevism. However, at this time of crisis a strong ally appeared on the Bolshevik side. This ally proved to be Hitler himself with his cruel Eastern European policy of colonization and total oppression. The population of the "liberated" countries, the Ukraine, Byelo-Russia, the Baltic States, and some Caucasian regions, was brutally treated as a second class people whose only right under "civilized" German rule was to work and to obey orders as slaves. Every sign of national activity was mercilessly suppressed. The despised Soviet Kholchoz (collective farms) were not dissolved as the peasants anticipated. Stalin realized that he was in a position to utilize for his own purposes the blunders of the external enemies of the Soviet regime. First, he appealed to the patriotism of the Great Russian people and urged them to defend their freedom and their "fatherland" against the German invaders. He called upon the non-Russian people already under German occupation to resist Hitler's tyranny. With the conclusion of an alliance with the Western Powers, he not only was assured of material help, but he had also eliminated the creation of a third force. This force, in the name of liberty, might have overthrown Stalin's dictatorship and proclaimed Russia a democratic republic which would continue the war against Germany.

As a result of Stalin's maneuvers, tactics and appeals, millions of peoples throughout the world, among them even those who knew the Bolsheviks well, interpreted his declarations as the final retreat from Marx's and Lenin's doctrines of Communist World domination. Even many people among the oppressed nations were led to believe that under the pressure of the German terror and persecutions, the Soviet regime had changed and that reality had forced Stalin into concess-

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000 ions and into the promotion of democracy within the Soviet Union.[48]

Numerous difficult problems, which Stalin was anxious to solve in accordance with his plans, forced the "Generalissimo" at the end of the War to follow a cautious policy toward the non-Russian peoples, liberated from the German occupation. First, he needed time for the stabilization of his power inside the Soviet Union. For example, in the Ukraine he had considerable difficulties with the well-organized Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which emerged in 1941 as the reaction against the German terror, and now was engaged in a struggle against the Soviet occupation forces.[49] In addition, there were millions of Soviet citizens in Western Europe, former German slave laborers and prisoners of war, whose return to the Soviet "homeland" was a matter of major importance to the Soviet regime. These people were living witnesses of the failure of the Communist experiments in their countries and could have given tremendous support to the free world in Stalin's planned cold war. Consequently, the Soviet Government was anxious to reach an agreement on the question of repatriation of all Soviet citizens from the Western countries. An agreement on this matter was concluded at the Yalta Conference and was announced by the White House on February 12, 1945. The anxiety of the Soviet Government was abated since the agreement did not provide for an individual choice between political asylum and repatriation but made the return obligatory upon all persons who were Soviet citizens as of September 1, 1939.[50]

661 As soon as the Soviet Government achieved control over the territories occupied by the Red Army, Stalin revealed his true plans with regard to the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. He accused some nationalities of being unworthy of the "privileges" given them

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48 The real meaning of the Soviet promises, alliances and retreats was clearly explained by Stalin in his article on "Strategy and Tactics," 1924. He wrote: "The revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as a means wherewith to link legal work with illegal work, in order to use it as a screen behind which his illegal activities in the revolutionary preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie may be intensified. This is what the revolutionary utilization of reforms and agreements in an imperialist environment means." J. V. Stalin, *Sotchineniya,* Vol. VI (Moscow, 1947), p. 166.

49 According to various information from behind the iron curtain, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is still operating in small detachments especially in the Carpathian mountains.

50 *Department of State Bulletin,* "Repatriation of U. S. and Soviet Citizens" (Washington, 1945), Vol. 14, p. 443.

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661 by the Soviet regime and, as a result, made them collectively responsible for the delayed defeat of the German Army. This condemnation brought about the liquidation of several Soviet nationalities such as the Chechen-Ingush, the Kalmyks, the Crimean Tartars and the Germans of the Volga.[51] With regard to the larger nationalities, like the Ukrainians, the Byelo-Russians, the Caucasians, who also proved to be unreliable during the crisis of 1941-43, Stalin had chosen the policy of total Russification, beginning with wholesale purges and persecutions, especially among the intelligentsia.[52]

661 The decision, however, of the Soviet Government to return to the
814 old policy of Russification was met by strong opposition. Ukrainian history, for example, was based (up to 1934 and again during the Second World War) on Hrushevskyj's works. It was, therefore, inconvenient even for the Russian Bolsheviks who were assured of Stalin's support to suddenly reject this interpretation of history since it had previous official approval by the Communists. Facing this situation, Soviet Russian historians were compelled to invent evidence that Hrushevskyj was not a scientist-historian, but a "bourgeois nationalist" who deliberately falsified actual facts in order to prove the differences between the Russian and Ukrainian nations.

One of the striking illustrations of Soviet-Russian difficulties in dealing with Ukrainian history and literature was offered by Litvin in *Bolshevik* (official Party periodical, in an article entitled, "About the History of the Ukrainian People"). In this article, Litvin admitted that the presentation of Ukrainian history and literature had up to this time been based on serious errors and deviations from the Soviet principle. These errors were promoted by the "enemies of the people" who had not yet been liquidated by the Party. He uncovered these deviations and errors in practically all the Soviet-Ukrainian histories used in schools and universities over a period of twenty-five years, and accused most of the Soviet-Ukrainian historians of having

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51 P. E. Mosely, "Soviet Policy and Nationality Conflicts in East Central Europe," *The Soviet Union, a Symposium*, W. Gurian, ed. (Notre Dame, 1951), p. 68.

52 Stalin's decision to return to the Tsarist policy of Russification should be considered as a severe blow to all non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, especially if one recalls his statement of what such promotion of Russian chauvinism would mean: "Every attempt to deviate toward great Russian chauvinism is an endeavor to ignore national differences of language, culture and mode of life; an endeavor to prepare the way for the liquidation of the national republics and regions; an endeavor to undermine the principle of national equality." Stalin's report at the XVI. Sjezd Wsesojuznoii Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), (June 26-July 13, 1930) cf. *Sotchineniya*, Vol. XII (Moscow, 1949), p. 362.

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served the anti-Soviet cause. The most inexcusable "crime" of these Soviet-Ukrainian writers was their failure to show that Great Russian literature played a significant role in developing Ukrainian culture. Litvin declared: 661 814

> The uncovery of serious shortcomings and mistakes in various publications of the Academy of Science of Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic by the Central Committees of All-Union Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Ukraine, as well as in many publications of the other Ukrainian publishing houses proved that the known group of historians and litterateurs in Ukraine are not sufficiently armed with the Marxist-Leninist materialistic methods and remain in the prison of bourgeois nationalistic methodology of Hrushevskyj. . . . Bourgeois historian Hrushevskyj developed a fallacious anti-historical conception of the origin and development of the Ukrainian people, as if the Ukrainian people had no relationship with the Russian people, as if the entire historical development of both nations had not proceeded in a genuine friendship, unity and mutual influence, but in a constant antagonism.[53]

In order to discourage Soviet historians from referring in the future to the works of Hrushevskyj, Litvin emphasized that Hrushevskyj had been in constant touch with the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, which directed anti-Soviet uprisings in the territories of the Soviet Ukraine long after the establishment of the Soviet order. Finally, after giving advice on how to write an "acceptable" history of the Ukraine, Litvin concluded that the "Ukrainian" people must wait for scientific works from Soviet historians, who will be able to present concrete proof of the "brotherly" union between the Russian and Ukrainian people and their common loyalty to the Bolsheviks.

Simultaneously with Litvin's accusations, the co-workers of Soviet-Ukrainian journals, newspapers and propaganda were advised to adjust themselves to the new Party line by denouncing and purging the "remnants" of the Ukrainian National elements from Soviet-Ukrainian literature. They were further advised to praise the Soviet order as an achievement of the Great Russian people, who, therefore, must be recognized as the leaders of all nations on the road to Communism. 661

The climax of the anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian course was

53 Litvin, "About the History of the Ukrainian People," *Boishevik*, No. 7 (Moscow, 1947), pp. 44-45.

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reached in the summer of 1951. On June 15, a ten-day festival, in which most of the Soviet-Ukrainian writers and poets participated, of Ukrainian art and literature was opened in Moscow. For some reason Stalin did not send his traditional greeting to the festival. But he attended the first performance of the opera, "Bohdan Khmelnitzkyj," the libretto of which was written by a well-known Soviet-Ukrainian writer, A. Korneichuk and his wife, Wanda Wasilevska. The following morning, the Soviet official newspaper, *Pravda,* condemned the libretto and accused its authors of "departure from historical truth." 661

On July 2, *Pravda* published an article which excited much attention in the Soviet Union and abroad. A war-time patriotic and popular poem by the Ukrainian poet, Wolodymyr Sosyura, entitled "Love the Ukraine" (written and repeatedly published in 1944 with the approval of the Soviet officials and reprinted in the Leningrad literary magazine, *Zvezda,* in May, 1951) gave *Pravda* an opportunity to unleash a blast at the ideological defections of Ukrainian writers and artists:

> . . . It is true, in his poem the poet calls for love of the Ukraine. The question arises: *Which* Ukraine is in question, of *which* Ukraine is Sosyura singing? Is he singing of that Ukraine which groaned for centuries under the exploiters' yoke and whose sorrow and bitterness poured out in Taras Shevchenko's angry lines? Or does Sosyura's poem refer to the new, prosperous Soviet Ukraine, created by the will of our people, led by the party of Bolsheviks? It is sufficient to examine Sosyura's poem to remove any doubt that, contrary to the true facts, he is singing of some primordial Ukraine, the Ukraine "in general." . . . Out of time, out of historical epoch—this is the Ukraine in the poet's portrayal.[54]

Following this attack, a series of meetings, at which serious ideological errors were found to exist, were initiated in July and August throughout the Ukraine. Having "proved" that the poem was "bourgeois-nationalistic," *Pravda* accused the editors of Russian journals which published the poem, the Ukrainian Press, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Ukraine of having failed to recognize and to combat the dangerous deviationist tendencies of Ukrainian writers.

In his open letter to the editors of *Pravda,* dated July 10, Sosyura

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54 "Against Ideological Distortions in Literature," Editorial, *Pravda,* July 2, 1951, p. 2.

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661 abjectly recanted his "unfortunate" errors. In a weird way, possible only under the pressure of Bolshevik terror, Sosyura wrote that he profoundly grasped the fact that the Soviet Ukraine cannot be conceived as separate from the mighty growth of the Soviet multi-national state, and that the Ukraine, after all, owed its present happiness to the fraternal assistance of the great Russian people. "Thanks to the leadership of our Party and of the deeply beloved leader of our peoples, Comrade Stalin, has the Ukraine become what it is," concluded Sosyura.[55]

On July 13, *Pravda* published a decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in which it was admitted that the deficiencies and errors were a result of laxity of the Central Committee in directing ideological-educational work. The Communist Party of the Ukraine pledged itself to take as quickly as possible drastic measures to eliminate serious existing deficiencies and errors in ideological works. It would educate by every means "the intelligentsia and the whole Ukrainian people . . . in the spirit of devotion to the party of Lenin and Stalin."[56]

Many more articles appeared and continued to appear in the Soviet press and journals on the distortion of ideology in Ukrainian literature and arts. The real reason for these accusations were clearly described in *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 15, in an article by the Soviet Ukrainian literary critic, Leonid Novichenko. He wrote:

> (Sosyura) . . . represents the Ukraine as standing alone, without connection with the great Russian people and other peoples of the Soviet Union. . . . The author refuses to see that in the battle to free the Ukraine, the sons of all the peoples of the Soviet Union and, in the first instance, the sons of Great Russia, took part; about them, he rudely and insultingly keeps quiet. . . . Sosyura, while praising a certain "exclusiveness" of the Ukrainian language, considered it possible not even to mention the Russian language, which is to every Ukrainian as much a native language as is Ukrainian itself.

The search for the shortcomings and mistakes in Ukrainian culture was intensified. On July 22, *Pravda Ukrainy* finally discovered that in the Ukraine,

> Too few lectures are being given on the economic and cultural construction of our country, about the eternal friendship of the Russian

55 Sosyura's letter to the editors of Pravda, *Pravda*, July 10, 1941, p. 4.
56 *Pravda*, July 13, 1951.

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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> and the Ukrainian peoples and about the struggle against the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

That the Soviet leaders were compelled to refer to bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism as dangerous phenomena after thirty-one years of occupation of the Ukraine, is concrete proof of the Communist failure to destroy the will of its people to live in liberty. Under the pressure of "public" opinion aroused by *Pravda,* the sixth plenary session of the Board of the Union of Soviet Writers of Ukraine was summoned at Kiev on July 30-31. Writers and poets from all over the Ukraine foregathered to discuss the "crisis" of Ukrainian literature. At this session, Sosyura was allowed to read to the assembly his new poem, "Ukraine," especially prepared for this occasion in order to demonstrate how much benefit he had derived from *Pravda's* "just" criticism.

Simultaneously with the anti-Ukrainian campaign, the Soviet officials discovered "nationalist" deviations in Armenia, Azerbaidzan, Turkestan, Byelo-Russia, Estonia, and in the Uzbek and Kazakhs Soviet Republics. The total mobilization of all party workers for the struggle against the dangerous internal "enemies" of the Soviet Russian people was once again underway. As in the past, the accusations of deviationism from the Party line would result in wholesale persecutions and purges of thousands of individuals found "guilty" of this "crime" by the Soviet regime. Such tactics, however, have resulted only in the weakening of the Bolshevik regime since they have driven millions of people into a silent passive opposition hardly to be destroyed.

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Thus history speaks clearly and unmistakably: the Ukraine, with its vast rich soil shelters people whose past demonstrates their yearning not to expand or to rule others, but to be their own masters on their own territories. Their tireless and fearless effort to establish an independent state and to gain their freedom certainly deserves consideration in any plans with regard to Eastern Europe. Freedom is worth fighting for; and it is freedom and equality not for the select few nations, but freedom for all, that will solidify all the peoples who, with God's help, shall one day celebrate a victory over freedom's conqueror—Bolshevism.

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CONSTITUTION

(FUNDAMENTAL LAW)

of the

UKRAINIAN

SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLIC

of January 30, 1937

As Amended Through November 21, 1949

April 1950 50¢

American Russian Institute

58 Park Avenue New York 16, New York

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CONSTITUTION

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CONSTITUTION

(Fundamental Law)

of the

UKRAINIAN

SOVIET SOCIALIST

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of January 30, 1937

As amended through November 21, 1949

Chapter I. The Social Structure

642 Art. 1. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

Art. 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists, the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the liberation of the Ukrainian people from national oppression by Tsarism and by the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie and the defeat of the nationalist counter-revolution constitute the political foundation of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 3. In the Ukrainian SSR all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

471 Art. 4. The economic foundation of the Ukrainian SSR is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production established as the result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man.

Art. 5. Socialist property in the Ukrainian SSR exists either in the form of State property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property (the possession of collective farms or co-operative associations).

475 421 Art. 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, communications, large State-organized agricultural enterprises (State farms, machine and tractor stations and the like), as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of houses in the cities and industrial localities, are State property, that is belong to the whole people.

474 421 Art. 7. The common enterprises of collective farms and co-operative organizations with their livestock and implements, and the products of the collective farms and co-operative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of collective farms and co-operative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the common collective farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small [472] plot of household land and, as its personal property, a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements — in accordance with the regulations of the agricultural artel.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

423 Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge
474 and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

472 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Ukrainian SSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

185 Art. 11. The economic life of the Ukrainian SSR is determined and directed by
471 the State National Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the independence of the socialist country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

461 Art. 12. In the Ukrainian SSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Ukrainian SSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Ukrainian SSR voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Ukrainian SSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

42 Art. 14. The Ukrainian SSR reserves the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Art. 15. The territory of the Ukrainian SSR may not be altered without its consent.

[40] Art. 15a. The Ukrainian SSR has its own Republican military formations.

[49] Art. 15b. The Ukrainian SSR has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

Art. 16. The laws of the USSR are binding within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

[41] Art. 17. Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a citizen of the USSR.
Citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR equal rights with citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

63 Art. 18. The Ukrainian SSR consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Transcarpathian, Zaporozhye, Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltava, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumi, Ternopol, Kharkov, Kherson, Chernigov and Chernovitsi Regions.

Art. 19. The jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, embraces:

a) Adoption of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and control over its observance;

b) Submission of the formation of new regions constituting part of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for confirmation;

c) Establishment of the boundaries, and of the division into districts, of regions;

d) Legislation of the Ukrainian SSR;

e) Maintenance of public order and safeguarding the rights of citizens;

f) Approval of the national-economic plan of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Approval of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR and of the report on its fulfilment;

h) Determination of state and local taxes, imposts and non-tax revenues in conformity with the laws of the USSR;

i) Direction of the fulfilment of the local budgets of the regions;

j) Direction of insurance and savings;

k) Administration of the banks, industrial, agricultural and trading enterprises and organizations subordinate to the Republic, as well as direction of local industry;

l) Control and superintendence of the condition and administration of enterprises subordinate to the Union;

m) Establishment of the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests and waters;

n) Direction of dwelling houses and the municipal economy, dwelling house construction and the modernisation of cities and other inhabited places;

o) Road building; direction of local transport and communications;

p) Labour legislation;

q) Direction of social maintenance;

r) Direction of elementary, secondary and higher education;

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

642 s) Direction of the cultural, educational and scientific organizations and institutions of the Ukrainian SSR, and administration of the cultural, educational and scientific organizations and institutions of all-Republican importance;

t) Direction of public health and administration of institutions of public health of all-Republican importance;

u) Direction and organization of physical culture and sports;

v) Organization of the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR;

w) Granting the rights of citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR;

x) Legislation concerning marriage and the family;

y) Amnesty and pardon of citizens convicted by judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR;

z) Organization of the military formations of the Ukrainian SSR;

aa) Establishment of the representation of the Ukrainian SSR in international relations.

Chapter III. The Higher Organs of State Power of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

646 Art. 20. The highest organ of state power in the Ukrainian SSR is the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 21. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is elected for a term of four years by the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR voting by election districts on the basis of one deputy for every 100,000 of the population.

Art. 22. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR exercises all rights vested in the Ukrainian SSR in accordance with Articles 13 and 19 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, in so far as they do not, by virtue of the Constitution, come within the jurisdiction of organs of the Ukrainian SSR that are accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, that is, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 23. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is the sole legislative organ of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 24. A law is considered adopted if passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR by a simple majority vote.

[643] Art. 25. Laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR are published over the signatures of the President and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 26. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and two Vice-Chairmen.

Art. 27. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR presides at the sittings of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainain SSR and has charge of the conduct of its business and proceedings.

643 Art. 28. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, consisting of a President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary of the Presidium and fifteen members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

1 [Cf. cat. 116, p. 2-4 -- Analyst]

[Ukranian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

643 Art. 29. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for all its activities.

Art. 30. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR:

a) Convenes the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR;

b) Issues decrees;

c) Gives interpretations of the laws of the Ukrainian SSR in operation;

d) Conducts nation-wide polls (referendums);

e) Annuls decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and likewise decisions and orders of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies, if they do not conform to law;

f) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, releases and appoints Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Grants the rights of citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR;

h) Confers titles of honour of the Ukrainian SSR and grants awards;

i) Exercises the right of pardoning citizens convicted by judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR;

j) Appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives of the Ukrainian SSR to foreign states;

k) Receives the letters of credence and recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to it by foreign states.

643 646 Art. 31. Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR twice a year.

Extraordinary sessions are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR at its discretion or on the demand of one-third of the deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

646 Art. 32. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Credentials Committee to verify the credentials of the members of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

On the report of the Credentials Committee, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR decides whether to recognize the credentials of deputies or to annul their election.

Art. 33. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, when it deems necessary, appoints commissions of investigation and audit on any matter.

It is the duty of all institutions and officials to comply with the demands of such commissions and to submit to them all necessary materials and documents.

Art. 34. A member of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR may not be prosecuted or arrested without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, or, when the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is not in session, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

643 646 [666] Art. 35. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR orders new elections to be held within a period not exceeding two months from the date of expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

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643 Art. 36. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of
646 the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR retains its powers until the newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR shall have formed a new Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 37. The newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is convened by the outgoing Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR not later than three months after the elections.

645 Art. 38. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR appoints the Government
[644] of the Ukrainian SSR, namely, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter IV. The Organs of State Administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

Art. 39. The highest executive and administrative organ of state power of the Ukrainian SSR is the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 40. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR is responsible and accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, or, in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 41. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, and of the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and verifies their execution.

Art. 42. Decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR are binding throughout the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 43. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR:

a) Coordinates and directs the work of the Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR and of other institutions under its jurisdiction; coordinates and verifies the work of the authorised representatives of the all-Union Ministries;

b) Adopts measures to carry out the national-economic plan;

c) Adopts measures to fulfil the state and local budgets of the Ukrainian SSR;

d) Adopts measures for the maintenance of public order, for the protection of the interests of the state, and for the safeguarding of the rights of citizens;

e) Directs and verifies the work of the Executive Committees of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies;

f) Sets up, whenever necessary, special Committees and Central Administrations under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR for economic and cultural affairs;

g) Directs the organization of the military formations of the Ukrainian SSR;

h) Exercises guidance in the sphere of the relations of the Ukrainian SSR with foreign states, on the basis of the general procedure established by the USSR governing the relations of Union Republics with foreign states.

Art. 44. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR has the right to annul decisions and orders of Executive Committees of regional Soviets of Working

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645 People's Deputies and likewise to suspend decisions and orders of regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR has the right to annul orders and instructions of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 45. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and consists of:

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR;
The Vice-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR;
The Chairman of the Planning Commission of the Ukrainian SSR;
The Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, namely:
- The Minister of Motor Transport
- The Minister of Internal Affairs
- The Minister of State Control
- The Minister of State Security
- The Minister of the Housing Construction Industry
- The Minister of Foreign Affairs
- The Minister of the Armed Forces
- The Minister of Cinematography
- The Minister of the Municipal Economy
- The Minister of Light Industry
- The Minister of Forestry
- The Minister of the Timber and Paper Industry
- The Minister of the Furniture and Carpentry Industries
- The Minister of the Local Fuel Industry
- The Minister of Local Industry
- The Minister of the Meat and Dairy Industry
- The Minister of Education
- The Minister of Public Health
- The Minister of the Building Materials Industry
- The Minister of State Farms
- The Minister of the Fish Industry
- The Minister of Agriculture
- The Minister of Social Maintenance
- The Minister of Trade
- The Minister of Finance
- The Minister of the Food Industry
- The Minister of Justice

The Chairman of the Committee on Cultural and Educational Institutions;
The Chairman of the Committee on Arts;
The Chief of the Administration of Higher Education.

Art. 46. The Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR direct the branches of state administration which come within the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 47. The Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR are either Union-Republican or Republican Ministries.

Art. 48. The following Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR are Union-Republican Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR:

- The Ministry of Internal Affairs
- The Ministry of State Control
- The Ministry of State Security
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- The Ministry of the Armed Forces

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The Ministry of Cinematography
The Ministry of Light Industry
The Ministry of Forestry
The Ministry of the Timber and Paper Industry
The Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Industry
The Ministry of Public Health
The Ministry of the Building Materials Industry
The Ministry of the Fish Industry
The Ministry of the Food Industry
The Ministry of State Farms
The Ministry of Agriculture
The Ministry of Trade
The Ministry of Finance
The Ministry of Justice

Art. 49. The following Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR are Republican Ministries:

The Ministry of the Housing Construction Industry
The Ministry of Motor Transport
The Ministry of the Furniture and Carpentry Industries
The Ministry of the Municipal Economy
The Ministry of Local Industry
The Ministry of the Local Fuel Industry
The Ministry of Education
The Ministry of Social Maintenance.

Art. 50. The Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, within the limits of the jurisdiction of their respective Ministries, issue orders and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, of the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and of the orders and instructions of the Union-Republican Ministries of the USSR, and verify their execution.

Art. 51. Each Union-Republican Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directs the branch of state administration of the Ukrainian SSR entrusted to it, with the exception of only a limited number of enterprises, according to a list confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and is subordinate both to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and the corresponding Union-Republican Ministry of the USSR.

Art. 52. Each Republican Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directs the branch of state administration entrusted to it and is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 53. The Government of the Ukrainian SSR or a Minister of the Ukrainian SSR to whom a question of a member of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is addressed must give a verbal or written reply in the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR within a period not exceeding three days.

Chapter V. The Local Organs of State Power

631 Art. 54. The organs of state power in regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages are the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 55. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, districts in big cities, settlements and villages are elected by the

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631 working people of the respective regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements villages for a term of two years.

Art. 56. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, district cities, settlements and villages direct cultural, political and economic affairs on their territory, draw up the local budgets, direct the work of the organs of administration subordinate to them, ensure the maintenance of public order, assist in strengthening the defensive capacity of the country and ensure the observance of the laws and the protection of the rights of citizens.

Art. 57. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies adopt decisions and issue orders within the limits of the powers vested in them by the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 58. The executive and administrative organ of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies of a region, area, district, city, settlement or village is the Executive Committee elected by it, consisting of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, a Secretary and members.

Art. 59. The executive and administrative organ of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies in a small locality is the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Secretary elected by the Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 60. The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies of a region, area, district, city, settlement or village exercises guidance in cultural, political and economic affairs within its territory on the basis of decisions taken by the corresponding Soviet of Working People's Deputies and superior state organs.

Art. 61. Sessions of regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies are convened by their respective Executive Committees not less than four times a year.

Art. 62. Sessions of district and area Soviets of Working People's Deputies are convened by their respective Executive Committees not less than six times a year.

Art. 63. Sessions of Soviets of Working People's Deputies of cities, settlements and villages are convened by their respective executive organs not less than once a month.

Art. 64. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities or districts in big cities each elect a Chairman and a Secretary for the duration of their sessions to conduct the sittings of the sessions.

Art. 65. The Chairman of a settlement or village Soviet convenes the Soviet and conducts its sittings.

Art. 66. The executive organs of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies are directly accountable both to the Soviets of Working People's Deputies which elected them and to the executive organs of the respective superior Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 67. The superior Executive Committees of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies have the right to annul decisions and orders of inferior Executive Committees and to suspend decisions and orders of inferior Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

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631 Art. 68. The superior Soviets of Working People's Deputies have the right to annul decisions and orders of inferior Soviets of Working People's Deputies and of their Executive Committees.

634 Art. 69. The regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments and Administrations of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Art
a General Department
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry
a Department of Public Education
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Department of Roads

and the following Administrations:

a Cinematographic Administration
a Light Industry Administration
a Local Fuel Industry Administration
an Agricultural Administration
a Food Industry Administration
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the Region, the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the Union-Republican Ministries of the Timber Industry, Meat and Dairy Industry, Building Materials Industry, Fish Industry and Textile Industry:

a Department of the Timber Industry
a Department of the Meat and Dairy Industry
a Department of the Building Materials Industry
a Department of the Fish Industry
a Department of the Textile Industry.

[625] Art. 70. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Justice of the Union set up their own administrations under the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies, in accordance with the conditions of the region and on the basis of the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Art. 71. The Departments and Administrations of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the corresponding regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 72. The area Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees carry on their work on the basis of the laws voted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and orders of the Regional Soviet of Workers' Deputies and their Executive Committees.

632 Art. 73. The district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

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a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Roads
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Public Education
a General Department
a Department of Agriculture
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committees and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the district, the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the respective regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies:

a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry.

[625] Art. 74. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security set up their Departments under the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies in accordance with the conditions of the district, on the basis of the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR and subject to confirmation by the corresponding regional Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 75. The Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

63B Art. 76. The city Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Public Health
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Public Education
a General Department
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the city's industry and its municipal and suburban economy,

a Department of Local Industry and
a Department of Agriculture.

Art. 77. The Departments of the city Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the respective city Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies or directly to the corresponding Departments of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 78. The Departments of city Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Kiev are subordinate in their activities both to the Kiev Soviet of Working People's Deputies and its Executive Committee as well as to the corresponding Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directly.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 79. On the expiration of the terms of office of the regional, area, district, city settlement or village Soviets of Working People's Deputies, their executive and administrative organs retain their powers until the newly elected Soviets shall have formed new executive and administrative organs.

Chapter VI. The Budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

652 Art. 80. The state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is drawn up by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and submitted by it to the Supreme Soviet of the 646 Ukrainian SSR for its approval.

[645] Upon its approval by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is published for general information.

Art. 81. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Budget Commission, which reports its conclusions on the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet.

Art. 82. The report on the fulfilment of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and published for general information.

651 Art. 83. The budgets of the regional, area, district, city, settlement and village Soviets include the revenues from the local economy, deductions from the 652 state revenues collected within their territory and likewise receipts from local taxes and imposts in amounts fixed by the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter VII. The Courts and the Procurator's Office

692 Art. 84. In the Ukrainian SSR justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Regional and Area Courts, the Special Courts of the USSR established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the People's Courts.

[693] Art. 85. In all Courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

Art. 86. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is the highest judicial organ of the Ukrainian SSR. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR.

[646] Art. 87. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for a term of five years.

Art. 88. Regional and area courts are elected by regional and area Soviets of Working People's Deputies for a term of five years.

Art. 89. People's courts are elected by the citizens of the district on basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of three years.

695 Art. 90. Judicial proceedings in the Ukrainian SSR are conducted in the Ukrainian language; persons not knowing the language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an [563] interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

695 Art. 91. In all courts of the Ukrainian SSR cases are heard in public, unless otherwise provided for by law, and the accused is guaranteed the right to be defended by counsel.

693 Art. 92. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

Art. 93. Supreme supervisory power to ensure the strict observance of the law by all Ministries and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by officials and citizens within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR generally, is exercised by the Procurator-General of the USSR directly and also through the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 94. The Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR is appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 95. Regional procurators are appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 96. Area, district and city procurators are appointed by the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR, subject to the approval of the Procurator-General of the USSR, for a term of five years.

Art. 97. The organs of the Procurator's Office perform their functions independently of any local organs whatsoever, being subordinate solely to the Procurator-General of the USSR.

Chapter VIII. Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens

641 Art. 98. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with
461 its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment.

Art. 99. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to rest and leisure.

The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the fixing of the working
[466] day for factory and office workers at eight hours and the reduction of the working day to seven or six hours for arduous trades and to four hours in workshops where conditions of work are exceptionally arduous; by the institution of annual vacations with full pay for factory and office workers; and by the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest-homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

641 Art. 100. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or disability.

This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance
657 of factory and office workers at State expense, free medical service for the working people, and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

871 Art. 101. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to education.

This right is ensured by universal compulsory elementary education;
641 by free education up to and including the seventh grade; by the system of State stipends to students who have distinguished themselves in higher educational establishments; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language; and by the organization in the factories, State farms and machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 102. Women in the Ukrainian SSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life.

[562] The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education and by State protection of the interests of mother and child, State aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers, maternity leave with full pay and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

[563] Art. 103. Equality of rights of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality and also any propagation of racial or national exclusiveness, hatred and contempt - are punishable by law.

[659] Art. 104. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the Ukrainian SSR is separated from the State and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognised for all citizens.

Art. 105. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed by law:

(a) Freedom of speech;
(b) Freedom of the press;
(c) Freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
(d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

[575] Art. 106. In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are ensured the right to unite in public organizations — trade unions, co-operative associations, youth organizations, sport and defence organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and State.

[694] Art. 107. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

Art. 108. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

Art. 109. The Ukrainian SSR affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 110. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to abide by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, to observe the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

[685] Art. 111. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to safeguard and strengthen public socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation [421] of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperity and culture of all the working people.

Persons committing offences against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.

Art. 112. Universal military service is law.

Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honourable duty of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

[687] Art. 113. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR. Treason to the country — violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the State, espionage — is punishable with all the severity of the law and is the most heinous of crimes.

Chapter IX. The Electoral System

666 Art. 114. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies — of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages — are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

Art. 115. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the Ukrainian SSR who have reached the age of 18, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

[641] Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR who has reached the age of 21, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities may be elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 116. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

[562] Art. 117. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

Art. 118. Citizens serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

Art. 119. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Working People's Deputies from the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of villages and cities to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.

Art. 120. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov 21, 1949]

Art. 121. Elections of deputies to Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR are held by electoral districts on the following bases:

in elections to regional Soviets - one deputy for every 15,000 to 30,000 of the population, depending upon its size;

in elections to district and area Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population; in a district or area whose population does not exceed 25,000, twenty-five deputies are elected, and in a district or area whose population exceeds 60,000, not more than sixty deputies are elected;

in elections to city Soviets or city district Soviets - one deputy for every 350 to 900 of the population, depending upon its size; in a city or city district whose population does not exceed 12,000, thirty-five deputies are elected;

in elections to the Kiev and Kharkov city Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population;

in elections to village or settlement Soviets - one deputy for every 100 of the population; in a village or settlement whose population does not exceed 1,000, nine deputies are elected, and where the population exceeds 2,500, not more than twenty-five deputies.

The basis of representation for each regional, district, city, village and settlement Soviet of Working People's Deputies is fixed in the "Ordinance Concerning Elections to Regional, District, City, Village and Settlement Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR," within the range of the bases of representation indicated in the present article.

Art. 122. Candidates for elections are nominated according to electoral district.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Art. 123. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time upon decision of the majority of the electors in the manner established by law.

Chapter X. Arms, Flag, Capital

Art. 124. The state arms of the Ukrainian SSR are a sickle and hammer of gold in relief, placed crosswise, handles down against a red background in the rays of the rising sun, and surrounded by ears of wheat, which are placed symmetrically, from bottom to top, forming a circle. Between the tops of the ears of wheat is a red star. At the bottom of the wreath are the words, "Ukrainian SSR" on a red band, and at the bottom of the ears of corn the words, "Workers of all Countries Unite!" in the Russian language on the right, and in the Ukrainian language on the left.

Art. 125. The state flag of the Ukrainian SSR is of cloth divided into two horizontal bands of color: the upper band, in red, is two-thirds of the width of the flag, and the lower band, in azure, is one-third of the width of the flag. In the upper part of the flag, about one-third of the distance from the staff, are a hammer and sickle of gold and above them a five-pointed star with a gold border.

The relation of width to length of the flag is 1:2.

Art. 126. The Capital of the Ukrainian SSR is the City of Kiev.

Chapter XI. Procedure for Amending the Constitution

Art. 127. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR may be amended only by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of the Supreme Soviet.

16: American Russian Institute RD1 Ukraine RD1
642

[For the complete text of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of January 30, 1937 as amended through November 21, 1949, see category 116, entire source.]

17: UNRRA G-4 (no date) 1947 RD1 Ukraine RD1

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS PAPERS, No. 39

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ECONOMIC REHABILITATION

IN

THE UKRAINE

DIVISION OF OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

UNRRA EUROPEAN REGIONAL OFFICE

LONDON, W.1

APRIL 1947

[FRONT COVER]

FOREWORD

121 Resolution 88 of the UNRRA Council authorises and requests the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration "to furnish to the United Nations reports on the work of the Administration and the progress made towards economic rehabilitation in the countries assisted by the Administration."

127 This paper is the thirty-ninth of a series which has been prepared by the Division of Operational Analysis, UNRRA European Regional Office. The papers are based mainly on information received from UNRRA Missions and from the Governments to which they are accredited. Because of the difficulties in obtaining adequate economic data, the accounts given are neither final nor complete. Economic Rehabilitation in the Ukraine was written by Mary Redmer. V.I. Wolpert assisted with translations and statistical material. A complete list of Operational Analysis Papers already issued appears at the end of this paper.

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I INTRODUCTION

101 The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (the Ukraine) is one of the U.S.S.R.'s sixteen constituent Union Republics. Situated in the south-western corner of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine is bordered on the south by the Black and Azov Seas and the Crimea (part of Russia); its western border touches the frontiers of Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as well as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Towards the north the Ukrainian S.S.R. verges on two other Soviet Republics: Byelorussia and Russia; and it is the Russian neighbourhood of the Don river which forms the Ukraine's eastern border.

101 135 In economic development and in population the Ukraine is second greatest of the Soviet Republics. It has a fertile soil, a mild humid climate, and is rich in deposits of coal, oil, iron, manganese and salts, as well as in building materials. It has four main rivers: the Dnieper (third largest in Europe), the Dniester, the Bug, and the Donets (a tributary of the Don), which are navigable and are also useful reservoirs of power.

433 162 Before 1941 the Ukraine contained more than one-fifth of the inhabitants of the entire Soviet Union. Its industry produced 54 per cent. of the coal, 60 per cent. of the pig iron, 48 per cent. of the steel, and 35 per cent. of the manganese ore turned out in the whole U.S.S.R.; it manufactured railway engines and cars, tractors, turbines, harvester combines, and mining and agricultural machinery for all parts of the Soviet Union. "It also produced artificial fertilizers, soda, glass and cement. The output of the sugar, meat-packing, flour-milling, distilling, and dairy industries reached great dimensions. Fishing was developed in the Black Sea and Azov Sea. The Dnieper Power Station, 361 the largest in Europe, was famous throughout the world. The cities of the Ukraine, both old and new, developed rapidly; during the past 25 years 77 new cities and 285 industrial settlements were built."[1]

241 Agriculture also was highly developed. In 1937-38 Ukrainian farms accounted for nearly one-fifth of the grain, one-sixth of the potatoes, and two-thirds of the sugar beet produced in the Soviet Union. The Ukraine also had a large proportion of the total Soviet Union livestock. Millions of head of cattle, pigs, sheep, and poultry were raised. Ukrainian agriculture was highly mechanized; before the war there were 90,000 tractors and 31,000 harvesting combines operating in the fields.

Area and Population

131 In January 1939 the Ukrainian Republic had an area of about 469,700 square kilometres including 8,000 square kilometres in its

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1 The Sixteen Soviet Republics, Soviet News, London, 1945.

131 constituent autonomous republic, the Moldavian A.S.S.R.[1] On November 1,
[728] 1939, 88,000 square kilometres were added when Western Ukraine, which in 1920 had been annexed by Poland, was re-joined to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

131 Another 21,300 square kilometres were added in June 1940 when
728 Bessarabia (annexed by Rumania in 1918) and Northern Bukovina (another part of Rumania) also were incorporated, making the Ukraine's total area then about 579,000 square kilometres. However, a small decrease occurred in August 1940 when the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. granted the petition of the Moldavian people in Bessarabia to join with a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic to form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war the area of the Ukraine was 575,000 square kilometres (2½ per cent. of the territory of the Soviet Union); and the population was over 40 millions. After the addition of the Transcarpathian region in June 1945, the Ukraine's total area was 587,700 square kilometres; it is approximately the same today. The following table summarizes the changes in the area and population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. from 1939 to June 1941.

---

635 The U.S.S.R. is composed of sixteen Union Soviet Socialist Republics.
642 Within this framework there exist a number of autonomous provinces, national regions and autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. Before August 1940 the Ukrainian S.S.R. included one autonomous republic, the Moldavian A.S.S.R. which was subsequently given full status and became the sixteenth Union Republic. According to Professor Trainin, the Soviet authority on legal questions, the main distinction between autonomous and union republics is that the latter are guaranteed the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. - a right which is not incorporated in the constitutions of the autonomous republics. Another difference regarding status is that whereas in the Soviet of Nationalities (one of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) every Union republic is represented by 25 deputies, the autonomous republic is represented by only 11.

TABLE I

Area and Population of the Ukrainian S.S.R., 1939-40

	Area (thousand square kilometres)	Population (millions)
131 161 Area Ukrainian S.S.R. January 1939	469.7	30.96
Territories added:		
Western Ukraine (added November 1939)	88.0	8.0
Part of Bessarabia	15.3	1.05
Northern Bukovina (both added June 1940)	6.0	0.5
	579.0	40.51
Territories transferred:		
Part of the Moldavian A.S.S.R. (together with part of Bessarabia, created the Moldavian S.S.R., August 1940)	3.9	0.31
Totals August 1940	575.1	40.20

Source : Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S.Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

728 131 162 In June 1945 the Transcarpathian Ukraine was ceded by Czechoslovakia to the Ukrainian S.S.R. This transfer added about 12,600 square kilometres area and a population of about 750,000. The details of the various cessions of territory are given below.

Soviet-Polish Frontiers

In the autumn of 1939, after the collapse of the Polish State and the occupation of Western Poland by German troops, the Soviet Government decided to take under its protection the life and property of the population of Eastern Poland, that is, Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, inhabited mainly by Ukrainians and Byelorussians. When they were seized by Poland in 1920, these territories were ethnographically and economically part of the Soviet Union. Their return to the Soviet Union increased the area and population of the Byelorussian S.S.R. by 108,000 square kilometres and 4.8 million inhabitants; and of the Ukraine, by 88,000 square kilometres and 8 million people.

In August 1945, a slight adjustment of frontiers took place between Poland and the Soviet Union. A treaty was signed which, in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference in February 1945, established the Polish-Soviet boundary roughly along the Curzon Line, with some deviations in favour of Poland. As a result of this, Poland was given back a small strip of the territory which had been incorporated in the Soviet Union in 1939.

000 Soviet Union in 1939.

101 In the years before its reunion with the Ukrainian S.S.R. Western Ukraine was relatively undeveloped, as compared with the industrial and agricultural expansion which was taking place in the Ukraine itself. The backwardness of Western Ukraine before its incorporation into the Soviet Union is shown by the following table, which compares per person output in 1938 of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with that of Western Ukraine.

TABLE II

433 Per Person Output of Western Ukraine and of Ukrainian S.S.R., 1938

	Western Ukraine	Ukrainian S.S.R.
Electro power (kilowatt hours)	13.05	305
Cement (kilograms)	12.2	39.7
Bricks (pieces)	17.0	50.3
Sugar (kilograms)	5.9	58.9
Soap (kilograms)	0.5	2.58

Source : Planned Economy, State Planning Commission, Moscow, 1940.

Transfer to the U.S.S.R. of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina

728 On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Government communicated with the Rumanian Minister in Moscow concerning Bessarabia[1]. In 1918, said the communication, Rumania, "taking advantage of the military weakness of Russia....(seized) a part of her territory, namely, Bessarabia, which is principally occupied by Ukrainians..." The Soviet Government, never having recognized any justice in Rumania's claims to Bessarabia, demanded the immediate return of this territory to the Soviet Union. The communication also stated that "... the return of Bessarabia is organically connected with the question of the return to the Soviet Union of that part of the Bukovina the majority of whose population is connected with the Soviet Union not only through the community of their historic destinies but through the similarity of their language and national Constitutions".

It was therefore proposed that Northern Bukovina, as well as Bessarabia, should be given to the Soviet Union, and that the transfer should take place immediately. On June 27, 1940, after the Rumanian Government's acceptance of the Soviet Proposals, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were re-joined to the Ukrainian Republic. The total area of these two ceded territories was 50,400 square kilometres, of which 21,300 were added to the Ukraine, and 29,100 square kilometres were incorporated into the newly created Moldavian S.S.R.

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1 The Bulletin of International News, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, July 13, 1940.

Moldavia

635
648 The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was created on August 2, 1940 by the decree of the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. This Republic consists of a part of the former Moldavian Autonomous S.S. Republic and of a section of Bessarabia incorporated into the Soviet Union. [131 161] The creation of this new Union Republic decreased the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 3,900 square kilometres and a population of 310,000 persons[1].

The Transcarpathian Ukraine[2]

728 In June 1945 an agreement was signed in Moscow between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic that the Transcarpathian Ukraine "...which on the basis of a pact of September 10, 1919, concluded at St.Germain-en-Laye, entered the Czechoslovak Republic with the rank of an Autonomous Republic, will, according to the wish manifested by the population of the Carpatho-Ukraine and on the basis of the friendly agreement of both high contracting parties, unite with its longstanding motherland, the Ukraine, and is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The frontier between Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine, existing since September 29, 1938, will, with modifications described, become the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic..."

Article II of the protocol appended to the Pact said that:

"Persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality living in Czechoslovak territory have the right to opt for Soviet citizenship until January 1, 1946... Czech and Slovak nationals residing or having their permanent domicile in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine have the right to opt for Czechoslovak nationality during the time until January 1, 1946".[3]

131
311 On January 1, 1935, the area of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 12,617 square kilometres. In 1937 about half of this was covered by forests and woods; roughly 239,000 hectares were arable, and about 328,000 hectares were devoted to vineyards, market gardens, and permanent meadows and pastures.

161 As at December 1, 1930, the population of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 725,357, an increase of nearly 121,000 over February 1921.[4]

---

1 Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S.Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

2 Called by the Czechs, Sub-Carpathian Rus, or Carpatho-Ukraine.

3 New York Times quoted by Voices of History (1945-46), Gramercy Publishing Company, New York.

4 Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovak Republic, London.

728 178 The progress in construction and rehabilitation which has taken place since the incorporation of this region into the Ukraine was revealed at a meeting of the Soviet of Nationalities on October 16, 1946, when the representative of the Transcarpathian Ukraine summed up the achievements in 1946. Nearly 300 enterprises had been restored, and nine machine and tractor stations had been set up to assist the peasants in working [212 the fields. Much had been done in 1946 to abolish illiteracy; there 871] were opened over 100 schools, including 75 elementary, seven technical, 27 secondary, four music schools for children, and one school for surgeons' assistants and midwives.

453 At the end of December it was stated that 35 new factories had started functioning in the Transcarpathian Region in 1946[1]. Moreover, as compared with 1945 when there was not a single coal mine, 8 mines were working in 1946. There had also been definite progress in building up consumer goods industries. A clothing and a shoe factory had begun working in Vinogradov, and a knitted goods mill in Mukachevo. Some 200 light industries have been opened in various parts of the region.

Population of the Ukraine

162 The Ukraine is inhabited largely by Ukrainians, and also by Russians, Jews, and Poles. Most of the population is literate, and in 1939 there were many technical and vocational schools, as well as scientific research institutes and about 40,000 libraries.

At the census of January 17, 1939 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had 30,960,221 inhabitants; an increase of 6.6 per cent. as compared with December 1926. The greatest increase had occurred in the towns, largely as a result of the migration of country people to new industries. Thus from 1926 to 1939 the urban population more than doubled (5,373,553 to 11,195,620) while the number of rural inhabitants decreased by 16½ per cent. (23,669,381 to 19,764,601).

000 The same was true for the entire Soviet Union. From 147,027,915 in December 1926, its total population increased by 15.9 per cent. to 170,467,186 in January 1939, the urban population having grown from 26.3 million to 55.9 millions; and the rural population having fallen from 120.7 million to 114.5 million.

162 The principal cities of the Ukraine with their population on [361 January 17, 1939, are Kiev, the capital (population, 846,293); Kharkov, capital of the Ukraine before 1934 (833,432), the part of Odessa on the Black Sea (604,223), Dniepropetrovsk on the Dnieper River (500,662), Stalino, industrial centre of the Donets Basin (462,395), and Nikolayev (167,108).

In January 1939 the urban population of the Ukraine was 36.2 per

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, December 29, 1946.

162 cent. of the total, as compared with 32.8 per cent. for the entire Soviet Union. Next to the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukraine has a higher percentage of urban population than any other Union Republic.

The German-Soviet War

726 On June 22, 1941, the German armies, supported by their satellites, including the Rumanians and the Hungarians, attacked the Soviet Union on a 1,500 mile front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. Nearly six weeks later the Germans started their main thrust against Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; on September 21, after a fierce struggle, the Soviet troops evacuated the city. It was another two months before the Germans reached Kharkov and Rostov.

727 [725] For the second time in this century the Ukraine was subjected to occupation and devastation by the Germans. However, the Soviet policy of scorching the earth in retreat had aggravated normal military destruction; and in addition, the Ukrainians conducted heroic guerilla warfare against the enemy occupation forces. As a result, the Germans found the fruits of conquest "rather disappointing"[1] For example, in the Ukraine it was possible in the autumn of 1941 to carry out only a small fraction of the average sowing. In the western part of the Ukraine, very few industrial plants remained intact; the Nikolayev naval yards, the Dnieper dam and power station, and the metallurgical plants of the Dniepropetrovsk district were all either crippled or destroyed.

726 The German occupation of the Ukraine lasted nearly three and a half years. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad early in 1943 was the turning point of the war and the beginning of the big Soviet offensives.

In the winter campaign of 1943-44 the Soviet troops won important victories in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, completed the liberation of the Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhie and Zhitomir regions and almost the whole of the Rovno and Kirovograd regions, as well as of a number of districts in other areas.[2] In April and May 1944 they liberated Odessa, and in August, Western Ukraine. The liberation of the whole Ukraine was completed by November 1944.

727 The years of hard fighting took a very heavy toll all along the western front of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian S.S.R. sustained enormous losses.

War Losses of Population

At the Kiev trial of German war criminals in January 1946 it was disclosed that more than four million Soviet citizens had been murdered

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1 The Russian Campaigns of 1941-43, W.E.D.Allen and Paul Muratoff, Penguin Books, London, 1944.

2 Soviet War News, London, February 24, 1944.

727 by the German invaders in the Ukraine, and more than two million had been abducted to slavery in Germany. Of these so deported, a considerable number perished in captivity[1].

The figure of four million Soviet citizens murdered in the Ukraine does not clearly indicate whether all of them were Ukrainians or whether a certain percentage came from other parts of the Soviet Union. No figures have been revealed showing the number of the Ukrainians killed at the front against the German armies and their 162 satellites. However, a comparison of the pre-war and present elec- 666 torate figures for the Ukraine gives some indication of the decrease, at least of the adult population. On December 12, 1937, the Ukrainian electorate was about 17,540,000; in 1939 this number was increased by the addition of Western Ukraine, which on March 24, 1940, had more than five million voters. But nearly seven years later, in the elections of February 1947, despite the fact that part of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Transcarpathian Ukraine also had been added, the total electorate in the Ukrainian S.S.R. was only 21,545,000.

Damages to Industry and Agriculture

727 The damage which the Germans inflicted on the industry and farming 433 of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics was tremendous, and far exceeded any comparable destruction in Western Europe.

[362] In the Ukraine the Germans destroyed or burned down 714 towns and more than 28,000 hamlets and villages, destroyed more than two million buildings and 540,000 outbuildings, and rendered about 10 million persons homeless (one-fourth of the Ukrainian population)[2].

Agriculture, animal husbandry, and industry were devastated. The coal mines were flooded. Over 16,150 industrial enterprises employing more than two million workers were stripped of machinery and the buildings heavily damaged or destroyed. The Germans wrecked or took away 127,800 electric motors and 81,600 metal-cutting lathes, destroyed railway lines and stations, and post and telegraph offices[2].

727 Tremendous damage was done to Ukrainian agriculture. The Germans 433 ruined and plundered collective farms, state farms and machine and 241 tractor stations.

Millions of hectares of planned fields were destroyed and over 56,000 tractors wrecked. Nearly 1,900,000 agricultural machines and 30,000 automobiles and other motor vehicles were destroyed or taken to Germany[3].

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1 Soviet News, London, June 29, 1946.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

3 Letter to UNRRA from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

727 [231] Seven and a half million head of cattle, 3.3 million horses, 9.3 million pigs, 7.3 million sheep and 59.4 million fowls were killed or taken away[1]. The invaders also stole from the collective farms and from private citizens of the Ukrainian S.S.R. over 12 million tons of farm products, including 9½ million tons of grain and flour[2].

The rehabilitation and rebuilding of liberated areas began at once whilst the war was still on; but although the Ukrainian S.S.R. received great assistance from other republics of the Soviet Union, it must be borne in mind that important economic regions of other republics of the Soviet Union were also devastated by the war.

According to the report on material damage issued by the U.S.S.R.'s Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes of the German-Fascist Invaders, the damage caused to the national economy of the U.S.S.R. and to the individual residents of villages and towns is estimated at more than 679,000 million roubles in terms of 1941 prices.

The damage to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic alone is estimated at 285,000 million roubles[3].

Thus according to the statement of the Soviet State Commission, the damages to the Ukrainian S.S.R. are about 40-42 per cent. of the total damages to the Soviet Union.

Damage caused to the Ukraine by the German invasion is estimated by the Ukrainian Paper Suchasne I Maibutne (Present and Future) at 100,000 million dollars[4].

Destruction of Ukrainian Cities

727 361 Following are summaries of the destruction which occurred in some of the most important of the Ukraine's cities.

Kiev (Population in 1939: 846,293).

According to the report of the Extraordinary State Commission, the material damage caused by the German invaders in Kiev was as follows:

They destroyed 940 buildings of state and public institutions and

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Letter from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

3 Soviet News, London, September 18, 1945.
(The official exchange value in March 1947 was 5.40 roubles equal one U.S. dollar; 21.36 roubles equal one pound sterling).

4 Soviet Monitor, TASS (Soviet News Agency) London, July 11, 1946.

727 361 ,742 municipally owned houses (more than 22 million square feet of housing space) and 3,600 privately owned houses comprising 5½ million square feet of space.

[361] As a result more than 200,000 inhabitants of Kiev have been made homeless.

The Germans gutted Kiev's industrial plants of their equipment and shipped it to Germany. They destroyed the buildings of industrial enterprises including the machine-building plants "Bolshevik" and "Red Excavator", which had supplied industry, agriculture and transport with machinery, implements, and spare parts.

They blew up the textile mills, a spinning and knitting mill, the Gorky clothing factory, the first, fourth and eighth shoe factories, and other plants; blew up, destroyed or burned down the electric-power stations, the trolley cars and trolley buses, the water supply system and the drainage system. They destroyed mechanized bakeries and other establishments.

[368] The very important railway junction Kiev-Darnitza was destroyed with all its tracks, equipment, and installations as well as all station buildings and the depot at the station Kiev I.

City of Kharkov (Population in 1939: 833,432).

In connection with the third anniversary of the liberation of Kharkov, "the second capital of the Ukraine", the following figures on destruction and the extent of rehabilitation have been made known.

727 361 362 Before the war Kharkov had 41 million square feet of housing floor space. The Germans destroyed about half of all the flats. In the three years since liberation, six million square feet of housing floor space have been restored. The people of Kharkov have also restored 293 big plants and factories, including the famous tractor works, an electro-mechanical plant, a turbo-generator works and machine tool, and agricultural implements and other plants[1].

Dniepropetrovsk (Population in 1939: 500,662).

In this city 30 per cent. of the homes, 80 per cent. of the industry, and 70 per cent. of schools and other cultural institutions were destroyed. The UNRRA Mission reports that reconstruction has been very slow, and is hampered by shortages of food, shelter and equipment. In 1946 many of the residents of Dniepropetrovsk were still living in huts contrived of straw and clay, under a tar paper roof.

Kremenchug (Population in 1939: 89,553).

In April 1946, when members of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946.

727 first visited Kremenchug, they reported it as over 90 per cent.
361 destroyed. "About 50,000 inhabitants have returned and are living
362 in dugouts, cellars, and rubble shacks. Reconstruction is progressing slowly because of the shortage of materials. The only industries operating are a small machine shop for bridge repair parts, a textile factory, and one wing of a cigarette factory which happened to escape destruction. One bakery is being repaired... All grain elevators and flour mills, which constituted the chief pre-war industry, are completely destroyed."

Poltava (Population in 1939: 130,305).

In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission reported Poltava about 80 per cent. destroyed. "About 100,000 of the inhabitants have returned and are living under conditions only slightly better than Kremenchug. On the main street only one building is intact. The Mayor estimated that reconstruction would take at least fifteen years. The locomotive repair shop and a stocking factory are the only industries operating two years after liberation."

Other Cities

In Zaporozhie (population in 1939: 289,188) 75 per cent. of the homes and virtually all industry were destroyed[1]. Stalino, the industrial and mining centre of the Donets Basin, has been described as a shadow of its former self. Its pre-war population was 510,000. During the war about 100,000 of the people were driven into slavery by the Germans. Another 80,000 men, women, and children were thrust into one of the mines to die. Seventy-five per cent. of all the buildings in the city were destroyed; and of these only 30 per cent. were in a condition to be restored. All the mines in the area were flooded; and from one pit alone over 3,300,000 tons of water had been pumped by August 1946[2].

The Ukraine's Application for UNRRA Assistance

727 In the summer of 1945 the government of the U.S.S.R. transmitted
648 to the Director General of UNRRA a request for assistance in rehabilitating
457 those areas of the Soviet Union which had suffered most heavily because of the war and the German occupation. In August 1945 at the Third Session of the UNRRA Council, the Soviet delegate strongly requested that 700 million U.S. dollars be allocated for relief work in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Republics. At the same Council Session the applications of Byelorussia and the Ukraine for membership in UNRRA were unanimously accepted, and the two republics were requested to send delegates to the Third Council meetings.

In December 1945 agreements were signed between UNRRA and the governments of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics providing for

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1 UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

2 Soviet News, London, August 22, 1946.

727 relief and rehabilitation supplies to be delivered until such time as
457 the two republics would be able themselves to pay with suitable means
648 of foreign exchange for their own imports[1].

727 The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement provided for a programme of supplies
439 amounting to 188 million U.S. dollars (approximately five dollars per head
648 of population), to be used for food, clothing, medical, agricultural, and industrial supplies. The agreement stipulated that UNRRA would attempt to deliver the bulk of these supplies to the Ukraine before June 30, 1946; however, because of procurement and transport difficulties, this early completion of the programme proved impossible. On May 30, 1946, therefore, the UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was extended to the end of 1946.

The schedule of supplies to be shipped has changed somewhat since the original programme was decided. As it now exists, about 53 per cent. (by value) of the total supplies are foodstuffs; 27 per cent. industrial supplies, and nearly 9 per cent. clothing. Supplies for the rehabilitation of agriculture will amount to 17,088,000 dollars, the greater part of which has been allocated for seeds. The following table shows by value the UNRRA programme of supplies for the Ukraine, as at March 21, 1947. A more detailed summary will follow in later sections of this report.

TABLE - III

UNRRA Programme of Supplies to the Ukrainian S.S.R.
(thousand U.S. dollars)

Food, feed, soap	100,189
Clothing, textiles, footwear	16,856
Medical and sanitation supplies	2,326
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591
Total	188,050

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

In March 1946 a small UNRRA Mission arrived in the Ukraine and established headquarters at Kiev. In subsequent months, some of the mission members have made many visits to various parts of the republic in order to observe the distribution of UNRRA supplies. They report that gigantic efforts are being made to restore the economy, but emphasize the discouraging fact that UNRRA assistance with machinery and other rehabilitation supplies is small in comparison with the tremendous destruction everywhere. The main UNRRA contribution has

1 UNRRA aid to Byelorussia will be dealt with in a future paper.

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439 been food supplies, which in many Ukrainian towns constituted the only
648 food to be seen in shops in 1946. For fats and oils particularly the Ukrainian population has been entirely dependent on UNRRA aid.

The U.S.S.R.'s Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

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649 UNRRA assistance to the Ukraine has been of necessity limited in scope and short-term in nature. Long after relief shipments are ended - and they are now all but complete - the Ukraine will still be working to rebuild its factories, cities, and farms. The main task of rehabilitation is therefore a long-term one, and depends upon long-range measures.

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185 On March 18, 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted a Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, for the rehabilitation and development of the national economy of the Soviet Union. This plan is the fourth of a series of Five-Year Plans[1] designed to increase the productivity of Soviet farming and industry, and in general to raise the standard of living of the whole population. As stated by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the principal aims of the Five-Year Plan in 1946-50 are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of the country, to recover the pre-war level in industry and agriculture, and then considerably to surpass that level.

[652] The new Five-Year Plan provides that nearly one-third of the capital investments for the entire Soviet Union in 1946-50 (49,500 million roubles out of a total of 250,300)[2] are to be spent on the restoration of the Ukraine. Of this 49,500 million, 5,469 million will be used for works under the Ukrainian Republic's jurisdiction.

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727 In the next five years all the destroyed cities of the Ukraine - particularly Kiev, Kharkov, Chernigov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, Stalino, and Zaporozhie - are to be rebuilt and their municipal services restored.
362 Housing is to be replaced as speedily as possible; in 1946-50, 175,120,000 square feet of state-owned housing are to be built, of which 12.65 million square feet are to be made available by local Soviets. The amount of privately owned housing to be built before 1950 is fixed at 36.3 million square feet.

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185 Also under the Five-Year Plan Ukrainian agriculture is to be rehabilitated; the crop area for 1950 is planned at 30.5 million hectares. By 1950 the Ukraine is scheduled to be producing about 20 per cent. of the grain harvested in the U.S.S.R. (approximately the same tonnage as in pre-war years); 60 per cent. of the sugar beet (about 6 per cent. more than pre-war); and the potato harvest is fixed for 23 million tons, 1½ millions more than in 1940.

000 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport

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1 First Five-Year Plan, 1929-32; second, 1933-37; third, 1938-42.

2 Estimated at 1945 prices.

727 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport
433 are to be rebuilt; the mining of coal is to regain and then to outstrip the pre-war output; the production of machinery and equipment for both light and heavy industry is to be restored; and to do this, iron and steel production is to be increased until it surpasses pre-war. War damaged power stations are to be rehabilitated, and additional ones are to be constructed, particularly in smaller communities.

[185] Altogether the output of industrial enterprises in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is envisaged at 9,200 million roubles, of which the output of state industries under local jurisdiction and of industrial co-operatives is estimated to comprise 3,100 million roubles[1].

The volume of industrial production in the whole U.S.S.R. in 1950 - that is, the last year of the Five-Year Plan - is fixed at 205,000 million roubles (in 1926-27 prices). Compared with 138,500 million roubles in 1940, this represents an increase in industrial output of 48 per cent.

727 Particular stress in the Five-Year Plan is laid on the development
433 of the Western Ukraine and the Transcarpathian Region. Lvov, the main
361 city of the Western Ukraine, is to be developed into a major industrial centre, where there are to be built and put into operation an automobile assembly plant, electrical, telephone, and telegraph-equipment manufacturing plants, a glass works, a knitting mill, and food processing plants.

In the Transcarpathian Region, new light industry plants are to be constructed, and the mining of brown coal (lignite) is to be organized and extended. Provision is to be made for the rehabilitation and development of the woodworking and wood chemical industries and of farming, particularly fruit-growing, viticulture, livestock breeding and apiculture,
[652] as well as of the food processing industries. The farms of the Transcarpathian Region are to be given considerable state assistance in the form of agricultural machines, fertilizers, and credits.

000 A more detailed discussion of the Five-Year Plan in connection with farming and the various industries follows in later sections of this report.

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[475] It must be remembered that a number of enterprises although situated in the Ukrainian Republic are not under the Republic's jurisdiction, but under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union Government.

II FARMING IN THE UKRAINE: PRE-WAR AND PRESENT

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433 The Ukraine - famous for its mild climate and rich black soil - has always assumed a role of considerable importance in the agricultural production of the Soviet Union. For example in 1937-38 it produced one-fifth of the grain, two-thirds of the sugar-beet, and one-sixth of the potatoes harvested in the whole U.S.S.R. The chief grain crops of the Ukraine are wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize and millet. A considerable amount of sunflower seed is produced for processing into oil; small quantities of linseed and mustard seed are also produced for the same purpose. Other industrial crops, particularly flax, hemp, a little cotton and the rubber-bearing dandelion, "kok-sagyz" (discovered in 1931), were also cultivated extensively in the Ukraine before the war.

The following table shows the area and production of the principal Ukrainian crops in 1928, 1932 and 1937; figures for production in the entire Soviet Union are included for comparison.

TABLE IV

Ukraine: Pre-War Agricultural Production
(area in million hectares, production in million metric tons)

	Ukrainian S.S.R. Area	Ukrainian S.S.R. Production	Entire Soviet Union Production
Wheat			
1928	3.1	3.34	22.11
1932	5.743	5.6	20.31
1937	6.433	10.08	46.86
Other grain			
1928	16.6	10.55	50.73
1932	12.381	9.06	49.48
1937	11.761	12.69	73.43
Sugar beet			
1928	.647	8.42	10.13
1932	1.174	4.28	9.645
1937	.817	14.44	21.86
Cotton			
1928	nil	nil	.824
1932	.181	.03	1.28
1937	.224	.12	2.58
Potatoes			
1928	1.4	10.21	46.38
1932	1.071	7.72	43.07
1937	1.338	11.9	65.63

Source: Compiled from Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1936 and 1939; Sown Areas of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1939,; and Socialist Agriculture, Moscow, 1939.

311 Despite a certain reduction in the area under cultivation in the
241 Ukraine, (25,124,900 hectares in 1937 as compared with 26,438,400 in
1932), production rose considerably, reflecting great progress in the
[407] mechanization of agriculture. The number of tractors increased from
51,300 in 1932 to 83,900 in 1937. The number of harvesting combines
[475] increased in the same period from 4,900 to 26,700. The number of
Machine and Tractor Stations grew from 657 to 958. The mechanization of agriculture in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is shown in the following table, which compares the output of energy from draught animals with the energy derived from machines, both in the Ukrainian Republic and in the entire Soviet Union. (It should be noted that, according to Soviet practice, the output of energy is measured in kilowatt hours.)

TABLE V

Output of Energy in Agriculture, 1938
(million kwh)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Total Soviet Union
[407] Energy from machines	4,211	19,304.2
379] Energy from draught cattle	1,662	14,667.5
Total output of energy in agriculture	5,873	33,971.7

Source : Planned Economy XII, Moscow, 1940.

[178] As the table shows, the percentage of mechanization in the Ukraine was greater than in the entire Soviet Union.

Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

311 According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there
425 were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000
721 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The principal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Izmail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

474 Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution
241 of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas
178 from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

475 Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the
407 Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Izmail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

475 In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in
407 June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in
652 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.

TABLE VI

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Transcarpathian Ukraine: Area and Production of Crops in 1937

	Hectares	Average yield in metric tons per hectare	Total production in metric tons
Wheat	31,476	0.7	20,796
Rye	25,679	0.62	13,773
Barley	3,331	0.48	1,396
Oats	30,527	0.45	13,124
Potatoes	46,253	8.72	397,347
Sugar beet	96	23.86	2,291

Source: Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovak Republic, London.

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The Organization of Farming in the U.S.S.R.

It may be well at this point to outline briefly the methods of farm organization which characterize the Soviet Union.

The Collective Farms (kolkhozes)

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The foremost agricultural problems of the Soviet Union have been to increase the area under cultivation, to improve the methods of production, to raise yields per hectare as well as total production, and from this increased production, to ensure that adequate supplies of food reach the towns and factories. The primary means of achieving these aims was the organization of individual peasant farms into collectives (kolkhozes). By 1932, the end of the first Five Year Plan, this transformation was largely completed.

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During the second and third Five Year periods the policy of using the most modern methods of scientific farming in the kolkhozes was continued. Thousands of tractors, threshing machines, combines, mowing machines, binders, and other large machines were produced for use on the collective farms, and were concentrated by the government in Machine and Tractor Stations (M.T.S.), which served the kolkhozes for a legally fixed fee, paid in kind.

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The M.T.S. are now a well-known feature of Soviet farming. They have their own workshops and staffs of mechanics and farm-hands. The average equipment of an M.T.S.[1] before the war was 84 tractors (approximately 15 h.p.), 22 combine harvesters, 14 threshers, and a proportionate number of ploughs, harrows, drills, etc. Each M.T.S. works for a group of kolkhozes, usually about 30, and carries out all the mechanized agricultural work (ploughing, sowing, harvesting, threshing, etc.). Apart from these mechanical services, the M.T.S. gives qualified advice on rotation, technique, financial matters, etc.

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1 What Are Collective Farms, V.A. Karpinski; Lindsay Drummond, London.

475 Payment for work done by M.T.S.'s is regulated by state tariff, and
437 consists of a portion of the farm produce. Milling work is also paid for in kind.

[442] Besides delivering grain and other agricultural products to the government in this way, (that is, payment in kind to the M.T.S. and the flour mills), the kolkhozes also were obliged to turn over a certain additional quota to the government by direct sale.

474 The share of agricultural produce which the government received from the kolkhozes was before the war often as much as 35-40 per cent. of the collectives' gross income; but aside from what was paid to the government in kind, the kolkhoz had also to pay administrative costs, including the salaries of kolkhoz office workers.

474 The kolkhoz also put aside funds for seed reserves, fodder,
434 insurance and emergencies; and after all these obligations were met, the remaining income was distributed among the kolkhoz members according to the number of days worked. In 1935, for example, the kolkhozes received for distribution among their members 32 per cent. of their cash income, in addition to 39 per cent. of the total yield of grain. In 1938 52.6 per cent. of the money income was distributed.

Productivity of the Collectives

241 The increased productivity which resulted from the collectivization
433 of agriculture is shown by an investigation which the People's
474 Commissariat of Agriculture conducted in 1937 of 221,000 kolkhozes
461 (91 per cent. of the U.S.S.R. total). A study was also made of the productivity of labour in 430 kolkhozes selected so as to give a cross section of regions of all types. The results were as follows: mechanization and the application of modern methods simplified the work and considerably reduced the need for human labour. The introduction of tractors, combines, and other agricultural implements had reduced the entire process of production to 10½ labour days per hectare, whereas on individual farms the same operations required nearly 21 days. At the same time the amount of production per hectare under the kolkhoz system had increased by 60 per cent. Altogether, the productivity of the kolkhozes was 3.2 times higher than that of individual farms. If only those kolkhozes were considered which used tractors, combines, and seeders, their productivity was 7 times as high.

474 Originally it had been expected that the collectives would supply
433 the bulk of all farm production for the state and the cities; and in
438 fact they did produce the grain, cotton, sugar, flax and other raw
472 materials required for the needs of the population, industry, and export; however, they did not yield sufficient quantities of other foods to supply the cities adequately. Instead, the individual plots

SU 474 433 438 472 which the kolkhoz members were permitted to keep[1] were performing this task, furnishing the city markets with meat, dairy products, eggs, poultry, vegetables, fruit, honey, mushrooms, and berries.

SU 474 [442 434] In April 1940, in order to provide a wider incentive for the kolkhoz members to increase their collective production, the system of delivery assessments was radically changed. Whereas the basis for grain deliveries to the government had previously been the amount of land sown or, in the case of meat, milk, eggs and poultry, the size of the herd or flock, the new basis for assessments was the amount of land held by the kolkhoz; and any production above the fixed rates could be retained by the kolkhoz for distribution among the members according to labour days.

U 461 474 241 466 A second decree applying to the Ukraine alone established supplementary pay for increasing the crop yield or productiveness in the raising of livestock. This decree directed the collectives of the Ukraine to assign various sections of the field or garden to work teams, working to produce a fixed quota. If the production did not exceed the quota, the members were paid only by the labour day; but if a team produced above the quota, it received part of the excess as bonus.

SU 423 In 1934 the Soviet Government decided to permit individual members of the kolkhozes to keep private farmsteads within the limits of ¼ to 1 hectare. A year later the code for the kolkhozes (called the "Stalin Code") confirmed these rights. It also secured forever the land held by the kolkhozes:

> "All boundaries formerly separating plots of land belonging to members of co-operatives are herby abolished, and all their holdings are pooled together to be used in common...the land occupied by the kolkhozes (as all land in the U.S.S.R.) is public government property. It is...secured to the kolkhozes for use without time limit, that is in perpetuity, and not subject to buying, selling or leasing to anyone by the co-operative... All agricultural production on kolkhoz land, shall be carried on by the members of the kolkhoz, jointly, co-operatively... Out of the land held in common a small part shall be set aside for the use of each household (for truck gardening, orchards, etc.)... The dimensions...may vary...from ¼ to ½ hectare and in certain regions up to one hectare".

1 [SIC-- ANALYST]

SU The State Farms (sovkhozes)

495 After the revolution, when the large holdings were broken up, a
242 certain number of well-organized estates were preserved as model agricultural stations. These were subsequently turned into State Farms (sovkhozes), the purposes of which was to experiment with seed selection, plant and livestock breeding, fertilizers, etc. The sovkhozes, operating with hired labour, turned over to the government all their pro-
SU duction above the requirements of the sovkhoz workers.

[407] To an even greater extent than the collective farms the State Farms were mechanized. They had the best technical equipment and, compared with the kolkhozes, twice the concentration of tractors per hectare. The sovkhoz workers received wages at specially worked out rates: they had the use of living quarters, dining rooms, and educational and enter-
SU tainment facilities.

[433] The State Farms achieved good results in raising production, both of
SU grain and of industrial crops.

474 However, the basic form of agricultural organization in the U.S.S.R.
475 continued to be the collective farms, which supplied the bulk of food
311 and agricultural raw materials for industry.

372 At the beginning of the third Five Year Plan (1938), there were in the Soviet Union 242,000 collective farms (kolkhozes) embracing 91 per cent. of all the land under cultivation. The kolkhozes had 117.2 million hectares of arable land; the 3,960 State Farms (sovkhozes) had 12.4 million hectares;[1] and 1.3 million individual farmers had 900,000 hectares of arable land.[2]

Collective Farms in the Ukraine

U
474 In 1938 the Ukraine contained almost one-ninth of the collective
311 farms in the Soviet Union (27,393 out of 242,392). The total area
433 occupied by the Ukrainian kolkhozes was 34.9 million hectares, of which about 61 per cent. was under cultivation. Like the kolkhozes in other Republics, the Ukrainian collectives made giant strides in the years between 1932-38: they increased in number, from 25,000 to 27,393; they increased their area of cultivation from 18.9 million to 21.4 million hectares;[3] but the greatest increase was in productivity, as the following table shows.

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1 Although the area of the sovkhozes extended to 68 million hectares, their sown acreage amounted to only 12.4 million hectares.

2 The Socialist Agricultural Economy of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1939

3 In the Ukraine as a whole, however, the cultivated area declined from 26.4 million hectares in 1932 to 25.6 million in 1938.

TABLE VII

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Average Yields of Grain on Ukrainian Collective Farms
(metric tons per hectare)

	Ukraine Average pre-world war I 1901-13	Ukrainian Collectives Average 1932-34	1937-39	1939
Winter rye	0.98	0.83	1.20	1.15
Winter wheat	1.04	0.93	1.43	1.59
Summer wheat	0.70	0.73	0.76	1.03
Summer barley	0.93	0.93	1.26	1.52
Oats	1.07	0.87	1.12	1.23
Millet	0.99	0.61	1.0	1.16
Buckwheat	0.68	0.50	0.58	1.50
Maize	1.11	0.93	1.5	1.57
Average all grains	0.91	0.85	1.23	1.36

Source: Speech delivered by N. Kruschev[1], Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, cited in Agriculture in 1940, A. Mortunov, Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940/II.

In the entire Soviet Union the average yield of grain crops increased from 0.7 tons per hectare in 1930 to 0.97 tons per hectare in 1938.

The development of agriculture in the collective farms of the Ukrainian S.S.R. from 1934-38 is further illustrated by the following table, which shows the area under cultivation, yield per hectare and gross output of the principal crops in 1938, all in percentages of 1934.

1 Now Premier of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

TABLE VIII

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Productivity of Ukrainian Collective Farms in 1938
(expressed in percentage of 1934)

	Area under cultivation	Yield per hectare	Gross output
Grain	88.0	176.0	157
Sugar beet	98.0	164.0	161
Sunflower	89.0	208.0	171
Flax	126.0	140.0	290
Cotton	146.0	671.0	986

Source: J. Statsenko "Productivity of Work in Collective Farms in the Ukrainian S.S.R." Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940/I.

As the table shows, the area under cultivation of grain, sugar beet, and sunflowers decreased somewhat; however, average yields per hectare and total production were increased by 75 to 100 per cent. This increase in productivity was brought about by improved cultivation methods: the use of selected seeds, chemical fertilizers, more scientific crop rotation and above all, by the greater mechanization of labour. As we have seen, the Ukraine had in 1938 nearly a thousand Machine and Tractor Stations, as compared with 657 in 1932. The effect of mechanization in the collectives is best shown by the fact that whereas in 1932 the M.T.S. cultivated 77.1 per cent. of the arable area of the Ukrainian kolkhozes, by 1937 they were serving 98.8 per cent. of the collectives' entire arable land.

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Since 1938 (the last year in which comprehensive agricultural statistics for the U.S.S.R. were published) there has been little information available about agricultural production in the Soviet Union. The figures which have been made public emerge from press or conference reports, and the information is usually very scanty. The immediate pre-war picture is therefore not clear.

We do have, however, the planned 1941 area of cultivation in the U.S.S.R., as well as the percentage of increase over 1940. From these figures we can estimate the sown areas in 1940, as the following tables show.

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TABLE IX

U.S.S.R.: Planned Area of Principal Crops, 1941

	Planned area 1941 in million hectares	Per cent. increase on 1940
Grain	111.1	0.2
Industrial crops	12.0	1.7
Vegetables, melons, potatoes	11.4	12.9
Fodder crops	22.5	24.3
Total	157.0	3.9

Source: Report of N. Voznesensky, Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. delivered on February 18, 1941, at the Eighteenth All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Using these figures as a basis, we have the following areas for 1940.

TABLE X

U.S.S.R.: Area Sown in 1940
(in million hectares)

Grain	110.9
Industrial crops	11.79
Vegetables, melons, potatoes	10.1
Fodder crops	18.1
Total	150.89

Source: Calculated on the basis of Table IX.

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Although we do not have similar figures for the Ukrainian S.S.R. alone, we do know that in 1940, 612,000 hectares were sown to sunflower, and 764,000 to sugar beet. The harvest of sugar beet amounted to 14.8 million tons (an average of 19.4 tons per hectare). In the same year the harvest of grain was over 28 million tons, and of potatoes, 21.5 million tons.[1]

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1 Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

241 433 In comparing these figures with 1937 production the increases in the area of the Republic must be borne in mind.

Effects of the War on Ukrainian Farming

727 241 474 When the German armies were finally driven out of the Ukraine in 1944 they left most of the Republic's farmsteads completely in ruins. So great was the devastation which they wrecked that even today the full extent of it is not definitely known. It has been estimated by Ukrainian officials, however, that the invaders ruined and plundered 27,110[1] of the Ukraine's collective farms and 872[1] of the state farms, burning the buildings and wrecking or stealing the machinery. The Germans also wrecked over 422,000 collective farm buildings and 425,000 privately owned farm buildings[2], scorched and laid waste millions of hectares of farm land, and destroyed 1,500[1] machine and tractor stations. The consequent losses of machinery were enormous. Fifty-six thousand tractors, 24,000 harvester combines, 30,200 trucks and automobiles used in farming and 1,892,000 other agricultural machines were destroyed or stolen by the Germans. The next table shows the losses compared with pre-war numbers.

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1 Statement by Mr. I.S. Senin, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. at a meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers on February 7, 1947, published in Soviet News, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Department of UNRRA Supplies of the Ukrainian Government, Kiev, April 6, 1946.

TABLE XI

Ukraine: War Losses of Farm Machinery

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	Number before the war	Destroyed or wrecked by the Germans
Tractors	over 90,000[1]	56,000[2]
Harvester combines	" 31,000[1]	24,000[2]
Trucks and cars used in agriculture	" 50,000[1]	30,200[3]
Other farm machines	n.a.	1,892,000[3]

1 Source: Mr. Baranovsky, Member of the UNRRA Council for the Ukrainian S.S.R. Speech at the Fourth Session of the UNRRA Council on March 20, 1946, Atlantic City, UNRRA Journal, Volume IV, No.6.

2 Source: Statement of the Soviet Commission on Material Damage Caused by the German-Fascist Invaders, Soviet News, September 18, 1945.

3 Source: Letter to the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine from Mr. V.V. Khomyak, Chief, Ukrainian Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

In addition to the spoilage of buildings, machinery and land, the Germans seized, slaughtered, or drove away millions of farm animals, and stole from the collective farms or from private citizens of the Ukraine over 12 million tons of farm produce, including 9.5 million tons of grain and flour[1].

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In the period immediately after liberation agriculture was slowly restarted, almost entirely by hand and in the most adverse conditions. Transport was highly disorganized and at the same time had to carry military traffic. On the heels of the victorious Soviet army the evacuated collective farmers were returning with their few animals to their wrecked farms. The flocks and herds were decimated or non-existent. Everywhere there were tremendous shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, machinery and manpower to do the work. In most districts in 1945 only 50 to 60 per cent. of the pre-war area could be sown. Many of the crops were sown late because of difficulty in cultivating the land; and when harvesting time came, much of the reaping and threshing had to be done by hand. Average yields of all crops were very low.

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1 Department of UNRRA Supplies of the Ukrainian Government, Kiev, April 6, 1946.

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Nevertheless, the 1945 harvest - assisted by lend-lease supplies which were still then available, and (beginning in December 1945) by UNRRA relief deliveries - was furnishing the population a fair amount of cereals and bread. There was, however, very little meat from domestic sources, and only a small amount of fats and oils, as the following table shows.

TABLE XII

Ukraine: Production and Utilization of Fats and Oils, 1945.
(thousand metric tons)

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	Oilseeds	
Production		
Total production of oilseeds		496.4
Deduction for seed		53.6
Available for processing		442.8
Utilization		
[388] Total production of oil		105.8
Deduction for industrial use (soap manufacture, etc.)		26.7
Available for human consumption		
by urban population	29.0	
by rural population	50.0	
Total		79.1
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
urban population		2.41
rural population		1.86
Average		1.98

[p2 8]

TABLE XII (Continued)

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262

Animal fat

Production		74.7
Imports		12.5[1]
Available for consumption		
by urban population	32.7	
by rural population	54.5	
Total		87.2
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
by urban population		2.73
by rural population		2.0
Average		2.19

Summary (Oils and Fats)

All fat and oil resources			
Vegetable oils		105.8	
Animal fats		74.7	
Total production		180.5	
Imports		12.5[1]	
Available for distribution		193.0	
Consumption			
Technical purposes		26.7	
Food			
Urban	61.7		
Rural	104.6		
Total food		166.3	
Total consumption		193.0	
Average consumption			Kilograms per person per year
by urban population			5.14
by rural population			3.86
Average			4.17

1 Available from Lend-lease

Source: Ukrainian Department of UNRRA Supplies, Kiev, May 15, 1946.

433 As the table shows, the Ukrainian people received in 1945 only 4
262 to 5 kilograms of fats - 8 to 18 kilograms less than their pre-war
388 annual consumption rate.

Disaster in 1946

433 Early in 1946 other UNRRA supplies in addition to food began to
241 arrive - seeds, small quantities of fertilizers, and a few farm tools.
648 Throughout the Ukraine great efforts were being made for a successful spring sowing. However, there were still shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, and machinery. None of the 1,600 tractors promised by UNRRA had arrived. Much of the work was still being done by hand, especially where no draught animals were available.

[311] Even despite these drawbacks, it is estimated that about 80 per cent. of the pre-war area was sown; but no figures are available on the acreage planted to individual crops. In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission, describing the difficulties in getting detailed agricultural statistics, stated:

> "....During a recent inspection trip we were informed by the agricultural authorities of the Poltava oblast,[1] one of the best agricultural regions in the Ukraine, that they did not even try to set production goals for their collective farms this year (1946); they simply told each farm to plant as much as possible of whatever crops it could raise with the seed, equipment, draught animals, and manpower available. (For example) We believe that nobody really knows with any degree of accuracy what acreage was planted to oil seeds in the Ukraine this year, what yield may be expected, or how much of the resulting oil will be available for non-farm use."

433 The Ukrainian people set high hopes on the 1946 harvest. However,
241 in the very summer when a good crop would have made all the difference,
649 the greatest drought since 1891 destroyed their prospects. It affected a vast area from Moldavia to the Urals, south to the Kuban and north to Moscow. The earth was parched; and the crops, burnt by the hot summer sun, had little to draw upon because rain and snowfall in the winter of 1945-46 had been poor. Hopes withered with the wheat. The potato crop too was affected: a hot wind out of Asia dried the plants, and dwarfed the tubers.

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1 Oblast: a district similar, for administrative purposes, to a county.

U
433 During all this time the livestock of the Ukraine (see next
231 Section), was being slowly and laboriously built up by gifts from the
262 rest of the Union, by levies on Germany, and by natural increase.
731 Meat was very scarce, since no-one was willing to slaughter and further deplete the slender herds. Cows, used for draught purposes, gave little milk. Now added to these intense shortages of meat, fat and dairy products was another great deficiency of cereals and bread, hitherto the mainstay of the Ukrainian post-war diet.

U
241 The 1946 harvest cannot, at the most optimistic estimate, be
433 reckoned at more than 40 per cent. of 1940 in cereals and vegetables
231 per hectare sown.[1] There is no fodder for the jealously guarded animals; shelter for them is also very scarce since the people themselves are only now moving out of dugouts. If the animals are slaughtered, the small supplies of dairy products and meat will soon disappear; and the problem of draught power will remain as acute as ever.

U
241 There is an agricultural dilemma in the Ukraine which a good
433 harvest would have gone far to break. Although extensive and con-
464 tinued demobilizations have been taking place, there is a great shortage of labour on the farms.[2] If manpower is taken from the farms to help produce the machinery necessary to liberate further men from the land, there may not be enough farm workers left to produce sufficient food for the factory workers. The poor harvest has aggravated this vicious circle.

The Soviet Government has attempted in various ways to meet this problem not only in the Ukraine, but throughout the Union. Everyone who is able to work does so; young people, old people, women. The
U women who worked during the war have remained part of the labour force in both industry and agriculture, and an increasing number are being
[462] recruited. In the Ukraine in 1946, women composed at least 60 - 70 per cent. of the farm working force.

SU
[464 At the same time as steps are being taken to concentrate more
241] workers in agriculture, the organization of the collective farms is
474 being overhauled and geared to higher efficiency. To accomplish this,
647 the Soviet Council of Ministers created on September 19, 1946, a Collective Farm Council, whose main tasks will be to elaborate measures for the improvement of collective farming. This Council which is authorized to call conferences of collective farm representatives when necessary, was set up for the purpose of "establishing strict control over the observation of collective farm statutes and for the solution of questions of the collective farm structure." One of their primary

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1 One must also bear in mind the reduced area under cultivation.

2 The war losses are felt very acutely.

474 one of their Primary
647 tasks[1] is to guard collective farm property against embezzlement or
685 misuse. During the war nearly 4.8 million hectares were unlawfully taken away from the kolkhozes; this land has now been returned to them.

474 Another aim of the Collective Farm Council is to ensure that the
647 collective farmers themselves have more direct participation in the
623 administration of the kolkhoz, in the allocation of revenue and the distribution of material means. General meetings of collective farmers are to be called regularly to elect management committees and auditing committees, whose activities are to be fully reported.

474 A very important change has occurred in the structure of collective
461 farms wages, which are now designed to place even greater emphasis on
465 efficiency; the minimum number of work days required has also been
464 raised. Another change which affects both industry and agriculture, has been made in administrative organization; Soviet News, London, March 5, 1947, reported as follows:

> "In view of the excessive growth of personnel in the administrative and managerial apparatus and in non-productive branches of national economy, and of the necessity of a further increase in the numbers engaged on productive works, the Council of Ministers issued an instruction to increase the number of productive workers in 1947 at the expense of the numbers employed in administrative and managerial apparatus and in non-productive work."

The administrative staffs of the collective farms have thus been reduced. According to Mr. Andreyev, head of the Collective Farms Council, over half the number of agronomists and experts will be directed to actual production. Simultaneously, the salaries of administrative personnel have been cut to 25 per cent. less than those of workers in the fields.

241 A recent resolution of the Soviet Communist Party also deals with
474 measures which are to be taken in connection with the rehabilitation of agriculture.[1] Among the main tasks specified are the improvement of the administration of agriculture; improvement in the work of machine and tractor stations; wide training of skilled agricultural cadres; and the provision of new tractors and agricultural machinery, as well as supplies of fertilizers and fuel.

All these measures are necessary - and particularly a great deal must be done in 1947 - if the Five Year Plan in agriculture is to be fulfilled.

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1 Soviet News, London, March 5, 1947.

1 [i.e., of the Collective Farm conferences set up 19 Sept. 1946 -- Analyst]

The Five-Year Plan in Ukrainian Agriculture

185 According to the Five-Year Plan 1946-50 the crop area of the
311 Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is to reach 30.5 million hectares, of which
494 21.3 million are to be planted on the collective farms. The distribution of major crops is planned as follows.

TABLE XIII

Ukraine: Crop Area in 1950 (Planned)
(hectares)

	Total area	Including on the collective farms
Grain crops	19,600,000	14,100,000
Industrial crops	2,600,000	2,200,000
Melons, potatoes, and other vegetables	2,800,000	1,000,000
Fodder crops	5,400,000	4,000,000

Source: The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

The area sown to sugar beet in 1950 is fixed at 830,000 hectares, and to sunflower, 801,000 hectares. The hopfields are to be rehabilitated, and the area of vineyards growing European varieties of grapes is to be expanded. Measures are to be taken to drain 40,000 hectares and irrigate 30,000 hectares of farm land; and all engineering work needed to ensure normal production is to be restored.

241 Average yields of Ukrainian crops in 1950 are envisaged as follows:
433 grain, 1.42 tons per hectare (compare 1939 average 1.36); flax, 0.42
185 tons; sugar beet, 19 tons; and potatoes, 11.2 tons per hectare.[1]

In the entire Soviet Union in 1950 the grain harvest is planned at 127 million tons, of which the Ukraine is to produce 27.8 million tons, or more than one-fifth. The Ukraine's sugar beet harvest is fixed at 15.7 million tons, representing over 60 per cent. of the sugar beet harvest of the U.S.S.R. in 1950. The production of potatoes is expected to be 23 million tons.

The following table compares these targets with pre-war production.

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1 Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

TABLE XIV

185 Ukraine: Planned Production in 1950 Compared with 1940 and 1913 (see
433 Note)
241 (million metric tons)

	1913	1940	1950
Grain	20	28	27.8
Sugar beet	8.9	14.8	15.7
Potatoes	about 5[1]	21.5	23

1 According to the report in Pravda, the potato harvest in 1940 was "over 4 times" that of 1913.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

[728] Note: In comparing the 1950 target figures with pre-war production it is important to bear in mind the territorial revisions which occurred in the Ukraine after 1939, when she regained Western Ukraine and part of Bessarabia, lost a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic (which, together with the Moldavian Section of Bessarabia, then became a separate Union Republic), and added Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathian Ukraine.

[131] Thus the present area of the Ukraine exceeds its 1938 area by
311 approximately 118,000 kilometres (11,800,000 hectares). However,
728 we do not know precisely how much of this is agricultural land. The arable land in Western Ukraine before the war amounted to 4 million hectares; that of Transcarpathian Ukraine, to 239,000 hectares. In the parts of Bessarabia and Bukovina which were ceded to the Soviet Union, 3,285,800 hectares were classified as arable. If we roughly divide this between Moldavia and the Ukraine in proportion to the total ex-Rumanian area incorporated in each, about 1,300,000 hectares of agricultural land would have been added to the Ukraine in its share of Bessarabia; and the arable area of present-day Ukraine would exceed the 1937 cultivated area by about 5½ million hectares, the potential total being 30.6 million. The fact that the Five-Year Plan fixes the Ukraine's 1950 area of cultivation at 30.5 million hectares seems to support this assumption.

Livestock

231 In 1941 the number of livestock in the Ukraine was estimated at 30.4 million, including 10.5 million cattle and 4.6 million horses.[1]

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1 Statement on March 20, 1946, by Mr. Baranovsky, Ukrainian delegate to the UNRRA Fourth Council Session, published in the "UNRRA Journal", March 21, 1946.

231 During the war these numbers were greatly reduced: the Germans killed, stole, or drove away 3.311 million horses, 7.594 million head of cattle, 9.333 million pigs, 7.317 million sheep, and over 59.379 million fowl of all kinds.[1]

231 727 474 The collective farms of the Republic suffered most heavily. After the German occupation the collective farms of the Ukraine were left with only 6.3 per cent. of their 1940 herds of cattle, 1.9 per cent. of their pigs, and 3.4 per cent. of their sheep. In practical terms, the Germans had almost completely wiped out collectively-owned livestock.

231 727 In rehabilitating their herds the collective farms have received much assistance from the Soviet Government and the fraternal Republics - Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia and others - which have supplied hundreds of thousands of animals. However, the number of livestock in the kolkhozes are still far below pre-war. Most rapid steps were made in the re-stocking of cattle herds, which by early 1946 had reached 66 per cent. of the pre-war number of Ukrainian collective farms; pigs were 25 per cent. of pre-war and sheep and goats, 29 per cent. (Note: the figures in the two preceding paragraphs relate to collective farms alone.)[2]

The following table shows the pre-war numbers of livestock in the Ukraine (pre-1940 boundaries) and in the Soviet Union as a whole.

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946.

TABLE XV

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Livestock in Pre-War Ukraine and in the U.S.S.R.

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	
	1932	1937
Cows	2,436,500	3,458,900
Other large cattle	1,591,700	4,300,500
Pigs	2,667,700	7,729,700
Sheep and goats	1,528,700	3,301,500
Horses	2,430,200	2,937,200

	Soviet Union	
	1934	1938
Large cattle	35,500,000	50,900,000
Pigs	11,500,000	25,700,000
Sheep and goats	36,500,000	66,600,000
Horses	15,400,000	16,200,000

Source: Soviet Construction, Moscow, 1939

[379 407] It will be noted that in both the Ukraine and in the U.S.S.R. as a whole, only a slight increase occurred in the number of horses. This again illuminates the greater use of machines in place of animal draught power.

Livestock in Western Ukraine

In 1939 the livestock of Western Ukraine alone was as follows.

TABLE XVI

Livestock in Western Ukraine, 1939

Cows	1,718,000
Other horned cattle	868,000
Pigs	1,466,000
Sheep and goats	772,000
Horses	1,043,000

Source: Concise Year-Book of Poland, Polish Ministry of Information, London, 1941

231 In the first years after Western Ukraine was incorporated into the
414 Ukrainian S.S.R. there were built up in that region 285 cattle farms, 185 sheep farms, and 112 pig farms. By January 1, 1941, there was a total of 742 livestock farms in Western Ukraine alone.[1]

Bessarabia

231 There are no recent figures available for livestock in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina; in 1935, however, it was estimated that these two regions contained three-quarters of a million cattle, as well as 611,000 pigs, 2,355,000 sheep, and 602,000 horses (a total of 4,340,000 cattle, sheep, pigs and horses).[2] We have no figures as to how much of this livestock was included in the provinces added to the Ukraine.

Ukrainian S.S.R. Livestock: the Five-Year Plan

231 By 1950, according to the Five-Year Plan, the number of horses in
185 the Ukraine should reach 2,629,000, a target which is 60 per cent. lower than the pre-war figure. To attain even this number, a great increase of horses must yet be made. In order partially to compensate, the Five-Year Plan has fixed a great increase in the number of oxen, so that the total number of oxen and horses together in 1950 will be five per cent. higher than before the war.

The following table shows the planned number of livestock in the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 1950.

TABLE XVII

Livestock in the Ukraine, 1950 (Planned)

	Total	Included on the collective farms	Per cent. increase 1950 total over 1940 numbers
Cattle	12,230,000	4,700,000	16
Pigs	9,600,000	3,300,000	7
Sheep and goats	6,780,000	3,100,000	0
Horses	2,629,000	1,363,000	- 60[1]

1 Decrease from 1941 figure.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

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1 Soviet State and Law III, Moscow, 1941.

2 International Institute of Agriculture, Rome.

185 According to the new Five-Year Plan, the output of meat in the
253 Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 will amount to 245,000 tons (for the entire
Soviet Union the production target is fixed at 1,300,000 tons) while
234 output of butter for the Ukraine in the year 1950 is fixed at 40,000
tons (275,000 tons for the entire Soviet Union).

The following factories and farms will be rehabilitated or built: 55 meat packing plants, 33 refrigerator plants, 97 poultry farms, 46 milk factories, and 100 butter and cheese factories.

III INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT

135 311 433 Ukrainian industry is based chiefly on rich deposits of coal in the Donets Basin, iron ore in the Krivoi Rog district (where the ore contains 60 per cent. metal), and manganese ore in the Nikopol area. To utilize this great natural wealth a very large metallurgical and machine-building industry has been bult up in the Ukraine. At the same time, many food factories including sugar refineries, have been created to process the food so abundantly produced by Ukrainian farms. In the period between wars, the share of the Ukraine in the country's industrial output declined somewhat, not because of slackened activity - on the contrary, Ukrainian industry continued to be even more intensively developed - but because the policy of the U.S.S.R. was to decentralize, and to expand and develop those areas, particularly the eastern ones which previously had no industry. This lengthening of the industrial pace naturally brought about a certain change in emphasis, so that whereas by 1938 the productivity of Soviet industry as a whole had increased to about eight times the output of Tsarist Russia in 1913; the proportion of Ukrainian output in the total was lessened. For example, in 1928 the Krivoi Rog district of the Ukraine produced 78 per cent. of all the iron ore in the U.S.S.R.; but in 1937, although this district was producing more, its share in the total was only 47 per cent.

War Damage to Industry

727 433 Before they were finally driven from the Ukraine the Germans furiously set about wrecking those Ukrainian industries which still survived. They stripped the plants of equipment and destroyed the buildings; they flooded the coal mines; they completed the destruction of the famous Lenin Hydro-Electric Power Station and the Dnieper Dam - both of which had been partially disabled by the retreating Soviet Army troops on August 28, 1941.

The damage to all branches of industry was tremendous and will take many years to repair, particularly since the shortages of labour and equipment, as well as the scarcity of food have been a hindrance at every step. Some of the difficulties were destribed in a report of the UNRRA Mission after visits to several of the larger Ukrainian cities in May 1946.

"In our cable...we outlined the condition and needs of industrial plants in six principal Ukrainian cities visited by members of the Mission during May. The pattern is fairly uniform. Many plants were completely destroyed and those which still stood were usually heavily damaged and almost universally gutted of all modern equipment. Included among those industries hardest hit are the heavy capital goods industries, machine tool manufacturing industries, and power stations, as well as the rolling and stationary stock of all forms of transportation, and equipment for processing building materials. So great is

727 the destruction that there are competing calls upon the limited
433 supplies of manpower, equipment and materials. We observed many instances of ingenious adaptation and salvaging of old and antiquated machinery; yet restoration was everywhere slow and complicated by lack of equipment to move away the rubble, transport the materials, produce the electric energy, and repair the streets, sewers, and gas and electric lines. There is a vicious circle. Iron and steel, for example, are needed to repair electric power stations and rebuild houses; efforts to restore these basic industries and facilities are constantly delayed because there is not enough shelter; and neither shelter nor the industries and community facilities can be replaced until there are more cranes, tractors and trucks. Low-calorie diets, induced by lack of foodstuffs, cause low efficiency and slow production. The food UNRRA is shipping has sustained the people, though, to be sure, it has not been sufficient to compensate for local shortages; the country may somewhat accelerate its industrial rehabilitation - especially of shelter and water supplies - when the equipment items on the UNRRA programme arrive. Meanwhile it is slowly restoring those parts of its economy which will respond to manpower aided by a minimum amount of mechanical equipment."

Industrial Aims of the Five-Year Plan

185 The great importance of rehabilitating Ukrainian industry and the
727 share which Ukrainian industry has to take in the entire Soviet Union economy are shown by the new Five-Year Plan.

By comparing the aims for 1950 with pre-war production figures, it is possible to have some impression of the destruction which occurred in the Ukraine during the war.

The table which follows shows the planned ratio of Ukrainian output in 1950 to the output of the entire Soviet Union. Where possible, pre-war figures have been included.

TABLE XVIII

Share of Ukrainian Industry in Total Soviet Production

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1940

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. total	Ukraine (per cent. of total)
	(thousand metric tons)		
Pig iron	9,200	14,900	61
Steel	8,600	18,400	47
Coal	83,800	164,600	51
Tractors (units)	n.a.	176,000[1]	n.a.
Locomotives (units)	880[2]	1,214[2]	72[2]
Sugar	1,790[2]	2,378[2]	75[2]

1950 (planned)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. total	Ukraine (per cent. of total)
	(thousand metric tons)		
Pig iron	9,700	19,500	49.7
Steel	8,800	25,400	34.6
Coal	86,100	250,000	34.4
Tractors (units)	25,000	112,000	22.3
Locomotives (units)	1,000	2,720	40.0
Sugar	1,637	2,400	68.2
Metallurgical equipment	n.a.	n.a.	33.9

1 1938 figure
2 1937 figures

Note: n.a. means not available.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, September 1, 1946; The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50; Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace, A. Yugov, C.A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London, 1941.

Progress in 1946

At the beginning of 1947 the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. issued a statement describing the progress in rehabilitation and development made during 1946. According to this statement the gross output of industry in the entire U.S.S.R. increased by 20 per cent. in 1946 as compared with 1945. About 800 government enterprises had been built, restored, or launched during the year. Navigation was opened on restored canals. A series of steps were also taken in 1946 to expand Soviet trade and consolidate the currency. Wages and salaries of low and medium-paid workers were raised.

SU
464 The number of workers and employees in the national economy of the
874 U.S.S.R. increased by 3 million. Vocational schools and factory training centres graduated thousands of skilled workers, and improved the skill of several millions already employed.

SU
727 Of the districts which suffered occupation, economic rehabilitation
433 as well as capital construction amounting to 17,500 million roubles in
652 1946 made it possible to increase their industrial output by 28 per cent. as compared with 1945. Pravda writes - "the factories, mills, pits, power stations, towns and villages which were destroyed by the enemy are being revived one by one...."[1]

In the Ukraine

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727 The Ukraine has been likened to one big building site, where more
433 than 500,000 workers are engaged in restoring industrial plants and
327 municipal buildings.[2] In the Donets Basin, the coal output of 1946 was 30 per cent. higher than that of 1945. In the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, 21 blast furnaces, 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries were at work by January 1947. Of 104 machine-building factories to be restored, 102 were already producing goods, and mastering the production of improved types of machinery. The Kharkov transport machine-building works was preparing to build long-distance steam engines; and the tractor works was increasing its production, as were many other factories.

U
727 In 1946 the Kharkov turbo-generator works made a 100,000 kilowatt
433 turbine and one of 50,000 kilowatts. At Dniepropetrovsk, a lorry
393 factory was being built; and in Odessa and Lvov, automobile assembly
398 works were under construction. Great work was also being done in the development of light industry, food processing, chemical works, and other branches of industry.

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727 After three years' work of restoration the Dnieper Dam had been
433 rebuilt in the main, and the housing for the power station erected.
377 By the end of 1946 the capacity of Ukrainian power stations had reached 70 per cent. of pre-war.

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362 Since the liberation over 104.5 million square feet of floor space
368 had been restored in the Ukraine. Over half a million of the 590,000 houses destroyed by the Germans were restored or built anew in Ukrainian villages; and more than 13,000 cultural institutions in the villages and 118,000 auxiliary buildings on the farms.[2]

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1 Pravda, quoted by Soviet News, London, January 22, 1946

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

Coal

316 433 The coal centre of the Ukraine is the basin of the Donets River, a tributary of the Don. In 1913 the Donets region was producing 80 per cent. of all the coal turned out in the entire Russian Empire. (23 million tons of the 29.2 million total); and even in 1940, when the production of other coal areas in the U.S.S.R. had been greatly expanded, and many new areas explored and put into operation, Donets mines still accounted for more than half the total output (83.8 million tons of the entire Soviet Union production of 164.6 million).

Since about 70 per cent. of all the fuel consumed in the U.S.S.R. is supplied by coal,[1] the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian coal industry is of tremendous importance to the economy of the Soviet Union.

727 316 It is now over three years since the Soviet Army drove the Germans out of the Donets Basin. Before their rout, the enemy flooded the mines and burned engineering plants, miners' settlements, and cities. Restoration work was started soon after the liberation of the Basin, but it was estimated that to restore coal output to the pre-war level it would be necessary to pump 650 million cubic metres of water out of the mines and to restore 1,565 miles of mine galleries.[2] Today, the towns of the Donets Basin are a mass of scaffolding, as war-devastated houses, buildings, and roads continue to be repaired. Mine derricks dot the landscape; and water is being pumped in a steady stream from the mine pits. At the Chelyuskin Mine which before the war was one of the biggest and best equipped in the Donets, over nine million cubic metres of water had been pumped by the middle of December 1946; and about 20 miles of galleries had been restored. Coal output averaged a thousand tons a day.

By January 1947 about 142 major coal mines of the 279 operating prior to the war had been restored, and 430 smaller ones, rehabilitated or built anew, were in operation. Production was nearly half of pre-war.[3]

[362] As regards housing for Donets workers, it is planned within the next five years not only to restore the houses demolished by the Germans, but also to build another 20 million square feet of housing space in the Donets Basin; in 1946 alone over four million square feet of floor [464] space had been reconstructed. Thousands of miners are being helped to build their own homes; and measures are being taken to increase their food supplies.

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1 Moscow Radio feature, "Sidelights on Soviet Life," cited in Soviet Monitor, London, January 29, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946

3 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947

Coal: Plans for the Future

185 Under the Five-Year Plan, the coal industry of the Ukraine is to
433 be speedily rehabilitated and further developed, so that by 1950 its
316 output will be 86,100,000 tons, including about 6 million tons of brown coal (lignite).[1] When it is remembered that this target is only 2.3 million tons over 1940 production, the enormous task of rehabilitation confronting the industry is made clear. The difficulties are even more accentuated if one compares the increase of coal production in three pre-war years, from 1937 to 1940, when output leaped from 70 million tons to 83.8 millions.

Plans for increasing the future coal output of the Ukraine include not only the restoration of old mines but also intensive prospecting and the sinking of many new shafts.

"Between 1946-50, coal mines with an aggregate capacity of 77,500,000 tons are to be put into operation in the Stalino and Voroshilovgrad regions of the Ukrainian S.S.R.[2]"; and coal fields in other areas are to be further developed. In particular there are to be put into operation in the Donets Basin and in the western regions of the Ukraine, small coal mines and drifts with a total capacity of 4,600,000 tons of coal, and peat briquette plants with a capacity of 50,000 tons.

The lignite mining industry is to be developed and by 1950 is expected to supply annually some 6 million tons of coal. Five lignite mines operating in the Ukraine in 1946 increased their output in October by three times as compared with April.

135 Large coal supplies are expected from the regions west of the
654 Dnieper, where 11 promising coal deposits are located. Prospecting is in progress there, as well as in the Zlochev, Krenenets, and Kolomya areas of Western Ukraine, where 28 shafts had been sunk by November 1946.[3]

Industrial lignite deposits have also been found in an area of four square miles between Slavgarod and Sinelhikovo (near Dniepropetrovsk) and in the Transcarpathian region.

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1 The coal output of the entire Soviet Union in 1950 is fixed at 250 million tons.

2 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

3 Soviet Monitor, London, November 21, 1946.

135 To the south-east, in the Don and northern Donets valleys,
654 geologists have discovered a number of new coal-bearing areas, and have confirmed that the Donets Basin coal layers stretch far to the east and south.

Other investigations of coal-bearing areas are to begin shortly, particularly around the Azov Sea coast and in other regions bordering the Donets Basin.

Coke

316 The coke output of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is planned to be 15,500,000 tons.

Natural Gas and Oil

315 With the incorporation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the Ukrainian
185 S.S.R. came into possession of oil producing regions. The Five-Year Plan calls for the intensive development of these and other areas of the Ukraine for the increased production of oil and natural gas. Three hundred and twenty-five wells are to be located to add to the
[654] petroleum resources of the western regions; prospecting for commercial deposits of petroleum in the Romny area is to be completed; and there is to be extensive geological exploration for natural gas in the Dragobych Region (Western Ukraine) and on the Azov and Black Sea coasts.

[382] The total output of petroleum in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 325,000 metric tons.

The plan also provides for the building of a gas pipeline from Dashava to Kiev. Already in process of construction, the first section of the pipeline will be completed this year (1947) and will supply gas to more than 30,000 flats and several large industrial plants in Kiev.

Electric Power Stations

377 Electrification has been one of the outstanding features of the Soviet economy. Before the war the Ukrainian Republic possessed a wide network of electric power stations. Best known was the huge Dnieper Dam and Lenin Hydro-electric Station, completed in 1932 near Zaporozhie. This station supplied electric power to a great industrial region: in the north the steel mills of Dniepropetrovsk and Dnieprodzerzhinsk, and to the south-east, the Nikopol manganese mines. These three industrial centres developed quickly after the Dnieper Dam was built; and the abundance of cheap power available from it also gave rise to the growth of a metal and machine-building centre at Zaporozhie.

727 In August 1941 the retreating Soviet army troops partially disabled
397 the Dnieper Dam and power station to prevent its falling into enemy hands. This destruction was later completed by the Germans. When the Soviet Army recaptured the region, they found that 35 of the dam's 48 piers had been blown up, and all the generators destroyed. Damage to the power house alone was estimated at 500,000,000 roubles.

Reconstruction work began in February 1944, when the war was still on. Three years later the assembly of the first power unit of 72,000 kilowatt capacity was completed; and on March 3, 1947, the Lenin Hydro-electric Station supplied its first post-war currency to the industry of the Dnieper Valley.

There are over 11,000 men and women engaged on the restoration job, which has involved repairing the dam and the underwater structures, building the housing for the power station, and mounting the machines. Another two power units are to be assembled later this year.

After the expulsion of the Germans from the Ukraine, the capacity of the Republic's power stations was only 0.4 per cent. of pre-war. By the end of August 1946 restored capacity had reached 47 per cent. In the Donets Basin 70 per cent. had been restored, and in the Stalino area, 79 per cent. In the city of Lvov (Western Ukraine) the pre-war capacity of its electric power stations had been surpassed by 18 per cent. In the first seven months of 1946 much had been accomplished: some 400 power stations, including 215 hydro-electric plants, had been launched in the Ukraine; and it was expected that 750 more power stations would be completed by the end of the year.

The Five-Year Plan fixes the 1950 output of electric power in the Ukraine at 13,690 million kilowatt hours. The total capcity of Ukrainian power stations is to be increased in 1946-50 by 2,574,000 kilowatts. The Five-Year Plan directs that:-

"The Lenin Hydro-electric Station on the Dnieper shall be rebuilt. Small hydro-electric power plants with a total capacity of 203,000 kilowatts shall be built to meet the requirements of agriculture and local consumers. Plant aggregating 95,000 kilowatts shall be put into operation at municipal electric power stations."

The restoration of electric power facilities will assist greatly in rehabilitating other sections of the Soviet economy

Iron and Steel

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327 The Five-Year Plan for the Ukrainian S.S.R. envisages an output in
433 1950 of 9.7 million tons of pig iron, and 8.8 million tons of steel.

In order to accomplish this, the iron and steel plants of the Donets Basin and the Dnieper region are to be rehabilitated; and there are to be put into operation 30 blast furnaces with an aggregate annual capacity of 9 million tons of pig-iron, steel smelting units with a

[This page is a duplicate of P. 45]

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[185] 327 433

capacity of 8.4 million tons of steel, and 58 rolling mills with a capacity of 6.5 million tons of finished rolled goods.

In view of the enormous destruction of industry during the war, these aims are heroic, because they in fact mean that for five years the Ukrainian iron and steel industry will be striving to regain and then even to exceed, the production of 1940. This is shown by the following table, which gives the pre-war output of iron ore, manganese ore, pig-iron, and steel, as well as the planned output of the latter two in 1950. Figures for the U.S.S.R. as a whole are also included for comparison.

TABLE XIX

Ukraine: Production of Pig Iron and Steel
(thousand metric tons)

Year	Iron ore		Manganese ore	
	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.
1928	4,671	5,700	531	1,200
1932	7,925	12,100	443	1,400
1937	16,414	26,000	957	2,000

Year	Pig iron		Steel	
	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.
1928	2,361	3,300	2,409	4,300
1932	3,911	6,200	3,128	5,900
1937	8,801	14,500	8,467	17,700
1940	9,200	14,900	8,600	18,400
1950 (Planned)	9,700	19,500	8,800	25,400

Note: 1940 figures not available for iron ore and manganese ore.

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace, A. Yugov, C.A. Watts and Co.Ltd., and The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50.

As the table shows, areas of the Soviet Union other than the Ukraine are expected considerably to increase their production during the next several years. This, as well as the complete revival of Ukrainian plants, is particularly necessary to rebuild the transport system, and to replace tractors, machinery, and farm implements which were either stolen or destroyed during the war.

Progress in Rebuilding

327 727 In 1946, nearly all of the ferrous metal plants in the Donets were put into working order once more. The biggest blast furnace in the Ukraine started operating again in the Azovstal works; two other blast furnaces were put into operation, one in the Dzerzhinsky works at Dnieprodzerzhinsk and the other in the Makeyevka iron and steel works, where the mounting of a great blooming mill was also completed. The open hearth furnace at the Petrovsky works, two coke batteries of the Dzerzhinsky works, coke battery No.2 at the Mariupol coke and chemical works, the rolling mills at Yenakievo and Kramatorsk, and a number of other units of the iron and steel industry started operations.[1]

Altogether by the end of 1946 there were 21 blast furnaces,[2] 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries at work in the Ukrainian S.S.R.[3]

The iron mines in the Krivoi Rog basin (Ukraine) had been 85 per cent. restored. Another five big iron mines are to be put into operation this year, and by 1950 ore extraction in the Krivoi Rog area is expected to surpass the pre-war output.[4]

However, the task of reconstruction is still immense. Many of the large plants are still greatly disabled. The largest iron and steel plant in the Ukraine (at Zaporozhie) was systematically destroyed by the Germans.

This factory, with its three blast furnaces, ten open-hearth furnaces, strip and rolling mills, and 25,000 kilowatt generator, was still expanding whenthe war broke out. A small amount of light equipment was evacuated, but the bulk of equipment and all of the structures housing it were damaged or destroyed. Soviet engineers estimate that 65 per cent. of the value of the equipment was destroyed. Total restoration costing seven hundred million roubles will take from three to four years. Full restoration will require vast amounts of iron and steel for repairing the plant, of mechanical equipment for operating the plant; and of materials to rebuild the houses of the workers.[5]

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1 Soviet News, London, January 23, 1947.

2 On January 1, 1935, there were 55 blast furnaces in the Ukraine (55 per cent. of total U.S.S.R. capacity) and 117 open-hearth furnaces (40 per cent. of total U.S.S.R. capacity).

3 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

4 Soviet Monitor, London, January 28, 1947.

5 UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

Heavy Industry Building in 1947.[1]

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727 Reconstruction and building will be on a wider scale in 1947, as many improvements are introduced. Mechanization is being extended in blast furnaces, open-hearths, and metal-rolling shops; and ore and coal stores are being equipped with modern cranes.

In the Donets Basin in 1947 the Stalino Metal Works are to put into operation another blast furnace, martin oven and rolling mill.[2] At the Azovstal works the two blast furnaces of 1,000 cubic metres each will be enlarged to 1,300 cubic metres. Also at the Azovstal works, which in the past did not produce any rolled metal, are being built a blooming mill, which will be the largest in the south, and a rolling mill. New blooming mills and rail rolling mills are also to start at the Petrovsky works in Dnieprepetrovsk, and at the Dzerzhinsky works in Dnieprodzerzhinsk. New pipe-rolling workshops will be added at the Nikopol Yuzhno-Trubny and the Dnieprepetrovsk works.

At the Zaporozhstal works in 1947 several workshops will be added; and a power station and a 1,300 cubic metre blast furnace will begin working in the first half of the year. Among the most urgent tasks at this plant is the reconstruction of machines producing sheet metal for automobile production.

Equipment for Iron and Steel Mills

According to the new Five-Year Plan, the Ukrainian output of equipment for iron and steel mills in 1950 has been fixed at 35,000 tons; the total production of the entire Soviet Union has been fixed at 102,900 tons (of which 66,700 are to be produced by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic).

Production of Tractors

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407 Before the war there were about 90,000 tractors in operation on
433 Ukrainian farms. During the occupation, 56,000 of these were wrecked or stolen by the Germans, who also completely destroyed the well-known tractor factory at Kharkov. Because of the particularly great need of tractors in the Ukraine, this factory was rebuilt with great vigour; and production resumed. By February 1947 the Kharkov Tractor Works had produced 3,000 tractors since the restoration of the plant.

The 1950 output of tractors in the Ukraine is expected to be 25,000; for the entire Soviet Union, production has been fixed at 112,000 tractors.

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1 See U.S.S.R. Deputy Minister for the Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, Radio Moscow, February 3, 1947, B.B.C. Digest of World Broadcasts No. 2784, London, February 5, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 2, 1947.

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Chemical Industry

The chemical industry of the Ukraine is based chiefly on coal deposits, but also on a number of other raw materials to be found there, including lacustrine deposits of sodium chloride (Artornovsk area) and phosphatic rocks (Konstantinovka area).

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[185]

The Five-Year Plan fixes that:

"The chemical plants of the Ukraine, including soda, nitrate, and superphosphate plants, shall be rebuilt, and the potash mines in the regions of Stanislav and Dragobych, and a new superphosphate plant, a paint and varnish plant and a plastics factory built.

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[654]

"In 1946-50 geological surveys shall be conducted with a view to locating commercial deposits of potassium salts to a total of 80 million tons, graphite to a total of 7.7 million tons, and gypsum to a total of 7 million tons."

Output in 1950 is fixed by the Plan as follows:

for the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Calcined soda	448,000 tons
Superphosphates	860,000 tons, and
Salt,	1,930,000 tons;

and for the entire Soviet Union:

Calcined soda	800,000 tons, and
Mineral fertilizers, superphosphates, nitrates and potash	5,100,000 tons.

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Light Industry[1]

By the end of 1946 the production of consumer goods in the U.S.S.R. had already revived considerably; output in the different branches ranged from 20 to 50 per cent. above 1945. Reconversion of the factories to peacetime production was largely completed; however, three big tasks remained: to complete the rehabilitation of all light industry enterprises wrecked by the Nazis; to replace the old or worn-out machinery; and to obtain an adequate supply of labour and materials.

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1 Soviet News, London, December 30, 1946, and February 6, 1947.

SU 727 185 SU [652]

A recent decree of the U.S.S.R.'s Council of Ministers was designed to assist the fulfilment of all those tasks. It puts light industries in the priority class for supplies of raw materials, fuel, electricity, manpower, and workers' housing; and it approves increases of capital investments in the textile industry from 5,900 million roubles to 7,300 million in 1946-50, and in light industry, from 2,180 to 2,900 million roubles in the same period.

As a result of these measures, consumer goods output by state-owned enterprises is expected to rise this year (1947) by 50 per cent. and the output of the co-operative societies will certainly increase as well.

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Light Industry Rebuilding in the Ukraine

By January 1947, 58 textile mills had been restored in the Ukraine. Work had been resumed at the Odessa and Sumy textile factories; and the Kharkov textile mill had been restored and considerably expanded. Sometime this year a new textile mill is to be launched in the town of Stryia, Dragobych Region; and in the Izmail Region, the Tatar-Bunary mill will resume operations. Cotton mills are being built in Lvov, Kiev, and Chernovitsy.

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Sericulture has been restored in the Ukraine, where it was begun only ten years before the war. It is to be further developed under the Five-Year Plan, and in the next ten or fifteen years the Ukrainian Republic should become one of the leading silk-producing regions of the Soviet Union. A silk mill is being constructed at Darnitsa, and Kiev silk mills have delivered their first batch of silk.

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Pre-War Output of Cotton Cloths[1]

In 1937 the production of cotton cloths in the Ukrainian S.S.R. amounted to 7.1 million metres (1.2 per cent. of the total output of the Soviet Union), while in 1932, production was only 2.2 million metres (0.08 per cent. of the total Soviet Union production of cotton cloths). The cotton cloths production of the entire Soviet Union had risen from 2,694 million metres in 1932 to 3,447.7 million in 1937.

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Leather Footwear[1]

Leather footwear production in the Ukraine in 1937 was 31,228,000 pairs of shoes, (17.07 per cent. of the 182,916,000 pairs produced in the whole Soviet Union); while in 1932 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had turned out only 14,535,000 pairs (16.72 per cent. of the Soviet Union total: 86,949,000 pairs)

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1 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939.

Food Industries

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727 The damage suffered by the Soviet food industry during the German
25 occupation - not counting the destruction of livestock and crops - has
U been estimated at 17,000 million roubles. Restoration work was begun
727 while the war was still on, and by May 1947, 3,200 food factories had
25 been rebuilt. A fairly large proportion of these restored factories
433 must have been in the Ukraine, where, according to the Soviet Monitor[1] 1,600 out of 1,822 pre-war food factories had been restored by November 6, 1946. The rehabilitated factories had exceeded their 11 months' food output programme by production valued at 12 million roubles (146 million roubles over the corresponding period of 1945).

Sugar

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257 Before the war the output of sugar in the Ukraine was as follows.

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TABLE XI

Pre-War Sugar Production: Ukraine and U.S.S.R.
(metric tons)

Year	Soviet Union total	Ukrainian S.S.R.
1928	1,221,200	1,086,400
1932	826,800	559,700
1937	2,377,500	1,789,800

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; and Statistical Yearbooks of the League of Nations, Geneva, 1936 and 1939.

The Five-Year Plan establishes that in 1946-50 sugar refineries in the Ukraine shall be restored or built capable of handling upwards of 67,000 tons of sugar beet per day. By 1950, according to plan, the output of granulated sugar in the Ukraine will reach 1,637,000 tons, (in the entire Soviet Union, 2.4 million tons).

Forestry

U
[311] In January 1935 the forest area of the Ukrainian S.S.R. was
313 3,845,000 hectares - about 0.5 per cent. of the forest area of the entire U.S.S.R.[2] The number of sawing frames in the Republic was 703 out of the Soviet Union total of 6,500 (total capacity, 18.4 million cubic metres).[3] Considering the relatively small forest

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1 November 11, 1946

2 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1936.

3 Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940, II.

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313 area of this Republic, the high proportion of sawing frames reveals the advanced development of its timber industry.

SU
313 During the war Soviet timber enterprises, along with other industries,
727 suffered considerably. Much has been done to repair the damage, but rehabilitation work has been seriously hampered by shortages of wagon transport and of seasonal labour. In January this year a Pravda leading article announced that the preparation of timber in the U.S.S.R. was nine million cubic metres short of the plan, and that the shipment of prepared timber was "in an even worse condition," particularly in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics. Part of the difficulty at least was due to breakdowns in tractors, but chiefly to labour shortage and low labour productivity. Here again, as in all branches of industry and agriculture, the exceedingly low food ration scales must be taken into account.

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185 The Five-Year Plan includes the following provisions for
313 Ukrainian timber developments:

> "To reduce the haulage of lumber to the Ukrainian S.S.R., the general plan for the production of undressed lumber in the Ukraine in the years 1946-50 shall be set at 47,600,000 cubic metres, with provision for an increase of felling in the western regions of the Ukraine and a restriction of felling in its eastern regions. Réafforestation shall be carried on extensively, timber being planted in the period 1946-50 on an area of 252,000 hectares and measures taken to replenish the thinned forests and to introduce fast-growing varieties of timber."

Paper Production

U
289 In 1937 the Ukraine produced 28,400 tons of paper, as compared with 22,600 tons in 1932. This output represented, in 1937, 3.42 per cent., and, in 1932, 4.8 per cent. of the Soviet Union total paper production.[1]

In 1946 the reviving paper industry of the Ukraine turned out about 9,500 tons of paper and cardboard, exceeding its production programme by 10 per cent. This year the output of paper and cardboard is expected to be more than double that of 1946.

The first section of a mill producing paper bags has been launched in the Dragobych Region, and another paper mill is being built in the same region. Two cardboard factories are being built, one in Lvov and one in Rakhov (Transcarpathian Region).[2]

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1 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 10, 1947.

Production of Building Materials

339 In connection with the reconstruction work being carried out in
185 the Ukraine, the production of building materials is extremely important. The Five-Year Plan lays down that the pre-war production of bricks is to be increased by 50 per cent. of tiles, by 170 per cent. of lime, by 120 per cent., and of gypsum by 190 per cent. The Plan also states that

> "Plants for the production of building materials - including cement, glass, brick, lime, and tile works, plants producing metal fixtures, prefabricated houses, building sections, plumbing fixtures, roofing materials and high tensile gypsum - shall be restored or built and stable local fuel and power supplies created for the building material plants."

The Ukrainian output of cement in 1950 is expected to be 2,065,000 tons as compared with 10,500,000 tons for the entire U.S.S.R.

[323] Under the jurisdiction of the Republic and local authorities there are to be put into operation in the years 1946-50 glass works with a capacity of 11-33 million square feet of glass, brick kilns with a capacity of 9 million bricks, and rolling mills and other building material plants.

Transport

727 The war and the occupation brought great devastation to the
489 transport system of the Ukraine. The greater part of the railroads were partially or completely destroyed, and many hundreds of railway bridges demolished. The port of Odessa on the Black Sea was systematically destroyed - piers, warehouses, elevators, floating cranes, and power supply. The Dnieper-Bug Canal, the only water outlet towards the west, was made impassable by the Germans, who destroyed the sluices, wrecked bridges, sank boats in midstream, and choked the canal with mud.

185 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, provides for the complete rehabili-
489 tation of Ukrainian transport. Railway lines and junctions, and locomotive and car repair works are to be fully restored. A number of railway lines are to be electrified; and west of the Dnieper several narrow gauge lines are to be constructed for closer connection of sugar beet growing areas with sugar refineries.

185 To alleviate the difficult situation in rail transport, motor
489 roads are to be rebuilt and extended. The Moscow-Kharkov highway is
494 to be rehabilitated and improved, and additional motor roads are to be built to connect towns of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with the towns of the North Caucasus and the Crimea. By 1950 the tonnage of freight transported by road should be 16 times the pre-war volume. The number

U 185 489 494 of road passengers should increase 7½ times; and the number of buses, by 3,000.

U 185 489 503 The Five-Year Plan also provides for the expansion of river and sea traffic. Small rivers are to be extensively adapted for navigation, and will also be utilized for local hydro-electric power supplies. Shipbuilding yards are to be rebuilt, and the tonnage of river and sea traffic is to be considerably increased. The freight turnover on small rivers of the Ukraine in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 450,000 metric tons.

Pre-War Traffic

U 489 In 1937 the Ukrainian railways handled 313.1 million metric tons of loads, as compared with 165.7 million in 1932. The river transport carried 7.7 million tons (4.7 million in 1932), while in the same year Ukrainian seaports handled 8.6 million tons as against 6.5 million tons in 1932.

SU 497 U 497 The U.S.S.R.'s system of rail transport is perhaps the weakest link in the Soviet economy. In 1937 the railway network of the entire Soviet Union amounted to only 86,400 kilometres (83,400 kilometres in 1933). The construction of additional lines had by no means kept pace with the expansion of industry and agriculture. The Ukraine in 1937 had some 14,400 kilometres of railway lines; and traffic loads in that year amounted to some 313.1 million metric tons. The inadequacy of the system if compared with other European countries is marked. For example, in France (the area of which was approximately equal to that of pre-war Ukraine) the length of the principal lines open for traffic on January 1, 1938, was 42,000 kilometres.

U 727 497 The war has greatly disrupted Ukrainian rail transport. Locomotives, rolling stock and tracks were heavily damaged or destroyed. The problem of rehabilitation is especially serious, because the lack of adequate transport facilities hinders other rebuilding projects. The locomotives and cars taken as reparations from Germany, being chiefly of narrow gauge, are consequently of no use on most existing Soviet tracks.

Production of Long Distance Locomotives

U 397 Before the war the output of long distance locomotives in the Ukraine was as follows.

TABLE XXI

U 397

Ukraine: Pre-War Production of Long Distance Locomotives

Year	Ukrainian S.S.R number	Soviet Union total number
1928	231	479
1932	431	828
1937	880	1,214

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; and Russia's Economic Front, A. Yugov, New York, 1941.

SU [397] Ukrainian production of longdistance locomotives in 1950 is planned to be 1,000. For the Soviet Union as a whole a target of 2,720 has been fixed: this includes 2,200 steam locomotives, 300 diesel, and 220 electric locomotives. The Ukrainian output of freight cars in 1950 is fixed at 55,500 - more than a third of the target for the whole U.S.S.R., which is 146,000 freight cars.

Motor Vehicles

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The number of motor vehicles to be produced in 1950 in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is fixed by the new Five-Year Plan at 25,000 while SU [397] for the entire Soviet Union the output is as follows: 428,000 trucks, 65,600 passenger cars, and 6,400 motor buses. Apparently the destruction of factories producing motor-vehicles was particularly heavy.

The Five-Year Plan provides for the building in the Ukraine of two motor car assembly plants, as well as a works to produre annually 60,000 motor trucks.

Dnieper-Bug Canal[1]

U 503 487

The Dnieper-Bug Canal, cutting through the Pinak bogs and the Brest forest in Byelorussia, is important as the only water outlet towards the west, connecting the Dnieper, Western Bug, and the Black Sea with the Vistula.

It first took shape at the end of the 18th century under the name of the Imperial Canal. But in those days, being shallow and without sluices, it was of little use for navigation. For ten months in the year the canal was dead. Only at high water, in the springtime, could a small quantity of timber be rafted along its course.

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1 Soviet News July 24, 1946.

503 The canal was reconstructed just before the German invasion.
487 In record time, eight months, ten large sluices were built in two
727 stairways of five locks each; and in August 1940 the first river vessels passed through from the Black Sea to the Vistula.

The Germans destroyed these sluices and choked the canal so that all the hydro-technical structures had to be rebuilt anew. The speed of reconstruction was such that by the middle of 1946 vessels and barges were passing freely from the Vistula along the Dnieper with cargoes of timber for the Ukraine.

At present the western Bug is navigable only in April and May. When it has been converted into a normal waterway, effective communication will be established between the Ukrainian and Byelorussian river basins and the Vistula, Oder, Elbe, and Rhine.

IV UNRRA ASSISTANCE TO THE UKRAINE

Distribution of UNRRA Supplies

648 731 UNRRA supplies for the Ukraine are handed over to the government at the port of entry (usually Odessa on the Black Sea); and the government is then responsible for arranging distribution.

648 731 647 Like most other countries receiving UNRRA help, the Ukrainian Government has established a special organization to supervise the reception, warehousing, and distribution of all UNRRA goods received. This organization - which has on its staff specialists in food, industrial equipment, agricultural rehabilitation, food processing machinery, medical supplies, transport, accounting and distribution - is called the Department of UNRRA Supplies, and is directly responsible to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

The Department (headed by Mr. V.V. Khomyak) works in close liaison with the various ministries of the Ukrainian Government, and with the UNRRA Mission. On the basis of decisions made by the particular ministries concerned, it draws up plans for the distribution of UNRRA supplies and keeps a central record of their sales and of the proceeds expended by the government for further relief projects.

504 648 731 Most UNRRA shipments for both the Ukraine and Byelorussia have arrived through the port of Odessa; and since early 1946 an UNRRA officer has been stationed there to handle problems connected with delivery. Before an UNRRA shipment comes in, the authorities at Odessa are notified of the ship's name, its expected time of arrival, and the nature of its cargo. As soon as possible after the ship lands, discharging of cargo begins. Stevedoring labour is supplied by the port commander's service organization, "Inflot", which also furnishes checkers to work in the ship's hold and on the docks, counting the supplies and reporting any damaged goods. As the cargo is unloaded, perishable items, such as clothing and cheese, are placed in warehouses on the docks, and seeds in a warehouse in the suburbs of Odessa. Packaged goods, such as canned meat, army rations, and juices, are piled on the dock at shipside and finally into freight cars.

648 731 Directives for the distribution of the supplies (based upon decisions of the recipient ministries concerned) are issued by the Department of UNRRA Supplies to the Ministry of Foreign Trade representative in Odessa, whose office then instructs the railroad and barge authorities, providing such information as the name and location of the organization or governmental authority receiving the supplies, and a description of the goods to be delivered.

[656] UNRRA relief supplies are either sold to individual ration-card or permit holders, or distributed to collectives, co-operatives, and other

648 enterprises; and in accordance with the provisions of the UNRRA
731 agreement, the Ukrainian Government uses the proceeds for further
relief and rehabilitation work within the country. Food and soap
[647] supplies for example are sold through regular trade channels to
ration-card holders, or are delivered to organizations which use
them for factory or community feeding. Clothing also is sold in
stores against ration cards, or in the case of workers having a high
rate of clothing and shoe consumption, against special orders. Used
clothing is distributed free of charge to invalids of the war, families
of war dead, pensioners, or other recipients of social welfare. Medical
supplies and equipment are transferred free of charge to the Ministry of
Health. The distribution of agricultural and industrial equipment
varies depending upon the nature of the supplies. Consumable items,
such as seeds, jute, bagging, rope and industrial raw materials, are
sold to collectives, state farms, co-operatives, or industrial enter-
prises. Capital equipment such as tractors, food processing machinery,
or power generators is delivered free of charge to the recipient
ministries or their subsidiary distribution organizations. Tractors
in particular are delivered in this way to state-owned Machine Tractor
Stations.

Proceeds of Sale of UNRRA Supplies

648 Up to March 1, 1947, the sale of UNRRA supplies in the Ukraine
731 had provided the government with 3,166,482,000 roubles[1] for additional
relief and rehabilitation work in the Republic. Roughly 85 per cent.
652 of this total resulted from sales of UNRRA food; 6 per cent. from the
sale of clothing; and 9 per cent. from the sale of miscellaneous raw
materials and agricultural supplies.

Of the cumulative proceeds up to March 1, about 21 million roubles had been used to pay the expenses of distribution, and 823,511 roubles had been spent to provide goods and services to the UNRRA Mission. Of the balance then remaining available (3,144,655,500), nearly half had been used for rehabilitation work at the Republican (state) level of government; 1,324,239,000 roubles had been transferred to regional executive committees (the next level of government) for expenditure on local projects; and about 391 million roubles in cash was still available for future use.

State Relief and Rehabilitation Projects

652 At the state level rehabilitation work carried on from the beginning
657 of UNRRA deliveries up to March 1, 1947, amounted to 1,429,060,000
roubles, and was divided among four main categories; rehabilitation of
the national economy, 74 per cent. of the total state-level expenditures;
health services, 14 per cent.; children's institutions and schools,
11 per cent.; and social welfare, 1 per cent.

Rehabilitation of the National Economy. These expenditures are administered by the various ministries having productive capital works

21.36 roubles equals one pound sterling; 5.40 roubles equals one U.S. dollar (March 1947).

652 under their jurisdiction. For example, capital works, repairs,
657 and equipment for livestock raising centres, piggeries, cattle sheds, slaughterhouses and refrigerators (under the Ministry of Cattle Breeding); vineyards, orchards, repairs of irrigation facilities (under the Ministry of Technical Agricultural Production); repairs to barns and agricultural implements (under the Ministry of Agriculture); and rehabilitation of the brick and ceramic industry (under the Ministry of Home Construction).

Health Services. These expenditures are administered by the Ministry of Health, and include the feeding of patients, and repairs and equipment for hospitals and health service agencies.

[658] Children's Institutions (over four years) and Schools. These expenditures are handled by the Ministry of Education, and include the feeding of children; and capital works, repairs and equipment for schools and children's homes.

Social Welfare Services Directed towards the Betterment of General Well-being. These expenditures are administed by the Ministry of Social Welfare and include such services as repairs and maintenance of social welfare agencies, and assistance to invalids.

Local Rehabilitation

648 As at March 1, 1947, about 41 per cent. of the gross proceeds of
727 UNRRA sales had been transferred to regional executive committees of the government for use in the local and district economy. The local
185 projects - which are undertaken after approval by the state authorities
731 and are subject to regular reporting and inspection - are similar in character to those carried out by the Republican Government Ministries. However, there is a considerable shift in emphasis. For example, at the regional level, nearly 57 per cent. of the total proceeds at their disposal was utilized for health services (hospitals, nurseries), 35 per cent. for children's institutions, 5 per cent. for repairs of public and industrial institutions, and 2 per cent. for the building of schools and repair of clubs.

Deliveries of UNRRA Supplies

648 In the original agreement between UNRRA and the Ukrainian Govern-
731 ment was a provision that the Administration would "strive within the limits of its resources" to procure and deliver the Ukraine's share of relief and rehabilitation supplies before July 1, 1946. In the early months of 1946, however, it became clear that procurement difficulties and transport hold-ups would prevent a great part of the supplies from being delivered in time. The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was therefore extended to the end of 1946.

From December 1945, (when UNRRA deliveries to the Ukraine began) up to June 30, 1946, (the time at which they were originally scheduled

648 to end) only 202,585 gross long tons of UNRRA supplies had arrived in
731 the Ukraine. These consisted mainly of foodstuffs (three-fourths of the entire tonnage); while slightly less than one-tenth was made up of clothing, textiles and footwear; and 67 tons were medical equipment. Despite the urgent need of agricultural and industrial supplies, only 15,336 and 13,249 tons respectively had reached the Ukraine by the end of June.

By the end of January 1947, UNRRA shipments to the Ukraine from all sources amounted to 407,125 gross long tons; and the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine reported that 372,796 tons of this had reached Soviet
[504] ports. Delays in shipments during December and January were greater than usual because the port of Odessa for the first time in many years was frozen over, and ships lay icebound for days.

The following table shows UNRRA shipments in comparison with the programme.

TABLE XXII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Programme (thousand U.S. dollars)	Shipments to January 31, 1946 (thousand U.S. dollars)	(gross long tons)
Food, feed, soap	100,189	94,387	287,519
Clothing, textiles, and footwear	16,856	16,801	15,095
Medical and sanitation	2,326	1,858	373
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088	14,403	29,070
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591	34,077	75,068
Totals	188,050	161,726	407,125

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Industrial Rehabilitation Supplies

731 As the table shows, 75,068 gross long tons of the total supplies
48 shipped by January 31 were industrial rehabilitation equipment. These supplies have, however, been extremely slow in arriving. Up to the
433 end of June 1946 only 13,249 gross long tons had reached the Ukraine, including United States army surplus equipment of about 20 electric power stations and generators, as well as some raw materials, chiefly rubber, tin, lead, copper and other metals, and welding electrodes. A small number of machines for use in automobile repair shops, and about 90 motor cars and trucks had also arrived; but the slow delivery of machinery to transport materials and process building equipment was a serious defect, since much of the rubble of war damage had been cleared away, and the lack of such supplies was a hindrance to

731 rebuilding. Between July 1, 1946, and January 31, 1947, however,
648 another 38,744 tons of industrial supplies arrived, bringing the
433 deliveries up to 51,993 gross long tons.

The following table shows the composition of all industrial supplies shipped to the Ukraine by the end of January 1947

TABLE XXIII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Industrial Equipment up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Transport and telecommunications	620	949
Public utilities	18,975	27,451
Building repair equipment	5,030	3,209
Machine repair equipment	1,041	527
Miscellaneous consumer goods	307	97
Materials, chemicals, engineering stores	7,930	42,684
	174	151
Totals	34,077	75,068

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Many of the metals which have been received are being used in canning factories or in the manufacture of household utensils and dishes. Pipe supplies (the first shipments of which arrived in December) are being used to replace destroyed water and gas mains. Canvas tarpaulin has been distributed for use in mines and on the farms of the Ukraine. Although these supplies have unquestionably filled some of the needs, the UNRRA Mission reports that the quantities are too small and the task of reconstruction too great for them to make much impact.

About one-third of the industrial rehabilitation programme for the Ukraine consists of so-called "protocol" supplies - that is certain items of industrial equipment which in a previous trade agreement the United Kingdom had contracted to furnish to the Soviet Union. After UNRRA assumed responsibility in the Ukraine and Byelorussia, negotiations commenced for the transfer of this equipment through UNRRA. About the middle of 1946 arrangements were concluded; and it was agreed that UNRRA would take over and deliver these "protocol" supplies as part of the industrial rehabilitation programme. Similarly, UNRRA became financially responsible for those "protocol" supplies which had already been delivered to the Soviet Union for use in Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

By March 1, 1947, about 16,720,000 dollars' worth of "protocol"

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433 supplies had been shipped to the Ukraine; remaining "protocol" ship-
648 ments to the Ukraine are expected to amount to 923 tons and 784,617 dollars.

Included in these supplies are power stations, pumps, portable cranes, presses, electric locomotives, and electrical and telephone equipment.

Agricultural Supplies

731 The greater part of the tonnage in agricultural supplies consisted
241 of seeds; by January 31, 1947, 15,669 gross long tons had been shipped.
648 Most of these seeds had arrived in the spring of 1946; however, some of the bags were inadequately labelled, and the contents not easily identifiable. Because of this difficulty the seeds had to be given costly and time-consuming laboratory tests, which delayed distribution. At the same time, 2,600 tons of seeds were reported by the Ukrainian Government to be either diseased or infested with weeds, and therefore unfit for sowing. Negotiations are still in process for the replacement of these defective seeds by suitable types.

[407] As at the end of 1946 the amount of farm machinery which had arrived was small. For example, the UNRRA programme calls for the delivery of 1,600 tractors to the Ukraine, but only 310 had been received by December 31, and these came too late for autumn ploughing. They are being distributed to state owned Machine Tractor Stations for use this spring.

UNRRA shipments have also included 6,692 tons of bagging, 2,090 tons of fishing equipment, and 244 tons of dairy equipment. These are shown in the following table, which summarizes agricultural rehabilitation shipments to the end of January.

TABLE XXIV

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Agricultural Supplies up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Bagging	1,672	6,692
Farm machinery	1,517	2,941
Fishing equipment	651	2,090
Food processing equipment	551	1,122
Repair material and hand tools		312
Seeds	9,861	15,669
Dairy and poultry equipment	151	244
Totals	14,403	29,070

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington

Medical Supplies

731 The UNRRA medical and sanitation programme for the Ukraine is
758 extremely small in relation to the needs; and the rate of deliveries
648 has been the poorest of any commodity group.

Up to the end of January 1947 the Administration had shipped to the Ukraine 373 gross long tons of medical and sanitation equipment valued at 1,858,000 dollars, leaving a balance still to be shipped of just over 468,000 dollars.

In a country where the destruction has been so great and where food supplies are so low, a medical programme of 2,326,000 dollars cannot make much impression; however, such equipment as has been received is being used to the best possible advantage.

743 Most of the hospitals and invalids' homes in the Ukraine are operating under appalling difficulties; and the urgency of the need for equipment and medical supplies is everywhere evident. The UNRRA Mission early in 1946 described several hospitals which they had visited in various parts of the Ukraine. Here is their observation of the one at Kremenchug:

"Kremenchug formerly had a good 450-bed general hospital, which was blown up by a thoroughly efficient demolition battalion when the Germans retreated. All equipment, including an 8,000-volume medical library and a well-equipped X-ray laboratory, was demolished. The only buildings which escaped destruction were seven small sheds and storage houses on the outskirts of the hospital grounds.

"The hospital staff recently installed 250 beds in these ramshackle buildings. In a number of wards the windows were bricked up because no glass is available, and the only light came from an unshaded 40-watt electric bulb in the corridor. Paint was flaking off the floor and the walls of the surgery; most of the roofs leaked, there were no indoor toilets; fuel was available to heat only the operating and delivery rooms and the nursery. (Four babies, on an average, are delivered each
743 day). Many of the patients had no gowns and no bed clothes, except
758 what they were able to bring with them. No soap whatever has been available to the hospital for some time; laundry was simply being boiled with a little soda, and the floors were scrubbed with a lye solution. The only surgical equipment we saw was a few dozen scalpels and haemostats in one small cabinet in the corner of the operating room, and two sterilizers.

"The doctor in charge told us that his patients received an average diet of 1,000 to 1,200 calories a day, consisting mostly of bread, potatoes, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of fat. (The low calorie intake is largely due to the inability of the patients to digest the coarse whole-grain rye or wheat bread, which is available in reasonable quantities). Theoretically the hospital is entitled to 2,500 grams

743 of meat daily for each thirty patients; but, since there is rarely
758 any meat to be had, it received 400 grams of dried milk as a substitute, or approximately 13 grams per patient each day.

"The hospital was so badly overcrowded that beds had been set up in the corridors and even in the yard. Some of these beds had been salvaged from the ruins of the old hospital, and consequently were badly twisted and charred."

The same general conditions prevailed in most of the hospitals visited. The fact that so much improvement has since been made with so little help promises the best use of future deliveries of UNRRA medical supplies. The programme includes in addition to dressings, drugs and chemicals, X-ray equipment and supplies, surgical instruments, dental equipment, and a penicillin plant.

Clothing

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[294] Since most of the Ukraine's clothing factories were heavily damaged or destroyed in the war, there is a widespread shortage of all articles of wearing apparel. The limited UNRRA programme has fallen
648 considerably short of satisfying all the requirements; however, such
731 supplies as have been sent - particularly textiles and shoes - have been economically used to help the most critical cases.

By the end of January 1947 UNRRA had sent the Ukraine 15,095 gross long tons of clothing valued at 16,801 dollars, leaving an unshipped balance of 55,000 dollars. The following table gives the composition of the shipments.

TABLE XXV

UNRRA Shipments of Clothing to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Finished clothing	779	384
Blankets and comforters	902	522
Cotton textiles	573	321
Woollen textiles	3,487	1,359
Raw wool	2,240	3,729
Footwear	5,697	3,997
Upper leather	575	259
Sole leather	1,274	1,626
Hides	188	381
Miscellaneous textiles	183	149
Miscellaneous footwear	735	2,368
Unclassified	168	n.a.
Totals	16,801	15,095

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

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In addition to these items, UNRRA has delivered several thousand tons of used clothing and footwear contributed through voluntary relief organizations in other countries. Most of the contributed supplies are distributed to war invalids or to orphans of the war.

The thousands of pairs of shoes delivered by UNRRA, as well as shoes made in the Ukraine from UNRRA leather, are sold according to a rationing system, with miners and heavy industry workers receiving highest priority. Textiles (also rationed) are sold as piece goods, or are made into garments in Ukrainian workshops for sale to permit holders. UNRRA blankets and comforters are distributed chiefly to hospitals and childrens' homes; and hides and other materials furnished by UNRRA are used in the construction of orthopædic footwear or artificial limbs for wounded veterans.

Food Supplies

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When the UNRRA Mission first arrived in the Ukraine, no data were available on the republic's exact food situation. The 1945 crops sown in a reduced area, under great difficulties of seed, fertilizer, and implement shortages, had yielded only a fraction of pre-war harvests. It was expected, however, that Ukrainian farms would produce enough grain to supply the population with bread and cereals until the 1946-47 harvest. UNRRA food supplies were therefore calculated to provide chiefly meats, fats (or equivalents in the form of army rations), and dairy products.

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Altogether, UNRRA planned to use 100 million dollars of the Ukrainian budget for food. By the end of January 1947, all but 5½ million dollars of this had been shipped, as is shown in the following table.

TABLE XXVI

UNRRA Food Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Grain and grain products	548	3,836
Meat and meat products	30,682	54,245
Fish	4,166	23,240
Dairy products	13,378	33,134
Fats, oils, soap	12,725	41,885
Pulses	615	4,658
Beverages	1,490	3,437
Soup- dehydrated	2,835	9,392
Quartermaster food	27,134	109,055
Other food	206	548
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture surpluses	808	3,689
Totals	94,587	287,519

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

731 Most of the UNRRA food supplies delivered to the Ukraine are
262 distributed to ration stores for sale to workers and their dependants.
[443 A large proportion (about 35 per cent.) also goes for communal feeding
265] through dining rooms, health resorts, homes for invalids and the aged, and dining halls of trade schools. Hospitals, childrens' homes, maternity homes, and the like also receive a share (around 10 per cent.) (The food distributed to welfare organizations is delivered free of charge).

731 Apart from the food which UNRRA supplies, the Ukrainian people
262 are dependent on whatever amounts of local produce may appear on
434 various markets. According to the rationing system, the farmers are allowed to retain part of their produce to feed themselves and their dependants, and the farm's livestock; the state then purchases a certain quota for use in feeding the non-farm population. If any surplus then remains, the farmers may keep it, or sell it on the free market at uncontrolled prices.

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433 In practice, however, because of the extremely poor harvests in the last two years, Ukrainian farmers have scarcely been able to feed
434 even themselves; and the amounts of domestically produced food which reach the ration stores or the free market have consequently been small.

The following section describes the sources of food supply open to the urban consumers.

The System of Food Distribution

443 In the cities of the Ukraine there are three outlets through which
434 foodstuffs reach the population:

364 (a) the ration stores, where the bulk of foodstuffs are sold
262 at fixed prices to ration-coupon holders;

(b) the so-called gastronoms (commercial stores) where scarce, luxury items are sold; and

(c) the public markets, where collective farmers and peasants bring their surplus produce for sale.

Most of the rural areas and villages of the Ukraine are expected to produce locally enough food to feed the inhabitants; and as they are nearly all considered to be self-supplying, they receive through the central distribution system only sugar and sometimes bread. Their surplus farm produce (that is, food in excess of that needed for feeding people or livestock on the farm and not subject to collection or purchase by the state) is usually brought by the farmers to the public markets for sale to the urban population.
[435 The quantities of produce and the variety of items available in the free public markets vary greatly from season to season and from day to day; Prices are equally unstable.

000 day to day; prices are equally unstable.

Ration Stores

443 Members of the UNRRA Mission have visited ration stores in all
434 the more important cities of the Ukraine. The city of Kiev, for
26 example, has about 300, all of them much alike. The typical ration food store serves from 2,000 to 2,500 families living in the immediate neighbourhood; if a family moves, it changes its ration card registration to a store in its new locality. Some stores, however, serve the employees of a particular factory or organization as well as a neighbourhood; others are limited to special categories of customers, such as veterans, pregnant women and nursing mothers, teachers, doctors, and scientific workers; these stores have a slightly more varied stock of goods; and in the case of shops for pregnant women and nursing mothers, the roster of customers is smaller so that there is no waiting to be served.

731 Except for bread, most of the food sold in Ukrainian ration shops in 1946 was supplied by UNRRA. Many of these relief supplies, however, did not fit into the established rationing system; therefore many rather elaborate substitution schemes had to be devised, particularly for U.S. army C, K and ten-in-one rations, which were often substituted for a variety of foods. These schemes were said to be in effect throughout the Ukraine, local bodies having authority to make minor changes in substitution values to fit whatever stocks of goods were on hand at the moment.

For example, according to the scheme effective in Kiev in March 1946, if a customer was entitled to buy one kilogram of meat or fish monthly, he might possible substitute 15 eggs, or 200 grams of powdered milk, or 800 grams of sausage, or a 600 gram can of UNRRA tushonka[1] provided any of these were available. In lieu of one kilogram of fat rarely available the customer might buy 60 eggs, or two kilos of cheese, or 3 kilograms of sour cream, or 1.6 kilograms of powdered milk, or 400 grams of peanut butter, again provided they were available.

The army ten-in-one rations are packed in two cardboard boxes, labelled "first half" and "second half". In Kiev the "first half" was considered to be equivalent to 500 grams of fat and 1½ kilograms of sugar; while the "second half" was equivalent to 2 kilograms of meat and 500 grams of sugar.

In Poltava in April 1946 one U.S. army K ration was being considered the equivalent of 800 grams of meat or 206 grams of fat; one C ration, equal to 925 grams of meat or 310 grams of fat; the first half of a ten-in-one ration equalled 1,500 grams of meat or 500 grams of fat, and the second half of a ten-in-one ration, four kilograms of meat or 1,330 grams of fat.

A canned meat mixture.

Gastronoms

443 434 262 554 461 In addition to the ration stores, Kiev has about five gastronoms, or commercial stores, where unrationed goods are for sale. Most of the gastronoms are stocked almost entirely with delicacies, such as Siberian crabmeat, live carp in water tanks, a little fresh meat, salami, candy, biscuits, and Russian cigarettes. (No UNRRA goods are sold in such stores). Until September 1946 the prices in gastronoms were so high that only a relatively small part of the population could afford to buy. The gastronoms were patronized primarily by those with high earnings - professors, theatrical stars, scientists, artists, high ranking army officers, skilled technicians, etc. One of their main purposes was to show the average worker that some luxuries did exist, and thus encourage him to raise his skills and productivity. Another purpose was to provide a special reward for various kinds of meritorious service. For example, war heroes and top generals were entitled to a 40 per cent discount on all purchases made at a gastronom. Moreover, workers who had stayed at the same factory for six years or more were entitled to a 20 per cent discount, and office workers with similar service to 10 per cent.

[435] In September 1946, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to abolish differences between the higher "commercial" prices and the low prices of rationed goods, the prices in gastronoms were lowered and certain ration prices, raised somewhat.

[465] At the same time, taking into account the difficulties which average and low-paid workers would encounter as a result of higher ration prices, the Council of Ministers decided to increase all salaries of less than 900 roubles a month. Thus, those workers who previously had earned up to 300 roubles a month received an increase of 110 roubles; those who had earned up to 500 roubles, another 80. Similar increases were allowed in pensions and in students' stipends.

So far as UNRRA food is concerned, the increases in ration prices have affected meat, fish, fats and oils, other categories of UNRRA food supplies particularly milk, cheese, and army rations were not affected.

434 435 The following table shows the increases in ration store prices.

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TABLE XXVII

Ukraine: Prices of Rationed Food
(in roubles per kilogram)

	Before October 1, 1946	After October 1, 1946	Percentage increase
Bread (black with rye)	0.9	3.2	255
Bread (whole wheat)	1.8	6.0	240
Meat tushonka	16.6	32.0	87
Pork in gravy	20.5	35.3	72
Meat and vegetables	10.0	15.3	53
Pork and rice	15.7	30.7	90
Meat and corn	10.0	17.7	77
Herrings in tomato sauce	11.5	25.0	117
Herrings in natural oil	17.2	37.5	118
Smoked cod	9.8	18.0	84
Lard	18.0	36.0	100

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

Public Markets

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The third kind of outlet for the distribution of food to the urban population is the public markets (officially called "Collective Farm Markets"). Their importance as a source of supplementary food is difficult generally to assess. On the one hand, extremely high prices plus the inconstancy or inadequacy of supplies prevent any group in the population from depending on the public markets for any substantial part of its diet; on the other hand, the variety of food sometimes available impels many to supplement the limited amounts and kinds of foods secured at the ration stores by purchases in the public markets. While prices are fixed and rigidly controlled in the ration stores, there is no control of prices whatever in the public markets, and the seller and purchaser usually agree on the price after a rather elaborate process of bargaining. On account of the limitations in supply, the selling prices are usually dear.

There are striking differences between the fixed, ration store prices and the uncontrolled market place prices. For example, in July 1946 (before ration prices were raised) white bread which - depending on the extraction rate of flour - was selling in ration stores at 90 kopecks[1] to 2.7 roubles a kilogram was selling in the public markets at 28.5 to

1 There are 160 kopecks to a rouble

443 41.6 roubles a kilogram. Butter, which was almost never available,
435 in the ration stores at 24 roubles a kilogram, and in the public
262 markets, at 150. The price of sugar in the public markets was, on July 10, four to five times the ration store price.

443 In addition to these products for which there are comparable prices
262 in the ration stores, the public markets also offered certain foodstuffs
433 which were seldom or never available in the ration stores. In the public markets of Kiev dressed beef was selling for 70 roubles a kilogram on June 3, 1946, and 60 roubles on July 6; milk, which on June 3 brought 15 roubles a litre was selling for 12 to 14 roubles on July 6. The fall in the price of tomatoes illustrates the play of demand and supply; when the first fresh tomatoes arrived on the public markets, they brought 15 roubles for each small tomato; by the end of July the price had fallen to 3.5 or 4 roubles for large size tomatoes of the best quality. Similar price reductions occurred in other vegetables and fruits; in each case, however, prices were still extremely high; even when the crops had been harvested, the demand remained far greater than the supply.

The extent of the shortages may be gathered from a report by the UNRRA Mission in June 1946, when a tour of Kiev's two great public markets revealed only one pound of meat, several fowls, small quantities of milk and butter from nearby farms, fifteen small sausages being sold from one can, and a few miscellaneous titbits such as matches, cigarettes, and candy from a ten-in-one ration.

Present supplies are even more attenuated. Ration scales have been cut, and this naturally increases the demand for supplies in the public markets. As the demand grows and supplies dwindle, prices rise even higher. The next table compares free market prices in June 1946, July 1946, and January 1947.

TABLE XXVIII

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Ukraine: Food Prices in a Typical Public Market
(in roubles)

	June 1946	July 1946	January 1947
Bread, kilo	22.5	23.0	50.0 - 55.0
Meat "	about 60.0	70 - 100	60.0
Fish "	-	-	65.0
Milk, litre	16.0	15.0	16.0
Butter, kilo	190.0	190.0	230.0
Eggs, dozen	42.0	48.0	-
Cereals (various) kilo	-	50.0	-
Sugar	-	100.0	-
Vegetable oil	-	200.0	200.0

- Very little or none on sale. Supplies vary greatly but are never very large.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

UNRRA Supplies and the Food Situation

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Until the produce from local farms became available in the spring and summer of 1946, the diet of the urban population of the Ukraine depended principally, apart from bread, on UNRRA food supplies, which in the beginning consisted almost entirely of U.S. army rations, plus some dried and evaporated milk and tushonka. Urgently needed fats and oils were slow in arriving; up to May only 8,596 tons had been received in the Ukraine. The shortage was critical, since domestic production was providing a rate of only 4 to 5 kilograms of fats a year per person, as compared with 12.8 in 1940 and 22 kilograms in 1929.

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Very little food was being received from other parts of the Soviet Union, and a protracted dry spell was threatening the 1946 harvest. Official rations for almost all categories of consumers were low;

262 [434] For example, light workers were entitled tonoonly 1,820 calories[1] a day from rationed foods, and office workers, only 1,236. Supplementary non-rationed foods were obtainable, but only in limited quantities and at high prices.

262 433 461 The inadequate diet which everyone had been receiving since the war was undoubtedly responsible for lowered work efficiency, and added to the shortage of machinery and equipment, for delayed reconstruction. For example, although up to October 1945 heavy workers were entitled to official rations providing 3,757 calories a day, the greater part of their diet consisted of bread and cereals. Because of the great livestock shortage, there was scarcely any meat available on the ration. Fairly typical was the situation of 13,000 workers engaged in rebuilding the Ukraine's largest steel mill at Zaporozhie, who during April 1946 received only 750 grams of fat (about 26½ ounces) and less than two pounds of meat per person, a diet clearly inadequate for heavy labour.

262 758 Patients in a Kremenchug hospital received a diet composed chiefly of bread, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of butter nr lard, which provided about 1,200 calories daily - a level radically below the emergency subsistence rate of 1,900 calories defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

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1 Compare all calorie rates with the emergency subsistence food consumption levels defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as the minima necessary to prevent serious malnutrition leading to disease and the danger of civil unrest. For European countries, these levels are as follows:

Emergency Subsistence Caloric Intake

Category	Calories per day	Category	Calories per day
0 - 2 years	1,000	Normal consumers (male)	1,900
3 - 5 "	1,250	Sedentary (female)	1,600
6 - 9 "	1,500	Moderate workers	2,000
10 - 17 years	2,000	Heavy workers	2,500
Pregnant and nursing women	2,000	Very heavy workers	3,000

1 [SIC - - ANALYST]

262 On the farms of the Ukraine the diet, although in some respects better, was for the most part, restricted and monotonous; bread and cabbage soup were the staple items; meat consumption was negligible and the intake of fats and oils, well below a pound a month per person.

262 The present situation compared with the spring of 1946 is much
731 worse. UNRRA food deliveries to the Ukraine are all but completed.
The 1946-47 harvest on which so many hopes were set, proved a dismal
433 disappointment; and other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance. Domestic stocks must therefore last until the next harvest; and the outlook until then is bleak.

434 On October 1, 1946, because of the shortage of domestically
262 produced food and the imminent cessation of UNRRA supplies, Ukrainian rations for all categories of consumers had to be reduced. For most people this meant either that their cereal ration was cancelled, or that their bread quota was lowered or both.

For example, heavy workers, light workers, and employees, - although still receiving the same amount of bread, are no longer entitled to the cereal ration of 2.0, 1.2, and 0.8 kilograms a month respectively. Dependents fare even worse: not only have they lost their cereal ration, but in addition, their bread quota has been cut from 9 to 7.5 kilograms a month. The bread ration for children also has been cut from 12 to 9 kilograms, and their meat from 0.4 to 0.3 kilograms; however, they still receive the same cereal ration as before (0.8 kilograms a month).

Rations for mothers vary of course, according to the occupational category; but their special allowances remain the same, providing approximately 745 extra calories daily.

In terms of calories, these bread and cereal cuts have reduced the diet of heavy workers from 3,757 calories a day to 3,527; light workers are down from 1,820 to 1,682; employees from 1,236 to 1,144; dependents from 895 to 704; and children up to 12, from 1,209 to 973.

The following table shows the ration scales now in effect. Six cut of about twelve groups have been chosen to show typical differentiations. Special groups - for example, tuberculosis patients in
[737] institutions - have not been included. It should be noted that dependents are defined as those who are not working and who have
000 passed the age of 55.[1] Mothers usually work and draw, throughout their

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1 Previously the age was 45 years; but it has been raised in an effort to get all non-producers to work.

434 mothers usually work and draw, throughout their
262 pregnancy and afterwards, their full occupational rations[1] plus the
745 special allowances indicated. If they do not work, they draw dependents' rations plus their special allowance.

[855] Children up to 14 includes infants from one to seven, who also receive special rations through milk kitchens, nurseries, nursery schools, and kindergartens. These amount to 9.0 litres of milk and 6.0 grams of fats monthly.

434 The employee category includes such occupational groups as office
262 workers, timekeepers, and caretakers. The light workers group includes railway workers, machine builders, etc. The heavy workers group includes moulders, steelworkers, and miners. The latter receive a further additional ration in the form of a hot meal if they do underground work.

(It must be emphasized that the amounts given in the table are official scales, which, even though reduced, cannot regularly be met. Throughout, the figures in brackets refer to scarce items which are authorized, but cannot be supplied.)

TABLE XXIX

Ukrainian Ration Scales from October 1, 1946
(in kilograms per month)

Rationed commodity	Consumer category: Heavy worker	Light worker	Employee	Dependent[1]	Children up to 14
Bread	36.0	18.0	12.0	7.5	9.0
Cereals	nil	nil	nil	nil	(0.8)
Sugar	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	0.3
Meat or fish	(3.2)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.5)	(0.4)
Fats	(0.9)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Butter (or substitute)	nil	nil	nil	nil	.06
Potatoes	(5.0)	"	"	"	nil
Vegetables	(3.0)	"	"	"	(2.0)
Milk, fresh, dried, or evaporated	nil	"	"	"	9.0
Vitamin juices	"	"	"	"	scarce
Approximate daily calories from rations only	3,527	1,682	1,144	704	973 plus 204 infants

[736] In February 1947 the rations for dependents was again changed, and they are now authorized to receive only bread, 7.5 kilograms monthly.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

[1] [As of 1947 -- Analyst]

262 745 434 Expectant and nursing mothers are usually at work, and have standard leaves with pay and special privileges; thus, if working, they receive rations appropriate to the occupational group, plus special food allowances; and if not working, dependents' rations plus these allowances. The supplements are as follows, monthly: cereals, 1.2 kilograms; butter (or substitute), 0.8 kilograms; sugar 0.6 kilograms; vegetables, 2.0 kilograms; milk (fresh or dried) 12 litres. Their approximate calories from rations alone are, therefore:

If light workers	1,682 plus 512 -	2,194	calories daily
If employees	1,144 plus 512 -	1,656	" "
If dependents	704 plus 512 -	1,216	" "

In the last case it is almost possible to assume that the husband is well paid and will be able to buy products in the open market.

262 Even if the established ration scales for all groups could be met, they would not provide an adequate, balanced diet. Particularly the rations for women and children are very light in fat, first-class protein, and calcium. They provide less than half the low League of Nation's standard for daily full-cream milk requirements of the expectant mother. But even these inadequate scales are seldom supplied.

262 434 Since mid-October 1946, the honouring of ration cards has, because of the increasing food shortages, become more and more irregular. In December 1946, for instance, large groups of persons in the Kiev area received only bread, sugar, and a few tins of vegetables on their cards. No meat, fish or fats were available. By the middle of January 1947, the situation had grown even more stringent, and only bread was supplied on the ration.

At the same time, the amount of food available off the ration has decreased almost to the vanishing point. Cereals and white bread have practically disappeared from the open market; and when they are available, the price is beyond the reach of the average person.

262 181 144 369 The effects of the poor diet are already to be seen. The people generally show a noticeable lack of their former liveliness, energy and cheerfulness. Moreover, according to the Medical Officer of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, clinical starvation has made its appearance in the smaller villages of the Republic: protein dropsy and avitaminosis are increasing; and among the townspeople there is great incidence of skin infections and respiratory and nasopharyngeal conditions.

645 744 262 In order to meet some of the medical aspects which may arise out of the present food situation, the Ministry of Health has taken the following steps.

645 744 262 (a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

241 727 The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

731 649 262 UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.

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734 Everything depends on this year's harvest (1947-48). Meanwhile, the next three or four months are expected to be the worst period since the famine of 1922. No people in Europe who suffered under German occupation and devastation will continue to suffer from hunger in 1947 as much as will the people of the Ukraine.

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[For bibliographical references on the Ukraine, see 17: UNRRA, RD1 Ukraine, cat. 116, footnotes entire source]

20: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1937 RD1 Ukraine RD1

MAGICAL BELIEFS AND PRACTICES AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS[1]

Part I

The Black Art and its Representatives

771 To the inhabitants of the plains and plateaus and the majestic-
789 ally rising Carpathians of Southern Poland—the Galician Ukrainian—life in its manifold aspects is pervaded by a mul-

101 [1] The Galician Ukrainians, also known as Ruthenians, are Eastern Slavs, and constitute a branch of the numerous Ukrainian, or Little

771 titude of mysterious, evil forces which he endeavours either to
789 ally himself with, propitiate, or combat in order to assure himself of good luck or avert the many calamities which these supernatural powers may bring. Magical beliefs and practices are therefore widespread and deeply rooted among the people. Even where the church has opposed and tried to counteract the older notions and usages, its success has been at best only partial. What it often has effected was a change in form, or the substitution of an authorized rite for an ancient magical practice.[2] The priest, for example, sometimes takes the place of the sorcerer by holding a special midnight Mass, the *czorna służba* (black service), at the instigation of a person who wishes to harm an enemy.[3] At other times he acts as medicine man, e.g. by stepping over the back of an ailing parishioner in order to relieve his
[342] backache.[4] A case of substitution is noticeable in the rite observed before moving into a newly constructed house. Wherever the old practices of sacrificing a black rooster, as an offering to the Devil or as a preventive against disease, has become extinct, its equivalent has appeared in the solemn consecration of the house by the priest.[5]

754 Among the Ukrainians, as elsewhere, magical beliefs and prac-
791 tices have two main aspects, which may be termed respectively
789 the black and white arts. While the former has its prime source in the arch enemy of man, the Devil, the latter, which functions mainly to counteract evil influences, relies on some powerful medium, sometimes God himself, to neutralize or overcome the

Russian, people inhabiting South Russia. They occupy the eastern section of the former Austrian province of Galicia, which is at present part of Poland. They number approximately 3,000,000 and belong almost exclusively to the peasant class. Geographically, and to a certain extent also culturally, they may be divided into lowlanders and highlanders, the former inhabiting the plains to the north and the latter the Carpathian mountains to the south.

[113] [2] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Rutenen in der Bukowina und Galizien," *Globus*, lxi, 282.

[3] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Kuzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 277.

[4] Kaindl, R. F. "Neue Beitraege zur Ethnologie und Volkskunde der Huzulen," *Globus*, lxix, 71.

[5] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 282.

forces of evil. The agents of the former include the witch and the wizard; and those of the latter, the fortune-teller, the soothsayer, the conjuror, and, in cases of sickness, the healer. Between these two groups of "professional" intermediaries between the supernatural and natural worlds stands the ordinary non-professional man or woman, who, by using certain formulas or more concrete means, can also invoke superhuman intervention. 754 791 789

A person associated with powers of evil, though difficult or impossible to recognize by ordinary means, since he usually looks exactly like any other human being, can be singled out much more easily by his actions, and especially by the results he is supposed to obtain. Thus a successful person, it is thought, is necessarily allied in one way or another with the Devil, or his assistants. A man who has luck in hunting or fishing is undoubtedly in communication with the Devil.[6] A woman who repeatedly returns from the woods with her basket full of mushrooms, or whose cow continuously yields more than an average quantity of milk, is nothing but a witch who is using her unholy powers to her own profit and, usually, also the detriment of her neighbours.[7] Indeed, there is not a wealthy or successful person in the village or town who is not in league with the Devil.[8] A peasant, therefore, who has luck with his crops and cattle most likely receives help from evil spirits, and a manufacturer who makes money from his factory in town does so because he has demons to work for him.[9] Thus, although there exist special means of detection, which, as we shall see, are made use of when necessary, mere good fortune is the simplest criterion. 754 777

Among individuals occupied with the black art, the witch (*widma*) wields by far the greatest power.[10] Just as after death she becomes the most feared of evil spirits, so during her life she is considered the most dangerous of the Devil's disciples. The 754

[6] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), iii, 12. [113]

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 114. [8] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 229, 232.

[9] Onyščuk, A. "Materyaly do huculskoi demonologii," *Materyaly do Ukrainskoi Etnologii* (Lviw, 1909), xl, 73.

[10] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 280.

754 people know, therefore, of no more derogatory term to apply to a woman than "witch."[11] In her ordinary life, the *widma* resembles other women in every respect; only in action does she take on a weird or unhuman aspect. Then she is found walking around in a totally nude state with her hair in disorder, carrying in her right hand a baking spatula or a broom and in her left a bucket filled with milk stolen from strange cows.[12] She may also appear in the form of a dog, mouse, cat, or other animal,[13] of a flashing, transparent ball rolling in the air,[14] or of sparks escaping from a chimney.[15]

The *widma* is not only a close ally of the Devil, but also a faithful servant ever ready to fulfil his commands. Besides the personal advantage which she derives from her destructive activities, she experiences a devilish pleasure in harming people, especially those whom she considers her enemies. Quiescent during the daytime, she begins her depredations only after dusk (*pidweczer*).[16] Nobody in the house is aware of her activities, for only her spirit leaves, her body remaining in a sleeping or dormant state. But if her spirit experiences any harm during its nightly excursions, the mark of the injury is registered simultaneously upon the motionless body at home.[17] Its activities finished, the spirit returns to the body, but can re-enter it only if it has remained in exactly the same position as it was left; otherwise the body cannot come to life again. It is enough to turn the body over to prevent the spirit from becoming re-united with it.[18] Thus during the Austro-Prussian war a soldier stayed overnight with a certain family. He became aware that the housewife was a witch and decided to play a trick on her. After her spirit had left, he turned the body over. Since, as a consequence, the spirit could not re-enter it, the woman was found lifeless when morning came. However, when the husband, thinking his wife dead, had summoned his neighbours and begun to make funeral preparations, the soldier

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[11] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 280. [12] *Idem*. [13] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 131.

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[14] Szuchiewicz, W. *Huculszczyzna* (Lwów, 1902-8, 4 vols.) iv, 283.

[15] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 231. [16] *Idem*.

[17] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 131 [18] *Ibid*., pp. 130-31.

admitted his guilt. The body was then put into its former position, and immediately thereupon it came to life.[19] 154 [174]

Witches form a well defined hierarchy in which four separate grades are distinguished. Those of the first and lowest rank are witches by birth. If a pregnant mother swallows a live coal that [177] has fallen into a dish of food, especially one cooked on Christmas Eve, her child will be born a witch or a wizard, depending upon its sex. A witch of this type has a small tail, and begins her supernatural activities as soon as she grows up. Her association with the Devil having been established by birth rather than by voluntary choice, she is definitely less powerful than one who has acquired her prowess through her own effort. Next in rank and in power is the witch by training, i.e. one who had been trained in the art from earliest childhood by her mother, herself a witch. Some hold that such women also have tails, "but nobody can ever see them, for they succeed in hiding them even from their own husbands." Although higher in rank than the first type, the witch by training, not having chosen her career through her own volition, cannot compare in power to a witch of the third category, one who has allied herself voluntarily with the Devil in her ripe years. Of still greater potency is the witch who has grown up from a foundling girl placed by the Devil himself, through the *diwe baby* (mysterious women), under the care of her foster parents. Within the hierarchy there is constant strife; witches of higher rank assert themselves to the detriment of their inferiors.[20]

Every witch has her speciality, her own sphere of activity which she does not exceed. Thus there are witches of cows (*wid korow*), of sheep (*wid owec*), of goats (*wid kiz*), of ducks (*wid husij*), of swine (*wid swynyj*), etc. Each knows the limit of her power (*znaje wid sebe*), and permits no other, especially one of equal rank, to encroach upon her rights.[21]

The time of the witches' activities is the night, especially the three hours immediately following midnight. Although any night is appropriate, the most opportune times are the nights preceding important holidays, i.e. those before Christmas and Easter, and particularly the eves of SS. George, Onufri, and John,

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 130. [20] *Ibid.*, pp. 111-14. [21] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15.

754 which fall respectively on the twenty-third of April and the twelfth and twenty-fourth of June (Julian calendar).[22] On these special nights the witches usually foregather for sessions with the Devil on the *Lysa Hora* (Bald Mountain), an unapproachable crest in the Carpathians, thought by the people to be the rendezvous for all the witches in the world. Each witch rides to the meetings on the back of her own wizard, or else uses a baking spatula as her steed, urging it on with a broom. The sessions are devoted, first of all, to reports on the accomplishments and to the receiving of future instructions from the Devil, who presides. At these conferences, witches accused of exceeding the prescribed limits of their activities are formally tried, and those convicted are punished. Every witch must attend in person, or, if unable to do so, must send a substitute chosen from among the peasants. Such an individual, although present at the conference, hears nothing of what goes on, except what refers to himself, i.e. to the witch he represents.[23]

The fields of activity of the various witches embrace practically everything of concern to man, from personal affliction to bad luck with cattle and extremes in weather, and the means they employ are equally varied. They need only stare at a person, or animal, to harm him. Much more effective is their spoken work, their curse. Their favourite methods of causing injury, however, are those called " throwing under " (*pidsypuwaty*) and " putting under " (*pidložyty*). The former consists in scattering ashes or thorns on a path ; people or cattle traversing it will then be attacked by serious diseases . A witch may also wash her shirt before sunset and sprinkle the water on a path her victim is to use. This alternative method of " throwing under " causes sundry women's diseases. Similar consequences flow from " putting under," in which the witch puts part of a dead animal, usually a bat wrapped up in a cloth, under the doorstep of the victim. Other means used by witches include herbs gathered on St. John's Day, mercury, and the dried scales of snakes. Witches also have power to send bears and wolves to kill man and cattle. In order to cause famine they sell across the border grain which is in the process of ripening ; as a result the

[22] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 280. [23] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 109-10.

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country on the other side has plenty while there is starvation at home.[24] Witches are also held responsible for hails, storms, floods and drought.[25] 754

The commonest speciality of witches, however, is the bewitching or drying up of cows. The methods and means employed are many. Some believe that the *widma* simply milks the cow once in the usual way. Others assert that she takes some milk from the victimized cow, especially on the eve of St. George or St. John, and with it smears the teats of her own cow, which then gives milk in abundance while the udder of the bewitched animal dries up or yields only blood. According to some, the witch need not even actually touch or see the cow she wishes to charm; she has only to think of a particular animal to receive her milk, which in such a case flows from a door post, table, bench, or other object in the house.[26] Hence a witch does not actually have to possess a cow in order to have milk. "Marusia of Ispas never had a cow, but nevertheless always enjoyed an abundant supply of milk, and even had enough to sell; this astounded the people greatly until Petro Hyrak once came to her and found her milking a board."[27]

Although hated and despised, a witch must never be openly insulted or mistreated. In mentioning a witch, one should always append a curse, such as: "May she disappear"; "May the Devil stand between her eyes and the bear between her shoulders."[28] [789]

The wizard (*opyr*), although as harmful as his female counterpart, is considered lower in rank and is, in general, less frequently encountered.[29] He is even forced to serve the witch, e.g. as the steed on which she rides to her meetings, but he has the power to counteract any harm she may intend to do him.

[24] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 232-3.

[25] Kaindl, R. F. "Wetterzauberei bei den Rutenen und Huzulen," *Mittheilungen der k.k. geogr. Gesellschaft in Wien*, xxxvii, 637. [113]

[26] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 254.

[27] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 128.

[28] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 231.

[29] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 109.

754 The *opyr* is born, not made. He, too, has a tail, and his sex organs differ from those of a normal man, for which reason he is infertile and childless.[30] Some hold that he changes his sex every month.[31] A *misiecznyk*, as such a person is called, can be identified much more easily than the witch by his unusually rosy cheeks (*wse w lycy czerwonyj*).[32] Wizards, too, have their individual specialities, and they are especially careful not to encroach upon the spheres of activity of the witches. There are, for example, wizards of hunting, of fishing, and of horses.[33] But just as the witches are particularly interested in harming cattle and in diverting the milk of cows, so the wizards centre their chief attention on the weather. They produce torrents, droughts, hail, and snowstorms. For this purpose they gather raindrops, dew, and water from thawing snow into a vessel, and frost, snow, and storms into a bag or the skin of an animal. If a wizard lets so much as one drop of water from his vessel fall into a river, a torrent or flood follows immediately ; if he presses upon his bag, frost and snowstorm ensue. Once, it is said, the wizards kept the sun covered by clouds for seven weeks, as a result of which excessive downpours, crop failure, and famine occurred.[34]

754 789 It is obviously of great advantage to the people to detect a witch or wizard operating in their village. Although they can do so at almost any time, there is no more opportune occasion than the eve of a high holiday. Thus in order to determine whether a suspected woman is really a witch, one method is to steal three chips of wood before sunrise on nine consecutive days. When a fire is built with the chips, the woman, if she be really a witch, will not fail to come to the house to borrow something ; however she may beg and entreat then, she should never be believed, because only thus does she lose her power to bring harm upon the house.[35]

[30] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 110-13.

[31] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 230.

[32] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 113.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

[34] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 230.

[35] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 281.

Part II

The White Art: Counteracting Means

The Ukrainian peasant believes that all calamities can be 789
avoided or removed by conjuration, by the use of mysterious
concoctions, or by other magical means. Counteracting the [791]
work of the Devil and his associates and inducing good luck
are the special business of the professional soothsayer or conjuror, but even the ordinary person with no pretensions to extraordinary power can do much in this direction. Without employing the services of a professional conjuror he can, for instance, ward off evil from his cattle, assure himself of good luck in an enterprise, bring harm to his enemies, force a favourable turn in his love affair, foretell the future, and even banish an impending storm from his fields.

Thus in order to protect their cattle from harm, or to alleviate 789
damage already done, on the eve of St. George people fasten 777
brooms on long poles (*wichy*) to their gates as a notification to witches to leave the farmstead undisturbed.[36] The first milk from a cow that has calved is salted and poured into her drinking water. Old horseshoes are scattered around the yard, since it is thought that cattle stepping over them cannot be bewitched. To remove the spell on a cow, she is given a drink of holy water mixed with petals from a consecrated Palm Sunday branch; to make this potion even more effective some sulphur is added. If a cow has been taken sick and the owner does not know the reason thereof, the best thing to do is to "extinguish some coals." The peasant, or the soothsayer in his stead, throws glowing coals into a bucket of water; if they sink, the cow is bewitched. To bring her back to health it is only necessary to spill the water upon a black dog; the malady then passes to the dog, and the cow recovers. So greatly does the peasant fear possible harm to his cattle, that he often refrains from even the seemingly most innocent expressions. Instead of saying, for example, "The milk is boiling," he says "The milk is warming up."[37]

[36] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), [113]
iii, 124.

[37] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 234-255.

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The most effective way of assuring oneself of good luck and prosperity is to ally oneself in some way with the Devil. The usual method is to sell him one's soul. A person wishing to do this draws up a formal contract, written with blood drawn from his little finger, whereby Satan is obligated to serve him throughout his life but in return gains possession of his soul after death.[38] One who has entered into such a pact with the Devil can share his benefits with another by selling the latter a lesser devil, who will bring him luck in all his undertakings.[39] A person cannot only buy a devil but also make one for himself. To do so he secures a partly developed egg from the body of a dissected hen and keeps it under his arm for nine consecutive days, even when walking and sleeping, taking care the while not to wash himself or comb his hair and, above all, not to pray. If he observes these rules there will hatch out of the egg a little devil, called *chowanec* (the nurtured), who too will serve him only on condition that he promise him his soul after death.[40] Another way of enlisting the services of the Devil is to stand at a crossways after midnight and call him thrice by name, whereupon Satan appears in person and gives the suppliant a coin (*inkluz*) which always brings him good luck.[41]

Any person, it is believed, can attain to supernatural or extraordinary powers if only he has a strong will, determination and courage, and can hold a secret. Thus one can gain control over hail by stealing a piece of wood from the church and having the priest (unwittingly, of course) read twelve masses over it.[42] A thief, to avoid detection, uses a curious amulet consisting of a human shin-bone emptied of its marrow and filled with candle wax. If he walks three times around a house with such a candle, all its occupants sink into a death-like slumber, and he can steal whatever he pleases with no danger of being caught.[43]

Mastery in any of the arts is attainable only with the help of

[38] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 86. [39] *Ibid.*, p. 86. [40] *Ibid.*, pp. 86-7.

[41] Hnatiuk, V. "Znadoby do halicko-ruskoi demonologii," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (Lviw, 1904), xv, 255.

[42] Szuchiewicz, W. *Huculszczyzna*, (Lwów 1902-8, 4 vols.), i, 54.

[43] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Rutenen in der Bukowina und Galizien," *Globus*, lxi, 282.

the Devil. A person desirous of becoming a master builder must 789
rise early on Easter morn, stand on the threshold of his house 777
with an axe in his hand, imitate the motions of one building a house, and say to himself: "I am not greeting the resurrection of Christ but am chopping with my axe." "The priest announces that Christ has arisen, but I say that the foundation beams are laid for a house." He then goes to church, and, when the priest announces "Christ has arisen!" he says: "I am laying the foundation of a house. As great as is this day, so great a master may I be!" With these words he assigns himself to the Devil, who helps him thenceforth to become a real master in his vocation.[44] One who wishes to excel at playing the flute can do so only with similar aid.

Such a person must pay for the instrument as much as is demanded, and, having bought it, carry it home so that no one may see it and bewitch it. Upon arriving home he must dress himself in clothes turned inside out, and then pour brandy or goat's milk into the flute. After closing the instrument tightly, he must carry it to the boundary of two villages, and there bury it where three roads meet. Returning home he must hide himself, so that no one sees him for nine days, during which period he must neither wash, comb, nor pray, but constantly think of the flute, and move his fingers up and down as if playing on it. On the ninth day he goes to get back his flute. Devils await him, playing on flutes and dancing, and the heavenly judges stand to one side and weep. An angel then sits on his right shoulder and a devil on his left; both whisper into his ear until he is forced to follow one of them. When the devils have finally conquered him, they hand him back his flute, upon the condition that his soul belongs to them. After he has emptied the flute of the brandy and washed himself with it, the devils take him with them to instruct him, and keep him until the cock crows, whereupon he becomes a master.[45]

It is within the power of almost any individual to harm his 789
enemies by certain well tested means, almost all of which bear the character of either exuvial or imitative magic. To cause

[44] Szuchiewicz, *Huculszczyzna*, iv, 293. [45] *Idem.*

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789 the death of his neighbour, a person takes water in which a still-born child has been bathed, pours it into a pot, and, after keeping it for nine days, spills it in front of the neighbour's house; whoever first steps on the unclean place will become crippled and die.[46] One who envies another his good fortune, and wishes to see him unlucky, secretly cuts off a few hairs from his head and mixes them with the excrement of a dog; the victim will thenceforth go "the dog's ways," i.e. fail in everything he undertakes.[47] To bring incessant strife upon a household, one does as follows. Observing a fight among dogs, he disperses them, gathers some of the dust raised in the combat, throws it upon glowing coals, and keeps this mixture for a day and a night; if he scatters this around the enemy's house on the following night before sunrise, there will arise among its occupants a struggle like that witnessed among the dogs.[48]

789 832 There are many ways by which a girl may arouse the love of a young man, and have him eventually marry her. One of them is to throw a little salt on him when he leaves the house, in the conviction that he will run after her as a sheep does after salt.[49] Another means is the following. When the young man has left the house, the girl gathers "his footsteps," i.e. the dust from his foot-prints, and puts the dust on the hinges of the door, believing that he will turn toward her as the door does upon its hinges.[50] A still more effective way of inducing a man to marry a girl, namely, by using part of his clothing, is illustrated by the following case.

Ivan Gajaniuk, a widower, had a maid who was very much in love with him and desired to marry him. With this purpose in mind she went on Pelyp (fasting period) to a famous sorceress known for her wisdom and skill in "bettering" (*lipszyty*). The old woman, upon hearing her wish, told her to come again and bring with her the man's drawers. The maid returned with a pair of underwear, but it belonged to a boy in her master's service. Thus it happened that the boy, and not the master, shortly afterwards married the girl.[51]

[46] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 134. [47] *Ibid.*, p. 135. [48] *Ibid.*, p. 139.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 141. [50] *Ibid.*, p. 141. [51] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

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An excellent illustration of the power ascribed to exuviae is the use of sweat to arouse love. Thus a sorceress sometimes mixes a little perspiration from the sole of a girl's foot with some soot from the chimney, and pronounces a formula over the mixture; if the girl pours this concoction into a drink given to a boy, he will surely fall in love with her and soon marry her.[52] 789 832

When a person faces a serious situation and wants to be sure that the means employed are effective, he resorts, as in some of the above-cited cases, to a professional sorcerer (*czariwnyk*) or soothsayer (*prymiwnyk*) for assistance. Of these practitioners, mostly women, the most proficient are thought to be the Gypsies,[53] and especially the offspring of a Gypsy and a Ukrainian peasant.[54] A sorcerer or sorceress is never born but made. A woman who wants to become a sorceress must fast for nine consecutive days, abstain from ablutions and prayer, indeed, renounce completely her belief in Christ, and carry an undeveloped egg under her left armpit throughout the period. She must not, moreover, reveal the secret of her power, lest she lose her skill. On her dying bed, however, she should tell everything to another woman, in order to avoid the suffering of a lingering death which would otherwise be her fate.[55] 756 791

The sorcerer or soothsayer foretells future happenings by reading the lines of the palm, by extinguishing coals in the manner already mentioned, and by pouring wax upon water and observing the different shapes it takes.[56] To put an end to malicious gossip, 756 787 791

> a soothsayer is called in, and a lock is handed her. She washes the lock in water, brought by the master of the house, walking backward all the way, from an abundant well, and then closes it in order to put an end to the gossip. In case the latter is very menacing, two locks may be washed and shut. Having closed the locks, the soothsayer sweeps all the dirt and dust of the room into the water, and has the inhabitants of the house take off all their clothes and wash themselves with it. Finally she washes the windows too, and then

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 139.
[53] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 291.
[54] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 236.
[55] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 291.
[56] *Idem.*

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756 pours the water with all its dirt (the gossip) out through the
791 window.[57]

While the female soothsayer occupies herself mainly with
789 prophesying the future, making love magic, and the like, her
[759] counterpart specializes in weather control—in banning hail, thunder, snowstorms, and torrents, and in bringing the rains needed to relieve drought. Even in such cases, however, the ordinary man is far from helpless. Armed with formulas and more concrete means, he can avert a calamity even without the aid of a weather expert. It will be convenient, therefore, to examine the weather lore of the people before turning to a consideration of the professional.

789 The layman, first of all, is much given to predicting the weather,
787 which he undertakes with the greatest of confidence, especially at Easter. On this day he forecasts atmospheric changes throughout the year, and these prophecies are not mere pastimes, but are believed in to the extent of letting them determine important economic activities.[58] Work and cattle trading, for example, are done in accordance with these predictions. If it rains on Easter Day, the whole summer will be wet; fair weather foretells a dry summer, and unsettled weather means that in general a good summer is at hand. Aside from these general prophecies the people indulge in more minute predictions on the same day. If fair weather prevails from 1 to 3 a.m., an early and fair spring may be expected, and the price of hay will rise and that of cattle will fall. If the weather is pleasant from early in the morning until noon, then the approaching spring will be fair and the harvest good; if, however, the morning is fair at first but the sky later becomes overcast, the spring will indeed be pleasant, but the time of the maize and potato harvest will be characterized by inclement weather. Further detailed predictions are made from the kind of weather prevailing during the evening and on the following night, and the work in the fields and pastures is planned in accordance therewith.[59]

789 The layman can also, as already intimated, do much to avert hail or relieve drought without calling upon the aid of the weather

[57] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 276. [58] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iii, 8.
[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

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expert. The simplest means is to toss holy water from an elevated place towards a threatening hail cloud. Another way of averting hail or an approaching storm is to light candles consecrated at Epiphany, or to put an oven spatula and a broom crosswise in front of the door. A further effective way of preventing hail is to take a piece of black cloth which has been used to wrap the feet, light it, and throw it half burned into the open. If this does not help, then the straw upon which someone has died is used instead. The most universal means, however, is the ringing of church bells, specially consecrated for the purpose, for as long as the danger lasts. Individual fields can be insured against hail throughout the year by burying consecrated Easter bread in the corners of the field.[60] An effective annual " insurance policy " can be taken out on Christmas Eve. Among the mountaineers it is the women who are entrusted with this task. After having fasted all day long, they repair with the approach of evening to their gardens and fields. There they walk around with their apron-dresses over their heads uttering their conjuration formulas. Upon their return home they immediately set the table, and, putting upon it their best food, they ask the Hail to enter as a guest, entreating him not to bother them during the year.[61]

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The people also know of many ways to bring rain when it is badly needed. The means, once more, range from the simplest to the most complex and elaborate practices. Rain can sometimes be induced by merely plucking some grass with the hand, by overthrowing a cross in the graveyard, or by throwing a poppy-head into a well. Another method is for the woman to refrain from washing clothes in the river, waiting stubbornly for rain. Still another is to kill a rooster on the bank of a river and then throw its blood and head into the water.[62] A curious means for breaking a long drought employed by people of certain villages towards the end of the last century is recorded by Kolberg.[63]

[60] Kaindl, R. F. " Wetterzauberei bei den Rutenen und Huzulen," *Mitt. der k.k. geogr. Gesellsch. in Wien*, xxxvii, 625, 628. [13]

[61] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 253.

[62] Kaindl, in *Mitt. k.k. geogr. Gesellsch.*, xxxvii, 639.

[63] *Pokucie*, iii, 122-3.

789 The village elder, with the aid of his assistants, calls together all the women, old and young, usually on a Sunday, at a certain place, whence they are taken to the nearest lake or river and made to bathe. This is supposed to cause immediate rain. The group of women thus assembled enter the water willingly, or, if they resist, are thrown in by force. There they must stand in their shirts, with the water up to their waists, for a full quarter of an hour. This act is called *baby splawyty* (bathing the women). If it is noticed that any of the women are absent, a trustworthy peasant is sent to the house of the disobedient one to find out the reason for her absence. The only excuses acceptable in this case are absence from the village and serious illness. In the latter case, however, the woman is at least made to urinate and the urine is immediately spilled on the field.

The urine of women, as a matter of fact, is generally held to possess the power of causing rain.

756 789 In order to avert effectively a dangerous hailstorm or an approaching cloudburst, or to end a long-standing drought, it is necessary to secure the services of a professional weather expert. One or more of these men are to be found in practically every village, but not all are considered equally skilful. Those with the greatest repute come from among the mountaineers. Although women are not unknown as weather conjurors, those who excel at the art are usually men. A weather-man of reputation is much sought after and looked up to. His services are in demand over wide territories, and he is well paid and often comparatively wealthy. Travelling from place to place in response to calls, he frequently returns home in the fall with wagons laden with grain obtained for his services.[64]

The weather expert, though versed in all kinds of atmospheric problems, specializes at times in one field, or is at least considered by the people to excel in dealing with one particular kind of phenomenon. The two commonest specialists are the *hradiwnyk* (hail-man) and the *chmarnyk* (rain-man). They are able not only to prevent storms and bring rain but also, if asked,

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to divert the hail or cloudburst to an enemy's field.[65] For this reason they are sometimes looked upon as malevolent persons in league with an evil spirit.[66] 756 789

The *hradiwnyk* or *chmarnyk* may control the weather either in the individual case or for the entire year. His methods differ widely, ranging from the utterance of simple formulas to the institution of elaborate ceremonies involving mysterious instruments. Naturally, the more elaborate the means, the more effective the results are believed to be. To avert a hail or a cloudburst the weather expert must have a special wand, called *koszturnik*. This implement is usually fashioned from a limb broken off from a knobby bladder-knot tree, and it acquires its magical potency by being used to separate a frog and a snake engaged in a life and death struggle. Such struggles often occur in the mountainous region in the spring, and are so fierce that the combatants foam at the mouth. Touching the foam endows the wand with mysterious power. Other instruments widely used by weather-men include the scythe, the hatchet, and sharp tools in general.[67] [778]

Conjuration in the individual case, i.e. whenever a storm approaches, is performed in the following manner. As soon as a hailstorm is in evidence, the *hradiwnyk* repairs to the field, where he either undresses completely or else retains only his shirt. He then takes his hat in one hand and a scythe in the other, and utters his formulas, which are intended to divert the hail to a road, a river, a forest, or the field of an enemy.[68] A wand of the type described above, if the weather-man has one, is, of course, more effective than a scythe. Should such a conjuration prove ineffective, the *hradiwnyk* simply presents his hind part to the hail—a last resort which is considered infallible.[69] An approaching torrent or cloudburst, too, is prevented by simple means. As soon as a heavy cloud appears, the *chmarnyk* runs outdoors and diverts the storm in any desired direction by merely pointing with his wand.[70]

[65] Kaindl, in *Mitt. k.k. geogr. Gesellsch.*, xxxvii, 626.

[66] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 121. [67] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 252, 253.

[68] Kaindl, in *Mitt. k.k. georg. Gesellsch.*, xxxvii, 626. [69] *Idem.*

[70] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 253.

789 To banish hail throughout the year the *hradiwnyk* must act
756 on Christmas Eve. He must neither eat nor drink throughout the day, nor must he spit or talk to anyone. Late at night he undresses completely and betakes himself naked to the field. Here he draws various circles with his magic wand and by uttering his formulas, tries to get the hail to appear before him. The hail, naturally enough, does not appear, and this evokes from the conjuror the following address: "As you are not heeding my call now, so may you remain far from us throughout the year!" With this the conjuration for the whole year is accomplished.[71]

756 How does the weather-man avoid blame for his false predictions and ineffective conjurations, which are necessarily very numerous, and how does he manage to hold the confidence of the people? The answer is obvious: he employs the familiar excuses used by shamans everywhere. After performing his act he asserts that the cloud must disappear and that there will be no hail whatever, or, if for some reason the cloud cannot be dispersed, that he is driving it away to deserted places so that it will hail only there. If, however, his art fails, and someone complains to this effect, then he says that he was unable to do anything because he noticed the impending cloud too late, i.e. when it was over and had already left the limits of his sphere of influence, for, if this occurs, there is nothing one can do to ward off hail in that region.[72] Another stock excuse is that "the weather-man of a neighbouring village, may God punish him, has diverted the hail to our village out of revenge." The people believe this, and so does the conjuror himself.[73]

751 Mention should be made in this connection of the current belief that natural phenomena have a definite influence upon human health. In some localities, when the people hear thunder for the first time in the spring, they throw themselves on the ground and roll around, even though they may be engaged at the time in important work and the earth be muddy. This behaviour is thought to prevent all sorts of aches and especially stomach disorders.[74] In other places, on similar occasions, the

[71] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 253. [72] Kolberg, *Pokučie*, iii, 123.
[73] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, i, 55. [74] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 234.

people seize stones and with them beat their foreheads three 751
times, saying: "Stone-head, stone-head, stone-head." This is supposed to make the head as hard as stone, i.e. immune to any ache.[75]

The evil spirits residing in natural phenomena can be a source 821
of danger unless one takes the necessary precautions. When it 789
thunders and lightens, one should avoid walking along the road, and should sit down somewhere at the side, because God is shooting at the fleeing Devil and his arrows may accidentally kill the wayfarer.[76] One should do the same in the case of a dust storm, for its indwelling Devil is likely to harm a Christian.[77] One can lessen the severity of a blizzard (*metylycia*), and cause it to subside, by throwing sharp edged sticks at the driving snow. Falling hail can also be rendered harmless by catching the first hailstones, chewing them, and spitting them on the ground; "the horns of the evil spirit are then chewed off," and the hail loses its harmfulness in that locality.[78]

Part III

Healing by Magic

Disease, like other calamities, is attributed by the people to 753
evil spirits. It is the incessant activities of a multitude of supernatural beings, the people believe, that cause the many afflictions that befall the human body and soul.[79] Epidemic and fatal diseases are personified as supernatural women. The female personification of the plague, according to a popular story, once made a young peasant carry her on his shoulders. Wherever he went people began to die by the thousands. Finally he attempted to get rid of his dread burden by throwing himself into a river. It was he alone, however, who drowned; the plague, being light

[75] Kolessa, F. "Ludowy wiruwania na pidhirju," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (Lviw, 1898), v, 77. [113]

[76] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 91. [77] Kolessa, F. *op cit.*, v, 76.

[78] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 234.

[79] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), 160.

753 as a feather, escaped. She was so frightened, nevertheless, that she fled to the forest and forsook her activities, so that the epidemic ceased.[80]

755 One way of avoiding death or serious harm is to propitiate the
782 spirits through vows.

> It happens often that a sick person makes a vow (*zarikajet sie*), i.e. a promise, that if he regains his health, he will forego certain pleasures in life, or abstain from some pleasant task. A certain woman, for example, accidentally drove a needle into the palm of her hands, and when the physician, after chloroforming her, removed the needle, the convalescent pledged herself never again to sew embroidered shoulder-pieces on to a shirt of hers. This promise she kept religiously, sewing only on shirts belonging to others. Another woman, in order to rid herself of a headache, promised that she would not spin on Fridays; when relieved, she occupied herself every Friday with a different task in order to avoid spinning. A peasant in order to preserve his cattle during an epidemic that had broken out, solemnly vowed to give up drinking liquor for half a year, and when his cattle were saved he kept his word.[81]

755 Believing in the supernatural causation of disease, the people have little faith in scientific medical treatment, if they do not ignore it altogether. Poverty, though doubtless a factor, is far less important than the conviction, fully compatible with the prevailing conception of disease, that the native medicine-men and their remedies are more reliable than physicians and their medications. That the question of money is not decisive can be seen from the fact that quack doctors often receive larger fees than trained physicians. Even when given free treatment and medicine, an individual often puts aside the medicament and then boasts that he has gotten well because he has not used it.[82] While he places full confidence in his own remedies,

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[80] Woycicki, K. W. *Polnische Volkssagen und Maerchen* (Berlin, 1839), pp. 23-4.

[81] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 160.

[82] Kaindl, R. F. *Die Huzulen* (Wien, 1894), p. 93.

sanctioned by the tradition of generations, he looks upon all 755
medicines prescribed by a physician with a certain suspicion.[83]

Popular remedies fall roughly into three categories: (1) amu- [751]
lets and other prophylactic and precautionary means, (2) incantations, and (3) concoctions, compounded of strange and varied elements from the animal, plant, and mineral worlds. Only in serious, persistent, or complicated cases, or in those ascribed to the direct influence of spirits, e.g. snake-bite, fright,[84] partial paralysis, and stomach disorders,[85] does the peasant consult a professional healer, man or woman: otherwise he uses the standard remedies passed on from generation to generation. Many of the treatments hereinafter to be described, therefore, are often undertaken without the help of a healer.[86]

The healer, who is called *znachor* (fem. *znachorka*) from *znaty* (to know), is not a wizard, nor is he in league with any of the forces of evil. His sole power and function is to combat or counteract ailments by performing conjurations and compounding remedies; he thus plays the role of physician. He is, to be sure, endowed with supernatural powers—he is even referred to as the "earthly god"—but he gets these from God himself.[87] As a matter of fact, the priest and his assistant, it is thought, can sometimes counteract the work of the Devil by ridding a person of his malady. Thus in some sections of the mountains the people commonly seek the aid of the sexton in case of illness. This official inserts a knife between the pages of the church prayer book as many times as are necessary to find the alleged "right place," charging the patient a certain fee for each insertion. He then reads from the book, as if they were written there, the causes and cure of the disease. This practice is said to be slowly becoming obsolete, but it is still not unusual for priests to undertake to cure people by special Masses and prayers and by consecration with holy water.[88]

[83] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 160. [84] *Ibid.*, pp. 167-69.

[85] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 239. [86] *Idem.*

[87] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161; Szuchiewicz, W. *Huculszczyzna* (Lwów, 1902-08, 4 vols.) iv, 297, 312. [113]

[88] Kaindl, R. F. "Aus der Volksueberlieferung der Bojken," *Globus*, lxxix, 152.

755 Although the *znachor*, especially one of reputation, can diagnose and treat any disease, he often specializes in particular ailments, e.g. fevers, paralysis, headaches, or snake-bite. He keeps his formulas and concoctions strictly secret, for a knowledge of them by others would impair if not invalidate his powers.[89] The formulas and recipes are much more numerous and varied than the ailments themselves; for curing fever, for instance, there are not less than seventy-seven remedies, corresponding to seventy-seven causes, i.e. spirits.[90] They range from the simplest prescriptions, e.g. to drink water drawn from a well before sunrise, to the most complicated compounds of herbs, animal and human exuviae and excrements, insects, dirt, etc., accompanied by elaborate verbal formulas and grotesque performances. While certain remedies are the private property of an individual healer and are only effective when performed or suggested by him, others are common knowledge and freely used by the people.

[754] The *znachor* or *znachorka*, is also an expert in inducing love, causing barren women to conceive, foretelling future events, and even settling difficult family problems.[91] Healers of reputation, like expert weather-men, are comparatively few in number—very often only one in a considerable territory—and are widely sought after. People often travel many miles to consult a master healer, and pay large fees for his services.[92]

The *znachor* ascribes his power to his special endowment from God, and his knowledge of the medicinal properties of different ingredients to a secret source which he cannot divulge. Every healer has his own fast-day, when he communes with God.[93] He knows which wells have water containing therapeutic qualities and what herbs are good for particular diseases. He gathers the herbs at certain seasons of the year and at prescribed hours during the day, and keeps them in readiness at his home. It is noteworthy that this mysterious art of healing, being the pro-

[89] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[90] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

[113] [91] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 233.

[92] *Ibid.* p. 277; Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[93] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, iv, 297.

* [healer -- analyst]

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perty of an individual, can be stolen.[94] Usually, however, it is transmitted from father to son.[95]

That the people, at least those seeking his advice, consider the *znachor* as endowed with unusual powers is obvious. But how does he regard himself? Does he really believe in his art, or does he merely take advantage of the ignorance of the people? There is no doubt that many actually believe in their extraordinary powers and in the effectiveness of their remedies.[96] On the other hand, however, there are those who admit, when pressed hard, that they sometimes delude and even mislead their patients,[97] while others claim—only before intelligent people, of course—that their conjurations really consist largely of Christian prayers, which cannot, at the worst, do any harm to the patient.[98]

The excuse for an obvious failure is the usual one of the shaman, or, for that matter, of quacks all over the world, namely, that the patient did not follow the directions strictly. This the healer usually finds very easy, since he often requires impossible tasks of his patients. He claims, for example, that the recommended water was not drawn from the well in the specified hour or manner, or that the coals over which he pronounced his conjuration were not taken from a "living" fire.[99] In one case two Jewish girls, who had come from afar to a famous *znachor* for a love potion, were sent all the way back on foot to fetch new containers, since those they had brought with them had been used and the potion poured into them would thus have had no effect.[100]

In mild cases and in those of chronic or general ill health, the healer, as a rule, merely offers advice. He tells the patient that his affliction is caused perhaps by the fact that he has built his house on the head of a demon, or that he has unwittingly dug up the root of a lilac bush, or that he has started some task at

[94] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[95] Kaindl, R. F. "Neue Beitraege zur Ethnologie und Volkskunde der Huzulen," *Globus*, lxix, 74.

[96] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 217.

[97] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxix, p. 74.

[98] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[99] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, iv, 313.

[100] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxix, 74.

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755 an ill-fated hour. His advice may be to move out of the house, destroy it, and build another on the opposite side of the road. After entreaties that this is a most difficult and costly procedure, the *znachor* usually concedes that the transfer of the patient's bed to the orchard, or even to the other side of the room, may suffice to relieve the trouble.[101] Another example of the type of advice offered for a persistent and undefined ailment is the following:

> Go before daybreak to a certain spot across the boundary of the third village, and there you will find a little well; draw some water from it, but before sunrise, take a drink and bathe your eyes, but see to it that no woman meets you, and you will become well in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.[102]

If the Devil, as sometimes happens, has his lodgings in a peasant's house or adjoining barn, some direct means of driving him out must be undertaken. The *znachor*, when called in, sprinkles the house with holy water, drives the cattle into the yard, and, with a whip in his hand, runs into the barn where the Devil is supposed to reside, since some of the cattle are sick. Lashing right and left with the whip at the walls and corners, while the people of the house assist him with sticks and brooms, he finally succeeds in expelling the evil spirit. He then sprinkles the barn with holy water and advises the people to stuff up every crack tightly, because the evil spirit may assume the form of an insect, a worm, or the like and re-enter the barn through the tiniest opening.[103]

For easily diagnosed ailments the medicine-man employs special incantations, usually in conjunction with a more concrete remedy. He need not even visit the sick room, provided he has part of the patient's clothing or a bit of his exuviae over which he can utter his formula.[104] In any case, it is absolutely necessary to have some object, often a stick, a rope, a knife, a coal, or a piece of wax, over which to perform his incantation. To relieve

[101] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 237; Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxix, 152.

[102] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 237. [103] *Ibid.*, p. 239.

[104] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

indigestion or an acute pain in the stomach, for example, the 755
znachor

> takes a rope and continually mumbles something while making various knots in it. He then hangs the rope, like a bag, around the shoulders of the patient. The formula itself is a secret; we have been told, however, that it is supposed to consist of the enumeration or rehearsing of all the tasks performed in connection with flax from the moment when its seeds are threshed out to the moment when the fabric is completed.[105]

Before undertaking to treat paralysis with herbs, the *znachor* takes a knife, grasps it by the cutting edge, makes the sign of the cross three times over the patient, and utters the following incantation:

> In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, oh, painful pain, malicious and cunning enemy, leave, depart from the born and baptized servant of God. Betake yourself to the crossways, to the swamps, where God's creatures do not go, where squirrels do not peer in, where geese do not hiss, and cocks do not crow. There you shall fly around, there you shall sit, there you shall return, there you shall have something to do in this world.[106]

The people themselves, of course, also employ incantations, and nearly every household has at least one member who knows how to conjure away the common ailments.

Foremost among the ills susceptible to cure by means of incan- 753
tations is the "evil eye" (*wroki*). So widespread and so generally feared is this form of bewitching that the people seem almost constantly to be taking one precaution or another against it. This vigilance becomes understandable when one realizes that any person may cause harm to another, often quite unwittingly, merely by looking at him or talking about him. Especially is this true of a person who has some uncanny quality about his eyes. Since one may possess and exert the evil eye all unknowingly, it is common, in observing or mentioning a person admiringly, to guard against injuring him by adding the phrase: "*n*

[105] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 168. [106] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, pp. 339-40.

753 *wroku* ! " (no evil eye !). Failure to take this precaution may result in harm, even though there is not the slightest intention of so doing.[107]

An individual affected by the " evil eye " first loses suddenly his good humour and complacency, and then becomes sick. The result may even be fatal, particularly if he falls asleep before ridding himself of the evil wrought upon him.[108] All successful, good looking, or otherwise fortunately endowed persons or animals are susceptible to the evil eye. Children, in particular, fall
755 an easy prey, for they have no power to resist. To render her child immune from the effects of a harmful glance which may possibly have been cast upon it during the day, a mother never fails to exorcise the evil before putting her child to sleep. This she does by sucking it out of the forehead of the child and spitting it out into the four corners of the room, signifying the four cardinal directions, so that the evil glance, from whatever direction it may have come, shall disappear whence it came. As she does so, she says : " *Chto ti wrik, naj ti wzme* ! " (Whoever sent you take you back !) A similar precaution is followed many times during the day, if the child feels indisposed.[109]

Adults are cured of the evil eye by a multitude of elaborate methods, including that of " extinguishing coals," already mentioned, and others too numerous to specify. The cure is usually undertaken by an otherwise ordinary person, even a member of the family, who is acquainted with a formula effective against the evil eye. Like the weather-man and healer, such an individual never reveals the secret of his art, for if he did, his charms would lose their effect and he himself might even suffer harm.[110]

751 Persons repeatedly subject to the effects of the evil eye are advised to carry constantly with them a piece of laudanum over which a soothsayer has uttered a special conjuration. Other protective devices, also useful for warding off other evil influences, include the *klokiczka*, a piece of wood consecrated together with Easter bread and carried on a string around the neck, a little mercury inserted in a wooden cross, brass rings and crosses, strings of hair or gut, old coins, certain dried herbs, and other

[107] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 132.
[108] *Idem.*
[109] *Idem.*
[110] *Ibid.*, p. 133.

amulets.[111] If a person takes the precaution of muttering under his breath the following formula: "Cover those eyes as the drawers cover the buttocks!" a suspected evil glance will have no effect.[112] 751

To protect a domestic animal from the consequences of the evil eye, a piece of leather from an old shoe is tied to a ribbon and hung about its neck. Sometimes a strip torn off an old pair of drawers is used instead. Crops are saved from harm by planting sticks in different parts of the field or garden and tying to them a few rags, a torn hat, a broken pot, or the like.[113] A person with the evil eye can injure a cow, even without actually seeing it, if he casts a glance at its milk. Hence the precaution is taken, when a customer comes to buy milk, of not letting him into the cellar or other place where it is kept.[114]

Various methods of misleading the spirit responsible for the disease, or of frightening it away, are believed to be effective. Thus to cure a child of a persistent ailment, for example, its mother is often advised to "sell" it. This she does by giving the child to another woman, who carries it out of the house and then goes to a window and says: "With the child I have greeted the sun, the corners of the house, and all the saints: now I greet the mother and beg her to repurchase the child." The woman then brings the infant into the house, where the drinking ceremony (*mohorycz*) which customarily accompanies a sale, takes place. Sometimes a change in name suffices to bring the child back to health. A witch ordinarily uses the name given at baptism; consequently a child whose name has been changed will not heed her call.[115] To cure a fever, cold water is suddenly poured over the head of the patient while he is asleep; this frightens the fever demon and causes it to run away.[116] Fever may also be shamed into leaving the body. The patient goes into a toilet and sleeps there until his chills pass. The fever, offended, then leaves the body.[117] 755

Exuvial magic is sometimes employed to work cures. A per-

[111] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 93.
[112] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 133.
[113] *Ibid.*, p. 134.
[114] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 233.
[115] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 256.
[116] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 173.
[117] *Ibid.*, pp. 173-74.

755 son suffering from fever, for example, pares the nails of his fingers and toes, and cuts a little hair from the four corners of his head; he then inserts the clippings in the stem of a rotten tree, closes the hole tightly, and runs home as fast as he can, saying: "May you not return until I myself shall come back for you!"[118] Mention might be made here of the belief that hair from one's head should not be thrown on the dung pile, for if a bird should appropriate it in building its nest the person would lose his hair. On the other hand, one can make his hair grow long and thick by throwing a few locks into fire or water.[119]

Human and animal exuviae are also believed to possess valuable curative qualities. Human nails and hair, the bones of meat consecrated on Easter, skin from the head of a dog, the hoof of a horse, and the excrements of domestic animals and fowl all serve as ingredients in the concoctions prepared for different ailments.[120] A cure for a cataract is compounded of the white of an egg, flour, and the dried and pulverized excreta of a child.[121] The excrement of a black cow is one of the ingredients in a remedy for a toothache; pieces of a horse's hoof are used in a fever cure; and the fat of a black cat or a stork forms a necessary element in a concoction to relieve rheumatism.[122] Pain in the eyes is soothed by an application of woman's milk.[123] Warts are removed by wetting them with the foam from a horse's urine. Human urine is considered an emetic and is used as an antidote for alcohol poisoning.[124]

825 754 Among living things, the frog plays the most important role in native medicine. A frog is thought to be endowed with extraordinary powers, which can be used either for good or for evil. A witch, for example, often makes use of a frog, sending it to the house of her enemy to bring affliction upon it. A frog must not be killed; if suspected as the agent of witchcraft, it may only be wrapped up and hung on a beam in the house. A boy who kills a frog may 825 bring death to his father.[125] On the other hand, this amphibian 757 is considered a clean animal. If one is found in a well, for

[118] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, p. 173.
[119] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 235.
[120] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 164.
[121] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[122] *Ibid.*, pp. 164, 167, 171.
[123] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 94.
[124] *Ibid.*, p. 95.
[125] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 137, 144.

example, the water is sure to be pure. It also possesses valuable 825
therapeutic qualities and is consequently employed in treating 757
divers ailments. A cataract, for instance, is cured by applying a tiny living frog to the eye. A sufferer from fever is given brandy in which a frog has been immersed, or is made to carry a frog, wrapped in a piece of cloth, in his bosom until it dies, whereupon the fever disappears. Another fever cure consists in putting three, or sometimes nine, lice into a glass of brandy, which is then given to the unwitting patient to drink.[126]

The range of ingredients in medicinal preparations is almost 757
infinite. Some of the concoctions are harmless, and many are useless, while a considerable number are probably definitely harmful. Liquor is widely used, as though the people were really aware of the therapeutic value of alcohol. A drink or an application of brandy serves as a kind of first-aid in any emergency, and liquor in some form serves either as the base or as an essential ingredient in nearly every compound.

Thus a patient suffering from fever is given a drink of whisky containing ground garlic, or is made to eat a piece of bread wrapped in a cobweb. A swelling is treated by applying to it a hot white onion. Dysentery is cured by having the patient drink brandy to which is added some clay peeled off the oven of a room in which no death has ever occurred. Massage with the fat of a black cat is recommended for rheumatism.[127] A sufferer from diarrhœa is massaged with butter and then bathed in water in which rye straw or dumplings have been boiled.[128] A headache is relieved by pouring cold water from a well over the patient's head until the pain subsides, and a toothache by an application of alcohol, cold water, or a mixture of ground pepper and garlic. A victim of a sore throat may rid himself of the ailment by fastening thin strips of raw bacon, or the excrement of a pig, around his neck, and by gargling his throat with an infusion of laudanum. Inflammation of the lungs is cured by massaging the body with alcohol in which soap and camphor have been diluted, or by an application of leeches. An abscess is treated by applying a salve prepared either of

[126] *Ibid.*, pp. 144, 163, 171, 174. [127] *Ibid.*, pp. 166-67, 171, 174.
[128] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 239.

757 honey mixed with wheat flour or sweet cream, or of wax and linseed oil. For constipation the patient is given a dose of pulverized glass, and for loose bowels, dried bilberries.[129] For indefinite pains or general indisposition, when other remedies have failed, recourse is had to a " cure-all " compounded from nine different grains, usually the following : hay from a meadow never cultivated, rye, wheat, buckwheat, barley, millet, oats, maize, beans, and flaxseed. The hay is boiled in three separate pots and the kernels of the other grains in a fourth. The water of all the vessels is then poured together and given to the patient to drink.[130]

Extensive use is made of fumigation, called " smoking under " (*pidkuryty*). To cure rabies, for example, a piece of skin is cut off the mad dog's head, and the patient is smoked with it. All imaginable herbs, weeds, and dried fruits are burned that their smoke may relieve the sick, especially sufferers from fever. The articles most in demand for purposes of fumigation include pages containing the Ten Commandments written in Hebrew, Jewish Passover bread (*matza*), sticks from a willow broom used for sweeping the church, a shirt in which someone has died, and the dried testicles of a horse.[131]

Blood-letting, either by direct means or by the application of leeches, and cupping are among the most popular of cure-alls. The latter, commonly called *hornec prewernuty* (to turn a pot), is performed in the following manner :

> Women take a pot that has been greased, pour a little water into it in order to form steam, heat it, and then apply its open side to the patient's abdomen, as cuppers do with their cups. The pot is so large, and adheres so fast to the body, that it can hardly be torn off ; it often happens that the cup has to be smashed before it can be removed. One can well imagine what acute pain the patient must experience during this operation, and how pronounced must be the traces left on his skin.[132]

The *hornec* (cup) is employed especially in healing hæmorrhoids

[129] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 94-5. [130] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 162.
[131] *Ibid.*, pp. 171-2. [132] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

The horne(cup) is employed especially in healing hæmorrhoids
(*zolotnyk*). According to popular belief, every person, male or 757
female, has a *zolotnyk* which dwells under his navel. If he lifts 753
a heavy burden, the *zolotnyk* descends and causes hæmorrhoids. The sufferer, after he has been cupped and the painful spot has been smeared with butter, is put in a very warm spot in the room, often in the oven itself, so that he may be properly "steamed up." To effect a permanent cure, however, the *zolotnyk* must be driven back to its "natural" seat. This is usually done by a professional healer, who, with the appropriate incantations, massages the patient's stomach with butter, using only an upward motion.[133]

Syphilis is not regarded with a gravity commensurate with its seriousness, but rather as just another of the numerous maladies with which people become afflicted. Every symptom of this venereal infection is looked upon as a distinct disease having its own cause. When its effects become visible on the nose, it is considered to be a wound caused by water, and its appearance on the palate is diagnosed as due to dust. All the symptoms are treated by smoking very strong tobacco, or by applying concoctions and salves compounded of various herbs.[134] As to the origin of this disease, the people tell the following fantastic story:

> A certain emperor was in love with his daughter-in-law. St. John, of course, reproved him, and made him dance with her at the ball. As a punishment, the emperor put St. John into a dungeon. In the morning the daughter-in-law and the executioner entered the dungeon and cut off St. John's head. At that very moment all food and drink turned into blood. The daughter-in-law then put the head of St. John on a plate and, upon arriving in town, hurled it seventy-six times in the air. Whoever was sprinkled with the blood of St. John's head became afflicted with syphilis.[135] 755

Epilepsy is definitely ascribed to an evil spirit. When the [753]
czort (Devil) gets hold of a person, they say, he throws him on the ground and turns his eyes so that he does not see or hear anything.

[133] *Ibid.*, pp. 162-3. [134] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, 57-8.

[135] *Ibid.*, i, p. 45.

756 thing. The victim may be cured by drawing blood from under the nail of his little finger, by pouring cold water over him and then rubbing his hands and head, and by bending his little finger and pressing it tightly. Above all, the stricken person must not be called by name. Epilepsy is also treated by strewing the patient with consecrated herbs cooked in holy water, by putting into his hands a candle once held by a dying person, or by fumigating him with smoke engendered by burning the hair left on a comb after it has been used to dress the hair of a corpse in preparation for a burial.[136]

The cure for tuberculosis actually prescribed by one *znachor* is hardly less fantastic: "Insert some dung under the shoe of a horse and let it remain there for nine days; when this period has elapsed, drive the horse out of the stable and let it gallop down the road; then run after it, catch the dung as it is cast off by the horse, and apply it to your limbs."[137]

Similia similibus curantur is as important a principle in peasant therapeutics as it is in other magical practices. The following remedies are based on this theory. If one gets a chill from drinking cold water, one must, in order to be cured, continue to drink cold water until one vomits. On the other hand, a person who becomes feverish on taking a bath should have a good quantity of water poured over him after he has fallen asleep. A person suffering from a sty, an eye inflammation which is called "barley" (*jiczmen*) in Ukrainian, throws a few kernels of this grain on the fire and runs away as fast as he can in order not to hear the crackling, which is supposed to betoken his cure.[138] The use of a piece of the mad dog's skin in the cure of rabies, as described above, is another illustration of the same principle.

Closely akin to the above is the sympathetic or imitative method of healing. A sufferer from a toothache, for example, upon being informed that somebody in the village has just died, goes to the house and touches first the dead man's teeth and then his own, or else takes the deceased's hand and with it touches his own teeth, saying: "May my teeth hurt as do those of the de-

[136] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, i, p. 322. [137] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 237.
[138] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 163, 172.

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ceased!" The toothache immediately disappears and never returns again.[139] One of the multitudinous remedies for fever involves a similar principle. At about 9 or 10 o'clock at night the patient goes to the grave of a recently buried person, scoops up therefrom a handful of earth, and runs home with it as fast as he can, so that, before sunrise, he can mix it with water, drink it, and thereby dispel his chills.[140]

SAMUEL KOENIG.

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BELIEFS REGARDING THE SOUL AND THE FUTURE WORLD AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS

775 THE departed soul, it is believed by the Ukrainian peasant, does not enter the other world immediately, except in the case of baptized children. It accompanies its body to the place of burial,[1] and returns home with its relatives.[2] When the mourners leave the cemetery, therefore, they are careful to follow the same route as on the outgoing journey, so as not to cause the soul any inconvenience; otherwise it might lose its way, and wander around before finding its way home.[3] Moreover, when the rela-

113 [1] Onyščuk, A. "Materyaly do huculskoi demonologii," *Materyaly do Ukrainskoi Etnologii*, xi (Lviw, 1909), 48.

[2] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna*, (Lwów, 1902-08, 4 vols.) ii, 275.

[3] *Ibid.*, ii, 275.

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775 tives and guests sit down to their post-funeral dinner—a meal nearly as elaborate as that at a christening or a wedding [4]—a candle, preferably one used at the funeral, is lit and put on the oven, and beside it are placed a glass of brandy and a morsel of bread, in the conviction that the soul will thus participate in the meal.[5] The mountaineers, for a similar reason, usually scatter a little flour on the table and window sill. In the morning they even prove that the soul has touched the flour by pointing to traces which have unquestionably been left by cockroaches and flies.[6] For several days, bread and brandy or water are offered anew each day.[7] In some localities the relatives visit the grave on the third day after the funeral, and place upon it little loaves of bread, cheese, milk, flour, dried prunes, or other foods. After the priest, who is present on such occasions, has finished his prayer, the food is distributed among the poor.[8] On a Sunday a few weeks later, if possible on Easter Sunday, the visit to the grave and the food offering are repeated.[9] These sacrifices to the dead, called *mesoczky* or *perepiczky*, can be explained in two possible ways; either as gifts of food for actual consumption by the dead, or—as is more likely—as attempts to propitiate the ghost, especially a vampire, and thus escape its evil influences.[10] The people are totally unaware of the meaning of the practice. When asked for an explanation, they reply: "*Tak si hodyt*" (this is as it should be).

Before departing for the other world, the soul roams about on earth for forty days, during which time it makes nightly visits to its former home.[11] According to some, it must spend seven years on earth and revisit all the places where during its lifetime

113 [4] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie*, (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), i, 219.

[5] *Ibid.*, i, 219.

[6] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 275.

[7] Kaindl, R. F. "Die Seele und ihr Aufenthaltsort nach dem Tode in dem Volksglauben der Rutenen und Huzulen," *Globus*, lxvii (Braunschweig, 1895), 358.

[8] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 277.

[9] Kaindl, R. F., *Die Huzulen* (Wien, 1894), p. 129.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 127 n.

[11] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxvii, 357.

it did anything good or bad.[12] During its nightly visits to its old home it enters the room quietly, even though the doors and windows be shut, uncovers the children and rocks them, and sometimes plays practical jokes on the members of the family.[13] It retains the power to harm, however, only for one year after the funeral, and the members of the family consequently fear it most during this period.[14] Especially must it be guarded against on the night following the funeral. On this night the members of the household of the deceased must not go to sleep, but must continue their vigil as in the two preceding nights. Although some of the participants in the post-funeral dinner leave after a few hours, others remain in the house to keep the mourners company. In order to keep awake, the watchers resort to various tricks to evoke laughter and ban sleep. As soon as one dozes off, for example, another smears soot on his face, fastens a rag to his coat, or sews his coat to that of another, and the ensuing laughter causes the napping one to awake.[15]

The other world, it is believed, is very distant, and the journey thither takes many days. The mountaineers believe that the soul travels on horseback,[16] and that the road is beset with obstacles and strewn with thorns. To reach the other world the soul must also cross a fathomless sea. If it is deserving, the Mother of God carries it over the water in a tightly woven net.[17]

The peasant conceives the future world in terms of the one he lives in. In heaven, people continue their daily existence much as they did on earth. They lead, to be sure, a life "where neither the burning sun, nor wind and storm disturb the perfect tranquility." But they occupy houses exactly like those found in the native villages, and they eat food which differs in no way from the regular peasant diet. Shepherds busy themselves tending cattle upon rich pastures, and tillers of the soil do their

[12] Onyšćuk, *op. cit.*, xi, 48.

[13] Kolessa, J., "Narodziny i chrzciny, wesele i pogrzeb u ludu ruskiego," *Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej*, xiii, (Kraków, 1889), 150.

[14] *Ibid.*, xiii, 150.

[15] Kolberg, *op. cit.*, i, 219.

[16] Kandi, in *Globus*, lxvii, 358.

[17] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 274.

715 work in fertile wheat fields. They differ from people on earth chiefly in that their faces are eternally beaming with happiness.[18]

The other world is divided into paradise (*raj*) and hell (*peklo*) The latter is divided into two parts—a hot and a cold region. The hot hell, where the fire is sevenfold stronger than on earth, is the abode of all sinners save those who failed to observe the fast days. These go to the cold hell, where a continuous frost prevails such as is experienced on earth only during the severest winters. Paradise is above the clouds, in heaven. Hell, on the other hand, is situated in the centre of the earth, and the road to it leads through impassable swamps and marshes. The throne of God, before which all souls must appear for judgment, is the point of departure for both paradise and hell. Thence lead two ladders, one up and the other down. By the former, the souls of the righteous climb to the abode of everlasting bliss; by the latter, those of the damned descend to the land of eternal torture.

Paradise is an immense, sunny meadow, the entrance to which leads through a door in the clouds. There the cottages of the souls are found, but all are occupied, so that a newcomer must usually wait three days in the judgment hall until God arranges a suitable place for him.[19] Hell, on the other hand, is enveloped in impenetrable darkness. There Satan rakes the eternal fire of sulphur and pitch in which sinners are tormented. The infernal punishments have naturally been influenced greatly by Christian visualization of retribution in the other world, especially by the gruesome scenes displayed even now in pictures in some of the older village churches.[20] To describe them would be superfluous. The peasant harbors, however, some independent and original ideas regarding future punishment which are worth considering, especially since they give an insight into his conception of what acts are sinful and what means of punishment are appropriate.

The principle underlying the peasant's conception of reward and punishment is "like should be paid with like." Thus, miserly people, especially those who have been too stingy to

[18] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxvii, 358.
[19] *Ibid.*, lxvii, 359-60. [20] *Ibid.*, lxvii, 361.

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715 present sound cattle to their godchildren, are punished by having only miserable herds in the other world, despite the rich pasture land given to them, while the generous enjoy beautiful cattle, although their meadows are poor. An inconsiderate person, one who would not help another even with a drink of water, is punished by having to lean over a well, fill a glass with water, spill it and refill it again, perpetually repeating this never-ending task. The selfish rich man or "baron," who, while alive, refused to share his spacious home with the poor or to offer them food when they knocked at his door, must ever run to and fro in an empty dismal palace, knocking his head against the wall each time he approaches it, as if trying to break through the walls in order to escape into the free, sunny world where one can enjoy human companionship. The unscrupulous village judge, who used to spend his time in the tavern drinking, is compelled in the future world to drink incessantly the tears of the innocent whom he convicted. Strife over inherited property is punished by turning the heirs into dogs who eternally tug at a corpse from opposite directions. A woman who has committed infanticide must cook the flesh of her child and eat it, repeating the process endlessly, since every Saturday the child is made whole again. A murderer, finally, forever tries to grasp the soul of his victim, who, in the form of a bird, flies in and out of the holes of a tree trunk (the wounds and body of the murdered person), but eternally fails in his endeavour.[21]

SAMUEL KOENIG.

SUPERNATURAL BELIEFS AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS

BY SAMUEL KOENIG

116 THE Ukrainian peasant of south-eastern Poland or Galicia looks upon all the forces of nature as actuated by spirits which must be conceived of as mainly ghost-derived. True nature spirits, whatever importance they may once have had, play to-day only a minor role in the folk beliefs of the Galician Ukrainians.[1] In the spirit environment of the peasant, their place is taken by two classes of beings: the Devil with his cohorts, and the ghosts of the dead.[2] It is to these that the various calamities and afflictions that befall man are attributed, and against them that all possible defensive measures are directed.

The most important spirit, and the most generally feared, is the Devil (*didko*). He causes extremes in natural phenomena with all their disastrous results to man. He brings, not only hail and whirlwinds, but also floods and excessive droughts. Indeed, he or his demons lie behind every mysterious force.[3]

As to the appearance of the Devil, popular beliefs are at variance. In general, he is thought to assume human shape, but he is black and has horns and a fiery tongue. Although

113 [1] Even Baba Jeudocha, the personification of the snowstorm, and Did (Old Man), the grim winter god who is symbolically burned some days after Christmas, can hardly be looked upon as strict nature spirits; both are said to have been originally human beings who turned into spirits only after their death. (See Kaindl, R. F., "Wetterzauberei bei den Rutenen und Huzulen," *Mittheilungen der k.k. geogr. Gesellschaft*, XXXVII (Wien, 1894), 631, 636.)

[2] Zelenin, D., *Russische (Ostslavische) Volkshunde* (Berlin, 1927), p. 384.

[3] Onyščuk, A., "Materyaly do Huculskoï Demonologii," *Materyaly do Ukrainskoï Etnologii* (Lviw, 1909), XI, 72-3.

776 he may take the form of either sex, the Devil himself is a male.[4] Sometimes he appears as a chimney sweep, when he has wings like a bat, tangled horns like a ram, and a tail.[5] The Devil can change his shape to suit his fancy, and can assume almost any form, e.g., that of a baby, a cow, a pig, an insect, a worm, or a straw.[6] Even when visible in no concrete form, he may nevertheless be present. When one sees a flash of light from afar at dusk, or hears a sudden whisper or rustle, one is certain it is the Devil, whose unseen presence is felt everywhere.[7] The Devil fears nothing save God, the cross, and holy water.[8] Nevertheless, he is mortal, and is particularly vulnerable to lightning. During a thunderstorm he seeks any available cover, but Elijah's arrow discovers him, and destroys him and his shelter.[9] His ordinary abode is hell, whence he ascends at night to pursue his baneful activities on earth.[10]

551 776 The people, as a rule, carefully avoid mentioning the name of the Devil (*didko* or *czort*). To utter it would be blasphemy (*lichoslowyty*), and to blaspheme against the Devil is a serious sin (*hrich welykyj*).[11] The people, therefore, usually resort to a circumlocution and call him *win* (he), *tot szczezby* (that one, may he be lost!), *zlyj duch* (the evil spirit),[12] or *neczystyj* (the unclean one).[13] His name may be mentioned, however, in extreme anger,[14] or he may be called familiarly by a nickname, such as Fedko or Chitko.[15] To some individuals, who have formed a pact with the Devil and have sold him their souls, he is harmless and even exceedingly helpful in attaining power and wealth.

113 [4] Kaindl, R. F., *Die Huzulen* (Wien, 1894), p. 81.
[5] Onyščuk, *op. cit.*, XI, 72.
[6] Kolberg, O., *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 232.
[7] *Idem.*
[8] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie* (Kraków, 4 vols., 1882-9), III, 86n.
[9] Zelenin, *op. cit.*, p. 397.
[10] Kaindl, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[11] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 81 n.
[12] *Idem.*
[13] Kaindl. *op. cit.*, p. 83.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 84.
[15] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 232.

775 The earth, according to peasant belief, literally teems with spirits of all sorts. Aside from Satan and his demons, however, these are mainly the ghosts of unclean persons more or less recently deceased. Some are exceedingly malevolent and harmful; others are less so, but none are beneficial to man.

Among the most dangerous of supernatural beings are the vampires, the ghosts of deceased witches and wizards. Destructive even in life, they have been released by death from all earthly restraints, and their evil nature, now given full freedom, makes them the most feared element in the imaginary environment. Vampires are of both sexes; males are called *opyry* and females *widmy*. Their corpses are revived at night by the action of the moonbeams, for which reason they are most active during the full moon. Leaving their graves, they first turn their steps to their former homes, to visit their families. An *opyr* who is survived by a widow is said to have intercourse with her. He may even beget offspring in this way, but they are born without bones. A *widma*, on the other hand, is innately modest, and is satisfied to turn loving eyes upon her husband or sweetheart. After visiting their homes, the vampires wander about the houses in the vicinity, rattling the doors and windows and even calling the occupants by name. Sometimes they enter a house by crawling under the door. Once inside, they fasten themselves on the chest of a sleeper and suck his warm blood, before hurrying back to their graves. Vampires usually wander for nine consecutive nights. Besides the harm they do to individuals, they send pestilences upon the village and cause excesses in natural phenomena.[16]

Much less harmful, as well as more restricted in their sphere of activities, are the ghosts of ordinary sinners

113 [16] Wagilewicz, J. "O upiorach i wiedźmach", *Časopis českoho museum* (Quoted by O. Kolgerg, *Pokucie*, III, 209, 211).

775 (*pokutnyky*) and those of persons who have died a violent death. They occupy themselves mainly with praying to God on moonlit nights in front of the church, and with frightening people.[17] Some of them, however, are definitely malignant, especially the ghosts of drowned persons (*topelnyky*). Such ghosts are doomed to roam the earth for seven years. They live in the water, usually near the spot where they met their death, and, like the vampires, are especially active at the full moon.[18] The appearance ascribed to them differs with the locality. Some picture the *topelnyk* as a little man with long hair which reaches to the ground and covers him completely ; others describe him as completely covered with fish-like scales.[19] The *topelnyky* are dangerous only to persons on the water, especially to those rowing in a boat. Since their redemption depends upon their success in drowning another person, they are always on the lookout for a victim.[20] In some places no peasant dares to go rowing on a Sunday or holiday, except to attend church or to call a priest or a doctor, under which circumstances the *topelnyky* have no power to harm.[21]

776 The waters also harbour *rusalky*, or nymphs, the ghosts of girls who have died before marriage. Their bodies are half human and half fish-like. They are not, as a rule, harmful, but spend their time singing, praying and telling stories.[22] It is interesting to note that neither the *rusalky* nor the *topelnyky* are really water spirits, i.e. nature spirits, but rather human ghosts who inhabit the waters. This again emphasizes the fact that true nature spirits are almost completely lacking among the Ukrainians. Moreover, the *rusalky* frequently take up their abode in forest glades and

113 [17] Hnatiuk, V., "Znadoby do halicko-ruskoï demonologii," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnik* (Lviw, 1904), XV, 145.

[18] *Ibid*, XV, 154.

[19] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 233.

[20] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna* (Lwów, 4 vols., 1902-8), IV, 283.

[21] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 233.

[22] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, IV, 282.

775 springs, and thus also become spirits of the woods and fields.[23]

Closely related to the water nymphs, but more harmful, are the so-called *mawky*, the ghosts of children who died before baptism. They are pictured as girls with tall, graceful figures, round faces and long tresses. They wear garlands of flowers upon their heads and are clothed in very thin, transparent dresses, but their backs entirely lack any covering of flesh, so that their entrails are externally visible.[24] They roam the world begging to be baptized, and are especially active on the Eve of St. John (Kupalo), on which night they entice people and suck their blood. A person misled by them never returns to his people, and after his death his soul is appropriated by the devil.[25]

776 Of a more definitely daimonic and malicious nature than the aforementioned spirits are the *diwe-baby*, *bohinky*, or, as they are usually called among the mountaineers, the *mamuny*. They are superhuman women, malevolent, full of passionate desire to associate with people, but with cold, unfeeling hearts. In appearance they are tall, lean, and pale-faced, and have long disorderly hair and breasts thrown over their shoulders.[26] The *diwe-baby* live in deep unapproachable caves, which they leave at night on mischief bent. Those of them who have children steal into houses where there are unbaptized infants, snatch them away and leave their own "miserable-looking, swollen, cross-eyed bastards" in their stead. Such foundlings cannot be taught to speak or walk; they howl like inhuman fiends, crawl upon their hands and grow very rapidly. In order to get rid of such a child and to get back her own, a mother must take the foundling, put him on the dung-pile, and beat him with a broom or stick until the *baba*, filled with pity for her child, is finally forced to take it back and to return the stolen

[23] Zelenin, *op. cit.*, p. 392.

[24] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 99.

[25] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, IV, 281.

[26] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 100.

776 infant.[27] The mountaineers, moreover, hold these spirits, some of whom are males, responsible for adultery.[28] The mountaineers likewise believe in a class of supernatural beings, called *czynatary*, who cause quarrels among people. These spirits throw an ant hill full of ants into a burning oven, and just as the ants have no way of escape, so the members of the stricken household cannot help quarreling amongst themselves, and may even go as far as to commit murder.[29]

The so-called *letawica*, or evil spirit of a falling star, is unquestionably the ghost of a wicked being. When it descends to earth it takes on human form of very enticing appearance. It may appear, the people hold, either in male or, less often, in female form, but it is always characterized by youth, beauty, and a slender figure. The *letawica* appears to boys and girls, especially to the latter, in lonely places, when the first promptings of love have been aroused in them. Allured by its display of passion, a girl falls readily into its arms, whereupon it begins sucking the sweetness of youth from her mouth. So passionate is its embrace that the victim gradually loses her freshness, withers, fades and finally dies in its arms.[30]

777 778 According to a widespread popular belief, certain objects or manifestations of nature are fetishes, i.e. they serve as dwellings for evil spirits, and, consequently, must be avoided with great care. One such object is the elder (*byzyna*). One must not dig around it, above all not remove any of its roots, for in them dwells an evil spirit who will cause the hand of any one who disregards the taboo to wither or even bring death to him or to a member of his family.[31] Objects of unusual shape, in particular, are believed to harbour evil

[27] *Ibid.*, III, 100-1.

[28] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit*, IV, 282.

[29] *Ibid.*, IV, 286.

[30] Wagilewicz, *op. cit.* (Quoted by O. Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 103.)

[31] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 235.

775 spirits. A gnarled and crooked tree, for example, should
778 never be felled, lest the anger of its indwelling spirit be aroused. Stones shaped like an egg should not be moved for a similar reason. Crossroads are to be avoided as much as possible, for "the evil spirits, upon being driven out of paradise, have settled there, continuing their malicious activities and causing people all manner of ills".[32] Even natural phenomena may be infested with malevolent spirits. When a whirlwind sucks up a column of dust, the people say that a devil's wedding is taking place. On seeing a twister one must immediately sit down on the ground and recite a formula, especially designed for the occasion; otherwise the whirling dust may get under one's feet and cause them to be crippled.[33]

776 The beings who constitute the spirit environment of the Ukrainian peasant are predominately malevolent. Though a few of them, like the *letawica* and the *topelnyk*, are restricted to a specialized activity, the great majority are capable of causing all kinds of human misery, besides the power they wield over natural forces. They consume the milk from the cows, send sleep upon a man when he is supposed to be keeping watch, uproot trees, roll rocks down from the mountains, send lightning and thunder, cause the death of sheep, and account for the failure of crops. They also cause physical and mental abnormalities, criminal tendencies, and excessive human desires and passions. Deformed children, idiots and imbeciles are the work of vampires and the *diwe-baby*; and murder, quarrels, adultery and sexual irregularities are incited by other malignant ghosts.

[32] Kaindl, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[33] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 91

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BELIEFS AND PRACTICES RELATING TO BIRTH AND CHILDHOOD AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS

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I. Pregnancy and Birth

Pregnancy, to the Ukrainian peasant, is a phenomenon surrounded by mysterious forces which, if offended in any way, are sure to bring misfortune upon the expectant mother and her unborn child. A pregnant woman is treated with consideration, and is usually showered with wishes for an easy confinement. A person mistreating an expectant mother exposes himself and his household to harm.[1] In the belief that labour pains, especially acute ones, are not inevitable but are caused by evil powers,

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[1] *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, by G. R. Owst, Cambridge, 1933. P. 99. Reinfelden's Moralization is in MS. Egerton 2419.

[1] Kaindl, R. F., *Die Huzulen: Ihr Leben, ihre Sitten, und ihre Volksüberlieferung* (Wien, 1894), p. 4.

843 the Ukrainian peasant woman keeps her pregnancy as secret as
784 possible. The Devil and persons with supernatural powers will
789 thus be kept in ignorance and, consequently, be prevented from interfering in any way with her accouchement.[2] The expectant mother therefore avoids mentioning her condition to any one except the midwife. A husband, for the same reason, dislikes to speak of his wife's pregnancy.[3] Some women, especially among the mountaineers (*hutzuls*), even wind about themselves a broad strip of woollen bandage, in order to hide their condition. So tightly is the bandage wrapped that it has a definite effect upon the child, which is usually very small at birth; in order to assure its normal development the midwife, upon delivering it, exclaims: "Now grow!"[4]

[847] A child is, as a rule, a welcome addition to the family. Hence an enceinte woman, legitimately married, rarely attempts abortion or infanticide.[5] On the contrary, she is greatly concerned to give birth to a healthy child, and in order to assure herself of this, she cautiously watches nearly every step she takes and strictly observes a variety of taboos. The precautions and taboos, both before and after birth, are based in most cases on the belief that things or actions produce similar results. In other words, certain objects that the pregnant woman may see or touch, certain foods that she may eat, and certain phenomena that she may observe, hear, or feel, will register a corresponding effect upon her child. Wherever, therefore, the consequences are obviously undesirable, a pregnant woman tries to avoid doing or observing the thing in question, or, if this is impossible, to guard against them by certain means which are usually imitative in nature. A few examples follow.

[13] [2] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie: Obraz Etnograficzny* (4 vols., Kraków, 1882–1889), i, 208.

[3] *Idem.*

[4] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna* (4 vols., Lwów, 1902–1908), ii, 2.

[5] Unmarried girls, on the other hand, very often take steps to dispose of their unborn children. Cf. Koenig, S., "Marriage and the Family among the Galician Ukrainians," in *Studies in the Science of Society*, G. P. Murdock (Editor) (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937), pp. 302–303.

843 If a pregnant woman looks fixedly at a person, or for that
784 matter if he stares at her, her child will be pretty or the reverse,
789 depending on that person's appearance. She therefore tries not to look at or be seen by an ugly individual.[6] She also avoids looking at a fisherman, lest her child will have a restless nature.[7] Neither must she watch a horse shaking its head, or her child will be constantly subject to similar behaviour.[8] If, on the other hand, she happens to see a galloping steed, her pregnancy will last twelve months.[9] Upon observing a mouse, an expectant mother must spit and touch her abdomen; otherwise her child will be born with a mark resembling a mouse on its body. A fire in the village may have a similar effect; if a woman is frightened by it and does not spit immediately, her unborn child will have the mark of a flame on its body. Should a pregnant woman eat an apple at the approach of her confinement, warts are likely to appear on the face of her child;[10] and if the apple be a stolen one, the child will grow up to be a thief.[11]

843 Definite signs enable one to predict the sex of an unborn child. If the prospective mother eats her meals with a good appetite, for example, it is a sign that she will have a boy; otherwise her child will be a girl. According to another indication, if the woman is to have a boy large spots appear on her face before her confinement, but if her face remains smooth and white
844 she is sure to have a girl.[12] The destiny of the child, and even
777 of the parents, can be foretold from certain omens. If birth
787 occurs around noon the child is destined to be unfortunate, while a baby born at daybreak will be lucky.[13] The crowing of a cock during birth is a bad omen. The birth of twins presages disaster, *e.g.*, the imminent death of one of the parents or the

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[6] Kolessa, J., "Narodziny i chrzciny, wesele i pogrzeb u ludu ruskiego," *Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej*, xii (Kraków, 1889) 117; Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[7] Kaindl, *ibid.*, p. 4.

[8] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

[9] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[10] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 1.

[11] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[12] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 174.

[13] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

844 impoverishment and consequent ruin of the homestead.[14] Ac-
777 cording to another version, the birth of twins or triplets is a
787 general punishment from God.[15] Since eating two potatoes, two apples, or two plums would result in her having twins, a pregnant woman is most careful to abstain therefrom.[16] A child born before the ninth month indicates that the woman has been unfaithful to her husband.[17]

843 The Ukrainian peasant woman, as a rule, goes about her daily
844 tasks uninterruptedly until the very onset of labour pains. The mountainee. woman in particular, owing to her robustness, seems to give birth with an unusual ease and unconcern. Besides attending to her routine work in the house, she is occupied at a period very close to her confinement with such work as milking cows, constructing fences, and pitching hay. Only a woman who is constitutionally weak takes to bed when she feels that her accouchement is not far off. Others often deliver their babies wherever they happen to be at the time—in the barn milking, in the field, or anywhere else. Sometimes a woman goes up to the attic, and after a few moments hands her baby down to someone below and then climbs down after it.[18] Women have even been known to return from market with a newborn baby in their arms and a sack full of purchased articles on their backs. In order to avoid leaving blood spots behind her in case she delivers her baby outside of the home, a woman who expects to give birth at any moment often puts on a pair of men's trousers under her dress when leaving the house.

844 Birth itself is surrounded by a mass of practices, again mostly imitative in nature, which are concerned rather with the well-being of the infant than with preserving the health of the mother.[19] When the hour of confinement arrives the husband repairs to call the midwife (*baba*), who is usually a woman with

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[14] Kolessa, J., "Ludowy wiruwania na pidhirju," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk*, v (Lwów, 1898), 83.

[15] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5.

[16] Kolessa, in *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk*, v, 83.

[17] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[18] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 2.

[19] Vowk, C., *Studii z Ukrainshoi Etnografii ta Antropologii* (Praha, n.d.), p. 188.

844 obstetrical experience. The first act of the *baba* is to give the mother a generous dose of whisky to ease her pains. Then she makes her walk thrice around the table, opening and loosening all closed, covered, or tied objects, such as benches, shelves, closets, and boxes; this has the effect of easing the birth of the child. This done, the midwife takes consecrated wreaths of herbs and holds them over the fire, to fumigate the confined woman with their smoke. If all this fails to have the desired effect, and the delivery proceeds with difficulty, the *baba* runs to the church and begs the sexton to lend her the girdle worn by the priest at divine service; returning home, she winds this about the woman and the child is then born with the greatest of ease.[20]

A woman usually delivers her baby in either a kneeling or a standing position. At times, when the case is especially difficult, she is led around in the room by two women, who grasp her under the arms. When delivery begins, the mother kneels down upon a cover spread out on the floor and deposits the
844 baby upon it.[21] The midwife takes the child as soon as it is
777 born, and holding it head down, beats thrice with the soles of its feet on the centre beam of the ceiling, so that it will grow up as strong as the beam. She then makes the sign of the cross over it, sprinkles some holy water on its head, and gives it a warm bath. If the baby is a girl, she puts into the bath some honey, mint, and other sweet-smelling herbs, so that it may grow up to be a sweet and pleasant girl.[22] The water of the bath is not poured out until the following morning; otherwise "the sleep of the child will be carried out along with it."[23]

Having dried the child at the fire, bundled it up, and put it on the oven to sleep, the midwife prepares a bed for the mother
844 at the corner of the oven. Under the sheet she puts some hay
784 consecrated with holy water, and on the bar over the bed she hangs a large sheet to separate the bed from the rest of the room.
789 Before the mother lies down, however, the *baba* takes care to tie a piece of garlic on her chest and to place near her, on the

[20] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 211.

[21] *Ibid.*, iii, 174; Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii,

[22] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 175.

[23] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

23: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1939 RD1 Uknaine RD1

844 bed, a knife and some keys, because iron has the power to
784 drive away evil forces.[24]

789 A precaution never forgotten is to light a candle immediately after the delivery; otherwise the baby, not being baptized as yet, would surely be harmed by lurking evil forces. Under no circumstances must the light be extinguished, at least not until holy water is obtained from the priest and sprinkled over the mother, the baby, and the entire room.[25] Besides this essential precaution, a multitude of other means are taken to protect the child and assure its healthy growth. As soon as possible after birth, for example, there is tied to the right wrist of the infant a little sack, called *szkalytoczka*, which contains the following articles: a piece of garlic—to make the child as sharp as this vegetable; a piece of clay from the oven—to make it as immune to the evil eye as is the oven; a piece of coal—to make the eyes of whoever casts upon it an evil glance burn like coal; some dust from the tracks of a dog—so that people will stare at it no more than they do at a dog's tracks. A small wooden cross is likewise hung on the infant's neck.[26] A mother must not turn her back upon her baby lest it turn yellow,[27] or be taken by a superhuman woman, the *diwa-baba*,[28] in exchange for a brat of hers. Nothing in the house may be given away on the day of birth, or the child will be given to sleeplessness. Whoever takes a glance at a newborn infant must spit immediately—to make sure that the child has not been bewitched.[29] Throughout the first night, some member of the family must keep watch, so that nothing may befall the child.[30]

777 A person's destiny, it is believed, is determined immediately upon his birth, at which moment twelve invisible judges convene on the window-sill near the table. Eleven of them pronounce

[24] *Idem.*

[25] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [26] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 4.

[27] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

[113] [28] Regarding the nature of this mysterious woman, see Koenig, S., "Supernatural Beliefs among the Galician Ukrainians," *Folk-Lore*, xlix (Sept. 1938), 274.

[29] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 4–5.

[30] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

777 various prophecies as to the future of the child, but final decision rests with the oldest, whose judgment prevails. These same judges grant the child a star, which shines only so long as he [776] lives; upon his death it falls to earth. Every person at birth likewise receives a guardian angel, whose duty it is to protect him throughout his life. Before starting any new task, and especially when in danger, the peasant calls upon his ministering angel for assistance, saying: "Guardian angel, help me!"[31] Since one's fate is determined at birth, one can do little to change it. This explains, in the popular mind, why one man is poor and another rich, one healthy and another sick, why one lives long and another dies young. It also explains why there are all kinds of children in the world, and why even children of the same parents often differ so markedly.[32]

845 A deformed or mentally deficient child is ascribed to the act 732 of an evil spirit, particularly the *diwa-baba*. Such a child has a large head, is always lean, and can never be satiated. With his tremendous appetite he suckles so ravenously that his mother's breast finally withers away. Such a child causes constant trouble, is retarded in its growth and short-lived, and does not reach a stature commensurate with his age until after death.[33]

II. Christening Ceremonies

851 While great secrecy surrounds pregnancy and birth, the 553 ceremonies that follow are ushered in with the greatest publicity. As soon as she has attended to the child and the mother, the midwife begins to make preparations for the christening (*chres-* [777] *tyny*), which must take place immediately. A child who is allowed to remain unbaptized over night is exposed to all sorts of dangers. If at all possible, therefore, an infant is taken to church to be baptized on the very day it is born, even though the hour be late in the evening, the weather extremely unfavourable, and the distance considerable.[34] While the father, who takes

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[31] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [32] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 287.

[33] Kaindl, R. F., "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi (Braunschweig, 1899), 256.

[34] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 113; Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6.

while the father, who takes

851 a passive part throughout the ceremony,[35] busies himself with
608 supplying the assembled guests with drinks, the *baba* repairs to
553 the village to invite the godparents (*kumy*) to the christening. The number of men and women asked to act in this capacity ranges from a single couple to as many as fifteen, depending upon the wealth and social status of the parents. The most desirable godparents are the couple who acted as best man and
851 maid of honour at the wedding of the parents.[36] A pregnant
608 woman, too, is considered a most acceptable godmother, for a
784 child held during baptism by such a woman is assured of good
777 luck. An enceinte woman, however, seldom consents to play the rôle, since her own child may be harmed thereby.[37] The wealthier and more prominent the godparents, the more desirable they are. If the parents have been unfortunate in rearing children, however, they invite a couple of wandering beggars to act as godparents and treat them with the greatest of courtesy. This, it is asserted, will change the luck of the parents, and will make the child grow and be healthy.[38] For two women to reciprocate as godmothers is considered not only unwise but a downright sin.[39] Near neighbours, too, make anything but good godparents. Since the two families live in close contact, it is almost inevitable that a quarrel shall sometime arise between them, and tradition as well as propriety strongly disapproves of unfriendly relations with one's *kumy*.[40] Contrary to what one might expect, for a gypsy to hold a child at baptism is supposed to bring it good luck, especially in trade and horse-raising.[41]

851 The midwife approaches the people selected as godparents
608 with these words: "May God grant you health! The mother
553 of the baby has sent me to ask you to do her the favour of holding her child during baptism." If they agree to undertake the function, they either follow her to the house a little later or else promise to meet her in the church at a designated hour.

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[35] According to D. Zelenin, *Russische* (*Ostslavische*) *Volkskunde* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1927), p. 295, the passivity may be explained by the fact that he is, like his wife, considered unclean.

[36] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 208–211.

[37] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 0.

[38] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

[39] *Idem*.

[40] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[41] *Idem*.

851 553 Upon returning home, she swathes the baby and takes a piece of bread and a knife, but does not leave the house until the mother has wiped the infant with her shirt to protect it from the evil eye. On the doorstep the *baba* makes the sign of the cross over the child, and sometimes another woman sprinkles it with holy water. The same procedure is repeated on the other side of the door. Here, however, the midwife sticks her knife into the door, and leaves it for some member of the household to remove later.[42]

If the godparents have come to the house, they follow the midwife, each carrying a long piece of linen (*kryżmo*) and a candle, while the father bears a hen, two loaves of bread, and a "head" of salt as a present for the priest. At the church, all kneel down while some of the godparents remove the swaddling clothes and two others hold the sides of the *kryżmo* on which the infant is placed. The priest, after lighting the candles and handing them back to the participants, reads a prayer, then turns to them and repeats thrice the question: "Do you renounce the evil spirit?" To this, the *baba* and the godparents, turning their heads to the door, reply: "We renounce!" The priest next asks them: "Are you willing to serve God and Jesus Christ?" Each godparent then hands over to the priest his piece of linen, which later becomes the property of the child. After these preliminaries comes the actual christening, which differs little from the usual Catholic ceremony. The name given the child is usually that of the saint who presides over that particular day. For boys, the most popular names are Iwan, Hryć, Hawrylo, Nykola, Michajlo, and Petro; for girls, Maryja, Katerina, Hanna, and Paraska.[43] Children, even twins, are usually baptized in church; only in the case of triplets does the priest go [793] to the house of the parents to perform the ceremony. Among the highlanders, it is believed that a widowed priest who learns of the birth of triplets, and goes voluntarily to the house, is allowed to remarry.[44] After the ceremony the sexton extin-

[113] [42] Kolberg, *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 49; Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

[43] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, pp. 49–50; *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[44] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6; ordinarily a uniate priest is allowed to marry only once—prior to his being ordained.

851 guishes the candles, appropriates half of them himself, and
553 returns the rest to the participants, who must light them again in the room where the mother is confined.[45] If the candles are not easily extinguished, it is a sign that the baptized child will have a long life.[46]

851 In some localities the godparents leave immediately after the
574 close of the ceremony for the house of the parents, where a festive dinner is served; in most places, however, they return to their homes and go to the party in the evening.[47] The midwife, upon her return, greets the mother with these words: "You have given us the child born; we, however, return it to you
[777] sacrificed and baptized." She then places the infant on a black fur coat (*kożuch*), which is thought to bring luck, and hands it over on the coat to the mother.[48]

At the christening dinner the father again plays a most inconspicuous rôle, the midwife and the godparents being the principal
[431] actors. Each guest brings presents of foodstuffs, chiefly beans, peas, eggs, cheese, salt, and bread. After a flood of greetings and congratulations, the women give their presents to the mother, placing them on her bed, while the men hand their gifts, usually loaves of bread, to the father.[49]

After these preliminaries, the guests seat themselves at the table. The master of the house serves each of them with a drink of whisky, and the midwife or the cook places before each an appetizer consisting of a piece of meat or another delicacy. The courses served at this meal are as numerous and elaborate as those of a wedding dinner. They usually include meat with gravy, *holubci* (grouts enveloped in cabbage leaves), *pirohy* (potatoes or grouts enveloped in dough), sour cream, *borszcz* (beet soup), and many other dishes, depending, of course, upon the economic status of the parents. Whisky is lavishly provided, and each guest offers a toast before every drink. It is interesting to note that, if the baby be a boy, the godparents,

[45] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[46] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[47] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[113] [48] Jandaurek, J., *Das Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien und das Herzogtum Bukowina* (Wien, 1884), p. 62.

[49] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

*[christening -- Analyst]

851 574 in drinking, imitate the motions of a person cutting straw, while in the case of a girl the motions are those of a woman washing clothes.[50]

Towards the end of the dinner the *baba* drinks an individual toast to each of the godparents and throws what remains in the glass at the ceiling. She then hands them each a goblet of whisky on a plate. After offering a toast and emptying his goblet, each puts a few coins on the plate, which the midwife takes individually to the mother. In some localities it is customary for the oldest godmother to put the infant upon a pillow and carry it around from guest to guest while holding a candle in her other hand; a younger godmother follows her with a plate, upon which everyone, beginning with the father, places some money as a gift for the child; the midwife, meanwhile, makes little bouquets of herbs and distributes them among the guests, receiving from each a few coins for herself.[51]

The christening festivities are marked by great hilarity, drinking, and the singing of songs designed for the occasion. When begun in the evening, they are prolonged far into the night, the men sometimes spending the whole night at the party; when begun in the morning, they last throughout the day. The parents keep open house. People come and go all day, bringing gifts and drinking to the health of the mother and child. The festivities may be extended to the second and even the third day—celebrations lasting a whole week are by no means rare—the parents being expected to supply the thronging visitors with food and drink.[52] Indeed, christening parties, along with wedding and funeral celebrations, have been the major cause in the impoverishment of many a peasant household.[53]

844 The midwife is formally dismissed on the third day, when she comes to carry out the hay and to change the bedding. She receives in payment a few coins, a loaf of bread, and, in the case of a firstborn child, also a piece of linen.[54] In a little ceremony, which marks the dismissal, the mother thrice pours water over

[50] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209–210; *Przemyskie*, p. 50.

[51] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 212; *Przemyskie*, p. 50.

[52] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210. [53] *Idem*.

[54] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 119–120.

844 the hands of the midwife and dries them with the linen presented to the latter. Then both women shake hands over the child, and beg one another three times for forgiveness for the troubles each has had to undergo.[55]

846 783 The mother is considered strictly unclean for three days, the period of the midwife's attendance. Nevertheless, she usually leaves her bed on the second or third day and performs her routine tasks about the house. She must not, however, go farther than thirty-five steps from the dwelling, lest she defile the fields which she might pass.[56] Indeed, she may not even take these few steps without carrying a knife with her.[57] The period during which the mother is not considered entirely clean lasts from three to six weeks, depending upon the locality. At the termination of this period a formal purification ceremony (*wywid* = leading out) is performed in the church by the priest. On the day of the ceremony, the midwife comes to take the mother to church. The latter dresses up in her best clothes, and is sprinkled by the midwife with holy water. Taking the baby in her arms, and carrying a knife, a few keys, some garlic, and a piece of bread, she follows the midwife to the church. Arriving at the entrance, she kneels with the child in her arms and awaits the priest. When he enters, she follows him to the small altar where the christening took place some weeks before. Here the priest, after performing a special ceremony, pronounces her entirely clean.[58]

852 608 574 After the purification rite, often as much as two years later, comes a ceremony which, more than any other, reveals the closeness of the bond that must have once existed between godparents and child. The parents of the child inquire of the godparents whether they will accept a present of *kolaczy*, twisted loaves of wheat bread, from which the ceremony is named *kolaczyny*. If the godparents agree, as they invariably do, the parents set a day for the celebration. Should the godparents have acted in the same capacity at the baptism of other children,

[55] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[56] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 7.

[57] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 119.

[58] *Idem.*

852 608 574 they invite all the parents of such children to participate in the celebration. On the appointed day the godparents prepare a festive dinner for the parents, who bring a goodly supply of whisky and six *kolaczy* each. If the child is still alive, the parents give the *kolaczy* to the godparents immediately, saying: "Please, *kumy*, accept the *kolaczy*; from God they come large, from us small." But if the child has died in the meantime, they first light candles and then place them and the loaves of bread on the floor, saying: "Please accept the *kolaczy* for the welfare of the soul of N. N."[59]

Friends and neighbours, as well as relatives, are invited to the *kolaczyny*, and all participate in the singing, dancing, and games that follow the dinner and often last till the next morning. The parents, when they depart, are given back one of the *kolaczy*, and in addition receive a calf, a sheep, a lamb, or a pig, depending upon the means of the godparents, as a gift for the child. Around the neck of such animal they always tie a red ribbon. If the godparent has no animal to give, he presents his godchild with a piece of clothing.[60]

III. Childhood

842 Only when a boy is born, as a rule, do the parents feel proud. A peasant, asked what "God gave him," will answer: "*Chlopcie!*" (a boy); but if the baby be a girl, he will reply: "*Detynu!*" (a child), as though trying to avoid mentioning its sex.[61]

854 For some time the mother keeps her infant in bed beside her, mainly in order to keep close watch over it. After a while, however, it is put into a cradle, a box made of boards, suspended by means of ropes from the bar above the mother's bed. It is hung at the foot of the bed so that it can easily be rocked at night. A red apple is usually suspended on a string above the head of the baby—to provide it with something to look at and play with.[62] Boxes on rockers, too, are quite common.[63] Special care is taken to assure the child undisturbed sleep. A visitor

[59] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 7.
[60] *Idem.*
[61] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 19.
[62] Szychiewicz, *op. cit.*, iii, 7.
[63] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 101.

23: Koenig E 4 (no date) 1939 RD1 Ukraine RD1

854 at a house where there is a newborn baby, even though he stays only a very short while, must sit down for a moment, or else the child will remain restless the whole day. No article may be lent from the house after sunset for the same reason.[64]

The swaddling clothes (*pelenky*) consist of linen rags in which the baby is wrapped, after its hands have been fastened to the body by a ribbon or string. A little hay covered by a coarse piece of linen serves as bedding. Once in place, the rags are hardly ever changed, so that they often practically rot away 852 under the child. What the mother seems more concerned with is to assure the child of a healthy growth of hair. Hence when the baby is a month old she cuts off its hair, puts it in a corner of the room, and says: "Look where I am placing your hair, so that in the other world you may know where to get it." This reflects the belief that every person must bring with him to the other world some part of his body. The locks from the head of a girl are usually inserted in the stem of a rotten willow tree, that she may have later a beautiful head of hair.[65]

853 The mother, especially among the *hutzuls*, seldom nurses the baby herself. The reason lies mainly in the fact that the peasant women often lack sufficient milk. The mother, however, ascribes this lack to witchcraft or the evil eye. Particularly around Christmas time is the nursing mother thought to be exposed to this sort of bewitchment. Nine days after Christmas, it is believed, the *diwe-baby* go around drying up the milk of Christian mothers to make their children waste away, that they may the more easily substitute their own.[66] The children, consequently, are fed from a cow's, goat's, or ram's horn cut off at the point, or, in more recent years, from a commercial nipple. Children six months old are fed mainly on buckwheat grouts dissolved in milk and on pieces of rye bread boiled in water. Somewhat older children eat the same food as adults, but continue at the same time to suckle at the breast or bottle.[67] A mother is especially anxious to train her child not to be fastidious

[64] K essa, in *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* v, 83–84.

[65] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 7.

[66] Szuchiewicz, *Huculszczyzna*, ii, 7.

[67] Zelenin, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

853 regarding food. For this reason she often makes it drink a spoonful of dishwater immediately after birth or weaning.[68]

857 Children mean additional working hands, and hence an increased source of income to the peasant's household. The older the boy or girl gets, the more indispensable does he become in the house, helping his father or mother. When scarcely eight years of age, he runs all sorts of errands, carries his father's lunch out to the distant fields all by himself, rides the horses to water, drives the cattle out to pasture—in a word, learns to depend upon himself. At the age of twelve he already performs practically all the tasks of an adult, sometimes working even harder than his parents.

869 784 From its very infancy the child is inculcated with various folk beliefs. It is taught, for example, not to spit on the fire, lest it get the mark of a flame on its face; not to eat apples before St. Spas (18th August, O.S.), lest frogs multiply in its belly; never, in the case of a girl, to walk backwards, lest she remain long unmarried; and not to throw away the nails that it bites off its fingers but to hide them in its bosom, for they belong to the Devil, who will demand them after death.[69]

852 The life of a boy is marked by no special ceremonies until the time of courtship. In the case of a girl, the only formal ceremony occurs in her sixth year, when her hair is put up for the first time. Before that age, her tresses fall freely about her shoulders. For the ceremony the mother invites a woman, called *sochtiwna*, who is experienced in such matters. Gathering the girl's hair from her forehead and from the back and both sides of her head, the woman ties the four strands together in the centre, saying: "As I am tying your hair from all four sides that it may adhere together, so may boys, widowers, sons of wealthy parents, and the most distinguished youths of the land seek you from all directions; whoever shall see you shall swoon for you, as a fish does for water." The parents thenceforth usually pay a little more attention to their daughter's appearance; at least they try to see to it that she wears another garment in addition to her shirt.

[68] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 7. [69] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 10.

[70] *Ibid.*, ii, 10–11.

857 Before the age of twelve or thirteen, boys and girls rarely ever play together or have any other contact with each other. Whenever children are seen at play, a strict separation of the sexes is noticed. This is not the result of any special instruction on the part of the parents, and still less the outcome of imitation. [562] Besides their different spheres of interest, the boys manifest a certain pride and self-consciousness which causes them to band together, leaving the girls to themselves. With puberty, however, boys and girls mix freely and seek each other's company. Peasant children scarcely recognize any distinction between rich and poor; the sons and daughters of the wealthy associate with those of the poor without consciousness of superiority or inferiority on either side.[71]

538 861 598 The philosophy of parents with regard to the training of their children, in so far as they can be said to have one, is summed up in the following proverbial expressions: "The granting of freedom to children means the constraint of the parents"; [72] or, "Give the children freedom and you will find yourself in slavery." [73] Other examples of folk wisdom reveal a similar attitude: "A child will not grow up without a rod." "Do not give in to a child." "Love your child with your heart and drive it with your hands." [74] "Love your child like your soul, and shake it like the pear tree." [75] The burden of rearing children, although actually not very heavy, is, nevertheless, a source of complaint and finds expression in proverbs, *e.g.*, "To feed a child is like carrying a rock." "Small children don't let you sleep, and big ones don't let you live." "Whoever has no children does not know what trouble is." [76] Other proverbs reflect an opposite attitude towards children: "A mother of ten is a joy." [77] "If God grants children, He will provide for them." [78]

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[71] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 8–9.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[113] [73] Franko, I., "Halicko-ruski narodni prypowidky," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (vols. xvi, xxiii–xxiv, Lwów, 1905–1908), xvi, 562.

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 563–564.

[75] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 8.

[76] Franko, *op. cit.*, pp. 564, 600.

[77] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 179.

[78] Franko, *op. cit.*, p. 598.

7

THE BRIDGE BETWEEN WEST AND EAST

101 The political boundary between Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia is not a clear-cut dividing line between two different worlds. There are a number of Ruthenian peasants in the eastern parts of Slovakia who form a gradual transition between the two neighbours. True, the Slovaks and the Ruthenians are two different Slav races. The Slovaks are closely related to the Moravians and Czechs in the West; the Ruthenians belong to the Russian family—mainly to its Ukrainian branch—although the thousand years of isolation from their kinsmen have had a specific effect on the character of the Ruthenian population on the southern slopes of the Carpathians. But there is a gradual link between the Slovaks and the Ruthenians, and Carpathian Ruthenia may aptly be described as a bridge between the Western and Eastern Slavs.

131 Geographically, too, the two neighbouring countries are similar. A
175 chain of wooded mountains separates them from the kindred Slav populations to the North and North-East; while to the South both countries have stretches of fertile plain which run down unobstructed into the vast Danubian basin. That is the reason why both countries fell victim to Hungarian expansion early in their history and remained under Hungarian rule as second-rate provinces for a thousand years. Until the end of 1918, neither Slovakia nor Carpathian Ruthenia were on the map.

177 Both these countries suffered from the long alien domination which
212 hampered their development. Slovakia was the more fortunate of the two because, in spite of her political separation from the independent lands of the Czech Crown, cultural and religious contacts with them had been maintained for centuries. But the Ruthenians received less support of this kind from their kindred beyond the Carpathians. As a result, Ruthenia was still more at the mercy of her Hungarian overlords and remained in a state of greater backwardness than her neighbour in the West. This is well illustrated by the degree of illiteracy in Ruthenia under the Hungarian regime which was, indeed, appalling; according to the last Hungarian census about three quarters of the Ruthenian population could not read or write.

177 Only people of considerable racial individuality could have resisted
181 systematic denationalisation as the Ruthenians did. They may be a simple people; but their mode of living, their outlook and their character have an unmistakable stamp of their own.

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians

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133

In the heart of the Carpathian mountains

Lake in the Carpathian forests



— CZECHOSLOVAKIA —

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they
177 were born. This applies even to those who, through force of circum-
181 stances, had to leave their native village to earn their living elsewhere.
167 Some have found occupation in the fertile South; but when they have saved some money they want to return home and are prepared to pay a higher price for a few poor fields, although in the valleys of the South they could buy much better land for the same amount. Hundreds of thousands have emigrated to America, where about as many Ruthenians can be found as have remained in the homeland under the Carpathians. Yet many long to come back home to find their last resting place in the native soil.

137 The peculiar beauty of this forgotten country has a strong grip
313 on her simple sons. The Ruthenian Carpathians are not so high as the Slovak peaks, but the vast stretches of dense forest, which cover almost half of Ruthenia, give the country a more primeval appearance. Some of the woods and slopes are delightful idylls, where the fresh and fragrant air is full of hum and rustle and warble. But in many parts, unchartered and untouched by human hand, the forest is sombre. Trees felled by storm or gale lie dead where they have fallen, and there is a smell of rotting wood in this lonely wilderness. Wild boar, wolf, lynx and bear have their hunting ground here, while above the tops of the mighty pines, firs, oaks and maples, circle the eagle and the hawk. Other parts of the forest are enlivened by the rhythmical sound of the axe cutting down trees to be floated down the rushing mountain streams. A large proportion of the hardy Ruthenians earn their living in this way. But above this expanse of deep forest are the sunlit pastures and upland meadows sprinkled with gentian, buttercups, pansies, chrysanthemums and geraniums. Sheep and cattle graze here during the summer months; Ruthenia is also a country of shepherds, who blow their huge horns at night to gather the scattered herds.

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

Wooden dam in Ruthenia

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-
Ruthenians

Shepherds blow huge horns to round up their sheep by night

511 In the narrow valleys and on their slopes are cottages and straggling
464 villages where the Ruthenian uplanders live. Nearly, all the huts are
made of wood and are flanked by gardens with patches of sunflowers.
241 In the higher altitudes the land consists mainly of meadows, and such
311 meagre fields as there are yield scanty crops of oats, potatoes or hemp—
not sufficient to live on. No wonder that during the summer months it is chiefly women and children who can be found at home; the menfolk either fell trees in the forest or earn their living as seasonal labourers in the towns and villages of the more prosperous South.

101 These lonely mountains and forests breed a people with a distinct
162 character of their own. Living as they do in seclusion, they not only
differ from their Slovak neighbours but show distinct regional differences

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

101 among themselves. They can be divided into three well-defined tribes
162 —the Lemki on the Slovak border, the Boiki in the centre, and the Huculs in the eastern tip of Ruthenia.

The most interesting tribe are the Huculs. They have preserved
186 their tribal characteristics better than their kinsmen. Their standard of education is higher, and they are more conscious and proud of their national individuality. When the Hungarians invaded Ruthenia after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Huculs offered the stiffest resistance, and during the war they were the core of the partisan force fighting against the totalitarian powers. Like the other Ruthenian
463 mountaineers, the Huculs are largely wood-cutters and raftsmen. But
342 they are distinguished by their skill as carpenters and wood-carvers. This is clearly reflected in their mode of life. Their wooden-cottages are neatly built and furnished and impress the visitor by their scrupulous cleanliness. Their tribal individuality and artistic skill find expression in the numerous carvings with which they like to decorate their unpainted houses.

181 The neighbouring Boiki have also, to some extent, preserved their pride in racial individuality, and their mode of life, though more primi-
511 tive, has some interesting features. They are kind-hearted, sincere and hospitable, in spite of their poverty. Though less proud than the Huculs, they fly into a temper when crossed, and impulsive outspoken-
342 ness is one of their traits. They live in cottages and huts which they like to paint in blue and brown, and this makes their exterior rather attractive. But the interior does not always live up to the façade. The better-off Boiki manage to live in fairly decent cottages with two or more rooms, but the huts of the poor often consist of one room only—a dark room with no chimney, one small window, and some roughly
352 made furniture. Some have no bedsteads in the true sense of the word; along the whole wall of the room one may find a long "plank-bed" where the grown-ups sleep at the one end and the children at the other. When the children grow up they sleep on separate beds of the same kind. Unlike the Hucul houses, the Boiki huts have no wooden
342 floors. The domestic animals often share the same room with their
511 masters in winter, sleeping on the bare earth. For many families such a room is therefore a kitchen, living room, bedroom, hall and stable in one.

511 Much the same applies to the Lemki tribe who live partly on Slovak territory. They are the poorest Ruthenian tribe and their racial
181 character has undergone a certain deterioration. Their standard of life is often appalling, the hygiene leaves much to be desired, and they have the largest number of illiterates, though some improvement has taken place under the Republic

000 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians
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Religious procession in a Ruthenian village

How they build churches in Ruthenia

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

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hungarians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians
241 as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works,
655 Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent
438 vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here
341 imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians
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

A wooden hut in the Carpathians

Ruthenian lumberjacks making rafts on the Black Tisz

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24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip
317 of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Siatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it
263 is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
511 during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation — all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians
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

Easter eggs from Ruthenia

Ruthenian folk art



24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

744 Europe; and many people used to die every year from tuberculosis and
164 other chest complaints. Severe epidemics—typhoid and dysentry—used to ravage the country every year; inadequate regulation of rivers and
146 stagnant waters gave rise to malaria; undernourishment of large sections of the population was responsible for sporadic pellagra. Venereal diseases were a curse owing to lack of medical attention and of appropriate legislation.

744 This enormous task was tackled with commendable vigour by the authorities of the Republic. In a country which used to have very few
185 doctors, a proper medical service was soon organised; up-to-date hospitals and children's homes were built; Red Cross stations and other hygiene and welfare institutions, set up in many parts of Ruthenia, strove to prevent and combat disease. This systematic effort resulted in a substantial reduction of mortality, while the draining of marshlands and the regulation of streams and ponds considerably checked epidemics.

185 Realising that ignorance is the root of many social evils, the State regarded the raising of the standard of education in Ruthenia as one
871 of its foremost tasks. The achievements in this field were perhaps the most striking. A country, which in 1918 had not more than eighteen elementary schools where children were only partly taught in Ruthenian, possessed 520 Ruthenian schools two years later; and after fifteen years of independence this small country in the Carpathians could boast 1,079 schools of various kinds—elementary, upper, secondary, technical and special schools. The magnitude of this achievement becomes evident when it is borne in mind that it was necessary to educate the requisite number of Ruthenian teachers from among the rising generation.

871 Thanks to these efforts illiteracy among the younger people has become rare. Those Ruthenians who according to the last census of
212 1930 were still unable to read and write were largely middle-aged or
185 old people. But even among them illiteracy has been considerably reduced because evening schools for adults were opened wherever pos-
517 sible. The people of Ruthenia proved to be keen pupils. Within a few years the neglected country had a promising intelligentsia—administrative workers, teachers, journalists, writers, doctors, engineers, composers, artists and scientists. In the thirties more than eighty periodicals, among them ten dailies, appeared in Ruthenia, and the production of books grew from year to year. The innate aptitude for arts and crafts was given a chance of development when a special art school was established in Užhorod, and musical talent, too, received much encouragement. As many as 7.7 per cent of all musical compositions and songs broadcast by Czechoslovak radio stations were the work of Ruthenian musicians.

000 Economic development was essential to a country where bread used

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians

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An Ikon

A Russian church in the capital of Ruthenia

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-
Ruthenians

511 Economic development was essential to a country where bread used
433 to be a delicacy and meat or salt a luxury. The Land Reform intro-
185 duced in the whole of the Republic in 1919 was a right step in this direction, although the standard of living among the peasant population in the mountainous districts still left something to be desired even during the last years of the Republic. Industrial development, too, was promoted, and 459 factories (timber, food, stone, earthenware, glass, chemicals, electricity, metal, paper) sprang up on Ruthenian territory during the twenty years of freedom. An important factor in the industrial development was the electrification of the country which before 1918 had hardly any electricity. Better road and rail communications, too, assisted in Ruthenia's gradual progress.

The work done in Carpathian Ruthenia under the Republic was a promising beginning. The regrettable setback due to the re-occupation of the country is likely to remain a mere episode. For the resistance of the population and the struggle of the partisans indicate that the Ruthenians are aware of their mission as a free people and that they wish to continue on the path of progress on which they embarked when they decided to become a member of the Czechoslovak Republic.

114 midable task of presenting the entire economic life in Ukraine in a brief and concise manner, both from the aspect of its development and in its present state. The third section of the book which describes the cultural life of Ukraine, the Church, and the psychological characteristics of the people are products of the writer's pen.

121 The work as a whole has been composed from a historical point of view and includes the period up to the year 1939. It is to be particularly emphasised that it has been necessary to present this complete historical development of Ukrainian public life in order to be able to explain adequately the present situation. This is the first extensive treatise on Ukraine in English and for this reason it appeared advisable to take into account the historical preliminaries of the present. However, it has also seemed wisest not to proceed in the treatment beyond the year 1939, since reliable statistical data are lacking for an authoritative presentation of recent years. During the second World War the Ukrainian territory was so thoroughly devastated by military operations, and so great changes of a political character have taken place, that a correct treatment of the present situation is essentially impossible. To make the matter still more difficult is the fact that the Soviet government, in whose sphere of authority lies the entire native soil of Ukraine, gives out almost no statistics and when any do appear their validity is of a very doubtful character.

104 The book has set as its goal the illumination of all aspects of the Ukrainian problem. With the one exeption noted above it has been composed by Ukrainian scholars, and now appears for the public as authentically representative of Ukrainian public opinion. For that reason, it is appropriate that it should render the Ukrainian names, not in the general and customary Russian or Polish transliteration, but in the little known Ukrainian one. We use, therefore, "Chernvhiv" instead of the customary "Chernigov", "Kyiv" instead of the generally known "Kiev", "Lviv" instead of "Lemberg" or "Lwow", etc. However, in order to make the reader familiar with the Ukrainian form of the names, we include with this introduction a list of Ukrainian geographical and proper names in which the Ukrainian and usual

Republics and the events of the next years. The rise of Nazism DDO
seemed to them the all-important menace and the opening of World War II convinced them of this even more strongly. The sudden understanding between the Soviets and the Nazis and then the equally sudden attack of the Germans upon the USSR still did not clear up the situation. The West aided the Soviets and, despite one difficulty after another, they willingly conceded the Soviet demands as a contribution to a common victory and sought in the United Nations a common meeting place for all anti-Fascist states. With some misgivings they admitted the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic as independent states to the United Nations.

In the meanwhile, as Soviet armies pushed westward into the heart of central Europe, they spread out what has since been termed the iron curtain to mask from the eyes of the world the nature of their government. Step by step, information from the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, from Rumania and Bulgaria has grown increasingly difficult to secure. When China and North Korea passed within the same veil, the world began to awake.

The scanty reports from Ukraine today receive more attention than did the neglected information of thirty-five years ago. Yet that is still not enough.

It is no exaggeration to say that the Russian Communists have used the Ukrainian land and the Ukrainian population as the laboratory for their future conquests. It is there, among the Ukrainian people, that Lenin and his associates worked out their program of disintegration, infiltration, conquest, exploitation and russification that they have employed so successfully since the end of World War II. It has cost the Ukrainians dearly to serve as this laboratory. By the millions they have perished of starvation, execution, and deportation, and the other peoples of central and eastern Europe are meeting the same fate.

The object of this work is to study that process insofar as it 121
can be known. Other books have told the story of the Ukrainian

[Process of Ukrainians serving as laboratory for later Soviet conquest -- Analyst]

struggle for independence, the efforts of the Ukrainian people to 121
set up their own free and independent state. That story is not re-
told here, for this book is concerned with the reverse of the
picture—the efforts of the Ukrainian people to protect themselves,
their mode of life and their culture, against the extension of the
Soviet Russian influences, against that system which, starting from
a declared policy of internationalism, has turned into a rigid, Rus-
sian imperialistic policy which weighs heavily upon every form and
department of life.

It is not only a study of the past. What happened in Kiev and Kharkiv is happening to-day in Warsaw, in Budapest, in Bucharest and Sofia, in Ulan Bator, Peking and Pyongyang. It is the story of a process and it is from that point of view that we must view the developments in Ukraine and the methods of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Once that is grasped, much that is obscure in the history of the last years will become clear and we can see the process in its development and in its completed form. We will know what to expect and what methods can best be devised to check this creeping paralysis of civilization and bring back to mankind its hope for a civilized future.

186 endows it with peculiar interest. Few subjects are of greater importance for the understanding of the political forces shaping contemporary society than the interaction of nationalism, in its numerous manifestations, and socialism, in its divergent branches. Ukrainian nationalism is especially significant in this regard because it took form at the same time that Marxian socialism became influential as an ideology in the Russian Empire. As Ukrainian nationalism acquired definitely political aims and the dominant element of Russian Marxism took on the political form of Soviet Communism, the interrelationship between these two forces became increasingly complex.

● 121 This circumstance, together with the intrinsic importance of Ukrainian nationalism as a force directed toward securing the support of one fifth of the population of the Soviet Union,[3] appears to justify a detailed study of Ukrainian nationalism, even though it has never attained its primary aim, the establishment of a truly independent state. Moreover, the importance of the interaction of nationalism and Communism suggests that the study be focused upon that part of Ukrainian ethnographical territory which between 1920 and 1941 was under Soviet control. This region, commonly known as the "East Ukraine," was subjected to the full impact of the Soviet system prior to the period covered in the present study, while the "West Ukraine" was divided among non-Communist Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia during most of the period between the two world wars. While the East Ukraine is emphasized, the West Ukraine is also considered at some length as the region in which nationalism was most vigorous and as that which served as a base for nationalist activities.

The present study is primarily political in theme, being directed to nationalism as a movement aiming at the establishment of an independent state. It is not limited to the political aspect in the narrow sense of the term, however. Since the Ukrainian

[3] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946) furnishes a comprehensive analysis of available Soviet census information. Some non-Soviet analyses, based of course on considerable extrapolation of available data, place the Ukrainian portion of the population of the USSR as high as one fourth.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

nationalists did not succeed in organizing a state apparatus, there is little scope for the study of constitutional or legal structures. As will become apparent shortly, the nature of the various nationalist ideologies makes intensive study of Ukrainian political philosophy of limited value. Consequently, an effort has been made to follow the approach sometimes described as the "sociology of politics." The history of the nationalist parties has been traced and, insofar as possible, the diverse social elements of the nationalist movement have been described.

Many efforts have been made to analyze the nature of nationalism and to determine the sources of its vitality. None have been entirely successful, for, like all dynamic movements which spread far beyond their original habitats, nationalism has been colored and transmuted by the varied milieus in which it has become established. It is a problem of peculiar difficulty to determine what has caused the movement to take root at all in many countries; this is especially true of the Ukraine. One of the most frequent stimuli of the nationalist spirit is religion, but the establishment of a separate Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy was the result of growing nationalist feeling rather than its cause.[4] Another stimulus of nationalism is the existence of distinctive customs and ways of living. In addition to distinctive popular art forms, which will be referred to later, there was a marked difference between the pre-1917 social organization of most Ukrainian peasant communities and their Russian counterparts. The people of the Ukraine, for example, did not usually follow the predominant Russian system of "repartition," or periodic redistribution of farmlands, with all its implications of subordination of the individual peasant to the community.[5] In 1905, before this people was generally recognized as a distinct nation, that shrewd observer of the tsar's dominions, Mackenzie Wallace, made these remarks:

[4] See Chapter VIII.

[5] Cf. Geroid Tanquary Robinson, *Rural Russia under the Old Regime: A History of the Landlord-Peasant World and a Prologue to the Peasant Revolution of 1917* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 35, on the comparative absence of the practice of repartition.

CHAPTER I

WHAT IS THE UKRAINE?

000 THE transformation of Czechoslovakia after the Munich agreement into a federal state has placed a poor and mountainous country formerly known under the name of 'Sub-Carpathian Russia,' later baptized 'The Autonomous Sub-Carpathian Ukraine,' into the front rank of European events.[1]

It is thus that the Ukrainian problem appears in Europe, made important by the number of the population which it concerns, by the extent of the territories which are affected, and by political and economic complications of immediate interest to four different States: the U.S.S.R., Poland, Rumania, and Hungary.

The importance of this problem is furthermore underlined by the role which it seems destined to play in the dynamic development of the German nation, in possibly guiding its future manifestation after that of the *Anschluss*, the annexation of Sudetenland, of Bohemia, of Moravia, and of Slovakia. In this the problem clearly has an international character.

. . . . .

121 The aim of this book is to explain the Ukrainian problem to British readers both in its entirety and in all its particular aspects; geographical, historical, ethnographical, economic, and political.

[1] Reannexed on 20 March 1939 by Hungary, this country has readopted the name of Sub-Carpathian Russia or Ruthenia.

EDITORIAL NOTE

121 In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

121 It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union RL

those the minorities possessed; and the necessity for knowing Russian would be heightened by drawing the minorities into the industrial, commercial and political life of the country as a whole. Meanwhile, literacy in the minority languages would facilitate the spread of communist doctrines stressing the international solidarity of the working-class against capitalism. To achieve unity while allowing the free use of minority languages might be the long — and perhaps very dangerous — way around, but Lenin believed it would be the only effective way in a backward, heterogeneous country like Russia.

The Soviet leaders were so certain that eventual lingustic uniformity could be attained only through temporary diversity that they went further in emphasizing minority languages than any state has ever gone: they made vigorous attempts to foster the actual use of the minority languages, to "nationalize" (i.e., "Ukrainize," "Armenianize," "Tartarize") political organizations, administrative apparatus, factory managements, trade-unions, military units, newspapers, books, theatres and schools, among the minorities. In their desire to retreat from the old Imperial policy of Russification, they leaned over so far backward that they introduced the element of compulsion in the opposite direction: they forced the national minorities and the Russians living among them to use the local languages in political, economic and cultural life, stopping short only at the threshold of the individual's private world. The ultimate effect of this policy upon the increase or decrease of nationalism among the minorities is not yet apparent, and the fate of such nationalism may hinge upon such factors as economic prosperity, political liberty and developments in the field of international relations; but the process of nationalizing the political, economic and cultural life of the minorities is an experiment which deserves more attention from the non-Soviet political and scholarly world than it has received.

In the field of education, the Soviet régime has followed a four-fold policy: first to establish a school system embracing all children; secondly, to promote the spread of communist doctrines by integrating them into the curriculum; thirdly, to nationalize the school system by introducing the languages of the minorities as the languages of instruction in schools attended by children of the minorities; and, fourthly, to pave the way for eventual assimilation by providing for the study of Russian as a separate subject in the schools of the minorities. The first two aspects of this policy are complex subjects, each of which deserves a separate study. The present discussion will therefore treat only of the linguistic phases of the Soviet educational policy: the nationalization of education — that is, the use of minority

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languages as the media of instruction; and the study of Russian as a separate subject.

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In setting out to nationalize education, the Soviet régime has encountered many obstacles: Russian nationalists — and there were some even among the Communists — opposed the policy; text-books and teachers were scarce; and the more backward minorities did not even possess a written language of their own. As the exigencies of space prevent the investigation of all the problems encountered in the nationalization of education, this study will be limited to examining the policy as applied in the Ukraine; that is, to the Ukrainians and to the other minorities — Poles, Jews, Germans and others — living among them. The Ukrainians, it may be noted, are the largest minority in the Soviet Union; they are the most significant from the point of view of current international relations; and the difficulties encountered by the nationalization policy in the Ukraine were sufficiently complex to provide some insight into the policy as a whole.

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Among the Ukrainians, as among the other minorities, the nationalization of education has stemmed from the program on the national question which Lenin formulated before the overthrow of the Tsarist régime. This program, intended to overcome minority nationalism, had to assign a conspicuous place to the language question. To many Ukrainians the treatment of their language by the Imperial government appeared even more onerous than the political oppression which was meted out to Russians and Ukrainians alike. The Ukrainian language was regarded by the government as an uncouth dialect of the Russian language; it was harried from the schools; and it was badgered throughout the literary, scholarly and theatrical worlds. The resulting Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin believed, was a threat to the international unity of the Ukrainian and Russian masses, a unity he regarded as essential for the achievement of socialism; and this Ukrainian nationalism would have to be met with the promise of linguistic equality for the Ukrainians and for all other nationalities. This conception was written into the program on the national question adopted by the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party in 1913, a program which was first intended to apply to a period of "capitalist democracy" but was retained after the establishment of the Soviet government in 1917. The first point in the program stated: "Insofar as national peace is possible in a capitalist society, which is based on exploitation, profits and wrangling, such peace is obtainable only by means of a thoroughly, consistently democratic, republican governmental structure, guaranteeing complete equality to all nations and languages, and by the inclusion in the con-

000 Editor's Note: Since this book is translated from German, the titles of books are translated from German also - instead of from original Ukranian or Russian. Therefore, the original titles are not given, only the translation.

/5/

Foreword

[114] The present work was written in the years 1938/39, - in the period when the West Ukrainians in the, however brief, existence of what was then Poland, were very much excited by an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine, the present-day Hungarian Carpathia. It was not only the West Ukrainians who in those days believed the hour of Greak Ukraine had come.

●121 The book represents an attempt, based on a journalist's personal knowledge and a thorough study of the country, to acquaint the German reader with the Ukrainian people, their country, their history, their culture, their way of life and their character.

In spite of the fact that since the book was completed in August 1939, fundamental changes have occurred in the eastern part of Europe as a result of the defeat of Poland and the struggle against Bolshevik Muscovite rule, the book can be published almost unchanged. For there was no 000 change in the terrible fate of the East Ukrainians in the old Soviet Ukraine up to the day of their liberation by German troops. The West Ukrainians in eastern Poland, in Bukovina and Bessarabia - regions which Moscow appropriated more or less forcibly after the collapse of Poland - had to learn during the brief period of

000 the Soviet regime what it means to live in a "workers' paradise". /6/ Not only was its entire intelligentsia deported or physically annihilated, its very highly developed cultural institutions were also completely destroyed.

•121 Now Soviet-Muscovite tyranny over the Ukrainian people has come to an end. We aim to show in this book the state of development of the Ukrainian people and of their economy at the moment of liberation. I am indebted especially to 000 Dr. Olena Kuschnir of Vienna and Professor Panas Fedenko of Prague for their collaboration and reading the manuscript.

Berlin, April 1942 The Author

FOREWORD

121 Resolution 88 of the UNRRA Council authorises and requests the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration "to furnish to the United Nations reports on the work of the Administration and the progress made towards economic rehabilitation in the countries assisted by the Administration."

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6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

114 could express real views and present facts have been touched upon
127 throughout this study. Because of censorship contemporary published sources present comparatively little material of direct political relevance. They do, however, present valuable information on the closely related topics of religious, cultural, and economic activity. Moreover, they describe the overt activities of individuals in specific places at specific times; it is often possible to check such facts in postwar descriptions of covert political activities against the framework obtained from contemporary sources. The extent to which facts cited by the postwar informant conform to the contemporary sources permits one to make a partial evaluation of the reliability of the informant. Contemporary Soviet sources on nationalist activities are much sparser, but for some events they provide valuable information which shifts in Soviet policy have caused to be deleted from postwar publications.

●124 Important as are the contemporary sources, a rounded picture of the wartime nationalist movements could not have been obtained without the aid of unpublished accounts of the participants. Some of these are in the form of manuscripts made available to the author of this study, but most were obtained through oral interviews. For reasons which should be clear to the reader of this study, it has been necessary to preserve the anonymity of the informants. The code system adopted makes it possible for the author to determine the source of each statement, however, and in many cases it will be possible for him to suggest persons whom an inquirer might approach for further information on a given topic.

The interviews were conducted during 1952–53 in Europe, Canada, and the United States. Before beginning the interviews, the author made a thorough examination of the greater part of the German documents and the published materials, contemporary and memoir. He was also fortunate enough to secure advice and information from a number of scholars who had worked on related studies of the Ukraine and of wartime Eastern Europe. These preliminary investigations enabled him to form an over-all picture of the topic. For many sections of the study, he could establish a reliable account lacking only a limited number of details. This approach was essential for the success of the interviews. Prospective informants were more inclined to furnish information when they learned that the author had acquired the background knowledge of subjects which were of intense personal interest to them. The preliminary investigation also enabled the author to determine some of the key questions, or at least to know which areas of his topic needed probing. An equally useful result of this investigation was that the knowledge acquired enabled the author to assess the validity of many statements while the informant was still available, so that dubious statements could be questioned or further information elicited.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Before the stage of interviewing was reached, however, prospective informants had to be selected and located. If a number of interviewers with ample time had been engaged in the study, it might have been desirable to interview *all* or a considerable portion of émigrés from the East Ukraine and large numbers from the West Ukraine. Such an approach might have yielded valuable information of a statistical nature. Since the émigrés are in many respects an atypical selection from the entire population, and since it is difficult if not impossible to evaluate present-day responses of a large number of interviewees on such matters as wartime attitudes, such an approach would at best have been a most delicate one. It would have been quite impossible for an individual investigator with a limited number of months at his disposal. 124

Under the circumstances, the only practical approach was to concentrate on interviewing persons who had had key roles in the events studied. As described above, the preliminary investigation enabled the author to determine the principal areas on which information was needed. It also enabled him in many cases to determine who had held a position which enabled him to acquire such information. The post-war Ukrainian press frequently indicated whether such persons were still alive and gave some hint concerning their present whereabouts. With this information, exact addresses could usually be obtained. Worth-while informants, whose value the author had not previously recognized, were provided directly by interested organizations and individuals. It is felt, however, that it would have been most unwise to have relied exclusively or predominantly upon such second-hand channels for obtaining a list of informants. Few persons, even among active nationalists, were familiar with all or most of the aspects of the study and were rarely acquainted with a very large proportion of the possible informants. Reliance on interested organizations and individuals for contacts would also, at least to some degree, have resulted in a slanting of the approach, since such channels consciously or unconsciously select informants sympathetic to them.

In addition to a number of Germans, Russians who had lived in the Ukraine and Ukrainians who desired continued union of the Ukraine and Russia (both categories are referred to in subsequent paragraphs as "Russophiles") were interviewed. Both Germans and Russophiles were chosen and located in a manner similar to that employed in the case of Ukrainian nationalists, although of course German and Russian individuals and organizations, rather than Ukrainian nationalist ones, usually served as intermediaries.

Because informants had been selected on the basis of their probable ability to provide information on specific aspects of the study, no generalized questionnaire was employed. Where possible a "non-directive" approach, designed to induce the interviewee to volunteer information

●124 he thought important, was used during the first stage of the interview. When specific information desired was not furnished spontaneously, however, detailed questions were put, and if necessary cross-examination employed. If the initial discussion had convinced the informant that the author was engaged in an impartial effort to establish the truth, and that his investigation made it necessary for him to be detailed and persistent in his inquiries, such "detective" methods were not usually resented, although of course some informants avoided revealing desired information.

The informants were frequently busy persons who could not spare an indefinite amount of time. This was especially the case since all rendered their assistance without financial compensation. In some cases an informant could give only a half-hour to answer a few especially important questions, in others several meetings totaling many hours could be arranged.

It would be impossible to give the total number of informants, since frequently at a gathering or in an organizational office a very large number of persons were encountered who furnished a useful hint or an impression of the wartime scene. In the case of seventy-three informants, however, it was felt worth while to conduct more or less systematic interviews and to prepare summary records of the information furnished, classified under the names of the interviewees. A large majority of these records are cited by code number in the footnotes of this study; since one informant frequently furnished more than one interview, the total number of code numbers exceeds seventy-three.

Of the seventy-three informants referred to above, fourteen were former German officials who had been involved in Ukrainian affairs during the war. Of these eleven had been active in the East Ukraine (and in some cases in the West Ukraine as well, and frequently in Berlin in connection with policy toward the Ukraine); three had significant experience in the West Ukraine only. Nine Russophiles were interviewed. Two were pre-1939 émigrés who did not visit the East Ukraine during the war but were active in politics concerning it. The other seven were residents of the Soviet East Ukraine until 1941 or later. Twenty-nine of the interviewees were West Ukrainian nationalists. Of these nineteen were not active in the East Ukraine; their information concerned the background of political activity in the West Ukraine and among the emigration. The remaining ten had extensive experience in the East Ukraine during the war. Seven of the interviewees were East Ukrainian nationalists who had emigrated before 1939. Of these only one was active in the East Ukraine during the war, but the others had important information on nationalist political developments in the emigration or in the West Ukraine, and several were able, through extensive contacts, to gather much information on the wartime East Ukraine. Finally, there were fourteen East

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Ukrainian interviewees who had remained in the East Ukraine until 1941 or later. 124

Information obtained from interviews and unpublished manuscripts constitutes an essential, although not a predominant part of the material used in this study. Among the informants were a considerable proportion of the leading personalities mentioned in the text. Moreover, in a very large number of cases information could be obtained from all or several of the conflicting groups concerning events in which they participated. A special effort was made to obtain all sides of a controversial issue, when adequate published sources were not available for one or more groups of participants, and as a rule this effort was successful. It is regrettable that the names of the informants cannot be given in connection with specific items of information which they provided. In many cases, even indication of the point of view represented by the anonymous informant would have provided a clue to his identity because the number of possible witnesses is frequently very limited.

While the use of oral informants for the study of recent political situations involves the disadvantage of inability to cite sources, there are numerous compensating advantages. Subjects, like the present one, which involve widespread clandestine activities, can scarcely be analyzed unless the participants themselves furnish information. Moreover, even when a published memoir exists, it cannot be called to account for discrepancies or asked for additional information as can the living witness. Beyond these advantages, there is the intangible but very real asset of contact with the actors of the drama studied, a contact which gives the author a "feel" for the situation and insights into the psychology of his subjects which would be difficult to achieve in any other fashion.

the two factions of the OUN were unable to penetrate institutional channels, it was sometimes possible for nationalist groups limited to specific localities to do so. No appraisal of the strength of nationalism in the East Ukraine during 1941–43 would be complete without an examination of this penetration of the institutional framework by nationalists. In such an examination it is essential to proceed with great caution, for it is all too easy for adherents of Ukrainian nationalist groups to ascribe in retrospect an exaggerated importance to their influence during the years of occupation. It would be tedious to describe the complicated and frequently unsatisfying ways in which the element of fact in inflated postwar accounts has been sought. Suffice it to say at this point that the basic approach has been the testing of the details of proper names, place names, and dates contained in each narration (whether in the form of printed memoir or oral testimony) against the abundant but superficial material contained in the Ukrainian press during the war years. In addition, the available wartime underground publications and German reports have been utilized. In this fashion, at least the extent of the real acquaintance of the narrator with the area he describes can be estimated, and frequently the validity of his assessment of the role of persons and events can be surmised by reading between the lines of descriptions published legally—but with a trace of "Aesopian" language—during the war.

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Primary targets for the efforts of nationalist elements in their campaign to win access to the East Ukrainian masses were the administrative apparatuses existing at the local level throughout the area of German occupation. The general outline of the machinery of government established by the Nazi regime in the occupied eastern territories has been described, and the policy of the officials in charge traced. The ruthless policy pursued made open activity of the OUN groups impossible, and their failure to understand this fact in time resulted in the slaughter of many of their adherents. The extent to which nationalist administrative officials could survive in the capital has already been indicated, however, and what was true of Kiev was true to a more marked degree of many of the smaller centers of the Ukraine. In spite

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NOTE ON SOURCES

SOURCES for the study of Ukrainian nationalism during the Second World War are extremely varied. Published personal narratives are important. Ukrainian memoirs, like most others, however, have serious defects as sources for the history of political events. On the nationalist side, memoirs are usually highly colored by the views or prejudices of the authors, since the tempestuous Ukrainian nationalist politics have rarely been conducive to impartial reflection. Moreover, the flight of the nationalists from Eastern Europe as the Soviet armies advanced resulted in the loss of many of the documents which might have enhanced the reliability of their memoirs. In many cases the personal circumstances of the writers have made it impossible for them to check their narratives against documents available since the war. Soviet memoirs of wartime events, on the other hand, suffer from the distortions resulting from adherence to the official line. 114 127

Fortunately, it is in many cases possible to check postwar narratives against contemporary records. In this respect documents from German archives made available to the public in connection with the Nuremberg trials are extremely valuable. Some of these documents, composed by Ukrainian nationalist leaders themselves, provide direct evidence of nationalist activity. Most of the documents concerning aspects of Ukrainian nationalism are reports by German political, military or police officials; they are of course subject to error due to misinformation or negligence of the authors. Occasionally the desire of an official of the Nazi dictatorship to put himself in a better light before his superiors, or to advance a policy he preferred, led to intentional distortion. Since the reports were for official use only, and as a rule were written by officials who were personally not deeply involved in Ukrainian affairs, the element of intentional coloring is comparatively minor, however.

A second very important body of contemporary sources consists of published material. Some publications were issued clandestinely; while the authors may have had numerous reasons for distortion, they were at least not subject to German censorship. By far the larger amount of available contemporary published material, however, was published under German censorship. Consequently, numerous facts had to be omitted and many views colored to make them acceptable to the Germans. German censorship was not iron-clad, however; the numerous ways in which publications in territories occupied by the Germans

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113, 13 Ukraine RD1

/For data on the physical geography, geology, climate, flora, fauna and soil of the steppe of the Ukraine, see 58: Berg, Rl Soviet Union, cat. 116, pp. 90-110. --Analyst/

113, 13 Ukraine RD1

/For data on the physical geography, geology, climate, flora, fauna and soil of the forest steppe of the Ukraine, see 58: Berg, R1 Soviet Union, cat. 116, pp. 68-89. -- Analyst. /

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The Ukrainian Territory

I

1. Geographical Relations

a) Its place in Europe

The frontiers of Ukraine coincide with the boundaries of the /131 area settled by the Ukrainian people. This area stretches from the Upper Tisa, the Danube, the Black Sea and the Caucasus to the woods and marshes of Polesya, from the Poprad, the Syan, the Vepr and the Pilitsa rivers (affluents of the Vistula) to the valleys of the Caucasus and the broad waters of the Don; further east numerous Ukrainian settlements lie on the way to Siberia and the Pacific.

Ukraine is the bridge between Eastern Europe and the /133 Mediterranean countries. Its tectonic structure is determined by the Ukraine gneiss and the chains of the Carpathians, the Yaila mountains and the Caucasus (young fold system). Recent shiftings of the surface have lent a more varied shape to this landscape than to any other in Eastern Europe. The glaciers of the Ice Age covered only a small part of what we call Ukraine to-day, with the result, however, that most of the country was covered with a thick crust of loess, the origin of the fertile Black Earth. Climate and flora are distinctly different from those of adjoining countries but, in spite of this, Ukraine does not possess any marked natural frontiers. The Black Sea and the Caucasus alone may be regarded as such and in the north, the boundary is partly given by the marshes of Polesya. The history of Ukraine has been in part determined by its lack of frontiers protected by Nature.

b) Frontiers

The Ukrainian territory lies between 43° and 53°N and 21° /131 and 45°E on the way to Asia, the continent of steppes and deserts. In consequence of their position, the frontiers of Ukraine have often been subject to alterations; the limits of the settled area often overlap neighboring areas and are, indeed, often so blurred that no sharp boundaries can be drawn, especially

●131 in Sub-Caucasia, but also in the zone between Poland and Ukraine.

101 The frontiers of the area settled by the Ukrainians are divided
131 into the following sections:

1. the southern section, bounded by the Seas and the Caucasus;
2. the southwestern section — the Roumanian-Magyar section;
3. the western section — bordering on Slovakia and Poland;
4. the northern section — the White Ruthenian-Russian section;
5. the eastern section — Don and Caucasus section.

The southern frontier was reached by the Ukrainian people at the end of the eighteenth century, thus linking up with the trade of the outside world. The frontier runs from the delta of the Danube to Gagry on the slopes of the Caucasus and is about 1125 miles long. Only part of the Crimean Peninsula was settled by the Ukrainians; it is a mixed settlement and includes among its population Ukrainians, Tatars and Russians.

The south-west frontier is about 625 miles long and has shifted considerably in the course of centuries in favor of the Roumanians. To-day the districts of Akkerman and Hotin as well as the north-west area of Bucovina are all that is left of the Ukrainian settlements that once spread all over Bessarabia, Moldavia and Bucovina. The losses on the Magyar frontier have not been so severe.

The western frontier, about 532 miles long, is not clearly defined in the Slovak section, there being many ethnographical insets. In the Polish section this frontier is a mixed zone, especially in the Kholm district and Podlakhia, where that section of the Ukrainian population which joined the Roman Catholic Church in the 20th century has become Polish in national consciousness.

On the northern frontier there is no rigid line of demarcation between Ukrainian and White Ruthenian dialects; east of the Dnipro (area round Chernyhiv) the frontier has become particularly blurred as the land was settled by Ukrainians, White Ruthenians and Russians.

The eastern frontier is divided into 2 parts by the wedge of Don Cossack territory projecting west, viz. the section bet-

ween Novokhopersk and Rostov and that extending from Rostov to Otomanivsk. 101 131

It is only in the western section that the frontier runs between the purely Ukrainian area in west Sub-Caucasia (Kuban area) and the Don area; eastern Sub-Caucasia is a mixed belt of Ukrainians and Russians. In the south-east, therefore, we must speak of two frontiers of Ukrainian territory, a narrower and a wider one. The former separates Ukrainian Transcaucasia from the eastern part of Transcaucasia that is partly Russian, while the latter also includes eastern Sub-Caucasia. Throughout its course, the south-eastern frontier is blurred and by no means fixed, as the process of colonisation is still going on.

c) Boundaries and Territories of the three Historical Ukrainian States:

The Kyiv state stretched in the 11th and 12th centuries from the Wyslok to the Donets and included areas which were not colonised and others whose inhabitants were not Ukrainians. It embraced almost 1153 846 square miles, almost 1/6 of which was constantly inhabited by Ukrainians. 131 175

The second Ukrainian state (the realm of the Cossacks) had an area of about 115 384 square miles, western Ukraine was not included within its boundaries.

The third Ukrainian state covered the entire area settled by the Ukrainian people, with the exception of the Don area and Sub-Caucasia. Without annexations (which were of brief duration), the third state covered about 242 308 square miles, with the Crimean Peninsula, a part of the Voronesh district, Carpathian Ukraine and Bucovina 265 384 square miles, i. e. less than the entire Ukrainian ethnographical territory (276 269 sq. miles) and much less than the entire territory originally settled by Ukrainians (357 885 sq. miles).

d) Size of the Ukrainian territory

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Up to World War I 29 039 sq. miles of the Ukrainian territory belonged to Austria-Hungary and the remainder to Russia. After the end of World War I and a short period of inde- 162 175

●131 pendence in the years 1917—1920, Ukraine was distributed among the following countries:

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Ukraine Territory	Area	Population on 1. 1. 1939 (in millions)
to USSR	216 846 sq.m.	37.3
to Poland	46 932 sq.m.	9.7
to Roumania	6 769 sq.m.	1.4
to Czechoslovakia	5 730 sq.m.	0.8

A separate Ukraine Soviet Republic was formed within the USSR (170 423 sqm. with 31.9 million inhabitants). The remaining Ukraine districts in Soviet Russia belonged to the RSFSR, and a tiny piece of Polesya to the Republic of Whi e Ruthenia. At the end of World War II almost the whole Ukrainian territory fell to the Soviet Union. 20 000 km² with more t' an a million inhabitants belongs to Poland, 5 000 km² with 100 00. inhabitants to Slovakia and small minorities to Roumania.

Soviet Ukraine embraces about 261 538 sq.m. with 43 million inhabitants. —

2. Natural Conditions in Ukraine

a) Landscape of Ukraine

133 Ukraine consists of vast plains and plateaus which seldom rise as high as 1000 ft. above sea-level. The monotony of the Ukrainian landscape is akin to that of neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. One can travel for hundreds of miles through a landscape that never changes, for the plateaus differ little from the plains, the transition from the one physical configuration to the other being scarcely perceptible. In the south, the scene is varied by mountains, but these constitute but 1/10 of the entire area of Ukraine.

Passing from south to north, we can distinguish 5 different forms of landscape.

In the south the southern low plain stretches along and includes the plains at the foot of the Carpathian mountains with the valley of the Vistula, the Syan and the Dnister, the Black Sea depression and the plain surrounding the lowlands of

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

II

Economic Life

By the "economy of Ukraine" in the following pages we do not mean the economy of Soviet Ukraine but of the entire Ukrainian territory. It is most difficult to present facts here, as the various sections of Ukrainian territory are not only incorporated in different states but have also varying economic organisations. These difficulties were due primarily to the peculiar character of Soviet statistics. In the statistics for the first two Five Year Plans it is impossible to translate into absolute figures either the real value of the rouble or the percentages given. More entanglements were caused by the inadequacy of data for quantity and quality and the obvious exaggeration of the natural wealth. These factors have been taken into consideration in the following pages. 000

Basic Problems

1. The area of Ukrainian economy

(far more than a million square kilometers) lies spread out like a fan round the north of the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv. Almost all its rivers flow into this north-east continuation of the Mediterranean, and Ukraine is the only country in Eastern Europe which they serve. The area includes fertile districts, and valuable mineral wealth; the various sections complement each other economically and communications between them are convenient. With a total population of about 60 millions (59 per sq. kilometer as compared with 8, the average for USSR), it approaches European conditions. So the natural, but not the political, conditions for a grand scale economy are given. /3/ ● /6/

from Ukraine, although it is true that Russia had to be supplied 439
with sugar in addition to raw and auxiliary materials (coal, ores, pig-iron, steel etc.). Imports to Ukraine (e. g. textiles) were more than met by exports. But no capital was imported from Russia to set off the active trade balance; this came almost entirely from other countries.

In the common budget of Imperial Russia in the years 651
1909—1913 Ukraine had to supply 20 % of the total revenue 439
while it was allocated only 20 % of the expenditure. Almost half (45—46 %) of the Imperial revenue from Dnipro Ukraine was diverted to other areas of Russia. Three fourths of the funds ear-marked for capitalisation went abroad in the form of interest and dividends; Russia itself utilised revenue from Ukraine to install rival plants that very often manufactured or finished goods derived from Ukraine. Ukraine exported abroad four to nine times as much as she imported and was solely responsible for the fact that Russia had an active trade balance. It is an undisputable fact that Ukraine was an integral part of the economic system of Europe before the First World War.

7. The Russian Eurasian Theory

is that all Eurasian and Asiatic parts of Russia, including 000
peripheral areas like Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan etc. must be united in one great empire. Let us view this problem from the point of view of economic geography.

The features common to that gigantic stretch of territory are the enormous distances between the various centers of production to the frontiers and the sea, the length of time that rivers and seas are ice-bound, sparse population, high costs of transportation, and an unfavorable position with regard to world markets. It must therefore be organised as a self-supporting economy, planned from some center. Western Siberia is the heart of Eurasia.

These facts do not apply to Ukraine. The 2400 km between 131
the sea and the Semyrjechka area may be Eurasian, while in 487
Europe the least favorable points are less than 600 km from the sea, and this "European" distance from the sea holds for Ukraine where no center is further than 600 km from the Black Sea. The distance between the Kusnets Basin, the chief coal area of

● 131 Eurasia and the ores in the Ural is more than 2000 km; the
487 coal of the Donets Basin, on the other hand, is about 350—450 km from the iron ore of Kryvyj Rih, while the iron and manganese ores of Kerch are nearer still. The seas in the north of Russia are frozen for 20—26 weeks, while the Black Sea has ice for but 3—4 weeks in the year. Most of its harbors can be kept open all winter by means of ice-breakers. The
[161] density of the population in Ukraine is 59 to the square kilometer which cannot be compared with the figures for Siberia (1 per sq. km) or with the average for USSR (8). Conditions in Ukraine, therefore, are much more akin to those in Europe than are those in the continental heart of Eurasia some 4000 km away. And for Ukraine this fact found expression, for instance, in the fact that it could not profit from the reduced railway freights that were granted for long-distance transportation. The unfavorable position of Moscow and Leningrad as manufacturing centers was a great handicap to the economy of Ukraine which possessed all the conditions necessary for production within its own frontiers but nevertheless had to import goods from there and export raw materials to very low prices.

As long as Russia's face was turned towards Europe, these considerations did not matter much, but they are felt all the more acutely now that the economy of the Soviet Union is definitely planned.

8. The Ukrainian idea of economy

421 with its championship of private property was always entirely different from the "mir" idea, with its farming in common and periodical division of the soil which was characteristic for Russian economy. Exceptions within Ukrainian territory, due to special conditions of time and place, do not alter this fundamental fact.
[566] That serfdom should have been abolished so late was felt to be a great burden by the Ukrainian who had enjoyed personal freedom in his days of political independence. He always connected serfdom with Russian rule which naturally did not help to mitigate his aversion to everything Russian.

433 In national Ukrainian literature, the relationship of different branches of economy is often discussed. It is often maintained that up to the present, development has been along the lines of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER I

THE RIVER WORLD AND THE KIEVAN STATE (UP TO 1240)

§1. THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR IN RUSSIAN HISTORY

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175*

RUSSIA is a land of rivers. The element of frustration in Russian history comes from the fact that all the rivers of the Great Eurasian Plain debouch into land-locked or ice-packed seas. The fine rivers of Siberia spend themselves in Arctic waters. The Dvina, north-westward artery from the Central Russian river system, flows to the Baltic. Southward the Dniestr, the Dniepr and the Don descend to the warm waters of the Black Sea to find the single outlet to the Mediterranean through the narrow straits which separate Europe from Asia. Eastward the Volga, greatest of Russian rivers, casts its waters into the Caspian, the largest of Asiatic lakes.

The rivers offer to the whole Eurasian Plain the possibility of a close-knit unity. Rapids are rare—those of the Dniepr are famous; the rivers are broad and slow flowing over the vast level plain. Only the enterprise of man was necessary to convert the primeval streams into a system of communications. Geographically, a north-south development of historical life would seem inevitable; and from early times the river routes from the Black Sea to the Baltic were known to the trading communities of the Mediterranean. Yet the very network of rivers which gives promise of a unified and ordered development of life over the Eurasian Plain offers at the same time opportunity for the intrusions of alien elements. So the early history of the Eurasian Plain is the history of the penetration of the region by successive invasions from east, west and north, and of the percolation of the most diverse influences. Regional cultures were created by exterior action, and, so far as there is evidence in historical times, by the fusion of invaders, generally not very numerous, with the conquered inhabitants. This was certainly the case with the medieval states of Novgorod and Kiev, where a Scandinavian warrior and trader class imposed themselves on a primitive Slav population.

The third and youngest cultural growth in medieval Russia was that which radiated from Moscow. Here, owing to the proximity of the Volga and the close relation between the Grand Duchy of Muscovy and the Golden Horde, Mongol and Islamic influences

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●131 175* imparted a peculiarly sombre and conservative tone to the reviving Russian state. The 'Asiatic' character of this third Russian culture may be contrasted with the enterprising 'western' complexion of 'Baltic' Novgorod and with the 'Mediterranean' brilliance of southern Kiev.

The Volga had always been a channel through which Oriental influences penetrated towards the north. In the days of the Khazar kingdom in the eighth century Persian, Arab and Jewish elements were strong. Klyuchevski, moreover, has emphasized the significance of the Finno-Ugrian substratum in the primitive population of the Volga basin. Here Voguls, Cheremises, Votyaks and other primordial Finnic tribes were enserfed by the Suzdal princes in the twelfth century. The new Russia which emerged in the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, and which for the first time conquered the river network of the Eurasian Plain from *within*, was a different Russia (less Slav and less European) from the Russias of Kiev and Novgorod.

The north-south trend in Russian history, which should found a unity upon the river network, is countered by a pull east-west. The Great Eurasian Plain has no limit north-westward till it reaches the Baltic and the North Sea; none westward till the Carpathians; while south-eastward it is lost in the Aralo-Caspian desert zone which stretches to the T'ien-Shan and beyond to the Khingan. Thus in comparatively recent times temporarily great powers like Poland and Sweden have exercised a formidable pressure upon the undefined borderlands. In earlier times the Germanic peoples in migration swept through to the Black Sea; the Goths ruled the South Russian land for two centuries. From the east successive waves of the Altaian peoples rode in from the desert zone of Inner Asia. The Hunnish and Avarian invasions of the southern steppelands on the way to Central Europe are very comparable to the later Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century. The Mongols were in fact merely the final wave of the Altaian peoples, who established themselves rather more effectively and for a longer period of time because their ruthless military qualities had been refined by the competence of Chinese and Persian statecraft.

The exposure of the Russian land both towards the west and towards the south-east made chronic the factors of instability and uncertainty which have affected all phases of Russian history. The fluidity of frontiers and the repetition of invasions have introduced complicated racial issues. The Russian state of the Muscovite Tsars was founded upon a real geographical unity, and it was a natural response to the slackening of pressures from the east. But the state which the first Ivans compounded out of Slav, Finnic and Tatar

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

material was never a racial unity, and when the Russian Empire expanded *outward* without limit, as its enemies had formerly pressed *inward* without limit, it absorbed into its sphere peoples, Slav and non-Slav, who were historically attached to other regions and who felt the attraction of other cultural worlds. 131 ● 175*

§2. SOUTH RUSSIA BEFORE THE SLAVS

Many peoples occupied South Russia before the Slavs. Numerous cultures flourished there before the beginnings of written history. The fan of rivers round the Black Sea (from east to west, Kuban, Don, Dniepr, Bug, Dniestr, Pruth, Danube) nourished a vast area which linked the Asiatic with the Trans-Danubian and Mediterranean worlds. At periods in archaeological time a common culture appears to have covered the whole area between the Caucasus and the upper valley of the Danube. This common cultural background of forms and designs does not, of course, necessarily imply a racial uniformity. In fact the remains of different physical types and differing burial practices indicate the movements and settlements of a diversity of peoples. 175*

The first historical period in South Russia began with the Greek colonization, the origins of which go back to the eighth century B.C. The Greeks themselves were undoubtedly the heirs of older thalassocracies in the Pontus—Minoan and Mycenaean. The Xth, XIth and XIIth Books of the *Odyssey* and the legend of the Argonauts suggest the existence of more ancient cultural epochs, which the archaeological wealth of the Kuban affirms.

The Greek colonial civilization in the Pontus has been well described by Minns and Rostovtsev. The Greek colonists round the northern shores found the Scythians in possession of the South Russian steppelands. The Scythians were probably an Altaian nomad aristocracy with an Iranian language and culture ruling over a variety of subject peoples, many of whom were cultivators. The influence not only of Greece but also of Iran and Upper Asia is to be discovered in the remarkable art which flowered under the patronage of the Scythian princes. The economy of the Scythians, based on stock-raising and agriculture, was complementary to that of the Greek states, and for several centuries both the Greek colonial cities and the Scythian rulers of the Pontic hinterland grew rich on the enormous trade which developed between the steppelands and the Mediterranean. Athens became dependent on Scythian wheat, particularly during the Peloponnesian War, and the Pontus was often an issue in the politics of the Hellenic world. Peisker thinks that the demand

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

433 ness and ideological fanaticism which are so characteristic of Com-
185 munist psychology—itself a manifestation of a certain state of spiritual sterility—were brought to bear to achieve ultimate objects, which on the American continent during the preceding century had been attained by more balanced, hardly less heroic, and certainly less catastrophic methods.

§ 3. INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

135 The industrial development of the Ukraine has been based on the
131 exploitation of the coal deposits of the Donets basin and of the iron-ore and manganese fields situated west of the Dniepr. Abundant layers of coal are found along both banks of the Donets. The eastern part of the carboniferous region lies within the territory of the Don with its Cossack population. The western part, which constitutes about two-thirds of the whole region, is situated within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine.

Whether the Donets region properly belongs to the Ukraine is a question which has never been definitely settled. Historically, the lands along the right bank of the river Donets in its northern part belonged to that 'New Ukraine' which began to be populated in the second half of the seventeenth century by settlers from Muscovy and by fugitives from Hetman's Ukraine—at that time devastated by the Turkish invasions of Ahmed Köprülü and Kara Mustafa. Subsequently, these lands were incorporated in the Government of Kharkov. The lands along the southern course of the Donets formed part of the extreme eastern angle of New Russia where settled life only really began in the eighteenth century after the Tartar Nogay Horde, which roamed over this region, had retired beyond the Volga.

In 1917 the Provisional Government, in admitting five Ukrainian Governments as the legitimate area for the exercise of 'the national and cultural influence of the Kiev *Rada*', excluded the Government of Kharkov for the reason that the Donets coal area lay within it. The Ukrainian language is not commonly spoken in the coal-fields, and even if the large numbers of temporary labourers who come in from the north are ignored, not more than half the population of Donbass (the Donets coal area) can boast of their Ukrainian origin. In general, this region has nothing which unites its mixed industrial population to the essentially Ukrainian rural population of adjoining regions to the west. The only real link which connects the Donets coal-fields with the industrial districts along the Dniepr and the manganese and iron-ore regions is a purely economic one.

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According to both German and Soviet geological calculations, the reserves of coal in the Donets area amount to about 55 milliard tons. The deposits are largely anthracite—inferior in quality to Welsh.

Donets coal was the basis of the early industrial development of the South of Russia. Exploitation was begun in the middle of the nineteenth century; the construction of railway lines speeded up development during the seventies, and in the eighties Donets coal was already in use in the industries of the Moscow and Petersburg regions. After the discovery, about 1890, of abundant iron-ore deposits to the west of the lower Dniepr, the Donets coal industry acquired a rapidly growing importance. Between 1900 and 1913 output was increased at the rate of 17 per cent per annum. In 1913 the Ukrainian part of the coal-field delivered 23 million tons: in 1916, 29 million. During this period the Donets fields supplied all the southern industries with coal, and its contribution to northern industries became important with the construction of a new line direct from the mine area to Moscow. More than half the coal industry, before the Revolution, was financed by French capital.

For some time after the Revolution the output of the mines was relatively insignificant: during 1919 the area was the scene of desperate battles between 'Whites' and 'Reds', and later it was devastated by the raids of Makhno and other anarchic *atamany*. The famine of 1921–2 accentuated the terrible conditions. During the period of the New Economic Policy, output of coal gradually revived, and in 1929 fell little short of that of 1913. The First Five Year Plan prescribed the accelerated industrialization of the Ukrainian mineral-bearing areas. The social struggle which formed part of the 'Revolution against Peasantry' did not particularly affect the Donets, but the famine of 1932–3 had its influence there. Nevertheless, if Soviet statistics are to be credited, the Government succeeded in coping with the difficulties, and in 1934 a production of 68 million tons of coal and anthracite was claimed—representing an output in excess of that of France. Ukrainian production occupied fourth place—after U.S., Great Britain and Germany. For 1938, Soviet statistics gave a production of 74 million tons out of a total of 104½ million tons for the whole of the Soviet Union. The average annual increase in production for the last five years, 1934–9, is substantially less than that for the preceding five years, 1929–34. One of the reasons for this is stated to be the difficulty of retaining labour which was available during the period of social conflict in the countryside, but which has drifted back to the farms following improvement in the conditions in the *Kolkhozy*. Labour

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

whether it has been properly used. For instance, one of the Ukrainian *Kolkhozy* reported that it had accomplished 50 per cent of the Sowing Plan when in reality it had only accomplished 2 per cent of it' (*Pravda*, 14 June, 1932). The harvest is continually assessed 'by the look of it in the fields' before it has been gathered in. Over a series of years the harvest has been between 20 and 30 per cent less than reports showed it to be. 113

The comparisons between Soviet actuality and pre-Revolutionary conditions are often unconvincing because Soviet statistics do not take quality into consideration. For instance, according to Soviet statistics, the output of peat has risen by 30 per cent. In reality, only the percentage of moisture retained in the peat accepted for delivery has risen.

In the *Times* article on 'The Plight of the Plan' (29 January, 1938) this question of quantity being the chief concern, irrespective of quality, in all the most important branches of industry in Soviet Ukraine, is discussed: 'The coal-mines show impressive figures but quantity is the chief concern. This has risen threefold or fourfold in the last decades, but recent disclosures indicate that the calorific value of the coal leaving Soviet mines is less even than that of the output in old Russia. The production of iron ore has gone up at a similar rate, but the final result is similar.' Cf. Makcheef, Th. (Maksheev), 'Heavy Industry in the Soviet Union,' *Contemporary Russia*, II, 2, London, 1938.

The Territory of Soviet Ukraine

Out of the 588,000 sq. km. claimed for 'Greater Ukraine', Soviet Ukraine occupied (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia in September 1939) 452,000. This area represents 2·1 per cent of the whole extent of the U.S.S.R. Soviet Ukraine occupies the territory of eight former Governments of the Empire: Kharkov, Chernigov (less five northern districts), Poltava, Ekaterinoslav (now renamed Dniepropetrovsk), Kherson, Podolia, Volhynia (excluding, until September 1939, the western districts annexed to Poland in 1921), Kiev. Three northern districts of the former Government of Tauris (Berdyansk, Melitopol, Dnieprovsk) are also included. The Putivl district of the former Kursk Government as well as some villages of the former Orel Government are also deemed to form part of the Ukraine. 131

In 1924 an 'Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic' was formed out of the Podolian districts of Balta and Tulchin along the Dniestr in order to give a semblance of self-government to the Roumanian-speaking villages of that region. The area of A.S.S.R. Moldavia is 8288 sq. km. and the population 572,000. The capital is located at Tiraspol.

The capital of the Ukrainian S.S.R. until 1934 was Kharkov; it is now Kiev.

In 1925 the administrative divisions of the area occupied by the Republic were reorganized into 40 Districts, 662 Regions, and 10,733 village and town Soviets. In 1929 the Districts were abolished out of economy and 7 *Oblasti* (Provinces) were established, roughly equivalent in size to the former Governments. These are: Vinnitsa (formerly Podolia), Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkov, Chernigov and Donets. Seven 'National Minority' Regions have been set up, and also 366 'National Minority' village Soviets 631

642 He enjoyed an immense advantage in the fact that the civil war
648 between the Whites and the Reds was largely fought on Ukrainian territory and thus compelled the young Ukrainian government to fight upon two fronts throughout the entire period, while for some time the new republic was forced also to oppose the Poles in the
[131] west. Lying as Ukraine did on the shore of the Black Sea, the armed forces of General Denikin, who was heading the effort to create an anti-Communist monolithic Russian government, could only reach Moscow by crossing Ukrainian territory. It was only across Ukrainian territory that the supplies sent to him by the Western nations after the ending of World War I could be delivered and it was his policy to allow no manifestation of Ukrainianism in any form, for he intended to continue that denial of Ukrainian existence that had characterized the old tsarist regime.

His efforts in this direction were aided by the unfortunate failure of the Western democratic powers which had triumphed in the war to understand either the nature of Bolshevism or the desires of the various national movements. At the same time his success was rendered impossible by the refusal of the West to back him in his efforts to restore all or most of the social and political order which had vanished with the abdication of the Tsar.

Thus with the White Russians and the Ukrainians locked in a desperate struggle, the way was open for Lenin to move with relative freedom on his path of disintegration and of conquest. He did not fail to take advantage of every opportunity, and the advances and retreats during the period from 1917 to 1920 and even later were but a preliminary for the later tactics of Communism.

On the other hand it cannot be denied that there existed in Ukraine certain factors which also worked to his advantage. The political and social system prevailing up to 1917 had not given any training in self-government to the Ukrainian people and in the midst of war and revolution they had to start on the most elementary tasks of popular education, while at the same time they corrected fundamental abuses in the economic situation and created and administered a government. Let us, therefore, look briefly at

the Vistula, Wislok, Poprad, the latter in Sub-Carpathian Russia, and finally in Hungary the High Tissa, a tributary of the Danube right up to the former Czecho-Rumanian border. Then this line cuts across Rumanian territory to the south of Tchernovitz (Cernauti) and follows the little river Reout, a tributary of the Dniester, right up to the latter. /101

Speaking geographically, that which we will decide to call the 'Ukraine' in this book has only one natural frontier: the southern inclines of the western part of the Carpathians. We do not speak of the coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov which officially forms its southern frontier, as this is above all the boundary of the Russian continent in its entirety. [131]

Actually, in the north-eastern basin of the Danube rises the immense semicircle of the Carpathians, dominating the Hungarian Plain. /33

The summits of these mountains reach to more than two thousand metres and are covered by beech, oaks, ash, and some fir trees—typical European forests. They have changed much less than those of the Alps or the Sudeten ranges. Here, in the western part of the Carpathians, in Sub-Carpathian Russia, the forests are still in an almost virgin state. They are still inhabited by bears and wild boar, and are but authentic vestiges—even because of the fact of their primitive state—of the great forests of Central Europe.

The Uzok Range, which has seen the passage of so many invaders in the course of the centuries, has all the characteristics of the high mountains of Central Europe.

From the geo-physical point of view Sub-Carpathian Russia, which stretches along the southern slopes of the Carpathians, is still part of the hilly country, divided by ranges of mountains, with a temperate climate typical of the whole of Central Europe, which has

137 Between the zone of the forests and that of the deserts, a geographical zone which enjoys a rich vegetation of corns and grasses stretches across the Russian plain. It is the Steppe, which begins on the shores of the Black Sea and almost immediately behind the Carpathians, a little to the east of Lvov, in Polish Galicia, along longitude 22 degrees east, and which continues from west to east, growing gradually wider beyond the frontiers of the Ukraine, and passing the official and conventional limit of Europe without interruption into Siberia.

134 Treeless since time immemorial, the plain is here exceptionally fertile. The grasses which grow here since prehistoric times have formed a thick layer of humus by their organic remains, which particularly favours the growth of all cereals, close relations of the wild species of the Steppe, the *pyrei*. The fertility of the soil is not only due to its organic composition but also to its porous structure whose capillary qualities facilitate irrigation.

This famous 'black earth,' the *tchernoziom*, is nowhere so rich as in the Ukraine. It forms, while becoming somewhat poorer towards the east, the typical soil of the whole Steppe both in the Ukraine and in Siberia.

137 The transition between the region of the forests and the Steppe is also not sudden. Before disappearing definitely in the ocean of corn and grass, the forests become lighter and sparser and here and there, especially along the rivers, they advance into the Steppes.

131 Yet the frontier between the zone of the forests and that of the Steppe is the only natural border which one can find in the immensity of the Russian plain. Formerly a stable political boundary—as we shall see when studying the history of the Ukraine[2]—it represents nothing to-day either from the ethnical or the political point of view.

2 [see category 116, pp. 27-106 --- Analyst]

This frontier runs in an almost straight line first towards the east to the Dnieper, which it reaches near the old City of Perejaslavl, then it runs towards the north-east and cuts through the present frontier of the Soviet Ukraine in the neighbourhood of Poutivl (approximately fifty degrees latitude north). 131

The forest reigns to the north of this line, which cuts the territory of the Ukraine into two unequal parts. The bigger part of Western Ukraine, Polish Galicia and the north-western part of Soviet Ukraine, lie in the forest zone and it is there, in about a quarter of the total territory, that the historic cradle of the Ukraine is to be found, as well as that of the whole of Russia, with the ancient towns of Halitch, Vladimir-Volynsk, Kiev, and Tchernigov.

The other and greater part of the actual Ukrainian territory includes the Steppes, now almost entirely under the plough, which reach down to the Black Sea. This is a country of relatively recent colonization.

In the Ukraine, as in the whole of Russia, the two principal zones are always present.

To sum up, if there is a geographic line between the Ukraine and Europe in the Carpathians, it is impossible to trace a geographic frontier between the Ukraine and the rest of Russia.

Geographically, Ukrainian territory is part of the great Russian Plain and has all the essential characteristics of the latter, and we can do no better than to refer to the dictionary of Larousse which gives the following excellent definition: 'Vast country of the south-west of the Russian Plain.'

Historic evolution alone, directed by the will of men, could, when encountering natural factors, give a distinctive character to this territory. 000

It is therefore this evolution of the Ukraine which

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

western part of the Ukraine, and we shall confine ourselves to the boundaries as determined on pages 16–19.[1]

We will accept the administrative Soviet frontier as being the northern and eastern boundaries. The coast of the Black Sea and of the Sea of Azov completes the boundary.

Thus the Ukraine, as determined by us, forms a territory whose extreme points are:

In the west longtitude 19 degrees east: the town of Uzhgorod in Hungarian Sub-Carpathian Russia;

In the east longtitude 37.5 degrees east: the town of Lougansk, in the oil-basin of the Donietz;

In the north latitude 52 degrees north: the town of Novgorod-Severski;

In the south latitude 48 degrees north: the town of Ovidiopol, at the mouth of the Dniester. This is within latitudes which are familiar to us, as those of Kiev and of Calais, of Odessa and of Nantes, of Poltava and of Paris correspond with each other.[2]

The maximum extent of Ukrainian territory in a west to east direction, from Uzhgorod to Lougansk, is, as the crow flies, a distance of 1375 kilometres, while in the north to south direction, from Novgorod-Severski to Ovidiopol it is 675 kilometres.

This territory occupies a space of 588,000 square kilometres (about 25,000 square kilometres more than France) of which

Soviet Ukraine has . . .	452,000 sq. km.
Poland (Volynia, Podolia, Galicia)	107,000 sq. km.
Rumanian Bucovina and Bessarabia	17,000 sq. km.
Sub-Carpathian Russia (Hungary)	12,000 sq. km.

[1] See Map No. 1.

[2] See Map No. 2: the map of France superimposed on that of the Ukraine.

the Dnieper, the Boug, and the Dniester, all flow from 133
north to south, to empty into the Black Sea.

The climate is similar on the whole territory, with an 132
average 'multi-annual' temperature slightly higher in the south and south-east, due to the great heat of the months of July and August in these parts, with the exception of a narrow border of the Black Sea, between Odessa and the isthmus of Perekop, where the winter and the autumn are very mild, which explains the presence in this region of such plants as cotton (a plant with a long period of growth) and trees so delicate as those of the peach.

On the whole territory of the Ukraine the month during which the average temperature is always the highest (20 degrees C.) is July, and that during which it is lowest (minus 4·5 degrees C.) is January.

The average rainfall varies between 25 and 80 centimetres per annum, with the dampest climate in the north-western part. Everywhere there is more rain during the summer.

This uniformity of the whole, which makes the task of geographical description an easy one, seems at first sight to make the division of the Ukrainian territory into different zones impossible, while giving each zone some original characteristics in the sphere of economic geography.

Nevertheless, when going deeper into an analysis of 131
the question, we establish a division of the Ukraine into two agro-climatic zones.

This separation is determined by climatic and agrarian factors. There are differences of rainfall, of the soil, and of flora.

The border of these two zones begins at the western frontier of the Ukraine, on the 48th degree latitude north, and rises in an almost straight line up to the

131 eastern frontier at the 50th degree latitude north, while cutting the territory into two almost equal parts.

132 In the northern zone (Zone 1) the rainfall is everywhere greater than 50 centimetres, while in the southern zone (Zone 2) it is less than 50 centimetres and varies between 25 and 50 centimetres.

134 The predominant soils of Zone 1 are poor *tchernozioms*, that is to say somewhat exhausted by the currents of water which have deprived them of their humus to a varying extent in different regions, and have brought to them some sand and clay from their sources.

On the contrary, the lands of Zone 2 are rich and complete *tchernozioms*.

137 Zone 1 comprises a vast forest region which, while spreading along the courses of the river becomes little by little a land of light woods, is yet characterized by the general presence of forests.

Zone 2 has no forests and is the true Steppe.

131 This separation is in practice nothing else but the frontier between the Steppe as such and the *lesso-steppe* (a Steppe with occasional woods)—a geographical term which has been accepted by Russian scientists for a long time.

This border is also that which defined the cradle of Russia, the ancient principality of Kiev, separating it from the savage Steppe of the nomads. Therefore, already at that distant epoch, the separation between these two agro-climatic zones existed in practice. Thus justified from a geographical point of view, the border between these two zones is all the more acceptable, as it is in tune with an historic reality since the establishment of settled populations.

000 Each time when we treat the question of populations in our study (the difference of density, of social distribution, and of ethnical composition), of agriculture

[see category 116, pp. 139-140 --- Analysis]

The Ukraine]

I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

101 Ukraina or Okraina (meaning 'border') appears originally to have formed the 'limes Rossicus' or 'Polonicus', i. e. borderland between the Russians, Poles, Turks, and Tatars, the centre of which lay in the lower reaches of the Dnieper valley. The connotation of the word has varied widely. When in process of time this borderland was colonized, and with the rise of Great Russia was extended in many directions, the old name Ukraina or Ukraine was loosely applied to the whole of the enlarged area where the Little Russians (Ruthenians) were in an increasing majority. This extension of the term was facilitated by the modern rise of Little Russian literature, especially in Austrian Galicia, where the use of the Little Russian language was permitted, and 'Ukrainian' rapidly passed from archaeological into literary currency as the equivalent of Little Russian in general.

The connotation of the Ukraine adopted here is that of the General Proclamation of the Ukrainian National Council, issued November 20, 1917, in which it is definitely stated: 'Therefore we announce: to the territory of the National Ukrainian Republic belong the lands where the majority of the population is Ukrainian—Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov, Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida (without the Crimea).'[1]

● 151 The Ukraine as thus constituted consists of three provinces, the South-west Territory (*Yugo-Zapadny*

[1] On March 29, 1918, the German Government recognized, in accordance with the Treaty of February 9 and the Ukrainian Proclamation, the nine Governments mentioned above as belonging to Ukraine proper, as well as parts of Cholm and Grodno.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

131 *Krai*), Little Russia (*Malorossiya*), and part of South or New Russia (*Novorossiya*). The South-west Territory is formed by the three Governments (*gubernii*) of Volhynia (area, 27,700 square miles), Podolia (16,219 square miles), and Kiev (19,686 square miles); Little Russia by those of Chernigov (20,233 square miles), Poltava (19,265 square miles), and Kharkov (21,035 square miles); and New Russia contains the Governments of Yekaterinoslav (24,478 square miles), Kherson (27,337 square miles), and Taurida (23,312 square miles, of which 9,704 belong to the Crimea). It should be noted that the Ukraine by this definition excludes Bessarabia, the Don Cossacks' Territory, and the Crimea, all of which are included in New Russia.

131 101 The Ukraine thus occupies an area of more than 190,000 square miles. It is bounded on the north by the Governments of Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, Smolensk, Mohilev, Minsk and Grodno; on the west by the recently created Russian Polish Government of Cholm, Eastern Galicia, and Bessarabia; on the south by the Black Sea, the Crimea, and the Sea of Azov; on the east by the Don Cossacks' Territory.

Except on the west and in the south the boundaries can hardly be said to coincide with natural divisions. Nor are they completely ethnographical, for the ethnographical area extends into Kursk, Voronezh, Grodno, Minsk, Cholm, and Eastern Galicia.

(2) Surface, Coast, and River System

Surface

133 The Ukraine falls naturally into three divisions: Polyesia in the north, the Black Sea plateau, extending from the western boundary to the Dnieper, and Little Russia on the left bank of the Dnieper.

Polyesia (of which only the southern part actually falls within the boundaries of the Ukraine as claimed by the Little Russians) occupies primarily the basin of the Pripet, a right-bank tributary of the Dnieper. The central portion consists of an almost unbroken

phils) of being the result of German intrigue.[1] This again gave rise to a pamphlet, by L. Tschelski, issued in Sofia (1915) by the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, entitled *Is the Ukrainian Movement a German Intrigue?* The Russian Government took severe measures against the members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, who, including the chief leader, Hrushevski, were banished to Siberia, or were forbidden to enter Russia from abroad. 175

(D) Fourth Period: Since the Russian Revolution of 1917

(*a*) *The Ukraine becomes independent.*—One of the first questions which faced the Provisional Government at the beginning of the Russian Revolution was the demand for an amnesty for the Ukrainian Nationalist offenders, who were allowed to return from Siberia and abroad. Next came the demand for Ukrainian autonomy and the appointment of a special Minister for Ukrainian Affairs, presented by a deputation sent from Kiev to Petrograd on April 6, 1917. Soon afterwards the first Ukrainian National Congress was convened at Kiev (April 19–22), at which some 800 members representative of the *intelligentsia* and the Social Revolutionaries were present. They elected a Central Rada, and declared for an autonomous Ukrainian republic under a Russian federal republic. Professor Hrushevski was elected President. The territory claimed for the Ukrainian state corresponded roughly to the western parts of the Governments of Lublin and Grodno, and the whole of the Governments of Kiev, Poltava, Kherson, Volhynia, Kharkov, Podolia, Yekaterinoslav, and Chernigov, and excluded the Austrian Ukraine. The Congresses of the Ukrainian Soldiers (May 5–7) and of the Ukrainian Peasants (May–June) supported the Rada at this time. But the Petrograd 668 642 [646] [131]

[1] In answer to a pamphlet by Tschelski, *No Liberator, but an Oppressor of Nations: How Russia freed the Ukraine.* L.L.U., Sofia, 1914.

UKRAINE
Land of Black Earth

/7/

The Outpost

000 Reaching the first villages of a different people, the stranger stands helpless. The great unknown of this world fills him with awe, with the wish to fathom its essence, and with vague expectations. Velykyi Lypnyk is such a village on the edge of a large community ruled by other laws. It is the most westerly outpost, the spearhead, as it were, of the self-contained settlement area of a people whose often grandiose history bears
181 out the truth: Woe to the vanquished! This race of Ukrainians is the largest on earth without its own state. Often the Ukrainians were chosen by providence for great deeds; for a long time they protected the West from the wild Asiatic hordes, then history made them dead quiet. They were forgotten and almost abandoned to extinction. But the people refused to be "a branch of the large Russian tree; they wanted to be a tree themselves, with roots, trunk, branches and leaves, drawing its nourishment from its own soil". Again and again they rose up against ruling peoples, they fought, won and - lost. /8/

131 A two- to three-hour drive by automobile separates the self-contained German settlement in Silesia from the Ukrainian spearhead in eastern Slovakia at the foot of the High Tatra. In between lies the settlement of the Zips Germans. It is a mere weekend excursion from Breslau or Vienna to the border of the Ukrainian realm. For the inhabitant of Breslau it is no farther than Berlin and for the Viennese it is as far as Munich. It takes six hours by car from Vienna or Breslau up the Oder and the Waag along the quiet, dreamy woodland slopes of the Slovakian mountains to the High Tatra. Between it and the Lower Beskid the

/13/ crystal-clear Poprad eats it way toward Galicia. Along this small stream live Ukrainians; near it lies Velykyi Lypnyk. Its neighbors are Germans, Gorals and Slovaks.

77/ Here lies the border of a strange world, a world whose other edge reaches almost to the Caspian Sea on the threshold of Asia. In it birth, life, death, time and many other things have a different value than elsewhere, other criteria obtain, and every stranger who would attempt to apply his own measure would fail. Even Christ has become different; he does not wear the crown of thorns, but the emperor's crown on his brow. Thus he sits in judgment over mankind. Here other altars are built, not the puritanically strict ones of the evangelical church nor the ostentatious ones of the Catholic, but the magnificent ones of the Byzantine church. The mysticism of this world between the peaks of the High Tatra, the glaciers of the Caucasus and the glistening mirror of the Caspian is already revealed here where Rome, Constantinople and Moscow are an equal distance away. True, the church steeple has an onion-shaped cupola, like any Bavarian one, but beside it two smaller cupolas adorn the roof and the altar conceals a magnificent painted screen, designed to wrap the service in still greater mystery. Like pure gold this iconostasis with the pictures of six prophets /9/ and twelve apostles is spread out before the sanctuary. Its basic tone is blue and yellow, the Ukrainian colors.

78 With God these people communicate through the priest, with the devil, directly. Even though they believe in Christ with deep religiosity, they by no means wish to be on a bad footing with the Evil One. It is not good to have him for an enemy; it is better not to say his name, or he might think he is being called and is expected to come. These people are also on good terms with spirits. The latter must be respected, feared,

/12/ Come Along, Friend

101 The Ukrainian country has been given various names. It is called the "largest meadow", and this implies the blossoming steppe in springtime and the nomadic herds numbering hundreds of thousands of cattle and sheep. But it is also called "cornhouse", and this recalls the huge granaries in the harbors of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. It is said to be the easternmost Mediterranean country, because its people are dark-haired and gayer than the thick-blooded Russians in the north, because the sun beats down as it does on the shores of the Mediterranean, and because in the Crimea cypresses and cedars tower into the heavens, figs and almonds ripen. Then, too, it is called a "peninsula of Asia" because the steppes of this continent reach over as far as the Dniestr and the delta of the Danube, and for two thousand years one Asiatic horde after another have pitched their tents in these wide spaces. Still others say that the Ukraine is the "bridge to India", for up to the Middle Ages the large trade routes from the West to the Far East and Asia Minor intersected here with those of the northern countries to Byzantium. Napoleon was of this opinion when he wanted to destroy the British Empire through the conquest of India. Czar Paul III[2] was supposed to carry out this plan, and had declared himself prepared to do so. His well-timed murder, however, in those days saved the British rule in India. (2)

2. Trietsch, Russia, page 24.

● 131 Geographers have established the fact that the Ukrainian national territory extends from 43 to 53 degrees northern latitude and from 21 to 45 degrees eastern longitude. /13/ They say

2 [sic--Analyst]

131 further that the boundaries of the Ukrainian nation may be divided into southern boundaries (Black Sea and Caucasus), southwest boundaries (Rumanians and Magyars), western boundaries (Slovaks and Poles), northern boundaries (White Russians and Russians) and eastern boundaries (peoples of the Don and the Caucasus). For these scholars Ukraine is the southern part of the vast Sarmatian lowland between the Carpathian arc, the Finnish highland, the Urals and the Caucasus. They certainly go to great pains to reduce to a common denominator the censuses of the various states in which the Ukrainians have been forced to live. They have added up the square kilometers of all Ukrainian countries and the people living in them, and have reached the following maximal result for 1933: (3)

162 3. Kubyievych: The Distribution of Population in the Ukraine, page 6.

Ukrainian provinces on January 1, 1933 within the states:	Surface in 1000 sq. kilometers	Surface area of total Ukrainian territory in percentage	Inhabitants in 1000	Proportion of inhabitants of total Ukrainian populated area in percentage
Soviet Union.....	773.4	82.4	43,658	79.6
Poland.....	132.2	14.1	9,198	16.8
Rumania.....	17.6	1.9	1,258	2.3
Czechoslovakia.	14.9	1.6	746	1.3
	938.1	100.0	54,860	100.0

I INTRODUCTION

101 The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (the Ukraine) is one of the U.S.S.R.'s sixteen constituent Union Republics. Situated in the south-western corner of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine is bordered on the south by the Black and Azov Seas and the Crimea (part of Russia); its western border touches the frontiers of Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as well as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Towards the north the Ukrainian S.S.R. verges on two other Soviet Republics: Byelorussia and Russia; and it is the Russian neighbourhood of the Don river which forms the Ukraine's eastern border.

101 135 In economic development and in population the Ukraine is second greatest of the Soviet Republics. It has a fertile soil, a mild humid climate, and is rich in deposits of coal, oil, iron, manganese and salts, as well as in building materials. It has four main rivers: the Dnieper (third largest in Europe), the Dniester, the Bug, and the Donets (a tributary of the Don), which are navigable and are also useful reservoirs of power.

433 162 Before 1941 the Ukraine contained more than one-fifth of the inhabitants of the entire Soviet Union. Its industry produced 54 per cent. of the coal, 60 per cent. of the pig iron, 48 per cent. of the steel, and 35 per cent. of the manganese ore turned out in the whole U.S.S.R.; it manufactured railway engines and cars, tractors, turbines, harvester combines, and mining and agricultural machinery for all parts of the Soviet Union. "It also produced artificial fertilizers, soda, glass and cement. The output of the sugar, meat-packing, flour-milling, distilling, and dairy industries reached great dimensions. Fishing was developed in the Black Sea and Azov Sea. The Dnieper Power Station, 361 the largest in Europe, was famous throughout the world. The cities of the Ukraine, both old and new, developed rapidly; during the past 25 years 77 new cities and 285 industrial settlements were built."[1]

241 Agriculture also was highly developed. In 1937-38 Ukrainian farms accounted for nearly one-fifth of the grain, one-sixth of the potatoes, and two-thirds of the sugar beet produced in the Soviet Union. The Ukraine also had a large proportion of the total Soviet Union livestock. Millions of head of cattle, pigs, sheep, and poultry were raised. Ukrainian agriculture was highly mechanized; before the war there were 90,000 tractors and 31,000 harvesting combines operating in the fields.

Area and Population

131 In January 1939 the Ukrainian Republic had an area of about 469,700 square kilometres including 8,000 square kilometres in its

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1 The Sixteen Soviet Republics, Soviet News, London, 1945.

131 constituent autonomous republic, the Moldavian A.S.S.R.[1] On November 1,
[728] 1939, 88,000 square kilometres were added when Western Ukraine, which in 1920 had been annexed by Poland, was re-joined to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

131 Another 21,300 square kilometres were added in June 1940 when
728 Bessarabia (annexed by Rumania in 1913) and Northern Bukovina (another part of Rumania) also were incorporated, making the Ukraine's total area then about 579,000 square kilometres. However, a small decrease occurred in August 1940 when the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. granted the petition of the Moldavian people in Bessarabia to join with a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic to form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war the area of the Ukraine was 575,000 square kilometres (2½ per cent. of the territory of the Soviet Union); and the population was over 40 millions. After the addition of the Transcarpathian region in June 1945, the Ukraine's total area was 587,700 square kilometres; it is approximately the same today. The following table summarizes the changes in the area and population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. from 1939 to June 1941.

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635 The U.S.S.R. is composed of sixteen Union Soviet Socialist Republics.
642 Within this framework there exist a number of autonomous provinces, national regions and autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. Before August 1940 the Ukrainian S.S.R. included one autonomous republic, the Moldavian A.S.S.R. which was subsequently given full status and became the sixteenth Union Republic. According to Professor Trainin, the Soviet authority on legal questions, the main distinction between autonomous and union republics is that the latter are guaranteed the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. - a right which is not incorporated in the constitutions of the autonomous republics. Another difference regarding status is that whereas in the Soviet of Nationalities (one of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) every Union republic is represented by 25 deputies, the autonomous republic is represented by only 11.

TABLE I

Area and Population of the Ukrainian S.S.R., 1939-40

	Area (thousand square kilometres)	Population (millions)
131 161 Area Ukrainian S.S.R. January 1939	469.7	30.96
Territories added:		
Western Ukraine (added November 1939)	88.0	8.0
Part of Bessarabia	15.3	1.05
Northern Bukovina (both added June 1940)	6.0	0.5
	579.0	40.51
Territories transferred:		
Part of the Moldavian A.S.S.R. (together with part of Bessarabia, created the Moldavian S.S.R., August 1940)	3.9	0.31
Totals August 1940	575.1	40.20

Source : Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S.Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

728 131 162 In June 1945 the Transcarpathian Ukraine was ceded by Czechoslovakia to the Ukrainian S.S.R. This transfer added about 12,600 square kilometres area and a population of about 750,000. The details of the various cessions of territory are given below.

Soviet-Polish Frontiers

In the autumn of 1939, after the collapse of the Polish State and the occupation of Western Poland by German troops, the Soviet Government decided to take under its protection the life and property of the population of Eastern Poland, that is, Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, inhabited mainly by Ukrainians and Byelorussians. When they were seized by Poland in 1920, these territories were ethnographically and economically part of the Soviet Union. Their return to the Soviet Union increased the area and population of the Byelorussian S.S.R. by 108,000 square kilometres and 4.8 million inhabitants; and of the Ukraine, by 88,000 square kilometres and 8 million people.

In August 1945, a slight adjustment of frontiers took place between Poland and the Soviet Union. A treaty was signed which, in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference in February 1945, established the Polish-Soviet boundary roughly along the Curzon Line, with some deviations in favour of Poland. As a result of this, Poland was given back a small strip of the territory which had been incorporated in the Soviet Union in 1939.

Moldavia

635 648 The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was created on August 2, 1940 by the decree of the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. This Republic consists of a part of the former Moldavian Autonomous S.S. Republic and of a section of Bessarabia incorporated into the Soviet Union. [131 161] The creation of this new Union Republic decreased the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 3,900 square kilometres and a population of 310,000 persons[1].

The Transcarpathian Ukraine[2]

728 In June 1945 an agreement was signed in Moscow between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic that the Transcarpathian Ukraine "...which on the basis of a pact of September 10, 1919, concluded at St.Germain-en-Laye, entered the Czechoslovak Republic with the rank of an Autonomous Republic, will, according to the wish manifested by the population of the Carpatho-Ukraine and on the basis of the friendly agreement of both high contracting parties, unite with its longstanding motherland, the Ukraine, and is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The frontier between Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine, existing since September 29, 1938, will, with modifications described, become the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic..."

Article II of the protocol appended to the Pact said that:

"Persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality living in Czechoslovak territory have the right to opt for Soviet citizenship until January 1, 1946... Czech and Slovak nationals residing or having their permanent domicile in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine have the right to opt for Czechoslovak nationality during the time until January 1, 1946".[3]

131 311 On January 1, 1935, the area of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 12,617 square kilometres. In 1937 about half of this was covered by forests and woods; roughly 239,000 hectares were arable, and about 328,000 hectares were devoted to vineyards, market gardens, and permanent meadows and pastures.

161 As at December 1, 1930, the population of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 725,357, an increase of nearly 121,000 over February 1921.[4]

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1 Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S.Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

2 Called by the Czechs, Sub-Carpathian Rus, or Carpatho-Ukraine.

3 New York Times quoted by Voices of History (1945-46), Gramercy Publishing Company, New York.

4 Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovak Republic, London.

TABLE XIV

185 Ukraine: Planned Production in 1950 Compared with 1940 and 1913 (see
433 Note)
241 (million metric tons)

	1913	1940	1950
Grain	20	28	27.8
Sugar beet	8.9	14.8	15.7
Potatoes	about 5[1]	21.5	23

1 According to the report in Pravda, the potato harvest in 1940 was "over 4 times" that of 1913.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

[728] Note: In comparing the 1950 target figures with pre-war production it is important to bear in mind the territorial revisions which occurred in the Ukraine after 1939, when she regained Western Ukraine and part of Bessarabia, lost a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic (which, together with the Moldavian Section of Bessarabia, then became a separate Union Republic), and added Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathian Ukraine.

[131] Thus the present area of the Ukraine exceeds its 1938 area by
311 approximately 118,000 kilometres (11,800,000 hectares). However,
728 we do not know precisely how much of this is agricultural land. The arable land in Western Ukraine before the war amounted to 4 million hectares; that of Transcarpathian Ukraine, to 239,000 hectares. In the parts of Bessarabia and Bukovina which were ceded to the Soviet Union, 3,285,800 hectares were classified as arable. If we roughly divide this between Moldavia and the Ukraine in proportion to the total ex-Rumanian area incorporated in each, about 1,300,000 hectares of agricultural land would have been added to the Ukraine in its share of Bessarabia; and the arable area of present-day Ukraine would exceed the 1937 cultivated area by about 5½ million hectares, the potential total being 30.6 million. The fact that the Five-Year Plan fixes the Ukraine's 1950 area of cultivation at 30.5 million hectares seems to support this assumption.

Livestock

231 In 1941 the number of livestock in the Ukraine was estimated at 30.4 million, including 10.5 million cattle and 4.6 million horses.[1]

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1 Statement on March 20, 1946, by Mr. Baranovsky, Ukrainian delegate to the UNRRA Fourth Council Session, published in the "UNRRA Journal", March 21, 1946.

7

THE BRIDGE BETWEEN WEST AND EAST

101 The political boundary between Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia is not a clear-cut dividing line between two different worlds. There are a number of Ruthenian peasants in the eastern parts of Slovakia who form a gradual transition between the two neighbours. True, the Slovaks and the Ruthenians are two different Slav races. The Slovaks are closely related to the Moravians and Czechs in the West; the Ruthenians belong to the Russian family—mainly to its Ukrainian branch—although the thousand years of isolation from their kinsmen have had a specific effect on the character of the Ruthenian population on the southern slopes of the Carpathians. But there is a gradual link between the Slovaks and the Ruthenians, and Carpathian Ruthenia may aptly be described as a bridge between the Western and Eastern Slavs.

131 175 Geographically, too, the two neighbouring countries are similar. A chain of wooded mountains separates them from the kindred Slav populations to the North and North-East; while to the South both countries have stretches of fertile plain which run down unobstructed into the vast Danubian basin. That is the reason why both countries fell victim to Hungarian expansion early in their history and remained under Hungarian rule as second-rate provinces for a thousand years. Until the end of 1918, neither Slovakia nor Carpathian Ruthenia were on the map.

177 212 Both these countries suffered from the long alien domination which hampered their development. Slovakia was the more fortunate of the two because, in spite of her political separation from the independent lands of the Czech Crown, cultural and religious contacts with them had been maintained for centuries. But the Ruthenians received less support of this kind from their kindred beyond the Carpathians. As a result, Ruthenia was still more at the mercy of her Hungarian overlords and remained in a state of greater backwardness than her neighbour in the West. This is well illustrated by the degree of illiteracy in Ruthenia under the Hungarian regime which was, indeed, appalling; according to the last Hungarian census about three quarters of the Ruthenian population could not read or write.

177 181 Only people of considerable racial individuality could have resisted systematic denationalisation as the Ruthenians did. They may be a simple people; but their mode of living, their outlook and their character have an unmistakable stamp of their own.

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER 28

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

Capital, Kiev (Kiyev); area, 222,600, population, 40,500,000

SU 131 U 131

THE UKRAINIAN SSR, or Ukraine, is in second place among the union republics from the point of view of population and economic potentials. The Ukraine is situated in the southwestern portion of the East European lowland, on the shores of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, and extends westward beyond the Carpathian Mountains to the Tisza River.

GENERAL SURVEY

SU 133 U 133

THE PREDOMINANT LOWLAND CHARACTER of the region is interrupted here and there by some low elevations, such as the Donets ridge in the southeast, the Volyn'-Podolian plateau in the west, and the intervening Dnieper ridge. The Carpathians, with their foothills to the north, constitute the only mountainous section of the Ukraine. Five distinct physical regions can be distinguished: (1) the Poles'ye, a forested zone in the north; (2) the wooded steppe in the center; (3) the steppe proper in the south; (4) the Carpathian foothills in the west; and (5) the Carpathians and the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

The Poles'ye in the north and the northwest forms a southern extension of the extensive Poles'ye lowland which constitutes the basic relief form of the adjoining Belorussian SSR. It is a low sandy and forested expanse, distinguished by considerable swampiness (Pripet Marshes). The woods are a mixture of deciduous and evergreen types. Podsols and marshy ground constitute the principal soil forms. The Poles'ye is drained by the lower course of two principal affluents of the Dnieper: the Pripet (or Pripyat'), on the right, and the Desna, on the left.

The wooded steppe on the right bank of the Dnieper is formed by the Volyn'-Podolian plateau. This upland is highest in the northwest and slopes gradually toward the east and the southeast. It has crystalline rock formations covered by recent sediments (sand, clay, and limestone)

133 In the Carpathians, too, it is only the central area that was settled by the Ukrainian people; this is a rolling, hilly landscape, rising to some 7 000 ft. (Chornohora). The Carpathian foothills are fertile and thickly populated and rich in mineral wealth (petroleum in Boryslav and Jaslo, potassium and common salt in Kalush, brown coal).

b) Climate

● 132 The climate of Ukraine is moderate, a continental climate with big differences between summer and winter temperatures (s. table).

Table:

Area	Lat.	Longit.	Height (meters)	Temperature in Celsius				Rainfall (mm)
				av. Jan.		July	Diff.	
Lviv	49° 50	24° 21	298	7.6	-4.0	18.7	22.7	690
Kyiv	50° 27	30° 30	183	6.9	-6.0	19.3	23.3	590
Kharkiv	50° 00	36° 14	140	6.6	-7.8	20.4	28.2	507
Stalingrad	48° 42	44° 31	42	7.7	9.9	24.7	34.6	372

Compared with that of Russia, the climate of Ukraine is warmer and more favorable to the cultivation of the soil; compared with that of western countries, it is drier and much healthier.

Climatically, Ukraine falls into four provinces, viz.:

1. the province of boreal climate (cold in winter, moderately warm in summer) lies in the north and stretches to the line Chisinau — Poltava — Voroshylivhrad — Saratov. It is favorable for the growth of forest plants.

2. the province of the dry steppe climate (cold winters, hot summers, low rainfall) stretches farther south to the mountains. Rainfall is irregularly distributed and is often insufficient for tree growth. The grass steppe is characteristic of this province.

3. the province of alpine climate includes the Carpathians, the Yaila and Caucasus ranges. The most striking feature in the alpine climate is the drop in average temperature in inverse proportion to altitude and the higher rainfall.

4. the province of oceanic climate (southern coast of Crimea and that part of Sub-Caucasia that lies along the sea coast) has warm, rainy winters and hot, dry summers. 132

c) Rivers and Seas

The rivers of Ukraine are long and carry much water. They either flow to the Baltic (Syan, Veper, Buh and Narew and other tributaries of the Vistula), or to the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv (Danube with tributaries, Dnister, Buh, Dnipro, Don with Donets etc.). The fact that the main watershed runs through the plains faciliates the construction of a network of canals connecting the seas. The Dnipro (1405 miles long and draining an area of 199 230 sq. miles) is the largest river in Ukraine. Historical settlements lie on its banks and the Ukrainian state developed along its course. For the people of Ukraine it is a sacred river. 133 487

The Buh (497 miles long, draining an area of 24 450 sq. miles) flows into the Black Sea west of the Dnipro. It has not much water and is not navigable.

South-west Ukraine is drained by the Dnister (856 miles long, area of basin 29615 sq. m.). Its course is not regulated either and it is not navigable. The rivers Prut and Cheremosh connect Ukraine with the Danube, while the Don and the Donets form the channel to the Sea of Oziv; the Kuban river drains the Kuban plain.

The Black Sea (area 158 462 sq. miles) connected by the Kerch Strait with the Sea of Oziv (area 14 615 sq. miles) has always been the channel of commerce between the eastern world and the countries round the Mediterranean. Its most important harbors, Odessa, Sevastopil, and Novorossijske are blocked by ice for a short time only; the Sea of Oziv, on the other hand, is too shallow to be navigable.

d) Flora and Fauna

The commonest tree in the northern forest zone is the pine; the birch, the alder, the ash and other species also occur frequently. In the west we find beech and larch, and in the Carpathians the spruce and the fir, and sometimes even the cedar. 137

● 132 The many abysses and canyons are a disadvantage. As there are no trees and therefore few birds, there are very many insects. There are also other pests and disadvantages connected with the climate. Ukraine has a continental climate, but it is milder than in Russia. The average yearly temperature of 8.10° Celsius corresponds to that of Erfurt (8.3°). The difference between the warmest month (July) and the coldest (January) is bigger than in Erfurt (18.8°) and increases towards the east (Lviv 23.4°, Kyiv 25.3°, Kharkiv 28.8°); the period of vegetation decreases in the same direction (Erfurt 218 days, Lviv 211, Kyiv 203, Kharkiv 201). The lack of clouds is favorable to growth and the ripening process.

Apart from mountainous areas, there is a rainfall in the North-west of 600 mm, in Galicia 700 mm, a figure which decreases for the central steppe to 500 mm and in the south steppe to 400 mm. In a limited territory round the Sea of Oziv and the Black Sea it is as low as 300 mm, the minimum in USA for successful agriculture. 6 million ha of the steppe often suffer from drought and bad harvests. The most important tasks of agriculture in Ukraine are to combat drought and to intensify methods of cultivating the soil; irrigation schemes in connection with the power station on the Dnipro which would ensure irrigation of 1—2 million ha, have not yet been carried out.

3. Utilisation of Soil

311 Arable land in Ukraine amounts to 66 % of the entire area, in the steppe even to 80 %. In France, Italy, Germany and Roumania the proportion is 41—45 %, while the average for USSR including Ukraine is only 31 %. Only in Hungary and Denmark we find a situation similar to that in Ukraine, though on a much smaller scale. Ukraine must rank as the first agrarian state in Europe.

The proportion of forest land is correspondingly low (12 %), though in the mountains and Polesya it accounts for 35—38 %; in the steppe it sinks as low as 4 %. Even the European countries that are poorest in forests, such as Italy and France, have 16—19 % forest land; the most of them reach the double of the figure for Ukraine

Kharkov, in its scenery and social conditions, resembles rather the 311
neighbouring districts of the Government of Kursk, while in the 162
south-east it is already really part of New Russia.

Climatic conditions on the left bank are rather less favourable 132
than on the right bank of the Dniepr: there is a lighter rainfall which is not so evenly distributed; the winters are more severe and the region of Kharkov endures a distinctly 'continental' climate. Prince Shcherbatov, a former minister of the Imperial Government, writes that: 'One of the most important factors in agriculture is rainfall, which does not always occur under favourable conditions in the Ukraine. Most of the rain comes in summer and often takes the form of downpours which impede work in the fields and harvesting; and in the spring there is often not enough rain. Rainfall is better distributed on the right bank of the Dniepr than in other parts. The difficult climatic conditions in the Ukraine liken the average black earth harvests to average harvests in Central Europe on an average soil.'

During the nineteenth century conditions in left-bank Ukraine 311
tended to favour the growth of a prosperous class of small farmers who supplanted the big landowners of the period of Peter I and Catherine II. These conditions derived from the shortage of labour on big estates which followed the opening up of the New Russian territories and from the wave of speculation which induced landowners to sell out their properties on the left bank of the Dniepr in order to participate in 'the rush' for the new lands. Left-bank Ukraine became a country of large peasant farms covering 10, 20, 30 and as much as 50 hectares, while a number of smaller 'working' landowners retained estates up to 100, 150 and 200 hectares. Land was worth in these parts 500 rubles (about £50 sterling on the pre-war exchange) a hectare.

At the same time the growth of these large farms in the Governments of left-bank Ukraine combined with a natural increase in the population to create a serious problem of 'over-crowding'. In the eighteenth century a numerous class of peasantry had existed who did not own any land of their own at all, but who merely possessed cottages and vegetable gardens and the right to graze their stock on common pasture lands. Following the Emancipation of the Serfs in 566
1861, the number of landless peasants showed a rapid increase. The small parcels of land allotted to the liberated serfs were soon redistributed between the thrifty and the shiftless; and the division of large estates did not contribute to the establishment of agricultural industries which might have provided a living for the less fortunate. Already in the eighties symptoms of over-population were noticeable 000

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

●132 AS A RULE, THE CLIMAC CONDITIONS IN THE NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTS are much less favourable than in left-bank and especially right-bank Ukraine. They become worse going from west to east: the region of Odessa has the most equable climate and the shores of the Azov Sea the worst of all. In the east rainfall is insufficient, attaining in good years 50–40 cm. and in bad years not exceeding 20 cm., while in central and southern Ukraine it is 80 cm. and 40 cm. respectively. There is, furthermore, in the New Russian Governments an unbalanced distribution of rainfall: the country suffers from a shortage of rain in the spring when it is most needed, and from violent downpours in the summer. The climate of New Russia clearly inclines to aridity. In the old days the Black Sea steppes were covered for a short time in spring by a luxurious growth of high grass and wild flowers which disappeared in the following months. The steppe dries up completely during a period when the temperature reaches from 30° to 40° Centigrade and even the rain-storms of July and August cannot give new life to the parched ground.
241 Under such conditions field labour calls for special methods. The soil has to be ploughed deep, and great layers of earth have to be lifted—'the black fallow' which has not been dried out. The weak peasants' horses of the northern Ukraine are useless for such work. Ploughing in New Russia requires either two pairs of strong oxen or, better, mechanical traction. Before the last war, only wealthy landowners or agricultural colonies working on a co-operative basis could afford the latter method, which was introduced into New Russia as early as the end of the nineteenth century.

By force of circumstances farming in New Russia acquired quite a different character from that which had evolved in the historic countryside of old Ukraine: it even created a different landscape. 'Fruit-trees, especially cherry-trees, lend a charm to the Ukrainian landscape in the neighbourhood of Kiev and Poltava which recalls the rural landscapes of France. In New Russia, on the contrary, the lack of trees, the dryness of the climate, clouds of dust driven by the wind, lonely hamlets—all this goes to create an austere landscape which recalls rather the high plains of northern Castile. Only the endless cornfields with their undulating golden sea of wheat lend a
[361] lyric note to these flat unwooded spaces. Villages there are not picturesque and in agricultural colonies practical considerations take precedence over the desire to beautify the environment. The houses, however, are more modern, more spacious and better built. Thatched roofs have given place to tiles or sheet-iron' (Brégy and Obolensky).

Wheat forms the basis of the agricultural wealth of New Russia. Before the last war, wheat covered 25 per cent of all the farmed

133 always favoured the formation of national groups, distinct from one another, and of States of relatively restricted size more or less dependent on their neighbours. Their development fills the whole history of Central Europe and they are only menaced by the German drive.

If we proceed in a north-easterly direction into Eastern Galicia, to the old 'Red Russia,' to-day *Malopolska* ('Little Poland' or 'Poland Minor'), we enter imperceptibly into the plains as the mountains become, little by little, hills which in turn are slowly obliterated. The hilly country becomes flat. Only the rivers, winding in the plain, interrupt here and there the monotony of the landscape. Advancing more and more towards the east, we always see the same plain without anything which resembles a natural limit, a plain which extends for hundreds and thousands of miles. We notice nothing at the frontier which separates Polish Galicia from the plain of Southern Russia (the Soviet Ukraine), but we also do not notice anything, when going towards the north, between the Ukraine and Russia proper.

Here we can go towards the ocean in the north and meet but rarely some chains of hills whose height is seldom more than three hundred metres.

Beyond the Carpathians, in the Ukraine, we enter the great plain which stretches, with only one interruption, the Urals, to Eastern Siberia.

132 The climate, too, changes almost imperceptibly and becomes a little colder and more continental towards the north and the east. However, the shroud of snow which covers the soil remains intact during three to five months in the whole of this immense part of the Continent, except, perhaps, along the shore of the Black Sea, where the climate is a little softer and where winter snow is rarer.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Apart from the severer climate of the Carpathian summits, that of the whole Ukrainian territory is nearly the same and can be characterized by the average temperature at Kiev, which is almost in the centre of the Ukraine, and which is an average of 7·3 degrees C., with an average minimum of −4·5 degrees C. and an average maximum of 20 degrees C. 132

This solid carpet of snow and these frozen rivers during long months are unknown in Western Europe.

The length of uninterrupted winter increases as one advances towards the north and the east. But on the whole extent of the Russian plain the average temperature in January does not rise above −4 degrees C. Human existence has to adapt itself to this fact. All the civilizations which have developed on the Russian plain have necessarily been influenced by it.

This aspect of the winter already tells us that from a climatic point of view the Ukraine belongs to a world quite different from the West and is connected with the great Russian continent. In the summer torrid and endless heat, broken by rare thunderstorms, such as are unknown in the West, confirms this statement. This very high summer temperature is not typical of the Ukraine alone but of the whole of Russia.

Beyond the frontier of the 'Soviet Republic of the Ukraine,' in the direction of the Volga and the Caspian Sea, the periods of heat are so long and intense that vegetation, which is progressively poorer, becomes almost non-existent. We enter a zone of semi-desert. But again we do so almost without noticing it, as the change of flora takes place slowly and imperceptibly from the Carpathians to the Caspian Sea.

In the greater part of the Ukraine the heat and dryness are sufficiently pronounced to hinder the growth of trees, but nevertheless insufficiently so as to kill all vegetation. 137 132

the Dnieper, the Boug, and the Dniester, all flow from /133
north to south, to empty into the Black Sea.

The climate is similar on the whole territory, with an /132
average 'multi-annual' temperature slightly higher in the south and south-east, due to the great heat of the months of July and August in these parts, with the exception of a narrow border of the Black Sea, between Odessa and the isthmus of Perekop, where the winter and the autumn are very mild, which explains the presence in this region of such plants as cotton (a plant with a long period of growth) and trees so delicate as those of the peach.

On the whole territory of the Ukraine the month during which the average temperature is always the highest (20 degrees C.) is July, and that during which it is lowest (minus 4·5 degrees C.) is January.

The average rainfall varies between 25 and 80 centimetres per annum, with the dampest climate in the north-western part. Everywhere there is more rain during the summer.

This uniformity of the whole, which makes the task of geographical description an easy one, seems at first sight to make the division of the Ukrainian territory into different zones impossible, while giving each zone some original characteristics in the sphere of economic geography.

Nevertheless, when going deeper into an analysis of /131
the question, we establish a division of the Ukraine into two agro-climatic zones.

This separation is determined by climatic and agrarian factors. There are differences of rainfall, of the soil, and of flora.

The border of these two zones begins at the western frontier of the Ukraine, on the 48th degree latitude north, and rises in an almost straight line up to the

131 eastern frontier at the 50th degree latitude north, while cutting the territory into two almost equal parts.

132 In the northern zone (Zone 1) the rainfall is everywhere greater than 50 centimetres, while in the southern zone (Zone 2) it is less than 50 centimetres and varies between 25 and 50 centimetres.

134 The predominant soils of Zone 1 are poor *tchernozioms*, that is to say somewhat exhausted by the currents of water which have deprived them of their humus to a varying extent in different regions, and have brought to them some sand and clay from their sources.

On the contrary, the lands of Zone 2 are rich and complete *tchernozioms*.

137 Zone 1 comprises a vast forest region which, while spreading along the courses of the river becomes little by little a land of light woods, is yet characterized by the general presence of forests.

Zone 2 has no forests and is the true Steppe.

131 This separation is in practice nothing else but the frontier between the Steppe as such and the *lesso-steppe* (a Steppe with occasional woods)—a geographical term which has been accepted by Russian scientists for a long time.

This border is also that which defined the cradle of Russia, the ancient principality of Kiev, separating it from the savage Steppe of the nomads. Therefore, already at that distant epoch, the separation between these two agro-climatic zones existed in practice. Thus justified from a geographical point of view, the border between these two zones is all the more acceptable, as it is in tune with an historic reality since the establishment of settled populations.

000 Each time when we treat the question of populations in our study (the difference of density, of social distribution, and of ethnical composition), of agriculture

[See category 116, pp. 139–140. --- Analyst]

133 and then forms the frontier line between the Governments of Podolia and Kherson and the neighbouring province of Bessarabia. It receives no very important tributaries in the Ukraine, though there is a fair number of smaller ones. Navigation is interrupted by the [502] Yampol rapids. For ordinary river craft an artificial canal affords a passage here, but steamboats cannot pass upstream. The depth of the water has lately been increased by a more scientific system of regulation.

The *Bug* rises in Russian Poland and reaches the Ukraine near Vlodava, to the north-west of Volhynia. It forms for some distance the boundary between the Ukraine and Russian Poland, and then flows through Austrian Galicia into the Ukraine at Volochysk. Its winding course follows a south-easterly direction, entering the Black Sea by a *liman*.

The chief tributaries of the Bug within the Ukraine provinces are, on the right bank, the Kedyma and the Chichekleya; and on the left bank the Ingul.

The *Donets* rises in the Government of Kursk, and enters the Ukraine to the north of Kharkov. It then flows to the south-east, leaving the Ukraine at the extreme north-eastern corner of Yekaterinoslav.

(3) Climate

132 Climatic statistics should generally be regarded as approximate.

The following recent figures are available for the South-west Territory—Tarnopol, although actually in Galicia, being taken as typical of the south-west of Volhynia, Berdichev of the south-east of Volhynia and the central part of the Government of Kiev, and Volkovints and Kamenets Podolsk of the Government of Podolia:

	Average Temperature (Fahrenheit).		
	January.	*July.*	*Year.*
Tarnopol . . .	22·5°	66·0°	44·1°
Berdichev . . .	22·3°	65·5°	45·0°
Volkovints . . .	20·5°	65·9°	44·4°
Kamenets Podolsk .	26·1°	68·5°	47·5°

The climate of Volhynia is more moderate than many eastern parts of Russia in the same latitude. Relatively mild winters are so common that the winter crops remain entire, and the climate is very beneficial for agriculture. Spring comes early (March), summer (at the end of May) is cool, autumn lasts long, and settled winter only begins in December. There are few droughts or periods of excessively wet weather. 132

The average annual rainfall in Volhynia varies from 20 to 24 in., in Podolia from 15 to 24 in., and is 20 in. in the Government of Kiev. July is the rainiest month, and after that June, May, and sometimes March.

The following are recent climatic statistics for Little Russia:

	Average Temperature (Fahrenheit).		
	January.	*July.*	*Year.*
Chernigov . . .	20·9°	68·0°	44·8°
Poltava	19·4°	70·3°	45·7°
Starobyelsk . . .	18·7°	73·6°	46·0°
Kharkov . . .	18·7°	70·7°	45·1°

The climate of Little Russia is closely connected with that of Central Russia, with its conflict between east and west winds. Winter tends to be long, though not so severe as in Central Russia, with frequent thaws, which sometimes greatly damage the winter wheat. The arrival of spring is apt to be uncertain, and is sometimes accompanied by a return of cold weather. Summer is moderately warm, and in the south-east sometimes hot. Autumn, with east winds, is remarkably dry.

The annual rainfall is inadequate, averaging 22 in. in the Government of Chernigov and 20 in. in that of Poltava, and varying between 21 in. in the west and 16 in. in the east and south-east of that of Kharkov. Droughts are common in the latter Government.

The climate of Odessa may be taken as more or less typical of New Russia, the mean temperature in January being 25·3°, in July 72·7°, and that for the whole year

132 49·3°. Drawbacks for agriculture in New Russia are the prevalence of north and east winds and an irregular and insufficient rainfall. The average rainfall at Yelisavetgrad is 17 in., at Odessa 16 in., at Lugansk 15 in., and at Nikolaev 14 in. The rains in April and May decide the harvest. June is the rainiest month, but from May to September there are droughts. Most places are largely dependent upon wells and ponds constructed in the ravines, which are frequent on the steppes.

The climate of the Ukraine, as a whole, is therefore continental, i. e. the variation between summer and winter temperatures is very great. Sudden variations of temperature are frequent. The rainfall is by no means abundant, and there is a progressive decline towards the south and south-east. The fact, however, that the bulk of the rainfall occurs in the summer favours agricultural operations, even where the annual amount of rainfall is comparatively low. It is only in New Russia that the country suffers seriously from drought.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

312 364 The Ukraine is very backward in regard to sanitary conditions. Less than half the towns have a satisfactory water-supply, and a very small percentage of them a regular drainage system.

164 758 Typhoid, diphtheria, and malaria are very prevalent. To the great majority of the people in the country, doctors are inaccessible, and even in the towns good hospitals and adequate medical attendance are very rare. In the matter of cleanliness, however, the Little Russians compare favourably with the Great Russians. 515

(5) Race and Language

Race

162 563 The population of the Ukraine is composed of a mixture of various races and nationalities, those chiefly represented being Little Russians, Poles, Jews,

161 Caucasian foreland. (7) This corresponds roughly

7. Kubyietych: The Distribution of Population in the Ukraine, page 11.

to the density of population in the Balkan countries.

133 The geographers have investigated the surface of the Ukrainian provinces and found that only 1.5% of the entire surface is more than 1000 meters high, barely 3.5% over 500 meters and 68.5% between 100 and 300 meters. Scarcely 1% of the Ukrainian population live in actual mountains, and surely more than half of all Ukrainians have never seen any mountains. (8)

8. Kubyievych: The Geography of the Ukrainian and the Bordering Areas, page 65.

•132 For decades scholars studied the climate, measured precipitation, heat and cold, and did not forget to check from what direction the wind blows. When they had made sufficient investigations, they established the fact that the Ukraine has an "oak climate", specifically in the damp, moderately cold northern and central Ukraine. Adjacent to this in the south is the "dry climate" zone with little precipitation, where there is less rain the farther southeast one goes. Moreover, geographers feel that it is significant that the Ukraine, along with the Carpathians, the Yaila Mountains in the Crimea, and the Caucasus have a mountain climate and that the southern shore of the Crimean Peninsula and the eastern coast of the Black Sea have a Mediterranean climate. Whereas the Ukrainians of the north would gladly renounce some of the 600 millimeters and more of precipitation which annually flood their fields, those of the south call upon God and all the spirits to send them a little more than their 200 millimeters of rain. But it need

132 not be one of those terrible thunderstorms which
/15/ hover threateningly over the villages for half a day at a time, sending down ghastly lightning or cloudbursts which wash away the humus. Nor should the moisture be accompanied by one of those icy snowstorms in which man and animal, shepherds and herds numbering in the thousands easily come to grief if they are caught by the impenetrable swirl of flakes on the open field.

133 The geographers who like to divide up the earth into zones studied Ukrainian soil with regard to its flora and found that north Ukraine down to Kiyev belongs to the region of north European forests where, besides oak, alder and birch, the spruce flourishes. In the south and southeast the dense forests open up into park landscapes and forest glades. The farther south one goes, the more scarce and sparse the islands of mighty oaks, lindens and elms become. This is the region of the wooded steppe which finally passes over into
134 the open, almost treeless grassy steppe. Seventy million hectares of Ukrainian soil is fertile black earth. It has erroneously been considered inexhaustible. Even though today the soil does not yet tolerate any artificial fertilizer, scholars are already racking their brains over the sad prospect that the natural fertility of black loam, the ideal of all farmers the world over, will be exhausted in about 50 years. Already at the time of the last czar, model farms and experimental stations sought ways and means to meet this danger.

*

000 Come along, comrade, and wander to the east toward the rising sun, into the land which at its greatest expanse is as long as the distance from Barcelona to Memel and as wide as the realm between the Brenner Pass and Kiel. Climb up from the merrily babbling Poprad through beech forests,

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RDL

the east to the Carpathians in the west. They are drained by the Dniester River and its affluents, which flow in narrow, convoluted river valleys through picturesque wooded depressions. The watersheds, devoid of forests, constitute the basic cultivated areas; they are under wheat, corn, and tobacco. Black earth prevails in all these lowland sections of the Ukraine.

The Carpathians extend through the Ukrainian SSR over a distance of about 150 miles. They constitute a number of ranges, rising gradually toward the southeast, where they reach an elevation of more than 6,600 feet, with passes at points up to 3,000 feet above sea-level. The least accessible section of the mountains lies in Northern Bukovina (Chernovtsy Oblast). The Ukrainian Carpathians form a part of the wooded section of the mountain range. They are covered with deciduous trees on the lower slopes and with evergreens in the upper reaches. The chief rock formations are sandstone and schists with occasional volcanic intrusives. Above 5,000 feet, mountain meadow pastures prevail. There is no permanent snow cover. Isolated snow fields remain until June and reappear in September. Considerable rainfall (40 to 60 inches a year) feeds such important rivers as the Tisza, which flows southwestward, the Dniester, and the Prut, which descend the eastern slopes. In general, the Carpathians are easily accessible and are crossed by highways and rail lines.

The Transcarpathian Ukraine (until 1945 part of Czechoslovakia) lies on the southern slopes of the Carpathians and extends onto the Hungarian lowland, where it is bounded by the Tisza River in the south.

The Dnieper is the most important Ukrainian river. It rises in Smolensk Oblast, outside the Ukrainian SSR. Below Kiev it forms many islands and braided branches in its course. Until the construction of the Dnieper hydroelectric station (*Dneproges*), the rapids in the vicinity of Zaporozh'ye interfered with continuous navigation. Since the completion of the dam and the flooding of the rapids above the dam, the entire river has become navigable. The other important rivers of the Ukraine, the Dniester, the Southern Bug, and the Northern Donets (an affluent of the Don), are all less suitable for navigation.

Compared with the other regions of the European part of the USSR, the Ukraine has a rather temperate climate, although colder and more continental in the eastern part. Thaws occur frequently during the winter, summers are hot, especially in the south, while autumn is dry and continuously clear. Spring arrives early in the west and, together with

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RDL

a long, warm autumn, provides excellent conditions for the development of agriculture. Average January temperatures vary from 27° F in the southwest to 14° F in the east, and July averages from 68° F in the north to 73° F in the south. The northern section of the Ukraine receives adequate rainfall (about 20 inches a year), but the south is much drier, having an average yearly rainfall of 9 inches. Most of the precipitation occurs in the first half of the year. During the summer, frequent violent rainstorms occur in the eastern sections.

The greater portion of the Ukraine lies in the wooded steppe and steppe zones, where black earth prevails. In the northern section, which lies in the forested zone, grassy marshes occur in abundance. In the wooded steppe zone the forest reserves have largely been depleted. Broad-leaved types, such as oak, maple, ash, and elm, occur only along the rivers and extend in green ribbons through gullies and ravines up to the watersheds. Characteristic local vegetation types are the dense growths of alder, willow, and poplar which border the inundated banks of the rivers and the many ox-bows and lakes which remain after the spring floods. The steppes on the watersheds have long been converted into rich wheat fields, a typical feature of the Ukrainian landscape.

Among the mineral resources which abound in the Ukrainian SSR, the primary raw materials for heavy metallurgy are most important. Scarcely anywhere else in the USSR are coal, iron, and manganese found within such proximity of each other as in the eastern Ukraine. The Donets Basin, or Donbas, with reserves of more than 90 billion tons, is the principal coal producer of the USSR. The Krivoy Rog iron mines produce iron ore of a high quality and metal content. Between these two sites are the rich manganese deposits in the area of Nikopol'. In the Donbas are extensive salt and mercury deposits. Petroleum fields lie in the foothills of the Carpathians, where salt, potash, and natural gas are also found. Another petroleum site is in the area of Romny (Sumy Oblast). The northern, marshy section of the Ukraine—Poles'ye—abounds in peat. Other minerals include polymetallic ores (Donets Basin), phosphorites, kaolin, limestone, marl, gypsum, and so forth.

The Ukraine is the most densely inhabited union republic of the USSR. Its 40 million inhabitants represent about one fifth of the total population of the USSR. The average population density is 180 per square mile; however, there is considerable variation throughout the region. The greatest concentration exists in the western Ukraine, along the foot of the Carpathians, where the density reaches 340 to 390 per square

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

The Ukrainian Territory

I

1. Geographical Relations

a) Its place in Europe

The frontiers of Ukraine coincide with the boundaries of the /131 area settled by the Ukrainian people. This area stretches from the Upper Tisa, the Danube, the Black Sea and the Caucasus to the woods and marshes of Polesya, from the Poprad, the Syan, the Vepr and the Pilitsa rivers (affluents of the Vistula) to the valleys of the Caucasus and the broad waters of the Don; further east numerous Ukrainian settlements lie on the way to Siberia and the Pacific.

Ukraine is the bridge between Eastern Europe and the /133 Mediterranean countries. Its tectonic structure is determined by the Ukraine gneiss and the chains of the Carpathians, the Yaila mountains and the Caucasus (young fold system). Recent shiftings of the surface have lent a more varied shape to this landscape than to any other in Eastern Europe. The glaciers of the Ice Age covered only a small part of what we call Ukraine to-day, with the result, however, that most of the country was covered with a thick crust of loess, the origin of the fertile Black Earth. Climate and flora are distinctly different from those of adjoining countries but, in spite of this, Ukraine does not possess any marked natural frontiers. The Black Sea and the Caucasus alone may be regarded as such and in the north, the boundary is partly given by the marshes of Polesya. The history of Ukraine has been in part determined by its lack of frontiers protected by Nature.

b) Frontiers

The Ukrainian territory lies between 43° and 53°N and 21° /131 and 45°E on the way to Asia, the continent of steppes and deserts. In consequence of their position, the frontiers of Ukraine have often been subject to alterations; the limits of the settled area often overlap neighboring areas and are, indeed, often so blurred that no sharp boundaries can be drawn, especially

131 pendence in the years 1917—1920, Ukraine was distributed among the following countries:

162
175

Ukraine Territory	Area	Population on 1. 1. 1939 (in millions)
to USSR	216 846 sq.m.	37.3
to Poland	46 932 sq.m.	9.7
to Roumania	6 769 sq.m.	1.4
to Czechoslovakia	5 730 sq.m.	0.8

A separate Ukraine Soviet Republic was formed within the USSR (170 423 sqm. with 31.9 million inhabitants). The remaining Ukraine districts in Soviet Russia belonged to the RSFSR, and a tiny piece of Polesya to the Republic of Whi e Ruthenia. At the end of World War II almost the whole Ukrainian territory fell to the Soviet Union. 20 000 km² with more t! an a million inhabitants belongs to Poland, 5 000 km² with 100 00. inhabitants to Slovakia and small minorities to Roumania.

Soviet Ukraine embraces about 261 538 sq.m. with 43 million inhabitants. —

2. Natural Conditions in Ukraine

a) Landscape of Ukraine

● 133 Ukraine consists of vast plains and plateaus which seldom rise as high as 1000 ft. above sea-level. The monotony of the Ukrainian landscape is akin to that of neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. One can travel for hundreds of miles through a landscape that never changes, for the plateaus differ little from the plains, the transition from the one physical configuration to the other being scarcely perceptible. In the south, the scene is varied by mountains, but these constitute but 1/10 of the entire area of Ukraine.

Passing from south to north, we can distinguish 5 different forms of landscape.

In the south the southern low plain stretches along and includes the plains at the foot of the Carpathian mountains with the valley of the Vistula, the Syan and the Dnister, the Black Sea depression and the plain surrounding the lowlands of

the Don, touching the valley of the Kuban and the shore of 133 ● the Caspian Sea.

This is followed by the zone of plateaus: the plateau between Lviv and Tomashev, Podolia, the Kholm-Volynia plateau, the Pokutia-Bessarabia plateau, the Dnipro plateau, and the Oziv-Donets plateau.

This zone of plateaus is bounded on the north by a strip of the northern plain. It embraces Podlakhia, Polesya and the district of Chernyhiv.

This zone unites with the plain on the left bank of the Dnipro in its middle course which merges on the eastern boundary with the plain on the left bank of the Donets.

Only the southern slope of the isolated plateau of Central Russia belongs to Ukraine.

From the point of view of geology, the oldest area is the so-called Ukrainian Crystal Plateau, consisting of the Dnipro and the Oziv plateaus and the eastern part of Volynia. Water and weathering influences have destroyed this ancient mountain ridge. Early in the Tertiary period it was flooded by the sea, covered with sands and loams and then, during the Ice Age, with a thick crust of loess.

In the Carbon period of the Paleozoic era the seams in the Donets Basin were formed. They seemed to turn north-west under the Dnipro Plain, for coal has also been found at Poltava.

The plain on the left bank of the Dnipro was formed by the depression between the Ukrainian Crystal Plateau and the Russian Central Plateau; this took place in the Jurassic period of the Mesozoic formation. The Carpathians, the Yaila mountains and the Caucasus belong to the Tertiary period.

No mountain-forming agents influenced other parts of Ukraine. The horizontal deposits in these areas are called „Black Sea Plateau".

Diluvial glaciers reached a line running over Sambir — Lviv — Lutsk — Zhytomyr — Kremenchuk — Hadiach — Briansk.

133 When the glaciers receded, sands, loams, moranes and numerous lakes were left. The wind blew tiny particles of loam (loess) out of the masses of sand and they gradually covered the entire central strip of the plateau and of the southern plain. This loess soil of Central and Southern Ukraine, the famous Black Earth, is the best type of soil in Europe. It covers about 70 million hectares (about 200 million acres) and makes Ukraine the granary of Europe.

The northern areas which retained sand and flint silted up and became marshes.

As a result of the emergence of the Ukrainian ridge and the plateau and of the depression of Polesya and the Black Sea Plain, the work of the rivers was sped up in the uplands and retarded in the plains. The river beds became deeper and deeper and formed the ravines (jary) which are characteristic of the Ukraine.

The landscape of Polesya has changed least of all. Extensive fens, marshy meadows and forests, from which a solid island occasionally emerges (all that is left of an old moraine or sand-dune) flank the sluggish waters of the Prypyat and its tributaries. In spring and after rains the banks are flooded and Polesya becomes one wide lake with trees and huts showing above the surface. What agrarian land exists is bad, and the population poor. Podlakhia is drier and richer in forests; the virgin forest of Bielovjesh with its herds of bison is well-known. The district round Chernyhiv is also higher and therefore more densely populated. The zone of the plateaus, especially Podolia, offer the eye a very different scene. It is a landscape of ravines, the largest and finest of which is that cut by the Dnister. The table-lands of Podolia slope gently towards the south and the plateau of Kholm and Volynia. Its „mountain ridge" is the Towtry chain formed of old coral reefs.

The Pokutia-Bessarabian plateau has a structure similar to Podolia. The plateau on the right bank of the Dnipro falls down abruptly 300 ft. to the river-bed, providing a jagged, mountainous horizon. The right bank tributaries have rocky channels and their courses are marked by frequent rapids

(porohy). The most famous of these is between Dnipropetrovske and Zaporizha; they are regulated to-day and no longer an obstacle to navigation. 133

The lowlands on the left bank form a sandy plain that rises in terraces to the Central Russian Plateau. It is steppe, bare of trees and rich in loess and is therefore fertile and densely populated.

On the Donets Plateau at the bend of the Donets river big industrial towns have sprung up in the last centuries, thus completely altering the appearance of the old steppes.

The characteristic features of the Black Sea Plain are the sluggish rivers that flow between banks overgrown with reeds; where they enter the sea, they form so called "Lymany", i. e. flooded valley bottoms which are separated from the sea by a strip of land broken at more than one point. In northern Crimea we are struck by the numerous salt lakes from which salt is extracted. The Kuban plain is distinguished by its fertility and mild climate; the Caspian plain, on the other hand, is a dry steppe merging into a sandy, salty desert blown over by all the winds of heaven.

On the coast of the Black Sea which falls away in low rocks we find again the flat sandbanks of the Adriatic character (the Lido). Such a sandbank, the Arabat, on the Oziv coast separates the Sea of Oziv from the "Lazy Sea".

The southern coast of the Crimea and the Caucasus, on the other hand, is steep and provides good harbors, as the sea is deep here (e. g. Sevastopil, Novorossijske etc).

The surface of the Crimean mountains which reach a height of 3800 ft. in Roman Kosh, is eroded. On the tops there are alpine pasturages (Jajla); on the north the wooded slopes fall gently, while on the south they descend abruptly to the sea.

The Caucasus has all the characteristics of a high mountain range; the lower heights are covered with virgin forest, the massed peaks in the centre rise far above snow-line (7500 — 10 000 ft.) reaching the highest point in the giant Elbrus (ca. 17 000 ft.).

● 133 In the Carpathians, too, it is only the central area that was settled by the Ukrainian people; this is a rolling, hilly landscape, rising to some 7 000 ft. (Chornohora). The Carpathian foothills are fertile and thickly populated and rich in mineral wealth (petroleum in Boryslav and Jaslo, potassium and common salt in Kalush, brown coal).

b) Climate

132 The climate of Ukraine is moderate, a continental climate with big differences between summer and winter temperatures (s. table).

Table:

Area	Lat.	Longit.	Height (meters)	Temperature in Celsius				Rainfall (mm)
				av. Jan.		July	Diff.	
Lviv	49° 50	24° 21	298	7.6	-4.0	18.7	22.7	690
Kyiv	50° 27	30° 30	183	6.9	-6.0	19.3	23.3	590
Kharkiv	50° 00	36° 14	140	6.6	-7.8	20.4	28.2	507
Stalingrad	48° 42	44° 31	42	7.7	9.9	24.7	34.6	372

Compared with that of Russia, the climate of Ukraine is warmer and more favorable to the cultivation of the soil; compared with that of western countries, it is drier and much healthier.

Climatically, Ukraine falls into four provinces, viz.:

1. the province of boreal climate (cold in winter, moderately warm in summer) lies in the north and stretches to the line Chisinau — Poltava — Voroshylivhrad — Saratov. It is favorable for the growth of forest plants.

2. the province of the dry steppe climate (cold winters, hot summers. low rainfall) stretches farther south to the mountains. Rainfall is irregularly distributed and is often insufficient for tree growth. The grass steppe is characteristic of this province.

3. the province of alpine climate includes the Carpathians, the Yaila and Caucasus ranges. The most striking feature in the alpine climate is the drop in average temperature in inverse proportion to altitude and the higher rainfall.

4. the province of oceanic climate (southern coast of Crimea and that part of Sub-Caucasia that lies along the sea coast) has warm, rainy winters and hot, dry summers. 132

c) Rivers and Seas

The rivers of Ukraine are long and carry much water. They either flow to the Baltic (Syan, Veper, Buh and Narew and other tributaries of the Vistula), or to the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv (Danube with tributaries, Dnister, Buh, Dnipro, Don with Donets etc.). The fact that the main watershed runs through the plains faciliates the construction of a network of canals connecting the seas. The Dnipro (1405 miles long and draining an area of 199 230 sq. miles) is the largest river in Ukraine. Historical settlements lie on its banks and the Ukrainian state developed along its course. For the people of Ukraine it is a sacred river. 133 487

The Buh (497 miles long, draining an area of 24 450 sq. miles) flows into the Black Sea west of the Dnipro. It has not much water and is not navigable.

South-west Ukraine is drained by the Dnister (856 miles long, area of basin 29615 sq. m.). Its course is not regulated either and it is not navigable. The rivers Prut and Cheremosh connect Ukraine with the Danube, while the Don and the Donets form the channel to the Sea of Oziv; the Kuban river drains the Kuban plain.

The Black Sea (area 158 462 sq. miles) connected by the Kerch Strait with the Sea of Oziv (area 14 615 sq. miles) has always been the channel of commerce between the eastern world and the countries round the Mediterranean. Its most important harbors, Odessa, Sevastopil, and Novorossijske are blocked by ice for a short time only; the Sea of Oziv, on the other hand, is too shallow to be navigable.

d) Flora and Fauna

The commonest tree in the northern forest zone is the pine; the birch, the alder, the ash and other species also occur frequently. In the west we find beech and larch, and in the Carpathians the spruce and the fir, and sometimes even the cedar. 137

491 roads were superior in quality to those in Galicia and the network was denser. The total length of highways in Ukraine was approximately 24 000 km. There was little motor traffic: there was more in Carpatho-Ukraine but in 1937 there were in Ukraine only 13 cars per 10 000 inhabitants (in France 492, England 431, Germany 183).

4. Inland Waterways

● 133 As regards length and the area of their basins, the rivers of
487 Ukraine are among the largest in Europe, but their navigability suffers from frequent windings, shallows and rapids. In summer variations in the water level are a great disadvantage, while in winter the rivers are frozen for 3—4 months. As the rivers melt from the mouth, there is no danger from ice-floes. 90 % of the rivers flow into the Black Sea, some into the Vistula and two insignificant streams into the Caspian Sea. The Dnipro and some of its tributaries are navigable as are also 4 other rivers:

The Dnipro is 2 248 km long and drains an area of 518 500 square kilometers, so that it is the third biggest river in Europe. By the dam it has been made navigable for 1 250 kilometers. Its tributaries, the Pripyat, the Desna and the Seym are also navigable. The total length of the Dnipro navigable network is 3250 kilometers, while 4 300 km of waterways can be used for shipping and floating rafts, i. e. more than $^2/_3$ of the total waterways in Ukraine (6 200 km).

505 Freight traffic on the Dnipro did not reach the pre-war level of 2.7 million t till 1932 and had increased by 1935 to 3.9 million t. Passenger traffic doubled in those years and amounted to 4.8 millions. $^1/_3$ of the goods transported was wood, and $^1/_4$ mineral building materials, more than $^1/_8$ grain, while coal, ore and metal were poorly represented. The important harbor towns on the Dnipro are Kyiv, Dnipropetrivske, Nishnodniprovske and Kherson.

The Dnister (1 372 km long, draining an area of 77 000 sq. km) has been prevented by geological and political conditions from developing any great shipping. Upper reaches and lower belong to two absolutely different political systems. Before the

505 First World War grain, wood, gypsum and building stone (250 000 t) were transported on the river, while later only wood was shipped on the upper reaches.

133 487 505 The Kuban (800 km long, with a basin of about 60 000 sq.km) has its source in Caucasian glaciers and is navigable all the year round for a stretch of 350 km. It is true that gravel and sandbanks make shipping difficult. In 1935 230 000 t of freight were shipped down the river. The Boh (709 km long, with a basin of 64 000 sq.km) has little water and many rapids. 100 km are navigable, but traffic is negligible. Of the Don (1984 km long, with a basin of 425 000 sq.km) which is the fourth biggest river in Europe, only the navigable lower reaches belong to Ukraine. Goods transported are above all grain, coal, salt-254 000 t in 1935. Conveyance of passengers is negligible.

Its right tributary, the Donets (1 020 km, with a basin of 99 000 km) crosses the Donets Basin and is navigable for a stretch of 350 km. The Buh, Vepr and Syan, Prut, Seret and Tysa are only important for floating down logs.

503 The condition of the Ukrainian waterways is not imposing, though Ukraine comes fourth in Europe with its 6 200 km of navigable rivers. There is no thorough system of regulating the rivers or building canals to connect them, though this has been planned for decades. There are only 200 km of canals. The following artificial systems of communication by water have been planned:

a) reconstruction of the Viking way and the linking up of Leningrad, Kyiv and Kherson (2 canals each 30 km long);

b) a connection between Riga and Kherson, in place of the antiquated route via the Beresina which has existed since 1805;

c) development of the now inadequate route (Oginski-Canal etc. 343 km) between the Dnipro or the Pripyat, Pina and Jasiolda and — via the Shara — the Memel linking Kherson with Königsberg;

d) (Royal canal etc. 233 km) between the Pina and — via the Mukhovets — the Buh and the Vistula, connecting Kherson with Danzig;

e) the construction of a canal from the Dnipro, via the Desna and the Bolva (30 km) to the Zizdra and Oka, and so to Moscow and the Volga; 503

f) a canal between the Dnipro and the Donets, via Samara and Vovcha;

g) a connection between Danzig and the Black Sea via the Vistula and the Syan, linking up with the Dnister and perhaps the Prut;

h) a canal between the Caspian and the Black Sea, via the valley of the Manych, a tributary of the Don and the Sea of Oziv.

5. Sea Traffic

The position of Ukraine like a fan, spreading out from the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv is particularly favorable for the export of mass products, while the coast of the Black Sea has not many natural harbors. Ports can, however, be built in the limans of the river-mouths. The coast of the Sea of Oziv is definitely unfavorable. It is only recently that harbor equipment has been mechanised and the harbors themselves improved. 133 504

Odessa is the third largest harbor in Russia, coming after Riga and Leningrad and lying in a bay 30 km north-east of the Dnister liman which is too shallow for shipping. The harbor is well constructed and freezes only for 2—3 weeks, which is easy to manage. Odessa is the only port in Ukraine where exports practically balance imports (in 1913: 2113 and 2061 t. average for 1930—1934: 1234 and 1550 thousand t). These figures refer to the total turn-over, in which figures for coastal trade exceed those for actual exports. In the former the import figures were higher and in the latter the export figures. 505

In Odessa grain forms the biggest part of the freight which also includes sugar, wood, methylated spirits and oil-cake. The imports are groceries, fruit, textile raw materials, chemicals etc. The town had become an important financial center with a stock exchange.

Mykolaiv on the liman of the Boh has a well built harbor with good connections with the hinterland. Grain and ore from 504

p 130

VI. FROM UNDERGROUND TO RESISTANCE

133 For groups carrying on open resistance to an occupying power, the Ukraine as a whole is a highly inhospitable region; throughout most of its extent it is an open plain without natural places of concealment. Aside from the mountainous areas of the Carpathians in Galicia, the Carpatho-Ukraine, and Bukovina, which remained for a long time outside the scope of open resistance activities, sheltered retreats for bands of any considerable size are difficult to find. They are limited almost entirely to the belt of woods and swamp on the northern border. Originally, forest vegetation prevailed north of a line reaching from a point on the Polish border not far to the southwest of Kremenets almost due east, through Zhitomir and Kiev, to the boundary of the Ukraine and the Russian Soviet Republic some fifty miles northwest of [311] Sumy.[1] In the course of the centuries, a large part of this region has been cleared for cultivation; the presence of numerous swampy areas prevented all the forest from being cut down, however, so that there are frequent wooded areas, which become more common and less separated by open spaces the farther north one goes. In the Ukraine, as it was administratively defined prior to 1941, this wooded strip rarely exceeds one hundred miles in width, although it is almost four hundred miles long. The Reichskommissariat Ukraine, however, included an additional strip annexed from Belorussia, averaging about forty miles in width, and containing still more impenetrable swamps than the more southerly wooded area. Of the forested region, the southern part, which has been partly cleared, is valuable agriculturally and is thickly settled; it forms an integral part of the

[1] Cf. *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznastva* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 106.

historic Ukrainian lands of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov. The 133
northern part, appropriately known as Polessia, or the "forest [313]
land," is of little value for crop growing but contains the only timber industry of significance in the Ukraine.

As the German armies rolled into the Ukraine in 1941, they 727
tended to advance along the main lines of communication, avoid- 725
ing the difficult, swampy regions. For weeks, or in some cases 668*
even months, the less accessible areas were not brought under German control. This circumstance made possible the development of partisan bands which carried on resistance to the occupation authority.

Although, since 1945, Soviet writers have maintained that the 725
plans for guerrilla warfare against the conqueror had been 665
secretly prepared before the outbreak of hostilities, they assert 669
that these plans were known only to the top level of Communist Party officials. It is fairly certain that the order to develop a partisan movement came as a surprise even to most devoted Communists.[2] In July, 1941, after the decision to form partisan detachments was announced, preparations were pushed forward at a rapid rate by the local authorities. The rapidity of the German advance to the line of the Dnieper, however, rendered largely ineffective systematic attempts to form a partisan movement in the Ukraine west of that river. Even east of the Dnieper the panic produced by the seemingly irresistible German drive played havoc with the organization of guerrilla warfare. Many of the secretly selected leaders were swept along, willingly or unwillingly, in the retreat of the Red Army, while others were discovered and executed by the Germans. In a few places, however, small groups made good their escape to forest or swamp hide-outs. In the southern Ukraine one such group of about five hundred men, trained and directed by the Red Army, but largely composed of local Communist and NKVD officials, established a center of opposition in the swamps formed by the Dnieper south of Nikopol' (Nikopil').[3] This group was destroyed by the German forces in

[2] Oleksii Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet* (The Underground *Oblast* Committee in Action), literary editor Evg. Bosniatskii (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950), pp. 12–14.

[3] Report of Feldpolizeidirektor at 444. Sicherungsdivision, November 5, 1941, NOKW 1519 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 1519).

[of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine -- Analyst]

previously described.[3] Under the conditions of German repression 668*
the nationalist parties could not afford to devote their limited strength to maintaining the initial advantage gained in these comparatively unimportant areas. By 1943, under the impact of rapidly growing Soviet partisan operations, nationalist activity seems to have ceased in Polessia west of the Dnieper.

South of Polessia runs a broad band of territory which falls into 133
the natural vegetation region of the wooded steppe, i.e., a region of mixed prairie and woods. In contrast to the rather poor gray soil of most of Polessia, it is a land well suited for intensive agriculture, and as a result has supported for centuries the densest agricultural population of the East Ukraine.

As in the case of Polessia, the principal dividing line within the 631
wooded steppe region is the Dnieper River. The area west of the river forms the heart of what have been known in Ukrainian history as the "Right Bank" lands. Kiev and the surrounding district had been acquired by the Russian tsar in the eighteenth century, but most of the area west of the Dnieper remained under Polish rule until 1792. The section closest to the river had had a considerable share in the Cossack tradition, but the more westerly sections, which were included in the historic provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, were deeply affected by the independent Cossack movement only during the height of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's career. This meant that serfdom had a longer and more [566]
oppressive history there than in the regions to the south and the east. While the peasants were thoroughly Ukrainian in language [563]
and customs, the cities included many Poles and Russians and an especially high percentage of Jews, who comprised from one third to one half of the urban population. This concentration of Jews, too, was a result of the historical background of the region; Poland had tolerated them, while the tsars had forbidden them to leave the Pale formed by the lands acquired in 1793 and later.[4]

Since the "Right Bank" was immediately contiguous to the 668*
nationalist bases in the West Ukraine, it was natural that the na-

[3] See Chapter V.

[4] Actually, the Pale included all the Ukraine in the nineteenth century, but Jews were less numerous on the "Left Bank."

German authorities; in a few other places, including the important towns of Lubny and Akhtyrka (Okhtyrka), editors continued their endeavors to stimulate national feeling.[29] Remarkably, the editor in the former town was a Russian who, after his pro-Ukrainian work brought him to the verge of arrest, was able to secure a new post as editor of a Russian-language paper in the Kursk *oblast*.[30] Most active of all this group, however, was the young editor of the Mirgorod paper, Michael Voskobiinyk, who pursued a line independent of the Nationalists yet modeled on the work of the *Nova Ukraïna* group.[31]

In general, nationalism in the "Left Bank" region under German occupation can be said to have been characterized by more influence of locally led and organized ecclesiastical and political bodies than the area to the west of the Dnieper. Moreover, it was marked by somewhat less friction between the Ukrainian and Russian elements and a willingness of some of the latter group to cooperate with the effort for Ukrainian nationalist revival. Probably the basic reason for this difference is the fact that both OUN groups were suppressed in this area before they could become very influential, and the nationalist structure which was built up afterwards was formed of persons who feared the extremist program of the integral nationalists. It may be also that the history of the region, with its lack of comparatively recent memories of oppression by Polish lords and the relative independence with which nationalist life could develop, created an atmosphere of self-confidence which militated against the more violent aspects of nationalist egoism.

To the south of the wooded steppe belt just discussed lies a broad region of more open steppe; in general the agricultural population of the area is considerably less dense than that of the region just described. The open plain with its very rich black soil and somewhat lesser rainfall lends itself to the cultivation of cereal crops which require smaller amounts of manpower, in contrast to the mixed sugar beet, dairy, potato, and grain agri-

[29] Interviews 47, 50.
[30] Interview 47.
[31] *Ibid.*

the Vistula, Wislok, Poprad, the latter in Sub-Carpathian Russia, and finally in Hungary the High Tissa, a tributary of the Danube right up to the former Czecho-Rumanian border. Then this line cuts across Rumanian territory to the south of Tchernovitz (Cernauti) and follows the little river Reout, a tributary of the Dniester, right up to the latter. /101

Speaking geographically, that which we will decide to call the 'Ukraine' in this book has only one natural frontier: the southern inclines of the western part of the Carpathians. We do not speak of the coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov which officially forms its southern frontier, as this is above all the boundary of the Russian continent in its entirety. [131]

Actually, in the north-eastern basin of the Danube rises the immense semicircle of the Carpathians, dominating the Hungarian Plain. /33

The summits of these mountains reach to more than two thousand metres and are covered by beech, oaks, ash, and some fir trees—typical European forests. They have changed much less than those of the Alps or the Sudeten ranges. Here, in the western part of the Carpathians, in Sub-Carpathian Russia, the forests are still in an almost virgin state. They are still inhabited by bears and wild boar, and are but authentic vestiges—even because of the fact of their primitive state—of the great forests of Central Europe.

The Uzok Range, which has seen the passage of so many invaders in the course of the centuries, has all the characteristics of the high mountains of Central Europe.

From the geo-physical point of view Sub-Carpathian Russia, which stretches along the southern slopes of the Carpathians, is still part of the hilly country, divided by ranges of mountains, with a temperate climate typical of the whole of Central Europe, which has

133 always favoured the formation of national groups, distinct from one another, and of States of relatively restricted size more or less dependent on their neighbours. Their development fills the whole history of Central Europe and they are only menaced by the German drive.

If we proceed in a north-easterly direction into Eastern Galicia, to the old 'Red Russia,' to-day *Malopolska* ('Little Poland' or 'Poland Minor'), we enter imperceptibly into the plains as the mountains become, little by little, hills which in turn are slowly obliterated. The hilly country becomes flat. Only the rivers, winding in the plain, interrupt here and there the monotony of the landscape. Advancing more and more towards the east, we always see the same plain without anything which resembles a natural limit, a plain which extends for hundreds and thousands of miles. We notice nothing at the frontier which separates Polish Galicia from the plain of Southern Russia (the Soviet Ukraine), but we also do not notice anything, when going towards the north, between the Ukraine and Russia proper.

Here we can go towards the ocean in the north and meet but rarely some chains of hills whose height is seldom more than three hundred metres.

Beyond the Carpathians, in the Ukraine, we enter the great plain which stretches, with only one interruption, the Urals, to Eastern Siberia.

132 The climate, too, changes almost imperceptibly and becomes a little colder and more continental towards the north and the east. However, the shroud of snow which covers the soil remains intact during three to five months in the whole of this immense part of the Continent, except, perhaps, along the shore of the Black Sea, where the climate is a little softer and where winter snow is rarer.

000 will occupy us particularly in order that we should be able to disentangle the historical factors which oppose her union with Russia, as well as those which tend to maintain this unity.

But before coming to this, let us try to consider one more geographical circumstance which underlines the unity of the Ukraine and Russia. This is the system of rivers. Here, too, the principles which apply to the
• 133 Ukraine also apply to the whole of Russia. The whole
[487] plain is a region of great rivers, which flow from south to north, or from north to south. It is in the latter direction that the rivers of the Ukraine flow. Their waters are emptied into the Black Sea. Chief among them is the Dnieper, which, owing to its length of 2500 kilometres, occupies third place in Europe, after the Volga and the Danube. It crosses Ukrainian territory from north to south, dividing it into two almost equal parts, while its sources lie in the north, in Great Russia, beyond Ukrainian territory. Thus it forms a natural link between the north and the border regions of the Black Sea. And it is to this great mercantile route, represented by this river, that the Ukrainian territory owes in great measure the rôle it has played in Europe since the tenth century of our era.

The river, too, was a great route of colonization. The first agriculturalists followed the routes which nature herself had provided in the Ukraine as well as in the whole Russian Plain.

000 As we have seen, it is impossible, geographically speaking, to fix the frontiers of the Ukraine. But we have also said, that to determine the subject and to reach the aim of this book, we have to establish approximately the territory which we will call by this name. Having also accepted the Carpathians as the only geographical frontier, we shall keep to this with regard to the whole

000 It seems to us that the method of economic geography is the most suitable as giving our study the required direction. Thus, after having defined a geographical basis of the whole, we shall successively study the most important factors in the economic geography of the Ukraine in the following order:

1. Man. (Population, its density, its aptitudes, and its level of economic culture.)

2. Agricultural riches and their exploitation. (The soil, plants, forests, and breeding.)

3. Riches beneath the soil and their extraction, heavy industry and light industry.

4. Communications on land, river, and the sea.

The fact that economic geography is a science which deals with two essential factors, man and the soil, whose relative importance varies in different regions and different epochs, but which is determined by the existence of man on the land, forces us to choose man as the first subject of our study.

The other factors will follow it in the order of their exploitation by man; the exploitation of the surface soil, of the subsoil, and finally the transformation of the products of this exploitation—industry.

As to the means of communication, we shall leave them to the end because they assure the distribution and the exchange of the products of the soil and of the subsoil, reflect the sites of industry, and, being able to create a new economic geography of the land, appear as the last link of the economic system.

Therefore the geography of the Ukraine appears to be relatively simple.

133 The whole territory has approximately the same altitude. Therefore its profile is uniform. Its geological origins are absolutely identical. The river system is poor and equally uniform; the three important rivers,

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Dnieper, the Boug, and the Dniester, all flow from /133
north to south, to empty into the Black Sea.

The climate is similar on the whole territory, with an /132
average 'multi-annual' temperature slightly higher in the south and south-east, due to the great heat of the months of July and August in these parts, with the exception of a narrow border of the Black Sea, between Odessa and the isthmus of Perekop, where the winter and the autumn are very mild, which explains the presence in this region of such plants as cotton (a plant with a long period of growth) and trees so delicate as those of the peach.

On the whole territory of the Ukraine the month during which the average temperature is always the highest (20 degrees C.) is July, and that during which it is lowest (minus 4·5 degrees C.) is January.

The average rainfall varies between 25 and 80 centimetres per annum, with the dampest climate in the north-western part. Everywhere there is more rain during the summer.

This uniformity of the whole, which makes the task of geographical description an easy one, seems at first sight to make the division of the Ukrainian territory into different zones impossible, while giving each zone some original characteristics in the sphere of economic geography.

Nevertheless, when going deeper into an analysis of /131
the question, we establish a division of the Ukraine into two agro-climatic zones.

This separation is determined by climatic and agrarian factors. There are differences of rainfall, of the soil, and of flora.

The border of these two zones begins at the western frontier of the Ukraine, on the 48th degree latitude north, and rises in an almost straight line up to the

On the contrary, in Zone 2 the absence of trees, the 137
drier climate, the dusty soil, and the isolated farms make the landscape more severe and more similar to the barren table-land of Northern Castile. Only the immensity of the cornfields with their golden ears introduces a lyrical note, vision-like, into this flat and treeless country. The villages of the Steppe are not 361
very picturesque and look mostly like colonies in which 342
the spirit of calculation dominates over the care of beauty. The habitations here are more modern, bigger, and better planned. The thatch here gives place to tiles and to corrugated iron. On the other hand, the poor people, deprived of wood, live in primitive hovels built of clay.

In the extreme north, in the forest region with its 133
sandy soil, the picturesque landscapes gradually disappear to resume the severe and sad monotony of the White Russian country-side.

The Ukrainian is very adaptable to civilization, that 181
is to say to the improvement of everyday life, and very quickly adopts all practical inventions, without any spirit of routine.

The Ukraine is the most literate part of Russia. Even 212
Soviet statistics, which cannot be assumed to be well disposed to the Tsarist regime, show that the percentage of the generation which was of a school age in 1914, which could read and write was, in 1923, 90 per cent in the towns and 73 per cent in the country, which, by the way, is a vigorous reply to the generally accepted opinion that in the pre-war Russian Empire the population stagnated in a condition of utter ignorance.

In the other parts of European Russia the percentage for the same generation was respectively 82 per cent in the towns and 57 per cent in the country-side.

It seems to us opportune to give an idea of the Ukraine 000

2 [See category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[133] culture of the more northern region. The reasons for the smaller
175 farm population are historical rather than purely economic, however. Most of the area was fully settled many generations later than the more northern regions, for it was the principal area of conflict of the Slavic settlers moving down from the north and the Tatar warriors based on the Crimea. The major instrument of colonization was the Cossack fortress settlement or *sich*. In the mid-seventeenth century the Cossacks accepted the suzerainty of the Orthodox tsar, but it was only in the late eighteenth century, after the Russian conquest of the Crimean Tatars, that the steppe
[563] was fully opened to peaceful development. These new lands, frequently called "Southern Russia," came to include considerable bodies of non-Ukrainian settlers, mostly Russians, but also large numbers of Germans and Serbs. In 1917 the Provisional Government in Petrograd strongly rejected demands of the Ukrainian Rada for the extension of its authority to the *guberniias* of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida, the last three corresponding roughly to the southern steppe region, since it felt they were not Ukrainian in character.[32]

369 The northern section of the steppe region, comprising the northern halves of the *Generalbezirke* Nikolaev and Dniepropetrovsk, did contain a preponderantly Ukrainian peasantry. The presence of two very important natural resources—the iron mines of Krivoi Rog and the water power of the Dnieper rapids—had led to rapid industrialization of this area during the period of the Soviet Five Year Plans, with a consequent large increase in the urban population. According to the census of 1939 five of the fifteen Ukrainian cities of over one hundred thousand population
369 lay in this region.[33] At the start of the period of industrialization,
563 in 1926, the city population was very largely non-Ukrainian. For example, Ukrainians formed less than half the total in Kirovograd (then Zinovevsk), Jews being the next largest ethnic group, closely followed by Russians.[34] In Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'e the

[32] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 72–73.

[33] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 250–53.

[34] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Recensement de la Population de l'URSS*, XIII (Moscow, 1929), 13–14.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

131 *Krai*), Little Russia (*Malorossiya*), and part of South or New Russia (*Novorossiya*). The South-west Territory is formed by the three Governments (*gubernii*) of Volhynia (area, 27,700 square miles), Podolia (16,219 square miles), and Kiev (19,686 square miles); Little Russia by those of Chernigov (20,233 square miles), Poltava (19,265 square miles), and Kharkov (21,035 square miles); and New Russia contains the Governments of Yekaterinoslav (24,478 square miles), Kherson (27,337 square miles), and Taurida (23,312 square miles, of which 9,704 belong to the Crimea). It should be noted that the Ukraine by this definition excludes Bessarabia, the Don Cossacks' Territory, and the Crimea, all of which are included in New Russia.

131 101 The Ukraine thus occupies an area of more than 190,000 square miles. It is bounded on the north by the Governments of Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, Smolensk, Mohilev, Minsk and Grodno; on the west by the recently created Russian Polish Government of Cholm, Eastern Galicia, and Bessarabia; on the south by the Black Sea, the Crimea, and the Sea of Azov; on the east by the Don Cossacks' Territory.

Except on the west and in the south the boundaries can hardly be said to coincide with natural divisions. Nor are they completely ethnographical, for the ethnographical area extends into Kursk, Voronezh, Grodno, Minsk, Cholm, and Eastern Galicia.

(2) Surface, Coast, and River System

Surface

133 The Ukraine falls naturally into three divisions: Polyesia in the north, the Black Sea plateau, extending from the western boundary to the Dnieper, and Little Russia on the left bank of the Dnieper.

Polyesia (of which only the southern part actually falls within the boundaries of the Ukraine as claimed by the Little Russians) occupies primarily the basin of the Pripet, a right-bank tributary of the Dnieper. The central portion consists of an almost unbroken

series of marshes, generally known as the Pinsk marshes, which form one of the most impassable, unfertile, and unhealthy areas in Russia. There is, however, higher ground both to the north and south of the marsh region. In the south there are the Volhynian Heights, running from Choim (in Russian Poland) through Lutsk, Rovno, and Dubno to Novograd Volynsk, a plateau rising to a height of over 1,000 ft. near Dubno. The high country is well wooded and suitable for agriculture. 133

The *Black Sea plateau* falls into four sections. The first or northern section is practically equivalent to the southern part of Volhynia. The highest point (over 1,200 ft.) occurs at Krzemenietz, from which the northern edge of the plateau extends east at a lesser elevation, passing north of Staro Konstantinov to Berdichev and Kiev.

The second section is that of the area between the Southern Bug and the Dniester, occupying a large part of Podolia. This section consists of a high plateau gradually declining from north-west to south-east, and includes along the western frontier the Miodobory Hills, running in a southerly direction into Bessarabia. The highest point is in the Proskurov district, 1,186 ft., and in this region there are also some marshes. Over the whole section are scattered numerous deep valleys, intersected by rapidly flowing watercourses at the base of well-wooded hills. The southern boundary of this section is formed by the Rivers Kedyma and Yagorlik, tributaries of the Bug and Dniester respectively.

From this river line the third or maritime section of the Black Sea plateau extends down to the Black Sea. This section contains various small rivers flowing roughly parallel to each other in a south-westerly direction, such as the Tiligul and the Kuyalnik.

The fourth or Zaporozhki section is the largest of the four. Its northern part is divided into two by the River Sinyukha, a tributary of the Bug. The western half rises to 800 ft., the eastern to 750 ft. Towards

● 133 the north this plateau slopes down into the plains of Polyesia around the Pripet, Irpen, and Teterev; on the west it is bounded by the Southern Bug; on the east by the Dnieper. The southern part of the section, in which the plateau levels down to 300 ft., assumes the uniform shape of flat steppes, and the rivers flow for the most part sluggishly in shallow, extensive, marshy valleys, rich in ponds.

Little Russia is a continuation of the heights in the Governments of Smolensk, Orel, and Kursk, and in general slopes from the north-east to the south-west. The Governments of Chernigov and Poltava form undulating plains, of which the former varies from 750 ft. in the north to 370–600 ft. in the south, and the latter has a somewhat lower altitude. The Government of Kharkov in general is a table-land with an elevation of 300–400 ft., though heights of over 850 ft. are reached. It is divided into two by the valley of the Northern Donets. Marshes abound in all parts of this section except in the Government of Kharkov. The rivers flow in deeply excavated valleys, of which the right banks have the appearance of hilly tracts, while low plains extend along the left.

Coast

The Ukrainian coast, though small in extent, is of the very greatest importance, not only to the Ukraine but to the whole of Russia. It forms an outlet for a vast amount of commerce, a great deal of which is dealt with by the port of Odessa.

A very characteristic feature of this part of the Black Sea coast is the existence of *limans*. These *limans*, which are similar in formation to the Venetian Lido and to the *haffs* of the Baltic coast, consist of small or large inlets at the mouth of a river, e. g. the Dnieper and the Bug, separated from the main body of the sea by a strip of land (*peresyp*) with a narrow entrance. The shore is in places fairly high, but is everywhere easily disintegrated by the action of the weather.

River System

The Ukraine as a whole consists of portions of the basins of the Rivers Dnieper (with its tributary the Pripet), Dniester, Bug, and Donets, the last named being the largest affluent of the Don. 133

The *Dnieper*, which rises in the Government of Smolensk, has a total length of about 1,410 miles, and drains an area of 202,140 square miles. It first touches Ukrainian territory at Loyev on the western border of Chernigov, and thence flows in a south-easterly direction to Yekaterinoslav, in a shifting channel which varies greatly in depth and breadth. At Yekaterinoslav the river turns south and then south-west, forming a succession of rapids, so that navigation in this part is only possible when the river is in flood. Artificial canals enable small vessels to proceed when there is low water in the channel. The Dnieper enters the Black Sea below the town of Kherson, by a *liman*, into which the Bug also discharges. 133 487 [502]

The chief tributaries of the Dnieper are: on the right bank, going from north to south, the Berezina, which runs through the Government of Minsk; the Pripet, with its many affluents, among them being the Styr and the Strumen, all of which overflow their banks and help to form the system of marshes which is more fully described in *Russian Poland*, No. 44 of this series (p. 15), and the Ingulets, which flows a little above Kherson into the Dnieper near its outlet to the Black Sea. 133

On the left bank the chief tributaries are the Sosh; the Desna, which flows through Chernigov into the Dnieper just above Kiev; and the Samara, which joins the river at Yekaterinoslav.

There is a regular service of passenger steamers on the Dnieper both above and below the rapids, and also along the Pripet as far as Pinsk. [505]

The *Dniester* rises in Austrian Galicia, and only the last 515 miles of its course, with a drainage area of 16,500 square miles, belong to Russian territory. It reaches the Ukraine provinces near Kamenets Podolsk,

●133 and then forms the frontier line between the Governments of Podolia and Kherson and the neighbouring province of Bessarabia. It receives no very important tributaries in the Ukraine, though there is a fair number of smaller ones. Navigation is interrupted by the [502] Yampol rapids. For ordinary river craft an artificial canal affords a passage here, but steamboats cannot pass upstream. The depth of the water has lately been increased by a more scientific system of regulation.

The *Bug* rises in Russian Poland and reaches the Ukraine near Vlodava, to the north-west of Volhynia. It forms for some distance the boundary between the Ukraine and Russian Poland, and then flows through Austrian Galicia into the Ukraine at Volochysk. Its winding course follows a south-easterly direction, entering the Black Sea by a *liman*.

The chief tributaries of the Bug within the Ukraine provinces are, on the right bank, the Kedyma and the Chichekleya; and on the left bank the Ingul.

The *Donets* rises in the Government of Kursk, and enters the Ukraine to the north of Kharkov. It then flows to the south-east, leaving the Ukraine at the extreme north-eastern corner of Yekaterinoslav.

(3) Climate

132 Climatic statistics should generally be regarded as approximate.

The following recent figures are available for the South-west Territory—Tarnopol, although actually in Galicia, being taken as typical of the south-west of Volhynia, Berdichev of the south-east of Volhynia and the central part of the Government of Kiev, and Volkovints and Kamenets Podolsk of the Government of Podolia:

	Average Temperature (Fahrenheit).		
	January.	*July.*	*Year.*
Tarnopol . . .	22·5°	66·0°	44·1°
Berdichev . . .	22·3°	65·5°	45·0°
Volkovints . . .	20·5°	65·9°	44·4°
Kamenets Podolsk .	26·1°	68·5°	47·5°

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in the Government of Yekaterinoslav in the Donets 491
coal and iron region.

The second-class roads, described as 'paved throughout', have a mileage of 953. They are under the care of the *zemstvos*, but the expenditure bestowed upon them is small.

The third class of roads, described as 'soil' roads, has by far the greatest mileage, their length being 54,148 miles. In no country of western Europe would they be classed as roads, being merely tracks from point to point, worn by the traffic of the district. They are under the care of the *mirs*, or communes, whose budgets admit of the expenditure of very small sums on their upkeep.

As other means of communication are also few and 491
unsatisfactory, the lack of good roads would be a fatal 489
drawback to any development of the country, were it not for the fact that during three or four months of the year traffic by sledge is almost everywhere possible without special regard to the existence of a road or even a track. As during this period agricultural operations are suspended, an opportunity is afforded of transporting a vast quantity of goods.

(*b*) *Rivers and Canals*

The rivers of the Ukraine include the middle and 487
lower courses of two large rivers, the Dnieper and the [133]
Dniester. Both are navigable for long distances, and should be of great importance as means of communication. Each, however, suffers from a serious natural defect which much curtails its usefulness, and to remedy which no adequate measures have been taken.

For purposes of navigation the river *Dnieper* falls into two sections known as 'above the rapids' and 'below the rapids'. Between Yekaterinoslav and Alexandrovsk are ten rapids, which are very dangerous and completely prevent navigation. Timber rafts are floated down, but the occupation of steering them is considered most hazardous and is entrusted to local pilots specially trained. Some attempt at improving

161 Caucasian foreland. (7) This corresponds roughly

7. Kubyietych: The Distribution of Population in the Ukraine, page 11.

to the density of population in the Balkan countries.

133 The geographers have investigated the surface of the Ukrainian provinces and found that only 1.5% of the entire surface is more than 1000 meters high, barely 3.5% over 500 meters and 68.5% between 100 and 300 meters. Scarcely 1% of the Ukrainian population live in actual mountains, and surely more than half of all Ukrainians have never seen any mountains. (8)

8. Kubyievych: The Geography of the Ukrainian and the Bordering Areas, page 65.

132 For decades scholars studied the climate, measured precipitation, heat and cold, and did not forget to check from what direction the wind blows. When they had made sufficient investigations, they established the fact that the Ukraine has an "oak climate", specifically in the damp, moderately cold northern and central Ukraine. Adjacent to this in the south is the "dry climate" zone with little precipitation, where there is less rain the farther southeast one goes. Moreover, geographers feel that it is significant that the Ukraine, along with the Carpathians, the Yaila Mountains in the Crimea, and the Caucasus have a mountain climate and that the southern shore of the Crimean Peninsula and the eastern coast of the Black Sea have a Mediterranean climate. Whereas the Ukrainians of the north would gladly renounce some of the 600 millimeters and more of precipitation which annually flood their fields, those of the south call upon God and all the spirits to send them a little more than their 200 millimeters of rain. But it need

[volhynia]

361 tossed down on the land, without any relationship to it. "The absence of public buildings alone had
[342] a depressive effect. These wooden huts on a slope, supported by stakes as though by high stilts, seemed merely to have been set down as chance would have it, less secure and permanent than nomad tents which the next day perhaps might already be taken down again. It scarcely seemed worthwhile to lay out a few roadways provisionally. For the rest, there was not a trace of a city plan, of a systematizing, architectural hand. Everything seemed temporary and unfinished, simply amassed, never shaped. The expression "shanty town" applied in a special /18/ sense to these places. Our criteria of beautifully compact city plans do not apply. Never concentrated within the area most difficult to attack, never held together by walls and moats, these Russian clusters of houses and courtyards which can scarcely be called cities any more, gradually become lost in the distance, without shape or outline: mirror images of the landscape that bears them, of the language that echoes in them, of the way of thinking of the people they house." (9)

9. Tintrup: War in the Ukraine, pages 23 and 24.

If you would now turn east in the direction
101 of Kiyev, you would come through numerous rambling
361 villages with streets. They contain attractive
563 farms where until recently you would have been warmly welcomed with German sounds. The Volhynia Germans lived here. But you continue northward
101 until the Volhynia plateau with a gradual incline
133 sinks into the Polesian swamps. You avoid this marsh land by turning northeast, and thus come to the extreme northwest tip of the Ukrainian area of settlement, Podlakhia, whose waters flow toward the Baltic. The primeval forests of Bila Vesha are gloomy, but even more gruesome are the deep

101 swamps of Polesia. Faggot and fascine paths lead
133 you from village to village, from settlement to settlement. If you visit this swamp land which extends almost to the central Russian plain and is about at large as Hungary including Carpatho-Ukraine, in spring during the time of thaws or during the floods of early summer, people will row you in a boat to their neighbor's. For at these times the rivers creeping in countless bends through lakes, ponds and tributaries of this country, which is only 170 meters above sea level, flood their banks for many weeks, even months. This landscape is unutterably sad, and, it has deprived of laughter the few people it scantily nourishes with fish,
[136] potatoes and oats. Polesia is a land of spooks without equal, where, across the bog through which elk and bison, sure-footed, make their way, there
[137] rises the "pillared hall of centuries-old oaks, lindens, aspens, ash trees, firs, spruces and pines." /19/ The sun rarely shines into this twilight where at night there are mysterious will-o'-the-wisps in this world of mold. Deathly silence prevails in this accursed land which even the birds avoid. You are standing on the border of the Soviet Union.

133 Descending the navigable Pripyat, and traveling eastward halfway to the central Russian plain, you reach, friend, the Dniepr, which comes from the north. You have come to the sacred river of the Ukrainians. They chant its praises in countless songs. This third largest river of Europe flows 2100 kilometers until, exhausted, it empties into the Black Sea. If it happens to be flood time, you will not be able to see from one bank to the other, the river rises to such an extent. It gets to be six, eight, even ten kilometers wide. Herodotus already compared it with the Nile.

505 If you now sail south[1] on a Dniepr steamer you will reach Kiyev. Do not be surprised at the numerous vessels which you meet on the river, for

1 [From the confluence of the Dniepr and the Pripyat - Analyst]

505 the mercantile fleet which it carried was, even long before the war, as large as the total mercantile tonnage of the Austro-Hungarian fleet.
346 Even from far off you will see on the hills of the city lying on the right bank the strange cupolas of the Byzantine churches and monasteries. Kiyev was formerly the "Rome of the East", and even today it is the "mother of all Russian cities". Hundreds of thousands of devout pilgrims
788 annually visited the famous cave monastery of Pecherska Lavra, the cathedral of St. Sophia, the Golden Gate and other sacred spots.[1]

• 133 The churning steamer which you again board in the sprawling, pounding and shrieking harbor section[1] will take you farther downstream. On the west bank the high plateau of the Dniepr Plain rises steeply. If you should wander over this undulating hill country with its fields of wheat and sugar beets, you would see everywhere the traces of Ukraine's past: mighty grave mounds of nomad chieftains, and embankments with which in early times the Ukrainian people protected themselves against Asiatic brigands. /20/ To the left of the stream, in the east, you see nothing but wild thickets of reeds, dense, impenetrable green meadows behind which the Dniepr Plain is hidden.
361 You would find villages there[2] which have as many inhabitants as a medium-sized city and which equal a metropolis in surface area. However, they have remained villages in which peasants live on their homesteads; it is almost a day's journey to their fields. Khar'kov, a small Cossack hamlet in the seventeenth century, and today the second largest city of the Ukraine, is situated on the eastern edge of this plain.
133 In Dniepropetrovsk where formerly the rapids began, you turn eastward, friend, and now reach the steppes. The earth which is swept bare by the eternal east wind and by the dust storms, is completely naked as soon as you ascend the Donets

[1] [i.e. In Kiev — Analyst]
[2] [i.e. In the Dniepr Plain — Analyst]

133 Plain where lie the coal districts of the Ukraine. The more bleak and unfriendly this industrial country with its black chimneys appears to you, the friendlier the quiet, pale yellow Donets beckons yonder, with its broad, green valley and the white chalk precipices crowned by dark green forests. Now your journey takes you south to the Sea of Azov, across the mouth of the Don to the Caucasian foothills. Immeasurable fields of sun-
101 flowers accompany you into this "second Ukraine".*
133 Here you feel the refreshing breath of the snowy mountains of the Caucasus. You are on the shores of the Argonauts. Virile and full of strength is this untouched land at the foot of the Elbrus. Like the mountains, the people, too, are giants. You have before you the descendants of the flower of the Ukrainian people, of the Zaporogian Cossacks who were settled here by Catherine II.

137 And now turn west, start homeward! The way
[133] leads across the Pontic Plain which extends north of the Black Sea as far as the Danube. On this "racial meadow" you will look in vain for the much-praised wild uncultivated steppe. You are in the land of Taras Bulba. Gogol, a Ukrainian, erected an imperishable monument to the bold Cossack in his tale. /21/ In those days the grass and shrubs of the steppe grew taller than a man, but today you will find only the knee-high herbs of the temporarily fallow fields, and here and there a thicket of wild cherries, mahaleb and thistles. Perhaps you will also come to one of those meadows that have become rare, which in a brief whiff of spring changes its color like a rich woman her clothes, wrapping itself in silver gray during the summer, and adorning itself in moss-green in autumn, when rain finally quenches the cracked earth. Smooth
133 and flat, amorphous as a calm sea, the Pontic Steppe stretches out before you. Burial mounds as
764 large as houses, called kurgany, point the way to the Dniestr. What ghastly secrets may they not

* [i.e. the Caucasian foothills — Analyst]

In the heart of the Carpathian mountains

Lake in the Carpathian forests



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CHAPTER 28

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

Capital, Kiev (Kiyev); area, 222,600, population, 40,500,000

SU 131 U 131 THE UKRAINIAN SSR, or Ukraine, is in second place among the union republics from the point of view of population and economic potentials. The Ukraine is situated in the southwestern portion of the East European lowland, on the shores of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, and extends westward beyond the Carpathian Mountains to the Tisza River.

GENERAL SURVEY

SU 133 U 133 THE PREDOMINANT LOWLAND CHARACTER of the region is interrupted here and there by some low elevations, such as the Donets ridge in the southeast, the Volyn'-Podolian plateau in the west, and the intervening Dnieper ridge. The Carpathians, with their foothills to the north, constitute the only mountainous section of the Ukraine. Five distinct physical regions can be distinguished: (1) the Poles'ye, a forested zone in the north; (2) the wooded steppe in the center; (3) the steppe proper in the south; (4) the Carpathian foothills in the west; and (5) the Carpathians and the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

The Poles'ye in the north and the northwest forms a southern extension of the extensive Poles'ye lowland which constitutes the basic relief form of the adjoining Belorussian SSR. It is a low sandy and forested expanse, distinguished by considerable swampiness (Pripet Marshes). The woods are a mixture of deciduous and evergreen types. Podsols and marshy ground constitute the principal soil forms. The Poles'ye is drained by the lower course of two principal affluents of the Dnieper: the Pripet (or Pripyat'), on the right, and the Desna, on the left.

The wooded steppe on the right bank of the Dnieper is formed by the Volyn'-Podolian plateau. This upland is highest in the northwest and slopes gradually toward the east and the southeast. It has crystalline rock formations covered by recent sediments (sand, clay, and limestone)

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along the watersheds and a top layer of loess. The rivers in this area frequently flow through canyon-like gorges, and rapids are commonly obstacles to navigation. Ravines and gullies are typical relief features. In the northwest, broad-leaved trees abound. The remainder of the region has black-earth steppe. The southeastern edge of the upland, the so-called Dnieper ridge, continues beyond the Dnieper to form the Azov uplands, extending northeastward along the coast of the Sea of Azov.

The left bank portion of the wooded steppe zone is formed by the Dnieper lowland, which slopes from the Central Russian upland southwestward to the Dnieper River. It is drained by several important left affluents of the Dnieper, among them the Sula, the Psel, and the Vorskla rivers. The last outspurs of the Central Russian upland penetrate into this area from the northeast. The uniformity of the loess-covered plain is broken by a large number of small shallow depressions, which become filled with water during the spring thaw. The northern portion of the plain was once covered by glaciers, which left moraine sediments, now covered with loess, and large expanses of sand sediments. The rivers generally have a slow current and are used for lumber drives. They overflow in the spring, inundating large areas, but become shallow during the summer. Woods are found only in the river valleys, while cultivated steppes predominate along the watersheds.

The Black Sea lowland along the shores of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov constitutes a true steppe form. It is drained by the lower courses of the Dnieper, the Southern Bug, and the Dniester, and a large number of smaller, partly intermittent, streams. The coast is characterized by cliffs, which are gradually being washed out by the action of the sea, and by the so-called limans, coastal lagoons which were formed in recent geologic times by the flooding of the lower river valleys and are separated by narrow sandspits, called *kosa*, from the open sea. The flatness of the plain is marred by many ravines, the remains of former river valleys, and by mound-like elevations which were erected by the ancient inhabitants of the steppe. The Donets ridge, which rises to 1,184 feet, also lies in the steppe zone, in the extreme east of the Ukrainian SSR. It consists of the remains of an old deeply eroded and weathered upland, which now appears only as a hilly plateau of sandstone, clayey schists, and limestone. The valleys of rivers and many ravines cut deeply into the surface of the area. Along its northern edge the plateau forms picturesque chalk cliffs on the Northern Donets River.

The Carpathian foothills extend from the Volyn'-Podolian upland in

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SU 133* the east to the Carpathians in the west. They are drained by the Dniester
U River and its affluents, which flow in narrow, convoluted river valleys
133 through picturesque wooded depressions. The watersheds, devoid of forests, constitute the basic cultivated areas; they are under wheat, corn, and tobacco. Black earth prevails in all these lowland sections of the Ukraine.

The Carpathians extend through the Ukrainian SSR over a distance of about 150 miles. They constitute a number of ranges, rising gradually toward the southeast, where they reach an elevation of more than 6,600 feet, with passes at points up to 3,000 feet above sea-level. The least accessible section of the mountains lies in Northern Bukovina (Chernovtsy Oblast). The Ukrainian Carpathians form a part of the wooded section of the mountain range. They are covered with deciduous trees on the lower slopes and with evergreens in the upper reaches. The chief rock formations are sandstone and schists with occasional volcanic intrusives. Above 5,000 feet, mountain meadow pastures prevail. There is no permanent snow cover. Isolated snow fields remain until June and reappear in September. Considerable rainfall (40 to 60 inches a year) feeds such important rivers as the Tisza, which flows southwestward, the Dniester, and the Prut, which descend the eastern slopes. In general, the Carpathians are easily accessible and are crossed by highways and rail lines.

The Transcarpathian Ukraine (until 1945 part of Czechoslovakia) lies on the southern slopes of the Carpathians and extends onto the Hungarian lowland, where it is bounded by the Tisza River in the south.

The Dnieper is the most important Ukrainian river. It rises in Smolensk Oblast, outside the Ukrainian SSR. Below Kiev it forms many islands and braided branches in its course. Until the construction of the Dnieper hydroelectric station (*Dneproges*), the rapids in the vicinity of Zaporozh'ye interfered with continuous navigation. Since the completion of the dam and the flooding of the rapids above the dam, the entire river has become navigable. The other important rivers of the Ukraine, the Dniester, the Southern Bug, and the Northern Donets (an
SU affluent of the Don), are all less suitable for navigation.

132 Compared with the other regions of the European part of the USSR,
U the Ukraine has a rather temperate climate, although colder and more
132 continental in the eastern part. Thaws occur frequently during the winter, summers are hot, especially in the south, while autumn is dry and continuously clear. Spring arrives early in the west and, together with

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Kiev Oblast

Area, 15,900, population, 3,500,000

5U
133* Kiev Oblast lies in the Dnieper lowland (in the north) and in the Volyn'-
241 Podolian upland (in the south). It is drained by the Dnieper and its
U right affluents, the Teterev and the Ros' rivers. In the northern section,
133 which penetrates into the forested Poles'ye, the growing of flax, potatoes,
241 and buckwheat are important. The rest of the oblast falls within the sugar economy. Truck produce in the Kiev metropoljtan area and orchards in the south, near Uman', and the southeast, near Smela, are important. Peat is worked mainly northwest of Kiev and near Smela, while lignite comes from Yurkovka near Zvenigorodka. Sugar mills abound throughout the center and the south; flour milling and distilling
5U are other rural industries.

361 Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR since 1934, was the third
438* largest city of the USSR on the eve of the Second World War. Situated on the middle course of the Dnieper River, below the mouths of its two
U large affluents, the Pripet and the Desna, Kiev occupies a central loca-
361 tion at the junction of the river, four rail trunk lines, and many high-
438 ways. An ancient city and until the middle 13th century the capital of Kievan Russia, Kiev is the site of many historical relics and monuments. An early commercial and food-processing center, it developed into an industrial point of first rank under the Soviet regime. Its heavy industries produce machine tools, machines, motors, aircraft parts, boilers, agricultural implements, motorcycles, and bicycles, as well as equipment for chemical, sugar, and tanning industries. There are electrical (radios and telephones), textile, and food industries. A number of major enterprises, including lumber mills, a meat-packing plant, a rubber-goods factory, and railway-car works are located in the left-bank industrial suburb of Darnitsa. Shipyards produce vessels for the Dnieper River traffic. A natural-gas pipe line for industrial and domestic use was laid in the post-war period from Dashava.

Other major industrial centers of the oblast are Belaya Tserkov', south of Kiev, Uman' in the far south, and Smela and Cherkassy on the Dnieper in the southeast. They are primarily food-processing centers, with sugar and flour mills and metal, clothing, and leather industries.

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Vinnitsa Oblast

Area, 10,600, population, 2,800,000

Vinnitsa Oblast lies in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, bounded in the southwest by the Dniester River and drained by the Southern Bug River. In addition to the basic sugar-beet and wheat crops, fruits, tobacco, and corn are raised near the Dniester River. Viticulture is possible in the deep, protected valleys of the southwest. The oblast is one of the foremost sugar producers of the Ukraine.

Vinnitsa, on the Southern Bug, has an industry closely connected with the agricultural economy. It processes the local products (sugar, flour, meat, alcohol) and has machine repair shops and a superphosphate plant.

Mogilev-Podol'skiy, on the Dniester in the south, has food-canning, lumber, and metalworking industries.

Kamenets-Podol'skiy Oblast

Area, 8,000, population, 1,800,000

Kamenets-Podol'skiy Oblast is also located in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, north of the Dniester River. It lies at the western end of the sugar region and also engages in the raising of fruits, tobacco, and corn near the Dniester River. Phosphorite and peat deposits are worked. In the northern forest belt, lumbering, paper milling, and ceramics are the chief occupations.

Proskurov, the capital, is a rail center on the upper Southern Bug River. It has food industries (flour milling and sugar refining), machine shops, and clothing and furniture plants.

Other industrial points are Kamenets-Podol'skiy near the Dniester, with fruit canneries, meat-packing and clothing industries, and Shepetovka, a rail center in the forest area, with sawmills, and meat-packing and railroad shops.

THE LEFT-BANK WOODED STEPPE

THE LEFT-BANK WOODED STEPPE includes the oblasts of Poltava, Sumy, and Khar'kov and represents a transition region between the right-bank Ukraine in the west and the Central Black-Earth Region of the Russian SFSR in the east. Although sugar beets continue to form a major crop, the emphasis is placed to a greater extent on grain crops, among which winter and spring wheat are most important. Potatoes and

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SU 133* 241 U 133 241 tobacco, in the north, and sunflowers and melons, in the south, are also raised. Hog raising forms the basis of a major meat-packing industry. Machinery industries are located chiefly in Khar'kov.

Khar'kov Oblast

Area, 12,000, population, 2,500,000

SU 133* 241 438* U 133 241 438 Khar'kov Oblast lies in the southwestern outspurs of the Central Russian upland and is drained by the Northern Donets and the upper Orel' and the lower Oskol rivers. Sugar beets predominate in the north, wheat and sunflowers in the south, and truck produce and orchards in the Khar'kov metropolitan area. Rural industry is based chiefly on the processing of the agricultural products and engages in sugar refining, flour milling, sunflower-oil extraction, distilling, and dairying. The oblast possesses a good rail network on the route from the Donets Basin to Moscow.

SU 438* U 438 Khar'kov, the capital of the Ukraine until 1934, is its second city and its foremost machine-construction center. Situated at the junction of six rail lines at the gates to the Donets Basin and Krivoy Rog industrial areas, it dates from the seventeenth century and developed rapidly after the industrialization of the southern Ukraine in the late nineteenth century. Its impressive array of products includes tractors, turbine generators, coal-mining and oil-drilling equipment, electrical goods, diesel motors, ball bearings, machine tools, harvester combines, locomotives, and bicycles. It also has light and food industries.

Izyum, on the Northern Donets, southeast of Khar'kov, has metalworking, ceramic, and sawmilling industries.

Kupyansk, a major rail center east of Khar'kov, engages in machine construction, metalworking, and lumber and sugar milling.

Poltava Oblast

Area, 13,200, population, 2,200,000

SU 133* 241 U 133 241 Poltava Oblast, in the Dnieper lowland, is bounded on the southwest by the Dnieper River and drained by its left affluents, the Sula, the Psel, and the Vorskla. It grows chiefly sugar beets and wheat, as well as other grains, hemp, mint, sunflowers, and corn. Sugar refining and flour milling are the main rural industries.

SU 438* U 438 Poltava, a four-way rail junction on the Vorskla River, is a processing center for a rich sugar and wheat region. It has locomotive repair shops, flour mills, meat-packing plants, and oil presses. Just northeast is the

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site of the battle of Poltava (1709), which marked the decisive defeat of the Swedes under Charles XII by Peter the Great.

Kremenchug, a lumber- and grain-trading point on the Dnieper, has light and food industries and produces road-construction machines. Its right-bank suburb, Kryukov, has large railway-car works.

Sumy Oblast

Area, 9,400, population, 1,700,000

Sumy Oblast, lies in the western outliers of the Central Russian upland and is drained by the upper Vorskla, the Psel, the Sula, and the Seym rivers. Basic crop combinations are sugar beets and wheat in the south, and hemp and wheat in the north. Also grown in the north are potatoes and buckwheat; in the south, tobacco and mint. Sugar refining, flour milling, and hemp retting are the chief industries. An oil field is under development near Romny.

Sumy is a sugar-refining center on the Psel River; it produces also agricultural machines, chemical fertilizer, and woolens.

Other industrial cities are Konotop, a rail junction with machine shops and food industries, and Shostka, which produces chemicals and photographic film.

DONETS BASIN

The Donets Basin, which includes the oblasts of Voroshilovgrad and Stalino, is the most heavily industrialized section of the Ukraine and one of the principal industrial bases of the USSR. The impressive industrial development of the district is the result of the combination of local coal production and the iron-ore imports from the Krivoy Rog area, which forms the basis of the large-scale metallurgical industry. Nearly all the major mills concentrated in the Donbas pass through a full cycle of metallurgical production; they had a prewar capacity of 6 million tons of pig iron, 5½ million tons of ingot steel, and 3 million tons of rolled metal. The coking process, which is essential for the iron and steel industry, also feeds the basic chemical industries producing nitrate fertilizer and other chemicals. The use of iron and steel products in the heavy-machine industry completes the industrial scheme of the region. Associated with these principal activities are the quarrying of building and flux materials (dolomite, limestone, refractory clays, and cement rock), the mining of salt, mercury, and lead-zinc ores, as well as large

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Ukraine RD1

SU 327 438* U 327 438

glass and soda works. A dense rail network and a unified power-transmission system connect the various enterprises. The vast number of urban centers, cities and workers' settlements, which have grown up around the metallurgical and machinery works and the coal mines, represent a concentration of almost one third of the urban population of the republic within 1/20 of its area.

Stalino Oblast

Area, 10,200, population, 3,000,000

SU 133* U 133 SU 135 U 135 SU 438* U 438

Stalino Oblast includes the western section of the Donets Basin, extending from the Sea to Azov in the south to the Northern Donets in the north. Agriculture (wheat, sunflowers, and cotton) is of importance only outside of the industrial section. Salt is mined near Artemovsk and mercury near Nikitovka. The principal coal-mining centers are Stalino, Makeyevka, Yenakiyevo, and Gorlovka.

Stalino, the largest city of the Donets Basin, had a population of 392,000 in 1948. It was originally called Yuzovo, or Yuzovka, for a Scottish industrialist, Hughes; it was called Stalin in the early part of the Soviet period. It has metallurgical, chemical, and coal-mining industries.

Makeyevka, a few miles northeast of Stalino, is the site of the Kirov metallurgical works, one of the largest of the Donbas, and coking installations. Coal mines operate in the suburban areas.

Yenakiyevo was called Rykovo from the 1920's until 1935, then Ordzhonikidze until 1943, when it again received its original name. It has a metallurgical industry, chemical works, and coal mines.

Gorlovka also has metallurgical, chemical, and coal-mining industries. Its northern suburb of Nikitovka has mercury mines and near-by Trudovaya is the terminus of an oil pipe line from the Groznyy fields in the Caucasus.

Konstantinovka has a metallurgical industry, zinc works, and produces ceramics, glass, and cement, as well as superphosphate fertilizer.

Kramatorsk is noted as a heavy-machine construction center which produces mining and metallurgical equipment. It also has railway-car repair shops and ceramics works. Druzhkovka, to the south, is another machinery center.

Slavyansk is a chemical center where there are salt mines and soda works, limestone quarries, and porcelain works. Artemovsk (formerly Bakhmut), to the southeast, is the center of an important salt-mining

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region, having 35 percent of the reserves of the USSR, and the site of soda works.

Debal'tsevo is one of the chief rail centers of the Donets Basin.

Chistyakovo, to the south, is a major coal-mining point.

Zhdanov, called Mariupol' until 1948, the principal port for the Donets Basin, on the Sea of Azov, is the seat of the new Azovstal' metallurgical works, one of the largest of the region. It also has the Il'ich works, which produce special steels, shipyards, and fish canneries.

Voroshilovgrad Oblast

Area, 10,300, population, 1,800,000

Voroshilovgrad Oblast is the easternmost division of the Ukrainian SSR. It includes the eastern portion of the Donets Basin and extends northward into a typical Ukrainian wheat and sunflower region. Most of its coal mines produce anthracite.

Voroshilovgrad, formerly called Lugansk, has large locomotive works and metallurgical and pipe-rolling mills and produces enameled goods and mining machinery.

Voroshilovsk (formerly Alchevsk) has metallurgical and coking industries. Just south is the coal-mining city of Parizhskaya Kommuna [Paris commune].

Kadiyevka, called Sergo from 1935 until 1943, and Krasnyy Luch are the two main coal-mining centers of the oblast, with many large satellite towns grouped near by. Almaznaya, southwest of Kadiyevka, produces special steel alloys. Lesser coal centers in the southeastern section of the region are Krasnodon, Sverdlovsk, and Roven'ki.

Rubezhnoye, in the northern coal district, on the Northern Donets, has large chemical (explosives) works, and produces paints and glass.

DNIEPER BEND

The Dnieper Bend, which includes Dnepropetrovsk Oblast and the adjacent section of Zaporozh'ye Oblast, is the second center of heavy industry in the Ukraine. Metallurgy, which is largely based on Krivoy Rog iron ore and Nikopol' manganese, is the principal branch of the industry. It receives its coal and flux materials from the Donets Basin. Unlike the Donbas, which frequently suffers from a shortage of water, it is amply supplied with water from the Dnieper River, which is also the source of most of its electric power. The main industrial centers lie

either at the sources of raw materials (Krivoy Rog, Nikopol') or on the Dnieper River (Dneprodzerzhinsk, Dnepropetrovsk, and Zaporozh'ye). Agricultural production emphasizes wheat, barley, sunflowers, southern hemp, and soy beans. On the basis of the local grain production and grain brought along the Dnieper, a large flour-milling industry has developed.

Dnepropetrovsk Oblast

Area, 12,600, population, 2,200,000

Dnepropetrovsk Oblast extends from the Dnieper Bend to the Donets Basin and is divided into two equal sections by the course of the Dnieper River. Grains and sunflowers are the basic crops, with some hemp in the northeast and cotton in the southwest. The major rural industries are flour milling, meat packing, and dairying.

Dnepropetrovsk, on the Dnieper River, is a major industrial and transportation center formerly called Yekaterinoslav. It has large metallurgical works, pipe rolling mills, rail and sheet-metal mills, and steel-construction works. An automobile plant is to be established during the post-war Five-Year Plan. The city has clothing, leather, and food industries and is an important lumber-trade center.

Dneprodzerzhinsk, on the Dnieper, west of Dnepropetrovsk, has metallurgical and chemical works, producing rolled steel products, coke, and nitrate fertilizer, plastics, and cement. Metal construction and railway-car building are other important activities.

Krivoy Rog, the center of a rich iron-ore region, distinguished by reserves of more than one million tons and a high metal content (70 percent), has metallurgical works and iron foundries.

Nikopol', the center of one of the main manganese areas of the USSR, has concentrating plants, shipyards, and one of the largest pipe-rolling mills of the Union. The manganese mining areas lie northeast of Nikopol' in the district of Marganets [manganese] and in the northwest, near Ordzhonikidze.

Lesser industrial centers are Novo-Moskovsk, with sheet-metal mills, and Pavlograd, a pulp-milling and furniture city.

Zaporozh'ye Oblast

Area, 10,400, population, 1,300,000

Zaporozh'ye Oblast extends from the Dnieper River to the Sea of Azov. Agricultural emphasis is on wheat in the north and on cotton

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Ukraine RD1

Kherson Oblast

Area, 10,600, population, 700,000

Kherson Oblast extends north of the Crimea from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea. It is a typical flat, dry steppe, with cotton and wheat growing. Kakhovka, on the Dnieper River below Zaporozh'ye, is the site of the second great Dnieper dam, scheduled for 1951–5[illegible] with irrigation canals reaching into the Crimea. Skadovsk and Khorly, on the Black Sea, and Genichesk, on the Sea of Azov, are minor fishing ports.

Kherson is a major port at the mouth of the Dnieper River, where there are shipyards, repair docks, agricultural machinery works, and extensive food-canning industries. It is the terminus of a new railroad built during the Second World War from the Crimea.

Nikolayev Oblast

Area, 7,500, population, 800,000

Nikolayev Oblast lies on the Black Sea and is drained by the lower Southern Bug and the Ingul rivers. Cotton and wheat are the chief crops, with castor beans and sunflowers in the north, truck produce near Nikolayev, and dairy farming. In the rural areas flour milling, dairying, and sugar refining are the main industries.

Nikolayev lies at the head of the Bug Liman, over forty miles from the Black Sea. It is a major shipbuilding center and exports grain, sugar, iron, and manganese ore. It produces agricultural machines and has textile, food, and fish-canning industries.

Odessa Oblast

Area, 10,800, population, 1,800,000

Odessa Oblast lies in the western section of the Black Sea lowland and extends from the Black Sea to the Volyn'-Podolian upland in the north. It is bounded in the west by the Moldavian SSR. Numerous minor intermittent streams drain it in the south, and the Southern Bug in the north. Sugar beets are the main crop in the north, wheat and sunflowers in the center, and cotton in the south. Of lesser importance are corn, fruits, and castor beans. Sugar refining, flour milling, dairying, and wine making are the chief rural industries.

Odessa, the third city of the Ukraine and one of the major ports of the USSR, exports lumber and grains, and imports oil from the Caucasus, coal from the Donbas, cement from Novorossiysk, for local in-

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SU 438* U 438

dustries and for transshipment to the right-bank Ukraine, Belorussia, and as far as Leningrad. Its industries include machinery works, which produce agricultural implements, machine tools, grain-elevator and food-industry equipment, cranes, and printing machinery. Its food industries process mainly sugar, flour, and canned goods. There are clothing and shoe factories, chemicals plants (superphosphate, iodine, linoleum, petroleum refining), woodworking and jute industries. The city has shipyards and railroad shops; during the post-war Plan, an automobile assembly plant will go into operation. Situated on the picturesque hillside, Odessa descends in several terraces, including a famous stairway, to the sea. Northward and southward along the coast are well-known health resorts (Khadzhibey Liman, Kugal'nik Liman Arkadiya, and Fontan) with mineral springs and mud baths. Regular overseas connections are maintained from the port.

Pervomaysk (formerly Ol'viopol') is situated on the Southern Bug and produces agricultural machines, flour, and meat.

Kirovograd Oblast

Area, 9,600, population, 1,100,000

SU 133* 241 U 133 241

Kirovograd Oblast lies somewhat north of the level steppe in the Volyn'-Podolian upland. It is bounded on the northeast by the Dnieper River and drained by the Ingul and Ingulets rivers. Wheat is the basic crop; sugar beets are grown in the northwest and the east, sunflowers in the south, and potatoes and flax in the moist, wooded region of the north. There are deposits of lignite, kaolin, refractory clays, and granite. Sugar refining, flour milling, and dairying are the main rural industries.

SU 438* U 438

Kirovograd was originally called Yelizavetgrad. In 1924 it was renamed Zinov'yevsk, then Kirovo in 1936, and Kirovograd in 1939. It lies on the upper Ingul River in a lignite-mining region and has important agricultural machine works and food-processing plants.

Znamenka is a rail center which has metalworking and food industries.

Aleksandriya, which has tanneries and flour mills, is also developing into the main lignite-mining center of the right-bank Ukraine.

Izmail Oblast

Area, 4,800, population, 700,000

SU 133* U 133

Izmail Oblast was formed in 1940 out of the southernmost part of Bessarabia which had a predominant Ukrainian and Russian popula-

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Ukraine RD1

SU 133x u 133

tion. It lies between the Dniester River and the Kiliya arm of the Danube delta and has Moldavian minorities in the northwest and Bulgarian elements in the west, near Bolgrad. The main crops are wheat, barley, and corn in the northwest, where sheep are also extensively raised. Near the Black Sea there are large vineyards and orchards. The oblast is one of the most important wine-producing districts of the USSR. Along the coast there are fisheries and saltworks. Building materials constitute the only mineral resources.

SU 241 u 241

SU 438x [504] u 438 [504]

Izmail (Rumanian *Ismaïl*) is a port and a fishing center on the Kiliya arm of the Danube delta. It produces caviar and has an active grain and lumber trade.

Kiliya (Rumanian *Chilia Nouă*) is a fishing port on the Danube delta, east of Izmail.

Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy (Rumanian *Cetatea Albă*) was known as Akkerman until 1944. It is a port on the Dniester Liman, trading in wine, fish, and wool. It has fisheries and saltworks and is surrounded by vineyards and orchards.

POLES'YE

SU 311 241 u 311 241

The Ukrainian Poles'ye, which includes the oblasts of Zhitomir and Chernigov and the northern sections of Kiev and Sumy oblasts, is distinguished by a relatively high humidity, wooded terrain (especially in the west), and podsolic soils, similar to its Belorussian counterpart, which adjoins it in the north. Among the sparsely settled population, industries are poorly developed. Intensive crops are grown in the forest clearings, including flax, hemp, potatoes, and forage crops, which support some dairy-cattle herds. In the south, along the border of the wooded steppe zone, sugar beets and tobacco are cultivated. The Poles'ye is the only Ukrainian region (not counting the western oblasts, which have not been long exposed to the Soviet planned economy) where rye acreage exceeds that of wheat. Buckwheat is also grown as a local food staple. Industry is largely based on agricultural and lumber resources. Among the food industries, starch processing and distilling are the chief activities. There are woodworking and furniture plants, porcelain works, tanneries, and hemp and flax retting installations. Among the mineral resources, one should note granite, sandstone, used in the making of refractory bricks, and labradorite. Peat extraction is important as a fuel basis.

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Zhitomir Oblast

Area, 11,600, population, 1,800,000

Zhitomir Oblast lies on the northern edge of the Volyn'-Podolian upland and extends northward into the Poles'ye. Sugar beets and wheat penetrate into the southern section, but in the remainder, potatoes, flax, buckwheat, and hops are grown. The forested area in the north yields lumber, clays, kaolin, and granite, and quartzite and has ceramic and paper-milling industries. In the southern rural areas sugar refining, distilling, and flour milling are the main industries.

Zhitomir, on the Teterev River, is a rail center, with lumber and grain trade. It has large furniture factories.

Berdichev, an active trading center, has important sugar and leather industries and clothing and dyeing plants, and flour and tobacco products are produced there.

Korosten', a rail junction in the northern part of the oblast, has various chemical plants, glass and porcelain works, and lumber and paper mills.

Novograd-Volynskiy, in the southwest, has machine shops and distilling and furniture industries.

Chernigov Oblast

Area, 12,200, population, 1,700,000

Chernigov Oblast is bounded on the west by the Dnieper and is drained by its chief left affluent, the Desna River. In addition to the basic rye, oats, and buckwheat crops, hemp and flax are grown in the north, potatoes in the center, and sugar beets, tobacco, and mint in the southeast. Lumbering is carried on in the wooded areas of the north and the west, and peat cutting in the marshy river valleys. Sugar refining, flour milling, meat packing, and flax and hemp retting are the main rural industries.

Chernigov, on the right bank of the Desna River, is one of the oldest cities of the Ukraine, having lumber and food-processing industries (canned goods, alcohol, and flour) and chemical works.

Nezhin is an agricultural center in a grain, potato, and sugar-beet district, while Priluki, the other industrial center of the oblast, processes sugar, tobacco, and flour and engages in the manufacture of clothing, leather goods, and furniture.

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Ukraine R01

WESTERN UKRAINE

THE WESTERN UKRAINE includes those areas (except for Izmail Oblast) which were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR after 1939 and later. Six oblasts (Rovno, Volyn', Ternopol', L'vov, Stanislav, and Drogobych) were annexed in the autumn of 1939 following the partition of Poland and the Soviet occupation of its eastern section. Chernovtsy Oblast was formed in the Northern Bukovina and the extreme northern section of Bessarabia after the acquisition of these territories from Rumania, in the summer of 1940. The Transcarpathian Oblast was ceded to the Ukraine according to an agreement with Czechoslovakia in 1945. The Western Ukraine can be roughly considered in four geographical sections: the Carpathian section in the south, on the slopes and in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, the Poles'ye, a northern lowland along the right affluents of the Pripet River, the hilly central section in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, and the Transcarpathian section.

The Carpathian section of the Western Ukraine includes the oblasts of Chernovtsy, Stanislav, and Drogobych. Its economy is based essentially on the mineral resources of the area: petroleum, natural gas, salt, and potash, and on the lumber resources on the slopes. There are a number of health resorts in the valleys.

Chernovtsy Oblast

Area, 3,200, population, 900,000

Chernovtsy Oblast lies along the upper Prut and the Dniester rivers. The forests (mainly beech), building materials, salt, and petroleum are found in the higher foothills. Agriculture puts the emphasis on grains (wheat, corn, and barley), potatoes and sugar beets in the south and on fruit growing along the Dniester, in the northeast. Sheep raising and lumbering are the main activities in the mountains. Sawmilling, woodworking, sugar refining, flour milling, and wine making are the chief rural industries.

Chernovtsy (Rumanian *Cernăuți*) called Chernovitsy until 1944, lies on a terrace above the Prut River. It has large textile and machine industries and produces chemicals, lumber, and food products.

Storozhinets (Rumanian *Storojineț*) is a road center in the agricultural region southwest of Chernovtsy.

SU 438* U 438 Khotin (Rumanian *Hotin*) lies in an orchard and vineyard area on the Dniester River. There is a noted leather industry.

Stanislav Oblast

Area, 5,400, population, 1,800,000

SU 133* U 133 Stanislav Oblast is drained by the upper Dniester and its right affluents descending from the Carpathian Mountains. It has important petroleum, salt, natural-gas, and potash deposits in the areas of Dolina and Bolekhov, with petroleum fields extending along the foothills in a southeasterly direction to Kosmach, southwest of Kolomyya. The principal oil towns are Bolekhov, Dolina, Pereginsko, Bogorodchany (where ozocerite is also secured), Solotvin, Nadvornaya, Pechenezhin, and Kosmach. Petroleum is refined at Bolekhov, Stanislav, and Kolomyya. The main lumber centers are Delyatin and Kuty, which has a large wood-distillation industry. On the right bank of the Dniester River lies the agricultural zone of the oblast, where grains, tobacco, and sugar beets are raised. Tobacco is processed at Zabolotov and sugar at Gorodenka.

SU 313 U 313 SU 241 U 241

SU 438* U 438 Stanislav (Polish *Stanisławów*, German *Stanislau*) has railroad and machine shops, an oil refinery, and textile and leather industries and produces asphalt, ceramics, lumber, and food products.

Kolomyya (Polish *Kołomyja*, German *Kolomea*), on the upper Prut River, has machine works and oil-refining and chemical plants. Textiles and cement are also produced.

Drogobych Oblast

Area, 4,000, population, 1,200,000

SU 135 U 135 Drogobych Oblast lies on the northern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and is bordered by Poland in the west. It is the chief petroleum region of the Western Ukraine, with the chief oil fields in the area of Drogobych and Borislav. Near by are potassium and magnesium salt mines and natural-gas wells. Salt is mined at Dobromil'. Agriculture is important along the Dniester River.

SU 438* 315 U [438] 315 Drogobych (Polish *Drohobycz*) is the center of the Western Ukrainian petroleum region, with important refining and chemical installations and potash and magnesium salt mines. It trades in petroleum, livestock, and agricultural products and produces rubber goods, lumber, and food products.

SU 315 Borislav (Polish *Borysław*) is another petroleum center southwest of Drogobych. It has petroleum and natural-gas wells and engages in the

manufacture of drilling equipment and the processing of ozocerite. The health resort of Truskavets, with mineral springs, lies just to the east.[1]

Sambor is an agricultural center, with sawmilling, flour-milling, and distilling industries.

Stryy (Polish *Stryj*) is a rail center where there are machine and metalworking industries, producing mainly drilling equipment, and chemical and lumber (matches and furniture) plants. Petroleum and natural gas are secured near by. From the gas wells of Dashava, just northeast of the city, a pipe line has been laid to Kiev during the post-war Five-Year Plan for industrial and domestic consumption.

The Poles'ye, which is wooded in the north, close to the Pripet River, also contains extensive marshy areas. It is the most backward section of the Western Ukraine. Its subsistence crops are rye and potatoes. Industry is poorly developed and is restricted to flour milling, sawmilling, and brickworking in the rural areas.

Rovno Oblast

Area, 8,000, population, 1,200,000

Rovno Oblast is drained by the Goryn and its affluent, the Sluch'. In the south, on the higher ground of the Volyn'-Podolian upland, agriculture produces grains, hops, tobacco, and sugar beets; in the northern section lumbering is the main industry. Granite, cement rock, and slate are quarried.

Rovno (Polish *Równe*) is a rail center having railroad shops, agricultural machinery works, and chemical and lumber industries.

Volyn' Oblast

Area, 7,700, population, 1,100,000

Volyn' Oblast which borders on Poland along the Western Bug River in the west, has some agriculture (grains and tobacco) in the south, but mainly lumbering industries in the north, along the Pripet River and its affluents.

Lutsk (Polish *Łuck*), the capital, lies on a minor rail branch, at the southern edge of the Pripet Marshes. It is an agricultural center and produces agricultural implements, clothing, leather, lumber, and flour.

Vladimir-Volynskiy (Polish *Włodzimierz*) is a rail junction and grain-trading point near the Polish border.

[1] [of Boriskav in Drogobych Oblast -- Analyst]

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Kovel' (Polish *Kowel*) is a rail center with knitting and hosiery mills, sawmills, tobacco, and flour mills.

The central section of the Western Ukraine lies in the fertile Volyn'-Podolian upland and includes the oblasts of Ternopol' and L'vov, as well as the adjoining zones of the oblasts to the north and the south. It is drained by the Dniester River and its left affluents, which cut deep ravines into the plateau. Its black-earth soils and the moderate climate favor an agricultural economy. The section is very similar to the right-bank wooded steppe of the old Soviet Ukraine in its dense rail network, its concentrated population, and the large number of urban centers. Grains (wheat, rye, and barley), potatoes, and sugar beets are the basic crops for the large food-processing industry, with flour mills and distilleries.

Ternopol' Oblast

Area, 5,300, population, 1,500,000

Ternopol' Oblast lies in the watershed area between the Pripet and the Dniester rivers. Grains (mainly winter wheat) and sunflowers are the principal crops throughout the larger portion of the oblast. Sugar beets are cultivated in the extreme north, and fruits in the south along the Dniester River. Building stone is quarried in several places.

Ternopol' (until 1944, Tarnopol') is a rail center with an active grain and egg trade. It produces agricultural implements, cement, lumber, and food products.

Kremenets (Polish *Krzemieniec*), on a rail spur north of Ternopol', produces flour-milling equipment, ceramics, and cement. There are peat bogs and chalk quarries.

Chortkov (Polish *Czortków*) is a rail center south of Ternopol', producing rubber goods, cement, and tile.

L'vov Oblast

Area, 4,300, population, 1,500,000

L'vov Oblast lies on the Polish border on the upper Western Bug. East of L'vov grains, potatoes, and fruits are the chief crops. Extensive quarrying industries form the basis for the manufacture of cement, glass, bricks, and tiles.

L'vov (Polish *Lwów*), the largest city of the Western Ukraine, is a nine-way rail hub and major industrial center trading in agricultural

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Ukraine R01

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438

products, petroleum, and lumber. It produces precision instruments, radio and telegraph equipment, and light bulbs. Its machinery plants produce agricultural implements, gas equipment, and bicycles. Other industries are connected with oil refining, textile milling, glassworking, and the manufacture of furniture, shoes, and lumber and food products. During the post-war Five-Year Plan, which schedules further industrialization of the city, an automobile assembly plant will go into operation.

Zolochev (Polish *Złoczów*), on the L'vov-Ternopol' railroad, is a center for newly developed lignite mines. It has metalworking, tanning, lumber, and distilling industries.

Transcarpathian Oblast

Area, 5,000, population, 900,000

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133x
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133

The Transcarpathian (Russian *Zakarpatskaya*) Oblast lies on the southwest slopes of the eastern Carpathians and is watered by mountain streams flowing southward to the Tisza River, an affluent of the Danube. The mountain slopes, which extend throughout the major part of the territory, are covered with excellent beech and oak stands. Fertile soils, suitable for the growing of grains (corn, wheat, oats, and rye) and potatoes, are found only in the mountain valleys and in the southern zone along the Tisza River. On the southern hill slopes grapes and tobacco are grown. Among the mineral resources salt is mined at Solotvin and there are petroleum, lignite, and low-quality iron deposits. Several mineral springs have bottling industries. Wood distillation and woodworking industries are found at Svalyava, Perechin, and Velikiy Bychkov. A paper mill has been constructed at Rakhovo during the post-war period. The region, which was formerly known as Carpatho-Ukraine, or Ruthenia, and in Czech as *Podkarpatska Rus*, was ceded by Czechoslovakia in September, 1945 and organized as a separate oblast within the Ukrainian SSR.

SU
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Uzhgorod (Czech *Užhorod*, Hungarian *Ungvár*), near the Czech border, is the capital of the oblast. It has food-processing and lumber industries.

Mukachevo (Czech *Mukačevo*, Hungarian *Munkács*), southeast of Uzhgorod, is another industrial center of the region.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

considerably. For 1938 the average figure for grain was given as 10.9 q/ha, for 1939 = 13.9 q/ha, for 1940 = 19.5 q/ha ("Visti" of 11. II. 1941). The average for those three years would be 13 q/ha, higher by 50 % than the average for 1931—1935. As these data were compiled for a meeting of the communist party, a tendency to propaganda must be borne in mind; even in official Soviet statistics, final figures are often more modest than those just quoted. But, in spite of an undisputed increase in yield, the economy of Ukraine must either be strengthened or increased, or both, if it is to be healthy. 241 433

2. Soil and Climate

Ukraine contains 44 % of the Black Earth in Europe (160.5 million ha) and almost 8 % of that in the whole world (900 million ha) and is one of the largest Black Earth areas in existence. In Ukraine itself $^3/_4$ of the entire soil is Black Earth and only $^1/_4$ podsol earth, mountain soil and the good renzine soil of Galicia. Podsol earth predominated in Podlakhia, the Kholm district, North Volynia, in Galician Subcarpathia, in the flats round the Syan and the Upper Buh, in Polesya and partly in the district of Chernyhiv. 134 ●

Black Earth is one of the best soils and excellently suited to grain. Its humus content is high, its structure crumbly and it is extremely porous. The humus binds certain quantities of moisture which are distributed fairly evenly. Black Earth dries quickly on the surface but lower down it retains moisture for a fair time, even during drought. It preserves its natural fertility for a long time, does not call for any complicated preparation and is easy to work. It requires no manure which may be positively bad for it and even when exploited, the soil preserves itself, so to speak. It needs a relatively small amount of seed.

It is not necessary to have any specially developed agricultural implements on Black Earth: motor-plows and power-driven agricultural machinery are eminently suitable for the great plains that all demand the same treatment. That is why the tendency to mechanisation and to introduce big-scale operations is particularly marked in the Black Earth areas. 241

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

311 and the Middle East have been left in suspense, a territory the size of
648 Europe and new routes into the heart of China and ultimately to the Pacific have been brought under Soviet control. Under these circumstances 'the wheat-fields of the Ukraine' receded again into the background and became of only local importance: the more so since, in the two Soviet 'Economic Plans', interest in South-Eastern Russia has been concentrated on the industrial development of the New Russian region. These conditions are illustrated by the growth of industrial centres like Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Lugansk, Zaporozhie, and the decline of the great grain port of Odessa.

311 The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine has never in fact justified the enthusiasm which it has inspired from the time of the seventeenth-century Polish poet quoted in an earlier context to the more recent period of Herr Hitler and his apostles of *Lebensraum*. The natural conditions of the Ukraine are such that they really generously reward agricultural labour, but they exact always patient, strenuous and systematic toil.

Natural conditions differ greatly over the expanse of the country which Michael Dragomanov considered to constitute 'Greater Ukraine'. The agricultural 'age' of these territories differs in the extreme. In New Russia agriculture is only a century old, while Galicia has supported a numerous population of husbandmen for nearly a thousand years.

162 *Galicia* is one of the oldest agricultural lands of all Europe and conditions there have hardly altered since the days of Daniel and his
134 *boyars*. The Galician earth, black in the eastern part, is tired old soil,
311 impoverished by incessant labour, itself prompted and intensified by
167 the ever-growing care of an ever-growing population to acquire its daily bread. Owing to the density of the population (110, and in some regions 132, inhabitants to the square kilometre) the area of holdings had been reduced to a minimum: 46 per cent of the farms comprise 2 hectares of land and sometimes less; 37 per cent comprise from 2 to 5 hectares. In a countryside where urban life has remained relatively stagnant live 75 per cent of the total population; while all commerce and crafts remain in the hands of the Jews in the large towns and in many of the villages, there is a 50 per cent surplus of hands among agricultural labourers. The peasants, Poles and Ukrainians alike, used to migrate to Germany and France as casual labour; before the last war they emigrated also in large numbers to Canada and the United States.

474 These arduous conditions of peasant life gradually developed a capacity for organization. Driven by necessity, the Galician peasantry set up a network of co-operatives for production and

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

distribution. These co-operatives formed the basis of a certain national unity which found expression in the political field. 474

Volhynia, partitioned after the war of 1920 between the Poles and the Soviets, is nearly as old an agricultural country as Galicia. Here the strips of rich black earth alternate with sandy and wooded country. Although density of population is not so great as in Galicia, poverty is perhaps even greater, owing to a lack of that capacity for organization which helps the Galician labourers to survive. The large estates of the Polish nobility have long disappeared; after the last war the Polish Government divided up the land. Numerous strips were allotted to Polish soldiers on the expiration of their service—with the intention of strengthening the Polish ethnic and cultural element in the region. The disappearance of the large estates, as in Transylvania and Roumania, had a deleterious effect on agricultural production and on the proper exploitation of the forests. The majority of the people lead a half-starved existence, and the young men dream of emigration to South America. In 1937, 25 per cent of the population of Polish Volhynia had neither bread nor wood. 311 134 241 735

Podolia has been a land of cultivation since the Middle Ages, although the soil was broken up two or three hundred years later than in Galicia and Volhynia. Now, as before the period of war and revolution (1914–20), Podolia remains in a close economic relationship to the other parts of the Ukraine. The black earth of this favoured province is really fruitful and well watered by numerous small rivers; climatic conditions are better than anywhere throughout the Ukraine—rain is plentiful and regular and the winters are short. It was probably the fields and pastures, the hillocks and woods of Podolia which the Polish poet had in mind when he wrote lyrically of 'the birthplace of Ceres and Diana'. Horticulture and apiculture have long flourished there. 311 134

In the past social conditions varied with the political situation according to whether the small landowners (Ukrainian Cossacks) or the Polish landlords were in the ascendant. During the eighteenth century Polish elements had the upper hand and for some time Podolia remained the last refuge of the Polish aristocracy. Polish social influences survived the Three Partitions, and it was only after the Polish Insurrection of 1830 that conditions began to change in favour of the Russian majority in the population. 177

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century this rich land with its soft climate had become very densely populated. By the end of the century Podolia ranked second in density of population of all the regions of the Russian Empire. The Government of Moscow took 162 311

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

162 first place, but in its population was included the million inhabitants
311 of the second capital of the Empire, while in Podolia there was no single town which numbered more than fifty thousand inhabitants. Density of population in Podolia reached the figure of 100 to the square kilometre, but the province was saved from the problems of over-population by the development of the large estates on capitalist lines. This process began about 1830 and developed on a large scale [178] after 1870. The beet-sugar industry with its subsidiary alcoholic distilleries, flour mills and horticulture provided a variety of livelihood for a population which by 1897 had attained to nearly four and a half millions. Between the years 1896 and 1933 more than a million and a half peasants migrated from other districts of the Ukraine to Siberia and the steppes beyond the Volga, but in Podolia emigration was scarcely perceptible.

[134] *The southern part of the Government of Kiev* along the right bank of the Dniepr enjoyed conditions somewhat similar to those in Podolia, while the northern districts resembled rather Volhynia. In the south a rich black earth supported a number of large estates where the beet-sugar industry, distilleries and mills flourished. In these southern districts were many well-to-do peasant farms covering up to 20 and 30 hectares apiece. Wheat was grown in sufficient quantities to satisfy local needs and to supply the six hundred thousand inhabitants of the city of Kiev. At the beginning of the century the population of the Government of Kiev amounted to over four and a half millions. At that time the three Governments of right-bank Ukraine (Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia) contained fourteen million inhabitants with an average density of 70–80 people per square kilometre. Such numbers were quite 'European' in their proportions and should have tended to discourage those Western dreamers who were even then casting envious eyes on the 'vacant lands' of the Ukraine.

It was almost equally difficult to discover 'vacant lands' in the [134] Governments of *left-bank Ukraine*. In Poltava, Chernigov and Kharkov the density of population amounted to 60–70 people per square kilometre. The uninterrupted belt of black earth in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov had been under the plough only since the seventeenth century—and many parts of it not before the eighteenth century. This was the land of which Alexey Tolstoy wrote: 'Know ye the land where all breathes plenty and content, where rivers flow as silver clear.' There were scarcely any towns of importance in this rural elysium. The characteristics of the Government of Kharkov, on the other hand, were quite distinct from those of the two adjoining left-bank provinces: in the north-west,

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the New Russian Governments) there were over 1 million hectares 433
under beetroot. Just before the last war the annual production of
beet in the Ukraine reached 150 million quintals: i.e. 18 per cent of 244
world production. The production of Ukrainian beet sugar ranked fourth—after that of America, Germany and France. In 1913 the Ukraine produced 11 million quintals of crystallized sugar. This output, together with that of the Polish factories, covered all the needs of the internal market (which during the preceding twenty-five years had augmented fourfold) and provided substantial surplus for export to the Baltic and the Middle East.

In addition to the beet processing plants, about 60 per cent of the alcohol refineries (corn, potatoes) of the Empire were located in the [274]
Ukraine. The production of vegetable oil (particularly from sunflower seed) was also important.

It has been estimated by the Soviet paper *Pravda* that approximately 1 milliard of rubles a year was paid for services on the semi-industrialized estates of landowners throughout Russia: of this sum a considerable proportion was paid for the hire of horse transport (since landowners did not maintain a large number of draught horses but hired from the villages). Of this milliard, about 300,000,000 were paid out in the Ukraine. As the peasant population of the [511]
Ukraine numbered about fifteen millions, some 20 rubles a year per head of the population was earned on 'supplementary' work on the large estates. 'Only owing to the sugar and other agricultural industries could the dense population of the Ukraine exist in such comparatively well-to-do circumstances.'

Thus the agricultural economy of Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, [241]
Chernigov and Poltava was based only partly on the production of cereals. With a population which reached nearly twenty millions, only about 2 million hectares were under wheat, while in New Russia, with a population about half that of the Ukrainian Governments, there were 4 million hectares under wheat. The Ukraine
exported only small quantities of wheat to Poland and White [439]
Russia, which provinces drew the bulk of their supplies from New
Russia. The real 'granaries' of Russia which supplied the whole [134]
Empire and exported a surplus abroad were the regions of the northern Caucasus and Trans-Volga with western Siberia and New Russia (including the Governments of Kherson and Ekaterinoslav with the northern part of Tauris and the southern part of Kharkov) In those regions the black earth really had a virgin quality during the first half of the nineteenth century; and its richness remains exceptional even now.

As a rule, the climatic conditions in the *New Russian Governments* 000

137 Between the zone of the forests and that of the deserts, a geographical zone which enjoys a rich vegetation of corns and grasses stretches across the Russian plain. It is the Steppe, which begins on the shores of the Black Sea and almost immediately behind the Carpathians, a little to the east of Lvov, in Polish Galicia, along longitude 22 degrees east, and which continues from west to east, growing gradually wider beyond the frontiers of the Ukraine, and passing the official and conventional limit of Europe without interruption into Siberia.

134 Treeless since time immemorial, the plain is here exceptionally fertile. The grasses which grow here since prehistoric times have formed a thick layer of humus by their organic remains, which particularly favours the growth of all cereals, close relations of the wild species of the Steppe, the *pyrei*. The fertility of the soil is not only due to its organic composition but also to its porous structure whose capillary qualities facilitate irrigation.

This famous 'black earth,' the *tchernoziom*, is nowhere so rich as in the Ukraine. It forms, while becoming somewhat poorer towards the east, the typical soil of the whole Steppe both in the Ukraine and in Siberia.

137 The transition between the region of the forests and the Steppe is also not sudden. Before disappearing definitely in the ocean of corn and grass, the forests become lighter and sparser and here and there, especially along the rivers, they advance into the Steppes.

131 Yet the frontier between the zone of the forests and that of the Steppe is the only natural border which one can find in the immensity of the Russian plain. Formerly a stable political boundary—as we shall see when studying the history of the Ukraine[2]—it represents nothing to-day either from the ethnical or the political point of view.

2 [see category 116, pp. 27-106 --- Analyst]

131 eastern frontier at the 50th degree latitude north, while cutting the territory into two almost equal parts.

132 In the northern zone (Zone 1) the rainfall is everywhere greater than 50 centimetres, while in the southern zone (Zone 2) it is less than 50 centimetres and varies between 25 and 50 centimetres.

134 The predominant soils of Zone 1 are poor *tchernozioms*, that is to say somewhat exhausted by the currents of water which have deprived them of their humus to a varying extent in different regions, and have brought to them some sand and clay from their sources.

On the contrary, the lands of Zone 2 are rich and complete *tchernozioms*.

137 Zone 1 comprises a vast forest region which, while spreading along the courses of the river becomes little by little a land of light woods, is yet characterized by the general presence of forests.

Zone 2 has no forests and is the true Steppe.

131 This separation is in practice nothing else but the frontier between the Steppe as such and the *lesso-steppe* (a Steppe with occasional woods)—a geographical term which has been accepted by Russian scientists for a long time.

This border is also that which defined the cradle of Russia, the ancient principality of Kiev, separating it from the savage Steppe of the nomads. Therefore, already at that distant epoch, the separation between these two agro-climatic zones existed in practice. Thus justified from a geographical point of view, the border between these two zones is all the more acceptable, as it is in tune with an historic reality since the establishment of settled populations.

000 Each time when we treat the question of populations in our study (the difference of density, of social distribution, and of ethnical composition), of agriculture

[See category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563 and the Greeks who competed with the merchant Jews in the great ports, where they formed very united and wealthy autonomous communities which to-day have been repatriated or dispersed.

II

Agriculture

241 Fundamentally an agricultural land, the Ukraine is particularly the land of cereals.

The incomparable richness of these lands, her temperate climate, and the aptitude of her population have made this branch of human activity the fundamental wealth of the country.

134 311 With the exception of the forest regions of the north-west, where sandy soil is met, nearly all the lands of the Ukraine are arable and actually only a few tens of thousands of hectares of waste land remain, which serve as natural pasturages and give an excellent hay which is very well suited for horses.

243 About 25,000,000 hectares are sown, of which 20,000,000 are growing cereals.

The abundance of nitrates in the surface layer of the earth, and its capillary structure, perfect for irrigation, allow the cultivation of the most valuable of cereals—[311] wheat. The area that has been sown with this cereal occupies more than 35 per cent of the worked land of the Ukraine and its production rises to 90,000,000 quintals, representing almost 8 per cent of the world harvest and 18 per cent of the European harvest.

The cultivation of wheat seems to develop from year to year at the expense of barley and of rye, cereals of inferior quality.

From the end of the nineteenth century wheat has

467 missionaires, dock and wharf laborers, outdoor servants, &c. The members of *artels* in the second group always receive employment in preference to other workers, as their trustworthiness is guaranteed by the *artel*, and the fact of their membership is some guarantee that they are efficient.

The *artels* are democratic and useful institutions, and, in a country where promptness and trustworthiness are somewhat rare qualities, they play a most valuable part in giving a measure of confidence and security to both employers and workmen.

(2) Agriculture

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

243 The agricultural industry is the largest in the Ukraine, and employs the great majority of the [134] population. The black-soil region extends over most of the area, only the Governments of Kiev, Podolia, and Chernigov, and the borders of the Black Sea, lying [433] outside it. It follows that the suitability of the Ukraine [439] for cereals is equal to that of any part of the world, and its surplus crops form a considerable proportion of the world's food-supply.

243 The mean area under cultivation in the period 1901–5 433 was 52,000,000 acres, producing 20,700,000 tons annually. Of this total, 45,600,000 acres were under breadstuff crops, and produced 15,000,000 tons. For the year 1914, the figures were 56,300,000 acres, producing 23,000,000 tons. Of this 50,400,000 acres were under breadstuff crops, with a return of 15,900,000 tons.

243 *Rye* is the principal crop, and is produced on the 439 peasants' lands more largely than any other cereal. It is the staple breadstuff of the country, and the internal consumption absorbs a large part of the crop, a minor quantity only being exported. In some years the crop is not sufficient for the home demand, and the peasants have to use imported flour or substitutes.

Wheat is next in importance, and provides the largest surplus for export. It is mainly grown on

132 not be one of those terrible thunderstorms which
/15/ hover threateningly over the villages for half a day at a time, sending down ghastly lightning or cloudbursts which wash away the humus. Nor should the moisture be accompanied by one of those icy snowstorms in which man and animal, shepherds and herds numbering in the thousands easily come to grief if they are caught by the impenetrable swirl of flakes on the open field.

133 The geographers who like to divide up the earth into zones studied Ukrainian soil with regard to its flora and found that north Ukraine down to Kiyev belongs to the region of north European forests where, besides oak, alder and birch, the spruce flourishes. In the south and southeast the dense forests open up into park landscapes and forest glades. The farther south one goes, the more scarce and sparse the islands of mighty oaks, lindens and elms become. This is the region of the wooded steppe which finally passes over into
● 134 the open, almost treeless grassy steppe. Seventy million hectares of Ukrainian soil is fertile black earth. It has erroneously been considered inexhaustible. Even though today the soil does not yet tolerate any artificial fertilizer, scholars are already racking their brains over the sad prospect that the natural fertility of black loam, the ideal of all farmers the world over, will be exhausted in about 50 years. Already at the time of the last czar, model farms and experimental stations sought ways and means to meet this danger.

*

000 Come along, comrade, and wander to the east toward the rising sun, into the land which at its greatest expanse is as long as the distance from Barcelona to Memel and as wide as the realm between the Brenner Pass and Kiel. Climb up from the merrily babbling Poprad through beech forests,

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Mineral Resources

●135 The distribution of minerals in Ukraine is most favorable. The most important supplies are in the midst of areas that are valuable from the point of view of agriculture: coal and salt in the Donets Basin, iron and manganese ore at the Bend of the Dnipro. Even the minerals in the Carpathians and the Caucasus (oil etc.), in spite of their remoteness from the center of the country, have fertile foreland in the vicinity.

There are secondary deposits scattered throughout the country (lignite, kaolin, peat etc.). In general, the mineral supplies of Ukraine are easy to get at; the problem of transportation is more easily solved than in Russia and there is little difference between geological deposits and those worth exploiting. In the last 30 years much progress has been made in mineral surveys, not that extensive new deposits have been discovered, but investigation of deposits already known has led to intensive operation of these.

In Ukraine, minerals occur over a large area and at no great depth. It is a disadvantage that productive layers are often limited and unevenly distributed; there are "dead" intervals and sometimes impurities that detract from quality; these faults are not present in the most important deposits of iron ore at Kryvyj Rih.

1. Main Minerals and Areas of Occurrence

Ukraine is richer in sources of fuel and power than most European countries. We only need mention the sole great coal deposit in Eastern Europe in the Donets Basin. The oil wells in the foothills on both wings of the Ukrainian territory are exposed from the point of view of strategy. Wood alone must be imported. There are many sources of water power, even if they are not very significant.

Metals are very unevenly distributed. While there is but a small quantity of non-precious metals, the abundance of ores for heavy iron industry assure for Ukraine an eminent place among the ore-producing countries of the world and it is even first as a producer of manganese ore. There are generous deposits of alumina, among others kaolin, salt, graphite and building materials, though one would not think so from the wretched condition of the roads. 135

The mineral wealth of the country is distributed as follows:

1) In the Donets Basin: coal, rock and other salt, some iron and other ores, including mercury, phosphorite, kaolin, fireproof alumina, many small deposits of other metals, limestone, marl, dolomite, chalk, quartz sand, building stone etc.
2) In the Dnipro Bend on Right Bank: iron ore at Kryvyj Rih and manganese ore at Nikopil; also graphite, ochre, brown coal, kaolin.
3) In the foreland of the Caucasus: petroleum, some coal, lead, tin and iron ores, many small deposits of non-precious minerals, largish deposits of cement, rich deposits of iron ore on the Kerch Peninsula.
4) In the Carpathians: petroleum, mineral wax, salt (also on south side), potassium, manganese ore, some iron ore, graphite, brown coal etc.

A small part of the coal deposit on the Donets spreads on to territory that is not Ukrainian. But, otherwise, all this mineral wealth is in Ukrainian soil, even if the influx of foreign labor has led to a decline in the Ukrainian population in some localities.

Such factors determine the place of Ukraine in the world sources of petroleum. The Galician oilfields are in ancient Ukrainian territory, but long Polish pressure has won the upper hand in a small part of the oilfields of Jaslo in the west. The oilfields in the Kuban area lie in territory that was long ago colonised by Ukraine, whereas the colonising process is still active in the Terek areas. The Groznyj petroleum field in North Caucasia has not yet been colonised by Ukrainians and, like many industrial areas, forms a Russian island that is miles away from contiguous Russian territories. If Ukraine claims Groznyj, it is

● 135 giving expression to a certain territorial theory, but above all to the natural ambition of a colonising nation to penetrate and hold the entire area it has settled.

2. Coal

Coal has recently been discovered outside of the Donets Basin 30 kilometers from Lviv, at Kaminka Strumylova, Sokal and Zadviria; the extent of this coalfield has not yet been determined.

In North Caucasia, where the entire coal has been estimated at 740 million t, 96 millions having beeen definitely established, the deposits south of Batalpashynske on the upper reaches of the Kuban and its tributaries are known to exist though there has been little prospecting. The deposit is usually estimated at 115 million t, while 38 million t have actually been proved to exist (the calorific value is low, viz. 6 900 for coal from the best known coalfields and 7 900 for those of best quality). The deposits at Koushin, Balaclava and Telenejir in the Crimea, estimated at 340 million t, are not first rate either.

The coal fields on the Don lie on the right bank of the lower reaches of the river from the district of Izium to where it flows into the Don. They have an area of 23 000 sq. kilometers compared with the 3 000 sq. kilometers of the Ruhr area which is richer in coal. The seams are fairly shallow, practically indeed on the surface (compared to the 350 meters depth in Upper Silesia). The average depth of the mine-shaft is 146 meters while in the Ruhr it is more than 600 meters and in the most important English mines 312 meters. The cost of bringing the coal to the surface is therefore relatively low.

The average thickness of the seams is scarcely $^3/_4$ meters, twice or three times less than in the Ruhr area or in the Kusnets Basin in Siberia. They run unevenly and are not continuous. The Donets coal contains more impurities and 10—14 % ash, compared with 8—9 % in Germany and 7—10 % in the „Kusbas" and its sulphur content is also greater (almost 2 % compared with 1.2 % and 0.5 % respectively). These are disadvantages for the carbonisation process.

At the Geological Conference in Toronto in 1913 the coal resources of the Donets Basin were estimated at 55.6 milliard t.

Table 4. Coal Resources in Leading Countries

	Anthracite		Coal		Brown coal		Altogether		Europe
	Mrd. t	% World	Mrd. t	% World	Mrd. t	% World	Mrd. t	% World	%
1. USA	19,7	3,4	1956	47,2	1863	64,0	3839	50,2	(480)
2. China	388,0	66,1	607	14,6	0,6	—	996	13,0	(154)
3. Canada	2,1	0,4	284	6,9	948	32,6	1234	16,1	(125)
4. Soviet Union	128,0	21,8	332	8,0	20,0	0,7	480	6,3	(59)
(Asiatic area)	(107,0)	Europe	(284)	Europe	(7,1)	Europe	(398)	(5,2)	—
(European area)	(20,8)	55,7	(48)	(6.7)	(12,9)	(25,3)	(77)	(1,0)	9,6
5. Germany	—	—	430	60,0	26,0	51,0	456	6,0	57,0
(Poland)	—	—	(170)	(23,7)	—	—	(170)	(2,2)	(21,2)
6. England	11,4	30,5	178	24,9	—	—	190	2,5	23,8
7. Ukraine	11,8	31,6	43	6,0	5,0	9,8	60	0,7	7,5
8. France	3,3	8,8	29	4,1	1,6	3,1	34	0,5	4,3
9. Belgium	—	—	11	1,5	—	—	11	0,5	1,4
10. Spitzbergen	—	—	8,8	1,2	—	—	8,8		1,1
11. Spain	1,6	4,3	6,4	0,9	0,8	1,8	8,8		1,1
12. Holland	0,3	0,8	4,1	0,6	—	—	4,4		0,6
Europe	37	6,3	716	17,3	47	1,6	800	10,5	100
Asia	514	87,6	978	23,6	12	0,4	1505	29,7	(188)
North America	22	3,7	2240	54,0	2812	96,7	5073	66,4	(634)
South America	1	0,2	31	0,8	—	—	32	0,4	(4)
Africa	12	2,0	45	1,1	1	—	58	0,8	(7)
Australia	1	0,2	133	3,2	35	1,2	169	2,2	(21)
World	590	100	4140	100	2910	100	7640	100	(965)

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Table 5. Coal Resources in 9 Largest Coaling Areas of World.

●/35

Area	Country	Principal kind of coal	mrd. t	% of world	% of total
1. Alberta Saskatchewan	Canada	brown coal	1119	14,6	34,6
2. Shangsi	China	coal & anthracite	714	9,3	22,1
3. Appalachians	USA	coal	551	7,2	17,0
4. Kusnets Basin	Western Siberia	coal	250	3,3	7,7
5. Ruhr	Germany	coal	214	2,8	6,6
6. Upper Silesia	Germany	coal	196	2,6	6,1
7. Donets Basin	Ukraine	coal & anthracite	69	0,9	2,1
8. Cheremkhowo	East Siberia	different varieties	66	0,[illegible]	2,0
9. Yorkshire	England	coal	56	0,7	1,7
Total			3235	42,4	100

Since then newly prospected areas have been added, the process of extension being not yet completed. In 1937 stocks were estimated at 89 mrd. t; but the figure for 1927, 69 mrd. t, calculated for a depth of 1 500 meters is more exact. $^2/_3$ of the coalfields, but much more than $^3/_4$ of the coal supplies (54.3 mrd. t) are in Ukrainian territory. As a producer of coal Ukraine is 7th in the countries of the world and 3rd in Europe.

There are many varieties of coal in the Donets Basin; bituminous, gas and furnace coal are mostly found in the coalfields of the west and the center, while porous coal and anthracite are also found in the eastern fields (the latter represent 30 % of the entire deposit). The 21 mrd. t anthracite here is far more than that found in all the other countries of Europe (17 milliard t). Bituminous coal constitutes less than $^1/_4$ of the Donets deposits.

3. Petroleum

Up to date no great quantities of petroleum have been discovered in Central Ukraine. The natural gas at Melitopil is evidence of petroleum at great depth. During prospective of salt mines in the Left Bank Region, petroleum has also been found.

The Galician oilfields stretch 400 km along the north flank of the Carpathians from Dunajec and the Duklapass to Buco-

vina and cover an area of 10 000 ha. The Jaslo oilfield is west 135
of the Syan, while the main fields of Drohobych with wells at Boryslav, Tustanovychi, Skhidnytsia, Mraznytsia lie east of the same river and the Bytkiv field is in the south-east.

The petroleum in these fields lies far below the surface, 1.000 meters deep in Boryslav and often more than 1 300 meters. Geological conditions make it difficult to exploit the wells, although the upper layers are firmer than those in North Caucasia and the deposits are more concentrated. South of the Carpathians there are insignificant deposits which, however, have perhaps not been sufficiently investigated.

The deposits in the Kuban area are distributed over a wide surface in 7—10 fields from the Taman Peninsula via Maikop, the center of the oil industry to the Laba. Up till now this area has only been 1/4 prospected (22.5 % in 1935). The soil is sandy and the petroleum lies 700 metres deep.

The oilfields of Groznyj lie in the north-east slopes of the Caucasus, on the southern bank of the Terek river. Geological conditions are not favorable and have not been adequately prospected (26 %).

Judged by European standards at least, the stores of petroleum in Ukraine are considerable. Resources in Galicia are estimated at 100 million t, and in the Kuban area at 66—82 million t (but also at far more than the Galician figure), the Groznyj fields are estimated to contain 208—1290 million t. It is true that more recent estimates for North Caucasia are more modest (240 million t in all); nevertheless, Ukraine ranks high among the oil producing countries of the globe.

The quality of the petroleum varies. In Galicia it is mostly of medium weight (specific weight: 0.825—0.835 g); it provides 5—12 % of light fractions, mainly benzine, 51—56 of medium, above all gas for lighting and only 24—30 % of heavy lubricating oils, such as masut, vaseline and the oils with up to 6 % paraffin, which are characteristic for Galicia. In many fields the percentage of benzine is much higher. In the Kuban area there is still more variety between the different fields. Maikop petroleum is lighter than Galician (0.805—0.835 g), contains no paraffin,

135 but more benzine (8—15 %) and even 30 % in the newer fields; Groznyj petroleum is particularly rich in benzine.

It also contains paraffin, but a relatively small percentage of the medium fractions. As a comparison we may quote Pennsylvanian oil (0.791—0.812 g specific weight) which, at a first distillation, yields 10—20 % benzine, 60—75 % medium and only 5—10 % heavy fractions. Baku oil has a specific weight of more than 0.870; it provides 5—7 % benzine, 27—33 % medium and 56 bis 65 % heavy fractions. Galician oil is midway between these two extremes while the varieties in North Caucasia belong rather to the lighter oils.

Mineral wax occurs at Boryslav and some other places in Galicia, but is otherwise very rare throughout the world.

Natural gas is found unaccompanied at Melitopil, Kerch, and in many places in North Caucasia, and otherwise it appears along with oil. It contains 70—97 % methane and also naphtaline, sulphur and other substances that can be used. It has, however, been little investigated and is used only in Galicia for long-distance heating and lighting, but otherwise only locally (8 500—9 000 calories).

4. Other Fuels and Sources of Power

In the Right Bank Region which is so valuable from the agricultural point of view, brown coal is the most abundant fuel. South of the Kyiv district there are the well-known deposits at Katerynopil, Jurkivka, Zhuravka, etc. In the Kirovohrad district (Jelizavethrad) there are those at Balashivka, Katerynivka, etc. In the surroundings of Oleksandrija — Semenivka, Zelenove etc, in the Kryvyj Rih district — Saksahan, Veselo-Ternivka, Heylivka etc. These 4 or 5 groups form a chain, which is, however, not continuous.

The group of deposits in Volynia and Podolia (stocks 30 million t) is centered round the Galician towns of Potylych n .r Rava Ruska, Hlynsko and Skvaryava, and also appear at Kremianets in Volynia. There is a group of deposits in Subcarpathian Galicia (27 million t) at Myshyn, Dzhuriv, Novoselytsia etc, the coal being of superior quality and of higher calorific value (4 100 — 4 400). Soviet estimates for 1940, to

be accepted with caution, increase the entire deposit of brown coal in Galicia and Volynia (the Dnister Basin) of not quite 100 million t to approximetely 1 mrd. In Carpatho - Ukraine there are numerous smaller deposits, to give the better known names for instance in Antalivtsi, Bilky, Dovhe, Nerezhnytsia etc. There is brown coal also in other parts of Ukrainian territory, the brown coal deposits in Ukraine probably amount to some (5—6) mrd. tons. But only a part of the 150 deposits has been investigated and up till now scarcely 518 million tons of industrial deposits have been determined there. They lie at no great depth, though mostly between layers of sand which allow water to sicker through. Mining conditions are difficult. On the whole neither the quality nor the calorific value (a little more than 2 000 on an average) of this earthy brown coal is high (lignite is rare). But brown coal is very good for the manufacture of briquettes and the process increases its calorific value considerably (4 500 calories), and makes it far easier to transport. /35

Peat, still more than brown coal, has the advantage of occurring in districts remote from coaling areas, above all in the north-east area of Ukraine. In some districts of Polesya there is peat over 1/3 of the entire surface. In the Kyiv district, the peat bogs on the river Irpen have long been known, as well as the extensive marshes of the Irdyn on the river Tiasmyn etc.

The peat areas in Ukraine have not been intensively studied. It is estimated that in the central area of the Dnipro region, 1.9 million ha of bogland would produce peat and about 0.8 million ha in Western Ukraine. Taking only 3/4 of that area into consideration, 2.3 million ha represent about 4 % of the entire peat land in Europe (56 million ha). Ukrainian figures are very low compared with the peat resources of the northern areas that belong to USSR. The peat in Ukraine was estimated at approximately 4 mrd. t while the corresponding figure for USSR was perhaps 460 million t. But up till 1927 only 1/3 (35.5 %) of the Dnipro-Ukraine peat land mentioned was registered and only 1/6 has really been prospected.

376 Waterpower in Ukraine is estimated at about 12 million HP. Of this some 9.6 million is supplied by the mountain rivers of North Caucasia. The water-power of the Carpathian rivers is much less, but also less utilised. The fall of the rivers in Dnipro-Ukraine is, of course, incomparably less though they carry far more water. Their water-power is estimated at 1.4 million HP, more than $^2/_3$ being utilised while scarcely 10 % of the entire water-power in Ukraine is harnessed to industry. It is not, however, certain that all the power of the mountain rivers could be utilised for industrial purposes.

5. Iron Ores

(See Table 6)

● 135 Ukraine has small deposits of iron ore in practically all areas, also in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine. In the Kuban area the entire resources amount to almost 100 million t. As an important contributor to the history of production, the Donets Basin must also be mentioned. All those deposits have a local, if sometimes not inconsiderable, significance.

The iron ore deposit at Kryvyj Rih (Russian Kriwoi Rog) is the most important in Eastern Europe, both from the point of view of quality and quantity. The ore lies along the Inhulets, the last tributary on the right bank of the Dnipro, and along its tributaries, the Zhovta and the Saksahan, some 130—200 kilometers from the mouth of the Dnipro. They are found in a hollow some 100 kilometers long but very narrow (2—6—9 km) and are generally only prospected some 320 meters deep, although valuable iron ore was found at a depth of almost 500 meters.

The thickness of the individual layers of ore is, in the least favorable cases, 4—7 meters, but mostly 10—30, 45—65, and more rarely 100—150 meters. Before World War I deposits were estimated at 200—300 million t, which figure rose to 1245 million t by 1932. As this is superior red iron ore, the Kryvyj Rih deposit with a pure metal content of 540 million tons, far surpasses all other iron ore deposits in Eastern Europe, even if they contain more crude ore. The quality of

Table 6. Iron Deposits of Ukraine in Soviet Union

Deposit, District, Country	Iron ores					Quartzite					Total	
	Total Deposits in Mill. t.	% of total Deposits in Soviet Union	A + B Deposits in Mill. t	% of A + B Deposits in Soviet Union	% Share of A + B in total Deposits	Total Deposits in Mrd. t	% of total Deposits of Soviet Union	A + B Deposits in Mrd. t	% of A + B Deposits in Soviet Union	% Share of A + B total Deposits	Total ores and Quartzite in Mrd. t	% of Soviet Union
Kryvyj Rih	1491	13,7	669	14,8	45	51,3	20	10,7	91,5	21	52,8	20
Kerch	2722	25	1638	36,4	60	—	—	—	—	—	2,7	1
North Caucasia	115	1,1	37	0,8	32	—	—	—	—	—	0,1	—
Other Districts	2	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—
Ukraine	4330	39,8	2345	52	54	52,3	20,4	10,7	91,5	20	56,6	21
Kursk	337	3,1	175	3,9	52	203,7	79	0,9	7,3	0,4	204	76
Choper Kalachow	716	6,6	184	4,1	26	—	—	—	—	—	0,7	—
Tula-Lipets a. o.	484	4,5	219	4,8	45	—	—	—	—	—	0,5	—
Central Russia	1537	14,2	578	12,8	37	203,7	79	0,9	7,3	0,4	205,2	76,5
North	1065	9,7	28	0,6	3	0,5	0,2	0,1	0,8	20	1,5	0,5
Transcaucasia	200	1,8	178	4	87	—	—	—	—	—	0,2	—
European area of Soviet Union	7132	65,5	3129	69,4	44	256	99,6	11,7	99,6	4,5	263	98
Ural	2414	22,2	1169	26,1	48	—	—	—	—	—	24	0,9
Kasakstan, Central Asia	119	1,1	11	0,2	9	—	—	—	—	—	0,1	—
Western Siberia	415	3,8	111	2,5	27	—	—	—	—	—	0,4	—
East Siberia, Jakutia	707	6,5	71	1,5	10	—	—	—	—	—	0,7	—
Far East	94	0,9	15	0,3	16	—	—	—	—	—	0,1	—
Soviet Union in Asia	3748	34,5	1377	30,6	37	1	0,4	0,05	0,4	5	4,7	2
Soviet Union total in Mrd. t.	10,9	100	4,5	100	40	257	100	11,7	100	4,5	268	100

● 135 Kryvyj Rih ores has always been acknowledged. They consist of 95 % haematite, with a minimum iron content of 55 % which, however, has an average of 62 %, and are characterised by their great purity. There are only the slightest traces of sulphur, the phosphorus content is 0.017—0.037 % and in the best qual ty ores only 0.005 %. As one of the ores in Europe with least phosphorus, the Kryvyj Rih iron ore is particularly suited to the Bessemer process. Its lumpiness is also favorable, for it makes preliminary treatment superfluous.

There is a huge deposit of approximately 50 billion t of iron quartz with an average pure metal content of 35 %. Only part can be utilised for practical purposes. A technically and economically progressive and profitable solution of the problem of getting iron from quartzites would enormously enhance the value of the Kryvyj Rih deposits for industry. The iron quartzite deposits in Kursk which partly lie in Ukrainian territory are still more significant (208 mrd. t), while deposits of iron ore only amount to 343 million t.

Kerch in the north of the Crimea has the most important deposit of ore, as far as area (2400 sq. km) and quantity of ore are concerned. It covers almost the entire peninsula, along the Strait of the same name, from the Sea of Oziv to the Black Sea. The layers of ore are not deep (2—20 meters, usually but not more than 4 meters) and can easily be mined on the surface. They are 2—20 meters thick, mostly 8—12, and in some places, however, as thin as 0,2 meters. The iron ore deposits in Kerch have been well-known for some time and have been adequately prospected. Recent estimates put these deposits at 2 722 million t, which would exceed even the rich iron ore deposits in Minnesota USA. But the average pure metal content of the almost exclusively brown iron ore in Kerch is only 34—43 %, often, indeed, less than 40 %. So that Kerch, with 245 million t of pure iron content is far behind Kryvyj Rih, and also behind the Ural deposits (411 million t in 1932, figures in table are more recent).

From the point of view of present day engineering, the quality of Kerch iron ores is not very high. Its average phosphor

content of 1 % means that the Thomas process only can be applied in the manufacture of steel, but it also contains 1.6 % sulphur and what is worse, up to 0.05 % arsenic, which may cause breaks in pig iron when cooled and which makes it worthless for further processes. Treatment is therefore costly. It is also a disadvantage that the ore should be so crumbly and sandy, which means that it must be made into briquettes or mixed. with better ores. In any case the ores must first be roasted. 135

Among the iron ore producing countries of the world, Ukraine comes fifth, along with France (4 mrd. t), USA (83.9 mrd. t), England (6.2 mrd. t), Russia (6—6.5 mrd. t). The iron ores of Kryvyj Rih are excellent in quality, but those of Kerch inferior. If they could be properly utilised, the position of Ukraine would be greatly strengthened, and the solution of the problem of iron quartzite would make it one of the first iron ore countries in the world.

6. Manganese Ores, Tin, Zinc etc.

There are small deposits of manganese ore in Ukraine at the following places: Labynska, the basin of the Bila and the Laba, at Khoshchevatka, district Haysyn in Podolia and in the southeast corner of the Galician Carpathians at the sources of the White and Black Cheremosh, where they were discovered a few years ago in inaccessible mountainous land. But Ukraine's eminent position as a country of manganese ore is due to Nikopil.

Nikopil, which has the richest deposit of manganese ore in the world, lies quite near the right bank of the Dnipro, about 230 km (200 km as crow flies) from the mouth of the river. It covers an area of about 150 sq. km. and comprises two sections, the western having richer deposits of better quality and being less worked than the eastern. Surveying by Prof. Vasylenko and others in the years 1928—1932 brought a great change in the exploitation of Nikopil manganese ore. Estimates of deposits were increased fourfold from about 100 million t. (see Table 7).

Compared with Chiaturi, the famous Georgian deposit of manganese ore in the Caucasus, Nikopil contains much more

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDI Ukraine RDI

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Table 7. Most Important Deposits of Manganese Ore in World.

Area of occurrence.	Deposits in Mill. Total	Prospected		Chemical Analysis in % Mn	Fe_2O_3	Ph	SiO_2	H_2O
			Nikopil:					
Nikopil	399	90	for export	1. 48—50	1,5—2	0,19	10—12	10—12
Labynska	38	34		2. 42—43	2 —2,5	0,20	15—16	13—15
Carpathian	10	—	for domestic use	1. 46—48	—	0,20	11	12
Khoshchevatka	8	3		2. 40—42	—	0,20	16	15
Ukraine	455	127		—	—	—	—	—
				1. 52	—	0,16	8—9	6—8
Chiaturi (Georgia)	166	163	Washore	2. 51	—	—	9	—
				3. 50	—	—	10	—
Soviet Union	656	330	crude ore	1. 48	1,5—2	0,18	12	8—10
				2. 45	—	—	15	10—12
% Share of Ukraine	70	40		1. 50—52	3—6	0,11	5—8	0,4—1,2
India	—	100	India	2. 47—48	5—6	0,15	8—10	—
			Shandur	38—42	13—17	0,04	2—3	1—3
Brazil	180	34		48—50	3,5—4,5	0,125	4—5	8—10
Gold Coast	39	13		1. 48—52	5—6	0,14	5—7	3
				2. 44—47	7—10	0,175	5—7	—
South Africa	—	48		1. 48—50	5—9	0,037	2—4	—
				2. 45—48	11—14	0,037	2—4	—
Egypt	—	12		34—37	20—25	0,11	3—4	2—4
Marocco-Algiers	33	2		—	—	—	—	—

ore (399 as against 166 million t), so its total manganese content is higher (143—190) compared with 72 million t, in spite of smaller pure metal content in some mines (35—50 % compared with 47—53 %). But Chiaturi has a considerably higher proportion of ore that can be got at than Nikopil, where 3/4 of the entire deposits come under Category C, "possible ores". So that the Georgian deposit comes first as a result of this fact and of its better quality and the more favorable mining conditions. Conditions of production are less favorable in Nikopil than in the Georgian ore-fields. It is true that the ore does not lie so deep in the earth, the top layer being only 6.5—25 meters thick. But its softness (clay, and also sand) means that mines have got to be built out with wood which must be brought from a distance. The thickness of the layers varies from 1.5 to 4 meters (in Chiatury 2—5 meters). The quality of the manganese ores at Nikopil is inferior to that of the deposits in Georgia and India. The deposits contain 90 % pyrolusit, which is the commonest manganese ore, but its consistency is often too fine, and lump ore is reckoned more valuable. The phosphor content is rather higher than in the two other deposits. On the whole, Nikopil ore is of a quality equal to that in other countries. 135

As a manganese ore country, Ukraine is first in the world with a quantity of more than 450 million t. Its manganese deposits are about 70 % of those in USSR and about 40 % of the total world resources.

Ukraine does indeed possess an abundant choice of other non-precious metals, but not in any great quantity. The mercury at Mykytivka in the Donets Basin is the only deposit in Ukraine that can be utilised for industry, and till recently, the only one in the USSR. In 1926 deposits were estimated at more than 6 000 t down to a depth of 320 m, an estimate that has recently been doubled. Naholnyj Krjaz where such metals are also found, though in small quantities, is in the Donets Basin, too. Deposits of copper ore are insignificant, while the zinc and lead ores at Sadon and Karachaj on the upper reaches of the Kuban are of importance. They are estimated at more than 3 million t. This figure also contains some silver. The reports of the discovery of rich deposits of nickel on the limans of

● 135 the Dnister in 1936 have not been seriously confirmed. Northern Caucasia has numerous deposits of non-precious metals, but little surveying has been done. According to what is known now, they do not, as a rule, contain any large quantities, but they might possibly play a certain rôle in the future.

7. Salt and Phosphorites

Cooking salt deposits occur every where in Ukraine, all three varieties of occurrence and of exploitation being present. It is difficult to estimate the total amount; in any case, Ukraine is one of the countries most rich in salt, even if it comes after the USA and Germany.

There is a rich deposit of rock salt in the north-west area of the Donets Basin, near Artemivske (formerly Bakhmut) and Slovianske in a wide hollow, distributed over an area of more than 1 500 sq. km. The thickness of the various strata of salt amounts to 30—40 m, the salt is extraordinarily pure (98 % NaCl), and uniform in composition. Recent estimates put the deposits at 100—120 mrd. t.

The rock salt deposit at Solotvyna, on the Tysa in Carpatho-Ukraine cannot be compared with the enormous deposits at Bakhmut. It is, however, quite extensive — 2.2 km long, 1.7 km broad, the depth being unknown, but at any rate more than 300 m. The salt layers are 8—30 m thick, and the percentage of impurities is low (2—4 %). Rock salt is also found on the Galician northern slopes of the Carpathians, very probably in great quantities, e. g. at Stebnyk, between the Dnister and Stryj; but these deposits have neither been prospected nor exploited.

Table-salt is got near Slovianske, from lakes, wells, and boreholes. In Galicia there are about 180 deposits from Latske near Peremyshl to the Bucovina, divided into six geographical groups. Numerous deposits also occur on the south slopes of the Carpathians.

Brine salt is got in the Crimea from about 300 salt lakes. Another 500 lie on the north-west coast of the Black Sea, round Kinburn. 7 limans between the Dnister and the Boh furnish salt, as did also the salt lakes in the Taman peninsula in the Kuban area.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDI Ukraine RDI

The salt lakes at Henycheske on the Sea of Oziv and those at 135
Batalpashynske in the Kuban area contain glauber salt.

There are fair quantities of potash salts in Galicia, on a strip 250 km long, stretching from Dobromyl (south of Peremyshl) parallel to the Carpathians to Kosiv. The richest deposits are at Kalish and Stebnyk, over an area of 250 sq. km. The salt strata are usually 4—18 m or 8—10 m thick.

Estimates of deposits vary between 100 million t with a pure content (K_2O) of 10—12 mill. t and 250 mill. t with 20 mill. t pure content. Even disregarding higher estimates (up to 450 mill. t.) this would represent 0.03—0.06 % of world store, of which Germany owns 55 %. The potash compounds in Galicia are sylvinite (18—35.5 % pure potash), kaynite (21.7 % K_2O) and glauconite (7—8 % K_2O) which appear distributed over a large area in Dnipro-Ukraine, at Kamjanets and in the north-east.

There are three or four deposits of phosphorites viz. on the Dnister and its left-bank tributaries in Galicia and in eastern Podolia, in the district of Chernyhiv and on the north-west edge of the Donets Basin, particularly round Izjum. In Galicia most of the phosphorites lie on a strip on the right bank of the Dnister, stretching for 65 km from Dovhe to the Zbruch; deposits are estimated at 33 mill. t. In (Eastern) Podolia they cover a large area (about 5 000 sq. km), particularly on the Ushytsia, a northern tributary, and on the Dnister itself. They extend into the Ukrainian districts of Bessarabia. In 1923 deposits were estimated at 16.4 million t., the pure content amounts to an average of 35.5—36 %, and the excellent quality has long been known.

The deposit at Krolevets, on the right bank of the Desna in the area of Chernyhiv contains 1 million t. phosphorites with a pure content of 20—30 %, mining conditions being more favorable. The deposits in the Donets Basin are more extensive and amount to 30 mill. t., but their low percentage of pure content (17—22 %) detracted much from their value. It is

135 only the technical discoveries of recent years that have restored value to inferior phosphorites.

The entire deposits of phosphorites in Ukraine amount to 62 mill. t. Like the potash, they are used in the manufacture of artificial manure. For a country that has got to produce such great quantities of agricultural produce, these deposits are none too big.

8. Varieties of Earth and Rock

Few countries have as much and as varied alumina as Ukraine. The largest deposit of fire-proof alumina is at Chasovyj-Yar in the Donets Basin, which amounts to 90 mill. t. There are other important deposits at Vladimirivka, Olenivka, Hozdory, Pjatykhatka etc.

Kaolin is the most valuable of all alumina and it is to be found on an enormous strip stretching from the marshes of Volynia in the north-west almost parallel to the Dnipro on its right bank to the orefields at Kryvyj Rih, then crossing to the left bank till to about 60—70 km distance from the Sea of Oziv.

Kaolin is found at about 315 places. On an average it is not more than 10 meters deep. The thickness of the various strata varies from a few meters to 106 m. The deposits are estimated at 120 mill. t. which would correspond to 40—50 mill. t. of pure content. The quality of the different deposits varies very much, but is often high.

9. Other Mineral Wealth

Other minerals to be found include ochre in large quantities and of excellent quality at several places, above all at Kryvyj Rih. Considerable deposits of gypsum, specially in the Bakhmut Hollow and in Podolia, limestone of all kinds from the highest quality to the commonest, is found almost all over Ukraine. Dolomites of excellent qualities are concentrated in the Donets area, marl for Portland cement etc. occurs in the Donets Basin, in Podolia and the Kyiv district and in inexhaustible quantities in the northern hollow, above all at Kupjanske and Artemivske.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Different varieties of granite are to be found on the Ukraine crystal plateau and also in Carpatho-Ukraine, as are also eruptive rocks in general. We mention labrodit, the largest deposit of its kind in Europe between Korosten and Zhytomir in Volynia, Volynian basalt, andesit in Carpatho-Ukraine, and also feldspat, mica-schist, and quartz, sand for the production of glass etc. 135

Graphite of good quality occurs in considerable quantities in Podolia on the Boh, there being more important deposits at Kryvyj Rih; and in the district of Mariupil and Berdjanske.

They have not been thoroughly prospected. Deposits have been estimated at approximately 100 mill. t. and mostly consist of slaty kinds of crystal graphite such as are used in metallurgy (fireproof pots etc). The percentage of pure graphite varies between 17 and 25 % (in the better deposits even 60—70 %). In this and in other respects the graphite of Ukraine is like that of Passau and is, in quality, inferior only to few (perhaps to that of Ceylon and Madagascar).

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

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

Table 10. Nikopil in World

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	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
Nikopil	9	11	29	73	58	51	46	48	60	97
Chiaturi	140	102	170	70	97	170	160	320	280	549
Russian Empire	162	114	200	143	157	222	208	370	342	648
Nikopil %	5,5	9,5	14,5	50	38,5	23	22	13	17,5	15
India	—	—	—	—	12	16	58	75	61	89
Brazil	—	—	—	—	2	5	14	16	26	65
World Production	375	260	375	310	385	395	490	630	590	990
Nikopil %	2.5	4	8	23	15	12,5	9,5	7,5	8	10
Nikopil's place in world production	—	—	4.	1.	2.	2.	3.	3.	3.	2.

	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
Nikopil	239	276	227	187	100	9	0,5	6	42	111
Chiaturi	663	258	258	204	26	55	121	—	53	194
Soviet Union	907	537	472	393	126	66	125	12	103	313
Nikopil %	26,5	51,5	48	47,5	79,5	14,5	0,5	50	40	35,5
India	694	418	665	600	526	547	748	690	482	706
Brazil	184	289	503	533	393	206	354	276	341	236
Gold Coast	—	—	4	32	31	36	44	7	67	142
Egypt	—	—	—	—	—	49	78	55	104	132
World Production	1870	1410	1860	2080	1750	1160	1160	1180	1220	1750
Nikopil %	13	19,5	12	9	5,5	1	—	0,5	3,5	7,5
Nikopil's place in world production	3.	3.	4.	4.	4.	—	—	—	6.	6.

327 practically all excellent coal); nevertheless, they amply suffice for the industrial needs of Ukraine.

● 135 316 Ore resources, on the other hand, are considerably richer in Ukraine. The first-class deposits at Kryvyj Rih alone are only a little less than the equally excellent deposits in the Ural (1.2 milliard t, compared with 1.4 milliard t), but as the percentage prospected is low (30 compared with 52 %), it has reserves for the future in its thick seams of iron quartzite. The iron content of the Kryvyj Rih ore being higher, it has greater resources of pure iron metal (540 million t) than the Ural (411 million t). To this we must add the iron-ore deposits at Kerch (2.7 milliard t). The manganese resources of the Donets Combine are the largest in the world (400 million t.).

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Production of Manganese Ore.

1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913
90	66	57	34	59	149	162	272	180	151	178	202	239	276
661	370	415	377	332	342	826	678	117	612	554	469	578	966
755	443	479	414	396	498	994	956	302	765	733	674	820	1245
12	15	12	8,5	15	30	16,5	28,5	59,5	20	24,5	30	29	22
130	123	160	174	153	251	579	917	685	655	814	681	643	828
108	100	157	162	208	224	121	237	166	241	254	174	155	122
1330	970	1060	940	920	1140	1920	2360	1290	1690	1900	1640	1740	2350
6,5	6,5	5,5	3,5	6,5	13	8,5	11,5	14	9	9,5	12,5	13,5	11,5
4.	4.	4.	4.	4.	4.	3.	3.	2.	4.	4.	3.	3.	3.

316

1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
113	241	478	472	531	580	602	493	443	524	818	1037	(1270)	960
339	544	543	372	172	830	783	390	389	481	914	1180	1502	1650
459	787	1029	844	702	1410	1385	883	832	1021	1822	2385	3000	2750
24,5	30,5	46,5	56	75,5	41	43,5	56	53	51	45	43,5	(42,5)	35
816	853	1032	1147	994	1010	843	546	216	222	413	652	827	—
159	332	261	273	360	316	207	147	37	20	7	42	156	265
259	344	350	375	330	415	424	251	51	269	371	438	417	535
150	81	122	153	137	191	121	102	0,3	1	1	87	—	148
1140	2770	3130	3180	2960	3770	3530	2320	1290	1740	2970	4010	4920	—
5,5	8,5	15,5	15	18	15,5	17	21	34	30	27,5	26	(26)	—
6.	5.	3.	2.	2.	3.	3.	2.	1.	1.	2.	2.	2.	—

Deposits in the Ural only come second or third, even if they suffice for the needs of the Kusnetsk at the moment. The Donets Basin is particularly well supplied with subsidiary materials for heavy industry (limestone, dolomites, fire-proof alumina and graphite), there being deposits of the kinds required at Kryvyj Rih, Mariupil and Berdjanske. The distance between ore and coal is not too great to be unprofitable, viz. 350—450 km to the Donets coal from the iron ore at Kryvyj Rih, 250—350 km from the manganese ores at Nikopil and 50—100 km between the two ore-fields. It is true that in England distances are more favorable, but they are no better than in Sweden, Germany, or France. Compared with the distance between the Ural ores and the Kusnets coal (2000 km) conditions of propinquity are first-rate in Ukraine. 135

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Caucasus were not inferior to those of New Russia and climatic conditions were much more favourable: rainfall, owing to the proximity of the great Caucasian ranges, was more regular. The Kuban region did actually become a granary. Rostov-on-the-Don grew and flourished in true 'American style'. A new grain port, Novorossiysk, was built and soon became a rival to Odessa. 311

Further railway development accompanied the exploitation of the Donets coal-mines and the growth of a metallurgical industry centred on the Krivoy Rog iron-ore deposits located to the west of the Dniepr. Two parallel lines were constructed to pass through Ekaterinoslav and the old district of the Zaporogian *Sech*, connecting the Donets basin with Krivoy Rog. Thus, simultaneously with the industrial development in the south and the flowering of the North Caucasian region, a new 'granary' and new regions of great mineral potential began at the turn of the century to impose a 'latitudinal' direction on railway construction: the opening of the great Siberian railway gave almost a priority to the possibilities of agricultural production in western and southern Siberia, and connected Chelyabinsk, through Ekaterinenburg, Vyatka and Vologda, with the Baltic ports. At the same time 'diagonal' development was proceeding far to the south-east through Turkestan to the frontiers of Afghanistan and the Chinese Empire. 496 135 311

The importance of the natural riches of Asiatic Russia came to be realized with an ever-growing force during the reign of Nicholas II (1896–1917). The principal economic axis of the Empire was evidently changing direction from the 'meridial' to the 'latitudinal'. The political policy of the Empire during the same period, with its emphasis on the Balkan Slavs and on the 'Byzantine' dreams of the epoch of Catherine II, was certainly archaistic in tendency and bore no relation to the fundamental realities of Eurasian geography. 311 648

The War of 1914–18 brought down in destruction that peculiarly hybrid cultural synthesis which was Romanov Russia; it obliterated at the same time the neo-Byzantine plans of the Pan-Slavists and weakened the whole position of Russia as a European power. The loss of a wide belt of territories (the whole inheritance of two hundred years of Romanov autocracy) between the Arctic and the Black Sea imposed on the new Soviet state the sheer necessity of a 'latitudinal' rather than a 'meridial' development. During the last two decades new efforts have been made to open up the agricultural and mineral wealth of the steppes beyond the Volga and the Ural in western and southern Siberia and of the valleys of the Altai and the Tien-Shan; and, while historic Russian ambitions in the Balkans

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

433 ness and ideological fanaticism which are so characteristic of Com-
185 munist psychology—itself a manifestation of a certain state of spiritual sterility—were brought to bear to achieve ultimate objects, which on the American continent during the preceding century had been attained by more balanced, hardly less heroic, and certainly less catastrophic methods.

§ 3. INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

135 The industrial development of the Ukraine has been based on the
131 exploitation of the coal deposits of the Donets basin and of the iron-ore and manganese fields situated west of the Dniepr. Abundant layers of coal are found along both banks of the Donets. The eastern part of the carboniferous region lies within the territory of the Don with its Cossack population. The western part, which constitutes about two-thirds of the whole region, is situated within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine.

Whether the Donets region properly belongs to the Ukraine is a question which has never been definitely settled. Historically, the lands along the right bank of the river Donets in its northern part belonged to that 'New Ukraine' which began to be populated in the second half of the seventeenth century by settlers from Muscovy and by fugitives from Hetman's Ukraine—at that time devastated by the Turkish invasions of Ahmed Köprülü and Kara Mustafa. Subsequently, these lands were incorporated in the Government of Kharkov. The lands along the southern course of the Donets formed part of the extreme eastern angle of New Russia where settled life only really began in the eighteenth century after the Tartar Nogay Horde, which roamed over this region, had retired beyond the Volga.

In 1917 the Provisional Government, in admitting five Ukrainian Governments as the legitimate area for the exercise of 'the national and cultural influence of the Kiev *Rada*', excluded the Government of Kharkov for the reason that the Donets coal area lay within it. The Ukrainian language is not commonly spoken in the coal-fields, and even if the large numbers of temporary labourers who come in from the north are ignored, not more than half the population of Donbass (the Donets coal area) can boast of their Ukrainian origin. In general, this region has nothing which unites its mixed industrial population to the essentially Ukrainian rural population of adjoining regions to the west. The only real link which connects the Donets coal-fields with the industrial districts along the Dniepr and the manganese and iron-ore regions is a purely economic one.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

According to both German and Soviet geological calculations, /135 the reserves of coal in the Donets area amount to about 55 milliard /131 tons. The deposits are largely anthracite—inferior in quality to Welsh.

Donets coal was the basis of the early industrial development of /135 the South of Russia. Exploitation was begun in the middle of the /316 nineteenth century; the construction of railway lines speeded up development during the seventies, and in the eighties Donets coal was already in use in the industries of the Moscow and Petersburg regions. After the discovery, about 1890, of abundant iron-ore deposits to the west of the lower Dniepr, the Donets coal industry acquired a rapidly growing importance. Between 1900 and 1913 output was increased at the rate of 17 per cent per annum. In 1913 the Ukrainian part of the coal-field delivered 23 million tons: in 1916, 29 million. During this period the Donets fields supplied all the southern industries with coal, and its contribution to northern industries became important with the construction of a new line direct from the mine area to Moscow. More than half the coal industry, before the Revolution, was financed by French capital.

For some time after the Revolution the output of the mines was relatively insignificant: during 1919 the area was the scene of desperate battles between 'Whites' and 'Reds', and later it was devastated by the raids of Makhno and other anarchic *atamany*. The famine of 1921–2 accentuated the terrible conditions. During the period of the New Economic Policy, output of coal gradually revived, and in 1929 fell little short of that of 1913. The First Five Year Plan prescribed the accelerated industrialization of the Ukrainian mineral-bearing areas. The social struggle which formed part of the 'Revolution against Peasantry' did not particularly affect the Donets, but the famine of 1932–3 had its influence there. Nevertheless, if Soviet statistics are to be credited, the Government succeeded in coping with the difficulties, and in 1934 a production of 68 million tons of coal and anthracite was claimed—representing an output in excess of that of France. Ukrainian production occupied fourth place—after U.S., Great Britain and Germany. For 1938, Soviet statistics gave a production of 74 million tons out of a total of 104½ million tons for the whole of the Soviet Union. The average annual increase in production for the last five years, 1934–9, is substantially less than that for the preceding five years, 1929–34. One of the reasons for this is stated to be the difficulty of retaining labour which was available during the period of social conflict in the countryside, but which has drifted back to the farms following improvement in the conditions in the *Kolkhozy*. Labour

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

464 Labour is very fluid in Donbass; an annual turnover of 40–50 per cent is estimated.

Soviet official information concerning the iron-ore industry of Krivoy Rog is probably more reliable than that concerning Donbass. The reserves of iron ore of high quality (40 per cent iron) are reckoned at 1100 million tons; some Ukrainian economists put these in excess of 3000 million tons. Mining in the Krivoy Rog (south-west of Ekaterinoslav and south-east of Elizavetgrad) began in the nineties and attained considerable proportions by the beginning of the present century. For the years 1913–16 average output was about 5 million tons per annum. According to Soviet statistics, output for 1938 was round 18 million tons.

135 316

Conditions for the development of metallurgical industry are extraordinarily favourable in New Russia: on one side of the Dniepr coal, and on the other iron. This is not all: along the banks of the Dniepr itself, round Nikopol and Khvochevatka, to the south of the old ground of the Zaporogian *Sech*, are rich mines of manganese, the quality of which is little inferior to that of the Georgian deposits at Chiaturi. According to the estimates of Ukrainian economists, reserves on the Dniepr amount to about 400 million tons: even if these estimates are exaggerated, there can be no doubt that the deposit is one of the most valuable in the world.

The production of the Dniepr manganese mines has risen from 260,000 tons in 1916 to over 1,000,000 tons in 1938. If the U.S.S.R. is the principal world producer, the Ukraine alone ranks before British India and South Africa (from which two latter countries it is worth recalling that Germany imported 585,000 tons in 1937).

The deposits of coal in Donbass, of iron at Krivoy Rog and of manganese round Nikopol are connected by railway lines which function probably more efficiently than any others in U.S.S.R. The juxtaposition of the mineral deposits and the metallurgical plants ensures full loads both ways. Only 18 per cent of Donets coal is exported outside the Ukraine, and only 5 per cent of the iron ore; the balance is consumed by the South Russian industries. Manganese, on the other hand, is exported abroad in large quantities.

325 103

Important metallurgical plants (70 per cent of the capital of which had been found by French and Belgian houses) existed in the South of Russia prior to the Revolution. In the 'Eastern' (Donets-Azov) group were included the following works: 'The New Russian' (station, Yuzovka, recalling the name of the Welshman Hughes); 'The Russo-Belgian' (Enakievo); 'The Kramatorsky' (Kramatorskaya); 'The Konstantinovsky' (Konstantinovskaya); 'The Donets-Yuriev' (Alchevskaya); 'The Nikopol-Mariupol'

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

474 U.S.S.R., and there is no doubt that one of the results will be a further
166 weakening of Ukrainian elements where the Government considers them to be still too strong

Secondary Branches of Ukrainian Agriculture

241 In addition to wheat, *rye*, *barley*, *oat* and *maize* crops are important. *Millet* is also grown and forms the base of the broth (*psheno*) which is a favourite dish in the South of Russia (in the North this broth or porridge is made from buck-wheat).

Clover and *lucerne* are comparatively little cultivated, and almost exclusively in right-bank Ukraine and Galicia.

About a million hectares are under *potatoes* in right-bank Ukraine; the bulk of the crop goes to the alcohol distilleries.

Sunflower-seed is important in the production of oil; *hemp* and small quantities of *linseed* and *mustard-seed* are produced for the same purpose.

The cultivation of *hops* was always traditional in Volhynia; in pre-Revolutionary days half of the hop production of the Empire came from Volhynia and right-bank Ukraine. In late years production has greatly declined.

Tobacco, the cultivation of which was introduced by Greek immigrants in the eighteenth century, is a speciality of the districts of Nezhin and Romen. The quality is not good and the cultivation of tobacco has no future in the Ukraine.

Particularly in Podolia and the region of Uman, *kolkhozniki* take great interest in horticulture; about 200,000 hectares are under orchards. On many *Kolkhozy* the *kolkhozniki* occupy themselves on the private cultivation of *tomatoes*, and the Government has set up canning plants in order to encourage this branch of production.

The *vine* grows well on the banks of the Dniepr and the southern Bug, in the neighbourhood of Berdyansk and Odessa, and along the Dniestr. But wine production has not been developed on the scale which it has attained in Bessarabia and the Crimea.

The Soviet Government favours agricultural experiments, and some *Kolkhozy* in the South have tried to cultivate *rice*—so far with little success.

An experiment on a large scale was made in the cultivation of *cotton*. 190,000 hectares between the mouth of the Dniepr and Perekop were reserved, but it is not likely that cotton cultivation in the Ukraine will prove the success which it has in the more suitable climates of Azerbaijan and Turkestan.

Secondary Mineral Resources in the Ukraine

● 135 Reserves of different qualities of *lignite* are distributed over many parts of the Ukraine. In view of the abundance of other resources of calorific power, exploitation has not been greatly developed, but output of lignite in the region of Elizavetgrad attains 300,000 tons a year.

A million tons of *peat* is cut annually in Ukraine—about 10 per cent of the output of U.S.S.R.

Bauxites in the Dniepr region are utilized for the Aluminium Works near Dnieprostroy.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Mercury is mined near Nikitovka Junction in Donbass.

Graphite deposits in the vicinity of Uman have recently been prospected. /135 ●

There are important deposits of *salt* in north-east Donbass.

Search has been made for *copper*, *tin* and *petroleum*. Indications of petroleum deposits have been discovered in the region of Poltava and on the shores of the Azov Sea. In different places deposits of high quality *clay* (*kaolin*) are found.

'*The Mystery*' *of Soviet Production*

A Russian mining engineer has contributed this note: 'It is quite impossible to ascertain where and how the enormous quantities of calorifics and metals which figure in Soviet statistics disappear, when one takes into consideration the absence of these products in the every-day life of the population. It is quite a usual occurrence that the simplest tools, common nails, sheet iron, are found to be unobtainable in U.S.S.R. Sometimes old roofs are torn off houses in order to cover new buildings.... Further, the greatest consumer of iron, railway construction, so active before the Revolution, is practically non-existent in these days. During the Five Year Plan only 5000 km. of railway lines were laid; and in general, under the Soviet régime, railway lines begun before and during the war have been left uncompleted. 000

'Soviet officials have never been able to give a satisfactory explanation of what happens to the metals produced in U.S.S.R. In conversations with foreigners they speak of "military needs", but these do not explain in full the destination of the vast alleged production, nor does the consumption in tractor and motor factories, nor the building which has been proceeding in expanding industrial towns like Lugansk, Zaporozhie and Kharkov. There has also been great construction work undertaken in the Moscow area, but no exact statistics for the consumption of metals in the building trades have been forthcoming which can adequately explain the use made of the vast output alleged to have been mined.'

Th. Makcheeff (*op. cit.*) thinks that in the Soviet statistics of output in heavy industry is included a large proportion of "shoddy" products. The 1913 figures excluded goods not up to standard; for the metallurgical factories were private concerns and not consumers as well: shoddy products were accordingly not taken into account. The Soviet Government being at once consumer and producer puts all its shoddy products into circulation, and these, according to the Soviet press, amount to 90 % and are referred to as "Second Quality Products."

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1



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404 (a)

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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404 (B)

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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135
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

404 (C)

(the northern or southern limits of certain cultivations 000
and of different methods of agricultural exploitation), of cattle-breeding (the predominance of cattle and of pigs in Zone 1 and of horses and sheep in Zone 2), of industry (metallurgy and other heavy industries in Zone 2 and light industry in Zone 1), or of communications, this border corresponds with undoubted economic realities.

Chance, or rather its geological structure, has decreed 135
that Zone 2 should possess all the mineral riches of the Ukraine while Zone 1 has none except, however, an insignificant deposit of oil in Polish Galicia, near Stanislavov.

I

Population

As we have previously said, the population of the 161
Ukraine is about 43,000,000, of whom 33·5 millions live within the frontiers of the Soviet Ukraine in the 11,500 parishes, 95 hamlets, and 90 towns.

Among all the Russian lands the Ukraine, with the industrial region of Moscow, is one of those with the densest population, especially in the region of Kiev and of Vinnitza, where the density reaches about 100 inhabitants to the square kilometre.

The average density of 70·6 inhabitants per square kilometre for the whole territory is almost the same in both zones, though a little higher in Zone 1, being from 65 to 87 with an average of 76 inhabitants per square kilometre, while Zone 2 has only 43 to 76, with an average of 65.

The least populated districts are the provinces of the south-east, the districts of Melitopol, Mariupol, and Lougansk, all in Zone 2.

Despite the small differences in the density of the

[see category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

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7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1



MAP No. 5

p 151

529 popular for sea bathing, although the beaches still lack a good tourist organization.

000 Nevertheless this branch of the activities of the country could, under more favourable circumstances, give a stable revenue to the population and thus contribute towards the enrichment of the Ukraine.

III

The Subsoil and Industry

135 Among the mineral riches of the Ukraine the first place belongs to coal and to iron ore.

These two important raw materials are to be found in Zone 2 1/2 coal in the Donietz basin and iron ore on the left bank of the Ingouletz (a tributary of the Boug) at Krivoi-Rog.

Besides these two fundamentally important resources the Ukraine possesses important deposits of manganese and aluminium in the surroundings of Nikopol, graphite and soft coal mines, recently discovered in the centre of the country, salt in the Donietz basin, and finally peat and oil wells in Polish Galicia, in the surroundings of Stanislavov. Geological researches recently carried out have led to the discovery of oil on the shores of the Sea of Azov.

433 In order to give an idea of the potential reserves awaiting exploitation in the subsoil of the Ukraine, let us indicate that before the last war production represented 135 gold francs per annum per inhabitant.

316 As a result of its naturally very rich geological structure and of the organization of the extraction of its resources, the basin of the Donietz could be compared with the best coal-producing centres of Europe. Its reserves may be less important than those of Siberia (Kouznetsk),

1/1 [see category 116, pp. 139-140 --- Analyst]

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union R1

INTRODUCTION

The author of this book is a historian. He has taken part in the Ukrainian national revolution from 1917 on. The book has been written to fix facts that are very often forgotten in the world, or are given a false interpretation in the various books on the Eastern European problem.

The principal fact from which the whole fatal conflict between Ukraine and Soviet Russia arises is that Ukraine has a democratic tradition created by the preceding historical evolution. Modern Russia is a continuation of the Muscovite Tsardom that has grown on the foundations of eastern despotism. For this reason Russia has not created a democratic tradition of its own up to this day and has a "considerable lack of European tradition", as it has been stated by the well known Russian historian Klyuchevsky. Therefore Communist dictatorship so easily seized power in Russia after the revolution of 1917, while the other peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, Ukrainians, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians, etc., created democratic states of their own.

The tragedy of the unhappy neighbours of Russia is that Russian imperialism in the past and present times has been principally directed against them, has enslaved and even exstirpated them.

The Ukrainian nation occupies a particular place in Eastern Europe both by its number, circa 35 millions, and by its geographical position, and especially by its large natural resources*). The famous British political writer Professor R. W. Seton-Watson states that the Ukrainian problem has been one of the reasons for World War I 1914—1918. It is generally known that the conquest of Ukraine was the principal aim for Hitler's 'Pressure to the East'. Thus World War II had the struggle for Ukraine as one of its reasons too.

We are living in a time when imperialism is being condemned as one of the greatest evils to mankind, but we see at the same time

*) The most important natural riches of Ukraine are: coal (Donets Bassin), iron ore (Krivoy Rog), oil (Boryslaw), manganese (Nikopol). The export of grain from Ukraine to Western Europe until 1914 was higher than 5,5 mil. tons per year. The production of sugar and spirit was very important. The export of agricultural products from Tsarist Russia came in its great part from Ukraine.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

either by salting, smoking, or sun-curing. Fish-curing is carried on in factories at Odessa and Ochakov.

The fisheries in the Azov Sea are important, but the principal grounds are not in Ukrainian territory, those which lie within its limits being of insignificant value.

(4) Minerals

(a) *Natural Resources*

The principal mineral resources of the Ukraine are coal, iron, and salt.

The *coal* is all in one large field usually known as the Donets basin, which extends from west to east for a distance of 300 miles. It is considered the largest coalfield in Europe, but owing to peculiarities of the geological strata it is split up into several areas with varying qualities of coal. Roughly the flame coals are on the western end of the field, the coking and semi-anthracite coals in the centre, and the anthracite in the east, though coking coals are also found towards the north-east corner. Very little pure anthracite is mined on Ukraine territory, as the beds are mainly in the Don Cossack district. Throughout the field the seams vary much in thickness. Some are too thin to be worked. The average thickness of those worked is 21 to 35 in.; seams of 5 ft. are moderately common, and the maximum thickness is 7 ft.

The output of coal from the Donets field is variable. This is chiefly due to labour difficulties, which arise in unexpected ways. Nevertheless if the figures of several years are considered together, a great increase is shown, and new pits are being opened every year. The average production for the years 1908 to 1912 was over 14,000,000 tons, the proportion of bituminous coal to anthracite being as 8 to 1. The figures include the whole field, as separate statistics for the portion over the Don Cossack border are not issued.

Iron.—The Ukraine is fortunate in having in close proximity to its coalfield a district rich in iron ore. The deposit, which is of excellent quality and easily worked,

642 On one-sixth of the world all the treasures within the earth and all that grows on top of it belong to the workers, as well as all mines, factories, and means of communication. The workers distribute the goods, they make the laws, determine the working hours, wages and prices; they also establish the deductions from wages and salaries and make out the taxes. Everyone must work, there are no persons of independent means and no capitalistic employers who can fatten on profits. The worker are the sovereign lords in the Soviet Union, and nothing prevents them from enjoying the enormous wealth of their country. Stalin had this theory in mind when he stated in his introduction to the new constitution in November 1936: "... in the field of political economy of the Soviet Union we now have a new socialistic economy which knows no depressions and no unemployment, no misery and no profit, and which grants its citizens every possibility for a life of comfort and civilization."

According to this definition, life in the Ukraine should be the most attractive; here is the country richest in natural resources in eastern Europe, with a pleasant, sunny climate. The raw 135 materials are happily balanced and are found within favorable distances between each other. There is coal, iron ore, manganese ore, water power, oil, turf, salt, potassium salts, phosphate and kaolin. There is lacking, with the exception of a certain amount of mercury and nickle, only colored metals.

361 /160/ The exploitation of Ukrainian natural resources is comparatively recent. The Englishman Hughes John established industry in the 1870s in the Donets region, and shortly thereafter Frenchmen and Belgians founded the ore industry near Krivoy Rog. The present-day industrial cities developed from the barracks of the first workers' 000 settlements. The tremendous increase in popula-

316 million tons. The beds in the Donets Basin have the advantage of being shallow and the disadvantage of being unevenly distributed and not very large. They are only three-quarters of a meter in diameter. Besides, the coal is impure and also has a high ash content. In spite of the fact that more is produced, the method of mining is antiquated.

Besides the incidence of brown coal in the Donets region, there are 120 smaller deposits in the right-bank region of the Ukraine, but they /162/ are scarcely exploited. It is presumed that there are larger deposits in this region also. In 1935 the total reserves of brown coal in the Soviet Ukraine were estimated at 550 million tons. (100) The mining of this coal is very much neg-

100. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 442.

lected and ore-dressing is unknown. In 1935 a total of 300,000 tons of brown coal was extracted in all the Ukrainian provinces, 240,000 tons of which came from eastern Ukraine. (101) The ex-

101. Deminskiy: The Economy of the Ukraine, page 137.

tensive peat bogs are merely of local importance.

315 When it comes to oil, the Ukrainian earth is
● 135 not niggardly. Well-known as the oil fields of Drogobich and Borislav on the northern slope of the Carpathians, the reserves of which are estimated at 58 to 100 million tons. Extraction reached its height as early as 1902 when it amounted to 2 million tons or 5% of world production. Since then it has constantly decreased, amounting to 1.2 million tons in 1913 and an annual average of 500,000 to 600,000 tons from 1932 to 1936. (102)

102. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 443.

135 The third oil region lies close by the Ukrainian border, many hundreds of kilometers distant from the compact Russian area of settlement, not far from the Caspis on the Terek. These reserves are estimated at 900 million tons. In 1925 2 million tons were extracted, in 1932 over 8 million tons, and in 1933 somewhat more than 5 million tons. (103) From the occurrence of inflammable and

103. Kubiyovich: Atlas...,page 53.

earth gases, oil reserves are suspected to be present on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov and along the Dniestr. The salts in the Donets Basin and along the Carpathians, and the sea salt near Odessa round off the wealth of natural resources. Potassium salts are deposited in Galicia, potassium gluconites in East Podolia, at the Dnepr and near Isyum; phosphates in Podolia along the Dnestr and in northern Ukraine near Chernigov; excellent kaolins are found in the region between Volhynia and the Black Sea, and graphite near
312 Krivoy Rog. The entire water-power reserves of the Ukrainian provinces are estimated at 9 million horse power; of this only one-tenth was utilized in 1932. /163/

327 Two industrial regions are connected with local natural resources. These are, first, the Donets Basin, rich in coal and salt, with coal mines, coke plants, foundaries and steel works. Here ore from Kerch and Krivoy Rog is smelted. Secondly, there is the mining district of Krivoy Rog and Mykopil on the Dnepr with iron and manganese mines, smelting factories, foundaries and metallurgic factories. With the completion of the large Dnepr power plant at Zaporishea - the normal water level was raised 37.5 meters by the construction of a mighty cofferdam and sluice along the entire rapids, which made the river navigable throughout - the industrial region of Krivoy

I INTRODUCTION

101 The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (the Ukraine) is one of the U.S.S.R.'s sixteen constituent Union Republics. Situated in the south-western corner of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine is bordered on the south by the Black and Azov Seas and the Crimea (part of Russia); its western border touches the frontiers of Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as well as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Towards the north the Ukrainian S.S.R. verges on two other Soviet Republics: Byelorussia and Russia; and it is the Russian neighbourhood of the Don river which forms the Ukraine's eastern border.

101 135 In economic development and in population the Ukraine is second greatest of the Soviet Republics. It has a fertile soil, a mild humid climate, and is rich in deposits of coal, oil, iron, manganese and salts, as well as in building materials. It has four main rivers: the Dnieper (third largest in Europe), the Dniester, the Bug, and the Donets (a tributary of the Don), which are navigable and are also useful reservoirs of power.

433 162 Before 1941 the Ukraine contained more than one-fifth of the inhabitants of the entire Soviet Union. Its industry produced 54 per cent. of the coal, 60 per cent. of the pig iron, 48 per cent. of the steel, and 35 per cent. of the manganese ore turned out in the whole U.S.S.R.; it manufactured railway engines and cars, tractors, turbines, harvester combines, and mining and agricultural machinery for all parts of the Soviet Union. "It also produced artificial fertilizers, soda, glass and cement. The output of the sugar, meat-packing, flour-milling, distilling, and dairy industries reached great dimensions. Fishing was developed in the Black Sea and Azov Sea. The Dnieper Power Station, 361 the largest in Europe, was famous throughout the world. The cities of the Ukraine, both old and new, developed rapidly; during the past 25 years 77 new cities and 285 industrial settlements were built."[1]

241 Agriculture also was highly developed. In 1937-38 Ukrainian farms accounted for nearly one-fifth of the grain, one-sixth of the potatoes, and two-thirds of the sugar beet produced in the Soviet Union. The Ukraine also had a large proportion of the total Soviet Union livestock. Millions of head of cattle, pigs, sheep, and poultry were raised. Ukrainian agriculture was highly mechanized; before the war there were 90,000 tractors and 31,000 harvesting combines operating in the fields.

Area and Population

131 In January 1939 the Ukrainian Republic had an area of about 469,700 square kilometres including 8,000 square kilometres in its

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1 The Sixteen Soviet Republics, Soviet News, London, 1945.

III INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT

135 311 433 Ukrainian industry is based chiefly on rich deposits of coal in the Donets Basin, iron ore in the Krivoi Rog district (where the ore contains 60 per cent. metal), and manganese ore in the Nikopol area. To utilize this great natural wealth a very large metallurgical and machine-building industry has been bult up in the Ukraine. At the same time, many food factories including sugar refineries, have been created to process the food so abundantly produced by Ukrainian farms. In the period between wars, the share of the Ukraine in the country's industrial output declined somewhat, not because of slackened activity - on the contrary, Ukrainian industry continued to be even more intensively developed - but because the policy of the U.S.S.R. was to decentralize, and to expand and develop those areas, particularly the eastern ones which previously had no industry. This lengthening of the industrial pace naturally brought about a certain change in emphasis, so that whereas by 1938 the productivity of Soviet industry as a whole had increased to about eight times the output of Tsarist Russia in 1913; the proportion of Ukrainian output in the total was lessened. For example, in 1928 the Krivoi Rog district of the Ukraine produced 78 per cent. of all the iron ore in the U.S.S.R.; but in 1937, although this district was producing more, its share in the total was only 47 per cent.

War Damage to Industry

727 433 Before they were finally driven from the Ukraine the Germans furiously set about wrecking those Ukrainian industries which still survived. They stripped the plants of equipment and destroyed the buildings; they flooded the coal mines; they completed the destruction of the famous Lenin Hydro-Electric Power Station and the Dnieper Dam - both of which had been partially disabled by the retreating Soviet Army troops on August 28, 1941.

The damage to all branches of industry was tremendous and will take many years to repair, particularly since the shortages of labour and equipment, as well as the scarcity of food have been a hindrance at every step. Some of the difficulties were destribed in a report of the UNRRA Mission after visits to several of the larger Ukrainian cities in May 1946.

"In our cable...we outlined the condition and needs of industrial plants in six principal Ukrainian cities visited by members of the Mission during May. The pattern is fairly uniform. Many plants were completely destroyed and those which still stood were usually heavily damaged and almost universally gutted of all modern equipment. Included among those industries hardest hit are the heavy capital goods industries, machine tool manufacturing industries, and power stations, as well as the rolling and stationary stock of all forms of transportation, and equipment for processing building materials. So great is

Coal: Plans for the Future

185 433 316 Under the Five-Year Plan, the coal industry of the Ukraine is to be speedily rehabilitated and further developed, so that by 1950 its output will be 86,100,000 tons, including about 6 million tons of brown coal (lignite).[1] When it is remembered that this target is only 2.3 million tons over 1940 production, the enormous task of rehabilitation confronting the industry is made clear. The difficulties are even more accentuated if one compares the increase of coal production in three pre-war years, from 1937 to 1940, when output leaped from 70 million tons to 85.8 millions.

Plans for increasing the future coal output of the Ukraine include not only the restoration of old mines but also intensive prospecting and the sinking of many new shafts.

"Between 1946-50, coal mines with an aggregate capacity of 77,500,000 tons are to be put into operation in the Stalino and Voroshilovgrad regions of the Ukrainian S.S.R.[2]"; and coal fields in other areas are to be further developed. In particular there are to be put into operation in the Donets Basin and in the western regions of the Ukraine, small coal mines and drifts with a total capacity of 4,600,000 tons of coal, and peat briquette plants with a capacity of 50,000 tons.

The lignite mining industry is to be developed and by 1950 is expected to supply annually some 6 million tons of coal. Five lignite mines operating in the Ukraine in 1946 increased their output in October by three times as compared with April.

135 654 Large coal supplies are expected from the regions west of the Dnieper, where 11 promising coal deposits are located. Prospecting is in progress there, as well as in the Zlochev, Kremenets, and Kolomya areas of Western Ukraine, where 28 shafts had been sunk by November 1946.[3]

Industrial lignite deposits have also been found in an area of four square miles between Slavgarod and Sinelhikovo (near Dniepropetrovsk) and in the Transcarpathian region.

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1 The coal output of the entire Soviet Union in 1950 is fixed at 250 million tons.

2 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

3 Soviet Monitor, London, November 21, 1946.

135 654 To the south-east, in the Don and northern Donets valleys, geologists have discovered a number of new coal-bearing areas, and have confirmed that the Donets Basin coal layers stretch far to the east and south.

Other investigations of coal-bearing areas are to begin shortly, particularly around the Azov Sea coast and in other regions bordering the Donets Basin.

Coke

316 The coke output of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is planned to be 15,500,000 tons.

Natural Gas and Oil

315 185 With the incorporation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the Ukrainian S.S.R. came into possession of oil producing regions. The Five-Year Plan calls for the intensive development of these and other areas of the Ukraine for the increased production of oil and natural gas. [654] Three hundred and twenty-five wells are to be located to add to the petroleum resources of the western regions; prospecting for commercial deposits of petroleum in the Romny area is to be completed; and there is to be extensive geological exploration for natural gas in the Dragobych Region (Western Ukraine) and on the Azov and Black Sea coasts.

[382] The total output of petroleum in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 325,000 metric tons.

The plan also provides for the building of a gas pipeline from Dashava to Kiev. Already in process of construction, the first section of the pipeline will be completed this year (1947) and will supply gas to more than 30,000 flats and several large industrial plants in Kiev.

Electric Power Stations

377 Electrification has been one of the outstanding features of the Soviet economy. Before the war the Ukrainian Republic possessed a wide network of electric power stations. Best known was the huge Dnieper Don and Lenin Hydro-electric Station, completed in 1932 near Zaporozhie. This station supplied electric power to a great industrial region: in the north the steel mills of Dniepropetrovsk and Dnieprodzerzhinsk, and to the south-east, the Nikopol manganese mines. These three industrial centres developed quickly after the Dnieper Dam was built; and the abundance of cheap power available from it also gave rise to the growth of a metal and machine-building centre at Zaporozhie.

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Chemical Industry

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315 The chemical industry of the Ukraine is based chiefly on coal deposits, but also on a number of other raw materials to be found there, including lacustrine deposits of sodium chloride (Artornovsk area) and phosphatic rocks (Konstantinovka area).

The Five-Year Plan fixes that:

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[185] "The chemical plants of the Ukraine, including soda, nitrate, and superphosphate plants, shall be rebuilt, and the potash mines in the regions of Stanislav and Dragobych, and a new superphosphate plant, a paint and varnish plant and a plastics factory built.

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[654] "In 1946-50 geological surveys shall be conducted with a view to locating commercial deposits of potassium salts to a total of 80 million tons, graphite to a total of 7.7 million tons, and gypsum to a total of 7 million tons."

Output in 1950 is fixed by the Plan as follows:

for the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Calcined soda	448,000 tons
Superphosphates	860,000 tons, and
Salt,	1,930,000 tons;

and for the entire Soviet Union:

Calcined soda	800,000 tons, and
Mineral fertilizers, superphosphates, nitrates and potash	5,100,000 tons.

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Light Industry[1]

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433 By the end of 1946 the production of consumer goods in the U.S.S.R. had already revived considerably; output in the different branches ranged from 20 to 50 per cent. above 1945. Reconversion of the factories to peacetime production was largely completed; however, three big tasks remained: to complete the rehabilitation of all light industry enterprises wrecked by the Nazis; to replace the old or worn-out machinery; and to obtain an adequate supply of labour and materials.

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1 Soviet News, London, December 30, 1946, and February 6, 1947.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip
317 of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Slatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it
263 is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
511 during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation—all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RDL

a long, warm autumn, provides excellent conditions for the development of agriculture. Average January temperatures vary from 27° F in the southwest to 14° F in the east, and July averages from 68° F in the north to 73° F in the south. The northern section of the Ukraine receives adequate rainfall (about 20 inches a year), but the south is much drier, having an average yearly rainfall of 9 inches. Most of the precipitation occurs in the first half of the year. During the summer, frequent violent rainstorms occur in the eastern sections.

The greater portion of the Ukraine lies in the wooded steppe and steppe zones, where black earth prevails. In the northern section, which lies in the forested zone, grassy marshes occur in abundance. In the wooded steppe zone the forest reserves have largely been depleted. Broad-leaved types, such as oak, maple, ash, and elm, occur only along the rivers and extend in green ribbons through gullies and ravines up to the watersheds. Characteristic local vegetation types are the dense growths of alder, willow, and poplar which border the inundated banks of the rivers and the many ox-bows and lakes which remain after the spring floods. The steppes on the watersheds have long been converted into rich wheat fields, a typical feature of the Ukrainian landscape.

Among the mineral resources which abound in the Ukrainian SSR, the primary raw materials for heavy metallurgy are most important. Scarcely anywhere else in the USSR are coal, iron, and manganese found within such proximity of each other as in the eastern Ukraine. The Donets Basin, or Donbas, with reserves of more than 90 billion tons, is the principal coal producer of the USSR. The Krivoy Rog iron mines produce iron ore of a high quality and metal content. Between these two sites are the rich manganese deposits in the area of Nikopol'. In the Donbas are extensive salt and mercury deposits. Petroleum fields lie in the foothills of the Carpathians, where salt, potash, and natural gas are also found. Another petroleum site is in the area of Romny (Sumy Oblast). The northern, marshy section of the Ukraine—Poles'ye—abounds in peat. Other minerals include polymetallic ores (Donets Basin), phosphorites, kaolin, limestone, marl, gypsum, and so forth.

The Ukraine is the most densely inhabited union republic of the USSR. Its 40 million inhabitants represent about one fifth of the total population of the USSR. The average population density is 180 per square mile; however, there is considerable variation throughout the region. The greatest concentration exists in the western Ukraine, along the foot of the Carpathians, where the density reaches 340 to 390 per square

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

major navigable through route of the Ukraine. The major ports are Zhdanov and Osipenko on the Sea of Azov, and Kherson, Nikolayev, and Odessa on the Black Sea. Odessa is one of the major maritime trade centers of the USSR.

The Ukraine exports coal, iron and steel, grain, salt, and sugar, and imports cloth from Moscow and Ivanovo, precision tools from Moscow and Leningrad, lumber from Gor'kiy Oblast, along the Volga, or from the Belorussian SSR along the Dnieper, petroleum products from Groznyy (by rail and pipe line) and from Baku (by sea via Batumi-Odessa), and fish from the Lower Volga.

Oblast Survey

The twenty-five oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR can be grouped into seven geographic regions on the basis of physical, economic, and historical factors: the right-bank and the left-bank sections of the wooded steppe, the Donets Basin, the Dnieper bend, the Black Sea lowland, the Ukrainian Poles'ye, and the Western Ukraine.

THE RIGHT-BANK WOODED STEPPE

The right-bank wooded steppe, which is the original settlement area of the Ukrainian people, includes the oblasts of Kamenets-Podol'skiy, Vinnitsa, and Kiev. Its fertile black-earth soils and the warm, humid climate have combined to turn the area into a region of intensive agriculture, a dense population, and a well-developed rail network. Sugar beets are the leading crop. Through careful tilling of the soil, the application of phosphate fertilizer, and the rotation with grains and forage grasses, high yields are obtained which furnish up to three tons of sugar per 2.5 acres. The principal grains are winter wheat, rye, barley, and oats. Leguminous crops (peas, lentils, beans) are extensively grown to restore soil fertility. In connection with the intensive crop cultivation, the raising of hogs and cattle for meat and milk production is also very important. Forage grasses and the by-products of the sugar-refining and associated distilling industries constitute an excellent feed supply. Also connected with the sugar economy of the area are the lignite and peat industries, which fuel the processing plants, the quarrying of limestone (used in the sugar-bleaching process), and the mining of phosphorite, which is converted into fertilizer.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

SU 327 438* U 327 438

glass and soda works. A dense rail network and a unified power-transmission system connect the various enterprises. The vast number of urban centers, cities and workers' settlements, which have grown up around the metallurgical and machinery works and the coal mines, represent a concentration of almost one third of the urban population of the republic within 1/20 of its area.

Stalino Oblast

Area, 10,200, population, 3,000,000

SU 133* U 133 SU 135 U 135 SU 438* U 438

Stalino Oblast includes the western section of the Dónets Basin, extending from the Sea to Azov in the south to the Northern Donets in the north. Agriculture (wheat, sunflowers, and cotton) is of importance only outside of the industrial section. Salt is mined near Artemovsk and mercury near Nikitovka. The principal coal-mining centers are Stalino, Makeyevka, Yenakiyevo, and Gorlovka.

Stalino, the largest city of the Donets Basin, had a population of 392,000 in 1948. It was originally called Yuzovo, or Yuzovka, for a Scottish industrialist, Hughes; it was called Stalin in the early part of the Soviet period. It has metallurgical, chemical, and coal-mining industries.

Makeyevka, a few miles northeast of Stalino, is the site of the Kirov metallurgical works, one of the largest of the Donbas, and coking installations. Coal mines operate in the suburban areas.

Yenakiyevo was called Rykovo from the 1920's until 1935, then Ordzhonikidze until 1943, when it again received its original name. It has a metallurgical industry, chemical works, and coal mines.

Gorlovka also has metallurgical, chemical, and coal-mining industries. Its northern suburb of Nikitovka has mercury mines and near-by Trudovaya is the terminus of an oil pipe line from the Groznyy fields in the Caucasus.

Konstantinovka has a metallurgical industry, zinc works, and produces ceramics, glass, and cement, as well as superphosphate fertilizer.

Kramatorsk is noted as a heavy-machine construction center which produces mining and metallurgical equipment. It also has railway-car repair shops and ceramics works. Druzhkovka, to the south, is another machinery center.

Slavyansk is a chemical center where there are salt mines and soda works, limestone quarries, and porcelain works. Artemovsk (formerly Bakhmut), to the southeast, is the center of an important salt-mining

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine R01

WESTERN UKRAINE

THE WESTERN UKRAINE includes those areas (except for Izmail Oblast) which were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR after 1939 and later. Six oblasts (Rovno, Volyn', Ternopol', L'vov, Stanislav, and Drogobych) were annexed in the autumn of 1939 following the partition of Poland and the Soviet occupation of its eastern section. Chernovtsy Oblast was formed in the Northern Bukovina and the extreme northern section of Bessarabia after the acquisition of these territories from Rumania, in the summer of 1940. The Transcarpathian Oblast was ceded to the Ukraine according to an agreement with Czechoslovakia in 1945. The Western Ukraine can be roughly considered in four geographical sections: the Carpathian section in the south, on the slopes and in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, the Poles'ye, a northern lowland along the right affluents of the Pripet River, the hilly central section in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, and the Transcarpathian section.

The Carpathian section of the Western Ukraine includes the oblasts of Chernovtsy, Stanislav, and Drogobych. Its economy is based essentially on the mineral resources of the area: petroleum, natural gas, salt, and potash, and on the lumber resources on the slopes. There are a number of health resorts in the valleys.

Chernovtsy Oblast

Area, 3,200, population, 900,000

Chernovtsy Oblast lies along the upper Prut and the Dniester rivers. The forests (mainly beech), building materials, salt, and petroleum are found in the higher foothills. Agriculture puts the emphasis on grains (wheat, corn, and barley), potatoes and sugar beets in the south and on fruit growing along the Dniester, in the northeast. Sheep raising and lumbering are the main activities in the mountains. Sawmilling, woodworking, sugar refining, flour milling, and wine making are the chief rural industries.

Chernovtsy (Rumanian *Cernăuţi*) called Chernovitsy until 1944, lies on a terrace above the Prut River. It has large textile and machine industries and produces chemicals, lumber, and food products.

Storozhinets (Rumanian *Storojineţ*) is a road center in the agricultural region southwest of Chernovtsy.

SU 438* U 438 Khotin (Rumanian *Hotin*) lies in an orchard and vineyard area on the Dniester River. There is a noted leather industry.

Stanislav Oblast

Area, 5,400, population, 1,300,000

SU 133* U 133 Stanislav Oblast is drained by the upper Dniester and its right affluents descending from the Carpathian Mountains. It has important petroleum, salt, natural-gas, and potash deposits in the areas of Dolina and Bolekhov, with petroleum fields extending along the foothills in a southeasterly direction to Kosmach, southwest of Kolomyya. The principal oil towns are Bolekhov, Dolina, Pereginsko, Bogorodchany (where ozocerite is also secured), Solotvin, Nadvornaya, Pechenezhin, and Kosmach. Petroleum is refined at Bolekhov, Stanislav, and Kolomyya. The main lumber centers are Delyatin and Kuty, which has a large wood-distillation industry. On the right bank of the Dniester River lies the agricultural zone of the oblast, where grains, tobacco, and sugar beets are raised. Tobacco is processed at Zabolotov and sugar at Gorodenka.

SU 313 U 313 SU 241 U 241

SU 438* U 438 Stanislav (Polish *Stanisławów*, German *Stanislau*) has railroad and machine shops, an oil refinery, and textile and leather industries and produces asphalt, ceramics, lumber, and food products.

Kolomyya (Polish *Kołomyja*, German *Kolomea*), on the upper Prut River, has machine works and oil-refining and chemical plants. Textiles and cement are also produced.

Drogobych Oblast

Area, 4,000, population, 1,200,000

SU 135 U 135 Drogobych Oblast lies on the northern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and is bordered by Poland in the west. It is the chief petroleum region of the Western Ukraine, with the chief oil fields in the area of Drogobych and Borislav. Near by are potassium and magnesium salt mines and natural-gas wells. Salt is mined at Dobromil'. Agriculture is important along the Dniester River.

SU 438* 315 U [438] 315 Drogobych (Polish *Drohobycz*) is the center of the Western Ukrainian petroleum region, with important refining and chemical installations and potash and magnesium salt mines. It trades in petroleum, livestock, and agricultural products and produces rubber goods, lumber, and food products.

SU 315 Borislav (Polish *Borysław*) is another petroleum center southwest of Drogobych. It has petroleum and natural-gas wells and engages in the

137 Oaks and hornbeams grow plentifully in the zone of transition between forest and the steppe while the pine prefers sandy river valleys. Vegetation in the mountains corresponds to that in western surroundings. The vast mountain pastures deserve special mention. On the coast of the Crimea and the Caucasus we find the buttertree, the cypress, the stone pine, the laurel, opuntias, agaves and other Mediterranean plants.

● 136 Prevalent animal species vary only slightly from those found in neighboring countries in the west. Worthy of mention are wild-cat, ermine, and bison in the forest region, bear, lynx and wild-cat in the Carpathians. In the Yaila mountains there are vultures. The Caucasus has the greatest variety of animals. It is still possible there to hunt ibex, jackals and ure-ox. On the southern slopes there are even panthers. Numerous rodents live in the steppes. The ure-ox, the beaver and the marmot are dying out.

3. Population.

a) Density

161 In 1939 the average density of the population in Ukraine was 68 persons per sq. kilometer. In the central forest-steppe zone, one of the most thickly populated agrarian areas in Europe, 80—120 people live on a sq. kilometer, between the Syan and Kursk. Northern Ukraine with its lighter soil is much more thinly populated; here the average density amounts to 40—60 persons per sq. kilometer, and in Polesya this figure even falls below 25. The density of the population in Southern Ukraine corresponds roughly to that in the north, though the Donets basin is an isolated area of dense population. The Caucasus foothills, a country with a climate at least as favorable as that of Central Ukraine is only two-thirds as densely populated, as it was colonised late. The mountains are thinly populated.

162 361 The majority of the Ukrainian people live in villages; 29 % live in towns and 10 % in cities with more than 100 000 inhabitants; trade and industry are not intensively developed; we are struck by the many towns that have grown up at the frontiers between the various natural areas; there are 60 bet-

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

planting, principally of sand-willows and pines, the main object being to arrest the movement of drift-sand. 137

The principal Ukraine timber trees are oak, maple, elm, ash, willow, aspen, lime, and wych-elm.

The art of forestry would appear to be almost entirely neglected. Systematic replanting of timber is hardly known, and wholesale destruction of woods on the river banks has had disastrous results in the splitting up of the channels. The lime is frequently denuded of its bark to make bast, the tree subsequently perishing as it stands. 313

(3) Fisheries

The fisheries of the Ukraine can be divided into three classes: those of the upper reaches of the rivers, those of the lower reaches and the lagoons at the mouths, and those of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea. 228

In the upper reaches of the principal rivers, fishing can scarcely be called an industry, being carried on by individuals mainly for their personal needs; the stock of fish is everywhere decreasing at a regrettable rate, and much alarm is caused by this depletion.

The fisheries of the lower reaches of the Dnieper, Dniester, and Southern Bug have considerable value. The principal fish taken are sturgeon, of which there are several varieties, carp, bream, fresh-water herring, and sander. The fisheries are the property of the riparian owners, who let them to syndicates. The State owns a considerable stretch on the Bug from Nikolaev to Novaya Odessa. The fishing seasons are from February to April and in the autumn, when the fish revisit the rivers to spawn. At this time they are taken for the roe, from which caviare of various qualities is made. 228 136

In the Black Sea the principal fish are mackerel, anchovy, and flounder. The fishing here is also carried on by syndicates, and is done close to shore with rather primitive appliances. The bulk of the fish is preserved

9: Protheto G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

either by salting, smoking, or sun-curing. Fish-curing is carried on in factories at Odessa and Ochakov.

The fisheries in the Azov Sea are important, but the principal grounds are not in Ukrainian territory, those which lie within its limits being of insignificant value.

(4) Minerals

(a) *Natural Resources*

The principal mineral resources of the Ukraine are coal, iron, and salt.

The *coal* is all in one large field usually known as the Donets basin, which extends from west to east for a distance of 300 miles. It is considered the largest coalfield in Europe, but owing to peculiarities of the geological strata it is split up into several areas with varying qualities of coal. Roughly the flame coals are on the western end of the field, the coking and semi-anthracite coals in the centre, and the anthracite in the east, though coking coals are also found towards the north-east corner. Very little pure anthracite is mined on Ukraine territory, as the beds are mainly in the Don Cossack district. Throughout the field the seams vary much in thickness. Some are too thin to be worked. The average thickness of those worked is 21 to 35 in.; seams of 5 ft. are moderately common, and the maximum thickness is 7 ft.

The output of coal from the Donets field is variable. This is chiefly due to labour difficulties, which arise in unexpected ways. Nevertheless if the figures of several years are considered together, a great increase is shown, and new pits are being opened every year. The average production for the years 1908 to 1912 was over 14,000,000 tons, the proportion of bituminous coal to anthracite being as 8 to 1. The figures include the whole field, as separate statistics for the portion over the Don Cossack border are not issued.

Iron.—The Ukraine is fortunate in having in close proximity to its coalfield a district rich in iron ore. The deposit, which is of excellent quality and easily worked,

101 swamps of Polesia. Faggot and fascine paths lead
133 you from village to village, from settlement to settlement. If you visit this swamp land which extends almost to the central Russian plain and is about at large as Hungary including Carpatho-Ukraine, in spring during the time of thaws or during the floods of early summer, people will row you in a boat to their neighbor's. For at these times the rivers creeping in countless bends through lakes, ponds and tributaries of this country, which is only 170 meters above sea level, flood their banks for many weeks, even months. This landscape is unutterably sad, and, it has deprived of laughter the few people it scantily nourishes with fish,
[136] potatoes and oats. Polesia is a land of spooks without equal, where, across the bog through which elk and bison, sure-footed, make their way, there
[137] rises the "pillared hall of centuries-old oaks, lindens, aspens, ash trees, firs, spruces and pines." /19/ The sun rarely shines into this twilight where at night there are mysterious will-o'-the-wisps in this world of mold. Deathly silence prevails in this accursed land which even the birds avoid. You are standing on the border of the Soviet Union.

133 Descending the navigable Pripyat, and traveling eastward halfway to the central Russian plain, you reach, friend, the Dniepr, which comes from the north. You have come to the sacred river of the Ukrainians. They chant its praises in countless songs. This third largest river of Europe flows 2100 kilometers until, exhausted, it empties into the Black Sea. If it happens to be flood time, you will not be able to see from one bank to the other, the river rises to such an extent. It gets to be six, eight, even ten kilometers wide. Herodotus already compared it with the Nile.

505 If you now sail south[1] on a Dniepr steamer you will reach Kiyev. Do not be surprised at the numerous vessels which you meet on the river, for

1 [From the confluence of the Dniepr and the Pripyat - Analyst]

C
621 their share of spoils had not yet wandered into
182 the hands of shopkeepers and innkeepers. There was something very tempting about these universal drinking bouts. The sech did not consist of a bunch of drunkards who were bent on drowning their sorrow in the bottle; it was a jolly, carefree company of men who lived from day to day in a mad delirium of joy. Everyone who came there forgot and threw off everything that ordinarily concerned him; for he enthusiastically gave himself up to carefree camaraderie with people, like himself, who had neither parents nor a home nor a family..., who did not own a thing except the free breath of heaven and an indestructible serenity of spirit."
C No woman was permitted to enter the sech.

Besides the Zaporogian Cossacks (Zaporogian
101 comes from "za porogamy" meaning "beyond the
182 rapids") on the fortified island in the Dniepr, there were free Cossacks who lived on their farms scattered throughout the country, and these were by far in the majority. But in case of war or in general insurrection they appeared mounted and completely equipped at the place of assembly within a few days. When the campaign was ended, the warrior and farmer, whichever he chose to be, returned "to his meadows and fields /46/or to the banks of the Dniepr, spent his time fishing and trading, brewed beer and spirits and lived as a free Cossack...There was not a trade that he was not familiar with. He distilled spirits, built wagons, ground powder, was a forger and locksmith, and was above all adept at loafing, drinking and carousing as only the Slav knows how to be. No matter what he did, he was always in his element."

U This description of the peaceable side of
136 Cossack life would be incomplete without a contem-
C porary account of the hunting grounds of the
136 Cossacks. "The Ukraine is so rich in wild game that avrochs, wild horses and deer are hunted only for their skins. Of their meat only the most suc-

Cossacks RD2

culent ribs and loins are used, everything else is discarded. The female deer and wild boar are not hunted at all. In winter roes and wild boars wander in large herds from the steppes into the forests, and in summer they return to the steppes. ...The bird world is so marvelously rich that in spring vast quantities of eggs and fledglings of wild ducks, wild geese, cranes and swans are gathered in. In spring such large schools of fish swim up the river that a spear thrown into the water comes to rest upright." (28)

U 136 C 136

28. Rudnytskyj: Ukrainians, the Country and the People, page 123.

This, then, was the kingdom of Chmielnicki, the Emperor of the Cossacks. As soon as the hordes of the Pecheneg and Polovtsi had driven the agricultural Ukrainian population out of the fertile South Ukrainian territory with scimitars and with fire, the first gangs of freebooters, fishermen and hunters from among the homeless banded together. On one of the more inaccessible islands of the Danube Delta a troop of no less than 6000 exiled Ukrainian farmers settled. There could scarcely be any question of their clinging to their native soil in regions where the farm population was obliged to withdraw into certain areas of swamps and virgin forests to avoid the constantly roving Asiatic nomads. For generations /47/ peasants ventured out into the open field only at the time of sowing and reaping. And in spite of that, millions of men, women and children fell victims to the "organized slave hunts" of these hordes.

U 175 C 178 621

Around the middle of the sixteenth century there developed small and later large militarily organized bands made up of homeless aristocratic and bourgeois refugees and the peasants who had escaped serfdom. As a result of a constant influx and integration, a regular army was formed which,

C 621 642 182

4. the province of oceanic climate (southern coast of Crimea and that part of Sub-Caucasia that lies along the sea coast) has warm, rainy winters and hot, dry summers. 132

c) Rivers and Seas

The rivers of Ukraine are long and carry much water. They either flow to the Baltic (Syan, Veper, Buh and Narew and other tributaries of the Vistula), or to the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv (Danube with tributaries, Dnister, Buh, Dnipro, Don with Donets etc.). The fact that the main watershed runs through the plains faciliates the construction of a network of canals connecting the seas. The Dnipro (1405 miles long and draining an area of 199 230 sq. miles) is the largest river in Ukraine. Historical settlements lie on its banks and the Ukrainian state developed along its course. For the people of Ukraine it is a sacred river. 133 487

The Buh (497 miles long, draining an area of 24 450 sq. miles) flows into the Black Sea west of the Dnipro. It has not much water and is not navigable.

South-west Ukraine is drained by the Dnister (856 miles long, area of basin 29615 sq. m.). Its course is not regulated either and it is not navigable. The rivers Prut and Cheremosh connect Ukraine with the Danube, while the Don and the Donets form the channel to the Sea of Oziv; the Kuban river drains the Kuban plain.

The Black Sea (area 158 462 sq. miles) connected by the Kerch Strait with the Sea of Oziv (area 14 615 sq. miles) has always been the channel of commerce between the eastern world and the countries round the Mediterranean. Its most important harbors, Odessa, Sevastopil, and Novorossijske are blocked by ice for a short time only; the Sea of Oziv, on the other hand, is too shallow to be navigable.

d) Flora and Fauna

The commonest tree in the northern forest zone is the pine; the birch, the alder, the ash and other species also occur frequently. In the west we find beech and larch, and in the Carpathians the spruce and the fir, and sometimes even the cedar. 137 ●

137 Oaks and hornbeams grow plentifully in the zone of transition between forest and the steppe while the pine prefers sandy river valleys. Vegetation in the mountains corresponds to that in western surroundings. The vast mountain pastures deserve special mention. On the coast of the Crimea and the Caucasus we find the buttertree, the cypress, the stone pine, the laurel, opuntias, agaves and other Mediterranean plants.

136 Prevalent animal species vary only slightly from those found in neighboring countries in the west. Worthy of mention are wild-cat, ermine, and bison in the forest region, bear, lynx and wild-cat in the Carpathians. In the Yaila mountains there are vultures. The Caucasus has the greatest variety of animals. It is still possible there to hunt ibex, jackals and ure-ox. On the southern slopes there are even panthers. Numerous rodents live in the steppes. The ure-ox, the beaver and the marmot are dying out.

3. Population.

a) Density

161 In 1939 the average density of the population in Ukraine was 68 persons per sq. kilometer. In the central forest-steppe zone, one of the most thickly populated agrarian areas in Europe, 80—120 people live on a sq. kilometer, between the Syan and Kursk. Northern Ukraine with its lighter soil is much more thinly populated; here the average density amounts to 40—60 persons per sq. kilometer, and in Polesya this figure even falls below 25. The density of the population in Southern Ukraine corresponds roughly to that in the north, though the Donets basin is an isolated area of dense population. The Caucasus foothills, a country with a climate at least as favorable as that of Central Ukraine is only two-thirds as densely populated, as it was colonised late. The mountains are thinly populated.

162 361 The majority of the Ukrainian people live in villages; 29 % live in towns and 10 % in cities with more than 100 000 inhabitants; trade and industry are not intensively developed; we are struck by the many towns that have grown up at the frontiers between the various natural areas; there are 60 bet-

the figure for the Roumanian provinces being 0.25, for the Polish 0.36, and 1.05 for the Hungarian provinces. 313 439

Imports of timber came mostly by water and rail from White Ruthenia and above all from the forests in the middle reaches of the Volga. The wood that was drifted down the Volga was loaded on railway trucks in Stalingrad and transported to its destination.

Hardwoods predominate in the forest stock of Ukraine (59 %). Oak represents 27 %, beech 9 % of the entire forests. Of the 41 % softwoods there is 27 % pine. Pine and oak are the main species in Dnipro-Ukraine, while in Galicia spruce predominates and beech in Carpatho-Ukraine. In the Caucasus species of oak and beech occur most frequently. 313 137

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Apart from the severer climate of the Carpathian summits, that of the whole Ukrainian territory is nearly the same and can be characterized by the average temperature at Kiev, which is almost in the centre of the Ukraine, and which is an average of 7·3 degrees C., with an average minimum of −4·5 degrees C. and an average maximum of 20 degrees C. 132

This solid carpet of snow and these frozen rivers during long months are unknown in Western Europe.

The length of uninterrupted winter increases as one advances towards the north and the east. But on the whole extent of the Russian plain the average temperature in January does not rise above −4 degrees C. Human existence has to adapt itself to this fact. All the civilizations which have developed on the Russian plain have necessarily been influenced by it.

This aspect of the winter already tells us that from a climatic point of view the Ukraine belongs to a world quite different from the West and is connected with the great Russian continent. In the summer torrid and endless heat, broken by rare thunderstorms, such as are unknown in the West, confirms this statement. This very high summer temperature is not typical of the Ukraine alone but of the whole of Russia.

Beyond the frontier of the 'Soviet Republic of the Ukraine,' in the direction of the Volga and the Caspian Sea, the periods of heat are so long and intense that vegetation, which is progressively poorer, becomes almost non-existent. We enter a zone of semi-desert. But again we do so almost without noticing it, as the change of flora takes place slowly and imperceptibly from the Carpathians to the Caspian Sea.

In the greater part of the Ukraine the heat and dryness are sufficiently pronounced to hinder the growth of trees, but nevertheless insufficiently so as to kill all vegetation. 137 132

137 Between the zone of the forests and that of the deserts, a geographical zone which enjoys a rich vegetation of corns and grasses stretches across the Russian plain. It is the Steppe, which begins on the shores of the Black Sea and almost immediately behind the Carpathians, a little to the east of Lvov, in Polish Galicia, along longitude 22 degrees east, and which continues from west to east, growing gradually wider beyond the frontiers of the Ukraine, and passing the official and conventional limit of Europe without interruption into Siberia.

134 Treeless since time immemorial, the plain is here exceptionally fertile. The grasses which grow here since prehistoric times have formed a thick layer of humus by their organic remains, which particularly favours the growth of all cereals, close relations of the wild species of the Steppe, the *pyrei*. The fertility of the soil is not only due to its organic composition but also to its porous structure whose capillary qualities facilitate irrigation.

This famous 'black earth,' the *tchernoziom*, is nowhere so rich as in the Ukraine. It forms, while becoming somewhat poorer towards the east, the typical soil of the whole Steppe both in the Ukraine and in Siberia.

137 The transition between the region of the forests and the Steppe is also not sudden. Before disappearing definitely in the ocean of corn and grass, the forests become lighter and sparser and here and there, especially along the rivers, they advance into the Steppes.

131 Yet the frontier between the zone of the forests and that of the Steppe is the only natural border which one can find in the immensity of the Russian plain. Formerly a stable political boundary—as we shall see when studying the history of the Ukraine[1]—it represents nothing to-day either from the ethnical or the political point of view.

1 [see category 116, pp. 27-106 --- Analyst]

131 eastern frontier at the 50th degree latitude north, while cutting the territory into two almost equal parts.

132 In the northern zone (Zone 1) the rainfall is everywhere greater than 50 centimetres, while in the southern zone (Zone 2) it is less than 50 centimetres and varies between 25 and 50 centimetres.

134 The predominant soils of Zone 1 are poor *tchernozioms*, that is to say somewhat exhausted by the currents of water which have deprived them of their humus to a varying extent in different regions, and have brought to them some sand and clay from their sources.

On the contrary, the lands of Zone 2 are rich and complete *tchernozioms*.

137 Zone 1 comprises a vast forest region which, while spreading along the courses of the river becomes little by little a land of light woods, is yet characterized by the general presence of forests.

Zone 2 has no forests and is the true Steppe.

131 This separation is in practice nothing else but the frontier between the Steppe as such and the *lesso-steppe* (a Steppe with occasional woods)—a geographical term which has been accepted by Russian scientists for a long time.

This border is also that which defined the cradle of Russia, the ancient principality of Kiev, separating it from the savage Steppe of the nomads. Therefore, already at that distant epoch, the separation between these two agro-climatic zones existed in practice. Thus justified from a geographical point of view, the border between these two zones is all the more acceptable, as it is in tune with an historic reality since the establishment of settled populations.

000 Each time when we treat the question of populations in our study (the difference of density, of social distribution, and of ethnical composition), of agriculture

[See category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

369 The Ukrainian people, being an old nation with an agricultural civilization, is not attracted by industry and by large concentrations of population. It prefers to live in the country, when its material life is assured, seeking to supplement its revenues by semi-agricultural professions such as those of artisan, or small trade, or finally the service of the State.

241 The Ukrainian agriculturalist, especially in the regions of the south, is conscious of participating in the general economy of the country. He takes a great interest in the choice of plants to be developed, in the organization of co-operatives for trade and credit, and in the construction of the means of communication. He is a civilized peasant, a quite European farmer. Without disparaging the intellect and the practical sense of the Great Russian people, it is necessary to recognize that the Ukrainian is more Western in all his conceptions, and more European, than his brother of the north.

163 On the other hand, the Ukrainian people have a great vitality. Among the peoples of Europe they have the greatest rate of increase, which reaches 2·3 per cent per annum. The fecundity of the women is astonishing: between twenty and thirty years it is 23 per cent, while in France it hardly reaches 8 per cent at the same ages.[1]

142 The average height of the men at the period of military service is about 1 m. 69½ cm.

137 342 Ukrainians are very clean and their houses very neat, mostly whitened with whitewash and surrounded by gardens. Fruit trees, particularly cherry trees, give the villages an attractive appearance, especially in the districts of Kiev and Poltava (Zone 1)[2] where the rich and green nature resembles the landscape of Southern England.

[1] That is to say that for a 100 women between twenty and thirty years one meets 23 expectant ones.

[2] [see category 116, pp. 139-140. ---Analyst]

On the contrary, in Zone 2 the absence of trees, the 137
drier climate, the dusty soil, and the isolated farms make the landscape more severe and more similar to the barren table-land of Northern Castile. Only the immensity of the cornfields with their golden ears introduces a lyrical note, vision-like, into this flat and treeless country. The villages of the Steppe are not 361
very picturesque and look mostly like colonies in which 342
the spirit of calculation dominates over the care of beauty. The habitations here are more modern, bigger, and better planned. The thatch here gives place to tiles and to corrugated iron. On the other hand, the poor people, deprived of wood, live in primitive hovels built of clay.

In the extreme north, in the forest region with its 133
sandy soil, the picturesque landscapes gradually disappear to resume the severe and sad monotony of the White Russian country-side.

The Ukrainian is very adaptable to civilization, that 181
is to say to the improvement of everyday life, and very quickly adopts all practical inventions, without any spirit of routine.

The Ukraine is the most literate part of Russia. Even 212
Soviet statistics, which cannot be assumed to be well disposed to the Tsarist regime, show that the percentage of the generation which was of a school age in 1914, which could read and write was, in 1923, 90 per cent in the towns and 73 per cent in the country, which, by the way, is a vigorous reply to the generally accepted opinion that in the pre-war Russian Empire the population stagnated in a condition of utter ignorance.

In the other parts of European Russia the percentage for the same generation was respectively 82 per cent in the towns and 57 per cent in the country-side.

It seems to us opportune to give an idea of the Ukraine 000

2 [See category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

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137
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7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1



MAP No. 5

p 151

Ukraine, where, as we have seen, it is only intensive in the western part of Zone 1. 246

. . . . .

Both from the point of view of numbers and of quality, the Ukraine is of little interest in forestry. Its production is even insufficient to satisfy the local needs. 137

The forests are mostly concentrated in the districts of Volynia, Kiev, and Tchernigov and are mainly fir trees. Their surface does not exceed 3,000,000 hectares.

Apart from the forests one meets, in the western part of Zone 1, oases of oaks and those light woods which are familiar to the rest of Europe, excepting, however, the beech tree, the geographical distribution of which is the best justification of the division of our continent into Western and Eastern Europe.

As to Zone 2, it is completely treeless with the exception of some oases to the east of Kharkov.

Towards the west the forest region increases and its exploitation becomes more intense. Already in Galicia, near the Carpathians, they represent an important part of the production of the country without, however, playing the role of an important export.

. . . . .

A land of great size and magnificent pastures, the Ukraine occupies an important place in Europe in the sphere of cattle-breeding. 231

The Ukrainian Steppes provide excellent conditions for the breeding of horses, the number of which before the last war reached 5,500,000.

It would be unjust not to note that the German colonists have contributed much to the improvement of the horses in Southern Ukraine, especially in the region of Kherson, where many great enterprises were devoted to them.

The years of collectivization and the extermination

425 by the Government at various times between the middle of the eighteenth century and 1861, in the hope that their superior methods of agriculture would be copied by other cultivators. This effect, however, was not produced, and the colonists form compact communities with little or no influence on their neighbours. Land in private ownership is usually farmed on more modern [241] and rational principles than the *nadyel* land, and produces almost the entire surplus of cereals which is sent abroad and to other parts of Russia.

421 The land owned by the Church, Crown, and members of the Imperial family is absolute freehold, and is generally well managed and productively farmed.

407 412 Up-to-date agricultural machinery is becoming more common all round. It is of course most in vogue on the large estates, especially in the case of expensive machines involving the use of power; steam-ploughs on the cable system are much in use on the large sugar-beet estates, and tractor ploughs with single engines are becoming numerous. By the help and enterprise of the *zemstvos* the peasants are now beginning to use modern machines and implements. The traditional *sock* or wooden plough, the flail, and other such primitive tools are disappearing, although it is hard to induce the peasant to abandon his old methods.

(c) *Forestry*

137 [311] A large portion of the Ukraine is totally denuded of trees at the present time. The Governments of Podolia and Volhynia, and the northern parts of Kiev and Chernigov, are well wooded, the area covered by forest being about 15 per cent. of the whole. In the remaining provinces the forest area averages 3–4 per cent. of the total. The State controls certain areas north of Kiev on both banks of the Dnieper, and in Volhynia on the south side of the Pripet marshes, as well as smaller scattered tracts in Podolia. In the Government of Yekaterinoslav the State has lately done much

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

planting, principally of sand-willows and pines, the main object being to arrest the movement of drift-sand. 137

The principal Ukraine timber trees are oak, maple, elm, ash, willow, aspen, lime, and wych-elm.

The art of forestry would appear to be almost entirely neglected. Systematic replanting of timber is hardly known, and wholesale destruction of woods on the river banks has had disastrous results in the splitting up of the channels. The lime is frequently denuded of its bark to make bast, the tree subsequently perishing as it stands. 313

(3) Fisheries

The fisheries of the Ukraine can be divided into three classes: those of the upper reaches of the rivers, those of the lower reaches and the lagoons at the mouths, and those of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea. 228

In the upper reaches of the principal rivers, fishing can scarcely be called an industry, being carried on by individuals mainly for their personal needs; the stock of fish is everywhere decreasing at a regrettable rate, and much alarm is caused by this depletion.

The fisheries of the lower reaches of the Dnieper, Dniester, and Southern Bug have considerable value. 228 136 The principal fish taken are sturgeon, of which there are several varieties, carp, bream, fresh-water herring, and sander. The fisheries are the property of the riparian owners, who let them to syndicates. The State owns a considerable stretch on the Bug from Nikolaev to Novaya Odessa. The fishing seasons are from February to April and in the autumn, when the fish revisit the rivers to spawn. At this time they are taken for the roe, from which caviare of various qualities is made.

In the Black Sea the principal fish are mackerel, anchovy, and flounder. The fishing here is also carried on by syndicates, and is done close to shore with rather primitive appliances. The bulk of the fish is preserved

132 not be one of those terrible thunderstorms which
/15/ hover threateningly over the villages for half a day at a time, sending down ghastly lightning or cloudbursts which wash away the humus. Nor should the moisture be accompanied by one of those icy snowstorms in which man and animal, shepherds and herds numbering in the thousands easily come to grief if they are caught by the impenetrable swirl of flakes on the open field.

●137 The geographers who like to divide up the earth into zones studied Ukrainian soil with regard to its flora and found that north Ukraine down to Kiyev belongs to the region of north European forests where, besides oak, alder and birch, the spruce flourishes. In the south and southeast the dense forests open up into park landscapes and forest glades. The farther south one goes, the more scarce and sparse the islands of mighty oaks, lindens and elms become. This is the region of the wooded steppe which finally passes over into
134 the open, almost treeless grassy steppe. Seventy million hectares of Ukrainian soil is fertile black earth. It has erroneously been considered inexhaustible. Even though today the soil does not yet tolerate any artificial fertilizer, scholars are already racking their brains over the sad prospect that the natural fertility of black loam, the ideal of all farmers the world over, will be exhausted in about 50 years. Already at the time of the last czar, model farms and experimental stations sought ways and means to meet this danger.

*

000 Come along, comrade, and wander to the east toward the rising sun, into the land which at its greatest expanse is as long as the distance from Barcelona to Memel and as wide as the realm between the Brenner Pass and Kiel. Climb up from the merrily babbling Poprad through beech forests,

101 swamps of Polesia. Faggot and fascine paths lead
133 you from village to village, from settlement to settlement. If you visit this swamp land which extends almost to the central Russian plain and is about at large as Hungary including Carpatho-Ukraine, in spring during the time of thaws or during the floods of early summer, people will row you in a boat to their neighbor's. For at these times the rivers creeping in countless bends through lakes, ponds and tributaries of this country, which is only 170 meters above sea level, flood their banks for many weeks, even months. This landscape is unutterably sad, and, it has deprived of laughter the few people it scantily nourishes with fish,
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• [137] rises the "pillared hall of centuries-old oaks, lindens, aspens, ash trees, firs, spruces and pines." /19/ The sun rarely shines into this twilight where at night there are mysterious will-o'-the-wisps in this world of mold. Deathly silence prevails in this accursed land which even the birds avoid. You are standing on the border of the Soviet Union.

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505 If you now sail south[1] on a Dniepr steamer you will reach Kiyev. Do not be surprised at the numerous vessels which you meet on the river, for

1 [From the confluence of the Dniepr and the Pripyat - Analyst]

11: Obermaier--17 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

133 Plain where lie the coal districts of the Ukraine. The more bleak and unfriendly this industrial country with its black chimneys appears to you, the friendlier the quiet, pale yellow Donets beckons yonder, with its broad, green valley and the white chalk precipices crowned by dark green forests. Now your journey takes you south to the Sea of Azov, across the mouth of the Don to the Caucasian foothills. Immeasurable fields of sun-
101 flowers accompany you into this "second Ukraine". 1
133 Here you feel the refreshing breath of the snowy mountains of the Caucasus. You are on the shores of the Argonauts. Virile and full of strength is this untouched land at the foot of the Elbrus. Like the mountains, the people, too, are giants. You have before you the descendants of the flower of the Ukrainian people, of the Zaporogian Cossacks who were settled here by Catherine II.

137 And now turn west, start homeward! The way
[133] leads across the Pontic Plain which extends north of the Black Sea as far as the Danube. On this "racial meadow" you will look in vain for the much-praised wild uncultivated steppe. You are in the land of Taras Bulba. Gogol, a Ukrainian, erected an imperishable monument to the bold Cossack in his tale. /21/ In those days the grass and shrubs of the steppe grew taller than a man, but today you will find only the knee-high herbs of the temporarily fallow fields, and here and there a thicket of wild cherries, mahaleb and thistles. Perhaps you will also come to one of those meadows that have become rare, which in a brief whiff of spring changes its color like a rich woman her clothes, wrapping itself in silver gray during the summer, and adorning itself in moss-green in autumn, when rain finally quenches the cracked earth. Smooth
133 and flat, amorphous as a calm sea, the Pontic Steppe stretches out before you. Burial mounds as
764 large as houses, called kurgany, point the way to the Dniestr. What ghastly secrets may they not

1 [i.e. the Caucasian foothills — Analyst]

They are the mountain people who cling to the place where they
177 were born. This applies even to those who, through force of circum-
181 stances, had to leave their native village to earn their living elsewhere.
167 Some have found occupation in the fertile South; but when they have saved some money they want to return home and are prepared to pay a higher price for a few poor fields, although in the valleys of the South they could buy much better land for the same amount. Hundreds of thousands have emigrated to America, where about as many Ruthenians can be found as have remained in the homeland under the Carpathians. Yet many long to come back home to find their last resting place in the native soil.

137 The peculiar beauty of this forgotten country has a strong grip
313 on her simple sons. The Ruthenian Carpathians are not so high as the Slovak peaks, but the vast stretches of dense forest, which cover almost half of Ruthenia, give the country a more primeval appearance. Some of the woods and slopes are delightful idylls, where the fresh and fragrant air is full of hum and rustle and warble. But in many parts, unchartered and untouched by human hand, the forest is sombre. Trees felled by storm or gale lie dead where they have fallen, and there is a smell of rotting wood in this lonely wilderness. Wild boar, wolf, lynx and bear have their hunting ground here, while above the tops of the mighty pines, firs, oaks and maples, circle the eagle and the hawk. Other parts of the forest are enlivened by the rhythmical sound of the axe cutting down trees to be floated down the rushing mountain streams. A large proportion of the hardy Ruthenians earn their living in this way. But above this expanse of deep forest are the sunlit pastures and upland meadows sprinkled with gentian, buttercups, pansies, chrysanthemums and geraniums. Sheep and cattle graze here during the summer months; Ruthenia is also a country of shepherds, who blow their huge horns at night to gather the scattered herds.

312



Wooden dam in Ruthenia

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RDL

a long, warm autumn, provides excellent conditions for the development of agriculture. Average January temperatures vary from 27° F in the southwest to 14° F in the east, and July averages from 68° F in the north to 73° F in the south. The northern section of the Ukraine receives adequate rainfall (about 20 inches a year), but the south is much drier, having an average yearly rainfall of 9 inches. Most of the precipitation occurs in the first half of the year. During the summer, frequent violent rainstorms occur in the eastern sections.

The greater portion of the Ukraine lies in the wooded steppe and steppe zones, where black earth prevails. In the northern section, which lies in the forested zone, grassy marshes occur in abundance. In the wooded steppe zone the forest reserves have largely been depleted. Broad-leaved types, such as oak, maple, ash, and elm, occur only along the rivers and extend in green ribbons through gullies and ravines up to the watersheds. Characteristic local vegetation types are the dense growths of alder, willow, and poplar which border the inundated banks of the rivers and the many ox-bows and lakes which remain after the spring floods. The steppes on the watersheds have long been converted into rich wheat fields, a typical feature of the Ukrainian landscape.

Among the mineral resources which abound in the Ukrainian SSR, the primary raw materials for heavy metallurgy are most important. Scarcely anywhere else in the USSR are coal, iron, and manganese found within such proximity of each other as in the eastern Ukraine. The Donets Basin, or Donbas, with reserves of more than 90 billion tons, is the principal coal producer of the USSR. The Krivoy Rog iron mines produce iron ore of a high quality and metal content. Between these two sites are the rich manganese deposits in the area of Nikopol'. In the Donbas are extensive salt and mercury deposits. Petroleum fields lie in the foothills of the Carpathians, where salt, potash, and natural gas are also found. Another petroleum site is in the area of Romny (Sumy Oblast). The northern, marshy section of the Ukraine—Poles'ye—abounds in peat. Other minerals include polymetallic ores (Donets Basin), phosphorites, kaolin, limestone, marl, gypsum, and so forth.

The Ukraine is the most densely inhabited union republic of the USSR. Its 40 million inhabitants represent about one fifth of the total population of the USSR. The average population density is 180 per square mile; however, there is considerable variation throughout the region. The greatest concentration exists in the western Ukraine, along the foot of the Carpathians, where the density reaches 340 to 390 per square

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181 The common cultural heritage is so great that it covers all pecularities.

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11: Obermaier--217 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

141



character study of a Ukrainian head

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141

A UKRAINIAN GIRL WITH PRONOUNCED NORDIC FEATURES

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369 The Ukrainian people, being an old nation with an agricultural civilization, is not attracted by industry and by large concentrations of population. It prefers to live in the country, when its material life is assured, seeking to supplement its revenues by semi-agricultural professions such as those of artisan, or small trade, or finally the service of the State.

241 The Ukrainian agriculturalist, especially in the regions of the south, is conscious of participating in the general economy of the country. He takes a great interest in the choice of plants to be developed, in the organization of co-operatives for trade and credit, and in the construction of the means of communication. He is a civilized peasant, a quite European farmer. Without disparaging the intellect and the practical sense of the Great Russian people, it is necessary to recognize that the Ukrainian is more Western in all his conceptions, and more European, than his brother of the north.

163 On the other hand, the Ukrainian people have a great vitality. Among the peoples of Europe they have the greatest rate of increase, which reaches 2·3 per cent per annum. The fecundity of the women is astonishing: between twenty and thirty years it is 23 per cent, while in France it hardly reaches 8 per cent at the same ages.[1]

142 The average height of the men at the period of military service is about 1 m. 69½ cm.

137 342 Ukrainians are very clean and their houses very neat, mostly whitened with whitewash and surrounded by gardens. Fruit trees, particularly cherry trees, give the villages an attractive appearance, especially in the districts of Kiev and Poltava (Zone 1)* where the rich and green nature resembles the landscape of Southern England.

[1] That is to say that for a 100 women between twenty and thirty years one meets 23 expectant ones.

* [see category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

181 political life of the Ukrainians, in that of the Great Russians a tendency toward materialsim prevails. The Ukrainians incline toward federation, the Russians toward absolutism; the Ukrainians have a tendency to prefer personal freedom, the Russians despotism. As a result of these contrasts, he says, there is an eternal battle between the two peoples. (79)

79. Zalozieckij: The Spiritual Life of the Ukraine in the Past and Present.

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174 Historically the differences between the two /131/ peoples were revealed even at the time the Golden Horde subjugated them both. To this day the Russians boast of the fact that at that time they had carried on a more clever Tatar policy, that they had yielded and voluntarily paid the head tax - in contrast to the Ukrainians. While in that century Ukrainian high nobility played the leading cultural role at the court of the Lithuanian Gedemins, the Muscovite grand prince

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But the Dinaric domain proper is the southern zone of Ukraine, including Carpathian Ukraine, the Hutsul area, Bucovina, Southern Podolia and all adjacent territory in the south and south-east including the Crimea and the Kuban area. Ukrainians in this area are definitely short-headed, darkish, tall, (about 5 ft. 9) and most resemble the South Slavs. On the middle reaches of the Dnister, the Prut and the Boh there are more marked traces of the Mediterranean race.

A certain deliberateness and modesty are characteristic for the Ukrainian who is most sensitive to impressions from without, though he reacts slowly to them. He is of balanced, even temperament and has humor and irony which help him to cope with the irritations of everyday life. He judges life from the standpoint of feeling; favorable climatic conditions and the relatively easy work in the fields betray him into a certain quiescence. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian loves his work and is most active in intellectual, artistic and practical provinces. On the other hand, hard times both in the past and at present have made him suspicious and increased his innate individualism. In social intercourse, for instance, although he is friendly, he is reserved rather than importunate. Revenge and cruelty are foreign to his nature. 157

As is the case with most old peasant peoples, the relationship of the Ukrainian to others is based on definite forms, that express social culture, good manners, courtesy and hospitality. Contrary to the Russian custom, authority in the home is shared by the head of the house and his wife; the functions of the latter extend beyond the duties of housekeeping and the upbringing of children and she has a say in all economic questions. Children enjoy a relatively generous amount of freedom and may be present at the customary morning and evening 156 593

tion of the Kievan State, where the Prince was only a servant of the 175
state and had to reckon with the will of his subjects, — knights and townsmen ('viche'), in Muscovy there was not the slightest trace. The Government of the Princes of Moscow imitated the despotic system of the Tartar 'Golden Horde'. Some Russian historians reject the legend of the taking over of the Kievan traditions by Moscow, and point out the peculiarity of the social and political order of the Muscovite state*). The Princes of Moscow did not tolerate the existence of the Republic of Great Novgorod on the Volkhov River at the side of their despotic state, and after having conquered that country they destroyed by bloody terror the freedom of the Republic of Novgorod (end of 15th century). The liberal traditions of Great Novgorod were definitely wiped out in 1570 by Tsar Ivan the Terrible, who carried out a cruel massacre in this city, and deported a great part of the population to the East. The Muscovite State, which had grown under the protectorate of the Tartar Khans, created a political and social order of its own, after the pattern of the eastern despotisms.

In an article published in the *Review of Politics* (July 1948) the [177]
well known American historian Hans Kohn says that the state of the Princes of Kiev, i. e. Ukraine, "looked toward Byzantium, whence it received its Church and toward Scandinavia, from where its dynasty came. When Kiev succumbed to the Mongol invasion, modern Russia was created by the will of the ruthless cunning of the great princes around Moscow.

The new capital grew up, . . ., far from the old cultural centres to the west, on recently colonial land where traditional urban liberties were unknown. Its people were no longer the Slavs of the Dnieper [144]
but a new race in which Slav, Finnish, and Mongol blood freely intermingled. From Moscow, no roads led to the West, the rivers pointed to the steppes and deserts of Asia; the political, cultural, and economic ties were with the great empire of the Tartars to whom it was tributary."

The oriental despotic features of the political and economic order of the Muscovite State gave the central government a tremendous power that was used for the enslavement of all social classes and for the seclusion of the Muscovite people from Western Europe. Until the end of the 17th century the Government of the Tsars did not permit its subjects to visit the countries of Western Europe and tried to prevent foreigners from entering their country. The Tsar

*) Prof. Presnyakov, *The Creation of the Great-Russian State:* Moscow 1918; various works of the historians Lyubavsky, Miliukov and others.

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24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

744 Europe; and many people used to die every year from tuberculosis and
164 other chest complaints. Severe epidemics—typhoid and dysentry—used
146 to ravage the country every year; inadequate regulation of rivers and stagnant waters gave rise to malaria; undernourishment of large sections of the population was responsible for sporadic pellagra. Venereal diseases were a curse owing to lack of medical attention and of appropriate legislation.

744 This enormous task was tackled with commendable vigour by the authorities of the Republic. In a country which used to have very few
185 doctors, a proper medical service was soon organised; up-to-date hospitals and children's homes were built; Red Cross stations and other hygiene and welfare institutions, set up in many parts of Ruthenia, strove to prevent and combat disease. This systematic effort resulted in a substantial reduction of mortality, while the draining of marshlands and the regulation of streams and ponds considerably checked epidemics.

185 Realising that ignorance is the root of many social evils, the State regarded the raising of the standard of education in Ruthenia as one
871 of its foremost tasks. The achievements in this field were perhaps the most striking. A country, which in 1918 had not more than eighteen elementary schools where children were only partly taught in Ruthenian, possessed 520 Ruthenian schools two years later; and after fifteen years of independence this small country in the Carpathians could boast 1,079 schools of various kinds—elementary, upper, secondary, technical and special schools. The magnitude of this achievement becomes evident when it is borne in mind that it was necessary to educate the requisite number of Ruthenian teachers from among the rising generation.

871 Thanks to these efforts illiteracy among the younger people has become rare. Those Ruthenians who according to the last census of
212 1930 were still unable to read and write were largely middle-aged or
185 old people. But even among them illiteracy has been considerably reduced because evening schools for adults were opened wherever pos-
517 sible. The people of Ruthenia proved to be keen pupils. Within a few years the neglected country had a promising intelligentsia—administrative workers, teachers, journalists, writers, doctors, engineers, composers, artists and scientists. In the thirties more than eighty periodicals, among them ten dailies, appeared in Ruthenia, and the production of books grew from year to year. The innate aptitude for arts and crafts was given a chance of development when a special art school was established in Užhorod, and musical talent, too, received much encouragement. As many as 7.7 per cent of all musical compositions and songs broadcast by Czechoslovak radio stations were the work of Ruthenian musicians.

000 Economic development was essential to a country where bread used

In contrast to Western European thought, it is characteristic 156
for the Russian's view of the world that he definitely rejects the 829
personal and always seeks to take his stand on a certain intellectual collectivism. In spite of the zealous efforts of some Russian scholars to explain and water down this quality of the Russian psyche, we must admit the truth of the assertion of the slavophils that the Russian spirit is collectivist, in the sense that it detests personal freedom, all kinds of contract conditions and individual property; that it prefers collectivist forms of economy was illustrated in the past by the traditional and typically Russian "Obshchina". And the collectivist experiments which have been carried out in the Soviet Union in modern times have shown that collectivist measures of the communist government met with no resistance to speak of in Russia proper, while peasants in Ukraine were ready to fight to the death in defense of the principle of private property as the fundament of western culture, and in spite of desperate conditions, actually did so.

If we wish to evaluate the principles of the Ukrainian view 152 ●
of the world adequately, we must study the structure of his psyche and reveal those qualities and functions that lend it its spiritual character. What strikes us most at the outset is the emphasis on the emotions; the preponderance of feelings over reason. The entire conduct of the Ukrainian is regulated, not by reason, "ratio", so characteristic for the entire philosophy of the Occident, but by profound feeling. This is a characteristic of all Slavs whose passions usually run the whole gamut of emotions. Slavs in general, and Ukrainians in particular, are capable of boundless enthusiasm which, at the first reverse, is followed by equally boundless apathy or despair. They are capable of deep love, which plays a predominant part in their psychical life, but negligible circumstances can often convert this feeling into its opposite, into a hatred for which no reason can be given other than from the emotional point of view. This lack of balance, these extreme variations within the emotions, make it difficult to preserve order and stability within; they are an important and at times decisive handicap to the formation of any system in intellectual work.

152 Love plays a great part in all spheres of life in Ukraine, 593 though it is less connected with eroticism than in other countries; it is first and foremost the product or the accompaniment of the relation between mother and child. Maternal love, in all its possible manifestations, is one of the spiritual prisms through which most of the phenomena of public and private life are regarded and acquire their particular color. Love comprehends an enormous complex of motives which have found expression in literature, art and music.

812 I do not intend to dwell on the manifestations of this emotion in daily life. But I should like to refer to Jurkevych, one of the few Ukrainian philosophers in the 19th century who gave his coutrymen what may be called a philosophy of the heart, a system ruthlessly opposed to the materialism at that time in vogue and also to the almost mechanical rationalism and intellectualism.

In analysing problems of contemporary philosophy, Jurkevych comes to the conclusion that a system of philosophy expressed in functions of the reason is quite incapable of including the entire and real human being. A certain modesty with regards to the limits of human knowledge is characteristic for Ukrainian philosophers. These limits are the result of the fact that human reason and its capacity of knowing the world hide another, more profound, function of the human spirit on which reason is based and which provides it with possibilities of development. This original function of the human spirit, which is fully acknowledged by Skovoroda but mentioned by I. T. Stavrovetskyj as early as the 17th century, is the human heart. The philosophy of the heart which Jurkevych has developed in his work on „The Heart and Its Importance for the Psychic Life of Man" is the most characteristic feature of the transition from Platonism to recent philosophy; but it is directly opposed to Kant and his school.

I have deliberately dwelt on Jurkevych as a representative of Ukrainian philosophy, as his theory is doubtless influenced by certain characteristics typical for the Ukrainian view of life. One of Jurkevych's pupils, Vladimir Solowjev, later a famous Russian thinker, when writing of his teacher, rightly emphasises

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

the Ukrainian elements in his nature: "Jurkevych came from the Government of Poltava and was therefore a Ukrainian, a fact which left traces in his language and character." 812

Of course I do not mean to say that the Ukrainian does not fully appreciate the powers of thought, or that he is hostile towards them. On the contrary, the intellectual representatives of the Ukrainian people, such as Drahomaniv and his school, Lesja Ukrayinka, are loyal adherents of rationalism and Ivan Franko bears on his banner the proud motto "ratio vincit". But if we study these men more carefully, we come to the conclusion that their rationalist views are a concession to the spirit of the times and are perhaps more in the nature of a mask which hides the emotion they are loath to admit as the decisive factor in their psychic make-up.

The peculiar character of Ukrainian intellectual life emerges most distinctly from a comparison with the fundamental features of the German psyche: "The peculiar character of German thought", Paul Menzer says in his book on the character of the German spirit, "may be best studied in German philosophy — a belief in system is inherent in it, the view that it must be possible to classify all reality in a series of ideas". This naive belief in the omnipotence of the idea is most apparent in Christian Wolff who thinks it is possible to solve all questions of knowledge, action and feeling by means of the reason. The entire attitude to life is to be regulated by reason, all spontaneous decisions arrived at by impulse are forbidden. There can be no doubt that life, conceived thus, must atrophy, but we must admit the great sweep of such a systematic experiment. In practice, Wolff's philosophy evolved a pedantic training for Germans which, however, had its good effects as confirmed by no less a man than Kant in his famous praise of the spirit of thoroughness. If we construct the direct opposite to the characteristics of the German spirit described by Menzer, we get the Ukrainian way of thinking: in place of exaggerated systematisation a lack of all system often replaced by the intuition of genius which, unconsciously, builds up on feeling; no thoroughness, no pondering, and consequently restricted action, but, on the contrary, too great an expansion of the sphere of in- 812 153

812 terest and, at the same time, superficial work. The Ukrainian
● 153 does not treat problems in theory and practice from the point of view of reason, but confronts reality with emotion, takes decision on the spur of the moment and confuses theoretical and practical issues.

157 In connection herewith I shall just touch on the third sphere
791 of psychological life, namely the will. Seeing that all three
181 functions, reason, feeling and will are closely dependent on each other, the supremacy of the first or the second will necessarily
812 influence the third. A will that is under the control of feeling and not of reason, will not be very strong, steadfast or consistent, but, like the feelings, will fall from one extreme into the other in a brief interval, so that periods of great, superhuman activity and joy in work are followed by times of complete passivity and the idleness of despair. The supremacy of feeling and the predominance of love provide us with a further element in the Ukrainian view of the world, namely the deep feeling for religion which is the main component in all Slav spiritual life. Many scholars of the last century emphasise the supremacy of feeling and the all-important part played by religion as the main characteristics of the spiritual life not only of modern Slavs, but also of their ancestors, whether remote or recent. Attempts have been made to differentiate the historical peculiarity of the Slavs from that of the Romance peoples, in particular from the French and the Germanic nations. Compared with the political French and the philosophical Teutons, the Slavs are, in the widest sense, the religious race.

Quite apart from our opinion of this characteristic, it must not be forgotten that all leading Slavs, whether Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians or Russians, whether philosophers, authors or artists, display an undoubted, if varied religiousness. Even revolutionaries like Bakunin, Herzen and others, though they rejected all belief at the start, were none the less deeply religious men and their fantastic fight against religion was but a negative expression of religious feeling. Atheism in Russia is the expression of an unsatisfied passion for belief, of a passion that refuses to let

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The Ukrainian's tendency to idealise, is also expressed in his relation to the weaker sex which generally enjoys a position of superiority in Ukrainian society. In literature, too, the Ukrainian woman appears in such an idealised and spiritualised form that even her faults, her foibles, do not detract from her spiritual value, but serve rather to enhance her charm and attractiveness. 181 562

The sense for actual reality is almost completely suffocated by the enthusiasm of the soul for the world of the imagination, for the ideal. 19th century drama contains a goodly company of women with a positive attitude to life — national heroines like Marusja Bohuslavka, lovable girls, good and faithful to boredom like Natalie of Poltava, unhappy victims of male seduction like Shevchenko's Kateryna and finally, prophetesses with an air of tragedy like the Ukrainian Cassandra. We must not forget that, except for the last named, these old-fashioned plays are still popular with the Ukrainian public and are performed even to-day, times without number, with great success throughout Ukraine, in the towns as well as in the remotest villages. 181 562 536

Western systems of thought have always been founded on the personal consciousness of the individual. Beginning with Plato in ancient Greece philosophical speculation has always started from individual consciousness as the only evident reality which is disputed by no one, a process which is still more evident in modern philosophy from Descartes on. Fichte's system is based on the philosophy of the ego which elsewhere appears in philosophy as a complete entity, independent of all other features, a sovereign being, which, in the intellectual world, is usually the final foundation of a concrete reality. 812

Here Ukrainians, in contrast to Russians, are decidedly western in outlook. Though they have not produced philosophic systems of th .r own based on the ego as the fundamental principle, or . the foundation of further speculation, nevertheless their whole intellectual life, their ethical standards and legal code, and still more their actual conduct, are all based on the individual; and to restrict the right of the individual even in the interests of the community, is always resented as an encroachment on the freedom of will. 812 156

156 829 181 641

The Ukrainian's individualism is most evident in his attitude to the social order, to the principle of the place of the community in society. He repudiates all forms of communal life which call for strict discipline and absolute obedience, without thinking that such a repudiation may be disastrous for the security of general interests and even, in the long run, for the personal advantage of the individual. His individualism as a social principle regards the individual as an end in himself, while the community is merely the sum or union of individuals and as such is only the means of guaranteeing the welfare of the individual. According to this national viewpoint, society — in Ukrainian "hromada" — is a voluntary union of individuals who, for the moment, are willing to work together for common aims, but who reserve the right to leave the union or even to attack it with every means in their power if they find that it is threatening their personal freedom, or when personal interest is greater than the interest of the community. We find a historical example of this attitude in the well-known military organisation of the Zaporoghian Cossacks, who regarded themselves as independent and free citizens, and only acknowledged their duty towards the community in so far as they considered it essential to the security and welfare of all.

In the history of Ukraine there are only too many cases where an exaggerated individualism prevented the formation of tradition as a supreme factor in building up a state, and where the historical existence of the entire people was at the mercy of conflicting forces which, in the absence of all desire to cooperate, were of necessity detrimental to the future of the state.

The structure of Russian society, called "mir" is diametrically opposed to this; it falls into the other extreme as the intellectual expression of the will of the community which completely absorbs personal independence. The essence and leading principle of the Russian "mir" is the compulsion inherent in the superior agency as the instrument of God's will. All rebellion against this divine compulsion is a grievous sin which the simple Russian cannot be expected to commit. This view was and is the most favorable condition for the birth and development of every absolute regime.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

In contrast to Western European thought, it is characteristic for the Russian's view of the world that he definitely rejects the personal and always seeks to take his stand on a certain intellectual collectivism. In spite of the zealous efforts of some Russian scholars to explain and water down this quality of the Russian psyche, we must admit the truth of the assertion of the slavophils that the Russian spirit is collectivist, in the sense that it detests personal freedom, all kinds of contract conditions and individual property; that it prefers collectivist forms of economy was illustrated in the past by the traditional and typically Russian "Obshchina". And the collectivist experiments which have been carried out in the Soviet Union in modern times have shown that collectivist measures of the communist government met with no resistance to speak of in Russia proper, while peasants in Ukraine were ready to fight to the death in defense of the principle of private property as the fundament of western culture, and in spite of desperate conditions, actually did so.

If we wish to evaluate the principles of the Ukrainian view of the world adequately, we must study the structure of his psyche and reveal those qualities and functions that lend it its spiritual character. What strikes us most at the outset is the emphasis on the emotions; the preponderance of feelings over reason. The entire conduct of the Ukrainian is regulated, not by reason, "ratio", so characteristic for the entire philosophy of the Occident, but by profound feeling. This is a characteristic of all Slavs whose passions usually run the whole gamut of emotions. Slavs in general, and Ukrainians in particular, are capable of boundless enthusiasm which, at the first reverse, is followed by equally boundless apathy or despair. They are capable of deep love, which plays a predominant part in their psychical life, but negligible circumstances can often convert this feeling into its opposite, into a hatred for which no reason can be given other than from the emotional point of view. This lack of balance, these extreme variations within the emotions, make it difficult to preserve order and stability within; they are an important and at times decisive handicap to the formation of any system in intellectual work.

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
631 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities
166 continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking up of the population into individual entities who would recognize
[156] no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

[During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

517 •156 [214] Kiyev, Khar'kov and Odessa are the most important centers of East Ukrainian intellectual life. It is there that most of the Ukrainian books, periodicals and newspapers are published. Besides that, the Ukrainian tongue is also printed in many smaller cities. Many of the Soviet Ukrainian authors glorify present conditions; these are the interpreters of Communism, the worshipers of machines and idols. But there are also others, like Khvylovy, who in truthful pamphlets derided the state of affairs, the proletarian wirepullers, their ingenuousness, their venality and their eagerness to work their way up, authors who write with a nationalistic purpose, who are "exposed" and then, like Khvylovy, come to an unfortunate end. "Experts maintain that even in the works of the Ukrainian Communist writers, especially the younger ones, the national feeling cannot be hidden, that an inner schism appears in their works. They do not actually belong to proletarian literature which has remained inwardly foreign to them. How could it be otherwise with such a past!" (56) /Facing page 104/

56. Zalozieckyj, ibid.

439 /Map VIII: Grain Export from the Soviet Ukraine and North Caucasus (Average for 1927/1928) This map differentiates between actual Soviet Ukraine and the North Caucasus regions. Export to foreign countries is insignificant compared to supplies sent to the Greater Russian areas of the Soviet Union situated in the forest belt./ /Key: Grain: ● from Soviet Ukraine, ● from the North Caucasus./

/105/ <u>Trapping Souls</u>

798 On Sunday, May 29, 1939 a unique event took place in the church of St. Peter in Rome:

In the northern zone of the country, including northern parts of the Kyiv and Chernyhiv areas and Northern Volynia purely Nordic elements prevail, alongside of Subnordic, Nordic and Laponoid mixtures; the middle zone is mostly Dinaric, above all in Podolia and Southern Volynia, Eastern Galicia (without the Hutsuly and Bojky) and in the extreme east of the Kharkiv area. 144

But the Dinaric domain proper is the southern zone of Ukraine, including Carpathian Ukraine, the Hutsul area, Bucovina, Southern Podolia and all adjacent territory in the south and south-east including the Crimea and the Kuban area. Ukrainians in this area are definitely short-headed, darkish, tall, (about 5 ft. 9) and most resemble the South Slavs. On the middle reaches of the Dnister, the Prut and the Boh there are more marked traces of the Mediterranean race.

A certain deliberateness and modesty are characteristic for the Ukrainian who is most sensitive to impressions from without, though he reacts slowly to them. He is of balanced, even temperament and has humor and irony which help him to cope with the irritations of everyday life. He judges life from the standpoint of feeling; favorable climatic conditions and the relatively easy work in the fields betray him into a certain quiescence. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian loves his work and is most active in intellectual, artistic and practical provinces. On the other hand, hard times both in the past and at present have made him suspicious and increased his innate individualism. In social intercourse, for instance, although he is friendly, he is reserved rather than importunate. Revenge and cruelty are foreign to his nature. 157 ●

As is the case with most old peasant peoples, the relationship of the Ukrainian to others is based on definite forms, that express social culture, good manners, courtesy and hospitality. Contrary to the Russian custom, authority in the home is shared by the head of the house and his wife; the functions of the latter extend beyond the duties of housekeeping and the upbringing of children and she has a say in all economic questions. Children enjoy a relatively generous amount of freedom and may be present at the customary morning and evening 156 593

812 terest and, at the same time, superficial work. The Ukrainian
153 does not treat problems in theory and practice from the point of view of reason, but confronts reality with emotion, takes decision on the spur of the moment and confuses theoretical and practical issues.

● 157 In connection herewith I shall just touch on the third sphere
791 of psychological life, namely the will. Seeing that all three
181 functions, reason, feeling and will are closely dependent on each other, the supremacy of the first or the second will necessarily
812 influence the third. A will that is under the control of feeling and not of reason, will not be very strong, steadfast or consistent, but, like the feelings, will fall from one extreme into the other in a brief interval, so that periods of great, superhuman activity and joy in work are followed by times of complete passivity and the idleness of despair. The supremacy of feeling and the predominance of love provide us with a further element in the Ukrainian view of the world, namely the deep feeling for religion which is the main component in all Slav spiritual life. Many scholars of the last century emphasise the supremacy of feeling and the all-important part played by religion as the main characteristics of the spiritual life not only of modern Slavs, but also of their ancestors, whether remote or recent. Attempts have been made to differentiate the historical peculiarity of the Slavs from that of the Romance peoples, in particular from the French and the Germanic nations. Compared with the political French and the philosophical Teutons, the Slavs are, in the widest sense, the religious race.

Quite apart from our opinion of this characteristic, it must not be forgotten that all leading Slavs, whether Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians or Russians, whether philosophers, authors or artists, display an undoubted, if varied religiousness. Even revolutionaries like Bakunin, Herzen and others, though they rejected all belief at the start, were none the less deeply religious men and their fantastic fight against religion was but a negative expression of religious feeling. Atheism in Russia is the expression of an unsatisfied passion for belief, of a passion that refuses to let

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

itself be put off with inadequate creeds, and that, in despair, denies God Himself. 157 771

In spite of this general, common background, expressions of religious feeling in the various Slavonic tribes differ greatly. The Ukrainian is never orthodox in his religious life; he does not cling at all to forms, to externals; rather does he endeavour always to comprehend the essence of a creed or belief. All who have studied the character of the Ukrainian people even superficially must admit that a religious quarrel or still more, a bitter strife over ritual forms such as has become a plague with Russians is quite impossible among Ukrainians. Ukrainian history provides us with interesting and instructive examples of this. When the Kyiv State became Christian and accepted the Byzantine form of the Christian Church, being thereby automatically drawn into the whirlpool of religious strife, the Grand Prince deliberately sought to avoid all dogmatic quarrels and to keep contact with the West, even though he was a member of the Eastern Church and shared in Eastern culture. Unconcerned with the subtleties of dogma, which did not interest Kyiv princes though their church depended on Constantinople, they nevertheless sent ambassadors to the German emperors and to Popes, received delegates from the West and showered gifts on them; they formed family unions with Catholic princes and rulers — in a word, began to smooth the way of mediation between Western and Eastern Europe, a rôle which Ukraine was later to assume. It is true that fierce wars of religion were waged in Ukraine as elsewhere in the 16th and 17th centuries. But here the strife between adherents of the Orthodox Church and Unionists represented in reality the gigantic struggle between two views of the world — the Eastern conservative view and the Western, more progressive one, a struggle which, in addition to religion, comprehended many other factors, such as national feeling and political and cultural standards. At present, too, when Ukrainians must live together under most trying circumstances, church differences scarcely come into play. As a result of his over-individual nature, the Ukrainian is all too ready to utilise every opportunity of arguing with his opponent, but religious feeling is too deeply rooted and com- 181 812

157 771 181 812 pels too much respect for the opinion of others for him to make diverging beliefs an object of strife. Skovoroda, the Ukrainian Socrates, whose spiritual life reflects all the characteristics of the national psyche of the Ukrainian people, expresses his attitude to religious things in a very simple formula, which is perhaps too simple for a philosopher: "Pagan temples and idols were also expressions of Christian belief, being inscribed as they were with the wise, sacred words: gnoti seauton, nosce te ipsum".

According to Skovoroda, God did not reveal His truth to Christians and Hebrews alone, but also to pagans, just as morality cannot be regarded as the monopoly of the Christian world, seeing that it has many eminent champions among the nations of the ancient world. In the province of religion the Ukrainian demands universality, respect for every genuine religious feeling, tolerance of the convictions of others, but not orthodoxy and not the forfeiture of valuable content for the sake of mere form.

181 812 The Ukrainian view of the world is characterised by an optimism founded on metaphysics and ethics. In spite of the overwhelming catastrophes that have constantly shaken the historical existence of the people to its foundations, in spite of the terrible persecutions to which the heart of the nation, its peasantry, has been exposed for centuries, hope of a better future was never dead, and indeed it rose afresh at the very time when, judged by objective standards, there were practically no prospects of improvement. And yet — in defiance of all foes — the Ukrainian people will and must live and fulfil its destined mission, the motto to which all leading spirits have always sworn allegiance. Of course, Ukrainian public opinion, especially in the higher classes, has also displayed depression caused by temporary circumstances; but though the situation was often extremely critical, Ukrainian history has no proper example of general dissolution, of complete and extensive despair. On the contrary, it is characteristic of Ukrainian mentality to regard the world and its phenomena from the best side and to trust in a favorable issue of all processes. "We'll get along somehow" is the expression, not only of mental balance, of a determination to keep a stiff upper lip, but is at the same time an unmistakable sign

Ukraine and Russia

A Survey of Their Economic Relations

It has long been contended that the Ukraine could not exist as a separate state. It is said her economic interests are so largely dependent upon those of the old Russian Empire that if separated therefrom, she would lack the economic strength to form a viable entity, and thus would render herself liable to decline or gradual absorption by some other state. In the light of present facts, both economists and impartial statesmen will find that this argument, which, among members of the opposing faction, seems to form the primary basis for objection to Ukraine's independent statehood, will not bear even the most superficial investigation.

Ukraine's Richness in Natural Resources

The Ukraine is a country with nearly 50,000,000 inhabitants, and possesses within its limits the most fertile lands of Europe, which, every year, feed the western countries from their enormous surplus of cereals, of cattle and of sugar. It is a country which stands fifth in the world in its production of coal and iron; which has at its disposal quantities of other raw materials, such as naphtha, magnesia, salt and mercury; which has, moreover, several hundred kilometers of water front. If, with all these natural advantages and wealth, the Ukraine cannot enjoy an autonomous life, how, then, can one explain the existence of Italy, Spain, Roumania and many other European countries in which the natural conditions are far less favorable to economic independence?

These facts have gradually become so self-evident to the public mind that oppositionists are being forced to abandon their former line of argument, and are now beginning to attack the question from the reverse standpoint. They now claim, not that Ukraine cannot form and maintain her economic unity, but that Russia cannot live without Ukraine, and that, without Ukraine, Russia would lack

137 Oaks and hornbeams grow plentifully in the zone of transition between forest and the steppe while the pine prefers sandy river valleys. Vegetation in the mountains corresponds to that in western surroundings. The vast mountain pastures deserve special mention. On the coast of the Crimea and the Caucasus we find the buttertree, the cypress, the stone pine, the laurel, opuntias, agaves and other Mediterranean plants.

136 Prevalent animal species vary only slightly from those found in neighboring countries in the west. Worthy of mention are wild-cat, ermine, and bison in the forest region, bear, lynx and wild-cat in the Carpathians. In the Yaila mountains there are vultures. The Caucasus has the greatest variety of animals. It is still possible there to hunt ibex, jackals and ure-ox. On the southern slopes there are even panthers. Numerous rodents live in the steppes. The ure-ox, the beaver and the marmot are dying out.

3. Population.

a) Density

161 In 1939 the average density of the population in Ukraine was 68 persons per sq. kilometer. In the central forest-steppe zone, one of the most thickly populated agrarian areas in Europe, 80—120 people live on a sq. kilometer, between the Syan and Kursk. Northern Ukraine with its lighter soil is much more thinly populated; here the average density amounts to 40—60 persons per sq. kilometer, and in Polesya this figure even falls below 25. The density of the population in Southern Ukraine corresponds roughly to that in the north, though the Donets basin is an isolated area of dense population. The Caucasus foothills, a country with a climate at least as favorable as that of Central Ukraine is only two-thirds as densely populated, as it was colonised late. The mountains are thinly populated.

162 361 The majority of the Ukrainian people live in villages; 29 % live in towns and 10 % in cities with more than 100 000 inhabitants; trade and industry are not intensively developed; we are struck by the many towns that have grown up at the frontiers between the various natural areas; there are 60 bet-

ween the forest steppe and the Kholm forests, among them 162
Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Kyiv and Konotip. Akkerman, Odessa, 361
Mykolajiv, Kherson, Sevastop'l lie on the sea coast. In all there are 18 towns with more than 100 000 inhabitants (statistics dating from 1939 and for Western Ukraine from 1931).

Kyiv	846 000
Kharkiv	833 000
Odessa	604 000
Dnipropetrovske	500 000
Stalino	462 000
Lviv	316 000
Zaporizha	289 000
Mariupil	222 000
Voroshylivhrad	213 000
Kryvyj Rih	198 000
Taganrih	189 000
Symferopil	143 000
Chernivtsi	111 000
Kerch	104 000

b) Movement of population

Movements in the population of Ukraine have been caused by 161 ●
natural increase and emigration and immigration, these movements being more pronounced than elsewhere in Europe.

Natural Increasein 1927 per 1000	Births	Mortality	Actual Increase
USSR	40.3	17.8	22.5
North Caucasia	42.7	17.1	25.6
Crimea	44.7	18.1	26.6
Galicia	31.8	20.3	11.5
Volynia and Polesya	39.4	17.7	19.4
Carpathian Ukraine	37.4	23.3	16.1

The greatest natural increase is to be found in those parts of Ukraine that are most sparsely populated, while the lowest, determined by low birthrate, is provided by Galicia which is over-populated. Increase in purely Ukrainian elements of the population exceeds the average value for other elements inhabiting the same areas of settlement. There are no data on

161 natural increase in the Ukrainian parts of the Soviet Union. The USSR not having issued any statistics. It seems, however, that population was reduced by increased mortality.

161 The steady flow of emigration diminished the actual in-
166 crease of the Ukrainian people. West Ukrainians go to the United States and Canada, the inhabitants of the Dnipro area to the Caucasus and Asia. Movements within the frontiers shift the population slowly to the east and south, these movements being strongest towards the Basin of the Donets and the North Caucasus, and weakest towards the areas on the right banks of the Dnipro and Galicia. There is also a steady flight from the country to the town. In consequence to an increase of the collective system, of famine and flight to the town, the population of the USSR did not grow since 1932; increase of population in the towns was opposed by considerable decrease in the country.

c) National Conditions

182 National conditions in the Ukrainian territory at present have been produced by long and complicated processes which Ukraine was forced to undergo by factors such as her geographical position, the extent of her territory, movements of colonisation, natural increase, migration, lack of an independent government, etc.

In consequence, the national composition of Ukrainian areas is characterised by peculiar features, such as a mixture of nationalities in many provinces, a fairly high percentage of national minorities, a considerable difference from the ethnological point of view between the populations of town and village, and so on.

167 We find different national conditions in the different frontier districts. In the West, the Ukrainian factor receded; the frontier between Ukraine and Poland was regulated in favor of the latter and, what was more important, the entire region of the frontier was settled by Poles who had been pressing east from time immemorial, in the search for better opportunities for their surplus population. The Polish immigration in these districts is

Besides Ukrainians, the area that is etnnographically and nationally Ukrainian counts among its population Russians, Jews, Poles, Germans. The Russians, according to statistics for 1. 1. 1933, amount to 8 million and live in Slobodian Ukraine, the Donets Basin (foreign labor immigration), the coastal areas (agricultural colonies) and, alongside of Ukrainians, in the eastern foothills of the Caucasus. Jews — 3 millions — $^2/_3$ of them in towns, live west of the Dnipro (the boundary of their former settlement under the Tsars), and from 2-3 % of the population of Left Bank Ukraine and less than 1 % in Slobodian Ukraine and the Caucasus. Poles numbering 2 800 000 live in districts that were formerly part of Poland, mainly on the "black earth" belt of Galicia and the Kholm district. The other national minorities are insignificant. 162 167

If we study the development of national minorities up to the time of enforced collectivisation, we notice that the Ukrainian element in Dnipro-Ukraine was strengthened, while it receded in Western Ukraine under pressure from the Poles. We cannot tell what changes have taken place in the national element of Soviet Ukraine in recent years, as the results of the last census, held in 1939, have not been published. We can only suppose that Ukrainian national substance has suffered severe losses from the enforced collectivisation, the eviction of Ukrainian peasants, famine, and Russian immigration, especially to the towns and the Donets Basin.

d) Ukrainians outside the boundaries of the ethnographical territory

6 millions, i. e. 13.5 % of the Ukrainian people live without its national territory, 700 000 in islands dispersed throughout neighboring western countries, above all in Batshka while others live as emigrants or laborers, especially in Germany and France. In 1933, there were 300 000 in Roumania, 100 000 in Poland, 40 000 in Czechoslovakia, 50 000 in Jugoslavia and 160 000 in other countries of Europe. 3 % of the Ukrainians — 1.3 millions — are scattered throughout the Soviet Union in Europe; the majority of these live in the lower reaches of the Volga (450 000), the middle reaches of the Volga (220 000), in the republic of 161 167

● 161 167 Bashkir (80 000) and the Ural area (50 000). Besides, Ukrainians have been actively colonising Asia, their superiority in numbers as compared with the Russians may be seen in the appended table (statistics from 1926).

Asia	Surface in sqm.	Population in 1000	Ukr.	Russ.	Kas.-Sib.	Others
Kasak in Siberia	174 075	2 240	40	22	27	11
Grey Wedge	12 308	17	29	19	44	8
Green Wedge						
1) Rayon Spask	26 928	232	59	22	—	19
2) Blahovischensk	3 846	86	50	43	—	7

The "Grey wedge" lies between the Khirgisi country and Kasakstan, the "Green wedge" on the Amur and near Spask.

1.3 million Ukrainians live in America (U.S.A. 7—8 000 000, Canada 3-400 000, South America 130 000).

e) Ukrainians in the world

At the end of 1932 there were 43-44 million Ukrainians; as far as numbers go, they are the second of the Slav peoples, and the seventh among European nations. The number of Ukrainians living in the different states towards the end of the years 1938 and 1940 was:

States	Ukrainians in millions	Percentage of Ukrainians in the world
a) 1938	[1]	
Soviet-Union	34.4	79.1
Poland	6.0	13.8
Roumania	1.1	2.5
U.S.A.	0.7	1.6
Czechoslovakia	0.6	1.4
Canada	0.3	0.7
And others	0.4	0.9

[1]) Among these 25.6 millions in Soviet-Ukraine.

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States	Ukrainians in millions	Percentage of Ukrainians in the world
b) 1940	[3])	
Soviet-Union	40.2	92.4
Germany	0.8	1.8
Hungary	0.6	1.4
U.S.A.	0.7	1.6
Canada	0.3	0.7
And others	0.9	2.1
Total	43.5	100

161
167

[3]) Among these 30.7 millions in Soviet-Ukraine.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

II

Economic Life

By the "economy of Ukraine" in the following pages we do not mean the economy of Soviet Ukraine but of the entire Ukrainian territory. It is most difficult to present facts here, as the various sections of Ukrainian territory are not only incorporated in different states but have also varying economic organisations. These difficulties were due primarily to the peculiar character of Soviet statistics. In the statistics for the first two Five Year Plans it is impossible to translate into absolute figures either the real value of the rouble or the percentages given. More entanglements were caused by the inadequacy of data for quantity and quality and the obvious exaggeration of the natural wealth. These factors have been taken into consideration in the following pages.

Basic Problems

1. The area of Ukrainian economy

(far more than a million square kilometers) lies spread out like a fan round the north of the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv. Almost all its rivers flow into this north-east continuation of the Mediterranean, and Ukraine is the only country in Eastern Europe which they serve. The area includes fertile districts, and valuable mineral wealth; the various sections complement each other economically and communications between them are convenient. With a total population of about 60 millions (59 per sq. kilometer as compared with 8, the average for USSR), it approaches European conditions. So the natural, but not the political, conditions for a grand scale economy are given.

131 Eurasia and the ores in the Ural is more than 2000 km; the
487 coal of the Donets Basin, on the other hand, is about 350—450 km from the iron ore of Kryvyj Rih, while the iron and manganese ores of Kerch are nearer still. The seas in the north of Russia are frozen for 20—26 weeks, while the Black Sea has ice for but 3—4 weeks in the year. Most of its harbors can be kept open all winter by means of ice-breakers. The
[161] density of the population in Ukraine is 59 to the square kilometer which cannot be compared with the figures for Siberia (1 per sq. km) or with the average for USSR (8). Conditions in Ukraine, therefore, are much more akin to those in Europe than are those in the continental heart of Eurasia some 4000 km away. And for Ukraine this fact found expression, for instance, in the fact that it could not profit from the reduced railway freights that were granted for long-distance transportation. The unfavorable position of Moscow and Leningrad as manufacturing centers was a great handicap to the economy of Ukraine which possessed all the conditions necessary for production within its own frontiers but nevertheless had to import goods from there and export raw materials to very low prices.

As long as Russia's face was turned towards Europe, these considerations did not matter much, but they are felt all the more acutely now that the economy of the Soviet Union is definitely planned.

8. The Ukrainian idea of economy

421 with its championship of private property was always entirely different from the "mir" idea, with its farming in common and periodical division of the soil which was characteristic for Russian economy. Exceptions within Ukrainian territory, due to special conditions of time and place, do not alter this fundamental fact.
[566] That serfdom should have been abolished so late was felt to be a great burden by the Ukrainian who had enjoyed personal freedom in his days of political independence. He always connected serfdom with Russian rule which naturally did not help to mitigate his aversion to everything Russian.

433 In national Ukrainian literature, the relationship of different branches of economy is often discussed. It is often maintained that up to the present, development has been along the lines of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

63/ in localities where non-Ukrainian elements predominate—Great Russians, White Russians, Greeks, Germans, Moldavians, Jews.

The largest towns of Soviet Ukraine are Kiev (625,000), Kharkov (650,000), Odessa (550,000), Dniepropetrovsk (former Ekaterinoslav, 325,000). Lvov, in 'Greater Ukraine', recently annexed to Soviet Ukraine, has 375,000 inhabitants. It is characteristic of current economic trends that the population has grown in Kharkov and decreased in Odessa (700,000 in 1916). Industrial centres have grown rapidly: Lugansk, Mariupol, Zaporozhie (formerly Alexandrovsk) have each of them over 100,000 inhabitants; Nikolaev and Kherson have each about 100,000. There are no large towns in Central and Western Ukraine: the most important of them, Vinnitsa and Poltava, have not more than 80,000 inhabitants each. Now we have Czernowitz (Chernovtsy), Kishinev and Jassy, each about 120,000.

The Population of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

● 161 The Census of 1 January 1933 gave the population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. as 31,901,000 persons. The figures for the more recent Census of 1937 are not sufficiently clear. (It is well known that the Government was displeased at the incompetent way in which this latter Census was carried out, and Stalin himself has expressed his dissatisfaction.) At any rate it is not denied that the increase of population in the Ukraine during the five years 1933–7 was at a rate lower than that for the whole Union calculated (with obvious exaggeration) at 16 per cent. The rate of increase in the Ukraine was considerably lower than in many of the eastern parts of the Union, notably Turkestan and the Kirghiz steppe—for which the obviously fantastic figures of 30 per cent and even 40 per cent were given. For the Ukraine the official increase was 6·6 per cent. On the basis of the figures for 1933, therefore, the population, allowing for increase, amounts to about 34,000,000 for 1938–9.

On the same territory about 30,000,000 people lived in 1917. In view of the fact that the normal increase in Russia before the Revolution was reckoned at 1·5 per cent p.a. and in some localities at 2 per cent p.a., the population of the Ukraine, under the social and political conditions existing under the Imperial régime, should have reached about 40,000,000 by the present day, even had there been a continuance of the movement of migration to Asiatic Russia which marked the turn of the century.

The history of the growth of population in the Ukraine during the last twenty years is of course far more complex than the bare figures would indicate. There was a terrible mortality, owing first to the Revolution and Civil War, and secondly to the two periods of famine and to the general deterioration in social and sanitary conditions. Again, parallel to a considerable migration of the peasantry, particularly during the famine periods, there was a constant flow of industrial workers from the north as a result of the Economic Plans. It is difficult therefore to avoid the following conclusions: that the growth of population during the two decades since the Revolution has been abnormally slow, but at the same time the change in the *composition* of the population has been rapid. The Ukrainians were continually disappearing or leaving their homeland while new elements were replacing them, mostly 'new-comers' from Central and Northern Russia.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

It is important to ascertain the number of Ukrainians who remain in the territory of S.S.R. Ukraine. According to Soviet statistics the urban population, amounting to 8,000,000, numbers only 30 per cent of Ukrainians. Among the rural population Ukrainians are in a majority, though they are not everywhere equally distributed: in some regions there are over 80 per cent; in others (like Odessa) 60 per cent; in the Doners rural areas a little over 50 per cent. In 1926, during the period of 'ukrainization' encouraged by the Government, 24,000,000 out of 30,000,000 registered as Ukrainians, but even 15 per cent of these 'native' Ukrainians gave their mother tongue as Russian. Since that date catastrophes have befallen the rural folk of the Ukraine: about 3,000,000 are reckoned to have perished during the famine of the early thirties, and another 2,000,000 certainly have migrated as a result of conditions which they found intolerable. These losses have not been wholly replaced by natural increase, and there is every reason to think that the number of 'native' Ukrainians in the rural population of the Republic has decreased since 1930 by at least 4,000,000. If at that time the number of persons speaking Ukrainian and considering themselves to be Ukrainians amounted to 20,000,000, there can scarcely be more than 16,000,000 peasants left now. If to these are added the number of Ukrainians living in the towns, the total probably amounts to about 18,000,000. In other words, the Ukrainian population of Soviet Ukraine (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia) amounted to little more than half of the total population. 161 369

This figure is eloquent: the Soviet Government has gone a long way to achieve the result towards which its policy was directed, and in the Ukrainian S.S.R. Ukrainians can no longer be considered to be in a great majority. It follows therefore that nearly half the population (16,000,000 to 17,000,000) are not Ukrainians. Among these alien elements a little less than 2,000,000 are Jews; about 1,000,000 are Moldavians; another million belong to different nationalities—White Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans. The remaining 12,000,000 to 13,000,000 consist either of people born in the Ukraine who do not wish to consider themselves Ukrainians or of 'new-comers' from other parts of the Union. The number of these 'new-comers' must amount to 8,000,000 to 9,000,000.

It is notable that in the last years (since 1930) the Government has used every means to encourage the settlement of these 'new-comers' not only in the industrial areas but also in the purely rural districts. It is obvious that Moscow does not desire vast rural areas with an entirely homogeneous Ukrainian population. The Government prefers groups of *Kolkhozy* on Ukrainian territory to be constituted on the mosaic principle. Each year, from all the Military Districts of the Soviet Union, soldiers who have finished their military service and who have sent in petitions that on account of lack of land they do not wish to return to their original homes are drafted to the new Red Army *Kolkhozy*. These *Kolkhozy*, recruited from the variety of nationalities throughout the Union, are being scattered over some of the best land of the Ukrainian countryside. In some regions there are as many as ten of these military collectivized farms. Reference has already been made to the measures taken by the Government against the bourgeois *kolkhozniki* during the summer of 1939. A new 'movement' of the population is in view in 474 166

668* organizations, though agents were probably present.[79] The UNR, on the other hand, as will be described, was able to establish loose connections with a group which had been formed by nationalist youths in the remote Kostopol' (Kostopil')-Liudvipol' (Liudvypil') area near the former border between Polish and Soviet Volhynia.

626 The situation in Bukovina prior to June, 1940, had in many
668* respects closely paralleled that which existed in Galicia before
[161] September, 1939. The small Ukrainian population (about one quarter of a million persons) was subjected to a denationalizing policy by the Rumanian government, which included severe limitations on the use of Ukrainian in education and restriction of the press and of cultural activities. As in Galicia, there was a legal press and party, however, which endeavored to work within the scope permitted by the Rumanian authorities. There was also a fairly large section of the OUN, working underground. Corresponding —less closely—to Volhynia, was a considerable area of Ukrainian settlement in southern Bessarabia. This section of the Ukrainian ethnic group, however, was so backward culturally and so cut off geographically from contact with districts in which nationalism was strong that it appears to have played almost no role in the nationalist movements of the war period.

648 In June, 1940, while Germany was still occupied with the final phases of the French campaign, the Soviet Union began to press claims for territorial cessions from Rumania. It had long been recognized that Moscow would seize the first favorable moment to secure the retrocession of Bessarabia, the annexation of which by Rumania it had never recognized. Demands for Bukovina, however, apparently came as something of a shock to the German negotiators who were preparing a settlement of the Russian demands. They objected on the grounds that Bukovina had never been a part of the Russian Empire and that it contained a large

[79] Mel'nyk adherents have since claimed that their organizers who had been in Volhynia for a considerable time were killed by Bandera followers shortly before or after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war; see Mykhailiuk, p. 88; O. Shuliak, *V im'ia pravdy: Do istorii povstanoho rukhu v Ukraini* (In the Name of Truth: On the History of the Insurrectionary Movement in the Ukraine) (Rotterdam, 1947), p. 10.

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POPULATIONS OF UKRAINIAN CITIES

(in thousands)

	1926[a]			1939[a]	1941–42			1926	1941–42	*Ratio of increase of proportion of Ukrainians to Russians (Column 8: Column 7)*
	Total	*Ukrainians*	*Russians*	*Total*	*Total*	*Ukrainians*	*Russians*	*Ratio of Ukrainians to Russians*	*Ratio of Ukrainians to Russians*	
Kiev[b]	513.8	216.6	125.5	846.3	352.0	282.0	50.2	1.73	5.6	3.2
Kharkov[c]	417.3	160.2	154.4	833.4	450.0	290.0	150.0	1.04	1.9	1.8
Dniepropetrovsk[d]	232.9	83.8	73.4	500.7	234.2	164.1	52.0	1.14	3.16	2.8
Poltava[e]	92.0	62.8	8.1	130.3	68.7	64.0	4.7	7.75	13.6	1.8
Kirovograd[f]	66.5	29.6	16.6	100.3	68.1	62.4	4.0	1.78	15.6	8.8
Kherson[g]	58.8	21.1	21.2	97.2	61.4	50.7	8.4	.99	6.0	6.1
Zhitomir[h]	76.7	28.5	10.5	95.1	40.1	24.5	2.5	2.71	9.8	3.6
Vinnitsa[i]	58.0	23.9	8.0	92.9	35.6	24.1	3.8	2.99	6.34	2.1
Kamenets-Podolsk[j]	32.1	14.4	2.3	72.4	12.0	10.6	0.5	6.30	21.2	3.4
Chernigov[k]	35.2	20.1	3.6	67.4	30.0	27.0	3.0	5.58	9.0	1.6
Uman'[l]	44.8	19.3	2.0	....	20.0	18.9	0.5	9.65	38.2	4.0
Pavlograd[m]	18.8	11.5	2.6	....	....	(94.1%)	(5.3%)	4.43	17.8	4.0

[a] Statistics for 1926 are from Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Recensement de la Population de l'URSS*, XI, XII, XIII (Moscow, 1929): XI, 76–77 (Zhitomir) and 162–63 (Chernigov); XII, 27 (Kiev), 20–21 (Vinnitsa), 204–5 (Kamenets-Podolsk), 210–11 (Uman'), 299 (Poltava), and 310–11 (Kharkov); XIII, 13–14 (Kirovograd), 36–37 (Kherson), 248–49 (Dniepropetrovsk), and 308–9 (Pavlograd). The 1939 figures are from Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 250–53.

[b] *Nova Doba*, September 6, 1942, p. 3; *Nastup*, September 6, 1942, p. 2 (from *Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta*); Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), p. 44. All of these reports are based on the city administration census of April 1, 1942. After that date, the population declined still more, but no later breakdown by nationalities is available.

[c] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 24, 1942, p. 2, based on a census taken by Professor Sosnovyi in December, 1941, evidently at the instance of the city administration. Only the proportion (65%) of the Ukrainians in the total population is given, but it has been assumed that the great majority of the remainder was Russian. The total population declined rapidly in the succeeding years, reaching a low of 200,000 after the German reconquest in March, 1943, of which 80 percent were Ukrainian according to their own declaration (interview with Mayor Semenenko in *L'vivs'ki Visti*, May 23–24, 1943).

[d] *Nastup*, February 22, 1942, p. 2, based on a city administration census. The figures include the suburb of Amur-Dniepropetrovsk. See also *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 17, 1942, p. 5. Another report (*Ukrains'ka Diiusist'*, February 1, 1942, p. 1) gives a total of 350,000, of which 300,000 were Ukrainian.

[e] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, November 1, 1942, p. 7. Only the proportion of Ukrainians in the total (93.1%) is given, but, as in the case of Kharkov, it may be assumed that by the date of the count the vast majority of the remainder was Russian.

[f] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, June 14, 1942, p. 7; *Ukrains'ka Diiusist'*, July 10, 1942, p. 1; *Nastup*, July 12, 1942, p. 2, all based on census of the city administration.

[g] *Deutsche Ost-Zeitung*, July 22, 1942, p. 2; *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, September 6, 1942, p. 6.

[h] *Nastup*, December 27, 1941, p. 3. About 15.5 percent of the population was Polish; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24, 1941, p. 2, based on a count by the police passport division, lists 2,000 Russians and 7,000 Poles in a total of 42,000.

[i] *Nastup*, February 1, 1942, p. 2, based on a census of January 1, 1942. About 6 percent of the total was Polish.

[j] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 25, 1942, p. 2, based on a census of the local administration.

[k] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 3, 1942, p. 4; *L'vivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2, based on the first statistical reports of the city administration.

[l] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, November 1, 1942, p. 7.

[m] *Ukrains'ka Diiusist'*, February 10, 1943, p. 1.

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(the northern or southern limits of certain cultivations 000
and of different methods of agricultural exploitation), of cattle-breeding (the predominance of cattle and of pigs in Zone 1 and of horses and sheep in Zone 2), of industry (metallurgy and other heavy industries in Zone 2 and light industry in Zone 1), or of communications, this border corresponds with undoubted economic realities.

Chance, or rather its geological structure, has decreed 135
that Zone 2 should possess all the mineral riches of the Ukraine while Zone 1 has none except, however, an insignificant deposit of oil in Polish Galicia, near Stanislavov.

I

Population

As we have previously said, the population of the 161
Ukraine is about 43,000,000, of whom 33·5 millions live within the frontiers of the Soviet Ukraine in the 11,500 parishes, 95 hamlets, and 90 towns.

Among all the Russian lands the Ukraine, with the industrial region of Moscow, is one of those with the densest population, especially in the region of Kiev and of Vinnitza, where the density reaches about 100 inhabitants to the square kilometre.

The average density of 70·6 inhabitants per square kilometre for the whole territory is almost the same in both zones, though a little higher in Zone 1, being from 65 to 87 with an average of 76 inhabitants per square kilometre, while Zone 2 has only 43 to 76, with an average of 65.

The least populated districts are the provinces of the south-east, the districts of Melitopol, Mariupol, and Lougansk, all in Zone 2.

Despite the small differences in the density of the

2 [see category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

161 population in the two zones, the character and origin of this density are not the same.

162 361 The density in Zone 1 is characterized by an agrarian over-population, resulting from a long feudal period and the servitude of the lands. The population is concentrated there in a large number of hamlets, in small towns and in small villages, the inhabitants adding to their agricultural revenues those of artisans, of small commerce, and of small industries.

There is almost a complete absence of large towns. Actually the whole of Zone 1 within Soviet boundaries, contains only one town whose population exceeds 100,000—Kiev, the administrative capital of the Ukraine (625,000 inhabitants).

Even if one adds Polish Galicia to this territory, as it is wholly part of Zone 1 we find only one other big town—Lvov, with 325,000 inhabitants, an administrative and cultural centre.

In Zone 2 on the contrary, we find three big towns: Kharkov (650,000 inhabitants), Odessa (550,000 inhabitants), and Dniepropetrovsk (375,000 inhabitants).

Apart from these three large towns, Zone 2 possesses a further four towns whose population exceeds 100,000: Nicolaiev, Mariupol, Zaporojie, and Lougansk.

The greater part of Zone 2 is a land of recent colonization. It is the New Russia and the free Ukraine, colonized during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Great Russian and Ukrainian elements.

The agricultural population is of a lesser density, and if the average number which expresses it is the same for the whole territory as for Zone 1 this is only a result of the greater number of large towns.

162 It would not be useless to point out that before the last war Odessa with her 700,000 inhabitants was the largest town of the Ukraine. But since the beginning

[see category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union R1

INTRODUCTION

The author of this book is a historian. He has taken part in the Ukrainian national revolution from 1917 on. The book has been written to fix facts that are very often forgotten in the world, or are given a false interpretation in the various books on the Eastern European problem. U 114

The principal fact from which the whole fatal conflict between Ukraine and Soviet Russia arises is that Ukraine has a democratic tradition created by the preceding historical evolution. Modern Russia is a continuation of the Muscovite Tsardom that has grown on the foundations of eastern despotism. For this reason Russia has not created a democratic tradition of its own up to this day and has a "considerable lack of European tradition", as it has been stated by the well known Russian historian Klyuchevsky. Therefore Communist dictatorship so easily seized power in Russia after the revolution of 1917, while the other peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, Ukrainians, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians, etc., created democratic states of their own. U 181 SU 181

The tragedy of the unhappy neighbours of Russia is that Russian imperialism in the past and present times has been principally directed against them, has enslaved and even exstirpated them.

The Ukrainian nation occupies a particular place in Eastern Europe both by its number, circa 35 millions, and by its geographical position, and especially by its large natural resources*). The famous British political writer Professor R. W. Seton-Watson states that the Ukrainian problem has been one of the reasons for World War I 1914—1918. It is generally known that the conquest of Ukraine was the principal aim for Hitler's 'Pressure to the East'. Thus World War II had the struggle for Ukraine as one of its reasons too. U 161 135

We are living in a time when imperialism is being condemned as one of the greatest evils to mankind, but we see at the same time U 181

*) The most important natural riches of Ukraine are: coal (Donets Bassin), iron ore (Krivoy Rog), oil (Boryslaw), manganese (Nikopol). The export of grain from Ukraine to Western Europe until 1914 was higher than 5,5 mil. tons per year. The production of sugar and spirit was very important. The export of agricultural products from Tsarist Russia came in its great part from Ukraine. U 439

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

161 Since the official census of 1897 various official estimates of the population in the Ukraine have been issued; they do not distinguish between the different branches of Russians. According to the official estimates of January 1912 and 1915 the totals for the nine Governments in the Ukraine were as follows:

	1912.	1915.
Volhynia	3,995,700	4,241,800
Podolia	3,882,700	4,127,600
Kiev	4,635,700	4,988,000
Chernigov	3,083,500	3,148,900
Poltava	3,673,100	3,906,200
Kharkov	3,329,700	3,452,000
Yekaterinoslav	3,214,900	3,537,300
Kherson	3,547,500	3,806,900
Taurida (without the Crimea)[1]	982,800	1,066,650
Total	30,345,600	32,275,350

163 It is well known that the birth-rate of the Little Russians is higher and steadier than that of the Great Russians. But, even allowing for a mere continuance since 1897 of the same ratio between the two, the total of Little Russians in the Ukraine in 1912 can be fairly estimated at 23,500,000.

There are also large numbers of Little Russians in other Governments of Russia. Figures for these Governments in 1897 were as follows:

Government.	*Total Population.*	*Little Russians.*	*Percentage.*
Grodno	1,603,409	363,000	23
Kursk	2,371,012	527,778	22
Voronezh	2,531,253	915,883	36
Bessarabia	1,935,412	379,698	20
Kuban Province (Caucasus)	1,918,881	908,818	48
Stavropol (Caucasus)	873,301	319,817	37

In the same year there were also 719,655 Little Russians in the Don Territory, 133,115 in the Government of Astrakhan, 76,928 in other parts of the Cau-

[1] The birth-rate has been more rapid on the mainland than in the Crimea; hence 50 per cent. of the population is allowed to Taurida alone.

casus, and 304,261 in parts of the old Governments of Lublin and Syedlets (now incorporated in the single Government of Choĭm). Thus in 1897 there was in European Russia a grand total of at least 21,692,766 Little Russians. 161

Austria and Hungary also contain considerable numbers of Little Russians, or as they are often called in these parts, Ruthenians. Official figures of 1910 give 3,208,092 in Galicia, 305,101 in the Bukovina, and 472,587 in certain north-eastern counties in Hungary, i. e. a total of 3,985,780 Little Russians.

Accurate statistics for the full, up-to-date total of Little Russians are not available. Reliable German figures estimate the present total of Little Russians as at least 30,000,000, which is also borne out by unofficial Little Russian and Polish figures. 161

Language

The whole language question has been somewhat exaggerated owing to its inevitable connexion with politics. It is asserted by many that Little Russian is a separate language from Great Russian, though on the other hand many declare that it is only a dialect. It should be noted that in 1905 the Petrograd Academy of Science recognized the value of the study of the Ukraine dialect. 197

(6) Population[1]

Distribution and Density

The *Russian Year Book* for 1916 gives the following estimate for the total population in the towns and in the country respectively on January 1, 1913: 162

Government.	*Town Population.*	*Country Population.*
Volhynia	293,300	3,777,200
Podolia	308,900	3,646,400
Kiev	744,500	3,919,100
Chernigov	321,100	2,787,700

[1] See also Appendix I, p.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

162

Government.	Town Population.	Country Population.
Poltava	363,500	3,352,900
Kharkov	516,200	2,851,500
Yekaterinoslav	406,500	2,883,600
Kherson	1,017,500	2,592,800
Taurida (with the Crimea)	447,200	1,559,300

It is apparent from these figures that a large proportion of the population of the Ukraine is still engaged in agricultural pursuits.

161 Many parts of the Ukraine are very thickly populated. The most densely populated Governments are as follows: Podolia, 243; Kiev, 236; Poltava, 192; Chernigov, 154; Kharkov, 160; Volhynia, 146; Yekaterinoslav, 135; and Kherson, 132 persons per square mile.

Movement

163 165 The population of the Ukraine increases more steadily than that of Great Russia. The following figures are given by the official statistical annual (1914) for the year 1912:

	Births. total.	Births. per 1,000.	Deaths. total.	Deaths. per 1,000.	Increase. per 1,000.
Volhynia	154,685	39·0	72,287	18·1	20·9
Podolia	145,401	37·4	73,254	18·9	18·5
Kiev	182,024	39·3	92,109	19·9	19·4
Chernigov	116,411	37·8	59,972	19·5	18·3
Poltava	136,951	37·3	64,801	17·6	19·7
Kharkov	151,064	45·4	73,349	22·0	23·4
Yekaterinoslav	159,233	49·5	72,995	22·7	26·8
Kherson	157,622	44·4	92,227	26·0	18·4
Taurida	85,913	43·7	44,080	22·4	21·3

165 The average mortality is lower in the towns than in the country, owing to the fact that the more robust elements of the population are attracted to the towns, leaving the old men, women, and children behind.

165 758 Infant mortality is often as high as 50 per cent.; this is due to ignorance, insufficient feeding, and the fact that mothers return to work in the fields or factories within a few days of child-birth. The imperfect system of medical aid prevents many cases of births and deaths from ever being officially reported.

795 Yekaterinoslav, 5 per cent.; Poltava, 4 per cent.;
162 Taurida, 4 per cent.; Kharkov, 0·5 per cent. only.

Like the Orthodox Church, the Jewish community has its sects. There are two such sects in the Ukraine; and their members exercise a great moral influence, and form a bridge between the Turkish and Jewish populations of the Ukraine. They are called Karaimy and Krymchaki, and live chiefly in the towns of the Taurida and Kherson Governments. They number about 12,000. These people, using mostly Tatar dialects, are supposed to be descendants of Jewish pre-Christian colonies in the Crimea and the Turkic Khazars of the Middle Ages, who were of Jewish faith. The Karaimy disapprove of the Talmud, and base all their beliefs on the Law of Moses. They differ from other Jewish
577] communities in their cleanliness, their absolute honesty in business, and their great sense of social duties. Hence their wealth is evenly distributed in their communities.

(c) *Mohammedans.*—The largest Mohammedan colony is found in the Taurida government (187,940, or 13 per cent.), but their schools are less efficient and their culture is much lower than that of the Mohammedans of the Volga or of Turkestan.

(B) Educational

●161 The last census, taken in 1897,[1] gives the following
212 figures:

Name of Government.	*Total population in 1,000's.*	*No. of literates in 1,000's.*	*Per cent. of literates.*
Podolia . .	3,018	450	14·5
Kharkov . .	2,492	384	15·4
Poltava . .	2,778	446	16·1
Volhynia . .	2,989	493	16·5
Kiev . . .	3,559	598	16·8
Chernigov . .	2,298	402	17·5
Yekaterinoslav .	2,114	433	20·5
Kherson . .	2,734	657	24·1
Taurida . .	1,448	380	26·2
	23,430	4,243	average 18·2

[1] From *The Ukrainian Movement as a Stage in South Russian Separatism*, Shchegolev (Kiev, 1912), p. 364.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

APPENDIX

I

NUMBER OF THE UKRAINIANS[1]

ACCORDING to the census of 1897, there were 23,430,000 Ukrainians in the nine Ukrainian Governments of Russia. The number accepted by the Russian Academy of Science in their report relating to the Ukrainian language is 22,700,000 (also based on the census of 1897). Prof. Hrushevski in his popular history of the Ukraine in Ukrainian ('How the Ukrainian People live'), published in 1915, says that there are altogether some 30,000,000 Ukrainians, of whom 25,000,000 are—or were—Russian subjects. According to Dr. Paul Ostwald (*Die Ukraine und die Ukrainische Bewegung*, 1916, p. 8), who takes his statistics from the *Revue Ukrainienne*, August, 1915, there are

4,220,000	Ukrainians	in	Austria-Hungary.
29,435,000	,,	,,	Russia.
760,000	,,	,,	America.
34,415,000			

This means that out of every thirty-eight Ukrainians, thirty are Russian. The two following tables give an idea of the distribution of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian Governments of Russia :

	1897.[2]		1910.[3]	
	Per cent. of Ukrainians.	*No. of Inhabitants.*	*Per cent. of Ukrainians.*	*No. of Inhabitants.*
Volhynia .	70	2,989,000	70	3,850,000
Podolia . .	81	3,018,000	81	3,030,000
Kiev . . .	80	3,559,000	79	4,570,000
Chernigov .	66	2,298,000	86	2,980,000
Poltava . .	93	2,778,000	95	3,580,000
Kharkov .	80	2,492,000	70	3,250,000
Yekaterinoslav	69	2,114,000	69	3,000,000
Kherson . .	54	2,734,000	54	3,450,000
Taurida . .	41	1,448,000	42	1,880,000

[1] See also p. 12. [2] Shchegolev, p. 364.
[3] Rudnyčkyj, p. 91.

The maximal result means that the Ukrainians in /162 these maximal boundaries have partly an absolute, partly a relative majority. The Ukrainians have an absolute majority in a total of 718,300 square kilometers on which there are 47,657 million inhabitants. (4)

4. Kubyievych: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 19.

Within the wider boundaries there are 30.2% foreign minorities, and in the narrower boundaries, 24.7%. (5)

5. Kubyievych: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 305 ff.

In 1933 there was a total of 43,360,000 Ukrainians throughout the world; of these 34.43 million were in the Soviet Union, 5.87 million in Poland, 1.1 million in Rumania (including Bessarabia and Bukovina), and 590,000 in Czechoslovakia. The remainder were Ukrainians living outside the country. (6) According to the well-known Ukrainian [101]

6. Ibid., page 325.

geographer Kubyievych, the Ukrainian racial /14/ boundary is difficult to determine in the eastern part of the Caucasian foreland where, besides Ukrainians, there are also Russian and Caucasian peoples, and on the northern boundary, where in the region of Chernigov the question is disputed as to whether the inhabitants are Ukrainians, Russians or White Russians. If we distribute the /161 54,870,000 inhabitants of the entire Ukrainian settled area over the 938,000 square kilometers of surface, 58.5 souls accrue to one square kilometer, while the number is 67.3 if we do not include the thinly populated mixed area of the eastern

161 Caucasian foreland. (7) This corresponds roughly

7. Kubyietych: The Distribution of Population in the Ukraine, page 11.

to the density of population in the Balkan countries.

133 The geographers have investigated the surface of the Ukrainian provinces and found that only 1.5% of the entire surface is more than 1000 meters high, barely 3.5% over 500 meters and 68.5% between 100 and 300 meters. Scarcely 1% of the Ukrainian population live in actual mountains, and surely more than half of all Ukrainians have never seen any mountains. (8)

8. Kubyievych: The Geography of the Ukrainian and the Bordering Areas, page 65.

132 For decades scholars studied the climate, measured precipitation, heat and cold, and did not forget to check from what direction the wind blows. When they had made sufficient investigations, they established the fact that the Ukraine has an "oak climate", specifically in the damp, moderately cold northern and central Ukraine. Adjacent to this in the south is the "dry climate" zone with little precipitation, where there is less rain the farther southeast one goes. Moreover, geographers feel that it is significant that the Ukraine, along with the Carpathians, the Yaila Mountains in the Crimea, and the Caucasus have a mountain climate and that the southern shore of the Crimean Peninsula and the eastern coast of the Black Sea have a Mediterranean climate. Whereas the Ukrainians of the north would gladly renounce some of the 600 millimeters and more of precipitation which annually flood their fields, those of the south call upon God and all the spirits to send them a little more than their 200 millimeters of rain. But it need

433 of the working time in July of this year...The Stalingrad plant presents a similar picture." (131) Where there is no needle there are no

131. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 25.

clothes. Pravda of May 8, 1939, criticizes the decrease in coal mining in the Donbas as follows: "The mine which determines the fate of the entire trust is behind schedule. It would seem as though the scandalous production which has lasted for a considerable time now would have been given serious consideration. The management of the mine is now trying to explain the poor production by the fact that the workers are leaving in order to attend to their spring planting." Visti of June 10, 1939, supplements this by reporting that the constant decrease of coal mining in the Donets Basin is forcing the economic management of Soviet Ukraine to increase the production of brown coal and turf.

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562 By reason of the Soviet Constitution, the
461 East Ukrainian woman has an equal position with
594 the man. This means that she has the same meager
[465] rights and the same heavy duties. Since the wages of the man are not adequate to support the family, the woman must also earn some of the daily bread. Thus the woman is a worker. The elimination of Sundays and holidays, the long trips to work, the standing-in-line for hours to get food, the shifting of days off in the different plants, the incredible housing shortage, the rearing of children in institutions, the easy divorces of "couples living together" - all this disrupts the family.
594 The devastating consequences which are bound to
161 result from the disregard /181/ of the family,

594 this seed of all political life, may be surmised
161 from the census of January 1939. On the basis of the estimated increase during the period of the New Economic Policy, the Soviet Union should have had 183 million inhabitants. Instead there were 170 million all told. There are 13 million souls missing - twice the number of the Czech nation!

462 The book entitled 'Woman in Socialistic Ukraine which appeared in Kiyev in 1937, tells of the triumphs of the Ukrainian woman, not in love and not in the family, but in the field of industry. According to this book, the Ukrainian woman has already "conquered" her position in all branches of industry, coal mines not excepted. In 1936, women comprised the following percentages of the total number of workers: in the building industry 18.3 percent, in the mining industry 26.3 percent, in the chemical industry 26.3 percent in the iron-industry 20.9 percent, and in the construction of machines 21.1 percent. There were 14,274 women engineers and technicians in 1936, and nearly half of the total number of physicians were women (9398). Moreover, the woman of Soviet Ukraine - always according to this book - takes an active part in the defense of the state as pilot, teacher, auto technician, as members of the parachute troops and so forth.

[29] On the subject ot the wardrobe of these industrious workers it is divulged that 37 percent of all Ukrainian women own two or more coats, 24.4 percent own two or more cloth or silk dresses, 40.5 percent have five changes of underwear and 38.7 percent have two or more pairs of leather shoes. It is taken for granted that all the other women have only one coat, one cloth or silk dress, one pair of shoes and no more than four changes of underwear.

And their feminine ambition? "Hanna Bondarenko, railroad engineer on the line 'Voroshilov',

TABLE I

Area and Population of the Ukrainian S.S.R., 1939-40

	Area (thousand square kilometres)	Population (millions)
131 161 Area Ukrainian S.S.R. January 1939	469.7	30.96
Territories added:		
Western Ukraine (added November 1939)	88.0	8.0
Part of Bessarabia	15.3	1.05
Northern Bukovina (both added June 1940)	6.0	0.5
	579.0	40.51
Territories transferred:		
Part of the Moldavian A.S.S.R. (together with part of Bessarabia, created the Moldavian S.S.R., August 1940)	3.9	0.31
Totals August 1940	575.1	40.20

Source : Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S.Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

728 131 162 In June 1945 the Transcarpathian Ukraine was ceded by Czechoslovakia to the Ukrainian S.S.R. This transfer added about 12,600 square kilometres area and a population of about 750,000. The details of the various cessions of territory are given below.

Soviet-Polish Frontiers

In the autumn of 1939, after the collapse of the Polish State and the occupation of Western Poland by German troops, the Soviet Government decided to take under its protection the life and property of the population of Eastern Poland, that is, Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, inhabited mainly by Ukrainians and Byelorussians. When they were seized by Poland in 1920, these territories were ethnographically and economically part of the Soviet Union. Their return to the Soviet Union increased the area and population of the Byelorussian S.S.R. by 108,000 square kilometres and 4.8 million inhabitants; and of the Ukraine, by 88,000 square kilometres and 8 million people.

In August 1945, a slight adjustment of frontiers took place between Poland and the Soviet Union. A treaty was signed which, in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference in February 1945, established the Polish-Soviet boundary roughly along the Curzon Line, with some deviations in favour of Poland. As a result of this, Poland was given back a small strip of the territory which had been incorporated in the Soviet Union in 1939.

Moldavia

635 648 The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was created on August 2, 1940 by the decree of the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. This Republic consists of a part of the former Moldavian Autonomous S.S. Republic and of a section of Bessarabia incorporated into the Soviet Union. [131 161] The creation of this new Union Republic decreased the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 3,900 square kilometres and a population of 310,000 persons[1].

The Transcarpathian Ukraine[2]

728 In June 1945 an agreement was signed in Moscow between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic that the Transcarpathian Ukraine "...which on the basis of a pact of September 10, 1919, concluded at St.Germain-en-Laye, entered the Czechoslovak Republic with the rank of an Autonomous Republic, will, according to the wish manifested by the population of the Carpatho-Ukraine and on the basis of the friendly agreement of both high contracting parties, unite with its longstanding motherland, the Ukraine, and is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The frontier between Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine, existing since September 29, 1938, will, with modifications described, become the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic..."

Article II of the protocol appended to the Pact said that:

"Persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality living in Czechoslovak territory have the right to opt for Soviet citizenship until January 1, 1946... Czech and Slovak nationals residing or having their permanent domicile in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine have the right to opt for Czechoslovak nationality during the time until January 1, 1946".[3]

131 311 On January 1, 1935, the area of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 12,617 square kilometres. In 1937 about half of this was covered by forests and woods; roughly 239,000 hectares were arable, and about 328,000 hectares were devoted to vineyards, market gardens, and permanent meadows and pastures.

161 As at December 1, 1930, the population of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 725,357, an increase of nearly 121,000 over February 1921.[4]

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1 Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S.Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

2 Called by the Czechs, Sub-Carpathian Rus, or Carpatho-Ukraine.

3 New York Times quoted by Voices of History (1945-46), Gramercy Publishing Company, New York.

4 Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovak Republic, London.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

THE UKRAINE

The history of the Western Ukraine between the two wars thus contains abundant evidence that the union of Western Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine had nothing in common with the spontaneous wishes of the populations concerned. S.U. 728

The annexation of the Western Ukraine was carried out in three stages. First, 1939 saw the occupation by the Red Army of the Ukrainian territories of Poland with 7,000,000 Ukrainians according to Ukrainian statistics, and 5,000,000 Ukrainians according to Polish statistics. Secondly, 1940 brought the establishment of Soviet Ukrainian rule over 1,000,000 Ukrainians of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia following an ultimatum to Rumania. Finally, in 1945 the union with the Transcarpathian Ukraine was established and 500,000 more Ukrainians were 'liberated'. UK [16]

The economic importance of the 50,000 square miles which the Soviet Union annexed as 'Western Ukrainian territories' is comparatively slight. The only real assets were the oil and natural gas riches of Eastern Galicia. The Eastern Galician oil-wells were, however, showing clear signs of exhaustion, since their production had sunk from 1,047,000 tons in 1913 to 601,000 tons in 1929 and to 353,000 tons in 1938. Soviet economists thought at first that this decrease was simply due to Polish capitalist inefficiency and predicted that the establishment of the Soviet régime in Eastern Galicia would lead to an increase of the oil production.[12] But in this they seem to have been mistaken, since the oil target figure for 1950 for the whole of the Ukraine was but 325,000 tons. The Soviet régime was more lucky with the natural gas deposits of Dashava than with the oil of Drogobych and Borislav as was shown by the building of a 300-mile-long gas pipeline linking Dashava with Kiev. S.U. 433 315

From the geopolitical point of view two of the new Ukrainian territories deserve particular attention: Southern Bessarabia – now the Izmail Province of the Soviet Ukraine – securing Soviet Russia an access to the Danube Delta, thus making her a Danubian power, and the Transcarpathian Ukraine, allowing her to be a factor in the Danubian basin. S.U. 728

TRANSCARPATHIAN UKRAINE

The annexation of Southern Bessarabia simply meant that Russia had recovered one of the territories which she had lost after the October Revolution, but Transcarpathia was a new asset which the Russian Empire had never before possessed.

Militarily, Russia obtained an area south of the Carpathians big enough with its 4,400 square miles for large-scale troop concentrations and an ideal initial basis for operations against a hostile Slovakia or S.U. 721

for her own industry the Russian custom frontier gave her 369
insufficient protection; on the contrary, it rather reserved 241
the Ukrainian market to Moscow and Warsaw.

Consequently the industrial development of the Ukraine 369
was very slow. The agricultural population did not find 241
enough work in the towns, and, as a result, the surplus of 162
agrarian population increased every year. In some parts of the Ukraine this surplus population was more serious than in any other part of former Russia. In the central Ukrainian provinces the agrarian population reached 800 to 1,000 inhabitants per 1,000 hektares of arable land, while in France and Germany the average was about 500 inhabitants. There was nothing left for the Ukrainian popula- [167]
tion but to emigrate and colonize the lands of Siberia and of Central Asia. There was also a rather considerable movement of emigration towards America. The most fertile governments of the Ukraine furnished many more emigrants than the less fertile but more industrial regions of central Russia.

Emigration as a Possible Solution

As a consolation, it is pointed out that, in case of the 000
reunion of the Ukraine with Russia, the Ukraine will have in Siberia a field for emigration all ready. But that is very poor consolation. Can emigration satisfy any country? Are the Italians proud of sending many emigrants to America? Did the Germans have cause to feel flattered by increasing the trans-Atlantic emigration, before they developed their own industries?

Why, then, should it be the lot of the Ukraine to let her population emigrate to distant Siberia?

Why can she not develop her economic life in such a manner that all her people shall have work on their own soil? The Ukraine ought not to remain an outlet for the industrial work of the Russians and Poles when her own people cannot find any work at home.

But one might ask why no complaint has been heard up to the present, either from the Ukrainians engaged in industry or from those engaged in agriculture? Why did

ween Novokhopersk and Rostov and that extending from Rostov to Otomanivsk. 101 131

It is only in the western section that the frontier runs between the purely Ukrainian area in west Sub-Caucasia (Kuban area) and the Don area; eastern Sub-Caucasia is a mixed belt of Ukrainians and Russians. In the south-east, therefore, we must speak of two frontiers of Ukrainian territory, a narrower and a wider one. The former separates Ukrainian Transcaucasia from the eastern part of Transcaucasia that is partly Russian, while the latter also includes eastern Sub-Caucasia. Throughout its course, the south-eastern frontier is blurred and by no means fixed, as the process of colonisation is still going on.

c) Boundaries and Territories of the three Historical Ukrainian States:

The Kyiv state stretched in the 11th and 12th centuries from the Wyslok to the Donets and included areas which were not colonised and others whose inhabitants were not Ukrainians. It embraced almost 1153 846 square miles, almost 1/6 of which was constantly inhabited by Ukrainians. 131 175

The second Ukrainian state (the realm of the Cossacks) had an area of about 115 384 square miles, western Ukraine was not included within its boundaries.

The third Ukrainian state covered the entire area settled by the Ukrainian people, with the exception of the Don area and Sub-Caucasia. Without annexations (which were of brief duration), the third state covered about 242 308 square miles, with the Crimean Peninsula, a part of the Voronesh district, Carpathian Ukraine and Bucovina 265 384 square miles, i. e. less than the entire Ukrainian ethnographical territory (276 269 sq. miles) and much less than the entire territory originally settled by Ukrainians (357 885 sq. miles).

d) Size of the Ukrainian territory

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Up to World War I 29 039 sq. miles of the Ukrainian territory belonged to Austria-Hungary and the remainder to Russia. After the end of World War I and a short period of inde- 162 175

131 pendence in the years 1917—1920, Ukraine was distributed among the following countries:

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Ukraine Territory	Area	Population on 1. 1. 1939 (in millions)
to USSR	216 846 sq.m.	37.3
to Poland	46 932 sq.m.	9.7
to Roumania	6 769 sq.m.	1.4
to Czechoslovakia	5 730 sq.m.	0.8

A separate Ukraine Soviet Republic was formed within the USSR (170 423 sqm. with 31.9 million inhabitants). The remaining Ukraine districts in Soviet Russia belonged to the RSFSR, and a tiny piece of Polesya to the Republic of Whi e Ruthenia. At the end of World War II almost the whole Ukrainian territory fell to the Soviet Union. 20 000 km² with more t' an a million inhabitants belongs to Poland, 5 000 km² with 100 00. inhabitants to Slovakia and small minorities to Roumania.

Soviet Ukraine embraces about 261 538 sq.m. with 43 million inhabitants. —

2. Natural Conditions in Ukraine

a) Landscape of Ukraine

133 Ukraine consists of vast plains and plateaus which seldom rise as high as 1000 ft. above sea-level. The monotony of the Ukrainian landscape is akin to that of neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. One can travel for hundreds of miles through a landscape that never changes, for the plateaus differ little from the plains, the transition from the one physical configuration to the other being scarcely perceptible. In the south, the scene is varied by mountains, but these constitute but 1/10 of the entire area of Ukraine.

Passing from south to north, we can distinguish 5 different forms of landscape.

In the south the southern low plain stretches along and includes the plains at the foot of the Carpathian mountains with the valley of the Vistula, the Syan and the Dnister, the Black Sea depression and the plain surrounding the lowlands of

137 Oaks and hornbeams grow plentifully in the zone of transition between forest and the steppe while the pine prefers sandy river valleys. Vegetation in the mountains corresponds to that in western surroundings. The vast mountain pastures deserve special mention. On the coast of the Crimea and the Caucasus we find the buttertree, the cypress, the stone pine, the laurel, opuntias, agaves and other Mediterranean plants.

136 Prevalent animal species vary only slightly from those found in neighboring countries in the west. Worthy of mention are wild-cat, ermine, and bison in the forest region, bear, lynx and wild-cat in the Carpathians. In the Yaila mountains there are vultures. The Caucasus has the greatest variety of animals. It is still possible there to hunt ibex, jackals and ure-ox. On the southern slopes there are even panthers. Numerous rodents live in the steppes. The ure-ox, the beaver and the marmot are dying out.

3. Population.

a) Density

161 In 1939 the average density of the population in Ukraine was 68 persons per sq. kilometer. In the central forest-steppe zone, one of the most thickly populated agrarian areas in Europe, 80—120 people live on a sq. kilometer, between the Syan and Kursk. Northern Ukraine with its lighter soil is much more thinly populated; here the average density amounts to 40—60 persons per sq. kilometer, and in Polesya this figure even falls below 25. The density of the population in Southern Ukraine corresponds roughly to that in the north, though the Donets basin is an isolated area of dense population. The Caucasus foothills, a country with a climate at least as favorable as that of Central Ukraine is only two-thirds as densely populated, as it was colonised late. The mountains are thinly populated.

● 162 361 The majority of the Ukrainian people live in villages; 29 % live in towns and 10 % in cities with more than 100 000 inhabitants; trade and industry are not intensively developed; we are struck by the many towns that have grown up at the frontiers between the various natural areas; there are 60 bet-

ween the forest steppe and the Kholm forests, among them Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Kyiv and Konotip. Akkerman, Odessa, Mykolajiv, Kherson, Sevastop'l lie on the sea coast. In all there are 18 towns with more than 100 000 inhabitants (statistics dating from 1939 and for Western Ukraine from 1931). 162 361

Kyiv	846 000
Kharkiv	833 000
Odessa	604 000
Dnipropetrovske	500 000
Stalino	462 000
Lviv	316 000
Zaporizha	289 000
Mariupil	222 000
Voroshylivhrad	213 000
Kryvyj Rih	198 000
Taganrih	189 000
Symferopil	143 000
Chernivtsi	111 000
Kerch	104 000

b) Movement of population

Movements in the population of Ukraine have been caused by natural increase and emigration and immigration, these movements being more pronounced than elsewhere in Europe. 161

Natural Increasein 1927 per 1000	Births	Mortality	Actual Increase
USSR	40.3	17.8	22.5
North Caucasia	42.7	17.1	25.6
Crimea	44.7	18.1	26.6
Galicia	31.8	20.3	11.5
Volynia and Polesya	39.4	17.7	19.4
Carpathian Ukraine	37.4	23.3	16.1

The greatest natural increase is to be found in those parts of Ukraine that are most sparsely populated, while the lowest, determined by low birthrate, is provided by Galicia which is over-populated. Increase in purely Ukrainian elements of the population exceeds the average value for other elements inhabiting the same areas of settlement. There are no data on

best demonstrated by the fact that there are scarcely 100 000 Ukrainians living west of the ethnographical frontier between Ukraine and Poland, while 2.5 million Poles are to be found east of the same line. (All statistics from the end of 1932). 167

The area of the eastern frontier is different; due to pressure from Ukrainian colonisation movements, many Ukrainian "islands" appear on the eastern frontier and occur repeatedly right to the Pacific Coast. Some districts were colonised by Ukrainians and Russians in common, which explains the mixed character of the population of the foothills of the Eastern Caucasus and the Crimea.

If we consider the Ukrainian national territory as a whole, within its narrower and wider boundaries, we find a large percentage of foreigners — 25 % within the narrower and up to 30 % within the wider frontiers —, although Ukrainian territory never goes beyond its ethnographical frontiers and although these national minorities are not concentrated in a few places but are scattered throughout the territory. No other extensive ethnographical unit in Europe has so many national minorities as Ukraine. The history of the Ukrainian territory is to blame for this handicap. It was repeatedly swamped by foreign peoples, the upper classes were robbed of their original nationality and in recent times Ukrainians settled unwillingly and in small numbers in towns. 162 167

Another characteristic of Ukrainian ethnographical territory is the great diversity in the national composition of the rural and urban population. The village is purely Ukrainian, the town mixed, often indeed of alien population. The lack of an independent political status and the reluctance of the Ukrainian peasantry to settle in towns opened the way for immigration from abroad, which in turn, helped to erase the national character of urban life; in addition, there are more Jews in the towns of Ukraine than in those of other European states. Thus the towns in the west of Ukraine are Ukrainian-Jewish-Polish, those on the Right Bank on the other hand are Ukrainian-Jewish-Russian while those on the Left Bank are Ukrainian-Russian. The following table shows the different national composition of

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rural and urban population. Out of every 1000 persons in Ukraine there are

	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews	Poles	Germans	Others
Town population	388	281	216	69	8	38
Rural population	767	121	18	50	14	30

The Ukrainians are unequally distributed over their ethnographical area. That part of Ukraine that was longest settled and that is most centrally situated is ethnographically purely Ukrainian, the national minorities amounting to less than 10 % of the population. This central area is a quadrangle with unequal sides, reaching in the west to the line Mohyliv-Berdychiv -Kyiv, in the east to Myropil on the line Sumy-Charkiv-Hrishyne, in the north to the White Ruthenian frontier and in the south across the steppe to the line Balta-Pershomajske-Zaporizha-Hrishyne. The Right Bank area is the most exclusively Ukrainian national territory. The population of the wide plains of this area is up to 99 % Ukrainian.

In frontier districts and also in the many mixed areas there is a large percentage of non-Ukrainians. In Galicia, the Kholm district, Podlakhia, Bucovina, Bessarabia, Slobodian Ukraine and in the areas of the Donets and the Kuban, non-Ukrainians amount to $^1/_3$ and more of the population.

In the steppe zone, too, there is a high percentage of national minorities, a result of the rapid colonisation of the steppe at the end of the 18th century. There were not sufficient Ukrainians to colonise the vast steppes, so the gaps were filled up by people of the most varied nationality — Ukrainians and Russians, many Germans as good farmers, and emigrants from the Balkans — Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks and Moldavians. National minorities are scattered here and represent 34 % of the population as against 66 % Ukrainians, so that the latter are everywhere in the majority. We find here 14.3 % Russians, 7.1 % Jews, 4.4 % Roumanians, 4.7 % Germans, 1.3 % Greeks, 1.6 % Bulgarians and 1.6 % others. The Ukrainians exceed even the largest group, the Russians, for there are $4^1/_2$ Ukrainians for every Russian, and in the country even 7½.

Besides Ukrainians, the area that is ethnographically and nationally Ukrainian counts among its population Russians, Jews, Poles, Germans. The Russians, according to statistics for 1. 1. 1933, amount to 8 million and live in Slobodian Ukraine, the Donets Basin (foreign labor immigration), the coastal areas (agricultural colonies) and, alongside of Ukrainians, in the eastern foothills of the Caucasus. Jews — 3 millions — $^2/_3$ of them in towns, live west of the Dnipro (the boundary of their former settlement under the Tsars), and from 2-3 % of the population of Left Bank Ukraine and less than 1 % in Slobodian Ukraine and the Caucasus. Poles numbering 2 800 000 live in districts that were formerly part of Poland, mainly on the "black earth" belt of Galicia and the Kholm district. The other national minorities are insignificant. 162 167

If we study the development of national minorities up to the time of enforced collectivisation, we notice that the Ukrainian element in Dnipro-Ukraine was strengthened, while it receded in Western Ukraine under pressure from the Poles. We cannot tell what changes have taken place in the national element of Soviet Ukraine in recent years, as the results of the last census, held in 1939, have not been published. We can only suppose that Ukrainian national substance has suffered severe losses from the enforced collectivisation, the eviction of Ukrainian peasants, famine, and Russian immigration, especially to the towns and the Donets Basin.

d) Ukrainians outside the boundaries of the ethnographical territory

6 millions, i. e. 13.5 % of the Ukrainian people live without its national territory, 700 000 in islands dispersed throughout neighboring western countries, above all in Batshka while others live as emigrants or laborers, especially in Germany and France. In 1933, there were 300 000 in Roumania, 100 000 in Poland, 40 000 in Czechoslovakia, 50 000 in Jugoslavia and 160 000 in other countries of Europe. 3 % of the Ukrainians — 1.3 millions — are scattered throughout the Soviet Union in Europe; the majority of these live in the lower reaches of the Volga (450 000), the middle reaches of the Volga (220 000), in the republic of 161 167

The Social Structure of the Ukrainian Community

The social structure of the Ukrainian people was fairly uniform till the Soviets took over the government. According to the census of 1926 which gives an accurate enough picture of pre-Soviet conditions, the majority of the people were engaged in agriculture. On December 17. 1926, 80.6 % of the population were employed in agriculture, 5.4 % in factories, 3.7 % were artisans, 0.5 % were employed in building, 1.9 % on the railway, 2.3 % in business, and 2.6 % in civil service. Te different social classes may be seen from the following table: 162

	Ukrainians %	Russians %	Jews %
Laborers	54.6	29.2	8.7
Servants	51.7	25.0	16.9
Professions	47.9	15.2	30.4
Farmers working with members of own family	88.6	4.9	1.3
Farmers with hired laborers	75.6	5.7	10.4
Independent peasants	56.7	10.7	26.7
Members of family working at home	89.1	5.2	0.6

The characteristic member of the social structure of the Ukrainian nation was the farmer who cultivated the soil with the help only of his family. The proportion of Ukrainians in the groups of laborers, employees and professions diminished as the salary and social standing of the group in question rose.

The collective system introduced by the First and Second Five Year Plans, made deep alterations in the social structure of the Ukrainian areas. The proportion between rural and urban population changed. According to the last census of 1939 the urban population had risen to 36.2 %, while the rural population had sunk to 63.8 %. In the Donets Basin and the Ukraine Steppe, where industrialisation was intensely developed, the population of the towns in some areas rose by 50 %. While from 1926-1932 towns like Dnipropetrovske increased 62.9%, Za- 162 361

162 361 porizha 244 %, Kryvyj Rih 156.6 %, Staline 170 %, Konstantynivka 233 %, towns in the Right and Left Bank areas decreased.

The increase in urban population in the Ukraine Soviet Republic is most probably due to foreign immigration. Housing has become worse practically everywhere; it is difficult to imagine that the immigrants can continue to live permanently under such wretched conditions.

474 The rural population was composed almost entirely of members of colkhoses. They possessed almost the entire agricultural land in common, all agricultural machinery and draught animals and much of the other livestock. There remained for personal use only small plots round the cottages, the cottages themselves and a few head of cattle (no horses), pigs and poultry.

474 465 Every member had to work on the soil of the colkhose. His wages were reckoned according to the number of days he had worked and these were calculated according to time and kind of work performed. The amount of grain left after fulfilling obligations to the state and payment for hire of machines and tractors, seed, cattle-breeding expenses, rate of amortisation etc. represented the wages. They were paid in kind and (a smaller proportion) in money. This meant that variations in harvest yield were almost exclusively expressed by what was left for wages. In the first years of the colkhose system, members often received 2-3 kg of grain for a day's work; as their energy was not fully utilised in the colkhose and as the members of the family who were unable to work had also to live from these meager earnings, famine arose in the early thirties in Ukraine, bringing a great increase in the death-rate. Later, wages are said to have been raised but the Soviet statistics do not show whether the wages listed (15 kg and more per day) applied to entire Ukraine or to individual colkhoses. The incomes of the various colkhose members also varied, as administrative jobs were better paid than work in fields and stables, and as several members revealed "propriety instincts" for extending or exploiting their own small share at the expense of the common property.

The proportion of farms managed by individuals decreased to less than 1 % of the entire agricultural area. The men employed at machinery and tractor centers, which seemed to attract all the mechanics required for the colkhose system, formed a privileged class. It depended on them whether an agricultural operation was carried through at the right time. This group was mainly composed of young people and non-Ukrainians. In 1934 some 797 600 were employed on the land and in forests in the Ukraine Soviet Republic. The Soviet officials, not so important numerically as on account of their influence, formed another group of the rural population. Finally, in the country districts there was a fairly large group of teaching and medical staffs and agricultural experts, mostly of Ukrainian peasant origin, as foreigners could not stand life in Ukrainian villages for long. 162 565

Urban population had a large percentage of foreigners, the main social groups being laborers in industry and commerce and the Soviet officials. The number of industrial laborers within the frontiers of the Ukraine Soviet Republic on January 1st, 1936 was 1 308 000. But this figure kept varying constantly, as many of the workers from country districts were not satisfied with conditions of life in the towns and changed jobs frequently or tried to get back home. The Soviet Government fought against these difficulties for years without being able to solve them. This group also included a great number of young people who grew up in post-war conditions. Their nationality varied; about half of the industrial proletariat in Ukraine was of Ukrainian origin. As a rule, material standards were not high. The average wage in 1934 amounted to 166.4 roubles a month, but this figure is not a clear indication of the individual's earning capacity as piece-work was general. In individual cases, where the Stakhanov system (whereby maximum output of labor was achieved) was introduced, higher than average wages were earned. In recent years real wages declined as a result of abolishing the cards which had entitled workmen to certain privileges in buying food and industrial products. Wage earners in Soviet business concerns were similarly situated to those in industrial plants but as the former were less important than the latter in the general scheme of Soviet economy, their develop- 162 369 465 434

465 ment has been slower and they have not yet reached the same
434 degree of intensity of labor which we found in factories. Jews play a great part in commercial life.

162 Among the lower categories of civil servants, Ukrainians were
435 in the majority from the beginning, while representatives of
511 foreign nationalities increased in the higher services. The average
647 salary of Soviet officials throws little light on the standard of living in this group of the population because the difference between higher and lower employees is again considerable. Incomes in the lower ranks were very small while the higher officials had a life of ease and could on occasion even afford luxury. Engineers are among the most privileged while teachers and actors are much worse off. The legal status of the Soviet official was entirely insecure; they lived constantly under threat of a "purge" or of being denounced as disturbing the process of Soviet economy. The higher ranks of bureaucrats were here in special danger.

162 The small group of the professional class (doctors, writers, lawyers), in spite of their freedom, was dependent on the apparatus of the Soviet State. The group of outcasts was most to be pitied, i. e. those who had been expelled by the regime from social intercourse, e. g. merchants, artisans, and priests. After identity cards were introduced and "socially dangerous" persons removed, this group greatly decreased.

162 Another group, finally, is formed by Ukrainians living
127 outside the frontiers of Ukrainian territory, who as "Kur-
697 kuls", "Pests", "Saboteurs" were sent to concentration camps in the North and in Siberia. The "Nationalists" are also included in this group. And the colonisation of remote frontier areas in Soviet Russia required forest laborers, miners and factory workers, who had to help in the coal mines of Siberia and in building up industrial concerns in Central Asia. It is impossible to give statistics for the proportion of Ukrainians in this group, but they cannot be ignored as they will certainly return home and play an important rôle in Ukraine whenever the general situation is altered.

162 In Ukrainian areas outside of the Soviet Union, conditions
127 resemble those obtaining in Western Europe. The Ukrainian

area in Poland showed the greatest variations, it having an urban population of 19 % in 1931; in the Lviv area of administration this rose to 30 % and sank to 12 % in Volynia. The urban population was composed of the following nationalities: Ukrainians 22.9 %, Poles 36.6 %, Jews 38.3 %. The figures for the rural population, on the other hand, were: Ukrainians 71.4 %, Poles 23 %, Jews 3.8 %, others 1.8 %. 74.9 % were employed in agriculture, 10.2 % in factories and mines, 7.4 % in business and transportation, 7.5 % in other callings. In areas previously belonging to Russia, the number of those engaged in agriculture rose to 80 % and in the administration of Lviv and Stanislaviv it only amounted to 65.5 % and 74.8 % respectively. 162 167

An excess rural population was characteristic of Polish parts of Ukraine, being particularly marked in provinces formerly Austrian. The agricultural area was divided into 52.4 % small holdings (up to 50 ha), 28.8 % large estates and 18.8 % state property. But in reality 84.3 % of the agricultural land was in small holdings as the large estates and the state property mostly consisted of forest land. In Galicia there were crofts (up to 5 ha) which could neither employ nor feed a large family. The medium-sized (5-20 ha) and larger farms (20-50 ha) did not represent even the half of all agricultural enterprises. Ukrainians were practically not represented at all in larger estates, so that the standard of living among the Ukrainian population was very low; the cooperative system which was widely spread, especially in Galicia, did something to raise the average standard.

The Ukrainian urban population was represented mainly by the lower middle-classes. In recent times efforts have been made to improve conditions for Ukrainian businessmen and to build new workshops for individual workers. These efforts soon met with success, in spite of Polish and Jewish competition.

Social conditions were different in Bucovina and Bessarabia. Though land there has been parcelled into tiny holdings and has consequently produced a social situation similar to that in Galicia, the conditions under which the Ukrainian peasant lived in Bessarabia were stable and more favorable. Jews formed a

162 proportion of the population of the little towns, the Ukrainian
167 intelligentsia being but weakly represented.

The population of those parts of Ukrainian territory that are in Czechoslovakia, is also mostly engaged in agriculture which accounts for 81.8 %, mining industry for 6.4 %, trade and transportation for 2.7 % and other professions for 9.1 %. In the main, Ukrainians live in the country; the less important cities and towns have a very mixed population, in which Ukrainians form the majority in only a few cases. The standards of living and material security are precarious, lower perhaps than in any other part of Ukrainian territory.

National Minorities in Ukraine

● 162 563 Minorities in Ukraine amount to 20 % in purely Ukrainian territory and to 24.7 % in other parts of the country and are the consequence of long domination by foreigners and the immigration that entailed. The same cause is responsible for increasing Jewish immigration; Jews have always appeared to assist the spread of Russian influence in the East and Polish in the West.

175 167 563 Contemporary minorities rarely date earlier than the second half of the 18th century, if we except a few peripheral areas in the west, the Tatars in Crimea and Russian colonisation in the east in the 17th century. Several earlier efforts made by the Polish Government and individual magnates to colonise the Right Bank region of Ukraine were unsuccessful; the first wave spent itself in the 16th century in the rebellion of Khmelnytskyj, while later colonists were completely absorbed by the native Ukrainian population. The Roman Catholic faith was able to persist only in a few places. A similar fate overtook Roumanian expansion in the 14th and 15th centuries in the Carpathians; it left traces in names and in the legal code of the settlements.

167 563 The Russians form the largest minority. Apart from the common colonisation of the Don area, it was only after the catastrophe at Poltava (1709) that Russians slowly penetrated into Ukraine. More numerous Russian settlers did not arrive till after there was no longer a Hetman (1764) and after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress (1775). At the same time the Turks were driven back from the Black Sea; the Ukrainian population, which had suffered great losses in the struggles with Turks and Tatars, was unable to tackle this job alone. But the Russians, who had been systematically settled, were disinclined to cultivate the steppe and preferred to move into the r ing towns as officials, artisans and laborers.

Ten thousands of German colonists took their place, settled by Catherine II in the former Governments of Kherson, Taurien, and Katerynoslav, later also in Southern Bessarabia. At the same time Emperor Joseph II settled German colonists in

Southern Galicia and Bucovina. Immigrants who were of the 167
same faith as the Ukrainians also arrived at this time from 563
Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Roumania (partly also from Armenia).

In the eighteen eighties the Russian Peasants' Bank settled 162
tens of thousands of Polish, German and Czech colonists 563
in Volynia. By far the majority of Poles in Galicia and in the 167
Kholm district also settled there as late as the second half of the 19th century, in Volynia and Polessia even in the 20th (in many cases after 1920). Single Polish settlements in the Right Bank region (especially in Podolia) are later in origin. Elsewhere the Polish population has been preserved in the towns only, the workshops and estates belonging to Polish landed proprietors. Even the "most Polish" area of Ukraine, the Markhlevitskyj district in Eastern Volynia, which was formed artificially for political reasons, only had 28 332 Poles, of whom, however, only 10 715 actually spoke Polish.

After the end of the 18th century Eastern Galicia was almost 162
purely Ukrainian; there were Poles only in the towns, in the 563
administration and in connection with big estates. This fact was emphatically recorded by Graf Pergen, an eminent Austrian official, after Galicia was transferred to Austria (1772). The official census reports for 1846 and 1851 still represented the Galician province of the Austrian empire as predominantly Ukrainian; 50.1 % (2 441 771) Ukrainians as compared with 40.9 % (1 994 802) Poles. The statistics for 1857 are: 45.2 % Ukrainians, 42.7 % Poles, 2.5 % Germans and 9.7 % Jews.

The Polish element has been artificially increased only since 1867, and then only slowly. In taking the census, the actual state of affairs was camouflaged by tricks of statistics; the Jews, for instance, were counted as Poles, thus increasing the number of the latter in the census of 1910 by more than 800 000; another paper trick was played on Roman Catholic Ukrainians, who had mostly been converted in the course of recent years by cunning and force from the Greek Catholic United Faith to Roman (in Poland synonymous with Polish) Catholicism. Although they spoke no Polish and had otherwise the same interests as other Ukrainians, most of them were

162 563 listed as Poles, thus increasing the number of the latter by almost half a million.

Every decade more and more united Catholics who were known to be of Ukrainian nationality were entered as Poles. In 1910 there were already 235 328 such "Greek Catholic Poles"; in 1921 there were 359 000 till the number of such Poles amounted to almost half a million. This explains what would otherwise be inexplicable: that the number of Ukrainians should have decreased from 4 880 312 in 1910 to 3873 223 in 1921, i. e. by 1 006 599, while in the same period the number of Poles is alleged to have risen from 15 319 734 (1910) to 18 820 163, i. e. by 3 500 429. As this was not sufficient to justify Poland's existence as a Great Power, the special group of „natives" was introduced, which was put down tentatively in 1921 as 41 000 and then, quite brazenly in 1931 as 707 000 (i. e. 2.2 % of the entire population of Poland, these being mostly Polesian Ukrainians). In addition to these tricks of statistics, a frank campaign of denationalisation was launched after the First World War by Poland with the support of the Roman Catholic Church. The following table shows how things developed:

Year	Greek Catholic	Roman Catholic
1869	64.2 %	21.84 %
1900	62.8 %	23.51 %
1910	61.7 %	25.31 %
1921	60.8 %	27.80 %
1931	60.1 %	28.50 %

This was the origin of the legend that Eastern Galicia was a country of mixed population to which Poland had a right, having contributed her share to the native population.

It is well known that Jews are aliens in Ukraine, and that they only appeared in Galicia in the wake of the Poles. Thanks to Polish support, the number of Jews in Ukraine has been almost doubled; it rose from 6.9 % to 12.8 % (1910).

In spite of political influences, the minorities have never succeeded in settling on areas of any extent. They are more strongly represented on the periphery and it is only in manufacturing towns that we find them in greater numbers living together. Of the 40 422 places in Soviet Ukraine, for

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instance 36 569, or 90.1 % were Ukrainian according to the statistics of 1925 and only 1769 or 4.5 % predominantly Russian, 1043 or 2.8 % predominantly German, 407 or 1.0 % predominantly Polish and about 200 predominantly Jewish (0.5%) and 148 (0.4 %) predominantly Moldavian. 162 563

Circumstances are similar in the so-called „mixed" Eastern Galicia; according to official statistics before World War I there were 3298 village communities, i. e. 88.7 % with a Ukrainian majority and scarcely 436 places (11.6 %) with a majority of Poles or other nationals.

The Russian Minority

Russians form the largest minority on Ukrainian territory. It is true that the Russian population has been slowly decreasing, but probably it still amounts to-day to 5 000 000 i. e. a little less than 10 % of the entire population. According to the calculation of the Ukrainian Bureau for Statistics and Economics for 1933, the Russian minority in Central Ukraine amounted to 4 615 000 = 9.7 % and over the entire territory (including mixed zones) to 8 074 000 = 15 %. The number of Russians has decreased most in Soviet Ukraine, amounting to 2 677 200 or 9.2 % of the entire population in 1926. There are no Russians either in Galicia or Carpatho-Ukraine and in Bucovina less than 3 000. In North-West Ukraine, too, they scarcely ever amount to more than 2 % of the entire population and occur only in scattered groups in the towns of Volynia, Polesya and the Kholm District.

It is surprising that the percentage of Russians should be so low just on the ethnographical frontiers of Russia. These frontier areas of North Ukraine, Volynia, Podolia, and the former departments of Chernyhiv and Poltava are purely Ukrainian with a very small Russian population amounting to between 0.3 % — 1 %. The proportion of Russians in the entire Right Bank population amounts only to 2.6 % (in country districts alone, even to 0.7 % only).

North-West Ukraine and the colonised areas of Northern Caucasia, on the other hand, are mixed regions where Russians and Ukrainians are rivals for supremacy. In the eastern foothills

162 563 of Ukrainian Northern Caucasia the proportion is 57.3 % Russians to 33.4 % Ukrainians; some places, too, in the Donets Basin are to be regarded as areas of Russian colonisation. But even here, in spite of official support, the Russians only count 31.4 % of the entire population and, in the towns, are constantly making way for more Ukrainians so that towns that used to be predominantly Russian had, in 1926 even, no more than 48.9 % Russians.

The proportion of Russians in the population south of Kursk and Voronesh and in the surroundings of Kharkiv is relatively large. It dates from the early 18th century and is supported by the Russian population in Kharkiv (37 %). The average figure for the Russian population of these areas amounts to 22.5 % of the entire population.

In spite of a considerable Russian population in the harbor towns, Ukrainians contribute largely to the population of the area round the Sea of Oziv and the Black Sea. It is true that there are still 663 000 Russians, but they are everywhere in the minority.

Proportion of Russians in Population

Rayon	general (%)	urban (%)	rural (%)
Melitopil	25.0	39.7	24.0
Odessa	23.3	38.1	8.2
Mariupil	18.5	46.7	10.6
Mykolajiv	15.7	39.5	9.9
Kherson	11.4	31.0	7.7
Autonomous Republic of Moldavia	8.5	23.3	6.5

In the industrial districts of the West (Kryvyj Rih, Zaporizha, and Dnipropetrovske), the proportion of Russians scarcely reached the figure for the entire Ukraine — it amounts to 8.9 % (25.1 % in the towns, 5 % in the country).

From the above it is obvious that the Russian population is greatest in large towns and industrial and mining areas. But the statement that the towns in Eastern Ukraine have a Russian majority must not be repeated for it was no longer true even

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in the second half of the 19th century. Even in those days the proportion of Ukrainians in the larger towns (with the exception of government capitals) amounted to 40.5 % (compared with 29.2 % Russians and 25.6 % Jews) and in the smaller towns to 52.4 % (compared with 21.8 % Russians and 21.0 % Jews). The total urban population in the Gouvernments of Chernyhiv, Poltava and Kharkiv had then a Ukrainian majority, while the Ukrainians were relatively in the majority in the towns in the Gouvernment of Katerynoslav. 162 563

This development has been continued. The census of 1925 produced even more favorable results: in the towns there were then 38.49 % Ukrainians, 29.4 % Jews, 27.22 % Russians, and 2.03 % Poles. 14 towns show a considerable majority of Ukrainians (up to 92.33 %); in 14 more the Ukrainians were relatively the strongest national group. The proportion of Ukrainians in the south also increased astonishingly, as may be seen from the figures for the harbor town of Mykolajiv (1897 = 8.8 %, 1923 = 17.5 % Ukrainians) or for Kherson (1897 = 19.5 %, 1920 = 40.4 %).

Jews

Before World War I there were 3 795 760 Jews, i. e. 8.2 % of the entire population of Ukraine. They were massed in the provinces that used to be Polish and were later Austro-Hungarian and also in the northern districts of the Right Bank Ukraine, in Volynia and Podolia where, at that time, they contributed 12.2—12.6 % of the entire population. There are most Jews in the east of Carpatho-Ukraine (more than 25 %), in the Kholm district (on an average 15.3 %), in the districts of Berdychiv (23.1 %), Odessa (22 %), Chernivtsi (21.4 %), Brest-Litovsk (20.8 %) and Pinsk (19.5 %). On the right bank of the Dnipro the Jewish share in the population was considerably smaller while on the left bank where Jews were forbidden to settle until the great Revolution, it was quite small; with the exception of Kharkiv it varied from 2—3 %.

The Jews lived for preference in the towns; in the country they were scattered as shop-keepers, inn-keepers, tenant farmers and artisans. But there were also a good number of towns where

● 162 the Jewish population was insignificant (e. g. Dmytrievsko
563 0.5 %, Vovchansk 1.1 %, Okhtyrka 1.3 %, Melitopil 3.4 %, Kamenske 4.1 %, Slovanske 4.4 %, Bila Tserkva 5.5 %, Berdiansk 8.1 %). Among the larger towns Stalino had 10.7 %. Kharkiv 19.5 % and Mykolajiv 21 % Jews.

For some time the number of Jews has been decreasing, partly as a result of emigration and partly because of the shifting of the peasant population. At the beginning of World War II there were probably about 2.5 million Jews. The last eight years have brought about a complete change and not even approximate figures can be given.

Poles

Official statistics list the Poles as third of the minorities in Ukraine. In 1914 they were responsible for 2 079 500 souls i. e. 4.5 % of the entire Ukrainian population. Of these 1 270 400 = 21.8 % were in Austrian and more than 809 000 = 2 % in Russian Ukraine (including the Kholm district and Volynia). At the outbreak of World War II there must have been 1 880 934 Poles (= 3.6 % of the entire population) on the Ukrainian ethnographical territory (1 608 900 in Poland, 246 034 in Soviet Ukraine and approximately 25 000 in Roumania). In the areas belonging to Poland they form about 18 % of the entire population and are more concentrated only in Lviv and the larger towns. In the foothills of the Carpathians, south of the Dnister, in spite of the vicinity of the ethnographical frontier, there were relatively few Poles (less than 5 % on the average in the west and less than 10 % in the east). Circumstances in Polessya and Volynia are similar. Nor have the towns in Western Ukraine a majority of Poles; in Lviv about half the population are Poles. In 1931 in all the towns in Eastern Galicia there were 26.9 % Ukrainians, in the administration area of Stanislaviv 33.8 % and in Podlakhia and Polesya 31.2 % and 31.64 respectively. In Eastern Ukraine there were 476 435 = 1.6 % Poles in 1926. They lived scattered only in 12 rayons of the Right Bank Ukraine, in Volynia and Podolia and, with the exception of Zhytomir (12.5 %) and Proskuriv (10.2 %) they accounted for less than 5 % of the entire population. 48.4 % of these

"Poles" listed Ukrainian as their mother-tongue (56.7 % even in the country), while 7 % spoke Russian. 162 563

Germans

The Germans, who cannot be very numerous in Ukraine today, amounted in 1914 to 871 270 souls = 1.9 % of the entire population. They lived mostly in three compact colonies (area round Black Sea, Kholm district, Volynia and Carpathian foothills). By 1935 they had decreased to 693 000 = 1.2 % of the entire population. In the Black Sea area they had an absolute majority in the rayons of Grossliebenthal, K. Liebknecht, Luxemburg, Prishib, Engels, Vysokopolje and Molotshna. Germans were settled in 12 of the 41 rayons of Soviet Ukraine. Most Germans lived in the country; there were communities of several thousand Germans in Odessa, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovske, Zaporizha and Mykolajiv.

Other minorities

The 460 000 Roumanians are to be found chiefly in the Moldavian Republic (0.89 %) where, however, they only constitute 30.1 % of the entire population (compared with 48.5 % Ukrainians). Otherwise Roumanians live in Bucovina and in the Bessarabian areas of Akkerman and Khotin.

The 160 000 Greeks live mostly in Mariupil and Stavropil.

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Agriculture

1. Agricultural Features and Overpopulation

162 The agricultural overpopulation of Ukraine is a result of its one-sided social and economic structure. In Germany the rural population forms 29 % of the entire population of the country, while the figures for the agrarian countries of Denmark and Hungary are 30 % and 25 % respectively, the corresponding figure for Ukraine being 75 %. The density of the agricultural population in Ukrainian territory amounts to a general average of 54 per ha of agriculturally utilised soil, in the Right Bank Region and in Western Ukraine to 80, and in Galicia to 103. In Denwark, the model agricultural country, the density of the agricultural population is not even 35 and in Bohemia, where agriculture and industry are highly developed, it is only 52. And yields per ha in Ukraine are fairly low: statistics for 1931—35 are as follows (q/ha):

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433

Country	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Average
Ukraine	8.5	8.8	8.3	9.2	8.7
Roumania	9.6	10.1	10.3	9.7	9.9
Hungary	13.5	11.8	14.1	12.3	12.9
Germany	21.0	17.4	20.1	19.5	19.5

Agricultural overpopulation is particularly noticeable in view of the small share of agricultural land per head of the rural population (not quite 2 ha). Produce is therefore exported at the expense of the standard of living which actually used to be lower in Ukraine than in the European states that imported the produce.

In the years immediately preceding the Second World War yields per ha in Dnipro-Ukraine seemed to have risen

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311 and the Middle East have been left in suspense, a territory the size of
648 Europe and new routes into the heart of China and ultimately to the Pacific have been brought under Soviet control. Under these circumstances 'the wheat-fields of the Ukraine' receded again into the background and became of only local importance: the more so since, in the two Soviet 'Economic Plans', interest in South-Eastern Russia has been concentrated on the industrial development of the New Russian region. These conditions are illustrated by the growth of industrial centres like Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Lugansk, Zaporozhie, and the decline of the great grain port of Odessa.

311 The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine has never in fact justified the enthusiasm which it has inspired from the time of the seventeenth-century Polish poet quoted in an earlier context to the more recent period of Herr Hitler and his apostles of *Lebensraum*. The natural conditions of the Ukraine are such that they really generously reward agricultural labour, but they exact always patient, strenuous and systematic toil.

Natural conditions differ greatly over the expanse of the country which Michael Dragomanov considered to constitute 'Greater Ukraine'. The agricultural 'age' of these territories differs in the extreme. In New Russia agriculture is only a century old, while Galicia has supported a numerous population of husbandmen for nearly a thousand years.

●162 *Galicia* is one of the oldest agricultural lands of all Europe and
134 conditions there have hardly altered since the days of Daniel and his *boyars*. The Galician earth, black in the eastern part, is tired old soil,
311 impoverished by incessant labour, itself prompted and intensified by
167 the ever-growing care of an ever-growing population to acquire its daily bread. Owing to the density of the population (110, and in some regions 132, inhabitants to the square kilometre) the area of holdings had been reduced to a minimum: 46 per cent of the farms comprise 2 hectares of land and sometimes less; 37 per cent comprise from 2 to 5 hectares. In a countryside where urban life has remained relatively stagnant live 75 per cent of the total population; while all commerce and crafts remain in the hands of the Jews in the large towns and in many of the villages, there is a 50 per cent surplus of hands among agricultural labourers. The peasants, Poles and Ukrainians alike, used to migrate to Germany and France as casual labour; before the last war they emigrated also in large numbers to Canada and the United States.

These arduous conditions of peasant life gradually developed
474 a capacity for organization. Driven by necessity, the Galician peasantry set up a network of co-operatives for production and

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distribution. These co-operatives formed the basis of a certain national unity which found expression in the political field. 474

Volhynia, partitioned after the war of 1920 between the Poles and the Soviets, is nearly as old an agricultural country as Galicia. Here the strips of rich black earth alternate with sandy and wooded country. Although density of population is not so great as in Galicia, poverty is perhaps even greater, owing to a lack of that capacity for organization which helps the Galician labourers to survive. The large estates of the Polish nobility have long disappeared; after the last war the Polish Government divided up the land. Numerous strips were allotted to Polish soldiers on the expiration of their service—with the intention of strengthening the Polish ethnic and cultural element in the region. The disappearance of the large estates, as in Transylvania and Roumania, had a deleterious effect on agricultural production and on the proper exploitation of the forests. The majority of the people lead a half-starved existence, and the young men dream of emigration to South America. In 1937, 25 per cent of the population of Polish Volhynia had neither bread nor wood. 311 134 241 735

Podolia has been a land of cultivation since the Middle Ages, although the soil was broken up two or three hundred years later than in Galicia and Volhynia. Now, as before the period of war and revolution (1914–20), Podolia remains in a close economic relationship to the other parts of the Ukraine. The black earth of this favoured province is really fruitful and well watered by numerous small rivers; climatic conditions are better than anywhere throughout the Ukraine—rain is plentiful and regular and the winters are short. It was probably the fields and pastures, the hillocks and woods of Podolia which the Polish poet had in mind when he wrote lyrically of 'the birthplace of Ceres and Diana'. Horticulture and apiculture have long flourished there. 311 134

In the past social conditions varied with the political situation according to whether the small landowners (Ukrainian Cossacks) or the Polish landlords were in the ascendant. During the eighteenth century Polish elements had the upper hand and for some time Podolia remained the last refuge of the Polish aristocracy. Polish social influences survived the Three Partitions, and it was only after the Polish Insurrection of 1830 that conditions began to change in favour of the Russian majority in the population. 177

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century this rich land with its soft climate had become very densely populated. By the end of the century Podolia ranked second in density of population of all the regions of the Russian Empire. The Government of Moscow took 162 311

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162 311 first place, but in its population was included the million inhabitants of the second capital of the Empire, while in Podolia there was no single town which numbered more than fifty thousand inhabitants. Density of population in Podolia reached the figure of 100 to the square kilometre, but the province was saved from the problems of over-population by the development of the large estates on capitalist lines. This process began about 1830 and developed on a large scale after 1870. The beet-sugar industry with its subsidiary alcoholic distilleries, flour mills and horticulture provided a variety of livelihood for a population which by 1897 had attained to nearly four and a half millions. Between the years 1896 and 1933 more than a million and a half peasants migrated from other districts of the Ukraine to Siberia and the steppes beyond the Volga, but in Podolia emigration was scarcely perceptible.

[178]

[134] *The southern part of the Government of Kiev* along the right bank of the Dniepr enjoyed conditions somewhat similar to those in Podolia, while the northern districts resembled rather Volhynia. In the south a rich black earth supported a number of large estates where the beet-sugar industry, distilleries and mills flourished. In these southern districts were many well-to-do peasant farms covering up to 20 and 30 hectares apiece. Wheat was grown in sufficient quantities to satisfy local needs and to supply the six hundred thousand inhabitants of the city of Kiev. At the beginning of the century the population of the Government of Kiev amounted to over four and a half millions. At that time the three Governments of right-bank Ukraine (Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia) contained fourteen million inhabitants with an average density of 70–80 people per square kilometre. Such numbers were quite 'European' in their proportions and should have tended to discourage those Western dreamers who were even then casting envious eyes on the 'vacant lands' of the Ukraine.

[134] It was almost equally difficult to discover 'vacant lands' in the Governments of *left-bank Ukraine*. In Poltava, Chernigov and Kharkov the density of population amounted to 60–70 people per square kilometre. The uninterrupted belt of black earth in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov had been under the plough only since the seventeenth century—and many parts of it not before the eighteenth century. This was the land of which Alexey Tolstoy wrote: 'Know ye the land where all breathes plenty and content, where rivers flow as silver clear.' There were scarcely any towns of importance in this rural elysium. The characteristics of the Government of Kharkov, on the other hand, were quite distinct from those of the two adjoining left-bank provinces: in the north-west,

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Kharkov, in its scenery and social conditions, resembles rather the 311
neighbouring districts of the Government of Kursk, while in the 162
south-east it is already really part of New Russia.

Climatic conditions on the left bank are rather less favourable 132
than on the right bank of the Dniepr: there is a lighter rainfall which is not so evenly distributed; the winters are more severe and the region of Kharkov endures a distinctly 'continental' climate. Prince Shcherbatov, a former minister of the Imperial Government, writes that: 'One of the most important factors in agriculture is rainfall, which does not always occur under favourable conditions in the Ukraine. Most of the rain comes in summer and often takes the form of downpours which impede work in the fields and harvesting; and in the spring there is often not enough rain. Rainfall is better distributed on the right bank of the Dniepr than in other parts. The difficult climatic conditions in the Ukraine liken the average black earth harvests to average harvests in Central Europe on an average soil.'

During the nineteenth century conditions in left-bank Ukraine 311
tended to favour the growth of a prosperous class of small farmers who supplanted the big landowners of the period of Peter I and Catherine II. These conditions derived from the shortage of labour on big estates which followed the opening up of the New Russian territories and from the wave of speculation which induced landowners to sell out their properties on the left bank of the Dniepr in order to participate in 'the rush' for the new lands. Left-bank Ukraine became a country of large peasant farms covering 10, 20, 30 and as much as 50 hectares, while a number of smaller 'working' landowners retained estates up to 100, 150 and 200 hectares. Land was worth in these parts 500 rubles (about £50 sterling on the pre-war exchange) a hectare.

At the same time the growth of these large farms in the Governments of left-bank Ukraine combined with a natural increase in the population to create a serious problem of 'over-crowding'. In the eighteenth century a numerous class of peasantry had existed who did not own any land of their own at all, but who merely possessed cottages and vegetable gardens and the right to graze their stock on common pasture lands. Following the Emancipation of the Serfs in 566
1861, the number of landless peasants showed a rapid increase. The small parcels of land allotted to the liberated serfs were soon redistributed between the thrifty and the shiftless; and the division of large estates did not contribute to the establishment of agricultural industries which might have provided a living for the less fortunate. Already in the eighties symptoms of over-population were noticeable 000

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different: 51 per cent and 49 per cent.' It is necessary to add that Sadovsky includes in production intended 'for general use' in both periods the output of agricultural industry: i.e. sugar, spirits, flour and sunflower oil. If these figures for rural industry are excluded, those for so-called 'light industry' remain practically negligible. For example, only 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in U.S.S.R. are derived from the Ukraine; and there is no manufacture of cloth or leather goods.

As Sadovsky justly remarks, the policy of exclusively encouraging heavy industry has resulted in the neglect of the economic interests of the western and central Ukraine. In effect, with the policy of industrializing eastern and south-eastern Ukraine, the Soviets have shown a tendency to de-industrialize the wide and rich western provinces. Here the basis of their policy is probably strategic as well as political. 'In a series of towns of right-bank Ukraine such as Zhitomir, Berdichev, Zhmerinka, Mohilev-Podolsk, Uman, Smela, signs of decadence can be observed during the period of the Five Year Plans.'

The 'Economic Plans' of the Soviet Government are subordinated to a general political policy which, as has been explained in the preceding chapter, aims at the complete fusion of the Soviet Ukraine with the rest of U.S.S.R.; and according to Communist theory political unity can only be based on economic fusion. In forcing the pace of the development of heavy industry in the south and south-east to the detriment of the light and agricultural industries of the rest of the country, the Moscow Government pursues two objectives. First, the importance of the Ukrainian national element in the Ukraine is reduced. 'The Ukrainian people are an old people of agricultural civilization and have never shown any inclination for industrial work and life in big towns. The Ukrainian prefers the country if he can earn his living there, and if it is necessary he finds work in the different branches of rural industry' (Brégy and Obolensky). According to official Soviet statistics on the nationality of workers in the Ukraine, the coal industry employs 75 per cent Russians and 25 per cent Ukrainians; the metallurgical, 73 per cent and 22 per cent respectively; the building trades 56 per cent and 37 per cent (*The National Policy of the Russian Communist Party Expressed in Figures*, p. 177). About 50 per cent only of the people in the Donets region are Ukrainians, and among the urban population of the whole of Soviet Ukraine 70 per cent are not Ukrainians. In two big towns like Odessa and Kharkov only 25 per cent of the inhabitants are Ukrainians. The same phenomenon can be observed in centres like Mariupol and Lugansk. In this wise the

CHAPTER FIVE

Ukrainization

The period of the New Economic Policy was likewise the 186
time when the movement for the Ukrainization of the state reached its highest point. This was a complicated political, cultural and scholarly movement which aimed to develop the Ukrainian self-consciousness in every possible way and to establish the proper role of the Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It took many and diverse forms, and while it developed into a definite opposition to Russian influence and Russian methods, it was not primarily so much an anti-Communist as an extra-Communist movement, even though most of its outstanding leaders were tried and tested members of the party.

The basis for the entire movement is to be found in the slight attraction that Communism as a doctrine possessed for the Ukrainian [665]
people. As late as 1927 there were only 122,928 Ukrainian Com-
munists, that is, about thirty-nine for each ten thousand of the [162]
Ukrainian population. The bulk of the Communists in Ukraine were Russian and the vast majority of these belonged to the urban proletariat or to the workers in the Donets Basin and Kryvy Rih.

The general period of disintegration during the civil war and [369]
the period of Militant Communism had greatly strengthened the power and self-confidence of the peasants and had weakened the power of the city workmen. This showed Lenin and the dominant group that some method had to be found to win at least the passive support of the countryside if new troubles were to be averted.

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the tenacity with which the 186
Ukrainian peasants, whether they were literate or illiterate, clung 191
to their native language. Lenin had used this characteristic with 665

simply Russians was constantly increased. It was almost forbidden 626
to mention the name Ukrainian in connection with the older settlers 186
in Kuban, along the Don, in the Green Wedge along the Amur, etc. [191]
and it was a matter of perplexity as to what language they could be said to speak or what dialect in connection with later studies of the dialects of the Russian language. It was inadmissible to regard them as speaking a peasant dialect in view of the attitude of the authorities in recognizing some sort of Ukrainian, but it was even worse to believe that Ukrainian could exist in those regions and so they were simply passed over and forgotten, while the newcomers, usually being under some kind of a ban, were simply treated as Russian deportees.

Even this was not the whole story, for in such cities as Vinnytsya 661
during these same years[1] the population was slaughtered by the thousands and buried secretly in carefully hidden burial places which were then turned into parks and playgrounds to conceal the extent of the crimes. This was repeated in many places but the situation in Vinnytsya attracted especial attention because during the War, the Germans found the places of burial and revealed the thousands of bodies of the victims, many of whom had been buried alive. The extent of these massacres was as great as was the killing of the Polish officers in Katyn, which was likewise brought to light during the war.

By the time the census of 1939 was taken and this was the last 162
one published, the growth of the number of Russians and the diminution of Ukrainians showed clearly that there was a large scale transfer of nationality which completely reversed the figures in some sections of Asia without regard for the natural laws of reproduction and mortality.

In this atmosphere the nature of the intellectual and literary 626
work in the UkSSR can well be imagined. The Ukrainian scholars 814
were forced to accept the full Russian theories of the Ukrainian 661
past. This led to a complete revaluation of all the "outstanding figures." In 1933 the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was condemned on the ground that he was a typical representative of the noble classes. By the outbreak of World War II he became a Rus-

1 [1936-1938 -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

separation. The Poles were Latin Catholics, while the Ukrainians, [162] ● though also in obedience to the Pope, were nearly all of the Greek 186 (i.e., Byzantine-Slavonic) rite. Consequently, it is not surprising 668* that the ranks of the clergy provided a large proportion of the 793 awakeners of Galician Ukrainian national feeling. Most prominent of such priests was Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi. He was the scion of a family which was counted among the Polish nobility, but he felt himself to be Ukrainian; his career embraced almost the entire span of Ukrainian nationalist activity, from the turn of the century to the close of the period covered in this study.[13]

The reasons why a Ukrainian nationalist movement arose 186 within the Russian Empire are not so obvious. By the beginning 668* of the twentieth century, the great bulk of prominent men of 177 Ukrainian ethnic origin appear to have been Russified in culture and feeling, even if they occasionally gave signs of remembering that there were different cultural elements in their family backgrounds.[14] That the Russian Empire could have carried out such a large-scale assimilation is a tribute to the degree to which it was supranational, avoiding the narrower concepts of ethno- 186 centrism. Although a strong current had set in since the sixties, 668* when N. T. Danilevskii's *Rossiia i Evropa* (Russia and Europe) heralded the advent of Pan-Slavism based on ethnic Russian hegemony, for many, especially for officials in the governing bureaucracy, the rule of the tsars remained an expression of the ecumenical tradition of empire, a "Third Rome," but one which

[13] See Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora, Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), and Il'ko Borschak (Elie Borschak—this author is better known by the French form of his name), *Un Prèlat Ukrainien: Le Metropolite Cheptyckyj (1865–1944)* (Paris: Editions Franco-Ukrainiennes, 1946). The fact that the parish priests of the Greek Catholic rite were allowed to marry meant that their nationalist feeling could be passed on from generation to generation, a factor of considerable significance in providing a continuing body of bearers of the "national ideal."

[14] Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution.*

Two of the best Ukrainian sources for the period are Izaac Mazepa, *Ukraïna v ohni i buri revoliutsiï, 1917–1921* (The Ukraine in the Fire and Storm of the Revolution, 1917–21), 3 vols. (Munich: Prometei, 1950–51), and Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsiï: Istoriia ukraïns'koï revoliutsiï, marets', 1917 r.—hruden', 1919 r.* (The Rebirth of a Nation: A History of the Ukrainian Revolution, March, 1917–December, 1919), 3 vols. (Vienna, 1920).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668* It is uncertain just why Mariupol' was so different from the Donbas as a whole in the extent of nationalist activity. Very likely, as was so frequently the case, the presence of a few strongly nationalist and yet temperate and resourceful men was sufficient to turn the balance in a situation in which the vast majority was neither able nor willing to engage in political activity. Of course, the city was also under the comparatively lenient German army regime; it may well be that the army deliberately fostered a center of Ukrainian nationalist activity at this point, so close to the front, especially to the hard-fought Kerch Peninsula battlefield, in order that it might serve as a rallying point for Ukrainian feeling and a possible base for the development of a Ukrainian fighting force.

The Ukrainian nationalists have always claimed as Ukrainian ethnic territory large areas beyond the eastern frontiers of the Ukrainian SSR, principally the southern part of Kursk *oblast*, the area around Rostov on the lower Don, the Crimea, and the Kuban' river valley. As far as the Kursk area is concerned, the war period yields no evidence, for the district was almost constantly a battlefield between the Red Army and the Germans. One clear indication concerning the Rostov district is the report cited in the preceding chapter of the Ukrainian speech but lack of nationalist feeling among the peasantry.[76] Another report by a nationalist Ukrainian confirms this, saying that 90 percent of the children spoke Ukrainian, but most of the older people spoke Russian habitually, and there was very little national feeling.[77]

[162] In 1941 Ukrainians comprised only a small proportion of the population of the Crimea. The Ukrainian nationalist claim to the peninsula was based primarily on geographical proximity and the lack of any clear majority for another ethnic group, since the prewar Crimea also had large numbers of Russians and Tatars, as well as smaller settlements of Italians, Greeks, and Germans. Hence it is not surprising that in 1942 the capital, Simferopol', should have had a Russian rather than a Ukrainian

[76] See Chapter X.
[77] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 18, 1942, p. 2.

162 The population on the whole of this territory[1] reaches about 43,000,000 inhabitants of which there are:

In the Soviet Ukraine . .	33,500,000
In the Polish part . . .	8,000,000
In the Rumanian part . .	900,000
In the Hungarian part . .	600,000

The average density of this population is about the same as that of France, being 70·6 inhabitants per square kilometre and varying between 45 and 100 inhabitants per square kilometre in different regions, the density being a little less than that of Poland (85) and a little greater than that of Rumania and Jugoslavia (48).

If one accepts the figures of official Polish and Soviet statistics, one can estimate that of this population of 43,000,000, 36,000,000 are Ukrainians and the rest Polish, Great-Russian, White-Russian, Jewish, Moldavian, German, Hungarian, and other minorities and small groups scattered throughout the territory.

These figures are, moreover, almost exactly confirmed by the religion of the population: 85 per cent are Orthodox or Catholics of the Eastern rite, of which all without exception are Ukrainians.

000 It is obvious that, owing to its size and its population, the Soviet Ukraine is far more important than the other parts of the Ukraine. Its economic potential is proportionately still greater, which forces us to allot it a predominant place in that part of the book which will deal with the economic geography of the Ukraine.

1/n [see category 116, p. 25--- Analyst]

161 population in the two zones, the character and origin of this density are not the same.

162 361 The density in Zone 1 is characterized by an agrarian over-population, resulting from a long feudal period and the servitude of the lands. The population is concentrated there in a large number of hamlets, in small towns and in small villages, the inhabitants adding to their agricultural revenues those of artisans, of small commerce, and of small industries.

There is almost a complete absence of large towns. Actually the whole of Zone 1 within Soviet boundaries, contains only one town whose population exceeds 100,000—Kiev, the administrative capital of the Ukraine (625,000 inhabitants).

Even if one adds Polish Galicia to this territory, as it is wholly part of Zone 1 we find only one other big town—Lvov, with 325,000 inhabitants, an administrative and cultural centre.

In Zone 2 on the contrary, we find three big towns: Kharkov (650,000 inhabitants), Odessa (550,000 inhabitants), and Dniepropetrovsk (375,000 inhabitants).

Apart from these three large towns, Zone 2 possesses a further four towns whose population exceeds 100,000: Nicolaiev, Mariupol, Zaporojie, and Lougansk.

The greater part of Zone 2 is a land of recent colonization. It is the New Russia and the free Ukraine, colonized during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Great Russian and Ukrainian elements.

The agricultural population is of a lesser density, and if the average number which expresses it is the same for the whole territory as for Zone 1 this is only a result of the greater number of large towns.

162 It would not be useless to point out that before the last war Odessa with her 700,000 inhabitants was the largest town of the Ukraine. But since the beginning

[see category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

of the Soviet regime and the quasi-disappearance of the export of cereals and the importation of coal and of colonial products, Odessa has given up its place to Kharkov and then to Kiev, the first an industrial centre and the second an administrative one. 162

On the whole territory of the Ukraine 25·5 million human beings live in the country and obtain their means of existence from agriculture and allied trades and only 8,000,000 live in towns.

The latter thus form 24 per cent of the population, representing 19 per cent in Zone 1 and 27 per cent in Zone 2.

The principal occupations of these 8,000,000 town-dwellers are the following: workers, 6·5 million; military, officials, and free professions, 1 million; artisans, ½ million. As these figures are taken from Soviet statistics, the professions of traders, industrialists, and people of independent means are not represented.

It is interesting to note that of the 8,000,000 town-dwellers, 70 per cent are not Ukrainians but national minorities, which are less numerous in the country-side. Nevertheless their average proportion is much greater in Zone 2 where it sometimes reaches 40 per cent, as, for example, in the district of Odessa, and nearly 50 per cent in the Donietz basin.

The natural outlet for the surplus agrarian population of Zone 1 seems to be the great industrial centres such as the oil basin of the Donietz and the mines of Krivoi-Rog, where the landless peasants can find work. And yet the majority of the working mass has come from districts outside the Ukraine, whereas many of the farmers of these regions have emigrated to Eastern Siberia, where they have founded whole villages. Others have gone to the United States or to Canada, where they have founded prosperous agricultural communities. 167

[See category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

361 It seems to us opportune to give an idea of the Ukraine by describing the urban populations which are, from the point of view of European town life, to a great extent among the best organized Russian towns.

The most European town is Odessa. Founded at the end of the eighteenth century, it has broad and straight avenues and streets bordered by plane trees and acacias and built according to a plan, very well paved, with the most perfect modern drainage systems, with very comfortable houses, and finally with its port which is constructed in accordance with the technically most advanced principles. Odessa can easily compete with the great European towns of the same importance. It is curious that the first governors of Odessa, who have done much for the embellishment of the town, were two French *émigrés*, the Duc de Richelieu and the Comte de Langeron, whose names have been given to two [874] important streets. The University of Odessa, called that of New Russia, has been the cultural centre not only of the southern region of the Ukraine but it also attracted the young people of the Crimea and the Caucasus. Its great commercial activity, its external night life, and its [162] cosmopolitan population, having 43 per cent Jews, 42 per cent Russians (Great Russians and Ukrainians), 6 per cent Greeks, 3 per cent Germans, 2 per cent Poles, 3 per cent Italians, Armenians, Georgians, Tartars, and others, gave it before the Revolution the appearance of a Mediterranean city.

Kharkov, also a University town, is to-day a European city, but, unlike Odessa, it owes its modern appearance to the Soviet regime. During fifteen years it had been the capital of the Ukraine and it has taken advantage of this position by completely changing its appearance which, before the last war, was very poor.

Kiev is a picturesque town lying on the hills of the right bank of the Dnieper. It is undoubtedly the most

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

attractive town not only of the Ukraine but of the whole 361
of Russia. Its magnificent public gardens amaze the visitors. It is excelled by Odessa from the point of view of town organization but excels it by far from the æsthetic point of view. Its [2]University of St. Vladimir and its [874]
Polytechnic School enjoyed a great reputation in Russia.

Among the other towns with a European appearance one can mention Nicolaiev, the port at the mouth of the Boug; Vinnitza, the capital of Podolia, and to-day perhaps Dniepropetrovsk, which has the School of Mines, founded some years before the Great War. These cities have modern public buildings, up-to-date railway stations, good networks of tramways, etc.

In the domain of the organization and the appearance of the towns and the houses, the difference between Zone 1 and 2[2] is great. In Zone 1 the country-side is better organized and possesses better roads, while the telephone system had appeared there before the last war, etc. On the other hand the towns which, as we have already shown, are almost all small, can hardly be called such at all.

The towns of Zone 2[2] are new towns which have had the benefit of modern organization, while the country-side still has a colonial appearance, without roads, with numerous isolated hamlets and farms, far removed from each other.

Now a few words about the ethnical composition of 162
the population of the Ukraine. The most important 583
minorities living on Ukrainian territory are the following:

First of all the Great Russians; workers, officials, and some colonists in the eastern and southern parts, especially in the New Russia. Then the Jews, very numerous (about 2,500,000), almost all traders, artisans, or members of the free professions before the Revolution; to-day employees in commerce, in the State co-operatives

[2] [Kiev--Analyst]
[2] [see category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

162 where they represent 30 per cent of the employees,
563 artisans, and workers in heavy and light industry.

The Germans, mostly agriculturalists, very rich before the Revolution, are concentrated in the districts of Odessa, Kherson, and in Northern Taurida.

According to information from German sources, and especially according to articles which had recently appeared in *Deutschtum im Auslande*, the number of German colonists in these regions had been, in 1914, about 750,000, of whom only 50,000 to 60,000 inhabited the great towns. Before the Revolution 2,500,000 hectares belonged to them. It is after 1840 that German colonization became intensified in the New Russia. Originally the Imperial Government had granted 600,000 hectares of excellent land to the colonists. Thanks to their labour and to the favourable economic conditions after 1840 and right up to 1914, the German colonists were able to acquire nearly 2,000,000 hectares at the expense of private owners descended from the nobility.

563 The German colonists always lived quite apart from the peasant community, enjoying a special legislation which granted them very important privileges in economic matters, especially in all that concerned the rights of succession. They had powerful economic organizations such as the Land Bank of Kherson (with a branch at Odessa) and numerous credit and trading co-operatives. In cultural and religious matters the German colonists also remained separated from their Ukrainian and Great Russian partners. Catholic and reformed parish schools were to be found in almost every German village, of whom some even possessed secondary schools and especially *Realschulen* based on the German schools of the same name, in which, though the general teaching was in Russian, German history and German geography had a predominant place.

is looked at by the majority of the Communist Party in Ukraine, 186
and here in Russia even more, as some sort of strategy, a diplomatic 668
game".

Rakovsky explained that, through the proclamation of the Soviet Union, Moscow had gained ten and twenty times more power in comparison with the previous state. Therefore Rakovsky demanded that the Government of the whole Union in Moscow should surrender 9/10 of its competence, and that this be transferred to the separate Soviet Republics. Together with the Commissar of the Interior of Soviet Ukraine of that time, Skypnyk, Rakovsky demanded that the relations between Ukraine and Russia should be these of a confederation.

Skrypnyk protested at the Congress of the Russian CP against the disregard of the national and cultural rights of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army that led to a forced Russification of Ukrainians. He regretted that Ukrainian schools were not allowed for the 7 millions of Ukrainians in the Russian Soviet Republic, [162] ● outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Skrypnyk sharply criticised the nationalism of the Russian Communists in Ukraine who did not admit the Ukrainian language in public and Party institutions.

The Russian Communist N. Bukharin stated in a speech at the 12th Congress of the Party that the Communist organisation in Ukraine had a Russian-Jewish composition with a very small number of Ukrainians. And in the meantime, Bukharin said, — "in Ukraine there is a very strong national movement" (*Records of the 12th Congress of the Russian CP*).

However, the demands of those Communists who wished to re- 631
strict Russian centralism and enlarge the rights of the separate Soviet Republics did not attain a majority at the Congress of the Russian CP. In July 1923, the strictly centralist Constitution of the USSR was ratified. Besides the theoretical declaration of the equality of rights of nations and the 'right of separation' of the peoples from Russia this constitution actually concentrates all power in the hands of Moscow, so that the acts and orders of the 'All-Union Government' are valid even then if the separate Soviet Republics would protest against them.

The policy of Soviet Ukrainisation was limited mostly to those 186
institutions which had to deal with the peasants. But in the towns 665
and industrial centres the Russian Communists tried to prevent the admission of the Ukrainian language by every means. For this reason quarrels between Ukrainian and Russian Communists arose in the ranks of the Communist Party in Ukraine. Thus the Communist Alexander Shumsky, the Commissar of Education in

[In the year 1922 -- Analyst]

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under 162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation 423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the [517] Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Russian intellectuals. 186 After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist 631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. 167
had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest: to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czecho- 563
slovakia met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the 873
recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrainian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Economic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrainian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrainian emigration developed.

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin [815]
University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed a considerable activity.

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian 563
Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, 186
remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name of their enslaved brethren.

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western terri- 563
tories of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They 575
are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily *Svoboda*. The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton, Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will*. There are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools, from American and Canadian Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, far- [162
mers. The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about 1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest political organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Com- 563
munist Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the 525
means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian 668

132 49·3°. Drawbacks for agriculture in New Russia are the prevalence of north and east winds and an irregular and insufficient rainfall. The average rainfall at Yelisavetgrad is 17 in., at Odessa 16 in., at Lugansk 15 in., and at Nikolaev 14 in. The rains in April and May decide the harvest. June is the rainiest month, but from May to September there are droughts. Most places are largely dependent upon wells and ponds constructed in the ravines, which are frequent on the steppes.

The climate of the Ukraine, as a whole, is therefore continental, i. e. the variation between summer and winter temperatures is very great. Sudden variations of temperature are frequent. The rainfall is by no means abundant, and there is a progressive decline towards the south and south-east. The fact, however, that the bulk of the rainfall occurs in the summer favours agricultural operations, even where the annual amount of rainfall is comparatively low. It is only in New Russia that the country suffers seriously from drought.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

312 The Ukraine is very backward in regard to sanitary
364 conditions. Less than half the towns have a satisfactory water-supply, and a very small percentage of them a regular drainage system.

164 Typhoid, diphtheria, and malaria are very prevalent.
758 To the great majority of the people in the country, doctors are inaccessible, and even in the towns good hospitals and adequate medical attendance are very
515 rare. In the matter of cleanliness, however, the Little Russians compare favourably with the Great Russians.

(5) Race and Language

Race

162 The population of the Ukraine is composed of
563 a mixture of various races and nationalities, those chiefly represented being Little Russians, Poles, Jews,

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Germans, Moldavians, and Bulgarians. There are also a certain number of Cossacks, but these are of Little Russian origin. The large majority of the inhabitants of the Ukraine are Little Russians, as will be seen by the tables given below. The origin of the Little Russians and their precise relation to the other branches of the Slav family are still a matter of dispute, but it is possible that they are of purer stock than the Great Russians, though they have assimilated Polish and Tatar elements, while the Great Russians have been largely influenced by the Finns.

The *Poles* live chiefly in the western Ukraine, occupying the Governments of Volhynia and Podolia, and the Kiev and Berdichev districts in the Government of Kiev. The large estates are chiefly in their hands, and they are tenants of many others, while they also fill important positions in the sugar trade and in general carry much weight in the social and economic life of the western and central Ukraine. They are Roman Catholics.

The *Jews*, who form a most important commercial, industrial, and political group, are found in the Governments of Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev (except in the capital), Chernigov, Poltava, Kherson, Yekaterinoslav (except in Yalta), and Taurida. The town of Berdichev, in particular, is a Jewish stronghold. Many of the largest estates are mortgaged to the Jews, although they tend to live in the towns, where they succeed as good business men and middle men. Statistics for the Jewish population in the Ukraine given in the *Recueil de matériaux sur la situation économique des Israelites de Russie, d'après l'enquête de la 'Jewish Colonisation Association'*, 1908, do not show a large increase over the figures of 1897.

As regards the *Germans*, Swabian colonies have existed at Odessa since 1803, and the famous Liebental agricultural colony between the Dniester and the Black Sea was founded in 1812. Below the falls of the Dnieper and in Taurida there are Mennonite colonies from West and East Prussia. There are also German agriculturists

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

162 563 in Volhynia, who have done excellent work in draining the marshes. The Germans make their agriculture pay, and commercially they have penetrated to every town in the Ukraine. They also control many of the large estates and possess considerable financial influence. Their religion is Lutheran, Roman Catholic, or Mennonite. From a comparison of the table on p. 11 with figures for 1915 given by Dr. Max Friederichsen, it appears that the Germans in the Ukraine have decreased by about 50,000 since 1897. Many have emigrated to America; others have been assimilated.

There are many *Moldavians* engaged in agriculture in the districts of Tyraspol, Yelisavetgrad, Ananiev, and Kherson. They form 6 per cent. of the population in the Government of Kherson, and 0·2 per cent. in that of Yekaterinoslav. Their religion is Orthodox Greek, as is also that of the *Bulgarians*. The latter are to be found chiefly in the districts of Berdyansk, Melitopol, Tyraspol, and round Odessa, and make excellent farmers. Though they speak Bulgarian, most of them understand Russian.

The *Cossacks* are energetic farmers, and have extensive farms. In their methods they are far in advance of the ordinary Little or Great Russians.

Among other nationalities are some *Czechs* in southwest Volhynia, and a certain number of *White Russians*, chiefly in the northern part of the Government of Chernigov.

The following are the figures given by the official Russian census in 1897 for the different races in the governments composing the Ukraine:

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Government.	Total.	Little Russians.	Great Russians.	White Russians.	Jews.	Germans.	Moldavians.	Poles.	Bulgarians.
1. Volhynia . .	2,989,482	2,095,579 (i. e. 70 per cent. of total population)	104,889	3,794	394,774	171,331	—	184,161	—
2. Podolia . . .	3,018,299	2,442,819 (81 per cent.)	98,984	—	369,306	4,069	26,764	69,156	—
3. Kiev . . .	3,559,229	2,819,145 (80 per cent.)	209,427	5,389	430,489	14,707	—	68,791	—
4. Chernigov . .	2,297,854	1,526,072 (66 per cent.)	495,963	151,466	113,787	5,306	—	3,302	—
5. Poltava . . .	2,778,151	2,583,133 (93 per cent.)	72,941	—	110,352	4,579	—	3,891	—
6. Kharkov . .	2,492,316	2,009,411 (81 per cent.)	440,936	10,258	12,650	9,080	—	5,910	—
7. Yekaterinoslav .	2,113,674	1,456,369 (69 per cent.)	364,974	14,052	99,152	80,979	9,175	12,365	—
8. Kherson (rural) .	2,733,612	1,462,039 (54 per cent.)	575,375	22,958	322,537	123,453	147,218	30,894	25,685
Odessa . . .	403,815	37,925 (9 per cent.)	198,233	1,267	124,511	10,248	488	17,395	600
9. Taurida [1] . .	1,447,790	611,121 (42 per cent.)	404,463	9,726	55,418	78,305	—	10,112	41,260

[1] The Little Russians only claim the mainland of the Government of Taurida. Allowing a third of the population in 1897 to represent residents in Taurida without the Crimea (which is an under-estimate), a total of about 22,867,000 is reached for the population in the whole of the Ukraine. Out of this total the Little Russians in the Ukraine amounted in 1897 to 17,043,613 or 74 per cent.

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casus, and 304,261 in parts of the old Governments of Lublin and Syedlets (now incorporated in the single Government of Choĭm). Thus in 1897 there was in European Russia a grand total of at least 21,692,766 Little Russians. 161

Austria and Hungary also contain considerable numbers of Little Russians, or as they are often called in these parts, Ruthenians. Official figures of 1910 give 3,208,092 in Galicia, 305,101 in the Bukovina, and 472,587 in certain north-eastern counties in Hungary, i. e. a total of 3,985,780 Little Russians.

Accurate statistics for the full, up-to-date total of Little Russians are not available. Reliable German figures estimate the present total of Little Russians as at least 30,000,000, which is also borne out by unofficial Little Russian and Polish figures. 161

Language

The whole language question has been somewhat exaggerated owing to its inevitable connexion with politics. It is asserted by many that Little Russian is a separate language from Great Russian, though on the other hand many declare that it is only a dialect. It should be noted that in 1905 the Petrograd Academy of Science recognized the value of the study of the Ukraine dialect. 197

(6) Population[1]

Distribution and Density

The *Russian Year Book* for 1916 gives the following estimate for the total population in the towns and in the country respectively on January 1, 1913: 162

Government.	*Town Population.*	*Country Population.*
Volhynia	293,300	3,777,200
Podolia	308,900	3,646,400
Kiev	744,500	3,919,100
Chernigov	321,100	2,787,700

[1] See also Appendix I, p.

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Government.	Town Population.	Country Population.
Poltava	363,500	3,352,900
Kharkov	516,200	2,851,500
Yekaterinoslav	406,500	2,883,600
Kherson	1,017,500	2,592,800
Taurida (with the Crimea)	447,200	1,559,300

It is apparent from these figures that a large proportion of the population of the Ukraine is still engaged in agricultural pursuits.

161 Many parts of the Ukraine are very thickly populated. The most densely populated Governments are as follows: Podolia, 243; Kiev, 236; Poltava, 192; Chernigov, 154; Kharkov, 160; Volhynia, 146; Yekaterinoslav, 135; and Kherson, 132 persons per square mile.

Movement.

163 165 The population of the Ukraine increases more steadily than that of Great Russia. The following figures are given by the official statistical annual (1914) for the year 1912:

	Births. total.	Births. per 1,000.	Deaths. total.	Deaths. per 1,000.	Increase. per 1,000.
Volhynia	154,685	39·0	72,287	18·1	20·9
Podolia	145,401	37·4	73,254	18·9	18·5
Kiev	182,024	39·3	92,109	19·9	19·4
Chernigov	116,411	37·8	59,972	19·5	18·3
Poltava	136,951	37·3	64,801	17·6	19·7
Kharkov	151,064	45·4	73,349	22·0	23·4
Yekaterinoslav	159,233	49·5	72,995	22·7	26·8
Kherson	157,622	44·4	92,227	26·0	18·4
Taurida	85,913	43·7	44,080	22·4	21·3

165 The average mortality is lower in the towns than in the country, owing to the fact that the more robust elements of the population are attracted to the towns, leaving the old men, women, and children behind.

165 758 Infant mortality is often as high as 50 per cent.; this is due to ignorance, insufficient feeding, and the fact that mothers return to work in the fields or factories within a few days of child-birth. The imperfect system of medical aid prevents many cases of births and deaths from ever being officially reported.

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frontier. After the proclamation of religious toleration in 1905, about 200,000 Ukrainians immediately declared themselves Uniats, so that the Russian Government soon found it necessary to restrict the scope of the proclamation. Though the Uniats in Russia were forbidden to join the Catholic Church, many of them became Catholics or sectaries. The last Russian persecution of the Uniat Church took place during the Russian occupation of Galicia in 1915, when the Russian bishop, Eulogius, started a regular campaign to replace Uniat priests by Orthodox clergy, and Uniat Ukrainian by Russian Orthodox schools. Many Uniat priests were banished to Siberia; and the Uniat Metropolitan, Szeptycki, was exiled to a Russian monastic prison. It is uncertain whether the Uniat Church has been gaining ground outside the provinces of Choĭm and Polesia. As no statistics have been taken in Russia since the decree of religious toleration in 1905, it is difficult to give a correct estimate of the number of members of the Russian Orthodox Church, but their percentage varies from 75 to 93 in the various Governments of the Russian Ukraine. The Great-Russian sect of the *Raskolniki* (Old Believers) found refuge in the Governments of Kharkov (0·1 per cent. of the population) and Chernigov (0·9 per cent.).

The number of Roman Catholics, chiefly Poles, is higher in the west (in Volhynia the Poles in 1897 formed 6·16 per cent. of the population), but they are only slightly more numerous than the Lutheran Protestants (in Volhynia 5·73 of the population), who are German colonists.

Of great social importance are the peasant sects, of which the chief in the Ukraine is the *Shtunda* (from *Stunde*, since they gather at a definite hour). The doctrines of this Lutheran sect, which originated in Württemberg in 1705, were brought to South Russia by the Württemberg merchants, as the Danzig merchants, who came here after the partitions of Poland, brought with them the teaching of the Mennonite sect. Since 1870 it has been oppressed officially by the Russian

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the Ukraine were mostly of the 'seminarist' type and often of Ukrainian nationality, and hence of peasant descent. In the Ukraine the secular clergy were, if anything, more popular than the monastic.

(*b*) *Jews.*—Next in number to the Orthodox are the Jews. Records make it clear that since the seventeenth century the Ukraine has been the centre of the Jewish 'pogrom' movement, and is more anti-Semitic than any other East-European country. A Hebrew-Jewish scholar, Nathan of Zaslavl, has left a document[1] containing the record of terrible atrocities perpetrated by the Ukrainians and Cossacks on the Jews during the Cossacks' War against Poland. The 'pogroms' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may appear less cruel; but, though they were organized by the Russian secret police, it has been proved in the law-courts that the local population was quite ready to fall in with the suggestions of these agents.[2] The reasons for this hatred are partly economic—for the Jews are very successful middlemen between the Ukraine and other countries, and hence in possession of capital, which they lend at a high rate to the peasant—but are also racial, since the hatred between these two races is stronger than that between either Poles or Great Russians and the Jews. All the traditions of the steppe-country peasant are opposed to those of the Jewish townsman. This is shown by the facts that there is hardly any mixed Jewish-Ukrainian population, and that the Jews live chiefly in the towns and industrial settlements where Russians and Poles predominate. The Jews came to the Ukraine on the first wave of colonization from Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

According to data obtained in 1897, the percentage of the Jewish population in the Governments of the Ukraine was as follows: Volhynia, 13·2 per cent.; Podolia, 12·24 per cent.; Kiev, 12·09 per cent.; Kherson, 12 per cent.; Chernigov, 5 per cent.;

[1] *Jawein Mesula: a Chronicle of Events from 1648 to 1652.* First printed in Vienna, 1656.

[2] I. Luchitski, *Legal Speeches concerning the Jewish Pogroms*, Kiev, 1908 (in Russian).

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Yekaterinoslav, 5 per cent.; Poltava, 4 per cent.; Taurida, 4 per cent.; Kharkov, 0·5 per cent. only.

Like the Orthodox Church, the Jewish community has its sects. There are two such sects in the Ukraine; and their members exercise a great moral influence, and form a bridge between the Turkish and Jewish populations of the Ukraine. They are called Karaimy and Krymchaki, and live chiefly in the towns of the Taurida and Kherson Governments. They number about 12,000. These people, using mostly Tatar dialects, are supposed to be descendants of Jewish pre-Christian colonies in the Crimea and the Turkic Khazars of the Middle Ages, who were of Jewish faith. The Karaimy disapprove of the Talmud, and base all their beliefs on the Law of Moses. They differ from other Jewish communities in their cleanliness, their absolute honesty in business, and their great sense of social duties. Hence their wealth is evenly distributed in their communities.

(c) *Mohammedans.*—The largest Mohammedan colony is found in the Taurida government (187,940, or 13 per cent.), but their schools are less efficient and their culture is much lower than that of the Mohammedans of the Volga or of Turkestan.

(B) Educational

The last census, taken in 1897,[1] gives the following figures:

Name of Government.	*Total population in 1,000's.*	*No. of literates in 1,000's.*	*Per cent. of literates.*
Podolia	3,018	450	14·5
Kharkov	2,492	384	15·4
Poltava	2,778	446	16·1
Volhynia	2,989	493	16·5
Kiev	3,559	598	16·8
Chernigov	2,298	402	17·5
Yekaterinoslav	2,114	433	20·5
Kherson	2,734	657	24·1
Taurida	1,448	380	26·2
	23,430	4,243	average 18·2

[1] From *The Ukrainian Movement as a Stage in South Russian Separatism*, Shchegolev (Kiev, 1912), p. 364.

565 of education, and in their occupations. The bulk
[162] (86·4 per cent.) of the Ukrainians are peasants and agriculturists. The percentage of people living in the country is in the Government of Kharkov, 85; in Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 88; Chernigov, 91; Taurida, 80; Kherson, 70. The percentage of peasants is almost the same, e. g. Kharkov, 90; Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 87; Chernigov, 86; Taurida, 73;
[163] Kherson, 61. The average increase in population is higher than in any other province in European Russia; consequently, though many peasants have become, during the last twenty-five years, workmen in the newly started industries, the general number of agricultural peasants remains unchanged.

421 *Land Tenure*[1].—While Great Russia is at present
428 a country of communal land-ownership (*mir*), in the
177 Ukraine or Little Russia individual or, strictly speaking, family ownership and communal ownership exist
[556] together (cf. p. 78). The *mir* in Great Russia appears to have been introduced in the sixteenth century, when the Moscow Government established serfdom and imposed heavy taxation, for it was easier to make the whole village responsible for the taxes than the separate families. However, in the north or, properly speaking, Novgorod Russ. the land, as a general rule, belonged to one large family or clan, composed of from two to six houses (the owners of which bore the same name), and called *pyechishche* (large stove). The ownership was hereditary, and hence the land became more and more subdivided, so that families owned more or less according to the number of children. There was no readjustment of the land as in the case of the *mir*. The *pyechishche* of Novgorod was known in Kiev-Russ as *ognishche* (meaning a large fire); and the term *ognishchanin* (meaning a member of the *ognishche*) is found in the Kiev law (*Russkaya*
428 *Pravda*). Connected with that form of tenure is a custom, which even now is found sometimes in the Ukraine, of minorate, according to which the younger

[1] See also p. 77.

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of Volhynia and Podolia conditions are better, and the peasants have larger holdings, though only 16 per cent. own above five *desyatines*; in Kharkov, 33 per cent. own above five *desyatines*. In no place do the Ukrainian peasants equal in land-ownership the German and Czech colonists. The average holding among the German colonists is from 10 to 12 *desyatines*, and they specialize in cattle-breeding. The Czechs are concentrated in south-western Volhynia (in the districts of Dubno, Rovno, and Lutsk); and their average holding is 13 *desyatines*. The peasants' holdings are in a striking contrast to the big estates. In the Kiev Government there are some 43 estates of above 5,000 *desyatines* each, mostly owned by the nobles (some of them descendants of the old independent dukes, *knaz*) of Russian, Polish, or German nationality. 421

About 10 per cent. of the inhabitants of the Governments of Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, Taurida, Kiev, and Chernigov are occupied in industries other than agricultural. Trade occupies between 6 and 7 per cent. of the population in the Governments of Kherson, Kiev, Podolia, and Taurida. 162

General Observations

Ukrainian Nationalism.—The feeling of nationality, as it exists to-day, dates from Chmielnicki's rising in 1648. The old history of Kiev-Russ is common to Great Russians, White Russians, and the Ukrainians (Little Russians), and has been continued after the Tatar invasions chiefly in Great Russia, while the Ukraine ever since has been subject to one of her neighbours. Since Chmielnicki's time, the Ukrainian nationality has made progress only in one direction, i.e. in producing a small but energetic *intelligentsia*, which does not consider itself Russian or Polish in addition to being Ukrainian, though it is obliged to seek its higher education in Russia, Poland, and other foreign countries. The national feeling of this class is 186 565

ideals of the *intelligentsia*, if the latter cannot provide them with the economic advantages to which they aspire. 186 565

The *Ukrainian territory* claimed by the propagandist literature, i. e. from San to Don, never formed a political unit, either independently or under the sway of any empire. It is a well-defined geographical unit with most favourable economic conditions, but the people living in these lands do not form a homogeneous nation of one linguistic, social, and cultural type. The essentially Ukrainian country lies on both sides of the Dnieper. In the Don and Kuban regions, the Ukrainian colonists were preceded by the Great-Russian colonists, in Eastern Galicia by the Poles. But it is true that during the time of the greatest Russian oppression Eastern Galicia played the part of Piedmont for the *intelligentsia* from the Russian Ukraine. The nine [162] Governments grouped by the Russian Administration into (1) South-west Territory (Podolia, Volhynia, and Kiev), (2) Malorossiya (Chernigov, Poltava, and Kharkov), and (3) Novorossiya (only Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav out of the five Governments of Novorossiya), have a population which is preponderantly Ukrainian in the rural districts; in the towns the Ukrainians are outnumbered by Jews, Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans, Italians, &c.

It is remarkable how small a part is played by the *intelligentsia* in industry and trade, in the Church, and in legal and educational institutions. All Ukrainians are agriculturists, but in most cases they are merely labourers, not concerned with the management of agricultural industries. Since 1905, however, the co-operative societies have brought to the Ukrainian peasant the social education which the *mir* gave to the Great-Russian peasant in the two last centuries. The claim, therefore, that these nine Governments are Ukrainian means that people speaking various Ukrainian dialects and having similar customs inhabit them, though, so far, they have not managed it politically, socially, or culturally, and are hardly likely to do 184 565

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

some of the others studied in mixed Ukrainian-Russian or Ukrainian-Jewish schools, they were "mechanically transferred" after the first four years to classes using Ukrainian.[66]

Zatonski, who replaced Skripnik as Commissar of Education, stated that the Ukrainization of Russian children had taken place in Kharkov and in the Don Basin as well as in Kiev; and he pointed to Krasnolutzki District, where the number of Russian schools had dropped from twenty in 1930 to twelve in 1932.[67] He also declared that in Kherson and Makiivitz there were no Russian elementary schools at all; and that in some places there had been a voluntary Ukrainization of Russian children because the buildings and equipment provided for the Russian schools were greatly inferior to those of the Ukrainian schools.[68] Additional evidence was forthcoming in 1934 and 1935 to show some enforced Ukrainization of Polish children and of those of other minorities, as well as of some of the Russian children; and this situation was denounced as an example of "deliberate nationalist wrecking."[69]

This campaign against over-Ukrainization, however, was not intended to lead to a revival of the Russification policy. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was adamant on this point. He explained in 1933 that the results of over-Ukrainization would have to be eliminated because this was demanded by internationalism, "by the brotherly interests of the toilers of all the nationalities in the Ukraine."[70] But, he went on, the Russian nationalists would not be allowed to take advantage of mistakes already committed in order to reverse the policy of Ukrainization; on the contrary, there would be a further drive for "Bolshevik Ukrainization." A similar view was taken in 1934 by Postishev, the assistant secretary of the Central Committee and the official most actively engaged in hunting down the Ukrainian nationalists.[71]

According to the latest available material, the Ukrainization of education has kept pace with the expansion of general education, and a greater proportion of pupils were studying in Ukrainian schools in 1937 than in 1927. By 1937 the general schools embraced 5,364,800 children as compared with 1,678,100 in 1913 — an increase of 319 percent over the pre-War year; and whereas twenty-two of every thousand people attended elementary school in the Kiev Educational District in 1912, in 1937 the figure for all of the Ukraine had risen to

[66] *Ibid.*, Mar. 29, 1933. [67] *Visti*, May 1, 1933. [68] *Ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1933.
[69] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1934 (speech of Zatonski); Aug. 22, 1934, Jan. 5, 1935.
[70] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1933. [71] *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1934.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine

one hundred seventeen of every thousand people.[72] The middle schools had expanded greatly by 1937; the fifth to tenth grades embraced 1,927,100 pupils in 1937 as compared with 347,900 pupils in 1928, an increase of 554 percent in ten years.[73]

While the school system was expanding quantitatively, the number of children studying in Ukrainian schools was also increasing. During the school year 1935–36, the year that marked the end of the campaign to check over-Ukrainization, 83.0 percent of the pupils in the general schools were studying in the Ukrainian language. This percentage coincides roughly with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. It also represents a higher percentage of pupils in Ukrainian schools than attended such schools in 1927, a fact which resulted from the expansion of middle schools in the rural areas and from the decline in the number of children attending schools in some of the other languages. During the school year 1935–36, 12.7 percent of all the pupils in the general schools studied in Russian, 1.4 percent in Jewish, 1.3 percent in German, 0.5 percent in Moldavian and 0.5 percent in Polish schools.[74] In absolute numbers, there had been an increase between 1927 and 1935–36 in the pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Greek languages; there had been a decline in the number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Swedish and Assyrian languages; and schools had been established for Uzbeks, Belorussians, Kirghiz, Kazaks, Turkomens and Latvians.[75]

With regard to the technical and higher educational institutions, the author has no figures on the number of students in the Ukrainized

[72] The figure for the number of pupils in 1937 is taken from *Sociizlističeskoe Stroitelstvo Sojuza S.S.S.R., 1933–1938* gg. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1939), p. 163.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[74] *Socialistična Ukraina. Statistični Zbirnik* (Kiev, 1937), p. 222.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 222. *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–26. A comparison of absolute figures for 1927 and 1935–36 must take into account that the statistics for 1927 gave the total number of pupils in mixed schools but not the number studying in various languages used in these schools. The number of pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Czech languages in 1935–36 was greater than the number studying in their own schools in 1927 plus the total number in mixed schools using these languages for some classes. The conclusion that there was a decline in the total number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Assyrian and Swedish languages is arrived at by considering roughly the number of pupils in mixed schools studying in these languages. For example, in 1927 there were 68,836 pupils in Jewish schools; in 1935–36 there were 69,211 pupils studying in the Jewish language; hence, there were 375 more pupils *studying in Jewish* in 1935–36 than had been *attending Jewish schools* in 1927. But in 1927 there were 11,603 pupils in mixed schools using Jewish and either Russian or Ukrainian; in all probability there were more than 375 pupils in these schools who were being taught in Jewish; and by 1935–36 the surplus above 375 had been lost to Jewish classes, indicating a decline in the total number studying in Jewish.

11: Obermaier RD1 Ukraine RD1
●162

[For Magyar denationalization of the Boyki and Huzul Ukrainian tribes, see category 116, page 6]

11: Obermaier RD1 Ukraine RD1
●162

[For statistics on Ukrainians living outside the Ukrainian frontiers, see category 116, pp. 199 and 202]

131 further that the boundaries of the Ukrainian nation may be divided into southern boundaries (Black Sea and Caucasus), southwest boundaries (Rumanians and Magyars), western boundaries (Slovaks and Poles), northern boundaries (White Russians and Russians) and eastern boundaries (peoples of the Don and the Caucasus). For these scholars Ukraine is the southern part of the vast Sarmatian lowland between the Carpathian arc, the Finnish highland, the Urals and the Caucasus. They certainly go to great pains to reduce to a common denominator the censuses of the various states in which the Ukrainians have been forced to live. They have added up the square kilometers of all Ukrainian countries and the people living in them, and have reached the following maximal result for 1933: (3)

•162 3. Kubyievych: The Distribution of Population in the Ukraine, page 6.

Ukrainian provinces on January 1, 1933 within the states:	Surface in 1000 sq. kilometers	Surface area of total Ukrainian territory in percentage	Inhabitants in 1000	Proportion of inhabitants of total Ukrainian populated area in percentage
Soviet Union.....	773.4	82.4	43,658	79.6
Poland.....	132.2	14.1	9,198	16.8
Rumania.....	17.6	1.9	1,258	2.3
Czechoslovakia.	14.9	1.6	746	1.3
	938.1	100.0	54,860	100.0

The maximal result means that the Ukrainians in /62 these maximal boundaries have partly an absolute, partly a relative majority. The Ukrainians have an absolute majority in a total of 718,300 square kilometers on which there are 47,657 million inhabitants. (4)

4. Kubyievych: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 19.

Within the wider boundaries there are 30.2% foreign minorities, and in the narrower boundaries, 24.7%. (5)

5. Kubyievych: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 305 ff.

In 1933 there was a total of 43,360,000 Ukrainians throughout the world; of these 34.43 million were in the Soviet Union, 5.87 million in Poland, 1.1 million in Rumania (including Bessarabia and Bukovina), and 590,000 in Czechoslovakia. The remainder were Ukrainians living outside the country. (6) According to the well-known Ukrainian (101)

6. Ibid., page 325.

geographer Kubyievych, the Ukrainian racial /11/ boundary is difficult to determine in the eastern part of the Caucasian foreland where, besides Ukrainians, there are also Russian and Caucasian peoples, and on the northern boundary, where in the region of Chernigov the question is disputed as to whether the inhabitants are Ukrainians, Russians or White Russians. If we distribute the /61 54,870,000 inhabitants of the entire Ukrainian settled area over the 938,000 square kilometers of surface, 58.5 souls accrue to one square kilometer, while the number is 67.3 if we do not include the thinly populated mixed area of the eastern

11: Obermaier--94 J-3(no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Galicia] [Volhynia] European Jews E14

U 563 are found in the villages and cities, everywhere except at hard peasant labor. As early as 1900, E.J. 162 74% of all Jews earning a livelihood in Russia, Poland and Galicia were in commerce, in the credit system, in crafts and in industry. In 1931 there U [463] were 158,400 Jews living in villages in East Galicia alone, that is 3% of the people living in the country; in the cities, on the other hand, there were 454,900 Jews or 37.3% of the urban population. (51) In 1929 the various trades were

51. Seraphim, Jewry in East European Area, p. 340.

50% in the hands of Jews, and in Volhynia a total of 73% of all tailors, shoemakers, tanners, bakers, furriers, blacksmiths, watchmakers and other artisans were Jews.

U 563 In spite of the fact that the Ukrainians lived in such close proximity to Jews, they kept their cultural life free of Jewish influence and their race free from Jewish blood.

*

U 476 "More important than selling and profit is the community which has become happy and morally strong as a result of proper training by means of cooperative work and self-aid." These words were not, as might be supposed, spoken at a major assembly of German cooperatives; they were coined at Lwów by the head of the Ukrainian cooperatives. They were addressed to the West Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian cooperatives were of unusual national significance; they improved the wretched condition of the peasants and educated the latter to think in terms of the common welfare; and they offered to Ukrainian intelligentsia a real, albeit meager possibility of existence. How can condi- U 162 tions in the country be anything but miserable if 60% of the peasants own dwarf farms with less than

•162 five hectares of land, if overpopulation is so great that in 49% of the country there are between 80 and 100 /93/ people and in 51% there are more than 100 persons per square kilometer. (52)

52. Kubiyovich: The Distribution of the Population, page 35.

476 The ideological center of the Ukrainian cooperative system was the "Revised Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives" with its center in Lwów. At the beginning of 1939 it controlled the four departmental provincial centers with a total of 3455 cooperatives and 673,000 members. The four departmental centers were the "Centrobanka" for credit cooperatives (1889 members at the end of 1938, with an annual sale of 70.5 million zloty); the "Centrosoyuz" for the agricultural buying and selling cooperatives, the "Maslosoyuz" for dairy farmers' cooperatives and the "Narodnya Torgovlia" for urban consumer societies. The private capital of the Revised Union amounted to 23 million zloty at the end of 1938, the savings came to over 12 million zloty. The sales receipts of all cooperatives amounted to 159 million zloty.

One is almost tempted to speak of a "Ukrainian autarchy" if one hears how much business the buying and selling cooperatives carried on. Galicia and [241] particularly Podolia with its rich black earth and sheltered valleys is rich in fruit, vegetables, legumes, hemp, grain. Cattle-raising is also [233] intensively carried on, especially in the Carpathian foreland. The peasant brought all these products to the cooperative which was ready to serve him and not to profit by him. The cooperatives maintained collection and sorting centers where the products were turned into "standardized" goods. The same cooperative furnished practically everything a farm household needed: shoes, chicory, sugar, kerosene, headgear, candles, seeds, artificial fertilizer and machines. Much of it

/141/ Hunger Overcomes Resistance

178 Bolshevism tore the Ukrainians away from their past and hurled them, as it were, into a dark, unknown future. They were thrown from one extreme into the other, not only with regard to religion, but also in a social, economic and political respect. They were thrown from unlimited individualism into a society where all are supposed to be equal.

When Bolshevik slogans spread through the Ukrainian villages there was a great deal that was
423 ripe for oblivion. Czarist Moscow, the great princes of the Church and the wealthy gentry had exerted themselves precisely to keep the populace in a state of ignorance and to prevent any kind of enlightenment. The masses were thus more tractable and the existing order was not endangered. Nevertheless, with thrift and industry the peasants had succeeded in considerably enlarging their land after serfdom was abolished in 1861, to the detriment of the landed proprietors. In 1861 the
[162] peasants owned 45.7% of 48.1 million hectares, in 1916 they owned 65%. (84) The rest was the property of the lords of the manor, the church and the state.

84. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 360.

423 With the rapid increase in population there
241 was a great land shortage, especially in North Ukraine, even after the distribution of land in 1861. Conditions had not improved much since 1830, when the representative of the nobility of the Poltava district reported in the Senate that in his district "there was a perceptible shortage of land and dire poverty". (85) In Podolia,

85. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of South Ukraine, page 32.

474 the inventory of goods, buildings and land are likewise property of the community, but the agricultural products are distributed on a share basis according to work performed, after expenses and reserves have been deducted. In contrast to the commune, the farm produce consumed by the family and the family's household economy are private. Nominally the farmer is co-owner of the kolhosp which the law describes as "agricultural common property on a cooperative basis". The rights and privileges of the farmer who has "voluntarily" joined are set forth in the statute. No compensation is paid for agricultural property brought in by the individual farm. If a farmer withdraws from the kolhosp, what he has brought in is not returned to him, but he can demand an allowance which, however, is very small and in no wise corresponds to the actual value.

162 Of the total of 44.5 million hectares of land in the Soviet Republic in 1938, 29.7 million hectares fell to the kolhosp, 1.8 million to the separate property of the kolhosp farmers, /Facing
439 page 152/ /Map X: Export of Coal and Sugar from Soviet Ukraine. (Average 1927/1928). The Ukrainian supply to the Great Russian areas of coal and sugar shows a similar development as the distribution of grain. In these products, too, export to foreign countries was small./ /153/ 1.5 million hectares to individual non-collective farmers, 4.2 million hectares to Soviet farms and 7.3 million hectares to other properties. (97)

97. Deminsky: "The Economy of the Ukraine" in Deutsche Berufserziehung, No. 15 and 16, p. 135.

414 From a practical point of view the kolhosp represents a large estate whose land lies round about the estate. All the members of the commune are the estate owners. Since the kolhosps are forbidden to employ outside manpower, a stranger cannot

369 always belonged to the countries of the world that have the least number of cities. In 1897 only 3% of the population of the entire Ukraine lived in large cities, and as late as 1926, only 6.7%. In 1931 Greater Ukraine had 12 cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. In the almost thirty years between 1897 and 1926 the village population increased by 41.5% and the urban population, also as a result of immigration, of course, by
• 162 85.4%. (108) The natural increase of the Ukrain-

108. Kubiyovich: Distribution of the Population in the Ukraine, page 30.

ian population belongs to the largest of Europe, in fact is often the largest. True, mortality is high - about 20 deaths annually per 1000 inhabitants -, but /166/ the birth rate is still essentially higher - about 40 births annually per 1000 inhabitants. The lowest population surplus is shown in densely populated Galicia with 11.5 per thousand, and Carpatho-Ukraine with 16.1 per thousand. In 1927 the natural increase in Soviet Ukraine amounted to 22.5 per thousand and in the Crimea to 26.8 per thousand. (109)

109. Kubiyovich: Distribution of the Population in the Ukraine, page 26.

369 The new period of growth of the Ukrainian cities, however, is limited to the Central Ukrainian industrial areas and the Donets Basin. The West Ukrainian cities are unsuitable for industrialization on account of the proximity of the border and the lack of larger power sources. Besides, traffic communications are extremely inadequate. These cities even decreased in population, just like the seaports, where today commerce and export
369 support fewer people than before the First World
162 War. During the first Five Year Plan the urban

369 162 population in the right-bank section of Soviet Ukraine decreased by 4.2%, whereas in the left-bank section it increased by 44%, in the Donets region alone by 93.5%. (110) Kiyev which was

110. Kubiyovich: Distribution of the Population in the Ukraine, page 32.

the quiet city of scholars and monasteries before the First World War shows 846,000 inhabitants according to the census of 1939; Khar'kov, the industrial and barracks city with its over-sized ostentatious buildings and skyscrapers shows 833,000; Odessa, where before the First World War 620,000 people lived and in 1923 324,000, houses 604,000 people in 1939. This seaport which was built by Catherine II suffered most in the famine of 1920.

According to the census of January 17, 1939 the entire population of Soviet Ukraine amounted to 30,960,221 souls, of whom about 19,764,000 lived in villages and about 11,195,000 in towns. In the census of 1926 the proportion of the urban population was 16.5%, whereas in 1939 it was said to be about 36%. According to these figures, Soviet Ukraine has, in the space of 13 years, changed from an agricultural country to a decidedly industrial country. Such a revolutionary process taking place within such a brief period, should be considered as out of the question, for similar developments in /167/ the central and western European countries took many decades under more favorable conditions. In order to be convinced of this analogy between Soviet Ukrainian urban development with that of Central Europe, one would have to be more familiar with the basic principles of Muscovite statisticians. For example, one might find an explanation for such an inorganic growth of the urban population in the fact that all settlements of over 2000 inhabitants

369 were counted as towns, whereas in former times
•162 even the huge peasant villages of 30,000 and 40,000 inhabitants were placed in the category of villages.

The result of the new census becomes particularly interesting if one brings in for comparison the Statistique de la population de l'Oukraine contemporaine published in 1929 by the statistical office of the Soviet Ukraine in Khar'kov in both Ukrainian and French. In this publication the population figure on January 1, 1929 is given as 30,363,547. According to that, the population of Soviet Ukraine increased from January 1, 1929 to January 17, 1939 by only 596,674 souls. From the beginning of the Five Year Plan period, however, the normal annual increase amounted to 600,000 souls, according to the birth surplus of 20 per thousand; this would be 6 millions in 10 years. Thus the population decreased by about 5.4 million souls from 1929 to 1939. In an evaluation of these results we must keep in mind the fact that since 1936 abortions have been punishable by 10 years imprisonment, and that a large immigration of Russian and Far Eastern elements has taken place, which was particularly promoted by Moscow.

162 No less serious than these factors is the
167 decrease of village population since 1926 by 4.41 million souls. Even if the largest part of these 4.41 million village inhabitants should be counted city dwellers, the decrease thus being only apparent, what has happened to the increase of the peasant population? The census of 1939 reveals the silent tragedy of the "dead frontier", the strip of land about 50 kilometers wide /168/ at the former Rumanian and Polish boundary, which had to be cleared of Ukrainian inhabitants. It betrays the famine from 1931 to 1933, the exiles
167 to the frosty North and the dislodgments. On this point the Komsomolets Ukrayiny of May 21 and 22, 1939 wrote that the Ukrainians were being

167 sent as farmers to the Far East and to Kazakstan, and as laborers to the construction of the railway lines Donets Basin-Moscow and Akmolinsk-Kartaly. The railway Akmolinsk-Kartaly crossed the desert of Kazakstan in an 806 kilometer stretch. The Visti of June 3, 1939 complete this picture when they write: "The Soviet Ukraine annually furnishes the newly-arisen industrial centers in the other Soviet Republics with hundreds of thousands of laborers. At Magnitogorsk, Kutsbas, in the Far East and on the Turkish Railway there are thousands of construction workers who come from all different parts of the Ukraine."

369 This policy of splitting up the Ukrainian people must in the long run have all the more fateful consequences since the cities in the Ukraine are primarily in foreign hands. "The Ukrainian people remained peasants and villagers; they left their cities in the hands of foreigners, Russians, Jews, Germans, Poles." This was the complaint even before the First World War of the Ukrainian geographer Rudnitskyj: (111) The Ukrain-

111. Rudnitskyj: ibid., page 162.

ian peasant son did not want to go to the city where people spoke in foreign tongues. Village tranquility and quiet romanticism he recaptured only in the country. And thus the Ukrainian peasant youth wandered by the hundreds of thousands to the Kuban, the Volga, to Siberia and yonder to the shores of the Pacific Ocean in order to colonize new land there, while foreigners took possession of the Ukrainian cities. The result was
162 369 that from 1926 to 1931 in the cities of all Ukrainian provinces there were 38.8 Ukrainians per 100 inhabitants, 28.1 Russians, 21.6 Jews, 6.9 Poles, 0.8 Germans and 3.8 of other nationalities. (112)

112. Kubiyovich: Georgraphy of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 307 and 308.

11: Obermaier--181 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

In 1926 there were 42.1% Ukrainians in Kiyev, 38.3% in Khar'kov, 17.4% in Odessa, /Facing page 168/ /Map XII: Balance of Trade in the Soviet Ukraine. The diagrams on this page permit a comparison of import and export during the periods before and after the First World War. Note the decrease of exports in agricultural products and the increase of industrial exports/ /Captions:/

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Diagram of
Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union in
1909/11, 1913 and 1934
(in million rubles)

1.
Export, of this trade with Russia
/In circle marked 795:/
Grain 222
Metal and metal goods 90
Products of animal husbandry 56
Other produces 28
Other agricultural products 399

2.
Import
/In circle marked 472:/
Metals and machines 34.5
Naphtha products 33.5
Groceries 33
Leather & leather goods 31
Fish 29
Wood products 17
Other products 17
Other finished products 217

3. Export
/In circle marked 744:/
Grain 235
Metals & crude metals 116
Products of animal husbandry 53
Coal 50
Other products 25
Sugar 265

4. Import
/In circle marked 331:/
Wood products 37
Naphtha products 13
Metal goods
Other ~~products~~ 74
Other finished goods 197

5. Export
/In circle marked 720:/
Sugar 160
Coal 140
Grain 50
Ores 10
Metals and machines 360

11: Obermaier--182 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

439 6. Import
/In circle marked 380:/
Naphtha 110
Wood products 70
Fish 20
Products of animal husbandry 5
Other finished products 180

7. Export of various goods from the Soviet Ukraine in 1913, 1928, 1932 and 1934 (in million tons).

8. Coal

9. Ores

10. Iron & steel

11. Grain

12. Sugar

13. Wood

14. Naphtha & naphtha products

15. Various finished products

000/Also facing page 168/ /Where tractors are worn out harrowing is now done with horses/ /Facing page 169/A/At planting time the seed must be got into the ground within a few days. The tractor is particularly adapted to the cultivation of large
369 areas/A/169/ 35.9% in Dnepropetrovsk, 16.2% in
162 Lwow (1931), 28.9% in Stalin, 29.9% in Krasnodar (chief city of the Kuban region), and 17.8% in Chernovtsy.

*

563 The Jews immediately seized what the Ukrainians had passed by. During the wars with the Turks Catherine II had opened to them the south Ukrainian gubernyas of Taurien, Kherson and Katerinoslav, the present-day Dnepropetrovsk. In 1835 the right of settlement of the Jews was extended to the entire right-bank section of the Ukraine with the exception of the city of Kiyev. The rest of Russia was almost completely free of Jews until 1917. From that time on all of Russia was open to them, and immediately the emigration

1 [For plates, cf. pp. 224-225, category IIC-Analyst]

563 of Jews who had been crowded together in the Ukraine began into the interior of Russia. The process of urbanization of the Jewish population was in full swing even before the First World War. Al- [62] ready by the year 1897 77.4% of the 1.2 million Jews in Russian Ukraine lived in cities, where they made up 22.7% of the population. (113)

113. Seraphim: The Jewry in East European Area, page 322.

Meanwhile the urbanization continued. The proportion of Jews in the total urban population of the district of Kiyev came to 28% in 1926, in the Odessa district it was 31%, in Dniepropetrovsk 32%, in Podolia 54.7%, in the highly industrial Donets region only 9.1%. (114)

114. Seraphim: The Jewry in East European Area, page 333.

000 Even though the Jews controlled almost the entire wholesale and retail trade in the Ukraine before the First World War, and were extremely influential in banking, this was not true of the apparatus of government. Gone today are the traders who realized fat profits on the 4000 Ukrainian fairs, who bought from wholesale dealers and wandered through the country as barterers; private trade has been shattered and the banks are state-controlled, but the influence of the Jews is greater than ever. As early as 1926 they had established themselves in government positions far beyond those that were open to them, and ruled over the Ukrainian and Russian people. In the municipal Soviets they had 20.1% of all positions, in the trade unions 38.1%; in /170/ the judiciary they had 18.9%, in finance administration 19.4%, in the cooperatives 26.8%, in the credit system 35.1% and in public affairs even 44.2% of all

181 The innermost feelings of the Ukrainians in the days of their liberation is described by a German war correspondent a few weeks after the Bolsheviks were driven out of Kiyev, in the following words of a Ukrainian physician in Kiyev: "You Germans must be very patient with us! You must help us as though we were schoolchildren to whom one must teach the most elementary aspects of life step by step! You must give us strength once more to believe in humanity! For we are not ourselves. We are pitiful, down-trodden, homeless creatures, human beings deprived of all that was sacred, who night and day have lived in the fear of being deported, exiled or shot because of our very existence." (135)

135. "Kiew - der Blutegel der Ukraine," Kiyev, the leech of the Ukraine, by the war correspondent, Erwin Kirchhof.

000 What, therefore, is to become of this country where intelligent men voice such shattering words? Now that the Bolsheviks have been driven out, there will first of all have to be a thorough stock-taking of the Ukrainian people to determine the presence of living cells capable of growth and development, in order that we may then, with careful consideration, be able to build, stone by stone, a new and better future. Too much in the way of diversified wealth and talent in the Ukraine has been destroyed or stunted by Muscovite imperialists, beginning with Peter the Great down to Stalin, the strangler, to make possible the achievement of such a tremendous task of reconstruction within a few years.

/Map in pocket of book/

The Peoples of the Ukraine

183 162 The distribution in 1939 of peoples and ethnic

563 groups living in Ukrainian territory. For each
162 race there are two, sometimes even three degrees of density shown: a highly concentrated area of 90 percent (however without regard to Jews who in some areas constitute 10 percent and more of the population), then a majority area of 90 percent, and finally an area where no group has the absolute majority and where the relative majority is shown. The Ukraine is most compactly settled in the center as well as toward the west, north and south, whereas in the east it is loosely settled. Here a motley aspect of ethnic intermingling appeared; peoples live next to each other who racially, culturally and in matters of religion belong to the most diverse ethnic groups: Ukrainians and Great Russians, Central European Germans, Turko-Tatars, Mongolian peoples, as well as those small, heterogeneous mountain tribes of the Caucasus, that represent remnants of peoples in areas of regression.

11: Obermaier J-3(no date) 1942
RD1 Ukraine RD1

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P.214	P.210
P.213	P.209
P.212	P.208
P.211	P.207

Schematic diagram to end map

p.206 (?)

11:Obermaier--207 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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/Key/

1. Ukrainians
   - over 90 percent
   - 50-90 percent
   - relative majority

2. Russians
   - over 90 percent
   - 50-90 percent
   - relative majority

8. Greeks
   - 50-90 percent
   - relative majority

9. Hungarians
   - 50-90 percent
   - relative majority

11:Obermaier--208 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563
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Rumanians
over 90 percent
50-90 percent
relative majority

Germans
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

Tatars
50-90 percent
relative majority

Kalmuchs
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

11:Obermaier--209 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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Slovaks
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

Ruthenians
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

Caucasian Mtn. tribes
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

Bulgarians
50-90 percent

Armenians
50-90 percent

11:Obermaier--210 J-3 (no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

Poles
over 90 percent

50-90 percent

Nogai
50-90 percent

Kirgiz or Kazakh
50-90 percent

11:Obermaier--211 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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11:Obermaier--212 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

11:Obermaier--213 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

11:Obermaier--214 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

I INTRODUCTION

101 The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (the Ukraine) is one of the U.S.S.R.'s sixteen constituent Union Republics. Situated in the south-western corner of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine is bordered on the south by the Black and Azov Seas and the Crimea (part of Russia); its western border touches the frontiers of Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as well as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Towards the north the Ukrainian S.S.R. verges on two other Soviet Republics: Byelorussia and Russia; and it is the Russian neighbourhood of the Don river which forms the Ukraine's eastern border.

101 135 In economic development and in population the Ukraine is second greatest of the Soviet Republics. It has a fertile soil, a mild humid climate, and is rich in deposits of coal, oil, iron, manganese and salts, as well as in building materials. It has four main rivers: the Dnieper (third largest in Europe), the Dniester, the Bug, and the Donets (a tributary of the Don), which are navigable and are also useful reservoirs of power.

433 162 Before 1941 the Ukraine contained more than one-fifth of the inhabitants of the entire Soviet Union. Its industry produced 54 per cent. of the coal, 60 per cent. of the pig iron, 48 per cent. of the steel, and 35 per cent. of the manganese ore turned out in the whole U.S.S.R.; it manufactured railway engines and cars, tractors, turbines, harvester combines, and mining and agricultural machinery for all parts of the Soviet Union. "It also produced artificial fertilizers, soda, glass and cement. The output of the sugar, meat-packing, flour-milling, distilling, and dairy industries reached great dimensions. Fishing was developed in the Black Sea and Azov Sea. The Dnieper Power Station, 361 the largest in Europe, was famous throughout the world. The cities of the Ukraine, both old and new, developed rapidly; during the past 25 years 77 new cities and 285 industrial settlements were built."[1]

241 Agriculture also was highly developed. In 1937-38 Ukrainian farms accounted for nearly one-fifth of the grain, one-sixth of the potatoes, and two-thirds of the sugar beet produced in the Soviet Union. The Ukraine also had a large proportion of the total Soviet Union livestock. Millions of head of cattle, pigs, sheep, and poultry were raised. Ukrainian agriculture was highly mechanized; before the war there were 90,000 tractors and 31,000 harvesting combines operating in the fields.

Area and Population

131 In January 1939 the Ukrainian Republic had an area of about 469,700 square kilometres including 8,000 square kilometres in its

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1 The Sixteen Soviet Republics, Soviet News, London, 1945.

TABLE I

Area and Population of the Ukrainian S.S.R., 1939-40

	Area (thousand square kilometres)	Population (millions)
131 161 Area Ukrainian S.S.R. January 1939	469.7	30.96
Territories added:		
Western Ukraine (added November 1939)	88.0	8.0
Part of Bessarabia	15.3	1.05
Northern Bukovina (both added June 1940)	6.0	0.5
	579.0	40.51
Territories transferred:		
Part of the Moldavian A.S.S.R. (together with part of Bessarabia, created the Moldavian S.S.R., August 1940)	3.9	0.31
Totals August 1940	575.1	40.20

Source : Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S.Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

728 131 162 In June 1945 the Transcarpathian Ukraine was ceded by Czechoslovakia to the Ukrainian S.S.R. This transfer added about 12,600 square kilometres area and a population of about 750,000. The details of the various cessions of territory are given below.

Soviet-Polish Frontiers

In the autumn of 1939, after the collapse of the Polish State and the occupation of Western Poland by German troops, the Soviet Government decided to take under its protection the life and property of the population of Eastern Poland, that is, Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, inhabited mainly by Ukrainians and Byelorussians. When they were seized by Poland in 1920, these territories were ethnographically and economically part of the Soviet Union. Their return to the Soviet Union increased the area and population of the Byelorussian S.S.R. by 108,000 square kilometres and 4.8 million inhabitants; and of the Ukraine, by 88,000 square kilometres and 8 million people.

In August 1945, a slight adjustment of frontiers took place between Poland and the Soviet Union. A treaty was signed which, in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference in February 1945, established the Polish-Soviet boundary roughly along the Curzon Line, with some deviations in favour of Poland. As a result of this, Poland was given back a small strip of the territory which had been incorporated in the Soviet Union in 1939.

728 178 The progress in construction and rehabilitation which has taken place since the incorporation of this region into the Ukraine was revealed at a meeting of the Soviet of Nationalities on October 16, 1946, when the representative of the Transcarpathian Ukraine summed up the achievements in 1946. Nearly 300 enterprises had been restored, and nine machine and tractor stations had been set up to assist the peasants in working [212 the fields. Much had been done in 1946 to abolish illiteracy; there 811] were opened over 100 schools, including 75 elementary, seven technical, 27 secondary, four music schools for children, and one school for surgeons' assistants and midwives.

433 At the end of December it was stated that 35 new factories had started functioning in the Transcarpathian Region in 1946[1]. Moreover, as compared with 1945 when there was not a single coal mine, 8 mines were working in 1946. There had also been definite progress in building up consumer goods industries. A clothing and a shoe factory had begun working in Vinogradov, and a knitted goods mill in Mukachevo. Some 200 light industries have been opened in various parts of the region.

Population of the Ukraine

162 The Ukraine is inhabited largely by Ukrainians, and also by Russians, Jews, and Poles. Most of the population is literate, and in 1939 there were many technical and vocational schools, as well as scientific research institutes and about 40,000 libraries.

At the census of January 17, 1939 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had 30,960,221 inhabitants; an increase of 6.6 per cent. as compared with December 1926. The greatest increase had occurred in the towns, largely as a result of the migration of country people to new industries. Thus from 1926 to 1939 the urban population more than doubled (5,373,553 to 11,195,620) while the number of rural inhabitants decreased by 16½ per cent. (23,669,381 to 19,764,601).

000 The same was true for the entire Soviet Union. From 147,027,915 in December 1926, its total population increased by 15.9 per cent. to 170,467,186 in January 1939, the urban population having grown from 26.3 million to 55.9 millions; and the rural population having fallen from 120.7 million to 114.5 million.

162 The principal cities of the Ukraine with their population on [361] January 17, 1939, are Kiev, the capital (population, 846,293), Kharkov, capital of the Ukraine before 1934 (833,432), the part of Odessa on the Black Sea (604,223), Dniepropetrovsk on the Dnieper River (500,662), Stalino, industrial centre of the Donets Basin (462,395), and Nikolayev (167,108).

In January 1939 the urban population of the Ukraine was 36.2 per

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, December 29, 1946.

162 cent. of the total, as compared with 32.8 per cent. for the entire Soviet Union. Next to the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukraine has a higher percentage of urban population than any other Union Republic.

The German-Soviet War

726 On June 22, 1941, the German armies, supported by their satellites, including the Rumanians and the Hungarians, attacked the Soviet Union on a 1,500 mile front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. Nearly six weeks later the Germans started their main thrust against Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; on September 21, after a fierce struggle, the Soviet troops evacuated the city. It was another two months before the Germans reached Kharkov and Rostov.

727 [725] For the second time in this century the Ukraine was subjected to occupation and devastation by the Germans. However, the Soviet policy of scorching the earth in retreat had aggravated normal military destruction; and in addition, the Ukrainians conducted heroic guerilla warfare against the enemy occupation forces. As a result, the Germans found the fruits of conquest "rather disappointing"[1] For example, in the Ukraine it was possible in the autumn of 1941 to carry out only a small fraction of the average sowing. In the western part of the Ukraine, very few industrial plants remained intact; the Nikolayev naval yards, the Dnieper dam and power station, and the metallurgical plants of the Dniepropetrovsk district were all either crippled or destroyed.

726 The German occupation of the Ukraine lasted nearly three and a half years. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad early in 1943 was the turning point of the war and the beginning of the big Soviet offensives.

In the winter campaign of 1943-44 the Soviet troops won important victories in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, completed the liberation of the Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhie and Zhitomir regions and almost the whole of the Rovno and Kirovograd regions, as well as of a number of districts in other areas.[2] In April and May 1944 they liberated Odessa, and in August, Western Ukraine. The liberation of the whole Ukraine was completed by November 1944.

727 The years of hard fighting took a very heavy toll all along the western front of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian S.S.R. sustained enormous losses.

War Losses of Population

At the Kiev trial of German war criminals in January 1946 it was disclosed that more than four million Soviet citizens had been murdered

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1 The Russian Campaigns of 1941-43, W.E.D.Allen and Paul Muratoff, Penguin Books, London, 1944.

2 Soviet War News, London, February 24, 1944.

727 by the German invaders in the Ukraine, and more than two million had been abducted to slavery in Germany. Of these so deported, a considerable number perished in captivity[1].

The figure of four million Soviet citizens murdered in the Ukraine does not clearly indicate whether all of them were Ukrainians or whether a certain percentage came from other parts of the Soviet Union. No figures have been revealed showing the number of the Ukrainians killed at the front against the German armies and their satellites. However, a comparison of the pre-war and present electorate figures for the Ukraine gives some indication of the decrease, at least of the adult population. On December 12, 1937, the Ukrainian electorate was about 17,540,000; in 1939 this number was increased by the addition of Western Ukraine, which on March 24, 1940, had more than five million voters. But nearly seven years later, in the elections of February 1947, despite the fact that part of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Transcarpathian Ukraine also had been added, the total electorate in the Ukrainian S.S.R. was only 21,545,000.

●162 666

Damages to Industry and Agriculture

727 433 The damage which the Germans inflicted on the industry and farming of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics was tremendous, and far exceeded any comparable destruction in Western Europe.

[362] In the Ukraine the Germans destroyed or burned down 714 towns and more than 28,000 hamlets and villages, destroyed more than two million buildings and 540,000 outbuildings, and rendered about 10 million persons homeless (one-fourth of the Ukrainian population)[2].

Agriculture, animal husbandry, and industry were devastated. The coal mines were flooded. Over 16,150 industrial enterprises employing more than two million workers were stripped of machinery and the buildings heavily damaged or destroyed. The Germans wrecked or took away 127,800 electric motors and 81,600 metal-cutting lathes, destroyed railway lines and stations, and post and telegraph offices[2].

727 433 241 Tremendous damage was done to Ukrainian agriculture. The Germans ruined and plundered collective farms, state farms and machine and tractor stations.

Millions of hectares of planned fields were destroyed and over 56,000 tractors wrecked. Nearly 1,900,000 agricultural machines and 30,000 automobiles and other motor vehicles were destroyed or taken to Germany[3].

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1 Soviet News, London, June 29, 1946.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

3 Letter to UNRRA from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-
Ruthenians

Shepherds blow huge horns to round up their sheep by night

511 In the narrow valleys and on their slopes are cottages and straggling
464 villages where the Ruthenian uplanders live. Nearly, all the huts are
made of wood and are flanked by gardens with patches of sunflowers.
241 In the higher altitudes the land consists mainly of meadows, and such
311 meagre fields as there are yield scanty crops of oats, potatoes or hemp—
not sufficient to live on. No wonder that during the summer months it
is chiefly women and children who can be found at home; the menfolk
either fell trees in the forest or earn their living as seasonal labourers
in the towns and villages of the more prosperous South.

101 These lonely mountains and forests breed a people with a distinct
162 character of their own. Living as they do in seclusion, they not only
differ from their Slovak neighbours but show distinct regional differences

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-
Ruthenians

101 162 among themselves. They can be divided into three well-defined tribes —the Lemki on the Slovak border, the Boiki in the centre, and the Huculs in the eastern tip of Ruthenia.

The most interesting tribe are the Huculs. They have preserved 186 their tribal characteristics better than their kinsmen. Their standard of education is higher, and they are more conscious and proud of their national individuality. When the Hungarians invaded Ruthenia after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Huculs offered the stiffest resistance, and during the war they were the core of the partisan force fighting against the totalitarian powers. Like the other Ruthenian 463 mountaineers, the Huculs are largely wood-cutters and raftsmen. But 342 they are distinguished by their skill as carpenters and wood-carvers. This is clearly reflected in their mode of life. Their wooden-cottages are neatly built and furnished and impress the visitor by their scrupulous cleanliness. Their tribal individuality and artistic skill find expression in the numerous carvings with which they like to decorate their unpainted houses.

181 The neighbouring Boiki have also, to some extent, preserved their 511 pride in racial individuality, and their mode of life, though more primitive, has some interesting features. They are kind-hearted, sincere and hospitable, in spite of their poverty. Though less proud than the Huculs, they fly into a temper when crossed, and impulsive outspoken- 342 ness is one of their traits. They live in cottages and huts which they like to paint in blue and brown, and this makes their exterior rather attractive. But the interior does not always live up to the façade. The better-off Boiki manage to live in fairly decent cottages with two or more rooms, but the huts of the poor often consist of one room only—a dark room with no chimney, one small window, and some roughly 352 made furniture. Some have no bedsteads in the true sense of the word; along the whole wall of the room one may find a long "plank-bed" where the grown-ups sleep at the one end and the children at the other. When the children grow up they sleep on separate beds of the same kind. Unlike the Hucul houses, the Boiki huts have no wooden 342 floors. The domestic animals often share the same room with their 511 masters in winter, sleeping on the bare earth. For many families such a room is therefore a kitchen, living room, bedroom, hall and stable in one.

511 Much the same applies to the Lemki tribe who live partly on Slovak territory. They are the poorest Ruthenian tribe and their racial 181 character has undergone a certain deterioration. Their standard of life is often appalling, the hygiene leaves much to be desired, and they have the largest number of illiterates, though some improvement has taken place under the Republic.

000 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip
317 of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Siatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it
263 is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
511 during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation—all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Ukraine RD1

167 bute a large army of colonists to the Slav ethnical expansion towards the East at the end of the nineteenth and in the twentieth century. To describe the Ukrainians as junior partners in the Russian colonization of Eurasia would hardly do full justice to the role which they played. Thus among the eight 'Governments' of European Russia which between 1897 and 1911 supplied the highest number of settlers for Russian Asia four were predominantly Ukrainian, Poltava, Chernigov, Kiev and Kharkov – two were Byelorussian – Mogilev and Vitebsk, and only two Great Russian – Kursk and Voronezh.

167 The share of the Ukrainians in the Eurasiatic colonization makes any
162 complete separation of Ukrainians and Russians, such as the extreme Ukrainian nationalists advocate, difficult if not impossible. Almost everywhere throughout the Soviet Empire there are Ukrainians living as workers, peasants and technical specialists. According to incomplete figures referring to the early thirties 1,049,000 Ukrainians then lived in Kazakhstan, 966,000 in Western Siberia, 447,000 in the Lower Volga region and roughly 400,000 in the Far East.[1] Smaller groups of Ukrainians lived in the Middle Volga region (215,000), in the Ural region (137,000) and in the western regions of the R.S.F.S.R. (186,000). This
[101] last-mentioned group of Ukrainians, particularly those of the province of Bryansk, constitute a particularly interesting species. They speak a strange Russian-Byelorussian-Ukrainian mixed language but have retained some sort of romantic attachment to the Ukraine on account of the alleged relationship of their forefathers with the Ukrainian Cossacks.[2]

The largest Ukrainian group outside the Ukraine, over 3,500,000 strong, inhabits the North Caucasus region where the Ukrainians in certain areas form up to 60 per cent of the total population. Ukrainian nationalists have therefore demanded that the borders of the Ukrainian Republic should be shifted towards the east to include in particular the fertile Kuban area.

The Ukrainian diaspora, particularly in the R.S.F.S.R., was steadily reinforced throughout the inter-war period. Between the 1926 and the 1939 census a considerable number of Ukrainians left the Ukraine to settle in the new industrial centres of Russia proper, thus increasing the Russian-Ukrainian intermixture. Through this migration such typical national Ukrainian provinces as Poltava and Vinnitsa lost within twelve years 15 and 7 per cent, respectively, of their total population.

RUSSIAN DIASPORA IN THE UKRAINE

000 From the point of view of future Ukrainian-Russian relations the existence of the Russian ethnical element in the Ukraine is no less important than the numerous Ukrainian diaspora in the R.S.F.S.R. and in the Central Asiatic Soviet Republics.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

THE UKRAINE

UK. 162 369

According to the 1926 census there were but 8 per cent Great Russians in the Ukraine, but these were mostly town-dwellers and proletarian elements and thus were able to play a considerable part in the political history of the Ukrainian S.S.R. since, according to Bolshevik principles, city workers necessarily lead the peasants, and the towns the countryside.

The towns of the Ukraine during the inter-war period had been not only bi-national Russian-Ukrainian but tri-national Russian-Ukrainian-Jewish, with the Jews frequently gravitating culturally to the Russian side. In Kiev, the largest Ukrainian city, the Ukrainians were originally the smallest ethnical group of the three. The 1926 census showed that Kiev's population consisted of 25·4 per cent Ukrainians, 36·2 per cent Russians, 32·1 per cent Jews and 3 per cent Poles. After 1926 the balance improved in favour of the Ukrainians but basically Kiev remained a Ukrainian-Russian-Jewish city. Kharkov, almost equal in size to Kiev, had in 1933 48 per cent Ukrainian inhabitants, whilst there were 30·3 per cent Russians and 17·7 per cent Jews. Of all the big cities of the Ukraine, Odessa, the capital of 'New Russia' has always been the least Ukrainian. Even including Odessa's country district the Ukrainians accounted for only 41 per cent of the total population against 23 per cent Russians and 20 per cent Jews. In the city of Odessa there were 17·5 per cent Ukrainians against 38·6 per cent Russians and 36·4 per cent Jews. Dniepropetrovsk, the fourth largest city of the Ukraine, in 1933 comprised 36 per cent Ukrainians, 31·5 per cent Russians and 26·6 per cent Jews.

The drastic reduction in the number of Jews through Hitlerite massacres and evacuation during the war improved the position of the Ukrainians in the cities of the Western and Central Ukraine, but in the industrial regions of the Eastern Ukraine the Ukrainians cannot keep pace with the tempo of urbanization and the needs of manpower. The two eastern border provinces of the Ukraine, Voroshilovgrad and Stalino, making up the Donets Basin, are inhabited by an international working-class, in particular by a strong Russian element, and are steadily growing in importance in relation to the Ukraine as a whole. The population of the Stalino Province rose by 91 per cent between 1926 and 1939 and that of the Voroshilovgrad Province by 37 per cent during the same period. The growth of the Stalino Province can be even better assessed by comparing the numbers of inhabitants of its three largest towns in 1926 and 1939. Stalino, the provincial centre rose from 174,000 to 462,000, Makeyevka from 79,421 to 240,000, Mariupol from 64,000 to 222,000.

STALINIST CENTRALISM VERSUS UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY

S.U. 631 186 UK. 186 642

The fact that Russians and Ukrainians are from the historical, geographical and ethnical point of view objectively inseparable calls for a certain

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

[Bulgarians]
[Albanians]
[Poles]

National Districts were a different matter. The most important of these Bulgarian National Districts received the name of Vasil Kolarov, a Bulgarian communist leader, who, after the abortive Bulgarian communist *coup d'état* of 1923, lived as an exile in the Soviet Union. The creation of the 'Kolarov District' in the Dniepropetrovsk Province with the 'capital' Kolarovka was thus a deliberate gesture to stimulate the illegal Communist Party in Bulgaria and to show its supporters that a little Soviet Bulgaria was alive inside the U.S.S.R. even if Bulgarian reaction frustrated the establishment of a Soviet Republic in the real Bulgaria for the time being. UK 563 S.U. 563

During the German occupation of the Ukraine many Russian Bulgars – they numbered 114,000 in 1939 – were repatriated to Bulgaria. After the end of the war at least a part of these evacuees were brought back to the Soviet Union, but there is no evidence of a survival of the Bulgarian National Districts.

3. ALBANIANS. There has been definite news that the 3,000 Albanians of the Soviet Ukraine have survived the war and have maintained their three Village Soviets in the Azov District of the Melitopol Province. The best evidence that this small minority remained in favour with the authorities was the fact that a fairly comprehensive study of their customs was published after the Second World War.[25] Also at least some of the Czech Village Soviets and collective farms of the Ukraine seem to have remained and their example was used as propaganda for collectivized agriculture in Czechoslovakia proper.

THE 'POLISH POLICY' OF THE UKRAINE

The most important nationality problem for the pre-war Ukraine was the Polish problem, just as the Ukrainian problem was the most serious nationality problem of pre-war Poland. S.U. 162 UK [162]

However unfavourable the drawing of the Soviet-Polish frontiers of 1921 had been from the Ukrainian point of view, 782,334 Poles lived, according to the 1926 census, within the borders of the U.S.S.R., of whom 476,435 were in the Ukraine itself, 97,948 in Byelorussia, and 197,827 dispersed over the R.S.F.S.R. Polish statisticians, and apparently also some Polish communists in Russia, have never accepted this figure, and have asserted that the total number of Poles amounted to 1,500,000.[26]

During the inter-war period Soviet policy considered the 'Soviet Poles' primarily as a potential revolutionary vanguard. The official Soviet view was that however small the Polish minority in the Ukraine, it was its duty to develop a proletarian Polish culture within the U.S.S.R. which could influence the Poles on the other side of the border. This idea was rejected by some prominent Polish communists who thought that the S.U. 563

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R.D.L

a long, warm autumn, provides excellent conditions for the development of agriculture. Average January temperatures vary from 27° F in the southwest to 14° F in the east, and July averages from 68° F in the north to 73° F in the south. The northern section of the Ukraine receives adequate rainfall (about 20 inches a year), but the south is much drier, having an average yearly rainfall of 9 inches. Most of the precipitation occurs in the first half of the year. During the summer, frequent violent rainstorms occur in the eastern sections.

The greater portion of the Ukraine lies in the wooded steppe and steppe zones, where black earth prevails. In the northern section, which lies in the forested zone, grassy marshes occur in abundance. In the wooded steppe zone the forest reserves have largely been depleted. Broad-leaved types, such as oak, maple, ash, and elm, occur only along the rivers and extend in green ribbons through gullies and ravines up to the watersheds. Characteristic local vegetation types are the dense growths of alder, willow, and poplar which border the inundated banks of the rivers and the many ox-bows and lakes which remain after the spring floods. The steppes on the watersheds have long been converted into rich wheat fields, a typical feature of the Ukrainian landscape.

Among the mineral resources which abound in the Ukrainian SSR, the primary raw materials for heavy metallurgy are most important. Scarcely anywhere else in the USSR are coal, iron, and manganese found within such proximity of each other as in the eastern Ukraine. The Donets Basin, or Donbas, with reserves of more than 90 billion tons, is the principal coal producer of the USSR. The Krivoy Rog iron mines produce iron ore of a high quality and metal content. Between these two sites are the rich manganese deposits in the area of Nikopol'. In the Donbas are extensive salt and mercury deposits. Petroleum fields lie in the foothills of the Carpathians, where salt, potash, and natural gas are also found. Another petroleum site is in the area of Romny (Sumy Oblast). The northern, marshy section of the Ukraine—Poles'ye—abounds in peat. Other minerals include polymetallic ores (Donets Basin), phosphorites, kaolin, limestone, marl, gypsum, and so forth.

The Ukraine is the most densely inhabited union republic of the USSR. Its 40 million inhabitants represent about one fifth of the total population of the USSR. The average population density is 180 per square mile; however, there is considerable variation throughout the region. The greatest concentration exists in the western Ukraine, along the foot of the Carpathians, where the density reaches 340 to 390 per square

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

SU 162 U 162 mile. The Donbas shows a density of 260 to 390 per square mile, while the concentration of the population in certain industrial areas goes as high as 525 per square mile. In sharp contrast to these densely settled sections, the northern wooded area of the Poles'ye supports only 50 to 75 persons per square mile, and even less in the marshy portions. The SU southern steppes also show a density of only 95 to 130 per square mile.

361 162 U 361 162 Large villages form the most typical settlement pattern in the Ukraine. Rural population centers of as many as 15,000 or more inhabitants stretch along the river valleys or along dry ravines, where artificial ponds provide the water supply. In many instances villages merge into each other and form a continuous settlement many miles long. Surrounded by orchards and with white-washed, thatched mud huts scattered about in disorderly fashion, they often present a singularly charming appearance.

About one third of the population lives in urban centers. The Ukrainian SSR counts fifteen cities of over 100,000 inhabitants and more than forty cities with a population of over 50,000. The large centers lie mainly in the Donets Basin, along the Dnieper and the shores SU of the Black Sea, as well as in the western Ukraine.

162 U 162 The national composition of the population of the Ukraine is quite homogeneous. The Ukrainians constitute about 80 percent of the total. Among the more important minorities are the Russians, who live principally in the Donbas and in the northern section, the Belorussians in the northwest, Poles in the west, and Bulgarians in the southwest. Before the Second World War, Jews formed a considerable percentage of the urban population, especially in the right-bank towns and in the western Ukraine. A considerable number of Volga Tatars are also found SU in the Donets Basin.

631 U 631 The Ukrainians constitute the second most important national group in the USSR. Their language, their culture and their mode of life are closely related to those of the Russians. Long split among several powers, the Ukrainians were as late as the end of the eighteenth century under the rule of the Russians (left-bank Ukraine), of the Poles (right-bank Ukraine), and of the Turks (southern steppes). Shortly thereafter the major portion of the Ukrainian people came under Russian rule, but many still remained in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in Rumania. In 1917 the Ukrainian SSR was created, but it was not until the final annexations of territory from Poland (1939), Rumania (1940),

369 The Ukrainian people, being an old nation with an agricultural civilization, is not attracted by industry and by large concentrations of population. It prefers to live in the country, when its material life is assured, seeking to supplement its revenues by semi-agricultural professions such as those of artisan, or small trade, or finally the service of the State.

241 The Ukrainian agriculturalist, especially in the regions of the south, is conscious of participating in the general economy of the country. He takes a great interest in the choice of plants to be developed, in the organization of co-operatives for trade and credit, and in the construction of the means of communication. He is a civilized peasant, a quite European farmer. Without disparaging the intellect and the practical sense of the Great Russian people, it is necessary to recognize that the Ukrainian is more Western in all his conceptions, and more European, than his brother of the north.

163 On the other hand, the Ukrainian people have a great vitality. Among the peoples of Europe they have the greatest rate of increase, which reaches 2·3 per cent per annum. The fecundity of the women is astonishing: between twenty and thirty years it is 23 per cent, while in France it hardly reaches 8 per cent at the same ages.[1]

142 The average height of the men at the period of military service is about 1 m. 69½ cm.

137 342 Ukrainians are very clean and their houses very neat, mostly whitened with whitewash and surrounded by gardens. Fruit trees, particularly cherry trees, give the villages an attractive appearance, especially in the districts of Kiev and Poltava (Zone 1)[7] where the rich and green nature resembles the landscape of Southern England.

[1] That is to say that for a 100 women between twenty and thirty years one meets 23 expectant ones.

7 [see category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

161 Since the official census of 1897 various official estimates of the population in the Ukraine have been issued; they do not distinguish between the different branches of Russians. According to the official estimates of January 1912 and 1915 the totals for the nine Governments in the Ukraine were as follows:

	1912.	1915.
Volhynia	3,995,700	4,241,800
Podolia	3,882,700	4,127,600
Kiev	4,635,700	4,988,000
Chernigov	3,083,500	3,148,900
Poltava	3,673,100	3,906,200
Kharkov	3,329,700	3,452,000
Yekaterinoslav	3,214,900	3,537,300
Kherson	3,547,500	3,806,900
Taurida (without the Crimea)[1]	982,800	1,066,650
Total	30,345,600	32,275,350

163 It is well known that the birth-rate of the Little Russians is higher and steadier than that of the Great Russians. But, even allowing for a mere continuance since 1897 of the same ratio between the two, the total of Little Russians in the Ukraine in 1912 can be fairly estimated at 23,500,000.

There are also large numbers of Little Russians in other Governments of Russia. Figures for these Governments in 1897 were as follows:

Government.	*Total Population.*	*Little Russians.*	*Percentage.*
Grodno	1,603,409	363,000	23
Kursk	2,371,012	527,778	22
Voronezh	2,531,253	915,883	36
Bessarabia	1,935,412	379,698	20
Kuban Province (Caucasus)	1,918,881	908,818	48
Stavropol (Caucasus)	873,301	319,817	37

In the same year there were also 719,655 Little Russians in the Don Territory, 133,115 in the Government of Astrakhan, 76,928 in other parts of the Cau-

[1] The birth-rate has been more rapid on the mainland than in the Crimea; hence 50 per cent. of the population is allowed to Taurida alone.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

162

Government.	Town Population.	Country Population.
Poltava	363,500	3,352,900
Kharkov	516,200	2,851,500
Yekaterinoslav	406,500	2,883,600
Kherson	1,017,500	2,592,800
Taurida (with the Crimea)	447,200	1,559,300

It is apparent from these figures that a large proportion of the population of the Ukraine is still engaged in agricultural pursuits.

161 Many parts of the Ukraine are very thickly populated. The most densely populated Governments are as follows: Podolia, 243; Kiev, 236; Poltava, 192; Chernigov, 154; Kharkov, 160; Volhynia, 146; Yekaterinoslav, 135; and Kherson, 132 persons per square mile.

Movement

● 163 165 The population of the Ukraine increases more steadily than that of Great Russia. The following figures are given by the official statistical annual (1914) for the year 1912:

	Births. total.	Births. per 1,000.	Deaths. total.	Deaths. per 1,000.	Increase. per 1,000.
Volhynia	154,685	39·0	72,287	18·1	20·9
Podolia	145,401	37·4	73,254	18·9	18·5
Kiev	182,024	39·3	92,109	19·9	19·4
Chernigov	116,411	37·8	59,972	19·5	18·3
Poltava	136,951	37·3	64,801	17·6	19·7
Kharkov	151,064	45·4	73,349	22·0	23·4
Yekaterinoslav	159,233	49·5	72,995	22·7	26·8
Kherson	157,622	44·4	92,227	26·0	18·4
Taurida	85,913	43·7	44,080	22·4	21·3

165 The average mortality is lower in the towns than in the country, owing to the fact that the more robust elements of the population are attracted to the towns, leaving the old men, women, and children behind.

165 758 Infant mortality is often as high as 50 per cent.; this is due to ignorance, insufficient feeding, and the fact that mothers return to work in the fields or factories within a few days of child-birth. The imperfect system of medical aid prevents many cases of births and deaths from ever being officially reported.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

565 of education, and in their occupations. The bulk
[162] (86·4 per cent.) of the Ukrainians are peasants and agriculturists. The percentage of people living in the country is in the Government of Kharkov, 85; in Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 88; Chernigov, 91; Taurida, 80; Kherson, 70. The percentage of peasants is almost the same, e. g. Kharkov, 90; Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 87; Chernigov, 86; Taurida, 73;
[163] Kherson, 61. The average increase in population is higher than in any other province in European Russia; consequently, though many peasants have become, during the last twenty-five years, workmen in the newly started industries, the general number of agricultural peasants remains unchanged.

421 *Land Tenure*[1].—While Great Russia is at present
428 a country of communal land-ownership (*mir*), in the
177 Ukraine or Little Russia individual or, strictly speaking, family ownership and communal ownership exist
[556] together (cf. p. 78). The *mir* in Great Russia appears to have been introduced in the sixteenth century, when the Moscow Government established serfdom and imposed heavy taxation, for it was easier to make the whole village responsible for the taxes than the separate families. However, in the north or, properly speaking, Novgorod Russ. the land, as a general rule, belonged to one large family or clan, composed of from two to six houses (the owners of which bore the same name), and called *pyechishche* (large stove). The ownership was hereditary, and hence the land became more and more subdivided, so that families owned more or less according to the number of children. There was no readjustment of the land as in the case of the *mir*. The *pyechishche* of Novgorod was known in Kiev-Russ as *ognishche* (meaning a large fire); and the term *ognishchanin* (meaning a member of the *ognishche*) is found in the Kiev law (*Russkaya*
428 *Pravda*). Connected with that form of tenure is a custom, which even now is found sometimes in the Ukraine, of minorate, according to which the younger

[1] See also p. 77.

647 their career and the assurance of a good income for the meagre appointments as an official. It is sufficient just to glance at the statistics of the Russian Empire in order to realize what a gigantic increase in the development of civilization was reached by the effort of the Russian [871] intellectuals and specialists. Public instruction had developed in these fifty years to an enormous extent, [165] infant mortality had fallen by more than 60 per cent, [164] epidemics had experienced a great fall, as also cattle diseases, and the yield of the land had increased in the [232] southern regions by more than 30 per cent. The improvement of the different breeds of horses and cattle was already evident on the eve of the Great War.

206 The backward country which Russia was supposed to be in the eyes of Westerners, including also the Ukraine, had in 1912 a big network of telephone lines in the country and especially in the region of Vinnitza, where the organization of the Zemstvos was especially active.

505 As to the river system, as we have already seen, it is very poor and is limited to four rivers, the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Boug, and the Donietz, of which the Dnieper alone is of any interest. The transport capacity of this one important river has been for ever spoiled by the rapids which make navigation impossible along a [503] considerable distance. It is only after the building of the *Dnieprogues*, whose gigantic barrage had submerged the rapids along a distance of about one hundred kilometres, that an uninterrupted river route was established, linking the upper Dnieper with the Black Sea.

This river drains the greater part of the Ukraine and has left its mark upon the whole historic and economic evolution of the country.

Before the Great War the annual tonnage of transports

132 49·3°. Drawbacks for agriculture in New Russia are the prevalence of north and east winds and an irregular and insufficient rainfall. The average rainfall at Yelisavetgrad is 17 in., at Odessa 16 in., at Lugansk 15 in., and at Nikolaev 14 in. The rains in April and May decide the harvest. June is the rainiest month, but from May to September there are droughts. Most places are largely dependent upon wells and ponds constructed in the ravines, which are frequent on the steppes.

The climate of the Ukraine, as a whole, is therefore continental, i. e. the variation between summer and winter temperatures is very great. Sudden variations of temperature are frequent. The rainfall is by no means abundant, and there is a progressive decline towards the south and south-east. The fact, however, that the bulk of the rainfall occurs in the summer favours agricultural operations, even where the annual amount of rainfall is comparatively low. It is only in New Russia that the country suffers seriously from drought.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

312 The Ukraine is very backward in regard to sanitary
314 conditions. Less than half the towns have a satisfactory water-supply, and a very small percentage of them a regular drainage system.

164 Typhoid, diphtheria, and malaria are very prevalent.
158 To the great majority of the people in the country, doctors are inaccessible, and even in the towns good hospitals and adequate medical attendance are very
515 rare. In the matter of cleanliness, however, the Little Russians compare favourably with the Great Russians.

(5) Race and Language

Race

162 The population of the Ukraine is composed of
563 a mixture of various races and nationalities, those chiefly represented being Little Russians, Poles, Jews,

262 745 434 Expectant and nursing mothers are usually at work, and have standard leaves with pay and special privileges; thus, if working, they receive rations appropriate to the occupational group, plus special food allowances; and if not working, dependents' rations plus these allowances. The supplements are as follows, monthly: cereals, 1.2 kilograms; butter (or substitute), 0.8 kilograms; sugar 0.6 kilograms; vegetables, 2.0 kilograms; milk (fresh or dried) 12 litres. Their approximate calories from rations alone are, therefore:

If light workers	1,682 plus 512 -	2,194	calories daily
If employees	1,144 plus 512 -	1,656	" "
If dependents	704 plus 512 -	1,216	" "

In the last case it is almost possible to assume that the husband is well paid and will be able to buy products in the open market.

262 Even if the established ration scales for all groups could be met, they would not provide an adequate, balanced diet. Particularly the rations for women and children are very light in fat, first-class protein, and calcium. They provide less than half the low League of Nation's standard for daily full-cream milk requirements of the expectant mother. But even these inadequate scales are seldom supplied.

262 434 Since mid-October 1946, the honouring of ration cards has, because of the increasing food shortages, become more and more irregular. In December 1946, for instance, large groups of persons in the Kiev area received only bread, sugar, and a few tins of vegetables on their cards. No meat, fish or fats were available. By the middle of January 1947, the situation had grown even more stringent, and only bread was supplied on the ration.

At the same time, the amount of food available off the ration has decreased almost to the vanishing point. Cereals and white bread have practically disappeared from the open market; and when they are available, the price is beyond the reach of the average person.

262 181 144 369 The effects of the poor diet are already to be seen. The people generally show a noticeable lack of their former liveliness, energy and cheerfulness. Moreover, according to the Medical Officer of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, clinical starvation has made its appearance in the smaller villages of the Republic: protein dropsy and avitaminosis are increasing; and among the townspeople there is great incidence of skin infections and respiratory and nasopharyngeal conditions.

645 744 262 In order to meet some of the medical aspects which may arise out of the present food situation, the Ministry of Health has taken the following steps.

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip
317 of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Slatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it
263 is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
511 during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation—all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
764 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

744 Europe; and many people used to die every year from tuberculosis and
164 other chest complaints. Severe epidemics—typhoid and dysentry—used
146 to ravage the country every year; inadequate regulation of rivers and stagnant waters gave rise to malaria; undernourishment of large sections of the population was responsible for sporadic pellagra. Venereal diseases were a curse owing to lack of medical attention and of appropriate legislation.

744 This enormous task was tackled with commendable vigour by the authorities of the Republic. In a country which used to have very few
185 doctors, a proper medical service was soon organised; up-to-date hospitals and children's homes were built; Red Cross stations and other hygiene and welfare institutions, set up in many parts of Ruthenia, strove to prevent and combat disease. This systematic effort resulted in a substantial reduction of mortality, while the draining of marshlands and the regulation of streams and ponds considerably checked epidemics.

185 Realising that ignorance is the root of many social evils, the State regarded the raising of the standard of education in Ruthenia as one
871 of its foremost tasks. The achievements in this field were perhaps the most striking. A country, which in 1918 had not more than eighteen elementary schools where children were only partly taught in Ruthenian, possessed 520 Ruthenian schools two years later; and after fifteen years of independence this small country in the Carpathians could boast 1,079 schools of various kinds—elementary, upper, secondary, technical and special schools. The magnitude of this achievement becomes evident when it is borne in mind that it was necessary to educate the requisite number of Ruthenian teachers from among the rising generation.

871 Thanks to these efforts illiteracy among the younger people has become rare. Those Ruthenians who according to the last census of
212 1930 were still unable to read and write were largely middle-aged or
185 old people. But even among them illiteracy has been considerably reduced because evening schools for adults were opened wherever pos-
517 sible. The people of Ruthenia proved to be keen pupils. Within a few years the neglected country had a promising intelligentsia—administrative workers, teachers, journalists, writers, doctors, engineers, composers, artists and scientists. In the thirties more than eighty periodicals, among them ten dailies, appeared in Ruthenia, and the production of books grew from year to year. The innate aptitude for arts and crafts was given a chance of development when a special art school was established in Užhorod, and musical talent, too, received much encouragement. As many as 7.7 per cent of all musical compositions and songs broadcast by Czechoslovak radio stations were the work of Ruthenian musicians.

000 Economic development was essential to a country where bread used

termed" and here by poor treatment at least forty percent of the 731
ten thousand gathered in, died. 661

The urban population felt the shortage because of the reduction of the bread ration for the unemployed to two hundred grams a day. The majority could not patronize the commercial shops for they had nothing with which to pay and the legal allowance of other products as fat, sugar and barley were either reduced or omitted. Even the more highly qualified of the intelligentsia were obliged to sell all their trinkets and gold teeth to secure some food. The prices allowed were ridiculous. One teacher at these stores received for a silver dollar "500 grams of sugar, a piece of soap and 200 grams of rice."

Physicians were forbidden to enter "hunger" in the records of illness and death. They were ordered to give as the cause of death "BBO" (absence of white corpuscles). Sometimes it was recorded as "childish" or "old age" weakness, "paralysis of the heart," "diarrhea," all symptoms of death by starvation.

It is impossible to estimate accurately the number of deaths, 165
for even the indefatigable NKVD gave up the attempt to list the 731
deaths along the roads, in the fields, and in the streets of the cities. 661
Villages died out and this was indicated by the use of black flags on certain houses. In these cases no attempt was made to keep the records in order. The so-called "therapeutic hospitals" did not turn over their records or admit to their files the workers of the ZATS (The Records of the Acts of the Civil Population), who were the collaborators of the NKVD. Thus, in one of these therapeutic hospitals in Kiev there were at least 5,000 deaths from starvation that were not recorded in the official statistics.

Of course, none of these hardships were felt by the highly placed [554]
Communists and party officials. They received their food through party channels which were not accessible to the ordinary residents of the city or the kolhosps.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the number who perished in the famine, but it was approximately 4,800,000. This is certainly an underestimate, although certain other calculations will place the number between five and six million.

[-famine in Ukraine, 1933-- Analyst]

647 their career and the assurance of a good income for the meagre appointments as an official. It is sufficient just to glance at the statistics of the Russian Empire in order to realize what a gigantic increase in the development of civilization was reached by the effort of the Russian [871] intellectuals and specialists. Public instruction had developed in these fifty years to an enormous extent, [165] infant mortality had fallen by more than 60 per cent, [164] epidemics had experienced a great fall, as also cattle diseases, and the yield of the land had increased in the [232] southern regions by more than 30 per cent. The improvement of the different breeds of horses and cattle was already evident on the eve of the Great War.

206 The backward country which Russia was supposed to be in the eyes of Westerners, including also the Ukraine, had in 1912 a big network of telephone lines in the country and especially in the region of Vinnitza, where the organization of the Zemstvos was especially active.

505 As to the river system, as we have already seen, it is very poor and is limited to four rivers, the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Boug, and the Donietz, of which the Dnieper alone is of any interest. The transport capacity of this one important river has been for ever spoiled by the rapids which make navigation impossible along a [503] considerable distance. It is only after the building of the *Dnieprogues*, whose gigantic barrage had submerged the rapids along a distance of about one hundred kilometres, that an uninterrupted river route was established, linking the upper Dnieper with the Black Sea.

This river drains the greater part of the Ukraine and has left its mark upon the whole historic and economic evolution of the country.

Before the Great War the annual tonnage of transports

661 The Ukrainian nation, from the famine of 1921/22 and later years, suffered under the Soviet terrorist régime great losses of its biological substance. To this were added the enormous losses in World War II, in the risings and from the terror of both totalitarian régimes.

731 In 1946 Ukraine had to suffer from a new famine in consequence of a bad harvest, and it must be stated that the policy of Moscow with respect to hungry Ukraine had not changed; the Ukrainian people received aid from the Communist Government only in a minimum degree. The principal aid came from America.

● 165 The statistics count the losses of the Ukrainian people during the Soviet Russian rule in Ukraine in millions. In 1917 approximately 30,000,000 people inhabited the territory of Ukraine within the frontiers of Soviet Ukraine before the outbreak of war in 1939. The Soviet statistics gave the figure of 31,000,000 inhabitants of Ukraine in 1933. The census of January 1939 counted a population of only 30,960,000 in Ukraine. These figures show clearly the consequences of the Soviet Russian policy of exstirpation in Ukraine. If a normal increase of population had taken place, the population of Ukraine should have reached at least 40,000,000. Thus Ukraine had had from 1917 to 1939 a loss of 10,000,000 inhabitants! (comp. Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union — History and Prospects:* Geneva, 1946).

An entirely different picture statistics show in Russia: from 78 million in 1926 the Russians grew to 99,3 million in 1939. These figures speak for themselves.

000 After World War II, the Russian Communist dictatorship is playing on the strings of the traditional Russian nationalism and imperialism more than before. 'The great Russian nation', 'the great Russian language' and similar epithets doubtless inspire the Russians and make them an obedient instrument of Moscow's imperialistic policy.

During World War II a new political trend appeared among the Russian emigrants who had fought at the beginning of the revolution in the 'White Armies' against the Communist dictatorship. This was the movement of so-called 'Soviet Patriots', who began to return in masses to Russia, especially from France, inspired by the prospects of the growth of the Russian Empire under Communist leadership.

In the Soviet Union the national movements of the subjugated peoples are officially regarded as the 'principal danger'. Therefore, the Soviet Government is making haste in 'liquidating' entire nations which Moscow has recognised as 'reactionary' — Crimean Tartars, the peoples of the North Caucasus, etc. Of course, the

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

162

Government.	Town Population.	Country Population.
Poltava	363,500	3,352,900
Kharkov	516,200	2,851,500
Yekaterinoslav	406,500	2,883,600
Kherson	1,017,500	2,592,800
Taurida (with the Crimea)	447,200	1,559,300

It is apparent from these figures that a large proportion of the population of the Ukraine is still engaged in agricultural pursuits.

161 Many parts of the Ukraine are very thickly populated. The most densely populated Governments are as follows: Podolia, 243; Kiev, 236; Poltava, 192; Chernigov, 154; Kharkov, 160; Volhynia, 146; Yekaterinoslav, 135; and Kherson, 132 persons per square mile.

Movement

163 ●165 The population of the Ukraine increases more steadily than that of Great Russia. The following figures are given by the official statistical annual (1914) for the year 1912:

	Births. total.	Births. per 1,000.	Deaths. total.	Deaths. per 1,000.	Increase. per 1,000.
Volhynia	154,685	39·0	72,287	18·1	20·9
Podolia	145,401	37·4	73,254	18·9	18·5
Kiev	182,024	39·3	92,109	19·9	19·4
Chernigov	116,411	37·8	59,972	19·5	18·3
Poltava	136,951	37·3	64,801	17·6	19·7
Kharkov	151,064	45·4	73,349	22·0	23·4
Yekaterinoslav	159,233	49·5	72,995	22·7	26·8
Kherson	157,622	44·4	92,227	26·0	18·4
Taurida	85,913	43·7	44,080	22·4	21·3

165 The average mortality is lower in the towns than in the country, owing to the fact that the more robust elements of the population are attracted to the towns, leaving the old men, women, and children behind.

165 758 Infant mortality is often as high as 50 per cent.; this is due to ignorance, insufficient feeding, and the fact that mothers return to work in the fields or factories within a few days of child-birth. The imperfect system of medical aid prevents many cases of births and deaths from ever being officially reported.

161 natural increase in the Ukrainian parts of the Soviet Union. he USSR not having issued any statistics. It seems, however, that population was reduced by increased mortality.

161 The steady flow of emigration diminished the actual in-
● 166 crease of the Ukrainian people. West Ukrainians go to the United States and Canada, the inhabitants of the Dnipro area to the Caucasus and Asia. Movements within the frontiers shift the population slowly to the east and south, these movements being strongest towards the Basin of the Donets and the North Caucasus, and weakest towards the areas on the right banks of the Dnipro and Galicia. There is also a steady flight from the country to the town. In consequence to an increase of the collective system, of famine and flight to the town, the population of the USSR did not grow since 1932; increase of population in the towns was opposed by considerable decrease in the country.

c) National Conditions

182 National conditions in the Ukrainian territory at present have been produced by long and complicated processes which Ukraine was forced to undergo by factors such as her geographical position, the extent of her territory, movements of colonisation, natural increase, migration, lack of an independent government, etc.

In consequence, the national composition of Ukrainian areas is characterised by peculiar features, such as a mixture of nationalities in many provinces, a fairly high percentage of national minorities, a considerable difference from the ethnological point of view between the populations of town and village, and so on.

167 We find different national conditions in the different frontier districts. In the West, the Ukrainian factor receded; the frontier between Ukraine and Poland was regulated in favor of the latter and, what was more important, the entire region of the frontier was settled by Poles who had been pressing east from time immemorial, in the search for better opportunities for their surplus population. The Polish immigration in these districts is

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the 474
Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian 661
peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their 423
women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and 668
more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization 731
in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, 166
and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the 661
enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign corre- 731
spondent who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

● 166 ALREADY IN THE EIGHTIES SYMPTOMS OF OVER-POPULATION WERE NOTICEABLE in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. The peasants continued to move on into New Russia, but by this time that region was itself becoming fairly thickly populated. Migrants pursued their way to the newer lands in the northern Caucasus and beyond the Volga. From 1890 onwards the Government took a hand in the organization of this migratory movement. According to the Emigration Department, set up at this period, the greatest number of migrants over the whole Empire came from the 'rich black earth regions' of Poltava, Chernigov, Kursk and Kharkov. However, between the years 1907 and 1913, the Poltava and Chernigov Governments, from being first and second in this respect, ranked only third and fifth. This fact is explained by the initiative of important landowners and industrialists like Kharitonenko, Tereshchenko and others who built up the sugar-beet industry on a large scale. Notwithstanding this factor, between 1906 and 1914, according to the statistics of the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia*, 1,610,000 peasants migrated from the Ukrainian Governments, while migration was also taking place from different districts of New Russia. The Ukrainians mostly went to settle the steppe area in western Siberia and the region of Orenburg; others reached the Amur and the shores of the Pacific Ocean, where the Ukrainian settlements came to be known as the Green Wedge (*Zelëny Klin*) and where the names of the wealthy villages of Novo-Kievskoe, Poltavskoe and Chernigovskoe piously recalled the origin of those who had come from the banks of the Dniepr and the Seym.

311 433 At the beginning of the twentieth century the classical 'three-field system', already prescribed as a law in the Lithuanian Statute of the sixteenth century, prevailed in left-bank Ukraine. This system answered the requirements of the small landowner or well-to-do peasant who farmed 20 to 100 hectares. Few troubled to produce more than a small surplus, the sale of which might cover their current wants. Horticulture, apiculture and some stock-raising served to supplement income. On the larger estates all the energies of the owners were directed to the lucrative exploitation of the sugar-beet industry. Stretches of land were bought or leased from peasants or small landowners in order to increase the acreage under beet. The rapid development and excellent management of the sugar-beet industry impressed and disturbed the German Commission of Professor Auhagen in 1912. By this time the industry had assumed a certain international importance. In 1914 433 there were over 190 sugar factories in the Ukraine out of 226 for the 244 whole Empire (the bulk of the balance was produced in Poland). As against 2 million hectares under wheat in the Ukraine (excluding

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

It is important to ascertain the number of Ukrainians who remain in the territory of S.S.R. Ukraine. According to Soviet statistics the urban population, amounting to 8,000,000, numbers only 30 per cent of Ukrainians. Among the rural population Ukrainians are in a majority, though they are not everywhere equally distributed: in some regions there are over 80 per cent; in others (like Odessa) 60 per cent; in the Donets rural areas a little over 50 per cent. In 1926, during the period of 'ukrainization' encouraged by the Government, 24,000,000 out of 30,000,000 registered as Ukrainians, but even 15 per cent of these 'native' Ukrainians gave their mother tongue as Russian. Since that date catastrophes have befallen the rural folk of the Ukraine: about 3,000,000 are reckoned to have perished during the famine of the early thirties, and another 2,000,000 certainly have migrated as a result of conditions which they found intolerable. These losses have not been wholly replaced by natural increase, and there is every reason to think that the number of 'native' Ukrainians in the rural population of the Republic has decreased since 1930 by at least 4,000,000. If at that time the number of persons speaking Ukrainian and considering themselves to be Ukrainians amounted to 20,000,000, there can scarcely be more than 16,000,000 peasants left now. If to these are added the number of Ukrainians living in the towns, the total probably amounts to about 18,000,000. In other words, the Ukrainian population of Soviet Ukraine (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia) amounted to little more than half of the total population. 161 369

This figure is eloquent: the Soviet Government has gone a long way to achieve the result towards which its policy was directed, and in the Ukrainian S.S.R. Ukrainians can no longer be considered to be in a great majority. It follows therefore that nearly half the population (16,000,000 to 17,000,000) are not Ukrainians. Among these alien elements a little less than 2,000,000 are Jews; about 1,000,000 are Moldavians; another million belong to different nationalities—White Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans. The remaining 12,000,000 to 13,000,000 consist either of people born in the Ukraine who do not wish to consider themselves Ukrainians or of 'new-comers' from other parts of the Union. The number of these 'new-comers' must amount to 8,000,000 to 9,000,000.

It is notable that in the last years (since 1930) the Government has used every means to encourage the settlement of these 'new-comers' not only in the industrial areas but also in the purely rural districts. It is obvious that Moscow does not desire vast rural areas with an entirely homogeneous Ukrainian population. The Government prefers groups of *Kolkhozy* on Ukrainian territory to be constituted on the mosaic principle. Each year, from all the Military Districts of the Soviet Union, soldiers who have finished their military service and who have sent in petitions that on account of lack of land they do not wish to return to their original homes are drafted to the new Red Army *Kolkhozy*. These *Kolkhozy*, recruited from the variety of nationalities throughout the Union, are being scattered over some of the best land of the Ukrainian countryside. In some regions there are as many as ten of these military collectivized farms. Reference has already been made to the measures taken by the Government against the bourgeois *kolkhozniki* during the summer of 1939. A new 'movement' of the population is in view in 474 166

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

474 U.S.S.R., and there is no doubt that one of the results will be a further weakening of Ukrainian elements where the Government considers them to
● 166 be still too strong

Secondary Branches of Ukrainian Agriculture

241 In addition to wheat, *rye*, *barley*, *oat* and *maize* crops are important. *Millet* is also grown and forms the base of the broth (*psheno*) which is a favourite dish in the South of Russia (in the North this broth or porridge is made from buck-wheat).

Clover and *lucerne* are comparatively little cultivated, and almost exclusively in right-bank Ukraine and Galicia.

About a million hectares are under *potatoes* in right-bank Ukraine; the bulk of the crop goes to the alcohol distilleries.

Sunflower-seed is important in the production of oil; *hemp* and small quantities of *linseed* and *mustard-seed* are produced for the same purpose.

The cultivation of *hops* was always traditional in Volhynia; in pre-Revolutionary days half of the hop production of the Empire came from Volhynia and right-bank Ukraine. In late years production has greatly declined.

Tobacco, the cultivation of which was introduced by Greek immigrants in the eighteenth century, is a speciality of the districts of Nezhin and Romen. The quality is not good and the cultivation of tobacco has no future in the Ukraine.

Particularly in Podolia and the region of Uman, *kolkhozniki* take great interest in horticulture; about 200,000 hectares are under orchards. On many *Kolkhozy* the *kolkhozniki* occupy themselves on the private cultivation of *tomatoes*, and the Government has set up canning plants in order to encourage this branch of production.

The *vine* grows well on the banks of the Dniepr and the southern Bug, in the neighbourhood of Berdyansk and Odessa, and along the Dniestr. But wine production has not been developed on the scale which it has attained in Bessarabia and the Crimea.

The Soviet Government favours agricultural experiments, and some *Kolkhozy* in the South have tried to cultivate *rice*—so far with little success.

An experiment on a large scale was made in the cultivation of *cotton*. 190,000 hectares between the mouth of the Dniepr and Perekop were reserved, but it is not likely that cotton cultivation in the Ukraine will prove the success which it has in the more suitable climates of Azerbaijan and Turkestan.

Secondary Mineral Resources in the Ukraine

135 Reserves of different qualities of *lignite* are distributed over many parts of the Ukraine. In view of the abundance of other resources of calorific power, exploitation has not been greatly developed, but output of lignite in the region of Elizavetgrad attains 300,000 tons a year.

A million tons of *peat* is cut annually in Ukraine—about 10 per cent of the output of U.S.S.R.

Bauxites in the Dniepr region are utilized for the Aluminium Works near Dnieprostroy.

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

●166 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the
626 village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past.[1] Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

[1] [after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

country for less populated districts in the east, while, on the slightest 166 ●
suspicions, whole families were deported, separated and exiled, and 626
their places taken by people from other Soviet republics who were brought in to destroy the racial unity that formerly existed in the villages.

To appreciate the difficulties of the peasants on the collective 241
farms, we must remember that the involved bureaucratic system 651
had ample opportunities for extorting the grain for little or no 474
payment. Thus the Motor Transport Stations which controlled 465
all the machinery were supported by payments from the collective farms of grain and other products in kind and this usually approached 21.5% of the total yield, while the Stations took over 23% of the crop for the government. Another 15% was retained by the kolhosp for sowing and for various insurance funds that were prescribed by law and another 18% was kept for fodder and for the compensation of the full-time administrators. Thus, there was barely a quarter of the produce left to be distributed among the working population and this was the variable quantity since all of the payments and collections were based not on the actual harvest but on the harvest as planned by the central authorities. Thus, in the case of a bad harvest, the share allotted for distribution was the part that was cut and the government, so far as possible was provided with its expected supply.

This amount was divided among the individuals and families on the basis of the labor days which they had worked. In the beginning a labor day meant labor for a day, no matter how many hours of labor were required, but even before World War II, this simple definition was replaced by a specification that it covered a definite amount of work and it might very easily happen that a slow or poor workman would have to work more than one day to make a labor day. Thus, there was the possibility of still further exploitation of the workmen, who could not know accurately until the end of the year on what they could count.

There was also distributed, likewise in proportion to labor days, a certain sum of money which the kolhosp received from the government in return for the sale of grain over the amount col-

[1 after 1933 famine - - Analyst]

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
●166 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

[During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

185 are a few large projects planned in the eastern part of the country which can be made immediately accessible to the Moscow Industrial area but which will be of little value to the Ukrainian population, for even the resorts along the coast of the Black Sea have now been definitely placed under a Union Commissariat and are being improved to accommodate the higher officials from the centre. The whole strength of the Soviet Union is being exerted to build up the industrial centres in the Urals and further to the east.

During these years there has been little progress made in many fields, and few or none of the evacuated personnel which formerly managed the factories have been returned. It is the same with machinery.

[166] On the other hand, where factories have been restored, the new directors have usually been sent down from Moscow to administer them, and so have the responsible workmen. The deportation from the villages still continues as the native population are removed to Siberia or elsewhere and non-Ukrainians are sent in, in accordance with a definite scheme for breaking up the homogeneity of the population.

665 Despite all this, there has scarcely passed a month in which
626 the central authorities in Moscow have not stressed defects in the working of the Ukrainian branch of the party. They have found continued failures to perform the required deliveries, a lack of ideological work and definite wrecking and deliberate sabotage due to bourgeois nationalist feelings on the part of the party leaders in the Ukraine. There has been a consistent and unrelenting attack on everything that has been done in the country, while the heads of the collective farms and the other institutions have been attacked and changed for nationalist deviations.

000 The conclusion is irresistible that it is not the intention of the central authority in Moscow to relax its pressure until it has annihilated the last point in the UkSSR which differs in the slightest degree from the rules prevailing in the RSFSR and that in the meantime it, despite its lip service to the cause of a federation, is working for a complete standardization, not only in the field of economics but in every other field as well.

The Russian Danube Steam Navigation Co. traded 505
from Odessa to Danube river ports. It had a fleet of eleven vessels, with a tonnage of 9,000.

The following foreign lines had regular sailings to Odessa: Thos. Wilson, Sons & Co., thrice weekly, from Hull; J. R. Ellerman, Ltd., fortnightly, from Liverpool; James Moss & Co., every four weeks, from Liverpool; the Messageries Maritimes, fortnightly, from Marseilles; and the Deutsche Levante Linie, monthly, from Genoa.

Tramp steamers of many nationalities are attracted in great numbers to Ukraine ports in the autumn for the shipment of the cereal crop, and there is seldom any lack of cargo space.

The foreign lines with regular services appear capable of meeting the normal demand on their cargo space. The Russian lines require Government support, as shipping under the Russian flag is not as a rule commercially successful.

(c) *Telegraphic Communication*

Telegraphic communication with foreign countries is 206
dependent mainly on cable lines not situated in the Ukraine, which has only one cable, from Odessa to Constantinople, the joint property of the Indo-European Telegraph Co. and the Eastern Telegraph Co. Telegrams for the East are sent *via* the Kertch station of the Indo-European Telegraph Co.; those for northern Europe or America, *via* Petrograd and thence by various cable lines.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(a) *Supply of Labour; Emigration and Immigration* 464

The line of cleavage between agricultural and other 166
labour is not so sharp in the Ukraine as in most other communities. The claims of agriculture are the greater by far, but the increase in the number of landless peasants who find it difficult to live in the country

464 districts through the long winter has led to the crea-
[166] tion of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the
[563] country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel,
[511] Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful,
221 but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any
511 branch of industry. The State makes no effort to
565 regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

this class are often compelled to accept badly-paid 466
work in the towns, and both men and women have 511
often to make long and laborious journeys on foot in 565
search of employment.

A large class engaged in domestic industries, whether as masters or as servants, make a very poor living, frequently working very long hours under bad sanitary conditions.

In the coal and iron industries there are some concerns, 466
particularly those capitalized from abroad, which look well after their work-people, provide housing, secure good supplies of provisions at moderate prices, and take other measures to ameliorate labour conditions. In consequence, however, of works and mines being often situated on land rented on short-term leases, many employers cannot afford to lay out money on such objects, and conditions for labour are generally bad. So difficult is it to attract labour, that mine-owners have sometimes sought to secure convict labour from the Government.

The peculiar characteristic of labour in the Ukraine 166 ●
is its mobility, which often occasions unexpected 464
crises. Superstition, epidemics of disease, and more obscure causes lead to vast movements of labourers from a district at very short notice.

The *artels*, which are labour organizations peculiar to 467
Russia, have an important influence on the supply and quality of certain labour. An *artel* is an association of workers, the general principles of which are: (1) all members must be actual workers; (2) all have equal rights in the organization; and (3) every member is responsible for the obligations contracted by the *artel*. The organization is usually non-capitalistic or has a very small capital.

In general there are two classes of *artels*, those of workers in producing trades and those of workers who provide service. The former are engaged in carpentering, cabinet-making, printing, linen-weaving, dairy-work, fishing, &c. The second group comprises stevedores, packers, customs agents, bank porters, com-

for her own industry the Russian custom frontier gave her 369
insufficient protection; on the contrary, it rather reserved 241
the Ukrainian market to Moscow and Warsaw.

Consequently the industrial development of the Ukraine 369
was very slow. The agricultural population did not find 241
enough work in the towns, and, as a result, the surplus of 162
agrarian population increased every year. In some parts of the Ukraine this surplus population was more serious than in any other part of former Russia. In the central Ukrainian provinces the agrarian population reached 800 to 1,000 inhabitants per 1,000 hektares of arable land, while in France and Germany the average was about 500 inhabitants. There was nothing left for the Ukrainian popula- [67] ●
tion but to emigrate and colonize the lands of Siberia and of Central Asia. There was also a rather considerable movement of emigration towards America. The most fertile governments of the Ukraine furnished many more emigrants than the less fertile but more industrial regions of central Russia.

Emigration as a Possible Solution

As a consolation, it is pointed out that, in case of the 000
reunion of the Ukraine with Russia, the Ukraine will have in Siberia a field for emigration all ready. But that is very poor consolation. Can emigration satisfy any country? Are the Italians proud of sending many emigrants to America? Did the Germans have cause to feel flattered by increasing the trans-Atlantic emigration, before they developed their own industries?

Why, then, should it be the lot of the Ukraine to let her population emigrate to distant Siberia?

Why can she not develop her economic life in such a manner that all her people shall have work on their own soil? The Ukraine ought not to remain an outlet for the industrial work of the Russians and Poles when her own people cannot find any work at home.

But one might ask why no complaint has been heard up to the present, either from the Ukrainians engaged in industry or from those engaged in agriculture? Why did

161 natural increase in the Ukrainian parts of the Soviet Union. The USSR not having issued any statistics. It seems, however, that population was reduced by increased mortality.

161 The steady flow of emigration diminished the actual in-
166 crease of the Ukrainian people. West Ukrainians go to the United States and Canada, the inhabitants of the Dnipro area to the Caucasus and Asia. Movements within the frontiers shift the population slowly to the east and south, these movements being strongest towards the Basin of the Donets and the North Caucasus, and weakest towards the areas on the right banks of the Dnipro and Galicia. There is also a steady flight from the country to the town. In consequence to an increase of the collective system, of famine and flight to the town, the population of the USSR did not grow since 1932; increase of population in the towns was opposed by considerable decrease in the country.

c) National Conditions

182 National conditions in the Ukrainian territory at present have been produced by long and complicated processes which Ukraine was forced to undergo by factors such as her geographical position, the extent of her territory, movements of colonisation, natural increase, migration, lack of an independent government, etc.

In consequence, the national composition of Ukrainian areas is characterised by peculiar features, such as a mixture of nationalities in many provinces, a fairly high percentage of national minorities, a considerable difference from the ethnological point of view between the populations of town and village, and so on.

● 167 We find different national conditions in the different frontier districts. In the West, the Ukrainian factor receded; the frontier between Ukraine and Poland was regulated in favor of the latter and, what was more important, the entire region of the frontier was settled by Poles who had been pressing east from time immemorial, in the search for better opportunities for their surplus population. The Polish immigration in these districts is

best demonstrated by the fact that there are scarcely 100 000 Ukrainians living west of the ethnographical frontier between Ukraine and Poland, while 2.5 million Poles are to be found east of the same line. (All statistics from the end of 1932). 167

The area of the eastern frontier is different; due to pressure from Ukrainian colonisation movements, many Ukrainian "islands" appear on the eastern frontier and occur repeatedly right to the Pacific Coast. Some districts were colonised by Ukrainians and Russians in common, which explains the mixed character of the population of the foothills of the Eastern Caucasus and the Crimea.

If we consider the Ukrainian national territory as a whole, within its narrower and wider boundaries, we find a large percentage of foreigners — 25 % within the narrower and up to 30 % within the wider frontiers —, although Ukrainian territory never goes beyond its ethnographical frontiers and although these national minorities are not concentrated in a few places but are scattered throughout the territory. No other extensive ethnographical unit in Europe has so many national minorities as Ukraine. The history of the Ukrainian territory is to blame for this handicap. It was repeatedly swamped by foreign peoples, the upper classes were robbed of their original nationality and in recent times Ukrainians settled unwillingly and in small numbers in towns. 162 167

Another characteristic of Ukrainian ethnographical territory is the great diversity in the national composition of the rural and urban population. The village is purely Ukrainian, the town mixed, often indeed of alien population. The lack of an independent political status and the reluctance of the Ukrainian peasantry to settle in towns opened the way for immigration from abroad, which in turn, helped to erase the national character of urban life; in addition, there are more Jews in the towns of Ukraine than in those of other European states. Thus the towns in the west of Ukraine are Ukrainian-Jewish-Polish, those on the Right Bank on the other hand are Ukrainian-Jewish-Russian while those on the Left Bank are Ukrainian-Russian. The following table shows the different national composition of

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●167

rural and urban population. Out of every 1000 persons in Ukraine there are

	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews	Poles	Germans	Others
Town population	388	281	216	69	8	38
Rural population	767	121	18	50	14	30

The Ukrainians are unequally distributed over their ethnographical area. That part of Ukraine that was longest settled and that is most centrally situated is ethnographically purely Ukrainian, the national minorities amounting to less than 10 % of the population. This central area is a quadrangle with unequal sides, reaching in the west to the line Mohyliv-Berdychiv -Kyiv, in the east to Myropil on the line Sumy-Charkiv-Hrishyne, in the north to the White Ruthenian frontier and in the south across the steppe to the line Balta-Pershomajske-Zaporizha-Hrishyne. The Right Bank area is the most exclusively Ukrainian national territory. The population of the wide plains of this area is up to 99 % Ukrainian.

In frontier districts and also in the many mixed areas there is a large percentage of non-Ukrainians. In Galicia, the Kholm district, Podlakhia, Bucovina, Bessarabia, Slobodian Ukraine and in the areas of the Donets and the Kuban, non-Ukrainians amount to $^1/_3$ and more of the population.

In the steppe zone, too, there is a high percentage of national minorities, a result of the rapid colonisation of the steppe at the end of the 18th century. There were not sufficient Ukrainians to colonise the vast steppes, so the gaps were filled up by people of the most varied nationality — Ukrainians and Russians, many Germans as good farmers, and emigrants from the Balkans — Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks and Moldavians. National minorities are scattered here and represent 34 % of the population as against 66 % Ukrainians, so that the latter are everywhere in the majority. We find here 14.3 % Russians, 7.1 % Jews, 4.4 % Roumanians, 4.7 % Germans, 1.3 % Greeks, 1.6 % Bulgarians and 1.6 % others. The Ukrainians exceed even the largest group, the Russians, for there are $4^1/_2$ Ukrainians for every Russian, and in the country even $7^1/_2$.

Besides Ukrainians, the area that is ethnographically and nationally Ukrainian counts among its population Russians, Jews, Poles, Germans. The Russians, according to statistics for 1. 1. 1933, amount to 8 million and live in Slobodian Ukraine, the Donets Basin (foreign labor immigration), the coastal areas (agricultural colonies) and, alongside of Ukrainians, in the eastern foothills of the Caucasus. Jews — 3 millions — $^2/_3$ of them in towns, live west of the Dnipro (the boundary of their former settlement under the Tsars), and from 2-3 % of the population of Left Bank Ukraine and less than 1 % in Slobodian Ukraine and the Caucasus. Poles numbering 2 800 000 live in districts that were formerly part of Poland, mainly on the "black earth" belt of Galicia and the Kholm district. The other national minorities are insignificant. 162 167

If we study the development of national minorities up to the time of enforced collectivisation, we notice that the Ukrainian element in Dnipro-Ukraine was strengthened, while it receded in Western Ukraine under pressure from the Poles. We cannot tell what changes have taken place in the national element of Soviet Ukraine in recent years, as the results of the last census, held in 1939, have not been published. We can only suppose that Ukrainian national substance has suffered severe losses from the enforced collectivisation, the eviction of Ukrainian peasants, famine, and Russian immigration, especially to the towns and the Donets Basin.

d) Ukrainians outside the boundaries of the ethnographical territory

6 millions, i. e. 13.5 % of the Ukrainian people live without its national territory, 700 000 in islands dispersed throughout neighboring western countries, above all in Batshka while others live as emigrants or laborers, especially in Germany and France. In 1933, there were 300 000 in Roumania, 100 000 in Poland, 40 000 in Czechoslovakia, 50 000 in Jugoslavia and 160 000 in other countries of Europe. 3 % of the Ukrainians — 1.3 millions — are scattered throughout the Soviet Union in Europe; the majority of these live in the lower reaches of the Volga (450 000), the middle reaches of the Volga (220 000), in the republic of 161 167

161 Bashkir (80 000) and the Ural area (50 000). Besides, Ukrainians
167 have been actively colonising Asia, their superiority in numbers as compared with the Russians may be seen in the appended table (statistics from 1926).

Asia	Surface in sqm.	Population in 1000	Ukr.	Russ.	Kas.-Sib.	Others
Kasak in Siberia	174 075	2 240	40	22	27	11
Grey Wedge	12 308	17	29	19	44	8
Green Wedge						
1) Rayon Spask	26 923	232	59	22	—	19
2) Blahovischensk	3 846	86	50	4[illegible]	—	7

The "Grey wedge" lies between the Khirgisi country and Kasakstan, the "Green wedge" on the Amur and nea- Spask.

1.3 million Ukrainians live in America (U.S.A. 7—8[illegible]0 000, Canada 3-400 000, South America 130 000).

e) Ukrainians in the world

At the end of 1932 there were 43-44 million Ukrainians; as far as numbers go, they are the second of the Slav peoples, and the seventh among European nations. The number of Ukrainians living in the different states towards the end of the years 1938 and 1940 was:

States	Ukrainians in millions	in the world Percentage of Ukrainians
a) 1938	[1]	
Soviet-Union	34.4	79.1
Poland	6.0	13.8
Roumania	1.1	2.5
U.S.A.	0.7	1.6
Czechoslovakia	0.6	1.4
Canada	0.3	0.7
And others	0.4	0.9

[1]) Among these 25.6 millions in Soviet-Ukraine.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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States	Ukrainians in millions	Percentage of Ukrainians in the world
b) 1940	[2]	
Soviet-Union	40.2	92.4
Germany	0.8	1.8
Hungary	0.6	1.4
U.S.A.	0.7	1.6
Canada	0.3	0.7
And others	0.9	2.1
Total	43.5	100

[2] Among these 30.7 millions in Soviet-Ukraine.

465 ment has been slower and they have not yet reached the same
degree of intensity of labor which we found in factories. Jews
434 play a great part in commercial life.

162 Among the lower categories of civil servants, Ukrainians were
in the majority from the beginning, while representatives of
465 foreign nationalities increased in the higher services. The average
511 salary of Soviet officials throws little light on the standard of
647 living in this group of the population because the difference between higher and lower employees is again considerable. Incomes in the lower ranks were very small while the higher officials had a life of ease and could on occasion even afford luxury. Engineers are among the most privileged while teachers and actors are much worse off. The legal status of the Soviet official was entirely insecure; they lived constantly under threat of a "purge" or of being denounced as disturbing the process of Soviet economy. The higher ranks of bureaucrats were here in special danger.

162 The small group of the professional class (doctors, writers, lawyers), in spite of their freedom, was dependent on the apparatus of the Soviet State. The group of outcasts was most to be pitied, i. e. those who had been expelled by the regime from social intercourse, e. g. merchants, artisans, and priests. After identity cards were introduced and "socially dangerous" persons removed, this group greatly decreased.

162 Another group, finally, is formed by Ukrainians living
● 167 outside the frontiers of Ukrainian territory, who as "Kur-
697 kuls", "Pests", "Saboteurs" were sent to concentration camps in the North and in Siberia. The "Nationalists" are also included in this group. And the colonisation of remote frontier areas in Soviet Russia required forest laborers, miners and factory workers, who had to help in the coal mines of Siberia and in building up industrial concerns in Central Asia. It is impossible to give statistics for the proportion of Ukrainians in this group, but they cannot be ignored as they will certainly return home and play an important rôle in Ukraine whenever the general situation is altered.

162 In Ukrainian areas outside of the Soviet Union, conditions
167 resemble those obtaining in Western Europe. The Ukrainian

area in Poland showed the greatest variations, it having an urban population of 19 % in 1931; in the Lviv area of administration this rose to 30 % and sank to 12 % in Volynia. The urban population was composed of the following nationalities: Ukrainians 22.9 %, Poles 36.6 %, Jews 38.3 %. The figures for the rural population, on the other hand, were: Ukrainians 71.4 %, Poles 23 %, Jews 3.8 %, others 1.8 %. 74.9 % were employed in agriculture, 10.2 % in factories and mines, 7.4 % in business and transportation, 7.5 % in other callings. In areas previously belonging to Russia, the number of those engaged in agriculture rose to 80 % and in the administration of Lviv and Stanislaviv it only amounted to 65.5 % and 74.8 % respectively. 162 167

An excess rural population was characteristic of Polish parts of Ukraine, being particularly marked in provinces formerly Austrian. The agricultural area was divided into 52.4 % small holdings (up to 50 ha), 28.8 % large estates and 18.8 % state property. But in reality 84.3 % of the agricultural land was in small holdings as the large estates and the state property mostly consisted of forest land. In Galicia there were crofts (up to 5 ha) which could neither employ nor feed a large family. The medium-sized (5-20 ha) and larger farms (20-50 ha) did not represent even the half of all agricultural enterprises. Ukrainians were practically not represented at all in larger estates, so that the standard of living among the Ukrainian population was very low; the cooperative system which was widely spread, especially in Galicia, did something to raise the average standard.

The Ukrainian urban population was represented mainly by the lower middle-classes. In recent times efforts have been made to improve conditions for Ukrainian businessmen and to build new workshops for individual workers. These efforts soon met with success, in spite of Polish and Jewish competition.

Social conditions were different in Bucovina and Bessarabia. Though land there has been parcelled into tiny holdings and has consequently produced a social situation similar to that in Galicia, the conditions under which the Ukrainian peasant lived in Bessarabia were stable and more favorable. Jews formed a

162 proportion of the population of the little towns, the Ukrainian
167 intelligentsia being but weakly represented.

The population of those parts of Ukrainian territory that are in Czechoslovakia, is also mostly engaged in agriculture which accounts for 81.8 %, mining industry for 6.4 %, trade and transportation for 2.7 % and other professions for 9.1 %. In the main, Ukrainians live in the country; the less important cities and towns have a very mixed population, in which Ukrainians form the majority in only a few cases. The standards of living and material security are precarious, lower perhaps than in any other part of Ukrainian territory.

The History of Ukraine

175 The two prime formative influences on the growth of the
● 167 Ukrainian people are the struggle for the steppe and the drive for expansion southwards; there never was any migratory movement towards Central Europe. All the strenght of the Ukrainian people was absorbed by the struggle in the steppe with an opponent who commanded respect and whose riding tactics were certainly superior to those of European armies of knights, by battles in an area devoid of natural and artificial obstacles, by the necessity of moving repeatedly into the plains of Polesya and Volynia with their great forests and many rivers and lakes whenever the mounted hosts from the east swept over the steppe. It was only at the end of the eighteenth and in the course of the nineteenth century that the steppe was finally subdued, the shores of the Black Sea reached and the eastern frontier pushed far ahead. The expansion of the territory settled on by the Ukrainians which is three times as great as 200 years ago, took place solely at the expense of nomadic peoples. It were the colonial acquisitions of the nineteenth century which brought the Ukrainian people within the orbit of Europe.

This strengthening of the Ukrainian people at its circumference was detrimental to intensive development within the state. Insets of alien nationalities remained on Ukrainian territory, above all in the towns, where trade and industry fell into the hands of foreigners. Partitioned among four states as it was after World War I, and now completely dependent on a rigidly centralised Great Power, the Ukrainian people has not yet evolved a political form of its own. Its future as a state still lies ahead.

175 Ukrainian history may be divided into the following periods:

1) the political supremacy of Kyiv up to 1154
2) the supremacy of the Galician-Volynian state from 1154-1340
3) the Lithuanian-Polish period, 1340-1648
   a) the Lithuanian 1340-1569
   b) the Polish 1569-1648
4) the Cossack State 1648-1782
5) the Russo-Austrian period 1792 (1772)-1918

175 In order to consolidate her power in Ukraine, Russia gave the Right Bank of the Dnipro back to Poland. But the Polish Republic of nobles was not able to assert itself against the Zaporog Fastness and its guerilla warfare (Haydamak movement). At times (1743, 1750, 1768) all Ukraine rose in rebellion. It was only after the destruction of the Zaporog Fastness that the country became quiet and complete order was re-established only after the Second Partition of Poland when the Right Bank Area of Ukraine was given to Russia. In the Carpathians there were also risings, the rebels being called „Opryshki" there. More important, however, is the colonisation which took place here in the 18th century. At that time Ukrainian settlements reached the river Tisa.

The eastern areas of Ukraine, the so-called Slobodian Ukraine, were quietest in these troublous times. Here the war-weary people of the western districts found refuge and peaceful work. It is true that the country belonged to the Tsar, but the Ukrainian people were allowed to retain a certain measure of self-government, and the Cossack organisation. Both of these were finally abolished in 1765 when the Slobodian aristocracy also became russianised.

The Russo-Austrian Period

175 In the 19th century it seemed as if the Ukrainian people had
● 167 more or less resigned themselves to being under Russian rule. All energy was concentrated on colonising the areas freed from Turks and Tatars; the frontiers of the country settled by Ukrainians were pushed farther and farther east and south. Russia was not blind to the threat to her national existence implied in this movement and sought to counteract Ukrainian expansion by forming colonies of Germans, Bulgars, and Greeks. But to no avail. Ukrainian colonisation crossed the upper and the lower reaches of the Don and villages even sprang up on the eastern bank of the Volga. Finally the Kuban area was settled by descendants of the Zaporog Cossacks who first occupied territory in North Caucasia and later, after bitter struggles with the mountain tribes in the Caucasus, had spread south.

175 The general situation of the Ukrainian people thus improved in this era of peaceful consolidation. The coast of the Black

National Minorities in Ukraine

162 563 Minorities in Ukraine amount to 20 % in purely Ukrainian territory and to 24.7 % in other parts of the country and are the consequence of long domination by foreigners and the immigration that entailed. The same cause is responsible for increasing Jewish immigration; Jews have always appeared to assist the spread of Russian influence in the East and Polish in the West.

175 167 563 Contemporary minorities rarely date earlier than the second half of the 18th century, if we except a few peripheral areas in the west, the Tatars in Crimea and Russian colonisation in the east in the 17th century. Several earlier efforts made by the Polish Government and individual magnates to colonise the Right Bank region of Ukraine were unsuccessful; the first wave spent itself in the 16th century in the rebellion of Khmelnytskyj, while later colonists were completely absorbed by the native Ukrainian population. The Roman Catholic faith was able to persist only in a few places. A similar fate overtook Roumanian expansion in the 14th and 15th centuries in the Carpathians; it left traces in names and in the legal code of the settlements.

167 563 The Russians form the largest minority. Apart from the common colonisation of the Don area, it was only after the catastrophe at Poltava (1709) that Russians slowly penetrated into Ukraine. More numerous Russian settlers did not arrive till after there was no longer a Hetman (1764) and after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress (1775). At the same time the Turks were driven back from the Black Sea; the Ukrainian population, which had suffered great losses in the struggles with Turks and Tatars, was unable to tackle this job alone. But the Russians, who had been systematically settled, were disinclined to cultivate the steppe and preferred to move into the r ing towns as officials, artisans and laborers.

Ten thousands of German colonists took their place, settled by Catherine II in the former Governments of Kherson, Taurien, and Katerynoslav, later also in Southern Bessarabia. At the same time Emperor Joseph II settled German colonists in

Southern Galicia and Bucovina. Immigrants who were of the same faith as the Ukrainians also arrived at this time from Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Roumania (partly also from Armenia). 167 563

In the eighteen eighties the Russian Peasants' Bank settled tens of thousands of Polish, German and Czech colonists in Volynia. By far the majority of Poles in Galicia and in the Kholm district also settled there as late as the second half of the 19th century, in Volynia and Polessia even in the 20th (in many cases after 1920). Single Polish settlements in the Right Bank region (especially in Podolia) are later in origin. Elsewhere the Polish population has been preserved in the towns only, the workshops and estates belonging to Polish landed proprietors. Even the "most Polish" area of Ukraine, the Markhlevitskyj district in Eastern Volynia, which was formed artificially for political reasons, only had 28 332 Poles, of whom, however, only 10 715 actually spoke Polish. 162 563 167

After the end of the 18th century Eastern Galicia was almost purely Ukrainian; there were Poles only in the towns, in the administration and in connection with big estates. This fact was emphatically recorded by Graf Pergen, an eminent Austrian official, after Galicia was transferred to Austria (1772). The official census reports for 1846 and 1851 still represented the Galician province of the Austrian empire as predominantly Ukrainian; 50.1 % (2 441 771) Ukrainians as compared with 40.9 % (1 994 802) Poles. The statistics for 1857 are: 45.2 % Ukrainians, 42.7 % Poles, 2.5 % Germans and 9.7 % Jews. 162 563

The Polish element has been artificially increased only since 1867, and then only slowly. In taking the census, the actual state of affairs was camouflaged by tricks of statistics; the Jews, for instance, were counted as Poles, thus increasing the number of the latter in the census of 1910 by more than 800 000; another paper trick was played on Roman Catholic Ukrainians, who had mostly been converted in the course of recent years by cunning and force from the Greek Catholic United Faith to Roman (in Poland synonymous with Polish) Catholicism. Although they spoke no Polish and had otherwise the same interests as other Ukrainians, most of them were

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Causes and Effects of Emigration

About 6 millions (= 15 %) of the 45 million Ukrainians live outside of Ukrainian territory proper in Europe, Asia, and America. 650 000 live in the thinly populated Volga areas in Europe, and 3 millions in Western Siberia and the Far East, while there are fairly large settlements in Canada (Alberta, Sascatchewan, Manitoba) that count about 400 000 Ukrainians. By this modern colonisation in the 19th and 20th centuries, the Ukrainian people has once more given proof of its talent for colonising, a talent that had been displayed with great success in earlier times when South Ukraine was settled. Since 1881 in particular when the Russian government removed restrictions from emigration, there has been a lively increase in Ukrainian colonisation; at this time movements began to build up and protect lines of communication between the center of Ukraine and the area round Rostov. Colonisation of the Volga Valley became more intense; the number of Ukrainians settled there is estimated to-day at 1 million while the Ukrainian contribution to the eastern area of North Caucasia amounts to 33.4 % (of a total population of 3 638 000). 167

Towards the end of the eighties movements of emigration to Siberia set in, the Russian Government under General Unterberger, Governor of the Amur district (1888—1897) being in favor of Ukrainian emigration to the Far East for reasons of military policy. The efforts of the government were supported by the Trans-Siberian Railway which offered reduced fares and other facilities. The colonisation movement reached its height after the Russo-Japanese War and the unrest among peasants in 1902; the Russian Government seized the opportunity of getting rid of unruly subjects and at the same time of strengthening its own position in Asia. Up till then most of the colonists in Asia came from Central Russia (48 %); now the scales are turned and Central Russia contributed only 32 % while 48 % came from Ukraine, and the remainder from other parts of the Empire.

Before Stolypin's Agrarian Reform (1906—1910) some 40—50 000 Ukrainians left their homes every year; after the Reform

167 the number rose to 250 000 and in 1909 reached the record figure of 290 000, i. e. about 68 % of the natural increase of the Ukrainian population. The table below gives figures for emigration:

Year	Number of emigrants	Ukrainians	%
1890—1900	1 078 000	366 448	34
1900—1910	2 257 000	1 197 463	53
1911—1914	696 000	410 600	60.3

Alone the Far East counted about 510 000 immigrants from Ukraine in the years from 1883 up till 1928.

Most emigrants came from the Left Bank area although the Right Bank was much more densely populated and was at the same time poorer, as regards soil. 75 % of the emigrants from 1891—1900 came from the three gouvernements of Chernyhiv, Poltava and Kharkiv alone. Of the inhabitants of Siberia born in Europe, 48.6 % in the Far East, 46.6 % in Kasakstan and Kirghiz, 22 % in Siberia proper and 11.6 % of the population in the other areas were born in Soviet Ukraine. (Census of 1926). The figures in Russian statistics are, moreover, too low all over; according to careful estimations by natives 33 % of the Siberian population = 3—3.5 millions are of Ukrainian origin. Ukraine has therefore a great interest in the Russian areas that lie in Asia, all the more as the land they have colonised is much more valuable as regards economy, transportation and political development than the rest of the country that has been colonised by Russians or than the very sparsely populated areas of Siberia. The Ukrainians avoided the forests and deserts that attracted Russians and selected steppe areas as far as the river Irtysh, i. e. the fertile loess land along the Trans-Siberian Railway that is a continuation of their native Black Earth. Finally, they liked to settle in groups, often as villages, so that we find large, continuous areas that are wholly Ukrainian in character. About 67 % of all Ukrainians who have emigrated to Asia are settled on the so-called "Grey Wedge" already mentioned which adjoins the European area of the Ural and the Volga. No more than 15 % are scattered throughout the endless spaces in the North, East, and Center of Siberia.

The first mentioned area colonised by Ukrainians consists of a strip about 2 000 km long and 100—400 km broad, south of the Trans-Siberian Railway from Omsk via Petropavlovsk as far as Slavhorod, the administration extending over considerable parts of Kasakstan and some districts of Western Siberia, marching in the south along the Afghanistan frontier in Kirghiz and in the Syr-Darja section of Kasakstan at Aulie-Ata and Alma-Ata with numerically smaller centers of Ukrainian colonisation. Here, over a large area of 450 000 sq. kilometres the Ukrainians are relatively in the majority while the Russians come only third, after the Kazaks. 167

There are, however, other isolated areas with a large Ukrainian majority. Fourteen of the twenty-seven rayons in the Aktyubinsk area for instance, have a Ukrainian majority (78.91 % on the average), in the district of Rustakov of 26—13; the population of the entire district is composed of 41.3 % Ukrainians, 31.7 % Kazaks and 21.2 % Russians. Similar circumstances prevail in the area of Syr-Darja and in Western Siberia, for example at Omsk where 60 % Ukrainians live with 25 % Russians; here, too, there are five Ukrainian rayons whose names are derived from the old country, viz. Pavlohrad (81.2 % Ukrainians), Poltava (73.1 %), Odessa (63.4 %), Taurien (58.4 %) and Ural (52.4 %). Throughout the district of Slavhorod the Ukrainians, with 46.8 % of the population are relatively in the majority, while in the more limited area they represent even the absolute majority of 56 % as compared with 33 % Russians.

Another large center of Ukrainian colonisation lies in the Far East in the river basin of the Amur and Ussuri: here, official statistics for 1926 give for a large area of 1 400 000 square kilometres with an entire population of 1 256 292 an official Ukrainian population of 315 203, in reality approximately 600 000 Ukrainians (48 % of the entire population) as compared with 205 000 Russians (16 %), 166 000 Koreans (13 %), 125 000 Kazaks (10 %), 5 % Chinese and 3 % White Ruthenians. The entire Far East, (including Transbaikalia), although four times bigger, still had 612 217 Ukrainians i. e. 25.43 % of its entire population of almost 2.5 millions.

● 167 In this area Ukrainians live mostly in districts on the frontier between Korea and Manchukuo, round the towns of Spask and Khabarovsk on the river Amur and also near Vladivostok and Blagovishchensk and reaching as far as Kharbin in Manchukuo. In these districts the national feeling was definitely Ukrainian which was not without influence on political life during the revolution of 1917—1921; for this feeling managed to express itself and to get special state agencies for Ukrainian affairs erected.

World War I, the revolution and the post-war years caused at first a complete stoppage of emigration; but in the years 1924—1927 173 000 people emigrated from the Soviet Ukraine (8.5 % of the natural increase). The nationalisation of the soil, the collectivisation of landed property, the complete impoverishment of the peasantry and the impossibility of free emigration have created a situation the consequences of which we have no means of judging and of which we know little.

Emigration from Ukrainian territory in Austro-Hungary developed along different lines. Here there was no land free for immigrants: moreover the peasants were far too poor to take part in any big scheme of colonisation. In the 18th century some thousand of peasants were transferred to the Bachka and Slavonia where about 20 000 of them still live to-day, in particular near Ruski Kerestur, having preserved their national language and habits. In the eighteen-nineties some 10 000 Ukrainian peasants from Galicia were settled at Prnjavor and Banjaluka and they, too, regard themselves as Ukrainians to-day. In view of the great increase in population and the consequent splitting up of family holdings, such attempts at colonisation naturally mean little. Almost half of the holdings in Galicia are no bigger than 2 ha; in addition to economic pressure, caused by dividing large Polish estates among new Polish settlers, political pressure was also increased, so that the position of the Ukrainian peasant became desperate. This was the origin of emigration overseas.

Emigration to the New World had already set in sporadically in the sixties among the Lemki and the Ukrainians in the

Carpathians, who had tried to find a living in North America. 167
They were followed in 1867 by Russian Ukrainians who settled in Alaska and by some families from Eastern Galicia and the victims of religious persecution in Russia. Once the favorable conditions for Canadian immigrants were known, many more left the Bucovina and Eastern Galicia; but a real fever of emigration was only occasioned when foreign agents opened a campaign for South America with the result that 26 % of the natural increase left the home country in the last decade of the 19th century, and from 35—45 % in the following decade, although South American conditions were not at all suitable for Ukrainians. Hundreds of thousands rushed out of the country in those days, thereby making it possible for the Poles to settle their own nationals in Eastern Galicia, fertile Podolia and elsewhere. It was a blessing that this wild emigration did not last; Ukrainian organisations managed to reduce the movement to some kind of order and to steer colonists away from South America to Canada.

At the same time emigration for the season to Germany was organised, a habit that had brought employment in Europe to unemployed and poor peasants. In the years 1907/8—1911/12 this movement comprised more than 75 000 persons a year and reached over 100 000 directly before World War I. Smaller groups went to Bohemia, Roumania and Denmark, even to France, Belgium and England.

After the war both of these opportunities became more restricted, if not completely blocked. America and Canada began to demand so much from their colonists that many turned again to South America. Seasonal emigration to Germany had been forbidden by the Poles and was now mainly directed to France where, before the economic crisis of 1931, it accounted for more than 250 000 people. At the same time a considerable number of Ukrainians began to return home as may be seen from the following table which represents emigration from Poland, Roumania and Czechoslovakia in the years 1919—1935:

● 167

Countries	emigration		returning emigrants		balance
including					
European countries		74 000		35 000	39 000
Overseas i. e.		146 000		15 000	131 000
United States	13 000		2 000	11 000	
Canada	73 000		6 000	67 000	
Argentine	47 000		5 000	42 000	
Brazil	8 000		1 000	7 000	
total		220 000		50 000	170 000

In those days most emigrants came from Eastern Galicia; from here and from the Kholm district they went to America or as seasonal laborers to France, from Volynia and Polesya to America, while Ukrainians from Roumania settled in Canada only. In the years 1920—1934 23 300 persons emigrated from the Carpatho-Ukraine, of whom 15 100 (65 %) were Ukrainians, 4 100 (17.5 %) Jews, 2 400 (14.7 %) Magyars and 600 (2.7 %) others.

Most Ukrainian emigrants to America went to the United States; from Galicia alone more than 300 000 Ukrainians went there in the years 1900—1919; and about the same number left Ukrainian territory in Austria-Hungary. At present about 750 000—800 000 Ukrainians live in the United States, mainly in the East, in New York and Jersey City, Philadelphia, Chicago, Pittsburg, Detroit and Cleveland, most of them being employed in the professions, and as miners, factory hands, artisans and businessmen in a small way. The most important Ukrainian organisations, unions and papers are in New York, Chicago and Philadelphia. In Jersey City the "Svoboda" (Liberty) — 40 000 subscribers — the largest Ukrainian daily in America, is published and in Philadelphia the "Ameryka", the most important organ of the Ukrainian Greek Catholics. Ukrainians are also found in smaller places as agricultural settlers and, particularly in the West, form fairly compact "islands" which even have Ukrainian names. In Dakota, for instance, there is a place called Ukraina and in Olyphant Pa the Ukrainians have a burgermeister of their own and their own municipal administration.

Ukrainians in North America are particularly well organised and have their own cultural and economic organisations amount-

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ing to several thousands which are mostly amalgamated in a "Union of Ukrainian Organisations" (Objednannja) in Philadelphia. They are above all fortunate in the excellent organisation of insurance and welfare enterprises, of which practically all Ukrainians, including children, are members. The Ukrainians from Hungary are best organised, their central organisation, the "Soedinenie" (Union), amounting to about 160 000. 167

Other important central organisations of Ukrainians are listed below:

Name	Founded	Number of members	Property in dollars
Ukrajinskyj Narodnyj Sojus (Jersey City) Ukrainian National Association	1894	33 468	3 256 206
Ukrajinskyj Robitnychyj Sojus (Scranton) Ukrainian Workers' Association	1910	15 958	1 549 904
Provydinnja (Philadelphia) Guidance	1912	15 278	635 084
Ukrajinska Narodnja Pomich (Pittsburg) Ukrainian Welfare Organisation	1915	9 000	250 000
Zhoda Bratstv (Olyphant) United Brethren	—	2 000	—

Most Ukrainians in America belong to the Greek Catholic United Church and have two sees, one for immigrants from Austria (126 churches with a membership of 244 118) and another for Hungarian Ukrainians (175 churches with a membership of 309 04[illegible]). Orthodox Ukrainians have been organised in two special churches and have 63 parish offices and 57 churches. There is also a Ukrainian Protestant Church.

Canada comes next as a goal of emigration for the Ukrainians. According to official Canadian statistics of 1941, 305 929 Ukrainians are now living in Canada. But this number represents only about half of the Ukrainian settlers, as they are often

167 listed according to their land of origin, i. e. as Austrians, Hungarians, Galicians, Poles, Russians etc. A careful estimate puts them at more than 400 000 which is almost 3 % of the entire population of Canada (11 506 655). In Canada they rank fourth after settlers from England, France and Germany and are concentrated mainly in the three western provinces of Manitoba, Saskachewan and Alberta, where they live in groups in large areas, so that they can make their influence felt in politics and also lead their own cultural life. They have made great progress in Canada in the course of time and have a good reputation as excellent colonists, as may be seen in the article by Prof. Phillippovich, a well known Austro-Hungarian political economist who wrote when the emigration movement was still young (1905): "What makes their presence of particular importance is their readiness to do work that is open to everybody in a new country, and that is the hardest to do, namely ordinary unskilled labor and personal service. The Ruthenian (Ukrainian) girls have a great reputation as domestic servants throughout the West. The agent general for colonisation told me that he has known little personal comfort after his Ruthenian maid left his home. And the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) build railways and roads. And when they have earned enough to be able to settle on a holding, then they work the stiffest soil with an industry and perseverance that wins the greatest respect. We reckon them among our most successful settlers, as the Vice-Minister of the Interior wrote me, a verdict which, as an impartial observer, I have heard confirmed by English officials. Our poor, despised, or at best ignored Ruthenians have come to their own there. The colonist's work is difficult and full of hardships and their simple tastes and physical endurance are valuable guarantees of success . . . But their personality grows with success. The same people finally become owners of what is for us a large farm, which they work with machines, and on which they can call dozens of cattle herds their own. They become shrewd men of business and learn to manage things like men of commercial experience."

Revolution, they did not seriously consider the situation which was then presented. At the same time, the French were so interested in the restoration of Poland that they had little inclination to listen to representatives of a people who were in opposition to their friends. 175 648

We thus see that the chief relations between England and Ukraine were to be found in the diplomatic sphere and in the reports of travellers and the works of various professors who were interested in the Slav languages and literatures, while the professors of history in the later periods were inclined to accept the various Russian theories of their own history, which were of course opposed to Ukraine. There was no opportunity for any large-scale personal acquaintance with the Ukrainians or their problems, and in this the Ukrainian situation followed closely the general pattern of British relations with the other countries of Eastern Europe.

Then at the end of the nineteenth century, a new situation arose in the United States and a little later in Canada. There came a relatively large-scale immigration of Ukrainians who settled chiefly in the factory and mining centers of the Eastern United States and the prairie farming regions in Western Canada. Most of these new immigrants came from Western Ukraine which was under the domination of Austria-Hungary as a wave of the great migration of peoples from that area. The difference in their choice of occupations in the United States and Canada was largely due to the difference between the methods adopted by the two countries in dealing with new arrivals. In the United States, they were allowed to find employment as they would and they gravitated to areas where there was already a considerable population of Slavs from Austria-Hungary. In Canada they were encouraged by the government to settle on still unoccupied land in the northwest and were given opportunities for acquiring their own land, as immigrants had been in the United States a half century before. 167 ●

Relatively few of the Ukrainian educated class came to the New World. The vast majority were peasants who hoped in the beginning to acquire the money in a few years to return to their old homes and live there in relative comfort. They were only

● 167 dimly conscious of their nationality and they were frequently registered by the immigration authorities who were themselves often ill informed as Ruthenians, Russians, Galicians, Austrians and Hungarians. In short they represented exactly that attitude and those classes for whom Ivan Franko was called to do so much preparatory work, before they could become fully conscious of their own value and their own national identity.

During the early years they had to undergo many hardships. Life was strange to them, far stranger than many had expected when they had listened to the tales of returning friends or the siren appeals of the steamship agencies. In communities where they were gathered in some numbers, they were drawn together and for their own protection and assistance, they began to organise along the lines which had been worked out by those nationalities which had preceded them. This process was accelerated, as they began to take root in their new environment and give up their plans for returning home in a few years.

000 Their first organisation were churches, whether of the Byzantine Catholic rite or of the Orthodox. The former had to contend again with the lack of information about them of many of the Roman Catholics who were ill prepared for the arrival of Uniat priests among them, and it was not until 1907 that they secured their first bishop.

The Orthodox came under the influence of the Russian clergy who were pushing southward from the Russian Orthodox mission established in Alaska before its purchase by the United States.

Another valuable instrument for organisation proved to be the fraternal organisation, which as a secular corporation could be organised under American laws for the development of mutual insurance funds and could also provide centres for recreation and for the self-improvement of its members in the broadest sense of the word. The first of these which has passed through several reorganisations and is still the largest is the "Ukrainian National Association" which was founded at Shamokin, Pennsylvania, in 1894. Several other such groups were founded and developed successfully but there is now a marked tendency toward consolidation among them.

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311 and the Middle East have been left in suspense, a territory the size of
648 Europe and new routes into the heart of China and ultimately to the Pacific have been brought under Soviet control. Under these circumstances 'the wheat-fields of the Ukraine' receded again into the background and became of only local importance: the more so since, in the two Soviet 'Economic Plans', interest in South-Eastern Russia has been concentrated on the industrial development of the New Russian region. These conditions are illustrated by the growth of industrial centres like Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Lugansk, Zaporozhie, and the decline of the great grain port of Odessa.

311 The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine has never in fact justified the enthusiasm which it has inspired from the time of the seventeenth-century Polish poet quoted in an earlier context to the more recent period of Herr Hitler and his apostles of *Lebensraum*. The natural conditions of the Ukraine are such that they really generously reward agricultural labour, but they exact always patient, strenuous and systematic toil.

Natural conditions differ greatly over the expanse of the country which Michael Dragomanov considered to constitute 'Greater Ukraine'. The agricultural 'age' of these territories differs in the extreme. In New Russia agriculture is only a century old, while Galicia has supported a numerous population of husbandmen for nearly a thousand years.

162 *Galicia* is one of the oldest agricultural lands of all Europe and
134 conditions there have hardly altered since the days of Daniel and his
311 *boyars*. The Galician earth, black in the eastern part, is tired old soil, impoverished by incessant labour, itself prompted and intensified by
● 167 the ever-growing care of an ever-growing population to acquire its daily bread. Owing to the density of the population (110, and in some regions 132, inhabitants to the square kilometre) the area of holdings had been reduced to a minimum: 46 per cent of the farms comprise 2 hectares of land and sometimes less; 37 per cent comprise from 2 to 5 hectares. In a countryside where urban life has remained relatively stagnant live 75 per cent of the total population; while all commerce and crafts remain in the hands of the Jews in the large towns and in many of the villages, there is a 50 per cent surplus of hands among agricultural labourers. The peasants, Poles and Ukrainians alike, used to migrate to Germany and France as casual labour; before the last war they emigrated also in large numbers to Canada and the United States.

These arduous conditions of peasant life gradually developed
474 a capacity for organization. Driven by necessity, the Galician peasantry set up a network of co-operatives for production and

722 no efforts were made to bring them together or to conduct a
814 revival of the Ukrainian work that had been so ruthlessly and needlessly shattered. It was a wartime device adopted for a passing situation and the masters in the Kremlin well understood that the fury of the war had done more than they had ever dreamed possible for the disintegration of the various Soviet Republics. Once, therefore, the evacuation had taken place, the Soviet leaders had only to sit by and to reap the profits. There would be plenty of time for that later and so the war years seemed an intermission in the relentless pressure that had been exerted in the past.

648 It was for the Soviet leaders a far more vital problem to
661 recover the masses of the people who had fled to the west or had been carried away by the Germans and who might, even in case
● [167] of a victory of the democratic powers, reveal the full force of the Soviet pressure. That was why they welcomed the Yalta Agreement which provided for the compulsory return to the USSR of all refugees and deported persons and why, once peace was restored, they showed such devilish ingenuity in trying to recover the control of every one who could testify from personal experience as to the nature of the Soviet rule.

It was with the greatest surprise and lack of comprehension that the Western leaders became aware of this situation. They had listened eagerly to the Soviet siren songs that it was only Nazi sympathizers and criminals and traitors who did not want to return under the Soviet rule and it required some months before supposedly serious statesmen recovered their equilibrium sufficiently to understand the way in which they had been duped in the middle of the war.

Yet, no sooner had Soviet rule been reestablished than the old processes were revived with even greater energy and vigor. The last masks of independence or of free thought in the cultural or economic fields were torn away and the old persecution and charges were pressed with every increasing zeal.

668* time was allotted to the process of registering "popular approval" [661] for incorporation of the occupied lands in the Soviet Union. A "Ukrainian National Congress," "elected" immediately after the Soviet invasion, met on October 26; on November 1 the head of its plenary committee, M. I. Panchyshyn, sent a request for admission to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; on November 15, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet) of the latter division of the Soviet state approved the request; thus East and West Ukraine were "united." [59]

[626] In spite of the complete replacement of independent press and 648 political organizations by Communist agencies, however, a strong ● 167 effort was made in the early months to attract support for the new regime. Perhaps one reason for this attempt was the desire to influence Ukrainians still outside the enlarged Soviet Ukrainian Republic, especially in the Generalgouvernement. In a protocol to the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, which had defined the frontier between the parts of Poland annexed by the two totalitarian powers, it was provided that the government of the USSR should place no obstacles in the way of migration of ethnic Germans from eastern Poland to Germany. This secured for the Nazis the right to "bring home" the tens of thousands of German-speaking Volhynians. In return, Germany acknowledged an equal right of Belorussians and Ukrainians to migrate to the Soviet Union.[60] In accordance with a further provision of the protocol, a Soviet "repatriation" commission was allowed to travel through the Lemko region in early 1940;[61] by the end of June, it had induced only thirty-five hundred Ukrainians to cross the border into the Soviet Union, however.[62]

[59] S. M. Belousov and O. P. Ohloblyn, *Zakhidna Ukraïna* (The West Ukraine) (Kiev: Akademiia Nauk URSR, Instytut Istoriï Ukraïny, 1940), pp. 108 ff.

[60] Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*, eds. Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington: Department of State, 1948), pp. 104–5.

[61] *Krakauer Zeitung*, February 18–19, 1940, p. 6, reports the departure of one thousand Ukrainians from this area after a visit of the Soviet commissioners.

[62] According to *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, pp. 2–3. In an article which was remark- 167 ably hostile to the Soviet regime, in view of the latter's publicly cordial relations with Germany at that time, the Nationalist paper stated that the "intensive propaganda" of the Soviet commission, aided by "the pro-Russian intelligentsia" but combatted by "healthy Ukrainian elements," had resulted in the meager migration

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The campaign to win friends in Galicia and Volhynia was in part negative; measures which were most likely to inflame anti-Soviet sentiments were avoided. The church was not entirely suppressed, though it was sharply criticized.[63] Its real property was confiscated and the religious orders disbanded.[64] The Soviet authorities weakened the influence of the church on the youth by liquidating the Catholic school system and forcibly inducting the children into Communist organizations.[65] However, the person of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was respected.[66] The part of the intelligentsia which was not prominent in politics was allowed to remain at large, although persons in callings such as the law sometimes found it necessary to turn to nonprofessional work.[67] On the more positive side, the Ukrainian language was given a far greater scope than it had enjoyed under Polish rule. In particular, the University of L'vov was formally Ukrainized in language and personnel, although it is said that the resistance of remaining Polish professors to lecturing in Ukrainian was not harshly dealt with.[68] Students from the East Ukrainian universities were brought on tours to the West Ukraine, and L'vov students made Communist-sponsored trips to Kiev.[69] Other ele-

cited. Either this is one of the not too infrequent examples of ability of the Prague publication to print items contrary to German policy, or someone in authority gave the signal for an anti-Soviet attitude even at that early date. In the latter case it may have been a subtle riposte in the hidden conflict over Soviet demands for Bukovina. On the other hand, as early as March the *Krakauer Zeitung* printed a report by a German who had visited the villages of the Lemko area. He praised the young Ukrainians, noting that they wore the national blue and yellow colors and greeted him with "Heil Hitler!" and "Slava Ukraïna!" (Glory to the Ukraine) (*Krakauer Zeitung*, March 7, 1940, p. 5).

[63] See F. Iastrebov, "Uniats'ke dukhovenstvo na sluzhbi u polskoho panstva" (The Uniate Clergy in the Service of the Polish Aristocracy), *Komunist*, October 9, 1939, p. 2.

[64] "Die Tragödie der ukrainisch-katholischen Kirche," *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, January, 1952, p. 14.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 18, 1942, p. 4; Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), p. 112.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] Interview 36.

[68] For the official Soviet version see M. Marchenko (the new rector of the University of L'vov), "L'vivs'kyi Universytet na novykh shliakhakh" (L'vov University on New Paths), *Komunist*, December 16, 1939, p. 2.

[69] Interview 51; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, on a trip of about forty students of the L'vov veterinary school to Kiev in the spring of 1940.

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V. REPRESSION AND REICHSKOMMISSARIAT

THE DRASTIC MEASURES taken by the Germans against the Bandera forces seemingly had cleared the field for the activity of the OUN-M. Like the apparent advantage gained by Bandera's group in the early summer, this opportunity soon proved to be an illusion. For some two months, however, Mel'nyk's adherents were able to carry on far-reaching activities in the central Ukraine. Since the beginning of this period coincided with the capture of Kiev by German troops, and the Ukraine's second city, Kharkov, fell before it ended, the interlude was of great importance in enabling the OUN-M to spread the doctrine of Nationalism in the former Soviet area. 668*

On September 19, 1941, the Germans occupied Kiev. Two or three days later, the first groups of Mel'nyk adherents arrived from the base in Zhitomir, and rapidly set about organizing national life in the city.[1] This was a difficult task at best because the Soviet forces had inflicted severe injuries on the city before leaving. A large part of this damage consisted of physical destruction, especially of industrial facilities and means of communication.[2] Even more serious from the point of view of rebuilding an anti-Communist, national civil life was the wholesale deportation of intelligentsia. For example, only five of the members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences were left, the others having been evacuated to what the Communist government called the "new cultural capital" of the Ukraine, Ufa, in the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.[3] 727 668* 167

[1] Interview 65.

[2] Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), pp. 21–23.

[3] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 16, 1941, p. 2, and February 25, 1942, p. 4; *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 1, 1941, p. 1.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

decrease of popular support for Germany in the Ukraine. There is good evidence that the population was at first sympathetic to the German efforts to recruit labor voluntarily.[70] Moreover, a large number of nationalist Ukrainians supported the measure; they not only wanted to help Germany win the war against the Soviet Union, but believed that it would be a valuable cultural experience for young Ukrainians to come into contact with advanced German technology and with Western European culture in general. To them it was means of drawing the Ukrainian nation away from its too-close association with the Russians and the "Asiatics" of their empire and of establishing a European orientation for their country.[71]

Unhappily for these visions, the methods used by the Germans in dealing with the volunteer workers soon dried up the supply. They were frequently given miserable transportation and poor accommodations on arrival in Germany. Highly trained workers and professional men who had volunteered in order to increase their technical ability by experience in Germany were assigned to common labor.[72] Most important, however, the Ukrainians, like other *Ostarbeiter,* were forced to wear a humiliating badge distinguishing them from Western Europeans; they were forbidden social contacts with the latter and, in order to implement this decree, were excluded from motion-picture theaters, restaurants, and other public places. The erstwhile willing worker felt that the Germans regarded him (as many did) as nothing but a Bolshevik prisoner.[73]

When this policy of segregation resulted in lack of volunteers, force was used; mandatory labor service for young men and women was officially introduced in the Reichskommissariat on September 21, 1942,[74] but in practice compulsion had long been employed. In reply to the inevitable evasion of this order, the most demoralizing of tricks—such as seizure of worshippers at

[70] Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete in Heeresgebiet B, First Lieutenant Theurer, October 7, 1942, PS 054 (hereafter referred to as PS 054).

[71] E.g., *Krakivs'ki Visti,* February 6, 1942, p. 2.

[72] PS 054.

[73] Opinion report for period June 12–July 14, 1942, Auslandbriefprüfstelle, Gruppe VIII, PS 302 (hereafter referred to as PS 302).

[74] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* September 22, 1942, p. 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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church services and invitations by German authorities to theatrical performances at which all were arrested—were utilized. Force and brutal retaliation, such as burning of villages from which the potential workers ran away, were frequently applied.[75] The conscripts were sent a thousand miles to Germany in unheated cattle cars, sealed with barbed wire. Still worse, there was no just selection of those most suited for departure, no systematic registration.[76] Mothers of small children were sometimes taken; sons and husbands who were the only support of their families were conscripted without adequate provision for the families' maintenance.[77]

The horror of such treatment was perhaps the single most important cause of popular revulsion against the Germans. In addition to all its material hardships, the mere idea of forced transportation to a distant and unknown land recalled the generations-old terror of banishment to Siberia.[78] The extent of the program was so enormous that every family was touched; it became a universal evil. Of the total population of Kiev, thirty-eight thousand persons (over 10 percent) were delivered to the *Ostarbeiter* program within the first ten months of German occupation.[79] In the southern *Generalbezirke* somewhat smaller numbers appear to have been involved[80] but in the crucial *Bezirk* of Zhitomir, one hundred and seventy thousand (about 6 percent of the population) were taken by mid-1943, and thirty thousand more were to follow.[81] In all, as early as August, 1943, one out of every forty inhabitants of the Ukraine had been deported to Germany as forced laborers,[82] and by the end of the occupation the number of

[75] Auslandbriefprüfstelle, report for September 11–November 11, 1942, PS 018 (hereafter referred to as PS 018).

[76] Landesbauernführer Körner, Die neue deutsche Ukraine-Politik, PS 1198 (hereafter referred to as PS 1198).

[77] Occ E-4 (1); PS 054.

[78] Oral report of Generalkommissar Leyser (Zhitomir) to Rosenberg, June 17, 1943, PS 265 (hereafter referred to as PS 265).

[79] Commander of the SP and the SS, Kiev, to Commander of the SP and the SS, Ukraine, July 20, 1942, NO 1603 (hereafter referred to as NO 1603).

[80] Only about 1 percent from *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev by mid-1942 (Conference of Sauckel and Reichskommissariat officials in Kiev, August 12, 1942, NO 1606; hereafter referred to as NO 1606).

[81] PS 265.

[82] According to Sauckel, director of the *Ostarbeiter* program, at a Führer Conference, August 20, 1943, NO 1831 (hereafter referred to as NO 1831).

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Ukrainian workers in Germany totaled one and one-half million.[83]

The suffering caused by the actions of the Germans described above[1] did not directly affect the activity of the nationalist elements, as did their repressive attitude toward education, religion, culture, and local administration. Indirectly, however, it played an enormous part in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine during the German occupation. One effect was a general subordination of all thought, all activity, to the demands of self-preservation. The constant struggle to keep alive resulted in a reduction of the energy and attention which could be devoted to all political questions, including nationalism. On the other hand, the sheer impossibility of coming to terms with the German authority, regardless of how ready one might be to sacrifice all independence to do so, led many to seek a political movement which promised deliverance. A vast number, of course, turned back to Communism, hoping that the experience of near-defeat would lead to a modification of Moscow's policies. For others, however, the only rational solution appeared to be the nationalist parties. 668*

Weak as they were after the waves of suppressions during the six months from September, 1941, to February, 1942, the two OUN groups endeavored to meet this challenge. Of the two factions, the Bandera group appears to have made the easiest, but not the most thorough-going adjustment. Its ability to adjust at a rather shallow level was due to several factors. The members of the OUN-B were nearly all young, and their movement placed little emphasis on systematic ideology. When they went to the East Ukraine, they carried a large number of slogans and romantic pledges as baggage.[84] These either attracted or antagonized

[83] PS 1198.

[84] One of these oaths, as discovered by the German police, reads:

"On my honor, for the fame of the fallen heroes, for the holy blood spilled, for my Ukrainian earth and the majesty of my Ukrainian homeland, I swear that I will struggle with all my strength and with my life for a free and Ukrainian state. With my heart, my soul, and my whole being I confess that only the Ukrainian revolution can give power to the Ukrainian state and the people. Unto death I will stand on the battlefield in order to build a national Ukrainian State. No one and nothing at all can hold me back from the path of the Ukrainian national revolution, neither difficulties nor death. I will carry out every command of my leader. I swear on the Ukraine, that I will loyally and honestly carry out

[1] [See category 116, pp. 118-124 -- Analyst]

of the Soviet regime and the quasi-disappearance of the 162
export of cereals and the importation of coal and of colonial products, Odessa has given up its place to Kharkov and then to Kiev, the first an industrial centre and the second an administrative one.

On the whole territory of the Ukraine 25·5 million human beings live in the country and obtain their means of existence from agriculture and allied trades and only 8,000,000 live in towns.

The latter thus form 24 per cent of the population, representing 19 per cent in Zone 1,* and 27 per cent in Zone 2.*

The principal occupations of these 8,000,000 town-dwellers are the following: workers, 6·5 million; military, officials, and free professions, 1 million; artisans, ½ million. As these figures are taken from Soviet statistics, the professions of traders, industrialists, and people of independent means are not represented.

It is interesting to note that of the 8,000,000 town-dwellers, 70 per cent are not Ukrainians but national minorities, which are less numerous in the country-side. Nevertheless their average proportion is much greater in Zone 2,* where it sometimes reaches 40 per cent, as, for example, in the district of Odessa, and nearly 50 per cent in the Donietz basin.

The natural outlet for the surplus agrarian population 167
of Zone 1* seems to be the great industrial centres such as the oil basin of the Donietz and the mines of Krivoi-Rog, where the landless peasants can find work. And yet the majority of the working mass has come from districts outside the Ukraine, whereas many of the farmers of these regions have emigrated to Eastern Siberia where they have founded whole villages. Others have gone to the United States or to Canada, where they have founded prosperous agricultural communities.

* [see Bregy 116, pp. 134- D. ---Analyst]

Attempts on a rising

661 were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.[1]

6. *The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East*

167 The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

668 Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrai-
186 nians, mostly farmers, were numbered. At that time a Ukrainian national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops, theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revolution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national, political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrainian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy. The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the develop-
[656] ment of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the
[191] development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrainians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow*, 1931, p. 33).

7. *The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars*

167 In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

[1] [During collectivization and famine in the Kuban region and the RSFSR, 1932-33 — Analyst]

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest: to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czechoslovakia met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrainian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Economic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrainian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrainian emigration developed. 167 563 873

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed a considerable activity. [815]

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name of their enslaved brethren. 563 186

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western territories of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily *Svoboda*. The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton, Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will*. There are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools, from American and Canadian Ukrainians. 563 575

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, farmers. The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about 1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest political organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Communist Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian [162] 563 575 668

8: Faden Ko H-4,5 (no date) 1951 RO1 UKraine KU1

3. *The New Ukrainian Political Emigration*

In consequence of the occupation of all Ukrainian territories by the armies of Soviet Russia, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had to remain outside the borders of their fatherland. In the first years after the termination of the war, the Ukrainian emigrants lived in Displaced Persons' Camps in Germany and Austria. Now the Ukrainians can be seen in all European and American countries, in Australia and New Zealand. These are all people who, for national and political reasons, opposed repatriation into a Ukraine oppressed by the Communist Government. They declared repeatedly, when they were threatened with forced repatriation, that they would sooner commit suicide than fall into the hands of their oppressors.

The Ukrainian emigrants in Europe and America are developing a considerable political and cultural activity. The central institutions of the Ukrainian political parties are remaining in exile where their press is being published, the elementary, secondary and academic schools are being operated — the Ukrainian University in Munich, the Ukrainian Technical University in Germany, until 1945 in Bohemia, and others.

After World War II the Ukrainian émigrés have created more scientific institutions: The Scientific Shevchenko Society, a continuation of the identical Society which had existed in Lviw since 1874, and had been destroyed by the Communist régime, and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science. These Ukrainian Scientific Societies are working effectively and have their branches in Europe and in America.

Under these circumstances, when in Ukraine enslaved by Soviet Russia, the Ukrainian political life is suppressed and cannot show itself freely, the Ukrainian emigrants think it their duty to speak in the name of their nation in the defence of its rights before civilised mankind. For this purpose the leaders of the Ukrainian parties created the Ukrainian National Council in July 1948, as the political representation of the Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainian National Council continues the tradition of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic which had been created through the will of the Ukrainian nation in 1918—1919. Many of the participants of the Ukrainian fight for liberation and many of the leaders of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic are still living. These men believe firmly that the time for the free state existence of the Ukrainian nation will come.

464 districts through the long winter has led to the crea-
[166] tion of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the
[563] country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel,
[511] Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful,
221 but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

● 167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any
511 branch of industry. The State makes no effort to
565 regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

369 were counted as towns, whereas in former times
162 even the huge peasant villages of 30,000 and 40,000 inhabitants were placed in the category of villages.

The result of the new census becomes particularly interesting if one brings in for comparison the Statistique de la population de l'Oukraine contemporaine published in 1929 by the statistical office of the Soviet Ukraine in Khar'kov in both Ukrainian and French. In this publication the population figure on January 1, 1929 is given as 30,363,547. According to that, the population of Soviet Ukraine increased from January 1, 1929 to January 17, 1939 by only 596,674 souls. From the beginning of the Five Year Plan period, however, the normal annual increase amounted to 600,000 souls, according to the birth surplus of 20 per thousand; this would be 6 millions in 10 years. Thus the population decreased by about 5.4 million souls from 1929 to 1939. In an evaluation of these results we must keep in mind the fact that since 1936 abortions have been punishable by 10 years imprisonment, and that a large immigration of Russian and Far Eastern elements has taken place, which was particularly promoted by Moscow.

162 No less serious than these factors is the
167 decrease of village population since 1926 by 4.41 million souls. Even if the largest part of these 4.41 million village inhabitants should be counted city dwellers, the decrease thus being only apparent, what has happened to the increase of the peasant population? The census of 1939 reveals the silent tragedy of the "dead frontier", the strip of land about 50 kilometers wide /168/ at the former Rumanian and Polish boundary, which had to be cleared of Ukrainian inhabitants. It betrays the famine from 1931 to 1933, the exiles
167 to the frosty North and the dislodgments. On this point the Komsomolets Ukrayiny of May 21 and 22, 1939 wrote that the Ukrainians were being

167 sent as farmers to the Far East and to Kazakstan, and as laborers to the construction of the railway lines Donets Basin-Moscow and Akmolinsk-Kartaly. The railway Akmolinsk-Kartaly crossed the desert of Kazakstan in an 806 kilometer stretch. The Visti of June 3, 1939 complete this picture when they write: "The Soviet Ukraine annually furnishes the newly-arisen industrial centers in the other Soviet Republics with hundreds of thousands of laborers. At Magnitogorsk, Kutsbas, in the Far East and on the Turkish Railway there are thousands of construction workers who come from all different parts of the Ukraine."

369 This policy of splitting up the Ukrainian people must in the long run have all the more fateful consequences since the cities in the Ukraine are primarily in foreign hands. "The Ukrainian people remained peasants and villagers; they left their cities in the hands of foreigners, Russians, Jews, Germans, Poles." This was the complaint even before the First World War of the Ukrainian geographer Rudnitskyj: (111) The Ukrain-

111. Rudnitskyj: ibid., page 162.

ian peasant son did not want to go to the city where people spoke in foreign tongues. Village tranquility and quiet romanticism he recaptured only in the country. And thus the Ukrainian peasant youth wandered by the hundreds of thousands to the Kuban, the Volga, to Siberia and yonder to the shores of the Pacific Ocean in order to colonize new land there, while foreigners took possession of the Ukrainian cities. The result was
162 369 that from 1926 to 1931 in the cities of all Ukrainian provinces there were 38.8 Ukrainians per 100 inhabitants, 28.1 Russians, 21.6 Jews, 6.9 Poles, 0.8 Germans and 3.8 of other nationalities. (112)

112. Kubiyovich: Georgraphy of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 307 and 308.

185 exists only in socialism." At the Party Congress in 1939, Stalin corrected these and similar expressions of conceit. He turned against the "fancifulness" of the advance estimates of the last Five Year Plan. The hopes of the proletarian masses of the Union for the promised paradise, nourished for more than twenty years, /183/ were abruptly destroyed by the "father of the people" with his allusion to the sacrifices which are still necessary in order to catch up with the most progressive states. There was still time for that, Stalin said, "and not a little time".

/184/ Emigrants

668 Although the Ukrainian people do not have a state (the Soviet Ukraine is merely a province of Moscow), they have three governments which have their seat in some foreign European country. There is the government of hetman Skoropadskiy which resigned in 1918 and was later revived in exile; then the directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic which originally consisted of five presidents. Its chairman Petliura is dead and its members have scattered. Finally there is a West Ukrainian government. The political emigration [162] from the Soviet Union, Bessarabia, Bukovina and Poland resides almost altogether in Europe. Here it numbers 150,000 souls including the emigrants. Of these about 50,000 East Ukrainians alone are living in what was formerly Poland, 50,000 Ukrainians are living in France, 15,000 without protectorate and 5000 under aprotectorate in Germany, 8000 in Belgium and 5000 each in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The rest are divided up among twelve countries.

The world knows little about the former goverments, nor do they stand out. All of them cling tenaciously to the fiction of their legality. The most active among them is the Petliura govern-

668 sech sharp shooters, Ievhen Konovalets who, after Petliura reached an understanding with the Poles separated from the dictator. Konovalet's successor is the former chief of staff of the Ukrainian army, chief of the sech sharp shooters Andrey Melnyk who was obliged to flee from Poland in 1938. The OUN has its strongest support in the Ukrainian emigrants in the USA - "Organization for the Political Revival of the Ukraine, New York" -, in Canada and South America. But also among the 150,000 European political refuges and emigrants it has the most adherents of all groups large and small. There are Ukrainian nationalists in almost all Central and West European capitals, among others in Rome, in Paris and in London where the "English-Ukrainian Society" establishes contact with the Ukrainian emigrants in Canada.

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167 /187/ When in the second half of the past century economic conditions became more and more unbearable in the Ukraine, many Ukrainians emigrated; from the Russian Ukraine to East Russia, from Galicia, from Carpatho-Ukraine, and from Bukovina overseas. In 1926, 771,000 Ukrainians lived outside the Ukraine proper in small and large linguistic islands, within European Russia, and 2,138,000 lived in Asia. In the United States there were about 700,000 Ukrainians, primarily workers; in Canada there were 300,000 mostly farmers; in Brazil 50,000 to 60,000, in Argentina 50,000, in the rest of the South American countries 10,000 to 20,000. (134)

134. Kubiyovich: Geography, page 321.

517 Organizations of compatriots of various kinds keep the Ukrainians together overseas. The closest ties are those between the farmers in

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians

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They are a mountain people who clung to the place where they
177 were born. This applies even to those who, through force of circum-
181 stances, had to leave their native village to earn their living elsewhere.
167 Some have found occupation in the fertile South; but when they have saved some money they want to return home and are prepared to pay a higher price for a few poor fields, although in the valleys of the South they could buy much better land for the same amount. Hundreds of thousands have emigrated to America, where about as many Ruthenians can be found as have remained in the homeland under the Carpathians. Yet many long to come back home to find their last resting place in the native soil.

137 The peculiar beauty of this forgotten country has a strong grip
313 on her simple sons. The Ruthenian Carpathians are not so high as the Slovak peaks, but the vast stretches of dense forest, which cover almost half of Ruthenia, give the country a more primeval appearance. Some of the woods and slopes are delightful idylls, where the fresh and fragrant air is full of hum and rustle and warble. But in many parts, unchartered and untouched by human hand, the forest is sombre. Trees felled by storm or gale lie dead where they have fallen, and there is a smell of rotting wood in this lonely wilderness. Wild boar, wolf, lynx and bear have their hunting ground here, while above the tops of the mighty pines, firs, oaks and maples, circle the eagle and the hawk. Other parts of the forest are enlivened by the rhythmical sound of the axe cutting down trees to be floated down the rushing mountain streams. A large proportion of the hardy Ruthenians earn their living in this way. But above this expanse of deep forest are the sunlit pastures and upland meadows sprinkled with gentian, buttercups, pansies, chrysanthemums and geraniums. Sheep and cattle graze here during the summer months; Ruthenia is also a country of shepherds, who blow their huge horns at night to gather the scattered herds.

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

Wooden dam in Ruthenia

Nor is Gogol an isolated example. Count Alexey Tolstoy too belongs to some extent to the Ukraine and no Ukrainian poet has succeeded in paying to his homeland a more beautiful lyrical tribute than Tolstoy's.

Were the Ukraine 'Little Russia' only, the land of the Cossacks, the problem would be more straightforward; but the Ukraine is, apart from minor territories, at least Little Russia plus New Russia. New Russia comprises those territories along the shores of the Black Sea which were incorporated into the Russian Empire for the most part under Catherine the Great. It was only by the amalgamation of Little Russia with a large part of New Russia that the Ukraine obtained a sea-coast and was able to include within its borders places like Odessa, Kherson, Mariupol and Nikolayev whose history was in no way linked with that of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmans. New Russia became a true microcosm of Europe. Just as the ancient and medieval history of New Russia is a mosaic of the history of many peoples which had settled on the northern shores of the Black Sea, traded with the goods and products of its hinterlands and founded states, a history of Greeks and Scythians, Khazars, Goths, Genoese and Tartars, so too the history of modern New Russia is a tale of all sorts of races. People from many lands transformed the steppe into arable soil, built ports and railway lines and developed the industry of the Donets Basin. New Russia was a little America in the sense of being a melting-pot of European races, with the difference, however, that not all pioneer settlers forgot the language of their forefathers in the Ukrainian-Russian surroundings.* The people who brought New Russia into being included sons of every nation of the Balkans, many Germans and even individual Frenchmen who assumed high administrative posts there. At least one Briton played a distinguished part in the development of New Russia, John Hughes, a pioneer of coal-mining in the Donets region, to whose initiative is due the foundation of the big industrial centre now called Stalino. (Until the early twenties the place was called after him 'Yuzovka'.)

UKRAINIAN DIASPORA IN THE U.S.S.R.

Whilst Russians and other peoples shared with the Ukrainians the credit for the colonization of what is to-day the Ukrainian S.S.R., millions of Ukrainians now live dispersed all over the Soviet Union.

The Ukraine, being a densely populated country, was able to contri-

* An ethnical group of colonists in New Russia, who were completely assimilated by their Russian-Ukrainian surroundings, were the Serbs, of whom about 100,000 came to the Southern Ukraine between 1739 and 1752. The Serbs colonized two Ukrainian regions, one on the right bank of the Dnieper, originally called 'New Serbia', and the other in the Donets Basin, called 'Slavyanoserbia'. A century after the Serbian pioneer immigration into New Russia the Serb element could no longer be traced in any population statistics of the Russian Empire.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Ukraine RD1

167 bute a large army of colonists to the Slav ethnical expansion towards the East at the end of the nineteenth and in the twentieth century. To describe the Ukrainians as junior partners in the Russian colonization of Eurasia would hardly do full justice to the role which they played. Thus among the eight 'Governments' of European Russia which between 1897 and 1911 supplied the highest number of settlers for Russian Asia four were predominantly Ukrainian, Poltava, Chernigov, Kiev and Kharkov – two were Byelorussian – Mogilev and Vitebsk, and only two Great Russian – Kursk and Voronezh.

167 The share of the Ukrainians in the Eurasiatic colonization makes any
162 complete separation of Ukrainians and Russians, such as the extreme Ukrainian nationalists advocate, difficult if not impossible. Almost everywhere throughout the Soviet Empire there are Ukrainians living as workers, peasants and technical specialists. According to incomplete figures referring to the early thirties 1,049,000 Ukrainians then lived in Kazakhstan, 966,000 in Western Siberia, 447,000 in the Lower Volga region and roughly 400,000 in the Far East.[1] Smaller groups of Ukrainians lived in the Middle Volga region (215,000), in the Ural region (137,000) and in the western regions of the R.S.F.S.R. (186,000). This
[101] last-mentioned group of Ukrainians, particularly those of the province of Bryansk, constitute a particularly interesting species. They speak a strange Russian-Byelorussian-Ukrainian mixed language but have retained some sort of romantic attachment to the Ukraine on account of the alleged relationship of their forefathers with the Ukrainian Cossacks.[2]

The largest Ukrainian group outside the Ukraine, over 3,500,000 strong, inhabits the North Caucasus region where the Ukrainians in certain areas form up to 60 per cent of the total population. Ukrainian nationalists have therefore demanded that the borders of the Ukrainian Republic should be shifted towards the east to include in particular the fertile Kuban area.

The Ukrainian diaspora, particularly in the R.S.F.S.R., was steadily reinforced throughout the inter-war period. Between the 1926 and the 1939 census a considerable number of Ukrainians left the Ukraine to settle in the new industrial centres of Russia proper, thus increasing the Russian-Ukrainian intermixture. Through this migration such typical national Ukrainian provinces as Poltava and Vinnitsa lost within twelve years 15 and 7 per cent, respectively, of their total population.

RUSSIAN DIASPORA IN THE UKRAINE

000 From the point of view of future Ukrainian-Russian relations the existence of the Russian ethnical element in the Ukraine is no less important than the numerous Ukrainian diaspora in the R.S.F.S.R. and in the Central Asiatic Soviet Republics.

000 you with a strong drink of spirits after your long journey.

/23/ Grand-Princes

101 A song attributed to Mazepa compares the Ukrainian people to a bird that builds its nest
•174 in a tree on a much-frequented street, and is therefore often startled and obliged to live in a state of constant unrest. Today it has been proved that the ancestors built their nest very early along the much-traveled road from Asia to the lower Danubian plains. According to the most recent research (10), the Ukrainians settled as

10. According to verbal statements of the Ukrainian archaeologist Pasternak of Lwow.

early as the Bronze Age between Carpathia, San, Pripyat and Dniepr. Even at that time they were obliged to shoulder a foreign yoke. At all times nomadic peoples with their herds of many hundreds of thousands of sheep, horses and camels were attracted to the succulent grasses of this endless steppe. A thousand years before our era the Cimmerii rode into the Ukrainian settlements at the head of restless peoples. Whether they were nomads or farmers, and whether they came over the Danube or the Volga has not yet been made clear. At about the same time the Thracians in the west sought their way from the Balkans across the Carpathians to East Galicia. To them the native population owes its ceramic art. The period of nomadic invasions occupies 2600 years of the country's history. The Scythians follow the Cimmerii about 800 B.C. Herodotus tells of their battles. Through him and through excavations we learn of the culture of this Mongol-Iranian people. The goldsmith's work with its magnificent ornaments, mostly of Greek origin, found in their

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graves, calls forth our admiration. Their aristocratic kingdom of the steppes was rigidly organized. For 400 years /24/ their kings accompanied by their retinues rode through the Pontic Plain until they were driven out by a stronger people, the Sarmatians. Scythians as well as Sarmatians repeatedly broke into Hungary on their marauding expeditions. In the second century of our era it is assumed that the Goths arrived in this plain of peoples. They came by way of the water route from the land of the Baltic and were the first river navigators in the Ukrainian countries - according to one group of investigators. Others say they are aborigines, and still others, have them come from the west or even the east. They allegedly dragged their boats on rollers across the flat watersheds between the rivers which flow toward the Baltic or the Black Sea. The fact that in the southern lands they did not sever connections with their homeland is proved by the military and commercial points of support which they established along these waterways. Their neighbors in Galicia were the Vandals. It was in 370 A.D. that the flood of Huns from Mongolia reached the dwellings of the Goths and swept away the latter. This was only the first wave of later mixed Finno-Turkish tides. This inexhaustible stream of humanity, at times slower, at other times torrential, engulfing everything, flowed along. Unpredictable was the will of these hordes which through many generations led a hunter's and shepherd's existence, only to plunge suddenly, like wolves, into the dwelling-places of foreign peoples.

It was not long before the Huns exhausted these ideal pastures and rode on in order to threaten western peoples. Along their trails the herds of the Bulgarians and after them the herds of the Turkish Avars passed across the Pontic Steppes. Finally, the Finno-Turkish race

101 of Khazars established a kingdom here, which
•174 extended from the Volga to the Danube. The Khazars were nomads who became domiciled, founded cities and carried on trade. At their court the Jews obtained predominating influence, and it sounds almost unbelievable to say that the khans adopted the faith of Moses. /Facing page
[000] 24: Character study of a Ukrainian head*/Facing page 25: A Ukrainian girl with pronounced nordic feature*/25/

[101] Kiyev, the center of the Polyani, was tri-
[174] butary to the Khazar. The Slavic tribes of the
181 Antae, the ancestors of the Ukrainians, were divided and fought one another. In the establishment of their society they scarcely developed beyond the formation of a district with several peasant communities. Fields and pastures belonged to all jointly. Family life was a patriarchy, and unanimity was demanded at the village and district meetings. These Slavs built compact houses of loam, and placed embankments around their towns. They cultivated their fields, made pottery and bartered their goods for swords, knives and various handicraft products. They offered sacrifice to the sun god Dashdboh, the wind god Stryboh, the thunder god Perun and other deities.

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175 It was the Swedish Vikings, called Varangians, who in the ninth and tenth centuries unified the Slavic tribes and established a kingdom with Kiyev as the capital, which, during its most flourishing period, extended from the Carpathians to the Volga and from the Caucasus to the White Sea. They rowed in boats to Lake Ilmen, founded Novgorod and from there, about the middle of the ninth century, conquered Kiyev. Rurik was the name of the Viking king of Novgorod; his warriors were called Rus', meaning "rowers",

*[For plates, cf. pp. 217-218, Category 11c - Analyst]

181 political life of the Ukrainians, in that of the Great Russians a tendency toward materialsim prevails. The Ukrainians incline toward federation, the Russians toward absolutism; the Ukrainians have a tendency to prefer personal freedom, the Russians despotism. As a result of these contrasts, he says, there is an eternal battle between the two peoples. (79)

79. Zalozieckij: The Spiritual Life of the Ukraine in the Past and Present.

144 The difference between Russians and Ukrainians are racially conditioned and historically substantianted. The hemotogenetic basis of the Russian people are the aboriginal Finno-Ural-Altaic peoples. These mixed with the advancing Slavs and later, at the time of the sovereignity of the Asiatic hordes, also with Tatars. In Ukrainian blood Slavic as well as Nordic components - Goths, Varangians - predominate. But Armenoids and Mediterranean races have gained influence, and a dash of Tatar blood cannot be lacking. The 142 Ukrainian is in general tall. He has broad shoulders, a round or semi-round skull, straight nose, high forehead, small mouth and small ears. His skin is slightly dark, his hair abundant, straight and predominantly dark. The Kubans in the East and the Huzuls in the West are the tallest, with an average height of 170 centimeters.

•174 Historically the differences between the two /131/ peoples were revealed even at the time the Golden Horde subjugated them both. To this day the Russians boast of the fact that at that time they had carried on a more clever Tatar policy, that they had yielded and voluntarily paid the head tax - in contrast to the Ukrainians. While in that century Ukrainian high nobility played the leading cultural role at the court of the Lithuanian Gedemins, the Muscovite grand prince

•174 Ivan Kalita destroyed the power of the nobility and therewith laid the foundation for Muscovite despotism. A further example of historically proved contrariety is furnished during the time of Ivan the Terrible. The most sinister force rules at that time in Moscow, while in the Ukraine the Cossacks are preparing to found the freest state that probably ever existed in East Europe.

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101 184 Among the Ukrainians there are, in turn, tribal differences. The inhabitants of the dark forest region of Podlakhia and Polesia, who are obliged to wrest all fruits from the earth, can scarcely be as gay as those of the sunny spaces of the south. Those are melancholy and oppressed people who up there carry on the struggle for existence. Farther south, from the fertile hills of Podolia way over to the foothills of the Caucasus, there are fields of golden grain, fruit grows of its own accord, the sky is blue for many months, and on the Kuban there is paradise itself. Cheerful, candid people live here.

181 The Ukrainians are a peasant people and more than 90% of all children first see the light of the world through the small window-panes of a straw- or shingle-covered cottage. They are peasant souls - that is, quiet, good-natured, placid human beings who cling to the sod, to their own farm, who want to plow, sow and reap. They are poor, but honest and at the same time hospitable and positively ceremonially polite. People like to call them "Southerners" because of their cheerful disposition and their humor. They love that contemplative life which /132/ is hard to combine with constant hard work. It has not been a blessing to the Ukrainian that the soil yields richly and effortlessly, that his daily bread need not be obtained amid constant toil and hardships. If that were the case, perhaps he

113, 175, 795, 474 Ukraine RD1

[For information pertaining to Soviet policies in the Western Ukraine, particularly in regard to the Uniate Church and collectivization, see 26: Anonymous, R1 Soviet Union, Cat. 116.]

ween Novokhopersk and Rostov and that extending from Rostov to Otomanivsk. 101 131

It is only in the western section that the frontier runs between the purely Ukrainian area in west Sub-Caucasia (Kuban area) and the Don area; eastern Sub-Caucasia is a mixed belt of Ukrainians and Russians. In the south-east, therefore, we must speak of two frontiers of Ukrainian territory, a narrower and a wider one. The former separates Ukrainian Transcaucasia from the eastern part of Transcaucasia that is partly Russian, while the latter also includes eastern Sub-Caucasia. Throughout its course, the south-eastern frontier is blurred and by no means fixed, as the process of colonisation is still going on.

c) Boundaries and Territories of the three Historical Ukrainian States

The Kyiv state stretched in the 11th and 12th centuries from the Wyslok to the Donets and included areas which were not colonised and others whose inhabitants were not Ukrainians. It embraced almost 1153 846 square miles, almost 1/6 of which was constantly inhabited by Ukrainians. 131 175

The second Ukrainian state (the realm of the Cossacks) had an area of about 115 384 square miles, western Ukraine was not included within its boundaries.

The third Ukrainian state covered the entire area settled by the Ukrainian people, with the exception of the Don area and Sub-Caucasia. Without annexations (which were of brief duration), the third state covered about 242 308 square miles, with the Crimean Peninsula, a part of the Voronesh district, Carpathian Ukraine and Bucovina 265 384 square miles, i. e. less than the entire Ukrainian ethnographical territory (276 269 sq. miles) and much less than the entire territory originally settled by Ukrainians (357 885 sq. miles).

d) Size of the Ukrainian territory

Up to World War I 29 039 sq. miles of the Ukrainian territory belonged to Austria-Hungary and the remainder to Russia. After the end of World War I and a short period of inde- 131 162 175

131 pendence in the years 1917—1920, Ukraine was distributed among the following countries:

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Ukraine Territory	Area	Population on 1. 1. 1939 (in millions)
to USSR	216 846 sq.m.	37.3
to Poland	46 932 sq.m.	9.7
to Roumania	6 769 sq.m.	1.4
to Czechoslovakia	5 730 sq.m.	0.8

A separate Ukraine Soviet Republic was formed within the USSR (170 423 sqm. with 31.9 million inhabitants). The remaining Ukraine districts in Soviet Russia belonged to the RSFSR, and a tiny piece of Polesya to the Republic of Whi e Ruthenia. At the end of World War II almost the whole Ukrainian territory fell to the Soviet Union. 20 000 km² with more t' an a million inhabitants belongs to Poland, 5 000 km² with 100 00 inhabitants to Slovakia and small minorities to Roumania.

Soviet Ukraine embraces about 261 538 sq.m. with 43 million inhabitants. —

2. Natural Conditions in Ukraine

a) Landscape of Ukraine

133 Ukraine consists of vast plains and plateaus which seldom rise as high as 1000 ft. above sea-level. The monotony of the Ukrainian landscape is akin to that of neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. One can travel for hundreds of miles through a landscape that never changes, for the plateaus differ little from the plains, the transition from the one physical configuration to the other being scarcely perceptible. In the south, the scene is varied by mountains, but these constitute but 1/10 of the entire area of Ukraine.

Passing from south to north, we can distinguish 5 different forms of landscape.

In the south the southern low plain stretches along and includes the plains at the foot of the Carpathian mountains with the valley of the Vistula, the Syan and the Dnister, the Black Sea depression and the plain surrounding the lowlands of

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The Ukrainian People

101 175 In general, the Ukrainians have marked national characteristics which make it easy to recognise them even beyond the frontiers of Ukrainian territory. They belong to the Indogermanic group — an old Slav people that grew out of elements provided by Asia Minor and Mediterranean countries. Their original home is that of all Slavs. Its neighbors in the north-west were the Baltic-Lithuanian group, in the south-west it impinged on the Thracian group. In the southern part of the territory which was not originally colonised by the Ukrainians they came into fruitful contact with the Greeks, whose influence spread as far as Poltava in early historic times.

The first Germanic colonisation in the third century before Christ interrupted the contact with the west which had brought old Mediterranean culture to the Ukrainians.

Connections with the Asiatic group of Indogermanic tribes lasted for another hundred years and were disrupted by nomadic hordes from the Urals who destroyed the last remaining Iranic tribes and from that time until the 18th century made the Ukraine steppe unsafe. Wanderings and attacks by nomadic tribes have had no influence on the physical and psychical development of the Ukrainians.

Nations of Slavonic peoples began to form between the third and fourth centuries. At that time the neighbors of the Ukrainians' ancestors in the south-west and the west were South- Slavonic and Czech tribes. In the north and north-west they were in contact with Russian, later White Ruthenian groups, though only as far as culture goes, for racially there was no contact. There is no proof that the "primeval Russian" transitional groups ever existed, though many philologists assert the contrary. On the other hand, the Ukrainian people, as the central group of central Slavs contributed much to the formation of the Russian and White Ruthenian groups of peoples.

Ukrainians appeared first in history as the "Antes" who pushed the Goths farther and farther west and who were the masters of the steppe on the shores of the Black Sea from the Dnister to the Sea of Oziv and also of the forest steppe farther north between the fourth and sixth centuries.

The Slav migration dates from this time; the Western Slavs slowly moved towards the Vistula, the Oder and the Elbe while the South Slavs wandered to the Balkans, perhaps a little later. Thereupon, ancient Ukrainian tribes also expanded to the west and the south-west, reached the Vistula and, in constant conflict, held these areas against the Poles till the 11th century and longer in parts. In the South the coast of the Sea of Oziv and the Black Sea was occupied and, at the close of the sixth century or, at latest, at the beginning of the seventh, the central Carpathian area and Carpathian Ukraine — long before the Magyars came.

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During this period when the Antes were supreme, the formation and the character of the Ukrainian people was strongly influenced by the Goths. The ancestors of the Ukrainians in those days were separate tribes with no tendency to national unity. It was only when towns were founded (Kyiv, Chernyhiv, and others) and when trade connections were developed that the tribes came closer to each other, thus making it possible form a state under a Germanic Viking dynasty. The capital was Kyiv, which had assumed the former rôle of the Greek towns Olbia and Kherson since the 9th century and had become the most important center of trade in Eastern Europe.

Nestor's chronicle and other sources mention many old Ukrainian tribes who lived in accordance with customs of their own (above all marriage and funeral customs). Leadership was in the hands of the numerically small but centrally situated tribe of the Polyany. West of them, as far as the Prypyat, the Derevlyany settled while the largest tribe of the Severyany were particularly active in pushing east and settled on the Desna, the Sejm and the Sula. South of the Polyany on the western bank of the Dnipro were the Ulichy and the Tyvertsy to the west of these, on the Dnister and at times on the Danube; in the 10th century, however, they were forced north and north-west by pressure from the Magyars and Pechenegs.

Many tribes, among them the Duliby, lived in the west of the old Ukrainian area. Tribal names soon made way for political designations which, as for instance in the case of the Volynians, have been preserved till to day. Altogether the tribes of

101 Western Ukraine, which were later organised in the united state
175 of Galicia and Volynia, are more pronouncedly national than the Eastern tribes round Kyiv. The Ukrainian tribes were united by the end of the 10th century and the beginning of the 11th, this process being promoted by a common religion and a common culture composed of Byzantine and Slav influences; at the same time the feelings of unity among Ukrainian peoples was furthered by political pressure from the Poles and the princes of Suzdal and Vladimir at the head of a growing Russian people (since the 12th century). Other factors that helped this union were the transfer of the political center of Ukraine to the west and the political and cultural tendencies of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian state..

It is only in the north and on the western frontiers of Ukraine that many traditional features and a great variety of signs betraying differences between tribes have been preserved. Here, and in parts of the Carpathian area there are rich sources of ancient Ukrainian folklore.

101 These Ukrainians of the mountains and the foothills fall into
181 the three almost equal groups of Lemky, Bojky, and Hutsuly. The Lemky, also called the Lemaky, south of the Carpathians, inhabit the upper course of almost all the Carpathian tributaries of the Vistula and the Visloka as far as the Syan and, along with the foothill group of the Samishantsi (in the Jaslo area), are often called Ruthenians. They cling to their traditions and are economically in a sound position. They were the natural mediators between the Ukrainians and the Western and Southern Slavs, for instance, in the art of folkpoetry. Syanik and Krynytsja are the chief centers in this area.

The Boyky or Verkhovyntsi (dwellers in mountain pastures) live east of the Syan, in the districts of Sambir, Turka, Drohobych, Dolyna, and Kalush and also south of the Carpathian range. The inhabitants of the southern areas of the Bojky in the Carpathian Ukraine were also called Dolyniany (valley dwellers) and are rightly deemed to be the pioneers of the ancient Ukrainian colonisation in the South Carpathians, being in many respects different from their brethren in the north. The Tukholtsi, round Skole and Smorze, are another group that are

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The Ukrainian Church

When it was spreading throughout Eastern Europe, Christianity as a rule encountered peoples that were in early stages of spiritual development, when the ideas of religious, intellectual, cultural and political life were scarcely differentiated. At this time the Christian religion was the content and the basis of every development in culture, so that the acceptance of Christianity by a people was first and foremost an event of cultural and polititical importance in its life. It goes without saying that the embracing of Christianity was accompanied by contacts with those countries which were most interested in spreading the new religion. There were two possibilities for the ancient Kyiv empire which Norman Vikings had developed in the heart of present-day Ukraine in the 9th and 10th centuries to become a powerful and unique political factor in Eastern Europe: it could either embrace the Christianity of Rome in the west, or of Constantinople in the east, i. e. draw on either of the two centers of Christianity which were at that time on terms of bitter, if veiled, hostility. 175

The fact that the Grand Princes of Kyiv were christianised from Byzantium is partly explained by the geographical position of their state. Their campaigns of conquest led them along the course of rivers, which, in those days, were the natural channels of intercourse. This meant that the warlike Kyiv rulers extended their territories to the south where trade contacts were first established with Greece and that the new Christian creed could be demonstrated ad oculos when Constantinople was visited, whence it therefore slowly filtered into northern areas. A considerable number of Greeks are known to have been living in Kyiv even before Volodymyr the Great's conversion to Christianity, a fact which must have had percussions on that event. Nor must we forget that just then Byzantine culture was at its height and that, in consequence, it far outshone the culture of western peoples and further that it was already pervaded by Slavonic factors which brought it nearer the consciousness and feelings of the population than the remote sun of the west which was just rising. It was the nearest and most natural solution that the

175 Grand Princes of Kyiv, i. e. the leaders of the Norman Vikings should fetch their Christian faith from Byzantium and we are probably right in maintaining that any other state in the same circumstances would also have been christianised from Byzantium.

175 797 The new religion was at first embraced only by the Princes and their courts, but later it was forced on the people by their superiors and became a bond that united the entire state organism. There was no fear that the people would make a combined and successful stand against Christianity for there was no pagan order of priests to take over leadership in such a contest. The people had only sorcerers in place of priests and so it was possible to christianise the country by peaceful methods though pagan ideas continued to live in popular consciousness for a considerable time. It is quite legitimate therefore, to speak at this time of a "double faith".

175 792 795 The organisation of the church in the Kyiv empire came from Byzantium which was also the home of the higher clergy with the exception of two cases when representatives of the native population were consecrated metropolitans. The conventual orders and the many monasteries, among which the Cave Monastery in Kyiv attained a great reputation throughout the world of orthodoxy, attempted to shape the lives of the people on Christian lines and to realise the ideals of Christianity. The monasteries were the most important and indeed the only centers of cultural life at that time.

175 795 The Tatars who raided Europe in the 13th century destroyed the Kyiv empire and then pushed further west though they were brought to a halt in the battle of Liegnitz in 1241. Nevertheless for centuries the countries of Eastern Europe had to submit to the yoke of East Asiatic nomads.

In the Mongolian era the position of the church was not exactly unfavorable, for the Khans allowed it a certain freedom and state protection. The metropolitans had, however, to fetch the written pardons (Jarlyks) from the horde personally which was a voluntary acknowledgement of their dependence on the secular power. The dignitaries of the orthodox church continued, it is true, to be consecrated by Constantinople, but no longer

directly but on the mediation and the recommendation of the Khans. 175 795

In the course of the 14th century after their liberation from the Tatars Ukrainian areas came under the sovereignty of the rulers of Lithuania and were then slowly absorbed by Poland after the union of that country with Lithuania. The position of the orthodox church in Ukraine which had already been weakened by the inroads of Tatars was further shaken by this political development and by the subjection of the country to an alien sovereign. It was degraded within the Polish republic from its former status as a state church to a factor of cultural life that was merely tolerated. It thereby lost authority as there was no executive power behind it and the general disorganisation and decay increased from year to year.

The southern sphere of Eastern European territory and the Ukrainian church were unmistakably characterised by a predilection for the west, and a spiritual kinship with the culture of Central and Western Europe. Even the Kyiv Grand Princes were plainly inclined to the west and, in spite of the dependence of their church on Byzantium, they contracted marriage unions with the Catholic dynasties of several European countries. The Tatar raids interrupted this movement, but only for a short time; for as soon as Ukrainian territory was absorbed first by the principality of Lithuania and then by the Polish state, it immediately formed contact again with the west. It is true that the orthodox church of Ukraine was subject to the Patriarch of Constantinople up to 1685, but spiritually it was turned towards the west. It remained loyal to its dogmas but fetched its spiritual weapons in its fight for equality from the arsenal of the leaders of the western churches, Catholic and Protestant. The educational institutes which trained for the priesthood in Ukraine borrowed their organisation from the Jesuit Colleges. Latin was the language used and Aristotle, and after him Christian Wolff with his systematic methods, reigned supreme. So it is no wonder that the youth trained in such schools was not suffocated by formalism and was therefore able to assimilate and develop new ideas. It was from this conciliatory

175 spirit that all the movements for union with Rome sprang
795 which were so characteristic for orthodoxy in Ukraine.

The orthodox church in the south, in Ukraine, followed its own historical development independent of events in the Muscovite state in the north. Up to the middle of the 17th century it was subject to Constantinople but incorporated within the Polish state and fought with unequal weapons for equality within the organism of a foreign state. But when, after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow, the "third Rome", became more and more supreme in the ecclesiastical and religious life of Eastern Europe, a dilemma arose for orthodox Ukrainians in Poland; they could either remain loyal to a weak Byzantium, or subject themselves to the new power of Moscow, or they could improve their political position and come into closer contact with the general process of culture in Europe by uniting with Rome. The movement for union was therefore determined not by dogma, but, in the first instance, by political and cultural considerations. The year 1596 finally witnessed the union of part of the orthodox Ukrainians with Rome. For, when faced with the choice between Moscow and Rome, most of the Ukrainian bishops decided in favor of the latter and thus created a split within the orthodox church which was to be of far-reaching consequence for the shaping of political events in Eastern Europe. Thus, since the end of the 16th century there were two church organisations on Ukrainian territory, the orthodox which was able to maintain itself chiefly in western areas and the united, which, in the course of time, developed to be the national church of Ukraine. With the increasing political importance of the Cossacks throughout the 17th century, the orthodox church tried to rise again and succeeded, above all in the province of culture, in creating new values which ultimately permeated the whole of Eastern Europe. After the fall of the Cossack state and the incorporation of the most of Ukraine in the Russian Empire in the course of the 18th century, the united church was more and more persecuted and in 1838 was finally banned; the Ukrainian orthodox church, on the other hand, fell increasingly under Russian influence. This process gained in intensity with time so that at the beginning of the 20th century the orthodox church

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in Ukraine was one of the most powerful instruments for "freeing" the population from national sentiments. After the establishment of an independent Ukraine in 1918, the orthodox church in Ukraine experienced a fresh, if shortlived, renaissance. It could not last long for, when the bolshevists gained the upper hand, the entire religious life of Ukraine suffered the same treatment as that in other parts of the Soviet Union. In the first years of the Soviet regime when the pressure of the government was bearable, orthodox Ukrainians in Soviet Russia organised themselves into the Ukrainian Independent Church, replacing the Old Slavonic church language by the modern mother-tongue. But when the new order in Eastern Europe grew stronger and all religion was banned from public life, the Ukrainian Independent Church had to cease functioning at home and confined its activity to the numerous circles of emigrants who, especially after World War I, sojourned in western countries.

As already mentioned, the orthodox church in Western Ukraine, in areas like Galicia and Volynia, held its own against the Union. But at the beginning of the 18th century these sections were also won for the idea of the union, which was finally stronger here than anywhere. For, even in the days of Polish supremacy, and still more after the occupation of this area by Austria, the United or Greek-Catholic church developed into a Ukrainian national church which protected the people on the one hand from Russian, and on the other from Polish influence. In the 20th century Count Andreas Sheptytskyj, the Lviv metropolitan of this church, who accomplished much not only as the supreme head of the church but just as much as a national leader, became the symbol of the church's wide-spread significance. So it is no wonder but a procedure of accepted political expediency that, even during the First World War the Russian Government, rightly seeing in the Greek-Catholic church a center of Ukrainian nationalism, arrested the Metropolitan Sheptytskyj immediately after the occupation of Lviv and sent him into exile. Similarly, the report which appeared last year in all newspapers that the several million members of the United Church had submitted to the Patriarch of Moscow after the country was occupied by bolshevist troops and had thus returned

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to the bosom of orthodoxy, was in the same category. That this did not happen voluntarily but was carried out by means of pressure from above is as certain as the fact that it was not religious and dogmatic consideration but solely political factors that were the motive forces behind this change of front from west to east.

175 728 The Peace of Riga (May 18th, 1921) between Poland and Russia allocated to the former Volynia, Polesya and the district of Kholm, formerly parts of the Russian Empire, while the Ambassadors' Council on March 14th, 1923 added Galicia to Poland's gains. In the Treaty of Riga both partners promised to respect the rights of their minorities while the Ambassadors' Council declared that Poland was to issue laws that would preserve Ukrainian rights and that this was why the Entente Powers relegated their supreme authority to Poland. In reality, throughout the period of Polish supremacy there was little or no attempt to satisfy Ukrainian claims. The Ukrainian Chairs, established at Lviv University by Austria, ceased to exist and the law providing for a Ukrainian university was never implemented. Ukrainian schools were slowly but surely replaced by others where Polish was used either in some or in all classes. Polish became the language of instruction in secondary and vocational schools. The Ukrainian language was not recognised legally either in the administration or in law courts and Ukrainian influence declined in all selfgovernment organisations. Poles colonised Ukrainian areas. A campaign of public opposition was opened against the Ukrainian church: hundreds of churches were shut, above all in the district round Kholm, and the buildings were frequently burned.

175 871 The reaction of the Ukrainian population was considerable. In the field of education steps were taken to organise private Ukrainian schools; thus in 1934-35 there were 21 Ukrainian secondary schools, 5 continuation vocational schools — mostly in the towns. This is no mean accomplishment in view of the Polish resistance. Besides actual schooling. Ukrainian youth outside of the schools was organised. In 1938 in Galicia. alone the Ukrainian Union for Adult Education had half a million members, 84 branches, 3208 reading rooms. 2065 theatrical societies and 1105 choirs (the Union was forbidden by Polish Law outside 175 of Galicia). Cooperative stores also served to support Ukrainian 474 interests. In 1935 there were incorporated in the Ukrainian Central Cooperative Organisation 3013 cooperative societies with a membership of 541 508. This organisation of economic self-help had also to struggle against bitter Polish resistance, as expressed in the military pacification of Galicia in 1930 or the

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

pogroms in the autumn of 1938 when Ukrainian economic establishments and their equipment in towns in Eastern Galicia were almost completely demolished by the Polish mob. The Ukrainians who had been incorporated in Roumania had lived undisturbed under the Austrian Empire. In Bucovina there were Ukrainian elementary and secondary schools and a Ukrainian Chair at Chernivtsi University. The Ukrainian language was recognised in administration and law. Under Roumanian supremacy these rights were all forfeited and replaced by a policy of deliberate denationalisation. The only thing that Ukraine achieved during this period was the introduction of Ukrainian as an optional subject in some elementary schools. Officials who were not Roumanian nationals were dismissed without notice.

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Ukrainian territory which belonged to the Czechoslovakian republic, so-called Carpathian Russia, although it was least significant in area and culture, enjoyed the greatest measure of freedom. It cannot, however, be said that Prague satisfied all the national claims of the Ukrainians.

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The History of Ukraine

● 175 167 The two prime formative influences on the growth of the Ukrainian people are the struggle for the steppe and the drive for expansion southwards; there never was any migratory movement towards Central Europe. All the strenght of the Ukrainian people was absorbed by the struggle in the steppe with an opponent who commanded respect and whose riding tactics were certainly superior to those of European armies of knights, by battles in an area devoid of natural and artificial obstacles, by the necessity of moving repeatedly into the plains of Polesya and Volynia with their great forests and many rivers and lakes whenever the mounted hosts from the east swept over the steppe. It was only at the end of the eighteenth and in the course of the nineteenth century that the steppe was finally subdued, the shores of the Black Sea reached and the eastern frontier pushed far ahead. The expansion of the territory settled on by the Ukrainians which is three times as great as 200 years ago, took place solely at the expense of nomadic peoples. It were the colonial acquisitions of the nineteenth century which brought the Ukrainian people within the orbit of Europe.

This strengthening of the Ukrainian people at its circumference was detrimental to intensive development within the state. Insets of alien nationalities remained on Ukrainian territory, above all in the towns, where trade and industry fell into the hands of foreigners. Partitioned among four states as it was after World War I, and now completely dependent on a rigidly centralised Great Power, the Ukrainian people has not yet evolved a political form of its own. Its future as a state still lies ahead.

175 Ukrainian history may be divided into the following periods:

1) the political supremacy of Kyiv up to 1154
2) the supremacy of the Galician-Volynian state from 1154-1340
3) the Lithuanian-Polish period, 1340-1648
   a) the Lithuanian 1340-1569
   b) the Polish 1569-1648
4) the Cossack State 1648-1782
5) the Russo-Austrian period 1792 (1772)-1918

●175 Such a division seems practical, even if it does not hold for all sections of the country. Thus for the Right Bank Region the Polish period does not end in 1648 but only with the Second Partition of Poland, and for Galicia it lasts from 1349 till 1772. For Carpatho-Ukraine the Austro-Hungarian period lasts from the beginning till 1918, with short interruptions. But, regarded from the standpoint of the history of the nation as a whole, these areas are peripheral and of lesser significance, in spite of their having repeatedly supplied the capitals with leaders who played a decisive part in national life.

Political Supremacy of Kyiv till 1154

Mention is first made of the Ukrainian people as we know it now in Byzantine chronicles. If we add to these the historical records left by Kyiv monks, we can form an idea of Ukraine at the end of the 9th century as a conglomerate of strictly isolated tribes, each with its own primitive political life. Their religion was uncertain, except for vestiges of a cult of the dead. They had no distinct priest caste. The tribes of the Severyany, the Polyany, the Derevlyany and the White Croats are at this time pushing southwards, the Uglichi and Tyvertsi have already reached the shores of the Black Sea and are in touch with Byzantium. This drive south takes place under the protection of the Khazar Empire which blocked the route of the nomads towards Asia. At the end of the tenth century, Eastern Europe had become the center of the Occident as far as commercial and financial transactions were concerned. An extensive network of waterways faciliated intercourse through the plains of Eastern Europe from north to south. In the seventh and eighth centuries, the Khazars on the Volga flourished as long as they controlled the trade routes to Bagdad, then a highly developed state; the Slavonic tribes on the Dnipro were vassals of the Khazars.

The decay of Bagdad entailed changes in the economic interests of the Khazar Empire, the religion and dynasty of which were of Jewish origin. The Khazars formed closer relations with Byzantine nations, and with the decline of the Volga as a trade route, the Dnipro and the tribes on its banks gained in impor-

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
UKRAINIAN
PRINCIPALITIES
in the XI—XIII C.
0 50 100 150 Miles
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KYIV
Dnieper R.
Dniester R.
Don R.
Vistula R.
Prut R.
Seret R.
Danube R.
Kalka R.
Donetz R.
Ros R.
Sula R.
Desna R.
Pripyat R.
Bug R.
Dnieper Rapids
Black Sea
Sea of Azov
Crimea
Kaffa
Sudak
Kherson
Odessa
Ismail
Kilia
Akkerman
Bilhorod
Kaniv
Pereyaslav
Chernihiv
Novgorod
Trubchevsk
Putivl
Kursk
Belgorod
Voronezh
Tmutorokan
Kiev
Vyshgorod
Vitebsk
Smolensk
Moscow
Pskov
Novgorod
Ladoga
Riga
Tartu
Tallinn
Helsinki
Turku
Stockholm
Gotland
Visby
Kalmar
Lublin
Zamosc
Przemysl
Lwow
Halych
Galich
Kolomyia
Stanislawow
Kamenetz
Bakhchisarai

175 tance. Of these, the Polyany, numerically small but excellent soldiers, formed the kernel of the Kyiv state. The most generally accepted theory to-day, that the Kyiv state is of Scandinavian origin, is founded on philology*) alone, while archaeology and traces of law and culture testify against greater Germanic influence. In the army of the Kyiv princes Germanic elements were strongly represented though they were eventually quickly and completely absorbed by the Slavs round them.

At the beginning of the tenth century the power of Kyiv increased rapidly and soon dominated all Slavonic tribes. Novgorod and the area of the upper Volga on Russian soil were annexed. Now the entire trade route from the Gulf of Finnland to the mouth of the Dnipro was under the suzerainty of the Kyiv princes. There were repeated clashes with Byzantium, as is seen by the peace treaties of 911 and 945, these being mostly the result of conflicting trade policies. Prince Svyatoslav the Brave (956-972) destroyed the Khazar Empire and conquered Bulgarian land on the Lower Danube, though only for a decade, for Byzantine pressure forced him to withdraw again after desperate battles.

The destruction of the Khazar Empire was a blunder from the political point of view for it left the way clear for Asiatic nomads to overrun Europe. The first to appear were the Pechenegs who besieged Kyiv in 962. Svyatoslav lost his life and the Ukrainians were pushed back northwards. Svyatoslav's son Volodymyr the Great or Holy (979-1015) was exhausted in the struggle against the Pechenegs; nevertheless he was able to extend his empire by the addition of land in West Ukraine (Galicia and perhaps also Carpathian Ukraine). The fact that he embraced the Greek form of Christianity which permitted the use of Slavonic in its liturgy had still greater

*) The name Rus (Reussen) is said to originate from the Scandinavian Vikings The similarity of the word with "Russia" has led to great confusion. At the time of the Lithuanian realm, Ukrainians and White Ruthenians both called themselves "Reussen" and this is the connotation which the word has in the present text. With the rise of Moscow, the Tsar assumed the title of "Ruler over all Reussen". In the present text, "Russian" and "Russia" are used exclusively for the northern neighbors of the Ukrainians.

175 repercussions. The reigns of Volodymyr and his son Yaroslav (1019-1054) mark the zenith of the power of Kyiv. In the battle at Eckfeld (1036) the Pechenegs were so utterly routed that they henceforth disappear completely from Ukrainian history. The first collection of Eastern Slavonic laws, the law of the "Reussen" (Ruskaja Pravda) dates from these years. From it we learn that the prince and his body-guard held the central power of the state. The latter lived at the prince's court and supplied the most important state officials. Its members were bound to the prince, though not insolubly, by oaths of loyalty and obedience. The prince consulted his body-guard before launching any important undertaking.

The town was the political center of the surrounding country and the town assembly the supreme authority of administration. A certain balance of power was maintained between the towns and the dynasty for they were dependent on each other. The peasantry had no political rights though its members were personally free and only paid tribute in kind to the prince and his body-guard. In addition there were also slaves, mostly recruited from captives taken in battle.

The theory that the entire dynasty should have the right to rule as princes prevailed generally, i. e. every prince claimed a share of the paternal possessions. This naturally caused a splitting up of the country which inevitably led to decay.

Principalities grew up in Pereyaslav, Chernyhiv and Galicia, and Turiv-Pinsk, but these became later still more disintegrated. The authority of the Grand Prince was centered in Kyiv and lasted for about another century. For the rest, there were incessant internal feuds which involved the larger cities as well as the country districts.

About the year 1060 great hordes of Asiatics, the Polovtsy or Cumans swept over the eastern frontier. The unity of the state was a thing of the past, resistance was weak and the land was hurried into the heart of the country round Kyiv and Chernyhiv. It was only after Volodymyr Monomakh, Yaroslav's son and Prince of Pereyaslav, succeeded in routing the Polovtsy in 1103 and 1111 that peace prevailed for a time.

Monomakh became Grand Prince of Kyiv (1113-1125); and the years of his reign and that of his son, Mstyslav, mark for the last time the supremacy of Kyiv. At the same time the jealousy of the Chernyhiv dynasty caused a hundred years' struggle for the prize of Kyiv. Monomakh's youngest son profited by these feuds and founded on Russian soil the principality of Suzdal and later Vladimir. The Finnish-Slav state seceded from Kyiv, soon acquired considerable power, finally aiming at supremacy over Kyiv. After the death of Isyaslav (Mstyslav's son) who had been able to maintain the authority of the state on the Dnipro from 1146 till 1154, Kyiv was stormed and sacked by the Suzdal troops in 1169. The victory of the Kyiv princes at Vishgorod (1172) rescued the country from direct dependence on Suzdal, but up to the beginning of the 13th century supremacy in Eastern Europe was centered in the settlements in Russia, north of Ukraine.

The end of the Kyiv state is linked with the decay of Byzantium and the ebb of the Scandinavian wave of expansion, both of which robbed the capital on the Dnipro of its importance as a center of trade. The inroads of Asiatic nomads made for a general feeling of insecurity and so, up to the 19th century, Ukraine remained on the periphery of the civilised world, impotent to attain its former greatness. The traditional customs of living in the primitive state which had been founded on trade, were gradually disintegrated and replaced by a new society which was in some ways analogous to the feudalism of Western Europe.

Political Supremacy of the Realm of Galicia and Volynia

Towards the end of the 11th century a new state grew up in the western part of Volodymyr's realm. At the turn of the century Galicia had already become a powerful principality that had successfully defended itself against Poland and Hungary. At that time it comprised the valleys of the Dnister and the Prut as far as the Black Sea. These rivers had gained in importance as they were less threatened by nomads than the Dnipro, especially in view of the Crusades. Nevertheless the Galician-Volynian realm never attained the position of Kyiv.

175 It enjoyed a period of prosperity under Yaroslav Osmomysl (1153—1187). As it was only sparsely populated, it had to expand east at the expense of the principality of Kyiv and thus had to come into conflict with the principality of Suzdal.

The solidarity of its ruling house was the chief foundation of Galicia's strength. Usually several brothers were ruling at the same time; the younger or less talented submitted themselves to the others without question. Its weakness lay in the country aristocracy, the boyars, with the resources of their estates behind them, and not bound to the person of the prince. The history of the Galician-Volynian state is a record of feuds between the prince and the boyars. While the Volynian nobility remained loyal to the prince, their Galician compeers did not shrink from alliances with rebel groups or foreign powers (Poland and Hungary). In these constant struggles Roman the Great, Prince of Volynia (1199—1205) gained a great, but only temporary victory; after overcoming the resistance of the boyars, he took Kyiv and ruled over almost all Ukraine. His early death prevented the consolidation of these successes; their sole lasting result was the union of Galicia with Volynia whither Roman's wife had fled with her young son, Danylo. In the long feuds connected with the dynastic succession. that laid Galicia waste, Volynia was an island of peace from which Danylo in the thirties extended his power once more to Kyiv. Then the invasion of the Mongols changed the situation entirely.

Already in 1223 a battle had been fought on the Kalka between the Mongols and the princes of Eastern Europe; but at first this victory of the Asiatics had no consequences to speak of, as they immediately withdrew to the east. In 1240 a new incursion followed, claiming Kyiv as a victim. From time to time Danylo had to acknowledge the supremacy of the Tatars but his entire energy was now directed towards throwing off the Mongol yoke at all costs. After routing the combined Hungarian and Polish armies at Yaroslav in 1245, thus putting an end to the claims of both countries for a hundred years, he tried to win the support of the Pope for a crusade against the Mongols. All he received at the Papal hands, however, was the royal crown (1253). All Danylo's attempts to attack the Tatars single-handed were in vain and in 1264 he died.

By this time the Galician-Volynian state was played out. The lands in Eastern Ukraine were lost, minor successes of Leo (1264—1300) and George I (1300—1308) did not last. In 1340 the last scion of the Rurik dynasty, George II Boleslav was poisoned, the consequence being the occupation of these areas by Poland. 175

Lviv, founded in the middle of the 13th century, is characteristic for the development of Galicia during this era. The Magdeburg Code was introduced into Western Ukraine and the social structure of society in the provinces adjacent to the Tatars was changed. The small princes became simple landowners. In the Kyiv district and Podolia, however, independent village communities arose which only paid certain tribute to the Khan's officials. The yoke of dependence was not heavy, and when the empire of the Tatars (the Golden Horde) began to dissolve, single communities became quite independent. These relatively good relations between Ukrainians and Mongols ended with the expansion of the state of Lithuania-Reussen.

The Lithuanian-Polish Period

From the 13th century the Lithuanians, under pressure of German colonisation in the east, had been seeking to form an alliance with the higher developed Slavonic tribes on its frontiers. These had so little political unity that they offered no resistance to the Lithuanian advance. Lithuanian princes were often called to the throne, marriages took place between Lithuanian and Ukrainian royal houses, and when George II Boleslav was murdered, the Lithuanian Prince Lubart was called to be head of the Galician-Volynian state. Lithuanian towns like Vilna, Grodno, or Kovno were Slavonic in character. As the supremacy of Lithuania-Reussen did not affect life in the single provinces, this state really consisted of a union of half independent states.

The deeper reason for the rise of the Lithuanian state lay in the decline of the trade route to the Black Sea and the fall of the Byzantine Empire. On the other hand towns like Breslau, Riga and Danzig prospered and this new life was not without importance for Ukraine. When the Teutonic Order cut

175 these centers off, the peoples of Eastern Europe allied themselves with the German towns and rose against the Order.

After the final decline of the Golden Horde Lithuanian feudalism determined political and social life among the tribes of "Reussen". Smart military organisation transformed peaceful peasant communities into settlements of soldiers. The nobility were bound by oath to bear arms; the peasants who were personally free, had to support their overlord by tributes while they were constantly at his command. In case of disobedience the land passed into the possession of the state. The citizens were responsible for the fortifications of the towns and maintenance of the garrisons. The higher nobility had some sovereign rights and played the part of intermediary between prince and people.

Under the Lithuanian Prince Gedymin (1315—1341) the Prypyat area was annexed to the state of Lithuania-Reussen. His son Olgerd was converted to the Orthodox Faith. He completed his father's work, beat the Tatars at the "Blue Water" (1363) and liberated the whole of Ukraine from the Mongols. Five years later he sacked Moscow, thereby protecting his eastern provinces from the rising power of the Muscovites. His most stubborn battles were those waged against the Teutonic Order and for succession to the state Volynia and Galicia (1340—87). Olgerd's brother, the Prince Lubart already mentioned, managed to keep Volynia only and it remained a reliable province in the Reussen state. In 1386 Yagailo, Olgerd's successor, acquired the throne of Poland by marrying the young queen Yadwiga; at the same time he joined the Roman Catholic Church, many of his nobles following his example, and he united Lithuania and Poland.

This union led to a rising of the Ukrainian nobility who thought that Poland had deceived them. Vitold, Yagailo's nephew, forced his uncle to acknowledge him as Grand Prince of Lithuania and his reign (1392—1430) marks the height of the power of the Lithuania-Reussen union. The Ukrainians reached the coast of the Black Sea for the second time and came into contact with the Genoese colonists in Crimea. Moscow was forced to recognise the suzerainty of Vitold. The victory at Grunwald

(1410) put an end to all danger from the Teutonic Order. At 175 the same time he played off the Prussians against the Poles to keep the latter in check. Vitold's state was systematically centralised and the little principalities disappeared. Fedor Koryatovych, Lord of Podolia, crossed the Carpathians and laid the foundation for the more dense colonisation of Carpatho-Ukraine. (1393—1415).

Vitold's death was followed by lengthy domestic feuds. If the Poles succeeded in gaining Podolia, the attack on Volynia was held up by the courageous defense of Lutsk (1430). The nobles were victorious after the murder of Grand Prince Sigismund (1432-1440). In the reign of Kasimir, Sigismund's successor (1440-1492), a "council of the nobles" conducted the affairs of the state. In 1446 Kasimir also became King of Poland; henceforth the king's person was the only link between Poland and the Lithuania-Reussen union.

The supremacy of the nobles in Lithuania was the beginning of decay. Poland, strengthened by the weakness of Germany in the 15th century, made increased efforts to join the neighboring state. In the east, Moscow's power was increasing, while Crimea in the south was in the hands of part of the Golden Horde. The Khans in Crimea recognised the suzerainty of Turkey in 1475 and for several years they made an annual incursion into Ukraine, sacking all in their way. Once more Ukraine had to abandon the sea-coast. The country was laid waste as far as the Prypyat and in 1482 Kyiv itself was destroyed. The Russians formed an alliance with the Tatars from Crimea and took Homel, Chernyhiv, and Smolensk. The reigns of Kasimir and his son Alexander (1492—1506) were a succession of catastrophes which was only broken by a breathing-space under Sigismund I (1506—1548). The Russians were beaten by the Volynian prince, Constantin Ostrozhskyj, at Orsha (1514) and protection from the Tatars on the frontier was better organised.

While the rule of the nobles brought constant unrest to Lithuania, Poland absorbed western culture and finally attracted some Ukrainian nobles. They became more and more Polish till the union between Reussen and Lithuania was so weakened that Sigismund II, the last of the Yagailo dynasty, accomplished

175 the real union of Poland with Reussen and Lithuania. Thus, the Ukrainian areas, while retaining their own language and laws, came under the control of Poland.

The Polish Period

By this time attacks by the Tatars in the Crimea were beginning to slacken. At the same time increasing prosperity in Central and Western Europe caused a greater demand for grain. The fertile soil of the steppe attracted cultivators and the Ukrainians began to expand again, though no longer as military colonies, but as large landowners, they alone being able to maintain the forces necessary for fighting against the Tatars. The lot of the ordinary peasant grew worse, the change in his status being reflected in various laws and finally in the Statute of Lithuania, issued in 1529. The first version was still founded on the law of the Kyiv dynasty but later (1566, 1588) the peasantry was degraded to a serfdom that had no rights at all.

The freedom of the towns also came to an end. It is true that the kings tried to win over the towns by granting them the Magdeburg Code but this intention was thwarted by the nobles, who as starosts, voevodes and officials in these towns were able to command armed support for themselves.

After 1569 the aristocrat was the only citizen of the Polish Republic to enjoy full rights and the same held for Ukrainian aristocrats. They became more and more Polish and Roman Catholic, a process hastened by the Jesuit seminaries that sprang up during the Counter-Reformation. Thus the greater part of its leading circles was lost to the Ukrainian people and little resistance was offered to the campaign of the Church of Rome. Only when, in the reign of Sigismund III (1587—1632), the Metropolitan of Kyiv and most of the bishops decided at the Council of Brest-Litovsk to proclaim the union did part of the population rebel. Brotherhoods were formed to defend the faith; but as they did not enjoy the protection of the nobles who had embraced the Roman Catholic faith, they were powerless to carry out any comprehensive scheme of action. It was only when the Cossacks intervened as the champions of the Orthodox population that matters were altered.

Cossacks — a Tatar-Turkish name for vagabonds and fighters — those Ukrainians were called who in summer earned a hard living on the steppe frontiers under constant threat of attack by the Tatars, and who thereafter, in autumn, sold the harvest of their labor in the towns (honey, fur, leather, fish and, later, also grain). They began to set up a military organisation of their own and to attack the Tatars independently (for the first time in 1492). 175

A proud feeling of independence developed among the Cossacks who were bound by no feudal laws of serfdom. They attracted numerous peasants desirous of throwing off the nobles' yoke. The bitter struggle against the frontier guards who represented the supremacy of the nobles, resulted in the formation of societies like the Zaporog Fastness „Sitsh", a fort founded amid the rapids on the Dnipro by the Cossack leader Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetskyj. All the surrounding area was regarded by the Cossacks as the special property of the Zaporog army, which only nominally acknowledged the superiority of the Polish king, while entertaining its own relations with foreign neighbors.

In 1571 King Sigismund II recognised the Cossacks as the protectors of the frontier and as auxiliary troops in time of war. The Cossacks paid no taxes; they had their own law courts and administration under a Hetman. The Cossack, therefore, was a member of a privileged class, which attracted many of the settled Ukrainian population. This influx changed the entire Cossack organisation, while the defense of national faith and life enhanced its popularity.

In the second half of the 16th century the Cossacks began to launch attacks, by water and on land. Constantinople, even, seems to have been threatened. But they also rose against the great landowners in Ukraine. It is true that the Polish general, Zolkiewski, inflicted defeat on Nalyvajko, the Cossack Hetman, at the Solonytsia (1596), but the rout was not complete. Poland required the help of the Cossacks in her wars in Moldavia, Livonia and against the Russians (1604—1613) and had therefore to continue granting them concessions. The position of Ukrainians in Poland was strengthened when Chernyhiv was once more seized from the Russians. At this time, Peter Ko-

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine B D1

● 175 nashevych-Zahaidachnyj (1614—1622); a Cossack leader, appears as spokesman for the entire Ukrainian people. His conduct towards the Poles was loyal; he saved the Polish troops under Prince Vladislav, who were besieged before Moscow and took a number of enemy fortresses. After Zolkiewski's death at Tsetsora (1620), Sahaidachnyj took over the command of the troops against the Turks and with the Poles won the victory at Hotin. At the same time he promoted the interest of Ukraine by bestowing the See of the Kyiv Metropolitan, vacant since the union of Brest, on the Patriarch of Antioch. He also strengthened the Kyiv Brotherhood and the Academy founded in 1615, which had been a refuge for scholars forced by the Poles to flee from Galicia. Jesuite intrigues and the persecution of adherents to the Orthodox faith combined with the cleft between Cossacks and nobles to make the continuance of Cossack loyalty to Poland impossible. There were various Cossack risings (1625, 1630, 1637-1638) which, though resulting in victory for the Poles, did not lead to any definite decision.

The Cossack Period

The man who succeeded in uniting the Ukrainian people against the Poles was Bohdan Khmelnytskyj, born in 1593, Hetman from 1648 up till 1657. He formed an alliance with the Crimean Tatars and attacked the Poles. By his victories at the Yellow Waters (Shovti Vody) and Korsun he liberated the Dnipro areas. After his victory at Pylava he marched on Varsaw. Circumstances such as the death of King Vladislav IV (1632-48), the accession of the new king and Polish peace overtures persuaded him to retreat; but when peace negotiations fell through, Khmelnytskyj besieged a Polish army at Zbarash and beat the new king, Jan Kazimir, at Zboriv. Thanks to the mediation of the Tatar Khan, peace followed for two years.

The reason for Khmelnytskyj's success was his great talent as an organiser. He merged the Ukrainian lesser nobility which had remained loyal to the Orthodox faith with the Cossacks, increased the fighting value of the Cossack army, and freed the peasants from serfdom and the tyranny of the gentry. The entire country received a military organisation and was divided

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

into hundreds (sotni). The head of a hundred directed all the administrative, legal and military affairs in his district. The military commander and the Hetman were the supreme authorities. The Lithuanian Statute continued valid for the open country while the Magdeburg Code held in the towns. The area round the Zaporog Fastness was a special unit of administration, subject to the Hetman alone. Khmelnytskyj's rebellion put an end for ever to the idea of the Yagailo dynasty (i. e. that Ukrainians and Poles should live in one state). An alliance with Russia was even accepted in order to win the freedom of Ukraine from Polish supremacy. This alliance was concluded by the Hetman in 1654 at Perejaslav after various battles, (defeat of the Cossacks at Berestechko in 1651; Khmelnytskyj's victories at Batih in 1652 and Zvanets in 1653). Ukraine acknowledged the Tsar as overlord, but retained its own army, finances and foreign policy. The combined Ukrainian and Russian armies now took Smolensk and Vilna and, with the help of the Grand Prince of Transylvania, the Cossacks occupied Varsaw. But when Khmelnytskyj saw that the Tsar was not willing to acknowledge the independent rights of Ukraine, he formed alliance with Transylvania and Sweden. The Hetman died while those negotiations were in progress. 175

Internal unrest, caused by the attempts of gentry and Cossack authorities to restrict the freedom of the peasants still further, resulted in a movement among the broad masses of the people for alliance with Russia. As there were at the same time feuds between the Cossack aristocracy and the Hetman it was easy for the Tsar to exploit the situation. Another important factor in the general dissatisfaction of the people was the attempt made by the Zaporog Fastness under Ivan Zirko (died 1680) to obtain hegemony over Ukraine. The result was that some of the Cossack gentry wished to renew the alliance with Poland. Thus Ukraine was divided and two Hetmans were appointed simultaneously. The Cossacks who wished to be rid both of Poland and Russia, joined with the Turks, thus completing the chaos. The so-called "ruin", or Time of Troubles, began (1657—1676), a time of decay when Ukraine was divided. Hetmann Ivan Vyhovskyj (1657-59) formed an alliance with Poland and

175 beat the Russians at Konotop (1659). But he was forced to abdicate by circles hostile to Poland. Yurij Khmelnytskyj had to follow suit after four years in office, he having inherited his father's name but none of his gifts. Paul Teterya (1663-1665) and Ivan Brjukhovetskyj (1663-68) were too servile to foreign rulers to enjoy the respect of their own people; the former, with Polish help, ruled over the Right Bank area, while the latter controlled the Left Bank with the help of Russia. There were lively battles between the two factions.

A final partition was arrived at in the Peace of Andrusovo (1667) when the Right Bank area fell to Poland, while the Left Bank came under the suzerainty of Moscow. Ukraine laid down arms. Hetman Peter Doroshenko (1665-76) drove out Poland and Russia for a short time and sought refuge with the Turks; but the latter kept Podolia and their Tatar allies pillaged Ukraine. Poland and Russia set up a Hetman in opposition (Michael Khanenko 1669-1974; Damian Mnohohrishnyj 1668-1672; Ivan Samoylovych 1672—1687).

Doroshenko finally surrendered to Samoylovych who fought with the help of Russia, trying in vain to unite all the Ukrainian area. Poland, Turkey and Russia agreed to let the Dnipro Right Bank area lie waste for ever; the remnant of the people living there was driven by force on to the Left Bank. A fresh attempt on the part of Jan Sobieski III to settle Cossack captains on the devastated area led to the military organisation of Semen Palij who made Fastiv his center of operation (1688-1704). He protected the country against the Tatars, acquired for it a measure of independence from the Poles and recognised the suzerainty of Ivan Mazeppa, who had succeeded Samoloyvych as Hetman. This led to fresh conflict with Poland. In 1702 Palij took Bila Tserkva, thus extending his power to the Dnister. Mazeppa, who, by command of Peter the Great, marched against Charles XII of Sweden in 1704, once more united the territory conquered by Palij to the Left Bank Region

Mazeppa (1687-1709) was the last great Ukrainian Hetman. He managed to convince Peter the Great of his loyalty while remaining the actual ruler of Ukraine. When Charles XII marched against Moscow, Mazeppa thought that the hour had

come for throwing off the Russian yoke completely. The Zaporog Fastness joined the alliance between Mazeppa and Sweden. But Peter invaded Ukraine so quickly that plans for a general rising were frustrated. The Russians were victorious at Poltava. Charles XII and Mazeppa fled to Turkey where the latter died shortly afterwards (1709). An attempt made by Pylyp Orlyk, his successor, to regain Ukraine, failed. The Zaporog Fastness joined the Tatars and erected their new Fastness on the Lower Dnipro. 175

Ukraine now lost all its special privileges. Mazeppa's successor, Ivan Skoropadskyj, was Hetman merely in name, while on the other hand, the Cossack aristocracy grew in importance so that Ukraine became an autonomous oligarchy within the Russian Empire. Often for long intervals there was no Hetman and a "Little Russian Board", consisting of Russian and Ukrainian officers, ruled the country. Though fresh concessions were made to Ukraine by Peter's weak successor, the good old days had gone for ever.

It was Catherine II who finally put an end to home rule in Ukraine. In 1764 Hetman Cyril Rosumovskyj had to abdicate and in 1775 the Fastness was destroyed for good. The Zaporog Cossacks founded a new Fastness at the mouth of the Danube in Turkey (existed till 1828) and laid the foundation of Ukrainian colonisation in Southern Bessarabia. In 1782 governments on the Russian model took the place of regiments. Catherine did indeed appoint her favorite, Prince Potemkin, to be Hetman (1790-91) and tried to form new Cossack regiments, but the attempt failed from the start. About the middle of the 18th century the new Cossack aristocracy acquired Russian manners and education and were lost to the nation; they forfeited all their special privileges for equal rights with Russian nobles, while the Ukrainian peasants became serfs. The mass of the Cossacks continued to exist as personally free peasants, but it lost all military organisation. Their name appears in history for the last time in 1812 and 1831 when they voluntarily marched against Napoleon and the Poles respectively. In 1835 the Magdeburg Code was abolished as was also the Lithuanian Statute in 1842.

●175 In order to consolidate her power in Ukraine, Russia gave the Right Bank of the Dnipro back to Poland. But the Polish Republic of nobles was not able to assert itself against the Zaporog Fastness and its guerilla warfare (Haydamak movement). At times (1743, 1750, 1768) all Ukraine rose in rebellion. It was only after the destruction of the Zaporog Fastness that the country became quiet and complete order was re-established only after the Second Partition of Poland when the Right Bank Area of Ukraine was given to Russia. In the Carpathians there were also risings, the rebels being called „Opryshki" there. More important, however, is the colonisation which took place here in the 18th century. At that time Ukrainian settlements reached the river Tisa.

The eastern areas of Ukraine, the so-called Slobodian Ukraine, were quietest in these troublous times. Here the war-weary people of the western districts found refuge and peaceful work. It is true that the country belonged to the Tsar, but the Ukrainian people were allowed to retain a certain measure of self-government, and the Cossack organisation. Both of these were finally abolished in 1765 when the Slobodian aristocracy also became russianised.

The Russo-Austrian Period

175 In the 19th century it seemed as if the Ukrainian people had
167 more or less resigned themselves to being under Russian rule. All energy was concentrated on colonising the areas freed from Turks and Tatars; the frontiers of the country settled by Ukrainians were pushed farther and farther east and south. Russia was not blind to the threat to her national existence implied in this movement and sought to counteract Ukrainian expansion by forming colonies of Germans, Bulgars, and Greeks. But to no avail. Ukrainian colonisation crossed the upper and the lower reaches of the Don and villages even sprang up on the eastern bank of the Volga. Finally the Kuban area was settled by descendants of the Zaporog Cossacks who first occupied territory in North Caucasia and later, after bitter struggles with the mountain tribes in the Caucasus, had spread south.

175 The general situation of the Ukrainian people thus improved in this era of peaceful consolidation. The coast of the Black

Sea was reached, serfdom revoked (1861), valuable deposits of 175 coal, iron and manganese were discovered; the population increased considerably, all of which caused other national questions to recede into the background. It was only in 1900 that the 175 first unmistakable signs of the spread of national consciousness 186 among the broad masses began to appear. In this year the 668 Revolutionary Ukraine Party included a demand for an independent Ukraine in its program and the Ukraine movement made great progress in the short constitutional period after 1905. Ukrainian books and reviews, the idea of national societies and unions for adult education began to spread. And yet we must admit to-day that national consciousness among the peasants was slow to awaken; the solution of social questions was felt to be more urgent.

In Galicia more progress was made. At the outbreak of World War I there was already a well-developed system of Ukrainian schools, gymnastic societies and cooperative associations built up in constant conflict with Polish officials. The Ukrainians were loyal in their feelings for Austria; they thought that the victory of the German side would bring their own national struggle immediate advantages.

Revolution and Post-War Years

When war broke out, Ukrainian divisions immediately took 175 part voluntarily in the fighting in the Carpathians. Special 669 camps were erected for Ukrainian prisoners of war in which Ukrainians were separated from the Russians and trained in the spirit of nationalism. In the country itself the Ukraine Central Council was formed at Kyiv after the fall of the Tsar and it demanded the right of self-government from the provisional government in St. Petersburg. This was refused and negotiations were broken off when the bolshevists finally seized power. Towards the end of 1917 Lenin sent bolshevist troops to Kyiv, whereupon the Central Council declared the independence of Ukraine on January 22nd, 1918. Now the misfortune that political power was almost exclusively in the hands of members of the socialist and democratic Left, avenged itself; for those parties had no experience in the political control of a state. No

●175 669 steps were taken to create a national army. While the peasants were engaged in carrying out agrarian reforms, they were horrified to hear that the Central Council was planning to do away with private property altogether.

The Central Council was strengthened anew by the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. German and A·· trian troops occupied the whole of Ukraine. But soon the Utopian social policy of the Central Council led to friction with the Germans so that they furthered the coup d'état of April 29th, 1918 whereby Paul Skoropadskyj, the descendant of a former Hetman became the ruler of Ukraine. But Skoropadskyj's policy of conciliation towards conservative and military groups which were more or less indifferent with regard to national problems soon met with opposition with Ukrainian nationalists. When in November 1918 the Hetman announced the federation of the new Russian state to be established from a center in the south area, there was a general rising. The Germans left Ukraine along with the Hetman as the war had meantime drawn to a close and in December 1918 a Council of Rebels took over the government in Kyiv. It had been possible to mobilise the peasantry against Skoropadskyj because they were told that under his authority they would have to give back the land that had been taken from the nobles; but the Council was unable to devise any effective slogan against bolshevism, it being itself entirely under the influence of cosmopolitan and international theories.

So the reunion with Galicia (constituted as "West-Ukrainian Republic" after the fall of the Danube monarchy) that was proclaimed on February 22nd, 1919 in Kyiv was merely the recognition of a principle. The war on two fronts against Poland and the bolshevists overtaxed the powers of the new-born state. In February 1919 Kyiv was lost and shortly after there was only a small part of Podolia still in the Council's hands. In July the government decided to abandon the struggle against Poland and to concentrate its energy against the bolshevists. The united army of Galicia and the Eastern Ukraine beat the bolshevists and towards the end of August Kyiv was re-taken. At this point Denikin's Russian White army attacked the flank of the Ukrainians who were forced to retreat once more. Typhus decimated

the forces. Simon Petlura, who was in command, negotiated with the Poles for an alliance against Russia. All men still fit for service were organised to produce a successful guerilla attack against Denikin's lines of communication and those of the bolshevists. Late in the spring of 1920 the Ukrainians, having once more beaten the bolshevists, formed an alliance with the Poles. A counter-attack by the bolshevists resulted in a common front of Poles and Ukrainians, on the south wing of which the latter defended the Dnister line. After the "miracle on the Vistula" the Poles forgot their allies who had finally to clear out of Podolia at the end of November. 175 669

As a result of these struggles the greatest part of Ukraine became an "independent republic". In reality the country was handed over to the central bolshevist power. Moreover about 7 million Ukrainians were incorporated in Russian territory. The Ambassadors' Council of 1923 allocated Galicia to Poland and that province, as well as the neighboring provinces of Volynia, Polesya and the district of Kholm enjoyed all the advantages of the Polish police system for two decades. Carpathian Ukraine which in 1919 had voluntarily joined Ukraine, was annexed to Czechoslovakia after the end of the war, while Bucovina and Bessarabia fell to Roumania. In spite of this partition of Ukrainian territory the struggles of 1917-1920 cannot be regarded as a failure.

Thanks to them the Ukrainian idea has now become the possession of the entire people.

It is obvious that hard times are ahead of the Ukrainians but the end of the present situation (the whole Ukrainian territory is occupied by the Soviet Union to-day) is in sight. There is a general feeling of injustice that spurs the people's determination to utilise every opportunity of launching a campaign for the life of the national state!

National Minorities in Ukraine

162 563 Minorities in Ukraine amount to 20 % in purely Ukrainian territory and to 24.7 % in other parts of the country and are the consequence of long domination by foreigners and the immigration that entailed. The same cause is responsible for increasing Jewish immigration; Jews have always appeared to assist the spread of Russian influence in the East and Polish in the West.

175 167 563 Contemporary minorities rarely date earlier than the second half of the 18th century, if we except a few peripheral areas in the west, the Tatars in Crimea and Russian colonisation in the east in the 17th century. Several earlier efforts made by the Polish Government and individual magnates to colonise the Right Bank region of Ukraine were unsuccessful; the first wave spent itself in the 16th century in the rebellion of Khmelnytskyj, while later colonists were completely absorbed by the native Ukrainian population. The Roman Catholic faith was able to persist only in a few places. A similar fate overtook Roumanian expansion in the 14th and 15th centuries in the Carpathians; it left traces in names and in the legal code of the settlements.

167 563 The Russians form the largest minority. Apart from the common colonisation of the Don area, it was only after the catastrophe at Poltava (1709) that Russians slowly penetrated into Ukraine. More numerous Russian settlers did not arrive till after there was no longer a Hetman (1764) and after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress (1775). At the same time the Turks were driven back from the Black Sea; the Ukrainian population, which had suffered great losses in the struggles with Turks and Tatars, was unable to tackle this job alone. But the Russians, who had been systematically settled, were disinclined to cultivate the steppe and preferred to move into the r ing towns as officials, artisans and laborers.

Ten thousands of German colonists took their place, settled by Catherine II in the former Governments of Kherson, Taurien, and Katerynoslav, later also in Southern Bessarabia. At the same time Emperor Joseph II settled German colonists in

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

The Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon World

It is sad but true that the Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon world have never developed through the centuries that close and constant relationship which has existed in the case of so many other peoples. There have been moments of contact but these have never lasted and did not until the present time result in a steady stream of interest. — Yet this unfortunate fact has been due rather to the history of the two peoples and to their geographical locations than to any deliberate neglect on either part. The Anglo-Saxon race, taking its rise from England, an island on the northwestern coast of Europe, was chiefly concerned with areas that it could reach by sea. During its long centuries of oppression, Ukraine was completely landlocked. It was cut off from the Black Sea by the Tatars. It was hemmed in on the north and east by Moscow and on the west where it formed part of the Polish-Lithuanian state, there was little encouragement for foreigners to travel to it.

It is interesting, however, that in all of the periods when Ukraine was playing an important rôle in European affairs, knowledge of it reached England, but almost invariably it was by means more or less connected with the sea.

Let us look first at the Kyiv period, when Kyiv was one of the great capitals of Christian Europe and when it far surpassed in wealth and culture any of the western capitals. At this period the bonds between Kyiv-Rus and Scandinavia were close. Even Volodymyr after the death of his father Svyatoslav was obliged to retire to Scandinavia and return with Varangian troops before he could establish himself on the throne. It was the same period when England was being ruled by King Canute the Dane. The Northmen, sailing back and forth across the North Sea, could not fail to carry news of the exploits of their Varangian cousins. A little later one of the daughters of Yaroslav was married to King Harold Hardraga, the King of Norway, who was later to fall in 1066 at the battle of Stamford Bridge only a few days before his conqueror King Harold II, the last Saxon King of England, was destined to fall before William of Normandy at Hastings. Later a daughter of Harold married Volodymyr Mono-

175 648 makh. Thus by the nature of events, during this period when both England and Ukraine were connected with the Scandinavian north, the court of Kyiv became well-known to English and especially Saxon nobles fleeing from their enemies in their own land. It brought about a personal acquaintance which had no deep roots and which ended with the disintegration of Kyiv and the absorption of England into the area of the Norman influence.

Nevertheless there was established at Kyiv a Scotch Benedictine Monastery in the eleventh century which continued until the Mongol invasion. It would be interesting to know whether this was a purely missionary establishment in the hope of introducing the western traditions into Kyiv or whether the monks had fled from the Norman conquest and the border disturbances, since at that time the King of Scotland was connected by marriage with the Saxon royal family and strove in vain to assist them against the new conquerors. At all events their residence in Kyiv was marked by signs of close friendship between them and the clergy and population of Kyiv.

After the Tatar conquest, we find that the Metropolitan Ruthenus Petrus, the Ruthenian Metropolitan Peter, was present at the First Council of Lyons in 1245. He had been installed as Metropolitan of Kyiv about 1242 with the aid of the patriotic groups, especially Prince Mykhajlo of Chernyhiv, who was later martyred by the Tatars. It is interesting that his presence at the Council in an attempt to secure the aid of the West has been recorded only by two English chroniclers of the Council, a fact that suggests some personal friendship which had perhaps been formed at Lyons.

Then came the Middle Ages, the period of the Crusades, and the constant wars of England and France. It was a period, in Ukraine, when there was not much to attract foreigners. The English were finding themselves on the sea and their sailors appeared quite frequently in Baltic ports and in the White Sea, but the latter were in far closer relations with Moscow than with Ukraine, especially as the Muscovites completely ignored the Ukrainian Orthodox at this period.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

As we might expect, it was the exploits of the Cossacks that reawakened interest and this time the English inspiration to learn more of the Ukrainians was largely derived from their relations with Constantinople. It was the sea-raids of the Cossacks that won their attention and the importance of these were stressed by the Patriarch Cyril Loukaris, who was very familiar with the situation in Ukraine. As a young man, the nephew of the then acting Patriarch, he had taught in Wilno. He was a friend of Count Constantin Ostrozhskyj and he was present at the Council at Brest. Ever after he retained his friendship with the leaders of Ukraine, Moldavia, and Vallakhia, and so he remained posted on the progress of the Orthodox in Ukraine and the history of the Cossack movement.

The English ambassador at Constantinople in the early seventeenth century, Thomas Roe, who played an important rôle in the religious conflicts in that city, was a strong supporter and friend of Cyril. He made many reports on the Cossacks and their raids and even attempted to save the life of the Cossack leader Samuil Koretsky, who had been taken prisoner by the Turkish forces, by pleading for him in the name of the King of England. Roe also, as a friend of Prince Gabriel Bethlen of Transylvania, may perhaps have been the author of the plan to unite the Ukrainian Orthodox with the Transylvanian Calvinists and the Swedes for overthrowing Poland during the Thirty Years' War. At the same time Yuryj Nemyrych who was later to succeed in arranging an alliance between Ukraine and Sweden was a student in England.

The revolt of Khmelnytskyj in 1648 was frequently noticed in the English newspapers which compared the Cossacks' leader to Oliver Cromwell. There are constant rumors that there was some correspondence between the two men but this has never been proved, perhaps because of the destruction of many of the documents of the day. It is, however, said that the radical Cossack leader who played an important rôle during part of the period, Maksym Kryvonos, Maxim of the Crooked Nose, was a Scotsman. He appears and disappears mysteriously in the course of the Cossack movement. He was far more bitter in his hatred than Khmelnytskyj and it is perhaps conceivable that

175 648 he was a fanatic Protestant who had come to the Cossacks to stir them up to increased and unreasoning bitterness.

During the years after the Cossack uprising, several Englishmen who were either in Poland or in Russia made lengthy reports on the life of the Cossacks, but the next important event in Ukrainian history, the revolt of Mazeppa, again aroused considerable interest, no less so because Peter the Great in an endeavour to break support for Charles XII of Sweden had apparently at one time thought of making the Duke of Marlborough the master of Ukraine. Nothing of course came of this plan but the English ambassador in Russia, Charles Lord Whitworth, reported on the actions of Mazeppa and the destruction of Baturin by the Muscovite armies.

After the defeat of Charles XII at Poltava, English diplomatic circles joined the Swedes in the effort to stop the advance of Peter the Great against that country. This brought them into contact with Phillip Orlyk, who was elected Hetman after the death of Mazeppa, and who spent years in Sweden and Turkey in an effort to form a coalition against Peter and restore freedom to Ukraine. None of Orlyk's hopes materialised but when he was in Turkey, he had the active support of the British ambassador who put pressure upon the Turks to counterbalance the demands of the Russians that he be surrendered.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the destruction of the political liberties of Ukraine and the general temper of the times tended to accept Ukraine as definitely part of Russia. England's opposition to Russian expansion became more and more felt in Asia and in the Balkans, where Russia was trying to bring under her control the other Orthodox Slavs. It was a period when Western Europe abandoned any hope of securing allies from the oppressed nations of Russia, even though there was a growing interest in the cultures of the different Slav peoples.

Thus by the time of World War I, the British authorities like the Americans were inclined to accept the statements of the Tsarist diplomats that the Ukrainian movement was solely a product of German propaganda and even after the Russian

Revolution, they did not seriously consider the situation which was then presented. At the same time, the French were so interested in the restoration of Poland that they had little inclination to listen to representatives of a people who were in opposition to their friends. 175 648

We thus see that the chief relations between England and Ukraine were to be found in the diplomatic sphere and in the reports of travellers and the works of various professors who were interested in the Slav languages and literatures, while the professors of history in the later periods were inclined to accept the various Russian theories of their own history, which were of course opposed to Ukraine. There was no opportunity for any large-scale personal acquaintance with the Ukrainians or their problems, and in this the Ukrainian situation followed closely the general pattern of British relations with the other countries of Eastern Europe.

Then at the end of the nineteenth century, a new situation arose in the United States and a little later in Canada. There came a relatively large-scale immigration of Ukrainians who settled chiefly in the factory and mining centers of the Eastern United States and the prairie farming regions in Western Canada. Most of these new immigrants came from Western Ukraine which was under the domination of Austria-Hungary as a wave of the great migration of peoples from that area. The difference in their choice of occupations in the United States and Canada was largely due to the difference between the methods adopted by the two countries in dealing with new arrivals. In the United States, they were allowed to find employment as they would and they gravitated to areas where there was already a considerable population of Slavs from Austria-Hungary. In Canada they were encouraged by the government to settle on still unoccupied land in the northwest and were given opportunities for acquiring their own land, as immigrants had been in the United States a half century before. 167

Relatively few of the Ukrainian educated class came to the New World. The vast majority were peasants who hoped in the beginning to acquire the money in a few years to return to their old homes and live there in relative comfort. They were only

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine

III

Cultural life

The General Trends of Ukrainian Culture

When studying the intellectual characteristics of the Ukrainians we come to the conclusion that their often too marked individualism and their ideals, which display themselves in the necessities of everyday life, stamp them as unmistakably western in their attitude to the world, while their geographical position drew them from the very beginning within the orbit of Central and Western Europe and later on made them instrumental in handing on the products of Western culture to the nations of the East. 181

The first mention of the Kyiv empire in history shows it in connection with a western power. In the Annals of Bertinius we read how emperor Ludwig received a Grecian delegation at Ingelheim on May 18th, 839 and how, in the company of the ambassadors sent by Theophilus, the Greek emperor, there were also certain men, "qui se, id est gentem suam, Rhos vocari dicebant." We may assume with great probability that these men were first sent from their home, Kyiv, to Constantinople, and had then accompanied the Grecian delegates on their long journey from Byzantium to the Rhine and that the name "Rhos" is identical with the later Rus-Ukraine. 175

Grand Princess Olga, who had embraced the Christian faith of the West, sent a delegation in 960 to the German Emperor Otto I, requesting that priests should be sent to her country that was so little known. Missionaries under Adalbert set out

175 on this long journey with, however, little practical success. As early as the reign of Volodymyr the Great and Yaroslav, his son, definite attempts were being made to share in the general cultural life of Europe through alliances with the powers of the West. Yaroslav in particular was zealous to form family alliances with western princes. It was also in keeping with this policy that he appointed Hilarion, a native monk of some standing, to be Metropolitan of Kyiv, a position hitherto always held by a Greek; he sought thus to strengthen his position with regard to Byzantium in the ecclesiastical as well as in the political world. Izyaslav, Yaroslav's eldest son, first negotiated with King Henry IV, whose wife, Praxedis, was a daughter of Vsevolod, Grand Prince of Kyiv, and later with his adversary, Pope Gregory VII, in order to establish contact with Rome. These and similar events point clearly to the fact that, in spite of geographical position and distance from Western Europe, in spite of the vicinity and the influence of the Byzantine empire, the Kyiv state and its leaders pursued a policy that was definitely directed towards the west.

175 177 After the Tatar invasion of the Ukrainian steppe, the reins of government in Ukraine fell into the hands of the Galician-Volynian Realm which, as an advanced outpost on the way to the West, became a channel of communication between the "world" of those days and the East. As was natural, western influences here became stronger, the romanesque style dominated in architecture and Latin became the language of public life. But the waves sent out by the West did not stop merely at the country that was nearest in space; they spread further east, where from the outset they counteracted a one-sided influence from Byzantium.

Lithuanian dominion over Ukraine was fundamentally peaceful in character; Lithuania had the upper hand in politics, but Ukraine was superior to her partner in culture, an advantage which was not abandoned when the Union with Poland took place. But this latter historical fact nevertheless brought Ukrainian territory into still closer contact with movements in the culture of Western Europe which, favored by fortunate conditions, spread rapidly eastwards. The Magdeburg Statute which

had been known earlier in Western Ukraine as a privilege of 175
the towns (Volodymyr from 1324 and Syanik from 1339) be- 177
comes the basis of organisation for further settlements in newly acquired areas. German artisans and artists are welcome to these areas and the youth of Ukraine are fired with enthusiasm to attend German and Italian universities in order to acquire learning with which they will subsequently enrich life at home. Thus western cultural movements like Humanism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation penetrated at long length the wide-flung steppe. It is true that they sometimes caused effects there that could not have been expected from experience in other countries. This is seen best in the case of the Reformation.

After the amalgamation of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian state with 795
Poland, the Orthodox Church, though already shaken to its foundations, begins to play an important part in public life; after the loss of Ukrainian independence, it becomes a rallying point for national feeling and the difference in creed between the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches coincides with the political difference between Poles and Ukrainians; it was therefore natural that nationalist circles should be absolutely opposed to every further attempt to weaken the Ukrainian Church. It was well known that grievous abuses had crept into the organisation and life of the Orthodox Church, for those abuses arose from the new position it had been forced to assume. From having been an all-powerful state church it was degraded to become a factor in a strange country that was barely tolerated and was therefore unable to control its own administration, all the more as it had no longer a decisive say in making church appointments. It was common property that Orthodoxy in Ukraine was in a critically weak condition of disintegration, but nobody dreamt of opposing it and still less of replacing it by another creed, its fall would have been a severe, if not fatal blow to the entire life of the nation.

Such were the psychological reasons for the fact that the reformation movement found such a weak echo in Ukraine, though the necessity for a change in conditions, for reform, but from within, was felt by all.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

113 Moshin, V. 'Nachalo Rusi: Normanny v Vostochnoy Evrope' (The Beginning of Russia: the Northmen in Eastern Europe), *Byzantino-Slavica*, Praha, 1931–2.

Smirnov, P. *Volzhski Put' v Starodavney Rusi* (The Volga Waterway in Ancient Russia), Kiev, 1928.

(6) *On the term 'Rus' in Western sources*

In the St Bertin Annals of the year 839 Bishop Prudentius writes about certain men who accompanied the envoys of the Emperor Theophilus on an embassy to the Emperor Louis the Pious: 'qui se, id est gentem suam, Rhos vocari dicebant, quos rex illorum, Chacanus vocabulo, ad se amicitiae, sicut asserebant, causa direxerat.' When the Emperor Louis began to ask who they were, he gathered from their answers that they were Swedes: 'comperit eos gentis esse Sueonum.' *M.G.H.* I, p. 434.

Luitprand of Cremona, about the year 970, writes: 'Rusios, quos alio nomine Nordmannos appellamus.'

In Arab sources

Numerous Arab writers mention 'Rus' or the 'King of Rus' or the Rus 'Kagan' (e.g. Ibn Rusta and Gardizi). The latter: 'Many men among the Slavs go over to the Rus and serve them in order to be under their protection.'

See A. Harkavy, *Skazaniya Musulmanskikh Pisateley o Rossii* (Statements of Moslem writers concerning Russia), Petersburg, 1870.

Minorsky, V. F. *Ḥudūd al-'Ālam*, London, 1937, pp. 427–438.

Cf. also S. Rapoport, 'Mohammedan Writers on the Slavs and Russians', in *Slavonic Review*, vol. VIII, no. 22.

(7) *On Kievan Russia*

Courses of Russian history by V. Klyuchevski, Moscow, 1923; S. Platonov, Petersburg, 1917; M. Lyubavski, Moscow, 1913; E. Schmurlo, Praha, 1931; also M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraina*, Kiev, 1913 (Ukr.); D. Doroshenko, *Outline of the History of Ukraina*, Warsaw, 1932 (Ukr.).

(8) *On the Nomads and Kiev*

Golubovski, P. *Pechenegi, Torki, Polovtsy do Nashestviya Tatar* (Pechenegs, Turks and Polovtsy before the Tartar Invasion), Kiev, 1884.

Bruce-Boswell, A. 'The Kipchaks', in *Slavonic Review*, vol. VII, no. 16.

Macartney, C. A. 'The Petchenegs', in *ibid.* vol. VIII, no. 23.

175 For an understanding of the role of the Altaian nomads in medieval Russia it is essential to read Boswell's brilliant study. 'The Arabs and the Georgians alone called the Kipchaks by their proper name. It appears in Western sources for the first time in Edrisi, who refers to the original Kipchak in Asia, after a detailed description of Comania. While the Greeks called the Kipchaks "Comans" the Saxons of Transylvania called them Valvi, or Falben, i.e. "sallow people". The Russians called them Pólovtsy, which some philologists derive from *polóvy* (*pálevy*), "sallow", but which is generally taken to mean "steppe folk" from *póle*, "field", i.e. it is a translation of the Turkish "Kipchak". (These Kipchaks should be distinguished from the Golden Horde, v, p. 42.)

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

175 Gorlice, and the Russian armies, after heavy fighting and enormous losses, began to retreat from Galicia into the Ukraine.

By the beginning of autumn the front had been established on a new line; the Russians continued to hold only a strip of Eastern Galicia and had been compelled to abandon to the enemy part of Volhynia with the towns of Kovel, Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynsk.

Anxiety was very great at that time and even Kiev seemed to be threatened. Podolia, Eastern Volhynia, right-bank Ukraine, had become regions in the immediate neighbourhood of the front. The evacuation of Galicia had been a difficult and painful proceeding. The Russian armies had been accompanied in their retreat by thousands of Galician peasants evidently in fear of the reprisals awaiting them at the hands of the Austro-Hungarian troops. They went on foot, and some in carts with their households, driving their cattle before them. Over a hundred thousand of such fugitives crossed the Russian frontier. Numbers of Jews followed the retreat in order to escape from the scene of war; and the Russian military authorities deported with them also all people who were considered 'suspicious' from the political point of view and such Ukrainians, Poles and Jews as were supposed to harbour 'criminal intentions'.

For the latter elements prisons were hastily improvised in Kiev, but no one knew what to do about them nor why they had been brought there. Charitable institutions had to feed and clothe them as though they were the most peaceful citizens. There were days when at the Kiev Central Station as many as 60,000 meals had to be provided for these swarms of unwanted 'guests'.

The Russian Committee from Lvov, with its chief, Dudkevich, also came to Kiev. Such an agglomeration of demoralized peasants and Jewish crowds in the rear of the South-Western Front was dangerous in every respect, and to begin with from a sanitary point of view. Beginning with the end of 1915 and all through 1916 the clearance of these 'new-comers' from Kiev went on. Dudkevich's Committee and other organizations were sent to Rostov-on-Don and later to Turkestan—whither was directed the main flow of fugitive peasants. Jews were allowed to go beyond the Dniepr into the Governments of the interior and the limits permitted them for settlement were temporarily abolished. Many of them remained in left-bank Ukraine and the towns of New Russia; and this migrant Jewish element, combined with the 'suspicious characters' who gained their liberty after the outbreak of the Revolution, constituted an unsettled and disintegrating factor during the period of social dissolution.

During 1916 life in the Ukraine approached normal conditions

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

again, after the offensive of General Brusilov had broken the Austro-Hungarian Front at several points. Part of Volhynia was cleared of the enemy and the Russians again invaded Galicia, occupying Stanislavov and also Czernowitz and the whole of the Bukovina. The Front was again removed from the region of Kiev. 175

Under the influence of the Russian victories the Roumanians entered the war, but they proved to be unprepared for serious conflict. A Russian army was sent to check the German invasion in Moldavia, and a new 'Roumanian Front' was created, so that the battle-line now ran from the Baltic to the Black Sea. During the winter of 1916–17 the South-Western Front was stabilized. Headquarters were planning a new offensive in the spring against Lvov and believed in its ultimate success. Peace and quiet reigned in Kiev and in the neighbourhood of the Front. (1)

§ 2. HRUSHEVSKY AND VINNICHENKO: THE UKRAINIANS AT BREST-LITOVSK

When the news of the February Revolution (February according to the Old Style, March according to the New) in Petrograd reached Kiev neither the authorities nor the populace would at first credit the truth of it. However, it was not long before the events which had taken place in the northern capital were repeated in Kiev and the cities of the Ukraine. 669 208

The process of decomposition which was destroying the armies of the North-Western and Western Fronts infected somewhat later the forces on the South-Western and Roumanian Fronts. As for the Ukrainian national movement, no one thought about it during those first days of revolution. With the exception of Finland, where the revolutionary movement was accompanied by a wave of feeling in favour of national independence, in no part of the Russian Empire were nationalist aspirations the motive of the Revolution. The first impulse of the masses, irrespective of their nationality, was to look upon the Revolution as a means of ending the war which had lasted too long. The other motives which soon made themselves apparent were everywhere of a social nature.

The state of mind of the masses found expression in the institution of 'Councils (*Soviety*) of Soldiers', Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates', in the creation of which all the leading socialist groups and parties took a hand. People of all nationalities participated in these Soviets; Georgian politicians, who for a generation had played a leading role in Russian radical movements, made themselves par- 208 623

The Background of the Communist Triumph

Let us, therefore, look briefly at 175

the outstanding elements of the situation as they were at the beginning of the revolution.

From the time of the organization and Christianization of the Kievan state at the end of the tenth century to the eighteenth century, Ukraine, whether independent, or subject to Poland-Lithuania, or to the Russian Tsars, had remained as a political unit, even though divided. However, in 1775 Catherine II destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich, the centre of the Ukrainian Kozaks, and in 1783 she abolished all Ukrainian political institutions and privileges. From that time the area was divided into *gubernias* as the rest of the Russian Empire and the full Russian methods of administration were introduced.

From that moment, too, the Russian government spared no efforts to destroy every vestige of Ukrainian national and cultural consciousness. The Ukrainian language was treated as a peasant dialect of Russian; the name Ukraine was forbidden and even the substitute Little Russia was treated as a generic term for the area north of the Black Sea, but it did not figure on the political map of the Russian Empire as a distinct entity. The Ukrainian revival in the nineteenth century beginning with the publication of Kotlyarevsky's parody of the *Aeneid* in 1798 was confined to the [536] cultural sphere and could offer little or nothing in the way of administrative experience to the Ukrainian people. Those Ukrainians who entered the Russian service were usually sent to distant areas, while the administrative personnel in Ukraine was chiefly Russian in origin and feeling.

The great estates were largely owned by Russians or by Poles 186 and even many Ukrainian landowners who had succeeded in retaining their holdings were so thoroughly Russianized that they [423] felt little sense of kinship with the peasants on their estates. Ukrainian life was lived chiefly in the villages. The Ukrainian language was not taught in the schools or used in the courts, for all education and administration were in the Russian language. Still the peasants continued their own manner of living with their own traditions and their own tastes and desires.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[133] culture of the more northern region. The reasons for the smaller
175 farm population are historical rather than purely economic, however. Most of the area was fully settled many generations later than the more northern regions, for it was the principal area of conflict of the Slavic settlers moving down from the north and the Tatar warriors based on the Crimea. The major instrument of colonization was the Cossack fortress settlement or *sich*. In the mid-seventeenth century the Cossacks accepted the suzerainty of the Orthodox tsar, but it was only in the late eighteenth century, after the Russian conquest of the Crimean Tatars, that the steppe
[563] was fully opened to peaceful development. These new lands, frequently called "Southern Russia," came to include considerable bodies of non-Ukrainian settlers, mostly Russians, but also large numbers of Germans and Serbs. In 1917 the Provisional Government in Petrograd strongly rejected demands of the Ukrainian Rada for the extension of its authority to the *guberniias* of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida, the last three corresponding roughly to the southern steppe region, since it felt they were not Ukrainian in character.[32]

369 The northern section of the steppe region, comprising the northern halves of the *Generalbezirke* Nikolaev and Dniepropetrovsk, did contain a preponderantly Ukrainian peasantry. The presence of two very important natural resources—the iron mines of Krivoi Rog and the water power of the Dnieper rapids—had led to rapid industrialization of this area during the period of the Soviet Five Year Plans, with a consequent large increase in the urban population. According to the census of 1939 five of the fifteen Ukrainian cities of over one hundred thousand population
369 lay in this region.[33] At the start of the period of industrialization,
563 in 1926, the city population was very largely non-Ukrainian. For example, Ukrainians formed less than half the total in Kirovograd (then Zinovevsk), Jews being the next largest ethnic group, closely followed by Russians.[34] In Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'e the

[32] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 72–73.

[33] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 250–53.

[34] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tsentralnóe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Recensement de la Population de l'URSS*, XIII (Moscow, 1929), 13–14.

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[For a summary of the history of the Ukraine from ancient times through the eighteenth century, see category 116, pp. 27-106.]

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Sometimes these laments bear a character of bitter irony. The pretended infallibility of German opinion concerning the fate and the history of the Ukrainian people exasperates him. 'The German will tell you: You are Mongolians. Yes, Mongolians, nude descendants of Tamerlaine clothed in gold. The German will tell you: You are Slavs. Yes, Slavs, unworthy great-grandsons of glorious ancestors.' 538

While ironizing about the faithful pupils of the German school he continues: 'They spoke according to German precepts in such a way that the German himself, though a great professor, could understand nothing of it . . . at Sitch the German, full of wisdom, grows the potato and you buy it and eat it for your health and you glorify the Zaporoges . . . but by whose blood has this earth been fertilized to produce the potatoes? . . . Her own children have led the Ukraine to the edge of the precipice, they have crucified her worse than the Poles, they want to teach them, at least they pretend it . . . they want to train this blind old man which is the Ukraine under German influence.' (*Kobzar.*)

For him the German question was not only one of literature since he, his sister and his two brothers were serfs of the German estate-owner Engelhardt, who was noted for his coarseness and the absence of any culture.

The Liberal era which began in Russia with the accession of Alexander II gave broad satisfaction to the aspirations of the circles of the former opposition. The liberation of the serfs in 1861, the inauguration of municipalities elected by the people, the radical reforms based on the permanence of judges, and the establishment of juries and judicial guarantees, eliminated the major reasons for the old revolutionary leanings. A wide movement of reconciliation began to develop which would probably have benefited the Ukraine as 668 175

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668 well as the whole empire. The Imperial Government
175 was clearly inclined to the idea of a regime of constitutional monarchy, based on the cultural autonomy of the various Russian territories and on the application of sufficiently broad systems of political autonomy to the ethnically non-Russian majorities.

As before, the Government was in no way opposed to the publication of books and journals in the Ukrainian language.

000 This whole evolution was compromised by the Polish insurrection of 1863. One knows that in 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, Alexander I committed the mistake which the great Catherine had taken care to avoid at the moment of the partition of Poland. He annexed the greater part of the ethnically Polish territory, the Grand duchy of Warsaw. Despite all the attempts at the establishment of an autonomous regime, the 'Polish question' became henceforth the most vulnerable point of internal Russian policy. During the Liberal era of Alexander II the autonomous political regime was naturally intended to be applied first of all to Poland. Nothing came of this attempt except a new and violent Polish insurrection. The insurgents, traditionally attached to the old conception of the Great Poland of former times, maintained the old pretensions to the Ukraine and White Russia. The programme of Prince Adam Czartoryski, the forerunner of the Polish insurrectionist movement, envisaged the co-ordination of the Polish and Ukrainian movement, the latter to be included in the plan of the Polish insurrection, in order to shake the omnipotence of the Russian Empire and to create a Slavonic federation under the direction of a Great Poland on her ruins! The efforts to draw the Ukrainian and the White Russian peasants towards her were to experience a fatal check; the peasants did all they could to facilitate the task of

000 lent its other ear to the Polish landowners who described the Ukrainian peasants as fomentors of trouble, aiming at the overthrow of the existing agrarian order, which offered great advantages to the Polish nobility.

204 As a result of the circular of Valouiev,[1] publications in the Ukrainian language almost ceased in Russia. The review *Osnova*, which had been the rallying centre of Ukrainian intellectuals, was closed. As a result there was an almost total eclipse, for several decades and almost until the Revolution, of the Ukrainian journalistic movement in Russia. Nevertheless some periodicals appeared, among which *Ukrainskaia Jizn* (Ukrainian Life), edited in Russian at St. Petersburg by that same Simon Petlioura who later became the chief of the insurrectionary Ukrainian movement against the forces of the Austro-Hungarian occupation, and who was assassinated in Paris in 1926. But now, in the place of a cultural Ukrainianism, there formed, on the other side of the frontier, in Galicia, a political Ukrainian movement which was openly anti-Russian and even aimed at the separation of the Ukraine from the rest of Russia.

175 Henceforth Galicia played the role of the Ukrainian 'Piedmont.' We know that during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Galicia had been the real centre of Russian resistance in Poland. But after the armistice of Androussovo which, in giving Kiev to Russia, had nevertheless left the land of Halytch under Polish domination, many things had changed there. At the beginning of the eighteenth century Poland had reached the aim never yet achieved before: the definite union of the Orthodox Church in Galicia with Rome was introduced. The last attempts at resistance of the old Russian brotherhoods, now fallen into decadence, did not suffice to prevent it. The direction of religious affairs passed to the Poles and to Polonized Russians who

[1] i.e. the circular which declared that the Ukrainian language was 'only Russian, corrupted by Polish influence'.—Analyst

were so detached from the popular masses that often they did not understand the Slavonic language in which, however, they had to read the liturgy of the Eastern rite. This led immediately to a terrible decadence of religious instruction among the people, an instruction which had, during centuries, been the backbone of national resistance. 175

The later evolution which followed soon showed that the Polish State had never been concerned with religious unity in the matter of dogmas but much more with the total denationalization of the Russian people. The Church of the Eastern rite remained in Poland in a position of political and social inferiority, even after its union with Rome. The Poles wanted to achieve a complete latinization of the Church, that is to say a total Polonization of their Russian subjects. As a result the Uniat Church, remaining a more or less persecuted Church because it maintained that ancient national rite, was gradually transformed into a guardian of national traditions in general and became in Galicia the last bastion of resistance to the invading Polonism, thus reassuming the role of the Russian Orthodox Church of former times.

But, dogmatically separated from the Russian Church, she could not direct herself towards Moscow and, later, towards St. Petersburg as easily as the Orthodox Church of Eastern Ukraine had done it. This was all the more so as the Empire continued to consider her as being suspect of Polonism to such a point that she was interdicted on Russian territory (decree of Nicholas I of 1839). This suspicion did great harm to the Russian cause in Galicia even during the Great War. Only a new and violent Polish persecution was required—that which raged in Galicia just before the present war—to induce the Orthodox and the Uniats to unite in a common

175 wish for resistance. We shall return to this question later.

Nevertheless the hopes which were founded on the power of the Russian Empire never ceased entirely to manifest themselves in Galicia. They were alive at the moment when Austria seized this territory during the partition of Poland. That was understood at Vienna, and to ward off this danger the Austrian Government adopted a clever policy of attempting to favour the development of a separatist national consciousness among the Russians of the 'Kingdom of Galicia.' Vienna immediately displayed a Liberalism towards the Uniat Church such as Poland had never shown. This had the effect of raising the level of religious instruction among the clergy and the people. In putting the difference which existed between the Uniat Church of Galicia and the Russian Orthodox Church into relief, the Austrian Government tried to give the word 'Ruthenian' a meaning which opposed it to the conception of 'Russian.' It did not prevent publications in the local language, especially religious ones, but it did not allow the penetration of the language and the influence of the immense empire of the east.

The struggle between the Poles and the 'Ruthenians' continued, however, in other forms under the Austrian domination. The Polish element had always been represented by the great landowners, the clergy of the Latin rite, and by a great part of the middle classes of the towns, whereas on the other side were the peasant masses and the Uniat clergy of the Slavonic rite. The first great political shock in Galicia, the Austro-Hungarian revolution of 1848, could, therefore, be nothing but a new episode in this region of the now four times secular struggle with Polonism.

The Danubian Monarchy, frightened by the rising of

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the Germans, the Hungarians, and the Poles, allied itself 175
at this moment with the anti-Polish Ruthenian movement, just as it allied itself at the same time with the Czechs and the Croatians. The greater part of the promises of the Austrian Government, given under the pressure of revolutionary events, were not kept afterwards. This applied particularly to those promises which concerned the partition of Galicia into two provinces, that of Polish Cracov and of Ruthenian Eastern Galicia.

Nevertheless this 'springtime,' although of short duration, did not fail to awaken the hopes which had survived so long and which helped the task of Austrian policy. An important social consequence emerged from the events of 1848: the abolition of serfdom thirteen years before the emancipation of the serfs in Russia.

In the following decades Austrian policy developed cleverly between the Poles and the Hungarians, although more inclined towards the first who were more conservative from the social point of view and, consequently, more in tune with the general lines of the policy of Vienna.

The Ruthenian language and instruction continued to enjoy a certain liberty on condition that they did not fall under Pan-Russian influences.

Austrian policy at least had the merit of allowing the 517
Ukrainian language and culture to develop and thus to give birth to an imaginative literature and to a journalistic movement of some importance, having its centre at Lvov, which became the nucleus of Ukrainian intellectual life. Numerous cultural institutions appeared one after another; journals, reviews, literary circles, and finally the Ruthenian University of Lvov.

After the measures of restriction which were taken against Ukrainianism in Russia, the intellectual circles of

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authorities by its rapid development and by its hold on 000
the people. Some months before the declaration of war a monster trial took place at Marmaros-Sziget, in which the adherents of the russophile organizations were tried for high treason. Most of the accused were peasants, which confirms the success of Russian ideas among the popular masses. Many were condemned to long terms of imprisonment. Immediately after the beginning of the war arrests again took place among the same Russian circles. These measures led to another trial at the beginning of 1915, but this time the tribunal sat at Talerhof under martial law and pronounced several death sentences. The account of these repressions against the Russian circles of Galicia by the Austrian Government was brought back by Count Bobrinsky, who served as a liaison agent between the Russian organizations in Kiev and those of Galicia and who was a witness at the first trial.

We have seen that the anti-Ukrainian police measures 648
taken by the Russian Government after the Polish 175
insurrection of 1863 were politically directed against the eventual possibility of Polish-Ukrainian collaboration, which was incidentally unrealizable. These measures did not bring about any political reaction in Russian Ukraine. They only brought the Ukrainian intellectual circles into evidence by their brutality and lack of justification. On the contrary they helped to crystallize the anti-Russian Ukrainian movement in Galicia, which found a loyal supporter in the Austro-Hungarian Government. The ideas developed in the plan of Prince Adam Czartoryski, despite their being out of tune with the whole history of the Ukrainian-Polish relations, were later adopted by certain Austrian circles which, as one knows, had become masters of Galicia after the last partition of Poland. Austria-Hungary

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648 175 intended to put itself in the place of the Great Poland of other days and to create, under the sceptre of the Hapsburgs, a federation of Slavonic lands. In the immediate entourage of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne, the idea of transforming the Austro-Hungarian Empire into a federal State found great favour. The idea of taking advantage of the anti-Russian Ukrainianism of Galicia as a counterweight to Russian power and, at the same time, to Polish pretensions to cultural and political direction of the Ukrainian movement, was quite in tune with this plan. It was the intention of the Austrian politicians to use Ukrainian separatism as a means of creating difficulties behind the Russian front in case of war, and of securing some allies on the other side of the frontier.

In order to attract the sympathies of the Ukrainian intellectuals the Austro-Hungarian Government showed great tolerance towards the cultural institutions of the country, readily authorizing the creation of Ukrainian schools and putting no obstacles in the way of the development of political societies and institutions which, as we have already said, also served to eclipse the Polish influence over the leading circles of Galicia. The Austrian Government did not only authorize the creation of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine,' but gave effective assistance to its development in granting it the means of action, which it did not grant to the political organizations of the other Slavonic minorities. Skoropis-Ioltoukhovsky, Jouk, Dorochenko, and Salisniak, all convinced separatists and extreme anti-Russians, were placed at the head of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine.' The Russian general staff became alarmed by this movement, whose principal aim it suspected—the disorganization, in case of war, of the foundations of the army which would be formed in the

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south of Russia. Later on, in 1917, the bulletin which 648
was published at Stockholm by the members of the 175
'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine' confirmed the justified anxiety of the Russian military authorities. This bulletin declared that the 'Union' had taken up a clear-cut position in all that concerned the relations with Russia, in basing all her hopes on the military defeat of the latter. It hoped for the occupation of the Ukraine by the troops of the countries at war with Russia, in order to attain a national independence with the aid of the central empires. Thanks to the great ability of her propagandists and to the continual support of the Austrian Government, the 'Union' was able to obtain considerable financial assistance consisting, apart from the contributions of the Galician and Bucovinian peasants and the Ukrainian colonists in America, of the grant of the 'Friends of Ukrainian Independence,' who belonged to those nationalities who were prepared to go to war with Russia. The accounts of the financial organization of the 'Union' were brought, in 1917, to the Russian military authorities by one of its former collaborators. One can say without exaggeration that the initiative and the elaboration of the programme of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' can be traced to Austria, which proposed, in case of an offensive in Russian-Ukrainian territory, that the members of this organization should follow her army with the aim of finding supporters of separatism among the native population of Russian Ukraine, and on the other hand for creating the new administration in the conquered country. But the Austrian advance did not take place. The Russian troops invaded Galicia and the most active members of the 'Union' had to take refuge in Vienna. Many of their number simply entered the Austrian secret service after this failure. That which remained of the 'Union'

175 continued to receive subsidies from the Austrian Government and engaged in cultural work and autonomous propaganda among the Russian prisoners of Ukrainian nationality.

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This propaganda began immediately after the Austrian defeat in Galicia in 1914. Special camps were organized in which Galician instructors tried to subject the Ukrainian peasants to their influence and to the idea of Ukrainian autonomy. The conditions under which these prisoners lived were better than those of Russian soldiers from other parts of Russia. But soon, owing to her continual military and political defeats, Austria began more and more to make way for Germany, who finally took over the affairs of the 'Union.'

The idea of a confederation of vassal States carved out of the Russian territory developed in Germany in certain intellectual and political circles since the end of the era of Bismarck. The decisive role in the development of these ideas was played by Baltic Germans originating from the Russian Baltic provinces, whose influence, at first purely cultural, became progressively stronger in the Reich.

000 The short-sighted policy of crude and superficial russification, inaugurated in the Baltic provinces in the reign of Alexander III, had exasperated a part of the Baltic nobility and especially of the intellectuals. Their national pride, encouraged by the great rise of Germany in 1870–1, was deeply offended by the policy of russification. Thus these barons and these intellectuals began to turn more and more towards the Reich. Some of them even tried to find a new home in the at last united Reich. They took with them a hate of Russian politics, their contempt of all the native peoples of Eastern Europe and their historical traditions, full of reminiscences of those struggles which the Teutonic order

000 to make the Ukrainian idea one of the principal pivots of German claims.

175 668 701 If, under Austrian direction, one did not dare to speak of separatism to the prisoners, the German general staff, the new master of the Ukrainian movement, thought of the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State, under German control, and gave its propagandists directions in this sense. From 1915 the Little Russians who agreed to declare themselves Ukrainians and not Russians were sent to the camp of Radstadt. In this camp specialists of the Ukrainian question, under the direction of Professor Bezpalko, undertook a series of lectures in which they drew pictures of the independence and liberty of the Cossacks for the benefit of their hearers, appealing to them to reject the 'heinous yoke of Asiatic Muscovy.' Towards the beginning of 1917, that is to say after two years of assiduous work, the German general staff succeeded in recruiting, in the camp, 15,000 prisoners. The regiment of 'Taras Chevtchenko' was created. This regiment consisted of eight companies and had about 1600 men. The soldiers of this regiment, looked upon as undoubted partisans of the independence of the Ukraine under German protection, were armed and equipped in readiness for being used in a possible offensive in South Russian regions. The remainder was divided into four groups:

1. About 1500 men formed the *Sitch* (the name of the ancient Cossack community) and enjoyed the complete confidence of the German authorities with regard to their loyalty to the new Ukrainian cause, without yet being entrusted with arms.

2. The 'apprentices,' about 3000, still considered as not absolutely reliable but already somewhat influenced by the propaganda.

3. The 'candidates,' about 3000, those who were

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neutral or indifferent to the question but without marked hostility. 175 668 701

4. Finally the 'opponents,' about 6000, who, although they had agreed to take the name of 'Ukrainians,' were actively opposed to separatist propaganda. They were continually sent to penal work and had to undergo severe and frequent punishments.

Thus of the 15,000 men who, enticed by the promise of an improvement of their lot, had agreed to join the Ukrainian units, one could only rely with difficulty on 3000 (the Chevtchenko regiment and the *Sitch*) who had been really affected by the propaganda. At this period the number of Russian prisoners exceeded 3,000,000, of whom at least 700,000 were Ukrainians, which confirms the absolute failure of this movement.

It would be interesting to remember that from the Russian side the same policy was inaugurated with respect to the prisoners of war of Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Croatian, etc., origin. This move enabled one to establish whole divisions composed of Slavonic minorities. From the beginning of the war Austro-Hungarian military units formed of Slavs, and especially of Czechs, went over to the Russians with their officers, arms, and baggage. Not a single similar case occurred in the Russian Army, which included many entirely Ukrainian regiments. On the contrary, according to the evidence of high Russian and German officers, the Ukrainian regiments were among the best troops, often used as shock units, the most famous of which was the 'Iron Brigade' commanded by General Denikine, future commander of the White Army.

To sum up, the political movements of autonomy and of Ukrainian separatism gave no tangible results despite a subsidized propaganda having the support of such powerful organisms as the central empires.

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When the February Revolution broke out in St. Petersburg no political Ukrainian movement developed in the early stages. Quite naturally the intellectual circles obtained more liberty to spread their ideas, which were not anti-Russian.

The municipal elections undertaken at Kiev almost immediately after the February Revolution, and which had undoubtedly taken advantage of all the liberties which characterized the first days of all revolutions, gave a result which clearly shows the almost complete non-existence of a Ukrainian political movement. In fact, of ninety municipal councillors the so-called Ukrainian parties obtained only six places, and that was in the capital of the Ukraine itself.

All classes of society hoped that the Provisional Government which replaced the Monarchy would be able to maintain the front and would allow the country to convoke a National Assembly which would decide the future political regime on the whole territory of the former Russian Empire. As soon as the active members of the Ukrainian political organizations of Galicia entered the Russian Ukraine they organized a kind of Ukrainian committee at Kiev, which started its autonomist political work. On 24 March 1917 the Ukrainian Associations spread over the whole territory were called upon to send their representatives to Kiev to form the first nucleus of a future Ukrainian Parliament. Although only the representatives of such Associations which had declared themselves Ukrainian were invited to this assembly, and although the direction of the assembly was entrusted to Galician Ukrainians, under the Presidency of Professor Hrouchevsky, not only was the idea of separatism absent, but the autonomous aspirations were of the most mild kind. This first assembly of Ukrainian deputies took the name of 'Rada' (the name

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of the Cossack Assembly of the time of Bogdan Khmelnitsky), which means 'Diet' or 'Council' in Ukrainian. Once installed, it tried to establish relations with the central Provisional Government, whose power became more and more fictitious. The menace of a Bolshevik *coup d'état* hung over the Government of St. Petersburg, a fact which allowed the Rada to justify its own establishment in declaring itself alone capable of protecting the Ukraine from Bolshevik invasion. This political manœuvre had many chances of success. The Ukrainian peasant was fundamentally hostile to Bolshevism, to the social levelling, and to the collectivization of the land. Nevertheless, anxious for the peace which the Bolsheviks had promised, the Ukrainian peasant lent them his ear. The leaders of the Rada, loyal to the principles of the 'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine,' were also not opposed to the idea of an immediate peace and their promises to preserve the Ukraine from Bolshevism and to conclude peace with the central powers was their most important trump card. The Provisional Government, in a state of complete disintegration and without any remaining support, hastened to recognize the Rada as a political organization, although no election in the proper sense of the word had taken place at the time of its formation. A statute, known under the name of 'Universal,' was instituted on Ukrainian territory. After the agreement between the Provisional Government and the Rada, Ukrainian autonomy was recognized but was limited to questions of language and culture and to the organization of local administration.

All other important questions, including the agrarian question, were left to the future National Pan-Russian Assembly. The administrative activity of the Rada was, at the beginning, limited to the town of Kiev alone, where its assemblies took place. During the summer of

175 668 642

1917 the propaganda agents of the Rada covered the whole country where they organized meetings and distributed pamphlets. They tried to persuade the proprietors of land that their aspirations would be more easily realized within the framework of an autonomous State and underlined the impotence of the Central Government in the face of a Bolshevik attack. The Ukrainian peasant, like that of the Volga and of Siberia and like the Cossacks of the Don, opposed the revolutionary theories, and it is in these countries that they met with the strongest opposition. The Rada could not have a better justification of its authority in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasant than the statement that the Bolshevik movement, of Great Russian origin, was imported into the Ukraine from the outside, which, moreover, was true. The title which the Ukrainian anarchist, Nestor Makhno, gave to his book on the Civil War, *The Russian Revolution in the Ukraine*, is singularly significant. The leaders of the Rada were careful not to proclaim their separatist ideas openly, knowing that such ideas would never find the support of the popular masses. Profiting, however, by the decay of the Provisional Government, they formed, with its consent, a sort of Ministry which took the name of 'General Secretariat,' and which declared itself the supreme power in the Ukraine on 29 July of the same year. The agrarian movement which spread over the whole territory of the Ukraine aimed especially at the great landowners, most of whom, especially in the west, were Poles. Thus the real popular movement took the form of the ancient quarrel between the peasants and the lords and developed quite independently of the Ukrainian movement represented by the Rada. When, in October 1917, the Provisional Government fell as the result of a Bolshevik insurrection, the only official

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authority existing in the Ukraine was represented by the General Secretariat of the Central Ukrainian Rada. 175 668 642

The peasants, hostile to Bolshevism, did not find any other political organization on which they could lean. Mistrusting the organizations of the Right (which were later to form the political nucleus of the White Armies) and equally fearing the local democratic municipalities where the intellectual and Jewish elements dominated, openly hostile to the working class which was almost entirely Bolshevized and consisted of non-Ukrainian elements, the farmers seemed to tend more and more towards the support of the Rada which seemed to be the only force capable of realizing their aspirations. Nevertheless the first clash between the elements which accepted the idea of an autonomous Ukraine and those which rallied to Bolshevism, was not to the advantage of the first. The agrarian question meant much to them. The Ukrainian Rada was unable to formulate a clear policy with regard to this most important question. Its resistance to the anarchical division of the lands, supported by the Bolsheviks, rapidly reduced the number of its supporters and the already small authority enjoyed by the General Secretariat in the eyes of the peasant mass. Nevertheless, on 20 November, the Rada proclaimed a democratic Ukrainian Republic. It is at this period that the allied military missions then resident at Kiev recognized *de facto* the Ukrainian Republic. At the same time the fourth 'Universal' was promulgated, one of the articles of which declared that the independence of the Ukraine was considered indispensable only because the rest of the Russian territory had fallen to the power of the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to remember this detail because it again proves that, even in politically favourable circumstances, the Rada did not dare openly to declare its separatism. This act did not increase the

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175 authority of the Ukrainian Government. No local
642 municipal or other organization took the slightest note
668 of its existence. Every department, every district, and every town governed itself and tried to resist the advance of the Bolsheviks. Not having any military forces or police organizations at their disposal, these local governments were unable to resist the attacks of the Red Guards and the armed soldiers, returned from the front and supported by Moscow. Soon the whole Ukraine elected local Soviet governments and the Rada, which hastened to proclaim, on 22 January 1918, the independence of the Ukraine, was obliged to flee on the 29th of the same month, seeking refuge at Jitomir. One of its most active members, Simon Petlioura, tried to organize anti-Bolshevik troops composed of peasants and prisoners of Galician origin. He succeeded in forming several units which, although unsatisfactory from a military point of view, cut a better figure than the bands of soldiers which were leaving the front. These military units, known under the name of '*haidamaks*,' formed small nuclei of resistance in the towns and villages and halted the Soviet offensive here and there. The more the Bolsheviks advanced towards the west, the more this resistance became effective, especially in Southern Podolia, where the Ukrainian organizations, supported by Galician prisoners, by Polish legionaries, and even by certain circles of purely Russian sympathies but hostile to Bolshevism, still retained some vestiges of power.

648 The insufficiency of technical, administrative, and
727 intellectual personnel did not allow the Ukrainians to give their civil and military organizations the force necessary for defeating the revolutionary movement directed by the Communist Party. On 9 February the Ukrainian Government, acting as a sovereign government, and despite the firm opposition of a large part of

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[Sub-Carpathan Ukraine]

CHAPTER VI

THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM TO-DAY

IF before the Great War Galicia was the home of the Ukrainian movement, and if since 1917 the first landmark of the new Ukrainian State was erected in the Russian part of the Ukraine, it is since 29 September 1938 that the tiny Sub-Carpathian Russia was invested with the role of a 'new Ukrainian Piedmont.' How did this come about? How could a country, linked with Hungary during seven centuries, though sentimentally tied to Russia, become this new 'Piedmont'? /175

We know that during the Great War the Carpatho-Russian people showed their attachment to the Russian cause almost openly, which exposed them to the severest repressions on the part of the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The inter-allied agreements of the time of the war, in giving Russia full liberty of establishing her new frontier with Austro-Hungary, seemed to have prepared the annexation of this small country by Russia.

The Russian Revolution, and the anarchy which followed, rendered these arrangements void. President Masaryk mentions the following in his memoirs:

'The collapse of Russia made the annexation of Sub-Carpathian Russia by the Czechoslovak Republic possible. First it was only a hope, but when I was in Russia, and particularly in the Ukraine, I was forced to give my attention to this plan.'

Immediately after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary the Czech legions were eager to occupy the western

175 part of Carpathian Russia—the district of Priachev. On 9 January 1919 this district was purely and simply annexed by Slovakia, which had herself become an integral part of the young Czechoslovak Republic.

In the other, the greater part of Carpathian Russia, power had fallen into the hands of the Russian national committees which remained in constant contact with the representatives elected by the Carpatho-Russian *émigrés* of America. This American delegation played a decisive role in the events which followed. Greatly attached to the national Russian cause, it nevertheless bowed to circumstances in recognizing the impossibility, owing to the situation in Russia, of uniting the Carpathian country to the Russian State. And it is thus that the Carpatho-Russian committees accepted, on 16 May 1919, the decisive resolution :

'Sub-Carpathian Russian forms an autonomous State within the Czechoslovakian Republic.'

It was this solution—the inclusion of Sub-Carpathian Russia as an autonomous entity in the Czechoslovakian State—which was expressly ratified by the peace treaties. Articles 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Treaty of St. Germain established in effect the international status of Carpathian Russia :

Czechoslovakia accepted the proposal of the powers of the *entente* which aimed at endowing Sub-Carpathian Russia with the largest possible autonomy (Article 10). She undertook to give her a Diet freely elected by the population as well as a local administration responsible to the Diet (Article 11). The officials of the State in Sub-Carpathian Russia were to be natives of the country and the Carpatho-Russian people were to be fairly represented in the common Parliament of the republic (Articles 12 and 13).

This statute, guaranteed by the powers of the *entente*,

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[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

was never put into operation, notwithstanding the repeated demands of Carpatho-Russian organizations which even tried, but in vain, to seize the Secretariat to the League of Nations. 175

Unfortunately for the Czechoslovakian State and for Europe, the Government of Prague showed itself extremely distrustful of all Russian national tendencies. Not only was the autonomous Diet never summoned, but the Czech authorities neglected, moreover, the international obligation to recruit the administrative staffs among the native population. According to an *aide-mémoire* presented to the League of Nations in 1923, there were 1213 Czech officials of the Ministry of Finance in Sub-Carpathian Russia against only 77 Russians, 272 Czech officials of the Ministry of Interior against 45 Russians, and 14 Czechs of the Ministry of Health against 2 Russians, etc.

Such a situation made collaboration between Russians and Czechs very difficult. It soon ended in the resignation of the first governor of the country, M. Jatkovitch, of Russian sympathies, who had played a very important role in the inclusion of Sub-Carpathian Russia in Czechoslovakia.

But it was not only the Czech officials who made their appearance in large numbers in the land of the Carpathians. Distrusting the Russians, the Government of Prague clearly favoured Ukrainian tendencies. Masaryk himself mentioned in his memoirs that he viewed with 'the greatest sympathy the efforts which aim at the introduction of the Little Russian language in the schools and the administration' of Sub-Carpathian Russia. The popular masses were completely strange to this Ukrainian movement and one attempted to implant it in the Carpathians with the help of *émigrés*, mostly from Galicia. The Russian Press of the Carpathians never

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

175 ceased to disclose the favourable conditions enjoyed by these foreign elements to whom the Czechoslovakian Government was quite ready to entrust public education in preference to Russians.

Thus Ukrainization nevertheless remained without appreciable results, when in 1937 the Czechoslovakian Government undertook a referendum in Sub-Carpathian Russia in order to establish the desires of the population concerning the choice of the language of instruction in primary schools; 82 per cent of the votes were given for the Russian language and only 18 per cent for Ukrainian. Even if we admit that this referendum had no political character, one would have to believe that the figures which resulted correspond to the facts.

A few days before the events of September 1938 the Czechoslovakian Government decided to inaugurate a federal policy and appointed the President of the 'Russian Agrarian Union,' Brody, as chief of the Government of Sub-Carpathian Russia. But as soon as the Munich agreements were signed the German Government demanded a change of political direction of this Cabinet. For a short while yet Brody remained at the head of the Cabinet of Sub-Carpathian Russia, but he was supplemented by two Ukrainian Ministers. In October a new change put an end to the power of the Russian party.

Under the growing pressure of the Reich, Czechoslovakia established a new Government in Sub-Carpathian Russia, presided over by Monsignor Volochine, of Ukrainian sympathies and with pro-German tendencies. Volochine proclaimed an 'Autonomous Sub-Carpathian Ukraine,' thus conforming to the German plan which tended to the creation of a Ukrainian springboard which was required by the policy of the *Drang nach Osten*. The installation of this Government was

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

in clear contradiction to the aspirations of the people. 175 Actually, in 1937, during the last relatively free elections to the Czechoslovakian Parliament, the Russian block, called the 'Russian Agrarian Union,' had obtained 120,000 votes against 40,000 Ukrainian votes of the party of Monsignor Volochine.

Always pursuing their anti-Russian policy, the agents of Monsignor Volochine denounced Brody to the Government of Prague, accusing him of high treason to Czechoslovakia, and insinuated that he had had the intention of uniting Sub-Carpathian Russia to Hungary. Brody was imprisoned, but had to be freed in February 1939 as the tribunal had pronounced his case not proven. But Volochine was already strongly in power, supported by Revay, a partisan of the close union with Germany and a former social democratic deputy of the Hungarian Parliament, who had become one of the active members of the 'Ukrainian National Union,' 'U.N.O.,' a terrorists' organization whose headquarters are at Berlin.

Prague and Berlin already sheltered numerous Ukrainian *émigrés*, since the union of Galicia and Poland, and especially the members of the U.N.O. who, as soon as the New Ukraine was proclaimed, moved to Ujhorod, an ancient medieval city, the capital of Sub-Carpathian Russia, to reinforce the ranks of militant Ukrainianism. The population, poor and often inert and illiterate, did not participate in any Ukrainian political movement.

The installation of the Ukrainian Government was immediately followed by the inauguration of Hitlerist methods in the country. Semi-military organizations, formed on the model of the S.A., took over the direction of public affairs. The new methods were applied to the elections to the Ukrainian Diet, the results of which were astounding: 92 per cent of the votes were given to the Ukrainians, whose candidates figured on the one

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

175 and only list, that of Volochine. It seems to us superfluous to insist on the impossibility of so rapid a change of public opinion, especially as no serious propaganda whatever had taken place before the installation of the new Government.

In order to have an idea of the new regime it is curious to note that the land, whose population does not exceed 600,000 people, saw itself endowed with three concentration camps in which all those were locked up who were Russians at heart and did not want to submit to this political farce.

During the period which passed between the Munich agreement and the annexation of Czechoslovakia by Germany, Sub-Carpathian Russia underwent the amputation of a narrow strip of her territory, along the Hungarian border, which was given to the latter together with the ancient capital, the town of Ujhorod.

As a reaction to the policy of Ukrainization of the Czechoslovakian Government, the Hungarians were eager to adopt a pro-Russian policy in the parts of Sub-Carpathian Russia which fell to them. The Russian schools were re-established and Ujhorod and Mukacevo returned to their ancient role of Russian cultural centres.

The Russian deputies of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, who represented the regions given to Hungary, and, in the first instance, Fenczik, the leader of the Russian Fascist Party, automatically became deputies of the Magyar Parliament.

It is curious to note that at the same time as the blue and yellow flag of the Ukraine was raised over the new autonomous Ukrainian republic, the tricolour flag of Imperial Russia is the only one authorized in the Hungarian part.

Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, deprived of the only big town, Ujhorod, had to establish a provisional capital at

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Sub-Carpathian Ukraine]

Chust, a place which is no more than a hamlet, and which has not even got a railway station. In this improvised capital the innumerable manifestations of the military force of the Ukrainian movement were displayed every day with the habitual pomp of Hitlerist mass meetings. 175

The scandal and the abuses of the last elections, the arbitrariness and brutality of the men of the *Sitch* (the name of the Ukrainian S.A.), obliged the Czechoslovakian Government to undertake measures for curbing the too clamorous activity of the blue-yellow Hitlerists, which was becoming too compromising.

The Czech general, Prhala, known for his Russian sympathies, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Czech troops stationed in the Ukrainian territory and entered as such into the Cabinet of Monsignor Volochine. At the same time Revay was dismissed. This operation did not please the German Government, which saw one of its most fervent adepts in Revay.

It is only after the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia and the establishment of the protectorate by the Reich in Slovakia and the occupation of Sub-Carpathian Russia by the Hungarian Army, that Ukrainian activities ended on its territory.

To-day we do not know yet what the immediate future of this country will be. It is more than probable that, once rejoined to Hungary, every expression of the Ukrainian movement will be suppressed, and the partisans of the Russian culture and spirit will again return to the direction of the land.

This seems to us the more likely as the Ukrainian movement was severely suppressed in Poland, the loyal ally of Hungary. This latter will never allow the inauguration of a movement on her territory which could one day be considered as being against the interests of Poland.

175 At a first glance the pro-Russian movement seems equally dangerous in the eyes of the Poles. But if the Ukrainian movement has a clearly political character the russophile movement in Sub-Carpathian Russia never raises the question of the return to Russia, but limits itself to the expression of its cultural aspirations.

The official indifference of the Reich to the suppression of the 'Sub-Carpathian Ukraine,' which had been created by it, seems astonishing. Is it because Germany has acknowledged that the 'Piedmont' had been badly chosen and had no chance whatever of becoming a serious Ukrainian springboard? Recent events would seem to indicate much wider plans. Or is it because for the moment she considers it inconvenient to take up an openly hostile position towards Hungary? It seems that the influential members of the U.N.O., disconcerted by the attitude of the Reich, hurriedly left Germany to find refuge elsewhere. The near future will throw light on this enigma. The scale of events is growing.

. . . . .

000 The following three factors have put the Ukrainian problem in the forefront of to-day's international politics:

1. The development of the German dynamic initiative which seeks to assure a new living space and to open a path towards the east.

2. The Soviet power which finds itself to-day the master of Russia, but which shows itself of being incapable of sufficiently influencing the situation in Eastern Europe by its actions and of giving it permanent equilibrium.

3. Polish events.

The idea of a German hold on the Ukraine was inaugurated during the Great War, if not earlier, and has

103 nomads "whom Ukraine mourned very much." This popular name gradually supplanted 'Rus'. The nearer to our times, the more the names 'Ukraine', 'Ukrainian' are used*). The name 'Little Russia', which had been used as the official name of Ukraine in Tsarist Russia, was not accepted by the Ukrainian people**).

● 175 The Ukrainian problem is not new in European history. The Ukrainian nation (Ruthenians), which had lived for millenniums on the territories between the Don River and the Carpathian Mountains, and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, has rendered Europe a great service. The knight armies of the Princes of Kiev, Chernigov, Galicia and Volhynia, in heroic exploits defended their country against the nomad hordes, and for centuries did not allow the wild Asiatic tribes to enter Western Europe. A poetical picture of this struggle gives us the famous 'Discourse of the Campaign of Igor' from the 12th century, in which is described the campaign of the 'Rusychi' of Prince Igor against the steppe horde of the Kumans. The powerful Tartar Horde coming from the interior of Asia destroyed the Ukrainian capital Kiev and other cities, and devastated the country in 1240.

After the destruction by the Tartars in the 13th century the Ukrainian public life was concentrated in Galicia and Volhynia. In the 14th century Galician territory was annexed by the Poles after the dynasty of the Galician Princes, the descendants of Vladimir the Saint, had died out. Volhynia and other parts of the Ukrainian territory weakened and devastated by the Tartars, came under the rule of Lithuanian Princes. The Lithuanian state was the immediate continuation of the political and cultural tradition of the Kievan state. The official language of the Lithuanian state was White-Ruthenian and Ukrainian.

With the coming of the Tartars the complete separation of the northern principalities of the former State of Kiev (Suzdal, Ryazan, Moscow, Tver) from Ukraine took place. Under the rule of the Princes of Moscow who 'collected the country', a peculiar system of a centralised despotic state arose. Of the liberal constitu-

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*) The famous Czech scholar Jan Amos Comenius who had lived for a long time in Poland, wrote in a letter dated 24, 5, 1655: "Polonia nostra tota bellis ardet ... tacebo de remotioribus oris Lithuania et *Ukraina*". *The Correspondence of Comenius. Treatises of the Czech Academy of Science*, Class III, Ann. 1, No. 2, p. 179: Prague 1892.

**) The name 'Little Russia' for Ukraine is of scholarly origin. For the first time (1303) it was used in a paper of the Patriarch of Constantinople for the designation of Ukraine as the Metropolis *(μικρὰ Ῥωσία)* in contrast to Moscow *(μεγάλη Ῥωσία)* which formerly was hierarchically subordinated to Kiev.

tion of the Kievan State, where the Prince was only a servant of the state and had to reckon with the will of his subjects, — knights and townsmen ('viche'), in Muscovy there was not the slightest trace. The Government of the Princes of Moscow imitated the despotic system of the Tartar 'Golden Horde'. Some Russian historians reject the legend of the taking over of the Kievan traditions by Moscow, and point out the peculiarity of the social and political order of the Muscovite state*). The Princes of Moscow did not tolerate the existence of the Republic of Great Novgorod on the Volkhov River at the side of their despotic state, and after having conquered that country they destroyed by bloody terror the freedom of the Republic of Novgorod (end of 15th century). The liberal traditions of Great Novgorod were definitely wiped out in 1570 by Tsar Ivan the Terrible, who carried out a cruel massacre in this city, and deported a great part of the population to the East. The Muscovite State, which had grown under the protectorate of the Tartar Khans, created a political and social order of its own, after the pattern of the eastern despotisms. 175 ●

In an article published in the *Review of Politics* (July 1948) the well known American historian Hans Kohn says that the state of the Princes of Kiev, i. e. Ukraine, "looked toward Byzantium, whence it received its Church and toward Scandinavia, from where its dynasty came. When Kiev succumbed to the Mongol invasion, modern Russia was created by the will of the ruthless cunning of the great princes around Moscow. [177]

The new capital grew up, . . ., far from the old cultural centres to the west, on recently colonial land where traditional urban liberties were unknown. Its people were no longer the Slavs of the Dnieper but a new race in which Slav, Finnish, and Mongol blood freely intermingled. From Moscow, no roads led to the West, the rivers pointed to the steppes and deserts of Asia; the political, cultural, and economic ties were with the great empire of the Tartars to whom it was tributary." [144]

The oriental despotic features of the political and economic order of the Muscovite State gave the central government a tremendous power that was used for the enslavement of all social classes and for the seclusion of the Muscovite people from Western Europe. Until the end of the 17th century the Government of the Tsars did not permit its subjects to visit the countries of Western Europe and tried to prevent foreigners from entering their country. The Tsar

*) Prof. Presnyakov, *The Creation of the Great-Russian State:* Moscow 1918; various works of the historians Lyubavsky, Miliukov and others.

175 was not only the unrestricted lord over the freedom and lives of his subjects; he was also the greatest merchant and contractor in his country (monopoly of foreign trade, monopoly of public houses a. s. o.). Even for the land that was cultivated by the Muscovite people a formula was stated: "The whole land belongs to God and the Tsar."

The Muscovite aristocrats had no power to use against the rule of the Tsars and signed in official papers with deminutive names 'Petrushka', instead of Peter, 'Ivashka', instead of Ivan, and called themselves 'Kholopy' (slaves) of their Tsar. The foreigners from the free Western European countries were impressed by the unlimited submission of the Muscovites to the Government of the Tsars, the lack of personal dignity among them, and their simultaneous enthusiasm for the absolute power of their Tsar, who had not to take an oath on the observation of the laws and the consideration of the liberties of his subjects as was the case in the free Western countries. The learned Scotsman Buchananus writes in his book *De iure regni apud Scotos,* in 1579, that Muscovy rejoices in tyranny ('Moscovia tyrannide gaudet').

[181] The present Communist Government has received the tyrannical tradition from the Tsars of Moscow. Soviet propaganda consequently glorifies one of the most cruel tyrants of universal history — Ivan the Terrible — in its press, literature and radio*). No less is the glorification of Tsar Peter I., the founder of modern Russian imperialism, by the Russian Communists. Here the Bolsheviks have found their corresponding Russian national tradition.

After the destruction of the Kievan State and the down-fall of the Principality of Galicia and Lodomeria the development of Ukraine and White Russia (Byelorussia) under the rule of the Lithuanian princely dynasty went in the general European direction. The nobility and the city population had their rights guaranteed by the laws in Lithuania and Poland, and the Monarch had to consider the will of his subjects. The Ukrainian nobility and the townsmen enjoyed these rights alike. However, after the Union of Lublin of 1569 between Lithuania and Poland almost the whole of Ukrainian territory was incorporated by Poland, and a strong pressure of the Polish State on the Ukrainian people began. The Polish authorities restricted the rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox nobility and, on the other hand, gave those who abandoned the Greek Orthodox Church and turned Catholic all possibilities of career and enrichment. An

*) Comp.: R. Wipper, *Ivan Grozny:* Moscow 1948 (An official glorification of the 'progressive and democratic' Tsar Ivan the Terrible).

even harder pressure was applied against the Ukrainian townsmen. 175
In those times the conversion of an Orthodox Ukrainian to Catholicism meant Polonisation. Since the end of the 16th century a large number of the Ukrainian nobility having accepted Catholicism left their Ukrainian nationality. The same pressure led to the Polonisation of a great part of the Ukrainian townsmen.

The neighbourhood of the Tartars was an obstacle to the normal development of Ukraine.

On the territory between Kiev and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov the stubborn struggle of the Ukrainian nation against the Tartars was carried on for centuries. The Tartars captured people from Ukraine and sold them into slavery in the oriental markets. The last invasion of the Crimean Horde into Ukraine was in 1769.

In spite of this permanent danger from the steppe and under these extremely difficult conditions the Ukrainian nation did not abandon its cultural activity.

Schools, literature, printing, developed in Ukraine. The learned [212]
Arab Paul of Aleppo, who visited Ukraine in 1654, wrote in his memoirs that education was common among the Ukrainian people, and that even the Ukrainian women were literate. Academies had also been founded in Ukraine, and were the models and sources of education for all Greek-Orthodox Slav peoples. Ukrainians studied at the Universities of Italy, France, Germany and other countries.

Against the Tartar hordes, the Ukrainians created an organisation of its own — the Cossack Army. From the middle of the 16th [701]
century, the centre of the Ukrainian Cossack Army was in the fortress 'Sich', southward of the Dnieper Cataracts. From this the name of 'Zaporovian Army' arose ('porohy' are the rocks in the Dnieper). The Zaporovian Army performed great deeds in fighting the Tartars. The Ukrainian Cossacks under the leadership of Petro Sahaydachny saved Poland from a terrible Turkish force in the battle of Khotin (Bessarabia), in 1621.

When in 1683 Central Europe was threatened by the Turks, the Ukrainian Cossacks were the force without which the Polish King Jan Sobieski could not dare to begin the decisive battle against the Turks before Vienna.

After the Union of Lublin of 1569, the Polish nobles wanted to take possession of the territory the Ukrainian people had defended against the Tartars. The Polish Government planned to abolish the Ukrainian Cossack Army, and to make the Cossacks serfs of the nobility. The nobility wished to lay their hands on the free peasants of Eastern Ukraine who had not known serfdom. The relations between the Polish Government and the masses of the Ukrainian

175 people deteriorated also in consequence of the religious persecutions of Ukrainians by the Polish State. For these reasons, in 1648 the great Ukrainian revolution against Poland broke out under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—1657), the Hetman of the Cossack Army.

[642] 175 648 In consequence of the revolution of 1648 the Ukrainian Cossack Republic was created headed by an elected Chief of State (Hetman). The official name of this State was 'Zaporovian Army' (Exercitus Zaporoviensis) with Tchyhyryn as Capital. Leaning upon the Cossacks and the free peasantry, the Ukrainian Republic could defend itself against the united forces of Poland and the Crimean Horde for several years. Having lost the hope for a settlement with Poland on the principle of equality, the Ukrainian Government concluded a treaty with the Muscovite Tsar in Pereyaslav, in 1654. The Muscovite Tsar promised the Ukrainians assistance against Poland and the Tartars. The treaty of Pereyaslav secured for Ukraine its own army, administration, and an independent foreign policy.

The transition of Ukraine towards Moscow in the 17th century provided the basis for the rise of the Muscovite state. The Ukrainian revolution of 1648 weakened Poland considerably.

Under the protectorate of the Tsar of Moscow Ukraine did not find security for its liberty, prosperity and progress. The Swedish King Charles X. Gustav understood this well when he wrote to his Ambassador to the Ukrainian Government, in 1657: "Moscow does not tolerate a free nation"*). When it had become evident that the Tsar of Moscow tried to reduce or to abolish the rights of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Government of B. Khmelnitsky planned the annulment of the alliance with Moscow, and concluded treaties with Sweden and Transylvania to secure the independence of Ukraine (1656 and 1657). The Ukrainian Government put forward the demand for the frontiers of the Ukrainian State as '*iuk totius Ukrainae antiquae vel Roxolaniae*' up to the Vistula, the Ukrainian ethnographic frontier of that time. In the treaty with Sweden of 1657, Ukraine was recognised as a free nation dependent on no one ('*gens libera, nulli subiecta*').

Against the Ukrainian aspirations for independence Poland and Moscow acted in common. By the treaty of Andrusov of 1667, Ukraine was divided among these countries on the Dnieper line. Turkey and the Crimean Horde interfered with the struggle in Ukraine. In these wars, lasting nearly 30 years, Ukraine on the western bank of the Dnieper River was disastrously devastated. In

*) *Archives of South-West Russia*, Part III, Vol. VI: Kiev 1908.

a treaty between Turkey, Moscow, and Poland of 1681, it was 175 determined to depopulate Ukraine between the South Bug and 648 Dnieper Rivers to the Black Sea. The western Ukrainian territories (Volhynia, Galicia etc.) remained under Polish rule. Ukraine to the East of the Dnieper remained under the protectorate of the Muscovite Tsars, preserving restricted autonomous rights, with an elected Hetman as the head of the Government.

Tsar Peter I. planned the abolition of the remains of the autonomous order of Ukraine on the Eastern bank of the Dnieper. In order to defend the freedom of Ukraine, Hetman Ivan Mazeppa concluded an alliance with the Swedish King Charles XII. against Russia in 1708. The battle of Poltava (1709), fatal for Ukraine and Sweden, put an end to the plans of the Ukrainian patriots to restore Ukrainian independence. Nonetheless, for decades even in the second half of the 18th century, the members of the Ukrainian Government which went into exile in 1709, continued in various countries their diplomatic action for the defence of the Ukrainian independence. They were headed by Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, the successor of Mazeppa, and included the son of Hetman Orlyk, Hryhor Orlyk, General in the French service, Fedir Myrovych and others.

After the battle of Poltava the Russian Government restricted [661] the autonomous rights of Ukraine considerably. Tsar Peter I. 175 deliberately destroyed Ukraine in order to oppress her people the more easily, as we are informed by Weber, the Resident of Brunswick-Hannover in Moscow, a contemporary of Tsar Peter I.*). Ukraine was forced to pay heavy contributions; Ukrainians were sent in masses to the North to build Petersburg, the new capital of the Tsars. Many thousands of Ukrainians died from exhaustion while working for the strengthening of Russian Tsarist despotism. At the same time Moscow took from Ukraine its best cultural workers — scholars, artists, artisans. Western civilisation was introduced to Russia principally by Ukrainian intellectuals. (See K. Kharlampovich, *Little Russian Influence on the Great Russian Ecclesiastical Life:* Kazan, 1912; and Pekarsky, *Science and Literature in the Time of Peter* — I — II).

The Tsarina Catherine II. abolished the autonomous Ukrainian Government in 1764. Ukraine was brought to the level of the other provinces of the Tsarist Empire.

The Russian Government decided also to destroy the Zaporovian Army, the nest of democratic liberty in Ukraine. In 1775, Russian

*) Weber, Das veränderte Rußland: Hannover 1729.

175 troops conquered the fortress of the Ukrainian Cossacks — the Zaporovian Sich. The remainder of the Zaporovian Cossacks migrated to the Turkish province at the mouth of the Danube, and founded there a new centre under the protectorate of the Sultan. The lands of the Zaporovian Army, that had been defended against the Tartar hordes in a fierce struggle lasting for hundreds of years, the Russian Government granted to its magnates, first of all to favourites of Catherine II.

175 648 The Western Ukrainian territories, which, by the Polish-Muscovite treaty of 1667, had remained in the Polish State after the dismemberment of Poland at the end of the 18th century, were incorporated partly by Russia and partly by Austria (Galicia 1772). Bukovina too, which had formerly belonged to Turkey, became a province of Austria in 1774. Carpatho-Ukraine had belonged to Hungary since the Middle Ages (cities Užhorod-Ungvar, Mukačevo-Munkacs).

181 175 [566] The struggle of the Ukrainians for independence under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—57) had abolished serfdom in the greater part of Ukraine. It was the ideal of the masses of the Ukrainian people to live free, independent like the free Ukrainian Cossacks. After the abolition of the autonomous rights of Ukraine at the end of the 18th century serfdom for the Ukrainian peasants was introduced in Ukraine in the Muscovite way. But against this oppression the masses of the Ukrainian people rose often in revolt.

Historical evolution has developed in the Ukrainian people an aspiration for freedom and defence of human dignity. Voltaire wrote in his *History of Charles XII.*: "L'Ukraine a toujours aspiré à être libre" (Ukraine has always aspired to be free). "This is a nation that wants freedom," wrote the prominent Ukrainian writer of the 17th century, the Archbishop of Chernigov, Lazar Baranovych, to the Muscovite Tsar Alexey Mikhaylovich.

The conviction prevailed among the Ukrainians that Ukraine was not dependent on Russia but was only associated in the person of the Monarch. In the political dialogue *Dispute of Little Russia with Great Russia* at the end of the 18th century we read the following words of 'Little Russia' addressing 'Great Russia': "Do not think thou art my lord, but thine and mine sovereign is our common master."

175 648 The Ukrainian patriots could not forget the loss of liberty and independence, and looked for understanding of the Ukrainian case to foreign countries. In 1793 the well known Ukrainian patriot Vasyl Kapnist tried to persuade the Prussian Minister Hertzberg

that it was in the interest of Prussia to help the Ukrainian people 175 ●
to cast off the chains of Muscovite slavery. During the Great French 648
Revolution the person of Napoleon was very popular in Ukraine. Ukrainian patriots were pleased by the victories of the French Emperor, and hoped that, after the defeat of Russia in a war with France, the time for the liberation of Ukraine would come, and the odious serfdom would be abolished. But Napoleon had no understanding of the Ukrainian problem. He planned the creation of two states 'Napoléonides' in Ukraine under his protectorate . . .*)

Ukrainian history has gone its own way, different from that of Russia. This has created the peculiar national character of the Ukrainians.

The foreigners who had visited Ukraine in the 17th and 18th 175
centuries pointed out the higher level of civilisation among the 181
Ukrainians in comparison with the Russians, and the highly deve- 517
loped feeling of personal dignity of the Ukrainian people. This love of freedom of the Ukrainian people appeared also in the fight against Tsarist absolutism in Russia, where revolutionaries of Ukrainian origin occupied the first places, Zhelyabov, Kybalchych, Konashevych, Osynsky, Kravchynsky (Stepnyak), Popko, and many other members of the party '*Narodnaya Volya*'.

In the 19th century, under the influence of the ideas of that time (the Great French Revolution, romanticism) the regeneration of the so-called unhistorical pepoples (Serbians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Baltic peoples) began; in the beginning it was the interest for the language and history of the peoples among the educated classes, and the attempt to write in the 'common people's' language. In Ukraine the regeneration of the popular literary language began [538] with the publication of the satirical poem of Ivan Kotlyarevsky *Aeneid:* 1798. In this poem the author underlines his dislike of serfdom and the lords

> "who did not give the people freedom
> and treated them like cattle."

Democratic ideas were widespread in Ukraine; the representatives 175
of the Ukrainian educated classes took an active part in the 186
revolutionary organisations directed towards the fall of the Tsarist régime (the uprising of the 'Decabrists', 1825—26, was most active in Ukraine, near Kiev).

In 1846 a Ukrainian political organisation, *The Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius,* was founded in Kiev. Many prominent representatives of Ukrainian culture like Taras Shevchenko (the

*) *Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes:* Paris 1922.

175 186 greatest Ukrainian poet), Mykola Kostomarov, historian, Panteleimon Kulish, historian and poet, Mykola Hulak, and others, took part in this organisation.

In the declarations of this society the idea of an independent Ukrainian democratic republic was promulgated: "And Ukraine will resurrect from her grave ... And Ukraine will be an independent republic" *(The Books of the Being of the Ukrainian Nation*, the work of the Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius).

The Russian Government punished the members of this society severely and acted rigorously against Ukrainian political and cultural regeneration.

[191] In 1863 the Russian Minister Valuyev declared that "the Ukrainian language did not exist, does not exist and cannot exist." In 1876, by a secret order of the Tsar, the printing and circulation of Ukrainian books, periodicals etc. in the Russian Empire was prohibited. Even the Bible in Ukrainian was forbidden. Ukrainian could not be tought in schools. The Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire was forbidden until 1905. Only the revolution of 1917 made the introduction of Ukrainian in schools possible. This prohibition of the living language of a considerable nation, the instrument of its culture, had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people and is a feature absolutely unique in universal history.

[871] 175 517 The prohibition of the Ukrainian language in the schools and in the press hindered the development of education in Ukraine. The statistics show that the number of schools and the level of education in Ukraine were higher in the 18th century than in the 19th*). On the other hand, the Russian schools separated the educated classes of the Ukrainian nation from their nationality, and put the intelligentsia of Ukrainian origin into the service of Russian culture. Thus, besides the economic exploitation to the advantage of the Russian Empire, Ukraine was deprived of her best intellectual forces which were drowned in the 'Russian Sea'. We can quote here only some names of prominent Ukrainians who, by virtue of circumstances, helped to create the Russian civilisation, and gave their talents for the increase of the Russian Empire: Archbishop Theophan Prokopovych, the deputy of the Patriarch of Moscow Stephan Javorsky, Bishop Dmytro Rostovsky — were prominent Ukrainian scholars of the time of Tsar Peter I. who were forced

*) Thus there were in 1748 in four regiments (Ukraine had a military Cossack administration) of the Hetmanate (for three regiments the figures are missing) 866 elementary schools, i. e., one school for 1000 inhabitants. From this, little or almost nothing remained in the 19th century.

to leave Ukraine and to serve the Muscovite State. The Ukrainian, Prince Alexander Bezborodko, directed for many years Russian foreign policy in the time of Catherine II. (1762—1796) and of Paul I., who is known, however, to have disliked Russia and to have dreamt of a free Ukraine. The greatest talents of modern Russian literature, Gogol and Dostoyevsky, were of Ukrainian origin; Gogol did not master Russian exactly until the end of his life, it was strange to him. Far-famed scholars — Maxim Kovalevsky, sociologist; the philosophers Lesevich and Yurkevich, Vladimir Vernadsky, geologist, the famous painter Ilya Repin, — were Ukrainians of whom Russian culture is proud. 175 517

The Ukrainians in the provinces of Austria, Galicia and Bukovina had lost their educated classes under the rule of the Poles and Turks. Here, as well as in the Ukrainian territory to the West of the Carpathian Mountains, Carpatho-Ukraine, which was under Hungarian rule, the Ukrainians were principally peasants; the cities were mostly not-Ukrainian. During the 'Spring of the Peoples' in 1848 the Ukrainian national movement in Austria and Hungary also appeared. In Galicia the Ruthenian Supreme Council — a political representative of the Ukrainians in Austria — was created. At the elections for the Austrian Parliament the Ukrainians secured a considerable number of mandates. The national rebirth began also in the Ukrainian territory on the western side of the Carpathian Mountains. But the reaction which occured in Austria hindered the Ukrainian national development. The Vienna Government put the Ukrainians in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine under Polish and Hungarian rule respectively in order to make the Poles and Hungarians loyal towards Austria. This enabled the Poles and Hungarians to conduct a policy of denationalisation against the Ukrainians. Only at the end of the 19th century, in spite of great hindrances on the part of the Poles, a Ukrainian political and cultural life developed in Galicia. In connection with this, Ukrainian science and literature, prohibited in Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa, found a home in Galicia (Lviw), and Bukovina (Chernivtsi). Ukrainians from Tsarist Ukraine published here their periodicals and books; here, under the direction of the famous Kievan historian Michael Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian Shevchenko Scientific Society developed. It was by its energy a real Ukrainian Academy of Science. 175 186 [668] [517] [814]

Gradually the Ukrainians in Austria were overcoming the obstacles created by the ruling class of the Polish nobility, and secured new mandates in the Austrian Parliament and the Galician Diet.

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

●175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under
162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation
423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to
[517] education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Rus-
186 sian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist
681 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

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II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

175

859. Invasion of the Variags.
880. Power concentrated at Kiev.
988. Vladimir, prince of Kiev, accepts Christianity.
1015. Death of Vladimir and division of his dominions.
1169. Title of Grand Duke assumed by the Prince of Suzdal.
1315. Kiev, Volhynia, and Chernigov pass to Lithuania.
1340. Halich passes to Poland.
1386. Marriage of Prince Jagiello of Lithuania with Queen Yadviga of Poland.
1569. Union of Lublin; establishment of Polish domination.
1648. Beginning of Cossack wars.
1654. Treaty of Pereyaslavl.
1667. Treaty of Andrusovo.
1686. Conquest of Zaporogia.
1708. Rebellion of Mazeppa.
1709. Battle of Poltava.
1734, 1764. Powers of Cossacks curtailed by Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.
1763, 1783. Ukrainian peasants made serfs.
1768. Rising of the Koliivshchina.
1772. First Partition of Poland; Halich-Russ ceded to Austria.
1793, 1795. Second and Third Partitions; division of the remainder of the Ukraine between Russia and Austria.
1825. Liberal propaganda commenced.
1831. Polish rising.
1846. Beginning of Nationalist movement.
1861. Abolition of serfdom.
1900. Formation of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party.
1917. Proclamation of Ukrainian Republic.
1918. Government of General Skoropadski.
Establishment of a Directory.

General Sketch of History

The history of the Ukraine is not, until the seventeenth century, a connected chronicle of events which happened to one people of one culture, language, and religion; it is rather the story of events which have taken place in the land which is now called the Ukraine.

175 The Eastern Slavs, with an admixture of Norman blood, who inhabited the Ukraine from the eighth to the thirteenth century, almost lost their contact with the Slavonic world after 1239, the year which saw the beginning of the Tatar invasions. Owing to the nature of the country—mostly level steppe—there was a more permanent assimilation of the invaders with the inhabitants here than in the Slavonic forest country to the north and west. After the invasions the literary language of the country became amalgamated with the Great Russian literary language; and the educated classes became polonized or russified. From the Tatar invasions to the middle of the seventeenth century the land appears in history as the territory or colony of its various neighbours, chiefly Poland. About the middle of the seventeenth century, however, the masses of the people, fully amalgamated with the Asiatic invaders, began, largely through Cossack influence, to feel a difference between themselves and the foreign ruling class. From this time onwards, an Ukrainian nation may be said to have existed.

The whole history of the Ukraine may be divided into the following four periods:

(A) The Kiev-Russ State (not Russia), 850–1340, organized by the Scandinavian conquerors.
(B) Lithuanian and Polish dominations, 1340–1795.
(C) Russian domination, 1795–1917.
(D) Ukraine since the Russian Revolution, 1917–19.

(A) First Period: Kiev-Russ; the Tatars (850–1340)

The territory of the Ukraine has been the scene of many short-lived dominations, such as the Scythian, the Sarmatian, the Gothic, and, in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., the Hunnic. The Slavs appeared shortly after the Huns. Just before the appearance of the Scandinavian Variags on the Dnieper, between the seventh and tenth centuries, a powerful

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Turkish Khanate of Khazars on the Don and lower Volga subjugated from time to time some of the Eastern Slavs, while other branches of them on the San and Dniester were subdued by the Avars and the Lakhs (Poles). In 859 the Variags appeared under the leadership of Rurik. They had already organized the Slavonic state of Novgorod in the north (852); and they brought with them the name of Russ (Ruotsi), which had been given to them by the Finns. The organization of the various states which originated in towns set up by these Scandinavians was mainly directed towards opening up and protecting trade communications between Constantinople and Scandinavia through the then already well-known commercial town of Kiev. 175

But already, in 880, Oleg, the successor of Rurik, and Igor, Rurik's son, had concentrated their power in Kiev itself, whose prince assumed the title of Grand Duke. From this centre they not only enlarged their territory by the addition of Slavonic lands, but even threatened Constantinople. Thence onwards the history of the Scandinavian invaders is blended with that of the Eastern Slavs, whose national consciousness was not very strong at that time. The Scandinavians adopted an East Slavonic language but a Byzantine culture, and formed a privileged class of warriors (*druzhina*) and princes. The princes of Kiev extended their power over the Eastern Slavs of the Dnieper and Bug, and occasionally over the Eastern Slavs of Halich (Red Russ or Ruthenia), who otherwise paid tribute to the Poles or were ruled by their own princes. Until the time of St. Vladimir, the first prince of Kiev to accept Christianity (988), there were certain small independent East Slavonic princes in the neighbourhood of Kiev. Vladimir kept the control of the government in his own hands, in so far as external affairs, i.e. trade and war, were concerned; but otherwise the princes ruled in their own towns. Thus the Kiev principality was rather a confederation of states than one united state.

After the death of St. Vladimir in 1015, his dominions were divided among his children; and thenceforward

175 the central government tended to become weaker and the power of the separate duchies to increase at its expense. Yaroslav, under whom the 'Russ Land Codex' (*Russkaya Pravda*) was compiled, united for a short time all the Russ lands; but, after his death in 1054, dynastic strife undermined the political and commercial importance of the Kiev state.

Several independent duchies overshadowed Kiev after the reign of Yaroslav; and still more was this the case after the death of Prince Vladimir Monomakh in 1125. The Scandinavian upper class had by this time become slavonized; and the cultural influence of Byzantium was stronger than that of Scandinavia among the Eastern Slavs. Three political centres replaced Kiev. In the north Novgorod recovered its old importance and developed its colonizing activity in the direction of northern Europe and Asia. In the south the Prince of Halich assumed the headship of Halich, Volhynia, and, to some extent, Chernigov; until in 1315, Kiev, Volhynia, and Chernigov passed to Lithuania, and Halich, in 1340, to Poland. The third political centre was formed by the princes who emigrated from Kiev-Russ and formed principalities along the Upper Volga and Oka, in Finnish lands. The leadership of these lay first with the Prince of Suzdal, who, in 1169, tried to subdue Kiev, and assumed the title of Grand Duke; then it passed to Vladimir-Suzdal, and finally to Moscow.

(B) Second Period: Lithuanian and Polish Domination (1340–1795)

(*a*) *Division between Poland and Lithuania* (1340–1569).—During this period Poland possessed Halich-Russ, where the Poles built a line of fortresses, proclaimed religious toleration for the Greek and Latin churches in 1447, brought Lvov to pre-eminence, and introduced the Magdeburg law into the towns. The Lithuanian dukes, who since 1315 had acquired the duchies of Chernigov, Volhynia, and Kiev, were the

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rivals of the Poles in Podolia. The success of the Lithuanian conquest was due partly to the fact that the conquerors often adopted the language of the Ukraine (White Russian dialect), and in many cases joined the Greek Orthodox Church. In this way the Poles and Lithuanians succeeded to the Tatars. While the north-western Ukraine remained in actual fact the property of the local princes, under a Lithuanian or Polish central government, the southern steppes were nominally claimed by the Polish Crown; actually, however, the half-nomadic population of Volhynia and Podolia had migrated to the steppes and colonized them along the Lower Dnieper (Nizh). The Black Sea littoral was still dependent on Turkey. The keenness of the rivalry between the Lithuanians and the Poles in the Ukraine was blunted by a common fear of the Germans and of the growing power of Moscow. In 1386 the Lithuanian Prince Jagiello married the Polish Queen Yadviga, so that the union between Poland and Lithuania originated in a purely dynastic arrangement. The Union of Lublin (1569) consolidated this dynastic connexion, united Lithuania and Poland into a bipartite state, and attached Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev, and Podlasia to the Polish state. In these newly acquired Ukrainian lands the Poles recognized, in spite of Cossack opposition, both the Latin and the Greek Churches.

(*b*) *Polish Domination* (1569–1772).—To protect the frontiers of the enlarged state, the Polish kings arranged the 'registration' of the Cossack communities living in the Nizh (Lower Dnieper), called also Zaporogia, i. e. the 'country beyond the rapids', and in the Northern Ukraine. The Cossacks who were placed on the register were paid by the King, and recognized the authority of the Crown 'hetman' (chief), but otherwise lived in almost complete independence in villages and military camps, and were unwilling to adopt any permanent state ties. A series of rebellions under local Cossack leaders against the Polish administration from 1592 onwards secured reforms from the Polish Crown, while the Polish attempts to colonize the Lower Dnieper

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175 and to control Zaporogia were more and more vigorously opposed by the Cossacks. The Muscovites meanwhile colonized the eastern steppes, now called also Ukraine (between the Dnieper and the Don), and gave support to all Cossack refugees from the Polish Ukraine.

The Cossack Wars (1648–1712), known also as 'The Ruin', differed from the previous rebellions in that they were better led, and that the Cossacks under Chmielnicki had the support of the Ukrainian peasants, who rose against their Polish overlords, and of some of the Ukrainian *szlachta* (landlords), who, although favoured politically by the Polish Government, joined the others on the ground of religious fellowship. The year 1648 marks the beginning of a national consciousness among all the Ukrainian people. Chmielnicki was, however, in 1653 compelled to apply to Moscow for protection. The Treaty of Pereyaslavl between Chmielnicki and the Tsar Alexis in 1654, while recognizing a certain amount of self-government for the Ukrainian and Zaporogian armies, brought the people of the Ukraine, as well as the military communities of Zaporogia, under a control from Moscow stricter than that formerly exercised by the Poles. The Ukrainian Cossacks retained their own system of government, and were allowed to receive foreign envoys from anywhere except Poland and Turkey, but they swore allegiance to the Tsar; while, from the beginning, the Tsar's envoy to Pereyaslavl, Buturlin, refused to confirm by oath the Tsar's allegiance to the treaty. Hence sooner or later most of the Hetmans, including Chmielnicki himself, rebelled against Moscow, in which revolts they were invariably supported by Turkey and Poland.

The failure of Moscow to subjugate the Ukrainians permanently, Turkish interference, and various dynastic reasons, led Poland and Moscow to make the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667). According to this treaty, Moscow obtained the country on the left side of the Dnieper (Trans-Dnieper and Kiev) and Poland the country on the right side of the Dnieper (Cis-Dnieper). Zapo-

rogia or Nizh was left in theory under the protection of both, but in practice it served as a land of refuge for those whose plans for autonomy had been defeated. These defeated rebels organized the famous *Sich*, a kind of military and ascetic order, from which women were absolutely excluded, and which involved complete social equality, adherence to the Orthodox Church, and allegiance to the Zaporogian community. The Ataman (Hetman), or head of the organization, was elected for a year, and had the power of a dictator in time of war. In peace the supreme authority rested with the Rada, or Council. Zaporogia formed an obstacle in the way of Russia's obtaining the Black Sea littoral, and was therefore conquered by Moscow in 1686. Soon afterwards the Cossacks rose for the last time, under Mazeppa (1708–9), and received help from Sweden, then at war with Russia. But the Russian victory at Poltava in 1709 decided the fate of the Cossacks. Their privileges were suppressed; and, though in 1710, by the Pact of Bendery, Sweden promised independence to the Ukraine and Zaporogia, the country was again divided between Poland and Russia, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Andrusovo. The *Sich* was suppressed, and was finally abolished in 1775.

When the victorious Peter the Great moved to the left (i. e. Russian) bank of the Dnieper, he brought with him the majority of the population of the right bank. The Cis-Dnieper or Polish Ukraine thus became depopulated; and the Polish administration, by granting special privileges to the colonists from Poland, Halich-Russ, and Trans-Dnieper, fostered the growth of *slobodas* (land-holdings with special privileges). The power of the *szlachta* was now limited by national Ukrainian risings against the Catholic Polish landlords and the Jews, as well as by pillaging expeditions from the Lower Dnieper. The most eventful rising was that of the Koliivshchina in 1768. It was cleverly manipulated by Catherine the Great; but after some 200,000 Poles, Jews, and Uniat Ukrainians had been massacred, the Empress intervened in favour of the Polish land-

● 175 lords, who cared more for the interest of their houses than for the Polish State.

After the Treaty of Andrusovo the Trans-Dnieper country was known as Hetmanshchina, i. e. the country dependent on the Hetman. The Ukrainians in the Hetmanshchina were grouped into ten regiments, in which the colonels had full administrative power, In 1734 Peter the Great withdrew the self-governing privileges of the regiments, abolished the dignity of the Hetman, and organized a kind of Ministry for Cossack affairs, called the Malorossiyan (Little Russian) Collegium, in which all colonels had to be Great Russians. Peter II and Elizabeth restored the dignity of the Hetman, but it was finally suspended by Catherine the Great in 1764. The country was colonized with Kalmucks, Serbs (in 1732 and 1753), and Germans, to whom important privileges were granted in 1763 and 1764. In 1775 Catherine distributed large quantities of Zaporogian territory among Russian nobles and officials.

(c) *The Ukraine during the Partitions of Poland* (1772–95).—In the First Partition (1772), Austria received Halich-Russ, i. e. the *voyevodstvas* of Russ and Belza, called by the Austrians Galicia, and occupied northern Moldavia. Russia took the eastern part of White Russia. In 1786 Austria acquired the Bukovina. The Cis-Dnieper Ukraine, or the *voyevodstvas* of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov, protested against this partition. Between the First Partition and the Second (1793) a great economic, intellectual and political revival in Poland led to reforms in the Polish Ukraine. The Jesuit schools, which had been dissolved in 1773, were replaced by State schools under the Polish Minister of Education; Krzemenietz and Winnica were the two intellectual centres around which the schools and industries were grouped. But all these reforms in the Polish Ukraine were made with a view to the retention of the country as a Polish province. At the same time, in the Trans-Dnieper country, the Russians, in spite of local protests, had carried out a ruthless russification.

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After the final victory over the Turks in eastern Europe and the annexation of the Crimea in 1783, Russia surrounded the Ukrainians on all sides. By the decrees of 1763 and 1783 the Ukrainian peasants were made serfs; and in 1785 the Ukrainian nobles were raised to the privileges of the Great Russian nobles. In the same year, Cossack regiments were organized on the model of the Imperial regiments; and, from 1780 onwards, the administrative division into Imperial 'Governments' was introduced. General education suffered a marked relapse. Thus in 1768, shortly after the suppression of the last Hetman, in the districts forming the present Chernigov Government, there were 134 schools, or one school for 746 people, while in the same districts in 1875 there were only 52 schools, or one school for 6,730 people.[1]

At the Second Partition in 1793, Russia obtained most of the Cis-Dnieper Ukraine, i. e. the *voyevodstvas* of Kiev, Braclav, Podolia, and the eastern part of Volhynia, as well as the rest of White Russia and half of Lithuania. In the Polish insurrection which followed that partition, the *szlachta* and many peasants of the Cis-Dnieper Ukraine supported the Polish leader, Kosciuszko. In the Third Partition, Russia took the remaining part of Volhynia and the eastern part of Choĭm, as well as the rest of Lithuania, while the greater part of Choĭm was taken by Austria. By the Treaty of Paris (1815), all the Choĭm land and Podlasia passed to Russia; and Eastern Galicia and the Bukovina were the only lands inhabited by Ukrainians retained by Austria.

(C) Third Period: Russian Domination, 1795–1917

(*a*) *Protests against Russification* (1795–1846).—After the Third Partition of Poland in 1795, the Russian Government of set policy favoured the aristocracy,

[1] M. Hrushevski, *Sketch of the History of the Ukrainian Nation*, 3rd ed., Petersburg, 1911, p. 417.

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175 whether Polish or Ukrainian, who were loyal to the Tsar, and to some extent also the Ukrainian peasants, at the expense of the Polish-Ukrainian middle class of landowners (*szlachta*), or the middle-class urban *intelligentsia* of Ukrainian nationality, who generally used the Russian language. Hence it was in these two latter classes that the spirit of protest still existed in
538 spite of its apparent hopelessness. The expression of this spirit of protest is to be found in the literature it produced, though this has obvious traces of Polish and Great Russian influence. Ukrainians such as Kapnist, Gogol, Velichko, Hanenko, Artemenski, and Hrebinka, were educated at the universities of Moscow and Kharkov, and wrote in the Russian language. To the same literary school belong Ivan Kotlarevski (1769–1839), the 'father' of Ukrainian literature, the first to write in Ukrainian as well as in Russian, and the Pole, Chodakowski, who was the first to study and collect the folk-lore of the Ukraine.

In the west of the Russian Ukraine a school of Ukrainian Polish poets arose, who wrote in Polish, but took as their subject the Ukraine and her liberation from Russia. Eminent among these were A. Malczewski, S. Goszynski,
175 B. Zaleski, and M. Czaikowski. Between 1803 and 1825, Adam Czartoryski and Tadeusz Czacki, two Polish Liberal nobles, acting for the Polish Education Committee under the then Liberal government of Alexander I, started numerous schools radiating from two chief centres—Krzemenietz, where a Catholic lyceum, and Human, where a Uniat college was founded. In 1818 a Masonic Lodge was instituted in Poltava, with the object of bringing about an understanding between the Liberals of Poland, the Ukraine, and Russia; and in 1825 an important meeting was held at Jitomir (*Slovyanskoye Sobranie*) of Dekabrist Russians, Poles, and Ukrainian *intelligentsia*—the latter still using the Polish and Russian languages. From 1825 dates the propaganda of the *lirniki* or Liberals, who wandered with their harps among the people like mediaeval bards, instilling into the Ukrainian peasants the ideas

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of the abolition of serfdom and of freedom from Russia. 175 Most of these Liberals, as for example Rzewuski and Padurva, were Poles, or the products of Polish culture.

The Polish Rising of 1831.—This rising received much active support from the *intelligentsia* in the part of the Ukraine concerned; and the greatest of Ukrainian [538] poets, Shevchenko (born 1814), was influenced by Polish middle-class Liberalism and Polish literature. The University of Kharkov, founded in 1805, had until 1831 many Polish professors lecturing in their own language. But this Polish cultural and political influence was checked when the Polish colleges in Vilna and Krzemenietz were suppressed in 1832, and a Russian university was founded at Kiev in 1834. This latter was at first distinctly governmental and official in character, but by the middle of the nineteenth century it had produced a new school of writers of far more active revolutionary tendencies than were ever manifested by the Kharkov circle. Apart from the Polish and Dekabrist risings and the literary attempts of polonized and russified Ukrainians, the first part of the nineteenth century is marked by a passive submission of the masses to the military and autocratic regime of Russia.

(*b*) *Russian, Polish, and Austrian Rivalry; Growth of Nationalism in the Ukraine* (1846–1914).—The modern nationalist movement in the Ukraine began with the foundation of a purely Ukrainian society called the 'Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood' in Kiev about 1846. This society had not merely the literary object of promoting the Ukrainian language, until then only in oral use among the peasants, but also a far-reaching political programme. Friendly feelings towards Polish and Russian Liberals still existed, and a federation of autonomous Slavonic states was aimed at. In this federation the Ukraine was to form two states, West Little Russia and East Little Russia. The creators of the society were the most prominent Ukrainian literary men, the poet Shevchenko, the historian Kostomarov, and the journalist Kulish.

175 In 1847 they and many others were arrested by the Russian Government; and the society, which never was legal, was suppressed. At the same time in the Austrian Ukraine the Government, following for the time being an anti-Polish policy, was popular with nationalist Ukrainians. Supported by the Government, the Galician Ukrainian peasants rose and massacred the Polish landlords. In 1846–7 serfdom was abolished in Galicia and Bukovina; a measure which was naturally received with favour by the Ukrainians, of whom a great majority were peasants. Count Stadion, the Austrian Governor of Galicia, organized in Lvov (Lemberg) the *Holovna Rada Ruska*, a nationalistic Ukrainian body, anti-Polish and anti-Russian, but supporting the Austrian Government. The same year brought, as a reaction against Austrian manœuvres, a short-lived Ukraino- (Ruthen) Polish agreement, made at the Slavonic (Pan-Slav) Congress in Prague. This again displeased the Russian Government, which hurriedly organized a society, the *Galitsko-Russkaya Matitsa*, in Lvov, with the object of beginning an anti-Austrian and anti-Polish, but Russophil, propaganda among the Galician Ukrainians. This society was especially active in 1866, when the Poles obtained autonomy in Galicia, with control over the Ukrainians. Russophil propaganda in Galicia had begun with the visit of Pogodin, the Russian Pan-Slavist, in 1835; but the Russophils organized themselves only after the 'mission' of T. Lebedyntsev, who, as the agent of the Russian Government, came to enrol Ukrainians for anti-Polish propaganda in Cholm in the Russian Ukraine.

While encouraging the Ukrainians in Austria in their nationalist feelings, Russia tried to suppress the Ukrainian movement in her own territory. The result of this was seen during the Crimean War, when an Ukrainian Pole, M. Czaikowski (Sadyk Pasha), tried, with the help of Turkey, to revive the *Sich* and organized his 'Cossacks' to fight against Russia. Nevertheless the call to the colours during the recent war

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roused in the Russian Ukraine a spirit demanding the abolition of serfdom and the restoration of old Cossack freedom. The chief centre of Ukrainian propaganda during the period 1860–90 was in East Galicia, though the 'Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood' received more support among the *intelligentsia* of the Russian Ukraine, and proceeded on more nationalist lines. In the East Ukraine appeared the journal *Osnova* (1862–3). Sunday schools held in the Ukrainian language were established (1861) in Russia, and societies were founded which called themselves literary, but were really political and nationalist in their aims. The most prominent of these were the 'Prosvita' on both sides of the Ukraine (1868), the 'Gromada' in Kiev (1870), and finally the 'Shevchenko' (1873) in Lvov and Kiev, which, under the leadership of the Ukrainophil *intelligentsia*, started the movement for establishing a uniform Ukrainian language throughout the Ukraine and bringing about democratic reforms. The founders of the 'Shevchenko' Society, not unlike Hrushevski some twenty years later, tried to spread a uniform propaganda on both sides of the frontier, but the Russian Government frustrated their endeavour to influence the Ukrainian peasant by severe police restrictions on the *intelligentsia*, and by decrees suppressing Ukrainian books and language (1863 and 1876).

On the other hand the abolition of serfdom in 1861 made the Russian Government popular with the peasant. The Abolition Law gave to the peasants allotments of between three and eight acres, though a minimum of sixteen acres was necessary to support a family. From the beginning, therefore, the Ukrainian peasant felt a grievance against the large landowners rather than against the central government; and, as agricultural industries became centralized in the hands of capitalists, the economic problem grew yearly more acute. The unions of landowners, the *zemstvos*, had no Ukrainians among them, while the Ukrainian peasants, among whom the village community (*mir*) of the Great Russians was very little developed, were also behind

175 other provinces of the Empire in co-operative and self-organizing capacity. There was, then, little hope that economic betterment would be brought about by the evolution of peasant communities, as in Great Russia and Siberia. This situation was used by the Ukrainian Nationalists and the Austrian Government, which supported them. The expectation of economic advantages underlay the nationalistic movement; and the villages afforded much better ground for it than the towns, which were mostly Russian. In order to counteract the influence of the Ukrainian 'Prosvita', the Russian Government supported the 'Society of the Kachkovski' in Lvov (1875), which had a Russophil tendency.

In 1898, under the leadership of the Ukrainophils Hrushevski and Franko, the language reform campaign began. The Ukrainophils accepted the Podgorski dialect spoken in the Carpathian valleys as far east as the Dniester as the standard language, and proposed a phonetic orthography; while the Russophil Ukrainians took the northern branch of the Russian Ukrainian dialect, called Little Russian, as the standard language, and proposed an 'historical' orthography based on etymological spelling. The Ukrainophils were supported by the Austrian Government, which in 1874 introduced the Ukrainian language into the elementary schools of East Galicia, and subsequently recognized in 1895 the phonetic orthography of the Ukrainophils as the standard orthography of the Ukrainian language in Galicia and the Bukovina.

After 1890, however, the Austrian Government altered the Ukrainian policy inaugurated by it in 1848. Acting partly in his capacity as an anti-Russian Austrian Premier, and partly as a Pole, Count Badeni, helped by Professor Antonovicz of Kiev, brought about in 1889–90 an understanding between the Nationalist Ukrainian *intelligentsia* and *szlachta* and the Conservative Poles on the ground of a common anti-Russian feeling. As a result of this understanding, Professor Hrushevski, a pupil of Antonovicz, went in 1894 from Kiev to Lvov to fill the chair of Ukrainian

history. Another representative of the Ukrainian *szlachta*, Paulin Swiecicki, tried to rouse Polish sympathy with Ukrainian irredentism. 175

But these measures were the last conciliatory steps. In the last ten years of the nineteenth century the anti-Polish parties, the Radicals, led by Dragomanov (1895) in the Austrian Ukraine, grew in strength; and relations between the Poles and Ukrainians in the Russian, and still more in the Austrian, Ukraine became worse and worse. This was undoubtedly connected with the fact that after 1866 the Austrian Government subjected the Ukrainians to the Poles, while in the Russian Ukraine the Government favoured the large Polish landowners, who occupied high positions at Court. The Galician elections of 1897, when Badeni's Polish policy was victorious, finally made a gulf between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia which affected relations between them in the Russian Ukraine as well. For the first time the Russophils and Ukrainophils united in opposition to the Poles.

In 1900 there was a further important change in Austrian policy in the Ukraine. The visit of the Emperor Francis Joseph to Berlin in that year was understood to have had the object of reconciling German and Austrian opinion in regard to the Ukraine. Shortly afterwards the Ukrainian Radical, M. Sembratovych, published an anti-Polish book, *Polonia Irredenta*, which was cordially welcomed by the German press.

Growth of Political Parties.—About the same time various Ukrainian political parties began to organize themselves. Of these the most important was that of the 'National Democrats', founded in 1899 by Professor Hrushevski in Galicia to fight for rights equal to those of the Poles in Galicia and for the autonomy of the Russian Ukraine as a federate Russian state. This party resembled the Polish National Democrats; and their half-gymnastic, half-military organizations, called *sokoly*, were similar to the Polish and Bohemian *sokoly*. In 1900 the first Revolutionary Ukrainian Party was organized in Lvov; in 1905 it assumed the name of the

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175 'Ukrainian Social Democratic Working-men's Party', and their gymnastic-military societies were called *sich*. Both these parties were in constant communication with the Russian Ukraine.

The Russian Revolution of 1905.—As a consequence of this revolution, the restriction upon the Ukrainian language in Russia, partly cancelled (with regard to theatres and public lectures) in 1881, was entirely withdrawn; and in 1910 the Russian Academy of Science published a report by seven academicians in which they supported the just demand of the Ukrainians to have their school text-books in their own language. This was taken by the Ukrainians to be a recognition of Ukrainian as a separate language. In 1906 the Ukrainian members of the first Duma joined the Autonomist-Federalist Group, but scarcely any separatist movement was noticeable. The second Duma had an Ukrainian club, which worked for the autonomy of the Ukraine; their organ was the *Ridna Sprava*. But in the third Duma, owing to manipulations of the franchise, the Ukraine was represented by very backward members, uneducated priests and peasants.

The Russian Ukraine turns to Austria and Germany.—Between 1907 and 1914 new anti-Ukrainian measures were passed by the Russian Government, much to the discontent of the Russian *intelligentsia*. After 1909 the Ukrainian Social Democratic party in the Russian Ukraine, which was connected with the Social Democrats in Galicia, grew stronger, and formulated a programme of autonomous government. The Ukrainian university students agitated in favour of Ukrainian chairs in Russian universities in Ukrainian territory; and Bishop Parthenius made an attempt to introduce the Ukrainian language as the medium of instruction in church schools. The attitude of the Poles towards this movement in the Russian Ukraine varied according to their connexion with one or the other of the two great political groups. The Conservative Polish landowners in the Ukraine, as for example Count Joseph Potocki, supported the Russian Govern-

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ment by building on their estates schools for Ukrainian peasants in which the Russian tongue was employed; and the leader of the Polish National Democratic Party in the Duma used his influence with Conservative Polish opinion in Galicia to support the Russophil propaganda carried on there by the Russian Government. As a result of these efforts, in the Galician elections of 1907 ten Russophils were elected to the Reichsrat as opposed to eleven Ukrainophils. This was followed by the murder of the Polish Viceroy, Count A. Potocki, by a Ukrainophil Radical in 1908. /75

Meanwhile in Galicia the Russophil propaganda of the Russian Government was rousing much opposition; and the Russophil party itself split up into two sections. The Pro-Russian Party, supported by the Pan-Slavist Count Bobrinski, and led by the Ukrainian Dudykievich, edited the *Prikarpatskaya Rus*; while the Moderate Russophil or Old Ruthenian Party, under the leadership of the Ukrainians Davydiak and Korol, published the *Halychanin*. The growing power of the Radicals also opposed the Russophils; and in the Galician elections of 1913 only one Russophil was elected. At the same time, German as well as Austrian influence began to assert itself among the Ukrainians of Galicia. This has been proved through the disclosure by a Polish journalist, Krysiak, of 97 documents exchanged from March 1903 onwards between the Prussian Anti-Polish Society (*Ostmarkenverein*) and the Ukrainian National Committee (*Ruthenisches National-Komitee*). The Prussian institution encouraged and materially supported the Ukrainian National Committee. Since both these institutions were nominally non-official, and the anti-Polish propaganda could not be treated as treason, because the State after all was Austrian, the Poles were unable to take direct measures against these intrigues; but in the trials of Russophil Ukrainians in Galicia for high treason the Polish Conservative jury acquitted the Russophils.

(c) *From the Outbreak of War to the Russian Revolution* (1914–17).—In the autumn of 1914 the Russian

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175 army occupied Eastern Galicia. Russian public opinion, hitherto ignorant of the existence of 'Ruthenians' in Eastern Galicia, was then instructed, and now became very Pan-Slav. The attitude of the first Russian Governor, Count Sheremetyev, was the outcome of circumstances that preceded the war. The small Russophil party of Ukrainians in Galicia and the Poles were left fairly undisturbed, while the Ukrainian Nationalists were persecuted. But with the appointment of Count George Bobrinski, cousin of the Pan-Slavist Vladimir Bobrinski, as Governor, and the Pan-Orthodox bishop, Eulogius, as Bishop of Galicia, all the Ukrainians in Galicia as well as the Poles began to suffer religious and political persecution. Polish schools were closed and the 'Prosvita' was suspended. From August 1914 the Ukrainian leaders, W. Wassilko, E. and K. Lewicki, and L. Baczynski, carried on negotiations with the Austrian and German authorities, aiming at the partition of Galicia and the union of Eastern Galicia with Volhynia and other parts of the Russian West Ukraine. The russifying policy of the Russian Administration furthered this agitation.

In the spring of 1915 the Russian retirement began, and by the autumn Galicia was cleared of Russians. Under the pressure of the Ukrainophils, Count Sturgkh assured K. Lewicki at a secret interview on September 7, 1915, that Eastern Galicia and such part of the Russian Ukraine as was or might be under Austrian occupation would be united in an autonomous Ukrainian state attached to Austria, with, at the outset, Austrian officials and language.[1] The Russian policy in Galicia was severely criticized by the Liberals and even by the Central party in the Duma on August 28, 1914, and September 10, 1915. N. Bobchev and T. Romanchuk, in the Russophil Ukrainian press, accused the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine (Ukraino-

[1] 'Documents Ruthéno-Ukrainiens', in *Extraits du Journal de M. Olesnyckyj* (pp. 7, 8), published by the Bureau polonais des publications politiques (Paris, May 1919).

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phils) of being the result of German intrigue.[1] This again gave rise to a pamphlet, by L. Tschelski, issued in Sofia (1915) by the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, entitled *Is the Ukrainian Movement a German Intrigue?* The Russian Government took severe measures against the members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, who, including the chief leader, Hrushevski, were banished to Siberia, or were forbidden to enter Russia from abroad.

(D) Fourth Period: Since the Russian Revolution of 1917

(*a*) *The Ukraine becomes independent.*—One of the first questions which faced the Provisional Government at the beginning of the Russian Revolution was the demand for an amnesty for the Ukrainian Nationalist offenders, who were allowed to return from Siberia and abroad. Next came the demand for Ukrainian autonomy and the appointment of a special Minister for Ukrainian Affairs, presented by a deputation sent from Kiev to Petrograd on April 6, 1917. Soon afterwards the first Ukrainian National Congress was convened at Kiev (April 19–22), at which some 800 members representative of the *intelligentsia* and the Social Revolutionaries were present. They elected a Central Rada, and declared for an autonomous Ukrainian republic under a Russian federal republic. Professor Hrushevski was elected President. The territory claimed for the Ukrainian state corresponded roughly to the western parts of the Governments of Lublin and Grodno, and the whole of the Governments of Kiev, Poltava, Kherson, Volhynia, Kharkov, Podolia, Yekaterinoslav, and Chernigov, and excluded the Austrian Ukraine. The Congresses of the Ukrainian Soldiers (May 5–7) and of the Ukrainian Peasants (May–June) supported the Rada at this time. But the Petrograd

[1] In answer to a pamphlet by Tschelski, *No Liberator, but an Oppressor of Nations: How Russia freed the Ukraine.* L.L.U., Sofia, 1914.

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648 hands, will be regulated in the separate treaties with the Ukrainian People's Republic, which form an essential part of the present peace treaty, and, so far as is practicable, will enter into force simultaneously therewith.

ARTICLE IX.—The agreements made in this treaty constitute an indivisible whole.

ARTICLE X.—For the interpretation of this treaty the German and Ukrainian text is authoritative for the relations between Germany and the Ukraine; the German, Hungarian, and Ukrainian text for the relations between Turkey and the Ukraine.

Final prescription. The present peace treaty will be ratified. The ratified documents shall be exchanged as soon as possible. So far as nothing therein prescribes otherwise, the peace treaty comes into force on its ratification. (Here follow the signatures.)

A supplementary treaty of twenty-eight articles was signed between Germany and the Ukraine on the same day. It deals with the resumption of consular relations, the revival of 'treaties, arrangements and agreements which were in force between Germany and Russia before the war', exchange of prisoners, compensation for damage, &c. (*The New Europe*, February 28, 1918.)

III

THE GERMAN COLONISTS IN S. RUSSIA (from F. Stach, *Survey of the History of the Colonists in S. Russia and their Present Life.* Moscow, 1916.)

● 175 563 REALIZING that in the southern territories acquired by Russia in the eighteenth century only colonists with a certain amount of culture could introduce a settled life and develop the resources of the country, Catherine the Great published a manifesto on December 4, 1762, inviting foreign colonists. As a result, 102 colonies were established on the Lower Volga in the Saratov and Samara Governments, 6 in Chernigov, 1 in Voronezh, 2 in Lifland, and 6 in the Petrograd Government. A further manifesto followed on July 22, 1763, enlarging the privileges of the colonists, which were very considerable.

This manifesto was the basis of the colonies of Russia. On March 19, 1764, a supplementary act was issued granting 30 desyatines of land to each family and prescribing the method of settling and rights of inheritance. The land was to pass to youngest son; this measure would force the father to teach

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elder sons various industries. Another manifesto of July 19, 1785, promised freedom from all taxation for 6 years. 175 563

The first party of settlers from Danzig, many of whom were Mennonite sectaries, arrived at Kremenchug in 1787. On September 6, 1800, Paul I proclaimed special privileges to the Mennonites of Novorossiya (Governments of Kherson, Taurida, Yekaterinoslav, and the Don Cossacks' Territory); 65 desyatines were granted to each family, and it was promised that they would never be called up for military and other duties against their wish. Further regulations concerning the colonists appeared in 1804.

In the reign of Alexander I, in 1818, a new Care Committee for South-Russian Colonies (Governments of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Taurida, and Bessarabia) was established in Yekaterinoslav 1818–22; it migrated to Kishinev a little later. On July 1, 1833, the Committee was limited in power and transferred to Odessa. It existed till July 4, 1871, when it was cancelled and all Russian colonists were placed under the general law. In 1874 they, together with the others, were made amenable to conscription.

Relations between the colonists and the Russians.—Before the Crimean War, and even down to 1860, the Russian towns had very little to do with the colonists, except in the case of those colonies which were situated in the neighbourhood of Odessa, Yekaterinoslav, Nikolaev, Simferopol, Chernigov, Voronezh, Samara, Saratov, and Petrograd. At first intercourse arose from commercial relations. But the influence of colonists on the Nogai was much greater after about 1809 and 1835 when the Nogai received land for permanent settlements. T. Kornis, a colonist of Orlovo, was responsible for helping some 17,000 Nogai to settle down. When the *dukhobors* of Tambov and Voronezh migrated to the neighbourhood of the Mennonites, they were greatly helped by them.

The Ministry of Public Property published in 1846 a report showing that at that time the colonists occupied 1,424,619 desyatines of land (1,309,945 arable). Their number was 95,342 men and 88,293 women, and they were chiefly engaged in agriculture, then cattle-breeding, butter-making, fruit cultivation, tobacco plantation, vegetable-growing, silk industry, wine plantation, and various applied industries.

In agriculture, so early as 1870, they used harvest machines, and in 1905 steam and electrical agricultural machines. In the sixties the Russian, Serbian, and Bulgarian colonists began to imitate the Germans, so that now their methods in agriculture are very much alike. During the last 50 years many colonists bought large private landed estates, especially in the Dneprovsk

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district; but for the last 25 years there has been a tendency to sell all land to the Russian colonists and migrate to the towns.

The Russian language was introduced in the schools of the colonists in 1860; and in 1871 their schools were taken over by the Ministry of Education.

The German colonies are chiefly found in the Governments of Taurida, Volhynia, and Yekaterinoslav.

101 of Khazars established a kingdom here, which
174 extended from the Volga to the Danube. The Khazars were nomads who became domiciled, founded cities and carried on trade. At their court the Jews obtained predominating influence, and it sounds almost unbelievable to say that the khans adopted the faith of Moses. /Facing page
[000] 24: Character study of a Ukrainian head*/Facing page 25: A Ukrainian girl with pronounced nordic features*/25/

[101] Kiyev, the center of the Polyani, was tri-
[174] butary to the Khazar. The Slavic tribes of the
181 Antae, the ancestors of the Ukrainians, were divided and fought one another. In the establishment of their society they scarcely developed beyond the formation of a district with several peasant communities. Fields and pastures belonged to all jointly. Family life was a patriarchy, and unanimity was demanded at the village and district meetings. These Slavs built compact houses of loam, and placed embankments around their towns. They cultivated their fields, made pottery and bartered their goods for swords, knives and various handicraft products. They offered sacrifice to the sun god Dashdboh, the wind god Stryboh, the thunder god Perun and other deities.

*

•175 It was the Swedish Vikings, called Varangians, who in the ninth and tenth centuries unified the Slavic tribes and established a kingdom with Kiyev as the capital, which, during its most flourishing period, extended from the Carpathians to the Volga and from the Caucasus to the White Sea. They rowed in boats to Lake Ilmen, founded Novgorod and from there, about the middle of the ninth century, conquered Kiyev. Rurik was the name of the Viking king of Novgorod; his warriors were called Rus', meaning "rowers",

*[For plates, cf. pp. 217-218, category 116 - Analyst]

and the state as a whole: "Kiyev Rus", after Rurik's successor Oleg moved the capital to Kiyev. The princes still took their wives and members of their retinue from Sweden.

Soon the Kiyev Rus were known in Constantinople. The splendor of the imperial city dazzled the Vikings who came to plunder or to be enlisted as mercenaries. Even in ancient times they had come before the gates of Byzantium with 200 sailboats and 6000 men, and a few years later there were 14,000 of them who plundered its suburbs. /26/ They carried on their marauding expeditions as far as the wealthy settlements of the southern Caspian up to the border of Persia. Contemporary Arabian and Greek writers say of the warlike Rus': "They are bold and courageous. When they attack a strange people, they do not desist until they have completely annihilated it." (11) Georgius of

11. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 46.

Amastra writes that at the beginning of the ninth century "the race of the Rus' which is disastrous in name as well as deed" laid waste the coast of Asia Minor as far as Sinope. (12)

12. Ibid., page 67.

Oleg was a conqueror's figure of the following type. He subjected all Slavic tribes, and when he had sufficiently consolidated his kingdom, he sailed, as the chronicles maintain, at the head of 80,000 men and 2000 boats to Byzantium, in order to extort a tribute from the Greek emperor. Not all of his warlike expeditions succeeded; the fleets of his followers were more than once destroyed by Greek fire. Prince Sviatoslav the Bold was "more a vagabond knight than the head of a state". Persistent wars led him from the Don to

•175 the Danube. He defeated the Khazar Kingdom, plundered the "White City" on the Volga, and in 968 set out with 60,000 warriors against the Bulgarians along the Danube. He was already preparing to engage them in a tremendous battle when the news reached him that Kiyev was being harrassed by the bloodthirsty Pecheneg hordes. Sviatoslav liberated his capital and returned to defeat the Bulgars and to plunder their chief city of Prislav. "It almost looked as though a mighty Slavic empire was to arise from Novgorod to the very gates of Byzantium." (13) Byzantium was well aware of

13. Reeb: Russian History.

this danger; it gathered all its forces and defeated the Viking who had grown used to victory. On his way back to Kiyev he ended his life under the saber blows of the Pecheneg.

The states of these Kiyev princes were loose structures. The military forces were divided into aggregates of tens, hundreds and thousands, and the king stood at their head. His retainers were regarded as associates, not servants. Whenever they pleased, they could leave their king and follow /27/ another. There were plenty of principalities, for they were occasionally divided after the death of the ruler. But Kiyev always remained the chief principality to which all the partial principalities were subject. The rights of the ancient people's assemblies of the Slavs in part passed over to the princes in the course of time. In the government the council of boyars supported them. Slavs and Vikings swore allegiance to one and the same prince - the former by the god Perun, the others by Thor. The administration of the prince's court was at the same time that of the principality; it was not unusual that the ruler and his followers personally levied the tribute.

•175 Joint military campaigns and marauding expeditions and the power of the grand-princes was what constituted the cement which held together the many principalities of the Kiyev Kingdom.

Vladimir, whom history has surnamed "the Great", a contemporary of Otto the Great, was not only a fearless general, but also a wise, farseeing statesman. The weakness of this kingdom which he conquered only by means of fratricidal war, was clear to him. Thus it seemed that the adoption of Christianity might prove a strong unifying tie between the ofttimes divergent, warring factions. Statesmanly insight persuaded Vladimir to adopt the Greek Orthodox, Byzantine form of Christianity. The papal legates of Rome tried in vain to win Vladimir over to the Roman Catholic faith. Byzantium was nearer, easier to reach, and there existed old, albeit often hostile, relations with it. For a baptismal present, as it were, the grand-prince obtained the hand of the Byzantine princess, a near relative of and from the same house as, Princess Theophano who was wedded to Emperor Otto II.

The adoption of Byzantine Christianity was one of those great historical events whose import could not have been foreseen at the moment when it was accomplished. /28/ Thus this decision of Vladimir was to influence East European history in the most enduring manner up to this very day. As a result of it, all of east Europe, with the exception of Poland, entered into the Byzantine cultural orbit. A country whose population as such bears a certain leaning toward passivity was joined to a cultural sphere which had already become rigid with formal doctrine. This world was on the way toward decline, whereas the West Roman world still awaited its flowering. In this way the east of Europe was to assume a position of great disadvantage as against the West.

The most immediate result of the adoption of Eastern Christianity was the transmission of

175 this Byzantine culture which was far superior to that of Kiyev, to the far-flung kingdom of the Rus'. For a good 200 years Byzantine knowledge, literature and art, as well as commercial goods were carried north. Bulgarian monks and teachers came, bidden and unbidden, into the country and taught reading and writing in the monastery schools. The learned documents they brought, spiritual essays, edifying sermons, historical treatises and geographical descriptions, exerted a great influence on their students. Greek master builders "brought architecture into the land which had seen its greatest accomplishment in fortifications by means of embankments". The chief attribute of the intellectual life of that time was the aversion toward Christian ideas and customs. If the adoption of Christianity was already very halting among the higher classes, the country people continued to worship their heathen gods to whom they offered sacrifices in forest and meadow, along streams and swamps. People did not want to renounce old customs, such as the freedom of love and marriage.

The kingdom of Kiyev reached its greatest efflorescence under Iaroslav the Wise, a son of Vladimir the Great. Both grand-princes were obliged to maintain their position and that of their kingdom by means of constant wars, and both succeeded at the same time in expanding their territory. Iaroslav, even more than Vladimir, built schools, monasteries and magnificent churches. Under /29/ his rule an exact copy of Hagia Sophia was built on the Dniepr by Greek architects. The type of church edifice with a triple nave and a central cupola made its triumphal entry into East Europe. Adam von Bremen called the Kiyev of Iaroslav "a rival of Constantinople". No less than 400 churches and numerous monasteries, proud edifices, decorated at that time the "Rome of the East".

The race of Kiyev Rurikians was so esteemed

175 that it was possible for them to fetch their wives from all the royal houses of Europe and to marry their daughters into these houses. Anna, the daughter of Iaroslav the Wise married Henry I, King of France. When he died she reigned until her son, Philipp I, came of age. Iaroslav's second daughter Elisaveta married King Harald Haardraade of Norway, and he himself had Ingegerd, the daughter of King Olaf Skotunung of Sweden as his spouse. Emperor Henry IV chose Evpraksia, the sister of Grand Prince Vladimir Monomakh, as his wife. The kings of Hungary, of Poland, of Denmark, of Norway, of Sweden, of Bulgaria and the emperors of Byzantium wooed women of the Kiyev court.

Within Iaroslav's kingdom there reigned a state of prosperity and freedom which was easily comparable to conditions in the western countries. A decree issued by the Grand Prince himself, the famous "right of the Rus", guaranteed lawful peace throughout the land. The nucleus of the population consisted of independent peasants who plowed their own land and slept in their own huts of loam or wood. Legally they were equal to the boyars. They planted wheat, oats, rye, barley, millet, peas, poppies and flax and gathered honey in the woods. They were not unfamiliar with domestic poultry. Besides that there were day laborers and peasants without land who were nevertheless free. Handicrafts reached a state of excellence which was to be sought for in vain 900 years later. In the few cities of the Kiyev Kingdom the boyars set the fashion. As wealthy landowners or merchants, /30/ they shipped grain, honey, wax, hemp, skins, amber and similar things on the Dniepr to Constantinople and imported precious fabrics, spices, wine and other rare items. They carried on a lively trade with Regensburg where they had their own settlement, with the Transcaspian cities and the Varangian country. Half merchants, half warriors, they also did not scorn the profit of occasional marauding

•173 expeditions - slaves were at that time a desirable item. Kiyev resembled a huge fair. The forest dwellers in the north built boats in the winter which, as soon as the rivers were free of ice, they took to Kiyev and sold to the merchants. Goods arrived ceaselessly from Smolensk, Novgorod and Lyubech and from other directions, only to be carried each year in June from Kiyev to Constantinople "in well-armed formations of ships along the coast of the Black Sea".

The life of the free citizens of the Kiyev Rus seems to have been an altogether tolerable one. Jolly festivals with long-drawn-out feasts were not rare, and it is said of Vladimir the Saintly One that he was a great tippler. In spite of the adoption of Christianity, no one wanted to renounce such tried and true customs as the ritualistic drinking bouts, especially at festivals in commemoration of the dead where people settled down on the grave of their dearest and there happily consumed around twenty jugs of beer or mead. The tax collectors, at that time still princely agents, led a wonderful life. Their provisions for the day consisted of: "A loaf of bread daily, millet and peas for the making of porridge, cheese, two chickens, a small lump of salt; a calf and a bucketful of malt for beer on Sunday; on fast-days a fish instead of meat." (14)

14. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 45.

An unfortunate law of inheritance was only one reason, but a very important one, for the downfall of the Kiyev Kingdom which began after Iaroslav's death in 1054. According to the existing practice of seniority succession, each of the brothers of the Grand-Prince and each of his sons was heir apparent to the highest rank. The Grand-Prince in turn ruled over the parts principalities that were being vacated. /31/ If one man

•175 man moved up, many others moved with him. The higher the prince stood in rank, the more comprehensive was the change in the princely seats. The princes divided up their domain in order to make it possible for their sons to live as befitted their rank, and this in later times caused many principalities to be no larger than rather imposing hereditary estates. The only favorable thing about it was that the small princes were obliged to establish princely residences, in other words, to found small cities along with warriors, merchants and monks.

Iaroslav's total lands were split up into six autonomous territorial formations. Inasmuch as each change of grand-princes was accompanied by violent struggles for seniority, the chain of eternal feuds was never broken. From then on the history of the Rus of Kiyev was a chronicle of princely fraternal struggles, as a result of which the cities and the open countryside were made to suffer greatly. During the two centuries between Iaroslav's death and the downfall of Kiyev, there arose and fell "64 principalities, 83 civil wars ravaged the country, 293 princes engaged in a struggle for Kiyev during this time." (15)

15. Reeb: History of the Ukraine, page 22.

Once again, before the Kiyev Rus, outrageously weakened by fratricidal strife, internal dissention, indifference of the Church, passivity of the citizens, went under with the first great assault from without, a superior figure of a prince appeared. It was Vladimir Monomakh, the last grand-prince of Kiyev who succeeded in holding the local princes under control. He was highly esteemed. Once again splendid churches and monasteries were built, once again the country experienced a late cultural flowering. Monamakh himself is a famous writer; his "Precepts to my

Children" exert an important influence on the public. But Monomakh is also a general.

Again the swift horses of hostile hordes appear before the walls and palisades of Kiyev. Wherever there is no high grass on the steppes for protection, they break through the midst of the grain fields. They belong to the Polovtsi, also called Kuman, who, no less warlike and greedy for spoils /32/ than the Pecheneg, roam through the land. Since the time of Sviatoslav when the Pecheneg had invaded the country, driven the farmers from the Pontic Steppe and destroyed entire Ukrainian tribes, the land lay devastated almost up to Kiyev. Vladimir had had long walls, palisades and wooden towers coated with loam, built to protect the boundary. The Pecheneg and after them the Turks were repeatedly defeated by the princes and thrown back across the Danube. But like a magnet to iron, the fertile steppe with its spicy herbs attracted the vast herds of peoples who drank sheep and mare's milk and tenderized their mutton by carrying it under their saddles.

The Polovtsi, greedy for spoils, had crossed the Danube and invaded the country after the Turks, venturing upon the Kiyev of Monomakh and the princely city of Pereiaslav. Thereupon Monomakh united the rulers of the southern principalities in a military expedition against the wanton horde. The Polovtsi suffered a serious defeat. He also waged war against the Circassians and the rest of the Pecheneg. In his "Precepts" the Grand-Prince gives the following report of his combats to his sons: "I have waged 83 battles, I have signed 19 peace treaties with the Polovtsi, captured at least 100 of their princes whom I again liberated, and killed more than 200 of them by having them thrown into the river." The same Monomakh warns his sons: "Do not forget the poor, be a father to orphans! Always strive to learn, that is a wonderful thing! My father spoke five languages." (16)

16. Tisserand R.L.: The Ukraine, Life of a People.

•175 The wars which broke out among the local princes after Monomakh's death belong to the darkest chapter in the history of the Kiyev Rus. Actually the kingdom ceased to exist. Nothing remained to hold it together, neither dynastic ties nor marauding expeditions, nor the church, which was powerless. For 35 years, from 1146 to 1181 there were ceaseless struggles for the throne
728 of Kiyev, and an almost /Facing page 32/ /Map 1:
631 Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938. The Ukraine was divided between four states as a result of the Peace of Riga on March 18, 1921 between the Soviet Union and Poland, the transfer of Bessarabia to Rumania, and the edicts of St. Germain and Trianon. In the west Poland was given West Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia), Carpatho-Ukraine passed from Hungary to Czechoslovakia, small parts of Carpatho-Ukraine, Bukovina and Bessarabia went to Rumania, while the major portion of Ukraine was left to the Soviet Union which established the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic on one part of Ukrainian national soil./ /Keys to the map: -.-.-. state boundaries, ——boundaries of the Soviet Republics, ---boundaries of the autonomous Soviet Republics, -..-..- boundaries of the autonomous territories, ... boundaries of the territories (oblasts), administration centers un-
175 derlined./ /33/ uninterrupted war was waged for sovereignty within the leading principality. The princes of Suzdal in the north waged the most bitter and brutal fight of all for supremacy. They whose descendants are to become the princes of Moscow do not shrink from an alliance with the khans of Polovtsi against Kiyev. More than once these hordes devastated the unfortunate country. Finally in 1155 Georgii Dolgorukov, Prince of Suzdal, was victorious over Kiyev, and fourteen years later the splendor of this city which had not seen its equal throughout eastern Europe melts away in the flare of Suzdal-Polovtsi pillage. (17)

17. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 91.

•175 It is Nestor's chronicle, the oldest literary monument of the Ukrainian people, which tells us about the Rus of Kiyev. It was written by many monks but bears the name of Brother Nestor, a contemporary of Monomakh. The three chronicles from which he obtained his knowledge of earlier events within the kingdom have been lost. Preserved to us, besides the Nestor chronicle, is the lofty "Song of Igor's Expedition", the Nieblungenlied of the Ukrainians and their first patriotic song. It narrates in extremely poetic form the military expedition of the Novgorod prince Igor Sviatoslavovich against the Polovtsi. Heaven and earth and animals and the entire animate world take part in the battle which is narrated quite in the spirit of the Nordic epics.

Scarcely was this beautiful song ended when in the east peoples began swarming in "of whom it was not known whither they came and what gods they worshiped". Jenghis Khan was their emperor and Mongolia their homeland, the same Jenghis Khan who had said to his son when the latter wanted to grant mercy to a city: "Compassion is proof of a weak character." His hords coming from Persia conquered the northern Caucasian and Crimean countries in 1222. When the Polovtsi learned of the approaching mighty army from their scouts and from captured Tatar, they called upon the princes of Halicz (Galicia), Kiyev and Chernigov for help. The entire militia of the southern /34/ principalities were called out in order to stave off the impending danger. The armies clashed at the Kalka, on the Sea of Azov, where the 100,000 Tatar of the Mongolian emperor annihilated the flower of the Ukrainian people. "The heads of the Rus fell under the sabers of the Tatar like stalks on the field under the sickle." (18)

18. Reeb: History of the Ukraine, page 14.

•175 Vae victis! Mountains of corpses, burning villages and cities, smoldering ruins, - these were the tracks left by the Tatar on the march to Moscow, Vladimir and Suzdal. In 1240 Kiyev is overtaken by the same fate; the men and women of the free Rus are dragged to the Asiatic slave markets.

/35/ Poland Colonized

To be one's own master or to be a slave: that is the fate of peoples! Poles, Lithuanians and Tatar are now the ones who, for four hundred years after the fall of Kiyev, determine what is right and what is criminal in the Ukrainian countries. Kiyev Rus sinks to the lowest level; its principalities become provinces of Poland, Lithuania and the Tatar tent city on the Volga, while the inhabitants become serfs.

It sounds ironical that at the moment when the wings of a dire fate already cast their shadow over the Ukraine, a member of the Rurik dynasty should adorn himself with a king's crown. Danilo Romanovich, grand-prince of Halicz-Volhynia, in 1253 receives the crown from the hands of the legates of Innocence IV.

Under his predecessors the principality extended from the mouth of the Danube up to San, a tributary of the Vistula, and since 1199 as far as Volhynia. But this imposing kingdom was internally dismembered. It even happened that princes and aristocrats hanged one another. "In the character of this aristocracy there is a streak of anarchism which expresses itself in a tendency to unbridled despotism, in imperiousness and lack of consideration toward subjects, in rebelliousness and treason against the princes, along with servile forms of social intercourse, all of which was bound to bring misfortune to any kingdom." (19) Danilo also

19. Kaindl, R.F.: Poland, page 64 and 65.

•175 fought against these insubordinate boyars. To break down their defiance, entire cities with all their inhabitants are destroyed. Ambitious Danilo has far-flung plans. He, the tributary prince of the Tatar khan in Sarai on the /35/ Volga, who has a king's crown from the papal city on the Tiber, wants to stretch out his hand to Kiyev, in spite of the fact that his plans of a crusade against the Tatar failed, and that only legates in cowls came instead of well-armed warriors. The khans, however, had long since seen through him; at their command he was obliged to burn down his own fortifications in 1259. Poisoned by the boyars, Danilo dies, and with him ends the Rurik dynasty of Halicz, exactly one hundred years after the destruction of Kiyev.

The history of the Ukraine, the territory on the border*, as the southern regions of the

[103]

*The name "Ukraine", meaning "borderland", appears for the first time in the chronicle of Nestor, which tells of a prince of Pereiaslav who is killed in 1187 in a battle with the nomads. The chronicle reported that "the Ukraine mourned him a great deal". In the year 1198 there is mention of a "Galician Ukraine" on the Polish border, and in 1215 of a "Ukraine" near Brest Litovsk. In the ceaseless wars of the principalities of the Rus', the various border countries gradually shrink to a single frontier country, the "Ukraine". This name which bears witness to the life of constant danger in these regions, is also in the course of time applied to the indigenous population.

Kiyev Rus began to be called, is from now on for long periods a history of its bondage. Foreign peoples dictate its laws. The country is completely exhausted as a result of the eternal wars of the

•175 princes and the devastations of the Tatar expeditions. Fortunately, the Mongols are milder rulers than the princes and the Poles. After they have subjected the Ukrainians, they are content with tributes in the form of young women, grain and cattle, and for the rest do not interfere with the affairs of the former principalities which have been split up into numerous communities. The people of the Ukraine are tired of eternal wars, and loosen the bonds toward their rulers wherever possible. They have had enough of compulsory labor; they would rather plow the land for wheat and millet for the Tatar.

The hunger for land of the Polish szlachta - aristocrats -, the greed for spoils of the heathen forest princes of Lithuania, /37/ and the rapacity of the newly-emerging Crimean Tatar after the destruction of the Golden Horde of Sarai, - these are the historical forces which the Ukrainian people are to feel during these centuries.

After the death by poison of the last member of the Rurik dynasty at Halicz-Volhynia, the glistening silvery Black Sea is already mirrored in the covetous Polish eyes. The Moldavian principality between the lower course of the Danube and the Dniestr, is a vassal state of Halicz-Volhynia. Casimir the Great now occupies Halicz and Lubart of Lithuania from the dynasty of Gedymin occupies Volhynia. The Lithuanians are more successful than the Poles in gathering up what was left behind by the Kiyev Rus. After they have defeated the Golden Horde in 1362 at the Blue Waters, the way to Kiyev and into the Dniestr basin lies open to them. The discipline and order which the new masters introduce into the resurrected principalities are weak, but at any rate they are better than the former anarchy. Like the khans of Sarai, the grand-princes of Lithuania are also gentle masters, and the subject principalities are given a sort of national autonomy, frequently under the rule of the old families.

•175 But the most amazing thing is the triumph of the olf Kiyev culture at the heathen court of the Gedymins. The grand-prince and his retinue speak the language of the Rus, take over their laws and in most cases even their Greek-Orthodox faith. The influence of the culture of the Rus at the Lithuanian court, as exercised by the Ukrainian princes and scholars, makes it seem not impossible that, under the leadership of the energetic Gedymin, the Kingdom of Kiyev might rise again.

But the ambition and vanity of Grand-Prince Iagailo is fateful for the Ukrainians. Deluded by the deceptive splendor of the Polish throne, he signs the blood alliance in 1385 and hands Lithuania and the Ukraine over to Polish despotism. The conditions imposed by the Polish szlachta are beyond all measure. In order to obtain the hand of the /38/ fifteen-year-old Polish queen Jadwiga, Iagailo is obliged to have himself and his people baptized in the Catholic faith and to promise to reconquer Poland's lost countries at his own expense, to guard and respect the privileges of the aristocracy, to release all Polish prisoners, to pay 200,000 guldens forfeit, and, above all, "to unite all his Lithuanian and Russian lands with Poland for all time." (20) Lithuania, White

20. Brandenburger: Polish History, page 37.

Russia, Black Russia and the Ukraine - at that time a territory three times as large as Poland - is debased to the status of a province of Cracow by the signature of the prince who was seized by Polish megalomania.

Iagailo's resolve was a decision against the Ukraine.

It is now all over with Ukrainian influence at the court of the Gedymin. The personal union, the identity of the person of the grand-prince of Lithuania and the king of Poland was to be of far-reaching significance for all of eastern Europe.

•175 But the Iagailo family were not to lead the Poles to the Black Sea, but into the Bohemian cauldron, and while they were holding court in Prague on the Vitava, the Turks entrenched themselves north of the Danubian estuary in the principality of Moldvia, only to afford from there a constant threat to the Poles. The rise of the Muscovite princes was to be of even greater significance. While the Iagailo family ruled in Prague and Cracow, these princes laid the foundations of a kingdom that in the end was to devour them all, the Lithuanians, the Poles and the Ukrainians. Moscow united the North Russian principalities in the Kingdom of Muscovy and shook off the Tatar yoke. Ivan III conferred upon himself the name "Czar of all the Russians" and thus formulated Moscow's claim to all "Russian" countries for the first time.

The extinction of the Iagailo dynasty at last gave Polish nobility the opportunity to annex the Lithuanian and East Ukrainian countries altogether. They met at Lublin in 1569, three years before the death of the last member of the Iagailo family, in order to receive the application given to their Ukrainian and /39/ Lithuanian mercenaries for the annexation of these countries. Since the Lithuanians, meanwhile, failed to come, their country was, in contumatiam, placed into the arms of Poland, while the Ukrainians signed the alliance. What booty for the impoverished Polish szlachta, for whom the gates of the Ukrainian provinces, which had in part still stood under Lithuanian dominion, now opened wide! In endless hords these debt-ridden panowie, accustomed to living from the proceeds of the labor of others and to regarding everything Ukrainian with condescension, journeyed beyond the Dniepr. They begged for land from the king, seized offices and positions and on flimsy pretexts snatched huge pieces of land from the Ukrainian aristocracy.(21)

21. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 193.

•175 The Ukraine is "blessed" with the culture of Polish aristocracy. Polish law is enforced first of all in Galicia and, with the advance of Polish rule, also in the remaining territories. The Polish nobility culture - this means the greatest distinction between the two strata of society, the szlachta and the common people; it means omnipotent nobility and impotent peasantry, deprived of rights. In Galicia this culture begins with the introduction of one-day service to the master. At first compulsory labor is required only a few days during the year, then one day a week, two days, finally every day. And still more is squeezed out of the unfortunate ones, for the master's life in Warsaw and Carcow costs a great deal of money. Toward the end of this development the peasant is nothing more than a work horse on the estate of the squire, at whose mercy he stands together with his family. "The Poles and the natives who have become Poles seize all power and might, all proceeds, all land. The native Ukrainian population is forced into a position of complete servitude, is converted into a thoroughly impoverished, deeply humiliated and despised mass of slaves and drudges of the Poles, divested of everything. Their culture and religion, their judiciary and economic life are brought to a state of complete ruin /40/ by this Polish rule." (22) The despotism of the Polish starosta

22. Ibid, page 180.

(elder) and his friends prevails in the cities. All positions are closed to non-Catholics, that is to say, to the Greek-Orthodox Ukrainians.

In this state of deepest affliction the marvelous power of the spirit is revealed. Vladimir's faith and scanty remnants of Byzantine culture separated the Ukrainians from the Poles, from Polish-Latin culture. "The faith of the fathers formed the elementary, albeit unconscious substructure of

•175 national sentiment." (23) The Jesuits worked hard

23. Zalotzieckyj: The Spiritual Life of The Ukraine, page 45.

to combat the Reformation in Poland. They erected schools and raised considerably the general level of education. Many Ukrainian gentlemen, enticed by superior Jesuit knowledge and the privileges of Catholic Polish nobility, adopted the Roman faith. But the people stubbornly clung to their religion. Then, in the period of greatest national danger, there developed the brotherhoods among the commoners of the cities. They founded schools, built churches and in this way, together with individual noblemen who had remained faithful to their people, they laid the foundation for a Ukrainian renascence. The contact of Byzantine-Ukrainian culture with that of Roman-Polish also showed its good sides: the Ukrainians learned from the Jesuits. The first Ukrainian books appeared, but were immediately banned by the Polish clergy. In his princely residence of Ostrog in Volhynia, Prince Constantin Ostrozhskyj set up the first printing press.

Nevertheless, the Poles and Jesuits and those bishops who had been placed by them in the vacated orthodox sinecures, did not give up their plans of uniting the Orthodox Church with the Roman-Catholic Church. Actually they succeeded in winning over a number of Ukrainian bishops to the Union which was agreed upon in Brest Litowsk in 1595. "But when, in the following year, a new synod of Brest Litovsk was supposed to ratify the union, Jesuit zeal which did not want any special position, and the selfishness and arrogance /Facing page 40/ /Map II: The Ukraine in the 11th to the 13th centuries. The independent Kiyev Kingdom at the height of the Middle Ages with its local principalities in the period before its destruction by the Mongol-Tatar invasion./ /Key inside map: -o-o-o National boundary. .....Boundaries of the

•178 principalities. ------Boundaries of the temporary annexations./ /41/ of the Roman prelates, who opposed the admission of the Greek bishops into the Senate, spoiled everything. Two parties were formed which excommunicated each other." (24)

24. Brandenburger: Polish History, page 72.

Indignant, the princes of the Church departed, and the tension between their camps was discharged in violent polemical treatises. Against every attempt to win them over by force to the fold of the supreme Roman shepherd, the Ukrainian populace offered stubborn resistance. A fresh breeze blew through the Byzantine churches and monasteries and swept away the despairing mood of penitence.

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Between 1250 and about 1500 whole swarms of Jews immigrated into Poland and Galicia. They came from Spain and France, from Germany and Holland and later also from Italy. At the time when in Brest Litovsk the bishops were consigning each other to hell, the haughty Polish magnates were already deep in Jewish debt. Jews were the bankers of royal marriages and of warriors. Wholesale trade was predominately in their hands, and there was a large class of Jewish tenant farmers with their quick profits, retail dealers and tradesmen. The Jews had, of course, assumed intimate connections from the beginning, "With the higher nobility as well as with the king, on the basis of credits, rents, and so forth. But the more the gentry retired from the management of their estates, in order, in their feeling of liberty, to carry on politics on a grand scale in the provincial and national diets and in the confederations, or to lead a life of enjoyment..., the more money they naturally required for all these purposes. Only the Jew was capable of providing

11: Obermaier--39AJ-3(no date)1942RD 2Ukraine RD2

[Map II: The Ukraine in the 11th to 13th centuries, cf. complete legend pp. 38-39]

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[Map II: the Ukraine in the 11th to 13th (centuries)

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•175 this money, and thus he became the creditor but at the same time, in order to protect himself, the administrator of the large as well as the small estates of the gentry." (25) There was scarcely an

25. Seraphim: The Jewry in the East European Area, page 45ff.

estate without a Jewish manager. The Jews migrated from the city to the country as administrators, innkeepers, /42/ tenant farmers, tax collectors and even as colonizing promoters in order to entice new farmers into the depopulated regions. The more money the gentlemen needed, the more the Jew wrested from the peasant serfs. Whatever amount was above that which was demanded by the lord of the manor, disappeared into the Jew's pocket.

These were the social, cultural and religious conditions at the beginning of the new era, the era of the Republic.

/43/ The Republic of the Steppes

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648 "Theodatus Chmielnicki, Dei gratia generalissimus ecclesiae Graecorum, imperator omnium Cosacorum zaporoviensum, terror et extirpator nobilitatis Poloniae fortalitiorumque expugnator, exterminator sacerdotum romanorum, persecutor ethnicorum, Anti-Christi et Judaeorum", which translated means: "Theodatus Chmielnicki, by the grace of God head of the Greek Church, emperor of all the Zaporogian Cossacks, terror and extirpator of the Polish nobility and conqueror of their fortifications, destroyer of the Roman clergy, persecutor of heathen, the anti-Christ and Jews." (26)

26. Borshchak: The Ukraine in Western Literature, page 309.

Cromwell was the one who sent the document

Cossacks RD2

culent ribs and loins are used, everything else is discarded. The female deer and wild boar are not hunted at all. In winter roes and wild boars wander in large herds from the steppes into the forests, and in summer they return to the steppes. ...The bird world is so marvelously rich that in spring vast quantities of eggs and fledglings of wild ducks, wild geese, cranes and swans are gathered in. In spring such large schools of fish swim up the river that a spear thrown into the water comes to rest upright." (28) U 136 C 136

28. Rudnytskyj: Ukrainians, the Country and the People, page 123.

This, then, was the kingdom of Chmielnicki, the Emperor of the Cossacks. As soon as the hordes of the Pecheneg and Polovtsi had driven the agricultural Ukrainian population out of the fertile South Ukrainian territory with scimitars and with fire, the first gangs of freebooters, fishermen and hunters from among the homeless banded together. On one of the more inaccessible islands of the Danube Delta a troop of no less than 6000 exiled Ukrainian farmers settled. There could scarcely be any question of their clinging to their native soil in regions where the farm population was obliged to withdraw into certain areas of swamps and virgin forests to avoid the constantly roving Asiatic nomads. For generations /47/ peasants ventured out into the open field only at the time of sowing and reaping. And in spite of that, millions of men, women and children fell victims to the "organized slave hunts" of these hordes. U 175 C 178 621

Around the middle of the sixteenth century there developed small and later large militarily organized bands made up of homeless aristocratic and bourgeois refugees and the peasants who had escaped serfdom. As a result of a constant influx and integration, a regular army was formed which, C 621 642 182

C 726 648 181 of the Cossack wars. Everywhere the daredevils of the sech "are in great demand as combatants..., especially in the Prussian army where they often attain the rank of officers." (34) An altogether

34. Kuschnir, W.: The Ukraine and its Importance in the Present War with Russia, page 23.

adventurous characterization of the Cossacks is given by Nicolas de Bartenon, Sieur de Monsacré in his general history of the wars of the Turks, which appeared in Paris in 1608. "These men are loath to work like the Scythians, hardened against all difficulties like the Huns, devoted to arms like the Goths, tanned by the sun like the Indians and cruel like the Sarmatians...lions in the hunt, equal to the Turks in craftiness. They remind one of the Scythians in their cruelty and of the Christians in their simple faith." (35)

35. Borshchak, The Ukraine in Western Literature.

U 175 C 177 There was ample cause for disputes with the Poles. After the Union of Lublin the Polish nobility "greedily" rushed into the Ukraine on the right of the Dniepr, and attempted to introduce there also the rule of the szlachta. The Jesuit and the Jew belonged to its entourage, the one in order to win over the Orthodox for Rome and therewith for the Polish nation, the other as estate manager and often even as - gatekeepers of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Jews who, according /50/ to the Orthodox Ukrainian conception were "damned" because they belonged to the race that had crucified Christ, the Jews who were despised in the city, here very quickly rose to the position of masters of the Ukrainians. As leaseholders of the estates of the Ukrainian nobility seized by the

11: Obermaier--49 J-3(no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
COSSACKS RD2

Polish szlachta, they were also not rarely in charge of the keys of the church. Thus if some poor little farmer wanted to christen his newborn child or if a young couple wanted to be married, they were obliged to pay a fee to the Jew before he would unlock the church. And this at a time when the "Zaporogian league of knights" set itself up as the patron of the Greek Orthodox Church and reaffirmed the rights of the hierarchy in Kiyev. U 175 C 177

Repeatedly, -in 1592, in 1596, 1630 and 1637 - the Cossacks rose up against Polish arrogance. The result was bloody, extremely cruel reprisals. They pilloried one another, scalded, burned, quartered, excoriated, hanged, broke each other on the wheel and beheaded one another. U 175 C 669

From 1637 on the uprisings of the suppressed peasants in the Ukraine west of the Dniepr against the Polish masters and their Jesuit and Jewish executors went on ceaselessly. The hatred of the Ukrainian people assumed such proportions that the slightest provocation caused the lust for revenge, which had been suppressed with difficulty, to flare up into madness. The Jewish historian Graetz in his history of the Jews characterizes the days before the purgatory of the great Ukrainian insurrection in the following words: "The Polish Jews were sorely deluded when they offered assistance to the nobility and the Jesuits in suppressing the Zaporgian Cossacks in the Ukraine and in Little Russia. The magnates desired to make profitable serfs out of the Cossacks, the Jesuits, Roman Catholics out of the Greek heretics; the Jews who had settled in the territory wanted to enrich themselves in this way and lord it over these humblest pariahs. They advised the owners of the colonies as to how they might most /51/ thoroughly demean, torture and maltreat the Cossacks. They presumed to set themselves up as judges over them, and offended them in religious matters. No wonder that the enslaved Cossacks hated the Jews almost more than their aristocratic and spiritual U 175 C 669 563

11: Obermaier--50 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
cossacks RD2

U 175 enemies." (36)

C 669
563

36. Quoted by Seraphim: The Jewry in East-European Area, page 51.

C 669 The rock started rolling when the Poles took away the estate of the Cossack chieftain Bogdan Chmielnicki, when they abducted his wife and killed his son. In vain the Cossack sought justice, and when he failed to find it, he galloped into the sech where he, the rebel, prepared to do anything, was elected hetman by the general assembly of warriors. The insurrection of all free Cossacks and all serfs became thus an accepted fact. With the cry: "death to the nobility, death to the Jesuits!" a mighty Cossack army set out from the sech in 1648, in order to fling the torch of rebellion into the land. The flames of rebellion leapt up everywhere, and soon the Ukraine was ablaze. Estates along with their masters, cities along with their inhabitants were reduced to ashes. Nearly 300,000 rebels took bloody revenge. The Polish armies were devastated or fled in the night before the Cossacks, like the troops at Pilavce which were 230,000 strong. Chmielnicki reached the gates of Lwów. All of Poland trembled at the thought of the day when the Cossacks will be lords of the land. But the hetman did not seize the opportunity - he made a compromise for 70,000 gulden and marched to the gates of Zamosc in order to besiege it. In Warsaw a king was being chosen. Chmielnicki's word sufficed to put Jan Casimir, the cardinal of the Jesuits, on the throne. With craft and cunning and grandiose promises the king succeeded in pacifying the insurrection. The long baggage train of rebels with their heavy cannons drawn by oxen and their booty-laden carts slowly rolled back to the Dniepr. The hetman did not know then that, just before reaching his goal, he thus gambled away Ukrainian freedom.

and the Ukraine itself thus paved the way for Moscow to the Black Sea and thus helped it attain decisive superiority in eastern Europe. /53/ C 669 648

In the following decades many attempts were made to alter this fact. There were three parties in the Ukraine, one of which wanted to join with Moscow, the other with Poland and the third with the Turks. All three felt that a protectorate was necessary. And all three of them had their turn, one after the other, without any effect on the fate of the Ukrainian people, except to divide it up like the spoils of war between the Russians and the Poles in the Peace of Andrusiv in 1667: Ukraine on the left bank fell to the Muscovite Kingdom, on the right bank to the Poles, except for Kiyev which went to Moscow. A later protectorate of the sultan over the right-bank Ukrainians lasted only a short time. The attempt of hetman Doroshenko to enter into an alliance with the Elector of Brandenburg in 1671 failed. U 175 C 648

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The Ukrainian people look back with pride to the Cossack Period and celebrate it in many songs. Perhaps an independent state would have grown up for the Ukrainians in that heroic epoch if there had been but one great statesman among the victorious generals, the hetmans. Death-defying warriors and the joyous shedding of blood were not enough, and there was no political, but only a religious idea at the basis of the "struggle against the infidels". Thus from a national political point of view the tremendous energy of the Cossacks was simply wasted and at the end of an epoch which might have led to the formation of a state important in world history, the mission that sought protection from two foes found itself faced with a third, Moscow.

In spite of the continual unrest, the cultural achievements were significant. From the time U 175 C 517 178

the Zaporogians took over the patronage of the Orthodox Church, Kiyev experiences a new cultural flowering. Metropolitan Mogila, himself a Jesuit scholar, reformed the famous Kiyev monasteries and schools after the Jesuit pattern. Under him the /54/ Academy, which still follows the old Byzantine tradition, also came into contact with western culture. Seven years after the death of Mogila, the Arabian author Paul of Aleppo, after a journey through the Ukraine, writes: "The Ukrainians are informed people; they love the sciences and the study of law. They know rhetoric, logic and philosophy. They like to carry on controversies. Beginning with Rakhov, all through Cossack territory we unexpectedly met with something very nice: Almost all the inhabitants can read and write, even their wives and daughters who know the liturgy and religious songs. Children are as abundant as grass, and all of them have learned to read, even orphans who are taught by clergymen." (37)

37. Tisserand: The Ukraine, the Life of a People.

During the era of the hetman Mazepa, around the turn of the 17th and 18th century, under Muscovite rule, the cultural life of the Ukraine experienced its greatest upsweep. Almost every village had a school, which was never again to be the case. This period found its most splendid expression, however, in the Ukrainian baroque, the union of Byzantine with the baroque style. The fund of knowledge and culture which had accumulated from the time of Mogila's enthronement in 1632 up to the tragic flight of Mazepa, was so rich that Peter the Great and his successors were able to draw abundantly from it. The Kiyev scholars and their students had a significant share in the Europeanizing process of the Muscovite Kingdom which up to that time was buried in obscure barbarism.

175 Under the two friends, Peter the Great and Ivan Mazepa, the protector and the hetman, the cultural development of the Ukrainian people came to an abrupt end. Peter waged bitter combat with the Swedes for access to the Baltic which lay in Swedish hands. The Czar's difficulties made it seem urgent to the hetman to shake off Moscow's dominion by means of an allegiance with the Swedish king Charles XII. The alliance was formed and Charles XII, coming from devastated /55/ Saxony, attacked the Muscovites. Meanwhile Peter, setting fire to his own land, retreated far into the interior and in one attack destroyed an army of reinforcements amounting to 18,000 men of the Swedish king. Amid dreadful deprivations, exhausted from hunger and cold, young Charles wandered about with his main forces of 33,000 landsknechts on the devastated trail of Peter. He got within 300 kilometers of Moscow when Mazepa persuaded him to turn off to Ukraine. There 30,000 Cossacks were supposed to be ready to come to his aid. However, the hetman promised too much. The mobilization of the Cossacks was only partially successful because Peter was occupying large areas and because, moreover, many Cossack chieftains were not cooperating. Near Poltava in Central Ukraine Czar Peter attacked King Charles and the hetman and destroyed both armies in 1709. Charles and Mazepa fled to the sultan; the one destroyed Sweden's chances of becoming a great power, the other defrauded the Ukraine of its autonomous rights.

The Muscovite meted out dreadful punishment on the followers of Mazepa. There were confiscations, banishments and trials. The hetman state became the province of "Little Russia", the Ukrainians became "Little Russians", the Muscovites "Great Russians" and the entire kingdom: "Russia". The suspension of the autonomous rights of the Ukrainians in 1764, the abolition of the sech by Catherine II in 1775, and the introduction of feudalism in 1783 struck the Ukrainians simply as the affixing of a seal to their defeat at Poltava. The

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•175 situation in the Ukraine under Polish rule, where the rage of the Ukrainian pariahs vented itself in the extremely violent hajdamak /robber/ rebellions, was hopeless. Bishops consecrated the knives which were "destined to become sated with blood". Hundreds of thousands of Poles, Jews and Jesuits were mercilessly massacred, and on the gallows along the streets hang, in groups of threes, a Pole, a Jew and a - dog, "all of one faith". The insurrections are quelled in a no less bloody manner. Even the /56/ partitioning of Poland, as a result of which the part of the Ukraine on the right bank fell to Russia, did not change the hopeless situation of the Ukrainian peasants.

000 Peter the Great attained his goal: Moscow's power was firmly anchored on the Baltic and the Black Sea. The significance which was to accrue to the Ukraine in the Muscovite Kingdom is summed up by Napoleon in the ominous "Will of Peter the Great" in the following words: "To come as close as possible to Constantinople and East India! Whoever rules there will be the true master of the world. To this end incite continual wars, alternately against the Turks and against Persia; build wharfs on the Black Sea. The latter, like the Baltic, to be taken possession of step by step; both are essential for the attainment of that goal. To hasten the downfall of Persia. To push forward to the Persian Gulf. If possible, to restore the old trade route to Syria and set out straight for India, the market of the world. Once there, we shall be able to dispense with the gold
U of England". (38) /Facing page 56/ /Map IV: The
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c 38. Trietsch, Russia, page 61, 62.
712
726 Ukraine Around the Middle of the Seventeenth Century (At the time of Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki). From the territory of the Zaporogian Cossacks there arose a first "Ukrainian" hetman state with Chigirin

as its center. It dealt heavy blows to the Polish-Lithuanian state in the middle of the seventeenth century. The arrows leading from Bazadenk to Lwów point out the direction taken by the army of Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki to Poland./ /Key inside map: National boundaries. Provincial boundaries. Western boundaries of the Ukrainian voivodeships in Poland. Campaign of Bogdan Chmielnicki against Poland in the year 1648. Cossack regimental command. * Seat of the military order "sech".

/57/ In the "Death Quadrangle"

"In a piercing, frosty north wind" on November 16, 1919 there marched passed each other in 'the quadrangle of death, silently, without a military salute, the fragmentary, wretched, barefoot detachments of the West Ukrainian supporting troops and the likewise fragmentary, wretched, barefoot East Ukrainian front-rank troops. The former were going east into the East Podolian area of concentration where the remnants of the West Ukrainian army were to capitulate before the 'Pan-Russians'; the others were going west to Central Volhynia where they were to surrender to the Poles. Both left behind the same landmarks along their way: frozen corpses in the ditches." (39) This was the

39. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism in the Years 1918 to 1923, page 389.

funeral march of the last soldiers of the West Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic.

The episode of the new Ukrainian statehood began with the March Revolution in Russia in 1917. On March 22, 1917, a few days after the revolution in Moscow, the "Ukrainian Central Council" was formed in Kiyev, consisting of representatives of

11: Obermaier--56A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Cossacks RD2

[MAP IV: Ukraine around the Middle of the Seventeenth Century, cf. complete Legend, pp. 55-56]

11: Obermaier--56B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Cossacks RD2

[Map IV. the Ukraine around the middle of the seventeenth century.]

668 the parties. At the same time the process of making
642 Ukrainians of the various divisions of the troops on
the front began, so that within a few months the
175 Central Council had about one and one-half to two
million Ukrainian soldiers at their disposal. But
in spite of this enormous army, the Central Council
by and large yielded to the orders of the Kerenskii
government of Moscow. Its further policy is characterized by the four manifestoes which it issued up
to the time of its dissolution in April 1919. On
June 23, 1917 the first manifesto of the Central
Council announced the autonomy of the Ukraine. It
was to maintain its own parliament, the Central
Council, and a /58/ government, the general secretariat. On July sixteenth the second manifesto followed, giving particulars as to what was meant by
autonomy, and containing an emphatic declaration
for confederacy. In its manifesto of November 19,
1917 after Lenin had already stepped into power, the
Central Council still clung to the union with Moscow.
Again in this "Universal"-that was what the manifestoes were called - which proclaimed the Ukrainian
People's Republic, there was mention of federation
with Moscow. On December fourteenth the Council of
648 People's Commissars in Moscow recognized "the
175 Ukrainian People's Republic and its right to separate
completely from Russia or to enter negotiations for
a federation or similar relationships." But in the
same document of recognition the Council of People's
Commissars laid down the condition that the disarming
of Red troops in the Ukraine would have to cease and
that the Central Council would have to desist from
its "counter-revolutionary activity". Should the
People's Commissars fail to obtain a satisfactory
answer to this demand within 48 hours, "the Council
of People's Commissars would assume that the Central
Council was in a state of open warfare against the
Soviet government." A few days after this recognition coupled with an ultimatum Bolshevik troops
broke into the Ukraine. In Khar'kov there was formed
a Ukrainian-Bolshevik counter-government, and Moscow'

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668
175

war against Kiyev began.

Straightway Bolshevik propaganda made itself felt in the Ukraine. It was easy to unleash revolutionary energies, after the Central Council had prepared the ground with the same arguments, albeit in a weaker form. In the country unbridled peasant rebellion against the squires raged. It was arable land and fine cattle and horses on the farms that the peasants wanted; they did not care who ruled in the cities. This was the state of affairs in the Ukraine when on January 22, 1918 the Central Council in Kiyev in a fourth manifesto proclaimed the sovereign "Ukrainian People's /59/ Republic" and put into effect separation from "indivisible Russia". However, at the same time it did not forget to announce that after the overthrow of Bolshevism, there should again be cooperation with Russia. The manifesto which was meant at last to arouse national passions suppressed for so long, was not heard in the noise of general rebellion. A few days after the proclamation of the Ukrainian People' Republic, the parliament and the government at Kiyev were surprised by a revolt of Bolsheviks and its members were arrested. If they had not been freed by the Ukrainian sharpshooters of the sech who became the nucleus of the later Ukrainian armies, and the corps of free Cossacks consisting of workmen, these parliamentarians would have faced certain death. It was precisely in those days that the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk recognized the independent Ukrainian People's Republic on February 9, 1918. Vienna was facing a famine and needed grain, so the peace was favorable to the Ukraine. For the adjudication of national sovereignty they were obliged to furnish a half million tons of grain. The "peace for bread" had been signed one day when the Bolsheviks drove the Central Council out of their capital. In March the situation became so threatening for the Ukrainian government that it was obliged to appeal to the Central Powers

64 for occupation and riddance of the Ukraine from
668 Bolsheviks. Thereupon German and Austro-Hungarian
175 troops occupied the country. In Kiyev the Central Powers established military, diplomatic and political representation. In order to take the wind out of the sails of the vigorous Bolshevik agitation, the Central Council nevertheless saw itself forced to continue its revolutionary activity. Thus, against their will, they led "the country toward a complete social-revolutionary dissolution in which East Ukraine had inevitably to fall victim to the Bolshevism of Moscow." (40)

40. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism.

It is obvious that the conservatively-minded German authorities had no understanding of such governmental tricks as would seriously jeopardize /60/ the furnishing of grain. Therefore they supported the attempt of the former aide-de-camp of the Czar and Russian general of Ukrainian origin, Pavlo Skoropadskyj, to introduce the monarchical office of hetman instead of the Republican Central Council. On April 29, 1918 Pavlo
668 Skoropadskyj, the offspring of a hetman family,
175 proclaimed a new hetman state in the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the indigenous props of this monarchical regime were very weak. If he had not been protected from the beginning by the authority of the army of occupation, the revolutionary masses would have driven him out along with his few dozens of landowners, industrialists, merchants and officers on the very first day. Skoropadskyj's first efforts were directed toward restoring the pre-revolutionary social conditions in the country, during which process his men did not shrink from severe penal expeditions and from the use of the "traditional Russian wisdom" - the club. This led to repeated bloody rebellions on the part of the embittered peasants. An uneducated, fermenting,

668 destitute mass of humanity, as yet incapable of
475 self-administration, a much too small middle class and a corrupt reactionary society at the head,- these were the elements of the hetman state. But it was the hetman's doom that, for lack of a national Ukrainian conservative stratum, he was obliged to lean more and more on the old domiciled Russian circles who in the end completely won over the Ukrainian head of the state to their reactionary plans. On November 14, 1918 Skoropadskyj set
642 up an Old Russian government in Kiyev and announced
648 the federation of the Ukraine with a czarist Russia
175 which, however, was never again to arise. Twenty-four hours after the announcement of the annexation of the Ukraine to this fictitious czarist Russia, the revolt of the "Ukrainian National League" against Skoropadskyj and the Old Russian counter-revolutionaries broke out. There begins the period of the second Ukrainian People's Republic, at the head of which is a five-man governing board. At the end of the /61/ seven-month rule of Skoropadskyj, after his flight from the new Ukrainian government, he made the following confession in his last manifesto of December 14, 1918: "God did not give me the strength to attain my goal."

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In the meantime Austria-Hungary also approached its dissolution. On October 10, 1918 in the Imperial Council of Vienna, the Ukrainian parliamentarians from Galicia demanded the right of self-government for the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary; it was only a few days before the collapse of the Empire. On the eighteenth of October the Ukrainian members of the Imperial Council and the Diet in Lwów founded the Ukrainian National Council which on the following day proclaimed the union of all Ukrainian territories in Austria-Hungary. The National Council set up three executive committees and therewith imagined it had done all that

was necessary. Then they believed a telegram of 642
the Western powers containing the confirmation or 648
the order to make use of self-government and found 175
the West Ukrainian state would come fluttering into the house. The parliamentarians who received their political education in the lobbies of the Imperial Council building had complete faith in the magic formula of self-government and were waiting to see what the Western powers would have to say. Action was taken only by several companies of East Galician-Ukrainian troops who in the night of the first of November seized Lwów in a surprise attack. The Galician capital was predominantly inhabited by Poles and Jews, and the Poles immediately countered with a revolt. The Ukrainian National Council was still waiting patiently; it had made no real preparations to take over power in Galicia. Thus its appeals must be directed to the anonymous masses, "To everyone", with the request that they lend a helping hand everywhere and intervene everywhere. Finally on November ninth the government, the temporary state secretariat, was formed and the division of governmental power very neatly handled. The /62/ National Council was to make the laws, the State Secretariat was to see that they were enforced. Then the order was given that all "necessary steps be taken to unite all the Ukrainian provinces into one state". The new state called itself the "West Ukrainian People's Republic". Its alliance with the East "Ukrainian People's Republic" was solemnly announced on January 22, 1919 in Kiyev. The West Ukrainian People's Republic was given the name "Western Territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic". In reality, however, conditions remained as before between the West Ukrainian and the East Ukrainian state, in spite of formal amalgamation. Both states continued to be independent allies, small West Ukraine being the stronger.

The West Ukrainian state was obliged from the beginning to reckon with opponents who were

642 bent on the most extreme measures. Roman Dmovski,
648 chairman of the Polish National Committee founded
in Paris during the war and leader of the Polish
•175 delegation at the peace negotiations, was the
most bitter enemy of any kind of Ukrainian state.
He countered the partition of Great Russia at
Brest Litovsk with the partitioning of the Ukraine.
It was completely in accordance with his ideas
when as early as February 28, 1918, after Brest
Litovsk, the Paris National Committee decided
completely to destroy Ukrainian state in East
Europe at any cost. To this end Polish agents in
Paris, London and Washington used all their powers
of persuasion on leading politicians and news-
papers. They wisely suppressed the fact that
Polish plans secretly included the entire Ukraine
west of the Dniepr which had fallen to Russia in
the partitions of Poland. These opponents of in-
dependent Ukrainian state were augmented: the
Polish army of General Haller, which was formed
in the summer of 1918 on French soil and which was
recognized as the "confederate army" on the twenty-
eighth of September, arrived in Poland.

West Ukraine could be nothing more than
booty or a tool in the hands of the Allies. Inas-
much as France /63/ wanted to build up against
Germany a Poland that was as strong as possible,
it was best that Poland subjugate West Ukraine
and thus exclude any threat from the rear. Only
Foch for a time entertained the plan of erecting
a Ukrainian vassal state and of throwing in its
soldiers against the Bolsheviks. For the English
Liberals, West Ukraine was an object of barter
which could be used as an extortionary measure
against the French, or, if there was no other way,
could be made into a mandate state under the sup-
ervision of the League of Nations.

The fiercest enemies of the East Ukrainian
648 statehood, however, were the Bolsheviks who, fully
175 aware of the fateful significance of a loss of the

648 Ukraine for the Muscovite realm, strained every
175 effort to fight for the country. The Pan-Russian counter-revolutionary armies also proved themselves opponents not to be underestimated. "The campaigns of Denikin, Kolchak, Iudenich and other Russian generals clearly proved that there were only two forces fighting in the Russian civil war: the old Czarist absolutism against the new Bolshevik despotism. And both of them fought with equal ferocity against the Ukraine." (41)

41. Danko: The Nation in Soviet Chains, page 25.

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726 A surprise attack of the Ukrainian troops
on Lwów set off the Polish-West Ukrainian War.
175 For weeks wild fighting raged in the streets of the city; finally the Poles succeeded in bringing in troops and forcing the Ukrainians out of Lwów during the night of November 22, 1918. The victors exercised bloody reprisals on the Ukrainian population; they destroyed Ukrainian property and dragged many respected citizens into concentration camps from which they were never to return. The Jews expiated for their neutrality with a three-day pogrom, during which whole blocks of houses went up in flames.

[631] After the loss of Lwów, the West Ukrainian
642 state included about 40,000 square kilometers with
648 four million /64/ inhabitants, among them three
726 million Ukrainians. To destroy this dwarf state
175 was the firm intention of the leaders of the Polish state of eighteen million. The Ukrainian government now had its seat at Stanislawów; Dr. Ievgen Petrushevych was the head of the state. He and many other men who were responsible for the fate of West Ukraine still regarded it as "an incident, a misunderstanding, an error" that there was any fighting at all between Poles and Ukrainians. Heedless of the front which was expanding day by

642 day and of the increasingly bloody battles, they
648 abandoned themselves to the illusion that these
726 misunderstandings would merely have to be cleared
175 up and all would be well. They believed that patience was required until the Allies carried out the right of self-government for which the Ukrainians alone were obliged to fight with weapons. "The fact that individual destinies must be determined by the will of the individual - such points of view which are so familiar to conquering nations, were completely foreign to the 'Ukrainian National Council', all the more since there was not a single, in any way outstanding, personality in leading political circles, who would have been capable in a critical situation to grasp the reins and direct events." (42)

42. Kuchabskyj: West Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 52.

175 The war which at the beginning was carried
726 on with a few thousand men on both sides was in full force by the end of December. At this time the Ukrainians successfully mobilized their fighting manpower up to 35 years of age. Then, however, they made the mistake of abandoning warfare in the open country and of leaving the initiative to the Poles who, in keeping with their reckless methods, made use of it. In spite of the fact that the Ukrainian front which ran northward from the Carpathians presented considerable deficiencies along its approximately 250-kilometer length, that the battalions, for example, were strung together loosely and without a unified supreme command, nevertheless the Polish troops which arrived from mid-January on suffered heavy defeats. Thus Gen-
000 eral Romer /Facing page 64/ /Above: A typical Ukrainian church made of wood, in the Carpathians. Below: Ukrainian peasant woman baking bread./1 /Facing page 65/ /The Ukrainian landscape is full

1 [This plate not processed for files - Analyst]

000 of unique charm. - In spite of their poverty, Ukrainian peasants keep their loam huts clean./7
726 /65/ along with 5000 men was defeated and shortly
•175 thereafter other Polish detachments north of Lwów were destroyed.

And now the Ukrainians fell into a situation which was somehow reminiscent of the siege of Lwów by hetman Chmielnicki in 1648. It was again Lwów that was besieged and cut off from the rest of the world. The city seemed hopelessly lost, there was even no water. At this point when the war was developing favorably for the Ukrainians and when it could only be a few days before Lwów fell into their hands as a trump which might even overtrump the Western Powers, they ceased hostilities as a result of the promises of a French military mission. "...If, in turn, you accept our proposal we shall take steps toward the recognition of your sovereignty...". But the peace terms of the French General Berthelemy seemed so severe to the Ukrainians that after three days they resumed the fight. The brief pause sufficed for the Poles to recover. Morale in the Ukrainian army was also no longer of the best after the prospects of peace had been shattered. The soldiers lived through a severe winter. Some of them were in need of coats, and even more, or a corps of officers which might have served as a moral support to them during the long months of life in the trenches. Five hundred soldiers and one officer! That represents a catastrophic dearth of officers. Gangs of East Ukrainian peasants sent to help, caused mutiny and plunder so that they were decimated and sent back over the border.

To what extent the Ukrainian general staff had already lost the leadership of its troops was proved by the vote which it took among the individual battalions upon the armistice command of the Entente of March 19, 1919. Whereas the Ukrainian army, in response to it, declared itself

7 [For plate, see p. 219, category 116 - Analyse]

for the armistice, the Poles who started a general 726
offensive on March eighteenth, paid no attention 175.
to the wishes of their allies /66/ in Paris. On the contrary, without running up against any opposition worth mentioning, they built up a favorable starting point for a new offensive, extending from the Carpathians to Volhynia. General Haller worked out the plans, unconcerned over the fact that the Supreme Council in Paris was already preparing the armistice terms. For the Council attached importance to a rapid ending of hostilities in order that Bolshevik Moscow may be all the more rapidly and positively destroyed. Polish attacks on the first and second Ukrainian army corps announced the impending catastrophe. The Ukrainian soldiers were tired of war; they marauded, mutinied, plundered, left the trenches and simply went home. No wonderthat the two army corps were defeated in "wildest flight". At this point General Haller prepared for what he considered would be the mortal blow. The disintegrated Ukrainian front was faced with nine Polish infantry divisions, among them two Haller divisions equipped in the best possible manner by the French. In most cases the Poles stormed empty ditches and deserted villages; occasionally they broke up local resistance. The defeat of the Ukrainians was complete.

At this moment, slowly, guardedly, two Rumanian divisions pushed across the crests of the Carpathians into southeastern Galicia and captured the only infantry supply base still left the Ukrainians.

The remnants of the exhausted West Ukrainian army marched eastward with its baggage and accompanied by fleeing civilians toward an unknown destination, while in East Ukraine Bolsheviks drove the remnants of the East Ukrainian army westward. Ievgen Petrushevych rose up to become dictator of his wandering West Ukrainian state.

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Another page was turned. General Haller 726
was obliged to throw his divisions onto the 175
western frontier of Poland. The Treaty of Versailles
was to be signed. No /67/ one knows whether the
Germans may not refuse to sign, ally themselves
with the Bolsheviks and enter a desperate struggle.

It does not seem impossible that a surprise attack of the Ukrainians may be successful. Petrushevych named the Russian General A. Grekov, who had staked everything on the Ukraine, supreme commander of the West Ukrainian forces. He is the author of the plans for an offensive which, under his name, was to enter Ukrainian military history as one of the most daring deeds.

In the early morning of June 8, 1919 the Ukrainians began the assault on the town of Chortkov which had been captured a few days before by the Poles. "The effect of this advance was baffling. Several Polish battalions who were defending the town dispersed and took to wildest flight. Almost the entire enemy artillery of this division, all their baggage and several hundred prisoners fell into the hands of West Ukrainians. In the market-place of the town a national parade of the Polish inhabitants of the entire countryside had just gathered in order to celebrate the 'burial of the Ukraine'. The fleeing soldiers fell upon this crowd: 'Run! The Ukrainians are already here!' - and the entire festively-clothed multitude fled with the troops, just as they were, abandoning everything. Then something improbable happened to the Ukrainians under General Grekov when the news of the battle of Chortkov reached them. On the entire West Ukrainian front of 35 kilometers the 726
8000 men whom West Ukrainians engaged in combat 703
pushed forward, and there followed a sudden, pos- 175
itively miraculous transformation in the attitude of the entire nation. Suddenly they became aware that they were being led, that they were being

commanded by a real general. The soldier who 726
only yesterday was unable to halt an enemy advance 703
now dashed ahead recklessly. The divisions which 175
throughout the war did not know how to cooperate
with their neighbors /68/ now functioned with a
baffling tactical assurance. They attacked, they
pushed through, they rolled up enemy flanks, they
pursued, they marched into the roar of enemy guns
to help their neighbor to victory. The higher
staff officers who up to that time had known
nothing but caution, suddenly learned how to seek
out the enemy, to find him, to attack, to pursue,
to break into the enemy's rear. The ones who
only yesterday were deserting, those who were
barely able to carry arms, young and old, all now
joined the advancing West Ukrainian troops. A
crowd marched into a village, only to leave it as
a company." (43)

43. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 302.

From the beginning an extreme shortage of 175
infantry munitions imperiled these brilliant 726
victories of West Ukrainia. There were only
enough weapons to equip a bare 20,000 men. On
June ninth and tenth the Ukrainians overran two
Polish divisions who fled in wild panic along with all
the inhabitants. Ten days later they put to
flight five divisions, and on June 27 a new Polish
line of resistance became shaky. It, too, was
destroyed. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians did not
succeed in capturing the badly needed arms and
munitions. At last, only two days' march from
Lwów the offensive was halted. New Polish divisions were thrown in and Pilsudski himself, who
had previously already taken over the supreme
command but had been unable to avoid the last
breakthrough, now gave the command for a counter-
offensive...In its extremity Poland mobilized the

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Supreme Council in Paris which on June 25 already drew up the following decision which was to be communicated to West Ukrainia: "In order to protect life and property of the peaceable inhabitants of East Galicia from the dangers which threaten them at the hands of the Bolshevik mobs, the 'Supreme Council' ...has resolved to empower the forces of the Polish Republic to carry on their operations as far as the Sbrucz River."

With new, completely equipped divisions the /69/ Poles began their offensive on June 28, 1919, exactly half an hour before General Grekov also ordered a new attack. The proportion of forces was too unequal, a Ukrainian victory became impossible. The Ukrainian army retreated amid constant counterattacks. Various positions could not be defended at all, because whole divisions had not a single cartridge. Thus the Ukrainians reached the river which forms the boundary between Galicia and East Ukraine. "A giant baggage train dragging the entire supplies of the army into the uncertain future, columns of civilian refugees, more than a hundred thousand people, left their homes. Among them was an army of over 60,000 men comprising the quartermaster corps, over 20,000 of these fighting forces." On July 16 the rear guard crossed the Sbrucz.

An eyewitness dramatically described the end of the Polish-West Ukrainian War: "These were dreadful days! From one side came Poles, from the other Bolsheviks. The territory of both Ukrainian states now comprised only a narrow strip along the bank of the Sbrucz River. In this area could be heard the booming of guns from the east and the west...Endless files of West Ukrainian army service corps marched past...From afar cannon boomed: this was the West Ukrainian artillery which held off the Polish attack with greatest bravery to give the service corps time

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•175 to retreat with the sick and wounded and with the supplies. There was still some ammunition for the cannons, the foot soldiers had none left. The latter helped their artillery wherever they could hold off the Poles with blank weapons, and they defended with their bodies the last fields of their West Ukrainian homeland." (44)

44. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 319.

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175 The same tragedy accompanied the battles of the East Ukrainians. Shortly after the summons of the Directorate which was secretly elected by the "Ukrainian National League" and was headed /70/ by the writer Volodimir Vynnychenko and the former bank official and journalist Simon Petliura, the army of the Directorate marched from Bila Cerkva to Kiyev. It consisted of 4 companies of infantry, 1 battery of field guns, 12 heavy machine guns and half a squadron of cavalry. Hetman Skoropadskyj threw all the forces he could spare at that moment into the troops of the Directorate: 3 battalions of infantry. At Fastiv, not far from Kiyev, the sech sharpshooters of the Directorate, after a heroic struggle, turned the tide of the battle in which a battalion of Russian officers was annihilated up to the last man, in their favor. "The effect of the battle was tremendous. With one blow, as though suddenly paralyzed, the counterrevolution in the Ukraine, specifically in Kiyev, gave itself up as lost. On the other hand, the entire East Ukraine arose at the first report of this victory as though at a magic word. Hundreds of thousands of peasants from all over stormed the cities and towns. The entire East Ukraine resembled a storm-lashed ocean." (45)

45. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 109.

•175 However minute the battle of Fastiv may have been, it was nevertheless of decisive historic importance. With the hetman-Ukraine the Russian counterrevolution lost its strategic basis from which no lesser person than Marshall Foch was planning to launch the destructive campaign against the Bolsheviks. Fastiv destroyed the foundations of his plans which had seemed feasible and the success of which would have resulted in a system of government other than the Bolshevik. But the victory of Fastiv was also the condition for the subsequent battles for freedom of the Ukrainians against the Russians and the all-Russian counterrevolution; as a result of them Ukrainian national sentiment was to gain unexpected strength.

As one of its first official acts the Directorate signed the agreement about the annexation of West Ukraine. On December 14, 1918, "supported by a hundred thousand armed peasants", it made its triumphal entry into Kiyev. Nevertheless, the mood of the people and appearances were deceptive. Aside /71/ from the fact that after the hetman administration was driven out, the forces absolutely necessary for the establishment of a new apparatus of government were lacking, a radical socialistic trend forthwith began to undermine the prestige of the Directorate in a fatal manner. When the Central Council sent out feelers to the Supreme Command of the French intervention troops which had landed at Odessa, Kherson and Mikolaiv, it was accused of negotiating with the intruders in order, like Skoropadskyj, to reinstate the Polish and Russian large landowners. The Bolshevik agitators coming from Moscow maintained the very same thing, and pointed to the counterrevolutionaries who were gathering together among the intervention troops. Mistrust of the Central Council finally became so great that many Ukrainian officers, with Grigorijev and Tiutiunnyk at their head, deserted in order to fight with their own troops

•115 against the Entente intervention. It was the army of Grigorjev, that had joined the Bolsheviks, which so disgracefully threw the invading army into the sea. When Lenin wanted to send his allies to the Hungarian Communists, Grigorijev refused to obey and proclaimed a separate independent Soviet Ukraine.

In this way a realm larger than Germany drifted into anarchy. Outside of Kiyev armed mobs of peasants constituted the supreme authority. Plundering, they marched into the cities, and woe to the landowner, woe to the Jew who fell into their hands. They deprived the homeward-bound German and Austrian troops of their weapons; they also made the railroads unsafe. From Austria and Germany the completely dilapidated prisoners of war wander back. "Headmen arose among the armed masses as well as among the country people who called themselves otamans - meaning approximately "commander" -, and the bands of the 'People's Army of the Directorate' soon largely turned into actual gangs. It was a matter of chance as to which side these bands joined - whether the 'Directorate', the /72/ Bolsheviks or the socialist-revolutionary 'pedocrats' who were opposed to everything. It all depended on what happened to please a headman. Here the 'social-revolutionary' circles rebelled against the Directorate, there a vulgar mob carried out bloody pogroms against the Jews, either under national-Ukrainian, Bolshevik or, as happened even more often, under anarchist slogans..."

In the middle of January, 1919, the West Ukrainian delegates arriving in Kiyev in order to attend the proclamation of the Great Ukrainian state, happened upon this unbelievable chaos.

This celebration was scarcely over when Bolshevik troops already approached the Great Ukrainian capital and, on February fourth, drove out the Directorate along with the West Ukrainian guests. Soon Lenin's hosts which were joined by revolutionary peasants as well as Jews and poor workers became

175 masters of the cities which were decisive for possession of the country. The Directorate, however, wandered about in Podolia and Volhynia with dwindling fighting forces, one day set up its quarters in railroad coaches, the next day in one of the horrible Jewish cities. The People's Republic "resembled a barricade of chariots on the march".

The Directorate now consisted of only three members. Simon Petliura, war minister in the Central Council of the Ukrainian Republic before the hetmanship of Skoropadskyj was chairman. His modesty and his brilliant eloquence fascinated his people, especially the sech sharpshooters. He was "a tribune, not a statesman; not a general but only a leader", (46) yet always imbued with

46. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 119 ff.

an unshakable faith in the victory of the Ukrainian national idea.

The thing which in March 1919 had called itself in Volhynia the "Ukrainian People's Republic" was no longer a state. Nor did it carry on any foreign politics. Petliura's idea of it is
000 that it /Facing page 72/ /Harvest time. From early morning until late at night the mowing machines, formerly drawn by horses, now by mighty tractors, are driven over the endless fields./1 /Facing page 73/ /The hut in which a Ukrainian worker's family lives in Krivyi Rog.2 Below: These are specialists - tractor drivers and tractor assemblers of a collective farm near
175 Uman./2/73/ supplied the troops with war material. There could no longer be any question of a fixed front. In April the East Ukrainian army numbered 15,000 men all told, half of which are West Ukrainians. These 15,000 are what is left of the

1 [This plate not processed for files - Analyst]
2 [For plate, see p. 220, category 116 - Analyst]

•175 100,000 volunteers with whom the Directorate entered Kiyev after the battle near Fastiv, four months before. The majority of these hosts were lost, joined wild bands, or went home. The ones who were faithful to Petliura, however, were like the Cossacks of earlier times, freedom-loving rebels, brave and fearless in the face of death.

In view of the situation which became ever more threatening, Petliura from the first saw his only hope in incorporating his troops into the Foch Plan. The Marshall wants to destroy the Bolsheviks - the Directorate has the same desire. As early as February, even before Petliura assumed dictatorship, the emissaries of the Directorate implored the supreme commander of the intervention troops of the Entente, which had landed in Odessa, to give them armaments. On February sixth the French officers delivered an "ultimatum" to the representatives of Greater Ukraine, by means of the fulfillment of which the Ukrainians would be able to attain the right of dying a hero's death under French supreme command - other privileges were to be discussed later.

French demands were simply incredible. The French, in possession of only a tiny area around Odessa, still drunk with victory in the west, set up conditions which completely overshadow anything the Central Powers demanded when they held in a firm military control all of Greater Ukraine. The president of the Directorate, the war minister and another member of the Directorate which, according to orders of the French supreme commander is to be reorganized, were supposed to withdraw. Railroads were to be put under the control of the French supreme command, the troops of the Directorate under the leadership of the French supreme commander. /74/ Russian officers were to be placed side by side with the Ukrainian ones, and the Ukrainians, finally, were to address a document to the French government in which they were to

•175 repent of their shortcomings - friendship with Germany and attempts at socialization -, promise to continue the war against the Bolsheviks, and ask France's support in mobilizing a Ukrainian army and in building up the entire "economic, financial, military and political life of the Ukraine. All of this was crowned by the demand that the petition to the French government must emphasize how very much the plea of the Ukraine to France "arose primarily from its confidence in the French people, their magnanimity and their historical renown".

The sech sharpshooters, the backbone of the army of the Directorate, protested against every attempt to remove Petliura, and since the Grigorijev army, allied with the Bolsheviks, drove the army of intervention into the Black Sea on April 3, 1919, the Ukrainians were spared the trouble of making use of French magnanimity. Thus the plans of the all-powerful Foch of rearranging east Europe according to French ideas failed. After the defeat of the army of intervention in Odessa, the prospects of its troop movements to Moscow being financed were very slight.

With this the East Ukrainian army lost all value as far as Foch's plans were concerned, and he therefore turned his wrath toward the West Ukrainian army which was causing trouble to his Polish protégés. "All that was left in the end of the world-shattering plans of Foch was the concentration of his forces for the terrible blow which was supposed to have brought 'occidental civilization' as far as the Volga, on the tiny country of West Ukraine which was no more than 200 kilometers wide and 200 kilometers deep. Like a hungry lion not scorning even a mouse, the mighty marshall discharged his terrible wrath on the little heap of misery which represented West Ukraine in combat with world powers." (47)

47. Kuchabskyj, Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism. page 214.

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175 /75/ After its withdrawal from East Galicia,
726 the West Ukrainian army joined the remnants of the army of the Directorate. "Quadrangle of death", this is the name given to the region between the Polish border and Kiyev and southward toward the Dniestr. There was no longer any escape for the Ukrainians; they were encircled by enemies from whom they either became isolated, as from the Rumanians in the southwest and the Poles in the west, or else are engaged in combat as by the Bolsheviks and the all-Russian, counterrevolutionary Denikin army. In spite of the union of West and East Ukraine on January 22, 1919, the West and East Ukrainian ministers rule side by side wherever the "capital" happens to be. Petrushevych still believed in the necessity of an independent West Ukrainian government. He was convinced that the Entente will surely give authority to such a government upon the expected rebirth of the West Ukrainian People's Republic. The dictator was possessed "of that firmness which is commonly called character". As though the supreme council of war had not already on June 25, 1919, when Grekov's victorious troops were still standing at the gates of Lwów, pronounced the death sentence over West Ukraine! Dmovskij remained the victor. The Ukrainian peace delegation whose members were at variance with one another, and who had even had difficulty entering the country, had been given no opportunity whatsoever to speak. Other peoples were given to states in which they never grew up; the Ukrainians were strangled in the midst of the fight for their state.

After the various divisions of their armies were united, the dictators Petliura and Petrushevych decided on an offensive against Kiyev. Once again with their fight for the capital of the country,

●175 they wished to prove to all the world the Ukrain-
726 ian will for independence. By the middle of July 1919, one month after the tragic crossing of the Sbrucz, the entire country between the Pripyat swamps in the north almost to Odessa in the south, from Sbrucz halfway to Kiyev, was conquered, and the outlines of the "quadrangle of death" pushed forward and extended. /76/ The influx of volunteers and rich spoils made possible the establishment of an army of 100,000 men with whom the assault on Kiyev could most probably be risked.

Once again Petliura tried to lead his strange form of a state out of its dreadful isolation. He offered to cover the flanks of the army of Denikin, the all-Russian counterrevolutionist. The general whom England supported in return for the tacit surrender of the oil fields of Baku, had just begun an impetuous course of victory which was to lead his armies made up primarily of Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks and Russian-Ukrainian Don Cossacks, east of the Dniepr to Moscow. Bolshevik rule seemed to be nearing its end. Supported by America and Japan because of prospects of concessions, Admiral Kolchak was fighting in Siberia against Lenin's troops. The nucleus of Kolchak's army consisted of the Czech Legion. North of the Arctic Ocean, with Archangel as the port of embarkation, English, Americans and Italians under the leadership of General Gurko threatened the Bolshevik state which was being attacked from Esthonia by the army of intervention under General Iudenich. - No, Denikin with his 200,000 victorious soldiers did not need to have his flanks protected by the Ukrainian separatist and rebel leader! Denikin instructed General Bredov to push on toward Kiyev in forced marches. Meanwhile Petliura pushed ahead a part of his now quite respectable army against the Fourteenth Army Corps of the Bolsheviks concentrated north of Odessa and

175 threatened - what a chaos! - in the east simul-
176 taneously by Denikin and by rebellious peasants. On this occasion the Ukrainians destroyed one Bolshevik division completely. Their offensive against Kiyev also hit the mark; the capital was occupied during the night of August 31, 1919 by the Ukrainian armies.

In a state of mad delusion Denikin, on the following day, snatched /77/ Kiyev from the Ukrainians who in their hatred of Bolshevism were certainly a match for the all-Russian reactionary general. What a fateful day! From the east Denikin's troops caught the guards on the Dniepr bridge unawares and entered the city when the Ukrainians were just making their solemn entry. With the salvos which were breaking in the midst of the parade of the unsuspecting victors, a simply grotesque battle began. The war which Petliura always wanted to avoid, broke out. Lenin can triumph - he got a breather while his enemies were murdering each other, and he threw the forces that were relased in this way into the front, which was most seriously threatened. The crime of the reactionary was punished on the spot. His victorious troops advanced to within 300 miles of Moscow when the Bolshevik Cavalry General Budienny attacked them and literally ran them down. The catastrophe which thus broke over the proud general and his world was crushing. Budienny destroyed corps after corps of the Denikin army, whose chaotically retreating soldiers, moreover, perished in the deluge of a wild peasant insurrection.

The physical and spiritual resistance of the Ukrainians was broken by the cowardly attack on Kiyev. Upon the ranks of discouraged and despairing soldiers who retreated into the "quadrangle of death" there descended a new enemy: spotted typhus. Without food, without underwear, without shoes, without clothing, without sanitary supplies, without weapons, without medicine - the Entente had forbidden the importation of drugs - they

175 726 dragged themselves away from the pursuing enemy. Whither? No one could answer this question. "In the railroad stations along the front hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers lay dying, without any kind of human help; and hundreds marched and fought while they were infected and broke down in the camps." By the end of October 1919, the two armies numbered 6000 men, of which 4000 were West Ukrainians. They were concentrated in the region of Kamenets in Podolia. /78/

The end was ghastly, like a vision of inferno. The "scourge of God", typhus, also lashed down upon the troops of Denikin which, exhausted by the epidemic and discouraged by the defeat at the hands of Budienny, had gathered together southeast of the remnants of the Ukrainian army. "Then suddenly the phantom of the 'all-Russian' counter-revolution loomed up: ruins of Denikin's army ignored the West Ukrainian frontal troops and everywhere pushed on only against the East Ukrainian divisions, in order to wreak revenge on the East Ukrainians at the last minute, before the victorious Bolshevism was to banish to the grave that 'all-Russian' ghost. This 'assault' of a few hundred pestilence-stricken 'all-Russians" against an equally few pestilence-stricken East Ukrainians was horrible. Everywhere the wreckage consisting of East Ukrainians surrendered, almost without a struggle, just as the 'all-Russians', who were in a state of even greater disintegration than the East Ukrainians, would surely have surrendered if it had occurred to the East Ukrainians to take their positions."

In this way the Greater Ukrainian state perished. "In a piercing, frosty northwind there marched in the 'quadrangle of death', silently..."

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After the victory of the Bolsheviks over their

•175 726 enemies Warsaw trembled at the thought of the moment when the Muscovites would begin their assault on young Poland in order to take it back into the folds of "indivisible Russia". Pilsudski awaited the attack which he would have liked to forestall, in the spring of 1920. For this preventive war Petliura, with the remnants of the East Ukrainian army which were sitting in concentration camps - the remnants of the West Ukrainian army put themselves under Bolshevik protection and were in part fighting on that side against the Poles, - is just good enough. With blissful confidence the head of the erstwhile Ukrainian People's Republic signed an alliance with the Poles. Petliura renounced /79/ West Ukraine, although it was precisely the West Ukrainians with their undeniable talent for organization and their picked troops who had made possible for him the unprecedented fight for freedom. In return the Poles promised him the formation of a new East Ukrainian state under their patronage. On April 17, 1920 Pilsudski's divisions and the faithful followers of Petliura set out for the east, and, as a matter of fact, they reached Kiyev. Petliura's troops were the bait with which they endeavored to catch the West Ukrainians fighting on the side of the Bolsheviks; they actually succeeded in catching them. A large number of West Ukrainians who had become Bolsheviks went over to the Poles and were disarmed. The Bolsheviks took this occasion to shoot the officers of the Ukrainian divisions that have remained faithful to them.

Polish rule in Kiyev lasted only five weeks, until June eleventh. Then Budienny followed close on the heels of the Poles, as he did previously on Denikin's troops. The honor of covering the headless retreat of the Poles with Ukrainian blood fell on Petliura. The elite of the French general staff finally halted the Russians not far from Warsaw, and then caused them to retreat. The

•175 726 "miracle on the Vistula" took place: the Bolsheviks turned around and halted beyond the Sbrucz.

175 726 728 At the peace negotiations in Riga the partners of Andrusov met after two and a half centuries for a partition of the Ukraine. The Russians conceded the Poles the western parts of Polesia, Volhynia and Podolia, Lublin and Podlakhia in the Riga Treaty of March 18, 1921. The protest of Petliura who was not admitted to the negotiations remained unheard. Was it blind hatred of the Bolsheviks, a commission of the Poles or burning patriotism, which, after this bitter disappointment, again drove him across the borders with a small band of followers? Whatever it is, the guerilla war which the ex-dictator unleashes in East Ukraine does not change anything in his country's fate, which was definitively sealed at Riga. /80/

175 726 Driven out of his home for the last time and again disarmed by the Poles, he was nevertheless permitted to kindle rebellions in East Ukraine from within the Polish state. If the East Ukrainians bled to death and the Bolsheviks had internal difficulties, this could only please Warsaw. When the Bolsheviks finally cruelly quelled these uprisings - according to accounts in the Communist of February 23, 1923, 6000 groups of rebels were discovered and destroyed in 1921 -, Petliura, the ally of Pilsudski at the conquest of Kiyev, was now merely a troublesome foreigner in Poland. As such he was banished. /Facing page 728 631 80/ /Map V: The Ukraine Before the First World War (1914). At the end of the eighteenth century the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom disintegrated. From that time on the main part of the Ukraine belonged to the Czar's realm. Parts of West Ukraine in so-called East Galicia and Bukovina, along with Chernovtsy went to Austria, Ukrainian territory in the Carpathians to Hungary./ /Key inside map: -.-.-. National boundaries. ...Provincial boundar-

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine

By Michael Pap

175 THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN controversy over the status of the Ukraine[1] dates as far back as 1654. In that year, Bohdan Khmelnitzkyj, Hetman of Ukraine, taking into account the constant dangers of Polish and Tartar aggressions, concluded a mutual assistance treaty, called "Perejaslavka Uhoda," with the Moscovite Tsar Alexej. The treaty provided for stationing a small military detachment of Tsarist forces in the Ukraine. The Russian Tsar pledged to respect the sovereignty of the Ukraine by not interfering in the internal, political and social life of the country. However, after the occupation of strategic military bases, these solemn vows were gradually ignored and forgotten. Tsarist agents, sent to the Ukraine under various pretexts, conducted themselves as conquerors rather than as allies of an independent power.[2] Recognizing his historical error in voluntarily submitting the Ukraine to Russian rule, Khmelnitzkyj mad vain preparations to drive out the Tsar's forces. His sudden death on August 6, 1657, interrupted his plans, and gave the Russian officials the opportunity to impose, without consulting the local government, more and more of the Tsar's laws and decrees upon the Ukraine. After Khmelnitzkyj's death, the Moscovite rulers found themselves in a very favorable situation. There was no leadership in the Ukraine capable of combatting the Russian occupation policy and of inspiring the Ukrainian people, exhausted in wars with the Tartars and Poles, to resist the forcible restrictions governing the Ukraine's independence.

Fifty-five years later, Hetman Ivan Mazepa, esteemed by Ukrainians as the most loyal servant of Tsar Peter I, concluded a secret agreement (1708), aimed at shaking off the Russian rule, with the Swedish King Charles XII. When the Swedish forces entered the Ukrainian frontiers, Mazepa issued a proclamation to his Cossacks to join the

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1 Ukraine is the second largest of the Soviet republics with a present population of approximately 50 millions of which about 42 millions are Ukranians. After World War I, the country was divided between the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. As a result of World War II, all Ukrainian territories came under the rule of the Kremlin, and were made parts of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which is a member of the United Nations.

2 For the detailed story see G. Vernadsky, *Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1941).

15: Pap S-4,5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine

175 King and to regain their lost independence. However, his appeal was distrusted because of his loyalty to the Tsar. As a result, only a small Cossack force joined the King's army; and it was defeated in the battle of Poltava on July 10, 1709. Russian military units occupied the entire territory of the Ukraine and made it a province of Russia. Gradually, even the existence of a separate Ukrainian nationality was denied by the Russians; but the spirit of lost liberty could not be completely destroyed. The opposition against the Tsar's oppression was felt and later promoted by the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) who, because of his courage, was forced to spend a considerable length of time in exile. The Russian reaction to the stirrings among the Ukrainian masses inspired by Shevchenko was a more severe and inhuman suppression. The lowest point of Russian chauvinism was reached when the Minister of the Interior, Count P. Valuev, issued on June 21, (June 8, old style) 1863 a ukase in which he angrily stated that "a Little Russian (Ukrainian) nationality never has existed, does not exist and cannot exist." [3] On May 18, 1876, Tsar Alexander II signed in Ems a special order prohibiting the use of the Ukrainian language in literature.[4] This order was remitted in 1905 but reimposed in full force in 1914 at the beginning of World War I. The Tsarist policy of oppression of non-Russian peoples was among the factors which contributed to the collapse of its regime in March, 1917.

* * *

668 After the fall of the monarchy, the non-Russian peoples availed themselves of the first opportunity to regain their freedom.[5] In the Ukraine, a National Central Rada (Council) was spontaneously organized in April, 1917 under the presidency of a well known historian, Mychajlo Hruschevskyj. This National Rada was recognized and welcomed as the representative organ of the Ukraine by the Congress of Ukrainian soldiers in Kiev in 1917, by the Peasants Congress of Ukraine, and by the Worker's Congress, July 1917. The political

3 T. G. Mazaryk, *The Spirit of Russia* (New York, 1919), p. 304.

4 D. Doroshensko, *History of the Ukraine* (Edmonton, 1939), p. 591.

5 The major non-Russian nationalities in the former Russian empire such as the Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians, Georgians, Azerbaijans, Armenians, Kasakhs, etc. have a long history of struggle aaginst Russian imperialism and oppression. However, former historians and Tsarist representatives abroad refer to them as Russians, despite the difference of culture and languages. This oversimplification of the real facts caused much confusion in the Western world in the past. Even today many responsible individuals refer to the Soviet Union simply as Russia.

7

THE BRIDGE BETWEEN WEST AND EAST

101 The political boundary between Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia is not a clear-cut dividing line between two different worlds. There are a number of Ruthenian peasants in the eastern parts of Slovakia who form a gradual transition between the two neighbours. True, the Slovaks and the Ruthenians are two different Slav races. The Slovaks are closely related to the Moravians and Czechs in the West; the Ruthenians belong to the Russian family—mainly to its Ukrainian branch—although the thousand years of isolation from their kinsmen have had a specific effect on the character of the Ruthenian population on the southern slopes of the Carpathians. But there is a gradual link between the Slovaks and the Ruthenians, and Carpathian Ruthenia may aptly be described as a bridge between the Western and Eastern Slavs.

131 175 Geographically, too, the two neighbouring countries are similar. A chain of wooded mountains separates them from the kindred Slav populations to the North and North-East; while to the South both countries have stretches of fertile plain which run down unobstructed into the vast Danubian basin. That is the reason why both countries fell victim to Hungarian expansion early in their history and remained under Hungarian rule as second-rate provinces for a thousand years. Until the end of 1918, neither Slovakia nor Carpathian Ruthenia were on the map.

177 212 Both these countries suffered from the long alien domination which hampered their development. Slovakia was the more fortunate of the two because, in spite of her political separation from the independent lands of the Czech Crown, cultural and religious contacts with them had been maintained for centuries. But the Ruthenians received less support of this kind from their kindred beyond the Carpathians. As a result, Ruthenia was still more at the mercy of her Hungarian overlords and remained in a state of greater backwardness than her neighbour in the West. This is well illustrated by the degree of illiteracy in Ruthenia under the Hungarian regime which was, indeed, appalling; according to the last Hungarian census about three quarters of the Ruthenian population could not read or write.

177 181 Only people of considerable racial individuality could have resisted systematic denationalisation as the Ruthenians did. They may be a simple people; but their mode of living, their outlook and their character have an unmistakable stamp of their own.

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they

THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

S.U. 562 635 UK 698 175 Soviet Russia has often followed in the footsteps of Czarist Russia, but as far as the appraisal of the Ukraine is concerned there is no continuity between old and new Russia. Czarist Russia simply denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation and denounced all Ukrainian national feeling as 'South Russian separatism'. Soviet policy, on the other hand, has encouraged Ukrainian nationalism in as far as it was able to serve Russia's territorial expansion. The most spectacular territorial advance which the Soviet Union has made since 1939 was that realized under the slogan 'unification of all Ukrainian lands in one national State'. In the course of this unification the Soviet Union not only re-annexed territories which Russia had lost in the Civil War but also occupied territories which had ceased to be 'Russian' ever since the Middle Ages, such as Eastern Galicia with the city of Lvov.

UK. [101] There cannot be the slightest doubt about the existence of a Ukrainian nation which some Russian nationalists tried to deny in the past, but it would be a mistake to consider the Ukrainians, despite their numbers, as a nation equal in character to the French, Italians, Spaniards, etc., as the extremists among the Ukrainian nationalists would like to represent it. The Ukrainians cannot claim to be historically and culturally a nation so complete that they could afford to cut themselves loose from their Russian neighbours and exist without them.

All foreign invaders fighting Russia had illusions in this respect; they all believed in a separation of Ukraine and Muscovy and conducted their political warfare accordingly. The Swedish King, Charles XII, allied himself with the Ukrainian Cossack Hetman Mazeppa; Napoleon came to Russia with the project of a Ukrainian State, 'Napoleonide', cutting Russia off from the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. The Third Reich of Adolf Hitler also tried to play up the Ukrainian issue against Great Russia.

'LITTLE RUSSIA' AND 'NEW RUSSIA'

UK. 101 186 538 There is every justification in the demand for a genuinely autonomous Ukraine but there is no logic and no life in an anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalist ideology. Neither Russian and Ukrainian history, nor the area of Russian and Ukrainian settlement, nor even Russian and Ukrainian literature can be separated from each other. Gogol, for instance, who wrote in Russian only, can be claimed by the Ukrainians not only because he was born in 'Little Russia', as the Ukraine used to be called in Czarist times, but also because some of his great works are devoted to his homeland, including the most Ukrainian literary work *Taras Bulba*. The Ukrainians have failed to produce any Ukrainian-writing poet or writer who even approximates to the importance of a Gogol.

175 on this long journey with, however, little practical success. As early as the reign of Volodymyr the Great and Yaroslav, his son, definite attempts were being made to share in the general cultural life of Europe through alliances with the powers of the West. Yaroslav in particular was zealous to form family alliances with western princes. It was also in keeping with this policy that he appointed Hilarion, a native monk of some standing, to be Metropolitan of Kyiv, a position hitherto always held by a Greek; he sought thus to strengthen his position with regard to Byzantium in the ecclesiastical as well as in the political world. Izyaslav, Yaroslav's eldest son, first negotiated with King Henry IV, whose wife, Praxedis, was a daughter of Vsevolod, Grand Prince of Kyiv, and later with his adversary, Pope Gregory VII, in order to establish contact with Rome. These and similar events point clearly to the fact that, in spite of geographical position and distance from Western Europe, in spite of the vicinity and the influence of the Byzantine empire, the Kyiv state and its leaders pursued a policy that was definitely directed towards the west.

175 After the Tatar invasion of the Ukrainian steppe, the reins
● 177 of government in Ukraine fell into the hands of the Galician-Volynian Realm which, as an advanced outpost on the way to the West, became a channel of communication between the "world" of those days and the East. As was natural, western influences here became stronger, the romanesque style dominated in architecture and Latin became the language of public life. But the waves sent out by the West did not stop merely at the country that was nearest in space; they spread further east, where from the outset they counteracted a one-sided influence from Byzantium.

Lithuanian dominion over Ukraine was fundamentally peaceful in character; Lithuania had the upper hand in politics, but Ukraine was superior to her partner in culture, an advantage which was not abandoned when the Union with Poland took place. But this latter historical fact nevertheless brought Ukrainian territory into still closer contact with movements in the culture of Western Europe which, favored by fortunate conditions, spread rapidly eastwards. The Magdeburg Statute which

had been known earlier in Western Ukraine as a privilege of the towns (Volodymyr from 1324 and Syanik from 1339) becomes the basis of organisation for further settlements in newly acquired areas. German artisans and artists are welcome to these areas and the youth of Ukraine are fired with enthusiasm to attend German and Italian universities in order to acquire learning with which they will subsequently enrich life at home. Thus western cultural movements like Humanism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation penetrated at long length the wide-flung steppe. It is true that they sometimes caused effects there that could not have been expected from experience in other countries. This is seen best in the case of the Reformation. T75 177

After the amalgamation of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian state with Poland, the Orthodox Church, though already shaken to its foundations, begins to play an important part in public life; after the loss of Ukrainian independence, it becomes a rallying point for national feeling and the difference in creed between the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches coincides with the political difference between Poles and Ukrainians; it was therefore natural that nationalist circles should be absolutely opposed to every further attempt to weaken the Ukrainian Church. It was well known that grievous abuses had crept into the organisation and life of the Orthodox Church, for those abuses arose from the new position it had been forced to assume. From having been an all-powerful state church it was degraded to become a factor in a strange country that was barely tolerated and was therefore unable to control its own administration, all the more as it had no longer a decisive say in making church appointments. It was common property that Orthodoxy in Ukraine was in a critically weak condition of disintegration, but nobody dreamt of opposing it and still less of replacing it by another creed, its fall would have been a severe, if not fatal blow to the entire life of the nation. 795

Such were the psychological reasons for the fact that the reformation movement found such a weak echo in Ukraine, though the necessity for a change in conditions, for reform, but from within, was felt by all.

874 of his fathers", of the Orthodoxy. He is thus a concrete symbol
795 of the synthesis of two worlds, of the harmonious and complete
union of two cultures, of the meeting of East and West and of
177 the fertilising of Ukrainian Orthodoxy by the Latin spirit of
.79 the Roman Catholic Church.

795 The seed scattered by Mohyla bore rich fruit. Hundreds of
scholars, writers, politicians and organisers graduated in the
874 course of the 17th and 18th centuries from this unique "alma mater", the Kyiv Academy, equipped with the modern weapons of western learning, to fight first of all for the independence and the honor of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. After completing their studies in Kyiv the Ukrainian patriots of that time go to Germany to appropriate the arguments used by the Reformation against Catholicism, they penetrate to Rome and do not shrink from joining the Roman Church for a season only in order to become better acquainted with their opponent's plans in the very center of his camp. On their return home they develop an energetic campaign in teaching and writing to prepare and train wide circles of less well educated priests for the fight. In order to supply their audiences with intellectual munition, they publish a series of pamphlets directed against the enemy and all manner of apologies in defence of their own cause, utilising the knowledge they had gathered in the West. This leads to an enormous outburst of polemic writing, to an intellectual activity in the country which strikes even foreigners.

● 177 But the efforts of these champions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy
814 who had been trained in the West, did not stop there; they performed a still more important function in making European influence supreme in the state of Moscow, or the Russia of Peter, as it was then called. Ukraine contributed no mean share to the work of Peter the Great. The foundation and building of the modern Russian Empire was the almost unaided work of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, for the intellectual conditions for the solving of this task were almost completely lacking in Moscow itself. In order to carry out his reforms which soon degenerated into an absolute mania for reform, Peter utilised

the powers of the South which, in the 17th and 18th centuries could boast of a brilliant galaxy of scholars while Moscow and the North were still wrapped in darkness. The most important, but by no means all of the intellectual leaders in Ukraine were Herasym and Meletij Smotrytskyj, Christophor Philalet, Ivan Vyshenskyj, Kyrylo Tranquillion Stavrovetskyj, Zahar Kopystenskyj, Jelissej Pletenetskyj, Lavryn Sysanyj, Petro Mohyla, Kassian Sakovych, Taras Zemka, Sylvester Kossov, Lazar Baranovych, Joannykyj Galatovskyj, Dmytro Rostovskyj, Inokentyj Gisel, Stefan Javorskyj, Theophilakt Lopatynskyj, Teophan Prokopovych — and the list is by no means exhausted. The Moscow of these days had very few and not the most prominent names with which to confront this host. It is quite comprehensible that, in these circumstances, Peter I should have had too great a predilection for those products of culture, which had developed in Ukraine under the immediate influence of Western intellectual life. The contribution of Ukraine to the public life of Russia is perhaps best characterised by two men, Stefan Javorskyj and Theophan Prokopovych, both of them students and professors at the Kyiv Academy, the first of whom became "Administrator of the Patriarchal See" after Peter had decided to renounce the patriarchate, while the second was active as a reformer of church administration in Russia and as the Tsar's adviser in all important matters of state. 177 814

This process of the mutual penetration of the physical power of the North with the intellectual strength of the South, initiated by Peter the Great's reforms, did not bring lasting blessing to either. It was natural that Ukraine, politically crushed and intellectually exploited to the full by Moscow during the 19th century should have been obliged to lead the shadow of an existence; but neither was Moscow, the fortunate profiteer of this relationship, capable of maintaining the supremacy it owed to the artificial appropriation of European culture, for the products of western culture which had been transplanted from the south as the foundation of public life proved to be too weak to sustain the edifice of the gigantic empire in times of crisis. Even before the catastrophe, in the second half of the 177

177 19th century, there were numerous intellectuals in Russia who turned from a Europe which they alleged to be disintegrating towards the East, their spiritual home. From their own point of view the leaders of the new Russia are certainly right in postulating the Eurasian solution of this problem. But this natural process brings that part of Ukraine which is still incorporated with Russia into an extremely difficult position as the trends of its development and its sympathies are entirely opposed to such a course.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

distribution. These co-operatives formed the basis of a certain national unity which found expression in the political field. 474

Volhynia, partitioned after the war of 1920 between the Poles and the Soviets, is nearly as old an agricultural country as Galicia. Here the strips of rich black earth alternate with sandy and wooded country. Although density of population is not so great as in Galicia, poverty is perhaps even greater, owing to a lack of that capacity for organization which helps the Galician labourers to survive. The large estates of the Polish nobility have long disappeared; after the last war the Polish Government divided up the land. Numerous strips were allotted to Polish soldiers on the expiration of their service—with the intention of strengthening the Polish ethnic and cultural element in the region. The disappearance of the large estates, as in Transylvania and Roumania, had a deleterious effect on agricultural production and on the proper exploitation of the forests. The majority of the people lead a half-starved existence, and the young men dream of emigration to South America. In 1937, 25 per cent of the population of Polish Volhynia had neither bread nor wood. 311 134 241 735

Podolia has been a land of cultivation since the Middle Ages, although the soil was broken up two or three hundred years later than in Galicia and Volhynia. Now, as before the period of war and revolution (1914–20), Podolia remains in a close economic relationship to the other parts of the Ukraine. The black earth of this favoured province is really fruitful and well watered by numerous small rivers; climatic conditions are better than anywhere throughout the Ukraine—rain is plentiful and regular and the winters are short. It was probably the fields and pastures, the hillocks and woods of Podolia which the Polish poet had in mind when he wrote lyrically of 'the birthplace of Ceres and Diana'. Horticulture and apiculture have long flourished there. 311 134

In the past social conditions varied with the political situation according to whether the small landowners (Ukrainian Cossacks) or the Polish landlords were in the ascendant. During the eighteenth century Polish elements had the upper hand and for some time Podolia remained the last refuge of the Polish aristocracy. Polish social influences survived the Three Partitions, and it was only after the Polish Insurrection of 1830 that conditions began to change in favour of the Russian majority in the population. 177 ●

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century this rich land with its soft climate had become very densely populated. By the end of the century Podolia ranked second in density of population of all the regions of the Russian Empire. The Government of Moscow took 162 311

638 rather far removed from the developments of the present, interested in literature and literary criticism and standing for the preservation of cultural values.

In view of the relations between the Communists in Ukraine and those in the RSFSR, it was only natural that all of the literary debates that went on in Moscow should find an echo in Ukraine. This was the period when Bukharin, Trotsky and Lunacharsky were debating very seriously the relations between the Communists, the proletarian writers and the so-called "fellow-travellers" who sympathized more or less sincerely with the revolution but who had not taken the full step and become members of the Communist Party. It was in this latter group that the greater Russian writers of the day were to be found and many of them had already achieved fame before the revolution. In 1925 they succeeded in obtaining what seemed to be a certain recognition by the party and it was on the basis of these decisions and this standard that both the Symbolists and the Neo-Classicists continued to be able to publish.

At the same time Ukrainian literature could not be considered as a mere reflection of any of these groups. There was still too much consciousness of Ukrainian independence to make the more able authors merely blind imitators of a foreign literature. Besides, [17] the contacts which still existed with Western Ukraine under Polish rule brought it about that even the Eastern Ukrainians were influenced both by the Polish and Austrian developments and writers as Stefanyk were read almost as much in Kiev and Kharkiv as they were in Lviv and Stanislaviv.

The taking over by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty of the Commissariat for Education could not fail to have a definite effect upon the leftist writers who dreamed of establishing not only a proletarian literature but also a Ukrainian proletarian literature, and with this purpose in mind there developed at the capital of Kharkiv and also in Kiev and elsewhere a new series of literary schools and movements, each of which based itself upon its own interpretation of the revolution. They started in general from two contradictory positions, depending on whether they stressed

[after Communist rule was established in Ukraine -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

separation. The Poles were Latin Catholics, while the Ukrainians, [162] though also in obedience to the Pope, were nearly all of the Greek 186 (i.e., Byzantine-Slavonic) rite. Consequently, it is not surprising 668* that the ranks of the clergy provided a large proportion of the 793 awakeners of Galician Ukrainian national feeling. Most prominent of such priests was Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi. He was the scion of a family which was counted among the Polish nobility, but he felt himself to be Ukrainian; his career embraced almost the entire span of Ukrainian nationalist activity, from the turn of the century to the close of the period covered in this study.[13]

The reasons why a Ukrainian nationalist movement arose 186 within the Russian Empire are not so obvious. By the beginning 668* of the twentieth century, the great bulk of prominent men of 177 Ukrainian ethnic origin appear to have been Russified in culture and feeling, even if they occasionally gave signs of remembering that there were different cultural elements in their family backgrounds.[14] That the Russian Empire could have carried out such a large-scale assimilation is a tribute to the degree to which it was supranational, avoiding the narrower concepts of ethno- 186 centrism. Although a strong current had set in since the sixties, 668* when N. T. Danilevskii's *Rossiia i Evropa* (Russia and Europe) heralded the advent of Pan-Slavism based on ethnic Russian hegemony, for many, especially for officials in the governing bureaucracy, the rule of the tsars remained an expression of the ecumenical tradition of empire, a "Third Rome," but one which

[13] See Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora, Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), and Il'ko Borschak (Elie Borschak—this author is better known by the French form of his name), *Un Prèlat Ukrainien: Le Metropolite Cheptyckyj (1865–1944)* (Paris: Editions Franco-Ukrainiennes, 1946). The fact that the parish priests of the Greek Catholic rite were allowed to marry meant that their nationalist feeling could be passed on from generation to generation, a factor of considerable significance in providing a continuing body of bearers of the "national ideal."

[14] Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution.*

Two of the best Ukrainian sources for the period are Izaac Mazepa, *Ukraïna v ohni i buri revoliutsiï, 1917–1921* (The Ukraine in the Fire and Storm of the Revolution, 1917–21), 3 vols. (Munich: Prometei, 1950–51), and Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsiï: Istoriia ukraïns'koï revoliutsiï, marets', 1917 r.—hruden', 1919 r.* (The Rebirth of a Nation: A History of the Ukrainian Revolution, March, 1917–December, 1919), 3 vols. (Vienna, 1920).

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X. NATIONALISM AND THE EAST UKRAINIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

369 THE STUDY of the role of Ukrainian nationalist groups in admin-
186 istration and educational life has shown that urban-centered activities played a preponderant role in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine under German occupation. The more highly developed urban educational systems were primary targets for nationalist organizers, while the cities served as centers from which the nationalists sought to secure popular support by controlling cultural activities and the press. This emphasis on urban activity has a long history in the development of nationalism in both the East and the West Ukraine. Since the rural districts in both areas were strongly Ukrainian in all linguistic and cultural attributes, many felt that it was not immediately necessary to cultivate nationalist sentiment there; they felt these attributes would maintain the national distinctiveness of the villagers. Whether this was a wise view can be more adequately discussed a little later.

During the Second World War, however, this tradition did result in the nationalist groups' devoting a great portion of their limited resources to the East Ukrainian cities, where it was necessary to start almost from the bottom in building national life.
177 An impressive number of accounts by nationalist Ukrainians tes-
369 tify to the predominance of Russian speech and manners in the
186 cities of the East Ukraine throughout the war period.[1] The ex-

[1] In addition to numerous remarks of this nature already cited in relation to particular situations, see *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3; November 27, 1942, p. 4; March 2, 1943, p. 2; T. Liakovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 17, 1942, p. 3; Iu. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3. It may appear surprising that so many convinced adherents of the nationalist movement should have admitted and even stressed the non-Ukrainian cultural character of the cities, since usually

planation is, of course, that a vast number of city dwellers were [177] Russified Ukrainians. Naturally enough, the nationalist leaders 369 felt that no secure basis for their program could exist as long as 186 the municipalities of the country were islands of foreign culture.

Within the urban group, nationalist efforts and nationalist 369 sentiment were largely concentrated in one social stratum. Na- 186 tionalist movements throughout the world have usually been the 565 work of the middle class. Since there had been no East Ukrainian capitalist middle class of any significance before 1920, and since there was no possibility that one could arise under Soviet conditions, except for a few traders carrying on a precarious business under the NEP, a commercial class continued to be lacking. The 475 counterpart to private commercial enterprise which existed under 565 the Soviet regime, the state trading system, was apparently largely operated by Jews and other non-Ukrainian elements.[2] Unfavorable appraisals of the activity of this system, plus distasteful memories of the "profit-and-run" techniques of the nepmen had produced an unattractive image of the private businessman in the minds of most East Ukrainians.[3] Although, under German occupation, a few gestures were made by some city administrations toward encouraging individual enterprise, the chief factors in production and distribution, insofar as the appalling economic conditions made such activities possible at all, were public and

nationalist movements endeavor to claim as large a proportion as possible of the inhabitants of a disputed area as members of their national group in origin and attitude. It must be remembered, however, that the OUN, and some other Ukrainian nationalist groups, were not democratic in ideology; hence the wishes of a majority at a particular time were of little importance in their eyes. Rather, this failure to possess the adherence of the inhabitants of an area which they regarded as theirs through the "rights" of history and blood served as an additional proof of the iniquities of the Soviet regime and of Russians in general and as a stimulus to more strenuous efforts to "correct" the situation.

[2] Some Ukrainians today (Interview 35) state that many wartime ascriptions of all the evils of the Soviet system to the Jews were highly exaggerated, in most cases a forced concession to Nazi racism, but insist that there was a good deal of anti-Semitism in the Ukraine because Jews predominated in retail distribution, and in the conditions of extreme shortage used their positions for selfish purposes. In view of the occupations of most Jews before the Revolution, their numerical predominance in the state distributive system is probably a fact, and it is fairly obvious that any recognizably alien group in such a position would be resented when they could not satisfy the consumers' wants, whether or not peculation played a role in their activities.

[3] Interview 65.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

princes summoned by Vladimir Monomachus to organize the common defence against the Polovets nomads.

With Christianity the letters and the arts of Byzantium make their appearance in Russia. From the eleventh century Kiev adorns itself with magnificent churches. Soon afterwards great monasteries were founded and became the centres of learning in Russia. During the twelfth century the splendours of Kiev astonished the travellers coming from the west who, at this time, had not yet a town culture in the full sense of the word. The princely court became transformed by contact with Constantinople. The princes themselves spoke Greek and many other foreign languages, indulged in literary studies and encouraged the development of civilization in their country. In introducing the Slavonic language to Russia as the language of the liturgy, the Eastern Church laid the first foundations of a literary Russian language, common to the whole country. Slavonic (originally the language of the Slavs of Bulgaria) is still very nearly related to the language of the Slavs of Eastern Europe. In Russia it changes slightly by contact with local dialects, but the written language remains, in its essential features, the same in the whole country. During the centuries to come the Slavonic liturgy and the fundamental similarity of the written language helped the different parts of Russia to preserve their national character and the consciousness of their unity.

Although the Russia of the eleventh and twelfth centuries took the essential elements of her civilization from Byzantium and recognized, in ecclesiastical matters, the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople, she nevertheless remained in permanent and very close relationship with the West. The breach between Rome and the Eastern Church was not quite completed at the time of the conversion of St. Vladimir, and when it

became a *fait accompli* (in 1054) its repercussions in Russia were at first very small. 175x 177 •

Before as after, the Russian princes maintained the most intimate relations with the Western courts to which they are bound by marriages. One cannot detect any trace of enmity towards the Western Christians. Quite on the contrary the Igumen Daniel, who goes from Kiev to Jerusalem to pray on the tomb of our Saviour, feels himself fraternally connected with the Francian crusaders who are fighting in the Holy Land. In Kiev itself there are Latin monasteries and the Russian princes make donations to them. The hour has not yet arrived when the aggressive attitude of the western neighbours of Russia will arouse her enmity.

The relations which, at this epoch, existed between Russia and the West were all the more natural as their way of living had many features in common. The princely courts of Russia, with their *drouzhina* (their retainers), their military character cemented by the personal loyalty towards their overlord, their love of feasts, the songs, accompanied by the sound of the *gouslis* and by characteristic gestures, and their chivalrous idealism, all this brought them near to those of the West.

On the other hand, also like the mediæval kingdoms of the West, the Russia of Kiev, although united under St. Vladimir and Yaroslav the Wise, is still far from being a fully united State, such as had existed in Byzantium and as we know it to-day.

Under the protecting power of a prince, who kept outside enemies at bay and maintained order in the interior, the country is composed of a federation of lands and cities who have their rights and privileges and are ruled by their elders and by their popular assemblies, the *vetchi*, which deal directly with the 175x 631 643

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER III

THE LITERARY, INTELLECTUAL, AND ARTISTIC UKRAINE

IT becomes apparent from the preceding chapters that the influences of the western neighbours, due to the geographical position and to historic development, have always been more pronounced in the Ukraine than in Northern Russia. We also find Polish and even German influences in the Ukrainian language, literature, folk-lore, and art, which had developed on the foundation of the old indivisible mediæval Russia.

The Ukrainian idiom belongs to the Russian family and even to the Eastern Slavonic family, which is almost the same thing. One of the most characteristic features which distinguish all the Russian idioms and the literary Russian language from other Slav languages, both western and southern, is the appearance of a new vowel between two or more consonants. For example, *gorod* (town) instead of *grad*, *molod* (young) instead of *mlad*, is constantly met with in Ukrainian. One could even say that it is Ukrainian which has encouraged this evolution, which was somewhat retarded in literary Russian by the stronger influences of old Slavonic.

Certain grammatical peculiarities of old Russian, greatly simplified in Great Russian, have been preserved in Ukrainian, such as the 'i' at the end of the infinitive. For example, to give *davat'* in Russian, *davati* in Ukrainian. There are also some peculiarities in the pronunciation. It seems that the 'g' was pronounced as an 'h' in old Russian, very strongly exhaled in the

197 Ukrainians, the German and Austrian authorities had to use Russian interpreters instead of Ukrainian ones from Galicia. Trained at the Ukrainian University of Lvov, founded by the Austrian Government, and belonging to another religion, being 'uniats' and non-Orthodox, the Galician men of letters, scientists and politicians who invaded the Ukraine after the Revolution of 1917, appeared as foreigners to the native population.

538 In popular Ukrainian poetry one finds no trace of the epic poem of the Russia of Kiev, of which the 'Tales of the Companions of Igor,' written in a language which was still very close to old Slavonic, is a magnificent example. The epic songs of the flourishing epoch of the State of Kiev, still bearing traces of the mixture of Christian and remnants of old pagan conceptions, have been perpetuated far into the north. They are the *byliny*, songs of St. Vladimir and his companions, which were accompanied by some acting, and which the popular *skazitels* still sing in the most distant North Russian lands in the forests on the shore of the White Sea. In the Ukraine a popular epic poetry of a new kind, based on subjects which have not been published, has appeared, inspired by the Cossack struggles. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have left us a few examples.

This poetry is highly lyrical, noble, and melancholy and has developed especially in the following century. It still lives to our days, known under the name of '*doumy*.' Although it speaks of epic deeds, this poetry is profoundly distinguished by that lyricism which characterizes the whole popular Ukrainian poetic art.

[533] 177 Like all the languages of the Russian family, Ukrainian adapts itself wonderfully to song. It is the Ukraine which has taught the whole of Russia the polyphonic song, which even penetrated to the remotest corners of the Russian land. It is possible that this song itself was early influenced in the Ukraine by certain elements of Western music.

first Russian revolution, that of 1905, one realized at 668
St. Petersburg and began to understand that this movement was not in itself a danger to the unity of the empire. The Governor-General of Kiev, Kleigels, in a good position to judge it, explained it in precisely this sense in his reports to the Imperial Government. But at the same time the Tsarist police, generally very well informed of everything which concerned it, was convinced that the Ukrainian *separatism* was but a weapon of the Austrians; it considered, moreover, that its success in Russia was almost insignificant.

Among the other expressions of the cultural life of the 177 ●
Ukraine, western influences have been particularly strong 341
in the artistic domain and especially in architecture and in decorative art.

The architecture of Kiev, at the period when it flourished most, had above all been a simple branch of byzantine art, transplanted without any modification to Russia. In the north, however, architectural art, although of byzantine inspiration, soon developed original forms of a purely national character.

Kiev, close to Byzantium, was too profoundly impressed by the splendours of Constantinople to be quite independent of them. The celebrated historian of Russian art, Grabar, notes that at the end of the twelfth century architects from Novgorod were invited to Kiev in order to replace the Greek masters by native Russians and to build churches and palaces in the national style. The people of Kiev were amazed by it.

Besides the more important assimilation in the north, the style of religious architecture (the only which was of importance in the old Russia) was quite similar throughout the whole extent of the old Slav-Norse State.

Later, when the centre of gravity of Southern Russia was moved towards the west to the lands of Galicia and

177 Volynia, Western influences became more pronounced.
341 Even at Kiev we find churches in the gothic style,
[531] modified, however, by national and above all by byzantine traditions. A salient feature of byzantine art especially survives. These are the magnificent frescoes, in which this art excels as does, too, the art of the old Russia of Kiev.

During the sixteenth century the influences of the Renaissance were already felt in Galicia, which was still at this epoch the principal centre of Southern Russia. But they were soon supplanted by those of the baroque, which, from the beginning of the seventeenth century, leaves its mark on the whole Ukrainian architecture. It forced the traditional forms of Russian architecture of the byzantine type to recede more and more, to a point at which Grabar asks himself if the Ukrainian art had not undergone a complete denationalization.

Nevertheless a peculiarity belonging to the whole of Russia was responsible for a revival of the national style: the old Russia, a land of forests, overlooked any other constructional material but wood. That which is built of stone obviously cannot be built in the same way as wood. Thus there developed in the Ukraine the special baroque style of the wooden churches, just as the original 'gothic' style in wood had appeared in the north. This exquisite style was most probably created without any Western influences.

The wooden churches not only protected the Ukrainian art from complete denationalization, but their original and national style began to fuse little by little even into the baroque architecture in stone. At the end of the seventeenth century, and in the first years of the eighteenth, this baroque, called 'Cossack,' was almost exclusive to the Ukraine.

In the eighteenth century the 'Cossack baroque' loses itself in the magnificent bloom of the Imperial

Russian baroque. At the end of the century it is replaced 171
by an equally imperial rococo. The churches built in 341
Kiev by Rastrelli clearly cannot be considered monuments of Ukrainian art. The empire style, originally transformed in Russia into the so-called 'Alexander' style, afterwards dominates in Kiev as in St. Petersburg.

As much as the old Ukrainian architecture has certainly contributed to the later development of the 177 531
imperial baroque, Ukrainian painting, open to all the Western influences from the seventeenth century onwards, has played a very important part in the development of modern Russian painting. Here the Western influences were often transmitted through the Ukraine and were assimilated there before dissolving in the civilization of the empire. The Ukrainian portraitists Levitsky, Borovsky, and Venetzianov, working at St. Petersburg, had a strong influence on Russian portraitism.

It was also the painter Lossenko and the sculptors Kozlovski and Martos, equally Ukrainians, taught by the Academy of Arts of St. Petersburg, who illustrated the century of Catherine II with their works.

The national originality was also maintained in the popular art, especially in iconography, thanks to the deep traditionalism of the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless Ukrainian iconography had lost much of its austerity in comparison with that of Northern Russia, under the influence of that levelling which came from Poland.

Eastern influences still make themselves felt in the popular art, in the taste for richness of ornamentation, and in the magnificence of colours. Embroideries, tapestries, jewellery, glassware, crockery, and sculptures in wood witness the rich artistic aptitudes of the Ukrainian people and have the just reputation of their value both in Russia and in the whole of Central Europe.

148 The Minister of the Reich at Kiev, Muhm, a subtler man, expressed himself differently though in the same sense: 'I am convinced that it is necessary to maintain the fiction of a friendly independent country in the Ukraine. . . . We shall completely destroy the little authority which remains with the Ukrainian Government if we were to show too coarsely that it is only a toy in our hands.'

191 177 Disarmed, enslaved by the great force of the army of the central empires, the Ukraine[1] was not in the position of an independent State. The Ukrainian language, imported from Galicia, was not spoken in the country. Only official documents and administrative notices were written in Ukrainian. Not a single private business ever used this language either for correspondence or advertising. In the schools and universities Russian continued to be used. The circulation of newspapers in the Ukrainian language was very small, while the Russian papers which agreed not to carry on open propaganda against the troops of occupation appeared everywhere and were actually the only ones read by the population.

727 642 The Ukrainian Government, composed of politicians having absolutely no administrative experience, soon proved to be incapable of organizing the supply of grain as promised to the armies of the central empires. The Germans then decided to change the regime. The organizations of landowners, small and big, which supplied corn and other agricultural produce to the forces of occupation, were favoured by the Austro-German authorities. It is unnecessary to point out that no Ukrainian political idea influenced the creation of these organizations. The Germans selected their association, known under the name of '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*,[1]

[1] '*Khliborobiv*' means farmers in Ukrainian. '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*' means association of farmers.

[1 [i.e. in 1919. --- Analyst]

An important group of Ukrainian politicians, who had formerly supported Petlioura, joined the Bolshevik cause after his defeat. The Soviet Government inaugurated a policy of Ukrainization from the beginning in order to satisfy their ambitions and to show the world their nationalistic Liberalism. But, as under Petlioura, it was a superficial one and never penetrated in fact either into the private life of the citizens or into the sphere of education, or even into the administration.

Although Ukrainian had become the official language, nobody used it and correspondence between official institutions continued, with rare exceptions, in Russian. One of the authors of this book, who held an administrative post in a Soviet enterprise in the Ukraine from 1921 to 1924, had never written a single word in Ukrainian and had never been prosecuted for this defection. It is not because the word 'Odessa' is now written with one 's' instead of two and the word '*plochtchad*' (in Russian a town square) is to-day replaced by the word '*maidan*,' that the Ukraine has ceased to be Russia.

The policy of Ukrainization continued without great changes and in spite of the lack of common sense until 1927, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party suddenly decided to introduce the Russian language as the second official language. One can explain this sudden change by the development of separatist anti-Soviet propaganda, undertaken by secret organizations, formed under the protection of Poland. There occurred in the Ukraine the first wave of purification which was directed against the 'Nationalistic Chauvinists,' accused of spiritual connection with Galician 'counter-revolutionary' elements, which had been affected by the propaganda of Polish 'Fascists.'

The people's commissar for education of the Ukraine,

661 Choumsky, and a group of his friends had opposed this policy of the Central Government. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine accused Choumsky himself of 'spiritual connection' with the counter-revolutionaries of the Polish Ukraine and especially with the U.N.D.O., the most important among the Ukrainian political parties in Galicia and working under Polish influence. At that period one still didn't shoot Soviet Ministers. But Choumsky was forced to leave the Ukraine and to accept a small administrative post in Moscow.

186 To regain the initiative in the Ukrainian question, the
177 Executive Committee of the Comintern passed a resolution in November 1927 directing the Communist Party in the Polish Ukraine to struggle resolutely for the separation of this country from Poland and for its re-inclusion in the Soviet Ukraine.

On the other hand the inauguration of the first five-year plan, which strengthened the economic ties between the Ukraine and the rest of the Soviet Union, and the creation of the Red Army on a basis of discipline and of modern military science, made the use of Russian necessary throughout the whole Soviet territory.

669 This pro-Russian tendency did not last long. The forced collectivization of the land, undertaken in execution of the five-year plan, turned the Ukrainian peasantry against the Soviet Government. This resistance soon changed into a kind of civil war and became underlined by hundreds of thousands of deportations, by thousands of executions, and by a terrible famine.[1]

The resistance to collectivization, which was incompatible with the spirit and the vital interests of the

[1] See the work of Calvin B. Hoover: *Economic Life in Soviet Russia*, M.R.S., Paris, 1934, in which many pages are given to the question of collectivization.

tion of the Kievan State, where the Prince was only a servant of the state and had to reckon with the will of his subjects, — knights and townsmen ('viche'), in Muscovy there was not the slightest trace. The Government of the Princes of Moscow imitated the despotic system of the Tartar 'Golden Horde'. Some Russian historians reject the legend of the taking over of the Kievan traditions by Moscow, and point out the peculiarity of the social and political order of the Muscovite state*). The Princes of Moscow did not tolerate the existence of the Republic of Great Novgorod on the Volkhov River at the side of their despotic state, and after having conquered that country they destroyed by bloody terror the freedom of the Republic of Novgorod (end of 15th century). The liberal traditions of Great Novgorod were definitely wiped out in 1570 by Tsar Ivan the Terrible, who carried out a cruel massacre in this city, and deported a great part of the population to the East. The Muscovite State, which had grown under the protectorate of the Tartar Khans, created a political and social order of its own, after the pattern of the eastern despotisms. 175

In an article published in the *Review of Politics* (July 1948) the well known American historian Hans Kohn says that the state of the Princes of Kiev, i. e. Ukraine, "looked toward Byzantium, whence it received its Church and toward Scandinavia, from where its dynasty came. When Kiev succumbed to the Mongol invasion, modern Russia was created by the will of the ruthless cunning of the great princes around Moscow. [177]

The new capital grew up, . . ., far from the old cultural centres to the west, on recently colonial land where traditional urban liberties were unknown. Its people were no longer the Slavs of the Dnieper but a new race in which Slav, Finnish, and Mongol blood freely intermingled. From Moscow, no roads led to the West, the rivers pointed to the steppes and deserts of Asia; the political, cultural, and economic ties were with the great empire of the Tartars to whom it was tributary." [144]

The oriental despotic features of the political and economic order of the Muscovite State gave the central government a tremendous power that was used for the enslavement of all social classes and for the seclusion of the Muscovite people from Western Europe. Until the end of the 17th century the Government of the Tsars did not permit its subjects to visit the countries of Western Europe and tried to prevent foreigners from entering their country. The Tsar

*) Prof. Presnyakov, *The Creation of the Great-Russian State:* Moscow 1918; various works of the historians Lyubavsky, Miliukov and others.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

frontier. After the proclamation of religious toleration in 1905, about 200,000 Ukrainians immediately declared themselves Uniats, so that the Russian Government soon found it necessary to restrict the scope of the proclamation. Though the Uniats in Russia were forbidden to join the Catholic Church, many of them became Catholics or sectaries. The last Russian persecution of the Uniat Church took place during the Russian occupation of Galicia in 1915, when the Russian bishop, Eulogius, started a regular campaign to replace Uniat priests by Orthodox clergy, and Uniat Ukrainian by Russian Orthodox schools. Many Uniat priests were banished to Siberia; and the Uniat Metropolitan, Szeptycki, was exiled to a Russian monastic prison. It is uncertain whether the Uniat Church has been gaining ground outside the provinces of Choĭm and Polesia. As no statistics have been taken in Russia since the decree of religious toleration in 1905, it is difficult to give a correct estimate of the number of members of the Russian Orthodox Church, but their percentage varies from 75 to 93 in the various Governments of the Russian Ukraine. The Great-Russian sect of the *Raskolniki* (Old Believers) found refuge in the Governments of Kharkov (0·1 per cent. of the population) and Chernigov (0·9 per cent.).

The number of Roman Catholics, chiefly Poles, is higher in the west (in Volhynia the Poles in 1897 formed 6·16 per cent. of the population), but they are only slightly more numerous than the Lutheran Protestants (in Volhynia 5·73 of the population), who are German colonists.

Of great social importance are the peasant sects, of which the chief in the Ukraine is the *Shtunda* (from *Stunde*, since they gather at a definite hour). The doctrines of this Lutheran sect, which originated in Württemberg in 1705, were brought to South Russia by the Württemberg merchants, as the Danzig merchants, who came here after the partitions of Poland, brought with them the teaching of the Mennonite sect. Since 1870 it has been oppressed officially by the Russian

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

172 In the primary schools only Russian was taught until recently, but in those kept by the *zemstvos* and Ukrainian societies Ukrainian is now also taught. In the secondary schools, which exist only in the larger towns, French and German instruction is given. In the German colonies there are German local schools (private), mostly primary. In the large towns of the western Ukraine and in the Polish colonies and on the large estates there are Polish private schools, which have been officially recognized since 1905. It is impossible to estimate the number of Ukrainians who went to universities, because many of them went to Russian universities outside the Ukraine or to foreign universities; but they can only have been a small percentage of the total number of literates.

The majority of the newspapers in the Ukraine were Russian. Each Government and each district had its own *Viedomosti*; and there were many Russian papers in Kiev. There were fewer Polish papers, chiefly in Kiev and the western Ukraine. The Germans had local papers in their colonies. The Ukrainians had, up to 1917, some eighteen newspapers, but some of them were printed abroad. In Kiev there were twelve Ukrainian papers, the most popular of which, *Rada*, was started in 1906; in Mohilev one, in Kharkov one, in Yekaterinoslav one, in Moscow one. One of the earliest Ukrainian papers printed abroad was the *Ruthenische Revue*, subsequently called *Ukrainische Rundschau*, started in 1903 in Vienna. This list does not include the Ukrainian newspapers printed in Eastern Galicia in a slightly different language and character.

(C) Political

177 Political conditions in the Ukraine were very much like those in other parts of the Russian Empire, except for special restrictions aiming at russification, e. g. the refusal to appoint the inhabitants of non-Russian districts to important Government positions. But the russification was not so thorough as in Finland

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

or Poland, because before 1905 opposition to the Russian Government was less marked. Besides, many Russian Liberals, even of official position, treated the Ukrainian movement as an interesting variation of Russian life. 177

(D) Social

The class divisions into titled aristocracy, nobles, townsmen, merchants, and peasants, existed as in other parts of the Russian Empire, but, roughly speaking, a different ethnic element corresponded to each social division. The titled aristocracy was mainly Polish in the western parts (with the name Polish Ukrainians) and Russian in the eastern. With but few exceptions, the same could be said of the class of landed nobles, in which the Great Russians formed the majority; Poles, Germans and others were the minority. The Ukrainian landed noble was almost unknown; and the townsmen of the large towns were also in a great majority non-Ukrainian, being chiefly Great Russians and Jews (in Berdichev the Jews form 78·4 per cent. of the population; in Yekaterinoslav, 40 per cent.), and, in the western Ukraine, Russian, Polish, German, Greek, &c. The Jews were mainly traders and shopkeepers, while the Great Russians and the foreigners were manufacturers. 565 563 184

But few of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia* took part in the industrial life of the country, about one-third of them belonging to the professional classes, i. e. doctors, Government officials, lawyers, and teachers. The Ukrainian professional classes originated from the ex-Cossacks and the townsmen rather than from the peasants, since there is a great distinction between the peasants and other members of the community. The Ukrainian nobles, it must be remembered, have in most cases become russified, and partly also polonized. The distinction between the peasant and other classes is not based on economic grounds, for some peasants in the Ukraine are very rich. It lies chiefly in their cultural condition, in their education, or rather lack 565 [463]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

565 of education, and in their occupations. The bulk
[162] (86·4 per cent.) of the Ukrainians are peasants and agriculturists. The percentage of people living in the country is in the Government of Kharkov, 85; in Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 88; Chernigov, 91; Taurida, 80; Kherson, 70. The percentage of peasants is almost the same, e. g. Kharkov, 90; Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 87; Chernigov, 86; Taurida, 73;
[163] Kherson, 61. The average increase in population is higher than in any other province in European Russia; consequently, though many peasants have become, during the last twenty-five years, workmen in the newly started industries, the general number of agricultural peasants remains unchanged.

421 *Land Tenure*[1].—While Great Russia is at present
428 a country of communal land-ownership (*mir*), in the
p. 177 Ukraine or Little Russia individual or, strictly speaking, family ownership and communal ownership exist
[556] together (cf. p. 78). The *mir* in Great Russia appears to have been introduced in the sixteenth century, when the Moscow Government established serfdom and imposed heavy taxation, for it was easier to make the whole village responsible for the taxes than the separate families. However, in the north or, properly speaking, Novgorod Russ. the land, as a general rule, belonged to one large family or clan, composed of from two to six houses (the owners of which bore the same name), and called *pyechishche* (large stove). The ownership was hereditary, and hence the land became more and more subdivided, so that families owned more or less according to the number of children. There was no readjustment of the land as in the case of the *mir*. The *pyechishche* of Novgorod was known in Kiev-Russ as *ognishche* (meaning a large fire); and the term *ognishchanin* (meaning a member of the *ognishche*) is found in the Kiev law (*Russkaya*
428 *Pravda*). Connected with that form of tenure is a custom, which even now is found sometimes in the Ukraine, of minorate, according to which the younger

[1] See also p. 77.

11: Obermaier--85 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[Ruthenia]

648 the "Camp of National Unity", General Skwarszynski, said in the Sejm: /the Polish parliament/ "... The common boundary with Hungary as a Danubian state and as a people traditionally friendly to us, corresponds not only to our feelings, but also to our interests. Therefore Hungary's aim to /84/ obtain Carpatho-Ukraine must be energetically supported by our foreign policy." The 186 speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Mudryj protest- 648 ed against this Polish policy[1] at the same meeting: "We must not forget that the Ukrainian people, on the basis of common blood, common tradition and a common spirit feels itself to be a unified national organism, regardless of what state it lives in and under what governments it falls. No power will crush this feeling of national unity." (48)

48. "Osteuropa", January issue, 1931, page 260.

When Mudryj referred to the devastation caused by the "diversional detachments" in Carpatho-Ukraine, he was silenced.

900 Poland had a bad conscience. The Carpatho-Ukrainian question, unimportant though it was, made it nervous. The great power grew unsure of itself and from old habit tried to set force against the right to live. According to the Polish political thesis only "another dialect" is to separate the Ukrainians from the Poles. If one took away their Greek Orthodox religion and their Cryillic script, they would differ from the Poles merely by reason of their dialect.

• 177 However, the Ukrainians have changed tremendously since the days when Emperor Joseph II said, at the end of his journey through Galicia, which was freed after hundreds of years of Polish domination: "The peasant is an unfortunate creature possessing nothing but a human exterior and physical life." In the 150 years that Vienna was their capital, the Ukrainians experienced an ex-

1 [i.e., 1935-39, to aid Hungary to obtain Carpatho-Ukraine - Ed.]

[Ruthenia]

177 traodrinary national, economic and cultural advance, and the war of liberation from 1918 to 1919 became indelibly fixed in their national consciousness. Volhynia, too, awakened as a nation.

186 648 N wonder, then, that after a mock autonomy was granted by the Polish parliament on September 22, 1922 - in accordance with the request of the Supreme Council of June 25, 1919 - and after the conference of the Parisian emissary /85/ of March 15, 1923, which adjudicated Galicia to the Poles, no wonder that the Ukrainians in Poland have continued to fight against Warsaw's rule with other means. The Ukrainians are helpless against drastic measures such as the introduction of Polish civilian administration or the closing of Ukrainian schools. They suffer national losses especially in the parcelling of large estates, which brings new Polish settlers into the overpopulated country and which leaves the Ukrainian small farmer out in the cold. The Poles have already succeeded in pushing back the western Ukrainian boundary by about thirty kilometers; they are successfully Polonizing Polesia where, because of the extreme backwardness and poverty of the inhabitants, hunger is a stronger motivating power than anything else. In 1905 the Ukrainians already lost 250,000 citizens in Lublin, which was then Russian, and which, after the first World War, became Polish. These people who were forcibly converted to the orthodox faith in 1870 went over to the Roman Catholic Church 35 years later; for their return to the Greek Catholic Church to which they had belonged before that was denied them. But becoming Roman Catholic means becoming Polonized. Once the Polish clergyman has set foot in a town, he is soon followed by the teacher, Polish societies are founded and the village is isolated from the Ukrainian neighborhood as from the area of infection.

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Are there. No time remains for God.
There pain and sorrow
Spent my mother's strength
And drove her, young, into the grave...
And helplessly among his brood -
For we were naked then and young -
My father worked himself to death
And died a slave...And we, orphaned now,
Abandoned our little hut
And moved away..." (54)

54. Quoted from Ukrainian Literature in the Service of its Nation, page 8.

538 Taras Shevchenko is the author of this poem. With him begins a new period of progress for the Ukrainian people after the end of Cossack glory and the period of greatest decline. One of the first to lay the foundation for this development which has not yet ceased, is Ivan Kotliarevskyj with whom begins the period of modern Ukrainian literature freed from Byzantinism and religion bonds. /101/ This was toward the end of the eighteenth century. His travesty of Virgil's Aeneid appeared in 1798 and was the first work to be printed in the Ukrainian popular tongue which from then on becomes the literary language of the Ukrainians. In 1818 the first grammar [177] follows. Around this time the ideas of the German Romanticists also come in and enduringly influence the Ukrainian intellectual world. People study their native language, tradition, folklore and history and in doing so, discover a past whose richness was scarcely imagined.

But the national impulses of the Ukrainian romanticists remain a "melancholy national feeling" until, around 1840, Taras Shevchenko stirs up the slumbering spirits. "The song of this poet had truly the effect of the resurrection trumpet of the archangel." Thus Panyko Kulish, the versatile brain of the Ukrainian in-

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Untold hosts of hirelings.
And tears? Blood? Verily enough
To sate all czars,
To drown them and their progeny
In widows' tears... The tears of maidens
Shed throughout full nights of longing,
The burning pain of mothers' tears,
Our hoary fathers' tears of blood
No stream could hold, - ah no,
A sea, a fiery sea!... Oh honor
To all dogs and tyrants
And to the Czar, our little father."(55)

55. "Taras Shevchenko" in Beiträge zur Ukrainekunde, Number 6, Berlin 1937.

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•177 558 The political concept of an "indivisible Russia" suggests the suppression of all Ukrainian movements toward independence, even if they be merely of a cultural nature. In accordance with this, and on the basis of the principle followed by the Russian Minister of Education Valuiev: "There is no separate Little Russian language, there never was and never can be", Moscow issued a general printed statement prohibiting all /103/ Ukrainian writings. Ukrainian culture which is 700 years older than the Muscovite culture based on it was simply declared invalid. Belletristic works by Ukrainian pens may appear only in Russian spelling. All writing was sharply censured, concerts, lectures and theatrical performances were forbidden. Later the theatrical prohibition was relaxed a bit, but for each Ukrainian play a Russian one of equal length had to be performed. Since members of the higher classes would be unrefined if they spoke Ukrainian, actors portraying persons from cultivated circles has to speak only Russian even to Ukrainian plays.

517 While the Ukrainian language was being banned from Kiyev, a new flowering of Ukrainian culture was beginning in the West Ukrainian metropolis of Lwów. In 1873 Ukrainian men of learning [741] founded the "Scientific Shevchenko Society", a free academy. The number of Ukrainian chairs at the University grew. Now that all scholarly activity in the Ukrainian language was curtailed in East Ukraine, professors and writers transferred their field of activity to Lwów where a number of different cultural organizations arose. Kiyev as the intellectual hub of all Ukraine was outstripped by Lwów, in fact, even by Czernovits /now Chernovtsy/. Each of these two cities published more than one hundred Ukrainian works in 1894, whereas Kiyev published only ten works of so-called "literature for the home".

•177 The revolution of 1905 only temporarily eased the pressure on Ukrainian cultural life. Freedom of the press and freedom of assembly remained only promises, and the "unity and indivisibility" of the Russian people was nothing but lifeless dogma until in 1917 its defenders were swept away by the seceding peoples.

Despite all difficulties, Lwów remained the 517 cultural center of West Ukraine even after the 668 first World War. Its focal point was the "Scien- [741] tific /104/ Shevchenko Society" which published its own periodicals and scholarly works. The spiritual trend of West Ukrainian intellectuals, in so far as they were not obliged to emigrate, was directed against traditional sentimentality. Young people were reared to think politically, to be ready for action and for dedication. In accordance with the political aims, the subject matter of present-day West Ukrainian literature shows a preference for the re-awakening of the Ukrainian people, for the heroic struggles of the last few decades, and for the heroic in the Ukrainian landscape.

87/ were established in Kiyev, Khar'kov, Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk.

No research is being carried on either in the institutes or the technical schools or the universities; they are all purely teaching institutions. There are special institutes, so-called research chairs, for research which can be carried on only within the framework of historical materialism. "The researcher is advised to limit his activity to collecting and systematizing material and to avoid drawing conclusions." (70) Since

70. Zalozieckij: Ibid., page 31.

there is only one publisher, the state, scientists often have difficulty publishing their works at all. Thus they often have no choice but to have individual studies lithographed and published in a collected edition of 50 to 100 copies. The students for their part have other worries: they live mostly in dormitories, usually very poorly. To a large extent they also lack the necessary educational equipment.

177 197 The Russianization of the Ukrainian language is part of the nationality fight between Russians and Ukrainians. Forgotten is the time when the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences in the year 1905 emphatically pointed out that the Russian and the Ukrainian language were separate languages. According to the opinion expressed at that time, the Russian literary language should not be imposed upon the Ukrainians, since they have at their disposal a "completely /125/ developed literary language of their own". In 1933 the State Publishing House of Moscow issued textbooks for Ukrainian schools in the new "unified" language. "Unification" means reintroduction of numerous Russian words with Ukrainian endings; it also means the use of Russian phrases which are completely foreign to the Ukrainian language. If a teacher should object to this corruption of the mother tongue of his pupils or not use it, there would be

177 sufficient grounds to deal with him in summary pro-
197 ceeding as a "separatist". Pravda of October 16, 1937 even accuses non-Russian students of "mutilating the great Russian language with all kinds of local linguistic rubbish".

The Russian State Publishing House in Moscow is playing a leading role in the language fight. Of 20 monographs which were published up to midsummer 1939 as a result of the great Shevchenko celebrations, no less than 16 were written in Russian and only 4 in the Ukrainian language.

Finally, a favorite method of Russianization is the granting of prizes, free journeys, and privileged places of work and study to young Ukrainians.

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665 Young people are supposed to spend their
883 leisure time in the Party organizations of the
867 "Yellow Bills", the "Pioneers" and with the
857 "Communistic Socialistic Youth" (Komsomol). /This is an erroneous reading of the Soviet abbreviation of Komministicheski Soiuz Molodiozh; which means Communist League of Young People. Editor/ There they are divided up into "groups of various interests" where they "can develop and satisfy their most urgent needs". There are those interested in the theater, music, sports, politics, the army and similar things. "From the outposts, from groups, from the clubs, from schools, the young people of talent come into the guardianship of the Pioneers every day, every evening, and there they develop, for they are under the supervision of experts..." (71) What "urgent needs" means is

71: H. Furman: Activity and Life of the Pioneers in the Ukraine.

explained by the Kiyev Visti of March 27, 1939, which says that the children conversation hours

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THE BRIDGE BETWEEN WEST AND EAST

101 The political boundary between Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia is not a clear-cut dividing line between two different worlds. There are a number of Ruthenian peasants in the eastern parts of Slovakia who form a gradual transition between the two neighbours. True, the Slovaks and the Ruthenians are two different Slav races. The Slovaks are closely related to the Moravians and Czechs in the West; the Ruthenians belong to the Russian family—mainly to its Ukrainian branch—although the thousand years of isolation from their kinsmen have had a specific effect on the character of the Ruthenian population on the southern slopes of the Carpathians. But there is a gradual link between the Slovaks and the Ruthenians, and Carpathian Ruthenia may aptly be described as a bridge between the Western and Eastern Slavs.

131 175 Geographically, too, the two neighbouring countries are similar. A chain of wooded mountains separates them from the kindred Slav populations to the North and North-East; while to the South both countries have stretches of fertile plain which run down unobstructed into the vast Danubian basin. That is the reason why both countries fell victim to Hungarian expansion early in their history and remained under Hungarian rule as second-rate provinces for a thousand years. Until the end of 1918, neither Slovakia nor Carpathian Ruthenia were on the map.

177 212 Both these countries suffered from the long alien domination which hampered their development. Slovakia was the more fortunate of the two because, in spite of her political separation from the independent lands of the Czech Crown, cultural and religious contacts with them had been maintained for centuries. But the Ruthenians received less support of this kind from their kindred beyond the Carpathians. As a result, Ruthenia was still more at the mercy of her Hungarian overlords and remained in a state of greater backwardness than her neighbour in the West. This is well illustrated by the degree of illiteracy in Ruthenia under the Hungarian regime which was, indeed, appalling; according to the last Hungarian census about three quarters of the Ruthenian population could not read or write.

177 181 Only people of considerable racial individuality could have resisted systematic denationalisation as the Ruthenians did. They may be a simple people; but their mode of living, their outlook and their character have an unmistakable stamp of their own.

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

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— CZECHOSLOVAKIA —

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they
177 were born. This applies even to those who, through force of circum-
181 stances, had to leave their native village to earn their living elsewhere.
167 Some have found occupation in the fertile South; but when they have saved some money they want to return home and are prepared to pay a higher price for a few poor fields, although in the valleys of the South they could buy much better land for the same amount. Hundreds of thousands have emigrated to America, where about as many Ruthenians can be found as have remained in the homeland under the Carpathians. Yet many long to come back home to find their last resting place in the native soil.

137 The peculiar beauty of this forgotten country has a strong grip
313 on her simple sons. The Ruthenian Carpathians are not so high as the Slovak peaks, but the vast stretches of dense forest, which cover almost half of Ruthenia, give the country a more primeval appearance. Some of the woods and slopes are delightful idylls, where the fresh and fragrant air is full of hum and rustle and warble. But in many parts, unchartered and untouched by human hand, the forest is sombre. Trees felled by storm or gale lie dead where they have fallen, and there is a smell of rotting wood in this lonely wilderness. Wild boar, wolf, lynx and bear have their hunting ground here, while above the tops of the mighty pines, firs, oaks and maples, circle the eagle and the hawk. Other parts of the forest are enlivened by the rhythmical sound of the axe cutting down trees to be floated down the rushing mountain streams. A large proportion of the hardy Ruthenians earn their living in this way. But above this expanse of deep forest are the sunlit pastures and upland meadows sprinkled with gentian, buttercups, pansies, chrysanthemums and geraniums. Sheep and cattle graze here during the summer months; Ruthenia is also a country of shepherds, who blow their huge horns at night to gather the scattered herds.

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

Wooden dam in Ruthenia

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hun
241 garians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent
438 vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here
341 imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

orientation. Khvylovy considered that Ukrainian literature should go 665
its own way and look towards Western Europe, no matter whether 186
bourgeois or proletarian. Shumsky advocated that the Ukrainian Communist Party should be independent of the Russian Communist Party.

This crisis within the Ukrainian Communist Party* prompted the 661
Moscow Bolshevik leadership in 1926 to make one of Stalin's principal 665
assistants, L. M. Kaganovich, Ukrainian party secretary for a short 186
period during which the first great purge against the nationalist deviation was carried out. Khvylovy was ejected from the party and Shumsky expelled from the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When Khvylovy repented he was given another chance and re-admitted as a party member, but in 1933 he committed suicide after a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism had been launched.

Admittedly the methods of repression in the Ukraine were comparatively liberal until 1929-30. From that time onwards the oppressive policy of the Soviet State overshadowed in the minds of the Ukrainian nationalists in the U.S.S.R. the contribution which Polish, Rumanian and Czech communists were ready to make for the establishment of a Greater Soviet Ukraine. Many Ukrainian nationalists became convinced that national unity was less vital to the Ukrainians than cultural and [177] political freedom, in particular that free intercourse with the West which Moscow was unwilling to grant.

The Soviet State inflicted many heavy blows on the representatives 668
of the western orientation among the Ukrainians, but never vanquished 661
it entirely. In this struggle Ukrainian nationalism commanded an almost inexhaustible reservoir of resistance forces. Bloodshed and terror seemed incapable of stamping out the longing for spiritual freedom. Almost every year brought the discovery of a new conspiracy, a new series of trials, a new trend in national Ukrainian deviations. In 1929 the G.P.U. discovered the 'Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy', the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in 1931 the 'Ukrainian National Centre', in 1933 the 'Ukrainian Military Organization' (UVO).

The offensive by the central Government against the Ukraine's trends [814] towards a more independent existence was conducted not only in the political sphere but also in the field of culture, where the régime had originally granted some scope to Ukrainian nationalism. One of the main bulwarks of Ukrainian nationalism was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The history section of the Academy had turned out to be so anti-Bolshevik that it had to be disbanded altogether while its head, Professor Hrushevsky, was exiled to Russia proper. This banishment of the 'great old man' of Ukrainian nationalism from his place of work showed better than anything else that the policy of reconciliation which Moscow had originally pursued in its relation towards Ukrainian nationalism had been but a short-term manœuvre.

*[Cf. category 665, p. 130 --Analyst]

177.10 ---------177.88

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The Different Areas of Ukraine, their Nationality and Political Position

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Let us review briefly the political development in the various areas of Ukraine between the two World Wars. Ukrainians within the Soviet Union were mainly distributed, as we have seen, between the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR) where they had no national rights, and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. By the constitution of July 6th, 1923, Soviet Ukraine is a member of the USSR which adjoined "voluntarily as a member of the union with the formal right to leave it when it likes".

The constitution of Soviet Ukraine was adjusted to that of the USSR. The Congress of Soviets, the Central Executive and its president are the supreme organs of authority. The Council of Commissaries functioned as the Executive Body and it was subject to the authority of the Congress of Soviets and the Central Executive Committee. Three categories of members were comprised in the Council of Ukrainian People's Commissaries: 1. commissaries for agriculture, justice, internal affairs, education, health and social welfare, who acted on their own authority in the provinces under their jurisdiction; 2. "unified" commissaries who had to function according to instructions from the central government, and 3. delegates from the general commissariat of the Union, appointed by different central agencies and dependent on them.

The independence of the various federal republics mainly existed merely on paper, as representatives of the RSFSR were in the majority in the supreme agencies of the USSR. The decisive feature of the organisation was that the composition of all agencies throughout the USSR was regulated by the communist party, which filled all posts with its own members. It, too, was completely centralised and took its orders from the head office of the party in Moscow which it then implemented in the various republics. The expansion of the communist party's function and the limitation of the rights of the individual republics formed the foundation of the growth of the USSR from the very beginning. Numerous amendments to the constitution which

642 reached a climax in Stalin's Constitution of December 5th, 1936
177 helped to liquidate the idea of federation; the principles on which
.64 the Soviet Union had been constituted in 1923 were denied, the rights of the federal republics being reduced to a minimum: only 4 Republican People's Commissariats remained (commissariat for education — minus universities; social welfare; local industry; communal management) and all other state functions now fell to the "unified" commissariats of the Central Government (now called unionist - republican). As the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities have, since 1936, been elected by direct and universal franchise, Russian influence gained the upper hand in these corporations, too. It is true that Stalin still recognised the right to leave the Union in principle, but at the same time he publicly stated: "It is obvious that we have no republics who would seriously entertain the idea of leaving the USSR"

While the Central Government was supreme, its relation to the Ukrainian state and nationality underwent numerous and profound changes. At first, communist leaders were inclined to ignore the Ukrainian question. But then they realised that the national movement in Ukraine was an instrument of power and that a respect for minorities was a condition of the growth of bolshevism in countries outside Russia, where the question of nationality had not been solved, the communist party began to display a readiness to make concessions. The educational system of Ukraine was organised, the activity of scientific institutes and the All-Ukrainian Academy in Kyiv supported and Russian officials instructed to learn the Ukrainian language in a short time. Considerable concessions were made to Ukrainian economy and if at the time of the New Economic Plan (NEP 1922-23) centralism was not extinct by any means, it seemed as if a tolerable modus vivendi was emerging.

But in 1929-30 when this system of political economy was liquidated in favor of the first Five Year Plan, there was a complete change. When the collectivist system was introduced it was no longer necessary to pay the respect to Ukrainian peasantry that had hitherto resulted in compromises. From now on,

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

attention was concentrated on building up a system of social economy within Russia, so that it was no longer necessary to bear in mind national movements in western countries, for the world revolution had been postponed for the meantime. The change in Ukraine took place gradually and in contradiction to public expressions of loyalty. The economic needs of Ukraine were ignored already in the first Five Year Plan, the educational system was restricted and the Academy of Learning came completely under communist influence. Ukrainian officials were replaced by Russians and the standing of Ukraine suffered. Russian, as the language of the Revolution, of Lenin and Stalin, was to be the language of one people which had hitherto used several languages, a fact that had concealed the inner unity that had actually existed.

This development caused a fresh outbreak of national resistance on the part of the Ukrainians. The movement of the rebels which had at first led to guerilla warfare, ceased about 1921-1922: factors responsible for the cessation of hostilities were the appointment of Ukrainian officials to the administration and the fact that the United Ukrainian Church was tolerated. When this also was forbidden and when the collectivist movement in the country met with the spontaneous resistance of the peasantry, a campaign of terrorism was re-started. "Nationalist" differences appeared even within party organisations: bolshevist dignitaries themselves could not keep clear of the Ukrainian movement. Thus in 1925 Shumskyj, commissary for education in the USSR, a very influential communist, was dismissed; in 1933 Skrypnyk, who held the same office and who was a personal friend of Lenin's, comitted suicide because he was unwilling to confess his "nationalist sins" to the party; his example was followed in 1937 by Lubtshenko, long president of the Council of People's Commissaries, in order not to fall into the hands of the GPU. The number of lesser communist dignitaries who were killed as nationalists or separatists is very great, and still greater is the host of those who did not belong to the communist ranks and who suffered the same fate in the struggle for national rights and political independence.

of Rome as the supreme head of their church, the pioneers of 795
the Union and of the cultural independence of Ukraine wished to throw off the cultural yoke of Poland, thinking that they would acquire equal rights with the Poles once the churches were united. The course of events has showed how much they were mistaken; for the Poles have merely exploited this rapprochement in ecclesiastical affairs as an instrument by means of which, with the help of the Jesuits, they aimed at ruling over the entire East and at completely absorbing the Ukrainian nation.

Western influence can also be detected in the guild-like 441
organisations of the Ukrainian middle-classes in towns like Lviv 871
Kyiv, Lutsk etc., organisations which, in addition to promoting the interests of a particular class or trade, also concerned themselves with church affairs. One of their main aims was the foundation of schools which taught Latin as well as Church Slavonic and Greek.

The most important foundation of those so-called Bro- 874
therhood schools was undoubtedly the Kyiv Academy 795
which owed its supremacy as an intellectual center, not 177
only of Ukraine, but of the whole of Eastern Europe .79
to the activities of such an eminent personality as Metropolitan Peter Mohyla. Mohyla, the son of the governor of Moldavia and educated in Jesuit schools, remained a life-long advocate of western culture and the Catholic Church, the organisation of which served him as a model when he was planning the reform of the Orthodox Church. We are scarcely able to-day to imagine what an enormous revolution and what great boldness of spirit was implied in the idea of introducing Catholic principles and methods into the organisation of the Orthodox Church which had been hostile to Rome for centuries. And yet this unique plan succeeded and could succeed only in Ukraine, for it was here alone that history had prepared the way for the adoption of these plans for realising western ideas. The spirit which inspired Mohyla's activities was wholly directed towards the West, as was clearly expressed in his innovations: in dogma, however, he remained a loyal disciple of the "faith

874 of his fathers", of the Orthodoxy. He is thus a concrete symbol
795 of the synthesis of two worlds, of the harmonious and complete
union of two cultures, of the meeting of East and West and of
177 the fertilising of Ukrainian Orthodoxy by the Latin spirit of
.79 the Roman Catholic Church.

795 The seed scattered by Mohyla bore rich fruit. Hundreds of
scholars, writers, politicians and organisers graduated in the
874 course of the 17th and 18th centuries from this unique "alma mater", the Kyiv Academy, equipped with the modern weapons of western learning, to fight first of all for the independence and the honor of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. After completing their studies in Kyiv the Ukrainian patriots of that time go to Germany to appropriate the arguments used by the Reformation against Catholicism, they penetrate to Rome and do not shrink from joining the Roman Church for a season only in order to become better acquainted with their opponent's plans in the very center of his camp. On their return home they develop an energetic campaign in teaching and writing to prepare and train wide circles of less well educated priests for the fight. In order to supply their audiences with intellectual munition, they publish a series of pamphlets directed against the enemy and all manner of apologies in defence of their own cause, utilising the knowledge they had gathered in the West. This leads to an enormous outburst of polemic writing, to an intellectual activity in the country which strikes even foreigners.

177 But the efforts of these champions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy
814 who had been trained in the West, did not stop there; they performed a still more important function in making European influence supreme in the state of Moscow, or the Russia of Peter, as it was then called. Ukraine contributed no mean share to the work of Peter the Great. The foundation and building of the modern Russian Empire was the almost unaided work of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, for the intellectual conditions for the solving of this task were almost completely lacking in Moscow itself. In order to carry out his reforms which soon degenerated into an absolute mania for reform, Peter utilised

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The predominance of the non-Ukrainian elements in the organs of administration and in educational institutions is of course explained by the fact that the Ukrainian people remained overwhelmingly peasant, and there had been in the nineteenth century, and even earlier, a large and heterogeneous alien element in the towns. Nevertheless Kaganovich, in his speech to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in 1927, was at pains to demonstrate the success of 'ukrainization'. 'Among us', he said with that graceful Jewish facility for identifying himself with the people among whom he had come, 'our Ukrainian culture has developed on a grand scale. Ukrainian culture has made such progress in all branches in these last years that even the most eager Ukrainian nationalists never dreamed of such rapid development. In primary schools Ukrainians are taught by Ukrainians in the Ukrainian language. The high schools are gradually becoming completely "ukrainized"; Ukrainian books and press are at present developing to an extent unknown in all the history of the Ukraine. In our Council of People's Commissars, which is the supreme administrative organ of our government, 13 out of 20 members are Ukrainian. In our Party's Executive Committee, 66 per cent are Ukrainians, 25 per cent are Russians, 14 per cent are Jews.'

Kaganovich's emphasis on the predominance of Ukrainians on the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party is, of course, meaningless, since in the Soviet hierarchy all power is vested in the Secretaries of the various regional and local Committees of the Communist Party, who are themselves responsible not to the members of the Committees but to the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. Stalin filled this latter position, and Kaganovich himself was his nominee sent from Moscow with complete power over the regional and local Committees in the Ukraine. Kaganovich's successor, 'the dictator' Postyshev, who only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was another importation from Moscow—as is Khrushchov, who is at present (1939) governing the Ukraine.

While Kaganovich was praising 'the achievements of "ukrainization"' he was already considering means of putting some limit on these achievements. In this same year when he made his genial speech before the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party under his influence issued a decree making Russian the second official language in the Ukraine. The First Five Year Plan was then beginning, and one of the most important features of this Plan was the wide development of industry in the Ukraine. The coal and metallurgical industries

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

665 were to be modernized, and the construction of the great power
●178 station of Dnieprostroy was in view. Thousands of engineers,
191 technicians and specialized workers were being sent into the Ukraine and these people not only had no knowledge of the Ukrainian dialect but they found that dialect most inappropriate for correspondence between different Government departments on complicated technical questions. The intensified industrialization of the Ukraine was obviously destined to strengthen greatly all connections with the north and linguistic differences gave promise of frequent and annoying difficulties. Very soon the Ukrainian language came only to be used in the sphere of 'cultural relations'.

Meanwhile Kaganovich, in surveying the various aspects of 'ukrainization', began gradually to investigate the part played in different branches of the administration by 'Ukrainian nationalists' or those suspected of being such.

§ 7. 'THE REVOLUTION AGAINST THE PEASANTS': REPRESSION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

665 In 1929 the Communist Revolution was approaching its second
423 and decisive stage: Marxist principles which had conquered the life of the cities were to be imposed on the countryside. But the process of 'collectivizing' agriculture was to prove even more difficult in the Ukraine than it was in the provinces of Great Russia. Individual property in land had always been traditional in the Ukraine, and the background of the social history of the country had been the unending struggle of the peasantry to maintain their right to own the land they worked—against Polish landlords and Cossack and, later, Great Russian landlords. The strength of the Ukrainian peasantry had always been their stubborn determination that each should own his plot of land, and their weakness had been a love of individual freedom degenerating often enough into libertarian anarchy.

423 The outlook of the Ukrainian peasant differed widely from that
474 of the Great Russian. The *obshchina*—the old Russian form of possessing (but not of working) land collectively—was unknown in the regions of Chernigov and Poltava and in all right-bank Ukraine. The creation of *kolkhozy* (collective farms) was from the beginning opposed, generally passively and sometimes actively, by the peasantry. And Kaganovich hastened, so soon as peasant opposition developed, to deprive the Ukrainians of the weapon which the national idea might provide. (In Caucasia and Turkestan, during the same period, opposition to collectivization was combined with a renascence and strengthening of local nationalist movements directed

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

162 first place, but in its population was included the million inhabitants
311 of the second capital of the Empire, while in Podolia there was no single town which numbered more than fifty thousand inhabitants. Density of population in Podolia reached the figure of 100 to the square kilometre, but the province was saved from the problems of over-population by the development of the large estates on capitalist lines. This process began about 1830 and developed on a large scale [178] after 1870. The beet-sugar industry with its subsidiary alcoholic distilleries, flour mills and horticulture provided a variety of livelihood for a population which by 1897 had attained to nearly four and a half millions. Between the years 1896 and 1933 more than a million and a half peasants migrated from other districts of the Ukraine to Siberia and the steppes beyond the Volga, but in Podolia emigration was scarcely perceptible.

[134] *The southern part of the Government of Kiev* along the right bank of the Dniepr enjoyed conditions somewhat similar to those in Podolia, while the northern districts resembled rather Volhynia. In the south a rich black earth supported a number of large estates where the beet-sugar industry, distilleries and mills flourished. In these southern districts were many well-to-do peasant farms covering up to 20 and 30 hectares apiece. Wheat was grown in sufficient quantities to satisfy local needs and to supply the six hundred thousand inhabitants of the city of Kiev. At the beginning of the century the population of the Government of Kiev amounted to over four and a half millions. At that time the three Governments of right-bank Ukraine (Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia) contained fourteen million inhabitants with an average density of 70–80 people per square kilometre. Such numbers were quite 'European' in their proportions and should have tended to discourage those Western dreamers who were even then casting envious eyes on the 'vacant lands' of the Ukraine.

It was almost equally difficult to discover 'vacant lands' in the [134] Governments of *left-bank Ukraine*. In Poltava, Chernigov and Kharkov the density of population amounted to 60–70 people per square kilometre. The uninterrupted belt of black earth in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov had been under the plough only since the seventeenth century—and many parts of it not before the eighteenth century. This was the land of which Alexey Tolstoy wrote: 'Know ye the land where all breathes plenty and content, where rivers flow as silver clear.' There were scarcely any towns of importance in this rural elysium. The characteristics of the Government of Kharkov, on the other hand, were quite distinct from those of the two adjoining left-bank provinces: in the north-west,

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Famine, the Soviets and the World

It is impossible to overestimate the significance of this 731
artificially induced famine in what had been one of the richest portions of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Taken in connection with the collectivization of agriculture which had served already to uproot and exile or liquidate many of the most industrious and successful parts of the population of the Ukraine, it was distinctly noticed that the history of the Soviet Union had entered a new phase which might be glossed over for public consumption but still represented a formidable menace to the general development of the entire area.

During the years of the New Economic Policy and the period of [178]
Ukrainization, much had been accomplished, not only to repair the damages of the Civil War and the period of Militant Communism, but great strides had been made in the development of Ukrainian culture. The collectivization of 1929-31 had, in a sense, menaced some of the economic gains but while the menace of Moscow was being felt on the material field, it had not hitherto been regarded in the same way culturally. It is true that there had been going on a great debate between Khvylovy and his rivals but it is doubtful if either Khvylovy or Skrypnyk had fully appreciated the forces that were now unleashed.

There had never been any question that every few decades Ukraine had undergone severe droughts which had produced local famines, especially in the Ukrainian steppes. The disorders of Militant Communism had coincided with one of these periods and had produced the situation in 1921-2. Still, at that time, for his own purposes, Lenin had allowed relief to be sent from abroad to the victims. The agricultural situation in 1931-3 was not so serious and

626 538 artistic enjoyment and it rendered it possible for the central government to abolish that sense of republican patriotism which had been so marked during the preceding period in all the non-Russian republics.

626 538 178 In place of the ideas of the old Ukrainian life which was being brought to an end by the compulsory collectivization and the establishment of the collective farms, in place of the old visions of the unity of the Ukrainian people and those ideals of a new national life that had dominated Ukrainian literature from the time of Shevchenko, in place of the efforts to establish in Ukrainian literature all those branches of art and culture which were stirring in Western Europe, there was now given to the writers, young and old, the command to celebrate and to glorify the actual process of socialist construction in Ukraine, as elsewhere. By 1934 Kulyk, as the organizer of the Ukrainian section, could write of the definite end of the old bourgeois nationalist sentiment as preached by Yefremiv and of the efforts of Khvylovy to reorient the psychology of Ukrainian literature on that of Europe. In his article on the modern Ukrainian literature in a volume on the *Literature of the Peoples of the USSR* published in 1934, he could pass over in silence, for obvious reasons, all of the great names which had appeared during the preceding ten years and shower his praise upon the young proletarian writers who were willing to follow blindly and, to the best of their ability, the new course.

There were, of course, some of the older and even of the more prominent men who were willing to compromise with the new regime. Among them the outstanding figures were Tychyna and Rylsky. Both of them, after consideration and treatment by the authorities, tried to bend their works to the new ideas but there were many who were unwilling or unable to be untrue to their artistic faith and for them there was not even the choice of silence or writing. They were compelled to conform or vanish and it was not long after the organization of the All-Union Society of Soviet Writers when this was made abundantly clear.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

of new school texts in Ukrainian, as well as popular editions of Ukrainian works.[16] Still more important, it began the publication of a newspaper which stood head and shoulders above any other Ukrainian publication in the German-dominated areas. *Krakivs'ki Visti* (Cracow News, as it was named after the Germans forbade the use of "Ukrainian" in the title) was one of the few papers which did not become a party organ but consistently served as a forum for a broad variety of Ukrainian viewpoints. Moreover, it was the only paper of this nature which possessed considerable material resources and attracted numerous contributions from writers of real talent. It was subjected to a censorship stricter than that inflicted on Ukrainian papers in Greater Germany (although much less severe than that of the papers later established under German rule farther east); nevertheless, it was able to reflect a considerable range of Ukrainian life and thought. As a result it is an invaluable witness of the events of the war years.

From the standpoint of Ukrainian national interests, the favorable policy of the Germans toward the group's cultural development was particularly valuable in enabling it to regain some of the ground lost under the Polish repression. It would take a lengthy volume to detail the ways in which the Ukrainians were able to improve their situation in this respect during the early war years. A single statistic will suffice, however, to indicate the general nature of the gains made. In the school year 1942–43 there were 4,173 Ukrainian-language schools in the Generalgouvernement,[17] while on the corresponding territory before 1939 there were only 2,510—of which only 457 were exclusively Ukrainian.[18] The most marked advance took place in the Chelm area, where, in the autumn of 1939, a large influx of intellectuals fleeing Soviet rule in eastern Galicia brought a new vigor to the cultural life of the Ukrainian community.[19]

[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 2, 1942, p. 3.

[17] This refers of course to the enlarged Generalgouvernement, which included eastern Galicia. It is, however, indicative of an extension of the Ukrainian educational system which was if anything even more pronounced in the areas west of the San and the Bug.

[18] P. Isaiïv, article on Ukrainian schools in the Generalgouvernement during the Second World War, *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstva*, p. 952; Buell, p. 279. The remainder were "mixed" schools which Buell says were given over to Polish teachers.

[19] Iurii (George) Tarkovych, "Zabuti Zemli" (Forgotten Lands), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

575 first half of 1939 threatened the educational
871 work of the "Ridna Shkola" just as it did that of the women's society, the society of agriculturists, the "Provista" and the cooperatives.

The efforts of the Ukrainians to raise the
871 level of popular education are admirable. When
873 at the beginning of their rule in Galicia the Poles deprived the Ukrainians of their few professorial chairs, the Ukrainians forthwith founded a "Secret University" which gave its lectures during 1922 and 1923 in private houses. At the end of each lecture the professors who were taken partly from universities of East Ukraine, partly from Austrian universities, announced to their listeners the time and place of their next lecture. In the end this "university" collapsed and the lecturers were arrested.

873 Two years after the enactment of the Ukrain-
ian law of autonomy of 1922 a Ukrainian univer-
●178 sity was supposed to have been founded - but in the summer of 1939 there was not yet a single Ukrainian professorial chair. In Lwów a Polish professor lectured on Ukrainian literature in the
241 Polish language, in /Facing page 96/ /Map VII: Agricultural Zones Under Cultivation. In the wooded zones of the north rye, oats and potatoes predominate. In the northern zones of steppes, wheat and sugar beets are added (winter wheat in the west and summer wheat in the east). A third zone on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and in the foreland of the Caucasus produces wheat, corn and barley. Adjoining this toward the west there is a corn-growing zone (with wheat in the north and barley in the south), whereas toward the northeast there is a zone extending to the middle part of the Volga with summer wheat and rye. Around the Caspian Sea is the pasture area of desert steppes, in the mountains, woodland and grasslands with some barley cultivation. The cultivation of cotton which has been recently undertaken along the coasts of the Black Sea and

241 the Sea of Azov also deserves to be mentioned./ /Key inside map: I Rye, potato and oats region. II Wheat and rye region; sub-zone of rye, wheat, potatoes; sub-zone of rye, winter wheat, sugar beets; sub-zone of summer wheat, rye, sugar beets. III Region of wheat, barley, corn; sub-zone of winter wheat, corn, barley, sunflowers. IV Summer wheat and rye zone; cotton. V Region of corn; sub-region of corn, wheat; sub-region of corn, barley. VI Oats and potato region. VII Forest region. VIII Grassland (pastures, alpine pastures, natural meadows). ⊥⊥⊥⊥ Area with abundant millet cultivation. ⊞ Area with abundant buckwheat cultivation. ....Northern boundary of region growing abundant amounts of corn. Intensive horticulture./ /97/ Cracow a Ukrainian
873 professor lectured in Polish on Ukrainian liter-
●178 ature, and in Warsaw Polish and Ukrainian professors lectured in Polish on Ukrainian literature and "History of the East" which meant history of the Ukraine under Polish rule. Moreover, study in Lwów was made very difficult for Ukrainian students. Warsaw wanted the Ukrainians to study in Cracow and in the capital of the country, and to have them taken out of the Ukrainian environment and drawn into the Polish one. In this connection a secret numerus clausus proved very useful: the Ukrainians, in contrast to their smarter Polish colleagues often failed.

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101 How was the situation in Bukovina? This little country of 5000 square kilometers on the northeast slope of the Carpathians in between the three countries, Poland, Soviet Union and Rumania, was, until its transfer to the Habsburg Kingdom in 1776, purely a colonial country of the Sublime Porte. Under Austria it experienced a rapid rise, and its chief city Czernovits (now Chernovtsy) was given the epithet "Vienna of the

533 lieves that song is a part of work, and he has special symbolic songs for every type of work.

527 769 The Monday a week after Easter is dedicated to the ancestors. Well supplied with food and drink, the whole families set out for the cemeteries, just as in the days of Vladimir, in order to observe the death cult. They sit down on the graves of their ancestors, eat the food they have brought, share it with the dead by placing the latters' portion beside the Christian cross made of wood, and they do not forget to empty a small glass of horilka over it. The dead are honored if the visitors leave their graves in an elevated mood.

776 Summer passes by with the customary field work. It is a glorious time, the pumpkins and the melons ripen, the hollyhocks bloom again and people sleep out in the open. The harvest begins not without symbolic rituals; for the spirits must be thanked and one must pray for good weather. When the grain has been stored in the barns, the priest consecrates the harvest wreath, the grains of which are mixed among the seed the following year.

793 In the midst of this strange pagan-Christian world, the priest lives and works as the representative of Christ on earth. He knows the customs of the people from the time he is a child, and he joins in on many occasions. It is not sacrilegious when during a difficult birth he places the church key on the belly of the woman in labor, when he administers the Holy Sacrament to sick cattle or seals graves so that the dead may not /140/ return. Both shepherd and flock most earnestly believe that such deeds are efficacious and pleasing in the sight of God.

771 The First World War, the civil wars and finally the Bolshevist cudgel have destroyed this
●178 world; faith and superstition, holy mass and the spirit cult were no longer tolerated.

/141/ Hunger Overcomes Resistance

•178 Bolshevism tore the Ukrainians away from their past and hurled them, as it were, into a dark, unknown future. They were thrown from one extreme into the other, not only with regard to religion, but also in a social, economic and political respect. They were thrown from unlimited individualism into a society where all are supposed to be equal.

When Bolshevik slogans spread through the Ukrainian villages there was a great deal that was
423 ripe for oblivion. Czarist Moscow, the great princes of the Church and the wealthy gentry had exerted themselves precisely to keep the populace in a state of ignorance and to prevent any kind of enlightenment. The masses were thus more tractable and the existing order was not endangered. Nevertheless, with thrift and industry the peasants had succeeded in considerably enlarging their land after serfdom was abolished in 1861, to the
[162] detriment of the landed proprietors. In 1861 the peasants owned 45.7% of 48.1 million hectares, in 1916 they owned 65%. (84) The rest was the prop-

84. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 360.

erty of the lords of the manor, the church and the state.

423 With the rapid increase in population there
241 was a great land shortage, especially in North Ukraine, even after the distribution of land in 1861. Conditions had not improved much since 1830, when the representative of the nobility of the Poltava district reported in the Senate that in his district "there was a perceptible shortage of land and dire poverty". (85) In Podolia,

85. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of South Ukraine, page 32.

728 178 The progress in construction and rehabilitation which has taken place since the incorporation of this region into the Ukraine was revealed at a meeting of the Soviet of Nationalities on October 16, 1946, when the representative of the Transcarpathian Ukraine summed up the achievements in 1946. Nearly 300 enterprises had been restored, and nine machine and tractor stations had been set up to assist the peasants in working [212 the fields. Much had been done in 1946 to abolish illiteracy; there 871] were opened over 100 schools, including 75 elementary, seven technical, 27 secondary, four music schools for children, and one school for surgeons' assistants and midwives.

433 At the end of December it was stated that 35 new factories had started functioning in the Transcarpathian Region in 1946[1]. Moreover, as compared with 1945 when there was not a single coal mine, 8 mines were working in 1946. There had also been definite progress in building up consumer goods industries. A clothing and a shoe factory had begun working in Vinogradov, and a knitted goods mill in Mukachevo. Some 200 light industries have been opened in various parts of the region.

Population of the Ukraine

162 The Ukraine is inhabited largely by Ukrainians, and also by Russians, Jews, and Poles. Most of the population is literate, and in 1939 there were many technical and vocational schools, as well as scientific research institutes and about 40,000 libraries.

At the census of January 17, 1939 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had 30,960,221 inhabitants; an increase of 6.6 per cent. as compared with December 1926. The greatest increase had occurred in the towns, largely as a result of the migration of country people to new industries. Thus from 1926 to 1939 the urban population more than doubled (5,373,553 to 11,195,620) while the number of rural inhabitants decreased by 16½ per cent. (23,669,381 to 19,764,601).

000 The same was true for the entire Soviet Union. From 147,027,915 in December 1926, its total population increased by 15.9 per cent. to 170,467,186 in January 1939, the urban population having grown from 26.3 million to 55.9 millions; and the rural population having fallen from 120.7 million to 114.5 million.

162 [361] The principal cities of the Ukraine with their population on January 17, 1939, are Kiev, the capital (population, 846,293), Kharkov, capital of the Ukraine before 1934 (833,432), the part of Odessa on the Black Sea (604,223), Dniepropetrovsk on the Dnieper River (500,662), Stalino, industrial centre of the Donets Basin (462,395), and Nikolayev (167,108).

In January 1939 the urban population of the Ukraine was 36.2 per

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, December 29, 1946.

311 Despite a certain reduction in the area under cultivation in the
241 Ukraine, (25,124,900 hectares in 1937 as compared with 26,438,400 in
[407] 1932), production rose considerably, reflecting great progress in the mechanization of agriculture. The number of tractors increased from
[475] 51,300 in 1932 to 83,900 in 1937. The number of harvesting combines increased in the same period from 4,900 to 26,700. The number of Machine and Tractor Stations grew from 657 to 958. The mechanization of agriculture in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is shown in the following table, which compares the output of energy from draught animals with the energy derived from machines, both in the Ukrainian Republic and in the entire Soviet Union. (It should be noted that, according to Soviet practice, the output of energy is measured in kilowatt hours.)

TABLE V

Output of Energy in Agriculture, 1938
(million kwh)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Total Soviet Union
[407] Energy from machines	4,211	19,304.2
379] Energy from draught cattle	1,662	14,667.5
Total output of energy in agriculture	5,873	33,971.7

Source : Planned Economy XII, Moscow, 1940.

[178] As the table shows, the percentage of mechanization in the Ukraine was greater than in the entire Soviet Union.

Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

311 According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there
425 were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000
723 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The principal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Izmail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

474 Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution
241 of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas
178 from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

475 Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the
407 Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Izmail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

475 In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in
407 June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in
652 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits
317 of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Slatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it
263 is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
511 during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation—all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

101 Western Ukraine, which were later organised in the united state
175 of Galicia and Volynia, are more pronouncedly national than the Eastern tribes round Kyiv. The Ukrainian tribes were united by the end of the 10th century and the beginning of the 11th, this process being promoted by a common religion and a common culture composed of Byzantine and Slav influences; at the same time the feelings of unity among Ukrainian peoples was furthered by political pressure from the Poles and the princes of Suzdal and Vladimir at the head of a growing Russian people (since the 12th century). Other factors that helped this union were the transfer of the political center of Ukraine to the west and the political and cultural tendencies of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian state..

It is only in the north and on the western frontiers of Ukraine that many traditional features and a great variety of signs betraying differences between tribes have been preserved. Here, and in parts of the Carpathian area there are rich sources of ancient Ukrainian folklore.

101 These Ukrainians of the mountains and the foothills fall into
181 the three almost equal groups of Lemky, Bojky, and Hutsuly. The Lemky, also called the Lemaky, south of the Carpathians, inhabit the upper course of almost all the Carpathian tributaries of the Vistula and the Visloka as far as the Syan and, along with the foothill group of the Samishantsi (in the Jaslo area), are often called Ruthenians. They cling to their traditions and are economically in a sound position. They were the natural mediators between the Ukrainians and the Western and Southern Slavs, for instance, in the art of folkpoetry. Syanik and Krynytsja are the chief centers in this area.

The Boyky or Verkhovyntsi (dwellers in mountain pastures) live east of the Syan, in the districts of Sambir, Turka, Drohobych, Dolyna, and Kalush and also south of the Carpathian range. The inhabitants of the southern areas of the Bojky in the Carpathian Ukraine were also called Dolyniany (valley dwellers) and are rightly deemed to be the pioneers of the ancient Ukrainian colonisation in the South Carpathians, being in many respects different from their brethren in the north. The Tukholtsi, round Skole and Smorze, are another group that are

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

racially distinct from the rest of the Bojky. In contrast to the latter, who devote themselves above all to cattle-rearing, they are particularly gifted for trade and were known throughout Galicia as smart traders in fruit and wine. 101 181

The Hutsuly, known also abroad as gifted craftsmen (weaving, wood and metal work, ceramics and embroidery) live in the Eastern Carpathians (on the upper reaches of the Prut and its tributaries) in Bucovina round the little town of Vyshnycya, and in the neighborhood of Marmaroshsiget and Hust. In the north-east they join the kindred tribe, the Pokutyany (in the districts of Tovmatsh, Horodenka, Obertyn, Snjatyn and Kuty) who are distinguished by rich folk-poetry and a highly developed sense for art.

North of these mountain tribes we meet the Western Ukrainians proper, who call themselves Ruthenians. They fall into several groups, mostly distinguished by costume and other externals e. g. the Pidhiriany (dwellers in foothills) in the Carpathian foothills as far as the Dnister, the Dolyniany in the Syan valley, in the districts of Peremyshl and Jaroslav and the Batjuki in the districts of Zhovkva, Rava Ruska and Javoriv.

In the East follow the Opolany (as far as the Strypa and the Seret) in the districts of Lviv, Bibrka, Rohatyn, Peremyshlany, Berezhany and Pidhajci; then still further east, the Podoliany and to the north the Volyniany who join the racially more uniform area of Eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainians of the north and north-west have also preserved traces of the customs of the original tribes — for instance the Zabuzhany on the Buh, the Podlashany round Siedlce. The Polesyany ("Polishuky") between Prypyat and Dnipro, show traces of ancient culture; their language is still mediaeval and there are pre-Christian elements in their religious services while their costume reminds us of pictures from the old Kyiv state. They are divided into Polesyany proper, Pyntshuky, Volyniany and Chernyhiv-Polesyany; groups in the north from the still unstudied transition to the White Ruthenians.

Though at first sight there appear to be many differences in the Ukrainian people, they are in reality of small account;

101 they are certainly no reason for a further national division.
181 The common cultural heritage is so great that it covers all pecularities.

The differences usually cited as important between formerly Austrian and formerly Russian Ukrainians are limited to historical influences. The ethnographical limits of Ukraine have never coincided with politi... frontiers; as far as culture goes, "Austrian West Ukraine" stretched almost to Kyiv, while, on the other hand, definitely East Ukrainian phenomena in the language that were characteristic for "Russian East Ukraine" actually begin to appear in "Austrian" Podolia and Pokutja.

144 The anthropological structure of Ukraine is much more
142 complicated. The Ukrainian people is composed of at last six racial types (Dinaric, Mediterranean, Alpine, Nordic, Subnordic and Lapponid). The original inhabitants were mostly fair and long-skulled, (Nordic racial type) then these were flooded by the Armenoid, round-headed dark race from the south-east which naturally left marks. This process produced new racial types, which also came into contact with aboriginal Asiatics in the north-east and with the numerous and prolific Mediterranean races originally from Greece and Jtaly, and produced in turn more new racial mixtures. Of all these racial mixtures with a nordic foundation, the most important is the Dinaric which appears immediately before the Bronze Age; since the Middle Ages the decisive element in the Ukrainian type has been Dinaric, to which class almost one half (44 %) of the present-day Ukrainians belong. Dinaric is a round headed dark type with a long and narrow face. Another important racial element in the national Ukrainian type is the Alpine (22 %) also a round headed dark type, but with a round face. Those two races determine the national Ukrainian type (66 %), other elements being more rare and only characteristic of frontier areas.

141 The Ukrainians belong to the Caucasian race and have an average cephalic index of 83.2 (varying from 82.8 to 89.8); the face is narrow, the nose straight and fairly narrow, the arms relatively short, the legs long, the figure being over average height (about 5 ft. 7), while the hair and the eyes are mostly dark

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The Basic Traits of the Ukrainian People

The cultural influences at work for thousands of years since the Secondary Stone Age in Ukrainian territory have naturally left traces: though the contribution of each varied, they combined to shape the spirit of the Ukrainian as we see it in all his actions and thoughts, in his whole conduct of life, or, to put it in general terms, in his view of the world. And when we pause to seek the basis of the specifically Ukrainian view of the world, our consciousness is suddenly flooded with the certainty that the spiritual life of the entire nation has its deepest source in an intimate relation to the soil, to Mother Earth. /8/

The Ukrainians are a people of peasants. There is no question of that. Even a hasty review of the history of Ukraine provides incontrovertible proof that it is not only an agricultural country to-day, but that it has always been an agricultural country for hundreds, nay thousands, of years.

This has meant that the population of these areas has always been in closest touch with the soil and that this intimacy with Mother Earth is particularly characteristic of the entire Ukrainian peasantry even in our own days. And this orientation of the inner man holds not only for one class, but for the entire nation, for the intelligentsia of to-day, the intellectual leaders of the people, has, in the main, sprung from the peasantry and the purely urban population, middleclass as well as laborers, is composed either of foreigners or of immigrants from the open country. The entire Ukrainian nation is to-day deeply rooted in its native soil, a circumstance which it regards as its most effective weapon, with the help of which it has managed not only to cling to the land given it by fate, in spite of numerous onslaughts by nomads both ancient and modern, but also to cherish no mean policy of expansion even in modern times. We find sufficient examples in the settlement of Siberia and other territory in the Far East, the emigration of agricultural workers to Canada and the United States. It is self-evident that such an intimate connection with the soil for almost a thousand years must have its counterpart in the spirit of the Ukrainian people. An extraordinarily strong and organic dependence of man on the soil that he cultivates and that nourishes him is

● 181 everywhere clearly reflected in language and literature, in habits and customs, in manifestations of religious life, in the cultural process, in music, art, and philosophy.

538 Taras Shevchenko, the intellectual leader of the Ukrainian
181 people and the national poet, was indissolubly bound to the black soil of his home, glebae adscriptus, the son of a serf, for whom a ransom of 2500 roubles had first to be paid by friends before he was physically free from the chains that bound him to the earth. To free him spiritually from Mother Earth was an impossibility, for the poet's soul was so firmly rooted in his native soil, that to have severed it from its roots would have meant spiritual death.

And it is not merely striving for external effect, but a genuine symbol of the spiritual make-up of the Ukrainian people that its national poet, though no more a serf but a fêted artist and poet, welcome in the best society of the Russian capital, is mostly portrayed in peasant costume and is handed down to posterity in this guise. Shevchenko, as a poet, was the people itself, so that external events in his life acquire symbolic significance for the entire nation. Ivan Franko, the most eminent poet of Western Ukraine, also a man of the people, bears witness to the peasantry as the foundation of a new period in the development of man:

"I am a peasant — prologue, not epilogue"

Another prominent champion of intellectual life in Ukraine is Skovoroda, a philosopher who lived in the 18th century. He is the Ukrainian Socrates and is a product of his native country, intimately connected with his surroundings and his time. We should be puzzled by his work if it were viewed apart from his relation to the broad mass of the peasantry; the whole significance of his teaching and influence can only be grasped if we remember that he was in direct contact with those elements in Ukrainian intellectual life which were deeply rooted in and inspired by the Black Earth.

V. Lypynskyj, the Ukrainian historian and sociologist of today, sums up and evaluates this intimacy with the soil in his "Letters to my Brother-Farmers", which appeared in 1921/22. He was the first to emphasise this essential feature of national

ideology and to make a militant peasantry the foundation and the pillar of the modern Ukrainian state. 538 181

We find an astonishingly simple, but profound synthesis of this entire peasant philosophy, the product of the soil, in "The Soil", a short, moving story by Vasyl Stefanyk, a contemporary poet; "Our destiny is the soil; forsake it and you are lost, cling to it and it will develop all your powers and draw out your very soul in the hollow of its hand; embrace it, subject yourself to it and it will suck the life-blood out of your veins — but in return, you have herds of sheep and horses and full stack-yards; and for your strength it will give you a cabin full of children and grand-children whose laughter is like silver bells and whose cheeks are red as the fruit of the snow ball tree . . ."

The profound love of the Ukrainian for the beauties of Nature springs from his connection with the soil, a love which seems to be firmly anchored in the depths of his soul. This aesthetic sense which is nurtured by natural forms, is reflected by the deep longing to express beauty of form, harmony of color and originality of theme in domestic surroundings, in dress or in the utensils of everyday life. Aesthetic, and not practical considerations always play the most important part, whether it be the construction of a church, the planning of a garden round a cottage, the weaving of an apron or a kerchief, the making of a table or a bench. 181 517

It is obvious that the very rich and valuable folk music and the no less rich and original folk poetry are also based on laws of aesthetic pleasure, derived from intimate intercourse with Nature and experience of her beauties.

And the Ukrainian's traditional and age-long contact with Nature is the tenacious bond between him and his culture and that of Western Europe, while at the same time it distinguishes him from the Muscovite, his neighbor in the North-East. For the latter people had never had any feeling for the soil; it regards agriculture not as an expression of love for Mother Earth, but as a necessity, or as a chance of making money. On the other hand, the Muscovites are the best traders among Slavonic peoples. The real farmer, too firmly rooted in the 181

● 181 earth and in his functions, who remains in the same place for generations, becomes too fixed in his habits and loses the mobility which is naturally the first essential quality of nomad peoples and which brings great advantages in trade.

The Ukrainian view of the world is based very definitely on idealism. The actions and resolutions of the Ukrainian are based not on objective reality as it confronts us, but on an ideal „reality" which contains many elements derived from imagination and fancy. Ukrainian history offers us many examples of this. I quote only two prominent instances:

181 538 Kostomariv, the Ukrainian historian, inspired by Messianic ideas, writes a gospel of the Ukrainian people, proclaiming its destiny as a leader in the history of mankind. The aim of this work was to bring new strength to the oppressed nation and to give new content to its life which was founded on a very sad reality; it soared so high in the clouds of idealising speculation, so oblivious of actual facts, that it was scarcely possible to establish a connection between it and real life. While it may be maintained that a people cannot be solely guided by conditions of life here and now, that it cannot do without ideals, that, on the contrary, development and progress are impossible without any inciting aim, even if it is beyond human grasp - nevertheless its efforts to rise must spring from its actual surroundings and not from the fantastic realm of the imagination. — Franko, in spite of the sad experience of his own life of suffering, is also an idealist who believes in man, in his innate goodness, his love of beauty and moral conduct. All the characters in his books, even the worst of them, often display good traits, or at least traces of a positive attitude to life which suffice to keep the chances of improvement open. It is more than obvious that these characters are not bad by nature, but that they have degenerated under the influence of different circumstances. Some critics assert that it was only this belief in an idealised humanity, in the possibility of progress, that gave Franko the moral courage to carry on in spite of bitter disappointment, and to work like one possessed for the welfare of his people and its culture.

The Ukrainian's tendency to idealise is also expressed in his relation to the weaker sex which generally enjoys a position of superiority in Ukrainian society. In literature, too, the Ukrainian woman appears in such an idealised and spiritualised form that even her faults, her foibles, do not detract from her spiritual value, but serve rather to enhance her charm and attractiveness. 181 562

The sense for actual reality is almost completely suffocated by the enthusiasm of the soul for the world of the imagination, for the ideal. 19th century drama contains a goodly company of women with a positive attitude to life — national heroines like Marusja Bohuslavka, lovable girls, good and faithful to boredom like Natalie of Poltava, unhappy victims of male seduction like Shevchenko's Kateryna and finally, prophetesses with an air of tragedy like the Ukrainian Cassandra. We must not forget that, except for the last named, these old-fashioned plays are still popular with the Ukrainian public and are performed even to-day, times without number, with great success throughout Ukraine, in the towns as well as in the remotest villages. 181 562 536

Western systems of thought have always been founded on the personal consciousness of the individual. Beginning with Plato in ancient Greece philosophical speculation has always started from individual consciousness as the only evident reality which is disputed by no one, a process which is still more evident in modern philosophy from Descartes on. Fichte's system is based on the philosophy of the ego which elsewhere appears in philosophy as a complete entity, independent of all other features, a sovereign being, which, in the intellectual world, is usually the final foundation of a concrete reality. 812

Here Ukrainians, in contrast to Russians, are decidedly western in outlook. Though they have not produced philosophic systems of th r own based on the ego as the fundamental principle, or the foundation of further speculation, nevertheless their whole intellectual life, their ethical standards and legal code, and still more their actual conduct, are all based on the individual; and to restrict the right of the individual even in the interests of the community, is always resented as an encroachment on the freedom of will. 812 156

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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829
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The Ukrainian's individualism is most evident in his attitude to the social order, to the principle of the place of the community in society. He repudiates all forms of communal life which call for strict discipline and absolute obedience, without thinking that such a repudiation may be disastrous for the security of general interests and even, in the long run, for the personal advantage of the individual. His individualism as a social principle regards the individual as an end in himself, while the community is merely the sum or union of individuals and as such is only the means of guaranteeing the welfare of the individual. According to this national viewpoint, society — in Ukrainian "hromada" — is a voluntary union of individuals who, for the moment, are willing to work together for common aims, but who reserve the right to leave the union or even to attack it with every means in their power if they find that it is threatening their personal freedom, or when personal interest is greater than the interest of the community. We find a historical example of this attitude in the well-known military organisation of the Zaporoghian Cossacks, who regarded themselves as independent and free citizens, and only acknowledged their duty towards the community in so far as they considered it essential to the security and welfare of all.

In the history of Ukraine there are only too many cases where an exaggerated individualism prevented the formation of tradition as a supreme factor in building up a state, and where the historical existence of the entire people was at the mercy of conflicting forces which, in the absence of all desire to cooperate, were of necessity detrimental to the future of the state.

The structure of Russian society, called "mir" is diametrically opposed to this; it falls into the other extreme as the intellectual expression of the will of the community which completely absorbs personal independence. The essence and leading principle of the Russian "mir" is the compulsion inherent in the superior agency as the instrument of God's will. All rebellion against this divine compulsion is a grievous sin which the simple Russian cannot be expected to commit. This view was and is the most favorable condition for the birth and development of every absolute regime.

812 terest and, at the same time, superficial work. The Ukrainian
153 does not treat problems in theory and practice from the point of view of reason, but confronts reality with emotion, takes decision on the spur of the moment and confuses theoretical and practical issues.

157 In connection herewith I shall just touch on the third sphere
771 of psychological life, namely the will. Seeing that all three
181 functions, reason, feeling and will are closely dependent on each other, the supremacy of the first or the second will necessarily
812 influence the third. A will that is under the control of feeling and not of reason, will not be very strong, steadfast or consistent, but, like the feelings, will fall from one extreme into the other in a brief interval, so that periods of great, superhuman activity and joy in work are followed by times of complete passivity and the idleness of despair. The supremacy of feeling and the predominance of love provide us with a further element in the Ukrainian view of the world, namely the deep feeling for religion which is the main component in all Slav spiritual life. Many scholars of the last century emphasise the supremacy of feeling and the all-important part played by religion as the main characteristics of the spiritual life not only of modern Slavs, but also of their ancestors, whether remote or recent. Attempts have been made to differentiate the historical peculiarity of the Slavs from that of the Romance peoples, in particular from the French and the Germanic nations. Compared with the political French and the philosophical Teutons, the Slavs are, in the widest sense, the religious race.

Quite apart from our opinion of this characteristic, it must not be forgotten that all leading Slavs, whether Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians or Russians, whether philosophers, authors or artists, display an undoubted, if varied religiousness. Even revolutionaries like Bakunin, Herzen and others, though they rejected all belief at the start, were none the less deeply religious men and their fantastic fight against religion was but a negative expression of religious feeling. Atheism in Russia is the expression of an unsatisfied passion for belief, of a passion that refuses to let

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukràine RDl

itself be put off with inadequate creeds, and that, in despair, denies God Himself. 157 771

In spite of this general, common background, expressions of religious feeling in the various Slavonic tribes differ greatly. The Ukrainian is never orthodox in his religious life; he does not cling at all to forms, to externals; rather does he endeavour always to comprehend the essence of a creed or belief. All who have studied the character of the Ukrainian people even superficially must admit that a religious quarrel or still more, a bitter strife over ritual forms such as has become a plague with Russians is quite impossible among Ukrainians. Ukrainian history provides us with interesting and instructive examples of this. When the Kyiv State became Christian and accepted the Byzantine form of the Christian Church, being thereby automatically drawn into the whirlpool of religious strife, the Grand Prince deliberately sought to avoid all dogmatic quarrels and to keep contact with the West, even though he was a member of the Eastern Church and shared in Eastern culture. Unconcerned with the subtleties of dogma, which did not interest Kyiv princes though their church depended on Constantinople, they nevertheless sent ambassadors to the German emperors and to Popes, received delegates from the West and showered gifts on them; they formed family unions with Catholic princes and rulers — in a word, began to smooth the way of mediation between Western and Eastern Europe, a rôle which Ukraine was later to assume. It is true that fierce wars of religion were waged in Ukraine as elsewhere in the 16th and 17th centuries. But here the strife between adherents of the Orthodox Church and Unionists represented in reality the gigantic struggle between two views of the world — the Eastern conservative view and the Western, more progressive one, a struggle which, in addition to religion, comprehended many other factors, such as national feeling and political and cultural standards. At present, too, when Ukrainians must live together under most trying circumstances, church differences scarcely come into play. As a result of his over-individual nature, the Ukrainian is all too ready to utilise every opportunity of arguing with his opponent, but religious feeling is too deeply rooted and com- 181 812

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

pels too much respect for the opinion of others for him to make diverging beliefs an object of strife. Skovoroda, the Ukrainian Socrates, whose spiritual life reflects all the characteristics of the national psyche of the Ukrainian people, expresses his attitude to religious things in a very simple formula, which is perhaps too simple for a philosopher: "Pagan temples and idols were also expressions of Christian belief, being inscribed as they were with the wise, sacred words: gnoti seauton, nosce te ipsum".

According to Skovoroda, God did not reveal His truth to Christians and Hebrews alone, but also to pagans, just as morality cannot be regarded as the monopoly of the Christian world, seeing that it has many eminent champions among the nations of the ancient world. In the province of religion the Ukrainian demands universality, respect for every genuine religious feeling, tolerance of the convictions of others, but not orthodoxy and not the forfeiture of valuable content for the sake of mere form.

The Ukrainian view of the world is characterised by an optimism founded on metaphysics and ethics. In spite of the overwhelming catastrophes that have constantly shaken the historical existence of the people to its foundations, in spite of the terrible persecutions to which the heart of the nation, its peasantry, has been exposed for centuries, hope of a better future was never dead, and indeed it rose afresh at the very time when, judged by objective standards, there were practically no prospects of improvement. And yet — in defiance of all foes — the Ukrainian people will and must live and fulfil its destined mission, the motto to which all leading spirits have always sworn allegiance. Of course, Ukrainian public opinion, especially in the higher classes, has also displayed depression caused by temporary circumstances; but though the situation was often extremely critical, Ukrainian history has no proper example of general dissolution, of complete and extensive despair. On the contrary, it is characteristic of Ukrainian mentality to regard the world and its phenomena from the best side and to trust in a favorable issue of all processes. "We'll get along somehow" is the expression, not only of mental balance, of a determination to keep a stiff upper lip, but is at the same time an unmistakable sign

of a feeling of confidence, no matter how circumstances may 181
change. 812

If we seek the origin of this apparently irrational optimism, we come to the conclusion that its roots lie in prehistoric times and that its motives have been preserved in folklore, tales and fables. The study of extensive Ukrainian material proves conclusively that the belief in the victory of good over evil is part and parcel of the people's faith. The world is ruled by the principle of good; evil, and its personification, the devil, are by no means equal to good and do not have an independent existence of their own. 776 812

Without going into details, we can make the general assertion that in Ukraine the devil is no powerful god who finds satisfaction in the sea of troubles that overwhelms man; his power does not equal that of the good spirit; in the realm of evil he is not supreme over subordinate demons — he is a petty spirit who, by exploiting the weaknesses of God and man, seeks to make unpleasantness for both.

The devil cannot have the mastery over a human being during the latter's life, even if he has promised him his soul. It is fairly easy to summon the devil in order to enter into a contract with him. In drawing up the articles of such a contract, the devil does not display any special intelligence, or even intellectual superiority over his human partner. The Evil One not infrequently gets the worst of a bargain with a simple peasant; he puts himself to no end of trouble in order to get money and honor for man before death, but after he is dead, man always finds a loop-hole in the contract through which he can slip and land happily in Paradise. 776

Thus we see that, for the Ukrainian, far from being an imposing figure, the devil degenerates into something comical and, at times, even pitiable, a being to be exploited or made a fool of by man. In the eternal struggle which it is man's fate to conduct against evil, man is far superior to the devil.

Maksimov assures us that the belief in an unlimited number of evil spirits is firmly rooted in the consciousness of the Great Russian. He believes that there are scarcely any places in the

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine

III

Cultural life

The General Trends of Ukrainian Culture

When studying the intellectual characteristics of the Ukrainians we come to the conclusion that their often too marked individualism and their ideals, which display themselves in the necessities of everyday life, stamp them as unmistakably western in their attitude to the world, while their geographical position drew them from the very beginning within the orbit of Central and Western Europe and later on made them instrumental in handing on the products of Western culture to the nations of the East. 181

The first mention of the Kyiv empire in history shows it in connection with a western power. In the Annals of Bertinius we read how emperor Ludwig received a Grecian delegation at Ingelheim on May 18th, 839 and how, in the company of the ambassadors sent by Theophilus, the Greek emperor, there were also certain men, "qui se, id est gentem suam, Rhos vocari dicebant." We may assume with great probability that these men were first sent from their home, Kyiv, to Constantinople, and had then accompanied the Grecian delegates on their long journey from Byzantium to the Rhine and that the name "Rhos" is identical with the later Rus-Ukraine. 175

Grand Princess Olga, who had embraced the Christian faith of the West, sent a delegation in 960 to the German Emperor Otto I, requesting that priests should be sent to her country that was so little known. Missionaries under Adalbert set out

On the contrary, in Zone 2 the absence of trees, the 137
drier climate, the dusty soil, and the isolated farms make the landscape more severe and more similar to the barren table-land of Northern Castile. Only the immensity of the cornfields with their golden ears introduces a lyrical note, vision-like, into this flat and treeless country. The villages of the Steppe are not 361
very picturesque and look mostly like colonies in which 342
the spirit of calculation dominates over the care of beauty. The habitations here are more modern, bigger, and better planned. The thatch here gives place to tiles and to corrugated iron. On the other hand, the poor people, deprived of wood, live in primitive hovels built of clay.

In the extreme north, in the forest region with its 133
sandy soil, the picturesque landscapes gradually disappear to resume the severe and sad monotony of the White Russian country-side.

The Ukrainian is very adaptable to civilization, that 181
is to say to the improvement of everyday life, and very quickly adopts all practical inventions, without any spirit of routine.

The Ukraine is the most literate part of Russia. Even 212
Soviet statistics, which cannot be assumed to be well disposed to the Tsarist regime, show that the percentage of the generation which was of a school age in 1914, which could read and write was, in 1923, 90 per cent in the towns and 73 per cent in the country, which, by the way, is a vigorous reply to the generally accepted opinion that in the pre-war Russian Empire the population stagnated in a condition of utter ignorance.

In the other parts of European Russia the percentage for the same generation was respectively 82 per cent in the towns and 57 per cent in the country-side.

It seems to us opportune to give an idea of the Ukraine 000

[See category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union K1

INTRODUCTION

The author of this book is a historian. He has taken part in the Ukrainian national revolution from 1917 on. The book has been written to fix facts that are very often forgotten in the world, or are given a false interpretation in the various books on the Eastern European problem.

The principal fact from which the whole fatal conflict between Ukraine and Soviet Russia arises is that Ukraine has a democratic tradition created by the preceding historical evolution. Modern Russia is a continuation of the Muscovite Tsardom that has grown on the foundations of eastern despotism. For this reason Russia has not created a democratic tradition of its own up to this day and has a "considerable lack of European tradition", as it has been stated by the well known Russian historian Klyuchevsky. Therefore Communist dictatorship so easily seized power in Russia after the revolution of 1917, while the other peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, Ukrainians, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians, etc., created democratic states of their own.

The tragedy of the unhappy neighbours of Russia is that Russian imperialism in the past and present times has been principally directed against them, has enslaved and even exstirpated them.

The Ukrainian nation occupies a particular place in Eastern Europe both by its number, circa 35 millions, and by its geographical position, and especially by its large natural resources*). The famous British political writer Professor R. W. Seton-Watson states that the Ukrainian problem has been one of the reasons for World War I 1914—1918. It is generally known that the conquest of Ukraine was the principal aim for Hitler's 'Pressure to the East'. Thus World War II had the struggle for Ukraine as one of its reasons too.

We are living in a time when imperialism is being condemned as one of the greatest evils to mankind, but we see at the same time

*) The most important natural riches of Ukraine are: coal (Donets Bassin), iron ore (Krivoy Rog), oil (Boryslaw), manganese (Nikopol). The export of grain from Ukraine to Western Europe until 1914 was higher than 5,5 mil. tons per year. The production of sugar and spirit was very important. The export of agricultural products from Tsarist Russia came in its great part from Ukraine.

181 how various peoples are enslaved and perish through the ruthless despotism of Soviet Russia. Russian Communist dictatorship has ruled the Ukrainian nation for more than 30 years. But the Ukrainians do not want foreign rule and wish to live in freedom and independence. The Ukrainian nation has been the first to fight against the renewed Russian imperialism, strengthened by Communist dictatorship, from December 1917 on. This struggle is little known to the world, though it had in some of its stages universal importance.

175 was not only the unrestricted lord over the freedom and lives of his subjects; he was also the greatest merchant and contractor in his country (monopoly of foreign trade, monopoly of public houses a. s. o.). Even for the land that was cultivated by the Muscovite people a formula was stated: "The whole land belongs to God and the Tsar."

The Muscovite aristocrats had no power to use against the rule of the Tsars and signed in official papers with deminutive names 'Petrushka', instead of Peter, 'Ivashka', instead of Ivan, and called themselves 'Kholopy' (slaves) of their Tsar. The foreigners from the free Western European countries were impressed by the unlimited submission of the Muscovites to the Government of the Tsars, the lack of personal dignity among them, and their simultaneous enthusiasm for the absolute power of their Tsar, who had not to take an oath on the observation of the laws and the consideration of the liberties of his subjects as was the case in the free Western countries. The learned Scotsman Buchananus writes in his book *De iure regni apud Scotos,* in 1579, that Muscovy rejoices in tyranny ('Moscovia tyrannide gaudet').

[181] The present Communist Government has received the tyrannical tradition from the Tsars of Moscow. Soviet propaganda consequently glorifies one of the most cruel tyrants of universal history — Ivan the Terrible — in its press, literature and radio*). No less is the glorification of Tsar Peter I., the founder of modern Russian imperialism, by the Russian Communists. Here the Bolsheviks have found their corresponding Russian national tradition.

After the destruction of the Kievan State and the down-fall of the Principality of Galicia and Lodomeria the development of Ukraine and White Russia (Byelorussia) under the rule of the Lithuanian princely dynasty went in the general European direction. The nobility and the city population had their rights guaranteed by the laws in Lithuania and Poland, and the Monarch had to consider the will of his subjects. The Ukrainian nobility and the townsmen enjoyed these rights alike. However, after the Union of Lublin of 1569 between Lithuania and Poland almost the whole of Ukrainian territory was incorporated by Poland, and a strong pressure of the Polish State on the Ukrainian people began. The Polish authorities restricted the rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox nobility and, on the other hand, gave those who abandoned the Greek Orthodox Church and turned Catholic all possibilities of career and enrichment. An

*) Comp.: R. Wipper, *Ivan Grozny:* Moscow 1948 (An official glorification of the 'progressive and democratic' Tsar Ivan the Terrible).

175 troops conquered the fortress of the Ukrainian Cossacks — the Zaporovian Sich. The remainder of the Zaporovian Cossacks migrated to the Turkish province at the mouth of the Danube, and founded there a new centre under the protectorate of the Sultan. The lands of the Zaporovian Army, that had been defended against the Tartar hordes in a fierce struggle lasting for hundreds of years, the Russian Government granted to its magnates, first of all to favourites of Catherine II.

175 648 The Western Ukrainian territories, which, by the Polish-Muscovite treaty of 1667, had remained in the Polish State after the dismemberment of Poland at the end of the 18th century, were incorporated partly by Russia and partly by Austria (Galicia 1772). Bukovina too, which had formerly belonged to Turkey, became a province of Austria in 1774. Carpatho-Ukraine had belonged to Hungary since the Middle Ages (cities Užhorod-Ungvar, Mukačevo-Munkacs).

181 175 [566] The struggle of the Ukrainians for independence under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—57) had abolished serfdom in the greater part of Ukraine. It was the ideal of the masses of the Ukrainian people to live free, independent like the free Ukrainian Cossacks. After the abolition of the autonomous rights of Ukraine at the end of the 18th century serfdom for the Ukrainian peasants was introduced in Ukraine in the Muscovite way. But against this oppression the masses of the Ukrainian people rose often in revolt.

Historical evolution has developed in the Ukrainian people an aspiration for freedom and defence of human dignity. Voltaire wrote in his *History of Charles XII.*: "L'Ukraine a toujours aspiré à être libre" (Ukraine has always aspired to be free). "This is a nation that wants freedom," wrote the prominent Ukrainian writer of the 17th century, the Archbishop of Chernigov, Lazar Baranovych, to the Muscovite Tsar Alexey Mikhaylovich.

The conviction prevailed among the Ukrainians that Ukraine was not dependent on Russia but was only associated in the person of the Monarch. In the political dialogue *Dispute of Little Russia with Great Russia* at the end of the 18th century we read the following words of 'Little Russia' addressing 'Great Russia': "Do not think thou art my lord, but thine and mine sovereign is our common master."

175 648 The Ukrainian patriots could not forget the loss of liberty and independence, and looked for understanding of the Ukrainian case to foreign countries. In 1793 the well known Ukrainian patriot Vasyl Kapnist tried to persuade the Prussian Minister Hertzberg

that it was in the interest of Prussia to help the Ukrainian people 175
to cast off the chains of Muscovite slavery. During the Great French 648
Revolution the person of Napoleon was very popular in Ukraine. Ukrainian patriots were pleased by the victories of the French Emperor, and hoped that, after the defeat of Russia in a war with France, the time for the liberation of Ukraine would come, and the odious serfdom would be abolished. But Napoleon had no understanding of the Ukrainian problem. He planned the creation of two states 'Napoléonides' in Ukraine under his protectorate . . .*)

Ukrainian history has gone its own way, different from that of Russia. This has created the peculiar national character of the Ukrainians.

The foreigners who had visited Ukraine in the 17th and 18th 175
centuries pointed out the higher level of civilisation among the 181
Ukrainians in comparison with the Russians, and the highly deve- 517
loped feeling of personal dignity of the Ukrainian people. This love of freedom of the Ukrainian people appeared also in the fight against Tsarist absolutism in Russia, where revolutionaries of Ukrainian origin occupied the first places, Zhelyabov, Kybalchych, Konashevych, Osynsky, Kravchynsky (Stepnyak), Popko, and many other members of the party '*Narodnaya Voiya*'.

In the 19th century, under the influence of the ideas of that time (the Great French Revolution, romanticism) the regeneration of the so-called unhistorical pepoples (Serbians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Baltic peoples) began; in the beginning it was the interest for the language and history of the peoples among the educated classes, and the attempt to write in the 'common people's' language. In Ukraine the regeneration of the popular literary language began [538] with the publication of the satirical poem of Ivan Kotlyarevsky *Aeneid:* 1798. In this poem the author underlines his dislike of serfdom and the lords

> "who did not give the people freedom
> and treated them like cattle."

Democratic ideas were widespread in Ukraine; the representatives 175
of the Ukrainian educated classes took an active part in the 186
revolutionary organisations directed towards the fall of the Tsarist régime (the uprising of the 'Decabrists', 1825—26, was most active in Ukraine, near Kiev).

In 1846 a Ukrainian political organisation, *The Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius,* was founded in Kiev. Many prominent representatives of Ukrainian culture like Taras Shevchenko (the

*) *Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes:* Paris 1922.

727 661 The Germans did not touch the Soviet collective farms, because they regarded them as the best method for exploiting the peasants. On the other hand, the German authorities did not wish to permit the partition of the land, for they prepared Ukraine for German colonisation.

● [181] Frauenfeld points out the high physical and moral qualities of the Ukrainians, their highly developed consciousness of personal dignity and their aspiration for education. He witnesses that the closing of schools by the German authorities in Ukraine roused the greatest dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian people:

"The Ukrainians, especially the women, are very desirous of learning, and one could hear from them: 'Under the Bolsheviks we were starving, but we could learn something at least. Under your rule we cannot even learn. This proves that you are our enemies' . .".

The author of the memorandum comes to the conclusion that the Ukrainians should not be exstirpated in the interests of Hitler's 'racial policy'; on the contrary "the often genuine blond and blue-eyed as well as brunette population" should be assimilated for such an assimilation "would be without doubt more desirable and advantageous than many we had absorbed during our history, or are even trying to suck up . . ."*).

725 668 Against pillage, terror, oppression and humiliation the Ukrainian people reacted with great vehemence, in spite of the extraordinary weakening by the previous Soviet terrorism, the famine and the war. In all parts of Ukraine risings broke out. This Ukrainian partisan movement helped to a great extent to defeat the German armies in Ukraine. But this was not a proof of affection of the Ukrainians for Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian partisan movement took place under the banner of an independent Ukraine. The initiative for the creation of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) came from officers of the army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1941.

The Ukrainian Partisan Army turned its weapons after the defeat of Germany against the new oppressor — Soviet Russia.

2. Ukraine after the War

727 000 In the course of World War II the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians from the Caucasus to the Carpathian Mountains came under the rule of Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian nation, from the

*) Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld, *Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete: 10. 2. 1944* (Document No. 5394, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes).

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UKRAINE
Land of Black Earth

/7/

The Outpost

000 Reaching the first villages of a different people, the stranger stands helpless. The great unknown of this world fills him with awe, with the wish to fathom its essence, and with vague expectations. Velykyi Lypnyk is such a village on the edge of a large community ruled by other laws. It is the most westerly outpost, the spearhead, as it were, of the self-contained settlement area of a people whose often grandiose history bears
181 out the truth: Woe to the vanquished! This race of Ukrainians is the largest on earth without its own state. Often the Ukrainians were chosen by providence for great deeds; for a long time they protected the West from the wild Asiatic hordes, then history made them dead quiet. They were forgotten and almost abandoned to extinction. But the people refused to be "a branch of the large Russian tree; they wanted to be a tree themselves, with roots, trunk, branches and leaves, drawing its nourishment from its own soil". Again and again they rose up against ruling peoples, they fought, won and - lost. /8/

131 A two- to three-hour drive by automobile separates the self-contained German settlement in Silesia from the Ukrainian spearhead in eastern Slovakia at the foot of the High Tatra. In between lies the settlement of the Zips Germans. It is a mere weekend excursion from Breslau or Vienna to the border of the Ukrainian realm. For the inhabitant of Breslau it is no farther than Berlin and for the Viennese it is as far as Munich. It takes six hours by car from Vienna or Breslau up the Oder and the Waag along the quiet, dreamy woodland slopes of the Slovakian mountains to the High Tatra. Between it and the Lower Beskid the

[Podolia] [Volhynia]

everyone else from among our ranks. 000

Before the First World War it was said of 101
Podolia, which you will reach if you wander farther 181
north and which lies like a plateau over the Dniestr 311
Valley, that bread grows on fence posts there,
/Facing page 16: Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. [000]
View of the lower part of the city/; /Facing page
17: The old fortress of Feodosiya on the Crimea/ 3
/17/ and that the fences are woven out of sausages. For the first time there lies before you an immeasurable sea of surging grain. Not a house far and wide, rarely a small wood. A groundless, dusty field road, surprisingly seems to lead into empty space, but where you think it ends, it leads you straight as a die, by means of steep turns into one of those deep valleys which the rivers in the course of thousands of years have carved into the plateaus. Down there the Podolians build their loam huts, the whitewashed walls of which have already greeted you from a distance through the green of the plum and cherry trees. If you follow the river upstream, it will more and more often lead you around ponds, marshes and swamps the nearer you come to its sources. You will see more storks than you have ever seen before in your life.

Almost imperceptibly you will reach Volhynia, 101
the western part of which belonged to Poland up to 491
1939, but was subject to the czar before that. You 361
will notice this immediately by the lack of good roads. For, as everywhere in former Czarist Russia, there are only a few paved roads, but all the more are there roads on which in dry weather you sink into the dust and in wet weather into mud. You will
notice it also by the cities and towns which are 361
even dirtier and more neglected than those of Galicia. You are in the midst of the ghettos of the world. These cities are a jumble of houses, "with an ugly traffic artery in the middle". They are spread out with a total absence of form, as though they had been

3 [For plates, cf. pp. 215-216, category 116 — Analyst]

101 of Khazars established a kingdom here, which
174 extended from the Volga to the Danube. The Khazars were nomads who became domiciled, founded cities and carried on trade. At their court the Jews obtained predominating influence, and it sounds almost unbelievable to say that the khans adopted the faith of Moses. /Facing page
[000] 24: Character study of a Ukrainian head/*/Facing page 25: A Ukrainian girl with pronounced nordic features/*/25/

[101] Kiyev, the center of the Polyani, was tri-
[174] butary to the Khazar. The Slavic tribes of the
●181 Antae, the ancestors of the Ukrainians, were divided and fought one another. In the establishment of their society they scarcely developed beyond the formation of a district with several peasant communities. Fields and pastures belonged to all jointly. Family life was a patriarchy, and unanimity was demanded at the village and district meetings. These Slavs built compact houses of loam, and placed embankments around their towns. They cultivated their fields, made pottery and bartered their goods for swords, knives and various handicraft products. They offered sacrifice to the sun god Dashdboh, the wind god Stryboh, the thunder god Perun and other deities.

*

175 It was the Swedish Vikings, called Varangians, who in the ninth and tenth centuries unified the Slavic tribes and established a kingdom with Kiyev as the capital, which, during its most flourishing period, extended from the Carpathians to the Volga and from the Caucasus to the White Sea. They rowed in boats to Lake Ilmen, founded Novgorod and from there, about the middle of the ninth century, conquered Kiyev. Rurik was the name of the Viking king of Novgorod; his warriors were called Rus', meaning "rowers",

*[For plates, cf. pp. 217-218, category 116 - Analyst]

665 23rd International Youth Day in Moscow in 1937:
883 "Never in the history of the world have there been
876 and are there such conditions for growth, education and training of the younger generation as have been created for young people among us by the Soviet government, by the Communist Party..." There are countless proofs of the fact that the basic principles of Bolshevik education are refuted by the products of this education.* The Komsomolskaja Pravda, number 83, 1935 admits "that the criminal elements in schools developed more actively than the Komsomols and the Pioneers, and therefore drew a large number of students into their sphere of influence", and Pravda of [681] February 19, 1935 reports that the following punishments are administered to combat hoodlumism among children of from 8 to 12 years: "The expulsion of the hoodlums from school, legal persecution of their parents, the formation of special divisions of militia to combat youthful criminals, and so forth." (78) This picture is

78. Richthofen, Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy, page 75.

rounded off by the introduction on April 7, 1935 of the death penalty for children beginning at the age of 12 for those of them who can be shown to have committed theft, banditry, murder or to have contemplated murder, and by the purges which began in the autumn of 1937 against the members of the Komsomol, especially in the Ukraine.

/130/ In the Village

•181 During the years in which Shevchenko stands watch in the searing heat of the Kirghiz Steppes, his friend Kostomariv formulates for the first time the contrasts between Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups. According to this, a tendency toward spirituality prevails in the social and

* [For a discussion of Bolshevik educational theory and methods, cf. pp 133-135, category NG - Analyst]

•181 political life of the Ukrainians, in that of the Great Russians a tendency toward materialsim prevails. The Ukrainians incline toward federation, the Russians toward absolutism; the Ukrainians have a tendency to prefer personal freedom, the Russians despotism. As a result of these contrasts, he says, there is an eternal battle between the two peoples. (79)

79. Zalozieckij: The Spiritual Life of the Ukraine in the Past and Present.

144 The difference between Russians and Ukrainians are racially conditioned and historically substantianted. The hemotogenetic basis of the Russian people are the aboriginal Finno-Ural-Altaic peoples. These mixed with the advancing Slavs and later, at the time of the sovereignity of the Asiatic hordes, also with Tatars. In Ukrainian blood Slavic as well as Nordic components - Goths, Varangians - predominate. But Armenoids and Mediterranean races have gained influence, and a dash of Tatar blood cannot be lacking. The
142 Ukrainian is in general tall. He has broad shoulders, a round or semi-round skull, straight nose, high forehead, small mouth and small ears. His skin is slightly dark, his hair abundant, straight and predominantly dark. The Kubans in the East and the Huzuls in the West are the tallest, with an average height of 170 centimeters.

174 Historically the differences between the two /131/ peoples were revealed even at the time the Golden Horde subjugated them both. To this day the Russians boast of the fact that at that time they had carried on a more clever Tatar policy, that they had yielded and voluntarily paid the head tax - in contrast to the Ukrainians. While in that century Ukrainian high nobility played the leading cultural role at the court of the Lithuanian Gedemins, the Muscovite grand prince

174 Ivan Kalita destroyed the power of the nobility and therewith laid the foundation for Muscovite despotism. A further example of historically proved contrariety is furnished during the time of Ivan the Terrible. The most sinister force rules at that time in Moscow, while in the Ukraine the Cossacks are preparing to found the freest state that probably ever existed in East Europe.

*

101 Among the Ukrainians there are, in turn,
184 tribal differences. The inhabitants of the dark forest region of Podlakhia and Polesia, who are obliged to wrest all fruits from the earth, can scarcely be as gay as those of the sunny spaces of the south. Those are melancholy and oppressed people who up there carry on the struggle for existence. Farther south, from the fertile hills of Podolia way over to the foothills of the Caucasus, there are fields of golden grain, fruit grows of its own accord, the sky is blue for many months, and on the Kuban there is paradise itself. Cheerful, candid people live here.

• 181 The Ukrainians are a peasant people and more than 90% of all children first see the light of the world through the small window-panes of a straw- or shingle-covered cottage. They are peasant souls - that is, quiet, good-natured, placid human beings who cling to the sod, to their own farm, who want to plow, sow and reap. They are poor, but honest and at the same time hospitable and positively ceremonially polite. People like to call them "Southerners" because of their cheerful disposition and their humor. They love that contemplative life which /132/ is hard to combine with constant hard work. It has not been a blessing to the Ukrainian that the soil yields richly and effortlessly, that his daily bread need not be obtained amid constant toil and hardships. If that were the case, perhaps he

181 would possess the favorable characteristic of obstinate perseverance; stubborness cannot replace it.

By nature the Ukrainian is an Easterner, that is to say he prefers the irrational, and his emotion outweighs his will. "The Eastern nature is characterized by rapid unexpected transitions from unprovoked and therefore short-lived enthusiasm and activity to complete, likewise unjustified quietism and apathy, which in history often expresses itself in a sudden transition from an imposing advance to epochs of complete deterioration." (80)

80. Zalozieckyj: The Spiritual Life of the Ukraine in the Past and Present.

562 The Ukrainians are proud of their women. The Ukrainian woman is slender and tall, usually with black hair and black eyes. Folksongs sing of her thick eyebrows and her beautiful legs. The Ukrainian gynecologist Yuriy Lypa says of the Ukrainian woman that she never comes under the domination of a man; that like no other woman of Europe she is associated with things warlike. For, according to tradition, the Amazons lived between the Dnieper and the Don. Her relationship to man is strictly regulated, in spite of great passion and hot blood. It is based on pride and a consciousness of dignity. She must exert strong will power in order to keep herself within the bounds she sets for herself. She is cruel toward herself, but especially toward other women who overstep these bounds. Kulish, an outstanding Ukrainian historian, author and ethnographer, attributes to women the creation of those tender Ukrainian love songs which are so full of harmony and restraint. It is said that the actual realm of the Ukrainian woman is her family, where she occupies the dominating position as mother. The Ukrainian woman is more prac-

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[Berlin]

517 Petliura Library. Finally, there is the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin.

/189/ Epilogue

181 After their liberation from the Soviet-Muscovite yoke the Ukrainian people have, for the first time in their recent history, had an opportunity to develop their talents and their natural resources freely and unimpeded for their own benefit. The tremendous amount of work that remains to be done can be estimated only by someone who is familiar with the incomparable misery which war-communism, more than two decades of Bolshevik rule and finally liberation from this rule have brought upon the Ukrainian country and its people. Reconstruction will necessarily be all the more difficult since the Ukrainians have to this day remained a peasant people, without their own artisans, without a merchant class, without officials and almost without a so-called intelligentsia. This fact has been very important for the biological survival of the Ukrainian people, for its seed thus withstood the most dire distress of centuries of suppression. Nevertheless: peasants are not statesmen! Peasants want to plow, sow, reap and tend their cattle. Thus it is not a matter of chance that, aside from its historical struggle against the Asiatic hordes, the most important achievement of the Ukrainian people is of a rural character: in the colonization of the steppes, of Siberian and far-eastern lands the Ukrainians have achieved great things. "In fact," says the well-known Ukrainian geographer Rudnickiy, "the entire life force of the nation was directed toward the one single problem of occupying new areas and cultivating them according to old customs." Nevertheless - "the political idea suffered thereby, as well as Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian city." /190/

181 The innermost feelings of the Ukrainians in the days of their liberation is described by a German war correspondent a few weeks after the Bolsheviks were driven out of Kiyev, in the following words of a Ukrainian physician in Kiyev: "You Germans must be very patient with us! You must help us as though we were schoolchildren to whom one must teach the most elementary aspects of life step by step! You must give us strength once more to believe in humanity! For we are not ourselves. We are pitiful, down-trodden, homeless creatures, human beings deprived of all that was sacred, who night and day have lived in the fear of being deported, exiled or shot because of our very existence." (135)

135. "Kiew - der Blutegel der Ukraine," Kiyev, the leech of the Ukraine, by the war correspondent, Erwin Kirchhof.

000 What, therefore, is to become of this country where intelligent men voice such shattering words? Now that the Bolsheviks have been driven out, there will first of all have to be a thorough stock-taking of the Ukrainian people to determine the presence of living cells capable of growth and development, in order that we may then, with careful consideration, be able to build, stone by stone, a new and better future. Too much in the way of diversified wealth and talent in the Ukraine has been destroyed or stunted by Muscovite imperialists, beginning with Peter the Great down to Stalin, the strangler, to make possible the achievement of such a tremendous task of reconstruction within a few years.

/Map in pocket of book/

The Peoples of the Ukraine

183 162 The distribution in 1939 of peoples and ethnic

262 745 434 Expectant and nursing mothers are usually at work, and have standard leaves with pay and special privileges; thus, if working, they receive rations appropriate to the occupational group, plus special food allowances; and if not working, dependents' rations plus these allowances. The supplements are as follows, monthly: cereals, 1.2 kilograms; butter (or substitute), 0.8 kilograms; sugar 0.6 kilograms; vegetables, 2.0 kilograms; milk (fresh or dried) 12 litres. Their approximate calories from rations alone are, therefore:

If light workers	1,682 plus 512 -	2,194	calories daily
If employees	1,144 plus 512 -	1,656	" "
If dependents	704 plus 512 -	1,216	" "

In the last case it is almost possible to assume that the husband is well paid and will be able to buy products in the open market.

262 Even if the established ration scales for all groups could be met, they would not provide an adequate, balanced diet. Particularly the rations for women and children are very light in fat, first-class protein, and calcium. They provide less than half the low League of Nation's standard for daily full-cream milk requirements of the expectant mother. But even these inadequate scales are seldom supplied.

262 434 Since mid-October 1946, the honouring of ration cards has, because of the increasing food shortages, become more and more irregular. In December 1946, for instance, large groups of persons in the Kiev area received only bread, sugar, and a few tins of vegetables on their cards. No meat, fish or fats were available. By the middle of January 1947, the situation had grown even more stringent, and only bread was supplied on the ration.

At the same time, the amount of food available off the ration has decreased almost to the vanishing point. Cereals and white bread have practically disappeared from the open market; and when they are available, the price is beyond the reach of the average person.

262 181 164 369 The effects of the poor diet are already to be seen. The people generally show a noticeable lack of their former liveliness, energy and cheerfulness. Moreover, according to the Medical Officer of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, clinical starvation has made its appearance in the smaller villages of the Republic: protein dropsy and avitaminosis are increasing; and among the townspeople there is great incidence of skin infections and respiratory and nasopharyngeal conditions.

645 744 262 In order to meet some of the medical aspects which may arise out of the present food situation, the Ministry of Health has taken the following steps.

7

THE BRIDGE BETWEEN WEST AND EAST

101 The political boundary between Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia is not a clear-cut dividing line between two different worlds. There are a number of Ruthenian peasants in the eastern parts of Slovakia who form a gradual transition between the two neighbours. True, the Slovaks and the Ruthenians are two different Slav races. The Slovaks are closely related to the Moravians and Czechs in the West; the Ruthenians belong to the Russian family—mainly to its Ukrainian branch—although the thousand years of isolation from their kinsmen have had a specific effect on the character of the Ruthenian population on the southern slopes of the Carpathians. But there is a gradual link between the Slovaks and the Ruthenians, and Carpathian Ruthenia may aptly be described as a bridge between the Western and Eastern Slavs.

131 175 Geographically, too, the two neighbouring countries are similar. A chain of wooded mountains separates them from the kindred Slav populations to the North and North-East; while to the South both countries have stretches of fertile plain which run down unobstructed into the vast Danubian basin. That is the reason why both countries fell victim to Hungarian expansion early in their history and remained under Hungarian rule as second-rate provinces for a thousand years. Until the end of 1918, neither Slovakia nor Carpathian Ruthenia were on the map.

177 212 Both these countries suffered from the long alien domination which hampered their development. Slovakia was the more fortunate of the two because, in spite of her political separation from the independent lands of the Czech Crown, cultural and religious contacts with them had been maintained for centuries. But the Ruthenians received less support of this kind from their kindred beyond the Carpathians. As a result, Ruthenia was still more at the mercy of her Hungarian overlords and remained in a state of greater backwardness than her neighbour in the West. This is well illustrated by the degree of illiteracy in Ruthenia under the Hungarian regime which was, indeed, appalling; according to the last Hungarian census about three quarters of the Ruthenian population could not read or write.

177 181 Only people of considerable racial individuality could have resisted systematic denationalisation as the Ruthenians did. They may be a simple people; but their mode of living, their outlook and their character have an unmistakable stamp of their own.

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they
177 were born. This applies even to those who, through force of circum-
181 stances, had to leave their native village to earn their living elsewhere.
167 Some have found occupation in the fertile South; but when they have saved some money they want to return home and are prepared to pay a higher price for a few poor fields, although in the valleys of the South they could buy much better land for the same amount. Hundreds of thousands have emigrated to America, where about as many Ruthenians can be found as have remained in the homeland under the Carpathians. Yet many long to come back home to find their last resting place in the native soil.

137 The peculiar beauty of this forgotten country has a strong grip
313 on her simple sons. The Ruthenian Carpathians are not so high as the Slovak peaks, but the vast stretches of dense forest, which cover almost half of Ruthenia, give the country a more primeval appearance. Some of the woods and slopes are delightful idylls, where the fresh and fragrant air is full of hum and rustle and warble. But in many parts, unchartered and untouched by human hand, the forest is sombre. Trees felled by storm or gale lie dead where they have fallen, and there is a smell of rotting wood in this lonely wilderness. Wild boar, wolf, lynx and bear have their hunting ground here, while above the tops of the mighty pines, firs, oaks and maples, circle the eagle and the hawk. Other parts of the forest are enlivened by the rhythmical sound of the axe cutting down trees to be floated down the rushing mountain streams. A large proportion of the hardy Ruthenians earn their living in this way. But above this expanse of deep forest are the sunlit pastures and upland meadows sprinkled with gentian, buttercups, pansies, chrysanthemums and geraniums. Sheep and cattle graze here during the summer months; Ruthenia is also a country of shepherds, who blow their huge horns at night to gather the scattered herds.

312



Wooden dam in Ruthenia

101 among themselves. They can be divided into three well-defined tribes
162 —the Lemki on the Slovak border, the Boiki in the centre, and the Huculs in the eastern tip of Ruthenia.

The most interesting tribe are the Huculs. They have preserved
186 their tribal characteristics better than their kinsmen. Their standard of education is higher, and they are more conscious and proud of their national individuality. When the Hungarians invaded Ruthenia after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Huculs offered the stiffest resistance, and during the war they were the core of the partisan force fighting against the totalitarian powers. Like the other Ruthenian
463 mountaineers, the Huculs are largely wood-cutters and raftsmen. But
342 they are distinguished by their skill as carpenters and wood-carvers. This is clearly reflected in their mode of life. Their wooden-cottages are neatly built and furnished and impress the visitor by their scrupulous cleanliness. Their tribal individuality and artistic skill find expression in the numerous carvings with which they like to decorate their unpainted houses.

181 The neighbouring Boiki have also, to some extent, preserved their
511 pride in racial individuality, and their mode of life, though more primitive, has some interesting features. They are kind-hearted, sincere and hospitable, in spite of their poverty. Though less proud than the Huculs, they fly into a temper when crossed, and impulsive outspoken-
342 ness is one of their traits. They live in cottages and huts which they like to paint in blue and brown, and this makes their exterior rather attractive. But the interior does not always live up to the façade. The better-off Boiki manage to live in fairly decent cottages with two or more rooms, but the huts of the poor often consist of one room only—a dark room with no chimney, one small window, and some roughly
352 made furniture. Some have no bedsteads in the true sense of the word; along the whole wall of the room one may find a long "plank-bed" where the grown-ups sleep at the one end and the children at the other. When the children grow up they sleep on separate beds of the same kind. Unlike the Hucul houses, the Boiki huts have no wooden
342 floors. The domestic animals often share the same room with their
511 masters in winter, sleeping on the bare earth. For many families such a room is therefore a kitchen, living room, bedroom, hall and stable in one.

511 Much the same applies to the Lemki tribe who live partly on Slovak territory. They are the poorest Ruthenian tribe and their racial
181 character has undergone a certain deterioration. Their standard of life is often appalling, the hygiene leaves much to be desired, and they have the largest number of illiterates, though some improvement has taken place under the Republic.

000 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The

161 natural increase in the Ukrainian parts of the Soviet Union. The USSR not having issued any statistics. It seems, however, that population was reduced by increased mortality.

161 The steady flow of emigration diminished the actual in-
166 crease of the Ukrainian people. West Ukrainians go to the United States and Canada, the inhabitants of the Dnipro area to the Caucasus and Asia. Movements within the frontiers shift the population slowly to the east and south, these movements being strongest towards the Basin of the Donets and the North Caucasus, and weakest towards the areas on the right banks of the Dnipro and Galicia. There is also a steady flight from the country to the town. In consequence to an increase of the collective system, of famine and flight to the town, the population of the USSR did not grow since 1932; increase of population in the towns was opposed by considerable decrease in the country.

c) National Conditions

● 182 National conditions in the Ukrainian territory at present have been produced by long and complicated processes which Ukraine was forced to undergo by factors such as her geographical position, the extent of her territory, movements of colonisation, natural increase, migration, lack of an independent government, etc.

In consequence, the national composition of Ukrainian areas is characterised by peculiar features, such as a mixture of nationalities in many provinces, a fairly high percentage of national minorities, a considerable difference from the ethnological point of view between the populations of town and village, and so on.

167 We find different national conditions in the different frontier districts. In the West, the Ukrainian factor receded; the frontier between Ukraine and Poland was regulated in favor of the latter and, what was more important, the entire region of the frontier was settled by Poles who had been pressing east from time immemorial, in the search for better opportunities for their surplus population. The Polish immigration in these districts is

p. 187

VIII. NATIONALISM AND THE CHURCH

THE PRINCIPAL propagators of Ukrainian nationalism in the occupied Ukraine were political groups. They were, however, not the only bearers of the concept of Ukrainian distinctiveness. Religious organizations also played an important role. The relation of the Greek Catholic Church to the nationalist parties has already been discussed. Unlike the political parties, most of which at least claimed to represent the entire Ukrainian nation, however, the Greek Catholic Church was almost wholly confined to Galicia, since the great mass of the East Ukrainian Christians were members of the Orthodox faith. 795 [668*]

In the Orthodox lands, religion and national affiliation have always been closely related. Most of the East and South Slavic peoples identify their church with their national existence. Some of the same characteristics which have enhanced the distinctiveness of these peoples have also formed the basis of divisions among the Orthodox Slavs. One such feature is the lack of a supreme authority within the Orthodox Church. Each body of the church, existing in a given territory in a given period, has a well-defined hierarchy, usually governed by a council of bishops and frequently headed by a patriarch or metropolitan. There is, however, no pope at the head of all Orthodoxy. It is true that the Orthodox Church, like the Roman Catholic Church, recognizes the authority of an ecumenical council, but such a council has not been held in the East for a millennium. [182]

A difficult question arises at this point: how is the "body of the faithful" or "territory" of each group to be defined? This problem has, in fact, been an extremely troublesome one in the history of the Orthodox Church, for in the absence of a central ecclesiastical authority there can be no final solution. In practice an answer has been provided by another characteristic feature 795 659

[See category 116, pp. 36-38 -- Analyst]

665 Ukrainian population prefers to read, whereas the works of Russian authors remain completely unknown in the Ukraine. It goes on to say that this is a very detrimental phenomenon, for Russian culture is important for the entire Soviet Union and for the whole world, while Ukrainian culture is of merely local significance.

Conversely, the Ukrainians accused the Muscovites of chauvinism. Stalin, the Georgian, tried to pronounce a Solomonic judgment at the Sixteenth Party Congress in June 1930 by condemning both Great Russian and Ukrainian nationalism: "Great Russian chauvinism under the communists reflects the efforts of the ruling classes of former Russia to reconstruct their lost privileges of domination over other peoples. As a result, the chauvinism of Great Russia is the chief danger in the national policy of the Communist Party." In accordance with these ideas, the Sixteenth Congress adopted the resolution that the Party should /117/ intensify its fight against Great Russian deviation and the deviations of "local nationalism".

648 As a matter of fact, Ukrainian nationalism was indeed becoming a danger to Bolshevik Moscow. •182 As compared to the period of war-communism, the Ukraine was living in remarkably comfortable circumstances. [369] The fact that the majority of the Ukrainian people, the rural population, enjoyed an adequate subsistence, must have had a positively irritating effect on the urban masses in their wretched circumstances. Was not this an open refutation of the communist doctrine? There was the additional fact that the Ukrainians became more and more importunate with their varied demands, and that the power of the Ukrainian government had increased so much during the NEP period, that finally it headed the opposition of non-Russian peoples in the Council of Nationalities (the second chamber next to the Supreme Council) and forced Moscow several times to change its

[During the NEP period in the Soviet Union — Analyst]

648 162 budget plans. If things went on in this way the social system of communism would face serious crises as a result of the flourishing peasant economy of the Ukraine - in the regions of Great Russia communal ownership of fields has prevailed since ancient times - and the Muscovite conception of national unity might be seriously threatened by the increasing power of "assembled peoples".

In order to avoid these dangers and also in view of other considerations, Stalin discontinued the New Economic Policy and introduced the period of the Five Year Plans. In spite of the decision of the Sixteenth Party Congress, the way to Russianization was opened, and Ukrainization discontinued; Ukrainian nationalism received a hard blow when free peasant farming was immediately liquidated. There have been untold victims of these revolutionary processes which were attended by violent upheavals from the time Stalin announced his principle of "socialism within one country".

"Socialism within one country" demanded 648 185 industrialization as the presupposition for the independence of the socialistic /118/ state. This industrialization had to take place throughout the realm and according to a unified plan. Every form of particularism could only be detrimental - the Ukrainian form doubly so; for in the Ukraine are the coal and metal and the water power reserves of the Dniepr from which horsepower by the millions can be obtained. Such considerations led to the First Five Year Plan, in the course of which Ukrainian economy, heavy industry, finance and particularly agriculture were subordinated to orders from Moscow. The division of private economy was "liquidated".

The new system* introduced the purging of the 661 Pan-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the year 1930, where members of the "League for the Liberation of the Ukraine" had entrenched themselves; they were now "unmasked". In a monster trial in

* [i.e., Beginning of the Five year Plans — Analyst]

593 meetings ("posydilky" and "Vetshernytsi"), and even at the
584 street meetings that are held at night ("vulytsja"); marriage is
591 seldom an affair of arrangement. After marriage, children generally leave their parents' home; a father often provides a home of his own for a son who wishes to marry.

536 Divorce is rare in the country. An unlucky choice of a conjugal
836 partner is borne with patience. Up till recently, in spite of the fact that boys and girls are constantly thrown together at work and at play, a high standard of chastity prevailed and illicit sexual intercourse was the exception. A "pokrytka" who has been seduced by a Russian soldier ("saldatka") or a foreigner (mostly a Pole) has no easy lot in the country. The whole family is deeply ashamed when the "bundling" custom ("komora") which is still practised in some parts of the country reveals that the
● 183 bride is no longer a virgin. Customs have been strengthened
561 by the respect for national traditions, a deep religious feeling and tolerance. Birth, baptism, marriage, death and burial are accompanied by very many, original, symbolic customs, dating partly from before the birth of Christ. For instance, the old custom of duly "recognising" the newborn has been preserved as well as the ceremony of the baptismal banquet which marks the reception of the newly born child into the community.

585 In the varied wedding customs which generally take the better part of three days, there are memories of the days when the men of the tribe kidnapped or bought their brides. A marriage in a national setting has many dramatic effects and is accompanied by a whole series of symbolical actions and choruses. They remind us of the original rôle of the family in society. Customs from the world of the Grand Princes have been preserved in those marriage rites as in the ritualistic folk-songs, while the influence of the church is confined to the
765 actual ceremony in the church. The wake ("posyzhinja") and the wake games, which are dying out, are echoes of ancestor-worship and intended to prevent the dead from returning to life. The custom of special laments for the dead ("holosinnia") and the funeral banquet (formerly "tryzna") have persisted; on the many days of commemoration of the dead (e. g. on the

188 The city [Kiev—Kyïv][6] and the surrounding country are, in fact,
●184 Little Russian rather than Great Russian, and between these two sections of the population there are profound differences—differences of language, costume, traditions, popular songs, proverbs, folk-lore, domestic arrangements, mode of life, and Communal organization. In these and other respects the Little Russians, South Russians, Ruthenes, or Khokhly, as they are variously designated, differ from the Great Russians of the North, who form the predominant factor in the Empire, and who have given to that wonderful structure its essential characteristics. Indeed, if I did not fear to ruffle unnecessarily the patriotic susceptibilities of my Great Russian friends who have a pet theory on this subject, I should say that we have here two distinct nationalities, further apart from each other than the English and the Scotch. The differences are due, I believe, partly to ethnographical peculiarities and partly to historical conditions.[7]

197 As Wallace observed, linguistic differences between the Ukrain-
186 ians and Russians were significant. The factor of language has indeed been used very frequently as the decisive criterion for distinguishing the two ethnic groups.[8] During the nineteenth century a distinctive, though still evolving, Ukrainian literary language arose based on the speech prevalent among the peasantry. This speech is a member of the East Slavic linguistic group and therefore is closer to Russian than to any other major language, although Russian is not readily understood by most of the peasants. Russian was already established as the literary language of the East Ukraine before literary Ukrainian became prominent, however, and it continued to be familiar to nearly all educated Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

[6] The second form is the Ukrainian. Usually the place names cited in this study are given in the forms generally used by the power which since 1945 has controlled the area in which they are located. This means that places now in the USSR are designated by the Russian forms, and the few now in Poland by Polish forms. Where the Ukrainian name is different, it is given in parentheses after the first citation. In a few cases (especially rivers) where another form is already familiar to the English reader, this practice has not been followed, and in the case of the city of Mariupol' (Mariiupil'), which has recently been renamed Zhdanov, the old name has been used.

[7] Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1905), p. 547.

[8] In this study this general usage of referring to those who speak Ukrainian as their native tongue as "Ukrainians" has been followed, although it should be constantly kept in mind that use of the language in childhood does not necessarily imply a belief in Ukrainian independence, or even a consciousness of national distinctiveness.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

or Poland, because before 1905 opposition to the Russian Government was less marked. Besides, many Russian Liberals, even of official position, treated the Ukrainian movement as an interesting variation of Russian life. 177

(D) Social

The class divisions into titled aristocracy, nobles, townsmen, merchants, and peasants, existed as in other parts of the Russian Empire, but, roughly speaking, a different ethnic element corresponded to each social division. The titled aristocracy was mainly Polish in the western parts (with the name Polish Ukrainians) and Russian in the eastern. With but few exceptions, the same could be said of the class of landed nobles, in which the Great Russians formed the majority; Poles, Germans and others were the minority. The Ukrainian landed noble was almost unknown; and the townsmen of the large towns were also in a great majority non-Ukrainian, being chiefly Great Russians and Jews (in Berdichev the Jews form 78·4 per cent. of the population; in Yekaterinoslav, 40 per cent.), and, in the western Ukraine, Russian, Polish, German, Greek, &c. The Jews were mainly traders and shopkeepers, while the Great Russians and the foreigners were manufacturers. 565 563 184

But few of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia* took part in the industrial life of the country, about one-third of them belonging to the professional classes, i. e. doctors, Government officials, lawyers, and teachers. The Ukrainian professional classes originated from the ex-Cossacks and the townsmen rather than from the peasants, since there is a great distinction between the peasants and other members of the community. The Ukrainian nobles, it must be remembered, have in most cases become russified, and partly also polonized. The distinction between the peasant and other classes is not based on economic grounds, for some peasants in the Ukraine are very rich. It lies chiefly in their cultural condition, in their education, or rather lack 565 [463]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

ideals of the *intelligentsia*, if the latter cannot provide them with the economic advantages to which they aspire. 186 565

The *Ukrainian territory* claimed by the propagandist literature, i. e. from San to Don, never formed a political unit, either independently or under the sway of any empire. It is a well-defined geographical unit with most favourable economic conditions, but the people living in these lands do not form a homogeneous nation of one linguistic, social, and cultural type. The essentially Ukrainian country lies on both sides of the Dnieper. In the Don and Kuban regions, the Ukrainian colonists were preceded by the Great-Russian colonists, in Eastern Galicia by the Poles. But it is true that during the time of the greatest Russian oppression Eastern Galicia played the part of Piedmont for the *intelligentsia* from the Russian Ukraine. The nine [162] Governments grouped by the Russian Administration into (1) South-west Territory (Podolia, Volhynia, and Kiev), (2) Malorossiya (Chernigov, Poltava, and Kharkov), and (3) Novorossiya (only Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav out of the five Governments of Novorossiya), have a population which is preponderantly Ukrainian in the rural districts; in the towns the Ukrainians are outnumbered by Jews, Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans, Italians, &c.

It is remarkable how small a part is played by the *intelligentsia* in industry and trade, in the Church, and in legal and educational institutions. All Ukrainians are agriculturists, but in most cases they are merely labourers, not concerned with the management of agricultural industries. Since 1905, however, the co-operative societies have brought to the Ukrainian peasant the social education which the *mir* gave to the Great-Russian peasant in the two last centuries. The claim, therefore, that these nine Governments are Ukrainian means that people speaking various Ukrainian dialects and having similar customs inhabit them, though, so far, they have not managed it politically, socially, or culturally, and are hardly likely to do 184 565

565 so efficiently without the help of educated foreigners
184 for some generations to come.

000 *The Ukraine and Great Russia.*—The future of the Ukraine affects Great Russia in the first instance. If the Ukraine is permanently severed from Great Russia, the latter will have to limit itself to the 'Moscow-Siberian' Empire, for it is hardly likely that any other native states formed within the limits of the former Russian Empire (Azerbaijan, Esthonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, the North Caucasian Republic, White Russia) would then belong to her. There seems to be a similarity between these states and the Ukraine, in that they all refuse to recognize Russian suzerainty, though they may possibly join Russia as states with equal rights. The Ukraine is the largest and richest of these states, so that she might play a determining part in their negotiation with Great Russia if she produces the necessary statesman. On the other hand, small as these other states are, they are more homogeneous ethnically and more advanced culturally than the Ukraine, and are able, with the exception of White Russia, to carry on political and economic affairs by themselves.

The Ukraine and Poland.—Poland and the Ukraine are neighbours who supplement each other in the economic sphere; and Poland has many men of education and enterprise. But good relations depend largely on the issue of the political conflict within the Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists claim Galicia as far as the River San, while the Poles, especially the Galician Poles, claim it all for Poland. The ethnic boundary is roughly along the River Bug. In the Eastern Galician problem lies the most serious danger of quarrel.

563 The next interest of Poland is in her minorities in Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev. They consist of noble landowners or professionals in the towns, some of them men whose families have lived there for the last four or five centuries. The reverse is the case of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. The Polish minorities in the Russian Ukraine are much smaller, but in

776 appeased, exorcised. When the priest of Velykyi Lypnyk consecrates the water of the village brook on the sixth of January, the people believe that the demons are thus driven away.

326 The men of Valykyi Lypnyk are tinkers, a
221 trade which in many places has a bad flavor. It is easy to say that they travel about the country like gypsies. But even though they wander from village to village, a small bundle of tools on their backs, repairing stoves and mending pots, they are, nevertheless, not homeless. As soon as spring comes, poverty drives them out on the road, and only late in the fall when the first white flakes begin to fall, they return to their wives and children with the few groschen they have saved.
241 For land is scarce, the clod of earth small, the soil is poor and the climate harsh.* The women work like drudges for their bit of barley bread and potatoes. With their small cows and a wooden plough they till the lower slopes of the mountain ridges. They sow by hand, harrow, and in the fall they cut off the barely ripe ears of grain with a sickle.
286 In their "spare time" these women* with their
291 strangely narrow faces sit barefoot in their full pleated skirts and pale pink blouses, a charming little cap on their heads, at their looms and tirelessly ply their shuttle back and forth between the taut threads, or press wool into felt for the jackets and trousers of their husbands.
342 The rooms of these "tinkers"* are surprisingly large and clean; the kitchen, living room, /10/ bedroom and work room are all in one. The whole structure with adjoining stable and wagon shed is built of wood, the inside unfinished, the outside [789] covered with loam. In order that there be no lack of magic, carpenters carve three suns into the central roof beam.

•184 How rich these "tinkers" of East Slovakia were with their little plot of free earth, their two or three cows, their barley bread and their loom, compared to their brothers in Carpatho-

* [In the village of Valykyi Lypnyk, Western Ukraine -Analyst]

184 Ukraine, to the small farmers in the Polish Ukraine, helpless and oppressed by the Poles, to the Soviet Ukrainians working in factories or on collective farms, or even to the exiles! They[1] all [212] speak the same language, albeit in different dialects, they write the same Cyrillic script, regard the good fortune of one among them as a common possession, while the misfortune that strikes one is felt by all.

101 The thousand souls of Velykyi Lypnyk belong to the westernmost tribe of Ukrainians, the Lemki. [197] They apeak a Slovakian-Ukrainian border dialect. Ukrainian scholars maintain that the Ukrainian settlements formerly reached almost to Cracow, but that the Lemki were pushed back into the mountains by the Poles in the North and the Slovaks in the South. Until the collapse of Poland a bitter nationality fight went on for this small spearhead, especially on the part of Poland, and in the process the Lemki, as the weaker ones, were obliged to yield step by step. The Magyars, no less than the Poles, oppressed the Ukrainian neighboring tribes of Boyki and Huzul and even more than the Slovaks oppressed the Lemki. The Magyar clergy added close to 160,000 Ukrainian souls to their ethnic group. In the census the word "Magyar" stands under the heading of "nationality", and "Greek Orthodox" under the heading of "religion". They are the denationalized Ukrainians who have, for the present, still remained true to their faith. All this began when, at the /11/ end of the last century, the Magyar clergy introduced Magyar hymns, and when in 1912 the Bishop of Haydudorog invented and decreed a Hungarian liturgy in place of the Old Slavic one. (1)

1. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 33.

1 [The Carpatho-, Polish-, Soviet-, and East Slovakian Ukrainians — Analyst]

798 collapse seemed inevitable when in 1595 seven Orthodox bishops had approved the Brest Union in principle. But Polish-Jesuit intolerance, unfulfilled promises and disregard of the rights of those who were ready to enter the union made some of the bishops mistrustful and again estranged them. The arrogance with which the Catholic party treated the Orthodox, their public mockery, indeed even maltreatment of the Orthodox priests at that time, caused a chasm so great that to this day it has not been bridged over. At the same time, those who were already Uniats were not much better off. Their "complete equality" with Polish citizens and the Catholic clergy remained an empty promise which it was not in the power of the Uniat bishops to enforce. If the lower priests did not belong to the nobility "they were often seen in torn clothing walking along, whip in hand, beside their horses and oxen, furnishing relays for the state or performing compulsory services as serfs to their master." (57)

57. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 24.

Conditions in the Uniat church improved in those regions that had come under Austrian rule after the partitioning of Poland, whereas in congressional Poland a ukase of the Czar again forcefully opened up the Orthodox heaven to the Uniats. With Peter the Great, who in 1721 had transferred the rights of the patriarchy of Moscow to the Holy Synod, the Czar had become the head of the Orthodox Church.

•184 795 Since the serious crisis of Orthodoxy in the 15th and 16th /107/ century, the opportunity for a reunion of both churches[7] has never been as favorable as it is at present. The "defender of all Orthodox believers" is dead. The Synod in Moscow as well as the Ukrainian church, which

7 [i.e., Catholic-orthodox - Analyst]

184 795 became autocephalous during the Revolution, have dissolved. In the wide realm of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics there is no visible ecclesiastical authority whatsoever. No one knows how many priests are secretly carrying on their duties. Churches are closed and have been transformed into "godless museums" or clubs. East Rome is without power and without priests.

648 795 It was said of Pius XI: "The Holy Father is much concerned about the re-unification of the East. It may be said that he has made this the goal of his life." (58) Pius XII, as may be

58. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 38.

seen by the honor bestowed on Vladimir, cherishes the same plans.

But the Soviet Union remained closed to the emissaries of the Vatican. Everything was done that could be done. In 1918 the Vatican hastened to send an ambassador to Kiyev. But before he arrived the addressee of the credentials, Hetman Skoropadsky, was already fleeing to the West. In 1922 to 1923 papal aid to the starving is supposed to "prepare the ground" for the seed which none other but Nuntius Pacelli scattered when in all secrecy in Berlin, he consecrated a Jesuit organizer as bishop of this charitable work; the Jesuit who is passing through must be consecrated secretly, in order that the Bolsheviks do not become suspicious and that the "simple" father who is apparently only concerned about apportioning the food that is handed out, can unostentatiously appoint five bishops. In this manner the first Catholic prelates are installed in the Ukraine. How often they have made use of their sacred powers and how many Catholic bishops and priests there are today in Soviet Ukraine is not known even in the Vatican.

174 Ivan Kalita destroyed the power of the nobility and therewith laid the foundation for Muscovite despotism. A further example of historically proved contrariety is furnished during the time of Ivan the Terrible. The most sinister force rules at that time in Moscow, while in the Ukraine the Cossacks are preparing to found the freest state that probably ever existed in East Europe.

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101 Among the Ukrainians there are, in turn,
•184 tribal differences. The inhabitants of the dark forest region of Podlakhia and Polesia, who are obliged to wrest all fruits from the earth, can scarcely be as gay as those of the sunny spaces of the south. Those are melancholy and oppressed people who up there carry on the struggle for existence. Farther south, from the fertile hills of Podolia way over to the foothills of the Caucasus, there are fields of golden grain, fruit grows of its own accord, the sky is blue for many months, and on the Kuban there is paradise itself. Cheerful, candid people live here.

181 The Ukrainians are a peasant people and more than 90% of all children first see the light of the world through the small window-panes of a straw- or shingle-covered cottage. They are peasant souls - that is, quiet, good-natured, placid human beings who cling to the sod, to their own farm, who want to plow, sow and reap. They are poor, but honest and at the same time hospitable and positively ceremonially polite. People like to call them "Southerners" because of their cheerful disposition and their humor. They love that contemplative life which /132/ is hard to combine with constant hard work. It has not been a blessing to the Ukrainian that the soil yields richly and effortlessly, that his daily bread need not be obtained amid constant toil and hardships. If that were the case, perhaps he

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revolution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

western Siberia, the Altai and the Far East. The execution of Stalin's commands is to be completed by September 1940. It is not to be anticipated that the acute conditions of 1929–34 will be repeated as a result of this new drive against the human nature of the Russian rural masses: the Communist machine has broken the strength of peasant society. At the same time, there is little doubt that the harvest of 1939–40 will not be as abundant as those of 1936–8.

The influence of the Revolution and of the Soviet régime on forestry in the South of Russia has been no less baleful than on other branches of rural industry. At the end of the nineteenth century woods covered 20 per cent of the whole area of the Ukraine; in 1928, according to the most optimistic estimates of Soviet statisticians, they did not occupy more than 7 per cent. Even in such a 'half-steppe' region as Poltava, owing to the care of the Imperial Government and of large landowners, woods had covered 10 per cent of the total area. 'Destruction of forests is one of the greatest evils because it is followed by the formation of deep ravines which drain the district of underground waters. The consequence of the formation of such ravines is that streams carry away valuable soil to the rivers and the sea. Every year thousands of hectares of good black earth are lost to the labourer and only serve to make the Dniepr and its affluents more shallow. The destruction of forests, the formation of ravines, the drying up of underground waters, threaten the future of the Ukraine with the gravest consequences.'

The Soviet Government is well aware of the dark side of its 'achievement' in the agricultural life of the South of Russia. But, as is well known, the Soviet leaders intend to effect a radical change in the balance of productive forces within the Union. Their reasons for this intention are both political and ideological: political because they realize that their dictatorship rests upon the industrial proletariat and has always aroused the antagonism of the peasants; ideological because they are the apostles of the mechanistic conception of life and, hypnotized by the material achievements of the capitalist world, they ape it in their attempt to transform it and can seek nothing more profound than the realization of Stalin's dream 'to catch up and surpass America'.

In 1913 the relation of agricultural to industrial production in Russia was 59·4 to 40·6. Under the original Five Year Plan formulated in 1928 the Soviets aimed at the attainment of a balance which should allocate 80·2 to industry and only 19·8 to agriculture. This fantastic aim was based obviously on the possibilities of bringing into exploitation the vast mineral resources which were known to lie under the soil of the Soviet Union. And all the political ruthless-

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

433 ness and ideological fanaticism which are so characteristic of Com-
185 munist psychology—itself a manifestation of a certain state of spiritual sterility—were brought to bear to achieve ultimate objects, which on the American continent during the preceding century had been attained by more balanced, hardly less heroic, and certainly less catastrophic methods.

§ 3. INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

135 The industrial development of the Ukraine has been based on the
131 exploitation of the coal deposits of the Donets basin and of the iron-ore and manganese fields situated west of the Dniepr. Abundant layers of coal are found along both banks of the Donets. The eastern part of the carboniferous region lies within the territory of the Don with its Cossack population. The western part, which constitutes about two-thirds of the whole region, is situated within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine.

Whether the Donets region properly belongs to the Ukraine is a question which has never been definitely settled. Historically, the lands along the right bank of the river Donets in its northern part belonged to that 'New Ukraine' which began to be populated in the second half of the seventeenth century by settlers from Muscovy and by fugitives from Hetman's Ukraine—at that time devastated by the Turkish invasions of Ahmed Köprülü and Kara Mustafa. Subsequently, these lands were incorporated in the Government of Kharkov. The lands along the southern course of the Donets formed part of the extreme eastern angle of New Russia where settled life only really began in the eighteenth century after the Tartar Nogay Horde, which roamed over this region, had retired beyond the Volga.

In 1917 the Provisional Government, in admitting five Ukrainian Governments as the legitimate area for the exercise of 'the national and cultural influence of the Kiev *Rada*', excluded the Government of Kharkov for the reason that the Donets coal area lay within it. The Ukrainian language is not commonly spoken in the coal-fields, and even if the large numbers of temporary labourers who come in from the north are ignored, not more than half the population of Donbass (the Donets coal area) can boast of their Ukrainian origin. In general, this region has nothing which unites its mixed industrial population to the essentially Ukrainian rural population of adjoining regions to the west. The only real link which connects the Donets coal-fields with the industrial districts along the Dniepr and the manganese and iron-ore regions is a purely economic one.

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different: 51 per cent and 49 per cent.' It is necessary to add that Sadovsky includes in production intended 'for general use' in both periods the output of agricultural industry: i.e. sugar, spirits, flour and sunflower oil. If these figures for rural industry are excluded, those for so-called 'light industry' remain practically negligible. For example, only 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in U.S.S.R. are derived from the Ukraine; and there is no manufacture of cloth or leather goods.

As Sadovsky justly remarks, the policy of exclusively encouraging heavy industry has resulted in the neglect of the economic interests of the western and central Ukraine. In effect, with the policy of industrializing eastern and south-eastern Ukraine, the Soviets have shown a tendency to de-industrialize the wide and rich western provinces. Here the basis of their policy is probably strategic as well as political. 'In a series of towns of right-bank Ukraine such as Zhitomir, Berdichev, Zhmerinka, Mohilev-Podolsk, Uman, Smela, signs of decadence can be observed during the period of the Five Year Plans.'

The 'Economic Plans' of the Soviet Government are subordinated to a general political policy which, as has been explained in the preceding chapter, aims at the complete fusion of the Soviet Ukraine with the rest of U.S.S.R.; and according to Communist theory political unity can only be based on economic fusion. In forcing the pace of the development of heavy industry in the south and south-east to the detriment of the light and agricultural industries of the rest of the country, the Moscow Government pursues two objectives. First, the importance of the Ukrainian national element in the Ukraine is reduced. 'The Ukrainian people are an old people of agricultural civilization and have never shown any inclination for industrial work and life in big towns. The Ukrainian prefers the country if he can earn his living there, and if it is necessary he finds work in the different branches of rural industry' (Brégy and Obolensky). According to official Soviet statistics on the nationality of workers in the Ukraine, the coal industry employs 75 per cent Russians and 25 per cent Ukrainians; the metallurgical, 73 per cent and 22 per cent respectively; the building trades 56 per cent and 37 per cent (*The National Policy of the Russian Communist Party Expressed in Figures*, p. 177). About 50 per cent only of the people in the Donets region are Ukrainians, and among the urban population of the whole of Soviet Ukraine 70 per cent are not Ukrainians. In two big towns like Odessa and Kharkov only 25 per cent of the inhabitants are Ukrainians. The same phenomenon can be observed in centres like Mariupol and Lugansk. In this wise the

185 development of industrial centres in the Ukraine and New Russia
433 leads to a preponderance of 'new-comers'—in fact, of that social element on whose support the Soviets could rely in a political struggle with the forces of Ukrainian nationalism.

The second political objective which the Soviet Government has pursued is the strengthening of the economic dependence of the Ukraine on the rest of the Union. 'The Soviet Government systematically and intentionally binds Southern industry with strong bonds to the industries of other parts of the Union. This conclusion is imposed by a study of the categories of goods which are transported by the Soviet railways in a "meridial" direction. A considerable part of rail transport in Soviet Ukraine is engaged on the carriage of the half-finished products of industrial works by the most complicated and lengthy routes, e.g. from the banks of the Dniepr to the Urals or from the Moscow district to the Donets region and back. If a comparison is made of goods transported from south to north and from north to south, it will be seen that the machine works of the Ukraine do not "finish" their products, but that these are sent for the final processes to different and sometimes distant parts of the U.S.S.R. The motor industry, in particular, strongly binds the Central Russian region, South Russia, the Volga region and the Urals. Tractors and different agricultural machines can only be "finished" in Ukraine after being sent to receive certain parts from the north or north-east. The Soviet Government evidently is ready to make heavy sacrifices in finance and efficiency in order to attain its political ends which are to bind with strong economic ties all the different parts of the Union' (V. Levitsky).

433 Under such conditions, therefore, it is not possible to speak of 'Ukrainian economy' as an independent whole. Partly through natural causes and partly as a result of the political policy of the Soviet Government, the interdependence of the Ukraine and Great Russia has become even more definite than it was twenty years ago. The development of heavy industry, which has far exceeded the needs of the Ukrainian land itself, and the decline of agriculture has led to a strengthening of the 'meridial' tie (while at the same time Moscow, by somewhat similar measures, is strengthening the 'latitudinal' tie with the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia and is even extending it in this last direction into the outlying provinces of the former Chinese Empire).

The possibility of a wholly independent 'Greater Ukraine' (including present Soviet Ukraine with the additions of eastern Galicia (now incorporated in Soviet Ukraine), Bukovina and Carpathian Rus, may certainly be considered (as Ukrainians some-

CHAPTER FOUR

The New Economic Policy

With the cities prostrate, the land untilled and the people 185 starving, not only in the Ukraine but elsewhere on Soviet-controlled territory, Lenin suddenly changed his policies and introduced various measures which rapidly relieved some of the most glaring defects of the Soviet system. The general term for the new arrangement is the New Economic Policy which more or less remained in force until 1929.

The basis of these measures was a change in the method of 185 collecting taxes and income. Whereas, during the period of Militant 651 Communism, the peasants had been compelled in theory to hand over their entire production to the state with the exception of what they were allowed to retain for their own personal use, they were now assigned a fixed amount which they were to contribute, and the balance they could retain or even sell in the local markets. The decree providing for this was signed March 21, 1921. This gave the peasants a new inspiration to work, for they could begin to make plans rationally and intelligently and could hope to receive some reward for their diligence and industry. This measure was supplemented by others which made it appear that the Bolshevik regime was in some degree returning to the philosophy or the practices of capitalism.

That was undoubtedly the impression that Lenin wanted to 000 convey abroad. There had been signs that some of the European countries were willing to renew commercial relations with the Soviets, and the introduction of the New Economic Policy strengthened these desires. People began to speculate glibly and naively that the practical realities of existence had forced Lenin to admit much that he had previously denied and they predicted that in

000 the coming years the form of Soviet life would steadily approach that in the Western world.

●185 The same reaction was to be seen at home. Many of the more sincere and convinced Communists greatly disliked the concessions to the old order that were made at this time. It seemed to them that their revered master was turning his back upon his old position and they scoffed at the new Nepmen, who were growing wealthy under the new regime.

Lenin was not to be shaken in his policy. His motives in these concessions to capitalism are well expressed in the remarks in the *History of the All-Union Communist Party.* "Militant Communism had tried to take the fortress by frontal assault. It advanced too far and risked being cut off from its base. Lenin made the proposition to retire a few steps, to retreat for a while further to the rear, so as to pass from an assault to a siege, and then, after gaining strength, to return to the assault."

The later sequence of events showed the correctness of this explanation. The New Economic Policy in Lenin's mind was a temporary move which was made in the hope that the economic life of the country would revive. He made no lasting concessions and a careful reading of all the measures shows that they were not motivated by the sense of failure that was ascribed to them by the capitalistic world. Lenin did not put the measures in any form that would definitely bind himself or his successors. They did not provide any guarantees of their permanence, nor did they state any principle that was in contradiction with the basic philosophy of Communism. They were, obviously, a mere tactical manoeuvre in the difficult situation in which the Soviets found themselves.

185 The basic decree was signed in Moscow and was, of course,
665 only applicable to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. It could not therefore be valid without further action in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic which was, by hypothesis, a completely independent and sovereign state. Yet so closely knit together was the fate of the Ukrainian Communist Party with that of Russia that it was not necessary for the Ukrainian Soviet regime to issue immediately any new decree on the subject. It was automatically

[New Economic Policy, March 1921 -- Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

assumed that it was equally binding in Ukraine and without any further ado, the Ukrainian peasants were given the right of selling any surplus products exactly as if there had been no independent Ukrainian Soviet government. 185 665

The legal aspects of this decree did not interest the bulk of the Ukrainian peasants. They saw only the relief which it afforded them and the opportunities that it gave. They immediately took advantage of it, and its first effects were to be seen in a surprisingly short time. Of course, there could be no improvement in the national well-being until the harvest and the harvest of 1921 was again reduced by drought, so that with the best of intentions, it was not until 1922 that conditions began to improve.

A new Russian land code was finally adopted on March 3, 1921, and it was, of course, the model to be observed in the Ukraine. Yet this did not suppress the discontent of the Ukrainian peasants. 423 671

In an effort to suppress this smouldering discontent, D. Manuilsky, who was then the Commissar for Agriculture of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee (the revolutionary centre and the provisional government of the country), summoned to Kharkiv a gathering of agronomists from all parts of Ukraine in the First All-Ukrainian Agronomical Congress. He found the more than one thousand present practically united in their assertions that the agricultural laws as developed by the Bolsheviks were inapplicable to the Ukraine. They had been drawn up and approved on March 6, 1919 and they were entirely based on the spirit of the Russian land commune which provided usually for a redistribution of the land every three years, with the supplemental provision that the redistribution should take into account the number of persons in each family. This was all very good when it agreed, as it did in Russia, with the general spirit of the people who were vitally interested in the commune as such. Conditions were different in Ukraine and the purely artificial Land Society was developed. Of course, all the peasants had to become members but the land was divided by households rather than on an individual basis. Furthermore, it was provided in the Ukrainian Code that "The right to land handed over for labor use is without term and

the very beginning, for at the moment the primary need was for 423
food and the peasants were compelled to live upon what they could 427
raise. It was not long before the returning prosperity commenced new differentiations in the villages. The poorer peasants began to take advantage of the provisions that they could lease their newly acquired land, and while the Russian law provided that a lease could run for only three years, the Ninth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets soon lengthened this term to 13 years and liberalized the laws for hired labor.

The result was that by 1926, the poor peasants had leased 1,181,000 hectares and 53.9% of the peasants who had at least ten hectares rented additional land.

In a word, under the New Economic Policy conditions began, 185
in fact, to return to what had been the situation prior to the 423
revolution, with the exception that the great land owners had disappeared, but as they had been largely Russian or Polish, their departure only increased the Ukrainian influence in the villages and made them more homogeneous than they had been before.

The Commissariat of Agriculture endeavored during these [645]
years of reconstruction[1] to maintain as independent a position as possible. It established its own independent services, its own research stations which were concerned with Ukrainian agricultural problems, its own breeding stations and its own bureaus for study and development of the various branches of agriculture, and it did its best to separate these from the similar services directed by Moscow and not concerned with the particular problems of Ukraine.

The peasants responded to this with their own efforts. In 1922, [452]
with the famine still raging, they secured permission from Moscow to establish the so-called Selo-Pomich (or Village Aid) to provide credit for the peasants. This finally persuaded the Cheka to hand over part of the golden objects which they had stolen from the churches, and it used the capital thus secured to buy seed corn in America. It then loaned this to the peasants and when the harvest came, the loan was repaid in kind and more credit was then extended.

1 [During NEP -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

185 474 291 The peasants also revived and breathed new life into the co-operatives which had been broken up during the period of Militant Communism. In 1923 they established another cooperative organization, the Selo-Tekhnyka (Village Machines) which purchased more expensive agricultural machinery and rented it out to the peasants for the appropriate agricultural work. These points became the centre of mechanization and were in effect the first [453] tractor stations. In 1924 they established the First Agricultural Bank, a sort of private institution which at one time had more loans outstanding than had the Ukrainian State Bank which was, of course, closely supervised by Moscow.

185 369 All these efforts* met with marked success and agriculture speedily began to revive. The peasants became more prosperous and their holdings of livestock rapidly increased, although they did not reach the pre-war level. This, in its turn, created a new demand for manufactured products and restored the factories to operation, and with them the conditions in the cities began to improve.

185 471 [475] Similar concessions were made to industry, but with one important difference. The larger and more important industrial plants were not turned back to their former owners who were, as before, allowed no voice or influence in their direction. They were taken from the workers who had seized and abused them during the period of Militant Communism and placed under the supervision of government trusts. These were either regional in character or confined to a single branch of industry. In either case, they were under the control of a more or less trusted group of men among whom Communists were in the leading positions, but while they received certain credits from the state, they were more or less autonomous and they were allowed to go through regular commercial transactions and encouraged to show profits in their annual reports. There was thus again a source of encouragement both for the directors and the workers, and slowly but surely the level of industry began to rise.

The smaller plants were very often leased to individuals who were allowed to employ hired labor and the hope was given to these that their taxes would be at such a level that they, too, could

* [NEP attempts to restore peasant prosperity -- Analyst]

show profits. The very small shops and plants were in some cases 185
taken back by their former owners when they had survived and any 471
provisions about the use of hired labor were tacitly forgotten in the first flush of the New Economic Policy.

All of these measures were interpreted by the great mass of the Ukrainian people as a recognition of the validity of human experience. There were, of course, keen realists who gave full credence to the declarations of Lenin that the Soviets had never wavered in their objections and were using these concessions only as a means of reviving the life of the country and strengthening their own position. At first this did not seem to be true and it was only as conditions really settled down and a semblance of prosperity returned that it became possible to note the steadily increasing pressure which the government exerted.

In the same way the currency reforms were not without their 185
own influence. In 1923 the government introduced a new cur- 652
rency, the chervonets, which was ostensibly based on a gold stand- 435
ard, to take the place of the old depreciated paper. Nevertheless, the latter was allowed to circulate in the rural districts with the result that its value continued to fall and it became more and more difficult for the peasants to satisfy their needs for manufactured goods which were priced in the new currency. This produced the so-called "scissors," for with the restoration of industry, the value of manufactures continued to rise, while the prices of agricultural products continually fell.

The political system was still not clear.[1] The new regulations 642
were introduced in the Council of Commissars in Moscow and it 665
was emphatically stated that they were for the Russian Soviet 645
Federated Socialist Republic, but Ukraine and also the other Soviet Republics put into practice the same resolutions, often without any decree by the ostensibly independent government.

The key to this enigma lay in the nature of Communist discipline. In theory and on paper the Soviet regime was thoroughly democratic in the broad sense of the word. There was an elaborate scheme of elections to the village and the higher Soviets, and even though this was weighted very heavily to provide increased repre-

[1] [During NEW ECONOMIC POLICY -- Analyst]

631 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of
642 Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications,
645 Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent
327 exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that
185 the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

432 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921,
241 which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the
185

payment of a specific amount of tax in kind and left to the peasant 432
the rest of his crop. In an endeavor to get this grain into Russia, 241
the government offered to buy it but it did not have the funds or 185
the inclination to pay for it at the market price. The financial reforms connected with the introduction of the chervonets could, to a certain degree, make it expedient for the peasant to sell to the government for cash, and as time went on the peasant gained the power of selling his crop for cash but the Moscow control of transportation and the prohibition of large scale trading left him helpless and he saw himself forced to dispose of it locally or to the government. Then the government made a fixed price which was far [435]
below that of the free market, and was often scarcely a third of the amount that the peasant could have secured. This sale of large quantities of agricultural products at a fixed price gradually became the rule and was one of the signs that the period of toleration for private income was coming to an end.

In 1925, the government began to clamp down on the small 656
traders, the Nepmen, who had profited by the opportunities which 661
they had had. Again it had a large choice of measures. Thus, depending on the situation, it could invoke laws against the hiring of labor; it could order the state agencies to refuse to buy from or sell to an obnoxious individual and thus isolate him; it could suspend his ration cards and perquisites, take away his right of voting and thus make him a pariah in the community; it could levy prohibitive taxes which would put him out of business and confiscate his property; or it could find some violation of some other law or regulation and imprison or exile him.

The degree of pressure which was put upon the peasants and 439
the workers varied from year to year. Each year Ukraine was 241
compelled to export more to Russia without regard to the needs of the local population. Thus, the amount of grain rose from 1,050,000 tons in 1924-5 to 3,165,000 tons in 1926-7, when there was a bumper crop, but in 1927-8, when the harvest partially failed and there were signs of need in the country, the amount collected and exported rose to 4,353,000 tons. At the same time, the continually increasing demands aroused again a spirit of oppo-

CHAPTER NINE

The Five Year Plan

Lenin and the Communists had never made any concealment of the fact that the New Economic Policy was only a passing concession to put an end to the stagnation and demoralization which had resulted from the civil war and the period of Militant Communism. It was not the adoption of a definite plan for the future nor was it a sign of a growing rapprochement with capitalism or a gesture toward the rest of the world, as the partisans of the Soviets abroad tried to make it appear. [185] 656 471 661

With each step of the recovery of the economy of Ukraine and of the Soviet Union as a whole, unobstrusive steps were taken to remove the various concessions which had been made. Year by year, from about 1925, new regulations were introduced by the Commissariat of Finance, one of the All-Union Commissariats which had the definite object of suppressing not only the concessions but of tightening up the restrictions on individual life and preparing the way for socialism and communism. By one device or another, the Nepmen were broken. Now the government forbade the state trusts to sell to them as individual traders either raw materials or finished or semi-finished products. Agreements which had been freely made by the government were either suddenly cancelled or were perverted. Obviously false charges were brought against the various individuals and they were fined exorbitantly or they were arrested and deported. By the fall of 1927 the sector of private trade had been almost completely liquidated and the way was open for the central government to do what it would with the situation.

With the Nepmen disposed of, the way was open for a similar attack upon the wealthier classes of the peasants and those who

These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown.. These were naturally the more 661
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw ma- 433
terials had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood. This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It concentrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in military preparations. Even when petitions were made by the Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR. Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transportation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932 they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 -1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

731 There is the frequent idea that the famine was specifically
661 directed against the rich peasants and the kurkuls. This is utterly
[565] false, for these had been liquidated earlier. The blow of 1933 fell chiefly upon the poorer classes who had always supported the Soviet regime and who regarded their suffering in the beginning as a mistake which Moscow would do its best to correct. In the same way it was the Ukrainian workmen of the smaller cities who bore the brunt of the hardships. It was the direct triumph of the Russian Bolsheviks over the Ukrainian poor.

185 Another proof that the famine occurred in connection with
731 the plans of Moscow was the fact that Postyshev, besides his official post, held that of general inspector of the Ministry of Grain Production for resettlement. It turned out later that he was given the general task of preparing a plan for an immigration into Ukraine from various portions of the Soviet Union. The dislocation of the population was worked out in detail. Millions of Russians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, etc., were to be sent in to complete the work of rerussification. Especial pains were devoted to the regions close to Russia on the Left Bank of the Dnieper and there was talk at one time of annexing to the Russian Republic the Kharkiv-Donbas industrial region, but this did not fall in with the plans of Stalin.

The result of the famine was the final stabilization of the collec-
[423] tive system of agriculture and the breaking of the old mode of life throughout the whole of Ukraine. More than that, it established the fact that in the economic sphere Moscow could direct Ukrainian life as it would. It overawed the population for the moment but it did not reconcile them to their fate and it went hand in hand with the attempt to exterminate the old Ukrainian cultural life.

[Ukraine, 1933 -- Analysis]

731 the country might have escaped, had it not been for the methods of the government in draining off from the population the last possible reserves of food.

731 185 There can be no doubt that this was done deliberately, for every measure taken by the government was intended to increase the difficulties of the population and to prepare for the final crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance that had been proceeding with ever [648] increasing force. Every measure, too, was intended to render it more difficult for the outside world to secure any actual knowledge of the conditions in the country until it was too late for the world to do more than register vain protests, for it was very definitely at this period that the censorship methods of the government and its apprehensions of what knowledge might bring to the world actively commenced to draw an iron curtain around Ukraine. Foreign correspondents were forbidden to visit Ukraine on one pretext or another and they were forced to send out such news as the government wished or to leave the Soviet Union.

[661] The collectivization and the famine had coincided with the beginning of the attack on Ukrainian scholarship and the arts, as we shall see, but these attacks by their very choice of victims had been directed against those men who had not been closely connected with the Communist Party in the past, even though they had not been entirely hostile. Along with the famine the tide turned, and soon the victims were those persons who had dared to hope for an equality of treatment (with the Great Russians) in the Soviet Union.

The famine was obviously intended not only to crush the population already impoverished by the collectivization but to administer a sound chastisement to all classes who were interested in the preservation and development of local and republic interests.

731 648 The famine was at its height in the winter and spring of 1933 and was only somewhat alleviated after the harvest of that year was brought in. It was only natural that, despite the efforts of the authorities, word of it would gradually seep out, in spite of the censorship. The news was most accessible to the Western Ukrainians, for as yet all communications had not been satisfactorily broken, and early in the summer they began to seek permission to organize relief

abroad for the benefit of the sufferers. On July 14, 1933, such a 731
body was already formed in Lviv and soon in the other sections of 648
Western Ukraine, while their appeals were heard by the Ukrainian emigrés abroad.

In August, Theodore Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna had been convinced of the truth of the famine and he appealed for aid for the starving. In the same month the General Secretary of the Congress of European Minorities published his summary of the conditions, as gleaned from all available sources, and the League took action at its meeting in September. In the same month the matter was brought up before the League of Nations in Geneva and relief was referred to the International Red Cross.

The movement spread to the Ukrainians in North America and on November 3, 1933, the sixth convention of the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States appealed to the government of the United States, urging that an impartial commission be sent to Ukraine to report on the truth of these reports.

This growing wave of protests among the Ukrainians and the [208]
emigrants from Ukraine was met by a stony silence on the part of the Soviet authorities, by absolute denial or by charges of unfriendly propaganda. The Soviet government refused to lift its barrier on any visits to Ukraine by foreign journalists or by any foreign visitors until after the harvest of 1933 was brought in and then they induced such journalists as Walter Duranty to recant previous statements as to the extent of the famine and report on September 18, 1933, that the harvest of that year was excellent "and all talk of famine now is ridiculous."

Almost the first detailed account of an American journalist was 731
given by William Henry Chamberlin on May 29, 1934, on his 185
return from the Soviet Union, when he estimated that between four and five million peasants were starving and he also quoted the speech of President Kalinin of the Soviet Union, made the year before, "The collective farmers have passed through a good school. For some, this school was quite ruthless."

This was a polite hint again that it had been the policy of the government to allow the famine to run its course in the hope of

731 breaking any possible opposition on the part of the collective farms
185 and the individual peasants.

The famine then on the domestic scene marked a definite turning point, a definite shift of emphasis in the relations between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, and that shift was extended to the individual Ukrainian. Yet, the very reports that emanated from the stricken country were not without their significance for the world.

731 1933 was a fateful year for Europe. The order to apply the
648 maximum pressure on the Ukrainians came on January 24th. On January 28th, just four days later and before the news could have leaked out, Kurt von Schleicher resigned as Chancellor of Germany and was succeeded by Adolf Hitler. Within a month came the Reichstag fire and all the turmoil connected with the advent of the Nazis to power.

A world that had still not been fully convinced of the dangers of the Communist regime was only too ready to magnify its benefits and its possibilities for good as compared with the apparently more pressing menace of Hitler. The period of the popular fronts began in all the European countries and it coincided with the coming into power of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the American bank crisis.

Under such circumstances, the rumors of the Ukrainian famine were heavily discounted by all except the most bitter anti-Communists and they obtained short hearing before world public opinion. No one wanted to believe these reports, and the troubled conditions when the reaction to the right seemed the menace to a world desirous of peace made it seem logical that the democratic world could secure some aid in its struggle from the Communist regime. All the old talk of the artificiality of the Ukrainian struggle that had circulated in 1918 was now reburnished and repropagandized.

The result might have been expected but it showed Stalin and the Soviet leaders that they had played their course well. They secured recognition by the United States in November of the same year, just as the real news of the extent of the tragedy was beginning

The crying need of the Ukrainians was for consumer goods. 433
Odesa and Kharkiv requested that they might be given the power 185
to build textile mills to supply the needs of the local population. 656
The request was denied, for the authorities had decided that the textile industry was to be concentrated in the RSFSR. The iron and steel cities requested that they might be given the permission to build factories to complete the fabrication of certain delicate types of machinery. The request was refused because it was to be only in the Moscow area that such articles were to be made. It was to be the task of Ukraine to furnish the raw material, the iron ore from Kryvy Rih, the coal of the Donbas, and to prepare the semi-finished pig-iron and other forms of semi-fabricated material that were needed by the central plants.

The plan not only provided for construction. It went even further and specified the exact amount of products that were to be turned out by each individual plant. While it was possible to secure some profits from the over-fulfillment of the plan, regardless of the effect that this might have upon the plan as a whole, any under-fulfillment was treated as a gross failure of obligation to the state.

This led, in turn, to additional restrictions on the freedom of [466]
the workers. Punishments were ordered for tardiness, for absence from employment even for a single day without a satisfactory reason, for an attempt to change the place of employment. These regulations were not the product of the governing bodies of the republics but of the Union authorities themselves and they were transmitted from Moscow to the national republics through the liaison between the All-Union commissariats and their subordinate organs.

It was the same with agriculture. Moscow knew what each collective farm, each kolkhoz, each sovkhoz was to furnish, and woe to the group that failed. The famine had been the result and that had been used to break the spirit of resistance of the Ukrainian villagers. The government specified the acreage that was to be devoted to wheat, to barley, to all of the crops that could be raised and it did no good if the local agronomists pointed out new

1/1 [1930's - after famine -- Analyst]

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
●185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

166 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the
626 village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past. Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

[after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
166 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

[During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

728 were a few well-known persons on the various lists of delegates,
666 the vast majority were either completely unknown or were definitely recognized as representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic or of the occupying forces.

The election on October 22[1] was carried on in the regular Bolshevik fashion with no opportunity for any choice of candidates. Over 90% of the people were marshalled to the polls and it was made clear that they had no choice but to approve the selected list. The response was, of course, practically unanimous and the next step was then in order.

728 On October 26[1] the National Assembly met in Lviv. The dele-
[185] gates, acting under definite orders, elected a presidium which included Stalin and the officials of the UkSSR. The first act was to pass a resolution of gratitude to Stalin and the Soviet leaders for their liberation of the country. Then there were a few laudatory speeches and the resolution was adopted to apply for membership in the USSR, to nationalize trade, industry and the banks, to divide the land of the state, the large landowners and the church among the landless and poor peasants, and to send a delegation to Kiev and Moscow to ask for the incorporation.

All this was a cut and dried performance to satisfy the Communist love of paper democracy and to justify their occupation of the country under the guise of liberation. There was no discussion allowed and once again the resolution was accepted unanimously.

On November 1[1] the selected delegation met Stalin, and the Presidium of the USSR in Moscow formally welcomed the liberated brothers and annexed their territory to the UkSSR. It was noteworthy that the action of Moscow completely overshadowed any reception at Kiev but this was only natural in view of the nature of the entire enterprise. There were none of those demonstrations that had marked the union of the two sections in the Ukrainian National Republic in 1919, when the vote and the union represented the will of the people.

Once these formalities had been accomplished, the Soviets felt free to act and, at a steadily increasing tempo, they went through in a few months a refined version of what they had accomplished

[1] [1939 -- Analyst]

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a 474
result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred 434
karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one 241
thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on [554]
these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for [665]
show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satisfactory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer is little better, although he 465
receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, 731
there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 con- 185
tinued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

1/1 [Post - WORLD WAR II - 1945 -- Analyst]

185 are a few large projects planned in the eastern part of the country which can be made immediately accessible to the Moscow Industrial area but which will be of little value to the Ukrainian population, for even the resorts along the coast of the Black Sea have now been definitely placed under a Union Commissariat and are being improved to accommodate the higher officials from the centre. The whole strength of the Soviet Union is being exerted to build up the industrial centres in the Urals and further to the east.

During these years there has been little progress made in many fields, and few or none of the evacuated personnel which formerly managed the factories have been returned. It is the same with machinery.

[166] On the other hand, where factories have been restored, the new directors have usually been sent down from Moscow to administer them, and so have the responsible workmen. The deportation from the villages still continues as the native population are removed to Siberia or elsewhere and non-Ukrainians are sent in, in accordance with a definite scheme for breaking up the homogeneity of the population.

665 626 Despite all this, there has scarcely passed a month in which the central authorities in Moscow have not stressed defects in the working of the Ukrainian branch of the party. They have found continued failures to perform the required deliveries, a lack of ideological work and definite wrecking and deliberate sabotage due to bourgeois nationalist feelings on the part of the party leaders in the Ukraine. There has been a consistent and unrelenting attack on everything that has been done in the country, while the heads of the collective farms and the other institutions have been attacked and changed for nationalist deviations.

000 The conclusion is irresistible that it is not the intention of the central authority in Moscow to relax its pressure until it has annihilated the last point in the UkSSR which differs in the slightest degree from the rules prevailing in the RSFSR and that in the meantime it, despite its lip service to the cause of a federation, is working for a complete standardization, not only in the field of economics but in every other field as well.

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728
Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669
of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrai- 665
nian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185
Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed 423
simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discon- [563]
tent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727
exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The represen- 565
tatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
652 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)

●185 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the
656 Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Congress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine
687 the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 1/3 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres (*The Bolshevik of Ukraine*, No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the
517 Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan (1929—1934)

● 185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy industries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, 83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia.

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peasants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property was taken into the collective farms (*Communist,* Kharkov, December 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater.

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administration, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc.

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

(b) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

Organizations to promote trade in the Ukraine are not numerous. The true traders of the country are the native Jews, and to trace their involved dealings is impossible. 441

The sales of the coal and iron are almost wholly controlled by rings and cartels. The most powerful one, the *Prodamet*, or metal sales combine, controlled recently over 80 per cent. of all the iron and steel produced in South Russia and threatened to absorb the entire output. 477

The activities of the *zemstvos* in trade call for mention. These organs of local government actively enter into trade in agricultural machinery, improved seed, and pedigree live-stock, and endeavour to improve the facilities for selling the products of domestic industry. Their aim is to lift the internal commerce of the country from the condition of dependence on speculating middlemen, into which it has almost irretrievably fallen, but their achievements so far only touch the fringe of a deep-seated social trouble. 441 185

There are chambers of commerce at Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Berdyansk, and Mariupol, and there is a branch of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce at Odessa. Odessa, Nikolaev, and Yelisavetgrad have corn exchanges, and coal and iron exchanges exist at Kharkov. 441

(c) *Foreign Interests and Methods of Economic Penetration*

The present state of commerce in the Ukraine provides a wide field for economic penetration from abroad. Agriculture in its first stages is not much affected, but in one case, that of the production of sugar from beet, the secondary stages of manufacture have been much exploited by foreign capital and management. The coal and iron mining industries and the iron and steel manufacturing industries owe their foundation in great measure to foreigners, by whom they are still largely 471 433

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both within and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.
[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . .* , 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

185 517 191 [369] in spite of efforts to produce films and to broadcast programs in the Ukrainian language — potent forces for assimilation to Russian culture. To the goal of assimilation, moreover, much is contributed by the industrialization of the Ukraine: new factories bring rural Ukrainians into the cities where Russian still predominates in social life, and the younger Ukrainians in the city easily adopt the prevailing language. But these forces for assimilation, even though coupled with the inculcation of communist doctrines through the media of education and culture, may be cancelled by a growth of nationalism; and such nationalism may thrive on the shocks of economic disorders and unsuccessful foreign war. The language policy itself promotes the process of assimilation by encouraging bi-lingualism; but by stressing the use of minority languages, it furthers at least a greater temporary diversification. The question of whether the forces of unity are now stronger or weaker than the forces of division can be answered only by the future.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

648 budget plans. If things went on in this way the
162 social system of communism would face serious crises as a result of the flourishing peasant economy of the Ukraine - in the regions of Great Russia communal ownership of fields has prevailed since ancient times - and the Muscovite conception of national unity might be seriously threatened by the increasing power of "assembled peoples".

In order to avoid these dangers and also in view of other considerations, Stalin discontinued the New Economic Policy and introduced the period of the Five Year Plans. In spite of the decision of the Sixteenth Party Congress, the way to Russianization was opened, and Ukrainization discontinued; Ukrainian nationalism received a hard blow when free peasant farming was immediately liquidated. There have been untold victims of these revolutionary processes which were attended by violent upheavals from the time Stalin announced his principle of "socialism within one country".

"Socialism within one country" demanded
648 industrialization as the presupposition for the
• 185 independence of the socialistic /118/ state. This industrialization had to take place throughout the realm and according to a unified plan. Every form of particularism could only be detrimental - the Ukrainian form doubly so; for in the Ukraine are the coal and metal and the water power reserves of the Dniepr from which horsepower by the millions can be obtained. Such considerations led to the First Five Year Plan, in the course of which Ukrainian economy, heavy industry, finance and particularly agriculture were subordinated to orders from Moscow. The division of private economy was "liquidated".

The new system[?] introduced the purging of the
661 Pan-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the year 1930, where members of the "League for the Liberation of the Ukraine" had entrenched themselves; they were now "unmasked". In a monster trial in

[?] [i.e., Beginning of the Five year Plans — Analyst]

423 tax collection and, finally, also corresponded
241 to the patriarchal order. It was only in the former Polish Ukraine on the right side of the river that purely private ownership was retained. The Bolshevik NEP now very cleverly fastened on to the community field system.

241 With the restoration of peace and order during the NEP years the social life of the peasant country again attained its equilibrium. The families which before that were broken up or dismembered now came together again. At the same time, great efforts were made to raise the productive capacity of the new family farms by means of technical education, and in this the young farmers were particularly eager to join. At that time, a German observer wrote: "In the activity of the youth organizations in the villages we see an expression of the deep longing to be freed at last from 'the power of darkness' and not always to stand apart while the civilized races divide up the treasures of the earth among themselves." (88)

88. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of the South Ukraine, page 69.

423 This hopeful development was abruptly inter-
241 rupted by the subsequent third phase of the agra-
474 rian revolution, the transfer of the individual
185 peasant farm to communal ownership of all village inhabitants. It was only by means of collectivism, the coordination of the farms with the communes in the other economic fields, that the Bolshevik regime could last; it was only in this way that one could strike at the root of Ukrainian nationalism, and only thus carry out the Five Year Plan. For industrial development with the purchase of foreign /146/ machines had to be paid for by exporting agricultural products. All that was needed now was a command, in order to maintain the export of the necessary amounts of grain at the prescribed price.

465 quality. For this the worker, if he does not spend any kopeks for food and housing, must work one and one-half months, and two months for the cheapest winter coat. Three colored shirts eat up a month's wages. For the same amount he could buy his wife three summer dresses of poor quality or three sets of underwear or three blouses. (129)

129. Statement of a German specialist in Kiyev.

Far too often the life of the Soviet Ukraine worker is exhausted in the struggle for his daily bread, for clothing and shelter, and yet before the war he was the best paid in Russia. Undoubtedly
345 the Bolsheviks have done a great deal of building,
466 but they neglected the building of houses in favor
185 of the building of clubhouses and palaces for cultural purposes, veritable giant structures of cement and steel where in the evening the locksmiths and metal founders then assemble "in order to hear lectures on Shakespeare". "For in human history there is an urge that has never before been recognized in the great masses...for art and literature. The famous tractor brigade of the Pasha Angelin comes forth with songs, and the workers of the Khar'kov tractor factory organize their own opera. Hundreds of groups of worker and kolhosp newspapers flaunt poems, stories and essays written by forge and tractor workers."

He whose thoughts take flight on the wings of Pegasus will find his hands only mechanically at
433 work. Among the construction workers the "never-before recognized urge of the great masses...for art and literature" expresses itself in the following way, according to Pravda of July 16, 1937: "The brick production program for the year could only be 19 percent accomplished in the first five months of the year, and the two subsequent months have also brought no change. The construct-

462 can her train 900 kilometers without changing engines. The train personnel consisted entirely of women." This according to Izvestiia of November 21, 1938. Pravda /182/ of May 4th, 1939 has a report of the modern types of feminine desires of the Ukrainian women in the Donets Basin: In the Voroshilovgrad region the number of housewives who express a desire to work in the mines increases every day. Recently 190 housewives were taken on in the mines of the Krasnoluky district. In Shaft Number 151 the women mine workers challenged their husbands to a competition. Comrade Khodonovich entered into competition with her husband who works as a locksmith in the same pit. Twelve of the housewives employed, systematically produced 130 to 150 percent of the norm." Under the pseudonym "sundries" behind which a Jew may be hiding, an enthusiastic admirer of this womanly existence writes: "Women, their work-blouses stretched tight over their breasts, their checked cap with a visor pulled over their short hair, with hard eyes that know no maidenly dreams, drive the motor trucks madly from one hall to another through long avenues that seem to meet in perspective. Women with hands that do not know how to hold children grasp red-hot rods with iron tongs and let them send forth sparks under pneumatic hammers. Is it a man or woman, this human form in leather here at the clattering mold, there in the hellish concert of the grindery?"(132)

132. Sundries: Russia Close Up, page 140.

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185 At the beginning of the third Five Year Plan, the Moscow Review of June 10th, 1937 wrote among other things: "The rapid development of mass well-being and culture will in general be one of the distinguishing features of the third Five Year Plan. At this point every possibility of comparison with America ceases. For that sort of thing

185 exists only in socialism." At the Party Congress in 1939, Stalin corrected these and similar expressions of conceit. He turned against the "fancifulness" of the advance estimates of the last Five Year Plan. The hopes of the proletarian masses of the Union for the promised paradise, nourished for more than twenty years, /183/ were abruptly destroyed by the "father of the people" with his allusion to the sacrifices which are still necessary in order to catch up with the most progressive states. There was still time for that, Stalin said, "and not a little time".

/184/ Emigrants

668 Although the Ukrainian people do not have a state (the Soviet Ukraine is merely a province of Moscow), they have three governments which have their seat in some foreign European country. There is the government of hetman Skoropadskiy which resigned in 1918 and was later revived in exile; then the directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic which originally consisted of five presidents. Its chairman Petliura is dead and its members have scattered. Finally there is a West Ukrainian government. The political emigration [162] from the Soviet Union, Bessarabia, Bukovina and Poland resides almost altogether in Europe. Here it numbers 150,000 souls including the emigrants. Of these about 50,000 East Ukrainians alone are living in what was formerly Poland, 50,000 Ukrainians are living in France, 15,000 without protectorate and 5000 under aprotectorate in Germany, 8000 in Belgium and 5000 each in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The rest are divided up among twelve countries.

The world knows little about the former goverments, nor do they stand out. All of them cling tenaciously to the fiction of their legality. The most active among them is the Petliura govern-

16: Amer. Russ. Inst. (no date) 1950 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

423 474 Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

472 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Ukrainian SSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

185 471 Art. 11. The economic life of the Ukrainian SSR is determined and directed by the State National Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the independence of the socialist country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

461 Art. 12. In the Ukrainian SSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Ukrainian SSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Ukrainian SSR voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Ukrainian SSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

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439 been food supplies, which in many Ukrainian towns constituted the only
648 food to be seen in shops in 1946. For fats and oils particularly the Ukrainian population has been entirely dependent on UNRRA aid.

The U.S.S.R.'s Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

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648 UNRRA assistance to the Ukraine has been of necessity limited in scope and short-term in nature. Long after relief shipments are ended - and they are now all but complete - the Ukraine will still be working to rebuild its factories, cities, and farms. The main task of rehabilitation is therefore a long-term one, and depends upon long-range measures.

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185 On March 18, 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted a Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, for the rehabilitation and development of the national economy of the Soviet Union. This plan is the fourth of a series of Five-Year Plans[1] designed to increase the productivity of Soviet farming and industry, and in general to raise the standard of living of the whole population. As stated by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the principal aims of the Five-Year Plan in 1946-50 are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of the country, to recover the pre-war level in industry and agriculture, and then considerably to surpass that level.

[652] The new Five-Year Plan provides that nearly one-third of the capital investments for the entire Soviet Union in 1946-50 (49,500 million roubles out of a total of 250,300)[2] are to be spent on the restoration of the Ukraine. Of this 49,500 million, 5,469 million will be used for works under the Ukrainian Republic's jurisdiction.

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727 In the next five years all the destroyed cities of the Ukraine - particularly Kiev, Kharkov, Chernigov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, Stalino, and Zaporozhie - are to be rebuilt and their municipal services restored.
362 Housing is to be replaced as speedily as possible; in 1946-50, 175,120,000 square feet of state-owned housing are to be built, of which 12.65 million square feet are to be made available by local Soviets. The amount of privately owned housing to be built before 1950 is fixed at 36.3 million square feet.

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185 Also under the Five-Year Plan Ukrainian agriculture is to be rehabilitated; the crop area for 1950 is planned at 30.5 million hectares. By 1950 the Ukraine is scheduled to be producing about 20 per cent. of the grain harvested in the U.S.S.R. (approximately the same tonnage as in pre-war years); 60 per cent. of the sugar beet (about 6 per cent. more than pre-war); and the potato harvest is fixed for 23 million tons, 1½ millions more than in 1940.

000 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport

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1 First Five-Year Plan, 1929-32; second, 1933-37; third, 1938-42.

2 Estimated at 1945 prices.

727 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport
433 are to be rebuilt; the mining of coal is to regain and then to cut-strip the pre-war output; the production of machinery and equipment for both light and heavy industry is to be restored; and to do this, iron and steel production is to be increased until it surpasses pre-war. War damaged power stations are to be rehabilitated, and additional ones are to be constructed, particularly in smaller communities.

[185] Altogether the output of industrial enterprises in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is envisaged at 9,200 million roubles, of which the output of state industries under local jurisdiction and of industrial co-operatives is estimated to comprise 3,100 million roubles[1].

The volume of industrial production in the whole U.S.S.R. in 1950 - that is, the last year of the Five-Year Plan - is fixed at 205,000 million roubles (in 1926-27 prices). Compared with 138,500 million roubles in 1940, this represents an increase in industrial output of 48 per cent.

727 Particular stress in the Five-Year Plan is laid on the development
433 of the Western Ukraine and the Transcarpathian Region. Lvov, the main
361 city of the Western Ukraine, is to be developed into a major industrial centre, where there are to be built and put into operation an automobile assembly plant, electrical, telephone, and telegraph-equipment manufacturing plants, a glass works, a knitting mill, and food processing plants.

In the Transcarpathian Region, new light industry plants are to be constructed, and the mining of brown coal (lignite) is to be organized and extended. Provision is to be made for the rehabilitation and development of the woodworking and wood chemical industries and of farming, particularly fruit-growing, viticulture, livestock breeding and apiculture, [652] as well as of the food processing industries. The farms of the Transcarpathian Region are to be given considerable state assistance in the form of agricultural machines, fertilizers, and credits.

000 A more detailed discussion of the Five-Year Plan in connection with farming and the various industries follows in later sections of this report.

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[475] It must be remembered that a number of enterprises although situated in the Ukrainian Republic are not under the Republic's jurisdiction, but under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union Government.

The Five-Year Plan in Ukrainian Agriculture

185 311 474 According to the Five-Year Plan 1946-50 the crop area of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is to reach 30.5 million hectares, of which 21.3 million are to be planted on the collective farms. The distribution of major crops is planned as follows.

TABLE XIII

Ukraine: Crop Area in 1950 (Planned)
(hectares)

	Total area	Including on the collective farms
Grain crops	19,600,000	14,100,000
Industrial crops	2,600,000	2,200,000
Melons, potatoes, and other vegetables	2,800,000	1,000,000
Fodder crops	5,400,000	4,000,000

Source: The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

The area sown to sugar beet in 1950 is fixed at 830,000 hectares, and to sunflower, 801,000 hectares. The hopfields are to be rehabilitated, and the area of vineyards growing European varieties of grapes is to be expanded. Measures are to be taken to drain 40,000 hectares and irrigate 30,000 hectares of farm land; and all engineering work needed to ensure normal production is to be restored.

241 433 185 Average yields of Ukrainian crops in 1950 are envisaged as follows: grain, 1.42 tons per hectare (compare 1939 average 1.36); flax, 0.42 tons; sugar beet, 19 tons; and potatoes, 11.2 tons per hectare.[1]

In the entire Soviet Union in 1950 the grain harvest is planned at 127 million tons, of which the Ukraine is to produce 27.8 million tons, or more than one-fifth. The Ukraine's sugar beet harvest is fixed at 15.7 million tons, representing over 60 per cent. of the sugar beet harvest of the U.S.S.R. in 1950. The production of potatoes is expected to be 23 million tons.

The following table compares these targets with pre-war production.

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1 Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

TABLE XIV

185 Ukraine: Planned Production in 1950 Compared with 1940 and 1913 (see Note)
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(million metric tons)

	1913	1940	1950
Grain	20	28	27.8
Sugar beet	8.9	14.8	15.7
Potatoes	about 5[1]	21.5	23

1 According to the report in Pravda, the potato harvest in 1940 was "over 4 times" that of 1913.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

[728] Note: In comparing the 1950 target figures with pre-war production it is important to bear in mind the territorial revisions which occurred in the Ukraine after 1939, when she regained Western Ukraine and part of Bessarabia, lost a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic (which, together with the Moldavian Section of Bessarabia, then became a separate Union Republic), and added Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathian Ukraine.

[131] Thus the present area of the Ukraine exceeds its 1938 area by approximately 118,000 kilometres (11,800,000 hectares). However,
311 we do not know precisely how much of this is agricultural land. The
728 arable land in Western Ukraine before the war amounted to 4 million hectares; that of Transcarpathian Ukraine, to 239,000 hectares. In the parts of Bessarabia and Bukovina which were ceded to the Soviet Union, 3,285,800 hectares were classified as arable. If we roughly divide this between Moldavia and the Ukraine in proportion to the total ex-Rumanian area incorporated in each, about 1,300,000 hectares of agricultural land would have been added to the Ukraine in its share of Bessarabia; and the arable area of present-day Ukraine would exceed the 1937 cultivated area by about 5½ million hectares, the potential total being 30.6 million. The fact that the Five-Year Plan fixes the Ukraine's 1950 area of cultivation at 30.5 million hectares seems to support this assumption.

Livestock

231 In 1941 the number of livestock in the Ukraine was estimated at 30.4 million, including 10.5 million cattle and 4.6 million horses.[1]

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1 Statement on March 20, 1946, by Mr. Baranovsky, Ukrainian delegate to the UNRRA Fourth Council Session, published in the "UNRRA Journal", March 21, 1946.

231 474 In the first years after Western Ukraine was incorporated into the Ukrainian S.S.R. there were built up in that region 285 cattle farms, 185 sheep farms, and 112 pig farms. By January 1, 1941, there was a total of 742 livestock farms in Western Ukraine alone.[1]

Bessarabia

231 There are no recent figures available for livestock in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina; in 1935, however, it was estimated that these two regions contained three-quarters of a million cattle, as well as 611,000 pigs, 2,395,000 sheep, and 602,000 horses (a total of 4,340,000 cattle, sheep, pigs and horses).[2] We have no figures as to how much of this livestock was included in the provinces added to the Ukraine.

Ukrainian S.S.R. Livestock: the Five-Year Plan

231 185 By 1950, according to the Five-Year Plan, the number of horses in the Ukraine should reach 2,629,000, a target which is 60 per cent. lower than the pre-war figure. To attain even this number, a great increase of horses must yet be made. In order partially to compensate, the Five-Year Plan has fixed a great increase in the number of oxen, so that the total number of oxen and horses together in 1950 will be five per cent. higher than before the war.

The following table shows the planned number of livestock in the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 1950.

TABLE XVII

Livestock in the Ukraine, 1950 (Planned)

	Total	Included on the collective farms	Per cent. increase 1950 total over 1940 numbers
Cattle	12,230,000	4,700,000	16
Pigs	9,600,000	3,500,000	7
Sheep and goats	6,780,000	3,100,000	8
Horses	2,629,000	1,363,000	- 60[1]

1 Decrease from 1941 figure.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

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1 Soviet State and Law III, Moscow, 1941.

2 International Institute of Agriculture, Rome.

●185 253 234 According to the new Five-Year Plan, the output of meat in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 will amount to 245,000 tons (for the entire Soviet Union the production target is fixed at 1,300,000 tons) while output of butter for the Ukraine in the year 1950 is fixed at 40,000 tons (275,000 tons for the entire Soviet Union).

The following factories and farms will be rehabilitated or built: 55 meat packing plants, 33 refrigerator plants, 97 poultry farms, 46 milk factories, and 100 butter and cheese factories.

727 the destruction that there are competing calls upon the limited
433 supplies of manpower, equipment and materials. We observed many instances of ingenious adaptation and salvaging of old and antiquated machinery; yet restoration was everywhere slow and complicated by lack of equipment to move away the rubble, transport the materials, produce the electric energy, and repair the streets, sewers, and gas and electric lines. There is a vicious circle. Iron and steel, for example, are needed to repair electric power stations and rebuild houses; efforts to restore these basic industries and facilities are constantly delayed because there is not enough shelter; and neither shelter nor the industries and community facilities can be replaced until there are more cranes, tractors and trucks. Low-calorie diets, induced by lack of foodstuffs, cause low efficiency and slow production. The food UNRRA is shipping has sustained the people, though, to be sure, it has not been sufficient to compensate for local shortages; the country may somewhat accelerate its industrial rehabilitation - especially of shelter and water supplies - when the equipment items on the UNRRA programme arrive. Meanwhile it is slowly restoring those parts of its economy which will respond to manpower aided by a minimum amount of mechanical equipment."

Industrial Aims of the Five-Year Plan

185 The great importance of rehabilitating Ukrainian industry and the
727 share which Ukrainian industry has to take in the entire Soviet Union economy are shown by the new Five-Year Plan.

By comparing the aims for 1950 with pre-war production figures, it is possible to have some impression of the destruction which occurred in the Ukraine during the war.

The table which follows shows the planned ratio of Ukrainian output in 1950 to the output of the entire Soviet Union. Where possible, pre-war figures have been included.

TABLE XVIII

Share of Ukrainian Industry in Total Soviet Production

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	Ukrainian S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. total	Ukraine (per cent. of total)
	(thousand metric tons)		
Pig iron	9,200	14,900	61
Steel	8,600	18,400	47
Coal	83,800	164,600	51
Tractors (units)	n.a.	176,000[1]	n.a.
Locomotives (units)	880[2]	1,214[2]	72[2]
Sugar	1,790[2]	2,378[2]	75[2]

1950 (planned)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. total	Ukraine (per cent. of total)
	(thousand metric tons)		
Pig iron	9,700	19,500	49.7
Steel	8,800	25,400	34.6
Coal	86,100	250,000	34.4
Tractors (units)	25,000	112,000	22.3
Locomotives (units)	1,000	2,720	40.0
Sugar	1,637	2,400	68.2
Metallurgical equipment	n.a.	n.a.	33.9

1 1938 figure
2 1937 figures

Note: n.a. means not available.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, September 1, 1946; The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50; Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace, A. Yugov, C.A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London, 1941.

Progress in 1946

At the beginning of 1947 the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. issued a statement describing the progress in rehabilitation and development made during 1946. According to this statement the gross output of industry in the entire U.S.S.R. increased by 20 per cent. in 1946 as compared with 1945. About 800 government enterprises had been built, restored, or launched during the year. Navigation was opened on restored canals. A series of steps were also taken in 1946 to expand Soviet trade and consolidate the currency. Wages and salaries of low and medium-paid workers were raised.

Coal: Plans for the Future

185 433 316 Under the Five-Year Plan, the coal industry of the Ukraine is to be speedily rehabilitated and further developed, so that by 1950 its output will be 86,100,000 tons, including about 6 million tons of brown coal (lignite).[1] When it is remembered that this target is only 2.3 million tons over 1940 production, the enormous task of rehabilitation confronting the industry is made clear. The difficulties are even more accentuated if one compares the increase of coal production in three pre-war years, from 1937 to 1940, when output leaped from 70 million tons to 83.8 millions.

Plans for increasing the future coal output of the Ukraine include not only the restoration of old mines but also intensive prospecting and the sinking of many new shafts.

"Between 1946-50, coal mines with an aggregate capacity of 77,500,000 tons are to be put into operation in the Stalino and Voroshilovgrad regions of the Ukrainian S.S.R.[2]"; and coal fields in other areas are to be further developed. In particular there are to be put into operation in the Donets Basin and in the western regions of the Ukraine, small coal mines and drifts with a total capacity of 4,600,000 tons of coal, and peat briquette plants with a capacity of 50,000 tons.

The lignite mining industry is to be developed and by 1950 is expected to supply annually some 6 million tons of coal. Five lignite mines operating in the Ukraine in 1946 increased their output in October by three times as compared with April.

135 654 Large coal supplies are expected from the regions west of the Dnieper, where 11 promising coal deposits are located. Prospecting is in progress there, as well as in the Zlochev, Krenenets, and Kolomya areas of Western Ukraine, where 28 shafts had been sunk by November 1946.[3]

Industrial lignite deposits have also been found in an area of four square miles between Slavgarod and Sinolhikovo (near Dniepropetrovsk) and in the Transcarpathian region.

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1 The coal output of the entire Soviet Union in 1950 is fixed at 250 million tons.

2 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

3 Soviet Monitor, London, November 21, 1946.

135 To the south-east, in the Don and northern Donets valleys,
654 geologists have discovered a number of new coal-bearing areas, and have confirmed that the Donets Basin coal layers stretch far to the east and south.

Other investigations of coal-bearing areas are to begin shortly, particularly around the Azov Sea coast and in other regions bordering the Donets Basin.

Coke

316 The coke output of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is planned to be 15,500,000 tons.

Natural Gas and Oil

315 With the incorporation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the Ukrainian
185 S.S.R. came into possession of oil producing regions. The Five-Year Plan calls for the intensive development of these and other areas of the Ukraine for the increased production of oil and natural gas. Three hundred and twenty-five wells are to be located to add to the
[654] petroleum resources of the western regions; prospecting for commercial deposits of petroleum in the Romny area is to be completed; and there is to be extensive geological exploration for natural gas in the Dragobych Region (Western Ukraine) and on the Azov and Black Sea coasts.

[382] The total output of petroleum in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 325,000 metric tons.

The plan also provides for the building of a gas pipeline from Dashava to Kiev. Already in process of construction, the first section of the pipeline will be completed this year (1947) and will supply gas to more than 30,000 flats and several large industrial plants in Kiev.

Electric Power Stations

377 Electrification has been one of the outstanding features of the Soviet economy. Before the war the Ukrainian Republic possessed a wide network of electric power stations. Best known was the huge Dnieper Don and Lenin Hydro-electric Station, completed in 1932 near Zaporozhie. This station supplied electric power to a great industrial region: in the north the steel mills of Dniepropetrovsk and Dnieprodzerzhinsk, and to the south-east, the Nikopol manganese mines. These three industrial centres developed quickly after the Dnieper Dam was built; and the abundance of cheap power available from it also gave rise to the growth of a metal and machine-building centre at Zaporozhie.

727 In August 1941 the retreating Soviet army troops partially disabled
377 the Dnieper Dam and power station to prevent its falling into enemy hands. This destruction was later completed by the Germans. When the Soviet Army recaptured the region, they found that 35 of the dam's 48 piers had been blown up, and all the generators destroyed. Damage to the power house alone was estimated at 500,000,000 roubles.

Reconstruction work began in February 1944, when the war was still on. Three years later the assembly of the first power unit of 72,000 kilowatt capacity was completed; and on March 3, 1947, the Lenin Hydro-electric Station supplied its first post-war currency to the industry of the Dnieper Valley.

There are over 11,000 men and women engaged on the restoration job, which has involved repairing the dam and the underwater structures, building the housing for the power station, and mounting the machines. Another two power units are to be assembled later this year.

After the expulsion of the Germans from the Ukraine, the capacity of the Republic's power stations was only 0.4 per cent. of pre-war. By the end of August 1946 restored capacity had reached 47 per cent. In the Donets Basin 70 per cent. had been restored, and in the Stalino area, 79 per cent. In the city of Lvov (Western Ukraine) the pre-war capacity of its electric power stations had been surpassed by 18 per cent. In the first seven months of 1946 much had been accomplished: some 400 power stations, including 215 hydro-electric plants, had been launched in the Ukraine; and it was expected that 750 more power stations would be completed by the end of the year.

The Five-Year Plan fixes the 1950 output of electric power in the Ukraine at 13,690 million kilowatt hours. The total capcity of Ukrainian power stations is to be increased in 1946-50 by 2,57_,000 kilowatts. The Five-Year Plan directs that:-

"The Lenin Hydro-electric Station on the Dnieper shall be rebuilt. Small hydro-electric power plants with a total capacity of 203,000 kilowatts shall be built to meet the requirements of agriculture and local consumers. Plant aggregating 95,000 kilowatts shall be put into operation at municipal electric power stations."

The restoration of electric power facilities will assist greatly in rehabilitating other sections of the Soviet economy

Iron and Steel

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327 The Five-Year Plan for the Ukrainian S.S.R. envisages an output in
433 1950 of 9.7 million tons of pig iron, and 8.8 million tons of steel.

In order to accomplish this, the iron and steel plants of the Donets Basin and the Dnieper region are to be rehabilitated; and there are to be put into operation 30 blast furnaces with an aggregate annual capacity of 9 million tons of pig-iron, stobl smelting units with a

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capacity of 8.4 million tons of steel, and 58 rolling mills with a capacity of 6.5 million tons of finished rolled goods.

In view of the enormous destruction of industry during the war, these aims are heroic, because they in fact mean that for five years the Ukrainian iron and steel industry will be striving to regain and then even to exceed, the production of 1940. This is shown by the following table, which gives the pre-war output of iron ore, manganese ore, pig-iron, and steel, as well as the planned output of the latter two in 1950. Figures for the U.S.S.R. as a whole are also included for comparison.

TABLE XIX

Ukraine: Production of Pig Iron and Steel
(thousand metric tons)

Year	Iron ore		Manganese ore	
	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.
1928	4,671	5,700	531	1,200
1932	7,925	12,100	443	1,400
1937	16,414	26,000	957	2,000

Year	Pig iron		Steel	
	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.
1928	2,361	3,300	2,409	4,300
1932	3,911	6,200	3,128	5,900
1937	8,801	14,500	8,467	17,700
1940	9,200	14,900	8,600	18,400
1950 (Planned)	9,700	19,500	8,800	25,400

Note: 1940 figures not available for iron ore and manganese ore.

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace, A. Yugov, C.A. Watts and Co.Ltd., and The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50.

As the table shows, areas of the Soviet Union other than the Ukraine are expected considerably to increase their production during the next several years. This, as well as the complete revival of Ukrainian plants, is particularly necessary to rebuild the transport system, and to replace tractors, machinery, and farm implements which were either stolen or destroyed during the war.

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Chemical Industry

The chemical industry of the Ukraine is based chiefly on coal deposits, but also on a number of other raw materials to be found there, including lacustrine deposits of sodium chloride (Artornovsk area) and phosphatic rocks (Konstantinovka area).

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The Five-Year Plan fixes that:

"The chemical plants of the Ukraine, including soda, nitrate, and superphosphate plants, shall be rebuilt, and the potash mines in the regions of Stanislav and Dragobych, and a new superphosphate plant, a paint and varnish plant and a plastics factory built.

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"In 1946-50 geological surveys shall be conducted with a view to locating commercial deposits of potassium salts to a total of 80 million tons, graphite to a total of 7.7 million tons, and gypsum to a total of 7 million tons."

Output in 1950 is fixed by the Plan as follows:

for the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Calcined soda	448,000 tons
Superphosphates	860,000 tons, and
Salt,	1,930,000 tons;

and for the entire Soviet Union:

Calcined soda	800,000 tons, and
Mineral fertilizers, superphosphates, nitrates and potash	5,100,000 tons.

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Light Industry[1]

By the end of 1946 the production of consumer goods in the U.S.S.R. had already revived considerably; output in the different branches ranged from 20 to 50 per cent. above 1945. Reconversion of the factories to peacetime production was largely completed; however, three big tasks remained: to complete the rehabilitation of all light industry enterprises wrecked by the Nazis; to replace the old or worn-out machinery; and to obtain an adequate supply of labour and materials.

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1 Soviet News, London, December 30, 1946, and February 6, 1947.

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313 area of this Republic, the high proportion of sawing frames reveals the advanced development of its timber industry.

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313 During the war Soviet timber enterprises, along with other industries,
727 suffered considerably. Much has been done to repair the damage, but rehabilitation work has been seriously hampered by shortages of wagon transport and of seasonal labour. In January this year a Pravda leading article announced that the preparation of timber in the U.S.S.R. was nine million cubic metres short of the plan, and that the shipment of prepared timber was "in an even worse condition," particularly in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics. Part of the difficulty at least was due to breakdowns in tractors, but chiefly to labour shortage and low labour productivity. Here again, as in all branches of industry and agriculture, the exceedingly low food ration scales must be taken into account.

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●185 The Five-Year Plan includes the following provisions for
313 Ukrainian timber developments:

> "To reduce the haulage of lumber to the Ukrainian S.S.R., the general plan for the production of undressed lumber in the Ukraine in the years 1946-50 shall be set at 47,600,000 cubic metres, with provision for an increase of felling in the western regions of the Ukraine and a restriction of felling in its eastern regions. Reafforestation shall be carried on extensively, timber being planted in the period 1946-50 on an area of 252,000 hectares and measures taken to replenish the thinned forests and to introduce fast-growing varieties of timber."

Paper Production

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In 1937 the Ukraine produced 28,400 tons of paper, as compared with
287 22,600 tons in 1932. This output represented, in 1937, 3.42 per cent., and, in 1932, 4.8 per cent. of the Soviet Union total paper production.[1]

In 1946 the reviving paper industry of the Ukraine turned out about 9,500 tons of paper and cardboard, exceeding its production programme by 10 per cent. This year the output of paper and cardboard is expected to be more than double that of 1946.

The first section of a mill producing paper bags has been launched in the Dragobych Region, and another paper mill is being built in the same region. Two cardboard factories are being built, one in Lvov and one in Rakhov (Transcarpathian Region).[2]

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1 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 10, 1947.

Production of Building Materials

339 In connection with the reconstruction work being carried out in
185 the Ukraine, the production of building materials is extremely important. The Five-Year Plan lays down that the pre-war production of bricks is to be increased by 50 per cent. of tiles, by 170 per cent. of lime, by 120 per cent., and of gypsum by 190 per cent. The Plan also states that

> "Plants for the production of building materials - including cement, glass, brick, lime, and tile works, plants producing metal fixtures, prefabricated houses, building sections, plumbing fixtures, roofing materials and high tensile gypsum - shall be restored or built and stable local fuel and power supplies created for the building material plants."

The Ukrainian output of cement in 1950 is expected to be 2,065,000 tons as compared with 10,500,000 tons for the entire U.S.S.R.

[323] Under the jurisdiction of the Republic and local authorities there are to be put into operation in the years 1946-50 glass works with a capacity of 11-33 million square feet of glass, brick kilns with a capacity of 9 million bricks, and rolling mills and other building material plants.

Transport

727 The war and the occupation brought great devastation to the
489 transport system of the Ukraine. The greater part of the railroads were partially or completely destroyed, and many hundreds of railway bridges demolished. The port of Odessa on the Black Sea was systematically destroyed - piers, warehouses, elevators, floating cranes, and power supply. The Dnieper-Bug Canal, the only water outlet towards the west, was made impassable by the Germans, who destroyed the sluices, wrecked bridges, sank boats in midstream, and choked the canal with mud.

185 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, provides for the complete rehabili-
489 tation of Ukrainian transport. Railway lines and junctions, and locomotive and car repair works are to be fully restored. A number of railway lines are to be electrified; and west of the Dnieper several narrow gauge lines are to be constructed for closer connection of sugar beet growing areas with sugar refineries.

185 To alleviate the difficult situation in rail transport, motor
489 roads are to be rebuilt and extended. The Moscow-Kharkov highway is
494 to be rehabilitated and improved, and additional motor roads are to be built to connect towns of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with the towns of the North Caucasus and the Crimea. By 1950 the tonnage of freight transported by road should be 16 times the pre-war volume. The number

U 185 489 494 of road passengers should increase 7½ times; and the number of buses, by 3,000.

U 185 489 503 The Five-Year Plan also provides for the expansion of river and sea traffic. Small rivers are to be extensively adapted for navigation, and will also be utilized for local hydro-electric power supplies. Shipbuilding yards are to be rebuilt, and the tonnage of river and sea traffic is to be considerably increased. The freight turnover on small rivers of the Ukraine in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 450,000 metric tons.

Pre-War Traffic

U 489 In 1937 the Ukrainian railways handled 313.1 million metric tons of loads, as compared with 165.7 million in 1932. The river transport carried 7.7 million tons (4.7 million in 1932), while in the same year Ukrainian seaports handled 8.6 million tons as against 6.5 million tons in 1932.

SU 497 U 497 The U.S.S.R.'s system of rail transport is perhaps the weakest link in the Soviet economy. In 1937 the railway network of the entire Soviet Union amounted to only 86,400 kilometres (83,400 kilometres in 1933). The construction of additional lines had by no means kept pace with the expansion of industry and agriculture. The Ukraine in 1937 had some 14,400 kilometres of railway lines; and traffic loads in that year amounted to some 313.1 million metric tons. The inadequacy of the system if compared with other European countries is marked. For example, in France (the area of which was approximately equal to that of pre-war Ukraine) the length of the principal lines open for traffic on January 1, 1938, was 42,000 kilometres.

U 727 497 The war has greatly disrupted Ukrainian rail transport. Locomotives, rolling stock and tracks were heavily damaged or destroyed. The problem of rehabilitation is especially serious, because the lack of adequate transport facilities hinders other rebuilding projects. The locomotives and cars taken as reparations from Germany, being chiefly of narrow gauge, are consequently of no use on most existing Soviet tracks.

Production of Long Distance Locomotives

U 397 Before the war the output of long distance locomotives in the Ukraine was as follows.

652 under their jurisdiction. For example, capital works, repairs,
657 and equipment for livestock raising centres, piggeries, cattle sheds, slaughterhouses and refrigerators (under the Ministry of Cattle Breeding); vineyards, orchards, repairs of irrigation facilities (under the Ministry of Technical Agricultural Production); repairs to barns and agricultural implements (under the Ministry of Agriculture); and rehabilitation of the brick and ceramic industry (under the Ministry of Home Construction).

Health Services. These expenditures are administered by the Ministry of Health, and include the feeding of patients, and repairs and equipment for hospitals and health service agencies.

[658] Children's Institutions (over four years) and Schools. These expenditures are handled by the Ministry of Education, and include the feeding of children; and capital works, repairs and equipment for schools and children's homes.

Social Welfare Services Directed towards the Betterment of General Well-Being. These expenditures are administed by the Ministry of Social Welfare and include such services as repairs and maintenance of social welfare agencies, and assistance to invalids.

Local Rehabilitation

648 As at March 1, 1947, about 41 per cent. of the gross proceeds of
727 UNRRA sales had been transferred to regional executive committees of the government for use in the local and district economy. The local
185 projects - which are undertaken after approval by the state authorities
731 and are subject to regular reporting and inspection - are similar in character to those carried out by the Republican Government Ministries. However, there is a considerable shift in emphasis. For example, at the regional level, nearly 57 per cent. of the total proceeds at their disposal was utilized for health services (hospitals, nurseries), 35 per cent. for children's institutions, 5 per cent. for repairs of public and industrial institutions, and 2 per cent. for the building of schools and repair of clubs.

Deliveries of UNRRA Supplies

648 In the original agreement between UNRRA and the Ukrainian Govern-
731 ment was a provision that the Administration would "strive within the limits of its resources" to procure and deliver the Ukraine's share of relief and rehabilitation supplies before July 1, 1946. In the early months of 1946, however, it became clear that procurement difficulties and transport hold-ups would prevent a great part of the supplies from being delivered in time. The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was therefore extended to the end of 1946.

From December 1945 (when UNRRA deliveries to the Ukraine began) up to June 30, 1946, (the time at which they were originally scheduled

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip
317 of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Slatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it
263 is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
511 during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation — all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

744 Europe; and many people used to die every year from tuberculosis and
164 other chest complaints. Severe epidemics—typhoid and dysentry—used
146 to ravage the country every year; inadequate regulation of rivers and stagnant waters gave rise to malaria; undernourishment of large sections of the population was responsible for sporadic pellagra. Venereal diseases were a curse owing to lack of medical attention and of appropriate legislation.

744 This enormous task was tackled with commendable vigour by the authorities of the Republic. In a country which used to have very few
185 doctors, a proper medical service was soon organised; up-to-date hospitals and children's homes were built; Red Cross stations and other hygiene and welfare institutions, set up in many parts of Ruthenia, strove to prevent and combat disease. This systematic effort resulted in a substantial reduction of mortality, while the draining of marshlands and the regulation of streams and ponds considerably checked epidemics.

185 Realising that ignorance is the root of many social evils, the State regarded the raising of the standard of education in Ruthenia as one
871 of its foremost tasks. The achievements in this field were perhaps the most striking. A country, which in 1918 had not more than eighteen elementary schools where children were only partly taught in Ruthenian, possessed 520 Ruthenian schools two years later; and after fifteen years of independence this small country in the Carpathians could boast 1,079 schools of various kinds—elementary, upper, secondary, technical and special schools. The magnitude of this achievement becomes evident when it is borne in mind that it was necessary to educate the requisite number of Ruthenian teachers from among the rising generation.

871 Thanks to these efforts illiteracy among the younger people has become rare. Those Ruthenians who according to the last census of
212 1930 were still unable to read and write were largely middle-aged or
185 old people. But even among them illiteracy has been considerably reduced because evening schools for adults were opened wherever pos-
517 sible. The people of Ruthenia proved to be keen pupils. Within a few years the neglected country had a promising intelligentsia—administrative workers, teachers, journalists, writers, doctors, engineers, composers, artists and scientists. In the thirties more than eighty periodicals, among them ten dailies, appeared in Ruthenia, and the production of books grew from year to year. The innate aptitude for arts and crafts was given a chance of development when a special art school was established in Užhorod, and musical talent, too, received much encouragement. As many as 7.7 per cent of all musical compositions and songs broadcast by Czechoslovak radio stations were the work of Ruthenian musicians.

000 Economic development was essential to a country where bread used

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

— CZECHOSLOVAKIA

511 Economic development was essential to a country where bread used
433 to be a delicacy and meat or salt a luxury. The Land Reform intro-
185 duced in the whole of the Republic in 1919 was a right step in this direction, although the standard of living among the peasant population in the mountainous districts still left something to be desired even during the last years of the Republic. Industrial development, too, was promoted, and 459 factories (timber, food, stone, earthenware, glass, chemicals, electricity, metal, paper) sprang up on Ruthenian territory during the twenty years of freedom. An important factor in the industrial development was the electrification of the country which before 1918 had hardly any electricity. Better road and rail communications, too, assisted in Ruthenia's gradual progress.

The work done in Carpathian Ruthenia under the Republic was a promising beginning. The regrettable setback due to the re-occupation of the country is likely to remain a mere episode. For the resistance of the population and the struggle of the partisans indicate that the Ruthenians are aware of their mission as a free people and that they wish to continue on the path of progress on which they embarked when they decided to become a member of the Czechoslovak Republic.

1; Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

JOHN S. RESHETAR

795 186 EASTERN ORTHODOXY, unlike Roman Catholicism, is organized on the principle of autocephalous national churches—each constituting an independent administrative entity. This fundamental difference between Eastern and Western Christianity causes the thinking Orthodox Christian to be confronted with a dilemma. He wants the Church to be close to the communicant and the clergy to teach him and pray in his own language, and yet if he desires that the whole Church be able to perpetuate itself and propagate the faith, he must grant to it a sufficiently centralized organization and at the same time combat all fissiparous tendencies. Thus, on the surface at least, there appears to be a conflict between Christ's injunction that there be "one fold and one shepherd" (John 10:16) and the actual establishment of national churches which can easily render unto Caesar what may be correctly regarded as "things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21).

While the communicant may ponder over this dilemma, there is in the last analysis little that he can do to reverse centuries of historical development which have led to the woefully loose organization of the present day. The titular head of the Eastern Orthodox [793] Church, the Patriarch of Constantinople, is but *primus inter pares* in his relations with the other patriarchs and branches of the Church. Individual ecclesiastical jurisdictions do not extend across political frontiers, and as a result the national churches have rarely been able to oppose secular rulers. The development of each new national movement in the Orthodox world of Eastern and Southeastern Europe has been accompanied by a demand for a separate national church and has accentuated this divisive tendency.

While the Orthodox Balkan peoples were acquiring ecclesiastical independence prior to World War I, the Orthodox Ukrainians living in the Russian Empire were denied the national status which would enable them to establish their own church and, instead, were regarded as Little Russians. Studies of the Orthodox Church made at that time by Western scholars contain no reference to its Ukrainian branch since it did not even enjoy a limited autonomy but was 000 regarded as an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church.[1] The

[1] See Adrian Fortescue's *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, 2nd ed. (London, 1908), pp. 285 ff. That the Orthodox Church in Ukraine exercised considerable influence on the Russian Church is made amply evident in the ponderous study by Constantine V. Kharlampovič, *Malorossijskoe Vlijanie na Velikorusskuju Cerkovnuju Žizn'* (Kazan, 1914), which deals with the period beginning in the middle of the sixteenth century and ending in 1762.

101 kunde, herausgegeben vom Ukrainischen Wissenschaftlichen Institut Berlin 1935).

[186] National consciousness increased as a consequence of oppression by Russians and Poles, in spite of whose resistance the name "Ukraine" as a special term for the Ukrainian territory spread quickly, thus emphasising the fact that there is a difference between the Ukrainians and their neighbors in the spheres of language, race, culture, national feeling and policy.

In Tsarist Russia the name "Ukraine" was the symbol of the Ukrainian people's struggle for independence. It was therefore abolished and replaced by "Little Russia", a term very much hated by Ukrainians.

In addition to the name "Ukrayina" Ukrainians originally used the term "Rus" to designate the political entity of the Kyiv empire to which at that time the territory of Ukraine belonged. Originally "Rus" applied solely to the southern parts of Eastern Europe, whilst the northern parts were called Muscovy. Tsar Peter the Great extended this name to the whole empire and entered it into official European nomenclature. In Peter's state, "Rus"-Ukraine was called "Little Russia" to indicate that this part of the realm was not one with the former Muscovite territory which got the name "Great Russia".

Before the First World War Austria had introduced "Ruthenia, Ruthenian" from Latin "Ruthenus" as official name for the Ukrainians in Galicia. But not before the 20th century was some order brought into the chaos of "Ukrainian — Little Russian — Ruthenian". The USSR officially acknowledged the name "Ukraine, Ukrainian" and the "Ukranian Soviet Republic" has succeeded in keeping its ground at least nominally in the world-wide family of nations.

Sea was reached, serfdom revoked (1861), valuable deposits of 175
coal, iron and manganese were discovered; the population increased considerably, all of which caused other national questions to recede into the background. It was only in 1900 that the 175
first unmistakable signs of the spread of national consciousness 186
among the broad masses began to appear. In this year the 668
Revolutionary Ukraine Party included a demand for an independent Ukraine in its program and the Ukraine movement made great progress in the short constitutional period after 1905. Ukrainian books and reviews, the idea of national societies and unions for adult education began to spread. And yet we must admit to-day that national consciousness among the peasants was slow to awaken; the solution of social questions was felt to be more urgent.

In Galicia more progress was made. At the outbreak of World War I there was already a well-developed system of Ukrainian schools, gymnastic societies and cooperative associations built up in constant conflict with Polish officials. The Ukrainians were loyal in their feelings for Austria; they thought that the victory of the German side would bring their own national struggle immediate advantages.

Revolution and Post-War Years

When war broke out, Ukrainian divisions immediately took 175
part voluntarily in the fighting in the Carpathians. Special 669
camps were erected for Ukrainian prisoners of war in which Ukrainians were separated from the Russians and trained in the spirit of nationalism. In the country itself the Ukraine Central Council was formed at Kyiv after the fall of the Tsar and it demanded the right of self-government from the provisional government in St. Petersburg. This was refused and negotiations were broken off when the bolshevists finally seized power. Towards the end of 1917 Lenin sent bolshevist troops to Kyiv, whereupon the Central Council declared the independence of Ukraine on January 22nd, 1918. Now the misfortune that political power was almost exclusively in the hands of members of the socialist and democratic Left, avenged itself; for those parties had no experience in the political control of a state. No

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

661 bands in the Ukraine. At the time of the 'purge' he occupied the highest military post in the Ukraine: that of Officer Commanding the Kiev Military District. The drama in the Ukraine did not end with the execution of Yakir; during the years 1935–7 several thousands of persons occupying important posts in the Red Army and in the Soviet administration were arrested and shot or exiled to concentration camps in Siberia and the North of Russia. This whirlwind of arrests and executions even carried away with it Postyshev and Kossior, the former instruments of 'the Revolution against the peasants'.

[701 186] In the meantime the last remnants of the national Ukrainian Army, which had flourished in the years 1923–9, disappeared. Units of the Ukrainian Army, based on the system of 'territorial Divisions' in the Red Army, had been quartered in the Ukraine alongside the troops 'of the Union'. The struggle with the peasantry had made it desirable to abolish the territorial system in the Ukraine as well as in other parts of the Union. The Ukrainian units were broken up and distributed to other parts of the country and their place was taken by regiments recruited in Great Russia. After the execution of the staff of the Kiev Command and the senior personnel of many of the Ukrainian regiments, nothing remained of the Ukrainian Army except the names of certain 'Red' regiments which were retained for the sake of form; but the Ukrainian language continued to be used in units where the rank and file were predominantly of Ukrainian origin.

Stalin's Constitution of 1936—which evoked such enthusiasm 642 among European Communists and which was even hailed in the capitalist Press of Western countries as a laudable 'return to democratic institutions' in contrast to the dictatorships of Central Europe —was a cynical accompaniment to the slaughter of so many thousands of Party members which was going on at that time within 'the Soviet Paradise'. Stalin's Constitution marked the final abandonment of the theory that the minority nationalities ranked as equal partners with Great Russia within the Soviet Union. The 'union of different states' was now transformed into one integral state (Paragraph 13: 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a unified state'). According to Paragraph 14 all authority on questions relating to international affairs, the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, the organization of defence and the command of the armed forces, foreign trade, the safety of the state, the management of all banks, all forms of transport, the principles of land distribution, the basis of public instruction, hygiene, and criminal and civil laws, was reposed in the Central Government.

The Background of the Communist Triumph

Let us, therefore, look briefly at 175
the outstanding elements of the situation as they were at the beginning of the revolution.

From the time of the organization and Christianization of the Kievan state at the end of the tenth century to the eighteenth century, Ukraine, whether independent, or subject to Poland-Lithuania, or to the Russian Tsars, had remained as a political unit, even though divided. However, in 1775 Catherine II destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich, the centre of the Ukrainian Kozaks, and in 1783 she abolished all Ukrainian political institutions and privileges. From that time the area was divided into *gubernias* as the rest of the Russian Empire and the full Russian methods of administration were introduced.

From that moment, too, the Russian government spared no efforts to destroy every vestige of Ukrainian national and cultural consciousness. The Ukrainian language was treated as a peasant dialect of Russian; the name Ukraine was forbidden and even the substitute Little Russia was treated as a generic term for the area north of the Black Sea, but it did not figure on the political map of the Russian Empire as a distinct entity. The Ukrainian revival in the nineteenth century beginning with the publication of Kotlyarevsky's parody of the *Aeneid* in 1798 was confined to the [536] cultural sphere and could offer little or nothing in the way of administrative experience to the Ukrainian people. Those Ukrainians who entered the Russian service were usually sent to distant areas, while the administrative personnel in Ukraine was chiefly Russian in origin and feeling.

The great estates were largely owned by Russians or by Poles 186 and even many Ukrainian landowners who had succeeded in retaining their holdings were so thoroughly Russianized that they [423] felt little sense of kinship with the peasants on their estates. Ukrainian life was lived chiefly in the villages. The Ukrainian language was not taught in the schools or used in the courts, for all education and administration were in the Russian language. Still the peasants continued their own manner of living with their own traditions and their own tastes and desires.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

186 563 The cities of Kiev, Kharkiv and Odesa had a large Russian population. The administrative, commercial and financial institutions were largely in Russian hands and the directors and leaders of these, whatever their political disagreements, were united in opposing the efforts of the Ukrainians to secure even that minimum of rights that they were guaranteed by Russian imperial law. The Russian element in Ukraine, radical or conservative, acted as a [316] unit during the fateful years 1917-1920. On the other hand, the miners and workers in the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih, the centre of the Ukrainian coal and iron industry, were in very large part likewise Russian and the ideology of St. Petersburg, especially in its radical aspects, was dominant throughout this part of the Ukrainian territory. Many of the most bitter opponents of Ukrainian rights were, in fact, Russian radical miners and workers from this area.

The Jewish population of Ukraine, a large minority, was little interested in the Ukrainian problem. Insofar as they were not actively sharing in the movement for special Jewish institutions, the majority, with certain conspicuous exceptions, were strong supporters of Russian unity, either conservative or radical or, like Leon Trotsky, they were at the service of any government which was opposed to the Ukrainian demands.

186 668 Thus in 1917 the strength of the Ukrainian movement was to be found in the villages. Here Ukrainian life was lived, Ukrainian thoughts and ambitions were sponsored and it was here that the vision of an old and a future independent Ukraine found its chief support. Even so, that population was itself divided, not according to the class principle but on an ideological pattern which included members of all classes and walks of life.

186 565 668 When the revolution broke out in 1917 or, to be more precise, when the tsarist regime collapsed, there were four main divisions in Ukrainian society and they were made clear within a very few months.

The first of these were the nationalists and the advocates of the restoration of order in the country. At the very beginning of the

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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century Mykola Mikhnovsky had issued a call for an independent state and for a while he had exerted a strong influence upon such future Ukrainian leaders as Symon Petlyura, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Volodymyr Chekhovsky, but his ideas of placing national liberation in the forefront seemed too extreme for his adherents and by 1917 many of these had in a sense fallen away from his advanced position.

On the other hand, two and a half years of war had shown to many of the Ukrainian officers and men in the Russian army the need of a disciplined force to uphold the national cause. Some of the Ukrainian regiments had early joined the forces of the Revolution, had adopted the Ukrainian flag and introduced Ukrainian as the language of command. Now at the Military Congresses which were held in Kiev in 1917, they took a strong stand in their demands that the Ukrainian National Rada adopt a firm policy toward St. Petersburg and the Provisional Government and they were willing to go much further than the Rada in the setting up of independent governmental machinery.

Opposed to this group were the great mass of the peasants. They were little aware of the involved task of governing or even maintaining order. It would be hardly fair to say that they were anarchistic in temperament. They had rather maintained almost unconsciously their Ukrainian character. Few of them had been further from their villages than the nearest administrative centre and they could not see the necessity of substituting another regime on a broad scale for the fallen tsarist system. For decades they had attributed all their hardships and difficulties to the tsar, the bureaucrats and the police, and with all three vanished, they had no desire to replace them. It seemed to them that the land was intended by God for their use, and once the landlords were dispossessed, they were ready to forget the past and live in peace and quiet with their neighbors. Two and a half years of war had taught them the folly of organized destruction and they willingly accepted the position that a new world had come into being in which there was no need for complicated forms of government, for the collection of taxes and the enforced maintenance of order.

186 565 668 They believed that the Revolution had almost automatically given them all that they desired—the right to use their own language, to have that language placed on a par with Russian and the right to secure their own land and to live peacefully upon it.

186 565 668 665 Between these two groups stood the bulk of the Ukrainian intellectuals grouped in the Social Revolutionist and Social Democratic Parties, each of which was modelled on its Russian equivalent. Yet we must not delude ourselves into thinking that these were political parties in any sense known to the Western world and America, where there has been a long record of political activity. They were before the Revolution rather conspiratorial and debating groups, busied with theorizing about all manner of political questions and (except where they had an opportunity to take part in the work of the zemstvos) without practical experience. A few of their members had served in the First Duma in 1906 but this had been dissolved within a couple of months by Tsar Nicholas II and each succeeding duma had become less representative. Thus the number of those intellectuals who had had practical political experience even in the conduct of elections was very small, while the debators, students, theoreticians, etc. in these parties cared more for the proper solution of ideas than for their application to practical life.

Neither of these groups existed as distinct Ukrainian parties. They tended largely to follow the leadership of the similar Russian groups; they had learned to employ the same methods, listened to the same leaders, and their demands as Ukrainians were loosely connected with their social and political theories. They were conscious, but only potentially active, nationalists and at the moment when it was necessary to make rapid decisions, they hesitated and splintered on the importance which they assigned to national and to economic and social measures.

The Social Revolutionists, largely intellectuals from the villages, were at first the more important. They were populists and non-Marxian socialists who voiced the desires of the peasants for the ownership of their land. They called for the confiscation of the large estates, for they did not believe that any one should have

larger holdings than he and his family could work. Since the land in Ukraine was held individually and the village community was only a figment of Russian law, they differed sharply from the Russian Social Revolutionists who stressed the existence of the community with an emphasis on the almost annual redistribution of land. Finally, they set themselves up as a Ukrainian party but still grouped around the journal *Narodnya Volya* (The People's Will), the traditional name for a Social Revolutionist paper.

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By the autumn of 1917 this party had definitely split. The left, which stressed the economic and social aspects of the party, established another journal *Borotba* (The Struggle). This was soon followed by a formal schism and the creation of a new Social Revolutionist Party (Borotbisty) with the name taken from their paper. It was only natural that the relations between this group and the Bolshevik Great Russians tended to become closer as radical ideas gained strength in the country.

The numerically smaller Social Democratic Party was purely Marxian and it spoke primarily for the Ukrainian factory workers. Like the Russian Party, it was divided between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, with the latter drifting steadily toward the Social Revolutionists and even some of the bourgeois groups. On the other hand, the efforts of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks to establish their own party met with continual opposition. The Marxian theories of the withering away of the state had long been used by Lenin and some of the German Social Democratic leaders as weapons against the Poles in both the Russian Empire and Germany, and the same ban was now applied to the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. If they wished approval by the central authorities, they were told to become merely a Ukrainian section of the Russian Party. If they persevered in their efforts, they were read out of the party which in Ukraine was dominated by the Russian factory workers and the Russian miners from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih.

The position of the Ukrainian Social Democrats and especially the Bolsheviks was thus much more difficult than that of the less organized and more spontaneous Social Revolutionists. Strict party

186 565 668 665 discipline hampered them at every turn and ardent Ukrainians as Mykola Skrypnyk, a personal and trusted friend of the Russian Bolshevik leaders, refused to make any schism in the party, even though he and his Ukrainian friends quite regularly appealed for recognition as a separate party, especially after the Bolsheviks recognized the existence of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

He, as an old Bolshevik, however, refused to cooperate with those Ukrainian Bolsheviks who dared to risk a fight with the central committee in Moscow and who finally tried to set up a Ukrainian Communist Party.

[648] The greatest weakness of both of these intellectual groups was their lack of appreciation of the importance of foreign policies. It was with great hesitation that their representatives in the Central Rada in the summer of 1917 approached the Russian Provisional Government to include a Ukrainian representative in all Russian diplomatic missions. They had had few or no representatives in the pre-revolutionary Russian diplomatic service; relatively few of them had been abroad, even to Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; they had no distinguished Ukrainian emigrants abroad who could speak to the world with the great authority of Ignace Jan Paderewski, Thomas G. Masaryk or Michael I. Pupin and during the crucial early months they largely neglected any consideration of foreign policy.

They wasted precious time in futile negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government over questions of federalism and they turned rather slowly toward the idea of independence. At each move of the more nationally conscious toward this goal, a certain portion of the more leftist members drew away toward the appropriate Russian camp in the name of internationalism and thus became the unconscious tools by which both the Provisional Government and later the Bolsheviks hoped to retain their control of the wealth of Ukraine.

It was this vagueness on the part of many of the intellectuals which kept them from being true intermediaries between the nationalist and military groups and the great mass of the peasants. It weakened the energy and zeal of some of the Ukrainian regi-

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ments which had declared for the Ukrainian cause immediately after the outbreak of the revolution and facilitated the development of pacifist opinion in the rank and file. So when, at the end of 1917, actual fighting started between the Russian Communists and the Ukrainian Central Rada, the armed forces of the new state were not as well prepared as they had been some months previously, and it was necessary to start again under almost new and more unfavorable conditions.

The pressure of events and the necessity for defense against the Red and the White invaders brought together the more consciously nationalist elements, first to declare the independence of Ukraine and then to organize, but the economic and social divergences were never solved. The dissolution of the Central Rada by the Germans and their support of a conservative government only embittered the political feuds and encouraged the rise of peasant leaders who were content to operate in their own areas and switched sides as questions of the moment moved them. All this weakened the sounder forces of the state and created the bewildering succession of such forms of government as the Rada, the Hetmanate of Skoropadsky and the Directory under Petlyura and gave the struggle at times a bizarre appearance as the different forces raised by the different political groups now combined against one or other of the invaders, only to separate when the other became the more pressing danger.

Under such conditions the central authority was finally overwhelmed and those people who were most strongly committed to a free and independent Ukrainian state withdrew from the country. The Soviet regime was able to take control. This did not, however, end the difficulties for there soon came a revelation that all was not yet well and harmonized. The peasants continued to be restless. The guerilla leaders did not at once cease their activity. Above all, the country was ruined but the relations between the Russians and the Ukrainians were not yet solved.

CHAPTER TWO

The Foundation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

186 642 665 As the power of the Provisional Government in Petrograd declined and more and more responsibility was assumed by the Central Rada in Kiev, relations between Petrograd and Kiev grew rapidly worse and the conception of Ukrainian independence gained strength in all circles, except among the Russian population of Ukraine. The seizure of power in Petrograd by Lenin could not fail to hasten the progress of separation.

During the summer and autumn of 1917 Lenin had advocated the widest application of the principle of self-determination and encouraged the non-Russian peoples to demand separation from the Provisional Government. He and his friends had hardly come into power, when he showed at once the cynicism and hypocrisy of his entire policy. The Central Rada in Kiev and the vast majority of the soviets in Ukraine repudiated the demand for the confiscation of all property, the expropriation of the land and the turning over of the control of all industry to the workers, although in the Third Universal it did provide for "state control over production in the interests of Ukraine and Russia" and declared that all land not worked directly by the owners was to become the property of the workers. For all intents and purposes, the Third Universal which was issued on November 20, 1917, did its best to separate Ukrainian affairs from Bolshevik control without as yet resorting to a declaration of formal independence.

This produced a very unsatisfactory situation, for the Bolsheviks attacked the efforts of the Secretary of the Rada for Military Affairs to effect an understanding with the old Russian Army

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186 642 665 Headquarters at Mohylev and with the other national groups which were rapidly making common cause with the Central Rada in their opposition to the extreme measures of the Petrograd Soviet. The Council of Commissars in Petrograd claimed to speak for the whole of the former Russia in its efforts to make peace with the Germans. When the Rada denied this and approached the other non-Russian peoples, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd formally accused the Rada of withdrawing Ukrainian troops from the front, of disarming Bolshevik units in Ukraine and of allowing the Don Cossack forces to retire to their homeland across Ukrainian territory. On December 17, it hypocritically recognized the right of Ukraine to independence but threatened war on the Rada if it did not meet the conditions of the Council of People's Commissars.

At the same time the Bolsheviks in the Kiev Soviet arranged an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the hope of putting pressure on the Rada. The attempt missed fire for the Congress proved to be under the influence of the anti-Bolshevik parties and adopted resolutions declaring that the Ukrainians had not thrown off the power of the Tsar to accept the domination of the Commissars. The Bolshevik spokesman Zatonsky was unable to make himself heard above the opposition and only 80 members supported the Soviet demands.

As a result of this failure Vasili Shakhray and Zatonsky left Kiev for Kharkiv where they joined a Congress of Soviets largely from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih. There, on December 20, they established a new Ukrainian Rada under Russian Communist control and set up a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were joined by a group of Ukrainian Bolsheviks including Neronovych and George Kotsyubynsky, the son of the well-known Ukrainian author who had been a friend of Gorky.

[701] The so-called Ukrainian army loyal to this new regime was composed almost exclusively of Russian troops and was under the open command of a Russian officer, Michael A. Muravyev. This force occupied Kiev on February 7, 1918 and held the city for about three weeks. Its actions showed clearly the nature of the government. Under the pretext of liberating the Ukrainians from

the control of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and the Rada, it abolished all Ukrainian newspapers and its disorderly elements not only executed members of the Ukrainian and Russian bourgeoisie but also Ukrainian Communists and radicals who used the Ukrainian language in their hearing. 186 642 665

In the meantime the Bolsheviks had opened negotiations with the Germans in Brest-Litovsk where Trotsky claimed to speak for the entire former Russian Empire. To circumvent this, the Rada formally declared the full independence of Ukraine and sent delegates to the peace conference. As a balance to this, Trotsky introduced into the conference the representatives of this new Ukrainian Soviet Republic who claimed to be the spokesmen for the Ukrainian peasants and proletariat. Their arguments did not convince the Germans and Austrians, who saw greater possibilities of profit by recognizing the Ukrainian National Republic, so as to secure without fighting a large part of the Ukrainian grain supplies. The Ukrainian National Republic signed this agreement with misgivings, for, in fact, it threw the Rada into the power of the Germans and ended all chance of assistance from the Allied democratic powers which had previously regarded Lenin as the tool of the German General Staff. Now, with the conclusion of this peace, they extended their ill-will to the Ukrainian Central Rada. 648 185 642 665 [728]

The immediate result was German assistance to the Rada and the Soviet forces were quickly forced out of Ukraine and back into Great Russian territory. The leaders of the Ukrainian Soviet government were members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and could not raise the question as to whether or not their new state was actually independent, and whether it could be, if it did not have its own Communist Party associated on a par with the Russian Party in the Communist International.

This brief Communist interlude in Ukraine should have been most instructive to both the Allied powers and the Germans, but neither drew the true lessons from it. The Allies, who were still opposed to the principles of Bolshevism and were annoyed by the speeches of Zinovyev and Chicherin, became more friendly disposed to the Russian Whites and gave up their efforts to win through

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648 invoking the democratic principles of self-determination the support
186 of any of the non-Russian peoples. The Germans, on the other
642 hand, after aiding the Rada to return, dispersed it on the ground
665 that it was too radical, but when a more conservative regime was set up under Hetman Skoropadsky, they did not give this honest support. They sought only for Ukrainian supplies and by their actions they weakened the power of the Hetman and strengthened discontent against his regime without allowing him to do anything that would weaken the power of the Communists.

The situation became almost ridiculously complicated. Germany, anxious to secure troops for the Western Front, was, by the spring of 1918, at peace with both the Commissars of Moscow and the government of Ukraine. It was therefore opposed to both the White Russians and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Even the Czechoslovaks on their way to Vladivostok, thanks to the negotiations between President Masaryk and Muravyev, were on friendly terms with the Ukrainian Communists and had difficulties with the Ukrainian government and the Germans. As soon as they crossed into the Russian Soviet Republic, they had difficulties with the Russian Communists and the Germans and found their support among a part of the White Russians. It was the same situation as in the far north where the Germans backed the White Finnish forces under Mannerheim against the red Finns who were the favored party of their friend and associate, Moscow. Yet all the time there was no Ukrainian Communist Party, for the Ukrainian Communists owed their prime allegiance to the Russian Communist Party which was, in theory at least, on the opposite side in the general disturbed situation.

To the Communists, as Skrypnyk, Shakhray and George Pyatakov who had played an important role in the Communist occupation of Kiev, this seemed a serious gap and at a meeting in Tahanrih in April they triumphed over the Communists from Katerynoslav who had insisted upon remaining merely a part of the Russian Communist Party. Their victory was of short duration, for when there came an organization meeting in Moscow on July 5, the Russian authorities definitely made it clear that they would not tolerate

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the existence of a Ukrainian Communist Party. Bela Kun warned that in the international civil war that was to be begun, great efforts were to be made not to allow it to assume anything of a national character, but to keep it restricted and fought on class lines. They were also informed that they could in this new struggle have no relations with Mensheviks or any Ukrainian Social Revolutionists or Social Democrats. A few months later Stalin was elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian party as a symbol of the dependence in which the party was to be kept.

648 186 642 665

The first people to appreciate fully the dilemma in which the Ukrainian Communists found themselves were the Ukrainian Communist leaders who had established, with Russian help, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were quickly taught that as long as the control of their Party was not in their own hands, they were completely helpless and at the mercy of the Russians.

Shakhray, who had endeavored to argue at Kiev in December, 1917 that the Ukrainian Communists were to be counted as Ukrainians, very soon in Russia became so disgusted that he resigned from the Russian Communist Party and retired to Saratov to establish a Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He criticized the extreme policy of centralization carried on by the Russian Communists.

Along with S. Mazlakh, he published a book entitled *The Wave—What is being done in Ukraine and with Ukraine.* This book, which was often quoted later by Skrypnyk and his associates, was the theoretical basis for Ukrainian Communism. Shakhray tried to foster discontent against the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky by stressing his relations with both the German forces in Ukraine and the White Russian refugees who had taken shelter in that country. He declared that Ukrainian independence could only be consistently won by the Ukrainian Communists, for they, as the Ukrainian proletariat, were the only people who could advocate and carry through a real revolution in view of the treachery of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, he attributed the Communist failure in Ukraine to the fact that the Party was entirely under

648 Russian control and looked at the cause of the Communists through
186 the eyes of the Russian colonists in Ukraine who were, in accord-
642 ance with the Russian imperialistic tradition, working not for
665 Ukraine but for Moscow.

He soon left Saratov for Kuban and here he was captured and killed by the Denikin forces. Mazlakh, who had remained a member of the Russian Communist Party, was later shot by them for nationalism. The third Commissar for War, Neronovych, became disillusioned and on the entrance of German troops into Ukraine he gave up politics but he fell into the hands of the Ukrainian National Army and was shot. Thus, the first attempts of the Russian Communist Party to seize Ukraine and expel the Ukrainian National government ended disastrously and relatively few of the early leaders survived. Most of them paid the penalty for their actions to one of the contending forces, with the Bolsheviks executing then or later the larger number.

During the summer of 1918 while Hetman Skoropadsky remained in power, the chief work which the Communists could hope to do in Ukraine was through their mission in Kiev under the leadership of D. Z. Manuilsky. This was ostensibly engaged in negotiations for a definite peace treaty between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. In reality, Manuilsky was almost openly intriguing with the tacit consent of the Germans who had no desire to see their own position in Moscow jeopardized, as their armies were being driven back on the Western Front. Manuilsky was also able to notice the constant splitting of the leftist Ukrainian parties, which, in their hostility to the policies of the Hetman, tended to move nearer to the Communist position.

The disintegration in both the Social Revolutionist and the Social Democrat ranks became steadily more marked during the summer of 1918. When the German armies collapsed and the Hetman could no longer retain his post, a Directory of five men, including Petlyura and Vynnychenko, set themselves up at the news of the abdication of the German Emperor and they soon recovered Kiev. At the same time the left wing of the Social

Revolutionists (Borotbisty) refused to recognize the new Directory and drifted rapidly toward the Bolshevik position. 648 186

The Kremlin, sensing the great change in the Ukrainian situation, at once refurbished the idea of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Its real head was now Christian Rakovsky, a Rumanian with Bulgarian citizenship who had never been in Ukraine, but its nominal leaders were Pyatakov and George Kotsyubynsky. These moved from Kursk along the railroad lines into Ukraine at the end of December but Chicherin, in his telegrams to the Directory, categorically denied that the Russians were supporting this movement in any way. He laid all the responsibility upon the Ukrainian Communists. The ruse did not work and finally on January 16, 1919, the Directory, in which Vynnychenko's star was sinking, declared war. 642 665

This was opposed by the left wing of the Social Democrats who were very influential in the Directory. On January 10-12, the two wings definitely parted and the left adopted the name of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Independent) and insisted upon the establishment of a non-Communist Soviet Republic. The right wing, in view of the weakness of the Ukrainian proletariat, advocated instead a Congress of Workers which would include both peasants and the city proletariat. When war actually started, the left wing split again between those who were willing to stand for an independent Ukraine and those who refused to act against Russia under any circumstances. The latter took the name of USDRP (Independent Lefts).

It was not long before the Borotbisty and the USDRP (Independent Lefts) began negotiations for merging. Both were convinced of the superiority of the Soviet form of democratic government and both were convinced that any Communist government would inevitably recognize the essential rights of the Ukrainian people. In this respect they were far more naive than were the leaders of the first Ukrainian Communist regime who had already become completely disillusioned at the contrast between the theories and the practice of Lenin and his associates. They refused to cooperate with Petlyura and the Directory and, in effect, they with-

648 drew from its support a considerable section of the Ukrainian in-
186 tellectuals at a crucial moment.

642 On the other hand, with their own armies they fought against
665 the White Russians of Denikin, because they saw in these merely an attempt to restore the old order. Yet they declined to be included in the organized army of the Directory and by their independent actions they made more difficult the burden of the army commanders. They encouraged the formation in the country of independent military bands which added to the growing chaos. To emphasize their position they again changed their name to the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and constantly sought to ingratiate themselves with the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party which had again succeeded in reoccupying Kiev and in forcing the Directory to flee.

On the other hand, the USDRP (Independents), almost as true admirers of the Soviet system but far more critical of the Russian influence, did merge their forces for the fighting against Denikin with the forces of the Directory. In the summer of 1919, this group, under the influence of the Khmelevtsevs of Kobilyaky in Poltavshchyna, commenced again to review their position. After the death of their leaders in a crossing of the Dnieper and after the defeat of Denikin, they decided to adopt the appellation of Communists and to rename themselves the Ukrainian Communist Party without any additional description title. Thus, they took the name of Ukapisty and as such they dragged on an independent existence for some years, confidently expecting that they would ultimately receive national and international recognition from the Comintern, the Communist International.

This endless splitting and regrouping of the various parties proved a headache to the Directory which was trying to organize the country for defense against both of the Russian invaders. The individual armed forces, acting independently, aided in wrecking the economy and this inspired peasant leaders of various kinds to seek the control of their own native regions. Some of these men proved themselves able, if short-sighted, leaders. Some, as Nestor Makhno, were unadulterated anarchists who saw no need of any

central regime. Others were mere adventurers thrown into prominence by the course of events and willing to shift their principles for the sake of a momentary personal advantage. Others were patriots with no broader vision than their home districts. 648 186 642 665

As a result, throughout 1919 there were some 328 revolts against the extending power of the Russian Communist forces which were fanning out over Ukraine, slaughtering and robbing as they went but still unable to secure a definite control of the villages.

As opposed to this welter of conflicting ideals, the policy of the Russian dominated Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party was simplicity and clarity itself. This supported the paper independence of the Ukrainian Soviet regime and openly avowed its intention of subjugating the country and of exploiting it for the benefit of Moscow. Their purposes were even openly avowed at the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies on March 22, 1919, when Shlikhter, a Ukrainian German and one of the commissars appointed by Moscow to collect grain, declared: "You all remember how Ukraine began to become Soviet; with every day of the advance of the Red Army, we and you felt more easy; the rich grain-producing Ukraine is ours. We have four central military divisions collecting and on them we rest all our hopes. We have a mass of workmen sent in (from Moscow to Ukraine), who know how to search all the Ukrainian villages. We always remember that the eyes of the proletariat of Russia are turned toward Ukraine."

These remarks represented the cynical attitude of Lenin and the Communists. They ignored the statements as to a Ukrainian Soviet Republic that were being made by Lenin and others to woo the various leftist Ukrainian parties. They were safe speeches made to reassure the Great Russians that the Bolsheviks still had a monolithic outlook, even though they were prepared to go to almost any lengths to create a paper regime which would insure and facilitate the plundering of the rich grain-producing Ukraine. They told, more or less, the truth, that was not recognized by the more idealistic theoreticians, that the Ukrainian Communists were, in fact, the dupes and victims of the Moscow regime which cared nothing for the Ukrainian people, or even the Ukrainian proletariat.

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648 By the end of 1919 the Ukrainian Soviet regime was so satis-
● 186 fied with the success of its raiding and collecting parties that it felt
642 able to proclaim an amnesty and to disarm the population com-
665 pletely. To accomplish the latter purpose, new Russian forces were sent into the country, the villages were thoroughly searched and disarmed. The peasants were tiring of the apparently endless exactions of the independent commanders and they turned against many of the patriotic partisan bands and declined to give them further support. This broke the movement and even the alliance of Petlyura with the Poles and the short occupation of Kiev by the combined armies in the spring of 1920 did not suffice to restore the old enthusiasm for the hard-pressed Directory.

By the end of 1920, when the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet delegations met the Poles in Riga in October, 1920, the fighting was nearly over. The Poles signed a treaty of peace without consulting their Ukrainian allies of the Ukrainian National Republic. There was nothing for the forces of the Directory to do but to retire abroad and continue their unsuccessful efforts to secure Western assistance. This was not forthcoming. The French were interested in aggrandizing Poland as a bulwark against Germany; the other allies were openly supporting Denikin through a misinterpreted friendship with the Russian people and there did not seem to be left even a spark of the principles enunicated but a short time before in Wilson's attitude toward self-determination and the rights of people to govern themselves. The struggle was ended and the Ukrainians were left at the mercy of their Russian overlords, now back in a new guise.

665 affirmative triumphed, and the Borotbisty were dissolved as a separate group. They were given the nominal right of choosing two members for the Executive Committee of the KP/b/U but this was, of course, an empty phrase, since that Executive Committee was itself but an agent and tool of the Executive Committee in Moscow.

The Ukapisty offered a more serious threat, for they were trained in Marxian dialectics and they knew the weak points in the program of the Moscow centre. They accepted the Marxian analysis of capitalist society and the Leninist theory of imperialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet regime. As regards the question of nationality, they shared the Marxist-Leninist conception but in contrast to the Russian Communist Party they [186] adapted this to suit a non-ruling and enslaved nation. The Ukapisty[1] theoretically based the difference between its attitude and that of the Russian Communist Party on the fact that the latter represented the proletariat of a dominant nation, while they stood for the proletariat of an enslaved nation. Thus the one considered the question of nationality as a question of tactics connected with the spreading of the proletarian revolution; for the other it was a question of program connected with the liberation of the people and itself not only from capitalistic but also from national enslavement. They condemned the Russian Bolshevik practices in Ukraine and, in contrast to the Bolshevik idea of spreading the revolution by armed force (an idea which collapsed with the defeat of the Red Army at Warsaw in 1920 and which was then condemned by Lenin himself), they believed in the "internal forces", i.e. that the revolution would only be organic and lasting if it was carried out by the internal forces of each nation and not if it was introduced by bayonets from abroad. They stood therefore for an independent Ukrainian Soviet state, with its own red army, its own independent economy, and its entrance into the Comintern on an equal footing with all other Communist parties.

The Ukapisty were allowed to exist until 1925 and it was not until the Comintern was willing to declare that it was Muscovite to the core and that all foreign Communist parties were of right

[1] [Ukrainian Communist Party -- Analyst]

CHAPTER FIVE

Ukrainization

The period of the New Economic Policy was likewise the 186
time when the movement for the Ukrainization of the state reached its highest point. This was a complicated political, cultural and scholarly movement which aimed to develop the Ukrainian self-consciousness in every possible way and to establish the proper role of the Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It took many and diverse forms, and while it developed into a definite opposition to Russian influence and Russian methods, it was not primarily so much an anti-Communist as an extra-Communist movement, even though most of its outstanding leaders were tried and tested members of the party.

The basis for the entire movement is to be found in the slight attraction that Communism as a doctrine possessed for the Ukrainian [665]
people. As late as 1927 there were only 122,928 Ukrainian Com-
munists, that is, about thirty-nine for each ten thousand of the [162]
Ukrainian population. The bulk of the Communists in Ukraine were Russian and the vast majority of these belonged to the urban proletariat or to the workers in the Donets Basin and Kryvy Rih.

The general period of disintegration during the civil war and [360]
the period of Militant Communism had greatly strengthened the power and self-confidence of the peasants and had weakened the power of the city workmen. This showed Lenin and the dominant group that some method had to be found to win at least the passive support of the countryside if new troubles were to be averted.

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the tenacity with which the 186
Ukrainian peasants, whether they were literate or illiterate, clung 191
to their native language. Lenin had used this characteristic with 665

● 186 skill and success in encouraging the Ukrainian opposition to the
191 Russian Provisional Government. The proper recognition of the
665 language had been one of the most insistent demands put forward by all groups which had later come together in the Ukrainian National Republic. The failure of the Bolsheviks in their early occupation of Ukraine to recognize the Ukrainian language had been one of the surest means of arousing opposition to their course and this time with their power established, the Bolsheviks decided to change their policy. As early as December 6, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party had declared: "In carrying out absolutely the principle of the self-determination of peoples, the Central Committee considers it necessary to repeat again that the Russian Communist Party maintains the recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic." It encouraged the Russians in Ukraine to learn Ukrainian and to aid in developing this as a weapon for the Communist education of the laboring masses.

Yet all was mere verbiage and even Vynnychenko who, at this moment, was sympathetic to the Bolsheviks in his "Letter to the Ukrainian Workmen and Peasants," published in *Forward* (Lviv, 30.10. 2-3, II, 1920), lamented the fact that, despite this, the Ukrainian language did not receive its just due and that many Russian Communists were inclined to look upon even Ukrainian Communists as potential counter-revolutionists.

On the other hand, there was one group of Communists who were sincerely devoted to this goal. They were the former Borotbisty and the Ukapisty who had stressed the need for Ukrainian Communism and who had never lost an opportunity, while stressing their Communist feelings, to express the hope that the Ukrainian Communists might some time be formed into a special party and be duly admitted to the Communist International on a par with all the other Communist parties of the world. They took advantage of the situation offered by the formation of the Union of Soviet Republics and eagerly sought posts in the Commissariat of Education, which was one of the independent republic commissariats. This gave them a very good opportunity to work for the develop-

ment of Ukrainian and Ukrainian culture in a field where there could be little expressed opposition. 186 191 665

On the other hand, every step for the fostering of Ukrainian or its development was met by the Russian Communists, and especially by those in Ukraine, with the greatest hostility. This went so far that Dmytro Lebid, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the KP/b/U, declared that there was a conflict of two languages and cultures in Ukraine and that it was not the duty of the Communist Party to interfere in this but to allow the dominant culture to win. In this he was actuated as a Russianized Ukrainian by his hostility to his native language and culture but he failed to win support, for it was very obvious that his policy of favoring Russian was only deepening the gulf between the Party and the Ukrainian peasants, the thing that the Moscow authorities were endeavoring at the time to bridge.

On August 1, 1923, the Communist Party passed a new decree which said: "The government of the workers and peasants regards it as necessary in the immediate future to concentrate its power on the spreading of a knowledge of the Ukrainian language. The former equality existing hitherto between the two most widely used languages in Ukraine, Ukrainian and Russian, is insufficient. Life, as experience has shown, causes the actual superiority of Russian. To remove this inequality, the government of the workmen and peasants will introduce a series of practical means which, respecting the equality of the languages of all nationalities on Ukrainian territory, must assure to the Ukrainian language that place which corresponds to the number and economic importance of the Ukrainian people in the territory of the UkSSR."

It further provided that Russian officials in Ukraine should learn Ukrainian within a definite period. All this sounded well on paper but the date by which Russian officials had either to learn Ukrainian or be recalled was constantly postponed further into the future, and the highest men who came for but short periods and who represented Moscow in the Ukrainian capital stubbornly refused to make any effort to obey these decrees.

On the other hand, every declaration to this effect was eagerly

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186 snapped up by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty in the Commis-
191 sariat for Education. In a short time they worked so effectively
665 that nearly all the books published in Ukraine and about 85% of the newspapers were put out in Ukrainian. The circulation of these Ukrainian publications in the villages increased rapidly and aided in producing a sense of relief among the peasants and a tolerance of the situation which was in sharp contrast to the prevailing mood of a few years before.

[871] A network of Ukrainian schools was set up throughout the country with instruction in the native language and the number of students grew rapidly from among the peasant classes. It had been centuries since the Ukrainian language had reached such a state of popularity. The theatres produced plays in Ukrainian as the chief part of their repertory. The cities assumed a markedly Ukrainian appearance and the leaders could look with satisfaction on their results.

871 The one difficulty was the low level of the instruction in many
186 places but this was equally characteristic of the Russian terrain.[1] The revolution and the Bolshevik laws had abolished the old Russian system of education and had eliminated from the schools the bulk of the older intelligentsia and their children who, on one excuse or another, were excluded from all opportunities for study. The old disciplines were abolished and the Soviet school entered upon a chaotic period. Nevertheless, the changes which the former Borotbist Hrynko introduced, including the establishment of seven year schools which gave the students the right to enter upon a three year course in various technical schools, served to increase rapidly the number of young and partly trained Ukrainians who were available for posts in the government service and who thereby freed the organization from its dependence upon Russian-trained people.

645 In 1925, he[2] was succeeded in the post of Commissar by O.
871 Shumsky, likewise a Borotbist, who had held the post of Ukrainian
186 Minister in Warsaw. He had come back in 1923 to become the
665 Director of Agitation and Propaganda for the Central Committee of the KP/b/U. An ardent believer in the Ukrainian cause, he

[1] [1923 -- Analyst]

[2] [Hrynko, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

opposed very strenuously all the Russifying influences in the Party and insisted, as a matter of principle, that only Ukrainian Communists should be promoted to prominent posts in the Ukrainian Communist organizations. He even went so far as to insist, when Kaganovich was sent from Moscow as Secretary of the Ukrainian section of the party, that he be removed and replaced by Chubar, an old Bolshevik, and he recommended that Hrynko should be made the head of the state. 645 871 186 665

Kaganovich, who had been rather on the side of Shumsky in many of his enterprises, now turned against him on the ground that he was breaking Communist discipline and, in a short time, Shumsky was removed and transferred to Moscow, where he received a post as head of the trade unions. From there he was moved to Leningrad to become head of a school of economics, but by this time his star was setting. Shumsky, on more charges, was sent to a concentration camp near the Finnish border. According to the story, he was assured that he had a chance to escape. He tried it and was shot. His leading assistants, Maksymovych, Vasylkiv and Turyansky, were branded as Shumkyists and punished accordingly. [687]

His successor, M. Skrypnyk, took up his work as Commissar of Education under even better auspices. Unlike his predecessors, who had entered the Communist Party from the ranks of the Borotbisty or the Ukapisty and who thereby risked the charge of being Ukrainian nationalists and having bourgeois-nationalist sympathies, Skrypnyk had been an old member of the Russian Social Democratic Party (Bolsheviks). He had been a personal friend of Lenin long before the Revolution. He had been arrested several times by the tsarist government, had taken an active part in the October Revolution of 1917 and was a disciplined member of the party. He was thus above reproach so far as his party standing was concerned.

From the time of the foundation of the Ukrainian National Republic, Skrypnyk had been one of the outstanding Ukrainians in the Communist Party. From the beginning he had taken the definite stand that the Communist organization in Ukraine should be thoroughly Ukrainian, independent of the Russian Communist Party and with a seat in the Comintern. He believed that Ukraine

645 should naturally have a Soviet government and be an indepen-
871 dent state with all the rights and perquisites of the RSFSR and
186 he regarded the war between the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and
665 the Ukrainian National Republic as a civil war in which the Soviet Russians naturally came to the aid of the Soviet Ukrainians. At the same time he believed equally strongly that this assistance should be that of a brother-nation and should have no elements of a foreign occupation.

He was a disciplined Communist and he always acted in accordance with the strictest Communist tradition. He never joined any faction or questioned the vote of his superiors but he remained firm in his convictions, and while he was always in the minority and was willing to yield superficially, he always seized the next opportunity to advance substantially the same points but in a somewhat different form. He was on friendly terms with Stalin and he came to his post after a definite interview with Stalin and with instructions that put him in a position second only to Kaganovich.

The appointment of Skrypnyk with his Communist record showed very well that in 1927 the VKP (the All-Union Communist Party) was still playing with the idea of making the Communist International a real gathering of supposed equals, united under the leadership of a central body in Moscow. It was a tacit recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a political entity, but it was equally the recognition of a Marxian Socialist culture which might lead to some of the later developments of Stalinism. The appointment insured Stalin of the aid of the true Ukrainian Communists in the coming battle between him and the left deviationists.

Once in his own mind Skrypnyk had answered the problem, he did not waver. He accepted the Marxian doctrine that by the development of an urban proletariat he could develop the Ukrainians to the point where they would be justified in demanding an entrance into the Comintern as an independent nation. He interpreted the cases of Czechoslovakia and Latvia as exactly that, since the proletariats of Prague and Brno, as well as Riga, had forced

national independence and he set himself to do the same in Kiev and Kharkiv. 645 871

Without wavering in his devotion to the principles of Communism, he attacked the problem in the broadest possible way. He stimulated derussification by supporting the Ukrainian press, theatre and schools. Under his influence and work, the cities, including Kharkiv, where Ukrainian influence had been relatively weak, came to be predominantly Ukrainian and in smaller places it became very rare to hear Russian spoken. The State Printing House and the smaller cooperative publishing houses produced almost nothing that was not in Ukrainian and during the few years that he remained in control, there were more Ukrainian books published than in the preceding century and a half. 186 665

Skrypnyk was still not satisfied. He extended his activity and patronage of things Ukrainian to all those areas in the RSFSR where Ukrainians were living in compact settlements. He provided Ukrainian papers, books and theatres for those who were living in Kurshchyna, Voronizhshchyna, along the Volga, Kuban, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan and the Far East. He sent educated men and women to establish schools and other cultural institutions and, for the first time in history, efforts were made to establish a real community of interests among all the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

More than that, he held out a friendly hand to Western Ukraine, which was under Polish rule. Although by this time the entire control of foreign affairs was concentrated in Moscow, Skrypnyk was allowed to arrange for a Ukrainian consul in Lviv and Yur. Lapchynsky, a former Ukapist, was appointed to the post. The consul's duty was to win support for the Communists in Eastern Galicia and, in pursuance of this purpose, Skrypnyk, too, paid a visit to Lviv. He had a certain success in his work and a few Western Ukrainians, as S. Rudnytsky, who came from Prague to become the head of the Ukrainian Institute of Geography and Cartography in Kharkiv, and the mathematician Chaykivsky, entered the UkSSR. They formed a special club in Kharkiv and had their own literary organization "Western Ukraine." Skrypnyk [648]

645 871 186 665 even worked out a plan to recruit 8,000 teachers in Western Ukraine to undertake Ukrainian work in the Donbas where the Russian influence was strongest.

At the same time Skrypnyk was a determined Communist and he lost no opportunity for advancing the doctrines of the movement, even at the risk of doing violence to those Ukrainian ideals in which he believed. Thus, in 1928, he demanded a reformation of [815] the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been working feverishly in the same cause of Ukrainization but which, from his point of view, was insufficiently Marxist and Communist. In 1929 he won his point and the Academy was forced to elect to membership seven Communists who were chosen for their knowledge of the subject and not for their scientific ability. One of the seven was Skrypnyk himself, and among the others were O. Shlikhter and Zatonsky, the veteran from the earlier Ukrainian Communist movement. He soon promoted Shlikhter to a prominent position and refused to confirm the election of the non-Communist scholar, Krymsky, to the post of secretary. At the same time he forced the election of several Western Ukrainian members, so that for a few years the Academy did become a real centre to represent all Ukrainian scholarship.

Thus, in this complex process Skrypnyk played at times a curious and often contradictory role. He was at once the head of the Ukrainian movement and of the Communist movement in the country and he never realized or noticed the contradictory character of his actions, like Tito in the early years of his dealing with Moscow. Still, during his term of office the Ukrainian movement reached its height and seemed to be flourishing.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Mykola Khvylovy

Shumsky and Skrypnyk, as Commissars for Education, defended the position of the Ukrainian language in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and among the Ukrainians in the entire USSR. They worked to break down the anti-Ukrainian attitude that had existed from the beginning in the Communist Party of Ukraine, but as men holding public office and busied with the political and administrative problems that were thus raised, they did not go further. The additional step to point out the road for this newly conscious Ukrainian Communism was taken by Mykola Khvylovy. 538 186

Khvylovy, who was born in 1891, was already well known as a Communist writer. A fearless author of strong convictions, he had worked his way early in the Civil War to the position of the Communists and had served as a commissar in the Ukrainian Communist Army. He was now one of the recognized Communist writers and moving spirit of the leading literary group, the *Vaplite* (the All-Ukrainian Academy of Proletarian Literature), the members of which were devoted to him.

Khvylovy was an ardent admirer of Trotsky and when the break came between Trotsky and Stalin, he took the side of the former and held, with him, that the cause of counter-revolution had triumphed and that the rise of a Soviet bureaucracy was merely a return to the old unhappy state. Khvylovy had become a Communist solely because of his belief that it was only through Communism and Communist teachings that humanity could achieve its goal of liberation and self-development and he was impatient with anything that seemed to contradict this theory.

538 He was at the same time an ardent Ukrainian. He could
● 186 not bear to see the subordinate position which Ukraine and the Ukrainian Communist Party held in the USSR and he resented the already obvious attempts to present Moscow as the supreme representative of Communism and of a general Communist culture.

In 1925, he began to publish a weekly pamphlet as a supplement to the central newspaper *Visti* under the title *Culture and Life*. In this he advocated the development of an independent Ukrainian Communist culture which would be distinct from that of Moscow. His first articles, which were purely literary in character, started a lively controversy in the press and in public meetings. It was difficult to attack him, for he based his arguments entirely upon the official statements of the Communist Party and he revealed the inconsistency which existed in these official statements. The entire Ukrainian section of the KP/b/U was aroused and so was the whole of Ukrainian society. Here was a popular writer who dared, in the name of Ukrainian Communism, to take the statements of the Communist Party (KP/b/U) seriously and to draw the logical conclusions from them. These articles he then republished in book form, *Quo Vadis* (1925), *Thoughts against the Current* (1926) and *The Sociological Equivalent* (1927).

Khvylovy's original arguments had urged the necessity for the new Communist Ukrainian literature to assimilate and build itself upon the great European cultural and literary tradition as exemplified in its greatest and noblest writers and thinkers and not to confine itself to being, as it had been too often in the past, a mere appanage and colony of Russia. He deplored the already evident tendency of Ukrainian Communist literature to base itself on the pronunciamentos of Moscow without testing and analyzing them and this led him to proclaim as his slogan "Away from Moscow."

"The ideas of the proletariat we all know without the guidance of Moscow. Only the young Ukrainian nation, the Ukrainian proletariat and its Communist intelligentsia are the true bearers of the great revolutionary socialist ideas and they must not orient themselves on the centre of All-Union Philistinism, on the Moscow sirens. They need to orient themselves on themselves and Europe, but not

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on the Europe of Spengler, which is declining and which we all hate, but on the Europe of the great civilization, the Europe of Goethe, Darwin, Byron, Newton, Marx, etc. That is the Europe that the first legions of the Asiatic Renaissance cannot dispense with." 538 186

In another article he wrote. "Russia is an independent country. Independent. We too are independent. Insofar as our literature has its own path of development, we must ask ourselves the question as to which of the world literatures it is to follow. It is not the Russian in any case. This is positive without any reservations. Ukrainian poetry must flee from Russian literature as rapidly as it can. The reason is that Russian literature has dominated us for centuries as the master of the situation and has trained our psychology to slavish imitation. To base our young art upon it means the halting of our development.

"The time has come to put an end to all Little Russianism, to Ukrainophilism and to Prosvitaism (an allusion to the net of elementary Ukrainian educational institutions existing before the Communist Revolution), and also to ragtag Moscophilism."

The ideas which Khvylovy expressed about literature had a far wider significance, for they could be applied to every aspect of Ukrainian life and activity. As the discussion shifted to the broader questions that were involved, Stalin, who was engrossed in the struggle with Trotsky, interfered personally. He wrote in April, 1926, as general secretary of the VKP/b [the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] to the KP/b/U: "If the Western European proletariat look with longing on the banner which waves in Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvylovy has nothing else to say in favor of Moscow but to urge the Ukrainian workers to flee from Moscow. What is to be said about the other Ukrainian intellectuals of the non-Communist camp, if the Communists begin to speak and not only speak but write in our Soviet press in the words of Khvylovy?"

This was the signal for a new series of attacks on Khvylovy by the complacent russifiers in the Communist Party of Ukraine. All the members of the Executive Committee except Shumsky joined

538 in the attack and so did their satellites, but Khvylovy stood his
● 186 ground and reiterated more strongly his demands for an independent Ukrainian cultural development and repeated Trotsky's attacks on Moscow as the centre of the new Philistinism which had devoured the revolution.

By the end of the year, Khvylovy and the *Vaplite* found it necessary to prepare a formal letter of apology and self-accusation for publication. However humble and self-accusing he was in this letter, he was thoroughly insincere, for he had no intention of changing his course and in a few weeks he resumed his hammering at the forces and advocates of Moscow. He merely sought to gain time to let his words sink in more deeply into the consciousness of the Ukrainian people. His opponents recognized this and throughout 1926 and 1927, they ceaselessly attacked him. In fact, at the end of 1927, at the Tenth Congress of the KP/b/, Kaganovich declared that Khvylovy was an "echo of the bourgeois and kurkuls who base their hopes for the restoration of a bourgeois government in Ukraine on the forces of an armed foreign imperialism."

Khvylovy's article on *Ukraine or Little Russia* was refused publication by the *Visti* on the orders of the party authorities and renewed efforts were made to silence him. This it was impossible to do decisively until the final expulsion of Trotsky from the Communist Party, for the leading representatives of Moscow could not be sure until that time that many of the expressions used by the daring writer would not be incorporated into the principles of the party itself, even though Trotsky had never been known for any pro-Ukrainianism.

To make his cause more vocal, Khvylovy began to express his basic ideas not only in his publicistic articles but in his artistic stories and novels which were very popular among all classes of literate Ukrainians. The climax came with his *Woodsnipes,* the first part of which appeared in 1928.

This was strictly a propaganda novel written with all of Khvylovy's artistic skill. In this he depicts types of his Ukrainian opponents, the Russian Bolshevists, the typical careerists, and the character of Aglaya, the new Ukrainian type who speaks in the words

and with the views of the author. She denounces the gloomy devils in the Moscow chauvinists who were bent upon the enslavement of Ukraine in the name of the International. "It is the same Russian intelligent-internationalist, who willingly talks about the self-determination of nations . . . only not of those which are in the Soviet Union. Here it sees only followers of Petlyura and does not notice its own interference. It here thinks that Ukrainian culture exists . . . as an Austrian intrigue. He points out to Europe the achievements of the Russian genius and leads out into the arena the other peoples of the Union, as the Russian tsarism maintained its own zoo for the people it had conquered. In a word, he is an internationalist who, behind his cosmopolitanism, preserves his own zoological nationalism." 538 186

The second part of the novel was completed and Khvylovy went abroad. As a result of the storm that this novel aroused, the journal of the *Vaplite* was suppressed. The moment was apparently chosen in the hope that Khvylovy would maintain his position and be forced into emigration, from which his influence in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic would be lessened, if not destroyed. Instead, Khvylovy promised to have the manuscript of the second part destroyed and returned to Ukraine.

"By destroying the *Woodsnipes* and thus buying the right to return home . . . and to continue the struggle in more limited forms," wrote Yur. D., in the introduction to the Salzburg edition of the book,—"Khvylovy assured the possibility of the appearance of a numbers of plays by Kulish, of the pieces of the Berezil, his own compilation of the *Literary Fair,* the Ukrainian films of Dovzhenko, the Ukrainization of the higher schools,—in a word he postponed for five years the assassination of the great cultural renaissance."

The other members of the *Vaplite* joined in their own way with Khvylovy in painting the contrasts between the high ideals set forth in the decrees of the Communist party and the sordid reality of the Bolshevik bureaucracy in the Ukraine, who were making no attempt to turn the visions of the party principles into the life of the people. All of the writers were attacked as Khvylovy and

538 sooner or later silenced, even though for some time they worked
186 with him in publishing the *Literary Fair,* a medley of works of all kinds with pungent introductions and comments.

This tendency became so marked that in 1927, Andry Khvylya, one of the most faithful supporters of the official line of the Party declared of the story of Valeriyan Pidmohylny, the *Third Revolution,* "It makes it seem as if Makhno was at the head of the revolutionary movement, that the villagers were with him, as their earth bore them, and that the Bolsheviks were running after Makhno and collecting cream, . . . that the Communist Party were a group of plotters, who had no connection with the masses but through espionage were profiting by the great deeds of other people." Khvylovy found another Communist ally in the person of Volobuyiv. He was a young Ukrainian economist who utilized the materials on the Ukraine prepared by Prof. V. Dobrohayev and published in the central organ of the KP/b/U, the *Bolshevik of Ukraine,* a series of articles which showed the extent of the exploitation of Ukraine by Moscow. He proved clearly that Moscow was carrying out a colonial policy in respect to Ukraine, instead of treating it as an equal republic. This was a sensational revelation for the twenties. Later the works of both Volobuyiv and Khvylovy were condemned by Moscow as anti-Communist and Volobuyiv, shortly after 1933, was exiled to a Siberian prison.

The growing pressure upon Ukraine, the forced collectivization which was beginning and the beginning of the great famine of 1932-3, completed the disillusionment of Khvylovy, who up to this time had maintained a stubborn faith in the principles of Communism and its aspirations for a better future for the common man. His later works made it clear that he had lost all hope that the revolution would accomplish anything except a continuation of the streams of blood that were beginning again to flow throughout Ukraine. Yet there was nothing for him to do but to continue his work.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

186 Yet this obvious truth apparently was overlooked by Skrypnyk
631 and, to a lesser extent, even by Khvylovy, who was absorbed in his everwidening discussion of the cultural significance of Ukrainian Communism and the role and mission of the Ukrainian Communists. While these were talking and arguing about certain ideas, the central authorities in Moscow were cleverly laying plans for removing from the field of practical politics and administration the very basis of local government for which they were fighting.

631 In the same way, reform of the administrative divisions was under way with the concealed purpose of changing the boundaries of the local sub-divisions, so that they would have a purely economic basis. This was done by the elimination of the central areas, the *gubernias* and the *okrugs* and the introduction of a two-step system of administration, the *kray* or *oblast* and the *rayon* or region, which was designed on a purely economic purpose and was admirably adapted for the elimination of local and even republic feeling.

By these and other administrative measures the essential features of the New Economic Policy were eliminated but they were done so gradually and locally that a large part of the population only realized the situation when the process was too far advanced to be affected by any scattered protests.

665 At the end of 1927 Trotsky was expelled from the Communist
642 Party and this ended the long feud between him and Stalin for the control of the Party. Trotsky had quite consistently fought the New Economic Policy as a needless concession to capitalism and within a few months of his rival's defeat, Stalin reversed his policy and openly adopted a more rigid system of controls similar to those which he had attacked Trotsky for urging.

As a matter of fact the pretext for a distinction between the Soviet government and the Communist Party was wearing thin. It was a needless piece of propaganda, once the regime felt itself sufficiently strong. There was no longer the need of maintaining non-party men in places of apparent authority and with his practical sense, Stalin speedily allowed the system to lapse into the limbo of obscurity and made the Communist Party openly what it was, the dictatorial party dominated directly from Moscow.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Early Trials

517 The change of economic policy which had ushered in the
186 collectivization of agriulture seemed at first to offer no threat to the cultural movemen which was going on in Ukraine. Despite the open criticisms tha had been made of Khvylovy and the more secret opposition that Skrypnyk was meeting, the cultural work continued in all its aspects. Politically the Commissariat of Education was still continuig its work, the new literature was proceeding with more and moe important works being produced, and outside and somewhat aprt from the political life of the day, Ukrainian scholarship was pnducing ever more serious works.

No one openly thught of overthrowing the regime although latent discontent coulc be discovered among the entire population. It had been years sine there had been any open opposition. The unruly leaders who hd appealed to arms had either gone abroad or quieted down and here was no one who was even suspected of the kind of dislovalty hat had been widespread during the period of Militant Communism.

186 Then, in 1929, jus as the compulsory collectivization was being
814 prepared, the Ukrainin Soviet government announced that it had
687 discovered the evidene of the existence of a secret society, the
661 Society for the Liberation of Ukraine, and it commenced a series of arrests of some of the outstanding intellectual leaders of the scientific world. This resulted in a public trial and condemnation of the accused but fo the most part they received relatively light sentences.

Who were involvd? For the most part they were individuals who had played moe or less important roles in the Ukrainian

186 National Republic, who had gone abroad after its collapse and
814 who had been invited back to take part in the work of the Ukrain-
687 ian Academy of Sciences. The government produced what seemed
661 to be definite evidence against these people but the curious fact
[538] was that this evidence was strangely inconsistent with all of their previous activity. On the prisoner's bench were such men as Serhey Yefremiv, the leading scholar of Ukrainian literature and a relative conservative, the academiciam Mykhaylo Slabchenko, a former Social Democrat, Prof. Joseph Hermayze, a former member of the Executive Committee of the same party, and the well-known writer L. Starytska-Chernyakivska, who was close to Efremiv and who had more or less dropped out of the modern literary movement and was living in practical retirement.

The Soviet record of the trial strongly suggests that all those factions which, during the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic had utterly failed to come to any agreement, had somehow or other composed their differences in the days when Ukrainian sentiments seemed to be dominant in the ranks of the Communist Party and when there were outstanding Communists, like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, pleading the Ukrainian cause. Yet, as was to be the case in almost all of the later trials, the court record based upon the testimony of the NKVD did not give any clue to the treasonable acts of which the defendants were accused and if they did, the stories passed belief. There was, likewise, no indication of the serious plans on which the organization was working or any details of its formal organization.

All the information that was revealed suggested that it was a definitely anti-Communist movement engineered by a group of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who objected to the Communist program of Ukrainization. There was no hint that the accused had any connection with the derussification program of Skrypnyk or the demand of Khvylovy and his friends of the *Vaplite* for the development of a definite Ukrainian Communism. The Society for the Liberation of Ukraine appeared like a ghost from the past and the prosecution seemed to have the tacit support of even those elements which were working for Ukrainization.

Up to this moment the only open manifestation had been the demand of Skrypnyk that Communists be included in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences but this had apparently been answered satisfactorily and, with slight changes, the Academy was working as before. The most that could be said was that the leaders of Ukrainian thought in the Academy had not properly in their old age kept pace with the development of Marxo-Leninist thought but even this was hardly sufficient for the outburst which was loosed against a group of widely respected scholars.

Another curious aspect of the situation was that the most severe sentences were not given to the announced ringleaders and chief culprits but that there was unearthed on the occasion another society, the SUM, the Society of Ukrainian Youth, which consisted of relatively obscure students, village intelligentsia, peasants and workmen who were shot by the hundreds and thousands without being brought before any tribunal. The head of this group, Mykola Pavlushkiv, was involved in the trial but once again there was no indication that any members of the SUM had been engaged in any form of sabotage or anti-governmental work. Members of the organization who have escaped abroad have testified that the SUM was organized only on the basis of personal friendships and never undertook or planned any deliberate acts of sabotage.

The discovery of the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine with its assumed anti-Communist tinge was the signal for the opening of a campaign against the most respected older non-Communist members of the Academy. The usual method was by the device of demanding Communist self-criticism, and criticism. Its practice was brutally simple and effective.

The Communist organs, especially the GPU-NKVD, decided which of these scholars were to be broken ideologically (and morally) and which were to be removed without fanfare. The latter disappeared. The former group were forced to appear for public "self-criticism." This was preceded by a series of attacks in the newspapers as to the mistakes in Marxo-Leninism which the victim had committed.

186 814 687 661

Then, on an appointed day, a meeting was arranged in a large hall to which the public was invited by the display of large placards and other notices. Selected speakers attacked in the most scurrilous and abusive language various aspects of the work of the accused and ascribed to him the grossest errors. Then came the (obligatory) speeches of those who "wished to speak," i.e. his collaborators and students. These were carefully prepared by the Communist nucleus in the Academy or the Committee. The accused was then compelled to admit his mistakes and promise hereafter to work "in the spirit of Marxo-Leninism and the decrees of the Communist Party." These performances usually lasted for two or three sessions and then the critical "testing" of the work went on in special scientific meetings or scientific publications or in the torture chambers of the GPU. If the accused did not humiliate himself sufficiently or if the collaborators showed themselves insufficiently critical, "rotten liberal," "compromising," "opportunistic" or leaving "ideologically (or class) hostile loopholes," the process was repeated with still more bitterness against the main culprit and his collaborators or witnesses who had attempted to defend him were attacked with equal ferocity and their testimony was sent to the proper places for "consideration."

This was the treatment accorded to Prof. Hrushevsky who, in 1930, was criticized publicly and then arrested and deported to Moscow where he was prevented from doing any work and only after he was completely broken was he sent to a rest-house in the Caucasus to die in 1934. With his removal, the old historical studies almost came to an end. The Academy was reorganized as the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and nearly all the work in the humanities were stopped. The Historical-Philological Section was combined with the Social-Economic Section and nearly all of its special fields were abolished, while at the same time there disappeared a large number of valuable books and collections which were ready for publication.

This destruction of the older scholars in the Academy was justified by grouping Hrushevsky with his historical studies in the same

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

category of public enemies as Mazepa and Petlyura, and the three came to form a trinity subject to constant attack. Their leading crime was declared to be bourgeois nationalism, the object of which was to separate the Ukrainian from the Russian people and to deny the great significance of the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

In 1931 the Soviet authorities found traces of another organization, the Ukrainian National Centre. This is even more mysterious than was the preceding case, for it involved a number of apolitical figures who were living in retirement, as Holubovych, but at the same time it commenced the liquidation of the leaders of the former Borotbisty and Ukapisty. Still heavier sentences were imposed upon these men and large numbers were deported.

Then came an announcement of the extension to Soviet Ukrainian territory of the work of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Colonel Konovalets, and a number of more prominent Ukrainians were executed or deported for reasons that were never satisfactorily explained.

At the same time the Soviets seem to have spread rumors in connection with collectivization that there were movements for an uprising against the regime. They endeavored to have pseudo-Ukrainian patriots from Poland establish contacts with former officers of the Ukrainian National Republic who had dropped into obscurity and then, at a given signal, called for a revolt and easily overpowered their dupes.

Thus these trials eliminated from Ukrainian life the older scholars who had been trained before the period of Communist rule. They justified in the minds of the emigrés the correctness of their position in refusing to listen to the blandishments of the Ukrainian Soviet government during the apparently rosy years of the New Economic Policy, when it seemed as if there was to be a rapprochement with the West. How far the activity of these men, who had put themselves into the lion's mouth and perished, served to renew the Ukrainian courage and self-reliance has been much debated, especially in view of the fact that they were all destroyed as bourgeois, long before any serious danger seemed to

186 threaten the position of the various groups of Ukrainian Com-
814 munists. Khvylovy, despite the attacks upon him and Skrypnyk, still
637 continued to work for the greater Ukrainization of the population
661 and of the cities and, so far, he had not been subjected to any too severe criticism. That was to come next.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Turning of the Cultural Tide

The Ukrainian Communists did not realize what they were 786 ●
doing when they launched their campaign against the bourgeois 814
intellectuals and the aged scholars in the Academy of Sciences. For the first time since the period of Ukrainization had started, they had definitely called the attention of Moscow to the existence in Ukraine of a survival of the old independent mode of thinking which had animated the Ukrainian leaders in the struggle for an independent state of their own and they had coined a name for it, bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism. That was to recur again and again and lead to their own ruin.

It is remarkable that neither Skrypnyk nor Khvylovy realized [829]
this earlier. Both men in their own way were seriously threatening the unity of the Soviet Union, to which as an ideal they were loyal. Both men, Skrypnyk in the political field and Khvylovy in literature, realized the danger to Ukraine of substituting Russianism for Communism. Both men accepted in different senses the basic ideals of Communism and both believed in a Communist International which would offer all peoples full rights of cultural and political development. Neither one understood that the Comintern was a shadow structure which was totally dependent upon the forces operating in Moscow and that the situation in 1928 and 1929 was basically different from that ten years before.

In the RSFSR the charter of liberty for the fellow travellers 626
which had been promulgated in 1925 was practically abolished by 538
the granting of extreme power of control to Averbakh and the RAPP (the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) which, to all intents and purposes, was issuing orders as to how the writers should support the Five Year Plan.

626 It was perfectly natural that a similar situation should develop
538 in Ukraine. The various schools of serious writing, as the *Vaplite,* stood out against this regimentation and ably defended their position, but that position was indefensible in the face of political pressure and without being conscious of any inconsistency, Skrypnyk, as a good Communist and a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was willing to exert pressure to bring the literary organization of Ukraine in line with that of the All-Union Communist Party at the very same time when he was deliberately thwarting the unifying tendencies of that party.

[186] The first sign of the changed order came with the arrest and
[68] deportation of M. Ivchenko for his novel *Working Powers* because it endeavored to express in a concrete form the problem of fitting the ideals of the various national groups into the stereotyped formula which was now fashionable. Next came the difficulties of Khvylovy over his novel *Woodsnipes,* despite his willingness to secure an opportunity for further work by the destruction of the second part of the novel.

It must be remembered that the groups which were now being attacked were not by their essential declarations anti-Communist. They reflected, rather, the disillusionment of many people with the prevailing manifestations of Communism, the growing realization that the Communist regime was not giving the people that ideal reality which its teachings indicated they should easily win.
[536] That was the gist of the drama by M. Kulish, the *People's Malakhy,* which reflected the contrast between the ideals of a high-minded but somewhat simple village Don Quixote and the realities of life on any particular level. This, as other of his plays, was well presented in the Berezil Theatre, directed by Les Kurbas, a Western Ukrainian who had developed in Kiev into one of the great producers and had pushed the Ukrainian theatrical art to its highest development. Writings of the same character had marked some of the early Russian works of A. N. Tolstoy after the revolution but, being a Great Russian, he was not involved in the endless controversies over the national questions and, like most of the Russian authors, he was able to work out a satisfactory agreement with the

626 device was also too obvious, for the new journal continued to
538 criticize the Russian policy and in 1931 it was forced to disband and most of the members who wanted to continue to write passed into the VUSPP, which, with all its rigid adherence to the party line, could not be too sure as to what that party line really was.

At one point in his career Skrypnyk, who was in many ways opposed to Khvylovy, dreamed of the establishment of a Federation of the Unions of Revolutionary Writers of Ukraine. He succeeded in forcing this upon the Futurists and many smaller leftist groups and also the *New Generation,* but his failure to make this real in 1931 was but a sign of the future.

By this time the VUSPP, along with the RAPP, had become the dominating force politically and Skrypnyk was forced to give up his endeavors and to allow most of his Federation members to join the VUSPP. This was but another step in the decay of all literary schools and it reflected the period of uncertainty and of a definite degree of opposition to the domination of the RAPP.

By the end of the twenties, the opportunities for independent thinking in literature had grown exceedingly few and scattered. There were still, in general, only the two currents of Ukrainian and Russian Communism, and the former was definitely beginning to wane under the continual attacks that were delivered both by its opponents and the Communist Party through its official organs.
[186] Still, up until 1931, Ukrainian literature continued to develop and the literary disputes, often over minor points of literature, thought and culture, animated society and lent a zest to the various writings. These now more than ever began to reflect a growing apprehension over the conditions as they were and the impossibility of equating the ideals of Communism and the realities of the Russian domination of the country.

A more decided blow was given by the decree of April 23, 1932.
[656] This ended all literary discussions and abolished all literary societies and groups throughout the entire Soviet Union. In place of these, Stalin announced the establishment of a single society throughout the entire Union, the All-Union Association of Soviet Writers, and turned this over to Maksim Gorky, perhaps the most prominent

the eighteenth century, the bell-tower of the Kiev-Kiril-Troitsky 346
Monastery of the eighteenth century built by the architect Ivan 661
Hryhorovych-Barsky, the Church of Sts. Borys and Hlib of the 633
eighteenth century, the Church of the Birth of Christ and the "good Nicholas," built by Andry Melensky at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Church of the Tithes, the celebrated statue of Samson by Hryhorovych-Barsky, and a long series of other monuments and buildings.

Almost all of these buildings came from those periods when the Ukrainians were the most free from Russian influence or, as in the case of the Mazepa baroque, had the closest contacts with the West. It was a deliberate part of the Communist attempt to rewrite the Ukrainian past.

Of course, their excuse was that the old primarily ecclesiastical culture stood in marked contradiction to the modern era of industrialization and collectivization, the "glorious age of Stalin" which called for the development of a new type of architecture. Still, in a surprising number of cases these new buildings did not make their appearance and the ground was left empty or covered with insignificant structures which could better have been placed on the site of those half-ruined shacks and hovels which were the real expressions of the Communist paradise.

The primary object[1] was the annihilation of the Ukrainian spirit 626
and represented part of the broad general movement which had 186 ●
been launched for the rerussification of the country and the stopping in every way of that spontaneous outburst of development which had been called into being by the downfall of tsarism and the founding of the Ukrainian National Republic. The general debacle was now complete.

Within four years, before the ending of the first Five Year Plan a situation had been brought about which seemed to the Soviet authorities a guarantee of their final victory over what they were pleased to call bourgeois nationalism but which was, in realty, the logical outgrowth of the Ukrainian aspirations throughout the centuries.

[1] [in destruction of churches & monuments of past in Kiev--Analyst

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
166 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges[1] and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

1 [During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

simply Russians was constantly increased. It was almost forbidden 626
to mention the name Ukrainian in connection with the older settlers 186
in Kuban, along the Don, in the Green Wedge along the Amur, etc. [191]
and it was a matter of perplexity as to what language they could be said to speak or what dialect in connection with later studies of the dialects of the Russian language. It was inadmissible to regard them as speaking a peasant dialect in view of the attitude of the authorities in recognizing some sort of Ukrainian, but it was even worse to believe that Ukrainian could exist in those regions and so they were simply passed over and forgotten, while the newcomers, usually being under some kind of a ban, were simply treated as Russian deportees.

Even this was not the whole story, for in such cities as Vinnytsya 661
during these same years, the population was slaughtered by the thousands and buried secretly in carefully hidden burial places which were then turned into parks and playgrounds to conceal the extent of the crimes. This was repeated in many places but the situation in Vinnytsya attracted especial attention because during the War, the Germans found the places of burial and revealed the thousands of bodies of the victims, many of whom had been buried alive. The extent of these massacres was as great as was the killing of the Polish officers in Katyn, which was likewise brought to light during the war.

By the time the census of 1939 was taken and this was the last 162
one published, the growth of the number of Russians and the diminution of Ukrainians showed clearly that there was a large scale transfer of nationality which completely reversed the figures in some sections of Asia without regard for the natural laws of reproduction and mortality.

In this atmosphere the nature of the intellectual and literary 626
work in the UkSSR can well be imagined. The Ukrainian scholars 814
were forced to accept the full Russian theories of the Ukrainian 661
past. This led to a complete revaluation of all the "outstanding figures." In 1933 the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was condemned on the ground that he was a typical representative of the noble classes. By the outbreak of World War II he became a Rus-

[1936-1938 -- Analyst]

725 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A.
668 had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrain-
[208] ians were loyal to the Soviet Union. This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided
● [186] to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army.

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

[651] The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West.

728 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of
648 the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

000 in an ideal organization. Stalin, by his policy in the thirties, blew away that mirage but it required a World War for him to annihilate it.

Soon after the Germans attacked, Stalin dissolved the Comintern to please his Western allies and to dupe them. He substituted the Slav Congress and when he secured the assent of the Big Three to liberate the Slavs, he highly developed this.

186 728 As the Red Army, now transformed by fiat of the Council of Commissars of the USSR into the Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies, "liberated" one Slav capital after another, they were followed by cultural missions who talked to the enthusiastic multitudes on the Slav Brotherhood of Nations in terms of 1848, Peter, the Third Rome and Stalin. Rylsky and Tychyna, Korniychuk and Yanovsky, all the outstanding Ukrainian writers who had yielded to the Russian cause and survived the purges, spoke. They praised the new situation and the democratic powers admired this.

665 It was only a sham because soon there was established the Cominform. Its seat was not in Moscow but its spirit was there. The object of the Cominform was not to create a new and equal gathering of Communist humanity, not the ostensible idea of the Comintern but it was to inform the Communists among the Slavs and elsewhere of the approach to Communism by the elder Communists of the world, the Muscovite Great Russians.

[538] In the purely cultural sphere the answer was the condemnation of formalism, and still more of internationalism. Formalism was a technical school of literary criticism which had contributed something to the study of literature and culture. It was an attempt to put technique above content, or rather to judge content by technique and its advocates, sometimes great scholars in a narrow field, basked in the light of the admiration of their friends, until they considered themselves great.

814 665 Internationalism was something else. Its content had been expressed by the Protopope Avvakum in 1666 when he announced at his trial in Moscow that all Orthodox Christians had to come to Moscow to learn. Now it was the same. History was to be periodicized between A. M. and P. M. (Ante Muscoviae and Post

p. 3

I. THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM

727 DURING the summer and autumn of 1941 the German armies rolled across the plains of the Ukraine; by November the entire Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was in their hands. Observers everywhere were aware of the significance of the conquest of [241] this huge area with its thirty-five million inhabitants. The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine, famous as the "granary of the USSR," the gigantic industrial complex of the Donets basin, and the rich mineral deposits were weighed in appraising the loss of the Soviet Union and the gain of Germany. While the political effects of the conquest received less attention at the time, in some ways they were even more important than the economic effects.

● 186 While there is a tradition of separate political development in the Ukraine,[1] modern nationalism—the doctrine that persons of a distinctive culture should constitute an independent state—came late to the area. To a close observer, the first stirrings of nationalism among educated groups in the Ukraine would have been apparent early in the nineteenth century, and by the middle [538] of that century Taras Shevchenko, the greatest name in Ukrainian literature, was giving poetic expression to nationalist aspirations. It was considerably later, however, that definitely political [668*] organizations were formed to establish the claim of the Ukraine to nationhood.[2] For the student of contemporary politics, it is precisely this late emergence of Ukrainian nationalism which

[1] The term "Ukraine" is used throughout this study (except in cases when another meaning is clearly implied) to refer to the territory comprised in the Ukrainian SSR in 1945. Essentially the same area (with the exception of the Carpatho-Ukraine, which is discussed briefly at several points in this study) was included in the Ukrainian SSR in 1941. This territory corresponds fairly closely—except, as noted in Chapter XI, in the east—to the Ukrainian "ethnographical" territory, the area in which the indigenous population speaks Ukrainian.

[2] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 12.

186 endows it with peculiar interest. Few subjects are of greater importance for the understanding of the political forces shaping contemporary society than the interaction of nationalism, in its numerous manifestations, and socialism, in its divergent branches. Ukrainian nationalism is especially significant in this regard because it took form at the same time that Marxian socialism became influential as an ideology in the Russian Empire. As Ukrainian nationalism acquired definitely political aims and the dominant element of Russian Marxism took on the political form of Soviet Communism, the interrelationship between these two forces became increasingly complex.

121 This circumstance, together with the intrinsic importance of Ukrainian nationalism as a force directed toward securing the support of one fifth of the population of the Soviet Union,[3] appears to justify a detailed study of Ukrainian nationalism, even though it has never attained its primary aim, the establishment of a truly independent state. Moreover, the importance of the interaction of nationalism and Communism suggests that the study be focused upon that part of Ukrainian ethnographical territory which between 1920 and 1941 was under Soviet control. This region, commonly known as the "East Ukraine," was subjected to the full impact of the Soviet system prior to the period covered in the present study, while the "West Ukraine" was divided among non-Communist Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia during most of the period between the two world wars. While the East Ukraine is emphasized, the West Ukraine is also considered at some length as the region in which nationalism was most vigorous and as that which served as a base for nationalist activities.

The present study is primarily political in theme, being directed to nationalism as a movement aiming at the establishment of an independent state. It is not limited to the political aspect in the narrow sense of the term, however. Since the Ukrainian

[3] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946) furnishes a comprehensive analysis of available Soviet census information. Some non-Soviet analyses, based of course on considerable extrapolation of available data, place the Ukrainian portion of the population of the USSR as high as one fourth.

nationalists did not succeed in organizing a state apparatus, there 121
is little scope for the study of constitutional or legal structures. As will become apparent shortly, the nature of the various nationalist ideologies makes intensive study of Ukrainian political philosophy of limited value. Consequently, an effort has been made to follow the approach sometimes described as the "sociology of politics." The history of the nationalist parties has been traced and, insofar as possible, the diverse social elements of the nationalist movement have been described.

Many efforts have been made to analyze the nature of national- 186
ism and to determine the sources of its vitality. None have been entirely successful, for, like all dynamic movements which spread far beyond their original habitats, nationalism has been colored and transmuted by the varied milieus in which it has become established. It is a problem of peculiar difficulty to determine what has caused the movement to take root at all in many countries; this is especially true of the Ukraine. One of the most frequent stimuli of the nationalist spirit is religion, but the establishment of a separate Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy was the result of growing nationalist feeling rather than its cause.[4] Another stimulus of nationalism is the existence of distinctive customs and ways of living. In addition to distinctive popular art forms, which will be referred to later, there was a marked difference between the pre-1917 social organization of most Ukrainian peasant communities and their Russian counterparts. The people of the Ukraine, for example, did not usually follow the predominant Russian system of "repartition," or periodic redistribution of farmlands, with all its implications of subordination of the individual peasant to the community.[5] In 1905, before this people was generally recognized as a distinct nation, that shrewd observer of the tsar's dominions, Mackenzie Wallace, made these remarks:

[4] See Chapter VIII.

[5] Cf. Geroid Tanquary Robinson, *Rural Russia under the Old Regime: A History of the Landlord-Peasant World and a Prologue to the Peasant Revolution of 1917* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 35, on the comparative absence of the practice of repartition.

6 Emergence of Nationalism

188 The city [Kiev—Kyïv][6] and the surrounding country are, in fact,
184 Little Russian rather than Great Russian, and between these two sections of the population there are profound differences—differences of language, costume, traditions, popular songs, proverbs, folk-lore, domestic arrangements, mode of life, and Communal organization. In these and other respects the Little Russians, South Russians, Ruthenes, or Khokhly, as they are variously designated, differ from the Great Russians of the North, who form the predominant factor in the Empire, and who have given to that wonderful structure its essential characteristics. Indeed, if I did not fear to ruffle unnecessarily the patriotic susceptibilities of my Great Russian friends who have a pet theory on this subject, I should say that we have here two distinct nationalities, further apart from each other than the English and the Scotch. The differences are due, I believe, partly to ethnographical peculiarities and partly to historical conditions.[7]

197 As Wallace observed, linguistic differences between the Ukrain-
186 ians and Russians were significant. The factor of language has indeed been used very frequently as the decisive criterion for distinguishing the two ethnic groups.[8] During the nineteenth century a distinctive, though still evolving, Ukrainian literary language arose based on the speech prevalent among the peasantry. This speech is a member of the East Slavic linguistic group and therefore is closer to Russian than to any other major language, although Russian is not readily understood by most of the peasants. Russian was already established as the literary language of the East Ukraine before literary Ukrainian became prominent, however, and it continued to be familiar to nearly all educated Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

[6] The second form is the Ukrainian. Usually the place names cited in this study are given in the forms generally used by the power which since 1945 has controlled the area in which they are located. This means that places now in the USSR are designated by the Russian forms, and the few now in Poland by Polish forms. Where the Ukrainian name is different, it is given in parentheses after the first citation. In a few cases (especially rivers) where another form is already familiar to the English reader, this practice has not been followed, and in the case of the city of Mariupol' (Mariiupil'), which has recently been renamed Zhdanov, the old name has been used.

[7] Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1905), p. 347.

[8] In this study this general usage of referring to those who speak Ukrainian as their native tongue as "Ukrainians" has been followed, although it should be constantly kept in mind that use of the language in childhood does not necessarily imply a belief in Ukrainian independence, or even a consciousness of national distinctiveness.

Fundamentally, though, it is not to the criteria of religion, 186
folkways, or language that the adherents of Ukrainian nationalism have appealed; more basic has been the evocation of a common historical tradition, the claim that the Ukrainian people, once great and independent, had lost its heritage. In the Europe of the turn of the century there were, to the superficial observer, two classes of nations, those which were embodied in independent states and those which were not.[9] Actually, the second group was almost as sharply subdivided into the "historic" nations, which had the memory of having possessed within modern times a stable state form, and those which were not so fortunate. Among the former may be mentioned the Poles, whose republic had vanished only a century previously, and the Czechs, who still preserved a vestige of their ancient state in the Crown of Bohemia. For groups like the Latvians, the Slovenes, and the inhabitants of the Ukraine, however, no such obvious rallying points of statehood existed; hence, the pages of history had to be searched to provide a comparable symbol of unity.

Since it was vital to the emerging nation that its language and 186
its history be embodied in works which could inspire loyalty, it 668*
was only natural that the leaders of the nationalist movement 538
should have been writers. The national poet Shevchenko has already been mentioned, and he was but one of many writers, such as Nicholas Kostomarov and John Franko. Historians, headed by Michael Hrushevs'kyi, who perhaps more than any other deserves the title of father of Ukrainian nationalism, were equally important.[10] The early leaders of the movement were almost without exception intellectuals—men more at home with words than deeds—a fact which was to have great significance for the future development of Ukrainian nationalism.

Part of the effort to stimulate the historical sense of the people 186
of the Ukraine centers around an endeavor to demonstrate that 668*
their ethnic and spiritual ancestor was the people of Kievan "Rus" and to deny that the Russians were descended from the medieval state of Kiev. Much greater energy is devoted, however,

[9] This concept is expressed in Hugh Seton-Watson's *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), pp. 268–69.
[10] Cf. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution*, p. 9.

186 to studying the Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Sich (the Stronghold 668* beyond the Rapids—of the Dnieper River) and to attempting to show that their struggles with Poland and Russia were in fact efforts to set up an independent Ukrainian state.[11] In this connection, the astonishing success against Poland of the seventeenth-century Cossack leader Bohdan Khmel'nits'kyi, who led his armies to the banks of the Vistula, is given special prominence. The subsequent story of how Khmel'nits'kyi became a vassal [12] of Moscow in order to maintain his independence of Poland, and of how the tsars then gradually absorbed his successors' realm, furnishes the chief historical basis for the allegation that union with the Russians was forced upon the Ukrainians.

While it could in all probability never have taken root without the existence of distinctive historical traditions, language, and customs, modern Ukrainian nationalism developed in the nineteenth century in a dual imitative-defensive reaction to foreign nationalisms. The German nationalist movement of the early nineteenth century, with its romantic emphasis on glorification of the national past and the language and customs of the common people, had a strong influence on nascent Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover, within the Austro-Hungarian Empire a culturally advanced segment of the Ukrainian people was in close contact with the intense nationalism of the Galician Poles. In Austrian Galicia the Poles occupied a privileged position, constituting in effect the ruling class of the area, which had once been part of the Polish kingdom. The Ukrainian-speaking half of the population of the province had never lost all awareness of its distinctiveness, since a considerable gap separates the Ukrainian and the Polish languages, and the ethnic division coincided with an ecclesiastical

[11] Compare the proportion of space devoted to the two periods in easily available histories by nationalist Ukrainians, such as Mykhailo (Michael) Hrushevs'kyi, *A History of the Ukraine,* ed. O. J. Frederiksen, Introduction by Professor George Vernadsky (New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Ukrainian National Association, 1941), and Dmytro Doroshenko, *History of the Ukraine,* trans. Hanna Keller (Edmonton, Alberta: The Institute Press, Ltd., 1939).

[12] The relationship of vassal is the one accepted by Hrushevs'kyi; see *Pro stari chasy na Ukraïni* (Concerning the Olden Days in the Ukraine) (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Narodna Vol'ia, 1916), pp. 90 ff. Less moderate Ukrainians and Russians have described the agreement between Khmel'nits'kyi and Moscow in sharply contradictory terms.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

separation. The Poles were Latin Catholics, while the Ukrainians, [162] though also in obedience to the Pope, were nearly all of the Greek 186 (i.e., Byzantine-Slavonic) rite. Consequently, it is not surprising 668* that the ranks of the clergy provided a large proportion of the 793 awakeners of Galician Ukrainian national feeling. Most prominent of such priests was Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi. He was the scion of a family which was counted among the Polish nobility, but he felt himself to be Ukrainian; his career embraced almost the entire span of Ukrainian nationalist activity, from the turn of the century to the close of the period covered in this study.[13]

The reasons why a Ukrainian nationalist movement arose 186 within the Russian Empire are not so obvious. By the beginning 668* of the twentieth century, the great bulk of prominent men of 177 Ukrainian ethnic origin appear to have been Russified in culture and feeling, even if they occasionally gave signs of remembering that there were different cultural elements in their family backgrounds.[14] That the Russian Empire could have carried out such a large-scale assimilation is a tribute to the degree to which it was supranational, avoiding the narrower concepts of ethno- 186 centrism. Although a strong current had set in since the sixties, 668* when N. T. Danilevskii's *Rossiia i Evropa* (Russia and Europe) heralded the advent of Pan-Slavism based on ethnic Russian hegemony, for many, especially for officials in the governing bureaucracy, the rule of the tsars remained an expression of the ecumenical tradition of empire, a "Third Rome," but one which

[13] See Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora, Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), and Il'ko Borschak (Elie Borschak—this author is better known by the French form of his name), *Un Prèlat Ukrainien: Le Metropolite Cheptyckyj (1865–1944)* (Paris: Editions Franco-Ukrainiennes, 1946). The fact that the parish priests of the Greek Catholic rite were allowed to marry meant that their nationalist feeling could be passed on from generation to generation, a factor of considerable significance in providing a continuing body of bearers of the "national ideal."

[14] Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution.*

Two of the best Ukrainian sources for the period are Izaac Mazepa, *Ukraïna v ohni i buri revoliutsiï, 1917–1921* (The Ukraine in the Fire and Storm of the Revolution, 1917–21), 3 vols. (Munich: Prometei, 1950–51), and Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsiï: Istoriia ukraïns'koï revoliutsiï, marets', 1917 r.—hruden', 1919 r.* (The Rebirth of a Nation: A History of the Ukrainian Revolution, March, 1917–December, 1919), 3 vols. (Vienna, 1920).

186 based its authority on symbols of universality rather than national
668* exclusivism.[15]

186 The claims of the Russian Empire to acceptance, however,
665 were weakened by its failure to solve social questions. However
565 much cultural differences and historical memories may have contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, it is difficult to conceive how it could have arisen had it not to a large extent corresponded with a basic cleavage in the social structure of the Ukraine. There, to an unusual degree, nationality coincided with economic class. The Ukrainians were, with the exception of a small intelligentsia, almost entirely peasants; the landowners and officials were Poles or Russians, while the commercial bourgeoisie was largely Jewish. Under such circumstances, any nationalist movement was likely to become a class movement as well, a movement whose leaders would stress agrarian reform and liberation of the peasant from "exploiting" groups.

186 It was in this way, of course, that Ukrainian nationalism be-
668* came a rival of Communism. Basically, Communism[16] in the Russian Empire in the period before and during the Revolution of 1917, was a movement of townspeople. Both its ideology and its practical possibilities induced it to seek especially the support of the urban industrial workers, led and inspired by a group of dissident intellectuals. The latter were drawn from all the nations of the tsarist realm, but were predominantly Russian and Jewish. The workers were predominantly Russian, and those few Ukrainian laborers who had settled permanently in the cities prior to 1917 had for the most part become Russified in speech and consciousness. But the Communist leadership, with its sharp insight into the real social conditions of the country, realized that no purely urban movement could succeed in a country four-fifths peasant; hence, it sought, especially after the March Revolution

[15] An especially interesting treatment of this aspect of the Russian Empire is presented by Hans Rothfels in *Reich, Staat und Nation im deutsch-baltischen Denken: Vortrag bei der öffentlichen Sitzung der Gelehrten Gesellschaft zu Königsberg am 12 Januar 1930, Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, 7. Jahr. Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse, Heft 4* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1930).

[16] Actually the "Bolshevik" faction of the Social Democratic Party in Russia did not adopt the designation "Communist" until 1917. To avoid confusion, however, the latter term has been used throughout this study for the essentially continuous movement.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in 1917, through the instrumentality of the soviets, to draw the villager into the revolutionary movement. At this point the Communists encountered the opposition of the Ukrainian nationalists. In the confusion and disorganization following the overthrow of the tsar in March, the Ukrainian nationalists had been able to pass from the stage of a quasi-legal group of parties, intent primarily on arousing an attachment to cultural nationalism, to a real, if shaky, political force. From the spring of 1917 to the summer of 1920, this force, though now no longer representing a single "movement," was able to maintain a series of Ukrainian governments on the soil of the Ukraine.

It is no purpose of this study to detail the nature of these governments which have been described elsewhere in comprehensive fashion.[17] For future reference, however, it is necessary at least to list them. The first, formed in April, 1917, was known as the Ukrainian Central Rada (*rada* means council and is the equivalent of the Russian word *soviet*), but during the first months of its activity it was really a semiautonomous administrative organ admitting the supremacy of the Provisional Government in Petrograd. Democratic and strongly socialist in its ideology, the Rada was the creation of the leftist intellectual groups which had predominated in the national movement before the war. It declared Ukrainian independence in January, 1918, but when it collided with the demands of the Germans, who occupied the Ukraine in February, 1918, the Rada was ousted. It was replaced by a quasi-monarchial regime under a member of the landowning aristocracy, Paul Skoropads'kyi, a descendant of a *het'man* or chieftain of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. After the armistice of November, 1918, this government, no longer supported by German troops, fell, and was replaced by a new regime, known as the Ukrainian People's Republic (Ukraïns'ka Narodna Respublika—UNR). This government lasted nearly two years, but was subject to extreme vicissitudes because of the strength of the Communist effort to conquer the Ukraine, attempts of the White anti-Bolshevik armies to reincorporate it in Russia, and the desire of Poland to extend her sphere of influence to the Dnieper. The administration, known as the "Directory," soon came under the

[17] Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution.*

The administration, known as the "Directory", soon came under the
642 control of its most forceful member, Simon Petliura, who, through
186 his military command, acquired such fame in this period that
668* among the less educated elements of the Ukrainian population his name has since been synonymous with the struggle for national independence.

Because they represented a measure of stability, the successive Ukrainian governments attracted the support of many persons who desired a regime independent of Communism. To be sure, many persons in the Ukraine who desired the establishment of a firm authority supported the conservative military commands of Denikin and Wrangel, the White generals. Before the latter became prominent, however, the equally conservative authority of the Het'man attracted the support of a considerable section of the upper classes of the tsarist society, including a number of military officers.[18] Once they had accepted the idea of an independent Ukraine, several of the officers, like Generals Vsevolod Petriv and Michael Omelianovych-Pavlenko, remained adherents of the nationalist Ukrainian regime which succeeded Skoropads'kyi, and were of valuable assistance because of their professional skill.[19]
186 On the other hand, except for Skoropads'kyi's group, the leader-
668* ship of Ukrainian nationalism remained predominantly in the hands of intellectuals throughout the revolutionary period, and even many of the Het'man's followers were writers and scholars. The educated youth of the Ukraine was divided between those who desired to join in the Bolshevik movement and those who chose the way of a left-wing nationalism. Victor Prykhod'ko, a

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[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 158–59.

[19] The biographies of these officers are extremely interesting because of the light they throw on the process of Ukrainization of tsarist aristocrats. Thus General Petriv had more Norwegian and Finnish than Ukrainian ancestry, but his family had been settled in the Ukraine for several generations; it is said that "his national consciousness was awakened" by association with ardently nationalist Finnish and Swedish officers from the grand duchy of Finland while on duty in Warsaw in 1904. Actually, the fact that the division of which he was chief of staff when the October Revolution took place was 80 percent Ukrainian may have decided him to throw in his lot with the national movement (cf. *Za Ukrainu*, January 28, 1945, p. 2, and February 1, 1945, p. 2). Omelianovych-Pavlenko was the son of a Don Cossack general and a Georgian princess, but being stationed in Odessa when the Bolshevik Revolution took place, he joined the Ukrainians. See Myroslav Martynets', "Gen.-Polk. M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko," (Colonel-General M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA*, August–September, 1952, p. 1).

nationalist who lived through the period, describes the former as 186
persons who thought on a "planetary" level, desiring to solve 668*
all the world's problems at once and regarding the claims of national affinity as "parochial." One, his schoolmate, was Volodymyr Zatons'kyi, who was later to become one of the most implacable of Communist officials in the Ukraine. Even before the war, he, according to the writer, refused to have anything to do with Ukrainian cultural activities, like the Prosvita [enlightenment] [575]
society in the city of Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamianets-Podils'k), where they were students. Rather, he associated with "foreigners," Russians and Jews, and was rapidly drawn into the revolutionary socialist movement.[20] The basis for a choice in this generation of young intellectuals appears to have been chance, or the psychological make-up of the individual, which was reinforced increasingly by the cumulative impact of associations formed after the initial choice was taken. Thus by the time the revolutionary conflicts drew to a close, the educated classes in the Ukraine were deeply split. Even more divided was the real foundation of any 565
independence movement, the peasants. They—or at least those 668*
who were somewhat more prosperous than the average—had 641
initially welcomed the Ukrainian governments. The increasing impotence of the new regimes and their preoccupation with factional strife and unrealistic programs instead of practical measures caused much indifference or disaffection among the peasants. In the judgment of one of the ablest students of the revolutionary period, however, the Ukrainian peasant preferred a nationalist government to either a Red or a "White" administration supporting a central regime.[21]

That the Communists were victors in the physical struggle is 642
no proof of greater popular support, for much of their strength

[20] Vyktor (Victor) Prykhodko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[21] William H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944). Moreover, one of the best Communist historians of the revolutionary period in the Ukraine, M. G. Rafes, a former adherent of the Jewish Bund, says the "natural" development of the peasants (and workers, especially in the sugar refineries in the small towns) was to "national socialism," "the Ukraine for the Ukrainian peasants," although he of course adds that they were inspired by the "reactionary bourgeois intelligentsia"; see *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine: Evoliutsiia i raskol "Bunda"* (Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine: The Evolution and Division of the "Bund") (Moscow, 1920), p. 8.

642 came from the Russian workers of the cities, or from outside the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government under Petliura was to a considerable extent discredited, because it had failed to devote sufficient attention to the needs of the peasantry and to [648] establish law and order. Moreover, by an eleventh-hour alliance with Poland, it had compromised its claim to represent the entire Ukrainian nation. This resulted from the fact that Galicia, which, upon the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy had formed its own West Ukrainian Republic, was surrendered to the Warsaw regime as a price for aid in the east, a solution in which most Galicians refused to acquiesce. Nevertheless, Poland and the Soviet Union made peace, and shortly afterwards the remnants of the Ukrainian army and bureaucracy retreated across the border for internment in Poland. From this sanctuary a group of a few hundred under Colonel George Tiutiunnyk sortied in October, 1921, for a last desperate raid into the Soviet-occupied Ukraine.[22]

After that the East Ukraine lay under Communist rule, which could no longer be challenged by military force. For a time, however, it appeared as if the rising tide of nationalist sentiment—it rose even among those who had long been adherents of Marxist doctrines—might bring about what arms had failed to accomplish. To understand this situation it is necessary to recall that the Communists under Lenin had modified their original stand in order to appeal to the nationalism of the non-Russians. In January, 1918, soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Third Congress of Soviets asserted a theoretical right of all the nations of the tsarist empire to go their several ways, to secede from the Bolshevik government in Moscow. At the same time, it deprived this right of any content by insisting that it be exercised only by the "toiling masses." Although the Communist Party's stand was more ambiguously phrased, its insistence that the interests of the toilers were represented only by the Communist Party and that the non-Russian Communist Parties formed inseparable parts of the central Bolshevik organization, in fact rendered self-determination a fiction. During the following years, the central Party [661] leadership used armed force when possible to insure that these local Communist Parties, thus reduced to mere branches of a

[22] Mazepa, III, 96–105.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

unified Party, should "rule" within each smaller nation which had formed part of the tsarist empire.

Having provided for the initial objective of substantial Communist control, however, the Bolshevik leaders made sweeping statements against "Great Russian chauvinism," and directed that the culture of each nation be "national in form, socialist in content." Encouraged by this apparent desire for development of the national culture at the expense of the Russian cultural supremacy, which had been grafted on their peoples in tsarist days, many of the Communist leaders of the non-Russian nations set about vigorously promoting an independent cultural life as soon as Communist control was established. In the Ukraine, the major leader in the effort during the early twenties was the commissar of education, Alexander Shums'kyi; after his deposition in 1927 he was succeeded by Nicholas Skrypnyk, an even more devoted Communist, but a firm adherent of Ukrainian cultural nationalism.[23] To what extent these men were sincere adherents of Ukrainian nationalism and to what extent the favor they extended to it was motivated by a desire to secure popular support and to curb the overweening power of Moscow in the interest of an internationalism which, to them, was in closer accord with original Communist ideology, it is hard to say. At any rate, they went to very considerable lengths to encourage specifically Ukrainian traits and traditions, especially in scholarship, literature, and the schools. While these Communist supporters of Ukrainian nationalism always formed only one segment of the ruling group in the Ukraine, and hence could not completely eradicate Russian permeation of

[23]No thorough treatment of the Ukraine under Soviet rule exists. Among the best brief analyses in English are John S. Reshetar, "National Deviation in the Soviet Union," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XII (April, 1953), 162–74; Michael Pap, "Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine," *Review of Politics*, XIV (April, 1952), 204–32; and an older but generally accurate account by Lancelot Lawton, "Ukraina: Europe's Greatest Problem," *East Europe*, III (Spring, 1939), 28–45. The continuation of Hrushevs'kyi's *A History of the Ukraine* by Professor O. J. Frederiksen, based on notes by Luke Mishuha (Chapter XXV) is also useful, as are more general works on the Soviet system, such as Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), Chapter IV, and Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1950), I, 289–307. The sources are, of course, voluminous and highly scattered. I can claim no special mastery of them, although my limited acquaintance leads me to the conclusions cited in the text, which are approximately those of Reshetar and Pap.

186 Ukrainian cultural life, they nevertheless developed a generation of young people who were accustomed to think and write in the Ukrainian literary language, although many continued to regard the use of Russian as a sign of culture.

Perhaps the Communists of the Skyrypnyk group remained at heart more devoted to Communism than to nationalism. Such was certainly not the case with a very large group of intellectuals, some from the rising generation, others from the group which had supported the national governments of the revolutionary period but later accepted the Soviet regime. Foremost among the latter was Michael Hrushevs'kyi; although he had served for a time as president of the Rada, he decided to return to the Soviet Ukraine when it appeared to offer an outlet for nationalist activity. For him and his group, which consisted predominantly of scholars and men of letters, the real aim was to reverse the Communist prescription by building a culture "socialist in form, national in content." Thus Hrushevs'kyi, who had always accepted a certain amount of socialist doctrine as the basis for needed reforms in the Ukraine, occasionally made room for Marxist ideology in his historical writings but left it clear that the real apex of his values was the Ukrainian nation. Moreover, he and his group persistently maintained that historical and economic links bound the Ukraine more closely to Western Europe than to Russia.

From the Communist point of view, such ideas were dangerous enough in themselves; while Communism could tolerate for a time basically antipathetic forms, it could not allow its own forms to be used as a cover for developing an independent ideology. It 186 661 appears that Stalin, the most ruthless insister on conformity, moved to crush the "national deviation" of the Ukrainians as soon as his power was sufficient; indeed, the first steps in this direction were taken as early as 1927. The great attack came in 1930, however, with the dismissal of Hrushevs'kyi from his academic post and the suppression of his scholarly organ *Ukraïna*. Along with this attack, which was carried out against all elements of intellectual life—including some obviously devout Marxists like the historian Iavors'kyi—which favored independent development of the Ukraine, went trials of suspect scholars who were

accused of having belonged to a subversive League for the Liberation of the Ukraine.[24] That this campaign of suppression coincided with the drive for the collectivization of agriculture in the Ukraine is hardly coincidental. In many respects the Ukrainian peasant was much more profoundly affected by the establishment of the kolkhoz (Ukrainian *kolhosp*), or collective farm, than was the Russian. The former was frequently more prosperous, hence had more to lose; moreover, the lack of a traditional communal agricultural organization in the Ukraine made the new system more alien and repugnant.

It appears certain that the Ukrainian peasantry formed a disproportionate, if not predominant, part of the hapless millions deported as "kulaks" to Siberia or Kazakhstan or driven by famine to the primitive slums of the expanding Soviet cities. Very probably this situation created a potential basis for a national rebellion based on economic and social oppression by alien rulers, just as had the Polish and Russian preponderance in governmental and landowning groups before the war. The Communists were frequently forced to use non-Ukrainians, Russian and Jewish intellectuals, workers from the towns, where they had real support, or persons imported from Russia itself, in order to carry out collectivization. Consequently, it is probable that the suppression of the nationalist intelligentsia at this time was at least in part a precautionary step to destroy a group which was of limited danger in itself yet might have presented a real threat to the Communists if it could have utilized the discontent of the peasants to turn them to nationalism. To what extent the Soviet regime succeeded in eliminating the nationalist intellectuals is one of the principal topics which will be dealt with on the basis of the evidence provided in this study. It should be noted at this point,

[24] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166; T. Skubyts'kyi, "Klassovaia bor'ba v ukrainskoi istoricheskoi literature" (The Class Struggle in Ukrainian Historical Literature), *Istorik-Marksist*, No. 17 (1930), pp. 27–40 (one of the principal Communist assaults on the Hrushevs'kyi school and other "deviationists"). The whole question of the purge of intellectuals, with special reference to historians, is discussed at length by Boris Krupnyts'kyi in "Die Ukrainische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion 1921–1941," in *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1941, pp. 125–51. For Skrypnyk's official statement, see his *Statti i promovy* (Articles and Speeches) (Kharkov: Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo Ukraïny, 1930), Vol. I: *Spil'ka Vyzvolennia Ukraïny* (The League for the Liberation of the Ukraine), pp. 413–36.

[661] however, that their resistance was undoubtedly crushed between 517 1930 and the closing series of purge trials in 1937–38.[25]

While articulate nationalism was being crushed in the Soviet ● 186 Ukraine, a somewhat different development was taking place in [563] the West Ukraine. In Poland the extreme policy of the ruling nationality, which had been chauvinistic enough under the Austrian empire, became still more violent toward the Ukrainians after the reestablishment of the Polish national state. As was previously noted,[1] Petliura's agreement with the Poles had been deeply resented by the Galician Ukrainians. While most nationalists endeavored to smooth over criticism of Petliura personally, especially after his assassination in Paris in 1925, most West Ukrainians gave no support to the émigré UNR government. The West Ukrainians, on the contrary, tried their own approaches to the problem of carrying on Ukrainian life under conditions of oppression by non-totalitarian, but intolerant, alien nationalist governments.

186 One attempted solution was the formation of legally recognized 665 parties which carried on electoral campaigns and sent representatives to the Polish Sejm or parliament where they attempted to protect the interests of their group within the framework of means permitted by the ruling nationality. This type of political activity, together with a wide variety of cultural work aimed at developing Ukrainian culture and maintaining the national distinctiveness of the masses, absorbed the efforts of a very large proportion of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia during the twenties and thirties. In particular, most of the older generation which had been reared under the relatively peaceful and stable conditions of Austrian rule, circles closely associated with the Greek Catholic Church, and most of the liberal professions engaged in this activity. Although there were a number of minor parties, some of which had authoritarian leanings, the majority of this segment of Ukrainian political workers was grouped in the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychne Ob''iednannia—UNDO), which was definitely democratic in character, with varying amounts of Catholic, liberal, and socialist ideology embodied in its program. Its efforts met

[25] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166.

1 [see category 116, p 14 --Analyst]

with very uncertain success, fluctuating from periods of relatively satisfactory cooperation with the Poles to embittered boycott of an unbearably oppressive regime.[26] 186 665

Some West Ukrainians soon rejected the road of accommodation to the Polish government; in the early twenties they turned to Communism as the champion of both nationalist aspirations and social needs. While the Ukrainians of Galicia were not so badly off economically as were those in the East Ukraine before and after the war of 1914, they suffered from a high ratio of population to available land, from inadequate agricultural productivity, and above all from the fact that the vast majority of bureaucratic and urban jobs which would have served as the natural outlets for their sons, compelled by ambition or lack of employment to leave the land, were absorbed by Poles and Jews. In Volhynia, conditions were much worse; probably they were as bad, as far as purely economic circumstances went, as those within the Soviet Ukraine prior to 1930. Consequently, a broad economic basis for Communist propaganda existed; under the circumstances in which a nationalist Ukrainian Communist regime appeared to be taking form in Kiev, this propaganda appealed strongly to the nationalist element among West Ukrainians as well. As a result, two Communist-front organizations, the Ukrainian Party of Labor (Ukraïns'ka Partiia Pratsi) and the Peasants-Workers Association (Selians'ko-Robitnycha Partiia—Sel-Rob) had considerable success, especially in Volhynia. More serious from the strictly nationalist point of view, a large number of the students, the backbone of the new generation which would have to carry on national life, was attracted to the Communist program.[27] 186 668 [464] [665]

At the same time, an extreme movement of a different type attracted wide support. The movement which is commonly known in American scholarship as "integral nationalism" arose in Western Europe at the close of the nineteenth century, considerably before Communism became a factor of any real political importance. It is generally recognized that one of the first exponents

[26] See Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939).

[27] See especially Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

●181 of the ideology was Charles Maurras, who, together with a group
668* of extreme French nationalists and advocates of political reaction, established the Action Française at the turn of the century. Integral nationalism never had much appeal in France or other Western European countries, but in modified forms it became a dominant force in the "dissatisfied" countries of Central and Southern Europe in the twenties. Here it was one element which provided an ideological platform for Mussolini's Fascism and for the rising Nazi party in Germany. Its influence was also felt strongly in the extreme nationalist parties of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Because integral nationalism is by definition a movement of individual nations rather than a universal ideology and because its adherents reject systematic rational programs, it is difficult to define its precise nature. The following characteristics, however, stand out: (1) a belief in the nation as the supreme value to which all others must be subordinated, essentially a totalitarian concept; (2) an appeal to mystically conceived ideas of the solidarity of all individuals making up the nation, usually on the assumption that biological characteristics or the irreversible effects of common historical development had welded them into one organic whole; (3) a subordination of rational, analytic thought to the "intuitively correct" emotions; (4) expression of the "national will" through a charismatic leader and an elite of nationalist enthusiasts organized in a single party; (5) glorification of action, war, and violence as an expression of the superior biological vitality of the nation.[28]

In the twenties these concepts came to permeate much of European—and to a much lesser extent American—thought, even when they were not accepted explicitly as a political program. Among the suppressed nations of Eastern Europe, where conditions were different from those in the Central European states in which the new ideology eventually won control, the new ideas were readily received, but in a somewhat modified form. This was the case in the West Ukraine in the twenties, where two essentially distinct groups prepared the ground for integral national-

[28] For a discussion of integral nationalism, see Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948).

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ism.[29] One drew its strength from the resentment of the Galician soldiers who had borne a heavy part of the burden of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, only to be consigned to second-class citizenship by Poland. The most active were veterans of the Sichovi Stril'tsi (Sich Sharpshooters), a unit which had operated under Colonel Eugene Konovalets' in the East Ukraine. After the collapse of the UNR, the unit disbanded in Galicia; many of its members united in forming an illegal, para-military organization known as the Ukraïns'ka Viis'kova Organizatsiia (Ukrainian Military Organization—UVO). In the bitter struggles with the Poles in the twenties, this group was harshly treated and retaliated with some deeds of violence. Basically, however, it was a military protective group rather than a terrorist underground.

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As a reaction to Communism, more radically nationalist groups arose. As has been noted, Communist influence threatened to win the bulk of the Ukrainian student population in the early twenties; this was true not only in the legally recognized universities, but also in the underground university established illegally in L'vov by Ukrainian scholars to give academic training to hundreds of the young people to whom the Poles denied admission to institutions of higher education. One of the principal factors in turning the students from Communism to a nationalist movement, which was organized as the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth (Soiuz Ukraïns'koï Natsionalistychnoï Molodi—SUNM), was the work of Dmytro Dontsov. Dontsov, an East Ukrainian by origin, had been an active propagator of nationalism even before the First World War. By the early twenties his teachings had come to resemble those of the integral nationalists, although apparently he derived most of his ideas from the Ger-

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[29] The following account is based on numerous oral and written sources. Three which may be mentioned in particular are V. Martynets', *Ukraïns'ke pidpillia vid UVO do OUN: Spohady i materiialy do peredistoriï ta istoriï ukraïns'koho organizovanoho natsionalizmu* (The Ukrainian Underground from the UVO to the OUN: Memoirs and Materials Concerning the Prehistory and the History of Organized Ukrainian Nationalism) (Winnipeg, 1949), a voluminous though overly sympathetic account; a series of articles in *Ukraïnets'-Chas*, June 10, 1951, p. 4, June 17, 1951, p. 4, July 1, 1951, p. 4, and August 8, 1951, p. 5, by Bohdan Kravtsiv; and Vasyl' Rudko ("R. Lisovii"), "Rozlam v OUN" (The Split in the OUN), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, May 23, 1949, p. 3.

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man nationalists, like Fichte and Herder, rather than from Maurras or Italians like Pareto and D'Annunzio. Space does not permit any real analysis of the ideology which Dontsov propagated with great success among the youth of Galicia. Insofar as it deviated from the general pattern of integral nationalism, however, it stressed especially the following features: (1) the emphasis on force inherent in the ideology was largely expressed, in the absence of the possibility of sustained open opposition to the dominant group, in advocacy of terrorism; (2) since a state which could be glorified as the bearer of the "national ideal" did not exist, enormous stress was placed on securing absolute adherence to the "pure" national language and culture; (3) absence of the tradition of a state which, through its institutional and legal structure, had supported the national aspirations, and opposition to existing states, led to extreme glorification of "illegality" as such; (4) in close connection with the two preceding points, the essential irrationalism of the ideology was expressed by fantastic romanticism, which was, however, among the comparatively unsophisticated Ukrainians more spontaneous and genuine than the cynical rejection of reason by Germans and Italians; (5) the failure of the efforts of the older generation, and its tendency to compromise with the Polish "occupiers," enhanced the natural tendency of integral nationalism to rely on youth and reject the moderation of its elders.

How these elements in the ideology of the dominant nationalist parties influenced the course of events during the Second World War forms a major topic of this study. Here it should be stressed, however, that integral nationalism was not the only foreign influence on the ideology of the nationalist parties between the two world wars. Also of great importance was the tradition of revolution which had its field of development so close at hand in the tsarist empire. In their terrorist underground activity during the late twenties and early thirties, which included especially assassination of Polish officials and Soviet representatives, the Ukrainian groups modeled themselves on movements like the Russian Narodnaia Volia of the 1870s. In other respects they (and indeed other integral nationalists like the German Nazis) copied Bolshevik methods, especially the organization of a secret political

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police to maintain the "purity" of the party and the ruthless 186
methods of intraparty strife. The stridency and lack of regard for 668*
the truth in propaganda show similar influences. There remained, however, strong elements of liberal and democratic, as well as Christian, principles, even when the participants in the movement verbally rejected them. Formal learning, respect for established authority, individual decision, and popular choice were never completely absent from the real workings of even the most radical groups. Integral nationalism was a fever which gripped some of the most active elements of the Ukraine in the generation after 1918, but it is easier to understand and perhaps to condone in this nation than in others which have had more opportunity for self-expression through the development of a state based upon law.

During the twenties the Ukrainian Military Organization and the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth gradually won over nearly all politically active elements in the West Ukraine, except those which adhered to the moderate legal parties. Moreover, there were always close connections between the veterans' organization and the students' group; in 1929 these connections were formalized by the establishment of the OUN (Organizatsiia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv—Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) which joined both groups into a single party which was to carry on the struggle both by political means and by force against all oppressors of the Ukrainian nation.[30] Through its appeal to the frustrated youth living under Polish rule and through its attraction for many of the embittered émigrés from the East Ukraine, the new movement rapidly attained considerable strength. For eight years it was directed by the former commander of the Sichovi Stril'tsi, Konovalets'. His assassination, almost certainly by a Soviet agent, on May 23, 1938, was a severe blow to the OUN.[31]

Before the new leadership of the organization could fairly estab-

[30] Most Ukrainian writers apply the term "nationalist" (*natsionalist*) to the OUN alone. Non-integral nationalists strongly reject its application to their parties. While I have felt it necessary to conform to the usage current in Western studies when using the term "nationalist" without capitalizing, I have begun the word with a capital letter whenever referring to the OUN.

[31] Stephen Davydovych, "Colonel Eugene Konovaletz," *Contemporary Russia*, II (August–October, 1938), [illegible].

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lish itself, it was confronted with a situation which would have severely tried the capacity of a much more experienced body. The agreements made at Munich in October, 1938, had weakened the Czechoslovak republic; the Ukrainian nationalists of the small and backward province of Carpatho-Ukraine began to agitate for autonomy. In this they were encouraged by the Nazi regime, which wished to use Ukrainian nationalism as an element tending to disrupt the Czechoslovak state, facilitating subsequent domination by Germany. Apparently the Germans also wished to encourage Ukrainian nationalism in the Carpatho-Ukraine as a potential threat to the Soviet Union and to Poland. In October, 1938, the nationalists declared the Carpatho-Ukraine to be a "free, federated [in Czechoslovakia] state," and eventually Prague recognized its autonomy, although the economically most valuable part was ceded to Hungary. Local Ukrainian nationalists, most of whom were members of, or sympathetic to, the OUN, were organized and excited to more extreme action by OUN leaders who had been living as émigrés in Germany and who had been dispatched to the Carpatho-Ukraine by the OUN directory on the advice of the German intelligence service.[32] A major part of their activities was devoted to forming a para-military organization, the Carpathian Sich, which, they hoped, would form the nucleus of an army of an all-Ukrainian state.

When the Germans occupied Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939, they agreed to permit Hungary to occupy the remainder of the Carpatho-Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists were informed of this decision and advised to submit to Hungarian rule;[33] they resolved, however, to take the desperate course of proclaiming the

[32] For accounts by participants in the early development of the Carpatho-Ukrainian "state," see Vasyl' Veresh-Sirmians'kyi, "Zakarpats'ka Molod'" (The Transcarpathian Youth), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, March 16, 1947, p. 6; Stepan Rosokha, "Karpats'ka Ukraïna v borot'bi za derzhavu" (The Carpatho-Ukraine in the Struggle for Statehood), *ibid.;* and Iurii Tarkovych, "Sontse iz zakhodu" (The Sun from the West), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, March 17, 1948, p. 5. On the role of the OUN see also Rudko (*Ukraïns'ki Visti*, May 23, 1949, p. 3) and Seton-Watson, p. 395.

[33] German Consul in Hust [Carpatho-Ukraine] to Foreign Ministry, March 14, 1939, and Staatssekretär von Weizsäcker to German Consul in Hust, March 15, 1939, Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, ed. Raymond J. Sontag *et al.*, Series D, Vol. IV (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 210, 237.

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independence of the Carpatho-Ukraine under a government headed by a priest, Monsignor Augustine Voloshyn. This "independence" lasted only a few days, however; the Carpathian Sich was unable to offer any effective resistance to the heavily armed Hungarian forces. The first major attempt of the nationalists in nearly two decades to liberate Ukrainian soil from foreign rule had failed. It was the forerunner of many such disappointments for the OUN and for all nationalist Ukrainians.

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II. THE UKRAINIANS AND THE POLISH CATASTROPHE

● 186 FEW GROUPS in the Europe of 1939 had more to gain from a change in the *status quo* than did the nationalist Ukrainians. All who dreamed of an independent and united Ukraine realized that it could arise only out of a series of catastrophic changes in Eastern Europe. The only event likely to initiate such upheavals was a major war.

For many years the most probable war of this nature had appeared to be one between Poland—perhaps with the backing of one or more Western powers—and the Soviet Union. Later, after Hitler's accession to power and the phenomenal increase of German strength, the likely antagonists appeared to be Germany and Poland on the one hand and the USSR on the other. Either contingency, the Ukrainian nationalists felt, would probably lead to a liberation of the Soviet Ukraine, since both Polish and German leaders had long included detachment of this area from Moscow among their major aims in the East. The end of the Polono-German *rapprochement* of the the middle thirties dispelled the hope of an immediate Central European combination against the Communist oppressor, but it opened up the prospect, scarcely less attractive for many Ukrainians, of German destruction of the hated Polish state. Consequently, in spite of the severe disappointment suffered when the Germans failed to support the embryonic Ukrainian "state" in the Carpatho-Ukraine, most nationalist circles were prepared in late 1939 to go along with German policy as they had in the preceding years. While the shock of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact in August caused considerable questioning of the validity of this course, it did not deter

the more active elements from maintaining their collaboration 186 ●
with Germany. Few, if any, could foresee that Germany would actually allow the Soviet Union to absorb the West Ukrainian lands.

Perhaps of all Ukrainian nationalist movements the least pre- 168*
pared to cope with the startling changes which took place after August, 1939, was that of Paul Skoropads'kyi. As was previously indicated, this movement had never been strong numerically, even in its days of dominance in the Ukraine. In emigration it was further weakened by the fact that many of its original followers had really been adherents of the Russian monarchy at heart, and saw little advantage in supporting a Ukrainian "monarch" unless he was the only ruler available. It is true that, following these defections, the Het'man and his remaining followers had become much more nationalist in their outlook; it was, however, scarcely possible for them to compete with the OUN in this respect, and they lacked the prestige of the UNR, which could claim lineal descent from those who had first endeavored to realize the dream of a modern Ukrainian state. With the exception of a small group in Great Britain, the bulk of Skoropads'kyi's émigré followers were organized in the Ukraïns'ka Hromada (Ukrainian Community) in Greater Germany, where they claimed some 3,500 members in 1940.[1] Most were middle-aged or older.

What the Het'manites lacked in numerical strength and youthful vigor they had in part made up through the prestige of their
adherents. Foremost among these, until his death in 1931, was [212]
Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, a talented historian and philosopher who is widely acknowledged to have been the most original and profound Ukrainian thinker of the post-1918 era. In the period now under consideration, his influence in the Hromada was continued by a group of able historians headed by Dmytro Doroshenko. The official ideology of the movement was a compromise between the

[1] See the first issue of *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1940, p. 1, the organ of the Het'man group. For a succinct but generally accurate and penetrating summary of the position of this and other Ukrainian groups in mid-1941, see a memorandum from the files of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Occ E-4 (5), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [5]). Since the signature is illegible, I have not been able to determine the name of the author of this memorandum.

The campaign to win friends in Galicia and Volhynia was in part negative; measures which were most likely to inflame anti-Soviet sentiments were avoided. The church was not entirely suppressed, though it was sharply criticized.[63] Its real property was confiscated and the religious orders disbanded.[64] The Soviet authorities weakened the influence of the church on the youth by liquidating the Catholic school system and forcibly inducting the children into Communist organizations.[65] However, the person of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was respected.[66] The part of the intelligentsia which was not prominent in politics was allowed to remain at large, although persons in callings such as the law sometimes found it necessary to turn to nonprofessional work.[67] On the more positive side, the Ukrainian language was given a far greater scope than it had enjoyed under Polish rule. In particular, the University of L'vov was formally Ukrainized in language and personnel, although it is said that the resistance of remaining Polish professors to lecturing in Ukrainian was not harshly dealt with.[68] Students from the East Ukrainian universities were brought on tours to the West Ukraine, and L'vov students made Communist-sponsored trips to Kiev.[69] Other ele-

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cited. Either this is one of the not too infrequent examples of ability of the Prague publication to print items contrary to German policy, or someone in authority gave the signal for an anti-Soviet attitude even at that early date. In the latter case it may have been a subtle riposte in the hidden conflict over Soviet demands for Bukovina. On the other hand, as early as March the *Krakauer Zeitung* printed a report by a German who had visited the villages of the Lemko area. He praised the young Ukrainians, noting that they wore the national blue and yellow colors and greeted him with "Heil Hitler!" and "Slava Ukraïna!" (Glory to the Ukraine) (*Krakauer Zeitung*, March 7, 1940, p. 5). [167]

[63] See F. Iastrebov, "Uniats'ke dukhovenstvo na sluzhbi u polskoho panstva" (The Uniate Clergy in the Service of the Polish Aristocracy), *Komunist*, October 9, 1939, p. 2.

[64] "Die Tragödie der ukrainisch-katholischen Kirche," *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, January, 1952, p. 14.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 18, 1942, p. 4; Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), p. 112.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] Interview 36.

[68] For the official Soviet version see M. Marchenko (the new rector of the University of L'vov), "L'vivs'kyi Universytet na novykh shliakhakh" (L'vov University on New Paths), *Komunist*, December 16, 1939, p. 2.

[69] Interview 51; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, on a trip of about forty students of the L'vov veterinary school to Kiev in the spring of 1940.

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● 186 ments of the Galician population—teachers, physicians, artists—were brought to Kiev to participate in Ukrainian cultural activities.[70]

626 186 After a comparatively short time, however, the Soviet administration appears to have become convinced that this "generous" treatment of Ukrainian national aspirations was unrewarding. About the middle of 1940, the Ukrainian occupation troops, which had evidently been on too friendly terms with the local population, were withdrawn and replaced by units recruited in Central Asia.[71] A strip along the border with the Generalgouvernement was cleared of its population to a depth of several miles, [423] and crossing was made almost impossible.[72] A start was made in the collectivization of agriculture.[73] No less important than these deliberate measures perhaps was the sending of tens of thousands of "carpetbagger" Soviet state, party, and army officials to the West Ukraine, where by their alien aspect (many were Russian) and their sheer numbers they severely irritated the local population.[74]

While it is impossible to know what the Soviet motives for introducing a harsher policy were, one may guess that the negative reaction of the population to the "tolerant" epoch played a part. The Soviet authorities probably discovered soon that the student exchanges had an effect opposite to that intended, for the West Ukrainian students were disagreeably surprised by the material

[70] Arthur W. Just, in *Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5.

[71] Mykhailo Kohut, "Iak zhylo halyts'ke selo pid bol'shevykamy" (How a Galician Village Lived under the Bolsheviks), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; Report of interview with Dr. H. J. Beyer (a German official who had been active in Galicia), *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, July 16, 1941, p. 3.

[72] *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, p. 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 10, 1940, p. 3, based on an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

[73] Kohut in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 25, 1941, p. 2, and May 17, 1942, p. 4.

[74] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 13, 1942, p. 4, states that, due to the influx of Poljsh refugees from the German military campaign and the arrival of Soviet officials, the population of L'vov increased from 318,000 to 450,000 under Soviet occupation. On August 14, 1941, it printed a letter from L'vov stating that Soviet officials and their families in L'vov had numbered 100,000. Just (*Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5) concludes from the number of votes cast in the Soviet election in Stanislav in the summer of 1940 that the population of that city must have increased by over 40,000, 1,000 of whom, he says, were NKVD officers.

poverty of the East Ukraine and the predominance in many 186
nominally Ukrainian places of the Russian language and cul- 626
ture.[75] East Ukrainian students coming to L'vov, on the other hand, had their first opportunity to become infected with the "virus" of "bourgeois nationalism." [76] Aside from producing these 668*
undesired ideological results, the earlier policy failed to prevent underground work by the Nationalist youth of Galicia.

Most of the members of the OUN were not able, of course, to [486]
leave the Soviet-occupied area. It is impossible to secure reliable
evidence concerning the exact extent to which those who re- 668*
mained could carry on their activities, but it is certain that they 661
carefully refrained from open opposition. Nevertheless, late in 1940 the NKVD succeeded in tracking down a large number of Nationalists; they were sentenced to death or prison after a proceeding in L'vov known in the OUN accounts as the "trial of the fifty-nine." Among those sentenced to death was Krymins'kyi, the chief of the OUN movement in Soviet-occupied territories.[77] In all likelihood, he and his companions had sided with Bandera in the dispute with Mel'nyk. Certainly, the remaining members who, in spite of severe losses, were able to continue as an organized underground, were firm adherents of the new leader. The new underground director, John Klymiv, was in fact one of the most fanatical supporters which this fanatical movement of the younger generation could boast.[78] While there were undoubtedly many supporters of Colonel Mel'nyk in Galicia, it is doubtful whether they were active—or rash—enough to form what could be called an underground, although apparently agents kept up sporadic contacts with headquarters in the Generalgouvernement.

The situation in Volhynia was less favorable to Nationalist 668*
activity than that in Galicia, since the OUN had never enrolled such a high proportion of the youth there. Throughout most if not all of the area, Mel'nyk and Bandera apparently had no

[75] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, p. 3.
[76] Interview 51.
[77] See, for example, Mykhailiuk, p. 4. Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, August 17, 1941, p. 4, reprinting an article from *Ukraïns'ki Shchodenni Visti* (L'vov).
[78] Interview 48.

[Non-interference with Ukrainian national aspirations --Analyst]

not all of the young men had joined the rebellion; a fairly large number of the youths of Galicia and Volhynia remained with their elders, and probably a majority of the younger generation in the Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovina did also. Secondly, the older group embodied a great deal more experience than did the young rebels; this was to be particularly valuable in operating in the East Ukraine, where most of the older men had lived during the revolutionary period, if indeed they were not natives of the area. Along with experience went contacts, for Konovalets' had managed to maintain a few tenuous lines of communication with sympathizers in the East Ukraine.[38] Fourthly, the OUN-M, although it appeared temporarily to have been replaced by its rival in the Wehrmacht's plans, never lost contact with the Germans, and was in a position to profit from this contact when the Bandera group lost favor. 668*

On July 6, 1941, a number of the leading Ukrainian nationalists who had served as officers in the Ukrainian Republican Army joined Mel'nyk in addressing an appeal to Hitler through the Abwehr. The signers of the appeal, besides Mel'nyk, who signed simply as "retired colonel," were Generals Omelianovych-Pavlenko and Kapustians'kyi, Colonels Sushko, Stefaniv, and Diatchenko, and Michael Khronoviat. Their appeal read as follows: 668* 186

The Ukrainian people, whose century-old struggle for freedom has scarcely been matched by any other people, espouses from the depths of its soul the ideals of the New Europe. The entire Ukrainian people yearns to take part in the realization of these ideals. We, old fighters for freedom in 1918–1921, request that we, together with our Ukrainian youth, be permitted the honor of taking part in the crusade against Bolshevik barbarism. In twenty-one years of a defensive struggle, we have suffered bloody sacrifices, and we suffer especially at present through the frightful slaughter of so many of our compatriots. We request that we be allowed to march shoulder to shoulder with the legions of Europe and with our liberator, the German Wehrmacht, and therefore we ask to be permitted to create a Ukrainian military formation.[39]

[38] Cf. Iurii (George) Boiko, *Ievhen Konovalets' i oseredno-skhidni zemli* (Eugene Konovalets' and the Central-Eastern Lands) (1947), pp. 34–50.

[39] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 15, July 7, 1941, NO 5154 (hereafter referred to as NO 5154).

727 While Ukrainian territory was being partitioned, a still more serious danger for the nationalist cause was shaping up. An exception to the authority of the Ostministerium in the occupied areas was the police power, which was lodged in Heinrich Himmler's hands. From the beginning of the campaign the Reichsführer SS had been charged with "establishing order" in the conquered areas in the east. The instruments employed for this task were *Einsatzgruppen,* task forces consisting of specially selected, ruthless police officials, headed by SS officers from Himmler's inner circle. During the stabilization period, these commanders were given powers within the broad range of "pacifying activities" in the rear areas, superseding those of all military commanders. These activities included especially the extermination of the Jewish population and the liquidation of all Communist organizations; "kommissars" and NKVD officials were to be shot outright.

661 The causes for conflict between the *Einsatzgruppen* and the
668* Ukrainian nationalists have been suggested in the preceding chapter. At first the Mel'nyk group was spared because it was thought to be politically impotent.[20] During the summer the SP claimed that "the splinter group under Colonel Andrew Mel'nyk, predominantly émigrés, no longer has any political significance," and regarded the OUN-M as a useful counterweight to Bandera's organization. By early November, 1941, however, SP reports were warning that Mel'nyk's group could become dangerous if it was left entirely unwatched because of the struggle against the Bandera party.[21] As soon as the OUN-M revealed ability to build an organization in the East Ukraine, it too was crushed.

668* The first major incident of repression against the Mel'nyk
661 forces occurred on November 21, an important anniversary for
186 Ukrainian nationalists. On that date, in 1921, Tiutiunnyk's band,

the Generalgouvernement, as not corresponding to "the principle of nationality" (*Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* August 31, 1941, p. 3). Within the next week, several branches of the UNO in Germany sent petitions directly to Hitler, protesting the transfers of Ukrainian territory; for petitions from the groups in Pilsen, Berlin and Luxemburg, see Occ E-4 (8), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [8]).

[20] NO 2650.

[21] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report of Events in the USSR, No. 133, November 14, 1941, p. 31, NO 2825 (hereafter referred to as NO 2825).

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one of the last important nationalist forces to penetrate the Soviet Ukraine, had made a "last stand" near the little town of Bazar on the edge of the wooded region north of the Kiev-Zhitomir line. The OUN-M now decided to make this anniversary the occasion for a great patriotic demonstration, which a participant has since described in considerable detail.[22] A large group of organizers was sent in from Zhitomir; on the appointed day many thousands streamed to Bazar for commemorative ceremonies. This demonstration of the strength of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment greatly alarmed the Germans, especially since the affair had been the work of an organized group which had secured the complete cooperation of the local Ukrainian authorities. The chief of the Bazar *raion* addressed the crowd, the police under the command of an old Ukrainian officer stood guard, and the police band provided music. All of these features must have indicated to the suspicious German police authorities that the Ukrainians had deliberately flaunted their independence. The reprisals were quick, and crushing. An inquiry was instituted at Bazar, which led to the arrest of several of the organizers; the trail led back to Zhitomir, where about two dozen OUN members, including one of the leaders of Ekzekutyva, were shot. The younger Iatseniuk and Anthony Baranivs'kyi, the remaining OUN leaders there, escaped only by fleeing to the woods. OUN-M influence in Zhitomir was sharply reduced, although few, apparently, of the administrative officials who had sympathized with it were molested.[23]

In the absence of direct evidence, it would be unsafe to conclude that the Bazar demonstration was the cause of the further attacks which were now carried out against the Mel'nyk group. At about the same time, however, drastic repressions of the Nationalists occurred in numerous cities, resulting in the destruction of the small Bukovinian expedition in Nikolaev and of groups in Kamenets-Podolsk (Kam'ianets'-Podil's'k), Chernigov (Chernihiv), and Poltava.[24] The chief repressive campaign was

[22] P. Dub, "V rokovyny demonstratsiĭ v Bazari (spomyn)" (On the Anniversary of the Demonstration in Bazar [In Memoriam]), *Za Samostiinist'* (November, 1946), pp. 8–11; see also *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, pp. 69–72.

[23] Alexander Iatseniuk, for example, remained chief of the *oblast* administration.

[24] *OUN u Viini*, p. 72.

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casionally a monopolistic part in municipal activities. As was inevitable, they sometimes exhibited an attitude of superiority; even when they behaved more tactfully, many local inhabitants nevertheless were inclined to suspect that they harbored such an attitude. Their presence in municipal offices, even when they were on a plane of equality with local officeholders, was bound to lead to some friction. Moreover, emphasis on the principle of integral nationalism meant the neglect of social welfare and civil rights questions which were of great concern to the local population after twenty years of Soviet rule. The "leader principle," which was expressed in the East Ukraine in as extreme terms as Mel'nyk ever permitted it in the emigration, was alien to the native inhabitants. The slogan "Petliura, Konovalets', Mel'nyk—three names, one idea" was at first meaningless to the average East Ukrainian, since the second and third of these names were unknown to him. When their meaning was explained, the phrase signified to many that after Petliura's death the nationalist movement had fallen into the hands of leaders from the half-alien West Ukraine.[28]

All of these irritations might have been accepted, however, had it not been for an ideological theme which resulted in more practical discomfort. The Nationalist creed required emphasis on the "purity" of the Ukrainian people. According to the OUN leaders' belief, this "purity" had been endangered by the intrusion of Russian elements—the physical immigration of Russians, who had become especially numerous in Kiev bureaucratic and intellectual circles, and the penetration of Russian influences into Ukrainian culture and speech. The extent of this penetration will be discussed in a later chapter; it is necessary to point out its importance here, however, in order to understand the Kiev reaction to OUN policy. The Nationalists set about radically "purging"

* Surviving OUN-M publications of this period are rare, many existing only in private collections. *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk* of September 28, 1941, p. 3 contains a reprint of a leaflet distributed in the East Ukraine describing Mel'nyk as the successor of Konovalets', who in turn was a successor of Petliura, "killed by the Jew Shvartsvart." For a criticism of OUN propaganda in the East Ukraine during this period, and notes on the reaction of the local population, see the account of the East Ukrainian émigré Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2.

668* alien aspects of life in the city. A certain number of local Ukrain-
182 ians accepted this campaign enthusiastically, sometimes carrying it further than the newcomers themselves. Others, although Ukrainian by background, had long been used to employing the Russian language and associating freely with persons of Russian ethnic origin. Consequently, the "purifying" process meant in many cases serious disruption of their accepted way of living and social relationships.

Because of the extreme importance of this factor it is worth describing in some detail a case which provides a striking illustration of the Nationalist psychology during this period. It is contained in the diary of a prominent Kiev author, Arkadii Liubchenko, who was evacuated by the Soviet forces but managed to remain in Kharkov until the German arrival. He then made contact with the Mel'nyk groups (which, as was previously pointed out, pursued the same policy there as in Kiev). Always nationalist, he soon became an enthusiastic convert to the creed of integral nationalism. In December, through his association with the Nationalists, he obtained a post on the Kharkov newspaper, *Nova Ukraïna*. Shortly afterwards, a Kharkov writer named Filipov appeared in the editorial offices; he told Liubchenko that he had prepared an article on the evils of the Communist regime which he wished to publish. When Liubchenko turned it down because it was written in Russian, Filipov protested that his mother had been Ukrainian and that he would submit the article in Ukrainian, as the question of language was indifferent to him. This brought the sneering reply that real Ukrainians, such as those dominating *Nova Ukraïna*, could have nothing to do with one who could not make up his mind whether he was a Ukrainian or a Russian, since such a person was an "internationalist" just like the Bolsheviks.[29] It may easily be imagined what effect such ideas had upon the rebuffed applicant. This is especially the case, since work for an organ like the newspaper was for many not merely a matter of prestige, or even of expression of opinion, but of life
511 and death. With the rapidly deteriorating food situation in Kiev
668 and Kharkov, employment by an agency which was recognized by

[29] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 25.

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soil, forests, water, mineral deposits; at the same time, the arable land is to be turned over to the creative peasant economy in permanent usufruct 668

(k) State ownership of heavy industry and transport; turning over the right of free extensive cooperative activities by small producers to the cooperative associations in light industry and food industry

(l) Assurance of free trade within the limits set by law

(m) Assurance of the free development of artisanry and the right to the formation of individual artisan establishments and undertakings

(n) Assurance of the right to free work for physical and mental workers and assurance of the protection of the interests of the workers by social legislation.

Although the above quotation indicates considerable attention to concrete problems, it must be emphasized that many practical deficiencies continued to obstruct the development of a coherent nationalist political theory. A much greater portion of the "Universal" was devoted to romanticized history and emotional appeals for action than to the proposal of clearly defined steps to be taken. The formulation of the other UHVR resolutions is frequently unclear, and the provisions are often inconsistent. These obscurities may sometimes have been inserted for deliberate tactical purposes, but in many cases, especially in the provisions for the governmental structure, they appear to have resulted from insufficient training in law and logic and from lack of real interest in constitutional questions. Moreover, it is evident that UHVR members had not undertaken the careful study on which to base real solutions to major problems, such as the agrarian question. In place of carefully worked-out programs, broad principles were proclaimed which indeed pointed the way to new systems but failed to indicate how they would be implemented.

Most important, nationalism remained the central point of the ideology, about which all else revolved. As the introductory paragraph of the "ideo-programmatic principles" put it: [186]

The protection of the life of the nation, of national unity, and culture is the first and highest goal of every healthy national organism. The national sovereign state is the chief guarantee of the preservation of the life and the normal development of the nation and the well-being of its citizens. Therefore the Ukrainian nation must at the present time devote all its forces to obtaining and strengthening its own state.

668* violently denounced by the Soviet rulers, it is likely that a large [661] part of the intelligentsia was "liquidated as a class."

At the same time,[1] a certain outlet was offered to nationalist 186 feeling, with a class-conscious twist, by emphasizing the heroic 208 feats of certain Ukrainian leaders of Red partisan units in the L'vov area.[37] This theme was relatively subdued, however, probably because there were not enough Ukrainian subjects suitable for glorification. In the Carpatho-Ukraine, where the Red partisans had evidently attracted genuine support as liberators from the de-nationalizing Hungarian regime, the tactic was employed much more extensively. Whole lists of partisan leaders, including at least one priest, were published. Moreover, one partisan was explicitly declared to speak "pure Ukrainian," and apparently all bore Ukrainian names.[38] This propaganda was followed up by the customary practice of forming a People's Committee which requested union of the province with the Soviet Union.[39] Even after the war was ended and the new acquisition securely incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine, however, an article was published which, had it been written by a non-Communist, would have been denounced as "racist." It was stated that some villages in the Carpatho-Ukraine spoke only Magyar, but that their "purely Ukrainian" character was shown by the family names of the inhabitants and their "Slavic appearance."[40]

661 Fortunately for them, the majority of the West Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia did not stay behind to enjoy the benefits of Soviet "re-education." It is one of the strange paradoxes of German-Ukrainian relations during the war, however, that at the very period when Germany was most in need of securing Ukrainian support, and when a minimal amount of such assistance was being developed in the form of the Galician Division, a new wave of repression fell upon the nationalist leaders. This occurred in the fall of 1943; its immediate causes cannot be determined, but it appears that it was basically a result of that tendency to strive for large results by employing force and trickery which marred

[37] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 26, 1945, p. 3.
[38] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 14, 1944, p. 2.
[39] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 23, 1944, p. 2.
[40] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 28, 1945, p. 3.

[1] [after the Ukraine was conquered by the Red Army in 1944-- Analyst]

795 of the Orthodox Church—its close dependence on the secular
659 authority. Historically, the Orthodox Church has been the official church par excellence; union of church and state is not only a legal expression but a vital reality in the history of Eastern Europe. Consequently, the actual extent of authority of each body of the church has usually coincided with the boundaries of the state in which it exists. A corollary of this coincidence of state and ecclesiastical authority has been the establishment of, or the endeavor to establish, a new hierarchical authority whenever a
[668] major change in state sovereignty has taken place. Moreover, as nationalist movements became powerful in the Orthodox lands in the nineteenth century, they often demanded a separate church organization as a consequence of their growing sense of national distinctiveness, and as a preparation for their separate statehood.

795 Until 1917, almost all Orthodox East Slavs were united in a
659 single state, the Russian Empire, with a single church, the Rus-
186 sian Orthodox Church. Since the seventeenth century this church had lacked the customary patriarch or primate, and was connected to the secular power, and to a considerable degree controlled by it through an imperial official, the Procurator of the Holy Synod. The October Revolution destroyed the formal links between these historically intertwined institutions. At this point, the growing strength of Ukrainian national consciousness gave rise to a demand for state independence. It was in accord with the history of Orthodoxy that this demand should have been accompanied by a parallel movement for the establishment of a church organization independent of Moscow, for that seat of ecclesiastical authority had lost its preeminent prestige through the disestablishment of the Russian Orthodox Church, while its role as a symbol of East Slav unity was necessarily repudiated by those who saw the Ukrainian future as distinct from that of Russia.

000 Had the group desiring continuation of the Russian state (whether as an empire or a constitutional democracy) won out, it is probable that ecclesiastical unity would have been restored, since the Russian church, while it lost many of its privileges after the February Revolution, stood to gain in prestige through the reconstitution of the office of Patriarch of Moscow. Had, on the contrary, an independent Ukrainian state been able to maintain

795 tion that this union was inoperative because of continued Soviet control of the church in Moscow. Doubtless influenced by these considerations, Polykarp, the bishop of Lutsk, declined to attend the *sobor,* presenting the excuse of "difficult conditions of communication," although his episcopal see was less than fifty miles from the Pochaïvs'ka Lavra.[20] Shortly afterwards Dionysius appointed Polykarp "vicar" of the Vladimir Volynsk and adjacent Gorukhov (Horukhiv) areas; at the time, apparently neither explicitly rejected Alexius as head of the Orthodox hierarchy in Volhynia.[21]

During the fall of 1941, opposition to Alexius's predominance gradually mounted. In addition to the friction over the investiture of the Lypkivite priests, great resentment arose from the fact that the bishops of Alexius's group were either predominantly of Russian origin or were known for past adherence to the [186] church of Moscow. The acceptance of continued subordination to Moscow, however theoretical the tie might be under the prevailing conditions, was of course resented by the Ukrainian nationalist elements. Moreover, many among the latter, especially the intelligentsia, strongly desired the replacement of the Old Slavonic liturgy by services in the living Ukrainian language, while the Volhynian *sobor* had merely provided for certain prayers in the latter speech.[22] As these points of friction accumulated, prominent Orthodox laymen like Stephen Skrypnyk, the publisher of the newspaper *Volyn'* in Rovno, rallied to the side of the Autocephalous group.[23] On November 28, Polykarp definitely broke with Alexius, declaring the Archbishop's group "anarchical," and repudiated him as ecclesiastical superior.[24] Shortly afterwards, Alexius replied by proclaiming himself Metropolitan of the Ukraine, in accordance with a decision of a second *sobor* of Volhynian bishops.[25]

[20] *UAPTs,* p. 3; *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[21] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist,* November 15, 1941, p. 3. In a move evidently designed to conciliate Polykarp, the *sobor* had named him bishop of Kamenets-Podolsk (*ibid.*).

[22] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[23] Cf. Skrypnyk's article in *Volyn',* reproduced in *L'vivs'ki Visti,* January 11–12, 1942, p. 5, and an article from the Kremenets *Kremianets'kyi Visnyk,* cited in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* October 15, 1941, p. 4.

[24] *L'vivs'ki Visti,* January 11–12, 1942, p. 5 (Skrypnyk's article cited).

[25] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 27, 1941, p. 3.

While the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine was splitting into 195
two antagonistic factions, the leader of the Greek Catholic Church was endeavoring to effect an ecclesiastical union of all Ukrainians. The separate development of the Greek Catholic Church has been sketched already. It may be pointed out, however, that what had originally been regarded as an instrument of the Poles for consolidating their dominion in the western Ukrainian lands had long since developed into a truly national church, in the sense of being independent of any foreign secular power, although it [186]
was largely confined to one province of the Ukraine. Since the Greek Catholic Church of the Ukraine possessed a rite and a body of ecclesiastical regulations quite different from that of the churches of the neighboring Catholic nations, which were of the Latin rite, the mere fact of adherence to it tended to set the Galicians apart as a national entity. As was pointed out, Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi had long been a vigorous supporter of the Ukrainian nationalist movements, although he had tried to turn them away from an extreme nationalism incompatible with Christianity. His influence was naturally greatest among his own coreligionists, but extended also to Ukrainians of the Orthodox faith. Hence Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi felt that the Soviet retreat offered an opportunity for bringing about the union of all Ukrainians in a single national church within the framework of the universal church in which he believed. The immediate opportunity for advancing this desire was a letter, October 21, 1941, to Archbishop Hilarion, congratulating him on his elevation to the episcopacy; Sheptyts'kyi explained that he could not do so before because of the severance of communications between the Soviet- and the German-dominated areas. Together with cordial felicitations, the Metropolitan expressed his hope that Hilarion would play a leading role in cleansing the Ukrainian church of "uncanonical" "Muscovite" influences introduced by Peter the Great, and hoped that this process would prepare the way for union of all the Ukrainian churches.[26] Two months later he addressed a

[26] The text of the letter is printed in Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), pp. 123–24.

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for reasons which will be discussed in the next chapter, little is 634
known about their activities in connection with nationalism. The 727
city administrations were more closely supervised by the Germans, but their size prevented them from being completely controlled. In spite of the fact that the populace soon realized that only the shadow of power was permitted the local administrations, the concept of the omnipotence of state control was so well established that even the outer signs of authority behind the nationalist cause were of some importance in winning support for it.
Throughout the occupied Ukraine, except for the Donbas, which [191]
was very mixed ethnically, the languages of administration were German and Ukrainian only. Although it is said that the officials who carried on the governmental work in the prescribed language frequently spoke Russian as soon as they had left their desks, and sometimes even wrote their reports and orders in that language,[4] having them translated into Ukrainian, the prestige value
of the change was considerable. The same was true of the wide- [186]
spread use of national symbols, which had been forbidden under Soviet rule, such as the trident and the blue and yellow colors; they appeared on the uniforms of the police, as banners decorating the administrative buildings, even on the streetcars. On the other hand, the removal of these symbols, when Russophile elements were introduced into the administration to replace the nationalists, was equally important as a negative token of loss
of prestige; the official language, however, always remained [191]
Ukrainian.[5]

Some indication of the influence exerted upon the overt atti- 186
tudes of the inhabitants of the East Ukraine by the apparent ascendancy of Ukrainian nationalism is furnished by nationalities statistics obtained from censuses taken by various city administrations in late 1941 and early 1942,[6] since each citizen was usually

[4] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3.

[5] When the *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* group was arrested, the cultural department of the Kiev city administration was ordered to remove all tridents and Ukrainian flags; see Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 11. In Dniepropetrovsk, the Germans followed up the destruction of the Ukrainian *oblast* administration by removing the trident from the masthead of *Vil'na Ukraïna* (The Free Ukraine), the city's newspaper, and changing its name to *Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta* (Interview 77).

[6] See Appendix.

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•186 permitted to determine his own nationality. There was an enormous increase in the proportion of persons claiming Ukrainian nationality as compared to the Soviet census of 1926, which had been conducted in the same fashion. That many factors were involved in the shift is indicated by the extreme variations from city to city, which will be touched upon in a later chapter. There [626] is, moreover, little doubt that pressures, ranging from fear of the nationalist-dominated police (which, in Zhitomir at least, took the census) to desire to obtain material benefits reserved for Ukrainians only, were significant. There is no question, however, that a large number of those who claimed Ukrainian nationality in 1941–42 were influenced by a desire to "climb upon the band wagon" by obtaining affiliation with the national group which they thought would be in favor in the future. The nationalist mayor of Kiev, Leontii Forostivs'kyi, during whose administration the census in the capital was taken, freely admits the importance of this factor.[7]

633 From a material standpoint, too, the municipal administration played a considerable role in the provision of support for nationalist activity. The funds at its disposal were not inconsiderable, the Kharkov city budget amounting to the equivalent of some eight million dollars annually.[8] The number of municipal employees was also sizable. In Kiev the total under Bahazii's direction, evidently largely dependent on the central municipal authority for their positions, was twenty thousand.[9] This figure was regarded as so excessive by the Germans that it figured in the charges made against him, but several months after his arrest the number employed by the city—apparently the purely administrative branches only, exclusive of education and manufacturing and commercial enterprises—was still 1,138, and 1,065 more were working for the *raions*.[10] Even the smaller figures are quite significant in a city whose total population had by that time sunk to 350,000, an extremely small percentage of which consisted of

[7] Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), p. 50.

[8] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, May 23–24, 1943, p. 2, quotes Mayor Semenenko as saying the budget for the last quarter of 1942 totaled 50,000,000 *karbovontsi* (10 *k.* = 1 RM = $0.40).

[9] PS 192.

[10] *Ukrains'ka Diimist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

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employable men. From the point of view of political sentiment, 633
as will be shown, the composition of the administrative force [565]
made it even more significant, for over one fourth were of the upper levels of the intelligentsia—those having a higher education—while another 35 percent were probably of the Soviet "intelligentsia," since they possessed secondary educations.[11] The city administrations, with their appurtenances of schools and publications, thus served as refuges for the intellectual class in general, which was shorn of its customary economic role by the terrible dislocations of war. Consequently the orientation of the structure in which they found a place could play a vital role in determining the direction this group's sentiments would take.

At least two East Ukrainian mayors,[12] in addition to Bahazii, 186
lost their lives for too ardent devotion to the nationalist cause. 633
Even when they were not in conflict with the occupying power, the mayors knew that their positions singled them out for Communist vengeance, from either secret agents or the returning Red Army. That a considerable group of officials was found to remain true to the nationalist cause—even if a bit timidly at times—is an indication that a considerable reservoir of leadership for nationalism existed in the East Ukraine.

While the city administration as a whole was both a symbol 727
of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy and an instrument for advancing the nationalist cause, the individual departments were 633
frequently of equal or greater significance. Their importance derived in large measure from the fact that administrative divisions entrusted with very important functions were frequently operated in considerable independence of the central municipal administration.

In practice the amount of authority exercised by any major official depended more on his own character and his relations with the German authorities than upon any formal apportionment of power. This was especially the case in the large cities, where in addition to the *Stadtkommissar* who stood above the native mayor, there were German officials in charge of each of

[11] *Ibid.*
[12] In Kamenets-Podolsk and Poltava.

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Moreover, since there were several German police authorities— 727
ordinary security police, secret police, railway police—operating 625
in the same area, unified at the top but having different Ukrain- 633
ian subchiefs operating under them, the possibility of several competing or antagonistic influences existed. In spite of the special concern of the Reichskommissariat to root out all OUN members in the police, the latter were able for many months to maintain their positions in several cities. For example, while the city administrations of Vinnitsa and Dniepropetrovsk were in the hands of Russophile elements opposed to Ukrainian nationalism, the police chief in the former city[14] and the Ukrainian in charge of the secret police in the latter[15] were supporters of the OUN. Close as was the supervision of the German police authorities, it was obviously impossible for them to watch every action of their subordinates, so that possession of such support within the police force was of great value to the nationalist groups.

In the wave of repression in Kiev in December, 1941, the fact 186●
that his sympathizers controlled the police in the *raion* in which 625
he was arrested allowed the chief of the OUN-M in the East 727
Ukraine, Dr. Kandyba, to secure his release, thus enabling him to prolong his activities for more than two years.[16] Moreover, the presence of nationalist elements in the police force served to prevent the control of these groups by secret Communist agents, who were successful in penetrating the police in a number of places in the southern Ukraine, and for a while in Kiev itself, through the German practice of retaining the Soviet *militsiia* as a matter of convenience.[17] Whatever value the nationalist penetration of the police force may have had in this connection was largely offset by the odium which attached to the nationalist groups when it became known to the population that they were collaborating with the Germans in this fashion. Moreover, the ill repute of the police was sometimes increased by the actions of the nationalists themselves who used the police as an instrument for terrorizing non-Ukrainians.[18]

[14] Interview 1.
[15] Interviews 1, 18.
[16] L. Dniprova, article in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.
[17] Interview 59.
[18] It is said that the Ukrainian police in Kiev, when ordered to secure hostages

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Komitet Dopomohy), was able, even on the eve of German evacuation, to provide meals for 36,000 persons (children and others unable to work),[22] one sixth of the city's population; its great popularity[23] was of tremendous importance in enabling Bohatyrchuk to secure support for his stand in favor of coalition with anti-Soviet Russians. On the other hand, in Dniepropetrovsk, where the city administration was largely in the hands of pro-Russian elements, the Ukrainians, inspired by an OUN-M organizer, formed a Red Cross organization which acted as a center for nationalist forces.

The nationalist element was more successful in the field of cooperative organization. While each city administration contained a department of trade, the cooperatives, as quasi-public bodies, appear to have been considerably more important as channels of local initiative. Far from being a product of the Communist regime, the cooperative movement was indigenous to both East and West Ukraine, having played an important role before the First World War, when it was already imbued with nationalist overtones.[24] In the NEP period of Soviet rule, and until the late twenties, the cooperatives had been able to maintain a considerable degree of independence and had, at least in the Kharkov region, served as a center for nationalist elements which worked with the Republican government.[25] In the Five Year Plan periods, the urban cooperatives had become adjuncts of the state trading systems, and other cooperatives had been closely integrated into state commercial operations.[26]

[22] *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo*, September 19, 1943, pp. 4–5; see also *Volyn'*, January 28, 1943, p. 3.

[23] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 4.

[24] For abundant details on the complex system of cooperatives developed in the Ukraine prior to 1917, see Eugene M. Kayden and Alexis N. Antsiferov, *The Cooperative Movement in Russia During the War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), a volume in the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, ed. James T. Shotwell, Russian Series, compiled for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. Cooperatives were far more developed in the Ukraine than in most other heavily populated areas of the Russian Empire (*ibid.*, pp. 40, 41, 266–69, 357), and served educational as well as economic development. Kharkov was the chief cooperative center in the Ukraine and was largely independent of the Russian centers.

[25] Interview 73.

[26] Alexander Baikov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 253; Arthur C. Arnold, *Banks, Credit, and Money in Soviet Russia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 477.

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727 When the Germans arrived, surviving leaders of the former
474 independent cooperatives were again able to assert themselves. As early as the winter of 1941–42, there was a total of 643 cooperative organizations in the Kiev region, including forty-eight *raion* food societies which bought agricultural produce and carried on economic organization;[27] in the city of Kharkov there were 150 cooperatives, which maintained close contacts with their sources of food stocks in the countryside.[28] There were, in addition to numerous distributing cooperatives, twenty-eight producing cooperatives in Kiev, in such diverse fields as transport, printing, and haberdashery.[29] The Ukraïnbank (All-Ukrainian Cooperative Bank), which had been formed in 1922 for financing all types of cooperatives, but incorporated in the Soviet central Torgbank in 1936, was revived.[30]

727 Moreover, there were more direct links to the nationalist move-
474 ments. An effort was made, with German approval, to organize
● 186 a general center for the food cooperatives, known as the All-Ukrainian Cooperative Society (Vseukraïns'ka Kooperatyvna Spilka), which coordinated local organizations, published a bulletin, and restored the museum of the history of cooperative development, an institution of considerable significance for nationalist sentiment.[31] Under an old officer of the Ukrainian army, Professor Perevertuna, a close collaborator of the OUN-M, it carried out activities on a large scale in the Kiev area, especially training replacements for the diminished ranks of cooperative workers.[32] In addition to more indirect fostering of nationalist sentiment, its aid to the nationalist cause included employing persons whom the Germans had dismissed from the municipal administration.[33] In early 1943, however, such activities resulted in the execution of the director.[34]

[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.
[28] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 24, 1942, p. 2.
[29] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 5, 1942, p. 2.
[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 10, 1942, p. 4. Cf. Baikov, p. 86, and Arnold, p. 477, for the background of this bank.
[31] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.
[32] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, July 11, 1942, p. 3.
[33] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75.
[34] *Ibid.*; *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 585.

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Like the cooperative movement, popular education had long 727
been a cornerstone of Ukrainian nationalism, more important in 658
many respects than direct political action. In the conflict between 871
the national Communists in the Ukraine and the Stalinist central- 626
ists, it was especially the commissars of education, such as Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk, who had led the fight for Ukrainization of cultural life. Consequently it was natural that nationalist Ukrainians were determined to control the municipal departments of education under German occupation.

A major aim of the Reichskommissar and his henchmen, however, was to prevent the development of a cultured Ukrainian class, to convert the people into a race of submissive peasants. Rosenberg's vision of a university in Kiev went by the board, and the standard schooling for every Ukrainian child was set at four years.[35] Few material injuries were as deeply resented as this drastic curb on the opportunities for education. Since there were real shortages of materials, books, and teachers, the Ukrainians held to the hope that the restriction did not represent a permanent policy, even in the face of the closing of *gimnaziias* which had been reopened under the army administration through the efforts of the local population itself.[36]

To a limited extent the ban on secondary and higher educa- 874
tion was evaded by the extensive use made of a loophole in the 727
German regulations which allowed the reopening of technical 186
schools. The enormous loss of artisans and professionally trained persons incurred by the annihilation of the Jewish inhabitants compelled even the power-mad Nazis to recognize the need for training Ukrainians in such occupations. A large number of technical secondary schools, agricultural schools, and even institutes of higher education like medical faculties, were permitted. The extent to which these facilities were utilized by the Ukrainian population is indicated by the fact that the enrollment of the Kiev medical institute reached 2,000 in 1943 when the total population of the city was only 300,000, while Kherson, with a fifth

[35] Report of Rosenberg to Hitler, August 11, 1942, PS 42 (hereafter referred to as PS 42); PS 1198.

[36] E.g., in Berdichev (*Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3, quoting *Nova Doba* [Berdichev] for September 1), Zhitomir (Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941), and Belaia Tserkov' (*Nationalist*, December 20, 1941, p. 2).

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874 that number of inhabitants, had 541 students in its medi-
727 cal school.[37] Medical institutes were also reopened in Stalino,
186 Dniepropetrovsk, and Vinnitsa, and perhaps in other cities, although it is doubtful if any of these were the centers of nationalist youth organization which the faculty in Kiev became under the leadership of the OUN-M.[38]

The educational structure described in the preceding paragraph was designed for adolescents or young adults, and thus could be used for direct propagation of nationalist concepts. It was, of course, partly for this reason that the Germans confined advanced training within such narrow limits. Even these restrictions were not the end of the difficulties faced in inculcating a nationalist type of education in those about to assume the role of citizens,
[466] for the technical schools were frequently emptied of their students and faculty to meet the demands of the *Ostarbeiter* recruiters. The elementary schools were also drained of teachers by the *Ostarbeiter* program, and the pupils, though too young for forced labor, were decimated by famine and plague. If the task of building national consciousness had to be viewed as a long-term one, then the four-year elementary school offered a considerable field for cultivation.[39]

191 The problem confronting the nationalist leaders in education
727 was twofold: they had to ensure a basis for the development of an independent Ukraine by making certain that all instruction
872 was in the Ukrainian language, so that the rising generation
186 would be fully at home in this speech; and they had to replace the Communist ideology by a positive nationalist concept. The first task was relatively uncomplicated, though far from easy in practice. In line with their policy of encouraging the purely nonpolitical aspects of Ukrainian nationality, the Germans ordered all instruction to be in Ukrainian. The nationalist directors enthusiastically supported this rule, but it was sometimes difficult to enforce it, since even teachers who were themselves nationalist in sentiment were not always able to conduct classes in Ukrainian.[40]

[37] Occ E-4 (1); *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 10, 1942, p. 1.

[38] See Chapter V.

[39] In Kiev alone there were fifty elementary schools with 17,000 students (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2).

[40] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 4; M. Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki*

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It was much more difficult to secure a predominant place for 727
the nationalist ideology in the schools. As is usually the case in 186
nationalist indoctrination in the schools, the efforts were concen- 872
trated upon the teaching of history.[41] This was especially important, since the justification of the Ukrainian independence movement is largely based upon the conception of a proud history distinct from that of the people of Moscow. Naturally enough, no Soviet textbooks were acceptable for the teaching of history from this point of view or from the general standpoint of eradicating Communist indoctrination. To some extent the gap was filled by [214]
books published in the year preceding the Soviet war by the educational press of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow.[42] Some texts were printed by the cultural department of the Kiev city administration. An amateurish effort was made also by certain OUN-B organizers to print locally a new version of Ukrainian history with an introduction of their own composition.[43] In view of the great material shortages and the brief time available, however, the lack of printed materials could not be made good. Consequently, a great deal depended on securing the proper teachers. To what extent the many thousands employed in the schools adhered to the nationalist doctrine is of course impossible to determine, but a number of purely indigenous formulations of nationalist concepts to be inculcated in the schools attest to the strength of nationalist feeling. The head of the Mariupol' school system proposed to stress the native language, love of the fatherland, and respect for elders; the educational ideology advocated by the group of young men who reorganized life in Krivoi Rog was instillation of Cossack ideals, the code of the Zaporozhian Sich, which was to lead to a spiritual, moral, and physical regeneration.[44]

Since the formal school program was largely confined to young 186
children, great efforts were also concentrated on developing a 517
voluntary system of adult education. The Prosvita societies had 515

Visti, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 27, 1943, p. 4, quoting D. Nitsenko in *Nova Ukraïna* (Kharkov).

[41] Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4.

[42] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 10, 1941, p. 2.

[43] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 28.

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 29, 1942, p. 2; November 15, 1941, p. 2; and November 18, 1941, p. 3 (referring to an article in *Dzvin* [Krivoi Rog], September, 1941).

186 been founded by the nationalist intelligentsia of the East Ukraine
517 many years before the Revolution. They were now revived, after
575 long suppression by the Communist regime, to carry on the work of developing national culture and inculcating a feeling of national identity. The two aims could be combined because all nationalist Ukrainians felt it essential to instill a love of the indigenous popular arts and customs, emphasizing their distinctive nature. That this effort had a political as well as a cultural sig-
[661] nificance is indicated by the fact that not only the Soviet regime (both before 1941 and upon reconquest, as in Kharkov)[45] but the German police as well attacked the Prosvita societies, and in the Reichskommissariat they were able, for varying periods, to lead only a clandestine life. The desire for national expression was shared by so many, however, that the Germans felt it was impossible to dam up all outlets; therefore the Prosvita was generally permitted, though under close observation.[46] Together with the church (and a few local societies not using the Prosvita name but having the same function), it was one of the few organizations of a nationalist character which was not under direct German control.

533 The work of the Prosvita groups, although arranged in various
517 ways in different localities, may be classified under four general
186 headings. Playing a major role everywhere were musical activities,
575 particularly choral groups, in which the Ukrainians had always excelled, and which served as a powerful intellectual and emotional stimulus to nationalist feeling, since most of the songs were distinctively Ukrainian. In addition, groups of *bandura* players (the *bandura* is a small lute-like stringed instrument indigenous to the Ukraine) were sponsored, and orchestras were
545 trained. In the larger centers, Prosvita collaborated with regular
517 professional musical organizations, such as conservatories and
575 operas, to produce nationalist-inspired performances. For ex-
186 ample, operas were reopened in Kiev and Kharkov, and offered a considerable repertoire of native Ukrainian pieces (*Taras Bul'ba, Natalka Poltavka,* etc.) as well as traditional Western

[45] Cf. *Nastup,* September 26, 1943, p. 3 (based on *Vinnyts'ki Visti,* August 29, 1943), on the destruction of Prosvita and its personnel in Kharkov during the Soviet interlude in February-March, 1943.

[46] MS E; PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

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operas such as *Madame Butterfly* and *Les Cloches de Corneville*. 545
Like other forms of national expression, however, operatic per- 517
formances ran afoul of the Nazi hatred of independent activity. 575
At first, the desirable places in the Kiev opera were reserved for 186
Germans, and then, in December, 1942, the performances were suspended altogether, an action which aroused the indignation of all elements of the population.[47]

Within a matter of days after the Red Army was driven out, active theatrical groups likewise sprang up, usually with Prosvita sponsorship, even in the smaller cities of the East Ukraine. For example, a theater had been started in Zhitomir before the first month of German occupation was past.[48] Even in cities like Chernigov and Simferopol' (in the Crimea), where evidences of nationalist activity were scanty, the theater was soon in full career.[49] Since the players were generally amateurs interested in using this medium of expression of their nationalist feeling, the performances were nationalist in content as well as language (evidently to a greater extent than the opera which, being composed largely of professional performers, was imbued with an "all-Union," i.e., Russian, character, at least behind the scenes).[50] Some presentations were so strongly imbued with nationalist ideology that they were censored by the Germans; the author of one of the most popular, Constantine Hupalo, was arrested for nationalist activity.[51]

Prosvita and related groups sponsored a wide variety of more 517
directly educational activities. These included lectures, valued 575
as a means of propagating knowledge of the language as well as 186
for their content; libraries and reading rooms, vital to the spread of the printed word in view of the extreme scarcity of even periodical literature; nationalist cultural work in the schools; and research and discussion on themes of national history and ethnography. In the more vigorous and less restricted societies, like the

[47] Interrogation of Shtepa, CXLVa 78; PS 1198.

[48] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1 (from *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* [Zhitomir], August 3, 1941).

[49] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 6, 1941, p. 4 (based on an interview with Theodore Pipa, the Chernigov editor).

[50] Cf. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 15, 1942, p. 3.

[51] His play, entitled *The Triumph of Procurator Dal'shii*, was a drama of the Ukrainian nationalist movement under Soviet rule (*OUN u Viini*, p. 74).

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186 515 517 Prosvita in Kharkov, these activities were greatly extended. The latter group operated a House of Popular Culture which served as a center for most nationalist organizations in the city, and came close to developing into an unofficial government.[52] Moreover, under the leadership of the energetic Professor V. V. Dubrovs'kyi, it undertook economic as well as purely cultural activities, such as book publishing and the provision of material aid for needy teachers and students.[53] Some indication of the scope of Prosvita's activities in Kharkov is provided by the fact that membership reached one thousand, while four thousand persons attended one of its concert series.[54]

In most places *Prosvita* and other cultural activities appear to have developed quite independently of the Nationalist party organizers from the west. To a certain extent the ideology of the Nationalists, especially that of the OUN-B, made them contemptuous of such gradual and unspectacular methods of developing nationalist strength.[55] To be sure, in centers such as Kiev and Zhitomir, which were strongly permeated by the OUN-M forces, cooperative relations existed between the latter and the local founders of Prosvita, but the Nationalist party did not have the personnel to carry on cultural work itself and apparently did

[52] Cf. Serednopolets'kyi in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 24, 1942, p. 2, on organizations operating in the House of National Culture. Erich Koch, in his letter to Rosenberg of March 16, 1943 (PS 192), complained that the Wehrmacht permitted the Kharkov Prosvita to become a sort of national government, and its role as a political as well as a cultural force is confirmed by Interview 73.

[53] *Nastup*, September 26, 1943, p. 3, based on an interview with a leading member of the Kharkov Prosvita, Professor P. Petrenko, in *Vinnyts'ki Visti*, August 29, 1943.

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 10, 1943, p. 2.

[55] For example, Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: Spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), p. 40, writes that it was necessary for OUN-B members to withdraw from Prosvita, amateur groups, etc., as these (after the introduction of the Reichskommissariat) were only tools of the Germans, and nationalist participation in them gave color to the Communist propaganda which represented the OUN as an agency of the Germans. On the other hand, the clandestine *Biuleten'* (No. 4, previously cited), in calling for an extension of OUN-B activity to all fields of life, criticizes those who condemn activity which is not of a strictly terroristic, revolutionary nature as "Prosvitanstvo."

not find the Prosvita organization well adapted to its tactic of underground work after German suppression.[56] On the other hand, the extremely important Kharkov Prosvita was organized almost entirely by local residents who had in many cases been associated with the Prosvita of pre-Soviet days, and who were unassociated with, or even to some extent hostile to, the OUN-M.[57] Here again there is strong indication of the survival in the East Ukraine of leadership capable of taking direction of important aspects of national life. That this leadership was directed to such a considerable extent to the less aggressive aspects of national development, however, indicates that a certain gap existed during the war years between nationalism in the East and the West Ukraine. 517 575 186

The means employed in the educational systems and in the cultural societies for propagating the national ideology can be classed for the most part under the heading of oral propaganda. The face-to-face type of communication has a long history of effective use in the east Slavic countries and, under the name "oral agitation," has been widely cultivated as a means of strengthening the Communist regime. Hence the population was used to this type of propaganda. Moreover, it was especially suited to the work of the nationalist groups, which were seeking to spread ideas frowned upon by the German authorities. The latter could suppress a performance or dissolve a society, arrest or execute a leader, but with their small number of personnel, their ignorance of the language, and their lack of sufficiently numerous and reliable local agents, they could not overhear everything and thus prevent the clever teacher or cultural worker from communicating political concepts to his audience. Since nationalist propagandists were so few and ill-equipped by organization and training to cope with the gigantic task of indoctrinating a population of thirty million, however, the problem of securing access to mass communication media under control of the propaganda departments of the municipal administrations was vitally important. Through such media nationalism might reach thousands 186 208 [227]

[56] Interview 61.
[57] Interviews 57, 73.

186 where oral methods by the same number of agitators reached
208 scores and live theatrical performances reached hundreds.

The principal activity of the propaganda department of a
727 Ukrainian municipal administration under German occupation
186 centered around the local newspaper, for other media such as the radio and motion pictures were under complete German control. It is worth devoting considerable attention to journalistic activity throughout the East Ukraine because of the value such study can have in elucidating the whole problem of the extent of nationalist activity in that area. Newspapers not only reached large numbers, but represented a symbol of authoritative pronouncement to a people accustomed to viewing the statements of the Soviet press as announcements of policy not subject to question.[58]

However much the German authorities may have feared the existence of a Ukrainian press, it was absolutely essential for them to authorize and support it for their own purposes. Under the Wehrmacht administration, especially in the early days, a very nonrestrictive policy was pursued, as was indicated by the ideologically independent nature of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* in Zhitomir and Kiev. General ground rules laid down included prohibition of the term "Ukraine" in the sense of a state, rather than as a territorial expression; insistence on reference to Germany as the "protector" of the Ukraine, rather than as an "ally"; and designation of the Wehrmacht as "saviors" rather than "occupiers."[59] Under army control newspapers sprang up in scores of towns, including all of the important cities of the East Ukraine, although in at least one (Poltava) the establishment of a paper was considerably delayed by the unwillingness of any officer to accept the responsibility of censoring it.[60] One reason for the Wehrmacht's

[58] There is considerably more information available on newspaper activity than on other politically significant aspects of the East Ukraine. Since many of the observers who have written accounts of the war period were themselves journalists, they naturally paid considerable attention to this field of activity. Moreover, the West Ukrainian newspapers published during the same period, which furnish the principal source of material on the East Ukraine, were also especially interested in journalistic enterprises. Consequently, one must guard against the assumption that the real importance of these newspapers was as great as the attention devoted to them indicates. Nevertheless, they were unquestionably very significant as means of transmitting nationalism and reflecting national feeling.

[59] PS 053.

[60] USSR Exhibit 278.

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liberality was a desire to carry propaganda to the numerous de- 727
serters who, if they were afraid to submit to German authority, 204
might join the Red partisans. Consequently, papers were fostered 186
in the swamp and wooded regions, even in small towns such as Ovruch, Olevsk, and Shchors. Indeed, the propaganda section of the army itself played a major role in founding newspapers, and even provided for the journalistic staffs in Zhitomir, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov the services of a competent and comparatively neutral Galician journalist, Peter Sahaidachnyi.

However, as was previously noted, the OUN-M took a leading role in establishing the papers in Zhitomir and Kiev. Its importance was also considerable in a number of the smaller cities. In Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, and Krivoi Rog, on the other hand, the initiative was taken by persons who had been journalists under the Soviet regime. In Krivoi Rog, Michael Pronchenko, a writer and poet who had been imprisoned by the Soviet regime, but later worked for the local Communist paper, upon Red army evacuation, took over the Communist press and, with the aid of other young men, began publishing a paper called *Dzvin* (The Bell).[61] In Kharkov, it was a former member of the staff of the defunct *Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna* who proposed immediately after the German arrival to start a newspaper under the name of *Novyi Chas* (The New Times).[62] It was some weeks before the paper could actually be started; the name then became *Nova Ukraïna,* and a large number of Mel'nyk adherents were on the staff. The chief editor and a majority of his subordinates, however, were local persons unaffiliated with the OUN. In a number of places Bandera organizers, too, assisted local men to establish papers.

When the Reichskommissariat took over the bulk of the East 626
Ukraine, a quite different policy was pursued; the outspokenly 204
nationalist organs were suppressed, their staffs executed. Even 186
the official policy of the Reichskommissariat, presumably ap- 727
proved by the Ostministerium, provided that all matters concerning newspapers in the native language should be submitted to the Press and Enlightenment Division of the Reichskommissariat.

[61] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 15, 1941, p. 3; Interview 7.
[62] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), pp. 7–9.

204 Newspapers were to be held to the minimum necessary to satisfy
626 the Ukrainian desire for news, and they were to be founded only
727 where "politically unobjectionable" journalists and adequate cen-
186 sorship machinery were available.[63] Nevertheless, as even this directive indicates, the need for a Ukrainian press could not be questioned. It was absolutely essential to have some means of reaching the population with directives, of quieting rumors, and of playing up the few positive features of the German administration. Since there were very few German personnel who could write Ukrainian, local men had to be turned to, although strong requests for newspapers were frequently refused when the Germans felt the burden of providing censors outweighed possible gains in propaganda or administrative convenience.

204 While important as a symbol of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy, the newspaper had certain severe limitations as a vehicle for nationalist ideology. Its frequency and size limited its utility. There were a few dailies, but the vast majority of newspapers appeared much less frequently, as the following figures on East Ukrainian newspapers show:[64]

Papers issued	
daily	5
three times a week	18
twice a week	25
weekly	9
unknown	41
TOTAL	98

Moreover, none exceeded four pages, and a large number could print only one page (being printed on the back of Soviet posters, etc.). This sharp curtailment was due primarily to the extremely severe paper shortage, especially in the south. *Nova Ukraïna* in Kharkov was forced to reduce its printing from fifty thousand to twenty-five thousand daily;[65] the daily *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* had to limit publication to three times a week; one paper in the Taurida *Generalbezirk* had to issue one copy of each number to each commune in the area, rather than to individuals.[66]

[63] PS 702.

[64] Figures compiled from numerous sources. It is very probable that the papers marked "unknown" appeared infrequently.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 21, 1942, p. 3.

[66] PS 1693.

204 If all the limited space available had been at the editor's dis-
626 posal, it would have sufficed for the expression of a wide range of
737 political comments. Actually, a large part, usually the front page, was taken up with "news," mostly military or concerning the allegedly superior attributes of the Germans.[67] Another large body of material consisted of notices and orders of the German administration. Furthermore, the editors were frequently compelled to write, or to print over their signatures, editorials prepared by the German propaganda officers stressing some point (usually fictitious), such as the joys of the *Ostarbeiter* program or the rapid progress of land distribution, which the authorities desired to have propagandized. There was also a considerable number of articles of a factual nature, designed to "educate" the Ukrainians on some topic such as agricultural technique, in which the Germans thought them to be deficient; these were frequently translated from the German press. A certain number of notices of the activity of Ukrainian agencies—the local administrations, the church, cultural activity—was permitted under close surveillance against political propaganda. A very small number of articles on history, literature, and other cultural topics was allowed.

204 These limitations came close to placing the Ukrainian editor in
737 a strait jacket. It is almost universally recognized by persons who
626 were active in journalism at this time, however, that there were
186 a few points at which the jacket might be stretched enough to justify the effort to use the newspaper as an outlet for nationalist expression. The few literary articles permitted, while deprived of overt political content, could be used to a certain extent to

[67] With the exception of a few issues of *Ukrains'ke Slovo* and *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo* from Kiev, the actual copies of these East Ukrainian papers have uniformly disappeared, so that it is impossible to make an investigation based on direct inspection. Their disappearance is readily explained by the hasty evacuation of the Ukraine by the German forces, the danger of having German organs on one's person in a flight to the West when one might fall into Soviet hands, and above all by the desperate need for paper of any kind for ordinary household uses. As a matter of fact, extensive, but by no means complete sets were gathered by the Institute for the Study of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Prague, as well as by certain émigré newspapers. The former collection, however, remained in the Czechoslovak capital after the end of the war and eventually fell into Soviet hands after the Communist coup (Interview 30). As a result, the presentation followed here must be based almost entirely on postwar information, and especially upon the numerous descriptions of East Ukrainian newspapers and reprints of their articles contained in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

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stress themes which were basic to the formation of national pride, 186
themes such as the nobility of Ukrainian literature, the separate 204
development of Ukrainian and Russian history, and the value of 626
Ukrainian folkways. Articles ostensibly directed against Com- 727
munists or Jews could contain oblique thrusts at Moscow and the Russians as well; sometimes such articles did indeed represent extremes of xenophobia. Even the articles giving purely factual accounts of Ukrainian activity were prized by the nationalists, since they brought to the public's attention phases of national life which had been prohibited by the Soviets. The fact that a considerable number of such items could be found for reprinting in the relatively free West Ukrainian and émigré presses (although of course the articles so treated were far from representative) indicates that the censorship barrier was not insuperable, and simple a priori consideration of the difficulty of securing alert and reliable censors for such a large body of publications substantiates this assertion.

While it was therefore true that the newspapers could be used, to a limited extent, for nationalist propaganda, the fact that they were edited by writers known to be nationalists had a certain negative effect on the regard in which the nationalist cause was held by the population, since the newspapers were obviously tools of the Germans. Communist propaganda—and Bandera propaganda after the OUN-B workers were forced from editorial posts—made a great deal of this fact. The most courageous nationalist editors tried to overcome this accusation of serving German interests by occasional sly attacks on the Germans, using the "Aesopian" language which the subjects of the Soviet empire had been forced to learn. Thus one editor, when ordered to write an article glorifying the *Ostarbeiter* program, described in glowing terms the luxurious dining cars on the trains to Germany; few Ukrainians observing the miserable cattle cars actually provided could miss the irony.[68] Not a few editors were willing to pursue such dangerous tactics.

As far as can be detected, the only papers which were controlled by pro-Russian elements (aside from the Russian-language papers) were *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo, Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta,*

[68] Interview 3.

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204 and possibly one or two of the Ukrainian-language papers in the
727 Donbas. A number of papers in the latter area and a few in the
186 southwest Ukraine were influenced by Bandera agents, although
626 edited by local people, and maintained a semblance of independence from German control. The important papers in Vinnitsa and Proskurov remained under OUN-M editors, who, however, had to exert the utmost care to avoid arrest. Some papers, like a group in the area northwest of Poltava, which were led by a young resident of Mirgorod (Myrhorod), Michael Voskobiinyk, who was the editor of the paper there, did what they could to propagate nationalist sentiment, while others in the same district were completely subservient to the Germans.[69]

It is probably safe to say that the majority of editors would have liked to insert nationalist themes in their papers, and did so in the early days before the repression. The terrible danger to which they were exposed, however, seems to have induced most to go even further than was necessary for safety's sake in eliminating every vestige of independent writing and in slavishly following the German line. This was, as some of them were ready to admit, largely a heritage from the spirit-crushing Soviet regime, for West Ukrainians in similar positions were willing to display more initiative even though exposed to greater risks.[70] It was also very probably due to the fact that the editors lacked any experience in journalism, for many had been teachers or had followed other professions which left them ill-prepared for their new tasks. The suspicion which attached to any who had worked for the
727 Soviet press, and had thus been compelled to write anti-German
186 material, forced journalists with Soviet experience to be especially
204 cautious.[71] Whatever the reasons, on the whole the East Ukrain-

[69] Interview 47.

[70] This was admitted by an East Ukrainian in *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk* in a sharp criticism of the editorial staffs who continued the Soviet tradition of complete subservience to authority in journalism, so that in some cases the Germans themselves had to urge them to be more enterprising (March 22, 1945, p. 1).

[71] One of the causes for the dismissal of Pronchenko from directorship of *Dzvin* was the accusation by his enemies that he had written an article against Hitler in a Soviet paper (MS E); Liubchenko feared that a similar charge would be made against him, and wrote that Shtepa told him outright that persons active in the Soviet press could not be employed on *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*, although this may simply have been an excuse to avoid hiring the nationalist writer (Liubchenko, pp. 26, 64).

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ians, when deprived of Nationalist support, made a rather poor showing as journalists. With some notable exceptions,[72] they did not measure up to the standards of the West Ukrainians or of old veterans of the Republican period like Nicholas Stasiuk, the editor of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta*. As will be shown, the administrative officials were also generally drawn from the intelligentsia, especially those of the academic or teaching profession, and had not been trained for the roles they assumed. That they nevertheless made a better showing of independence and devotion to national aims may possibly be explained by the fact that the Soviet regime had encouraged an attitude of limited self-assertion in local administrative bodies, so long as no questions of policy were at stake, while newspaper staffs were much more rigidly confined to transmission of Communist Party-inspired material and even more minutely controlled. Many persons of initiative must have felt it was better to take posts in which real service of a nonpolitical nature could be rendered, rather than assume the unattractive function of mouthpiece for a repressive regime. The question of the characteristics of the East Ukrainian intellectual can be considered in a larger context in the next chapter.

[72] Among these were Voskobiinyk, Hrynenko (Zhitomir), and a number of editorial writers in Kharkov, as well as those mentioned earlier as founding newspapers, although their careers were generally limited to a few weeks.

p. 236

X. NATIONALISM AND THE EAST UKRAINIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

369 THE STUDY of the role of Ukrainian nationalist groups in admin-
●186 istration and educational life has shown that urban-centered activities played a preponderant role in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine under German occupation. The more highly developed urban educational systems were primary targets for nationalist organizers, while the cities served as centers from which the nationalists sought to secure popular support by controlling cultural activities and the press. This emphasis on urban activity has a long history in the development of nationalism in both the East and the West Ukraine. Since the rural districts in both areas were strongly Ukrainian in all linguistic and cultural attributes, many felt that it was not immediately necessary to cultivate nationalist sentiment there; they felt these attributes would maintain the national distinctiveness of the villagers. Whether this was a wise view can be more adequately discussed a little later.

During the Second World War, however, this tradition did result in the nationalist groups' devoting a great portion of their limited resources to the East Ukrainian cities, where it was necessary to start almost from the bottom in building national life.
177 An impressive number of accounts by nationalist Ukrainians tes-
369 tify to the predominance of Russian speech and manners in the
186 cities of the East Ukraine throughout the war period.[1] The ex-

[1] In addition to numerous remarks of this nature already cited in relation to particular situations, see *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3; November 27, 1942, p. 4; March 2, 1943, p. 2; T. Liakovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 17, 1942, p. 3; Iu. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3. It may appear surprising that so many convinced adherents of the nationalist movement should have admitted and even stressed the non-Ukrainian cultural character of the cities, since usually

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planation is, of course, that a vast number of city dwellers were [177] Russified Ukrainians. Naturally enough, the nationalist leaders 369 felt that no secure basis for their program could exist as long as 186 the municipalities of the country were islands of foreign culture.

Within the urban group, nationalist efforts and nationalist 369 sentiment were largely concentrated in one social stratum. Na- 186 tionalist movements throughout the world have usually been the 565 work of the middle class. Since there had been no East Ukrainian capitalist middle class of any significance before 1920, and since there was no possibility that one could arise under Soviet conditions, except for a few traders carrying on a precarious business under the NEP, a commercial class continued to be lacking. The 475 counterpart to private commercial enterprise which existed under 565 the Soviet regime, the state trading system, was apparently largely operated by Jews and other non-Ukrainian elements.[2] Unfavorable appraisals of the activity of this system, plus distasteful memories of the "profit-and-run" techniques of the nepmen had produced an unattractive image of the private businessman in the minds of most East Ukrainians.[3] Although, under German occupation, a few gestures were made by some city administrations toward encouraging individual enterprise, the chief factors in production and distribution, insofar as the appalling economic conditions made such activities possible at all, were public and

nationalist movements endeavor to claim as large a proportion as possible of the inhabitants of a disputed area as members of their national group in origin and attitude. It must be remembered, however, that the OUN, and some other Ukrainian nationalist groups, were not democratic in ideology; hence the wishes of a majority at a particular time were of little importance in their eyes. Rather, this failure to possess the adherence of the inhabitants of an area which they regarded as theirs through the "rights" of history and blood served as an additional proof of the iniquities of the Soviet regime and of Russians in general and as a stimulus to more strenuous efforts to "correct" the situation.

[2] Some Ukrainians today (Interview 35) state that many wartime ascriptions of all the evils of the Soviet system to the Jews were highly exaggerated, in most cases a forced concession to Nazi racism, but insist that there was a good deal of anti-Semitism in the Ukraine because Jews predominated in retail distribution, and in the conditions of extreme shortage used their positions for selfish purposes. In view of the occupations of most Jews before the Revolution, their numerical predominance in the state distributive system is probably a fact, and it is fairly obvious that any recognizably alien group in such a position would be resented when they could not satisfy the consumers' wants, whether or not peculation played a role in their activities.

[3] Interview 65.

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[475] cooperative enterprises. Hence the development of a middle class
565 on the traditional Western model did not take place.

Actually, in the Ukraine, as in many other countries in which
517 nationalist movements have developed, it was other components
186 of the middle class which played the leading role. These were the intellectuals, the professionals, and the bureaucrats, together with the student body from which they were recruited. All four of these categories, together with a vast number of persons who would in Western usage be classified simply as clerks, technicians, or even custodial personnel, are lumped together in Soviet classifications as "intelligentsia"—i.e., all whose work does not involve a large measure of manual labor.[4] The leaders of the nationalist movements came from a narrower stratum however. The majority of this leadership consisted of intellectuals par excellence; that is, it was drawn from the academic or literary profession.

This crucial statement requires some proof, which is difficult to present in the absence of statistics or the possibility of sampling, both of which are unavailable for obvious reasons. However, the preponderance of intellectuals is indicated indirectly by figures previously cited on the extremely high proportion of persons with higher or secondary education employed in the Kiev city and *raion* administrations in 1942,[5] and by the statements from well-informed participants that these and other administrations, as well as editorial staffs, served as refuges for intellectuals displaced from their normal occupations.[6] Furthermore, the efforts of nationalist groups, whether OUN or local, were directed very largely toward assisting and encouraging the teachers and writers, a factor which suggests that they were closely tied to these segments of the population. For example, Mel'nyk organizers in Kiev in the winter of 1941–42 made special efforts to secure work in the cooperatives for teachers in order to enable them to avoid forced labor for the rebuilding of bridges.[7] Similarly, the strong

[4] For a discussion of the concept in Soviet usage, see Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 324 ff.

[5] See Chapter IX.

[6] See Chapter V.

[7] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 16. According to one account, the Red Cross in Kiev also aided the intelligentsia (along with prisoners of war) to a special degree (*Krakiv'ki Visti*, December 4, 1942, p. 2).

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East Ukrainian nationalist group in Kharkov took the unusual step of utilizing Prosvita as a relief organization for educators.[8] In addition, the very ability of nationalist elements to maintain themselves in the educational systems when other departments of administration had passed from their hands indicates that the staffs of these branches of administration were especially imbued with nationalism. The comparatively small number of cases and lack of availability of any sampling technique precludes generalization solely on the basis of cases known to the writer of this study. It may be noted, however, that of some sixty East Ukrainians prominent in the nationalist movement whose occupational background is known, about three fifths were either instructors in higher schools, teachers, journalists, or writers. As examples, some of the most prominent may be mentioned. All three mayors of German-occupied Kiev were educators. The chief of the *oblast* administration in Dniepropetrovsk, organized with OUN-B help, was the dean of the electro-technical faculty of the university; later, a member of its medical faculty played the leading role in organizing a "national council" for the OUN-M.[9] The great majority of the Kharkov group, including all of the major organizers of Prosvita, as well as at least two of the OUN-M Ekzekutyva, were university professors; so were the editors of the nationalist-oriented papers in Stalino and Voroshilovgrad (Luhans'k).[10] Among the new Autocephalous bishops, the single East Ukrainian who did not have a clerical background, Professor Haievs'kyi, was also an educator. Writers, while much less prominent, were important. Arkadii Liubchenko, perhaps the best known of all who joined the OUN, has already been described. Most of the nationalist editors were drawn from trained writers, although as in the case of the poet Pronchenko in Krivoi Rog, they appear to have been more often men whose careers were in belles-lettres than professional reporters or editorial workers.

That such a high proportion of available leadership for the nationalist movement came from educators and writers is probably due in part to the leading role played by "national Communist" educational commissars like Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk more

[8] *Nastup*, September 26, 1943, p. 3, referring to *Vinnyts'ki Visti*, August 29, 1943.
[9] Interviews 1, 48.
[10] Interview 66.

517 than a decade earlier in fostering national culture. Evidently even
186 the repeated Communist purges could not wholly eradicate the permeation of the educational system by nationalist ideas. Indeed, Skrypnyk and other Communists of that period were praised openly by writers in the war years as defenders of the Ukrainian "national idea," [11] and Skrypnyk's plan for an orthographical commission to set standards for Ukrainian publications was formally revived. It should be noticed, however, that direct links between nationalist leaders of the war period and the Skrypnyk group were very few. Moreover, the Russophile leaders were also predominantly intellectuals.[12] The general conclusion appears to be that the intellectuals (using the term in the Western sense) as a group were the most disaffected stratum in Soviet society capable of assuming a leadership role. Of great significance is the fact that a very high proportion of all those who were active in nationalist life under the German occupation had direct reasons for resentment against the Soviet regime, either because they had been barred from intellectual work or because they had been imprisoned for anti-Soviet activity. Also they had a wider historical perspective and hence were quicker to react to the new situation.

463 The second most important group was composed of engineers
186 and other technical specialists like agronomy experts and chemists. Several of these were closely associated with academic life. Others seem to have been drawn from the operating staffs of Soviet industrial establishments, as in the great metallurgical center of Krivoi Rog, where a group of young men composed predominantly of engineers took over the rebuilding of city life soon after the Soviet troops withdrew.[13] One of their number became mayor, was active in nationalist work, probably in connection with the OUN-B, and as a result was executed by the Germans.[14] The most active local recruit of the OUN-M in Kiev, who

[11] Victor Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[12] Although two of their most prominent leaders (Bohatyrchuk and the mayor of Vinnitsa) were physicians, they were also occupants of academic chairs.

[13] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 22, 1941, p. 3.

[14] MS E; Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), p. 39.

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led the organization after the West Ukrainian and émigré leaders had been forced to withdraw, was an engineer. On the whole, however, it may be said that engineers were more concerned with material reconstruction than politics, and did not play proportionately as significant a role as did engineers in the nationalist movements abroad and in Galicia.

The predominance of intellectuals and technical specialists in the nationalist movement imparted a certain specific color to the activities. In the first place, from the purely administrative point of view, the lack of trained men was a serious handicap. While the purely material aspects of city life were carried on about as well as might have been hoped in view of the destruction, shortages, and German obstruction, the conduct of public administration was far from adequate. This was, indeed, one of the major causes of the downfall of the OUN-M regime in Kiev, whether the worst defects consisted of favoritism and speculation by officials, or simply poor organizational and human relations. Nationalist fervor, enthusiasm, facility in the use of literary Ukrainian, were no substitutes for managerial skills and personnel psychology. Yet it was precisely these abilities which intellectuals who were excluded from public life, as were Soviet Ukrainian educators suspected of adherence to the Skrypnyk group, could not acquire. At the same time, so much of their energy had been turned in upon their academic and cultural cultivation of things Ukrainian, such as language and history, that the intellectuals failed to place the emotional and abstract aspects of the nationalist cause in a balanced framework when the opportunity for action arose. It cannot be said that the intellectuals were less courageous than others might have been in striving for national ends in the face of German terrorism; many lost their lives, although, as has been pointed out in the case of some of the small-city editors, others were sometimes found to act as pliant tools for the occupiers. It does, however, appear that persons more inclined to take a functional instead of an emotional approach to administration might have been more successful in evading German demands.

Very striking is the almost total lack of legal expression among almost all participants in administrative work. Probably the basic reason for this omission was that lawyers were few and far between among non-Communist elements in the Ukraine. A con-

693 fidential Wehrmacht report ascribes to this lack the difficulty experienced in getting the court system started,[15] and one Ukrainian account states that of two hundred and fifty lawyers in the Kharkov *oblast* under Soviet rule only thirty-five were not Jews.[16] While an anti-Semitic bias in this statement may need to be discounted, it does appear likely that the vast majority of a professional group which was already very small (there are few Western cities where there is only one lawyer per four thousand population!) was largely non-Ukrainian.

Of the few prominent legally trained Ukrainians, none had been able to practice his profession for many years. Alexander Semenenko, the mayor of Kharkov, had been educated as a lawyer under the tsarist regime and had practiced for a time in the early years of Communist rule. In the thirties, however, he was imprisoned for a number of years, and was a fugitive from the NKVD when the German army occupied the city.[17] Volodymyr Dolenko, who with Professor Dubrovs'kyi was the principal organizer of the strong nationalist group in Kharkov, had also been trained as a lawyer under the old regime, and he too had been prevented by the Communists from practicing.[18] Alexander Iatseniuk, head of the Zhitomir *oblast* administration, a judge under Nicholas II, had been relegated to the position of lecturer in a higher school by the Soviets.[19] His administration included a number of other jurists.

693 The want of training in the law was particularly striking in the
● 182 Ukrainian nationalist movements. The failure to attempt to form a codified set of principles of either a legal or an administrative nature, the frequent arbitrary action in allotting positions on a basis of partisan enthusiasm rather than objectively determinable qualifications, the frequent tendency to accept an extreme nationalist position and then to push it even further, might all have been curbed by a stronger legal tradition.

[15] PS 1693.
[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 4.
[17] *Krakauer Zeitung*, May 14, 1944, p. 4.
[18] Interview 73.
[19] Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2; the reporter states that the directives of the city administration were "precise and factual," not full of "romantic phrases."

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been curbed by a stronger legal tradition. Perhaps by coincidence 633
the administrations in Zhitomir and Kharkov were comparatively 563
tolerant of minority groups, and awakened no such violent opposition from Russophile elements as in Kiev. Indeed, as has already been pointed out, the Zhitomir administration in 1941 included a Pole and a Russian in prominent posts, apparently working in harmony with other officials, while the nationalist group in Kharkov during the occupation attracted the lasting support of at least one academician of Russian origin. These groups were also able to avoid destruction by the Germans, in spite of considerable harassment, perhaps because their activities were not so violent as to arouse the public outcry which served as an excuse for the attack on the Kiev group.

The severe shortage of lawyers was paralleled by an even 633
greater lack of administrators with experience in posts of great 186
responsibility. This deficiency doubtless arose primarily from the fact that persons holding high administrative posts were almost universally strong adherents of the Communist regime. In a number of cases, leading Soviet officials such as chairmen of city soviets organized underground sabotage against German installations or led partisan groups for the Communist cause, and the large majority no doubt evacuated with the Red Army. It would have been difficult in any case for such a highly placed member of the Soviet regime to join the nationalist cause, as he would probably have been executed in short order by the *Einsatzgruppen*, whose tasks included the killing of all "kommissars." Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that no Soviet military, party, or state official of any importance, as far as is known to the present writer, ever joined the Ukrainian nationalist cause, either through the local groups in the East Ukraine or through the prisoner-of-war camps, although several from these groups did join the Vlasov movement.

What the East Ukraine lacked in trained legal and administrative personnel, the West Ukrainian organizers failed to supply. Indeed, they appear not to have seen the need. They recognized the desirability of sending in journalists (the West Ukrainians were more effective as editors, although the extremely propa-

633 gandistic nature of much of their work exacerbated the defects
188 already existing in the intellectual nationalist tendencies in the east).[20] They also recognized the need for trained military officers to lead the police units, as well as for organizers of cooperatives, merchants, and other personnel to reorganize economic life.[21] Since the Galicians, unlike their East Ukrainian fellows, had been brought up under the influence of the Roman law tradition transmitted by the Austrian administration and the Catholic Church, one might have thought that they would provide a balancing ele-
[693] ment of legal thought. Actually, although there were numerous lawyers in the legal parties in Galicia, lawyers were even rarer among OUN leaders than among prominent East Ukrainians. Moreover, the whole current of revolutionary romanticism and the glorification of "illegalism" necessarily militated against the development of legalistic elements in the thinking of the nationalist factions. At the same time, of course, underground oppositional work had afforded the western group no experience in the responsibilities of public administration; the older émigrés who might have provided a modicum of such experience were kept out of the East Ukraine by the Germans. As the following statistics on the émigré group in Bohemia-Moravia indicate, however, the possible supply was not great, even if one accepts the figures which were obtained by listing, presumably at their own valuation, persons available to return to the East Ukraine in 1941.[22]

[20] Iu. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 6, 1941, p. 2.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] From a registration by a Ukrainian community organization in Prague, September 28, 1941 (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 4, 1941, p. 3). For comparison, the occupations of the postwar emigration (largely West rather than East Ukrainian, in contrast to the interwar émigré group) may be given:

	ÉMIGRÉS IN GERMANY	
	U. S. Zone (*total 85,646*)	*British Zone* (*total 44,987*)
Peasants	30 percent	44 percent
Workers	16	21
Artisans	18	14
Intellectuals	23	8
Miscellaneous	13	13

(Michael Pap, *Die Probleme der ukrainischen Staatlichkeit und der Emigration*, Inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde vorgelegt der Hohen Philosophischen Fakultät der Ruperts-Carola Universität zu Heidelberg, 1948 [Typescript available in the Library of Congress]).

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Workers of various skills	1,788
Students	560
Liberal professions (journalists, writers, merchants, artists, etc.)	313
Teachers	252
Engineers	343
Administrators	178
Jurists	11

Compared to the occupational differences in nationalist activity, differences of age and sex played a minor role. There is little information on the activity of women. Evidently they carried on most of the welfare work; one German report states that a major reason for permitting the functioning of the Ukrainian Red Cross was a desire to absorb the energies of the women intellectuals, who had been highly "politicized" by the Soviet regime.[23] There are a few cases of prominent nationalist work by women, for example, by the poet Olena Teliha who headed the OUN-M literary circle in Kiev until its suppression by the Germans. In general, nationalist observers agree that the women were less active politically than the men. While there is too little evidence to warrant a firm conclusion on this score, it is just possible that the nationalist movements neglected a useful source of support, which was certainly tapped by the Communist underground.[24] 462 186

Youth, on the other hand, played a prominent part in nationalist work. While a large number of Mel'nyk supporters were drawn from the older generation, and the OUN-B made special efforts to capture the younger group, there was here no "conflict of generations" in respect to adherence to the two factions. Since only physically active persons were useful in the east, even the Mel'nyk organizers were predominantly youthful, and thus could approach their contemporaries more readily. The strength of the youth organizations dominated by the OUN-M in Kiev and Zhitomir has already been described. Other young men, of course, rejected both nationalist groups as too extreme, and formed centers of their own, while still others appear to have arisen in complete independence of outside stimulation. Thus the whole administra- 186 883 [668*]

[Occupation specialization of Ukrainian émigré group in Bohemia - Moravia--Analyst]

[23] USSR Exhibit 278.

[24] PS 3876.

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186 883 tion and cultural life of Pavlograd, a small town east of Dniepropetrovsk on the way to the Donbas, was organized by a group of graduates from the local *gimnaziia*.[25] They owed their nationalism, according to reports by visitors, entirely to the work of an inspiring teacher (who had in turn received his nationalist indoctrination in Kharkov University) who had taught there until caught by the NKVD some years previously.[26]

[668] The division of nationalist youth among both factions of the OUN, and locally formed groups, parallels closely the division of their elders in the East Ukraine. In one respect, however, the younger generation was different; there was a considerable number of youths who had been active adherents of Communist organizations but who now joined the nationalist movements.[27] The most prominent ex-Komsomol was the son of Alexander Iatseniuk who, after an extremely active career in OUN-M organization in the Zhitomir area, fled to the Volhynian woods where as "Volynets'" he became an important nationalist partisan leader. On the other hand, large numbers of young people were daring enough to praise the Soviet openly, or took part in underground activity, while condemning the Ukrainian language and customs.[28]

On the whole, in their reaction to nationalist political activity, there does not seem to have been any marked difference between the younger and the older generations, at least not nearly so sharp a difference as in Galicia. It is fairly certain that a large percentage of the youth who joined nationalist activities were influenced by their parents. Others—sons of kulaks, priests, and intellectuals who had been persecuted by the Soviet regime—resented the Soviet order because of their parents' misfortune.

Apparently whatever advantage the nationalist movement may have enjoyed among the older generation because of the latter's memory of Petliura and the nationalist activity of the twenties was at least partly offset by the greater appeal of a romantic,

[25] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 12, 1942, p. 3; *Nova Doba* (Berlin), July 5, 1942, p. 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 3, 1942, p. 2.

[26] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 3, 1942, p. 2.

[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 23, 1941, p. 2, based on an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti*.

[28] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1942, p. 3.

activist movement like the OUN to youth, or by the latter's desire in other cases to rearrange life to suit themselves. There is a faint suggestion that the Soviet regime may already have become the "old order" against which revolutionary youth is wont to rebel. On the other hand, these very qualities which made the nationalist *political* movement attractive to the younger generation had the effect of keeping it antagonistic to religion. As has already been pointed out, there is almost universal agreement that youth in the East Ukraine was cool, even hostile, to the churches.[29] In the south, the Protestants and dissident Orthodox groups seem to have been somewhat more successful, but they had no direct relation to the nationalist movement.[30]

The OUN-B, it will be recalled, placed special emphasis on securing the allegiance of youth, since its young agitators were unable to attract the support of the intelligentsia.[31] There is a small amount of evidence to indicate that the nationalist movements attracted a broader occupational group from the youth than from among its elders. So little is known concerning the role of the laboring classes, however, that no conclusions can be offered. Historically, the working class in the East Ukraine had been predominantly Russian or Russified. The working class was also generally more loyal to the Soviet system than most of the other social groups. Even if the Ukrainian claim that a large influx of dispossessed peasants and their children during the thirties had resulted in a Ukrainization of the urban laboring class be accepted, there is no evidence that such persons became interested in politics or had any important part in nationalist activity. Probably those who were mature when they left the village continued to be peasants in outlook, while a few rose into the intelligentsia, acquiring its coloration.

As frequently observed in this study, the disproportion of material available is no sure indication of a corresponding difference in the importance of factors involved. Since in many instances only fragmentary evidence is at hand, what is presented may be

[29] Cf. articles in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 12, 1941, p. 3; October 3, 1942, p. 2.

[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 3, 1942, p. 2; PS 1693.

[31] See the clandestine leaflet from the Odessa area previously referred to for sharp OUN-B criticism of the intelligentsia as tools of the Germans.

000 drawn too heavily from particular sources or may too greatly concern special aspects. In the case of urban-rural differences in nationalist activity, it is certain that such a bias exists in the character and extent of the evidence. For one thing, any single activity in a city of some size, such as the development of a Prosvita society, or the control of an administration, is sufficiently important to merit a place in contemporary reports, while a similar rural activity, conducted on a much smaller scale but equally important in its limited area, would probably pass unrecorded. Since the main channels of communication—newspapers and personal contacts of West Ukrainian and émigrés with local figures—were predominantly urban, they would naturally leave behind many more reports on city developments. Perhaps most important is the fact that the higher degree of articulateness of urban dwellers, in the Ukraine as elsewhere, tends to give them a disproportionate share in the written expression which later becomes the historical record.

565 In the cities, there was no positive goal to compete with the
186 nationalist movements for the hopes and enthusiasms of the popu-
369 lace. The terrible deprivations, the German executions, the *Ostarbeiter* program, the fear of Communist agents, were factors which had a far greater significance for the average urban person than did the efforts of the nationalist movements; but a general effect was to promote passivity and resignation. On the land, however, a positive goal was before all eyes, which for a large segment of the peasantry far outweighed any prospect of national inde-
565 pendence, however desirable that might be in itself.[32] This tran-
186 scendent goal was the destruction of the collectivized system of agriculture and its replacement by a system in which individual initiative and the demands of the peasants would play a greater part. The nature of the agrarian question and the Germans' fumbling efforts to use the peasants' desire to gain support, while retaining the old restrictive kolkhoz system to make exploitation of the peasant easier, has already been described in general terms; it would exceed the scope of this study to treat the subject itself

[32] This is implied even by nationalist writers; for example, Iurii Tarkovych notes that the first question of peasants in the area between Kiev and Chernigov was, "When will the land be divided?" (*Krakiw'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3).

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in greater detail. It is absolutely essential to stress the key nature of this problem, however, for it is almost beyond doubt that any movement which had offered a fully satisfactory solution to the agrarian problem would have won the adherence of the mass of the peasantry, regardless of its stand on the national question.

Superficially, the situation in the countryside was satisfactory from the nationalist standpoint. It is true that certain peasant traits of a distinctively national character had been subjected to erosion by the developments of the Soviet period. The handicrafts, including making of the national costume, had almost vanished under the joint impact of material shortages and growing availability of factory products.[33] The physical appearance of the villages had been altered too and much of their distinctiveness lost through the Soviet destruction of the cemeteries.[34]

In the more basic matter of language, the changes had not been so great, although in some areas at least many "town words" in the "all-Soviet" (i.e., Russian) tongue had been introduced.[35] From the point of view of developing replenishments for the intellectual elite from peasant stock, the situation was worse, however, for the Ukrainian tongue was frequently scorned as the speech of "Ivany i Maryny z kolhospu"—"Johns and Marys off the farm."[36] Even more significant, the mere fact that the peasants spoke Ukrainian, and even had a certain affection for the language as their mother tongue, did not necessarily prove that they possessed any consciousness of nationality. A Ukrainian visitor to one of the villages in the Taganrog district of the lower Don, just beyond the border of the Ukrainian SSR, reported that all the inhabitants spoke pure Ukrainian and retained Ukrainian customs. When addressed as Ukrainians, however, they denied the appellation, insisting that the "Ukrainians" lived over to the west, across the border. The nationalist reporter pointed out the identity of speech and manners with the population to the west, but they replied, "Yes, they are our brothers," yet persisted in denying that they were themselves Ukrainian.[37]

[33] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 26, 1942, p. 3.
[34] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 15, 1942, p. 4.
[35] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1942, p. 3.
[36] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3.
[37] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 22, 1942, p. 2.

186 The means at hand to stimulate a sense of nationality among
565 the peasants were rather meager. Most important, undoubtedly,
795 was the church. Within a few months after the Communists were driven out, many hundreds of parishes had been reestablished.[38] Undoubtedly the older people who had received some religious training welcomed the reappearance of the clergy. Baptisms and marriages took place in large numbers, and the churches were well attended. Since the Germans forbade the use of public funds for payment of the salaries of the clergy, the latter had to depend on the generosity of their flocks or the produce of their own land. Apparently the parishioners responded by furnishing their pastors with sufficient income in kind.[39] In most areas, there developed a conflict between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous clergy. At first, the latter (or, in the "Left Bank" region, simply the clergy consecrated in the orthodox fashion who used the Slavonic liturgy) predominated in the villages, but as more Autocephalous priests were consecrated, and more of the older priests came to accept the Ukrainian language service, they evidently won the support of the peasantry. Strange as it may seem in view of reputed village conservatism, the living language was apparently more popular as a religious vehicle in the country than in the town,[40] and cases are recorded in which the peasants actually drove out the priest who persisted in the use of Slavonic.[41]

793 Religion as a stimulus to nationalist feeling was, however, sub-
186 ject to severe limitations. One was the inadequate background of the clergy. Many were simple peasants up to the time of their consecration, although an effort was made to train them in short courses. Where such a man was of sound character and good common sense, as was the case in one Podolian village, he could accomplish a good deal. There, according to the report, the priest, one of the local peasants until his recent consecration, was highly respected for his good example. His sermons stressed brotherly love, the importance of industriousness, mutual assistance, proper

[38] See Chapter XI.

[39] PS 1693.

[40] Report from a *gimnaziia* teacher in Poltava (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3); *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

[41] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

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education of children, and self-control.[42] Generally, however, the clergy was unable to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in several villages the latter even objected to returning the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs.[43]

One of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. How effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of more detailed evidence, but in some cases it evidently did at least provide reading material and some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. There is considerable difference of opinion as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were imbued with Communist ideas.[44]

The great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmitters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for example, the physician, who had been a UNR officer, played the chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. He was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village *feldsher* (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. These constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, who were described as having "no unified outlook," being still "under the influence of Bolshevik ideology." [45] This criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not uncommon in nationalist

[42] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.
[43] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3.
[44] Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 18, 1941, for favorable reports; and Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28–29, for some criticisms of the rural teachers.
[45] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

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186 writers.[46] To a certain extent it may be due to resentment against
565 the clerical workers' unresponsiveness to nationalist propaganda,
369 or even to simple snobbery toward those aspiring to the title of
517 "intelligentsia" without a formal education. In part it appears, however, to correspond to a real lack of breadth of mind among this lowest group of the Soviet intelligentsia, a deficiency which would have made it difficult to use them for any political or social movement not tied immediately to their customary frame of thinking.

On the other hand, there were often elements in the villages which were available for some sort of political activity. The memory of Petliura was still present; some refused to believe that he was dead, thinking the story to be Communist propaganda.[47] In another area, both the president of the village soviet and the head of one of the collective farms remained behind and organized life in cooperation with nationalist elements.[48] Yet, in another case, a man of some education in one of the villages, who was related to an émigré minister of the UNR, after expressing fervently nationalist sentiments, recoiled with horror at the idea that his auditor might recommend him to the Germans for an official post, fearing the vengeance of Communist agents.[49] The presence of the latter was, indeed, a great handicap to nationalist organization in the rural areas, where the protection of the police force was not so great (especially in partisan-infested areas) as in the towns, and where the naturally cautious peasant hesitated to commit himself until assured the Soviet administration would never return.[50]

186 Since the organized nationalist forces were so few in members,
369 they could not undertake any direct or continuous indoctrination
208 of the rural population, unless they abandoned their efforts to win the cities. They had to rely primarily on the Prosvita branches, the country schools, and the village administrations. Printed material was also used whenever it could be controlled

[46] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 23, 1941, p. 2, reprinting an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti*.
[47] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.
[48] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[49] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.
[50] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

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by nationalist Ukrainians. As a matter of fact, a large proportion 186
of the newspapers in the smaller towns were directed principally 369
at rural readers; the extreme shortage of papers[51] in many areas 208
prevented their being of great influence even when they had [204]
some nationalist content. Moreover, the central periodical for farmers, *Ukraïns'kyi Khliborob,* with a weekly printing of seventy thousand, was edited by Eugene Arkypenko, who later joined the Vlasov movement.[52] While this publication was not used against the nationalist cause, it was devoid of positive nationalist material, being confined entirely to technical agricultural articles.

The less-than-lukewarm supporters of the nationalist move- 186
ments who constituted the bulk of the personnel in positions 369
which provided access to the rural population apparently did not do a great deal to convert the dormant cultural nationality of the peasants into active nationalism. There is no question that the cities inevitably constituted a prime target for nationalist efforts. Probably, in view of the severe limitations imposed by lack of time and nationalist personnel, by Red partisans and German restrictions, the enormous task of overcoming village inertia toward a purely political movement could not have been carried out in any case. Nevertheless, the initial failure of the nationalist groups (at least the OUN and others coming from the west) to grasp the overriding importance of the land question, and the necessity of making this a prime means by which the rural population could be won to the nationalist cause, must certainly be ranked as one of the great lost opportunities of this period. If the nationalists had from the beginning used all their energies to present a positive program of agrarian reform as the heart of their message, they might not have left any tangible organization to withstand renewed Soviet occupation, but they might have left behind a concept of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a defender of the interests of the peasantry. This, along with the vaguer memories of the Republican era, might have left an enduring imprint on the peasantry.

[51] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[52] *Volyn',* June 17, 1942, p. 4; Interview 45.

668* tionalists made a strong effort to extend their influence to the region. A large part of these efforts were concentrated on Kiev and Zhitomir. In Vinnitsa, the largest city of Podolia, on the other hand, the situation developed unfavorably for the nationalists soon after the German arrival. When the Germans captured the city, they were impressed by the activity of the director of the medical institute and his ability to speak German, learned while a student in Germany. Consequently, they appointed him mayor. Of mixed Russian and Ukrainian descent, the new mayor considered himself Ukrainian, but favored the continuance of ties with Russia. His administration contained other pro-Russian elements, while the Vinnitsa *oblast* administration was headed by an ethnic German said to have had Russophile tendencies. The police, on the other hand, and the newspaper were controlled by OUN-M adherents, although both were men of exceeding caution.[5] Vinnitsa played only an indirect role in stimulating Ukrainian nationalism; the unearthing in June, 1943, of enormous mass graves of victims of NKVD executions in 1937–38 and during the retreat of 1941, including, it is said, a number imprisoned for nationalist activities, served to increase the dread felt of the rapidly materializing prospect of Soviet reconquest.

668* 186 If Vinnitsa was the chief anti-nationalist stronghold, Proskurov, a smaller city to the northwest, was the headquarters for the OUN-M in Podolia. There the Mel'nyk group counted the mayor and the police chief (a Carpatho-Ukrainian trained in the [204] Czechoslovak army) among its members.[6] It also controlled the newspaper, *Ukraïns'kyi Holos,* which had a circulation of thirteen thousand, said to have been more than double that of the Soviet paper which had been published in Proskurov.[7] Farther east, the districts west and southwest of Kiev were under strong nationalist influence. While the OUN-M was establishing its headquarters in Kiev, newspapers and local administrations were being formed in a number of small cities such as Vasilkov, Belaia Tserkov', Tarashcha, Korsun', Smela (Smila), Cherkasy, and Uman'. The formation of the National Rada by the Mel'nyk group made a great

[5] Interview 1.
[6] Interviews 1, 50.
[7] *Nastup,* December 25, 1941, p. 4, citing *Ukraïns'kyi Holos.*

impression on the intellectuals of the smaller towns. OUN-M 668* writers and propagandists appear to have maintained regular con- 186 tact with them for several months in 1941, and it is apparent that the Kiev *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* served as a model for many of the new [204] editors.[8] Schools were opened under the direction of nationalist [658] educators, Prosvita and theatrical groups were formed, coopera- tives linked with *Vukospilka* were active. Apparently, too, the town administrations were largely in Ukrainian hands; the mu- [191] nicipal authorities in Uman' issued a sweeping order forbidding the use of the Russian language in any office, school, or enterprise under their jurisdiction.[9]

The influence of the nationalists in the towns penetrated to some degree to the countryside in the area west of the Dnieper. For example, nationalist papers like *Nova Doba,* published in [204] Berdichev, seem to have had a moderately large circulation in the villages. There also seem to have been nationalist influences of a purely local character in some places, aside from those brought in by the nationalist parties. Zvenigorodka, a small town about a hundred miles due south of Kiev had been the home of the Free Cossacks, a nationalist organization of the wealthier peasants during the revolutionary period. The group was revived by some of the villagers under the German occupation, and, together with a mimeographed newspaper, served as a focal point for local nationalism.[10]

The influence of the church, especially in the rural areas, was 794 not entirely on the side of Ukrainian nationalism.[1] The Auton- 186 omous clergy under Alexius made an early start in reorganizing religious life in this region. They established a diocese of Vinnitsa and Zhitomir, and during most of the period of occupation were supported by the influential Bishop Damaskin (Maliuti) of Kamenets-Podolsk. Damaskin's diocese included nearly five hundred churches, with a hundred and sixty priests.[11] Apparently most of this large organization, which was overwhelmingly concentrated in the rural districts, had no objection to Damaskin's allegiance to the Russophile church. The Autocephalous Church

[8] Interview 30.
[9] *Nastup,* May 3, 1942, p. 2.
[10] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[11] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 13, 1942, p. 2.
[1] [After Germans had occupied this territory--Analyst]

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794 established its own organization, installing a bishop in Zhitomir,
186 as well as the energetic Ihor in Belaia Tserkov'. Ihor was replaced for a time by Emmanuel, but when the latter passed over to the Autonomous Church, he took a new post in western Volhynia, perhaps because he found the rather strong nationalist atmosphere in Belaia Tserkov' unpleasant. The fact that the Autonomous Church was able to maintain such a strong organization indicates that sentiment in the rural areas was not always ardently nationalist, even in the most "pure" of Ukrainian lands.

631 The wooded steppe region east of the Dnieper, the "Left Bank," constituted the second half of the traditional Ukrainian heartland. The western part had been for centuries under Polish and Lithuanian rule, coming under Moscow in the late seventeenth century, together with Kiev. The eastern part, roughly equivalent to the Kharkov *oblast,* had never been under Polish rule, but had owed allegiance to the tsars. It served as a refuge for serfs escaping from their Polono-Lithuanian masters, and hence was known as the "Slobozhanshchyna" or "Free Land." Since even the western part of the "Left Bank" had been annexed by the Russian Empire long before the partitions of Poland, however, its history diverged considerably from that of the "Right Bank."

668* The most interesting nationalist developments in this region during 1941–43 took place in Kharkov. While Kharkov was always claimed as the second city of the Ukraine, it never occupied the place in nationalist thinking which Kiev held, and the fact that the Russian ethnic and linguistic element there was strong aroused less indignation. Some account of the differences in the nationalist movements in Kiev and Kharkov has already been given. The essential divergence arose from the fact that the OUN-M organizers reached the latter city only in November, when their period of grace was already running out. Enthusiasm was great enough for them to secure powerful support from local people. A strong *ekzekutyva* was formed with a mayor of one of the city *raions,* an ardently nationalist professor, George Boiko, and several other local people, in addition to Kononenko, the chief West Ukrainian organizer, as members.[12] The adherence of

[12] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UWR), April, 1946, p. 75; Interview 57.

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surrounding areas, as because it exerted influence upon them. The 668*
chief channels by which it did so were the Prosvita organizations, the newspaper, and the church. A leader of the independent nationalist group estimates that its influence, exercised primarily through the Prosvita, reached as far west as Lubny and Poltava,[16] and there is evidence that it also played a part in organization as far south as the northern Donbas.[17] *Nova Ukraïna* was also widely known, serving as a model for nationalist editors in the "Left Bank" region who wanted to pursue as independent a line as possible and hence rejected the guidance of *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*.

The special role played by the church of Kharkov merits more 793
than passing mention. When the Germans arrived, they found 578
that an elderly prelate, Archbishop Theophilus, had survived the 186
Soviet period. Seventy-six years old, a native of a village of the Khoral (Khorol) region in the heart of the "Left Bank" Ukraine, he had become a priest in 1885.[18] With the aid of local clergymen, he reassumed control of ecclesiastical life in Kharkov in late 1941 and claimed to be in charge of the entire "Left Bank" as Metropolitan of the Ukraine.[19] Many—especially in the Autocephalous Church—criticized him because he was consecrated bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church (in 1923) and because he continued to use Old Slavonic in the liturgy.[20] Others, however, saw him as a Ukrainian patriot, since he was Ukrainian by birth, spoke pure Ukrainian, celebrated a service in commemoration of Kruty, and praised the Ukrainian newspaper.[21] At any rate the dissidents were able to make little progress against him; only two Lypkivite priests had survived, while Theophilus's clergy numbered more than one hundred.[22] However, the latter appear to have been subjected to very loose control by the archbishop and

[16] *Ibid.*
[17] Interview 68.
[18] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 15, 1943, p. 3.
[19] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 5, 1943, p. 2; March 6, 1942, p. 3.
[20] Interview 69. A letter to Archbishop Hilarion from one of his former pupils in the Kharkov area, asking his advice on reorganization of the church, suggests that all were not satisfied with Theophilus' ascendancy, even at an early date (*Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, February 10, 1942, p. 4).
[21] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 5, 1942, p. 4; January 24, 1943, p. 2; May 15, 1943, p. 3.
[22] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, February 10, 1942, p. 4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 5, 1943, p. 2.

793 to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services accord-
578 ing to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of
the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left"
186 as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

668* It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

727 Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor
661 were shot by German police; the city passed under the control
204 of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.
[24] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.
[26] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.
[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.
[28] Interview 47.

proportion of Jews was somewhat lower, but the Ukrainians were 369
even fewer, numbering scarcely more than one third of the popula- 563
tion.[35]

The figures for Kirovograd in 1942 are hardly enough upon 186
which to base generalizations.[36] Apparently, however, a great shift to Ukrainian national affiliation, much larger than that which took place in the average northern city, had occurred. As in the case of the other figures, it is not certain that this represents a real change, although it is probable that a large part of the interwar growth was composed of Ukrainian peasants. A number of circumstances suggest, however, that part of the difference arose from a real shift in allegiance of numerous elements of Russian origin, i.e., a shift induced not so much by expectation that persons classing themselves as Ukrainians would have a favored position in a new Ukrainian state, as by a sincere feeling of belonging to a "Ukraine" defined on a geographic rather than an ethnic basis. The readiness of technical specialists, who took the lead in Krivoi Rog, to adopt with enthusiasm Ukrainian symbols, while devoting their major attention to economic reconstruction, suggests that this acceptance of a territorial basis of national identity may have played a role, while the support of Russian cultural and political tendencies by a similar group in Dniepropetrovsk indicates the instability of this choice. Apparently the situation was something like this: as long as the Ukrainian state which the Germans seemed to favor appeared to be an instrument for the overthrow of Communism and the rebuilding of new life, it was readily acceptable; when it became a romantic creed of ethnocentrism it was repugnant as an obstacle to the satisfaction

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] See Appendix. The necessity for caution in interpreting the extremely great shift in Kirovograd is indicated by the fact that the only other large city in the area for which data are available, Dniepropetrovsk, showed a comparatively small shift. It will be recalled, however, that the latter city was under a Russophile administration. Unfortunately, there is no information available concerning the tendencies of the city administration in Kirovograd for the time the census was taken. It is mathematically demonstrable, however, that the decline of the Russian group can be accounted for in Kirovograd only on the basis of a shift of persons formerly classed as Russians to the Ukrainian group, unless one of two rather unlikely assumptions is made, namely that (1) the Russian population actually declined between 1926 and 1941, or (2) numerous Jews later exterminated listed themselves as Russians in 1926.

186 of down-to-earth needs and the development of smooth human relations.

668* There were, however, many variations on this theme. Both the initial stimulation and the ensuing withdrawal from nationalist ideology on the part of many persons in the area[1] was due, according to numerous and consistent reports of eyewitnesses, to the activities of Bandera organizers. The great predominance of Mel'nyk adherents in the northern Ukraine was matched by the ascendancy of the younger faction in the south. In part this circumstance was accidental. Both OUN parties had planned to send organizing groups into all areas of the Ukraine. The Mel'nyk group destined for the south, however, was evidently weakened intentionally to permit a concentration on the northern area, where historical tradition and experience in the revolutionary period led the older men to expect greater success.[37] For the most part, the Bandera groups in the north were wiped out by the SP, while their emissaries in the south got off to an early start and were well entrenched by the time the slower acting Mel'nyk group arrived there.[38] Although a certain amount of rivalry persisted in the largest city in each of the two main areas—Kiev and Dniepropetrovsk—after the Mel'nyk group was also proscribed by the Germans, there was for the most part a tacit acceptance of the territorial division of activity which had developed in the early months.[39]

This circumstance renders the investigation of the southern region more difficult. While the Bandera followers have been active since the war in describing their exploits, the fact that at no time, even in the early months, could they engage in large-scale open activities makes it difficult to check their accounts with contemporary journalistic reports. For example, German police reports state that in early October, 1941, a group of fifteen West Ukrainians, all or most of whom were Bandera adherents, tried to secure control of the administration and newspaper in

1 [Northern part of the steppe industrial area -- Analyst]

[37] Interview 61.

[38] The headquarters of the Bandera group remained in Kiev, where Myron, the director of its work in the entire East Ukraine, resided until he was killed (evidently by a German police agent) in the summer of 1942; after that OUN-B headquarters were in Dniepropetrovsk.

[39] Interview 1.

668* member actually joined the Natsional'no-Trudovoi Soiuz (NTS—
727 National Workers' Union), the Russian counterpart to the OUN. When the OUN parties, including a relatively important Mel'nyk group which was especially active in educational circles, continued their work underground, they were able to gain or regain some support, partly as a reaction to the lengths to which the Russophile element, especially the Autonomous Church, went, and partly also because of an increasing moderation in their own ideology.[44]

● 186 No simple conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of these complex situations. The picture is further complicated by a tendency, illustrated in a number of instances, for Russians living in the Ukraine to accept a moderate Ukrainian nationalist position when not exposed to the pressure of an extreme Nationalist and strongly anti-Russian ideology. One strong adherent of the Ukrainian ethnic nationalist position was much impressed on finding in Novomirgorod (Novomyrhorod), near Kirovograd, a young teacher and his wife who both felt themselves to be Ukrainian, although born in Russia, and who "hated the Bolsheviks just as much as we do."[45] In another small town in the area (Novo Ukrainka) a nationalist organizer found most of the teachers to be "still under the influence of Communist ideology," which probably meant among other things that they did not consider the "purity" of Ukrainian culture of the greatest importance.[46] There seems to have been a fairly widespread tendency on the part of many Ukrainians and of many Russians living in the Ukraine, to reject any ethnic national creed in favor of some ideology based on territorial identity. It would not do to overemphasize this factor, however, for there was considerable support, especially in the northwestern area around the see of Kirovograd, for the Autocephalous Church,[47] which stressed the Ukrainian language, and isolated smaller places like Pavlograd were real centers of devotion to all things Ukrainian. Even such

[44] Interview 1.
[45] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 2, 1942, p. 3.
[46] Matla, p. 28.
[47] On the question of language to be used in church service, cf. Chapter VIII.

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a large center as Dnieprodzerzhinsk had a nationalist mayor and a nationalist editor.[48]

The extreme south, the coastal strip along the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, from Odessa to Osipenko (Berdianka), had had a still shorter history of settlement than the area immediately to the north. Best suited of all Ukrainian lands to large-scale wheat farming with a small agricultural working force, it had a relatively sparse rural population, very mixed ethnically, with many German villages and some districts of Russian majority. The cities were still more heterogeneous, with Ukrainians forming a small minority in the larger ones, according to the census of 1926.

The study of conditions in this area is seriously hampered by the fact that the western third fell to Rumanian-occupied Transnistria. To prepare the way for the annexation of Transnistria, and, in addition, to gratify the desire of high officials for loot and profiteering, the Rumanians sent in a large number of their own administrators.[49] Since the rather backward Moldavians comprised only a small proportion of the total population, one of the Slavic elements had to be tolerated. Believing that German victory would lead eventually to the creation of an independent Ukraine, which would inevitably demand the land west of the Dniester as an irredenta, the Rumanians favored the Russians; the position of Russian nationalist elements in Odessa resembled that of the Mel'nyk group in Kiev and Zhitomir before their suppression by the Germans. Russian was an official language, along with Rumanian and German; a Russian theater was opened; several Russian publications were started.[50] The guiding organization of the Russians was a group called the Union of Russian Officers, which had the St. George cross as its emblem and evidently was strongly tsarist in its ideology.[51] It is said to have maintained contacts with émigré groups in Serbia and elsewhere and to have refused cooperation with the Vlasov movement.[52] At any

[48] Interview 10; *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, June 14, 1942, p. 7.

[49] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, February 7, 1943, p. 1, based on a Zentraleuropa agency report.

[50] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 17, 1943, p. 3; Interview 18; Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 122.

[51] Clandestine publication from Odessa region previously cited.

[52] *Ibid.*; Interview 18.

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work directed by Eugene Stakhiv did what it could to encourage national tendencies among the local Ukrainians.[70]

The city of Mariupol' was an outstanding exception to the conditions prevailing throughout most of the area. While Mariupol' was administratively part of the Donbas, lying in the Stalino *oblast,* it is over fifty miles from the Donets basin itself, on the shore of the Sea of Azov. Like the other cities of the Donbas, however, it had grown enormously, more than tripling in size between the two Soviet censuses. Even after the losses of war, its population numbered 178,358, placing it not far below the largest Ukrainian metropolises.[71] What is remarkable for a city in the Donbas, or indeed in the whole southern area, is that it was under full Ukrainian control. Its well-developed Prosvita society and Ukrainian educational system have already been mentioned. The Orthodox Church is said to have been active and oriented toward Ukrainian nationalism, although here as elsewhere in the far south Protestants and dissident Orthodox sects played an important role.[72] In addition, the mayor was outspokenly nationalist, encouraging the formation of a Ukrainian military force.[73] Probably the guiding spirit in the nationalist development in the city, however, was Nicholas Stasiuk, minister of supply under the Rada in 1918, who had managed to survive the Soviet period by working as a park attendant.[74] He took over the editorship of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* which, although restricted by the paper shortage especially acute in the treeless south, was the second most influential Ukrainian paper on the "Left Bank" (next to *Nova Ukraïna*). While necessarily cautious, its tone was strongly nationalist. Moreover, in addition to Stasiuk, there were a number of nationalist journalists to aid in carrying on the newspaper's work. Stasiuk himself is said not only to have carried on this legal pronationalist activity, but to have assisted the OUN-B underground which made its area base in the city.[75]

[70] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 50; Interview 66.
[71] *L'vivs'ki Visti,* August 27, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 24, 1942, p. 2.
[72] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 3, 1942, p. 2.
[73] Cf. Chapter VII.
[74] Interview 66; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 7, 1942, p. 2.
[75] Ie. Stakhiv, pp. 52–54; Interview 66. The nationalist tone of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* is apparent from the considerable number of its articles reprinted in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

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newspaper and that the only Ukrainian activities were cultural and educational.[78] 668*

The Kuban', the large and fertile region to the northwest of the Caucasus, undoubtedly has a larger Ukrainian ethnic component, but its distinct historical development—the area was settled by groups of the Cossack type recruited by the tsars to further expansion against the Moslem tribes—had apparently led to a different ethnic affiliation. During the war period the area was occupied only a short time by the Germans. In this period, five newspapers were founded in the principal cities, all in Russian.[79] That this may not be an indication of Russian predominance is suggested by a German official concerned with the area during the war who says that the army censorship authority was in the hands of an extremely pro-Russian Balt.[80] At any rate, there is practically no evidence of Ukrainian activity.[81]

Ethnic nationalist feeling—which included support of the OUN-M, large-scale development of Prosvita, Ukrainian cultural activities, Ukrainian newspapers, emphasizing national history, and above all a tendency to condemn and discriminate against all non-Ukrainian elements—was most prevalent in the old northern centers of Ukrainian life, especially in the northwest. In these areas the historic struggle against Polish overlords, the difficult position of the rising Ukrainian intelligentsia because of the predominance of Jews, Russians and Poles in the towns, the contrasting strength of Ukrainian popular culture in the village, appear to have led to bitterness or at least to a strong feeling of ethnocentrism among the nationalist intellectuals. 668* 186

The south, on the other hand, had long been recognized as less

[78] For a description of Ukrainian cultural, educational, and religious activity in Simferopol' see Iaroslav Savka in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 18, 1942, p. 4.

[79] They are listed in *Nastup*, January 10, 1943, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 14, 1943, p. 2, also lists the paper in Krasnodar', the capital, as Russian, and says the Russian language also predominated in the theater.

[80] Interview 33.

[81] The Krasnodar' paper (*Kuban'*) published an article by "A. Kuban'skii" on December 20, 1942, telling of the Ukrainian cultural revival in the early days of the Soviet regime (*Nastup*, February 20, 1943, p. 4). There were also a few OUN organizers in the area, probably with German units.

668* Ukrainian by all who were familiar with the country. Yet, while
186 the manifestations of Ukrainian cultural activity were sparser and the influence of the OUN groups much less, there seems to have been a fairly strong tendency for a large portion of the inhabitants, of whatever ethnic origin, to accept the Ukraine as their motherland because they lived in it and were attached to it. Moreover, if earlier experiences of the nationalist movements are a trustworthy guide, this feeling represented a change from the conditions of the "South Russia" and "New Russia" of imperial days. Hence there is strong ground for suggesting that territorial patriotism has grown under the Soviet regime. The significance of this observation, and other evidence which supports it, must be treated in a larger context in the concluding chapter.

One knows that the movement of ideas aiming at the abolition of servitude began to appear in the higher layers of society at the epoch of the Napoleonic War. Quite naturally it appeared together with an interest for everything popular and was, at the same time, inspired by the ideas fashionable in the West: on the one hand encyclopædism and voltairianism and on the other freemasonry and carbonarism. It could not fail to spread in the Ukraine, as elsewhere. 668 186

Thus a secret society, the 'United Slavs,' was formed, among whose members were not only Ukrainian officers and officials, but also actual Great Russians. A naïve romanticism reigned—oaths were sworn on swords and speeches made in the style of Plutarch, associated with a passionate love of popular traditions and with the desire to lighten the destiny of the peasant masses under the burden of servitude. Following the example of the romantic revolutionaries of the West, the young conspirators dreamed of the epochs of the past and of the Cossack epics, the heroes of which appeared to them as champions of liberty. Kotliarevsky himself, without belonging to the 'United Slavs,' was intimately connected with masonic circles, and his amazing pamphlet, *Travesty of Aeneid*, already denounced the social weaknesses and injustices of the epoch.

Conforming to the ideas of romantic and revolutionary nationalism, the 'United Slavs' aimed at a republican and democratic federation of all the Slavs. Their pro-Ukrainianism represented only a link in the Pan-Slav revolutionary chain, and it was diametrically opposed to a rupture between the Ukraine and Great Russia. One of the principal chiefs of the Ukrainian movement, Gorbatchevsky, wrote in his memoirs, in Russian, that the success of the insurrection 'might have signified a new era in the history of the Russian people.'

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 The society of the 'United Slavs' was only one
186 expression of the great liberating movement, and its failure was the logical consequence of the suppression of the Decembrist insurrection at St. Petersburg on 14 December 1825, which gave it its name.

This failure checked for a long time the attempts of political revolt in the whole of Russia. Nevertheless the intellectual movement continued, always inspired by the same sources and the same ideals.

538 The genius of Chevtchenko determined the path which the whole Ukrainian literature was to follow. It clung especially to the description of popular life, of the peasant life with its sadness and its injustices. Deeply steeped in folk-lore, it was especially inspired by the pity of the disinherited, by this social pity which is a feature of its affinity with the great Russian literature. In the writings of Marko Vovtchok (pen-name of Marie Vilinska Markovitch) in the *Popular Tales*, approved by Chevtchenko himself, we find again the touching picture of the peasant miseries. Later, in Galicia, Franko, Martovitch, and Stefanik give some pretty examples of this literature, more social than national. Parallel to this, in Russian Ukraine, this tradition was pursued until the revolution by Kotsiubinsky, Tobilevitch, and, above all, by Lessia Oukrainka, the niece of Michael Dragomanov, to whom we will presently return.

536 The Ukrainian Theatre experienced a remarkable
545 development towards the end of the nineteenth century. We have already considered the taste of the Ukrainian people for dramatic art, a taste which had already found expression in the old marionette plays. The rise of the new Ukrainian literature could not fail to bring about the development of a modern theatre. As a result a troupe of Ukrainian actors, that of Kropivnitzky, was formed at Kiev and had a great success. The Imperial

An important group of Ukrainian politicians,[1] who had formerly supported Petlioura, joined the Bolshevik cause after his defeat. The Soviet Government inaugurated a policy of Ukrainization from the beginning in order to satisfy their ambitions and to show the world their nationalistic Liberalism. But, as under Petlioura, it was a superficial one and never penetrated in fact either into the private life of the citizens or into the sphere of education, or even into the administration. /186 /191 /177

Although Ukrainian had become the official language, nobody used it and correspondence between official institutions continued, with rare exceptions, in Russian. One of the authors of this book, who held an administrative post in a Soviet enterprise in the Ukraine from 1921 to 1924, had never written a single word in Ukrainian and had never been prosecuted for this defection. It is not because the word 'Odessa' is now written with one 's' instead of two and the word '*plochtchad*' (in Russian a town square) is to-day replaced by the word '*maidan*,' that the Ukraine has ceased to be Russia.

The policy of Ukrainization continued without great changes and in spite of the lack of common sense until 1927, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party suddenly decided to introduce the Russian language as the second official language. One can explain this sudden change by the development of separatist anti-Soviet propaganda, undertaken by secret organizations, formed under the protection of Poland. There occurred in the Ukraine the first wave of purification which was directed against the 'Nationalistic Chauvinists,' accused of spiritual connection with Galician 'counter-revolutionary' elements, which had been affected by the propaganda of Polish 'Fascists.' /661

The people's commissar for education of the Ukraine,

[1] [i.e. in 1923 --- Analyst]

661 Choumsky, and a group of his friends had opposed this policy of the Central Government. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine accused Choumsky himself of 'spiritual connection' with the counter-revolutionaries of the Polish Ukraine and especially with the U.N.D.O., the most important among the Ukrainian political parties in Galicia and working under Polish influence. At that period one still didn't shoot Soviet Ministers. But Choumsky was forced to leave the Ukraine and to accept a small administrative post in Moscow.

•186 177 To regain the initiative in the Ukrainian question, the Executive Committee of the Comintern passed a resolution in November 1927 directing the Communist Party in the Polish Ukraine to struggle resolutely for the separation of this country from Poland and for its re-inclusion in the Soviet Ukraine.

On the other hand the inauguration of the first five-year plan, which strengthened the economic ties between the Ukraine and the rest of the Soviet Union, and the creation of the Red Army on a basis of discipline and of modern military science, made the use of Russian necessary throughout the whole Soviet territory.

669 This pro-Russian tendency did not last long. The forced collectivization of the land, undertaken in execution of the five-year plan, turned the Ukrainian peasantry against the Soviet Government. This resistance soon changed into a kind of civil war and became underlined by hundreds of thousands of deportations, by thousands of executions, and by a terrible famine.[1]

The resistance to collectivization, which was incompatible with the spirit and the vital interests of the

[1] See the work of Calvin B. Hoover: *Economic Life in Soviet Russia*, M.R.S., Paris, 1934, in which many pages are given to the question of collectivization.

7:Sregy & Oboiensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

peasant proprietors, was so violent and seemed so 669
justified that it carried certain Communist circles of peasant extraction with it, and especially the former *borot'bistes* (Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries of the left) who had accepted the Soviet programme in 1917. A new and violent purification followed.

Fearing a connection between the discontent of the 186
peasants, the opposition within the party, and the 661
nationalist movement supported from abroad, the Soviet Government took Ukrainianism under its control in order to prevent its use by the opponents of collectivization as a weapon against the Soviet regime. This time Ukrainization was pushed to the extreme and was maintained by the huge apparatus of repression. In all the enterprises, and in workers' syndicates, special cells were formed for the propaganda of the Ukrainian language and for the rigorous control of the knowledge of Ukrainian, which had become the obligatory language, established by the officials. The number of Ukrainian teachers was increased, new Ukrainian theatres, clubs, and libraries were created in industrial centres. Russian newspapers were almost completely suppressed. Those who resisted Ukrainization were mercilessly expelled from the administration and everything was put under the direct control of a special commission of the Council of People's Commissars. To all the countless suppressions to which the Soviet citizens were subjected that of the Ukrainization was added.

The attempt to snatch Ukrainianism from the hands of circles socially opposed to the Soviet regime was not successful. A veritable nationalistic anti-Soviet propaganda spread everywhere, supported by the officials of the regime. Then came the second change of policy. 661
Two trials, one of the 'Union for the Deliverance of the Ukraine' and the other of the 'National Centre'

that it was in the interest of Prussia to help the Ukrainian people 175
to cast off the chains of Muscovite slavery. During the Great French 648
Revolution the person of Napoleon was very popular in Ukraine. Ukrainian patriots were pleased by the victories of the French Emperor, and hoped that, after the defeat of Russia in a war with France, the time for the liberation of Ukraine would come, and the odious serfdom would be abolished. But Napoleon had no understanding of the Ukrainian problem. He planned the creation of two states 'Napoléonides' in Ukraine under his protectorate . . .*)

Ukrainian history has gone its own way, different from that of Russia. This has created the peculiar national character of the Ukrainians.

The foreigners who had visited Ukraine in the 17th and 18th 175
centuries pointed out the higher level of civilisation among the 181
Ukrainians in comparison with the Russians, and the highly deve- 517
loped feeling of personal dignity of the Ukrainian people. This love of freedom of the Ukrainian people appeared also in the fight against Tsarist absolutism in Russia, where revolutionaries of Ukrainian origin occupied the first places, Zhelyabov, Kybalchych, Konashevych, Osynsky, Kravchynsky (Stepnyak), Popko, and many other members of the party '*Narodnaya Volya*'.

In the 19th century, under the influence of the ideas of that time (the Great French Revolution, romanticism) the regeneration of the so-called unhistorical pepoples (Serbians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Baltic peoples) began; in the beginning it was the interest for the language and history of the peoples among the educated classes, and the attempt to write in the 'common people's' language. In Ukraine the regeneration of the popular literary language began [538] with the publication of the satirical poem of Ivan Kotlyarevsky *Aeneid:* 1798. In this poem the author underlines his dislike of serfdom and the lords

> "who did not give the people freedom
> and treated them like cattle."

Democratic ideas were widespread in Ukraine; the representatives 175
of the Ukrainian educated classes took an active part in the 186
revolutionary organisations directed towards the fall of the Tsarist régime (the uprising of the 'Decabrists', 1825—26, was most active in Ukraine, near Kiev).

In 1846 a Ukrainian political organisation, *The Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius,* was founded in Kiev. Many prominent representatives of Ukrainian culture like Taras Shevchenko (the

*) *Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes:* Paris 1922.

175 greatest Ukrainian poet), Mykola Kostomarov, historian, Panteleimon Kulish, historian and poet, Mykola Hulak, and others, took part in this organisation.
186

In the declarations of this society the idea of an independent Ukrainian democratic republic was promulgated: "And Ukraine will resurrect from her grave ... And Ukraine will be an independent republic" *(The Books of the Being of the Ukrainian Nation,* the work of the Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius).

The Russian Government punished the members of this society severely and acted rigorously against Ukrainian political and cultural regeneration.

[191] In 1863 the Russian Minister Valuyev declared that "the Ukrainian language did not exist, does not exist and cannot exist." In 1876, by a secret order of the Tsar, the printing and circulation of Ukrainian books, periodicals etc. in the Russian Empire was prohibited. Even the Bible in Ukrainian was forbidden. Ukrainian could not be tought in schools. The Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire was forbidden until 1905. Only the revolution of 1917 made the introduction of Ukrainian in schools possible. This prohibition of the living language of a considerable nation, the instrument of its culture, had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people and is a feature absolutely unique in universal history.

[871] The prohibition of the Ukrainian language in the schools and in the press hindered the development of education in Ukraine. The statistics show that the number of schools and the level of education in Ukraine were higher in the 18th century than in the 19th*). On the other hand, the Russian schools separated the educated classes of the Ukrainian nation from their nationality, and put the intelligentsia of Ukrainian origin into the service of Russian culture. Thus, besides the economic exploitation to the advantage of the Russian Empire, Ukraine was deprived of her best intellectual forces which were drowned in the 'Russian Sea'. We can quote here only some names of prominent Ukrainians who, by virtue of circumstances, helped to create the Russian civilisation, and gave their talents for the increase of the Russian Empire: Archbishop Theophan Prokopovych, the deputy of the Patriarch of Moscow Stephan Javorsky, Bishop Dmytro Rostovsky — were prominent Ukrainian scholars of the time of Tsar Peter I. who were forced
175
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*) Thus there were in 1748 in four regiments (Ukraine had a military Cossack administration) of the Hetmanate (for three regiments the figures are missing) 866 elementary schools, i. e., one school for 1000 inhabitants. From this, little or almost nothing remained in the 19th century.

to leave Ukraine and to serve the Muscovite State. The Ukrainian, 175
Prince Alexander Bezborodko, directed for many years Russian 517
foreign policy in the time of Catherine II. (1762—1796) and of Paul I., who is known, however, to have disliked Russia and to have dreamt of a free Ukraine. The greatest talents of modern Russian literature, Gogol and Dostoyevsky, were of Ukrainian origin; Gogol did not master Russian exactly until the end of his life, it was strange to him. Far-famed scholars — Maxim Kovalevsky, sociologist; the philosophers Lesevich and Yurkevich, Vladimir Vernadsky, geologist, the famous painter Ilya Repin, — were Ukrainians of whom Russian culture is proud.

The Ukrainians in the provinces of Austria, Galicia and Bukovina had lost their educated classes under the rule of the Poles and 175 186 [668] Turks. Here, as well as in the Ukrainian territory to the West of the Carpathian Mountains, Carpatho-Ukraine, which was under Hungarian rule, the Ukrainians were principally peasants; the cities were mostly not-Ukrainian. During the 'Spring of the Peoples' in 1848 the Ukrainian national movement in Austria and Hungary also appeared. In Galicia the Ruthenian Supreme Council — a political representative of the Ukrainians in Austria — was created. At the elections for the Austrian Parliament the Ukrainians secured a considerable number of mandates. The national rebirth began also in the Ukrainian territory on the western side of the Carpathian Mountains. But the reaction which occured in Austria hindered the Ukrainian national development. The Vienna Government put the Ukrainians in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine under Polish and Hungarian rule respectively in order to make the Poles and Hungarians loyal towards Austria. This enabled the Poles and Hungarians to conduct a policy of denationalisation against the Ukrainians. Only at the end of the 19th century, in spite of great hindrances on the part of the Poles, a Ukrainian political and cultural life developed in Galicia. In connection with this, [517] Ukrainian science and literature, prohibited in Kiev, Kharkov, and [814] Odessa, found a home in Galicia (Lviw), and Bukovina (Chernivtsi). Ukrainians from Tsarist Ukraine published here their periodicals and books; here, under the direction of the famous Kievan historian Michael Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian Shevchenko Scientific Society developed. It was by its energy a real Ukrainian Academy of Science.

Gradually the Ukrainians in Austria were overcoming the obstacles created by the ruling class of the Polish nobility, and secured new mandates in the Austrian Parliament and the Galician Diet.

186 The development of Ukrainian political and cultural life in
665 Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians condemned to ruthless Russification under Tsarist rule. When the first modern Ukrainian political organisation in Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, was founded in 1900 (from 1905 this party was named Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party) its first publication *Independent Ukraine* was printed in Austria, in Bukovina.

186 The Ukrainian patriots under Tsarist Russian Government,
668 morally and materially supported the fight of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights; these territories were a Ukrainian Piedmont. For not even the revolution of 1905 gave the Ukrainians in Russia their national rights. Of course, the Ukrainians had their deputies in the Russian 'Duma' who demanded autonomy for Ukraine. But the Ukrainian language was not admitted in the schools, the rights of the Ukrainian press were restricted, and active Ukrainians were persecuted by the Russian authorities. Among the Ukrainians in Russia the fight of the Austrian Ukrainians for the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviw roused great interest. The Russian Government regarded the creation of a Ukrainian University in Galicia as a great danger for the 'indivisible Russia' and sought an agreement with the Polish nationalists in Galicia against the Ukrainian movement. The Russian nationalists regarded the opening of a Ukrainian University in Lviw as a 'casus belli' for Russia against Austria.

668 The Russian Government closely watched the Ukrainian move-
661 ment in Austria and was much alarmed by its successes. In consequence, the Petersburg Government prepared to annex Galicia and Bukovina long before the war of 1914, in order to wipe out 'Mazeppism'. When, in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, a Ukrainian delegation visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to protest against the new prohibition of the Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire, the Minister replied cynically:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once for all . . .".

727 The suppression of the Ukrainian movement was one of the main
661 aims of Tsarist Russian policy in World War I. The occupation of Galicia and Bukovina by the Russian armies in 1914-1917 brought heavy damage to the Ukrainian movement; the Ukrainian schools, press, co-operative societies, scientific and educational institutions
727 were destroyed. Thousands of Ukrainians, Austrian citizens, were
659 deported to Siberia. In the occupied territories a ruthless Russifica-
661 tion was started, and in Galicia the forced conversion of the Greek-

669 indignation was caused by the bloody Communist terror that took thousands of innocent people as its victims. The war of Soviet Russia against Ukraine and the terror by the Russian 'Red Guards' in Ukraine, still strengthened among the Ukrainians the will to fight for their national independence. This was expressed in an essay by the President of the Ukrainian Central Council, Professor Hrushevsky, the most authoritative personality of Ukrainian political life of that time. Hrushevsky wrote:

"The first matter I have to lay stress on is that from now, in our relations with Moscow, a radical change has taken place. It is vain to look for a possibility of living with the Russians in the boundaries of one state. We had sincerely believed that in a new Russia the Ukrainian nation could find the necessary conditions for its manifold development. Now we have lost this belief. We have convinced ourselves that our ways differ from those of a reactionary or a revolutionary Russia. After the unprecedented barbaric atrocities of the Russian Bolsheviks against the Ukrainian people, after the cruel shelling of the Ukrainian capital by the Soviet Russian troops, in our relations with Russia a new period begins. Ukraine has to continue her struggle for liberation in order to create an independent state. Our social and political ideals must be based not on the examples of oriental despotism, but on the principles of the life and development of civilised Europe, where, before all, human dignity is valued. Ukraine has always stood in her history culturally and politically nearer to Western Europe. If we want to liberate ourselves from foreign violence, we have to conform to the civilised West" (*On the Threshold of New Ukraine:* Kiev, 1918).

8. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

728 The Soviet Russian Government had by its ruthless propaganda for an immediate peace treaty definitely disorganised the front against the Central Powers. Thus the representatives of the Ukrainian Government took part in the peace negotiations with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk. The diplomats of the Central Powers gave the Ukrainian Government in the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegates various facilities in order to secure a 'grain treaty' with Ukraine. For the food situation of the Central Powers at that time was fatal. The peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers was concluded in Brest-Litovsk on February 9, 1918. As at that time a great part of Ukraine was occupied by the Soviet Russian troops, it was in the interest of the Central Powers to interrupt the export of grain to Russia, and to use the food

669 December 12, 1918, a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as [661] against 'Russian followers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parliament and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian 668 National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians ● 186 in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the 642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

tories that had been formerly under Russian and Austrian rule. 182
The Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic issued a 642
special Act on January 22, 1919, in Kiev which declared:

"From this day, the parts of Ukraine — the Western-Ukrainian Democratic Republic, Galicia, Bukovina and Hungarian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) and the Great Ukraine on the Dnieper, unite. The ancient hopes which the best sons of Ukraine had lived and died for become reality. From now there is one indivisible independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic".

Relying on this Act, the delegation from Western Ukraine, numbering 65 people, took part in the Congress of Ukraine which had been called to Kiev on January 23, 1919.

The Western-Ukrainian Republic, from the first days of its [726]
existence, had to fight in a heavy struggle against the Poles who 728
pretended to rule in Galicia even after the dissolution of Austria. The Poles invaded the Western Ukrainian Republic after having concentrated large forces on this front. The Ukrainian Government asked the Entente Powers and the Paris Peace Conference for mediation in the Polish-Ukrainian war. In February 1919, a Mission of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia headed by the French General Berthélemy, and with the participation of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy. This Mission presented to the Poles and Ukrainians a plan for an armistice on February 28, 1919. According to this plan, until the final decision of the Peace Conference, the territory of Galicia eastwards of the Bug and Stryj Rivers should remain under Ukrainian administration, while the Western part of Galicia should be administered by the Polish authorities. The Galician territory which remained under Ukrainian administration should be recognised by the Big Powers 'de facto' as an independent state, and the Ukrainian Army should be recognised and trained with the assistance of the Entente Powers. The Ukrainian Government did not accept the demarcation line proposed by the Mission of General Berthélemy as unfavourable for Ukraine. In May 1919, a new Mission of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia, headed by General Botha (South Africa). General Botha's Mission altered the previous armistice draft, and the Ukrainian Government agreed to accept it. However, the Poles rejected this plan.

The small country — Ukrainian Galicia — had to strain all her 726
forces in order to hold the front against the whole might of Poland. From Eastern Ukraine Galicia could not receive any considerable help, because the Ukrainian forces had to fight the Skoropadsky

nian Communists who wished to create an independent Soviet Ukraine participated in these uprisings. The policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine had a clearly predatory character. The Communist Commissar Schlichter said of the tasks of the Soviet Russian campaign at a session of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919: 642 669

"You all remember that when Ukraine was becoming Soviet with every day of the advance of the Red Army we became easier in our minds; the rich-in-bread Ukraine is ours! . . . We have four central supply detachments. We set all hopes on them. We have a lot of workers we have sent out who will be able to overflow all Ukrainian villages. We shall always remember that the looks of the proletariat of Russia are turned towards Ukraine" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 2: Kharkov, 1928).

Not only by the ruthless pillage were the Ukrainian people put against the Russian Communist dictatorship; by its nationalist policy, too, it roused great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians. The Rumanian Communist Rakovsky, who was appointed by Moscow as Premier of the Soviet Government of Ukraine, declared that the Ukrainian language and culture were 'petty bourgeois' and that the use of the Ukrainian language in public institutions was necessary only for 'Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries'. [186] 656 191

For this reason the 'dictatorship of the Russian culture' was introduced in Ukraine by the Russian Communists as a 'proletarian' one. "The Soviet Government in Ukraine in 1918 made in fact Russian the official language", — writes the Communist N. Popov in his *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine* (1929). Against the declarations of an 'independent Soviet Ukraine', the Rakovsky Government proclaimed the 'federation' of Ukraine with Russia. There could not be free elections to the Soviets in Ukraine. The power in the villages was given to the 'Comittees of Poor Peasants' consisting often of people sent from Russia. According to the instruction these Comittees were given they had the duty — "to fulfil precisely and relentlessly all orders of the supply authorities . . ."

13. Risings in Ukraine

In spring 1919, when the Soviet Army had reached the Dniester River, Moscow prepared its forces for the support of Soviet Hungary. But at that time the same troops who had fought against the Franco-Greek forces under the command of Hrihoriev, Tyutyunnyk and others, started the fight against the Russian Communists. Of the strength of this movement Rakovsky, Premier of 669

people took place. The Ukrainian Government and Army were 669
forced under the pressure of Denikin to leave the temporary capital of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, the city of Kamenets in Podolia, on November 15, 1919. The Ukrainian Army marched into the hinterland of the enemy. The enormous partisan movement in Ukraine in autumn 1919, stopped Denikin's offensive on Moscow. Of this the Russian Red Army took advantage, broke through the front of Denikin and marched into Ukraine again. The front of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, brought into disorder by the war with Denikin, could not be restored at once, and the Soviet Russian troops seized almost the entire territory of Ukraine again.

When the leaders of the Russian Volunteers saw the coming of their definite defeat, they offered the command of the Ukrainian Army which was carrying on a partisan war against the oppressors of Ukraine, an alliance against the Russian Communists. The delegate of the Russian Volunteer Army, Colonel Popov, wrote in January, 1920, to the Ukrainian Supreme Command: "We have what you want — arms, but you have that we have not — the confidence of the population". The Ukrainians declined this offer of the Russian 'Whites' convinced that any alliance with them would bring only damage to the Ukrainian struggle for liberation.

The Army of the Ukrainian Republic began its 'Winter-Campaign', famous in the history of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, in Lubar in Volhynia on December 6, 1919. This army, by order of its Government, made partisan war on the territories of Ukraine against 'White' and 'Red' Russia until May 5, 1920. Only leaning upon the confidence and the active support of the population could this army cover distances of thousands of miles carrying the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of equipment did not allow the Army of the 'Winter Campaign' to accept in its ranks many thousands of Ukrainians who wished to fight actively for the independent Ukraine.

16. The New Tactics of the Russian Communists in Ukraine

The failure of the Soviet Russian policy in Ukraine in 1919 656
caused much discussion among the Communists themselves. By 182●
order from Moscow, in October 1919, not only the 'Government of 668
Soviet Ukraine', headed by Rakovsky, was abolished, but also the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Among the Communists who had worked in Ukraine in 1919 a group of the so-called federalists appeared that demanded from Moscow more rights for Ukraine. The leader of this group,

656 G. Lapchinsky, explained that Ukraine must be an independent state and not a Russian colony.

●186 The powerful Ukrainian movement forced the Russian Com-
668 munists to alter for a certain time their tactics in Ukraine. The Soviet Russian Government ordered the Communists to pay attention to the national peculiarities of Ukraine. In December 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution on the recognition by Russia of the independent Soviet Ukraine. Among other matters this resolution states that the "members of the Communist Party in Ukrainian territory are obliged to realise the right of the working masses of learning their mother language in schools, and speaking it in all Soviet institutions".

The resolution recommends the restriction of the requisition of food from the Ukrainian peasants. Besides, this resolution of the Russian CP pointed out that the principal task of Soviet construction in Ukraine was the requisition of arms from the population.

The President of the Soviet Russian Government, Lenin, wrote in *The Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victory over Denikin* on January 4, 1920:

"The independence of Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party. Only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can decide the question on their Soviet Congress — whether Ukraine should be united with Russia or left an independent Republic . . . We want a voluntary union of nations, a union that would not permit violence of one nation against another".

All these declarations of the Russian Communist Party leaders had the aim to lull the vigilance of the masses of the Ukrainian people. In reality the Soviet Russian Government did not even intend to change its imperialist course against Ukraine. Moscow feared the armed Ukrainian people and distrusted them. Therefore, for instance, a conference of the members of the Russian Communist Party in Homel passed the following resolution in October 1919:

"The advance to the South and the organisation of Soviet administration in Ukraine are possible only with the aid of regular disciplined troops, who, in any case, must not be of local origin" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 6: Kharkov, 1926, p. 4).

669 The Soviet Russian troops, after having seized the Ukrainian
661 territory until the spring of 1920, began at once the struggle against

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER III

UKRAINE UNDER SOVIET RUSSIAN RULE SINCE 1920

1. The Soviet Régime in Ukraine 1920—21

[656] After the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and Lenin's letter to the Ukrainian workers and peasants announcing a new approach to the Ukrainian problem (December 1919; January 1920) the policy of Moscow towards Ukraine did not change in substance. Soviet Russia did not trust even the Communists of Ukrainian nationality or those Russian Communists who wished to meet the Ukrainian national demands even partly. The group of Communists-Federalists headed by G. Lapchinsky published in February 1920, a pamphlet entitled *Project of a Resolution on the Party Policy.* The authors of this pamphlet protested against the rule of the Russian element in Ukraine. They wrote on the "mad, and, for the cause of the revolution, disastrous plan of the occupation of Ukraine by the military and political forces of Soviet Russia. After the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation in the times of the Romanovs and Hapsburgs, every attempt to direct the fate of the country from outside will arouse the growth of nationalism".

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[665] In the pamphlet, facts on the full dependence of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Central Committee of the Russian CP are quoted: thus the Communist organisation in Ukraine — "had to fulfil all demands of the Central Committee of the Russian CP, even, if it regarded them injurious to the cause of the revolution in Ukraine".

656 Moscow deported the opposing Communists from Ukraine or expelled them from the Party. The Soviet Russian régime in Ukraine thereto was strengthened. For this purpose Moscow gave preponderance to the Russian element in the Soviet administration in Ukraine. For instance, the election system for the 4th Congress of the Soviets in Ukraine in 1920 was the following: from 1000 soldiers of the Red Army one deputy was elected, from 10,000 workers one deputy, and one deputy from 50,000 peasants. It should be remembered that 1920 in the ranks of the Red Army in Ukraine

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731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
656 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

●186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Congress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

is looked at by the majority of the Communist Party in Ukraine, 186
and here in Russia even more, as some sort of strategy, a diplomatic 668
game".

Rakovsky explained that, through the proclamation of the Soviet Union, Moscow had gained ten and twenty times more power in comparison with the previous state. Therefore Rakovsky demanded that the Government of the whole Union in Moscow should surrender 9/10 of its competence, and that this be transferred to the separate Soviet Republics. Together with the Commissar of the Interior of Soviet Ukraine of that time, Skypnyk, Rakovsky demanded that the relations between Ukraine and Russia should be these of a confederation.

Skrypnyk protested at the Congress of the Russian CP against the disregard of the national and cultural rights of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army that led to a forced Russification of Ukrainians. He regretted that Ukrainian schools were not allowed [162]
for the 7 millions of Ukrainians in the Russian Soviet Republic, outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Skrypnyk sharply criticised the nationalism of the Russian Communists in Ukraine who did not admit the Ukrainian language in public and Party institutions.

The Russian Communist N. Bukharin stated in a speech at the 12th Congress of the Party that the Communist organisation in Ukraine had a Russian-Jewish composition with a very small number of Ukrainians. And in the meantime, Bukharin said, — "in Ukraine there is a very strong national movement" (*Records of the 12th Congress of the Russian CP*).

However, the demands of those Communists who wished to re- 631
strict Russian centralism and enlarge the rights of the separate Soviet Republics did not attain a majority at the Congress of the Russian CP. In July 1923, the strictly centralist Constitution of the USSR was ratified. Besides the theoretical declaration of the equality of rights of nations and the 'right of separation' of the peoples from Russia this constitution actually concentrates all power in the hands of Moscow, so that the acts and orders of the 'All-Union Government' are valid even then if the separate Soviet Republics would protest against them.

The policy of Soviet Ukrainisation was limited mostly to those 186
institutions which had to deal with the peasants. But in the towns 665
and industrial centres the Russian Communists tried to prevent the admission of the Ukrainian language by every means. For this reason quarrels between Ukrainian and Russian Communists arose in the ranks of the Communist Party in Ukraine. Thus the Communist Alexander Shumsky, the Commissar of Education in

[In the year 1922 -- Analyst]

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine
687 the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 1/3 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres *(The Bolshevik of Ukraine,* No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the
517 Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. *Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan* (1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but 000
politically faithful to Moscow.

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also 661
by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of 651
forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though 243
terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists.

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet 661
Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the 665
CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others.

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion 687
from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commis- 186
sar of Education in Ukraine from 1027—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the

687 national problem and encouraged others to do likewise. In Moscow
● 186 Skrypnyk's theoretical works on the national problem were treated with distrust: for in the CP one is to believe that Lenin and Stalin have given unchangeable dogmas an orthodox Communist is not expected to discuss. In the meantime Skrypnyk in his speeches and articles summoned the Ukrainian Communists to a 'national construction not restricted by anything'. He pointed out that national consciousness should be developed among the masses of Ukrainian people, and that through the development of the national culture certain values should be given to the Ukrainian workers and peasants.

Skrypnyk described the practice of the Russian Communist Party in the national question in the following words:

"For the majority of our Party, Ukraine as a national element did not exist. There was only 'Little Russia', as a part of the indivisible Russia, something uncertain both in its relations with Russia and with regard to its territory and even its language" (Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches,* vol. I, p. 291; Kharkov 1932). Frequently, in the Congresses of the Communist Party, Skrypnyk demanded the organising of Ukrainian schools in the territories of the Russian Soviet Republic inhabited by Ukrainians. These views and demands of Skrypnyk Moscow recognised as 'nationalism', he himself was declared as an 'instrument of intervention'. In order to avoid being the principal figure in a new trial Skrypnyk thought it better to end this life by suicide. This happened on July 6, 1933, on the 10th anniversary of the ratification of the first constitution of the USSR, of which Skrypnyk was one of the co-editors.

661 Moscow's fears of the Communist opposition in Ukraine are
665 shown by the dimensions of the 'purge' which had been made among the Communists in Ukraine in 1933. During 1933, 35,5% of the members were expelled from the CP of Ukraine (*Communist:* 1, 2, 1934). In some regions, for instance in that of Kiev, half of the members were expelled from the Communist Party. Many Communist organisations in villages ceased to exist and were replaced by 'political detachments' sent from Russia. In the course of 10 months in 1933, in Ukraine, 237 secretaries of Rayon Committees of the Communist Party, 279 Presidents of Rayon Executive Committees, and 158 Presidents of Rayon Control Commissions were dismissed (*Izvestia:* Moscow 28, 11, 1933).

The purge in the public institutions of Ukraine was directed principally against the Ukrainians. The Communist Mykolenko,

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER IV

THE UKRAINIANS OUTSIDE SOVIET UKRAINE AFTER 1920

I. The Ukrainians in Poland

563 186 After the signing of the Treaty of Riga (1921) between Soviet Russia and Poland, about 6 million Ukrainians remained under Polish rule (Galicia, Volhynia, Polissia, Pidlyasha, Kholm Region). The case of Galicia as that of a former Austrian territory appeared from time to time in international policy. The members of the Ukrainian National Council of Galicia remaining in Western Europe demanded the right of free self-determination for this territory. In February 1921, the Council of the League of Nations stated in its resolution: "Galicia lies outside the borders of Poland", "Poland is only the actual occupant of Galicia". But this and other resolutions could not remove the Polish rule in Galicia. Poland did not care for the resolutions of the League of Nations. However, in order to appease foreign public opinion, the Polish Diet passed in September, 1922, a bill on the autonomy of the Counties into which Galicia had been divided in 1920, and a bill on the creation of a Ukrainian University. In November 1922, elections to the Polish Diet took place. The Ukrainians, having regard to the special situation of Galicia, did not take part in these elections. In other Ukrainian territories under Polish rule, particularly in Volhynia, the Ukrainian political parties attained at these elections a great victory.

On March 15, 1923, in a resolution of the Conference of the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan in Paris, the frontiers of the Riga Treaty between Poland and the USSR were recognised "with regard to the fact that Poland had admitted with respect to Eastern Galicia that the ethnographic situation demanded unconditionally an autonomous order".

563 661 But the Polish authorities had no intention to grant political autonomy to the Ukrainians. Even the rights of the Ukrainians for cultural development were narrowly restricted in Poland. Against the Ukrainians in Poland, a police régime was introduced. In 1920 there were in the Polish concentration camps many thousands

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under 162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation 423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the [517] Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Rus- 182 sian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist 631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

Attempts on a rising

661 were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.[1]

6. *The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East*

167 The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

668 Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrai-
● 185 nians, mostly farmers, were numbered. At that time a Ukrainian national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops, theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revolution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national, political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrainian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy. The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the develop-
[150] ment of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the
[170] development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrainians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow,* 1931, p. 33).

7. *The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars*

167 In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

[1] [During collectivization and famine in the Kuban region and the RSFSR 1932-33 -- Analyst]

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest: to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czechoslovakia met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrainian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Economic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrainian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrainian emigration developed.

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed a considerable activity.

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name of their enslaved brethren.

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western territories of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily *Svoboda*. The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton, Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will*. There are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools, from American and Canadian Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, farmers. The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about 1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest political organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Communist Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian

657 ing World War II, the Soviet Government abolished the Ukrainian
798 Greek-Catholic Church by force, against the will of the popula-
661 tion, and destroyed the hierarchy of this Church. The Ukrainian Greek Catholics who were in union with Rome were ordered to become subordinate to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow, who is backed by the Soviet Government.

000 The struggle of the Ukrainians against Russian imperialism did not cease after World War II. It is being conducted in various forms. In this struggle other peoples who are oppressed by Russia, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkestan, participate. Thus a common front of freedom-loving peoples against despotic Russia is being created.

656 In 1949, Moscow has permitted Ukraine to use an own flag and
186 an own different anthem. However, this cannot be regarded an ex-
661 tension of the rights of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. It seems to be more an attempt to bring the so-called satellite countries to the Ukrainian level.

Moscow is watching attentively every expression of Ukrainian political thought and national sentiment, and wants to have everything under its control. The Decade of Ukrainian Culture held in Moscow in July 1951, ended with rebukes and threats against the participants of the Decade, and a 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists whom Moscow imputes 'bourgeois nationalism'. Only the Russian Communists have beeen beyond any doubt as regards their 'internationalism'; there was no case that the manifestations of nationalism among the Russian Communists had been condemned by the Communist Party. On the contrary, Moscow is cultivating an exaggerated national pride among the Russian people. The Ukrainian Communists are under a especially heavy control of
[554] Moscow. No Ukrainian has been General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This position has always been occupied by people sent from Moscow: Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Khrushchev, finally Melnikov.

'Titoism' is no isolated phenomenon in the relations between imperialist Russia and Yugoslavia. Similar trends hostile to Russian imperialism have existed among Ukrainian Communists since the first days of Soviet Russian occupation in Ukraine. The Russian terrorism prevented these trends, however, from getting strong. Nevertheless, they exist clandestinely. Moscow's persecution of 'burgeois nationalism' among the Ukrainian Communists gives an eloquent proof of Ukrainian opposition against Russian imperalism.

8: Feden Ko H-4,5 (no date) 1951 RO1 Ukraine KO1

3. *The New Ukrainian Political Emigration*

In consequence of the occupation of all Ukrainian territories by the armies of Soviet Russia, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had to remain outside the borders of their fatherland. In the first years after the termination of the war, the Ukrainian emigrants lived in Displaced Persons' Camps in Germany and Austria. Now the Ukrainians can be seen in all European and American countries, in Australia and New Zealand. These are all people who, for national and political reasons, opposed repatriation into a Ukraine oppressed by the Communist Government. They declared repeatedly, when they were threatened with forced repatriation, that they would sooner commit suicide than fall into the hands of their oppressors. 167 186 668

The Ukrainian emigrants in Europe and America are developing a considerable political and cultural activity. The central institutions of the Ukrainian political parties are remaining in exile where their press is being published, the elementary, secondary and academic schools are being operated — the Ukrainian University in Munich, the Ukrainian Technical University in Germany, until 1945 in Bohemia, and others.

After World War II the Ukrainian émigrés have created more scientific institutions: The Scientific Shevchenko Society, a continuation of the identical Society which had existed in Lviw since 1874, and had been destroyed by the Communist régime, and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science. These Ukrainian Scientific Societies are working effectively and have their branches in Europe and in America. [815]

Under these circumstances, when in Ukraine enslaved by Soviet Russia, the Ukrainian political life is suppressed and cannot show itself freely, the Ukrainian emigrants think it their duty to speak in the name of their nation in the defence of its rights before civilised mankind. For this purpose the leaders of the Ukrainian parties created the Ukrainian National Council in July 1948, as the political representation of the Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainian National Council continues the tradition of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic which had been created through the will of the Ukrainian nation in 1918—1919. Many of the participants of the Ukrainian fight for liberation and many of the leaders of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic are still living. These men believe firmly that the time for the free state existence of the Ukrainian nation will come.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Ukraine were mostly of the 'seminarist' type and often of Ukrainian nationality, and hence of peasant descent. In the Ukraine the secular clergy were, if anything, more popular than the monastic.

(*b*) *Jews.*—Next in number to the Orthodox are the Jews. Records make it clear that since the seventeenth century the Ukraine has been the centre of the Jewish 'pogrom' movement, and is more anti-Semitic than any other East-European country. A Hebrew-Jewish scholar, Nathan of Zaslavl, has left a document[1] containing the record of terrible atrocities perpetrated by the Ukrainians and Cossacks on the Jews during the Cossacks' War against Poland. The 'pogroms' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may appear less cruel; but, though they were organized by the Russian secret police, it has been proved in the law-courts that the local population was quite ready to fall in with the suggestions of these agents.[2] The reasons for this hatred are partly economic—for the Jews are very successful middlemen between the Ukraine and other countries, and hence in possession of capital, which they lend at a high rate to the peasant—but are also racial, since the hatred between these two races is stronger than that between either Poles or Great Russians and the Jews. All the traditions of the steppe-country peasant are opposed to those of the Jewish townsman. This is shown by the facts that there is hardly any mixed Jewish-Ukrainian population, and that the Jews live chiefly in the towns and industrial settlements where Russians and Poles predominate. The Jews came to the Ukraine on the first wave of colonization from Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

According to data obtained in 1897, the percentage of the Jewish population in the Governments of the Ukraine was as follows: Volhynia, 13·2 per cent.; Podolia, 12·24 per cent.; Kiev, 12·09 per cent.; Kherson, 12 per cent.; Chernigov, 5 per cent.;

[1] *Jawein Mesula: a Chronicle of Events from 1648 to 1652.* First printed in Vienna, 1656.

[2] I. Luchitski, *Legal Speeches concerning the Jewish Pogroms*, Kiev, 1908 (in Russian).

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of Volhynia and Podolia conditions are better, and the peasants have larger holdings, though only 16 per cent. own above five *desyatines*; in Kharkov, 33 per cent. own above five *desyatines*. In no place do the Ukrainian peasants equal in land-ownership the German and Czech colonists. The average holding among the German colonists is from 10 to 12 *desyatines*, and they specialize in cattle-breeding. The Czechs are concentrated in south-western Volhynia (in the districts of Dubno, Rovno, and Lutsk); and their average holding is 13 *desyatines*. The peasants' holdings are in a striking contrast to the big estates. In the Kiev Government there are some 43 estates of above 5,000 *desyatines* each, mostly owned by the nobles (some of them descendants of the old independent dukes, *knaz*) of Russian, Polish, or German nationality.

About 10 per cent. of the inhabitants of the Governments of Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, Taurida, Kiev, and Chernigov are occupied in industries other than agricultural. Trade occupies between 6 and 7 per cent. of the population in the Governments of Kherson, Kiev, Podolia, and Taurida.

General Observations

Ukrainian Nationalism.—The feeling of nationality, as it exists to-day, dates from Chmielnicki's rising in 1648. The old history of Kiev-Russ is common to Great Russians, White Russians, and the Ukrainians (Little Russians), and has been continued after the Tatar invasions chiefly in Great Russia, while the Ukraine ever since has been subject to one of her neighbours. Since Chmielnicki's time, the Ukrainian nationality has made progress only in one direction, i.e. in producing a small but energetic *intelligentsia*, which does not consider itself Russian or Polish in addition to being Ukrainian, though it is obliged to seek its higher education in Russia, Poland, and other foreign countries. The national feeling of this class is

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186 565 different from that of the bulk of the peasants, whose local differences in dialects and customs are sufficiently great to obscure the idea of national unity understood by the *intelligentsia*. Not only has the Dnieper peasant no conception of a Ruthenian in Eastern Galicia, but he knows very little more about the Don or Kuban Ukrainian. But all these peasants, now as in the time of Chmielnicki, are conscious of their social and economic disabilities, and also of the fact that all the business and management of the country is in the hands of rich and educated foreigners.

Hence, the so-called feeling of nationality of the Ukrainian peasant is based on social unrest; and nationalist enthusiasm was aroused on that ground by the Rada and the Soviets of 1917, as it had been by Chmielnicki 250 years before. As soon as Chmielnicki's rising became political rather than social in aim, it failed, and even its foreign supporters did not save it. The same can be said about the nationalist movement of the Rada Directory of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia*. It went down before the Soviets because it was too political, while the Soviets are more intent upon social conditions.

The military strength of the Ukrainian nationalists is less now than it was in the time of Chmielnicki, since the strong military class of original Cossacks on which Chmielnicki relied either disappeared through successful Russian repressions or else amalgamated with the present Cossack community of the Don and the Kuban, which is only partly Ukrainian and has different political and social predilections. On the other hand, the rivalry between Russia, Austria, and the Poles, and the respective propaganda of the three rivals, have created among the *intelligentsia* of the Ukraine a feeling of self-confidence and a political programme that surpass Chmielnicki's and Mazeppa's dreams. In the struggle between Nationalist and Socialist interests, the bulk of the population has in the last three years given precedence to the latter; and it is still uncertain whether the peasants will care to support the

ideals of the *intelligentsia*, if the latter cannot provide them with the economic advantages to which they aspire. 186 565

The *Ukrainian territory* claimed by the propagandist literature, i.e. from San to Don, never formed a political unit, either independently or under the sway of any empire. It is a well-defined geographical unit with most favourable economic conditions, but the people living in these lands do not form a homogeneous nation of one linguistic, social, and cultural type. The essentially Ukrainian country lies on both sides of the Dnieper. In the Don and Kuban regions, the Ukrainian colonists were preceded by the Great-Russian colonists, in Eastern Galicia by the Poles. But it is true that during the time of the greatest Russian oppression Eastern Galicia played the part of Piedmont for the *intelligentsia* from the Russian Ukraine. The nine [162] Governments grouped by the Russian Administration into (1) South-west Territory (Podolia, Volhynia, and Kiev), (2) Malorossiya (Chernigov, Poltava, and Kharkov), and (3) Novorossiya (only Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav out of the five Governments of Novorossiya), have a population which is preponderantly Ukrainian in the rural districts; in the towns the Ukrainians are outnumbered by Jews, Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans, Italians, &c.

It is remarkable how small a part is played by the *intelligentsia* in industry and trade, in the Church, and in legal and educational institutions. All Ukrainians are agriculturists, but in most cases they are merely labourers, not concerned with the management of agricultural industries. Since 1905, however, the co-operative societies have brought to the Ukrainian peasant the social education which the *mir* gave to the Great-Russian peasant in the two last centuries. The claim, therefore, that these nine Governments are Ukrainian means that people speaking various Ukrainian dialects and having similar customs inhabit them, though, so far, they have not managed it politically, socially, or culturally, and are hardly likely to do 184 565

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LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE[1]

By HAROLD R. WEINSTEIN

000 One of the most painful lessons mankind has learned since the rise of nationalism in the last hundred years is that language diversity fosters conflicts between states and among peoples living within one state but speaking different languages. Conversely, language uniformity makes for unity. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries most governments have strongly desired such uniformity. In some countries, as in America, assimilation into one language has been achieved by allowing national groups the free use of their native languages, and by relying upon the advance of education and of commercial and industrial development to break down the barriers
u 563 those languages erect between various linguistic groups. In the period
191 before the First World War, many governments sought language uni-
SU formity by forcibly repressing the languages of minorities, by Ger-
563 manizing, Magyarizing, Russifying their national minority groups. Of
191 no government was this more true than of that of the old Russian Empire, in which the "minorities" — that is, the groups other than the Great-Russians — constituted over half the population. But by attempting to suppress the languages of the Ukrainians, Georgians, Tatars and so on, the Tsarist régime did not achieve its goal of
u ●[186] unity; rather, it aroused a host of nationalist movements which put language repression first on the bill of grievances against the government and which helped drive Tsarism to its death.

u Lenin believed that the Tsarist method defeated its own ends and
829 that the goal of unity had to be approached by other paths. First of
191 all, literacy would have to precede any attempt to obtain language
SU uniformity: as long as none other than oral means of communication
829 existed between the minorities and the Russians, the Russian lan-
191 guage could not really permeate the minorities and break down their national horizons. Literacy, of course, could be most easily reached by universal education in the minority languages themselves. Then, once the art of reading was mastered and great cultural vistas were opened to the minorities, they would be in a position to go ahead and adopt Russian as a second language. The Russian language would appeal to them because it is the language of a stronger culture than

122 [1] This study is based on material gathered for a book on the policy of the Soviet Union with regard to national minorities. The book is being written under a grant from the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, and it is being sponsored by Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes and Geroid Tanquary Robinson of Columbia University.

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languages as the media of instruction; and the study of Russian as a separate subject.

u 871 su 871

In setting out to nationalize education, the Soviet régime has encountered many obstacles: Russian nationalists — and there were some even among the Communists — opposed the policy; text-books and teachers were scarce; and the more backward minorities did not even possess a written language of their own. As the exigencies of space prevent the investigation of all the problems encountered in the nationalization of education, this study will be limited to examining the policy as applied in the Ukraine; that is, to the Ukrainians and to the other minorities — Poles, Jews, Germans and others — living among them. The Ukrainians, it may be noted, are the largest minority in the Soviet Union; they are the most significant from the point of view of current international relations; and the difficulties encountered by the nationalization policy in the Ukraine were sufficiently complex to provide some insight into the policy as a whole.

u 121 s.u. [563]

u 871 191 ●186 829

Among the Ukrainians, as among the other minorities, the nationalization of education has stemmed from the program on the national question which Lenin formulated before the overthrow of the Tsarist régime. This program, intended to overcome minority nationalism, had to assign a conspicuous place to the language question. To many Ukrainians the treatment of their language by the Imperial government appeared even more onerous than the political oppression which was meted out to Russians and Ukrainians alike. The Ukrainian language was regarded by the government as an uncouth dialect of the Russian language; it was harried from the schools; and it was badgered throughout the literary, scholarly and theatrical worlds. The resulting Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin believed, was a threat to the international unity of the Ukrainian and Russian masses, a unity he regarded as essential for the achievement of socialism; and this Ukrainian nationalism would have to be met with the promise of linguistic equality for the Ukrainians and for all other nationalities. This conception was written into the program on the national question adopted by the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party in 1913, a program which was first intended to apply to a period of "capitalist democracy" but was retained after the establishment of the Soviet government in 1917. The first point in the program stated: "Insofar as national peace is possible in a capitalist society, which is based on exploitation, profits and wrangling, such peace is obtainable only by means of a thoroughly, consistently democratic, republican governmental structure, guaranteeing complete equality to all nations and languages, and by the inclusion in the con-

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stitution of a basic law nullifying every kind of privilege of one nation and every kind of violation of the right of the national minorities."[2] 871 191

While defending this point in the program, Lenin explained that he did not desire to turn Russia into a "Babelesque confusion" in which one national group could not communicate with another; and he thought that sooner or later the minorities of Russia would become assimilated, probably through adopting the Russian language he cherished so highly and which he expected would be taught as a subject in the schools.[3] However, Lenin argued, such assimilation could be achieved not by compulsion, not by the Tsarist method of repression, but by the natural process of commercial and industrial development and intercourse. To force the minorities to study the Russian language by "the use of the stick" merely estranged them and turned them against that language. If, on the other hand, the minorities were allowed to use their own language in education, they would willingly accept the study of Russian also and would, as in America, voluntarily use it because of its advantage in economic intercourse. Hence, wherever minorities lived compactly, their languages would be used as the medium of instruction in the schools; and where members of minorities were isolated among other nationalities, they would be given the opportunity to study the language of their nationality. 186 829

Although the Provisional Government, ushered in by the February Revolution in 1917, intended to alter the policy of Russification and proclaimed linguistic freedom for the minorities, it did not succeed in overcoming the hostility of the minority nationalists who were then rapidly extending their influence among the peasantry. The Provisional Government, for example, wrangled with the Ukrainian nationalists not only on the question of political autonomy, but also on the expediency of Ukrainizing some of the army units; and in the Ukraine itself the former Tsarist officials remaining at their posts obstructed the Ukrainization of the school system. As the discontent of the peasantry with the land policy of the Provisional Government fed the flames of Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin was more than ever resolved to overcome minority hostility by, among other things, establishing linguistic equality.

After the October Revolution had put the Bolsheviks in control, the Soviet régime introduced into the schools the policy of national

[2] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach i Rešenijach S'ezdov, Konferencii i Plenumov Ts.K., 1898–1932* (Moscow, 1933), I, 238–240.

[3] For the views of Lenin contained in this paragraph, see Lenin, V. I., *Sočinenija* (Moscow, 1935), XVI, pp. 509, 551–554, 595–596; XVII, pp. 66, 89, 114–115, 133, 139–154, 178–181, 361.

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871 languages as the medium of instruction. Lenin stigmatized as "Great-
191 Russian Chauvinists," those people in the Commissariat of Education
●186 who favored teaching only in the Russian language; and referring
827 specifically to the Ukrainians in a resolution he wrote for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, he stated that if the Bolsheviks wanted to overcome the hostility of the Ukrainian peasants (a hostility quite clearly evident during the Civil War from 1918 to 1920), the Ukrainian language could not be pushed into the background of either educational or political life.[4] Stalin argued that education in the minority languages would facilitate the raising of the cultural level of the minorities to that of the Russians and would thereby forge bonds of union between them.[5] The educational policy for the minorities, he stated, must have it as its aim: "to develop national culture; to build up a wide network of courses and schools for both general education and vocational and technical training, teaching in the native languages, for the purpose of training Soviet, party, trade-union and economic cadres from among the native people."[6] These views of Lenin and Stalin were incorporated into party resolutions, adopted in the decade after 1919, on education and on national policy generally.[7]

871 It was, of course, much easier to make speeches and pass resolutions than to realize the aims set forth therein. Even in the relatively advanced Ukraine it promised to be very difficult to establish a "wide network" of schools giving instruction in the national languages. The heritage of buildings, school supplies and qualified teachers bequeathed by Tsarism was meager in comparison with the needs of a régime aspiring to universal education: in the Kiev Educational District, for example, only twenty-two of every thousand people attended school in 1913.[8] Educational facilities, moreover, were reduced by the disastrous Civil War, during which constant fighting, famine, typhus, cholera, economic collapse and bankruptcy levied a high tax on the educational system; and the lack of funds and personnel long hampered its recuperation.[9] By 1924 the system approached its status

[4] *Ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 155, 552–554.

[5] J. Stalin, *Stati i Reči ob Ukraine* (Kiev, 1936), pp. 111–112, 194–195.

[6] J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (New York, 1935), p. 208.

[7] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach . . .* I, pp. 155, 637.

[8] The Kiev Educational District comprised the provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Podolia, Volhynia and Chernigov. The number of pupils is from Ministerstvo Narodnogo Prosvieshcheniia, *Vsepodanneiši Otčet, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1915), p. 196. The estimate of the population is from Centralny Statističeski Komitet, *Ežegodnik Rossii, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 33–59.

[9] For the condition of the educational system up to 1924, see *Urkainska Socialistična Radianska Respublika. Zbirnik Spravozdan Narodnich Komisarijativ i centralnich ustanov U.S.R.R. ta Upolnivaženich Narodnich Komisarijativ R.S.F.S.R. 5-mu Vseukrainskomu Z'izdovi Rad Ukraini. Otčet Narodnogo Komisariati Osviti U.S.R.R. za 1920 rik* (*Kharkov*,

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In 1933 Zatonski censured the nationalists in the Commissariat of Education for neglecting the teaching of Russian which, because it was the means of all-Union communication, "should be taught in all the Ukrainian schools and in the schools of other nationalities."[84] But the real interest in the teaching of Russian appeared in 1937 and 1938, when the Commissariat was again over-hauled. During these years there was another intensified drive against Ukrainian nationalism, as well as against other varieties of opposition to the Party's policies and against every manifestation of inefficiency. Even Zatonskii was removed from his post. And while the renewed attack on nationalism in general was proceeding, a large amount of criticism was directed against the Commissariat of Education for its neglect of the Russian language as a subject of study. The critics — one of whom was E. N. Postnikova, a teacher and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. — stated that because of "the wrecking activities of the bourgeois nationalists," there was a higher percentage of failures in the courses on Russian language and literature than in any other subject.[85] In the first place, not enough time was being allotted to the study of Russian. Secondly, there was a dearth of text-books and of Russian literature in the school libraries: even such works as Gorki's *Mother*, Tolstoi's *War and Peace*, Goncharov's *Oblomov* and the collected works of Lenin were to be found only in Ukrainian translations. Thirdly, the Commissariat had not devoted sufficient attention to methods of teaching Russian and had failed to provide methodological programs for the guidance of teachers. Finally, the knowledge of Russian possessed by the teachers themselves was entirely inadequate; even the graduates of the pedagogical institutes did not know the language well enough to teach it. Since, the critics argued, the pupils themselves were strongly inclined to study Russian, the Commissariat should provide more thorough preparation of teachers, assign more time for this subject, provide more text-books and more Russian literature.

As a result of these criticisms the re-organized Commissariat provided new programs, several of which are in the hands of the author, and it increased the time allotted to the study of Russian. The number of hours specified for the study of languages during the entire period of attendance in the various types of schools, according to the

[84] *Visti*, Aug. 23, 1933.

[85] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), May 16, 1937; *Učitelskaia Gazeta* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), Feb. 27, 1938, Mar. 19, 1938, Mar. 29, 1938.

[Ruthenians]

728 ies in Austria and boundaries of the various gub-
631 ermyas in Russia./

/81/

Fair Play

•186 In the winter of 1938/39 the Ukrainian peasants in Poland were no longer recognizable. If after the pacification of 1930 they went about for many years bent and timid like beaten dogs, they now carried their heads higher. It was as though they felt a fresh breeze, and whenever they had business with Polish officials they omitted expressions of due respect, in fact they became cynical. They stood around in groups, talked in the most animated fashion, nudged each other meaningfully and sometimes laughed out loud.

[186] What happened? Since the end of October
101 1938, there was the "Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy"
642 beyond the Carpathians. There on the southern slopes of the Carpathians live the Ukrainian tribes of Lemki, Boyki and the Huzul. On poor soil they eke out a precarious living as small farmers, woodsmen and shepherds. In the warmer season many of them hire themselves out as harvest workers in the fertile Hungarian lowlands, and there they also trade in carriage grease. Before the First World War they shipped salt to Warsaw and fruit even as far as Moscow. Ruthenia, as their little country was once called, always belonged to the Kingdom bearing the crown of Stephen. After the downfall of the Hapsburg monarchy Czech insatiability succeeded in having "Carpatho-Russia" - that is what Ruthenia was now called - assigned to the Czechs by the edict of Saint-Germain. The "autonomy" which the little country was promised on paper in the edict remained an unfulfilled dream for its inhabitants. "Carpatho-Russia" was a province abounding in forests, which Prague could and would exploit. It was only after the solution of the Sudeten

[Ruthenians]

101 642 crisis when the centralistic /82/power of the Czechs slackened and the Slovaks stubbornly insisted on their autonomy, that the "Carpatho-Ukrainians" - this is the name they henceforth adopted - were also granted a certain autonomy.

•186 This seeming independence, nothing more than a weak, short-lived light which the Hungarian storm was to blow out only a few months later, in March 1939, sufficed, however to nourish vigorously the hopes of West Ukrainians north of the Carpathians. Therefore Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy was more important to them than sunshine and rain. This was the great event which they were discussing and on account of which they even neglected their fields. Just as all Ukrainians from the Kuban to the Carpathians honor the same heroes in their common folksongs, the seafarers of the Rus and the Cossacks of the sech, just as they shared the experience and the suffering of the wars of liberation between 1917 and 1923, so they now regarded as their own good fortune the fact that a piece of land, if only a small one, was apparently under independent Ukrainian administration.

In Ruska Lane and on the "Ring" in Lwów the newly-awakened Ukrainian self-awareness made itself felt in demonstrations. In the middle of October and the beginning of November 1938, the Ukrainians of Lwów protested against the foes of the "Silver Land". Not only in the Galician metropolis, but also in Przemysl, in Stryj, in all of West Ukrainia, the Ukrainians mustered: cries of abuse against Poland and cries of "Slava Ukrajini!" - "Glory to - the Ukraine!" - were heard, and the national anthem was repeated innumerable times. It did not cool the hot passions to have Poles on these occasions beat to death a few Ukrainians or shoot them down. The fever of hope that they might shake off Polish domination seized them. Ukrainian daily papers filled their front pages exclusively with reports from Carpatho-Ukraine.

11: Obermaier--84 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Volhynia] [Ruthenia]

•186 Nothing happened there which their special reporters did not describe in detail. In neighboring Volhynia which, for easier Polonization, was separated from Galicia by a Chinese wall, /83/ and where Ukrainian newspapers from Lwów were forbidden, people paid two zloty, the equivalent of two marks, for the smuggled papers. Radios were much in demand and the cooperatives which ordinarily sold shoelaces, underwear and soap, were suddenly supposed to furnish radio sets. The members wanted it. They brought their zloty, and when these did not suffice they paid in chickens and eggs. Half the village listened to the reports from a friendly broadcasting station in the Ukrainian language, picked up by a common receiving set. The people did not mind at all that they were obliged to stand or squat as close together as sardines in a can.

186 208

The "audition" cost five groschen which amounts to two and one-half pfennig. Anyone who had no money paid with an egg for news taken from the ether. What they heard on these occasions were sometimes their own wish-dreams. The autonomous government, which set up its residence first in Uzhgorod and then, until the country's reintegration into Hungary, in Khust, had great plans. The listeners discussed this with great animation.

648 186 208

The peasants who could write set down on paper the result of long deliberation about existing conditions as well as their wishes for the future, in the form of letters and sent them to the Polish President as well as to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Prime Minister Voloshyn and to a foreign statesman from whom they hoped to get help. Most of these letters got only as far as the office of the voivode. Thereupon Poland's fist became day by day more oppressive. The autonomy of the neighboring small country, however meager it was, was a violent shock to Polish power. Warsaw desired the quickest possible disappearance of Carpatho-Ukraine. On December third the head of

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[i.e., 1938-39 among the Ukrainians in Volhynia - Andy]

11: Obermaier--85 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Ruthenia]

648 the "Camp of National Unity", General Skwarszynski, said in the Sejm: /the Polish parliament/ "... The common boundary with Hungary as a Danubian state and as a people traditionally friendly to us, corresponds not only to our feelings, but also to our interests. Therefore Hungary's aim to /84/ obtain Carpatho-Ukraine must be energetically supported by our foreign policy." The
• 186 speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Mudryj protest-
648 ed against this Polish policy[1] at the same meeting: "We must not forget that the Ukrainian people, on the basis of common blood, common tradition and a common spirit feels itself to be a unified national organism, regardless of what state it lives in and under what governments it falls. No power will crush this feeling of national unity." (48)

48. "Osteuropa", January issue, 1931, page 260.

When Mudryj referred to the devastation caused by the "diversional detachments" in Carpatho-Ukraine, he was silenced.

000 Poland had a bad conscience. The Carpatho-Ukrainian question, unimportant though it was, made it nervous. The great power grew unsure of itself and from old habit tried to set force against the right to live. According to the Polish political thesis only "another dialect" is to separate the Ukrainians from the Poles. If one took away their Greek Orthodox religion and their Cryillic script, they would differ from the Poles merely by reason of their dialect.

m However, the Ukrainians have changed tremendously since the days when Emperor Joseph II said, at the end of his journey through Galicia, which was freed after hundreds of years of Polish domination: "The peasant is an unfortunate creature possessing nothing but a human exterior and physical life." In the 150 years that Vienna was their capital, the Ukrainians experienced an ex-

1 [i.e., 1935-39, to aid Hungary to obtain Carpatho-Ukraine - Ainsl, ed.]

[Ruthenia]

177 traodrinary national, economic and cultural advance, and the war of liberation from 1918 to 1919 became indelibly fixed in their national consciousness. Volhynia, too, awakened as a nation.

186 648 N wonder, then, that after a mock autonomy was granted by the Polish parliament on September 22, 1922 - in accordance with the request of the Supreme Council of June 25, 1919 - and after the conference of the Parisian emissary /85/ of March 15, 1923, which adjudicated Galicia to the Poles, no wonder that the Ukrainians in Poland have continued to fight against Warsaw's rule with other means. The Ukrainians are helpless against drastic measures such as the introduction of Polish civilian administration or the closing of Ukrainian schools. They suffer national losses especially in the parcelling of large estates, which brings new Polish settlers into the overpopulated country and which leaves the Ukrainian small farmer out in the cold. The Poles have already succeeded in pushing back the western Ukrainian boundary by about thirty kilometers; they are successfully Polonizing Polesia where, because of the extreme backwardness and poverty of the inhabitants, hunger is a stronger motivating power than anything else. In 1905 the Ukrainians already lost 250,000 citizens in Lublin, which was then Russian, and which, after the first World War, became Polish. These people who were forcibly converted to the orthodox faith in 1870 went over to the Roman Catholic Church 35 years later; for their return to the Greek Catholic Church to which they had belonged before that was denied them. But becoming Roman Catholic means becoming Polonized. Once the Polish clergyman has set foot in a town, he is soon followed by the teacher, Polish societies are founded and the village is isolated from the Ukrainian neighborhood as from the area of infection.

15: Pap S-4,5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 661 of the triumph and success of "brotherly" cooperation among various nations under the leadership of the great Russian people and the "wisest" Stalin. Nevertheless, these proclamations of co-operation were soon negated by existing facts. Again *Pravda* reported new anti-Soviet activity of the "enemies of the People" in the youth organization (Comsomol) in the Ukraine:

> There is uncovered again the unseemly sight of the work of counter-revolutionaries and spies within the Comsomol of the Ukraine. Masking themselves in a base fashion, they carry on disruptive counter-revolutionary work. They consciously fouled the cadres of the Comsomol and the propaganda apparatus and they ruined political education. They served the fascists, conducted spying activities and prepared sabotage and terroristic acts. . . . These enemies of the people placed their own men in executive posts. When these men fell at one post they were immediately transferred into another region.[45]

The resistance of the Ukrainians to Moscow's domination could not be denied. However, such statements had double meaning and were produced by the Soviet press in order to justify the policy of strict centralization and Russification in the Ukraine. Even such a loyal Moscow servant as Liubchenko, President of the Soviet Ukraine, was by now considered as a dangerous and undesirable individual since he was a Ukrainian and could hinder, as Skrypnyk did in the past, the realization of the Soviet Russian policy. For this reason he was compelled to commit suicide on September 11, 1937. In the familiar Bolshevik manner, the Soviet press informed the people that Liubchenko was involved in anti-Soviet connections and, "evidently" afraid to face his responsibility before the Ukrainian people for betraying their interests, had ended his life. Such an interpretation of Liubchenko's death—who in 1934 had praised the GPU for its successful work in "totally" destroying the "nationalist" groups within the Ukrainian Communist Party—gave the Soviet regime the "legal" right to replace most Ukrainians holding higher positions in the Soviet administration by Russians whom the Kremlin could trust. Nevertheless, passive resistance to the existing order was continually felt and could not be wiped out entirely.

• 186 In 1938 world tension and fear of World War II increased. Therefore, even the rise of national consciousness in the small Carp-

45 *Pravda*, July 25 1937.

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atho-Ukraine (which after 1918 became a part of Czechoslovakia and gradually developed into an autonomous entity with its own national Ukrainian Government) caused great concern in the Kremlin. 186

In order to diminish the fear of insecurity, Khruschev, Stalin's new deputy in the Ukraine, declared that Soviet patriotism prevailed in the Ukraine and that the people were filled with hatred for all bourgeois nationalists, all those "spies, Liubchenkos, Khvylovists, Zatonskis and other evil spirits."[46] In reality, however, Khruschev was not certain of Ukrainian loyalty to the Kremlin. For this reason, he considered it necessary to remind the people of their indebtedness to Moscow for the realization of their dreams:

> Ukrainian people had struggled for many years with the Tsarist autocracy, landlords and capitalists, demanding their right to develop their own culture, to possess their own schools, publish their own literature and to learn in their own language. Only as a result of the October Socialist revolution, as a result of Lenin-Stalin national policy and Stalin's personal interest in the development of the Ukrainian culture, did we win a world-wide historical victory in the field of cultural achievements.[47]

The invasion of Carpatho-Ukraine by the Hungarian Army on March 15, 1939 was received by Moscow with relief. Stalin interpreted Hitler's approval of the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine to mean that Germans had abandoned their plan to invade the Soviet Union in the near future. On August 23, 1939, the Soviet Government concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany. This pact was followed by the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 and the Red Army invasion on September 17 of Eastern Poland, which was inhabited mostly by Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians. The old and practically abandoned Soviet declaration of the right of nations to self-determination was once again proclaimed as valid so as legally to justify the right of the Soviet Union to intervene and to "liberate brothers", Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians, from Polish oppression.

* * *

On June 22, 1941, the German Army invaded the Soviet Union.

46 *XVIII. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), March 10-21, 1939*, Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow, 1939), p. 169.
47 *Ibid.*, p. 173.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov 21, 1949]

646 Art. 121. Elections of deputies to Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR are held by electoral districts on the following bases:

[634] In elections to regional Soviets - one deputy for every 15,000 to 30,000 of the population, depending upon its size;

[632] In elections to district and area Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population; in a district or area whose population does not exceed 25,000, twenty-five deputies are elected, and in a district or area whose population exceeds 60,000, not more than sixty deputies are elected;

[632] In elections to city Soviets or city district Soviets - one deputy for every 350 to 900 of the population, depending upon its size; in a city or city district whose population does not exceed 12,000, thirty-five deputies are elected;

In elections to the Kiev and Kharkov city Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population;

[623] In elections to village or settlement Soviets - one deputy for every 100 of the population; in a village or settlement whose population does not exceed 1,000, nine deputies are elected, and where the population exceeds 2,500, not more than twenty-five deputies.

The basis of representation for each regional, district, city, village and settlement Soviet of Working People's Deputies is fixed in the "Ordinance Concerning Elections to Regional, District, City, Village and Settlement Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR," within the range of the bases of representation indicated in the present article.

Art. 122. Candidates for elections are nominated according to electoral district.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Art. 123. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time upon decision of the majority of the electors in the manner established by law.

Chapter X. Arms, Flag, Capital

186 Art. 124. The state arms of the Ukrainian SSR are a sickle and hammer of gold in relief, placed crosswise, handles down against a red background in the rays of the rising sun, and surrounded by ears of wheat, which are placed symmetrically, from bottom to top, forming a circle. Between the tops of the ears of wheat is a red star. At the bottom of the wreath are the words, "Ukrainian SSR" on a red band, and at the bottom of the ears of corn the words, "Workers of all Countries United" in the Russian language on the right, and in the Ukrainian language on the left.

Art. 125. The state flag of the Ukrainian SSR is of cloth divided into two horizontal bands of color: the upper band, in red, is two-thirds of the width of the flag, and the lower band, in azure, is one-third of the width of the flag. In the upper part of the flag, about one-third of the distance from the staff, are a hammer and sickle of gold and above them a five-pointed star with a gold border.

The relation of width to length of the flag is 1:2.

Art. 126. The Capital of the Ukrainian SSR is the City of Kiev.

Chapter XI. Procedure for Amending the Constitution

642 Art. 127. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR may be amended only by de-
646 cision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of the Supreme Soviet.

101 among themselves. They can be divided into three well-defined tribes
162 —the Lemki on the Slovak border, the Boiki in the centre, and the Huculs in the eastern tip of Ruthenia.

The most interesting tribe are the Huculs. They have preserved
186 their tribal characteristics better than their kinsmen. Their standard of education is higher, and they are more conscious and proud of their national individuality. When the Hungarians invaded Ruthenia after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Huculs offered the stiffest resistance, and during the war they were the core of the partisan force fighting against the totalitarian powers. Like the other Ruthenian
463 mountaineers, the Huculs are largely wood-cutters and raftsmen. But
342 they are distinguished by their skill as carpenters and wood-carvers. This is clearly reflected in their mode of life. Their wooden-cottages are neatly built and furnished and impress the visitor by their scrupulous cleanliness. Their tribal individuality and artistic skill find expression in the numerous carvings with which they like to decorate their unpainted houses.

181 The neighbouring Boiki have also, to some extent, preserved their pride in racial individuality, and their mode of life, though more primi-
511 tive, has some interesting features. They are kind-hearted, sincere and hospitable, in spite of their poverty. Though less proud than the Huculs, they fly into a temper when crossed, and impulsive outspoken-
342 ness is one of their traits. They live in cottages and huts which they like to paint in blue and brown, and this makes their exterior rather attractive. But the interior does not always live up to the façade. The better-off Boiki manage to live in fairly decent cottages with two or more rooms, but the huts of the poor often consist of one room only—a dark room with no chimney, one small window, and some roughly
352 made furniture. Some have no bedsteads in the true sense of the word; along the whole wall of the room one may find a long "plank-bed" where the grown-ups sleep at the one end and the children at the other. When the children grow up they sleep on separate beds of the same kind. Unlike the Hucul houses, the Boiki huts have no wooden
342 floors. The domestic animals often share the same room with their
511 masters in winter, sleeping on the bare earth. For many families such a room is therefore a kitchen, living room, bedroom, hall and stable in one.

511 Much the same applies to the Lemki tribe who live partly on Slovak territory. They are the poorest Ruthenian tribe and their racial
181 character has undergone a certain deterioration. Their standard of life is often appalling, the hygiene leaves much to be desired, and they have the largest number of illiterates, though some improvement has taken place under the Republic.

000 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The

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S.U. 523 635 UK 698 175 Soviet Russia has often followed in the footsteps of Czarist Russia, but as far as the appraisal of the Ukraine is concerned there is no continuity between old and new Russia. Czarist Russia simply denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation and denounced all Ukrainian national feeling as 'South Russian separatism'. Soviet policy, on the other hand, has encouraged Ukrainian nationalism in as far as it was able to serve Russia's territorial expansion. The most spectacular territorial advance which the Soviet Union has made since 1939 was that realized under the slogan 'unification of all Ukrainian lands in one national State'. In the course of this unification the Soviet Union not only re-annexed territories which Russia had lost in the Civil War but also occupied territories which had ceased to be 'Russian' ever since the Middle Ages, such as Eastern Galicia with the city of Lvov.

UK. [101] There cannot be the slightest doubt about the existence of a Ukrainian nation which some Russian nationalists tried to deny in the past, but it would be a mistake to consider the Ukrainians, despite their numbers, as a nation equal in character to the French, Italians, Spaniards, etc., as the extremists among the Ukrainian nationalists would like to represent it. The Ukrainians cannot claim to be historically and culturally a nation so complete that they could afford to cut themselves loose from their Russian neighbours and exist without them.

All foreign invaders fighting Russia had illusions in this respect; they all believed in a separation of Ukraine and Muscovy and conducted their political warfare accordingly. The Swedish King, Charles XII, allied himself with the Ukrainian Cossack Hetman Mazeppa; Napoleon came to Russia with the project of a Ukrainian State, 'Napoleonide', cutting Russia off from the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. The Third Reich of Adolf Hitler also tried to play up the Ukrainian issue against Great Russia.

'LITTLE RUSSIA' AND 'NEW RUSSIA'

UK. 101 186 538 There is every justification in the demand for a genuinely autonomous Ukraine but there is no logic and no life in an anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalist ideology. Neither Russian and Ukrainian history, nor the area of Russian and Ukrainian settlement, nor even Russian and Ukrainian literature can be separated from each other. Gogol, for instance, who wrote in Russian only, can be claimed by the Ukrainians not only because he was born in 'Little Russia', as the Ukraine used to be called in Czarist times, but also because some of his great works are devoted to his homeland, including the most Ukrainian literary work *Taras Bulba*. The Ukrainians have failed to produce any Ukrainian-writing poet or writer who even approximates to the importance of a Gogol.

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Nor is Gogol an isolated example. Count Alexey Tolstoy too belongs to some extent to the Ukraine and no Ukrainian poet has succeeded in paying to his homeland a more beautiful lyrical tribute than Tolstoy's.

Were the Ukraine 'Little Russia' only, the land of the Cossacks, the problem would be more straightforward; but the Ukraine is, apart from minor territories, at least Little Russia plus New Russia. New Russia comprises those territories along the shores of the Black Sea which were incorporated into the Russian Empire for the most part under Catherine the Great. It was only by the amalgamation of Little Russia with a large part of New Russia that the Ukraine obtained a sea-coast and was able to include within its borders places like Odessa, Kherson, Mariupol and Nikolayev whose history was in no way linked with that of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmans. New Russia became a true microcosm of Europe. Just as the ancient and medieval history of New Russia is a mosaic of the history of many peoples which had settled on the northern shores of the Black Sea, traded with the goods and products of its hinterlands and founded states, a history of Greeks and Scythians, Khazars, Goths, Genoese and Tartars, so too the history of modern New Russia is a tale of all sorts of races. People from many lands transformed the steppe into arable soil, built ports and railway lines and developed the industry of the Donets Basin. New Russia was a little America in the sense of being a melting-pot of European races, with the difference, however, that not all pioneer settlers forgot the language of their forefathers in the Ukrainian-Russian surroundings.* The people who brought New Russia into being included sons of every nation of the Balkans, many Germans and even individual Frenchmen who assumed high administrative posts there. At least one Briton played a distinguished part in the development of New Russia, John Hughes, a pioneer of coal-mining in the Donets region, to whose initiative is due the foundation of the big industrial centre now called Stalino. (Until the early twenties the place was called after him 'Yuzovka'.)

UKRAINIAN DIASPORA IN THE U.S.S.R.

Whilst Russians and other peoples shared with the Ukrainians the credit for the colonization of what is to-day the Ukrainian S.S.R., millions of Ukrainians now live dispersed all over the Soviet Union.

The Ukraine, being a densely populated country, was able to contri-

* An ethnical group of colonists in New Russia, who were completely assimilated by their Russian-Ukrainian surroundings, were the Serbs, of whom about 100,000 came to the Southern Ukraine between 1739 and 1752. The Serbs colonized two Ukrainian regions, one on the right bank of the Dnieper, originally called 'New Serbia', and the other in the Donets Basin, called 'Slavyanoserbia'. A century after the Serbian pioneer immigration into New Russia the Serb element could no longer be traced in any population statistics of the Russian Empire.

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THE UKRAINE

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According to the 1926 census there were but 8 per cent Great Russians in the Ukraine, but these were mostly town-dwellers and proletarian elements and thus were able to play a considerable part in the political history of the Ukrainian S.S.R. since, according to Bolshevik principles, city workers necessarily lead the peasants, and the towns the countryside.

The towns of the Ukraine during the inter-war period had been not only bi-national Russian-Ukrainian but tri-national Russian-Ukrainian-Jewish, with the Jews frequently gravitating culturally to the Russian side. In Kiev, the largest Ukrainian city, the Ukrainians were originally the smallest ethnical group of the three. The 1926 census showed that Kiev's population consisted of 25·4 per cent Ukrainians, 36·2 per cent Russians, 32·1 per cent Jews and 3 per cent Poles. After 1926 the balance improved in favour of the Ukrainians but basically Kiev remained a Ukrainian-Russian-Jewish city. Kharkov, almost equal in size to Kiev, had in 1933 48 per cent Ukrainian inhabitants, whilst there were 30·3 per cent Russians and 17·7 per cent Jews. Of all the big cities of the Ukraine, Odessa, the capital of 'New Russia' has always been the least Ukrainian. Even including Odessa's country district the Ukrainians accounted for only 41 per cent of the total population against 23 per cent Russians and 20 per cent Jews. In the city of Odessa there were 17·5 per cent Ukrainians against 38·6 per cent Russians and 36·4 per cent Jews. Dniepropetrovsk, the fourth largest city of the Ukraine, in 1933 comprised 36 per cent Ukrainians, 31·5 per cent Russians and 26·6 per cent Jews.

The drastic reduction in the number of Jews through Hitlerite massacres and evacuation during the war improved the position of the Ukrainians in the cities of the Western and Central Ukraine, but in the industrial regions of the Eastern Ukraine the Ukrainians cannot keep pace with the tempo of urbanization and the needs of manpower. The two eastern border provinces of the Ukraine, Voroshilovgrad and Stalino, making up the Donets Basin, are inhabited by an international working-class, in particular by a strong Russian element, and are steadily growing in importance in relation to the Ukraine as a whole. The population of the Stalino Province rose by 91 per cent between 1926 and 1939 and that of the Voroshilovgrad Province by 37 per cent during the same period. The growth of the Stalino Province can be even better assessed by comparing the numbers of inhabitants of its three largest towns in 1926 and 1939. Stalino, the provincial centre rose from 174,000 to 462,000, Makeyevka from 79,421 to 240,000, Mariupol from 64,000 to 222,000.

STALINIST CENTRALISM VERSUS UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY

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The fact that Russians and Ukrainians are from the historical, geographical and ethnical point of view objectively inseparable calls for a certain

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co-ordination of the affairs of the two peoples. The Bolshevik régime has failed to bring about this co-ordination. The Russian-Ukrainian union as determined by the constitutions of 1923 and 1936 amounted to a subordination of the Ukraine to Moscow and indirectly to the Great Russians.

The foundation of the U.S.S.R. on December 30th, 1922, constituted in itself a triumph for the Russian people and a defeat for the Ukrainians. It signified the end of the loose constitutional ties which during the first years of the Soviet régime existed between Great Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and the peoples of Transcaucasia. A firm centralistic organization – the U.S.S.R. – took the place of the treaty relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidzhan. Stalin, in his capacity of Peoples Commissar for Nationalities, played a leading part in this process of transformation which rendered a great service to Russian nationalism but ignored the aspirations of the non-Russian peoples.

It is easy to understand why Stalin followed in the footsteps of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great in his desire for a strong centralistic Russian State. He knew the strength of local nationalism and distrusted many of the local Communists. He thought that the future of the Soviet Union could not be left in their hands and that Moscow, the capital of the Russian people, was the only suitable centre of gravity of the Soviet State. This is the psychological background against which the foundation of the U.S.S.R. has to be considered. Lenin was still alive when the U.S.S.R. was proclaimed and Stalin was then by no means all-powerful. That is why the discussions preceding the foundation of the Soviet Union took place in an atmosphere of comparative freedom. Both Stalin and his opponents clearly showed their cards.

The opposition to the formation of a centralized Soviet Union, as Stalin conceived it, was led by the Ukraine with the prominent participation of Georgia. The principal spokesman of the Ukraine in the discussion on constitutional issues was Khristian Rakovsky, an old Bolshevik, whom Stalin later on never ceased to consider as a dangerous 'wrecker'. Rakovsky was no Ukrainian himself, but a Bulgarian who at the First Congress of the Comintern in March 1919 represented the 'Revolutionary Balkan Federation'. There is no doubt that Rakovsky, strongly aided by the old Ukrainian Bolshevik, Mikola Skrypnik, proved to be an excellent defender of the interests of the Ukrainian and indirectly of all non-Russian communists of Soviet Russia.

Rakovsky and Skrypnik wanted to preserve the statehood of the Ukraine and opposed to Stalin's 'Union', a loose 'confederation' of Soviet Republics. Instead of Stalin's 'Soviet of Nationalities' Rakovsky proposed a 'Council of States'. He further rejected the establishment of the 'Presidium of the Central Executive Committee', which until the new Stalin Constitution of 1936 was the most powerful constitutional organ

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of the Soviet State and served the purposes of a centralistic leadership. The Ukrainians, led by Rakovsky and Skrypnik, also made efforts to keep their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, to maintain at least some degree of control over the railway system and postal services in their territory and in general to curtail the prerogatives conferred on the all-Union Peoples Commissariats.[3]

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The Ukrainians were defeated and Stalin got his centralistic constitution accepted which, in the long run, enabled him to rule in Kharkov and Kiev almost in the same way as in Moscow and Leningrad.

COMMUNIST IRREDENTA AND 'UKRAINIZATION' POLICY

Though ignoring the wishes of the Ukrainians regarding their constitutional status within the U.S.S.R., Stalin offered them a glittering consolation prize; the promise of a future Ukrainian State, to include all the Ukrainian lands which the peace settlement after the First World War had allocated to Rumania, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

This aim was to be achieved with the help of the Comintern and its policy on the national question. Many Ukrainians, though anti-Soviet 'bourgeois nationalists' at heart, were inclined to make peace outwardly with Bolshevism in the first years of the Soviet régime, because world-Communism stood for the most far-reaching fulfilment of Ukrainian national aspirations.

The Fifth World Congress of the Comintern in 1924 included ~~in~~ its resolution on the 'National Question in Central Europe and the Balkans' the following passage 'The Congress . . . considers it necessary for the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania to launch the general slogan of separation of the Ukrainian lands from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and their union with the Soviet Ukraine and through it, with the U.S.S.R.'. The congress was satisfied that the Communist Parties of Poland and Rumania had successfully promoted the demand for Ukrainian self-determination. From the details of the resolution it appeared that the frontiers of a future united Ukraine were to be drawn slightly to the west of the Russian-Polish border as fixed in 1945.[4]

The wish of certain groups of Ukrainian nationalists to come to terms with the Soviet régime was reinforced by an apparent readiness of the Soviet Government to grant to the Ukrainians a certain measure of freedom in the cultural field, provided that they recognized the totalitarian aspirations of the Communist Party. An expression of this policy of communist-nationalist co-operation was the fact that the historian of Ukrainian nationalism, Mikhail Hrushevsky, returned to Kiev in 1924 to take over the direction of the historical section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

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THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

186 517 For the next few years Ukrainian intellectuals were absorbed with the cultural 'Ukrainization' of the Ukraine, for which Moscow gave a free hand while firmly controlling the posts of political command. The Ukrainian language came into its own, a scientific Ukrainian terminology was created, and Ukrainian book production had a boom.

THE FIRST PURGES

186 665 The Soviet authorities soon discovered that the Ukrainian nationalist renaissance could not be arrested halfway and that cultural nationalism was bound to lead to political nationalism. The Ukrainian nationalists on the other hand, found out that in a totalitarian State like the U.S.S.R. there could be no real freedom, not even for Ukrainian cultural nationalism. From 1926 onwards the contradictions between Ukrainian nationalism and the communist State became more and more noticeable. Before hitting out against the bourgeois Ukrainian nationalist groups which conspired against the Soviet régime, the Kremlin had to make order within the Ukrainian Communist Party itself. The latter had originated from the amalgamation of the Bolsheviks with a genuine home-grown communist movement, the Borotbists. They were a left-wing extremist group called after the Ukrainian émigré newspaper *Borotba* published in Geneva in 1915. From the ideological point of view they had much in common with Marshal Tito's Yugoslav communists. They insisted on unconditional national independence, but in every other respect their aims were indistinguishable from those of the Bolsheviks. In 1919 the Borotbists assumed the title of 'Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists)' and applied for membership of the Communist International. Together with the Ukrainian Bolsheviks proper they formed the first Ukrainian Soviet Government, the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee which organized the fight against General Denikin's White Guards. Lenin valued the co-operation of the Borotbists and stated that the question of Ukrainian independence should be no reason for disunity between them and the Bolsheviks, the more so since a section of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks favoured an independent status for the Ukraine.[5] The merger of the two communist fractions in March 1920 was of great value to the Bolsheviks for the Borotbists exercised considerable influence on the Ukrainian masses.

The Borotbist traditions of Ukrainian communism explain to a considerable extent the particular strength of nationalist heresy within the Ukrainian Communist Party. The first Borotbist deviations were officially labelled as 'Khvylovy-ism' and 'Shumsky-ism' after Mikola Khvylovy, an outstanding Ukrainian writer and Oleksandr Shumsky, Minister of Education. Both Khvylovy and Shumsky scandalized orthodox communists in the middle of the twenties by their outspoken western

[Cf. cat. 186, pp. 129-130, 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]

orientation. Khvylovy considered that Ukrainian literature should go 665
its own way and look towards Western Europe, no matter whether 186
bourgeois or proletarian. Shumsky advocated that the Ukrainian Communist Party should be independent of the Russian Communist Party.

This crisis within the Ukrainian Communist Party* prompted the 661
Moscow Bolshevik leadership in 1926 to make one of Stalin's principal 665
assistants, L. M. Kaganovich, Ukrainian party secretary for a short 186
period during which the first great purge against the nationalist deviation was carried out. Khvylovy was ejected from the party and Shumsky expelled from the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When Khvylovy repented he was given another chance and re-admitted as a party member, but in 1933 he committed suicide after a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism had been launched.

Admittedly the methods of repression in the Ukraine were comparatively liberal until 1929-30. From that time onwards the oppressive policy of the Soviet State overshadowed in the minds of the Ukrainian nationalists in the U.S.S.R. the contribution which Polish, Rumanian and Czech communists were ready to make for the establishment of a Greater Soviet Ukraine. Many Ukrainian nationalists became convinced that national unity was less vital to the Ukrainians than cultural and [177]
political freedom, in particular that free intercourse with the West which Moscow was unwilling to grant.

The Soviet State inflicted many heavy blows on the representatives 668
of the western orientation among the Ukrainians, but never vanquished 661
it entirely. In this struggle Ukrainian nationalism commanded an almost inexhaustible reservoir of resistance forces. Bloodshed and terror seemed incapable of stamping out the longing for spiritual freedom. Almost every year brought the discovery of a new conspiracy, a new series of trials, a new trend in national Ukrainian deviations. In 1929 the G.P.U. discovered the 'Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy', the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in 1931 the 'Ukrainian National Centre', in 1933 the 'Ukrainian Military Organization' (UVO).

The offensive by the central Government against the Ukraine's trends [814]
towards a more independent existence was conducted not only in the political sphere but also in the field of culture, where the régime had originally granted some scope to Ukrainian nationalism. One of the main bulwarks of Ukrainian nationalism was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The history section of the Academy had turned out to be so anti-Bolshevik that it had to be disbanded altogether while its head, Professor Hrushevsky, was exiled to Russia proper. This banishment of the 'great old man' of Ukrainian nationalism from his place of work showed better than anything else that the policy of reconciliation which Moscow had originally pursued in its relation towards Ukrainian nationalism had been but a short-term manœuvre.

*[Cf. category 665, p. 130 --Analyst]

THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

661 668 423 Political and cultural oppression of Ukrainian nationalism[1] was co-ordinated with a tough fight against the Ukrainian peasant masses opposing the policy of collectivization. Famine, total disorganization of the Ukrainian agriculture and the formation of armed peasant bands were characteristic features of this period. The central Government got the situation in hand by physically annihilating peasant resistance, by making partial concessions on the tempo of collectivization and by thoroughly purging, between 1930 and 1932, the staff of the Ukrainian Peoples' Commissariat for Agriculture of alleged Borotbist wreckers.

THE SKRYPNIK AFFAIR

661 186 665 The Ukrainian crisis in the early thirties culminated in the 'affair Skrypnik', which was the most important single event in Ukrainian history of that period.

After his unsuccessful fight in 1922 as an associate of Rakovsky[2] for a 'Confederation of Soviet Republics' and for the quasi-independence of the Ukraine, Skrypnik in his day-to-day work as Peoples Commissar for the Interior, Justice, and Education tried to save for the Ukraine what could be saved in the way of an autonomous status. One of his main preoccupations was to prevent as far as possible the foundation of all-Union institutions such as the All-Union Agricultural Academy; but he failed.

Skrypnik had been a Marxist since 1897, and a member of the Bolshevik Party since its foundation. After the Revolution he was not just a local Ukrainian figure but became a Vice-Premier in the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nobody could with any shadow of justification denounce Skrypnik as nationalist. Skrypnik, it is true, considered that the central Government should bring proletarian internationalism and justified national aspirations into harmony with each other. 'Our work', he used to say, 'should be organized in such a way as to give the working masses of each nation the possibility of developing its national consciousness as much as possible'.

This conception amounted from an orthodox Bolshevik standpoint to the 'triumph of nationalism over the proletarian revolution' and was bound to get Skrypnik into trouble sooner or later. The men whom Stalin commissioned to liquidate the 'Skrypnik affair' were a Pole, Stanislav Kosior, and a Russian, Pavel Postyshev, first and second secretary respectively of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The final clash occurred on June 10th, 1933, in Kharkov, when Postyshev and Kosior, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, accused Skrypnik of being an enemy of the State and the actual head of the Ukrainian counter-revolution. At

1 [Cf. cat. 186, pp. 130-131 - Analyst]
2 [Cf. cat. 64-2, p 128 Analyst 132]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
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that meeting the Ukrainian Communist Party decided that Great Russian chauvinism had ceased to be the main danger in the Ukraine and that Ukraine nationalism had become enemy number one. The decision constituted an important landmark in the history of the Soviet Ukraine and the prelude to a purge on a tremendous scale. 661 186 665

Skrypnik drew his conclusions from the 'new situation' by committing suicide less than four weeks after the decisive meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Executive Committee. Skrypnik's disappearance, whilst affecting the situation in the Ukraine in general, was particularly important in the field of Ukrainian cultural policy. After Skrypnik's death Postyshev and Kosior stopped the 'Ukrainization of the Ukraine', a favourite slogan of Ukrainian communists up to 1933, and started a determined campaign against 'over-Ukrainization'. 'Fight against over-Ukrainization' was in reality nothing else than the recapture by the Great Russians of some of the positions which had been lost to the Ukrainians, particularly in the Donets Basin. There is no doubt that the Ukrainization had been overdone and had actually led to the imposition of the Ukrainian language on non-Ukrainians, particularly in the schools. [563]

THE 'GREAT PURGE'

In 1934 and 1935 the party leadership discovered a big terrorist organization of Borotbists in Kiev and Kharkov, as well as an alleged 'Nationalist-Trotskyite Bloc'.[6] In 1936 the situation seemed to be more stable in the Ukraine, but 1937 was again a disastrous year for that country. Official Soviet statements claimed that in 1937 Ukrainian nationalism had made particularly extensive efforts to detach the Ukrainian S.S.R. from Russia by plotting with German and Polish fascists. Some of the plots and conspiracies uncovered had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism and were simply Ukrainian off-shoots of anti-Stalin currents within the All-Union Communist Party. It is true, however, that the Ukraine suffered much more during the big purge of 1937–38 than any other Soviet Republic. Moreover, the purge went on in the Ukraine after it had been ended on the whole in other parts of the Soviet Union. 661 665 668

The new chain of dramatic incidents started in the Ukraine in the summer of 1937, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Panas Petrovich Lyubchenko, committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest, trial and execution. Lyubchenko had been Prime Minister for three years during which he had made himself conspicuous by his passionate speeches denouncing Hitler's plans of aggression. Lyubchenko was a former Borotbist and thus suspect to the Kremlin. He was charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian fascist party and allying it to the 'right-wing Trotskyite centre'.[7] Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, was arrested

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UKRAINE RD1

Thus in Russia itself the 'Uniate heresy' was liquidated and it survived only in the Ukrainian territories which until 1918 belonged to the Austrian Empire and after 1918 to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. It was only after the final establishment of the Soviet power in Lvov, the see of the Ukrainian Uniate Metropolitan, that the great historical opportunity presented itself of accomplishing the work of Catherine II and Nicholas I with regard to the Uniate Church.

Soviet interference in Ukrainian church affairs proceeded as follows. In April 1945 the Metropolitan Slepoy, four bishops and several priests of the Uniate Church, all opponents of Orthodoxy and faithful supporters of the Pope were arrested as 'accomplices of German occupants'. One month later a 'Central Initiative Group for Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church' was formed and in April 1946 a Synod in Lvov solemnly proclaimed the union of the two churches. Considering the conditions prevailing in Russia the 'initiative group' could not have been set up, nor could the Lvov Synod be summoned without the active support of the Soviet authorities, and particularly of the 'Plenipotentiary for Religious Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R.'. The decisions of the Lvov Synod were not accepted by a number of parish priests who despite official pressure refused to abandon the Uniate Church. By January 1948 the resistance, according to official Soviet reports, seemed on the whole to be broken.

The Synod of Lvov was an ecclesiastical event only in name. In reality its decisions constituted a victory of the Russian State over Western tendencies in a frontier territory and the Orthodox Church was nothing but the accidental instrument by the help of which the victory was achieved. The Synod was merely an episode in the repression of the Western influences which after the end of the Second World War challenged Bolshevism in almost every sphere of Ukrainian life.[17]

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Apart from receiving additional strength from the Western Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism of the war and post-war period derived inspiration from two diametrically opposed sources. On the one hand, Ukrainian nationalism was encouraged under the German occupation. Without granting to the Ukrainian people the slightest shadow of an independent status, the German occupants favoured and consolidated the negative anti-Russian and anti-Jewish features of Ukrainian nationalism.

On the other hand, official Soviet propaganda also gave a fresh impetus to Ukrainian nationalism by allowing some expression to Ukrainian national hero-worship, for instance, by the creation of a war decoration commemorating the popular Ukrainian Cossack Hetman

186 of the seventeenth century, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. The Kremlin, like Hitler, had no intention of satisfying the essence of Ukrainian national aspirations; all it wanted was to secure a greater degree of Ukrainian co-operation in the war effort, in guerilla fighting and sabotage behind the enemy lines. The Soviet Government could not prevent its wartime emergency measures from being misunderstood and mistaken for some sort of *carte blanche* for future nationalistic deviations.

669 The full extent to which Ukrainian nationalists may have betrayed the Soviet Union during the war with Germany is, of course, impossible [727] to estimate. The Ukrainian Soviet Government indirectly recognized, however, that the militant anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists must have constituted a fairly considerable body by proclaiming an amnesty in 1944 for the members of the U.P.A., the 'Ukrainian Insurgent Army'. This amnesty is unique in the history of the U.S.S.R. since it applied collectively to an entire group notable for its fanatical hatred of the Soviet régime and its contempt for the Russians.

This amnesty offer was so unusual for Soviet conditions that many U.P.A. members refused to take it seriously. The U.P.A. continued to terrorize the Soviet Ukrainian-Polish-Czechoslovak border areas, and in 1945–47 carried out daring raids deep into Czech and Polish territories. The members of the U.P.A. detachments were often referred to as 'Banderovtsy' after their leader Stephen Bandera.

[728] The 'Banderovtsy' exploited for their ends the fact that a comparatively small strip of land in Eastern Poland which was inhabited by Ukrainians was not included in the Ukrainian S.S.R., the area of Kholm and Hrubeshov. According to the nationalities programme of the Comintern the Kholm area was to be included in the Soviet Ukrainian State. The Ukrainian State President, M. S. Grechukha, in a Supreme Soviet debate on February 7th, 1944, also demanded the incorporation of this 'Ukrainian Far West' into the Ukrainian S.S.R.[18] However, the Soviet central Government apparently found it impossible to convince the Western Allies and even the Polish communists that another slice of Poland should be cut off. Thus the Ukraine was denied its 'Far West' and a repatriation of the Ukrainians of the Polish areas concerned was carried out instead.

The activities of the 'Banderovtsy' found particular support among the peasants of the Ukrainian villages of the Polish border area earmarked for evacuation; for one of the foremost tasks of the U.P.A. detachments was to render the evacuation impossible and to prevent by terrorist acts any Polish colonization on former Ukrainian farmland. It has been asserted that the Banderovtsy enjoyed support from local Ukrainian Soviet authorities in the border areas because of their anti-Polish character. This allegation is difficult to check. It is certain, however, that the U.P.A. detachments could not possibly have maintained themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrainian peasantry.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrainian peasantry. 000

While the armed struggle of Ukrainian nationalists was confined to a small fringe along the Ukrainian border, the Soviet Government had to face more subtle forms of opposition throughout the Soviet Ukraine. 186 814 661 One of the outstanding features of the post-war development in the Ukraine was that the same cultural institutions which in the purges of the thirties had been compelled to change their nationalistic Ukrainian personnel from top to bottom, were again involved in difficulties with the Soviet authorities.

This was particularly true of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and especially of its Institute for Language and Literature and its Institute for History. The former produced in 1945 an *Essay on the History of Ukrainian Literature*, whose authors stressed the dependence of Ukrainian literature on the West and 'concealed that Russian and Ukrainian literatures exercised a mutual fertilizing influence on each other in the course of centuries'.[19]

Even more serious 'nationalist excesses' were committed in the field of history writing. It seems that practically all major historical works which the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences published in 1941–5 contained 'serious mistakes of a nationalistic character'. For several years the party and state authorities did not pay much attention to the works of Ukrainian academicians; but after 1946–7 the leading party organs restarted to analyse Ukrainian historical writings and pointed out that Ukrainian historians had never, in fact, succeeded in overcoming the influence of the nationalistic-bourgeois school of Professor Hrushevsky.[20]

In the light of official Soviet admissions the ideological consolidation of the Ukraine seemed not to have advanced by a single inch since the days when Hrushevsky was still the teacher of the historians and Khvylovy the authority for those dealing with problems of Ukrainian literature. Twenty years after Khvylovy's first expulsion from the Communist Party, and fifteen years after his suicide, orthodox Ukrainian Bolsheviks were still haunted by the fear of 'Khvylovy-ist ideas' and were active in opposing them.

The first step in the purge of Ukrainian literature in the post-war period was the replacement of the editorial boards of the three leading Ukrainian literary journals *Vitchizna* (Fatherland), *Dnipro* (Dnieper) and *Radyansky Lviv* (Soviet Lvov). All three journals had been accused of systematically printing nationalist novels and articles. As the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers was obviously responsible for ideological offences committed in literary journals published on Ukrainian territory, the purge had to be extended to this organization as well. The leading personalities of the writers' union, including its president, 186 661 538

*[Cf. cat. 116, pp. 30-31, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]

113, • 19 Ukrainians RD1

[For information pertaining to the Ukrainian language, see 22: Matthews, R1 Soviet Union, category 116; pp. 118-119.]

THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE

The Russian or Eastern branch of Slavonic falls into three divisions, Great Russian, Little Russian or Ukrainian, and White Russian. The last, spoken in the former governments of Vitebsk, Minsk and Mohilev, has only claimed to be a written language since the Revolution: it is very close to Great Russian save for certain points in which it makes a transition to Polish, its Western neighbour, South Great Russian and Ukrainish. The other two branches have always called themselves simply "Russian", the Great Russians calling the South-Western language "Little Russian", which was resented by its speakers. These latter, unable in practice to establish their claim to be called "Russians", have adopted the words "Ukraina" and "Ukrainian" from the part of their country most distinguished in history (v. p. 64). The name "Ruthenian" is simply a foreigner's mishandling of *Rusin* = "one Russian man". It is applied mostly to the Western Ukrainians, but in older usage (e.g. in Latin books) to any Russian. 191

The Ukrainians claim that their language is the true representative of the speech current in Kievan Russia before the Mongol invasion: it has certainly kept certain points, e.g. the use of the vocative case and the distinction between *e* and *ye*, now lost in Great Russian: on the other hand it has changed original *g* into *h* (which does not exist in Great Russian), *o* in certain cases into *i*, *ě* into *i*, "hard *l*" often into *v* or *w*, etc., and has borrowed many words from Polish and even from German.

The Ukrainian language varies greatly in different parts of its wide area, the speech of the Kiev region and, curiously enough, the archaic dialects of "Carpathian Rus" differing less from Great Russian than does that of Galicia. The train of circumstances by which Galician became the foundation of the modern literary language is set forth in Chapter v (pp. 247 sqq.).

The shaded band on Map I shows the extreme limits of Ukrainian speech, but the borders are very vague and within them much Great Russian is spoken: along the sea in "New Russia" and to the East Great Russian is really dominant. In the extreme West the towns mostly speak Polish and the countryside Ukrainian.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

102
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XVI (A)

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl·Ukraine RDl

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XVI (B)

4. Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

102
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XVI (C)

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1



xvi (D)

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

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XVI (E)

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

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XVI (F)

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

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XVI (G)

102
191

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

XVI (H)

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The predominance of the non-Ukrainian elements in the organs of administration and in educational institutions is of course explained by the fact that the Ukrainian people remained overwhelmingly peasant, and there had been in the nineteenth century, and even earlier, a large and heterogeneous alien element in the towns. Nevertheless Kaganovich, in his speech to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in 1927, was at pains to demonstrate the success of 'ukrainization'. 'Among us', he said with that graceful Jewish facility for identifying himself with the people among whom he had come, 'our Ukrainian culture has developed on a grand scale. Ukrainian culture has made such progress in all branches in these last years that even the most eager Ukrainian nationalists never dreamed of such rapid development. In primary schools Ukrainians are taught by Ukrainians in the Ukrainian language. The high schools are gradually becoming completely "ukrainized"; Ukrainian books and press are at present developing to an extent unknown in all the history of the Ukraine. In our Council of People's Commissars, which is the supreme administrative organ of our government, 13 out of 20 members are Ukrainian. In our Party's Executive Committee, 66 per cent are Ukrainians, 25 per cent are Russians, 14 per cent are Jews.'

Kaganovich's emphasis on the predominance of Ukrainians on the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party is, of course, meaningless, since in the Soviet hierarchy all power is vested in the Secretaries of the various regional and local Committees of the Communist Party, who are themselves responsible not to the members of the Committees but to the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. Stalin filled this latter position, and Kaganovich himself was his nominee sent from Moscow with complete power over the regional and local Committees in the Ukraine. Kaganovich's successor, 'the dictator' Postyshev, who only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was another importation from Moscow—as is Khrushchov, who is at present (1939) governing the Ukraine.

While Kaganovich was praising 'the achievements of "ukrainization"' he was already considering means of putting some limit on these achievements. In this same year when he made his genial speech before the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party under his influence issued a decree making Russian the second official language in the Ukraine. The First Five Year Plan was then beginning, and one of the most important features of this Plan was the wide development of industry in the Ukraine. The coal and metallurgical industries

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

665 178 ●191 were to be modernized, and the construction of the great power station of Dnieprostroy was in view. Thousands of engineers, technicians and specialized workers were being sent into the Ukraine and these people not only had no knowledge of the Ukrainian dialect but they found that dialect most inappropriate for correspondence between different Government departments on complicated technical questions. The intensified industrialization of the Ukraine was obviously destined to strengthen greatly all connections with the north and linguistic differences gave promise of frequent and annoying difficulties. Very soon the Ukrainian language came only to be used in the sphere of 'cultural relations'.

Meanwhile Kaganovich, in surveying the various aspects of 'ukrainization', began gradually to investigate the part played in different branches of the administration by 'Ukrainian nationalists' or those suspected of being such.

§ 7. 'THE REVOLUTION AGAINST THE PEASANTS': REPRESSION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

665 423 In 1929 the Communist Revolution was approaching its second and decisive stage: Marxist principles which had conquered the life of the cities were to be imposed on the countryside. But the process of 'collectivizing' agriculture was to prove even more difficult in the Ukraine than it was in the provinces of Great Russia. Individual property in land had always been traditional in the Ukraine, and the background of the social history of the country had been the unending struggle of the peasantry to maintain their right to own the land they worked—against Polish landlords and Cossack and, later, Great Russian landlords. The strength of the Ukrainian peasantry had always been their stubborn determination that each should own his plot of land, and their weakness had been a love of individual freedom degenerating often enough into libertarian anarchy.

423 474 The outlook of the Ukrainian peasant differed widely from that of the Great Russian. The *obshchina*—the old Russian form of possessing (but not of working) land collectively—was unknown in the regions of Chernigov and Poltava and in all right-bank Ukraine. The creation of *kolkhozy* (collective farms) was from the beginning opposed, generally passively and sometimes actively, by the peasantry. And Kaganovich hastened, so soon as peasant opposition developed, to deprive the Ukrainians of the weapon which the national idea might provide. (In Caucasia and Turkestan, during the same period, opposition to collectivization was combined with a renascence and strengthening of local nationalist movements directed

CHAPTER FIVE

Ukrainization

The period of the New Economic Policy was likewise the 186
time when the movement for the Ukrainization of the state reached its highest point. This was a complicated political, cultural and scholarly movement which aimed to develop the Ukrainian self-consciousness in every possible way and to establish the proper role of the Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It took many and diverse forms, and while it developed into a definite opposition to Russian influence and Russian methods, it was not primarily so much an anti-Communist as an extra-Communist movement, even though most of its outstanding leaders were tried and tested members of the party.

The basis for the entire movement is to be found in the slight attraction that Communism as a doctrine possessed for the Ukrainian people. As late as 1927 there were only 122,928 Ukrainian Com- [665]
munists, that is, about thirty-nine for each ten thousand of the [162]
Ukrainian population. The bulk of the Communists in Ukraine were Russian and the vast majority of these belonged to the urban proletariat or to the workers in the Donets Basin and Kryvy Rih.

The general period of disintegration during the civil war and [369]
the period of Militant Communism had greatly strengthened the power and self-confidence of the peasants and had weakened the power of the city workmen. This showed Lenin and the dominant group that some method had to be found to win at least the passive support of the countryside if new troubles were to be averted.

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the tenacity with which the 186
Ukrainian peasants, whether they were literate or illiterate, clung 191 ●
to their native language. Lenin had used this characteristic with 665

186 skill and success in encouraging the Ukrainian opposition to the
● 191 Russian Provisional Government. The proper recognition of the
665 language had been one of the most insistent demands put forward by all groups which had later come together in the Ukrainian National Republic. The failure of the Bolsheviks in their early occupation of Ukraine to recognize the Ukrainian language had been one of the surest means of arousing opposition to their course and this time with their power established, the Bolsheviks decided to change their policy. As early as December 6, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party had declared: "In carrying out absolutely the principle of the self-determination of peoples, the Central Committee considers it necessary to repeat again that the Russian Communist Party maintains the recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic." It encouraged the Russians in Ukraine to learn Ukrainian and to aid in developing this as a weapon for the Communist education of the laboring masses.

Yet all was mere verbiage and even Vynnychenko who, at this moment, was sympathetic to the Bolsheviks in his "Letter to the Ukrainian Workmen and Peasants," published in *Forward* (Lviv, 30.10. 2-3, II, 1920), lamented the fact that, despite this, the Ukrainian language did not receive its just due and that many Russian Communists were inclined to look upon even Ukrainian Communists as potential counter-revolutionists.

On the other hand, there was one group of Communists who were sincerely devoted to this goal. They were the former Borotbisty and the Ukapisty who had stressed the need for Ukrainian Communism and who had never lost an opportunity, while stressing their Communist feelings, to express the hope that the Ukrainian Communists might some time be formed into a special party and be duly admitted to the Communist International on a par with all the other Communist parties of the world. They took advantage of the situation offered by the formation of the Union of Soviet Republics and eagerly sought posts in the Commissariat of Education, which was one of the independent republic commissariats. This gave them a very good opportunity to work for the develop-

ment of Ukrainian and Ukrainian culture in a field where there could be little expressed opposition. 186 191 665

On the other hand, every step for the fostering of Ukrainian or its development was met by the Russian Communists, and especially by those in Ukraine, with the greatest hostility. This went so far that Dmytro Lebid, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the KP/b/U, declared that there was a conflict of two languages and cultures in Ukraine and that it was not the duty of the Communist Party to interfere in this but to allow the dominant culture to win. In this he was actuated as a Russianized Ukrainian by his hostility to his native language and culture but he failed to win support, for it was very obvious that his policy of favoring Russian was only deepening the gulf between the Party and the Ukrainian peasants, the thing that the Moscow authorities were endeavoring at the time to bridge.

On August 1, 1923, the Communist Party passed a new decree which said: "The government of the workers and peasants regards it as necessary in the immediate future to concentrate its power on the spreading of a knowledge of the Ukrainian language. The former equality existing hitherto between the two most widely used languages in Ukraine, Ukrainian and Russian, is insufficient. Life, as experience has shown, causes the actual superiority of Russian. To remove this inequality, the government of the workmen and peasants will introduce a series of practical means which, respecting the equality of the languages of all nationalities on Ukrainian territory, must assure to the Ukrainian language that place which corresponds to the number and economic importance of the Ukrainian people in the territory of the UkSSR."

It further provided that Russian officials in Ukraine should learn Ukrainian within a definite period. All this sounded well on paper but the date by which Russian officials had either to learn Ukrainian or be recalled was constantly postponed further into the future, and the highest men who came for but short periods and who represented Moscow in the Ukrainian capital stubbornly refused to make any effort to obey these decrees.

On the other hand, every declaration to this effect was eagerly

Ukraine Under the Soviets

186 snapped up by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty in the Commis-
191 sariat for Education. In a short time they worked so effectively
665 that nearly all the books published in Ukraine and about 85% of the newspapers were put out in Ukrainian. The circulation of these Ukrainian publications in the villages increased rapidly and aided in producing a sense of relief among the peasants and a tolerance of the situation which was in sharp contrast to the prevailing mood of a few years before.

[871] A network of Ukrainian schools was set up throughout the country with instruction in the native language and the number of students grew rapidly from among the peasant classes. It had been centuries since the Ukrainian language had reached such a state of popularity. The theatres produced plays in Ukrainian as the chief part of their repertory. The cities assumed a markedly Ukrainian appearance and the leaders could look with satisfaction on their results.

871 The one difficulty was the low level of the instruction in many
186 places but this was equally characteristic of the Russian terrain. 1/1 The revolution and the Bolshevik laws had abolished the old Russian system of education and had eliminated from the schools the bulk of the older intelligentsia and their children who, on one excuse or another, were excluded from all opportunities for study. The old disciplines were abolished and the Soviet school entered upon a chaotic period. Nevertheless, the changes which the former Borotbist Hrynko introduced, including the establishment of seven year schools which gave the students the right to enter upon a three year course in various technical schools, served to increase rapidly the number of young and partly trained Ukrainians who were available for posts in the government service and who thereby freed the organization from its dependence upon Russian-trained people.

645 In 1925, he 2/1 was succeeded in the post of Commissar by O.
871 Shumsky, likewise a Borotbist, who had held the post of Ukrainian
186 Minister in Warsaw. He had come back in 1923 to become the
665 Director of Agitation and Propaganda for the Central Committee of the KP/b/U. An ardent believer in the Ukrainian cause, he

1/1 [1923 -- Analyst]

2/1 [Hrynko, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

661 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in
558 Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

[665] The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

[814] Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

●191 Postyshev's 1 object was the rerussification of the country, for it
626 had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian news-
[871] papers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

basis with Ukrainian. He established Russian theatres in the larger 191
cities and sent them Russian companies from Leningrad and Moscow 636
to show the greatness of Russian art, while at the same time he had [545]
Les Kurbas arrested at the end of the year and closed the Berezil Theatre, the leading company in Ukraine, and even abolished its name as Catherine the Great had abolished the name of the Zaporozhian Sich one hundred fifty years before.

The fundamental object was to re-Russianize Ukraine as rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this idea, Zatonsky even suggested that the students should be encouraged to talk a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian in the hope that they could thus be more quickly induced to accept the alien tongue. That was a rash thought, for as soon as it was reported to Moscow, there came a strong protest from Gorky that such a procedure could only injure the purity of the Russian language by mixing foreign elements in it. Zatonsky hurriedly withdrew his suggestions but it was too late and only a few years later he was to pay the penalty for his rash proposal.

It was small wonder that Khvylovy, who knew well that he [762]
was threatened with arrest and execution, committed suicide in despair on May 13, 1933 and he was followed on July 6, by Skrypnyk who was too familiar with the workings of Russian Communism not to realize that he would be steadily demoted until he could be finished off without comment as a fallen idol.

The terror and the destruction proceeded apace and after the 661
murder of Kirov in Leningrad on December 21, 1934, new in- 538
vestigations were ordered and it was discovered that the bulk of the Ukrainian authors were involved in the conspiracy. In a very short time their ranks were almost completely decimated. In the same month H. Kosynka, O. Vlyzko, I. Krushelnytsky, K. Burevy, and D. Falkivsky were shot on various pretenses. Nearly all the former members of the *Vaplite,* the Neo-Classicists, the groups connected with the MARS in Kiev and the *New Generation,* were liquidated in one way or another, either by execution or deportation and deportation was practically the equivalent of death, for scarcely one of the deported ever returned to the Ukraine or made

[reference to forced Russification of Ukraine, 1932 - Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

626 814 191 In the field of studies in the Ukrainian language,[1] under the leadership of A. Khvylya who had already distinguished himself by his attacks on the entire process of Ukrainization, new steps were taken to counteract all that had been gained by any school of thought.

In the beginning Naum Kaganovich had tried to show that the scholars of the preceding period had worked under the influence of "populist" theories of language. He was soon forced to change this to a statement that the work had been "bourgeois nationalist," the favorite slogan for anything that was not Russian. In his article, *The Language Theory of Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism,* he wrote: "Here under the conception of the people emerge the kurkul circles; the bourgeois nationalists have shaped the development of the Ukrainian language on the speech of the kurkuls." In another passage he declared: "By this approach to the people the bourgeois nationalists understand the removal from the language of everything that is connected with the October revolution, the removal of all features which bring it closer to the language of the Russian proletariat and the workers of the other republics of the USSR and the implanting of everything that is outmoded, conservative and permeated with the nationalist bourgeois spirit."

It was easy to see at what these new "scholars" were aiming. The old arguments as to whether the local dialects of the peasants or the newer literary language which had been developed for over a century was the better Ukrainian were now replaced by the definite statement that the proper form was that which was the language of the more "advanced" classes, i.e. the Communists and their sympathizers, who were the least connected with any special area and were the least affected by any considerations of locality or traditional culture or usage. Even during Ukrainization the Communists of high rank coming from Moscow had been officially relieved of the task of learning Ukrainian. Now this was expanded and those who, of their own volition, learned a few words were adjudged the best authorities on Ukrainian because of their Communist knowledge and standing.

The new authorities set themselves the task of rooting out those

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

attempts which the "bourgeois nationalists" had made to bring 626
together the Ukrainians of the east and of the west. They declared 814
that the preceding group had sought to bring back capitalism and 191
to separate Ukrainian from the "brotherly" Russian and to remodel it on Polish and German standards. They attacked any system of orthography and transliteration which differed from that used in Russian and in their attacks on Polonisms in Ukrainian they went so far as to call Polish any Ukrainian form which differed from the Russian, even when the Polish word in fact had the same form as the Russian and differed from the Ukrainian.

In the small dictionaries that were printed only those words were admitted that revealed Russian relations and the academician Krymsky once remarked of one of these that it was merely a Russian-Russian dictionary, so far had the process been carried.

In 1933 Khvylya published a new orthography for Ukrainian. This repudiated the work that had been done earlier to bring together Eastern and Western Ukrainian and sought to take as the standard those Ukrainian dialects that had been most thoroughly russianized, although at the same time he carefully avoided explaining the policy on which he was working.

Thus, during these years there developed a definite policy of disintegrating the language from within. It was based very definitely upon the old theories of the nineteenth century, that Ukrainian was merely a corrupt form of Russian and could not have any independent development, but such a statement which would have satisfied Nicholas I and Belinsky was not expressed clearly. It was enveloped in a mass of Communist jargon which appealed to the great names of Bolshevik ideology and covered a complete ignorance of any of the facts of language or of popular usage.

At the same time in another field Postyshev saw the opportunity 633
to deliver further blows under the guise of progress and of satisfying Ukrainian aspirations. He moved the capital of the Ukrainian Republic back to Kiev from Kharkiv.[1] There were good reasons for this. The Soviet regime had been established at Kharkiv, because it was nearer to the Russian boundary and hence could more easily receive support from Russian military sources during the

[1] [1933 -- Analyst]

simply Russians was constantly increased. It was almost forbidden 626
to mention the name Ukrainian in connection with the older settlers 186
in Kuban, along the Don, in the Green Wedge along the Amur, etc. [191]
and it was a matter of perplexity as to what language they could be said to speak or what dialect in connection with later studies of the dialects of the Russian language. It was inadmissible to regard them as speaking a peasant dialect in view of the attitude of the authorities in recognizing some sort of Ukrainian, but it was even worse to believe that Ukrainian could exist in those regions and so they were simply passed over and forgotten, while the newcomers, usually being under some kind of a ban, were simply treated as Russian deportees.

Even this was not the whole story, for in such cities as Vinnytsya 661
during these same years the population was slaughtered by the thousands and buried secretly in carefully hidden burial places which were then turned into parks and playgrounds to conceal the extent of the crimes. This was repeated in many places but the situation in Vinnytsya attracted especial attention because during the War, the Germans found the places of burial and revealed the thousands of bodies of the victims, many of whom had been buried alive. The extent of these massacres was as great as was the killing of the Polish officers in Katyn, which was likewise brought to light during the war.

By the time the census of 1939 was taken and this was the last 162
one published, the growth of the number of Russians and the diminution of Ukrainians showed clearly that there was a large scale transfer of nationality which completely reversed the figures in some sections of Asia without regard for the natural laws of reproduction and mortality.

In this atmosphere the nature of the intellectual and literary 626
work in the UkSSR can well be imagined. The Ukrainian scholars 814
were forced to accept the full Russian theories of the Ukrainian 661
past. This led to a complete revaluation of all the "outstanding figures." In 1933 the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was condemned on the ground that he was a typical representative of the noble classes. By the outbreak of World War II he became a Rus-

1 [1936-1938 -- Analyst]

626 sian patriot for signing the Treaty of Pereyaslav and bringing the
814 Zaporozhian Kozaks under Muscovite domination. It was so in
661 every branch of historical study. In back of the conception of the Soviet man and Soviet patriotism began to emerge with ever greater clarity the conception of Russian patriotism, as the doctrine of the "elder brother" who had given culture and civilization to the other nations of the Soviet Union became clearer and clearer.

626 It was the same thing in language. Khvylya and his friends
814 had been working on a Ukrainian-Russian dictionary but this was
191 immediately criticized by *Pravda* for its divisive tendencies, and the guilty compilers were liquidated. A new edition was started in 1938 on still a new principle. The Ukrainian and Russian words were to have the same number of synonyms and these were to have identical value. If, in any particular case, this did not prove to be true, it was so much the worse for the Ukrainian. If there were more words in Ukrainian to express various shades of one idea that there were in Russian, the words were banned. If there were fewer, the Russian words were supplied in order to show the influence that Russian had had upon the cultural development of Ukrainian.

The result was the reverse of what Zatonsky had proposed. He had suggested a mixed language with the idea that the Ukrainians would develop by practice toward the use of standard Russian. Now the new Commissariat of Education was introducing Russian into Ukrainian, forbidding the use of Ukrainian syntactical constructions which had no parallel in Russian in order to train the Ukrainians to speak Russian by infiltrating it into their native speech. The result would have been perhaps the same, but the important difference was that it preserved the supremacy of the Russian language in a pure form and corrupted the Ukrainian beyond recognition.

538 This procedure was too violent, even for many of the poets
191 and writers who were most ardent in their support of the Stalinist
626 regime. Men like Bazhan, who had put his pen entirely at the disposal of Moscow, continued to use some of the forbidden words and even obtained rewards for their obsequious phrases couched in

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

this taboo language. It was necessary if the whole theory of the USSR was not to fall by the wayside and the authorities in Moscow were becoming aware of the growing danger of Nazism. 538 191 626

They encouraged the writers, as Tychyna and Rylsky, to write narrative and other poems on themes of the old hostility of the Ukrainians to the Polish nobles and to stress the assistance which, in those ancient days, the Ukrainians had received from the Muscovite authorities. They fanned again the fires of the civil war when the Ukrainian Communists, backed by their Muscovite friends and masters, were warring against the Ukrainian National Republic and Petlyura. 538 626

In fact, during these fantastic years, Tychyna, Rylsky, Yanovsky and similar writers, as well as Korniychuk, found it easier to maintain their freedom by this fanning of Ukrainian chauvinism into flame than did those authors who, following the narrow interpretation of socialist realism, sought to trace the transformations in the contemporary life and the growth of confidence in the Russian ideas of industrialization and collectivization. Again and again these men were called to account for allowing their local and national sympathies to run away with them and to include descriptions which were perhaps nostalgic but which could be twisted in the perverse logic of the NKVD into hidden criticisms of the great Stalin, the leaders of the people, and the all-wise and beneficent rule of Moscow.

By 1939, the situation in the Ukraine had changed entirely from what it had been in 1929 when the first five year plan was getting under way. The salient features of the Ukrainian economic life had been destroyed. Yet Moscow was not yet satisfied. 651

Despite the increased taxation and the reduction in the income of the average dweller on a collective farm, the Communist Party demanded each year a larger part of the grain and of the cash income. The voluntary donations for the benefit of the armed forces were increased and steps were begun to demand taxes in kind from the returns which the peasants received from their individual plots. Thus a peasant was required to contribute so many eggs per year to the government, which did not concern itself as to

436 the more favored because the Soviets equated in value the Polish zloty and the Soviet karbovanets. When we take into consideration the fact that prior to the war a pound of meat in Poland cost four zloty and in the UkSSR twenty-five to thirty karbovantsy, the vast purchasing power of the Soviet officials can be seen. Then in December, to ruin the native population, they arbitrarily stopped the zloty as legal tender, so that the Ukrainian population lost everything, except those fortunate persons who had succeeded in exchanging their Polish money for German marks by clandestine trade across the border.

191 This swarm of officials was of various kinds. Those who were attached to fields like military affairs, the railroads, the posts and telegraphs, etc., i.e. those branches which were directly under the All-Union Commissariats, made no concealment of the fact that Russian was from now on to be the chief language. Other sections which were under the Commissariats in Kiev first adopted Ukrainian as their official tongue, but by the middle of 1940 they, too, had passed over to the use of Russian, exactly as had been done in all the offices in Kiev.

661 471 By the end of November,[1] when the supplies in the stores were already becoming exhausted, the actual work of nationalization commenced. The former owners were often thrown out, if their establishments had been of any size, and as former wealthy individuals they were refused food tickets and other privileges on the ground that they belonged to the non-laboring element and were enemies of the people. This meant that they were compelled to sell upon the black market everything that they had been able to save or which they possessed and which had not been confiscated, and during the winter many of them, like the Polish landlowners and the police who fell into Communist hands, were deported under atrocious and inhuman conditions to Kazakhstan and Central Asia to disappear.

[665] On the other hand, the Soviets introduced at once the idea of dining halls for the workers and special stores for Communists and higher functionaries where they could secure easily and cheaply whatever there was to be obtained in Western Ukraine.

[1] [1939 --Analyst]

The Soviet Cultural Policy in the Ukraine After the War

The situation is even more severe in the field of language. 191
Korniychuk after World War II emphasized that Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism was not to be sought only by a consideration 626 538
of the contents of books and paintings. It was reflected in a still more dangerous form in the language of the books themselves. Any author who showed a predilection for the use of the older forms of the language or sought to develop it in any way other than the Communist Party desired was thereby convicting himself of holding nationalistic sentiments and of being dangerously reactionary. He thus accused of bourgeois nationalism even those writers as Yanovsky who had been most rigorous in following the party line in content.

The real significance of this statement of Korniychuk's is 191
shown by the *Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary* which finally appeared 626
in 1948 under the editorship of L. A. Bulakhovsky and M. F. 814
Rylsky. The work was published in Moscow, although it bore the stamp of the Institute of Language Study of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR.

In this the authors made no concealment of their program, for [198]
they definitely stated that their work was based upon the "spoken" Ukrainian of the government offices (where it was the most corrupted by Russian words), and not the older Ukrainian language as spoken before the introduction of the Bolshevik reforms. They added, too, that they had supplied from Russian whatever was lacking in Ukrainian, for "thanks to the Russian language, the Ukrainian has been able to acquire the capacity to respond to the needs of socialist construction and to satisfy the cultural needs of the Ukrainian people."

Stripped of its Communist jargon, this passage merely means that the Moscow authorities have decided to carry on their policy of russification in a new way. They have recognized the gap between the older Ukrainian language and the hodgepodge which they have produced and they are now insisting on using the words of the older usage in their most narrow and restricted sense, and by refusing to recognize any possibility of development in Ukrainian or any changes in it, they are forcing Ukrainian to become a dead language and by an inverted purism are planning to compel

191 the Ukrainians to recognize that Russian and Russian alone is in
626 a position to grow and develop.
814 This is entirely in line with the new philological policy dictated by Stalin after his repudiation of the late Prof. Marr and what was commonly known as Marrism, a theory that Stalin had sponsored for many years. Now he was willing to argue that Russian as the language of the USSR was not only the Russian language as the language of the Russian people but it was also in a new sense a zonal language, the approved language of Socialism and Communism and, as such, it had already absorbed all that it needed and its mission was to replace all those languages which were spoken by people who had awaked to the truth of the Moscow doctrines.

626 Thus the new theories of language study that were officially
814 accepted in Moscow opened new vistas for cultural oppression and perversion of the Ukrainian masses. They were a signal for renewed efforts, not only to control the Ukrainian cultural life in the present and the future but their efforts were extended to the past and the scholars were set to carry out an artificial restatement of Ukrainian history, literature and culture from the earliest known periods.

538 It is small wonder then that the modern post-war Ukrainian
626 literature is becoming more and more a pallid and bloodless imitation of the stereotyped patterns required for Great Russian and that even those authors who have sold themselves to the Stalinist regime are unable to produce anything of real value or of even mediocre excellence. They are turning out the average propaganda material against the imperialistic Americans on the lines ordered by the Politiburo with never a thought except the income and perquisites which they are slated to receive and the constant terror lest at some moment by an unfortunate slip they may be accused justly or unjustly of that terrible crime of bourgeois nationalism and lose in an instant all that they have worked for years to win.

The cultural pressure exerted on eastern Ukraine is spread likewise with even more force over those portions in the West which had been formerly under Poland or Czechoslovakia. Here, as former parts of the old Hapsburg monarchy, the writers had had

727 of the determined efforts of Erich Koch and his cohorts to bring
634 every aspect of life under their control, the sheer extent of the Ukraine and the size of its population prevented complete success. For example, in the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev, there were only five hundred Germans on the administrative staff, charged with governing a population of 1,920,000, in an area of nearly seventeen thousand square miles.[3]

191 The limitations on control arising from the small number of
634 German personnel available were made yet narrower by the
727 language barrier. The extent to which the Wehrmacht was dependent on nationalists as interpreters has already been described. Since few Reichskommissariat officials knew the Slavic languages and yet in general rejected the use of émigrés or West Ukrainians as aides, they were thrown back on local interpreters and assistants as intermediaries between themselves and the masses. Supposedly
126 reliable persons, often ethnic Germans, were employed. These
634 physical limitations, however, compelled the German officials to
727 concentrate on keeping the "commanding heights" of the administration—economic controls, armed force, and means of communication—in their hands, while turning over most other aspects of public affairs to administrators drawn from the native population. In these fields they could lay down policy and occasionally intervene brutally to punish real or fancied violations of their directives. They could play one group against another and thereby secure a check on the development of movements threatening to pass from German control. They could place all aspects of life under a crushing weight of fear and material deprivation. Lacking a body of supporters extending down to the smallest units of society, however, they could not enforce a positive program of indoctrination and—except in an intermittent and incomplete fashion—they could not prevent those who were in contact with the masses of the population from imparting their own ideological tinge to their activities.

634 The physical limitations of German power meant that the
727 local administrative machinery in the East Ukraine was to a large extent left to the inhabitants. Local men were of course especially predominant in the administration of rural areas, but

[3] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, December 2, 1942, p. 1; *Volyn'*, February 25, 1943, p. 4.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

for reasons which will be discussed in the next chapter, little is 634 known about their activities in connection with nationalism. The 727 city administrations were more closely supervised by the Germans, but their size prevented them from being completely controlled. In spite of the fact that the populace soon realized that only the shadow of power was permitted the local administrations, the concept of the omnipotence of state control was so well established that even the outer signs of authority behind the nationalist cause were of some importance in winning support for it. Throughout the occupied Ukraine, except for the Donbas, which [191] was very mixed ethnically, the languages of administration were German and Ukrainian only. Although it is said that the officials who carried on the governmental work in the prescribed language frequently spoke Russian as soon as they had left their desks, and sometimes even wrote their reports and orders in that language,[4] having them translated into Ukrainian, the prestige value of the change was considerable. The same was true of the widespread use of national symbols, which had been forbidden under [186] Soviet rule, such as the trident and the blue and yellow colors; they appeared on the uniforms of the police, as banners decorating the administrative buildings, even on the streetcars. On the other hand, the removal of these symbols, when Russophile elements were introduced into the administration to replace the nationalists, was equally important as a negative token of loss of prestige; the official language, however, always remained [191] Ukrainian.[5]

Some indication of the influence exerted upon the overt atti- 186 tudes of the inhabitants of the East Ukraine by the apparent ascendancy of Ukrainian nationalism is furnished by nationalities statistics obtained from censuses taken by various city administrations in late 1941 and early 1942,[6] since each citizen was usually

[4] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3.

[5] When the *Ukrains'ke Slovo* group was arrested, the cultural department of the Kiev city administration was ordered to remove all tridents and Ukrainian flags; see Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukrains'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 11. In Dniepropetrovsk, the Germans followed up the destruction of the Ukrainian *oblast* administration by removing the trident from the masthead of *Vil'na Ukraina* (The Free Ukraine), the city's newspaper, and changing its name to *Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta* (Interview 77).

[6] See Appendix.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

874 that number of inhabitants, had 541 students in its medi-
727 cal school.[37] Medical institutes were also reopened in Stalino,
186 Dniepropetrovsk, and Vinnitsa, and perhaps in other cities, although it is doubtful if any of these were the centers of nationalist youth organization which the faculty in Kiev became under the leadership of the OUN-M.[38]

The educational structure described in the preceding paragraph was designed for adolescents or young adults, and thus could be used for direct propagation of nationalist concepts. It was, of course, partly for this reason that the Germans confined advanced training within such narrow limits. Even these restrictions were not the end of the difficulties faced in inculcating a nationalist type of education in those about to assume the role of citizens,
[466] for the technical schools were frequently emptied of their students and faculty to meet the demands of the *Ostarbeiter* recruiters. The elementary schools were also drained of teachers by the *Ostarbeiter* program, and the pupils, though too young for forced labor, were decimated by famine and plague. If the task of building national consciousness had to be viewed as a long-term one, then the four-year elementary school offered a considerable field for cultivation.[39]

191 The problem confronting the nationalist leaders in education
727 was twofold: they had to ensure a basis for the development of
872 an independent Ukraine by making certain that all instruction
186 was in the Ukrainian language, so that the rising generation would be fully at home in this speech; and they had to replace the Communist ideology by a positive nationalist concept. The first task was relatively uncomplicated, though far from easy in practice. In line with their policy of encouraging the purely nonpolitical aspects of Ukrainian nationality, the Germans ordered all instruction to be in Ukrainian. The nationalist directors enthusiastically supported this rule, but it was sometimes difficult to enforce it, since even teachers who were themselves nationalist in sentiment were not always able to conduct classes in Ukrainian.[40]

[37] Occ E-4 (1); *Ukrains'ka Diiznist'*, October 10, 1942, p. 1.
[38] See Chapter V.
[39] In Kiev alone there were fifty elementary schools with 17,000 students (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2).
[40] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 4; M. Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki*

in greater detail. It is absolutely essential to stress the key nature 565
of this problem, however, for it is almost beyond doubt that any 186
movement which had offered a fully satisfactory solution to the agrarian problem would have won the adherence of the mass of the peasantry, regardless of its stand on the national question.

Superficially, the situation in the countryside was satisfactory 186
from the nationalist standpoint. It is true that certain peasant 369
traits of a distinctively national character had been subjected to erosion by the developments of the Soviet period. The handicrafts, including making of the national costume, had almost vanished under the joint impact of material shortages and growing availability of factory products.[33] The physical appearance of the villages had been altered too and much of their distinctiveness lost through the Soviet destruction of the cemeteries.[34]

In the more basic matter of language, the changes had not been 191
so great, although in some areas at least many "town words" in 369
the "all-Soviet" (i.e., Russian) tongue had been introduced.[35] 186
From the point of view of developing replenishments for the intellectual elite from peasant stock, the situation was worse, however, for the Ukrainian tongue was frequently scorned as the speech of "Ivany i Maryny z kolhospu"—"Johns and Marys off the farm."[36] Even more significant, the mere fact that the peasants spoke Ukrainian, and even had a certain affection for the language as their mother tongue, did not necessarily prove that they possessed any consciousness of nationality. A Ukrainian visitor to one of the villages in the Taganrog district of the lower Don, just beyond the border of the Ukrainian SSR, reported that all the inhabitants spoke pure Ukrainian and retained Ukrainian customs. When addressed as Ukrainians, however, they denied the appellation, insisting that the "Ukrainians" lived over to the west, across the border. The nationalist reporter pointed out the identity of speech and manners with the population to the west, but they replied, "Yes, they are our brothers," yet persisted in denying that they were themselves Ukrainian.[37]

[33] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 26, 1942, p. 3.
[34] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 15, 1942, p. 4.
[35] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1942, p. 3.
[36] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3.
[37] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 22, 1942, p. 2.

impression on the intellectuals of the smaller towns. OUN-M 668*
writers and propagandists appear to have maintained regular con- 186
tact with them for several months in 1941, and it is apparent that
the Kiev *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* served as a model for many of the new [204]
editors.[8] Schools were opened under the direction of nationalist [658]
educators, Prosvita and theatrical groups were formed, coopera-
tives linked with *Vukospilka* were active. Apparently, too, the
town administrations were largely in Ukrainian hands; the mu- [191]
nicipal authorities in Uman' issued a sweeping order forbidding
the use of the Russian language in any office, school, or enter-
prise under their jurisdiction.[9]

The influence of the nationalists in the towns penetrated to some degree to the countryside in the area west of the Dnieper. For example, nationalist papers like *Nova Doba,* published in [204] Berdichev, seem to have had a moderately large circulation in the villages. There also seem to have been nationalist influences of a purely local character in some places, aside from those brought in by the nationalist parties. Zvenigorodka, a small town about a hundred miles due south of Kiev had been the home of the Free Cossacks, a nationalist organization of the wealthier peasants during the revolutionary period. The group was revived by some of the villagers under the German occupation, and, together with a mimeographed newspaper, served as a focal point for local nationalism.[10]

The influence of the church, especially in the rural areas, was 794
not entirely on the side of Ukrainian nationalism.[1] The Auton- 186
omous clergy under Alexius made an early start in reorganizing religious life in this region. They established a diocese of Vinnitsa and Zhitomir, and during most of the period of occupation were supported by the influential Bishop Damaskin (Maliuti) of Kamenets-Podolsk. Damaskin's diocese included nearly five hundred churches, with a hundred and sixty priests.[11] Apparently most of this large organization, which was overwhelmingly concentrated in the rural districts, had no objection to Damaskin's allegiance to the Russophile church. The Autocephalous Church

[8] Interview 30.
[9] *Nastup,* May 3, 1942, p. 2.
[10] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[11] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 13, 1942, p. 2.

[1] [After Germans had occupied this territory--Analyst]

648 The Minister of the Reich at Kiev, Muhm, a subtler man, expressed himself differently though in the same sense: 'I am convinced that it is necessary to maintain the fiction of a friendly independent country in the Ukraine. . . . We shall completely destroy the little authority which remains with the Ukrainian Government if we were to show too coarsely that it is only a toy in our hands.'

191 177 Disarmed, enslaved by the great force of the army of the central empires, the Ukraine was not in the position of an independent State. The Ukrainian language, imported from Galicia, was not spoken in the country. Only official documents and administrative notices were written in Ukrainian. Not a single private business ever used this language either for correspondence or advertising. In the schools and universities Russian continued to be used. The circulation of newspapers in the Ukrainian language was very small, while the Russian papers which agreed not to carry on open propaganda against the troops of occupation appeared everywhere and were actually the only ones read by the population.

727 642 The Ukrainian Government, composed of politicians having absolutely no administrative experience, soon proved to be incapable of organizing the supply of grain as promised to the armies of the central empires. The Germans then decided to change the regime. The organizations of landowners, small and big, which supplied corn and other agricultural produce to the forces of occupation, were favoured by the Austro-German authorities. It is unnecessary to point out that no Ukrainian political idea influenced the creation of these organizations. The Germans selected their association, known under the name of '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*',[1]

[1] '*Khliborobiv*' means farmers in Ukrainian. '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*' means association of farmers.

[i.e. In 1919. --- Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

An important group of Ukrainian politicians, who had formerly supported Petlioura, joined the Bolshevik cause after his defeat. The Soviet Government inaugurated a policy of Ukrainization from the beginning in order to satisfy their ambitions and to show the world their nationalistic Liberalism. But, as under Petlioura, it was a superficial one and never penetrated in fact either into the private life of the citizens or into the sphere of education, or even into the administration.

Although Ukrainian had become the official language, nobody used it and correspondence between official institutions continued, with rare exceptions, in Russian. One of the authors of this book, who held an administrative post in a Soviet enterprise in the Ukraine from 1921 to 1924, had never written a single word in Ukrainian and had never been prosecuted for this defection. It is not because the word 'Odessa' is now written with one 's' instead of two and the word '*plochtchad*' (in Russian a town square) is to-day replaced by the word '*maidan*,' that the Ukraine has ceased to be Russia.

The policy of Ukrainization continued without great changes and in spite of the lack of common sense until 1927, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party suddenly decided to introduce the Russian language as the second official language. One can explain this sudden change by the development of separatist anti-Soviet propaganda, undertaken by secret organizations, formed under the protection of Poland. There occurred in the Ukraine the first wave of purification which was directed against the 'Nationalistic Chauvinists,' accused of spiritual connection with Galician 'counter-revolutionary' elements, which had been affected by the propaganda of Polish 'Fascists.'

The people's commissar for education of the Ukraine,

[i.e. in 1923 --- Analyst]

175 186 greatest Ukrainian poet), Mykola Kostomarov, historian, Panteleimon Kulish, historian and poet, Mykola Hulak, and others, took part in this organisation.

In the declarations of this society the idea of an independent Ukrainian democratic republic was promulgated: "And Ukraine will resurrect from her grave ... And Ukraine will be an independent republic" *(The Books of the Being of the Ukrainian Nation,* the work of the Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius).

The Russian Government punished the members of this society severely and acted rigorously against Ukrainian political and cultural regeneration.

[191] In 1863 the Russian Minister Valuyev declared that "the Ukrainian language did not exist, does not exist and cannot exist." In 1876, by a secret order of the Tsar, the printing and circulation of Ukrainian books, periodicals etc. in the Russian Empire was prohibited. Even the Bible in Ukrainian was forbidden. Ukrainian could not be tought in schools. The Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire was forbidden until 1905. Only the revolution of 1917 made the introduction of Ukrainian in schools possible. This prohibition of the living language of a considerable nation, the instrument of its culture, had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people and is a feature absolutely unique in universal history.

[871] 175 517 The prohibition of the Ukrainian language in the schools and in the press hindered the development of education in Ukraine. The statistics show that the number of schools and the level of education in Ukraine were higher in the 18th century than in the 19th*). On the other hand, the Russian schools separated the educated classes of the Ukrainian nation from their nationality, and put the intelligentsia of Ukrainian origin into the service of Russian culture. Thus, besides the economic exploitation to the advantage of the Russian Empire, Ukraine was deprived of her best intellectual forces which were drowned in the 'Russian Sea'. We can quote here only some names of prominent Ukrainians who, by virtue of circumstances, helped to create the Russian civilisation, and gave their talents for the increase of the Russian Empire: Archbishop Theophan Prokopovych, the deputy of the Patriarch of Moscow Stephan Javorsky, Bishop Dmytro Rostovsky — were prominent Ukrainian scholars of the time of Tsar Peter I. who were forced

*) Thus there were in 1748 in four regiments (Ukraine had a military Cossack administration) of the Hetmanate (for three regiments the figures are missing) 866 elementary schools, i. e., one school for 1000 inhabitants. From this, little or almost nothing remained in the 19th century.

nian Communists who wished to create an independent Soviet Ukraine participated in these uprisings. The policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine had a clearly predatory character. The Communist Commissar Schlichter said of the tasks of the Soviet Russian campaign at a session of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919: 642 669

"You all remember that when Ukraine was becoming Soviet with every day of the advance of the Red Army we became easier in our minds; the rich-in-bread Ukraine is ours! . . . We have four central supply detachments. We set all hopes on them. We have a lot of workers we have sent out who will be able to overflow all Ukrainian villages. We shall always remember that the looks of the proletariat of Russia are turned towards Ukraine" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 2: Kharkov, 1928).

Not only by the ruthless pillage were the Ukrainian people put against the Russian Communist dictatorship; by its nationalist policy, too, it roused great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians. The Rumanian Communist Rakovsky, who was appointed by Moscow as Premier of the Soviet Government of Ukraine, declared that the Ukrainian language and culture were 'petty bourgeois' and that the use of the Ukrainian language in public institutions was necessary only for 'Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries'. [186] 656 191

For this reason the 'dictatorship of the Russian culture' was introduced in Ukraine by the Russian Communists as a 'proletarian' one. "The Soviet Government in Ukraine in 1918 made in fact Russian the official language", — writes the Communist N. Popov in his *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine* (1929). Against the declarations of an 'independent Soviet Ukraine', the Rakovsky Government proclaimed the 'federation' of Ukraine with Russia. There could not be free elections to the Soviets in Ukraine. The power in the villages was given to the 'Comittees of Poor Peasants' consisting often of people sent from Russia. According to the instruction these Comittees were given they had the duty — "to fulfil precisely and relentlessly all orders of the supply authorities . . ."

13. Risings in Ukraine

In spring 1919, when the Soviet Army had reached the Dniester River, Moscow prepared its forces for the support of Soviet Hungary. But at that time the same troops who had fought against the Franco-Greek forces under the command of Hrihoriev, Tyutyunnyk and others, started the fight against the Russian Communists. Of the strength of this movement Rakovsky, Premier of 669

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
656 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Congress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

though this population had accepted in a friendly manner the Soviet 728
rule, hoping for an improvement of their situation. When Rumania 661
in alliance with Germany joined the war against USSR in 1941, the [726]
Rumanian authorities on their part terrorised the Ukrainian population of Bukovina and Bessarabia. At the end of the war Bukovina and Bessarabia were joined with USSR again. The Communist terror turned with even greater vehemence against the Ukrainians there. Especially from Bukovina a great part of the Ukrainian population had been deported into the Eastern regions of the USSR. The cities were filled with foreign elements, colonists from Russia were brought into the villages.

3. The Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine)

After 1919 Carpatho-Ukraine, which had been for centuries 563
under Hungarian rule, was attached to Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian population of this country consists mostly of peasants. The towns had a Jewish and Hungarian population. The Czech authorities in Carpatho-Ukraine (official name Carpatho-Ruthenia) favoured for some time the development of Ukrainian schools. But [191]
from 1925 the Prague Government began to support the Russophile group that despised the Ukrainian language as 'peasant' and used a strange mixture of the Church-Slavonic, Ukrainian, and Russian languages. In reality, these 'Russophiles' were adherents of Hungary and received support from Budapest too. The entire administration in Carpatho-Ukraine came into the hands of the Czech bureaucracy. According to the Treaty of Saint Germain, Carpatho-Ukraine was guaranteed autonomy inside the boundaries of CSR, but the Czechoslovakian Government permanently deferred its realisation.

At the end of 1938 Germany launched strong pressure against Czechoslovakia exploiting the national problem of this country, (Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians). The Prague Government changed the centralistic Constitution to a federative one. For the Carpathian Ukraine the Prague Government recognised an autonomous statute with a separate Diet and Government. Against this the neighbour states — Hungary and Poland — reacted vehemently. In February 1939, the elections to 642
the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine took place. After the separation of 726
Slovakia from Bohemia the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed the independence of this country (March 16, 1939). But with Hitler's and Mussolini's consent the Hungarian troops occupied Carpatho-Ukraine after stubborn fighting against the Ukrainian volunteers.

which was led by General Kornilov, later by Denikin. In the summer 669
of 1918 the Kuban Region fell into the hands of the Russian Volunteer Army. The leaders of this army wished to make the Kuban Region a base for the restoration of Tsarist Russia. Among the population of the Kuban Region and in the State Council a strong opposition to the Russian Volunteers arose. But Russian influence was stronger. under the pressure of Denikin's army an alliance of the Cossack territories — the Don, Kuban and Terek regions — for the fight against the Russian Communists was formed at the end of 1918. Against those Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks who defended their independence the Russian Volunteers used terroristic methods: President of the Kuban State Council Mykola Ryabovol was murdered in June 1919 in Rostov, prominent members of the State Council were arrested and hanged. This terror by the Russian 'Whites' was the reason that the Kuban Cossacks left the front against the Russian Red Army and repealed the alliance with the Russian Volunteers. At the beginning of 1920 the Kuban State Council according to the will of the population took the Government of the Kuban into its hands. Vasyl Ivanys was appointed Premier. The Kuban leaders wished to get rid of the protectorate of the Russian Volunteers and to continue the struggle against the Soviet Russian Army in alliance with Ukraine and the peoples of the Caucasus. But in April 1920, under pressure of the Soviet Russian Army, the Kuban Government was forced to leave its territory and to move to Crimea, where at that time the Volunteers' Army of General Wrangel was. Being pressed between two forces, both of which fought for domination in Russia, the 'Red' and the 'White' Russians, the Ukrainian Kuban Government could not attain any agreement with them and went abroad.

The Kuban Region was occupied by the Russian Red Army. 656
Soviet Russia refused recognition of the Ukrainian nationality 191
in the Kuban Region for a long time, and carried on a Russification line through the school and press. Only on August 30, 1929, the Commissariat of Education in Moscow decided that the literary language of the Ukrainians inside the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Republic was the language of Ukraine.

But even after this the Russian Communist bureaucracy hindered [891]
the development of schools among the Ukrainians in the RSFSR. In December 1933, in the Kuban Region and on other territories of the RSFSR, with a Ukrainian population of 7 millions, all Ukrainian schools, press etc. were abolished by order from Moscow. During the collectivisation and the famine of 1932—33 the population
of the Kuban Region had enormous losses. Attempts on a rising 000

661 were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.

6. The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East

167 The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

668 Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrai-
186 nians, mostly farmers, were numbered. At that time a Ukrainian national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops, theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revolution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national, political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrainian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy. The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the develop-
656 ment of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the
191 development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrainians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow*, 1931, p. 33).

7. The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars

167 In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

Of course, the 656
Ukrainian problem has remained from old times for Soviet Russia 661
the basic problem of its internal and foreign policy. The unceasing Russification policy against the Ukrainians is carried on by particularly cunning methods: the Ukrainian language is not yet [191] abolished definitely in the offices of Soviet Ukraine. But that official who speaks Ukrainian also in his family and in private relations becomes in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suspicious, and has to suffer repressions.

The Communist theory of the national problem worked out by Lenin preaches the 'fusion of nations'. Basing on this, the Russian Communist Government is trying to 'fuse' the nations of the Soviet Union with the Russians. Against peoples who oppose forced Russification, ruthless repressions are used by Moscow. Even the mentioning of the national rights of the non-Russian peoples is condemned in the USSR as 'bourgeois nationalism'.

There is a great principal difference between the situation of the 000
Russians and the peoples united by force with this state: though the Russians are not satisfied with the Communist dictatorship, they do not, however, feel national oppression. Even in the new anthem of the USSR it is said that this state was rallied by Great Russia. We can state the efforts of Russian political groups opposing the Communist régime to maintain the rule of the Russian state over the territories conquered by Soviet Russia, even after the eventual fall of the Soviet régime.

As a curious fact we can quote the view of the well-known Communist L. Trotzky, who was assassinated in Mexico during World War II, on the Ukrainian problem. Trotzky demanded in 1939 the full separation of Ukraine from Russia. But Trotzky thought of an independent Ukraine in the form of a Soviet Republic. This naturally deprived his thesis of all seriousness, for Trotzky needed the slogan of an independent Ukraine only as a political argument in polemics against Stalin (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 77/78, 1939).

As the facts prove, the Ukrainian nation has to endure the heaviest oppression in the USSR. Unfortunately, the words of the famous historian of France Charles Seignobos written in 1913 on Ukraine, can be used emphatically to describe the outstanding feature of the present state of the Ukrainian nation: "Here is the most oppressed nation" ("Voici la nation la plus opprimée", *Les Annales des Nationalités:* Paris, 1913).

In its equalising policy, the Soviet Russian Government retains, 659
also, traces of the Tsarist régime in the affairs of Church and reli- 796
gion. Thus, after having seized Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine dur- 661

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LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE[1]

By HAROLD R. WEINSTEIN

000 One of the most painful lessons mankind has learned since the rise of nationalism in the last hundred years is that language diversity fosters conflicts between states and among peoples living within one state but speaking different languages. Conversely, language uniformity makes for unity. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries most governments have strongly desired such uniformity. In some countries, as in America, assimilation into one language has been achieved by allowing national groups the free use of their native languages, and by relying upon the advance of education and of commercial and industrial development to break down the barriers those languages erect between various linguistic groups. In the period before the First World War, many governments sought language uniformity by forcibly repressing the languages of minorities, by Germanizing, Magyarizing, Russifying their national minority groups. Of no government was this more true than of that of the old Russian Empire, in which the "minorities" — that is, the groups other than the Great-Russians — constituted over half the population. But by attempting to suppress the languages of the Ukrainians, Georgians, Tatars and so on, the Tsarist régime did not achieve its goal of unity; rather, it aroused a host of nationalist movements which put language repression first on the bill of grievances against the government and which helped drive Tsarism to its death.

Lenin believed that the Tsarist method defeated its own ends and that the goal of unity had to be approached by other paths. First of all, literacy would have to precede any attempt to obtain language uniformity: as long as none other than oral means of communication existed between the minorities and the Russians, the Russian language could not really permeate the minorities and break down their national horizons. Literacy, of course, could be most easily reached by universal education in the minority languages themselves. Then, once the art of reading was mastered and great cultural vistas were opened to the minorities, they would be in a position to go ahead and adopt Russian as a second language. The Russian language would appeal to them because it is the language of a stronger culture than

[1] This study is based on material gathered for a book on the policy of the Soviet Union with regard to national minorities. The book is being written under a grant from the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, and it is being sponsored by Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes and Geroid Tanquary Robinson of Columbia University.

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those the minorities possessed; and the necessity for knowing Russian would be heightened by drawing the minorities into the industrial, commercial and political life of the country as a whole. Meanwhile, literacy in the minority languages would facilitate the spread of communist doctrines stressing the international solidarity of the working-class against capitalism. To achieve unity while allowing the free use of minority languages might be the long — and perhaps very dangerous — way around, but Lenin believed it would be the only effective way in a backward, heterogeneous country like Russia.

The Soviet leaders were so certain that eventual lingustic uniformity could be attained only through temporary diversity that they went further in emphasizing minority languages than any state has ever gone: they made vigorous attempts to foster the actual use of the minority languages, to "nationalize" (i.e., "Ukrainize," "Armenianize," "Tartarize") political organizations, administrative apparatus, factory managements, trade-unions, military units, newspapers, books, theatres and schools, among the minorities. In their desire to retreat from the old Imperial policy of Russification, they leaned over so far backward that they introduced the element of compulsion in the opposite direction: they forced the national minorities and the Russians living among them to use the local languages in political, economic and cultural life, stopping short only at the threshold of the individual's private world. The ultimate effect of this policy upon the increase or decrease of nationalism among the minorities is not yet apparent, and the fate of such nationalism may hinge upon such factors as economic prosperity, political liberty and developments in the field of international relations; but the process of nationalizing the political, economic and cultural life of the minorities is an experiment which deserves more attention from the non-Soviet political and scholarly world than it has received.

In the field of education, the Soviet régime has followed a four-fold policy: first to establish a school system embracing all children; secondly, to promote the spread of communist doctrines by integrating them into the curriculum; thirdly, to nationalize the school system by introducing the languages of the minorities as the languages of instruction in schools attended by children of the minorities; and, fourthly, to pave the way for eventual assimilation by providing for the study of Russian as a separate subject in the schools of the minorities. The first two aspects of this policy are complex subjects, each of which deserves a separate study. The present discussion will therefore treat only of the linguistic phases of the Soviet educational policy: the nationalization of education — that is, the use of minority

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languages as the media of instruction; and the study of Russian as a separate subject.

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In setting out to nationalize education, the Soviet régime has encountered many obstacles: Russian nationalists — and there were some even among the Communists — opposed the policy; text-books and teachers were scarce; and the more backward minorities did not even possess a written language of their own. As the exigencies of space prevent the investigation of all the problems encountered in the nationalization of education, this study will be limited to examining the policy as applied in the Ukraine; that is, to the Ukrainians and to the other minorities — Poles, Jews, Germans and others — living among them. The Ukrainians, it may be noted, are the largest minority in the Soviet Union; they are the most significant from the point of view of current international relations; and the difficulties encountered by the nationalization policy in the Ukraine were sufficiently complex to provide some insight into the policy as a whole.

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Among the Ukrainians, as among the other minorities, the nationalization of education has stemmed from the program on the national question which Lenin formulated before the overthrow of the Tsarist régime. This program, intended to overcome minority nationalism, had to assign a conspicuous place to the language question. To many Ukrainians the treatment of their language by the Imperial government appeared even more onerous than the political oppression which was meted out to Russians and Ukrainians alike. The Ukrainian language was regarded by the government as an uncouth dialect of the Russian language; it was harried from the schools; and it was badgered throughout the literary, scholarly and theatrical worlds. The resulting Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin believed, was a threat to the international unity of the Ukrainian and Russian masses, a unity he regarded as essential for the achievement of socialism; and this Ukrainian nationalism would have to be met with the promise of linguistic equality for the Ukrainians and for all other nationalities. This conception was written into the program on the national question adopted by the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party in 1913, a program which was first intended to apply to a period of "capitalist democracy" but was retained after the establishment of the Soviet government in 1917. The first point in the program stated: "Insofar as national peace is possible in a capitalist society, which is based on exploitation, profits and wrangling, such peace is obtainable only by means of a thoroughly, consistently democratic, republican governmental structure, guaranteeing complete equality to all nations and languages, and by the inclusion in the con-

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stitution of a basic law nullifying every kind of privilege of one nation and every kind of violation of the right of the national minorities."[2]

While defending this point in the program, Lenin explained that he did not desire to turn Russia into a "Babelesque confusion" in which one national group could not communicate with another; and he thought that sooner or later the minorities of Russia would become assimilated, probably through adopting the Russian language he cherished so highly and which he expected would be taught as a subject in the schools.[3] However, Lenin argued, such assimilation could be achieved not by compulsion, not by the Tsarist method of repression, but by the natural process of commercial and industrial development and intercourse. To force the minorities to study the Russian language by "the use of the stick" merely estranged them and turned them against that language. If, on the other hand, the minorities were allowed to use their own language in education, they would willingly accept the study of Russian also and would, as in America, voluntarily use it because of its advantage in economic intercourse. Hence, wherever minorities lived compactly, their languages would be used as the medium of instruction in the schools; and where members of minorities were isolated among other nationalities, they would be given the opportunity to study the language of their nationality.

Although the Provisional Government, ushered in by the February Revolution in 1917, intended to alter the policy of Russification and proclaimed linguistic freedom for the minorities, it did not succeed in overcoming the hostility of the minority nationalists who were then rapidly extending their influence among the peasantry. The Provisional Government, for example, wrangled with the Ukrainian nationalists not only on the question of political autonomy, but also on the expediency of Ukrainizing some of the army units; and in the Ukraine itself the former Tsarist officials remaining at their posts obstructed the Ukrainization of the school system. As the discontent of the peasantry with the land policy of the Provisional Government fed the flames of Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin was more than ever resolved to overcome minority hostility by, among other things, establishing linguistic equality.

After the October Revolution had put the Bolsheviks in control, the Soviet régime introduced into the schools the policy of national

[2] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach i Rešenijach S'ezdov, Konferencii i Plenumov Ts.K., 1898–1932* (Moscow, 1933), I, 238–240.

[3] For the views of Lenin contained in this paragraph, see Lenin, V. I., *Sočinenija* (Moscow, 1935), XVI, pp. 509, 551–554, 595–596; XVII, pp. 66, 89, 114–115, 133, 139–154, 178–181, 361.

871 languages as the medium of instruction. Lenin stigmatized as "Great-
●191 Russian Chauvinists," those people in the Commissariat of Education
176 who favored teaching only in the Russian language; and referring
829 specifically to the Ukrainians in a resolution he wrote for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, he stated that if the Bolsheviks wanted to overcome the hostility of the Ukrainian peasants (a hostility quite clearly evident during the Civil War from 1918 to 1920), the Ukrainian language could not be pushed into the background of either educational or political life.[4] Stalin argued that education in the minority languages would facilitate the raising of the cultural level of the minorities to that of the Russians and would thereby forge bonds of union between them.[5] The educational policy for the minorities, he stated, must have it as its aim: "to develop national culture; to build up a wide network of courses and schools for both general education and vocational and technical training, teaching in the native languages, for the purpose of training Soviet, party, trade-union and economic cadres from among the native people."[6] These views of Lenin and Stalin were incorporated into party resolutions, adopted in the decade after 1919, on education and on national policy generally.[7]

871 It was, of course, much easier to make speeches and pass resolutions than to realize the aims set forth therein. Even in the relatively advanced Ukraine it promised to be very difficult to establish a "wide network" of schools giving instruction in the national languages. The heritage of buildings, school supplies and qualified teachers bequeathed by Tsarism was meager in comparison with the needs of a régime aspiring to universal education: in the Kiev Educational District, for example, only twenty-two of every thousand people attended school in 1913.[8] Educational facilities, moreover, were reduced by the disastrous Civil War, during which constant fighting, famine, typhus, cholera, economic collapse and bankruptcy levied a high tax on the educational system; and the lack of funds and personnel long hampered its recuperation.[9] By 1924 the system approached its status

[4] *Ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 155, 552–554.

[5] J. Stalin, *Stati i Reči ob Ukraine* (Kiev, 1936), pp. 111–112, 194–195.

[6] J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (New York, 1935), p. 208.

[7] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach . . .* I, pp. 155, 637.

[8] The Kiev Educational District comprised the provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Podolia, Volhynia and Chernigov. The number of pupils is from Ministerstvo Narodnogo Prosvieshcheniia, *Vsepodanneišii Otčet, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1915), p. 196. The estimate of the population is from Centralny Statističeski Komitet, *Ežegodnik Rossii, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 33–59.

[9] For the condition of the educational system up to 1924, see *Urkainska Socialistična Radianska Respublika. Zbirnik Spravozdan Narodnich Komisarijativ i centralnich ustanov U.S.R.R. ta Upolnivaženich Narodnich Komisarijativ R.S.F.S.R. 5-mu Vseukrainskomu Z'izdovi Rad Ukraini. Otčet Narodnogo Komisariati Osviti U.S.R.R. za 1920 rik (Kharkov,*

under Tsarism, but a long road had to be travelled before all children 871
would have an opportunity to attend schools. Buildings would have to be constructed, teachers trained, text-books written and published. The Ukrainian government first endeavored to provide "ele- 871
mentary" or four-year schools for all children from eight to twelve 658
years of age, then to expand these schools into "incomplete middle" or seven-year schools, and finally to replace these with "complete middle" or ten-year schools; and, in the meanwhile, the government established technical schools and higher educational institutions to train engineers, doctors, actors and other types of "socialist cadres." This quantitative growth of the school system was matched by its growth qualitatively, as measured from the point of view of the language policy. In spite of the shortages of teachers knowing Ukrainian [191] ●
and the languages of the other minorities,[2] the almost complete absence of text-books in these languages, and the appearance of considerable opposition on the part of political leaders, of teachers and even of parents, the Russian language was gradually replaced as the medium of instruction by the other languages.

As early as March 1919 an order of the Commissariat of Education 871
of the newly re-established Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic de- 191
clared that the Russification policy was abrogated; that the Commis- 656
sariat would aid in the development of the long-repressed Ukrainian language; and that "in view of the elimination of a governmental language as such, and of the declaration that all local languages are equal, the Commissariat of Education gives the local population the right to determine in which language teaching must be carried on in the schools, safeguarding simultaneously the interests of [other] national groups."[10] Wherever the language of instruction remained Russian, a second language — also chosen by the local population itself — was to be taught as a special subject. In September 1920 this [271]
provisional order was strengthened by a law of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. The law instructed the Commissariat of Education to draw up a plan for schools of all grades and categories with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.[11] Ukrainian was to be studied as an obligatory subject in all teacher-training institutions and was to be used as the language of instruction in some of them. The law also ordered the Government Publishing House to issue "a sufficient quantity of text-books as well as *belles-lettres* and other publications in the Ukrainian language."

1921), pp. 3–6; *Zbirnik Uzakonen ta Rosporiadžen Robitničo-Seljanskogo Urjady Ukraini za 1924 rik*, 1924, part 1, sec. 271, pp. 800–803; Sojuz Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R., *Pjatysesojuznyi S'ezd Sojuza Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R. Stenografičeski Otčet* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 172–174. [10] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1919, sec. 260, p. 347.

[11] *Ibid.*, 1920, part 1, sec. 509, pp. 712–713.

[2] [Prior to 1924 -- Analyse]

871 During 1923 and 1924 several laws designed to provide elementary
191 education for all children specified that this education was to be con-
656 ducted in Ukrainian where that nationality predominated, and in the languages of the "national minorities" (minorities within the Ukrainian nationality — Poles, Germans, Jews, Czechs and so forth) wherever these minorities formed compact groups.[12] The laws outlined a series of practical measures to make this rule effective: teachers knowing Ukrainian were to be assigned to schools in which they were needed; text-books and other reading materials in Ukrainian were to be increased; pedagogical schools and courses were to be transferred to Ukrainian; pedagogical journals were to be Ukrainized; and all classes for teaching illiterates and semi-literates, except those for the non-Ukrainian minorities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian. Provision was also made for the obligatory study of Ukrainian as a separate subject in all schools being conducted in other languages.

These laws gave impetus to the process of Ukrainizing the "general" (elementary, incomplete middle and middle) schools; and the process was aided by the presence of many nationalists who had formerly opposed the Soviet régime but who had been pardoned and put to work in the Commissariat of Education. In 1923, according to a newspaper report, 47 percent of the general schools had been Ukrainized, while plans had been made to provide the Ukrainian pupils with Ukrainian schools by 1925.[13] During the years from 1923 to 1925 the realization of these plans was proceeding most effectively in the rural areas, where the largest proportion of the Ukrainian population was to be found. In the province of Kharkov, for example, 20 percent of the general schools in the school year 1923–24 were still using Russian and 49 percent were "mixed schools" — schools using Russian in some classes and Ukrainian in others; but 69 percent of the schools in the city of Kharkov were still using Russian exclusively.[14] A picture of the manifold difficulties encountered in this transitional period was presented by the district of Krolevetski in the province of
[875] Chernigov.[15] In 1924 instruction in the elementary schools was supposed to be given in Ukrainian; but a majority of the teachers hardly knew the language, and they actually used a jumble of Ukrainian and Russian. In the middle schools the situation was worse: a majority of the teachers not only did not know Ukrainian, but considered themselves exempt from learning it because they had been former

[12] *Ibid.*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–899; 1924, part 1, sec. 272, p. 801; 1924, part 1, sec. 300, pp. 932–933.

[13] *Visti* (organ of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Executive Committee), Oct. 28, 1923.

[14] *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1923; see also *ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1924. [15] *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1924.

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teachers in the gymnasium and therefore possessed "higher qualifications"; and these teachers showed "active or passive resistance" to Ukrainization. In this district, as in many others, the complaint was made that the schools lacked Ukrainian text-books and other such reading materials.[16]

These difficulties were gradually being overcome. By 1924 the publication of text-books and children's literature in Russian had almost ceased in the Ukraine, and the publishing houses were concentrating on Ukrainian materials.[17] Ukrainian was being taught in all pedagogical schools and teacher-training courses.[18] The results of this step were apparent in 1925. In Chernigov province, for example, 67 percent of the teachers had mastered Ukrainian, and the proportion of Ukrainian schools — which then stood at 54 percent — was being raised as rapidly as the teachers who had recently learned Ukrainian could be transferred to the districts where they were needed.[19]

During 1925 and 1926 the whole process of Ukrainization was raised to the status of a "high-pressure (*udarnaja*) campaign. "Attention was directed even to the *crèches* because, as one writer explained, the early years of a child's life are of the utmost significance in his linguistic development.[20] But a report from Chernigov in 1926 stated that the teachers were agitating among the peasantry against the Ukrainization of the schools; they were "striving with all their forces to discredit the Ukrainian language, to arouse the peasants to adopt resolutions against Ukrainizing the schools, and so on."[21] This was denied by the school officials in the region from which the report emanated,[22] but similar items of news came from other regions. One writer cited a specific teacher in the Don Basin: although she was supposed to teach the Ukrainian language as a separate subject, she could hardly speak it and she referred to it as "a terribly ugly and crude language."[23] Another reporter, again from Chernigov, produced evidence to illustrate the hostility of both parents and teachers: because of this hostility a region with an overwhelmingly Ukrainian population contained thirty-five Russian schools, one Ukrainian and one mixed school.[24]

[16] See *ibid.*, Mar. 4, 1924, Mar. 5, 1924.

[17] *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1924. [18] *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1923.

[19] *Kommunist* (organ of the Central Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine), Mar. 21, 1925.

[20] *Proletarska Prawda* (organ of the Kiev Regional Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, of the Kiev Regional Executive Committee and of the Kiev Regional Trade-Union Council), Aug. 26, 1926.

[21] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926. [22] *Ibid.*, July 25, 1926.

[23] *Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1926. [24] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926.

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871 However, the Ukrainization of education slowly approached its
● 191 goal. It is impossible to determine the actual number of Ukrainian
656 children studying in Ukrainian schools, for the school statistics contained only the total number of children studying in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish and other schools; and while some Ukrainian children studied in non-Ukrainian schools, many non-Ukrainian children studied in Ukrainian schools. However, an approximate idea of the extent of Ukrainization can be gained by comparing the proportion of school children in Ukrainian schools with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. According to the school census of December, 1927, ten years after the Bolshevik Revolution, 75.8 percent of all pupils in elementary schools were in schools conducted entirely in Ukrainian; 6.9 percent were in schools in which some classes were conducted in Ukrainian and some in other languages; and 10.6 per cent were in Russian schools.[25] As the Ukrainians in 1927 were estimated at 80.1 percent of the total population and the Russians at 9.2 percent, the elementary schools might be considered to be nearing the goal of Ukrainization. The seven-year schools, then the predominant type of middle schools, lagged behind the elementary schools because they were relatively more numerous in the Russianized cities; of the pupils in these schools, 60.7 per cent were in Ukrainian schools, 14.7 percent in mixed schools and 15.5 per cent in Russian schools.

In some places, particularly in some cities, the Ukrainization policy overshot its mark. Whereas the Ukrainian population of Kiev was estimated at 41.1 percent of the total population in 1927, 49.8 percent of its school children were attending Ukrainian schools, 5.9 percent mixed schools and 30.6 percent Russian schools.[26] The proportion of pupils in Ukrainian schools was also greater than the proportion of the Ukrainian population in Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk. This situation, as shall be noted below, was regarded unfavorably by some writers in the newspapers, but the charges of "over-Ukrainization" received little attention from the government until after 1933. During the period from 1923 to 1933 the government was concentrating its efforts upon suppressing Russian nationalism and upon providing the Ukrainian and other non-Russian nationalities with schools conducted in their own languages.

874 In this period much attention was also given to the Ukrainization
191 of technical and higher educational institutions, but in these institu-
656 tions the lack of teachers knowing Ukrainian, of text-books and of good-will was an even greater handicap than in the Ukrainization of

[25] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini na 15 Grudnja 1927 (Peperedni Pidsumki Škilnogo Perepisy)*, Kharkov, 1928, pp. 20–21. [26] *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

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the general schools. As early as 1923 the government ordered the gradual Ukrainization of various technical schools ("technicums," "workers' faculties," etc.) and of higher educational institutions (medical, art, pedagogical, engineering and other "institutes").[27] Vacancies in their teaching and administrative staffs were to be filled preferably with people knowing Ukrainian; some courses were to be conducted in Ukrainian immediately; all students were obliged to study Ukrainian history, literature, economic geography and language; Ukrainian dictionaries and lists of Ukrainian equivalents for Russian scientific terms were to be issued in order to hasten Ukrainization. After the promulgation of this law the process of Ukrainizing technical and higher educational institutions proceeded under the constant prodding of the Commissariat of Education;[28] but by the summer of 1926 only a small proportion of these schools were considered fully Ukrainized, the chief obstacle being that the faculties did not know Ukrainian: in Odessa and Kharkov, for example, only six percent of the professors in the higher educational institutions had mastered that language.[29] At this time the Central Committee of the Party stepped into the picture and ordered an intensification of efforts to Ukrainize these institutions.[30]

A lively flurry of activity to bring the technical and higher schools into line followed the Central Committee's directive, which was passed along by the local committees.[31] The Commissariat of Education ordered the Ukrainization of all technical schools, except those serving national minorities, by the beginning of the school year 1927–28.[32] The Scientific-Pedagogical Society of the Ukrainian Academy of Science held a series of conferences to improve the teaching of the Ukrainian language, literature and history; to work out and distribute lists of Ukrainian scientific terms; and to establish Ukrainization courses for faculty members.[33] Finally, the Ukrainian government took a long step toward the Ukrainization of these schools when its basic statute on education, adopted in 1927, formulated a series of definite rules pertaining to technical and higher schools.[34] All students entering these institutions were to be examined in their knowledge, unless they had graduated from Ukrainian middle schools. Professors, other teachers and scientific workers were to possess a knowledge of Ukrainian equivalent to that demanded of government officials, and

[27] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . ., 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–897.
[28] E.g. *Kommunist*, Mar. 6, 1925; Mar. 20, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, July 6, 1926.
[29] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 6, 1926. [30] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1926.
[31] This was done, for example, by the Kiev Regional Committee of the Party.—*Ibid.*, July 15, 1926. [32] *Ibid.*, July 14, 1926. [33] *Ibid.*, July 4, 1926, July 22, 1926.
[34] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . ., 1927, part 1, sec. 157, pp. 626–628.

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no professor or other teacher could be appointed unless he could conduct his courses in Ukrainian.[35] Institutions for scientific research and for preparing research workers, including the universities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian; and candidates for degrees in such institutions were not to be accepted until they had passed an examination in that language.

Progress in Ukrainizing the technical and higher educational institutions was indicated by the school census of 1927. The Ukrainian language was used for instruction in educational establishments embracing 14.2 percent of the students in the higher institutes, 33.7 percent of the students in the technicums and 47.4 percent of those in other types of technical schools.[36] Although the actually Ukrainized institutes and technicums were not numerous, many of the others were then undergoing Ukrainization. Establishments using both Ukrainian and Russian contained 74.8 percent of the students in the institutes, 43.7 percent of those in the technicums and 33.3 percent of those in other types of technical schools. Only 7.1 percent of the students in the institutes, 17.7 percent of those in the technicums and 13.7 percent in other technical schools still studied exclusively in Russian.[37]

After 1927 the process of Ukrainization proceeded steadily, but in 1929 the Party and the government still regarded the condition of the higher and technical schools pessimistically. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, stated that a considerable part of the teachers and professors in these institutions were hostile to Ukrainization;[38] and newspaper reports bore him out. In Odessa, for example, Professors Tolstoi and Demetz refused to teach in Ukrainian and considered that all lecturers who did so were "renegades."[39] In 1929 the Commissariat of Education was forced to rule that all students intending to graduate from higher educational institutions would first have to pass an examination in the Ukrainian language equivalent to that demanded of government officials.[40]

[35] Only students and professors coming to the Ukraine from other republics were to be permitted additional time to fulfill the requirements.

[36] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 48–51. In this period technicums were classified with higher educational institutions rather than with other types of technical or "professional" schools, which were in turn classified as middle schools. The other technical schools included "workers' faculties," "workers' evening professional schools," "schools of the working youth," "long-term courses," "schools of brigade apprenticeship," and "trade-union schools."

[37] This data was given in a speech by Kossior, published in *Proletari* (organ of the central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine and of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade-Unions), July 17, 1930. [38] *Ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1929.

[39] *Komsomolec Ukraini* (organ of the Central Committee of the Leninist Communist Union of the Youth of the Ukraine), Mar. 16, 1929. [40] *Proletari*, Apr. 25, 1919.

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At this time, when the whole problem of Ukrainizing the highly Russianized Don Basin and other industrial regions in the Ukraine was being attacked, the failure to Ukrainize the school system was frequently mentioned.[41] Even a directive of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in January 1930, stated that in the industrial regions only the schools for general education and for extirpating illiteracy had been Ukrainized; and the directive ordered the Commissariat of Education to examine the faculty members of the technical and higher schools on their knowledge of Ukrainian, and to take steps to insure that these people possessed such a knowledge.[42]

During 1930 and 1931 the reports on the Ukrainization of technical and higher schools were limited largely to items of "self-criticism" which pointed out obstacles or found fault with specific institutions and individuals. The professors in the Medical Institute in Kharkov now knew Ukrainian, but the process of Ukrainization was being retarded by the lack of Ukrainian text-books.[43] In the Lisenko Theatrical Institute in Kiev the classes were conducted in Ukrainian, but the reporter complained that extra-class work was still being carried on in Russian.[44] An investigation of the Institute of Consumer Coöperation and of the Veterinary Institute revealed that the majority of the students still spoke Russian among themselves and that two professors of the former institution refused to instruct their classes in Ukrainian.[45] Both professors and students in the Construction Institute and the Chemical Institute were reported to be hostile to the use of Ukrainian: one of the professors had been discharged for this reason, and the students had declared Ukrainization to be proper only for the middle schools. Because the library lacked Ukrainian books and only three of the hundred and twenty-two journals received were in Ukrainian, the administration of the Chemical Institute was upbraided for opposition to Ukrainization.[46] The Textile and Mining Institutes were also cited as examples of the failure to Ukrainize properly.[47]

The years up to 1933 constituted the high-pressure period of Ukrainization; after 1933 the government concentrated its attention chiefly upon suppressing the tendency to "over-Ukrainize," where such a tendency was discernible, and upon rectifying the results of this tendency which had already appeared. This was not a new pol-

[41] E. g., *Komsomolec Ukraini*, May 16, 1929, June 26, 1929.
[42] *Proletari*, Jan. 3, 1930. [43] *Ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1930.
[44] *Proletarska Pravda*, Sept. 22, 1931. [45] *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1931.
[46] *Ibid.*, June 30, 1931. [47] *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1931.

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Chernigov the school assigned to the Jewish language — which in the Soviet Union means Yiddish rather than Hebrew — was using that language even before the schools for Ukrainian children were using Ukrainian.[54] A report from Kiev described a campaign undertaken to draw Polish students into the Polish Pedagogical Institute, into the Polish departments of the technical schools, and into other Polish educational units.[55] In the meanwhile, the Jewish Pedagogical Institute in Kiev was being moved into a new building provided by the Commissariat of Education, and elementary schools were being established for Czechs and Assyrians.[56] Dnepropetrovsk reported that its German school was being enlarged.[57] The city of Kharkov found it could not open a school for Koreans (!) because no teachers were available, and the Kharkov City Committee of the Party asked the Vladivostok City Committee and the Communist University of the Toiling East to supply a few Korean teachers.[58]

No evidence that Kharkov ever succeeded in opening a Korean school has come into the hands of the author; but in 1926 the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. complimented the Ukrainian Republic on its attention to the educational needs of the minorities; and the school statistics for 1927 indicated that a considerable number of children of the minorities were studying in their own languages. Of all the pupils in general (four and seven year) schools, 2.9 percent studied in Jewish schools; 1.4 percent in German schools; 0.9 percent in Polish schools and 0.8 percent in schools using other minority languages: Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Tartar, Swedish, Greek, Assyrian and Moldavian.[59] Schools using both Ukrainian or Russian and some other language or languages embraced 2.1 percent of all the pupils. Since Jews composed 5.4 percent of the total population, Poles 1.6 percent, Germans 1.4 percent and other minorities 2.1 percent, it is evident that many of the children of the smaller nationalities went to Ukrainian or Russian schools. This fact can probably be accounted for in part by the lack of buildings and teachers, by the scattered distribution of the smaller minorities and by the indifference of the smaller nationalities themselves. The Jews, for example, have tended to assimilate into the Russian nationality in the large cities and into the Ukrainian nationality in the smaller towns and villages. The younger generation of Jews favor Russian or Ukrainian as their social language, and many Jewish parents prefer to put their

[54] *Visti*, Oct. 2, 1924.
[55] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 24, 1926.
[56] *Ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1926.
[57] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1926.
[58] *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925.
[59] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–25.

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871 563 656 children into Russian or Ukrainian schools. One reporter in 1933 gave evidence to show that some Jewish parents had desired their children to attend non-Jewish schools, but that pressure had been brought to bear upon them by zealous officials to send their children to the Jewish schools newly constructed for them.[60]

As an illustration of the attitude of the children themselves, an experience of the author may be pertinent. Upon visiting a Jewish school in Kiev, he observed that some of the pupils were carrying Russian text-books; and to the enquiry as to whether no Yiddish books existed for those subjects, several pupils replied: "Oh, yes; but we like to read the Russian texts better than the Yiddish." The school happened to be located in the old Jewish section of Kiev, and undoubtedly the children were sent to this school either because they spoke Yiddish at home (but not amongst themselves) or because of the superior facilities offered by a new institution; and if they had been able to decide for themselves, it is possible that many of these children would have chosen to attend Russian or even Ukrainian [191] schools. Russian is the language of a culture stronger than the secular non-Hebrew culture conveyed by the Yiddish language in the Soviet Union; Russian is also the language spoken in Moscow and generally throughout the U.S.S.R.; and all those pupils, and parents, too, who ever expect to move freely about the Union must have complete mastery of the Russian language. What is true of the Jews is also true of the Poles, Germans, Czechs and others.

874 563 191 That the children of the minorities had to master the Russian and Ukrainian languages if they desired to continue their education on the higher levels is indicated by the nature of the technical and higher educational institutions in the Ukraine. It was impossible to set up an electrical engineering institute for a handful of Poles or Assyrians, or to establish every type of higher educational institution for the Jews. Hence, as the statistics for 1927 indicated, most of the technical and higher educational institutions taught in Ukrainian, Russian or a mixture of the two. Of the students in the lower technical schools (technical schools other than technicums) only 1.4 percent studied in Jewish schools, 0.1 percent in Polish schools, 0.3 percent in German schools, 0.1 percent in the schools of other minorities, and 3.0 percent studied in schools that had one or more of the minority languages together with either Russian or Ukrainian or both.[61] There were no institutes using exclusively the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian minority languages, although 3.9 percent of the students studied

[60] *Proletarska Pravda*, Mar. 29, 1933.

[61] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 48-51.

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in institutes that conducted part of their work in Russian or Ukrainian and part in other languages. Of the students in the technicums, 1.5 percent studied in technicums using the Jewish language, 0.5 percent in those using Polish, 0.7 percent in those using German, 0.5 per cent in those using other non-Russian minority languages, and 0.5 percent in technicums using Russian or Ukrainian and one or more of the other languages. These figures do not signify that the Jewish, Polish or German children were deprived of a chance to study in technical and higher schools; on the contrary, the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian student body in these establishments, as will be noted below, was relatively larger than the Ukrainian and Russian student body.

The work of establishing schools using the languages of the smaller nationalities continued after 1927; in fact, it was given additional impetus by the campaign of 1933–35 against nationalist influences in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education. But before examining the effects of this campaign, it is necessary to note the attitude toward Russian schools. At the core of the process of Ukrainization was the transformation of Russian into Ukrainian schools; and it was not surprising that there appeared in at least some areas a tendency to deprive the Russian-speaking population of an opportunity to study in Russian schools. This was, to be sure, not at all the intention of the government. In its decree in expanding general education, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee ordered that "special attention be directed toward assuring schools with instruction in the Russian language for all children of the Russian nationality."[62] But, as has been noted above, the proportion of pupils studying in Ukrainian schools in some places — especially in the larger cities — was greater than the proportion of Ukrainians in the population. A writer in *Proletarska Pravda* (*Proletarian Truth*) claimed in 1926 that the general schools in Kiev were being over-Ukrainized.[63] He was answered by another writer, who argued that whereas the criticism was based on an examination of the number of *schools*, there was still a larger proportion of *classes* being held in Russian than the proportion of Russians in the total population; and the second writer denounced the first for bringing grist to the mill of the enemies of the Soviet national policy.[64] The criticism was proven correct by the school statistics for 1927; but since the process of Ukrainization was in full swing and since at this time the Party considered the Russian nationalists

[62] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1926, part 1, sec. 453, p. 1246.
[63] *Proletarska Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1926. [64] *Ibid.*

in the Ukraine more dangerous than the Ukrainian variety, no additional attention was given to the problem of Russian children.

In 1933, however, the offensive against Ukrainian nationalism occasioned a review of the Ukrainization process. Ukrainian nationalism had been considered a dangerous force since 1926, when Shumskii and Khvilovoi — two important figures in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education — were censured for desiring "to orient Ukrainian culture on capitalist Europe rather than on socialist Moscow." The Party became still more alert to signs of nationalism after the uncovering in 1929 of the Society for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, a secret organization headed by such outstanding nationalists as Efremov, Germaize and Nikovskii. But it was the campaign against the collectivization of agriculture which occasioned the intensive campaign against the nationalists. The Party regarded the opposition to collectivization as the result in large part of the nationalists, and it set out to remove them from every branch of political, economic and cultural activity. The central figure in the campaign was Nicholas Skripnik, an "Old Bolshevik" who was accused of having fallen under the influence of his nationalist colleagues and was removed from his position as Commissar of Education in March 1933. Even before his removal, however, the Commissariat of Education and all of its activities were under fire.

Charges of over-Ukrainization of the school system were first launched in an editorial appearing in *Kommunist* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party) in February 1933, and reprinted in other newspapers. The editorial said: "The mistakes and perversions in realizing the Ukrainization of the schools led in a considerable number of places to neglecting and ignoring the interests of the national minorities and especially the needs and requirements of the Russian toiling masses living in the Ukraine. Among responsible circles of the Commissariat there was concocted the 'theory' that the majority of the children in the cities, small towns and other labor centers speak a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon, and that therefore the majority of these children should study in the Ukrainian language. As a result, a significant part of the Russian toiling masses were deprived of schools in their native language and actually subjected to the forced Ukrainization which the Party had condemned in all of its directives."[66] Shortly after this editorial appeared, an article in *Proletarska Pravda* stated that in Kiev only 49 percent of the Russian children and 30 percent of the Jewish children studied in schools conducted in their native languages; that although

[66] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1933.

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some of the others studied in mixed Ukrainian-Russian or Ukrainian-Jewish schools, they were "mechanically transferred" after the first four years to classes using Ukrainian.[66]

Zatonski, who replaced Skripnik as Commissar of Education, stated that the Ukrainization of Russian children had taken place in Kharkov and in the Don Basin as well as in Kiev; and he pointed to Krasnolutzki District, where the number of Russian schools had dropped from twenty in 1930 to twelve in 1932.[67] He also declared that in Kherson and Makiivitz there were no Russian elementary schools at all; and that in some places there had been a voluntary Ukrainization of Russian children because the buildings and equipment provided for the Russian schools were greatly inferior to those of the Ukrainian schools.[68] Additional evidence was forthcoming in 1934 and 1935 to show some enforced Ukrainization of Polish children and of those of other minorities, as well as of some of the Russian children; and this situation was denounced as an example of "deliberate nationalist wrecking."[69]

This campaign against over-Ukrainization, however, was not intended to lead to a revival of the Russification policy. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was adamant on this point. He explained in 1933 that the results of over-Ukrainization would have to be eliminated because this was demanded by internationalism, "by the brotherly interests of the toilers of all the nationalities in the Ukraine."[70] But, he went on, the Russian nationalists would not be allowed to take advantage of mistakes already committed in order to reverse the policy of Ukrainization; on the contrary, there would be a further drive for "Bolshevik Ukrainization." A similar view was taken in 1934 by Postishev, the assistant secretary of the Central Committee and the official most actively engaged in hunting down the Ukrainian nationalists.[71]

According to the latest available material, the Ukrainization of education has kept pace with the expansion of general education, and a greater proportion of pupils were studying in Ukrainian schools in 1937 than in 1927. By 1937 the general schools embraced 5,364,800 children as compared with 1,678,100 in 1913 — an increase of 319 percent over the pre-War year; and whereas twenty-two of every thousand people attended elementary school in the Kiev Educational District in 1912, in 1937 the figure for all of the Ukraine had risen to

[66] *Ibid.*, Mar. 29, 1933. [67] *Visti*, May 1, 1933. [68] *Ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1933.
[69] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1934 (speech of Zatonski); Aug. 22, 1934, Jan. 5, 1935.
[70] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1933. [71] *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1934.

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871 one hundred seventeen of every thousand people.[72] The middle schools
162 had expanded greatly by 1937; the fifth to tenth grades embraced
212 1,927,100 pupils in 1937 as compared with 347,900 pupils in 1928, an increase of 554 percent in ten years.[73]

871 While the school system was expanding quantitatively, the number
191 of children studying in Ukrainian schools was also increasing. During the school year 1935–36, the year that marked the end of the campaign to check over-Ukrainization, 83.0 percent of the pupils in the general schools were studying in the Ukrainian language. This percentage coincides roughly with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. It also represents a higher percentage of pupils in Ukrainian schools than attended such schools in 1927, a fact which resulted from the expansion of middle schools in the rural areas and from the decline in the number of children attending schools in some of the other languages. During the school year 1935–36, 12.7 percent of all the pupils in the general schools studied in Russian, 1.4 percent in Jewish, 1.3 percent in German, 0.5 percent in Moldavian and 0.5 percent in Polish schools.[74] In absolute numbers, there had been an increase between 1927 and 1935–36 in the pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Greek languages; there had been a decline in the number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Swedish and Assyrian languages; and schools had been established for Uzbeks, Belorussians, Kirghiz, Kazaks, Turkomens and Latvians.[75]

874 With regard to the technical and higher educational institutions, the author has no figures on the number of students in the Ukrainized

[72] The figure for the number of pupils in 1937 is taken from *Socizlističeskoe Stroitelstvo Sojuza S.S.S.R., 1933–1938* gg. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1939), p. 163.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[74] *Socialistična Ukraina. Statistični Zbirnik* (Kiev, 1937), p. 222.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 222. *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini* . . . , pp. 20–26. A comparison of absolute figures for 1927 and 1935–36 must take into account that the statistics for 1927 gave the total number of pupils in mixed schools but not the number studying in various languages used in these schools. The number of pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Czech languages in 1935–36 was greater than the number studying in their own schools in 1927 plus the total number in mixed schools using these languages for some classes. The conclusion that there was a decline in the total number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Assyrian and Swedish languages is arrived at by considering roughly the number of pupils in mixed schools studying in these languages. For example, in 1927 there were 68,836 pupils in Jewish schools; in 1935–36 there were 69,211 pupils studying in the Jewish language; hence, there were 375 more pupils *studying in Jewish* in 1935–36 than had been *attending Jewish schools* in 1927. But in 1927 there were 11,603 pupils in mixed schools using Jewish and either Russian or Ukrainian; in all probability there were more than 375 pupils in these schools who were being taught in Jewish; and by 1935–36 the surplus above 375 had been lost to Jewish classes, indicating a decline in the total number studying in Jewish.

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schools for the years after 1927; and one might conclude from the lack of such figures in the important statistical collections that Ukrainization has ceased or has been reversed. However, this conclusion would not be consistent with the continued stress on the preparation of "Ukrainian cadres," which was the primary purpose of Ukrainizing these institutions. The need for Ukrainian engineers, agronomists, writers and scientific workers was emphasized both by Kossior and by the resolution of the Thirteenth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1937.[76] Kossior, moreover, stated that there had been a large increase in the number of Ukrainian professors, instructors, scientific workers and candidates for higher degrees. Finally, the number of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technical and higher schools had grown absolutely and relatively. Between 1927 and 1936 the total number of students in the technicums had increased from 29,300 to 133,300; in the workers' faculties, from 7,400 to 53,500; and in the institutes from 28,200 to 108,200.[77] The increase for the technicums was 455 percent, for the workers' faculties 722 percent and for the institutes 384 percent. In the meanwhile, the proportion of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technicums had risen from 58.0 to 75.3 percent; in the workers' faculties from 57.9 to 65.0 percent; and in the institutes from 48.8 to 53.7 percent.[78] The number of students from among the minorities had increased absolutely but had fallen relatively. Since the increasing proportion of the students were Ukrainians (probably chiefly graduates of Ukrainian general schools and therefore favorable to and easily adaptable to courses conducted in Ukrainian), and since the number of Ukrainian faculty members had risen, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the process of Ukrainizing the technical and higher institutions had continued even after the intensive campaign against the nationalists was undertaken in 1933.

As for the obligatory study of the Ukrainian language in the schools of the other nationalities — provided for in laws of 1920 and 1927[79] — no change has taken place. An order of the Commissariat of Education, issued in December 1940 and just received by the author, clearly indicates this fact. The order is designed to facilitate the study of Ukrainian by children who have come from other republics and, having entered non-Ukrainian schools, are handicapped in the study of

[76] *Visti*, May 30, 1937; June 6, 1937. [77] *Socialistična Ukraina . . .*, p. 133.

[78] The percentages for 1927 are taken from *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii (Bilšovikiv) Ukraini . . .*, pp. 48–52. The percentages for 1936 are from *Socialistična Ukraina . . .*, p. 152.

[79] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1920, part 1, sec. 509, p. 713; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626.

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this subject.[80] Declaring that the mastering of Ukrainian is obligatory for these children as well as for all other pupils in non-Ukrainian schools, the order states that the younger ones shall be sent to lower grades to study Ukrainian; the older ones may continue along with their classmates, and are to be marked leniently in this subject; and all are to be given special assistance in their study of Ukrainian so that by the time they graduate they may be able to fulfill the requirements demanded of the other pupils. Hence, the campaign against nationalism has not altered this aspect of the Ukrainization policy.

Perhaps the most significant result of the campaign against the Ukrainian nationalists was the effort to point up the importance of the Russian language and the value of Russian culture for the Soviet Union's minorities. One aspect of this effort was the greater emphasis placed on the study of the Russian language in the non-Russian schools of the Ukraine. A thorough mastering of Russian, regarded as a "second" and not as a "foreign language," had long been intended by the Party leaders, and had been provided for in the legislation on education. The important law on the Ukrainization of education in 1923 stated that "because the Russian language has all-governmental and all-Union significance and because it joins the Ukrainian people to the culture of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," the study of Russian as an obligatory subject was to be retained in all Ukrainian schools.[81] In the schools of the non-Ukrainian minorities in the Ukraine, either Ukrainian or Russian was to be selected by the population as a subject for obligatory study. The basic statute on education issued in 1927 went still further: both the Ukrainian and the Russian languages were to be taught as obligatory subjects in *all* schools.[82] In explaining the purpose of this clause, Skripnik stated that "now — since the proletarian revolution — the Russian language, once a language of oppression, is the language in which are written the works of Lenin; now the Ukrainians regard it as a brotherly language containing great revolutionary compositions; and in order that after leaving school the Ukrainians may be able to make use of Russian culture, the Russian language is taught as an obligatory subject."[83] This statement, coming from the Commissar of Education, was of considerable importance; but it was later revealed that interest in the Russian language had been lost in the whirl of Ukrainization.

[80] *Zbirnik Nakaziv ta Rosporiadžen Narodnogo Komisariaty Osviti Ukrainskoi R.S.R.*, 1940, sec. 355, p. 14. [81] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, p. 900.
[82] *Ibid.*, 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626. [83] *Proletarska Pravda*, May 9, 1926.

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In 1933 Zatonski censured the nationalists in the Commissariat of Education for neglecting the teaching of Russian which, because it was the means of all-Union communication, "should be taught in all the Ukrainian schools and in the schools of other nationalities."[84] But the real interest in the teaching of Russian appeared in 1937 and 1938, when the Commissariat was again over-hauled. During these years there was another intensified drive against Ukrainian nationalism, as well as against other varieties of opposition to the Party's policies and against every manifestation of inefficiency. Even Zatonskii was removed from his post. And while the renewed attack on nationalism in general was proceeding, a large amount of criticism was directed against the Commissariat of Education for its neglect of the Russian language as a subject of study. The critics — one of whom was E. N. Postnikova, a teacher and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. — stated that because of "the wrecking activities of the bourgeois nationalists," there was a higher percentage of failures in the courses on Russian language and literature than in any other subject.[85] In the first place, not enough time was being allotted to the study of Russian. Secondly, there was a dearth of text-books and of Russian literature in the school libraries: even such works as Gorki's *Mother*, Tolstoi's *War and Peace*, Goncharov's *Oblomov* and the collected works of Lenin were to be found only in Ukrainian translations. Thirdly, the Commissariat had not devoted sufficient attention to methods of teaching Russian and had failed to provide methodological programs for the guidance of teachers. Finally, the knowledge of Russian possessed by the teachers themselves was entirely inadequate; even the graduates of the pedagogical institutes did not know the language well enough to teach it. Since, the critics argued, the pupils themselves were strongly inclined to study Russian, the Commissariat should provide more thorough preparation of teachers, assign more time for this subject, provide more text-books and more Russian literature.

As a result of these criticisms the re-organized Commissariat provided new programs, several of which are in the hands of the author, and it increased the time allotted to the study of Russian. The number of hours specified for the study of languages during the entire period of attendance in the various types of schools, according to the

[84] *Visti*, Aug. 23, 1933.

[85] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), May 16, 1937; *Učitelskaia Gazeta* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), Feb. 27, 1938, Mar. 19, 1938, Mar. 29, 1938.

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871 teaching plans for the school year 1939–40, is contained in the fol-
191 lowing table:[86]
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I. Schools with Ukrainian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Ukrainian Language	1130 hours	1187 hours
Russian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Ukrainian Language	2068 hours	1994 hours
Russian Language	1131 hours	1221 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

II. Schools with Russian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Russian Language	1130 hours	1147 hours
Ukrainian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Russian Language	2150 hours	2111 hours
Ukrainian Language	955 hours	1022 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

III. Schools with Jewish or Moldavian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Jewish or Moldavian Language	993 hours	989 hours
Ukrainian Language	196 hours	252 hours
Russian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Jewish or Moldavian Language	1383 hours	1350 hours
Ukrainian Language	586 hours	618 hours
Russian Language	1131 hours	1221 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

[86] Narodni Kommissariat Osvita U.R.S.R., *Navčalni plani. počatkovoi ta serednoi školi* (Kiev, 1939) pp. 8–9, 11, 13, 15–17, 19, 21, 23. It may be noted that the plan for the rural elementary schools contained 36 more hours and for the rural middle schools 54 more hours than was assigned to the corresponding urban schools.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both within and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.
[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . .* , 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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in spite of efforts to produce films and to broadcast programs in the Ukrainian language — potent forces for assimilation to Russian culture. To the goal of assimilation, moreover, much is contributed by the industrialization of the Ukraine: new factories bring rural Ukrainians into the cities where Russian still predominates in social life, and the younger Ukrainians in the city easily adopt the prevailing language. But these forces for assimilation, even though coupled with the inculcation of communist doctrines through the media of education and culture, may be cancelled by a growth of nationalism; and such nationalism may thrive on the shocks of economic disorders and unsuccessful foreign war. The language policy itself promotes the process of assimilation by encouraging bi-lingualism; but by stressing the use of minority languages, it furthers at least a greater temporary diversification. The question of whether the forces of unity are now stronger or weaker than the forces of division can be answered only by the future.

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

Russian literatures. It is in this spirit that Kotliarevsky 538
published his comic poem, the *Travesty of Aeneid*, in 1798, the first great Ukrainian literary work, followed by a light comedy, *Natalka Poltavka*, which had a great success in Russia during a century and which is played to-day in all the countries of the Ukrainian language. Under the influence of German romanticism a particular interest arose in the Russian literary world for all that which was connected with the folk-lore, the language, and the customs of the people, as well as for their traditions and their art. Thus the first efforts of Kotliarevsky were well received by the literary circles of St. Petersburg and his *Travesty of Aeneid* remained one of the favourite readings of several Russian generations.

Encouraged by the great Slavophile movement which broke with all exaggerated Westernization, Russian writers turned to all the manifestations of the popular genius and, quite naturally, also to that of the Ukraine.

Just as in the eighteenth century the religious language and culture of Southern Russia had brought about the literary awakening of Moscow, in allowing the Russian language to free itself from its archaic forms, so, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ukraine, her romantic past, the charm of her nature, and of her popular life, inspired Russian literature and poetry. The same period saw the birth of two Ukrainian geniuses who for ever occupy places of a high order in universal literature: Gogol (1809–52) and Chevtchenko (1814–61). Nicholas Gogol wrote only in Russian, not because he 538
was forced to do so by some exterior factors, or because 192
he ignored Ukrainian, but because the greatness and the diversity of his talent passed beyond the possibilities of expression of the literary Ukrainian language. Despite the picturesqueness and the indisputable richness of its forms, this language never went beyond the literary

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

538 192 form of popular idiom. Thus, in the domain of literary, scientific, philosophic, and technical vocabulary, it is incomparably less developed than the Russian language. The pictures of town life, of the life of the upper layers of society, which dominated, during the whole of the nineteenth century, as the subject of imaginative writings and particularly of the novel, are not easily expressed in the Ukrainian language. Some expressions and words, necessary for this, are missing. We even take the liberty of expressing the opinion, which may seem bold, that the reading of *Crime and Punishment*, of *War and Peace*, of *Oblomov*, or of *Dead Souls* in Russian would be of greater value to a Ukrainian than the translation of these works into his mother-tongue. Moreover, the translations of these immortal works into other great European languages seem to us to be closer to the form, the contents, and the ideas expressed by them than their translations into the Ukrainian language, which so much resembles Russian. Therefore every work of Gogol belongs, without any doubt, to the Russian literature without being, for this reason, foreign
538 to the Ukrainian world. A traditionalist, profoundly pious, to a point of being irritated by the Russian 'Intelligentsia,' already imbued with positivist ideas, he loved the whole Russia with an ardent and passionate love. He was hurt by the spectacle of desertions and cowardice which characterized the Russian life of his time, of all those open wounds which he was able to distinguish and to depict with an unrivalled sarcasm. Like the Slavophiles and later Dostoievski, he hoped that the salvation would come from the deeper forces dormant in the Orthodox Church and in the Russian Monarchy. The Ukrainian chauvinists of our day sometimes describe him as a renegade, an opinion which it is unnecessary to contradict. One only has to re-read

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

The Ukrainian Language

197 Ukrainian belongs to the Slavonic branch of the family of Indogermanic languages and this branch again divides into South Slav, West Slav and East Slav. Ukrainian, with Russian and White Ruthenian, forms the East Slav group which is an intermediary among Slavonic languages. Morphologically Ukrainian is like Russian, phonetically it approaches Serbo-Croatian and, as far as meaning goes, it has much in common with Polish. The north-west area of Ukrainian lies in the region of the home of Slavonic languages.

● 195 The development of Ukrainian as an independent language dates from the 9th century. Up to the end of the 18th century, old Church Slavonic, which had come with Christianity mainly from Bulgaria, served as the language of literature. With Ukrainian additions this has remained the language of the church up till the present. It is also the vehicle for historical chronicles (the Nestor Chronicle, the Chronicle of Galicia and Volynia) and the Igor Song, the greatest epic of the 12th century. Most of the literary monuments of those days, however, were destroyed in the wars against the Asiatic hordes. And yet the importance of old Church Slavonic as used in Ukraine spread far beyond the frontiers of the country; it became the court language of the Grand Princes of Lithuania and the official 197 language in Moldavia. Literary activity increased in Ukraine 538 in the 17th century but the subjects treated were taken from religion and so Church Slavonic continued to be the vehicle of literary expression. Historical works in the 17th and 18th centuries, the Cossack Chronicles by Velychko, Samovydets and the "History of the Ruthenes" (Istorija Rusow) are written in Church Slavonic with popular Ukrainian and Polish additions and many foreign words. At the same time individual writers are already writing in the national language, for example Nekrashevych, Gavatovych, partly also Skovoroda, while "Dumy", folksongs and anonymous verses are also written in Ukrainian.

About the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries Ukrainian finally managed to establish itself, for which Kotlarevskyj's travesty of the Aeneid (1798) was originally responsible. Literature becomes a national concern (cf. Kvitka-Osnovjanenko, Met-

874 for party schools, for workmen's clubs and centers of adult education in the country.

871 In the course of years this basic scheme underwent many changes till it was adapted to the general Soviet scheme in 1932; by a resolution passed by the Central Executive of the Communist Party on August 25 of that year the 7-year elementary school in Ukraine was transformed into a 10-year school, a third section being added, and the technical schools which had not yet become institutes were put on the same level as the higher schools; new universities had to be founded in order to cope with the difficult tasks of cultural reconstruction. It is not our place here to criticise this or that measure; in order to evaluate these radical reforms properly one would have not only to examine the plans but also their application in practice and the results they achieved.

We are, however, particularly interested in the national element in the general system of communist education which finds articulate expression in the language used.

● 195 In the original Ukrainian Socialist Republic the Ukrainian
871 language was to have priority as the official language; this point of view was approved even in 1920 after the Revolution and steps were taken to make Ukrainian the vehicle of instruction throughout the schools where this had not already been done. Ukrainian nationalists were quick to seize this opportunity of promoting their native tongue and to aim at positive results at least in this province. But the growth in national consciousness among the broad masses of workmen and peasants due to the intensified use of the Ukrainian language began to make communist leading circles in the country uneasy. Russian was introduced as a second official language, by which the authorities hoped to put a brake on nationalism and to prevent Ukrainian influences from becoming too strong. Thus there were throughout Ukraine schools taught in two, and even three languages in order that Russian and Jewish minorities might enjoy their own rights. This preference shown to national minorities greatly handicapped the proper official language, a fact that was the more striking the higher the level of school investigated. The position of Ukrainian was most precarious at the universities,

as was frankly admitted by the official representatives at the 195
People's Commissariat for education. The shortage of teachers 871
able to lecture in Ukrainian, the lack of Ukrainian text-books and the poor development of Ukrainian scientific terminology were quoted as excuses; sometimes also the hostile attitude of some of the professors.

The same thing could be noticed in the attendance of schools by pupils of different nationality. In all vocational schools there were 53,1 % Ukrainians, 20 % Russians, and 22,5 % Jews while the population was composed as follows: 80 % Ukrainians, 9.2 % Russians, and 5.4 % Jews. Circumstances were even less favorable to the Ukrainians at the universities where the percentage of Ukrainian students sank in proportion as Jewish and Russian quotas increased. The "purges" that were conducted at universities from time to time carried off mainly Ukrainians, thereby still further reducing the proportion of students from the nation to which the majority of the population belonged.

The provinces in Eastern Galicia and Bucovina which had 871
fallen to Austria were incorporated in the general educational system in that country. The efforts of the Ukrainian population in the second half of the 19th century were confined to preserving the national character of the schools. In this they only partially succeeded, as the Poles were hostile to these efforts. To be able to educate their young people along national lines, the Ukrainians founded a series of private schools about the turn of the century which were maintained by public Ukrainian contributions. At the same time a severe struggle arose round Lviv university, which the Polish authorities in Galicia had transformed from an originally German and then Ukrainian-Polish university to an almost entirely Polish center of education. Circumstances were more favorable in Bucovina where the Ukrainians wer tolerated by the Germans to satisfy their national claims.

In consequence of the unhappy outcome of the war between Poland and Ukraine (1919), Eastern Galicia was incorporated in the Polish state, whereby the position of the Ukrainians became much worse than it had been under Austria. According to

1: Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The development of a Ukrainian historiography during the nineteenth century caused some of the nationalist intellectuals, many of whom were sons of priests, to discover that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine did not originally regard itself as bound by the protectorate which Muscovy assumed over the Ukrainian Cossacks as a result of the Perejaslav Treaty of 1654. By 1686, however, the influence of the Muscovites was so great among the Cossacks that the Orthodox Churches of Ukraine and Muscovy were merged on the basis of internal independence; the Cossacks retained the right to elect their metropolitan archbishop but pledged nominal subordination to the Patriarchate of Moscow, which had been established less than a century before, in place of their traditional tie with the Constantinople Patriarchate.

The domain of the Cossacks was gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire, and by the nineteenth century the metropolitan archbishops of Kiev were being appointed by Moscow. Many of these were not natives of Ukraine and had little in common with the local population, whose spiritual needs were ministered to by natives who entered the priesthood of the Russian Church. They employed the archaic Church Slavonic language in the performance of Church offices, but in many parishes sermons were delivered in the peasant vernacular which in the twentieth century was to serve as the basis for the development of literary Ukrainian. By the turn of the century Bishop Parfeny Levyc'kyj of the diocese of Podollia was himself delivering sermons in Ukrainian, and encouraging priests to do so, until he was transferred to the Russian diocese of Tula. The Orthodox seminaries in Kiev and Poltava were hotbeds of Ukrainian nationalist and revolutionary socialist agitation prior to the revolution.[2]

When the Imperial regime collapsed in February of 1917 and was replaced by the Provisional Government, a multitude of functional congresses met in Kiev to give voice to the economic and social objectives of the revolution, and to demand political autonomy for Ukraine. At the same time, they did not neglect to advocate reorganization of the Orthodox Church. Initially their demands were modest, but by the time of the November Revolution the nationalists were asking for an autocephalous Ukrainian Church which would be independent of the State in its internal administration and provide for the use of the Ukrainian language in the celebration of the divine liturgy. Since this was a period in which soviets, or councils, were being formed as political institutions, it is not surprising that there was considerable sentiment in favor of

[2] This is admitted even by a sworn enemy of everything Ukrainian. See A. Carinnyj, *Ukrainskoe Dviženie* (Berlin, 1925), p. 134.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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lynskyj, Hrebinka etc.). Shevchenko, the greatest Ukrainian poet and Panko Kulish, the most eminent scholar of those days helped to perfect Ukrainian as a literary language. As all these writers came from Eastern Ukraine, the literary language grew from the East Ukrainian dialects of Poltava, Kharkiv and Kyiv. 197 538

In subsequent years Ukrainian became a still finer instrument in the hands of Marko Vovchok, Hlibiv, Konyskyj, Storoshenko and Shashkevych in Galicia and Fedjkovych in Bucovina.

After the Russian government laid a ban on Ukrainian (1876), literary and scientific life was concentrated in Lviv, the Ukrainian center in Austria-Hungary. This meant that western dialects came to their own, for many writers from Eastern Ukraine now published their works in the west (Myrnyj and Nechuj-Levytskyj, novelists; Starytskyj, dramatist and poet; Tobylevych, dramatist and later Hrinchenko, Kotsjubynskyj, Samijlenko and Lesja Ukrayinka, the greatest Ukrainian poetess). Ivan Franko is one of the greatest Ukrainians from the west at this time.

In Galicia a scientific and technical terminology developed so that in 1918 Ukrainian could take its place as the official language of the independent Ukrainian state and later of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The following modern writers have done much to enhance the reputation of Ukrainian as a literary language: Olha Kobylanska, Bohdan Lepkyj, Vasyl Stefanyk (in a literary Pokutish-Volynian dialect), Oleksander Oles, Spyrydon Cherkasenko, Pavlo Tychyna, Maksym Rylskyj, Mykola Khvylovyj, Oleksa Slisarenko, Jurij Janovskyj, Jewhen Malaniuk, Bohdan Ihor Antonych etc.

The scientific study of the Ukrainian language was promoted above all by the Ukrainian Academy of Learning in Kyiv: Ukrainian has up till now been taught in lectures and tutorial courses in the universities of Berlin, Königsberg, Vienna, Münster, Halle, Prague, Naples and Paris. But Ukrainian philology was first studied in the 17th century (Grammar by M. Smotrytskyj in 1618). Two hundred years later A. Pavlovskyj's grammar, the first to deal with Ukrainian as a national language, appeared in Petersburg. And it is a Ukrainian, Oleksander Potebnya (1835—1891) who is the founder of Slavonic philology. 814

6 Emergence of Nationalism

188 The city [Kiev—Kyïv][6] and the surrounding country are, in fact,
184 Little Russian rather than Great Russian, and between these two sections of the population there are profound differences—differences of language, costume, traditions, popular songs, proverbs, folk-lore, domestic arrangements, mode of life, and Communal organization. In these and other respects the Little Russians, South Russians, Ruthenes, or Khokhly, as they are variously designated, differ from the Great Russians of the North, who form the predominant factor in the Empire, and who have given to that wonderful structure its essential characteristics. Indeed, if I did not fear to ruffle unnecessarily the patriotic susceptibilities of my Great Russian friends who have a pet theory on this subject, I should say that we have here two distinct nationalities, further apart from each other than the English and the Scotch. The differences are due, I believe, partly to ethnographical peculiarities and partly to historical conditions.[7]

● 197 As Wallace observed, linguistic differences between the Ukrain-
186 ians and Russians were significant. The factor of language has indeed been used very frequently as the decisive criterion for distinguishing the two ethnic groups.[8] During the nineteenth century a distinctive, though still evolving, Ukrainian literary language arose based on the speech prevalent among the peasantry. This speech is a member of the East Slavic linguistic group and therefore is closer to Russian than to any other major language, although Russian is not readily understood by most of the peasants. Russian was already established as the literary language of the East Ukraine before literary Ukrainian became prominent, however, and it continued to be familiar to nearly all educated Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

[6] The second form is the Ukrainian. Usually the place names cited in this study are given in the forms generally used by the power which since 1945 has controlled the area in which they are located. This means that places now in the USSR are designated by the Russian forms, and the few now in Poland by Polish forms. Where the Ukrainian name is different, it is given in parentheses after the first citation. In a few cases (especially rivers) where another form is already familiar to the English reader, this practice has not been followed, and in the case of the city of Mariupol' (Mariiupil'), which has recently been renamed Zhdanov, the old name has been used.

[7] Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1905), p. 347.

[8] In this study this general usage of referring to those who speak Ukrainian as their native tongue as "Ukrainians" has been followed, although it should be constantly kept in mind that use of the language in childhood does not necessarily imply a belief in Ukrainian independence, or even a consciousness of national distinctiveness.

X175 princes summoned by Vladimir Monomachus to organize the common defence against the Polovets nomads.

177 With Christianity the letters and the arts of Byzantium
X175 make their appearance in Russia. From the eleventh century Kiev adorns itself with magnificent churches. Soon afterwards great monasteries were founded and became the centres of learning in Russia. During the twelfth century the splendours of Kiev astonished the travellers coming from the west who, at this time, had not yet a town culture in the full sense of the word. The princely court became transformed by contact with Constantinople. The princes themselves spoke Greek and many other foreign languages, indulged in literary studies and encouraged the development of civilization
197 in their country. In introducing the Slavonic language
177 to Russia as the language of the liturgy, the Eastern
X175 Church laid the first foundations of a literary Russian language, common to the whole country. Slavonic (originally the language of the Slavs of Bulgaria) is still very nearly related to the language of the Slavs of Eastern Europe. In Russia it changes slightly by contact with local dialects, but the written language remains, in its essential features, the same in the whole country. During the centuries to come the Slavonic liturgy and the fundamental similarity of the written language helped the different parts of Russia to preserve their national character and the consciousness of their unity.

177 Although the Russia of the eleventh and twelfth
X175 centuries took the essential elements of her civilization from Byzantium and recognized, in ecclesiastical matters, the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople, she nevertheless remained in permanent and very close relationship with the West. The breach between Rome and the Eastern Church was not quite completed at the time of the conversion of St. Vladimir, and when it

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER III

THE LITERARY, INTELLECTUAL, AND ARTISTIC UKRAINE

IT becomes apparent from the preceding chapters that the influences of the western neighbours, due to the geographical position and to historic development, have always been more pronounced in the Ukraine than in Northern Russia. We also find Polish and even German influences in the Ukrainian language, literature, folk-lore, and art, which had developed on the foundation of the old indivisible mediæval Russia. 177

The Ukrainian idiom belongs to the Russian family and even to the Eastern Slavonic family, which is almost the same thing. One of the most characteristic features which distinguish all the Russian idioms and the literary Russian language from other Slav languages, both western and southern, is the appearance of a new vowel between two or more consonants. For example, *gorod* (town) instead of *grad*, *molod* (young) instead of *mlad*, is constantly met with in Ukrainian. One could even say that it is Ukrainian which has encouraged this evolution, which was somewhat retarded in literary Russian by the stronger influences of old Slavonic. 177

Certain grammatical peculiarities of old Russian, greatly simplified in Great Russian, have been preserved in Ukrainian, such as the 'i' at the end of the infinitive. For example, to give *davat'* in Russian, *davati* in Ukrainian. There are also some peculiarities in the pronunciation. It seems that the 'g' was pronounced as an 'h' in old Russian, very strongly exhaled in the

197 German manner, as one pronounces it in the Ukraine. In Great Russia it has become a 'gu' quite similar to the Latin 'g.' The two ways of pronouncing this letter immediately allow one to recognize the southern or northern origin of Russians. The *yat* of old Russian, fused with the plain 'e' in Great Russian, has in all cases become 'i' in Ukrainian. Thus *khleb* (bread) in Russian is *khlib* in Ukrainian. In this case we witness a very clear geographical differentiation of a formerly identical pronunciation.

On the other hand a large number of words which still exist in the Great Russian tongue and in literary Russian have been replaced in Ukrainian by words borrowed from Polish or, through it, from German. The Polish domination in the Ukraine and the many and prolonged contacts between the Ukrainians and the Poles have led to the direct introduction of many Polish words, pronounced in a slightly different way, into the Ukrainian language.

Notwithstanding all the differences between Great Russian and Ukrainian during the whole nineteenth century, the latter was considered simply a Russian dialect. German scholars, who were then authorities in philological matters, and even Polish scholars like Siarczinski, were the champions of this point of view. Yet on 20 February 1906 the Russian Imperial Academy, true to its tradition of impartiality and independence in scientific questions, decided, by a majority of one, that Ukrainian was really a special language and not simply a Russian dialect. It is well to remember that during the sixteenth century the old Slavonic began to be replaced by more modern forms and such that were nearer to the local dialect, in Southern Russia, which formed a new written language. The evolution of the written language in Muscovy, on the contrary, where

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the old archaic Slavonic still continued to exist during the seventeenth century, took place much later, and it is Kiev which had given the start to this evolution which ended only in the nineteenth century. 197

Leaving Sub-Carpathian Russia aside, where the idiom is very similar to ordinary Russian, with only a few peculiarities of pronunciation and where the written language is quite simply the Russian literary language, one can distinguish three different dialects in the Ukraine: that of the north, that of the south, and that of the west. The first, spoken in Polesia and in the wooded parts of the old lands of Kiev and Tchernigov, is that which is most nearly related to Great Russian. The dialect of the south used in all the territories of the Steppe, colonized during the last centuries, is the one which has become the foundation of literary Ukrainian. Finally the dialect of the west, spoken in Galicia and the territories which lie along the border of the old Russian Empire (the land of Kholm, in Volynia and in part of Podolia), has been the most corrupted by the Germano-Polo-Latin influences and has borrowed the greatest number of words to replace the corresponding expressions in old Russian.

But since Galicia has become the real centre of the Ukrainian movement, with a pronounced tendency of escaping as much as possible from all that which is Russian, the literary Ukrainian language has become more and more related to the Galician dialect of the west, which has, as a result of the abundance of Polish expressions, made it more difficult to understand not only by Great Russians but also by Russian Ukrainians.

One has seen, during the period of the German occupation of 1918, that the peasants of Central Ukraine had some difficulty in understanding this Galician idiom. To make themselves understood by the Eastern

197 Ukrainians, the German and Austrian authorities had to use Russian interpreters instead of Ukrainian ones from Galicia. Trained at the Ukrainian University of Lvov, founded by the Austrian Government, and belonging to another religion, being 'uniats' and non-Orthodox, the Galician men of letters, scientists and politicians who invaded the Ukraine after the Revolution of 1917, appeared as foreigners to the native population.

538 In popular Ukrainian poetry one finds no trace of the epic poem of the Russia of Kiev, of which the 'Tales of the Companions of Igor,' written in a language which was still very close to old Slavonic, is a magnificent example. The epic songs of the flourishing epoch of the State of Kiev, still bearing traces of the mixture of Christian and remnants of old pagan conceptions, have been perpetuated far into the north. They are the *byliny*, songs of St. Vladimir and his companions, which were accompanied by some acting, and which the popular *skazitels* still sing in the most distant North Russian lands in the forests on the shore of the White Sea. In the Ukraine a popular epic poetry of a new kind, based on subjects which have not been published, has appeared, inspired by the Cossack struggles. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have left us a few examples.

This poetry is highly lyrical, noble, and melancholy and has developed especially in the following century. It still lives to our days, known under the name of '*doumy*.' Although it speaks of epic deeds, this poetry is profoundly distinguished by that lyricism which characterizes the whole popular Ukrainian poetic art.

[533] 177 Like all the languages of the Russian family, Ukrainian adapts itself wonderfully to song. It is the Ukraine which has taught the whole of Russia the polyphonic song, which even penetrated to the remotest corners of the Russian land. It is possible that this song itself was early influenced in the Ukraine by certain elements of Western music.

early influenced in the Ukraine by certain elements of 000
Western music.

We already know that the beginnings of Ukrainian 533
literature, during the epoch of the State of Kiev, are completely interwoven with those of Russian literature. It is at the end of the sixteenth century that one should look for the first example of a literature already written in a noticeably vulgarized form and which approaches modern Ukrainian.

The struggles which followed the religious union of 197
1596 were accompanied by an intense literary activity in the Ukraine which served almost exclusively polemic ends. The cause of Orthodoxy being that of the lower classes after the defection of a great part of the clergy and of the old aristocracy, it was of necessity that its defenders had to turn to the people. We can also note a broad democratization of ideas in the writings emanating from the Orthodox camp, which favoured the use of a language which one tried to make as intelligible as possible to the masses.

The Orthodox were at first fundamentally opposed to the use of Latin, which their adversaries wished to impose upon them. 'It is because the Slavonic language is the most fertile and the most loved by God, that the devil rises against it, since, by means of simple and diligent reading, it leads towards God, without pagan malice, such as the grammar, the rhetoric, and the dialectic,' wrote the defender of Orthodoxy, the monk of Mount Athos, John Vichinsky, in revolting against the literary code of the Jesuits who were quite strange to the popular soul. He appealed to the people:

'It is better for you to go to church without bishops and priests influenced by the devil, and to guard the purity of Orthodoxy, rather than to blaspheme it and to trample upon it in going to church with bishops and

191 priests who are no longer those of God' . . . and he called upon the high clergy to preach the Evangelical Fraternity of all men: 'Have you the right to call yourselves pastors of the Church and even to consider yourselves simply the faithful, if you despise your brother who is born, like you, of the baptismal water and devotion? Be he a serf, a skinner, a sadler, or a tailor, he is your brother, your equal.'

The old Slavonic, so much defended, was not after all sufficiently acceptable as a language of the 'serfs, skinners, sadlers, and tailors' for whom it was meant. Vichinsky was really among the first who brought their Slavonic nearer to the popular idiom. Others followed his example, among them Smotritsky and Zizany.

These beginnings of a broadly popularized literature in a language which was already being called 'Russian' and which we can consider as the old Ukrainian, nevertheless had no future. The intellectual evolution of Southern Russia took another course. Orthodoxy emerged victorious from the struggles which she had to endure, but at the same time she widely adopted, in the Ukraine, the literary forms and the ambiguous style of her adversaries, which excluded or strongly hindered the popular influences.

793 It is the name of the Metropolitan Peter Mohila, one of the most remarkable representatives of Orthodoxy in the seventeenth century, which remains bound up with the new tendency of influencing intellectual Orthodox life by Latin scholasticism. Himself a descendant of a noble family of Moldavia, Mohila did not have the same bonds with the popular Ukrainian masses as the Orthodox preachers of the first heroic struggles. Very energetic, haughty, extremely violent in the method of his actions (according to his contemporaries he never hesitated to expel those monks who angered him from the monasteries,

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

661 Oppositionists of the party the opportunity of releasing a veritable ' Petliourization ' of the peasant class and of the small town-dwellers, aiming at the separation of the Ukraine from the U.S.S.R.

648 Since 1936, as a reaction to the policy of the Reich, which tended to unite the different Ukrainian movements under its guidance, the Soviet Government adopted a new Ukrainian policy the official thesis of which was the *brotherly union of the Ukrainian and Great Russian people, as bequeathed by history.*

•197 To-day we observe an attempt at bringing the Ukrainian and Russian languages closer together. Ukrainian is being purged of its Polonisms and its Germanisms, imported from Galicia, which ' the enemies of the people ' had tried to implant in the Soviet Ukraine. A system which tends to awaken and to maintain Russian national pride has been inaugurated. The victory of Poltava is no longer the victory of a Tsar who oppressed his people, but the liberation of the Ukrainian workers from the Swedish and Polish aggressors.

000 To sum up, among all the countries subjected to the ' social experiments ' by the heirs of Lenin, the Ukraine bows to them with far greater difficulty than the others. In this she seems to be the obvious prey of separatism, led by foreigners, the declared enemies of her people.

The Soviet Government is alone responsible for the existence of this separatism, which cannot be justified from any point of view and is foreign to the spirit and the interests of the Ukrainian people.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

casus, and 304,261 in parts of the old Governments of Lublin and Syedlets (now incorporated in the single Government of Cholm). Thus in 1897 there was in European Russia a grand total of at least 21,692,766 Little Russians. 161

Austria and Hungary also contain considerable numbers of Little Russians, or as they are often called in these parts, Ruthenians. Official figures of 1910 give 3,208,092 in Galicia, 305,101 in the Bukovina, and 472,587 in certain north-eastern counties in Hungary, i. e. a total of 3,985,780 Little Russians.

Accurate statistics for the full, up-to-date total of Little Russians are not available. Reliable German figures estimate the present total of Little Russians as at least 30,000,000, which is also borne out by unofficial Little Russian and Polish figures. 161

Language

The whole language question has been somewhat exaggerated owing to its inevitable connexion with politics. It is asserted by many that Little Russian is a separate language from Great Russian, though on the other hand many declare that it is only a dialect. It should be noted that in 1905 the Petrograd Academy of Science recognized the value of the study of the Ukraine dialect. 197

(6) Population[1]

Distribution and Density

The *Russian Year Book* for 1916 gives the following estimate for the total population in the towns and in the country respectively on January 1, 1913: 162

Government.	*Town Population.*	*Country Population.*
Volhynia	293,300	3,777,200
Podolia	308,900	3,646,400
Kiev	744,500	3,919,100
Chernigov	321,100	2,787,700

[1] See also Appendix I, p.

184 Ukraine, to the small farmers in the Polish Ukraine, helpless and oppressed by the Poles, to the Soviet Ukrainians working in factories or on collective farms, or even to the exiles! They[1] all [24] speak the same language, albeit in different dialects, they write the same Cyrillic script, regard the good fortune of one among them as a common possession, while the misfortune that strikes one is felt by all.

101 The thousand souls of Velykyi Lypnyk belong to the westernmost tribe of Ukrainians, the Lemki. [97] They apeak a Slovakian-Ukrainian border dialect. Ukrainian scholars maintain that the Ukrainian settlements formerly reached almost to Cracow, but that the Lemki were pushed back into the mountains by the Poles in the North and the Slovaks in the South. Until the collapse of Poland a bitter nationality fight went on for this small spearhead, especially on the part of Poland, and in the process the Lemki, as the weaker ones, were obliged to yield step by step. The Magyars, no less than the Poles, oppressed the Ukrainian neighboring tribes of Boyki and Huzul and even more than the Slovaks oppressed the Lemki. The Magyar clergy added close to 160,000 Ukrainian souls to their ethnic group. In the census the word "Magyar" stands under the heading of "nationality", and "Greek Orthodox" under the heading of "religion". They are the denationalized Ukrainians who have, for the present, still remained true to their faith. All this began when, at the /11/ end of the last century, the Magyar clergy introduced Magyar hymns, and when in 1912 the Bishop of Haydudorog invented and decreed a Hungarian liturgy in place of the Old Slavic one. (1)

1. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 33.

1 [The Carpatho-, Polish-, Soviet-, and East Slovakian Ukrainians — Analyst]

87 were established in Kiyev, Khar'kov, Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk.

No research is being carried on either in the institutes or the technical schools or the universities; they are all purely teaching institutions. There are special institutes, so-called research chairs, for research which can be carried on only within the framework of historical materialism. "The researcher is advised to limit his activity to collecting and systematizing material and to avoid drawing conclusions." (70) Since

70. Zalozieckij: Ibid., page 31.

there is only one publisher, the state, scientists often have difficulty publishing their works at all. Thus they often have no choice but to have individual studies lithographed and published in a collected edition of 50 to 100 copies. The students for their part have other worries: they live mostly in dormitories, usually very poorly. To a large extent they also lack the necessary educational equipment.

177 The Russianization of the Ukrainian language
190 is part of the nationality fight between Russians and Ukrainians. Forgotten is the time when the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences in the year 1905 emphatically pointed out that the Russian and the Ukrainian language were separate languages. According to the opinion expressed at that time, the Russian literary language should not be imposed upon the Ukrainians, since they have at their disposal a "completely /125/ developed literary language of their own". In 1933 the State Publishing House of Moscow issued textbooks for Ukrainian schools in the new "unified" language. "Unification" means reintroduction of numerous Russian words with Ukrainian endings; it also means the use of Russian phrases which are completely foreign to the Ukrainian language. If a teacher should object to this corruption of the mother tongue of his pupils or not use it, there would be

177 sufficient grounds to deal with him in summary pro-
191 ceeding as a "separatist". Pravda of October 16, 1937 even accuses non-Russian students of "mutilating the great Russian language with all kinds of local linguistic rubbish".

The Russian State Publishing House in Moscow is playing a leading role in the language fight. Of 20 monographs which were published up to midsummer 1939 as a result of the great Shevchenko celebrations, no less than 16 were written in Russian and only 4 in the Ukrainian language.

Finally, a favorite method of Russianization is the granting of prizes, free journeys, and privileged places of work and study to young Ukrainians.

*

665 Young people are supposed to spend their
883 leisure time in the Party organizations of the
867 "Yellow Bills", the "Pioneers" and with the
857 "Communistic Socialistic Youth" (Komsomol). /This is an erroneous reading of the Soviet abbreviation of Komministicheski Soiuz Molodiozh; which means Communist League of Young People. Editor/ There they are divided up into "groups of various interests" where they "can develop and satisfy their most urgent needs". There are those interested in the theater, music, sports, politics, the army and similar things. "From the outposts, from groups, from the clubs, from schools, the young people of talent come into the guardianship of the Pioneers every day, every evening, and there they develop, for they are under the supervision of experts..." (71) What "urgent needs" means is

71: H. Furman: Activity and Life of the Pioneers in the Ukraine.

explained by the Kiyev Visti of March 27, 1939, which says that the children conversation hours

Under such conditions, if the chaos and the disorder were not 722
to be allowed to spread further, it was obvious that something had to be done to improve the morale of the population. This was particularly evident and necessary during the early months when it seemed as if the Nazis might decide to make some concessions to the people. As a result, there were a series of developments undertaken which superficially, at least, offered some concessions to the spirit of the various non-Russian nationalities.

Thus, in 1943 the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR was [814]
allowed to celebrate its twenty fifth anniversary at Ufa in the Bashkir Autonomous Republic and to list its institutes which were scattered throughout Asia. Such an event rendered it possible to blame the Nazis for the destruction of what had not been evacuated. It furnished good propaganda for the Western powers who were already sending copious supplies to the USSR and receiving in return from it only condemnation and criticism.

In the same way, the various writers who had passed the 722
approval of the government were assigned posts as newspaper 538
correspondents in the Red Army where they could sing the praises 626
of Stalin. Yet, at the same time, they were encouraged to write articles and poems which would reflect the hostility to the Nazis and again and again the censorship was relaxed for men like Sosyura to write poems in praise of the Ukraine, of its past, its present and its future.

Others like Yanovsky and Bazhan were allowed to emphasize [198]
the separation between the traditional Ukrainian speech and the
jargon that had been put out in the various Ukrainian-Russian [814]
dictionaries after the breaking of the Ukrainian Renaissance. They were allowed to assemble collaborators to compile a more conservative dictionary and to revamp the system of orthography which had been the work of such pronounced Russian sympathizers as Khvylya during the preceding period.

Yet, these concessions were more apparent than real, for under 722
the wartime conditions, those Ukrainian scholars that had the 814
apparent confidence of the government were scattered far and wide. They were living perforce under abnormal conditions and

The situation is even more severe in the field of language. 191
Korniychuk after World War II emphasized that Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism was not to be sought only by a consideration of the contents of books and paintings. It was reflected in a still more dangerous form in the language of the books themselves. Any author who showed a predilection for the use of the older forms of the language or sought to develop it in any way other than the Communist Party desired was thereby convicting himself of holding nationalistic sentiments and of being dangerously reactionary. He thus accused of bourgeois nationalism even those writers as Yanovsky who had been most rigorous in following the party line in content. 626 538

The real significance of this statement of Korniychuk's is shown by the *Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary* which finally appeared in 1948 under the editorship of L. A. Bulakhovsky and M. F. Rylsky. The work was published in Moscow, although it bore the stamp of the Institute of Language Study of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR. 191 626 814

In this the authors made no concealment of their program, for they definitely stated that their work was based upon the "spoken" Ukrainian of the government offices (where it was the most corrupted by Russian words), and not the older Ukrainian language as spoken before the introduction of the Bolshevik reforms. They added, too, that they had supplied from Russian whatever was lacking in Ukrainian, for "thanks to the Russian language, the Ukrainian has been able to acquire the capacity to respond to the needs of socialist construction and to satisfy the cultural needs of the Ukrainian people." [19]

Stripped of its Communist jargon, this passage merely means that the Moscow authorities have decided to carry on their policy of russification in a new way. They have recognized the gap between the older Ukrainian language and the hodgepodge which they have produced and they are now insisting on using the words of the older usage in their most narrow and restricted sense, and by refusing to recognize any possibility of development in Ukrainian or any changes in it, they are forcing Ukrainian to become a dead language and by an inverted purism are planning to compel

The campaign to win friends in Galicia and Volhynia was in part negative; measures which were most likely to inflame anti-Soviet sentiments were avoided. The church was not entirely suppressed, though it was sharply criticized.[63] Its real property was confiscated and the religious orders disbanded.[64] The Soviet authorities weakened the influence of the church on the youth by liquidating the Catholic school system and forcibly inducting the children into Communist organizations.[65] However, the person of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was respected.[66] The part of the intelligentsia which was not prominent in politics was allowed to remain at large, although persons in callings such as the law sometimes found it necessary to turn to nonprofessional work.[67] On the more positive side, the Ukrainian language was given a far greater scope than it had enjoyed under Polish rule. In particular, the University of L'vov was formally Ukrainized in language and personnel, although it is said that the resistance of remaining Polish professors to lecturing in Ukrainian was not harshly dealt with.[68] Students from the East Ukrainian universities were brought on tours to the West Ukraine, and L'vov students made Communist-sponsored trips to Kiev.[69] Other ele-

661 626 [198] 186

cited. Either this is one of the not too infrequent examples of ability of the Prague publication to print items contrary to German policy, or someone in authority gave the signal for an anti-Soviet attitude even at that early date. In the latter case it may have been a subtle riposte in the hidden conflict over Soviet demands for Bukovina. On the other hand, as early as March the *Krakauer Zeitung* printed a report by a German who had visited the villages of the Lemko area. He praised the young Ukrainians, noting that they wore the national blue and yellow colors and greeted him with "Heil Hitler!" and "Slava Ukraïna!" (Glory to the Ukraine) (*Krakauer Zeitung*, March 7, 1940, p. 5). [167]

[63] See F. Iastrebov, "Uniats'ke dukhovenstvo na sluzhbi u polskoho panstva" (The Uniate Clergy in the Service of the Polish Aristocracy), *Komunist*, October 9, 1939, p. 2.

[64] "Die Tragödie der ukrainisch-katholischen Kirche," *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, January, 1952, p. 14.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 18, 1942, p. 4; Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), p. 112.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] Interview 36.

[68] For the official Soviet version see M. Marchenko (the new rector of the University of L'vov), "L'vivs'kyi Universytet na novykh shliakhakh" (L'vov University on New Paths), *Komunist*, December 16, 1939, p. 2.

[69] Interview 51; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, on a trip of about forty students of the L'vov veterinary school to Kiev in the spring of 1940.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The Ukrainian Press

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Beginnings of the Ukrainian Press:

I. In foreign languages:

When published	Name	Where published	Kind
1776	Gazette de Léopol	Lviv	Items of news in French
1803	Militärische Zeitschrift	Lviv	Military paper in German
1812	Kharkowskij Jezhegodnik	Kharkiv	Russian paper
1816-1819	Ukrainskij Viestnik	Kharkiv	Russian paper with Ukrainian contributions
1844	Dramatisches Unterhaltungsblatt	Eperjes	Literary paper in German
1848	Bucovina	Chernivtsi	Paper in Roumanian and German

II. In Ukrainian:

1848-1857	Zorja Halytska (Galician Star)		Daily
1850-1866	Vistnyk dla Rusyniw (News for Ukr.)	Vienna	Official publications of Austro-Hungarian authorities
1849-1858 1872-1918	Vistnyk Zakoniw (Code of laws)	Vienna	Official publications of Austro-Hungarian authorities

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

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When published	Name	Where published	Kind
1849 and seq.	Vseobshchyj Dnewnyk	Lviv	Official organ for Galicia
1890-1918	Narodna Chasopys (Popular paper)	Lviv	
1850	Vistnyk (News)	Chernivtsi	Official organ for Bucovina
1850	Krajewyj Vistnyk		For the Ukrainians in Hungary

A small but influential Ukrainian press grew in the second half of the 19th century from modest beginnings which were largely official (see preceding table). This press dealt at first only with questions of national politics and of literature, but in time grew more and more specialised. The most important newspaper at that time is the "Dilo" (Deed), a Lviv daily which, since its foundation in 1882, exercised great influence on the trend of national politics in West Ukraine, and for some time even throughout Ukraine, while the "Batjkivshchyna" (Mother-country) 1879—1896, a popular paper, which has appeared since 1897 under the name of "Svoboda" (Liberty), undertook to enlighten and influence the masses. The following are also worth mentioning: the radical papers "Narod" (The People) 1890—1895, "Hromadskyj Holos" (The Voice of the Community) since 1895, and "Zhyttja i Slovo" (Life and Word) 1894—1897 which, in the hands of journalists like M. Drahomaniv and I. Franko have done much to quicken Ukrainian life and open it to European influence.

Literary and scientific reviews, under capable editors, with national Ukrainian views, played an important part in the intellectual life of the country, developing very quickly from local publications in West Ukraine to become the main organs of public opinion throughout the country. The best of these were the "Pravda" (Truth) 1867—1898 and the "Zorja" (Star) 1880—1897 which, since 1898, has appeared under the name of "Literaturno-Naukovyj Vistnyk" (News from Literature and

204 Learning); its editors were Prof. M. Hrushevskyj, Dr. I. Franko and V. Hnatjuk, and it counted the most eminent writers in West and East Ukraine among its contributors.

After the beginnings of the East Ukraine press, "Osnova" (Intellectual Basis) 1861—1862, had been suppressed by the Imperialist Russian Government, and after all writings in Ukrainian had been forbidden by the Russian Home Minister Valujev in 1863 and by the edict of 1876, the press in West Ukraine became the voice for the entire nation. At that time the Ukrainian press consisted of 44 papers published in Austro-Hungary and in America; all political and scientific publications in Russia had to appear in Russian as the official language while Ukrainian (with official Russian spelling) might only by employed for subjects of folk-lorist or historical interest.

It was only after the Revolution of 1905 that papers could once more be published in Ukraine: on November 12th the "Khliborob" (Peasant), a national Ukrainian paper in Lubni, followed on November 24th by "Ridnyj Kraj" (Native Country), and then the most important paper in East Ukraine, the "Hromadska Dumka" (Ideas of the Community), which corresponded to the Lviv "Dilo" (Deed), which after the Revolution was replaced by the daily "Rada" (Council).

In a short time there were about 70 newspapers and journals in East Ukraine, some of which could hold their own in spite of the reaction which soon set in. At the same time the number of publications in West Ukraine was greatly increased and, before World War I, had reached the total of 80 in Austro-Hungary, 14 outside of Ukraine, 14 in USA, 10 in Canada, and 2 in Brazil.

This promising development collapsed when the First World War broke out. The government put a veto on papers in East Ukraine while Russian Military authorities suppressed those in West Ukraine. The "Dilo" and the "Ukrainske Slovo" (Ukrainian Word) and "Bucovina" (since 1885 in Chernivtsi) removed to Vienna.

The third epoch in the modern history of the Ukrainian press began with the revolution of 1917. In this year there were no

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

fewer than 172 Ukrainian papers and in the following year this number increased to 268. The East Ukraine press disappeared with the rapid decline of Ukraine's independence and its place was taken by a communist press. In West Ukraine a struggle began with Polish and Roumanian authorities and with the censorship, with the result that many newspaper enterprises emigrated. 204

Official statistics give the number of Ukrainian publications in Soviet-Ukraine in 1933 as 1780 and 1494 in the middle of 1935. Among these, it is true, there are many single sheet publications to be affixed like notices or distributed and also many papers belonging to special businesses. The number of newspapers proper was 539 (23 district papers, 16 municipal and about 500 publications for the rayons). More than 80 % (465 publications) were written in Ukrainian, the remainder in the languages of the minorities: in Russian, Polish, German, and Moldavian.

Two papers published in Kyiv are reckoned to be the most important organs of the Soviet Ukrainian press, viz. the "Communist" (with a circulation of 305 000) and "Visty" (News) with a circulation of 375 000 which correspond to the Moscow "Pravda" (Truth) and "Izvestija" (News) as far as contents and technique are concerned. We might also mention the Kharkiv "Comsomolets Ukrajiny" (Comsomolets-member of the Soviet youth organisation) and "Robitnycha Gazeta" (Workers' Newspaper), "Proletar" (Proletarian) and the Kyiv papers, the "Proletarska Pravda" (Truth of the Proletariate) and "Bolshevik". The entire circulation of the Soviet Ukrainian press was somewhere between 3¾ and 5 millions and the chief centers of publication were Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odessa.

In spite of all difficulties the press in West Ukraine continued to thrive as may be seen from the following table:

Land	Number in 1934	1936	
Poland	122	143	
Czechoslovakia	16	23	
Roumania	10	10	
total	148	176	publications

204 About the half of all papers in West Ukraine (88 or 50.58 %) appeared in Lviv, 13 in Uzhhorod, 10 in Kolomea, 10 in Chernivtsi, 9 in Lutsk, 7 in Stanislaviv and 7 in Munkach. The most important Ukr. newspapers, published in 1939 in West Ukraine, are: "Dilo", (Deed), "Novyj Chas" (New Times), "Ukrajinski Visty" (Ukrainian News) in Lviv, "Chas" (Times) in Chernivtsi and "Nova Svoboda" (New Freedom) in Uzhhorod.

The Ukrainian press for emigrants increased considerably (1934 = 76; 1936 = 110). The figures for 1939 were: 17 in the so-called Protectorate, 12 in Poland, 10 in France, 7 in Germany, and 1 each in Leningrad, Moscow, and Saratow, 3 in Jugoslavia, 2 in England, 1 in Austria, 3 in the Far East, 2 in Manchukuo, 24 in USA, 18 in Canada, 4 in Argentine, 4 in Brazi.

Among the most important of these are: 1) "Svoboda" (Freedom) — New Jersey City since 1893. 2) "America" – Philadelphia since 1886. 3) "Ukrajinski Shchodenni Visty" (Ukrainian Daily News) — communist daily New York. 4) "Ukrajinskyj Holos" (Ukrainian Voice) — Winnipeg, Canada. 5) "Kanadyjskyj Farmer" (Canadian Farmer) — Winnipeg, Ukrainian Toiler (Toronto). 6) "Narodnja Gazeta" (Native Paper) — communist, Winnipeg. The circulation of Ukrainian papers outside of Ukraine amounts to about 1 000 000; but the papers are actually read by ten times as many people.

661 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in
558 Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist
[665] Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which
[814] had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

Postyshev's object was the rerussification of the country, for it
191 had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many
626 of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian news-
[871] papers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

The old newspapers ceased at once to appear[1] but the new occupants started in all of the main cities new Communist newspapers as the *Free Ukraine* in Lviv and the *Soviet Ukraine* in Stanyslaviv. They allowed also a Communist Polish newspaper the *Red Flag* and a similar paper in Yiddish. 728 [204]

The old officials were at first encouraged to return to their posts, whether they were Polish or not but in a very short time they began to disappear and they were replaced by Ukrainian-speaking persons, some from the neighborhood and some from eastern Ukraine. At almost the same time, while preparations were begun for the proposed plebiscite, the authorities quietly picked up and incarcerated most of the old political leaders, especially those of the UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic League, the representatives of those parties that had sought a normalization of relations with the Poles. [661]

In the same slow and unobstrusive way the Polish police of the different cities were replaced by a "national militia." This was composed of armed groups of young men who more or less volunteered for the work of maintaining order. The Ukrainian and the Jewish organizations tried to bring these self-appointed groups under control but this proved a difficult task for, in many cases, the new Soviet authorities had encouraged some of the more lawless and tumultuous elements to undertake the work so as to profit themselves by the resultant chaos and to facilitate the calling in of their own people. [625]

This era of anxiety on the part of the population and of extreme moderation on the part of the occupying forces lasted for almost a month, while preparations were being made for the election of representatives of all organizations, factories, and groups to a National Assembly for the consideration of reunion with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Meetings were held everywhere, at which attendance was compulsory, and everywhere there was expressed by selected speakers the gratitude of the people for their liberation from the Polish lords and the imperialistic capitalists. Khrushchov and other high functionaries arrived from Kiev to conduct these elections and to superintend the preparation of the lists of delegates. Yet it was almost at once noted that while there 728 666

[1] [1939, Russian occupation of Poland -- Analyst]

in working out a complex organization after twenty years of near- 668*
exclusion from public administration, as well as to delay in securing the approval of Frank and Hitler. On April 13–15, 1940, however, representatives of Ukrainian groups were able to meet openly in Cracow as a steering committee, and in early June this body was formally recognized by Frank as the Ukrainian Central Committee.[13]

The accomplishment was a considerable one, although on paper 746
the new body was extremely limited in its function which, in ac- 668*
cordance with Hitler's injunction, was defined as the improvement of the welfare of the Ukrainian population of the Generalgouvernement. For this purpose, the committee[1] was granted the right to prepare a budget covered in part by allocation of funds from the treasury of the Generalgouvernement and was allowed to direct a network of Aid Committees throughout the Ukrainian ethnographical area. Among the more important formal functions of the organization was the distribution of aid received from philanthropic agencies in the United States and from the International Red Cross.[14] As is usually the case with Ukrainian organizations working under the shadow of arbitrary foreign regimes, however, the formal aspect of its activity was not the most impor- 871
tant. Officially, the committee[1] had no control over education, but 668*
through its relations with the German authorities it was able to exert great influence on the selection of teachers and the provision of instructional facilities. Through its control of welfare funds, it was able to facilitate the attendance of numerous children at the Ukrainian schools.[15] Thus it rendered an important contribution to the reinvigoration of Ukrainian cultural life throughout the area.

This educational activity was carried on in close connection 668*
with the development of a Ukrainian press. The November con- 214
ference, in addition to laying the groundwork for a central rep- 204
resentative body, had founded (also under Dr. Kubiiovych's direction) a large-scale publishing agency which issued a series

[13] *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstvo* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), pp. 580–82.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Interview 9.

[1] [Ukrainian Central Committee in General Government --Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[214] of new school texts in Ukrainian, as well as popular editions of
● 204 Ukrainian works.[16] Still more important, it began the publication
668* of a newspaper which stood head and shoulders above any other Ukrainian publication in the German-dominated areas. *Krakivs'ki Visti* (Cracow News, as it was named after the Germans forbade the use of "Ukrainian" in the title) was one of the few papers which did not become a party organ but consistently served as a forum for a broad variety of Ukrainian viewpoints. Moreover, it was the only paper of this nature which possessed considerable material resources and attracted numerous contributions from writers of real talent. It was subjected to a censorship stricter than that inflicted on Ukrainian papers in Greater Germany (although much less severe than that of the papers later established under German rule farther east); nevertheless, it was able to reflect a considerable range of Ukrainian life and thought. As a result it is an invaluable witness of the events of the war years.

563 From the standpoint of Ukrainian national interests, the favor-
178 able policy of the Germans toward the group's cultural develop-
871 ment was particularly valuable in enabling it to regain some of the ground lost under the Polish repression. It would take a lengthy volume to detail the ways in which the Ukrainians were able to improve their situation in this respect during the early war years. A single statistic will suffice, however, to indicate the general nature of the gains made. In the school year 1942–43 there were 4,173 Ukrainian-language schools in the Generalgouvernement,[17] while on the corresponding territory before 1939 there were only 2,510—of which only 457 were exclusively Ukrainian.[18] The most marked advance took place in the Chelm area, where, in the autumn of 1939, a large influx of intellectuals fleeing Soviet rule in eastern Galicia brought a new vigor to the cultural life of the Ukrainian community.[19]

[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 2, 1942, p. 3.

[17] This refers of course to the enlarged Generalgouvernement, which included eastern Galicia. It is, however, indicative of an extension of the Ukrainian educational system which was if anything even more pronounced in the areas west of the San and the Bug.

[18] P. Isaiïv, article on Ukrainian schools in the Generalgouvernement during the Second World War, *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva*, p. 952; Buell, p. 279. The remainder were "mixed" schools which Buell says were given over to Polish teachers.

[19] Iurii (George) Tarkovych, "Zabuti Zemli" (Forgotten Lands), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

cautious aide, Dr. Baran, however, in his capacity as a director 668* of the largest Ukrainian newspaper, *Dilo,* went with the editor of [804] ● *Novyi Chas,* Zenon Pelens'kyi, to confer with A. T. Chekaniuk, head of the newly installed press affairs office, concerning continuation of Ukrainian journalistic activities.[55] Then the true nature of the Soviet conquest began to reveal itself. Chekaniuk was already installed in the editorial offices of *Dilo* and evidently perfectly acquainted with the views and backgrounds of his petitioners. He showed them a staff of twenty newly arrived Soviet journalists who were already preparing the publication of *Dilo*'s successor, the Communist *Vil'na Ukraïna.* Then he made it perfectly clear to his "guests" that while some use might be found for their talents if they were properly directed, the direction itself was already, and would remain, completely in the hands of the Communists.[56]

Within a week, several leading figures in the Ukrainian com- 668* munity, including Constantine Levits'kyi and the secretary of 661 the representative committee, John Nymchuk, had been arrested. For the time being, however, the actual members of the delegation to Soviet headquarters were spared, and several managed to escape to German-occupied territory.[57] The leaders of the UNDO were also arrested; Dr. Dmytro Levits'kyi, the head of the party and of the Ukrainian delegation in the Polish parliament, was arrested on September 28 and so were his most important colleagues about the same time. The arrested leaders were sent to Moscow—it is said to the infamous Lubianka prison—and with rare exceptions have not been heard of since.[58] The Communists, after getting rid of the principal nationalist politicians, quickly proceeded with their own political organization of Galicia and Volhynia. Even the official Soviet version indicates that a minimum

[55] Chekaniuk, a specialist in political journalism, was editor of the major Kiev newspaper *Komunist,* and in 1940 became a candidate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

[56] The preceding paragraphs are based largely on Stepan Baran's article, "Zustrich z bol'shevykamy" (Encounter with the Bolsheviks), *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 12, 1942, p. 2, and April 14, 1942, p. 2, confirmed in all essential aspects by Interviews 41, 78.

[57] Baran, "Zustrich," *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 12, 1942, p. 2.

[58] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* March 22, 1942, p. 4. In one town at least, participants in the revolutionary struggle for Ukrainian independence also seem to have been singled out for arrest or execution (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 3, 1941, p. 3).

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German colony. Molotov countered that it was the last "missing piece" of the Ukraine, though he agreed to limit his demands to the northern, predominantly Ukrainian part and offered to permit the repatriation of the ethnic German minority.[80] 648

Germany was not ready for a break with the USSR; consequently Rumania was forced to give way. On June 28, her forces evacuated Chernovtsy (Chernivtsi),[81] the Bukovinian capital, and the Red Army took over. The sequence of events was similar to that which had occurred nine months previously in L'vov, but the tempo was quicker. The leading newspaper, *Chas,* was Sovietized and a new Communist organ, *Nova Rada,* founded, though a number of Ukrainian books forbidden under Rumanian rule were authorized.[82] The Ukrainian People's House and other national cultural societies were closed. At the same time, the Soviet press assailed the repressive measures which the Rumanians had taken against Ukrainian cultural life. Soviet writers were indignant at the difficulties experienced by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Chernovtsy, although they denounced the Petliurist elements among them.[83] Numerous leading Ukrainians were not allowed to enjoy their new "intellectual freedom," but were arrested or shot as nationalist "counterrevolutionaries." It is said, however, that the German consul and the commission for evacuating the ethnic Germans succeeded in taking out numerous Ukrainian political leaders and priests of the Orthodox Church.[84] In any case, many thousands of refugees, mostly young people, found their way to Germany, where a large proportion provided an invigorating element for the segment of the OUN which had remained under Mel'nyk.[85] 661 [204]

The subjection of the West Ukraine to Soviet rule brought death or imprisonment to a considerable number of prominent Ukrainians; the entire population was oppressed by a heavy

[80] Ambassador von der Schulenburg in Moscow to Auswärtiges Amt, June 26, 1940, *Nazi-Soviet Relations,* p. 159.

[81] Rumanian Cernăuţi; German Chernowitz.

[82] *Nastup,* August 3, 1940, p. 3.

[83] "Besarabiia i pivnichna chastyna Bukovyny" (Bessarabia and the Northern Part of Bukovina), *Komunist,* June 30, 1940, p. 2; S. Zhurakovych and Ie. Patner, "Misto pod Prutom" (City on the Pruth), *Komunist,* July 5, 1940, p. 3.

[84] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* September 7, 1941, p. 3.

[85] See Chapter IV.

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tives coming from the west. Numerous local citizens, mostly 668*
young men but including also several administrative officials, joined the Nationalist organization. Support was so strong, in fact, that a new district organization (Kraieva Ekzekutyva) of the Mel'nyk party could be formed, headed by the son of the chief of the *oblast* administration and another local leader.[56] Generally speaking, OUN-M influence was predominant in the civic life of Zhitomir as the summer of 1941 drew to a close.

The first OUN-M organizers appear to have arrived with the 668* Wehrmacht. Foremost among them was Bohdan Konyk, a Gali- 625 cian, who was especially concerned with police organization. At the end of July, with the help of a young Carpatho-Ukrainian journalist, George Tarkovych, whose numerous articles are a major source for this period, he went with German authorization to a nearby camp of Soviet war prisoners and selected volunteers for the police force.[57] Zakhvalins'kyi, an East Ukrainian by origin who had once been a member of the Ukrainian Republican Army but who had lived for many years as a common worker in France, was made commander. He was an adherent of Mel'nyk. As his deputy, a local nonparty man, Kalenda, was chosen, while the commander's adjutant was a Bukovinian member of the Mel'nyk party.[58]

A major task of the police force was to prepare an organization for installation in Kiev, as soon as the capital should fall into 668* German hands. The same purpose was evident in the formation [204] of a newspaper, *Ukraïns'ke Slovo;* this organ was destined for transfer to Kiev as soon as possible. Consequently, the chief propaganda workers of the eastern group of the OUN-M were active in its creation. Among them were John Rohach, a Carpatho-Ukrainian, Iaroslav Chemeryns'kyi, one of the leading émigré writers, and Peter Oliïnyk. Under their direction, a number of able local journalists were recruited, though not all of them were adherents of the Mel'nyk party.[59]

All of these preparations served as a backdrop for the most

[56] Interviews 12, 65; cf. V. Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 10, 1941, p. 2; *OUN u Viini,* p. 53.
[57] Cf. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 21, 1942, p. 2; Interview 35.
[58] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 10, 1941, p. 2; Interview 65.
[59] *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, pp. 3-5; Interviews 3, 65.

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661 reserved for the capital. A number of OUN-M activities there,
668* without being considered important enough to require drastic action, had contributed to a feeling of irritation on the part of the
[204] Himmler henchmen. A famous poetess, Olena Teliha, had created an unauthorized Nationalist literary periodical, *Litvary*. A youth group Sich was considered potentially dangerous. A Ukrainian National Council (Rada) had been formed by the Mel'nyk group to act as a symbol of unity in the East Ukraine and, they hoped, eventually to become the central organ of nationalist activities. The risks involved in such activity, in view of the attitude of the real rulers of Germany, were fully understood by the Wehrmacht officers, one of whom advised the Ukrainians to transform the Council into a more innocuous Aid Committee. When this advice was refused, the Council was formally dissolved (November 17), and went underground.[25] The SP authorities were aware of the organ's continued existence, and while they regarded it as too insignificant for immediate suppression, it increased their distrust of the Nationalists.[26] With this background, one can understand why the first blow fell upon the legal, but extremely Nationalist, *Ukraïns'ke Slovo*. Its large circulation—over fifty thousand [27]—gave it, in the eyes of the police, the potentiality of dangerous influence. Moreover, the editorial staff of this organ, as was previously noted, was composed very largely of West Ukrainians and old émigrés; these elements were regarded as especially dangerous by the SS leadership.

668* Unfortunately for the Nationalist cause, during their two months' activity in Kiev the newcomers had also lost ground in
578 local opinion. Some of the antipathy which they aroused stemmed from the fact that they were outsiders; even those who had been born in the East Ukraine or, like Kandyba, whose father had been born there, had long been out of touch with the local population. With some justification, because they were better organized, had clearer concepts of what they wanted, and were used to displaying initiative, the OUN group took a leading, oc-

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[26] PS 3876.
[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 15, 1942, p. 5.

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the Germans, and hence able to issue ration cards and provide a small income, was indispensable for most intellectuals.[30]

In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that the German enemies of the Nationalist movement felt that the time was ripe to destroy its prestige by an attack on its principal organ. On December 12, 1941, the SP force seized *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and arrested all the leading editorial workers, including Rohach, Chemeryns'kyi and Oliïnyk.[31] Kandyba, too, was arrested, but by native police in a city *raion* (ward) controlled by the OUN-M; this circumstance allowed him to escape.[32]

Two days later the newspaper reappeared, as *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* but with a quite different editorial policy. The new editor was Constantine Shtepa, acting rector of the University of Kiev. Of Ukrainian origin, he had been an officer in the tsarist army and, although strongly anti-Soviet, remained a pronounced Russian patriot, desiring the acceptance of the Russian culture and language throughout the Ukraine and the maintenance of governmental ties with Moscow. Consequently, he was a bitter enemy of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.[33] The first issue of his paper contained an article, inspired by the Germans, but acceptable to Shtepa, in which the Nationalists were vigorously attacked for turning what "should have been an informational journal into an organ of their group." The Nationalists, it explained, had refused to heed German warnings that the paper must serve the whole community; consequently Shtepa had taken charge to "popularize" it. What this meant, was clarified by an article on the second page which demanded "work instead of politics."[34]

Under Shtepa's administration, *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* became extremely subservient to the Germans. In part this was due to the extreme severity and alertness of the German censorship; the edi-

[30] Interview 59. Liubchenko himself (Liubchenko, pp. 60 ff.), when the shoe was on the other foot and he was compelled to seek work in Kiev, found this to be the case.

[31] *OUN u Viini,* p. 73.

[32] L. Dniprova in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.

[33] Record of interrogation of an editor in Kiev, early 1943, who was a specialist in ancient history, the author of *Die Völkerwanderung* and *Das römische Recht* (CXLVa 78, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine) (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 78). The only person fitting this description is Constantine Shtepa.

[34] These articles are reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diïsnist',* January 5, 1942, p. 2.

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tor himself was compelled to publish over his own signature articles composed by the German propaganda section, although German records show that he vigorously and courageously criticized Nazi policy in private discussions with German officials.[35]

The nationalists were deeply antagonized by these articles which attacked the foundations of their movement by denying the historical equality of Ukrainian culture with the Russian. Shtepa apparently went far beyond even the Communist newspapers in this respect, reverting to the "Little Russian" tradition which was so abhorrent to all nationalist Ukrainians.[36] However sincere his Russian nationalism may have been, for a man of Ukrainian origin, writing in the Ukrainian language, in the Ukrainian capital, to denounce the Ukrainian nationalist movement could only be regarded in nationalist circles as an act of high treason.

727 During the late autumn, while the *Einsatzgruppen* were crushing the OUN-M groups, the administration of the Reichskommissariat was being established throughout the "Right Bank" Ukraine, while the area east of the Dnieper remained under Wehrmacht control. According to the plans laid in the Ostministerium, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was eventually to include all of the pre-1941 Soviet Ukraine except Transnistria, Galicia, and the areas acquired by the USSR from Rumania in 1940. In addition, it was to have its boundary extended roughly due east in a line passing south of Kursk to the Volga, where it was to embrace the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.[37] In the northwest the Reichskommissariat was to embrace approximately two tiers of *raions* in the southern part of the pre-1941 Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, including Brest, Pinsk, and the greater part of the railroad connecting these towns with Gomel.[38]

By the end of August, the process of pacifying the western

[35] CXLVa 78.

[36] *Biuleten'* (Bulletin), No. 9–10 of the OUN-B (late 1942), pp. 14–15. This clandestine publication was furnished me by Nicholas Lebed'.

[37] Memorandum, Die neuen Ostgebiete, June 16, 1941, PS 1033 (hereafter referred to as PS 1033); Rosenberg to Alfred Meyer, October 20, 1941, PS 1057 (hereafter referred to as PS 1057).

[38] PS 1057; Memorandum, Die Zivilverwaltung im besetzten Osten, Part II, Reichskommissariat Ukraine, PS 702 (hereafter referred to as PS 702).

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668* tending to offer more scope to national aspirations than did the Germans. Rejecting all claims of Vlasov to speak for their nations, they demanded in categorical terms, backed up by the threat that otherwise they could not "accept responsibility for the consequences which may result among our compatriots from the Vlasov action," that the Germans make the following concessions:

1. Forbid any claim of General Vlasov to the leadership of our peoples;
2. Recognize the right, to take effect immediately, of our peoples to independent states and to pronounce a definite recognition of our national representative bodies;
3. Organize our national military formations under unified command of their own leaders, subject to the German Wehrmacht in operative matters, for the fight against Bolshevism, and turn over the political leadership within these formations to our national representative bodies.[60]

Whether Rosenberg turned over this document to Hitler is questionable, in view of its uncompromising terms, but it is certain that on the same day it was presented he himself sent a very strong protest to his Führer against Vlasov's committee.[61]

Either because neither faction among the German leadership could secure Hitler's unequivocal approval, or because the most powerful Nazi leaders still desired, at the eleventh hour, to pursue their customary tactic of *divide et impera,* no definite choice was ever made between Vlasov and the Ukrainian leaders. The latter were allowed to continue with their efforts to organize their compatriots. At the same time, Vlasov was free to attract those Ukrainians whom he could prevail upon to join his movement.

668* The Ukrainian-language press was left under nationalist control. The principal paper for the *Ostarbeiter* and other workers in Germany, *Holos,* remained under the editorship of Bohdan Kravtsiv, a determined nationalist, while a leading East Ukrainian journalist, George Muzichenko, left its staff shortly after he joined the Vlasov information bureau.[62] Two other papers, *Ukraïns'kyi Dobrovolets'* (the journal of the military units) and

[60] *Ibid.*
[61] NO 1815.
[62] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 8, 1944, p. 3. A few weeks earlier the Vlasov group had made a strong effort to secure control of these and other Ukrainian papers in Germany. Cf. NO 3039.

Za Ukraïnu, were kept in the hands of nationalist editors, who were able to direct oblique attacks on Vlasov.[63] 668* 204

Nevertheless, it is certain that Vlasov was given some advantages, and secured considerable success, in his efforts to recruit prisoners of war of all Soviet nationalities for his Russian Liberation Army (Rossiskaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia—ROA). Even according to Ukrainian nationalist sources, only half of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were fully "nationally conscious," and many could not even speak the Ukrainian language.[64] Moreover, Vlasov was able to secure a number of high-ranking ex-Soviet officers of Ukrainian origin for his staff, including the commander of the first ROA division, General Buniachenko. Altogether, units, in various stages of integration in the ROA, totaled three hundred thousand by January, 1945, and of this number perhaps 35 to 40 percent were of Ukrainian ethnic stock.[65] 727 704

Apparently no direct threats or compulsion were used to secure adherence of civilians to the KONR.[66] On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalist sources maintain that the apparent German favor enjoyed by Vlasov was a powerful inducement to the de-

[63] For example, the latter newspaper published the translation of an article from *Das Schwartze Korps* (an SS organ) harshly criticizing Russian émigrés, on January 18, 1945, p. 2.

[64] M. Les', "Chomu ia buv 'Vlasovtsem'?" (Why was I a "Vlasovite"?), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (October-November, 1952), p. 3, states that 50 percent of the Ukrainian prisoners were "nationally conscious," 40 percent somewhat so, and 10 percent not at all. A contemporary account (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 23, 1941, p. 2) states that many of the letters addressed by Ukrainian prisoners to the newspaper which the Germans had established for them (*Nova Doba*) were in Russian, but notes that they were sent to the Ukrainian rather than the Russian paper, *Klich.* The latter also carried material evidently intended for a Ukrainian audience. Other contemporary accounts of the prisoners differ as to whether they could speak the Ukrainian language. One insists that 80 percent were "nationally conscious," and that the Russian prisoners accepted the fact that the Ukrainians were "separatists" without anger, for while the latter wanted an independent state they had always lived peacefully with the Russians and other minorities in the Ukraine (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 5, 1941, p. 2).

[65] Unsigned list of units from the eastern peoples, January, 1945, NO 5800 (hereafter referred to as NO 5800). For the percentage of Ukrainians see Les', p. 3, and MS H, which states that Vlasov told Shandruk that 70 percent of the first ROA division were Ukrainians. If so, this figure must have been reached by including persons with very little Ukrainian nationalist feeling whom the Russian National Socialist leader, Bronislav Kaminskii, recruited in the Lokot' area on the border of the Ukrainian and Russian Soviet Republics, since (according to Thorwald, p. 44) Kaminskii's brigade alone formed more than a third of this division.

[66] Interview 45.

186 where oral methods by the same number of agitators reached
208 scores and live theatrical performances reached hundreds.

204 The principal activity of the propaganda department of a
727 Ukrainian municipal administration under German occupation
186 centered around the local newspaper, for other media such as the radio and motion pictures were under complete German control. It is worth devoting considerable attention to journalistic activity throughout the East Ukraine because of the value such study can have in elucidating the whole problem of the extent of nationalist activity in that area. Newspapers not only reached large numbers, but represented a symbol of authoritative pronouncement to a people accustomed to viewing the statements of the Soviet press as announcements of policy not subject to question.[58]

However much the German authorities may have feared the existence of a Ukrainian press, it was absolutely essential for them to authorize and support it for their own purposes. Under the Wehrmacht administration, especially in the early days, a very nonrestrictive policy was pursued, as was indicated by the ideologically independent nature of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* in Zhitomir and Kiev. General ground rules laid down included prohibition of the term "Ukraine" in the sense of a state, rather than as a territorial expression; insistence on reference to Germany as the "protector" of the Ukraine, rather than as an "ally"; and designation of the Wehrmacht as "saviors" rather than "occupiers."[59] Under army control newspapers sprang up in scores of towns, including all of the important cities of the East Ukraine, although in at least one (Poltava) the establishment of a paper was considerably delayed by the unwillingness of any officer to accept the responsibility of censoring it.[60] One reason for the Wehrmacht's

[58] There is considerably more information available on newspaper activity than on other politically significant aspects of the East Ukraine. Since many of the observers who have written accounts of the war period were themselves journalists, they naturally paid considerable attention to this field of activity. Moreover, the West Ukrainian newspapers published during the same period, which furnish the principal source of material on the East Ukraine, were also especially interested in journalistic enterprises. Consequently, one must guard against the assumption that the real importance of these newspapers was as great as the attention devoted to them indicates. Nevertheless, they were unquestionably very significant as means of transmitting nationalism and reflecting national feeling.

[59] PS 053.

[60] USSR Exhibit 278.

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liberality was a desire to carry propaganda to the numerous deserters who, if they were afraid to submit to German authority, might join the Red partisans. Consequently, papers were fostered in the swamp and wooded regions, even in small towns such as Ovruch, Olevsk, and Shchors. Indeed, the propaganda section of the army itself played a major role in founding newspapers, and even provided for the journalistic staffs in Zhitomir, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov the services of a competent and comparatively neutral Galician journalist, Peter Sahaidachnyi.

However, as was previously noted, the OUN-M took a leading role in establishing the papers in Zhitomir and Kiev. Its importance was also considerable in a number of the smaller cities. In Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, and Krivoi Rog, on the other hand, the initiative was taken by persons who had been journalists under the Soviet regime. In Krivoi Rog, Michael Pronchenko, a writer and poet who had been imprisoned by the Soviet regime, but later worked for the local Communist paper, upon Red army evacuation, took over the Communist press and, with the aid of other young men, began publishing a paper called *Dzvin* (The Bell).[61] In Kharkov, it was a former member of the staff of the defunct *Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna* who proposed immediately after the German arrival to start a newspaper under the name of *Novyi Chas* (The New Times).[62] It was some weeks before the paper could actually be started; the name then became *Nova Ukraïna,* and a large number of Mel'nyk adherents were on the staff. The chief editor and a majority of his subordinates, however, were local persons unaffiliated with the OUN. In a number of places Bandera organizers, too, assisted local men to establish papers.

When the Reichskommissariat took over the bulk of the East Ukraine, a quite different policy was pursued; the outspokenly nationalist organs were suppressed, their staffs executed. Even the official policy of the Reichskommissariat, presumably approved by the Ostministerium, provided that all matters concerning newspapers in the native language should be submitted to the Press and Enlightenment Division of the Reichskommissariat.

[61] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 15, 1941, p. 3; Interview 7.

[62] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), pp. 7–9.

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

PLACES HAVING UKRAINIAN NEWSPAPERS 1941-45

- Daily
- More than once a week
- Weekly
- Unknown

p. 230

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204 626 727 186 Newspapers were to be held to the minimum necessary to satisfy the Ukrainian desire for news, and they were to be founded only where "politically unobjectionable" journalists and adequate censorship machinery were available.[63] Nevertheless, as even this directive indicates, the need for a Ukrainian press could not be questioned. It was absolutely essential to have some means of reaching the population with directives, of quieting rumors, and of playing up the few positive features of the German administration. Since there were very few German personnel who could write Ukrainian, local men had to be turned to, although strong requests for newspapers were frequently refused when the Germans felt the burden of providing censors outweighed possible gains in propaganda or administrative convenience.

204 While important as a symbol of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy, the newspaper had certain severe limitations as a vehicle for nationalist ideology. Its frequency and size limited its utility. There were a few dailies, but the vast majority of newspapers appeared much less frequently, as the following figures on East Ukrainian newspapers show:[64]

Papers issued	
daily	5
three times a week	18
twice a week	25
weekly	9
unknown	41
TOTAL	98

Moreover, none exceeded four pages, and a large number could print only one page (being printed on the back of Soviet posters, etc.). This sharp curtailment was due primarily to the extremely severe paper shortage, especially in the south. *Nova Ukraïna* in Kharkov was forced to reduce its printing from fifty thousand to twenty-five thousand daily;[65] the daily *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* had to limit publication to three times a week; one paper in the Taurida *Generalbezirk* had to issue one copy of each number to each commune in the area, rather than to individuals.[66]

[63] PS 702.

[64] Figures compiled from numerous sources. It is very probable that the papers marked "unknown" appeared infrequently.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 21, 1942, p. 3.

[66] PS 1693.

●204 If all the limited space available had been at the editor's dis-
626 posal, it would have sufficed for the expression of a wide range of
727 political comments. Actually, a large part, usually the front page, was taken up with "news," mostly military or concerning the allegedly superior attributes of the Germans.[67] Another large body of material consisted of notices and orders of the German administration. Furthermore, the editors were frequently compelled to write, or to print over their signatures, editorials prepared by the German propaganda officers stressing some point (usually fictitious), such as the joys of the *Ostarbeiter* program or the rapid progress of land distribution, which the authorities desired to have propagandized. There was also a considerable number of articles of a factual nature, designed to "educate" the Ukrainians on some topic such as agricultural technique, in which the Germans thought them to be deficient; these were frequently translated from the German press. A certain number of notices of the activity of Ukrainian agencies—the local administrations, the church, cultural activity—was permitted under close surveillance against political propaganda. A very small number of articles on history, literature, and other cultural topics was allowed.

204 These limitations came close to placing the Ukrainian editor in
727 a strait jacket. It is almost universally recognized by persons who
626 were active in journalism at this time, however, that there were
186 a few points at which the jacket might be stretched enough to justify the effort to use the newspaper as an outlet for nationalist expression. The few literary articles permitted, while deprived of overt political content, could be used to a certain extent to

[67] With the exception of a few issues of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* from Kiev, the actual copies of these East Ukrainian papers have uniformly disappeared, so that it is impossible to make an investigation based on direct inspection. Their disappearance is readily explained by the hasty evacuation of the Ukraine by the German forces, the danger of having German organs on one's person in a flight to the West when one might fall into Soviet hands, and above all by the desperate need for paper of any kind for ordinary household uses. As a matter of fact, extensive, but by no means complete sets were gathered by the Institute for the Study of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Prague, as well as by certain émigré newspapers. The former collection, however, remained in the Czechoslovak capital after the end of the war and eventually fell into Soviet hands after the Communist coup (Interview 30). As a result, the presentation followed here must be based almost entirely on postwar information, and especially upon the numerous descriptions of East Ukrainian newspapers and reprints of their articles contained in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

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stress themes which were basic to the formation of national pride, 186
themes such as the nobility of Ukrainian literature, the separate 204
development of Ukrainian and Russian history, and the value of 626
Ukrainian folkways. Articles ostensibly directed against Com- 727
munists or Jews could contain oblique thrusts at Moscow and the Russians as well; sometimes such articles did indeed represent extremes of xenophobia. Even the articles giving purely factual accounts of Ukrainian activity were prized by the nationalists, since they brought to the public's attention phases of national life which had been prohibited by the Soviets. The fact that a considerable number of such items could be found for reprinting in the relatively free West Ukrainian and émigré presses (although of course the articles so treated were far from representative) indicates that the censorship barrier was not insuperable, and simple a priori consideration of the difficulty of securing alert and reliable censors for such a large body of publications substantiates this assertion.

While it was therefore true that the newspapers could be used, to a limited extent, for nationalist propaganda, the fact that they were edited by writers known to be nationalists had a certain negative effect on the regard in which the nationalist cause was held by the population, since the newspapers were obviously tools of the Germans. Communist propaganda—and Bandera propaganda after the OUN-B workers were forced from editorial posts —made a great deal of this fact. The most courageous nationalist editors tried to overcome this accusation of serving German interests by occasional sly attacks on the Germans, using the "Aesopian" language which the subjects of the Soviet empire had been forced to learn. Thus one editor, when ordered to write an article glorifying the *Ostarbeiter* program, described in glowing terms the luxurious dining cars on the trains to Germany; few Ukrainians observing the miserable cattle cars actually provided could miss the irony.[68] Not a few editors were willing to pursue such dangerous tactics.

As far as can be detected, the only papers which were controlled by pro-Russian elements (aside from the Russian-language papers) were *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo, Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta,*

[68] Interview 3.

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204 and possibly one or two of the Ukrainian-language papers in the
727 Donbas. A number of papers in the latter area and a few in the
186 southwest Ukraine were influenced by Bandera agents, although
626 edited by local people, and maintained a semblance of independence from German control. The important papers in Vinnitsa and Proskurov remained under OUN-M editors, who, however, had to exert the utmost care to avoid arrest. Some papers, like a group in the area northwest of Poltava, which were led by a young resident of Mirgorod (Myrhorod), Michael Voskobiinyk, who was the editor of the paper there, did what they could to propagate nationalist sentiment, while others in the same district were completely subservient to the Germans.[69]

It is probably safe to say that the majority of editors would have liked to insert nationalist themes in their papers, and did so in the early days before the repression. The terrible danger to which they were exposed, however, seems to have induced most to go even further than was necessary for safety's sake in eliminating every vestige of independent writing and in slavishly following the German line. This was, as some of them were ready to admit, largely a heritage from the spirit-crushing Soviet regime, for West Ukrainians in similar positions were willing to display more initiative even though exposed to greater risks.[70] It was also very probably due to the fact that the editors lacked any experience in journalism, for many had been teachers or had followed other professions which left them ill-prepared for their new tasks. The suspicion which attached to any who had worked for the
727 Soviet press, and had thus been compelled to write anti-German
186 material, forced journalists with Soviet experience to be especially
204 cautious.[71] Whatever the reasons, on the whole the East Ukrain-

[69] Interview 47.

[70] This was admitted by an East Ukrainian in *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk* in a sharp criticism of the editorial staffs who continued the Soviet tradition of complete subservience to authority in journalism, so that in some cases the Germans themselves had to urge them to be more enterprising (March 22, 1945, p. 1).

[71] One of the causes for the dismissal of Pronchenko from directorship of *Dzvin* was the accusation by his enemies that he had written an article against Hitler in a Soviet paper (MS E); Liubchenko feared that a similar charge would be made against him, and wrote that Shtepa told him outright that persons active in the Soviet press could not be employed on *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*, although this may simply have been an excuse to avoid hiring the nationalist writer (Liubchenko, pp. 26, 64).

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ians, when deprived of Nationalist support, made a rather poor showing as journalists. With some notable exceptions,[72] they did not measure up to the standards of the West Ukrainians or of old veterans of the Republican period like Nicholas Stasiuk, the editor of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta*. As will be shown, the administrative officials were also generally drawn from the intelligentsia, especially those of the academic or teaching profession, and had not been trained for the roles they assumed. That they nevertheless made a better showing of independence and devotion to national aims may possibly be explained by the fact that the Soviet regime had encouraged an attitude of limited self-assertion in local administrative bodies, so long as no questions of policy were at stake, while newspaper staffs were much more rigidly confined to transmission of Communist Party-inspired material and even more minutely controlled. Many persons of initiative must have felt it was better to take posts in which real service of a nonpolitical nature could be rendered, rather than assume the unattractive function of mouthpiece for a repressive regime. The question of the characteristics of the East Ukrainian intellectual can be considered in a larger context in the next chapter.

[72] Among these were Voskobiinyk, Hrynenko (Zhitomir), and a number of editorial writers in Kharkov, as well as those mentioned earlier as founding newspapers, although their careers were generally limited to a few weeks.

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by nationalist Ukrainians. As a matter of fact, a large proportion 186
of the newspapers in the smaller towns were directed principally 369
at rural readers; the extreme shortage of papers[51] in many areas 208
prevented their being of great influence even when they had [204]
some nationalist content. Moreover, the central periodical for farmers, *Ukraïns'kyi Khliborob,* with a weekly printing of seventy thousand, was edited by Eugene Arkypenko, who later joined the Vlasov movement.[52] While this publication was not used against the nationalist cause, it was devoid of positive nationalist material, being confined entirely to technical agricultural articles.

The less-than-lukewarm supporters of the nationalist move- 186
ments who constituted the bulk of the personnel in positions 369
which provided access to the rural population apparently did not do a great deal to convert the dormant cultural nationality of the peasants into active nationalism. There is no question that the cities inevitably constituted a prime target for nationalist efforts. Probably, in view of the severe limitations imposed by lack of time and nationalist personnel, by Red partisans and German restrictions, the enormous task of overcoming village inertia toward a purely political movement could not have been carried out in any case. Nevertheless, the initial failure of the nationalist groups (at least the OUN and others coming from the west) to grasp the overriding importance of the land question, and the necessity of making this a prime means by which the rural population could be won to the nationalist cause, must certainly be ranked as one of the great lost opportunities of this period. If the nationalists had from the beginning used all their energies to present a positive program of agrarian reform as the heart of their message, they might not have left any tangible organization to withstand renewed Soviet occupation, but they might have left behind a concept of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a defender of the interests of the peasantry. This, along with the vaguer memories of the Republican era, might have left an enduring imprint on the peasantry.

[51] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[52] *Volyn',* June 17, 1942, p. 4; Interview 45.

668* tionalists made a strong effort to extend their influence to the region. A large part of these efforts were concentrated on Kiev and Zhitomir. In Vinnitsa, the largest city of Podolia, on the other hand, the situation developed unfavorably for the nationalists soon after the German arrival. When the Germans captured the city, they were impressed by the activity of the director of the medical institute and his ability to speak German, learned while a student in Germany. Consequently, they appointed him mayor. Of mixed Russian and Ukrainian descent, the new mayor considered himself Ukrainian, but favored the continuance of ties with Russia. His administration contained other pro-Russian elements, while the Vinnitsa *oblasi* administration was headed by an ethnic German said to have had Russophile tendencies. The police, on the other ha..d, and the newspaper were controlled by OUN-M adherents, although both were men of exceeding caution.[5] Vinnitsa played only an indirect role in stimulating Ukrainian nationalism; the unearthing in June, 1943, of enormous mass graves of victims of NKVD executions in 1937–38 and during the retreat of 1941, including, it is said, a number imprisoned for nationalist activities, served to increase the dread felt of the rapidly materializing prospect of Soviet reconquest.

668* 186 If Vinnitsa was the chief anti-nationalist stronghold, Proskurov, a smaller city to the northwest, was the headquarters for the OUN-M in Podolia. There the Mel'nyk group counted the mayor and the police chief (a Carpatho-Ukrainian trained in the [304] Czechoslovak army) among its members.[6] It also controlled the newspaper, *Ukraïns'kyi Holos,* which had a circulation of thirteen thousand, said to have been more than double that of the Soviet paper which had been published in Proskurov.[7] Farther east, the districts west and southwest of Kiev were under strong nationalist influence. While the OUN-M was establishing its headquarters in Kiev, newspapers and local administrations were being formed in a number of small cities such as Vasilkov, Belaia Tserkov', Tarashcha, Korsun', Smela (Smila), Cherkasy, and Uman'. The formation of the National Rada by the Mel'nyk group made a great

[5] Interview 1.
[6] Interviews 1, 50.
[7] *Nastup,* December 25, 1941, p. 4, citing *Ukraïns'kyi Holos.*

impression on the intellectuals of the smaller towns. OUN-M 668*
writers and propagandists appear to have maintained regular con- 186
tact with them for several months in 1941, and it is apparent that
the Kiev *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* served as a model for many of the new [204]
editors.[8] Schools were opened under the direction of nationalist [658]
educators, Prosvita and theatrical groups were formed, coopera-
tives linked with *Vukospilka* were active. Apparently, too, the
town administrations were largely in Ukrainian hands; the mu- [191]
nicipal authorities in Uman' issued a sweeping order forbidding
the use of the Russian language in any office, school, or enter-
prise under their jurisdiction.[9]

The influence of the nationalists in the towns penetrated to
some degree to the countryside in the area west of the Dnieper.
For example, nationalist papers like *Nova Doba,* published in [204]
Berdichev, seem to have had a moderately large circulation in the
villages. There also seem to have been nationalist influences of
a purely local character in some places, aside from those brought
in by the nationalist parties. Zvenigorodka, a small town about a
hundred miles due south of Kiev had been the home of the Free
Cossacks, a nationalist organization of the wealthier peasants
during the revolutionary period. The group was revived by some
of the villagers under the German occupation, and, together with
a mimeographed newspaper, served as a focal point for local
nationalism.[10]

The influence of the church, especially in the rural areas, was 794
not entirely on the side of Ukrainian nationalism.[1] The Auton- 186
omous clergy under Alexius made an early start in reorganizing
religious life in this region. They established a diocese of Vinnitsa
and Zhitomir, and during most of the period of occupation were
supported by the influential Bishop Damaskin (Maliuti) of Ka-
menets-Podolsk. Damaskin's diocese included nearly five hun-
dred churches, with a hundred and sixty priests.[11] Apparently
most of this large organization, which was overwhelmingly con-
centrated in the rural districts, had no objection to Damaskin's
allegiance to the Russophile church. The Autocephalous Church

[8] Interview 30.
[9] *Nastup,* May 3, 1942, p. 2.
[10] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[11] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 13, 1942, p. 2.

[1] [After Germans had occupied this territory--Analyst]

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793 to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services accord-
578 ing to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of
186 the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left" as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

668* It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

727 Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor
661 were shot by German police; the city passed under the control
204 of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.
[24] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.
[26] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.
[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.
[28] Interview 47.

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German authorities; in a few other places, including the important towns of Lubny and Akhtyrka (Okhtyrka), editors continued their endeavors to stimulate national feeling.[29] Remarkably, the editor in the former town was a Russian who, after his pro-Ukrainian work brought him to the verge of arrest, was able to secure a new post as editor of a Russian-language paper in the Kursk *oblast*.[30] Most active of all this group, however, was the young editor of the Mirgorod paper, Michael Voskobiinyk, who pursued a line independent of the Nationalists yet modeled on the work of the *Nova Ukraïna* group.[31]

In general, nationalism in the "Left Bank" region under German occupation can be said to have been characterized by more influence of locally led and organized ecclesiastical and political bodies than the area to the west of the Dnieper. Moreover, it was marked by somewhat less friction between the Ukrainian and Russian elements and a willingness of some of the latter group to cooperate with the effort for Ukrainian nationalist revival. Probably the basic reason for this difference is the fact that both OUN groups were suppressed in this area before they could become very influential, and the nationalist structure which was built up afterwards was formed of persons who feared the extremist program of the integral nationalists. It may be also that the history of the region, with its lack of comparatively recent memories of oppression by Polish lords and the relative independence with which nationalist life could develop, created an atmosphere of self-confidence which militated against the more violent aspects of nationalist egoism.

To the south of the wooded steppe belt just discussed lies a broad region of more open steppe; in general the agricultural population of the area is considerably less dense than that of the region just described. The open plain with its very rich black soil and somewhat lesser rainfall lends itself to the cultivation of cereal crops which require smaller amounts of manpower, in contrast to the mixed sugar beet, dairy, potato, and grain agri-

[East of the Dnieper -- Analyst]

[29] Interviews 47, 50.
[30] Interview 47.
[31] *Ibid.*

"all over the Union." Consequently, the area could be expected to be very lukewarm in its reaction to the nationalist movements. This tendency was reinforced by the great distance of the region from the stimulation center in the West Ukraine—Stalino is nearly one thousand miles from L'vov—and by the lack of strong historical ties with the Ukraine. Two special factors also played a role: the suppression of the Kiev OUN-M group came before a nationalist revival could get under way in the area, and the news frightened the few nationalist Ukrainians away from public life; and the German army authorities who were in charge were reluctant to permit even the formal and linguistic ascendancy permitted Ukrainians elsewhere.[65] Finally, even according to an OUN organizer active in the area, the Ukrainians were inclined from long habit to allow the Russians priority.[66]

As a result, in a large number of cities in the Donbas, including Slaviansk, Artemovsk (Bakhmut), Debal'tsevo, and Snezhnoe, the Russians succeeded in establishing a cultural ascendancy without, however, its taking on much political significance. This ascendancy included, in particular, the publication of Russian-language newspapers, which as a rule were not allowed in the former Ukrainian Soviet Republic.[67] A number of Ukrainian-language papers were also founded, some expressly designed for the rural population. In Stalino, with the help of OUN-B organizers, a nationalist editor was able to transform an originally Russian paper into a Ukrainian organ, while for a time Ukrainian-language papers with nationalist tendencies were published in Voroshilovgrad and Kramatorskaia (Kramators'ka).[68] In Enakievo an administration of Ukrainians was installed with the aid of Italian troops which occupied the town, while Ukrainian officials were also found in other city administrations.[69] All efforts at nationalist organization were hampered by the fact that the area was not conquered until late 1941, and, except for a brief period in 1942, they lay within a short distance of the front. A few OUN-M organizers were active in the area, and a considerable Bandera net-

[65] PS 051.
[66] Interview 66.
[67] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 23, 1942, p. 3.
[68] Interview 66.
[69] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 12, 1942, p. 3.

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work directed by Eugene Stakhiv did what it could to encourage national tendencies among the local Ukrainians.[70] 668*

The city of Mariupol' was an outstanding exception to the conditions prevailing throughout most of the area. While Mariupol' was administratively part of the Donbas, lying in the Stalino *oblast,* it is over fifty miles from the Donets basin itself, on the shore of the Sea of Azov. Like the other cities of the Donbas, however, it had grown enormously, more than tripling in size between the two Soviet censuses. Even after the losses of war, its population numbered 178,358, placing it not far below the largest Ukrainian metropolises.[71] What is remarkable for a city in the Donbas, or indeed in the whole southern area, is that it was under full Ukrainian control. Its well-developed Prosvita society and Ukrainian educational system have already been mentioned. The Orthodox Church is said to have been active and oriented toward Ukrainian nationalism, although here as elsewhere in the far south Protestants and dissident Orthodox sects played an important role.[72] In addition, the mayor was outspokenly nationalist, encouraging the formation of a Ukrainian military force.[73] Probably the guiding spirit in the nationalist development in the city, however, was Nicholas Stasiuk, minister of supply under the Rada in 1918, who had managed to survive the Soviet period by working as a park attendant.[74] He took over the editorship of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* which, although restricted by the paper shortage especially acute in the treeless south, was the second most influential Ukrainian paper on the "Left Bank" (next to *Nova Ukraïna*). While necessarily cautious, its tone was strongly nationalist. Moreover, in addition to Stasiuk, there were a number of nationalist journalists to aid in carrying on the newspaper's work. Stasiuk himself is said not only to have carried on this legal pronationalist activity, but to have assisted the OUN-B underground which made its area base in the city.[75]

186 668* 369 [794] [204]

[70] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 50; Interview 66.

[71] *L'vivs'ki Visti,* August 27, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 24, 1942, p. 2.

[72] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 3, 1942, p. 2.

[73] Cf. Chapter VII.

[74] Interview 66; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 7, 1942, p. 2.

[75] Ie. Stakhiv, pp. 52–54; Interview 66. The nationalist tone of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* is apparent from the considerable number of its articles reprinted in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

000 lent its other ear to the Polish landowners who described the Ukrainian peasants as fomentors of trouble, aiming at the overthrow of the existing agrarian order, which offered great advantages to the Polish nobility.

204 As a result of the circular of Valouiev,[1] publications in the Ukrainian language almost ceased in Russia. The review *Osnova*, which had been the rallying centre of Ukrainian intellectuals, was closed. As a result there was an almost total eclipse, for several decades and almost until the Revolution, of the Ukrainian journalistic movement in Russia. Nevertheless some periodicals appeared, among which *Ukrainskaia Jizn* (Ukrainian Life), edited in Russian at St. Petersburg by that same Simon Petlioura who later became the chief of the insurrectionary Ukrainian movement against the forces of the Austro-Hungarian occupation, and who was assassinated in Paris in 1926. But now, in the place of a cultural Ukrainianism, there formed, on the other side of the frontier, in Galicia, a political Ukrainian movement which was openly anti-Russian and even aimed at the separation of the Ukraine from the rest of Russia.

175 Henceforth Galicia played the role of the Ukrainian 'Piedmont.' We know that during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Galicia had been the real centre of Russian resistance in Poland. But after the armistice of Androussovo which, in giving Kiev to Russia, had nevertheless left the land of Halytch under Polish domination, many things had changed there. At the beginning of the eighteenth century Poland had reached the aim never yet achieved before: the definite union of the Orthodox Church in Galicia with Rome was introduced. The last attempts at resistance of the old Russian brotherhoods, now fallen into decadence, did not suffice to prevent it. The direction of religious affairs passed to the Poles and to Polonized Russians who

[1] i.e. the circular which declared that the Ukrainian language was 'only Russian, corrupted by Polish influence.'—Analyst

563 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the
423 Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the
big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective
474 farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the
masses of the people.[1] It should be pointed out that between the
Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet
Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was
preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population
of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first
had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria.
In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that
time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for
10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the
political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians.
From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian.
The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a
separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and
Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the
Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the
Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the
Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian
co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppres-
sions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian
press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed
various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded.
This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 man-
dates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

● [204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the
development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in
Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was
allowed.

728 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR.
661 The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet
Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to
the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as
1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupa-
tion by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation)
soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

[1. In Western Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

172 In the primary schools only Russian was taught until recently, but in those kept by the *zemstvos* and Ukrainian societies Ukrainian is now also taught. In the secondary schools, which exist only in the larger towns, French and German instruction is given. In the German colonies there are German local schools (private), mostly primary. In the large towns of the western Ukraine and in the Polish colonies and on the large estates there are Polish private schools, which have been officially recognized since 1905. It is impossible to estimate the number of Ukrainians who went to universities, because many of them went to Russian universities outside the Ukraine or to foreign universities; but they can only have been a small percentage of the total number of literates.

204 The majority of the newspapers in the Ukraine were Russian. Each Government and each district had its own *Viedomosti*; and there were many Russian papers in Kiev. There were fewer Polish papers, chiefly in Kiev and the western Ukraine. The Germans had local papers in their colonies. The Ukrainians had, up to 1917, some eighteen newspapers, but some of them were printed abroad. In Kiev there were twelve Ukrainian papers, the most popular of which, *Rada*, was started in 1906; in Mohilev one, in Kharkov one, in Yekaterinoslav one, in Moscow one. One of the earliest Ukrainian papers printed abroad was the *Ruthenische Revue*, subsequently called *Ukrainische Rundschau*, started in 1903 in Vienna. This list does not include the Ukrainian newspapers printed in Eastern Galicia in a slightly different language and character.

(C) Political

171 Political conditions in the Ukraine were very much like those in other parts of the Russian Empire, except for special restrictions aiming at russification, e. g. the refusal to appoint the inhabitants of non-Russian districts to important Government positions. But the russification was not so thorough as in Finland

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The construction of light railways in agricultural districts would be of great benefit to the country, but no steps have as yet been taken towards this end.

(*d*) *Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones*

In organization the Russian postal system much resembles that of other European countries, but in extent it is considerably below the average standard. Rural districts are poorly served, although a special effort to improve their facilities has recently been made. Russia is a member of the Universal Postal Union.

Owing to delay and loss of ordinary correspondence, an immense quantity is sent by registered post, especially commercial correspondence, but also newspapers and periodicals.

Parcel post and the sending of goods 'cash on delivery' are in working, but the regulations as to packing, &c., are minute and very vexatious, though necessary to prevent theft in transit.

The facilities for transmitting money through the post are freely made use of, particularly by peasants working at a distance from their homes. In 1910 there were over 40,000,000 dispatches of this kind, their total value being upwards of £200,000,000.

Telegraphs.—Of the total length of telegraph wire for public use in Russia, more than one-third is owned by the private railway companies, the remainder by the postal department. Charges are low, but the service is moderate. Much use is made of 'urgent' telegrams at triple rates to ensure prompt and correct delivery.

Telephones.—The telephone system is fairly well developed in towns in the Ukraine. Private enterprise first entered the field, a company worked by the Bell Telephone Syndicate obtaining a concession for an installation at Odessa in 1895. Shortly afterwards the State established systems at Kiev, Kharkov, and other towns. Still later the *zemstvos* in certain districts interested themselves, and many systems

647 their career and the assurance of a good income for the meagre appointments as an official. It is sufficient just to glance at the statistics of the Russian Empire in order to realize what a gigantic increase in the development of civilization was reached by the effort of the Russian [871] intellectuals and specialists. Public instruction had developed in these fifty years to an enormous extent, [165] infant mortality had fallen by more than 60 per cent, [164] epidemics had experienced a great fall, as also cattle diseases, and the yield of the land had increased in the [232] southern regions by more than 30 per cent. The improvement of the different breeds of horses and cattle was already evident on the eve of the Great War.

• 206 The backward country which Russia was supposed to be in the eyes of Westerners, including also the Ukraine, had in 1912 a big network of telephone lines in the country and especially in the region of Vinnitza, where the organization of the Zemstvos was especially active.

505 As to the river system, as we have already seen, it is very poor and is limited to four rivers, the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Boug, and the Donietz, of which the Dnieper alone is of any interest. The transport capacity of this one important river has been for ever spoiled by the rapids which make navigation impossible along a [503] considerable distance. It is only after the building of the *Dnieprogues*, whose gigantic barrage had submerged the rapids along a distance of about one hundred kilometres, that an uninterrupted river route was established, linking the upper Dnieper with the Black Sea.

This river drains the greater part of the Ukraine and has left its mark upon the whole historic and economic evolution of the country.

Before the Great War the annual tonnage of transports

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Telephones.—The telephone system is fairly well developed in towns in the Ukraine. Private enterprise first entered the field, a company worked by the Bell Telephone Syndicate obtaining a concession for an installation at Odessa in 1895. Shortly afterwards the State established systems at Kiev, Kharkov, and other towns. Still later the *zemstvos* in certain districts interested themselves, and many systems

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

have been opened and worked under their auspices and control. The most notable development has been in the districts of Bakhmut (Government of Yekaterinoslav), Lebedyenski (Kharkov), and Lokhivitski (Poltava). Mariupol and district has communication with Bakhmut and other places on the Donets coalfield. Otherwise trunk communication is confined to a line connecting Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson.

The instruments of private telephone installations are usually of the Bell Co.'s make. The State and the *zemstvos* have generally installed instruments made by Ericsson, Stockholm.

(2) External

(a) *Ports*

Accommodation.—The Ukraine is not lacking in good natural ports on the Black Sea: Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson are capable of handling great quantities of traffic. On the Azov Sea, Berdyansk and Mariupol share the trade, but in their case purely artificial harbours have had to be constructed at great expense, as the coast has no natural harbour.

There are no tides, any variations of depth of water being caused by wind of great force or long persistence from one quarter.

Odessa is the most frequented port of the Russian Black Sea coast. There is a good depth of water in the bay, but it is much exposed to the two most dangerous winds which blow on the coast, viz. the south and the south-east. The outer harbour is formed by a mole known as the eastern mole, which has a curve to the eastward, and a detached breakwater 1,400 yds. in length parallel with the shore. The eastern entrance has 24–30 ft. of water, and the western 17 ft., and both have an entrance width of 300 yds. This outer harbour is safe from all winds, and gives commodious anchorage.

The inner harbour is formed by five moles which divide it into four parts. The two western moles

The Russian Danube Steam Navigation Co. traded 505
from Odessa to Danube river ports. It had a fleet of eleven vessels, with a tonnage of 9,000.

The following foreign lines had regular sailings to Odessa: Thos. Wilson, Sons & Co., thrice weekly, from Hull; J. R. Ellerman, Ltd., fortnightly, from Liverpool; James Moss & Co., every four weeks, from Liverpool; the Messageries Maritimes, fortnightly, from Marseilles; and the Deutsche Levante Linie, monthly, from Genoa.

Tramp steamers of many nationalities are attracted in great numbers to Ukraine ports in the autumn for the shipment of the cereal crop, and there is seldom any lack of cargo space.

The foreign lines with regular services appear capable of meeting the normal demand on their cargo space. The Russian lines require Government support, as shipping under the Russian flag is not as a rule commercially successful.

(c) *Telegraphic Communication*

Telegraphic communication with foreign countries is 206
dependent mainly on cable lines not situated in the Ukraine, which has only one cable, from Odessa to Constantinople, the joint property of the Indo-European Telegraph Co. and the Eastern Telegraph Co. Telegrams for the East are sent *via* the Kertch station of the Indo-European Telegraph Co.; those for northern Europe or America, *via* Petrograd and thence by various cable lines.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(a) *Supply of Labour; Emigration and Immigration* 464

The line of cleavage between agricultural and other 166
labour is not so sharp in the Ukraine as in most other communities. The claims of agriculture are the greater by far, but the increase in the number of landless peasants who find it difficult to live in the country

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

again, after the offensive of General Brusilov had broken the Austro-Hungarian Front at several points. Part of Volhynia was cleared of the enemy and the Russians again invaded Galicia, occupying Stanislavov and also Czernowitz and the whole of the Bukovina. The Front was again removed from the region of Kiev. 175

Under the influence of the Russian victories the Roumanians entered the war, but they proved to be unprepared for serious conflict. A Russian army was sent to check the German invasion in Moldavia, and a new 'Roumanian Front' was created, so that the battle-line now ran from the Baltic to the Black Sea. During the winter of 1916–17 the South-Western Front was stabilized. Headquarters were planning a new offensive in the spring against Lvov and believed in its ultimate success. Peace and quiet reigned in Kiev and in the neighbourhood of the Front. (1)

§2. HRUSHEVSKY AND VINNICHENKO: THE UKRAINIANS AT BREST-LITOVSK

When the news of the February Revolution (February according to the Old Style, March according to the New) in Petrograd reached Kiev neither the authorities nor the populace would at first credit the truth of it. However, it was not long before the events which had taken place in the northern capital were repeated in Kiev and the cities of the Ukraine. 669 208

The process of decomposition which was destroying the armies of the North-Western and Western Fronts infected somewhat later the forces on the South-Western and Roumanian Fronts. As for the Ukrainian national movement, no one thought about it during those first days of revolution. With the exception of Finland, where the revolutionary movement was accompanied by a wave of feeling in favour of national independence, in no part of the Russian Empire were nationalist aspirations the motive of the Revolution. The first impulse of the masses, irrespective of their nationality, was to look upon the Revolution as a means of ending the war which had lasted too long. The other motives which soon made themselves apparent were everywhere of a social nature.

The state of mind of the masses found expression in the institution of 'Councils (*Soviety*) of Soldiers', Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates', in the creation of which all the leading socialist groups and parties took a hand. People of all nationalities participated in these Soviets; Georgian politicians, who for a generation had played a leading role in Russian radical movements, made themselves par- 208 623

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

208 623 668

ticularly prominent (Chkheidze, Tsereteli and Chenkeli really dominated the first Petrograd Soviet).

At this early period the great majority of the Ukrainian population were really more indifferent to 'the Ukrainian movement' than they had been before the war. The soldiers in the trenches were only interested in two things: in an immediate return to their homes and in their participation in the land distribution which was to be a feature of the agrarian reforms in the new Russia. If in a comparatively short time 'the Ukrainian movement' became a factor of importance in revolutionary Russia, it was only owing to the exceptional energy and insistence of the small group of men who were leading the Ukrainian nationalists.

Already in March Professor Hrushevsky had made his appearance in Kiev; he was joined by one of the activists of 1905, Vinnichenko, who during that earlier phase had called himself a 'Ukrainian Social Democrat'. The journalist Simon Petlyura, who was destined to become the most picturesque of the Ukrainian leaders, also turned up in Kiev.(2) At the beginning of 1917 Petlyura had found himself in the modest post of accountant in one of the branches of the 'Union of the Towns' which, together with the 'Union of Zemstvos', had been largely concerned with the supply problems of the war. These two Unions became the stronghold of the Ukrainian nationalists; in Kiev alone there were 6000 people employed on the 'Union of Zemstvos' and 2000 on the 'Union of the Towns'. Branches of the two Unions existed in all the towns of the Ukraine and the staffs consisted for the greater part of 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'—just the social strata where, before the war, the Ukrainian nationalists had been gaining recruits.

Without losing any time, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko gathered round themselves in Kiev an active group who shared their ideas, and they began to organize a 'Ukrainian Conference'. The sponsors of the Conference sent 'invitations' to 'elect delegates' from the nine Governments which they considered as constituting the territory of the Ukraine (three Governments on the right and three on the left bank of the Dniepr and the three Governments of New Russia). The elections were held 'according to the Revolutionary ways': in other words, delegates arrived in Kiev on the authority of some small 'circle' or club or of a 'Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' which might have consisted of five or six people. There appeared also 'self-appointed delegates'—deserters from the Front and 'new-comers' from Galicia.

No one was particularly astonished at this strange assembly, since 'revolutionary enthusiasm' reigned supreme throughout the whole

abroad for the benefit of the sufferers. On July 14, 1933, such a 731
body was already formed in Lviv and soon in the other sections of 648
Western Ukraine, while their appeals were heard by the Ukrainian emigrés abroad.

In August, Theodore Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna had been convinced of the truth of the famine and he appealed for aid for the starving. In the same month the General Secretary of the Congress of European Minorities published his summary of the conditions, as gleaned from all available sources, and the League took action at its meeting in September. In the same month the matter was brought up before the League of Nations in Geneva and relief was referred to the International Red Cross.

The movement spread to the Ukrainians in North America and on November 3, 1933, the sixth convention of the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States appealed to the government of the United States, urging that an impartial commission be sent to Ukraine to report on the truth of these reports.

This growing wave of protests among the Ukrainians and the [208]
emigrants from Ukraine was met by a stony silence on the part of the Soviet authorities, by absolute denial or by charges of unfriendly propaganda. The Soviet government refused to lift its barrier on any visits to Ukraine by foreign journalists or by any foreign visitors until after the harvest of 1933 was brought in and then they induced such journalists as Walter Duranty to recant previous statements as to the extent of the famine and report on September 18, 1933, that the harvest of that year was excellent "and all talk of famine now is ridiculous."

Almost the first detailed account of an American journalist was 731
given by William Henry Chamberlin on May 29, 1934, on his 185
return from the Soviet Union, when he estimated that between four and five million peasants were starving and he also quoted the speech of President Kalinin of the Soviet Union, made the year before, "The collective farmers have passed through a good school. For some, this school was quite ruthless."

This was a polite hint again that it had been the policy of the government to allow the famine to run its course in the hope of

725 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A.
668 had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrain-
[208] ians were loyal to the Soviet Union. This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided
[186] to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army.

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

[651] The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West.

728 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of
648 the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

in 1939, now received a new master. As soon as the Soviet forces 728
entered the region in the autumn of 1944, they immediately began 648
a campaign to liberate this area from Czecho-Slovakia and reunite it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was the same old story carried on in the same way as in 1939. There was a mass of petitions apparently prepared by the native population asking for liberation, but these were in reality the work of a handful of carefully selected Communists.

They speedily reached their goal and on June 29, 1945, President Benes of Czechoslovakia recognized the justice of their claims and by an agreement handed over the entire province which was duly reunited with their brothers in Moscow. This brought together under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic nearly all the Ukrainians, except a few who were still living in Poland and in a small stretch of territory which the UkSSR voluntarily ceded to Poland to satisfy the increasing claims of the Polish Communists and their needs in their efforts to cement their power in that state.

At the same time the realization by the Soviet authorities of the seriousness of the situation offered by the U. P. A. and the unrest among the Ukrainians led them to act on both the foreign and the domestic front. On the former they mobilized all of their [208] ●
friends and dupes abroad to stress the connection of the U. P. A., [725]
the "Bandera bandits," and the Nazi criminals and they achieved considerable success in closing the eyes of the west until they had won considerable victories over the various U. P. A. groups, for too many Western leaders failed to see the inconsistency that they preached. At one and the same time the Soviet authorities boasted of their complete control of the territory of Western Ukraine, thanks to the love of the population for the Red Army and in almost the same breath they declaimed against these armed forces which were holding up the advance of the Red Army and the NKVD in the very areas where the people were thirsting for liberation.

On the domestic front in the autumn of 1945 they sent a large 661
force of men into the Carpathian area under the command of 668
Khrushchov as Premier of the UkSSR and General Ryasny, the 725

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

chief of administration.[9] Having achieved this post, he repaid the 727
organization which had assisted him by using his influence to 633
secure the adherence to the OUN-M of the most important officials.[10]

While most of the economic and cultural divisions of the city 668*
government were left in the hands of local men, the OUN forces 208
took care to organize the most important branches—propaganda 625
and police—under their own followers. Zakhvalins'kyi was 727
brought from Zhitomir to take command of the police units, but after a short period, in which his alleged incompetence and dissolute life made him objectionable to his party, he was replaced by one of the Galician leaders, Roman Bidar. Kandyba soon arrived to take charge of propaganda activity. With him came the staff of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* headed by John Rohach. The newspaper was to be printed in Kiev, but the destruction of the principal press by the explosions forced the editors to continue publication for some weeks in Zhitomir.[11]

Having captured Kiev, the German armies rapidly pushed on 668*
to the east, taking with them most of the interpreters and advisers 727
who had formed an essential part of the OUN-M "conquest" of Zhitomir and Kiev. By the end of October, they had reached Kharkov, where Konyk took the lead in propaganda work. He and his assistants succeeded in recruiting a considerable number of the local intelligentsia for their organization but, as will be shown later, failed in their attempt to attain a high degree of success similar to that in Kiev.[12]

Lest repeated reference to collaboration of the Mel'nyk forces with the Wehrmacht lead to an exaggerated conception of the role of the OUN-M in the operations of the German army, it should be pointed out that the latter employed many Slavic interpreters and advisers in addition to the Mel'nyk followers. Some of these were Ukrainians, of all political persuasions, including Bandera supporters. Strong efforts were made to get rid of the latter after the decision to suppress their party, but for a

[9] Bahazii assumed the post on November 1 (*Nastup,* December 20, 1941, p. 2).
[10] Interviews 53, 65.
[11] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 21, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, p. 3; Interview 65.
[12] See Chapter X.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

most of the peasantry seem to have responded favorably.[63] Frustrating delays ensued throughout a large part of the Ukraine, however, especially in the Reichskommissariat. In part they were due to misplaced German thoroughness in requiring exact surveys of the land before proceeding to its division among the households in the *Landbaugenossenschaft*. More serious was the deliberate obstruction of Koch and others who, feeling that the program would leave some small segment of life free of their control, argued that it would result in reduced deliveries. As a result, only 10 percent instead of the planned 20 percent of *Gemeinwirtschaften* were converted to *Landbaugenossenschaften*.[64] In spite of the meager practical results, the de-collectivization program was a favorite theme of Koch's propaganda, doubtless because he allowed so little else of a positive nature even to be discussed. In the end, however, the constantly broken pledges unquestionably caused a loss of faith in the Germans, even a willingness to return to the known evils of the Soviet system. The peasant's saying, "A bad mother is still better than a step-mother who makes many promises," indicated his judgment of the German agricultural policy.[65]

The problem of securing agricultural supplies was closely connected with that of supplying the Ukrainian urban population with food. One way in which the Germans sought to obtain most of the farm products for their own use was to make practically no provision for feeding the city dwellers. This was especially true during the first winter. The concept was simple: the starving urban population would find some means, through barter or otherwise, of inducing the peasants to part with an extra, hidden supply of food beyond that which the Germans had been able to

[63] Cf. for example Report of Ortskommandantur Melitopol', July 8, 1942, PS 1693 (hereafter referred to as PS 1693); Report No. 7 of Representative of Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte and Stab des Befehlshabers des ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte Captain Müller, March 24, 1942, to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, PS 1686 (hereafter referred to as PS 1686).

[64] Memorandum by Bräutigam, October 25, 1942, PS 294 (hereafter referred to as PS 294).

[65] Situation report, Wirtschaftinspektorat Süd lc, April, 1942, NG 1089 (hereafter referred to as NG 1089); Memorandum of Generalkommissar for the Crimea, Alfred Frauenfeld, to Himmler, February 10, 1944, NO 5394 (hereafter referred to as NO 5394).

668* violently denounced by the Soviet rulers, it is likely that a large
[661] part of the intelligentsia was "liquidated as a class."

At the same time,[1] a certain outlet was offered to nationalist
186 feeling, with a class-conscious twist, by emphasizing the heroic
208 feats of certain Ukrainian leaders of Red partisan units in the L'vov area.[37] This theme was relatively subdued, however, probably because there were not enough Ukrainian subjects suitable for glorification. In the Carpatho-Ukraine, where the Red partisans had evidently attracted genuine support as liberators from the de-nationalizing Hungarian regime, the tactic was employed much more extensively. Whole lists of partisan leaders, including at least one priest, were published. Moreover, one partisan was explicitly declared to speak "pure Ukrainian," and apparently all bore Ukrainian names.[38] This propaganda was followed up by the customary practice of forming a People's Committee which requested union of the province with the Soviet Union.[39] Even after the war was ended and the new acquisition securely incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine, however, an article was published which, had it been written by a non-Communist, would have been denounced as "racist." It was stated that some villages in the Carpatho-Ukraine spoke only Magyar, but that their "purely Ukrainian" character was shown by the family names of the inhabitants and their "Slavic appearance."[40]

661 Fortunately for them, the majority of the West Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia did not stay behind to enjoy the benefits of Soviet "re-education." It is one of the strange paradoxes of German-Ukrainian relations during the war, however, that at the very period when Germany was most in need of securing Ukrainian support, and when a minimal amount of such assistance was being developed in the form of the Galician Division, a new wave of repression fell upon the nationalist leaders. This occurred in the fall of 1943; its immediate causes cannot be determined, but it appears that it was basically a result of that tendency to strive for large results by employing force and trickery which marred

[37] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 26, 1945, p. 3.
[38] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 14, 1944, p. 2.
[39] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 23, 1944, p. 2.
[40] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 28, 1945, p. 3.

[1] [after the Ukraine was conquered by the Red Army in 1944-- Analyst]

IX. CHANNELS OF NATIONALIST ACTIVITY

[795] 668* THOUGH the church did in some measure provide an institutional framework through which nationalist sentiment could be expressed, its usefulness for the propagation of a political doctrine was necessarily limited. Such organizational channels were essential to the nationalist movements if they were to achieve large-scale results in the occupied East Ukraine. To be sure, the underground parties themselves provided a network of contacts and a minimum of central direction. In comparison with the vast area to be covered—populated in 1941–43, even after wartime dislocations, by thirty millions—resources under their direct control [208] were microscopic. Clandestine publications could be issued by mimeograph machines or small hand presses and circulated from one trusted individual to another. Such propaganda could, however, reach only a few thousand. As underground groups, the nationalist parties necessarily had extremely small memberships. For example, a group of twelve members of the OUN-B in Kramatorskaia (Kremators'ka) in the Donbas is referred to by one of the leaders of the party in that area as a "big" cell.[1] Again, the entire number of active OUN-M workers in Kiev in late 1942 never exceeded thirty.[2] It is certain that the members of each of the OUN organizations in the chief cities after early 1942 could be counted in dozens and that the total number of active workers in the East Ukraine numbered only a few hundred.

For a conspiratorial organization, however, the number of members is not necessarily a criterion of effectiveness. By infiltrating key positions in public institutions, the nationalist parties might obtain influence out of all proportion to the number of their adherents. Moreover, even when centrally organized parties like

[1] Interview 66.
[2] Interview 65.

p 210

not find the Prosvita organization well adapted to its tactic of underground work after German suppression.[56] On the other hand, the extremely important Kharkov Prosvita was organized almost entirely by local residents who had in many cases been associated with the Prosvita of pre-Soviet days, and who were unassociated with, or even to some extent hostile to, the OUN-M.[57] Here again there is strong indication of the survival in the East Ukraine of leadership capable of taking direction of important aspects of national life. That this leadership was directed to such a considerable extent to the less aggressive aspects of national development, however, indicates that a certain gap existed during the war years between nationalism in the East and the West Ukraine.

The means employed in the educational systems and in the cultural societies for propagating the national ideology can be classed for the most part under the heading of oral propaganda. The face-to-face type of communication has a long history of effective use in the east Slavic countries and, under the name "oral agitation," has been widely cultivated as a means of strengthening the Communist regime. Hence the population was used to this type of propaganda. Moreover, it was especially suited to the work of the nationalist groups, which were seeking to spread ideas frowned upon by the German authorities. The latter could suppress a performance or dissolve a society, arrest or execute a leader, but with their small number of personnel, their ignorance of the language, and their lack of sufficiently numerous and reliable local agents, they could not overhear everything and thus prevent the clever teacher or cultural worker from communicating political concepts to his audience. Since nationalist propagandists were so few and ill-equipped by organization and training to cope with the gigantic task of indoctrinating a population of thirty million, however, the problem of securing access to mass communication media under control of the propaganda departments of the municipal administrations was vitally important. Through such media nationalism might reach thousands

[56] Interview 61.
[57] Interviews 57, 73.

186 where oral methods by the same number of agitators reached
208 scores and live theatrical performances reached hundreds.

The principal activity of the propaganda department of a
204 727 Ukrainian municipal administration under German occupation
186 centered around the local newspaper, for other media such as the radio and motion pictures were under complete German control. It is worth devoting considerable attention to journalistic activity throughout the East Ukraine because of the value such study can have in elucidating the whole problem of the extent of nationalist activity in that area. Newspapers not only reached large numbers, but represented a symbol of authoritative pronouncement to a people accustomed to viewing the statements of the Soviet press as announcements of policy not subject to question.[58]

However much the German authorities may have feared the existence of a Ukrainian press, it was absolutely essential for them to authorize and support it for their own purposes. Under the Wehrmacht administration, especially in the early days, a very nonrestrictive policy was pursued, as was indicated by the ideologically independent nature of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* in Zhitomir and Kiev. General ground rules laid down included prohibition of the term "Ukraine" in the sense of a state, rather than as a territorial expression; insistence on reference to Germany as the "protector" of the Ukraine, rather than as an "ally"; and designation of the Wehrmacht as "saviors" rather than "occupiers."[59] Under army control newspapers sprang up in scores of towns, including all of the important cities of the East Ukraine, although in at least one (Poltava) the establishment of a paper was considerably delayed by the unwillingness of any officer to accept the responsibility of censoring it.[60] One reason for the Wehrmacht's

[58] There is considerably more information available on newspaper activity than on other politically significant aspects of the East Ukraine. Since many of the observers who have written accounts of the war period were themselves journalists they naturally paid considerable attention to this field of activity. Moreover, the West Ukrainian newspapers published during the same period, which furnish the principal source of material on the East Ukraine, were also especially interested in journalistic enterprises. Consequently, one must guard against the assumption that the real importance of these newspapers was as great as the attention devoted to them indicates. Nevertheless, they were unquestionably very significant as means of transmitting nationalism and reflecting national feeling.

[59] PS 053.

[60] USSR Exhibit 278.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

186 writers.[46] To a certain extent it may be due to resentment against
565 the clerical workers' unresponsiveness to nationalist propaganda,
369 or even to simple snobbery toward those aspiring to the title of
517 "intelligentsia" without a formal education. In part it appears, however, to correspond to a real lack of breadth of mind among this lowest group of the Soviet intelligentsia, a deficiency which would have made it difficult to use them for any political or social movement not tied immediately to their customary frame of thinking.

On the other hand, there were often elements in the villages which were available for some sort of political activity. The memory of Petliura was still present; some refused to believe that he was dead, thinking the story to be Communist propaganda.[47] In another area, both the president of the village soviet and the head of one of the collective farms remained behind and organized life in cooperation with nationalist elements.[48] Yet, in another case, a man of some education in one of the villages, who was related to an émigré minister of the UNR, after expressing fervently nationalist sentiments, recoiled with horror at the idea that his auditor might recommend him to the Germans for an official post, fearing the vengeance of Communist agents.[49] The presence of the latter was, indeed, a great handicap to nationalist organization in the rural areas, where the protection of the police force was not so great (especially in partisan-infested areas) as in the towns, and where the naturally cautious peasant hesitated to commit himself until assured the Soviet administration would never return.[50]

186 Since the organized nationalist forces were so few in members,
369 they could not undertake any direct or continuous indoctrination
208 of the rural population, unless they abandoned their efforts to win the cities. They had to rely primarily on the Prosvita branches, the country schools, and the village administrations. Printed material was also used whenever it could be controlled

[46] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 23, 1941, p. 2, reprinting an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti*.

[47] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.

[48] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

[49] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.

[50] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

by nationalist Ukrainians. As a matter of fact, a large proportion 186
of the newspapers in the smaller towns were directed principally 369
at rural readers; the extreme shortage of papers[51] in many areas 208
prevented their being of great influence even when they had [204]
some nationalist content. Moreover, the central periodical for farmers, *Ukraïns'kyi Khliborob,* with a weekly printing of seventy thousand, was edited by Eugene Arkypenko, who later joined the Vlasov movement.[52] While this publication was not used against the nationalist cause, it was devoid of positive nationalist material, being confined entirely to technical agricultural articles.

The less-than-lukewarm supporters of the nationalist move- 186
ments who constituted the bulk of the personnel in positions 369
which provided access to the rural population apparently did not do a great deal to convert the dormant cultural nationality of the peasants into active nationalism. There is no question that the cities inevitably constituted a prime target for nationalist efforts. Probably, in view of the severe limitations imposed by lack of time and nationalist personnel, by Red partisans and German restrictions, the enormous task of overcoming village inertia toward a purely political movement could not have been carried out in any case. Nevertheless, the initial failure of the nationalist groups (at least the OUN and others coming from the west) to grasp the overriding importance of the land question, and the necessity of making this a prime means by which the rural population could be won to the nationalist cause, must certainly be ranked as one of the great lost opportunities of this period. If the nationalists had from the beginning used all their energies to present a positive program of agrarian reform as the heart of their message, they might not have left any tangible organization to withstand renewed Soviet occupation, but they might have left behind a concept of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a defender of the interests of the peasantry. This, along with the vaguer memories of the Republican era, might have left an enduring imprint on the peasantry.

[51] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[52] *Volyn',* June 17, 1942, p. 4; Interview 45.

[Volhynia] [Ruthenia]

186 Nothing happened there which their special reporters did not describe in detail. In neighboring Volhynia which, for easier Polonization, was separated from Galicia by a Chinese wall, /83/ and where Ukrainian newspapers from Lwów were forbidden, people paid two zloty, the equivalent of two marks, for the smuggled papers. Radios were 186 much in demand 1 and the cooperatives which ordin- • 208 arily sold shoelaces, underwear and soap, were suddenly supposed to furnish radio sets. The members wanted it. They brought their zloty, and when these did not suffice they paid in chickens and eggs. Half the village listened to the reports from a friendly broadcasting station in the Ukrainian language, picked up by a common receiving set. The people did not mind at all that they were obliged to stand or squat as close together as sardines in a can.

The "audition" cost five groschen which amounts to two and one-half pfennig. Anyone who had no money paid with an egg for news taken from the ether. What they heard on these occasions were sometimes their own wish-dreams. The autonomous government, which set up its residence first in Uzhgorod and then, until the country's reintegration into Hungary, in Khust, had great plans. The listeners discussed this with great animation.

648 The peasants who could write set down on 186 paper the result of long deliberation about exist- 208 ing conditions as well as their wishes for the future, in the form of letters and sent them to the Polish President as well as to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Prime Minister Voloshyn and to a foreign statesman from whom they hoped to get help. Most of these letters got only as far as the office of 648 the voivode. Thereupon Poland's fist became day by day more oppressive. The autonomy of the neighboring small country, however meager it was, was a violent shock to Polish power. Warsaw desired the quickest possible disappearance of Carpatho-Ukraine. On December third the head of

1 [i.e., 1938-39 among the Ukrainians in Volhynia - Andy]

12:Buraček--1 R-4, 5 (no date) 1930 RDl Ukraine RDl

Fine Arts in the Ukraine

By M. Buraček

532 /401/ Ukrainian literature had important representatives already in the first half of the nineteenth century whereas the fine arts did not produce any names of importance till the end of the century. But the actual development of the fine arts in the Ukraine started only in the twentieth century, the years after the revolution being the most decisive ones for the further development of the fine arts.

[208] During the civil war art played an important part in propaganda and agitation. Millions of posters, slogans, and illustrations flooded the country. Demonstrations, theatrical performances, manifestations of all sorts of programs of the various "fronts" -- fronts of the industrial areas, of the rural areas, of the educational realm, of sanitary measures -- all these required the cooperation of the artist. A number of "peasant homes" in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk and other cities as well as soldiers' barracks, clubs, etc. were ornamented with fresco paintings, ornaments and decorations.

Easel painting was virtually unknown. This was proved in 1918 in the "Exhibition of Ukrainian Artists", where the paintings exhibited were small in number and had no special qualities. In 1920, in a small room in Kiev, another exhibition of paintings was shown, and once more it had no broad character. Only at the beginning of 1925, at the opening of the so-called Fair of the 'Kontrakty' /a special section of the city of Kiev/ in Kiev, a rather interesting exhibition was shown in which not only painters but also graphic artists and sculptors participated.

When, after the civil war, attention was paid to economic reconstruction, the role of the artist in social life also changed. Draftsmen were employed as illustrators and caricaturists. The publishing houses ordered dust jackets, book illustrations, original type, and the like, from the artists. Painters went to work on portraits of statesmen and theatrical designs. Since that time, art for art's sake is on its way out, and the artists are entering more and more into the service of everyday life and economy. The gap between art and life becomes smaller and smaller. Of course, art is not exclusively dedicated to utilitarian purposes. At the same time, the artists are in search of a new language, of a new style. And eventually the time came when this search brought about a grouping together of the artists in a firm organization.

In 1926, upon the initiative of the artists, F. Krycevs'kyj, Kozik,

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

TABLE OF ALPHABETS

212

Transliteration	Great Russian	Ukrainian	Polish
a	а	а	a
			ą (*nasal*)
b	б	б	b
ch	ч	ч	cz
d	д	д	d
dz	дз	дз	dz
dz′ *or* dzy (*soft*)		дз (*soft*)	dź
dzh	дж	дж	dż
e	э (e)	е	e
ē	ё (*sounds* yo)	ïо	io
			ę (*nasal*)
f	ф	ф	f
g	г	ґ	g
h	(г)	г	h
i	и	і	i
k	к	к	k
l	л (*hard*)	л (*hard*)	ł
l′ *or* ly	л (*soft*)	л (*soft*)	l
m	м	м	m
n	н	н	n
n′ *or* ny	н (*soft*)	н (*soft*)	ń
o	о	о	o
			ó (*sounds* u)

Transliteration	Great Russian	Ukrainian	Polish
p	п	п	p
r	р	р	r
			rz (*sounds* zh)
s	с	с	s
s′ *or* sy	с (*soft*)	с (*soft*)	ś
sh	ш	ш	sz
shch	щ	щ	szcz
t	т	т	t
ts	ц	ц	c
ts′ *or* tsy		ц (*soft*)	ć
u	у	у	u
v	в	в	w
y *consonant*	й	й	j (i)
y *vowel*	ы	и	y
ya	я	я	ia, ja
ye (*Gt. R.* e)	е	є	ie, je
yi		ї	ji
yu	ю	ю	iu, ju
z	з	з	z
z′ *or* zy	з (*soft*)	з (*soft*)	ź
zh	ж	ж	ż
(′) *represents*	ь	ь	(′)

but has mostly been omitted.

In Ukrainian soft дз, с, ц, з (Polish dź, ś, ć, ź) sound almost dzh, sh, ch, and zh

On the contrary, in Zone 2 the absence of trees, the 137
drier climate, the dusty soil, and the isolated farms make the landscape more severe and more similar to the barren table-land of Northern Castile. Only the immensity of the cornfields with their golden ears introduces a lyrical note, vision-like, into this flat and treeless country. The villages of the Steppe are not 361
very picturesque and look mostly like colonies in which 342
the spirit of calculation dominates over the care of beauty. The habitations here are more modern, bigger, and better planned. The thatch here gives place to tiles and to corrugated iron. On the other hand, the poor people, deprived of wood, live in primitive hovels built of clay.

In the extreme north, in the forest region with its 133
sandy soil, the picturesque landscapes gradually disappear to resume the severe and sad monotony of the White Russian country-side.

The Ukrainian is very adaptable to civilization, that 181
is to say to the improvement of everyday life, and very quickly adopts all practical inventions, without any spirit of routine.

The Ukraine is the most literate part of Russia. Even 212
Soviet statistics, which cannot be assumed to be well disposed to the Tsarist regime, show that the percentage of the generation which was of a school age in 1914, which could read and write was, in 1923, 90 per cent in the towns and 73 per cent in the country, which, by the way, is a vigorous reply to the generally accepted opinion that in the pre-war Russian Empire the population stagnated in a condition of utter ignorance.

In the other parts of European Russia the percentage for the same generation was respectively 82 per cent in the towns and 57 per cent in the country-side.

It seems to us opportune to give an idea of the Ukraine 000

2 [See category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

even harder pressure was applied against the Ukrainian townsmen. 175
In those times the conversion of an Orthodox Ukrainian to Catholicism meant Polonisation. Since the end of the 16th century a large number of the Ukrainian nobility having accepted Catholicism left their Ukrainian nationality. The same pressure led to the Polonisation of a great part of the Ukrainian townsmen.

The neighbourhood of the Tartars was an obstacle to the normal development of Ukraine.

On the territory between Kiev and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov the stubborn struggle of the Ukrainian nation against the Tartars was carried on for centuries. The Tartars captured people from Ukraine and sold them into slavery in the oriental markets. The last invasion of the Crimean Horde into Ukraine was in 1769.

In spite of this permanent danger from the steppe and under these extremely difficult conditions the Ukrainian nation did not abandon its cultural activity.

Schools, literature, printing, developed in Ukraine. The learned [212] Arab Paul of Aleppo, who visited Ukraine in 1654, wrote in his memoirs that education was common among the Ukrainian people, and that even the Ukrainian women were literate. Academies had also been founded in Ukraine, and were the models and sources of education for all Greek-Orthodox Slav peoples. Ukrainians studied at the Universities of Italy, France, Germany and other countries.

Against the Tartar hordes, the Ukrainians created an organisation of its own — the Cossack Army. From the middle of the 16th [701] century, the centre of the Ukrainian Cossack Army was in the fortress 'Sich', southward of the Dnieper Cataracts. From this the name of 'Zaporovian Army' arose ('porohy' are the rocks in the Dnieper). The Zaporovian Army performed great deeds in fighting the Tartars. The Ukrainian Cossacks under the leadership of Petro Sahaydachny saved Poland from a terrible Turkish force in the battle of Khotin (Bessarabia), in 1621.

When in 1683 Central Europe was threatened by the Turks, the Ukrainian Cossacks were the force without which the Polish King Jan Sobieski could not dare to begin the decisive battle against the Turks before Vienna.

After the Union of Lublin of 1569, the Polish nobles wanted to take possession of the territory the Ukrainian people had defended against the Tartars. The Polish Government planned to abolish the Ukrainian Cossack Army, and to make the Cossacks serfs of the nobility. The nobility wished to lay their hands on the free peasants of Eastern Ukraine who had not known serfdom. The relations between the Polish Government and the masses of the Ukrainian

Yekaterinoslav, 5 per cent.; Poltava, 4 per cent.; Taurida, 4 per cent.; Kharkov, 0·5 per cent. only.

Like the Orthodox Church, the Jewish community has its sects. There are two such sects in the Ukraine; and their members exercise a great moral influence, and form a bridge between the Turkish and Jewish populations of the Ukraine. They are called Karaimy and Krymchaki, and live chiefly in the towns of the Taurida and Kherson Governments. They number about 12,000. These people, using mostly Tatar dialects, are supposed to be descendants of Jewish pre-Christian colonies in the Crimea and the Turkic Khazars of the Middle Ages, who were of Jewish faith. The Karaimy disapprove of the Talmud, and base all their beliefs on the Law of Moses. They differ from other Jewish communities in their cleanliness, their absolute honesty in business, and their great sense of social duties. Hence their wealth is evenly distributed in their communities.

(c) *Mohammedans.*—The largest Mohammedan colony is found in the Taurida government (187,940, or 13 per cent.), but their schools are less efficient and their culture is much lower than that of the Mohammedans of the Volga or of Turkestan.

(B) Educational

The last census, taken in 1897,[1] gives the following figures:

Name of Government.	*Total population in 1,000's.*	*No. of literates in 1,000's.*	*Per cent. of literates.*
Podolia	3,018	450	14·5
Kharkov	2,492	384	15·4
Poltava	2,778	446	16·1
Volhynia	2,989	493	16·5
Kiev	3,559	598	16·8
Chernigov	2,298	402	17·5
Yekaterinoslav	2,114	433	20·5
Kherson	2,734	657	24·1
Taurida	1,448	380	26·2
	23,430	4,243	average 18·2

[1] From *The Ukrainian Movement as a Stage in South Russian Separatism*, Shchegolev (Kiev, 1912), p. 364.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The high percentage of literates in Novorossiya 212
(Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav) is due to the 871
presence of German colonists. In ten Great-Russian Governments (Pskov, Penza, Simbirsk, Tambov, Smolensk, Orel, Kaluga, Riazan, Tula, and Nijni Novgorod) there are 16,302,000 inhabitants, of whom 16·9 per cent. can read and write. Since the census of 1897, education in the Ukraine has been rapidly spreading, thanks chiefly to the *zemstvos*, who supported about half the existing schools. In the Government of Poltava the *zemstvos* spent in 1900 as much as 20 per cent. of their income on education. According to the statistics of Yasnopolski, who bases his calculations on the reports of the Central Statistical Committee in Petrograd, and brings his figures down to 1910, the percentage of literates is as follows: Taurida, 38 per cent.; Kherson, 35; Yekaterinoslav, 29; Chernigov, 25; Kiev, 24; Kharkov, 23; Poltava, 23; Volhynia, 23; Podolia, 20.

Within the territories of the nine Governments which 873
form the Ukraine, there are three universities and several higher educational institutions in Odessa, in Kiev, and in Kharkov. The language and administration are Russian, though Kiev has Chairs of Ukrainian Language and History, recently instituted; and they all gather, especially at Kiev, a fair number of Ukrainian scholars. The three university towns form centres round which other schools are grouped. Kiev is the centre for the South-west Territory, i. e. the Governments of Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia; Odessa is the centre for Novorossiya, i. e. the Governments of Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav; and Kharkov is the centre for Malorossiya, i. e. the Governments of Chernigov, Poltava, and Kharkov. On the whole, education is most advanced in Novorossiya, and Odessa has the greatest number of schools (420), secondary and primary. The Government of Kharkov is very poor in schools, though Kharkov itself possesses about 111; next come the Governments of Podolia, Poltava, and Volhynia.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

some of the others studied in mixed Ukrainian-Russian or Ukrainian-Jewish schools, they were "mechanically transferred" after the first four years to classes using Ukrainian.[66] 871 191 656

Zatonski, who replaced Skripnik as Commissar of Education, stated that the Ukrainization of Russian children had taken place in Kharkov and in the Don Basin as well as in Kiev; and he pointed to Krasnolutzki District, where the number of Russian schools had dropped from twenty in 1930 to twelve in 1932.[67] He also declared that in Kherson and Makiivitz there were no Russian elementary schools at all; and that in some places there had been a voluntary Ukrainization of Russian children because the buildings and equipment provided for the Russian schools were greatly inferior to those of the Ukrainian schools.[68] Additional evidence was forthcoming in 1934 and 1935 to show some enforced Ukrainization of Polish children and of those of other minorities, as well as of some of the Russian children; and this situation was denounced as an example of "deliberate nationalist wrecking."[69] [565]

This campaign against over-Ukrainization, however, was not intended to lead to a revival of the Russification policy. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was adamant on this point. He explained in 1933 that the results of over-Ukrainization would have to be eliminated because this was demanded by internationalism, "by the brotherly interests of the toilers of all the nationalities in the Ukraine."[70] But, he went on, the Russian nationalists would not be allowed to take advantage of mistakes already committed in order to reverse the policy of Ukrainization; on the contrary, there would be a further drive for "Bolshevik Ukrainization." A similar view was taken in 1934 by Postishev, the assistant secretary of the Central Committee and the official most actively engaged in hunting down the Ukrainian nationalists.[71]

According to the latest available material, the Ukrainization of education has kept pace with the expansion of general education, and a greater proportion of pupils were studying in Ukrainian schools in 1937 than in 1927. By 1937 the general schools embraced 5,364,800 children as compared with 1,678,100 in 1913 — an increase of 319 percent over the pre-War year; and whereas twenty-two of every thousand people attended elementary school in the Kiev Educational District in 1912, in 1937 the figure for all of the Ukraine had risen to 871 162 212

[66] *Ibid.*, Mar. 29, 1933. [67] *Visti*, May 1, 1933. [68] *Ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1933.
[69] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1934 (speech of Zatonski); Aug. 22, 1934, Jan. 5, 1935.
[70] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1933. [71] *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1934.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine

one hundred seventeen of every thousand people.[72] The middle schools had expanded greatly by 1937; the fifth to tenth grades embraced 1,927,100 pupils in 1937 as compared with 347,900 pupils in 1928, an increase of 554 percent in ten years.[73]

While the school system was expanding quantitatively, the number of children studying in Ukrainian schools was also increasing. During the school year 1935–36, the year that marked the end of the campaign to check over-Ukrainization, 83.0 percent of the pupils in the general schools were studying in the Ukrainian language. This percentage coincides roughly with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. It also represents a higher percentage of pupils in Ukrainian schools than attended such schools in 1927, a fact which resulted from the expansion of middle schools in the rural areas and from the decline in the number of children attending schools in some of the other languages. During the school year 1935–36, 12.7 percent of all the pupils in the general schools studied in Russian, 1.4 percent in Jewish, 1.3 percent in German, 0.5 percent in Moldavian and 0.5 percent in Polish schools.[74] In absolute numbers, there had been an increase between 1927 and 1935–36 in the pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Greek languages; there had been a decline in the number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Swedish and Assyrian languages; and schools had been established for Uzbeks, Belorussians, Kirghiz, Kazaks, Turkomens and Latvians.[75]

With regard to the technical and higher educational institutions, the author has no figures on the number of students in the Ukrainized

[72] The figure for the number of pupils in 1937 is taken from *Socizlističeskoe Stroitelstvo Sojuza S.S.S.R., 1933–1938* gg. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1939), p. 163.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[74] *Socialistična Ukraina. Statistični Zbirnik* (Kiev, 1937), p. 222.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 222. *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini* . . . , pp. 20–26. A comparison of absolute figures for 1927 and 1935–36 must take into account that the statistics for 1927 gave the total number of pupils in mixed schools but not the number studying in various languages used in these schools. The number of pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Czech languages in 1935–36 was greater than the number studying in their own schools in 1927 plus the total number in mixed schools using these languages for some classes. The conclusion that there was a decline in the total number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Assyrian and Swedish languages is arrived at by considering roughly the number of pupils in mixed schools studying in these languages. For example, in 1927 there were 68,836 pupils in Jewish schools; in 1935–36 there were 69,211 pupils studying in the Jewish language; hence, there were 375 more pupils *studying in Jewish* in 1935–36 than had been *attending Jewish schools* in 1927. But in 1927 there were 11,603 pupils in mixed schools using Jewish and either Russian or Ukrainian; in all probability there were more than 375 pupils in these schools who were being taught in Jewish; and by 1935–36 the surplus above 375 had been lost to Jewish classes, indicating a decline in the total number studying in Jewish.

184 Ukraine, to the small farmers in the Polish Ukraine, helpless and oppressed by the Poles, to the Soviet Ukrainians working in factories or on collective farms, or even to the exiles! They[1] all [212] speak the same language, albeit in different dialects, they write the same Cyrillic script, regard the good fortune of one among them as a common possession, while the misfortune that strikes one is felt by all.

101 The thousand souls of Velykyi Lypnyk belong to the westernmost tribe of Ukrainians, the Lemki. [197] They apeak a Slovakian-Ukrainian border dialect. Ukrainian scholars maintain that the Ukrainian settlements formerly reached almost to Cracow, but that the Lemki were pushed back into the mountains by the Poles in the North and the Slovaks in the South. Until the collapse of Poland a bitter nationality fight went on for this small spearhead, especially on the part of Poland, and in the process the Lemki, as the weaker ones, were obliged to yield step by step. The Magyars, no less than the Poles, oppressed the Ukrainian neighboring tribes of Boyki and Huzul and even more than the Slovaks oppressed the Lemki. The Magyar clergy added close to 160,000 Ukrainian souls to their ethnic group. In the census the word "Magyar" stands under the heading of "nationality", and "Greek Orthodox" under the heading of "religion". They are the denationalized Ukrainians who have, for the present, still remained true to their faith. All this began when, at the /11/ end of the last century, the Magyar clergy introduced Magyar hymns, and when in 1912 the Bishop of Haydudorog invented and decreed a Hungarian liturgy in place of the Old Slavic one. (1)

1. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 33.

1 [The Carpatho-, Polish-, Soviet-, and East Slovakian Ukrainians — Analyst]

728 178 The progress in construction and rehabilitation which has taken place since the incorporation of this region into the Ukraine was revealed at a meeting of the Soviet of Nationalities on October 16, 1946, when the representative of the Transcarpathian Ukraine summed up the achievements in 1946. Nearly 300 enterprises had been restored, and nine machine and tractor stations had been set up to assist the peasants in working the fields. Much had been done in 1946 to abolish illiteracy; there were opened over 100 schools, including 75 elementary, seven technical, 27 secondary, four music schools for children, and one school for surgeons' assistants and midwives. [212 871]

433 At the end of December it was stated that 35 new factories had started functioning in the Transcarpathian Region in 1946[1]. Moreover, as compared with 1945 when there was not a single coal mine, 8 mines were working in 1946. There had also been definite progress in building up consumer goods industries. A clothing and a shoe factory had begun working in Vinogradov, and a knitted goods mill in Mukachevo. Some 200 light industries have been opened in various parts of the region.

Population of the Ukraine

162 The Ukraine is inhabited largely by Ukrainians, and also by Russians, Jews, and Poles. Most of the population is literate, and in 1939 there were many technical and vocational schools, as well as scientific research institutes and about 40,000 libraries.

At the census of January 17, 1939 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had 30,960,221 inhabitants; an increase of 6.6 per cent. as compared with December 1926. The greatest increase had occurred in the towns, largely as a result of the migration of country people to new industries. Thus from 1926 to 1939 the urban population more than doubled (5,373,553 to 11,195,620) while the number of rural inhabitants decreased by 16½ per cent. (23,669,381 to 19,764,601).

000 The same was true for the entire Soviet Union. From 147,027,915 in December 1926, its total population increased by 15.9 per cent. to 170,467,186 in January 1939, the urban population having grown from 26.3 million to 55.9 millions; and the rural population having fallen from 120.7 million to 114.5 million.

162 [361] The principal cities of the Ukraine with their population on January 17, 1939, are Kiev, the capital (population, 846,293), Kharkov, capital of the Ukraine before 1934 (833,432), the part of Odessa on the Black Sea (604,223), Dnieprepetrovsk on the Dnieper River (500,662), Stalino, industrial centre of the Donets Basin (462,395), and Nikolayev (167,108).

In January 1939 the urban population of the Ukraine was 36.2 per

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, December 29, 1946.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

7

THE BRIDGE BETWEEN WEST AND EAST

101 The political boundary between Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia is not a clear-cut dividing line between two different worlds. There are a number of Ruthenian peasants in the eastern parts of Slovakia who form a gradual transition between the two neighbours. True, the Slovaks and the Ruthenians are two different Slav races. The Slovaks are closely related to the Moravians and Czechs in the West; the Ruthenians belong to the Russian family—mainly to its Ukrainian branch—although the thousand years of isolation from their kinsmen have had a specific effect on the character of the Ruthenian population on the southern slopes of the Carpathians. But there is a gradual link between the Slovaks and the Ruthenians, and Carpathian Ruthenia may aptly be described as a bridge between the Western and Eastern Slavs.

131 175 Geographically, too, the two neighbouring countries are similar. A chain of wooded mountains separates them from the kindred Slav populations to the North and North-East; while to the South both countries have stretches of fertile plain which run down unobstructed into the vast Danubian basin. That is the reason why both countries fell victim to Hungarian expansion early in their history and remained under Hungarian rule as second-rate provinces for a thousand years. Until the end of 1918, neither Slovakia nor Carpathian Ruthenia were on the map.

177 212 Both these countries suffered from the long alien domination which hampered their development. Slovakia was the more fortunate of the two because, in spite of her political separation from the independent lands of the Czech Crown, cultural and religious contacts with them had been maintained for centuries. But the Ruthenians received less support of this kind from their kindred beyond the Carpathians. As a result, Ruthenia was still more at the mercy of her Hungarian overlords and remained in a state of greater backwardness than her neighbour in the West. This is well illustrated by the degree of illiteracy in Ruthenia under the Hungarian regime which was, indeed, appalling; according to the last Hungarian census about three quarters of the Ruthenian population could not read or write.

177 181 Only people of considerable racial individuality could have resisted systematic denationalisation as the Ruthenians did. They may be a simple people; but their mode of living, their outlook and their character have an unmistakable stamp of their own.

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they

744 Europe; and many people used to die every year from tuberculosis and
164 other chest complaints. Severe epidemics—typhoid and dysentry—used
146 to ravage the country every year; inadequate regulation of rivers and stagnant waters gave rise to malaria; undernourishment of large sections of the population was responsible for sporadic pellagra. Venereal diseases were a curse owing to lack of medical attention and of appropriate legislation.

744 This enormous task was tackled with commendable vigour by the authorities of the Republic. In a country which used to have very few
185 doctors, a proper medical service was soon organised; up-to-date hospitals and children's homes were built; Red Cross stations and other hygiene and welfare institutions, set up in many parts of Ruthenia, strove to prevent and combat disease. This systematic effort resulted in a substantial reduction of mortality, while the draining of marshlands and the regulation of streams and ponds considerably checked epidemics.

185 Realising that ignorance is the root of many social evils, the State regarded the raising of the standard of education in Ruthenia as one
871 of its foremost tasks. The achievements in this field were perhaps the most striking. A country, which in 1918 had not more than eighteen elementary schools where children were only partly taught in Ruthenian, possessed 520 Ruthenian schools two years later; and after fifteen years of independence this small country in the Carpathians could boast 1,079 schools of various kinds—elementary, upper, secondary, technical and special schools. The magnitude of this achievement becomes evident when it is borne in mind that it was necessary to educate the requisite number of Ruthenian teachers from among the rising generation.

871 Thanks to these efforts illiteracy among the younger people has become rare. Those Ruthenians who according to the last census of
212 1930 were still unable to read and write were largely middle-aged or
185 old people. But even among them illiteracy has been considerably reduced because evening schools for adults were opened wherever pos-
517 sible. The people of Ruthenia proved to be keen pupils. Within a few years the neglected country had a promising intelligentsia—administrative workers, teachers, journalists, writers, doctors, engineers, composers, artists and scientists. In the thirties more than eighty periodicals, among them ten dailies, appeared in Ruthenia, and the production of books grew from year to year. The innate aptitude for arts and crafts was given a chance of development when a special art school was established in Užhorod, and musical talent, too, received much encouragement. As many as 7.7 per cent of all musical compositions and songs broadcast by Czechoslovak radio stations were the work of Ruthenian musicians.

000 Economic development was essential to a country where bread used

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

level of the earlier times. Western influences become more 538
prominent; it is a time of transition, nor does the Reformation count for much, for even the Ukrainian translation of the Bible by Dr. Franz Skoryna in 1515 was a response to national needs and cannot be derived from external influences. The first [213] ●
Ukrainian books, on the other hand, were printed in 1491—93 by Shveipolt Fiol in a German printing-press in Cracow, and that in connection with the first Ukrainian academy (Ostroh 1577—1640), which had been formed for the purpose of publishing a critical edition of the Bible.

Literary and educative activity was really in the hands of 814
the brotherhoods, which naturally were greatly interested in efforts to unite the churches. Polish literature worthy of note arose, important preliminary work was done in the province of language (Smotrytskyj's Grammar of Church Slavonic 1618), but it was only after Mohyla (1596—1647) re-organised the Academy in Kyiv that a cultural center was formed which was to play a decisive part in the literature of Ukraine for about 200 years.

Theological, rhetorical and philosophical works appear, the history text-book "Synopsis" by I. Gisel (died in 1684) goes through 30 editions, and Gregor Skovoroda (1722—1794), the most eminent philosopher of the 18th century in Eastern Europe and a student at the Kyiv Academy, wrote his books, the real significance of which is only being recognised now.

The cultural renaissance in Ukraine due to the brotherhoods and the Kyiv Academy brought new impetus to other provinces of intellectual life, as for instance dramatic art (Jakob Gavatovych 1598—1679, Mytrophan Dowhalevskyj 18th century. Demeter Rostovskyj, 1651—1705, the writing of history Samuel Velychko, died in 1728; Gregor Hrabyanka, died in 1737, and Gregor Poletyka, died in 1784), and also in plastic art which reached a high level of excellence in the Left Bank Region under Mazeppa's hetmanate. Young men in Ukraine were no longer content 871
with native education; more and more they flocked to foreign, and above all, to German and Italian universities. Hetman Rozumovskyj's (1728—1803) intention to found a native uni-

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in working out a complex organization after twenty years of near-exclusion from public administration, as well as to delay in securing the approval of Frank and Hitler. On April 13–15, 1940, however, representatives of Ukrainian groups were able to meet openly in Cracow as a steering committee, and in early June this body was formally recognized by Frank as the Ukrainian Central Committee.[13] 668*

The accomplishment was a considerable one, although on paper the new body was extremely limited in its function which, in accordance with Hitler's injunction, was defined as the improvement of the welfare of the Ukrainian population of the Generalgouvernement. For this purpose, the committee[1] was granted the right to prepare a budget covered in part by allocation of funds from the treasury of the Generalgouvernement and was allowed to direct a network of Aid Committees throughout the Ukrainian ethnographical area. Among the more important formal functions of the organization was the distribution of aid received from philanthropic agencies in the United States and from the International Red Cross.[14] As is usually the case with Ukrainian organizations working under the shadow of arbitrary foreign regimes, however, the formal aspect of its activity was not the most important. Officially, the committee[1] had no control over education, but through its relations with the German authorities it was able to exert great influence on the selection of teachers and the provision of instructional facilities. Through its control of welfare funds, it was able to facilitate the attendance of numerous children at the Ukrainian schools.[15] Thus it rendered an important contribution to the reinvigoration of Ukrainian cultural life throughout the area. 746 668* 871 668*

This educational activity was carried on in close connection with the development of a Ukrainian press. The November conference, in addition to laying the groundwork for a central representative body, had founded (also under Dr. Kubiiovych's direction) a large-scale publishing agency which issued a series 668* 214 204

[13] *Entryklopediia Ukrainoznavstvo* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), pp. 580–82.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Interview 9.

[1] [Ukrainian Central Committee in General Government --Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[214] of new school texts in Ukrainian, as well as popular editions of
204 Ukrainian works.[16] Still more important, it began the publication
668* of a newspaper which stood head and shoulders above any other Ukrainian publication in the German-dominated areas. *Krakivs'ki Visti* (Cracow News, as it was named after the Germans forbade the use of "Ukrainian" in the title) was one of the few papers which did not become a party organ but consistently served as a forum for a broad variety of Ukrainian viewpoints. Moreover, it was the only paper of this nature which possessed considerable material resources and attracted numerous contributions from writers of real talent. It was subjected to a censorship stricter than that inflicted on Ukrainian papers in Greater Germany (although much less severe than that of the papers later established under German rule farther east); nevertheless, it was able to reflect a considerable range of Ukrainian life and thought. As a result it is an invaluable witness of the events of the war years.

563 From the standpoint of Ukrainian national interests, the favor-
178 able policy of the Germans toward the group's cultural develop-
871 ment was particularly valuable in enabling it to regain some of the ground lost under the Polish repression. It would take a lengthy volume to detail the ways in which the Ukrainians were able to improve their situation in this respect during the early war years. A single statistic will suffice, however, to indicate the general nature of the gains made. In the school year 1942–43 there were 4,173 Ukrainian-language schools in the Generalgouvernement,[17] while on the corresponding territory before 1939 there were only 2,510—of which only 457 were exclusively Ukrainian.[18] The most marked advance took place in the Chelm area, where, in the autumn of 1939, a large influx of intellectuals fleeing Soviet rule in eastern Galicia brought a new vigor to the cultural life of the Ukrainian community.[19]

[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 2, 1942, p. 3.

[17] This refers of course to the enlarged Generalgouvernement, which included eastern Galicia. It is, however, indicative of an extension of the Ukrainian educational system which was if anything even more pronounced in the areas west of the San and the Bug.

[18] P. Isaiïv, article on Ukrainian schools in the Generalgouvernement during the Second World War, *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva*, p. 952; Buell, p. 279. The remainder were "mixed" schools which Buell says were given over to Polish teachers.

[19] Iurii (George) Tarkovych, "Zabuti Zemli" (Forgotten Lands), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

It was much more difficult to secure a predominant place for 727
the nationalist ideology in the schools. As is usually the case in 186
nationalist indoctrination in the schools, the efforts were concen- 872
trated upon the teaching of history.[41] This was especially important, since the justification of the Ukrainian independence movement is largely based upon the conception of a proud history distinct from that of the people of Moscow. Naturally enough, no Soviet textbooks were acceptable for the teaching of history from this point of view or from the general standpoint of eradicating Communist indoctrination. To some extent the gap was filled by [214]
books published in the year preceding the Soviet war by the educational press of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow.[42] Some texts were printed by the cultural department of the Kiev city administration. An amateurish effort was made also by certain OUN-B organizers to print locally a new version of Ukrainian history with an introduction of their own composition.[43] In view of the great material shortages and the brief time available, however, the lack of printed materials could not be made good. Consequently, a great deal depended on securing the proper teachers. To what extent the many thousands employed in the schools adhered to the nationalist doctrine is of course impossible to determine, but a number of purely indigenous formulations of nationalist concepts to be inculcated in the schools attest to the strength of nationalist feeling. The head of the Mariupol' school system proposed to stress the native language, love of the fatherland, and respect for elders; the educational ideology advocated by the group of young men who reorganized life in Krivoi Rog was instillation of Cossack ideals, the code of the Zaporozhian Sich, which was to lead to a spiritual, moral, and physical regeneration.[44]

Since the formal school program was largely confined to young 186
children, great efforts were also concentrated on developing a 517
voluntary system of adult education. The Prosvita societies had 515

Visti, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 27, 1943, p. 4, quoting D. Nitsenko in *Nova Ukraïna* (Kharkov).

[41] Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4.

[42] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 10, 1941, p. 2.

[43] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 28.

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 29, 1942, p. 2; November 15, 1941, p. 2; and November 18, 1941, p. 3 (referring to an article in *Dzvin* [Krivoi Rog], September, 1941).

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teachers in the gymnasium and therefore possessed "higher qualifications"; and these teachers showed "active or passive resistance" to Ukrainization. In this district, as in many others, the complaint was made that the schools lacked Ukrainian text-books and other such reading materials.[16]

These difficulties were gradually being overcome. By 1924 the publication of text-books and children's literature in Russian had almost ceased in the Ukraine, and the publishing houses were concentrating on Ukrainian materials.[17] Ukrainian was being taught in all pedagogical schools and teacher-training courses.[18] The results of this step were apparent in 1925. In Chernigov province, for example, 67 percent of the teachers had mastered Ukrainian, and the proportion of Ukrainian schools — which then stood at 54 percent — was being raised as rapidly as the teachers who had recently learned Ukrainian could be transferred to the districts where they were needed.[19] [214]

During 1925 and 1926 the whole process of Ukrainization was raised to the status of a "high-pressure (*udarnaja*) campaign." Attention was directed even to the *crèches* because, as one writer explained, the early years of a child's life are of the utmost significance in his linguistic development.[20] But a report from Chernigov in 1926 stated that the teachers were agitating among the peasantry against the Ukrainization of the schools; they were "striving with all their forces to discredit the Ukrainian language, to arouse the peasants to adopt resolutions against Ukrainizing the schools, and so on."[21] This was denied by the school officials in the region from which the report emanated,[22] but similar items of news came from other regions. One writer cited a specific teacher in the Don Basin: although she was supposed to teach the Ukrainian language as a separate subject, she could hardly speak it and she referred to it as "a terribly ugly and crude language."[23] Another reporter, again from Chernigov, produced evidence to illustrate the hostility of both parents and teachers: because of this hostility a region with an overwhelmingly Ukrainian population contained thirty-five Russian schools, one Ukrainian and one mixed school.[24]

[16] See *ibid.*, Mar. 4, 1924, Mar. 5, 1924.

[17] *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1924. [18] *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1923.

[19] *Kommunist* (organ of the Central Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine), Mar. 21, 1925.

[20] *Proletarska Pravda* (organ of the Kiev Regional Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, of the Kiev Regional Executive Committee and of the Kiev Regional Trade-Union Council), Aug. 26, 1926.

[21] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926. [22] *Ibid.*, July 25, 1926.

[23] *Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1926. [24] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926.

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517 156 [214]

Kiyev, Khar'kov and Odessa are the most important centers of East Ukrainian intellectual life. It is there that most of the Ukrainian books, periodicals and newspapers are published. Besides that, the Ukrainian tongue is also printed in many smaller cities. Many of the Soviet Ukrainian authors glorify present conditions; these are the interpreters of Communism, the worshipers of machines and idols. But there are also others, like Khvylovy, who in truthful pamphlets derided the state of affairs, the proletarian wirepullers, their ingenuousness, their venality and their eagerness to work their way up, authors who write with a nationalistic purpose, who are "exposed" and then, like Khvylovy, come to an unfortunate end. "Experts maintain that even in the works of the Ukrainian Communist writers, especially the younger ones, the national feeling cannot be hidden, that an inner schism appears in their works. They do not actually belong to proletarian literature which has remained inwardly foreign to them. How could it be otherwise with such a past!" (56) /Facing page 104/

56. Zalozieckyj, ibid.

439 /Map VIII: Grain Export from the Soviet Ukraine and North Caucasus (Average for 1927/1928) This map differentiates between actual Soviet Ukraine and the North Caucasus regions. Export to foreign countries is insignificant compared to supplies sent to the Greater Russian areas of the Soviet Union situated in the forest belt./ /Key: Grain: ● from Soviet Ukraine, ● from the North Caucasus./

/105/ Trapping Souls

798 On Sunday, May 29, 1939 a unique event took place in the church of St. Peter in Rome:

661 pared with that which remained to the Ukrainians
648 in Poland. The old cultural city on the Dniepr was experiencing a new efflorescence; 70% of all students in Soviet Ukraine were attending Ukrainian schools. There had been nothing like
[214] it since the days of the Cossacks. /115/ Between
[217] 1918 and 1928 the Academy of Sciences published 888 works and numerous libraries were founded. (60) Hundreds of newspapers, periodicals and

60. Tisserand: The Ukraine, Life of a People, page 283.

pamphlets enlightened Ukrainians eager for knowledge in their mother tongue, and poetry and belles-lettres had reached a very high level. But soon black shadows were to fall on this brilliance.

Not yet satisfied with the results of the
661 policy of Ukrainization - in 1929 only 36% of
665 the officials were Ukrainians, the rest Jews and Russians (61) - the Central Committee of the

61. Fedenko: Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R., page 17.

Communist Party of the Ukraine decided at the end of December, 1929, to intensify the process of nationalization. Especially the working classes were to take an active part in Ukrainian cultural life; Ukrainian theaters were to put on regular performances in the industrial areas; there were to be "Ukrainization cells" formed in the factories, the high union posts and the leading positions in the cooperatives were to be held by Ukrainians, and adherence to the course of nationalization of the administrative system was to be supervised. In this manner the cities were to be Ukrainized. The Commissar of People's Education, Skrypnyk, the successor of Shumskyj, successfully sought both to disseminate Ukrainian literature

532 artist whose historical portraits of the Hetmans Khmelnytskyj, Mazeppa, and Skoropadskyj are striking revelations in the province of Ukrainian art.

Museums, Archives, and Libraries

● 217 The earliest Ukrainian collection of historical documents and prehistoric remains was transferred at the beginning of the 19th century to Russian and Polish collections in order to prove the great ages of Russian and Polish culture. The first historical museum was founded in Chernyhiv by Vasyl Tarnovskyj (1837—1899). His example was followed by Ukrainian professors teaching at Russian universities, by scientific expeditions sent to study the country and by archaeological congresses. The Municipal Museum, the Tereshchenko Gallery and the collection of the Khanenko family which developed into the Museum of Fine Art, were founded in Kyiv. In Lviv the Stauropigian Museum was founded in 1889, the National Museum and the Museum of the Shevchenko Society of Learning in 1905. Smaller collections were opened in Poltava, Kamenets Podilskyj, Sambir, Colomea, etc. The Bucovina possesses a collection in Chernivtsi, Carpatho-Ukraine in Uzhhorod. But, nevertheless, anyone who wishes to see the most important collection of Ukrainian folk-lore, must go to the Ethnographical Museum in Petersburg.

The nationalisation of Ukrainian museums under communist rule has had a favorable influence. Measures of conservation, restoration and concentration have raised museums to a considerable level, whereas conditions are not nearly so satisfactory in Western Ukraine where there was no support from the state. The number of museums has grown from 10 in 1914 to at least 90 to-day. The museum of "The War of Liberation" in Prague is worth mentioning, as it is maintained exclusively by contributions from the Ukrainian population.

The biggest library on Ukrainian territory is the Ukrainian "People's Library" attached to the Academy of Learning in Kyiv; it contains 2 000 000 books and also great collections of newspapers, music and picture postcards. Of all publications printed in the Soviet Union a copy was to be sent to this library. In addition it conducted scientific research work, supported

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research activity and published reviews. The library of the Shevchenko Society of Learning in Lviv was just as important for the intellectual life of Ukraine during the last 50 years. It contained 120 000 books and was specially devoted to all matters concerning Ukraine. The "Ukraine Book Chamber", first in Kyiv and then in Kharkiv has registered book production in Ukraine since 1918. A Scientific Book Institute in Kyiv in 1922 was devoted to the study of printing in Ukraine. 217

Ukraine has had many archives; they are important institutions, since much has to be done towards saving from destruction material relating to the past of the country. In Kharkiv there is the "Historical Archives", the central office of the archives of the Kharkiv province, of Poltava and Chernyhiv, further the Archives of Ukrainian Printing in Poltava, the Historical Archives, comprising material dealing with the Poltava area and finally, the Central Archives of Ancient Documents attached to the Ukrainian Academy of Learning in Kyiv, containing 400 000 documents, and many others.

476 was made in the cooperative society's own factories. The society owned cement factories, lime plants, mills, cloth-weaving factories, bakeries, oil presses and even a factory that made boot polish and cosmetics.

439 Whither did Ukrainian goods go? Peas, beans and poultry to England and Belgium, clover seed to Holland, /94/ pigs to Germany, beef cattle via Constanta to Greece, poultry to Germany, Switzerland and to - Palestine, eggs to many countries and, in cans, as far as Buenos Aires.

[545] Sociologically noteworthy is the growth of an urban stratum of artisans, merchants and small industrialists. The Ukrainians who, much to their 369 own disadvantage, neglected the cities because of 476 their love for quiet village life, now gradually pushed into the cities, and the credit cooperatives supported them in this.

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741 Of greatest significance for the advancement of Ukrainian culture were the societies for edu- 517 cation and public health. The society for popular •217 education, "Prosvita", was even older than the Ukrainian system of cooperatives, reaching back to 1883. It was a veritable national sanctuary of the Ukrainians. The people are indebted to it for a large part of their cultural advance. The "Prosvita" was an actual school for advanced studies in the country. In 3214 village libraries with 700,000 volumes, two instructive monthly magazines and with inexpensive editions of books, it enabled the village inhabitants who were cut off from all urban culture to obtain the knowledge which alone made it possible for them to assert themselves against their enemies. Besides that, 741 "Prosvita", which on January 1, 1938 numbered 517 360,000 members, and owned 1457 club houses with rooms for meetings, promoted group singing, music, the community theater and folk art. It helped

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648 in Poland. The old cultural city on the Dniepr was experiencing a new efflorescence; 70% of all students in Soviet Ukraine were attending Ukrainian schools. There had been nothing like
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464 districts through the long winter has led to the crea-
[166] tion of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the
[563] country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel,
[511] Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful,
221 but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any
511 branch of industry. The State makes no effort to
565 regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

776 appeased, exorcised. When the priest of Velykyi Lypnyk consecrates the water of the village brook on the sixth of January, the people believe that the demons are thus driven away.

326 The men of Valykyi Lypnyk are tinkers, a
●221 trade which in many places has a bad flavor. It is easy to say that they travel about the country like gypsies. But even though they wander from village to village, a small bundle of tools on their backs, repairing stoves and mending pots, they are, nevertheless, not homeless. As soon as spring comes, poverty drives them out on the road, and only late in the fall when the first white flakes begin to fall, they return to their wives and children with the few groschen they have saved.
241 For land is scarce, the clod of earth small, the soil is poor and the climate harsh.[1] The women work like drudges for their bit of barley bread and potatoes. With their small cows and a wooden plough they till the lower slopes of the mountain ridges. They sow by hand, harrow, and in the fall they cut off the barely ripe ears of grain with a sickle.
286 In their "spare time" these women[2] with their
291 strangely narrow faces sit barefoot in their full pleated skirts and pale pink blouses, a charming little cap on their heads, at their looms and tirelessly ply their shuttle back and forth between the taut threads, or press wool into felt for the jackets and trousers of their husbands.
342 The rooms of these "tinkers"[1] are surprisingly large and clean; the kitchen, living room, /10/ bedroom and work room are all in one. The whole structure with adjoining stable and wagon shed is built of wood, the inside unfinished, the outside
[989] covered with loam. In order that there be no lack of magic, carpenters carve three suns into the central roof beam.

184 How rich these "tinkers" of East Slovakia were with their little plot of free earth, their two or three cows, their barley bread and their loom, compared to their brothers in Carpatho-

[1] [In the village of Valykyi Lypnyk, Western Ukraine -Analyst]

planting, principally of sand-willows and pines, the main object being to arrest the movement of drift-sand. 137

The principal Ukraine timber trees are oak, maple, elm, ash, willow, aspen, lime, and wych-elm.

The art of forestry would appear to be almost entirely neglected. Systematic replanting of timber is hardly known, and wholesale destruction of woods on the river banks has had disastrous results in the splitting up of the channels. The lime is frequently denuded of its bark to make bast, the tree subsequently perishing as it stands. 313

(3) Fisheries

The fisheries of the Ukraine can be divided into three classes: those of the upper reaches of the rivers, those of the lower reaches and the lagoons at the mouths, and those of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea. 228

In the upper reaches of the principal rivers, fishing can scarcely be called an industry, being carried on by individuals mainly for their personal needs; the stock of fish is everywhere decreasing at a regrettable rate, and much alarm is caused by this depletion.

The fisheries of the lower reaches of the Dnieper, Dniester, and Southern Bug have considerable value. The principal fish taken are sturgeon, of which there are several varieties, carp, bream, fresh-water herring, and sander. The fisheries are the property of the riparian owners, who let them to syndicates. The State owns a considerable stretch on the Bug from Nikolaev to Novaya Odessa. The fishing seasons are from February to April and in the autumn, when the fish revisit the rivers to spawn. At this time they are taken for the roe, from which caviare of various qualities is made. 228 136

In the Black Sea the principal fish are mackerel, anchovy, and flounder. The fishing here is also carried on by syndicates, and is done close to shore with rather primitive appliances. The bulk of the fish is preserved

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

228 [136] either by salting, smoking, or sun-curing. Fish-curing is carried on in factories at Odessa and Ochakov.

The fisheries in the Azov Sea are important, but the principal grounds are not in Ukrainian territory, those which lie within its limits being of insignificant value.

(4) Minerals

(a) *Natural Resources*

135 The principal mineral resources of the Ukraine are coal, iron, and salt.

135 316 The *coal* is all in one large field usually known as the Donets basin, which extends from west to east for a distance of 300 miles. It is considered the largest coalfield in Europe, but owing to peculiarities of the geological strata it is split up into several areas with varying qualities of coal. Roughly the flame coals are on the western end of the field, the coking and semi-anthracite coals in the centre, and the anthracite in the east, though coking coals are also found towards the north-east corner. Very little pure anthracite is mined on Ukraine territory, as the beds are mainly in the Don Cossack district. Throughout the field the seams vary much in thickness. Some are too thin to be worked. The average thickness of those worked is 21 to 35 in.; seams of 5 ft. are moderately common, and the maximum thickness is 7 ft.

316 423 The output of coal from the Donets field is variable. This is chiefly due to labour difficulties, which arise in unexpected ways. Nevertheless if the figures of several years are considered together, a great increase is shown, and new pits are being opened every year. The average production for the years 1908 to 1912 was over 14,000,000 tons, the proportion of bituminous coal to anthracite being as 8 to 1. The figures include the whole field, as separate statistics for the portion over the Don Cossack border are not issued.

Iron.—The Ukraine is fortunate in having in close proximity to its coalfield a district rich in iron ore. The deposit, which is of excellent quality and easily worked,

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A recent decree of the U.S.S.R.'s Council of Ministers was designed to assist the fulfilment of all those tasks. It puts light industries in the priority class for supplies of raw materials, fuel, electricity, manpower, and workers' housing; and it approves increases of capital investments in the textile industry from 5,900 million roubles to 7,300 million in 1946-50, and in light industry, from 2,180 to 2,900 million roubles in the same period.

As a result of these measures, consumer goods output by state-owned enterprises is expected to rise this year (1947) by 50 per cent. and the output of the co-operative societies will certainly increase as well.

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Light Industry Rebuilding in the Ukraine

By January 1947, 58 textile mills had been restored in the Ukraine. Work had been resumed at the Odessa and Sumy textile factories; and the Kharkov textile mill had been restored and considerably expanded. Sometime this year a new textile mill is to be launched in the town of Stryia, Dragobych Region; and in the Izmail Region, the Tatar-Bunary mill will resume operations. Cotton mills are being built in Lvov, Kiev, and Chernovitsy.

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Sericulture has been restored in the Ukraine, where it was begun only ten years before the war. It is to be further developed under the Five-Year Plan, and in the next ten or fifteen years the Ukrainian Republic should become one of the leading silk-producing regions of the Soviet Union. A silk mill is being constructed at Darnitsa, and Kiev silk mills have delivered their first batch of silk.

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Pre-War Output of Cotton Cloths[1]

In 1937 the production of cotton cloths in the Ukrainian S.S.R. amounted to 7.1 million metres (1.2 per cent. of the total output of the Soviet Union), while in 1932, production was only 2.2 million metres (0.08 per cent. of the total Soviet Union production of cotton cloths). The cotton cloths production of the entire Soviet Union had risen from 2,694 million metres in 1932 to 3,447.7 million in 1937.

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Leather Footwear[1]

Leather footwear production in the Ukraine in 1937 was 31,228,000 pairs of shoes, (17.07 per cent. of the 182,916,000 pairs produced in the whole Soviet Union); while in 1932 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had turned out only 14,535,000 pairs (16.72 per cent. of the Soviet Union total: 86,949,000 pairs)

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1 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939.

in agriculture (fertilizers) and in other branches of the economy. There are several superphosphate plants on the right bank, a large soda industry in the Artemovsk-Lisichansk area in the north of the Donets Basin, based on local salt deposits, chemical plants tied closely to the coking and the metallurgical establishments, and sulphuric acid and fertilizer plants connected with the metallurgy of zinc.

In addition to zinc, which is imported into the Donets Basin, nonferrous metallurgy includes that of aluminum, which is also imported and worked at Zaporozh'ye on the basis of *Dneproges* power, and of mercury, mined near Nikitovka in the Donbas.

The petroleum and natural-gas industry is of only local importance and is intended to supply the Ukraine with its gas and liquid fuel needs. The oil fields lie in the foothills of the Carpathians, near Borislav and Drogobych. During the current Plan, a natural gas pipe line was laid from Dashava (in the oil fields) to Kiev. The Ukraine also imports petroleum from Baku via the ports of Osipenko and Odessa, and the station of Trudovaya (Donbas) is the terminus of a kerosene pipe line from the Groznyy fields.

The textile industry (wool, cotton, and linen milling) supplies only local needs. The food industry, on the other hand, is of national importance. This is true especially of the sugar-refining industry, located mainly in the Vinnitsa and Kiev oblasts, on the right bank, and in the Poltava and Kiev oblasts, on the left bank.

The agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR, less important than heavy industry with respect to the value of production, occupies, nonetheless, a major position in the economy of the USSR. Arable land occupies 60 percent of the total area. Prior to the Second World War the Ukraine was one of the regions best equipped with machine-tractor stations and agricultural machinery. Among the cereals, winter wheat in the west, spring wheat in the east, and barley are most important. The sugar beet is by far the major industrial crop; sunflower, cotton, and tobacco are grown to a lesser extent. Orchard farming is popular and produces melons and pumpkins, garden fruits (apples, pears, plums, and cherries), and in the south, apricots and grapes. Horses, cattle, and pigs are raised throughout the region.

The right-bank Poles'ye is least developed agriculturally. Marshes and forests occupy most of the area. In the isolated patches of moist arable land, potatoes, buckwheat, flax, and hemp are the chief crops. The area abounds, however, in pasture land, and dairy farming is

241 Nevertheless, old traditions are preserved in connection with agricultural implements and habits. The Ukrainian peasant uses the ancient Slav "ralo" with one plowshare and the old plow reminiscent of Roman models, which is unknown to Russian and White Ruthenian peasants. Up till recently the heavy wooden plow was used in the steppe, drawn by 14 - 16 oxen. As with South and West Slavs, the ox is here the animal usually used for draught, and not the horse, as with the Russians.

The scythe is the most important implement for harvesting. Wheat, rye and barley are cut with the scythe which has developed curious 3-blade forms in Ukraine. The sheaves are first laid together in small stacks, composed of 30 sheaves and called "polukipok". This traditional harvesting operation is known to-day only in Ukraine and White Ruthenia. The latter nation, on the other hand, and the Russians use the drying kiln for grain which has never become common in Ukraine, being used only in Volynia and in the north of the district round Chernyhiv.

Threshing is done by flail ("cip"), a characteristic form of which appears also in Mecklenburg. In the south, in addition to threshing by means of a wheel-cart drawn by oxen ("harnanyty"), a roller is also used, while in Bessarabia and the Kuban area, special boards ("mjalky") are found, such as are also used extensively to-day in Greece and Macedonia. Threshing is mostly done in special sheds ("tik") and in winter on ice and in barns ("stodola"), which have a small floor specially for this purpose. The threshing procedure of the Ukrainian differs also from that of the Russian; he does not lay the sheaves out in rows like the latter, but threshes not more than 2 - 3 sheaves
251 at once. Grain is stored in granaries and in the steppe also in pearshaped pits or in straw-containers ("solomjanyk"); in the Carpathians, Polesya and Volynia the custom of storing grain in hollowed trees ("kadovby") is still preserved. In Podolia, Bessarabia and in Southern Ukraine generally maize is gathered
● 231 and dried in special contraptions, woven like baskets. The shape of the bee-hives in Ukraine is also peculiar. In addition to the forest hives ("kolody") there are also hives lying or standing
ooo on a log or piece of wood ("lezen" or "stojan"). The peculiar

successful (45 000 t). Sunflowers were cultivated in 1935 on an 247
area of 1 659 000 ha, mainly in the Kuban area. The yield for 1930—35 (0.9 million t) was only a little less than that of the USSR and much more than that of any other country.

As a grain producing country, Ukraine, with its yield of 433
approximately 25 million t of the four main European varieties 243
(= 10 % of world production), took a leading place in the years before the First World War (1909—1931). It exported 7.9 million t, or 1/5 of total world grain exports, topping the list for wheat and barley (4.3 million t, and 20 % and 2.7 million t and 43 % respectively of world exports). In the years 1931—35, production in Ukraine decreased by only 9 % i. e. by 24.6 million t, world production amounting then to 276.6 million t, while the decrease in export trade in the same period was much greater. The reason for this was the small yield per hektar as well as inadequate cultivation in consequence of collectivisation and unfavorable conditions for selling agricultural and buying industrial products; in addition there was an increased demand at home as the country became more industrialised.

6. Cattle Rearing

The distribution of livestock in Ukraine varies considerably. 231
In the wide spaces of North Caucasia there is much pasture- 433
land so that there are not many cattle per unit of area, though 811
quite a number per head of the population.

The opposite is true of Galicia where management is intensive. The many meadows of Polesya support good stocks of cattle while the mountain pastures of the Carpathians are not sufficiently utilised. Between those extremes we have the bulk of Ukrainian arable land with relatively poor supplies of fodder for cattle. The result is that Ukraine does not contribute to the cattle rearing industry of the world what one might expect from a country of its agricultural standing. Before World War I there were 13.5 million head of cattle in Ukraine, i. e. 2.8 % of world stock. The proportion of dairy cows in this figure increases continuously as the use of oxen for draught, which used to be a characteristic feature of the country, had been declining for some time. (Table 3).

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Table 3. The Livestock in Ukraine (1912—1937) in Million of Head.

	1912	16	20	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	37
cattle	6,5	7,7	6,8	7,1	8,3	8,9	8,4	8,4	8,6	7,6	6,3	6,2	5,0	4,4	5,3	6,3	7,8
cows	2,6	3,1	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,9	3,9	3,9	4,0	3,9	3,5	3,4	2,7	2,4	2,5	2,6	3,5
horses	5,6	5,5	3,9	3,8	4,0	4,2	4,6	5,1	5,5	5,6	5,3	4,8	3,7	2,6	2,5	2,6	3,5
pigs	4,3	4,6	5,3	2,4	4,2	3,7	3,7	4,4	7,0	4,2	3,2	5,4	2,6	2,1	4,2	4,7	7,7
sheep	6,2	6,4	6,9	8,4	9,3	9,7	8,7	8,0	8,1	7,0	4,5	3,4	2,1	2,0	2,2	2,8	3,8

In 1912 the number of horses was disproportionately high, viz., 7 millions. With the increasing use of motors, this number was reduced which, from the point of view of economy, was perfectly justifiable. Pig breeding, on the other hand, tended to increase, particularly in the north-west and the Kuban area. In spite of that, there were before World War I only 7.1 million pigs in the country, i. e. 4 % of world stock.

Sheep breeding has declined as a result of intensive management and competition from overseas on the world wool market, above all in fine wools.

Dnipro Ukraine statistics for the year 1916 provide characteristic material for judging the general development as well as the present position. Except for horses which had stopped increasing even before 1908, the figures for 1916 were only temporarily reached in the last year before the series of Five Year Plans. Diagrams 1 and 2).

[474] Collectivisation measures by the Soviets were a great blow to cattle rearing in Ukraine. Rather than hand over cattle to the State for nothing, the peasants slaughtered their stocks wholesale; and, as a result of bad treatment, epidemics and poor feeding, the cattle stocks of collective enterprises greatly declined. In 1933 the number of cattle and horses was only half what it had been in 1928 and pigs and sheep less than a quarter, while the entire stock had been reduced to 2/5, or 38 %. It was only after the colkhose peasants were allowed to keep cattle of their own, that numbers began slowly to rise, though they did not reach the level of 1928.

In Western Ukraine the development of stock-keeping was much more favorable, but the number for the whole of Ukraine was below prewar level, except in the case of pigs.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1



Diagram 1. Livestock in Dnipro-Ukraine (1912-37; in 100000)



Diagram 2. Livestock in Dnipro-Ukraine (1912-37; in 100000)

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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Cattle trade and management in Ukraine in general are far from satisfactory, though there was a well organised cooperative dairy system in Galicia; butter was even exported. On both sides, particularly in the south of the Carpathians, the production of cheese made good progress. Any export of meat that there was, is partly a result of the small demand for home consumption. Though poultry farming was neither intensive nor sufficiently progressive, a considerable number of eggs was exported.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

land in the Ukraine and New Russia: of 25 million hectares of 241
arable, 6½ million were under wheat, and of these 4½ million were
in New Russia. Ukrainian and New Russian production attained 433
90 million quintals a year, of which 70 million came from the New 241
Russian Governments. (In addition, the Ukraine produced for internal consumption about 30 million quintals of rye—in the northern districts—nearly as much barley, and about 20 million quintals of oats.) The wheat crop of the Ukraine and New Russia represented 8 per cent of the total world, and 18 per cent of European, production. With an average production of 70 million quintals a year, the New Russian Governments could throw an important surplus on to the world market. Before the Revolution about 76 per cent of the crop was retained in the villages for food, storage and seed (on the larger mechanized estates and co-operative colonies the average was round 70 per cent). The balance, about 20 million quintals, went on the market: of it about one-quarter was absorbed by the towns and industrial centres of New Russia. Under these conditions the three New Russian Governments had [439] available for export abroad 15 million quintals of wheat, i.e. about 1½ million tons. The crop of New Russia and the northern Caucasus was exported to the Ottoman Empire, Greece and particularly to Italy, where the 'hard' types of grain were appreciated as an ingredient of macaroni and other *paste*. Even after the last war and all the ruin of agriculture resulting from the Revolution, the Soviet Press, in 1929, could boast that about 1½ million tons of wheat had been exported through the New Russian and North Caucasian ports (Professor Brutskus holds that this export—the relation of which to total production greatly exceeded pre-War proportions—was one of the factors in preparing the way for the terrible famine of 1932).

'From remote times the Ukraine and New Russia were famous 231 ●
for their draught oxen. Further, many landowners possessed herds of foreign cattle, principally Swiss breeds. All the German colonies bred good milkers' (Shcherbatov). In 1914 there were estimated to be over 9 million head of cattle, 6 million sheep (numbers of them of valuable breed) and 5 to 6 million pigs in the Ukrainian and New Russian Governments (the pigs predominated in northern and western Ukraine and sheep in the New Russian steppes). South Russia, an ideal horseman's country, possessed also a vast number of horses. Before the last war there were reckoned to be 5½ million horses in the Ukraine and New Russia (1 horse to every 5–6 people, and one-sixth of all the horses in the Empire). Government studs, and those of private landowners and of certain *zemstva*, maintained

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1.

231 a high standard of breeding—particularly of draught horses. The Army Remount Department fulfilled a third of its requirements in the south, and there was a considerable export abroad. As a result of the Revolution, breeding suffered probably more than any other branch of rural production. Statistics for 1922 illustrate the disastrous effect of the Revolution on livestock throughout the whole Empire. In 1916 the total head of cattle was about 60 million: in 1922, 23 million. The number of horses in 1916 was estimated at 35 million: in 1922 at 20 million. Sheep numbered 120 million in 1916: 46 million in 1922. In view of the fact that South Russia was the principal field of the Civil War, it is probable that about 50 per cent of the horses and cattle destroyed were lost in this region. It is reckoned that in the Ukraine and New Russia only one-third of the pigs remained and one-quarter of the sheep. Losses in domestic animals are much more difficult to recover than losses in other branches of domestic industry; further, the special conditions of field labour in New Russia required a large proportion of draught oxen and horses.

[656] 433 One of the principal reasons which compelled Lenin to formulate the New Economic Policy was the necessity of restoring the food production of the Soviet Union.

'"War Communism" and attempts to introduce "integral socialism" into the countryside ended in 1922. At that date began the period of "liberalism" in Communist policy in relation to the villages. The peasantry were allowed freedom in the choice of land labour and almost complete freedom in other economic activities. The years between 1922 and 1929 produced excellent results: the lost sowing area was recovered and breeding was resumed. The food question in the country was improving' (Prof. 113 Markov, *Socialist Economy in U.S.S.R.*, Part 2, *Agriculture*, Paris, 1937). By 1929 agricultural production approached pre-war standards (150–160 million quintals of cereals compared with 200 millions average for the years 1909–13). In spite of the fact that, following the break-up of large estates, the peasants had expanded the sown area at the expense of pasture (and according to the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia* were showing a diminishing average on arable of 15–20 per cent as a result of more primitive methods of farming), the breeding of cattle and horses was nearing pre-war figures and the production of pigs was improving.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Ukraine, where, as we have seen, it is only intensive in the western part of Zone 1. 246

. . . . .

Both from the point of view of numbers and of quality, the Ukraine is of little interest in forestry. Its production is even insufficient to satisfy the local needs. 137

The forests are mostly concentrated in the districts of Volynia, Kiev, and Tchernigov and are mainly fir trees. Their surface does not exceed 3,000,000 hectares.

Apart from the forests one meets, in the western part of Zone 1, oases of oaks and those light woods which are familiar to the rest of Europe, excepting, however, the beech tree, the geographical distribution of which is the best justification of the division of our continent into Western and Eastern Europe.

As to Zone 2, it is completely treeless with the exception of some oases to the east of Kharkov.

Towards the west the forest region increases and its exploitation becomes more intense. Already in Galicia, near the Carpathians, they represent an important part of the production of the country without, however, playing the role of an important export.

. . . . .

A land of great size and magnificent pastures, the Ukraine occupies an important place in Europe in the sphere of cattle-breeding. 231

The Ukrainian Steppes provide excellent conditions for the breeding of horses, the number of which before the last war reached 5,500,000.

It would be unjust not to note that the German colonists have contributed much to the improvement of the horses in Southern Ukraine, especially in the region of Kherson, where many great enterprises were devoted to them.

The years of collectivization and the extermination

231 of the wealthier peasant have, unfortunately, struck a terrible blow (as elsewhere throughout Russia) at the total number of horses, which has fallen by 50 per cent and amounts to-day to only 2,750,000.

Cattle have experienced the same disaster.

The number of cattle, which reaches 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 to-day, was 9,000,000 in 1914.

The position is still more serious with regard to sheep—from 6,000,000 they have fallen to 2,500,000.

Only the breeding of pigs has been able to remain at approximately the same level. It only shows a fall of 10 per cent to 15 per cent and the number of these animals reaches 4,500,000 at the present time.

Cattle-breeding is characterized in the Ukraine by the predominance of pigs in Zone 1 and of horses and sheep in Zone 2.[2] As to cattle, the milk-producing species are more numerous in Zone 1 and the beasts of burden in Zone 2.[2] The Ukrainian breed of oxen is one of the best in the world. It provides excellent meat, but the cows of this breed give only just enough milk to feed their calves. The raising of oxen for the drawing of ploughs and carts is very seriously menaced by the introduction of tractors for agricultural work.

It is interesting to note when studying cattle-breeding in the Ukraine, that it is certain that under other political, social, and economic conditions it could become a very important branch of the economic activity of the country. Pre-Great War statistical figures show us that the number of domestic animals increased at a greater rate than that of the people who owned them.

The Ukraine consumes almost entirely, in the form of meat and milk, the products of her own cattle-breeding, and does not export to the industrial regions beyond her frontiers, except some horses, beasts of ~~burden~~, skins, wool, and pig-bristles.

[2] [See category 116 pp. 139-140---Analyst]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

249 Of the crops producing vegetable oils, linseed and sunflower are the principal. A great deal of sunflower seed is eaten raw by peasants and labourers all over Russia. These two crops are decreasing.

244 *Fruit and vegetables.*—The orchard districts are in the
439 Governments of Podolia, Chernigov, Poltava, and Kiev.
245 Apples, pears, plums, cherries, mulberries, and apricots grow freely, and the surplus goes to northern Russia, great quantities being preserved. Vegetables succeed well in the alluvial soils near the rivers. They are mostly grown by summer immigrants from Bulgaria (cf. p. 72), who use a primitive system of irrigation. The surplus supply all goes to northern Russia.

● 231 The live-stock of the Ukraine is very numerous, but of late years has tended to decrease.

Horses are much in demand for agricultural work, especially as the use of oxen as draught animals is being gradually abandoned. There is also a strong demand for horses in the coal and iron region for haulage. As a result the stock of horses has considerably increased in six out of the nine Governments, Volhynia, Podolia, and Chernigov alone showing decreases.

Cattle have decreased in numbers in five Governments and increased in four, but the total shows a serious falling off.

236 *Sheep* are divided roughly into two classes, fine-woolled and coarse-woolled, the former producing wool known as 'Spanish', the latter being killed for their skins. There is a general decrease of stock in every province of the Ukraine. The great increase of population and the demand for land, with rising rents, make sheep-farming not sufficiently profitable under present agricultural conditions.

231 The stock of *pigs* is, on the whole, maintained, and even shows a good increase in some Governments.

The *goat* was formerly of importance, and there was a considerable stock in the country, but it has dwindled latterly at a very rapid rate.

235 *Poultry* are kept in considerable numbers, but poultry-farming on modern methods is very rare and of small economic importance.

000 *Apiculture* is common in the northern Ukraine, and

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Apiculture is common in the northern Ukraine and 231
vast quantities of honey are produced, but its quality suffers from the prevalent ignorance of scientific methods of bee-keeping, and it does not command a good price.

Disease among domestic animals causes great ravages. 232
Cattle-plague epidemics are of annual occurrence and cause heavy losses, the proportion of fatal cases being very high. The other most prevalent troubles appear to be anthrax, frounce in horses, and pneumo-enteritis amongst swine. The last disease has made great inroads of latter years, a large proportion of cases being fatal. The proportion of live-stock per 100 inhabitants shows decrease under almost every head, a slight increase in horses or pigs in some Governments by no means counterbalancing the all-round continuous shrinkage.

(b) *Land Tenure*[1] *and Methods of Cultivation*

As regards tenure, land in the Ukraine falls into 421
three main classes: (1) land owned privately, mainly 471
in large estates, but a small proportion in farm-holdings by successful peasants; (2) land termed *nadyel*, owned almost entirely by peasant communes; and (3) land owned by the Orthodox Church or the Crown, or granted as appanages to members of the Imperial family. The following table shows the total acreage, and the proportion belonging to each of these classes:

		Percentage of		
Government.	*Total area in millions of acres.*	*Private property.*	*Nadyel.*	*Church and Crown land, &c.*
Volhynia	15,484	48·9	39·8	11·3
Podolia	9,873	44·4	48·0	7·6
Chernigov	11,836	41·7	53·1	5·2
Kiev	12,484	45·2	45·6	9·2
Kherson	16,591	51·5	37·3	11·2
Poltava	11,331	45·1	52·3	2·6
Kharkov	12,141	35·8	59·2	5·0
Yekaterinoslav	15,041	50·4	45·4	4·2
Taurida	7,099	52·6	37·2	10·2
Total	111,880	Average 46·2	46·4	7·4

[1] See also p. 50.

727 [231] Seven and a half million head of cattle, 3.3 million horses, 9.3 million pigs, 7.3 million sheep and 59.4 million fowls were killed or taken away[1]. The invaders also stole from the collective farms and from private citizens of the Ukrainian S.S.R. over 12 million tons of farm products, including 9½ million tons of grain and flour[2].

The rehabilitation and rebuilding of liberated areas began at once whilst the war was still on; but although the Ukrainian S.S.R. received great assistance from other republics of the Soviet Union, it must be borne in mind that important economic regions of other republics of the Soviet Union were also devastated by the war.

According to the report on material damage issued by the U.S.S.R.'s Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes of the German-Fascist Invaders, the damage caused to the national economy of the U.S.S.R. and to the individual residents of villages and towns is estimated at more than 679,000 million roubles in terms of 1941 prices.

The damage to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic alone is estimated at 285,000 million roubles[3].

Thus according to the statement of the Soviet State Commission, the damages to the Ukrainian S.S.R. are about 40-42 per cent. of the total damages to the Soviet Union.

Damage caused to the Ukraine by the German invasion is estimated by the Ukrainian Paper Suchasne I Maibutne (Present and Future) at 100,000 million dollars[4].

Destruction of Ukrainian Cities

727 361 Following are summaries of the destruction which occurred in some of the most important of the Ukraine's cities.

Kiev (Population in 1939: 846,293).

According to the report of the Extraordinary State Commission, the material damage caused by the German invaders in Kiev was as follows:

They destroyed 940 buildings of state and public institutions and

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Letter from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

3 Soviet News, London, September 18, 1945.
(The official exchange value in March 1947 was 5.40 roubles equal one U.S. dollar; 21.36 roubles equal one pound sterling).

4 Soviet Monitor, TASS (Soviet News Agency) London, July 11, 1946.

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433 During all this time the livestock of the Ukraine (see next
231 Section), was being slowly and laboriously built up by gifts from the
262 rest of the Union, by levies on Germany, and by natural increase.
731 Meat was very scarce, since no-one was willing to slaughter and further deplete the slender herds. Cows, used for draught purposes, gave little milk. Now added to these intense shortages of meat, fat and dairy products was another great deficiency of cereals and bread, hitherto the mainstay of the Ukrainian post-war diet.

U
241 The 1946 harvest cannot, at the most optimistic estimate, be
433 reckoned at more than 40 per cent. of 1940 in cereals and vegetables per hectare sown.[1] There is no fodder for the jealously guarded
231 animals; shelter for them is also very scarce since the people themselves are only now moving out of dugouts. If the animals are slaughtered, the small supplies of dairy products and meat will soon disappear; and the problem of draught power will remain as acute as ever.

U
241 There is an agricultural dilemma in the Ukraine which a good
433 harvest would have gone far to break. Although extensive and con-
464 tinued demobilizations have been taking place, there is a great shortage of labour on the farms.[2] If manpower is taken from the farms to help produce the machinery necessary to liberate further men from the land, there may not be enough farm workers left to produce sufficient food for the factory workers. The poor harvest has aggravated this vicious circle.

The Soviet Government has attempted in various ways to meet this problem not only in the Ukraine, but throughout the Union. Everyone who is able to work does so; young people, old people, women. The women who worked during the war have remained part of the labour force
U in both industry and agriculture, and an increasing number are being
[462] recruited. In the Ukraine in 1946, women composed at least 60 - 70 per cent. of the farm working force.

SU
[464 At the same time as steps are being taken to concentrate more
241 workers in agriculture, the organization of the collective farms is
474 being overhauled and geared to higher efficiency. To accomplish this,
647 the Soviet Council of Ministers created on September 19, 1946, a Collective Farm Council, whose main tasks will be to elaborate measures for the improvement of collective farming. This Council which is authorized to call conferences of collective farm representatives when necessary, was set up for the purpose of "establishing strict control over the observation of collective farm statutes and for the solution
9 of of questions of the collective farm structure." One of their primary

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1 One must also bear in mind the reduced area under cultivation.

2 The war losses are felt very acutely.

TABLE XIV

185 Ukraine: Planned Production in 1950 Compared with 1940 and 1913 (see Note)
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(million metric tons)

	1913	1940	1950
Grain	20	28	27.8
Sugar beet	8.9	14.8	15.7
Potatoes	about 5[1]	21.5	23

1 According to the report in Pravda, the potato harvest in 1940 was "over 4 times" that of 1913.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

[728] Note: In comparing the 1950 target figures with pre-war production it is important to bear in mind the territorial revisions which occurred in the Ukraine after 1939, when she regained Western Ukraine and part of Bessarabia, lost a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic (which, together with the Moldavian Section of Bessarabia, then became a separate Union Republic), and added Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathian Ukraine.

[131] Thus the present area of the Ukraine exceeds its 1938 area by
311 approximately 118,000 kilometres (11,800,000 hectares). However,
728 we do not know precisely how much of this is agricultural land. The arable land in Western Ukraine before the war amounted to 4 million hectares; that of Transcarpathian Ukraine, to 239,000 hectares. In the parts of Bessarabia and Bukovina which were ceded to the Soviet Union, 3,285,800 hectares were classified as arable. If we roughly divide this between Moldavia and the Ukraine in proportion to the total ex-Rumanian area incorporated in each, about 1,300,000 hectares of agricultural land would have been added to the Ukraine in its share of Bessarabia; and the arable area of present-day Ukraine would exceed the 1937 cultivated area by about 5½ million hectares, the potential total being 30.6 million. The fact that the Five-Year Plan fixes the Ukraine's 1950 area of cultivation at 30.5 million hectares seems to support this assumption.

Livestock

231 In 1941 the number of livestock in the Ukraine was estimated at 30.4 million, including 10.5 million cattle and 4.6 million horses.[1]

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1 Statement on March 20, 1946, by Mr. Baranovsky, Ukrainian delegate to the UNRRA Fourth Council Session, published in the "UNRRA Journal", March 21, 1946.

231 During the war these numbers were greatly reduced: the Germans killed, stole, or drove away 3.311 million horses, 7.594 million head of cattle, 9.333 million pigs, 7.317 million sheep, and over 59.379 million fowl of all kinds.[1]

231 727 474 The collective farms of the Republic suffered most heavily. After the German occupation the collective farms of the Ukraine were left with only 6.3 per cent. of their 1940 herds of cattle, 1.9 per cent. of their pigs, and 3.4 per cent. of their sheep. In practical terms, the Germans had almost completely wiped out collectively-owned livestock.

231 727 In rehabilitating their herds the collective farms have received much assistance from the Soviet Government and the fraternal Republics - Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia and others - which have supplied **hundreds** of thousands of animals. However, the number of livestock in the kolkhozes are still far below pre-war. Most rapid steps were made in the re-stocking of cattle herds, which by early 1946 had reached 66 per cent. of the pre-war number of Ukrainian collective farms; pigs were 23 per cent. of pre-war and sheep and goats, 29 per cent. (Note: the figures in the two preceding paragraphs relate to collective farms alone.)[2]

The following table shows the pre-war numbers of livestock in the Ukraine (pre-1940 boundaries) and in the Soviet Union as a whole.

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12,1946.

TABLE XV

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Livestock in Pre-War Ukraine and in the U.S.S.R.

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	
	1932	1937
Cows	2,436,500	3,458,900
Other large cattle	1,591,700	4,300,500
Pigs	2,667,700	7,729,700
Sheep and goats	1,528,700	3,301,500
Horses	2,430,200	2,937,200

	Soviet Union	
	1934	1938
Large cattle	35,500,000	50,900,000
Pigs	11,500,000	25,700,000
Sheep and goats	36,500,000	66,600,000
Horses	15,400,000	16,200,000

Source: Soviet Construction, Moscow, 1939

[379 407] It will be noted that in both the Ukraine and in the U.S.S.R. as a whole, only a slight increase occurred in the number of horses. This again illuminates the greater use of machines in place of animal draught power.

Livestock in Western Ukraine

In 1939 the livestock of Western Ukraine alone was as follows.

TABLE XVI

Livestock in Western Ukraine, 1939

Cows	1,718,000
Other horned cattle	868,000
Pigs	1,466,000
Sheep and goats	772,000
Horses	1,043,000

Source: Concise Year-Book of Poland, Polish Ministry of Information, London, 1941

231 474 In the first years after Western Ukraine was incorporated into the Ukrainian S.S.R. there were built up in that region 285 cattle farms, 185 sheep farms, and 112 pig farms. By January 1, 1941, there was a total of 742 livestock farms in Western Ukraine alone.[1]

Bessarabia

231 There are no recent figures available for livestock in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina; in 1935, however, it was estimated that these two regions contained three-quarters of a million cattle, as well as 611,000 pigs, 2,395,000 sheep, and 602,000 horses (a total of 4,340,000 cattle, sheep, pigs and horses).[2] We have no figures as to how much of this livestock was included in the provinces added to the Ukraine.

Ukrainian S.S.R. Livestock: the Five-Year Plan

231 185 By 1950, according to the Five-Year Plan, the number of horses in the Ukraine should reach 2,629,000, a target which is 60 per cent. lower than the pre-war figure. To attain even this number, a great increase of horses must yet be made. In order partially to compensate, the Five-Year Plan has fixed a great increase in the number of oxen, so that the total number of oxen and horses together in 1950 will be five per cent. higher than before the war.

The following table shows the planned number of livestock in the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 1950.

TABLE XVII

Livestock in the Ukraine, 1950 (Planned)

	Total	Included on the collective farms	Per cent. increase 1950 total over 1940 numbers
Cattle	12,230,000	4,700,000	16
Pigs	9,600,000	3,300,000	7
Sheep and goats	6,780,000	3,100,000	8
Horses	2,629,000	1,363,000	- 60[1]

1 Decrease from 1941 figure.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

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1 Soviet State and Law III, Moscow, 1941.

2 International Institute of Agriculture, Rome.

SU 727 185 SU [652]

A recent decree of the U.S.S.R.'s Council of Ministers was designed to assist the fulfilment of all these tasks. It puts light industries in the priority class for supplies of raw materials, fuel, electricity, manpower, and workers' housing; and it approves increases of capital investments in the textile industry from 5,900 million roubles to 7,300 million in 1946-50, and in light industry, from 2,180 to 2,900 million roubles in the same period.

As a result of these measures, consumer goods output by state-owned enterprises is expected to rise this year (1947) by 50 per cent. and the output of the co-operative societies will certainly increase as well.

Light Industry Rebuilding in the Ukraine

U 228

By January 1947, 58 textile mills had been restored in the Ukraine. Work had been resumed at the Odessa and Sumy textile factories; and the Kharkov textile mill had been restored and considerably expanded. Sometime this year a new textile mill is to be launched in the town of Stryia, Dragobych Region; and in the Izmail Region, the Tatar-Bunary mill will resume operations. Cotton mills are being built in Lvov, Kiev, and Chernovitsy.

U 231

Sericulture has been restored in the Ukraine, where it was begun only ten years before the war. It is to be further developed under the Five-Year Plan, and in the next ten or fifteen years the Ukrainian Republic should become one of the leading silk-producing regions of the Soviet Union. A silk mill is being constructed at Darnitsa, and Kiev silk mills have delivered their first batch of silk.

Pre-War Output of Cotton Cloths[1]

U 288 433

In 1937 the production of cotton cloths in the Ukrainian S.S.R. amounted to 7.1 million metres (1.2 per cent. of the total output of the Soviet Union), while in 1932, production was only 2.2 million metres (0.08 per cent. of the total Soviet Union production of cotton cloths). The cotton cloths production of the entire Soviet Union had risen from 2,694 million metres in 1932 to 3,447.7 million in 1937.

Leather Footwear[1]

U 282 SU 282

Leather footwear production in the Ukraine in 1937 was 31,228,000 pairs of shoes, (17.07 per cent. of the 182,916,000 pairs produced in the whole Soviet Union); while in 1932 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had turned out only 14,535,000 pairs (16.72 per cent. of the Soviet Union total: 86,949,000 pairs)

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1 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R1

major navigable through route of the Ukraine. The major ports are Zhdanov and Osipenko on the Sea of Azov, and Kherson, Nikolayev, and Odessa on the Black Sea. Odessa is one of the major maritime trade centers of the USSR.

The Ukraine exports coal, iron and steel, grain, salt, and sugar, and imports cloth from Moscow and Ivanovo, precision tools from Moscow and Leningrad, lumber from Gor'kiy Oblast, along the Volga, or from the Belorussian SSR along the Dnieper, petroleum products from Groznyy (by rail and pipe line) and from Baku (by sea via Batumi-Odessa), and fish from the Lower Volga.

Oblast Survey

The twenty-five oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR can be grouped into seven geographic regions on the basis of physical, economic, and historical factors: the right-bank and the left-bank sections of the wooded steppe, the Donets Basin, the Dnieper bend, the Black Sea lowland, the Ukrainian Poles'ye, and the Western Ukraine.

THE RIGHT-BANK WOODED STEPPE

The right-bank wooded steppe, which is the original settlement area of the Ukrainian people, includes the oblasts of Kamenets-Podol'skiy, Vinnitsa, and Kiev. Its fertile black-earth soils and the warm, humid climate have combined to turn the area into a region of intensive agriculture, a dense population, and a well-developed rail network. Sugar beets are the leading crop. Through careful tilling of the soil, the application of phosphate fertilizer, and the rotation with grains and forage grasses, high yields are obtained which furnish up to three tons of sugar per 2.5 acres. The principal grains are winter wheat, rye, barley, and oats. Leguminous crops (peas, lentils, beans) are extensively grown to restore soil fertility. In connection with the intensive crop cultivation, the raising of hogs and cattle for meat and milk production is also very important. Forage grasses and the by-products of the sugar-refining and associated distilling industries constitute an excellent feed supply. Also connected with the sugar economy of the area are the lignite and peat industries, which fuel the processing plants, the quarrying of limestone (used in the sugar-bleaching process), and the mining of phosphorite, which is converted into fertilizer.

647 their career and the assurance of a good income for the meagre appointments as an official. It is sufficient just to glance at the statistics of the Russian Empire in order to realize what a gigantic increase in the development of civilization was reached by the effort of the Russian [871] intellectuals and specialists. Public instruction had developed in these fifty years to an enormous extent, [165] infant mortality had fallen by more than 60 per cent, [164] epidemics had experienced a great fall, as also cattle diseases, and the yield of the land had increased in the [232] southern regions by more than 30 per cent. The improvement of the different breeds of horses and cattle was already evident on the eve of the Great War.

206 The backward country which Russia was supposed to be in the eyes of Westerners, including also the Ukraine, had in 1912 a big network of telephone lines in the country and especially in the region of Vinnitza, where the organization of the Zemstvos was especially active.

505 As to the river system, as we have already seen, it is very poor and is limited to four rivers, the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Boug, and the Donietz, of which the Dnieper alone is of any interest. The transport capacity of this one important river has been for ever spoiled by the rapids which make navigation impossible along a [503] considerable distance. It is only after the building of the *Dnieprogues*, whose gigantic barrage had submerged the rapids along a distance of about one hundred kilometres, that an uninterrupted river route was established, linking the upper Dnieper with the Black Sea.

This river drains the greater part of the Ukraine and has left its mark upon the whole historic and economic evolution of the country.

Before the Great War the annual tonnage of transports

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Apiculture is common in the northern Ukraine and 231
vast quantities of honey are produced, but its quality suffers from the prevalent ignorance of scientific methods of bee-keeping, and it does not command a good price.

Disease among domestic animals causes great ravages. 232
Cattle-plague epidemics are of annual occurrence and cause heavy losses, the proportion of fatal cases being very high. The other most prevalent troubles appear to be anthrax, frounce in horses, and pneumo-enteritis amongst swine. The last disease has made great inroads of latter years, a large proportion of cases being fatal. The proportion of live-stock per 100 inhabitants shows decrease under almost every head, a slight increase in horses or pigs in some Governments by no means counterbalancing the all-round continuous shrinkage.

(b) *Land Tenure*[1] *and Methods of Cultivation*

As regards tenure, land in the Ukraine falls into 421
three main classes: (1) land owned privately, mainly 471
in large estates, but a small proportion in farm-holdings by successful peasants; (2) land termed *nadyel*, owned almost entirely by peasant communes; and (3) land owned by the Orthodox Church or the Crown, or granted as appanages to members of the Imperial family. The following table shows the total acreage, and the proportion belonging to each of these classes:

		Percentage of		
Government.	*Total area in millions of acres.*	*Private property.*	*Nadyel.*	*Church and Crown land, &c.*
Volhynia	15,484	48·9	39·8	11·3
Podolia	9,873	44·4	48·0	7·6
Chernigov	11,836	41·7	53·1	5·2
Kiev	12,484	45·2	45·6	9·2
Kherson	16,591	51·5	37·3	11·2
Poltava	11,331	45·1	52·3	2·6
Kharkov	12,141	35·8	59·2	5·0
Yekaterinoslav	15,041	50·4	45·4	4·2
Taurida	7,099	52·6	37·2	10·2
Total	111,880	Average 46·2	46·4	7

[1] See also p. 50.

162 five hectares of land, if overpopulation is so great that in 49% of the country there are between 80 and 100 /93/ people and in 51% there are more than 100 persons per square kilometer. (52)

52. Kubiyovich: The Distribution of the Population, page 35.

476 The ideological center of the Ukrainian cooperative system was the "Revised Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives" with its center in Lwów. At the beginning of 1939 it controlled the four departmental provincial centers with a total of 3455 cooperatives and 673,000 members. The four departmental centers were the "Centrobanka" for credit cooperatives (1889 members at the end of 1938, with an annual sale of 70.5 million zloty); the "Centrosoyuz" for the agricultural buying and selling cooperatives, the "Maslosoyuz" for dairy farmers' cooperatives and the "Narodnya Torgovlia" for urban consumer societies. The private capital of the Revised Union amounted to 23 million zloty at the end of 1938, the savings came to over 12 million zloty. The sales receipts of all cooperatives amounted to 159 million zloty.

One is almost tempted to speak of a "Ukrainian autarchy" if one hears how much business the buying and selling cooperatives carried on. Galicia and [241] particularly Podolia with its rich black earth and sheltered valleys is rich in fruit, vegetables, legumes, hemp, grain. Cattle-raising is also [233] intensively carried on, especially in the Carpathian foreland. The peasant brought all these products to the cooperative which was ready to serve him and not to profit by him. The cooperatives maintained collection and sorting centers where the products were turned into "standardized" goods. The same cooperative furnished practically everything a farm household needed: shoes, chicory, sugar, kerosene, headgear, candles, seeds, artificial fertilizer and machines. Much of it

474 goats and poultry, whereby allowance was made for regional variations. Thus Kuban Cossacks may also keep a horse, and their individual property around the farm can be two hectares in size.

474 233 The census of cattle in 1935 showed that these concessions were necessary. This census showed that livestock in the Soviet Union had been reduced to about one-half from 1928 to 1935. At the same time the minimum during the summer of 1933 had already been overcome, and there was a gradual increase in cattle-raising noticeable. From 1928 to 1935 the number of horses had decreased from 5.5 million to 2.5 million, that of horned cattle from 8.5 to 4.9 million, the number of pigs from 6.9 to 4.8 million, and that of goats and sheep from 9.8 to 1.8 million. Conditions were similar in the Kuban region. (94) The Kolhosp /abbrev. for 'collective farm' in Ukrainian; Kolkhoz in Russian. Editor/ had completely failed

94. Kubiyovich: Atlas of the Ukraine and the Bordering Areas, page 38.

in cattle-raising.

*

241 What is it that grows in the region of the Soviet Union settled by Ukrainians? Individual cultures have always been subject to considerable fluctuation. During the NEP period the cultivation of wheat receded and rye cultivation increased. The land was extensively farmed, few horses were kept and more sheep. Then came the Bolsheviks and introduced their "rational method of cultivation". That the result of it is not satisfactory was admitted by Stalin at the Eighteenth Congress in March 1939, when he stated that collectivism in the Soviet Union had, it is true, embraced 93.5% of the entire peasantry, but that he could not

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The milk industry, too, is relatively undeveloped in the Ukraine and might even become insufficient to supply the needs of the big towns and the industrial centres if the breeding does not increase in order to be able to overtake the other branches of economic activity. 234

The general opinion which considers the Ukraine an inexhaustible source of meat and milk seems to be unfounded, at least at the present time. This is all the more true as, while the purchasing power of the native population rises, the insufficiency of the resources in this respect becomes more and more noticeable. 000

The transformation which the Ukraine has undergone in the sphere of the exploitation of the products of the surface soil since the establishment of the Soviet regime, while leaving aside the crisis in cattle-breeding, has undoubtedly not led to progress.

The trial plantations of cotton, of soho, and of rice, the mechanization of the working of the land by the extensive employment of tractors, seem to be the only advantages which have been given by the new regime to the development of Ukrainian agriculture. 242

It would seem necessary to note another wealth of the Ukrainian soil which does not enter into any of our economic categories—these are the various spas. 529 757

In the first instance there are, in the environs of Odessa, two lakes, the Kouialnik and the Khadji-Bey, ancient bays which formed when they were the mouths of rivers since dried up and which are to-day completely separated from the sea. The medicinal value of these two lakes is appreciated by all Russia. Tens of thousands of invalids, especially rheumatics and paralytics, flock there every year for the mud baths which are very rich in iodine salts.

Many parts of the coast of the Black Sea are very 529

185 According to the new Five-Year Plan, the output of meat in the
253 Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 will amount to 245,000 tons (for the entire
234 Soviet Union the production target is fixed at 1,300,000 tons) while output of butter for the Ukraine in the year 1950 is fixed at 40,000 tons (275,000 tons for the entire Soviet Union).

The following factories and farms will be rehabilitated or built: 55 meat packing plants, 33 refrigerator plants, 97 poultry farms, 46 milk factories, and 100 butter and cheese factories.

249 Of the crops producing vegetable oils, linseed and *sunflower* are the principal. A great deal of sunflower seed is eaten raw by peasants and labourers all over Russia. These two crops are decreasing.

244 *Fruit and vegetables.*—The orchard districts are in the
439 Governments of Podolia, Chernigov, Poltava, and Kiev.
245 Apples, pears, plums, cherries, mulberries, and apricots grow freely, and the surplus goes to northern Russia, great quantities being preserved. Vegetables succeed well in the alluvial soils near the rivers. They are mostly grown by summer immigrants from Bulgaria (cf. p. 72), who use a primitive system of irrigation. The surplus supply all goes to northern Russia.

231 The live-stock of the Ukraine is very numerous, but of late years has tended to decrease.

Horses are much in demand for agricultural work, especially as the use of oxen as draught animals is being gradually abandoned. There is also a strong demand for horses in the coal and iron region for haulage. As a result the stock of horses has considerably increased in six out of the nine Governments, Volhynia, Podolia, and Chernigov alone showing decreases.

Cattle have decreased in numbers in five Governments and increased in four, but the total shows a serious falling off.

236 *Sheep* are divided roughly into two classes, fine-woolled and coarse-woolled, the former producing wool known as 'Spanish', the latter being killed for their skins. There is a general decrease of stock in every province of the Ukraine. The great increase of population and the demand for land, with rising rents, make sheep-farming not sufficiently profitable under present agricultural conditions.

231 The stock of *pigs* is, on the whole, maintained, and even shows a good increase in some Governments.

The *goat* was formerly of importance, and there was a considerable stock in the country, but it has dwindled latterly at a very rapid rate.

235 *Poultry* are kept in considerable numbers, but poultry-farming on modern methods is very rare and of small economic importance.

000 *Apiculture* is common in the northern Ukraine, and

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257 316 325 651

During the last thirty or forty years, it is true, the economic situation of the Ukraine has changed considerably; three large industries have developed in the country: the sugar industry, the mining and the metal industries. And one is tempted to say that this development was due to Russian protection. But is this quite correct? Undoubtedly the protection had some influence, but not as much as one might suppose. In the first place, one must not forget that in the Ukraine there are natural conditions much more favorable to these industries than in any other part of the Russian Empire. Certainly the sugar, metal and mining interests are among those which depend on the location of their raw materials and can never start in a place where these are lacking. Besides, these industries are infinitely more fostered by transportational advantages than by custom duties. The duties which were imposed on foreign coal did not prevent the importation of English coal into the Baltic provinces nor into Petrograd. On the other hand, even if all custom duties on foreign coal had been suppressed, it would never have penetrated into central Russia and there replaced the fuel of Donetz. As to the sugar, the situation in the Ukraine was perhaps even more favorable. As to metallurgy, it no doubt profited by the protective Russian tax. But there again the role of this tax was not very great. In fact, the products of Ukrainian metallurgy were heavy (rails, beams, tires, wheels, pipes, iron bars, etc.), and their manufacture was only slightly stimulated by the tax because of the great distances over which they had, in any case, to be carried. Protective tariff is much more necessary to those industries which supply finished products of light weight, but of these the Ukraine furnished very few. The textile industry of Moscow and of Poland profited much more by protection, as did many other branches of the industrial activities of central Russia.

Effect of Russian Imperial Methods in Ukraine

369 241

Therefore, by this system, the Ukraine had more loss than profit. She was still a market for Russian and Polish industrial products, for which she paid high prices. But

for her own industry the Russian custom frontier gave her 369
insufficient protection; on the contrary, it rather reserved 241
the Ukrainian market to Moscow and Warsaw.

Consequently the industrial development of the Ukraine 369
was very slow. The agricultural population did not find 241
enough work in the towns, and, as a result, the surplus of 162
agrarian population increased every year. In some parts of the Ukraine this surplus population was more serious than in any other part of former Russia. In the central Ukrainian provinces the agrarian population reached 800 to 1,000 inhabitants per 1,000 hektares of arable land, while in France and Germany the average was about 500 inhabitants. There was nothing left for the Ukrainian popula- [167]
tion but to emigrate and colonize the lands of Siberia and of Central Asia. There was also a rather considerable movement of emigration towards America. The most fertile governments of the Ukraine furnished many more emigrants than the less fertile but more industrial regions of central Russia.

Emigration as a Possible Solution

As a consolation, it is pointed out that, in case of the 000
reunion of the Ukraine with Russia, the Ukraine will have in Siberia a field for emigration all ready. But that is very poor consolation. Can emigration satisfy any country? Are the Italians proud of sending many emigrants to America? Did the Germans have cause to feel flattered by increasing the trans-Atlantic emigration, before they developed their own industries?

Why, then, should it be the lot of the Ukraine to let her population emigrate to distant Siberia?

Why can she not develop her economic life in such a manner that all her people shall have work on their own soil? The Ukraine ought not to remain an outlet for the industrial work of the Russians and Poles when her own people cannot find any work at home.

But one might ask why no complaint has been heard up to the present, either from the Ukrainians engaged in industry or from those engaged in agriculture? Why did

The typical Ukrainian house ("khata") is a low house, all 342
on the ground floor; it consists of a living room ("svitlytsja"), a vestibule ("siny") and a bedroom ("komora"). It is built of wood, willows, twigs or reeds, plastered over with clay. In the steppe bricks dried in the sun and made of clay, chaff or chopped straw, are used. Larger stones or short, thick wooden props form the foundation. In mountain areas and in richly wooded Polesia, houses are mostly made of wood. The roofs of Ukrainian houses are usually square and covered with straw, reeds or shingles according to the district.

The Ukrainian farm-house is carefully fenced and surrounded by a garden with fruit and flowers. The house is separate from the farm buildings which are generally round a yard ("obijstja") beside the house; in Northern Ukraine, the latter is smaller, but has a roof of its own. In areas inhabited by Hutsuly, Bojky and partly also by Lemky, house and buildings are under one roof and connected by a roofed passage, ("hrasda").

The wooden churches, a native creation of high artistic 346
value, are a peculiar charm of Ukrainian architecture. We find the oldest forms in Podolia and the country of the Bojky. The wooden churches of the Hutsuly show Byzantine influence, the churches in Carpathian Ukraine, Gothic, and those in the territory of the Lemky, baroque tendencies. The village in 361
Ukraine generally consists of a group of houses with several irregular streets; in the mountains, in areas inhabited by Bojky and Lemky, there are long chain villages, while the Hutsuly prefer the collection of peasant-houses as found in the steppe. In north-west Ukraine there are also chain villages, usually consisting of two streets, which, in Polesya and Volynia, cross each other; in the plains the villages rarely number more than 1000 inhabitants, but in Podolia and Volynia there are also villages with 3000, 4000 and more inhabitants.

Ukrainians are occupied chiefly with agriculture; cattle are 241 ●
reared, particularly in the Carpathians and in the foothill areas, partly also in the steppe. Up till recently, agricultural methods were primitive. Later, however, more modern ways of cultivation and a rotation of crops were introduced and the entire industry modernised.

241 Nevertheless, old traditions are preserved in connection with agricultural implements and habits. The Ukrainian peasant uses the ancient Slav "ralo" with one plowshare and the old plow reminiscent of Roman models, which is unknown to Russian and White Ruthenian peasants. Up till recently the heavy wooden plow was used in the steppe, drawn by 14 - 16 oxen. As with South and West Slavs, the ox is here the animal usually used for draught, and not the horse, as with the Russians.

The scythe is the most important implement for harvesting. Wheat, rye and barley are cut with the scythe which has developed curious 3-blade forms in Ukraine. The sheaves are first laid together in small stacks, composed of 30 sheaves and called "polukipok". This traditional harvesting operation is known to-day only in Ukraine and White Ruthenia. The latter nation, on the other hand, and the Russians use the drying kiln for grain which has never become common in Ukraine, being used only in Volynia and in the north of the district round Chernyhiv.

Threshing is done by flail ("cip"), a characteristic form of which appears also in Mecklenburg. In the south, in addition to threshing by means of a wheel-cart drawn by oxen ("harnanyty"), a roller is also used, while in Bessarabia and the Kuban area, special boards ("mjalky") are found, such as are also used extensively to-day in Greece and Macedonia. Threshing is mostly done in special sheds ("tik") and in winter on ice and in barns ("stodola"), which have a small floor specially for this purpose. The threshing procedure of the Ukrainian differs also from that of the Russian; he does not lay the sheaves out in rows like the latter, but threshes not more than 2 - 3 sheaves at once. Grain is stored in granaries and in the steppe also in 251 pearshaped pits or in straw-containers ("solomjanyk"); in the Carpathians, Polesya and Volynia the custom of storing grain in hollowed trees ("kadovby") is still preserved. In Podolia, Bessarabia and in Southern Ukraine generally maize is gathered 231 and dried in special contraptions, woven like baskets. The shape of the bee-hives in Ukraine is also peculiar. In addition to the forest hives ("kolody") there are also hives lying or standing on a log or piece of wood ("lezen" or "stojan"). The peculiar

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Agriculture

1. Agricultural Features and Overpopulation

162 The agricultural overpopulation of Ukraine is a result of its one-sided social and economic structure. In Germany the rural population forms 29 % of the entire population of the country, while the figures for the agrarian countries of Denmark and Hungary are 30 % and 25 % respectively, the corresponding figure for Ukraine being 75 %. The density of the agricultural population in Ukrainian territory amounts to a general average of 54 per ha of agriculturally utilised soil, in the Right Bank Region and in Western Ukraine to 80, and in Galicia to 103. In Denwark, the model agricultural country, the density of the agricultural population is not even 35 and in Bohemia, where agriculture and industry are highly developed, 241 it is only 52. And yields per ha in Ukraine are fairly low: 433 statistics for 1931—35 are as follows (q/ha):

Country	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Average
Ukraine	8.5	8.8	8.3	9.2	8.7
Roumania	9.6	10.1	10.3	9.7	9.9
Hungary	13.5	11.8	14.1	12.3	12.9
Germany	21.0	17.4	20.1	19.5	19.5

Agricultural overpopulation is particularly noticeable in view of the small share of agricultural land per head of the rural population (not quite 2 ha). Produce is therefore exported at the expense of the standard of living which actually used to be lower in Ukraine than in the European states that imported the produce.

In the years immediately preceding the Second World War yields per ha in Dnipro-Ukraine seemed to have risen

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

considerably. For 1938 the average figure for grain was given as 10.9 q/ha, for 1939 = 13.9 q/ha, for 1940 = 19.5 q/ha ("Visti" of 11. II. 1941). The average for those three years would be 13 q/ha, higher by 50 % than the average for 1931—1935. As these data were compiled for a meeting of the communist party, a tendency to propaganda must be borne in mind; even in official Soviet statistics, final figures are often more modest than those just quoted. But, in spite of an undisputed increase in yield, the economy of Ukraine must either be strengthened or increased, or both, if it is to be healthy. 241 433

2. Soil and Climate

Ukraine contains 44 % of the Black Earth in Europe (160.5 million ha) and almost 8 % of that in the whole world (900 million ha) and is one of the largest Black Earth areas in existence. In Ukraine itself ³/₄ of the entire soil is Black Earth and only ¹/₄ podsol earth, mountain soil and the good renzine soil of Galicia. Podsol earth predominated in Podlakhia, the Kholm district, North Volynia, in Galician Subcarpathia, in the flats round the Syan and the Upper Buh, in Polesya and partly in the district of Chernyhiv. 134

Black Earth is one of the best soils and excellently suited to grain. Its humus content is high, its structure crumbly and it is extremely porous. The humus binds certain quantities of moisture which are distributed fairly evenly. Black Earth dries quickly on the surface but lower down it retains moisture for a fair time, even during drought. It preserves its natural fertility for a long time, does not call for any complicated preparation and is easy to work. It requires no manure which may be positively bad for it and even when exploited, the soil preserves itself, so to speak. It needs a relatively small amount of seed.

It is not necessary to have any specially developed agricultural implements on Black Earth: motor-plows and power-driven agricultural machinery are eminently suitable for the great plains that all demand the same treatment. That is why the tendency to mechanisation and to introduce big-scale operations is particularly marked in the Black Earth areas. 241

The 15 % meadows and pastureland is a little lower than 311
the average for most European countries; this figure is higher for Polesya, the Carpathians and the foothills of the Caucasus (25—30 %); in the more intensively managed areas of the Right-Bank Region it sinks to 5 %. Ukraine (like Bohemia and Moravia) has only 7 % of land that cannot be utilised for agriculture or forestry, a proportion that is 16 % for Polesya alone. This figure is considerably higher for most European countries: Germany, Roumania, France and Italy have 12—19 %, USSR 17 %.

20 % of all plowed lands lie fallow, as, with the exception of some areas in the West, the three-crop rotation system is general. Grain takes up 76 % of the arable land, 90 % even in the steppe. Since the first World War this share has declined in favor of technical cultures which have doubled their pre-war area. In 1935 they accounted for 9 %; a further 8 % is used for other vegetation for food (potatoes), 7 % for fodder plants.

Wheat and barley are the two kinds of grain that are most 241
characteristic for Ukraine, though much rye is also grown. Its share (21 %) of the land laid down in grain and potatoes was in the years 1931—35 between that of wheat (32 %) and that of barley (13 %). Oats followed (10 %), then maize (9 %), millet (6 %) and buckwheat (3 %), potatoes (6 %). Rye is above all used for domestic consumption.

4. Grain: Areas of Production and Varieties

The biggest surpluses in grain are harvested in the old pro- 243
vinces of Katerynoslav, Kherson, Tauria and the Kuban area, crops being wheat and barley and others. The proportion of these two varieties in the entire yield of grain decreases as we pass from south-east to north-west. In Western Ukraine, Volynia and the district of Tarnopil are areas of surplus yields while the rest of Galicia has to import grain. Wheat thrives best on the Black Earth of what was once steppe and occupies about 1/3 of the area laid down in grain and potatoes. Cultivation of wheat increased for a long time in accordance with the growing world consumption, but decreased when facilities for export disappeared and when domestic consumption became more important (see tables 1 and 2).

distribution. These co-operatives formed the basis of a certain national unity which found expression in the political field. 474

Volhynia, partitioned after the war of 1920 between the Poles and the Soviets, is nearly as old an agricultural country as Galicia. Here the strips of rich black earth alternate with sandy and wooded country. Although density of population is not so great as in Galicia, poverty is perhaps even greater, owing to a lack of that capacity for organization which helps the Galician labourers to survive. The large estates of the Polish nobility have long disappeared; after the last war the Polish Government divided up the land. Numerous strips were allotted to Polish soldiers on the expiration of their service—with the intention of strengthening the Polish ethnic and cultural element in the region. The disappearance of the large estates, as in Transylvania and Roumania, had a deleterious effect on agricultural production and on the proper exploitation of the forests. The majority of the people lead a half-starved existence, and the young men dream of emigration to South America. In 1937, 25 per cent of the population of Polish Volhynia had neither bread nor wood. 311 134 241 735

Podolia has been a land of cultivation since the Middle Ages, although the soil was broken up two or three hundred years later than in Galicia and Volhynia. Now, as before the period of war and revolution (1914–20), Podolia remains in a close economic relationship to the other parts of the Ukraine. The black earth of this favoured province is really fruitful and well watered by numerous small rivers; climatic conditions are better than anywhere throughout the Ukraine—rain is plentiful and regular and the winters are short. It was probably the fields and pastures, the hillocks and woods of Podolia which the Polish poet had in mind when he wrote lyrically of 'the birthplace of Ceres and Diana'. Horticulture and apiculture have long flourished there. 311 134

In the past social conditions varied with the political situation according to whether the small landowners (Ukrainian Cossacks) or the Polish landlords were in the ascendant. During the eighteenth century Polish elements had the upper hand and for some time Podolia remained the last refuge of the Polish aristocracy. Polish social influences survived the Three Partitions, and it was only after the Polish Insurrection of 1830 that conditions began to change in favour of the Russian majority in the population. 177

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century this rich land with its soft climate had become very densely populated. By the end of the century Podolia ranked second in density of population of all the regions of the Russian Empire. The Government of Moscow took 162 311

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the New Russian Governments) there were over 1 million hectares 433
under beetroot. Just before the last war the annual production of
beet in the Ukraine reached 150 million quintals: i.e. 18 per cent of 244
world production. The production of Ukrainian beet sugar ranked fourth—after that of America, Germany and France. In 1913 the Ukraine produced 11 million quintals of crystallized sugar. This output, together with that of the Polish factories, covered all the needs of the internal market (which during the preceding twenty-five years had augmented fourfold) and provided substantial surplus for export to the Baltic and the Middle East.

In addition to the beet processing plants, about 60 per cent of the alcohol refineries (corn, potatoes) of the Empire were located in the [274]
Ukraine. The production of vegetable oil (particularly from sunflower seed) was also important.

It has been estimated by the Soviet paper *Pravda* that approximately 1 milliard of rubles a year was paid for services on the semi-industrialized estates of landowners throughout Russia: of this sum a considerable proportion was paid for the hire of horse transport (since landowners did not maintain a large number of draught horses but hired from the villages). Of this milliard, about 300,000,000 were paid out in the Ukraine. As the peasant population of the
Ukraine numbered about fifteen millions, some 20 rubles a year per [511]
head of the population was earned on 'supplementary' work on the large estates. 'Only owing to the sugar and other agricultural industries could the dense population of the Ukraine exist in such comparatively well-to-do circumstances.'

Thus the agricultural economy of Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, [241]
Chernigov and Poltava was based only partly on the production of cereals. With a population which reached nearly twenty millions, only about 2 million hectares were under wheat, while in New Russia, with a population about half that of the Ukrainian Governments, there were 4 million hectares under wheat. The Ukraine
exported only small quantities of wheat to Poland and White [439]
Russia, which provinces drew the bulk of their supplies from New Russia. The real 'granaries' of Russia which supplied the whole
Empire and exported a surplus abroad were the regions of the [134]
northern Caucasus and Trans-Volga with western Siberia and New Russia (including the Governments of Kherson and Ekaterinoslav with the northern part of Tauris and the southern part of Kharkov) In those regions the black earth really had a virgin quality during the first half of the nineteenth century; and its richness remains exceptional even now.

As a rule, the climatic conditions in the *New Russian Governments* 000

132 AS A RULE, THE CLIMAC CONDITIONS IN THE NEW RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTS are much less favourable than in left-bank and especially right-bank Ukraine. They become worse going from west to east: the region of Odessa has the most equable climate and the shores of the Azov Sea the worst of all. In the east rainfall is insufficient, attaining in good years 50–40 cm. and in bad years not exceeding 20 cm., while in central and southern Ukraine it is 80 cm. and 40 cm. respectively. There is, furthermore, in the New Russian Governments an unbalanced distribution of rainfall: the country suffers from a shortage of rain in the spring when it is most needed, and from violent downpours in the summer. The climate of New Russia clearly inclines to aridity. In the old days the Black Sea steppes were covered for a short time in spring by a luxurious growth of high grass and wild flowers which disappeared in the following months. The steppe dries up completely during a period when the temperature reaches from 30° to 40° Centigrade and even the rain-storms of July and August cannot give new life to the parched ground. ● 241 Under such conditions field labour calls for special methods. The soil has to be ploughed deep, and great layers of earth have to be lifted—'the black fallow' which has not been dried out. The weak peasants' horses of the northern Ukraine are useless for such work. Ploughing in New Russia requires either two pairs of strong oxen or, better, mechanical traction. Before the last war, only wealthy landowners or agricultural colonies working on a co-operative basis could afford the latter method, which was introduced into New Russia as early as the end of the nineteenth century.

By force of circumstances farming in New Russia acquired quite a different character from that which had evolved in the historic countryside of old Ukraine: it even created a different landscape. 'Fruit-trees, especially cherry-trees, lend a charm to the Ukrainian landscape in the neighbourhood of Kiev and Poltava which recalls the rural landscapes of France. In New Russia, on the contrary, the lack of trees, the dryness of the climate, clouds of dust driven by the wind, lonely hamlets—all this goes to create an austere landscape which recalls rather the high plains of northern Castile. Only the endless cornfields with their undulating golden sea of wheat lend a [361] lyric note to these flat unwooded spaces. Villages there are not picturesque and in agricultural colonies practical considerations take precedence over the desire to beautify the environment. The houses, however, are more modern, more spacious and better built. Thatched roofs have given place to tiles or sheet-iron' (Brégy and Obolensky).

Wheat forms the basis of the agricultural wealth of New Russia. Before the last war, wheat covered 25 per cent of all the farmed

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

land in the Ukraine and New Russia: of 25 million hectares of 241
arable, 6½ million were under wheat, and of these 4½ million were
in New Russia. Ukrainian and New Russian production attained 433
90 million quintals a year, of which 70 million came from the New 241
Russian Governments. (In addition, the Ukraine produced for internal consumption about 30 million quintals of rye—in the northern districts—nearly as much barley, and about 20 million quintals of oats.) The wheat crop of the Ukraine and New Russia represented 8 per cent of the total world, and 18 per cent of European, production. With an average production of 70 million quintals a year, the New Russian Governments could throw an important surplus on to the world market. Before the Revolution about 76 per cent of the crop was retained in the villages for food, storage and seed (on the larger mechanized estates and co-operative colonies the average was round 70 per cent). The balance, about 20 million quintals, went on the market: of it about one-quarter was absorbed by the towns and industrial centres of New Russia. Under these conditions the three New Russian Governments had [439] available for export abroad 15 million quintals of wheat, i.e. about 1½ million tons. The crop of New Russia and the northern Caucasus was exported to the Ottoman Empire, Greece and particularly to Italy, where the 'hard' types of grain were appreciated as an ingredient of macaroni and other *paste*. Even after the last war and all the ruin of agriculture resulting from the Revolution, the Soviet Press, in 1929, could boast that about 1½ million tons of wheat had been exported through the New Russian and North Caucasian ports (Professor Brutskus holds that this export—the relation of which to total production greatly exceeded pre-War proportions—was one of the factors in preparing the way for the terrible famine of 1932).

'From remote times the Ukraine and New Russia were famous 231
for their draught oxen. Further, many landowners possessed herds of foreign cattle, principally Swiss breeds. All the German colonies bred good milkers' (Shcherbatov). In 1914 there were estimated to be over 9 million head of cattle, 6 million sheep (numbers of them of valuable breed) and 5 to 6 million pigs in the Ukrainian and New Russian Governments (the pigs predominated in northern and western Ukraine and sheep in the New Russian steppes). South Russia, an ideal horseman's country, possessed also a vast number of horses. Before the last war there were reckoned to be 5½ million horses in the Ukraine and New Russia (1 horse to every 5–6 people, and one-sixth of all the horses in the Empire). Government studs, and those of private landowners and of certain *zemstva*, maintained

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

474 U.S.S.R., and there is no doubt that one of the results will be a further
166 weakening of Ukrainian elements where the Government considers them to be still too strong

Secondary Branches of Ukrainian Agriculture

● 241 In addition to wheat, *rye*, *barley*, *oat* and *maize* crops are important. *Millet* is also grown and forms the base of the broth (*psheno*) which is a favourite dish in the South of Russia (in the North this broth or porridge is made from buck-wheat).

Clover and *lucerne* are comparatively little cultivated, and almost exclusively in right-bank Ukraine and Galicia.

About a million hectares are under *potatoes* in right-bank Ukraine; the bulk of the crop goes to the alcohol distilleries.

Sunflower-seed is important in the production of oil; *hemp* and small quantities of *linseed* and *mustard-seed* are produced for the same purpose.

The cultivation of *hops* was always traditional in Volhynia; in pre-Revolutionary days half of the hop production of the Empire came from Volhynia and right-bank Ukraine. In late years production has greatly declined.

Tobacco, the cultivation of which was introduced by Greek immigrants in the eighteenth century, is a speciality of the districts of Nezhin and Romen. The quality is not good and the cultivation of tobacco has no future in the Ukraine.

Particularly in Podolia and the region of Uman, *kolkhozniki* take great interest in horticulture; about 200,000 hectares are under orchards. On many *Kolkhozy* the *kolkhozniki* occupy themselves on the private cultivation of *tomatoes*, and the Government has set up canning plants in order to encourage this branch of production.

The *vine* grows well on the banks of the Dniepr and the southern Bug, in the neighbourhood of Berdyansk and Odessa, and along the Dniestr. But wine production has not been developed on the scale which it has attained in Bessarabia and the Crimea.

The Soviet Government favours agricultural experiments, and some *Kolkhozy* in the South have tried to cultivate *rice*—so far with little success.

An experiment on a large scale was made in the cultivation of *cotton*. 190,000 hectares between the mouth of the Dniepr and Perekop were reserved, but it is not likely that cotton cultivation in the Ukraine will prove the success which it has in the more suitable climates of Azerbaijan and Turkestan.

Secondary Mineral Resources in the Ukraine

135 Reserves of different qualities of *lignite* are distributed over many parts of the Ukraine. In view of the abundance of other resources of calorific power, exploitation has not been greatly developed, but output of lignite in the region of Elizavetgrad attains 300,000 tons a year.

A million tons of *peat* is cut annually in Ukraine—about 10 per cent of the output of U.S.S.R.

Bauxites in the Dniepr region are utilized for the Aluminium Works near Dnieprostroy.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

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Ukraine Under the Soviets

185 474 241 The peasants also revived and breathed new life into the co-operatives which had been broken up during the period of Militant Communism. In 1923 they established another cooperative organization, the Selo-Tekhnyka (Village Machines) which purchased more expensive agricultural machinery and rented it out to the peasants for the appropriate agricultural work. These points became the centre of mechanization and were in effect the first [453] tractor stations. In 1924 they established the First Agricultural Bank, a sort of private institution which at one time had more loans outstanding than had the Ukrainian State Bank which was, of course, closely supervised by Moscow.

185 369 All these efforts met with marked success and agriculture speedily began to revive. The peasants became more prosperous and their holdings of livestock rapidly increased, although they did not reach the pre-war level. This, in its turn, created a new demand for manufactured products and restored the factories to operation, and with them the conditions in the cities began to improve.

185 471 [475] Similar concessions were made to industry, but with one important difference. The larger and more important industrial plants were not turned back to their former owners who were, as before, allowed no voice or influence in their direction. They were taken from the workers who had seized and abused them during the period of Militant Communism and placed under the supervision of government trusts. These were either regional in character or confined to a single branch of industry. In either case, they were under the control of a more or less trusted group of men among whom Communists were in the leading positions, but while they received certain credits from the state, they were more or less autonomous and they were allowed to go through regular commercial transactions and encouraged to show profits in their annual reports. There was thus again a source of encouragement both for the directors and the workers, and slowly but surely the level of industry began to rise.

The smaller plants were very often leased to individuals who were allowed to employ hired labor and the hope was given to these that their taxes would be at such a level that they, too, could

[NEP attempts to restore peasant prosperity -- Analyst]

631 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of
642 Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications,
645 Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent
327 exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that
185 the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

432 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921,
241 which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the
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payment of a specific amount of tax in kind and left to the peasant 432
the rest of his crop. In an endeavor to get this grain into Russia, 241
the government offered to buy it but it did not have the funds or 185
the inclination to pay for it at the market price. The financial reforms connected with the introduction of the chervonets could, to a certain degree, make it expedient for the peasant to sell to the government for cash, and as time went on the peasant gained the power of selling his crop for cash but the Moscow control of transportation and the prohibition of large scale trading left him helpless and he saw himself forced to dispose of it locally or to the government. Then the government made a fixed price which was far [435]
below that of the free market, and was often scarcely a third of the amount that the peasant could have secured. This sale of large quantities of agricultural products at a fixed price gradually became the rule and was one of the signs that the period of toleration for private income was coming to an end.

In 1925, the government began to clamp down on the small 656
traders, the Nepmen, who had profited by the opportunities which 661
they had had. Again it had a large choice of measures. Thus, depending on the situation, it could invoke laws against the hiring of labor; it could order the state agencies to refuse to buy from or sell to an obnoxious individual and thus isolate him; it could suspend his ration cards and perquisites, take away his right of voting and thus make him a pariah in the community; it could levy prohibitive taxes which would put him out of business and confiscate his property; or it could find some violation of some other law or regulation and imprison or exile him.

The degree of pressure which was put upon the peasants and 439
the workers varied from year to year. Each year Ukraine was 241
compelled to export more to Russia without regard to the needs of the local population. Thus, the amount of grain rose from 1,050,000 tons in 1924-5 to 3,165,000 tons in 1926-7, when there was a bumper crop, but in 1927-8, when the harvest partially failed and there were signs of need in the country, the amount collected and exported rose to 4,353,000 tons. At the same time, the continually increasing demands aroused again a spirit of oppo-

439 sition and of indifference among the peasantry and a resentment
241 against the growing exactions of the Soviet regime in Moscow.

Still these were years of relative peace. With the introduction of the New Economic Policy, the government became more tolerant of differences of opinion and the OGPU (the Organization of the State Political Administration, the new name for the old Cheka) was relatively inactive. There were few political arrests, imprisonments, executions and deportations and the bulk of the population began to breathe more easily. There were men, however, who saw the straws in the wind. For example in 1924, Mikhnovsky, who had been one of the early Ukrainian nationalists, committed suicide and so did Syrotenko, a prominent Social Revolutionist, but these were in a way exceptional cases.

It is far more likely that this lull was part of the Moscow policy of preparing to eliminate in one swoop all persons who might prove to be dangerous, but it was also affected by the confusion and the intrigues that were going on in Moscow. With the death of Lenin, there was no clear successor to his post and prestige. There were many claimants, notably Stalin and Trotsky. When Lenin died, the power passed into the hands of a small group of leaders with Stalin, the Secretary of the Communist Party, and Trotsky as Commissar for War as the main contenders for the supreme power. The struggle between these two men lasted for several years, with the star of Stalin rising over that of Trotsky who favored a far more rigorous policy toward both the Nepmen and traders in the cities and the kulaks or kurkuls (the richer peasants) who had profited materially by the opportunities for private trade and production. It was not until that conflict was over that any one dared to risk the internal upheaval that might come with a change from the avowed outlines of the New Economic Policy and a reintroduction of more rigorous socialist or communist practice.

CHAPTER TEN

The Famine

In 1921, the great famine which had swept over Ukraine had been the result of a failure of the crops, a prolonged drought and the excesses of Militant Communism which had demoralized the country. The Soviets, more or less unwillingly, allowed the despatch of foreign assistance and this saved the lives of millions. There was to be no interference in the punishment of the obstinate peasants this time. 731

In the fall of 1929, just as compulsory collectivization was being introduced, the government in Moscow made an important change in the agricultural set-up, for it transferred the Commissariat of Agriculture to the central group by establishing an All-Union Commissariat which was to be in control of all agriculture in the Soviet Union. This meant that in Ukraine all of the work which had been previously done by the local authorities was now transferred to Moscow. The republic commissariats ceased to have the power to pursue individual plans for improving the conditions of the soil, for varying the crops as their own advisers decided or as the population felt it necessary. Everything was to be done from the centre and the Ukrainian Soviet Government was compelled to hand over all of its research stations and other institutions to Muscovite control. This put a stop to the intensive development of Ukrainian agriculture which had been fostered by the Ukrainian land code and introduced the new system in which the peasants were in the same position as the workers in the factories. 341 645 631

At the same time the central regime ceased to make public the actual figures of production on the ground that they might betray to outside nations important facts as to the Soviet development. From this time on estimates and achievements were given only in 433

[1929 – All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture was established 93 --Amlyst]

433 terms of percentages in reference to a prior date. Still the alreao, published data were so scanty and incomplete that it became increasingly more and more difficult to secure an actual picture of the progress in the Union as a whole and still more so in any of the separate Soviet Republics, for the central regime rarely broke down what little information it gave out among its constituent parts.

651 It was not long before another change was made in the methods
241 of collecting the products from the collective farms. Under the new
661 system, the farms did not contribute according to their crop but according to the amount of land which they proposed to sow. This amount was due to the government, even in those cases where there was a complete failure of the harvest not under the control of the workers. In other words, if a crop failed because of bad weather conditions, the peasants were compelled to hand over just as much produce as if they had had a bumper crop.

It can be easily seen that such a measure was merely another device for weakening the economic position of the village and the independence of the collective farm. At the same time the establishment of official tractor stations in place of the old locally controlled centres which sent crews and machines into the countryside gave the government another weapon for the exertion of pressure upon the peasants and even the Communists who were in charge of the farms and these crews likewise were paid not on the basis of their work but of the theoretical area which was to be sown. Later this was again changed to the total area of the farm whether it was suitable for any special kind of agriculture or not.

These measures only increased the discontent among the peasants who once again began to limit their work to the minimum necessary to maintain themselves on a steadily dropping scale of living. To counter-balance this the Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a decree in February, 1930 allowing the local authorities who were, of course, handpicked by Moscow to resort to extreme measures against the kurkuls, to confiscate their property and then to dispose of them by sending them and their families to concentration camps, to special settlements in the far north or eastern Asia or merely by expelling them from their home district.

4 [after establishing All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture, 1929 --Analyst]

These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown. These were naturally the more 661
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw ma- 433
terials had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood. This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It concentrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in military preparations. Even when petitions were made by the Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR. Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transportation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932 they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 - 1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

651/ missars issued a decree for the "protection of socialist property."
685 Under this law the stealing of a single ear of grain from a kolhosp
241 granary could be punished by confinement for ten years in a con-
511 centration camp. It was so interpreted that if a peasant picked up a single stalk from the field after the harvest, he was liable for the same punishment. In other words, the peasant could only secure his grain legally from and through the administration of the kolhosp.

With this law on the books, the Ukrainian collective farms could be punished either for failing to protect "socialist property" or they could be attacked for failing to present to the government crops and grain in an amount equal to that foreseen by the plan. This was the easier because there were few of the kolhosps that had been able to sow the area required of them. Lack of intelligent and competent leadership on the farms and the exigencies of the weather made it almost inevitable that there would be deficiencies, especially since the schedules were made up in Moscow and took no account of the local conditions.

As the grain deliveries lagged, the demands increased and on January 24, 1933, the Central Committee of the VKP/b issued a new resolution that "it was regarded as proved that the party organization of Ukraine had not carried out the tasks assigned to it in organizing grain deliveries and executing the grain plan."

To remedy this, the central authorities ordered the formation of political detachments in the machine tractor stations, "the chief basic tasks of which were the insuring of the unconditional and immediate execution by the kolhosps and their members of all their obligations to the state and especially the decisive struggle with the stealing of kolhosp property, the struggle with the manifestations of sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the sharing of the grain supplies and the meat products of the kolhosps."

The leaders of these detachments were given the obligation "to secure the constant lawful and accurate fulfilment of the laws of the Soviet government by administrative and criminal measures against the organizers of the stealing of Soviet property and the

sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the branch of village agriculture." 651 685

The machine tractor stations were staffed by men largely alien to the Ukrainian countryside. The more fanatical Communists were placed in these political detachments and were, in effect, told to supplement or replace the local administration in the exercise of pressure and terror upon both the heads and the members of the kolhosps. To aid them in their work Moscow sent to Ukraine a Russian Pavel Postyshev as a special plenipotentiary of the Central Committee with 7,000 party workers from the Russian Republic. 241 511

The work of these special "commissions" and "brigades" was marked by the utmost severity. They entered the villages, and made the most thorough searches of the houses and barns of every peasant. They dug up the earth, broke into the walls of buildings and the stoves in which the peasants tried to hide their last handfuls of food. They even in places took specimens of the fecal matter from the toilets in the effort to learn in that way by analysis whether the peasants had stolen government property and were eating grain. Wherever they found any, the peasants were severely punished, while the detachments carried off not only grain but everything edible.

The same reports came from every corner of Ukraine. "They requisitioned everything that could be eaten" was the report from the village of Zorich in the district of Poltava. In one village in the district of Odesa, "they collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram" and in other places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove. In at least one of these commissions, Molotov, then head of the Council of Ministers, took a personal part.

The natural result was a famine of unprecedented severity. The villages had been hungry in the autumn. After these searches commenced, they literally starved. An Englishman, M. Magridge, wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1933: "During a recent visit to Ukraine, I have seen a little of the war which the Soviet government is carrying on against the peasants. The fields were 731 661

[result of excessive grain requisitions in 1933 -- Analyst]

country for less populated districts in the east, while, on the slightest 166
suspicions, whole families were deported, separated and exiled, and 626
their places taken by people from other Soviet republics who were brought in to destroy the racial unity that formerly existed in the villages.

To appreciate the difficulties of the peasants on the collective 241
farms, we must remember that the involved bureaucratic system 651
had ample opportunities for extorting the grain for little or no 474
payment. Thus the Motor Transport Stations which controlled 465
all the machinery were supported by payments from the collective farms of grain and other products in kind and this usually approached 21.5% of the total yield, while the Stations took over 23% of the crop for the government. Another 15% was retained by the kolhosp for sowing and for various insurance funds that were prescribed by law and another 18% was kept for fodder and for the compensation of the full-time administrators. Thus, there was barely a quarter of the produce left to be distributed among the working population and this was the variable quantity since all of the payments and collections were based not on the actual harvest but on the harvest as planned by the central authorities. Thus, in the case of a bad harvest, the share allotted for distribution was the part that was cut and the government, so far as possible was provided with its expected supply.

This amount was divided among the individuals and families on the basis of the labor days which they had worked. In the beginning a labor day meant labor for a day, no matter how many hours of labor were required, but even before World War II, this simple definition was replaced by a specification that it covered a definite amount of work and it might very easily happen that a slow or poor workman would have to work more than one day to make a labor day. Thus, there was the possibility of still further exploitation of the workmen, who could not know accurately until the end of the year on what they could count.

There was also distributed, likewise in proportion to labor days, a certain sum of money which the kolhosp received from the government in return for the sale of grain over the amount col-

[1 after 1933 famine - - Analyst]

241 lected for the tax in kind. This was a negligible sum and the
651 average member rarely received more than one ruble per labor
474 day. This sum was, of course, insufficient to provide for the
465 goods which the family needed to purchase, and since their share
[511] of the grain was rarely sufficient to feed them, their situation became hopeless, while of other products the individual received about one litre of oil, fifty kilograms of potatoes, thirty-five kilograms of fruit, and five-tenths kilograms of meat and fat.

[435] The real significance of these figures is shown in the prices that were charged in the state stores.[1] There a kilogram of bread cost ninety kopecks, ten eggs brought eight rubles, a kilogram of beef twenty-four rubles, and a pair of boots four hundred and fifty rubles, while a farmer's suit of clothes cost five hundred rubles.

[422] It made the peasant really dependent upon his individual plot of land if he was to secure any necessities.[1] This was far too small and its use was bound with many restrictions. Thus, no family was allowed to hold more than one cow and two calves, one sow, up to ten goats, an undefined number of chickens and up to twenty beehives. In the beginning it was possible for the peasant to secure a certain amount of food for these animals from the common store. He was allowed to retain the manure and it was thus possible for him to improve his own individual plot and thus to secure larger returns. It was a liberal application of such principles that had rendered possible the general improvement which was noticeable during the years 1934-6, when the government was endeavoring to make the system of collective farms workable.

It can be easily seen that the system of allowing individual incomes was based on a principle opposite that of the New Economic Policy, for it would require scarcely a legislative enactment to reduce these amounts while the New Economic Policy presented a norm of profit to the workers. Yet with each year, once the government was convinced of its success, it found it possible in various ways to tap this new source of income for its own purposes.

The favorite method was by taxation. Thus, by 1939 if we should assume that the average family received in cash four hun-

1 [Ukraine - after 1933 famine -- Analyst]

dred and eighty karbovantsy, they would be required to pay 241 ●
twenty-two and a half karb. in taxes, twenty in rent, fifty as a 651
special tax and they would be required to volunteer to take at 474
least two hundred in government bonds. 465

Even this did not cover the total payments to the government. With its usual love of double-talk and subterfuge, the government, which controlled every branch of human activity in the USSR, talked of the establishment of socialism and levied indirect taxes on all transactions so that the actual cost to the villagers of any manufactured article was about three times what it cost the government as producer. The whole subject was carefully veiled as a state secret to protect the Soviet Union against capitalist intrigues but the unfortunate population were the unwilling contributors to this new order of life.

Under such conditions it is extremely difficult to pierce the veil [652]
of percentages as to cost and production and give a reliable estimate as to the amount of money received for the government or the relationship between the sums spent in maintaining the operation of the Moscow-controlled factories in Ukraine and the amount spent upon the needs of the population either individually, as families or as citizens of the UkSSR or of the UkSSR as a governmental unity within the Soviet sphere. From those figures which the Soviet has let out, it is possible to see that the yearly budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has run from 2½-5% of the budget of the USSR while the population has been at least 18% of the total population.

With the villages compelled to yield the last pound of grain, 369
etc., that could be extracted by force, and receiving in return 511
almost no manufactured goods, the position of the city workmen and the intelligentsia was little better. The wages of the workmen were always insufficient, the housing conditions were hardly endurable, and the only point of betterment was that the larger places and some of the plants especially favored by the regime received more manufactured goods of a poor quality and at a high price which the fortunate people might be able to secure.

727 Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the
661 title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors
[241] merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

[538] By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing
[466] Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

668 These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba—Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

668 This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian
725 forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

727 their posts and the vast majority of those who were Communists
316 received more or less sinecures above ground. Their places were
[466] taken by forcing the Ukrainian peasants, including a large percentage of young girls, to work in the pits with the minimum of safeguards. Little money was appropriated for the restoration of the damaged housing, for as the writer Korniychuk declared in one of his works, "Ukraine was so thankful for the success of Stalin that they did not care how they lived, for if he had perished, life would not be worth living under any circumstances."

727 With this attitude prominently emphasized by the leading propagandists, it is easy to see that the resources and energies of the population were directed by force rather toward those items that would advance the importance and the convenience of Moscow, than those that would be of advantage to the local population.

[496] The one exception was the necessity for rebuilding immediately and strengthening the railroad communications between the Donbas, Moscow, Leningrad and the Black Sea ports—in other words, the extreme eastern part of the Ukraine which was slated for a special development with roads and railroads linking the country up with the Russian centres rather than with the other Ukrainian centres to the west for these were regarded as exposed centres in case of a new outbreak of hostilities and were to be neglected until they were masked by the extension of Soviet power over the satellite countries.

474 The collectivized agriculture was in little better shape. In
●341 that part of the Ukraine which had been under Soviet control before 1939, the authorities revived the collective farms but they had been so badly ruined that at first the authorities were often willing to be more considerate of the members. Immediately after the war they allowed them to group themselves into links or permanent sections of some eight to ten people who would thus come to feel themselves a distinct unit in the collective farm. It did not take long for the more rigid Communists to decide that this sense of permanence was in a way a defiance of the principles of collectivization, for very often members of the same household, if it were at all numerous, would group themselves into a link. In such cases the link became more prosperous, for it was in a way

a revival of that form of family agriculture which had long been popular in the Ukraine before the collectivization. Furthermore, it was soon suspected that the links varied in their delivery of supplies to the government, sometimes in inverse proportion to their own readiness to work. The peasants likewise as in the early days of the NEP devoted more attention to their own private plots of land, a phenomenon that had been noticed even before World War II. 474 241

The Soviet authorities had several answers to such developments. On the one hand, they finally forbade the operation of the permanent links which had developed to the point where they threatened the objective of collectivization, the turning of the peasant farmer into a paid proletarian worker in agriculture. On the other hand they reduced the size again of the individual plot of land and they forced the peasants to give up animal raising on their plots by charging them for even the straw from the collective farms and the wild fodder that grew in abandoned places. Then again, they levied a tax on the products of these plots and this, plus the reduction of the allotment, rendered it impossible for the peasant to improve his lot except through increased work on the collective farm. In the meanwhile the steady raising of the quota of work required for one labor day made it impossible for the average peasant, unless he was a Stakhanovist (i.e. a person who cooperated with the central regime and thereby received favorable assignments) to complete one labor day within one calendar day, no matter how long hours he worked. This had been a favorite device of the Russian landlords as we learn from Radishchev's *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*, a famous Russian radical work of the end of the eighteenth century but a modern version of it was adapted by the Russian Communist leaders and used effectively. 474 241 466 [423]

Even these measures were not the desirable solution. This was first proposed by Khrushchov in 1947, and while it was at first looked upon with some disfavor, it was finally deemed suitable by the slave-drivers of the Kremlin, and Khrushchov, after a period of mild disfavor, was promoted to the Politburo, and another Russian, Melnikov, placed in charge of Ukraine. This was the 474 241 665

474 creation of great "agro-cities" or "agro-settlements" which would
241 unite several collective farms in one great centre which could be
665 more easily controlled by the Communist Party with a smaller number of qualified party members in charge. By the end of 1950 the number of kolhosps (collective farms) had been reduced from 33,653, as at the end of the war, to 14,443. The number of households in one had grown from 163 households to 277. At the same time the number of collective farms in which there were definite party leaders had increased from 42% to 78%. This does not imply a growth in Communist membership, for the number of Communist authorities might, under the new ratio, be reduced by almost 3,000 in personnel. This would be hardly likely but it explains at a glance the increased control that the Communists could exert over the larger groups. It also made it easier by destroying the separated villages to prevent as effective help being given to the U. P. A. and the other anti-Communist movements which lingered on, as the peasants saw that the new era was to be not one of peace but of increased hardships. At the same time, the
423 peasant was made more helpless for his holdings in the neighbor-
241 hood of his home were reduced to 0.15 hectare or approximately a third of an acre.

This area is roughly equivalent to the average American suburban lot of 150 x 100 feet and on this the average peasant family was supposed, no matter how many members it contained, to raise all the vegetables, eggs and milk which the family required for the year and also any other plant or animal requirement which was needed as a cash crop. Even this was now burdened with taxes and the peasant was forbidden to secure anything from the collective farm to assist in his economy, outside of what he secured in his pay for a steadily diminishing number of labor days and the accompanying cash and kind receipts which were apportioned to him for his work.

474 Estimates based on figures from some collective farms show
434 that the average family receives for its year's work, if three or four
241 members work, something in the neighborhood of three hundred pounds of grain, four hundred pounds of potatoes and about one

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a 474
result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred 434
karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one 241
thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on [554]
these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for [665]
show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satisfactory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer is little better, although he 465
receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, 731
there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 con- 185
tinued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

[Post - WORLD WAR II - 1945 -- Analyst]

p. 3

I. THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM

727 DURING the summer and autumn of 1941 the German armies rolled across the plains of the Ukraine; by November the entire Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was in their hands. Observers everywhere were aware of the significance of the conquest of [241] this huge area with its thirty-five million inhabitants. The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine, famous as the "granary of the USSR," the gigantic industrial complex of the Donets basin, and the rich mineral deposits were weighed in appraising the loss of the Soviet Union and the gain of Germany. While the political effects of the conquest received less attention at the time, in some ways they were even more important than the economic effects.

186 While there is a tradition of separate political development in the Ukraine,[1] modern nationalism—the doctrine that persons of a distinctive culture should constitute an independent state—came late to the area. To a close observer, the first stirrings of nationalism among educated groups in the Ukraine would have been apparent early in the nineteenth century, and by the middle [538] of that century Taras Shevchenko, the greatest name in Ukrainian literature, was giving poetic expression to nationalist aspirations. It was considerably later, however, that definitely political [668*] organizations were formed to establish the claim of the Ukraine to nationhood.[2] For the student of contemporary politics, it is precisely this late emergence of Ukrainian nationalism which

[1] The term "Ukraine" is used throughout this study (except in cases when another meaning is clearly implied) to refer to the territory comprised in the Ukrainian SSR in 1945. Essentially the same area (with the exception of the Carpatho-Ukraine, which is discussed briefly at several points in this study) was included in the Ukrainian SSR in 1941. This territory corresponds fairly closely—except, as noted in Chapter XI, in the east—to the Ukrainian "ethnographical" territory, the area in which the indigenous population speaks Ukrainian.

[2] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 12.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

an archdiocese of Kherson at an early date.[61] As was related previously, the *Generalkommissar* was suspicious of the Autocephalous Church and urged that steps be taken against it when it grew strong in the north of his area. Later, Michael (Khoroshyi), bishop of Kirovograd, was to come to Nikolaev as archbishop, and was recognized by the *Generalkommissar*,[62] but the pro-Russian ecclesiastical group seems to have maintained a strong position. On the other hand, the extremely large shift in national affiliation in Kherson indicated by the city census suggests that the same factor of adoption of loyalty to the Ukraine as a territorial entity may have been at work here as well as farther north.[63] Farther east along the coast, in the *Generalbezirk* Taurien (Taurida), with its capital in Melitopol' (Melitopil'), there appears to have been little effort at nationalist organization; the newspapers, police, and other agencies were Ukrainian, but seem to have been completely subject to German control.[64]

Beyond the coastal strip just discussed lies the most easterly section of the Ukrainian SSR, the Donbas. This area, in which agriculture takes the form of large-scale wheat farming, as in the far south, is known as the "Ruhr"—or better, one of the "Ruhrs"—of the Soviet Union. Its industry, which grew at a tremendous pace in the interwar period, is based primarily upon rich coal deposits. Its five cities of more than one hundred thousand population in 1939 had nearly tripled their total number of inhabitants since the previous census. It is probable that this increase resulted in a substantial gain for the Ukrainian ethnic component, which previously had been very small, as the surrounding peasantry is largely, though not overwhelmingly, Ukrainian. As far as the technical staffs, which composed the bulk of the educated class, are concerned, however, Ukrainian nationalist observers themselves admit that the great majority was drawn from

[61] *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, January 20, 1942, p. 1. The archbishop was Anthony (Martsenko), who received his appointment in 1941 from the Sobor of Volhynian Bishops. Up to the time of the definite split between the Autonomous and the Autocephalous churches he was apparently still sympathetic to the Ukrainian nationalists as his secretary is reported to have been an OUN member (NO 3279).

[62] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, March 6, 1943, p. 5.

[63] See Appendix.

[64] PS 1693.

369 The Ukrainian people, being an old nation with an agricultural civilization, is not attracted by industry and by large concentrations of population. It prefers to live in the country, when its material life is assured, seeking to supplement its revenues by semi-agricultural professions such as those of artisan, or small trade, or finally the service of the State.

241 The Ukrainian agriculturalist, especially in the regions of the south, is conscious of participating in the general economy of the country. He takes a great interest in the choice of plants to be developed, in the organization of co-operatives for trade and credit, and in the construction of the means of communication. He is a civilized peasant, a quite European farmer. Without disparaging the intellect and the practical sense of the Great Russian people, it is necessary to recognize that the Ukrainian is more Western in all his conceptions, and more European, than his brother of the north.

163 On the other hand, the Ukrainian people have a great vitality. Among the peoples of Europe they have the greatest rate of increase, which reaches 2·3 per cent per annum. The fecundity of the women is astonishing: between twenty and thirty years it is 23 per cent, while in France it hardly reaches 8 per cent at the same ages.[1]

142 The average height of the men at the period of military service is about 1 m. 69½ cm.

137 342 Ukrainians are very clean and their houses very neat, mostly whitened with whitewash and surrounded by gardens. Fruit trees, particularly cherry trees, give the villages an attractive appearance, especially in the districts of Kiev and Poltava (Zone 1) 7/1 where the rich and green nature resembles the landscape of Southern England.

[1] That is to say that for a 100 women between twenty and thirty years one meets 23 expectant ones.

7 [see category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563 and the Greeks who competed with the merchant Jews in the great ports, where they formed very united and wealthy autonomous communities which to-day have been repatriated or dispersed.

II

Agriculture

● 241 Fundamentally an agricultural land, the Ukraine is particularly the land of cereals.

The incomparable richness of these lands, her temperate climate, and the aptitude of her population have made this branch of human activity the fundamental wealth of the country.

134 311 With the exception of the forest regions of the north-west, where sandy soil is met, nearly all the lands of the Ukraine are arable and actually only a few tens of thousands of hectares of waste land remain, which serve as natural pasturages and give an excellent hay which is very well suited for horses.

243 About 25,000,000 hectares are sown, of which 20,000,000 are growing cereals.

The abundance of nitrates in the surface layer of the earth, and its capillary structure, perfect for irrigation, allow the cultivation of the most valuable of cereals—[311] wheat. The area that has been sown with this cereal occupies more than 35 per cent of the worked land of the Ukraine and its production rises to 90,000,000 quintals, representing almost 8 per cent of the world harvest and 18 per cent of the European harvest.

The cultivation of wheat seems to develop from year to year at the expense of barley and of rye, cereals of inferior quality.

From the end of the nineteenth century wheat has

249 are known under the name of '*makhorka*.' Fine tobacco is only cultivated in the southern region, near the Crimea, and only in small quantities.

243 As to hops, they are spread over the relatively poor lands of Volynia. Since the end of the nineteenth century this crop has experienced a great development in the Ukraine, which has furnished more than 50 per cent of the hops on the markets of the Russian Empire. This, as is well known, is an indispensable product in the manufacture of beer.

Owing to their utilization in the breweries oats can equally be considered as being not only a direct food crop. This would also apply to a part of the potato harvest (total of 1·2 million hectares), which supplies the most important material for the production of alcohol.

248 The cultivation of cotton which was begun five or six years ago in the extreme south of the Ukraine, between the mouth of the Dnieper and the isthmus of Perekop, is a recent industry. We have little information about its possible future and cannot dwell on it. Actually cotton plantations occupy about 150,000 hectares. The employment of a new variety, called the 'non-irrigated cotton,' seems to give satisfactory results.

241 In all that concerns agriculture, the division into agro-climatic zones seems to be entirely justified.

Actually the northern limit of the cultivation of maize and sunflower corresponds almost entirely to the border between these two zones. On the other hand 95 per cent of the land occupied by sugar-beet is to be found in the southern part of Zone 1.[1] This separation is also not quite so definite for the cultivation of cereals, but nevertheless it exists. The greater amount of wheat is grown in Zone 2.[1] Rye and oats, on the contrary, occupy a greater surface in the north. In the case of the two less important cereals, buckwheat and millet, the separa-

[1] [See category 116, pp. 139-140.---Analyst]

tion is very clear, buckwheat growing in Zone 1 and 241
millet in Zone 2.

The great development of agriculture has created a 392
growing demand for agricultural machinery, which brought about the appearance and the rapid development of this branch of industry, concentrated to-day especially at Kherson, at Zaporojie, and at Kharkov.

Parallel to this a very important industry of food 241
products has developed. These are the great and highly perfected mills, the sugar refineries, the distilleries, the breweries. and the tobacco factories which cover the whole territory of the Ukraine. As auxiliary products of agriculture, apart from vegetables of all kinds, known in Europe, the production of which is difficult to estimate, one can mention the melons, water-melons, cucumbers, and tomatoes, to the cultivation of which important tracts have been given.

The production of fruit and grapes has not experienced 245
so great a development. The surface given to fruit trees (cherries, apples, apricots, and pears) reaches about 250,000 hectares. The most important horticultural centres are to be found in the region of Ouman, on the banks of the Dniester, at the mouth of the Dnieper, and equally in the surroundings of Odessa, which are famous for their peach trees. The town of Ouman has a horticultural school and an experimental station which had already long before the Great War a great agricultural reputation throughout Russia.

The marketable harvest of fruit reached 80,000 tons before the Great War.

The surplus production of fruits and especially of vegetables (tomatoes) have brought about the rise and the rapid development of a food tinning industry which seemed to offer great possibilities in the future.

As to the vineyards (about 60,000 hectares), they are

[See category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

245 found in the extreme south of the Ukraine, on the banks of the Dniester and the Boug (Voznessensk), in the region of Odessa, at the mouth of the Dnieper, and in the region of the rapids near Zaporojie.

Despite the small importance of the vineyards in the agricultural economy of the Ukraine, a great effort has been made by Russia in this sphere. An experimental station for vines has been established near Odessa which has a laboratory for the analysis of the harvests. Highly qualified specialists have made researches there on the growth of native and French varieties for the creation of species adapted to the soil and to the climatic conditions of the Ukrainian vine region.

246 The cultivation of fodder, such as clover and others, are relatively little known in the Ukraine. The lands which are given up to them are almost entirely in the western part of Zone 1,2 which is over-populated and provided with natural pastures. Their surface does not exceed 1,000,000 hectares. In the Ukrainian Steppe only the natural pastures are of importance. (It is to be hoped that the culture of fodder will develop in the Steppe as it is necessary for the rational enrichment of the land.)

241 Before going on to the question of forestry and to breeding, let us say a few words about the state of agriculture in the lately Polish part of the Ukraine.

Being a natural continuation of Zone 1,2 with a poorer soil, this country produces a large proportion of rye, which occupies more than a third of the sown surface.

The other crops are barley, wheat, oats, and potatoes, all of which are used by the native population. The cultivation of sugar-beet is very limited.

246 On the other hand the cultivation of fodder is more extensive in Polish Galicia than in the Soviet part of the

2 [see category 116, pp. 139-140 --- Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

433 241 German economists who foresee a perfect collaboration between the Ukraine and Germany ('Germany and the Ukraine supplement one another economically,' wrote the *Volk und Reich* in 1933) make a great mistake or even deceive the public intentionally in continuing to consider the Ukraine an agricultural land. If one compares the national agricultural revenue of the Ukraine with that of her industry, the first is certainly inferior to the second.

000 If one day the Ukraine should enter into the German economic system, and if Germany were to export the mineral which she lacks from the Ukraine, what would one do with the immense machine factories, and the coal mines which supply the metal industries, and with the quarter of a million workers of that industry? Let us admit that the Ukraine should become independent and that she should become detached from the Russian economic system, and that by this fact she should become hostile to Russia, who would cease to absorb the surplus of her economy, what would happen then?

Russia would, perhaps, create a new Ukraine in her Asiatic possessions. The wealth of the subsoil of Western Siberia is far greater by many times than that of the Ukraine. Metal is also more abundant. The soil of Siberia is more fertile and the possibilities of agricultural development are immense. That is not all. What would the Ukraine do with the surplus of her agricultural population, whose average density is greater than that of Germany, and which could emigrate, to-day, to Siberia and found colonies as it pleases? Is there another country in the world which will accept so great an emigration?

If the Russian Empire, backward though it is supposed to have been, has been able, during hundreds of years, to transform the wild Steppes into an industrial and

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy industries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, 83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia. 185 [433] [465]

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peasants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property was taken into the collective farms (*Communist,* Kharkov, December 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater. 474 241 661 565

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administration, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc. 871 [241]

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

alleviate these conditions various measures have been 425
adopted, such as the easement or complete extinguish- 511
ing of the burden of the purchase-price of the *nadyel*, the prevention of its frequent redistribution, and the founding of the Peasants' Land Bank by the State to facilitate further purchases of land by the communes. Nevertheless, a result not looked for by the framers 565
of the law abolishing serfdom has followed, namely the creation of a large landless agricultural proletariat, which tends to sink in the social scale, to live partly by industry in the towns, and to be migratory in its habits.

The law of 1906 introduced for the first time the 421
general principle of individual and permanent ownership of *nadyel* lands. It aimed at the breaking up of the *mirs* as no longer fulfilling a need, in the expectation that security of tenure by the individual would lead to a more rational and successful system of cultivation. The period since the promulgation of the law is too short to allow of sound conclusions as to its effect.

The *nadyel* lands are almost entirely cultivated 241
on the three-field system, each unit of land being 311
planted one year with a winter-sown grain, the following year with a spring-sown grain, and lying fallow in the third year. This method causes a disastrous impoverishment of the land, especially as in many cases the minimum of manure, whether animal or chemical, is used. An alternative method must be introduced, or the productiveness of the black-soil land under peasant ownership will continue to shrink as heretofore.

The land held by private owners is in general their 425
perpetual freehold, and can be roughly divided into that 563
held by the nobility in large estates and the smaller holdings purchased from them since the abolition of serfdom by prosperous peasants and others desirous of embarking on agriculture on their own account. There are also a number of foreign colonists, chiefly Germans, descendants of those introduced into the country

425 by the Government at various times between the middle of the eighteenth century and 1861, in the hope that their superior methods of agriculture would be copied by other cultivators. This effect, however, was not produced, and the colonists form compact communities with little or no influence on their neighbours. Land in private ownership is usually farmed on more modern [241] and rational principles than the *nadyel* land, and produces almost the entire surplus of cereals which is sent abroad and to other parts of Russia.

421 The land owned by the Church, Crown, and members of the Imperial family is absolute freehold, and is generally well managed and productively farmed.

407 412 Up-to-date agricultural machinery is becoming more common all round. It is of course most in vogue on the large estates, especially in the case of expensive machines involving the use of power; steam-ploughs on the cable system are much in use on the large sugar-beet estates, and tractor ploughs with single engines are becoming numerous. By the help and enterprise of the *zemstvos* the peasants are now beginning to use modern machines and implements. The traditional *sock* or wooden plough, the flail, and other such primitive tools are disappearing, although it is hard to induce the peasant to abandon his old methods.

(c) *Forestry*

137 [311] A large portion of the Ukraine is totally denuded of trees at the present time. The Governments of Podolia and Volhynia, and the northern parts of Kiev and Chernigov, are well wooded, the area covered by forest being about 15 per cent. of the whole. In the remaining provinces the forest area averages 3–4 per cent. of the total. The State controls certain areas north of Kiev on both banks of the Dnieper, and in Volhynia on the south side of the Pripet marshes, as well as smaller scattered tracts in Podolia. In the Government of Yekaterinoslav the State has lately done much

776 appeased, exorcised. When the priest of Velykyi Lypnyk consecrates the water of the village brook on the sixth of January, the people believe that the demons are thus driven away.

326 The men of Valykyi Lypnyk are tinkers, a
221 trade which in many places has a bad flavor. It is easy to say that they travel about the country like gypsies. But even though they wander from village to village, a small bundle of tools on their backs, repairing stoves and mending pots, they are, nevertheless, not homeless. As soon as spring comes, poverty drives them out on the road, and only late in the fall when the first white flakes begin to fall, they return to their wives and children with the few groschen they have saved.

●241 For land is scarce, the clod of earth small, the soil is poor and the climate harsh.* The women work like drudges for their bit of barley bread and potatoes. With their small cows and a wooden plough they till the lower slopes of the mountain ridges. They sow by hand, harrow, and in the fall they cut off the barely ripe ears of grain with a sickle.

186 In their "spare time" these women* with their
291 strangely narrow faces sit barefoot in their full pleated skirts and pale pink blouses, a charming little cap on their heads, at their looms and tirelessly ply their shuttle back and forth between the taut threads, or press wool into felt for the jackets and trousers of their husbands.

342 The rooms of these "tinkers"* are surprisingly large and clean; the kitchen, living room, /10/ bedroom and work room are all in one. The whole structure with adjoining stable and wagon shed is built of wood, the inside unfinished, the outside
[789] covered with loam. In order that there be no lack of magic, carpenters carve three suns into the central roof beam.

184 How rich these "tinkers" of East Slovakia were with their little plot of free earth, their two or three cows, their barley bread and their loom, compared to their brothers in Carpatho-

* [In the village of Valykyi Lypnyk, Western Ukraine -Analyst]

162 five hectares of land, if overpopulation is so great that in 49% of the country there are between 80 and 100 /93/ people and in 51% there are more than 100 persons per square kilometer. (52)

52. Kubiyovich: The Distribution of the Population, page 35.

476 The ideological center of the Ukrainian cooperative system was the "Revised Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives" with its center in Lwów. At the beginning of 1939 it controlled the four departmental provincial centers with a total of 3455 cooperatives and 673,000 members. The four departmental centers were the "Centrobanka" for credit cooperatives (1889 members at the end of 1938, with an annual sale of 70.5 million zloty); the "Centrosoyuz" for the agricultural buying and selling cooperatives, the "Maslosoyuz" for dairy farmers' cooperatives and the "Narodnya Torgovlia" for urban consumer societies. The private capital of the Revised Union amounted to 23 million zloty at the end of 1938, the savings came to over 12 million zloty. The sales receipts of all cooperatives amounted to 159 million zloty.

One is almost tempted to speak of a "Ukrainian autarchy" if one hears how much business the buying and selling cooperatives carried on. Galicia and [241] particularly Podolia with its rich black earth and sheltered valleys is rich in fruit, vegetables, legumes, hemp, grain. Cattle-raising is also [233] intensively carried on, especially in the Carpathian foreland. The peasant brought all these products to the cooperative which was ready to serve him and not to profit by him. The cooperatives maintained collection and sorting centers where the products were turned into "standardized" goods. The same cooperative furnished practically everything a farm household needed: shoes, chicory, sugar, kerosene, headgear, candles, seeds, artificial fertilizer and machines. Much of it

575 first half of 1939 threatened the educational
871 work of the "Ridna Shkola" just as it did that of the women's society, the society of agriculturists, the "Provista" and the cooperatives.

The efforts of the Ukrainians to raise the
871 level of popular education are admirable. When
873 at the beginning of their rule in Galicia the Poles deprived the Ukrainians of their few professorial chairs, the Ukrainians forthwith founded a "Secret University" which gave its lectures during 1922 and 1923 in private houses. At the end of each lecture the professors who were taken partly from universities of East Ukraine, partly from Austrian universities, announced to their listeners the time and place of their next lecture. In the end this "university" collapsed and the lecturers were arrested.

873 Two years after the enactment of the Ukrain-
ian law of autonomy of 1922 a Ukrainian univer-
178 sity was supposed to have been founded - but in the summer of 1939 there was not yet a single Ukrainian professorial chair. In Lwów a Polish professor lectured on Ukrainian literature in the
●241 Polish language, in /Facing page 96/ /Map VII: Agricultural Zones Under Cultivation. In the wooded zones of the north rye, oats and potatoes predominate. In the northern zones of steppes, wheat and sugar beets are added (winter wheat in the west and summer wheat in the east). A third zone on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and in the foreland of the Caucasus produces wheat, corn and barley. Adjoining this toward the west there is a corn-growing zone (with wheat in the north and barley in the south), whereas toward the northeast there is a zone extending to the middle part of the Volga with summer wheat and rye. Around the Caspian Sea is the pasture area of desert steppes, in the mountains, woodland and grasslands with some barley cultivation. The cultivation of cotton which has been recently undertaken along the coasts of the Black Sea and

•241 the Sea of Azov also deserves to be mentioned./ /Key inside map: I Rye, potato and oats region. II Wheat and rye region; sub-zone of rye, wheat, potatoes; sub-zone of rye, winter wheat, sugar beets; sub-zone of summer wheat, rye, sugar beets. III Region of wheat, barley, corn; sub-zone of winter wheat, corn, barley, sunflowers. IV Summer wheat and rye zone; cotton. V Region of corn; sub-region of corn, wheat; sub-region of corn, barley. VI Oats and potato region. VII Forest region. VIII Grassland (pastures, alpine pastures, natural meadows). Area with abundant millet cultivation. Area with abundant buckwheat cultivation. ....Northern boundary of region growing abundant amounts of corn. Intensive horticulture./ /97/ Cracow a Ukrainian
873 professor lectured in Polish on Ukrainian liter-
178 ature, and in Warsaw Polish and Ukrainian professors lectured in Polish on Ukrainian literature and "History of the East" which meant history of the Ukraine under Polish rule. Moreover, study in Lwów was made very difficult for Ukrainian students. Warsaw wanted the Ukrainians to study in Cracow and in the capital of the country, and to have them taken out of the Ukrainian environment and drawn into the Polish one. In this connection a secret numerus clausus proved very useful: the Ukrainians, in contrast to their smarter Polish colleagues often failed.

*

101 How was the situation in Bukovina? This little country of 5000 square kilometers on the northeast slope of the Carpathians in between the three countries, Poland, Soviet Union and Rumania, was, until its transfer to the Habsburg Kingdom in 1776, purely a colonial country of the Sublime Porte. Under Austria it experienced a rapid rise, and its chief city Czernovits (now Chernovtsy) was given the epithet "Vienna of the

11: Obermaier--100A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

•241





MAP VII: Agricultural zones under cultivation, cf. complete Legend, pp. 99-100]

11: Obermaier--100B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

[Map VII: Agricultural zones under cultivation]

/141/ Hunger Overcomes Resistance

178 Bolshevism tore the Ukrainians away from their past and hurled them, as it were, into a dark, unknown future. They were thrown from one extreme into the other, not only with regard to religion, but also in a social, economic and political respect. They were thrown from unlimited individualism into a society where all are supposed to be equal.

When Bolshevik slogans spread through the Ukrainian villages there was a great deal that was
423 ripe for oblivion. Czarist Moscow, the great princes of the Church and the wealthy gentry had exerted themselves precisely to keep the populace in a state of ignorance and to prevent any kind of enlightenment. The masses were thus more tractable and the existing order was not endangered. Nevertheless, with thrift and industry the peasants had succeeded in considerably enlarging their land after serfdom was abolished in 1861, to the detriment of the landed proprietors. In 1861 the
[162] peasants owned 45.7% of 48.1 million hectares, in 1916 they owned 65%. (84) The rest was the property of the lords of the manor, the church and the state.

84. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 360.

423 With the rapid increase in population there
● 241 was a great land shortage, especially in North Ukraine, even after the distribution of land in 1861. Conditions had not improved much since 1830, when the representative of the nobility of the Poltava district reported in the Senate that in his district "there was a perceptible shortage of land and dire poverty". (85) In Podolia,

85. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of South Ukraine, page 32.

423 Volhynia, and in the northern guberniyas more than
241 half the land belonged to large estates before the First World War, and the rest was divided among the small /142/ farmers with many children, who barely earned a laborer's living. Since the small farmers could not live from the yield of their one- to four-hectare fields, they tried to supplement their income by doing other work. They hired themselves out as day laborers to the estates and rented land from the lords of the manor - in the part of the Ukraine on the right bank of the river especially from Jews who, for their part, were tenants on a large scale - for a wickedly high rent.

In the South Ukrainian steppe, which was not settled until late, conditions were different. This steppe occupies about three-sevenths of the surface of present-day Soviet Ukraine. When Catherine II had cleared the steppe of Crimean Tatars and the Caucasian peoples, she sent for foreign colonists, especially Germans to settle the land. The influx of settlers from all sides was so great that in some parts there was a shortage of land even at the beginning of the 19th century, and the descendants of the first settlers were in turn, obliged to emigrate in the middle
241 of the century. But in general there was enough land. Steppe farming which was once pasture farming, underwent a basic transformation. Since grain was well paid, the farmers and estate owners turned the scar of the steppes into arable land; thus what was once rich pastureland became in the end, poor pastureland. In terms of territory, no less than 75 to 90% of the entire soil was arable, so that there was a shortage of feed for the draft animals. People were forced to limit the number of oxen and horses they kept and return to extensive farming, plowing the soil with four light horses and a light plow, rather than with eight heavy oxen and a heavy plow.

241 In the Kuban region the farmers made things particularly easy for themselves. There, around the turn of the century you could see the Cossack riding over the stubble field, not for pleasure, but with a bag of wheat slung around his shoulders, from which he scattered seed between sheer stubbles or even on fallow ground.

A wild grazing culture, the most primitive form of agriculture, in which a field is sown with the same type of seed /143/ until it is exhausted and then is left fallow, was still customary around 1850 in South Ukraine. The next higher stage of agriculture, the three-fallow system, where the soil is alternately cultivated with winter grain followed by summer grain and a year's fallow, has been preserved to this day in Podolia, Polesia and parts of Central Ukraine, in spite of the agrarian revolution. The modern crop rotation system which has long since been introduced in the western and central European countries was not adopted until before the war when it came from Galicia to Volhynia and into Central Ukraine.

The steppe demands its own method of cultivation. Where soil moisture is so slight that clover and potato cultures do not thrive, our crop rotation system is from the start impossible to carry out. Experiments in growing a drought-resistant steppe clover have not yet brought the desired results. Thus for the time being the old method of agriculture is retained in the steppes: winter grain, summer grain (wheat or barley), fallow. Experience has shown that the fallow could be successfully replaced by corn, but the farmers did not want to take up the new culture even at the time of the New Economic Policy, "because of indifference". (86)

86. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of South Ukraine, p. 93.

•241 It is almost unbelievable that in many regions of the steppe the planted surface is not ploughed up, or in any case only superficially with a land-parer. The purpose is to conserve soil moisture. Often the entire sowing, the entire spring work of the farmer consists of a single process. A light land-parer scratches the surface; it has a box attached to it containing the seed, and the harrow is attached to this "ploughing and sowing machine". With this type of sowing one necessarily reaps a lot of weeds.

243 438 Nevertheless, before the war the Ukraine enjoyed the reputation of being a granary. During the years 1909 to 1913 the country produced on an average of 8.6 million more tons of grain annually than it consumed. The annual export amounted to /144/ an average of 4.3 million tons of wheat alone and 2.7 million tons of barley. (87) Surplus and export dropped considerably

87. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 390.

under Bolshevik rule. In 1934 only one million tons of grain were exported.

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425 669 In 1917, when the Bolsheviks became active, the general feeling in North and Central Ukraine was extremely favorable to an agrarian revolution. The land-hungry peasants were deeply convinced of the fact that the "right of the landowner was an injustice". Whoever promised the peasants that they were to receive all the lands they could themselves cultivate, had won them over to his cause. As a matter of fact, in 1917, at the beginning of the revolution, the lands of the estate owners and the large farmers were immediately divided up, in the process of which the estates often went up in flames and

425 669 the cattle were burned. However, the glorious state did not last long. The farmers lacked seed, machines and draft animals in order to cultivate the land they so easily obtained. Besides, the men who came back from the war and the landless village farmers wanted to have a share in the booty. In the guberniyas of Kiyev and Khar'kov the government claimed the forests and the extensive beet fields. Civil wars, drought and epidemics carried off hundreds of thousands of peasant families during the years of the Bolshevist war. Thus ended the first chapter of the agrarian revolution, so eagerly awaited.

423 241 The New Economic Policy with its tolerance of a "bludgeoned private economy" constituted the second chapter. The peasants obtained their land and their farms on long leases; they could cultivate their land as they pleased, except that the farm could not be carelessly run, otherwise the management of the establishment could pass over into other hands. Nothing was gained by the fact that all the land belonged to the community. The "communal fields" were a Russian form of possession which had found favor at the time of Catherine II in the steppes and in the part of the Ukraine on the left bank of the river. Even though the farmer could not dispose of his land 497 at any time like a free /Facing page 144/ /Map IX: Railroad Communications. The main lines of communication run in a north-south direction, whereas the east-west lines have always been neglected./ /Key: Number of daily passenger trains 423 in 1935./ /145/ estate owner, even though he was 241 obliged to acquiesce to the fact that the entire community property was redistributed every 10 to 20 years, nevertheless, he could do as he pleased on his section of land. No less than 88.9% of peasant land in the Ukrainian steppes belonged to the communities, and in North Ukraine, 80.4%. The czars had condoned this form of ownership, because it simplified administration, facilitated

423 tax collection and, finally, also corresponded
241 to the patriarchal order. It was only in the former Polish Ukraine on the right side of the river that purely private ownership was retained. The Bolshevik NEP now very cleverly fastened on to the community field system.

241 With the restoration of peace and order during the NEP years the social life of the peasant country again attained its equilibrium. The families which before that were broken up or dismembered now came together again. At the same time, great efforts were made to raise the productive capacity of the new family farms by means of technical education, and in this the young farmers were particularly eager to join. At that time, a German observer wrote: "In the activity of the youth organizations in the villages we see an expression of the deep longing to be freed at last from 'the power of darkness' and not always to stand apart while the civilized races divide up the treasures of the earth among themselves." (88)

88. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of the South Ukraine, page 69.

423 This hopeful development was abruptly inter-
241 rupted by the subsequent third phase of the agra-
474 rian revolution, the transfer of the individual
185 peasant farm to communal ownership of all village inhabitants. It was only by means of collectivism, the coordination of the farms with the communes in the other economic fields, that the Bolshevik regime could last; it was only in this way that one could strike at the root of Ukrainian nationalism, and only thus carry out the Five Year Plan. For industrial development with the purchase of foreign /146/ machines had to be paid for by exporting agricultural products. All that was needed now was a command, in order to maintain the export of the necessary amounts of grain at the prescribed price.

474 goats and poultry, whereby allowance was made for regional variations. Thus Kuban Cossacks may also keep a horse, and their individual property around the farm can be two hectares in size.

474 233 The census of cattle in 1935 showed that these concessions were necessary. This census showed that livestock in the Soviet Union had been reduced to about one-half from 1928 to 1935. At the same time the minimum during the summer of 1933 had already been overcome, and there was a gradual increase in cattle-raising noticeable. From 1928 to 1935 the number of horses had decreased from 5.5 million to 2.5 million, that of horned cattle from 8.5 to 4.9 million, the number of pigs from 6.9 to 4.8 million, and that of goats and sheep from 9.8 to 1.8 million. Conditions were similar in the Kuban region. (94) The Kolhosp /abbrev. for 'collective farm' in Ukrainian; Kolkhoz in Russian. Editor/ had completely failed

94. Kubiyovich: Atlas of the Ukraine and the Bordering Areas, page 38.

in cattle-raising.

*

•241 What is it that grows in the region of the Soviet Union settled by Ukrainians? Individual cultures have always been subject to considerable fluctuation. During the NEP period the cultivation of wheat receded and rye cultivation increased. The land was extensively farmed, few horses were kept and more sheep. Then came the Bolsheviks and introduced their "rational method of cultivation". That the result of it is not satisfactory was admitted by Stalin at the Eighteenth Congress in March 1939, when he stated that collectivism in the Soviet Union had, it is true, embraced 93.5% of the entire peasantry, but that he could not

241 conceal the fact that the grain harvest of 1938 was only one-sixth larger than that of 1913, whereas the population had increased by nearly 30%.

According to the latest statistics, 80% of the entire arable soil is cultivated, while 20% of it is left fallow. Of the total cultivated surface of all Ukrainian provinces, 76% is planted to grain, 57% of which consists of wheat /151/ and rye, 33% of barley, oats and corn, 10% of millet and buckwheat. Of the entire cultivated area 9% is occupied by industrial plants, chiefly sugar beets and sunflowers, 8% by potatoes, vegetables and legumes, and 7% by fodder. Of the 160 million hectares of land planted to wheat throughout the world in 1933, 12 million hectares fell to the Ukrainian provinces. This gave them third place after the USA with its 17 million hectares and British India with 14.6 million hectares. (95) But the hectare yields in the

95. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas.

Ukrainian provinces are uncommonly low according to German ideas and in view of the excellent soil. They amount to 9.2 doppelzentner /two hundred weights = 100 kilograms = 220.50 lbs./of wheat (Germany: 22 doppelzentner) and 9.2 doppelzentner of rye (Germany: 17.5 doppelzentner). (96) The

96. Deminskij: "The Economy of the Ukraine" in Deutsche Berufserziehung, Number 15 and 16, page 135.

careless method of cultivating the soil, on the one hand, and the insufficient amount of precipitation on the other, are to blame for these low yields.

249 The sunflower is a cultivated plant that is little known in our country. Its region of cultivation begins in eastern Podolia, runs along

I INTRODUCTION

101 The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (the Ukraine) is one of the U.S.S.R.'s sixteen constituent Union Republics. Situated in the south-western corner of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine is bordered on the south by the Black and Azov Seas and the Crimea (part of Russia); its western border touches the frontiers of Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as well as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Towards the north the Ukrainian S.S.R. verges on two other Soviet Republics: Byelorussia and Russia; and it is the Russian neighbourhood of the Don river which forms the Ukraine's eastern border.

101 135 In economic development and in population the Ukraine is second greatest of the Soviet Republics. It has a fertile soil, a mild humid climate, and is rich in deposits of coal, oil, iron, manganese and salts, as well as in building materials. It has four main rivers: the Dnieper (third largest in Europe), the Dniester, the Bug, and the Donets (a tributary of the Don), which are navigable and are also useful reservoirs of power.

433 162 Before 1941 the Ukraine contained more than one-fifth of the inhabitants of the entire Soviet Union. Its industry produced 54 per cent. of the coal, 60 per cent. of the pig iron, 48 per cent. of the steel, and 35 per cent. of the manganese ore turned out in the whole U.S.S.R.; it manufactured railway engines and cars, tractors, turbines, harvester combines, and mining and agricultural machinery for all parts of the Soviet Union. "It also produced artificial fertilizers, soda, glass and cement. The output of the sugar, meat-packing, flour-milling, distilling, and dairy industries reached great dimensions. Fishing was developed in the Black Sea and Azov Sea. The Dnieper Power Station, 361 the largest in Europe, was famous throughout the world. The cities of the Ukraine, both old and new, developed rapidly; during the past 25 years 77 new cities and 285 industrial settlements were built."[1]

241 Agriculture also was highly developed. In 1937-38 Ukrainian farms accounted for nearly one-fifth of the grain, one-sixth of the potatoes, and two-thirds of the sugar beet produced in the Soviet Union. The Ukraine also had a large proportion of the total Soviet Union livestock. Millions of head of cattle, pigs, sheep, and poultry were raised. Ukrainian agriculture was highly mechanized; before the war there were 90,000 tractors and 31,000 harvesting combines operating in the fields.

Area and Population

131 In January 1939 the Ukrainian Republic had an area of about 469,700 square kilometres including 8,000 square kilometres in its

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1 The Sixteen Soviet Republics, Soviet News, London, 1945.

727 by the German invaders in the Ukraine, and more than two million had been abducted to slavery in Germany. Of these so deported, a considerable number perished in captivity[1].

The figure of four million Soviet citizens murdered in the Ukraine does not clearly indicate whether all of them were Ukrainians or whether a certain percentage came from other parts of the Soviet Union. No figures have been revealed showing the number of the Ukrainians killed at the front against the German armies and their 162 satellites. However, a comparison of the pre-war and present elec- 666 torate figures for the Ukraine gives some indication of the decrease, at least of the adult population. On December 12, 1937, the Ukrainian electorate was about 17,540,000; in 1939 this number was increased by the addition of Western Ukraine, which on March 24, 1940, had more than five million voters. But nearly seven years later, in the elections of February 1947, despite the fact that part of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Transcarpathian Ukraine also had been added, the total electorate in the Ukrainian S.S.R. was only 21,545,000.

Damages to Industry and Agriculture

727 The damage which the Germans inflicted on the industry and farming 433 of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics was tremendous, and far exceeded any comparable destruction in Western Europe.

[362] In the Ukraine the Germans destroyed or burned down 714 towns and more than 28,000 hamlets and villages, destroyed more than two million buildings and 540,000 outbuildings, and rendered about 10 million persons homeless (one-fourth of the Ukrainian population)[2].

Agriculture, animal husbandry, and industry were devastated. The coal mines were flooded. Over 16,150 industrial enterprises employing more than two million workers were stripped of machinery and the buildings heavily damaged or destroyed. The Germans wrecked or took away 127,800 electric motors and 81,600 metal-cutting lathes, destroyed railway lines and stations, and post and telegraph offices[2].

727 Tremendous damage was done to Ukrainian agriculture. The Germans 433 ruined and plundered collective farms, state farms and machine and 241 tractor stations.

Millions of hectares of planned fields were destroyed and over 56,000 tractors wrecked. Nearly 1,900,000 agricultural machines and 30,000 automobiles and other motor vehicles were destroyed or taken to Germany[3].

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1 Soviet News, London, June 29, 1946.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

3 Letter to UNRRA from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

727 439 been food supplies, which in many Ukrainian towns constituted the only 648 food to be seen in shops in 1946. For fats and oils particularly the Ukrainian population has been entirely dependent on UNRRA aid.

The U.S.S.R.'s Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

727 648 UNRRA assistance to the Ukraine has been of necessity limited in scope and short-term in nature. Long after relief shipments are ended - and they are now all but complete - the Ukraine will still be working to rebuild its factories, cities, and farms. The main task of rehabilitation is therefore a long-term one, and depends upon long-range measures.

727 185 On March 18, 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted a Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, for the rehabilitation and development of the national economy of the Soviet Union. This plan is the fourth of a series of Five-Year Plans[1] designed to increase the productivity of Soviet farming and industry, and in general to raise the standard of living of the whole population. As stated by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the principal aims of the Five-Year Plan in 1946-50 are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of the country, to recover the pre-war level in industry and agriculture, and then considerably to surpass that level.

[652] The new Five-Year Plan provides that nearly one-third of the capital investments for the entire Soviet Union in 1946-50 (49,500 million roubles out of a total of 250,300)[2] are to be spent on the restoration of the Ukraine. Of this 49,500 million, 5,469 million will be used for works under the Ukrainian Republic's jurisdiction.

361 727 362 In the next five years all the destroyed cities of the Ukraine - particularly Kiev, Kharkov, Chernigov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, Stalino, and Zaporozhie - are to be rebuilt and their municipal services restored. Housing is to be replaced as speedily as possible; in 1946-50, 175,120,000 square feet of state-owned housing are to be built, of which 12.65 million square feet are to be made available by local Soviets. The amount of privately owned housing to be built before 1950 is fixed at 36.3 million square feet.

241 185 Also under the Five-Year Plan Ukrainian agriculture is to be rehabilitated; the crop area for 1950 is planned at 30.5 million hectares. By 1950 the Ukraine is scheduled to be producing about 20 per cent. of the grain harvested in the U.S.S.R. (approximately the same tonnage as in pre-war years); 60 per cent. of the sugar beet (about 6 per cent. more than pre-war); and the potato harvest is fixed for 23 million tons, 1½ millions more than in 1940.

000 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport

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1 First Five-Year Plan, 1929-32; second, 1933-37; third, 1938-42.

2 Estimated at 1945 prices.

II FARMING IN THE UKRAINE: PRE-WAR AND PRESENT

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433 The Ukraine - famous for its mild climate and rich black soil - has always assumed a role of considerable importance in the agricultural production of the Soviet Union. For example in 1937-38 it produced one-fifth of the grain, two-thirds of the sugar-beet, and one-sixth of the potatoes harvested in the whole U.S.S.R. The chief grain crops of the Ukraine are wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize and millet. A considerable amount of sunflower seed is produced for processing into oil; small quantities of linseed and mustard seed are also produced for the same purpose. Other industrial crops, particularly flax, hemp, a little cotton and the rubber-bearing dandelion, "kok-sagyz" (discovered in 1931), were also cultivated extensively in the Ukraine before the war.

The following table shows the area and production of the principal Ukrainian crops in 1928, 1932 and 1937; figures for production in the entire Soviet Union are included for comparison.

TABLE IV

Ukraine: Pre-War Agricultural Production
(area in million hectares, production in million metric tons)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.		Entire Soviet Union
	Area	Production	Production
Wheat			
1928	3.1	3.34	22.11
1932	5.743	5.6	20.31
1937	6.433	10.08	46.86
Other grain			
1928	16.6	10.55	50.73
1932	12.381	9.06	49.48
1937	11.761	12.69	73.43
Sugar beet			
1928	.647	8.42	10.13
1932	1.174	4.28	9.645
1937	.817	14.44	21.86
Cotton			
1928	nil	nil	.824
1932	.181	.03	1.28
1937	.224	.12	2.58
Potatoes			
1928	1.4	10.21	46.38
1932	1.071	7.72	43.07
1937	1.338	11.9	65.63

Source: Compiled from Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1936 and 1939; Sown Areas of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1939,; and Socialist Agriculture, Moscow, 1939.

311 241 Despite a certain reduction in the area under cultivation in the Ukraine, (25,124,900 hectares in 1937 as compared with 26,438,400 in 1932), production rose considerably, reflecting great progress in the [407] mechanization of agriculture. The number of tractors increased from 51,300 in 1932 to 83,900 in 1937. The number of harvesting combines [475] increased in the same period from 4,900 to 26,700. The number of Machine and Tractor Stations grew from 657 to 958. The mechanization of agriculture in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is shown in the following table, which compares the output of energy from draught animals with the energy derived from machines, both in the Ukrainian Republic and in the entire Soviet Union. (It should be noted that, according to Soviet practice, the output of energy is measured in kilowatt hours.)

TABLE V

Output of Energy in Agriculture, 1938
(million kwh)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Total Soviet Union
[407] Energy from machines	4,211	19,304.2
379] Energy from draught cattle	1,662	14,667.5
Total output of energy in agriculture	5,873	33,971.7

Source : Planned Economy XII, Moscow, 1940.

[178] As the table shows, the percentage of mechanization in the Ukraine was greater than in the entire Soviet Union.

Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

311 According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there
425 were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000
723 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The principal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Izmail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

474 Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution
241 of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas
178 from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

475 Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the
407 Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Izmail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

475 In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in
407 June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in
652 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.

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TABLE VI

Transcarpathian Ukraine: Area and Production of Crops in 1937

	Hectares	Average yield in metric tons per hectare	Total production in metric tons
Wheat	31,476	0.7	20,796
Rye	25,679	0.62	13,773
Barley	3,331	0.48	1,396
Oats	30,527	0.45	13,124
Potatoes	46,253	8.72	397,347
Sugar beet	96	23.86	2,291

Source: Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovak Republic, London.

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The Organization of Farming in the U.S.S.R.

It may be well at this point to outline briefly the methods of farm organization which characterize the Soviet Union.

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The Collective Farms (kolkhozes)

The foremost agricultural problems of the Soviet Union have been to increase the area under cultivation, to improve the methods of production, to raise yields per hectare as well as total production, and from this increased production, to ensure that adequate supplies of food reach the towns and factories. The primary means of achieving these aims was the organization of individual peasant farms into collectives (kolkhozes). By 1932, the end of the first Five Year Plan, this transformation was largely completed.

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During the second and third Five Year periods the policy of using the most modern methods of scientific farming in the kolkhozes was continued. Thousands of tractors, threshing machines, combines, mowing machines, binders, and other large machines were produced for use on the collective farms, and were concentrated by the government in Machine and Tractor Stations (M.T.S.), which served the kolkhozes for a legally fixed fee, paid in kind.

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The M.T.S. are now a well-known feature of Soviet farming. They have their own workshops and staffs of mechanics and farm-hands. The average equipment of an M.T.S.[1] before the war was 84 tractors (approximately 15 h.p.), 22 combine harvesters, 14 threshers, and a proportionate number of ploughs, harrows, drills, etc. Each M.T.S. works for a group of kolkhozes, usually about 30, and carries out all the mechanized agricultural work (ploughing, sowing, harvesting, threshing, etc.). Apart from these mechanical services, the M.T.S. gives qualified advice on rotation, technique, financial matters, etc.

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1 What Are Collective Farms, V.A. Karpinski; Lindsay Drummond, London.

SU 474 435 438 472 which the kolkhoz members were permitted to keep[1] were performing this task, furnishing the city markets with meat, dairy products, eggs, poultry, vegetables, fruit, honey, mushrooms, and berries.

SU 474 [442 434] In April 1940, in order to provide a wider incentive for the kolkhoz members to increase their collective production, the system of delivery assessments was radically changed. Whereas the basis for grain deliveries to the government had previously been the amount of land sown or, in the case of meat, milk, eggs and poultry, the size of the herd or flock, the new basis for assessments was the amount of land held by the kolkhoz; and any production above the fixed rates could be retained by the kolkhoz for distribution among the members according to labour days.

U 461 474 241 466 A second decree applying to the Ukraine alone established supplementary pay for increasing the crop yield or productiveness in the raising of livestock. This decree directed the collectives of the Ukraine to assign various sections of the field or garden to work teams, working to produce a fixed quota. If the production did not exceed the quota, the members were paid only by the labour day; but if a team produced above the quota, it received part of the excess as bonus.

SU 423 In 1934 the Soviet Government decided to permit individual members of the kolkhozes to keep private farmsteads within the limits of ¼ to 1 hectare. A year later the code for the kolkhozes (called the "Stalin Code") confirmed these rights. It also secured forever the land held by the kolkhozes:

> "All boundaries formerly separating plots of land belonging to members of co-operatives are herby abolished, and all their holdings are pooled together to be used in common...the land occupied by the kolkhozes (as all land in the U.S.S.R.) is public government property. It is...secured to the kolkhozes for use without time limit, that is in perpetuity, and not subject to buying, selling or leasing to anyone by the co-operative... All agricultural production on kolkhoz land, shall be carried on by the members of the kolkhoz, jointly, co-operatively... Out of the land held in common a small part shall be set aside for the use of each household (for truck gardening, orchards, etc.)... The dimensions...may vary...from ¼ to ½ hectare and in certain regions up to one hectare".

1 [SIC-- ANALYST]

TABLE VIII

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Productivity of Ukrainian Collective Farms in 1938
(expressed in percentage of 1934)

	Area under cultivation	Yield per hectare	Gross output
Grain	88.0	176.0	157
Sugar beet	98.0	164.0	161
Sunflower	89.0	208.0	171
Flax	126.0	140.0	290
Cotton	146.0	671.0	986

Source: J. Shatsenko "Productivity of Work in Collective Farms in the Ukrainian S.S.R." Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940/I.

As the table shows, the area under cultivation of grain, sugar beet, and sunflowers decreased somewhat; however, average yields per hectare and total production were increased by 75 to 100 per cent. This increase in productivity was brought about by improved cultivation methods: the use of selected seeds, chemical fertilizers, more scientific crop rotation and above all, by the greater mechanization of labour. As we have seen, the Ukraine had in 1938 nearly a thousand Machine and Tractor Stations, as compared with 657 in 1932. The effect of mechanization in the collectives is best shown by the fact that whereas in 1932 the M.T.S. cultivated 77.1 per cent. of the arable area of the Ukrainian kolkhozes, by 1937 they were serving 98.8 per cent. of the collectives' entire arable land.

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Since 1938 (the last year in which comprehensive agricultural statistics for the U.S.S.R. were published) there has been little information available about agricultural production in the Soviet Union. The figures which have been made public emerge from press or conference reports, and the information is usually very scanty. The immediate pre-war picture is therefore not clear.

We do have, however, the planned 1941 area of cultivation in the U.S.S.R., as well as the percentage of increase over 1940. From these figures we can estimate the sown areas in 1940, as the following tables show.

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TABLE IX

U.S.S.R.: Planned Area of Principal Crops, 1941

	Planned area 1941 in million hectares	Per cent. increase on 1940
Grain	111.1	0.2
Industrial crops	12.0	1.7
Vegetables, melons, potatoes	11.4	12.9
Fodder crops	22.5	24.3
Total	157.0	3.9

Source: Report of N. Voznesensky, Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. delivered on February 18, 1941, at the Eighteenth All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Using these figures as a basis, we have the following areas for 1940.

TABLE X

U.S.S.R.: Area Sown in 1940
(in million hectares)

Grain	110.9
Industrial crops	11.79
Vegetables, melons, potatoes	10.1
Fodder crops	18.1
Total	150.89

Source: Calculated on the basis of Table IX.

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Although we do not have similar figures for the Ukrainian S.S.R. alone, we do know that in 1940, 612,000 hectares were sown to sunflower, and 764,000 to sugar beet. The harvest of sugar beet amounted to 14.8 million tons (an average of 19.4 tons per hectare). In the same year the harvest of grain was over 28 million tons, and of potatoes, 21.5 million tons.[1]

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1 Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

241 In comparing these figures with 1937 production the increases in the area
433 of the Republic must be borne in mind.

Effects of the War on Ukrainian Farming

727 When the German armies were finally driven out of the Ukraine in
241 1944 they left most of the Republic's farmsteads completely in ruins.
474 So great was the devastation which they wrecked that even today the full extent of it is not definitely known. It has been estimated by Ukrainian officials, however, that the invaders ruined and plundered 27,110[1] of the Ukraine's collective farms and 872[1] of the state farms, burning the buildings and wrecking or stealing the machinery. The Germans also wrecked over 422,000 collective farm buildings and 423,000 privately owned farm buildings[2], scorched and laid waste millions of hectares of farm land, and destroyed 1,300[1] machine and tractor stations. The consequent losses of machinery were enormous. Fifty-six thousand tractors, 24,000 harvester combines, 30,200 trucks and automobiles used in farming and 1,892,000 other agricultural machines were destroyed or stolen by the Germans. The next table shows the losses compared with pre-war numbers.

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1 Statement by Mr. I.S. Senin, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. at a meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers on February 7, 1947, published in Soviet News, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Department of UNRRA Supplies of the Ukrainian Government, Kiev, April 6, 1946.

TABLE XI

Ukraine: War Losses of Farm Machinery

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	Number before the war	Destroyed or wrecked by the Germans
Tractors	over 90,000[1]	56,000[2]
Harvester combines	" 31,000[1]	24,000[2]
Trucks and cars used in agriculture	" 50,000[1]	30,200[3]
Other farm machines	n.a.	1,892,000[3]

1 Source: Mr. Baranovsky, Member of the UNRRA Council for the Ukrainian S.S.R. Speech at the Fourth Session of the UNRRA Council on March 20, 1946, Atlantic City, UNRRA Journal, Volume IV, No.6.

2 Source: Statement of the Soviet Commission on Material Damage Caused by the German-Fascist Invaders, Soviet News, September 18, 1945.

3 Source: Letter to the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine from Mr. V.V. Khomyak, Chief, Ukrainian Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

In addition to the spoilage of buildings, machinery and land, the Germans seized, slaughtered, or drove away millions of farm animals, and stole from the collective farms or from private citizens of the Ukraine over 12 million tons of farm produce, including 9.5 million tons of grain and flour[1].

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In the period immediately after liberation agriculture was slowly restarted, almost entirely by hand and in the most adverse conditions. Transport was highly disorganized and at the same time had to carry military traffic. On the heels of the victorious Soviet army the evacuated collective farmers were returning with their few animals to their wrecked farms. The flocks and herds were decimated or non-existent. Everywhere there were tremendous shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, machinery and manpower to do the work. In most districts in 1945 only 50 to 60 per cent. of the pre-war area could be sown. Many of the crops were sown late because of difficulty in cultivating the land; and when harvesting time came, much of the reaping and threshing had to be done by hand. Average yields of all crops were very low.

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1 Department of UNRRA Supplies of the Ukrainian Government, Kiev, April 6, 1946.

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Nevertheless, the 1945 harvest - assisted by lend-lease supplies which were still then available, and (beginning in December 1945) by UNRRA relief deliveries - was furnishing the population a fair amount of cereals and bread. There was, however, very little meat from domestic sources, and only a small amount of fats and oils, as the following table shows.

TABLE XII

Ukraine: Production and Utilization of Fats and Oils, 1945.
(thousand metric tons)

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Oilseeds		
Production		
Total production of oilseeds		496.4
Deduction for seed		53.6
Available for processing		442.8
Utilization		
[388] Total production of oil		105.8
Deduction for industrial use (soap manufacture, etc.)		26.7
Available for human consumption		
by urban population	29.0	
by rural population	50.0	
Total		79.1
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
urban population		2.41
rural population		1.86
Average		1.98

433 As the table shows, the Ukrainian people received in 1945 only 4
262 to 5 kilograms of fats - 8 to 18 kilograms less than their pre-war
388 annual consumption rate.

Disaster in 1946

433 Early in 1946 other UNRRA supplies in addition to food began to
241 arrive - seeds, small quantities of fertilizers, and a few farm tools.
648 Throughout the Ukraine great efforts were being made for a successful spring sowing. However, there were still shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, and machinery. None of the 1,600 tractors promised by UNRRA had arrived. Much of the work was still being done by hand, especially where no draught animals were available.

[311] Even despite these drawbacks, it is estimated that about 80 per cent. of the pre-war area was sown; but no figures are available on the acreage planted to individual crops. In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission, describing the difficulties in getting detailed agricultural statistics, stated:

> "....During a recent inspection trip we were informed by the agricultural authorities of the Poltava oblast,[1] one of the best agricultural regions in the Ukraine, that they did not even try to set production goals for their collective farms this year (1946); they simply told each farm to plant as much as possible of whatever crops it could raise with the seed, equipment, draught animals, and manpower available. (For example) We believe that nobody really knows with any degree of accuracy what acreage was planted to oil seeds in the Ukraine this year, what yield may be expected, or how much of the resulting oil will be available for non-farm use."

433 The Ukrainian people set high hopes on the 1946 harvest. However,
241 in the very summer when a good crop would have made all the difference,
648 the greatest drought since 1891 destroyed their prospects. It affected a vast area from Moldavia to the Urals, south to the Kuban and north to Moscow. The earth was parched; and the crops, burnt by the hot summer sun, had little to draw upon because rain and snowfall in the winter of 1945-46 had been poor. Hopes withered with the wheat. The potato crop too was affected: a hot wind out of Asia dried the plants, and dwarfed the tubers.

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1 Oblast: a district similar, for administrative purposes, to a county.

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433 During all this time the livestock of the Ukraine (see next
231 Section), was being slowly and laboriously built up by gifts from the
262 rest of the Union, by levies on Germany, and by natural increase.
731 Meat was very scarce, since no-one was willing to slaughter and further deplete the slender herds. Cows, used for draught purposes, gave little milk. Now added to these intense shortages of meat, fat and dairy products was another great deficiency of cereals and bread, hitherto the mainstay of the Ukrainian post-war diet.

U
241 The 1946 harvest cannot, at the most optimistic estimate, be
433 reckoned at more than 40 per cent. of 1940 in cereals and vegetables
231 per hectare sown.[1] There is no fodder for the jealously guarded animals; shelter for them is also very scarce since the people themselves are only now moving out of dugouts. If the animals are slaughtered, the small supplies of dairy products and meat will soon disappear; and the problem of draught power will remain as acute as ever.

U
241 There is an agricultural dilemma in the Ukraine which a good
433 harvest would have gone far to break. Although extensive and con-
464 tinued demobilizations have been taking place, there is a great shortage of labour on the farms.[2] If manpower is taken from the farms to help produce the machinery necessary to liberate further men from the land, there may not be enough farm workers left to produce sufficient food for the factory workers. The poor harvest has aggravated this vicious circle.

The Soviet Government has attempted in various ways to meet this problem not only in the Ukraine, but throughout the Union. Everyone who is able to work does so; young people, old people, women. The
U women who worked during the war have remained part of the labour force in both industry and agriculture, and an increasing number are being
[462] recruited. In the Ukraine in 1946, women composed at least 60 - 70 per cent. of the farm working force.

SU
[464 At the same time as steps are being taken to concentrate more
341 workers in agriculture, the organization of the collective farms is
474 being overhauled and geared to higher efficiency. To accomplish this,
647 the Soviet Council of Ministers created on September 19, 1946, a Collective Farm Council, whose main tasks will be to elaborate measures for the improvement of collective farming. This Council which is authorized to call conferences of collective farm representatives when necessary, was set up for the purpose of "establishing strict control over the observation of collective farm statutes and for the solution
0 of questions of the collective farm structure." One of their primary

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1 One must also bear in mind the reduced area under cultivation.

2 The war losses are felt very acutely.

The Five-Year Plan in Ukrainian Agriculture

185 311 474 According to the Five-Year Plan 1946-50 the crop area of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is to reach 30.5 million hectares, of which 21.3 million are to be planted on the collective farms. The distribution of major crops is planned as follows.

TABLE XIII

Ukraine: Crop Area in 1950 (Planned)
(hectares)

	Total area	Including on the collective farms
Grain crops	19,600,000	14,100,000
Industrial crops	2,600,000	2,200,000
Melons, potatoes, and other vegetables	2,800,000	1,000,000
Fodder crops	5,400,000	4,000,000

Source: The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

The area sown to sugar beet in 1950 is fixed at 830,000 hectares, and to sunflower, 801,000 hectares. The hopfields are to be rehabilitated, and the area of vineyards growing European varieties of grapes is to be expanded. Measures are to be taken to drain 40,000 hectares and irrigate 30,000 hectares of farm land; and all engineering work needed to ensure normal production is to be restored.

241 433 185 Average yields of Ukrainian crops in 1950 are envisaged as follows: grain, 1.42 tons per hectare (compare 1939 average 1.36); flax, 0.42 tons; sugar beet, 19 tons; and potatoes, 11.2 tons per hectare.[1]

In the entire Soviet Union in 1950 the grain harvest is planned at 127 million tons, of which the Ukraine is to produce 27.8 million tons, or more than one-fifth. The Ukraine's sugar beet harvest is fixed at 15.7 million tons, representing over 60 per cent. of the sugar beet harvest of the U.S.S.R. in 1950. The production of potatoes is expected to be 23 million tons.

The following table compares these targets with pre-war production.

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1 Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

TABLE XIV

185 Ukraine: Planned Production in 1950 Compared with 1940 and 1913 (see Note)
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(million metric tons)

	1913	1940	1950
Grain	20	28	27.8
Sugar beet	8.9	14.8	15.7
Potatoes	about 5[1]	21.5	23

1 According to the report in Pravda, the potato harvest in 1940 was "over 4 times" that of 1913.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

[728] Note: In comparing the 1950 target figures with pre-war production it is important to bear in mind the territorial revisions which occurred in the Ukraine after 1939, when she regained Western Ukraine and part of Bessarabia, lost a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic (which, together with the Moldavian Section of Bessarabia, then became a separate Union Republic), and added Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathian Ukraine.

[131] Thus the present area of the Ukraine exceeds its 1938 area by
311 approximately 118,000 kilometres (11,800,000 hectares). However,
728 we do not know precisely how much of this is agricultural land. The arable land in Western Ukraine before the war amounted to 4 million hectares; that of Transcarpathian Ukraine, to 239,000 hectares. In the parts of Bessarabia and Bukovina which were ceded to the Soviet Union, 3,285,800 hectares were classified as arable. If we roughly divide this between Moldavia and the Ukraine in proportion to the total ex-Rumanian area incorporated in each, about 1,300,000 hectares of agricultural land would have been added to the Ukraine in its share of Bessarabia; and the arable area of present-day Ukraine would exceed the 1937 cultivated area by about 5½ million hectares, the potential total being 30.6 million. The fact that the Five-Year Plan fixes the Ukraine's 1950 area of cultivation at 30.5 million hectares seems to support this assumption.

Livestock

231 In 1941 the number of livestock in the Ukraine was estimated at 30.4 million, including 10.5 million cattle and 4.6 million horses.[1]

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1 Statement on March 20, 1946, by Mr. Baranovsky, Ukrainian delegate to the UNRRA Fourth Council Session, published in the "UNRRA Journal", March 21, 1946.

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433 supplies had been shipped to the Ukraine; remaining "protocol" ship-
648 ments to the Ukraine are expected to amount to 923 tons and 784,617 dollars.

Included in these supplies are power stations, pumps, portable cranes, presses, electric locomotives, and electrical and telephone equipment.

Agricultural Supplies

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241 The greater part of the tonnage in agricultural supplies consisted of seeds; by January 31, 1947, 15,669 gross long tons had been shipped.
648 Most of these seeds had arrived in the spring of 1946; however, some of the bags were inadequately labelled, and the contents not easily identifiable. Because of this difficulty the seeds had to be given costly and time-consuming laboratory tests, which delayed distribution. At the same time, 2,600 tons of seeds were reported by the Ukrainian Government to be either diseased or infested with weeds, and therefore unfit for sowing. Negotiations are still in process for the replacement of these defective seeds by suitable types.

[407] As at the end of 1946 the amount of farm machinery which had arrived was small. For example, the UNRRA programme calls for the delivery of 1,600 tractors to the Ukraine, but only 310 had been received by December 31, and these came too late for autumn ploughing. They are being distributed to state owned Machine Tractor Stations for use this spring.

UNRRA shipments have also included 6,692 tons of bagging, 2,090 tons of fishing equipment, and 244 tons of dairy equipment. These are shown in the following table, which summarizes agricultural rehabilitation shipments to the end of January.

TABLE XXIV

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Agricultural Supplies up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Bagging	1,672	6,692
Farm machinery	1,517	2,941
Fishing equipment	651	2,090
Food processing equipment	551	1,122
Repair material and hand tools		312
Seeds	9,861	15,669
Dairy and poultry equipment	151	244
Totals	14,403	29,070

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington

291 In addition to these items, UNRRA has delivered several thousand
73, tons of used clothing and footwear contributed through voluntary
relief organizations in other countries. Most of the contributed
648 supplies are distributed to war invalids or to orphans of the war.

The thousands of pairs of shoes delivered by UNRRA, as well as shoes made in the Ukraine from UNRRA leather, are sold according to a rationing system, with miners and heavy industry workers receiving highest priority. Textiles (also rationed) are sold as piece goods, or are made into garments in Ukrainian workshops for sale to permit holders. UNRRA blankets and comforters are distributed chiefly to hospitals and childrens' homes; and hides and other materials furnished by UNRRA are used in the construction of orthopædic footwear or artificial limbs for wounded veterans.

Food Supplies

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241 When the UNRRA Mission first arrived in the Ukraine, no data
were available on the republic's exact food situation. The 1945
733 crops sown in a reduced area, under great difficulties of seed,
262 fertilizer, and implement shortages, had yielded only a fraction of
pre-war harvests. It was expected, however, that Ukrainian farms
would produce enough grain to supply the population with bread and
cereals until the 1946-47 harvest. UNRRA food supplies were therefore calculated to provide chiefly meats, fats (or equivalents in the form of army rations), and dairy products.

731
262 Altogether, UNRRA planned to use 100 million dollars of the
648 Ukrainian budget for food. By the end of January 1947, all but
5½ million dollars of this had been shipped, as is shown in the following table.

TABLE XXVI

UNRRA Food Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Grain and grain products	548	3,836
Meat and meat products	30,682	54,245
Fish	4,166	23,240
Dairy products	13,378	33,134
Fats, oils, soap	12,725	41,885
Pulses	615	4,658
Beverages	1,490	3,437
Soup- dehydrated	2,835	9,392
Quartermaster food	27,134	109,055
Other food	206	548
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture surpluses	608	3,639
Totals	94,587	287,519

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

731 262 [443 265] Most of the UNRRA food supplies delivered to the Ukraine are distributed to ration stores for sale to workers and their dependants. A large proportion (about 35 per cent.) also goes for communal feeding through dining rooms, health resorts, homes for invalids and the aged, and dining halls of trade schools. Hospitals, childrens' homes, maternity homes, and the like also receive a share (around 10 per cent.) (The food distributed to welfare organizations is delivered free of charge).

731 262 434 Apart from the food which UNRRA supplies, the Ukrainian people are dependent on whatever amounts of local produce may appear on various markets. According to the rationing system, the farmers are allowed to retain part of their produce to feed themselves and their dependants, and the farm's livestock; the state then purchases a certain quota for use in feeding the non-farm population. If any surplus then remains, the farmers may keep it, or sell it on the free market at uncontrolled prices.

241 433 434 In practice, however, because of the extremely poor harvests in the last two years, Ukrainian farmers have scarcely been able to feed even themselves; and the amounts of domestically produced food which reach the ration stores or the free market have consequently been small.

The following section describes the sources of food supply open to the urban consumers.

The System of Food Distribution

443 434 364 262 In the cities of the Ukraine there are three outlets through which foodstuffs reach the population:

(a) the ration stores, where the bulk of foodstuffs are sold at fixed prices to ration-coupon holders;

(b) the so-called gastronoms (commercial stores) where scarce, luxury items are sold; and

(c) the public markets, where collective farmers and peasants bring their surplus produce for sale.

Most of the rural areas and villages of the Ukraine are expected to produce locally enough food to feed the inhabitants; and as they are nearly all considered to be self-supplying, they receive through the central distribution system only sugar and sometimes bread. Their surplus farm produce (that is, food in excess of that needed for feeding people or livestock on the farm and not subject to collection or purchase by the state) is usually brought by the farmers to the public markets for sale to the urban population. [435 The quantities of produce and the variety of items available in the free public markets vary greatly from season to season and from day to day; Prices are equally variable.

645 744 262 (a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

241 727 The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

731 649 262 UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-
Ruthenians

Shepherds blow huge horns to round up their sheep by night

511 In the narrow valleys and on their slopes are cottages and straggling
464 villages where the Ruthenian uplanders live. Nearly, all the huts are
made of wood and are flanked by gardens with patches of sunflowers.
241 In the higher altitudes the land consists mainly of meadows, and such
311 meagre fields as there are yield scanty crops of oats, potatoes or hemp—
not sufficient to live on. No wonder that during the summer months it
is chiefly women and children who can be found at home; the menfolk
either fell trees in the forest or earn their living as seasonal labourers
in the towns and villages of the more prosperous South.

101 These lonely mountains and forests breed a people with a distinct
162 character of their own. Living as they do in seclusion, they not only
differ from their Slovak neighbours but show distinct regional differences

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hun-
241 garians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent
438 vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here
341 imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

in agriculture (fertilizers) and in other branches of the economy. There are several superphosphate plants on the right bank, a large soda industry in the Artemovsk-Lisichansk area in the north of the Donets Basin, based on local salt deposits, chemical plants tied closely to the coking and the metallurgical establishments, and sulphuric acid and fertilizer plants connected with the metallurgy of zinc.

In addition to zinc, which is imported into the Donets Basin, nonferrous metallurgy includes that of aluminum, which is also imported and worked at Zaporozh'ye on the basis of *Dneproges* power, and of mercury, mined near Nikitovka in the Donbas.

The petroleum and natural-gas industry is of only local importance and is intended to supply the Ukraine with its gas and liquid fuel needs. The oil fields lie in the foothills of the Carpathians, near Borislav and Drogobych. During the current Plan, a natural gas pipe line was laid from Dashava (in the oil fields) to Kiev. The Ukraine also imports petroleum from Baku via the ports of Osipenko and Odessa, and the station of Trudovaya (Donbas) is the terminus of a kerosene pipe line from the Groznyy fields.

The textile industry (wool, cotton, and linen milling) supplies only local needs. The food industry, on the other hand, is of national importance. This is true especially of the sugar-refining industry, located mainly in the Vinnitsa and Kiev oblasts, on the right bank, and in the Poltava and Kiev oblasts, on the left bank.

The agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR, less important than heavy industry with respect to the value of production, occupies, nonetheless, a major position in the economy of the USSR. Arable land occupies 60 percent of the total area. Prior to the Second World War the Ukraine was one of the regions best equipped with machine-tractor stations and agricultural machinery. Among the cereals, winter wheat in the west, spring wheat in the east, and barley are most important. The sugar beet is by far the major industrial crop; sunflower, cotton, and tobacco are grown to a lesser extent. Orchard farming is popular and produces melons and pumpkins, garden fruits (apples, pears, plums, and cherries), and in the south, apricots and grapes. Horses, cattle, and pigs are raised throughout the region.

The right-bank Poles'ye is least developed agriculturally. Marshes and forests occupy most of the area. In the isolated patches of moist arable land, potatoes, buckwheat, flax, and hemp are the chief crops. The area abounds, however, in pasture land, and dairy farming is

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Ukraine RD1

SK 311 241 U 311 241

strongly developed. In the left-bank Poles'ye, land has long been cultivated and drained. There are occasional marshy and forested sections, mainly between the Dnieper and the Desna. The chief crops are hemp, tobacco, buckwheat, and leguminous plants. Orchard farming is important. The right-bank wooded steppe is the principal agricultural region of the Ukraine. It combines fertile black earth with a warm and moist climate, and the ready availability of phosphate fertilizer. The sugar beet is predominant and closely linked with the sugar industry. Among the cereals, rye, winter wheat, and oats are most important; potatoes and leguminous crops are also grown. The by-products of sugar refining and fodder crops support large livestock herds raised for dairy products and meat. The growing of fruit is of national importance. Vineyards lie in protected valleys near the Dniester River. The left-bank wooded steppe grows crops similar to those of the right bank. Sugar beets decrease toward the east and are gradually replaced by sunflowers. Similarly, winter wheat gradually makes way for spring wheat. In the southern steppes, where a drier climate prevails, wheat is the most important crop. Rye, corn, and barley are also grown, the latter mainly in the very dry districts. Along the Sea of Azov and westward to the lower Dnieper cotton has been introduced in recent years and is grown without irrigation. Ukrainian cotton is of rather poor quality and produces little fiber. Melons are grown to a great extent, and there are vineyards along the Sea of Azov coast and around Odessa. In the Carpathian realm, the northern foothills abound in wheat and sugar beets. Up-slope dairy farming is important. Agriculture is poorly developed in the Transcarpathian Ukraine. Large areas are covered by forests and pasture land. In the vicinity of the large metropolitan centers, such as Kiev, Khar'kov, L'vov, as well as in the densely inhabited sections of the Donbas, around Krivoy Rog, and along the Dnieper, truck produce and dairy farming are most important.

SK 496 U 496

The intensely developed economy of the Ukraine requires a correspondingly well-developed transportation network. In view of the shallowness of most of the Ukrainian rivers, the railroads bear most of the load. The Ukraine has the densest rail network of the USSR, the chief centers being at L'vov, Kiev, and Khar'kov. Among recently completed lines and spurs, the direct Donbas-Moscow trunk is of the greatest significance. Only since 1932, when the construction of the *Dneproges* dam was completed and an artificial lake was created at the site of the rapids (a former obstacle to navigation), has the Dnieper become the

SK 504 U 504

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
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major navigable through route of the Ukraine. The major ports are Zhdanov and Osipenko on the Sea of Azov, and Kherson, Nikolayev, and Odessa on the Black Sea. Odessa is one of the major maritime trade centers of the USSR.

The Ukraine exports coal, iron and steel, grain, salt, and sugar, and imports cloth from Moscow and Ivanovo, precision tools from Moscow and Leningrad, lumber from Gor'kiy Oblast, along the Volga, or from the Belorussian SSR along the Dnieper, petroleum products from Groznyy (by rail and pipe line) and from Baku (by sea via Batumi-Odessa), and fish from the Lower Volga.

Oblast Survey

The twenty-five oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR can be grouped into seven geographic regions on the basis of physical, economic, and historical factors: the right-bank and the left-bank sections of the wooded steppe, the Donets Basin, the Dnieper bend, the Black Sea lowland, the Ukrainian Poles'ye, and the Western Ukraine.

THE RIGHT-BANK WOODED STEPPE

The right-bank wooded steppe, which is the original settlement area of the Ukrainian people, includes the oblasts of Kamenets-Podol'skiy, Vinnitsa, and Kiev. Its fertile black-earth soils and the warm, humid climate have combined to turn the area into a region of intensive agriculture, a dense population, and a well-developed rail network. Sugar beets are the leading crop. Through careful tilling of the soil, the application of phosphate fertilizer, and the rotation with grains and forage grasses, high yields are obtained which furnish up to three tons of sugar per 2.5 acres. The principal grains are winter wheat, rye, barley, and oats. Leguminous crops (peas, lentils, beans) are extensively grown to restore soil fertility. In connection with the intensive crop cultivation, the raising of hogs and cattle for meat and milk production is also very important. Forage grasses and the by-products of the sugar-refining and associated distilling industries constitute an excellent feed supply. Also connected with the sugar economy of the area are the lignite and peat industries, which fuel the processing plants, the quarrying of limestone (used in the sugar-bleaching process), and the mining of phosphorite, which is converted into fertilizer.

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Ukraine RD1

Kiev Oblast

Area, 15,900, population, 3,500,000

Kiev Oblast lies in the Dnieper lowland (in the north) and in the Volyn'-Podolian upland (in the south). It is drained by the Dnieper and its right affluents, the Teterev and the Ros' rivers. In the northern section, which penetrates into the forested Poles'ye, the growing of flax, potatoes, and buckwheat are important. The rest of the oblast falls within the sugar economy. Truck produce in the Kiev metropolitan area and orchards in the south, near Uman', and the southeast, near Smela, are important. Peat is worked mainly northwest of Kiev and near Smela, while lignite comes from Yurkovka near Zvenigorodka. Sugar mills abound throughout the center and the south; flour milling and distilling are other rural industries.

Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR since 1934, was the third largest city of the USSR on the eve of the Second World War. Situated on the middle course of the Dnieper River, below the mouths of its two large affluents, the Pripet and the Desna, Kiev occupies a central location at the junction of the river, four rail trunk lines, and many highways. An ancient city and until the middle 13th century the capital of Kievan Russia, Kiev is the site of many historical relics and monuments. An early commercial and food-processing center, it developed into an industrial point of first rank under the Soviet regime. Its heavy industries produce machine tools, machines, motors, aircraft parts, boilers, agricultural implements, motorcycles, and bicycles, as well as equipment for chemical, sugar, and tanning industries. There are electrical (radios and telephones), textile, and food industries. A number of major enterprises, including lumber mills, a meat-packing plant, a rubber-goods factory, and railway-car works are located in the left-bank industrial suburb of Darnitsa. Shipyards produce vessels for the Dnieper River traffic. A natural-gas pipe line for industrial and domestic use was laid in the post-war period from Dashava.

Other major industrial centers of the oblast are Belaya Tserkov', south of Kiev, Uman' in the far south, and Smela and Cherkassy on the Dnieper in the southeast. They are primarily food-processing centers, with sugar and flour mills and metal, clothing, and leather industries.

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Vinnitsa Oblast

Area, 10,600, population, 2,300,000

Vinnitsa Oblast lies in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, bounded in the southwest by the Dniester River and drained by the Southern Bug River. In addition to the basic sugar-beet and wheat crops, fruits, tobacco, and corn are raised near the Dniester River. Viticulture is possible in the deep, protected valleys of the southwest. The oblast is one of the foremost sugar producers of the Ukraine.

Vinnitsa, on the Southern Bug, has an industry closely connected with the agricultural economy. It processes the local products (sugar, flour, meat, alcohol) and has machine repair shops and a superphosphate plant.

Mogilev-Podol'skiy, on the Dniester in the south, has food-canning, lumber, and metalworking industries.

Kamenets-Podol'skiy Oblast

Area, 8,000, population, 1,800,000

Kamenets-Podol'skiy Oblast is also located in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, north of the Dniester River. It lies at the western end of the sugar region and also engages in the raising of fruits, tobacco, and corn near the Dniester River. Phosphorite and peat deposits are worked. In the northern forest belt, lumbering, paper milling, and ceramics are the chief occupations.

Proskurov, the capital, is a rail center on the upper Southern Bug River. It has food industries (flour milling and sugar refining), machine shops, and clothing and furniture plants.

Other industrial points are Kamenets-Podol'skiy near the Dniester, with fruit canneries, meat-packing and clothing industries, and Shepetovka, a rail center in the forest area, with sawmills, and meat-packing and railroad shops.

THE LEFT-BANK WOODED STEPPE

THE LEFT-BANK WOODED STEPPE includes the oblasts of Poltava, Sumy, and Khar'kov and represents a transition region between the right-bank Ukraine in the west and the Central Black-Earth Region of the Russian SFSR in the east. Although sugar beets continue to form a major crop, the emphasis is placed to a greater extent on grain crops, among which winter and spring wheat are most important. Potatoes and

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

SU 133* 241 U 133 tobacco, in the north, and sunflowers and melons, in the south, are also raised. Hog raising forms the basis of a major meat-packing industry. Machinery industries are located chiefly in Khar'kov.

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Khar'kov Oblast

Area, 12,000, population, 2,500,000

SU 133* 241 438* U 133 241 438 Khar'kov Oblast lies in the southwestern outspurs of the Central Russian upland and is drained by the Northern Donets and the upper Orel' and the lower Oskol rivers. Sugar beets predominate in the north, wheat and sunflowers in the south, and truck produce and orchards in the Khar'kov metropolitan area. Rural industry is based chiefly on the processing of the agricultural products and engages in sugar refining, flour milling, sunflower-oil extraction, distilling, and dairying. The oblast possesses a good rail network on the route from the Donets Basin to Moscow.

SU 438* U 438 Khar'kov, the capital of the Ukraine until 1934, is its second city and its foremost machine-construction center. Situated at the junction of six rail lines at the gates to the Donets Basin and Krivoy Rog industrial areas, it dates from the seventeenth century and developed rapidly after the industrialization of the southern Ukraine in the late nineteenth century. Its impressive array of products includes tractors, turbine generators, coal-mining and oil-drilling equipment, electrical goods, diesel motors, ball bearings, machine tools, harvester combines, locomotives, and bicycles. It also has light and food industries.

Izyum, on the Northern Donets, southeast of Khar'kov, has metalworking, ceramic, and sawmilling industries.

Kupyansk, a major rail center east of Khar'kov, engages in machine construction, metalworking, and lumber and sugar milling.

Poltava Oblast

Area, 13,200, population, 2,200,000

SU 133* 241 U 133 241 Poltava Oblast, in the Dnieper lowland, is bounded on the southwest by the Dnieper River and drained by its left affluents, the Sula, the Psel, and the Vorskla. It grows chiefly sugar beets and wheat, as well as other grains, hemp, mint, sunflowers, and corn. Sugar refining and flour milling are the main rural industries.

SU 438* U 438 Poltava, a four-way rail junction on the Vorskla River, is a processing center for a rich sugar and wheat region. It has locomotive repair shops, flour mills, meat-packing plants, and oil presses. Just northeast is the

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
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site of the battle of Poltava (1709), which marked the decisive defeat of the Swedes under Charles XII by Peter the Great.

Kremenchug, a lumber- and grain-trading point on the Dnieper, has light and food industries and produces road-construction machines. Its right-bank suburb, Kryukov, has large railway-car works.

Sumy Oblast

Area, 9,400, population, 1,700,000

Sumy Oblast, lies in the western outliers of the Central Russian upland and is drained by the upper Vorskla, the Psel, the Sula, and the Seym rivers. Basic crop combinations are sugar beets and wheat in the south, and hemp and wheat in the north. Also grown in the north are potatoes and buckwheat; in the south, tobacco and mint. Sugar refining, flour milling, and hemp retting are the chief industries. An oil field is under development near Romny.

Sumy is a sugar-refining center on the Psel River; it produces also agricultural machines, chemical fertilizer, and woolens.

Other industrial cities are Konotop, a rail junction with machine shops and food industries, and Shostka, which produces chemicals and photographic film.

DONETS BASIN

The Donets Basin, which includes the oblasts of Voroshilovgrad and Stalino, is the most heavily industrialized section of the Ukraine and one of the principal industrial bases of the USSR. The impressive industrial development of the district is the result of the combination of local coal production and the iron-ore imports from the Krivoy Rog area, which forms the basis of the large-scale metallurgical industry. Nearly all the major mills concentrated in the Donbas pass through a full cycle of metallurgical production; they had a prewar capacity of 6 million tons of pig iron, 5½ million tons of ingot steel, and 3 million tons of rolled metal. The coking process, which is essential for the iron and steel industry, also feeds the basic chemical industries producing nitrate fertilizer and other chemicals. The use of iron and steel products in the heavy-machine industry completes the industrial scheme of the region. Associated with these principal activities are the quarrying of building and flux materials (dolomite, limestone, refractory clays, and cement rock), the mining of salt, mercury, and lead-zinc ores, as well as large

either at the sources of raw materials (Krivoy Rog, Nikopol') or on the Dnieper River (Dneprodzerzhinsk, Dnepropetrovsk, and Zaporozh'ye). Agricultural production emphasizes wheat, barley, sunflowers, southern hemp, and soy beans. On the basis of the local grain production and grain brought along the Dnieper, a large flour-milling industry has developed.

Dnepropetrovsk Oblast

Area, 12,600, population, 2,200,000

Dnepropetrovsk Oblast extends from the Dnieper Bend to the Donets Basin and is divided into two equal sections by the course of the Dnieper River. Grains and sunflowers are the basic crops, with some hemp in the northeast and cotton in the southwest. The major rural industries are flour milling, meat packing, and dairying.

Dnepropetrovsk, on the Dnieper River, is a major industrial and transportation center formerly called Yekaterinoslav. It has large metallurgical works, pipe rolling mills, rail and sheet-metal mills, and steel-construction works. An automobile plant is to be established during the post-war Five-Year Plan. The city has clothing, leather, and food industries and is an important lumber-trade center.

Dneprodzerzhinsk, on the Dnieper, west of Dnepropetrovsk, has metallurgical and chemical works, producing rolled steel products, coke, and nitrate fertilizer, plastics, and cement. Metal construction and railway-car building are other important activities.

Krivoy Rog, the center of a rich iron-ore region, distinguished by reserves of more than one million tons and a high metal content (70 percent), has metallurgical works and iron foundries.

Nikopol', the center of one of the main manganese areas of the USSR, has concentrating plants, shipyards, and one of the largest pipe-rolling mills of the Union. The manganese mining areas lie northeast of Nikopol' in the district of Marganets [manganese] and in the northwest, near Ordzhonikidze.

Lesser industrial centers are Novo-Moskovsk, with sheet-metal mills, and Pavlograd, a pulp-milling and furniture city.

Zaporozh'ye Oblast

Area, 10,400, population, 1,300,000

Zaporozh'ye Oblast extends from the Dnieper River to the Sea of Azov. Agricultural emphasis is on wheat in the north and on cotton

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SU 241 U ●241

in the southern flat steppes. Other crops include castor beans, vineyards (near Osipenko), and fruits near Melitopol' and Kamenka-Dneprovskaya.

SU 376 U 376

Zaporozh'ye (the former Aleksandrovsk) is a major industrial and hydroelectric-power center, the site of the Dnieper dam and power station (*Dneproges*). This largest water-power producer of Europe has a capacity of 550,000 kilowatts. Completed in 1932, the dam was blown up in 1941 by the retreating Russians in accordance with their scorched-earth policy. Reconstruction began shortly after its recapture in 1943, and in 1947 the first turbine went into operation. The power generated by *Dneproges* furnished the basis for the industrial development of Zaporozh'ye, supplying its new special steel works, aluminum, and magnesium plants. It produces harvester combines and chemicals.

SU 438* U 438

Melitopol', an agricultural center in the southern steppe, has machine shops, producing diesel motors, grain-elevator equipment, and pumps. In addition to chemical and furniture industries, it also has flour mills, meat-packing plants, and cottonseed-oil presses.

Osipenko, until 1940 called Berdyansk, is an important port on the Sea of Azov. It has agricultural machinery works, an aircraft plant, shipyards, and railroad repair shops. Near by is a health and beach resort.

THE BLACK SEA LOWLAND

SU 241 U 241

The Black Sea lowland, with its dry level steppes, includes the oblasts of Odessa, Nikolayev, Kherson, the southern part of Zaporozh'ye, as well as Kirovograd and Izmail. This area which was annexed by the Russian Empire only in the eighteenth century, is a region of relatively recent settlement. Only toward the end of the last century did extensive grain growing replace the previously predominant pastoral economy, and the region developed into the main grain producer of the Ukraine. In the Soviet period a vast cotton area was introduced in the lower Dnieper area and cultivated by dry-farming methods in rotation with fodder crops. Elsewhere sunflowers, soy beans, fruits, melons, and vineyards became important. The local industry is closely connected with the agricultural production and engages in processing and machine manufacturing. Shipbuilding is centered in the large coastal cities.

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Ukraine RU1

Kherson Oblast

Area, 10,600, population, 700,000

Kherson Oblast extends north of the Crimea from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea. It is a typical flat, dry steppe, with cotton and wheat growing. Kakhovka, on the Dnieper River below Zaporozh'ye, is the site of the second great Dnieper dam, scheduled for 1951–57, with irrigation canals reaching into the Crimea. Skadovsk and Khorly, on the Black Sea, and Genichesk, on the Sea of Azov, are minor fishing ports.

Kherson is a major port at the mouth of the Dnieper River, where there are shipyards, repair docks, agricultural machinery works, and extensive food-canning industries. It is the terminus of a new railroad built during the Second World War from the Crimea.

Nikolayev Oblast

Area, 7,500, population, 800,000

Nikolayev Oblast lies on the Black Sea and is drained by the lower Southern Bug and the Ingul rivers. Cotton and wheat are the chief crops, with castor beans and sunflowers in the north, truck produce near Nikolayev, and dairy farming. In the rural areas flour milling, dairying, and sugar refining are the main industries.

Nikolayev lies at the head of the Bug Liman, over forty miles from the Black Sea. It is a major shipbuilding center and exports grain, sugar, iron, and manganese ore. It produces agricultural machines and has textile, food, and fish-canning industries.

Odessa Oblast

Area, 10,800, population, 1,800,000

Odessa Oblast lies in the western section of the Black Sea lowland and extends from the Black Sea to the Volyn'-Podolian upland in the north. It is bounded in the west by the Moldavian SSR. Numerous minor intermittent streams drain it in the south, and the Southern Bug in the north. Sugar beets are the main crop in the north, wheat and sunflowers in the center, and cotton in the south. Of lesser importance are corn, fruits, and castor beans. Sugar refining, flour milling, dairying, and wine making are the chief rural industries.

Odessa, the third city of the Ukraine and one of the major ports of the USSR, exports lumber and grains, and imports oil from the Caucasus, coal from the Donbas, cement from Novorossiysk, for local in-

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

SU 438* U 438

dustries and for transshipment to the right-bank Ukraine, Belorussia, and as far as Leningrad. Its industries include machinery works, which produce agricultural implements, machine tools, grain-elevator and food-industry equipment, cranes, and printing machinery. Its food industries process mainly sugar, flour, and canned goods. There are clothing and shoe factories, chemicals plants (superphosphate, iodine, linoleum, petroleum refining), woodworking and jute industries. The city has shipyards and railroad shops; during the post-war Plan, an automobile assembly plant will go into operation. Situated on the picturesque hillside, Odessa descends in several terraces, including a famous stairway, to the sea. Northward and southward along the coast are well-known health resorts (Khadzhibey Liman, Kugal'nik Liman Arkadiya, and Fontan) with mineral springs and mud baths. Regular overseas connections are maintained from the port.

Pervomaysk (formerly Ol'viopol') is situated on the Southern Bug and produces agricultural machines, flour, and meat.

Kirovograd Oblast

Area, 9,600, population, 1,100,000

SU 133* 241 U 133 241

Kirovograd Oblast lies somewhat north of the level steppe in the Volyn'-Podolian upland. It is bounded on the northeast by the Dnieper River and drained by the Ingul and Ingulets rivers. Wheat is the basic crop; sugar beets are grown in the northwest and the east, sunflowers in the south, and potatoes and flax in the moist, wooded region of the north. There are deposits of lignite, kaolin, refractory clays, and granite. Sugar refining, flour milling, and dairying are the main rural industries.

SU 438* U 438

Kirovograd was originally called Yelizavetgrad. In 1924 it was renamed Zinov'yevsk, then Kirovo in 1936, and Kirovograd in 1939. It lies on the upper Ingul River in a lignite-mining region and has important agricultural machine works and food-processing plants.

Znamenka is a rail center which has metalworking and food industries.

Aleksandriya, which has tanneries and flour mills, is also developing into the main lignite-mining center of the right-bank Ukraine.

Izmail Oblast

Area, 4,800, population, 700,000

SU 133* U 133

Izmail Oblast was formed in 1940 out of the southernmost part of Bessarabia which had a predominant Ukrainian and Russian popula-

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RD1

SU 133x u 133

tion. It lies between the Dniester River and the Kiliya arm of the Danube delta and has Moldavian minorities in the northwest and Bulgarian elements in the west, near Bolgrad. The main crops are wheat, barley, and corn in the northwest, where sheep are also extensively raised. Near the Black Sea there are large vineyards and orchards. The oblast is one of the most important wine-producing districts of the USSR. Along the coast there are fisheries and saltworks. Building materials constitute the only mineral resources.

SU 241 u 241

SU 438x [504] u 438 [504]

Izmail (Rumanian *Ismail*) is a port and a fishing center on the Kiliya arm of the Danube delta. It produces caviar and has an active grain and lumber trade.

Kiliya (Rumanian *Chilia Nouă*) is a fishing port on the Danube delta, east of Izmail.

Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy (Rumanian *Cetatea Albă*) was known as Akkerman until 1944. It is a port on the Dniester Liman, trading in wine, fish, and wool. It has fisheries and saltworks and is surrounded by vineyards and orchards.

POLES'YE

SU 311 241 u 311 241

The Ukrainian Poles'ye, which includes the oblasts of Zhitomir and Chernigov and the northern sections of Kiev and Sumy oblasts, is distinguished by a relatively high humidity, wooded terrain (especially in the west), and podsolic soils, similar to its Belorussian counterpart, which adjoins it in the north. Among the sparsely settled population, industries are poorly developed. Intensive crops are grown in the forest clearings, including flax, hemp, potatoes, and forage crops, which support some dairy-cattle herds. In the south, along the border of the wooded steppe zone, sugar beets and tobacco are cultivated. The Poles'ye is the only Ukrainian region (not counting the western oblasts, which have not been long exposed to the Soviet planned economy) where rye acreage exceeds that of wheat. Buckwheat is also grown as a local food staple. Industry is largely based on agricultural and lumber resources. Among the food industries, starch processing and distilling are the chief activities. There are woodworking and furniture plants, porcelain works, tanneries, and hemp and flax retting installations. Among the mineral resources, one should note granite, sandstone, used in the making of refractory bricks, and labradorite. Peat extraction is important as a fuel basis.

23: Shabad N-4 (no-date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

Zhitomir Oblast

Area, 11,600, population, 1,800,000

Zhitomir Oblast lies on the northern edge of the Volyn'-Podolian upland and extends northward into the Poles'ye. Sugar beets and wheat penetrate into the southern section, but in the remainder, potatoes, flax, buckwheat, and hops are grown. The forested area in the north yields lumber, clays, kaolin, and granite, and quartzite and has ceramic and paper-milling industries. In the southern rural areas sugar refining, distilling, and flour milling are the main industries.

Zhitomir, on the Teterev River, is a rail center, with lumber and grain trade. It has large furniture factories.

Berdichev, an active trading center, has important sugar and leather industries and clothing and dyeing plants, and flour and tobacco products are produced there.

Korosten', a rail junction in the northern part of the oblast, has various chemical plants, glass and porcelain works, and lumber and paper mills.

Novograd-Volynskiy, in the southwest, has machine shops and distilling and furniture industries.

Chernigov Oblast

Area, 12,200, population, 1,700,000

Chernigov Oblast is bounded on the west by the Dnieper and is drained by its chief left affluent, the Desna River. In addition to the basic rye, oats, and buckwheat crops, hemp and flax are grown in the north, potatoes in the center, and sugar beets, tobacco, and mint in the southeast. Lumbering is carried on in the wooded areas of the north and the west, and peat cutting in the marshy river valleys. Sugar refining, flour milling, meat packing, and flax and hemp retting are the main rural industries.

Chernigov, on the right bank of the Desna River, is one of the oldest cities of the Ukraine, having lumber and food-processing industries (canned goods, alcohol, and flour) and chemical works.

Nezhin is an agricultural center in a grain, potato, and sugar-beet district, while Priluki, the other industrial center of the oblast, processes sugar, tobacco, and flour and engages in the manufacture of clothing, leather goods, and furniture.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

WESTERN UKRAINE

THE WESTERN UKRAINE includes those areas (except for Izmail Oblast) which were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR after 1939 and later. Six oblasts (Rovno, Volyn', Ternopol', L'vov, Stanislav, and Drogobych) were annexed in the autumn of 1939 following the partition of Poland and the Soviet occupation of its eastern section. Chernovtsy Oblast was formed in the Northern Bukovina and the extreme northern section of Bessarabia after the acquisition of these territories from Rumania, in the summer of 1940. The Transcarpathian Oblast was ceded to the Ukraine according to an agreement with Czechoslovakia in 1945. The Western Ukraine can be roughly considered in four geographical sections: the Carpathian section in the south, on the slopes and in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, the Poles'ye, a northern lowland along the right affluents of the Pripet River, the hilly central section in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, and the Transcarpathian section.

SU 631 U 631

The Carpathian section of the Western Ukraine includes the oblasts of Chernovtsy, Stanislav, and Drogobych. Its economy is based essentially on the mineral resources of the area: petroleum, natural gas, salt, and potash, and on the lumber resources on the slopes. There are a number of health resorts in the valleys.

SU 135 U 135 SU 529 U 529

Chernovtsy Oblast

Area, 3,200, population, 900,000

Chernovtsy Oblast lies along the upper Prut and the Dniester rivers. The forests (mainly beech), building materials, salt, and petroleum are found in the higher foothills. Agriculture puts the emphasis on grains (wheat, corn, and barley), potatoes and sugar beets in the south and on fruit growing along the Dniester, in the northeast. Sheep raising and lumbering are the main activities in the mountains. Sawmilling, woodworking, sugar refining, flour milling, and wine making are the chief rural industries.

SU 133* 241 U 133 241 SU 438* U 438

Chernovtsy (Rumanian *Cernăuți*) called Chernovitsy until 1944, lies on a terrace above the Prut River. It has large textile and machine industries and produces chemicals, lumber, and food products.

Storozhinets (Rumanian *Storojineț*) is a road center in the agricultural region southwest of Chernovtsy.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine R01

SU 438* U 438

Khotin (Rumanian *Hotin*) lies in an orchard and vineyard area on the Dniester River. There is a noted leather industry.

Stanislav Oblast

Area, 5,400, population, 1,300,000

SU 133* U 133

Stanislav Oblast is drained by the upper Dniester and its right affluents descending from the Carpathian Mountains. It has important petroleum, salt, natural-gas, and potash deposits in the areas of Dolina and Bolekhov, with petroleum fields extending along the foothills in a southeasterly direction to Kosmach, southwest of Kolomyya. The principal oil towns are Bolekhov, Dolina, Peregínsko, Bogorodchany (where ozocerite is also secured), Solotvin, Nadvornaya, Pechenezhin, and Kosmach. Petroleum is refined at Bolekhov, Stanislav, and Kolomyya. The main lumber centers are Delyatin and Kuty, which has a large wood-distillation industry. On the right bank of the Dniester River lies the agricultural zone of the oblast, where grains, tobacco, and sugar beets are raised. Tobacco is processed at Zabolotov and sugar at Gorodenka.

SU 313 U 313 SU 241 U 241

SU 438* U 438

Stanislav (Polish *Stanisławów*, German *Stanislau*) has railroad and machine shops, an oil refinery, and textile and leather industries and produces asphalt, ceramics, lumber, and food products.

Kolomyya (Polish *Kołomyja*, German *Kolomea*), on the upper Prut River, has machine works and oil-refining and chemical plants. Textiles and cement are also produced.

Drogobych Oblast

Area, 4,000, population, 1,200,000

SU 135 U 135

Drogobych Oblast lies on the northern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and is bordered by Poland in the west. It is the chief petroleum region of the Western Ukraine, with the chief oil fields in the area of Drogobych and Borislav. Near by are potassium and magnesium salt mines and natural-gas wells. Salt is mined at Dobromil'. Agriculture is important along the Dniester River.

SU 438* 315 U [438] 315 SU 315

Drogobych (Polish *Drohobycz*) is the center of the Western Ukrainian petroleum region, with important refining and chemical installations and potash and magnesium salt mines. It trades in petroleum, livestock, and agricultural products and produces rubber goods, lumber, and food products.

Borislav (Polish *Borysław*) is another petroleum center southwest of Drogobych. It has petroleum and natural-gas wells and engages in the

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RU1

manufacture of drilling equipment and the processing of ozocerite. The health resort of Truskavets, with mineral springs, lies just to the east.[1]

Sambor is an agricultural center, with sawmilling, flour-milling, and distilling industries.

Stryy (Polish *Stryj*) is a rail center where there are machine and metalworking industries, producing mainly drilling equipment, and chemical and lumber (matches and furniture) plants. Petroleum and natural gas are secured near by. From the gas wells of Dashava, just northeast of the city, a pipe line has been laid to Kiev during the post-war Five-Year Plan for industrial and domestic consumption.

The Poles'ye, which is wooded in the north, close to the Pripet River, also contains extensive marshy areas. It is the most backward section of the Western Ukraine. Its subsistence crops are rye and potatoes. Industry is poorly developed and is restricted to flour milling, sawmilling, and brickworking in the rural areas.

Rovno Oblast

Area, 8,000, population, 1,200,000

Rovno Oblast is drained by the Goryn and its affluent, the Sluch'. In the south, on the higher ground of the Volyn'-Podolian upland, agriculture produces grains, hops, tobacco, and sugar beets; in the northern section lumbering is the main industry. Granite, cement rock, and slate are quarried.

Rovno (Polish *Równe*) is a rail center having railroad shops, agricultural machinery works, and chemical and lumber industries.

Volyn' Oblast

Area, 7,700, population, 1,100,000

Volyn' Oblast which borders on Poland along the Western Bug River in the west, has some agriculture (grains and tobacco) in the south, but mainly lumbering industries in the north, along the Pripet River and its affluents.

Lutsk (Polish *Łuck*), the capital, lies on a minor rail branch, at the southern edge of the Pripet Marshes. It is an agricultural center and produces agricultural implements, clothing, leather, lumber, and flour.

Vladimir-Volynskiy (Polish *Włodzimierz*) is a rail junction and grain-trading point near the Polish border.

[1] [of Boryslav in Drogobych Oblast--Analyst]

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukrainian RSS

Kovel' (Polish *Kowel*) is a rail center with knitting and hosiery mills, sawmills, tobacco, and flour mills.

The central section of the Western Ukraine lies in the fertile Volyn'-Podolian upland and includes the oblasts of Ternopol' and L'vov, as well as the adjoining zones of the oblasts to the north and the south. It is drained by the Dniester River and its left affluents, which cut deep ravines into the plateau. Its black-earth soils and the moderate climate favor an agricultural economy. The section is very similar to the right-bank wooded steppe of the old Soviet Ukraine in its dense rail network, its concentrated population, and the large number of urban centers. Grains (wheat, rye, and barley), potatoes, and sugar beets are the basic crops for the large food-processing industry, with flour mills and distilleries.

Ternopol' Oblast

Area, 5,300, population, 1,500,000

Ternopol' Oblast lies in the watershed area between the Pripet and the Dniester rivers. Grains (mainly winter wheat) and sunflowers are the principal crops throughout the larger portion of the oblast. Sugar beets are cultivated in the extreme north, and fruits in the south along the Dniester River. Building stone is quarried in several places.

Ternopol' (until 1944, Tarnopol') is a rail center with an active grain and egg trade. It produces agricultural implements, cement, lumber, and food products.

Kremenets (Polish *Krzemieniec*), on a rail spur north of Ternopol', produces flour-milling equipment, ceramics, and cement. There are peat bogs and chalk quarries.

Chortkov (Polish *Czortków*) is a rail center south of Ternopol', producing rubber goods, cement, and tile.

L'vov Oblast

Area, 4,300, population, 1,500,000

L'vov Oblast lies on the Polish border on the upper Western Bug. East of L'vov grains, potatoes, and fruits are the chief crops. Extensive quarrying industries form the basis for the manufacture of cement, glass, bricks, and tiles.

L'vov (Polish *Lwów*), the largest city of the Western Ukraine, is a nine-way rail hub and major industrial center trading in agricultural

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The milk industry, too, is relatively undeveloped in 234
the Ukraine and might even become insufficient to supply the needs of the big towns and the industrial centres if the breeding does not increase in order to be able to overtake the other branches of economic activity.

The general opinion which considers the Ukraine an 000
inexhaustible source of meat and milk seems to be unfounded, at least at the present time. This is all the more true as, while the purchasing power of the native population rises, the insufficiency of the resources in this respect becomes more and more noticeable.

The transformation which the Ukraine has undergone in the sphere of the exploitation of the products of the surface soil since the establishment of the Soviet regime, while leaving aside the crisis in cattle-breeding, has undoubtedly not led to progress.

The trial plantations of cotton, of soho, and of rice, 242
the mechanization of the working of the land by the extensive employment of tractors, seem to be the only advantages which have been given by the new regime to the development of Ukrainian agriculture.

It would seem necessary to note another wealth of the 529 757
Ukrainian soil which does not enter into any of our economic categories—these are the various spas.

In the first instance there are, in the environs of Odessa, two lakes, the Kouialnik and the Khadji-Bey, ancient bays which formed when they were the mouths of rivers since dried up and which are to-day completely separated from the sea. The medicinal value of these two lakes is appreciated by all Russia. Tens of thousands of invalids, especially rheumatics and paralytics, flock there every year for the mud baths which are very rich in iodine salts.

Many parts of the coast of the Black Sea are very 529

elements which are absolutely essential to her economic existence. In this new phase of reasoning, it is evident that other interests than those of the Ukraine intervene, and one can easily detect the Russian point of view. However, in our present study of the subject, let us lay aside all thought of any ulterior motive on the part of our adversaries, and approach the matter in an objective manner, in order to discern, if possible, the vital economic interests of the Russian people which might suffer through the creation of an independent Ukraine.

Is Great Russia Economically Dependent on Ukraine?

Concisely stated, the three fundamental bases of opposition usually put forward are:

1. The Ukraine is the granary of Russia. Without Ukraine, upon which she depended for her entire supply of agricultural products, Russia would suffer from hunger.

2. The Ukraine separates Russia from the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, thus closing the door to foreign markets.

3. If the Ukraine were established in ethnographic limits, she would thus possess nearly all the coal and iron of the old Russian Empire, and hence would cut off Russia's present supply of these indispensable raw materials of industry.

Let us candidly and thoroughly examine each of these arguments.

u 243 438 s.u 243 438 In the first place, statistics show that Ukraine has always been the granary for western Europe rather than for Russia and has, in fact, exported only a very small per cent of her cereal products into Russia. The latter, furthermore, possessed such an excess of grain that she herself has exported in the past, and still continues to export, an appreciable quantity of cereals.

Great Russia's Own Grain Supply Ample

For the years 1909-1911, during which time the exports were especially large, the total quantity of cereals shipped from former Russia averaged 440,000,000 bushels each year. Of this amount the nine Ukrainian governments

supplied 201,670,000. If we now add to these nine governments the Kuban, the Ukrainian region north of the Caucasus, as well as the Ukrainian parts of other governments which border them, we must increase these figures by 91,670,000, which gives to ethnographic Ukraine an exportation of about 293,340,000 bushels of cereals. During this time the other parts of former Russia, including Siberia, exported about 40,000,000 bushels annually. As neither Poland nor Finland exported cereals, and Lithuania and the Baltic provinces only small quantities, if any, it was Russia proper that had the large excess.

U 438 243 SU 438 243

As to the Ukraine, her exportations of cereals to Russia did not reach more than 10 to 15 per cent of her total ~~output~~ export; that is to say, about ~~six or seven~~ 36 million bushels, and nearly all of that was destined for Poland, Lithuania and White Russia, Great Russia consuming only a small fraction of the amount. Then, too, the Ukrainian wheat has always had as a competitor in the markets of Moscow and Petrograd the wheat from the fields of Siberia and the regions of the Volga.

If hunger now exists in Russia, it is due to a dreadful crisis in transportation, to which may be added the fact that Siberia and some parts of the Volga regions refuse their wheat to Russia in the present Bolshevist state and, even within Bolshevist Russia, the peasants will not give their wheat to the cities, since they get nothing from the cities in return. In the Petrograd and Moscow districts, suffering has been heightened by the Allied blockade.

In this way, a fair analysis of existing agricultural conditions with reference to relative production and exportation in both Ukraine and Russia proves the fallacy of the first argument advanced by those who interpose these conditions as a barrier to Ukraine's economic freedom. The irrefutable fact remains that, instead of depending upon the Ukraine for wheat, Russia not only has enough for her own use but, even during those years when the harvests in the east of Russia and in Siberia fail to reach their maximum, retains a sufficient surplus of grain to enable her to export it in considerable quantities.

The second objection, which involves the question of

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The 15 % meadows and pastureland is a little lower than 311
the average for most European countries; this figure is higher for Polesya, the Carpathians and the foothills of the Caucasus (25—30 %); in the more intensively managed areas of the Right-Bank Region it sinks to 5 %. Ukraine (like Bohemia and Moravia) has only 7 % of land that cannot be utilised for agriculture or forestry, a proportion that is 16 % for Polesya alone. This figure is considerably higher for most European countries: Germany, Roumania, France and Italy have 12—19 %, USSR 17 %.

20 % of all plowed lands lie fallow, as, with the exception of some areas in the West, the three-crop rotation system is general. Grain takes up 76 % of the arable land, 90 % even in the steppe. Since the first World War this share has declined in favor of technical cultures which have doubled their pre-war area. In 1935 they accounted for 9 %; a further 8 % is used for other vegetation for food (potatoes), 7 % for fodder plants.

Wheat and barley are the two kinds of grain that are most 241
characteristic for Ukraine, though much rye is also grown. Its share (21 %) of the land laid down in grain and potatoes was in the years 1931—35 between that of wheat (32 %) and that of barley (13 %). Oats followed (10 %), then maize (9 %), millet (6 %) and buckwheat (3 %), potatoes (6 %). Rye is above all used for domestic consumption.

4. Grain: Areas of Production and Varieties

The biggest surpluses in grain are harvested in the old pro- 243
vinces of Katerynoslav, Kherson, Tauria and the Kuban area, crops being wheat and barley and others. The proportion of these two varieties in the entire yield of grain decreases as we pass from south-east to north-west. In Western Ukraine, Volynia and the district of Tarnopil are areas of surplus yields while the rest of Galicia has to import grain. Wheat thrives best on the Black Earth of what was once steppe and occupies about 1/3 of the area laid down in grain and potatoes. Cultivation of wheat increased for a long time in accordance with the growing world consumption, but decreased when facilities for export disappeared and when domestic consumption became more important (see tables 1 and 2).

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

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Table 1. Ukraine in the World Production of Grain.

1909—13	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Total in Mill.
	in thousand t.				
East Ukraine	9 350	5 200	6 100	2 350	23
Russian Empire	20 500	19 000	9 000	13 500	62
Share of East Ukraine in %	48	30	72	17	37
West Ukraine	640	680	400	250	2
Ukraine total	9 990	5 900	6 500	2 600	25
World Production in Million t.	100	45	38	65	250
Share of Ukraine in %	10	13	17	3	10
1931—1935					
East Ukraine	9 100	5 420	3 720	2 230	20,5
Soviet Union	23 900	21 900	6 600	15 000	67,5
Share of East Ukraine in %	38	25	56	15	30
West Ukraine	1 020	1 530	680	870	4,1
Ukraine total	10 120	6 950	4 400	3 100	24,6
World Production in Million t.	127	46	39	62	274
Share of Ukraine in %	8	15	11	5	9

Table 2. Ukraine in the World Export of Grain.

1909—1913	Wheat 1000 t	Wheat %	Rye 1000 t	Rye %	Barley 1000 t	Barley %	Oats 1000 t	Oats %	Total 1000 t	Total %	Maize 1000 t	Maize %	Altogether Mill. t	Altogether %
1. Ukraine	4300	20	600	21	2700	43	300	8,5	7900	23	700	10	8,6	21
2. Argentine . . .	2600	12	—	—	—	—	620	17,5	3220	9,5	2950	40,5	6,1	15
3. USA	2960	13,5	10	0,5	160	2,5	60	1,5	3190	9,5	1020	14	4,1	10
4. Roumania . . .	1430	6,5	100	3,5	350	5,5	150	4,5	2030	6	1000	14	3,1	7
5. Canada	2530	12	—	—	100	1,5	180	5	2810	8	—	—	2,8	6
6. Russian Empire . .	100	0,5	200	7	1000	16	800	23	2150	6	100	1,5	2,2	5
7. B. India	1380	6,5	—	—	230	3,5	—	—	1610	4,5	—	—	1,6	4
8. Australia . . .	1150	5,5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1150	5,5	—	—	1,2	3
World	21500	100	2800	100	6300	100	3500	100	34100	100	7300	100	41,4	100
Share of Ukraine in %	20		21		43		9		23		10		21	
Russian Empire	4400	21,5	800	28,5	3700	58,5	1100	31	10000	29,5	800	11	10,8	26
Share of Ukraine in %	98		75		73		27		79		88		80	

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5. Other Agricultural Produce

244 433 In Western Ukraine potatoes account for 16—18 % of the arable land, decreasing towards the south-east to 3—2%. There has been a considerable increase in the cultivation of potatoes of recent times on the small property belonging to private or to collectivised peasants. The yield per ha which before World War I amounted to 92 q sank in the years 1929—1933 to 86 q (Belgium 213, Germany 156, France 110, USSR 80, USA 72). Its total production of 20.6 million t, 10 % of world production (205.6 million t in years 1931—35) puts Ukraine fourth after Germany, USSR (exclusive of Ukraine), and Polan' (exclusive of Ukrainian territory).

249 433 Sugar beet is the most important technical culture. It is grown mostly in the center of Dnipro-Ukraine where the rainfall is 500 mm, above all in the area round Kyiv and in Podolia. The average area planted in the years from 1901/02 to 1910/11 amounted to 555 000 ha and the total yield to 85 million t (154 q/ha). In 1935 Ukraine, with a sugar beet area of 952 000 ha, was the first country in the world as regards this product.

And yet the yields per hektar have decreased to 90 q, the average for 1931—35. In Germany the corresponding figure is 290 q/ha, in Denmark 322 q/ha, in Holland 350 q/ha, in the USSR

[243]



84 q/ha. The reason for the decrease is to be sought in the Soviet form of management. With an entire yield of 8.8 mil-

lion t and 14 % of the world production of sugar beet, Ukraine comes second after Germany (10.6 million t) and before France and the USA (8.2 and 8.1 million t respectively). 249 433



[243]

Conditions for growing tobacco in Ukraine are favorable, but the area planted, which in 1908 was 50 000 ha, has not been increased; the yield has risen slightly (8 000 t in the entire country). Better qualities were planted in the south, and elsewhere the well-known "makhorka". Hops of good quality were 249 433



[243]

grown in Volynia and partly also in Galicia; 2 000 t were harvested.

248 433 Hemp is produced above all in the Chernyhiv area (229 000 ha), Ukraine coming after the USSR in hemp production of the world; in the years 1931—35 its fibre yield was 13 % (8 000 t)

[249]



and its seed yield 19 % (420 000 t) of the world production. Flax is grown on an area of 230 000 ha; Ukraine with a yield of 60 000 t stands second in world production of fibre flax (9.4 % of 640 000 t) while it is sixth as a producer of flax for seed, its yield of 71 000 t being 2 % of world production (3.5 million t).

[243]

Cotton is produced on areas that shift from year to year, mostly without artificial irrigation; hitherto it has not been very successful (45,000t)

successful (45 000 t). Sunflowers were cultivated in 1935 on an 247
area of 1 659 000 ha, mainly in the Kuban area. The yield for 1930—35 (0.9 million t) was only a little less than that of the USSR and much more than that of any other country.

As a grain producing country, Ukraine, with its yield of 433
approximately 25 million t of the four main European varieties 243
(= 10 % of world production), took a leading place in the years before the First World War (1909—1931). It exported 7.9 million t, or 1/8 of total world grain exports, topping the list for wheat and barley (4.3 million t and 20 % and 2.7 million t and 43 % respectively of world exports). In the years 1931—35, production in Ukraine decreased by only 9 % i. e. by 24.6 million t, world production amounting then to 276.6 million t, while the decrease in export trade in the same period was much greater. The reason for this was the small yield per hektar as well as inadequate cultivation in consequence of collectivisation and unfavorable conditions for seling agricultural and buying industrial products; in addition there was an increased demand at home as the country became more industrialised.

6. Cattle Rearing

The distribution of livestock in Ukraine varies considerably. 231
In the wide spaces of North Caucasia there is much pasture- 433
land so that there are not many cattle per unit of area, though 811
quite a number per head of the population.

The opposite is true of Galicia where management is intensive. The many meadows of Poesya support good stocks of cattle while the mountain pastures of the Carpathians are not sufficiently utilised. Between those extremes we have the bulk of Ukrainian arable land with relatively poor supplies of fodder for cattle. The result is that Ukraine does not contribute to the cattle rearing industry of the world what one might expect from a country of its agricultural standing. Before World War I there were 13.5 million head of cattle in Ukraine, i. e. 2.8 % of world stock. The proportion of dary cows in this figure increases continuously as the use of oxen for draught, which used to be a characteristic feature of the country, had been declining for some time. (Table 3).

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563 and the Greeks who competed with the merchant Jews in the great ports, where they formed very united and wealthy autonomous communities which to-day have been repatriated or dispersed.

II

Agriculture

241 Fundamentally an agricultural land, the Ukraine is particularly the land of cereals.

The incomparable richness of these lands, her temperate climate, and the aptitude of her population have made this branch of human activity the fundamental wealth of the country.

134 311 With the exception of the forest regions of the north-west, where sandy soil is met, nearly all the lands of the Ukraine are arable and actually only a few tens of thousands of hectares of waste land remain, which serve as natural pasturages and give an excellent hay which is very well suited for horses.

● 243 About 25,000,000 hectares are sown, of which 20,000,000 are growing cereals.

The abundance of nitrates in the surface layer of the earth, and its capillary structure, perfect for irrigation, allow the cultivation of the most valuable of cereals—[311] wheat. The area that has been sown with this cereal occupies more than 35 per cent of the worked land of the Ukraine and its production rises to 90,000,000 quintals, representing almost 8 per cent of the world harvest and 18 per cent of the European harvest.

The cultivation of wheat seems to develop from year to year at the expense of barley and of rye, cereals of inferior quality.

From the end of the nineteenth century wheat has

243 experienced a great extension and has acquired an industrial and commercial character. Millions of hectares are sown with it, and a special selection of seeds has been undertaken for its development and for the production of new varieties which would resist drought, with a view to bringing about a stabilization of harvests. Considered best on the world markets for the production of fine flours and of nourishing bread, the well-known Russian 'hard corn' had, especially at the time immediately before the last war, a very good price in the world markets. Powerful elevators had been built in the ports of the Black Sea where the grain was stored before being loaded on the boats.

This crop occupies the great majority of the fields of Zone 2,[1] where the lands are richer and suffice adequately for the increased production of this cereal. More than 4,000,000 hectares are producing wheat in this zone of a total of 6,500,000 in the whole Ukraine.

Farther to the north, and especially towards the relatively poor lands of Volynia and of the region of Tchernigov, rye, the production of which is as high as 30,000,000 quintals, begins to replace wheat, but it only serves, unlike the latter, to supply the internal consumption as it has not yet reached a level of export production.

Apart from wheat and rye, the Ukraine produces an important quantity of barley, about 35,000,000 quintals; of maize, 22,000,000 to 25,000,000; of oats, 20,000,000; and finally great quantities of buckwheat and millet.

Wheat, the harvest of which can easily reach 100,000,000 quintals and more, is an excellent export commodity.

Its extensive exploitation had not only benefited the great landowners, but equally the average farmers who have the good sense to increase their revenues by

1 [see category 11b, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

applying improved methods of working and in engaging 243 in a selection of varieties as demanded by the mills and the exporters.

The State and local organizations equally try to come to the aid of the cultivators in order to improve the quality and raise the production of this precious grain.

The Soviet State, wishing to substitute itself for all [474] former capitalist enterprises, organized the *sovkhoses* (State agricultural enterprises), where it tried to return to the pre-war traditions of exploitation. The general system of Soviet economy does not, however, permit the organization of the exploitation of wheat on a commercial scale. The figures which we have just cited cannot be applied to the Soviet Ukraine in its present state. Actually agricultural decadence during the Civil War and the period of militant communism and the collectivization of the peasants had disorganized all that which had been done during the preceding epoch for the rational exploitation of this important resource. The widespread utilization of tractors has not yet compensated for the losses which have been sustained. Nevertheless wheat remains and will remain the essential product of Ukrainian soil. It is its most important agricultural potential.

Although the cultivation of maize, almost entirely concentrated in Zone 2, only occupies the fourth place among the cereals of the Ukraine, its importance is great owing to the fact that this country alone produces 65 per cent of the maize of the Soviet Union. On the other hand this crop is a very recommendable phase in the enrichment of the soils, whose supply of water and chemical salts is pitilessly exhausted by the growing of wheat, more so, as in order to replace them the utilization of manure in the southern regions sometimes presents a certain danger owing to the possible droughts.

[See category 116, pp. 139-140 --- Analyst]

243 Quite recently one has experimented in the Ukraine with two crops formerly unknown in that country—soho and rice—which have given good results. The experience is especially interesting in the case of rice, a very important cereal unknown in Europe, except in Italy, and the cultivation of which may well open new agricultural perspectives.

. . . . .

249 Beside the cereals, the most important sown surface (2,500,000 hectares) is occupied by the so-called technical cultivations, the products of which serve as raw materials in industry, both food and general.

These are the sugar-beet, oil-bearing plants, linseed, hops, and tobacco. The beet, the sown surface of which covers nearly 1,000,000 hectares, occupies the predominant place.

This cultivation expects concentrated exploitation by the great enterprises, furnished by an appropriate agricultural organization and abundant labour, in order to give big harvests.

Thus, before the advent of the Soviet regime, the harvest of beet in the Ukraine reached 150,000,000 quintals, representing nearly 18 per cent of the world's production. At present, notwithstanding the increase of the utilized surface, the harvest only reaches a maximum of 110,000,000. This diminution must be considered as being temporary and solely due to the new system of State capitalism which cannot fully replace private initiative.

One cannot, however, expect a new increase of production in this direction because the cultivation of sugar-beet exhausts the land, hinders the rational system of agricultural exploitation, and requires an enormous outlay on chemical manure, which has to be set off as a

249 are known under the name of '*makhorka*.' Fine tobacco is only cultivated in the southern region, near the Crimea, and only in small quantities.

● 243 As to hops, they are spread over the relatively poor lands of Volynia. Since the end of the nineteenth century this crop has experienced a great development in the Ukraine, which has furnished more than 50 per cent of the hops on the markets of the Russian Empire. This, as is well known, is an indispensable product in the manufacture of beer.

Owing to their utilization in the breweries oats can equally be considered as being not only a direct food crop. This would also apply to a part of the potato harvest (total of 1·2 million hectares), which supplies the most important material for the production of alcohol.

248 The cultivation of cotton which was begun five or six years ago in the extreme south of the Ukraine, between the mouth of the Dnieper and the isthmus of Perekop, is a recent industry. We have little information about its possible future and cannot dwell on it. Actually cotton plantations occupy about 150,000 hectares. The employment of a new variety, called the 'non-irrigated cotton,' seems to give satisfactory results.

241 In all that concerns agriculture, the division into agro-climatic zones seems to be entirely justified.

Actually the northern limit of the cultivation of maize and sunflower corresponds almost entirely to the border between these two zones. On the other hand 95 per cent of the land occupied by sugar-beet is to be found in the southern part of Zone 1.[1] This separation is also not quite so definite for the cultivation of cereals, but nevertheless it exists. The greater amount of wheat is grown in Zone 2.[1] Rye and oats, on the contrary, occupy a greater surface in the north. In the case of the two less important cereals, buckwheat and millet, the separa-

1 [see category 116, pp. 139-140.---Analyst]

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but 000
politically faithful to Moscow.

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also 661
by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of 651
forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though 243
terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists.

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet 661
Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the 665
CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others.

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion 687
from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commis- 186
sar of Education in Ukraine from 1027—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

467 missionaires, dock and wharf labourers, outdoor servants, &c. The members of *artels* in the second group always receive employment in preference to other workers, as their trustworthiness is guaranteed by the *artel*, and the fact of their membership is some guarantee that they are efficient.

The *artels* are democratic and useful institutions, and, in a country where promptness and trustworthiness are somewhat rare qualities, they play a most valuable part in giving a measure of confidence and security to both employers and workmen.

(2) Agriculture

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

243 The agricultural industry is the largest in the Ukraine, and employs the great majority of the [134] population. The black-soil region extends over most of the area, only the Governments of Kiev, Podolia, and Chernigov, and the borders of the Black Sea, lying [433] outside it. It follows that the suitability of the Ukraine [431] for cereals is equal to that of any part of the world, and its surplus crops form a considerable proportion of the world's food-supply.

243 The mean area under cultivation in the period 1901–5 433 was 52,000,000 acres, producing 20,700,000 tons annually. Of this total, 45,600,000 acres were under breadstuff crops, and produced 15,000,000 tons. For the year 1914, the figures were 56,300,000 acres, producing 23,000,000 tons. Of this 50,400,000 acres were under breadstuff crops, with a return of 15,900,000 tons.

243 *Rye* is the principal crop, and is produced on the 439 peasants' lands more largely than any other cereal. It is the staple breadstuff of the country, and the internal consumption absorbs a large part of the crop, a minor quantity only being exported. In some years the crop is not sufficient for the home demand, and the peasants have to use imported flour or substitutes.

Wheat is next in importance, and provides the largest surplus for export. It is mainly grown on

privately-owned lands. The failure or success of the Ukraine wheat harvest has its effect upon the corn exchanges of the whole world, and its shipment from the Black Sea is the occasion of much anxiety and speculation every season.

Barley is largely grown and exported, being principally raised on privately-owned land. *Maize* comes next in value; the greater part of the crop is consumed locally, but a moderate quantity is exported in good years. The *oat* crop is valuable, and a proportion remains for export after the supply of local needs. *Millet* and *buckwheat* are grown for local use.

Of the non-cereal crops, *potatoes* take the first place, exceeding all others by a large margin. They are used not only for food and the manufacture of potato flour, but for the distillation of spirits, a flourishing industry in many districts. Small crops of *peas*, *beans*, and *lentils* are also grown.

The *sugar-beet* is raised in great quantities, especially in the governments which have not the black soil. Kiev produces most, Podolia and Kharkov come next; the remaining Governments have only small crops, and Taurida and Yekaterinoslav none. There is usually a large surplus of refined sugar for export, in addition to a valuable internal trade in sugar and manufactures thereof; the by-products of cattle food and spirit distilled from molasses increase the value of this crop.

Tobacco used to be widely cultivated except in the black-soil zone, but its cultivation is steadily decreasing everywhere. It still remains important in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. Only the coarsest qualities are raised, the leaf being known as *makhorka* and used solely by peasants and labourers.

Volhynia grows a large quantity of *hops*, about half the total yield of all Russia. The product is mostly sold locally, but occasionally a surplus is exported to the Warsaw market.

The *grape-vine* is cultivated in Podolia, Kherson, and Yekaterinoslav. The wine produced is of inferior quality, and has only a local market.

Of the crops producing vegetable oils, *linseed* and

241 It is almost unbelievable that in many regions of the steppe the planted surface is not ploughed up, or in any case only superficially with a land-parer. The purpose is to conserve soil moisture. Often the entire sowing, the entire spring work of the farmer consists of a single process. A light land-parer scratches the surface; it has a box attached to it containing the seed, and the harrow is attached to this "ploughing and sowing machine". With this type of sowing one necessarily reaps a lot of weeds.

•243 438 Nevertheless, before the war the Ukraine enjoyed the reputation of being a granary. During the years 1909 to 1913 the country produced on an average of 8.6 million more tons of grain annually than it consumed. The annual export amounted to /144/ an average of 4.3 million tons of wheat alone and 2.7 million tons of barley. (87) Surplus and export dropped considerably

87. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 390.

under Bolshevik rule. In 1934 only one million tons of grain were exported.

*

425 669 In 1917, when the Bolsheviks became active, the general feeling in North and Central Ukraine was extremely favorable to an agrarian revolution. The land-hungry peasants were deeply convinced of the fact that the "right of the landowner was an injustice". Whoever promised the peasants that they were to receive all the land they could themselves cultivate, had won them over to his cause. As a matter of fact, in 1917, at the beginning of the revolution, the lands of the estate owners and the large farmers were immediately divided up, in the process of which the estates often went up in flames and

5. Other Agricultural Produce

● 244 433 In Western Ukraine potatoes account for 16—18 % of the arable land, decreasing towards the south-east to 3—2%. There has been a considerable increase in the cultivation of potatoes of recent times on the small property belonging to private or to collectivised peasants. The yield per ha which before World War I amounted to 92 q sank in the years 1929—1933 to 86 q (Belgium 213, Germany 156, France 110, USSR 80, USA 72). Its total production of 20.6 million t, 10 % of world production (205.6 million t in years 1931—35) puts Ukraine fourth after Germany, USSR (exclusive of Ukraine), and Polan' (exclusive of Ukrainian territory).

249 433 Sugar beet is the most important technical cultu.e. It is grown mostly in the center of Dnipro-Ukraine where the rainfall is 500 mm, above all in the area round Kyiv and in Podol.·. The average area planted in the years from 1901/02 to 1910/11 amounted to 555 000 ha and the total yield to 85 million t (154 q/ha). In 1935 Ukraine, with a sugar beet area of 952 000 ha, was the first country in the world as regards this product.

And yet the yields per hektar have decreased to 90 q, the average for 1931—35. In Germany the corresponding figure is 290 q/ha, in Denmark 322 q/ha, in Holland 350 q/ha, in the USSR

[243]



84 q/ha. The reason for the decrease is to be sought in the Soviet form of management. With an entire yield of 8.8 mil-

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

166 ALREADY IN THE EIGHTIES SYMPTOMS OF OVER-POPULATION WERE NOTICEABLE

in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. The peasants continued to move on into New Russia, but by this time that region was itself becoming fairly thickly populated. Migrants pursued their way to the newer lands in the northern Caucasus and beyond the Volga. From 1890 onwards the Government took a hand in the organization of this migratory movement. According to the Emigration Department, set up at this period, the greatest number of migrants over the whole Empire came from the 'rich black earth regions' of Poltava, Chernigov, Kursk and Kharkov. However, between the years 1907 and 1913, the Poltava and Chernigov Governments, from being first and second in this respect, ranked only third and fifth. This fact is explained by the initiative of important landowners and industrialists like Kharitonenko, Tereshchenko and others who built up the sugar-beet industry on a large scale. Notwithstanding this factor, between 1906 and 1914, according to the statistics of the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia*, 1,610,000 peasants migrated from the Ukrainian Governments, while migration was also taking place from different districts of New Russia. The Ukrainians mostly went to settle the steppe area in western Siberia and the region of Orenburg; others reached the Amur and the shores of the Pacific Ocean, where the Ukrainian settlements came to be known as the Green Wedge (*Zelëny Klin*) and where the names of the wealthy villages of Novo-Kievskoe, Poltavskoe and Chernigovskoe piously recalled the origin of those who had come from the banks of the Dniepr and the Seym.

311 433 At the beginning of the twentieth century the classical 'three-field system', already prescribed as a law in the Lithuanian Statute of the sixteenth century, prevailed in left-bank Ukraine. This system answered the requirements of the small landowner or well-to-do peasant who farmed 20 to 100 hectares. Few troubled to produce more than a small surplus, the sale of which might cover their current wants. Horticulture, apiculture and some stock-raising served to supplement income. On the larger estates all the energies of the owners were directed to the lucrative exploitation of the sugar-beet industry. Stretches of land were bought or leased from peasants or small landowners in order to increase the acreage under beet. The rapid development and excellent management of the sugar-beet industry impressed and disturbed the German Commission of Professor Auhagen in 1912. By this time the industry had assumed a certain international importance. In 1914 433 there were over 190 sugar factories in the Ukraine out of 226 for the ● 244 whole Empire (the bulk of the balance was produced in Poland). As against 2 million hectares under wheat in the Ukraine (excluding

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the New Russian Governments) there were over 1 million hectares 433
under beetroot. Just before the last war the annual production of
beet in the Ukraine reached 150 million quintals: i.e. 18 per cent of 244●
world production. The production of Ukrainian beet sugar ranked fourth—after that of America, Germany and France. In 1913 the Ukraine produced 11 million quintals of crystallized sugar. This output, together with that of the Polish factories, covered all the needs of the internal market (which during the preceding twenty-five years had augmented fourfold) and provided substantial surplus for export to the Baltic and the Middle East.

In addition to the beet processing plants, about 60 per cent of the alcohol refineries (corn, potatoes) of the Empire were located in the [274]
Ukraine. The production of vegetable oil (particularly from sunflower seed) was also important.

It has been estimated by the Soviet paper *Pravda* that approximately 1 milliard of rubles a year was paid for services on the semi-industrialized estates of landowners throughout Russia: of this sum a considerable proportion was paid for the hire of horse transport (since landowners did not maintain a large number of draught horses but hired from the villages). Of this milliard, about 300,000,000 were paid out in the Ukraine. As the peasant population of the [511]
Ukraine numbered about fifteen millions, some 20 rubles a year per head of the population was earned on 'supplementary' work on the large estates. 'Only owing to the sugar and other agricultural industries could the dense population of the Ukraine exist in such comparatively well-to-do circumstances.'

Thus the agricultural economy of Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, [241]
Chernigov and Poltava was based only partly on the production of cereals. With a population which reached nearly twenty millions, only about 2 million hectares were under wheat, while in New Russia, with a population about half that of the Ukrainian Governments, there were 4 million hectares under wheat. The Ukraine
exported only small quantities of wheat to Poland and White [439]
Russia, which provinces drew the bulk of their supplies from New Russia. The real 'granaries' of Russia which supplied the whole
Empire and exported a surplus abroad were the regions of the [134]
northern Caucasus and Trans-Volga with western Siberia and New Russia (including the Governments of Kherson and Ekaterinoslav with the northern part of Tauris and the southern part of Kharkov) In those regions the black earth really had a virgin quality during the first half of the nineteenth century; and its richness remains exceptional even now.

As a rule, the climatic conditions in the *New Russian Governments* 000

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

privately-owned lands. The failure or success of the 243
Ukraine wheat harvest has its effect upon the corn 439
exchanges of the whole world, and its shipment from the Black Sea is the occasion of much anxiety and speculation every season.

Barley is largely grown and exported, being principally raised on privately-owned land. *Maize* comes next in value; the greater part of the crop is consumed locally, but a moderate quantity is exported in good years. The *oat* crop is valuable, and a proportion remains for export after the supply of local needs. *Millet* and *buckwheat* are grown for local use.

Of the non-cereal crops, *potatoes* take the first 244
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are used not only for food and the manufacture of potato flour, but for the distillation of spirits, a flourishing industry in many districts. Small crops of *peas*, *beans*, and *lentils* are also grown.

The *sugar-beet* is raised in great quantities, especially in the governments which have not the black soil. Kiev produces most, Podolia and Kharkov come next; the remaining Governments have only small crops, and Taurida and Yekaterinoslav none. There is usually a large surplus of refined sugar for export, in addition to a valuable internal trade in sugar and manufactures thereof; the by-products of cattle food and spirit distilled from molasses increase the value of this crop.

Tobacco used to be widely cultivated except in the 247
black-soil zone, but its cultivation is steadily decreasing everywhere. It still remains important in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. Only the coarsest qualities are raised, the leaf being known as *makhorka* and used solely by peasants and labourers.

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249 Of the crops producing vegetable oils, linseed and sunflower are the principal. A great deal of sunflower seed is eaten raw by peasants and labourers all over Russia. These two crops are decreasing.

244 *Fruit and vegetables.*—The orchard districts are in the
439 Governments of Podolia, Chernigov, Poltava, and Kiev.
245 Apples, pears, plums, cherries, mulberries, and apricots grow freely, and the surplus goes to northern Russia, great quantities being preserved. Vegetables succeed well in the alluvial soils near the rivers. They are mostly grown by summer immigrants from Bulgaria (cf. p. 72), who use a primitive system of irrigation. The surplus supply all goes to northern Russia.

231 The live-stock of the Ukraine is very numerous, but of late years has tended to decrease.

Horses are much in demand for agricultural work, especially as the use of oxen as draught animals is being gradually abandoned. There is also a strong demand for horses in the coal and iron region for haulage. As a result the stock of horses has considerably increased in six out of the nine Governments, Volhynia, Podolia, and Chernigov alone showing decreases.

Cattle have decreased in numbers in five Governments and increased in four, but the total shows a serious falling off.

236 *Sheep* are divided roughly into two classes, fine-woolled and coarse-woolled, the former producing wool known as 'Spanish', the latter being killed for their skins. There is a general decrease of stock in every province of the Ukraine. The great increase of population and the demand for land, with rising rents, make sheep-farming not sufficiently profitable under present agricultural conditions.

231 The stock of *pigs* is, on the whole, maintained, and even shows a good increase in some Governments.

The *goat* was formerly of importance, and there was a considerable stock in the country, but it has dwindled latterly at a very rapid rate.

235 *Poultry* are kept in considerable numbers, but poultry-farming on modern methods is very rare and of small economic importance.

000 *Apiculture* is common in the northern Ukraine, and

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

tion is very clear, buckwheat growing in Zone 1 and 241
millet in Zone 2.

The great development of agriculture has created a 392
growing demand for agricultural machinery, which brought about the appearance and the rapid development of this branch of industry, concentrated to-day especially at Kherson, at Zaporojie, and at Kharkov.

Parallel to this a very important industry of food 241
products has developed. These are the great and highly perfected mills, the sugar refineries, the distilleries, the breweries. and the tobacco factories which cover the whole territory of the Ukraine. As auxiliary products of agriculture, apart from vegetables of all kinds, known in Europe, the production of which is difficult to estimate, one can mention the melons, water-melons, cucumbers, and tomatoes, to the cultivation of which important tracts have been given.

The production of fruit and grapes has not experienced 245
so great a development. The surface given to fruit trees (cherries, apples, apricots, and pears) reaches about 250,000 hectares. The most important horticultural centres are to be found in the region of Ouman, on the banks of the Dniester, at the mouth of the Dnieper, and equally in the surroundings of Odessa, which are famous for their peach trees. The town of Ouman has a horticultural school and an experimental station which had already long before the Great War a great agricultural reputation throughout Russia.

The marketable harvest of fruit reached 80,000 tons before the Great War.

The surplus production of fruits and especially of vegetables (tomatoes) have brought about the rise and the rapid development of a food tinning industry which seemed to offer great possibilities in the future.

As to the vineyards (about 60,000 hectares), they are

[see category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

245 found in the extreme south of the Ukraine, on the banks of the Dniester and the Boug (Voznessensk), in the region of Odessa, at the mouth of the Dnieper, and in the region of the rapids near Zaporojie.

Despite the small importance of the vineyards in the agricultural economy of the Ukraine, a great effort has been made by Russia in this sphere. An experimental station for vines has been established near Odessa which has a laboratory for the analysis of the harvests. Highly qualified specialists have made researches there on the growth of native and French varieties for the creation of species adapted to the soil and to the climatic conditions of the Ukrainian vine region.

246 The cultivation of fodder, such as clover and others, are relatively little known in the Ukraine. The lands which are given up to them are almost entirely in the western part of Zone 1,2 which is over-populated and provided with natural pastures. Their surface does not exceed 1,000,000 hectares. In the Ukrainian Steppe only the natural pastures are of importance. (It is to be hoped that the culture of fodder will develop in the Steppe as it is necessary for the rational enrichment of the land.)

241 Before going on to the question of forestry and to breeding, let us say a few words about the state of agriculture in the lately Polish part of the Ukraine.

Being a natural continuation of Zone 1,2 with a poorer soil, this country produces a large proportion of rye, which occupies more than a third of the sown surface.

The other crops are barley, wheat, oats, and potatoes, all of which are used by the native population. The cultivation of sugar-beet is very limited.

246 On the other hand the cultivation of fodder is more extensive in Polish Galicia than in the Soviet part of the

2 [see category 116, pp. 139-140 --- Analyst]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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245 found in the extreme south of the Ukraine, on the banks of the Dniester and the Boug (Voznessensk), in the region of Odessa, at the mouth of the Dnieper, and in the region of the rapids near Zaporojie.

Despite the small importance of the vineyards in the agricultural economy of the Ukraine, a great effort has been made by Russia in this sphere. An experimental station for vines has been established near Odessa which has a laboratory for the analysis of the harvests. Highly qualified specialists have made researches there on the growth of native and French varieties for the creation of species adapted to the soil and to the climatic conditions of the Ukrainian vine region.

246 The cultivation of fodder, such as clover and others, are relatively little known in the Ukraine. The lands which are given up to them are almost entirely in the western part of Zone 1,2 which is over-populated and provided with natural pastures. Their surface does not exceed 1,000,000 hectares. In the Ukrainian Steppe only the natural pastures are of importance. (It is to be hoped that the culture of fodder will develop in the Steppe as it is necessary for the rational enrichment of the land.)

241 Before going on to the question of forestry and to breeding, let us say a few words about the state of agriculture in the lately Polish part of the Ukraine.

Being a natural continuation of Zone 1,2 with a poorer soil, this country produces a large proportion of rye, which occupies more than a third of the sown surface.

The other crops are barley, wheat, oats, and potatoes, all of which are used by the native population. The cultivation of sugar-beet is very limited.

246 On the other hand the cultivation of fodder is more extensive in Polish Galicia than in the Soviet part of the

2 [see category 116, pp. 139-140--- Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Ukraine, where, as we have seen, it is only intensive in the western part of Zone 1. 246

. . . . .

Both from the point of view of numbers and of quality, the Ukraine is of little interest in forestry. Its production is even insufficient to satisfy the local needs. 137

The forests are mostly concentrated in the districts of Volynia, Kiev, and Tchernigov and are mainly fir trees. Their surface does not exceed 3,000,000 hectares.

Apart from the forests one meets, in the western part of Zone 1, oases of oaks and those light woods which are familiar to the rest of Europe, excepting, however, the beech tree, the geographical distribution of which is the best justification of the division of our continent into Western and Eastern Europe.

As to Zone 2, it is completely treeless with the exception of some oases to the east of Kharkov.

Towards the west the forest region increases and its exploitation becomes more intense. Already in Galicia, near the Carpathians, they represent an important part of the production of the country without, however, playing the role of an important export.

. . . . .

A land of great size and magnificent pastures, the Ukraine occupies an important place in Europe in the sphere of cattle-breeding. 231

The Ukrainian Steppes provide excellent conditions for the breeding of horses, the number of which before the last war reached 5,500,000.

It would be unjust not to note that the German colonists have contributed much to the improvement of the horses in Southern Ukraine, especially in the region of Kherson, where many great enterprises were devoted to them.

The years of collectivization and the extermination

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

successful (45 000 t). Sunflowers were cultivated in 1935 on an area of 1 659 000 ha, mainly in the Kuban area. The yield for 1930—35 (0.9 million t) was only a little less than that of the USSR and much more than that of any other country. 247

As a grain producing country, Ukraine, with its yield of approximately 25 million t of the four main European varieties (= 10 % of world production), took a leading place in the years before the First World War (1909—1931). It exported 7.9 million t, or 1/3 of total world grain exports, topping the list for wheat and barley (4.3 million t, and 20 % and 2.7 million t and 43 % respectively of world exports). In the years 1931—35, production in Ukraine decreased by only 9 % i. e. by 24.6 million t, world production amounting then to 276.6 million t, while the decrease in export trade in the same period was much greater. The reason for this was the small yield per hektar as well as inadequate cultivation in consequence of collectivisation and unfavorable conditions for selling agricultural and buying industrial products; in addition there was an increased demand at home as the country became more industrialised. 433 243

6. Cattle Rearing

The distribution of livestock in Ukraine varies considerably. In the wide spaces of North Caucasia there is much pasture-land so that there are not many cattle per unit of area, though quite a number per head of the population. 231 433 811

The opposite is true of Galicia where management is intensive. The many meadows of Polesya support good stocks of cattle while the mountain pastures of the Carpathians are not sufficiently utilised. Between those extremes we have the bulk of Ukrainian arable land with relatively poor supplies of fodder for cattle. The result is that Ukraine does not contribute to the cattle rearing industry of the world what one might expect from a country of its agricultural standing. Before World War I there were 13.5 million head of cattle in Ukraine, i. e. 2.8 % of world stock. The proportion of dairy cows in this figure increases continuously as the use of oxen for draught, which used to be a characteristic feature of the country, had been declining for some time. (Table 3).

248 433 Hemp is produced above all in the Chernyhiv area (229 000 ha), Ukraine coming after the USSR in hemp production of the world; in the years 1931—35 its fibre yield was 13 % (8 000 t)

[249]



and its seed yield 19 % (420 000 t) of the world production. Flax is grown on an area of 230 000 ha; Ukraine with a yield of 60 000 t stands second in world production of fibre flax (9.4 % of 640 000 t) while it is sixth as a producer of flax for seed, its yield of 71 000 t being 2 % of world production (3.5 million t).

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

Cotton is produced on areas that shift from year to year, mostly without artificial irrigation; hitherto it has not been very successful (45,000t)

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243 As to hops, they are spread over the relatively poor lands of Volynia. Since the end of the nineteenth century this crop has experienced a great development in the Ukraine, which has furnished more than 50 per cent of the hops on the markets of the Russian Empire. This, as is well known, is an indispensable product in the manufacture of beer.

Owing to their utilization in the breweries oats can equally be considered as being not only a direct food crop. This would also apply to a part of the potato harvest (total of 1·2 million hectares), which supplies the most important material for the production of alcohol.

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241 In all that concerns agriculture, the division into agro-climatic zones seems to be entirely justified.

Actually the northern limit of the cultivation of maize and sunflower corresponds almost entirely to the border between these two zones. On the other hand 95 per cent of the land occupied by sugar-beet is to be found in the southern part of Zone 1.[1] This separation is also not quite so definite for the cultivation of cereals, but nevertheless it exists. The greater amount of wheat is grown in Zone 2.[1] Rye and oats, on the contrary, occupy a greater surface in the north. In the case of the two less important cereals, buckwheat and millet, the separa-

1 [see category 116, pp. 139-140.---Analyst]

5. Other Agricultural Produce

244 433 In Western Ukraine potatoes account for 16—18 % of the arable land, decreasing towards the south-east to 3—2%. There has been a considerable increase in the cultivation of potatoes of recent times on the small property belonging to private or to collectivised peasants. The yield per ha which before World War I amounted to 92 q sank in the years 1929—1933 to 86 q (Belgium 213, Germany 156, France 110, USSR 80, USA 72). Its total production of 20.6 million t, 10 % of world production (205.6 million t in years 1931—35) puts Ukraine fourth after Germany, USSR (exclusive of Ukraine), and Poland (exclusive of Ukrainian territory).

● 249 433 Sugar beet is the most important technical culture. It is grown mostly in the center of Dnipro-Ukraine where the rainfall is 500 mm, above all in the area round Kyiv and in Podolia. The average area planted in the years from 1901/02 to 1910/11 amounted to 555 000 ha and the total yield to 85 million t (154 q/ha). In 1935 Ukraine, with a sugar beet area of 952 000 ha, was the first country in the world as regards this product.

And yet the yields per hektar have decreased to 90 q, the average for 1931—35. In Germany the corresponding figure is 290 q/ha, in Denmark 322 q/ha, in Holland 350 q/ha, in the USSR

[243]



84 q/ha. The reason for the decrease is to be sought in the Soviet form of management. With an entire yield of 8.8 mil-

lion t and 14 % of the world production of sugar beet, Ukraine comes second after Germany (10.6 million t) and before France and the USA (8.2 and 8.1 million t respectively). 249 433

[243]



Conditions for growing tobacco in Ukraine are favorable, but the area planted, which in 1908 was 50 000 ha, has not been increased; the yield has risen slightly (8 000 t in the entire country). Better qualities were planted in the south, and elsewhere the well-known "makhorka". Hops of good quality were 249 433

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

grown in Volynia and partly also in Galicia; 2 000 t were harvested.

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

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

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243 Quite recently one has experimented in the Ukraine with two crops formerly unknown in that country—soho and rice—which have given good results. The experience is especially interesting in the case of rice, a very important cereal unknown in Europe, except in Italy, and the cultivation of which may well open new agricultural perspectives.

. . . . .

249 Beside the cereals, the most important sown surface (2,500,000 hectares) is occupied by the so-called technical cultivations, the products of which serve as raw materials in industry, both food and general.

These are the sugar-beet, oil-bearing plants, linseed, hops, and tobacco. The beet, the sown surface of which covers nearly 1,000,000 hectares, occupies the predominant place.

This cultivation expects concentrated exploitation by the great enterprises, furnished by an appropriate agricultural organization and abundant labour, in order to give big harvests.

Thus, before the advent of the Soviet regime, the harvest of beet in the Ukraine reached 150,000,000 quintals, representing nearly 18 per cent of the world's production. At present, notwithstanding the increase of the utilized surface, the harvest only reaches a maximum of 110,000,000. This diminution must be considered as being temporary and solely due to the new system of State capitalism which cannot fully replace private initiative.

One cannot, however, expect a new increase of production in this direction because the cultivation of sugar-beet exhausts the land, hinders the rational system of agricultural exploitation, and requires an enormous outlay on chemical manure, which has to be set off as a

capital investment against a revenue which does not surpass the normal revenue of a well-organized production of wheat. 249

The cultivation of sugar-beet is concentrated in the region of Kiev, Kharkov, and in Podolia (Zone 1).[1] The harvest is almost everywhere made into raw sugar on the spot. The refineries, however, are dispersed over the whole territory; 95 per cent of the sugar industry of the Soviet Union is in the Ukraine and owes its expansion to the general Pan-Russian economic organization.

The oil-bearing plants are represented in the Ukraine by the sunflower, linseed, hemp, and mustard.

The cultivation of sunflowers occupies about 800,000 to 850,000 hectares. This is the only source of consumable vegetable oil. Sunflower oil is very nourishing and much appreciated by the native population. It has only one fault—it cannot be preserved for a long time and must be used from harvest to harvest.

Linseed and hemp furnish machine oil and that which is used for the manufacture of paint. Linseed also furnishes the seeds for the northern regions, in Great Russia, where it is cultivated for its fibres. Mustard grains give, apart from the well-known seasoning, small quantities of oil which is used in some food industries.

Among other non-food cultivations, the surface and the harvest of which are more or less important, let us mention tobacco, hops, and cotton.

The production of tobacco in the Ukraine is considerable. 60 per cent of the tobacco plantations of the U.S.S.R. are to be found in the region of Tchernigov and of Romny (in the district of Poltava).

These are tobaccos of an inferior quality, furnishing the partial requirements throughout Russia, and which

1 [See category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

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1 [see category 116, pp. 139-140.---Analyst]

339 To finish with heavy industries, let us still mention the production of building materials—600,000 tons of cement (in the region of the Sea of Azov) and 1 milliard of bricks are annually manufactured in the Ukraine.

258 As for light industry, it is that of food production which occupies the first place.

257 The sugar industry of the whole of Russia is to be found almost entirely in the Ukraine. 12,000,000 quintals of crystallized sugar and 4,000,000 quintals of refined sugar can be produced here annually.

256 The milling industry also occupies an important place. Very important mills, many of which are supplied with highly perfected means of sifting and straining, specialized in the manufacture of fine flours for export before the last war. This industry is concentrated in the ports or in the towns near these or near river ports and in the surroundings of important railway junctions of the southern region. This industry represents 35 per cent of the whole milling industry of the Union and produces, despite the fact that it is not working at full pressure, 2,500,000 tons of wheat flour per annum.

249 The oil mills of the Ukraine produce 40,000 tons of sunflower oil, 3000 tons of linseed oil, and 3000 tons of mustard oil.

274 70 per cent of the alcohol distilleries of the Soviet Union are also in the Ukraine, manufacturing all types of alcohol: from corn, for drinks such as vodka and other liqueurs, and from potatoes, for the dye industry, for pharmaceutical products, and for perfumery.

277 The very important tobacco industry is distributed throughout the great centres of the territory.

255 As for the production of tinned foods, 78 per cent of the production of the Union originates from the Ukraine. Important quantities of vegetables (especially of tomatoes) and of fruit are tinned and exported from the territory.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

privately-owned lands. The failure or success of the 243
Ukraine wheat harvest has its effect upon the corn 439
exchanges of the whole world, and its shipment from the Black Sea is the occasion of much anxiety and speculation every season.

Barley is largely grown and exported, being principally raised on privately-owned land. *Maize* comes next in value; the greater part of the crop is consumed locally, but a moderate quantity is exported in good years. The *oat* crop is valuable, and a proportion remains for export after the supply of local needs. *Millet* and *buckwheat* are grown for local use.

Of the non-cereal crops, *potatoes* take the first 244
place, exceeding all others by a large margin. They 439
are used not only for food and the manufacture of potato flour, but for the distillation of spirits, a flourishing industry in many districts. Small crops of *peas*, *beans*, and *lentils* are also grown.

The *sugar-beet* is raised in great quantities, especially in the governments which have not the black soil. Kiev produces most, Podolia and Kharkov come next; the remaining Governments have only small crops, and Taurida and Yekaterinoslav none. There is usually a large surplus of refined sugar for export, in addition to a valuable internal trade in sugar and manufactures thereof; the by-products of cattle food and spirit distilled from molasses increase the value of this crop.

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000 *Apiculture* is common in the northern Ukraine, and

241 conceal the fact that the grain harvest of 1938 was only one-sixth larger than that of 1913, whereas the population had increased by nearly 30%.

According to the latest statistics, 80% of the entire arable soil is cultivated, while 20% of it is left fallow. Of the total cultivated surface of all Ukrainian provinces, 76% is planted to grain, 57% of which consists of wheat /151/ and rye, 33% of barley, oats and corn, 10% of millet and buckwheat. Of the entire cultivated area 9% is occupied by industrial plants, chiefly sugar beets and sunflowers, 8% by potatoes, vegetables and legumes, and 7% by fodder. Of the 160 million hectares of land planted to wheat throughout the world in 1933, 12 million hectares fell to the Ukrainian provinces. This gave them third place after the USA with its 17 million hectares and British India with 14.6 million hectares. (95) But the hectare yields in the

95. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas.

Ukrainian provinces are uncommonly low according to German ideas and in view of the excellent soil. They amount to 9.2 doppelzentner /two hundred weights = 100 kilograms = 220.50 lbs./of wheat (Germany: 22 doppelzentner) and 9.2 doppelzentner of rye (Germany: 17.5 doppelzentner). (96) The

96. Deminskij: "The Economy of the Ukraine" in Deutsche Berufserziehung, Number 15 and 16, page 135.

careless method of cultivating the soil, on the one hand, and the insufficient amount of precipitation on the other, are to blame for these low yields.

249 The sunflower is a cultivated plant that is little known in our country. Its region of cultivation begins in eastern Podolia, runs along

249 the coast of the Black Sea, divides into two wide branches at the Sea of Azov, one of which extends up to the Volga and the other down to Ciscaucasia. In the Kuban region the sunflower occupies up to 30% of the entire cultivated land. The lovely blossoms with their coffee-brown centers and their wreath of yellow rays are improbably large in the Kuban country. Oil mills press out the seeds and manufacture table oil from them. The Kuban "dessert varieties" are valued as a delicacy, the seeds of which are eaten like nuts and are as large as dates. In the last few years the cultivation of cotton has been newly introduced all around the Sea of Azov. But its yield is very small, and the surface cultivated fluctuates from year to year. Between 1931 and 1935 an average of about 300,000 hectares was planted. The attempts to grow rice in the Dnepr plains are also new.

*

474 /152/ What is a collective farm? The Bolsheviks distinguish between the so-called Soviet farms, the communes and the artels, both also called kolhosp. The Soviet farm is a government estate in which land, buildings, livestock and goods belong to the state. The Soviet farms are supposed to be model farms for agricultural research; their average size is 1000 to 1200 hectares. They are run by "government officials".

The commune is a composite of peasant farms; the individual farms do not have a particular share of land, and it is cultivated according to a general agricultural plan. Its inventory, buildings and products are the property of the community. The members of the commune receive only a share of the yield which they need to cover their living requirements. The commune did not survive as an organizational form of Bolshevik agriculture, but the artel did. In the latter,

249

An important agricultural product: sunflowers.

Food Industries

5
727 The damage suffered by the Soviet food industry during the German
25 occupation - not counting the destruction of livestock and crops - has
U been estimated at 17,000 million roubles. Restoration work was begun
727 while the war was still on, and by May 1947, 3,200 food factories had
25 been rebuilt. A fairly large proportion of these restored factories
433 must have been in the Ukraine, where, according to the Soviet Monitor[1] 1,600 out of 1,822 pre-war food factories had been restored by November 6, 1946. The rehabilitated factories had exceeded their 11 months' food output programme by production valued at 12 million roubles (146 million roubles over the corresponding period of 1945).

Sugar

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257 Before the war the output of sugar in the Ukraine was as follows.

SU
257

TABLE XX

Pre-War Sugar Production: Ukraine and U.S.S.R.
(metric tons)

Year	Soviet Union total	Ukrainian S.S.R.
1928	1,221,200	1,086,400
1932	826,800	559,700
1937	2,377,500	1,789,800

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; and Statistical Yearbooks of the League of Nations, Geneva, 1936 and 1939.

The Five-Year Plan establishes that in 1946-50 sugar refineries in the Ukraine shall be restored or built capable of handling upwards of 67,000 tons of sugar beet per day. By 1950, according to plan, the output of granulated sugar in the Ukraine will reach 1,637,000 tons, (in the entire Soviet Union, 2.4 million tons).

Forestry

U
[311] In January 1935 the forest area of the Ukrainian S.S.R. was
313 3,845,000 hectares - about 0.5 per cent. of the forest area of the entire U.S.S.R.[2] The number of sawing frames in the Republic was 703 out of the Soviet Union total of 6,500 (total capacity, 18.4 million cubic metres).[3] Considering the relatively small forest

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1 November 11, 1946

2 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1936.

3 Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940, II.

241 Nevertheless, old traditions are preserved in connection with agricultural implements and habits. The Ukrainian peasant uses the ancient Slav "ralo" with one plowshare and the old plow reminiscent of Roman models, which is unknown to Russian and White Ruthenian peasants. Up till recently the heavy wooden plow was used in the steppe, drawn by 14 - 16 oxen. As with South and West Slavs, the ox is here the animal usually used for draught, and not the horse, as with the Russians.

The scythe is the most important implement for harvesting. Wheat, rye and barley are cut with the scythe which has developed curious 3-blade forms in Ukraine. The sheaves are first laid together in small stacks, composed of 30 sheaves and called "polukipok". This traditional harvesting operation is known to-day only in Ukraine and White Ruthenia. The latter nation, on the other hand, and the Russians use the drying kiln for grain which has never become common in Ukraine, being used only in Volynia and in the north of the district round Chernyhiv.

Threshing is done by flail ("cip"), a characteristic form of which appears also in Mecklenburg. In the south, in addition to threshing by means of a wheel-cart drawn by oxen ("harnanyty"), a roller is also used, while in Bessarabia and the Kuban area, special boards ("mjalky") are found, such as are also used extensively to-day in Greece and Macedonia. Threshing is mostly done in special sheds ("tik") and in winter on ice and in barns ("stodola"), which have a small floor specially for this purpose. The threshing procedure of the Ukrainian differs also from that of the Russian; he does not lay the sheaves out in rows like the latter, but threshes not more than 2 - 3 sheaves at once. Grain is stored in granaries and in the steppe also in
● 251 pearshaped pits or in straw-containers ("solomjanyk"); in the Carpathians, Polesya and Volynia the custom of storing grain in hollowed trees ("kadovby") is still preserved. In Podolia, Bessarabia and in Southern Ukraine generally maize is gathered
231 and dried in special contraptions, woven like baskets. The shape of the bee-hives in Ukraine is also peculiar. In addition to the forest hives ("kolody") there are also hives lying or standing
ooo on a log or piece of wood ("lezen" or "stojan"). The peculiar

and often ancient methods and apparatuses used in catching fish in Ukraine are also worth mentioning.

The food of the peasants is almost exclusively vegetarian and consists of bread and cake, vegetables and milk. Although meat is eaten only on very special occasions, the menu is not monotonous. Bread is made of wheat or rye, in the mountains also of barley. The Ukrainians leaven their bread but, in contrast to the Russians, usually bake it without salt. Some unleavened kinds of bread ("mlynets", "perepitshka") are used for ritualistic purposes.

The national dishes in Ukraine are "borshtsh", a soup made of the juice of pickled beetroot ("kvas"); "halushky" boiled flour dumplings of unleavened buckwheat or wheat flour, "varenyky", called "pyrohy" in Western Ukraine, small flour pastries, filled with potatoes, curd, millet, cabbage and so on, which are boiled and eaten with sour cream, butter or honey; "holubtsy" = cabbage roulades; "kasha" = porridge; "kysil", a sourish porridge of flour; in Southern Ukraine "kulesha" or "mamalyga" = maize porridge and finally, different soups with dough ("zatyrka") and cabbage ("kapusnjak").

Ritual dishes are "kutja" (wheat and honey) and "uzvar" (Christmas dish of dried fruit). Salted lard ("salo") and bacon ("solonyna") are much used at cooking. In periods of fasting, food is baked in oil. Roasting and smoking are not usual cooking procedures, but boiling in pure butter or fat is popular.

The national beverages are brandy ("horilka"), mead ("med"), honey boiled with brandy ("varenukha"), "kvas", made of sour rye, biscuit or fruit, in places also a drink of millet malt ("braha") and birch, and maple juice.

The Ukrainian is good at all peasant crafts, especially at wood work, carpentry, turnery and rope-making. Weaving and furrier-work is widely practised and ceramic work is done everywhere, while work in metal which was formerly common, has almost died out. Tailoring to-day is also mostly in the hands of foreigners.

185 According to the new Five-Year Plan, the output of meat in the
253 Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 will amount to 245,000 tons (for the entire
234 Soviet Union the production target is fixed at 1,300,000 tons) while output of butter for the Ukraine in the year 1950 is fixed at 40,000 tons (275,000 tons for the entire Soviet Union).

The following factories and farms will be rehabilitated or built: 55 meat packing plants, 33 refrigerator plants, 97 poultry farms, 46 milk factories, and 100 butter and cheese factories.

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There were about 80 tobacco factories before World War I, 277
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A highly developed cement industry in Novorossijske (10 plants) used to produce 633 000 t annually. In 1934, 5 of the plants there produced 1 million t, and with Dnipro-Ukraine 1.5 million t = 45 % of the total production of USSR. Ukraine must come eight in world production. In Dnipro-Ukraine and North Caucasia in the same year, 940 000 t of fire-proof earthenware and dinas bricks were produced, 924 000 t lime, 220 000 t chalk, 207 000 t alabaster and 37 000 t gypsum.

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7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The possibilities of the development of this industry are enormous. The excellent quality of the vegetables and fruits and the big supplies of fish at the mouth of the Dnieper would have been able to give this industry a great importance, but in this respect the Soviet Government has shown especial incompetence.

Light industry in the exact sense of the word is relatively little developed in the Ukraine. Apart from a few saw mills, soap factories, skin and leather works, furniture works, perfumeries, and porcelain factories, there is little which would attract our attention. We will limit ourselves to simply mentioning them. One cannot really speak of a textile industry. The whole Ukraine has only three factories and only produces 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in Russia.

If agriculture is in a state of curtailment since the appearance of the Soviet regime, if neither light industry nor the means of communication have made any progress (which is equivalent to an absence of progress), the production of minerals and the metal industry show great development, especially since 1932, to which must be added the construction of the *Dnieprogues*.

This progress is not only manifested by the increase of production, but by the centralization of the metal industry in the districts in which the raw materials are extracted. Before the last war the Ukraine was a country of a great surplus of corn, iron, and coal. To-day the surplus of her production is represented by manufactured metal goods and in this her economic potential is found to be radically changed.

The displacement and the development of the industrial potential of the Ukraine ought to have resulted in the increased welfare of her population. Nothing like that has been achieved.

Neither the aim nor the object of this book allow us

385 also manufactured in Konstantynivka (200 000 t), in the Dnipro Combine (140 000 t) and in Kerch (80 000 t), also in Znesinnia near Lviv (capacity of 80 000 t). The total figure for 1932 was 70 000 t = 47 % of total Russian production.

Potash salts were manufactured into artificial manures in Kalush and Holyn while Slovjanske supplied among other products soda for the entire USSR (in 1932 = 375 000 t). By-products from coke and benzol were manufactured in the Donets Basin, the Dnipro Combine (in 1932 = 264 000 pitch, 250 000 ammonia, 132 000 tar) and in Kryvyj Rih, and more recently also synthetic ammonia and aniline dyes. Plants for the dry distillation of wood were erected in Kyiv and Carpatho-Ukraine (Byehkiv, Perechyn, Svaljava).

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After a decline caused by the First World War, the pre-war figure was reached only at the beginning of the first Five Year Plan. In 1933/34 170 sugar factories were operating, and they produced 0.8 million t = 8.5 % of world sugar production (USA 1.6, Germany 1.4, France 0.9 million t). Most of the plants are in the Kyiv district and Podolia; 3 are in Galicia. The contribution of Ukraine to the entire production of USSR sank slowly but steadily as the sugar industry was subsidised by the state in the Black Earth district of Central Russia, Siberia and Central Asia. Progress was made in the Kuban area only, where there was not a single sugar factory up to 1914. In 1933/34 20 000 t of sugar were produced there.

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During the last thirty or forty years, it is true, the economic situation of the Ukraine has changed considerably; three large industries have developed in the country: the sugar industry, the mining and the metal industries. And one is tempted to say that this development was due to Russian protection. But is this quite correct? Undoubtedly the protection had some influence, but not as much as one might suppose. In the first place, one must not forget that in the Ukraine there are natural conditions much more favorable to these industries than in any other part of the Russian Empire. Certainly the sugar, metal and mining interests are among those which depend on the location of their raw materials and can never start in a place where these are lacking. Besides, these industries are infinitely more fostered by transportational advantages than by custom duties. The duties which were imposed on foreign coal did not prevent the importation of English coal into the Baltic provinces nor into Petrograd. On the other hand, even if all custom duties on foreign coal had been suppressed, it would never have penetrated into central Russia and there replaced the fuel of Donetz. As to the sugar, the situation in the Ukraine was perhaps even more favorable. As to metallurgy, it no doubt profited by the protective Russian tax. But there again the role of this tax was not very great. In fact, the products of Ukrainian metallurgy were heavy (rails, beams, tires, wheels, pipes, iron bars, etc.), and their manufacture was only slightly stimulated by the tax because of the great distances over which they had, in any case, to be carried. Protective tariff is much more necessary to those industries which supply finished products of light weight, but of these the Ukraine furnished very few. The textile industry of Moscow and of Poland profited much more by protection, as did many other branches of the industrial activities of central Russia.

Effect of Russian Imperial Methods in Ukraine

369 241

Therefore, by this system, the Ukraine had more loss than profit. She was still a market for Russian and Polish industrial products, for which she paid high prices. But

257 The central agrarian section of Ukraine, on both banks of
311 the Dnipro, includes industries producing foodstuffs and luxuries, above all the sugar industry. There are also plants here for manufacturing leather and medium-heavy machinery. Factories are much smaller than in the coal and ore area and the many small power-stations run on brown coal and peat.

381 The Carpathian area is the home above all of the chemical
311 industry and the capacity of the power-stations, usually run by gas and expensive imported coal, seldom by the abundant water power available, exceeds 10 000 KW only in Lviv — Uzhhorod, being used principally for lighting the towns. Industrialisation is densest on the oil-fields of Drohobych.

371 In the foreland of the Caucasus electric plants are run by
311 petroleum only and water power is not exploited at all. The small factories (petroleum, tobaceo, leather and machinery of medium weight) are too scattered to form an industrial area in the strict sense.

392 The large towns form industrial centers that are not dependent
311 on the presence of raw materials. Kharkiv has heavy engineering plants for transportation requirements, factories for agricultural machinery, electro-technical factories, and workshops for precision instruments and machinery. These are large enterprises, built recently and attached to big power-stations (Chuhujiv 25 000 KW), so that Kharkiv may be classed with the industrial area in the vicinity.

39 Kyiv builds ships and produces chemical and electro-technical
311 equipment and has chemical and textile plants as well as sugar and foodstuffs factories. In Odessa the same factories are represented and there are also canneries, leather works and plants for producing cinema installations. In addition, there are workshops that specialise in the structure of motor-cars and planes. In the other towns in the country enterprises for this or that industry have been established.

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9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

ing both from abroad and from other parts of Russia. 433
The two principal exceptions to this rule are manu- 439
factured food-stuffs, and heavy iron and steel products.

Sixty-eight per cent. of the manufactured products 433
of the country consist of food-stuffs. The industries 252
contributing to this output are various, including flour- 257
milling, sugar-refining, and those dependent wholly or partly upon sugar, such as confectionery, fruit-preserving, distilling from molasses, brewing, and wine-making. Most of the undertakings concerned have only a small capital, and are situated near the source of their raw material. In the neighbourhood of Kiev, however, sugar-refining and its dependent industries are carried on in large works, many of which are capitalized from abroad.

The close conjunction of the Donets coalfield and 327
the iron and manganese deposits has enabled the 433
Ukraine to be almost entirely self-supporting in iron and steel manufactures of the first categories, and to supply the wants of the remainder of Russia as well. Pig-iron, bar-iron, roof-iron, steel rails, axles, tubes, and assorted merchant iron are all made in the iron-works which have been established in increasing numbers on the coal and iron fields. These works are seldom in large centres of population, but as a rule in small towns and villages, some of which owe their existence to the need of housing for the labour employed.

The output of raw iron and steel in the first stage of manufacture under the headings of Bessemer and Thomas bars, Martin-process bars, cast-iron and steel billets, and cast-iron tubes, was in 1906 1,300,000 tons, and in 1910 1,900,000 tons. The output of iron and steel in the second stage of manufacture, under the headings of T and H beams, rails, sheet-iron, rolled wire, roof-iron, trusses, springs, assorted merchant iron and axles, was in 1906 1,010,000 tons, and in 1910 1,602,258 tons. In the former year the output in both stages was equal to about 45 per cent., and in the latter year to about 55 per cent., of the total Russian output.

433 became /165/ "Red Progress, Dnepropetrovsk", and so on. The giant tractor factory in Khar'kov was newly erected, an accomplishment which is proudly shown to every foreign visitors. Important, however, is not only the number of tractors that leave the factory, but also their serviceability and durability. The significance of the industrial plants which have remained from the pre-war period is also evident from the invested capital, according to which, just as before, the iron industry ranks first, coal second and the sugar industry third. In these three industries half of the entire capital invested in Ukrainian industry is combined. Only after that come machine construction and the chemical works which to a certain extent have arisen only in most recent times. (106)

106. Kubiyovich: Commentary to the Atlas, page XXXIII.

• 257 The sugar industry forms only a part of the food and luxury industry which was a very important branch even before the war. Its center is in the beet-growing region between Podolia, Kiyev and Khar'kov. In 1913 200 Ukrainian sugar factories produced 1.2 million tons of sugar, in 1933 170 factories produced 0.8 million tons. (107)

107. Deminskiy, The Economy of the Ukraine, page 140.

258 Besides that there is, also dating back to the pre-
274 war period, a considerable mill and oil industry, the latter in the Kuban region, as well as distilleries.

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369 The increase of urban population is a natural concomitant of industrialization. The Ukraine has

Food Industries

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727 The damage suffered by the Soviet food industry during the German
25 occupation - not counting the destruction of livestock and crops - has
U been estimated at 17,000 million roubles. Restoration work was begun
727 while the war was still on, and by May 1947, 3,200 food factories had
25 been rebuilt. A fairly large proportion of these restored factories
433 must have been in the Ukraine, where, according to the Soviet Monitor[1] 1,600 out of 1,822 pre-war food factories had been restored by November 6, 1946. The rehabilitated factories had exceeded their 11 months' food output programme by production valued at 12 million roubles (146 million roubles over the corresponding period of 1945).

Sugar

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257 Before the war the output of sugar in the Ukraine was as follows.
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TABLE XX

Pre-War Sugar Production: Ukraine and U.S.S.R.
(metric tons)

Year	Soviet Union total	Ukrainian S.S.R.
1928	1,221,200	1,086,400
1932	826,800	559,700
1937	2,377,500	1,789,800

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; and Statistical Yearbooks of the League of Nations, Geneva, 1936 and 1939.

The Five-Year Plan establishes that in 1946-50 sugar refineries in the Ukraine shall be restored or built capable of handling upwards of 67,000 tons of sugar beet per day. By 1950, according to plan, the output of granulated sugar in the Ukraine will reach 1,637,000 tons, (in the entire Soviet Union, 2.4 million tons).

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factured food-stuffs, and heavy iron and steel products.

Sixty-eight per cent. of the manufactured products 433
of the country consist of food-stuffs. The industries 258
contributing to this output are various, including flour- 257
milling, sugar-refining, and those dependent wholly or partly upon sugar, such as confectionery, fruit-preserving, distilling from molasses, brewing, and wine-making. Most of the undertakings concerned have only a small capital, and are situated near the source of their raw material. In the neighbourhood of Kiev, however, sugar-refining and its dependent industries are carried on in large works, many of which are capitalized from abroad.

The close conjunction of the Donets coalfield and 327
the iron and manganese deposits has enabled the 433
Ukraine to be almost entirely self-supporting in iron and steel manufactures of the first categories, and to supply the wants of the remainder of Russia as well. Pig-iron, bar-iron, roof-iron, steel rails, axles, tubes, and assorted merchant iron are all made in the iron-works which have been established in increasing numbers on the coal and iron fields. These works are seldom in large centres of population, but as a rule in small towns and villages, some of which owe their existence to the need of housing for the labour employed.

The output of raw iron and steel in the first stage of manufacture under the headings of Bessemer and Thomas bars, Martin-process bars, cast-iron and steel billets, and cast-iron tubes, was in 1906 1,300,000 tons, and in 1910 1,900,000 tons. The output of iron and steel in the second stage of manufacture, under the headings of T and H beams, rails, sheet-iron, rolled wire, roof-iron, trusses, springs, assorted merchant iron and axles, was in 1906 1,010,000 tons, and in 1910 1,602,258 tons. In the former year the output in both stages was equal to about 45 per cent., and in the latter year to about 55 per cent., of the total Russian output.

433 became /165/ "Red Progress, Dnepropetrovsk", and so on. The giant tractor factory in Khar'kov was newly erected, an accomplishment which is proudly shown to every foreign visitors. Important, however, is not only the number of tractors that leave the factory, but also their serviceability and durability. The significance of the industrial plants which have remained from the pre-war period is also evident from the invested capital, according to which, just as before, the iron industry ranks first, coal second and the sugar industry third. In these three industries half of the entire capital invested in Ukrainian industry is combined. Only after that come machine construction and the chemical works which to a certain extent have arisen only in most recent times. (106)

106. Kubiyovich: Commentary to the Atlas, page XXXIII.

257 The sugar industry forms only a part of the food and luxury industry which was a very important branch even before the war. Its center is in the beet-growing region between Podolia, Kiyev and Khar'kov. In 1913 200 Ukrainian sugar factories produced 1.2 million tons of sugar, in 1933 170 factories produced 0.8 million tons. (107)

107. Deminskiy, The Economy of the Ukraine, page 140.

258 Besides that there is, also dating back to the pre-
274 war period, a considerable mill and oil industry, the latter in the Kuban region, as well as distilleries.

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369 The increase of urban population is a natural concomitant of industrialization. The Ukraine has

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Nevertheless, the 1945 harvest - assisted by lend-lease supplies which were still then available, and (beginning in December 1945) by UNRRA relief deliveries - was furnishing the population a fair amount of cereals and bread. There was, however, very little meat from domestic sources, and only a small amount of fats and oils, as the following table shows.

TABLE XII

Ukraine: Production and Utilization of Fats and Oils, 1945.
(thousand metric tons)

727
433
258
262

	Oilseeds	
Production		
Total production of oilseeds		496.4
Deduction for seed		53.6
Available for processing		442.8
Utilization		
388 Total production of oil		105.8
Deduction for industrial use (soap manufacture, etc.)		26.7
Available for human consumption		
by urban population	29.0	
by rural population	50.0	
Total		79.1
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
urban population		2.41
rural population		1.86
Average		1.98

[p2 8]

TABLE XII (Continued)

727
433
258 Production
262

Animal fat

Production		74.7
Imports		12.5[1]
Available for consumption		
by urban population	32.7	
by rural population	54.5	
Total		87.2
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
by urban population		2.73
by rural population		2.0
Average		2.19

Summary (Oils and Fats)

All fat and oil resources		
Vegetable oils		105.8
Animal fats		74.7
Total production		180.5
Imports		12.5[1]
Available for distribution		193.0
Consumption		
Technical purposes		26.7
Food		
Urban	61.7	
Rural	104.6	
Total food		166.3
Total consumption		193.0
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
by urban population		5.14
by rural population		3.86
Average		4.17

1 Available from Lend-lease

Source: Ukrainian Department of UNRRA Supplies, Kiev, May 15, 1946.

the scheme officially outlined for the good of Russia, the surplus food in Podolia should not be used to save the lives of the peasants in Odessa, a few miles away, but should be carried through the starving regions, placed on board a steamer and sold in Hamburg . . ." (p. 323). 731 656 439

A representative of the Relief Committee of Fridtjof Nansen who was in Ukraine at the beginning of 1922 gives the following facts on the famine:

"Eight million souls are starving in the south of the Ukraine, 2½ millions of them have absolutely nothing to eat. A further 2½ millions are feeding themselves on substitutes, such as hay, dried plants, etc., but are not getting any normal meals; three millions have some supplies, but in such small quantities that they will soon be reckoned in the first and second categories. It may be said that before the end of April 7 million souls will come under these two categories. About 700,000 little children who have been brought into municipal asylums do not receive more than one fifth of the normal portion. Child mortality is tremendous. It reaches 50%. In Zaporoje one million souls are litterally starving. 60% are children. Cannibalism is spreading. Ten thousand people die in Zaporoje daily. All the cattle and the horses have been devoured". (*La famine en Ukraine:* Genève, 1922). 731 656 261

The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee gives a picture of the famine in Ukraine as follows:

"The country side is parched, without trees or plants, almost entirely black. The straw of the roofs is being used to nourish men and animals. People relate that they first ate up all dogs, cats, crows that they could catch and then took to the starving cattle, to boot-leather and furniture wood. You hear accounts and find evidence of necrophagy and cannibalism. You speak with people who have devoured their children, their brothers and sisters. You see skeleton-like human forms lying in the peasant's huts, dying, or waiting without hope, to be rescued by death . . . Usually no one takes the trouble, or no one has sufficient energy to bury the dead".

In the time when the Ukrainian people were starving in masses, the Russian Government took care only of the aid for the hungry along the Volga. The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee in Ukraine wrote in his report of 1922: 731 656

"At the beginning of this year one could have seen in famine-stricken districts of the Gouvernement Nikolaiev such proclamations: 'Workers of Nikolaiev: Come to the assistance of the famine-stricken of the Volga region!' This happened at a time when this

and often ancient methods and apparatuses used in catching 000
fish in Ukraine are also worth mentioning.

The food of the peasants is almost exclusively vegetarian and 262
consists of bread and cake, vegetables and milk. Although meat 252
is eaten only on very special occasions, the menu is not monotonous. Bread is made of wheat or rye, in the mountains also of barley. The Ukrainians leaven their bread but, in contrast to the Russians, usually bake it without salt. Some unleavened kinds of bread ("mlynets", "perepitshka") are used for ritualistic purposes.

The national dishes in Ukraine are "borshtsh", a soup made of the juice of pickled beetroot ("kvas"); "halushky" boiled flour dumplings of unleavened buckwheat or wheat flour, "varenyky", called "pyrohy" in Western Ukraine, small flour pastries, filled with potatoes, curd, millet, cabbage and so on, which are boiled and eaten with sour cream, butter or honey; "holubtsy" = cabbage roulades; "kasha" = porridge; "kysil", a sourish porridge of flour; in Southern Ukraine "kulesha" or "mamalyga" = maize porridge and finally, different soups with dough ("zatyrka") and cabbage ("kapusnjak").

Ritual dishes are "kutja" (wheat and honey) and "uzvar" (Christmas dish of dried fruit). Salted lard ("salo") and bacon ("solonyna") are much used at cooking. In periods of fasting, food is baked in oil. Roasting and smoking are not usual cooking procedures, but boiling in pure butter or fat is popular.

The national beverages are brandy ("horilka"), mead ("med"), 273
honey boiled with brandy ("varenukha"), "kvas", made of sour rye, biscuit or fruit, in places also a drink of millet malt ("braha") and birch, and maple juice.

The Ukrainian is good at all peasant crafts, especially at wood 32
work, carpentry, turnery and rope-making. Weaving and fur- 28
rier-work is widely practised and ceramic work is done everywhere, while work in metal which was formerly common, has almost died out. Tailoring to-day is also mostly in the hands of foreigners.

most of the peasantry seem to have responded favorably.[63] Frustrating delays ensued throughout a large part of the Ukraine, however, especially in the Reichskommissariat. In part they were due to misplaced German thoroughness in requiring exact surveys of the land before proceeding to its division among the households in the *Landbaugenossenschaft*. More serious was the deliberate obstruction of Koch and others who, feeling that the program would leave some small segment of life free of their control, argued that it would result in reduced deliveries. As a result, only 10 percent instead of the planned 20 percent of *Gemeinwirtschaften* were converted to *Landbaugenossenschaften*.[64] In spite of the meager practical results, the de-collectivization program was a favorite theme of Koch's propaganda, doubtless because he allowed so little else of a positive nature even to be discussed. In the end, however, the constantly broken pledges unquestionably caused a loss of faith in the Germans, even a willingness to return to the known evils of the Soviet system. The peasant's saying, "A bad mother is still better than a step-mother who makes many promises," indicated his judgment of the German agricultural policy.[65]

The problem of securing agricultural supplies was closely connected with that of supplying the Ukrainian urban population with food. One way in which the Germans sought to obtain most of the farm products for their own use was to make practically no provision for feeding the city dwellers. This was especially true during the first winter. The concept was simple: the starving urban population would find some means, through barter or otherwise, of inducing the peasants to part with an extra, hidden supply of food beyond that which the Germans had been able to

[63] Cf. for example Report of Ortskommandantur Melitopol', July 8, 1942, PS 1693 (hereafter referred to as PS 1693); Report No. 7 of Representative of Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte and Stab des Befehlshabers des ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte Captain Müller, March 24, 1942, to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, PS 1686 (hereafter referred to as PS 1686).

[64] Memorandum by Bräutigam, October 25, 1942, PS 294 (hereafter referred to as PS 294).

[65] Situation report, Wirtschaftinspektorat Süd Ic, April, 1942, NG 1089 (hereafter referred to as NG 1089); Memorandum of Generalkommissar for the Crimea, Alfred Frauenfeld, to Himmler, February 10, 1944, NO 5394 (hereafter referred to as NO 5394).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

727 extract from them.[66] To a certain extent, of course, this was true. 262 Private individuals, as in the days after the Revolution, traveled about the countryside endeavoring to get something to eat in [746] return for whatever they had to give the peasant. The city administrations and welfare committees did what they could to secure food for their clients; indeed this was one reason the Germans allowed these suspect organizations to function at all, for they were thereby relieved of the necessity of attending to such matters. The resources at the hands of these organs were, however, infinitesimal compared to the needs.[67] This was especially true since the most valuable materials left in the cities were requisitioned by the Germans.[68]

The peasants in turn had little to sell. They had lived under the regimented planned economy of the Soviets, which prevented the individual from accumulating a private stock of agricultural products, rather than the loose system of tsarist days, when the more prosperous peasants could usually find a little more to sell if the price was attractive enough. Extremely heavy requisitions by the Wehrmacht, especially in the form of unauthorized seizures, had also depleted the supplies available. The result was a severe shortage of food in the cities, especially in the larger ones such as Kiev and Kharkov, which brought famine and the pestilences associated with it in the winter and spring of 1942.[69]

Like the agricultural policy and the starvation of the cities, the *Ostarbeiter* program was the result of ruthless efforts to increase the German war potential. Unlike the former policies, however, its evils do not even have the excuse of short-run expediency. The concept of bringing foreign workers to the armaments factories was, in itself, reasonable enough. Moreover, properly handled, it might very well have resulted in an increase rather than a

[66] PS 2174.

[67] During the terrible winter of 1941–42, the social welfare department of the Kiev municipal administration dispensed only about 100,000 *karbovontsi* (i.e., rubles; nominally the equivalent of 10,000 RM or about $4,000) per month; at the time, milk was 20 *k.* a liter, potatoes about 250 *k.* a hundredweight (*Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1). This monetary outlay may, of course, have been supplemented by food obtained by barter.

[68] For example, a charge brought against the Bahazii administration was that it had used newsprint to barter for food with the small towns (Interview 59). Cf. also p. 116 above.

[69] According to Oberländer (USSR Exhibit No. 278).

11:Obermaier--142 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

•262 Seventeen ingredients are supposed to go into the favorite dish of the Ukrainians, borscht, a soured beet soup. The Ukrainian cuisine also favors porridges made from various cereals, cooked in water and served with milk, cream or fat. The Ukrainian also loves his boiled vareniki, thinly rolled dough filled with pot cheese, chopped meat, cabbage or fruit. In West Ukraine the poor farmers must be content with potatoes, rye bread and turnips. The gentlemen farmers among the Ukrainians are the wealthy Kuban Cossacks who /135/ consume bacon and milk for breakfast, borscht, groats, fowl or fish for dinner, and fruit, cold borscht, melons and bacon in the afternoon, and vareniki in the evening. This is how it was in the Kuban paradise in the good old days.

*

512 When the cold east wind silently passes through the steppes or the west wind brings snow and wraps the Ukraine in white, when communication practically ceases between the villages, and nights and sleep are long, then the women sit down to their spindles and the men fetch their looms from 463 from the sheds. All the family clothing, the 286 underwear and linen for the house that is needed throughout the year, is made by hand during the long cold winter months, just as it was in our country /Germany/ in medieval households before the days of urban craftsmen. They make rope shoes and shoes of leather in regions where the ground is stony; they weave linen and woolen fabrics, sew shirts - during the hot summer often the only article of women's clothing except for their narrow aprons - and cut winter jackets from sheep [53] skins. They embroider lovely bright-colored patterns in endless variety on the shirts and the smooth skins of the furs, on tablecloths and towels, for the artistic talents of the Ukrainian people are incomparable. They carve in wood, model in clay and paint it, and weave carpets.

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Nevertheless, the 1945 harvest - assisted by lend-lease supplies which were still then available, and (beginning in December 1945) by UNRRA relief deliveries - was furnishing the population a fair amount of cereals and bread. There was, however, very little meat from domestic sources, and only a small amount of fats and oils, as the following table shows.

TABLE XII

Ukraine: Production and Utilization of Fats and Oils, 1945.
(thousand metric tons)

727
433
258
262

	Oilseeds	
Production		
Total production of oilseeds		496.4
Deduction for seed		53.6
Available for processing		442.8
Utilization		
388 Total production of oil		105.8
Deduction for industrial use (soap manufacture, etc.)		26.7
Available for human consumption		
by urban population	29.0	
by rural population	50.0	
Total		79.1
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
urban population		2.41
rural population		1.86
Average		1.98

[p2 87]

TABLE XII (Continued)

727
433
288
262

Animal fat

Production		74.7
Imports		12.5[1]
Available for consumption		
by urban population	32.7	
by rural population	54.5	
Total		87.2
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
by urban population		2.73
by rural population		2.0
Average		2.19

Summary (Oils and Fats)

All fat and oil resources		
Vegetable oils		105.8
Animal fats		74.7
Total production		180.5
Imports		12.5[1]
Available for distribution		193.0
Consumption		
Technical purposes		26.7
Food		
Urban	61.7	
Rural	104.6	
Total food		166.3
Total consumption		193.0
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
by urban population		5.14
by rural population		3.86
Average		4.17

1 Available from Lend-lease

Source: Ukrainian Department of UNRRA Supplies, Kiev, May 15, 1946.

433 As the table shows, the Ukrainian people received in 1945 only 4
262 to 5 kilograms of fats - 8 to 18 kilograms less than their pre-war
388 annual consumption rate.

Disaster in 1946

433 Early in 1946 other UNRRA supplies in addition to food began to
241 arrive - seeds, small quantities of fertilizers, and a few farm tools.
648 Throughout the Ukraine great efforts were being made for a successful spring sowing. However, there were still shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, and machinery. None of the 1,600 tractors promised by UNRRA had arrived. Much of the work was still being done by hand, especially where no draught animals were available.

[311] Even despite these drawbacks, it is estimated that about 80 per cent. of the pre-war area was sown; but no figures are available on the acreage planted to individual crops. In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission, describing the difficulties in getting detailed agricultural statistics, stated:

> "...During a recent inspection trip we were informed by the agricultural authorities of the Poltava oblast,[1] one of the best agricultural regions in the Ukraine, that they did not even try to set production goals for their collective farms this year (1946); they simply told each farm to plant as much as possible of whatever crops it could raise with the seed, equipment, draught animals, and manpower available. (For example) We believe that nobody really knows with any degree of accuracy what acreage was planted to oil seeds in the Ukraine this year, what yield may be expected, or how much of the resulting oil will be available for non-farm use."

433 The Ukrainian people set high hopes on the 1946 harvest. However,
241 in the very summer when a good crop would have made all the difference,
648 the greatest drought since 1891 destroyed their prospects. It affected a vast area from Moldavia to the Urals, south to the Kuban and north to Moscow. The earth was parched; and the crops, burnt by the hot summer sun, had little to draw upon because rain and snowfall in the winter of 1945-46 had been poor. Hopes withered with the wheat. The potato crop too was affected: a hot wind out of Asia dried the plants, and dwarfed the tubers.

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1 Oblast: a district similar, for administrative purposes, to a county.

U
433 During all this time the livestock of the Ukraine (see next
231 Section), was being slowly and laboriously built up by gifts from the
262 rest of the Union, by levies on Germany, and by natural increase.
731 Meat was very scarce, since no-one was willing to slaughter and further deplete the slender herds. Cows, used for draught purposes, gave little milk. Now added to these intense shortages of meat, fat and dairy products was another great deficiency of cereals and bread, hitherto the mainstay of the Ukrainian post-war diet.

U
241 The 1946 harvest cannot, at the most optimistic estimate, be
433 reckoned at more than 40 per cent. of 1940 in cereals and vegetables
231 per hectare sown.[1] There is no fodder for the jealously guarded animals; shelter for them is also very scarce since the people themselves are only now moving out of dugouts. If the animals are slaughtered, the small supplies of dairy products and meat will soon disappear; and the problem of draught power will remain as acute as ever.

U
241 There is an agricultural dilemma in the Ukraine which a good
433 harvest would have gone far to break. Although extensive and con-
464 tinued demobilizations have been taking place, there is a great shortage of labour on the farms.[2] If manpower is taken from the farms to help produce the machinery necessary to liberate further men from the land, there may not be enough farm workers left to produce sufficient food for the factory workers. The poor harvest has aggravated this vicious circle.

The Soviet Government has attempted in various ways to meet this problem not only in the Ukraine, but throughout the Union. Everyone who is able to work does so; young people, old people, women. The
U women who worked during the war have remained part of the labour force in both industry and agriculture, and an increasing number are being
[462] recruited. In the Ukraine in 1946, women composed at least 60 - 70 per cent. of the farm working force.

SU
[464 At the same time as steps are being taken to concentrate more
241] workers in agriculture, the organization of the collective farms is
474 being overhauled and geared to higher efficiency. To accomplish this,
647 the Soviet Council of Ministers created on September 19, 1946, a Collective Farm Council, whose main tasks will be to elaborate measures for the improvement of collective farming. This Council which is authorized to call conferences of collective farm representatives when necessary, was set up for the purpose of "establishing strict control over the observation of collective farm statutes and for the solution
9 of questions of the collective farm structure." One of their primary

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1 One must also bear in mind the reduced area under cultivation.

2 The war losses are felt very acutely.

291 In addition to these items, UNRRA has delivered several thousand
73, tons of used clothing and footwear contributed through voluntary
relief organizations in other countries. Most of the contributed
648 supplies are distributed to war invalids or to orphans of the war.

The thousands of pairs of shoes delivered by UNRRA, as well as shoes made in the Ukraine from UNRRA leather, are sold according to a rationing system, with miners and heavy industry workers receiving highest priority. Textiles (also rationed) are sold as piece goods, or are made into garments in Ukrainian workshops for sale to permit holders. UNRRA blankets and comforters are distributed chiefly to hospitals and childrens' homes; and hides and other materials furnished by UNRRA are used in the construction of orthopædic footwear or artificial limbs for wounded veterans.

Food Supplies

731 When the UNRRA Mission first arrived in the Ukraine, no data
241 were available on the republic's exact food situation. The 1945
433 crops sown in a reduced area, under great difficulties of seed,
262 fertilizer, and implement shortages, had yielded only a fraction of pre-war harvests. It was expected, however, that Ukrainian farms would produce enough grain to supply the population with bread and cereals until the 1946-47 harvest. UNRRA food supplies were therefore calculated to provide chiefly meats, fats (or equivalents in the form of army rations), and dairy products.

731 Altogether, UNRRA planned to use 100 million dollars of the
262 Ukrainian budget for food. By the end of January 1947, all but
648 5½ million dollars of this had been shipped, as is shown in the following table.

TABLE XXVI

UNRRA Food Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Grain and grain products	548	3,836
Meat and meat products	30,682	54,245
Fish	4,166	23,240
Dairy products	13,378	33,134
Fats, oils, soap	12,725	41,885
Pulses	615	4,658
Beverages	1,490	3,437
Soup- dehydrated	2,835	9,392
Quartermaster food	27,134	109,055
Other food	206	548
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture surpluses	808	3,689
Totals	94,587	287,519

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

731
262 Most of the UNRRA food supplies delivered to the Ukraine are
[443 distributed to ration stores for sale to workers and their dependants.
265] A large proportion (about 35 per cent.) also goes for communal feeding through dining rooms, health resorts, homes for invalids and the aged, and dining halls of trade schools. Hospitals, childrens' homes, maternity homes, and the like also receive a share (around 10 per cent.) (The food distributed to welfare organizations is delivered free of charge).

731 Apart from the food which UNRRA supplies, the Ukrainian people
262 are dependent on whatever amounts of local produce may appear on
434 various markets. According to the rationing system, the farmers are allowed to retain part of their produce to feed themselves and their dependants, and the farm's livestock; the state then purchases a certain quota for use in feeding the non-farm population. If any surplus then remains, the farmers may keep it, or sell it on the free market at uncontrolled prices.

241
433 In practice, however, because of the extremely poor harvests in the last two years, Ukrainian farmers have scarcely been able to feed
434 even themselves; and the amounts of domestically produced food which reach the ration stores or the free market have consequently been small.

The following section describes the sources of food supply open to the urban consumers.

The System of Food Distribution

443 In the cities of the Ukraine there are three outlets through which
434 foodstuffs reach the population:

361 (a) the ration stores, where the bulk of foodstuffs are sold
262 at fixed prices to ration-coupon holders;

(b) the so-called gastronoms (commercial stores) where scarce, luxury items are sold; and

(c) the public markets, where collective farmers and peasants bring their surplus produce for sale.

Most of the rural areas and villages of the Ukraine are expected to produce locally enough food to feed the inhabitants; and as they are nearly all considered to be self-supplying, they receive through the central distribution system only sugar and sometimes bread. Their surplus farm produce (that is, food in excess of that needed for feeding people or livestock on the farm and not subject to collection or purchase by the state) is usually brought by the farmers to the public markets for sale to the urban population.
[435 The quantities of produce and the variety of items available in the free public markets vary greatly from season to season and from day to day; Prices are equally unstable.

000 day to day; prices are equally unstable.

Ration Stores

443 Members of the UNRRA Mission have visited ration stores in all
434 the more important cities of the Ukraine. The city of Kiev, for
example, has about 300, all of them much alike. The typical ration food store serves from 2,000 to 2,500 families living in the immediate neighbourhood; if a family moves, it changes its ration card registration to a store in its new locality. Some stores, however, serve the employees of a particular factory or organization as well as a neighbourhood; others are limited to special categories of customers, such as veterans, pregnant women and nursing mothers, teachers, doctors, and scientific workers; these stores have a slightly more varied stock of goods; and in the case of shops for pregnant women and nursing mothers, the roster of customers is smaller so that there is no waiting to be served.

137 Except for bread, most of the food sold in Ukrainian ration shops in 1946 was supplied by UNRRA. Many of these relief supplies, however, did not fit into the established rationing system; therefore many rather elaborate substitution schemes had to be devised, particularly for U.S. army C, K and ten-in-one rations, which were often substituted for a variety of foods. These schemes were said to be in effect throughout the Ukraine, local bodies having authority to make minor changes in substitution values to fit whatever stocks of goods were on hand at the moment.

For example, according to the scheme effective in Kiev in March 1946, if a customer was entitled to buy one kilogram of meat or fish monthly, he might possible substitute 15 eggs, or 200 grams of powdered milk, or 800 grams of sausage, or a 600 gram can of UNRRA tushonka[1] provided any of these were available. In lieu of one kilogram of fat rarely available the customer might buy 60 eggs, or two kilos of cheese, or 3 kilograms of sour cream, or 1.6 kilograms of powdered milk, or 400 grams of peanut butter, again provided they were available.

The army ten-in-one rations are packed in two cardboard boxes, labelled "first half" and "second half". In Kiev the "first half" was considered to be equivalent to 500 grams of fat and 1½ kilograms of sugar; while the "second half" was equivalent to 2 kilograms of meat and 500 grams of sugar.

In Poltava in April 1946 one U.S. army K ration was being considered the equivalent of 800 grams of meat or 206 grams of fat; one C ration, equal to 925 grams of meat or 310 grams of fat; the first half of a ten-in-one ration equalled 1,500 grams of meat or 500 grams of fat, and the second half of a ten-in-one ration, four kilograms of meat or 1,350 grams of fat.

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[1] A canned meat mixture.

Gastronoms

443 434 262 554 461 In addition to the ration stores, Kiev has about five gastronoms, or commercial stores, where unrationed goods are for sale. Most of the gastronoms are stocked almost entirely with delicacies, such as Siberian crabmeat, live carp in water tanks, a little fresh meat, salami, candy, biscuits, and Russian cigarettes. (No UNRRA goods are sold in such stores). Until September 1946 the prices in gastronoms were so high that only a relatively small part of the population could afford to buy. The gastronoms were patronized primarily by those with high earnings - professors, theatrical stars, scientists, artists, high ranking army officers, skilled technicians, etc. One of their main purposes was to show the average worker that some luxuries did exist, and thus encourage him to raise his skills and productivity. Another purpose was to provide a special reward for various kinds of meritorious service. For example, war heroes and top generals were entitled to a 40 per cent discount on all purchases made at a gastronom. Moreover, workers who had stayed at the same factory for six years or more were entitled to a 20 per cent discount, and office workers with similar service to 10 per cent.

[435] In September 1946, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to abolish differences between the higher "commercial" prices and the low prices of rationed goods, the prices in gastronoms were lowered and certain ration prices, raised somewhat.

[465] At the same time, taking into account the difficulties which average and low-paid workers would encounter as a result of higher ration prices, the Council of Ministers decided to increase all salaries of less than 900 roubles a month. Thus, those workers who previously had earned up to 300 roubles a month received an increase of 110 roubles; those who had earned up to 500 roubles, another 80. Similar increases were allowed in pensions and in students' stipends.

So far as UNRRA food is concerned, the increases in ration prices have affected meat, fish, fats and oils, other categories of UNRRA food supplies particularly milk, cheese, and army rations were not affected.

434 435 The following table shows the increases in ration store prices.

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TABLE XXVII

Ukraine: Prices of Rationed Food
(in roubles per kilogram)

	Before October 1, 1946	After October 1, 1946	Percentage increase
Bread (black with rye)	0.9	3.2	255
Bread (whole wheat)	1.8	6.0	240
Meat tushonka	16.6	32.0	87
Pork in gravy	20.5	35.3	72
Meat and vegetables	10.0	15.3	53
Pork and rice	15.7	30.7	90
Meat and corn	10.0	17.7	77
Herrings in tomato sauce	11.5	25.0	117
Herrings in natural oil	17.2	37.5	118
Smoked cod	9.8	18.0	84
Lard	18.0	36.0	100

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

Public Markets

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[474]
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The third kind of outlet for the distribution of food to the urban population is the public markets (officially called "Collective Farm Markets"). Their importance as a source of supplementary food is difficult generally to assess. On the one hand, extremely high prices plus the inconstancy or inadequacy of supplies prevent any group in the population from depending on the public markets for any substantial part of its diet; on the other hand, the variety of food sometimes available impels many to supplement the limited amounts and kinds of foods secured at the ration stores by purchases in the public markets. While prices are fixed and rigidly controlled in the ration stores, there is no control of prices whatever in the public markets, and the seller and purchaser usually agree on the price after a rather elaborate process of bargaining. On account of the limitations in supply, the selling prices are usually dear.

There are striking differences between the fixed, ration store prices and the uncontrolled market place prices. For example, in July 1946 (before ration prices were raised) white bread which - depending on the extraction rate of flour - was selling in ration stores at 90 kopecks[1] to 2.7 roubles a kilogram was selling in the public markets at 28.5 to

1 There are 160 kopecks to a rouble

443 41.6 roubles a kilogram. Butter, which was almost never available,
435 in the ration stores at 24 roubles a kilogram, and in the public
262 markets, at 150. The price of sugar in the public markets was, on July 10, four to five times the ration store price.

443 In addition to these products for which there are comparable prices
262 in the ration stores, the public markets also offered certain foodstuffs
433 which were seldom or never available in the ration stores. In the public markets of Kiev dressed beef was selling for 70 roubles a kilogram on June 3, 1946, and 60 roubles on July 6; milk, which on June 3 brought 15 roubles a litre was selling for 12 to 14 roubles on July 6. The fall in the price of tomatoes illustrates the play of demand and supply; when the first fresh tomatoes arrived on the public markets, they brought 15 roubles for each small tomato; by the end of July the price had fallen to 3.5 or 4 roubles for large size tomatoes of the best quality. Similar price reductions occurred in other vegetables and fruits; in each case, however, prices were still extremely high; even when the crops had been harvested, the demand remained far greater than the supply.

The extent of the shortages may be gathered from a report by the UNRRA Mission in June 1946, when a tour of Kiev's two great public markets revealed only one pound of meat, several fowls, small quantities of milk and butter from nearby farms, fifteen small sausages being sold from one can, and a few miscellaneous titbits such as matches, cigarettes, and candy from a ten-in-one ration.

Present supplies are even more attenuated. Ration scales have been cut, and this naturally increases the demand for supplies in the public markets. As the demand grows and supplies dwindle, prices rise even higher. The next table compares free market prices in June 1946, July 1946, and January 1947.

TABLE XXVIII

Ukraine: Food Prices in a Typical Public Market
(in roubles)

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	June 1946	July 1946	January 1947
Bread, kilo	22.5	23.0	50.0 - 55.0
Meat "	about 60.0	70 - 100	60.0
Fish "	-	-	65.0
Milk, litre	16.0	15.0	16.0
Butter, kilo	190.0	190.0	250.0
Eggs, dozen	42.0	48.0	-
Cereals (various) kilo	-	50.0	-
Sugar	-	100.0	-
Vegetable oil	-	200.0	200.0

- Very little or none on sale. Supplies vary greatly but are never very large.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

UNRRA Supplies and the Food Situation

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[+33]

Until the produce from local farms became available in the spring and summer of 1946, the diet of the urban population of the Ukraine depended principally, apart from bread, on UNRRA food supplies, which in the beginning consisted almost entirely of U.S. army rations, plus some dried and evaporated milk and tushonka. Urgently needed fats and oils were slow in arriving; up to May only 8,596 tons had been received in the Ukraine. The shortage was critical, since domestic production was providing a rate of only 4 to 5 kilograms of fats a year per person, as compared with 12.8 in 1940 and 22 kilograms in 1929.

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Very little food was being received from other parts of the Soviet Union, and a protracted dry spell was threatening the 1946 harvest. Official rations for almost all categories of consumers were low;

262 [434] For example, light workers were entitled tononly 1 1,820 calories[1] a day from rationed foods, and office workers, only 1,236. Supplementary non-rationed foods were obtainable, but only in limited quantities and at high prices.

262 433 461 The inadequate diet which everyone had been receiving since the war was undoubtedly responsible for lowered work efficiency, and added to the shortage of machinery and equipment, for delayed reconstruction. For example, although up to October 1946 heavy workers were entitled to official rations providing 3,757 calories a day, the greater part of their diet consisted of bread and cereals. Because of the great livestock shortage, there was scarcely any meat available on the ration. Fairly typical was the situation of 13,000 workers engaged in rebuilding the Ukraine's largest steel mill at Zaporozhie, who during April 1946 received only 750 grams of fat (about 26½ ounces) and less than two pounds of meat per person, a diet clearly inadequate for heavy labour.

262 758 Patients in a Kremenchug hospital received a diet composed chiefly of bread, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of butter or lard, which provided about 1,200 calories daily - a level radically below the emergency subsistence rate of 1,900 calories defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

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1 Compare all calorie rates with the emergency subsistence food consumption levels defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as the minima necessary to prevent serious malnutrition leading to disease and the danger of civil unrest. For European countries, these levels are as follows:

Emergency Subsistence Calorie Intake

Category	Calories per day	Category	Calories per day
0 - 2 years	1,000	Normal consumers (male)	1,900
3 - 5 "	1,250	Sedentary (female)	1,600
6 - 9 "	1,500	Moderate workers	2,000
10 - 17 years	2,000	Heavy workers	2,500
Pregnant and nursing women	2,000	Very heavy workers	3,000

1 [SIC - - ANALYST]

262 On the farms of the Ukraine the diet, although in some respects better, was for the most part, restricted and monotonous; bread and cabbage soup were the staple items; meat consumption was negligible and the intake of fats and oils, well below a pound a month per person.

262 731 733 The present situation compared with the spring of 1946 is much worse. UNRRA food deliveries to the Ukraine are all but completed. The 1946-47 harvest on which so many hopes were set, proved a dismal disappointment; and other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance. Domestic stocks must therefore last until the next harvest; and the outlook until then is bleak.

434 262 On October 1, 1946, because of the shortage of domestically produced food and the imminent cessation of UNRRA supplies, Ukrainian rations for all categories of consumers had to be reduced. For most people this meant either that their cereal ration was cancelled, or that their bread quota was lowered or both.

For example, heavy workers, light workers, and employees, - although still receiving the same amount of bread, are no longer entitled to the cereal ration of 2.0, 1.2, and 0.8 kilograms a month respectively. Dependents fare even worse: not only have they lost their cereal ration, but in addition, their bread quota has been cut from 9 to 7.5 kilograms a month. The bread ration for children also has been cut from 12 to 9 kilograms, and their meat from 0.4 to 0.3 kilograms; however, they still receive the same cereal ration as before (0.8 kilograms a month).

Rations for mothers vary of course, according to the occupational category; but their special allowances remain the same, providing approximately 745 extra calories daily.

In terms of calories, these bread and cereal cuts have reduced the diet of heavy workers from 3,757 calories a day to 3,527; light workers are down from 1,820 to 1,682; employees from 1,236 to 1,144; dependents from 895 to 704; and children up to 12, from 1,209 to 973.

The following table shows the ration scales now in effect. Six out of about twelve groups have been chosen to show typical differentiations. Special groups - for example, tuberculosis patients in [737] institutions - have not been included. It should be noted that dependents are defined as those who are not working and who have passed the age of 55.[1] Mothers usually work and draw, throughout their

1 Previously the age was 45 years; but it has been raised in an effort to get all non-producers to work.

434 mothers usually work and draw, throughout their
262 pregnancy and afterwards, their full occupational rations[1] plus the
745 special allowances indicated. If they do not work, they draw dependents' rations plus their special allowance.

[855] Children up to 14 includes infants from one to seven, who also receive special rations through milk kitchens, nurseries, nursery schools, and kindergartens. These amount to 9.0 litres of milk and 6.0 grams of fats monthly.

434 The employee category includes such occupational groups as office
262 workers, timekeepers, and caretakers. The light workers group includes railway workers, machine builders, etc. The heavy workers group includes moulders, steelworkers, and miners. The latter receive a further additional ration in the form of a hot meal if they do underground work.

(It must be emphasized that the amounts given in the table are official scales, which, even though reduced, cannot regularly be met. Throughout, the figures in brackets refer to scarce items which are authorized, but cannot be supplied.)

TABLE XXIX

Ukrainian Ration Scales from October 1, 1946
(in kilograms per month)

Rationed commodity	Consumer category: Heavy worker	Light worker	Employee	Dependent	Children up to 14
Bread	36.0	18.0	12.0	7.5	9.0
Cereals	nil	nil	nil	nil	(0.8)
Sugar	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	0.3
Meat or fish	(3.2)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.5)	(0.4)
Fats	(0.9)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Butter (or substitute)	nil	nil	nil	nil	.06
Potatoes	(5.0)	"	"	"	nil
Vegetables	(3.0)	"	"	"	(2.0)
Milk, fresh, dried, or evaporated	nil	"	"	"	9.0
Vitamin juices	"	"	"	"	scarce
Approximate daily calories from rations only	3,527	1,682	1,144	704	973 plus 204 infants

[736] In February 1947 the rations for dependents was again changed, and they are now authorized to receive only bread, 7.5 kilograms monthly.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

1 [As of 1947 -- Analyst]

262 745 434 Expectant and nursing mothers are usually at work, and have standard leaves with pay and special privileges; thus, if working, they receive rations appropriate to the occupational group, plus special food allowances; and if not working, dependents' rations plus these allowances. The supplements are as follows, monthly: cereals, 1.2 kilograms; butter (or substitute), 0.8 kilograms; sugar 0.6 kilograms; vegetables, 2.0 kilograms; milk (fresh or dried) 12 litres. Their approximate calories from rations alone are, therefore:

If light workers	1,682 plus 512 -	2,194	calories daily
If employees	1,144 plus 512 -	1,656	" "
If dependents	704 plus 512 -	1,216	" "

In the last case it is almost possible to assume that the husband is well paid and will be able to buy products in the open market.

262 Even if the established ration scales for all groups could be met, they would not provide an adequate, balanced diet. Particularly the rations for women and children are very light in fat, first-class protein, and calcium. They provide less than half the low League of Nation's standard for daily full-cream milk requirements of the expectant mother. But even these inadequate scales are seldom supplied.

262 434 Since mid-October 1946, the honouring of ration cards has, because of the increasing food shortages, become more and more irregular. In December 1946, for instance, large groups of persons in the Kiev area received only bread, sugar, and a few tins of vegetables on their cards. No meat, fish or fats were available. By the middle of January 1947, the situation had grown even more stringent, and only bread was supplied on the ration.

At the same time, the amount of food available off the ration has decreased almost to the vanishing point. Cereals and white bread have practically disappeared from the open market; and when they are available, the price is beyond the reach of the average person.

262 181 164 369 The effects of the poor diet are already to be seen. The people generally show a noticeable lack of their former livelinesss, energy and cheerfulness. Moreover, according to the Medical Officer of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, clinical starvation has made its appearance in the smaller villages of the Republic: protein dropsy and avitaminosis are increasing; and among the townspeople there is great incidence of skin infections and respiratory and nasopharyingeal conditions.

645 744 262 In order to meet some of the medical aspects which may arise out of the present food situation, the Ministry of Health has taken the following steps.

645 744 262 (a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

241 727 The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

731 649 262 UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.

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734 Everything depends on this year's harvest (1947-48). Meanwhile, the next three or four months are expected to be the worst period since the famine of 1922. No people in Europe who suffered under German occupation and devastation will continue to suffer from hunger in 1947 as much as will the people of the Ukraine.

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip
317 of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Slatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters
263 cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
511 during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation—all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

731
262 Most of the UNRRA food supplies delivered to the Ukraine are distributed to ration stores for sale to workers and their dependants.
[443 A large proportion (about 35 per cent.) also goes for communal feeding
265] through dining rooms, health resorts, homes for invalids and the aged, and dining halls of trade schools. Hospitals, childrens' homes, maternity homes, and the like also receive a share (around 10 per cent.) (The food distributed to welfare organizations is delivered free of charge).

731 Apart from the food which UNRRA supplies, the Ukrainian people
26 are dependent on whatever amounts of local produce may appear on various markets. According to the rationing system, the farmers are
434 allowed to retain part of their produce to feed themselves and their dependants, and the farm's livestock; the state then purchases a certain quota for use in feeding the non-farm population. If any surplus then remains, the farmers may keep it, or sell it on the free market at uncontrolled prices.

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433 In practice, however, because of the extremely poor harvests in the last two years, Ukrainian farmers have scarcely been able to feed
434 even themselves; and the amounts of domestically produced food which reach the ration stores or the free market have consequently been small.

The following section describes the sources of food supply open to the urban consumers.

The System of Food Distribution

443 In the cities of the Ukraine there are three outlets through which
434 foodstuffs reach the population:

364 (a) the ration stores, where the bulk of foodstuffs are sold
262 at fixed prices to ration-coupon holders;

(b) the so-called gastronoms (commercial stores) where scarce, luxury items are sold; and

(c) the public markets, where collective farmers and peasants bring their surplus produce for sale.

Most of the rural areas and villages of the Ukraine are expected to produce locally enough food to feed the inhabitants; and as they are nearly all considered to be self-supplying, they receive through the central distribution system only sugar and sometimes bread. Their surplus farm produce (that is, food in excess of that needed for feeding people or livestock on the farm and not subject to collection or purchase by the state) is usually brought by the farmers to the public markets for sale to the urban population.
[435 The quantities of produce and the variety of items available in the free public markets vary greatly from season to season and from day to day; Prices are equally unstable.

and often ancient methods and apparatuses used in catching 000
fish in Ukraine are also worth mentioning.

The food of the peasants is almost exclusively vegetarian and 262
consists of bread and cake, vegetables and milk. Although meat 252
is eaten only on very special occasions, the menu is not monotonous. Bread is made of wheat or rye, in the mountains also of barley. The Ukrainians leaven their bread but, in contrast to the Russians, usually bake it without salt. Some unleavened kinds of bread ("mlynets", "perepitshka") are used for ritualistic purposes.

The national dishes in Ukraine are "borshtsh", a soup made of the juice of pickled beetroot ("kvas"); "halushky" boiled flour dumplings of unleavened buckwheat or wheat flour, "varenyky", called "pyrohy" in Western Ukraine, small flour pastries, filled with potatoes, curd, millet, cabbage and so on, which are boiled and eaten with sour cream, butter or honey; "holubtsy" = cabbage roulades; "kasha" = porridge; "kysil", a sourish porridge of flour; in Southern Ukraine "kulesha" or "mamalyga" = maize porridge and finally, different soups with dough ("zatyrka") and cabbage ("kapusnjak").

Ritual dishes are "kutja" (wheat and honey) and "uzvar" (Christmas dish of dried fruit). Salted lard ("salo") and bacon ("solonyna") are much used at cooking. In periods of fasting, food is baked in oil. Roasting and smoking are not usual cooking procedures, but boiling in pure butter or fat is popular.

The national beverages are brandy ("horilka"), mead ("med"), 273 ●
honey boiled with brandy ("varenukha"), "kvas", made of sour rye, biscuit or fruit, in places also a drink of millet malt ("braha") and birch, and maple juice.

The Ukrainian is good at all peasant crafts, especially at wood 32
work, carpentry, turnery and rope-making. Weaving and fur- 28
rier-work is widely practised and ceramic work is done everywhere, while work in metal which was formerly common, has almost died out. Tailoring to-day is also mostly in the hands of foreigners.

development has not been satisfactory. In Western Ukraine 256
small mills continued to operate with an output in 1932 of about 4 million t flour (and 170 000 t barley groats).

The oil industry manufactured native products and is best 258
developed in the Kuban area. In 1934, 90 000 t oil were produced, and in Dnipro-Ukraine 58 000 t = about 40 % of the total production for USSR. Large oil plants have been constructed since then in Slovjanske, Dnipropetrovske and Krasnodar.

More than ³/₄ of the canned food required for the whole of 255
Russia was produced in Ukraine. There are plans for a large-scale development of this industry.

Breweries and distilleries are not yet developed; out of a total 274
number of 225 distilleries, 151 are in Galicia, but they supplied about 40 % of the Soviet production before the first Five-Year Plan.

There were about 80 tobacco factories before World War I, 277
with an output of 9 000 t; in 1927/28 there were only 26 factories which produced more than 20 milliard cigarettes, i. e. 360 000 t = 36 — 54 % of the production for USSR.

10. Other Branches of Industry

Slate production in Ukraine increased from 2 000 t in 1913 339
to 14 500 t in 1931; the raw material was manufactured in two plants in Zavalla and Mariupil.

A highly developed cement industry in Novorossijske (10 plants) used to produce 633 000 t annually. In 1934, 5 of the plants there produced 1 million t, and with Dnipro-Ukraine 1.5 million t = 45 % of the total production of USSR. Ukraine must come eight in world production. In Dnipro-Ukraine and North Caucasia in the same year, 940 000 t of fire-proof earthenware and dinas bricks were produced, 924 000 t lime, 220 000 t chalk, 207 000 t alabaster and 37 000 t gypsum.

Excellent kaolin is found in Dnipro-Ukraine. In 1913 34 400 t 323
and in 1931, 78 500 t were produced. In 1928 the 11 porcelaine factories in the country had an output of 18 700 t (¹/₃ of total

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the New Russian Governments) there were over 1 million hectares 433
under beetroot. Just before the last war the annual production of
beet in the Ukraine reached 150 million quintals: i.e. 18 per cent of 244
world production. The production of Ukrainian beet sugar ranked fourth—after that of America, Germany and France. In 1913 the Ukraine produced 11 million quintals of crystallized sugar. This output, together with that of the Polish factories, covered all the needs of the internal market (which during the preceding twenty-five years had augmented fourfold) and provided substantial surplus for export to the Baltic and the Middle East.

In addition to the beet processing plants, about 60 per cent of the alcohol refineries (corn, potatoes) of the Empire were located in the [274]
Ukraine. The production of vegetable oil (particularly from sunflower seed) was also important.

It has been estimated by the Soviet paper *Pravda* that approximately 1 milliard of rubles a year was paid for services on the semi-industrialized estates of landowners throughout Russia: of this sum a considerable proportion was paid for the hire of horse transport (since landowners did not maintain a large number of draught horses but hired from the villages). Of this milliard, about 300,000,000 were paid out in the Ukraine. As the peasant population of the Ukraine numbered about fifteen millions, some 20 rubles a year per [511]
head of the population was earned on 'supplementary' work on the large estates. 'Only owing to the sugar and other agricultural industries could the dense population of the Ukraine exist in such comparatively well-to-do circumstances.'

Thus the agricultural economy of Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, [241]
Chernigov and Poltava was based only partly on the production of cereals. With a population which reached nearly twenty millions, only about 2 million hectares were under wheat, while in New Russia, with a population about half that of the Ukrainian Governments, there were 4 million hectares under wheat. The Ukraine exported only small quantities of wheat to Poland and White [439]
Russia, which provinces drew the bulk of their supplies from New Russia. The real 'granaries' of Russia which supplied the whole Empire and exported a surplus abroad were the regions of the [134]
northern Caucasus and Trans-Volga with western Siberia and New Russia (including the Governments of Kherson and Ekaterinoslav with the northern part of Tauris and the southern part of Kharkov) In those regions the black earth really had a virgin quality during the first half of the nineteenth century; and its richness remains exceptional even now.

As a rule, the climatic conditions in the *New Russian Governments* 000

339 To finish with heavy industries, let us still mention the production of building materials—600,000 tons of cement (in the region of the Sea of Azov) and 1 milliard of bricks are annually manufactured in the Ukraine.

258 As for light industry, it is that of food production which occupies the first place.

257 The sugar industry of the whole of Russia is to be found almost entirely in the Ukraine. 12,000,000 quintals of crystallized sugar and 4,000,000 quintals of refined sugar can be produced here annually.

256 The milling industry also occupies an important place. Very important mills, many of which are supplied with highly perfected means of sifting and straining, specialized in the manufacture of fine flours for export before the last war. This industry is concentrated in the ports or in the towns near these or near river ports and in the surroundings of important railway junctions of the southern region. This industry represents 35 per cent of the whole milling industry of the Union and produces, despite the fact that it is not working at full pressure, 2,500,000 tons of wheat flour per annum.

249 The oil mills of the Ukraine produce 40,000 tons of sunflower oil, 3000 tons of linseed oil, and 3000 tons of mustard oil.

274 70 per cent of the alcohol distilleries of the Soviet Union are also in the Ukraine, manufacturing all types of alcohol: from corn, for drinks such as vodka and other liqueurs, and from potatoes, for the dye industry, for pharmaceutical products, and for perfumery.

277 The very important tobacco industry is distributed throughout the great centres of the territory.

255 As for the production of tinned foods, 78 per cent of the production of the Union originates from the Ukraine. Important quantities of vegetables (especially of tomatoes) and of fruit are tinned and exported from the territory.

433 became /165/ "Red Progress, Dnepropetrovsk", and so on. The giant tractor factory in Khar'kov was newly erected, an accomplishment which is proudly shown to every foreign visitors. Important, however, is not only the number of tractors that leave the factory, but also their serviceability and durability. The significance of the industrial plants which have remained from the pre-war period is also evident from the invested capital, according to which, just as before, the iron industry ranks first, coal second and the sugar industry third. In these three industries half of the entire capital invested in Ukrainian industry is combined. Only after that come machine construction and the chemical works which to a certain extent have arisen only in most recent times. (106)

106. Kubiyovich: Commentary to the Atlas, page XXXIII.

257 The sugar industry forms only a part of the food and luxury industry which was a very important branch even before the war. Its center is in the beet-growing region between Podolia, Kiyev and Khar'kov. In 1913 200 Ukrainian sugar factories produced 1.2 million tons of sugar, in 1933 170 factories produced 0.8 million tons. (107)

107. Deminskiy, The Economy of the Ukraine, page 140.

258 Besides that there is, also dating back to the pre-
274 war period, a considerable mill and oil industry, the latter in the Kuban region, as well as distilleries.

*

369 The increase of urban population is a natural concomitant of industrialization. The Ukraine has

development has not been satisfactory. In Western Ukraine 256
small mills continued to operate with an output in 1932 of about 4 million t flour (and 170 000 t barley groats).

The oil industry manufactured native products and is best 258
developed in the Kuban area. In 1934, 90 000 t oil were produced, and in Dnipro-Ukraine 58 000 t = about 40 % of the total production for USSR. Large oil plants have been constructed since then in Slovjanske, Dnipropetrovske and Krasnodar.

More than 3/4 of the canned food required for the whole of 255
Russia was produced in Ukraine. There are plans for a large-scale development of this industry.

Breweries and distilleries are not yet developed; out of a total 274
number of 225 distilleries, 151 are in Galicia, but they supplied about 40 % of the Soviet production before the first Five-Year Plan.

There were about 80 tobacco factories before World War I, 277
with an output of 9 000 t; in 1927/28 there were only 26 factories which produced more than 20 milliard cigarettes, i. e. 360 000 t = 36 — 54 % of the production for USSR.

10. Other Branches of Industry

Slate production in Ukraine increased from 2 000 t in 1913 339
to 14 500 t in 1931; the raw material was manufactured in two plants in Zavalla and Mariupil.

A highly developed cement industry in Novorossijske (10 plants) used to produce 633 000 t annually. In 1934, 5 of the plants there produced 1 million t, and with Dnipro-Ukraine 1.5 million t = 45 % of the total production of USSR. Ukraine must come eight in world production. In Dnipro-Ukraine and North Caucasia in the same year, 940 000 t of fire-proof earthenware and dinas bricks were produced, 924 000 t lime, 220 000 t chalk, 207 000 t alabaster and 37 000 t gypsum.

Excellent kaolin is found in Dnipro-Ukraine. In 1913 34 400 t 323
and in 1931, 78 500 t were produced. In 1928 the 11 porcelaine factories in the country had an output of 18 700 t (1/3 of total

339 To finish with heavy industries, let us still mention the production of building materials—600,000 tons of cement (in the region of the Sea of Azov) and 1 milliard of bricks are annually manufactured in the Ukraine.

258 As for light industry, it is that of food production which occupies the first place.

257 The sugar industry of the whole of Russia is to be found almost entirely in the Ukraine. 12,000,000 quintals of crystallized sugar and 4,000,000 quintals of refined sugar can be produced here annually.

256 The milling industry also occupies an important place. Very important mills, many of which are supplied with highly perfected means of sifting and straining, specialized in the manufacture of fine flours for export before the last war. This industry is concentrated in the ports or in the towns near these or near river ports and in the surroundings of important railway junctions of the southern region. This industry represents 35 per cent of the whole milling industry of the Union and produces, despite the fact that it is not working at full pressure, 2,500,000 tons of wheat flour per annum.

249 The oil mills of the Ukraine produce 40,000 tons of sunflower oil, 3000 tons of linseed oil, and 3000 tons of mustard oil.

274 70 per cent of the alcohol distilleries of the Soviet Union are also in the Ukraine, manufacturing all types of alcohol: from corn, for drinks such as vodka and other liqueurs, and from potatoes, for the dye industry, for pharmaceutical products, and for perfumery.

277 The very important tobacco industry is distributed throughout the great centres of the territory.

255 As for the production of tinned foods, 78 per cent of the production of the Union originates from the Ukraine. Important quantities of vegetables (especially of tomatoes) and of fruit are tinned and exported from the territory.

and often ancient methods and apparatuses used in catching 000
fish in Ukraine are also worth mentioning.

The food of the peasants is almost exclusively vegetarian and 262
consists of bread and cake, vegetables and milk. Although meat 252
is eaten only on very special occasions, the menu is not monotonous. Bread is made of wheat or rye, in the mountains also of barley. The Ukrainians leaven their bread but, in contrast to the Russians, usually bake it without salt. Some unleavened kinds of bread ("mlynets", "perepitshka") are used for ritualistic purposes.

The national dishes in Ukraine are "borshtsh", a soup made of the juice of pickled beetroot ("kvas"); "halushky" boiled flour dumplings of unleavened buckwheat or wheat flour, "varenyky", called "pyrohy" in Western Ukraine, small flour pastries, filled with potatoes, curd, millet, cabbage and so on, which are boiled and eaten with sour cream, butter or honey; "holubtsy" = cabbage roulades; "kasha" = porridge; "kysil", a sourish porridge of flour; in Southern Ukraine "kulesha" or "mamalyga" = maize porridge and finally, different soups with dough ("zatyrka") and cabbage ("kapusnjak").

Ritual dishes are "kutja" (wheat and honey) and "uzvar" (Christmas dish of dried fruit). Salted lard ("salo") and bacon ("solonyna") are much used at cooking. In periods of fasting, food is baked in oil. Roasting and smoking are not usual cooking procedures, but boiling in pure butter or fat is popular.

The national beverages are brandy ("horilka"), mead ("med"), 273
honey boiled with brandy ("varenukha"), "kvas", made of sour rye, biscuit or fruit, in places also a drink of millet malt ("braha") and birch, and maple juice.

The Ukrainian is good at all peasant crafts, especially at wood 32
work, carpentry, turnery and rope-making. Weaving and fur- 28
rier-work is widely practised and ceramic work is done everywhere, while work in metal which was formerly common, has almost died out. Tailoring to-day is also mostly in the hands of foreigners.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

there are several large factories which specialize in every kind of machine necessary for the sugar industry. 392 433

Several other industries, while of small account in comparison with those described above, deserve mention.

Manufacturing enterprises dependent upon animal products divide themselves principally into tanneries and woollen factories. The centres of the leather industry lie in the northern portion of the country, especially in the Governments of Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, and Podolia. This industry accounts for 4·5 per cent. of the total manufacturing output of the Ukraine. The woollen industry is centred in Kharkov, which has two large cloth mills, and in the town of Klintsi in the Government of Chernigov, where not only cloth but knitted goods, yarns, rugs, shawls, and other woollen goods are turned out from eight considerable factories. The production of woollen goods represents 3·5 per cent. of the total Ukraine output of manufactures. 282 288 433

The timber-working industry is chiefly found in the riparian towns, especially on the Dnieper. Yekaterinoslav takes first place, and Kremenchug, Alexandrovsk and Kherson also have saw-mills. Much of the timber shipped abroad is in an unworked state, and manufactures of the better sort are poorly represented. The industry accounts for only 4 per cent. of the value of the Ukraine manufactures. 313 433

The chemical industry is of minor importance. It is concerned chiefly with the products and by-products of coal gas at Odessa and Kharkov, but there is also a soda factory in the Bakhmut district and there are a number of match-factories in the Novozibkovsk district of Chernigov. The products of the industry represent only 3·5 per cent. of the value of the manufactures of the Ukraine. None of the more advanced branches of the industry is established in the country. 382 433

The industries enumerated account for 90–95 per cent. of the manufactures of the country. The remainder, grouped under the headings of paper, linen, cotton, and fibre industries, are of negligible account. 433

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185 A recent decree of the U.S.S.R.'s Council of Ministers was designed to assist the fulfilment of all these tasks. It puts light industries in the priority class for supplies of raw materials, fuel, electricity, SU manpower, and workers' housing; and it approves increases of capital [652] investments in the textile industry from 5,900 million roubles to 7,300 million in 1946-50, and in light industry, from 2,180 to 2,900 million roubles in the same period.

As a result of these measures, consumer goods output by state-owned enterprises is expected to rise this year (1947) by 50 per cent. and the output of the co-operative societies will certainly increase as well.

Light Industry Rebuilding in the Ukraine

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228 By January 1947, 58 textile mills had been restored in the Ukraine. Work had been resumed at the Odessa and Sury textile factories; and the Kharkov textile mill had been restored and considerably expanded. Sometime this year a new textile mill is to be launched in the town of Stryia, Dragobych Region; and in the Izmail Region, the Tatar-Bunary mill will resume operations. Cotton mills are being built in Lvov, Kiev, and Chernovitsy.

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U
Pre-War Output of Cotton Cloths[1]

288 In 1937 the production of cotton cloths in the Ukrainian S.S.R.
433 amounted to 7.1 million metres (1.2 per cent. of the total output of the Soviet Union), while in 1932, production was only 2.2 million metres (0.03 per cent. of the total Soviet Union production of cotton cloths). The cotton cloths production of the entire Soviet Union had risen from 2,694 million metres in 1932 to 3,447.7 million in 1937.

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Leather Footwear[1]

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282 Leather footwear production in the Ukraine in 1937 was 31,228,000 pairs of shoes, (17.07 per cent. of the 182,916,000 pairs produced in the whole Soviet Union); while in 1932 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had turned out only 14,535,000 pairs (16.72 per cent. of the Soviet Union total: 86,949,000 pairs)

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1 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939.

776 appeased, exorcised. When the priest of Velykyi Lypnyk consecrates the water of the village brook on the sixth of January, the people believe that the demons are thus driven away.

326 The men of Valykyi Lypnyk are tinkers, a
221 trade which in many places has a bad flavor. It is easy to say that they travel about the country like gypsies. But even though they wander from village to village, a small bundle of tools on their backs, repairing stoves and mending pots, they are, nevertheless, not homeless. As soon as spring comes, poverty drives them out on the road, and only late in the fall when the first white flakes begin to fall, they return to their wives and children with the few groschen they have saved.

241 For land is scarce, the clod of earth small, the soil is poor and the climate harsh.* The women work like drudges for their bit of barley bread and potatoes. With their small cows and a wooden plough they till the lower slopes of the mountain ridges. They sow by hand, harrow, and in the fall they cut off the barely ripe ears of grain with a sickle.

286 In their "spare time" these women* with their
291 strangely narrow faces sit barefoot in their full pleated skirts and pale pink blouses, a charming little cap on their heads, at their looms and tirelessly ply their shuttle back and forth between the taut threads, or press wool into felt for the jackets and trousers of their husbands.

342 The rooms of these "tinkers"* are surprisingly large and clean; the kitchen, living room, /10/ bedroom and work room are all in one. The whole structure with adjoining stable and wagon shed is built of wood, the inside unfinished, the outside
[789] covered with loam. In order that there be no lack of magic, carpenters carve three suns into the central roof beam.

184 How rich these "tinkers" of East Slovakia were with their little plot of free earth, their two or three cows, their barley bread and their loom, compared to their brothers in Carpatho-

* [In the village of Valykyi Lypnyk, Western Ukraine -Analyst]

11:Obermaier--142 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

282 Seventeen ingredients are supposed to go into the favorite dish of the Ukrainians, borscht, a soured beet soup. The Ukrainian cuisine also favors porridges made from various cereals, cooked in water and served with milk, cream or fat. The Ukrainian also loves his boiled vareniki, thinly rolled dough filled with pot cheese, chopped meat, cabbage or fruit. In West Ukraine the poor farmers must be content with potatoes, rye bread and turnips. The gentlemen farmers among the Ukrainians are the wealthy Kuban Cossacks who /135/ consume bacon and milk for breakfast, borscht, groats, fowl or fish for dinner, and fruit, cold borscht, melons and bacon in the afternoon, and vareniki in the evening. This is how it was in the Kuban paradise in the good old days.

*

52 When the cold east wind silently passes through the steppes or the west wind brings snow and wraps the Ukraine in white, when communication practically ceases between the villages, and nights and sleep are long, then the women sit down to their spindles and the men fetch their looms from from the sheds. All the family clothing, the 463 underwear and linen for the house that is needed • 286 throughout the year, is made by hand during the long cold winter months, just as it was in our country /Germany/ in medieval households before the days of urban craftsmen. They make rope shoes and shoes of leather in regions where the ground is stony; they weave linen and woolen fabrics, sew shirts - during the hot summer often the only article of women's clothing except for their narrow aprons - and cut winter jackets from sheep [53] skins. They embroider lovely bright-colored patterns in endless variety on the shirts and the smooth skins of the furs, on tablecloths and towels, for the artistic talents of the Ukrainian people are incomparable. They carve in wood, Model in clay and paint it, and weave carpets.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

different: 51 per cent and 49 per cent.' It is necessary to add that 433
Sadovsky includes in production intended 'for general use' in both periods the output of agricultural industry: i.e. sugar, spirits, flour and sunflower oil. If these figures for rural industry are excluded, those for so-called 'light industry' remain practically negligible. For example, only 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in U.S.S.R. [288]
are derived from the Ukraine; and there is no manufacture of cloth or leather goods.

As Sadovsky justly remarks, the policy of exclusively encouraging 185
heavy industry has resulted in the neglect of the economic interests 433
of the western and central Ukraine. In effect, with the policy of industrializing eastern and south-eastern Ukraine, the Soviets have shown a tendency to de-industrialize the wide and rich western provinces. Here the basis of their policy is probably strategic as well as political. 'In a series of towns of right-bank Ukraine such as Zhitomir, Berdichev, Zhmerinka, Mohilev-Podolsk, Uman, Smela, signs of decadence can be observed during the period of the Five Year Plans.'

The 'Economic Plans' of the Soviet Government are subordinated to a general political policy which, as has been explained in the preceding chapter, aims at the complete fusion of the Soviet Ukraine with the rest of U.S.S.R.; and according to Communist theory political unity can only be based on economic fusion. In forcing the pace of the development of heavy industry in the south and south-east to the detriment of the light and agricultural industries of the rest of the country, the Moscow Government pursues two objectives. First, the importance of the Ukrainian national element in the Ukraine is reduced. 'The Ukrainian people are [369]
an old people of agricultural civilization and have never shown any inclination for industrial work and life in big towns. The Ukrainian prefers the country if he can earn his living there, and if it is necessary he finds work in the different branches of rural industry' (Brégy and Obolensky). According to official Soviet statistics on [162]
the nationality of workers in the Ukraine, the coal industry employs 75 per cent Russians and 25 per cent Ukrainians; the metallurgical, 73 per cent and 22 per cent respectively; the building trades 56 per cent and 37 per cent (*The National Policy of the Russian Communist Party Expressed in Figures*, p. 177). About 50 per cent only of the people in the Donets region are Ukrainians, and among the urban population of the whole of Soviet Ukraine 70 per cent are not Ukrainians. In two big towns like Odessa and Kharkov only 25 per cent of the inhabitants are Ukrainians. The same phenomenon can be observed in centres like Mariupol and Lugansk. In this wise the

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Pre-War Output of Cotton Cloths[1]

In 1937 the production of cotton cloths in the Ukrainian S.S.R. amounted to 7.1 million metres (1.2 per cent. of the total output of the Soviet Union), while in 1932, production was only 2.2 million metres (0.08 per cent. of the total Soviet Union production of cotton cloths). The cotton cloths production of the entire Soviet Union had risen from 2,694 million metres in 1932 to 3,447.7 million in 1937.

U 292 SU 282

Leather Footwear[1]

Leather footwear production in the Ukraine in 1937 was 31,228,000 pairs of shoes, (17.07 per cent. of the 182,916,000 pairs produced in the whole Soviet Union); while in 1932 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had turned out only 14,535,000 pairs (16.72 per cent. of the Soviet Union total: 86,949,000 pairs)

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1 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939.

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313 area of this Republic, the high proportion of saving frames reveals the advanced development of its timber industry.

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313 During the war Soviet timber enterprises, along with other industries,
727 suffered considerably. Much has been done to repair the damage, but rehabilitation work has been seriously hampered by shortages of wagon transport and of seasonal labour. In January this year a Pravda leading article announced that the preparation of timber in the U.S.S.R. was nine million cubic metres short of the plan, and that the shipment of prepared timber was "in an even worse condition," particularly in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics. Part of the difficulty at least was due to breakdowns in tractors, but chiefly to labour shortage and low labour productivity. Here again, as in all branches of industry and agriculture, the exceedingly low food ration scales must be taken into account.

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185 The Five-Year Plan includes the following provisions for
313 Ukrainian timber developments:

> "To reduce the haulage of lumber to the Ukrainian S.S.R., the general plan for the production of undressed lumber in the Ukraine in the years 1946-50 shall be set at 47,600,000 cubic metres, with provision for an increase of felling in the western regions of the Ukraine and a restriction of felling in its eastern regions. Réafforestation shall be carried on extensively, timber being planted in the period 1946-50 on an area of 252,000 hectares and measures taken to replenish the thinned forests and to introduce fast-growing varieties of timber."

Paper Production

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281 In 1937 the Ukraine produced 28,400 tons of paper, as compared with 22,600 tons in 1932. This output represented, in 1937, 3.42 per cent., and, in 1932, 4.8 per cent. of the Soviet Union total paper production.[1]

In 1946 the reviving paper industry of the Ukraine turned out about 9,500 tons of paper and cardboard, exceeding its production programme by 10 per cent. This year the output of paper and cardboard is expected to be more than double that of 1946.

The first section of a mill producing paper bags has been launched in the Dragobych Region, and another paper mill is being built in the same region. Two cardboard factories are being built, one in Lvov and one in Rakhov (Transcarpathian Region).[2]

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1 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 10, 1947.

538 rical ballads (dumy) which glorify and preserve the whole of the past of Ukraine, are deservedly famous.

533 The Ukrainian folk-song which has been handed down in many collections and manuscripts from the 16th century, enjoys a great reputation both at home and abroad. These songs were sung at Lithuanian and Polish courts (14th - 16th centuries) and before Tsars and boyars in Moscow down to the second half of the 18th century. They were admired in Turkey and Italy too, and found honorable mention as early as 1675 in Herbigny's collection "Religiosae Kijovienses Cryptae".

534 The Ukrainian accompanies his singing on many instruments: there are the "kobza" and the "bandura", stringed instruments of foreign origin, cymbals which are unknown to the Russians, bag-pipes ("duda"), a peculiar kind of flute ("svyril") and the mountain pipe ("trembita"); primitive instruments like the lyre
535 have also persisted. The dance plays a comparatively minor part. Besides the ceremonious dances ("kolo") there are round dances ("hopak", "kozatshok" and "kolomyjka"), and the old sword dance is found among the Hutsuly.

531 A richly developed folk-art is on the same level as the folk-poetry and music; it finds expression above all in national costumes and ornaments, in painted Easter eggs, embroidery, in the complicated weaving and wood-carving patterns and in bead-work, ceramics, furniture and household utensils.

● 291 The ornate costumes often show in their embroidery influen-
531 ces from the East, the South and the Balkans. Particular attention is paid to embroidery on shirts, while women's skirts ("plakhty") and men's coats are often magnificent works of art for which, according to the district, homespun linen and woollen stuffs are used. Embroidery patterns utilise geometric forms as well as conventional flowers and leaves.

352 Furniture consists mainly of benches, a carved table, painted
531 and inlaid chests ("skryni") and a carved pottery cupboard ("mysnyk"). The room is, in addition, decorated with paintings, embroidered towels and carpets; in Eastern Ukraine the stove is also painted.

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* [In the village of Valykyi Lypnyk, Western Ukraine -Analyst]

594 161 this seed of all political life, may be surmised from the census of January 1939. On the basis of the estimated increase during the period of the New Economic Policy, the Soviet Union should have had 183 million inhabitants. Instead there were 170 million all told. There are 13 million souls missing - twice the number of the Czech nation!

462 The book entitled 'Woman in Socialistic Ukraine which appeared in Kiyev in 1937, tells of the triumphs of the Ukrainian woman, not in love and not in the family, but in the field of industry. According to this book, the Ukrainian woman has already "conquered" her position in all branches of industry, coal mines not excepted. In 1936, women comprised the following percentages of the total number of workers: in the building industry 18.3 percent, in the mining industry 26.3 percent, in the chemical industry 26.3 percent in the iron-industry 20.9 percent, and in the construction of machines 21.1 percent. There were 14,274 women engineers and technicians in 1936, and nearly half of the total number of physicians were women (9398). Moreover, the woman of Soviet Ukraine - always according to this book - takes an active part in the defense of the state as pilot, teacher, auto technician, as members of the parachute troops and so forth.

[29] On the subject ot the wardrobe of these industrious workers it is divulged that 37 percent of all Ukrainian women own two or more coats, 24.4 percent own two or more cloth or silk dresses, 40.5 percent have five changes of underwear and 38.7 percent have two or more pairs of leather shoes. It is taken for granted that all the other women have only one coat, one cloth or silk dress, one pair of shoes and no more than four changes of underwear.

And their feminine ambition? "Hanna Bondarenko, railroad engineer on the line 'Voroshilov',

11: Obermaier--221 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
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Handmade national costumes

743 758 of meat daily for each thirty patients; but, since there is rarely any meat to be had, it received 400 grams of dried milk as a substitute, or approximately 13 grams per patient each day.

"The hospital was so badly overcrowded that beds had been set up in the corridors and even in the yard. Some of these beds had been salvaged from the ruins of the old hospital, and consequently were badly twisted and charred."

The same general conditions prevailed in most of the hospitals visited. The fact that so much improvement has since been made with so little help promises the best use of future deliveries of UNRRA medical supplies. The programme includes in addition to dressings, drugs and chemicals, X-ray equipment and supplies, surgical instruments, dental equipment, and a penicillin plant.

Clothing

291 [294] 548 731 Since most of the Ukraine's clothing factories were heavily damaged or destroyed in the war, there is a widespread shortage of all articles of wearing apparel. The limited UNRRA programme has fallen considerably short of satisfying all the requirements; however, such supplies as have been sent - particularly textiles and shoes - have been economically used to help the most critical cases.

By the end of January 1947 UNRRA had sent the Ukraine 15,095 gross long tons of clothing valued at 16,801 dollars, leaving an unshipped balance of 55,000 dollars. The following table gives the composition of the shipments.

TABLE XXV

UNRRA Shipments of Clothing to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Finished clothing	779	384
Blankets and comforters	902	522
Cotton textiles	573	321
Woollen textiles	3,487	1,359
Raw wool	2,240	3,729
Footwear	5,697	3,997
Upper leather	575	259
Sole leather	1,274	1,624
Hides	188	381
Miscellaneous textiles	183	149
Miscellaneous footwear	735	2,368
Unclassified	168	n.a.
Totals	16,801	15,095

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

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In addition to these items, UNRRA has delivered several thousand tons of used clothing and footwear contributed through voluntary relief organizations in other countries. Most of the contributed supplies are distributed to war invalids or to orphans of the war.

The thousands of pairs of shoes delivered by UNRRA, as well as shoes made in the Ukraine from UNRRA leather, are sold according to a rationing system, with miners and heavy industry workers receiving highest priority. Textiles (also rationed) are sold as piece goods, or are made into garments in Ukrainian workshops for sale to permit holders. UNRRA blankets and comforters are distributed chiefly to hospitals and childrens' homes; and hides and other materials furnished by UNRRA are used in the construction of orthopædic footwear or artificial limbs for wounded veterans.

Food Supplies

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When the UNRRA Mission first arrived in the Ukraine, no data were available on the republic's exact food situation. The 1945 crops sown in a reduced area, under great difficulties of seed, fertilizer, and implement shortages, had yielded only a fraction of pre-war harvests. It was expected, however, that Ukrainian farms would produce enough grain to supply the population with bread and cereals until the 1946-47 harvest. UNRRA food supplies were therefore calculated to provide chiefly meats, fats (or equivalents in the form of army rations), and dairy products.

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Altogether, UNRRA planned to use 100 million dollars of the Ukrainian budget for food. By the end of January 1947, all but 5½ million dollars of this had been shipped, as is shown in the following table.

TABLE XXVI

UNRRA Food Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Grain and grain products	548	3,836
Meat and meat products	30,682	54,245
Fish	4,166	23,240
Dairy products	13,378	33,134
Fats, oils, soap	12,725	41,885
Pulses	615	4,658
Beverages	1,490	3,437
Soup- dehydrated	2,835	9,392
Quartermaster food	27,134	109,055
Other food	206	548
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture surpluses	808	3,689
Totals	94,587	287,519

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hun
241 garians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent
438 vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here
341 imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

743 of meat daily for each thirty patients; but, since there is rarely
758 any meat to be had, it received 400 grams of dried milk as a substitute, or approximately 13 grams per patient each day.

"The hospital was so badly overcrowded that beds had been set up in the corridors and even in the yard. Some of these beds had been salvaged from the ruins of the old hospital, and consequently were badly twisted and charred."

The same general conditions prevailed in most of the hospitals visited. The fact that so much improvement has since been made with so little help promises the best use of future deliveries of UNRRA medical supplies. The programme includes in addition to dressings, drugs and chemicals, X-ray equipment and supplies, surgical instruments, dental equipment, and a penicillin plant.

Clothing

291 Since most of the Ukraine's clothing factories were heavily
[294] damaged or destroyed in the war, there is a widespread shortage of all
148 articles of wearing apparel. The limited UNRRA programme has fallen
731 considerably short of satisfying all the requirements; however, such supplies as have been sent - particularly textiles and shoes - have been economically used to help the most critical cases.

By the end of January 1947 UNRRA had sent the Ukraine 15,095 gross long tons of clothing valued at 16,801 dollars, leaving an unshipped balance of 55,000 dollars. The following table gives the composition of the shipments.

TABLE XXV

UNRRA Shipments of Clothing to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Finished clothing	779	384
Blankets and comforters	902	522
Cotton textiles	573	321
Woollen textiles	3,487	1,359
Raw wool	2,240	3,729
Footwear	5,697	3,997
Upper leather	575	259
Sole leather	1,274	1,626
Hides	188	381
Miscellaneous textiles	183	149
Miscellaneous footwear	735	2,368
Unclassified	168	n.a.
Totals	16,801	15,095

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

3: Mirchuk Ukraine RD1

433, 311, 471, 438

[For location of mineral deposits and other raw materials and indications of their importance to the economy of Ukraine, see category 116, pp. 146-188. For location and productivity of various industries, see pp. 164-188.]

132 The many abysses and canyons are a disadvantage. As there are no trees and therefore few birds, there are very many insects. There are also other pests and disadvantages connected with the climate. Ukraine has a continental climate, but it is milder than in Russia. The average yearly temperature of 8.10° Celsius corresponds to that of Erfurt (8.3°). The difference between the warmest month (July) and the coldest (January) is bigger than in Erfurt (18.8°) and increases towards the east (Lviv 23.4°, Kyiv 25.3°, Kharkiv 28.8°); the period of vegetation decreases in the same direction (Erfurt 218 days, Lviv 211, Kyiv 203, Kharkiv 201). The lack of clouds is favorable to growth and the ripening process.

Apart from mountainous areas, there is a rainfall in the North-west of 600 mm, in Galicia 700 mm, a figure which decreases for the central steppe to 500 mm and in the south steppe to 400 mm. In a limited territory round the Sea of Oziv and the Black Sea it is as low as 300 mm, the minimum in USA for successful agriculture. 6 million ha of the steppe often suffer from drought and bad harvests. The most important tasks of agriculture in Ukraine are to combat drought and to intensify methods of cultivating the soil; irrigation schemes in connection with the power station on the Dnipro which would ensure irrigation of 1—2 million ha, have not yet been carried out.

3. Utilisation of Soil

● 311 Arable land in Ukraine amounts to 66 % of the entire area, in the steppe even to 80 %. In France, Italy, Germany and Roumania the proportion is 41—45 %, while the average for USSR including Ukraine is only 31 %. Only in Hungary and Denmark we find a situation similar to that in Ukraine, though on a much smaller scale. Ukraine must rank as the first agrarian state in Europe.

The proportion of forest land is correspondingly low (12 %), though in the mountains and Polesya it accounts for 35—38 %; in the steppe it sinks as low as 4 %. Even the European countries that are poorest in forests, such as Italy and France, have 16—19 % forest land; the most of them reach the double of the figure for Ukraine

The 15 % meadows and pastureland is a little lower than 311
the average for most European countries; this figure is higher for Polesya, the Carpathians and the foothills of the Caucasus (25—30 %); in the more intensively managed areas of the Right-Bank Region it sinks to 5 %. Ukraine (like Bohemia and Moravia) has only 7 % of land that cannot be utilised for agriculture or forestry, a proportion that is 16 % for Polesya alone. This figure is considerably higher for most European countries: Germany, Roumania, France and Italy have 12—19 %, USSR 17 %.

20 % of all plowed lands lie fallow, as, with the exception of some areas in the West, the three-crop rotation system is general. Grain takes up 76 % of the arable land, 90 % even in the steppe. Since the first World War this share has declined in favor of technical cultures which have doubled their pre-war area. In 1935 they accounted for 9 %; a further 8 % is used for other vegetation for food (potatoes), 7 % for fodder plants.

Wheat and barley are the two kinds of grain that are most 241
characteristic for Ukraine, though much rye is also grown. Its share (21 %) of the land laid down in grain and potatoes was in the years 1931—35 between that of wheat (32 %) and that of barley (13 %). Oats followed (10 %), then maize (9 %), millet (6 %) and buckwheat (3 %), potatoes (6 %). Rye is above all used for domestic consumption.

4. Grain: Areas of Production and Varieties

The biggest surpluses in grain are harvested in the old pro- 243
vinces of Katerynoslav, Kherson, Tauria and the Kuban area, crops being wheat and barley and others. The proportion of these two varieties in the entire yield of grain decreases as we pass from south-east to north-west. In Western Ukraine, Volynia and the district of Tarnopil are areas of surplus yields while the rest of Galicia has to import grain. Wheat thrives best on the Black Earth of what was once steppe and occupies about $^1/_3$ of the area laid down in grain and potatoes. Cultivation of wheat increased for a long time in accordance with the growing world consumption, but decreased when facilities for export disappeared and when domestic consumption became more important (see tables 1 and 2).

successful (45 000 t). Sunflowers were cultivated in 1935 on an area of 1 659 000 ha, mainly in the Kuban area. The yield for 1930—35 (0.9 million t) was only a little less than that of the USSR and much more than that of any other country. 247

As a grain producing country, Ukraine, with its yield of approximately 25 million t of the four main European varieties (= 10 % of world production), took a leading place in the years before the First World War (1909—1931). It exported 7.9 million t, or 1/5 of total world grain exports, topping the list for wheat and barley (4.3 million t, and 20 % and 2.7 million t and 43 % respectively of world exports). In the years 1931—35, production in Ukraine decreased by only 9 % i. e. by 24.6 million t, world production amounting then to 276.6 million t, while the decrease in export trade in the same period was much greater. The reason for this was the small yield per hektar as well as inadequate cultivation in consequence of collectivisation and unfavorable conditions for selling agricultural and buying industrial products; in addition there was an increased demand at home as the country became more industrialised. 433 243

6. Cattle Rearing

The distribution of livestock in Ukraine varies considerably. In the wide spaces of North Caucasia there is much pasture-land so that there are not many cattle per unit of area, though quite a number per head of the population. 231 433 811

The opposite is true of Galicia where management is intensive. The many meadows of Polesya support good stocks of cattle while the mountain pastures of the Carpathians are not sufficiently utilised. Between those extremes we have the bulk of Ukrainian arable land with relatively poor supplies of fodder for cattle. The result is that Ukraine does not contribute to the cattle rearing industry of the world what one might expect from a country of its agricultural standing. Before World War I there were 13.5 million head of cattle in Ukraine, i. e. 2.8 % of world stock. The proportion of dairy cows in this figure increases continuously as the use of oxen for draught, which used to be a characteristic feature of the country, had been declining for some time. (Table 3).

313 being 13 % and 0.14 ha for the Right Bank Region and 7 % or 0.12 ha for the Left Bank Region. The southern zone has still less (0.08 ha per head) and there is practically none at all in the southern steppe proper.

[311] Thanks to its enormous area Ukraine with its 11 million ha of forest land comes fifth in Europe, but there is only 12 % of forest land in the entire country, and scarcely 0.2 ha per head of the population, while 0.3 ha is regarded as the minimum. The figures for actual forest stock will be still less, as only three quarters of the nominal forest land in Soviet Ukraine (3.1 million out of 4.3 million ha) represent actual forests. Thus the ratio of forest to the entire area of Ukraine would be 9 %. Forestry in those parts of Ukraine that used to belong to Austria-Hungary was on a higher level than in the other provinces; after the war it was highest in Carpatho-Ukraine.

313 The annual increment in timber in Dnipro-Ukraine amounts to 2 cubic meters per ha, in Volynia, Podlakhia and Polesya to 1.9 cubic metres, in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine to 3.3 cubic metres, so that the average figure for the entire country is 2.3 cubic metres. This average for Ukraine is low compared with the figure of 5 cubic meters for the state forests of Germany and 4.4 for the communal forests.

313 439 Reckoned per head of the population there is in Ukraine a timber increment of only 0.4 cubic meters, which is far lower than in most of the forest countries in Europe. As a result, wood has to be imported for mining and industrial areas.

Wood imports amounted to 1.8 million t in Dnipro-Ukraine in 1913, and the average figures for 1928/29 and 1933/34 are 3.7 and 4 million t respectively. The average imports to Northern Caucasia for the last year amounted to 1.2 million t, while the figure for the Crimea is 250 000 and for the whole of Eastern Ukraine 5.5 million t. The demand for timber is greatest in the Donets Basin, the Dnipro Bend and also in Kharkiv and Odessa.

Imports consist chiefly of soft woods; a certain amount of valuable oak is even exported from areas that are otherwise dependent on imports. In those parts of Ukraine that belong to Soviet Russia there is 0.16 ha forest per head of the population,

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Industry and Mining

1. Fundamental Facts

433 It lay in the nature of her situation as a colony of Russia that only those branches of industry in Ukraine were promoted which utilised raw materials that were locally abundant and difficult to transport over long distances. It was impossible, for instance, to develop a modern textile industry. Even if it cost twice as much to transport cotton from New York to Moscow via Murmansk as via Odessa and Kharkiv and even if the industrial area in Central Russia had to import coal from the Donets Basin, Ukraine was nevertheless dependent on Russia for manufactured goods.

433 311 464 Labor was originally more plentiful in Russia than in Ukraine. The population on the upper reaches of the Volga and the Oka was more apt to seek employment in trade and industry, as the soil in those areas yielded poorer harvests and the percentage of forest land was higher. In Ukraine, on the other hand, farmers were loth to leave the good Black Earth. And that is why it was long impossible there to make labor a decisive factor in placing industries. This could be done only much later in the larger towns, and even then it made little difference to the general trend. But it is characteristic for Ukraine that sources of raw material have determined the location of industry, coal-mines and hydro-electric works being geographically fixed and altogether there are more industries, the raw materials of which are more difficult to transport than their products. The proportion of plants whose location is determined by the presence of raw materials is three times higher in Ukraine than in the industrial states of Central and Western Europe.

Table 8. Production of

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	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	1878	1879
Donets Basin	256	330	595	617	573	842	957	801	1130	1253
Dombrowa Basin	330	301	298	336	402	408	423	612	1070	1085
Russian Empire	700	830	1100	1200	1300	1700	1900	1800	2500	2900
% of Donets Basin	37	41	54	52,5	44	49	50	44,5	45	43

	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901	1902
Donets Basin	3930	4850	4890	5110	6790	7570	9220	11*	10,9	10,7
Dombrowa Basin	3160	3350	3680	3660	3760	4090	3970	4,2	4,2	4,3
Russian Empire	7600	8800	9100	9400	11,3*	12,3	14	16,2	16,6	16,5
% of Donets Basin	52	55	53,5	54,5	60,5	61,5	66	68	65,5	65

	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
Donets Basin	25,3	27,6	26,6	28,7	25	9	5,6	4,6	5,8	7,2	8,1
Kusnetsk Basin	0,8	0,9	1	1,2	1,1	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,8	0,9	0,8
Soviet Union	29,1	31,8	30,9	34,5	31,3	12	7,2	7,2	8,2	11,3	12,7
% of Donets Basin	87	87	86	83	80	75	78	64	70,5	63,5	64

* From 1900 in Million t total for Empire from 1897.

2. Branches and Areas of Industry

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The Donets Basin is the center of the heavy iron industry, heavy engineering, the non-ferrous industry and the production of chemicals on a large scale. The many electricity and overland generating plants that have sprung up almost contiguously utilise coal waste as a rule and have a considerable capacity, the largest being those at Shterivka and Zujivka with 150 000 KW each. There was a lively demand for machinery, above all for agricultural machinery, while the metal industry never reached the same level. Before World War I Ukraine contributed scarcely 17 % of all those employed in the manufacture of metal wares in Russia, though it supplied $^2/_3$ — $^3/_4$ of the raw materials required by the heavy iron industry throughout Russia. In 1934 the Ukrainian share in the manufacture of iron ore was constantly declining, so that metal goods of even fairly simple nature had to be imported.

Coal in Donets Basin

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1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892
1414	1495	1740	1758	1665	1883	2110	2060	2500	3110	3000	3140	3570
1285	1400	1400	1600	1665	1800	1990	2050	2420	2480	2470	2600	2890
3300	3500	3800	3900	3900	4300	4600	4600	5400	6200	6000	6200	7000
43	42,5	46	45	42,5	44	46	45	46,5	50	50	50,5	51

1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915
11.6	13	12,9	14,2	18,2	17,9	17,7	16,7	19,9	21,4	25,3	27,6	26,6
4,8	4,8	3,6	4,6	5,4	5,6	5,7	5,5	5,8	6,4	6,9	3,8	—
17,9	19,6	18,7	21,7	26	25,9	26	24,9	28,4	31,1	36	35,6	30,9
65	66,5	69	65,5	70	69	68	67	70	69	70	78	86

1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
11.8	12.5	19,6	24,6	27,3	31	36,5	40,9	44	51	61,4	69,6	77,5	77,5
1	1	1,8	2,6	2,6	3	3,6	5,5	7,3	9,2	11,6	14,1	17,3	17,8
16,3	16,5	25,8	32.3	35.5	40	47,8	56,8	64,4	76,3	93,6	109	126	128
72,5	76	76	76	77	77,5	76,5	72	68,5	67	65,5	64	61,5	60,5

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The largest centers of production in the Donets Basin are Stalino, Makijivka, Kramatorska, Voroshylivhrad, Horlivka, Konstantynivka, Artemivske (Bakhmut), Slovianske etc. Mariupil is the exporting harbor.

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At the Dnipro Bend there are, among others, plants for best quality steel, ship-building yards, electro-technical factories and largescale chemical works. The gigantic power-station at Dnipropetrivske has a capacity of 558 000 KW. The main centers of production are Dnipropetrivske, Zaporizha, Dniprodshershinske, Kryvyj Rih and Nikopil. The exporting harbors are Mykolajiv and, for some products, Kherson.

The Donets Basin and the Dnipro Bend are frequently combined to-day and represent a many-sided economy on a wide basis of raw materials and power. As a combine it is contrasted with the Ural-Kusnetsk Combine (above all as regards coal and iron). Kerch with its ore mines and heavy industry gravitates towards the Donets Combine.

257 The central agrarian section of Ukraine, on both banks of
311 the Dnipro, includes industries producing foodstuffs and luxuries, above all the sugar industry. There are also plants here for manufacturing leather and medium-heavy machinery. Factories are much smaller than in the coal and ore area and the many small power-stations run on brown coal and peat.

381 The Carpathian area is the home above all of the chemical
311 industry and the capacity of the power-stations, usually run by gas and expensive imported coal, seldom by the abundant water power available, exceeds 10 000 KW only in Lviv — Uzhhorod, being used principally for lighting the towns. Industrialisation is densest on the oil-fields of Drohobych.

371 In the foreland of the Caucasus electric plants are run by
311 petroleum only and water power is not exploited at all. The small factories (petroleum, tobaceo, leather and machinery of medium weight) are too scattered to form an industrial area in the strict sense.

392 The large towns form industrial centers that are not dependent
311 on the presence of raw materials. Kharkiv has heavy engineering plants for transportation requirements, factories for agricultural machinery, electro-technical factories, and workshops for precision instruments and machinery. These are large enterprises, built recently and attached to big power-stations (Chuhujiv 25 000 KW), so that Kharkiv may be classed with the industrial area in the vicinity.

39 Kyiv builds ships and produces chemical and electro-technical
311 equipment and has chemical and textile plants as well as sugar and foodstuffs factories. In Odessa the same factories are represented and there are also canneries, leather works and plants for producing cinema installations. In addition, there are workshops that specialise in the structure of motor-cars and planes. In the other towns in the country enterprises for this or that industry have been established.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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CHAPTER VII

THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

§1. AGRICULTURAL HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

In the political mythology of the twentieth century the legend about 'the vast riches of the Ukraine' has played, and is destined to play, a certain part. In history the Ukraine will take place with the Route to the Indies, the North-West Passage, Golconda, the Empire of Prester John, and other phantasmagorias of the human mind which in their time have inspired the nations to the drama of effort and the tragedy of conflict. 437

In the modern world where generalization has displaced religion and where the generation made literate by popular education has thrown up 'Leaders' who are adepts in the exploitation of generalized ideas, it was inevitable that movements based on facile and false scientific, geographical and ethnical conceptions should become fashionable. 'The wheat-fields of the Ukraine' form a roseate hinterland to the Nordic Race and the Classless State in the dream-world of the masses of Central Europe. Apart, therefore, from the intrinsic interest of the subject, it becomes a matter of current importance to analyse the extent of the real resources of the Ukraine and their actual and potential relation to the economic problem of Europe.

There exists a widespread idea that the Ukraine was 'the granary of the Russian Empire', but in reality it would be difficult to indicate the period to which this idea could be applicable. Certainly, during the eighteenth century, as the Tartars and Turks were driven from the mouths of the Ukrainian rivers, a period of progressive prosperity set in. But under Alexander I, during the Napoleonic Wars, the bulk of the grain supply of the Empire was drawn from the southern regions of Central Russia—from the Governments of Orel, Kursk, Voronezh and Tambov. This source of supply was adequate in view of the numbers of the population at that period, and the state of the roads between the Black Sea provinces and Central Russia put a prohibitive cost on transportation from the south. 433 311

During the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I export abroad developed through Odessa and the Azov ports—Taganrog and 439

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

439 Mariupol. The supply came from the big New Russian estates and from the German, Moldavian and Serb colonies founded in the eighteenth century. Towards the middle of the century the agricultural production of the Ukraine and the New Russian Governments began to form an important proportion of the general production of the Empire, but still these regions could not be called 'the granary of Russia' on account of the continuing lack of proper means of communication with the central provinces. The upper Dniepr and the upper course of the western Dvina were too shallow to serve adequately the needs of modern transport, and as late as the Crimean War the Russian railway system had not been extended south of Moscow.

496 The first important imperial trunk lines were constructed during the sixties and seventies: Moscow-Kursk-Kharkov-Rostov-on-the-Don (with branch lines from Kursk to Kiev and from Kharkov to the Crimea); Moscow-Voronezh-Rostov-on-the-Don (with extensions to the northern Caucasus); Petersburg-Vilna-Rovno-Kiev-Odessa; Kharkov-Kremenchug (on the Dniepr)-Nikolaev. Railway construction had taken the 'meridial' direction: the economic axis of the Empire during the three decades 1860–90 ran from 'the industrial north' to 'the agricultural south'.

The new railway system improved the conditions for the export of Ukrainian and New Russian grain through the Black Sea ports. At the same time access to the north was provided by the railway 'diagonal' connecting Orel (on the Moscow-Kursk line) with Riga: this 'diagonal' continued to the south-east through the northern part of the Don region to Tsaritsyn on the lower Volga. Further, a special 'grain line' linked the Ukraine with the Baltic: starting from Kremenchug on the Dniepr, it passed through the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov, White Russia and Lithuania to the new ice-free port of Libava (Libau).

311 It thus began to appear that the Ukrainian and New Russian provinces were indeed to become the granary of the Russian Empire. But the colossal economic potentialities of the outlying [496] quarters of the Empire, which began to come into development during the second half of the nineteenth century, very soon overwhelmed this comparatively modest conception. In the seventies the first 'latitudinal' railway threw a bridge across the Volga at Samara and was continued as far as the southern Urals. The steppes beyond the Volga offered immense new space for agricultural exploitation. In the meantime the conquest of the Caucasus had been completed, and the rapid expansion of the economic life of the Kuban and Terek regions had begun. Soil conditions in the northern

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Caucasus were not inferior to those of New Russia and climatic 311
conditions were much more favourable: rainfall, owing to the proximity of the great Caucasian ranges, was more regular. The Kuban region did actually become a granary. Rostov-on-the-Don grew and flourished in true 'American style'. A new grain port, Novorossiysk, was built and soon became a rival to Odessa.

Further railway development accompanied the exploitation of 496
the Donets coal-mines and the growth of a metallurgical industry 135
centred on the Krivoy Rog iron-ore deposits located to the west of 311
the Dniepr. Two parallel lines were constructed to pass through Ekaterinoslav and the old district of the Zaporogian *Sech*, connecting the Donets basin with Krivoy Rog. Thus, simultaneously with the industrial development in the south and the flowering of the North Caucasian region, a new 'granary' and new regions of great mineral potential began at the turn of the century to impose a 'latitudinal' direction on railway construction: the opening of the great Siberian railway gave almost a priority to the possibilities of agricultural production in western and southern Siberia, and connected Chelyabinsk, through Ekaterinenburg, Vyatka and Vologda, with the Baltic ports. At the same time 'diagonal' development was proceeding far to the south-east through Turkestan to the frontiers of Afghanistan and the Chinese Empire.

The importance of the natural riches of Asiatic Russia came to be 311
realized with an ever-growing force during the reign of Nicholas II 648
(1896–1917). The principal economic axis of the Empire was evidently changing direction from the 'meridial' to the 'latitudinal'. The political policy of the Empire during the same period, with its emphasis on the Balkan Slavs and on the 'Byzantine' dreams of the epoch of Catherine II, was certainly archaistic in tendency and bore no relation to the fundamental realities of Eurasian geography.

The War of 1914–18 brought down in destruction that peculiarly hybrid cultural synthesis which was Romanov Russia; it obliterated at the same time the neo-Byzantine plans of the Pan-Slavists and weakened the whole position of Russia as a European power. The loss of a wide belt of territories (the whole inheritance of two hundred years of Romanov autocracy) between the Arctic and the Black Sea imposed on the new Soviet state the sheer necessity of a 'latitudinal' rather than a 'meridial' development. During the last two decades new efforts have been made to open up the agricultural and mineral wealth of the steppes beyond the Volga and the Ural in western and southern Siberia and of the valleys of the Altai and the Tien-Shan; and, while historic Russian ambitions in the Balkans

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

and the Middle East have been left in suspense, a territory the size of Europe and new routes into the heart of China and ultimately to the Pacific have been brought under Soviet control. Under these circumstances 'the wheat-fields of the Ukraine' receded again into the background and became of only local importance: the more so since, in the two Soviet 'Economic Plans', interest in South-Eastern Russia has been concentrated on the industrial development of the New Russian region. These conditions are illustrated by the growth of industrial centres like Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Lugansk, Zaporozhie, and the decline of the great grain port of Odessa.

The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine has never in fact justified the enthusiasm which it has inspired from the time of the seventeenth-century Polish poet quoted in an earlier context to the more recent period of Herr Hitler and his apostles of *Lebensraum*. The natural conditions of the Ukraine are such that they really generously reward agricultural labour, but they exact always patient, strenuous and systematic toil.

Natural conditions differ greatly over the expanse of the country which Michael Dragomanov considered to constitute 'Greater Ukraine'. The agricultural 'age' of these territories differs in the extreme. In New Russia agriculture is only a century old, while Galicia has supported a numerous population of husbandmen for nearly a thousand years.

Galicia is one of the oldest agricultural lands of all Europe and conditions there have hardly altered since the days of Daniel and his *boyars*. The Galician earth, black in the eastern part, is tired old soil, impoverished by incessant labour, itself prompted and intensified by the ever-growing care of an ever-growing population to acquire its daily bread. Owing to the density of the population (110, and in some regions 132, inhabitants to the square kilometre) the area of holdings had been reduced to a minimum: 46 per cent of the farms comprise 2 hectares of land and sometimes less; 37 per cent comprise from 2 to 5 hectares. In a countryside where urban life has remained relatively stagnant live 75 per cent of the total population; while all commerce and crafts remain in the hands of the Jews in the large towns and in many of the villages, there is a 50 per cent surplus of hands among agricultural labourers. The peasants, Poles and Ukrainians alike, used to migrate to Germany and France as casual labour; before the last war they emigrated also in large numbers to Canada and the United States.

These arduous conditions of peasant life gradually developed a capacity for organization. Driven by necessity, the Galician peasantry set up a network of co-operatives for production and

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

distribution. These co-operatives formed the basis of a certain national unity which found expression in the political field. 474

Volhynia, partitioned after the war of 1920 between the Poles and the Soviets, is nearly as old an agricultural country as Galicia. Here the strips of rich black earth alternate with sandy and wooded country. Although density of population is not so great as in Galicia, poverty is perhaps even greater, owing to a lack of that capacity for organization which helps the Galician labourers to survive. The large estates of the Polish nobility have long disappeared; after the last war the Polish Government divided up the land. Numerous strips were allotted to Polish soldiers on the expiration of their service—with the intention of strengthening the Polish ethnic and cultural element in the region. The disappearance of the large estates, as in Transylvania and Roumania, had a deleterious effect on agricultural production and on the proper exploitation of the forests. The majority of the people lead a half-starved existence, and the young men dream of emigration to South America. In 1937, 25 per cent of the population of Polish Volhynia had neither bread nor wood. 311 134 241 735

Podolia has been a land of cultivation since the Middle Ages, although the soil was broken up two or three hundred years later than in Galicia and Volhynia. Now, as before the period of war and revolution (1914–20), Podolia remains in a close economic relationship to the other parts of the Ukraine. The black earth of this favoured province is really fruitful and well watered by numerous small rivers; climatic conditions are better than anywhere throughout the Ukraine—rain is plentiful and regular and the winters are short. It was probably the fields and pastures, the hillocks and woods of Podolia which the Polish poet had in mind when he wrote lyrically of 'the birthplace of Ceres and Diana'. Horticulture and apiculture have long flourished there. 311 134

In the past social conditions varied with the political situation according to whether the small landowners (Ukrainian Cossacks) or the Polish landlords were in the ascendant. During the eighteenth century Polish elements had the upper hand and for some time Podolia remained the last refuge of the Polish aristocracy. Polish social influences survived the Three Partitions, and it was only after the Polish Insurrection of 1830 that conditions began to change in favour of the Russian majority in the population. 177

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century this rich land with its soft climate had become very densely populated. By the end of the century Podolia ranked second in density of population of all the regions of the Russian Empire. The Government of Moscow took 162 311

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

162 first place, but in its population was included the million inhabitants
● 311 of the second capital of the Empire, while in Podolia there was no single town which numbered more than fifty thousand inhabitants. Density of population in Podolia reached the figure of 100 to the square kilometre, but the province was saved from the problems of over-population by the development of the large estates on capitalist lines. This process began about 1830 and developed on a large scale [178] after 1870. The beet-sugar industry with its subsidiary alcoholic distilleries, flour mills and horticulture provided a variety of livelihood for a population which by 1897 had attained to nearly four and a half millions. Between the years 1896 and 1933 more than a million and a half peasants migrated from other districts of the Ukraine to Siberia and the steppes beyond the Volga, but in Podolia emigration was scarcely perceptible.

[134] *The southern part of the Government of Kiev* along the right bank of the Dniepr enjoyed conditions somewhat similar to those in Podolia, while the northern districts resembled rather Volhynia. In the south a rich black earth supported a number of large estates where the beet-sugar industry, distilleries and mills flourished. In these southern districts were many well-to-do peasant farms covering up to 20 and 30 hectares apiece. Wheat was grown in sufficient quantities to satisfy local needs and to supply the six hundred thousand inhabitants of the city of Kiev. At the beginning of the century the population of the Government of Kiev amounted to over four and a half millions. At that time the three Governments of right-bank Ukraine (Kiev, Podolia, Volhynia) contained fourteen million inhabitants with an average density of 70–80 people per square kilometre. Such numbers were quite 'European' in their proportions and should have tended to discourage those Western dreamers who were even then casting envious eyes on the 'vacant lands' of the Ukraine.

It was almost equally difficult to discover 'vacant lands' in the [134] Governments of *left-bank Ukraine*. In Poltava, Chernigov and Kharkov the density of population amounted to 60–70 people per square kilometre. The uninterrupted belt of black earth in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov had been under the plough only since the seventeenth century—and many parts of it not before the eighteenth century. This was the land of which Alexey Tolstoy wrote: 'Know ye the land where all breathes plenty and content, where rivers flow as silver clear.' There were scarcely any towns of importance in this rural elysium. The characteristics of the Government of Kharkov, on the other hand, were quite distinct from those of the two adjoining left-bank provinces: in the north-west,

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Kharkov, in its scenery and social conditions, resembles rather the neighbouring districts of the Government of Kursk, while in the south-east it is already really part of New Russia.

Climatic conditions on the left bank are rather less favourable than on the right bank of the Dniepr: there is a lighter rainfall which is not so evenly distributed; the winters are more severe and the region of Kharkov endures a distinctly 'continental' climate. Prince Shcherbatov, a former minister of the Imperial Government, writes that: 'One of the most important factors in agriculture is rainfall, which does not always occur under favourable conditions in the Ukraine. Most of the rain comes in summer and often takes the form of downpours which impede work in the fields and harvesting; and in the spring there is often not enough rain. Rainfall is better distributed on the right bank of the Dniepr than in other parts. The difficult climatic conditions in the Ukraine liken the average black earth harvests to average harvests in Central Europe on an average soil.'

During the nineteenth century conditions in left-bank Ukraine tended to favour the growth of a prosperous class of small farmers who supplanted the big landowners of the period of Peter I and Catherine II. These conditions derived from the shortage of labour on big estates which followed the opening up of the New Russian territories and from the wave of speculation which induced landowners to sell out their properties on the left bank of the Dniepr in order to participate in 'the rush' for the new lands. Left-bank Ukraine became a country of large peasant farms covering 10, 20, 30 and as much as 50 hectares, while a number of smaller 'working' landowners retained estates up to 100, 150 and 200 hectares. Land was worth in these parts 500 rubles (about £50 sterling on the pre-war exchange) a hectare.

At the same time the growth of these large farms in the Governments of left-bank Ukraine combined with a natural increase in the population to create a serious problem of 'over-crowding'. In the eighteenth century a numerous class of peasantry had existed who did not own any land of their own at all, but who merely possessed cottages and vegetable gardens and the right to graze their stock on common pasture lands. Following the Emancipation of the Serfs in 1861, the number of landless peasants showed a rapid increase. The small parcels of land allotted to the liberated serfs were soon redistributed between the thrifty and the shiftless; and the division of large estates did not contribute to the establishment of agricultural industries which might have provided a living for the less fortunate. Already in the eighties symptoms of over-population were noticeable

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

166 ALREADY IN THE EIGHTIES SYMPTOMS OF OVER-POPULATION WERE NOTICEABLE in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. The peasants continued to move on into New Russia, but by this time that region was itself becoming fairly thickly populated. Migrants pursued their way to the newer lands in the northern Caucasus and beyond the Volga. From 1890 onwards the Government took a hand in the organization of this migratory movement. According to the Emigration Department, set up at this period, the greatest number of migrants over the whole Empire came from the 'rich black earth regions' of Poltava, Chernigov, Kursk and Kharkov. However, between the years 1907 and 1913, the Poltava and Chernigov Governments, from being first and second in this respect, ranked only third and fifth. This fact is explained by the initiative of important landowners and industrialists like Kharitonenko, Tereshchenko and others who built up the sugar-beet industry on a large scale. Notwithstanding this factor, between 1906 and 1914, according to the statistics of the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia*, 1,610,000 peasants migrated from the Ukrainian Governments, while migration was also taking place from different districts of New Russia. The Ukrainians mostly went to settle the steppe area in western Siberia and the region of Orenburg; others reached the Amur and the shores of the Pacific Ocean, where the Ukrainian settlements came to be known as the Green Wedge (*Zelëny Klin*) and where the names of the wealthy villages of Novo-Kievskoe, Poltavskoe and Chernigovskoe piously recalled the origin of those who had come from the banks of the Dniepr and the Seym.

311 433 At the beginning of the twentieth century the classical 'three-field system', already prescribed as a law in the Lithuanian Statute of the sixteenth century, prevailed in left-bank Ukraine. This system answered the requirements of the small landowner or well-to-do peasant who farmed 20 to 100 hectares. Few troubled to produce more than a small surplus, the sale of which might cover their current wants. Horticulture, apiculture and some stock-raising served to supplement income. On the larger estates all the energies of the owners were directed to the lucrative exploitation of the sugar-beet industry. Stretches of land were bought or leased from peasants or small landowners in order to increase the acreage under beet. The rapid development and excellent management of the sugar-beet industry impressed and disturbed the German Commission of Professor Auhagen in 1912. By this time the industry had assumed a certain international importance. In 1914 433 there were over 190 sugar factories in the Ukraine out of 226 for the 244 whole Empire (the bulk of the balance was produced in Poland). As against 2 million hectares under wheat in the Ukraine (excluding

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

western Siberia, the Altai and the Far East. The execution of Stalin's commands is to be completed by September 1940. It is not to be anticipated that the acute conditions of 1929–34 will be repeated as a result of this new drive against the human nature of the Russian rural masses: the Communist machine has broken the strength of peasant society. At the same time, there is little doubt that the harvest of 1939–40 will not be as abundant as those of 1936–8.

The influence of the Revolution and of the Soviet régime on forestry in the South of Russia has been no less baleful than on other branches of rural industry. At the end of the nineteenth century woods covered 20 per cent of the whole area of the Ukraine; in 1928, according to the most optimistic estimates of Soviet statisticians, they did not occupy more than 7 per cent. Even in such a 'half-steppe' region as Poltava, owing to the care of the Imperial Government and of large landowners, woods had covered 10 per cent of the total area. 'Destruction of forests is one of the greatest evils because it is followed by the formation of deep ravines which drain the district of underground waters. The consequence of the formation of such ravines is that streams carry away valuable soil to the rivers and the sea. Every year thousands of hectares of good black earth are lost to the labourer and only serve to make the Dniepr and its affluents more shallow. The destruction of forests, the formation of ravines, the drying up of underground waters, threaten the future of the Ukraine with the gravest consequences.'

The Soviet Government is well aware of the dark side of its 'achievement' in the agricultural life of the South of Russia. But, as is well known, the Soviet leaders intend to effect a radical change in the balance of productive forces within the Union. Their reasons for this intention are both political and ideological: political because they realize that their dictatorship rests upon the industrial proletariat and has always aroused the antagonism of the peasants; ideological because they are the apostles of the mechanistic conception of life and, hypnotized by the material achievements of the capitalist world, they ape it in their attempt to transform it and can seek nothing more profound than the realization of Stalin's dream 'to catch up and surpass America'.

In 1913 the relation of agricultural to industrial production in Russia was 59·4 to 40·6. Under the original Five Year Plan formulated in 1928 the Soviets aimed at the attainment of a balance which should allocate 80·2 to industry and only 19·8 to agriculture. This fantastic aim was based obviously on the possibilities of bringing into exploitation the vast mineral resources which were known to lie under the soil of the Soviet Union. And all the political ruthless-

p 130

VI. FROM UNDERGROUND TO RESISTANCE

133 For groups carrying on open resistance to an occupying power, the Ukraine as a whole is a highly inhospitable region; throughout most of its extent it is an open plain without natural places of concealment. Aside from the mountainous areas of the Carpathians in Galicia, the Carpatho-Ukraine, and Bukovina, which remained for a long time outside the scope of open resistance activities, sheltered retreats for bands of any considerable size are difficult to find. They are limited almost entirely to the belt of woods and swamp on the northern border. Originally, forest vegetation prevailed north of a line reaching from a point on the Polish border not far to the southwest of Kremenets almost due east, through Zhitomir and Kiev, to the boundary of the Ukraine and the Russian Soviet Republic some fifty miles northwest of [311] Sumy.[1] In the course of the centuries, a large part of this region has been cleared for cultivation; the presence of numerous swampy areas prevented all the forest from being cut down, however, so that there are frequent wooded areas, which become more common and less separated by open spaces the farther north one goes. In the Ukraine, as it was administratively defined prior to 1941, this wooded strip rarely exceeds one hundred miles in width, although it is almost four hundred miles long. The Reichskommissariat Ukraine, however, included an additional strip annexed from Belorussia, averaging about forty miles in width, and containing still more impenetrable swamps than the more southerly wooded area. Of the forested region, the southern part, which has been partly cleared, is valuable agriculturally and is thickly settled; it forms an integral part of the

[1] Cf. *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznastva* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 106.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563 and the Greeks who competed with the merchant Jews in the great ports, where they formed very united and wealthy autonomous communities which to-day have been repatriated or dispersed.

II

Agriculture

241 Fundamentally an agricultural land, the Ukraine is particularly the land of cereals.

The incomparable richness of these lands, her temperate climate, and the aptitude of her population have made this branch of human activity the fundamental wealth of the country.

134 311 With the exception of the forest regions of the north-west, where sandy soil is met, nearly all the lands of the Ukraine are arable and actually only a few tens of thousands of hectares of waste land remain, which serve as natural pasturages and give an excellent hay which is very well suited for horses.

243 About 25,000,000 hectares are sown, of which 20,000,000 are growing cereals.

The abundance of nitrates in the surface layer of the earth, and its capillary structure, perfect for irrigation, allow the cultivation of the most valuable of cereals—[311] wheat. The area that has been sown with this cereal occupies more than 35 per cent of the worked land of the Ukraine and its production rises to 90,000,000 quintals, representing almost 8 per cent of the world harvest and 18 per cent of the European harvest.

The cultivation of wheat seems to develop from year to year at the expense of barley and of rye, cereals of inferior quality.

From the end of the nineteenth century wheat has

alleviate these conditions various measures have been 425
adopted, such as the easement or complete extinguish- 511
ing of the burden of the purchase-price of the *nadyel*, the prevention of its frequent redistribution, and the founding of the Peasants' Land Bank by the State to facilitate further purchases of land by the communes. Nevertheless, a result not looked for by the framers 565
of the law abolishing serfdom has followed, namely the creation of a large landless agricultural proletariat, which tends to sink in the social scale, to live partly by industry in the towns, and to be migratory in its habits.

The law of 1906 introduced for the first time the 421
general principle of individual and permanent ownership of *nadyel* lands. It aimed at the breaking up of the *mirs* as no longer fulfilling a need, in the expectation that security of tenure by the individual would lead to a more rational and successful system of cultivation. The period since the promulgation of the law is too short to allow of sound conclusions as to its effect.

The *nadyel* lands are almost entirely cultivated 241
on the three-field system, each unit of land being 311
planted one year with a winter-sown grain, the following year with a spring-sown grain, and lying fallow in the third year. This method causes a disastrous impoverishment of the land, especially as in many cases the minimum of manure, whether animal or chemical, is used. An alternative method must be introduced, or the productiveness of the black-soil land under peasant ownership will continue to shrink as heretofore.

The land held by private owners is in general their 425
perpetual freehold, and can be roughly divided into that 563
held by the nobility in large estates and the smaller holdings purchased from them since the abolition of serfdom by prosperous peasants and others desirous of embarking on agriculture on their own account. There are also a number of foreign colonists, chiefly Germans, descendants of those introduced into the country

425 by the Government at various times between the middle of the eighteenth century and 1861, in the hope that their superior methods of agriculture would be copied by other cultivators. This effect, however, was not produced, and the colonists form compact communities with little or no influence on their neighbours. Land in private ownership is usually farmed on more modern [241] and rational principles than the *nadyel* land, and produces almost the entire surplus of cereals which is sent abroad and to other parts of Russia.

421 The land owned by the Church, Crown, and members of the Imperial family is absolute freehold, and is generally well managed and productively farmed.

407 412 Up-to-date agricultural machinery is becoming more common all round. It is of course most in vogue on the large estates, especially in the case of expensive machines involving the use of power; steam-ploughs on the cable system are much in use on the large sugar-beet estates, and tractor ploughs with single engines are becoming numerous. By the help and enterprise of the *zemstvos* the peasants are now beginning to use modern machines and implements. The traditional *sock* or wooden plough, the flail, and other such primitive tools are disappearing, although it is hard to induce the peasant to abandon his old methods.

(c) *Forestry*

137 [311] A large portion of the Ukraine is totally denuded of trees at the present time. The Governments of Podolia and Volhynia, and the northern parts of Kiev and Chernigov, are well wooded, the area covered by forest being about 15 per cent. of the whole. In the remaining provinces the forest area averages 3–4 per cent. of the total. The State controls certain areas north of Kiev on both banks of the Dnieper, and in Volhynia on the south side of the Pripet marshes, as well as smaller scattered tracts in Podolia. In the Government of Yekaterinoslav the State has lately done much

[Podolia] [Volhynia]

everyone else from among our ranks. 000

Before the First World War it was said of 101
Podolia, which you will reach if you wander farther 181
north and which lies like a plateau over the Dniestr 311
Valley, that bread grows on fence posts there,
/Facing page 16: Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. [000]
View of the lower part of the city/; /Facing page
17: The old fortress of Feodosiya on the Crimea/ 3
/17/ and that the fences are woven out of sausages. For the first time there lies before you an immeasurable sea of surging grain. Not a house far and wide, rarely a small wood. A groundless, dusty field road, surprisingly seems to lead into empty space, but where you think it ends, it leads you straight as a die, by means of steep turns into one of those deep valleys which the rivers in the course of thousands of years have carved into the plateaus. Down there the Podolians build their loam huts, the whitewashed walls of which have already greeted you from a distance through the green of the plum and cherry trees. If you follow the river upstream, it will more and more often lead you around ponds, marshes and swamps the nearer you come to its sources. You will see more storks than you have ever seen before in your life.

Almost imperceptibly you will reach Volhynia, 101
the western part of which belonged to Poland up to 491
1939, but was subject to the czar before that. You 361
will notice this immediately by the lack of good roads. For, as everywhere in former Czarist Russia, there are only a few paved roads, but all the more are there roads on which in dry weather you sink into the dust and in wet weather into mud. You will 361
notice it also by the cities and towns which are even dirtier and more neglected than those of Galicia. You are in the midst of the ghettos of the world. These cities are a jumble of houses, "with an ugly traffic artery in the middle". They are spread out with a total absence of form, as though they had been

3 [For plates, cf. pp. 215-216, category 116 — Analyst]

Moldavia

635 648 The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was created on August 2, 1940 by the decree of the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. This Republic consists of a part of the former Moldavian Autonomous S.S. Republic and of a section of Bessarabia incorporated into the Soviet Union. [131 161] The creation of this new Union Republic decreased the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 3,900 square kilometres and a population of 310,000 persons[1].

The Transcarpathian Ukraine[2]

728 In June 1945 an agreement was signed in Moscow between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic that the Transcarpathian Ukraine "...which on the basis of a pact of September 10, 1919, concluded at St.Germain-en-Laye, entered the Czechoslovak Republic with the rank of an Autonomous Republic, will, according to the wish manifested by the population of the Carpatho-Ukraine and on the basis of the friendly agreement of both high contracting parties, unite with its longstanding motherland, the Ukraine, and is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The frontier between Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine, existing since September 29, 1938, will, with modifications described, become the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic..."

Article II of the protocol appended to the Pact said that:

"Persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality living in Czechoslovak territory have the right to opt for Soviet citizenship until January 1, 1946... Czech and Slovak nationals residing or having their permanent domicile in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine have the right to opt for Czechoslovak nationality during the time until January 1, 1946".[3]

131 311 On January 1, 1935, the area of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 12,617 square kilometres. In 1937 about half of this was covered by forests and woods; roughly 239,000 hectares were arable, and about 328,000 hectares were devoted to vineyards, market gardens, and permanent meadows and pastures.

161 As at December 1, 1930, the population of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 725,357, an increase of nearly 121,000 over February 1921.[4]

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1 Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S.Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

2 Called by the Czechs, Sub-Carpathian Rus, or Carpatho-Ukraine.

3 New York Times quoted by Voices of History (1945-46), Gramercy Publishing Company, New York.

4 Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovak Republic, London.

311 241 [407] [475] Despite a certain reduction in the area under cultivation in the Ukraine, (25,124,900 hectares in 1937 as compared with 26,438,400 in 1932), production rose considerably, reflecting great progress in the mechanization of agriculture. The number of tractors increased from 51,300 in 1932 to 83,900 in 1937. The number of harvesting combines increased in the same period from 4,900 to 26,700. The number of Machine and Tractor Stations grew from 657 to 958. The mechanization of agriculture in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is shown in the following table, which compares the output of energy from draught animals with the energy derived from machines, both in the Ukrainian Republic and in the entire Soviet Union. (It should be noted that, according to Soviet practice, the output of energy is measured in kilowatt hours.)

TABLE V

Output of Energy in Agriculture, 1938
(million kwh)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Total Soviet Union
[407] Energy from machines	4,211	19,304.2
379] Energy from draught cattle	1,662	14,667.5
Total output of energy in agriculture	5,873	33,971.7

Source : Planned Economy XII, Moscow, 1940.

[178] As the table shows, the percentage of mechanization in the Ukraine was greater than in the entire Soviet Union.

Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

311 According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there
425 were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000
723 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The principal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Izmail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

474 Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution
241 of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas
178 from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

475 Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the
407 Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Izmail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

475 In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in
407 June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in
652 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.

SU The State Farms (sovkhozes)

475 After the revolution, when the large holdings were broken up, a
242 certain number of well-organized estates were preserved as model agricultural stations. These were subsequently turned into State Farms (sovkhozes), the purposes of which was to experiment with seed selection, plant and livestock breeding, fertilizers, etc. The sovkhozes, operating with hired labour, turned over to the government all their production above the requirements of the sovkhoz workers.

SU

[407] To an even greater extent than the collective farms the State Farms were mechanized. They had the best technical equipment and, compared with the kolkhozes, twice the concentration of tractors per hectare. The sovkhoz workers received wages at specially worked out rates: they had the use of living quarters, dining rooms, and educational and entertainment facilities.

SU

[433] The State Farms achieved good results in raising production, both of grain and of industrial crops.

SU
474 However, the basic form of agricultural organization in the U.S.S.R.
475 continued to be the collective farms, which supplied the bulk of food
311 and agricultural raw materials for industry.

372 At the beginning of the third Five Year Plan (1938), there were in the Soviet Union 242,000 collective farms (kolkhozes) embracing 91 per cent. of all the land under cultivation. The kolkhozes had 117.2 million hectares of arable land; the 3,960 State Farms (sovkhozes) had 12.4 million hectares;[1] and 1.5 million individual farmers had 900,000 hectares of arable land.[2]

Collective Farms in the Ukraine

U
474 In 1938 the Ukraine contained almost one-ninth of the collective
311 farms in the Soviet Union (27,393 out of 242,392). The total area
433 occupied by the Ukrainian kolkhozes was 34.9 million hectares, of which about 61 per cent. was under cultivation. Like the kolkhozes in other Republics, the Ukrainian collectives made giant strides in the years between 1932-38: they increased in number, from 25,000 to 27,393; they increased their area of cultivation from 18.9 million to 21.4 million hectares;[3] but the greatest increase was in productivity, as the following table shows.

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1 Although the area of the sovkhozes extended to 68 million hectares, the sown acreage amounted to only 12.4 million hectares.

2 The Socialist Agricultural Economy of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1939

3 In the Ukraine as a whole, however, the cultivated area declined from 26.4 million hectares in 1932 to 25.6 million in 1938.

TABLE VII

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Average Yields of Grain on Ukrainian Collective Farms
(metric tons per hectare)

	Ukraine Average pre-world war I 1901-13	Ukrainian Collectives Average 1932-34	1937-39	1939
Winter rye	0.98	0.83	1.20	1.15
Winter wheat	1.04	0.93	1.43	1.59
Summer wheat	0.70	0.73	0.76	1.03
Summer barley	0.93	0.93	1.26	1.52
Oats	1.07	0.87	1.12	1.23
Millet	0.99	0.61	1.0	1.16
Buckwheat	0.68	0.50	0.58	1.50
Maize	1.11	0.93	1.5	1.57
Average all grains	0.91	0.85	1.23	1.36

Source: Speech delivered by N. Kruschev[1], Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, cited in Agriculture in 1940, A. Mortunov, Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940/II.

In the entire Soviet Union the average yield of grain crops increased from 0.7 tons per hectare in 1930 to 0.97 tons per hectare in 1938.

The development of agriculture in the collective farms of the Ukrainian S.S.R. from 1934-38 is further illustrated by the following table, which shows the area under cultivation, yield per hectare and gross output of the principal crops in 1938, all in percentages of 1934.

1 Now Premier of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

TABLE VIII

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Productivity of Ukrainian Collective Farms in 1938
(expressed in percentage of 1934)

	Area under cultivation	Yield per hectare	Gross output
Grain	88.0	176.0	157
Sugar beet	98.0	164.0	161
Sunflower	85.0	208.0	171
Flax	126.0	140.0	290
Cotton	146.0	671.0	986

Source: J. Sautsenko "Productivity of Work in Collective Farms in the Ukrainian S.S.R." Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940/I.

As the table shows, the area under cultivation of grain, sugar beet, and sunflowers decreased somewhat; however, average yields per hectare and total production were increased by 75 to 100 per cent. This increase in productivity was brought about by improved cultivation methods: the use of selected seeds, chemical fertilizers, more scientific crop rotation and above all, by the greater mechanization of labour. As we have seen, the Ukraine had in 1938 nearly a thousand Machine and Tractor Stations, as compared with 657 in 1932. The effect of mechanization in the collectives is best shown by the fact that whereas in 1932 the M.T.S. cultivated 77.1 per cent. of the arable area of the Ukrainian kolkhozes, by 1937 they were serving 98.8 per cent. of the collectives' entire arable land.

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Since 1938 (the last year in which comprehensive agricultural statistics for the U.S.S.R. were published) there has been little information available about agricultural production in the Soviet Union. The figures which have been made public emerge from press or conference reports, and the information is usually very scanty. The immediate pre-war picture is therefore not clear.

We do have, however, the planned 1941 area of cultivation in the U.S.S.R., as well as the percentage of increase over 1940. From these figures we can estimate the sown areas in 1940, as the following tables show.

433 As the table shows, the Ukrainian people received in 1945 only 4
262 to 5 kilograms of fats - 8 to 18 kilograms less than their pre-war
388 annual consumption rate.

Disaster in 1946

433 Early in 1946 other UNRRA supplies in addition to food began to
241 arrive - seeds, small quantities of fertilizers, and a few farm tools.
648 Throughout the Ukraine great efforts were being made for a successful spring sowing. However, there were still shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, and machinery. None of the 1,600 tractors promised by UNRRA had arrived. Much of the work was still being done by hand, especially where no draught animals were available.

[311] Even despite these drawbacks, it is estimated that about 80 per cent. of the pre-war area was sown; but no figures are available on the acreage planted to individual crops. In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission, describing the difficulties in getting detailed agricultural statistics, stated:

> "....During a recent inspection trip we were informed by the agricultural authorities of the Poltava oblast,[1] one of the best agricultural regions in the Ukraine, that they did not even try to set production goals for their collective farms this year (1946); they simply told each farm to plant as much as possible of whatever crops it could raise with the seed, equipment, draught animals, and manpower available. (For example) We believe that nobody really knows with any degree of accuracy what acreage was planted to oil seeds in the Ukraine this year, what yield may be expected, or how much of the resulting oil will be available for non-farm use."

433 The Ukrainian people set high hopes on the 1946 harvest. However,
241 in the very summer when a good crop would have made all the difference,
648 the greatest drought since 1891 destroyed their prospects. It affected a vast area from Moldavia to the Urals, south to the Kuban and north to Moscow. The earth was parched; and the crops, burnt by the hot summer sun, had little to draw upon because rain and snowfall in the winter of 1945-46 had been poor. Hopes withered with the wheat. The potato crop too was affected: a hot wind out of Asia dried the plants, and dwarfed the tubers.

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1 Oblast: a district similar, for administrative purposes, to a county.

The Five-Year Plan in Ukrainian Agriculture

185 According to the Five-Year Plan 1946-50 the crop area of the
●311 Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is to reach 30.5 million hectares, of which
474 21.3 million are to be planted on the collective farms. The distribution of major crops is planned as follows.

TABLE XIII

Ukraine: Crop Area in 1950 (Planned)
(hectares)

	Total area	Including on the collective farms
Grain crops	19,600,000	14,100,000
Industrial crops	2,600,000	2,200,000
Melons, potatoes, and other vegetables	2,800,000	1,000,000
Fodder crops	5,400,000	4,000,000

Source: The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

The area sown to sugar beet in 1950 is fixed at 830,000 hectares, and to sunflower, 801,000 hectares. The hopfields are to be rehabilitated, and the area of vineyards growing European varieties of grapes is to be expanded. Measures are to be taken to drain 40,000 hectares and irrigate 50,000 hectares of farm land; and all engineering work needed to ensure normal production is to be restored.

241 Average yields of Ukrainian crops in 1950 are envisaged as follows:
433 grain, 1.42 tons per hectare (compare 1939 average 1.36); flax, 0.42
185 tons; sugar beet, 19 tons; and potatoes, 11.2 tons per hectare.[1]

In the entire Soviet Union in 1950 the grain harvest is planned at 127 million tons, of which the Ukraine is to produce 27.8 million tons, or more than one-fifth. The Ukraine's sugar beet harvest is fixed at 15.7 million tons, representing over 60 per cent. of the sugar beet harvest of the U.S.S.R. in 1950. The production of potatoes is expected to be 23 million tons.

The following table compares these targets with pre-war production.

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1 Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

TABLE XIV

185 Ukraine: Planned Production in 1950 Compared with 1940 and 1913 (see Note)
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(million metric tons)

	1913	1940	1950
Grain	20	28	27.8
Sugar beet	8.0	14.8	15.7
Potatoes	about 5[1]	21.5	23

1 According to the report in Pravda, the potato harvest in 1940 was "over 4 times" that of 1913.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

[728] Note: In comparing the 1950 target figures with pre-war production it is important to bear in mind the territorial revisions which occurred in the Ukraine after 1939, when she regained Western Ukraine and part of Bessarabia, lost a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic (which, together with the Moldavian Section of Bessarabia, then became a separate Union Republic), and added Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathian Ukraine.

[131] Thus the present area of the Ukraine exceeds its 1938 area by approximately 118,000 kilometres (11,800,000 hectares). However, we do not know precisely how much of this is agricultural land. The arable land in Western Ukraine before the war amounted to 4 million hectares; that of Transcarpathian Ukraine, to 239,000 hectares. In the parts of Bessarabia and Bukovina which were ceded to the Soviet Union, 3,285,800 hectares were classified as arable. If we roughly divide this between Moldavia and the Ukraine in proportion to the total ex-Rumanian area incorporated in each, about 1,300,000 hectares of agricultural land would have been added to the Ukraine in its share of Bessarabia; and the arable area of present-day Ukraine would exceed the 1937 cultivated area by about 5½ million hectares, the potential total being 30.6 million. The fact that the Five-Year Plan fixes the Ukraine's 1950 area of cultivation at 30.5 million hectares seems to support this assumption.

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Livestock

231 In 1941 the number of livestock in the Ukraine was estimated at 30.4 million, including 10.5 million cattle and 4.6 million horses.[1]

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1 Statement on March 20, 1946, by Mr. Baranovsky, Ukrainian delegate to the UNRRA Fourth Council Session, published in the "UNRRA Journal", March 21, 1946.

III INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT

135 311 433 Ukrainian industry is based chiefly on rich deposits of coal in the Donets Basin, iron ore in the Krivoi Rog district (where the ore contains 60 per cent. metal), and manganese ore in the Nikopol area. To utilize this great natural wealth a very large metallurgical and machine-building industry has been bult up in the Ukraine. At the same time, many food factories including sugar refineries, have been created to process the food so abundantly produced by Ukrainian farms. In the period between wars, the share of the Ukraine in the country's industrial output declined somewhat, not because of slackened activity - on the contrary, Ukrainian industry continued to be even more intensively developed - but because the policy of the U.S.S.R. was to decentralize, and to expand and develop those areas, particularly the eastern ones which previously had no industry. This lengthening of the industrial pace naturally brought about a certain change in emphasis, so that whereas by 1938 the productivity of Soviet industry as a whole had increased to about eight times the output of Tsarist Russia in 1913; the proportion of Ukrainian output in the total was lessened. For example, in 1928 the Krivoi Rog district of the Ukraine produced 78 per cent. of all the iron ore in the U.S.S.R.; but in 1937, although this district was producing more, its share in the total was only 47 per cent.

War Damage to Industry

727 433 Before they were finally driven from the Ukraine the Germans furiously set about wrecking those Ukrainian industries which still survived. They stripped the plants of equipment and destroyed the buildings; they flooded the coal mines; they completed the destruction of the famous Lenin Hydro-Electric Power Station and the Dnieper Dam - both of which had been partially disabled by the retreating Soviet Army troops on August 28, 1941.

The damage to all branches of industry was tremendous and will take many years to repair, particularly since the shortages of labour and equipment, as well as the scarcity of food have been a hindrance at every step. Some of the difficulties were destribed in a report of the UNRRA Mission after visits to several of the larger Ukrainian cities in May 1946.

"In our cable...we outlined the condition and needs of industrial plants in six principal Ukrainian cities visited by members of the Mission during May. The pattern is fairly uniform. Many plants were completely destroyed and those which still stood were usually heavily damaged and almost universally gutted of all modern equipment. Included among those industries hardest hit are the heavy capital goods industries, machine tool manufacturing industries, and power stations, as well as the rolling and stationary stock of all forms of transportation, and equipment for processing building materials. So great is

Food Industries

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727 The damage suffered by the Soviet food industry during the German
25 occupation - not counting the destruction of livestock and crops - has
U been estimated at 17,000 million roubles. Restoration work was begun
727 while the war was still on, and by May 1947, 5,200 food factories had
25 been rebuilt. A fairly large proportion of these restored factories
433 must have been in the Ukraine, where, according to the Soviet Monitor[1] 1,600 out of 1,822 pre-war food factories had been restored by November 6, 1946. The rehabilitated factories had exceeded their 11 months' food output programme by production valued at 12 million roubles (146 million roubles over the corresponding period of 1945).

Sugar

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257 Before the war the output of sugar in the Ukraine was as follows.

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TABLE XX

Pre-War Sugar Production: Ukraine and U.S.S.R.
(metric tons)

Year	Soviet Union total	Ukrainian S.S.R.
1928	1,221,200	1,086,400
1932	826,800	559,700
1937	2,377,500	1,789,800

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; and Statistical Yearbooks of the League of Nations, Geneva, 1936 and 1939.

The Five-Year Plan establishes that in 1946-50 sugar refineries in the Ukraine shall be restored or built capable of handling upwards of 67,000 tons of sugar beet per day. By 1950, according to plan, the output of granulated sugar in the Ukraine will reach 1,637,000 tons, (in the entire Soviet Union, 2.4 million tons).

Forestry

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311 In January 1935 the forest area of the Ukrainian S.S.R. was
313 3,845,000 hectares - about 0.5 per cent. of the forest area of the entire U.S.S.R.[2] The number of sawing frames in the Republic was 703 out of the Soviet Union total of 6,500 (total capacity, 18.4 million cubic metres).[3] Considering the relatively small forest

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1 November 11, 1946

2 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1936.

3 Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940, II.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-
Ruthenians

Shepherds blow huge horns to round up their sheep by night

511 In the narrow valleys and on their slopes are cottages and straggling
464 villages where the Ruthenian uplanders live. Nearly, all the huts are
241 made of wood and are flanked by gardens with patches of sunflowers.
311 In the higher altitudes the land consists mainly of meadows, and such meagre fields as there are yield scanty crops of oats, potatoes or hemp—not sufficient to live on. No wonder that during the summer months it is chiefly women and children who can be found at home; the menfolk either fell trees in the forest or earn their living as seasonal labourers in the towns and villages of the more prosperous South.

101 These lonely mountains and forests breed a people with a distinct
162 character of their own. Living as they do in seclusion, they not only differ from their Slovak neighbours but show distinct regional differences

in agriculture (fertilizers) and in other branches of the economy. There are several superphosphate plants on the right bank, a large soda industry in the Artemovsk-Lisichansk area in the north of the Donets Basin, based on local salt deposits, chemical plants tied closely to the coking and the metallurgical establishments, and sulphuric acid and fertilizer plants connected with the metallurgy of zinc.

In addition to zinc, which is imported into the Donets Basin, nonferrous metallurgy includes that of aluminum, which is also imported and worked at Zaporozh'ye on the basis of *Dneproges* power, and of mercury, mined near Nikitovka in the Donbas.

The petroleum and natural-gas industry is of only local importance and is intended to supply the Ukraine with its gas and liquid fuel needs. The oil fields lie in the foothills of the Carpathians, near Borislav and Drogobych. During the current Plan, a natural gas pipe line was laid from Dashava (in the oil fields) to Kiev. The Ukraine also imports petroleum from Baku via the ports of Osipenko and Odessa, and the station of Trudovaya (Donbas) is the terminus of a kerosene pipe line from the Groznyy fields.

The textile industry (wool, cotton, and linen milling) supplies only local needs. The food industry, on the other hand, is of national importance. This is true especially of the sugar-refining industry, located mainly in the Vinnitsa and Kiev oblasts, on the right bank, and in the Poltava and Kiev oblasts, on the left bank.

The agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR, less important than heavy industry with respect to the value of production, occupies, nonetheless, a major position in the economy of the USSR. Arable land occupies 60 percent of the total area. Prior to the Second World War the Ukraine was one of the regions best equipped with machine-tractor stations and agricultural machinery. Among the cereals, winter wheat in the west, spring wheat in the east, and barley are most important. The sugar beet is by far the major industrial crop; sunflower, cotton, and tobacco are grown to a lesser extent. Orchard farming is popular and produces melons and pumpkins, garden fruits (apples, pears, plums, and cherries), and in the south, apricots and grapes. Horses, cattle, and pigs are raised throughout the region.

The right-bank Poles'ye is least developed agriculturally. Marshes and forests occupy most of the area. In the isolated patches of moist arable land, potatoes, buckwheat, flax, and hemp are the chief crops. The area abounds, however, in pasture land, and dairy farming is

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

SU 311 241 U 311 241

strongly developed. In the left-bank Poles'ye, land has long been cultivated and drained. There are occasional marshy and forested sections, mainly between the Dnieper and the Desna. The chief crops are hemp, tobacco, buckwheat, and leguminous plants. Orchard farming is important. The right-bank wooded steppe is the principal agricultural region of the Ukraine. It combines fertile black earth with a warm and moist climate, and the ready availability of phosphate fertilizer. The sugar beet is predominant and closely linked with the sugar industry. Among the cereals, rye, winter wheat, and oats are most important; potatoes and leguminous crops are also grown. The by-products of sugar refining and fodder crops support large livestock herds raised for dairy products and meat. The growing of fruit is of national importance. Vineyards lie in protected valleys near the Dniester River. The left-bank wooded steppe grows crops similar to those of the right bank. Sugar beets decrease toward the east and are gradually replaced by sunflowers. Similarly, winter wheat gradually makes way for spring wheat. In the southern steppes, where a drier climate prevails, wheat is the most important crop. Rye, corn, and barley are also grown, the latter mainly in the very dry districts. Along the Sea of Azov and westward to the lower Dnieper cotton has been introduced in recent years and is grown without irrigation. Ukrainian cotton is of rather poor quality and produces little fiber. Melons are grown to a great extent, and there are vineyards along the Sea of Azov coast and around Odessa. In the Carpathian realm, the northern foothills abound in wheat and sugar beets. Up-slope dairy farming is important. Agriculture is poorly developed in the Transcarpathian Ukraine. Large areas are covered by forests and pasture land. In the vicinity of the large metropolitan centers, such as Kiev, Khar'kov, L'vov, as well as in the densely inhabited sections of the Donbas, around Krivoy Rog, and along the Dnieper, truck produce and dairy farming are most important.

SU 496 U 496

The intensely developed economy of the Ukraine requires a correspondingly well-developed transportation network. In view of the shallowness of most of the Ukrainian rivers, the railroads bear most of the load. The Ukraine has the densest rail network of the USSR, the chief centers being at L'vov, Kiev, and Khar'kov. Among recently completed lines and spurs, the direct Donbas-Moscow trunk is of the greatest significance. Only since 1932, when the construction of the *Dneproges* dam was completed and an artificial lake was created at the site of the rapids (a former obstacle to navigation), has the Dnieper become the

SU 504 U 504

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RD1

SU 133x u 133

tion. It lies between the Dniester River and the Kiliya arm of the Danube delta and has Moldavian minorities in the northwest and Bulgarian elements in the west, near Bolgrad. The main crops are wheat, barley, and corn in the northwest, where sheep are also extensively raised. Near the Black Sea there are large vineyards and orchards. The oblast is one of the most important wine-producing districts of the USSR. Along the coast there are fisheries and saltworks. Building materials constitute the only mineral resources.

SU 241 u 241

SU 438x [504] u 438 [504]

Izmail (Rumanian *Ismaïl*) is a port and a fishing center on the Kiliya arm of the Danube delta. It produces caviar and has an active grain and lumber trade.

Kiliya (Rumanian *Chilia Nouă*) is a fishing port on the Danube delta, east of Izmail.

Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy (Rumanian *Cetatea Albă*) was known as Akkerman until 1944. It is a port on the Dniester Liman, trading in wine, fish, and wool. It has fisheries and saltworks and is surrounded by vineyards and orchards.

POLES'YE

SU 311 241 u 311 241

THE UKRAINIAN POLES'YE, which includes the oblasts of Zhitomir and Chernigov and the northern sections of Kiev and Sumy oblasts, is distinguished by a relatively high humidity, wooded terrain (especially in the west), and podsolic soils, similar to its Belorussian counterpart, which adjoins it in the north. Among the sparsely settled population, industries are poorly developed. Intensive crops are grown in the forest clearings, including flax, hemp, potatoes, and forage crops, which support some dairy-cattle herds. In the south, along the border of the wooded steppe zone, sugar beets and tobacco are cultivated. The Poles'ye is the only Ukrainian region (not counting the western oblasts, which have not been long exposed to the Soviet planned economy) where rye acreage exceeds that of wheat. Buckwheat is also grown as a local food staple. Industry is largely based on agricultural and lumber resources. Among the food industries, starch processing and distilling are the chief activities. There are woodworking and furniture plants, porcelain works, tanneries, and hemp and flax retting installations. Among the mineral resources, one should note granite, sandstone, used in the making of refractory bricks, and labradorite. Peat extraction is important as a fuel basis.

132 49·3°. Drawbacks for agriculture in New Russia are the prevalence of north and east winds and an irregular and insufficient rainfall. The average rainfall at Yelisavetgrad is 17 in., at Odessa 16 in., at Lugansk 15 in., and at Nikolaev 14 in. The rains in April and May decide the harvest. June is the rainiest month, but from May to September there are droughts. Most places are largely dependent upon wells and ponds constructed in the ravines, which are frequent on the steppes.

The climate of the Ukraine, as a whole, is therefore continental, i. e. the variation between summer and winter temperatures is very great. Sudden variations of temperature are frequent. The rainfall is by no means abundant, and there is a progressive decline towards the south and south-east. The fact, however, that the bulk of the rainfall occurs in the summer favours agricultural operations, even where the annual amount of rainfall is comparatively low. It is only in New Russia that the country suffers seriously from drought.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

312 The Ukraine is very backward in regard to sanitary
364 conditions. Less than half the towns have a satisfactory water-supply, and a very small percentage of them a regular drainage system.

164 Typhoid, diphtheria, and malaria are very prevalent.
758 To the great majority of the people in the country, doctors are inaccessible, and even in the towns good hospitals and adequate medical attendance are very
515 rare. In the matter of cleanliness, however, the Little Russians compare favourably with the Great Russians.

(5) Race and Language

Race

162 The population of the Ukraine is composed of
563 a mixture of various races and nationalities, those chiefly represented being Little Russians, Poles, Jews,

135 The third oil region lies close by the Ukrainian border, many hundreds of kilometers distant from the compact Russian area of settlement, not far from the Caspis on the Terek. These reserves are estimated at 900 million tons. In 1925 2 million tons were extracted, in 1932 over 8 million tons, and in 1933 somewhat more than 5 million tons. (103) From the occurrence of inflammable and

103. Kubiyovich: Atlas...,page 53.

earth gases, oil reserves are suspected to be present on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov and along the Dniestr. The salts in the Donets Basin and along the Carpathians, and the sea salt near Odessa round off the wealth of natural resources. Potassium salts are deposited in Galicia, potassium gluconites in East Podolia, at the Dnepr and near Isyum; phosphates in Podolia along the Dnestr and in northern Ukraine near Chernigov; excellent kaolins are found in the region between Volhynia and the Black Sea, and graphite near
•312 Krivoy Rog. The entire water-power reserves of the Ukrainian provinces are estimated at 9 million horse power; of this only one-tenth was utilized in 1932. /163/

329 Two industrial regions are connected with local natural resources. These are, first, the Donets Basin, rich in coal and salt, with coal mines, coke plants, foundaries and steel works. Here ore from Kerch and Krivoy Rog is smelted. Secondly, there is the mining district of Krivoy Rog and Mykopil on the Dnepr with iron and manganese mines, smelting factories, foundaries and metallurgic factories. With the completion of the large Dnepr power plant at Zaporishea - the normal water level was raised 37.5 meters by the construction of a mighty cofferdam and sluice along the entire rapids, which made the river navigable throughout - the industrial region of Krivoy

11: Obermaier--221 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

(b)

• 312

Ukrainian girl drawing water

11: Obermaier--227 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

A village in West Ukraine

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they
177 were born. This applies even to those who, through force of circum-
181 stances, had to leave their native village to earn their living elsewhere.
167 Some have found occupation in the fertile South; but when they have saved some money they want to return home and are prepared to pay a higher price for a few poor fields, although in the valleys of the South they could buy much better land for the same amount. Hundreds of thousands have emigrated to America, where about as many Ruthenians can be found as have remained in the homeland under the Carpathians. Yet many long to come back home to find their last resting place in the native soil.

137 The peculiar beauty of this forgotten country has a strong grip
313 on her simple sons. The Ruthenian Carpathians are not so high as the Slovak peaks, but the vast stretches of dense forest, which cover almost half of Ruthenia, give the country a more primeval appearance. Some of the woods and slopes are delightful idylls, where the fresh and fragrant air is full of hum and rustle and warble. But in many parts, unchartered and untouched by human hand, the forest is sombre. Trees felled by storm or gale lie dead where they have fallen, and there is a smell of rotting wood in this lonely wilderness. Wild boar, wolf, lynx and bear have their hunting ground here, while above the tops of the mighty pines, firs, oaks and maples, circle the eagle and the hawk. Other parts of the forest are enlivened by the rhythmical sound of the axe cutting down trees to be floated down the rushing mountain streams. A large proportion of the hardy Ruthenians earn their living in this way. But above this expanse of deep forest are the sunlit pastures and upland meadows sprinkled with gentian, buttercups, pansies, chrysanthemums and geraniums. Sheep and cattle graze here during the summer months; Ruthenia is also a country of shepherds, who blow their huge horns at night to gather the scattered herds.

312



Wooden dam in Ruthenia

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RU1

Kherson Oblast

Area, 10,600, population, 700,000

Kherson Oblast extends north of the Crimea from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea. It is a typical flat, dry steppe, with cotton and wheat growing. Kakhovka, on the Dnieper River below Zaporozh'ye, is the site of the second great Dnieper dam, scheduled for 1951–57, with irrigation canals reaching into the Crimea. Skadovsk and Khorly, on the Black Sea, and Genichesk, on the Sea of Azov, are minor fishing ports.

Kherson is a major port at the mouth of the Dnieper River, where there are shipyards, repair docks, agricultural machinery works, and extensive food-canning industries. It is the terminus of a new railroad built during the Second World War from the Crimea.

Nikolayev Oblast

Area, 7,500, population, 800,000

Nikolayev Oblast lies on the Black Sea and is drained by the lower Southern Bug and the Ingul rivers. Cotton and wheat are the chief crops, with castor beans and sunflowers in the north, truck produce near Nikolayev, and dairy farming. In the rural areas flour milling, dairying, and sugar refining are the main industries.

Nikolayev lies at the head of the Bug Liman, over forty miles from the Black Sea. It is a major shipbuilding center and exports grain, sugar, iron, and manganese ore. It produces agricultural machines and has textile, food, and fish-canning industries.

Odessa Oblast

Area, 10,800, population, 1,800,000

Odessa Oblast lies in the western section of the Black Sea lowland and extends from the Black Sea to the Volyn'-Podolian upland in the north. It is bounded in the west by the Moldavian SSR. Numerous minor intermittent streams drain it in the south, and the Southern Bug in the north. Sugar beets are the main crop in the north, wheat and sunflowers in the center, and cotton in the south. Of lesser importance are corn, fruits, and castor beans. Sugar refining, flour milling, dairying, and wine making are the chief rural industries.

Odessa, the third city of the Ukraine and one of the major ports of the USSR, exports lumber and grains, and imports oil from the Caucasus, coal from the Donbas, cement from Novorossiysk, for local in-

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Forestry

The natural conditions for a satisfactory system of forestry are given neither on the Black Earth nor on the steppe proper, where the low rainfall practically excludes sylviculture in place. The situation in Polesya and the mountains is entirely different, but forest areas there are too limited to play any part of importance in the general economy of the country. Exploitation in former times, above all the export of wood and potash by the Union of Poland and Lithuania, completely destroyed forest stocks. It is only since the end of the nineteenth century that there has been any forest conservation in Russia. Since 1880, Dnipro Ukraine alone has lost out of 4,2 million ha of forests (4.9 million ha of forest land), more than 40 %, so that in 1932 it had only 2.5 million ha of forests (3.5 million ha of forest land). 313

Reforestation of forest land would produce 650000 ha of forests, which could be increased to 1.5 million ha by including land that is not particularly valuable for agriculture. Such measures which, in the 35 years before the First World War had produced in Germany an increase of 2.5% and 13% in France in the course of 64 years, were not seriously entertained in post-war years either by USSR or Poland. Areas that had been stripped of trees (22 % and 12 % respectively) were not forested.

Forests in the Carpathians amount to 48 % of the stocks in the entire Ukraine, there being 1.08 ha per head of the population; the corresponding figures for the Caucasus, especially in the north are 58 % and 1.6 ha, for Polesya 40 %, and 0.5 ha. The other areas of the northern zone have fewer forests, the figures being 20 % and 0.23 ha for Podlakhia and Chernyhiv and 19% and 0.18 ha for Galicia and Volynia in the central zone. The center of Dnipro-Ukraine has little forest land, the figures

313 being 13 % and 0.14 ha for the Right Bank Region and 7 % or 0.12 ha for the Left Bank Region. The southern zone has still less (0.08 ha per head) and there is practically none at all in the southern steppe proper.

[311] Thanks to its enormous area Ukraine with its 11 million ha of forest land comes fifth in Europe, but there is only 12 % of forest land in the entire country, and scarcely 0.2 ha per head of the population, while 0.3 ha is regarded as the minimum. The figures for actual forest stock will be still less, as only three quarters of the nominal forest land in Soviet Ukraine (3.1 million out of 4.3 million ha) represent actual forests. Thus the ratio of forest to the entire area of Ukraine would be 9 %. Forestry in those parts of Ukraine that used to belong to Austria-Hungary was on a higher level than in the other provinces; after the war it was highest in Carpatho-Ukraine.

313 The annual increment in timber in Dnipro-Ukraine amounts to 2 cubic meters per ha, in Volynia, Podlakhia and Polesya to 1.9 cubic metres, in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine to 3.3 cubic metres, so that the average figure for the entire country is 2.3 cubic metres. This average for Ukraine is low compared with the figure of 5 cubic meters for the state forests of Germany and 4.4 for the communal forests.

313 439 Reckoned per head of the population there is in Ukraine a timber increment of only 0.4 cubic meters, which is far lower than in most of the forest countries in Europe. As a result, wood has to be imported for mining and industrial areas.

Wood imports amounted to 1.8 million t in Dnipro-Ukraine in 1913, and the average figures for 1928/29 and 1933/34 are 3.7 and 4 million t respectively. The average imports to Northern Caucasia for the last year amounted to 1.2 million t, while the figure for the Crimea is 250 000 and for the whole of Eastern Ukraine 5.5 million t. The demand for timber is greatest in the Donets Basin, the Dnipro Bend and also in Kharkiv and Odessa.

Imports consist chiefly of soft woods; a certain amount of valuable oak is even exported from areas that are otherwise dependent on imports. In those parts of Ukraine that belong to Soviet Russia there is 0.16 ha forest per head of the population,

the figure for the Roumanian provinces being 0.25, for the Polish 0.36, and 1.05 for the Hungarian provinces. 313 439

Imports of timber came mostly by water and rail from White Ruthenia and above all from the forests in the middle reaches of the Volga. The wood that was drifted down the Volga was loaded on railway trucks in Stalingrad and transported to its destination.

Hardwoods predominate in the forest stock of Ukraine (59 %). Oak represents 27 %, beech 9 % of the entire forests. Of the 41 % softwoods there is 27 % pine. Pine and oak are the main species in Dnipro-Ukraine, while in Galicia spruce predominates and beech in Carpatho-Ukraine. In the Caucasus species of oak and beech occur most frequently. 313 137

historic Ukrainian lands of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov. The 133
northern part, appropriately known as Polessia, or the "forest [313]
land," is of little value for crop growing but contains the only timber industry of significance in the Ukraine.

As the German armies rolled into the Ukraine in 1941, they 727
tended to advance along the main lines of communication, avoid- 725
ing the difficult, swampy regions. For weeks, or in some cases 668
even months, the less accessible areas were not brought under German control. This circumstance made possible the development of partisan bands which carried on resistance to the occupation authority.

Although, since 1945, Soviet writers have maintained that the 725
plans for guerrilla warfare against the conqueror had been 665
secretly prepared before the outbreak of hostilities, they assert 669
that these plans were known only to the top level of Communist Party officials. It is fairly certain that the order to develop a partisan movement came as a surprise even to most devoted Communists.[2] In July, 1941, after the decision to form partisan detachments was announced, preparations were pushed forward at a rapid rate by the local authorities. The rapidity of the German advance to the line of the Dnieper, however, rendered largely ineffective systematic attempts to form a partisan movement in the Ukraine west of that river. Even east of the Dnieper the panic produced by the seemingly irresistible German drive played havoc with the organization of guerrilla warfare. Many of the secretly selected leaders were swept along, willingly or unwillingly, in the retreat of the Red Army, while others were discovered and executed by the Germans. In a few places, however, small groups made good their escape to forest or swamp hide-outs. In the southern Ukraine one such group of about five hundred men, trained and directed by the Red Army, but largely composed of local Communist and NKVD officials, established a center of opposition in the swamps formed by the Dnieper south of Nikopol' (Nikopil').[3] This group was destroyed by the German forces in

[2] Oleksii Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet* (The Underground *Oblast* Committee in Action), literary editor Evg. Bosniatskii (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950), pp. 12–14.

[3] Report of Feldpolizeidirektor at 444. Sicherungsdivision, November 5, 1941, NOKW 1519 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 1519).

[of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine -- Analyst]

planting, principally of sand-willows and pines, the main object being to arrest the movement of drift-sand. 137

The principal Ukraine timber trees are oak, maple, elm, ash, willow, aspen, lime, and wych-elm.

The art of forestry would appear to be almost entirely neglected. Systematic replanting of timber is hardly known, and wholesale destruction of woods on the river banks has had disastrous results in the splitting up of the channels. The lime is frequently denuded of its bark to make bast, the tree subsequently perishing as it stands. 313

(3) Fisheries

The fisheries of the Ukraine can be divided into three classes: those of the upper reaches of the rivers, those of the lower reaches and the lagoons at the mouths, and those of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea. 228

In the upper reaches of the principal rivers, fishing can scarcely be called an industry, being carried on by individuals mainly for their personal needs; the stock of fish is everywhere decreasing at a regrettable rate, and much alarm is caused by this depletion.

The fisheries of the lower reaches of the Dnieper, Dniester, and Southern Bug have considerable value. 228 136 The principal fish taken are sturgeon, of which there are several varieties, carp, bream, fresh-water herring, and sander. The fisheries are the property of the riparian owners, who let them to syndicates. The State owns a considerable stretch on the Bug from Nikolaev to Novaya Odessa. The fishing seasons are from February to April and in the autumn, when the fish revisit the rivers to spawn. At this time they are taken for the roe, from which caviare of various qualities is made.

In the Black Sea the principal fish are mackerel, anchovy, and flounder. The fishing here is also carried on by syndicates, and is done close to shore with rather primitive appliances. The bulk of the fish is preserved

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

there are several large factories which specialize in every kind of machine necessary for the sugar industry. 392 433

Several other industries, while of small account in comparison with those described above, deserve mention.

Manufacturing enterprises dependent upon animal products divide themselves principally into tanneries and woollen factories. The centres of the leather industry lie in the northern portion of the country, especially in the Governments of Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, and Podolia. This industry accounts for 4·5 per cent. of the total manufacturing output of the Ukraine. The woollen industry is centred in Kharkov, which has two large cloth mills, and in the town of Klintsi in the Government of Chernigov, where not only cloth but knitted goods, yarns, rugs, shawls, and other woollen goods are turned out from eight considerable factories. The production of woollen goods represents 3·5 per cent. of the total Ukraine output of manufactures. 282 288 433

The timber-working industry is chiefly found in the riparian towns, especially on the Dnieper. Yekaterinoslav takes first place, and Kremenchug, Alexandrovsk and Kherson also have saw-mills. Much of the timber shipped abroad is in an unworked state, and manufactures of the better sort are poorly represented. The industry accounts for only 4 per cent. of the value of the Ukraine manufactures. 313 433

The chemical industry is of minor importance. It is concerned chiefly with the products and by-products of coal gas at Odessa and Kharkov, but there is also a soda factory in the Bakhmut district and there are a number of match-factories in the Novozibkovsk district of Chernigov. The products of the industry represent only 3·5 per cent. of the value of the manufactures of the Ukraine. None of the more advanced branches of the industry is established in the country. 382 43

The industries enumerated account for 90–95 per cent. of the manufactures of the country. The remainder, grouped under the headings of paper, linen, cotton, and fibre industries, are of negligible account. 433

Food Industries

5
727 The damage suffered by the Soviet food industry during the German
25 occupation - not counting the destruction of livestock and crops - has
U been estimated at 17,000 million roubles. Restoration work was begun
727 while the war was still on, and by May 1947, 3,200 food factories had
25 been rebuilt. A fairly large proportion of these restored factories
433 must have been in the Ukraine, where, according to the Soviet Monitor[1] 1,600 out of 1,822 pre-war food factories had been restored by November 6, 1946. The rehabilitated factories had exceeded their 11 months' food output programme by production valued at 12 million roubles (146 million roubles over the corresponding period of 1945).

Sugar

U
257 Before the war the output of sugar in the Ukraine was as follows.

SU
257

TABLE XX

Pre-War Sugar Production: Ukraine and U.S.S.R.
(metric tons)

Year	Soviet Union total	Ukrainian S.S.R.
1928	1,221,200	1,086,400
1932	826,800	559,700
1937	2,377,500	1,789,800

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; and Statistical Yearbooks of the League of Nations, Geneva, 1936 and 1939.

The Five-Year Plan establishes that in 1946-50 sugar refineries in the Ukraine shall be restored or built capable of handling upwards of 67,000 tons of sugar beet per day. By 1950, according to plan, the output of granulated sugar in the Ukraine will reach 1,637,000 tons, (in the entire Soviet Union, 2.4 million tons).

Forestry

U
[311] In January 1935 the forest area of the Ukrainian S.S.R. was
313 3,845,000 hectares - about 0.5 per cent. of the forest area of the entire U.S.S.R.[2] The number of sawing frames in the Republic was 703 out of the Soviet Union total of 6,500 (total capacity, 18.4 million cubic metres).[3] Considering the relatively small forest

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1 November 11, 1946

2 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1936.

3 Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940, II.

U
313 area of this Republic, the high proportion of sawing frames reveals the advanced development of its timber industry.

SU
313 During the war Soviet timber enterprises, along with other industries,
72 suffered considerably. Much has been done to repair the damage, but rehabilitation work has been seriously hampered by shortages of wagon transport and of seasonal labour. In January this year a Pravda leading article announced that the preparation of timber in the U.S.S.R. was nine million cubic metres short of the plan, and that the shipment of prepared timber was "in an even worse condition," particularly in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics. Part of the difficulty at least was due to breakdowns in tractors, but chiefly to labour shortage and low labour productivity. Here again, as in all branches of industry and agriculture, the exceedingly low food ration scales must be taken into account.

U
185 The Five-Year Plan includes the following provisions for
313 Ukrainian timber developments:

> "To reduce the haulage of lumber to the Ukrainian S.S.R., the general plan for the production of undressed lumber in the Ukraine in the years 1946-50 shall be set at 47,600,000 cubic metres, with provision for an increase of felling in the western regions of the Ukraine and a restriction of felling in its eastern regions. Reafforestation shall be carried on extensively, timber being planted in the period 1946-50 on an area of 252,000 hectares and measures taken to replenish the thinned forests and to introduce fast-growing varieties of timber."

Paper Production

U
281 In 1937 the Ukraine produced 28,400 tons of paper, as compared with 22,600 tons in 1932. This output represented, in 1937, 3.42 per cent., and, in 1932, 4.8 per cent. of the Soviet Union total paper production.[1]

In 1946 the reviving paper industry of the Ukraine turned out about 9,500 tons of paper and cardboard, exceeding its production programme by 10 per cent. This year the output of paper and cardboard is expected to be more than double that of 1946.

The first section of a mill producing paper bags has been launched in the Dragobych Region, and another paper mill is being built in the same region. Two cardboard factories are being built, one in Lvov and one in Rakhov (Transcarpathian Region).[2]

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1 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 10, 1947.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians

160

They are a mountain people who cling to the place where they
177 were born. This applies even to those who, through force of circum-
181 stances, had to leave their native village to earn their living elsewhere.
167 Some have found occupation in the fertile South; but when they have saved some money they want to return home and are prepared to pay a higher price for a few poor fields, although in the valleys of the South they could buy much better land for the same amount. Hundreds of thousands have emigrated to America, where about as many Ruthenians can be found as have remained in the homeland under the Carpathians. Yet many long to come back home to find their last resting place in the native soil.

137 The peculiar beauty of this forgotten country has a strong grip
313 on her simple sons. The Ruthenian Carpathians are not so high as the Slovak peaks, but the vast stretches of dense forest, which cover almost half of Ruthenia, give the country a more primeval appearance. Some of the woods and slopes are delightful idylls, where the fresh and fragrant air is full of hum and rustle and warble. But in many parts, unchartered and untouched by human hand, the forest is sombre. Trees felled by storm or gale lie dead where they have fallen, and there is a smell of rotting wood in this lonely wilderness. Wild boar, wolf, lynx and bear have their hunting ground here, while above the tops of the mighty pines, firs, oaks and maples, circle the eagle and the hawk. Other parts of the forest are enlivened by the rhythmical sound of the axe cutting down trees to be floated down the rushing mountain streams. A large proportion of the hardy Ruthenians earn their living in this way. But above this expanse of deep forest are the sunlit pastures and upland meadows sprinkled with gentian, buttercups, pansies, chrysanthemums and geraniums. Sheep and cattle graze here during the summer months; Ruthenia is also a country of shepherds, who blow their huge horns at night to gather the scattered herds.

312



Wooden dam in Ruthenia

Khotin (Rumanian *Hotin*) lies in an orchard and vineyard area on the Dniester River. There is a noted leather industry.

Stanislav Oblast

Area, 5,400, population, 1,300,000

Stanislav Oblast is drained by the upper Dniester and its right affluents descending from the Carpathian Mountains. It has important petroleum, salt, natural-gas, and potash deposits in the areas of Dolina and Bolekhov, with petroleum fields extending along the foothills in a southeasterly direction to Kosmach, southwest of Kolomyya. The principal oil towns are Bolekhov, Dolina, Pereginsko, Bogorodchany (where ozocerite is also secured), Solotvin, Nadvornaya, Pechenezhin, and Kosmach. Petroleum is refined at Bolekhov, Stanislav, and Kolomyya. The main lumber centers are Delyatin and Kuty, which has a large wood-distillation industry. On the right bank of the Dniester River lies the agricultural zone of the oblast, where grains, tobacco, and sugar beets are raised. Tobacco is processed at Zabolotov and sugar at Gorodenka.

Stanislav (Polish *Stanisławów*, German *Stanislau*) has railroad and machine shops, an oil refinery, and textile and leather industries and produces asphalt, ceramics, lumber, and food products.

Kolomyya (Polish *Kołomyja*, German *Kolomea*), on the upper Prut River, has machine works and oil-refining and chemical plants. Textiles and cement are also produced.

Drogobych Oblast

Area, 4,000, population, 1,200,000

Drogobych Oblast lies on the northern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and is bordered by Poland in the west. It is the chief petroleum region of the Western Ukraine, with the chief oil fields in the area of Drogobych and Borislav. Near by are potassium and magnesium salt mines and natural-gas wells. Salt is mined at Dobromil'. Agriculture is important along the Dniester River.

Drogobych (Polish *Drohobycz*) is the center of the Western Ukrainian petroleum region, with important refining and chemical installations and potash and magnesium salt mines. It trades in petroleum, livestock, and agricultural products and produces rubber goods, lumber, and food products.

Borislav (Polish *Borysław*) is another petroleum center southwest of Drogobych. It has petroleum and natural-gas wells and engages in the

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

western Siberia, the Altai and the Far East. The execution of Stalin's commands is to be completed by September 1940. It is not to be anticipated that the acute conditions of 1929–34 will be repeated as a result of this new drive against the human nature of the Russian rural masses: the Communist machine has broken the strength of peasant society. At the same time, there is little doubt that the harvest of 1939–40 will not be as abundant as those of 1936–8.

The influence of the Revolution and of the Soviet régime on forestry in the South of Russia has been no less baleful than on other branches of rural industry. At the end of the nineteenth century woods covered 20 per cent of the whole area of the Ukraine; in 1928, according to the most optimistic estimates of Soviet statisticians, they did not occupy more than 7 per cent. Even in such a 'half-steppe' region as Poltava, owing to the care of the Imperial Government and of large landowners, woods had covered 10 per cent of the total area. 'Destruction of forests is one of the greatest evils because it is followed by the formation of deep ravines which drain the district of underground waters. The consequence of the formation of such ravines is that streams carry away valuable soil to the rivers and the sea. Every year thousands of hectares of good black earth are lost to the labourer and only serve to make the Dniepr and its affluents more shallow. The destruction of forests, the formation of ravines, the drying up of underground waters, threaten the future of the Ukraine with the gravest consequences.'

The Soviet Government is well aware of the dark side of its 'achievement' in the agricultural life of the South of Russia. But, as is well known, the Soviet leaders intend to effect a radical change in the balance of productive forces within the Union. Their reasons for this intention are both political and ideological: political because they realize that their dictatorship rests upon the industrial proletariat and has always aroused the antagonism of the peasants; ideological because they are the apostles of the mechanistic conception of life and, hypnotized by the material achievements of the capitalist world, they ape it in their attempt to transform it and can seek nothing more profound than the realization of Stalin's dream 'to catch up and surpass America'.

In 1913 the relation of agricultural to industrial production in Russia was 59·4 to 40·6. Under the original Five Year Plan formulated in 1928 the Soviets aimed at the attainment of a balance which should allocate 80·2 to industry and only 19·8 to agriculture. This fantastic aim was based obviously on the possibilities of bringing into exploitation the vast mineral resources which were known to lie under the soil of the Soviet Union. And all the political ruthless-

stry, but also by power plants. On the whole, however, brown 316
coal and peat have no great importance for Ukraine.

7. Petroleum and Gas

The petroleum industry was founded in Galicia about the 382
middle of the 19th century. In 1909 Galicia (yearly production of 2 million t) contributed 5 % of the world production of petroleum and ranked third. But an uninterrupted decline set in, so that in 1937 its figure of 510 000 t was only 16th in world production.

The reason for this decline was the splitting up of landed property and backward methods of production. Some of the 25 refineries were on Polish territory. The crude oil is transported by rail. As the high paraffin content of Galician oil causes obstruction in pipes and as the oilfields are far from the sea and the market for this oil is in Central Europe, there has been no attempt to lay pipe lines.

In the Kuban area the figure for petroleum production was only 150 000 t in 1912, but this increased under the two first Five Year Plans to 1.8 million t in 1937. Since 1900 the petroleum is conducted by pipe from Maikop to Krasnodar, the pipe being 108 km long and able to send 900 000 t a year. In 1928 it was connected with the main pipe which is 618 km long and connects the Groznyj oil-field with Tuapse, a growing harbor on the Black Sea.

Since 1893 oil-wells have been bored in Groznyj. Shortly 315
before World War I, these wells produced 1.2 million t, and in 1925 double as much, under the first Five Year Plan almost 7 million t yearly, under the second 3.7 million t. These varying yields testify to the wealth of oil, but also to the ruthless methods of exploitation, especially where oil is allowed to spurt out in jets.

In the Kuban area and in Groznyj oil refineries are equipped 382
on modern lines. In the thirties $^3/_4$ of the entire petrol requirements of Russia were supplied from this area. Pipe lines 315
also connect Groznyj with Mahach Kala on the Caspian Sea,

Table 11. Production of Petroleum in

382

	1880	1885	1890	1895	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905
Galicia	32	65	92	215	326	452	576	728	830	802
Maikop	—	18	30	22	4	5	7	5	—	1
Groznyj	—	—	—	463	500	573	527	537	660	707
Ukraine	32	83	122	700	830	1030	1110	1270	1490	1510
Russian Empire and Austria	590	1950	3720	6870	10700	12000	11600	11000	11600	8300
% of Ukraine	5½	4½	3¼	10¼	7¾	8½	9½	11½	13	18¼

	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
Galicia	765	705	715	736	770	813	796	720	745	675
Maikop	18	45	51	44	46	77	72	80	105	155
Groznyj	1207	1440	1504	1640	2014	2410	3022	3360	3690	4570
Ukraine	1990	2190	2270	2420	3830	3300	3890	4160	4540	5400
Soviet Union and Poland	4300	5300	6000	6800	7100	8800	9700	11300	12300	14400
% of Ukraine	46¼	41¼	37¾	35½	34	40¾	40	36¾	37	37½

315 with Armavir (490 km) and thence with Trudova in the Donets Basin (468 km). There is a plan to extend the lines to Dnipropetrovske (242 km).

In 1937 the petroleum produced in Ukraine, including Groznyj, amounted to 5 million t = 2 % of world production.

It is only Galicia that possesses any appreciable quantities of natural gas. During the thirties, production rose to about ½ million cubic meters, the greater part of which was used in the manufacture of gasoline. The longest pipes are from Dashava to Boryslav and Lviv.

8. Chemical Industry and the Production of Salt

385 The chief products of the chemical industry which grew rapidly during the First World War are acids (e. g. sulphuric acid) and bases, soda and artificial manure. In 1934 in Dnipro-Ukraine there were 103 plants employing 28 650 workers, 14 of these plants (12 730 workers) being big businesses. In Western

316 million tons. The beds in the Donets Basin have the advantage of being shallow and the disadvantage of being unevenly distributed and not very large. They are only three-quarters of a meter in diameter. Besides, the coal is impure and also has a high ash content. In spite of the fact that more is produced, the method of mining is antiquated.

Besides the incidence of brown coal in the Donets region, there are 120 smaller deposits in the right-bank region of the Ukraine, but they /162/ are scarcely exploited. It is presumed that there are larger deposits in this region also. In 1935 the total reserves of brown coal in the Soviet Ukraine were estimated at 550 million tons. (100) The mining of this coal is very much neg-

100. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 442.

lected and ore-dressing is unknown. In 1935 a total of 300,000 tons of brown coal was extracted in all the Ukrainian provinces, 240,000 tons of which came from eastern Ukraine. (101) The ex-

101. Deminskiy: The Economy of the Ukraine, page 137.

tensive peat bogs are merely of local importance.

●315 When it comes to oil, the Ukrainian earth is
135 not niggardly. Well-known as the oil fields of Drogobich and Borislav on the northern slope of the Carpathians, the reserves of which are estimated at 58 to 100 million tons. Extraction reached its height as early as 1902 when it amounted to 2 million tons or 5% of world production. Since then it has constantly decreased, amounting to 1.1 million tons in 1913 and an annual average of 500,000 to 600,000 tons from 1932 to 1936. (102)

102. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 443.

135 To the south-east, in the Don and northern Donets valleys,
654 geologists have discovered a number of new coal-bearing areas, and have confirmed that the Donets Basin coal layers stretch far to the east and south.

Other investigations of coal-bearing areas are to begin shortly, particularly around the Azov Sea coast and in other regions bordering the Donets Basin.

Coke

316 The coke output of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is planned to be 15,500,000 tons.

Natural Gas and Oil

315 With the incorporation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the Ukrainian
185 S.S.R. came into possession of oil producing regions. The Five-Year Plan calls for the intensive development of these and other areas of the Ukraine for the increased production of oil and natural gas. Three hundred and twenty-five wells are to be located to add to the
[654] petroleum resources of the western regions; prospecting for commercial deposits of petroleum in the Romny area is to be completed; and there is to be extensive geological exploration for natural gas in the Dragobych Region (Western Ukraine) and on the Azov and Black Sea coasts.

[382] The total output of petroleum in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 325,000 metric tons.

The plan also provides for the building of a gas pipeline from Dashava to Kiev. Already in process of construction, the first section of the pipeline will be completed this year (1947) and will supply gas to more than 30,000 flats and several large industrial plants in Kiev.

Electric Power Stations

377 Electrification has been one of the outstanding features of the Soviet economy. Before the war the Ukrainian Republic possessed a wide network of electric power stations. Best known was the huge Dnieper Dam and Lenin Hydro-electric Station, completed in 1932 near Zaporozhie. This station supplied electric power to a great industrial region: in the north the steel mills of Dniepropetrovsk and Dnieprodzerzhinsk, and to the south-east, the Nikopol manganese mines. These three industrial centres developed quickly after the Dnieper Dam was built; and the abundance of cheap power available from it also gave rise to the growth of a metal and machine-building centre at Zaporozhie.

in agriculture (fertilizers) and in other branches of the economy. There are several superphosphate plants on the right bank, a large soda industry in the Artemovsk-Lisichansk area in the north of the Donets Basin, based on local salt deposits, chemical plants tied closely to the coking and the metallurgical establishments, and sulphuric acid and fertilizer plants connected with the metallurgy of zinc.

In addition to zinc, which is imported into the Donets Basin, nonferrous metallurgy includes that of aluminum, which is also imported and worked at Zaporozh'ye on the basis of *Dneproges* power, and of mercury, mined near Nikitovka in the Donbas.

The petroleum and natural-gas industry is of only local importance and is intended to supply the Ukraine with its gas and liquid fuel needs. The oil fields lie in the foothills of the Carpathians, near Borislav and Drogobych. During the current Plan, a natural gas pipe line was laid from Dashava (in the oil fields) to Kiev. The Ukraine also imports petroleum from Baku via the ports of Osipenko and Odessa, and the station of Trudovaya (Donbas) is the terminus of a kerosene pipe line from the Groznyy fields.

The textile industry (wool, cotton, and linen milling) supplies only local needs. The food industry, on the other hand, is of national importance. This is true especially of the sugar-refining industry, located mainly in the Vinnitsa and Kiev oblasts, on the right bank, and in the Poltava and Kiev oblasts, on the left bank.

The agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR, less important than heavy industry with respect to the value of production, occupies, nonetheless, a major position in the economy of the USSR. Arable land occupies 60 percent of the total area. Prior to the Second World War the Ukraine was one of the regions best equipped with machine-tractor stations and agricultural machinery. Among the cereals, winter wheat in the west, spring wheat in the east, and barley are most important. The sugar beet is by far the major industrial crop; sunflower, cotton, and tobacco are grown to a lesser extent. Orchard farming is popular and produces melons and pumpkins, garden fruits (apples, pears, plums, and cherries), and in the south, apricots and grapes. Horses, cattle, and pigs are raised throughout the region.

The right-bank Poles'ye is least developed agriculturally. Marshes and forests occupy most of the area. In the isolated patches of moist arable land, potatoes, buckwheat, flax, and hemp are the chief crops. The area abounds, however, in pasture land, and dairy farming is

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

SU 438* U 438

Khotin (Rumanian *Hotin*) lies in an orchard and vineyard area on the Dniester River. There is a noted leather industry.

Stanislav Oblast

Area, 5,400, population, 1,300,000

SU 133* U 133

Stanislav Oblast is drained by the upper Dniester and its right affluents descending from the Carpathian Mountains. It has important petroleum, salt, natural-gas, and potash deposits in the areas of Dolina and Bolekhov, with petroleum fields extending along the foothills in a southeasterly direction to Kosmach, southwest of Kolomyya. The principal oil towns are Bolekhov, Dolina, Peregínsko, Bogorodchany (where ozocerite is also secured), Solotvin, Nadvornaya, Pechenezhin, and Kosmach. Petroleum is refined at Bolekhov, Stanislav, and Kolomyya. The main lumber centers are Delyatin and Kuty, which has a large wood-distillation industry. On the right bank of the Dniester River lies the agricultural zone of the oblast, where grains, tobacco, and sugar beets are raised. Tobacco is processed at Zabolotov and sugar at Gorodenka.

SU 313 U 313 SU 241 U 241 SU 438* U 438

Stanislav (Polish *Stanisławów*, German *Stanislau*) has railroad and machine shops, an oil refinery, and textile and leather industries and produces asphalt, ceramics, lumber, and food products.

Kolomyya (Polish *Kołomyja*, German *Kolomea*), on the upper Prut River, has machine works and oil-refining and chemical plants. Textiles and cement are also produced.

Drogobych Oblast

Area, 4,000, population, 1,200,000

SU 135 U 135

Drogobych Oblast lies on the northern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and is bordered by Poland in the west. It is the chief petroleum region of the Western Ukraine, with the chief oil fields in the area of Drogobych and Borislav. Near by are potassium and magnesium salt mines and natural-gas wells. Salt is mined at Dobromil'. Agriculture is important along the Dniester River.

SU 438* 315 U [438] 315 SU 315

Drogobych (Polish *Drohobycz*) is the center of the Western Ukrainian petroleum region, with important refining and chemical installations and potash and magnesium salt mines. It trades in petroleum, livestock, and agricultural products and produces rubber goods, lumber, and food products.

Borislav (Polish *Borysław*) is another petroleum center southwest of Drogobych. It has petroleum and natural-gas wells and engages in the

manufacture of drilling equipment and the processing of ozocerite. The health resort of Truskavets, with mineral springs, lies just to the east.[1]

Sambor is an agricultural center, with sawmilling, flour-milling, and distilling industries.

Stryy (Polish *Stryj*) is a rail center where there are machine and metalworking industries, producing mainly drilling equipment, and chemical and lumber (matches and furniture) plants. Petroleum and natural gas are secured near by. From the gas wells of Dashava, just northeast of the city, a pipe line has been laid to Kiev during the post-war Five-Year Plan for industrial and domestic consumption.

The Poles'ye, which is wooded in the north, close to the Pripet River, also contains extensive marshy areas. It is the most backward section of the Western Ukraine. Its subsistence crops are rye and potatoes. Industry is poorly developed and is restricted to flour milling, sawmilling, and brickworking in the rural areas.

Rovno Oblast

Area, 8,000, population, 1,200,000

Rovno Oblast is drained by the Goryn and its affluent, the Sluch'. In the south, on the higher ground of the Volyn'-Podolian upland, agriculture produces grains, hops, tobacco, and sugar beets; in the northern section lumbering is the main industry. Granite, cement rock, and slate are quarried.

Rovno (Polish *Równe*) is a rail center having railroad shops, agricultural machinery works, and chemical and lumber industries.

Volyn' Oblast

Area, 7,700, population, 1,100,000

Volyn' Oblast which borders on Poland along the Western Bug River in the west, has some agriculture (grains and tobacco) in the south, but mainly lumbering industries in the north, along the Pripet River and its affluents.

Lutsk (Polish *Łuck*), the capital, lies on a minor rail branch, at the southern edge of the Pripet Marshes. It is an agricultural center and produces agricultural implements, clothing, leather, lumber, and flour.

Vladimir-Volynskiy (Polish *Włodzimierz*) is a rail junction and grain-trading point near the Polish border.

[1] [Of Boriskav in Drogobych Oblast--Analyst]

504 Let us compare for a moment the regions for which the Black and the Baltic Seas serve as ports. That for which the Black Sea affords an outlet does not extend more than 500 or 600 kilometers, while that served by the Baltic ports reaches as far as western Siberia. Thus, the Baltic region exceeds that of the Black Sea by several thousand kilometers.

000 Surely these facts, coupled with even the most cursory consideration of the Russian imperialistic policy, show beyond a doubt that in respect to the direct economic utilization of the southern ports, the setting up of a separate government by the Ukraine does not obstruct any fundamental interests of the Russian people. Briefly stated, Russia proper does not use directly the southern ports except Rostov, which is the outlet of the region of the Don and in part of the lower region of the Volga, but there is not such a vast difference between the Russian and Ukrainian interests that these minor details as to a common use of various ports can not be conciliated by special agreement.

Coal Fields of Ukraine Not Necessary to Great Russia

316 433 Proceeding directly to the third and last question, that involving coal and iron, we are confronted first of all with the geographic fact that it is really within the ethnographic limits of the Ukraine that are found nearly all the coal fields of Donetz, as well as most of the productive centers of anthracite. More than 90 per cent of the total output of coal of the Donetz basin, during the last years of normal exploitation, came from the Ukrainian regions, while the total production of coal of the Donetz basin reached 70 per cent of the general production of coal of the old Russian Empire, and we may increase this to 85 per cent, if we do not include in the total the output of Russian [438] Poland. Notwithstanding these percentages of production, the general statistics of railroad traffic, together with the data collected by the Special War Committee on the Supply of Fuel, show that nearly four-fifths of the Ukrainian coal and anthracite was used in Ukraine, one-fifth only being exported to Russia.

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The Ukraine has almost no fuel except the coal from Donetz. Northern and Central Russia, on the contrary, have wood, peat and coal from the south of Moscow. Northwestern Russia and the Baltic provinces never used the coal from Donetz, as it could not compete in price with the English or German coal. During the war, doubtless because the Baltic Sea was closed, they began to transport coal from Donetz to Petrograd. Now the Baltic Sea is reopened and its freedom guaranteed by the Allies. Therefore, English coal can regain its natural markets.

The industrial region of Moscow, as well as that of the Volga, received an enormous quantity of naphtha from Baku which competes as fuel with the coal of Donetz. When the conditions have again become normal, exports of naphtha will recommence, because the basin of the Volga is the natural outlet for the oil fields of Baku. The Urals and Siberia are supplied with local coal, while in western Siberia are found vast deposits, in the region of Kutznetsk. These beds are more extended and richer than those of Donetz, but the coal fields were scarcely worked because the means of transportation was very primitive. They can be joined to the Ural and Altai regions either by rail or water. Under these conditions the inexhaustible ore supplies of the Urals and the Altai district will supply the metal industry of Russia in such quantities that Russia will become metallurgically independent of the Ukraine. Thus the coal fields of Donetz, which have always been more Ukrainian than Russian, should in the future remain entirely Ukrainian.

Furthermore, the question of the basin of Donetz is not concluded. The ethnographic frontier of the Ukraine and of Russia passes through these coal fields. The Ukraine and Russia could easily, for their mutual interests, reach some understanding and modify this frontier. But in any event the most important part of the coal field should remain in the Ukrainian limits, because the facts up to date show how much more Donetz is bound to the Ukrainian industry than to that of Russia. The metallurgical industry alone of the Ukraine consumes nearly 30 per cent of the total production of the basin.

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Ukraine's Iron Supply Not Essential to Great Russia

We now come to the question of iron. Here also it is claimed that the economic development of Russia is impossible without the Ukrainian iron. But we can answer without the slightest hesitation that this affirmation is incorrect.

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It is a fact that the Ukraine produced two-thirds or three-fourths of the iron of former Russia. She exported a considerable quantity into the old empire, but one cannot conclude that this situation will not change in the future. True, the development of the metallurgical industry in the Ukraine in the last forty years was much greater than in the Urals and the other provinces. But if we wish to draw more specific conclusions, we must remember that the beds of iron ore in the Ukraine are not very large. Those in the region of Krivy Rih in the Kherson government near that of Ekaterinoslav, which are now the principal source of the iron ore in the Ukraine, may exhaust themselves in a few decades as will the scarcely more abundant ore fields of Crimea.

It would be erroneous to assume that the metal production of the Ukraine would be adequate to the needs of all Russia for any great period of time. Knowing the probabilities of early exhaustion of the limited beds of Ukrainian ore, and in intelligent observance of the laws of conservation, Russia must, with that wisdom and foresight which has made for industrial soundness in all strong nations, increase her production of iron in the Urals and in Siberia. For the time being, however, and until Russia can bring into operation the products of her hitherto undeveloped areas, the Ukraine can and desires to maintain her place on the Russian markets with metals, as with sugar.

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Economic Co-operation is Possible

It is the earnest desire of the Ukraine that her future economic relations with Russia be intensely co-operative and that the commercial relations of the two states under

259 During the last thirty or forty years, it is true, the
316 economic situation of the Ukraine has changed consider-
325 ably; three large industries have developed in the country:
651 the sugar industry, the mining and the metal industries. And one is tempted to say that this development was due to Russian protection. But is this quite correct? Undoubtedly the protection had some influence, but not as much as one might suppose. In the first place, one must not forget that in the Ukraine there are natural conditions much more favorable to these industries than in any other part of the Russian Empire. Certainly the sugar, metal and mining interests are among those which depend on the location of their raw materials and can never start in a place where these are lacking. Besides, these industries are infinitely more fostered by transportational advantages than by custom duties. The duties which were imposed on foreign coal did not prevent the importation of English coal into the Baltic provinces nor into Petrograd. On the other hand, even if all custom duties on foreign coal had been suppressed, it would never have penetrated into central Russia and there replaced the fuel of Donetz. As to the sugar, the situation in the Ukraine was perhaps even more favorable. As to metallurgy, it no doubt profited by the protective Russian tax. But there again the role of this tax was not very great. In fact, the products of Ukrainian metallurgy were heavy (rails, beams, tires, wheels, pipes, iron bars, etc.), and their manufacture was only slightly stimulated by the tax because of the great distances over which they had, in any case, to be carried. Protective tariff is much more necessary to those industries which supply finished products of light weight, but of these the Ukraine furnished very few. The textile industry of Moscow and of Poland profited much more by protection, as did many other branches of the industrial activities of central Russia.

Effect of Russian Imperial Methods in Ukraine

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241 Therefore, by this system, the Ukraine had more loss than profit. She was still a market for Russian and Polish industrial products, for which she paid high prices. But

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

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

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Table 8. Production of

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	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	1878	1879
Donets Basin	256	330	595	617	573	842	957	801	1130	1253
Dombrowa Basin	330	301	298	336	402	408	423	612	1070	1085
Russian Empire	700	830	1100	1200	1300	1700	1900	1800	2500	2900
% of Donets Basin	37	41	54	52,5	44	49	50	44,5	45	43

	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901	1902
Donets Basin	3930	4850	4890	5110	6790	7570	9220	11*	10,9	10,7
Dombrowa Basin	3160	3350	3680	3660	3760	4090	3970	4,2	4,2	4,3
Russian Empire	7600	8800	9100	9400	11,3*	12,3	14	16,2	16,6	16,5
% of Donets Basin	52	55	53,5	54,5	60,5	61,5	66	68	65,5	65

	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
Donets Basin	25,3	27,6	26,6	28,7	25	9	5,6	4,6	5,8	7,2	8,1
Kusnetsk Basin	0,8	0,9	1	1,2	1,1	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,8	0,9	0,8
Soviet Union	29,1	31,8	30,9	34,5	31,3	12	7,2	7,2	8,2	11,3	12,7
% of Donets Basin	87	87	86	83	80	75	78	64	70,5	63,5	64

* From 1900 in Million t total for Empire from 1897.

2. Branches and Areas of Industry

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The Donets Basin is the center of the heavy iron industry, heavy engineering, the non-ferrous industry and the production of chemicals on a large scale. The many electricity and overland generating plants that have sprung up almost contiguously utilise coal waste as a rule and have a considerable capacity, the largest being those at Shterivka and Zujivka with 150 000 KW each. There was a lively demand for machinery, above all for agricultural machinery, while the metal industry never reached the same level. Before World War I Ukraine contributed scarcely 17 % of all those employed in the manufacture of metal wares in Russia, though it supplied $^2/_3$ — $^3/_4$ of the raw materials required by the heavy iron industry throughout Russia. In 1934 the Ukrainian share in the manufacture of iron ore was constantly declining, so that metal goods of even fairly simple nature had to be imported.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Coal in Donets Basin

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1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892
1414	1495	1740	1758	1665	1883	2110	2060	2500	3110	3000	3140	3570
1285	1400	1400	1600	1665	1800	1990	2050	2420	2480	2470	2600	2890
3300	3500	3800	3900	3900	4300	4600	4600	5400	6200	6000	6200	7000
43	42,5	46	45	42,5	44	46	45	46,5	50	50	50,5	51

1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915
11.6	13	12,9	14,2	18,2	17,9	17,7	16,7	19,9	21,4	25,3	27,6	26,6
4,8	4,8	3,6	4,6	5,4	5,6	5,7	5,5	5,8	6,4	6,9	3,8	—
17.9	19.6	18,7	21,7	26	25,9	26	24.9	28,4	31,1	36	35.6	30,9
65	66,5	69	65,5	70	69	68	67	70	69	70	78	86

1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
11.8	12,5	19,6	24,6	27,3	31	36,5	40,9	44	51	61,4	69,6	77,5	77,5
1	1	1,8	2,6	2,6	3	3,6	5,5	7,3	9,2	11,6	14,1	17,3	17,8
16.3	16,5	25,8	32.3	35.5	40	47,8	56,8	64,4	76,3	93,6	109	126	128
72,5	76	76	76	77	77,5	76,5	72	68,5	67	65,5	64	61,5	60,5

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The largest centers of production in the Donets Basin are Stalino, Makijivka, Kramatorska, Voroshylivhrad, Horlivka, Konstantynivka, Artemivske (Bakhmut), Slovianske etc. Mariupil is the exporting harbor.

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At the Dnipro Bend there are, among others, plants for best quality steel, ship-building yards, electro-technical factories and largescale chemical works. The gigantic power-station at Dnipropetrivske has a capacity of 558 000 KW. The main centers of production are Dnipropetrivske, Zaporizha, Dniprodshershinske, Kryvyj Rih and Nikopil. The exporting harbors are Mykolajiv and, for some products, Kherson.

The Donets Basin and the Dnipro Bend are frequently combined to-day and represent a many-sided economy on a wide basis of raw materials and power. As a combine it is contrasted with the Ural-Kusnetsk Combine (above all as regards coal and iron). Kerch with its ore mines and heavy industry gravitates towards the Donets Combine.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

3. Production of Coal and Iron

See Table 8 and diagrams 3 and 4

Coal mining in the Donets Basin dates from the 18th century, but at first only in order to supply the needs of the towns on the coast. It was only after railways were built in the sixties that the coal production of the Donets Basin developed. The railway as a wholesale consumer accounted for 28—35 %, and in some years 41—44 % of the production. In 1860, 100 000 tons of coal were mined; but this rapidly increased six to tenfold and soon exceeded the figure for the Dombrova Basin, the rival area in Imperial Russia. 316

The second factor which promoted development was the opening up of the iron ore area of Kryvyj Rih in the eighties. In 1884 the Donets Basin production represented 43.5 % of the production for the whole of Russia, a figure which had risen by 1914 to almost 70 %. During this period Donets Basin coal production was increased six-fold, while that of all other areas in Russia has increased three times, and world production two and a half time. In 1913 the Donets Basin produced 25.3 million t, almost 2 % of world production which placed this coalfield fifth among the coal-producing areas of the world.

In 1927 the pre-war figure was once more reached.

During the Five Year Plans it increased considerably as the remote areas where new industries were founded had to be supplied from the Donets, at least indirectly by exporting the products of heavy industry. The production for 1933—37 was 67 million t, more than two and a half times as much as the pre-war figure and 6 % of the world-production which had only increased $^1/_{10}$ since 1913.

In spite of this great absolute increase, the share of Ukraine in the total production of USSR steadily declined, from 77 % in 1927/28 to 60.5 % in 1937. This was mainly due to the forced increase in non-Ukrainian mines. As a result of shifting industrial centers east, the production of the Kusnetsk Basin alone rose in the period 1913—37 from 0.8 million t. to almost 18 million t., i. e. twenty-two fold while in the Donets Basin it increased only threefold. Capital investments were naturally correspondingly

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

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

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Diagram 3

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

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

Diagram 4.

Share of Donets Basin in the coal production of Russia (1884—1937)

higher in the Kusnetsk area, where the output capacity of a mine was 1.44 million t, or twice as much again as the corresponding figure for the Donets Basin (640 000 t).

The production of iron ore was developed from the Donets Basin because of the propinquity of coal. In 1868 Ukraine contributed scarcely 1 % of the total Russian production of 650 000 t. A change took place when the resources of Kryvyj Rih began to be exploited in the eighties. In a short time the figures for Ukraine exceeded those for Russia and Poland and, in twenty years' time, even those for the rich ore fields in the Ural. In the last year before World War I Kryvyj Rih with 6.4 million t. contributed 90 % of the steadily rising iron-ore production of Ukraine, and more than $^2/_3$ of the amount for

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Table 9. Production of Iron Ore in

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	1868	1870	1873	1878	1880	1882	1883	1885	1987	1888
Ukraine	5	22	45	65	74	83	91	115	164	229
Ural	441	467	505	549	629	580	577	655	737	806
Russian Empire	660	800	900	920	1050	1000	1000	1100	1270	1450
% of Ukraine	3/4	3	5	7	7	8½	9	10½	13½	16

	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909
Ukraine	3440	2375	2345	2740	3575	3560	3590	4020	4090	3755
Ural	1650	1765	1300	1105	1035	1380	1240	1105	1080	1155
Russian Empire	6100	4700	4000	4200	5100	5400	5300	5[illegible]0	5500	5100
% of Ukraine	56½	50½	58½	65½	70	65½	67½	72	74½	73½

	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927
Ukraine	350	—	—	10	100	170	450	1280	2300	3800
Ural	400	150	130	90	130	195	400	870	945	940
Soviet Union	1300	180	150	150	260	400	900	2200	3400	5000
% of Ukraine	27	—	—	6	38½	42½	50	57½	67½	76

Russia, almost 6 % of that for-Europe and more than 3.5 % of the world production of ore. It stood 4th in the iron-ore areas of the world, though well behind Lake Superior and the Lorraine-Luxembourg area.

In Kerch it was only towards the end of the 19th century that production became noteworthy, but even then it did not reach ½ million t. Pre-war figures were not reached till 1930: but the ratio of this contribution to the entire production declined for the same reason as in the Donets Basin. From 1929—1932 it was about pre-war level (72.5 %), but in 1937 it had sunk to about the level of the Donets coal (60.5 %) though two and a half times as much ore was actually produced. In the years 1933—37 the quantity produced amounted to 14.6 million t, i. e. 10 % of the world production. Kerch therefore came third in the iron-ore areas of the world (after USA with 39 and France with 33 million t., and before Sweden with 8.5 million t and England with 11.5 million t.).

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDF Ukraine RDI

Ukraine (1868—1937; in 1000 tons and %)

1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	970	1245	1925	2120	3065
—	20	—	26	29½	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
344	376	472	560	650	1210	—	1380	—	1620
—	1007	—	970	1030	2900	—	4100	—	5800
—	1900	—	2100	2200	33½	—	47	—	53

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1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917
4260	5020	5780	6850	4800	6870	4800	4400	5500	3800
1180	1530	1850	1875	1085	1875	1085	—	800	510
5800	7000	8200	9300	6300	9200	6100	5700	6500	4500
73½	72	70½	76	74½	74½	78½	77	84½	84½

1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
4700	5700	7800	8000	8400	9300	13700	17000	17100	17200
1100	1770	1800	2000	3200	4100	6200	7680	(8300)	8700
6500	8000	10400	10700	12200	14500	21800	27100	27900	27800
72½	71	75	75	69	64	63	62½	(61½)	62

1886 marked the beginning of the production of manganese ore in Nikopil which reached 276 000 t in 1913, i. e. 22 % of the production for Russia and almost 12 % of that for the world. Ukraine came third after Georgia and India. In the year 1932/33 it even topped world manganese ore production with 483 000 t (the figure for the world being 1.5 % million, to which Nikopil contributed 32 %, Chiatury 20 %, India 15 %). From 1934 it slid down to the second place, though production actually increased to approximately 1 million in the years 1935—37 (more than a quarter of the world production)

4. Heavy Industry

Heavy iron industry in Ukraine has unparalleled resources of raw material at its disposal. It is true that the coal reserves in the Donets Basin do not reach those of the heavy industries in the Ural and Western Siberia (70 milliard t, of which scarcely ¼ is of good coking quality, compared with 250 milliard t, 327

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Table 10. Nikopil in World

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	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
Nikopil	9	11	29	73	58	51	46	48	60	97
Chiaturi	140	102	170	70	97	170	160	320	280	549
Russian Empire	162	114	200	143	157	222	208	370	342	648
Nikopil %	5,5	9,5	14,5	50	38,5	23	22	13	17,5	15
India	—	—	—	—	12	16	58	75	61	89
Brazil	—	—	—	—	2	5	14	16	26	65
World Production	375	260	375	310	385	395	490	630	590	990
Nikopil %	2.5	4	8	23	15	12,5	9,5	7,5	8	10
Nikopil's place in world production	—	—	4.	1.	2.	2.	3.	3.	3.	2.

	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
Nikopil	239	276	227	187	100	9	0,5	6	42	111
Chiaturi	663	258	258	204	26	55	121	—	53	194
Soviet Union	907	537	472	393	126	66	125	12	103	313
Nikopil %	26,5	51,5	48	47,5	79,5	14,5	0,5	50	40	35,5
India	694	418	665	600	526	547	748	690	482	706
Brazil	184	289	503	533	393	206	354	276	341	236
Gold Coast	—	—	4	32	31	36	44	7	67	142
Egypt	—	—	—	—	—	49	78	55	104	132
World Production	1870	1410	1860	2080	1750	1160	1160	1180	1220	1750
Nikopil %	13	19,5	12	9	5,5	1	—	0,5	3,5	7,5
Nikopil's place in world production	3.	3.	4.	4.	4.	—	—	—	6.	6.

327 practically all excellent coal); nevertheless, they amply suffice for the industrial needs of Ukraine.

135 316 Ore resources, on the other hand, are considerably richer in Ukraine. The first-class deposits at Kryvyj Rih alone are only a little less than the equally excellent deposits in the Ural (1.2 milliard t, compared with 1.4 milliard t), but as the percentage prospected is low (30 compared with 52 %), it has reserves for the future in its thick seams of iron quartzite. The iron content of the Kryvyj Rih ore being higher, it has greater resources of pure iron metal (540 million t) than the Ural (411 million t). To this we must add the iron-ore deposits at Kerch (2.7 milliard t). The manganese resources of the Donets Combine are the largest in the world (400 million t.).

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Production of Manganese Ore.

1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913
90	66	57	34	59	149	162	272	180	151	178	202	239	276
661	370	415	377	332	342	826	678	117	612	554	469	578	966
755	443	479	414	396	498	994	956	302	765	733	674	820	1245
12	15	12	8,5	15	30	16,5	28,5	59,5	20	24,5	30	29	22
130	123	160	174	153	251	579	917	685	655	814	681	643	828
108	100	157	162	208	224	121	237	166	241	254	174	155	122
1330	970	1060	940	920	1140	1920	2360	1290	1690	1900	1640	1740	2350
6,5	6,5	5,5	3,5	6,5	13	8,5	11,5	14	9	9,5	12,5	13,5	11,5
4.	4.	4.	4.	4.	4.	3.	3.	2.	4.	4.	3.	3.	3.

316

1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
113	241	478	472	531	580	602	493	443	524	818	1037	(1270)	960
339	544	543	372	172	830	783	390	389	481	914	1180	1502	1650
459	787	1029	844	702	1410	1385	883	832	1021	1822	2385	3000	2750
24,5	30,5	46,5	56	75,5	41	43,5	56	53	51	45	43,5	(42,5)	35
816	853	1032	1147	994	1010	843	546	216	222	413	652	827	—
159	332	261	273	360	316	207	147	37	20	7	42	156	265
259	344	350	375	330	415	424	251	51	269	371	438	417	535
150	81	122	153	137	191	121	102	0,3	1	1	87	—	148
1140	2770	3130	3180	2960	3770	3530	2320	1290	1740	2970	4010	4920	—
5,5	8,5	15,5	15	18	15,5	17	21	34	30	27,5	26	(26)	—
6.	5.	3.	2.	2.	3.	3.	2.	1.	1.	2.	2.	2.	—

Deposits in the Ural only come second or third, even if they suffice for the needs of the Kusnetsk at the moment. The Donets Basin is particularly well supplied with subsidiary materials for heavy industry (limestone, dolomites, fire-proof alumina and graphite), there being deposits of the kinds required at Kryvyj Rih, Mariupil and Berdjanske. The distance between ore and coal is not too great to be unprofitable, viz. 350—450 km to the Donets coal from the iron ore at Kryvyj Rih, 250—350 km from the manganese ores at Nikopil and 50—100 km between the two ore-fields. It is true that in England distances are more favorable, but they are no better than in Sweden, Germany, or France. Compared with the distance between the Ural ores and the Kusnets coal (2 000 km) conditions of propinquity are first-rate in Ukraine. 135

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Diagram 5. Production of iron ore in Ukraine (1870—1937; in mill t)

Diagram 6. Share of Ukraine in the production of iron ore in Russia (1887—1937)





Diagram 6.

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Diagram 7.



Production of manganese ore in Ukraine (1885—1937; in thousand t.)

316



Diagram 8.

Share of Ukraine in the world production of manganese ore (1896—1937)

327 471 quity are first-rate in Ukraine. Heavy industry in Ukraine was characterised from the beginning by the capitalist features that predominated in European production: protective duties and state orders greatly furthered development without handicapping other industrial centers. Pig-iron in Ukraine gradually rose to 19 % of the amount produced in all Russia. In the period 1887—1899 fifteen blast furnaces were added to the two which had been in operation since 1872. In 1913, ten of these were in the coalfields of the Donets Basin, two in the ore areas at Kryvyj Rih and Kerch and five between them. 48 blast furnaces produced 62 000 t each per year, while the 66 blast furnaces of the Ural only produced 12 800 t each and the 14 in the Central Russian area 12 100 t each and even the 11 modern furnaces in Congress Poland produced only 37 500 t each.

The following features were characteristic for Ukraine in contrast to the industrial area of the Ural:

1) a tendency to large-scale production, 2) an inclination for mass production, 3) a striving for concentration in production,

6. Production of Electricity, Brown Coal and Peat

377 In the production of electric current Ukraine has not made much progress. The figure for 1932 was 2 800 million KWh (Germany 23460 mill. KWh, Italy 10230 million KWh, Switzerland 4 800 million KWh, Belgium 3 800 million KWh). Of the total current produced in Ukraine, 2 045 mill. KWh were contributed by Dnipro-Ukraine, 474 million by North Caucasia, 211 million by Western Ukraine. 80 % of the electric current in Dnipro-Ukraine is generated by coal (3/5 by coal dust), 15 % by petroleum and only 5.5 % by water-power.

In the period from 1927—1933 the great hydro-electric plant was constructed at Dnipropetrovske (Dniprelstan, Russian Dnjeprostroj) with a capacity of 558 000 KW; at the time it was the second largest hydro-electric plant in the world and was built by American engineers. It is a great feat of engineering. And yet scarcely 8 % of the available water-power has been exploited. The plant is of importance for shipping (in overcoming rapids in the river) and for the irrigation of arid areas, but also for industry. All manner of factories have sprung up round it — for the production of pig-iron, best-quality steel, metal and manganese alloys, aluminium, then chemical factories for sulfates, synthetic ammonia, soda etc.

316 The mining of brown coal started in the middle of the 19th century and produced from 1902—11 an annual average of 41 000 t. This figure sank rapidly after World War I. The industry began in the district round Kyiv as a result of the erection of sugar factories and it also supplied several agricultural machinery plants, but it could not hold its own in competition with Donets coal. After World War I, the production of brown coal was systematically promoted and in 1934 had reached 0.3 million t. It is used by power plants and for the manufacture of briquettes. A start has been made to produce benzine by hydro-genetic processes.

The production of peat has also grown from modest beginnings (annual production before 1914 only 23 000 t) to a considerable figure (1.1 million t in 1935). It is confined practically to Dnipro-Ukraine. It is utilised mainly by the agricultural indu-

stry, but also by power plants. On the whole, however, brown 316
coal and peat have no great importance for Ukraine.

7. Petroleum and Gas

The petroleum industry was founded in Galicia about the 382
middle of the 19th century. In 1909 Galicia (yearly production of 2 million t) contributed 5 % of the world production of petroleum and ranked third. But an uninterrupted decline set in, so that in 1937 its figure of 510 000 t was only 16th in world production.

The reason for this decline was the splitting up of landed property and backward methods of production. Some of the 25 refineries were on Polish territory. The crude oil is transported by rail. As the high paraffin content of Galician oil causes obstruction in pipes and as the oilfields are far from the sea and the market for this oil is in Central Europe, there has been no attempt to lay pipe lines.

In the Kuban area the figure for petroleum production was only 150 000 t in 1912, but this increased under the two first Five Year Plans to 1.8 million t in 1937. Since 1900 the petroleum is conducted by pipe from Maikop to Krasnodar, the pipe being 108 km long and able to send 900 000 t a year. In 1928 it was connected with the main pipe which is 618 km long and connects the Groznyj oil-field with Tuapse, a growing harbor on the Black Sea.

Since 1893 oil-wells have been bored in Groznyj. Shortly 315
before World War I, these wells produced 1.2 million t, and in 1925 double as much, under the first Five Year Plan almost 7 million t yearly, under the second 3.7 million t. These varying yields testify to the wealth of oil, but also to the ruthless methods of exploitation, especially where oil is allowed to spurt out in jets.

In the Kuban area and in Groznyj oil refineries are equipped 382
on modern lines. In the thirties $^3/_4$ of the entire petrol requirements of Russia were supplied from this area. Pipe lines 315
also connect Groznyj with Mahach Kala on the Caspian Sea,

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

According to both German and Soviet geological calculations, the reserves of coal in the Donets area amount to about 55 milliard tons. The deposits are largely anthracite—inferior in quality to Welsh.

Donets coal was the basis of the early industrial development of the South of Russia. Exploitation was begun in the middle of the nineteenth century; the construction of railway lines speeded up development during the seventies, and in the eighties Donets coal was already in use in the industries of the Moscow and Petersburg regions. After the discovery, about 1890, of abundant iron-ore deposits to the west of the lower Dniepr, the Donets coal industry acquired a rapidly growing importance. Between 1900 and 1913 output was increased at the rate of 17 per cent per annum. In 1913 the Ukrainian part of the coal-field delivered 23 million tons: in 1916, 29 million. During this period the Donets fields supplied all the southern industries with coal, and its contribution to northern industries became important with the construction of a new line direct from the mine area to Moscow. More than half the coal industry, before the Revolution, was financed by French capital.

For some time after the Revolution the output of the mines was relatively insignificant: during 1919 the area was the scene of desperate battles between 'Whites' and 'Reds', and later it was devastated by the raids of Makhno and other anarchic *atamany*. The famine of 1921–2 accentuated the terrible conditions. During the period of the New Economic Policy, output of coal gradually revived, and in 1929 fell little short of that of 1913. The First Five Year Plan prescribed the accelerated industrialization of the Ukrainian mineral-bearing areas. The social struggle which formed part of the 'Revolution against Peasantry' did not particularly affect the Donets, but the famine of 1932–3 had its influence there. Nevertheless, if Soviet statistics are to be credited, the Government succeeded in coping with the difficulties, and in 1934 a production of 68 million tons of coal and anthracite was claimed—representing an output in excess of that of France. Ukrainian production occupied fourth place—after U.S., Great Britain and Germany. For 1938, Soviet statistics gave a production of 74 million tons out of a total of 104½ million tons for the whole of the Soviet Union. The average annual increase in production for the last five years, 1934–9, is substantially less than that for the preceding five years, 1929–34. One of the reasons for this is stated to be the difficulty of retaining labour which was available during the period of social conflict in the countryside, but which has drifted back to the farms following improvement in the conditions in the *Kolkhozy*. Labour

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

464 labour is very fluid in Donbass; an annual turnover of 40–50 per cent is estimated.

135 Soviet official information concerning the iron-ore industry of Krivoy Rog is probably more reliable than that concerning 316 Donbass. The reserves of iron ore of high quality (40 per cent iron) are reckoned at 1100 million tons; some Ukrainian economists put these in excess of 3000 million tons. Mining in the Krivoy Rog (south-west of Ekaterinoslav and south-east of Elizavetgrad) began in the nineties and attained considerable proportions by the beginning of the present century. For the years 1913–16 average output was about 5 million tons per annum. According to Soviet statistics, output for 1938 was round 18 million tons.

Conditions for the development of metallurgical industry are extraordinarily favourable in New Russia: on one side of the Dniepr coal, and on the other iron. This is not all: along the banks of the Dniepr itself, round Nikopol and Khvochevatka, to the south of the old ground of the Zaporogian *Sech*, are rich mines of manganese, the quality of which is little inferior to that of the Georgian deposits at Chiaturi. According to the estimates of Ukrainian economists, reserves on the Dniepr amount to about 400 million tons: even if these estimates are exaggerated, there can be no doubt that the deposit is one of the most valuable in the world.

The production of the Dniepr manganese mines has risen from 260,000 tons in 1916 to over 1,000,000 tons in 1938. If the U.S.S.R. is the principal world producer, the Ukraine alone ranks before British India and South Africa (from which two latter countries it is worth recalling that Germany imported 585,000 tons in 1937).

The deposits of coal in Donbass, of iron at Krivoy Rog and of manganese round Nikopol are connected by railway lines which function probably more efficiently than any others in U.S.S.R. The juxtaposition of the mineral deposits and the metallurgical plants ensures full loads both ways. Only 18 per cent of Donets coal is exported outside the Ukraine, and only 5 per cent of the iron ore; the balance is consumed by the South Russian industries. Manganese, on the other hand, is exported abroad in large quantities.

325 Important metallurgical plants (70 per cent of the capital of 103 which had been found by French and Belgian houses) existed in the South of Russia prior to the Revolution. In the 'Eastern' (Donets-Azov) group were included the following works: 'The New Russian' (station, Yuzovka, recalling the name of the Welshman Hughes); 'The Russo-Belgian' (Enakievo); 'The Kramatorsky' (Kramatorskaya); 'The Konstantinovsky' (Konstantinovskaya); 'The Donets-Yuriev' (Alchevskaya); 'The Nikopol-Mariupol'

Ukraine Under the Soviets

186 563 The cities of Kiev, Kharkiv and Odesa had a large Russian population. The administrative, commercial and financial institutions were largely in Russian hands and the directors and leaders of these, whatever their political disagreements, were united in opposing the efforts of the Ukrainians to secure even that minimum of rights that they were guaranteed by Russian imperial law. The Russian element in Ukraine, radical or conservative, acted as a [316] unit during the fateful years 1917-1920. On the other hand, the miners and workers in the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih, the centre of the Ukrainian coal and iron industry, were in very large part likewise Russian and the ideology of St. Petersburg, especially in its radical aspects, was dominant throughout this part of the Ukrainian territory. Many of the most bitter opponents of Ukrainian rights were, in fact, Russian radical miners and workers from this area.

The Jewish population of Ukraine, a large minority, was little interested in the Ukrainian problem. Insofar as they were not actively sharing in the movement for special Jewish institutions, the majority, with certain conspicuous exceptions, were strong supporters of Russian unity, either conservative or radical or, like Leon Trotsky, they were at the service of any government which was opposed to the Ukrainian demands.

186 668 Thus in 1917 the strength of the Ukrainian movement was to be found in the villages. Here Ukrainian life was lived, Ukrainian thoughts and ambitions were sponsored and it was here that the vision of an old and a future independent Ukraine found its chief support. Even so, that population was itself divided, not according to the class principle but on an ideological pattern which included members of all classes and walks of life.

186 565 668 When the revolution broke out in 1917 or, to be more precise, when the tsarist regime collapsed, there were four main divisions in Ukrainian society and they were made clear within a very few months.

The first of these were the nationalists and the advocates of the restoration of order in the country. At the very beginning of the

Western world, the Soviet Union conferred upon the Ukrainian 631
Soviet Republic the right to have its own anthem and its own 648
national flag.

These actions were not to be interpreted as a concession from Moscow, although they were presented in that guise. They were rather intended to strengthen the Soviet position in international affairs and by an appearance of generosity to facilitate the reduction of the satellite states to the same position as that held by the Union Republics. In this sense they were a response to the centralizing tendencies which were now to be expressed in a still stronger form.

As soon as hostilities ended and even before the Soviets were 665
assured of all their hopes, they began to purge again the Ukrainian 661
Communist Party and within a few months some 38% of the high officials were removed on the ground of bourgeois nationalism. All those who had not retreated to the east or could not show that they were working throughout the war as zealous Soviet partisans were summarily exiled as bourgeois nationalists. In the same way, when the enforced return of displaced persons began under the Yalta Agreement, very few were allowed to return to their homes. The vast majority were either executed for surrendering to the Germans or were sent to the labor camps in the far north and east for reeducation.

The Fourth Five Year Plan which was commenced in 1946 727
was very definitely devoted to the restoration of the country after the ravages of the war and to the increase of the Soviet capacity for defense. It was only in Ukraine and Byelorussia that the restoration had to absorb the energies of a considerable majority of the population, for while there were areas in the neighborhood of Leningrad and Stalingrad which had been badly devastated, the situation in the Ukraine was far worse. The cities and factories had been destroyed, the mines had been flooded and the population were living as best they might among the ruins which had been left by the two invading armies.

At the same time the work of restoration went very slowly. [316]
Less than one third of the miners of the Donbas had returned to

727 their posts and the vast majority of those who were Communists
316 received more or less sinecures above ground. Their places were
[466] taken by forcing the Ukrainian peasants, including a large percentage of young girls, to work in the pits with the minimum of safeguards. Little money was appropriated for the restoration of the damaged housing, for as the writer Korniychuk declared in one of his works, "Ukraine was so thankful for the success of Stalin that they did not care how they lived, for if he had perished, life would not be worth living under any circumstances."

727 With this attitude prominently emphasized by the leading propagandists, it is easy to see that the resources and energies of the population were directed by force rather toward those items that would advance the importance and the convenience of Moscow, than those that would be of advantage to the local population.

[496] The one exception was the necessity for rebuilding immediately and strengthening the railroad communications between the Donbas, Moscow, Leningrad and the Black Sea ports—in other words, the extreme eastern part of the Ukraine which was slated for a special development with roads and railroads linking the country up with the Russian centres rather than with the other Ukrainian centres to the west for these were regarded as exposed centres in case of a new outbreak of hostilities and were to be neglected until they were masked by the extension of Soviet power over the satellite countries.

474 The collectivized agriculture was in little better shape. In
341 that part of the Ukraine which had been under Soviet control before 1939, the authorities revived the collective farms but they had been so badly ruined that at first the authorities were often willing to be more considerate of the members. Immediately after the war they allowed them to group themselves into links or permanent sections of some eight to ten people who would thus come to feel themselves a distinct unit in the collective farm. It did not take long for the more rigid Communists to decide that this sense of permanence was in a way a defiance of the principles of collectivization, for very often members of the same household, if it were at all numerous, would group themselves into a link. In such cases the link became more prosperous, for it was in a way

529 popular for sea bathing, although the beaches still lack a good tourist organization.

000 Nevertheless this branch of the activities of the country could, under more favourable circumstances, give a stable revenue to the population and thus contribute towards the enrichment of the Ukraine.

III

The Subsoil and Industry

135 Among the mineral riches of the Ukraine the first place belongs to coal and to iron ore.

These two important raw materials are to be found in Zone 2 coal in the Donietz basin and iron ore on the left bank of the Ingouletz (a tributary of the Boug) at Krivoi-Rog.

Besides these two fundamentally important resources the Ukraine possesses important deposits of manganese and aluminium in the surroundings of Nikopol, graphite and soft coal mines, recently discovered in the centre of the country, salt in the Donietz basin, and finally peat and oil wells in Polish Galicia, in the surroundings of Stanislavov. Geological researches recently carried out have led to the discovery of oil on the shores of the Sea of Azov.

433 In order to give an idea of the potential reserves awaiting exploitation in the subsoil of the Ukraine, let us indicate that before the last war production represented 135 gold francs per annum per inhabitant.

316 As a result of its naturally very rich geological structure and of the organization of the extraction of its resources, the basin of the Donietz could be compared with the best coal-producing centres of Europe. Its reserves may be less important than those of Siberia (Kouznetsk),

[see category 116, pp. 139-140 --- Analyst]

but they are estimated as having a depth of 1000 metres 316 according to the most recent work undertaken by the Soviet Government, and the information given by German sources estimate them at 55 milliard tons, which makes these deposits almost inexhaustible.

By their quality the coals of the Donietz are among the very best, having a very high calorific value.

They give excellent varieties for heating and furnish coke for the metal industry, gas and liquid fuels. Rich in volatile substances, they are a raw material of the chemical industry.

The exploitation of the Donietz basin is relatively recent, beginning as it does only in the second half of the nineteenth century. This field has not known the methods of exploitation of the pre-mechanical kind which characterized the European pits and those of the Moscow region.

In the greater part of the mines the technical organization has already reached a high degree of perfection and continues to progress rapidly. This progress results in a great increase of extraction, the annual figure of which rises to-day to 75,000,000 tons (12,000,000 in 1900 and 31,000,000 in 1914), representing 65 per cent of the total production of the Soviet Union and exceeding that of France by 15,000,000 tons.

The application of mechanization to the extraction, an exploitation which is commercially more rational, and a better organization of labour in the sense of stabilization, of its specialization, and of the raising of the standard of living of the workers, could increase the production further by many million tons.

Two very important factors are favouring the rapid growth of the production of coal in the Ukraine. First it is the relative nearness, of 500 kilometres in a straight line, of the whole basin of the Donietz from the iron

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

316 mines of the Krivoi-Rog and secondly the presence between these two centres, in the surroundings of Nikopol, of important deposits of manganese, whose annual extraction exceeds 1,000,000 tons.

Actually the proximity of the mines of Krivoi-Rog, the resources of which, according to the exact estimates of geologists, are considerable (1 milliard 100 million tons of mineral which contains 40 per cent of iron), has allowed the distribution of the whole iron industry of the Ukraine between these two regions—that of the
316 Donietz and that of Krivoi-Rog. This centralization
489 allows one to utilize on the spot the enormous quantities of coal and of employing the railways in the most economical way, thus reducing the transport charges which are a heavy item in relation to a material.

The whole traffic between these two regions goes in two directions. The coal of the Donietz is loaded on trucks which are directed towards the Krivoi-Rog. These trucks return with a load of minerals. Thus a continual exchange takes place between these two centres, resulting in a very small circulation of empty trucks and thus creating one of the essential conditions of a rational exploitation of the railways.

316 The centralization of the Ukrainian metal industry
433 strongly favours its development. The Ukraine to-day occupies one of the leading places in the production of pig-iron (the fourth place, with 6,500,000 tons annually), of steel (third place, with 5,000,000 tons annually), and of sheet-iron (fifth place, with 3,000,000 tons annually).

327 The shaping of the metal and its transformation into metallic manufactured objects is equally concentrated on the borders of these two producing regions. Thus only 18 per cent of the coal of the Donietz and 5 per cent of the raw mineral of the Krivoi-Rog are exported from the Ukraine. The rest is shaped and worked on the

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

spot and leaves the country in the form of special steels, 327
of sheet-iron, of all sorts of machines and tools, as well as of chemical products.

The two mining regions and the regions of Dniepropetrovsk possess forty-five furnaces having a volume of 25,000,000 cubic metres and more than 110 Martin ovens. Russian industry still depends to-day in great measure on the factories of the Ukraine.

As we have seen, the state of industry in the Ukraine, especially of heavy industry, is conditioned by the geographical position of its raw materials and of the sources of energy. All the metal is concentrated at Krivoi-Rog and the source of energy is represented in the first instance by the coal of the Donietz.

The peat bogs dispersed over the whole territory and 316
whose extent does not exceed 400,000 hectares and the production 500,000 tons, and the brown coals the extraction of which is only 300,000 tons, can enter into the calculation only as auxiliary fuel of a definitely local importance.

The Ukraine, on the contrary, is well supplied with 377
hydro-electric plant. This energy is mainly given by the station of *Dnieprogues*, better known under the name of '*Dnieprostroi*,' which means 'Construction on the Dnieper.' This name was especially valuable during the building of the station which, having been finished, has taken the name of '*Dnieprogues*,' an abbreviation of '*Dniepro*vskaia *Gu*idro-*E*lectritcheskaia *S*tantsia,' which means 'hydro-electric station on the Dnieper.' Built by the Soviets on the rapids of this river, it employs the energy and the power which reach 600,000 kwh.

In the other regions of the Ukraine the network of hydro-electric stations is relatively poor, as the rivers do not provide the necessary resources in this respect. The existing stations serve the mills, the oil mills, the sugar refineries, or the town stations of small power.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

228 [134] either by salting, smoking, or sun-curing. Fish-curing is carried on in factories at Odessa and Ochakov.

The fisheries in the Azov Sea are important, but the principal grounds are not in Ukrainian territory, those which lie within its limits being of insignificant value.

(4) Minerals

(a) *Natural Resources*

135 The principal mineral resources of the Ukraine are coal, iron, and salt.

135 316 The *coal* is all in one large field usually known as the Donets basin, which extends from west to east for a distance of 300 miles. It is considered the largest coalfield in Europe, but owing to peculiarities of the geological strata it is split up into several areas with varying qualities of coal. Roughly the flame coals are on the western end of the field, the coking and semi-anthracite coals in the centre, and the anthracite in the east, though coking coals are also found towards the north-east corner. Very little pure anthracite is mined on Ukraine territory, as the beds are mainly in the Don Cossack district. Throughout the field the seams vary much in thickness. Some are too thin to be worked. The average thickness of those worked is 21 to 35 in.; seams of 5 ft. are moderately common, and the maximum thickness is 7 ft.

316 423 The output of coal from the Donets field is variable. This is chiefly due to labour difficulties, which arise in unexpected ways. Nevertheless if the figures of several years are considered together, a great increase is shown, and new pits are being opened every year. The average production for the years 1908 to 1912 was over 14,000,000 tons, the proportion of bituminous coal to anthracite being as 8 to 1. The figures include the whole field, as separate statistics for the portion over the Don Cossack border are not issued.

Iron.—The Ukraine is fortunate in having in close proximity to its coalfield a district rich in iron ore. The deposit, which is of excellent quality and easily worked,

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

is near the small town of Krivoy-Rog on the borders of the Governments of Yekaterinoslav and Kherson, between the town of Yekaterinoslav and the port of Nikolaev. This district has produced 95 per cent. of the iron ore mined in European Russia in recent years, and after supplying the needs of the numerous iron-works on the Donets coalfield and dispatching great quantities to other parts of Russia, it exports a large surplus through the ports of Nikolaev and Mariupol. This supply is eagerly taken up, principally by Great Britain and Germany.

The Krivoy-Rog iron is a brown non-phosphoric ore, containing about 70 per cent. of pure iron. The output is steadily increasing: the ore mined amounted in 1906 to 3,000,000 tons, and in 1910 exceeded 4,000,000 tons. There have been further increases since.

Deposits of *manganese* ore are found in the Government of Yekaterinoslav at Nikopol on the lower Dnieper, a few miles east of the Krivoy-Rog iron district. Exploitation began in 1886, and has been very successful.

The production, of which 75 per cent. is exported, fluctuates greatly according to the price of manganese abroad, and a maximum output of 300,000 tons in 1907 was succeeded by a fall to one-half this amount in 1909, with a slight recovery in the following years.

Mercury has been exploited since 1879 at Nikitovka, in the Government of Yekaterinoslav. The mineral is found in the coal measures near the surface. After being successfully worked for thirty years, the mines were closed about 1909.

Salt.—The Ukraine has valuable deposits of salt. There is an important mine of rock-salt near Bakhmut in the Government of Yekaterinoslav. Boring has been continued to a depth of 760 ft. without passing through the entire thickness of the salt bed; of this 340 ft. consists of pure salt.

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9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD: Ukraine RD1

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(*b*) *Methods of Extraction*

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(5) Manufactures

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439 part in the economic life of the Ukraine, the country not producing sufficient for its own wants and import-

11: Obermaier--170 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

464 The tremendous increase in popula-
361 tion which the Ukraine showed after the liberation of peasants in 1861 found employment in the growing industry and in railroad construction, insofar as the surplus population did not prefer emigration to Siberia and eastern Asia. When there was less work on the farms, the farmers and farmers' sons traveled into the industrial regions, only to return to their villages at planting and harvest time. Thus a stock of Ukrainian industrial workers could not be formed; foreign Russian manpower immigrated and remained for good. In 1918 and 1919, when the Muscovite Bolsheviks broke into the Ukraine and the Russian industrial workers reinforce their ranks, the absence of a Ukrainian industrial working class was to make itself disastrously felt.

• 316 The world thinks of the Ukraine more as a granary than as asource of valuable raw materials. And yet, there are considerable treasures buried in Ukrainian soil. The reserve of iron ore in the Ukraine is the third largest in the world. At Krivoy Rog, 250 kilometers northeast of Odessa, according to the latest calculations there are deposited 1.25 billion tons of high percentage Bessemer ores (60 to 61% iron content) and also considerable quantities of ferruginous quartz. In Kerch on the easternmost spur of the Crimean Peninsula there are 2.7 billion tons of phosphorous ores with an iron content of 38 to 42%, and in the northern Caucasus there are smaller deposits. The following table shows the importance of Ukrainian ore extraction for the Great
439 Russian realm: /Facing page 160/ /Map XI: Iron Ore and Steel Export from the Soviet Ukraine (Average 1927/1928). The Ukraine was the great source of steel for the industrial works around Moscow and Leningrad./ /161/

316

	Iron Ore Extraction in million tons		
	1913	1932	1935
Krivoy Rog.....	6388	7925	16,594

•316

Iron Ore Extraction
in million tons(contd)

	1913	1932	1935
Kerch.....	0.480	0.516	0.136
Ural.....	1778	3054	7684(98)

98. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 447.

Well-known are the largest manganese ore deposits of the world between Krivoy Rog and the Dniepr with a reserve of approximately 400 million tons and a net content of mostly 36 to 48%. The amount of copper and mercury mined in the Donets Basin is insignificant, but the nickle deposit newly discovered in 1936 at the mouth of the Dniestr near Akkerman is very promising.

Ukrainian heavy industry is based, furthermore, on important deposits of hard coal and brown coal. There are smaller deposits along the Kuban River, but more extensive coal mines are in the Donets Basin, also called "Donbas". The total reserves of this region are estimated at 70 billion tons. The coal is deposited in three layers, at the bottom anthracite, in the middle stone coal and on top brown coal which in part can be mined in open diggings. About 58% of the Donets coal is anthracite; this is 70% of the European anthracite reserves. Only 25% of the Donets coal is brown coal and suitable for heavy industry. (99) The

99. Deminskiy: The Economy of the Ukraine, page 136.

entire extraction of coal in the Donbas amounted to 25.2 million tons in 1913, 45.1 million tons in 1932 and 61.7 million tons in 1934. The amount mined in the rest of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, was only 32.3 million tons, and in Germany (including the Saar) in the same year, 136

316 million tons. The beds in the Donets Basin have the advantage of being shallow and the disadvantage of being unevenly distributed and not very large. They are only three-quarters of a meter in diameter. Besides, the coal is impure and also has a high ash content. In spite of the fact that more is produced, the method of mining is antiquated.

Besides the incidence of brown coal in the Donets region, there are 120 smaller deposits in the right-bank region of the Ukraine, but they /162/ are scarcely exploited. It is presumed that there are larger deposits in this region also. In 1935 the total reserves of brown coal in the Soviet Ukraine were estimated at 550 million tons. (100) The mining of this coal is very much neg-

100. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 442.

lected and ore-dressing is unknown. In 1935 a total of 300,000 tons of brown coal was extracted in all the Ukrainian provinces, 240,000 tons of which came from eastern Ukraine. (101) The ex-

101. Deminskiy: The Economy of the Ukraine, page 137.

tensive peat bogs are merely of local importance.

315 When it comes to oil, the Ukrainian earth is
135 not niggardly. Well-known as the oil fields of Drogobich and Borislav on the northern slope of the Carpathians, the reserves of which are estimated at 58 to 100 million tons. Extraction reached its height as early as 1902 when it amounted to 2 million tons or 5% of world production. Since then it has constantly decreased, amounting to 1.1 million tons in 1913 and an annual average of 500,000 to 600,000 tons from 1932 to 1936. (102)

102. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 443.

Coal

316 433 The coal centre of the Ukraine is the basin of the Donets River, a tributary of the Don. In 1913 the Donets region was producing 80 per cent. of all the coal turned out in the entire Russian Empire. (23 million tons of the 29.2 million total); and even in 1940, when the production of other coal areas in the U.S.S.R. had been greatly expanded, and many new areas explored and put into operation, Donets mines still accounted for more than half the total output (85.8 million tons of the entire Soviet Union production of 164.6 million).

Since about 70 per cent. of all the fuel consumed in the U.S.S.R. is supplied by coal,[1] the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian coal industry is of tremendous importance to the economy of the Soviet Union.

727 316 It is now over three years since the Soviet Army drove the Germans out of the Donets Basin. Before their rout, the enemy flooded the mines and burned engineering plants, miners' settlements, and cities. Restoration work was started soon after the liberation of the Basin, but it was estimated that to restore coal output to the pre-war level it would be necessary to pump 650 million cubic metres of water out of the mines and to restore 1,565 miles of mine galleries.[2] Today, the towns of the Donets Basin are a mass of scaffolding, as war-devastated houses, buildings, and roads continue to be repaired. Mine derricks dot the landscape; and water is being pumped in a steady stream from the mine pits. At the Chelyuskin Mine which before the war was one of the biggest and best eqipped in the Donets, over nine million cubic metres of water had been pumped by the middle of December 1946; and about 20 miles of galleries had been restored. Coal output averaged a thousand tons a day.

By January 1947 about 142 major coal mines of the 279 operating prior to the war had been restored, and 430 smaller ones, rehabilitated or built anew, were in operation. Production was nearly half of pre-war.[3]

[362] As regards housing for Donets workers, it is planned within the next five years not only to restore the houses demolished by the Germans, but also to build another 20 million square feet of housing space in the Donets Basin; in 1946 alone over four million square feet of floor [464] space had been reconstructed. Thousands of miners are being helped to build their own homes; and measures are being taken to increase their food supplies.

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1 Moscow Radio feature, "Sidelights on Soviet Life," cited in Soviet Monitor, London, January 29, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946

3 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947

Coal: Plans for the Future

185 433 316 Under the Five-Year Plan, the coal industry of the Ukraine is to be speedily rehabilitated and further developed, so that by 1950 its output will be 86,100,000 tons, including about 6 million tons of brown coal (lignite).[1] When it is remembered that this target is only 2.3 million tons over 1940 production, the enormous task of rehabilitation confronting the industry is made clear. The difficulties are even more accentuated if one compares the increase of coal production in three pre-war years, from 1937 to 1940, when output leaped from 70 million tons to 83.8 millions.

Plans for increasing the future coal output of the Ukraine include not only the restoration of old mines but also intensive prospecting and the sinking of many new shafts.

"Between 1946-50, coal mines with an aggregate capacity of 77,500,000 tons are to be put into operation in the Stalino and Voroshilovgrad regions of the Ukrainian S.S.R.[2]"; and coal fields in other areas are to be further developed. In particular there are to be put into operation in the Donets Basin and in the western regions of the Ukraine, small coal mines and drifts with a total capacity of 4,600,000 tons of coal, and peat briquette plants with a capacity of 50,000 tons.

The lignite mining industry is to be developed and by 1950 is expected to supply annually some 6 million tons of coal. Five lignite mines operating in the Ukraine in 1946 increased their output in October by three times as compared with April.

135 654 Large coal supplies are expected from the regions west of the Dniepor, where 11 promising coal deposits are located. Prospecting is in progress there, as well as in the Zlochev, Kremenets, and Kolomya areas of Western Ukraine, where 28 shafts had been sunk by November 1946.[3]

Industrial lignite deposits have also been found in an area of four square miles between Slavgarod and Sinelhikovo (near Dniepropetrovsk) and in the Transcarpathian region.

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1 The coal output of the entire Soviet Union in 1950 is fixed at 250 million tons.

2 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

3 Soviet Monitor, London, November 21, 1946.

135 To the south-east, in the Don and northern Donets valleys,
654 geologists have discovered a number of new coal-bearing areas, and have confirmed that the Donets Basin coal layers stretch far to the east and south.

Other investigations of coal-bearing areas are to begin shortly, particularly around the Azov Sea coast and in other regions bordering the Donets Basin.

Coke

316 The coke output of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is planned to be 15,500,000 tons.

Natural Gas and Oil

315 With the incorporation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the Ukrainian
185 S.S.R. came into possession of oil producing regions. The Five-Year Plan calls for the intensive development of these and other areas of the Ukraine for the increased production of oil and natural gas. Three hundred and twenty-five wells are to be located to add to the
[654] petroleum resources of the western regions; prospecting for commercial deposits of petroleum in the Romny area is to be completed; and there is to be extensive geological exploration for natural gas in the Dragobych Region (Western Ukraine) and on the Azov and Black Sea coasts.

[382] The total output of petroleum in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 325,000 metric tons.

The plan also provides for the building of a gas pipeline from Dashava to Kiev. Already in process of construction, the first section of the pipeline will be completed this year (1947) and will supply gas to more than 30,000 flats and several large industrial plants in Kiev.

Electric Power Stations

377 Electrification has been one of the outstanding features of the Soviet economy. Before the war the Ukrainian Republic possessed a wide network of electric power stations. Best known was the huge Dnieper Dam and Lenin Hydro-electric Station, completed in 1932 near Zaporozhie. This station supplied electric power to a great industrial region: in the north the steel mills of Dniepropetrovsk and Dnieprodzerzhinsk, and to the south-east, the Nikopol manganese mines. These three industrial centres developed quickly after the Dnieper Dam was built; and the abundance of cheap power available from it also gave rise to the growth of a metal and machine-building centre at Zaporozhie.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RD1

Su 631 U 631

and Czechoslovakia (1945) that most Ukrainians of eastern Europe became united into one territorial entity.

The present administrative-territorial system was introduced into the Ukrainian SSR in 1932 by the creation of seven oblasts. By 1939 the number had increased to fifteen. Following the partition of Poland, in 1939, and the annexation of the Western Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR, six more oblasts (Volyn', Rovno, L'vov, Drogobych, Ternopol', and Stanislav) were added. In 1940 Rumania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR. The extreme northern and southern sections of the territory were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR as the Chernovtsy and Izmail oblasts in view of their predominant Ukrainian population. However, the Ukraine lost the greater part of Moldavian Autonomous SSR (formed in 1924) when the Moldavian territory was joined to the central part of Bessarabia to form the newly constituted Moldavian SSR. Seven districts (rayons) of the Moldavian Autonomous SSR, including those of Balta and Kotovsk remained in the Ukrainian SSR as part of the Odessa Oblast, due to the predominance of a Ukrainian population. In 1945 the western frontier of the Ukrainian SSR was changed in favor of Poland with the adoption of the so-called "Curzon line," which left the city of Przemyśl (Russian *Peremyshl'*) and areas to the northeast and southwest, along the San River, to Poland. In June, 1945, the Carpatho-Ukraine, or Ruthenia, was transferred from Czechoslovakia and constituted into the Transcarpathian (*Zakarpatskaya*) Oblast. At present the Ukrainian SSR is divided into twenty-five oblasts.

Su 438* U 438

The economy of the Ukrainian SSR combines a rich agricultural development with a powerful mining and metallurgical industry, based in particular on the coal of the Donets Basin and the iron ore of Krivoy Rog. As a result of the industrialization of the USSR, the Ukraine became not only a basic grain-exporting region of the USSR, as well as an area of intensive agriculture and agricultural industry, but also the major coal and metallurgical base and heavy-machine construction center of the USSR. The Ukraine has more than one fifth of the total sown area of the USSR and produces one quarter of the grain, two thirds of the sugar, three fifths of the coal and pig iron, one half of the salt and about one fifth of the machines and chemicals.

Su U 316 433

In 1940 the Donets Basin furnished 85 million tons of coal per year. It supplied not only all the industry of the Ukraine itself but also the

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

SU 316 433 U 316 433

metropolitan areas of Moscow, Leningrad, and other industrial centers, as well as the entire southern rail network of the USSR west of the Volga and south of the Moscow coal basin. During the period of the German occupation of the Ukraine (1941–43), the coal mines suffered greatly. At present, reconstruction work is in full swing, mines are being reestablished, and it is hoped to have reached prewar production by the end of the post-war Five-Year Plan. The major coal-mining centers are Stalino, Yenakiyevo, Gorlovka, Kadiyevka, Chistyakovo, Krasnyy Luch, and Sverdlovsk. Anthracite, used principally for fuel, is mined in the eastern and the southern sections, while coking coal is produced in the western and the northern parts of the Donets Basin.

SU 327 433 U 327 433

The giant iron and steel mills of the Ukraine lie mainly in the western part of the Donbas, that is, in the coke-supplying area, in the Krivoy Rog iron basin, and along the Dnieper between these two raw-material sources. Among the mills producing over one million tons of pig iron per year are modernized prerevolutionary plants at Makeyevka (Donbas), and at Dnepropetrovsk and at Dneprodzerzhinsk on the Dnieper and new plants at Krivoy Rog, Zaporozh'ye, and Zhdanov. The Azovstal' mills at Zhdanov use Kerch' (Crimea) iron ore, which is shipped across the Sea of Azov.

SU 392 438* U 392 438

Machine construction has been developed to a very large extent in the Ukraine in recent years. Due to the close proximity of the sources of metal and in view of the lack of skilled local labor, the Ukraine was designed to produce types of machinery requiring little precision work, but large amounts of metal. Plants located in the Donbas specialize in heavy machine construction; among them, Kramatorsk produces coal-mining and steel-milling machinery, and Voroshilovgrad has a large locomotive works. Agricultural machinery plants are located along the Dnieper and on the right bank. Khar'kov possesses a large tractor plant and locomotive works and produces hydro-turbines and electric motors. There are car-building works at Nikolayev and Dnepropetrovsk, shipyards at Nikolayev, Kherson, and Kiev, and oil-drilling machinery is made in L'vov.

SU 381 438* U 381 438

The industrial picture of the Ukraine includes a number of factors suitable for the establishment of a strong chemical industry: the by-products of coking and metallurgical processes, the presence of such important raw materials as salt and phosphorites, the availability of cheap energy produced by coal-fed (*Zugres* and *Shtergres*) or hydroelectric (*Dneproges*) power stations, and finally the need for chemical products

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

SU 438* U 438 region, having 35 percent of the reserves of the USSR, and the site of soda works.

Debal'tsevo is one of the chief rail centers of the Donets Basin.

SU [504] U [504] Chistyakovo, to the south, is a major coal-mining point.

Zhdanov, called Mariupol' until 1948, the principal port for the Donets Basin, on the Sea of Azov, is the seat of the new Azovstal' metallurgical works, one of the largest of the region. It also has the Il'ich works, which produce special steels, shipyards, and fish canneries.

Voroshilovgrad Oblast

SU Area, 10,300, population, 1,800,000

133* U 133 Voroshilovgrad Oblast is the easternmost division of the Ukrainian SSR. It includes the eastern portion of the Donets Basin and extends northward into a typical Ukrainian wheat and sunflower region. Most of its coal mines produce anthracite.

SU 438* U 438 Voroshilovgrad, formerly called Lugansk, has large locomotive works and metallurgical and pipe-rolling mills and produces enameled goods and mining machinery.

Voroshilovsk (formerly Alchevsk) has metallurgical and coking industries. Just south is the coal-mining city of Parizhskaya Kommuna [Paris commune].

SU 316 438* U 316 438 Kadiyevka, called Sergo from 1935 until 1943, and Krasnyy Luch are the two main coal-mining centers of the oblast, with many large satellite towns grouped near by. Almaznaya, southwest of Kadiyevka, produces special steel alloys. Lesser coal centers in the southeastern section of the region are Krasnodon, Sverdlovsk, and Roven'ki.

Rubezhnoye, in the northern coal district, on the Northern Donets, has large chemical (explosives) works, and produces paints and glass.

DNIEPER BEND

SU 325 U 325 The Dnieper Bend, which includes Dnepropetrovsk Oblast and the adjacent section of Zaporozh'ye Oblast, is the second center of heavy industry in the Ukraine. Metallurgy, which is largely based on Krivoy Rog iron ore and Nikopol' manganese, is the principal branch of the industry. It receives its coal and flux materials from the Donets Basin. Unlike the Donbas, which frequently suffers from a shortage of water, it is amply supplied with water from the Dnieper River, which is also the source of most of its electric power. The main industrial centers lie

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Ukraine (1880—1937 in 1000 t and %)

1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
770	1126	1724	2086	1763	1458	1187	1114	880	750	900	860	820
1	2	3	13	23	129	152	88	74	135	45	58	80
629	642	853	931	1214	1233	1071	1288	1446	1435	1715	1782	610
1400	1770	2580	3030	3000	2820	2410	2490	2400	2320	2660	2700	1510
8900	9700	10400	11300	11500	10700	10500	10300	10100	10100	10900	9700	4400
15¾	18¼	25	26¾	26	26¾	21	24¼	23¾	23	24½	28	34¼

382

1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	—	20-23	24-28	29-32	33-37
663	631	557	551	530	515	511	500	—	730	770	640	520
462	959	1015	769	1160	1335	1162	1480	—	40	90	640	1180
6955	7700	8078	5160	3520	3300	3447	3000	—	1450	2940	6820	3700
8080	9290	9650	6480	5210	5250	5120	4980	—	2220	3800	8100	5400
19300	22100	22900	22000	24600	25600	27900	27800	—	5600	9700	19700	25600
41	42	42	29½	21¼	20½	18¼	18	—	39½	39	41	21½

Ukraine in 1932 there were 115 small concerns employing 2 700 workers. 385

In 1913 about 950 000 t salt were produced (540 000 t rock salt, 200 000 t common salt, 210 000 brine salt). This figure was double for 1934 (7th in world production) but it was differently distributed (135 000 common salt, 225 000 brine salt, the rest rock salt). 317

Potash production in Ukraine in the years 1924—1932 reached 305 000 t with a K_2O content of 58 000 t which secured the third place in world production. (The corresponding figures for Germany were 9.9 and 1.1 million t, for France 2.5 and 0.4 million t). 385

Big-scale chemical production was concentrated partly in the Donets Basin and recently also round the Dnipro power plant. Sulphuric acid was produced at Konstantynivka (the main plant of the USSR with a production capacity of 30 000 t) and some smaller factories. In 1934, 350 000 t were produced (45 % of the total Russian production). Superphosphates were

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

is near the small town of Krivoy-Rog on the borders of the Governments of Yekaterinoslav and Kherson, between the town of Yekaterinoslav and the port of Nikolaev. This district has produced 95 per cent. of the iron ore mined in European Russia in recent years, and after supplying the needs of the numerous iron-works on the Donets coalfield and dispatching great quantities to other parts of Russia, it exports a large surplus through the ports of Nikolaev and Mariupol. This supply is eagerly taken up, principally by Great Britain and Germany. 316 433 [433]

The Krivoy-Rog iron is a brown non-phosphoric ore, containing about 70 per cent. of pure iron. The output is steadily increasing: the ore mined amounted in 1906 to 3,000,000 tons, and in 1910 exceeded 4,000,000 tons. There have been further increases since.

Deposits of *manganese* ore are found in the Government of Yekaterinoslav at Nikopol on the lower Dnieper, a few miles east of the Krivoy-Rog iron district. Exploitation began in 1886, and has been very successful.

The production, of which 75 per cent. is exported, fluctuates greatly according to the price of manganese abroad, and a maximum output of 300,000 tons in 1907 was succeeded by a fall to one-half this amount in 1909, with a slight recovery in the following years.

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(5) Manufactures

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439 part in the economic life of the Ukraine, the country not producing sufficient for its own wants and import-

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip
317 of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Siatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters
263 cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
511 during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation—all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

and often ancient methods and apparatuses used in catching 000
fish in Ukraine are also worth mentioning.

The food of the peasants is almost exclusively vegetarian and 262
consists of bread and cake, vegetables and milk. Although meat 252
is eaten only on very special occasions, the menu is not monotonous. Bread is made of wheat or rye, in the mountains also of barley. The Ukrainians leaven their bread but, in contrast to the Russians, usually bake it without salt. Some unleavened kinds of bread ("mlynets", "perepitshka") are used for ritualistic purposes.

The national dishes in Ukraine are "borshtsh", a soup made of the juice of pickled beetroot ("kvas"); "halushky" boiled flour dumplings of unleavened buckwheat or wheat flour, "varenyky", called "pyrohy" in Western Ukraine, small flour pastries, filled with potatoes, curd, millet, cabbage and so on, which are boiled and eaten with sour cream, butter or honey; "holubtsy" = cabbage roulades; "kasha" = porridge; "kysil", a sourish porridge of flour; in Southern Ukraine "kulesha" or "mamalyga" = maize porridge and finally, different soups with dough ("zatyrka") and cabbage ("kapusnjak").

Ritual dishes are "kutja" (wheat and honey) and "uzvar" (Christmas dish of dried fruit). Salted lard ("salo") and bacon ("solonyna") are much used at cooking. In periods of fasting, food is baked in oil. Roasting and smoking are not usual cooking procedures, but boiling in pure butter or fat is popular.

The national beverages are brandy ("horilka"), mead ("med"), 273
honey boiled with brandy ("varenukha"), "kvas", made of sour rye, biscuit or fruit, in places also a drink of millet malt ("braha") and birch, and maple juice.

The Ukrainian is good at all peasant crafts, especially at wood 32 ●
work, carpentry, turnery and rope-making. Weaving and fur- 23
rier-work is widely practised and ceramic work is done everywhere, while work in metal which was formerly common, has almost died out. Tailoring to-day is also mostly in the hands of foreigners.

development has not been satisfactory. In Western Ukraine 256
small mills continued to operate with an output in 1932 of about 4 million t flour (and 170 000 t barley groats).

The oil industry manufactured native products and is best 258
developed in the Kuban area. In 1934, 90 000 t oil were produced, and in Dnipro-Ukraine 58 000 t = about 40 % of the total production for USSR. Large oil plants have been constructed since then in Slovjanske, Dnipropetrovske and Krasnodar.

More than ³/₄ of the canned food required for the whole of 255
Russia was produced in Ukraine. There are plans for a large-scale development of this industry.

Breweries and distilleries are not yet developed; out of a total 274
number of 225 distilleries, 151 are in Galicia, but they supplied about 40 % of the Soviet production before the first Five-Year Plan.

There were about 80 tobacco factories before World War I, 277
with an output of 9 000 t; in 1927/28 there were only 26 factories which produced more than 20 milliard cigarettes, i. e. 360 000 t = 36 — 54 % of the production for USSR.

10. Other Branches of Industry

Slate production in Ukraine increased from 2 000 t in 1913 339
to 14 500 t in 1931; the raw material was manufactured in two plants in Zavalla and Mariupil.

A highly developed cement industry in Novorossijske (10 plants) used to produce 633 000 t annually. In 1934, 5 of the plants there produced 1 million t, and with Dnipro-Ukraine 1.5 million t = 45 % of the total production of USSR. Ukraine must come eight in world production. In Dnipro-Ukraine and North Caucasia in the same year, 940 000 t of fire-proof earthenware and dinas bricks were produced, 924 000 t lime, 220 000 t chalk, 207 000 t alabaster and 37 000 t gypsum.

Excellent kaolin is found in Dnipro-Ukraine. In 1913 34 400 t 323 ●
and in 1931, 78 500 t were produced. In 1928 the 11 porcelaine factories in the country had an output of 18 700 t (¹/₃ of total

● 323 Soviet production). These, it is true, were small and old-fashioned factories; an enormous factory with an annual capacity of 40 000 t per annum has been planned and probably also erected in Mariupil. The glass industry is poorly developed, although its produce represents in value one third of the total production for the USSR. A large glass factory with an annual production capacity of 60 000 t was erected in Lysychansk. There is an extensive leather industry and a small production of paper, matches, india-rubber and textiles. The manufacture of soap, fats and chemical and pharmaceutical produce is fairly well developed. Arts and crafts which are largely practised in the family are on a very high level.

Production of Building Materials

339 In connection with the reconstruction work being carried out in
185 the Ukraine, the production of building materials is extremely important. The Five-Year Plan lays down that the pre-war production of bricks is to be increased by 50 per cent. of tiles, by 170 per cent. of lime, by 120 per cent., and of gypsum by 190 per cent. The Plan also states that

> "Plants for the production of building materials - including cement, glass, brick, lime, and tile works, plants producing metal fixtures, prefabricated houses, building sections, plumbing fixtures, roofing materials and high tensile gypsum - shall be restored or built and stable local fuel and power supplies created for the building material plants."

The Ukrainian output of cement in 1950 is expected to be 2,065,000 tons as compared with 10,500,000 tons for the entire U.S.S.R.

[323] Under the jurisdiction of the Republic and local authorities there are to be put into operation in the years 1946-50 glass works with a capacity of 11-33 million square feet of glass, brick kilns with a capacity of 9 million bricks, and rolling mills and other building material plants.

Transport

727 The war and the occupation brought great devastation to the
489 transport system of the Ukraine. The greater part of the railroads were partially or completely destroyed, and many hundreds of railway bridges demolished. The port of Odessa on the Black Sea was systematically destroyed - piers, warehouses, elevators, floating cranes, and power supply. The Dniepor-Bug Canal, the only water outlet towards the west, was made impassable by the Germans, who destroyed the sluices, wrecked bridges, sank boats in midstream, and choked the canal with mud.

185 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, provides for the complete rehabili-
489 tation of Ukrainian transport. Railway lines and junctions, and locomotive and car repair works are to be fully restored. A number of railway lines are to be electrified; and west of the Dnieper several narrow gauge lines are to be constructed for closer connection of sugar beet growing areas with sugar refineries.

185 To alleviate the difficult situation in rail transport, motor
489 roads are to be rebuilt and extended. The Moscow-Kharkov highway is
494 to be rehabilitated and improved, and additional motor roads are to be built to connect towns of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with the towns of the North Caucasus and the Crimea. By 1950 the tonnage of freight transported by road should be 16 times the pre-war volume. The number

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The Ukraine has almost no fuel except the coal from Donetz. Northern and Central Russia, on the contrary, have wood, peat and coal from the south of Moscow. Northwestern Russia and the Baltic provinces never used the coal from Donetz, as it could not compete in price with the English or German coal. During the war, doubtless because the Baltic Sea was closed, they began to transport coal from Donetz to Petrograd. Now the Baltic Sea is reopened and its freedom guaranteed by the Allies. Therefore, English coal can regain its natural markets.

The industrial region of Moscow, as well as that of the Volga, received an enormous quantity of naphtha from Baku which competes as fuel with the coal of Donetz. When the conditions have again become normal, exports of naphtha will recommence, because the basin of the Volga is the natural outlet for the oil fields of Baku. The Urals and Siberia are supplied with local coal, while in western Siberia are found vast deposits, in the region of Kutznetsk. These beds are more extended and richer than those of Donetz, but the coal fields were scarcely worked because the means of transportation was very primitive. They can be joined to the Ural and Altai regions either by rail or water. Under these conditions the inexhaustible ore supplies of the Urals and the Altai district will supply the metal industry of Russia in such quantities that Russia will become metallurgically independent of the Ukraine. Thus the coal fields of Donetz, which have always been more Ukrainian than Russian, should in the future remain entirely Ukrainian.

Furthermore, the question of the basin of Donetz is not concluded. The ethnographic frontier of the Ukraine and of Russia passes through these coal fields. The Ukraine and Russia could easily, for their mutual interests, reach some understanding and modify this frontier. But in any event the most important part of the coal field should remain in the Ukrainian limits, because the facts up to date show how much more Donetz is bound to the Ukrainian industry than to that of Russia. The metallurgical industry alone of the Ukraine consumes nearly 30 per cent of the total production of the basin.

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257 316 325 651 During the last thirty or forty years, it is true, the economic situation of the Ukraine has changed considerably; three large industries have developed in the country: the sugar industry, the mining and the metal industries. And one is tempted to say that this development was due to Russian protection. But is this quite correct? Undoubtedly the protection had some influence, but not as much as one might suppose. In the first place, one must not forget that in the Ukraine there are natural conditions much more favorable to these industries than in any other part of the Russian Empire. Certainly the sugar, metal and mining interests are among those which depend on the location of their raw materials and can never start in a place where these are lacking. Besides, these industries are infinitely more fostered by transportational advantages than by custom duties. The duties which were imposed on foreign coal did not prevent the importation of English coal into the Baltic provinces nor into Petrograd. On the other hand, even if all custom duties on foreign coal had been suppressed, it would never have penetrated into central Russia and there replaced the fuel of Donetz. As to the sugar, the situation in the Ukraine was perhaps even more favorable. As to metallurgy, it no doubt profited by the protective Russian tax. But there again the role of this tax was not very great. In fact, the products of Ukrainian metallurgy were heavy (rails, beams, tires, wheels, pipes, iron bars, etc.), and their manufacture was only slightly stimulated by the tax because of the great distances over which they had, in any case, to be carried. Protective tariff is much more necessary to those industries which supply finished products of light weight, but of these the Ukraine furnished very few. The textile industry of Moscow and of Poland profited much more by protection, as did many other branches of the industrial activities of central Russia.

Effect of Russian Imperial Methods in Ukraine

369 241 Therefore, by this system, the Ukraine had more loss than profit. She was still a market for Russian and Polish industrial products, for which she paid high prices. But

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

464 labour is very fluid in Donbass; an annual turnover of 40–50 per cent is estimated.

Soviet official information concerning the iron-ore industry 135 of Krivoy Rog is probably more reliable than that concerning 316 Donbass. The reserves of iron ore of high quality (40 per cent iron) are reckoned at 1100 million tons; some Ukrainian economists put these in excess of 3000 million tons. Mining in the Krivoy Rog (south-west of Ekaterinoslav and south-east of Elizavetgrad) began in the nineties and attained considerable proportions by the beginning of the present century. For the years 1913–16 average output was about 5 million tons per annum. According to Soviet statistics, output for 1938 was round 18 million tons.

Conditions for the development of metallurgical industry are extraordinarily favourable in New Russia: on one side of the Dniepr coal, and on the other iron. This is not all: along the banks of the Dniepr itself, round Nikopol and Khvochevatka, to the south of the old ground of the Zaporogian *Sech*, are rich mines of manganese, the quality of which is little inferior to that of the Georgian deposits at Chiaturi. According to the estimates of Ukrainian economists, reserves on the Dniepr amount to about 400 million tons: even if these estimates are exaggerated, there can be no doubt that the deposit is one of the most valuable in the world.

The production of the Dniepr manganese mines has risen from 260,000 tons in 1916 to over 1,000,000 tons in 1938. If the U.S.S.R. is the principal world producer, the Ukraine alone ranks before British India and South Africa (from which two latter countries it is worth recalling that Germany imported 585,000 tons in 1937).

The deposits of coal in Donbass, of iron at Krivoy Rog and of manganese round Nikopol are connected by railway lines which function probably more efficiently than any others in U.S.S.R. The juxtaposition of the mineral deposits and the metallurgical plants ensures full loads both ways. Only 18 per cent of Donets coal is exported outside the Ukraine, and only 5 per cent of the iron ore; the balance is consumed by the South Russian industries. Manganese, on the other hand, is exported abroad in large quantities.

325 Important metallurgical plants (70 per cent of the capital of 103 which had been found by French and Belgian houses) existed in the South of Russia prior to the Revolution. In the 'Eastern' (Donets-Azov) group were included the following works: 'The New Russian' (station, Yuzovka, recalling the name of the Welshman Hughes); 'The Russo-Belgian' (Enakievo); 'The Kramatorsky' (Kramatorskaya); 'The Konstantinovsky' (Konstantinovskaya); 'The Donets-Yuriev' (Alchevskaya); 'The Nikopol-Mariupol'

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

(Mariupol); 'The Russian Providence' (near Mariupol); 'The Kerch' (near Kerch). In the 'Western' (Dniepr) group the principal works were: 'The Gdantsev' (Krivoy Rog); 'The Dniepr' (near Ekaterinoslav); 'The Alexandrovsky' (near Alexandrovsk). Almost all these works have continued to function under the Soviets; during the course of the last twenty years some have been considerably enlarged and others modernized. Some have been renamed: e.g. 'Alexandrovsky', now 'Zaporogian Steel'; 'Gdantsev', 'Krivoy Rog'; 'Russian Providence', 'Azov Steel'. These three, particularly, have become very important plants. 325 103

The Ukrainian and New Russian metallurgical industry comprises 45 blast furnaces and 118 open-hearth furnaces. In the twenty-five years between 1913 and 1938 the output of pig iron has been expanded from 3 million to nearly 8 million tons; rolled iron from 1 million to 3 million; steel from 2 to 5 million tons. Thus, the metallurgical industry of Ukraine and New Russia (excluding the rest of U.S.S.R.) ranks fourth in world production of pig iron (after U.S., Germany and Great Britain) and fifth in the production of steel and rolled iron (after U.S., Germany, Britain and France). In 1938 the Ukrainian and New Russian industries produced 55 per cent of all Russian pig iron, 35 per cent of all steel and 25 per cent of all rolled iron. Concentrated within a comparatively limited region the heavy industry of New Russia and the Ukraine constitutes the most highly developed industrial area of the Soviet Union. 327

The Revolutionary régime was fortunate in inheriting a wide area of industrialization which, in the immediate pre-Revolutionary period, had been expensively equipped with modern plants by West European capitalist groups. The régime cannot be considered to have achieved anything remarkable in further development, and had the capitalist system of promotion been allowed to survive it is probable that progress would have been more rapid.

The most spectacular (and widely advertised) achievement of the Soviet régime in the Ukraine has been the construction of the grandiose hydro-electric plant in the neighbourhood of the rapids of the Dniepr (Dnieprostroy). A new source of energy (about 600,000 kilowatts), equivalent to a third of the electric energy produced in the Ukraine, has been made available for industry. Dnieprostroy may, however, be considered as a somewhat redundant reinforcement of the power sources of the country which could only have been undertaken by a régime which was not hampered by considerations of productive yield on capital investment. In view of the vast deposits of coal and anthracite to hand and of the as yet unexplored reserves of lignite, the development of a new source of 377

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

377 The functioning of the *Dnieprogues* station, which could open enormous possibilities of development of all kinds of industries and of the electrification of the railways, has nevertheless, despite its enormous power, failed to change the industrial geography of the Ukraine because it is just half-way between the Donietz basin and Krivoi-Rog and thus does not bring about any alteration in the distribution of the sources of energy.

438 Thus the heavy industry of the Ukraine remains, in its greater part, concentrated around this region, round Nikopol and along the northern edge of the Donietz basin.

325 Kharkov and its surroundings are the greatest metallurgical centres of the Ukraine. There great factories of turbines, of generators, of electrical machines, of tractors, of locomotives, of railway trucks, and of factory equipment, etc., are to be found.

327 The production of sheet-iron and of steel rails, tubes, plates, beams, wire, etc., is distributed among many factories of the Donietz basin, at Nikopol and at Dniepropetrovsk.

Zaporojie (not far from Krivoi-Rog and near the *Dnieprogues*) produces nearly 60 per cent of the special steels of the Union. The Soviets intend to create a new powerful centre of metal industry there.

397 392 Apart from Kharkov, factories producing all the heavier machines such as locomotives are to be found in the Donbass (abbreviation of Donietz basin which we will now use), at Lougansk, and at Kramatorski, where an enormous newly constructed factory is one of the largest in the world.

402 The equipment for the light industry—the mills, wine-presses, oil mills and elevators—is chiefly manufactured at Berdiansk (Donbass), Melitopol (Northern Taurida), Tcherkassy (centre), Kiev, and Odessa.

392 Agricultural machinery comes from the factories of

Zaporojie, Ielisavetgrad (region of Odessa), Berdiansk 372
(on the Sea of Azov), and Kherson (at the mouth of the Dnieper).

The marine docks in which the ships of commerce 396
and of war are being built are at Nicolaiev (at the mouth of the Boug), and river constructions of all types at Kiev. There are important repair shops for railway stock at Odessa and Kiev.

We enumerate here only the districts in which the 000
larger metal industries are concentrated, the production of which exceeds local needs. The greater part of the 325
large Ukrainian towns, especially of the seaports, possess 438
small metal factories, the total production of which is not negligible.

It suffices to consult the economic map[1] of the Ukraine to realize that the heavier the products of the metal industry are, the more its centres are removed from the mining regions, a fact which gives a clearly rational character to the geography of Ukrainian metallurgy.

Besides metallurgy, heavy industry is represented in 385
the Ukraine by the chemical industry and in the first 382
instance by that which is based on coal. Such is the industry which produces azote, benzole, nitro-benzine, and sulphuric acid. Important factories engaged in the production of volatile materials have been built at Gorlovka, Lissitschansk, Konstantinovka, and Slaviansk (in the Donbass). This industry, which is still in its very early stages, already meets 30 per cent of the needs of Soviet Ukraine.

The factories producing superphosphates, whose annual production reaches 250,000 tons, are distributed between Konstantinovka (Donbass), Odessa, and Vinnitza, in Podolia.

Kharkov possesses great dye factories and those 386
producing paints, varnish, and enamel.

1 [see category 116, p. 151---Analyst]

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

SU 438* U 438 region, having 35 percent of the reserves of the USSR, and the site of soda works.

Debal'tsevo is one of the chief rail centers of the Donets Basin.

SU Chistyakovo, to the south, is a major coal-mining point.

[504] U [504] Zhdanov, called Mariupol' until 1948, the principal port for the Donets Basin, on the Sea of Azov, is the seat of the new Azovstal' metallurgical works, one of the largest of the region. It also has the Il'ich works, which produce special steels, shipyards, and fish canneries.

Voroshilovgrad Oblast

SU Area, 10,300, population, 1,800,000

133* U 133 Voroshilovgrad Oblast is the easternmost division of the Ukrainian SSR. It includes the eastern portion of the Donets Basin and extends northward into a typical Ukrainian wheat and sunflower region. Most of its coal mines produce anthracite.

SU 438* U 438 Voroshilovgrad, formerly called Lugansk, has large locomotive works and metallurgical and pipe-rolling mills and produces enameled goods and mining machinery.

Voroshilovsk (formerly Alchevsk) has metallurgical and coking industries. Just south is the coal-mining city of Parizhskaya Kommuna [Paris commune].

SU 316 438* U 316 438 Kadiyevka, called Sergo from 1935 until 1943, and Krasnyy Luch are the two main coal-mining centers of the oblast, with many large satellite towns grouped near by. Almaznaya, southwest of Kadiyevka, produces special steel alloys. Lesser coal centers in the southeastern section of the region are Krasnodon, Sverdlovsk, and Roven'ki.

Rubezhnoye, in the northern coal district, on the Northern Donets, has large chemical (explosives) works, and produces paints and glass.

DNIEPER BEND

SU 325 U 325 The Dnieper Bend, which includes Dnepropetrovsk Oblast and the adjacent section of Zaporozh'ye Oblast, is the second center of heavy industry in the Ukraine. Metallurgy, which is largely based on Krivoy Rog iron ore and Nikopol' manganese, is the principal branch of the industry. It receives its coal and flux materials from the Donets Basin. Unlike the Donbas, which frequently suffers from a shortage of water, it is amply supplied with water from the Dnieper River, which is also the source of most of its electric power. The main industrial centers lie

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

SU U 325

either at the sources of raw materials (Krivoy Rog, Nikopol') or on the Dnieper River (Dneprodzerzhinsk, Dnepropetrovsk, and Zaporozh'ye). Agricultural production emphasizes wheat, barley, sunflowers, southern hemp, and soy beans. On the basis of the local grain production and grain brought along the Dnieper, a large flour-milling industry has developed.

SU 241 438* U 241 438

Dnepropetrovsk Oblast

Area, 12,600, population, 2,200,000

SU 133* 241 U 133 241

Dnepropetrovsk Oblast extends from the Dnieper Bend to the Donets Basin and is divided into two equal sections by the course of the Dnieper River. Grains and sunflowers are the basic crops, with some hemp in the northeast and cotton in the southwest. The major rural industries are flour milling, meat packing, and dairying.

SU 438* U 438

Dnepropetrovsk, on the Dnieper River, is a major industrial and transportation center formerly called Yekaterinoslav. It has large metallurgical works, pipe rolling mills, rail and sheet-metal mills, and steel-construction works. An automobile plant is to be established during the post-war Five-Year Plan. The city has clothing, leather, and food industries and is an important lumber-trade center.

Dneprodzerzhinsk, on the Dnieper, west of Dnepropetrovsk, has metallurgical and chemical works, producing rolled steel products, coke, and nitrate fertilizer, plastics, and cement. Metal construction and railway-car building are other important activities.

Krivoy Rog, the center of a rich iron-ore region, distinguished by reserves of more than one million tons and a high metal content (70 percent), has metallurgical works and iron foundries.

Nikopol', the center of one of the main manganese areas of the USSR, has concentrating plants, shipyards, and one of the largest pipe-rolling mills of the Union. The manganese mining areas lie northeast of Nikopol' in the district of Marganets [manganese] and in the northwest, near Ordzhonikidze.

Lesser industrial centers are Novo-Moskovsk, with sheet-metal mills, and Pavlograd, a pulp-milling and furniture city.

Zaporozh'ye Oblast

Area, 10,400, population, 1,300,000

SU U 241

Zaporozh'ye Oblast extends from the Dnieper River to the Sea of Azov. Agricultural emphasis is on wheat in the north and on cotton

776 appeased, exorcised. When the priest of Velykyi Lypnyk consecrates the water of the village brook on the sixth of January, the people believe that the demons are thus driven away.

•326 The men of Valykyi Lypnyk are tinkers, a
221 trade which in many places has a bad flavor. It is easy to say that they travel about the country like gypsies. But even though they wander from village to village, a small bundle of tools on their backs, repairing stoves and mending pots, they are, nevertheless, not homeless. As soon as spring comes, poverty drives them out on the road, and only late in the fall when the first white flakes begin to fall, they return to their wives and children with the few groschen they have saved.
241 For land is scarce, the clod of earth small, the soil is poor and the climate harsh.* The women work like drudges for their bit of barley bread and potatoes. With their small cows and a wooden plough they till the lower slopes of the mountain ridges. They sow by hand, harrow, and in the fall they cut off the barely ripe ears of grain with a sickle.
286 In their "spare time" these women* with their
291 strangely narrow faces sit barefoot in their full pleated skirts and pale pink blouses, a charming little cap on their heads, at their looms and tirelessly ply their shuttle back and forth between the taut threads, or press wool into felt for the jackets and trousers of their husbands.
342 The rooms of these "tinkers"* are surprisingly large and clean; the kitchen, living room, /10/ bedroom and work room are all in one. The whole structure with adjoining stable and wagon shed is built of wood, the inside unfinished, the outside
[289] covered with loam. In order that there be no lack of magic, carpenters carve three suns into the central roof beam.

184 How rich these "tinkers" of East Slovakia were with their little plot of free earth, their two or three cows, their barley bread and their loom, compared to their brothers in Carpatho-

*[In the village of Valykyi Lypnyk, Western Ukraine -Analyst]

Table 8. Production of

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	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	1878	1879
Donets Basin	256	330	595	617	573	842	957	801	1130	1253
Dombrowa Basin	330	301	298	336	402	408	423	612	1070	1085
Russian Empire	700	830	1100	1200	1300	1700	1900	1800	2500	2900
% of Donets Basin	37	41	54	52,5	44	49	50	44,5	45	43

	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901	1902
Donets Basin	3930	4850	4890	5110	6790	7570	9220	11*	10,9	10,7
Dombrowa Basin	3160	3350	3680	3660	3760	4090	3970	4,2	4,2	4,3
Russian Empire	7600	8800	9100	9400	11,3*	12,3	14	16,2	16,6	16,5
% of Donets Basin	52	55	53,5	54,5	60,5	61,5	66	68	65,5	65

	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
Donets Basin	25,3	27,6	26,6	28,7	25	9	5,6	4,6	5,8	7,2	8,1
Kusnetsk Basin	0,8	0,9	1	1,2	1,1	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,8	0,9	0,8
Soviet Union	29,1	31,8	30,9	34,5	31,3	12	7,2	7,2	8,2	11,3	12,7
% of Donets Basin	87	87	86	83	80	75	78	64	70,5	63,5	64

* From 1900 in Million t total for Empire from 1897.

2. Branches and Areas of Industry

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The Donets Basin is the center of the heavy iron industry, heavy engineering, the non-ferrous industry and the production of chemicals on a large scale. The many electricity and overland generating plants that have sprung up almost contiguously utilise coal waste as a rule and have a considerable capacity, the largest being those at Shterivka and Zujivka with 150 000 KW each. There was a lively demand for machinery, above all for agricultural machinery, while the metal industry never reached the same level. Before World War I Ukraine contributed scarcely 17 % of all those employed in the manufacture of metal wares in Russia, though it supplied $^2/_3$ — $^3/_4$ of the raw materials required by the heavy iron industry throughout Russia. In 1934 the Ukrainian share in the manufacture of iron ore was constantly declining, so that metal goods of even fairly simple nature had to be imported.

Coal in Donets Basin

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1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892
1414	1495	1740	1758	1665	1883	2110	2060	2500	3110	3000	3140	3570
1285	1400	1400	1600	1665	1800	1990	2050	2420	2480	2470	2600	2890
3300	3500	3800	3900	3900	4300	4600	4600	5400	6200	6000	6200	7000
43	42,5	46	45	42,5	44	46	45	46,5	50	50	50,5	51

1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915
11.6	13	12,9	14,2	18,2	17,9	17,7	16,7	19,9	21,4	25,3	27,6	26,6
4,8	4,8	3,6	4,6	5,4	5,6	5,7	5,5	5,8	6,4	6,9	3,8	—
17,9	19,6	18,7	21,7	26	25,9	26	24,9	28,4	31,1	36	35,6	30,9
65	66,5	69	65,5	70	69	68	67	70	69	70	78	86

1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
11.8	12,5	19,6	24,6	27,3	31	36,5	40,9	44	51	61,4	69,6	77,5	77,5
1	1	1,8	2,6	2,6	3	3,6	5,5	7,3	9.2	11,6	14,1	17,3	17,8
16,3	16,5	25,8	32,3	35,5	40	47,8	56,8	64,4	76,3	93,6	109	126	128
72,5	76	76	76	77	77,5	76,5	72	68,5	67	65,5	64	61,5	60,5

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The largest centers of production in the Donets Basin are Stalino, Makijivka, Kramatorska, Voroshylivhrad, Horlivka, Konstantynivka, Artemivske (Bakhmut), Slovianske etc. Mariupil is the exporting harbor.

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At the Dnipro Bend there are, among others, plants for best quality steel, ship-building yards, electro-technical factories and largescale chemical works. The gigantic power-station at Dnipropetrivske has a capacity of 558 000 KW. The main centers of production are Dnipropetrivske, Zaporizha, Dniprodshershinske, Kryvyj Rih and Nikopil. The exporting harbors are Mykolajiv and, for some products, Kherson.

The Donets Basin and the Dnipro Bend are frequently combined to-day and represent a many-sided economy on a wide basis of raw materials and power. As a combine it is contrasted with the Ural-Kusnetsk Combine (above all as regards coal and iron). Kerch with its ore mines and heavy industry gravitates towards the Donets Combine.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDI Ukraine RDI

Ukraine (1868—1937; in 1000 tons and %)

1889	1890	1891	1892	1893	970	1245	1925	2120	3065
—	20	—	26	29½	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
344	376	472	560	650	1210	—	1380	—	1620
—	1007	—	970	1030	2900	—	4100	—	5800
—	1900	—	2100	2200	33½	—	47	—	53

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1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917
4260	5020	5780	6850	4800	6870	4800	4400	5500	3800
1180	1530	1850	1875	1085	1875	1085	—	800	510
5800	7000	8200	9300	6300	9200	6100	5700	6500	4500
73½	72	70½	76	74½	74½	78½	77	84½	84½

1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
4700	5700	7800	8000	8400	9300	13700	17000	17100	17200
1100	1770	1800	2000	3200	4100	6200	7680	(8300)	8700
6500	8000	10400	10700	12200	14500	21800	27100	27900	27800
72½	71	75	75	69	64	63	62½	(61½)	62

1886 marked the beginning of the production of manganese ore in Nikopil which reached 276 000 t in 1913, i. e. 22 % of the production for Russia and almost 12 % of that for the world. Ukraine came third after Georgia and India. In the year 1932/33 it even topped world manganese ore production with 483 000 t (the figure for the world being 1.5 % million, to which Nikopil contributed 32 %, Chiatury 20 %, India 15 %). From 1934 it slid down to the second place, though production actually increased to approximately 1 million in the years 1935—37 (more than a quarter of the world production)

4. Heavy Industry

Heavy iron industry in Ukraine has unparalleled resources of raw material at its disposal. It is true that the coal reserves in the Donets Basin do not reach those of the heavy industries in the Ural and Western Siberia (70 milliard t, of which scarcely ¼ is of good coking quality, compared with 250 milliard t, 327

Table 10. Nikopil in World

316

	1890	1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
Nikopil	9	11	29	73	58	51	46	48	60	97
Chiaturi	140	102	170	70	97	170	160	320	280	549
Russian Empire	162	114	200	143	157	222	208	370	342	648
Nikopil %	5,5	9,5	14,5	50	38,5	23	22	13	17,5	15
India	—	—	—	—	12	16	58	75	61	89
Brazil	—	—	—	—	2	5	14	16	26	65
World Production	375	260	375	310	385	395	490	630	590	990
Nikopil %	2.5	4	8	23	15	12,5	9.5	7,5	8	10
Nikopil's place in world production	—	—	4.	1.	2.	2.	3.	3.	3.	2.

	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
Nikopil	239	276	227	187	100	9	0,5	6	42	111
Chiaturi	663	258	258	204	26	55	121	—	53	194
Soviet Union	907	537	472	393	126	66	125	12	103	313
Nikopil %	26,5	51,5	48	47,5	79,5	14,5	0,5	50	40	35,5
India	694	418	665	600	526	547	748	690	482	706
Brazil	184	289	503	533	393	206	354	276	341	236
Gold Coast	—	—	4	32	31	36	44	7	67	142
Egypt	—	—	—	—	—	49	78	55	104	132
World Production	1870	1410	1860	2080	1750	1160	1160	1180	1220	1750
Nikopil %	13	19,5	12	9	5,5	1	—	0,5	3,5	7,5
Nikopil's place in world production	3.	3.	4.	4.	4.	—	—	—	6.	6.

327 practically all excellent coal); nevertheless, they amply suffice for the industrial needs of Ukraine.

135 316 Ore resources, on the other hand, are considerably richer in Ukraine. The first-class deposits at Kryvyj Rih alone are only a little less than the equally excellent deposits in the Ural (1.2 milliard t, compared with 1.4 milliard t), but as the percentage prospected is low (30 compared with 52 %), it has reserves for the future in its thick seams of iron quartzite. The iron content of the Kryvyj Rih ore being higher, it has greater resources of pure iron metal (540 million t) than the Ural (411 million t). To this we must add the iron-ore deposits at Kerch (2.7 milliard t). The manganese resources of the Donets Combine are the largest in the world (400 million t.).

316



Diagram 8.

Share of Ukraine in the world production of manganese ore (1896—1937)

327 471 quity are first-rate in Ukraine. Heavy industry in Ukraine was characterised from the beginning by the capitalist features that predominated in European production: protective duties and state orders greatly furthered development without handicapping other industrial centers. Pig-iron in Ukraine gradually rose to 19 % of the amount produced in all Russia. In the period 1887—1899 fifteen blast furnaces were added to the two which had been in operation since 1872. In 1913, ten of these were in the coalfields of the Donets Basin, two in the ore areas at Kryvyj Rih and Kerch and five between them. 48 blast furnaces produced 62 000 t each per year, while the 66 blast furnaces of the Ural only produced 12 800 t each and the 14 in the Central Russian area 12 100 t each and even the 11 modern furnaces in Congress Poland produced only 37 500 t each.

The following features were characteristic for Ukraine in contrast to the industrial area of the Ural:

1) a tendency to large-scale production, 2) an inclination for mass production, 3) a striving for concentration in production,

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

327



Production of pig iron in Ukraine (1870—1937; in million t).

so that fewer intermediate products were put on the market, 327
4) a tendency to form cartels or trusts, 5) much foreign capital, 471
6) a readier response to the influence of crises.

In 1887 pig-iron production in Ukraine amounted to 67 000 t 327
and exceeded the figures for its two weaker rivals and in 1896 (636 000 t) the figure for the Ural. In 1900 it supplied the half and in 1913 $^2/_3$ of the production in the whole of Russia and 4% of that in the world, coming fifth in the pig-iron areas. As a producer of steel, Ukraine came fifth with a total production of

327



Diagram 10

Share of Ukraine in the production of pig iron in Russia (1878—1937).

2.7 million t, but it lagged farther behind the leading steel producing countries, and its contribution to the production for Russia and for the world was smaller than in the case of pig-iron.

In 1930 pre-war production levels were once more reached: but from 1933—37 pig-iron production increased to 7.5 million t, thus giving Ukraine the third place in world production (76 million t). In the production of steel and sheet iron, it remained fifth. But during the same period, the share of Ukraine in the total Soviet production declined steadily, as a result of the policy of the Five-Year-Plans which diverted more attention and capital to areas outside of Ukraine.

The tendency to increase and concentrate plants persisted after World War I. There were fewer furnaces (44 in 1933), but their average size increased from 382 cubic meters in 1913 to 513 cubic meters and their annual production to almost 100 000 t. The newer furnaces measured even 935 cubic meters. Modern

methods and branches of industry have been introduced, as for instance the production of superior steel and iron alloys. 327

The development of the power-station on the Dnipro entailed a certain change in the location of heavy industry. And the ratio of coal to iron per manufactured unit which was 2.8 : 1 before World War I became 1.6 : 1, though it is still more practicable to transport high quality ores to coal than vice-versa. The Dnipro power-station, however, which is more favorably situated as regards markets and consumption is attracting new foundations of enterprises in heavy industry. This is particularly true of Zaporizha. 371 327

5. Production of Machinery and Metal Goods

Even before World War I, markets were favorable for the production of machinery, above all for agricultural purposes which accounted for the work done for private customers in 126 plants. But modern, large factories were not built till after the war. New branches of production were started, e. g. for motor-cars and tractors (see huge factory in Kharkiv), machinery for mines and precision instruments while the construction of engines and railway trucks increased. The largest factories are in the Donets Combine and in the three large towns; the manufacture of agricultural machines is also distributed over other areas. 392

The non-ferrous metal industry is poorly represented. Between 1914 and 1928 there was practically no increase in the production of mercury (41 000 to 42 000 t). In the Kuban area in 1913 3 000 t zinc and 1 350 t lead were produced; in 1932 these figures were 5 000 and 3 500 t lead respectively. Under the first Five Year Plan zinc factories were erected in connection with the chemical works in Konstantynivka and aluminium works in Kichkas near the power plant on the Dnipro Bend. The annual production of the latter is estimated at 40 000 t. Fuel or power requirements play a greater part than the transportation of raw materials. The production of metal goods is confined to small factories. 328

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

(Mariupol); 'The Russian Providence' (near Mariupol); 'The Kerch' (near Kerch). In the 'Western' (Dniepr) group the principal works were: 'The Gdantsev' (Krivoy Rog); 'The Dniepr' (near Ekaterinoslav); 'The Alexandrovsky' (near Alexandrovsk). Almost all these works have continued to function under the Soviets; during the course of the last twenty years some have been considerably enlarged and others modernized. Some have been renamed: e.g. 'Alexandrovsky', now 'Zaporogian Steel'; 'Gdantsev', 'Krivoy Rog'; 'Russian Providence', 'Azov Steel'. These three, particularly, have become very important plants.

The Ukrainian and New Russian metallurgical industry comprises 45 blast furnaces and 118 open-hearth furnaces. In the twenty-five years between 1913 and 1938 the output of pig iron has been expanded from 3 million to nearly 8 million tons; rolled iron from 1 million to 3 million; steel from 2 to 5 million tons. Thus, the metallurgical industry of Ukraine and New Russia (excluding the rest of U.S.S.R.) ranks fourth in world production of pig iron (after U.S., Germany and Great Britain) and fifth in the production of steel and rolled iron (after U.S., Germany, Britain and France). In 1938 the Ukrainian and New Russian industries produced 55 per cent of all Russian pig iron, 35 per cent of all steel and 25 per cent of all rolled iron. Concentrated within a comparatively limited region the heavy industry of New Russia and the Ukraine constitutes the most highly developed industrial area of the Soviet Union.

The Revolutionary régime was fortunate in inheriting a wide area of industrialization which, in the immediate pre-Revolutionary period, had been expensively equipped with modern plants by West European capitalist groups. The régime cannot be considered to have achieved anything remarkable in further development, and had the capitalist system of promotion been allowed to survive it is probable that progress would have been more rapid.

The most spectacular (and widely advertised) achievement of the Soviet régime in the Ukraine has been the construction of the grandiose hydro-electric plant in the neighbourhood of the rapids of the Dniepr (Dnieprostroy). A new source of energy (about 600,000 kilowatts), equivalent to a third of the electric energy produced in the Ukraine, has been made available for industry. Dnieprostroy may, however, be considered as a somewhat redundant reinforcement of the power sources of the country which could only have been undertaken by a régime which was not hampered by considerations of productive yield on capital investment. In view of the vast deposits of coal and anthracite to hand and of the as yet unexplored reserves of lignite, the development of a new source of

tons of grain or about 75% of the total amount that they secured 651 661
in the whole of the former Russian Empire.

This led to new clashes and with the suppression of the larger armed partisan bands, there grew up a new feeling of ugliness that boded ill for the security of the whole regime. The success of the Communists in the industrial centres was thus balanced by their failure to win over any substantial part of the rural population.

In the cities the new regime[1] met with problems of another 433
kind. The workers in the great coal and iron industry where Com- 369
munism was strongest had at a very early date expelled the managers [327]
and foremen and had taken over themselves the operation of the plants, many of which had been ruined in the civil war. Now they found that they were not able to restore production. Industry practically came to a halt and by the end of 1921 there was only one blast furnace operating in Ukraine. The production of pig-iron dropped to 11,300 tons, or barely 3% of the pre-war production. The railroads suffered the same fate. There was no way of repairing them and without a trained administrative staff, they almost stopped functioning. This, in turn, increased unemployment and a lack of food in the cities and once more the city dwellers began to stream out into the country districts.

As a final blow there came in 1920 one of those periods of 731
drought which have recurred sporadically in Ukraine throughout the centuries. In view of the general decay in transportation and the ravages of the war, this became serious and the situation grew even worse when the same phenomenon was repeated in 1921. Between the drought and the raiding detachments, the peasants had no reserves of grain and a famine broke out which cost the lives of several million Ukrainians.

This famine was very definitely the result of Communist mismanagement, plus the drought, but the Soviet regime was unable to take any effective counter-measures. When its extent was realized, the regime allowed through the League of Nations the organization of the American Relief Administration under Herbert Hoover. This collected and sent to the stricken areas large quantities of grain but it carried on its work with such impartiality that

1 [Ukrainian Soviet Republic established 1919 -- Analyst]

631 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of
642 Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications,
645 Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent
●327 exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that
185 the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

432 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921,
241 which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the
185

316 mines of the Krivoi-Rog and secondly the presence between these two centres, in the surroundings of Nikopol, of important deposits of manganese, whose annual extraction exceeds 1,000,000 tons.

Actually the proximity of the mines of Krivoi-Rog, the resources of which, according to the exact estimates of geologists, are considerable (1 milliard 100 million tons of mineral which contains 40 per cent of iron), has allowed the distribution of the whole iron industry of the Ukraine between these two regions—that of the
316 Donietz and that of Krivoi-Rog. This centralization
489 allows one to utilize on the spot the enormous quantities of coal and of employing the railways in the most economical way, thus reducing the transport charges which are a heavy item in relation to a material.

The whole traffic between these two regions goes in two directions. The coal of the Donietz is loaded on trucks which are directed towards the Krivoi-Rog. These trucks return with a load of minerals. Thus a continual exchange takes place between these two centres, resulting in a very small circulation of empty trucks and thus creating one of the essential conditions of a rational exploitation of the railways.

316 The centralization of the Ukrainian metal industry
433 strongly favours its development. The Ukraine to-day occupies one of the leading places in the production of pig-iron (the fourth place, with 6,500,000 tons annually), of steel (third place, with 5,000,000 tons annually), and of sheet-iron (fifth place, with 3,000,000 tons annually).

327 The shaping of the metal and its transformation into metallic manufactured objects is equally concentrated on the borders of these two producing regions. Thus only 18 per cent of the coal of the Donietz and 5 per cent of the raw mineral of the Krivoi-Rog are exported from the Ukraine. The rest is shaped and worked on the

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

spot and leaves the country in the form of special steels, 327
of sheet-iron, of all sorts of machines and tools, as well as of chemical products.

The two mining regions and the regions of Dniepropetrovsk possess forty-five furnaces having a volume of 25,000,000 cubic metres and more than 110 Martin ovens. Russian industry still depends to-day in great measure on the factories of the Ukraine.

As we have seen, the state of industry in the Ukraine, especially of heavy industry, is conditioned by the geographical position of its raw materials and of the sources of energy. All the metal is concentrated at Krivoi-Rog and the source of energy is represented in the first instance by the coal of the Donietz.

The peat bogs dispersed over the whole territory and 316
whose extent does not exceed 400,000 hectares and the production 500,000 tons, and the brown coals the extraction of which is only 300,000 tons, can enter into the calculation only as auxiliary fuel of a definitely local importance.

The Ukraine, on the contrary, is well supplied with 377
hydro-electric plant. This energy is mainly given by the station of *Dnieprogues*, better known under the name of '*Dnieprostroi*,' which means 'Construction on the Dnieper.' This name was especially valuable during the building of the station which, having been finished, has taken the name of '*Dnieprogues*,' an abbreviation of '*Dnieprovskaia Gidro-Electritcheskaia Stantsia*,' which means 'hydro-electric station on the Dnieper.' Built by the Soviets on the rapids of this river, it employs the energy and the power which reach 600,000 kwh.

In the other regions of the Ukraine the network of hydro-electric stations is relatively poor, as the rivers do not provide the necessary resources in this respect. The existing stations serve the mills, the oil mills, the sugar refineries, or the town stations of small power.

377 The functioning of the *Dnieprogues* station, which could open enormous possibilities of development of all kinds of industries and of the electrification of the railways, has nevertheless, despite its enormous power, failed to change the industrial geography of the Ukraine because it is just half-way between the Donietz basin and Krivoi-Rog and thus does not bring about any alteration in the distribution of the sources of energy.

438 Thus the heavy industry of the Ukraine remains, in its greater part, concentrated around this region, round Nikopol and along the northern edge of the Donietz basin.

325 Kharkov and its surroundings are the greatest metallurgical centres of the Ukraine. There great factories of turbines, of generators, of electrical machines, of tractors, of locomotives, of railway trucks, and of factory equipment, etc., are to be found.

327 The production of sheet-iron and of steel rails, tubes, plates, beams, wire, etc., is distributed among many factories of the Donietz basin, at Nikopol and at Dniepropetrovsk.

Zaporojie (not far from Krivoi-Rog and near the *Dnieprogues*) produces nearly 60 per cent of the special steels of the Union. The Soviets intend to create a new powerful centre of metal industry there.

397 392 Apart from Kharkov, factories producing all the heavier machines such as locomotives are to be found in the Donbass (abbreviation of Donietz basin which we will now use), at Lougansk, and at Kramatorski, where an enormous newly constructed factory is one of the largest in the world.

402 The equipment for the light industry—the mills, wine-presses, oil mills and elevators—is chiefly manufactured at Berdiansk (Donbass), Melitopol (Northern Taurida), Tcherkassy (centre), Kiev, and Odessa.

392 Agricultural machinery comes from the factories of

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The possibilities of the development of this industry 255
are enormous. The excellent quality of the vegetables and fruits and the big supplies of fish at the mouth of the Dnieper would have been able to give this industry a great importance, but in this respect the Soviet Government has shown especial incompetence.

Light industry in the exact sense of the word is 000
relatively little developed in the Ukraine. Apart from a few saw mills, soap factories, skin and leather works, furniture works, perfumeries, and porcelain factories, there is little which would attract our attention. We will limit ourselves to simply mentioning them. One cannot really speak of a textile industry. The whole Ukraine has only three factories and only produces 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in Russia.

If agriculture is in a state of curtailment since the 433
appearance of the Soviet regime, if neither light industry 327
nor the means of communication have made any progress (which is equivalent to an absence of progress), the production of minerals ~~and~~ the metal industry show great development, especially since 1932, to which must be added the construction of the *Dnieprogues*.

This progress is not only manifested by the increase of production, but by the centralization of the metal industry in the districts in which the raw materials are extracted. Before the last war the Ukraine was a country of a great surplus of corn, iron, and coal. To-day the 433
surplus of her production is represented by manufactured metal goods and in this her economic potential is found to be radically changed.

The displacement and the development of the industrial potential of the Ukraine ought to have resulted in the increased welfare of her population. Nothing like that has been achieved.

Neither the aim nor the object of this book allow us

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

ing both from abroad and from other parts of Russia. 433
The two principal exceptions to this rule are manu- 439
factured food-stuffs, and heavy iron and steel products.

Sixty-eight per cent. of the manufactured products 433
of the country consist of food-stuffs. The industries 258
contributing to this output are various, including flour- 257
milling, sugar-refining, and those dependent wholly or partly upon sugar, such as confectionery, fruit-preserving, distilling from molasses, brewing, and wine-making. Most of the undertakings concerned have only a small capital, and are situated near the source of their raw material. In the neighbourhood of Kiev, however, sugar-refining and its dependent industries are carried on in large works, many of which are capitalized from abroad.

The close conjunction of the Donets coalfield and 327
the iron and manganese deposits has enabled the 433
Ukraine to be almost entirely self-supporting in iron and steel manufactures of the first categories, and to supply the wants of the remainder of Russia as well. Pig-iron, bar-iron, roof-iron, steel rails, axles, tubes, and assorted merchant iron are all made in the iron-works which have been established in increasing numbers on the coal and iron fields. These works are seldom in large centres of population, but as a rule in small towns and villages, some of which owe their existence to the need of housing for the labour employed.

The output of raw iron and steel in the first stage of manufacture under the headings of Bessemer and Thomas bars, Martin-process bars, cast-iron and steel billets, and cast-iron tubes, was in 1906 1,300,000 tons, and in 1910 1,900,000 tons. The output of iron and steel in the second stage of manufacture, under the headings of T and H beams, rails, sheet-iron, rolled wire, roof-iron, trusses, springs, assorted merchant iron and axles, was in 1906 1,010,000 tons, and in 1910 1,602,258 tons. In the former year the output in both stages was equal to about 45 per cent., and in the latter year to about 55 per cent., of the total Russian output.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

433 The development of the industry on a large scale
327 dates from the year 1870, when a British subject named Hughes received from the Russian Government a concession for the manufacture of iron rails. The company founded by him exists to-day under British management at a place called Hughesovka, and is known as the New Russia Co., Ltd. It has been followed up by a great number of other enterprises, some Russian, but most founded by British, French, and Belgian capital, which has been freely invested in the industry during the last forty years, particularly between 1880 and the end of the century.

392 Agricultural machinery is in constant demand.
433 When first used in the country, it had all to be imported, but of late it has been manufactured in the Ukraine in increasing quantities. Although the customs duties on agricultural machinery are low—certain types in fact are admitted free—the machinery made in the country finds more favour every year. For certain complex machines the Ukraine is still dependent upon imports, but, apart from these, it will probably be able in time to produce all the agricultural machinery it needs. In 1913, out of a total of 770 agricultural machinery factories in Russia, 271 were situated in the Ukraine. The value of their output was 31,000,000 rubles, that of the whole of Russia being 54,000,000 rubles. In addition to the production of the factories, large quantities of tools and machinery of the simpler sort are made by domestic workers, working single-handed or in small syndicates.

The principal agricultural machinery works are in the Governments of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Taurida, and Kharkov. The firms John Greaves & Co. and E. L. Mathias & Sons (Berdyansk), Hartmann Machinery Co. (Lugansk), H. A. Klassen (Sofiesk), R. & E. Elworthy (Yelisavetgrad), I. I. Hoehn (Odessa), and Franz & Schroeder (Neu-Halbstadt), are among those doing the largest business, and the names of the concerns show how largely foreign enterprise has entered this field, none having a Russian title. At Kiev and Kharkov

135 The third oil region lies close by the Ukrainian border, many hundreds of kilometers distant from the compact Russian area of settlement, not far from the Caspis on the Terek. These reserves are estimated at 900 million tons. In 1925 2 million tons were extracted, in 1932 over 8 million tons, and in 1933 somewhat more than 5 million tons. (103) From the occurrence of inflammable and

103. Kubiyovich: Atlas...,page 53.

earth gases, oil reserves are suspected to be present on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov and along the Dniestr. The salts in the Donets Basin and along the Carpathians, and the sea salt near Odessa round off the wealth of natural resources. Potassium salts are deposited in Galicia, potassium gluconites in East Podolia, at the Dnepr and near Isyum; phosphates in Podolia along the Dnestr and in northern Ukraine near Chernigov; excellent kaolins are found in the region between Volhynia and the Black Sea, and graphite near
312 Krivoy Rog. The entire water-power reserves of the Ukrainian provinces are estimated at 9 million horse power; of this only one-tenth was utilized in 1932. /163/

•327 Two industrial regions are connected with local natural resources. These are, first, the Donets Basin, rich in coal and salt, with coal mines, coke plants, foundaries and steel works. Here ore from Kerch and Krivoy Rog is smelted. Secondly, there is the mining district of Krivoy Rog and Mykopil on the Dnepr with iron and manganese mines, smelting factories, foundaries and metallurgic factories. With the completion of the large Dnepr power plant at Zaporishea - the normal water level was raised 37.5 meters by the construction of a mighty cofferdam and sluice along the entire rapids, which made the river navigable throughout - the industrial region of Krivoy

327 Rog received an important complement. Supplied by the 436,000 kilowatts of the power plant, a new industrial combine was established in this region, with iron and steel works, with factories for aluminum, alloys, for cement, soda, ammonia, sulfurous acid and similar chemical products. In this district agricultural and heavy machinery is also built. The pig iron production of 47 Ukrainian blast furnaces amounted to 3.1 million tons in 1913, 4.3 million tons in 1932, and 6.7 million tons in 1934; steel production during the same years came to 2.7 million tons, 2.2 million tons and 5.4 million tons, and the production of malleable iron in each case came to 2.3 million, 2.2 million and 2.9 million tons. (104)

104. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 455.

402 The manufacture of heavy industrial raw products for machines and implements of all kinds occurs in the scattered industrial cities, especially in the part of the Ukraine on the right bank of the river. Khar'kov, with its construction of heavy machinery, agricultural machines, precision instruments and transport machines such as locomotives, railroad cars and tractors, stands at the head of Ukrainian industrial cities. In Kiyev ships, heavy machinery and chemical and electrotechnical machines are built, and in Odessa agricultural machinery, precision instruments and motor cars. Here canning and leather industry is also carried on. In Mariupil /164/ and Taganrog there are foundaries. In almost all larger harbors of the Black Sea coast, ships are built. In the Crimea there are canning and tobacco factories.

433 After Ukrainian industry suffered severe reverses as a result of the First World War and the Revolution, a wave of industrialism set in with the first Five Year Plan in 1928. The wealth of

SU
464 The number of workers and employees in the national economy of the
874 U.S.S.R. increased by 3 million. Vocational schools and factory training centres graduated thousands of skilled workers, and improved the skill of several millions already employed.

SU
727 Of the districts which suffered occupation, economic rehabilitation
433 as well as capital construction amounting to 17,500 million roubles in
652 1946 made it possible to increase their industrial output by 28 per cent. as compared with 1945. Pravda writes - "the factories, mills, pits, power stations, towns and villages which were destroyed by the enemy are being revived one by one...."[1]

In the Ukraine

U
727 The Ukraine has been likened to one big building site, where more
433 than 500,000 workers are engaged in restoring industrial plants and municipal buildings.[2] In the Donets Basin, the coal output of 1946
327 was 30 per cent. higher than that of 1945. In the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, 21 blast furnaces, 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries were at work by January 1947. Of 104 machine-building factories to be restored, 102 were already producing goods, and mastering the production of improved types of machinery. The Kharkov transport machine-building works was preparing to build long-distance steam engines; and the tractor works was increasing its production, as were many other factories.

U
727 In 1946 the Kharkov turbo-generator works made a 100,000 kilowatt
433 turbine and one of 50,000 kilowatts. At Dniepropetrovsk, a lorry
393 factory was being built; and in Odessa and Lvov, automobile assembly
398 works were under construction. Great work was also being done in the development of light industry, food processing, chemical works, and other branches of industry.

U
727 After three years' work of restoration the Dnieper Dam had been
433 rebuilt in the main, and the housing for the power station erected.
377 By the end of 1946 the capacity of Ukrainian power stations had reached 70 per cent. of pre-war.

U
362 Since the liberation over 104.5 million square feet of floor space
368 had been restored in the Ukraine. Over half a million of the 590,000 houses destroyed by the Germans were restored or built anew in Ukrainian villages; and more than 13,000 cultural institutions in the villages and 118,000 auxiliary buildings on the farms.[2]

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1 Pravda, quoted by Soviet News, London, January 22, 1946

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

727 In August 1941 the retreating Soviet army troops partially disabled
397 the Dnieper Dam and power station to prevent its falling into enemy hands. This destruction was later completed by the Germans. When the Soviet Army recaptured the region, they found that 35 of the dam's 48 piers had been blown up, and all the generators destroyed. Damage to the power house alone was estimated at 500,000,000 roubles.

Reconstruction work began in February 1944, when the war was still on. Three years later the assembly of the first power unit of 72,000 kilowatt capacity was completed; and on March 3, 1947, the Lenin Hydro-electric Station supplied its first post-war currency to the industry of the Dnieper Valley.

There are over 11,000 men and women engaged on the restoration job, which has involved repairing the dam and the underwater structures, building the housing for the power station, and mounting the machines. Another two power units are to be assembled later this year.

After the expulsion of the Germans from the Ukraine, the capacity of the Republic's power stations was only 0.4 per cent. of pre-war. By the end of August 1946 restored capacity had reached 47 per cent. In the Donets Basin 70 per cent. had been restored, and in the Stalino area, 79 per cent. In the city of Lvov (Western Ukraine) the pre-war capacity of its electric power stations had been surpassed by 18 per cent. In the first seven months of 1946 much had been accomplished: some 400 power stations, including 215 hydro-electric plants, had been launched in the Ukraine; and it was expected that 750 more power stations would be completed by the end of the year.

The Five-Year Plan fixes the 1950 output of electric power in the Ukraine at 13,690 million kilowatt hours. The total capcity of Ukrainian power stations is to be increased in 1946-50 by 2,57[illegible],000 kilowatts. The Five-Year Plan directs that:-

"The Lenin Hydro-electric Station on the Dnieper shall be rebuilt. Small hydro-electric power plants with a total capacity of 203,000 kilowatts shall be built to meet the requirements of agriculture and local consumers. Plant aggregating 95,000 kilowatts shall be put into operation at municipal electric power stations."

The restoration of electric power facilities will assist greatly in rehabilitating other sections of the Soviet economy

Iron and Steel

185
327 The Five-Year Plan for the Ukrainian S.S.R. envisages an output in
433 1950 of 9.7 million tons of pig iron, and 8.8 million tons of steel.

In order to accomplish this, the iron and steel plants of the Donets Basin and the Dnieper region are to be rehabilitated; and there are to be put into operation 30 blast furnaces with an aggregate annual capacity of 9 million tons of pig-iron, steel smelting units with a

[185] 327 433

capacity of 8.4 million tons of steel, and 58 rolling mills with a capacity of 6.5 million tons of finished rolled goods.

In view of the enormous destruction of industry during the war, these aims are heroic, because they in fact mean that for five years the Ukrainian iron and steel industry will be striving to regain and then even to exceed, the production of 1940. This is shown by the following table, which gives the pre-war output of iron ore, manganese ore, pig-iron, and steel, as well as the planned output of the latter two in 1950. Figures for the U.S.S.R. as a whole are also included for comparison.

TABLE XIX

Ukraine: Production of Pig Iron and Steel
(thousand metric tons)

Year	Iron ore		Manganese ore	
	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.
1928	4,671	5,700	531	1,200
1932	7,925	12,100	443	1,400
1937	16,414	26,000	957	2,000

Year	Pig iron		Steel	
	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.
1928	2,361	3,300	2,409	4,300
1932	3,911	6,200	3,128	5,900
1937	8,801	14,500	8,467	17,700
1940	9,200	14,900	8,600	18,400
1950 (Planned)	9,700	19,500	8,800	25,400

Note: 1940 figures not available for iron ore and manganese ore.

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace, A. Yugov, C.A. Watts and Co.Ltd., and The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50.

As the table shows, areas of the Soviet Union other than the Ukraine are expected considerably to increase their production during the next several years. This, as well as the complete revival of Ukrainian plants, is particularly necessary to rebuild the transport system, and to replace tractors, machinery, and farm implements which were either stolen or destroyed during the war.

Progress in Rebuilding

327 727 In 1946, nearly all of the ferrous metal plants in the Donets were put into working order once more. The biggest blast furnace in the Ukraine started operating again in the Azovstal works; two other blast furnaces were put into operation, one in the Dzerzhinsky works at Dnieprodzerzhinsk and the other in the Makeyevka iron and steel works, where the mounting of a great blooming mill was also completed. The open hearth furnace at the Petrovsky works, two coke batteries of the Dzerzhinsky works, coke battery No.2 at the Mariupol coke and chemical works, the rolling mills at Yenakievo and Kremenchuk, and a number of other units of the iron and steel industry started operations.[1]

Altogether by the end of 1946 there were 21 blast furnaces,[2] 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries at work in the Ukrainian S.S.R.[3]

The iron mines in the Krivoi Rog basin (Ukraine) had been 85 per cent. restored. Another five big iron mines are to be put into operation this year, and by 1950 ore extraction in the Krivoi Rog area is expected to surpass the pre-war output.[4]

However, the task of reconstruction is still immense. Many of the large plants are still greatly disabled. The largest iron and steel plant in the Ukraine (at Zaporozhie) was systematically destroyed by the Germans.

This factory, with its three blast furnaces, ten open-hearth furnaces, strip and rolling mills, and 25,000 kilowatt generator, was still expanding when the war broke out. A small amount of light equipment was evacuated, but the bulk of equipment and all of the structures housing it were damaged or destroyed. Soviet engineers estimate that 65 per cent. of the value of the equipment was destroyed. Total restoration costing seven hundred million roubles will take from three to four years. Full restoration will require vast amounts of iron and steel for repairing the plant, of mechanical equipment for operating the plant; and of materials to rebuild the houses of the workers.[5]

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1 Soviet News, London, January 23, 1947.

2 On January 1, 1935, there were 55 blast furnaces in the Ukraine (55 per cent. of total U.S.S.R. capacity) and 117 open-hearth furnaces (40 per cent. of total U.S.S.R. capacity).

3 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

4 Soviet Monitor, London, January 28, 1947.

5 UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

Heavy Industry Building in 1947.[1]

● 327 727 Reconstruction and building will be on a wider scale in 1947, as many improvements are introduced. Mechanization is being extended in blast furnaces, open-hearths, and metal-rolling shops; and ore and coal stores are being equipped with modern cranes.

In the Donets Basin in 1947 the Stalino Metal Works are to put into operation another blast furnace, martin oven and rolling mill.[2] At the Azovstal works the two blast furnaces of 1,000 cubic metres each will be enlarged to 1,300 cubic metres. Also at the Azovstal works, which in the past did not produce any rolled metal, are being built a blooming mill, which will be the largest in the south, and a rolling mill. New blooming mills and rail rolling mills are also to start at the Petrovsky works in Dnieprepetrovsk, and at the Dzerzhinsky works in Dnieprodzerzhinsk. New pipe-rolling workshops will be added at the Nikopol Yuzhno-Trubny and the Dniepropetrovsk works.

At the Zaporozhstal works in 1947 several workshops will be added; and a power station and a 1,300 cubic metre blast furnace will begin working in the first half of the year. Among the most urgent tasks at this plant is the reconstruction of machines producing sheet metal for automobile production.

Equipment for Iron and Steel Mills

According to the new Five-Year Plan, the Ukrainian output of equipment for iron and steel mills in 1950 has been fixed at 35,000 tons; the total production of the entire Soviet Union has been fixed at 102,900 tons (of which 66,700 are to be produced by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic).

Production of Tractors

727 407 433 Before the war there were about 90,000 tractors in operation on Ukrainian farms. During the occupation, 56,000 of these were wrecked or stolen by the Germans, who also completely destroyed the well-known tractor factory at Kharkov. Because of the particularly great need of tractors in the Ukraine, this factory was rebuilt with great vigour; and production resumed. By February 1947 the Kharkov Tractor Works had produced 3,000 tractors since the restoration of the plant.

The 1950 output of tractors in the Ukraine is expected to be 25,000; for the entire Soviet Union, production has been fixed at 112,000 tractors.

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1 See U.S.S.R. Deputy Minister for the Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, Radio Moscow, February 3, 1947, B.B.C. Digest of World Broadcasts No. 274, London, February 5, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 2, 1947.

SU 316 433 U 316 433 metropolitan areas of Moscow, Leningrad, and other industrial centers, as well as the entire southern rail network of the USSR west of the Volga and south of the Moscow coal basin. During the period of the German occupation of the Ukraine (1941–43), the coal mines suffered greatly. At present, reconstruction work is in full swing, mines are being reestablished, and it is hoped to have reached prewar production by the end of the post-war Five-Year Plan. The major coal-mining centers are Stalino, Yenakiyevo, Gorlovka, Kadiyevka, Chistyakovo, Krasnyy Luch, and Sverdlovsk. Anthracite, used principally for fuel, is mined in the eastern and the southern sections, while coking coal is produced in the western and the northern parts of the Donets Basin.

SU 327 433 U 327 433 The giant iron and steel mills of the Ukraine lie mainly in the western part of the Donbas, that is, in the coke-supplying area, in the Krivoy Rog iron basin, and along the Dnieper between these two raw-material sources. Among the mills producing over one million tons of pig iron per year are modernized prerevolutionary plants at Makeyevka (Donbas), and at Dnepropetrovsk and at Dneprodzerzhinsk on the Dnieper and new plants at Krivoy Rog, Zaporozh'ye, and Zhdanov. The Azovstal' mills at Zhdanov use Kerch' (Crimea) iron ore, which is shipped across the Sea of Azov.

SU 392 438* U 392 438 Machine construction has been developed to a very large extent in the Ukraine in recent years. Due to the close proximity of the sources of metal and in view of the lack of skilled local labor, the Ukraine was designed to produce types of machinery requiring little precision work, but large amounts of metal. Plants located in the Donbas specialize in heavy machine construction; among them, Kramatorsk produces coal-mining and steel-milling machinery, and Voroshilovgrad has a large locomotive works. Agricultural machinery plants are located along the Dnieper and on the right bank. Khar'kov possesses a large tractor plant and locomotive works and produces hydro-turbines and electric motors. There are car-building works at Nikolayev and Dnepropetrovsk, shipyards at Nikolayev, Kherson, and Kiev, and oil-drilling machinery is made in L'vov.

SU 381 438* U 381 438 The industrial picture of the Ukraine includes a number of factors suitable for the establishment of a strong chemical industry: the by-products of coking and metallurgical processes, the presence of such important raw materials as salt and phosphorites, the availability of cheap energy produced by coal-fed (*Zugres* and *Shtergres*) or hydroelectric (*Dneproges*) power stations, and finally the need for chemical products

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

site of the battle of Poltava (1709), which marked the decisive defeat of the Swedes under Charles XII by Peter the Great.

Kremenchug, a lumber- and grain-trading point on the Dnieper, has light and food industries and produces road-construction machines. Its right-bank suburb, Kryukov, has large railway-car works.

Sumy Oblast

Area, 9,400, population, 1,700,000

Sumy Oblast, lies in the western outliers of the Central Russian upland and is drained by the upper Vorskla, the Psel, the Sula, and the Seym rivers. Basic crop combinations are sugar beets and wheat in the south, and hemp and wheat in the north. Also grown in the north are potatoes and buckwheat; in the south, tobacco and mint. Sugar refining, flour milling, and hemp retting are the chief industries. An oil field is under development near Romny.

Sumy is a sugar-refining center on the Psel River; it produces also agricultural machines, chemical fertilizer, and woolens.

Other industrial cities are Konotop, a rail junction with machine shops and food industries, and Shostka, which produces chemicals and photographic film.

DONETS BASIN

THE DONETS BASIN, which includes the oblasts of Voroshilovgrad and Stalino, is the most heavily industrialized section of the Ukraine and one of the principal industrial bases of the USSR. The impressive industrial development of the district is the result of the combination of local coal production and the iron-ore imports from the Krivoy Rog area, which forms the basis of the large-scale metallurgical industry. Nearly all the major mills concentrated in the Donbas pass through a full cycle of metallurgical production; they had a prewar capacity of 6 million tons of pig iron, 5½ million tons of ingot steel, and 3 million tons of rolled metal. The coking process, which is essential for the iron and steel industry, also feeds the basic chemical industries producing nitrate fertilizer and other chemicals. The use of iron and steel products in the heavy-machine industry completes the industrial scheme of the region. Associated with these principal activities are the quarrying of building and flux materials (dolomite, limestone, refractory clays, and cement rock), the mining of salt, mercury, and lead-zinc ores, as well as large

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

glass and soda works. A dense rail network and a unified power-transmission system connect the various enterprises. The vast number of urban centers, cities and workers' settlements, which have grown up around the metallurgical and machinery works and the coal mines, represent a concentration of almost one third of the urban population of the republic within 1/20 of its area.

Stalino Oblast

Area, 10,200, population, 3,000,000

Stalino Oblast includes the western section of the Dónets Basin, extending from the Sea to Azov in the south to the Northern Donets in the north. Agriculture (wheat, sunflowers, and cotton) is of importance only outside of the industrial section. Salt is mined near Artemovsk and mercury near Nikitovka. The principal coal-mining centers are Stalino, Makeyevka, Yenakiyevo, and Gorlovka.

Stalino, the largest city of the Donets Basin, had a population of 392,000 in 1948. It was originally called Yuzovo, or Yuzovka, for a Scottish industrialist, Hughes; it was called Stalin in the early part of the Soviet period. It has metallurgical, chemical, and coal-mining industries.

Makeyevka, a few miles northeast of Stalino, is the site of the Kirov metallurgical works, one of the largest of the Donbas, and coking installations. Coal mines operate in the suburban areas.

Yenakiyevo was called Rykovo from the 1920's until 1935, then Ordzhonikidze until 1943, when it again received its original name. It has a metallurgical industry, chemical works, and coal mines.

Gorlovka also has metallurgical, chemical, and coal-mining industries. Its northern suburb of Nikitovka has mercury mines and near-by Trudovaya is the terminus of an oil pipe line from the Groznyy fields in the Caucasus.

Konstantinovka has a metallurgical industry, zinc works, and produces ceramics, glass, and cement, as well as superphosphate fertilizer.

Kramatorsk is noted as a heavy-machine construction center which produces mining and metallurgical equipment. It also has railway-car repair shops and ceramics works. Druzhkovka, to the south, is another machinery center.

Slavyansk is a chemical center where there are salt mines and soda works, limestone quarries, and porcelain works. Artemovsk (formerly Bakhmut), to the southeast, is the center of an important salt-mining

methods and branches of industry have been introduced, as for instance the production of superior steel and iron alloys. 327

The development of the power-station on the Dnipro entailed a certain change in the location of heavy industry. And the ratio of coal to iron per manufactured unit which was 2.8 : 1 before World War I became 1.6 : 1, though it is still more practicable to transport high quality ores to coal than vice-versa. The Dnipro power-station, however, which is more favorably situated as regards markets and consumption is attracting new foundations of enterprises in heavy industry. This is particularly true of Zaporizha. 371 327

5. Production of Machinery and Metal Goods

Even before World War I, markets were favorable for the production of machinery, above all for agricultural purposes which accounted for the work done for private customers in 126 plants. But modern, large factories were not built till after the war. New branches of production were started, e. g. for motor-cars and tractors (see huge factory in Kharkiv), machinery for mines and precision instruments while the construction of engines and railway trucks increased. The largest factories are in the Donets Combine and in the three large towns; the manufacture of agricultural machines is also distributed over other areas. 392

The non-ferrous metal industry is poorly represented. Between 1914 and 1928 there was practically no increase in the production of mercury (41 000 to 42 000 t). In the Kuban area in 1913 3 000 t zinc and 1 350 t lead were produced; in 1932 these figures were 5 000 and 3 500 t lead respectively. Under the first Five Year Plan zinc factories were erected in connection with the chemical works in Konstantynivka and aluminium works in Kichkas near the power plant on the Dnipro Bend. The annual production of the latter is estimated at 40 000 t. Fuel or power requirements play a greater part than the transportation of raw materials. The production of metal goods is confined to small factories. 328

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RD1

in agriculture (fertilizers) and in other branches of the economy. There are several superphosphate plants on the right bank, a large soda industry in the Artemovsk-Lisichansk area in the north of the Donets Basin, based on local salt deposits, chemical plants tied closely to the coking and the metallurgical establishments, and sulphuric acid and fertilizer plants connected with the metallurgy of zinc.

In addition to zinc, which is imported into the Donets Basin, nonferrous metallurgy includes that of aluminum, which is also imported and worked at Zaporozh'ye on the basis of *Dneproges* power, and of mercury, mined near Nikitovka in the Donbas.

The petroleum and natural-gas industry is of only local importance and is intended to supply the Ukraine with its gas and liquid fuel needs. The oil fields lie in the foothills of the Carpathians, near Borislav and Drogobych. During the current Plan, a natural gas pipe line was laid from Dashava (in the oil fields) to Kiev. The Ukraine also imports petroleum from Baku via the ports of Osipenko and Odessa, and the station of Trudovaya (Donbas) is the terminus of a kerosene pipe line from the Groznyy fields.

The textile industry (wool, cotton, and linen milling) supplies only local needs. The food industry, on the other hand, is of national importance. This is true especially of the sugar-refining industry, located mainly in the Vinnitsa and Kiev oblasts, on the right bank, and in the Poltava and Kiev oblasts, on the left bank.

The agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR, less important than heavy industry with respect to the value of production, occupies, nonetheless, a major position in the economy of the USSR. Arable land occupies 60 percent of the total area. Prior to the Second World War the Ukraine was one of the regions best equipped with machine-tractor stations and agricultural machinery. Among the cereals, winter wheat in the west, spring wheat in the east, and barley are most important. The sugar beet is by far the major industrial crop; sunflower, cotton, and tobacco are grown to a lesser extent. Orchard farming is popular and produces melons and pumpkins, garden fruits (apples, pears, plums, and cherries), and in the south, apricots and grapes. Horses, cattle, and pigs are raised throughout the region.

The right-bank Poles'ye is least developed agriculturally. Marshes and forests occupy most of the area. In the isolated patches of moist arable land, potatoes, buckwheat, flax, and hemp are the chief crops. The area abounds, however, in pasture land, and dairy farming is

development has not been satisfactory. In Western Ukraine 256
small mills continued to operate with an output in 1932 of about 4 million t flour (and 170 000 t barley groats).

The oil industry manufactured native products and is best 258
developed in the Kuban area. In 1934, 90 000 t oil were produced, and in Dnipro-Ukraine 58 000 t = about 40 % of the total production for USSR. Large oil plants have been constructed since then in Slovjanske, Dnipropetrovske and Krasnodar.

More than ³/₄ of the canned food required for the whole of 255
Russia was produced in Ukraine. There are plans for a large-scale development of this industry.

Breweries and distilleries are not yet developed; out of a total 274
number of 225 distilleries, 151 are in Galicia, but they supplied about 40 % of the Soviet production before the first Five-Year Plan.

There were about 80 tobacco factories before World War I, 277
with an output of 9 000 t; in 1927/28 there were only 26 factories which produced more than 20 milliard cigarettes, i. e. 360 000 t = 36 — 54 % of the production for USSR.

10. Other Branches of Industry

Slate production in Ukraine increased from 2 000 t in 1913 339 ●
to 14 500 t in 1931; the raw material was manufactured in two plants in Zavalla and Mariupil.

A highly developed cement industry in Novorossijske (10 plants) used to produce 633 000 t annually. In 1934, 5 of the plants there produced 1 million t, and with Dnipro-Ukraine 1.5 million t = 45 % of the total production of USSR. Ukraine must come eight in world production. In Dnipro-Ukraine and North Caucasia in the same year, 940 000 t of fire-proof earthenware and dinas bricks were produced, 924 000 t lime, 220 000 t chalk, 207 000 t alabaster and 37 000 t gypsum.

Excellent kaolin is found in Dnipro-Ukraine. In 1913 34 400 t 323
and in 1931, 78 500 t were produced. In 1928 the 11 porcelaine factories in the country had an output of 18 700 t (¹/₃ of total

339 To finish with heavy industries, let us still mention the production of building materials—600,000 tons of cement (in the region of the Sea of Azov) and 1 milliard of bricks are annually manufactured in the Ukraine.

258 As for light industry, it is that of food production which occupies the first place.

257 The sugar industry of the whole of Russia is to be found almost entirely in the Ukraine. 12,000,000 quintals of crystallized sugar and 4,000,000 quintals of refined sugar can be produced here annually.

256 The milling industry also occupies an important place. Very important mills, many of which are supplied with highly perfected means of sifting and straining, specialized in the manufacture of fine flours for export before the last war. This industry is concentrated in the ports or in the towns near these or near river ports and in the surroundings of important railway junctions of the southern region. This industry represents 35 per cent of the whole milling industry of the Union and produces, despite the fact that it is not working at full pressure, 2,500,000 tons of wheat flour per annum.

249 The oil mills of the Ukraine produce 40,000 tons of sunflower oil, 3000 tons of linseed oil, and 3000 tons of mustard oil.

274 70 per cent of the alcohol distilleries of the Soviet Union are also in the Ukraine, manufacturing all types of alcohol: from corn, for drinks such as vodka and other liqueurs, and from potatoes, for the dye industry, for pharmaceutical products, and for perfumery.

277 The very important tobacco industry is distributed throughout the great centres of the territory.

255 As for the production of tinned foods, 78 per cent of the production of the Union originates from the Ukraine. Important quantities of vegetables (especially of tomatoes) and of fruit are tinned and exported from the territory.

Production of Building Materials

339 In connection with the reconstruction work being carried out in
185 the Ukraine, the production of building materials is extremely important. The Five-Year Plan lays down that the pre-war production of bricks is to be increased by 50 per cent. of tiles, by 170 per cent. of lime, by 120 per cent., and of gypsum by 190 per cent. The Plan also states that

> "Plants for the production of building materials - including cement, glass, brick, lime, and tile works, plants producing metal fixtures, prefabricated houses, building sections, plumbing fixtures, roofing materials and high tensile gypsum - shall be restored or built and stable local fuel and power supplies created for the building material plants."

The Ukrainian output of cement in 1950 is expected to be 2,095,000 tons as compared with 10,500,000 tons for the entire U.S.S.R.

[323] Under the jurisdiction of the Republic and local authorities there are to be put into operation in the years 1946-50 glass works with a capacity of 11-33 million square feet of glass, brick kilns with a capacity of 9 million bricks, and rolling mills and other building material plants.

Transport

727 The war and the occupation brought great devastation to the
489 transport system of the Ukraine. The greater part of the railroads were partially or completely destroyed, and many hundreds of railway bridges demolished. The port of Odessa on the Black Sea was systematically destroyed - piers, warehouses, elevators, floating cranes, and power supply. The Dnieper-Bug Canal, the only water outlet towards the west, was made impassable by the Germans, who destroyed the sluices, wrecked bridges, sank boats in midstream, and choked the canal with mud.

185 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, provides for the complete rehabili-
489 tation of Ukrainian transport. Railway lines and junctions, and locomotive and car repair works are to be fully restored. A number of railway lines are to be electrified; and west of the Dnieper several narrow gauge lines are to be constructed for closer connection of sugar beet growing areas with sugar refineries.

185 To alleviate the difficult situation in rail transport, motor
489 roads are to be rebuilt and extended. The Moscow-Kharkov highway is
494 to be rehabilitated and improved, and additional motor roads are to be built to connect towns of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with the towns of the North Caucasus and the Crimea. By 1950 the tonnage of freight transported by road should be 16 times the pre-war volume. The number

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDJ

The Fine Arts

1. Architecture

341 346 The first influences of art began to make themselves felt in the ancient Ukrainian territory in the 10th century when the Christian faith was introduced from Byzantium. Thus the famous cathedral of St. Sophia, a monumental building, was erected at Kyiv in the years 1017—1035 in the reign of Grand Prince Yaroslav the Wise. Formerly the "Hagia Sophia" in Constantinople was thought to be the model for it but probably it was copied from the so-called New-Church (Nea), built by Basil I in the 9th century in the Greek capital. All buildings belonging to the earliest period in Ukrainian history have since then been so often destroyed, transformed, supplemented and changed that we are obliged to fall back on suppositions. The church of the Kyiv Cave Monastery was different from the cathedral of St. Sophia. It was founded in 1075 by Grand Prince Svyatoslav II and served as a model for a whole series of Kyiv monasteries. The church of the Cyrill monastery at Kyiv, dating from 1140, was similar in style as were also the church of the Vydubytskyj monastery (1108), the Trinity Church built over the portal of the Cave monastery (1106), the Cathedral of the Redeemer in Chernyhiv with its well preserved construction, and many more.

The best creation of the Galician school of architecture is the relatively well-preserved Panteleymon Church in Halych, built about 1209 and later transformed into a Franciscan convent.

341 The 14th, 15th and 16th centuries are a transitional period in the history of Ukrainian architecture, when gothic and renaissance influence did probably penetrate into Ukraine, though they were not sufficiently widely spread nor uniform enough to pro-

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

duce any acknowledged style there. It cannot, however, be denied that in Eastern Ukraine several gothic monuments of repute have been preserved, e. g. in Kyiv (Church of Peter and Paul), in Lubni, and in Sutkivtsi in Podolia, while traces of gothic even in remote parts of Ukrainian national territory were to be found down to the middle of the 17th century. Gothic style came mainly from Silesia, via Cracow, and by way of western Carpatho-Ukraine and Transylvania and it were German masters who spread it in Ukraine. In the time of the renaissance we find many Italians from Lombardy and Switzerland working in Ukraine. Neither style played such an important part in the architecture of churches as in secular buildings, in town-halls, for instance, or patricians' houses, and fortifications erected in the towns of Western Ukraine such as Lviv, Yaroslav, Zamosts, Peremyshl and Lutsk.

Baroque style, like renaissance architecture, also came from Italy, and that by two channels: from Rome and from the old Genoese colonies in the Crimea, who, although they had been conquered by Tatars, absorbed their conquerors in time and made them Italian. Thus baroque in Ukraine assumed two forms — Jesuit baroque in Western Ukraine and Cossack baroque in Central Ukraine, a most original form of expression with many national features. Church dignitaries and the higher Cossack leaders were the patrons of this flourishing Ukrainian architecture; Mazeppa alone had five large churches built or restored in Kyiv. The following are the most important examples of this architectural style: The St. Nicholas Military Cathedral, 1690—1694, built by Hetman Mazeppa; the Church of the Assumption of Christ of the Kyiv brotherhood, built in 1695 by the same patron; the Church of the Trinity in Chernyhiv (1679); and the church of the Mharskyj monastery (1682—1694) which owes its foundation to Hetman Samoylovych.

Both of these variants, the Jesuit baroque in Western Ukraine and the Cossack baroque in the central area were, as in the rest of Europe in the 18th century, gradually transformed into rococo which style in Ukraine preserved the national features of its predecessors. The Cathedral of St. George in Lviv is undoubtedly the finest and most impressive example of this

341 style. Classicism, which first appeared at the beginning of the 18th century, finds its most complete expression in the magnificent palaces in Baturyn built for the last Ukrainian Hetman Rozumovskyj (Cyrill, 1728—1803) by Charles Cameron, an Englishman, in 1800 in Potshep, from plans by Vallen de la Motte, and in other mansions of Ukrainian magnates. In Ukraine, the classical style underwent three phases of development, corresponding to what Western Europeans know as Louis XIV, Empire and Biedermeier and marks the end of the efforts to achieve an independent architecture in Ukraine. In 1801, at the same time as selfgovernment was abolished for Ukraine, a law was passed, forbidding the erection of churches in Ukrainian style; finished plans were provided from St. Petersburg from which buildings had to be erected in the time to come.

In the second half of the 19th century, architecture in Ukraine was subjected to historical influences deriving from the romantic movement in Western Europe which resulted in a pseudo-Byzantine style. This was introduced into Ukraine by force and did not succeed in reviving architectural impulses there. Before the war, attempts were made to recussitate the baroque style with its national features in connection with the revival of national architecture in wood which was reconstructed by ethnographical experts and propagated mainly by the architects Vasyl Krychevskyj (1872), Serhij Tymoshenko (1881), and others. In the Ukraine of recent times the functional architecture of the west has gained the upper hand, its main monuments being the building of the State Trust at Kharkiv, the electricity works in Kyiv, the cloth factory in Kreminchuk and the buildings of the Dniprelstan.

2. Sculpture

532 The first traces of sculpture in Ukraine date back to Greek times, but not earlier than the fourth century before Christ. Under the Grand Princes sculpture naturally flourished in connection with the lively building activity of that time; but relatively few monuments have survived and these are not of any particular value. In the 14th and 15th centuries western influences make themselves felt in this province and appear in reliefs as a palimpsest on old Byzantine motives from icono-

first Russian revolution, that of 1905, one realized at 668
St. Petersburg and began to understand that this movement was not in itself a danger to the unity of the empire. The Governor-General of Kiev, Kleigels, in a good position to judge it, explained it in precisely this sense in his reports to the Imperial Government. But at the same time the Tsarist police, generally very well informed of everything which concerned it, was convinced that the Ukrainian *separatism* was but a weapon of the Austrians; it considered, moreover, that its success in Russia was almost insignificant.

Among the other expressions of the cultural life of the 177
Ukraine, western influences have been particularly strong 341
in the artistic domain and especially in architecture and in decorative art.

The architecture of Kiev, at the period when it flourished most, had above all been a simple branch of byzantine art, transplanted without any modification to Russia. In the north, however, architectural art, although of byzantine inspiration, soon developed original forms of a purely national character.

Kiev, close to Byzantium, was too profoundly impressed by the splendours of Constantinople to be quite independent of them. The celebrated historian of Russian art, Grabar, notes that at the end of the twelfth century architects from Novgorod were invited to Kiev in order to replace the Greek masters by native Russians and to build churches and palaces in the national style. The people of Kiev were amazed by it.

Besides the more important assimilation in the north, the style of religious architecture (the only which was of importance in the old Russia) was quite similar throughout the whole extent of the old Slav-Norse State.

Later, when the centre of gravity of Southern Russia was moved towards the west to the lands of Galicia and

177 Volynia, Western influences became more pronounced.
• 341 Even at Kiev we find churches in the gothic style,
[531] modified, however, by national and above all by byzantine traditions. A salient feature of byzantine art especially survives. These are the magnificent frescoes, in which this art excels as does, too, the art of the old Russia of Kiev.

During the sixteenth century the influences of the Renaissance were already felt in Galicia, which was still at this epoch the principal centre of Southern Russia. But they were soon supplanted by those of the baroque, which, from the beginning of the seventeenth century, leaves its mark on the whole Ukrainian architecture. It forced the traditional forms of Russian architecture of the byzantine type to recede more and more, to a point at which Grabar asks himself if the Ukrainian art had not undergone a complete denationalization.

Nevertheless a peculiarity belonging to the whole of Russia was responsible for a revival of the national style: the old Russia, a land of forests, overlooked any other constructional material but wood. That which is built of stone obviously cannot be built in the same way as wood. Thus there developed in the Ukraine the special baroque style of the wooden churches, just as the original 'gothic' style in wood had appeared in the north. This exquisite style was most probably created without any Western influences.

The wooden churches not only protected the Ukrainian art from complete denationalization, but their original and national style began to fuse little by little even into the baroque architecture in stone. At the end of the seventeenth century, and in the first years of the eighteenth, this baroque, called 'Cossack,' was almost exclusive to the Ukraine.

In the eighteenth century the 'Cossack baroque' loses itself in the magnificent bloom of the Imperial

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Russian baroque. At the end of the century it is replaced by an equally imperial rococo. The churches built in Kiev by Rastrelli clearly cannot be considered monuments of Ukrainian art. The empire style, originally transformed in Russia into the so-called 'Alexander' style, afterwards dominates in Kiev as in St. Petersburg. 171 341

As much as the old Ukrainian architecture has certainly contributed to the later development of the imperial baroque, Ukrainian painting, open to all the Western influences from the seventeenth century onwards, has played a very important part in the development of modern Russian painting. Here the Western influences were often transmitted through the Ukraine and were assimilated there before dissolving in the civilization of the empire. The Ukrainian portraitists Levitsky, Borovsky, and Venetzianov, working at St. Petersburg, had a strong influence on Russian portraitism. 177 531

It was also the painter Lossenko and the sculptors Kozlovski and Martos, equally Ukrainians, taught by the Academy of Arts of St. Petersburg, who illustrated the century of Catherine II with their works.

The national originality was also maintained in the popular art, especially in iconography, thanks to the deep traditionalism of the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless Ukrainian iconography had lost much of its austerity in comparison with that of Northern Russia, under the influence of that levelling which came from Poland.

Eastern influences still make themselves felt in the popular art, in the taste for richness of ornamentation, and in the magnificence of colours. Embroideries, tapestries, jewellery, glassware, crockery, and sculptures in wood witness the rich artistic aptitudes of the Ukrainian people and have the just reputation of their value both in Russia and in the whole of Central Europe.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hun-
241 garians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent
438 vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the
341 twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip
317 of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Siatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it
263 is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
511 during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation—all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

The typical Ukrainian house ("khata") is a low house, all 342
on the ground floor; it consists of a living room ("svitlytsja"), a vestibule ("siny") and a bedroom ("komora"). It is built of wood, willows, twigs or reeds, plastered over with clay. In the steppe bricks dried in the sun and made of clay, chaff or chopped straw, are used. Larger stones or short, thick wooden props form the foundation. In mountain areas and in richly wooded Polesia, houses are mostly made of wood. The roofs of Ukrainian houses are usually square and covered with straw, reeds or shingles according to the district.

The Ukrainian farm-house is carefully fenced and surrounded by a garden with fruit and flowers. The house is separate from the farm buildings which are generally round a yard ("obijstja") beside the house; in Northern Ukraine, the latter is smaller, but has a roof of its own. In areas inhabited by Hutsuly, Bojky and partly also by Lemky, house and buildings are under one roof and connected by a roofed passage, ("hrasda").

The wooden churches, a native creation of high artistic 346
value, are a peculiar charm of Ukrainian architecture. We find the oldest forms in Podolia and the country of the Bojky. The wooden churches of the Hutsuly show Byzantine influence, the churches in Carpathian Ukraine, Gothic, and those in the territory of the Lemky, baroque tendencies. The village in 361
Ukraine generally consists of a group of houses with several irregular streets; in the mountains, in areas inhabited by Bojky and Lemky, there are long chain villages, while the Hutsuly prefer the collection of peasant-houses as found in the steppe. In north-west Ukraine there are also chain villages, usually consisting of two streets, which, in Polesya and Volynia, cross each other; in the plains the villages rarely number more than 1000 inhabitants, but in Podolia and Volynia there are also villages with 3000, 4000 and more inhabitants.

Ukrainians are occupied chiefly with agriculture; cattle are 241
reared, particularly in the Carpathians and in the foothill areas, partly also in the steppe. Up till recently, agricultural methods were primitive. Later, however, more modern ways of cultivation and a rotation of crops were introduced and the entire industry modernised.

369 The Ukrainian people, being an old nation with an agricultural civilization, is not attracted by industry and by large concentrations of population. It prefers to live in the country, when its material life is assured, seeking to supplement its revenues by semi-agricultural professions such as those of artisan, or small trade, or finally the service of the State.

241 The Ukrainian agriculturalist, especially in the regions of the south, is conscious of participating in the general economy of the country. He takes a great interest in the choice of plants to be developed, in the organization of co-operatives for trade and credit, and in the construction of the means of communication. He is a civilized peasant, a quite European farmer. Without disparaging the intellect and the practical sense of the Great Russian people, it is necessary to recognize that the Ukrainian is more Western in all his conceptions, and more European, than his brother of the north.

163 On the other hand, the Ukrainian people have a great vitality. Among the peoples of Europe they have the greatest rate of increase, which reaches 2·3 per cent per annum. The fecundity of the women is astonishing: between twenty and thirty years it is 23 per cent, while in France it hardly reaches 8 per cent at the same ages.[1]

142 The average height of the men at the period of military service is about 1 m. 69½ cm.

137 342 Ukrainians are very clean and their houses very neat, mostly whitened with whitewash and surrounded by gardens. Fruit trees, particularly cherry trees, give the villages an attractive appearance, especially in the districts of Kiev and Poltava (Zone 1)* where the rich and green nature resembles the landscape of Southern England.

[1] That is to say that for a 100 women between twenty and thirty years one meets 23 expectant ones.

* [see category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

On the contrary, in Zone 2 the absence of trees, the 137
drier climate, the dusty soil, and the isolated farms make the landscape more severe and more similar to the barren table-land of Northern Castile. Only the immensity of the cornfields with their golden ears introduces a lyrical note, vision-like, into this flat and treeless country. The villages of the Steppe are not 361
very picturesque and look mostly like colonies in which 342
the spirit of calculation dominates over the care of beauty. The habitations here are more modern, bigger, and better planned. The thatch here gives place to tiles and to corrugated iron. On the other hand, the poor people, deprived of wood, live in primitive hovels built of clay.

In the extreme north, in the forest region with its 133
sandy soil, the picturesque landscapes gradually disappear to resume the severe and sad monotony of the White Russian country-side.

The Ukrainian is very adaptable to civilization, that 181
is to say to the improvement of everyday life, and very quickly adopts all practical inventions, without any spirit of routine.

The Ukraine is the most literate part of Russia. Even 212
Soviet statistics, which cannot be assumed to be well disposed to the Tsarist regime, show that the percentage of the generation which was of a school age in 1914, which could read and write was, in 1923, 90 per cent in the towns and 73 per cent in the country, which, by the way, is a vigorous reply to the generally accepted opinion that in the pre-war Russian Empire the population stagnated in a condition of utter ignorance.

In the other parts of European Russia the percentage for the same generation was respectively 82 per cent in the towns and 57 per cent in the country-side.

It seems to us opportune to give an idea of the Ukraine 000

[See category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

776 appeased, exorcised. When the priest of Velykyi Lypnyk consecrates the water of the village brook on the sixth of January, the people believe that the demons are thus driven away.

326 The men of Valykyi Lypnyk are tinkers, a
221 trade which in many places has a bad flavor. It is easy to say that they travel about the country like gypsies. But even though they wander from village to village, a small bundle of tools on their backs, repairing stoves and mending pots, they are, nevertheless, not homeless. As soon as spring comes, poverty drives them out on the road, and only late in the fall when the first white flakes begin to fall, they return to their wives and children with the few groschen they have saved.
241 For land is scarce, the clod of earth small, the soil is poor and the climate harsh.* The women work like drudges for their bit of barley bread and potatoes. With their small cows and a wooden plough they till the lower slopes of the mountain ridges. They sow by hand, harrow, and in the fall they cut off the barely ripe ears of grain with a sickle.
286 In their "spare time" these women* with their
271 strangely narrow faces sit barefoot in their full pleated skirts and pale pink blouses, a charming little cap on their heads, at their looms and tirelessly ply their shuttle back and forth between the taut threads, or press wool into felt for the jackets and trousers of their husbands.
342 The rooms of these "tinkers"* are surprisingly large and clean; the kitchen, living room, /10/ bedroom and work room are all in one. The whole structure with adjoining stable and wagon shed is built of wood, the inside unfinished, the outside
[789] covered with loam. In order that there be no lack of magic, carpenters carve three suns into the central roof beam.

184 How rich these "tinkers" of East Slovakia were with their little plot of free earth, their two or three cows, their barley bread and their loom, compared to their brothers in Carpatho-

*[In the village of Valykyi Lypnyk, Western Ukaine -Analyst]

361 tossed down on the land, without any relationship to it. "The absence of public buildings alone had
[342] a depressive effect. These wooden huts on a slope, supported by stakes as though by high stilts, seemed merely to have been set down as chance would have it, less secure and permanent than nomad tents which the next day perhaps might already be taken down again. It scarcely seemed worthwhile to lay out a few roadways provisionally. For the rest, there was not a trace of a city plan, of a systematizing, architectural hand. Everything seemed temporary and unfinished, simply amassed, never shaped. The expression "shanty town" applied in a special /18/ sense to these places. Our criteria of beautifully compact city plans do not apply. Never concentrated within the area most difficult to attack, never held together by walls and moats, these Russian clusters of houses and courtyards which can scarcely be called cities any more, gradually become lost in the distance, without shape or outline: mirror images of the landscape that bears them, of the language that echoes in them, of the way of thinking of the people they house." (9)

9. Tintrup: War in the Ukraine, pages 23 and 24.

101 If you would now turn east in the direction
361 of Kiyev, you would come through numerous rambling villages with streets. They contain attractive
563 farms where until recently you would have been warmly welcomed with German sounds. The Volhynia Germans lived here. But you continue northward
101 until the Volhynia plateau with a gradual incline
133 sinks into the Polesian swamps. You avoid this marsh land by turning northeast, and thus come to the extreme northwest tip of the Ukrainian area of settlement, Podlakhia, whose waters flow toward the Baltic. The primeval forests of Bila Veska are gloomy, but even more gruesome are the deep

361 the shadows of cherry and mahaleb trees. There every poor farmer adorns his dwelling with lovely, ever-smiling nature..."

Where there is no local building commission, where the street finds its own way, where the four corner posts of a house are set in humus, where no cellar is dug, there/134/the houses and villages grow out of the ground willfully like mushrooms. These are the cluster villages. The villages built in rows with streets are found in the newly settled regions of the Ukrainian steppes and the Kuban. In this new country the Ukrainians, [369] who otherwise love villages, also live on isolated farms. In the north and along the rivers they build wooden houses, and in the steppes, houses of loam. Even in the cities stone houses are rare. Flowers, hollyhocks and sunflowers are to be found in front of every cottage. As a rule, the Ukrain- • 342 ian farmhouse has two to three rooms. Whether it houses a poor family or a rich one, the ground plan is always the same; only the size varies. There is the vestibule with the summer kitchen and one half of the stove that extends through the wall; the other half stands in the large livingroom where cooking takes place in the winter, where the family lives, where they receive guests and where everyone sleeps. Then there is also a small storage chamber. The furnishings of the large room are simple and clean: there is a bench running all the way around the large, decorated clay stove and around the room; a rough table and a few chairs stand in the corner, also a sleeping platform for the parents, and a chest. Many icons, "the gods", decorate the wall. Since the barns are very primitive and draughty, a new-born calf or a young lamb that needs warmth is sometimes brought into the room when the winters are cold.

*

000 Seventeen ingredients are supposed to go into

11: Obermaier --219 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

Ukrainian peasant loam huts

11: Obermaier--220 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The hut in which a Ukrainian worker's family lives in Kriwyi Rog.



Tractor drivers and tractor assemblers of a collective farm near Uman.

20: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1937 RD1 Ukraine RD1

771 titude of mysterious, evil forces which he endeavours either to
789 ally himself with, propitiate, or combat in order to assure himself of good luck or avert the many calamities which these supernatural powers may bring. Magical beliefs and practices are therefore widespread and deeply rooted among the people. Even where the church has opposed and tried to counteract the older notions and usages, its success has been at best only partial. What it often has effected was a change in form, or the substitution of an authorized rite for an ancient magical practice.[2] The priest, for example, sometimes takes the place of the sorcerer by holding a special midnight Mass, the *czorna służba* (black service), at the instigation of a person who wishes to harm an enemy.[3] At other times he acts as medicine man, e.g. by stepping over the back of an ailing parishioner in order to relieve his [342] backache.[4] A case of substitution is noticeable in the rite observed before moving into a newly constructed house. Wherever the old practices of sacrificing a black rooster, as an offering to the Devil or as a preventive against disease, has become extinct, its equivalent has appeared in the solemn consecration of the house by the priest.[5]

154 Among the Ukrainians, as elsewhere, magical beliefs and prac-
791 tices have two main aspects, which may be termed respectively
189 the black and white arts. While the former has its prime source in the arch enemy of man, the Devil, the latter, which functions mainly to counteract evil influences, relies on some powerful medium, sometimes God himself, to neutralize or overcome the

Russian, people inhabiting South Russia. They occupy the eastern section of the former Austrian province of Galicia, which is at present part of Poland. They number approximately 3,000,000 and belong almost exclusively to the peasant class. Geographically, and to a certain extent also culturally, they may be divided into lowlanders and highlanders, the former inhabiting the plains to the north and the latter the Carpathian mountains to the south.

[113] [2] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Rutenen in der Bukowina und Galizien," *Globus*, lxi, 282.

[3] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Kuzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 277.

[4] Kaindl, R. F. "Neue Beitraege zur Ethnologie und Volkskunde der Huzulen," *Globus*, lxix, 71.

[5] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 282.

101 among themselves. They can be divided into three well-defined tribes
162 —the Lemki on the Slovak border, the Boiki in the centre, and the Huculs in the eastern tip of Ruthenia.

The most interesting tribe are the Huculs. They have preserved
186 their tribal characteristics better than their kinsmen. Their standard of education is higher, and they are more conscious and proud of their national individuality. When the Hungarians invaded Ruthenia after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Huculs offered the stiffest resistance, and during the war they were the core of the partisan force fighting against the totalitarian powers. Like the other Ruthenian
463 mountaineers, the Huculs are largely wood-cutters and raftsmen. But
342 they are distinguished by their skill as carpenters and wood-carvers. This is clearly reflected in their mode of life. Their wooden cottages are neatly built and furnished and impress the visitor by their scrupulous cleanliness. Their tribal individuality and artistic skill find expression in the numerous carvings with which they like to decorate their unpainted houses.

181 The neighbouring Boiki have also, to some extent, preserved their pride in racial individuality, and their mode of life, though more primi-
511 tive, has some interesting features. They are kind-hearted, sincere and hospitable, in spite of their poverty. Though less proud than the Huculs, they fly into a temper when crossed, and impulsive outspoken-
342 ness is one of their traits. They live in cottages and huts which they like to paint in blue and brown, and this makes their exterior rather attractive. But the interior does not always live up to the façade. The better-off Boiki manage to live in fairly decent cottages with two or more rooms, but the huts of the poor often consist of one room only—a dark room with no chimney, one small window, and some roughly
352 made furniture. Some have no bedsteads in the true sense of the word; along the whole wall of the room one may find a long "plank-bed" where the grown-ups sleep at the one end and the children at the other. When the children grow up they sleep on separate beds of the same kind. Unlike the Hucul houses, the Boiki huts have no wooden
342 floors. The domestic animals often share the same room with their
511 masters in winter, sleeping on the bare earth. For many families such a room is therefore a kitchen, living room, bedroom, hall and stable in one.

511 Much the same applies to the Lemki tribe who live partly on Slovak territory. They are the poorest Ruthenian tribe and their racial
181 character has undergone a certain deterioration. Their standard of life is often appalling, the hygiene leaves much to be desired, and they have the largest number of illiterates, though some improvement has taken place under the Republic

000 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians
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

A wooden hut in the Carpathians

Ruthenian lumberjacks making rafts on the Black Tisa

501

31: Sosnovy S-5 (no date) 1954 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

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obtain but may also be of inferior quality. The individual builder has also been faced with the problem of the government's attitude toward him which has been marked, as we have seen, by considerable fluctuations.

At the end of the twenties, Gosplan severely criticized individual building:

> The individual builder takes no account of sanitary or technical requirements, builds his house using very cheap and often defective materials and neglects to equip his dwelling with facilities considered an essential part of urban housing. The result is inferior but very inexpensive houses,[125] usually situated, without any planning, on the outskirts of the city; this is a tremendous obstacle to the future development of city planning.[126]

Some writers have noted that individual dwellings "consist of a one-room apartment with a kitchen, which serves at the same time as dwelling space" and "that these houses, in essence, differ very little from the village *izba*...."[127]

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125. Average cost per sq. m. of dwelling space in the individual sector was one-quarter of that in the public sector. See *Kontrol'nye tsifry narodnovo khozyaistva SSSR na 1927/28 g.g.* [Control Figures for the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. for 1927-1928], Moscow, 1928, p. 201.

126. *Pyatiletnii plan narodno-khozyaistvennovo stroitel'stva SSSR, op. cit.*, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 283.

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269
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127. *Planovoye khozyaistvo*, Moscow, No. 9, 1927, p. 150. The following data (average figures) illustrate prerevolutionary rural living standards in the Ukraine, which were superior to those in other republics: 1.5 rooms per dwelling; 4.7 sq. m. of dwelling space per person; 75.7% of all houses had blind windows; only 5.2% had hinged window panes; 37.3% had a light coefficient of 1:15 (ratio of window space to floor space; in an average size room, the ratio is 1:8) while in the remainder it was considerably lower; 55.1% were damp; 94.8% had earth floors; and 81.4% had straw-covered roofs. Water and sewage systems, electricity, and gas were nonexistent in the rural areas. Rural housing in the postrevolutionary era eliminated many of these shortcomings. See Marzeyev, *op. cit.*, p. 426.

465 quality. For this the worker, if he does not spend any kopeks for food and housing, must work one and one-half months, and two months for the cheapest winter coat. Three colored shirts eat up a month's wages. For the same amount he could buy his wife three summer dresses of poor quality or three sets of underwear or three blouses. (129)

129. Statement of a German specialist in Kiyev.

Far too often the life of the Soviet Ukraine worker is exhausted in the struggle for his daily bread, for clothing and shelter, and yet before the war he was the best paid in Russia. Undoubtedly 345 the Bolsheviks have done a great deal of building, 466 but they neglected the building of houses in favor 185 of the building of clubhouses and palaces for cultural purposes, veritable giant structures of cement and steel where in the evening the locksmiths and metal founders then assemble "in order to hear lectures on Shakespeare". "For in human history there is an urge that has never before been recognized in the great masses...for art and literature. The famous tractor brigade of the Pasha Angelin comes forth with songs, and the workers of the Khar'kov tractor factory organize their own opera. Hundreds of groups of worker and kolhosp newspapers flaunt poems, stories and essays written by forge and tractor workers."

He whose thoughts take flight on the wings of Pegasus will find his hands only mechanically at 433 work. Among the construction workers the "never-before recognized urge of the great masses...for art and literature" expresses itself in the following way, according to Pravda of July 16, 1937: "The brick production program for the year could only be 19 percent accomplished in the first five months of the year, and the two subsequent months have also brought no change. The construct-

The typical Ukrainian house ("khata") is a low house, all 342
on the ground floor; it consists of a living room ("svitlytsja"), a vestibule ("siny") and a bedroom ("komora"). It is built of wood, willows, twigs or reeds, plastered over with clay. In the steppe bricks dried in the sun and made of clay, chaff or chopped straw, are used. Larger stones or short, thick wooden props form the foundation. In mountain areas and in richly wooded Polesia, houses are mostly made of wood. The roofs of Ukrainian houses are usually square and covered with straw, reeds or shingles according to the district.

The Ukrainian farm-house is carefully fenced and surrounded by a garden with fruit and flowers. The house is separate from the farm buildings which are generally round a yard ("obijstja") beside the house; in Northern Ukraine, the latter is smaller, but has a roof of its own. In areas inhabited by Hutsuly, Bojky and partly also by Lemky, house and buildings are under one roof and connected by a roofed passage, ("hrasda").

The wooden churches, a native creation of high artistic 346 ●
value, are a peculiar charm of Ukrainian architecture. We find the oldest forms in Podolia and the country of the Bojky. The wooden churches of the Hutsuly show Byzantine influence, the churches in Carpathian Ukraine, Gothic, and those in the territory of the Lemky, baroque tendencies. The village in 361
Ukraine generally consists of a group of houses with several irregular streets; in the mountains, in areas inhabited by Bojky and Lemky, there are long chain villages, while the Hutsuly prefer the collection of peasant-houses as found in the steppe. In north-west Ukraine there are also chain villages, usually consisting of two streets, which, in Polesya and Volynia, cross each other; in the plains the villages rarely number more than 1000 inhabitants, but in Podolia and Volynia there are also villages with 3000, 4000 and more inhabitants.

Ukrainians are occupied chiefly with agriculture; cattle are 241
reared, particularly in the Carpathians and in the foothill areas, partly also in the steppe. Up till recently, agricultural methods were primitive. Later, however, more modern ways of cultivation and a rotation of crops were introduced and the entire industry modernised.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDJ

The Fine Arts

1. Architecture

341 The first influences of art began to make themselves felt in the ancient Ukrainian territory in the 10th century when the
● 346 Christian faith was introduced from Byzantium. Thus the famous cathedral of St. Sophia, a monumental building, was erected at Kyiv in the years 1017—1035 in the reign of Grand Prince Yaroslav the Wise. Formerly the "Hagia Sophia" in Constantinople was thought to be the model for it but probably it was copied from the so-called New-Church (Nea), built by Basil I in the 9th century in the Greek capital. All buildings belonging to the earliest period in Ukrainian history have since then been so often destroyed, transformed, supplemented and changed that we are obliged to fall back on suppositions. The church of the Kyiv Cave Monastery was different from the cathedral of St. Sophia. It was founded in 1075 by Grand Prince Svyatoslav II and served as a model for a whole series of Kyiv monasteries. The church of the Cyrill monastery at Kyiv, dating from 1140, was similar in style as were also the church of the Vydubytskyj monastery (1108), the Trinity Church built over the portal of the Cave monastery (1106), the Cathedral of the Redeemer in Chernyhiv with its well preserved construction, and many more.

The best creation of the Galician school of architecture is the relatively well-preserved Panteleymon Church in Halych, built about 1209 and later transformed into a Franciscan convent.

341 The 14th, 15th and 16th centuries are a transitional period in the history of Ukrainian architecture, when gothic and renaissance influence did probably penetrate into Ukraine, though they were not sufficiently widely spread nor uniform enough to pro-

633 civil war. Kiev, as the centre of traditional Ukrainian life, was more liable to sympathy with the Ukrainian national movement, as the Russians had found on more than one occasion. Now, with the country prostrate, it seemed advisable for the Communists to mark their triumph and endeavor to identify themselves with the masses by recognizing Kiev.

Yet, it brought with it another blow to Ukrainian prestige. Of all the cities in Ukraine, Kiev was the richest in the monuments of the past. Therefore, to mark the Communist triumph, they decided to rebuild large portions of the city and to erect buildings that would be worthy of the new regime. It was easy to find as the proper sites the areas where the old Kiev had stood.

346 661 633 From the very first days of Bolshevism and Communism, the regime, with its atheistic trends, had devoted itself to the robbing of the churches. Even the ikonostasis of St. Sophia had been melted down to recover the gold ornaments with which it had been decorated. The museums had been largely pillaged. Some of the contents had been removed to Moscow on various pretexts, but still more had been wantonly destroyed.

Now work began in earnest to wreck the surviving monuments of the past. In quick succession the Communists ruined, blew up or levelled a large number of churches which spoke too strongly of the past greatness of Kiev and the Ukrainians. These included the Cathedral Church of the Golden Domed Monastery of St. Michael of the twelfth century, with a bell-tower of the seventeenth, the Church of the Three Saints of the twelfth century, the cloisters of the Monastery of St. Irena of the eleventh century, the finest monuments of the period of Mazepa at the end of the seventeenth century, including the Cathedrals of the Theophany of the Brotherhood Monastery and the "Great Nicholas" of the Ustyno-Mykolayiv Monastery, the work of the architect Joseph Startsev, with a bell-tower of the late eighteenth or the early nineteenth century, the "Little Nicholas" and the Church of St. George of the eighteenth century, a large number of structures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of the Kievan-Mezhyhirye Monastery of the Transfiguration, the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Podil of

[1933 - Ukraine Capital was moved to Kiev from Kharkiv -- Analyst]

the eighteenth century, the bell-tower of the Kiev-Kiril-Troitsky 346 ●
Monastery of the eighteenth century built by the architect Ivan 661
Hryhorovych-Barsky, the Church of Sts. Borys and Hlib of the 633
eighteenth century, the Church of the Birth of Christ and the "good Nicholas," built by Andry Melensky at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Church of the Tithes, the celebrated statue of Samson by Hryhorovych-Barsky, and a long series of other monuments and buildings.

Almost all of these buildings came from those periods when the Ukrainians were the most free from Russian influence or, as in the case of the Mazepa baroque, had the closest contacts with the West. It was a deliberate part of the Communist attempt to rewrite the Ukrainian past.

Of course, their excuse was that the old primarily ecclesiastical culture stood in marked contradiction to the modern era of industrialization and collectivization, the "glorious age of Stalin" which called for the development of a new type of architecture. Still, in a surprising number of cases these new buildings did not make their appearance and the ground was left empty or covered with insignificant structures which could better have been placed on the site of those half-ruined shacks and hovels which were the real expressions of the Communist paradise.

The primary object[1] was the annihilation of the Ukrainian spirit 626
and represented part of the broad general movement which had 186
been launched for the rerussification of the country and the stopping in every way of that spontaneous outburst of development which had been called into being by the downfall of tsarism and the founding of the Ukrainian National Republic. The general debacle was now complete.

Within four years, before the ending of the first Five Year Plan a situation had been brought about which seemed to the Soviet authorities a guarantee of their final victory over what they were pleased to call bourgeois nationalism but which was, in realty, the logical outgrowth of the Ukrainian aspirations throughout the centuries.

1 [in destruction of churches & monuments of past in Kiev--Analyst

505 the mercantile fleet which it carried was, even long before the war, as large as the total mercantile tonnage of the Austro-Hungarian fleet.
● 346 Even from far off you will see on the hills of the city lying on the right bank the strange cupolas of the Byzantine churches and monasteries. Kiyev was formerly the "Rome of the East", and even today it is the "mother of all Russian cities". Hundreds of thousands of devout pilgrims
788 annually visited the famous cave monastery of Pecherska Lavra, the cathedral of St. Sophia, the Golden Gate and other sacred spots.[1]

133 The churning steamer which you again board in the sprawling, pounding and shrieking harbor section[2] will take you farther downstream. On the west bank the high plateau of the Dniepr Plain rises steeply. If you should wander over this undulating hill country with its fields of wheat and sugar beets, you would see everywhere the traces of Ukraine's past: mighty grave mounds of nomad chieftains, and embankments with which in early times the Ukrainian people protected themselves against Asiatic brigands. /20/ To the left of the stream, in the east, you see nothing but wild thickets of reeds, dense, impenetrable green meadows behind which the Dniepr Plain is hidden.
361 You would find villages there[2] which have as many inhabitants as a medium-sized city and which equal a metropolis in surface area. However, they have remained villages in which peasants live on their homesteads; it is almost a day's journey to their fields. Khar'kov, a small Cossack hamlet in the seventeenth century, and today the second largest city of the Ukraine, is situated on the eastern edge of this plain.

133 In Dniepropetrovsk where formerly the rapids began, you turn eastward, friend, and now reach the steppes. The earth which is swept bare by the eternal east wind and by the dust storms, is completely naked as soon as you ascend the Donets

[1] [i.e. In Kiev — Analyst]
[2] [i.e. In the Dniepr Plain — Analyst]

24; Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians
163

788

Religious procession in a Ruthenian village

How they build churches in Ruthenia

346



24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians

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An Icon

A Russian church in the capital of Ruthenia

349



Richelieu Terrace in Odessa

538 rical ballads (dumy) which glorify and preserve the whole of the past of Ukraine, are deservedly famous.

533 The Ukrainian folk-song which has been handed down in many collections and manuscripts from the 16th century, enjoys a great reputation both at home and abroad. These songs were sung at Lithuanian and Polish courts (14th - 16th centuries) and before Tsars and boyars in Moscow down to the second half of the 18th century. They were admired in Turkey and Italy too, and found honorable mention as early as 1675 in Herbigny's collection "Religiosae Kijovienses Cryptae".

534 The Ukrainian accompanies his singing on many instruments: there are the "kobza" and the "bandura", stringed instruments of foreign origin, cymbals which are unknown to the Russians, bag-pipes ("duda"), a peculiar kind of flute ("svyril") and the mountain pipe ("trembita"); primitive instruments like the lyre
535 have also persisted. The dance plays a comparatively minor part. Besides the ceremonious dances ("kolo") there are round dances ("hopak", "kozatshok" and "kolomyjka"), and the old sword dance is found among the Hutsuly.

531 A richly developed folk-art is on the same level as the folk-poetry and music; it finds expression above all in national costumes and ornaments, in painted Easter eggs, embroidery, in the complicated weaving and wood-carving patterns and in bead-work, ceramics, furniture and household utensils.

291 The ornate costumes often show in their embroidery influen-
531 ces from the East, the South and the Balkans. Particular attention is paid to embroidery on shirts, while women's skirts ("plakhty") and men's coats are often magnificent works of art for which, according to the district, homespun linen and woollen stuffs are used. Embroidery patterns utilise geometric forms as well as conventional flowers and leaves.

● 352 Furniture consists mainly of benches, a carved table, painted
531 and inlaid chests ("skryni") and a carved pottery cupboard ("mysnyk"). The room is, in addition, decorated with paintings, embroidered towels and carpets; in Eastern Ukraine the stove is also painted.

101 162 among themselves. They can be divided into three well-defined tribes —the Lemki on the Slovak border, the Boiki in the centre, and the Huculs in the eastern tip of Ruthenia.

The most interesting tribe are the Huculs. They have preserved 186 their tribal characteristics better than their kinsmen. Their standard of education is higher, and they are more conscious and proud of their national individuality. When the Hungarians invaded Ruthenia after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Huculs offered the stiffest resistance, and during the war they were the core of the partisan force fighting against the totalitarian powers. Like the other Ruthenian 463 mountaineers, the Huculs are largely wood-cutters and raftsmen. But 342 they are distinguished by their skill as carpenters and wood-carvers. This is clearly reflected in their mode of life. Their wooden cottages are neatly built and furnished and impress the visitor by their scrupulous cleanliness. Their tribal individuality and artistic skill find expression in the numerous carvings with which they like to decorate their unpainted houses.

181 511 The neighbouring Boiki have also, to some extent, preserved their pride in racial individuality, and their mode of life, though more primitive, has some interesting features. They are kind-hearted, sincere and hospitable, in spite of their poverty. Though less proud than the Huculs, they fly into a temper when crossed, and impulsive outspoken- 342 ness is one of their traits. They live in cottages and huts which they like to paint in blue and brown, and this makes their exterior rather attractive. But the interior does not always live up to the façade. The better-off Boiki manage to live in fairly decent cottages with two or more rooms, but the huts of the poor often consist of one room only— a dark room with no chimney, one small window, and some roughly 352 made furniture. Some have no bedsteads in the true sense of the word; along the whole wall of the room one may find a long "plank-bed" where the grown-ups sleep at the one end and the children at the other. When the children grow up they sleep on separate beds of the same kind. Unlike the Hucul houses, the Boiki huts have no wooden 342 511 floors. The domestic animals often share the same room with their masters in winter, sleeping on the bare earth. For many families such a room is therefore a kitchen, living room, bedroom, hall and stable in one.

511 181 Much the same applies to the Lemki tribe who live partly on Slovak territory. They are the poorest Ruthenian tribe and their racial character has undergone a certain deterioration. Their standard of life is often appalling, the hygiene leaves much to be desired, and they have the largest number of illiterates, though some improvement has taken place under the Republic.

000 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The

137 Oaks and hornbeams grow plentifully in the zone of transition between forest and the steppe while the pine prefers sandy river valleys. Vegetation in the mountains corresponds to that in western surroundings. The vast mountain pastures deserve special mention. On the coast of the Crimea and the Caucasus we find the buttertree, the cypress, the stone pine, the laurel, opuntias, agaves and other Mediterranean plants.

136 Prevalent animal species vary only slightly from those found in neighboring countries in the west. Worthy of mention are wild-cat, ermine, and bison in the forest region, bear, lynx and wild-cat in the Carpathians. In the Yaila mountains there are vultures. The Caucasus has the greatest variety of animals. It is still possible there to hunt ibex, jackals and ure-ox. On the southern slopes there are even panthers. Numerous rodents live in the steppes. The ure-ox, the beaver and the marmot are dying out.

3. Population.

a) Density

161 In 1939 the average density of the population in Ukraine was 68 persons per sq. kilometer. In the central forest-steppe zone, one of the most thickly populated agrarian areas in Europe, 80—120 people live on a sq. kilometer, between the Syan and Kursk. Northern Ukraine with its lighter soil is much more thinly populated; here the average density amounts to 40—60 persons per sq. kilometer, and in Polesya this figure even falls below 25. The density of the population in Southern Ukraine corresponds roughly to that in the north, though the Donets basin is an isolated area of dense population. The Caucasus foothills, a country with a climate at least as favorable as that of Central Ukraine is only two-thirds as densely populated, as it was colonised late. The mountains are thinly populated.

162 The majority of the Ukrainian people live in villages; 29 % • 361 live in towns and 10 % in cities with more than 100 000 inhabitants; trade and industry are not intensively developed; we are struck by the many towns that have grown up at the frontiers between the various natural areas; there are 60 bet-

ween the forest steppe and the Kholm forests, among them 162
Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Kyiv and Konotip. Akkerman, Odessa, 361
Mykolajiv, Kherson, Sevastop'l lie on the sea coast. In all there are 18 towns with more than 100 000 inhabitants (statistics dating from 1939 and for Western Ukraine from 1931).

Kyiv	846 000
Kharkiv	833 000
Odessa	604 000
Dnipropetrovske	500 000
Stalino	462 000
Lviv	316 000
Zaporizha	289 000
Mariupil	222 000
Voroshylivhrad	213 000
Kryvyj Rih	198 000
Taganrih	189 000
Symferopil	143 000
Chernivtsi	111 000
Kerch	104 000

b) Movement of population

Movements in the population of Ukraine have been caused by 161
natural increase and emigration and immigration, these movements being more pronounced than elsewhere in Europe.

Natural Increasein 1927 per 1000	Births	Mortality	Actual Increase
USSR	40.3	17.8	22.5
North Caucasia	42.7	17.1	25.6
Crimea	44.7	18.1	26.6
Galicia	31.8	20.3	11.5
Volynia and Polesya	39.4	17.7	19.4
Carpathian Ukraine	37.4	23.3	16.1

The greatest natural increase is to be found in those parts of Ukraine that are most sparsely populated, while the lowest, determined by low birthrate, is provided by Galicia which is over-populated. Increase in purely Ukrainian elements of the population exceeds the average value for other elements inhabiting the same areas of settlement. There are no data on

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The Social Structure of the Ukrainian Community

The social structure of the Ukrainian people was fairly uniform till the Soviets took over the government. According to the census of 1926 which gives an accurate enough picture of pre-Soviet conditions, the majority of the people were engaged in agriculture. On December 17. 1926, 80.6 % of the population were employed in agriculture, 5.4 % in factories, 3.7 % were artisans, 0.5 % were employed in building, 1.9 % on the railway, 2.3 % in business, and 2.6 % in civil service. Te different social classes may be seen from the following table: 162

	Ukrainians %	Russians %	Jews %
Laborers	54.6	29.2	8.7
Servants	51.7	25.0	16.9
Professions	47.9	15.2	30.4
Farmers working with members of own family	88.6	4.9	1.3
Farmers with hired laborers	75.6	5.7	10.4
Independent peasants	56.7	10.7	26.7
Members of family working at home	89.1	5.2	0.6

The characteristic member of the social structure of the Ukrainian nation was the farmer who cultivated the soil with the help only of his family. The proportion of Ukrainians in the groups of laborers, employees and professions diminished as the salary and social standing of the group in question rose.

The collective system introduced by the First and Second Five Year Plans, made deep alterations in the social structure of the Ukrainian areas. The proportion between rural and urban population changed. According to the last census of 1939 the urban population had risen to 36.2 %, while the rural population had sunk to 63.8 %. In the Donets Basin and the Ukraine Steppe, where industrialisation was intensely developed, the population of the towns in some areas rose by 50 %. While from 1926-1932 towns like Dnipropetrovske increased 62.9%, Za- 162 361

162 porizha 244 %, Kryvyj Rih 156.6 %, Staline 170 %, Konstanty-
361 nivka 233 %, towns in the Right and Left Bank areas decreased.

The increase in urban population in the Ukraine Soviet Republic is most probably due to foreign immigration. Housing has become worse practically everywhere; it is difficult to imagine that the immigrants can continue to live permanently under such wretched conditions.

474 The rural population was composed almost entirely of members of colkhoses. They possessed almost the entire agricultural land in common, all agricultural machinery and draught animals and much of the other livestock. There remained for personal use only small plots round the cottages, the cottages themselves and a few head of cattle (no horses), pigs and poultry.

474 Every member had to work on the soil of the colkhose. His
465 wages were reckoned according to the number of days he had worked and these were calculated according to time and kind of work performed. The amount of grain left after fulfilling obligations to the state and payment for hire of machines and tractors, seed, cattle-breeding expenses, rate of amortisation etc. represented the wages. They were paid in kind and (a smaller proportion) in money. This meant that variations in harvest yield were almost exclusively expressed by what was left for wages. In the first years of the colkhose system, members often received 2-3 kg of grain for a day's work; as their energy was not fully utilised in the colkhose and as the members of the family who were unable to work had also to live from these meager earnings, famine arose in the early thirties in Ukraine, bringing a great increase in the death-rate. Later, wages are said to have been raised but the Soviet statistics do not show whether the wages listed (15 kg and more per day) applied to entire Ukraine or to individual colkhoses. The incomes of the various colkhose members also varied, as administrative jobs were better paid than work in fields and stables, and as several members revealed "propriety instincts" for extending or exploiting their own small share at the expense of the common property.

132 AS A RULE, THE CLIMAC CONDITIONS IN THE NEW RUSSIAN GOUVERNMENTS are much less favourable than in left-bank and especially right-bank Ukraine. They become worse going from west to east: the region of Odessa has the most equable climate and the shores of the Azov Sea the worst of all. In the east rainfall is insufficient, attaining in good years 50–40 cm. and in bad years not exceeding 20 cm., while in central and southern Ukraine it is 80 cm. and 40 cm. respectively. There is, furthermore, in the New Russian Governments an unbalanced distribution of rainfall: the country suffers from a shortage of rain in the spring when it is most needed, and from violent downpours in the summer. The climate of New Russia clearly inclines to aridity. In the old days the Black Sea steppes were covered for a short time in spring by a luxurious growth of high grass and wild flowers which disappeared in the following months. The steppe dries up completely during a period when the temperature reaches from 30° to 40° Centigrade and even the rain-storms of July and August cannot give new life to the parched ground. 241 Under such conditions field labour calls for special methods. The soil has to be ploughed deep, and great layers of earth have to be lifted—'the black fallow' which has not been dried out. The weak peasants' horses of the northern Ukraine are useless for such work. Ploughing in New Russia requires either two pairs of strong oxen or, better, mechanical traction. Before the last war, only wealthy landowners or agricultural colonies working on a co-operative basis could afford the latter method, which was introduced into New Russia as early as the end of the nineteenth century.

By force of circumstances farming in New Russia acquired quite a different character from that which had evolved in the historic countryside of old Ukraine: it even created a different landscape. 'Fruit-trees, especially cherry-trees, lend a charm to the Ukrainian landscape in the neighbourhood of Kiev and Poltava which recalls the rural landscapes of France. In New Russia, on the contrary, the lack of trees, the dryness of the climate, clouds of dust driven by the wind, lonely hamlets—all this goes to create an austere landscape which recalls rather the high plains of northern Castile. Only the endless cornfields with their undulating golden sea of wheat lend a [361] lyric note to these flat unwooded spaces. Villages there are not picturesque and in agricultural colonies practical considerations take precedence over the desire to beautify the environment. The houses, however, are more modern, more spacious and better built. Thatched roofs have given place to tiles or sheet-iron' (Brégy and Obolensky).

Wheat forms the basis of the agricultural wealth of New Russia. Before the last war, wheat covered 25 per cent of all the farmed

a large center as Dnieprodzerzhinsk had a nationalist mayor and a 186
nationalist editor.[48]

The extreme south, the coastal strip along the Black Sea and 36
the Sea of Azov, from Odessa to Osipenko (Berdianka), had had
a still shorter history of settlement than the area immediately to
the north. Best suited of all Ukrainian lands to large-scale wheat
farming with a small agricultural working force, it had a relatively
sparse rural population, very mixed ethnically, with many Ger-
man villages and some districts of Russian majority. The cities
were still more heterogeneous, with Ukrainians forming a small
minority in the larger ones, according to the census of 1926.

The study of conditions in this area is seriously hampered by 727
the fact that the western third fell to Rumanian-occupied Trans- 573
nistria. To prepare the way for the annexation of Transnistria,
and, in addition, to gratify the desire of high officials for loot and
profiteering, the Rumanians sent in a large number of their own
administrators.[49] Since the rather backward Moldavians com-
prised only a small proportion of the total population, one of the
Slavic elements had to be tolerated. Believing that German vic-
tory would lead eventually to the creation of an independent
Ukraine, which would inevitably demand the land west of the
Dniester as an irredenta, the Rumanians favored the Russians;
the position of Russian nationalist elements in Odessa resembled
that of the Mel'nyk group in Kiev and Zhitomir before their sup-
pression by the Germans. Russian was an official language, along
with Rumanian and German; a Russian theater was opened;
several Russian publications were started.[50] The guiding organ-
ization of the Russians was a group called the Union of Russian
Officers, which had the St. George cross as its emblem and evi-
dently was strongly tsarist in its ideology.[51] It is said to have main-
tained contacts with émigré groups in Serbia and elsewhere and
to have refused cooperation with the Vlasov movement.[52] At any

[48] Interview 10; *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, June 14, 1942, p. 7.

[49] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, February 7, 1943, p. 1, based on a Zentraleuropa agency report.

[50] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 17, 1943, p. 3; Interview 18; Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 122.

[51] Clandestine publication from Odessa region previously cited.

[52] *Ibid.*; Interview 18.

161 population in the two zones, the character and origin of this density are not the same.

162 361 The density in Zone 1 is characterized by an agrarian over-population, resulting from a long feudal period and the servitude of the lands. The population is concentrated there in a large number of hamlets, in small towns and in small villages, the inhabitants adding to their agricultural revenues those of artisans, of small commerce, and of small industries.

There is almost a complete absence of large towns. Actually the whole of Zone 1, within Soviet boundaries, contains only one town whose population exceeds 100,000—Kiev, the administrative capital of the Ukraine (625,000 inhabitants).

Even if one adds Polish Galicia to this territory, as it is wholly part of Zone 1, we find only one other big town—Lvov, with 325,000 inhabitants, an administrative and cultural centre.

In Zone 2 on the contrary, we find three big towns: Kharkov (650,000 inhabitants), Odessa (550,000 inhabitants), and Dniepropetrovsk (375,000 inhabitants).

Apart from these three large towns, Zone 2 possesses a further four towns whose population exceeds 100,000: Nicolaiev, Mariupol, Zaporojie, and Lougansk.

The greater part of Zone 2 is a land of recent colonization. It is the New Russia and the free Ukraine, colonized during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Great Russian and Ukrainian elements.

The agricultural population is of a lesser density, and if the average number which expresses it is the same for the whole territory as for Zone 1 this is only a result of the greater number of large towns.

162 It would not be useless to point out that before the last war Odessa with her 700,000 inhabitants was the largest town of the Ukraine. But since the beginning

[see category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

On the contrary, in Zone 2 the absence of trees, the 137
drier climate, the dusty soil, and the isolated farms make the landscape more severe and more similar to the barren table-land of Northern Castile. Only the immensity of the cornfields with their golden ears introduces a lyrical note, vision-like, into this flat and treeless country. The villages of the Steppe are not 361
very picturesque and look mostly like colonies in which 342
the spirit of calculation dominates over the care of beauty. The habitations here are more modern, bigger, and better planned. The thatch here gives place to tiles and to corrugated iron. On the other hand, the poor people, deprived of wood, live in primitive hovels built of clay.

In the extreme north, in the forest region with its 133
sandy soil, the picturesque landscapes gradually disappear to resume the severe and sad monotony of the White Russian country-side.

The Ukrainian is very adaptable to civilization, that 181
is to say to the improvement of everyday life, and very quickly adopts all practical inventions, without any spirit of routine.

The Ukraine is the most literate part of Russia. Even 212
Soviet statistics, which cannot be assumed to be well disposed to the Tsarist regime, show that the percentage of the generation which was of a school age in 1914, which could read and write was, in 1923, 90 per cent in the towns and 73 per cent in the country, which, by the way, is a vigorous reply to the generally accepted opinion that in the pre-war Russian Empire the population stagnated in a condition of utter ignorance.

In the other parts of European Russia the percentage for the same generation was respectively 82 per cent in the towns and 57 per cent in the country-side.

It seems to us opportune to give an idea of the Ukraine 000

7 [See category 116, pp. 139-140. --- Analyst]

It seems to us opportune to give an idea of the Ukraine
361 by describing the urban populations which are, from the point of view of European town life, to a great extent among the best organized Russian towns.

The most European town is Odessa. Founded at the end of the eighteenth century, it has broad and straight avenues and streets bordered by plane trees and acacias and built according to a plan, very well paved, with the most perfect modern drainage systems, with very comfortable houses, and finally with its port which is constructed in accordance with the technically most advanced principles. Odessa can easily compete with the great European towns of the same importance. It is curious that the first governors of Odessa, who have done much for the embellishment of the town, were two French *émigrés*, the Duc de Richelieu and the Comte de Langeron, whose names have been given to two
[874] important streets. The University of Odessa, called that of New Russia, has been the cultural centre not only of the southern region of the Ukraine but it also attracted the young people of the Crimea and the Caucasus. Its great commercial activity, its external night life, and its
[162] cosmopolitan population, having 43 per cent Jews, 42 per cent Russians (Great Russians and Ukrainians), 6 per cent Greeks, 3 per cent Germans, 2 per cent Poles, 3 per cent Italians, Armenians, Georgians, Tartars, and others, gave it before the Revolution the appearance of a Mediterranean city.

Kharkov, also a University town, is to-day a European city, but, unlike Odessa, it owes its modern appearance to the Soviet regime. During fifteen years it had been the capital of the Ukraine and it has taken advantage of this position by completely changing its appearance which, before the last war, was very poor.

Kiev is a picturesque town lying on the hills of the right bank of the Dnieper. It is undoubtedly the most

attractive town not only of the Ukraine but of the whole 361
of Russia. Its magnificent public gardens amaze the visitors. It is excelled by Odessa from the point of view of town organization but excels it by far from the æsthetic point of view. Its [2]University of St. Vladimir and its [874]
Polytechnic School enjoyed a great reputation in Russia.

Among the other towns with a European appearance one can mention Nicolaiev, the port at the mouth of the Boug; Vinnitza, the capital of Podolia, and to-day perhaps Dniepropetrovsk, which has the School of Mines, founded some years before the Great War. These cities have modern public buildings, up-to-date railway stations, good networks of tramways, etc.

In the domain of the organization and the appearance of the towns and the houses, the difference between Zone 1 and [2]2 is great. In Zone 1 the country-side is better organized and possesses better roads, while the telephone system had appeared there before the last war, etc. On the other hand the towns which, as we have already shown, are almost all small, can hardly be called such at all.

The towns of Zone [2]2 are new towns which have had the benefit of modern organization, while the country-side still has a colonial appearance, without roads, with numerous isolated hamlets and farms, far removed from each other.

Now a few words about the ethnical composition of 162
the population of the Ukraine. The most important 563
minorities living on Ukrainian territory are the following:

First of all the Great Russians; workers, officials, and some colonists in the eastern and southern parts, especially in the New Russia. Then the Jews, very numerous (about 2,500,000), almost all traders, artisans, or members of the free professions before the Revolution; to-day employees in commerce, in the State co-operatives

[2] [Kiev--Analyst]
[2] [see category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

11: Obermaier--13 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Podolia] [Volhynia]

everyone else from among our ranks. 000

Before the First World War it was said of 101
Podolia, which you will reach if you wander farther 181
north and which lies like a plateau over the Dniestr 311
Valley, that bread grows on fence posts there,
/Facing page 16: Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. [000]
View of the lower part of the city/; /Facing page
17: The old fortress of Feodosiya on the Crimea/;
/17/ and that the fences are woven out of sausages. For the first time there lies before you an immeasurable sea of surging grain. Not a house far and wide, rarely a small wood. A groundless, dusty field road, surprisingly seems to lead into empty space, but where you think it ends, it leads you straight as a die, by means of steep turns into one of those deep valleys which the rivers in the course of thousands of years have carved into the plateaus. Down there the Podolians build their loam huts, the whitewashed walls of which have already greeted you from a distance through the green of the plum and cherry trees. If you follow the river upstream, it will more and more often lead you around ponds, marshes and swamps the nearer you come to its sources. You will see more storks than you have ever seen before in your life.

Almost imperceptibly you will reach Volhynia, 101
the western part of which belonged to Poland up to 491
1939, but was subject to the czar before that. You 361
will notice this immediately by the lack of good roads. For, as everywhere in former Czarist Russia, there are only a few paved roads, but all the more are there roads on which in dry weather you sink into the dust and in wet weather into mud. You will 361
notice it also by the cities and towns which are even dirtier and more neglected than those of Galicia. You are in the midst of the ghettos of the world. These cities are a jumble of houses, "with an ugly traffic artery in the middle". They are spread out with a total absence of form, as though they had been

[For plates, cf. pp. 215-216, category 116 - Analyst]

11: Obermaier--14 J-3(no date)1942 KDl Ukraine KDl
[volhynia]

361 tossed down on the land, without any relationship to it. "The absence of public buildings alone had [342] a depressive effect. These wooden huts on a slope, supported by stakes as though by high stilts, seemed merely to have been set down as chance would have it, less secure and permanent than nomad tents which the next day perhaps might already be taken down again. It scarcely seemed worthwhile to lay out a few roadways provisionally. For the rest, there was not a trace of a city plan, of a systematizing, architectural hand. Everything seemed temporary and unfinished, simply amassed, never shaped. The expression "shanty town" applied in a special /18/ sense to these places. Our criteria of beautifully compact city plans do not apply. Never concentrated within the area most difficult to attack, never held together by walls and moats, these Russian clusters of houses and courtyards which can scarcely be called cities any more, gradually become lost in the distance, without shape or outline: mirror images of the landscape that bears them, of the language that echoes in them, of the way of thinking of the people they house." (9)

9. Tintrup: War in the Ukraine, pages 23 and 24.

101 If you would now turn east in the direction
361 of Kiyev, you would come through numerous rambling
563 villages with streets. They contain attractive farms where until recently you would have been warmly welcomed with German sounds. The Volhynia Germans lived here. But you continue northward
101 until the Volhynia plateau with a gradual incline
133 sinks into the Polesian swamps. You avoid this marsh land by turning northeast, and thus come to the extreme northwest tip of the Ukrainian area of settlement, Podlakhia, whose waters flow toward the Baltic. The primeval forests of Bila Vesha are gloomy, but even more gruesome are the deep

505 the mercantile fleet which it carried was, even long before the war, as large as the total mercantile tonnage of the Austro-Hungarian fleet.
346 Even from far off you will see on the hills of the city lying on the right bank the strange cupolas of the Byzantine churches and monasteries. Kiyev was formerly the "Rome of the East", and even today it is the "mother of all Russian cities". Hundreds of thousands of devout pilgrims
788 annually visited the famous cave monastery of Pecherska Lavra, the cathedral of St. Sophia, the Golden Gate and other sacred spots.[1]

133 The churning steamer which you again board in the sprawling, pounding and shrieking harbor section[1] will take you farther downstream. On the west bank the high plateau of the Dniepr Plain rises steeply. If you should wander over this undulating hill country with its fields of wheat and sugar beets, you would see everywhere the traces of Ukraine's past: mighty grave mounds of nomad chieftains, and embankments with which in early times the Ukrainian people protected themselves against Asiatic brigands. /20/ To the left of the stream, in the east, you see nothing but wild thickets of reeds, dense, impenetrable green meadows behind which the Dniepr Plain is hidden.
361 You would find villages there[2] which have as many inhabitants as a medium-sized city and which equal a metropolis in surface area. However, they have remained villages in which peasants live on their homesteads; it is almost a day's journey to their fields. Khar'kov, a small Cossack hamlet in the seventeenth century, and today the second largest city of the Ukraine, is situated on the eastern edge of this plain.

133 In Dniepropetrovsk where formerly the rapids began, you turn eastward, friend, and now reach the steppes. The earth which is swept bare by the eternal east wind and by the dust storms, is completely naked as soon as you ascend the Donets

[1] [i.e. In Kiev — Analyst]
[2] [i.e. In the Dniepr Plain — Analyst]

harbor! Some kurgany were opened and Scythian princes were found who had taken with them under the earth a retinue of more than 200 riders on horseback and in full armor.

You must not overlook the Crimean Peninsula, the Tauris of the Greeks! You pass through a narrow isthmus and find yourself on the Peninsula. Gradually the steppe mounts up to the Yaila Range from the peaks of which daring roads climb down the steep coast to the blue-green Black Sea. Crimea, ancient land of the Tatar! Christ was driven out of the Ukraine; but Mohammed has entrenched himself under the flat roofs of these Tatar villages and cities, in order to receive the prayers of his believers when the sun flames up over the Caucasus or sinks across Bessarabia. Thus southern Crimea with its Tatars, its marble palaces of past Russian grandeur, its groves of olives, mulberries and figs, and its Bolshewik sanatariums, leads a special existence which, in its timeless diversity, will affect you strangely.

The mouth of the Dniepr is behind you and Odessa lies in front of you. Catherine II, the great colonizer, erected this city on the bare ground of the steppe. The yellow shell-limestone coast drops steeply into the sea. Straight as a die, quite after the modern European pattern, the third largest city of Ukraine /22/ is laid out. You will miss trees and parks and perhaps you will say it is a cold heap of stones. You forget that Odessa in summer does not have enough water for its inhabitants to drink. The earth is saline and rain extremely sparse.

There are still fifty kilometers separating you from the Rumanian border. Beyond the Dniestr you are on Bessarabian soil, and here, too, you will meet Ukrainians. Travel up the imperceptibly rising Bessarabian plain between the Dniestr and the Prut, in the course of which you repeatedly touch on Rumanian soil, and you will reach green Bukovina where the hospitable Huzul will present

562 tical than her husband. She cares for the family as an entity, /133/ which is why Ukrainian common law knows no divorce. The so-called mother's inheritance which may not be touched by her husband is proof, it is said, of her material independence. In critical moments of his life the man consults with his wife or his mother. It is said that the Ukrainian woman has a considerable share in the development of the new Ukrainian nationalism. As early as the turn of the century the women's periodical Rodnij Krai (place of publication Poltava) contained demands for a purification of the nation and the race from foreign elements; the racial unity of the Ukrainians was particularly emphasized. (81)

81. Yuriy Lypa: "The Ukrainian Woman" in Die Frau, April 1938.

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•361 About the villages of the Russians and the Ukrainians Shevchenko wrote in his Turkestan diary - he kept it hidden in his boot tops - that the Russian, in contrast to the Ukrainian, is born with a dislike of everything green. "A village of Great Russia, according to a statement of Gogol, is a heap of rough beams piled one on top of the other, with black holes in place of windows, surrounded by eternal dirt and eternal winter. There is not a single green twig to be seen. Behind the village there extend impenetrable forests - but it seems as though the village had purposely crept out of this impenetrable garden onto the highway and spread out in two rows along the road, built inns and on the village square a little church and a pub, and that was all it needed. Such an antipathy against the beauties of nature is inconceivable. How different the Ukraine! The white friendly little houses in town and city nestle in

•361 the shadows of cherry and mahaleb trees. There every poor farmer adorns his dwelling with lovely, ever-smiling nature..."

Where there is no local building commission, where the street finds its own way, where the four corner posts of a house are set in humus, where no cellar is dug, there/134/the houses and villages grow out of the ground willfully like mushrooms. These are the cluster villages. The villages built in rows with streets are found in the newly settled regions of the Ukrainian steppes and the Kuban. In this new country the Ukrainians, [369] who otherwise love villages, also live on isolated farms. In the north and along the rivers they build wooden houses, and in the steppes, houses of loam. Even in the cities stone houses are rare. Flowers, hollyhocks and sunflowers are to be found in front of every cottage. As a rule, the Ukrain-342 ian farmhouse has two to three rooms. Whether it houses a poor family or a rich one, the ground plan is always the same; only the size varies. There is the vestibule with the summer kitchen and one half of the stove that extends through the wall; the other half stands in the large livingroom where cooking takes place in the winter, where the family lives, where they receive guests and where everyone sleeps. Then there is also a small storage chamber. The furnishings of the large room are simple and clean: there is a bench running all the way around the large, decorated clay stove and around the room; a rough table and a few chairs stand in the corner, also a sleeping platform for the parents, and a chest. Many icons, "the gods", decorate the wall. Since the barns are very primitive and draughty, a new-born calf or a young lamb that needs warmth is sometimes brought into the room when the winters are cold.

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000 Seventeen ingredients are supposed to go into

642 On one-sixth of the world all the treasures within the earth and all that grows on top of it belong to the workers, as well as all mines, factories, and means of communication. The workers distribute the goods, they make the laws, determine the working hours, wages and prices; they also establish the deductions from wages and salaries and make out the taxes. Everyone must work, there are no persons of independent means and no capitalistic employers who can fatten on profits. The workers are the sovereign lords in the Soviet Union, and nothing prevents them from enjoying the enormous wealth of their country. Stalin had this theory in mind when he stated in his introduction to the new constitution in November 1936: "... in the field of political economy of the Soviet Union we now have a new socialistic economy which knows no depressions and no unemployment, no misery and no profit, and which grants its citizens every possibility for a life of comfort and civilization."

According to this definition, life in the Ukraine should be the most attractive; here is the country richest in natural resources in eastern Europe, with a pleasant, sunny climate. The raw
B5 materials are happily balanced and are found within favorable distances between each other. There is coal, iron ore, manganese ore, water power, oil, turf, salt, potassium salts, phosphate and kaolin. There is lacking, with the exception of a certain amount of mercury and nickle, only colored metals.

●361 /160/ The exploitation of Ukrainian natural resources is comparatively recent. The Englishman Hughes John established industry in the 1870s in the Donets region, and shortly thereafter Frenchmen and Belgians founded the ore industry near Krivoy Rog. The present-day industrial cities developed from the barracks of the first workers'
000 settlements. The tremendous increase in popula-

11: Obermaier--170 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

464 The tremendous increase in popula-
361 tion which the Ukraine showed after the liberation of peasants in 1861 found employment in the growing industry and in railroad construction, insofar as the surplus population did not prefer emigration to Siberia and eastern Asia. When there was less work on the farms, the farmers and farmers' sons traveled into the industrial regions, only to return to their villages at planting and harvest time. Thus a stock of Ukrainian industrial workers could not be formed; foreign Russian manpower immigrated and remained for good. In 1918 and 1919, when the Muscovite Bolsheviks broke into the Ukraine and the Russian industrial workers reinforce their ranks, the absence of a Ukrainian industrial working class was to make itself disastrously felt.

316 The world thinks of the Ukraine more as a granary than as asource of valuable raw materials. And yet, there are considerable treasures buried in Ukrainian soil. The reserve of iron ore in the Ukraine is the third largest in the world. At Krivoy Rog, 250 kilometers northeast of Odessa, according to the latest calculations there are deposited 1.25 billion tons of high percentage Bessemer ores (60 to 61% iron content) and also considerable quantities of ferruginous quartz. In Kerch on the easternmost spur of the Crimean Peninsula there are 2.7 billion tons of phosphorous ores with an iron content of 38 to 42%, and in the northern Caucasus there are smaller deposits. The following table shows the importance of Ukrainian ore extraction for the Great
439 Russian realm: /Facing page 160/ /Map XI: Iron Ore and Steel Export from the Soviet Ukraine (Average 1927/1928). The Ukraine was the great source of steel for the industrial works around Moscow and Leningrad./ /161/

316

	Iron Ore Extraction in million tons		
	1913	1932	1935
Krivoy Rog.....	6388	7925	16,594

433 tion of factories and dwellings is therefore held up and interrupted. Building costs rise a great deal... The shortage of bricks is increased by the fact that the bricks that are delivered are to a large extent useless. The imperfection comes to 25 to 30 percent by the time the bricks are laid. But even these bricks that are laid do not as a rule measure up to the prescribed
361 durability test." (130) In the finished settle-

130. Quoted by Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in This Way, page 26.

ments life is described thus in Visti, January 10th, 1939: "The settlement of Rudchenkovo in the Donbas has changed its aspect completely under the Soviet government. Large sections of many-storied houses have arisen and streets with lights and 10,000 square meters of asphalt sidewalks. Street car tracks were laid which connect the settlement with the center of the city of Stalin. There is also a bus connection here; the water system was improved, and the building of the cultural center for miners of the Donbas was erected aswell as a polyclinic, schools, clubs and shops. Nevertheless: 1. For three years now there have been talks in the district councils of the region and even in the regional executive committee about the opening of a sales center for heating material; 2. in /179/ Rudchenkovo a bath house does not yet exist; 3. the street car stop is out on the open steppe one-half mile from the clinic, and there is not even a small shelter at the car stopl 4. there is no public pharmacy; 5. lighting in the houses is unsatisfactory - the electrical plants have almost generally become useless; 6. there is no dairy; 7. there is no shop for children's goods; 8. the book business is very poorly organized. - The leaders of the trust 'Stalin Coal' and of the district council

361 of Kirovsk must finally take note of the needs of the workers and do away with the inadequacies which constitute the dark side of the tremendous economic development of the population of Rudchenkovo."

Soviet bureaucracy is working with unbelievable assiduousness on city planning. The building plan of Rostov, for example, according to Izvestiia of August 5th, 1937, had been under construction for eight years at that time, and the reconstruction plan of Nizhne-Tagilak, a small city in the Urals, is a book of 10,000 pages. The men who drew up the reconstruction plan of Gor'kiy must have been Stakhanov bureaucrats, for its pages are no longer numbered but - weighed; and it weighs two tons.

433 It sounds somewhat exaggerated when the Moscow Review of June 3, 1937, maintains that the Five Year Plans determine the course of future Soviet economy "with the accuracy of a time table". Not the only reason why these time tables cannot be adhered to is after all the fluctuation of the workers, which, in turn, is caused by the shortage of food and housing. Along with many other journals, 'Za Industriializatsiiu' of August 23rd, 1937, confirms the fact that the workers suffer considerable wage deficits because of the disorganization of Soviet economy: "The large companies of heavy industry are suffering from a great scarcity of oxygen. Thus, for example, the Martin furnaces of the plant 'Red October' in Stalingrad had to be allowed to go out because of lack of oxygen. /180/ A similar situation occurred in quite a number of other Soviet cities such as Khar'kov, Dnepropetrovsk and Rostov. In front of the oxygen factory of Khar'kov there are a great many trucks waiting every day, in order to get at least a few bottles of oxygen. This factory is extremely inefficient, which can in part be traced back to the frequent interruptions caused by accidents. Thus the Khar'kov plant was idle 28 percent

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WORKERS' SETTLEMENT NEAR KRIVOY ROG

I INTRODUCTION

101 The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (the Ukraine) is one of the U.S.S.R.'s sixteen constituent Union Republics. Situated in the south-western corner of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine is bordered on the south by the Black and Azov Seas and the Crimea (part of Russia); its western border touches the frontiers of Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as well as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Towards the north the Ukrainian S.S.R. verges on two other Soviet Republics: Byelorussia and Russia; and it is the Russian neighbourhood of the Don river which forms the Ukraine's eastern border.

101 135 In economic development and in population the Ukraine is second greatest of the Soviet Republics. It has a fertile soil, a mild humid climate, and is rich in deposits of coal, oil, iron, manganese and salts, as well as in building materials. It has four main rivers: the Dnieper (third largest in Europe), the Dniester, the Bug, and the Donets (a tributary of the Don), which are navigable and are also useful reservoirs of power.

433 162 Before 1941 the Ukraine contained more than one-fifth of the inhabitants of the entire Soviet Union. Its industry produced 54 per cent. of the coal, 60 per cent. of the pig iron, 48 per cent. of the steel, and 35 per cent. of the manganese ore turned out in the whole U.S.S.R.; it manufactured railway engines and cars, tractors, turbines, harvester combines, and mining and agricultural machinery for all parts of the Soviet Union. "It also produced artificial fertilizers, soda, glass and cement. The output of the sugar, meat-packing, flour-milling, distilling, and dairy industries reached great dimensions. Fishing was developed in the Black Sea and Azov Sea. The Dnieper Power Station, ● 361 the largest in Europe, was famous throughout the world. The cities of the Ukraine, both old and new, developed rapidly; during the past 25 years 77 new cities and 285 industrial settlements were built."[1]

241 Agriculture also was highly developed. In 1937-38 Ukrainian farms accounted for nearly one-fifth of the grain, one-sixth of the potatoes, and two-thirds of the sugar beet produced in the Soviet Union. The Ukraine also had a large proportion of the total Soviet Union livestock. Millions of head of cattle, pigs, sheep, and poultry were raised. Ukrainian agriculture was highly mechanized; before the war there were 90,000 tractors and 31,000 harvesting combines operating in the fields.

Area and Population

131 In January 1939 the Ukrainian Republic had an area of about 469,700 square kilometres including 8,000 square kilometres in its

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1 The Sixteen Soviet Republics, Soviet News, London, 1945.

728 178 The progress in construction and rehabilitation which has taken place since the incorporation of this region into the Ukraine was revealed at a meeting of the Soviet of Nationalities on October 16, 1946, when the representative of the Transcarpathian Ukraine summed up the achievements in 1946. Nearly 300 enterprises had been restored, and nine machine and tractor stations had been set up to assist the peasants in working [212 the fields. Much had been done in 1946 to abolish illiteracy; there 871] were opened over 100 schools, including 75 elementary, seven technical, 27 secondary, four music schools for children, and one school for surgeons' assistants and midwives.

433 At the end of December it was stated that 35 new factories had started functioning in the Transcarpathian Region in 1946[1]. Moreover, as compared with 1945 when there was not a single coal mine, 8 mines were working in 1946. There had also been definite progress in building up consumer goods industries. A clothing and a shoe factory had begun working in Vinogradov, and a knitted goods mill in Mukachevo. Some 200 light industries have been opened in various parts of the region.

Population of the Ukraine

162 The Ukraine is inhabited largely by Ukrainians, and also by Russians, Jews, and Poles. Most of the population is literate, and in 1939 there were many technical and vocational schools, as well as scientific research institutes and about 40,000 libraries.

At the census of January 17, 1939 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had 30,960,221 inhabitants; an increase of 6.6 per cent. as compared with December 1926. The greatest increase had occurred in the towns, largely as a result of the migration of country people to new industries. Thus from 1926 to 1939 the urban population more than doubled (5,373,553 to 11,195,620) while the number of rural inhabitants decreased by 16½ per cent. (23,669,381 to 19,764,601).

000 The same was true for the entire Soviet Union. From 147,027,915 in December 1926, its total population increased by 15.9 per cent. to 170,467,186 in January 1939, the urban population having grown from 26.3 million to 55.9 millions; and the rural population having fallen from 120.7 million to 114.5 million.

162 The principal cities of the Ukraine with their population on [361] January 17, 1939, are Kiev, the capital (population, 846,293), Kharkov, capital of the Ukraine before 1934 (833,432), the part of Odessa on the Black Sea (604,223), Dniepropetrovsk on the Dnieper River (500,662), Stalino, industrial centre of the Donets Basin (462,395), and Nikolayev (167,108).

In January 1939 the urban population of the Ukraine was 36.2 per

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, December 29, 1946.

727 [231] Seven and a half million head of cattle, 3.3 million horses, 9.3 million pigs, 7.3 million sheep and 59.4 million fowls were killed or taken away[1]. The invaders also stole from the collective farms and from private citizens of the Ukrainian S.S.R. over 12 million tons of farm products, including 9½ million tons of grain and flour[2].

The rehabilitation and rebuilding of liberated areas began at once whilst the war was still on; but although the Ukrainian S.S.R. received great assistance from other republics of the Soviet Union, it must be borne in mind that important economic regions of other republics of the Soviet Union were also devastated by the war.

According to the report on material damage issued by the U.S.S.R.'s Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes of the German-Fascist Invaders, the damage caused to the national economy of the U.S.S.R. and to the individual residents of villages and towns is estimated at more than 679,000 million roubles in terms of 1941 prices.

The damage to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic alone is estimated at 285,000 million roubles[3].

Thus according to the statement of the Soviet State Commission, the damages to the Ukrainian S.S.R. are about 40-42 per cent. of the total damages to the Soviet Union.

Damage caused to the Ukraine by the German invasion is estimated by the Ukrainian Paper Suchasne I Maibutne (Present and Future) at 100,000 million dollars[4].

Destruction of Ukrainian Cities

727 361 Following are summaries of the destruction which occurred in some of the most important of the Ukraine's cities.

Kiev (Population in 1939: 846,293).

According to the report of the Extraordinary State Commission, the material damage caused by the German invaders in Kiev was as follows:

They destroyed 940 buildings of state and public institutions and

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Letter from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

3 Soviet News, London, September 18, 1945.
(The official exchange value in March 1947 was 5.40 roubles equal one U.S. dollar; 21.36 roubles equal one pound sterling).

4 Soviet Monitor, TASS (Soviet News Agency) London, July 11, 1946.

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[368] The very important railway junction Kiev-Darnitza was destroyed with all its tracks, equipment, and installations as well as all station buildings and the depot at the station Kiev I.

City of Kharkov (Population in 1939: 833,432).

In connection with the third anniversary of the liberation of Kharkov, "the second capital of the Ukraine", the following figures on destruction and the extent of rehabilitation have been made known.

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361 space. The Germans destroyed about half of all the flats. In the three years since liberation, six million square feet of housing floor
362 space have been restored. The people of Kharkov have also restored 293 big plants and factories, including the famous tractor works, an electro-mechanical plant, a turbo-generator works and machine tool, and agricultural implements and other plants[1].

Dniepropetrovsk (Population in 1939: 500,662).

In this city 30 per cent. of the homes, 80 per cent. of the industry, and 70 per cent. of schools and other cultural institutions were destroyed. The UNRRA Mission reports that reconstruction has been very slow, and is hampered by shortages of food, shelter and equipment. In 1946 many of the residents of Dniepropetrovsk were still living in huts contrived of straw and clay, under a tar paper roof.

Kremenchug (Population in 1939: 89,553).

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946.

727 first visited Kremenchug, they reported it as over 90 per cent.
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Poltava (Population in 1939: 130,305).

In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission reported Poltava about 80 per cent. destroyed. "About 100,000 of the inhabitants have returned and are living under conditions only slightly better than Kremenchug. On the main street only one building is intact. The Mayor estimated that reconstruction would take at least fifteen years. The locomotive repair shop and a stocking factory are the only industries operating two years after liberation."

Other Cities

In Zaporozhie (population in 1939: 289,188) 75 per cent. of the homes and virtually all industry were destroyed[1]. Stalino, the industrial and mining centre of the Donets Basin, has been described as a shadow of its former self. Its pre-war population was 510,000. During the war about 100,000 of the people were driven into slavery by the Germans. Another 80,000 men, women, and children were thrust into one of the mines to die. Seventy-five per cent. of all the buildings in the city were destroyed; and of these only 30 per cent. were in a condition to be restored. All the mines in the area were flooded; and from one pit alone over 3,300,000 tons of water had been pumped by August 1946[2].

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2 Soviet News, London, August 22, 1946.

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The U.S.S.R.'s Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

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[652] The new Five-Year Plan provides that nearly one-third of the capital investments for the entire Soviet Union in 1946-50 (49,500 million roubles out of a total of 250,300)[2] are to be spent on the restoration of the Ukraine. Of this 49,500 million, 5,469 million will be used for works under the Ukrainian Republic's jurisdiction.

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1 First Five-Year Plan, 1929-32; second, 1933-37; third, 1938-42.

2 Estimated at 1945 prices.

727 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport
433 are to be rebuilt; the mining of coal is to regain and then to outstrip the pre-war output; the production of machinery and equipment for both light and heavy industry is to be restored; and to do this, iron and steel production is to be increased until it surpasses pre-war. War damaged power stations are to be rehabilitated, and additional ones are to be constructed, particularly in smaller communities.

[185] Altogether the output of industrial enterprises in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is envisaged at 9,200 million roubles, of which the output of state industries under local jurisdiction and of industrial co-operatives is estimated to comprise 3,100 million roubles[1].

The volume of industrial production in the whole U.S.S.R. in 1950 - that is, the last year of the Five-Year Plan - is fixed at 205,000 million roubles (in 1926-27 prices). Compared with 138,500 million roubles in 1940, this represents an increase in industrial output of 48 per cent.

727 Particular stress in the Five-Year Plan is laid on the development
433 of the Western Ukraine and the Transcarpathian Region. Lvov, the main
361 city of the Western Ukraine, is to be developed into a major industrial centre, where there are to be built and put into operation an automobile assembly plant, electrical, telephone, and telegraph-equipment manufacturing plants, a glass works, a knitting mill, and food processing plants.

In the Transcarpathian Region, new light industry plants are to be constructed, and the mining of brown coal (lignite) is to be organized and extended. Provision is to be made for the rehabilitation and development of the woodworking and wood chemical industries and of farming, particularly fruit-growing, viticulture, livestock breeding and apiculture, [652] as well as of the food processing industries. The farms of the Transcarpathian Region are to be given considerable state assistance in the form of agricultural machines, fertilizers, and credits.

000 A more detailed discussion of the Five-Year Plan in connection with farming and the various industries follows in later sections of this report.

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[475] It must be remembered that a number of enterprises although situated in the Ukrainian Republic are not under the Republic's jurisdiction, but under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union Government.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

292 531 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 574 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia. Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 471 563 464 241 In the southern part of the country life and people are different. Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hungarians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 655 438 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns, such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

361 341 The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

361/341 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river, to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162/563 There are at least four religions in Užhorod as well as in other Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of 135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits 317 of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Siatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317/263 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178/511/185 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation — all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744/164 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

mile. The Donbas shows a density of 260 to 890 per square mile, while the concentration of the population in certain industrial areas goes as high as 525 per square mile. In sharp contrast to these densely settled sections, the northern wooded area of the Poles'ye supports only 50 to 75 persons per square mile, and even less in the marshy portions. The southern steppes also show a density of only 95 to 130 per square mile.

Large villages form the most typical settlement pattern in the Ukraine. Rural population centers of as many as 15,000 or more inhabitants stretch along the river valleys or along dry ravines, where artificial ponds provide the water supply. In many instances villages merge into each other and form a continuous settlement many miles long. Surrounded by orchards and with white-washed, thatched mud huts scattered about in disorderly fashion, they often present a singularly charming appearance.

About one third of the population lives in urban centers. The Ukrainian SSR counts fifteen cities of over 100,000 inhabitants and more than forty cities with a population of over 50,000. The large centers lie mainly in the Donets Basin, along the Dnieper and the shores of the Black Sea, as well as in the western Ukraine.

The national composition of the population of the Ukraine is quite homogeneous. The Ukrainians constitute about 80 percent of the total. Among the more important minorities are the Russians, who live principally in the Donbas and in the northern section, the Belorussians in the northwest, Poles in the west, and Bulgarians in the southwest. Before the Second World War, Jews formed a considerable percentage of the urban population, especially in the right-bank towns and in the western Ukraine. A considerable number of Volga Tatars are also found in the Donets Basin.

The Ukrainians constitute the second most important national group in the USSR. Their language, their culture and their mode of life are closely related to those of the Russians. Long split among several powers, the Ukrainians were as late as the end of the eighteenth century under the rule of the Russians (left-bank Ukraine), of the Poles (right-bank Ukraine), and of the Turks (southern steppes). Shortly thereafter the major portion of the Ukrainian people came under Russian rule, but many still remained in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in Rumania. In 1917 the Ukrainian SSR was created, but it was not until the final annexations of territory from Poland (1939), Rumania (1940),

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RD1

Kiev Oblast

Area, 15,900, population, 3,500,000

SU 133* 241 U 133 241

Kiev Oblast lies in the Dnieper lowland (in the north) and in the Volyn'-Podolian upland (in the south). It is drained by the Dnieper and its right affluents, the Teterev and the Ros' rivers. In the northern section, which penetrates into the forested Poles'ye, the growing of flax, potatoes, and buckwheat are important. The rest of the oblast falls within the sugar economy. Truck produce in the Kiev metropoljtan area and orchards in the south, near Uman', and the southeast, near Smela, are important. Peat is worked mainly northwest of Kiev and near Smela, while lignite comes from Yurkovka near Zvenigorodka. Sugar mills abound throughout the center and the south; flour milling and distilling are other rural industries.

SU 361 438* U 361 438

Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR since 1934, was the third largest city of the USSR on the eve of the Second World War. Situated on the middle course of the Dnieper River, below the mouths of its two large affluents, the Pripet and the Desna, Kiev occupies a central location at the junction of the river, four rail trunk lines, and many highways. An ancient city and until the middle 13th century the capital of Kievan Russia, Kiev is the site of many historical relics and monuments. An early commercial and food-processing center, it developed into an industrial point of first rank under the Soviet regime. Its heavy industries produce machine tools, machines, motors, aircraft parts, boilers, agricultural implements, motorcycles, and bicycles, as well as equipment for chemical, sugar, and tanning industries. There are electrical (radios and telephones), textile, and food industries. A number of major enterprises, including lumber mills, a meat-packing plant, a rubber-goods factory, and railway-car works are located in the left-bank industrial suburb of Darnitsa. Shipyards produce vessels for the Dnieper River traffic. A natural-gas pipe line for industrial and domestic use was laid in the post-war period from Dashava.

Other major industrial centers of the oblast are Belaya Tserkov', south of Kiev, Uman' in the far south, and Smela and Cherkassy on the Dnieper in the southeast. They are primarily food-processing centers, with sugar and flour mills and metal, clothing, and leather industries.

727 by the German invaders in the Ukraine, and more than two million had been abducted to slavery in Germany. Of these so deported, a considerable number perished in captivity[1].

The figure of four million Soviet citizens murdered in the Ukraine does not clearly indicate whether all of them were Ukrainians or whether a certain percentage came from other parts of the Soviet Union. No figures have been revealed showing the number of the Ukrainians killed at the front against the German armies and their 162 666 satellites. However, a comparison of the pre-war and present electorate figures for the Ukraine gives some indication of the decrease, at least of the adult population. On December 12, 1937, the Ukrainian electorate was about 17,540,000; in 1939 this number was increased by the addition of Western Ukraine, which on March 24, 1940, had more than five million voters. But nearly seven years later, in the elections of February 1947, despite the fact that part of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Transcarpathian Ukraine also had been added, the total electorate in the Ukrainian S.S.R. was only 21,545,000.

Damages to Industry and Agriculture

727 433 The damage which the Germans inflicted on the industry and farming of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics was tremendous, and far exceeded any comparable destruction in Western Europe.

[362] In the Ukraine the Germans destroyed or burned down 714 towns and more than 28,000 hamlets and villages, destroyed more than two million buildings and 540,000 outbuildings, and rendered about 10 million persons homeless (one-fourth of the Ukrainian population)[2].

Agriculture, animal husbandry, and industry were devastated. The coal mines were flooded. Over 16,150 industrial enterprises employing more than two million workers were stripped of machinery and the buildings heavily damaged or destroyed. The Germans wrecked or took away 127,800 electric motors and 81,600 metal-cutting lathes, destroyed railway lines and stations, and post and telegraph offices[2].

727 433 241 Tremendous damage was done to Ukrainian agriculture. The Germans ruined and plundered collective farms, state farms and machine and tractor stations.

Millions of hectares of planned fields were destroyed and over 56,000 tractors wrecked. Nearly 1,900,000 agricultural machines and 30,000 automobiles and other motor vehicles were destroyed or taken to Germany[3].

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1 Soviet News, London, June 29, 1946.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

3 Letter to UNRRA from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

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874 U.S.S.R. increased by 3 million. Vocational schools and factory training centres graduated thousands of skilled workers, and improved the skill of several millions already employed.

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727 Of the districts which suffered occupation, economic rehabilitation
433 as well as capital construction amounting to 17,500 million roubles in
652 1946 made it possible to increase their industrial output by 28 per cent. as compared with 1945. Pravda writes - "the factories, mills, pits, power stations, towns and villages which were destroyed by the enemy are being revived one by one...."[1]

In the Ukraine

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727 The Ukraine has been likened to one big building site, where more
433 than 500,000 workers are engaged in restoring industrial plants and
327 municipal buildings.[2] In the Donets Basin, the coal output of 1946 was 30 per cent. higher than that of 1945. In the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, 21 blast furnaces, 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries were at work by January 1947. Of 104 machine-building factories to be restored, 102 were already producing goods, and mastering the production of improved types of machinery. The Kharkov transport machine-building works was preparing to build long-distance steam engines; and the tractor works was increasing its production, as were many other factories.

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727 In 1946 the Kharkov turbo-generator works made a 100,000 kilowatt
433 turbine and one of 50,000 kilowatts. At Dniepropetrovsk, a lorry
393 factory was being built; and in Odessa and Lvov, automobile assembly
398 works were under construction. Great work was also being done in the development of light industry, food processing, chemical works, and other branches of industry.

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727 After three years' work of restoration the Dnieper Dam had been
433 rebuilt in the main, and the housing for the power station erected.
377 By the end of 1946 the capacity of Ukrainian power stations had reached 70 per cent. of pre-war.

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● 362 Since the liberation over 104.5 million square feet of floor space
368 had been restored in the Ukraine. Over half a million of the 590,000 houses destroyed by the Germans were restored or built anew in Ukrainian villages; and more than 13,000 cultural institutions in the villages and 118,000 auxiliary buildings on the farms.[2]

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1 Pravda, quoted by Soviet News, London, January 22, 1946

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

Coal

316 433 The coal centre of the Ukraine is the basin of the Donets River, a tributary of the Don. In 1913 the Donets region was producing 80 per cent. of all the coal turned out in the entire Russian Empire. (23 million tons of the 29.2 million total); and even in 1940, when the production of other coal areas in the U.S.S.R. had been greatly expanded, and many new areas explored and put into operation, Donets mines still accounted for more than half the total output (83.8 million tons of the entire Soviet Union production of 164.6 million).

Since about 70 per cent. of all the fuel consumed in the U.S.S.R. is supplied by coal,[1] the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian coal industry is of tremendous importance to the economy of the Soviet Union.

727 316 It is now over three years since the Soviet Army drove the Germans out of the Donets Basin. Before their rout, the enemy flooded the mines and burned engineering plants, miners' settlements, and cities. Restoration work was started soon after the liberation of the Basin, but it was estimated that to restore coal output to the pre-war level it would be necessary to pump 650 million cubic metres of water out of the mines and to restore 1,565 miles of mine galleries.[2] Today, the towns of the Donets Basin are a mass of scaffolding, as war-devastated houses, buildings, and roads continue to be repaired. Mine derricks dot the landscape; and water is being pumped in a steady stream from the mine pits. At the Chelyuskin Mine which before the war was one of the biggest and best eqipped in the Donets, over nine million cubic metres of water had been pumped by the middle of December 1946; and about 20 miles of galleries had been restored. Coal output averaged a thousand tons a day.

By January 1947 about 142 major coal mines of the 279 operating prior to the war had been restored, and 430 smaller ones, rehabilitated or built anew, were in operation. Production was nearly half of pre-war.[3]

● [362] As regards housing for Donets workers, it is planned within the next five years not only to restore the houses demolished by the Germans, but also to build another 20 million square feet of housing space in the Donets Basin; in 1946 alone over four million square feet of floor [464] space had been reconstructed. Thousands of miners are being helped to build their own homes; and measures are being taken to increase their food supplies.

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1 Moscow Radio feature, "Sidelights on Soviet Life," cited in Soviet Monitor, London, January 29, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946

3 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947

132 49·3°. Drawbacks for agriculture in New Russia are the prevalence of north and east winds and an irregular and insufficient rainfall. The average rainfall at Yelisavetgrad is 17 in., at Odessa 16 in., at Lugansk 15 in., and at Nikolaev 14 in. The rains in April and May decide the harvest. June is the rainiest month, but from May to September there are droughts. Most places are largely dependent upon wells and ponds constructed in the ravines, which are frequent on the steppes.

The climate of the Ukraine, as a whole, is therefore continental, i. e. the variation between summer and winter temperatures is very great. Sudden variations of temperature are frequent. The rainfall is by no means abundant, and there is a progressive decline towards the south and south-east. The fact, however, that the bulk of the rainfall occurs in the summer favours agricultural operations, even where the annual amount of rainfall is comparatively low. It is only in New Russia that the country suffers seriously from drought.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

312 The Ukraine is very backward in regard to sanitary
314 conditions. Less than half the towns have a satisfactory water-supply, and a very small percentage of them a regular drainage system.

164 Typhoid, diphtheria, and malaria are very prevalent.
158 To the great majority of the people in the country, doctors are inaccessible, and even in the towns good hospitals and adequate medical attendance are very
515 rare. In the matter of cleanliness, however, the Little Russians compare favourably with the Great Russians.

(5) Race and Language

Race

162 The population of the Ukraine is composed of
563 a mixture of various races and nationalities, those chiefly represented being Little Russians, Poles, Jews,

727 361 ,742 municipally owned houses (more than 22 million square feet of housing space) and 3,600 privately owned houses comprising 5½ million square feet of space.

[361] As a result more than 200,000 inhabitants of Kiev have been made homeless.

The Germans gutted Kiev's industrial plants of their equipment and shipped it to Germany. They destroyed the buildings of industrial enterprises including the machine-building plants "Bolshevik" and "Red Excavator", which had supplied industry, agriculture and transport with machinery, implements, and spare parts.

They blew up the textile mills, a spinning and knitting mill, the Gorky clothing factory, the first, fourth and eighth shoe factories, and other plants; blew up, destroyed or burned down the electric-power stations, the trolley cars and trolley buses, the water supply system and the drainage system. They destroyed mechanized bakeries and other establishments.

[368] The very important railway junction Kiev-Darnitza was destroyed with all its tracks, equipment, and installations as well as all station buildings and the depot at the station Kiev I.

City of Kharkov (Population in 1939: 833,432).

In connection with the third anniversary of the liberation of Kharkov, "the second capital of the Ukraine", the following figures on destruction and the extent of rehabilitation have been made known.

727 361 362a Before the war Kharkov had 41 million square feet of housing floor space. The Germans destroyed about half of all the flats. In the three years since liberation, six million square feet of housing floor space have been restored. The people of Kharkov have also restored 293 big plants and factories, including the famous tractor works, an electro-mechanical plant, a turbo-generator works and machine tool, and agricultural implements and other plants[1].

Dniepropetrovsk (Population in 1939: 500,662).

In this city 30 per cent. of the homes, 80 per cent. of the industry, and 70 per cent. of schools and other cultural institutions were destroyed. The UNRRA Mission reports that reconstruction has been very slow, and is hampered by shortages of food, shelter and equipment. In 1946 many of the residents of Dniepropetrovsk were still living in huts contrived of straw and clay, under a tar paper roof.

Kremenchug (Population in 1939: 89,553).

In April 1946, when members of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946.

SU
464 The number of workers and employees in the national economy of the
874 U.S.S.R. increased by 3 million. Vocational schools and factory training centres graduated thousands of skilled workers, and improved the skill of several millions already employed.

SU
727 Of the districts which suffered occupation, economic rehabilitation
433 as well as capital construction amounting to 17,500 million roubles in
652 1946 made it possible to increase their industrial output by 28 per cent. as compared with 1945. Pravda writes - "the factories, mills, pits, power stations, towns and villages which were destroyed by the enemy are being revived one by one...."[1]

In the Ukraine

U
727 The Ukraine has been likened to one big building site, where more
433 than 500,000 workers are engaged in restoring industrial plants and
327 municipal buildings.[2] In the Donets Basin, the coal output of 1946 was 30 per cent. higher than that of 1945. In the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, 21 blast furnaces, 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries were at work by January 1947. Of 104 machine-building factories to be restored, 102 were already producing goods, and mastering the production of improved types of machinery. The Kharkov transport machine-building works was preparing to build long-distance steam engines; and the tractor works was increasing its production, as were many other factories.

U
727 In 1946 the Kharkov turbo-generator works made a 100,000 kilowatt
433 turbine and one of 50,000 kilowatts. At Dniopropetrovsk, a lorry
393 factory was being built; and in Odessa and Lvov, automobile assembly
398 works were under construction. Great work was also being done in the development of light industry, food processing, chemical works, and other branches of industry.

U
727 After three years' work of restoration the Dnieper Dam had been
433 rebuilt in the main, and the housing for the power station erected.
377 By the end of 1946 the capacity of Ukrainian power stations had reached 70 per cent. of pre-war.

U
362 Since the liberation over 104.5 million square feet of floor space
368 had been restored in the Ukraine. Over half a million of the 590,000 houses destroyed by the Germans were restored or built anew in Ukrainian villages; and more than 13,000 cultural institutions in the villages and 118,000 auxiliary buildings on the farms.[2]

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1 Pravda, quoted by Soviet News, London, January 22, 1946

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

259 During the last thirty or forty years, it is true, the
316 economic situation of the Ukraine has changed consider-
325 ably; three large industries have developed in the country:
651 the sugar industry, the mining and the metal industries. And one is tempted to say that this development was due to Russian protection. But is this quite correct? Undoubtedly the protection had some influence, but not as much as one might suppose. In the first place, one must not forget that in the Ukraine there are natural conditions much more favorable to these industries than in any other part of the Russian Empire. Certainly the sugar, metal and mining interests are among those which depend on the location of their raw materials and can never start in a place where these are lacking. Besides, these industries are infinitely more fostered by transportational advantages than by custom duties. The duties which were imposed on foreign coal did not prevent the importation of English coal into the Baltic provinces nor into Petrograd. On the other hand, even if all custom duties on foreign coal had been suppressed, it would never have penetrated into central Russia and there replaced the fuel of Donetz. As to the sugar, the situation in the Ukraine was perhaps even more favorable. As to metallurgy, it no doubt profited by the protective Russian tax. But there again the role of this tax was not very great. In fact, the products of Ukrainian metallurgy were heavy (rails, beams, tires, wheels, pipes, iron bars, etc.), and their manufacture was only slightly stimulated by the tax because of the great distances over which they had, in any case, to be carried. Protective tariff is much more necessary to those industries which supply finished products of light weight, but of these the Ukraine furnished very few. The textile industry of Moscow and of Poland profited much more by protection, as did many other branches of the industrial activities of central Russia.

Effect of Russian Imperial Methods in Ukraine

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241 Therefore, by this system, the Ukraine had more loss than profit. She was still a market for Russian and Polish industrial products, for which she paid high prices. But

for her own industry the Russian custom frontier gave her 369
insufficient protection; on the contrary, it rather reserved 241
the Ukrainian market to Moscow and Warsaw.

Consequently the industrial development of the Ukraine 369
was very slow. The agricultural population did not find 241
enough work in the towns, and, as a result, the surplus of 162
agrarian population increased every year. In some parts of the Ukraine this surplus population was more serious than in any other part of former Russia. In the central Ukrainian provinces the agrarian population reached 800 to 1,000 inhabitants per 1,000 hektares of arable land, while in France and Germany the average was about 500 inhabitants. There was nothing left for the Ukrainian popula- [67]
tion but to emigrate and colonize the lands of Siberia and of Central Asia. There was also a rather considerable movement of emigration towards America. The most fertile governments of the Ukraine furnished many more emigrants than the less fertile but more industrial regions of central Russia.

Emigration as a Possible Solution

As a consolation, it is pointed out that, in case of the 000
reunion of the Ukraine with Russia, the Ukraine will have in Siberia a field for emigration all ready. But that is very poor consolation. Can emigration satisfy any country? Are the Italians proud of sending many emigrants to America? Did the Germans have cause to feel flattered by increasing the trans-Atlantic emigration, before they developed their own industries?

Why, then, should it be the lot of the Ukraine to let her population emigrate to distant Siberia?

Why can she not develop her economic life in such a manner that all her people shall have work on their own soil? The Ukraine ought not to remain an outlet for the industrial work of the Russians and Poles when her own people cannot find any work at home.

But one might ask why no complaint has been heard up to the present, either from the Ukrainians engaged in industry or from those engaged in agriculture? Why did

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The proportion of farms managed by individuals decreased to less than 1 % of the entire agricultural area. The men employed at machinery and tractor centers, which seemed to attract all the mechanics required for the colkhose system, formed a privileged class. It depended on them whether an agricultural operation was carried through at the right time. This group was mainly composed of young people and non-Ukrainians. In 1934 some 797 600 were employed on the land and in forests in the Ukraine Soviet Republic. The Soviet officials, not so important numerically as on account of their influence, formed another group of the rural population. Finally, in the country districts there was a fairly large group of teaching and medical staffs and agricultural experts, mostly of Ukrainian peasant origin, as foreigners could not stand life in Ukrainian villages for long. 162 565

Urban population had a large percentage of foreigners, the main social groups being laborers in industry and commerce and the Soviet officials. The number of industrial laborers within the frontiers of the Ukraine Soviet Republic on January 1st, 1936 was 1 308 000. But this figure kept varying constantly, as many of the workers from country districts were not satisfied with conditions of life in the towns and changed jobs frequently or tried to get back home. The Soviet Government fought against these difficulties for years without being able to solve them. This group also included a great number of young people who grew up in post-war conditions. Their nationality varied; about half of the industrial proletariat in Ukraine was of Ukrainian origin. As a rule, material standards were not high. The average wage in 1934 amounted to 166.4 roubles a month, but this figure is not a clear indication of the individual's earning capacity as piece-work was general. In individual cases, where the Stakhanov system (whereby maximum output of labor was achieved) was introduced, higher than average wages were earned. In recent years real wages declined as a result of abolishing the cards which had entitled workmen to certain privileges in buying food and industrial products. Wage earners in Soviet business concerns were similarly situated to those in industrial plants but as the former were less important than the latter in the general scheme of Soviet economy, their develop- 162 369 465 434

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

different: 51 per cent and 49 per cent.' It is necessary to add that 433
Sadovsky includes in production intended 'for general use' in both periods the output of agricultural industry: i.e. sugar, spirits, flour and sunflower oil. If these figures for rural industry are excluded, those for so-called 'light industry' remain practically negligible. For example, only 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in U.S.S.R. are derived from the Ukraine; and there is no manufacture of cloth [288] or leather goods.

As Sadovsky justly remarks, the policy of exclusively encouraging 185
heavy industry has resulted in the neglect of the economic interests 433
of the western and central Ukraine. In effect, with the policy of industrializing eastern and south-eastern Ukraine, the Soviets have shown a tendency to de-industrialize the wide and rich western provinces. Here the basis of their policy is probably strategic as well as political. 'In a series of towns of right-bank Ukraine such as Zhitomir, Berdichev, Zhmerinka, Mohilev-Podolsk, Uman, Smela, signs of decadence can be observed during the period of the Five Year Plans.'

The 'Economic Plans' of the Soviet Government are subordinated to a general political policy which, as has been explained in the preceding chapter, aims at the complete fusion of the Soviet Ukraine with the rest of U.S.S.R.; and according to Communist theory political unity can only be based on economic fusion. In forcing the pace of the development of heavy industry in the south and south-east to the detriment of the light and agricultural industries of the rest of the country, the Moscow Government pursues two objectives. First, the importance of the Ukrainian national element in the Ukraine is reduced. 'The Ukrainian people are [369] •
an old people of agricultural civilization and have never shown any inclination for industrial work and life in big towns. The Ukrainian prefers the country if he can earn his living there, and if it is necessary he finds work in the different branches of rural industry' (Brégy and Obolensky). According to official Soviet statistics on [162]
the nationality of workers in the Ukraine, the coal industry employs 75 per cent Russians and 25 per cent Ukrainians; the metallurgical, 73 per cent and 22 per cent respectively; the building trades 56 per cent and 37 per cent (*The National Policy of the Russian Communist Party Expressed in Figures*, p. 177). About 50 per cent only of the people in the Donets region are Ukrainians, and among the urban population of the whole of Soviet Ukraine 70 per cent are not Ukrainians. In two big towns like Odessa and Kharkov only 25 per cent of the inhabitants are Ukrainians. The same phenomenon can be observed in centres like Mariupol and Lugansk. In this wise the

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

It is important to ascertain the number of Ukrainians who remain in the territory of S.S.R. Ukraine. According to Soviet statistics the urban population, amounting to 8,000,000, numbers only 30 per cent of Ukrainians. Among the rural population Ukrainians are in a majority, though they are not everywhere equally distributed: in some regions there are over 80 per cent; in others (like Odessa) 60 per cent; in the Donets rural areas a little over 50 per cent. In 1926, during the period of 'ukrainization' encouraged by the Government, 24,000,000 out of 30,000,000 registered as Ukrainians, but even 15 per cent of these 'native' Ukrainians gave their mother tongue as Russian. Since that date catastrophes have befallen the rural folk of the Ukraine: about 3,000,000 are reckoned to have perished during the famine of the early thirties, and another 2,000,000 certainly have migrated as a result of conditions which they found intolerable. These losses have not been wholly replaced by natural increase, and there is every reason to think that the number of 'native' Ukrainians in the rural population of the Republic has decreased since 1930 by at least 4,000,000. If at that time the number of persons speaking Ukrainian and considering themselves to be Ukrainians amounted to 20,000,000, there can scarcely be more than 16,000,000 peasants left now. If to these are added the number of Ukrainians living in the towns, the total probably amounts to about 18,000,000. In other words, the Ukrainian population of Soviet Ukraine (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia) amounted to little more than half of the total population. 161 369

This figure is eloquent: the Soviet Government has gone a long way to achieve the result towards which its policy was directed, and in the Ukrainian S.S.R. Ukrainians can no longer be considered to be in a great majority. It follows therefore that nearly half the population (16,000,000 to 17,000,000) are not Ukrainians. Among these alien elements a little less than 2,000,000 are Jews; about 1,000,000 are Moldavians; another million belong to different nationalities—White Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans. The remaining 12,000,000 to 13,000,000 consist either of people born in the Ukraine who do not wish to consider themselves Ukrainians or of 'new-comers' from other parts of the Union. The number of these 'new-comers' must amount to 8,000,000 to 9,000,000.

It is notable that in the last years (since 1930) the Government has used every means to encourage the settlement of these 'new-comers' not only in the industrial areas but also in the purely rural districts. It is obvious that Moscow does not desire vast rural areas with an entirely homogeneous Ukrainian population. The Government prefers groups of *Kolkhozy* on Ukrainian territory to be constituted on the mosaic principle. Each year, from all the Military Districts of the Soviet Union, soldiers who have finished their military service and who have sent in petitions that on account of lack of land they do not wish to return to their original homes are drafted to the new Red Army *Kolkhozy*. These *Kolkhozy*, recruited from the variety of nationalities throughout the Union, are being scattered over some of the best land of the Ukrainian countryside. In some regions there are as many as ten of these military collectivized farms. Reference has already been made to the measures taken by the Government against the bourgeois *kolkhozniki* during the summer of 1939. A new 'movement' of the population is in view in 474 166

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517
Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645]
through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669]
and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642
munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661]
as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423
tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation[1] 369
It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

[1] [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

423 The natural result was the growing depopulation of the cities.
369 Peasants who had gone into industry now flowed back to their native villages and demanded their share of the land in the hope that they might be able to raise food for themselves and their families. This increased the already overcrowded rural population and intensified the bitterness that was felt among all classes.

The hatred thus aroused was increased by the formation of committees of poor and landless peasants to take over the estates. Yet in Ukraine there was an important sector of the population who had been the owners and proprietors of from two to nearly one hundred acres of land. In some districts these included nearly a quarter of the peasant families and in an attempt to propitiate them the Soviets were frequently inclined to favor them and allow them to retain their holdings instead of dividing them among the more idle and shiftless of the population.

651 Yet this did not serve to maintain agricultural production[1] for
661 the crying demand of Moscow was for food. The Communists had abolished all markets and taxes but they substituted for them a rule that the peasants were to turn over their entire crop to the government and should retain for themselves only 31 pounds of grain per month for each member of the family. This naturally dissatisfied the peasants who had been won to the support of the new regime by the promises of the government that they could secure for their own use the land of the state and of the landlords. Each year, as the Soviets tried to enforce the collection, they planted less and less acreage and resorted to more skilful methods of hiding what they did produce in the hope that they might somehow exchange it for those manufactured products of which they were in urgent need.

To counterbalance this, the Russian detachments made more and more extensive raids and they were not satisfied to take merely the legal surplus. They seized everything in the way of food and supplies on which they could lay their hands and, in case of opposition, they ruthlessly shot the peasants without any trial or investigation as counter-revolutionists. In a sense they succeeded in their mission, for the food collectors in 1920 secured in Ukraine 2,560,000

[1] [Expropriation of landowners, distribution of land to peasants, 1919-21- Analyst]

tons of grain or about 75% of the total amount that they secured 651 661
in the whole of the former Russian Empire.

This led to new clashes and with the suppression of the larger armed partisan bands, there grew up a new feeling of ugliness that boded ill for the security of the whole regime. The success of the Communists in the industrial centres was thus balanced by their failure to win over any substantial part of the rural population.

In the cities the new regime[1] met with problems of another 433
kind. The workers in the great coal and iron industry where Com- 369
munism was strongest had at a very early date expelled the managers [327]
and foremen and had taken over themselves the operation of the plants, many of which had been ruined in the civil war. Now they found that they were not able to restore production. Industry practically came to a halt and by the end of 1921 there was only one blast furnace operating in Ukraine. The production of pig-iron dropped to 11,300 tons, or barely 3% of the pre-war production. The railroads suffered the same fate. There was no way of repairing them and without a trained administrative staff, they almost stopped functioning. This, in turn, increased unemployment and a lack of food in the cities and once more the city dwellers began to stream out into the country districts.

As a final blow there came in 1920 one of those periods of 731
drought which have recurred sporadically in Ukraine throughout the centuries. In view of the general decay in transportation and the ravages of the war, this became serious and the situation grew even worse when the same phenomenon was repeated in 1921. Between the drought and the raiding detachments, the peasants had no reserves of grain and a famine broke out which cost the lives of several million Ukrainians.

This famine was very definitely the result of Communist mismanagement, plus the drought, but the Soviet regime was unable to take any effective counter-measures. When its extent was realized, the regime allowed through the League of Nations the organization of the American Relief Administration under Herbert Hoover. This collected and sent to the stricken areas large quantities of grain but it carried on its work with such impartiality that

[1] [Ukrainian Soviet Republic established 1919 -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

185 474 241 The peasants also revived and breathed new life into the co-operatives which had been broken up during the period of Militant Communism. In 1923 they established another cooperative organization, the Selo-Tekhnyka (Village Machines) which purchased more expensive agricultural machinery and rented it out to the peasants for the appropriate agricultural work. These points became the centre of mechanization and were in effect the first [453] tractor stations. In 1924 they established the First Agricultural Bank, a sort of private institution which at one time had more loans outstanding than had the Ukrainian State Bank which was, of course, closely supervised by Moscow.

185 369 All these efforts* met with marked success and agriculture speedily began to revive. The peasants became more prosperous and their holdings of livestock rapidly increased, although they did not reach the pre-war level. This, in its turn, created a new demand for manufactured products and restored the factories to operation, and with them the conditions in the cities began to improve.

185 471 [475] Similar concessions were made to industry, but with one important difference. The larger and more important industrial plants were not turned back to their former owners who were, as before, allowed no voice or influence in their direction. They were taken from the workers who had seized and abused them during the period of Militant Communism and placed under the supervision of government trusts. These were either regional in character or confined to a single branch of industry. In either case, they were under the control of a more or less trusted group of men among whom Communists were in the leading positions, but while they received certain credits from the state, they were more or less autonomous and they were allowed to go through regular commercial transactions and encouraged to show profits in their annual reports. There was thus again a source of encouragement both for the directors and the workers, and slowly but surely the level of industry began to rise.

The smaller plants were very often leased to individuals who were allowed to employ hired labor and the hope was given to these that their taxes would be at such a level that they, too, could

* [NEP attempts to restore peasant prosperity -- Analyst]

CHAPTER FIVE

Ukrainization

The period of the New Economic Policy was likewise the 186
time when the movement for the Ukrainization of the state reached its highest point. This was a complicated political, cultural and scholarly movement which aimed to develop the Ukrainian self-consciousness in every possible way and to establish the proper role of the Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It took many and diverse forms, and while it developed into a definite opposition to Russian influence and Russian methods, it was not primarily so much an anti-Communist as an extra-Communist movement, even though most of its outstanding leaders were tried and tested members of the party.

The basis for the entire movement is to be found in the slight attraction that Communism as a doctrine possessed for the Ukrainian people. As late as 1927 there were only 122,928 Ukrainian Communists, that is, about thirty-nine for each ten thousand of the Ukrainian population. The bulk of the Communists in Ukraine were Russian and the vast majority of these belonged to the urban proletariat or to the workers in the Donets Basin and Kryvy Rih. [665] [162]

The general period of disintegration during the civil war and the period of Militant Communism had greatly strengthened the power and self-confidence of the peasants and had weakened the power of the city workmen. This showed Lenin and the dominant group that some method had to be found to win at least the passive support of the countryside if new troubles were to be averted. [369]

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the tenacity with which the 186
Ukrainian peasants, whether they were literate or illiterate, clung 191
to their native language. Lenin had used this characteristic with 665

dred and eighty karbovantsy, they would be required to pay 241
twenty-two and a half karb. in taxes, twenty in rent, fifty as a 651
special tax and they would be required to volunteer to take at 474
least two hundred in government bonds. 465

Even this did not cover the total payments to the government. With its usual love of double-talk and subterfuge, the government, which controlled every branch of human activity in the USSR, talked of the establishment of socialism and levied indirect taxes on all transactions so that the actual cost to the villagers of any manufactured article was about three times what it cost the government as producer. The whole subject was carefully veiled as a state secret to protect the Soviet Union against capitalist intrigues but the unfortunate population were the unwilling contributors to this new order of life.

Under such conditions it is extremely difficult to pierce the veil [652] of percentages as to cost and production and give a reliable estimate as to the amount of money received for the government or the relationship between the sums spent in maintaining the operation of the Moscow-controlled factories in Ukraine and the amount spent upon the needs of the population either individually, as families or as citizens of the UkSSR or of the UkSSR as a governmental unity within the Soviet sphere. From those figures which the Soviet has let out, it is possible to see that the yearly budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has run from 2½-5% of the budget of the USSR while the population has been at least 18% of the total population.

With the villages compelled to yield the last pound of grain, 369
etc., that could be extracted by force, and receiving in return 511
almost no manufactured goods, the position of the city workmen and the intelligentsia was little better. The wages of the workmen were always insufficient, the housing conditions were hardly endurable, and the only point of betterment was that the larger places and some of the plants especially favored by the regime received more manufactured goods of a poor quality and at a high price which the fortunate people might be able to secure.

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369 They could also, if they still had preserved any valuables, dispose
511 of them through the Torgsin stores which sold imported wares for foreign currency and precious metals.

[554] Of course, neither in city or village did any of these restrictions apply to the more important Communists who possessed their own stores at which the government supplied them with the necessary articles to allow them to live in comfort and luxury as a welcome investment for the regime. The line of demarcation between the poor and the rich, the ordinary people and the Communists, became steadily greater, until it was often wider than it had been in the old tsarist Russian empire.

642 All these measures which had been adopted in Moscow[1] were
631 in theory supposed to apply to all sections of the USSR equally, but it was not long before the natives of Ukraine realized that however impartial the laws might seem, they were not sufficiently flexible to take account of local and republican differences. The central regime was interested in advancing and developing the Moscow industrial area and it expended on this in various grandiose efforts, as the Moscow subway, enormous sums of money. It is safe to say that the expenditures in that one area alone equalled the entire budget and money spent by the central government in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It classified Ukraine as one of the regions where the supply of manufactured goods was less necessary.

The crushing of the Ukrainian Communists, the suicide of Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, no less than the complete altering of the land code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the substitution of the new policy of collectivization, showed perfectly well where the real power of the USSR lay in the thirties and it was accompanied by such acts as the introduction of Russian as the
[701] standard language of instruction and of the army. This was followed by the formal transfer of the Ukrainian divisions to the Red Army and a number of other acts which completed the subordination of the UkSSR. Already in 1930, during difficulties on the Soviet-Manchuria borders, the Red Army had not hesitated to

1 [after 1933 - measures dealing with production, supply etc. --illegible]

668 such as the head of the *oblast* (district) administration, Alexander Iatseniuk, the chief of the city administration, Pavlovs'kyi, and nearly all of his department heads.[50] A wide variety of nationalist organizations sprang up, including Prosvita, churches, and an active theater. Local artists appeared on Ukrainian programs permitted by the German-controlled broadcasting station. [871] Schools, including two *gimnaziias* and a pedagogical institute, were reopened, and a local school administration was established.[51]

[369] The population of the city sank to forty-two thousand (including seven thousand Poles and two thousand Russians) after the [438] deportation of the Jews. However, economic life was stimulated by the reopening of a sugar refinery and other industries; markets were reopened and private trade was encouraged.[52] One hundred [795] and seventy-nine physicians were present, a very high number in [883] proportion to the population.[53] An extremely active youth organization, known, like its counterparts in the West Ukraine, as the Sich, was formed; its activities included sports, choral singing, theatricals, and development of an orchestra.[54]

All of these organizations were under the control of nationalist Ukrainians, although the emphasis appeared to be on the formation of a Ukrainian territorial state which would include all persons, of whatever ethnic origin, living on Ukrainian soil. Thus one of the chief administrative officials, the head of the *raion* administration (i.e., the rural area outside the city) was a Pole, and the director of the economic section of the city administration was a Russian.[55] There appears to have been a large measure of cordiality between the local groups and the OUN representa-

[50] Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 1, 1941, p. 2; 454th Sicherungsdivision, Section VII, Report of October 4, 1941, NOKW 2129 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2129).

[51] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* October 1, 1941, p. 1; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 24 and 26, 1941, pp. 2 and 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 25, 1942, p. 5; *Nastup,* September 6, 1941, p. 5.

[52] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* September 15, 1941, p. 1, based on *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Zhitomir), August 3, 1941; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[53] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 24, 1941, p. 2; many, however, were apparently Jews who were temporarily spared because of their usefulness (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 1, 1941, p. 2).

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[55] *Ibid.,* p. 2, and *Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 1, 1941, p. 2.

[Zhitomir in the East Ukraine, 1941 -- Analyst]

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X. NATIONALISM AND THE EAST UKRAINIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

●369 186 THE STUDY of the role of Ukrainian nationalist groups in administration and educational life has shown that urban-centered activities played a preponderant role in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine under German occupation. The more highly developed urban educational systems were primary targets for nationalist organizers, while the cities served as centers from which the nationalists sought to secure popular support by controlling cultural activities and the press. This emphasis on urban activity has a long history in the development of nationalism in both the East and the West Ukraine. Since the rural districts in both areas were strongly Ukrainian in all linguistic and cultural attributes, many felt that it was not immediately necessary to cultivate nationalist sentiment there; they felt these attributes would maintain the national distinctiveness of the villagers. Whether this was a wise view can be more adequately discussed a little later.

During the Second World War, however, this tradition did result in the nationalist groups' devoting a great portion of their limited resources to the East Ukrainian cities, where it was necessary to start almost from the bottom in building national life. 177 An impressive number of accounts by nationalist Ukrainians tes- 369 tify to the predominance of Russian speech and manners in the 186 cities of the East Ukraine throughout the war period.[1] The ex-

[1] In addition to numerous remarks of this nature already cited in relation to particular situations, see *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3; November 27, 1942, p. 4; March 2, 1943, p. 2; T. Liakovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 17, 1942, p. 3; Iu. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3. It may appear surprising that so many convinced adherents of the nationalist movement should have admitted and even stressed the non-Ukrainian cultural character of the cities, since usually

planation is, of course, that a vast number of city dwellers were [177] Russified Ukrainians. Naturally enough, the nationalist leaders 369 felt that no secure basis for their program could exist as long as 186 the municipalities of the country were islands of foreign culture.

Within the urban group, nationalist efforts and nationalist 369 sentiment were largely concentrated in one social stratum. Na- 186 tionalist movements throughout the world have usually been the 565 work of the middle class. Since there had been no East Ukrainian capitalist middle class of any significance before 1920, and since there was no possibility that one could arise under Soviet conditions, except for a few traders carrying on a precarious business under the NEP, a commercial class continued to be lacking. The 475 counterpart to private commercial enterprise which existed under 565 the Soviet regime, the state trading system, was apparently largely operated by Jews and other non-Ukrainian elements.[2] Unfavorable appraisals of the activity of this system, plus distasteful memories of the "profit-and-run" techniques of the nepmen had produced an unattractive image of the private businessman in the minds of most East Ukrainians.[3] Although, under German occupation, a few gestures were made by some city administrations toward encouraging individual enterprise, the chief factors in production and distribution, insofar as the appalling economic conditions made such activities possible at all, were public and

nationalist movements endeavor to claim as large a proportion as possible of the inhabitants of a disputed area as members of their national group in origin and attitude. It must be remembered, however, that the OUN, and some other Ukrainian nationalist groups, were not democratic in ideology; hence the wishes of a majority at a particular time were of little importance in their eyes. Rather, this failure to possess the adherence of the inhabitants of an area which they regarded as theirs through the "rights" of history and blood served as an additional proof of the iniquities of the Soviet regime and of Russians in general and as a stimulus to more strenuous efforts to "correct" the situation.

[2] Some Ukrainians today (Interview 35) state that many wartime ascriptions of all the evils of the Soviet system to the Jews were highly exaggerated, in most cases a forced concession to Nazi racism, but insist that there was a good deal of anti-Semitism in the Ukraine because Jews predominated in retail distribution, and in the conditions of extreme shortage used their positions for selfish purposes. In view of the occupations of most Jews before the Revolution, their numerical predominance in the state distributive system is probably a fact, and it is fairly obvious that any recognizably alien group in such a position would be resented when they could not satisfy the consumers' wants, whether or not peculation played a role in their activities.

[3] Interview 65.

000 drawn too heavily from particular sources or may too greatly concern special aspects. In the case of urban-rural differences in nationalist activity, it is certain that such a bias exists in the character and extent of the evidence. For one thing, any single activity in a city of some size, such as the development of a Prosvita society, or the control of an administration, is sufficiently important to merit a place in contemporary reports, while a similar rural activity, conducted on a much smaller scale but equally important in its limited area, would probably pass unrecorded. Since the main channels of communication—newspapers and personal contacts of West Ukrainian and émigrés with local figures—were predominantly urban, they would naturally leave behind many more reports on city developments. Perhaps most important is the fact that the higher degree of articulateness of urban dwellers, in the Ukraine as elsewhere, tends to give them a disproportionate share in the written expression which later becomes the historical record.

565 186 369 In the cities, there was no positive goal to compete with the nationalist movements for the hopes and enthusiasms of the populace. The terrible deprivations, the German executions, the *Ostarbeiter* program, the fear of Communist agents, were factors which had a far greater significance for the average urban person than did the efforts of the nationalist movements; but a general effect was to promote passivity and resignation. On the land, however, a positive goal was before all eyes, which for a large segment of the peasantry far outweighed any prospect of national independence, however desirable that might be in itself.[82] This transcendent goal was the destruction of the collectivized system of agriculture and its replacement by a system in which individual initiative and the demands of the peasants would play a greater part. The nature of the agrarian question and the Germans' fumbling efforts to use the peasants' desire to gain support, while retaining the old restrictive kolkhoz system to make exploitation of the peasant easier, has already been described in general terms; it would exceed the scope of this study to treat the subject itself

565 186

[82] This is implied even by nationalist writers; for example, Iurii Tarkovych notes that the first question of peasants in the area between Kiev and Chernigov was, "When will the land be divided?" (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3).

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in greater detail. It is absolutely essential to stress the key nature 565
of this problem, however, for it is almost beyond doubt that any 186
movement which had offered a fully satisfactory solution to the agrarian problem would have won the adherence of the mass of the peasantry, regardless of its stand on the national question.

Superficially, the situation in the countryside was satisfactory 186
from the nationalist standpoint. It is true that certain peasant 369
traits of a distinctively national character had been subjected to erosion by the developments of the Soviet period. The handicrafts, including making of the national costume, had almost vanished under the joint impact of material shortages and growing availability of factory products.[33] The physical appearance of the villages had been altered too and much of their distinctiveness lost through the Soviet destruction of the cemeteries.[34]

In the more basic matter of language, the changes had not been 191
so great, although in some areas at least many "town words" in 369
the "all-Soviet" (i.e., Russian) tongue had been introduced.[35] 186
From the point of view of developing replenishments for the intellectual elite from peasant stock, the situation was worse, however, for the Ukrainian tongue was frequently scorned as the speech of "Ivany i Maryny z kolhospu"—"Johns and Marys off the farm."[36] Even more significant, the mere fact that the peasants spoke Ukrainian, and even had a certain affection for the language as their mother tongue, did not necessarily prove that they possessed any consciousness of nationality. A Ukrainian visitor to one of the villages in the Taganrog district of the lower Don, just beyond the border of the Ukrainian SSR, reported that all the inhabitants spoke pure Ukrainian and retained Ukrainian customs. When addressed as Ukrainians, however, they denied the appellation, insisting that the "Ukrainians" lived over to the west, across the border. The nationalist reporter pointed out the identity of speech and manners with the population to the west, but they replied, "Yes, they are our brothers," yet persisted in denying that they were themselves Ukrainian.[37]

[33] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 26, 1942, p. 3.
[34] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 15, 1942, p. 4.
[35] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1942, p. 3.
[36] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3.
[37] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 22, 1942, p. 2.

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education of children, and self-control.[42] Generally, however, the clergy was unable to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in several villages the latter even objected to returning the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs.[43]

One of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. How effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of more detailed evidence, but in some cases it evidently did at least provide reading material and some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. There is considerable difference of opinion as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were imbued with Communist ideas.[44]

The great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmitters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for example, the physician, who had been a UNR officer, played the chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. He was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village *feldsher* (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. These constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, who were described as having "no unified outlook," being still "under the influence of Bolshevik ideology."[45] This criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not uncommon in nationalist

[42] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.
[43] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3.
[44] Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 18, 1941, for favorable reports; and Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28–29, for some criticisms of the rural teachers.
[45] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

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186 writers.[46] To a certain extent it may be due to resentment against
565 the clerical workers' unresponsiveness to nationalist propaganda,
369 or even to simple snobbery toward those aspiring to the title of
517 "intelligentsia" without a formal education. In part it appears, however, to correspond to a real lack of breadth of mind among this lowest group of the Soviet intelligentsia, a deficiency which would have made it difficult to use them for any political or social movement not tied immediately to their customary frame of thinking.

On the other hand, there were often elements in the villages which were available for some sort of political activity. The memory of Petliura was still present; some refused to believe that he was dead, thinking the story to be Communist propaganda.[47] In another area, both the president of the village soviet and the head of one of the collective farms remained behind and organized life in cooperation with nationalist elements.[48] Yet, in another case, a man of some education in one of the villages, who was related to an émigré minister of the UNR, after expressing fervently nationalist sentiments, recoiled with horror at the idea that his auditor might recommend him to the Germans for an official post, fearing the vengeance of Communist agents.[49] The presence of the latter was, indeed, a great handicap to nationalist organization in the rural areas, where the protection of the police force was not so great (especially in partisan-infested areas) as in the towns, and where the naturally cautious peasant hesitated to commit himself until assured the Soviet administration would never return.[50]

186 Since the organized nationalist forces were so few in members,
369 they could not undertake any direct or continuous indoctrination
208 of the rural population, unless they abandoned their efforts to win the cities. They had to rely primarily on the Prosvita branches, the country schools, and the village administrations. Printed material was also used whenever it could be controlled

[46] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 23, 1941, p. 2, reprinting an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti*.

[47] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.

[48] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

[49] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.

[50] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

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by nationalist Ukrainians. As a matter of fact, a large proportion of the newspapers in the smaller towns were directed principally at rural readers; the extreme shortage of papers[51] in many areas prevented their being of great influence even when they had some nationalist content. Moreover, the central periodical for farmers, *Ukraïns'kyi Khliborob,* with a weekly printing of seventy thousand, was edited by Eugene Arkypenko, who later joined the Vlasov movement.[52] While this publication was not used against the nationalist cause, it was devoid of positive nationalist material, being confined entirely to technical agricultural articles.

The less-than-lukewarm supporters of the nationalist movements who constituted the bulk of the personnel in positions which provided access to the rural population apparently did not do a great deal to convert the dormant cultural nationality of the peasants into active nationalism. There is no question that the cities inevitably constituted a prime target for nationalist efforts. Probably, in view of the severe limitations imposed by lack of time and nationalist personnel, by Red partisans and German restrictions, the enormous task of overcoming village inertia toward a purely political movement could not have been carried out in any case. Nevertheless, the initial failure of the nationalist groups (at least the OUN and others coming from the west) to grasp the overriding importance of the land question, and the necessity of making this a prime means by which the rural population could be won to the nationalist cause, must certainly be ranked as one of the great lost opportunities of this period. If the nationalists had from the beginning used all their energies to present a positive program of agrarian reform as the heart of their message, they might not have left any tangible organization to withstand renewed Soviet occupation, but they might have left behind a concept of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a defender of the interests of the peasantry. This, along with the vaguer memories of the Republican era, might have left an enduring imprint on the peasantry.

[51] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[52] *Volyn',* June 17, 1942, p. 4; Interview 45.

[133] culture of the more northern region. The reasons for the smaller
176 farm population are historical rather than purely economic, however. Most of the area was fully settled many generations later then the more northern regions, for it was the principal area of conflict of the Slavic settlers moving down from the north and the Tatar warriors based on the Crimea. The major instrument of colonization was the Cossack fortress settlement or *sich*. In the mid-seventeenth century the Cossacks accepted the suzerainty of the Orthodox tsar, but it was only in the late eighteenth century, after the Russian conquest of the Crimean Tatars, that the steppe
[563] was fully opened to peaceful development. These new lands, frequently called "Southern Russia," came to include considerable bodies of non-Ukrainian settlers, mostly Russians, but also large numbers of Germans and Serbs. In 1917 the Provisional Government in Petrograd strongly rejected demands of the Ukrainian Rada for the extension of its authority to the *guberniias* of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida, the last three corresponding roughly to the southern steppe region, since it felt they were not Ukrainian in character.[82]

369 The northern section of the steppe region, comprising the northern halves of the *Generalbezirke* Nikolaev and Dniepropetrovsk, did contain a preponderantly Ukrainian peasantry. The presence of two very important natural resources—the iron mines of Krivoi Rog and the water power of the Dnieper rapids—had led to rapid industrialization of this area during the period of the Soviet Five Year Plans, with a consequent large increase in the urban population. According to the census of 1939 five of the fifteen Ukrainian cities of over one hundred thousand population
369 lay in this region.[83] At the start of the period of industrialization,
563 in 1926, the city population was very largely non-Ukrainian. For example, Ukrainians formed less than half the total in Kirovograd (then Zinovevsk), Jews being the next largest ethnic group, closely followed by Russians.[84] In Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'e the

[82] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 72–73.

[83] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 250–53.

[84] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Recensement de la Population de l'URSS*, XIII (Moscow, 1929), 13–14.

proportion of Jews was somewhat lower, but the Ukrainians were even fewer, numbering scarcely more than one third of the population.[35] 369 563

The figures for Kirovograd in 1942 are hardly enough upon which to base generalizations.[36] Apparently, however, a great shift to Ukrainian national affiliation, much larger than that which took place in the average northern city, had occurred. As in the case of the other figures, it is not certain that this represents a real change, although it is probable that a large part of the interwar growth was composed of Ukrainian peasants. A number of circumstances suggest, however, that part of the difference arose from a real shift in allegiance of numerous elements of Russian origin, i.e., a shift induced not so much by expectation that persons classing themselves as Ukrainians would have a favored position in a new Ukrainian state, as by a sincere feeling of belonging to a "Ukraine" defined on a geographic rather than an ethnic basis. The readiness of technical specialists, who took the lead in Krivoi Rog, to adopt with enthusiasm Ukrainian symbols, while devoting their major attention to economic reconstruction, suggests that this acceptance of a territorial basis of national identity may have played a role, while the support of Russian cultural and political tendencies by a similar group in Dniepropetrovsk indicates the instability of this choice. Apparently the situation was something like this: as long as the Ukrainian state which the Germans seemed to favor appeared to be an instrument for the overthrow of Communism and the rebuilding of new life, it was readily acceptable; when it became a romantic creed of ethnocentrism it was repugnant as an obstacle to the satisfaction 186

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] See Appendix. The necessity for caution in interpreting the extremely great shift in Kirovograd is indicated by the fact that the only other large city in the area for which data are available, Dniepropetrovsk, showed a comparatively small shift. It will be recalled, however, that the latter city was under a Russophile administration. Unfortunately, there is no information available concerning the tendencies of the city administration in Kirovograd for the time the census was taken. It is mathematically demonstrable, however, that the decline of the Russian group can be accounted for in Kirovograd only on the basis of a shift of persons formerly classed as Russians to the Ukrainian group, unless one of two rather unlikely assumptions is made, namely that (1) the Russian population actually declined between 1926 and 1941, or (2) numerous Jews later exterminated listed themselves as Russians in 1926.

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an archdiocese of Kherson at an early date.[61] As was related previously, the *Generalkommissar* was suspicious of the Autocephalous Church and urged that steps be taken against it when it grew strong in the north of his area. Later, Michael (Khoroshyi), bishop of Kirovograd, was to come to Nikolaev as archbishop, and was recognized by the *Generalkommissar*,[62] but the pro-Russian ecclesiastical group seems to have maintained a strong position. On the other hand, the extremely large shift in national affiliation in Kherson indicated by the city census suggests that the same factor of adoption of loyalty to the Ukraine as a territorial entity may have been at work here as well as farther north.[63] Farther east along the coast, in the *Generalbezirk* Taurien (Taurida), with its capital in Melitopol' (Melitopil'), there appears to have been little effort at nationalist organization; the newspapers, police, and other agencies were Ukrainian, but seem to have been completely subject to German control.[64]

Beyond the coastal strip just discussed lies the most easterly section of the Ukrainian SSR, the Donbas. This area, in which agriculture takes the form of large-scale wheat farming, as in the far south, is known as the "Ruhr"—or better, one of the "Ruhrs"—of the Soviet Union. Its industry, which grew at a tremendous pace in the interwar period, is based primarily upon rich coal deposits. Its five cities of more than one hundred thousand population in 1939 had nearly tripled their total number of inhabitants since the previous census. It is probable that this increase resulted in a substantial gain for the Ukrainian ethnic component, which previously had been very small, as the surrounding peasantry is largely, though not overwhelmingly, Ukrainian. As far as the technical staffs, which composed the bulk of the educated class, are concerned, however, Ukrainian nationalist observers themselves admit that the great majority was drawn from

[61] *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, January 20, 1942, p. 1. The archbishop was Anthony (Martsenko), who received his appointment in 1941 from the Sobor of Volhynian Bishops. Up to the time of the definite split between the Autonomous and the Autocephalous churches he was apparently still sympathetic to the Ukrainian nationalists as his secretary is reported to have been an OUN member (NO 3279).

[62] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, March 6, 1943, p. 5.

[63] See Appendix.

[64] PS 1695.

"all over the Union." Consequently, the area could be expected to be very lukewarm in its reaction to the nationalist movements. This tendency was reinforced by the great distance of the region from the stimulation center in the West Ukraine—Stalino is nearly one thousand miles from L'vov—and by the lack of strong historical ties with the Ukraine. Two special factors also played a role: the suppression of the Kiev OUN-M group came before a nationalist revival could get under way in the area, and the news frightened the few nationalist Ukrainians away from public life; and the German army authorities who were in charge were reluctant to permit even the formal and linguistic ascendancy permitted Ukrainians elsewhere.[65] Finally, even according to an OUN organizer active in the area, the Ukrainians were inclined from long habit to allow the Russians priority.[66]

As a result, in a large number of cities in the Donbas, including Slaviansk, Artemovsk (Bakhmut), Debal'tsevo, and Snezhnoe, the Russians succeeded in establishing a cultural ascendancy without, however, its taking on much political significance. This ascendancy included, in particular, the publication of Russian-language newspapers, which as a rule were not allowed in the former Ukrainian Soviet Republic.[67] A number of Ukrainian-language papers were also founded, some expressly designed for the rural population. In Stalino, with the help of OUN-B organizers, a nationalist editor was able to transform an originally Russian paper into a Ukrainian organ, while for a time Ukrainian-language papers with nationalist tendencies were published in Voroshilovgrad and Kramatorskaia (Kramators'ka).[68] In Enakievo an administration of Ukrainians was installed with the aid of Italian troops which occupied the town, while Ukrainian officials were also found in other city administrations.[69] All efforts at nationalist organization were hampered by the fact that the area was not conquered until late 1941, and, except for a brief period in 1942, they lay within a short distance of the front. A few OUN-M organizers were active in the area, and a considerable Bandera net-

[65] PS 051.
[66] Interview 66.
[67] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 23, 1942, p. 3.
[68] Interview 66.
[69] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 12, 1942, p. 3.

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work directed by Eugene Stakhiv did what it could to encourage national tendencies among the local Ukrainians.[70] 668*

The city of Mariupol' was an outstanding exception to the conditions prevailing throughout most of the area. While Mariupol' was administratively part of the Donbas, lying in the Stalino *oblast,* it is over fifty miles from the Donets basin itself, on the shore of the Sea of Azov. Like the other cities of the Donbas, however, it had grown enormously, more than tripling in size between the two Soviet censuses. Even after the losses of war, its population numbered 178,358, placing it not far below the largest Ukrainian metropolises.[71] What is remarkable for a city in the Donbas, or indeed in the whole southern area, is that it was under full Ukrainian control. Its well-developed Prosvita society and Ukrainian educational system have already been mentioned. The Orthodox Church is said to have been active and oriented toward Ukrainian nationalism, although here as elsewhere in the far south Protestants and dissident Orthodox sects played an important role.[72] In addition, the mayor was outspokenly nationalist, encouraging the formation of a Ukrainian military force.[73] Probably the guiding spirit in the nationalist development in the city, however, was Nicholas Stasiuk, minister of supply under the Rada in 1918, who had managed to survive the Soviet period by working as a park attendant.[74] He took over the editorship of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* which, although restricted by the paper shortage especially acute in the treeless south, was the second most influential Ukrainian paper on the "Left Bank" (next to *Nova Ukraïna*). While necessarily cautious, its tone was strongly nationalist. Moreover, in addition to Stasiuk, there were a number of nationalist journalists to aid in carrying on the newspaper's work. Stasiuk himself is said not only to have carried on this legal pronationalist activity, but to have assisted the OUN-B underground which made its area base in the city.[75]

186 668* 369 [794] [204]

[70] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 50; Interview 66.

[71] *L'vivs'ki Visti,* August 27, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 24, 1942, p. 2.

[72] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 3, 1942, p. 2.

[73] Cf. Chapter VII.

[74] Interview 66; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 7, 1942, p. 2.

[75] Ie. Stakhiv, pp. 52–54; Interview 66. The nationalist tone of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* is apparent from the considerable number of its articles reprinted in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

369 The Ukrainian people, being an old nation with an agricultural civilization, is not attracted by industry and by large concentrations of population. It prefers to live in the country, when its material life is assured, seeking to supplement its revenues by semi-agricultural professions such as those of artisan, or small trade, or finally the service of the State.

241 The Ukrainian agriculturalist, especially in the regions of the south, is conscious of participating in the general economy of the country. He takes a great interest in the choice of plants to be developed, in the organization of co-operatives for trade and credit, and in the construction of the means of communication. He is a civilized peasant, a quite European farmer. Without disparaging the intellect and the practical sense of the Great Russian people, it is necessary to recognize that the Ukrainian is more Western in all his conceptions, and more European, than his brother of the north.

163 On the other hand, the Ukrainian people have a great vitality. Among the peoples of Europe they have the greatest rate of increase, which reaches 2·3 per cent per annum. The fecundity of the women is astonishing: between twenty and thirty years it is 23 per cent, while in France it hardly reaches 8 per cent at the same ages.[1]

142 The average height of the men at the period of military service is about 1 m. 69½ cm.

137 342 Ukrainians are very clean and their houses very neat, mostly whitened with whitewash and surrounded by gardens. Fruit trees, particularly cherry trees, give the villages an attractive appearance, especially in the districts of Kiev and Poltava (Zone 1)* where the rich and green nature resembles the landscape of Southern England.

[1] That is to say that for a 100 women between twenty and thirty years one meets 23 expectant ones.

*[see category 116, pp. 139-140. - - Analyst]

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both within and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.

[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . .* , 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

185 517 191 369 000

in spite of efforts to produce films and to broadcast programs in the Ukrainian language — potent forces for assimilation to Russian culture. To the goal of assimilation, moreover, much is contributed by the industrialization of the Ukraine: new factories bring rural Ukrainians into the cities where Russian still predominates in social life, and the younger Ukrainians in the city easily adopt the prevailing language. But these forces for assimilation, even though coupled with the inculcation of communist doctrines through the media of education and culture, may be cancelled by a growth of nationalism; and such nationalism may thrive on the shocks of economic disorders and unsuccessful foreign war. The language policy itself promotes the process of assimilation by encouraging bi-lingualism; but by stressing the use of minority languages, it furthers at least a greater temporary diversification. The question of whether the forces of unity are now stronger or weaker than the forces of division can be answered only by the future.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

476 was made in the cooperative society's own factories. The society owned cement factories, lime plants, mills, cloth-weaving factories, bakeries, oil presses and even a factory that made boot polish and cosmetics.

439 Whither did Ukrainian goods go? Peas, beans and poultry to England and Belgium, clover seed to Holland, /94/ pigs to Germany, beef cattle via Constanta to Greece, poultry to Germany, Switzerland and to - Palestine, eggs to many countries and in cans, as far as Buenos Aires.

[545] Sociologically noteworthy is the growth of an urban stratum of artisans, merchants and small industrialists. The Ukrainians who, much to their ●369 own disadvantage, neglected the cities because of 476 their love for quiet village life, now gradually pushed into the cities, and the credit cooperatives supported them in this.

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741 Of greatest significance for the advancement of Ukrainian culture were the societies for edu- 517 cation and public health. The society for popular 217 education, "Prosvita", was even older than the Ukrainian system of cooperatives, reaching back to 1883. It was a veritable national sanctuary of the Ukrainians. The people are indebted to it for a large part of their cultural advance. The "Prosvita" was an actual school for advanced studies in the country. In 3214 village libraries with 700,000 volumes, two instructive monthly magazines and with inexpensive editions of books, it enabled the village inhabitants who were cut off from all urban culture to obtain the knowledge which alone made it possible for them to assert themselves against their enemies. Besides that, 741/ "Prosvita", which on January 1, 1938 numbered 517 360,000 members, and owned 1457 club houses with rooms for meetings, promoted group singing, music, the community theater and folk art. It helped

665 Ukrainian population prefers to read, whereas the works of Russian authors remain completely unknown in the Ukraine. It goes on to say that this is a very detrimental phenomenon, for Russian culture is important for the entire Soviet Union and for the whole world, while Ukrainian culture is of merely local significance.

Conversely, the Ukrainians accused the Muscovites of chauvinism. Stalin, the Georgian, tried to pronounce a Solomonic judgment at the Sixteenth Party Congress in June 1930 by condemning both Great Russian and Ukrainian nationalism: "Great Russian chauvinism under the communists reflects the efforts of the ruling classes of former Russia to reconstruct their lost privileges of domination over other peoples. As a result, the chauvinism of Great Russia is the chief danger in the national policy of the Communist Party." In accordance with these ideas, the Sixteenth Congress adopted the resolution that the Party should /117/ intensify its fight against Great Russian deviation and the deviations of "local nationalism".

648 As a matter of fact, Ukrainian nationalism was indeed becoming a danger to Bolshevik Moscow.
182 As compared to the period of war-communism, the Ukraine was living in remarkably comfortable circumstances. [369] The fact that the majority of the Ukrainian people, the rural population, enjoyed an adequate subsistence, must have had a positively irritating effect on the urban masses in their wretched circumstances. Was not this an open refutation of the communist doctrine? There was the additional fact that the Ukrainians became more and more importunate with their varied demands, and that the power of the Ukrainian government had increased so much during the NEP period, that finally it headed the opposition of non-Russian peoples in the Council of Nationalities (the second chamber next to the Supreme Council) and forced Moscow several times to change its

[During the NEP period in the Soviet Union — Analyst]

361 the shadows of cherry and mahaleb trees. There every poor farmer adorns his dwelling with lovely, ever-smiling nature..."

Where there is no local building commission, where the street finds its own way, where the four corner posts of a house are set in humus; where no cellar is dug, there/134/the houses and villages grow out of the ground willfully like mushrooms. These are the cluster villages. The villages built in rows with streets are found in the newly settled regions of the Ukrainian steppes and the Kuban. In this new country the Ukrainians, [369] who otherwise love villages, also live on isolated farms. In the north and along the rivers they build wooden houses, and in the steppes, houses of loam. Even in the cities stone houses are rare. Flowers, hollyhocks and sunflowers are to be found in front of every cottage. As a rule, the Ukrain-
342 ian farmhouse has two to three rooms. Whether it houses a poor family or a rich one, the ground plan is always the same; only the size varies. There is the vestibule with the summer kitchen and one half of the stove that extends through the wall; the other half stands in the large livingroom where cooking takes place in the winter, where the family lives, where they receive guests and where everyone sleeps. Then there is also a small storage chamber. The furnishings of the large room are simple and clean: there is a bench running all the way around the large, decorated clay stove and around the room; a rough table and a few chairs stand in the corner, also a sleeping platform for the parents, and a chest. Many icons, "the gods", decorate the wall. Since the barns are very primitive and draughty, a new-born calf or a young lamb that needs warmth is sometimes brought into the room when the winters are cold.

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000 Seventeen ingredients are supposed to go into

433 became /165/ "Red Progress, Dnepropetrovsk", and so on. The giant tractor factory in Khar'kov was newly erected, an accomplishment which is proudly shown to every foreign visitors. Important, however, is not only the number of tractors that leave the factory, but also their serviceability and durability. The significance of the industrial plants which have remained from the pre-war period is also evident from the invested capital, according to which, just as before, the iron industry ranks first, coal second and the sugar industry third. In these three industries half of the entire capital invested in Ukrainian industry is combined. Only after that come machine construction and the chemical works which to a certain extent have arisen only in most recent times. (106)

106. Kubiyovich: Commentary to the Atlas, page XXXIII.

257 The sugar industry forms only a part of the food and luxury industry which was a very important branch even before the war. Its center is in the beet-growing region between Podolia, Kiyev and Khar'kov. In 1913 200 Ukrainian sugar factories produced 1.2 million tons of sugar, in 1933 170 factories produced 0.8 million tons. (107)

107. Deminskiy, The Economy of the Ukraine, page 140.

258 Besides that there is, also dating back to the pre-
274 war period, a considerable mill and oil industry, the latter in the Kuban region, as well as distilleries.

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369 The increase of urban population is a natural concomitant of industrialization. The Ukraine has

369 always belonged to the countries of the world that have the least number of cities. In 1897 only 3% of the population of the entire Ukraine lived in large cities, and as late as 1926, only 6.7%. In 1931 Greater Ukraine had 12 cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. In the almost thirty years between 1897 and 1926 the village population increased by 41.5% and the urban population, also as a result of immigration, of course, by
162 85.4%. (108) The natural increase of the Ukrain-

108. Kubiyovich: Distribution of the Population in the Ukraine, page 30.

ian population belongs to the largest of Europe, in fact is often the largest. True, mortality is high - about 20 deaths annually per 1000 inhabitants -, but /166/ the birth rate is still essentially higher - about 40 births annually per 1000 inhabitants. The lowest population surplus is shown in densely populated Galicia with 11.5 per thousand, and Carpatho-Ukraine with 16.1 per thousand. In 1927 the natural increase in Soviet Ukraine amounted to 22.5 per thousand and in the Crimea to 26.8 per thousand. (109)

109. Kubiyovich: Distribution of the Population in the Ukraine, page 26.

369 The new period of growth of the Ukrainian cities, however, is limited to the Central Ukrainian industrial areas and the Donets Basin. The West Ukrainian cities are unsuitable for industrialization on account of the proximity of the border and the lack of larger power sources. Besides, traffic communications are extremely inadequate. These cities even decreased in population, just like the seaports, where today commerce and export
369 support fewer people than before the First World
162 War. During the first Five Year Plan the urban

369 population in the right-bank section of Soviet
Ukraine decreased by 4.2%, whereas in the left-
162 bank section it increased by 44%, in the Donets
region alone by 93.5%. (110) Kiyev which was

110. Kubiyovich: Distribution of the Population in the Ukraine, page 32.

the quiet city of scholars and monasteries before the First World War shows 846,000 inhabitants according to the census of 1939; Khar'kov, the industrial and barracks city with its over-sized ostentatious buildings and skyscrapers shows 833,000; Odessa, where before the First World War 620,000 people lived and in 1923 324,000, houses 604,000 people in 1939. This seaport which was built by Catherine II suffered most in the famine of 1920.

According to the census of January 17, 1939 the entire population of Soviet Ukraine amounted to 30,960,221 souls, of whom about 19,764,000 lived in villages and about 11,195,000 in towns. In the census of 1926 the proportion of the urban population was 16.5%, whereas in 1939 it was said to be about 36%. According to these figures, Soviet Ukraine has, in the space of 13 years, changed from an agricultural country to a decidedly industrial country. Such a revolutionary process taking place within such a brief period, should be considered as out of the question, for similar developments in /167/ the central and western European countries took many decades under more favorable conditions. In order to be convinced of this analogy between Soviet Ukrainian urban development with that of Central Europe, one would have to be more familiar with the basic principles of Muscovite statisticians. For example, one might find an explanation for such an inorganic growth of the urban population in the fact that all settlements of over 2000 inhabitants

369 were counted as towns, whereas in former times
162 even the huge peasant villages of 30,000 and 40,000 inhabitants were placed in the category of villages.

The result of the new census becomes particularly interesting if one brings in for comparison the Statistique de la population de l'Oukraine contemporaine published in 1929 by the statistical office of the Soviet Ukraine in Khar'kov in both Ukrainian and French. In this publication the population figure on January 1, 1929 is given as 30,363,547. According to that, the population of Soviet Ukraine increased from January 1, 1929 to January 17, 1939 by only 596,674 souls. From the beginning of the Five Year Plan period, however, the normal annual increase amounted to 600,000 souls, according to the birth surplus of 20 per thousand; this would be 6 millions in 10 years. Thus the population decreased by about 5.4 million souls from 1929 to 1939. In an evaluation of these results we must keep in mind the fact that since 1936 abortions have been punishable by 10 years imprisonment, and that a large immigration of Russian and Far Eastern elements has taken place, which was particularly promoted by Moscow.

No less serious than these factors is the
162 decrease of village population since 1926 by 4.41
167 million souls. Even if the largest part of these 4.41 million village inhabitants should be counted city dwellers, the decrease thus being only apparent, what has happened to the increase of the peasant population? The census of 1939 reveals the silent tragedy of the "dead frontier", the strip of land about 50 kilometers wide /168/ at the former Rumanian and Polish boundary, which had to be cleared of Ukrainian inhabitants. It betrays the famine from 1931 to 1933, the exiles
167 to the frosty North and the dislodgments. On this point the Komsomolets Ukrayiny of May 21 and 22, 1939 wrote that the Ukrainians were being

161 sent as farmers to the Far East and to Kazakstan, and as laborers to the construction of the railway lines Donets Basin-Moscow and Akmolinsk-Kartaly. The railway Akmolinsk-Kartaly crossed the desert of Kazakstan in an 806 kilometer stretch. The Visti of June 3, 1939 complete this picture when they write: "The Soviet Ukraine annually furnishes the newly-arisen industrial centers in the other Soviet Republics with hundreds of thousands of laborers. At Magnitogorsk, Kutsbas, in the Far East and on the Turkish Railway there are thousands of construction workers who come from all different parts of the Ukraine."

369 This policy of splitting up the Ukrainian people must in the long run have all the more fateful consequences since the cities in the Ukraine are primarily in foreign hands. "The Ukrainian people remained peasants and villagers; they left their cities in the hands of foreigners, Russians, Jews, Germans, Poles." This was the complaint even before the First World War of the Ukrainian geographer Rudnitskyj: (111) The Ukrain-

111. Rudnitskyj: ibid., page 162.

ian peasant son did not want to go to the city where people spoke in foreign tongues. Village tranquility and quiet romanticism he recaptured only in the country. And thus the Ukrainian peasant youth wandered by the hundreds of thousands to the Kuban, the Volga, to Siberia and yonder to the shores of the Pacific Ocean in order to colonize new land there, while foreigners took possession of the Ukrainian cities. The result was
162 369 that from 1926 to 1931 in the cities of all Ukrainian provinces there were 38.8 Ukrainians per 100 inhabitants, 28.1 Russians, 21.6 Jews, 6.9 Poles, 0.8 Germans and 3.8 of other nationalities. (112)

112. Kubiyovich: Georgraphy of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 307 and 308.

11: Obermaier--181 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

In 1926 there were 42.1% Ukrainians in Kiyev, 38.3% in Khar'kov, 17.4% in Odessa, /Facing page 168/ /Map XII: Balance of Trade in the Soviet Ukraine. The diagrams on this page permit a comparison of import and export during the periods before and after the First World War. Note the decrease of exports in agricultural products and the increase of industrial exports/ /Captions:/

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Diagram of
Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union in
1909/11, 1913 and 1934
(in million rubles)

1.
Export, of this trade with Russia
/In circle marked 795:/
Grain 222
Metal and metal goods 90
Products of animal husbandry 56
Other produces 28
Other agricultural products 399

2.
Import
/In circle marked 472:/
Metals and machines 34.5
Naphtha products 33.5
Groceries 33
Leather & leather goods 31
Fish 29
Wood products 17
Other products 17
Other finished products 217

3. Export
/In circle marked 744:/
Grain 235
Metals & crude metals 116
Products of animal husbandry 53
Coal 50
Other products 25
Sugar 265

4. Import
/In circle marked 331:/
Wood products 37
Naphtha products 13
Metal goods
Other products 74
Other finished goods 197

5. Export
/In circle marked 720:/
Sugar 160
Coal 140
Grain 50
Ores 10
Metals and machines 360

11: Obermaier--182 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

439 6. Import
/In circle marked 380:/
Naphtha 110
Wood products 70
Fish 20
Products of animal husbandry 5
Other finished products 180

7. Export of various goods from the Soviet Ukraine in 1913, 1928, 1932 and 1934 (in million tons).

8. Coal
9. Ores

10. Iron & steel

11. Grain

12. Sugar

13. Wood

14. Naphtha & naphtha products

15. Various finished products

000/Also facing page 168/ /Where tractors are worn out harrowing is now done with horses/ /Facing page 169/A/At planting time the seed must be got into the ground within a few days. The tractor is particularly adapted to the cultivation of large
369 areas/A/169/ 35.9% in Dnepropetrovsk, 16.2% in
162 Lwow (1931), 28.9% in Stalin, 29.9% in Krasnodar (chief city of the Kuban region), and 17.8% in Chernovtsy.

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563 The Jews immediately seized what the Ukrainians had passed by. During the wars with the Turks Catherine II had opened to them the south Ukrainian gubernyas of Taurien, Kherson and Katerinoslav, the present-day Dnepropetrovsk. In 1835 the right of settlement of the Jews was extended to the entire right-bank section of the Ukraine with the exception of the city of Kiyev. The rest of Russia was almost completely free of Jews until 1917. From that time on all of Russia was open to them, and immediately the emigration

A [For plates, cf. pp. 224-225, category 11c - Analyst]

731 Most of the UNRRA food supplies delivered to the Ukraine are
262 distributed to ration stores for sale to workers and their dependants.
[443 A large proportion (about 35 per cent.) also goes for communal feeding
265] through dining rooms, health resorts, homes for invalids and the aged, and dining halls of trade schools. Hospitals, childrens' homes, maternity homes, and the like also receive a share (around 10 per cent.) (The food distributed to welfare organizations is delivered free of charge).

731 Apart from the food which UNRRA supplies, the Ukrainian people
262 are dependent on whatever amounts of local produce may appear on
434 various markets. According to the rationing system, the farmers are allowed to retain part of their produce to feed themselves and their dependants, and the farm's livestock; the state then purchases a certain quota for use in feeding the non-farm population. If any surplus then remains, the farmers may keep it, or sell it on the free market at uncontrolled prices.

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433 In practice, however, because of the extremely poor harvests in the last two years, Ukrainian farmers have scarcely been able to feed
434 even themselves; and the amounts of domestically produced food which reach the ration stores or the free market have consequently been small.

The following section describes the sources of food supply open to the urban consumers.

The System of Food Distribution

443 In the cities of the Ukraine there are three outlets through which
434 foodstuffs reach the population:

364 (a) the ration stores, where the bulk of foodstuffs are sold
262 at fixed prices to ration-coupon holders;

(b) the so-called gastronoms (commercial stores) where scarce, luxury items are sold; and

(c) the public markets, where collective farmers and peasants bring their surplus produce for sale.

Most of the rural areas and villages of the Ukraine are expected to produce locally enough food to feed the inhabitants; and as they are nearly all considered to be self-supplying, they receive through the central distribution system only sugar and sometimes bread. Their surplus farm produce (that is, food in excess of that needed for feeding people or livestock on the farm and not subject to collection or purchase by the state) is usually brought by the farmers to the public markets for sale to the urban population.
[435 The quantities of produce and the variety of items available in the free public markets vary greatly from season to season and from day to day; Prices are equally unstable.

262 745 434 Expectant and nursing mothers are usually at work, and have standard leaves with pay and special privileges; thus, if working, they receive rations appropriate to the occupational group, plus special food allowances; and if not working, dependents' rations plus these allowances. The supplements are as follows, monthly: cereals, 1.2 kilograms; butter (or substitute), 0.8 kilograms; sugar 0.6 kilograms; vegetables, 2.0 kilograms; milk (fresh or dried) 12 litres. Their approximate calories from rations alone are, therefore:

If light workers	1,682 plus 512 -	2,194	calories daily
If employees	1,144 plus 512 -	1,656	" "
If dependents	704 plus 512 -	1,216	" "

In the last case it is almost possible to assume that the husband is well paid and will be able to buy products in the open market.

262 Even if the established ration scales for all groups could be met, they would not provide an adequate, balanced diet. Particularly the rations for women and children are very light in fat, first-class protein, and calcium. They provide less than half the low League of Nation's standard for daily full-cream milk requirements of the expectant mother. But even these inadequate scales are seldom supplied.

262 434 Since mid-October 1946, the honouring of ration cards has, because of the increasing food shortages, become more and more irregular. In December 1946, for instance, large groups of persons in the Kiev area received only bread, sugar, and a few tins of vegetables on their cards. No meat, fish or fats were available. By the middle of January 1947, the situation had grown even more stringent, and only bread was supplied on the ration.

At the same time, the amount of food available off the ration has decreased almost to the vanishing point. Cereals and white bread have practically disappeared from the open market; and when they are available, the price is beyond the reach of the average person.

262 181 164 369 The effects of the poor diet are already to be seen. The people generally show a noticeable lack of their former liveliness, energy and cheerfulness. Moreover, according to the Medical Officer of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, clinical starvation has made its appearance in the smaller villages of the Republic: protein dropsy and avitaminosis are increasing; and among the townspeople there is great incidence of skin infections and respiratory and nasopharyngeal conditions.

645 744 262 In order to meet some of the medical aspects which may arise out of the present food situation, the Ministry of Health has taken the following steps.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hun-
241 garians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent
438 vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here
341 imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

THE UKRAINE

UK. 162 369

According to the 1926 census there were but 8 per cent Great Russians in the Ukraine, but these were mostly town-dwellers and proletarian elements and thus were able to play a considerable part in the political history of the Ukrainian S.S.R. since, according to Bolshevik principles, city workers necessarily lead the peasants, and the towns the countryside.

The towns of the Ukraine during the inter-war period had been not only bi-national Russian-Ukrainian but tri-national Russian-Ukrainian-Jewish, with the Jews frequently gravitating culturally to the Russian side. In Kiev, the largest Ukrainian city, the Ukrainians were originally the smallest ethnical group of the three. The 1926 census showed that Kiev's population consisted of 25·4 per cent Ukrainians, 36·2 per cent Russians, 32·1 per cent Jews and 3 per cent Poles. After 1926 the balance improved in favour of the Ukrainians but basically Kiev remained a Ukrainian-Russian-Jewish city. Kharkov, almost equal in size to Kiev, had in 1933 48 per cent Ukrainian inhabitants, whilst there were 30·3 per cent Russians and 17·7 per cent Jews. Of all the big cities of the Ukraine, Odessa, the capital of 'New Russia' has always been the least Ukrainian. Even including Odessa's country district the Ukrainians accounted for only 41 per cent of the total population against 23 per cent Russians and 20 per cent Jews. In the city of Odessa there were 17·5 per cent Ukrainians against 38·6 per cent Russians and 36·4 per cent Jews. Dniepropetrovsk, the fourth largest city of the Ukraine, in 1933 comprised 36 per cent Ukrainians, 31·5 per cent Russians and 26·6 per cent Jews.

The drastic reduction in the number of Jews through Hitlerite massacres and evacuation during the war improved the position of the Ukrainians in the cities of the Western and Central Ukraine, but in the industrial regions of the Eastern Ukraine the Ukrainians cannot keep pace with the tempo of urbanization and the needs of manpower. The two eastern border provinces of the Ukraine, Voroshilovgrad and Stalino, making up the Donets Basin, are inhabited by an international working-class, in particular by a strong Russian element, and are steadily growing in importance in relation to the Ukraine as a whole. The population of the Stalino Province rose by 91 per cent between 1926 and 1939 and that of the Voroshilovgrad Province by 37 per cent during the same period. The growth of the Stalino Province can be even better assessed by comparing the numbers of inhabitants of its three largest towns in 1926 and 1939. Stalino, the provincial centre rose from 174,000 to 462,000, Makeyevka from 79,421 to 240,000, Mariupol from 64,000 to [illegible],000.

STALINIST CENTRALISM VERSUS UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY

S.U. 631 186 UK. 186 642

The fact that Russians and Ukrainians are from the historical, geographical and ethnical point of view objectively inseparable calls for a certain

31: Sosnovy S-5 (no date) 1954 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

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obtain but may also be of inferior quality. The individual builder has also been faced with the problem of the government's attitude toward him which has been marked, as we have seen, by considerable fluctuations.

At the end of the twenties, Gosplan severely criticized individual building:

> The individual builder takes no account of sanitary or technical requirements, builds his house using very cheap and often defective materials and neglects to equip his dwelling with facilities considered an essential part of urban housing. The result is inferior but very inexpensive houses,[125] usually situated, without any planning, on the outskirts of the city; this is a tremendous obstacle to the future development of city planning.[126]

Some writers have noted that individual dwellings "consist of a one-room apartment with a kitchen, which serves at the same time as dwelling space" and "that these houses, in essence, differ very little from the village *izba*...."[127]

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125. Average cost per sq. m. of dwelling space in the individual sector was one-quarter of that in the public sector. See *Kontrol'nye tsifry narodnovo khozyaistva SSSR na 1927/28 g.g.* [Control Figures for the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. for 1927-1928], Moscow, 1928, p. 201.

126. *Pyatiletnii plan narodno-khozyaistvennovo stroitel'stva SSSR, op. cit.*, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 283.

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127. *Planovoye khozyaistvo,* Moscow, No. 9, 1927, p. 150. The following data (average figures) illustrate prerevolutionary rural living standards in the Ukraine, which were superior to those in other republics: 1.5 rooms per dwelling; 4.7 sq. m. of dwelling space per person; 75.7% of all houses had blind windows; only 5.2% had hinged window panes; 37.3% had a light coefficient of 1:15 (ratio of window space to floor space; in an average size room, the ratio is 1:8) while in the remainder it was considerably lower; 55.1% were damp; 94.8% had earth floors; and 81.4% had straw-covered roofs. Water and sewage systems, electricity, and gas were nonexistent in the rural areas. Rural housing in the postrevolutionary era eliminated many of these shortcomings. See Marzeyev, *op. cit.*, p. 426.

257 The central agrarian section of Ukraine, on both banks of
311 the Dnipro, includes industries producing foodstuffs and luxuries, above all the sugar industry. There are also plants here for manufacturing leather and medium-heavy machinery. Factories are much smaller than in the coal and ore area and the many small power-stations run on brown coal and peat.

381 The Carpathian area is the home above all of the chemical
311 industry and the capacity of the power-stations, usually run by gas and expensive imported coal, seldom by the abundant water power available, exceeds 10 000 KW only in Lviv — Uzhhorod, being used principally for lighting the towns. Industrialisation is densest on the oil-fields of Drohobych.

●371 In the foreland of the Caucasus electric plants are run by
311 petroleum only and water power is not exploited at all. The small factories (petroleum, tobaceo, leather and machinery of medium weight) are too scattered to form an industrial area in the strict sense.

392 The large towns form industrial centers that are not dependent
311 on the presence of raw materials. Kharkiv has heavy engineering plants for transportation requirements, factories for agricultural machinery, electro-technical factories, and workshops for precision instruments and machinery. These are large enterprises, built recently and attached to big power-stations (Chuhujiv 25 000 KW), so that Kharkiv may be classed with the industrial area in the vicinity.

39 Kyiv builds ships and produces chemical and electro-technical
311 equipment and has chemical and textile plants as well as sugar and foodstuffs factories. In Odessa the same factories are represented and there are also canneries, leather works and plants for producing cinema installations. In addition, there are workshops that specialise in the structure of motor-cars and planes. In the other towns in the country enterprises for this or that industry have been established.

methods and branches of industry have been introduced, as for instance the production of superior steel and iron alloys. 327

The development of the power-station on the Dnipro entailed a certain change in the location of heavy industry. And the ratio of coal to iron per manufactured unit which was 2.8 : 1 before World War I became 1.6 : 1, though it is still more practicable to transport high quality ores to coal than vice-versa. The Dnipro power-station, however, which is more favorably situated as regards markets and consumption is attracting new foundations of enterprises in heavy industry. This is particularly true of Zaporizha. 371 327

5. Production of Machinery and Metal Goods

Even before World War I, markets were favorable for the production of machinery, above all for agricultural purposes which accounted for the work done for private customers in 126 plants. But modern, large factories were not built till after the war. New branches of production were started, e. g. for motor-cars and tractors (see huge factory in Kharkiv), machinery for mines and precision instruments while the construction of engines and railway trucks increased. The largest factories are in the Donets Combine and in the three large towns; the manufacture of agricultural machines is also distributed over other areas. 392

The non-ferrous metal industry is poorly represented. Between 1914 and 1928 there was practically no increase in the production of mercury (41 000 to 42 000 t). In the Kuban area in 1913 3 000 t zinc and 1 350 t lead were produced; in 1932 these figures were 5 000 and 3 500 t lead respectively. Under the first Five Year Plan zinc factories were erected in connection with the chemical works in Konstantynivka and aluminium works in Kichkas near the power plant on the Dnipro Bend. The annual production of the latter is estimated at 40 000 t. Fuel or power requirements play a greater part than the transportation of raw materials. The production of metal goods is confined to small factories. 328

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

438 [655] In addition to factory industries there exists in Russia a group known as *kustarni* or domestic industries. They are considered so important by the Government that measures are taken by the various authorities to improve their output and conditions, to revive old ones and even to found new ones. Their range is wide, and they are carried on by families, by working syndicates or *artels* (cf. p. 73), or by individuals. In the Ukraine these industries are less well developed than in most parts of Russia, and in some provinces are hardly represented. There are three branches well established. Pottery is manufactured in the Governments of Kiev, Chernigov, and Poltava, where suitable clays are found, and the *kustarni* earthenware of these districts has a good reputation all over the country. Shoes, harness, and other leather goods are produced in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. Combs, buttons, and other objects made from animal horn are also a noted product of Poltava.

(6) Power

371 In the Ukraine power is almost exclusively produced by steam. Electric power is used for the tramways in Odessa and Kiev, but water-power is neglected, and electric drive for factory work is not employed.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(a) *General Characteristics; Markets, Fairs, &c.*

438 441 The trade of the Ukraine consists almost entirely in the movement and marketing of the produce of the land in one form or another. One of its noticeable features is the passage of commodities through several hands before they come into use. Nowhere are found so many middlemen, salesmen, and agents. This is caused principally by the lack of capital in the hands of the producer and a general encumbrance and hypothecation of land, crops, machinery, &c. There is

376 Waterpower in Ukraine is estimated at about 12 million HP. Of this some 9.6 million is supplied by the mountain rivers of North Caucasia. The water-power of the Carpathian rivers is much less, but also less utilised. The fall of the rivers in Dnipro-Ukraine is, of course, incomparably less though they carry far more water. Their water-power is estimated at 1.4 million HP, more than $^2/_3$ being utilised while scarcely 10 % of the entire water-power in Ukraine is harnessed to industry. It is not, however, certain that all the power of the mountain rivers could be utilised for industrial purposes.

5. Iron Ores

(See Table 6)

135 Ukraine has small deposits of iron ore in practically all areas, also in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine. In the Kuban area the entire resources amount to almost 100 million t. As an important contributor to the history of production, the Donets Basin must also be mentioned. All those deposits have a local, if sometimes not inconsiderable, significance.

The iron ore deposit at Kryvyj Rih (Russian Kriwoi Rog) is the most important in Eastern Europe, both from the point of view of quality and quantity. The ore lies along the Inhulets, the last tributary on the right bank of the Dnipro, and along its tributaries, the Zhovta and the Saksahan, some 130—200 kilometers from the mouth of the Dnipro. They are found in a hollow some 100 kilometers long but very narrow (2—6—9 km) and are generally only prospected some 320 meters deep, although valuable iron ore was found at a depth of almost 500 meters.

The thickness of the individual layers of ore is, in the least favorable cases, 4—7 meters, but mostly 10—30, 45—65, and more rarely 100—150 meters. Before World War I deposits were estimated at 200—300 million t, which figure rose to 1245 million t by 1932. As this is superior red iron ore, the Kryvyj Rih deposit with a pure metal content of 540 million tons, far surpasses all other iron ore deposits in Eastern Europe, even if they contain more crude ore. The quality of

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

SU 241 U 241

in the southern flat steppes. Other crops include castor beans, vineyards (near Osipenko), and fruits near Melitopol' and Kamenka-Dneprovskaya.

SU 376 U 376

Zaporozh'ye (the former Aleksandrovsk) is a major industrial and hydroelectric-power center, the site of the Dnieper dam and power station (*Dneproges*). This largest water-power producer of Europe has a capacity of 550,000 kilowatts. Completed in 1932, the dam was blown up in 1941 by the retreating Russians in accordance with their scorched-earth policy. Reconstruction began shortly after its recapture in 1943, and in 1947 the first turbine went into operation. The power generated by *Dneproges* furnished the basis for the industrial development of Zaporozh'ye, supplying its new special steel works, aluminum, and magnesium plants. It produces harvester combines and chemicals.

SU 438* U 438

Melitopol', an agricultural center in the southern steppe, has machine shops, producing diesel motors, grain-elevator equipment, and pumps. In addition to chemical and furniture industries, it also has flour mills, meat-packing plants, and cottonseed-oil presses.

Osipenko, until 1940 called Berdyansk, is an important port on the Sea of Azov. It has agricultural machinery works, an aircraft plant, shipyards, and railroad repair shops. Near by is a health and beach resort.

THE BLACK SEA LOWLAND

SU 241 U 241

THE BLACK SEA LOWLAND, with its dry level steppes, includes the oblasts of Odessa, Nikolayev, Kherson, the southern part of Zaporozh'ye, as well as Kirovograd and Izmail. This area which was annexed by the Russian Empire only in the eighteenth century, is a region of relatively recent settlement. Only toward the end of the last century did extensive grain growing replace the previously predominant pastoral economy, and the region developed into the main grain producer of the Ukraine. In the Soviet period a vast cotton area was introduced in the lower Dnieper area and cultivated by dry-farming methods in rotation with fodder crops. Elsewhere sunflowers, soy beans, fruits, melons, and vineyards became important. The local industry is closely connected with the agricultural production and engages in processing and machine manufacturing. Shipbuilding is centered in the large coastal cities.

Coal in Donets Basin

316

1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892
1414	1495	1740	1758	1665	1883	2110	2060	2500	3110	3000	3140	3570
1285	1400	1400	1600	1665	1800	1990	2050	2420	2480	2470	2600	2890
3300	3500	3800	3900	3900	4300	4600	4600	5400	6200	6000	6200	7000
43	42,5	46	45	42,5	44	46	45	46,5	50	50	50,5	51

1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915
11.6	13	12,9	14,2	18,2	17,9	17,7	16,7	19.9	21,4	25,3	27,6	26,6
4,8	4,8	3,6	4,6	5,4	5,6	5,7	5,5	5,8	6,4	6,9	3,8	—
17,9	19,6	18,7	21,7	26	25,9	26	24.9	28.4	31,1	36	35,6	30,9
65	66,5	69	65,5	70	69	68	67	70	69	70	78	86

1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
11.8	12.5	19,6	24,6	27,3	31	36,5	40,9	44	51	61,4	69,6	77,5	77,5
1	1	1,8	2,6	2,6	3	3,6	5,5	7,3	9,2	11,6	14,1	17,3	17,8
16,3	16,5	25,8	32.3	35.5	40	47,8	56,8	64,4	76,3	93,6	109	126	128
72,5	76	76	76	77	77,5	76,5	72	68,5	67	65,5	64	61,5	60,5

327
311

The largest centers of production in the Donets Basin are Stalino, Makijivka, Kramatorska, Voroshylivhrad, Horlivka, Konstantynivka, Artemivske (Bakhmut), Slovianske etc. Mariupil is the exporting harbor.

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At the Dnipro Bend there are, among others, plants for best quality steel, ship-building yards, electro-technical factories and largescale chemical works. The gigantic power-station at Dnipropetrivske has a capacity of 558 000 KW. The main centers of production are Dnipropetrivske, Zaporizha, Dniprodshershinske, Kryvyj Rih and Nikopil. The exporting harbors are Mykolajiv and, for some products, Kherson.

The Donets Basin and the Dnipro Bend are frequently combined to-day and represent a many-sided economy on a wide basis of raw materials and power. As a combine it is contrasted with the Ural-Kusnetsk Combine (above all as regards coal and iron). Kerch with its ore mines and heavy industry gravitates towards the Donets Combine.

6. Production of Electricity, Brown Coal and Peat

●377 In the production of electric current Ukraine has not made much progress. The figure for 1932 was 2 800 million KWh (Germany 23460 mill. KWh, Italy 10230 million KWh, Switzerland 4 800 million KWh, Belgium 3 800 million KWh). Of the total current produced in Ukraine, 2 045 mill. KWh were contributed by Dnipro-Ukraine, 474 million by North Caucasia, 211 million by Western Ukraine. 80 % of the electric current in Dnipro-Ukraine is generated by coal (3/5 by coal dust), 15 % by petroleum and only 5.5 % by water-power.

In the period from 1927—1933 the great hydro-electric plant was constructed at Dnipropetrovske (Dniprelstan, Russian Dnjeprostroj) with a capacity of 558 000 KW; at the time it was the second largest hydro-electric plant in the world and was built by American engineers. It is a great feat of engineering. And yet scarcely 8 % of the available water-power has been exploited. The plant is of importance for shipping (in overcoming rapids in the river) and for the irrigation of arid areas, but also for industry. All manner of factories have sprung up round it — for the production of pig-iron, best-quality steel, metal and manganese alloys, aluminium, then chemical factories for sulfates, synthetic ammonia, soda etc.

316 The mining of brown coal started in the middle of the 19th century and produced from 1902—11 an annual average of 41 000 t. This figure sank rapidly after World War I. The industry began in the district round Kyiv as a result of the erection of sugar factories and it also supplied several agricultural machinery plants, but it could not hold its own in competition with Donets coal. After World War I, the production of brown coal was systematically promoted and in 1934 had reached 0.3 million t. It is used by power plants and for the manufacture of briquettes. A start has been made to produce benzine by hydro-genetic processes.

The production of peat has also grown from modest beginnings (annual production before 1914 only 23 000 t) to a considerable figure (1.1 million t in 1935). It is confined practically to Dnipro-Ukraine. It is utilised mainly by the agricultural indu-

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

(Mariupol); 'The Russian Providence' (near Mariupol); 'The Kerch' (near Kerch). In the 'Western' (Dniepr) group the principal works were: 'The Gdantsev' (Krivoy Rog); 'The Dniepr' (near Ekaterinoslav); 'The Alexandrovsky' (near Alexandrovsk). Almost all these works have continued to function under the Soviets; during the course of the last twenty years some have been considerably enlarged and others modernized. Some have been renamed: e.g. 'Alexandrovsky', now 'Zaporogian Steel'; 'Gdantsev', 'Krivoy Rog'; 'Russian Providence', 'Azov Steel'. These three, particularly, have become very important plants. 325 103

The Ukrainian and New Russian metallurgical industry comprises 45 blast furnaces and 118 open-hearth furnaces. In the twenty-five years between 1913 and 1938 the output of pig iron has been expanded from 3 million to nearly 8 million tons; rolled iron from 1 million to 3 million; steel from 2 to 5 million tons. Thus, the metallurgical industry of Ukraine and New Russia (excluding the rest of U.S.S.R.) ranks fourth in world production of pig iron (after U.S., Germany and Great Britain) and fifth in the production of steel and rolled iron (after U.S., Germany, Britain and France). In 1938 the Ukrainian and New Russian industries produced 55 per cent of all Russian pig iron, 35 per cent of all steel and 25 per cent of all rolled iron. Concentrated within a comparatively limited region the heavy industry of New Russia and the Ukraine constitutes the most highly developed industrial area of the Soviet Union. 327

The Revolutionary régime was fortunate in inheriting a wide area of industrialization which, in the immediate pre-Revolutionary period, had been expensively equipped with modern plants by West European capitalist groups. The régime cannot be considered to have achieved anything remarkable in further development, and had the capitalist system of promotion been allowed to survive it is probable that progress would have been more rapid.

The most spectacular (and widely advertised) achievement of the Soviet régime in the Ukraine has been the construction of the grandiose hydro-electric plant in the neighbourhood of the rapids of the Dniepr (Dnieprostroy). A new source of energy (about 600,000 kilowatts), equivalent to a third of the electric energy produced in the Ukraine, has been made available for industry. Dnieprostroy may, however, be considered as a somewhat redundant reinforcement of the power sources of the country which could only have been undertaken by a régime which was not hampered by considerations of productive yield on capital investment. In view of the vast deposits of coal and anthracite to hand and of the as yet unexplored reserves of lignite, the development of a new source of 377

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

377 energy was not of urgent importance. Dnieprostroy supplies neighbouring towns and industrial plants with light and power (including the new 'Dniepr Electrical-Metallurgical Works' and the 'Dniepr Aluminium Works'), but the electrification of the railways of Soviet Ukraine has not yet been undertaken, nor does this appear necessary in view of the cheap supplies of fuel locally available.

397 392 103 As for machine and other mechanical works, there were in existence before 1916: 'Hartmann's Locomotive Works' at Lugansk; the more modern 'Kharkov Locomotive Works' and 'The Electro-Mechanical Works', also at Kharkov; and a series of smaller machine works (particularly for the manufacture of agricultural machinery) at Sumy, Alexandrovsk, Berdyansk, Odessa and Kiev. The Soviet Government considerably enlarged the 'Lugansk Locomotive Works', and recently machine and locomotive works have been in process of construction and subsequent enlargement at Kramatorskaya (in the Donets region). New 'Tractors' Construction Works' have been built in Kharkov. Machinery plants have been founded in Berdyansk and Cherkassy; the old Kiev and Alexandrovsk works have been enlarged; and new agricultural machinery works have been built in Elizavetgrad, Melitopol and Kherson. The shipbuilding works in Nikolaev continue to supply the Black Sea fleet as before the Revolution. There, during the last war, ships were in construction for the Imperial Navy; armour-plate being manufactured in the 'Nikopol-Mariupol Works'.

381 Some progress has been made in the development of a chemical industry based on the abundant supplies of coal in Donbass. There are chemical processing plants at Slavyansk and Lisichansk, and near the railway stations of Gorlovka and Konstantinovka. The industry is still in the experimental stage, but Soviet 'Plans' envisage the supply of 30 per cent of the needs of the home market.

433 The Soviet emphasis on the development of Ukrainian heavy industry and a parallel neglect of the possible expansion of light industries has produced a badly balanced economy in Soviet Ukraine and the country remains dependent on other and often distant parts of the Union for the satisfaction of many of the needs of the people. Political considerations which aim at establishing the complete interdependence of the various parts of the Union are at the basis of the particular direction of the Five Year Plans in the Ukraine. The emigré Ukrainian economist, V. Sadovsky, writes: 'In 1934, 69·4 per cent of industry went to the production of materials and of the tools of production, and only 34·6 per cent for general needs. In this sense the relations existing in 1913 were

spot and leaves the country in the form of special steels, 327
of sheet-iron, of all sorts of machines and tools, as well as of chemical products.

The two mining regions and the regions of Dniepropetrovsk possess forty-five furnaces having a volume of 25,000,000 cubic metres and more than 110 Martin ovens. Russian industry still depends to-day in great measure on the factories of the Ukraine.

As we have seen, the state of industry in the Ukraine, especially of heavy industry, is conditioned by the geographical position of its raw materials and of the sources of energy. All the metal is concentrated at Krivoi-Rog and the source of energy is represented in the first instance by the coal of the Donietz.

The peat bogs dispersed over the whole territory and 316
whose extent does not exceed 400,000 hectares and the production 500,000 tons, and the brown coals the extraction of which is only 300,000 tons, can enter into the calculation only as auxiliary fuel of a definitely local importance.

The Ukraine, on the contrary, is well supplied with 377
hydro-electric plant. This energy is mainly given by the station of *Dnieprogues*, better known under the name of '*Dnieprostroi*,' which means 'Construction on the Dnieper.' This name was especially valuable during the building of the station which, having been finished, has taken the name of '*Dnieprogues*,' an abbreviation of '*Dniepro*vskaia *Gu*idro-*E*lectritcheskaia *S*tantsia,' which means 'hydro-electric station on the Dnieper.' Built by the Soviets on the rapids of this river, it employs the energy and the power which reach 600,000 kwh.

In the other regions of the Ukraine the network of hydro-electric stations is relatively poor, as the rivers do not provide the necessary resources in this respect. The existing stations serve the mills, the oil mills, the sugar refineries, or the town stations of small power.

377 The functioning of the *Dnieprogues* station, which could open enormous possibilities of development of all kinds of industries and of the electrification of the railways, has nevertheless, despite its enormous power, failed to change the industrial geography of the Ukraine because it is just half-way between the Donietz basin and Krivoi-Rog and thus does not bring about any alteration in the distribution of the sources of energy.

438 Thus the heavy industry of the Ukraine remains, in its greater part, concentrated around this region, round Nikopol and along the northern edge of the Donietz basin.

325 Kharkov and its surroundings are the greatest metallurgical centres of the Ukraine. There great factories of turbines, of generators, of electrical machines, of tractors, of locomotives, of railway trucks, and of factory equipment, etc., are to be found.

327 The production of sheet-iron and of steel rails, tubes, plates, beams, wire, etc., is distributed among many factories of the Donietz basin, at Nikopol and at Dniepropetrovsk.

Zaporojie (not far from Krivoi-Rog and near the *Dnieprogues*) produces nearly 60 per cent of the special steels of the Union. The Soviets intend to create a new powerful centre of metal industry there.

391 392 Apart from Kharkov, factories producing all the heavier machines such as locomotives are to be found in the Donbass (abbreviation of Donietz basin which we will now use), at Lougansk, and at Kramatorski, where an enormous newly constructed factory is one of the largest in the world.

402 The equipment for the light industry—the mills, wine-presses, oil mills and elevators—is chiefly manufactured at Berdiansk (Donbass), Melitopol (Northern Taurida), Tcherkassy (centre), Kiev, and Odessa.

392 Agricultural machinery comes from the factories of

SU
464 The number of workers and employees in the national economy of the
874 U.S.S.R. increased by 3 million. Vocational schools and factory training centres graduated thousands of skilled workers, and improved the skill of several millions already employed.

SU
727 Of the districts which suffered occupation, economic rehabilitation
433 as well as capital construction amounting to 17,500 million roubles in
652 1946 made it possible to increase their industrial output by 28 per cent. as compared with 1945. Pravda writes - "the factories, mills, pits, power stations, towns and villages which were destroyed by the enemy are being revived one by one...."[1]

In the Ukraine

U
727 The Ukraine has been likened to one big building site, where more
433 than 500,000 workers are engaged in restoring industrial plants and
327 municipal buildings.[2] In the Donets Basin, the coal output of 1946 was 30 per cent. higher than that of 1945. In the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, 21 blast furnaces, 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries were at work by January 1947. Of 104 machine-building factories to be restored, 102 were already producing goods, and mastering the production of improved types of machinery. The Kharkov transport machine-building works was preparing to build long-distance steam engines; and the tractor works was increasing its production, as were many other factories.

U
727 In 1946 the Kharkov turbo-generator works made a 100,000 kilowatt
433 turbine and one of 50,000 kilowatts. At Dniepropetrovsk, a lorry
393 factory was being built; and in Odessa and Lvov, automobile assembly
398 works were under construction. Great work was also being done in the development of light industry, food processing, chemical works, and other branches of industry.

U
727 After three years' work of restoration the Dnieper Dam had been
433 rebuilt in the main, and the housing for the power station erected.
377 By the end of 1946 the capacity of Ukrainian power stations had reached 70 per cent. of pre-war.

U
362 Since the liberation over 104.5 million square feet of floor space
368 had been restored in the Ukraine. Over half a million of the 590,000 houses destroyed by the Germans were restored or built anew in Ukrainian villages; and more than 13,000 cultural institutions in the villages and 118,000 auxiliary buildings on the farms.[2]

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1 Pravda, quoted by Soviet News, London, January 22, 1946

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

135 To the south-east, in the Don and northern Donets valleys,
654 geologists have discovered a number of new coal-bearing areas, and have confirmed that the Donets Basin coal layers stretch far to the east and south.

Other investigations of coal-bearing areas are to begin shortly, particularly around the Azov Sea coast and in other regions bordering the Donets Basin.

Coke

316 The coke output of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is planned to be 15,500,000 tons.

Natural Gas and Oil

315 With the incorporation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the Ukrainian
185 S.S.R. came into possession of oil producing regions. The Five-Year Plan calls for the intensive development of these and other areas of the Ukraine for the increased production of oil and natural gas. Three hundred and twenty-five wells are to be located to add to the
[654] petroleum resources of the western regions; prospecting for commercial deposits of petroleum in the Romny area is to be completed; and there is to be extensive geological exploration for natural gas in the Dragobych Region (Western Ukraine) and on the Azov and Black Sea coasts.

[382] The total output of petroleum in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 325,000 metric tons.

The plan also provides for the building of a gas pipeline from Dashava to Kiev. Already in process of construction, the first section of the pipeline will be completed this year (1947) and will supply gas to more than 30,000 flats and several large industrial plants in Kiev.

Electric Power Stations

377 Electrification has been one of the outstanding features of the Soviet economy. Before the war the Ukrainian Republic possessed a wide network of electric power stations. Best known was the huge Dnieper Dam and Lenin Hydro-electric Station, completed in 1932 near Zaporozhie. This station supplied electric power to a great industrial region: in the north the steel mills of Dniepropetrovsk and Dnieprodzerzhinsk, and to the south-east, the Nikopol manganese mines. These three industrial centres developed quickly after the Dnieper Dam was built; and the abundance of cheap power available from it also gave rise to the growth of a metal and machine-building centre at Zaporozhie.

727 In August 1941 the retreating Soviet army troops partially disabled
397 the Dnieper Dam and power station to prevent its falling into enemy hands. This destruction was later completed by the Germans. When the Soviet Army recaptured the region, they found that 35 of the dam's 48 piers had been blown up, and all the generators destroyed. Damage to the power house alone was estimated at 500,000,000 roubles.

Reconstruction work began in February 1944, when the war was still on. Three years later the assembly of the first power unit of 72,000 kilowatt capacity was completed; and on March 3, 1947, the Lenin Hydro-electric Station supplied its first post-war currency to the industry of the Dnieper Valley.

There are over 11,000 men and women engaged on the restoration job, which has involved repairing the dam and the underwater structures, building the housing for the power station, and mounting the machines. Another two power units are to be assembled later this year.

After the expulsion of the Germans from the Ukraine, the capacity of the Republic's power stations was only 0.4 per cent. of pre-war. By the end of August 1946 restored capacity had reached 47 per cent. In the Donets Basin 70 per cent. had been restored, and in the Stalino area, 79 per cent. In the city of Lvov (Western Ukraine) the pre-war capacity of its electric power stations had been surpassed by 18 per cent. In the first seven months of 1946 much had been accomplished: some 400 power stations, including 215 hydro-electric plants, had been launched in the Ukraine; and it was expected that 750 more power stations would be completed by the end of the year.

The Five-Year Plan fixes the 1950 output of electric power in the Ukraine at 13,690 million kilowatt hours. The total capcity of Ukrainian power stations is to be increased in 1946-50 by 2,57_,000 kilowatts. The Five-Year Plan directs that:-

"The Lenin Hydro-electric Station on the Dnieper shall be rebuilt. Small hydro-electric power plants with a total capacity of 203,000 kilowatts shall be built to meet the requirements of agriculture and local consumers. Plant aggregating 95,000 kilowatts shall be put into operation at municipal electric power stations."

The restoration of electric power facilities will assist greatly in rehabilitating other sections of the Soviet economy

Iron and Steel

185 The Five-Year Plan for the Ukrainian S.S.R. envisages an output in
327 1950 of 9.7 million tons of pig iron, and 8.8 million tons of steel.
433

In order to accomplish this, the iron and steel plants of the Donets Basin and the Dnieper region are to be rehabilitated; and there are to be put into operation 30 blast furnaces with an aggregate annual capacity of 9 million tons of pig-iron, steel smelting units with a

311 Despite a certain reduction in the area under cultivation in the
241 Ukraine, (25,124,900 hectares in 1937 as compared with 26,438,400 in
1932), production rose considerably, reflecting great progress in the
[407] mechanization of agriculture. The number of tractors increased from
61,300 in 1932 to 83,900 in 1937. The number of harvesting combines
[475] increased in the same period from 4,900 to 26,700. The number of
Machine and Tractor Stations grew from 657 to 958. The mechanization of agriculture in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is shown in the following table, which compares the output of energy from draught animals with the energy derived from machines, both in the Ukrainian Republic and in the entire Soviet Union. (It should be noted that, according to Soviet practice, the output of energy is measured in kilowatt hours.)

TABLE V

Output of Energy in Agriculture, 1938
(million kwh)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Total Soviet Union
[407] Energy from machines	4,211	19,304.2
379] Energy from draught cattle	1,662	14,667.5
Total output of energy in agriculture	5,873	33,971.7

Source : Planned Economy XII, Moscow, 1940.

[178] As the table shows, the percentage of mechanization in the Ukraine was greater than in the entire Soviet Union.

TABLE XV

231 Livestock in Pre-War Ukraine and in the U.S.S.R.

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	
	1932	1937
Cows	2,436,500	3,458,900
Other large cattle	1,591,700	4,300,500
Pigs	2,667,700	7,729,700
Sheep and goats	1,528,700	3,301,500
Horses	2,430,200	2,937,200

	Soviet Union	
	1934	1938
Large cattle	35,500,000	50,900,000
Pigs	11,500,000	25,700,000
Sheep and goats	36,500,000	66,600,000
Horses	15,400,000	16,200,000

Source: Soviet Construction, Moscow, 1939

379 407 It will be noted that in both the Ukraine and in the U.S.S.R. as a whole, only a slight increase occurred in the number of horses. This again illuminates the greater use of machines in place of animal draught power.

Livestock in Western Ukraine

In 1939 the livestock of Western Ukraine alone was as follows.

TABLE XVI

Livestock in Western Ukraine, 1939

Cows	1,718,000
Other horned cattle	868,000
Pigs	1,466,000
Sheep and goats	772,000
Horses	1,043,000

Source: Concise Year-Book of Poland, Polish Ministry of Information, London, 1941

257 The central agrarian section of Ukraine, on both banks of
311 the Dnipro, includes industries producing foodstuffs and luxuries, above all the sugar industry. There are also plants here for manufacturing leather and medium-heavy machinery. Factories are much smaller than in the coal and ore area and the many small power-stations run on brown coal and peat.

● 381 The Carpathian area is the home above all of the chemical
311 industry and the capacity of the power-stations, usually run by gas and expensive imported coal, seldom by the abundant water power available, exceeds 10 000 KW only in Lviv — Uzhhorod, being used principally for lighting the towns. Industrialisation is densest on the oil-fields of Drohobych.

371 In the foreland of the Caucasus electric plants are run by
311 petroleum only and water power is not exploited at all. The small factories (petroleum, tobacco, leather and machinery of medium weight) are too scattered to form an industrial area in the strict sense.

392 The large towns form industrial centers that are not dependent
311 on the presence of raw materials. Kharkiv has heavy engineering plants for transportation requirements, factories for agricultural machinery, electro-technical factories, and workshops for precision instruments and machinery. These are large enterprises, built recently and attached to big power-stations (Chuhujiv 25 000 KW), so that Kharkiv may be classed with the industrial area in the vicinity.

39 Kyiv builds ships and produces chemical and electro-technical
311 equipment and has chemical and textile plants as well as sugar and foodstuffs factories. In Odessa the same factories are represented and there are also canneries, leather works and plants for producing cinema installations. In addition, there are workshops that specialise in the structure of motor-cars and planes. In the other towns in the country enterprises for this or that industry have been established.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

377 energy was not of urgent importance. Dnieprostroy supplies neighbouring towns and industrial plants with light and power (including the new 'Dniepr Electrical-Metallurgical Works' and the 'Dniepr Aluminium Works'), but the electrification of the railways of Soviet Ukraine has not yet been undertaken, nor does this appear necessary in view of the cheap supplies of fuel locally available.

397 As for machine and other mechanical works, there were in
392 existence before 1916: 'Hartmann's Locomotive Works' at Lugansk;
103 the more modern 'Kharkov Locomotive Works' and 'The Electro-Mechanical Works', also at Kharkov; and a series of smaller machine works (particularly for the manufacture of agricultural machinery) at Sumy, Alexandrovsk, Berdyansk, Odessa and Kiev. The Soviet Government considerably enlarged the 'Lugansk Locomotive Works', and recently machine and locomotive works have been in process of construction and subsequent enlargement at Kramatorskaya (in the Donets region). New 'Tractors' Construction Works' have been built in Kharkov. Machinery plants have been founded in Berdyansk and Cherkassy; the old Kiev and Alexandrovsk works have been enlarged; and new agricultural machinery works have been built in Elizavetgrad, Melitopol and Kherson. The shipbuilding works in Nikolaev continue to supply the Black Sea fleet as before the Revolution. There, during the last war, ships were in construction for the Imperial Navy; armour-plate being manufactured in the 'Nikopol-Mariupol Works'.

●381 Some progress has been made in the development of a chemical industry based on the abundant supplies of coal in Donbass. There are chemical processing plants at Slavyansk and Lisichansk, and near the railway stations of Gorlovka and Konstantinovka. The industry is still in the experimental stage, but Soviet 'Plans' envisage the supply of 30 per cent of the needs of the home market.

433 The Soviet emphasis on the development of Ukrainian heavy industry and a parallel neglect of the possible expansion of light industries has produced a badly balanced economy in Soviet Ukraine and the country remains dependent on other and often distant parts of the Union for the satisfaction of many of the needs of the people. Political considerations which aim at establishing the complete interdependence of the various parts of the Union are at the basis of the particular direction of the Five Year Plans in the Ukraine. The emigré Ukrainian economist, V. Sadovsky, writes: 'In 1934, 69·4 per cent of industry went to the production of materials and of the tools of production, and only 34·6 per cent for general needs. In this sense the relations existing in 1913 were

SU 316 433 U 316 433 metropolitan areas of Moscow, Leningrad, and other industrial centers, as well as the entire southern rail network of the USSR west of the Volga and south of the Moscow coal basin. During the period of the German occupation of the Ukraine (1941–43), the coal mines suffered greatly. At present, reconstruction work is in full swing, mines are being reestablished, and it is hoped to have reached prewar production by the end of the post-war Five-Year Plan. The major coal-mining centers are Stalino, Yenakiyevo, Gorlovka, Kadiyevka, Chistyakovo, Krasnyy Luch, and Sverdlovsk. Anthracite, used principally for fuel, is mined in the eastern and the southern sections, while coking coal is produced in the western and the northern parts of the Donets Basin.

SU 327 433 U 327 433 The giant iron and steel mills of the Ukraine lie mainly in the western part of the Donbas, that is, in the coke-supplying area, in the Krivoy Rog iron basin, and along the Dnieper between these two raw-material sources. Among the mills producing over one million tons of pig iron per year are modernized prerevolutionary plants at Makeyevka (Donbas), and at Dnepropetrovsk and at Dneprodzerzhinsk on the Dnieper and new plants at Krivoy Rog, Zaporozh'ye, and Zhdanov. The Azovstal' mills at Zhdanov use Kerch' (Crimea) iron ore, which is shipped across the Sea of Azov.

SU 392 438* U 392 438 Machine construction has been developed to a very large extent in the Ukraine in recent years. Due to the close proximity of the sources of metal and in view of the lack of skilled local labor, the Ukraine was designed to produce types of machinery requiring little precision work, but large amounts of metal. Plants located in the Donbas specialize in heavy machine construction; among them, Kramatorsk produces coal-mining and steel-milling machinery, and Voroshilovgrad has a large locomotive works. Agricultural machinery plants are located along the Dnieper and on the right bank. Khar'kov possesses a large tractor plant and locomotive works and produces hydro-turbines and electric motors. There are car-building works at Nikolayev and Dnepropetrovsk, shipyards at Nikolayev, Kherson, and Kiev, and oil-drilling machinery is made in L'vov.

SU 381 438* U 381 438 The industrial picture of the Ukraine includes a number of factors suitable for the establishment of a strong chemical industry: the by-products of coking and metallurgical processes, the presence of such important raw materials as salt and phosphorites, the availability of cheap energy produced by coal-fed (*Zugres* and *Shtergres*) or hydroelectric (*Dneproges*) power stations, and finally the need for chemical products

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RD2

in agriculture (fertilizers) and in other branches of the economy. There are several superphosphate plants on the right bank, a large soda industry in the Artemovsk-Lisichansk area in the north of the Donets Basin, based on local salt deposits, chemical plants tied closely to the coking and the metallurgical establishments, and sulphuric acid and fertilizer plants connected with the metallurgy of zinc.

In addition to zinc, which is imported into the Donets Basin, nonferrous metallurgy includes that of aluminum, which is also imported and worked at Zaporozh'ye on the basis of *Dneproges* power, and of mercury, mined near Nikitovka in the Donbas.

The petroleum and natural-gas industry is of only local importance and is intended to supply the Ukraine with its gas and liquid fuel needs. The oil fields lie in the foothills of the Carpathians, near Borislav and Drogobych. During the current Plan, a natural gas pipe line was laid from Dashava (in the oil fields) to Kiev. The Ukraine also imports petroleum from Baku via the ports of Osipenko and Odessa, and the station of Trudovaya (Donbas) is the terminus of a kerosene pipe line from the Groznyy fields.

The textile industry (wool, cotton, and linen milling) supplies only local needs. The food industry, on the other hand, is of national importance. This is true especially of the sugar-refining industry, located mainly in the Vinnitsa and Kiev oblasts, on the right bank, and in the Poltava and Kiev oblasts, on the left bank.

The agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR, less important than heavy industry with respect to the value of production, occupies, nonetheless, a major position in the economy of the USSR. Arable land occupies 60 percent of the total area. Prior to the Second World War the Ukraine was one of the regions best equipped with machine-tractor stations and agricultural machinery. Among the cereals, winter wheat in the west, spring wheat in the east, and barley are most important. The sugar beet is by far the major industrial crop; sunflower, cotton, and tobacco are grown to a lesser extent. Orchard farming is popular and produces melons and pumpkins, garden fruits (apples, pears, plums, and cherries), and in the south, apricots and grapes. Horses, cattle, and pigs are raised throughout the region.

The right-bank Poles'ye is least developed agriculturally. Marshes and forests occupy most of the area. In the isolated patches of moist arable land, potatoes, buckwheat, flax, and hemp are the chief crops. The area abounds, however, in pasture land, and dairy farming is

stry, but also by power plants. On the whole, however, brown 316
coal and peat have no great importance for Ukraine.

7. Petroleum and Gas

The petroleum industry was founded in Galicia about the 382 ●
middle of the 19th century. In 1909 Galicia (yearly production of 2 million t) contributed 5 % of the world production of petroleum and ranked third. But an uninterrupted decline set in, so that in 1937 its figure of 510 000 t was only 16th in world production.

The reason for this decline was the splitting up of landed property and backward methods of production. Some of the 25 refineries were on Polish territory. The crude oil is transported by rail. As the high paraffin content of Galician oil causes obstruction in pipes and as the oilfields are far from the sea and the market for this oil is in Central Europe, there has been no attempt to lay pipe lines.

In the Kuban area the figure for petroleum production was only 150 000 t in 1912, but this increased under the two first Five Year Plans to 1.8 million t in 1937. Since 1900 the petroleum is conducted by pipe from Maikop to Krasnodar, the pipe being 108 km long and able to send 900 000 t a year. In 1928 it was connected with the main pipe which is 618 km long and connects the Groznyj oil-field with Tuapse, a growing harbor on the Black Sea.

Since 1893 oil-wells have been bored in Groznyj. Shortly 315
before World War I, these wells produced 1.2 million t, and in 1925 double as much, under the first Five Year Plan almost 7 million t yearly, under the second 3.7 million t. These varying yields testify to the wealth of oil, but also to the ruthless methods of exploitation, especially where oil is allowed to spurt out in jets.

In the Kuban area and in Groznyj oil refineries are equipped 382
on modern lines. In the thirties ³/₄ of the entire petrol requirements of Russia were supplied from this area. Pipe lines 315
also connect Groznyj with Mahach Kala on the Caspian Sea,

Table 11. Production of Petroleum in

382

	1880	1885	1890	1895	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905
Galicia	32	65	92	215	326	452	576	728	830	802
Maikop	—	18	30	22	4	5	7	5	—	1
Groznyj	—	—	—	463	500	573	527	537	660	707
Ukraine	32	83	122	700	830	1030	1110	1270	1490	1510
Russian Empire and Austria	590	1950	3720	6870	10700	12000	11600	11000	11600	8300
% of Ukraine	5½	4½	3¼	10¼	7¾	8½	9½	11½	13	18¼

	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
Galicia	765	705	715	736	770	813	796	720	745	675
Maikop	18	45	51	44	46	77	72	80	105	155
Groznyj	1207	1440	1504	1640	2014	2410	3022	3360	3690	4570
Ukraine	1990	2190	2270	2420	3830	3300	3890	4160	4540	5400
Soviet Union and Poland	4300	5300	6000	6800	7100	8800	9700	11300	12300	14400
% of Ukraine	46¼	41¼	37¾	35½	54	40¾	40	36¾	37	37½

315 with Armavir (490 km) and thence with Trudova in the Donets Basin (468 km). There is a plan to extend the lines to Dnipropetrovske (242 km).

In 1937 the petroleum produced in Ukraine, including Groznyj, amounted to 5 million t = 2 % of world production.

It is only Galicia that possesses any appreciable quantities of natural gas. During the thirties, production rose to about ½ million cubic meters, the greater part of which was used in the manufacture of gasoline. The longest pipes are from Dashava to Boryslav and Lviv.

8. Chemical Industry and the Production of Salt

385 The chief products of the chemical industry which grew rapidly during the First World War are acids (e. g. sulphuric acid) and bases, soda and artificial manure. In 1934 in Dnipro-Ukraine there were 103 plants employing 28 650 workers, 14 of these plants (12 730 workers) being big businesses. In Western

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Ukraine (1880—1937 in 1000 t and %)

382

1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
770	1126	1724	2086	1763	1458	1187	1114	880	750	900	860	820
1	2	3	13	23	129	152	88	74	135	45	58	80
629	642	853	931	1214	1233	1071	1288	1446	1435	1715	1782	610
1400	1770	2580	3030	3000	2820	2410	2490	2400	2320	2660	2700	1510
8900	9700	10400	11300	11500	10700	10500	10300	10100	10100	10900	9700	4400
15¾	18¼	25	26¾	26	26¼	21	24¼	23¾	23	24½	28	34¼

1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	—	20-23	24-28	29-32	33-37
663	631	557	551	530	515	511	500	—	730	770	640	520
462	959	1015	769	1160	1335	1162	1480	—	40	90	640	1180
6955	7700	8078	5160	3520	3300	3447	3000	—	1450	2940	6820	3700
8080	9290	9650	6480	5210	5250	5120	4980	—	2220	3800	8100	5400
19300	22100	22900	22000	24600	25600	27900	27800	—	5600	9700	19700	25600
41	42	42	29½	21¼	20½	18½	18	—	39½	39	41	21½

Ukraine in 1932 there were 115 small concerns employing 2 700 workers. 385

In 1913 about 950 000 t salt were produced (540 000 t rock salt, 200 000 t common salt, 210 000 brine salt). This figure was double for 1934 (7th in world production) but it was differently distributed (135 000 common salt, 225 000 brine salt, the rest rock salt). 317

Potash production in Ukraine in the years 1924—1932 reached 305 000 t with a K_2O content of 58 000 t which secured the third place in world production. (The corresponding figures for Germany were 9.9 and 1.1 million t, for France 2.5 and 0.4 million t). 385

Big-scale chemical production was concentrated partly in the Donets Basin and recently also round the Dnipro power plant. Sulphuric acid was produced at Konstantynivka (the main plant of the USSR with a production capacity of 30 000 t) and some smaller factories. In 1934, 350 000 t were produced (45 % of the total Russian production). Superphosphates were

Zaporojie, Ielisavetgrad (region of Odessa), Berdiansk 312
(on the Sea of Azov), and Kherson (at the mouth of the Dnieper).

The marine docks in which the ships of commerce 396
and of war are being built are at Nicolaiev (at the mouth of the Boug), and river constructions of all types at Kiev. There are important repair shops for railway stock at Odessa and Kiev.

We enumerate here only the districts in which the 000
larger metal industries are concentrated, the production of which exceeds local needs. The greater part of the 325
large Ukrainian towns, especially of the seaports, possess 438
small metal factories, the total production of which is not negligible.

It suffices to consult the economic map[1] of the Ukraine to realize that the heavier the products of the metal industry are, the more its centres are removed from the mining regions, a fact which gives a clearly rational character to the geography of Ukrainian metallurgy.

Besides metallurgy, heavy industry is represented in 385
the Ukraine by the chemical industry and in the first 382
instance by that which is based on coal. Such is the industry which produces azote, benzole, nitro-benzine, and sulphuric acid. Important factories engaged in the production of volatile materials have been built at Gorlovka, Lissitschansk, Konstantinovka, and Slaviansk (in the Donbass). This industry, which is still in its very early stages, already meets 30 per cent of the needs of Soviet Ukraine.

The factories producing superphosphates, whose annual production reaches 250,000 tons, are distributed between Konstantinovka (Donbass), Odessa, and Vinnitza, in Podolia.

Kharkov possesses great dye factories and those 386
producing paints, varnish, and enamel.

1 [see category 116, p. 151---Analyst]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

there are several large factories which specialize in every kind of machine necessary for the sugar industry. 392 433

Several other industries, while of small account in comparison with those described above, deserve mention.

Manufacturing enterprises dependent upon animal products divide themselves principally into tanneries and woollen factories. The centres of the leather industry lie in the northern portion of the country, especially in the Governments of Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, and Podolia. This industry accounts for 4·5 per cent. of the total manufacturing output of the Ukraine. The woollen industry is centred in Kharkov, which has two large cloth mills, and in the town of Klintsi in the Government of Chernigov, where not only cloth but knitted goods, yarns, rugs, shawls, and other woollen goods are turned out from eight considerable factories. The production of woollen goods represents 3·5 per cent. of the total Ukraine output of manufactures. 282 288 433

The timber-working industry is chiefly found in the riparian towns, especially on the Dnieper. Yekaterinoslav takes first place, and Kremenchug, Alexandrovsk and Kherson also have saw-mills. Much of the timber shipped abroad is in an unworked state, and manufactures of the better sort are poorly represented. The industry accounts for only 4 per cent. of the value of the Ukraine manufactures. 313 433

The chemical industry is of minor importance. It is concerned chiefly with the products and by-products of coal gas at Odessa and Kharkov, but there is also a soda factory in the Bakhmut district and there are a number of match-factories in the Novozibkovsk district of Chernigov. The products of the industry represent only 3·5 per cent. of the value of the manufactures of the Ukraine. None of the more advanced branches of the industry is established in the country. 382 433

The industries enumerated account for 90–95 per cent. of the manufactures of the country. The remainder, grouped under the headings of paper, linen, cotton, and fibre industries, are of negligible account. 433

135 To the south-east, in the Don and northern Donets valleys,
654 geologists have discovered a number of new coal-bearing areas, and have confirmed that the Donets Basin coal layers stretch far to the east and south.

Other investigations of coal-bearing areas are to begin shortly, particularly around the Azov Sea coast and in other regions bordering the Donets Basin.

Coke

316 The coke output of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is planned to be 15,500,000 tons.

Natural Gas and Oil

315 With the incorporation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the Ukrainian
185 S.S.R. came into possession of oil producing regions. The Five-Year Plan calls for the intensive development of these and other areas of the Ukraine for the increased production of oil and natural gas. Three hundred and twenty-five wells are to be located to add to the
[654] petroleum resources of the western regions; prospecting for commercial deposits of petroleum in the Romny area is to be completed; and there is to be extensive geological exploration for natural gas in the Dragobych Region (Western Ukraine) and on the Azov and Black Sea coasts.

[382] The total output of petroleum in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 325,000 metric tons.

The plan also provides for the building of a gas pipeline from Dashava to Kiev. Already in process of construction, the first section of the pipeline will be completed this year (1947) and will supply gas to more than 30,000 flats and several large industrial plants in Kiev.

Electric Power Stations

377 Electrification has been one of the outstanding features of the Soviet economy. Before the war the Ukrainian Republic possessed a wide network of electric power stations. Best known was the huge Dnieper Dam and Lenin Hydro-electric Station, completed in 1932 near Zaporozhie. This station supplied electric power to a great industrial region: in the north the steel mills of Dniepropetrovsk and Dnieprodzerzhinsk, and to the south-east, the Nikopol manganese mines. These three industrial centres developed quickly after the Dnieper Dam was built; and the abundance of cheap power available from it also gave rise to the growth of a metal and machine-building centre at Zaporozhie.

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382

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385 also manufactured in Konstantynivka (200 000 t), in the Dnipro Combine (140 000 t) and in Kerch (80 000 t), also in Znesinnia near Lviv (capacity of 80 000 t). The total figure for 1932 was 70 000 t = 47 % of total Russian production.

Potash salts were manufactured into artificial manures in Kalush and Holyn while Slovjanske supplied among other products soda for the entire USSR (in 1932 = 375 000 t). By-products from coke and benzol were manufactured in the Donets Basin, the Dnipro Combine (in 1932 = 264 000 pitch, 250 000 ammonia, 132 000 tar) and in Kryvyj Rih, and more recently also synthetic ammonia and aniline dyes. Plants for the dry distillation of wood were erected in Kyiv and Carpatho-Ukraine (Bychkiv, Perechyn, Svaljava).

9. Agricultural Industry

257 The sugar industry is one of the oldest and best developed in the country and comes third after iron and coal in respect of the value of its products. The first sugar factory was built as early as 1825; in 1859/60 there were 250 factories, and before World War I, 197 (compared with 39 in Russia) with an annual production of 1.2 million t (compared with 290 000 t in Russia). Ukraine comes after Germany (1.9 million t) as the second sugar beet producing country in the world.

After a decline caused by the First World War, the pre-war figure was reached only at the beginning of the first Five Year Plan. In 1933/34 170 sugar factories were operating, and they produced 0.8 million t = 8.5 % of world sugar production (USA 1.6, Germany 1.4, France 0.9 million t). Most of the plants are in the Kyiv district and Podolia; 3 are in Galicia. The contribution of Ukraine to the entire production of USSR sank slowly but steadily as the sugar industry was subsidised by the state in the Black Earth district of Central Russia, Siberia and Central Asia. Progress was made in the Kuban area only, where there was not a single sugar factory up to 1914. In 1933/34 20 000 t of sugar were produced there.

256 The many small mills in Ukraine were replaced by big plants after World War I. In 1927/28 there were only 610 mills. Their

Zaporojie, Ielisavetgrad (region of Odessa), Berdiansk 312
(on the Sea of Azov), and Kherson (at the mouth of the Dnieper).

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producing paints, varnish, and enamel.

1 [see category 116, p. 151---Analyst]

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Chemical Industry

The chemical industry of the Ukraine is based chiefly on coal deposits, but also on a number of other raw materials to be found there, including lacustrine deposits of sodium chloride (Artornovsk area) and phosphatic rocks (Konstantinovka area).

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[185]

The Five-Year Plan fixes that:

"The chemical plants of the Ukraine, including soda, nitrate, and superphosphate plants, shall be rebuilt, and the potash mines in the regions of Stanislav and Dragobych, and a new superphosphate plant, a paint and varnish plant and a plastics factory built.

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"In 1946-50 geological surveys shall be conducted with a view to locating commercial deposits of potassium salts to a total of 80 million tons, graphite to a total of 7.7 million tons, and gypsum to a total of 7 million tons."

Output in 1950 is fixed by the Plan as follows:

for the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Calcined soda	448,000 tons
Superphosphates	860,000 tons, and
Salt,	1,930,000 tons;

and for the entire Soviet Union:

Calcined soda	800,000 tons, and
Mineral fertilizers, superphosphates, nitrates and potash	5,100,000 tons.

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Light Industry[1]

By the end of 1946 the production of consumer goods in the U.S.S.R. had already revived considerably; output in the different branches ranged from 20 to 50 per cent. above 1945. Reconversion of the factories to peacetime production was largely completed; however, three big tasks remained: to complete the rehabilitation of all light industry enterprises wrecked by the Nazis; to replace the old or worn-out machinery; and to obtain an adequate supply of labour and materials.

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1 Soviet News, London, December 30, 1946, and February 6, 1947.

Zaporojie, Ielisavetgrad (region of Odessa), Berdiansk 312
(on the Sea of Azov), and Kherson (at the mouth of the Dnieper).

The marine docks in which the ships of commerce 396
and of war are being built are at Nicolaiev (at the mouth of the Boug), and river constructions of all types at Kiev. There are important repair shops for railway stock at Odessa and Kiev.

We enumerate here only the districts in which the 000
larger metal industries are concentrated, the production of which exceeds local needs. The greater part of the 325
large Ukrainian towns, especially of the seaports, possess 438
small metal factories, the total production of which is not negligible.

It suffices to consult the economic map[1] of the Ukraine to realize that the heavier the products of the metal industry are, the more its centres are removed from the mining regions, a fact which gives a clearly rational character to the geography of Ukrainian metallurgy.

Besides metallurgy, heavy industry is represented in 385
the Ukraine by the chemical industry and in the first 382
instance by that which is based on coal. Such is the industry which produces azote, benzole, nitro-benzine, and sulphuric acid. Important factories engaged in the production of volatile materials have been built at Gorlovka, Lissitschansk, Konstantinovka, and Slaviansk (in the Donbass). This industry, which is still in its very early stages, already meets 30 per cent of the needs of Soviet Ukraine.

The factories producing superphosphates, whose annual production reaches 250,000 tons, are distributed between Konstantinovka (Donbass), Odessa, and Vinnitza, in Podolia.

Kharkov possesses great dye factories and those 386
producing paints, varnish, and enamel.

1 [see category 116, p. 151---Analyst]

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648

Nevertheless, the 1945 harvest - assisted by lend-lease supplies which were still then available, and (beginning in December 1945) by UNRRA relief deliveries - was furnishing the population a fair amount of cereals and bread. There was, however, very little meat from domestic sources, and only a small amount of fats and oils, as the following table shows.

TABLE XII

Ukraine: Production and Utilization of Fats and Oils, 1945.
(thousand metric tons)

727
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258
262

	Oilseeds	
Production		
Total production of oilseeds		496.4
Deduction for seed		53.6
Available for processing		442.8
Utilization		
[388] Total production of oil		105.8
Deduction for industrial use (soap manufacture, etc.)		26.7
Available for human consumption		
by urban population	29.0	
by rural population	50.0	
Total		79.1
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
urban population		2.41
rural population		1.86
Average		1.98

433 As the table shows, the Ukrainian people received in 1945 only 4
262 to 5 kilograms of fats - 8 to 18 kilograms less than their pre-war
388 annual consumption rate.

Disaster in 1946

433 Early in 1946 other UNRRA supplies in addition to food began to
241 arrive - seeds, small quantities of fertilizers, and a few farm tools.
648 Throughout the Ukraine great efforts were being made for a successful spring sowing. However, there were still shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, and machinery. None of the 1,600 tractors promised by UNRRA had arrived. Much of the work was still being done by hand, especially where no draught animals were available.

[311] Even despite these drawbacks, it is estimated that about 80 per cent. of the pre-war area was sown; but no figures are available on the acreage planted to individual crops. In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission, describing the difficulties in getting detailed agricultural statistics, stated:

> "....During a recent inspection trip we were informed by the agricultural authorities of the Poltava oblast,[1] one of the best agricultural regions in the Ukraine, that they did not even try to set production goals for their collective farms this year (1946); they simply told each farm to plant as much as possible of whatever crops it could raise with the seed, equipment, draught animals, and manpower available. (For example) We believe that nobody really knows with any degree of accuracy what acreage was planted to oil seeds in the Ukraine this year, what yield may be expected, or how much of the resulting oil will be available for non-farm use."

433 The Ukrainian people set high hopes on the 1946 harvest. However,
241 in the very summer when a good crop would have made all the difference,
648 the greatest drought since 1891 destroyed their prospects. It affected a vast area from Moldavia to the Urals, south to the Kuban and north to Moscow. The earth was parched; and the crops, burnt by the hot summer sun, had little to draw upon because rain and snowfall in the winter of 1945-46 had been poor. Hopes withered with the wheat. The potato crop too was affected: a hot wind out of Asia dried the plants, and dwarfed the tubers.

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1 Oblast: a district similar, for administrative purposes, to a county.

257 The central agrarian section of Ukraine, on both banks of
311 the Dnipro, includes industries producing foodstuffs and luxuries, above all the sugar industry. There are also plants here for manufacturing leather and medium-heavy machinery. Factories are much smaller than in the coal and ore area and the many small power-stations run on brown coal and peat.

381 The Carpathian area is the home above all of the chemical
311 industry and the capacity of the power-stations, usually run by gas and expensive imported coal, seldom by the abundant water power available, exceeds 10 000 KW only in Lviv — Uzhhorod, being used principally for lighting the towns. Industrialisation is densest on the oil-fields of Drohobych.

371 In the foreland of the Caucasus electric plants are run by
311 petroleum only and water power is not exploited at all. The small factories (petroleum, tobaceo, leather and machinery of medium weight) are too scattered to form an industrial area in the strict sense.

392 The large towns form industrial centers that are not dependent
311 on the presence of raw materials. Kharkiv has heavy engineering plants for transportation requirements, factories for agricultural machinery, electro-technical factories, and workshops for precision instruments and machinery. These are large enterprises, built recently and attached to big power-stations (Chuhujiv 25 000 KW), so that Kharkiv may be classed with the industrial area in the vicinity.

● 39 Kyiv builds ships and produces chemical and electro-technical
311 equipment and has chemical and textile plants as well as sugar and foodstuffs factories. In Odessa the same factories are represented and there are also canneries, leather works and plants for producing cinema installations. In addition, there are workshops that specialise in the structure of motor-cars and planes. In the other towns in the country enterprises for this or that industry have been established.

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methods and branches of industry have been introduced, as for instance the production of superior steel and iron alloys. 327

The development of the power-station on the Dnipro entailed a certain change in the location of heavy industry. And the ratio of coal to iron per manufactured unit which was 2.8 : 1 before World War I became 1.6 : 1, though it is still more practicable to transport high quality ores to coal than vice-versa. The Dnipro power-station, however, which is more favorably situated as regards markets and consumption is attracting new foundations of enterprises in heavy industry. This is particularly true of Zaporizha. 371 327

5. Production of Machinery and Metal Goods

Even before World War I, markets were favorable for the production of machinery, above all for agricultural purposes which accounted for the work done for private customers in 126 plants. But modern, large factories were not built till after the war. New branches of production were started, e. g. for motor-cars and tractors (see huge factory in Kharkiv), machinery for mines and precision instruments while the construction of engines and railway trucks increased. The largest factories are in the Donets Combine and in the three large towns; the manufacture of agricultural machines is also distributed over other areas. 392

The non-ferrous metal industry is poorly represented. Between 1914 and 1928 there was practically no increase in the production of mercury (41 000 to 42 000 t). In the Kuban area in 1913 3 000 t zinc and 1 350 t lead were produced; in 1932 these figures were 5 000 and 3 500 t lead respectively. Under the first Five Year Plan zinc factories were erected in connection with the chemical works in Konstantynivka and aluminium works in Kichkas near the power plant on the Dnipro Bend. The annual production of the latter is estimated at 40 000 t. Fuel or power requirements play a greater part than the transportation of raw materials. The production of metal goods is confined to small factories. 328

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

377 energy was not of urgent importance. Dnieprostroy supplies neighbouring towns and industrial plants with light and power (including the new 'Dniepr Electrical-Metallurgical Works' and the 'Dniepr Aluminium Works'), but the electrification of the railways of Soviet Ukraine has not yet been undertaken, nor does this appear necessary in view of the cheap supplies of fuel locally available.

397 As for machine and other mechanical works, there were in existence before 1916: 'Hartmann's Locomotive Works' at Lugansk; 392 the more modern 'Kharkov Locomotive Works' and 'The Electro-103 Mechanical Works', also at Kharkov; and a series of smaller machine works (particularly for the manufacture of agricultural machinery) at Sumy, Alexandrovsk, Berdyansk, Odessa and Kiev. The Soviet Government considerably enlarged the 'Lugansk Locomotive Works', and recently machine and locomotive works have been in process of construction and subsequent enlargement at Kramatorskaya (in the Donets region). New 'Tractors' Construction Works' have been built in Kharkov. Machinery plants have been founded in Berdyansk and Cherkassy; the old Kiev and Alexandrovsk works have been enlarged; and new agricultural machinery works have been built in Elizavetgrad, Melitopol and Kherson. The shipbuilding works in Nikolaev continue to supply the Black Sea fleet as before the Revolution. There, during the last war, ships were in construction for the Imperial Navy; armour-plate being manufactured in the 'Nikopol-Mariupol Works'.

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433 The Soviet emphasis on the development of Ukrainian heavy industry and a parallel neglect of the possible expansion of light industries has produced a badly balanced economy in Soviet Ukraine and the country remains dependent on other and often distant parts of the Union for the satisfaction of many of the needs of the people. Political considerations which aim at establishing the complete interdependence of the various parts of the Union are at the basis of the particular direction of the Five Year Plans in the Ukraine. The emigré Ukrainian economist, V. Sadovsky, writes: 'In 1934, 69·4 per cent of industry went to the production of materials and of the tools of production, and only 34·6 per cent for general needs. In this sense the relations existing in 1913 were

tion is very clear, buckwheat growing in Zone 1[1] and 241
millet in Zone 2.[1]

The great development of agriculture has created a 392
growing demand for agricultural machinery, which brought about the appearance and the rapid development of this branch of industry, concentrated to-day especially at Kherson, at Zaporojie, and at Kharkov.

Parallel to this a very important industry of food 241
products has developed. These are the great and highly perfected mills, the sugar refineries, the distilleries, the breweries. and the tobacco factories which cover the whole territory of the Ukraine. As auxiliary products of agriculture, apart from vegetables of all kinds, known in Europe, the production of which is difficult to estimate, one can mention the melons, water-melons, cucumbers, and tomatoes, to the cultivation of which important tracts have been given.

The production of fruit and grapes has not experienced 245
so great a development. The surface given to fruit trees (cherries, apples, apricots, and pears) reaches about 250,000 hectares. The most important horticultural centres are to be found in the region of Ouman, on the banks of the Dniester, at the mouth of the Dnieper, and equally in the surroundings of Odessa, which are famous for their peach trees. The town of Ouman has a horticultural school and an experimental station which had already long before the Great War a great agricultural reputation throughout Russia.

The marketable harvest of fruit reached 80,000 tons before the Great War.

The surplus production of fruits and especially of vegetables (tomatoes) have brought about the rise and the rapid development of a food tinning industry which seemed to offer great possibilities in the future.

As to the vineyards (about 60,000 hectares), they are

[1] [See category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

377 The functioning of the *Dnieprogues* station, which could open enormous possibilities of development of all kinds of industries and of the electrification of the railways, has nevertheless, despite its enormous power, failed to change the industrial geography of the Ukraine because it is just half-way between the Donietz basin and Krivoi-Rog and thus does not bring about any alteration in the distribution of the sources of energy.

438 Thus the heavy industry of the Ukraine remains, in its greater part, concentrated around this region, round Nikopol and along the northern edge of the Donietz basin.

325 Kharkov and its surroundings are the greatest metallurgical centres of the Ukraine. There great factories of turbines, of generators, of electrical machines, of tractors, of locomotives, of railway trucks, and of factory equipment, etc., are to be found.

327 The production of sheet-iron and of steel rails, tubes, plates, beams, wire, etc., is distributed among many factories of the Donietz basin, at Nikopol and at Dniepropetrovsk.

Zaporojie (not far from Krivoi-Rog and near the *Dnieprogues*) produces nearly 60 per cent of the special steels of the Union. The Soviets intend to create a new powerful centre of metal industry there.

397 392 Apart from Kharkov, factories producing all the heavier machines such as locomotives are to be found in the Donbass (abbreviation of Donietz basin which we will now use), at Lougansk, and at Kramatorski, where an enormous newly constructed factory is one of the largest in the world.

402 The equipment for the light industry—the mills, wine-presses, oil mills and elevators—is chiefly manufactured at Berdiansk (Donbass), Melitopol (Northern Taurida), Tcherkassy (centre), Kiev, and Odessa.

392 Agricultural machinery comes from the factories of

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1 [see category 116, p. 151---Analyst]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

433 The development of the industry on a large scale
327 dates from the year 1870, when a British subject named Hughes received from the Russian Government a concession for the manufacture of iron rails. The company founded by him exists to-day under British management at a place called Hughesovka, and is known as the New Russia Co., Ltd. It has been followed up by a great number of other enterprises, some Russian, but most founded by British, French, and Belgian capital, which has been freely invested in the industry during the last forty years, particularly between 1880 and the end of the century.

392 Agricultural machinery is in constant demand.
433 When first used in the country, it had all to be imported, but of late it has been manufactured in the Ukraine in increasing quantities. Although the customs duties on agricultural machinery are low—certain types in fact are admitted free—the machinery made in the country finds more favour every year. For certain complex machines the Ukraine is still dependent upon imports, but, apart from these, it will probably be able in time to produce all the agricultural machinery it needs. In 1913, out of a total of 770 agricultural machinery factories in Russia, 271 were situated in the Ukraine. The value of their output was 31,000,000 rubles, that of the whole of Russia being 54,000,000 rubles. In addition to the production of the factories, large quantities of tools and machinery of the simpler sort are made by domestic workers, working single-handed or in small syndicates.

The principal agricultural machinery works are in the Governments of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Taurida, and Kharkov. The firms John Greaves & Co. and E. L. Mathias & Sons (Berdyansk), Hartmann Machinery Co. (Lugansk), H. A. Klassen (Sofiesk), R. & E. Elworthy (Yelisavetgrad), I. I. Hoehn (Odessa), and Franz & Schroeder (Neu-Halbstadt), are among those doing the largest business, and the names of the concerns show how largely foreign enterprise has entered this field, none having a Russian title. At Kiev and Kharkov

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

there are several large factories which specialize in every kind of machine necessary for the sugar industry. 392 433

Several other industries, while of small account in comparison with those described above, deserve mention.

Manufacturing enterprises dependent upon animal products divide themselves principally into tanneries and woollen factories. The centres of the leather industry lie in the northern portion of the country, especially in the Governments of Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, and Podolia. This industry accounts for 4·5 per cent. of the total manufacturing output of the Ukraine. The woollen industry is centred in Kharkov, which has two large cloth mills, and in the town of Klintsi in the Government of Chernigov, where not only cloth but knitted goods, yarns, rugs, shawls, and other woollen goods are turned out from eight considerable factories. The production of woollen goods represents 3·5 per cent. of the total Ukraine output of manufactures. 282 288 433

The timber-working industry is chiefly found in the riparian towns, especially on the Dnieper. Yekaterinoslav takes first place, and Kremenchug, Alexandrovsk and Kherson also have saw-mills. Much of the timber shipped abroad is in an unworked state, and manufactures of the better sort are poorly represented. The industry accounts for only 4 per cent. of the value of the Ukraine manufactures. 313 433

The chemical industry is of minor importance. It is concerned chiefly with the products and by-products of coal gas at Odessa and Kharkov, but there is also a soda factory in the Bakhmut district and there are a number of match-factories in the Novozibkovsk district of Chernigov. The products of the industry represent only 3·5 per cent. of the value of the manufactures of the Ukraine. None of the more advanced branches of the industry is established in the country. 382 433

The industries enumerated account for 90–95 per cent. of the manufactures of the country. The remainder, grouped under the headings of paper, linen, cotton, and fibre industries, are of negligible account. 433

SU 316 433 U 316 433 metropolitan areas of Moscow, Leningrad, and other industrial centers, as well as the entire southern rail network of the USSR west of the Volga and south of the Moscow coal basin. During the period of the German occupation of the Ukraine (1941–43), the coal mines suffered greatly. At present, reconstruction work is in full swing, mines are being reestablished, and it is hoped to have reached prewar production by the end of the post-war Five-Year Plan. The major coal-mining centers are Stalino, Yenakiyevo, Gorlovka, Kadiyevka, Chistyakovo, Krasnyy Luch, and Sverdlovsk. Anthracite, used principally for fuel, is mined in the eastern and the southern sections, while coking coal is produced in the western and the northern parts of the Donets Basin.

SU 327 433 U 327 433 The giant iron and steel mills of the Ukraine lie mainly in the western part of the Donbas, that is, in the coke-supplying area, in the Krivoy Rog iron basin, and along the Dnieper between these two raw-material sources. Among the mills producing over one million tons of pig iron per year are modernized prerevolutionary plants at Makeyevka (Donbas), and at Dnepropetrovsk and at Dneprodzerzhinsk on the Dnieper and new plants at Krivoy Rog, Zaporozh'ye, and Zhdanov. The Azovstal' mills at Zhdanov use Kerch' (Crimea) iron ore, which is shipped across the Sea of Azov.

SU 392 438* U ●392 438 Machine construction has been developed to a very large extent in the Ukraine in recent years. Due to the close proximity of the sources of metal and in view of the lack of skilled local labor, the Ukraine was designed to produce types of machinery requiring little precision work, but large amounts of metal. Plants located in the Donbas specialize in heavy machine construction; among them, Kramatorsk produces coal-mining and steel-milling machinery, and Voroshilovgrad has a large locomotive works. Agricultural machinery plants are located along the Dnieper and on the right bank. Khar'kov possesses a large tractor plant and locomotive works and produces hydro-turbines and electric motors. There are car-building works at Nikolayev and Dnepropetrovsk, shipyards at Nikolayev, Kherson, and Kiev, and oil-drilling machinery is made in L'vov.

SU 381 438* U 381 438 The industrial picture of the Ukraine includes a number of factors suitable for the establishment of a strong chemical industry: the by-products of coking and metallurgical processes, the presence of such important raw materials as salt and phosphorites, the availability of cheap energy produced by coal-fed (*Zugres* and *Shtergres*) or hydroelectric (*Dneproges*) power stations, and finally the need for chemical products

SU
464 The number of workers and employees in the national economy of the
874 U.S.S.R. increased by 3 million. Vocational schools and factory training centres graduated thousands of skilled workers, and improved the skill of several millions already employed.

SU
727 Of the districts which suffered occupation, economic rehabilitation
433 as well as capital construction amounting to 17,500 million roubles in
652 1946 made it possible to increase their industrial output by 28 per cent. as compared with 1945. Pravda writes - "the factories, mills, pits, power stations, towns and villages which were destroyed by the enemy are being revived one by one...."[1]

In the Ukraine

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727 The Ukraine has been likened to one big building site, where more
433 than 500,000 workers are engaged in restoring industrial plants and
327 municipal buildings.[2] In the Donets Basin, the coal output of 1946 was 30 per cent. higher than that of 1945. In the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, 21 blast furnaces, 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries were at work by January 1947. Of 104 machine-building factories to be restored, 102 were already producing goods, and mastering the production of improved types of machinery. The Kharkov transport machine-building works was preparing to build long-distance steam engines; and the tractor works was increasing its production, as were many other factories.

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727 In 1946 the Kharkov turbo-generator works made a 100,000 kilowatt
433 turbine and one of 50,000 kilowatts. At Dniepropetrovsk, a lorry
393 factory was being built; and in Odessa and Lvov, automobile assembly
398 works were under construction. Great work was also being done in the development of light industry, food processing, chemical works, and other branches of industry.

U
727 After three years' work of restoration the Dnieper Dam had been
433 rebuilt in the main, and the housing for the power station erected.
377 By the end of 1946 the capacity of Ukrainian power stations had reached 70 per cent. of pre-war.

U
362 Since the liberation over 104.5 million square feet of floor space
368 had been restored in the Ukraine. Over half a million of the 590,000 houses destroyed by the Germans were restored or built anew in Ukrainian villages; and more than 13,000 cultural institutions in the villages and 118,000 auxiliary buildings on the farms.[2]

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1 Pravda, quoted by Soviet News, London, January 22, 1946

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

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397 392 Apart from Kharkov, factories producing all the heavier machines such as locomotives are to be found in the Donbass (abbreviation of Donietz basin which we will now use), at Lougansk, and at Kramatorski, where an enormous newly constructed factory is one of the largest in the world.

402 The equipment for the light industry—the mills, wine-presses, oil mills and elevators—is chiefly manufactured at Berdiansk (Donbass), Melitopol (Northern Taurida), Tcherkassy (centre), Kiev, and Odessa.

392 Agricultural machinery comes from the factories of

U
185 of road passengers should increase 7½ times; and the number of buses,
489 by 3,000.
494

U The Five-Year Plan also provides for the expansion of river and
185 sea traffic. Small rivers are to be extensively adapted for navi-
489 gation, and will also be utilized for local hydro-electric power
503 supplies. Shipbuilding yards are to be rebuilt, and the tonnage of river and sea traffic is to be considerably increased. The freight turnover on small rivers of the Ukraine in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 450,000 metric tons.

Pre-War Traffic

U In 1937 the Ukrainian railways handled 313.1 million metric tons
489 of loads, as compared with 165.7 million in 1932. The river transport carried 7.7 million tons (4.7 million in 1932), while in the same year Ukrainian seaports handled 8.6 million tons as against 6.5 million tons in 1932.

SU The U.S.S.R.'s system of rail transport is perhaps the weakest
497 link in the Soviet economy. In 1937 the railway network of the entire
U Soviet Union amounted to only 86,400 kilometres (85,400 kilometres in
497 1933). The construction of additional lines had by no means kept pace with the expansion of industry and agriculture. The Ukraine in 1937 had some 14,400 kilometres of railway lines; and traffic loads in that year amounted to some 313.1 million metric tons. The inadequacy of the system if compared with other European countries is marked. For example, in France (the area of which was approximately equal to that of pre-war Ukraine) the length of the principal lines open for traffic on January 1, 1938, was 42,000 kilometres.

U The war has greatly disrupted Ukrainian rail transport. Locomotives,
727 rolling stock and tracks were heavily damaged or destroyed. The
497 problem of rehabilitation is especially serious, because the lack of adequate transport facilities hinders other rebuilding projects. The locomotives and cars taken as reparations from Germany, being chiefly of narrow gauge, are consequently of no use on most existing Soviet tracks.

Production of Long Distance Locomotives

U Before the war the output of long distance locomotives in the
397 Ukraine was as follows.

TABLE XXI

U 397

Ukraine: Pre-War Production of Long Distance Locomotives

Year	Ukrainian S.S.R number	Soviet Union total number
1928	231	479
1932	431	828
1937	880	1,214

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; and Russia's Economic Front, A. Yugov, New York, 1941.

SU [397] Ukrainian production of longdistance locomotives in 1950 is planned to be 1,000. For the Soviet Union as a whole a target of 2,720 has been fixed: this includes 2,200 steam locomotives, 300 diesel, and 220 electric locomotives. The Ukrainian output of freight cars in 1950 is fixed at 55,500 - more than a third of the target for the whole U.S.S.R., which is 146,000 freight cars.

Motor Vehicles

U 397 SU [397] The number of motor vehicles to be produced in 1950 in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is fixed by the new Five-Year Plan at 25,000 while for the entire Soviet Union the output is as follows: 428,000 trucks, 65,600 passenger cars, and 6,400 motor buses. Apparently the destruction of factories producing motor-vehicles was particularly heavy.

The Five-Year Plan provides for the building in the Ukraine of two motor car assembly plants, as well as a works to produre annually 60,000 motor trucks.

Dnieper-Bug Canal[1]

U 503 487 The Dnieper-Bug Canal, cutting through the Pinsk bogs and the Brest forest in Byelorussia, is important as the only water outlet towards the west, connecting the Dnieper, Western Bug, and the Black Sea with the Vistula.

It first took shape at the end of the 18th century under the name of the Imperial Canal. But in those days, being shallow and without sluices, it was of little use for navigation. For ten months in the year the canal was dead. Only at high water, in the springtime, could a small quantity of timber be rafted along its course.

---

1 Soviet News July 24, 1946.

SU
464 The number of workers and employees in the national economy of the
874 U.S.S.R. increased by 3 million. Vocational schools and factory training centres graduated thousands of skilled workers, and improved the skill of several millions already employed.

SU
727 Of the districts which suffered occupation, economic rehabilitation
433 as well as capital construction amounting to 17,500 million roubles in
652 1946 made it possible to increase their industrial output by 28 per cent. as compared with 1945. Pravda writes - "the factories, mills, pits, power stations, towns and villages which were destroyed by the enemy are being revived one by one...."[1]

In the Ukraine

U
727 The Ukraine has been likened to one big building site, where more
433 than 500,000 workers are engaged in restoring industrial plants and
327 municipal buildings.[2] In the Donets Basin, the coal output of 1946 was 30 per cent. higher than that of 1945. In the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, 21 blast furnaces, 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries were at work by January 1947. Of 104 machine-building factories to be restored, 102 were already producing goods, and mastering the production of improved types of machinery. The Kharkov transport machine-building works was preparing to build long-distance steam engines; and the tractor works was increasing its production, as were many other factories.

U
727 In 1946 the Kharkov turbo-generator works made a 100,000 kilowatt
433 turbine and one of 50,000 kilowatts. At Dniepropetrovsk, a lorry
393 factory was being built; and in Odessa and Lvov, automobile assembly
398 works were under construction. Great work was also being done in the development of light industry, food processing, chemical works, and other branches of industry.

U
727 After three years' work of restoration the Dnieper Dam had been
433 rebuilt in the main, and the housing for the power station erected.
377 By the end of 1946 the capacity of Ukrainian power stations had reached 70 per cent. of pre-war.

U
362 Since the liberation over 104.5 million square feet of floor space
368 had been restored in the Ukraine. Over half a million of the 590,000 houses destroyed by the Germans were restored or built anew in Ukrainian villages; and more than 13,000 cultural institutions in the villages and 118,000 auxiliary buildings on the farms.[2]

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1 Pravda, quoted by Soviet News, London, January 22, 1946

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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392 Agricultural machinery comes from the factories of

327 Rog received an important complement. Supplied by the 436,000 kilowatts of the power plant, a new industrial combine was established in this region, with iron and steel works, with factories for aluminum, alloys, for cement, soda, ammonia, sulfurous acid and similar chemical products. In this district agricultural and heavy machinery is also built. The pig iron production of 47 Ukrainian blast furnaces amounted to 3.1 million tons in 1913, 4.3 million tons in 1932, and 6.7 million tons in 1934; steel production during the same years came to 2.7 million tons, 2.2 million tons and 5.4 million tons, and the production of malleable iron in each case came to 2.3 million, 2.2 million and 2.9 million tons. (104)

104. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 455.

• 402 The manufacture of heavy industrial raw products for machines and implements of all kinds occurs in the scattered industrial cities, especially in the part of the Ukraine on the right bank of the river. Khar'kov, with its construction of heavy machinery, agricultural machines, precision instruments and transport machines such as locomotives, railroad cars and tractors, stands at the head of Ukrainian industrial cities. In Kiyev ships, heavy machinery and chemical and electrotechnical machines are built, and in Odessa agricultural machinery, precision instruments and motor cars. Here canning and leather industry is also carried on. In Mariupil /164/ and Taganrog there are foundaries. In almost all larger harbors of the Black Sea coast, ships are built. In the Crimea there are canning and tobacco factories.

433 After Ukrainian industry suffered severe reverses as a result of the First World War and the Revolution, a wave of industrialism set in with the first Five Year Plan in 1928. The wealth of

9; Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

425 by the Government at various times between the middle of the eighteenth century and 1861, in the hope that their superior methods of agriculture would be copied by other cultivators. This effect, however, was not produced, and the colonists form compact communities with little or no influence on their neighbours. Land in private ownership is usually farmed on more modern [241] and rational principles than the *nadyel* land, and produces almost the entire surplus of cereals which is sent abroad and to other parts of Russia.

421 The land owned by the Church, Crown, and members of the Imperial family is absolute freehold, and is generally well managed and productively farmed.

407 412 Up-to-date agricultural machinery is becoming more common all round. It is of course most in vogue on the large estates, especially in the case of expensive machines involving the use of power; steam-ploughs on the cable system are much in use on the large sugar-beet estates, and tractor ploughs with single engines are becoming numerous. By the help and enterprise of the *zemstvos* the peasants are now beginning to use modern machines and implements. The traditional *sock* or wooden plough, the flail, and other such primitive tools are disappearing, although it is hard to induce the peasant to abandon his old methods.

(c) *Forestry*

137 [311] A large portion of the Ukraine is totally denuded of trees at the present time. The Governments of Podolia and Volhynia, and the northern parts of Kiev and Chernigov, are well wooded, the area covered by forest being about 15 per cent. of the whole. In the remaining provinces the forest area averages 3–4 per cent. of the total. The State controls certain areas north of Kiev on both banks of the Dnieper, and in Volhynia on the south side of the Pripet marshes, as well as smaller scattered tracts in Podolia. In the Government of Yekaterinoslav the State has lately done much

11: Obermaier--225 J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

401



planting

311 Despite a certain reduction in the area under cultivation in the
241 Ukraine, (25,124,900 hectares in 1937 as compared with 26,438,400 in
[407] 1932), production rose considerably, reflecting great progress in the mechanization of agriculture. The number of tractors increased from
[475] 51,300 in 1932 to 83,900 in 1937. The number of harvesting combines increased in the same period from 4,900 to 26,700. The number of Machine and Tractor Stations grew from 657 to 958. The mechanization of agriculture in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is shown in the following table, which compares the output of energy from draught animals with the energy derived from machines, both in the Ukrainian Republic and in the entire Soviet Union. (It should be noted that, according to Soviet practice, the output of energy is measured in kilowatt hours.)

TABLE V

Output of Energy in Agriculture, 1938
(million kwh)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Total Soviet Union
[407] Energy from machines	4,211	19,304.2
379] Energy from draught cattle	1,662	14,667.5
Total output of energy in agriculture	5,873	33,971.7

Source : Planned Economy XII, Moscow, 1940.

[178] As the table shows, the percentage of mechanization in the Ukraine was greater than in the entire Soviet Union.

Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

311 According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there
425 were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000
723 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The prin-
cipal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Izmail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

474 Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution
241 of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas
178 from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

475 Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the
407 Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Izmail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

475 In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in
407 June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in
652 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.

TABLE XI

Ukraine: War Losses of Farm Machinery

727
241
407

	Number before the war	Destroyed or wrecked by the Germans
Tractors	over 90,000[1]	56,000[2]
Harvester combines	" 31,000[1]	24,000[2]
Trucks and cars used in agriculture	" 50,000[1]	30,200[3]
Other farm machines	n.a.	1,892,000[3]

1 Source: Mr. Baranovsky, Member of the UNRRA Council for the Ukrainian S.S.R. Speech at the Fourth Session of the UNRRA Council on March 20, 1946, Atlantic City, UNRRA Journal, Volume IV, No.6.

2 Source: Statement of the Soviet Commission on Material Damage Caused by the German-Fascist Invaders, Soviet News, September 18, 1945.

3 Source: Letter to the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine from Mr. V.V. Khoryak, Chief, Ukrainian Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

In addition to the spoilage of buildings, machinery and land, the Germans seized, slaughtered, or drove away millions of farm animals, and stole from the collective farms or from private citizens of the Ukraine over 12 million tons of farm produce, including 9.5 million tons of grain and flour[1].

727
241

In the period immediately after liberation agriculture was slowly restarted, almost entirely by hand and in the most adverse conditions. Transport was highly disorganized and at the same time had to carry military traffic. On the heels of the victorious Soviet army the evacuated collective farmers were returning with their few animals to their wrecked farms. The flocks and herds were decimated or non-existent. Everywhere there were tremendous shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, machinery and manpower to do the work. In most districts in 1945 only 50 to 60 per cent. of the pre-war area could be sown. Many of the crops were sown late because of difficulty in cultivating the land; and when harvesting time came, much of the reaping and threshing had to be done by hand. Average yields of all crops were very low.

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1 Department of UNRRA Supplies of the Ukrainian Government, Kiev, April 6, 1946.

TABLE XV

231

Livestock in Pre-War Ukraine and in the U.S.S.R.

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	
	1932	1937
Cows	2,436,500	3,458,900
Other large cattle	1,591,700	4,300,500
Pigs	2,667,700	7,729,700
Sheep and goats	1,528,700	3,301,500
Horses	2,430,200	2,937,200

	Soviet Union	
	1934	1938
Large cattle	35,500,000	50,900,000
Pigs	11,500,000	25,700,000
Sheep and goats	36,500,000	66,600,000
Horses	15,400,000	16,200,000

Source: Soviet Construction, Moscow, 1939

[379 407] It will be noted that in both the Ukraine and in the U.S.S.R. as a whole, only a slight increase occurred in the number of horses. This again illuminates the greater use of machines in place of animal draught power.

Livestock in Western Ukraine

In 1939 the livestock of Western Ukraine alone was as follows.

TABLE XVI

Livestock in Western Ukraine, 1939

Cows	1,718,000
Other horned cattle	868,000
Pigs	1,466,000
Sheep and goats	772,000
Horses	1,043,000

Source: Concise Year-Book of Poland, Polish Ministry of Information, London, 1941

Heavy Industry Building in 1947.[1]

327
727 Reconstruction and building will be on a wider scale in 1947, as heavy improvements are introduced. Mechanization is being extended in blast furnaces, open-hearths, and metal-rolling shops; and ore and coal stores are being equipped with modern cranes.

In the Donets Basin in 1947 the Stalino Metal Works are to put into operation another blast furnace, martin oven and rolling mill.[2] At the Azovstal works the two blast furnaces of 1,000 cubic metres each will be enlarged to 1,300 cubic metres. Also at the Azovstal works, which in the past did not produce any rolled metal, are being built a blooming mill, which will be the largest in the south, and a rolling mill. New blooming mills and rail rolling mills are also to start at the Petrovsky works in Dniepropetrovsk, and at the Dzerzhinsky works in Dnieprodzerzhinsk. New pipe-rolling workshops will be added at the Nikopol Yuzhno-Trubny and the Dniepropetrovsk works.

At the Zaporozhstal works in 1947 several workshops will be added; and a power station and a 1,300 cubic metre blast furnace will begin working in the first half of the year. Among the most urgent tasks at this plant is the reconstruction of machines producing sheet metal for automobile production.

Equipment for Iron and Steel Mills

According to the new Five-Year Plan, the Ukrainian output of equipment for iron and steel mills in 1950 has been fixed at 35,000 tons; the total production of the entire Soviet Union has been fixed at 102,900 tons (of which 66,700 are to be produced by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic).

Production of Tractors

727 Before the war there were about 90,000 tractors in operation on
● 407 Ukrainian farms. During the occupation, 56,000 of these were wrecked
423 or stolen by the Germans, who also completely destroyed the well-known tractor factory at Kharkov. Because of the particularly great need of tractors in the Ukraine, this factory was rebuilt with great vigour; and production resumed. By February 1947 the Kharkov Tractor Works had produced 3,000 tractors since the restoration of the plant.

The 1950 output of tractors in the Ukraine is expected to be 25,000; for the entire Soviet Union, production has been fixed at 112,000 tractors.

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1 See U.S.S.R. Deputy Minister for the Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, Radio Moscow, February 3, 1947, B.B.C. Digest of World Broadcasts No. 2784, London, February 5, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 2, 1947.

731
433 supplies had been shipped to the Ukraine; remaining "protocol" ship-
648 ments to the Ukraine are expected to amount to 923 tons and 784,617 dollars.

Included in these supplies are power stations, pumps, portable cranes, presses, electric locomotives, and electrical and telephone equipment.

Agricultural Supplies

731 The greater part of the tonnage in agricultural supplies consisted
241 of seeds; by January 31, 1947, 15,669 gross long tons had been shipped.
648 Most of these seeds had arrived in the spring of 1946; however, some of the bags were inadequately labelled, and the contents not easily identifiable. Because of this difficulty the seeds had to be given costly and time-consuming laboratory tests, which delayed distribution. At the same time, 2,600 tons of seeds were reported by the Ukrainian Government to be either diseased or infested with weeds, and therefore unfit for sowing. Negotiations are still in process for the replacement of these defective seeds by suitable types.

[407] As at the end of 1946 the amount of farm machinery which had arrived was small. For example, the UNRRA programme calls for the delivery of 1,600 tractors to the Ukraine, but only 310 had been received by December 31, and these come too late for autumn ploughing. They are being distributed to state owned Machine Tractor Stations for use this spring.

UNRRA shipments have also included 6,692 tons of bagging, 2,090 tons of fishing equipment, and 244 tons of dairy equipment. These are shown in the following table, which summarizes agricultural rehabilitation shipments to the end of January.

TABLE XXIV

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Agricultural Supplies up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Bagging	1,672	6,692
Farm machinery	1,517	2,941
Fishing equipment	651	2,090
Food processing equipment	551	1,122
Repair material and hand tools		312
Seeds	9,861	15,669
Dairy and poultry equipment	151	244
Totals	14,403	29,070

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

425 by the Government at various times between the middle of the eighteenth century and 1861, in the hope that their superior methods of agriculture would be copied by other cultivators. This effect, however, was not produced, and the colonists form compact communities with little or no influence on their neighbours. Land in private ownership is usually farmed on more modern [241] and rational principles than the *nadyel* land, and produces almost the entire surplus of cereals which is sent abroad and to other parts of Russia.

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13) Eurasia and the ores in the Ural is more than 2000 km; the
487 coal of the Donets Basin, on the other hand, is about 350—450 km from the iron ore of Kryvyj Rih, while the iron and manganese ores of Kerch are nearer still. The seas in the north of Russia are frozen for 20—26 weeks, while the Black Sea has ice for but 3—4 weeks in the year. Most of its harbors can be kept open all winter by means of ice-breakers. The
[161] density of the population in Ukraine is 59 to the square kilometer which cannot be compared with the figures for Siberia (1 per sq. km) or with the average for USSR (8). Conditions in Ukraine, therefore, are much more akin to those in Europe than are those in the continental heart of Eurasia some 4000 km away. And for Ukraine this fact found expression, for instance, in the fact that it could not profit from the reduced railway freights that were granted for long-distance transportation. The unfavorable position of Moscow and Leningrad as manufacturing centers was a great handicap to the economy of Ukraine which possessed all the conditions necessary for production within its own frontiers but nevertheless had to import goods from there and export raw materials to very low prices.

As long as Russia's face was turned towards Europe, these considerations did not matter much, but they are felt all the more acutely now that the economy of the Soviet Union is definitely planned.

8. The Ukrainian idea of economy

● 421 with its championship of private property was always entirely different from the "mir" idea, with its farming in common and periodical division of the soil which was characteristic for Russian economy. Exceptions within Ukrainian territory, due to special conditions of time and place, do not alter this fundamental fact.
[566] That serfdom should have been abolished so late was felt to be a great burden by the Ukrainian who had enjoyed personal freedom in his days of political independence. He always connected serfdom with Russian rule which naturally did not help to mitigate his aversion to everything Russian.

433 In national Ukrainian literature, the relationship of different branches of economy is often discussed. It is often maintained that up to the present, development has been along the lines of

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

565 of education, and in their occupations. The bulk
[162] (86·4 per cent.) of the Ukrainians are peasants and agriculturists. The percentage of people living in the country is in the Government of Kharkov, 85; in Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 88; Chernigov, 91; Taurida, 80; Kherson, 70. The percentage of peasants is almost the same, e. g. Kharkov, 90; Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 87; Chernigov, 86; Taurida, 73;
[163] Kherson, 61. The average increase in population is higher than in any other province in European Russia; consequently, though many peasants have become, during the last twenty-five years, workmen in the newly started industries, the general number of agricultural peasants remains unchanged.

421 *Land Tenure*[1].—While Great Russia is at present
428 a country of communal land-ownership (*mir*), in the
177 Ukraine or Little Russia individual or, strictly speaking, family ownership and communal ownership exist
[556] together (cf. p. 78). The *mir* in Great Russia appears to have been introduced in the sixteenth century, when the Moscow Government established serfdom and imposed heavy taxation, for it was easier to make the whole village responsible for the taxes than the separate families. However, in the north or, properly speaking, Novgorod Russ. the land, as a general rule, belonged to one large family or clan, composed of from two to six houses (the owners of which bore the same name), and called *pyechishche* (large stove). The ownership was hereditary, and hence the land became more and more subdivided, so that families owned more or less according to the number of children. There was no readjustment of the land as in the case of the *mir*. The *pyechishche* of Novgorod was known in Kiev-Russ as *ognishche* (meaning a large fire); and the term *ognishchanin* (meaning a member of the *ognishche*) is found in the Kiev law (*Russkaya*
428 *Pravda*). Connected with that form of tenure is a custom, which even now is found sometimes in the Ukraine, of minorate, according to which the younger

[1] See also p. 77.

son inherits his father's house, since the elder son has 428
started a new house and received his share during his father's life. If a member of the *ognishche* had not enough land, he migrated.

This old custom of family ownership was the basis 421
of the Cossack communities, which differed from the 177
mir in that, as the Cossacks gave little attention to 525
cultivation and paid no taxes, the re-allotment of their lands was not necessary, though in theory every Cossack had the same right to the land. However, towards the end of the seventeenth century, the 'elders' of the Cossacks began to appropriate more land than the commoners. After Russia had subdued the Ukraine, the commoners were turned into peasants (in 1763 and 1783), and the 'elders' were given titles of nobility in 1785. After the final introduction of serfdom into the Ukraine, the taxes were equally imposed, and therefore communal ownership on the Moscow lines was introduced, though it never had such success as in Great Russia. Remnants of *ognishches* still exist in the Governments of Chernigov and Poltava, whither it was brought by the Ukrainian colonists, though individual ownership is now predominant. In some cases, though each house owns some land privately, there are other lands, meadows, and fishing rights which belong to all the village community, and are re-allotted from time to time.

In the Ukraine, as it was immediately before the 421
war, all the land was divided into individual and communal property. The individual property consisted of (1) State lands, (2) Imperial family appanages, (3) Church and monastery lands, (4) town lands, (5) nobles' lands, and (6) lands belonging to others than nobles. The communal property was held by the peasant and village communities. Individual ownership prevails in the Governments of Yekaterinoslav (50·4 per cent. in 1905), Kherson (51·5 per cent.), Taurida (52·6 per cent.). Then come the Governments of the south-west, Volhynia (48·9 per cent.), Kiev (45·2 per cent.), Podolia (44·4 per cent.). The eastern

Governments have the smallest percentage of private ownership. Thus, in Kharkov, which contains the greatest number of Great Russians, only 35·8 per cent. of land is privately owned, and in Chernigov 41·7 per cent. The Poltava Government forms an exception; and, as it is a Government in which the Ukrainian population forms between 93 and 95 per cent., it is worth noticing that individual property still forms 45·1 per cent., even though the Stolypin reforms tended to give every facility for the introduction of communal ownership. But, though the Taurida, Kherson, and Yekaterinoslav Governments have the highest percentage of land individually owned, it is owned mostly by the nobles, especially in Yekaterinoslav (67·2 per cent.) and Kherson (63 per cent.), and less by the peasants (Yekaterinoslav, 23·7 per cent., and Kherson, 13·8 per cent.).

Taking into account both the individual and the communal land of the peasants, we find that only in the Governments of Kharkov (59 per cent.), Chernigov (53 per cent.), and Poltava (52 per cent.) do the peasants own above half of the arable land. In Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev, they own between 40 and 48 per cent.; in Yekaterinoslav, 45 per cent.; while in Taurida and Kherson, where only about half the population is Ukrainian and town life is well developed, the percentage is 37.

The amount of land assigned to each family by the Emancipation Law of 1861 was between three and eight acres, though sixteen acres are necessary to support a family. Since then the population has increased by 43 per cent., but the land available for peasant owners has only increased by 20 per cent. (in 1910). This fact has compelled the peasants to rent land, and lies at the bottom of all economic unrest. In the Government of Poltava, where the situation is most acute, some 60 per cent. of the peasants own only from one to three *desyatines*[1] of land, and as few as 4 per cent. have more than five *desyatines*. In the Governments

[1] One *desyatine* = 2·7 acres.

of Volhynia and Podolia conditions are better, and the peasants have larger holdings, though only 16 per cent. own above five *desyatines*; in Kharkov, 33 per cent. own above five *desyatines*. In no place do the Ukrainian peasants equal in land-ownership the German and Czech colonists. The average holding among the German colonists is from 10 to 12 *desyatines*, and they specialize in cattle-breeding. The Czechs are concentrated in south-western Volhynia (in the districts of Dubno, Rovno, and Lutsk); and their average holding is 13 *desyatines*. The peasants' holdings are in a striking contrast to the big estates. In the Kiev Government there are some 43 estates of above 5,000 *desyatines* each, mostly owned by the nobles (some of them descendants of the old independent dukes, *knaz*) of Russian, Polish, or German nationality. 421

About 10 per cent. of the inhabitants of the Governments of Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, Taurida, Kiev, and Chernigov are occupied in industries other than agricultural. Trade occupies between 6 and 7 per cent. of the population in the Governments of Kherson, Kiev, Podolia, and Taurida. 162

General Observations

Ukrainian Nationalism.—The feeling of nationality, as it exists to-day, dates from Chmielnicki's rising in 1648. The old history of Kiev-Russ is common to Great Russians, White Russians, and the Ukrainians (Little Russians), and has been continued after the Tatar invasions chiefly in Great Russia, while the Ukraine ever since has been subject to one of her neighbours. Since Chmielnicki's time, the Ukrainian nationality has made progress only in one direction, i.e. in producing a small but energetic *intelligentsia*, which does not consider itself Russian or Polish in addition to being Ukrainian, though it is obliged to seek its higher education in Russia, Poland, and other foreign countries. The national feeling of this class is 186 565

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Apiculture is common in the northern Ukraine and 231
vast quantities of honey are produced, but its quality suffers from the prevalent ignorance of scientific methods of bee-keeping, and it does not command a good price.

Disease among domestic animals causes great ravages. 232
Cattle-plague epidemics are of annual occurrence and cause heavy losses, the proportion of fatal cases being very high. The other most prevalent troubles appear to be anthrax, frounce in horses, and pneumo-enteritis amongst swine. The last disease has made great inroads of latter years, a large proportion of cases being fatal. The proportion of live-stock per 100 inhabitants shows decrease under almost every head, a slight increase in horses or pigs in some Governments by no means counterbalancing the all-round continuous shrinkage.

(*b*) *Land Tenure*[1] *and Methods of Cultivation*

As regards tenure, land in the Ukraine falls into 421
three main classes: (1) land owned privately, mainly 471
in large estates, but a small proportion in farm-holdings by successful peasants; (2) land termed *nadyel*, owned almost entirely by peasant communes; and (3) land owned by the Orthodox Church or the Crown, or granted as appanages to members of the Imperial family. The following table shows the total acreage, and the proportion belonging to each of these classes:

		Percentage of		
Government.	*Total area in millions of acres.*	*Private property.*	*Nadyel.*	*Church and Crown land, &c.*
Volhynia	15,484	48·9	39·8	11·3
Podolia	9,873	44·4	48·0	7·6
Chernigov	11,836	41·7	53·1	5·2
Kiev	12,484	45·2	45·6	9·2
Kherson	16,591	51·5	37·3	11·2
Poltava	11,331	45·1	52·3	2·6
Kharkov	12,141	35·8	59·2	5·0
Yekaterinoslav	15,041	50·4	45·4	4·2
Taurida	7,099	52·6	37·2	10·2
Total	111,880	Average 46·2	46·4	–

[1] See also p. 50.

421 425 Land tenure in the Ukraine is at present in an unstable state. The principal factors affecting it are two legal enactments, the first being the law of 1861 abolishing serfdom and providing for the ownership of land by peasants, who previously had held none, and the second being the Stolypin law of 1906 modifying the principle of communal ownership in peasant lands. The law of 1861 provided for land to be taken from private estates and handed over to peasants on a deferred purchase system. The land was not assigned to individuals, but to *mirs* (local communes), which divided it up for cultivation. The law also provided for periodical redistributions of this land, which is known always as the *nadyel* or endowment land. At the present time a good deal of *nadyel* land in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov is held by individual peasant owners, but elsewhere it is all owned by communes. A peculiar principle of this system is the mutual responsibility of all members of the commune for its legal and financial obligations, even should a member have forsaken the locality and the practice of agriculture.

425 511 The great defect of the distribution of 1861 is that it is based on the rural population of that date, with no machinery for providing additional land in proportion to the natural increase of population, which has been very rapid. Two evil results have followed. First, at the periodical redistributions of *nadyel* land the amount available per head has steadily decreased. The holdings have therefore tended to become uneconomical, and a consequent impoverishment of the peasants has taken place, with the natural concomitants of arrears of rent and taxes and an increased burden of debt on the land. Secondly, efforts to purchase or rent further land from private proprietors, in order to increase the available *nadyel* land or supply the wants of prosperous peasants who wish to buy new farms, has led to an enormous increase in the price and rent of land, a rise of three times being frequent and a tenfold rise occasional. To

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alleviate these conditions various measures have been 425
adopted, such as the easement or complete extinguish- 511
ing of the burden of the purchase-price of the *nadyel*, the prevention of its frequent redistribution, and the founding of the Peasants' Land Bank by the State to facilitate further purchases of land by the communes. Nevertheless, a result not looked for by the framers 565
of the law abolishing serfdom has followed, namely the creation of a large landless agricultural proletariat, which tends to sink in the social scale, to live partly by industry in the towns, and to be migratory in its habits.

The law of 1906 introduced for the first time the 421
general principle of individual and permanent ownership of *nadyel* lands. It aimed at the breaking up of the *mirs* as no longer fulfilling a need, in the expectation that security of tenure by the individual would lead to a more rational and successful system of cultivation. The period since the promulgation of the law is too short to allow of sound conclusions as to its effect.

The *nadyel* lands are almost entirely cultivated 241
on the three-field system, each unit of land being 311
planted one year with a winter-sown grain, the following year with a spring-sown grain, and lying fallow in the third year. This method causes a disastrous impoverishment of the land, especially as in many cases the minimum of manure, whether animal or chemical, is used. An alternative method must be introduced, or the productiveness of the black-soil land under peasant ownership will continue to shrink as heretofore.

The land held by private owners is in general their 425
perpetual freehold, and can be roughly divided into that 563
held by the nobility in large estates and the smaller holdings purchased from them since the abolition of serfdom by prosperous peasants and others desirous of embarking on agriculture on their own account. There are also a number of foreign colonists, chiefly Germans, descendants of those introduced into the country

425 by the Government at various times between the middle of the eighteenth century and 1861, in the hope that their superior methods of agriculture would be copied by other cultivators. This effect, however, was not produced, and the colonists form compact communities with little or no influence on their neighbours. Land in private ownership is usually farmed on more modern [241] and rational principles than the *nadyel* land, and produces almost the entire surplus of cereals which is sent abroad and to other parts of Russia.

421 The land owned by the Church, Crown, and members of the Imperial family is absolute freehold, and is generally well managed and productively farmed.

407 412 Up-to-date agricultural machinery is becoming more common all round. It is of course most in vogue on the large estates, especially in the case of expensive machines involving the use of power; steam-ploughs on the cable system are much in use on the large sugar-beet estates, and tractor ploughs with single engines are becoming numerous. By the help and enterprise of the *zemstvos* the peasants are now beginning to use modern machines and implements. The traditional *sock* or wooden plough, the flail, and other such primitive tools are disappearing, although it is hard to induce the peasant to abandon his old methods.

(c) *Forestry*

137 [311] A large portion of the Ukraine is totally denuded of trees at the present time. The Governments of Podolia and Volhynia, and the northern parts of Kiev and Chernigov, are well wooded, the area covered by forest being about 15 per cent. of the whole. In the remaining provinces the forest area averages 3–4 per cent. of the total. The State controls certain areas north of Kiev on both banks of the Dnieper, and in Volhynia on the south side of the Pripet marshes, as well as smaller scattered tracts in Podolia. In the Government of Yekaterinoslav the State has lately done much

CONSTITUTION

(Fundamental Law)

of the

UKRAINIAN

SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLIC

of January 30, 1937

As amended through November 21, 1949

Chapter I. The Social Structure

642 Art. 1. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

Art. 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists, the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the liberation of the Ukrainian people from national oppression by Tsarism and by the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie and the defeat of the nationalist counter-revolution constitute the political foundation of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 3. In the Ukrainian SSR all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

471 Art. 4. The economic foundation of the Ukrainian SSR is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production established as the result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man.

Art. 5. Socialist property in the Ukrainian SSR exists either in the form of State property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property (the possession of collective farms or co-operative associations).

475 421 Art. 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, communications, large State-organized agricultural enterprises (State farms, machine and tractor stations and the like), as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of houses in the cities and industrial localities, are State property, that is belong to the whole people.

474 421 Art. 7. The common enterprises of collective farms and co-operative organizations with their livestock and implements, and the products of the collective farms and co-operative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of collective farms and co-operative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the common collective farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small [472] plot of household land and, as its personal property, a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements — in accordance with the regulations of the agricultural artel.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

423 474 Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

472 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Ukrainian SSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

185 471 Art. 11. The economic life of the Ukrainian SSR is determined and directed by the State National Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the independence of the socialist country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

461 Art. 12. In the Ukrainian SSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Ukrainian SSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Ukrainian SSR voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Ukrainian SSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 110. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to abide by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, to observe the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

[685] Art. 111. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to safeguard and strengthen public socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation [4.1] of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperity and culture of all the working people.

Persons committing offences against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.

Art. 112. Universal military service is law.

Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honourable duty of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

[687] Art. 113. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR. Treason to the country — violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the State, espionage — is punishable with all the severity of the law and is the most heinous of crimes.

Chapter IX. The Electoral System

666 Art. 114. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies — of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages — are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

Art. 115. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the Ukrainian SSR who have reached the age of 18, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR who has reached the age of 21, [641] irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities may be elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 116. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

[562] Art. 117. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

Art. 118. Citizens serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

Art. 119. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Working People's Deputies from the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of villages and cities to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.

Art. 120. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.

341 lected for the tax in kind. This was a negligible sum and the
651 average member rarely received more than one ruble per labor
474 day. This sum was, of course, insufficient to provide for the
465 goods which the family needed to purchase, and since their share
[511] of the grain was rarely sufficient to feed them, their situation became hopeless, while of other products the individual received about one litre of oil, fifty kilograms of potatoes, thirty-five kilograms of fruit, and five-tenths kilograms of meat and fat.

[435] The real significance of these figures is shown in the prices that were charged in the state stores.[1] There a kilogram of bread cost ninety kopecks, ten eggs brought eight rubles, a kilogram of beef twenty-four rubles, and a pair of boots four hundred and fifty rubles, while a farmer's suit of clothes cost five hundred rubles.

[422] It made the peasant really dependent upon his individual plot of land if he was to secure any necessities.[1] This was far too small and its use was bound with many restrictions. Thus, no family was allowed to hold more than one cow and two calves, one sow, up to ten goats, an undefined number of chickens and up to twenty beehives. In the beginning it was possible for the peasant to secure a certain amount of food for these animals from the common store. He was allowed to retain the manure and it was thus possible for him to improve his own individual plot and thus to secure larger returns. It was a liberal application of such principles that had rendered possible the general improvement which was noticeable during the years 1934-6, when the government was endeavoring to make the system of collective farms workable.

It can be easily seen that the system of allowing individual incomes was based on a principle opposite that of the New Economic Policy, for it would require scarcely a legislative enactment to reduce these amounts while the New Economic Policy presented a norm of profit to the workers. Yet with each year, once the government was convinced of its success, it found it possible in various ways to tap this new source of income for its own purposes.

The favorite method was by taxation. Thus, by 1939 if we should assume that the average family received in cash four hun-

1 [Ukraine - after 1933 famine -- Analyst]

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665 178 191 were to be modernized, and the construction of the great power station of Dnieprostroy was in view. Thousands of engineers, technicians and specialized workers were being sent into the Ukraine and these people not only had no knowledge of the Ukrainian dialect but they found that dialect most inappropriate for correspondence between different Government departments on complicated technical questions. The intensified industrialization of the Ukraine was obviously destined to strengthen greatly all connections with the north and linguistic differences gave promise of frequent and annoying difficulties. Very soon the Ukrainian language came only to be used in the sphere of 'cultural relations'.

Meanwhile Kaganovich, in surveying the various aspects of 'ukrainization', began gradually to investigate the part played in different branches of the administration by 'Ukrainian nationalists' or those suspected of being such.

§7. 'THE REVOLUTION AGAINST THE PEASANTS': REPRESSION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

665 423 In 1929 the Communist Revolution was approaching its second and decisive stage: Marxist principles which had conquered the life of the cities were to be imposed on the countryside. But the process of 'collectivizing' agriculture was to prove even more difficult in the Ukraine than it was in the provinces of Great Russia. Individual property in land had always been traditional in the Ukraine, and the background of the social history of the country had been the unending struggle of the peasantry to maintain their right to own the land they worked—against Polish landlords and Cossack and, later, Great Russian landlords. The strength of the Ukrainian peasantry had always been their stubborn determination that each should own his plot of land, and their weakness had been a love of individual freedom degenerating often enough into libertarian anarchy.

423 474 The outlook of the Ukrainian peasant differed widely from that of the Great Russian. The *obshchina*—the old Russian form of possessing (but not of working) land collectively—was unknown in the regions of Chernigov and Poltava and in all right-bank Ukraine. The creation of *kolkhozy* (collective farms) was from the beginning opposed, generally passively and sometimes actively, by the peasantry. And Kaganovich hastened, so soon as peasant opposition developed, to deprive the Ukrainians of the weapon which the national idea might provide. (In Caucasia and Turkestan, during the same period, opposition to collectivization was combined with a renascence and strengthening of local nationalist movements directed

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against the Great Russian hegemony.) The Ukrainian enthusiasts of 423 ●
'cultural acheivements' so recently lauded by Kaganovich himself 474
were now accused of 'maintaining relations with nationalist political organizations in Galicia'. And it was not difficult to prove their connections with open or secret organizations 'suffering under the yoke of Poland'. The existence of such connections had been tolerated and even favoured by the Soviet administration to the extent which they furthered Communist propagandist activities in Poland, but there could be no difficulty, if necessary, in treating them as treason.

In 1930 the first Ukrainian political trial took place in Kharkov. 668
A group of individuals were accused of having relations with 'the 674
Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'—the same organization 661
which had been created before the war under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian Government and which was now supposed to be functioning in Galicia. In the following year, as a result of the growing resistance of the peasants to collectivization, action against Ukrainian 'suspects' became more violent. The peasants were bitterly opposed to the *kolkhozy*, but certainly not on 'national' grounds. Faced with the imminent danger of a peasant revolt, the Soviet administration decided to eliminate all persons who through their origins could be considered to be connected with the peasantry and who might organize this revolt and become its leaders. Regardless of their loyalty to the Soviet régime during the preceding years, there now began a systematic destruction of Ukrainians belonging to the 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'.

In 1931 the Bolsheviks professed to have 'discovered' a Ukrainian 661
organization called 'the National Centre'. Holubovich (former 687
head of the *Rada* Government and participator in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations), Shershel, Mazurenko and other 'ex-politicians' were accused of being the leaders of this secret organization. They were shot. Thousands of arrests followed, the victims of which suffered execution or exile to labour camps which were themselves living cemeteries. Two years later, in 1933, the political police (G.P.U.) declared that they had discovered a real military conspiracy on the part of 'a secret military organization'. After a theatrical trial, Kotsubinsky (Vice-President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars), Kovnar (Commissar for Agriculture), and scores of other persons who had all occupied important posts in the army or the administration were shot. One of the most prominent figures in Ukrainian political life, who from the beginning had associated himself with the Communist Revolution and who had for a long time been an influential member of the Council of People's Com-

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the second was to crush the will of the peasantry. In the first he succeeded as best he could and added to the sensational trials of 1931–3 the discovery of 'a secret Ukrainian organization' which was accused of being in direct touch with the Ukrainian separatists who were working abroad under the leadership of Colonel Konovalets. It was, however, beyond the strength of Postyshev to cope with the chaos which reigned in rural Ukraine during the years 1932–4 as a result of the policy of forced collectivization. Despite the fact that Postyshev 'eliminated' from the Ukrainian Communist Party over a quarter of its total strength, and in spite of thousands of arrests and hundreds of executions, the Party Secretary was accused of 'weakness and lack of energy' and was replaced by a certain Kossior. The late 'dictator' was, after a lapse of time, himself arrested and probably shot together with many of his closest collaborators.

But all the cruel personal dramas which took place under the Secretaryships of Postyshev and Kossior were as nothing compared to the terrible miseries which overtook the Ukrainian countryside during the five years 1930–35 as a result of the introduction of the *kolkhozy*. In their very essence *kolkhozy* were organically opposed to all the traditions and ways of life of the Ukrainian peasantry. Collective farming on a large scale was carried through at the cost of ruining small and 'average' peasant farms through the instrument of the ruthless pressure of the administration. The very rapid development of 'the *kolkhoz* movement' so much admired by Communists all the world over was the result, not of the peasants voluntarily joining the collective farms, but of their being driven on to them often by the use of military force—a fact which Stalin himself acknowledged in his article 'Head-turning from Success' (*Pravda*, 2 March 1930). The immediate consequence of the *kolkhoz* policy was seen in the lowering of agricultural production throughout the whole country which quickly led to the increasing misery of the peasantry, famine and terrible mortality. One of the principal reasons of all this was the *mania grandiosa* which always characterizes the policy of extreme ideologues; having become convinced of the low productive capacity of the smaller *kolkhozy* already set up, the enthusiasts of the Communist Party, in 1930, demanded their enlargement on a 'gigantic' scale. According to the reliable testimony of a member of the Communist Party (the Ukrainian agronomist Mirkevich, the initiator of tractor stations) 'this measure, in a series of regions, was realized in an exceptionally bureaucratic and senseless manner. *Kolkhozy* of 55–100 hectares were suddenly transformed, without any adequate technical preparation, into

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474 661 423 *kolkhozy* covering some tens of thousands of hectares; as, for instance, the *Kolkhoz* of "Chervony Perekop" in the Government of Kherson which was set up to comprise 50,000 hectares. In some cases, "to simplify matters", a whole region containing hundreds of villages was declared to constitute one *kolkhoz*. All the boundaries between village lands were abolished; then the whole expanse of land arbitrarily included in the *kolkhoz* was divided into farms of several thousand hectares each—without any regard as to where the villages actually lay. Cattle and agricultural machinery were scattered about over scores of kilometres' (*Pravda*, 3 April 1930).

Nevertheless Stalin declared that: 'The time has come to finish with every kind of camouflage: we must destroy the *kulaks* and deprive them of the possibility to work on the land.' At that moment anyone who owned three cows or the equivalent in sheep, pigs, or even chickens, was considered to be a *kulak*. As a result of this policy it was not long before all the larger and more prosperous peasant farms were destroyed. These farms, since the disappearance of the large private estates, had been the principal producers of the agricultural surplus, since it was only the better-off farmers who had a surplus in excess of their needs for disposal in the towns.

474 661 423 668 As early as 1930 the policy of forced collectivization provoked open resistance in the Ukraine, and attempts were made at armed revolt; but geographical conditions did not favour the type of guerilla warfare which was undertaken with considerable determination and success by the peasants in Georgia, and particularly in the Armenian district of Karabagh and by the Tartars of the Daghestan foothills. These agrarian risings in the Ukraine were suppressed with the greatest cruelty and were followed by mass executions and by the transportation of tens of thousands of peasants. The Soviets applied methods which were then almost new in their struggle with the Ukrainian peasantry; they put them into concentration camps where they had to do forced labour. In the region of Odessa, near Tiraspol, a large and prosperous colony of 'Old Believers' completely disappeared. All the men, with the exception of a few youngsters who managed to cross the Dniestr into Bessarabia, were transported, and the women and children simply scattered over the steppe. The construction of the White Sea Canal, so much advertised by the admirers of Soviet methods in Western Europe, cost the lives of many tens of thousands of peasants, as the vast cemeteries along the banks of the northern lakes and rivers bear witness.

Very often the prospect of transportation to the far north or to Siberia caused the peasants, as in old time, to abandon everything

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and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the 474
Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian 661
peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their 423
women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and 668
more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization 731
in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, 166
and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the 661
enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign corre- 131
spondent who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revolution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

423 1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political
661 and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding
565 chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the
474 redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution
[433] against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable: during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

475 The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

474 The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the
661 new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

474 As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really
423 serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the
656 Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32, and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

had been based. '"Liberal" tendencies began already in 1932 in the sense that *kolkhozniki* (individual members of the *Kolkhozy*) were allowed to keep their own cattle (Decree of 4 February 1932). Subsequently, in 1935, *kolkhozniki* were accorded the right to farm their own private allotments within the boundaries of the *Kolkhozy*. 474 423 656

These modifications in policy soon gave positive results. It is difficult to say whether the *Kolkhozy* have come to be accepted by the peasantry as the permanent basis of rural life. At the same time there can be no doubt that the grant of certain rights of private farming to the *kolkhozniki*, combined with a relatively free market, has tended to a notable improvement in the conditions of peasant life. In consequence food production throughout the whole country has again increased.

There are now four forms of farming in existence side by side in the Soviet countryside: 423

(*a*) *Sovkhozy* (State farms); 471
(*b*) Individual farms; 433
(*c*) *Kolkhozy* (Collective farms);
(*d*) Allotments belonging to the *kolkhozniki* within the area of the *Kolkhozy*.

The relative importance of these different types of farm can be judged from the areas allotted to each in the 'sowing plan' of 1936: *Sovkhozy* covered 16 million hectares; individual farms, 5 million; *Kolkhozy*, 108 million; *kolkhozniki* holdings, 8 million.

Obviously, the *Kolkhozy* constitute the most important source of agricultural production. On an estimated yield of 8·3 quintals per hectare, the *Kolkhoz* pays 1·7 quintals to the state in taxes; 3·3 to the governmental 'machine stations' which provide and maintain plant; the balance goes to the *kolkhozniki*. The *Kolkhozy*, with a sowing area of rather over 100 million hectares and a yield of 7 quintals per hectare, supply the state organizations with about 150 million quintals (approximately 15 million tons) surplus over the consumption of the rural population. This reckoning is, of course, purely theoretical, but, in 1934, when bread rations existed for the town population, the administration did distribute about 10 million tons of bread.

The importance of the *kolkhozniki* (who are allowed to cultivate from ¼ hectare to 1 hectare each) lies in the production of vegetables and fruit and, to a certain extent, of livestock. The Plan for 1937 estimated that individual farmers and *kolkhozniki* possessed 29 million head of cattle as compared with 4½ million owned by the *Kolkhozy* over their vastly greater acreage. The private farmers and

423 *kolkhozniki* were reckoned to be even richer in pigs, of which they
471 counted 15 million against 5 million on the *Kolkhozy* and an even
433 lesser number on the *Sovkhozy*. The tiny bits of land which belong to the *kolkhozniki* personally, as well as their domestic animals, have become a school of individual farming which has grown up in the middle of 'the Socialist experiment' as a compromise with the dictates of economics and human nature. In twenty-eight towns in 1938, 82 per cent rye flour, 74 per cent wheat flour, 86 per cent beef, 93 per cent milk, 97 per cent eggs, 87 per cent potatoes, and 72 per cent cabbages, were brought to market by *kolkhozniki* and individual farmers, and only the balance came from the state and collective farms. True the official statisticians could find comfort in the fact that as against the general balance of state commerce which amounted to 100 milliards of roubles the free market only absorbed 16 milliards: but the free market shows a definite tendency to grow and in four years has doubled its transactions.

656 The successful private initiative of the *kolkhozniki* has already
423 begun to weigh upon the minds of the protagonists of the integral Revolution. In the spring of 1938 a Government Decree proclaimed that 'abuses are observed on those allotments of land which are given over to *kolkhozniki* for the personal cultivation of kitchen-gardens or other domestic needs. These abuses consist in the fact that the allotments are sometimes not situated next to the habitations of the *kolkhozniki*, but lie in the middle of *Kolkhoz* lands and exceed the size allowed by the law. The worst part of it all is that these allotments have become the principal care of *kolkhozniki*, and that they show negligence in the accomplishment of their duties in collective farming. It has also been affirmed that these allotments are sometimes cultivated by people who are not members of *Kolkhozy*. A stop has to be put to this state of things as it leads to the development of bourgeois tendencies. The dangerous influence of *kulaki*, who have succeeded in escaping, is suspected.' As a result of this situation, Stalin, by a Decree of 15 August 1939, ordered a 'verification' of all allotments taken over by *kolkhozniki* for personal cultivation: he took the opportunity to recall the law which provided that such allotments were not to exceed ¼ or ½ a hectare. It was also declared that all allotments in isolated situations in the middle of *Kolkhoz* land were illegal and should be abolished: special attention was directed to *Kolkhozy* lying in the Ukraine and Western Russia. *Kolkhozniki*, whose individual allotments were to be abolished, were themselves to be expelled from their *Kolkhozy* and united in new *Kolkhozy* in regions where 'new land' could be found. For this purpose attention was directed to the lands beyond the Volga, in

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

western Siberia, the Altai and the Far East. The execution of Stalin's commands is to be completed by September 1940. It is not to be anticipated that the acute conditions of 1929–34 will be repeated as a result of this new drive against the human nature of the Russian rural masses: the Communist machine has broken the strength of peasant society. At the same time, there is little doubt that the harvest of 1939–40 will not be as abundant as those of 1936–8.

The influence of the Revolution and of the Soviet régime on forestry in the South of Russia has been no less baleful than on other branches of rural industry. At the end of the nineteenth century woods covered 20 per cent of the whole area of the Ukraine; in 1928, according to the most optimistic estimates of Soviet statisticians, they did not occupy more than 7 per cent. Even in such a 'half-steppe' region as Poltava, owing to the care of the Imperial Government and of large landowners, woods had covered 10 per cent of the total area. 'Destruction of forests is one of the greatest evils because it is followed by the formation of deep ravines which drain the district of underground waters. The consequence of the formation of such ravines is that streams carry away valuable soil to the rivers and the sea. Every year thousands of hectares of good black earth are lost to the labourer and only serve to make the Dniepr and its affluents more shallow. The destruction of forests, the formation of ravines, the drying up of underground waters, threaten the future of the Ukraine with the gravest consequences.'

The Soviet Government is well aware of the dark side of its 'achievement' in the agricultural life of the South of Russia. But, as is well known, the Soviet leaders intend to effect a radical change in the balance of productive forces within the Union. Their reasons for this intention are both political and ideological: political because they realize that their dictatorship rests upon the industrial proletariat and has always aroused the antagonism of the peasants; ideological because they are the apostles of the mechanistic conception of life and, hypnotized by the material achievements of the capitalist world, they ape it in their attempt to transform it and can seek nothing more profound than the realization of Stalin's dream 'to catch up and surpass America'.

In 1913 the relation of agricultural to industrial production in Russia was 59·4 to 40·6. Under the original Five Year Plan formulated in 1928 the Soviets aimed at the attainment of a balance which should allocate 80·2 to industry and only 19·8 to agriculture. This fantastic aim was based obviously on the possibilities of bringing into exploitation the vast mineral resources which were known to lie under the soil of the Soviet Union. And all the political ruthless-

The Background of the Communist Triumph

Let us, therefore, look briefly at 175
the outstanding elements of the situation as they were at the beginning of the revolution.

From the time of the organization and Christianization of the Kievan state at the end of the tenth century to the eighteenth century, Ukraine, whether independent, or subject to Poland-Lithuania, or to the Russian Tsars, had remained as a political unit, even though divided. However, in 1775 Catherine II destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich, the centre of the Ukrainian Kozaks, and in 1783 she abolished all Ukrainian political institutions and privileges. From that time the area was divided into *gubernias* as the rest of the Russian Empire and the full Russian methods of administration were introduced.

From that moment, too, the Russian government spared no efforts to destroy every vestige of Ukrainian national and cultural consciousness. The Ukrainian language was treated as a peasant dialect of Russian; the name Ukraine was forbidden and even the substitute Little Russia was treated as a generic term for the area north of the Black Sea, but it did not figure on the political map of the Russian Empire as a distinct entity. The Ukrainian revival in the nineteenth century beginning with the publication of Kotlyarevsky's parody of the *Aeneid* in 1798 was confined to the [536] cultural sphere and could offer little or nothing in the way of administrative experience to the Ukrainian people. Those Ukrainians who entered the Russian service were usually sent to distant areas, while the administrative personnel in Ukraine was chiefly Russian in origin and feeling.

The great estates were largely owned by Russians or by Poles 186
and even many Ukrainian landowners who had succeeded in retaining their holdings were so thoroughly Russianized that they [423] felt little sense of kinship with the peasants on their estates. Ukrainian life was lived chiefly in the villages. The Ukrainian language was not taught in the schools or used in the courts, for all education and administration were in the Russian language. Still the peasants continued their own manner of living with their own traditions and their own tastes and desires.

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517
Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645]
through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669]
and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642
munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661]
as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423 ●
tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation[4] 369
It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

4 [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

423 The natural result was the growing depopulation of the cities.
369 Peasants who had gone into industry now flowed back to their native villages and demanded their share of the land in the hope that they might be able to raise food for themselves and their families. This increased the already overcrowded rural population and intensified the bitterness that was felt among all classes.

The hatred thus aroused was increased by the formation of committees of poor and landless peasants to take over the estates. Yet in Ukraine there was an important sector of the population who had been the owners and proprietors of from two to nearly one hundred acres of land. In some districts these included nearly a quarter of the peasant families and in an attempt to propitiate them the Soviets were frequently inclined to favor them and allow them to retain their holdings instead of dividing them among the more idle and shiftless of the population.

651 Yet this did not serve to maintain agricultural production[1] for
661 the crying demand of Moscow was for food. The Communists had abolished all markets and taxes but they substituted for them a rule that the peasants were to turn over their entire crop to the government and should retain for themselves only 31 pounds of grain per month for each member of the family. This naturally dissatisfied the peasants who had been won to the support of the new regime by the promises of the government that they could secure for their own use the land of the state and of the landlords. Each year, as the Soviets tried to enforce the collection, they planted less and less acreage and resorted to more skilful methods of hiding what they did produce in the hope that they might somehow exchange it for those manufactured products of which they were in urgent need.

To counterbalance this, the Russian detachments made more and more extensive raids and they were not satisfied to take merely the legal surplus. They seized everything in the way of food and supplies on which they could lay their hands and, in case of opposition, they ruthlessly shot the peasants without any trial or investigation as counter-revolutionists. In a sense they succeeded in their mission, for the food collectors in 1920 secured in Ukraine 2,560,000

[1] [Expropriation of landowners, distribution of land to peasants, 1919-21- Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

assumed that it was equally binding in Ukraine and without any further ado, the Ukrainian peasants were given the right of selling any surplus products exactly as if there had been no independent Ukrainian Soviet government. 185 665

The legal aspects of this decree did not interest the bulk of the Ukrainian peasants. They saw only the relief which it afforded them and the opportunities that it gave. They immediately took advantage of it, and its first effects were to be seen in a surprisingly short time. Of course, there could be no improvement in the national well-being until the harvest and the harvest of 1921 was again reduced by drought, so that with the best of intentions, it was not until 1922 that conditions began to improve.

A new Russian land code was finally adopted on March 3, 1921, and it was, of course, the model to be observed in the Ukraine. Yet this did not suppress the discontent of the Ukrainian peasants. 423 671

In an effort to suppress this smouldering discontent, D. Manuilsky, who was then the Commissar for Agriculture of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee (the revolutionary centre and the provisional government of the country), summoned to Kharkiv a gathering of agronomists from all parts of Ukraine in the First All-Ukrainian Agronomical Congress. He found the more than one thousand present practically united in their assertions that the agricultural laws as developed by the Bolsheviks were inapplicable to the Ukraine. They had been drawn up and approved on March 6, 1919 and they were entirely based on the spirit of the Russian land commune which provided usually for a redistribution of the land every three years, with the supplemental provision that the redistribution should take into account the number of persons in each family. This was all very good when it agreed, as it did in Russia, with the general spirit of the people who were vitally interested in the commune as such. Conditions were different in Ukraine and the purely artificial Land Society was developed. Of course, all the peasants had to become members but the land was divided by households rather than on an individual basis. Furthermore, it was provided in the Ukrainian Code that "The right to land handed over for labor use is without term and

423 671 can be taken away only in accordance with the provisions of the law." This insured the individual household in possession of its own piece of land and made it possible for the more industrious to undertake the improvement of the soil.

By the time that the final form of the Labor Code was established on November 22, 1922, it had become almost essentially different from the Russian Code, although it paid a lip service to the principle of nationalization through the actions of the Land Societies. A further sign of submission was the establishment of maximums on landholding. No household in the densely settled areas could have more than fourteen hectares or, in the less thickly populated areas, forty-eight hectares. The Land Society had the right to decide on the form of exploitation of the land to be carried out but if a family disagreed with the form established, it was entitled to demand the same amount of land but not necessarily the same land that it had contributed. Furthermore, outside of the requirement that all members of household were compelled to labor personally on the land, the provisions dealing with hired labor and the renting of land were left purposely vague or were omitted for further study.

The new code, which was more liberal than that in Russia, was devised in the interests of the landless peasants and also the poor and middle peasants, and definitely ratified the seizure of the estates of the large landowners. Sixty-eight per cent of the landless peasants received small tracts of land and fifty-two percent of those with holdings from two to four hectares were settled under more favorable conditions, or received additional land. On the other hand, 27.2% of those with more than sixteen hectares, the normal holding, and 56.8% of those with more than twenty-five hectares, saw their additional land removed and handed over to their less fortunate neighbors. In a sense this might seem to have been a solution of the crying need of the peasants for land but it brought with it some unexpected results.

423 427 The civil war had completely destroyed any free capital, and without capital the peasants could not buy the tools, the fertilizers, etc., which they needed to prosper. This made little difference in

the very beginning, for at the moment the primary need was for 423 ●
food and the peasants were compelled to live upon what they could 427
raise. It was not long before the returning prosperity commenced new differentiations in the villages. The poorer peasants began to take advantage of the provisions that they could lease their newly acquired land, and while the Russian law provided that a lease could run for only three years, the Ninth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets soon lengthened this term to 13 years and liberalized the laws for hired labor.

The result was that by 1926, the poor peasants had leased 1,181,000 hectares and 53.9% of the peasants who had at least ten hectares rented additional land.

In a word, under the New Economic Policy conditions began, 185
in fact, to return to what had been the situation prior to the 423
revolution, with the exception that the great land owners had disappeared, but as they had been largely Russian or Polish, their departure only increased the Ukrainian influence in the villages and made them more homogeneous than they had been before.

The Commissariat of Agriculture endeavored during these [645]
years of reconstruction to maintain as independent a position as possible. It established its own independent services, its own research stations which were concerned with Ukrainian agricultural problems, its own breeding stations and its own bureaus for study and development of the various branches of agriculture, and it did its best to separate these from the similar services directed by Moscow and not concerned with the particular problems of Ukraine.

The peasants responded to this with their own efforts. In 1922, [452]
with the famine still raging, they secured permission from Moscow to establish the so-called Selo-Pomich (or Village Aid) to provide credit for the peasants. This finally persuaded the Cheka to hand over part of the golden objects which they had stolen from the churches, and it used the capital thus secured to buy seed corn in America. It then loaned this to the peasants and when the harvest came, the loan was repaid in kind and more credit was then extended. [During NEP -- Analyst]

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment 642
of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely 631
in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to ad- [475]
minister industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine 423
they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new 474
philosophy[1] looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and 661
determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force 425
them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1] [1927- Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

423 474 661 425 policy was now changed and the middle and the richer peasants were grouped together and opposed to the poor peasants. This multiplied enormously the hostile and unsympathetic elements of the population but by holding out tempting offers to the poor peasants, the Communists succeeded in fanning anew the flames of class hatred in the villages and in producing the desired effects.

[651] Along with the adoption of the Five Year Plan, the All-Union Congress called for the strengthening of attempts at collectivization. As a result, the amount of grain demanded and the amount of taxes were rapidly raised with the avowed purpose of ruining the kulaks and kurkuls, as they were called in Ukraine. Increased pressure was put upon all classes of the rural population to join collective farms and in some districts this was so effective that almost seventy per cent of the land was turned over for organization on a "voluntary" basis.

As a further step in the same direction there began in 1928 and also in 1929 a furious attack on the richer and middle peasants and a growing insistence on the need of "dekurkulizing" the villages. This meant nothing more or less than the elimination from the countryside of all those people who had prospered under the New Economic Policy. The property of the richer and more prosperous peasants was completely confiscated and they with their families were deprived of all their rights, often including the house where they had lived or the shacks into which they could crawl for shelter. With superb inhumanity the Bolsheviks would drive formerly wealthy peasants and their families from their homes in the middle of winter and leave them without food or clothing and would threaten any of their relatives or friends who dared to give them any relief.

In the first stages of the process, cases were known where some of these richer people were moved out of the Ukraine with their goods and cattle, but as the Communists settled down to their work, they simply seized everything for their own use and that of the collective farms and contented themselves with shooting or deporting their enemies, often to the far north for work in the

forests or to northeastern Siberia for work in the mines and in the more remote parts of the wilderness.[1]

423
474
661
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1 A graphic account of this dekurkulization was given in a DP camp by Sh., a former peasant of the district of Kharkiv:

"On May 22, 1929, all my property, tools, cattle, building and clothing were confiscated. I and my family (my wife, six small children and my mother), were left without means of livelihood; we stayed with people like old folks, ate what we were given, although people were forbidden to give to us. On November 27, in spite of the fact that there was snow on the ground and 15 degrees of frost, I and my entire family, without clothes and half-naked, were put out of the house. Until February, 1930 I lived in another house which was half fallen down. On February 28, I, my wife and six children (my mother had disappeared; I do not know where) were arrested and with other dekurkulized persons were sent to the railroad station. There we were packed into freight cars as sardines in a barrel and travelled for 11 days, without knowing our destination. We were fed once every two days. Many perished from cold and exhaustion. We finally reached the station of Makarikha near Kotlas, district of Archangel, and in 40 degrees of frost, we were detrained in the woods in the snow.

"Then all those able to work were driven to forest operations 300 kilometers from Kotlas. They drove us half shod in the intense cold. They fed us on the way 300 grams of bread, 5 grams of barley and 3 grams of salt per person a day. Many died on the way. Many, unable to walk further, were shot on the spot. There we cut wood and they treated us very badly. The norms of work were abnormally high. We lived in huts which were holes we dug ourselves. Of the many thousands of people who came there more than half died of exhaustion, hunger and cold.

"Of the members of the families of kurkuls who remained at the station of Makarikha, more than half froze. Among these were my sons Ivan and Fedir; a third son Hryhory died of exhaustion. Later all the children up to 14, including three of mine, were returned to Ukraine but I have no further news of them. They probably perished. In 1932, first my wife and then I escaped by hiding in cars loaded with wood. I found work in the Don Basin. In 1937 my wife was arrested suddenly and shot in the prison of Artemivsk in the Don Basin. I escaped because I was living under an assumed name. Now I am a DP and living in Germany in an IRO camp."

Ukraine Under the Soviets

423 474 661 425 They followed this up at the end of 1929 by providing for the compulsory collectivization of all the land. Private holding of land was abolished and so was private use. The peasants were forced into collective farms to which they had to contribute all of their livestock, agricultural implements and tools. Then they were left nothing that they could call their own except a small garden plot that was assigned to each family for the purpose of raising those types of vegetables that it was not profitable to raise in large quantities, because the collective farms were occupied with those types of agriculture that were selected for them by the central authorities in Moscow.

The immediate result differed in different places. In Great Russian territory, where the principle of the community ownership of land had definitely taken root, the peasants complied without too much hesitation. In Ukraine and Kuban, where the older style of Ukrainian agriculture had been long in vogue, the peasants became sulky. They killed off large numbers of their cattle and livestock of various kinds. The government, seeing this tremendous loss, then tried to eliminate from the collectives and liquidate in one way or another all of those who had been guilty of disobedience to the order requiring the peasants to contribute all their wealth.

There developed almost a civil war in some sections of the country as discontent rose and the peasants were prepared to die rather than to yield. Nevertheless, this time the government was not prepared to concede anything, as it had in 1921, and despite remarks by Stalin that in some details the Communists had become dizzy from success, the regime held its course and even continued to apply the screws more tightly. The result was the famine of 1932 and 1933.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

731 There is the frequent idea that the famine was specifically
661 directed against the rich peasants and the kurkuls. This is utterly
[565] false, for these had been liquidated earlier. The blow of 1933 fell chiefly upon the poorer classes who had always supported the Soviet regime and who regarded their suffering in the beginning as a mistake which Moscow would do its best to correct. In the same way it was the Ukrainian workmen of the smaller cities who bore the brunt of the hardships. It was the direct triumph of the Russian Bolsheviks over the Ukrainian poor.

185 Another proof that the famine occurred in connection with
731 the plans of Moscow was the fact that Postyshev, besides his official post, held that of general inspector of the Ministry of Grain Production for resettlement. It turned out later that he was given the general task of preparing a plan for an immigration into Ukraine from various portions of the Soviet Union. The dislocation of the population was worked out in detail. Millions of Russians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, etc., were to be sent in to complete the work of rerussification. Especial pains were devoted to the regions close to Russia on the Left Bank of the Dnieper and there was talk at one time of annexing to the Russian Republic the Kharkiv-Donbas industrial region, but this did not fall in with the plans of Stalin.

The result of the famine was the final stabilization of the collec-
[423] tive system of agriculture and the breaking of the old mode of life throughout the whole of Ukraine. More than that, it established the fact that in the economic sphere Moscow could direct Ukrainian life as it would. It overawed the population for the moment but it did not reconcile them to their fate and it went hand in hand with the attempt to exterminate the old Ukrainian cultural life.

[Ukraine, 1933 -- Analysis]

651 whether or not that peasant was raising hens. The government demanded its share of the manure from the private cattle and it made no difference as to whether or not the individual raised cattle.

423 685 At the same time[1] the heads of the Communist Party sought high and wide for misuse of state property. Again and again they discovered that on collective farms the administration and the peasants were in agreement that the best way to allow some improvement in the general economic situation was to permit the peasant to cultivate and have the income from a slightly larger plot of land. The increased productivity in this way often more than covered the apparent use of state income from the operations of the farm but to the leaders of the Communist Party this was as severe an offence as was the failure to fulfil obligations, for it dared to question the superiority of the policy of collectivization. During 1939, the Party made strenuous efforts to stop such abuses and they even went further in urging and commanding a reduction in the individual allotments of land, which had been the only means of winning even a grudging approval of the Ukrainian peasants for the idea of collectivization.

Of course, with the outbreak of World War II there came a slight relaxation of this pressure, for Stalin and his friends apparently became aware that an excessive attack upon the peasantry might lead them to make common cause with the opponents of the Soviet Union. Yet, this relaxation of pressure was very slight during the years 1939-1941, when the alliance of Stalin and Hitler seemed to be firm and steady and when the Soviet Union was expanding in accordance with its own powers and its own intrigues. In all this the Ukraine remained aloof, closely guarded against the importation of new ideas and the population dragged on their weary existence, scarcely daring to dream that anything could happen to change their unhappy lot.

1 [1939 -- Analyst]

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

At the same time the nationalization of the land was commenced 423 ●
and this gave a good excuse for the elimination of another class 471
of formerly prosperous people, whether they were Poles or Ukrainians. At first this was carried out along the lines of the Ukrainian land code of 1922, for the authorities were eager to get crops in when spring came. Still, during the summer of 1940 they began to urge the formation of collective farms. The peasants in some of the more backward regions listened to these ideas willingly, but in the better areas where agriculture was on a far higher and more efficient plane than in large sections of eastern Ukraine, they were very cool and meetings had to be postponed again and again if disorders were to be averted in the middle of the war. Still the Soviet authorities felt that they could waste some time until a real peace was restored and their hands were definitely free.

In regard to the educational establishments and all questions 661
of organization, they acted without delay. In the first days of the 814
occupation, the Soviet commissars seized the property of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and prevented all further work by confiscating the building and its contents and preventing all further publications. On January 14, 1940, they forced the complete self-liquidation of the Society. The president, Prof. Rakovsky, at once fled to the west and during the next uncertain months a large part of the active members made their way to Krakow in the Polish Government General, where they endeavored to resume their work. The Society was then turned into a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR and was placed under the control of the administration in Kiev, while part of its collections and its work was placed under the University of Lviv, which was now ostensibly Ukrainianized and given the name of Ivan Franko, the great Western Ukrainian scholar and writer. This was not for long, for very soon here, too, the lecturers to win Soviet approval began to switch over from Ukrainian to Russian.

All other societies of every kind were abolished and fitted into 655
the Soviet scheme of things. The cooperative network, especially such great societies as the Maslosoyuz (Dairy Cooperative Society) and the People's Trade were made governmental organs. Various

a revival of that form of family agriculture which had long been 474
popular in the Ukraine before the collectivization. Furthermore, 241
it was soon suspected that the links varied in their delivery of supplies to the government, sometimes in inverse proportion to their own readiness to work. The peasants likewise as in the early days of the NEP devoted more attention to their own private plots of land, a phenomenon that had been noticed even before World War II.

The Soviet authorities had several answers to such develop- 474
ments. On the one hand, they finally forbade the operation of the 241
permanent links which had developed to the point where they 466
threatened the objective of collectivization, the turning of the [423]
peasant farmer into a paid proletarian worker in agriculture. On the other hand they reduced the size again of the individual plot of land and they forced the peasants to give up animal raising on their plots by charging them for even the straw from the collective farms and the wild fodder that grew in abandoned places. Then again, they levied a tax on the products of these plots and this, plus the reduction of the allotment, rendered it impossible for the peasant to improve his lot except through increased work on the collective farm. In the meanwhile the steady raising of the quota of work required for one labor day made it impossible for the average peasant, unless he was a Stakhanovist (i.e. a person who cooperated with the central regime and thereby received favorable assignments) to complete one labor day within one calendar day, no matter how long hours he worked. This had been a favorite device of the Russian landlords as we learn from Radishchev's *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*, a famous Russian radical work of the end of the eighteenth century but a modern version of it was adapted by the Russian Communist leaders and used effectively.

Even these measures were not the desirable solution. This was 474
first proposed by Khrushchov in 1947, and while it was at first 241
looked upon with some disfavor, it was finally deemed suitable by 665
the slave-drivers of the Kremlin, and Khrushchov, after a period of mild disfavor, was promoted to the Politburo, and another Russian, Melnikov, placed in charge of Ukraine. This was the

474 creation of great "agro-cities" or "agro-settlements" which would
241 unite several collective farms in one great centre which could be
665 more easily controlled by the Communist Party with a smaller number of qualified party members in charge. By the end of 1950 the number of kolhosps (collective farms) had been reduced from 33,653, as at the end of the war, to 14,443. The number of households in one had grown from 163 households to 277. At the same time the number of collective farms in which there were definite party leaders had increased from 42% to 78%. This does not imply a growth in Communist membership, for the number of Communist authorities might, under the new ratio, be reduced by almost 3,000 in personnel. This would be hardly likely but it explains at a glance the increased control that the Communists could exert over the larger groups. It also made it easier by destroying the separated villages to prevent as effective help being given to the U. P. A. and the other anti-Communist movements which lingered on, as the peasants saw that the new era was to be not one of peace but of increased hardships. At the same time, the
423 peasant was made more helpless for his holdings in the neighbor-
241 hood of his home were reduced to 0.15 hectare or approximately a third of an acre.

This area is roughly equivalent to the average American suburban lot of 150 x 100 feet and on this the average peasant family was supposed, no matter how many members it contained, to raise all the vegetables, eggs and milk which the family required for the year and also any other plant or animal requirement which was needed as a cash crop. Even this was now burdened with taxes and the peasant was forbidden to secure anything from the collective farm to assist in his economy, outside of what he secured in his pay for a steadily diminishing number of labor days and the accompanying cash and kind receipts which were apportioned to him for his work.

474 Estimates based on figures from some collective farms show
434 that the average family receives for its year's work, if three or four
241 members work, something in the neighborhood of three hundred pounds of grain, four hundred pounds of potatoes and about one

accused of having belonged to a subversive League for the Liberation of the Ukraine.[24] That this campaign of suppression coincided with the drive for the collectivization of agriculture in the Ukraine is hardly coincidental. In many respects the Ukrainian peasant was much more profoundly affected by the establishment of the kolkhoz (Ukrainian *kolhosp*), or collective farm, than was the Russian. The former was frequently more prosperous, hence had more to lose; moreover, the lack of a traditional communal agricultural organization in the Ukraine made the new system more alien and repugnant.

It appears certain that the Ukrainian peasantry formed a disproportionate, if not predominant, part of the hapless millions deported as "kulaks" to Siberia or Kazakhstan or driven by famine to the primitive slums of the expanding Soviet cities. Very probably this situation created a potential basis for a national rebellion based on economic and social oppression by alien rulers, just as had the Polish and Russian preponderance in governmental and landowning groups before the war. The Communists were frequently forced to use non-Ukrainians, Russian and Jewish intellectuals, workers from the towns, where they had real support, or persons imported from Russia itself, in order to carry out collectivization. Consequently, it is probable that the suppression of the nationalist intelligentsia at this time was at least in part a precautionary step to destroy a group which was of limited danger in itself yet might have presented a real threat to the Communists if it could have utilized the discontent of the peasants to turn them to nationalism. To what extent the Soviet regime succeeded in eliminating the nationalist intellectuals is one of the principal topics which will be dealt with on the basis of the evidence provided in this study. It should be noted at this point,

[24] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166; T. Skubyts'kyi, "Klassovaia bor'ba v ukrainskoi istoricheskoi literature" (The Class Struggle in Ukrainian Historical Literature), *Istorik-Marksist*, No. 17 (1930), pp. 27–40 (one of the principal Communist assaults on the Hrushevs'kyi school and other "deviationists"). The whole question of the purge of intellectuals, with special reference to historians, is discussed at length by Boris Krupnyts'kyi in "Die Ukrainische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion 1921–1941," in *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1941, pp. 125–51. For Skrypnyk's official statement, see his *Statti i promovy* (Articles and Speeches) (Kharkov: Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo Ukraïny, 1930), Vol. I: *Spil'ka Vyzvolennia Ukraïny* (The League for the Liberation of the Ukraine), pp. 413–36.

186 ments of the Galician population—teachers, physicians, artists—were brought to Kiev to participate in Ukrainian cultural activities.[70]

626 After a comparatively short time, however, the Soviet administration appears to have become convinced that this "generous" 186 treatment of Ukrainian national aspirations was unrewarding. About the middle of 1940, the Ukrainian occupation troops, which had evidently been on too friendly terms with the local population, were withdrawn and replaced by units recruited in Central Asia.[71] A strip along the border with the Generalgouvernement was cleared of its population to a depth of several miles, [423] and crossing was made almost impossible.[72] A start was made in the collectivization of agriculture.[73] No less important than these deliberate measures perhaps was the sending of tens of thousands of "carpetbagger" Soviet state, party, and army officials to the West Ukraine, where by their alien aspect (many were Russian) and their sheer numbers they severely irritated the local population.[74]

While it is impossible to know what the Soviet motives for introducing a harsher policy were, one may guess that the negative reaction of the population to the "tolerant" epoch played a part. The Soviet authorities probably discovered soon that the student exchanges had an effect opposite to that intended, for the West Ukrainian students were disagreeably surprised by the material

[70] Arthur W. Just, in *Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5.

[71] Mykhailo Kohut, "Iak zhylo halyts'ke selo pid bol'shevykamy" (How a Galician Village Lived under the Bolsheviks), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; Report of interview with Dr. H. J. Beyer (a German official who had been active in Galicia), *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, July 16, 1941, p. 3.

[72] *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, p. 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 10, 1940, p. 3, based on an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

[73] Kohut in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 25, 1941, p. 2, and May 17, 1942, p. 4.

[74] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 13, 1942, p. 4, states that, due to the influx of Polish refugees from the German military campaign and the arrival of Soviet officials, the population of L'vov increased from 318,000 to 450,000 under Soviet occupation. On August 14, 1941, it printed a letter from L'vov stating that Soviet officials and their families in L'vov had numbered 100,000. Just (*Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5) concludes from the number of votes cast in the Soviet election in Stanislav in the summer of 1940 that the population of that city must have increased by over 40,000, 1,000 of whom, he says, were NKVD officers.

one of the camps put it.[58] As colder weather approached, typhus combined with starvation to bring about hundreds of thousands of deaths. 727 697

Since many of these camps were located in the Ukraine the population soon became aware of the conditions in them, even though a substantial portion of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were separated out and released by the Germans.[59] Moreover, the inhabitants could scarcely avoid noticing the corpses of prisoners of war shot (perhaps as "kommissars" or Communists) and left lying in the villages.[60] Consequently, a belief that the Germans intended to destroy the Slavic peoples soon became widespread.

A second German failure was less shocking than the treatment of the prisoners of war, but in the long run it had an even more deleterious effect on relations with the Ukrainian population. This was the policy in relation to agriculture. As was noted previously, the major objective of the Nazi leadership in its occupation of the Ukraine was the acquisition of food and raw materials to increase Germany's war potential. This objective involved the necessity of dealing with the question of the kolkhoz, which was the predominant form of agricultural organization in the Soviet Union. 423● 727

The problem posed for the German occupiers was not an easy one by any standards. It will be recalled that the chief reason for the introduction of the kolkhoz by Moscow was the prevalence of the "scissors crisis" during the late twenties; this emergency arose fundamentally because the Soviet rulers were unable or unwilling to supply enough consumer goods to induce individual peasants to deliver large quantities of agricultural products. The Germans were faced with the same dilemma, because the needs of their

[58] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 21, 1942, p. 2.

[59] Interview 51; Directive of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Abteilung Kriegsgefangene, June 16, 1941, PS 888 (hereafter referred to as PS 888); *Nastup*, July 12, 1941, p. 2; Amt Ausland Abwehr to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Annex, September 15, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 338 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 338).

[60] Memorandum by First Lieutenant Oberländer, Abwehr II, Heeresgruppe Süd, November 28, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 278 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 278). Oberländer significantly points out that pro-German sentiment in the population had greatly diminished within a few weeks of conquest—i.e., while the Wehrmacht was still the occupying authority.

423 fighting forces required that very little production be diverted to
727 consumer goods. Moreover, their situation was in many respects more difficult than that of the Kremlin in 1929, for the material basis for the reconstruction of individual farms—buildings, equipment, livestock—was often lacking. Under these circumstances, a return to individual operation of agriculture would probably have meant a sharp net decline in productivity and a still greater decline in surpluses available for delivery.

On the other hand, the Germans had strong reasons for favoring the dissolution of the collective-farm system, as a salient feature of the Soviet system which they affected to despise. More than any other aspect of the Soviet system, the kolkhoz appears to have been hated by large numbers of the peasants. While it is questionable whether this hatred was universally felt, it was undoubtedly a very strong sentiment among the older groups of the population, those most ready on other grounds to cooperate with the Germans.[61]

Faced with this dilemma, the German rulers followed a tactic of compromise and deceit. They promised to dissolve the kolkhoz, stipulating reasonably enough, but in opposition to the desire of the peasant for immediate acquisition of land, that the process be gradual. First, the kolkhoz was to be transformed into a *Gemeinwirtschaft* (*hromads'ke hospodarstvo*) or community enterprise; the only signficant immediate effect was the increase in the *dvor* or garden allotment permitted each household. In a second stage, to follow in the near future, the *Gemeinwirtschaft* was to be transformed into a *Landbaugenossenschaft* (*khliborobs'ka spilka*) or agricultural association. At this stage each household was to receive a definite section of land, and be rewarded in proportion to the harvest from this land, although many of the major agricultural operations were to be performed in common to overcome the extreme dearth of draft animals, tractors, tractor fuel, and implements.[62]

Where the program was carried out without proscrastination,

[61] PS 3876.

[62] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, February 28, 1942, p. 3. A final stage, the *Einzelhof*, or individual farm, was envisaged by the planners, but very rarely, if ever, instituted.

most of the peasantry seem to have responded favorably.[63] Frustrating delays ensued throughout a large part of the Ukraine, however, especially in the Reichskommissariat. In part they were due to misplaced German thoroughness in requiring exact surveys of the land before proceeding to its division among the households in the *Landbaugenossenschaft*. More serious was the deliberate obstruction of Koch and others who, feeling that the program would leave some small segment of life free of their control, argued that it would result in reduced deliveries. As a result, only 10 percent instead of the planned 20 percent of *Gemeinwirtschaften* were converted to *Landbaugenossenschaften*.[64] In spite of the meager practical results, the de-collectivization program was a favorite theme of Koch's propaganda, doubtless because he allowed so little else of a positive nature even to be discussed. In the end, however, the constantly broken pledges unquestionably caused a loss of faith in the Germans, even a willingness to return to the known evils of the Soviet system. The peasant's saying, "A bad mother is still better than a step-mother who makes many promises," indicated his judgment of the German agricultural policy.[65]

The problem of securing agricultural supplies was closely connected with that of supplying the Ukrainian urban population with food. One way in which the Germans sought to obtain most of the farm products for their own use was to make practically no provision for feeding the city dwellers. This was especially true during the first winter. The concept was simple: the starving urban population would find some means, through barter or otherwise, of inducing the peasants to part with an extra, hidden supply of food beyond that which the Germans had been able to

[63] Cf. for example Report of Ortskommandantur Melitopol', July 8, 1942, PS 1693 (hereafter referred to as PS 1693); Report No. 7 of Representative of Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte and Stab des Befehlshabers des ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte Captain Müller, March 24, 1942, to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, PS 1686 (hereafter referred to as PS 1686).

[64] Memorandum by Bräutigam, October 25, 1942, PS 294 (hereafter referred to as PS 294).

[65] Situation report, Wirtschaftinspektorat Süd lc, April, 1942, NG 1089 (hereafter referred to as NG 1089); Memorandum of Generalkommissar for the Crimea, Alfred Frauenfeld, to Himmler, February 10, 1944, NO 5394 (hereafter referred to as NO 5394).

648 Army which was being organized in the territory of the
[642] Don Cossacks and in the Northern Caucasus. They were not far wrong. The Government of the 'Independent Ukraine,' considered to be anti-Russian, supplied the Volunteer Army,[1] on whose standards the device 'the one and indivisible Russia' was inscribed, with arms and ammunition. Entire trains proceeded to Rostov-on-Don, transporting officers, cadets, and civilians wishing to serve in the Volunteer Army. Even at Kiev the White military organization enjoyed a certain amount of liberty. A tacit collaboration developed under the half-sympathetic eyes of the central empires, between the command of the White Army and the Ukrainian Government of Kiev. This tolerance on the part of the Austro-Germans found its explanation in the imminence of their defeat on the western front. Thus Ukrainian politics and especially the support of Bolshevism which they considered an involuntary ally, having ranged Russia among the neutrals, no longer had any sense. The Austro-German authorities began to take an interest in the opponents of Communism and of Ukrainianism and even looked to the Don Cossacks with a view to collaboration, those same Cossacks who, though well organized since the October Revolution as an independent State, had never expressed the desire of separating from the Russian Empire.

642 The internal policy of the new Government, com-
727 pletely at the service of the forces of occupation, was
423 characterized by the support of private property and particularly of the landowners. This policy led to the proclamation of new laws regarding the return of estates to the landowners, of which they had been deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles of 1917.

[1] The name which was officially used by the White Army which, at the beginning, did not resort to any mobilization and only filled its ranks with volunteers.

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728
Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669
of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrai- 665
nian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185
Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed 423
simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discon- [563]
tent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727
exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The represen- 565
tatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
656 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Congress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933: U 661 665

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

6. *The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33*

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation. U 731 656

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*). SU [474] [423] U [474] [423]

Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

563 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the
423 Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the
474 big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the masses of the people. It should be pointed out that between the Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR.
661 The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

[2. In [illegible] Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under 162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation ●423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to [517] education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Rus- 186 sian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist 631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

/141/ Hunger Overcomes Resistance

178 Bolshevism tore the Ukrainians away from their past and hurled them, as it were, into a dark, unknown future. They were thrown from one extreme into the other, not only with regard to religion, but also in a social, economic and political respect. They were thrown from unlimited individualism into a society where all are supposed to be equal.

When Bolshevik slogans spread through the Ukrainian villages there was a great deal that was ripe for oblivion. Czarist Moscow, the great princes of the Church and the wealthy gentry had exerted themselves precisely to keep the populace in a state of ignorance and to prevent any kind of enlightenment. The masses were thus more tractable and the existing order was not endangered. Nevertheless, with thrift and industry the peasants had succeeded in considerably enlarging their land after serfdom was abolished in 1861, to the detriment of the landed proprietors. In 1861 the peasants owned 45.7% of 48.1 million hectares, in 1916 they owned 65%. (84) The rest was the property of the lords of the manor, the church and the state.

423 [162]

84. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 360.

423 241 With the rapid increase in population there was a great land shortage, especially in North Ukraine, even after the distribution of land in 1861. Conditions had not improved much since 1830, when the representative of the nobility of the Poltava district reported in the Senate that in his district "there was a perceptible shortage of land and dire poverty". (85) In Podolia,

85. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of South Ukraine, page 32.

423 Volhynia, and in the northern guberniyas more than
241 half the land belonged to large estates before the First World War, and the rest was divided among the small /142/ farmers with many children, who barely earned a laborer's living. Since the small farmers could not live from the yield of their one- to four-hectare fields, they tried to supplement their income by doing other work. They hired themselves out as day laborers to the estates and rented land from the lords of the manor - in the part of the Ukraine on the right bank of the river especially from Jews who, for their part, were tenants on a large scale - for a wickedly high rent.

In the South Ukrainian steppe, which was not settled until late, conditions were different. This steppe occupies about three-sevenths of the surface of present-day Soviet Ukraine. When Catherine II had cleared the steppe of Crimean Tatars and the Caucasian peoples, she sent for foreign colonists, especially Germans to settle the land. The influx of settlers from all sides was so great that in some parts there was a shortage of land even at the beginning of the 19th century, and the descendants of the first settlers were in turn, obliged to emigrate in the middle
241 of the century. But in general there was enough land. Steppe farming which was once pasture farming, underwent a basic transformation. Since grain was well paid, the farmers and estate owners turned the scar of the steppes into arable land; thus what was once rich pastureland became in the end, poor pastureland. In terms of territory, no less than 75 to 90% of the entire soil was arable, so that there was a shortage of feed for the draft animals. People were forced to limit the number of oxen and horses they kept and return to extensive farming, plowing the soil with four light horses and a light plow, rather than with eight heavy oxen and a heavy plow.

425 669 the cattle were burned. However, the glorious state did not last long. The farmers lacked seed, machines and draft animals in order to cultivate the land they so easily obtained. Besides, the men who came back from the war and the landless village farmers wanted to have a share in the booty. In the guberniyas of Kiyev and Khar'kov the government claimed the forests and the extensive beet fields. Civil wars, drought and epidemics carried off hundreds of thousands of peasant families during the years of the Bolshevist war. Thus ended the first chapter of the agrarian revolution, so eagerly awaited.

423 241 The New Economic Policy with its tolerance of a "bludgeoned private economy" constituted the second chapter. The peasants obtained their land and their farms on long leases; they could cultivate their land as they pleased, except that the farm could not be carelessly run, otherwise the management of the establishment could pass over into other hands. Nothing was gained by the fact that all the land belonged to the community. The "communal fields" were a Russian form of possession which had found favor at the time of Catherine II in the steppes and in the part of the Ukraine on the left bank of the river. Even though the farmer could not dispose of his land 497 at any time like a free /Facing page 144/ /Map IX: Railroad Communications. The main lines of communication run in a north-south direction, whereas the east-west lines have always been neglected./ /Key: Number of daily passenger trains 423 in 1935./ /145/ estate owner, even though he was 241 obliged to acquiesce to the fact that the entire community property was redistributed every 10 to 20 years, nevertheless, he could do as he pleased on his section of land. No less than 88.9% of peasant land in the Ukrainian steppes belonged to the communities, and in North Ukraine, 80.4%. The czars had condoned this form of ownership, because it simplified administration, facilitated

423 tax collection and, finally, also corresponded
241 to the patriarchal order. It was only in the former Polish Ukraine on the right side of the river that purely private ownership was retained. The Bolshevik NEP now very cleverly fastened on to the community field system.

241 With the restoration of peace and order during the NEP years the social life of the peasant country again attained its equilibrium. The families which before that were broken up or dismembered now came together again. At the same time, great efforts were made to raise the productive capacity of the new family farms by means of technical education, and in this the young farmers were particularly eager to join. At that time, a German observer wrote: "In the activity of the youth organizations in the villages we see an expression of the deep longing to be freed at last from 'the power of darkness' and not always to stand apart while the civilized races divide up the treasures of the earth among themselves." (88)

88. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of the South Ukraine, page 69.

423 This hopeful development was abruptly inter-
241 rupted by the subsequent third phase of the agra-
474 rian revolution, the transfer of the individual
185 peasant farm to communal ownership of all village inhabitants. It was only by means of collectivism, the coordination of the farms with the communes in the other economic fields, that the Bolshevik regime could last; it was only in this way that one could strike at the root of Ukrainian nationalism, and only thus carry out the Five Year Plan. For industrial development with the purchase of foreign /146/ machines had to be paid for by exporting agricultural products. All that was needed now was a command, in order to maintain the export of the necessary amounts of grain at the prescribed price.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

423 474 Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

472 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Ukrainian SSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

185 471 Art. 11. The economic life of the Ukrainian SSR is determined and directed by the State National Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the independence of the socialist country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

461 Art. 12. In the Ukrainian SSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Ukrainian SSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Ukrainian SSR voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Ukrainian SSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

V

THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

Ukrainians and Byelorussians are officially recognized as independent nations within the U.S.S.R., yet not in the same sense as Armenians, Georgians or the peoples of Central Asia. Nominally the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other peoples having Soviet Republics of their own are put on an equal footing, but in reality the Kremlin adheres to the idea of a Russian super-nation comprising Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Great Russians. This Russian super-nation makes up almost four-fifths of the population of the U.S.S.R. and is thus largely identical with the Soviet Union. S.U. 563 635 829

The Soviet régime which has always been eager to exaggerate the importance of the cleavage between various branches of the family of Finnish or Turkic peoples is equally anxious to minimize the differences existing between Slavs. This apparent contradiction in approach is easily explained. Finnish and Turkic unity favours disintegration but Slav unity makes for the consolidation and the strengthening of the Soviet State. S.U. 182

The dominant Soviet conception of history classes Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Great Russians as 'three brotherly peoples' who after the twelfth century developed out of a formerly existing single Russian people. The Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Great Russians, according to official Soviet history, were still united in the ancient Slav State of Kiev and went their separate ways only after Kiev's downfall. S.U. 814 829

I. THE UKRAINE

The Ukrainians are the most numerous people of the Soviet Union apart from the Great Russians. UK. 423

Their land is both the most important industrial arsenal and the largest granary of Russia. Before the Second World War it supplied more than half Russia's coal, 60 per cent of her iron ore and cast iron, 50 per cent of all steel, 70 per cent of all sugar beet and 40 per cent of all winter-wheat. These facts in themselves determine the importance of the Ukrainian factor in the general planning of Soviet Russian policy.

THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

661 668 423

Political and cultural oppression of Ukrainian nationalism[1] was co-ordinated with a tough fight against the Ukrainian peasant masses opposing the policy of collectivization. Famine, total disorganization of the Ukrainian agriculture and the formation of armed peasant bands were characteristic features of this period. The central Government got the situation in hand by physically annihilating peasant resistance, by making partial concessions on the tempo of collectivization and by thoroughly purging, between 1930 and 1932, the staff of the Ukrainian Peoples' Commissariat for Agriculture of alleged Borotbist wreckers.

THE SKRYPNIK AFFAIR

661 186 665

The Ukrainian crisis in the early thirties culminated in the 'affair Skrypnik', which was the most important single event in Ukrainian history of that period.

After his unsuccessful fight in 1922 as an associate of Rakovsky[2] for a 'Confederation of Soviet Republics' and for the quasi-independence of the Ukraine, Skrypnik in his day-to-day work as Peoples Commissar for the Interior, Justice, and Education tried to save for the Ukraine what could be saved in the way of an autonomous status. One of his main preoccupations was to prevent as far as possible the foundation of all-Union institutions such as the All-Union Agricultural Academy; but he failed.

Skrypnik had been a Marxist since 1897, and a member of the Bolshevik Party since its foundation. After the Revolution he was not just a local Ukrainian figure but became a Vice-Premier in the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nobody could with any shadow of justification denounce Skrypnik as nationalist. Skrypnik, it is true, considered that the central Government should bring proletarian internationalism and justified national aspirations into harmony with each other. 'Our work', he used to say, 'should be organized in such a way as to give the working masses of each nation the possibility of developing its national consciousness as much as possible'.

This conception amounted from an orthodox Bolshevik standpoint to the 'triumph of nationalism over the proletarian revolution' and was bound to get Skrypnik into trouble sooner or later. The men whom Stalin commissioned to liquidate the 'Skrypnik affair' were a Pole, Stanislav Kosior, and a Russian, Pavel Postyshev, first and second secretary respectively of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The final clash occurred on June 10th, 1933, in Kharkov, when Postyshev and Kosior, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, accused Skrypnik of being an enemy of the State and the actual head of the Ukrainian counter-revolution. At

1 [Cf. cat. 186, p.p. 130-131 -- Analyst]
2 [Cf. cat. 642, p.128 -- Analyst]

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment 642
of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely 631
in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to ad- [475]
minister industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine 423
they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new 474
philosophy[1] looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and 661
determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force 425
them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

1 [1927- Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

423 policy was now changed and the middle and the richer peasants
474 were grouped together and opposed to the poor peasants. This
661 multiplied enormously the hostile and unsympathetic elements of
425 the population but by holding out tempting offers to the poor peasants, the Communists succeeded in fanning anew the flames of class hatred in the villages and in producing the desired effects.

[651] Along with the adoption of the Five Year Plan, the All-Union Congress called for the strengthening of attempts at collectivization. As a result, the amount of grain demanded and the amount of taxes were rapidly raised with the avowed purpose of ruining the kulaks and kurkuls, as they were called in Ukraine. Increased pressure was put upon all classes of the rural population to join collective farms and in some districts this was so effective that almost seventy per cent of the land was turned over for organization on a "voluntary" basis.

As a further step in the same direction there began in 1928 and also in 1929 a furious attack on the richer and middle peasants and a growing insistence on the need of "dekurkulizing" the villages. This meant nothing more or less than the elimination from the countryside of all those people who had prospered under the New Economic Policy. The property of the richer and more prosperous peasants was completely confiscated and they with their families were deprived of all their rights, often including the house where they had lived or the shacks into which they could crawl for shelter. With superb inhumanity the Bolsheviks would drive formerly wealthy peasants and their families from their homes in the middle of winter and leave them without food or clothing and would threaten any of their relatives or friends who dared to give them any relief.

In the first stages of the process, cases were known where some of these richer people were moved out of the Ukraine with their goods and cattle, but as the Communists settled down to their work, they simply seized everything for their own use and that of the collective farms and contented themselves with shooting or deporting their enemies, often to the far north for work in the

forests or to northeastern Siberia for work in the mines and in the more remote parts of the wilderness.[1]

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661
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1 A graphic account of this dekurkulization was given in a DP camp by Sh., a former peasant of the district of Kharkiv:

"On May 22, 1929, all my property, tools, cattle, building and clothing were confiscated. I and my family (my wife, six small children and my mother), were left without means of livelihood; we stayed with people like old folks, ate what we were given, although people were forbidden to give to us. On November 27, in spite of the fact that there was snow on the ground and 15 degrees of frost, I and my entire family, without clothes and half-naked, were put out of the house. Until February, 1930 I lived in another house which was half fallen down. On February 28, I, my wife and six children (my mother had disappeared; I do not know where) were arrested and with other dekurkulized persons were sent to the railroad station. There we were packed into freight cars as sardines in a barrel and travelled for 11 days, without knowing our destination. We were fed once every two days. Many perished from cold and exhaustion. We finally reached the station of Makarikha near Kotlas, district of Archangel, and in 40 degrees of frost, we were detrained in the woods in the snow.

"Then all those able to work were driven to forest operations 300 kilometers from Kotlas. They drove us half shod in the intense cold. They fed us on the way 300 grams of bread, 5 grams of barley and 3 grams of salt per person a day. Many died on the way. Many, unable to walk further, were shot on the spot. There we cut wood and they treated us very badly. The norms of work were abnormally high. We lived in huts which were holes we dug ourselves. Of the many thousands of people who came there more than half died of exhaustion, hunger and cold.

"Of the members of the families of kurkuls who remained at the station of Makarikha, more than half froze. Among these were my sons Ivan and Fedir; a third son Hryhory died of exhaustion. Later all the children up to 14, including three of mine, were returned to Ukraine but I have no further news of them. They probably perished. In 1932, first my wife and then I escaped by hiding in cars loaded with wood. I found work in the Don Basin. In 1937 my wife was arrested suddenly and shot in the prison of Artemivsk in the Don Basin. I escaped because I was living under an assumed name. Now I am a DP and living in Germany in an IRO camp."

Ukraine Under the Soviets

423 They followed this up at the end of 1929 by providing for the
474 compulsory collectivization of all the land. Private holding of land
661 was abolished and so was private use. The peasants were forced
● 425 into collective farms to which they had to contribute all of their livestock, agricultural implements and tools. Then they were left nothing that they could call their own except a small garden plot that was assigned to each family for the purpose of raising those types of vegetables that it was not profitable to raise in large quantities, because the collective farms were occupied with those types of agriculture that were selected for them by the central authorities in Moscow.

The immediate result differed in different places. In Great Russian territory, where the principle of the community ownership of land had definitely taken root, the peasants complied without too much hesitation. In Ukraine and Kuban, where the older style of Ukrainian agriculture had been long in vogue, the peasants became sulky. They killed off large numbers of their cattle and livestock of various kinds. The government, seeing this tremendous loss, then tried to eliminate from the collectives and liquidate in one way or another all of those who had been guilty of disobedience to the order requiring the peasants to contribute all their wealth.

There developed almost a civil war in some sections of the country as discontent rose and the peasants were prepared to die rather than to yield. Nevertheless, this time the government was not prepared to concede anything, as it had in 1921, and despite remarks by Stalin that in some details the Communists had become dizzy from success, the regime held its course and even continued to apply the screws more tightly. The result was the famine of 1932 and 1933.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

421 Land tenure in the Ukraine is at present in an
●425 unstable state. The principal factors affecting it are two legal enactments, the first being the law of 1861 abolishing serfdom and providing for the ownership of land by peasants, who previously had held none, and the second being the Stolypin law of 1906 modifying the principle of communal ownership in peasant lands. The law of 1861 provided for land to be taken from private estates and handed over to peasants on a deferred purchase system. The land was not assigned to individuals, but to *mirs* (local communes), which divided it up for cultivation. The law also provided for periodical redistributions of this land, which is known always as the *nadyel* or endowment land. At the present time a good deal of *nadyel* land in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov is held by individual peasant owners, but elsewhere it is all owned by communes. A peculiar principle of this system is the mutual responsibility of all members of the commune for its legal and financial obligations, even should a member have forsaken the locality and the practice of agriculture.

425 The great defect of the distribution of 1861 is that
511 it is based on the rural population of that date, with no machinery for providing additional land in proportion to the natural increase of population, which has been very rapid. Two evil results have followed. First, at the periodical redistributions of *nadyel* land the amount available per head has steadily decreased. The holdings have therefore tended to become uneconomical, and a consequent impoverishment of the peasants has taken place, with the natural concomitants of arrears of rent and taxes and an increased burden of debt on the land. Secondly, efforts to purchase or rent further land from private proprietors, in order to increase the available *nadyel* land or supply the wants of prosperous peasants who wish to buy new farms, has led to an enormous increase in the price and rent of land, a rise of three times being frequent and a tenfold rise occasional. To

alleviate these conditions various measures have been 425
adopted, such as the easement or complete extinguish- 511
ing of the burden of the purchase-price of the *nadyel*, the prevention of its frequent redistribution, and the founding of the Peasants' Land Bank by the State to facilitate further purchases of land by the communes. Nevertheless, a result not looked for by the framers 565
of the law abolishing serfdom has followed, namely the creation of a large landless agricultural proletariat, which tends to sink in the social scale, to live partly by industry in the towns, and to be migratory in its habits.

The law of 1906 introduced for the first time the 421
general principle of individual and permanent ownership of *nadyel* lands. It aimed at the breaking up of the *mirs* as no longer fulfilling a need, in the expectation that security of tenure by the individual would lead to a more rational and successful system of cultivation. The period since the promulgation of the law is too short to allow of sound conclusions as to its effect.

The *nadyel* lands are almost entirely cultivated 241
on the three-field system, each unit of land being 311
planted one year with a winter-sown grain, the following year with a spring-sown grain, and lying fallow in the third year. This method causes a disastrous impoverishment of the land, especially as in many cases the minimum of manure, whether animal or chemical, is used. An alternative method must be introduced, or the productiveness of the black-soil land under peasant ownership will continue to shrink as heretofore.

The land held by private owners is in general their 425
perpetual freehold, and can be roughly divided into that 563
held by the nobility in large estates and the smaller holdings purchased from them since the abolition of serfdom by prosperous peasants and others desirous of embarking on agriculture on their own account. There are also a number of foreign colonists, chiefly Germans, descendants of those introduced into the country

9; Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

425 by the Government at various times between the middle of the eighteenth century and 1861, in the hope that their superior methods of agriculture would be copied by other cultivators. This effect, however, was not produced, and the colonists form compact communities with little or no influence on their neighbours. Land in private ownership is usually farmed on more modern [241] and rational principles than the *nadyel* land, and produces almost the entire surplus of cereals which is sent abroad and to other parts of Russia.

421 The land owned by the Church, Crown, and members of the Imperial family is absolute freehold, and is generally well managed and productively farmed.

407 412 Up-to-date agricultural machinery is becoming more common all round. It is of course most in vogue on the large estates, especially in the case of expensive machines involving the use of power; steam-ploughs on the cable system are much in use on the large sugar-beet estates, and tractor ploughs with single engines are becoming numerous. By the help and enterprise of the *zemstvos* the peasants are now beginning to use modern machines and implements. The traditional *sock* or wooden plough, the flail, and other such primitive tools are disappearing, although it is hard to induce the peasant to abandon his old methods.

(c) *Forestry*

137 [311] A large portion of the Ukraine is totally denuded of trees at the present time. The Governments of Podolia and Volhynia, and the northern parts of Kiev and Chernigov, are well wooded, the area covered by forest being about 15 per cent. of the whole. In the remaining provinces the forest area averages 3–4 per cent. of the total. The State controls certain areas north of Kiev on both banks of the Dnieper, and in Volhynia on the south side of the Pripet marshes, as well as smaller scattered tracts in Podolia. In the Government of Yekaterinoslav the State has lately done much

241 It is almost unbelievable that in many regions of the steppe the planted surface is not ploughed up, or in any case only superficially with a land-parer. The purpose is to conserve soil moisture. Often the entire sowing, the entire spring work of the farmer consists of a single process. A light land-parer scratches the surface; it has a box attached to it containing the seed, and the harrow is attached to this "ploughing and sowing machine". With this type of sowing one necessarily reaps a lot of weeds.

243 438 Nevertheless, before the war the Ukraine enjoyed the reputation of being a granary. During the years 1909 to 1913 the country produced on an average of 8.6 million more tons of grain annually than it consumed. The annual export amounted to /144/ an average of 4.3 million tons of wheat alone and 2.7 million tons of barley. (87) Surplus and export dropped considerably

87. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 390.

under Bolshevik rule. In 1934 only one million tons of grain were exported.

*

425 669 In 1917, when the Bolsheviks became active, the general feeling in North and Central Ukraine was extremely favorable to an agrarian revolution. The land-hungry peasants were deeply convinced of the fact that the "right of the landowner was an injustice". Whoever promised the peasants that they were to receive all the land they could themselves cultivate, had won them over to his cause. As a matter of fact, in 1917, at the beginning of the revolution, the lands of the estate owners and the large farmers were immediately divided up, in the process of which the estates often went up in flames and

425 669 the cattle were burned. However, the glorious state did not last long. The farmers lacked seed, machines and draft animals in order to cultivate the land they so easily obtained. Besides, the men who came back from the war and the landless village farmers wanted to have a share in the booty. In the guberniyas of Kiyev and Khar'kov the government claimed the forests and the extensive beet fields. Civil wars, drought and epidemics carried off hundreds of thousands of peasant families during the years of the Bolshevist war. Thus ended the first chapter of the agrarian revolution, so eagerly awaited.

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000 the prescribed price.

474 According to ideas in Moscow, the score had
425 to come out even. It could not be difficult at last to introduce more modern agricultural methods along with the collective farms. The tractors, it was believed, would surely bring it about. However, Moscow made its figures without consulting the Ukrainian farmer whose individualistic bent and stubborn adherence to private property were to cause the equalizers the worst difficulties imaginable.

Collectivism began in the year 1928 with wonderful promises. In 1929 only 2% of the planted surface of the Ukraine was communal and cultivated according to a plan. In other words, there was resistance along the whole front! Now extortionate taxation was applied. Unlimited taxation in money and grain made the peasants ripe for the "voluntary" adoption of the collective. Hotbeds of resistance were exterminated. There was now no turning back in this agrarian revolution from above, for the Five Year Plan was at stake. A Ukrainian victory would have had incalculable consequences for Moscow. Not in vain had the Muscovites been trained from the time of Ivan the Terrible and particularly by Peter the Great and Catherine to break down stubborness. The methods which the Bolsheviks now used to assert their will were old; it was only the technique that was new.

Compulsory collectivism on a large scale began in 1929 with the suppression of free sales of products from the individual farms with the removal of surplus and with political persecution. There was almost nothing left over from the 1929 harvest. Planting in 1930 was inadequate, for the work of those who were exiled had to be added to the regular work. In 1931 conditions worsened. The lack of draft animals was simply catastrophic, for the farmers had /147/ slaughtered all the cattle that should have been

474 given to the collective without compensation. The
425 country people carried on sabotage wherever possible. The Bolsheviks retaliated with relentless and merciless war. The Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Skrypnyk complained in July 1932 at the Party Conference in the presence of Molotov and Kaganovich: "Absolutely everything has been taken away from us. That is why we are without bread, that is why we are suffering from hunger." (89) There was not enough manpower to bring in

89. Visti for July 11, 1932.

the harvest, so the authorities combed the streets of the cities and forthwith transported in trucks to the villages everyone who could not give a satisfactory account of himself. The gipsy bands - some of them had German passports - escaped toward the west. In the spring of 1933 famine took its toll of countless peasant families in one of the most fertile regions of the earth, and those that remained alive nourished themselves on roots and grass or fled into the cities of stone and wood in order to find bread there. According to accounts of the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, Kosior, at the Party Conference in Kiyev, about 300 million pood of grain was lost in the 1932 harvest, because it was not harvested but it rotted in the fields or at the collection centers. (90) For a long time now it

90. Kovalevskyj: Chervony Terror na Ukraini, p. 123 ff./Red Terror in the Ukraine/

was not the individual farmers who practiced sabotage in order to escape the collective, it was the Kolkhoz (collective farms) themselves that bitterly resisted Moscow's demands. The Ukrainian communists and Soviet officials were

474 accused of collaboration in preventing the warehousing of grain. As early as December 6, 1932
425 the Council of the People's Commissars came to the following decision: "The resistance of those communists who in reality have become leaders of the sabotage, as well as the passive and favorably disposed attitude of various Party organizations toward this sabotage shall be liquidated." (91)

91. Salisnyak: "The Struggle Between the Ukraine and Moscow in the Soviet Union" Nation und Staat, July-November, 1937.

In 1933, after a four-year struggle, the resistance of the Ukrainian people against that new order which seemed to the Muscovites to be the purpose of the state, was broken. Moscow, /148/ without any regard for the victims among its opponent, had fought a hard battle of nationalities and won. The Communist of December 11, 1934 gives a faint picture of the extent of this catastrophe when it reports that during the period of collectivization 200,000 Ukrainian farms were destroyed and their owners along with their families were exiled to North Russia.

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563 The Bolshevik agrarian revolution with all its consequences also did not spare the descendants of those German emigrants who had moved to the Ukraine between 1789 and 1842. The promise of abundant arable land and freedom of religious worship had at one time attracted these sectarians to this country. They were industrious, capable people who rapidly increased their possessions and multiplied. In 1914 there were 600,000 of them in the region of the Black Sea, 100,000 in the North Caucasus and 200,000 in Volhynia,

Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

311 According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there
425 were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000
723 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The principal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Izmail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

474 Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution
241 of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas
178 from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

475 Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the
407 Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Izmail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

475 In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in
407 June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in
652 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.

423 can be taken away only in accordance with the provisions of the
671 law." This insured the individual household in possession of its own piece of land and made it possible for the more industrious to undertake the improvement of the soil.

By the time that the final form of the Labor Code was established on November 22, 1922, it had become almost essentially different from the Russian Code, although it paid a lip service to the principle of nationalization through the actions of the Land Societies. A further sign of submission was the establishment of maximums on landholding. No household in the densely settled areas could have more than fourteen hectares or, in the less thickly populated areas, forty-eight hectares. The Land Society had the right to decide on the form of exploitation of the land to be carried out but if a family disagreed with the form established, it was entitled to demand the same amount of land but not necessarily the same land that it had contributed. Furthermore, outside of the requirement that all members of household were compelled to labor personally on the land, the provisions dealing with hired labor and the renting of land were left purposely vague or were omitted for further study.

The new code, which was more liberal than that in Russia, was devised in the interests of the landless peasants and also the poor and middle peasants, and definitely ratified the seizure of the estates of the large landowners. Sixty-eight per cent of the landless peasants received small tracts of land and fifty-two percent of those with holdings from two to four hectares were settled under more favorable conditions, or received additional land. On the other hand, 27.2% of those with more than sixteen hectares, the normal holding, and 56.8% of those with more than twenty-five hectares, saw their additional land removed and handed over to their less fortunate neighbors. In a sense this might seem to have been a solution of the crying need of the peasants for land but it brought with it some unexpected results.

423 The civil war had completely destroyed any free capital, and
●427 without capital the peasants could not buy the tools, the fertilizers, etc., which they needed to prosper. This made little difference in

the very beginning, for at the moment the primary need was for food and the peasants were compelled to live upon what they could raise. It was not long before the returning prosperity commenced new differentiations in the villages. The poorer peasants began to take advantage of the provisions that they could lease their newly acquired land, and while the Russian law provided that a lease could run for only three years, the Ninth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets soon lengthened this term to 13 years and liberalized the laws for hired labor. 423 427

The result was that by 1926, the poor peasants had leased 1,181,000 hectares and 53.9% of the peasants who had at least ten hectares rented additional land.

In a word, under the New Economic Policy conditions began, in fact, to return to what had been the situation prior to the revolution, with the exception that the great land owners had disappeared, but as they had been largely Russian or Polish, their departure only increased the Ukrainian influence in the villages and made them more homogeneous than they had been before. 185 423

The Commissariat of Agriculture endeavored during these years of reconstruction to maintain as independent a position as possible. It established its own independent services, its own research stations which were concerned with Ukrainian agricultural problems, its own breeding stations and its own bureaus for study and development of the various branches of agriculture, and it did its best to separate these from the similar services directed by Moscow and not concerned with the particular problems of Ukraine. [645]

The peasants responded to this with their own efforts. In 1922, with the famine still raging, they secured permission from Moscow to establish the so-called Selo-Pomich (or Village Aid) to provide credit for the peasants. This finally persuaded the Cheka to hand over part of the golden objects which they had stolen from the churches, and it used the capital thus secured to buy seed corn in America. It then loaned this to the peasants and when the harvest came, the loan was repaid in kind and more credit was then extended. [452] [During NEP -- Analyst]

656 had profited by the operation of the Ukrainian land code which,
471 as we have seen, was less rigid than were the similar arrangements
661 in the RSFSR, where the land society was organized far more on
[427] the lines of a collective than it was in Ukraine. It was always possible to apply individually any of the laws against the leasing of land or the employment of hired help, for in both cases the provisions had been left vague and indefinite, so that the authorities could act whenever they so desired. As a matter of fact, as one of the first measures the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic reduced the period on which a lease could be made from thirteen to six years and thus it was easily possible to upset many of the calculations that had been made by the richer and more progressive landowners.

[435] At the same time the closing of the official markets rendered it possible for the government to force the peasants to dispose of their grain at the officially pegged prices which in the grain-growing districts were considerably lower than they were in the less fertile areas of the north. If this did not produce the desired results, it was equally possible to demand the grain tax in kind and to compel the peasants to turn over, free of charge and under the guise of payments, additional supplies. All these measures, which were introduced in many cases personally and not by districts, caused the peasants to feel themselves becoming steadily more impoverished and less able to resist the demands of the government.

631 On the other hand, the All-Union Commissariats which took
642 precedence over those in the individual Soviet republics and which were, in reality, staffed only by Russian Communists, effectively broke the power of the localities or of the republics to have any special voice in the management of their own affairs.* This was, in its turn, skilfully explained by stressing the superior requirements of the Union which, on any closer analysis, turned out to be the interests of the Russian area. Thus, at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a Russian who was at the time the chief of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission remarked in an unambiguous manner: "It seems to me that we must assign perfectly clear tasks, to emphasize that the national

* [1925, during relinquishment of NEP -- Analyst]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

565 of education, and in their occupations. The bulk
[162] (86·4 per cent.) of the Ukrainians are peasants and agriculturists. The percentage of people living in the country is in the Government of Kharkov, 85; in Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 88; Chernigov, 91; Taurida, 80; Kherson, 70. The percentage of peasants is almost the same, e. g. Kharkov, 90; Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 87; Chernigov, 86; Taurida, 73;
[163] Kherson, 61. The average increase in population is higher than in any other province in European Russia; consequently, though many peasants have become, during the last twenty-five years, workmen in the newly started industries, the general number of agricultural peasants remains unchanged.

421 *Land Tenure*[1].—While Great Russia is at present
●428 a country of communal land-ownership (*mir*), in the
177 Ukraine or Little Russia individual or, strictly speaking, family ownership and communal ownership exist
[556] together (cf. p. 78). The *mir* in Great Russia appears to have been introduced in the sixteenth century, when the Moscow Government established serfdom and imposed heavy taxation, for it was easier to make the whole village responsible for the taxes than the separate families. However, in the north or, properly speaking, Novgorod Russ. the land, as a general rule, belonged to one large family or clan, composed of from two to six houses (the owners of which bore the same name), and called *pyechishche* (large stove). The ownership was hereditary, and hence the land became more and more subdivided, so that families owned more or less according to the number of children. There was no readjustment of the land as in the case of the *mir*. The *pyechishche* of Novgorod was known in Kiev-Russ as *ognishche* (meaning a large fire); and the term *ognishchanin* (meaning a member of the *ognishche*) is found in the Kiev law (*Russkaya*
428 *Pravda*). Connected with that form of tenure is a custom, which even now is found sometimes in the Ukraine, of minorate, according to which the younger

[1] See also p. 77.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

son inherits his father's house, since the elder son has 428 ●
started a new house and received his share during his father's life. If a member of the *ognishche* had not enough land, he migrated.

This old custom of family ownership was the basis 421
of the Cossack communities, which differed from the 177
mir in that, as the Cossacks gave little attention to 525
cultivation and paid no taxes, the re-allotment of their lands was not necessary, though in theory every Cossack had the same right to the land. However, towards the end of the seventeenth century, the 'elders' of the Cossacks began to appropriate more land than the commoners. After Russia had subdued the Ukraine, the commoners were turned into peasants (in 1763 and 1783), and the 'elders' were given titles of nobility in 1785. After the final introduction of serfdom into the Ukraine, the taxes were equally imposed, and therefore communal ownership on the Moscow lines was introduced, though it never had such success as in Great Russia. Remnants of *ognishches* still exist in the Governments of Chernigov and Poltava, whither it was brought by the Ukrainian colonists, though individual ownership is now predominant. In some cases, though each house owns some land privately, there are other lands, meadows, and fishing rights which belong to all the village community, and are re-allotted from time to time.

In the Ukraine, as it was immediately before the 421
war, all the land was divided into individual and communal property. The individual property consisted of (1) State lands, (2) Imperial family appanages, (3) Church and monastery lands, (4) town lands, (5) nobles' lands, and (6) lands belonging to others than nobles. The communal property was held by the peasant and village communities. Individual ownership prevails in the Governments of Yekaterinoslav (50·4 per cent. in 1905), Kherson (51·5 per cent.), Taurida (52·6 per cent.). Then come the Governments of the south-west, Volhynia (48·9 per cent.), Kiev (45·2 per cent.), Podolia (44·4 per cent.). The eastern

851 553 guishes the candles, appropriates half of them himself, and returns the rest to the participants, who must light them again in the room where the mother is confined.[45] If the candles are not easily extinguished, it is a sign that the baptized child will have a long life.[46]

851 574 In some localities the godparents leave immediately after the close of the ceremony for the house of the parents, where a festive dinner is served; in most places, however, they return to their homes and go to the party in the evening.[47] The midwife, upon her return, greets the mother with these words: "You have given us the child born; we, however, return it to you [777] sacrificed and baptized." She then places the infant on a black fur coat (*kozuch*), which is thought to bring luck, and hands it over on the coat to the mother.[48]

At the christening dinner the father again plays a most inconspicuous rôle, the midwife and the godparents being the principal [431] actors. Each guest brings presents of foodstuffs, chiefly beans, peas, eggs, cheese, salt, and bread. After a flood of greetings and congratulations, the women give their presents to the mother, placing them on her bed, while the men hand their gifts, usually loaves of bread, to the father.[49]

After these preliminaries, the guests seat themselves at the table. The master of the house serves each of them with a drink of whisky, and the midwife or the cook places before each an appetizer consisting of a piece of meat or another delicacy. The courses served at this meal are as numerous and elaborate as those of a wedding dinner. They usually include meat with gravy, *holubci* (grouts enveloped in cabbage leaves), *pirohy* (potatoes or grouts enveloped in dough), sour cream, *borszcz* (beet soup), and many other dishes, depending, of course, upon the economic status of the parents. Whisky is lavishly provided, and each guest offers a toast before every drink. It is interesting to note that, if the baby be a boy, the godparents,

[45] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[46] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[47] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[113] [48] Jandaurek, J., *Das Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien und das Herzogtum Bukowina* (Wien, 1884), p. 62.

[49] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

*[christening -- Analyst]

631 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of
642 Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications,
645 Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent
327 exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that
185 the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

●432 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921,
241 which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the
185

payment of a specific amount of tax in kind and left to the peasant 432
the rest of his crop. In an endeavor to get this grain into Russia, 241
the government offered to buy it but it did not have the funds or 185
the inclination to pay for it at the market price. The financial reforms connected with the introduction of the chervonets could, to a certain degree, make it expedient for the peasant to sell to the government for cash, and as time went on the peasant gained the power of selling his crop for cash but the Moscow control of transportation and the prohibition of large scale trading left him helpless and he saw himself forced to dispose of it locally or to the government. Then the government made a fixed price which was far [435]
below that of the free market, and was often scarcely a third of the amount that the peasant could have secured. This sale of large quantities of agricultural products at a fixed price gradually became the rule and was one of the signs that the period of toleration for private income was coming to an end.

In 1925, the government began to clamp down on the small 656
traders, the Nepmen, who had profited by the opportunities which 661
they had had. Again it had a large choice of measures. Thus, depending on the situation, it could invoke laws against the hiring of labor; it could order the state agencies to refuse to buy from or sell to an obnoxious individual and thus isolate him; it could suspend his ration cards and perquisites, take away his right of voting and thus make him a pariah in the community; it could levy prohibitive taxes which would put him out of business and confiscate his property; or it could find some violation of some other law or regulation and imprison or exile him.

The degree of pressure which was put upon the peasants and 439
the workers varied from year to year. Each year Ukraine was 241
compelled to export more to Russia without regard to the needs of the local population. Thus, the amount of grain rose from 1,050,000 tons in 1924-5 to 3,165,000 tons in 1926-7, when there was a bumper crop, but in 1927-8, when the harvest partially failed and there were signs of need in the country, the amount collected and exported rose to 4,353,000 tons. At the same time, the continually increasing demands aroused again a spirit of oppo-

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

166 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the
626 village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past.[1] Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

[1] [after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

Ukraine and Russia

A Survey of Their Economic Relations

It has long been contended that the Ukraine could not exist as a separate state. It is said her economic interests are so largely dependent upon those of the old Russian Empire that if separated therefrom, she would lack the economic strength to form a viable entity, and thus would render herself liable to decline or gradual absorption by some other state. In the light of present facts, both economists and impartial statesmen will find that this argument, which, among members of the opposing faction, seems to form the primary basis for objection to Ukraine's independent statehood, will not bear even the most superficial investigation.

Ukraine's Richness in Natural Resources

The Ukraine is a country with nearly 50,000,000 inhabitants, and possesses within its limits the most fertile lands of Europe, which, every year, feed the western countries from their enormous surplus of cereals, of cattle and of sugar. It is a country which stands fifth in the world in its production of coal and iron; which has at its disposal quantities of other raw materials, such as naphtha, magnesia, salt and mercury; which has, moreover, several hundred kilometers of water front. If, with all these natural advantages and wealth, the Ukraine cannot enjoy an autonomous life, how, then, can one explain the existence of Italy, Spain, Roumania and many other European countries in which the natural conditions are far less favorable to economic independence?

These facts have gradually become so self-evident to the public mind that oppositionists are being forced to abandon their former line of argument, and are now beginning to attack the question from the reverse standpoint. They now claim, not that Ukraine cannot form and maintain her economic unity, but that Russia cannot live without Ukraine, and that, without Ukraine, Russia would lack

504 Let us compare for a moment the regions for which the Black and the Baltic Seas serve as ports. That for which the Black Sea affords an outlet does not extend more than 500 or 600 kilometers, while that served by the Baltic ports reaches as far as western Siberia. Thus, the Baltic region exceeds that of the Black Sea by several thousand kilometers.

000 Surely these facts, coupled with even the most cursory consideration of the Russian imperialistic policy, show beyond a doubt that in respect to the direct economic utilization of the southern ports, the setting up of a separate government by the Ukraine does not obstruct any fundamental interests of the Russian people. Briefly stated, Russia proper does not use directly the southern ports except Rostov, which is the outlet of the region of the Don and in part of the lower region of the Volga, but there is not such a vast difference between the Russian and Ukrainian interests that these minor details as to a common use of various ports can not be conciliated by special agreement.

Coal Fields of Ukraine Not Necessary to Great Russia

316 Proceeding directly to the third and last question, that
433 involving coal and iron, we are confronted first of all with the geographic fact that it is really within the ethnographic limits of the Ukraine that are found nearly all the coal fields of Donetz, as well as most of the productive centers of anthracite. More than 90 per cent of the total output of coal of the Donetz basin, during the last years of normal exploitation, came from the Ukrainian regions, while the total production of coal of the Donetz basin reached 70 per cent of the general production of coal of the old Russian Empire, and we may increase this to 85 per cent, if we do not include in the total the output of Russian
[438] Poland. Notwithstanding these percentages of production, the general statistics of railroad traffic, together with the data collected by the Special War Committee on the Supply of Fuel, show that nearly four-fifths of the Ukrainian coal and anthracite was used in Ukraine, one-fifth only being exported to Russia.

an effort to lower the tax on manufactured articles, the European countries began to put exorbitant duties on Russian agricultural products. Subsequent records show how detrimental was the Russo-German treaty of 1904 to agriculture among the Russian peoples. Thus were the interests of the agricultural regions clearly sacrificed to the interests of a few industrial centers.

Policy of Former Russia Injurious to Ukraine

How did this affect the Ukraine? We have shown that, in former Russia, the Ukraine was the principal exporter of agricultural products, and that she could not find a market for her wheat in industrial Russia because of the stern competition offered by the Volga and Siberia. Hence her only course was to seek an outside market, and this she did by exporting all surplus cereals to western Europe. Even here Russia subordinated the Ukrainian agricultural interests to the interests of industrial security. Added to this injustice, she took no steps to encourage Ukrainian exportation into central Russia. Money was spent in constructing elevators in the region of the Volga and in Siberia and refrigerator trains were organized for shipping meat, poultry, butter and fruit into eastern Russia, Siberia and Central Asia: all this to the neglect of Ukrainian interests. Nor was there any compensation for this loss by the promotion of the manufacturing industry in Ukraine. It is an indisputable fact that Ukrainian manufactures are much less developed than those of either Russia or Russian Poland. We can find one reason for this, however, in a certain period of Ukraine's history.

Russia and Poland were already enjoying an assured and peaceful national life while Ukraine was still struggling against the factors which were devastating her territory. The colonization of certain Ukrainian territories after the expulsion of the nomads took place much later than that of the other Russian provinces. Later, Ukraine was invaded by the Poles, who did not cease to treat her like a colony, and exploited her entirely for their own benefit. Hence, at the time of Ukraine's incorporation into Russia,

Hence, at the time of Ukraine's incorporation into Russia, the latter had industries, while Ukraine had none. To add to the difficulties already surrounding her industrial initiative and development, Ukraine, being included in the same customs frontier with Moscow and Warsaw, was forced from the very first to compete with districts industrially much stronger than herself. Thus, while Ukraine remained a colony of Russia, her growth was thwarted and checked rather than fostered by the mother country and was in danger of the same fate that overtook Ukrainian Galicia, which was smothered in the custom frontiers of Austria, and remained a colony for the industries of German Austria.

We cannot stop with a consideration of commercial policies alone in seeking to discover the Russian agencies that were unfavorable to the economic interests of Ukraine, for there are many other matters to be studied, if one is to give a clear and unbiased perspective of the true situation.

Over-centralization in Former Russia

Results show that the guiding principle of all Russian policy was centralization, absolute and unqualified. Even the most insignificant orders of the State, which were to be carried out thousands of miles away from the center of the empire, could not be passed except by the agreement of the central government in Petrograd, which, from the very nature of affairs, understood little of the needs and condition of the people upon whom they were to be inflicted. Naturally, the only beneficiaries were the manufacturers, contractors or intermediaries who were in favor at court and near the antechambers of the ministries, while the interests having no headquarters at Petrograd stood little chance of securing any orders from the State. Because of these conditions, the administration of all the important enterprises—factories, banks, insurance companies and similar organizations—was located in Moscow or Petrograd. Even mills and factories were often located in inconvenient points, simply because they were nearer the center of things. The higher branches of technical education were likewise centralized there.

3: Mirchuk

Ukraine RD1

433, 311, 471, 438

[For location of mineral deposits and other raw materials and indications of their importance to the economy of Ukraine, see category 116, pp. 146-188. For location and productivity of various industries, see pp. 164-188.]

the Don which continued to Ityl, the Khazar capital at the mouth of the Volga where two important routes terminated, viz. a caravan road from Bagdad via Khovaresm in the Turkestan of to-day and a road from China via the basin of the Tarim. Communicating routes led via the Pripyat to the Memel and Vistula areas, and via Halych to Hungary or via Cracow to Prague and Regensburg. 487

But Ukraine forfeited these advantages when Bagdad, Byzantium and Kyiv declined and when the Crusades shifted the main trade routes to the Mediterranean and later when America was discovered and the sea route to India became known. In addition, there were changes in the needs of civilisation; instead of furs, wax and honey, there was now a demand for goods in bulk like grain and timber which had to be transported all too expensively to the West via the Baltic as the Turks blocked the exit to the Mediterranean. The early golden age of Ukraine was the result of favorable trade conditions and it sank when these changed.

4. Black Earth and Granary

The enormous area of 70 million ha black earth produced considerable surplus grain crops. Ukraine became the granary of Europe, but as the structure of the country was wholly agrarian, industry was slow to develop so that towns and industry were flooded by aliens. 433

Grain was exported in ancient times to Greece and Rome. Grain and cattle were transported from the central Dnipro area to the harbors and markets of Germany. But export trade only began to flourish in earnest when the fertile steppe and the sea coast were re-conquered. Food requirements of European industrial states were supplied from harbors on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov; and yet this improvement in geographical trade conditions was no longer the decisive feature in Ukrainian economy. 439

Ukraine was responsible for 10 % of the world's production of the four European kinds of grain and was therefore among the leading sources. From 1909—1913 its grain exports accounted to 8.6 million roubles, and to more than a fifth of the entire

439 world export of grain; Ukraine played a leading part in the export of wheat, rye and barley (20.21 % and 25 % respectively of the world export).

The bulk of the exports did not go to Russia which drew its supplies from the Volga Basin and the East. Part went to White Ruthenia, Poland and the Baltic, if it was not ear-marked for Central and Western Europe. And Ukrainian cattle were not greatly in demand in the Russian market, which is one reason why cattle-rearing never developed very satisfactorily.

5. The preponderance of foreigners in industry

433 was partly due to Ukrainian concentration in agriculture. It
464 is quite true that, at the outset, Ukraine was not interested in mining and industry. On the other hand the Russians, by Nature less bound to the poorer soil on which they had settled, immigrated to mining and industrial areas of Ukraine. This produced dangerous national islands. The work done by Ukrainian laborers in the Donets area was better than in the Ural, even if it did not reach the standards of Central and Western Europe.

471 In Ukraine industry foreigners predominated even more as investors of capital than as laborers, more capital coming from countries abroad than from Russia. Before World War I about 400 million roubles were invested in Dnipro Ukraine alone, where the value of mining and industrial products amounted to 170 million roubles. 95 % of the capital invested in heavy industry was of foreign origin; 80 % of the pig-iron produced in 1913 came from 10 concerns with French capital (out of a total of 16 in the Russia of those days); they represented an investment of more than 112 million roubles. Of the 103 million roubles of French capital invested in coal mines, 82 millions were accounted for by the Donets Basin. Ten of the 12 concerns run with Belgian capital were in Ukraine.

6. Ukraine's relations to Russia as a colony

439 find expression in the economy of Dnipro Ukraine where certain industries were neglected and deprived of funds in favor of Russian areas. And this is no result of a balance between an agrarian and an industrial country for it was not to the North and the East that agricultural produce was exported

131 Eurasia and the ores in the Ural is more than 2000 km; the
487 coal of the Donets Basin, on the other hand, is about 350—450 km from the iron ore of Kryvyj Rih, while the iron and manganese ores of Kerch are nearer still. The seas in the north of Russia are frozen for 20—26 weeks, while the Black Sea has ice for but 3—4 weeks in the year. Most of its harbors can be kept open all winter by means of ice-breakers. The
[161] density of the population in Ukraine is 59 to the square kilometer which cannot be compared with the figures for Siberia (1 per sq. km) or with the average for USSR (8). Conditions in Ukraine, therefore, are much more akin to those in Europe than are those in the continental heart of Eurasia some 4000 km away. And for Ukraine this fact found expression, for instance, in the fact that it could not profit from the reduced railway freights that were granted for long-distance transportation. The unfavorable position of Moscow and Leningrad as manufacturing centers was a great handicap to the economy of Ukraine which possessed all the conditions necessary for production within its own frontiers but nevertheless had to import goods from there and export raw materials to very low prices.

As long as Russia's face was turned towards Europe, these considerations did not matter much, but they are felt all the more acutely now that the economy of the Soviet Union is definitely planned.

8. The Ukrainian idea of economy

421 with its championship of private property was always entirely different from the "mir" idea, with its farming in common and periodical division of the soil which was characteristic for Russian economy. Exceptions within Ukrainian territory, due to special conditions of time and place, do not alter this fundamental fact.
[566] That serfdom should have been abolished so late was felt to be a great burden by the Ukrainian who had enjoyed personal freedom in his days of political independence. He always connected serfdom with Russian rule which naturally did not help to mitigate his aversion to everything Russian.

●433 In national Ukrainian literature, the relationship of different branches of economy is often discussed. It is often maintained that up to the present, development has been along the lines of

increasing industrialisation. Extensive exports of agricultural produce, we are told, are not good for a fairly densely populated country. This call for intensive industrialisation is common to the otherwise diametrically opposed groups of nationalists who dream of self-sufficiency, and of disciples of the Bolshevist Eurasian school. 433

One-sided industrialisation is an extravagant program, for the country of the Black Earth will, of course, always remain agrarian in character. Increasing industrialisation and the growth of the home market will intensify agriculture, though not in the usual sense, as the nature of the steppe stands in the way. It will pay to solve the problem of the arid areas and production will be increased.

In a purely liberal economic system Ukraine would, of course, have to cease being a country of extensive agrarian exports and dumping great quantities of grain on the market at a loss. But now that international commerce is planned, it is neither necessary that Ukraine should supply the world market with the great quantities of the years preceding the First World War nor that agricultural countries should be forced to sell produce at dumping prices or to other malpractices.

It would considerably strengthen the economic independence of Europe to include Ukraine as a source of agricultural produce and as an industrialised and solvent customer. The economy of Europe will find its necessary complement in a Ukrainian system that is adapted to European needs and not diverted to form part of a Eurasian scheme.

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Agriculture

1. Agricultural Features and Overpopulation

162 The agricultural overpopulation of Ukraine is a result of its one-sided social and economic structure. In Germany the rural population forms 29 % of the entire population of the country, while the figures for the agrarian countries of Denmark and Hungary are 30 % and 25 % respectively, the corresponding figure for Ukraine being 75 %. The density of the agricultural population in Ukrainian territory amounts to a general average of 54 per ha of agriculturally utilised soil, in the Right Bank Region and in Western Ukraine to 80, and in Galicia to 103. In Denwark, the model agricultural country, the density of the agricultural population is not even 35 and in Bohemia, where agriculture and industry are highly developed, 241 it is only 52. And yields per ha in Ukraine are fairly low: 433 statistics for 1931—35 are as follows (q/ha):

Country	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Average
Ukraine	8.5	8.8	8.3	9.2	8.7
Roumania	9.6	10.1	10.3	9.7	9.9
Hungary	13.5	11.8	14.1	12.3	12.9
Germany	21.0	17.4	20.1	19.5	19.5

Agricultural overpopulation is particularly noticeable in view of the small share of agricultural land per head of the rural population (not quite 2 ha). Produce is therefore exported at the expense of the standard of living which actually used to be lower in Ukraine than in the European states that imported the produce.

In the years immediately preceding the Second World War yields per ha in Dnipro-Ukraine seemed to have risen

considerably. For 1938 the average figure for grain was given as 10.9 q/ha, for 1939 = 13.9 q/ha, for 1940 = 19.5 q/ha ("Visti" of 11. II. 1941). The average for those three years would be 13 q/ha, higher by 50 % than the average for 1931—1935. As these data were compiled for a meeting of the communist party, a tendency to propaganda must be borne in mind; even in official Soviet statistics, final figures are often more modest than those just quoted. But, in spite of an undisputed increase in yield, the economy of Ukraine must either be strengthened or increased, or both, if it is to be healthy. 241 433

2. Soil and Climate

Ukraine contains 44 % of the Black Earth in Europe (160.5 million ha) and almost 8 % of that in the whole world (900 million ha) and is one of the largest Black Earth areas in existence. In Ukraine itself ³/₄ of the entire soil is Black Earth and only ¹/₄ podsol earth, mountain soil and the good renzine soil of Galicia. Podsol earth predominated in Podlakhia, the Kholm district, North Volynia, in Galician Subcarpathia, in the flats round the Syan and the Upper Buh, in Polesya and partly in the district of Chernyhiv. 134

Black Earth is one of the best soils and excellently suited to grain. Its humus content is high, its structure crumbly and it is extremely porous. The humus binds certain quantities of moisture which are distributed fairly evenly. Black Earth dries quickly on the surface but lower down it retains moisture for a fair time, even during drought. It preserves its natural fertility for a long time, does not call for any complicated preparation and is easy to work. It requires no manure which may be positively bad for it and even when exploited, the soil preserves itself, so to speak. It needs a relatively small amount of seed.

It is not necessary to have any specially developed agricultural implements on Black Earth: motor-plows and power-driven agricultural machinery are eminently suitable for the great plains that all demand the same treatment. That is why the tendency to mechanisation and to introduce big-scale operations is particularly marked in the Black Earth areas. 241

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5. Other Agricultural Produce

244 In Western Ukraine potatoes account for 16—18 % of the
● 433 arable land, decreasing towards the south-east to 3—2%. There has been a considerable increase in the cultivation of potatoes of recent times on the small property belonging to private or to collectivised peasants. The yield per ha which before World War I amounted to 92 q sank in the years 1929—1933 to 86 q (Belgium 213, Germany 156, France 110, USSR 80, USA 72). Its total production of 20.6 million t, 10 % of world production (205.6 million t in years 1931—35) puts Ukraine fourth after Germany, USSR (exclusive of Ukraine), and Poland (exclusive of Ukrainian territory).

249 Sugar beet is the most important technical culture. It is
433 grown mostly in the center of Dnipro-Ukraine where the rainfall is 500 mm, above all in the area round Kyiv and in Podolia. The average area planted in the years from 1901/02 to 1910/11 amounted to 555 000 ha and the total yield to 85 million t (154 q/ha). In 1935 Ukraine, with a sugar beet area of 952 000 ha, was the first country in the world as regards this product.

And yet the yields per hektar have decreased to 90 q, the average for 1931—35. In Germany the corresponding figure is 290 q/ha, in Denmark 322 q/ha, in Holland 350 q/ha, in the USSR

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

84 q/ha. The reason for the decrease is to be sought in the Soviet form of management. With an entire yield of 8.8 mil-

lion t and 14 % of the world production of sugar beet, Ukraine comes second after Germany (10.6 million t) and before France and the USA (8.2 and 8.1 million t respectively). 249 433

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

Conditions for growing tobacco in Ukraine are favorable, but the area planted, which in 1908 was 50 000 ha, has not been increased; the yield has risen slightly (8 000 t in the entire country). Better qualities were planted in the south, and elsewhere the well-known "makhorka". Hops of good quality were 249 433

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

grown in Volynia and partly also in Galicia; 2 000 t were harvested.

248 Hemp is produced above all in the Chernyhiv area (229 000 ha),
● 433 Ukraine coming after the USSR in hemp production of the world; in the years 1931—35 its fibre yield was 13 % (8 000 t)

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

and its seed yield 19 % (420 000 t) of the world production. Flax is grown on an area of 230 000 ha; Ukraine with a yield of 60 000 t stands second in world production of fibre flax (9.4 % of 640 000 t) while it is sixth as a producer of flax for seed, its yield of 71 000 t being 2 % of world production (3.5 million t).

[243]



Cotton is produced on areas that shift from year to year, mostly without artificial irrigation; hitherto it has not been very successful (45,000)

successful (45 000 t). Sunflowers were cultivated in 1935 on an 247
area of 1 659 000 ha, mainly in the Kuban area. The yield for 1930—35 (0.9 million t) was only a little less than that of the USSR and much more than that of any other country.

As a grain producing country, Ukraine, with its yield of 433
approximately 25 million t of the four main European varieties 243
(= 10 % of world production), took a leading place in the years before the First World War (1909—1931). It exported 7.9 million t, or 1/8 of total world grain exports, topping the list for wheat and barley (4.3 million t, and 20 % and 2.7 million t and 43 % respectively of world exports). In the years 1931—35, production in Ukraine decreased by only 9 % i. e. by 24.6 million t, world production amounting then to 276.6 million t, while the decrease in export trade in the same period was much greater. The reason for this was the small yield per hektar as well as inadequate cultivation in consequence of collectivisation and unfavorable conditions for selling agricultural and buying industrial products; in addition there was an increased demand at home as the country became more industrialised.

6. Cattle Rearing

The distribution of livestock in Ukraine varies considerably. 231
In the wide spaces of North Caucasia there is much pasture- 433
land so that there are not many cattle per unit of area, though 811
quite a number per head of the population.

The opposite is true of Galicia where management is intensive. The many meadows of Polesya support good stocks of cattle while the mountain pastures of the Carpathians are not sufficiently utilised. Between those extremes we have the bulk of Ukrainian arable land with relatively poor supplies of fodder for cattle. The result is that Ukraine does not contribute to the cattle rearing industry of the world what one might expect from a country of its agricultural standing. Before World War I there were 13.5 million head of cattle in Ukraine, i. e. 2.8 % of world stock. The proportion of dairy cows in this figure increases continuously as the use of oxen for draught, which used to be a characteristic feature of the country, had been declining for some time. (Table 3).

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Table 3. The Livestock in Ukraine (1912—1937) in Million of Head.

	1912	16	20	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	37
cattle	6,5	7,7	6,8	7,1	8,3	8,9	8,4	8,4	8,6	7,6	6,3	6,2	5,0	4,4	5,3	6,3	7,8
cows	2,6	3,1	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,9	3,9	3,9	4,0	3,9	3,5	3,4	2,7	2,4	2,5	2,6	3,5
horses	5,6	5,5	3,9	3,8	4,0	4,2	4,6	5,1	5,5	5,6	5,3	4,8	3,7	2,6	2,5	2,6	3,5
pigs	4,3	4,6	5,3	2,4	4,2	3,7	3,7	4,4	7,0	4,2	3,2	5,4	2,6	2,1	4,2	4,7	7,7
sheep	6,2	6,4	6,9	8,4	9,3	9,7	8,7	8,0	8,1	7,0	4,5	3,4	2,1	2,0	2,2	2,8	3,8

In 1912 the number of horses was disproportionately high, viz., 7 millions. With the increasing use of motors, this number was reduced which, from the point of view of economy, was perfectly justifiable. Pig breeding, on the other hand, tended to increase, particularly in the north-west and the Kuban area. In spite of that, there were before World War I only 7.1 million pigs in the country, i. e. 4 % of world stock.

Sheep breeding has declined as a result of intensive management and competition from overseas on the world wool market, above all in fine wools.

Dnipro Ukraine statistics for the year 1916 provide characteristic material for judging the general development as well as the present position. Except for horses which had stopped increasing even before 1908, the figures for 1916 were only temporarily reached in the last year before the series of Five Year Plans. Diagrams 1 and 2).

[474] Collectivisation measures by the Soviets were a great blow to cattle rearing in Ukraine. Rather than hand over cattle to the State for nothing, the peasants slaughtered their stocks wholesale; and, as a result of bad treatment, epidemics and poor feeding, the cattle stocks of collective enterprises greatly declined. In 1933 the number of cattle and horses was only half what it had been in 1928 and pigs and sheep less than a quarter, while the entire stock had been reduced to 2/5, or 38 %. It was only after the colkhose peasants were allowed to keep cattle of their own, that numbers began slowly to rise, though they did not reach the level of 1928.

In Western Ukraine the development of stock-keeping was much more favorable, but the number for the whole of Ukraine was below prewar level, except in the case of pigs.

231 433 Cattle trade and management in Ukraine in general are far from satisfactory, though there was a well organised cooperative dairy system in Galicia; butter was even exported. On both sides, particularly in the south of the Carpathians, the production of cheese made good progress. Any export of meat that there was, is partly a result of the small demand for home consumption. Though poultry farming was neither intensive nor sufficiently progressive, a considerable number of eggs was exported.

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Industry and Mining

1. Fundamental Facts

433 It lay in the nature of her situation as a colony of Russia that only those branches of industry in Ukraine were promoted which utilised raw materials that were locally abundant and difficult to transport over long distances. It was impossible, for instance, to develop a modern textile industry. Even if it cost twice as much to transport cotton from New York to Moscow via Murmansk as via Odessa and Kharkiv and even if the industrial area in Central Russia had to import coal from the Donets Basin, Ukraine was nevertheless dependent on Russia for manufactured goods.

433 311 464 Labor was originally more plentiful in Russia than in Ukraine. The population on the upper reaches of the Volga and the Oka was more apt to seek employment in trade and industry, as the soil in those areas yielded poorer harvests and the percentage of forest land was higher. In Ukraine, on the other hand, farmers were loth to leave the good Black Earth. And that is why it was long impossible there to make labor a decisive factor in placing industries. This could be done only much later in the larger towns, and even then it made little difference to the general trend. But it is characteristic for Ukraine that sources of raw material have determined the location of industry, coal-mines and hydro-electric works being geographically fixed and altogether there are more industries, the raw materials of which are more difficult to transport than their products. The proportion of plants whose location is determined by the presence of raw materials is three times higher in Ukraine than in the industrial states of Central and Western Europe.

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problem. The lightning rapidity of the economic development of the South of Russia, which even the revolutionary events of 1905 could not stop, attracted the attention of German specialists. 000

Two years before the war a commission of German economists and technicians under the presidency of Professor Auhagen visited Southern Russia and made a report to the German Government. The members of the commission were particularly impressed by the progress of the metallurgical and beet-sugar industries. The large investments of French and Belgian capital in the coal and metallurgical industries did not escape their notice, and they anticipated a flow of British capital following the Anglo-Russian Agreement. Professor Auhagen came to the gloomy conclusion that 'if some untoward event does not stop this rapid Russian development, Germany will soon be faced by a neighbour more powerful than herself'. 433

This economic development attracted the attention of the promotors of German *Weltpolitik* to the possibilities of Ukrainian separatism. Very exaggerated hopes of revolutionary and separatist movements in Russia inflated the mind of the Emperor William, who was encouraged in his miscalculations by the German Ambassador in Petersburg, Count Pourtalès. 000

In his memoirs (*Aus meiner Dienstzeit*, IV, 197 *et sqq.*), Field-Marshal Conrad recalls a meeting at which the Emperor William refused to listen to the objections of the Austrian Chancellor, Count Stürgkh, and insisted on 'revolutionizing' the populations of Russian Poland and the Ukraine. The Emperor proposed 'to use all means for this purpose and to send there tracts, emissaries and large funds'. The Emperor's amateurish excursion into the technical problems of organizing separatist diversions formed the basis of the so-called 'Pontus Expedition' (which was to include within its scope the raising of an insurrection among the Kuban Cossacks and the formation of a 'Georgian Legion' for action in the Caucasus). The Emperor urged that the Austro-Hungarian fleet should join the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in the Black Sea where, after panic had been spread among the population of the South Russian coasts, agents should be landed 'in lonely places', well supplied with money and revolutionary literature, with the object of organizing riots in the Ukraine in the rear of the Russian armies. The objections of Field-Marshal Conrad and of the Austrian Admiral Haus prevented this fantastic 'embryon' of the future 'manœuvre' of sending Lenin and Trotsky into Russia from being carried into effect (see also the memoirs of the Austro-Hungarian military attaché in Istanbul, General Pomiankowski, *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches*, pp. 80 *et sqq.*).

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CHAPTER VII

THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

§1. AGRICULTURAL HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

In the political mythology of the twentieth century the legend 439
about 'the vast riches of the Ukraine' has played, and is destined to play, a certain part. In history the Ukraine will take place with the Route to the Indies, the North-West Passage, Golconda, the Empire of Prester John, and other phantasmagorias of the human mind which in their time have inspired the nations to the drama of effort and the tragedy of conflict.

In the modern world where generalization has displaced religion and where the generation made literate by popular education has thrown up 'Leaders' who are adepts in the exploitation of generalized ideas, it was inevitable that movements based on facile and false scientific, geographical and ethnical conceptions should become fashionable. 'The wheat-fields of the Ukraine' form a roseate hinterland to the Nordic Race and the Classless State in the dream-world of the masses of Central Europe. Apart, therefore, from the intrinsic interest of the subject, it becomes a matter of current importance to analyse the extent of the real resources of the Ukraine and their actual and potential relation to the economic problem of Europe.

There exists a widespread idea that the Ukraine was 'the granary 433
of the Russian Empire', but in reality it would be difficult to 311
indicate the period to which this idea could be applicable. Certainly, during the eighteenth century, as the Tartars and Turks were driven from the mouths of the Ukrainian rivers, a period of progressive prosperity set in. But under Alexander I, during the Napoleonic Wars, the bulk of the grain supply of the Empire was drawn from the southern regions of Central Russia—from the Governments of Orel, Kursk, Voronezh and Tambov. This source of supply was adequate in view of the numbers of the population at that period, and the state of the roads between the Black Sea provinces and Central Russia put a prohibitive cost on transportation from the south.

During the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I export abroad 439
developed through Odessa and the Azov ports—Taganrog and

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166 ALREADY IN THE EIGHTIES SYMPTOMS OF OVER-POPULATION WERE NOTICEABLE in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. The peasants continued to move on into New Russia, but by this time that region was itself becoming fairly thickly populated. Migrants pursued their way to the newer lands in the northern Caucasus and beyond the Volga. From 1890 onwards the Government took a hand in the organization of this migratory movement. According to the Emigration Department, set up at this period, the greatest number of migrants over the whole Empire came from the 'rich black earth regions' of Poltava, Chernigov, Kursk and Kharkov. However, between the years 1907 and 1913, the Poltava and Chernigov Governments, from being first and second in this respect, ranked only third and fifth. This fact is explained by the initiative of important landowners and industrialists like Kharitonenko, Tereshchenko and others who built up the sugar-beet industry on a large scale. Notwithstanding this factor, between 1906 and 1914, according to the statistics of the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia*, 1,610,000 peasants migrated from the Ukrainian Governments, while migration was also taking place from different districts of New Russia. The Ukrainians mostly went to settle the steppe area in western Siberia and the region of Orenburg; others reached the Amur and the shores of the Pacific Ocean, where the Ukrainian settlements came to be known as the Green Wedge (*Zelëny Klin*) and where the names of the wealthy villages of Novo-Kievskoe, Poltavskoe and Chernigovskoe piously recalled the origin of those who had come from the banks of the Dniepr and the Seym.

311 433 At the beginning of the twentieth century the classical 'three-field system', already prescribed as a law in the Lithuanian Statute of the sixteenth century, prevailed in left-bank Ukraine. This system answered the requirements of the small landowner or well-to-do peasant who farmed 20 to 100 hectares. Few troubled to produce more than a small surplus, the sale of which might cover their current wants. Horticulture, apiculture and some stock-raising served to supplement income. On the larger estates all the energies of the owners were directed to the lucrative exploitation of the sugar-beet industry. Stretches of land were bought or leased from peasants or small landowners in order to increase the acreage under beet. The rapid development and excellent management of the sugar-beet industry impressed and disturbed the German Commission of Professor Auhagen in 1912. By this time the industry had assumed a certain international importance. In 1914 433 there were over 190 sugar factories in the Ukraine out of 226 for the 244 whole Empire (the bulk of the balance was produced in Poland). As against 2 million hectares under wheat in the Ukraine (excluding

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the New Russian Governments) there were over 1 million hectares 433 ●
under beetroot. Just before the last war the annual production of
beet in the Ukraine reached 150 million quintals: i.e. 18 per cent of 244
world production. The production of Ukrainian beet sugar ranked fourth—after that of America, Germany and France. In 1913 the Ukraine produced 11 million quintals of crystallized sugar. This output, together with that of the Polish factories, covered all the needs of the internal market (which during the preceding twenty-five years had augmented fourfold) and provided substantial surplus for export to the Baltic and the Middle East.

In addition to the beet processing plants, about 60 per cent of the alcohol refineries (corn, potatoes) of the Empire were located in the [274]
Ukraine. The production of vegetable oil (particularly from sunflower seed) was also important.

It has been estimated by the Soviet paper *Pravda* that approximately 1 milliard of rubles a year was paid for services on the semi-industrialized estates of landowners throughout Russia: of this sum a considerable proportion was paid for the hire of horse transport (since landowners did not maintain a large number of draught horses but hired from the villages). Of this milliard, about 300,000,000 were paid out in the Ukraine. As the peasant population of the [511]
Ukraine numbered about fifteen millions, some 20 rubles a year per head of the population was earned on 'supplementary' work on the large estates. 'Only owing to the sugar and other agricultural industries could the dense population of the Ukraine exist in such comparatively well-to-do circumstances.'

Thus the agricultural economy of Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, [241]
Chernigov and Poltava was based only partly on the production of cereals. With a population which reached nearly twenty millions, only about 2 million hectares were under wheat, while in New Russia, with a population about half that of the Ukrainian Governments, there were 4 million hectares under wheat. The Ukraine [439]
exported only small quantities of wheat to Poland and White Russia, which provinces drew the bulk of their supplies from New Russia. The real 'granaries' of Russia which supplied the whole [134]
Empire and exported a surplus abroad were the regions of the northern Caucasus and Trans-Volga with western Siberia and New Russia (including the Governments of Kherson and Ekaterinoslav with the northern part of Tauris and the southern part of Kharkov) In those regions the black earth really had a virgin quality during the first half of the nineteenth century; and its richness remains exceptional even now.

As a rule, the climatic conditions in the *New Russian Governments* 000

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land in the Ukraine and New Russia: of 25 million hectares of 241
arable, 6½ million were under wheat, and of these 4½ million were
in New Russia. Ukrainian and New Russian production attained 433
90 million quintals a year, of which 70 million came from the New 241
Russian Governments. (In addition, the Ukraine produced for internal consumption about 30 million quintals of rye—in the northern districts—nearly as much barley, and about 20 million quintals of oats.) The wheat crop of the Ukraine and New Russia represented 8 per cent of the total world, and 18 per cent of European, production. With an average production of 70 million quintals a year, the New Russian Governments could throw an important surplus on to the world market. Before the Revolution about 76 per cent of the crop was retained in the villages for food, storage and seed (on the larger mechanized estates and co-operative colonies the average was round 70 per cent). The balance, about 20 million quintals, went on the market: of it about one-quarter was absorbed by the towns and industrial centres of New Russia. Under these conditions the three New Russian Governments had [439] available for export abroad 15 million quintals of wheat, i.e. about 1½ million tons. The crop of New Russia and the northern Caucasus was exported to the Ottoman Empire, Greece and particularly to Italy, where the 'hard' types of grain were appreciated as an ingredient of macaroni and other *paste*. Even after the last war and all the ruin of agriculture resulting from the Revolution, the Soviet Press, in 1929, could boast that about 1½ million tons of wheat had been exported through the New Russian and North Caucasian ports (Professor Brutskus holds that this export—the relation of which to total production greatly exceeded pre-War proportions—was one of the factors in preparing the way for the terrible famine of 1932).

'From remote times the Ukraine and New Russia were famous 231
for their draught oxen. Further, many landowners possessed herds of foreign cattle, principally Swiss breeds. All the German colonies bred good milkers' (Shcherbatov). In 1914 there were estimated to be over 9 million head of cattle, 6 million sheep (numbers of them of valuable breed) and 5 to 6 million pigs in the Ukrainian and New Russian Governments (the pigs predominated in northern and western Ukraine and sheep in the New Russian steppes). South Russia, an ideal horseman's country, possessed also a vast number of horses. Before the last war there were reckoned to be 5½ million horses in the Ukraine and New Russia (1 horse to every 5–6 people, and one-sixth of all the horses in the Empire). Government studs, and those of private landowners and of certain *zemstva*, maintained

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231 a high standard of breeding—particularly of draught horses. The Army Remount Department fulfilled a third of its requirements in the south, and there was a considerable export abroad. As a result of the Revolution, breeding suffered probably more than any other branch of rural production. Statistics for 1922 illustrate the disastrous effect of the Revolution on livestock throughout the whole Empire. In 1916 the total head of cattle was about 60 million: in 1922, 23 million. The number of horses in 1916 was estimated at 35 million: in 1922 at 20 million. Sheep numbered 120 million in 1916: 46 million in 1922. In view of the fact that South Russia was the principal field of the Civil War, it is probable that about 50 per cent of the horses and cattle destroyed were lost in this region. It is reckoned that in the Ukraine and New Russia only one-third of the pigs remained and one-quarter of the sheep. Losses in domestic animals are much more difficult to recover than losses in other branches of domestic industry; further, the special conditions of field labour in New Russia required a large proportion of draught oxen and horses.

[656] 433 One of the principal reasons which compelled Lenin to formulate the New Economic Policy was the necessity of restoring the food production of the Soviet Union.

'"War Communism" and attempts to introduce "integral socialism" into the countryside ended in 1922. At that date began the period of "liberalism" in Communist policy in relation to the villages. The peasantry were allowed freedom in the choice of land labour and almost complete freedom in other economic activities. The years between 1922 and 1929 produced excellent results: the lost sowing area was recovered and breeding was resumed. The food question in the country was improving' (Prof. 113 Markov, *Socialist Economy in U.S.S.R.*, Part 2, *Agriculture*, Paris, 1937). By 1929 agricultural production approached pre-war standards (150–160 million quintals of cereals compared with 200 millions average for the years 1909–13). In spite of the fact that, following the break-up of large estates, the peasants had expanded the sown area at the expense of pasture (and according to the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia* were showing a diminishing average on arable of 15–20 per cent as a result of more primitive methods of farming), the breeding of cattle and horses was nearing pre-war figures and the production of pigs was improving.

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423 1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political
661 and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding
565 chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the
474 redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution
[433] against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable:
during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle
by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived
and one-quarter of the sheep.

475 The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to
the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which
in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolu-
tionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were
set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665
were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown
area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million
in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area
of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked
these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of
urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with
the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this
fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour
which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures.
In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the
Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were
employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

474 The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the
661 new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—
including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants
on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly:
in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into
Kolkhozy; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per
cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in
1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in
U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area
occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to
only 4 per cent in 1936.

474 As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really
423 serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the
656 Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32,
and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation
which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the
Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found
itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

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had been based. '"Liberal" tendencies began already in 1932 in the sense that *kolkhozniki* (individual members of the *Kolkhozy*) were allowed to keep their own cattle (Decree of 4 February 1932). Subsequently, in 1935, *kolkhozniki* were accorded the right to farm their own private allotments within the boundaries of the *Kolkhozy*.

These modifications in policy soon gave positive results. It is difficult to say whether the *Kolkhozy* have come to be accepted by the peasantry as the permanent basis of rural life. At the same time there can be no doubt that the grant of certain rights of private farming to the *kolkhozniki*, combined with a relatively free market, has tended to a notable improvement in the conditions of peasant life. In consequence food production throughout the whole country has again increased.

There are now four forms of farming in existence side by side in the Soviet countryside:

(*a*) *Sovkhozy* (State farms);
(*b*) Individual farms;
(*c*) *Kolkhozy* (Collective farms);
(*d*) Allotments belonging to the *kolkhozniki* within the area of the *Kolkhozy*.

The relative importance of these different types of farm can be judged from the areas allotted to each in the 'sowing plan' of 1936: *Sovkhozy* covered 16 million hectares; individual farms, 5 million; *Kolkhozy*, 108 million; *kolkhozniki* holdings, 8 million.

Obviously, the *Kolkhozy* constitute the most important source of agricultural production. On an estimated yield of 8·3 quintals per hectare, the *Kolkhoz* pays 1·7 quintals to the state in taxes; 3·3 to the governmental 'machine stations' which provide and maintain plant; the balance goes to the *kolkhozniki*. The *Kolkhozy*, with a sowing area of rather over 100 million hectares and a yield of 7 quintals per hectare, supply the state organizations with about 150 million quintals (approximately 15 million tons) surplus over the consumption of the rural population. This reckoning is, of course, purely theoretical, but, in 1934, when bread rations existed for the town population, the administration did distribute about 10 million tons of bread.

The importance of the *kolkhozniki* (who are allowed to cultivate from ¼ hectare to 1 hectare each) lies in the production of vegetables and fruit and, to a certain extent, of livestock. The Plan for 1937 estimated that individual farmers and *kolkhozniki* possessed 29 million head of cattle as compared with 4½ million owned by the *Kolkhozy* over their vastly greater acreage. The private farmers and

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423 *kolkhozniki* were reckoned to be even richer in pigs, of which they
471 counted 15 million against 5 million on the *Kolkhozy* and an even
433 lesser number on the *Sovkhozy*. The tiny bits of land which belong to the *kolkhozniki* personally, as well as their domestic animals, have become a school of individual farming which has grown up in the middle of 'the Socialist experiment' as a compromise with the dictates of economics and human nature. In twenty-eight towns in 1938, 82 per cent rye flour, 74 per cent wheat flour, 86 per cent beef, 93 per cent milk, 97 per cent eggs, 87 per cent potatoes, and 72 per cent cabbages, were brought to market by *kolkhozniki* and individual farmers, and only the balance came from the state and collective farms. True the official statisticians could find comfort in the fact that as against the general balance of state commerce which amounted to 100 milliards of roubles the free market only absorbed 16 milliards: but the free market shows a definite tendency to grow and in four years has doubled its transactions.

656 The successful private initiative of the *kolkhozniki* has already
423 begun to weigh upon the minds of the protagonists of the integral Revolution. In the spring of 1938 a Government Decree proclaimed that 'abuses are observed on those allotments of land which are given over to *kolkhozniki* for the personal cultivation of kitchen-gardens or other domestic needs. These abuses consist in the fact that the allotments are sometimes not situated next to the habitations of the *kolkhozniki*, but lie in the middle of *Kolkhoz* lands and exceed the size allowed by the law. The worst part of it all is that these allotments have become the principal care of *kolkhozniki*, and that they show negligence in the accomplishment of their duties in collective farming. It has also been affirmed that these allotments are sometimes cultivated by people who are not members of *Kolkhozy*. A stop has to be put to this state of things as it leads to the development of bourgeois tendencies. The dangerous influence of *kulaki*, who have succeeded in escaping, is suspected.' As a result of this situation, Stalin, by a Decree of 15 August 1939, ordered a 'verification' of all allotments taken over by *kolkhozniki* for personal cultivation: he took the opportunity to recall the law which provided that such allotments were not to exceed ¼ or ½ a hectare. It was also declared that all allotments in isolated situations in the middle of *Kolkhoz* land were illegal and should be abolished: special attention was directed to *Kolkhozy* lying in the Ukraine and Western Russia. *Kolkhozniki*, whose individual allotments were to be abolished, were themselves to be expelled from their *Kolkhozy* and united in new *Kolkhozy* in regions where 'new land' could be found. For this purpose attention was directed to the lands beyond the Volga, in

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western Siberia, the Altai and the Far East. The execution of Stalin's 656
commands is to be completed by September 1940. It is not to be 423
anticipated that the acute conditions of 1929–34 will be repeated as a result of this new drive against the human nature of the Russian rural masses: the Communist machine has broken the strength of peasant society. At the same time, there is little doubt that the harvest of 1939–40 will not be as abundant as those of 1936–8.

The influence of the Revolution and of the Soviet régime on 311
forestry in the South of Russia has been no less baleful than on other 314
branches of rural industry. At the end of the nineteenth century woods covered 20 per cent of the whole area of the Ukraine; in 1928, according to the most optimistic estimates of Soviet statisticians, they did not occupy more than 7 per cent. Even in such a 'half-steppe' region as Poltava, owing to the care of the Imperial Government and of large landowners, woods had covered 10 per cent of the total area. 'Destruction of forests is one of the greatest evils because it is followed by the formation of deep ravines which drain the district of underground waters. The consequence of the formation of such ravines is that streams carry away valuable soil to the rivers and the sea. Every year thousands of hectares of good black earth are lost to the labourer and only serve to make the Dniepr and its affluents more shallow. The destruction of forests, the formation of ravines, the drying up of underground waters, threaten the future of the Ukraine with the gravest consequences.'

The Soviet Government is well aware of the dark side of its 185
'achievement' in the agricultural life of the South of Russia. But, as is well known, the Soviet leaders intend to effect a radical change in the balance of productive forces within the Union. Their reasons for this intention are both political and ideological: political because they realize that their dictatorship rests upon the industrial proletariat and has always aroused the antagonism of the peasants; ideological because they are the apostles of the mechanistic conception of life and, hypnotized by the material achievements of the capitalist world, they ape it in their attempt to transform it and can seek nothing more profound than the realization of Stalin's dream 'to catch up and surpass America'.

In 1913 the relation of agricultural to industrial production in 433
Russia was 59·4 to 40·6. Under the original Five Year Plan formu- 185
lated in 1928 the Soviets aimed at the attainment of a balance which should allocate 80·2 to industry and only 19·8 to agriculture. This fantastic aim was based obviously on the possibilities of bringing into exploitation the vast mineral resources which were known to lie under the soil of the Soviet Union. And all the political ruthless-

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433 ness and ideological fanaticism which are so characteristic of Com-
185 munist psychology—itself a manifestation of a certain state of spiritual sterility—were brought to bear to achieve ultimate objects, which on the American continent during the preceding century had been attained by more balanced, hardly less heroic, and certainly less catastrophic methods.

§ 3. INDUSTRIAL HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

135 The industrial development of the Ukraine has been based on the
131 exploitation of the coal deposits of the Donets basin and of the iron-ore and manganese fields situated west of the Dniepr. Abundant layers of coal are found along both banks of the Donets. The eastern part of the carboniferous region lies within the territory of the Don with its Cossack population. The western part, which constitutes about two-thirds of the whole region, is situated within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine.

Whether the Donets region properly belongs to the Ukraine is a question which has never been definitely settled. Historically, the lands along the right bank of the river Donets in its northern part belonged to that 'New Ukraine' which began to be populated in the second half of the seventeenth century by settlers from Muscovy and by fugitives from Hetman's Ukraine—at that time devastated by the Turkish invasions of Ahmed Köprülü and Kara Mustafa. Subsequently, these lands were incorporated in the Government of Kharkov. The lands along the southern course of the Donets formed part of the extreme eastern angle of New Russia where settled life only really began in the eighteenth century after the Tartar Nogay Horde, which roamed over this region, had retired beyond the Volga.

In 1917 the Provisional Government, in admitting five Ukrainian Governments as the legitimate area for the exercise of 'the national and cultural influence of the Kiev *Rada*', excluded the Government of Kharkov for the reason that the Donets coal area lay within it. The Ukrainian language is not commonly spoken in the coal-fields, and even if the large numbers of temporary labourers who come in from the north are ignored, not more than half the population of Donbass (the Donets coal area) can boast of their Ukrainian origin. In general, this region has nothing which unites its mixed industrial population to the essentially Ukrainian rural population of adjoining regions to the west. The only real link which connects the Donets coal-fields with the industrial districts along the Dniepr and the manganese and iron-ore regions is a purely economic one.

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377 energy was not of urgent importance. Dnieprostroy supplies neighbouring towns and industrial plants with light and power (including the new 'Dniepr Electrical-Metallurgical Works' and the 'Dniepr Aluminium Works'), but the electrification of the railways of Soviet Ukraine has not yet been undertaken, nor does this appear necessary in view of the cheap supplies of fuel locally available.

397 As for machine and other mechanical works, there were in
392 existence before 1916: 'Hartmann's Locomotive Works' at Lugansk;
103 the more modern 'Kharkov Locomotive Works' and 'The Electro-Mechanical Works', also at Kharkov; and a series of smaller machine works (particularly for the manufacture of agricultural machinery) at Sumy, Alexandrovsk, Berdyansk, Odessa and Kiev. The Soviet Government considerably enlarged the 'Lugansk Locomotive Works', and recently machine and locomotive works have been in process of construction and subsequent enlargement at Kramatorskaya (in the Donets region). New 'Tractors' Construction Works' have been built in Kharkov. Machinery plants have been founded in Berdyansk and Cherkassy; the old Kiev and Alexandrovsk works have been enlarged; and new agricultural machinery works have been built in Elizavetgrad, Melitopol and Kherson. The shipbuilding works in Nikolaev continue to supply the Black Sea fleet as before the Revolution. There, during the last war, ships were in construction for the Imperial Navy; armour-plate being manufactured in the 'Nikopol-Mariupol Works'.

381 Some progress has been made in the development of a chemical industry based on the abundant supplies of coal in Donbass. There are chemical processing plants at Slavyansk and Lisichansk, and near the railway stations of Gorlovka and Konstantinovka. The industry is still in the experimental stage, but Soviet 'Plans' envisage the supply of 30 per cent of the needs of the home market.

● 433 The Soviet emphasis on the development of Ukrainian heavy industry and a parallel neglect of the possible expansion of light industries has produced a badly balanced economy in Soviet Ukraine and the country remains dependent on other and often distant parts of the Union for the satisfaction of many of the needs of the people. Political considerations which aim at establishing the complete interdependence of the various parts of the Union are at the basis of the particular direction of the Five Year Plans in the Ukraine. The emigré Ukrainian economist, V. Sadovsky, writes: 'In 1934, 69·4 per cent of industry went to the production of materials and of the tools of production, and only 34·6 per cent for general needs. In this sense the relations existing in 1913 were

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different: 51 per cent and 49 per cent.' It is necessary to add that Sadovsky includes in production intended 'for general use' in both periods the output of agricultural industry: i.e. sugar, spirits, flour and sunflower oil. If these figures for rural industry are excluded, those for so-called 'light industry' remain practically negligible. For example, only 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in U.S.S.R. are derived from the Ukraine; and there is no manufacture of cloth or leather goods.

As Sadovsky justly remarks, the policy of exclusively encouraging heavy industry has resulted in the neglect of the economic interests of the western and central Ukraine. In effect, with the policy of industrializing eastern and south-eastern Ukraine, the Soviets have shown a tendency to de-industrialize the wide and rich western provinces. Here the basis of their policy is probably strategic as well as political. 'In a series of towns of right-bank Ukraine such as Zhitomir, Berdichev, Zhmerinka, Mohilev-Podolsk, Uman, Smela, signs of decadence can be observed during the period of the Five Year Plans.'

The 'Economic Plans' of the Soviet Government are subordinated to a general political policy which, as has been explained in the preceding chapter, aims at the complete fusion of the Soviet Ukraine with the rest of U.S.S.R.; and according to Communist theory political unity can only be based on economic fusion. In forcing the pace of the development of heavy industry in the south and south-east to the detriment of the light and agricultural industries of the rest of the country, the Moscow Government pursues two objectives. First, the importance of the Ukrainian national element in the Ukraine is reduced. 'The Ukrainian people are an old people of agricultural civilization and have never shown any inclination for industrial work and life in big towns. The Ukrainian prefers the country if he can earn his living there, and if it is necessary he finds work in the different branches of rural industry' (Brégy and Obolensky). According to official Soviet statistics on the nationality of workers in the Ukraine, the coal industry employs 75 per cent Russians and 25 per cent Ukrainians; the metallurgical, 73 per cent and 22 per cent respectively; the building trades 56 per cent and 37 per cent (*The National Policy of the Russian Communist Party Expressed in Figures*, p. 177). About 50 per cent only of the people in the Donets region are Ukrainians, and among the urban population of the whole of Soviet Ukraine 70 per cent are not Ukrainians. In two big towns like Odessa and Kharkov only 25 per cent of the inhabitants are Ukrainians. The same phenomenon can be observed in centres like Mariupol and Lugansk. In this wise the

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185 development of industrial centres in the Ukraine and New Russia
● 433 leads to a preponderance of 'new-comers'—in fact, of that social element on whose support the Soviets could rely in a political struggle with the forces of Ukrainian nationalism.

The second political objective which the Soviet Government has pursued is the strengthening of the economic dependence of the Ukraine on the rest of the Union. 'The Soviet Government systematically and intentionally binds Southern industry with strong bonds to the industries of other parts of the Union. This conclusion is imposed by a study of the categories of goods which are transported by the Soviet railways in a "meridial" direction. A considerable part of rail transport in Soviet Ukraine is engaged on the carriage of the half-finished products of industrial works by the most complicated and lengthy routes, e.g. from the banks of the Dniepr to the Urals or from the Moscow district to the Donets region and back. If a comparison is made of goods transported from south to north and from north to south, it will be seen that the machine works of the Ukraine do not "finish" their products, but that these are sent for the final processes to different and sometimes distant parts of the U.S.S.R. The motor industry, in particular, strongly binds the Central Russian region, South Russia, the Volga region and the Urals. Tractors and different agricultural machines can only be "finished" in Ukraine after being sent to receive certain parts from the north or north-east. The Soviet Government evidently is ready to make heavy sacrifices in finance and efficiency in order to attain its political ends which are to bind with strong economic ties all the different parts of the Union' (V. Levitsky).

433 Under such conditions, therefore, it is not possible to speak of 'Ukrainian economy' as an independent whole. Partly through natural causes and partly as a result of the political policy of the Soviet Government, the interdependence of the Ukraine and Great Russia has become even more definite than it was twenty years ago. The development of heavy industry, which has far exceeded the needs of the Ukrainian land itself, and the decline of agriculture has led to a strengthening of the 'meridial' tie (while at the same time Moscow, by somewhat similar measures, is strengthening the 'latitudinal' tie with the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia and is even extending it in this last direction into the outlying provinces of the former Chinese Empire).

The possibility of a wholly independent 'Greater Ukraine' (including present Soviet Ukraine with the additions of eastern Galicia (now incorporated in Soviet Ukraine), Bukovina and Carpathian Rus, may certainly be considered (as Ukrainians some-

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433

times do) from the angle of the 'economic potentialities' of the country regarded as a unit separate from Great Russia. Neither over-populated Galicia nor the poverty-stricken Carpathian valleys could contribute to increase the sum of the wealth of a 'Greater Ukraine'. (The oil-fields of Kolomiya and Stanislavov, with their modest production of 500,000 tons a year, are not an important factor.) But the addition to the population of Soviet Ukraine (34 millions) of the 10 million poor peasants of the outlying provinces should not strain the resources of the Dniepr lands, and the new human material should, in fact, provide increased wealth.

The most remarkable feature of Ukrainian 'economic potentialities' is the fortunate balance between agricultural and industrial riches. Such a fortunate balance cannot be found in any country in Europe except France. The population of 'Greater Ukraine' rather exceeds that of France, as does the total area (588,000 sq. km. in Ukraine against 563,000 sq. km. in France). The average density of population (70.6 inhabitants per sq. km.) is also about the same as in France. 'Economic potentialities' are curiously comparable. The capacity of the Ukrainian harvest is about 200 million quintals (although this is not attained under the Soviet system of agriculture), double that of France which is not quite self-sufficient, but the French output of coal is about 55–60 million tons; the Ukrainian about 70 million. France produces 7–10 million tons of pig iron and from 8–10 million tons of steel. The corresponding figures for the Ukraine are 8 million tons of pig iron and 5 million tons of steel.

Ukrainian patriots who dream of a wholly independent 'Greater Ukraine' claim that the 'economic potentialities' of their country prove that this conception is not utopian. And in that sense, of course, they are right. 'Economic potentialities', in relation to the general complex of conditions which are required by the independent life of a country, are, however, to borrow an expression from mathematics, 'necessary' but not 'sufficient'. These 'economic potentialities' may promise a happy balance between agriculture and industry, but it is only in theory that the harmonious development of economic life remains possible, in practice it can encounter different obstacles in the political, social and cultural conditions which are determined by the course of history.

Ukrainian nationalists claim, for instance, that, should an independent 'Greater Ukraine' become established, life would arrange itself in the natural course of things and that light industries and crafts would arise to satisfy all the immediate needs of the population. Here, however, lies a far more difficult problem than would appear at first sight. Neither the Soviet nor the Imperial Governments can

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433 be held to have been primarily responsible for the backwardness of craftsmanship in the Ukraine nor of those 'light industries' which may be said to have taken the place of the crafts in the modern world. Crafts are created as a result of a long historical process which marches with the cultural development of a country. In the Ukraine a modern capitalist heavy industry was superimposed upon the structure of a rather backward rural economy in the latter half of the nineteenth century. By contrast France is the living embodiment of cultural processes which have produced a harmonious economic life where agriculture and both 'heavy' and 'light' industries are blended in such happy combination and where the work of craftsmen has reached perfection. But then France has a long independent historical past behind her, the political and social experiences of a nation of genius and great achievements in all the domains which challenge the human mind and human activities.

In this wise even 'the economic problem' of 'Greater Ukraine' is not limited by simple figures concerning her 'economic potentialities'. Therefore 'the political problem' which the present and future of the Ukraine represents becomes even more complex. With all the assets of her 'economic potentialities', with all the positive features which can be observed in her economic life even under present conditions, the Ukraine is still very far, as regards herself and other countries concerned, from a satisfactory solution of 'the political problem' of her form in the present and the future. The 'Ukrainian problem' is, perhaps, one of the chief reasons for the absence of balance in continental Europe.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND ADDITIONS TO CHAPTER VII

Sources for the Economic History of S.S.R. Ukraine

113 Any attempt to acquire an objective view of the course of economic life in the Soviet Union calls for an attentive, prudent and critical survey of the vast material published on the subject in Soviet periodicals during the past two decades. A work of this kind is beyond the resources of a single student and requires the corporate study of whole institutions, as for instance: the International Agricultural Institute in Rome; the East European Institute in Breslau (under the direction of Professor Auhagen); the Ukrainian Academy of Podebrady (Czechoslovakia); the Economic Cabinet of Professor Prokopovich in Prague; the Society for the Study of Modern Russia in Paris; the Bureau for Researches on Russia in Birmingham.

tons of grain or about 75% of the total amount that they secured 651 661
in the whole of the former Russian Empire.

This led to new clashes and with the suppression of the larger armed partisan bands, there grew up a new feeling of ugliness that boded ill for the security of the whole regime. The success of the Communists in the industrial centres was thus balanced by their failure to win over any substantial part of the rural population.

In the cities the new regime[1] met with problems of another 433 369
kind. The workers in the great coal and iron industry where Com- [327]
munism was strongest had at a very early date expelled the managers and foremen and had taken over themselves the operation of the plants, many of which had been ruined in the civil war. Now they found that they were not able to restore production. Industry practically came to a halt and by the end of 1921 there was only one blast furnace operating in Ukraine. The production of pig-iron dropped to 11,300 tons, or barely 3% of the pre-war production. The railroads suffered the same fate. There was no way of repairing them and without a trained administrative staff, they almost stopped functioning. This, in turn, increased unemployment and a lack of food in the cities and once more the city dwellers began to stream out into the country districts.

As a final blow there came in 1920 one of those periods of 731
drought which have recurred sporadically in Ukraine throughout the centuries. In view of the general decay in transportation and the ravages of the war, this became serious and the situation grew even worse when the same phenomenon was repeated in 1921. Between the drought and the raiding detachments, the peasants had no reserves of grain and a famine broke out which cost the lives of several million Ukrainians.

This famine was very definitely the result of Communist mismanagement, plus the drought, but the Soviet regime was unable to take any effective counter-measures. When its extent was realized, the regime allowed through the League of Nations the organization of the American Relief Administration under Herbert Hoover. This collected and sent to the stricken areas large quantities of grain but it carried on its work with such impartiality that

[1] [Ukrainian Soviet Republic established 1919 -- Analyst]

CHAPTER TEN

The Famine

In 1921, the great famine which had swept over Ukraine 731
had been the result of a failure of the crops, a prolonged drought and the excesses of Militant Communism which had demoralized the country. The Soviets, more or less unwillingly, allowed the despatch of foreign assistance and this saved the lives of millions. There was to be no interference in the punishment of the obstinate peasants this time.

In the fall of 1929, just as compulsory collectivization was being 841
introduced, the government in Moscow made an important change 645
in the agricultural set-up, for it transferred the Commissariat of 631
Agriculture to the central group by establishing an All-Union Commissariat which was to be in control of all agriculture in the Soviet Union. This meant that in Ukraine all of the work which had been previously done by the local authorities was now transferred to Moscow. The republic commissariats ceased to have the power to pursue individual plans for improving the conditions of the soil, for varying the crops as their own advisers decided or as the population felt it necessary. Everything was to be done from the centre and the Ukrainian Soviet Government was compelled to hand over all of its research stations and other institutions to Muscovite control. This put a stop to the intensive development of Ukrainian agriculture which had been fostered by the Ukrainian land code and introduced the new system in which the peasants were in the same position as the workers in the factories.

At the same time the central regime ceased to make public the 433
actual figures of production on the ground that they might betray to outside nations important facts as to the Soviet development. From this time on estimates and achievements were given only in

[1929 - All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture was established - Analyst]

● 433 terms of percentages in reference to a prior date. Still the alreao, published data were so scanty and incomplete that it became increasingly more and more difficult to secure an actual picture of the progress in the Union as a whole and still more so in any of the separate Soviet Republics, for the central regime rarely broke down what little information it gave out among its constituent parts.

651 It was not long before another change was made in the methods
241 of collecting the products from the collective farms. Under the new
661 system, the farms did not contribute according to their crop but according to the amount of land which they proposed to sow. This amount was due to the government, even in those cases where there was a complete failure of the harvest not under the control of the workers. In other words, if a crop failed because of bad weather conditions, the peasants were compelled to hand over just as much produce as if they had had a bumper crop.

It can be easily seen that such a measure was merely another device for weakening the economic position of the village and the independence of the collective farm. At the same time the establishment of official tractor stations in place of the old locally controlled centres which sent crews and machines into the countryside gave the government another weapon for the exertion of pressure upon the peasants and even the Communists who were in charge of the farms and these crews likewise were paid not on the basis of their work but of the theoretical area which was to be sown. Later this was again changed to the total area of the farm whether it was suitable for any special kind of agriculture or not.

These measures only increased the discontent among the peasants who once again began to limit their work to the minimum necessary to maintain themselves on a steadily dropping scale of living. To counter-balance this the Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a decree in February, 1930 allowing the local authorities who were, of course, handpicked by Moscow to resort to extreme measures against the kurkuls, to confiscate their property and then to dispose of them by sending them and their families to concentration camps, to special settlements in the far north or eastern Asia or merely by expelling them from their home district.

4/1 [after establishing All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture, 1929 --Analyst]

These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown.. These were naturally the more 661
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw ma- 433
terials had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood. This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It concentrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in military preparations. Even when petitions were made by the Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR. Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transportation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932 they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 -1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

The crying need of the Ukrainians was for consumer goods. 433
Odesa and Kharkiv requested that they might be given the power 185
to build textile mills to supply the needs of the local population. 656
The request was denied, for the authorities had decided that the textile industry was to be concentrated in the RSFSR. The iron and steel cities requested that they might be given the permission to build factories to complete the fabrication of certain delicate types of machinery. The request was refused because it was to be only in the Moscow area that such articles were to be made. It was to be the task of Ukraine to furnish the raw material, the iron ore from Kryvy Rih, the coal of the Donbas, and to prepare the semi-finished pig-iron and other forms of semi-fabricated material that were needed by the central plants.

The plan not only provided for construction. It went even further and specified the exact amount of products that were to be turned out by each individual plant. While it was possible to secure some profits from the over-fulfillment of the plan, regardless of the effect that this might have upon the plan as a whole, any under-fulfillment was treated as a gross failure of obligation to the state.

This led, in turn, to additional restrictions on the freedom of [466]
the workers. Punishments were ordered for tardiness, for absence from employment even for a single day without a satisfactory reason, for an attempt to change the place of employment. These regulations were not the product of the governing bodies of the republics but of the Union authorities themselves and they were transmitted from Moscow to the national republics through the liaison between the All-Union commissariats and their subordinate organs.

It was the same with agriculture. Moscow knew what each collective farm, each kolkhoz, each sovkhoz was to furnish, and woe to the group that failed. The famine had been the result and that had been used to break the spirit of resistance of the Ukrainian villagers. The government specified the acreage that was to be devoted to wheat, to barley, to all of the crops that could be raised and it did no good if the local agronomists pointed out new
1/1 [1930's - after famine -- Analyst]

433 185 656 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

166 626 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past. Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

[after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

in the eastern Ukraine in the course of twenty years. At first their 728
actions were moderate but with the passage of time they began to develop and to reveal those tendencies which had marked their course in the east.

The first task was the reorganization of the country geographically. On September 28[1] they had come to a new agreement with [648]
the Germans, whereby Germany had given up her claims to Lithuania in return for the area between the San and the Buh Rivers. So the Soviets assigned Wilno and its territory to an independent Lithuania; they annexed the region further south to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the rest to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This left to the Germans four sections of Western Ukraine, Kholmshchyna, Pidlyashshya, Posannya, and Lemkivshchyna, which were included in the Polish Government General and were governed directly by the Nazis, who allowed the appointment of a Ukrainian Central Committee to represent the Ukrainians before the higher authorities, especially in question of relief, etc.

The Soviet territory[2] was divided into six districts with their 728
centres at Lviv, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil, Rivne and 631
Lutsk. Each of these was then divided into rayons or regions with about 25,000 population. The centres of these regions were often small towns but the division was made quite arbitrarily and each centre was amply provided with bureaucratic machinery.

The economic condition of the country was extremely bad and [433]
the only saving feature was that the harvest had already been gathered, so that there was a good chance for a large part of the agricultural population, even of the poor, to survive during the winter. Yet the influx of refugees fleeing before the German advance filled the cities and the severance of connections with the west prevented the arrival of any more manufactured goods or supplies and, of course, none came from the east.

On the contrary, there came a new swarm of Soviet officials who 436
were themselves amazed at the wealth of goods in what, to the natives, seemed impoverished markets. They brought with them liberal sums of money to buy whatever they wished and they were

1 [1939 -- Analyst]
2 [of occupied Poland -- Analyst]

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Ukraine After World War II

At the conclusion of World War II, Stalin and the officials 000
of the USSR were ready for the next step. They had satisfactorily fooled the Western powers, they had entered the UkSSR and the Byelorussian SSR in the United Nations and they had secured from the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the British Commonwealth of Nations the right to return (by force, if necessary) persons with USSR citizenship. They had decorated the Allied leaders with medals commemorating the Russian conquerors of the past and they were ready to move ahead. They were sure that no one would care to ask about the fate of the unfortunate victims of the German slave camps because every American and Western civil or military authority of high rank had become convinced of the humaneness of Stalin and his group.

The Ukraine had been thoroughly devastated, as we have seen. 433 ●
Its factories and its fields had been laid waste. That part of its 642
machinery which had not been wantonly destroyed by one of the 727
two contesting invaders had been carted to work outside of the UkSSR. But even so, Ukraine was not quiet.

The population, even that part which had been more favorably disposed to the Soviets because of the persecution by the Nazis, had hoped that with the return of peace and the Soviet victory there might be an improvement in living conditions, an increase of consumer goods, a relaxation of some of the austerity that had marked the years before 1941. They were almost at once to be disillusioned, for they very soon found that out of the scanty stores of food which they had preserved from the greedy Nazis they were supposed to make generous gifts for the benefit of Stalin and the elder

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.
727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "warmongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representa-
[701] tive in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

Ukraine After World War II

The Ukraine is regarded as a profitable colony from which the wealth is to be drawn in the manner of the old imperialism. It is to be absorbed and assimilated to the last degree and, at the same time, the RSFSR and the USSR, built around the elder brother, are working in desperation to prepare within its own boundaries new sources of supply. Within the last fifteen years, while the resources of the Donbas and Kryvy Rih have increased, according to the five year plans, some 10-15%, the actual percentage which the fundamental products of the Ukraine bear to the total production of those same products in the USSR has significantly dropped more than that.

Thus at one and the same time the Kremlin is planning to annihilate all of the salient characteristics of the economy of the Ukraine and its population, on the ground that the Ukraine is a necessary source of raw material for the USSR and is striving to free itself of as much dependence on that raw material as it can. This is typical of the double-faced tactics of the leaders of the Union and it easily explains the still smouldering discontent among the Ukrainian people.

529 popular for sea bathing, although the beaches still lack a good tourist organization.

000 Nevertheless this branch of the activities of the country could, under more favourable circumstances, give a stable revenue to the population and thus contribute towards the enrichment of the Ukraine.

III

The Subsoil and Industry

135 Among the mineral riches of the Ukraine the first place belongs to coal and to iron ore.

These two important raw materials are to be found in Zone 2/1 coal in the Donietz basin and iron ore on the left bank of the Ingouletz (a tributary of the Boug) at Krivoi-Rog.

Besides these two fundamentally important resources the Ukraine possesses important deposits of manganese and aluminium in the surroundings of Nikopol, graphite and soft coal mines, recently discovered in the centre of the country, salt in the Donietz basin, and finally peat and oil wells in Polish Galicia, in the surroundings of Stanislavov. Geological researches recently carried out have led to the discovery of oil on the shores of the Sea of Azov.

● 433 In order to give an idea of the potential reserves awaiting exploitation in the subsoil of the Ukraine, let us indicate that before the last war production represented 135 gold francs per annum per inhabitant.

316 As a result of its naturally very rich geological structure and of the organization of the extraction of its resources, the basin of the Donietz could be compared with the best coal-producing centres of Europe. Its reserves may be less important than those of Siberia (Kouznetsk),

2/1 [see category 116, pp. 139-140 --- Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

316 mines of the Krivoi-Rog and secondly the presence between these two centres, in the surroundings of Nikopol, of important deposits of manganese, whose annual extraction exceeds 1,000,000 tons.

Actually the proximity of the mines of Krivoi-Rog, the resources of which, according to the exact estimates of geologists, are considerable (1 milliard 100 million tons of mineral which contains 40 per cent of iron), has allowed the distribution of the whole iron industry of the Ukraine between these two regions—that of the
316 Donietz and that of Krivoi-Rog. This centralization
489 allows one to utilize on the spot the enormous quantities of coal and of employing the railways in the most economical way, thus reducing the transport charges which are a heavy item in relation to a material.

The whole traffic between these two regions goes in two directions. The coal of the Donietz is loaded on trucks which are directed towards the Krivoi-Rog. These trucks return with a load of minerals. Thus a continual exchange takes place between these two centres, resulting in a very small circulation of empty trucks and thus creating one of the essential conditions of a rational exploitation of the railways.

316 The centralization of the Ukrainian metal industry
433 strongly favours its development. The Ukraine to-day occupies one of the leading places in the production of pig-iron (the fourth place, with 6,500,000 tons annually), of steel (third place, with 5,000,000 tons annually), and of sheet-iron (fifth place, with 3,000,000 tons annually).

327 The shaping of the metal and its transformation into metallic manufactured objects is equally concentrated on the borders of these two producing regions. Thus only 18 per cent of the coal of the Donietz and 5 per cent of the raw mineral of the Krivoi-Rog are exported from the Ukraine. The rest is shaped and worked on the

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The possibilities of the development of this industry 255
are enormous. The excellent quality of the vegetables and fruits and the big supplies of fish at the mouth of the Dnieper would have been able to give this industry a great importance, but in this respect the Soviet Government has shown especial incompetence.

Light industry in the exact sense of the word is 000
relatively little developed in the Ukraine. Apart from a few saw mills, soap factories, skin and leather works, furniture works, perfumeries, and porcelain factories, there is little which would attract our attention. We will limit ourselves to simply mentioning them. One cannot really speak of a textile industry. The whole Ukraine has only three factories and only produces 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in Russia.

If agriculture is in a state of curtailment since the 433
appearance of the Soviet regime, if neither light industry 327
nor the means of communication have made any progress (which is equivalent to an absence of progress), the production of minerals and the metal industry show great development, especially since 1932, to which must be added the construction of the *Dnieprogues*.

This progress is not only manifested by the increase of production, but by the centralization of the metal industry in the districts in which the raw materials are extracted. Before the last war the Ukraine was a country of a great surplus of corn, iron, and coal. To-day the 433
surplus of her production is represented by manufactured metal goods and in this her economic potential is found to be radically changed.

The displacement and the development of the industrial potential of the Ukraine ought to have resulted in the increased welfare of her population. Nothing like that has been achieved.

Neither the aim nor the object of this book allow us

433 to enlarge upon the reasons which have determined the destruction of the favourable results which ought to have appeared in this direction. We shall only limit ourselves to enumerating the more important points.

1. The defective distribution due to frequent failures of transport which are expressed by the accumulation of unused manufactured goods in the great industrial centres and by the irregularity of furnishing the factories with raw materials.

2. The very inferior quality of the manufactured goods, the enormous percentage of rejects, the continuous shortage of spare parts required for the normal functioning, and the upkeep of the machines. These defects are due to an insufficient technical staff, to low wages and salaries, and to the police system introduced into the administration of the industries.

3. The lack of co-ordination between the different branches of industry, the poor condition of State commerce, due to the incompetence of the staffs and to the very complex and very slow bureaucratic procedure.

Nevertheless, imperfect though they may be, the new mines and factories exist and under other political and economic conditions, accompanied by the revival of agriculture, of foreign commerce, and of a better functioning of transport, the Ukraine would be put on the same economic level as the best organized and the richest countries of the world.

IV

Means of Communication

496 In no other sector of economic activity does the link
489 between the Ukraine and the rest of Russia become so clearly apparent as in the matter of the organization of

on this river was more than 80 per cent of the river 505
tonnage of the whole country. The ports of the Dnieper had, before the Great War, 360 steamers and more than 1800 other boats. Timber, salt, and corn composed, and still composed to-day, the predominant part of the goods carried by the Dnieper.

The insufficient and incompetent management of the river ports and the small tonnage of the ships still do not allow one to-day to increase the river transport of the Ukraine to any noticeable extent.

On the other hand the geographical possibilities of sea transport are enormous. Excellent ports like Odessa and Nikolaiev, lying 600 kilometres from Constantinople and 1000 kilometres from Batoum, can assure the transport of export and import goods on a big scale and especially that of petrol from the Caucasus. Beside [504]
Odessa and Nikolaiev, the Ukraine still possesses other ports which are also favoured from a geographical and technical point of view, among them Marioupol, Berdiansk, and Kherson and some smaller ports of local interest.

We have noted that under normal conditions of 433
economic exploitation the Ukraine, thanks to its agricultural and industrial potential, could be put on the level of the richest countries of the world. The continuation of the economic development of the Ukraine is conditioned by the existence of a stable outlet. If it is a question of a surplus of wheat, sugar, and other produce of the land, or of the products of industry, this surplus is to-day dependent on the consuming regions of the rest of Russia. The Ukraine, which consumes 85 per cent of its resources of energy and almost all its minerals in order to transform them locally into manufactured articles, is not only a source of raw materials, as is usually imagined.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

433 241 German economists who foresee a perfect collaboration between the Ukraine and Germany ('Germany and the Ukraine supplement one another economically,' wrote the *Volk und Reich* in 1933) make a great mistake or even deceive the public intentionally in continuing to consider the Ukraine an agricultural land. If one compares the national agricultural revenue of the Ukraine with that of her industry, the first is certainly inferior to the second.

000 If one day the Ukraine should enter into the German economic system, and if Germany were to export the mineral which she lacks from the Ukraine, what would one do with the immense machine factories, and the coal mines which supply the metal industries, and with the quarter of a million workers of that industry? Let us admit that the Ukraine should become independent and that she should become detached from the Russian economic system, and that by this fact she should become hostile to Russia, who would cease to absorb the surplus of her economy, what would happen then?

Russia would, perhaps, create a new Ukraine in her Asiatic possessions. The wealth of the subsoil of Western Siberia is far greater by many times than that of the Ukraine. Metal is also more abundant. The soil of Siberia is more fertile and the possibilities of agricultural development are immense. That is not all. What would the Ukraine do with the surplus of her agricultural population, whose average density is greater than that of Germany, and which could emigrate, to-day, to Siberia and found colonies as it pleases? Is there another country in the world which will accept so great an emigration?

If the Russian Empire, backward though it is supposed to have been, has been able, during hundreds of years, to transform the wild Steppes into an industrial and

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy industries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, 83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia. 185 [433] [465]

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peasants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property was taken into the collective farms (*Communist,* Kharkov, December 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater. 474 241 661 565

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administration, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc. 871 [241]

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

467 missionaires, dock and wharf labourers, outdoor servants, &c. The members of *artels* in the second group always receive employment in preference to other workers, as their trustworthiness is guaranteed by the *artel*, and the fact of their membership is some guarantee that they are efficient.

The *artels* are democratic and useful institutions, and, in a country where promptness and trustworthiness are somewhat rare qualities, they play a most valuable part in giving a measure of confidence and security to both employers and workmen.

(2) Agriculture

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

243 The agricultural industry is the largest in the Ukraine, and employs the great majority of the [134] population. The black-soil region extends over most of the area, only the Governments of Kiev, Podolia, and Chernigov, and the borders of the Black Sea, lying [433] outside it. It follows that the suitability of the Ukraine [439] for cereals is equal to that of any part of the world, and its surplus crops form a considerable proportion of the world's food-supply.

243 The mean area under cultivation in the period 1901–5 433 was 52,000,000 acres, producing 20,700,000 tons annually. Of this total, 45,600,000 acres were under breadstuff crops, and produced 15,000,000 tons. For the year 1914, the figures were 56,300,000 acres, producing 23,000,000 tons. Of this 50,400,000 acres were under breadstuff crops, with a return of 15,900,000 tons.

243 *Rye* is the principal crop, and is produced on the 439 peasants' lands more largely than any other cereal. It is the staple breadstuff of the country, and the internal consumption absorbs a large part of the crop, a minor quantity only being exported. In some years the crop is not sufficient for the home demand, and the peasants have to use imported flour or substitutes.

Wheat is next in importance, and provides the largest surplus for export. It is mainly grown on

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

228 either by salting, smoking, or sun-curing. Fish-curing
[30] is carried on in factories at Odessa and Ochakov.

The fisheries in the Azov Sea are important, but the principal grounds are not in Ukrainian territory, those which lie within its limits being of insignificant value.

(4) Minerals

(a) *Natural Resources*

135 The principal mineral resources of the Ukraine are coal, iron, and salt.

135 The *coal* is all in one large field usually known as
316 the Donets basin, which extends from west to east for a distance of 300 miles. It is considered the largest coalfield in Europe, but owing to peculiarities of the geological strata it is split up into several areas with varying qualities of coal. Roughly the flame coals are on the western end of the field, the coking and semi-anthracite coals in the centre, and the anthracite in the east, though coking coals are also found towards the north-east corner. Very little pure anthracite is mined on Ukraine territory, as the beds are mainly in the Don Cossack district. Throughout the field the seams vary much in thickness. Some are too thin to be worked. The average thickness of those worked is 21 to 35 in.; seams of 5 ft. are moderately common, and the maximum thickness is 7 ft.

316 The output of coal from the Donets field is variable.
● 433 This is chiefly due to labour difficulties, which arise in unexpected ways. Nevertheless if the figures of several years are considered together, a great increase is shown, and new pits are being opened every year. The average production for the years 1908 to 1912 was over 14,000,000 tons, the proportion of bituminous coal to anthracite being as 8 to 1. The figures include the whole field, as separate statistics for the portion over the Don Cossack border are not issued.

Iron.—The Ukraine is fortunate in having in close proximity to its coalfield a district rich in iron ore. The deposit, which is of excellent quality and easily worked,

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

is near the small town of Krivoy-Rog on the borders of the Governments of Yekaterinoslav and Kherson, between the town of Yekaterinoslav and the port of Nikolaev. This district has produced 95 per cent. of the iron ore mined in European Russia in recent years, and after supplying the needs of the numerous iron-works on the Donets coalfield and dispatching great quantities to other parts of Russia, it exports a large surplus through the ports of Nikolaev and Mariupol. This supply is eagerly taken up, principally by Great Britain and Germany. 316 433 [437]

The Krivoy-Rog iron is a brown non-phosphoric ore, containing about 70 per cent. of pure iron. The output is steadily increasing: the ore mined amounted in 1906 to 3,000,000 tons, and in 1910 exceeded 4,000,000 tons. There have been further increases since.

Deposits of *manganese* ore are found in the Government of Yekaterinoslav at Nikopol on the lower Dnieper, a few miles east of the Krivoy-Rog iron district. Exploitation began in 1886, and has been very successful.

The production, of which 75 per cent. is exported, fluctuates greatly according to the price of manganese abroad, and a maximum output of 300,000 tons in 1907 was succeeded by a fall to one-half this amount in 1909, with a slight recovery in the following years.

Mercury has been exploited since 1879 at Nikitovka, in the Government of Yekaterinoslav. The mineral is found in the coal measures near the surface. After being successfully worked for thirty years, the mines were closed about 1909.

Salt.—The Ukraine has valuable deposits of salt. There is an important mine of rock-salt near Bakhmut in the Government of Yekaterinoslav. Boring has been continued to a depth of 760 ft. without passing through the entire thickness of the salt bed; of this 340 ft. consists of pure salt. 317 433

On the edge of the Kouyalnitski lagoon, north-east of Odessa, there is a salt lake which produces enough

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1-20 RD1 Ukraine RD1

317 salt for the domestic needs and preserving industries
433 of the neighbourhood.

Brine springs are worked at Bakhmut and at Slavyansk in the Government of Kharkov. The brine is pumped to the surface and the salt evaporated.

The salt production is increasing but slowly, and not in proportion to the needs of the preserving and curing industries of Russia; prices are rising and imports increasing. The average output for the years 1905–9 was 1,326,000 tons of pure salt, which was over 50 per cent. of the production of all Russia.

316 *Building stone.*—Quarrying for limestone is a great industry near Odessa, which is built of the local stone. Granite is quarried on the banks of the larger rivers, and Yekaterinoslav and other towns are largely built of granite, which is also used for harbour works and railway bridges.

317 *Pottery clays.*—Kaolin is found in the Ukraine, the entire output of Russia being produced within its boundaries. Clays of good quality exist in the Governments of Poltava, Kharkov, and Kherson, and supply material for the local domestic industry in earthenware.

(*b*) *Methods of Extraction*

316 There is nothing new or striking in the methods used for extracting the minerals mentioned; on the contrary, except where foreign capital is interested, they are on the whole not equal to those followed in western Europe and America. The greatest drawback is the low producing power of labour, for which no immediate remedy is to be found. There is room for improved machinery on a large scale, but unless the habits of the people change, the output per head will remain comparatively small.

(5) Manufactures

433 Manufacturing industry plays a relatively small
439 part in the economic life of the Ukraine, the country not producing sufficient for its own wants and import-

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

ing both from abroad and from other parts of Russia. 433
The two principal exceptions to this rule are manu- 439
factured food-stuffs, and heavy iron and steel products.

Sixty-eight per cent. of the manufactured products 433
of the country consist of food-stuffs. The industries 252
contributing to this output are various, including flour- 257
milling, sugar-refining, and those dependent wholly or partly upon sugar, such as confectionery, fruit-preserving, distilling from molasses, brewing, and wine-making. Most of the undertakings concerned have only a small capital, and are situated near the source of their raw material. In the neighbourhood of Kiev, however, sugar-refining and its dependent industries are carried on in large works, many of which are capitalized from abroad.

The close conjunction of the Donets coalfield and 327
the iron and manganese deposits has enabled the 433
Ukraine to be almost entirely self-supporting in iron and steel manufactures of the first categories, and to supply the wants of the remainder of Russia as well. Pig-iron, bar-iron, roof-iron, steel rails, axles, tubes, and assorted merchant iron are all made in the iron-works which have been established in increasing numbers on the coal and iron fields. These works are seldom in large centres of population, but as a rule in small towns and villages, some of which owe their existence to the need of housing for the labour employed.

The output of raw iron and steel in the first stage of manufacture under the headings of Bessemer and Thomas bars, Martin-process bars, cast-iron and steel billets, and cast-iron tubes, was in 1906 1,300,000 tons, and in 1910 1,900,000 tons. The output of iron and steel in the second stage of manufacture, under the headings of T and H beams, rails, sheet-iron, rolled wire, roof-iron, trusses, springs, assorted merchant iron and axles, was in 1906 1,010,000 tons, and in 1910 1,602,258 tons. In the former year the output in both stages was equal to about 45 per cent., and in the latter year to about 55 per cent., of the total Russian output.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

433 The development of the industry on a large scale
327 dates from the year 1870, when a British subject named Hughes received from the Russian Government a concession for the manufacture of iron rails. The company founded by him exists to-day under British management at a place called Hughesovka, and is known as the New Russia Co., Ltd. It has been followed up by a great number of other enterprises, some Russian, but most founded by British, French, and Belgian capital, which has been freely invested in the industry during the last forty years, particularly between 1880 and the end of the century.

392 Agricultural machinery is in constant demand.
433 When first used in the country, it had all to be imported, but of late it has been manufactured in the Ukraine in increasing quantities. Although the customs duties on agricultural machinery are low—certain types in fact are admitted free—the machinery made in the country finds more favour every year. For certain complex machines the Ukraine is still dependent upon imports, but, apart from these, it will probably be able in time to produce all the agricultural machinery it needs. In 1913, out of a total of 770 agricultural machinery factories in Russia, 271 were situated in the Ukraine. The value of their output was 31,000,000 rubles, that of the whole of Russia being 54,000,000 rubles. In addition to the production of the factories, large quantities of tools and machinery of the simpler sort are made by domestic workers, working single-handed or in small syndicates.

The principal agricultural machinery works are in the Governments of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Taurida, and Kharkov. The firms John Greaves & Co. and E. L. Mathias & Sons (Berdyansk), Hartmann Machinery Co. (Lugansk), H. A. Klassen (Sofiesk), R. & E. Elworthy (Yelisavetgrad), I. I. Hoehn (Odessa), and Franz & Schroeder (Neu-Halbstadt), are among those doing the largest business, and the names of the concerns show how largely foreign enterprise has entered this field, none having a Russian title. At Kiev and Kharkov

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

there are several large factories which specialize in every kind of machine necessary for the sugar industry. 392 433

Several other industries, while of small account in comparison with those described above, deserve mention.

Manufacturing enterprises dependent upon animal products divide themselves principally into tanneries and woollen factories. The centres of the leather industry lie in the northern portion of the country, especially in the Governments of Kharkov, Poltava, Chernigov, and Podolia. This industry accounts for 4·5 per cent. of the total manufacturing output of the Ukraine. The woollen industry is centred in Kharkov, which has two large cloth mills, and in the town of Klintsi in the Government of Chernigov, where not only cloth but knitted goods, yarns, rugs, shawls, and other woollen goods are turned out from eight considerable factories. The production of woollen goods represents 3·5 per cent. of the total Ukraine output of manufactures. 282 288 433

The timber-working industry is chiefly found in the riparian towns, especially on the Dnieper. Yekaterinoslav takes first place, and Kremenchug, Alexandrovsk and Kherson also have saw-mills. Much of the timber shipped abroad is in an unworked state, and manufactures of the better sort are poorly represented. The industry accounts for only 4 per cent. of the value of the Ukraine manufactures. 313 433

The chemical industry is of minor importance. It is concerned chiefly with the products and by-products of coal gas at Odessa and Kharkov, but there is also a soda factory in the Bakhmut district and there are a number of match-factories in the Novozibkovsk district of Chernigov. The products of the industry represent only 3·5 per cent. of the value of the manufactures of the Ukraine. None of the more advanced branches of the industry is established in the country. 382 45[illegible]

The industries enumerated account for 90–95 per cent. of the manufactures of the country. The remainder, grouped under the headings of paper, linen, cotton, and fibre industries, are of negligible account. 433

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

a very large population of Jews, who have become general tradesmen and brokers to the community. 438 441

The cereal crop is the subject of elaborate commercial transactions, and much of it is sold two or three times before it is harvested. The lack of proper storage leads to the rapid dispersal of the bulk of the surplus crop. Odessa and Nikolaev have corn exchanges where the export of the crop is financed, and there is an exchange for internal cereal trade at Yelisavetgrad.

The sugar trade is subject to Government control. A committee fixes annually the amount of sugar to be placed on the home market and the distribution of supplies to the refineries, the quantity so dealt with paying the minimum excise. After this allocation any surplus remaining is disposed of according to the general state of the market and the stock held over from the previous season, and is allotted for internal use or export. Russia was a signatory to the Sugar Convention of 1907, and agreed that, during the six years from the date of the convention, she should not export in all more than 1,000,000 tons. This specially affected the Ukraine as the principal sugar-producing area in Russia. 458 432 655

The sugar and alcohol markets are at Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa. 435

Wool of the finer sorts called 'Spanish' is dealt in principally at Kharkov, which is also the chief market for leather.

There is a flax market at Novozybkov in the province of Chernigov.

The principal timber markets are Yekaterinoslav and Kherson.

Odessa is a market for a great number of commodities produced in the interior, especially food-stuffs, cattle, tobacco, and vegetable oils.

The custom of transacting important business at fixed fairs is of very long standing in the Ukraine, and, while the importance of every fair tends to decrease at present owing to the adoption of other methods of trading, the fairs continue to be held, and, especially 438 475

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

(b) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

Organizations to promote trade in the Ukraine are not numerous. The true traders of the country are the native Jews, and to trace their involved dealings is impossible. 441

The sales of the coal and iron are almost wholly controlled by rings and cartels. The most powerful one, the *Prodamet*, or metal sales combine, controlled recently over 80 per cent. of all the iron and steel produced in South Russia and threatened to absorb the entire output. 477

The activities of the *zemstvos* in trade call for mention. These organs of local government actively enter into trade in agricultural machinery, improved seed, and pedigree live-stock, and endeavour to improve the facilities for selling the products of domestic industry. Their aim is to lift the internal commerce of the country from the condition of dependence on speculating middlemen, into which it has almost irretrievably fallen, but their achievements so far only touch the fringe of a deep-seated social trouble. 441 185

There are chambers of commerce at Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Berdyansk, and Mariupol, and there is a branch of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce at Odessa. Odessa, Nikolaev, and Yelisavetgrad have corn exchanges, and coal and iron exchanges exist at Kharkov. 441

(c) *Foreign Interests and Methods of Economic Penetration*

The present state of commerce in the Ukraine provides a wide field for economic penetration from abroad. Agriculture in its first stages is not much affected, but in one case, that of the production of sugar from beet, the secondary stages of manufacture have been much exploited by foreign capital and management. The coal and iron mining industries and the iron and steel manufacturing industries owe their foundation in great measure to foreigners, by whom they are still largely 471 432

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

491 managed and financed. Russia has not been able to
453 find capital for new projects, with the result that within the last twenty-five years numerous undertakings have been started with foreign money. Official lists show that the nation most largely interested is France, Belgium and Great Britain coming next. The fortunes of these enterprises have varied, but in general their success has not been great in proportion to the original capital.

453 The last quarter of a century has also seen the
491 foundation of a number of trading banks with Russian titles and boards of directors at least nominally Russian. Their resources, however, are largely provided and completely controlled from Germany. These institutions have admittedly acquired a controlling interest in most of the concerns above mentioned, often at a very moderate outlay, and have supplied additional loan capital at profitable rates of interest. One and the same bank has in many cases obtained control over every stage in the production of a manufactured article, from the winning of the raw material onward, of course drawing its profit from every undertaking concerned. Certain British concerns have held out and kept their shares in their own hands, but financial institutions governed by German capitalists have a preponderating hold on those industries of the Ukraine which are large enough to repay their attention—that is, on the coal, iron, and allied industries of the Donets, and the sugar industries of the Kiev district.

The foreign interests in the Ukraine lie principally in the industrial concerns above mentioned. British interests are not strong, and are chiefly represented by some collieries and ironworks at Alexandrovsk and the general properties of the New Russia Co., Ltd., at Hughesovka and elsewhere (cf. p. 86).

327 Rog received an important complement. Supplied by the 436,000 kilowatts of the power plant, a new industrial combine was established in this region, with iron and steel works, with factories for aluminum, alloys, for cement, soda, ammonia, sulfurous acid and similar chemical products. In this district agricultural and heavy machinery is also built. The pig iron production of 47 Ukrainian blast furnaces amounted to 3.1 million tons in 1913, 4.3 million tons in 1932, and 6.7 million tons in 1934; steel production during the same years came to 2.7 million tons, 2.2 million tons and 5.4 million tons, and the production of malleable iron in each case came to 2.3 million, 2.2 million and 2.9 million tons. (104)

104. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 455.

402 The manufacture of heavy industrial raw products for machines and implements of all kinds occurs in the scattered industrial cities, especially in the part of the Ukraine on the right bank of the river. Khar'kov, with its construction of heavy machinery, agricultural machines, precision instruments and transport machines such as locomotives, railroad cars and tractors, stands at the head of Ukrainian industrial cities. In Kiyev ships, heavy machinery and chemical and electrotechnical machines are built, and in Odessa agricultural machinery, precision instruments and motor cars. Here canning and leather industry is also carried on. In Mariupil /164/ and Taganrog there are foundaries. In almost all larger harbors of the Black Sea coast, ships are built. In the Crimea there are canning and tobacco factories.

•433 After Ukrainian industry suffered severe reverses as a result of the First World War and the Revolution, a wave of industrialism set in with the first Five Year Plan in 1928. The wealth of

433 the Soviet Union was to be increased according to the most modern methods. The industrialization of the agrarian country was based on existing industrial plants which were enlarged, on the opening-up of new sources of power and the establishment of large industrial combines. Foreign enterprises and above all foreign specialists assisted in a decisive way in the carrying-out of the first Five Year Plan. But the first and still fresh impulse of industrial development was broken even in 1932 at the beginning of the second Five Year Plan, the increased production figures for iron and coal to the contrary notwithstanding. Meanwhile, systems of stimulating production were introduced, such as the Udarniki Movement in 1933 (shocktroop workers) and the Stakhanov Movement of 1936, whereby production was actually increased. During the second Five Year Plan the number of industrial workers in Soviet Ukraine increased essentially more slowly than during the first.
[444] In 1928 there were somewhat over 600,000 "independent workers" in the entire Soviet Ukraine, more than half of whom were coal and metal workers. In 1931 their number had increased to 900,000, in 1933 to over 1 million, and in 1935, to barely 1.2 million workers - female workers not included. (105)

105. Kubiyovich: Atlas of the Ukraine and the Area Bordering it, page 46.

By far the greater number of industries of the present Soviet Ukrainian economy still stem from the pre-war period, as for example almost all factories for agricultural machines. The only revolutionary step in this branch of economy is the merging of individual enterprises and the changing of names. The firm "Heim, Odessa" became the Bolshevik factory "October Revolution", "Fuchs, Kleiner, Berger and Zagorelin, Katerynoslav"

•433 became /165/ "Red Progress, Dnepropetrovsk", and so on. The giant tractor factory in Khar'kov was newly erected, an accomplishment which is proudly shown to every foreign visitors. Important, however, is not only the number of tractors that leave the factory, but also their serviceability and durability. The significance of the industrial plants which have remained from the pre-war period is also evident from the invested capital, according to which, just as before, the iron industry ranks first, coal second and the sugar industry third. In these three industries half of the entire capital invested in Ukrainian industry is combined. Only after that come machine construction and the chemical works which to a certain extent have arisen only in most recent times. (106)

106. Kubiyovich: Commentary to the Atlas, page XXXIII.

257 The sugar industry forms only a part of the food and luxury industry which was a very important branch even before the war. Its center is in the beet-growing region between Podolia, Kiyev and Khar'kov. In 1913 200 Ukrainian sugar factories produced 1.2 million tons of sugar, in 1933 170 factories produced 0.8 million tons. (107)

107. Deminskiy, The Economy of the Ukraine, page 140.

258 Besides that there is, also dating back to the pre-
274 war period, a considerable mill and oil industry, the latter in the Kuban region, as well as distilleries.

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369 The increase of urban population is a natural concomitant of industrialization. The Ukraine has

11: Obermaier--185 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

47 where the state regulates everything, there is no longer any room for self-maintenance. State commerce is supervised by the various commissariats, which fact does not facilitate its smooth running. The commissariats for internal commerce, for the food industry, for local industry, the "Division for the Welfare of Workers" and other offices also have a voice. In 1935 there were 310,300 workers employed "in the service of Ukrainian commerce". Of this crew the Jews represented 42.8% and the Ukrainians 38.1%. (118)

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118: Soviet Trade, Kiyev 1937.

/171/ The Soviet press sometimes tells tales out of school about how Soviet business has developed under the leadership of the Jews who reputedly have a talent for business. Pravda of November 16, 1936, writes of a "fantastic flood of rules and regulations". During the first nine months of 1936, they said, the people's commissar Weizer issued 42,000 orders, decrees and resolutions. Izvestiia of March 14, 1937 writes: "In Rostov on the Don the demand for light articles of clothing is great, but the shops are empty. Summer clothing, suits, underwear, sport clothes, bathing suits, there is nothing of this kind in the fifty-nine shops of the city. There is unbelievable disorder in supplies." On the subject of profiteering Pravda reports on May 25, 1937: "In 1936 deficits, embezzlements and divestments amounted to an enormous sum: in government business 217 million rubles, in the consumer cooperatives 203 million rubles. But these represent only the deficits and embezzlements that were discovered!" Za Industriializatsii of July 17, 1937, gives an interesting glimpse into how the Donets region is supplied with food. "In the regulation of April 29 of this year," writes the periodical, "the council of the people's commis-

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[685]

433 sariats of the Soviet Union decided that very shortly a reform in the methods of supplying food and articles of everyday use to miners of the Donets Basin is to take place. Since the time this decree was issued more than two months have elapsed, but nothing has changed. - We have visited the pits of all the different districts of the Donets Basin and have spoken to the men and women workers. We were obliged to conclude that in none of the districts has there been any improvement worth speaking of in the matter of food supply, that, on the contrary, conditions have grown worse to a large extent. We mention as an example the coal mines in the district of Rovenechky. Here there is a working population of 30,000 people; and every day one can see how /172/ long lines form outside the food stores already early in the morning. After these people have patiently waited, usually for several hours, they are told that no food supply whatsoever has arrived, so that they return home without having received anything. We asked a number of leading union officials how the food supply trade is organized. Trade union official Kondratov gave us the following explanation: In our store there is neither sugar nor salt nor groats. Meat is very seldom sold, and is usually of poor quality. Since February of this year we have had salt herring only one single time, other fish we have not even seen." (119)

119. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in This Way, page 44ff.

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491 Like trade, the system of communication is poor in the Ukraine. In 1880, there were in the Northern Ukraine, 210,000 chumak, that is carters and dealers who took care of long-distance trans-

464 cuts wages." A few days later 'Za Industriyalizatsiiu' deals with the same subject: "The fluctuation of workers in the Molotov automobile factory is great, especially among those who have been newly employed. In the course of eleven months in 1936 over 12,000 workers have moved away. The shortage of housing is often given as the chief reason for the mass flight. Inasmuch as the machines are idle, the wages of the workers are greatly reduced... The workers wait for the machines eight to ten days a month. The management succeeds in providing normal or semi-normal working conditions for only a few of the workers - for the famous Stakhanov-workers." (125) Very

125. Quoted by Keyserlingk, The Russian worker lives in this way, page 22.

similar are the conditions in the new combine "Zaporishstali" where in 1935, 9151 workers were taken on and 7675 released; this is reported by Visti on May 22, 1939. The same paper reports on May 17, 1939 that 331 young farmers from the region of Chernigov were sent into the coal mines of the Donets Basin.

433 461 At the beginning of the second Five Year Plan, Bolshevik employers with the help of the erstwhile farmer Isotov refuted those false prophets who, like Marx and Lenin, maintained that people would lead a secure, carefree and enjoyable life in the socialist state with little work and high wages. After special preparations the miner Isotov turned out 40 to 60 percent more than he had previously averaged. Isotov's first effort was particularly celebrated and propagandized. It served as a pretext for the introduction of the Udarnik or shock-worker movement. Two years later, when this impulse had abated just as had the previous enthusiasm of the first Five Year Plan, the big, powerful peasant boy Alexei Stakhanov fell

433 461 into the same trap. Instead of extracting 7 to 8 tons from a pit, Stakhanov now came up with 105 tons of coal. /176/ The familiar Isotov propagandistic fireworks were repeated, and as before many workers suddenly discovered how much more they could have been producing. They suddenly worked so fast that their hands grew hot. Instead of 590 crank shafts a forger could now mold 1027 in one shift, instead of 15 to 20 spindles women workers now managed 140, and instead of 320 pairs of shoes a shoemaker now made 3000 pairs. What good did it do that many refused to play the game any longer? Their achievements were measured according to the records set by the Stakhanov workers, and their wages decreased. In February 1936, the record-establishing frenzy reached its climax in the so-called Stakhanov Month when the world was to be shown what the Soviet Union was capable of achieving. Pravda gave an account of the results of this month of superior achievements on March 19th, 1936: "During the Stakhanov Month industry stood under the sign of bungling. Often the quality of the products decreased, defective products increased, and in many factories the state plan was not carried out..." The hatred of the workers toward the Stakhanov workers who were contemptuously regarded as ambitious yes men, went so far that they were sometimes even put out of the way. Nevertheless, the authorities continued to organize Stakhanov days, weeks and decades throughout the year, until the fever finally abated. Apparently the efforts had not resulted in favorable experiences. Mashinostroenie of December 23rd, 1937 gives a small picture of the expenses incurred during this time by a Soviet factory proprietor: "In the course of a week of the Stakhanov decade, 18,765 pistons had to be discarded as defective in the piston workshop alone of the factory 'Red Trade Union International'. The management of the factory has resigned

433 itself to such an extent to the mass production of
461 discards that it regards this condition as an unavoidable fact and builds up its production program on the score of 35 percent discards." (126)

126. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 32.

000 /Facing page 176/ /An important agricultural product: sunflowers. The seeds are removed from the receptacle with small sticks, and are then taken to the oil mills/7/Facing page 177/ /Picture of a village in the more well-timbered West Ukraine where the houses are built of wood/7/177/

465 In the spring of 1937, two years after the introduction of the Stakhanov System, the average gross wages of the Soviet worker, according to the official figures of the Moscow Statistical Office, amounted to 212 rubles monthly. (127) In the

127. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 33.

meantime there has hardly been any change in these figures. From these 212 rubles about 10 percent are deducted (128) so that the worker has 191 rubles left over per month to cover his living expenses. If he had no rent to pay, with this amount he could buy 106 kilograms of white bread or 44 kilograms of groats or 119 liters of milk or 29.5 kilograms of sweet cherries; or he could consume 24 canteen meals a month or buy 19 kilograms of margarine. He could also acquire three pairs of sneakers or a pair of cheap men's shoes, provided they are even available in a normal size, - usually there are only outsizes in stock in the state stores and cooperatives, for the Jews have shifted the marketable goods to the open market where their cost is multiple. There would not be enough for a man's suit of the cheapest

7 [For plates, cf. pp. 226-227, category 116-Analyse]

465 quality. For this the worker, if he does not spend any kopeks for food and housing, must work one and one-half months, and two months for the cheapest winter coat. Three colored shirts eat up a month's wages. For the same amount he could buy his wife three summer dresses of poor quality or three sets of underwear or three blouses. (129)

129. Statement of a German specialist in Kiyev.

Far too often the life of the Soviet Ukraine worker is exhausted in the struggle for his daily bread, for clothing and shelter, and yet before the war he was the best paid in Russia. Undoubtedly
345 the Bolsheviks have done a great deal of building,
466 but they neglected the building of houses in favor
185 of the building of clubhouses and palaces for cultural purposes, veritable giant structures of cement and steel where in the evening the locksmiths and metal founders then assemble "in order to hear lectures on Shakespeare". "For in human history there is an urge that has never before been recognized in the great masses...for art and literature. The famous tractor brigade of the Pasha Angelin comes forth with songs, and the workers of the Khar'kov tractor factory organize their own opera. Hundreds of groups of worker and kolhosp newspapers flaunt poems, stories and essays written by forge and tractor workers."

He whose thoughts take flight on the wings of Pegasus will find his hands only mechanically at
•433 work. Among the construction workers the "never-before recognized urge of the great masses...for art and literature" expresses itself in the following way, according to Pravda of July 16, 1937: "The brick production program for the year could only be 19 percent accomplished in the first five months of the year, and the two subsequent months have also brought no change. The construct-

433 tion of factories and dwellings is therefore held up and interrupted. Building costs rise a great deal... The shortage of bricks is increased by the fact that the bricks that are delivered are to a large extent useless. The imperfection comes to 25 to 30 percent by the time the bricks are laid. But even these bricks that are laid do not as a rule measure up to the prescribed 361 durability test." (130) In the finished settle-

130. Quoted by Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in This Way, page 26.

ments life is described thus in Visti, January 10th, 1939: "The settlement of Rudchenkovo in the Donbas has changed its aspect completely under the Soviet government. Large sections of many-storied houses have arisen and streets with lights and 10,000 square meters of asphalt sidewalks. Street car tracks were laid which connect the settlement with the center of the city of Stalin. There is also a bus connection here; the water system was improved, and the building of the cultural center for miners of the Donbas was erected aswell as a polyclinic, schools, clubs and shops. Nevertheless: 1. For three years now there have been talks in the district councils of the region and even in the regional executive committee about the opening of a sales center for heating material; 2. in /179/ Rudchenkovo a bath house does not yet exist; 3. the street car stop is out on the open steppe one-half mile from the clinic, and there is not even a small shelter at the car stopl 4. there is no public pharmacy; 5. lighting in the houses is unsatisfactory - the electrical plants have almost generally become useless; 6. there is no dairy; 7. there is no shop for children's goods; 8. the book business is very poorly organized. - The leaders of the trust 'Stalin Coal' and of the district council

361 of Kirovsk must finally take note of the needs of the workers and do away with the inadequacies which constitute the dark side of the tremendous economic development of the population of Rudchenkovo."

Soviet bureaucracy is working with unbelievable assiduousness on city planning. The building plan of Rostov, for example, according to Izvestiia of August 5th, 1937, had been under construction for eight years at that time, and the reconstruction plan of Nizhne-Tagilak, a small city in the Urals, is a book of 10,000 pages. The men who drew up the reconstruction plan of Gor'kiy must have been Stakhanov bureaucrats, for its pages are no longer numbered but - weighed; and it weighs two tons.

433 It sounds somewhat exaggerated when the Moscow Review of June 3, 1937, maintains that the Five Year Plans determine the course of future Soviet economy "with the accuracy of a time table". Not the only reason why these time tables cannot be adhered to is after all the fluctuation of the workers, which, in turn, is caused by the shortage of food and housing. Along with many other journals, 'Za Industriializatsiiu' of August 23rd, 1937, confirms the fact that the workers suffer considerable wage deficits because of the disorganization of Soviet economy: "The large companies of heavy industry are suffering from a great scarcity of oxygen. Thus, for example, the Martin furnaces of the plant 'Red October' in Stalingrad had to be allowed to go out because of lack of oxygen. /180/ A similar situation occurred in quite a number of other Soviet cities such as Khar'kov, Dnepropetrovsk and Rostov. In front of the oxygen factory of Khar'kov there are a great many trucks waiting every day, in order to get at least a few bottles of oxygen. This factory is extremely inefficient, which can in part be traced back to the frequent interruptions caused by accidents. Thus the Khar'kov plant was idle 28 percent

433 of the working time in July of this year...The Stalingrad plant presents a similar picture." (131) Where there is no needle there are no

131. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 25.

clothes. Pravda of May 8, 1939, criticizes the decrease in coal mining in the Donbas as follows: "The mine which determines the fate of the entire trust is behind schedule. It would seem as though the scandalous production which has lasted for a considerable time now would have been given serious consideration. The management of the mine is now trying to explain the poor production by the fact that the workers are leaving in order to attend to their spring planting." Visti of June 10, 1939, supplements this by reporting that the constant decrease of coal mining in the Donets Basin is forcing the economic management of Soviet Ukraine to increase the production of brown coal and turf.

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562 By reason of the Soviet Constitution, the
461 East Ukrainian woman has an equal position with
594 the man. This means that she has the same meager
[465] rights and the same heavy duties. Since the wages of the man are not adequate to support the family, the woman must also earn some of the daily bread. Thus the woman is a worker. The elimination of Sundays and holidays, the long trips to work, the standing-in-line for hours to get food, the shifting of days off in the different plants, the incredible housing shortage, the rearing of children in institutions, the easy divorces of "couples living together" - all this disrupts the family.
594 The devastating consequences which are bound to
161 result from the disregard /181/ of the family,

I INTRODUCTION

101 The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (the Ukraine) is one of the U.S.S.R.'s sixteen constituent Union Republics. Situated in the south-western corner of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine is bordered on the south by the Black and Azov Seas and the Crimea (part of Russia); its western border touches the frontiers of Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as well as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Towards the north the Ukrainian S.S.R. verges on two other Soviet Republics: Byelorussia and Russia; and it is the Russian neighbourhood of the Don river which forms the Ukraine's eastern border.

101 135 In economic development and in population the Ukraine is second greatest of the Soviet Republics. It has a fertile soil, a mild humid climate, and is rich in deposits of coal, oil, iron, manganese and salts, as well as in building materials. It has four main rivers: the Dnieper (third largest in Europe), the Dniester, the Bug, and the Donets (a tributary of the Don), which are navigable and are also useful reservoirs of power.

● 433 162 Before 1941 the Ukraine contained more than one-fifth of the inhabitants of the entire Soviet Union. Its industry produced 54 per cent. of the coal, 60 per cent. of the pig iron, 48 per cent. of the steel, and 35 per cent. of the manganese ore turned out in the whole U.S.S.R.; it manufactured railway engines and cars, tractors, turbines, harvester combines, and mining and agricultural machinery for all parts of the Soviet Union. "It also produced artificial fertilizers, soda, glass and cement. The output of the sugar, meat-packing, flour-milling, distilling, and dairy industries reached great dimensions. Fishing was developed in the Black Sea and Azov Sea. The Dnieper Power Station, 361 the largest in Europe, was famous throughout the world. The cities of the Ukraine, both old and new, developed rapidly; during the past 25 years 77 new cities and 285 industrial settlements were built."[1]

241 Agriculture also was highly developed. In 1937-38 Ukrainian farms accounted for nearly one-fifth of the grain, one-sixth of the potatoes, and two-thirds of the sugar beet produced in the Soviet Union. The Ukraine also had a large proportion of the total Soviet Union livestock. Millions of head of cattle, pigs, sheep, and poultry were raised. Ukrainian agriculture was highly mechanized; before the war there were 90,000 tractors and 31,000 harvesting combines operating in the fields.

Area and Population

131 In January 1939 the Ukrainian Republic had an area of about 469,700 square kilometres including 8,000 square kilometres in its

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1 The Sixteen Soviet Republics, Soviet News, London, 1945.

000 Soviet Union in 1939.

701 In the years before its reunion with the Ukrainian S.S.R. Western Ukraine was relatively undeveloped, as compared with the industrial and agricultural expansion which was taking place in the Ukraine itself. The backwardness of Western Ukraine before its incorporation into the Soviet Union is shown by the following table, which compares per person output in 1938 of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with that of Western Ukraine.

TABLE II

● 433 Per Person Output of Western Ukraine and of Ukrainian S.S.R., 1938

	Western Ukraine	Ukrainian S.S.R.
Electro power (kilowatt hours)	13.05	305
Cement (kilograms)	12.2	39.7
Bricks (pieces)	17.0	50.3
Sugar (kilograms)	5.9	58.9
Soap (kilograms)	0.5	2.58

Source : Planned Economy, State Planning Commission, Moscow, 1940.

Transfer to the U.S.S.R. of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina

728 On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Government communicated with the Rumanian Minister in Moscow concerning Bessarabia[1]. In 1918, said the communication, Rumania, "taking advantage of the military weakness of Russia....(seized) a part of her territory, namely, Bessarabia, which is principally occupied by Ukrainians..." The Soviet Government, never having recognized any justice in Rumania's claims to Bessarabia, demanded the immediate return of this territory to the Soviet Union. The communication also stated that "... the return of Bessarabia is organically connected with the question of the return to the Soviet Union of that part of the Bukovina the majority of whose population is connected with the Soviet Union not only through the community of their historic destinies but through the similarity of their language and national Constitutions".

It was therefore proposed that Northern Bukovina, as well as Bessarabia, should be given to the Soviet Union, and that the transfer should take place immediately. On June 27, 1940, after the Rumanian Government's acceptance of the Soviet Proposals, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were re-joined to the Ukrainian Republic. The total area of these two ceded territories was 50,400 square kilometres, of which 21,300 were added to the Ukraine, and 29,100 square kilometres were incorporated into the newly created Moldavian S.S.R.

1 The Bulletin of International News, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, July 13, 1940.

728 178 The progress in construction and rehabilitation which has taken place since the incorporation of this region into the Ukraine was revealed at a meeting of the Soviet of Nationalities on October 16, 1946, when the representative of the Transcarpathian Ukraine summed up the achievements in 1946. Nearly 300 enterprises had been restored, and nine machine and tractor stations had been set up to assist the peasants in working [212 the fields. Much had been done in 1946 to abolish illiteracy; there 871] were opened over 100 schools, including 75 elementary, seven technical, 27 secondary, four music schools for children, and one school for surgeons' assistants and midwives.

453 At the end of December it was stated that 35 new factories had started functioning in the Transcarpathian Region in 1946[1]. Moreover, as compared with 1945 when there was not a single coal mine, 8 mines were working in 1946. There had also been definite progress in building up consumer goods industries. A clothing and a shoe factory had began working in Vinogradov, and a knitted goods mill in Mukachevo. Some 200 light industries have been opened in various parts of the region.

Population of the Ukraine

162 The Ukraine is inhabited largely by Ukrainians, and also by Russians, Jews, and Poles. Most of the population is literate, and in 1939 there were many technical and vocational schools, as well as scientific research institutes and about 40,000 libraries.

At the census of January 17, 1939 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had 30,960,221 inhabitants; an increase of 6.6 per cent. as compared with December 1926. The greatest increase had occurred in the towns, largely as a result of the migration of country people to new industries. Thus from 1926 to 1939 the urban population more than doubled (5,373,553 to 11,195,620) while the number of rural inhabitants decreased by 16½ per cent. (23,669,381 to 19,764,601).

000 The same was true for the entire Soviet Union. From 147,027,915 in December 1926, its total population increased by 15.9 per cent. to 170,467,186 in January 1939, the urban population having grown from 26.3 million to 55.9 millions; and the rural population having fallen from 120.7 million to 114.5 million.

162 [361] The principal cities of the Ukraine with their population on January 17, 1939, are Kiev, the capital (population, 846,293); Kharkov, capital of the Ukraine before 1934 (833,432), the part of Odessa on the Black Sea (604,223), Dniepropetrovsk on the Dnieper River (500,662), Stalino, industrial centre of the Donets Basin (462,395), and Nikolayev (167,108).

In January 1939 the urban population of the Ukraine was 36.2 per

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, December 29, 1946.

727 by the German invaders in the Ukraine, and more than two million had been abducted to slavery in Germany. Of these so deported, a considerable number perished in captivity[1].

The figure of four million Soviet citizens murdered in the Ukraine does not clearly indicate whether all of them were Ukrainians or whether a certain percentage came from other parts of the Soviet Union. No figures have been revealed showing the number of the Ukrainians killed at the front against the German armies and their satellites. However, a comparison of the pre-war and present electorate figures for the Ukraine gives some indication of the decrease, at least of the adult population. On December 12, 1937, the Ukrainian electorate was about 17,540,000; in 1939 this number was increased by the addition of Western Ukraine, which on March 24, 1940, had more than five million voters. But nearly seven years later, in the elections of February 1947, despite the fact that part of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Transcarpathian Ukraine also had been added, the total electorate in the Ukrainian S.S.R. was only 21,545,000.

162 666

Damages to Industry and Agriculture

727 433 The damage which the Germans inflicted on the industry and farming of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics was tremendous, and far exceeded any comparable destruction in Western Europe.

[362] In the Ukraine the Germans destroyed or burned down 714 towns and more than 28,000 hamlets and villages, destroyed more than two million buildings and 540,000 outbuildings, and rendered about 10 million persons homeless (one-fourth of the Ukrainian population)[2].

Agriculture, animal husbandry, and industry were devastated. The coal mines were flooded. Over 16,150 industrial enterprises employing more than two million workers were stripped of machinery and the buildings heavily damaged or destroyed. The Germans wrecked or took away 127,800 electric motors and 81,600 metal-cutting lathes, destroyed railway lines and stations, and post and telegraph offices[2].

727 433 241 Tremendous damage was done to Ukrainian agriculture. The Germans ruined and plundered collective farms, state farms and machine and tractor stations.

Millions of hectares of planned fields were destroyed and over 56,000 tractors wrecked. Nearly 1,900,000 agricultural machines and 30,000 automobiles and other motor vehicles were destroyed or taken to Germany[3].

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1 Soviet News, London, June 29, 1946.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

3 Letter to UNRRA from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

727 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport
433 are to be rebuilt; the mining of coal is to regain and then to outstrip the pre-war output; the production of machinery and equipment for both light and heavy industry is to be restored; and to do this, iron and steel production is to be increased until it surpasses pre-war. War damaged power stations are to be rehabilitated, and additional ones are to be constructed, particularly in smaller communities.

[185] Altogether the output of industrial enterprises in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is envisaged at 9,200 million roubles, of which the output of state industries under local jurisdiction and of industrial co-operatives is estimated to comprise 3,100 million roubles[1].

The volume of industrial production in the whole U.S.S.R. in 1950 - that is, the last year of the Five-Year Plan - is fixed at 205,000 million roubles (in 1926-27 prices). Compared with 138,500 million roubles in 1940, this represents an increase in industrial output of 48 per cent.

727 Particular stress in the Five-Year Plan is laid on the development
433 of the Western Ukraine and the Transcarpathian Region. Lvov, the main
361 city of the Western Ukraine, is to be developed into a major industrial centre, where there are to be built and put into operation an automobile assembly plant, electrical, telephone, and telegraph-equipment manufacturing plants, a glass works, a knitting mill, and food processing plants.

In the Transcarpathian Region, new light industry plants are to be constructed, and the mining of brown coal (lignite) is to be organized and extended. Provision is to be made for the rehabilitation and development of the woodworking and wood chemical industries and of farming, particularly fruit-growing, viticulture, livestock breeding and apiculture, [652] as well as of the food processing industries. The farms of the Transcarpathian Region are to be given considerable state assistance in the form of agricultural machines, fertilizers, and credits.

000 A more detailed discussion of the Five-Year Plan in connection with farming and the various industries follows in later sections of this report.

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[475] It must be remembered that a number of enterprises although situated in the Ukrainian Republic are not under the Republic's jurisdiction, but under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union Government.

II FARMING IN THE UKRAINE: PRE-WAR AND PRESENT

241 433 The Ukraine - famous for its mild climate and rich black soil - has always assumed a role of considerable importance in the agricultural production of the Soviet Union. For example in 1937-38 it produced one-fifth of the grain, two-thirds of the sugar-beet, and one-sixth of the potatoes harvested in the whole U.S.S.R. The chief grain crops of the Ukraine are wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize and millet. A considerable amount of sunflower seed is produced for processing into oil; small quantities of linseed and mustard seed are also produced for the same purpose. Other industrial crops, particularly flax, hemp, a little cotton and the rubber-bearing dandelion, "kok-sagyz" (discovered in 1931), were also cultivated extensively in the Ukraine before the war.

The following table shows the area and production of the principal Ukrainian crops in 1928, 1932 and 1937; figures for production in the entire Soviet Union are included for comparison.

TABLE IV

Ukraine: Pre-War Agricultural Production
(area in million hectares, production in million metric tons)

	Ukrainian S.S.R. Area	Ukrainian S.S.R. Production	Entire Soviet Union Production
Wheat			
1928	3.1	3.34	22.11
1932	5.743	5.6	20.31
1937	6.433	10.08	46.86
Other grain			
1928	16.6	10.55	50.73
1932	12.381	9.06	49.48
1937	11.761	12.69	73.43
Sugar beet			
1928	.647	8.42	10.13
1932	1.174	4.28	9.645
1937	.817	14.44	21.86
Cotton			
1928	nil	nil	.824
1932	.181	.03	1.28
1937	.224	.12	2.58
Potatoes			
1928	1.4	10.21	46.38
1932	1.071	7.72	43.07
1937	1.338	11.9	65.63

Source: Compiled from Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1936 and 1939; Sown Areas of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1939,; and Socialist Agriculture, Moscow, 1939.

TABLE VI

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Transcarpathian Ukraine: Area and Production of Crops in 1937

	Hectares	Average yield in metric tons per hectare	Total production in metric tons
Wheat	31,476	0.7	20,796
Rye	25,679	0.62	13,773
Barley	3,331	0.48	1,396
Oats	30,527	0.45	13,124
Potatoes	46,253	8.72	397,347
Sugar beet	96	23.86	2,291

Source: Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovak Republic, London.

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The Organization of Farming in the U.S.S.R.

It may be well at this point to outline briefly the methods of farm organization which characterize the Soviet Union.

The Collective Farms (kolkhozes)

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The foremost agricultural problems of the Soviet Union have been to increase the area under cultivation, to improve the methods of production, to raise yields per hectare as well as total production, and from this increased production, to ensure that adequate supplies of food reach the towns and factories. The primary means of achieving these aims was the organization of individual peasant farms into collectives (kolkhozes). By 1932, the end of the first Five Year Plan, this transformation was largely completed.

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During the second and third Five Year periods the policy of using the most modern methods of scientific farming in the kolkhozes was continued. Thousands of tractors, threshing machines, combines, mowing machines, binders, and other large machines were produced for use on the collective farms, and were concentrated by the government in Machine and Tractor Stations (M.T.S.), which served the kolkhozes for a legally fixed fee, paid in kind.

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The M.T.S. are now a well-known feature of Soviet farming. They have their own workshops and staffs of mechanics and farm-hands. The average equipment of an M.T.S.[1] before the war was 84 tractors (approximately 15 h.p.), 22 combine harvesters, 14 threshers, and a proportionate number of ploughs, harrows, drills, etc. Each M.T.S. works for a group of kolkhozes, usually about 30, and carries out all the mechanized agricultural work (ploughing, sowing, harvesting, threshing, etc.). Apart from these mechanical services, the M.T.S. gives qualified advice on rotation, technique, financial matters, etc.

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1 What Are Collective Farms, V.A. Karpinski; Lindsay Drummond, London.

SU The State Farms (sovkhozes)

475 After the revolution, when the large holdings were broken up, a
242 certain number of well-organized estates were preserved as model agricultural stations. These were subsequently turned into State Farms (sovkhozes), the purposes of which was to experiment with seed selection, plant and livestock breeding, fertilizers, etc. The sovkhozes, operating with hired labour, turned over to the government all their pro-
SU duction above the requirements of the sovkhoz workers.

[407] To an even greater extent than the collective farms the State Farms were mechanized. They had the best technical equipment and, compared with the kolkhozes, twice the concentration of tractors per hectare. The sovkhoz workers received wages at specially worked out rates: they had the use of living quarters, dining rooms, and educational and enter-
SU tainment facilities.

[433] The State Farms achieved good results in raising production, both of grain and of industrial crops.

SU
474 However, the basic form of agricultural organisation in the U.S.S.R.
475 continued to be the collective farms, which supplied the bulk of food
311 and agricultural raw materials for industry.

372 At the beginning of the third Five Year Plan (1938), there were in the Soviet Union 242,000 collective farms (kolkhozes) embracing 91 per cent. of all the land under cultivation. The kolkhozes had 117.2 million hectares of arable land; the 3,960 State Farms (sovkhozes) had 12.4 million hectares;[1] and 1.5 million individual farmers had 900,000 hectares of arable land.[2]

Collective Farms in the Ukraine

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474 In 1938 the Ukraine contained almost one-ninth of the collective
311 farms in the Soviet Union (27,393 out of 242,392). The total area
433 occupied by the Ukrainian kolkhozes was 34.9 million hectares, of which about 61 per cent. was under cultivation. Like the kolkhozes in other Republics, the Ukrainian collectives made giant strides in the years between 1932-38: they increased in number, from 25,000 to 27,393; they increased their area of cultivation from 18.9 million to 21.4 million hectares;[3] but the greatest increase was in productivity, as the following table shows.

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1 Although the area of the sovkhozes extended to 68 million hectares, the tilled acreage amounted to only 12.4 million hectares.

2 The Socialist Agricultural Economy of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1939

3 In the Ukraine as a whole, however, the cultivated area declined from 26.4 million hectares in 1932 to 25.6 million in 1938.

TABLE VII

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Average Yields of Grain on Ukrainian Collective Farms
(metric tons per hectare)

	Ukraine Average pre-world war I 1901-13	Ukrainian Collectives Average 1932-34	1937-39	1939
Winter rye	0.98	0.83	1.20	1.15
Winter wheat	1.04	0.93	1.43	1.59
Summer wheat	0.70	0.73	0.76	1.03
Summer barley	0.93	0.93	1.26	1.52
Oats	1.07	0.87	1.12	1.23
Millet	0.99	0.61	1.0	1.16
Buckwheat	0.68	0.50	0.58	1.50
Maize	1.11	0.93	1.5	1.57
Average all grains	0.91	0.85	1.23	1.36

Source: Speech delivered by N. Kruschev[1], Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, cited in Agriculture in 1940, A. Mortunov, Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940/II.

In the entire Soviet Union the average yield of grain crops increased from 0.7 tons per hectare in 1930 to 0.97 tons per hectare in 1938.

The development of agriculture in the collective farms of the Ukrainian S.S.R. from 1934-38 is further illustrated by the following table, which shows the area under cultivation, yield per hectare and gross output of the principal crops in 1938, all in percentages of 1934.

1 Now Premier of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

TABLE VIII

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Productivity of Ukrainian Collective Farms in 1938
(expressed in percentage of 1934)

	Area under cultivation	Yield per hectare	Gross output
Grain	88.0	176.0	157
Sugar beet	98.0	164.0	161
Sunflower	89.0	208.0	171
Flax	126.0	140.0	290
Cotton	146.0	671.0	986

Source: J. Stotsenko "Productivity of Work in Collective Farms in the Ukrainian S.S.R." Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940/I.

As the table shows, the area under cultivation of grain, sugar beet, and sunflowers decreased somewhat; however, average yields per hectare and total production were increased by 75 to 100 per cent. This increase in productivity was brought about by improved cultivation methods: the use of selected seeds, chemical fertilizers, more scientific crop rotation and above all, by the greater mechanization of labour. As we have seen, the Ukraine had in 1938 nearly a thousand Machine and Tractor Stations, as compared with 657 in 1932. The effect of mechanization in the collectives is best shown by the fact that whereas in 1932 the M.T.S. cultivated 77.1 per cent. of the arable area of the Ukrainian kolkhozes, by 1937 they were serving 98.8 per cent. of the collectives' entire arable land.

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Since 1938 (the last year in which comprehensive agricultural statistics for the U.S.S.R. were published) there has been little information available about agricultural production in the Soviet Union. The figures which have been made public emerge from press or conference reports, and the information is usually very scanty. The immediate pre-war picture is therefore not clear.

We do have, however, the planned 1941 area of cultivation in the U.S.S.R., as well as the percentage of increase over 1940. From these figures we can estimate the sown areas in 1940, as the following tables show.

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TABLE IX

U.S.S.R.: Planned Area of Principal Crops, 1941

	Planned area 1941 in million hectares	Per cent. increase on 1940
Grain	111.1	0.2
Industrial crops	12.0	1.7
Vegetables, melons, potatoes	11.4	12.9
Fodder crops	22.5	24.3
Total	157.0	3.9

Source: Report of N. Voznesensky, Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. delivered on February 18, 1941, at the Eighteenth All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Using these figures as a basis, we have the following areas for 1940.

TABLE X

U.S.S.R.: Area Sown in 1940
(in million hectares)

Grain	110.9
Industrial crops	11.79
Vegetables, melons, potatoes	10.1
Fodder crops	18.1
Total	150.89

Source: Calculated on the basis of Table IX.

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Although we do not have similar figures for the Ukrainian S.S.R. alone, we do know that in 1940, 612,000 hectares were sown to sunflower, and 764,000 to sugar beet. The harvest of sugar beet amounted to 14.8 million tons (an average of 19.4 tons per hectare). In the same year the harvest of grain was over 28 million tons, and of potatoes, 21.5 million tons.[1]

1 Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

241 433 In comparing these figures with 1937 production the increases in the area of the Republic must be borne in mind.

Effects of the War on Ukrainian Farming

727 241 474 When the German armies were finally driven out of the Ukraine in 1944 they left most of the Republic's farmsteads completely in ruins. So great was the devastation which they wrecked that even today the full extent of it is not definitely known. It has been estimated by Ukrainian officials, however, that the invaders ruined and plundered 27,110[1] of the Ukraine's collective farms and 872[1] of the state farms, burning the buildings and wrecking or stealing the machinery. The Germans also wrecked over 422,000 collective farm buildings and 425,000 privately owned farm buildings[2], scorched and laid waste millions of hectares of farm land, and destroyed 1,500[1] machine and tractor stations. The consequent losses of machinery were enormous. Fifty-six thousand tractors, 24,000 harvester combines, 30,200 trucks and automobiles used in farming and 1,892,000 other agricultural machines were destroyed or stolen by the Germans. The next table shows the losses compared with pre-war numbers.

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1 Statement by Mr. I.S. Senin, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. at a meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers on February 7, 1947, published in Soviet News, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Department of UNRRA Supplies of the Ukrainian Government, Kiev, April 6, 1946.

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Nevertheless, the 1945 harvest - assisted by lend-lease supplies which were still then available, and (beginning in December 1945) by UNRRA relief deliveries - was furnishing the population a fair amount of cereals and bread. There was, however, very little meat from domestic sources, and only a small amount of fats and oils, as the following table shows.

TABLE XII

Ukraine: Production and Utilization of Fats and Oils, 1945.
(thousand metric tons)

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Oilseeds		
Production		
Total production of oilseeds		496.4
Deduction for seed		53.6
Available for processing		442.8
Utilization		
[388] Total production of oil		105.8
Deduction for industrial use (soap manufacture, etc.)		26.7
Available for human consumption		
by urban population	29.0	
by rural population	50.0	
Total		79.1
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
urban population		2.41
rural population		1.86
Average		1.98

[p2 87]

TABLE XII (Continued)

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Animal fat

Production		74.7
Imports		12.5[1]
Available for consumption		
by urban population	32.7	
by rural population	54.5	
Total		87.2
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
by urban population		2.73
by rural population		2.0
Average		2.19

Summary (Oils and Fats)

All fat and oil resources			
Vegetable oils		105.8	
Animal fats		74.7	
Total production		180.5	
Imports		12.5[1]	
Available for distribution		193.0	
Consumption			
Technical purposes		26.7	
Food			
Urban	61.7		
Rural	104.6		
Total food		166.3	
Total consumption		193.0	
Average consumption			Kilograms per person per year
by urban population			5.14
by rural population			3.86
Average			4.17

1 Available from Lend-lease

Source: Ukrainian Department of UNRRA Supplies, Kiev, May 15, 1946.

433 As the table shows, the Ukrainian people received in 1945 only 4
262 to 5 kilograms of fats - 8 to 18 kilograms less than their pre-war
388 annual consumption rate.

Disaster in 1946

433 Early in 1946 other UNRRA supplies in addition to food began to
241 arrive - seeds, small quantities of fertilizers, and a few farm tools.
648 Throughout the Ukraine great efforts were being made for a successful spring sowing. However, there were still shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, and machinery. None of the 1,600 tractors promised by UNRRA had arrived. Much of the work was still being done by hand, especially where no draught animals were available.

[311] Even despite these drawbacks, it is estimated that about 80 per cent. of the pre-war area was sown; but no figures are available on the acreage planted to individual crops. In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission, describing the difficulties in getting detailed agricultural statistics, stated:

> "....During a recent inspection trip we were informed by the agricultural authorities of the Poltava oblast,[1] one of the best agricultural regions in the Ukraine, that they did not even try to set production goals for their collective farms this year (1946); they simply told each farm to plant as much as possible of whatever crops it could raise with the seed, equipment, draught animals, and manpower available. (For example) We believe that nobody really knows with any degree of accuracy what acreage was planted to oil seeds in the Ukraine this year, what yield may be expected, or how much of the resulting oil will be available for non-farm use."

433 The Ukrainian people set high hopes on the 1946 harvest. However,
241 in the very summer when a good crop would have made all the difference,
648 the greatest drought since 1891 destroyed their prospects. It affected a vast area from Moldavia to the Urals, south to the Kuban and north to Moscow. The earth was parched; and the crops, burnt by the hot summer sun, had little to draw upon because rain and snowfall in the winter of 1945-46 had been poor. Hopes withered with the wheat. The potato crop too was affected: a hot wind out of Asia dried the plants, and dwarfed the tubers.

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1 Oblast: a district similar, for administrative purposes, to a county.

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433 During all this time the livestock of the Ukraine (see next
231 Section), was being slowly and laboriously built up by gifts from the
262 rest of the Union, by levies on Germany, and by natural increase.
731 Meat was very scarce, since no-one was willing to slaughter and further deplete the slender herds. Cows, used for draught purposes, gave little milk. Now added to these intense shortages of meat, fat and dairy products was another great deficiency of cereals and bread, hitherto the mainstay of the Ukrainian post-war diet.

U
241 The 1946 harvest cannot, at the most optimistic estimate, be
433 reckoned at more than 40 per cent. of 1940 in cereals and vegetables
231 per hectare sown.[1] There is no fodder for the jealously guarded animals; shelter for them is also very scarce since the people themselves are only now moving out of dugouts. If the animals are slaughtered, the small supplies of dairy products and meat will soon disappear; and the problem of draught power will remain as acute as ever.

U
241 There is an agricultural dilemma in the Ukraine which a good
433 harvest would have gone far to break. Although extensive and con-
464 tinued demobilizations have been taking place, there is a great shortage of labour on the farms.[2] If manpower is taken from the farms to help produce the machinery necessary to liberate further men from the land, there may not be enough farm workers left to produce sufficient food for the factory workers. The poor harvest has aggravated this vicious circle.

The Soviet Government has attempted in various ways to meet this problem not only in the Ukraine, but throughout the Union. Everyone who is able to work does so; young people, old people, women. The
U women who worked during the war have remained part of the labour force in both industry and agriculture, and an increasing number are being
[462] recruited. In the Ukraine in 1946, women composed at least 60 - 70 per cent. of the farm working force.

SU
[464 At the same time as steps are being taken to concentrate more
241] workers in agriculture, the organization of the collective farms is
474 being overhauled and geared to higher efficiency. To accomplish this,
647 the Soviet Council of Ministers created on September 19, 1946, a Collective Farm Council, whose main tasks will be to elaborate measures for the improvement of collective farming. This Council which is authorized to call conferences of collective farm representatives when necessary, was set up for the purpose of "establishing strict control over the observation of collective farm statutes and for the solution
000 of questions of the collective farm structure." One of their primary

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1 One must also bear in mind the reduced area under cultivation.

2 The war losses are felt very acutely.

The Five-Year Plan in Ukrainian Agriculture

185 311 474 According to the Five-Year Plan 1946-50 the crop area of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is to reach 30.5 million hectares, of which 21.3 million are to be planted on the collective farms. The distribution of major crops is planned as follows.

TABLE XIII

Ukraine: Crop Area in 1950 (Planned)
(hectares)

	Total area	Including on the collective farms
Grain crops	19,600,000	14,100,000
Industrial crops	2,600,000	2,200,000
Melons, potatoes, and other vegetables	2,800,000	1,000,000
Fodder crops	5,400,000	4,000,000

Source: The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

The area sown to sugar beet in 1950 is fixed at 830,000 hectares, and to sunflower, 801,000 hectares. The hopfields are to be rehabilitated, and the area of vineyards growing European varieties of grapes is to be expanded. Measures are to be taken to drain 40,000 hectares and irrigate 30,000 hectares of farm land; and all engineering work needed to ensure normal production is to be restored.

241 433 185 Average yields of Ukrainian crops in 1950 are envisaged as follows: grain, 1.42 tons per hectare (compare 1939 average 1.36); flax, 0.42 tons; sugar beet, 19 tons; and potatoes, 11.2 tons per hectare.[1]

In the entire Soviet Union in 1950 the grain harvest is planned at 127 million tons, of which the Ukraine is to produce 27.8 million tons, or more than one-fifth. The Ukraine's sugar beet harvest is fixed at 15.7 million tons, representing over 60 per cent. of the sugar beet harvest of the U.S.S.R. in 1950. The production of potatoes is expected to be 23 million tons.

The following table compares these targets with pre-war production.

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1 Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

TABLE XIV

185 Ukraine: Planned Production in 1950 Compared with 1940 and 1913 (see Note)
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(million metric tons)

	1913	1940	1950
Grain	20	28	27.8
Sugar beet	8.9	14.8	15.7
Potatoes	about 5[1]	21.5	23

1 According to the report in Pravda, the potato harvest in 1940 was "over 4 times" that of 1913.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

[728] Note: In comparing the 1950 target figures with pre-war production it is important to bear in mind the territorial revisions which occurred in the Ukraine after 1939, when she regained Western Ukraine and part of Bessarabia, lost a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic (which, together with the Moldavian Section of Bessarabia, then became a separate Union Republic), and added Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathian Ukraine.

[731] Thus the present area of the Ukraine exceeds its 1938 area by approximately 118,000 kilometres (11,800,000 hectares). However, we do not know precisely how much of this is agricultural land. The arable land in Western Ukraine before the war amounted to 4 million hectares; that of Transcarpathian Ukraine, to 239,000 hectares. In the parts of Bessarabia and Bukovina which were ceded to the Soviet Union, 3,285,800 hectares were classified as arable. If we roughly divide this between Moldavia and the Ukraine in proportion to the total ex-Rumanian area incorporated in each, about 1,300,000 hectares of agricultural land would have been added to the Ukraine in its share of Bessarabia; and the arable area of present-day Ukraine would exceed the 1937 cultivated area by about 5½ million hectares, the potential total being 30.6 million. The fact that the Five-Year Plan fixes the Ukraine's 1950 area of cultivation at 30.5 million hectares seems to support this assumption.

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Livestock

231 In 1941 the number of livestock in the Ukraine was estimated at 30.4 million, including 10.5 million cattle and 4.6 million horses.[1]

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1 Statement on March 20, 1946, by Mr. Baranovsky, Ukrainian delegate to the UNRRA Fourth Council Session, published in the "UNRRA Journal", March 21, 1946.

III INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT

135 311 433 Ukrainian industry is based chiefly on rich deposits of coal in the Donets Basin, iron ore in the Krivoi Rog district (where the ore contains 60 per cent. metal), and manganese ore in the Nikopol area. To utilize this great natural wealth a very large metallurgical and machine-building industry has been bult up in the Ukraine. At the same time, many food factories including sugar refineries, have been created to process the food so abundantly produced by Ukrainian farms. In the period between wars, the share of the Ukraine in the country's industrial output declined somewhat, not because of slackened activity - on the contrary, Ukrainian industry continued to be even more intensively developed - but because the policy of the U.S.S.R. was to decentralize, and to expand and develop those areas, particularly the eastern ones which previously had no industry. This lengthening of the industrial pace naturally brought about a certain change in emphasis, so that whereas by 1938 the productivity of Soviet industry as a whole had increased to about eight times the output of Tsarist Russia in 1913; the proportion of Ukrainian output in the total was lessened. For example, in 1928 the Krivoi Rog district of the Ukraine produced 78 per cent. of all the iron ore in the U.S.S.R.; but in 1937, although this district was producing more, its share in the total was only 47 per cent.

War Damage to Industry

727 433 Before they were finally driven from the Ukraine the Germans furiously set about wrecking those Ukrainian industries which still survived. They stripped the plants of equipment and destroyed the buildings; they flooded the coal mines; they completed the destruction of the famous Lenin Hydro-Electric Power Station and the Dnieper Dam - both of which had been partially disabled by the retreating Soviet Army troops on August 28, 1941.

The damage to all branches of industry was tremendous and will take many years to repair, particularly since the shortages of labour and equipment, as well as the scarcity of food have been a hindrance at every step. Some of the difficulties were destribed in a report of the UNRRA Mission after visits to several of the larger Ukrainian cities in May 1946.

"In our cable...we outlined the condition and needs of industrial plants in six principal Ukrainian cities visited by members of the Mission during May. The pattern is fairly uniform. Many plants were completely destroyed and those which still stood were usually heavily damaged and almost universally gutted of all modern equipment. Included among those industries hardest hit are the heavy capital goods industries, machine tool manufacturing industries, and power stations, as well as the rolling and stationary stock of all forms of transportation, and equipment for processing building materials. So great is

727 the destruction that there are competing calls upon the limited
433 supplies of manpower, equipment and materials. We observed many instances of ingenious adaptation and salvaging of old and antiquated machinery; yet restoration was everywhere slow and complicated by lack of equipment to move away the rubble, transport the materials, produce the electric energy, and repair the streets, sewers, and gas and electric lines. There is a vicious circle. Iron and steel, for example, are needed to repair electric power stations and rebuild houses; efforts to restore these basic industries and facilities are constantly delayed because there is not enough shelter; and neither shelter nor the industries and community facilities can be replaced until there are more cranes, tractors and trucks. Low-calorie diets, induced by lack of foodstuffs, cause low efficiency and slow production. The food UNRRA is shipping has sustained the people, though, to be sure, it has not been sufficient to compensate for local shortages; the country may somewhat accelerate its industrial rehabilitation - especially of shelter and water supplies - when the equipment items on the UNRRA programme arrive. Meanwhile it is slowly restoring those parts of its economy which will respond to manpower aided by a minimum amount of mechanical equipment."

Industrial Aims of the Five-Year Plan

185 The great importance of rehabilitating Ukrainian industry and the
727 share which Ukrainian industry has to take in the entire Soviet Union economy are shown by the new Five-Year Plan.

By comparing the aims for 1950 with pre-war production figures, it is possible to have some impression of the destruction which occurred in the Ukraine during the war.

The table which follows shows the planned ratio of Ukrainian output in 1950 to the output of the entire Soviet Union. Where possible, pre-war figures have been included.

TABLE XVIII

Share of Ukrainian Industry in Total Soviet Production

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1940

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. total	Ukraine (per cent. of total)
	(thousand metric tons)		
Pig iron	9,200	14,900	61
Steel	8,600	18,400	47
Coal	83,800	164,600	51
Tractors (units)	n.a.	176,000[1]	n.a.
Locomotives (units)	880[2]	1,214[2]	72[2]
Sugar	1,790[2]	2,378[2]	75[2]

1950 (planned)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. total	Ukraine (per cent. of total)
	(thousand metric tons)		
Pig iron	9,700	19,500	49.7
Steel	8,800	25,400	34.6
Coal	86,100	250,000	34.4
Tractors (units)	25,000	112,000	22.3
Locomotives (units)	1,000	2,720	40.0
Sugar	1,637	2,400	68.2
Metallurgical equipment	n.a.	n.a.	33.9

1 1938 figure
2 1937 figures

Note: n.a. means not available.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, September 1, 1946; The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50; Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace, A. Yugov, C.A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London, 1941.

Progress in 1946

At the beginning of 1947 the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. issued a statement describing the progress in rehabilitation and development made during 1946. According to this statement the gross output of industry in the entire U.S.S.R. increased by 20 per cent. in 1946 as compared with 1945. About 800 government enterprises had been built, restored, or launched during the year. Navigation was opened on restored canals. A series of steps were also taken in 1946 to expand Soviet trade and consolidate the currency. Wages and salaries of low and medium-paid workers were raised.

SU
464 The number of workers and employees in the national economy of the
874 U.S.S.R. increased by 3 million. Vocational schools and factory training centres graduated thousands of skilled workers, and improved the skill of several millions already employed.

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727 Of the districts which suffered occupation, economic rehabilitation
433 as well as capital construction amounting to 17,500 million roubles in
652 1946 made it possible to increase their industrial output by 28 per cent. as compared with 1945. Pravda writes - "the factories, mills, pits, power stations, towns and villages which were destroyed by the enemy are being revived one by one...."[1]

In the Ukraine

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727 The Ukraine has been likened to one big building site, where more
433 than 500,000 workers are engaged in restoring industrial plants and
327 municipal buildings.[2] In the Donets Basin, the coal output of 1946 was 30 per cent. higher than that of 1945. In the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, 21 blast furnaces, 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries were at work by January 1947. Of 104 machine-building factories to be restored, 102 were already producing goods, and mastering the production of improved types of machinery. The Kharkov transport machine-building works was preparing to build long-distance steam engines; and the tractor works was increasing its production, as were many other factories.

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727 In 1946 the Kharkov turbo-generator works made a 100,000 kilowatt
433 turbine and one of 50,000 kilowatts. At Dniepropetrovsk, a lorry
393 factory was being built; and in Odessa and Lvov, automobile assembly
398 works were under construction. Great work was also being done in the development of light industry, food processing, chemical works, and other branches of industry.

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727 After three years' work of restoration the Dnieper Dam had been
433 rebuilt in the main, and the housing for the power station erected.
377 By the end of 1946 the capacity of Ukrainian power stations had reached 70 per cent. of pre-war.

U
362 Since the liberation over 104.5 million square feet of floor space
368 had been restored in the Ukraine. Over half a million of the 590,000 houses destroyed by the Germans were restored or built anew in Ukrainian villages; and more than 13,000 cultural institutions in the villages and 118,000 auxiliary buildings on the farms.[2]

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1 Pravda, quoted by Soviet News, London, January 22, 1946

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

Coal

316 The coal centre of the Ukraine is the basin of the Donets River,
433 a tributary of the Don. In 1913 the Donets region was producing 80 per cent. of all the coal turned out in the entire Russian Empire. (23 million tons of the 29.2 million total); and even in 1940, when the production of other coal areas in the U.S.S.R. had been greatly expanded, and many new areas explored and put into operation, Donets mines still accounted for more than half the total output (85.8 million tons of the entire Soviet Union production of 164.6 million).

Since about 70 per cent. of all the fuel consumed in the U.S.S.R. is supplied by coal,[1] the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian coal industry is of tremendous importance to the economy of the Soviet Union.

727 It is now over three years since the Soviet Army drove the Germans
346 out of the Donets Basin. Before their rout, the enemy flooded the mines and burned engineering plants, miners' settlements, and cities. Restoration work was started soon after the liberation of the Basin, but it was estimated that to restore coal output to the pre-war level it would be necessary to pump 650 million cubic metres of water out of the mines and to restore 1,565 miles of mine galleries.[2] Today, the towns of the Donets Basin are a mass of scaffolding, as war-devastated houses, buildings, and roads continue to be repaired. Mine derricks dot the landscape; and water is being pumped in a steady stream from the mine pits. At the Chelyuskin Mine which before the war was one of the biggest and best eqipped in the Donets, over nine million cubic metres of water had been pumped by the middle of December 1946; and about 20 miles of galleries had been restored. Coal output averaged a thousand tons a day.

By January 1947 about 142 major coal mines of the 279 operating prior to the war had been restored, and 430 smaller ones, rehabilitated or built anew, were in operation. Production was nearly half of pre-war.[3]

[362] As regards housing for Donets workers, it is planned within the next five years not only to restore the houses demolished by the Germans, but also to build another 20 million square feet of housing space in the Donets Basin; in 1946 alone over four million square feet of floor
[464] space had been reconstructed. Thousands of miners are being helped to build their own homes; and measures are being taken to increase their food supplies.

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1 Moscow Radio feature, "Sidelights on Soviet Life," cited in Soviet Monitor, London, January 29, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946

3 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947

Coal: Plans for the Future

185 Under the Five-Year Plan, the coal industry of the Ukraine is to
433 be speedily rehabilitated and further developed, so that by 1950 its
316 output will be 86,100,000 tons, including about 6 million tons of brown coal (lignite).[1] When it is remembered that this target is only 2.3 million tons over 1940 production, the enormous task of rehabilitation confronting the industry is made clear. The difficulties are even more accentuated if one compares the increase of coal production in three pre-war years, from 1937 to 1940, when output leaped from 70 million tons to 85.8 millions.

Plans for increasing the future coal output of the Ukraine include not only the restoration of old mines but also intensive prospecting and the sinking of many new shafts.

"Between 1946-50, coal mines with an aggregate capacity of 77,500,000 tons are to be put into operation in the Stalino and Voroshilovgrad regions of the Ukrainian S.S.R.[2]"; and coal fields in other areas are to be further developed. In particular there are to be put into operation in the Donets Basin and in the western regions of the Ukraine, small coal mines and drifts with a total capacity of 4,600,000 tons of coal, and peat briquette plants with a capacity of 50,000 tons.

The lignite mining industry is to be developed and by 1950 is expected to supply annually some 6 million tons of coal. Five lignite mines operating in the Ukraine in 1946 increased their output in October by three times as compared with April.

135 Large coal supplies are expected from the regions west of the
654 Dnieper, where 11 promising coal deposits are located. Prospecting is in progress there, as well as in the Zloshev, Krenenets, and Kolomya areas of Western Ukraine, where 28 shafts had been sunk by November 1946.[3]

Industrial lignite deposits have also been found in an area of four square miles between Slavgarod and Sinolhikovo (near Dniepropetrovsk) and in the Transcarpathian region.

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1 The coal output of the entire Soviet Union in 1950 is fixed at 250 million tons.

2 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

3 Soviet Monitor, London, November 21, 1946.

727 In August 1941 the retreating Soviet army troops partially disabled
377 the Dnieper Dam and power station to prevent its falling into enemy hands. This destruction was later completed by the Germans. When the Soviet Army recaptured the region, they found that 35 of the dam's 48 piers had been blown up, and all the generators destroyed. Damage to the power house alone was estimated at 500,000,000 roubles.

Reconstruction work began in February 1944, when the war was still on. Three years later the assembly of the first power unit of 72,000 kilowatt capacity was completed; and on March 3, 1947, the Lenin Hydro-electric Station supplied its first post-war currency to the industry of the Dnieper Valley.

There are over 11,000 men and women engaged on the restoration job, which has involved repairing the dam and the underwater structures, building the housing for the power station, and mounting the machines. Another two power units are to be assembled later this year.

After the expulsion of the Germans from the Ukraine, the capacity of the Republic's power stations was only 0.4 per cent. of pre-war. By the end of August 1946 restored capacity had reached 47 per cent. In the Donets Basin 70 per cent. had been restored, and in the Stalino area, 79 per cent. In the city of Lvov (Western Ukraine) the pre-war capacity of its electric power stations had been surpassed by 18 per cent. In the first seven months of 1946 much had been accomplished: some 400 power stations, including 215 hydro-electric plants, had been launched in the Ukraine; and it was expected that 750 more power stations would be completed by the end of the year.

The Five-Year Plan fixes the 1950 output of electric power in the Ukraine at 13,690 million kilowatt hours. The total capcity of Ukrainian power stations is to be increased in 1946-50 by 2,57[illegible],000 kilowatts. The Five-Year Plan directs that:-

"The Lenin Hydro-electric Station on the Dnieper shall be rebuilt. Small hydro-electric power plants with a total capacity of 203,000 kilowatts shall be built to meet the requirements of agriculture and local consumers. Plant aggregating 95,000 kilowatts shall be put into operation at municipal electric power stations."

The restoration of electric power facilities will assist greatly in rehabilitating other sections of the Soviet economy

Iron and Steel

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327 The Five-Year Plan for the Ukrainian S.S.R. envisages an output in 1950 of 9.7 million tons of pig iron, and 8.8 million tons of steel.
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In order to accomplish this, the iron and steel plants of the Donets Basin and the Dnieper region are to be rehabilitated; and there are to be put into operation 30 blast furnaces with an aggregate annual capacity of 9 million tons of pig-iron, steel smelting units with a

[185] 327 433

capacity of 8.4 million tons of steel, and 58 rolling mills with a capacity of 6.5 million tons of finished rolled goods.

In view of the enormous destruction of industry during the war, these aims are heroic, because they in fact mean that for five years the Ukrainian iron and steel industry will be striving to regain and then even to exceed, the production of 1940. This is shown by the following table, which gives the pre-war output of iron ore, manganese ore, pig-iron, and steel, as well as the planned output of the latter two in 1950. Figures for the U.S.S.R. as a whole are also included for comparison.

TABLE XIX

Ukraine: Production of Pig Iron and Steel
(thousand metric tons)

Year	Iron ore		Manganese ore	
	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.
1928	4,671	5,700	531	1,200
1932	7,925	12,100	443	1,400
1937	16,414	26,000	957	2,000

Year	Pig iron		Steel	
	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Whole U.S.S.R.
1928	2,361	3,300	2,409	4,300
1932	3,911	6,200	3,128	5,900
1937	8,801	14,500	8,467	17,700
1940	9,200	14,900	8,600	18,400
1950 (Planned)	9,700	19,500	8,800	25,400

Note: 1940 figures not available for iron ore and manganese ore.

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace, A. Yugov, C.A. Watts and Co.Ltd., and The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50.

As the table shows, areas of the Soviet Union other than the Ukraine are expected considerably to increase their production during the next several years. This, as well as the complete revival of Ukrainian plants, is particularly necessary to rebuild the transport system, and to replace tractors, machinery, and farm implements which were either stolen or destroyed during the war.

Heavy Industry Building in 1947.[1]

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727 Reconstruction and building will be on a wider scale in 1947, as many improvements are introduced. Mechanization is being extended in blast furnaces, open-hearths, and metal-rolling shops; and ore and coal stores are being equipped with modern cranes.

In the Donets Basin in 1947 the Stalino Metal Works are to put into operation another blast furnace, martin oven and rolling mill.[2] At the Azovstal works the two blast furnaces of 1,000 cubic metres each will be enlarged to 1,300 cubic metres. Also at the Azovstal works, which in the past did not produce any rolled metal, are being built a blooming mill, which will be the largest in the south, and a rolling mill. New blooming mills and rail rolling mills are also to start at the Petrovsky works in Dniepropetrovsk, and at the Dzerzhinsky works in Dnieprodzerzhinsk. New pipe-rolling workshops will be added at the Nikopol Yuzhno-Trubny and the Dniepropetrovsk works.

At the Zaporozhstal works in 1947 several workshops will be added; and a power station and a 1,300 cubic metre blast furnace will begin working in the first half of the year. Among the most urgent tasks at this plant is the reconstruction of machines producing sheet metal for automobile production.

Equipment for Iron and Steel Mills

According to the new Five-Year Plan, the Ukrainian output of equipment for iron and steel mills in 1950 has been fixed at 35,000 tons; the total production of the entire Soviet Union has been fixed at 102,900 tons (of which 66,700 are to be produced by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic).

Production of Tractors

727 Before the war there were about 90,000 tractors in operation on
407 Ukrainian farms. During the occupation, 56,000 of these were wrecked
433 or stolen by the Germans, who also completely destroyed the well-known tractor factory at Kharkov. Because of the particularly great need of tractors in the Ukraine, this factory was rebuilt with great vigour; and production resumed. By February 1947 the Kharkov Tractor Works had produced 3,000 tractors since the restoration of the plant.

The 1950 output of tractors in the Ukraine is expected to be 25,000; for the entire Soviet Union, production has been fixed at 112,000 tractors.

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1 See U.S.S.R. Deputy Minister for the Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, Radio Moscow, February 3, 1947, B.B.C. Digest of World Broadcasts No. 2784, London, February 5, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 2, 1947.

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Chemical Industry

The chemical industry of the Ukraine is based chiefly on coal deposits, but also on a number of other raw materials to be found there, including lacustrine deposits of sodium chloride (Artornovsk area) and phosphatic rocks (Konstantinovka area).

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The Five-Year Plan fixes that:

"The chemical plants of the Ukraine, including soda, nitrate, and superphosphate plants, shall be rebuilt, and the potash mines in the regions of Stanislav and Dragobych, and a new superphosphate plant, a paint and varnish plant and a plastics factory built.

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[654]

"In 1946-50 geological surveys shall be conducted with a view to locating commercial deposits of potassium salts to a total of 80 million tons, graphite to a total of 7.7 million tons, and gypsum to a total of 7 million tons."

Output in 1950 is fixed by the Plan as follows:

for the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Calcined soda	448,000 tons
Superphosphates	860,000 tons, and
Salt,	1,930,000 tons;

and for the entire Soviet Union:

Calcined soda	800,000 tons, and
Mineral fertilizers, superphosphates, nitrates and potash	5,100,000 tons.

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Light Industry[1]

By the end of 1946 the production of consumer goods in the U.S.S.R. had already revived considerably; output in the different branches ranged from 20 to 50 per cent. above 1945. Reconversion of the factories to peacetime production was largely completed; however, three big tasks remained: to complete the rehabilitation of all light industry enterprises wrecked by the Nazis; to replace the old or worn-out machinery; and to obtain an adequate supply of labour and materials.

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1 Soviet News, London, December 30, 1946, and February 6, 1947.

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A recent decree of the U.S.S.R.'s Council of Ministers was designed to assist the fulfilment of all these tasks. It puts light industries in the priority class for supplies of raw materials, fuel, electricity, manpower, and workers' housing; and it approves increases of capital investments in the textile industry from 5,900 million roubles to 7,300 million in 1946-50, and in light industry, from 2,180 to 2,900 million roubles in the same period.

As a result of these measures, consumer goods output by state-owned enterprises is expected to rise this year (1947) by 50 per cent. and the output of the co-operative societies will certainly increase as well.

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Light Industry Rebuilding in the Ukraine

By January 1947, 58 textile mills had been restored in the Ukraine. Work had been resumed at the Odessa and Surg textile factories; and the Kharkov textile mill had been restored and considerably expanded. Sometime this year a new textile mill is to be launched in the town of Stryia, Dragobych Region; and in the Izmail Region, the Tatar-Bunary mill will resume operations. Cotton mills are being built in Lvov, Kiev, and Chernovitsy.

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Sericulture has been restored in the Ukraine, where it was begun only ten years before the war. It is to be further developed under the Five-Year Plan, and in the next ten or fifteen years the Ukrainian Republic should become one of the leading silk-producing regions of the Soviet Union. A silk mill is being constructed at Darnitsa, and Kiev silk mills have delivered their first batch of silk.

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Pre-War Output of Cotton Cloths[1]

In 1937 the production of cotton cloths in the Ukrainian S.S.R. amounted to 7.1 million metres (1.2 per cent. of the total output of the Soviet Union), while in 1932, production was only 2.2 million metres (0.08 per cent. of the total Soviet Union production of cotton cloths). The cotton cloths production of the entire Soviet Union had risen from 2,694 million metres in 1932 to 3,447.7 million in 1937.

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Leather Footwear[1]

Leather footwear production in the Ukraine in 1937 was 31,228,000 pairs of shoes, (17.07 per cent. of the 182,916,000 pairs produced in the whole Soviet Union); while in 1932 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had turned out only 14,535,000 pairs (16.72 per cent. of the Soviet Union total: 86,949,000 pairs)

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1 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939.

Food Industries

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727 The damage suffered by the Soviet food industry during the German
25 occupation - not counting the destruction of livestock and crops - has
U been estimated at 17,000 million roubles. Restoration work was begun
727 while the war was still on, and by May 1947, 3,200 food factories had
25 been rebuilt. A fairly large proportion of these restored factories
433 must have been in the Ukraine, where, according to the Soviet Monitor[1] 1,600 out of 1,822 pre-war food factories had been restored by November 6, 1946. The rehabilitated factories had exceeded their 11 months' food output programme by production valued at 12 million roubles (146 million roubles over the corresponding period of 1945).

Sugar

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257 Before the war the output of sugar in the Ukraine was as follows.

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TABLE XX

Pre-War Sugar Production: Ukraine and U.S.S.R.
(metric tons)

Year	Soviet Union total	Ukrainian S.S.R.
1928	1,221,200	1,086,400
1932	826,800	559,700
1937	2,377,500	1,789,800

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; and Statistical Yearbooks of the League of Nations, Geneva, 1936 and 1939.

The Five-Year Plan establishes that in 1946-50 sugar refineries in the Ukraine shall be restored or built capable of handling upwards of 67,000 tons of sugar beet per day. By 1950, according to plan, the output of granulated sugar in the Ukraine will reach 1,637,000 tons, (in the entire Soviet Union, 2.4 million tons).

Forestry

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[311] In January 1935 the forest area of the Ukrainian S.S.R. was
313 3,845,000 hectares - about 0.5 per cent. of the forest area of the entire U.S.S.R.[2] The number of sawing frames in the Republic was 703 out of the Soviet Union total of 6,500 (total capacity, 18.4 million cubic metres).[3] Considering the relatively small forest

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1 November 11, 1946

2 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1936.

3 Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940, II.

648 to end) only 202,585 gross long tons of UNRRA supplies had arrived in
731 the Ukraine. These consisted mainly of foodstuffs (three-fourths of the entire tonnage); while slightly less than one-tenth was made up of clothing, textiles and footwear; and 67 tons were medical equipment. Despite the urgent need of agricultural and industrial supplies, only 15,336 and 13,249 tons respectively had reached the Ukraine by the end of June.

By the end of January 1947, UNRRA shipments to the Ukraine from all sources amounted to 407,125 gross long tons; and the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine reported that 372,796 tons of this had reached Soviet
[504] ports. Delays in shipments during December and January were greater than usual because the port of Odessa for the first time in many years was frozen over, and ships lay icebound for days.

The following table shows UNRRA shipments in comparison with the programme.

TABLE XXII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Programme (thousand U.S. dollars)	Shipments to January 31, 1946 (thousand U.S. dollars)	(gross long tons)
Food, feed, soap	100,189	94,587	287,519
Clothing, textiles, and footwear	16,856	16,801	15,095
Medical and sanitation	2,326	1,858	373
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088	14,403	29,070
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591	34,077	75,068
Totals	188,050	161,726	407,125

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Industrial Rehabilitation Supplies

731 As the table shows, 75,068 gross long tons of the total supplies
48 shipped by January 31 were industrial rehabilitation equipment. These supplies have, however, been extremely slow in arriving. Up to the
433 end of June 1946 only 13,249 gross long tons had reached the Ukraine, including United States army surplus equipment of about 20 electric power stations and generators, as well as some raw materials, chiefly rubber, tin, lead, copper and other metals, and welding electrodes. A small number of machines for use in automobile repair shops, and about 90 motor cars and trucks had also arrived; but the slow delivery of machinery to transport materials and process building equipment was a serious defect, since much of the rubble of war damage had been cleared away, and the lack of such supplies was a hindrance to

731 rebuilding. Between July 1, 1946, and January 31, 1947, however,
648 another 38,744 tons of industrial supplies arrived, bringing the
433 deliveries up to 51,993 gross long tons.

The following table shows the composition of all industrial supplies shipped to the Ukraine by the end of January 1947

TABLE XXIII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Industrial Equipment up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Transport and telecommunications	620	949
Public utilities	18,975	27,451
Building repair equipment	5,030	3,209
Machine repair equipment	1,041	527
Miscellaneous consumer goods	307	97
Materials, chemicals, engineering stores	7,930	42,684
	174	151
Totals	34,077	75,068

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Many of the metals which have been received are being used in canning factories or in the manufacture of household utensils and dishes. Pipe supplies (the first shipments of which arrived in December) are being used to replace destroyed water and gas mains. Canvas tarpaulin has been distributed for use in mines and on the farms of the Ukraine. Although these supplies have unquestionably filled some of the needs, the UNRRA Mission reports that the quantities are too small and the task of reconstruction too great for them to make much impact.

About one-third of the industrial rehabilitation programme for the Ukraine consists of so-called "protocol" supplies - that is certain items of industrial equipment which in a previous trade agreement the United Kingdom had contracted to furnish to the Soviet Union. After UNRRA assumed responsibility in the Ukraine and Byelorussia, negotiations commenced for the transfer of this equipment through UNRRA. About the middle of 1946 arrangements were concluded; and it was agreed that UNRRA would take over and deliver these "protocol" supplies as part of the industrial rehabilitation programme. Similarly, UNRRA became financially responsible for those "protocol" supplies which had already been delivered to the Soviet Union for use in Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

By March 1, 1947, about 16,720,000 dollars' worth of "protocol"

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433 supplies had been shipped to the Ukraine; remaining "protocol" ship-
648 ments to the Ukraine are expected to amount to 923 tons and 784,617 dollars.

Included in these supplies are power stations, pumps, portable cranes, presses, electric locomotives, and electrical and telephone equipment.

Agricultural Supplies

731 The greater part of the tonnage in agricultural supplies consisted
241 of seeds; by January 31, 1947, 15,669 gross long tons had been shipped.
648 Most of these seeds had arrived in the spring of 1946; however, some of the bags were inadequately labelled, and the contents not easily identifiable. Because of this difficulty the seeds had to be given costly and time-consuming laboratory tests, which delayed distribution. At the same time, 2,600 tons of seeds were reported by the Ukrainian Government to be either diseased or infested with weeds, and therefore unfit for sowing. Negotiations are still in process for the replacement of these defective seeds by suitable types.

[407] As at the end of 1946 the amount of farm machinery which had arrived was small. For example, the UNRRA programme calls for the delivery of 1,600 tractors to the Ukraine, but only 310 had been received by December 31, and these came too late for autumn ploughing. They are being distributed to state owned Machine Tractor Stations for use this spring.

UNRRA shipments have also included 6,692 tons of bagging, 2,090 tons of fishing equipment, and 244 tons of dairy equipment. These are shown in the following table, which summarizes agricultural rehabilitation shipments to the end of January.

TABLE XXIV

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Agricultural Supplies up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Bagging	1,672	6,692
Farm machinery	1,517	2,941
Fishing equipment	651	2,090
Food processing equipment	551	1,122
Repair material and hand tools		312
Seeds	9,861	15,669
Dairy and poultry equipment	151	244
Totals	14,403	29,070

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington

291 731 648 In addition to these items, UNRRA has delivered several thousand tons of used clothing and footwear contributed through voluntary relief organizations in other countries. Most of the contributed supplies are distributed to war invalids or to orphans of the war.

The thousands of pairs of shoes delivered by UNRRA, as well as shoes made in the Ukraine from UNRRA leather, are sold according to a rationing system, with miners and heavy industry workers receiving highest priority. Textiles (also rationed) are sold as piece goods, or are made into garments in Ukrainian workshops for sale to permit holders. UNRRA blankets and comforters are distributed chiefly to hospitals and childrens' homes; and hides and other materials furnished by UNRRA are used in the construction of orthopædic footwear or artificial limbs for wounded veterans.

Food Supplies

731 241 433 262 When the UNRRA Mission first arrived in the Ukraine, no data were available on the republic's exact food situation. The 1945 crops sown in a reduced area, under great difficulties of seed, fertilizer, and implement shortages, had yielded only a fraction of pre-war harvests. It was expected, however, that Ukrainian farms would produce enough grain to supply the population with bread and cereals until the 1946-47 harvest. UNRRA food supplies were therefore calculated to provide chiefly meats, fats (or equivalents in the form of army rations), and dairy products.

731 262 648 Altogether, UNRRA planned to use 100 million dollars of the Ukrainian budget for food. By the end of January 1947, all but 5½ million dollars of this had been shipped, as is shown in the following table.

TABLE XXVI

UNRRA Food Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Grain and grain products	548	3,836
Meat and meat products	30,682	54,245
Fish	4,166	23,440
Dairy products	13,378	33,134
Fats, oils, soap	12,725	41,885
Pulses	615	4,658
Beverages	1,490	3,437
Soup- dehydrated	2,835	9,392
Quartermaster food	27,134	109,055
Other food	206	548
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture surpluses	808	3,689
Totals	94,587	287,519

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

731 Most of the UNRRA food supplies delivered to the Ukraine are
262 distributed to ration stores for sale to workers and their dependants.
[443 A large proportion (about 35 per cent.) also goes for communal feeding
265] through dining rooms, health resorts, homes for invalids and the aged, and dining halls of trade schools. Hospitals, childrens' homes, maternity homes, and the like also receive a share (around 10 per cent.) (The food distributed to welfare organizations is delivered free of charge).

731 Apart from the food which UNRRA supplies, the Ukrainian people
262 are dependent on whatever amounts of local produce may appear on
434 various markets. According to the rationing system, the farmers are allowed to retain part of their produce to feed themselves and their dependants, and the farm's livestock; the state then purchases a certain quota for use in feeding the non-farm population. If any surplus then remains, the farmers may keep it, or sell it on the free market at uncontrolled prices.

241 In practice, however, because of the extremely poor harvests in
433 the last two years, Ukrainian farmers have scarcely been able to feed
434 even themselves; and the amounts of domestically produced food which reach the ration stores or the free market have consequently been small.

The following section describes the sources of food supply open to the urban consumers.

The System of Food Distribution

443 In the cities of the Ukraine there are three outlets through which
434 foodstuffs reach the population:

364 (a) the ration stores, where the bulk of foodstuffs are sold
262 at fixed prices to ration-coupon holders;

(b) the so-called gastronoms (commercial stores) where scarce, luxury items are sold; and

(c) the public markets, where collective farmers and peasants bring their surplus produce for sale.

Most of the rural areas and villages of the Ukraine are expected to produce locally enough food to feed the inhabitants; and as they are nearly all considered to be self-supplying, they receive through the central distribution system only sugar and sometimes bread. Their surplus farm produce (that is, food in excess of that needed for feeding people or livestock on the farm and not subject to collection or purchase by the state) is usually brought by the farmers to the public markets for sale to the urban population.
[435 The quantities of produce and the variety of items available in the free public markets vary greatly from season to season and from day to day; Prices are equally unstable.

443 41.6 roubles a kilogram. Butter, which was almost never available,
435 in the ration stores at 24 roubles a kilogram, and in the public
262 markets, at 150. The price of sugar in the public markets was, on July 10, four to five times the ration store price.

443 In addition to these products for which there are comparable prices in the ration stores, the public markets also offered certain foodstuffs
262 which were seldom or never available in the ration stores. In the
433 public markets of Kiev dressed beef was selling for 70 roubles a kilogram on June 3, 1946, and 60 roubles on July 6; milk, which on June 3 brought 15 roubles a litre was selling for 12 to 14 roubles on July 6. The fall in the price of tomatoes illustrates the play of demand and supply; when the first fresh tomatoes arrived on the public markets, they brought 15 roubles for each small tomato; by the end of July the price had fallen to 3.5 or 4 roubles for large size tomatoes of the best quality. Similar price reductions occurred in other vegetables and fruits; in each case, however, prices were still extremely high; even when the crops had been harvested, the demand remained far greater than the supply.

The extent of the shortages may be gathered from a report by the UNRRA Mission in June 1946, when a tour of Kiev's two great public markets revealed only one pound of meat, several fowls, small quantities of milk and butter from nearby farms, fifteen small sausages being sold from one can, and a few miscellaneous titbits such as matches, cigarettes, and candy from a ten-in-one ration.

Present supplies are even more attenuated. Ration scales have been cut, and this naturally increases the demand for supplies in the public markets. As the demand grows and supplies dwindle, prices rise even higher. The next table compares free market prices in June 1946, July 1946, and January 1947.

TABLE XXVIII

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Ukraine: Food Prices in a Typical Public Market
(in roubles)

	June 1946	July 1946	January 1947
Bread, kilo	22.5	23.0	50.0 - 55.0
Meat "	about 60.0	70 - 100	60.0
Fish "	-	-	65.0
Milk, litre	16.0	15.0	16.0
Butter, kilo	190.0	190.0	230.0
Eggs, dozen	42.0	48.0	-
Cereals (various) kilo	-	50.0	-
Sugar	-	100.0	-
Vegetable oil	-	200.0	200.0

- Very little or none on sale. Supplies vary greatly but are never very large.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

UNRRA Supplies and the Food Situation

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Until the produce from local farms became available in the spring and summer of 1946, the diet of the urban population of the Ukraine depended principally, apart from bread, on UNRRA food supplies, which in the beginning consisted almost entirely of U.S. army rations, plus some dried and evaporated milk and tushonka. Urgently needed fats and oils were slow in arriving; up to May only 8,596 tons had been received in the Ukraine. The shortage was critical, since domestic production was providing a rate of only 4 to 5 kilograms of fats a year per person, as compared with 12.8 in 1940 and 22 kilograms in 1929.

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Very little food was being received from other parts of the Soviet Union, and a protracted dry spell was threatening the 1946 harvest. Official rations for almost all categories of consumers were low;

262 [434] For example, light workers were entitled tononly 1,820 calories[1] a day from rationed foods, and office workers, only 1,236. Supplementary non-rationed foods were obtainable, but only in limited quantities and at high prices.

262 433 461 The inadequate diet which everyone had been receiving since the was undoubtedly responsible for lowered work efficiency, and added to the shortage of machinery and equipment, for delayed reconstruction. For example, although up to October 1946 heavy workers were entitled to official rations providing 3,757 calories a day, the greater part of their diet consisted of bread and cereals. Because of the great livestock shortage, there was scarcely any meat available on the ration. Fairly typical was the situation of 13,000 workers engaged in rebuilding the Ukraine's largest steel mill at Zaporozhie, who during April 1946 received only 750 grams of fat (about 26½ ounces) and less than two pounds of meat per person, a diet clearly inadequate for heavy labour.

262 758 Patients in a Kremenchug hospital received a diet composed chiefly of bread, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of butter or lard, which provided about 1,200 calories daily - a level radically below the emergency subsistence rate of 1,900 calories defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

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1 Compare all calorie rates with the emergency subsistence food consumption levels defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as the minima necessary to prevent serious malnutrition leading to disease and the danger of civil unrest. For European countries, these levels are as follows:

Emergency Subsistence Calorie Intake

Category	Calories per day	Category	Calories per day
0 - 2 years	1,000	Normal consumers (male)	1,900
3 - 5 "	1,250	Sedentary (female)	1,600
6 - 9 "	1,500	Moderate workers	2,000
10 - 17 years	2,000	Heavy workers	2,500
Pregnant and nursing women	2,000	Very heavy workers	3,000

1 [SIC - - ANALYST]

262 On the farms of the Ukraine the diet, although in some respects better, was for the most part, restricted and monotonous; bread and cabbage soup were the staple items; meat consumption was negligible and the intake of fats and oils, well below a pound a month per person.

262 731 433 The present situation compared with the spring of 1946 is much worse. UNRRA food deliveries to the Ukraine are all but completed. The 1946-47 harvest on which so many hopes were set, proved a dismal disappointment; and other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance. Domestic stocks must therefore last until the next harvest; and the outlook until then is bleak.

434 262 On October 1, 1946, because of the shortage of domestically produced food and the imminent cessation of UNRRA supplies, Ukrainian rations for all categories of consumers had to be reduced. For most people this meant either that their cereal ration was cancelled, or that their bread quota was lowered or both.

For example, heavy workers, light workers, and employees, - although still receiving the same amount of bread, are no longer entitled to the cereal ration of 2.0, 1.2, and 0.8 kilograms a month respectively. Dependents fare even worse: not only have they lost their cereal ration, but in addition, their bread quota has been cut from 9 to 7.5 kilograms a month. The bread ration for children also has been cut from 12 to 9 kilograms, and their meat from 0.4 to 0.3 kilograms; however, they still receive the same cereal ration as before (0.8 kilograms a month).

Rations for mothers vary of course, according to the occupational category; but their special allowances remain the same, providing approximately 745 extra calories daily.

In terms of calories, these bread and cereal cuts have reduced the diet of heavy workers from 3,757 calories a day to 3,527; light workers are down from 1,820 to 1,682; employees from 1,236 to 1,144; dependents from 895 to 704; and children up to 12, from 1,209 to 973.

The following table shows the ration scales now in effect. Six out of about twelve groups have been chosen to show typical differentiations. Special groups - for example, tuberculosis patients in [737] institutions - have not been included. It should be noted that dependents are defined as those who are not working and who have 000 passed the age of 55.[1] Mothers usually work and draw, throughout their

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1 Previously the age was 45 years; but it has been raised in an effort to get all non-producers to work.

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— CZECHOSLOVAKIA —

Economic development was essential to a country where bread used to be a delicacy and meat or salt a luxury. The Land Reform introduced in the whole of the Republic in 1919 was a right step in this direction, although the standard of living among the peasant population in the mountainous districts still left something to be desired even during the last years of the Republic. Industrial development, too, was promoted, and 459 factories (timber, food, stone, earthenware, glass, chemicals, electricity, metal, paper) sprang up on Ruthenian territory during the twenty years of freedom. An important factor in the industrial development was the electrification of the country which before 1918 had hardly any electricity. Better road and rail communications, too, assisted in Ruthenia's gradual progress.

The work done in Carpathian Ruthenia under the Republic was a promising beginning. The regrettable setback due to the re-occupation of the country is likely to remain a mere episode. For the resistance of the population and the struggle of the partisans indicate that the Ruthenians are aware of their mission as a free people and that they wish to continue on the path of progress on which they embarked when they decided to become a member of the Czechoslovak Republic.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

and Czechoslovakia (1945) that most Ukrainians of eastern Europe became united into one territorial entity. SU 631 U

The present administrative-territorial system was introduced into the Ukrainian SSR in 1932 by the creation of seven oblasts. By 1939 the number had increased to fifteen. Following the partition of Poland, in 1939, and the annexation of the Western Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR, six more oblasts (Volyn', Rovno, L'vov, Drogobych, Ternopol', and Stanislav) were added. In 1940 Rumania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR. The extreme northern and southern sections of the territory were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR as the Chernovtsy and Izmail oblasts in view of their predominant Ukrainian population. However, the Ukraine lost the greater part of Moldavian Autonomous SSR (formed in 1924) when the Moldavian territory was joined to the central part of Bessarabia to form the newly constituted Moldavian SSR. Seven districts (rayons) of the Moldavian Autonomous SSR, including those of Balta and Kotovsk remained in the Ukrainian SSR as part of the Odessa Oblast, due to the predominance of a Ukrainian population. In 1945 the western frontier of the Ukrainian SSR was changed in favor of Poland with the adoption of the so-called "Curzon line," which left the city of Przemyśl (Russian *Peremyshl'*) and areas to the northeast and southwest, along the San River, to Poland. In June, 1945, the Carpatho-Ukraine, or Ruthenia, was transferred from Czechoslovakia and constituted into the Transcarpathian (*Zakarpatskaya*) Oblast. At present the Ukrainian SSR is divided into twenty-five oblasts. 631

The economy of the Ukrainian SSR combines a rich agricultural development with a powerful mining and metallurgical industry, based in particular on the coal of the Donets Basin and the iron ore of Krivoy Rog. As a result of the industrialization of the USSR, the Ukraine became not only a basic grain-exporting region of the USSR, as well as an area of intensive agriculture and agricultural industry, but also the major coal and metallurgical base and heavy-machine construction center of the USSR. The Ukraine has more than one fifth of the total sown area of the USSR and produces one quarter of the grain, two thirds of the sugar, three fifths of the coal and pig iron, one half of the salt and about one fifth of the machines and chemicals. SU 438* U 438

In 1940 the Donets Basin furnished 85 million tons of coal per year. It supplied not only all the industry of the Ukraine itself but also the SU U* 316 433

SU 316 433 U 316 433 metropolitan areas of Moscow, Leningrad, and other industrial centers, as well as the entire southern rail network of the USSR west of the Volga and south of the Moscow coal basin. During the period of the German occupation of the Ukraine (1941–43), the coal mines suffered greatly. At present, reconstruction work is in full swing, mines are being reestablished, and it is hoped to have reached prewar production by the end of the post-war Five-Year Plan. The major coal-mining centers are Stalino, Yenakiyevo, Gorlovka, Kadiyevka, Chistyakovo, Krasnyy Luch, and Sverdlovsk. Anthracite, used principally for fuel, is mined in the eastern and the southern sections, while coking coal is produced in the SU western and the northern parts of the Donets Basin.

327 433 U 327 433 The giant iron and steel mills of the Ukraine lie mainly in the western part of the Donbas, that is, in the coke-supplying area, in the Krivoy Rog iron basin, and along the Dnieper between these two raw-material sources. Among the mills producing over one million tons of pig iron per year are modernized prerevolutionary plants at Makeyevka (Donbas), and at Dnepropetrovsk and at Dneprodzerzhinsk on the Dnieper and new plants at Krivoy Rog, Zaporozh'ye, and Zhdanov. The Azovstal' mills at Zhdanov use Kerch' (Crimea) iron ore, which is shipped across SU the Sea of Azov.

392 438* U 392 438 Machine construction has been developed to a very large extent in the Ukraine in recent years. Due to the close proximity of the sources of metal and in view of the lack of skilled local labor, the Ukraine was designed to produce types of machinery requiring little precision work, but large amounts of metal. Plants located in the Donbas specialize in heavy machine construction; among them, Kramatorsk produces coal-mining and steel-milling machinery, and Voroshilovgrad has a large locomotive works. Agricultural machinery plants are located along the Dnieper and on the right bank. Khar'kov possesses a large tractor plant and locomotive works and produces hydro-turbines and electric motors. There are car-building works at Nikolayev and Dnepropetrovsk, shipyards at Nikolayev, Kherson, and Kiev, and oil-drilling machinery is SU made in L'vov.

381 438* U 381 438 The industrial picture of the Ukraine includes a number of factors suitable for the establishment of a strong chemical industry: the by-products of coking and metallurgical processes, the presence of such important raw materials as salt and phosphorites, the availability of cheap energy produced by coal-fed (*Zugres* and *Shtergres*) or hydroelectric (*Dneproges*) power stations, and finally the need for chemical products

The proportion of farms managed by individuals decreased to less than 1 % of the entire agricultural area. The men employed at machinery and tractor centers, which seemed to attract all the mechanics required for the colkhose system, formed a privileged class. It depended on them whether an agricultural operation was carried through at the right time. This group was mainly composed of young people and non-Ukrainians. In 1934 some 797 600 were employed on the land and in forests in the Ukraine Soviet Republic. The Soviet officials, not so important numerically as on account of their influence, formed another group of the rural population. Finally, in the country districts there was a fairly large group of teaching and medical staffs and agricultural experts, mostly of Ukrainian peasant origin, as foreigners could not stand life in Ukrainian villages for long. 162 565

Urban population had a large percentage of foreigners, the main social groups being laborers in industry and commerce and the Soviet officials. The number of industrial laborers within the frontiers of the Ukraine Soviet Republic on January 1st, 1936 was 1 308 000. But this figure kept varying constantly, as many of the workers from country districts were not satisfied with conditions of life in the towns and changed jobs frequently or tried to get back home. The Soviet Government fought against these difficulties for years without being able to solve them. This group also included a great number of young people who grew up in post-war conditions. Their nationality varied; about half of the industrial proletariat in Ukraine was of Ukrainian origin. As a rule, material standards were not high. The average wage in 1934 amounted to 166.4 roubles a month, but this figure is not a clear indication of the individual's earning capacity as piece-work was general. In individual cases, where the Stakhanov system (whereby maximum output of labor was achieved) was introduced, higher than average wages were earned. In recent years real wages declined as a result of abolishing the cards which had entitled workmen to certain privileges in buying food and industrial products. Wage earners in Soviet business concerns were similarly situated to those in industrial plants but as the former were less important than the latter in the general scheme of Soviet economy, their develop- 162 369 465 434

465 ment has been slower and they have not yet reached the same degree of intensity of labor which we found in factories. Jews
● 434 play a great part in commercial life.

162 Among the lower categories of civil servants, Ukrainians were in the majority from the beginning, while representatives of
465 foreign nationalities increased in the higher services. The average
511 salary of Soviet officials throws little light on the standard of
647 living in this group of the population because the difference between higher and lower employees is again considerable. Incomes in the lower ranks were very small while the higher officials had a life of ease and could on occasion even afford luxury. Engineers are among the most privileged while teachers and actors are much worse off. The legal status of the Soviet official was entirely insecure; they lived constantly under threat of a "purge" or of being denounced as disturbing the process of Soviet economy. The higher ranks of bureaucrats were here in special danger.

162 The small group of the professional class (doctors, writers, lawyers), in spite of their freedom, was dependent on the apparatus of the Soviet State. The group of outcasts was most to be pitied, i. e. those who had been expelled by the regime from social intercourse, e. g. merchants, artisans, and priests. After identity cards were introduced and "socially dangerous" persons removed, this group greatly decreased.

162 Another group, finally, is formed by Ukrainians living
167 outside the frontiers of Ukrainian territory, who as "Kur-
697 kuls", "Pests", "Saboteurs" were sent to concentration camps in the North and in Siberia. The "Nationalists" are also included in this group. And the colonisation of remote frontier areas in Soviet Russia required forest laborers, miners and factory workers, who had to help in the coal mines of Siberia and in building up industrial concerns in Central Asia. It is impossible to give statistics for the proportion of Ukrainians in this group, but they cannot be ignored as they will certainly return home and play an important rôle in Ukraine whenever the general situation is altered.

162 In Ukrainian areas outside of the Soviet Union, conditions
167 resemble those obtaining in Western Europe. The Ukrainian

474 creation of great "agro-cities" or "agro-settlements" which would
241 unite several collective farms in one great centre which could be
665 more easily controlled by the Communist Party with a smaller number of qualified party members in charge. By the end of 1950 the number of kolhosps (collective farms) had been reduced from 33,653, as at the end of the war, to 14,443. The number of households in one had grown from 163 households to 277. At the same time the number of collective farms in which there were definite party leaders had increased from 42% to 78%. This does not imply a growth in Communist membership, for the number of Communist authorities might, under the new ratio, be reduced by almost 3,000 in personnel. This would be hardly likely but it explains at a glance the increased control that the Communists could exert over the larger groups. It also made it easier by destroying the separated villages to prevent as effective help being given to the U. P. A. and the other anti-Communist movements which lingered on, as the peasants saw that the new era was to be not one of peace but of increased hardships. At the same time, the
423 peasant was made more helpless for his holdings in the neighbor-
241 hood of his home were reduced to 0.15 hectare or approximately a third of an acre.

This area is roughly equivalent to the average American suburban lot of 150 x 100 feet and on this the average peasant family was supposed, no matter how many members it contained, to raise all the vegetables, eggs and milk which the family required for the year and also any other plant or animal requirement which was needed as a cash crop. Even this was now burdened with taxes and the peasant was forbidden to secure anything from the collective farm to assist in his economy, outside of what he secured in his pay for a steadily diminishing number of labor days and the accompanying cash and kind receipts which were apportioned to him for his work.

474 Estimates based on figures from some collective farms show
● 434 that the average family receives for its year's work, if three or four
241 members work, something in the neighborhood of three hundred pounds of grain, four hundred pounds of potatoes and about one

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a 474
result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred 434
karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one 241
thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on [554]
these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for [665]
show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satisfactory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer is little better, although he 465
receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, 731
there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 con- 185
tinued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

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Ration Stores

443 Members of the UNRRA Mission have visited ration stores in all
434 the more important cities of the Ukraine. The city of Kiev, for
example, has about 300, all of them much alike. The typical ration food store serves from 2,000 to 2,500 families living in the immediate neighbourhood; if a family moves, it changes its ration card registration to a store in its new locality. Some stores, however, serve the employees of a particular factory or organization as well as a neighbourhood; others are limited to special categories of customers, such as veterans, pregnant women and nursing mothers, teachers, doctors, and scientific workers; these stores have a slightly more varied stock of goods; and in the case of shops for pregnant women and nursing mothers, the roster of customers is smaller so that there is no waiting to be served.

721 Except for bread, most of the food sold in Ukrainian ration shops in 1946 was supplied by UNRRA. Many of these relief supplies, however, did not fit into the established rationing system; therefore many rather elaborate substitution schemes had to be devised, particularly for U.S. army C, K and ten-in-one rations, which were often substituted for a variety of foods. These schemes were said to be in effect throughout the Ukraine, local bodies having authority to make minor changes in substitution values to fit whatever stocks of goods were on hand at the moment.

For example, according to the scheme effective in Kiev in March 1946, if a customer was entitled to buy one kilogram of meat or fish monthly, he might possible substitute 15 eggs, or 200 grams of powdered milk, or 800 grams of sausage, or a 600 gram can of UNRRA tushonka[1] provided any of these were available. In lieu of one kilogram of fat rarely available the customer might buy 60 eggs, or two kilos of cheese, or 3 kilograms of sour cream, or 1.6 kilograms of powdered milk, or 400 grams of peanut butter, again provided they were available.

The army ten-in-one rations are packed in two cardboard boxes, labelled "first half" and "second half". In Kiev the "first half" was considered to be equivalent to 500 grams of fat and 1½ kilograms of sugar; while the "second half" was equivalent to 2 kilograms of meat and 500 grams of sugar.

In Poltava in April 1946 one U.S. army K ration was being considered the equivalent of 800 grams of meat or 206 grams of fat; one C ration, equal to 925 grams of meat or 310 grams of fat; the first half of a ten-in-one ration equalled 1,500 grams of meat or 500 grams of fat, and the second half of a ten-in-one ration, four kilograms of meat or 1,330 grams of fat.

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[1] A canned meat mixture.

Gastronoms

443 434 262 554 461 In addition to the ration stores, Kiev has about five gastronoms, or commercial stores, where unrationed goods are for sale. Most of the gastronoms are stocked almost entirely with delicacies, such as Siberian crabmeat, live carp in water tanks, a little fresh meat, salami, candy, biscuits, and Russian cigarettes. (No UNRRA goods are sold in such stores). Until September 1946 the prices in gastronoms were so high that only a relatively small part of the population could afford to buy. The gastronoms were patronized primarily by those with high earnings - professors, theatrical stars, scientists, artists, high ranking army officers, skilled technicians, etc. One of their main purposes was to show the average worker that some luxuries did exist, and thus encourage him to raise his skills and productivity. Another purpose was to provide a special reward for various kinds of meritorious service. For example, war heroes and top generals were entitled to a 40 per cent discount on all purchases made at a gastronom. Moreover, workers who had stayed at the same factory for six years or more were entitled to a 20 per cent discount, and office workers with similar service to 10 per cent.

[435] In September 1946, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to abolish differences between the higher "commercial" prices and the low prices of rationed goods, the prices in gastronoms were lowered and certain ration prices, raised somewhat.

[465] At the same time, taking into account the difficulties which average and low-paid workers would encounter as a result of higher ration prices, the Council of Ministers decided to increase all salaries of less than 900 roubles a month. Thus, those workers who previously had earned up to 300 roubles a month received an increase of 110 roubles; those who had earned up to 500 roubles, another 80. Similar increases were allowed in pensions and in students' stipends.

So far as UNRRA food is concerned, the increases in ration prices have affected meat, fish, fats and oils, other categories of UNRRA food supplies particularly milk, cheese, and army rations were not affected.

434 435 The following table shows the increases in ration store prices.

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TABLE XXVII

Ukraine: Prices of Rationed Food
(in roubles per kilogram)

	Before October 1, 1946	After October 1, 1946	Percentage increase
Bread (black with rye)	0.9	3.2	255
Bread (whole wheat)	1.8	6.0	240
Meat tushonka	16.6	32.0	87
Pork in gravy	20.5	35.3	72
Meat and vegetables	10.0	15.3	53
Pork and rice	15.7	30.7	90
Meat and corn	10.0	17.7	77
Herrings in tomato sauce	11.5	25.0	117
Herrings in natural oil	17.2	37.5	118
Smoked cod	9.8	18.0	84
Lard	18.0	36.0	100

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

Public Markets

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The third kind of outlet for the distribution of food to the urban population is the public markets (officially called "Collective Farm Markets"). Their importance as a source of supplementary food is difficult generally to assess. On the one hand, extremely high prices plus the inconstancy or inadequacy of supplies prevent any group in the population from depending on the public markets for any substantial part of its diet; on the other hand, the variety of food sometimes available impels many to supplement the limited amounts and kinds of foods secured at the ration stores by purchases in the public markets. While prices are fixed and rigidly controlled in the ration stores, there is no control of prices whatever in the public markets, and the seller and purchaser usually agree on the price after a rather elaborate process of bargaining. On account of the limitations in supply, the selling prices are usually dear.

There are striking differences between the fixed, ration store prices and the uncontrolled market place prices. For example, in July 1946 (before ration prices were raised) white bread which - depending on the extraction rate of flour - was selling in ration stores at 90 kopecks[1] to 2.7 roubles a kilogram was selling in the public markets at 28.5 to

1 There are 160 kopecks to a rouble

TABLE XXVIII

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Ukraine: Food Prices in a Typical Public Market
(in roubles)

	June 1946	July 1946	January 1947
Bread, kilo	22.5	23.0	50.0 - 55.0
Meat "	about 60.0	70 - 100	60.0
Fish "	-	-	65.0
Milk, litre	16.0	15.0	16.0
Butter, kilo	190.0	190.0	230.0
Eggs, dozen	42.0	48.0	-
Cereals (various) kilo	-	50.0	-
Sugar	-	100.0	-
Vegetable oil	-	200.0	200.0

- Very little or none on sale. Supplies vary greatly but are never very large.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

UNRRA Supplies and the Food Situation

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Until the produce from local farms became available in the spring and summer of 1946, the diet of the urban population of the Ukraine depended principally, apart from bread, on UNRRA food supplies, which in the beginning consisted almost entirely of U.S. army rations, plus some dried and evaporated milk and tushonka. Urgently needed fats and oils were slow in arriving; up to May only 8,596 tons had been received in the Ukraine. The shortage was critical, since domestic production was providing a rate of only 4 to 5 kilograms of fats a year per person, as compared with 12.8 in 1940 and 22 kilograms in 1929.

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Very little food was being received from other parts of the Soviet Union, and a protracted dry spell was threatening the 1946 harvest. Official rations for almost all categories of consumers were low;

262 For example, light workers were entitled to only 1,820 calories[1] a
[434] day from rationed foods, and office workers, only 1,236. Supplementary non-rationed foods were obtainable, but only in limited quantities and at high prices.

262 The inadequate diet which everyone had been receiving since the
433 war was undoubtedly responsible for lowered work efficiency, and added
461 to the shortage of machinery and equipment, for delayed reconstruction. For example, although up to October 1946 heavy workers were entitled to official rations providing 3,757 calories a day, the greater part of their diet consisted of bread and cereals. Because of the great livestock shortage, there was scarcely any meat available on the ration. Fairly typical was the situation of 13,000 workers engaged in rebuilding the Ukraine's largest steel mill at Zaporoshie, who during April 1946 received only 750 grams of fat (about 26½ ounces) and less than two pounds of meat per person, a diet clearly inadequate for heavy labour.

262 Patients in a Kremenchug hospital received a diet composed chiefly
758 of bread, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of butter or lard, which provided about 1,200 calories daily - a level radically below the emergency subsistence rate of 1,900 calories defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

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1 Compare all calorie rates with the emergency subsistence food consumption levels defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as the minima necessary to prevent serious malnutrition leading to disease and the danger of civil unrest. For European countries, these levels are as follows:

Emergency Subsistence Calorie Intake

Category	Calories per day	Category	Calories per day
0 - 2 years	1,000	Normal consumers (male)	1,900
3 - 5 "	1,250	Sedentary (female)	1,600
6 - 9 "	1,500	Moderate workers	2,000
10 - 17 years	2,000	Heavy workers	2,500
Pregnant and nursing women	2,000	Very heavy workers	3,000

1 [SIC - - ANALYST]

262 On the farms of the Ukraine the diet, although in some respects better, was for the most part, restricted and monotonous; bread and cabbage soup were the staple items; meat consumption was negligible and the intake of fats and oils, well below a pound a month per person.

262 731 433 The present situation compared with the spring of 1946 is much worse. UNRRA food deliveries to the Ukraine are all but completed. The 1946-47 harvest on which so many hopes were set, proved a dismal disappointment; and other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance. Domestic stocks must therefore last until the next harvest; and the outlook until then is bleak.

434 262 On October 1, 1946, because of the shortage of domestically produced food and the imminent cessation of UNRRA supplies, Ukrainian rations for all categories of consumers had to be reduced. For most people this meant either that their cereal ration was cancelled, or that their bread quota was lowered or both.

For example, heavy workers, light workers, and employees, - although still receiving the same amount of bread, are no longer entitled to the cereal ration of 2.0, 1.2, and 0.8 kilograms a month respectively. Dependents fare even worse: not only have they lost their cereal ration, but in addition, their bread quota has been cut from 9 to 7.5 kilograms a month. The bread ration for children also has been cut from 12 to 9 kilograms, and their meat from 0.4 to 0.3 kilograms; however, they still receive the same cereal ration as before (0.8 kilograms a month).

Rations for mothers vary of course, according to the occupational category; but their special allowances remain the same, providing approximately 745 extra calories daily.

In terms of calories, these bread and cereal cuts have reduced the diet of heavy workers from 3,757 calories a day to 3,527; light workers are down from 1,820 to 1,682; employees from 1,236 to 1,144; dependents from 895 to 704; and children up to 12, from 1,209 to 973.

The following table shows the ration scales now in effect. Six out of about twelve groups have been chosen to show typical differentiations. Special groups - for example, tuberculosis patients in [737] institutions - have not been included. It should be noted that dependents are defined as those who are not working and who have ooo passed the age of 55.[1] Mothers usually work and draw, throughout their

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1 Previously the age was 45 years; but it has been raised in an effort to get all non-producers to work.

434 262 745 Mothers usually work and draw, throughout their pregnancy and afterwards, their full occupational rations[1] plus the special allowances indicated. If they do not work, they draw dependents' rations plus their special allowance.

[855] Children up to 14 includes infants from one to seven, who also receive special rations through milk kitchens, nurseries, nursery schools, and kindergartens. These amount to 9.0 litres of milk and 6.0 grams of fats monthly.

434 262 The employee category includes such occupational groups as office workers, timekeepers, and caretakers. The light workers group includes railway workers, machine builders, etc. The heavy workers group includes moulders, steelworkers, and miners. The latter receive a further additional ration in the form of a hot meal if they do underground work.

(It must be emphasized that the amounts given in the table are official scales, which, even though reduced, cannot regularly be met. Throughout, the figures in brackets refer to scarce items which are authorized, but cannot be supplied.)

TABLE XXIX

Ukrainian Ration Scales from October 1, 1946
(in kilograms per month)

Rationed commodity	Consumer category: Heavy worker	Light worker	Employee	Dependent[1]	Children up to 14
Bread	36.0	18.0	12.0	7.5	9.0
Cereals	nil	nil	nil	nil	(0.8)
Sugar	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	0.3
Meat or fish	(3.2)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.5)	(0.4)
Fats	(0.9)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Butter (or substitute)	nil	nil	nil	nil	.06
Potatoes	(5.0)	"	"	"	nil
Vegetables	(3.0)	"	"	"	(2.0)
Milk, fresh, dried, or evaporated	nil	"	"	"	9.0
Vitamin juices	"	"	"	"	scarce
Approximate daily calories from rations only	3,527	1,682	1,144	704	973 plus 204 infants

[736] In February 1947 the rations for dependents was again changed, and they are now authorized to receive only bread, 7.5 kilograms monthly.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

1 [As of 1947 -- Analyst]

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Expectant and nursing mothers are usually at work, and have standard leaves with pay and special privileges; thus, if working, they receive rations appropriate to the occupational group, plus special food allowances; and if not working, dependents' rations plus these allowances. The supplements are as follows, monthly: cereals, 1.2 kilograms; butter (or substitute), 0.8 kilograms; sugar 0.6 kilograms; vegetables, 2.0 kilograms; milk (fresh or dried) 12 litres. Their approximate calories from rations alone are, therefore:

If light workers	1,682 plus 512 -	2,194	calories daily
If employees	1,144 plus 512 -	1,656	" "
If dependents	704 plus 512 -	1,216	" "

In the last case it is almost possible to assume that the husband is well paid and will be able to buy products in the open market.

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Even if the established ration scales for all groups could be met, they would not provide an adequate, balanced diet. Particularly the rations for women and children are very light in fat, first-class protein, and calcium. They provide less than half the low League of Nation's standard for daily full-cream milk requirements of the expectant mother. But even these inadequate scales are seldom supplied.

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Since mid-October 1946, the honouring of ration cards has, because of the increasing food shortages, become more and more irregular. In December 1946, for instance, large groups of persons in the Kiev area received only bread, sugar, and a few tins of vegetables on their cards. No meat, fish or fats were available. By the middle of January 1947, the situation had grown even more stringent, and only bread was supplied on the ration.

At the same time, the amount of food available off the ration has decreased almost to the vanishing point. Cereals and white bread have practically disappeared from the open market; and when they are available, the price is beyond the reach of the average person.

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The effects of the poor diet are already to be seen. The people generally show a noticeable lack of their former livelinoes, energy and cheerfulness. Moreover, according to the Medical Officer of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, clinical starvation has made its appearance in the smaller villages of the Republic: protein dropsy and avitaminosis are increasing; and among the townspeople there is great incidence of skin infections and respiratory and nasopharyngeal conditions.

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In order to meet some of the medical aspects which may arise out of the present food situation, the Ministry of Health has taken the following steps.

show profits. The very small shops and plants were in some cases 185
taken back by their former owners when they had survived and any 471
provisions about the use of hired labor were tacitly forgotten in the first flush of the New Economic Policy.

All of these measures were interpreted by the great mass of the Ukrainian people as a recognition of the validity of human experience. There were, of course, keen realists who gave full credence to the declarations of Lenin that the Soviets had never wavered in their objections and were using these concessions only as a means of reviving the life of the country and strengthening their own position. At first this did not seem to be true and it was only as conditions really settled down and a semblance of prosperity returned that it became possible to note the steadily increasing pressure which the government exerted.

In the same way the currency reforms were not without their 185
own influence. In 1923 the government introduced a new cur- 652
rency, the chervonets, which was ostensibly based on a gold stand- 435
ard, to take the place of the old depreciated paper. Nevertheless, the latter was allowed to circulate in the rural districts with the result that its value continued to fall and it became more and more difficult for the peasants to satisfy their needs for manufactured goods which were priced in the new currency. This produced the so-called "scissors," for with the restoration of industry, the value of manufactures continued to rise, while the prices of agricultural products continually fell.

The political system was still not clear.[1] The new regulations 642
were introduced in the Council of Commissars in Moscow and it 665
was emphatically stated that they were for the Russian Soviet 645
Federated Socialist Republic, but Ukraine and also the other Soviet Republics put into practice the same resolutions, often without any decree by the ostensibly independent government.

The key to this enigma lay in the nature of Communist discipline. In theory and on paper the Soviet regime was thoroughly democratic in the broad sense of the word. There was an elaborate scheme of elections to the village and the higher Soviets, and even though this was weighted very heavily to provide increased repre-

[1] [During NEW ECONOMIC POLICY -- Analyst]

payment of a specific amount of tax in kind and left to the peasant 432
the rest of his crop. In an endeavor to get this grain into Russia, 241
the government offered to buy it but it did not have the funds or 185
the inclination to pay for it at the market price. The financial reforms connected with the introduction of the chervonets could, to a certain degree, make it expedient for the peasant to sell to the government for cash, and as time went on the peasant gained the power of selling his crop for cash but the Moscow control of transportation and the prohibition of large scale trading left him helpless and he saw himself forced to dispose of it locally or to the government. Then the government made a fixed price which was far [435] below that of the free market, and was often scarcely a third of the amount that the peasant could have secured. This sale of large quantities of agricultural products at a fixed price gradually became the rule and was one of the signs that the period of toleration for private income was coming to an end.

In 1925, the government began to clamp down on the small 656
traders, the Nepmen, who had profited by the opportunities which 661
they had had. Again it had a large choice of measures. Thus, depending on the situation, it could invoke laws against the hiring of labor; it could order the state agencies to refuse to buy from or sell to an obnoxious individual and thus isolate him; it could suspend his ration cards and perquisites, take away his right of voting and thus make him a pariah in the community; it could levy prohibitive taxes which would put him out of business and confiscate his property; or it could find some violation of some other law or regulation and imprison or exile him.

The degree of pressure which was put upon the peasants and 439
the workers varied from year to year. Each year Ukraine was 241
compelled to export more to Russia without regard to the needs of the local population. Thus, the amount of grain rose from 1,050,000 tons in 1924-5 to 3,165,000 tons in 1926-7, when there was a bumper crop, but in 1927-8, when the harvest partially failed and there were signs of need in the country, the amount collected and exported rose to 4,353,000 tons. At the same time, the continually increasing demands aroused again a spirit of oppo-

656 had profited by the operation of the Ukrainian land code which,
471 as we have seen, was less rigid than were the similar arrangements
661 in the RSFSR, where the land society was organized far more on
[427] the lines of a collective than it was in Ukraine. It was always possible to apply individually any of the laws against the leasing of land or the employment of hired help, for in both cases the provisions had been left vague and indefinite, so that the authorities could act whenever they so desired. As a matter of fact, as one of the first measures the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic reduced the period on which a lease could be made from thirteen to six years and thus it was easily possible to upset many of the calculations that had been made by the richer and more progressive landowners.

[435] At the same time the closing of the official markets rendered it possible for the government to force the peasants to dispose of their grain at the officially pegged prices which in the grain-growing districts were considerably lower than they were in the less fertile areas of the north. If this did not produce the desired results, it was equally possible to demand the grain tax in kind and to compel the peasants to turn over, free of charge and under the guise of payments, additional supplies. All these measures, which were introduced in many cases personally and not by districts, caused the peasants to feel themselves becoming steadily more impoverished and less able to resist the demands of the government.

631 On the other hand, the All-Union Commissariats which took
642 precedence over those in the individual Soviet republics and which were, in reality, staffed only by Russian Communists, effectively broke the power of the localities or of the republics to have any special voice in the management of their own affairs.[1] This was, in its turn, skilfully explained by stressing the superior requirements of the Union which, on any closer analysis, turned out to be the interests of the Russian area. Thus, at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a Russian who was at the time the chief of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission remarked in an unambiguous manner: "It seems to me that we must assign perfectly clear tasks, to emphasize that the national

[1] [1925, during relinquishment of NEP -- Analyst]

73/ backs, waiting for a freight train. Agents of the NKVD held them
66/ up and took away their grain. They begged together and singly and prayed but it did not help. Then one peasant climbed out on a high tree near the station and began to cry out about all the horrors of the famine in Ukraine. He cursed the party, the government, its leaders and the NKVD. A crowd quickly gathered and soon came the agents of the NKVD who began to harangue the hearers and urged the "orator" to come down quickly, threatening him with life imprisonment. He was immovable; then the NKVD called for the local fire department who were told to turn their hoses on the tree. The peasant climbed higher and then suddenly threw himself down like a stone."

In the spring of 1933 the starving masses with their gray faces moved into the large cities. They formed lines for the "buying of bread"* or, begging, they surrounded the mills. They died by thousands in the streets of Kharkiv, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, and the other cities. In many cases the police cars simply picked up the dead and dying every morning and carried them out of the city where they were thrown into pits. There were established in the cities and their environs "therapeutic hospitals" near which were vans covered with tarpaulins. These were used to collect the sufferers and the hospitals were simply places to separate the dead and the dying.

The children suffered terribly and thousands were picked up on the streets. Parents often abandoned their children, usually near police stations, in the hope that they would be picked up and taken to refugee camps but here they were little better off. Prof. M. M. testified that near Kharkiv the "NKVD opened a large children's concentration camp, the 'Barracks of death' as it was

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* In the beginning of 1933 at the height of the famine in Ukraine, the USSR opened shops in the cities where grain was sold at a doubled price, i.e. commercial prices—4 karb. for 1 kg. of white and 3 karb. for 1 kg. of black bread. The peasant received from the government for the obligatory "sale" of grain 90 kop. for 16 kg. of wheat. These commercial prices had to be paid for in foreign currency or in gold or silver.

241 lected for the tax in kind. This was a negligible sum and the
651 average member rarely received more than one ruble per labor
474 day. This sum was, of course, insufficient to provide for the
465 goods which the family needed to purchase, and since their share
[511] of the grain was rarely sufficient to feed them, their situation became hopeless, while of other products the individual received about one litre of oil, fifty kilograms of potatoes, thirty-five kilograms of fruit, and five-tenths kilograms of meat and fat.

[435] The real significance of these figures is shown in the prices that were charged in the state stores.[1] There a kilogram of bread cost ninety kopecks, ten eggs brought eight rubles, a kilogram of beef twenty-four rubles, and a pair of boots four hundred and fifty rubles, while a farmer's suit of clothes cost five hundred rubles.

[422] It made the peasant really dependent upon his individual plot of land if he was to secure any necessities.[1] This was far too small and its use was bound with many restrictions. Thus, no family was allowed to hold more than one cow and two calves, one sow, up to ten goats, an undefined number of chickens and up to twenty beehives. In the beginning it was possible for the peasant to secure a certain amount of food for these animals from the common store. He was allowed to retain the manure and it was thus possible for him to improve his own individual plot and thus to secure larger returns. It was a liberal application of such principles that had rendered possible the general improvement which was noticeable during the years 1934-6, when the government was endeavoring to make the system of collective farms workable.

It can be easily seen that the system of allowing individual incomes was based on a principle opposite that of the New Economic Policy, for it would require scarcely a legislative enactment to reduce these amounts while the New Economic Policy presented a norm of profit to the workers. Yet with each year, once the government was convinced of its success, it found it possible in various ways to tap this new source of income for its own purposes.

The favorite method was by taxation. Thus, by 1939 if we should assume that the average family received in cash four hun-

1 [Ukraine - after 1933 famine -- Analyst]

731 262 [443] 265 Most of the UNRRA food supplies delivered to the Ukraine are distributed to ration stores for sale to workers and their dependants. A large proportion (about 35 per cent.) also goes for communal feeding through dining rooms, health resorts, homes for invalids and the aged, and dining halls of trade schools. Hospitals, childrens' homes, maternity homes, and the like also receive a share (around 10 per cent.) (The food distributed to welfare organizations is delivered free of charge).

731 262 434 Apart from the food which UNRRA supplies, the Ukrainian people are dependent on whatever amounts of local produce may appear on various markets. According to the rationing system, the farmers are allowed to retain part of their produce to feed themselves and their dependants, and the farm's livestock; the state then purchases a certain quota for use in feeding the non-farm population. If any surplus then remains, the farmers may keep it, or sell it on the free market at uncontrolled prices.

241 433 434 In practice, however, because of the extremely poor harvests in the last two years, Ukrainian farmers have scarcely been able to feed even themselves; and the amounts of domestically produced food which reach the ration stores or the free market have consequently been small.

The following section describes the sources of food supply open to the urban consumers.

The System of Food Distribution

443 434 364 262 In the cities of the Ukraine there are three outlets through which foodstuffs reach the population:

(a) the ration stores, where the bulk of foodstuffs are sold at fixed prices to ration-coupon holders;

(b) the so-called gastronoms (commercial stores) where scarce, luxury items are sold; and

(c) the public markets, where collective farmers and peasants bring their surplus produce for sale.

Most of the rural areas and villages of the Ukraine are expected to produce locally enough food to feed the inhabitants; and as they are nearly all considered to be self-supplying, they receive through the central distribution system only sugar and sometimes bread. Their surplus farm produce (that is, food in excess of that needed for feeding people or livestock on the farm and not subject to collection or purchase by the state) is usually brought by the farmers to the public markets for sale to the urban population. [435] The quantities of produce and the variety of items available in the free public markets vary greatly from season to season and from day to day; prices are equally unstable.

Gastronoms

443 434 262 554 461 In addition to the ration stores, Kiev has about five gastronoms, or commercial stores, where unrationed goods are for sale. Most of the gastronoms are stocked almost entirely with delicacies, such as Siberian crabmeat, live carp in water tanks, a little fresh meat, salami, candy, biscuits, and Russian cigarettes. (No UNRRA goods are sold in such stores). Until September 1946 the prices in gastronoms were so high that only a relatively small part of the population could afford to buy. The gastronoms were patronized primarily by those with high earnings - professors, theatrical stars, scientists, artists, high ranking army officers, skilled technicians, etc. One of their main purposes was to show the average worker that some luxuries did exist, and thus encourage him to raise his skills and productivity. Another purpose was to provide a special reward for various kinds of meritorious service. For example, war heroes and top generals were entitled to a 40 per cent discount on all purchases made at a gastronom. Moreover, workers who had stayed at the same factory for six years or more were entitled to a 20 per cent discount, and office workers with similar service to 10 per cent.

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The third kind of outlet for the distribution of food to the urban population is the public markets (officially called "Collective Farm Markets"). Their importance as a source of supplementary food is difficult generally to assess. On the one hand, extremely high prices plus the inconstancy or inadequacy of supplies prevent any group in the population from depending on the public markets for any substantial part of its diet; on the other hand, the variety of food sometimes available impels many to supplement the limited amounts and kinds of foods secured at the ration stores by purchases in the public markets. While prices are fixed and rigidly controlled in the ration stores, there is no control of prices whatever in the public markets, and the seller and purchaser usually agree on the price after a rather elaborate process of bargaining. On account of the limitations in supply, the selling prices are usually dear.

There are striking differences between the fixed, ration store prices and the uncontrolled market place prices. For example, in July 1946 (before ration prices were raised) white bread which - depending on the extraction rate of flour - was selling in ration stores at 90 kopecks[1] to 2.7 roubles a kilogram was selling in the public markets at 28.5 to

1 There are 160 kopecks to a rouble

443 41.6 roubles a kilogram. Butter, which was almost never available,
435 in the ration stores at 24 roubles a kilogram, and in the public
262 markets, at 150. The price of sugar in the public markets was, on July 10, four to five times the ration store price.

443 In addition to these products for which there are comparable prices
262 in the ration stores, the public markets also offered certain foodstuffs
433 which were seldom or never available in the ration stores. In the public markets of Kiev dressed beef was selling for 70 roubles a kilogram on June 3, 1946, and 60 roubles on July 6; milk, which on June 3 brought 15 roubles a litre was selling for 12 to 14 roubles on July 6. The fall in the price of tomatoes illustrates the play of demand and supply; when the first fresh tomatoes arrived on the public markets, they brought 15 roubles for each small tomato; by the end of July the price had fallen to 3.5 or 4 roubles for large size tomatoes of the best quality. Similar price reductions occurred in other vegetables and fruits; in each case, however, prices were still extremely high; even when the crops had been harvested, the demand remained far greater than the supply.

The extent of the shortages may be gathered from a report by the UNRRA Mission in June 1946, when a tour of Kiev's two great public markets revealed only one pound of meat, several fowls, small quantities of milk and butter from nearby farms, fifteen small sausages being sold from one can, and a few miscellaneous titbits such as matches, cigarettes, and candy from a ten-in-one ration.

Present supplies are even more attenuated. Ration scales have been cut, and this naturally increases the demand for supplies in the public markets. As the demand grows and supplies dwindle, prices rise even higher. The next table compares free market prices in June 1946, July 1946, and January 1947.

TABLE XXVIII

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Ukraine: Food Prices in a Typical Public Market
(in roubles)

	June 1946	July 1946	January 1947
Bread, kilo	22.5	23.0	50.0 - 55.0
Meat "	about 60.0	70 - 100	60.0
Fish "	-	-	65.0
Milk, litre	16.0	15.0	16.0
Butter, kilo	190.0	190.0	230.0
Eggs, dozen	42.0	48.0	-
Cereals (various) kilo	-	50.0	-
Sugar	-	100.0	-
Vegetable oil	-	200.0	200.0

- Very little or none on sale. Supplies vary greatly but are never very large.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

UNRRA Supplies and the Food Situation

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Until the produce from local farms became available in the spring and summer of 1946, the diet of the urban population of the Ukraine depended principally, apart from bread, on UNRRA food supplies, which in the beginning consisted almost entirely of U.S. army rations, plus some dried and evaporated milk and tushonka. Urgently needed fats and oils were slow in arriving; up to May only 8,596 tons had been received in the Ukraine. The shortage was critical, since domestic production was providing a rate of only 4 to 5 kilograms of fats a year per person, as compared with 12.8 in 1940 and 22 kilograms in 1929.

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Very little food was being received from other parts of the Soviet Union, and a protracted dry spell was threatening the 1946 harvest. Official rations for almost all categories of consumers were low;

in the eastern Ukraine in the course of twenty years. At first their 728
actions were moderate but with the passage of time they began to develop and to reveal those tendencies which had marked their course in the east.

The first task was the reorganization of the country geographically. On September 28[1] they had come to a new agreement with [648]
the Germans, whereby Germany had given up her claims to Lithuania in return for the area between the San and the Buh Rivers. So the Soviets assigned Wilno and its territory to an independent Lithuania; they annexed the region further south to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the rest to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This left to the Germans four sections of Western Ukraine, Kholmshchyna, Pidlyashshya, Posannya, and Lemkivshchyna, which were included in the Polish Government General and were governed directly by the Nazis, who allowed the appointment of a Ukrainian Central Committee to represent the Ukrainians before the higher authorities, especially in question of relief, etc.

The Soviet territory[2] was divided into six districts with their 728
centres at Lviv, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil, Rivne and 631
Lutsk. Each of these was then divided into rayons or regions with about 25,000 population. The centres of these regions were often small towns but the division was made quite arbitrarily and each centre was amply provided with bureaucratic machinery.

The economic condition of the country was extremely bad and [433]
the only saving feature was that the harvest had already been gathered, so that there was a good chance for a large part of the agricultural population, even of the poor, to survive during the winter. Yet the influx of refugees fleeing before the German advance filled the cities and the severance of connections with the west prevented the arrival of any more manufactured goods or supplies and, of course, none came from the east.

On the contrary, there came a new swarm of Soviet officials who 436
were themselves amazed at the wealth of goods in what, to the natives, seemed impoverished markets. They brought with them liberal sums of money to buy whatever they wished and they were

[1] [1939 -- Analyst]
[2] [of occupied Poland -- Analyst]

436 the more favored because the Soviets equated in value the Polish zloty and the Soviet karbovanets. When we take into consideration the fact that prior to the war a pound of meat in Poland cost four zloty and in the UkSSR twenty-five to thirty karbovantsy, the vast purchasing power of the Soviet officials can be seen. Then in December,[1] to ruin the native population, they arbitrarily stopped the zloty as legal tender, so that the Ukrainian population lost everything, except those fortunate persons who had succeeded in exchanging their Polish money for German marks by clandestine trade across the border.

191 This swarm of officials was of various kinds. Those who were attached to fields like military affairs, the railroads, the posts and telegraphs, etc., i.e. those branches which were directly under the All-Union Commissariats, made no concealment of the fact that Russian was from now on to be the chief language. Other sections which were under the Commissariats in Kiev first adopted Ukrainian as their official tongue, but by the middle of 1940 they, too, had passed over to the use of Russian, exactly as had been done in all the offices in Kiev.

661 471 By the end of November,[1] when the supplies in the stores were already becoming exhausted, the actual work of nationalization commenced. The former owners were often thrown out, if their establishments had been of any size, and as former wealthy individuals they were refused food tickets and other privileges on the ground that they belonged to the non-laboring element and were enemies of the people. This meant that they were compelled to sell upon the black market everything that they had been able to save or which they possessed and which had not been confiscated, and during the winter many of them, like the Polish landlowners and the police who fell into Communist hands, were deported under atrocious and inhuman conditions to Kazakhstan and Central Asia to disappear.

[665] On the other hand, the Soviets introduced at once the idea of dining halls for the workers and special stores for Communists and higher functionaries where they could secure easily and cheaply whatever there was to be obtained in Western Ukraine.

[1] [1939--Analyst]

/91/ [Galicia] Self-Aid [Volhynia]

555 Galicia and Volhynia are parts of the ghetto of the world, lying between Cracow and Odessa. There is no question about the fact that anyone who can here compete commercially with the Jews and politically with the Poles has certain abilities. The Ukrainians of Galicia have a talent for organization. If their business methods are often primitive according to our conceptions, it is not their fault. Where proper money is scarce, 555 [436] as is the case among all small peasants of the East and Southeast, it is replaced by some market- 476 able goods: people unhesitatingly deal in eggs. Ukrainian cooperatives tried very hard to change these conditions; they were equally adept in ancient barter as in international business involving clearing and regulations pertaining to payments and foreign exchange.

Jews and cooperatives waged a bitter fight against each other. But where usury and chain businesses of ill repute flourish, cooperatives [452] have an easy time of it. Before the First World War the usurers demanded a 100% interest. Now they say: "I am giving you money; good, - but you must sell me your calves, your geese, your chickens and your eggs." For a zentner of seed they demand two zentner of produce from the harvest. In the gin shops they manage to obtain, by fraudulent means, the best pastures of the Huzul country, only to rent them to the former owners. If the cooperative makes its way into such villages which are under Jewish domination, it soon has the peasants on its side, and since no one buys from the Jew, no one sells to him and his inn is avoided, he must sooner or later pack up his belongings. /92/

For the Ukrainians the Jewish problem is a 563 problem of food. Wherever people have ambitions and where they desire to improve their basic way of living, they run up against Jews. Jews

elements which are absolutely essential to her economic existence. In this new phase of reasoning, it is evident that other interests than those of the Ukraine intervene, and one can easily detect the Russian point of view. However, in our present study of the subject, let us lay aside all thought of any ulterior motive on the part of our adversaries, and approach the matter in an objective manner, in order to discern, if possible, the vital economic interests of the Russian people which might suffer through the creation of an independent Ukraine.

Is Great Russia Economically Dependent on Ukraine?

Concisely stated, the three fundamental bases of opposition usually put forward are:

1. The Ukraine is the granary of Russia. Without Ukraine, upon which she depended for her entire supply of agricultural products, Russia would suffer from hunger.

2. The Ukraine separates Russia from the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, thus closing the door to foreign markets.

3. If the Ukraine were established in ethnographic limits, she would thus possess nearly all the coal and iron of the old Russian Empire, and hence would cut off Russia's present supply of these indispensable raw materials of industry.

Let us candidly and thoroughly examine each of these arguments.

U. 243 438 S.U 243 438

In the first place, statistics show that Ukraine has always been the granary for western Europe rather than for Russia and has, in fact, exported only a very small per cent of her cereal products into Russia. The latter, furthermore, possessed such an excess of grain that she herself has exported in the past, and still continues to export, an appreciable quantity of cereals.

Great Russia's Own Grain Supply Ample

For the years 1909-1911, during which time the exports were especially large, the total quantity of cereals shipped from former Russia averaged 440,000,000 bushels each year. Of this amount the nine Ukrainian governments

supplied 201,670,000. If we now add to these nine governments the Kuban, the Ukrainian region north of the Caucasus, as well as the Ukrainian parts of other governments which border them, we must increase these figures by 91,670,000, which gives to ethnographic Ukraine an exportation of about 293,340,000 bushels of cereals. During this time the other parts of former Russia, including Siberia, exported about 40,000,000 bushels annually. As neither Poland nor Finland exported cereals, and Lithuania and the Baltic provinces only small quantities, if any, it was Russia proper that had the large excess.

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As to the Ukraine, her exportations of cereals to Russia did not reach more than 10 to 15 per cent of her total ~~exports~~ export; that is to say, about ~~six or seven~~ 36 million bushels, and nearly all of that was destined for Poland, Lithuania and White Russia, Great Russia consuming only a small fraction of the amount. Then, too, the Ukrainian wheat has always had as a competitor in the markets of Moscow and Petrograd the wheat from the fields of Siberia and the regions of the Volga.

If hunger now exists in Russia, it is due to a dreadful crisis in transportation, to which may be added the fact that Siberia and some parts of the Volga regions refuse their wheat to Russia in the present Bolshevist state and, even within Bolshevist Russia, the peasants will not give their wheat to the cities, since they get nothing from the cities in return. In the Petrograd and Moscow districts, suffering has been heightened by the Allied blockade.

In this way, a fair analysis of existing agricultural conditions with reference to relative production and exportation in both Ukraine and Russia proves the fallacy of the first argument advanced by those who interpose these conditions as a barrier to Ukraine's economic freedom. The irrefutable fact remains that, instead of depending upon the Ukraine for wheat, Russia not only has enough for her own use but, even during those years when the harvests in the east of Russia and in Siberia fail to reach their maximum, retains a sufficient surplus of grain to enable her to export it in considerable quantities.

The second objection, which involves the question of 000

504 Let us compare for a moment the regions for which the Black and the Baltic Seas serve as ports. That for which the Black Sea affords an outlet does not extend more than 500 or 600 kilometers, while that served by the Baltic ports reaches as far as western Siberia. Thus, the Baltic region exceeds that of the Black Sea by several thousand kilometers.

000 Surely these facts, coupled with even the most cursory consideration of the Russian imperialistic policy, show beyond a doubt that in respect to the direct economic utilization of the southern ports, the setting up of a separate government by the Ukraine does not obstruct any fundamental interests of the Russian people. Briefly stated, Russia proper does not use directly the southern ports except Rostov, which is the outlet of the region of the Don and in part of the lower region of the Volga, but there is not such a vast difference between the Russian and Ukrainian interests that these minor details as to a common use of various ports can not be conciliated by special agreement.

Coal Fields of Ukraine Not Necessary to Great Russia

316 Proceeding directly to the third and last question, that
433 involving coal and iron, we are confronted first of all with the geographic fact that it is really within the ethnographic limits of the Ukraine that are found nearly all the coal fields of Donetz, as well as most of the productive centers of anthracite. More than 90 per cent of the total output of coal of the Donetz basin, during the last years of normal exploitation, came from the Ukrainian regions, while the total production of coal of the Donetz basin reached 70 per cent of the general production of coal of the old Russian Empire, and we may increase this to 85 per cent, if we do not include in the total the output of Russian
[438] Poland. Notwithstanding these percentages of production, the general statistics of railroad traffic, together with the data collected by the Special War Committee on the Supply of Fuel, show that nearly four-fifths of the Ukrainian coal and anthracite was used in Ukraine, one-fifth only being exported to Russia.

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The Ukraine has almost no fuel except the coal from Donetz. Northern and Central Russia, on the contrary, have wood, peat and coal from the south of Moscow. Northwestern Russia and the Baltic provinces never used the coal from Donetz, as it could not compete in price with the English or German coal. During the war, doubtless because the Baltic Sea was closed, they began to transport coal from Donetz to Petrograd. Now the Baltic Sea is reopened and its freedom guaranteed by the Allies. Therefore, English coal can regain its natural markets.

The industrial region of Moscow, as well as that of the Volga, received an enormous quantity of naphtha from Baku which competes as fuel with the coal of Donetz. When the conditions have again become normal, exports of naphtha will recommence, because the basin of the Volga is the natural outlet for the oil fields of Baku. The Urals and Siberia are supplied with local coal, while in western Siberia are found vast deposits, in the region of Kutznetsk. These beds are more extended and richer than those of Donetz, but the coal fields were scarcely worked because the means of transportation was very primitive. They can be joined to the Ural and Altai regions either by rail or water. Under these conditions the inexhaustible ore supplies of the Urals and the Altai district will supply the metal industry of Russia in such quantities that Russia will become metallurgically independent of the Ukraine. Thus the coal fields of Donetz, which have always been more Ukrainian than Russian, should in the future remain entirely Ukrainian.

Furthermore, the question of the basin of Donetz is not concluded. The ethnographic frontier of the Ukraine and of Russia passes through these coal fields. The Ukraine and Russia could easily, for their mutual interests, reach some understanding and modify this frontier. But in any event the most important part of the coal field should remain in the Ukrainian limits, because the facts up to date show how much more Donetz is bound to the Ukrainian industry than to that of Russia. The metallurgical industry alone of the Ukraine consumes nearly 30 per cent of the total production of the basin.

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2: Timoshenko S-4, 5 (no date) 1919 RD1 Ukraine RD1
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Ukraine's Iron Supply Not Essential to Great Russia

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We now come to the question of iron. Here also it is claimed that the economic development of Russia is impossible without the Ukrainian iron. But we can answer without the slightest hesitation that this affirmation is incorrect.

It is a fact that the Ukraine produced two-thirds or three-fourths of the iron of former Russia. She exported a considerable quantity into the old empire, but one cannot conclude that this situation will not change in the future. True, the development of the metallurgical industry in the Ukraine in the last forty years was much greater than in the Urals and the other provinces. But if we wish to draw more specific conclusions, we must remember that the beds of iron ore in the Ukraine are not very large. Those in the region of Krivy Rih in the Kherson government near that of Ekaterinoslav, which are now the principal source of the iron ore in the Ukraine, may exhaust themselves in a few decades as will the scarcely more abundant ore fields of Crimea.

It would be erroneous to assume that the metal production of the Ukraine would be adequate to the needs of all Russia for any great period of time. Knowing the probabilities of early exhaustion of the limited beds of Ukrainian ore, and in intelligent observance of the laws of conservation, Russia must, with that wisdom and foresight which has made for industrial soundness in all strong nations, increase her production of iron in the Urals and in Siberia. For the time being, however, and until Russia can bring into operation the products of her hitherto undeveloped areas, the Ukraine can and desires to maintain her place on the Russian markets with metals, as with sugar.

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Economic Co-operation is Possible

It is the earnest desire of the Ukraine that her future economic relations with Russia be intensely co-operative and that the commercial relations of the two states under

3: Mirchuk Ukraine RD1
433, 311, 471, 438

[For location of mineral deposits and other raw materials and indications of their importance to the economy of Ukraine, see category 116, pp. 146-188. For location and productivity of various industries, see pp. 164-188.]

668* such as the head of the *oblast* (district) administration, Alexander Iatseniuk, the chief of the city administration, Pavlovs'kyi, and nearly all of his department heads.[50] A wide variety of nationalist organizations sprang up, including Prosvita, churches, and an active theater. Local artists appeared on Ukrainian programs permitted by the German-controlled broadcasting station. [871] Schools, including two *gimnaziias* and a pedagogical institute, were reopened, and a local school administration was established.[51]

[369] The population of the city sank to forty-two thousand (including seven thousand Poles and two thousand Russians) after the [438] deportation of the Jews. However, economic life was stimulated by the reopening of a sugar refinery and other industries; markets were reopened and private trade was encouraged.[52] One hundred [795] and seventy-nine physicians were present, a very high number in [883] proportion to the population.[53] An extremely active youth organization, known, like its counterparts in the West Ukraine, as the Sich, was formed; its activities included sports, choral singing, theatricals, and development of an orchestra.[54]

All of these organizations were under the control of nationalist Ukrainians, although the emphasis appeared to be on the formation of a Ukrainian territorial state which would include all persons, of whatever ethnic origin, living on Ukrainian soil. Thus one of the chief administrative officials, the head of the *raion* administration (i.e., the rural area outside the city) was a Pole, and the director of the economic section of the city administration was a Russian.[55] There appears to have been a large measure of cordiality between the local groups and the OUN representa-

[50] Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2; 454th Sicherungsdivision, Section VII, Report of October 4, 1941, NOKW 2129 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2129).

[51] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 1, 1941, p. 1; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24 and 26, 1941, pp. 2 and 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 25, 1942, p. 5; *Nastup*, September 6, 1941, p. 5.

[52] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1, based on *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Zhitomir), August 3, 1941; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[53] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24, 1941, p. 2; many, however, were apparently Jews who were temporarily spared because of their usefulness (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2).

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 2, and *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2.

1/1 [Zhitomir in the East Ukraine, 1941 -- Analyst]

377 The functioning of the *Dnieprogues* station, which could open enormous possibilities of development of all kinds of industries and of the electrification of the railways, has nevertheless, despite its enormous power, failed to change the industrial geography of the Ukraine because it is just half-way between the Donietz basin and Krivoi-Rog and thus does not bring about any alteration in the distribution of the sources of energy.

438 Thus the heavy industry of the Ukraine remains, in its greater part, concentrated around this region, round Nikopol and along the northern edge of the Donietz basin.

325 Kharkov and its surroundings are the greatest metallurgical centres of the Ukraine. There great factories of turbines, of generators, of electrical machines, of tractors, of locomotives, of railway trucks, and of factory equipment, etc., are to be found.

327 The production of sheet-iron and of steel rails, tubes, plates, beams, wire, etc., is distributed among many factories of the Donietz basin, at Nikopol and at Dniepropetrovsk.

Zaporojie (not far from Krivoi-Rog and near the *Dnieprogues*) produces nearly 60 per cent of the special steels of the Union. The Soviets intend to create a new powerful centre of metal industry there.

397 Apart from Kharkov, factories producing all the
392 heavier machines such as locomotives are to be found in the Donbass (abbreviation of Donietz basin which we will now use), at Lougansk, and at Kramatorski, where an enormous newly constructed factory is one of the largest in the world.

402 The equipment for the light industry—the mills, wine-presses, oil mills and elevators—is chiefly manufactured at Berdiansk (Donbass), Melitopol (Northern Taurida), Tcherkassy (centre), Kiev, and Odessa.

392 Agricultural machinery comes from the factories of

Zaporojie, Ielisavetgrad (region of Odessa), Berdiansk 372
(on the Sea of Azov), and Kherson (at the mouth of the Dnieper).

The marine docks in which the ships of commerce 396
and of war are being built are at Nicolaiev (at the mouth of the Boug), and river constructions of all types at Kiev. There are important repair shops for railway stock at Odessa and Kiev.

We enumerate here only the districts in which the 000
larger metal industries are concentrated, the production of which exceeds local needs. The greater part of the 325
large Ukrainian towns, especially of the seaports, possess 438
small metal factories, the total production of which is not negligible.

It suffices to consult the economic map[1] of the Ukraine to realize that the heavier the products of the metal industry are, the more its centres are removed from the mining regions, a fact which gives a clearly rational character to the geography of Ukrainian metallurgy.

Besides metallurgy, heavy industry is represented in 385
the Ukraine by the chemical industry and in the first 382
instance by that which is based on coal. Such is the industry which produces azote, benzole, nitro-benzine, and sulphuric acid. Important factories engaged in the production of volatile materials have been built at Gorlovka, Lissitschansk, Konstantinovka, and Slaviansk (in the Donbass). This industry, which is still in its very early stages, already meets 30 per cent of the needs of Soviet Ukraine.

The factories producing superphosphates, whose annual production reaches 250,000 tons, are distributed between Konstantinovka (Donbass), Odessa, and Vinnitza, in Podolia.

Kharkov possesses great dye factories and those 386
producing paints, varnish, and enamel.

[1] [see category 116, p. 151---Analyst]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

to carry these goods. The imports consist of machinery, 505
manufactured goods, colonial and tropical products, 439
and chemicals; Odessa also imports coal from the [438]
Donets region, which is shipped at Mariupol or Taganrog.

The export trade of Berdyansk is chiefly coal, iron-ore, and grain. Mariupol principally exports Donets coal. The imports of both places are general, but a large proportion consists of chemicals and particular minerals required in the iron and steel industry in the Government of Yekaterinoslav.

The number and tonnage of the vessels entering the above-mentioned ports in 1910, and the amounts of the exports and imports, are shown in the following table:

	Total vessels entered.	*Tonnage.*	*British vessels entered.*	*Tonnage.*	*Imports (tons).*	*Exports (tons).*
Odessa	848	1,596,217	174	388,136	566,743	1,736,029
Nikolaev	544	1,126,441	315	676,834	178,790	2,070,419
Kherson	152	330,260	131	288,789	104,693	844,919
Berdyansk	180	269,365	38	65,492	28,693	416,451
Mariupol	231	394,451	67	119,242	266,693	1,587,161
				Total	1,145,612	6,654,979

The respective values of the exports and imports are more difficult to ascertain, but the difference in value is certainly not so great as that in weight. For some years before the war, the value of the exports of the whole of Russia exceeded that of her imports by about 40 per cent., and the proportion for the Ukraine ports is probably about the same.

Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Development.—The Ukraine Black Sea ports would appear, on 504 655
the whole, to be equal to the demands put upon them; in fact, there is severe competition between Odessa and Nikolaev. The recent improvements at Nikolaev have inspired the Odessa authorities to apply for powers to carry out great extensions, but so far these have not been granted, as the central authorities held that there was no prospect of a good return on the capital that would be required.

438 [655] In addition to factory industries there exists in Russia a group known as *kustarni* or domestic industries. They are considered so important by the Government that measures are taken by the various authorities to improve their output and conditions, to revive old ones and even to found new ones. Their range is wide, and they are carried on by families, by working syndicates or *artels* (cf. p. 73), or by individuals. In the Ukraine these industries are less well developed than in most parts of Russia, and in some provinces are hardly represented. There are three branches well established. Pottery is manufactured in the Governments of Kiev, Chernigov, and Poltava, where suitable clays are found, and the *kustarni* earthenware of these districts has a good reputation all over the country. Shoes, harness, and other leather goods are produced in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. Combs, buttons, and other objects made from animal horn are also a noted product of Poltava.

(6) Power

371 In the Ukraine power is almost exclusively produced by steam. Electric power is used for the tramways in Odessa and Kiev, but water-power is neglected, and electric drive for factory work is not employed.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(a) *General Characteristics; Markets, Fairs, &c.*

438 441 The trade of the Ukraine consists almost entirely in the movement and marketing of the produce of the land in one form or another. One of its noticeable features is the passage of commodities through several hands before they come into use. Nowhere are found so many middlemen, salesmen, and agents. This is caused principally by the lack of capital in the hands of the producer and a general encumbrance and hypothecation of land, crops, machinery, &c. There is

a very large population of Jews, who have become general tradesmen and brokers to the community. 438 441

The cereal crop is the subject of elaborate commercial transactions, and much of it is sold two or three times before it is harvested. The lack of proper storage leads to the rapid dispersal of the bulk of the surplus crop. Odessa and Nikolaev have corn exchanges where the export of the crop is financed, and there is an exchange for internal cereal trade at Yelisavetgrad.

The sugar trade is subject to Government control. A committee fixes annually the amount of sugar to be placed on the home market and the distribution of supplies to the refineries, the quantity so dealt with paying the minimum excise. After this allocation any surplus remaining is disposed of according to the general state of the market and the stock held over from the previous season, and is allotted for internal use or export. Russia was a signatory to the Sugar Convention of 1907, and agreed that, during the six years from the date of the convention, she should not export in all more than 1,000,000 tons. This specially affected the Ukraine as the principal sugar-producing area in Russia. 438 433 655

The sugar and alcohol markets are at Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa. 438

Wool of the finer sorts called 'Spanish' is dealt in principally at Kharkov, which is also the chief market for leather.

There is a flax market at Novozybkov in the province of Chernigov.

The principal timber markets are Yekaterinoslav and Kherson.

Odessa is a market for a great number of commodities produced in the interior, especially food-stuffs, cattle, tobacco, and vegetable oils.

The custom of transacting important business at fixed fairs is of very long standing in the Ukraine, and, while the importance of every fair tends to decrease at present owing to the adoption of other methods of trading, the fairs continue to be held, and, especially 438 443

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

438 in petty classes of trade. are still the occasion of much
443 buying and selling. The principal ones are as follows:

At Kiev the so-called Kontraktovaya fair is held from February 5 to 29. The goods dealt in are carpets, woven materials, silk, ready-made clothing, wooden goods, preserved fish, groceries, sugar, flax, iron, machines, coal, and salt. The real importance of the fair lies in its being the meeting-place for traders of all sorts from the neighbouring provinces. Bankers, agriculturists, and manufacturers meet to settle old and to make new contracts (hence its title), to liquidate or renew bills, &c. The turnover is about £250,000.

Poltava has a fair called Illinskaya from July 1 to 31. It is exclusively for the sale of skins, leather, and manufactures thereof. The turnover averages about £100,000.

Kharkov has four annual fairs, named after the religious festivals at which they are held: (1) Kreshenskaya (Epiphany), January 6 to February 1, for trade in manufactured goods, groceries, peltry, and leather. The turnover is about £1,250,000. (2) Troitskaya (Trinity), June 1 to 30, for trade in wool, sheepskins, and manufactured goods. Turnover, about £500,000. (3) Uspenskaya (Assumption), August 1 to 31, for manufactured and colonial goods. Turnover, about £900,000. (4) Pokrovskaya (Intercession of the Virgin), October 1 to 26 for general trade, as at Kreshenskaya. Turnover, about £1,250,000.

Jitomir has a hop fair from September 6 to 14 for the sale of the season's crop, the value of which fluctuates widely from year to year.

A large annual fair, principally for the disposal of wool, is held at Kakhovka.

438 The internal trade of the Ukraine is generally
452 conducted on the basis of a long credit, six to nine months by bill: and the fairs and exchanges give opportunity to gauge the general financial state of the country, which is almost totally dependent upon harvest conditions, and to provide for liquidation or renewal of the floating credit as circumstances require.

241 It is almost unbelievable that in many regions of the steppe the planted surface is not ploughed up, or in any case only superficially with a land-parer. The purpose is to conserve soil moisture. Often the entire sowing, the entire spring work of the farmer consists of a single process. A light land-parer scratches the surface; it has a box attached to it containing the seed, and the harrow is attached to this "ploughing and sowing machine". With this type of sowing one necessarily reaps a lot of weeds.

243 438 Nevertheless, before the war the Ukraine enjoyed the reputation of being a granary. During the years 1909 to 1913 the country produced on an average of 8.6 million more tons of grain annually than it consumed. The annual export amounted to /144/ an average of 4.3 million tons of wheat alone and 2.7 million tons of barley. (87) Surplus and export dropped considerably

87. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 390.

under Bolshevik rule. In 1934 only one million tons of grain were exported.

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425 669 In 1917, when the Bolsheviks became active, the general feeling in North and Central Ukraine was extremely favorable to an agrarian revolution. The land-hungry peasants were deeply convinced of the fact that the "right of the landowner was an injustice". Whoever promised the peasants that they were to receive all the land they could themselves cultivate, had won them over to his cause. As a matter of fact, in 1917, at the beginning of the revolution, the lands of the estate owners and the large farmers were immediately divided up, in the process of which the estates often went up in flames and

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
292 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects
531 testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hun-
241 garians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works,
438 Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the
341 twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
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SU 631 U 631

and Czechoslovakia (1945) that most Ukrainians of eastern Europe became united into one territorial entity.

The present administrative-territorial system was introduced into the Ukrainian SSR in 1932 by the creation of seven oblasts. By 1939 the number had increased to fifteen. Following the partition of Poland, in 1939, and the annexation of the Western Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR, six more oblasts (Volyn', Rovno, L'vov, Drogobych, Ternopol', and Stanislav) were added. In 1940 Rumania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR. The extreme northern and southern sections of the territory were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR as the Chernovtsy and Izmail oblasts in view of their predominant Ukrainian population. However, the Ukraine lost the greater part of Moldavian Autonomous SSR (formed in 1924) when the Moldavian territory was joined to the central part of Bessarabia to form the newly constituted Moldavian SSR. Seven districts (rayons) of the Moldavian Autonomous SSR, including those of Balta and Kotovsk remained in the Ukrainian SSR as part of the Odessa Oblast, due to the predominance of a Ukrainian population. In 1945 the western frontier of the Ukrainian SSR was changed in favor of Poland with the adoption of the so-called "Curzon line," which left the city of Przemyśl (Russian *Peremyshl'*) and areas to the northeast and southwest, along the San River, to Poland. In June, 1945, the Carpatho-Ukraine, or Ruthenia, was transferred from Czechoslovakia and constituted into the Transcarpathian (*Zakarpatskaya*) Oblast. At present the Ukrainian SSR is divided into twenty-five oblasts.

SU 438* U 438

The economy of the Ukrainian SSR combines a rich agricultural development with a powerful mining and metallurgical industry, based in particular on the coal of the Donets Basin and the iron ore of Krivoy Rog. As a result of the industrialization of the USSR, the Ukraine became not only a basic grain-exporting region of the USSR, as well as an area of intensive agriculture and agricultural industry, but also the major coal and metallurgical base and heavy-machine construction center of the USSR. The Ukraine has more than one fifth of the total sown area of the USSR and produces one quarter of the grain, two thirds of the sugar, three fifths of the coal and pig iron, one half of the salt and about one fifth of the machines and chemicals.

SU U 316 433

In 1940 the Donets Basin furnished 85 million tons of coal per year. It supplied not only all the industry of the Ukraine itself but also the

SU 316 433 U 316 433 metropolitan areas of Moscow, Leningrad, and other industrial centers, as well as the entire southern rail network of the USSR west of the Volga and south of the Moscow coal basin. During the period of the German occupation of the Ukraine (1941–43), the coal mines suffered greatly. At present, reconstruction work is in full swing, mines are being reestablished, and it is hoped to have reached prewar production by the end of the post-war Five-Year Plan. The major coal-mining centers are Stalino, Yenakiyevo, Gorlovka, Kadiyevka, Chistyakovo, Krasnyy Luch, and Sverdlovsk. Anthracite, used principally for fuel, is mined in the eastern and the southern sections, while coking coal is produced in the SU western and the northern parts of the Donets Basin.

327 433 U 327 433 The giant iron and steel mills of the Ukraine lie mainly in the western part of the Donbas, that is, in the coke-supplying area, in the Krivoy Rog iron basin, and along the Dnieper between these two raw-material sources. Among the mills producing over one million tons of pig iron per year are modernized prerevolutionary plants at Makeyevka (Donbas), and at Dnepropetrovsk and at Dneprodzerzhinsk on the Dnieper and new plants at Krivoy Rog, Zaporozh'ye, and Zhdanov. The Azovstal' mills at Zhdanov use Kerch' (Crimea) iron ore, which is shipped across SU the Sea of Azov.

392 438* U 392 438 Machine construction has been developed to a very large extent in the Ukraine in recent years. Due to the close proximity of the sources of metal and in view of the lack of skilled local labor, the Ukraine was designed to produce types of machinery requiring little precision work, but large amounts of metal. Plants located in the Donbas specialize in heavy machine construction; among them, Kramatorsk produces coal-mining and steel-milling machinery, and Voroshilovgrad has a large locomotive works. Agricultural machinery plants are located along the Dnieper and on the right bank. Khar'kov possesses a large tractor plant and locomotive works and produces hydro-turbines and electric motors. There are car-building works at Nikolayev and Dnepropetrovsk, shipyards at Nikolayev, Kherson, and Kiev, and oil-drilling machinery is SU made in L'vov.

381 438* U 381 438 The industrial picture of the Ukraine includes a number of factors suitable for the establishment of a strong chemical industry: the by-products of coking and metallurgical processes, the presence of such important raw materials as salt and phosphorites, the availability of cheap energy produced by coal-fed (*Zugres* and *Shtergres*) or hydroelectric (*Dneproges*) power stations, and finally the need for chemical products

in agriculture (fertilizers) and in other branches of the economy. There are several superphosphate plants on the right bank, a large soda industry in the Artemovsk-Lisichansk area in the north of the Donets Basin, based on local salt deposits, chemical plants tied closely to the coking and the metallurgical establishments, and sulphuric acid and fertilizer plants connected with the metallurgy of zinc.

In addition to zinc, which is imported into the Donets Basin, nonferrous metallurgy includes that of aluminum, which is also imported and worked at Zaporozh'ye on the basis of *Dneproges* power, and of mercury, mined near Nikitovka in the Donbas.

The petroleum and natural-gas industry is of only local importance and is intended to supply the Ukraine with its gas and liquid fuel needs. The oil fields lie in the foothills of the Carpathians, near Borislav and Drogobych. During the current Plan, a natural gas pipe line was laid from Dashava (in the oil fields) to Kiev. The Ukraine also imports petroleum from Baku via the ports of Osipenko and Odessa, and the station of Trudovaya (Donbas) is the terminus of a kerosene pipe line from the Groznyy fields.

The textile industry (wool, cotton, and linen milling) supplies only local needs. The food industry, on the other hand, is of national importance. This is true especially of the sugar-refining industry, located mainly in the Vinnitsa and Kiev oblasts, on the right bank, and in the Poltava and Kiev oblasts, on the left bank.

The agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR, less important than heavy industry with respect to the value of production, occupies, nonetheless, a major position in the economy of the USSR. Arable land occupies 60 percent of the total area. Prior to the Second World War the Ukraine was one of the regions best equipped with machine-tractor stations and agricultural machinery. Among the cereals, winter wheat in the west, spring wheat in the east, and barley are most important. The sugar beet is by far the major industrial crop; sunflower, cotton, and tobacco are grown to a lesser extent. Orchard farming is popular and produces melons and pumpkins, garden fruits (apples, pears, plums, and cherries), and in the south, apricots and grapes. Horses, cattle, and pigs are raised throughout the region.

The right-bank Poles'ye is least developed agriculturally. Marshes and forests occupy most of the area. In the isolated patches of moist arable land, potatoes, buckwheat, flax, and hemp are the chief crops. The area abounds, however, in pasture land, and dairy farming is

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major navigable through route of the Ukraine. The major ports are Zhdanov and Osipenko on the Sea of Azov, and Kherson, Nikolayev, and Odessa on the Black Sea. Odessa is one of the major maritime trade centers of the USSR.

The Ukraine exports coal, iron and steel, grain, salt, and sugar, and imports cloth from Moscow and Ivanovo, precision tools from Moscow and Leningrad, lumber from Gor'kiy Oblast, along the Volga, or from the Belorussian SSR along the Dnieper, petroleum products from Groznyy (by rail and pipe line) and from Baku (by sea via Batumi-Odessa), and fish from the Lower Volga.

Oblast Survey

The twenty-five oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR can be grouped into seven geographic regions on the basis of physical, economic, and historical factors: the right-bank and the left-bank sections of the wooded steppe, the Donets Basin, the Dnieper bend, the Black Sea lowland, the Ukrainian Poles'ye, and the Western Ukraine.

THE RIGHT-BANK WOODED STEPPE

The right-bank wooded steppe, which is the original settlement area of the Ukrainian people, includes the oblasts of Kamenets-Podol'skiy, Vinnitsa, and Kiev. Its fertile black-earth soils and the warm, humid climate have combined to turn the area into a region of intensive agriculture, a dense population, and a well-developed rail network. Sugar beets are the leading crop. Through careful tilling of the soil, the application of phosphate fertilizer, and the rotation with grains and forage grasses, high yields are obtained which furnish up to three tons of sugar per 2.5 acres. The principal grains are winter wheat, rye, barley, and oats. Leguminous crops (peas, lentils, beans) are extensively grown to restore soil fertility. In connection with the intensive crop cultivation, the raising of hogs and cattle for meat and milk production is also very important. Forage grasses and the by-products of the sugar-refining and associated distilling industries constitute an excellent feed supply. Also connected with the sugar economy of the area are the lignite and peat industries, which fuel the processing plants, the quarrying of limestone (used in the sugar-bleaching process), and the mining of phosphorite, which is converted into fertilizer.

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Kiev Oblast

Area, 15,900, population, 3,500,000

SU 133* 241 U 133 241 Kiev Oblast lies in the Dnieper lowland (in the north) and in the Volyn'-Podolian upland (in the south). It is drained by the Dnieper and its right affluents, the Teterev and the Ros' rivers. In the northern section, which penetrates into the forested Poles'ye, the growing of flax, potatoes, and buckwheat are important. The rest of the oblast falls within the sugar economy. Truck produce in the Kiev metropolitan area and orchards in the south, near Uman', and the southeast, near Smela, are important. Peat is worked mainly northwest of Kiev and near Smela, while lignite comes from Yurkovka near Zvenigorodka. Sugar mills abound throughout the center and the south; flour milling and distilling are other rural industries.

SU 361 438* U 361 438 Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR since 1934, was the third largest city of the USSR on the eve of the Second World War. Situated on the middle course of the Dnieper River, below the mouths of its two large affluents, the Pripet and the Desna, Kiev occupies a central location at the junction of the river, four rail trunk lines, and many highways. An ancient city and until the middle 13th century the capital of Kievan Russia, Kiev is the site of many historical relics and monuments. An early commercial and food-processing center, it developed into an industrial point of first rank under the Soviet regime. Its heavy industries produce machine tools, machines, motors, aircraft parts, boilers, agricultural implements, motorcycles, and bicycles, as well as equipment for chemical, sugar, and tanning industries. There are electrical (radios and telephones), textile, and food industries. A number of major enterprises, including lumber mills, a meat-packing plant, a rubber-goods factory, and railway-car works are located in the left-bank industrial suburb of Darnitsa. Shipyards produce vessels for the Dnieper River traffic. A natural-gas pipe line for industrial and domestic use was laid in the post-war period from Dashava.

Other major industrial centers of the oblast are Belaya Tserkov', south of Kiev, Uman' in the far south, and Smela and Cherkassy on the Dnieper in the southeast. They are primarily food-processing centers, with sugar and flour mills and metal, clothing, and leather industries.

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Vinnitsa Oblast

Area, 10,600, population, 2,300,000

Vinnitsa Oblast lies in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, bounded in the southwest by the Dniester River and drained by the Southern Bug River. In addition to the basic sugar-beet and wheat crops, fruits, tobacco, and corn are raised near the Dniester River. Viticulture is possible in the deep, protected valleys of the southwest. The oblast is one of the foremost sugar producers of the Ukraine.

Vinnitsa, on the Southern Bug, has an industry closely connected with the agricultural economy. It processes the local products (sugar, flour, meat, alcohol) and has machine repair shops and a superphosphate plant.

Mogilev-Podol'skiy, on the Dniester in the south, has food-canning, lumber, and metalworking industries.

Kamenets-Podol'skiy Oblast

Area, 8,000, population, 1,800,000

Kamenets-Podol'skiy Oblast is also located in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, north of the Dniester River. It lies at the western end of the sugar region and also engages in the raising of fruits, tobacco, and corn near the Dniester River. Phosphorite and peat deposits are worked. In the northern forest belt, lumbering, paper milling, and ceramics are the chief occupations.

Proskurov, the capital, is a rail center on the upper Southern Bug River. It has food industries (flour milling and sugar refining), machine shops, and clothing and furniture plants.

Other industrial points are Kamenets-Podol'skiy near the Dniester, with fruit canneries, meat-packing and clothing industries, and Shepetovka, a rail center in the forest area, with sawmills, and meat-packing and railroad shops.

THE LEFT-BANK WOODED STEPPE

THE LEFT-BANK WOODED STEPPE includes the oblasts of Poltava, Sumy, and Khar'kov and represents a transition region between the right-bank Ukraine in the west and the Central Black-Earth Region of the Russian SFSR in the east. Although sugar beets continue to form a major crop, the emphasis is placed to a greater extent on grain crops, among which winter and spring wheat are most important. Potatoes and

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tobacco, in the north, and sunflowers and melons, in the south, are also raised. Hog raising forms the basis of a major meat-packing industry. Machinery industries are located chiefly in Khar'kov.

Khar'kov Oblast

Area, 12,000, population, 2,500,000

Khar'kov Oblast lies in the southwestern outspurs of the Central Russian upland and is drained by the Northern Donets and the upper Orel' and the lower Oskol rivers. Sugar beets predominate in the north, wheat and sunflowers in the south, and truck produce and orchards in the Khar'kov metropolitan area. Rural industry is based chiefly on the processing of the agricultural products and engages in sugar refining, flour milling, sunflower-oil extraction, distilling, and dairying. The oblast possesses a good rail network on the route from the Donets Basin to Moscow.

Khar'kov, the capital of the Ukraine until 1934, is its second city and its foremost machine-construction center. Situated at the junction of six rail lines at the gates to the Donets Basin and Krivoy Rog industrial areas, it dates from the seventeenth century and developed rapidly after the industrialization of the southern Ukraine in the late nineteenth century. Its impressive array of products includes tractors, turbine generators, coal-mining and oil-drilling equipment, electrical goods, diesel motors, ball bearings, machine tools, harvester combines, locomotives, and bicycles. It also has light and food industries.

Izyum, on the Northern Donets, southeast of Khar'kov, has metalworking, ceramic, and sawmilling industries.

Kupyansk, a major rail center east of Khar'kov, engages in machine construction, metalworking, and lumber and sugar milling.

Poltava Oblast

Area, 13,200, population, 2,200,000

Poltava Oblast, in the Dnieper lowland, is bounded on the southwest by the Dnieper River and drained by its left affluents, the Sula, the Psel, and the Vorskla. It grows chiefly sugar beets and wheat, as well as other grains, hemp, mint, sunflowers, and corn. Sugar refining and flour milling are the main rural industries.

Poltava, a four-way rail junction on the Vorskla River, is a processing center for a rich sugar and wheat region. It has locomotive repair shops, flour mills, meat-packing plants, and oil presses. Just northeast is the

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site of the battle of Poltava (1709), which marked the decisive defeat of the Swedes under Charles XII by Peter the Great.

Kremenchug, a lumber- and grain-trading point on the Dnieper, has light and food industries and produces road-construction machines. Its right-bank suburb, Kryukov, has large railway-car works.

Sumy Oblast

Area, 9,400, population, 1,700,000

Sumy Oblast, lies in the western outliers of the Central Russian upland and is drained by the upper Vorskla, the Psel, the Sula, and the Seym rivers. Basic crop combinations are sugar beets and wheat in the south, and hemp and wheat in the north. Also grown in the north are potatoes and buckwheat; in the south, tobacco and mint. Sugar refining, flour milling, and hemp retting are the chief industries. An oil field is under development near Romny.

Sumy is a sugar-refining center on the Psel River; it produces also agricultural machines, chemical fertilizer, and woolens.

Other industrial cities are Konotop, a rail junction with machine shops and food industries, and Shostka, which produces chemicals and photographic film.

DONETS BASIN

THE DONETS BASIN, which includes the oblasts of Voroshilovgrad and Stalino, is the most heavily industrialized section of the Ukraine and one of the principal industrial bases of the USSR. The impressive industrial development of the district is the result of the combination of local coal production and the iron-ore imports from the Krivoy Rog area, which forms the basis of the large-scale metallurgical industry. Nearly all the major mills concentrated in the Donbas pass through a full cycle of metallurgical production; they had a prewar capacity of 6 million tons of pig iron, 5½ million tons of ingot steel, and 3 million tons of rolled metal. The coking process, which is essential for the iron and steel industry, also feeds the basic chemical industries producing nitrate fertilizer and other chemicals. The use of iron and steel products in the heavy-machine industry completes the industrial scheme of the region. Associated with these principal activities are the quarrying of building and flux materials (dolomite, limestone, refractory clays, and cement rock), the mining of salt, mercury, and lead-zinc ores, as well as large

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SU 327 438* U 327 438

glass and soda works. A dense rail network and a unified power-transmission system connect the various enterprises. The vast number of urban centers, cities and workers' settlements, which have grown up around the metallurgical and machinery works and the coal mines, represent a concentration of almost one third of the urban population of the republic within 1/20 of its area.

Stalino Oblast

Area, 10,200, population, 3,000,000

SU 133* U 133 SU 135 U 135 SU 438* U 438

Stalino Oblast includes the western section of the Donets Basin, extending from the Sea to Azov in the south to the Northern Donets in the north. Agriculture (wheat, sunflowers, and cotton) is of importance only outside of the industrial section. Salt is mined near Artemovsk and mercury near Nikitovka. The principal coal-mining centers are Stalino, Makeyevka, Yenakiyevo, and Gorlovka.

Stalino, the largest city of the Donets Basin, had a population of 392,000 in 1948. It was originally called Yuzovo, or Yuzovka, for a Scottish industrialist, Hughes; it was called Stalin in the early part of the Soviet period. It has metallurgical, chemical, and coal-mining industries.

Makeyevka, a few miles northeast of Stalino, is the site of the Kirov metallurgical works, one of the largest of the Donbas, and coking installations. Coal mines operate in the suburban areas.

Yenakiyevo was called Rykovo from the 1920's until 1935, then Ordzhonikidze until 1943, when it again received its original name. It has a metallurgical industry, chemical works, and coal mines.

Gorlovka also has metallurgical, chemical, and coal-mining industries. Its northern suburb of Nikitovka has mercury mines and near-by Trudovaya is the terminus of an oil pipe line from the Groznyy fields in the Caucasus.

Konstantinovka has a metallurgical industry, zinc works, and produces ceramics, glass, and cement, as well as superphosphate fertilizer.

Kramatorsk is noted as a heavy-machine construction center which produces mining and metallurgical equipment. It also has railway-car repair shops and ceramics works. Druzhkovka, to the south, is another machinery center.

Slavyansk is a chemical center where there are salt mines and soda works, limestone quarries, and porcelain works. Artemovsk (formerly Bakhmut), to the southeast, is the center of an important salt-mining

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SU 438* U 438 region, having 85 percent of the reserves of the USSR, and the site of soda works.

Debal'tsevo is one of the chief rail centers of the Donets Basin.

SU [504] U [504] Chistyakovo, to the south, is a major coal-mining point.

Zhdanov, called Mariupol' until 1948, the principal port for the Donets Basin, on the Sea of Azov, is the seat of the new Azovstal' metallurgical works, one of the largest of the region. It also has the Il'ich works, which produce special steels, shipyards, and fish canneries.

Voroshilovgrad Oblast

SU Area, 10,300, population, 1,800,000

133* U 133 Voroshilovgrad Oblast is the easternmost division of the Ukrainian SSR. It includes the eastern portion of the Donets Basin and extends northward into a typical Ukrainian wheat and sunflower region. Most of its coal mines produce anthracite.

SU 438* U 438 Voroshilovgrad, formerly called Lugansk, has large locomotive works and metallurgical and pipe-rolling mills and produces enameled goods and mining machinery.

Voroshilovsk (formerly Alchevsk) has metallurgical and coking industries. Just south is the coal-mining city of Parizhskaya Kommuna [Paris commune].

SU 316 438* U 316 438 Kadiyevka, called Sergo from 1935 until 1943, and Krasnyy Luch are the two main coal-mining centers of the oblast, with many large satellite towns grouped near by. Almaznaya, southwest of Kadiyevka, produces special steel alloys. Lesser coal centers in the southeastern section of the region are Krasnodon, Sverdlovsk, and Roven'ki.

Rubezhnoye, in the northern coal district, on the Northern Donets, has large chemical (explosives) works, and produces paints and glass.

DNIEPER BEND

SU 325 U 325 The Dnieper Bend, which includes Dnepropetrovsk Oblast and the adjacent section of Zaporozh'ye Oblast, is the second center of heavy industry in the Ukraine. Metallurgy, which is largely based on Krivoy Rog iron ore and Nikopol' manganese, is the principal branch of the industry. It receives its coal and flux materials from the Donets Basin. Unlike the Donbas, which frequently suffers from a shortage of water, it is amply supplied with water from the Dnieper River, which is also the source of most of its electric power. The main industrial centers lie

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either at the sources of raw materials (Krivoy Rog, Nikopol') or on the Dnieper River (Dneprodzerzhinsk, Dnepropetrovsk, and Zaporozh'ye). Agricultural production emphasizes wheat, barley, sunflowers, southern hemp, and soy beans. On the basis of the local grain production and grain brought along the Dnieper, a large flour-milling industry has developed.

SU 241 438* U 241 438

Dnepropetrovsk Oblast

Area, 12,600, population, 2,200,000

SU 133* 241 U 133 241

Dnepropetrovsk Oblast extends from the Dnieper Bend to the Donets Basin and is divided into two equal sections by the course of the Dnieper River. Grains and sunflowers are the basic crops, with some hemp in the northeast and cotton in the southwest. The major rural industries are flour milling, meat packing, and dairying.

SU 438* U 438

Dnepropetrovsk, on the Dnieper River, is a major industrial and transportation center formerly called Yekaterinoslav. It has large metallurgical works, pipe rolling mills, rail and sheet-metal mills, and steel-construction works. An automobile plant is to be established during the post-war Five-Year Plan. The city has clothing, leather, and food industries and is an important lumber-trade center.

Dneprodzerzhinsk, on the Dnieper, west of Dnepropetrovsk, has metallurgical and chemical works, producing rolled steel products, coke, and nitrate fertilizer, plastics, and cement. Metal construction and railway-car building are other important activities.

Krivoy Rog, the center of a rich iron-ore region, distinguished by reserves of more than one million tons and a high metal content (70 percent), has metallurgical works and iron foundries.

Nikopol', the center of one of the main manganese areas of the USSR, has concentrating plants, shipyards, and one of the largest pipe-rolling mills of the Union. The manganese mining areas lie northeast of Nikopol' in the district of Marganets [manganese] and in the northwest, near Ordzhonikidze.

Lesser industrial centers are Novo-Moskovsk, with sheet-metal mills, and Pavlograd, a pulp-milling and furniture city.

Zaporozh'ye Oblast

Area, 10,400, population, 1,300,000

SU U 241

Zaporozh'ye Oblast extends from the Dnieper River to the Sea of Azov. Agricultural emphasis is on wheat in the north and on cotton

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

in the southern flat steppes. Other crops include castor beans, vineyards (near Osipenko), and fruits near Melitopol' and Kamenka-Dneprovskaya.

Zaporozh'ye (the former Aleksandrovsk) is a major industrial and hydroelectric-power center, the site of the Dnieper dam and power station (*Dneproges*). This largest water-power producer of Europe has a capacity of 550,000 kilowatts. Completed in 1932, the dam was blown up in 1941 by the retreating Russians in accordance with their scorched-earth policy. Reconstruction began shortly after its recapture in 1943, and in 1947 the first turbine went into operation. The power generated by *Dneproges* furnished the basis for the industrial development of Zaporozh'ye, supplying its new special steel works, aluminum, and magnesium plants. It produces harvester combines and chemicals.

Melitopol', an agricultural center in the southern steppe, has machine shops, producing diesel motors, grain-elevator equipment, and pumps. In addition to chemical and furniture industries, it also has flour mills, meat-packing plants, and cottonseed-oil presses.

Osipenko, until 1940 called Berdyansk, is an important port on the Sea of Azov. It has agricultural machinery works, an aircraft plant, shipyards, and railroad repair shops. Near by is a health and beach resort.

THE BLACK SEA LOWLAND

THE BLACK SEA LOWLAND, with its dry level steppes, includes the oblasts of Odessa, Nikolayev, Kherson, the southern part of Zaporozh'ye, as well as Kirovograd and Izmail. This area which was annexed by the Russian Empire only in the eighteenth century, is a region of relatively recent settlement. Only toward the end of the last century did extensive grain growing replace the previously predominant pastoral economy, and the region developed into the main grain producer of the Ukraine. In the Soviet period a vast cotton area was introduced in the lower Dnieper area and cultivated by dry-farming methods in rotation with fodder crops. Elsewhere sunflowers, soy beans, fruits, melons, and vineyards became important. The local industry is closely connected with the agricultural production and engages in processing and machine manufacturing. Shipbuilding is centered in the large coastal cities.

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Ukraine RU1

Kherson Oblast

Area, 10,600, population, 700,000

Kherson Oblast extends north of the Crimea from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea. It is a typical flat, dry steppe, with cotton and wheat growing. Kakhovka, on the Dnieper River below Zaporozh'ye, is the site of the second great Dnieper dam, scheduled for 1951–57, with irrigation canals reaching into the Crimea. Skadovsk and Khorly, on the Black Sea, and Genichesk, on the Sea of Azov, are minor fishing ports.

Kherson is a major port at the mouth of the Dnieper River, where there are shipyards, repair docks, agricultural machinery works, and extensive food-canning industries. It is the terminus of a new railroad built during the Second World War from the Crimea.

Nikolayev Oblast

Area, 7,500, population, 800,000

Nikolayev Oblast lies on the Black Sea and is drained by the lower Southern Bug and the Ingul rivers. Cotton and wheat are the chief crops, with castor beans and sunflowers in the north, truck produce near Nikolayev, and dairy farming. In the rural areas flour milling, dairying, and sugar refining are the main industries.

Nikolayev lies at the head of the Bug Liman, over forty miles from the Black Sea. It is a major shipbuilding center and exports grain, sugar, iron, and manganese ore. It produces agricultural machines and has textile, food, and fish-canning industries.

Odessa Oblast

Area, 10,800, population, 1,800,000

Odessa Oblast lies in the western section of the Black Sea lowland and extends from the Black Sea to the Volyn'-Podolian upland in the north. It is bounded in the west by the Moldavian SSR. Numerous minor intermittent streams drain it in the south, and the Southern Bug in the north. Sugar beets are the main crop in the north, wheat and sunflowers in the center, and cotton in the south. Of lesser importance are corn, fruits, and castor beans. Sugar refining, flour milling, dairying, and wine making are the chief rural industries.

Odessa, the third city of the Ukraine and one of the major ports of the USSR, exports lumber and grains, and imports oil from the Caucasus, coal from the Donbas, cement from Novorossiysk, for local in-

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

SU 438* U 438 dustries and for transshipment to the right-bank Ukraine, Belorussia, and as far as Leningrad. Its industries include machinery works, which produce agricultural implements, machine tools, grain-elevator and food-industry equipment, cranes, and printing machinery. Its food industries process mainly sugar, flour, and canned goods. There are clothing and shoe factories, chemicals plants (superphosphate, iodine, linoleum, petroleum refining), woodworking and jute industries. The city has shipyards and railroad shops; during the post-war Plan, an automobile assembly plant will go into operation. Situated on the picturesque hillside, Odessa descends in several terraces, including a famous stairway, to the sea. Northward and southward along the coast are well-known health resorts (Khadzhibey Liman, Kugal'nik Liman Arkadiya, and Fontan) with mineral springs and mud baths. Regular overseas connections are maintained from the port.

Pervomaysk (formerly Ol'viopol') is situated on the Southern Bug and produces agricultural machines, flour, and meat.

Kirovograd Oblast

Area, 9,600, population, 1,100,000

SU 133* 241 U 133 241 Kirovograd Oblast lies somewhat north of the level steppe in the Volyn'-Podolian upland. It is bounded on the northeast by the Dnieper River and drained by the Ingul and Ingulets rivers. Wheat is the basic crop; sugar beets are grown in the northwest and the east, sunflowers in the south, and potatoes and flax in the moist, wooded region of the north. There are deposits of lignite, kaolin, refractory clays, and granite. Sugar refining, flour milling, and dairying are the main rural industries.

SU 438* U 438 Kirovograd was originally called Yelizavetgrad. In 1924 it was renamed Zinov'yevsk, then Kirovo in 1936, and Kirovograd in 1939. It lies on the upper Ingul River in a lignite-mining region and has important agricultural machine works and food-processing plants.

Znamenka is a rail center which has metalworking and food industries.

Aleksandriya, which has tanneries and flour mills, is also developing into the main lignite-mining center of the right-bank Ukraine.

Izmail Oblast

Area, 4,800, population, 700,000

SU 133* U 133 Izmail Oblast was formed in 1940 out of the southernmost part of Bessarabia which had a predominant Ukrainian and Russian popula-

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RD1

SU 133x u 133

tion. It lies between the Dniester River and the Kiliya arm of the Danube delta and has Moldavian minorities in the northwest and Bulgarian elements in the west, near Bolgrad. The main crops are wheat, barley, and corn in the northwest, where sheep are also extensively raised. Near the Black Sea there are large vineyards and orchards. The oblast is one of the most important wine-producing districts of the USSR. Along the coast there are fisheries and saltworks. Building materials constitute the only mineral resources.

SU 241 u 241

SU 438x [504] u 438 [504]

Izmail (Rumanian *Ismaïl*) is a port and a fishing center on the Kiliya arm of the Danube delta. It produces caviar and has an active grain and lumber trade.

Kiliya (Rumanian *Chilia Nouă*) is a fishing port on the Danube delta, east of Izmail.

Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy (Rumanian *Cetatea Albă*) was known as Akkerman until 1944. It is a port on the Dniester Liman, trading in wine, fish, and wool. It has fisheries and saltworks and is surrounded by vineyards and orchards.

POLES'YE

SU 311 241 u 311 241

The Ukrainian Poles'ye, which includes the oblasts of Zhitomir and Chernigov and the northern sections of Kiev and Sumy oblasts, is distinguished by a relatively high humidity, wooded terrain (especially in the west), and podsolic soils, similar to its Belorussian counterpart, which adjoins it in the north. Among the sparsely settled population, industries are poorly developed. Intensive crops are grown in the forest clearings, including flax, hemp, potatoes, and forage crops, which support some dairy-cattle herds. In the south, along the border of the wooded steppe zone, sugar beets and tobacco are cultivated. The Poles'ye is the only Ukrainian region (not counting the western oblasts, which have not been long exposed to the Soviet planned economy) where rye acreage exceeds that of wheat. Buckwheat is also grown as a local food staple. Industry is largely based on agricultural and lumber resources. Among the food industries, starch processing and distilling are the chief activities. There are woodworking and furniture plants, porcelain works, tanneries, and hemp and flax retting installations. Among the mineral resources, one should note granite, sandstone, used in the making of refractory bricks, and labradorite. Peat extraction is important as a fuel basis.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

Zhitomir Oblast

SU Area, 11,600, population, 1,800,000

133* Zhitomir Oblast lies on the northern edge of the Volyn'-Podolian up-
241 land and extends northward into the Poles'ye. Sugar beets and wheat
U penetrate into the southern section, but in the remainder, potatoes, flax,
133 buckwheat, and hops are grown. The forested area in the north yields
241 lumber, clays, kaolin, and granite, and quartzite and has ceramic and
SU 438* paper-milling industries. In the southern rural areas sugar refining, dis-
U tilling, and flour milling are the main industries.
438

Zhitomir, on the Teterev River, is a rail center, with lumber and grain trade. It has large furniture factories.

Berdichev, an active trading center, has important sugar and leather industries and clothing and dyeing plants, and flour and tobacco products are produced there.

Korosten', a rail junction in the northern part of the oblast, has various chemical plants, glass and porcelain works, and lumber and paper mills.

Novograd-Volynskiy, in the southwest, has machine shops and distilling and furniture industries.

Chernigov Oblast

SU Area, 12,200, population, 1,700,000

133* Chernigov Oblast is bounded on the west by the Dnieper and is drained
241 by its chief left affluent, the Desna River. In addition to the basic rye,
U oats, and buckwheat crops, hemp and flax are grown in the north, po-
133 tatoes in the center, and sugar beets, tobacco, and mint in the southeast.
241 Lumbering is carried on in the wooded areas of the north and the west,
SU 438* and peat cutting in the marshy river valleys. Sugar refining, flour mill-
U ing, meat packing, and flax and hemp retting are the main rural indus-
438 tries.

Chernigov, on the right bank of the Desna River, is one of the oldest cities of the Ukraine, having lumber and food-processing industries (canned goods, alcohol, and flour) and chemical works.

Nezhin is an agricultural center in a grain, potato, and sugar-beet district, while Priluki, the other industrial center of the oblast, processes sugar, tobacco, and flour and engages in the manufacture of clothing, leather goods, and furniture.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine R01

WESTERN UKRAINE

THE WESTERN UKRAINE includes those areas (except for Izmail Oblast) which were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR after 1939 and later. Six oblasts (Rovno, Volyn', Ternopol', L'vov, Stanislav, and Drogobych) were annexed in the autumn of 1939 following the partition of Poland and the Soviet occupation of its eastern section. Chernovtsy Oblast was formed in the Northern Bukovina and the extreme northern section of Bessarabia after the acquisition of these territories from Rumania, in the summer of 1940. The Transcarpathian Oblast was ceded to the Ukraine according to an agreement with Czechoslovakia in 1945. The Western Ukraine can be roughly considered in four geographical sections: the Carpathian section in the south, on the slopes and in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, the Poles'ye, a northern lowland along the right affluents of the Pripet River, the hilly central section in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, and the Transcarpathian section.

SU 631 U 631

The Carpathian section of the Western Ukraine includes the oblasts of Chernovtsy, Stanislav, and Drogobych. Its economy is based essentially on the mineral resources of the area: petroleum, natural gas, salt, and potash, and on the lumber resources on the slopes. There are a number of health resorts in the valleys.

SU 135 U 135 SU 529 U 529

Chernovtsy Oblast

Area, 3,200, population, 900,000

Chernovtsy Oblast lies along the upper Prut and the Dniester rivers. The forests (mainly beech), building materials, salt, and petroleum are found in the higher foothills. Agriculture puts the emphasis on grains (wheat, corn, and barley), potatoes and sugar beets in the south and on fruit growing along the Dniester, in the northeast. Sheep raising and lumbering are the main activities in the mountains. Sawmilling, woodworking, sugar refining, flour milling, and wine making are the chief rural industries.

SU 133* 241 U 133 241 SU 438* U 438

Chernovtsy (Rumanian *Cernăuţi*) called Chernovitsy until 1944, lies on a terrace above the Prut River. It has large textile and machine industries and produces chemicals, lumber, and food products.

Storozhinets (Rumanian *Storojineţ*) is a road center in the agricultural region southwest of Chernovtsy.

SU 438* U 438 Khotin (Rumanian *Hotin*) lies in an orchard and vineyard area on the Dniester River. There is a noted leather industry.

Stanislav Oblast

Area, 5,400, population, 1,300,000

SU 133* U 133 Stanislav Oblast is drained by the upper Dniester and its right affluents descending from the Carpathian Mountains. It has important petroleum, salt, natural-gas, and potash deposits in the areas of Dolina and Bolekhov, with petroleum fields extending along the foothills in a southeasterly direction to Kosmach, southwest of Kolomyya. The principal oil towns are Bolekhov, Dolina, Peregínsko, Bogorodchany (where SU 313 U 313 ozocerite is also secured), Solotvin, Nadvornaya, Pechenezhin, and Kosmach. Petroleum is refined at Bolekhov, Stanislav, and Kolomyya. The main lumber centers are Delyatin and Kuty, which has a large wood-SU 241 U 241 distillation industry. On the right bank of the Dniester River lies the agricultural zone of the oblast, where grains, tobacco, and sugar beets are raised. Tobacco is processed at Zabolotov and sugar at Gorodenka.

SU 438* U 438 Stanislav (Polish *Stanisławów*, German *Stanislau*) has railroad and machine shops, an oil refinery, and textile and leather industries and produces asphalt, ceramics, lumber, and food products.

Kolomyya (Polish *Kołomyja*, German *Kolomea*), on the upper Prut River, has machine works and oil-refining and chemical plants. Textiles and cement are also produced.

Drogobych Oblast

Area, 4,000, population, 1,200,000

SU 135 U 135 Drogobych Oblast lies on the northern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains and is bordered by Poland in the west. It is the chief petroleum region of the Western Ukraine, with the chief oil fields in the area of Drogobych and Borislav. Near by are potassium and magnesium salt mines and natural-gas wells. Salt is mined at Dobromil'. Agriculture is SU important along the Dniester River.

SU 438* 315 U [438] 315 Drogobych (Polish *Drohobycz*) is the center of the Western Ukrainian petroleum region, with important refining and chemical installations and potash and magnesium salt mines. It trades in petroleum, livestock, and agricultural products and produces rubber goods, lumber, and food products.

SU 315 Borislav (Polish *Borysław*) is another petroleum center southwest of Drogobych. It has petroleum and natural-gas wells and engages in the

manufacture of drilling equipment and the processing of ozocerite. The health resort of Truskavets, with mineral springs, lies just to the east.[1]

Sambor is an agricultural center, with sawmilling, flour-milling, and distilling industries.

Stryy (Polish *Stryj*) is a rail center where there are machine and metalworking industries, producing mainly drilling equipment, and chemical and lumber (matches and furniture) plants. Petroleum and natural gas are secured near by. From the gas wells of Dashava, just northeast of the city, a pipe line has been laid to Kiev during the post-war Five-Year Plan for industrial and domestic consumption.

The Poles'ye, which is wooded in the north, close to the Pripet River, also contains extensive marshy areas. It is the most backward section of the Western Ukraine. Its subsistence crops are rye and potatoes. Industry is poorly developed and is restricted to flour milling, saw-milling, and brickworking in the rural areas.

Rovno Oblast

Area, 8,000, population, 1,200,000

Rovno Oblast is drained by the Goryn and its affluent, the Sluch'. In the south, on the higher ground of the Volyn'-Podolian upland, agriculture produces grains, hops, tobacco, and sugar beets; in the northern section lumbering is the main industry. Granite, cement rock, and slate are quarried.

Rovno (Polish *Równe*) is a rail center having railroad shops, agricultural machinery works, and chemical and lumber industries.

Volyn' Oblast

Area, 7,700, population, 1,100,000

Volyn' Oblast which borders on Poland along the Western Bug River in the west, has some agriculture (grains and tobacco) in the south, but mainly lumbering industries in the north, along the Pripet River and its affluents.

Lutsk (Polish *Łuck*), the capital, lies on a minor rail branch, at the southern edge of the Pripet Marshes. It is an agricultural center and produces agricultural implements, clothing, leather, lumber, and flour.

Vladimir-Volynskiy (Polish *Włodzimierz*) is a rail junction and grain-trading point near the Polish border.

[1 Cf Borislav in Drogobych Oblast--Analyst]

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

SU 438* U 438 Kovel' (Polish *Kowel*) is a rail center with knitting and hosiery mills, sawmills, tobacco, and flour mills.

SU 133* U 133 The central section of the Western Ukraine lies in the fertile Volyn'-Podolian upland and includes the oblasts of Ternopol' and L'vov, as well as the adjoining zones of the oblasts to the north and the south. It is drained by the Dniester River and its left affluents, which cut deep ravines into the plateau. Its black-earth soils and the moderate climate favor an agricultural economy. The section is very similar to the right-bank wooded steppe of the old Soviet Ukraine in its dense rail network, its concentrated population, and the large number of urban centers. Grains (wheat, rye, and barley), potatoes, and sugar beets are the basic crops for the large food-processing industry, with flour mills and distilleries.

Ternopol' Oblast

Area, 5,300, population, 1,500,000

SU 133* 241 U 133 241 Ternopol' Oblast lies in the watershed area between the Pripet and the Dniester rivers. Grains (mainly winter wheat) and sunflowers are the principal crops throughout the larger portion of the oblast. Sugar beets are cultivated in the extreme north, and fruits in the south along the Dniester River. Building stone is quarried in several places.

SU 438* U 438 Ternopol' (until 1944, Tarnopol') is a rail center with an active grain and egg trade. It produces agricultural implements, cement, lumber, and food products.

Kremenets (Polish *Krzemieniec*), on a rail spur north of Ternopol', produces flour-milling equipment, ceramics, and cement. There are peat bogs and chalk quarries.

Chortkov (Polish *Czortków*) is a rail center south of Ternopol', producing rubber goods, cement, and tile.

L'vov Oblast

Area, 4,300, population, 1,500,000

SU 133* 438* U [133] 438 L'vov Oblast lies on the Polish border on the upper Western Bug. East of L'vov grains, potatoes, and fruits are the chief crops. Extensive quarrying industries form the basis for the manufacture of cement, glass, bricks, and tiles.

SU 438* L'vov (Polish *Lwów*), the largest city of the Western Ukraine, is a nine-way rail hub and major industrial center trading in agricultural

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RD1

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products, petroleum, and lumber. It produces precision instruments, radio and telegraph equipment, and light bulbs. Its machinery plants produce agricultural implements, gas equipment, and bicycles. Other industries are connected with oil refining, textile milling, glassworking, and the manufacture of furniture, shoes, and lumber and food products. During the post-war Five-Year Plan, which schedules further industrialization of the city, an automobile assembly plant will go into operation.

Zolochev (Polish *Złoczów*), on the L'vov-Ternopol' railroad, is a center for newly developed lignite mines. It has metalworking, tanning, lumber, and distilling industries.

Transcarpathian Oblast

Area, 5,000, population, 900,000

SU
133x
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The Transcarpathian (Russian *Zakarpatskaya*) Oblast lies on the southwest slopes of the eastern Carpathians and is watered by mountain streams flowing southward to the Tisza River, an affluent of the Danube. The mountain slopes, which extend throughout the major part of the territory, are covered with excellent beech and oak stands. Fertile soils, suitable for the growing of grains (corn, wheat, oats, and rye) and potatoes, are found only in the mountain valleys and in the southern zone along the Tisza River. On the southern hill slopes grapes and tobacco are grown. Among the mineral resources salt is mined at Solotvin and there are petroleum, lignite, and low-quality iron deposits. Several mineral springs have bottling industries. Wood distillation and woodworking industries are found at Svalyava, Perechin, and Velikiy Bychkov. A paper mill has been constructed at Rakhovo during the post-war period. The region, which was formerly known as Carpatho-Ukraine, or Ruthenia, and in Czech as *Podkarpatska Rus*, was ceded by Czechoslovakia in September, 1945 and organized as a separate oblast within the Ukrainian SSR.

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438x
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Uzhgorod (Czech *Užhorod*, Hungarian *Ungvár*), near the Czech border, is the capital of the oblast. It has food-processing and lumber industries.

Mukachevo (Czech *Mukačevo*, Hungarian *Munkács*), southeast of Uzhgorod, is another industrial center of the region.

2: Timoshenko S-4, 5 (no date) 1919 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union R1

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The second objection, which involves the question of Russia's need for the Ukrainian ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, is readily refuted by Russian maritime history.

Great Russia Not Dependent on the Black Sea Ports

We grant that, to the casual thinker with little or no knowledge of the trade routes of modern commerce, it may at first appear that Russia cannot live without southern ports, but, while it is true that more than half of the maritime exports of former Russia were on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, those who present this argument forget that the Ukrainian exports composed nearly half of those of the whole Russian Empire. It has already been proved that ethnic Ukraine shipped about two-thirds of the total amount of cereals. If we take these facts into consideration, we must conclude that it was the Ukraine which used the southern ports and not Russia. Nor did Russia export much of her merchandise by way of the Black Sea. The official Russian statistics of the traffic of merchandise by rail show no southern port except Rostov-on-the-Don, which served as an outlet for the products of the territories situated north of the ethnic frontier of the Ukraine and Russia. As to Novorosseysk, that was always the port for the Cossacks of Kuban and of the northern Caucasus. Even the northern regions of the Ukraine, including the governments of Tchernihov, that of Poltava and a part of the government of Kharkov, sent their wheat by the ports of the Baltic and even by Libau and Koenigsberg.

Statistics indicate that imports have never been shipped in by way of the Black Sea to any great extent. The records of Russian foreign commerce for the year 1912 show that 80 per cent of the maritime imports of the old empire of Russia were made by way of the Baltic, so that even the Ukraine received much foreign merchandise by this route. The policy of the Russian Government was always in favor of Baltic ports, to the detriment of those on the Black Sea. Finally speaking, all Russian commercial policy, in which an important item was the railroad rates, was in favor of the Baltic ports.

an effort to lower the tax on manufactured articles, the European countries began to put exorbitant duties on Russian agricultural products. Subsequent records show how detrimental was the Russo-German treaty of 1904 to agriculture among the Russian peoples. Thus were the interests of the agricultural regions clearly sacrificed to the interests of a few industrial centers.

Policy of Former Russia Injurious to Ukraine

How did this affect the Ukraine? We have shown that, in former Russia, the Ukraine was the principal exporter of agricultural products, and that she could not find a market for her wheat in industrial Russia because of the stern competition offered by the Volga and Siberia. Hence her only course was to seek an outside market, and this she did by exporting all surplus cereals to western Europe. Even here Russia subordinated the Ukrainian agricultural interests to the interests of industrial security. Added to this injustice, she took no steps to encourage Ukrainian exportation into central Russia. Money was spent in constructing elevators in the region of the Volga and in Siberia and refrigerator trains were organized for shipping meat, poultry, butter and fruit into eastern Russia, Siberia and Central Asia: all this to the neglect of Ukrainian interests. Nor was there any compensation for this loss by the promotion of the manufacturing industry in Ukraine. It is an indisputable fact that Ukrainian manufactures are much less developed than those of either Russia or Russian Poland. We can find one reason for this, however, in a certain period of Ukraine's history.

Russia and Poland were already enjoying an assured and peaceful national life while Ukraine was still struggling against the factors which were devastating her territory. The colonization of certain Ukrainian territories after the expulsion of the nomads took place much later than that of the other Russian provinces. Later, Ukraine was invaded by the Poles, who did not cease to treat her like a colony, and exploited her entirely for their own benefit. Hence, at the time of Ukraine's incorporation into Russia,

the Don which continued to Ityl, the Khazar capital at the mouth 487
of the Volga where two important routes terminated, viz. a caravan road from Bagdad via Khovaresm in the Turkestan of to-day and a road from China via the basin of the Tarim. Communicating routes led via the Pripyat to the Memel and Vistula areas, and via Halych to Hungary or via Cracow to Prague and Regensburg.

But Ukraine forfeited these advantages when Bagdad, Byzantium and Kyiv declined and when the Crusades shifted the main trade routes to the Mediterranean and later when America was discovered and the sea route to India became known. In addition, there were changes in the needs of civilisation; instead of furs, wax and honey, there was now a demand for goods in bulk like grain and timber which had to be transported all too expensively to the West via the Baltic as the Turks blocked the exit to the Mediterranean. The early golden age of Ukraine was the result of favorable trade conditions and it sank when these changed.

4. Black Earth and Granary

The enormous area of 70 million ha black earth produced 433
considerable surplus grain crops. Ukraine became the granary of Europe, but as the structure of the country was wholly agrarian, industry was slow to develop so that towns and industry were flooded by aliens.

Grain was exported in ancient times to Greece and Rome. 439 ●
Grain and cattle were transported from the central Dnipro area to the harbors and markets of Germany. But export trade only began to flourish in earnest when the fertile steppe and the sea coast were re-conquered. Food requirements of European industrial states were supplied from harbors on the Black Sea and the Sea of Odiv; and yet this improvement in geographical trade conditions was no longer the decisive feature in Ukrainian economy.

Ukraine was responsible for 10 % of the world's production of the four European kinds of grain and was therefore among the leading sources. From 1909—1913 its grain exports accounted to 8.6 million roubles, and to more than a fifth of the entire

●439 world export of grain; Ukraine played a leading part in the export of wheat, rye and barley (20.21 % and 25 % respectively of the world export).

The bulk of the exports did not go to Russia which drew its supplies from the Volga Basin and the East. Part went to White Ruthenia, Poland and the Baltic, if it was not ear-marked for Central and Western Europe. And Ukrainian cattle were not greatly in demand in the Russian market, which is one reason why cattle-rearing never developed very satisfactorily.

5. The preponderance of foreigners in industry

433 was partly due to Ukrainian concentration in agriculture. It
464 is quite true that, at the outset, Ukraine was not interested in mining and industry. On the other hand the Russians, by Nature less bound to the poorer soil on which they had settled, immigrated to mining and industrial areas of Ukraine. This produced dangerous national islands. The work done by Ukrainian laborers in the Donets area was better than in the Ural, even if it did not reach the standards of Central and Western Europe.

471 In Ukraine industry foreigners predominated even more as investors of capital than as laborers, more capital coming from countries abroad than from Russia. Before World War I about 400 million roubles were invested in Dnipro Ukraine alone, where the value of mining and industrial products amounted to 170 million roubles. 95 % of the capital invested in heavy industry was of foreign origin; 80 % of the pig-iron produced in 1913 came from 10 concerns with French capital (out of a total of 16 in the Russia of those days); they represented an investment of more than 112 million roubles. Of the 103 million roubles of French capital invested in coal mines, 82 millions were accounted for by the Donets Basin. Ten of the 12 concerns run with Belgian capital were in Ukraine.

6. Ukraine's relations to Russia as a colony

439 find expression in the economy of Dnipro Ukraine where certain industries were neglected and deprived of funds in favor of Russian areas. And this is no result of a balance between an agrarian and an industrial country for it was not to the North and the East that agricultural produce was exported

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

from Ukraine, although it is true that Russia had to be supplied 439
with sugar in addition to raw and auxiliary materials (coal, ores, pig-iron, steel etc.). Imports to Ukraine (e. g. textiles) were more than met by exports. But no capital was imported from Russia to set off the active trade balance; this came almost entirely from other countries.

In the common budget of Imperial Russia in the years 651
1909—1913 Ukraine had to supply 20 % of the total revenue 439
while it was allocated only 20 % of the expenditure. Almost half (45—46 %) of the Imperial revenue from Dnipro Ukraine was diverted to other areas of Russia. Three fourths of the funds ear-marked for capitalisation went abroad in the form of interest and dividends; Russia itself utilised revenue from Ukraine to install rival plants that very often manufactured or finished goods derived from Ukraine. Ukraine exported abroad four to nine times as much as she imported and was solely responsible for the fact that Russia had an active trade balance. It is an undisputable fact that Ukraine was an integral part of the economic system of Europe before the First World War.

7. The Russian Eurasian Theory

is that all Eurasian and Asiatic parts of Russia, including 000
peripheral areas like Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan etc. must be united in one great empire. Let us view this problem from the point of view of economic geography.

The features common to that gigantic stretch of territory are the enormous distances between the various centers of production to the frontiers and the sea, the length of time that rivers and seas are ice-bound, sparse population, high costs of transportation, and an unfavorable position with regard to world markets. It must therefore be organised as a self-supporting economy, planned from some center. Western Siberia is the heart of Eurasia.

These facts do not apply to Ukraine. The 2 400 km between 131
the sea and the Semyrjechka area may be Eurasian, while in 487
Europe the least favorable points are less than 600 km from the sea, and this "European" distance from the sea holds for Ukraine where no center is further than 600 km from the Black Sea. The distance between the Kusnets Basin, the chief coal area of

Table 2. Ukraine in the World Export of Grain.

1909—1913	Wheat 1000 t	Wheat %	Rye 1000 t	Rye %	Barley 1000 t	Barley %	Oats 1000 t	Oats %	Total 1000 t	Total %	Maize 1000 t	Maize %	Altogether Mill. t	Altogether %
1. Ukraine	4300	20	600	21	2700	43	300	8,5	7900	23	700	10	8,6	21
2. Argentine . . .	2600	12	—	—	—	—	620	17,5	3220	9,5	2950	40,5	6,1	15
3. USA	2960	13,5	10	0,5	160	2,5	60	1,5	3190	9,5	1020	14	4,1	10
4. Roumania . . .	1430	6,5	100	3,5	350	5,5	150	4,5	2030	6	1000	14	3,1	7
5. Canada	2530	12	—	—	100	1,5	180	5	2810	8	—	—	2,8	6
6. Russian Empire . .	100	0,5	200	7	1000	16	800	23	2150	6	100	1,5	2,2	5
7. B. India	1380	6,5	—	—	230	3,5	—	—	1610	4,5	—	—	1,6	4
8. Australia	1150	5,5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1150	5,5	—	—	1,2	3
World	21500	100	2800	100	6300	100	3500	100	34100	100	7300	100	41,4	100
Share of Ukraine in %	20		21		43		9		23		10		21	
Russian Empire	4400	21,5	800	28,5	3700	58,5	1100	31	10000	29,5	800	11	10,8	26
Share of Ukraine in %	98		75		73		27		79		88		80	

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313 being 13 % and 0.14 ha for the Right Bank Region and 7 % or 0.12 ha for the Left Bank Region. The southern zone has still less (0.08 ha per head) and there is practically none at all in the southern steppe proper.

[311] Thanks to its enormous area Ukraine with its 11 million ha of forest land comes fifth in Europe, but there is only 12 % of forest land in the entire country, and scarcely 0.2 ha per head of the population, while 0.3 ha is regarded as the minimum. The figures for actual forest stock will be still less, as only three quarters of the nominal forest land in Soviet Ukraine (3.1 million out of 4.3 million ha) represent actual forests. Thus the ratio of forest to the entire area of Ukraine would be 9 %. Forestry in those parts of Ukraine that used to belong to Austria-Hungary was on a higher level than in the other provinces; after the war it was highest in Carpatho-Ukraine.

313 The annual increment in timber in Dnipro-Ukraine amounts to 2 cubic meters per ha, in Volynia, Podlakhia and Polesya to 1.9 cubic metres, in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine to 3.3 cubic metres, so that the average figure for the entire country is 2.3 cubic metres. This average for Ukraine is low compared with the figure of 5 cubic meters for the state forests of Germany and 4.4 for the communal forests.

313 439 Reckoned per head of the population there is in Ukraine a timber increment of only 0.4 cubic meters, which is far lower than in most of the forest countries in Europe. As a result, wood has to be imported for mining and industrial areas.

Wood imports amounted to 1.8 million t in Dnipro-Ukraine in 1913, and the average figures for 1928/29 and 1933/34 are 3.7 and 4 million t respectively. The average imports to Northern Caucasia for the last year amounted to 1.2 million t, while the figure for the Crimea is 250 000 and for the whole of Eastern Ukraine 5.5 million t. The demand for timber is greatest in the Donets Basin, the Dnipro Bend and also in Kharkiv and Odessa.

Imports consist chiefly of soft woods; a certain amount of valuable oak is even exported from areas that are otherwise dependent on imports. In those parts of Ukraine that belong to Soviet Russia there is 0.16 ha forest per head of the population,

the figure for the Roumanian provinces being 0.25, for the Polish 0.36, and 1.05 for the Hungarian provinces. 313 439

Imports of timber came mostly by water and rail from White Ruthenia and above all from the forests in the middle reaches of the Volga. The wood that was drifted down the Volga was loaded on railway trucks in Stalingrad and transported to its destination.

Hardwoods predominate in the forest stock of Ukraine (59 %). Oak represents 27 %, beech 9 % of the entire forests. Of the 41 % softwoods there is 27 % pine. Pine and oak are the main species in Dnipro-Ukraine, while in Galicia spruce predominates and beech in Carpatho-Ukraine. In the Caucasus species of oak and beech occur most frequently. 313 137

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Trade

Domestic and Foreign Trade

471 It was characteristic of the Ukrainian territory that trade was largely in the hands of aliens. To counteract this an efficient system of co-operative organisations grew up and spread over other provinces than trade. This phenomenon will be treated later as an independent feature.

● 439 The foreign trade of Ukraine is of great importance for many other European countries. It must not be judged by conditions of recent years when trade between Ukraine and the rest of Europe has been depressed and any considerable trade in merchandise has only existed with the USSR. We must return to the time before the first World War if we wish to get a true picture of the natural possibilities of exchange of merchandise between Ukraine and the countries of Central and Western Europe, though we must also bear in mind the changes that have taken place in Ukrainian economy and in the entire position of world trade.

Balance and Trade before 1914

No exact balance of trade can be calculated for the Ukrainian national territory for the years before the first World War. Statistics were drawn up in Russia for Dnipro-Ukraine, but they only included 9 provinces, viz. Volynia, Kyiv, Podolia, Chernyhiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson, Tauria (the last three names were often combined as the "South Steppe" or "New Russia"). Parts of Ukrainian territory were omitted from these statistics, e. g. the Kholm district, districts in Podlakhia, in the province of Kursk and Voronesh etc., and the Ukrainian part of the Kuban area was quite isolated. So that

a balance of trade for Ukraine did not even cover the whole of the central part of the Ukrainian national territory, to say nothing of the areas that are linked up with Russia. 439

Nor did Ukrainian Galicia form an independent unit of administration in Austria; it was administered together with a Polish area, as was the same with the Ukrainian part of Bucovina, which was under Roumanian administration, and Carpatho-Ukraine under Hungarian administration. An approximately exact balance can therefore be calculated only for Dnipro-Ukraine; for the remainder, general estimates only can be given. [631]

Kryvchenko's figures for 1909—1911 give the best idea of the balance of trade for Dnipro-Ukraine before World War I. 1909—1911 were the last normal years for export trade via the Black Sea before the wars between Turkey and Italy and the Balkan wars. In the case of Ukraine which was not an independent state, a distinction must be made between export to foreign countries proper and export to other parts of the Russian empire. And the same distinction must be made for imports. The actual volume of Ukrainian imports or exports is obtained by adding these two categories, and the same holds for other sections of Ukrainian national territory. The "Russian exports from the Ukrainian provinces of the empire to foreign countries" would result in a low figure, which is by no means correct but which is sometimes quoted. The following are the characteristic features of the Dnipro-Ukrainian balance of trade before the first World War; the distinction already mentioned between exports and imports both beyond the frontiers and in trading with other parts of Russia, the latter category being a little in excess of the former; the fact that it was definitely favorable, both absolutely and relatively, particularly as regards foreign countries; the predominant share of agriculture in exports; the difference between the volume and quality of manufactured goods exported to foreign countries and those exported to other parts of Russia; the predominance of finished industrial commodities imported. Turnovers in foreign trade varied greatly, according to whether foreign countries or other parts of the Russian empire were concerned. In 1909—1911 the latter ac-

● 439 counted for 790 million roubles and were higher by 1/3 than the turnovers with countries outside of Russia (470 million roubles).. As regards exports, this proportion was not very unfavorable, as exports to non-Ukrainian areas of Russia exceeded those abroad only by 1/6. But imports from non-Ukrainian Russia were three and a half times more than those from foreign countries.

Most of the exports were not sent to Russia proper but to Poland, White Ruthenia and the Baltic provinces. The majority of imports came from Russia itself (cotton products). These facts reflect the political situation.

439 457 The balance of trade in Dnipro-Ukraine (1909—1911) was favorable expressed both in absolute and relative values. Exports were 350 % of imports in trade with foreign countries and 115 % in trade with areas in Russia, approximately 170 % in all "foreign" trade. The balance in money was 263, 60, 323 million roubles respectively. It was very high (55.5 %) in comparison with the turnover in trade with foreign countries (475 mill. r.). The figure indicating the extent to which the balance of trade was favorable was much lower (7 %) for the larger turnover (792 mill. r.) with non-Ukrainian areas within Russia, while it was approximately 26 % for the entire turnover (1267 million roubles).

In 1913 balance and turnover had increased to 414 (for foreign trade to 272) and 1 600 million roubles respectively for all trade with countries outside of Ukraine but the relation of one to the other remained the same (26 %). The relation of export to import trade also remained the same (170 %) as both had increased to the same extent. The absolute value of the favorable balance of trade for Dnipro-Ukraine had risen, though relatively it had remained the same. In the entire Russian balance of trade before World War I, on the other hand, the favorable balance sank from 429 million roubles (1591—1162) in 1911 to 347 (1519—1172) in the following year and to 146 million roubles (1520—1374) in the last year before the war. Without Dnipro-Ukraine the Russian balance of trade was unfavorable by 268 million roubles.

The agricultural nature of Ukrainian export trade is clearly 439 expressed in the balance of trade. 86 % of the entire exports are contributed by agricultural products, if partly manufactured (flour 14 % and, above all sugar, 28 %). In trade with foreign countries the 99 % contributed by agricultural produce is more than impressive while the 74 % share of export trade with other parts of Russia is significant enough. Grain was exported above all to foreign countries and flour and sugar to non-Ukrainian areas within Russia. And here we come to another characteristic of the export trade of Dnipro-Ukraine, its lack of uniformity corresponding to its agricultural origin.

The extent to which exports are manufactured varies in the balance of trade according to whether the commodities were destined for foreign countries or for non-Ukrainian areas in Russia. In the first case the share of industrially manufactured commodities is small (sugar 6 %, flour 2 %) even if we take the products of more intense agriculture into consideration and include animal produce (7 %; total 15 %). In export to Russian countries, on the other hand, this share is high: besides sugar and flour (together 65 %), some products of chemical industry are contained in "other produce". "Metals and produce" (21 %) are not raw materials, but half-manufactured commodities. Without being definitely an industrial land, the Dnipro-Ukraine, in comparison with other parts of the Russian empire plays an outstanding part as a source of industrially manufactured commodities. Such merchandise represents about half of the entire foreign trade, and about 60 % if animal produce is included. But the question is, to what extent are these commodities manufactured? "Metals and products" (11.5 %) are partly half-manufactured. In any case the export trade of Dnipro-Ukraine was quite different according as it was directed to foreign or to Russian countries.

Three quarters of the imports to Dnipro-Ukraine came from other parts of the Russian empire and one quarter from foreign countries. These consisted for the most part of manufactured industrial products (about $^2/_3$ of the entire total) and to a small extent of foodstuffs and luxuries ($^1/_3$). Textiles from Russia (cotton and linen goods) and Poland (woolen goods) formed

●439 40 % of the entire manufactures. Machinery and metal products came principally from Germany, wood from White Ruthenia and Russia, groceries from abroad, but tea partly from or via Russia. Dnipro-Ukraine got petroleum products from Ukrainian areas in Northern Caucasia. Many superfluous commodities were imported (steel, cement, coke, wood and bunker coal, phosphorites and acids), many manufactured goods could be made from available materials.

The balance of trade for the entire Ukrainian territory is in essentials similar to that for Dnipro-Ukraine. In Galicia exports practically balanced imports so that the inclusion of that province in statistics for the entire territory merely increased the turnover figure but not the favorable balance in terms of money. As regards individual items, however, the export of petroleum (products) plays an important part in the balance for the entire territory, for Dnipro-Ukraine imported those commodities, and the same holds for wood which Carpatho-Ukraine also exported in relatively large quantities. The share of animal produce is increased by the addition of Galicia which exported a considerable quantity of cattle, pigs and meat (to Vienna, and partly to Bohemia) and also eggs.

In the Kuban area exports greatly exceeded imports, so that the credit side of the balance of trade for the whole of Ukraine is increased by the addition of this area. It also enhances the position of Ukraine in the world grain market, as grain, and particularly wheat and barley, formed one of the main exports from the Kuban area (86 % of the volume of export trade and probably 60 % of the value in money, though no estimates of money values are available). The export of oil from sun-flowers, oil-cake and tobacco is also characteristic. On the other hand sugar, one of the main articles of export from Dnipro-Ukraine is poorly represented as are also poultry and eggs. Petroleum and petroleum products are among the most important non-agricultural exports which, however, do not include coal, ores and metals.

Balance of Trade after World War I

Changes in the structure of the balance of trade for Dnipro-Ukraine are more important, especially on the export side than

alterations in volume and turnover. Dnipro-Ukraine formerly used to export a great part of its surplus produce to countries abroad (i. e. beyond the frontiers of Russia); if we remember that other exports were sent mainly to Poland, White Ruthenia and the Baltic provinces, we see that the central area of Russia proper was not much of a market for Ukraine (mostly for sugar). 439

After World War I and particularly as a result of the economic policy of the Five Year Plan, political relations became decisive also for export, as they had formerly been, at least partially, for import. The nationalisation of production and trade forced export into channels prescribed by the Soviet government to effect as close a connection as possible with central areas in Russia. Export from Ukraine to countries abroad existed only in very modest proportions.

Dnipro-Ukraine balance of trade has not changed much as regards volume or the extent to which it is favorable. If we bear in mind the changes in political frontiers that have taken place since 1913 the pre-war figure for exports of 720 million roubles more or less remains the same for 1934. The favorable balance of 335 million roubles also approximately corresponded to that for 1909—1911, the relation of export to import, 190 %, is rather higher, and so is the relation of balance to turnover (335 : 1105 = 30 %).

But marked changes have taken place in the individual items exported. Agricultural produce sank to 30 %, i. e. a little more than $^1/_3$ of the old level. The export of grain, expressed in absolute quantities, sank from 6.7 to 1 million t (i. e. by 85 %) while the export of animal produce practically disappeared.

The 22 % of sugar exports represented about a quarter of the old figure. Mining produce (coal, ores) rose from 1.6 % to almost 21 %, and the quantity exported to almost 21 million t. Metals and metal products, formerly 11.5 % of value of exports, now account for 50 % and are the most important single item. Ukraine is therefore no longer a country for exporting agricultural produce; it supplies industrial raw materials and products of heavy industry and partly also machinery.

Alterations in imports are not so important in principle, but there are marked changes in the relation of the different com-

439 modities imported to one another. Textile products still head the list, they represent 47 % of the entire imports, a higher percentage than before the war. Imports of petroleum and petroleum products in connection with increasing motorisation, is of significance; this item has increased fourfold in percentage from 7.2 to 28.5 % and in volume from less than 300 000 t to almost 2 million t. The figures for the import of wood also show a sharp increase (now 18 %). On the other hand numerous small items of half-manufactured goods and industrial produce, but also of foodstuffs and luxuries have disappeared.

Merchandise Exported and Lands of Destination

The commodities imported into and exported from the Ukrainian national territory have remained essentially the same though changes in volume have taken place. Ukraine is actually or potentially a source of exports, above all of grain, eggs, sugar, salt, coal, iron and manganese ores, heavy iron industry produce, machinery, chemicals etc. Peripheral areas export large quantities of petroleum (products) and wood, while the central area imports them. Ukraine is a market for manufactured industrial produce, specially textiles, also for machinery and tools, partly also for chemical products etc. Central and Western Europe are interested in the export of grain, eggs, coal, iron and manganese ores, and partly also in petroleum (products).

The grain exports from Dnipro-Ukraine must be supplemented by the heavy exports from the Kuban area (1904—1913 = 1.5 million t); the sections of Ukrainian territory included in Austria-Hungary exported very little grain. In the years 1909—1911 eastern Ukraine exported in all 8.6 million t, which represented $^4/_5$ of the entire exports of grain from Russia and $^1/_5$ of world export of grain; this made it first as a land exporting grain in general, first also for wheat, rye and barley, third for oats and fourth for maize (see Table 2).

$^4/_5$ of the volume exported went to countries abroad, and only $^1/_5$ to other parts of Russia, though mostly not to Russia proper but to Poland, White Ruthenia and the Baltic provinces. The main consumers of Ukrainian grain abroad were Germany and

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Holland, i. e. in reality it was Germany as in Holland it was 439
mostly a case of transit trade. In the years 1909—1911 Germany alone imported 2.7 million t "Russian" barley for feeding every year, which came from Ukrainian territory. Russian exports of wheat to Italy also came from Ukraine and they amounted to approximately 1 million t with smaller quantities of other grain. Ukrainian grain was also exported to England, France, Greece etc. Only very little flour was exported abroad by Dnipro-Ukraine.

After the first World War grain exports sank to a fraction of the pre-war amount (about 1/7). The reasons for this were the increased population, industrialisation, alterations in distribution of ownership, but also backward agricultural methods. But collectivisation and the Soviet form of economy introduced into Ukrainian territory did more than those to nip in the bud the favorable signs that were evident before the Five Year Plan.

And still the good harvests of recent years have resulted in an increase of exports from Ukraine to Russia. In 1937 Dnipro-Ukraine alone is said to have exported approximately 4½ million t. A large proportion of this was due to extremely good harvest conditions and almost as much to the ruthlessness with which Soviet officials collected contributions, no adequate allowance having been made for the population of Ukraine. The further increase in grain exports from Ukraine could not be reckoned as a permanent item in Soviet economy and it would be far too optimistic to conclude that such enormous reserves of grain were actually available. But the export figure given above is at any rate a valuable index of the capacity of Ukraine to export several million tons (about 5—7) when conditions are once more normal.

The individual provinces of Ukrainian territory stood first in world export of eggs. Assuming that the export capacity of Dnipro-Ukraine is unchanged, a higher figure would be reached than even for the best egg-exporting countries. Exports of eggs from Ukraine, which had been 90—100 000 t and 20 % of world export (450 000 t), sank in the years before 1927 to 58 000 t and 12% of world export which had risen in 1927 to 500 000 t. As a result of Five Year Plans and collectivisation no more eggs were exported from Ukraine. Most of the eggs exported from Ukraine used to go to Germany and Austria. Sugar was exported

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Table 12. Nikopil's supply of world market with

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Export	1900	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906
Nikopil	21	12	6	14	20	37	91
Chiaturi	419	308	444	445	465	334	483
Russian Empire	440	320	450	459	485	371	574
% of Nikopil	5	3,5	1,5	3	4	10	16
Br. India	133	135	158	184	184	331	563
Brazil	108	100	157	162	208	224	121
Gold Coast	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
World Export	925	770	945	955	980	01[illegible]	1395
% of Nikopil	2,5	1,5	0,5	1,5	2	3,5	6,5

Export	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925
Nikopil	—	—	3	38	38	31	168
Chiaturi	5	176	25	168	353	477	433
Soviet Union	5	176	28	206	391	508	601
% of Nikopil	—	—	10,5	18,5	9,5	6	28
Br. India	388	819	539	891	827	779	751
Brazil	206	454	276	341	23[illegible]	159	312
Gold Coast	34	44	7	62	138	237	344
South Africa	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Egypt	—	—	47	—	—	—	42
World Export	775	1570	935	1585	165[illegible]	1760	2070
% of Nikopil	—	—	—	2,5	2,5	2	8
Nikopil in world export	—	—	—	5.	5.	5.	5.

from Dnipro Ukraine to Russia and even to Asia, but not to European countries.

Hard coal was exported abroad even before World War I from the Donets Basin. The countries round the Black Sea and the Mediterranean were the main consumers — Turkey, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and France. But no great quantities were exported to those countries In 1931 about 1.2 million tons of coal were shipped in Ukrainian ports, almost ½ million t to Italy, a little less to the Middle East etc. Almost half of the exports (45 %) consisted of anthracite, while most of the coal was sent to non-Ukrainian areas in Russia — more than 16 million t in 1934 (only 7 million t in 1913). The industrial centers of European Russia and the railways depend mostly on Donets coal. In 1934 almost 20 million t of hard and coking coal was exported altogether.

manganese ore (1900 — 1937 in 1 000 t and %).

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907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
109	51	65	68	49	78	91	44	—	—	—	0,3
509	395	555	616	586	930	1103	708	—	1,5	4,2	32,5
618	446	620	684	635	1008	1196	752	—	1,5	4,2	32,8
17,5	11,5	10,5	10	7,5	7,5	7,5	6	—	—	—	1
659	516	591	685	634	800	818	515	481	663	445	393
237	166	241	254	174	155	122	184	289	503	533	393
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	30	32
1650	1175	1490	1660	1495	2030	2230	1490	805	1245	1130	1025
6,5	4,5	4,5	4	3,5	4	4	3	—	—	—	—

1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
211	206	227	239	220	226	37	159	125	64	8	—
472	555	281	743	570	515	382	490	580	580	606	1001
683	761	508	982	790	741	419	649	705	644	614	1001
31	27	44,5	24,5	28	30,5	9	24,5	17,5	10	1,5	—
623	857	848	980	785	425	306	382	516	879	750	997
320	242	362	293	192	96	21	25	2	61	166	241
350	375	330	426	424	251	51	269	345	405	418	536
—	—	—	—	48	105	3	22	66	81	208	483
48	37	44	22	22	14	8	—	12	7	65	64
2050	2400	2180	2710	2235	1640	830	1390	1715	2120	2260	3450
10,5	8,5	10,5	9	10	14	4,5	11,5	7,5	3	0,5	—
5.	5	5	5.	4.	4.	4.	4.	4.	5.	—	—

The export of iron ore was greatly restricted by the heavy demands of domestic consumption, as most of the ore was utilised by domestic heavy iron industry. In 1908—1915 about 1 million t ore, i. e. 20 % of the amount mined then, were exported from Kryvyj Rih beyond the frontiers of Dnipro-Ukraine. 380 000 t of that amount were sent to non-Ukrainian areas of Russia, mainly to Poland, 870 000 t were exported to foreign countries, 445 000 t by sea.

Germany, the main market for Ukrainian exports in ore, took almost all the quantity sent overland (225 000 t) and also a considerable quantity of the iron ore sent by sea, partly via Holland; it consumed in all 79—99 % of all the iron ore exported from Ukraine, the amount varying with the year.

Before World War I the Georgian deposits in Chiaturi were the main source of the exports abroad of manganese ores. The

● 439 Ukrainian manganese ores at Nikopil were reserved for domestic consumption. Still in the five years from 1910—1914, 65 700 t were exported abroad, scarcely 7.7 % of the total Russian export and 3.7 % of world export. In the time between 1925—1929 the exports of manganese ore from Nikopil reached a height of 210 000 t annually (30 % of the Soviet and 9 % of the world export) but sank during the next five years to 153 000 t and ceased altogether in 1927 in consequence of the increasing needs of the USSR for domestic consumption.

In the years when it was exporting most (1925—28) Nikopil exported 200 000 t mainly to 6 countries. Germany took 43 % Luxemburg 31 %, Poland 10 %, Italy 8 %, France 5 %, England 3 %. But Nikopil manganese ore was also exported to non-Ukrainian areas of USSR. In the years 1930—1934 Ukrainian production of pig-iron amounted to approximately 54 % of the figure for USSR. During the same five years manganese ore production in the USSR amounted on an average to 1 185 000 t. Of this amount 661 000 t are deducted for export, so that the amount consumed was 524 000 t, in Ukraine 335 000 t. But Nikopil delivered 423 000 t for home consumption, so that Ukraine exported to non-Ukrainian Russia 88 000 t. This added to the figure for exports abroad gives approximately 240 000 t i. e. 15.5 % of world production of manganese ore (5th place). (See Table 12).

Petroleum and petroleum products were exported from Galicia and Northern Caucasia. Only when we include Groznyj Ukraine has a considerable excess of exports over imports, as Dnipro-Ukraine does not import more than 2 million t (in 1934) and only 500—800 000 t more than the amount produced in the Ukrainian territory in the Kuban area. 3—3.5 million t of the oil produced at Groznyj would remain for export, and also the amount produced in Galicia (½ million t). In 1935 Galician oil was exported partly to Poland (about 200—240 000 t) and partly abroad (170 000 t), mostly to Germany.

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But if the Occupation authorities were not much interested in the *Rada*, they could not help being interested in the Government which depended upon the *Rada* and which had undertaken, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, to procure supplies and raw materials for Germany and Austria. In order to comply with the formalities of diplomatic etiquette, the all-important clause of the Treaty had been worded in a somewhat vague and delicate way. Clause 7 ran as follows: 'The contracting parties mutually undertake to enter into economic relations without delay and to organize the exchange of goods on the basis of the following stipulations: until 31 July of the current year a reciprocal exchange of the surplus of their most important agricultural and industrial products for the purpose of meeting current requirements.' It proceeds to lay down that 'the quantities and classes of products shall be decided in the future by a special mixed commission'. It had only been in private conversations between the respective Delegations that the million tons had been mentioned.

The energetic and experienced Groener was entrusted with the realization of Clause 7, and for this purpose he established in Kiev the *Deutsche Ukrainische Kaufmännische Wirtschaftstelle*. This institution elaborated a detailed and rational mode of action. The Mixed Commission set up under the Peace Treaty sat for a long time before it could assess the classes and quantities of goods to be extracted from the Ukraine. At last, on 8 April, a Protocol was signed which formed a special Appendix to the Peace Treaty, and according to which the Government of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' undertook to send to Germany and Austria-Hungary a million tons of grain, 400 million eggs, cattle to the weight of about 46,000 tons, a great number of horses, a considerable quantity of coal, manganese, fodder, sugar, lard, etc. After the Protocol was signed it was not long before it became apparent that the theoretical calculations of General Groener would not be easy to realize in practice.

Field-Marshal Eichhorn himself gave vent to his scepticism when he grumbled that 'the whole trouble is that we have to treat this Ukraine as a friendly country'. But Baron Mumm hastened to retort: 'In my opinion it is absolutely necessary to keep up the fiction that the Ukraine is a friendly and independent country; otherwise we shall completely destroy the already shaky authority of the *Rada*.' General Hoffmann had no great confidence in all the methodical plans of General Groener and expressed the view that it would have been much better to have entrusted the whole business to Jewish intermediaries. By March, instead of the promised 300 train-loads of grain, only one train had arrived for Vienna and one for Buda-

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

728 439 Pest. In April the situation somewhat improved, but it was evident that there was no hope of receiving by the end of July any substantial proportion of the goods which had been stipulated under the Peace Treaty. It became clear that the enthusiastic delegates of the 'Popular Republic' had greatly exaggerated the agricultural wealth of their country. They had had in view 'potential possibilities', but they had quite failed to take into account the actual state of affairs in the spring of 1918. During the whole of the preceding year agrarian disorders had been taking place. The peasants had appropriated lands, and the countryside had been swarming with ex-soldiers who had completely lost their morale and who, although they had quitted the front, had no wish whatever to return to peaceful occupations. Under such conditions the harvest of 1917 had not been gathered as it would have been in normal times; and, furthermore, no one knew to whom what had actually been gathered really belonged. The cattle of the landowners had been in great part slaughtered or driven off when the Red Guards made their appearance in the Ukraine during the winter of 1917; the sugar factories were standing idle. At the same time, the well-to-do peasants had quickly learned to hide their grain and other produce, and they were no more willing to deliver to the Germans than they had been to the Bolsheviks.

As a result of all this, during the whole period of the Occupation, the Germans only succeeded in exporting 9293 wagon-loads of grain; 23,195 wagon-loads of fodder, sugar, cattle, eggs and other products; and 4567 wagon-loads of minerals (coal, manganese)—as a whole 37,000 wagons under the auspices of the *Wirtschaftstelle* and 5000 through 'private initiative'. This tonnage amounted to scarcely a fifth part of what had been expected before 31 July 1918. And even the quantities which Germany succeeded in securing were delivered after the Government of the *Rada* had given place to that of Hetman Skoropadsky, and for the most part during the first three months of the later régime.

[642] 727 The failure of the *Rada* in 'the economic collaboration' with the Germans was the reason for its downfall. When the Germans came into the Ukraine their inspection of stocks of supplies not only revealed the relative scarcity of these stocks but also the chaotic state of Ukrainian economy at that moment. The estates of the landowners had almost completely disappeared, and the peasants had appropriated the land. This action of the agrarian proletariat had, however, received no legal sanction, and the *Rada* had not yet elaborated any land laws. To the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* the practical and not the legal state of affairs was important. Field-Marshal Eichhorn therefore issued an 'Order to the Ukrainian popu-

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

arms, after which they were allowed to go home with the exception of a few of their number, including several cabinet ministers, who were arrested on the spot. On the following day, during a meeting of the Union of Cornraisers, Paul Skoropadsky was proclaimed 'Hetman of the Ukraine'. 727 642

Skoropadsky remained Hetman for about seven-and-a-half months and resigned when the Germans were evacuating the Ukraine. Those seven months can be divided into two distinct periods: the first until the middle of August and the second until the end of November. 727 439

During the first period the Germans found that their manœuvre had been crowned with comparative success. In July, particularly, supplies of grain and coal were delivered at a regular and rapid tempo. The Germans, again, succeeded in securing thousands of horses of which they were badly in need, not so much for the cavalry as for the artillery and transport services. In Berlin and Vienna bread reappeared and meat and sugar was to be had in considerable quantities. Skoropadsky's Government turned out to be much more capable than that of the *Rada*, perhaps for the reason that the Hetman did not bother about any ideology whatever. The Foreign Minister, Doroshenko, was not over-burdened with work, but the energetic Minister of the Interior, Igor Kistyakovsky, and the Minister of Commerce, Gutnik, had plenty to do. Berlin and Vienna placed at the disposal of the Government the quantity of Marks necessary to cover the issue of 400,000,000 *karbóvantsi* (about 300,000,000 Marks) issued by the Hetman; and for this reason the *karbóvantsi* enjoyed a greater credit with the people than had the 'paper' of the *Rada*. In the meantime 'a real General', General Ragoza, formerly commanding the 4th Russian Army, undertook the task of organizing the Hetman's army. Not only officers of Ukrainian origin, but officers from all over Russia freely enlisted in it.

The historian of Brest-Litovsk justly remarks that in June 1918 'the Ukraine became for a short time a bourgeois Mecca and thither flocked thousands of refugees from Soviet Russia' (Wheeler-Bennett, p. 323). Kiev rapidly lost even that 'shade of Ukrainism' which it had worn in the *Rada* days. Baron Mumm, the German Minister Resident, was depressed by this aspect of affairs when he wrote to Groener: 'I tried to insist with the President of the Council of Ministers Lizohub that the German Government desires his cabinet to have more of *couleur locale*.' Mumm altogether was not particularly pleased with the *coup d'état*, since the military men had not asked his opinion about it and had not even troubled to let him know before it was accomplished. In another report Mumm suspects the Hetman's Government of being 'pro-Russian', but adds that 'this should 727 642

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CHAPTER VII

THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

§1. AGRICULTURAL HISTORY OF THE UKRAINE

In the political mythology of the twentieth century the legend 439 about 'the vast riches of the Ukraine' has played, and is destined to play, a certain part. In history the Ukraine will take place with the Route to the Indies, the North-West Passage, Golconda, the Empire of Prester John, and other phantasmagorias of the human mind which in their time have inspired the nations to the drama of effort and the tragedy of conflict.

In the modern world where generalization has displaced religion and where the generation made literate by popular education has thrown up 'Leaders' who are adepts in the exploitation of generalized ideas, it was inevitable that movements based on facile and false scientific, geographical and ethnical conceptions should become fashionable. 'The wheat-fields of the Ukraine' form a roseate hinterland to the Nordic Race and the Classless State in the dream-world of the masses of Central Europe. Apart, therefore, from the intrinsic interest of the subject, it becomes a matter of current importance to analyse the extent of the real resources of the Ukraine and their actual and potential relation to the economic problem of Europe.

There exists a widespread idea that the Ukraine was 'the granary 433 of the Russian Empire', but in reality it would be difficult to 311 indicate the period to which this idea could be applicable. Certainly, during the eighteenth century, as the Tartars and Turks were driven from the mouths of the Ukrainian rivers, a period of progressive prosperity set in. But under Alexander I, during the Napoleonic Wars, the bulk of the grain supply of the Empire was drawn from the southern regions of Central Russia—from the Governments of Orel, Kursk, Voronezh and Tambov. This source of supply was adequate in view of the numbers of the population at that period, and the state of the roads between the Black Sea provinces and Central Russia put a prohibitive cost on transportation from the south.

During the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I export abroad 439 developed through Odessa and the Azov ports—Taganrog and

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

439 Mariupol. The supply came from the big New Russian estates and from the German, Moldavian and Serb colonies founded in the eighteenth century. Towards the middle of the century the agricultural production of the Ukraine and the New Russian Governments began to form an important proportion of the general production of the Empire, but still these regions could not be called 'the granary of Russia' on account of the continuing lack of proper means of communication with the central provinces. The upper Dniepr and the upper course of the western Dvina were too shallow to serve adequately the needs of modern transport, and as late as the Crimean War the Russian railway system had not been extended south of Moscow.

496 The first important imperial trunk lines were constructed during the sixties and seventies: Moscow-Kursk-Kharkov-Rostov-on-the-Don (with branch lines from Kursk to Kiev and from Kharkov to the Crimea); Moscow-Voronezh-Rostov-on-the-Don (with extensions to the northern Caucasus); Petersburg-Vilna-Rovno-Kiev-Odessa; Kharkov-Kremenchug (on the Dniepr)-Nikolaev. Railway construction had taken the 'meridial' direction: the economic axis of the Empire during the three decades 1860–90 ran from 'the industrial north' to 'the agricultural south'.

The new railway system improved the conditions for the export of Ukrainian and New Russian grain through the Black Sea ports. At the same time access to the north was provided by the railway 'diagonal' connecting Orel (on the Moscow-Kursk line) with Riga: this 'diagonal' continued to the south-east through the northern part of the Don region to Tsaritsyn on the lower Volga. Further, a special 'grain line' linked the Ukraine with the Baltic: starting from Kremenchug on the Dniepr, it passed through the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov, White Russia and Lithuania to the new ice-free port of Libava (Libau).

311 It thus began to appear that the Ukrainian and New Russian provinces were indeed to become the granary of the Russian Empire. But the colossal economic potentialities of the outlying [496] quarters of the Empire, which began to come into development during the second half of the nineteenth century, very soon overwhelmed this comparatively modest conception. In the seventies the first 'latitudinal' railway threw a bridge across the Volga at Samara and was continued as far as the southern Urals. The steppes beyond the Volga offered immense new space for agricultural exploitation. In the meantime the conquest of the Caucasus had been completed, and the rapid expansion of the economic life of the Kuban and Terek regions had begun. Soil conditions in the northern

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the New Russian Governments) there were over 1 million hectares 433
under beetroot. Just before the last war the annual production of
beet in the Ukraine reached 150 million quintals: i.e. 18 per cent of 244
world production. The production of Ukrainian beet sugar ranked fourth—after that of America, Germany and France. In 1913 the Ukraine produced 11 million quintals of crystallized sugar. This output, together with that of the Polish factories, covered all the needs of the internal market (which during the preceding twenty-five years had augmented fourfold) and provided substantial surplus for export to the Baltic and the Middle East.

In addition to the beet processing plants, about 60 per cent of the alcohol refineries (corn, potatoes) of the Empire were located in the [274]
Ukraine. The production of vegetable oil (particularly from sunflower seed) was also important.

It has been estimated by the Soviet paper *Pravda* that approximately 1 milliard of rubles a year was paid for services on the semi-industrialized estates of landowners throughout Russia: of this sum a considerable proportion was paid for the hire of horse transport (since landowners did not maintain a large number of draught horses but hired from the villages). Of this milliard, about 300,000,000 were paid out in the Ukraine. As the peasant population of the [511]
Ukraine numbered about fifteen millions, some 20 rubles a year per head of the population was earned on 'supplementary' work on the large estates. 'Only owing to the sugar and other agricultural industries could the dense population of the Ukraine exist in such comparatively well-to-do circumstances.'

Thus the agricultural economy of Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, [241]
Chernigov and Poltava was based only partly on the production of cereals. With a population which reached nearly twenty millions, only about 2 million hectares were under wheat, while in New Russia, with a population about half that of the Ukrainian Governments, there were 4 million hectares under wheat. The Ukraine exported only small quantities of wheat to Poland and White [439]
Russia, which provinces drew the bulk of their supplies from New Russia. The real 'granaries' of Russia which supplied the whole [134]
Empire and exported a surplus abroad were the regions of the northern Caucasus and Trans-Volga with western Siberia and New Russia (including the Governments of Kherson and Ekaterinoslav with the northern part of Tauris and the southern part of Kharkov) In those regions the black earth really had a virgin quality during the first half of the nineteenth century; and its richness remains exceptional even now.

As a rule, the climatic conditions in the *New Russian Governments* 000

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land in the Ukraine and New Russia: of 25 million hectares of 241
arable, 6½ million were under wheat, and of these 4½ million were
in New Russia. Ukrainian and New Russian production attained 433
90 million quintals a year, of which 70 million came from the New 241
Russian Governments. (In addition, the Ukraine produced for internal consumption about 30 million quintals of rye—in the northern districts—nearly as much barley, and about 20 million quintals of oats.) The wheat crop of the Ukraine and New Russia represented 8 per cent of the total world, and 18 per cent of European, production. With an average production of 70 million quintals a year, the New Russian Governments could throw an important surplus on to the world market. Before the Revolution about 76 per cent of the crop was retained in the villages for food, storage and seed (on the larger mechanized estates and co-operative colonies the average was round 70 per cent). The balance, about 20 million quintals, went on the market: of it about one-quarter was absorbed by the towns and industrial centres of New Russia. Under these conditions the three New Russian Governments had [439] available for export abroad 15 million quintals of wheat, i.e. about 1½ million tons. The crop of New Russia and the northern Caucasus was exported to the Ottoman Empire, Greece and particularly to Italy, where the 'hard' types of grain were appreciated as an ingredient of macaroni and other *paste*. Even after the last war and all the ruin of agriculture resulting from the Revolution, the Soviet Press, in 1929, could boast that about 1½ million tons of wheat had been exported through the New Russian and North Caucasian ports (Professor Brutskus holds that this export—the relation of which to total production greatly exceeded pre-War proportions—was one of the factors in preparing the way for the terrible famine of 1932).

'From remote times the Ukraine and New Russia were famous 231
for their draught oxen. Further, many landowners possessed herds of foreign cattle, principally Swiss breeds. All the German colonies bred good milkers' (Shcherbatov). In 1914 there were estimated to be over 9 million head of cattle, 6 million sheep (numbers of them of valuable breed) and 5 to 6 million pigs in the Ukrainian and New Russian Governments (the pigs predominated in northern and western Ukraine and sheep in the New Russian steppes). South Russia, an ideal horseman's country, possessed also a vast number of horses. Before the last war there were reckoned to be 5½ million horses in the Ukraine and New Russia (1 horse to every 5–6 people, and one-sixth of all the horses in the Empire). Government studs, and those of private landowners and of certain *zemstva*, maintained

payment of a specific amount of tax in kind and left to the peasant 432
the rest of his crop. In an endeavor to get this grain into Russia, 241
the government offered to buy it but it did not have the funds or 185
the inclination to pay for it at the market price. The financial reforms connected with the introduction of the chervonets could, to a certain degree, make it expedient for the peasant to sell to the government for cash, and as time went on the peasant gained the power of selling his crop for cash but the Moscow control of transportation and the prohibition of large scale trading left him helpless and he saw himself forced to dispose of it locally or to the government. Then the government made a fixed price which was far [435]
below that of the free market, and was often scarcely a third of the amount that the peasant could have secured. This sale of large quantities of agricultural products at a fixed price gradually became the rule and was one of the signs that the period of toleration for private income was coming to an end.

In 1925, the government began to clamp down on the small 656
traders, the Nepmen, who had profited by the opportunities which 661
they had had. Again it had a large choice of measures. Thus, depending on the situation, it could invoke laws against the hiring of labor; it could order the state agencies to refuse to buy from or sell to an obnoxious individual and thus isolate him; it could suspend his ration cards and perquisites, take away his right of voting and thus make him a pariah in the community; it could levy prohibitive taxes which would put him out of business and confiscate his property; or it could find some violation of some other law or regulation and imprison or exile him.

The degree of pressure which was put upon the peasants and 439 ●
the workers varied from year to year. Each year Ukraine was 241
compelled to export more to Russia without regard to the needs of the local population. Thus, the amount of grain rose from 1,050,000 tons in 1924-5 to 3,165,000 tons in 1926-7, when there was a bumper crop, but in 1927-8, when the harvest partially failed and there were signs of need in the country, the amount collected and exported rose to 4,353,000 tons. At the same time, the continually increasing demands aroused again a spirit of oppo-

439 sition and of indifference among the peasantry and a resentment
241 against the growing exactions of the Soviet regime in Moscow.

Still these were years of relative peace. With the introduction of the New Economic Policy, the government became more tolerant of differences of opinion and the OGPU (the Organization of the State Political Administration, the new name for the old Cheka) was relatively inactive. There were few political arrests, imprisonments, executions and deportations and the bulk of the population began to breathe more easily. There were men, however, who saw the straws in the wind. For example in 1924, Mikhnovsky, who had been one of the early Ukrainian nationalists, committed suicide and so did Syrotenko, a prominent Social Revolutionist, but these were in a way exceptional cases.

It is far more likely that this lull was part of the Moscow policy of preparing to eliminate in one swoop all persons who might prove to be dangerous, but it was also affected by the confusion and the intrigues that were going on in Moscow. With the death of Lenin, there was no clear successor to his post and prestige. There were many claimants, notably Stalin and Trotsky. When Lenin died, the power passed into the hands of a small group of leaders with Stalin, the Secretary of the Communist Party, and Trotsky as Commissar for War as the main contenders for the supreme power. The struggle between these two men lasted for several years, with the star of Stalin rising over that of Trotsky who favored a far more rigorous policy toward both the Nepmen and traders in the cities and the kulaks or kurkuls (the richer peasants) who had profited materially by the opportunities for private trade and production. It was not until that conflict was over that any one dared to risk the internal upheaval that might come with a change from the avowed outlines of the New Economic Policy and a reintroduction of more rigorous socialist or communist practice.

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union R1

INTRODUCTION

The author of this book is a historian. He has taken part in the Ukrainian national revolution from 1917 on. The book has been written to fix facts that are very often forgotten in the world, or are given a false interpretation in the various books on the Eastern European problem. U 114

The principal fact from which the whole fatal conflict between Ukraine and Soviet Russia arises is that Ukraine has a democratic tradition created by the preceding historical evolution. Modern Russia is a continuation of the Muscovite Tsardom that has grown on the foundations of eastern despotism. For this reason Russia has not created a democratic tradition of its own up to this day and has a "considerable lack of European tradition", as it has been stated by the well known Russian historian Klyuchevsky. Therefore Communist dictatorship so easily seized power in Russia after the revolution of 1917, while the other peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, Ukrainians, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians, etc., created democratic states of their own. U 181 SU 181

The tragedy of the unhappy neighbours of Russia is that Russian imperialism in the past and present times has been principally directed against them, has enslaved and even exstirpated them.

The Ukrainian nation occupies a particular place in Eastern Europe both by its number, circa 35 millions, and by its geographical position, and especially by its large natural resources*). The famous British political writer Professor R. W. Seton-Watson states that the Ukrainian problem has been one of the reasons for World War I 1914—1918. It is generally known that the conquest of Ukraine was the principal aim for Hitler's 'Pressure to the East'. Thus World War II had the struggle for Ukraine as one of its reasons too. U 161 135

We are living in a time when imperialism is being condemned as one of the greatest evils to mankind, but we see at the same time U 181

*) The most important natural riches of Ukraine are: coal (Donets Bassin), iron ore (Krivoy Rog), oil (Boryslaw), manganese (Nikopol). The export of grain from Ukraine to Western Europe until 1914 was higher than 5,5 mil. tons per year. The production of sugar and spirit was very important. The export of agricultural products from Tsarist Russia came in its great part from Ukraine. U 439

731 656 "necessary to request the ARA (American Relief Administration) not to split its forces, *but to concentrate them entirely on the Volga area*" (p. 248).

Professor Fisher remarks in his book:

"The policy of the Communist Party with respect to the Ukraine famine presents many curious aspects. Not only did the Moscow Government fail to bring the Ukrainian situation to the knowledge of the American Relief Administration as it did other regions much more remote, but it actively discouraged... anything likely to bring the Americans in contact with the Ukraine... Before the ARA had begun its operations (January, 1922) the Moscow and the so-called Kharkov Government did not undertake anything serious for the aid to the hungry people of Ukraine" (H.H.Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia:* New York, 1927). Further, Prof. Fisher says in his book:

"From the first the Moscow Government had discouraged all proposals which tended to bring the ARA into contact with the Ukraine. Litvinov (at that time Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, *P. F.*), had described the port of Odessa, back in the fall of 1921, as out of the question for ARA operations, although it was subsequently used very successfully. It is also significant that, until the ARA had investigated and established outposts in the south, Moscow virtually ignored in its press the famine conditions along the Black Sea..." (p. 252).

731 656 459 Prof. Fisher states that the Russian Communist Government exported food from the hungry regions in Ukraine:

"It is astonishing enough that these trainloads of food have been loaded in Kiev and Poltava and sent hundreds of miles to the hungry along the Volga, instead of being transported a score or so miles across the Gubernia line to Odessa or Nikolaiev, where there was a first class famine in swing. It is even more astonishing, when one learns... that Odessa Gubernia, with a crop of only seventeen per cent of normal and with people dying of hunger in the streets of its principal town as well as in the huts of its villages, sent sixty-five cars to Central Russia, while Nikolaiev, with a crop only four per cent of normal, and containing in the city of Kherson the most desperately afflicted spot in South Russia, in fact, one of the worst in the entire country, sent eight cars to the Volga" (p. 261).

On the export of grain from Ukraine during the famine of 1921/22 the American historian brings the following facts:

"The Gubernia of Podolia produced a considerable food surplus. The adjoining Gubernia of Odessa had a deficit, and many people were doomed to starve if food were not brought in. According to

the scheme officially outlined for the good of Russia, the surplus food in Podolia should not be used to save the lives of the peasants in Odessa, a few miles away, but should be carried through the starving regions, placed on board a steamer and sold in Hamburg . . ." (p. 323). 731 656 439

A representative of the Relief Committee of Fridtjof Nansen who was in Ukraine at the beginning of 1922 gives the following facts on the famine:

"Eight million souls are starving in the south of the Ukraine, 2½ millions of them have absolutely nothing to eat. A further 2½ millions are feeding themselves on substitutes, such as hay, dried plants, etc., but are not getting any normal meals; three millions have some supplies, but in such small quantities that they will soon be reckoned in the first and second categories. It may be said that before the end of April 7 million souls will come under these two categories. About 700,000 little children who have been brought into municipal asylums do not receive more than one fifth of the normal portion. Child mortality is tremendous. It reaches 50%. In Zaporoje one million souls are litterally starving. 60% are children. Cannibalism is spreading. Ten thousand people die in Zaporoje daily. All the cattle and the horses have been devoured". (*La famine en Ukraine:* Genève, 1922). 731 656 261

The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee gives a picture of the famine in Ukraine as follows:

"The country side is parched, without trees or plants, almost entirely black. The straw of the roofs is being used to nourish men and animals. People relate that they first ate up all dogs, cats, crows that they could catch and then took to the starving cattle, to boot-leather and furniture wood. You hear accounts and find evidence of necrophagy and cannibalism. You speak with people who have devoured their children, their brothers and sisters. You see skeleton-like human forms lying in the peasant's huts, dying, or waiting without hope, to be rescued by death . . . Usually no one takes the trouble, or no one has sufficient energy to bury the dead".

In the time when the Ukrainian people were starving in masses, the Russian Government took care only of the aid for the hungry along the Volga. The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee in Ukraine wrote in his report of 1922: 731 656

"At the beginning of this year one could have seen in famine-stricken districts of the Gouvernement Nikolaiev such proclamations: 'Workers of Nikolaiev: Come to the assistance of the famine-stricken of the Volga region!' This happened at a time when this

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The navigable length of the principal rivers is as follows: 487

	For Shipping. Miles.	For Rafting only. Miles.
Dnieper . .	1,250	136
Desna . .	537	166
Dniester . .	521	35

All the above-mentioned waterways suffer in common from four serious defects. (1) They are frozen for a considerable period of the year. In the basin of the Dnieper traffic was only possible in the first ten years of this century for an average of 230 days above the rapids and 250 below. Other rivers are in a similar case. (2) The volume of water falls rapidly in summer, and in dry seasons lack of water impedes navigation seriously. (3) Wholesale cutting down of the forests on the banks has led to alteration of the beds of the rivers and the splitting up of the channels. (4) Works for the improvement of navigation scarcely exist, not even the most urgent having been undertaken. 487 502

The principal cargoes carried are breadstuffs, wood, and coal. Cereals are embarked in great quantities on the lower Dnieper and Southern Bug for shipment abroad from Kherson and Nikolaev. The upper Dnieper and the Dniester carry timber. 505 439

Navigable canals do not exist in the Ukraine. Should the scheme for a Dvina-Dnieper canal materialize, it would have a noticeable commercial effect upon the towns of Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Alexandrovsk, and Kherson. 503

(c) *Railways*

Railway System.—There are in the Ukraine three great railway centres, viz. Kiev, Kharkov, and Yekaterinoslav. 496

1. From Kiev a line runs in a westerly direction to Sarny and Kovel, continuing thence to Choïm and Warsaw.

A second line goes in a north-easterly direction to Bakhmach, thence *via* Kursk and Orel to Moscow.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

504 from its mouth. There are two entrances from the sea, the Rvach and Zbarev channels, the former being 22 ft. deep, the latter only 10 ft. There are three loading berths at a quay, respectively 420, 125, and 425 ft. long, but vessels mostly load in the stream from lighters by means of floating cranes, of which there are 22, or by using their own winches. Vessels are allowed to load up to 23 ft. owing to a recent improvement in the channel. A new quay to accommodate 18 steamers is under construction.

Berdyansk roads are protected by a long semi-circular sand-spit from all winds except the south-west. There is 14–16 ft. of water in the roads. The harbour is protected from all winds by a breakwater 700 yds. in length, parallel with and half a mile distant from the shore line in front of the town. A dredged channel, 1½ miles in length and 10½ ft. deep, leads up to the western end of the breakwater. Quay space is at present deficient, but a first-class port is projected and partially under construction. The harbour is being dredged to increase its general depth to 20 ft.

Mariupol harbour consists of an area on the open foreshore enclosed by two moles. The entrance channel is dredged to a depth of 24 ft., and the depth in the anchorage inside the moles is 22–26 ft. Within the harbour, 440 yds. from the shore line and parallel with it, is a breakwater 500 yds. long. The inner harbour inside this breakwater is reserved for vessels loading coal Against the quays, where rails run alongside, there is a minimum depth of 12 ft. and a maximum of 24 ft. There are two hydraulic elevators for loading coal, but much coal and all grain is loaded by hand, and mechanical appliances are greatly needed. Mariupol is considered a harbour of first-class importance, and extensive improvements of all kinds are projected.

505 431 *Nature and Volume of Trade.*—Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson export cereals and other agricultural products; Nikolaev also exports great quantities of iron-ore and Kherson timber. Many vessels arrive in ballast

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

to carry these goods. The imports consist of machinery, manufactured goods, colonial and tropical products, and chemicals; Odessa also imports coal from the Donets region, which is shipped at Mariupol or Taganrog.

The export trade of Berdyansk is chiefly coal, iron-ore, and grain. Mariupol principally exports Donets coal. The imports of both places are general, but a large proportion consists of chemicals and particular minerals required in the iron and steel industry in the Government of Yekaterinoslav.

The number and tonnage of the vessels entering the above-mentioned ports in 1910, and the amounts of the exports and imports, are shown in the following table:

	Total vessels entered.	*Tonnage.*	*British vessels entered.*	*Tonnage.*	*Imports (tons).*	*Exports (tons).*
Odessa	848	1,596,217	174	388,136	566,743	1,736,029
Nikolaev	544	1,126,441	315	676,834	178,790	2,070,419
Kherson	152	330,260	131	288,789	104,693	844,919
Berdyansk	180	269,365	38	65,492	28,693	416,451
Mariupol	231	394,451	67	119,242	266,693	1,587,161
				Total	1,145,612	6,654,979

The respective values of the exports and imports are more difficult to ascertain, but the difference in value is certainly not so great as that in weight. For some years before the war, the value of the exports of the whole of Russia exceeded that of her imports by about 40 per cent., and the proportion for the Ukraine ports is probably about the same.

Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Development.—The Ukraine Black Sea ports would appear, on the whole, to be equal to the demands put upon them; in fact, there is severe competition between Odessa and Nikolaev. The recent improvements at Nikolaev have inspired the Odessa authorities to apply for powers to carry out great extensions, but so far these have not been granted, as the central authorities held that there was no prospect of a good return on the capital that would be required.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

467 missionaires, dock and wharf labourers, outdoor servants, &c. The members of *artels* in the second group always receive employment in preference to other workers, as their trustworthiness is guaranteed by the *artel*, and the fact of their membership is some guarantee that they are efficient.

The *artels* are democratic and useful institutions, and, in a country where promptness and trustworthiness are somewhat rare qualities, they play a most valuable part in giving a measure of confidence and security to both employers and workmen.

(2) Agriculture

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

243 The agricultural industry is the largest in the Ukraine, and employs the great majority of the [434] population. The black-soil region extends over most of the area, only the Governments of Kiev, Podolia, and Chernigov, and the borders of the Black Sea, lying [433] outside it. It follows that the suitability of the Ukraine [439] for cereals is equal to that of any part of the world, and its surplus crops form a considerable proportion of the world's food-supply.

243 The mean area under cultivation in the period 1901–5 433 was 52,000,000 acres, producing 20,700,000 tons annually. Of this total, 45,600,000 acres were under breadstuff crops, and produced 15,000,000 tons. For the year 1914, the figures were 56,300,000 acres, producing 23,000,000 tons. Of this 50,400,000 acres were under breadstuff crops, with a return of 15,900,000 tons.

243 *Rye* is the principal crop, and is produced on the 439 peasants' lands more largely than any other cereal. It is the staple breadstuff of the country, and the internal consumption absorbs a large part of the crop, a minor quantity only being exported. In some years the crop is not sufficient for the home demand, and the peasants have to use imported flour or substitutes.

Wheat is next in importance, and provides the largest surplus for export. It is mainly grown on

9: Prothero. G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

privately-owned lands. The failure or success of the Ukraine wheat harvest has its effect upon the corn exchanges of the whole world, and its shipment from the Black Sea is the occasion of much anxiety and speculation every season.

Barley is largely grown and exported, being principally raised on privately-owned land. *Maize* comes next in value; the greater part of the crop is consumed locally, but a moderate quantity is exported in good years. The *oat* crop is valuable, and a proportion remains for export after the supply of local needs. *Millet* and *buckwheat* are grown for local use.

Of the non-cereal crops, *potatoes* take the first place, exceeding all others by a large margin. They are used not only for food and the manufacture of potato flour, but for the distillation of spirits, a flourishing industry in many districts. Small crops of *peas*, *beans*, and *lentils* are also grown.

The *sugar-beet* is raised in great quantities, especially in the governments which have not the black soil. Kiev produces most, Podolia and Kharkov come next; the remaining Governments have only small crops, and Taurida and Yekaterinoslav none. There is usually a large surplus of refined sugar for export, in addition to a valuable internal trade in sugar and manufactures thereof; the by-products of cattle food and spirit distilled from molasses increase the value of this crop.

Tobacco used to be widely cultivated except in the black-soil zone, but its cultivation is steadily decreasing everywhere. It still remains important in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. Only the coarsest qualities are raised, the leaf being known as *makhorka* and used solely by peasants and labourers.

Volhynia grows a large quantity of *hops*, about half the total yield of all Russia. The product is mostly sold locally, but occasionally a surplus is exported to the Warsaw market.

The *grape vine* is cultivated in Podolia, Kherson, and Yekaterinoslav. The wine produced is of inferior quality, and has only a local market.

Of the crops producing vegetable oils, *linseed* and

249 Of oil crops producing vegetable oils, hemp-seed and *sunflower* are the principal. A great deal of sunflower seed is eaten raw by peasants and labourers all over Russia. These two crops are decreasing.

244 *Fruit and vegetables.*—The orchard districts are in the
● 439 Governments of Podolia, Chernigov, Poltava, and Kiev.
245 Apples, pears, plums, cherries, mulberries, and apricots grow freely, and the surplus goes to northern Russia, great quantities being preserved. Vegetables succeed well in the alluvial soils near the rivers. They are mostly grown by summer immigrants from Bulgaria (cf. p. 72), who use a primitive system of irrigation. The surplus supply all goes to northern Russia.

231 The live-stock of the Ukraine is very numerous, but of late years has tended to decrease.

Horses are much in demand for agricultural work, especially as the use of oxen as draught animals is being gradually abandoned. There is also a strong demand for horses in the coal and iron region for haulage. As a result the stock of horses has considerably increased in six out of the nine Governments, Volhynia, Podolia, and Chernigov alone showing decreases.

Cattle have decreased in numbers in five Governments and increased in four, but the total shows a serious falling off.

236 *Sheep* are divided roughly into two classes, fine-woolled and coarse-woolled, the former producing wool known as 'Spanish', the latter being killed for their skins. There is a general decrease of stock in every province of the Ukraine. The great increase of population and the demand for land, with rising rents, make sheep-farming not sufficiently profitable under present agricultural conditions.

231 The stock of *pigs* is, on the whole, maintained, and even shows a good increase in some Governments.

The *goat* was formerly of importance, and there was a considerable stock in the country, but it has dwindled latterly at a very rapid rate.

235 *Poultry* are kept in considerable numbers, but poultry-farming on modern methods is very rare and of small economic importance.

000 *Apiculture* is common in the northern Ukraine, and

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

is near the small town of Krivoy-Rog on the borders of the Governments of Yekaterinoslav and Kherson, between the town of Yekaterinoslav and the port of Nikolaev. This district has produced 95 per cent. of the iron ore mined in European Russia in recent years, and after supplying the needs of the numerous iron-works on the Donets coalfield and dispatching great quantities to other parts of Russia, it exports a large surplus through the ports of Nikolaev and Mariupol. This supply is eagerly taken up, principally by Great Britain and Germany. 316 433 [433]

The Krivoy-Rog iron is a brown non-phosphoric ore, containing about 70 per cent. of pure iron. The output is steadily increasing: the ore mined amounted in 1906 to 3,000,000 tons, and in 1910 exceeded 4,000,000 tons. There have been further increases since.

Deposits of *manganese* ore are found in the Government of Yekaterinoslav at Nikopol on the lower Dnieper, a few miles east of the Krivoy-Rog iron district. Exploitation began in 1886, and has been very successful.

The production, of which 75 per cent. is exported, fluctuates greatly according to the price of manganese abroad, and a maximum output of 300,000 tons in 1907 was succeeded by a fall to one-half this amount in 1909, with a slight recovery in the following years.

Mercury has been exploited since 1879 at Nikitovka, in the Government of Yekaterinoslav. The mineral is found in the coal measures near the surface. After being successfully worked for thirty years, the mines were closed about 1909.

Salt.—The Ukraine has valuable deposits of salt. There is an important mine of rock-salt near Bakhmut in the Government of Yekaterinoslav. Boring has been continued to a depth of 760 ft. without passing through the entire thickness of the salt bed; of this 340 ft. consists of pure salt. 317 433

On the edge of the Koyalnitski lagoon, north-east of Odessa, there is a salt lake which produces enough

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1-20 RD: Ukraine RD1

317 salt for the domestic needs and preserving industries
433 of the neighbourhood.

Brine springs are worked at Bakhmut and at Slavyansk in the Government of Kharkov. The brine is pumped to the surface and the salt evaporated.

The salt production is increasing but slowly, and not in proportion to the needs of the preserving and curing industries of Russia; prices are rising and imports increasing. The average output for the years 1905–9 was 1,326,000 tons of pure salt, which was over 50 per cent. of the production of all Russia.

316 *Building stone.*—Quarrying for limestone is a great industry near Odessa, which is built of the local stone. Granite is quarried on the banks of the larger rivers, and Yekaterinoslav and other towns are largely built of granite, which is also used for harbour works and railway bridges.

317 *Pottery clays.*—Kaolin is found in the Ukraine, the entire output of Russia being produced within its boundaries. Clays of good quality exist in the Governments of Poltava, Kharkov, and Kherson, and supply material for the local domestic industry in earthenware.

(b) *Methods of Extraction*

316 There is nothing new or striking in the methods used for extracting the minerals mentioned; on the contrary, except where foreign capital is interested, they are on the whole not equal to those followed in western Europe and America. The greatest drawback is the low producing power of labour, for which no immediate remedy is to be found. There is room for improved machinery on a large scale, but unless the habits of the people change, the output per head will remain comparatively small.

(5) Manufactures

433 Manufacturing industry plays a relatively small
439 part in the economic life of the Ukraine, the country not producing sufficient for its own wants and import-

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

ing both from abroad and from other parts of Russia. 433
The two principal exceptions to this rule are manu- 439
factured food-stuffs, and heavy iron and steel products.

Sixty-eight per cent. of the manufactured products 433
of the country consist of food-stuffs. The industries 252
contributing to this output are various, including flour- 257
milling, sugar-refining, and those dependent wholly or partly upon sugar, such as confectionery, fruit-preserving, distilling from molasses, brewing, and wine-making. Most of the undertakings concerned have only a small capital, and are situated near the source of their raw material. In the neighbourhood of Kiev, however, sugar-refining and its dependent industries are carried on in large works, many of which are capitalized from abroad.

The close conjunction of the Donets coalfield and 327
the iron and manganese deposits has enabled the 453
Ukraine to be almost entirely self-supporting in iron and steel manufactures of the first categories, and to supply the wants of the remainder of Russia as well. Pig-iron, bar-iron, roof-iron, steel rails, axles, tubes, and assorted merchant iron are all made in the iron-works which have been established in increasing numbers on the coal and iron fields. These works are seldom in large centres of population, but as a rule in small towns and villages, some of which owe their existence to the need of housing for the labour employed.

The output of raw iron and steel in the first stage of manufacture under the headings of Bessemer and Thomas bars, Martin-process bars, cast-iron and steel billets, and cast-iron tubes, was in 1906 1,300,000 tons, and in 1910 1,900,000 tons. The output of iron and steel in the second stage of manufacture, under the headings of T and H beams, rails, sheet-iron, rolled wire, roof-iron, trusses, springs, assorted merchant iron and axles, was in 1906 1,010,000 tons, and in 1910 1,602,258 tons. In the former year the output in both stages was equal to about 45 per cent., and in the latter year to about 55 per cent., of the total Russian output.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

(2) Foreign

(a) *Exports*

No separate figures as to exports from the Ukraine are given in official statistics, which in every case refer to the Empire as a whole. Owing, however, to the nature of the exports, it is possible to draw some general conclusions. 439

The total exports of Russia for several years of the twentieth century have averaged £100,000,000 in value. Considerably more than half at all times, and frequently as much as two-thirds, come under the heading of food-stuffs. Of these, cereals and sugar are certainly almost entirely of Ukrainian origin. Butter and eggs, the two other most notable items, are not exported from the Ukraine in any quantity, but the total value of these exports does not approach a quarter of the value of the exports of wheat alone.

The following figures show how the export of cereals, especially wheat, varies according to the harvest. Of the years quoted, 1908 was poor, 1909 good, and 1910 excellent:

	1908.	1909.	1910.
	£	£	£
Wheat	11,200,000	38,400,000	40,500,000
Rye	2,500,000	3,400,000	2,900,000
Barley	13,200,000	16,500,000	15,800,000

Wood and prepared timber are largely exported from Russia, and a small proportion comes from the Ukraine.

Of hides, another important export, the Ukraine furnishes a good share, and the same remark applies to oil-seed products.

Iron-ore exports are almost entirely of Ukrainian origin, coming from Krivoy-Rog.

The above headings cover the most important articles which the Ukraine has for export. The wheat goes principally to Great Britain, Holland, and Germany; the rye to Austria, Germany, and other

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

439 destinations; and the barley chiefly to Germany. The iron-ore goes mainly to Great Britain and Germany.

(b) *Imports*

As in the case of exports, exact figures for the Ukraine imports cannot be given. In the long list of Russian imports, only three stand out conspicuously —raw cotton, wool, and machinery. Neither imported wool nor cotton is worked in the Ukraine, and the importation of agricultural machinery, though still considerable, is declining. As for commodities under the headings of colonial produce and manufactured goods, the share taken by the Ukraine cannot be estimated, but it is probable that more than half the amount imported through Ukraine ports is consumed beyond the Ukraine boundaries, as the adjacent parts of Russia have greater purchasing power. It may safely be said, however, that the imports of chemical manures, which are increasing rapidly, are largely destined for the Ukraine.

Germany is the principal source of Russia's imports, her share being usually 45–50 per cent. of their total value. Imports from Great Britain represent only 12–14 per cent. of the whole. The rest of the import trade is divided among many countries, none of which contributes as much as 10 per cent. of the total.

(c) *Customs and Tariffs*

651 The Russian tariff is on the whole highly protective, particularly in reference to manufactured articles. As far as possible the duties are levied on weight, only occasionally on value. The tariff contains 218 sections and many sub-classifications.

There is a short free list which includes many kinds of agricultural machinery, live cattle, horses, and cattle food consisting of by-products of manufacture. Certain fertilizing substances and chemicals necessary for tanning and other industries are imported under low duties.

The conventional tariff is modified in favour of various nations in respect of specified items according to the commercial treaties mentioned below. 651

(d) *Commercial Treaties*

The Ukraine having hitherto formed part of the Russian Empire, the commercial treaties of the Empire have had full force there. Up to the year 1893, notwithstanding any treaties existing, all European nations were on the same footing in relation to the Russian tariff. Since then the following special conventions as to tariffs have been concluded: 648 439

With France.—A treaty of 1893 provides for a reduction of Russian duties on 52 articles of French origin, in exchange for a reduced French tariff on naphtha and its products.

With Serbia.—A treaty of commerce and navigation, signed in 1893, agrees to a decrease of the Russian duty on Serbian fruits, in exchange for Serbian concessions on fish and mineral oils.

With Germany.—By a treaty of commerce signed in 1894, Russia lowered her duties in favour of Germany on 135 articles, in consideration of which she obtained most-favoured-nation treatment from Germany.

With Portugal.—A general convention of 1895 arranged that Russia should benefit by certain reductions of the Portuguese tariff, and that Portuguese cork and cork products should be allowed a 20 per cent. reduction of duty on entering Russia.

With Japan.—A general treaty, signed in 1895, placed Japan, in respect of her commercial relations with Russia, on a similar footing to that of European countries.

With Bulgaria.—In 1897 the Russian tariff on dried meat, eggs, and undressed leather was lowered in favour of Bulgaria, and attar of roses was admitted free of duty. In return, certain general concessions and most-favoured-nation treatment were accorded by Bulgaria to Russia.

9: Protocols 6-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

648 Asia generally has peculiar commercial relations
431 with Russia, the duties on both sides being as a rule low, while numerous arrangements for reciprocal concessions have been made, notably with Persia, the Turkish Empire, and China.

(D) FINANCE

(1) Public Finance

652 The Russian Imperial revenue is largely raised in indirect taxes. The budget for 1911 shows the following revenue figures:

		Roubles.
Direct taxes		210,000,000
Indirect taxes:		
Liquor	42,000,000	
Tobacco	69,000,000	
Sugar	123,000,000	
Petroleum	44,000,000	
Matches	18,000,000	
Customs	289,000,000	
		585,000,000
Duties:		
Stamps, fees on transfers, harbour dues, railway dues		169,000,000
Royalties:		
Mines, mint, posts and telegraphs, and spirit monopoly		849,000,000
State property, including railways		765,000,000
Remainder		122,000,000
Total		2,700,000,000

The principal spending departments were the Ministries of Ways and Communications, War, and Finance, and the Public Debt service. These accounted for three-fourths of the expenditure.

476 was made in the cooperative society's own factories. The society owned cement factories, lime plants, mills, cloth-weaving factories, bakeries, oil presses and even a factory that made boot polish and cosmetics.

• 439 Whither did Ukrainian goods go? Peas, beans and poultry to England and Belgium, clover seed to Holland, /94/ pigs to Germany, beef cattle via Constanta to Greece, poultry to Germany, Switzerland and to - Palestine, eggs to many countries and in cans, as far as Buenos Aires.

[545] Sociologically noteworthy is the growth of an urban stratum of artisans, merchants and small industrialists. The Ukrainians who, much to their 369 own disadvantage, neglected the cities because of 476 their love for quiet village life, now gradually pushed into the cities, and the credit cooperatives supported them in this.

*

741 Of greatest significance for the advancement of Ukrainian culture were the societies for edu- 517 cation and public health. The society for popular 217 education, "Prosvita", was even older than the Ukrainian system of cooperatives, reaching back to 1883. It was a veritable national sanctuary of the Ukrainians. The people are indebted to it for a large part of their cultural advance. The "Prosvita" was an actual school for advanced studies in the country. In 3214 village libraries with 700,000 volumes, two instructive monthly magazines and with inexpensive editions of books, it enabled the village inhabitants who were cut off from all urban culture to obtain the knowledge which alone made it possible for them to assert themselves against their enemies. Besides that, 741 "Prosvita", which on January 1, 1938 numbered 517 360,000 members, and owned 1457 club houses with rooms for meetings, promoted group singing, music, the community theater and folk art. It helped

11: Obermaier--108 J-3(no date)1942RD1UkraineRD1

517 156 [214] Kiyev, Khar'kov and Odessa are the most important centers of East Ukrainian intellectual life. It is there that most of the Ukrainian books, periodicals and newspapers are published. Besides that, the Ukrainian tongue is also printed in many smaller cities. Many of the Soviet Ukrainian authors glorify present conditions; these are the interpreters of Communism, the worshipers of machines and idols. But there are also others, like Khvylovy, who in truthful pamphlets derided the state of affairs, the proletarian wirepullers, their ingenuousness, their venality and their eagerness to work their way up, authors who write with a nationalistic purpose, who are "exposed" and then, like Khvylovy, come to an unfortunate end. "Experts maintain that even in the works of the Ukrainian Communist writers, especially the younger ones, the national feeling cannot be hidden, that an inner schism appears in their works. They do not actually belong to proletarian literature which has remained inwardly foreign to them. How could it be otherwise with such a past!" (56) /Facing page 104/

56. Zalozieckyj, ibid.

439 /Map VIII: Grain Export from the Soviet Ukraine and North Caucasus (Average for 1927/1928) This map differentiates between actual Soviet Ukraine and the North Caucasus regions. Export to foreign countries is insignificant compared to supplies sent to the Greater Russian areas of the Soviet Union situated in the forest belt./ /Key: Grain: ● from Soviet Ukraine, ● from the North Caucasus./

/105/ Trapping Souls

798 On Sunday, May 29, 1939 a unique event took place in the church of St. Peter in Rome:

11: Obermaier--108A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

•439



Map VIII: Grain Export from the Soviet Ukraine and North Caucasus (average for 1927/1928), cf. complete Legend, p. 109]

11: Obermaier--108B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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
Magnitogorsk
Orenburg
Kuybyshev
Saratov
Stalingrad
Astrakhan
Krasnovodsk
Orsk
Aralsk
Tashkent
Kzyl-Orda
Semipalatinsk
Omsk
Tyumen
Sverdlovsk
Kurgan
Chelyabinsk
Kokchetav
Pavlodar
Barnaul
Novosibirsk
Kemerovo
Tomsk
Krasnoyarsk
Irkutsk
Chita
Yakutsk
Vladivostok
Khabarovsk
Blagoveshchensk
Sverdlovsk
Tobolsk
Yakutsk
Irkutsk
Krasnoyarsk
Tomsk
Novosibirsk
Barnaul
Pavlodar
Kokchetav
Chelyabinsk
Kurgan
Tyumen
Omsk
Semipalatinsk
Kzyl-Orda
Aralsk
Orsk
Krasnovodsk
Astrakhan
Stalingrad
Saratov
Kuybyshev
Orenburg
Magnitogorsk
Tashkent

474 the inventory of goods, buildings and land are likewise property of the community, but the agricultural products are distributed on a share basis according to work performed, after expenses and reserves have been deducted. In contrast to the commune, the farm produce consumed by the family and the family's household economy are private. Nominally the farmer is co-owner of the kolhosp which the law describes as "agricultural common property on a cooperative basis". The rights and privileges of the farmer who has "voluntarily" joined are set forth in the statute. No compensation is paid for agricultural property brought in by the individual farm. If a farmer withdraws from the kolhosp, what he has brought in is not returned to him, but he can demand an allowance which, however, is very small and in no wise corresponds to the actual value.

162 Of the total of 44.5 million hectares of land in the Soviet Republic in 1938, 29.7 million hectares fell to the kolhosp, 1.8 million to the separate property of the kolhosp farmers, /Facing
•439 page 152/ /Map X: Export of Coal and Sugar from Soviet Ukraine. (Average 1927/1928). The Ukrainian supply to the Great Russian areas of coal and sugar shows a similar development as the distribution of grain. In these products, too, export to foreign countries was small./ /153/ 1.5 million hectares to individual non-collective farmers, 4.2 million hectares to Soviet farms and 7.3 million hectares to other properties. (97)

97. Deminsky: "The Economy of the Ukraine" in Deutsche Berufserziehung, No. 15 and 16, p. 135.

474 From a practical point of view the kolhosp represents a large estate whose land lies round about the estate. All the members of the commune are the estate owners. Since the kolhosps are forbidden to employ outside manpower, a stranger cannot

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

Map X: Export of coal and sugar from Soviet Ukraine. (Average 1927/1928, cf. complete legend, A 1Cd]

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
Kiev
Kharkov
Dnepropetrovsk
Donetsk
Odessa
Nikolaev
Kherson
Simferopol
Sevastopol
Kiselevsk
Rostov
Taganrog
Krasnodar
Stalingrad
Saratov
Voronezh
Kursk
Orel
Tula
Moscow
Smolensk
Minsk
Gomel
Bryansk
Kaluga
Tamb

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464 The tremendous increase in popula-
361 tion which the Ukraine showed after the liberation of peasants in 1861 found employment in the growing industry and in railroad construction, insofar as the surplus population did not prefer emigration to Siberia and eastern Asia. When there was less work on the farms, the farmers and farmers' sons traveled into the industrial regions, only to return to their villages at planting and harvest time. Thus a stock of Ukrainian industrial workers could not be formed; foreign Russian manpower immigrated and remained for good. In 1918 and 1919, when the Muscovite Bolsheviks broke into the Ukraine and the Russian industrial workers reinforce their ranks, the absence of a Ukrainian industrial working class was to make itself disastrously felt.

316 The world thinks of the Ukraine more as a granary than as asource of valuable raw materials. And yet, there are considerable treasures buried in Ukrainian soil. The reserve of iron ore in the Ukraine is the third largest in the world. At Krivoy Rog, 250 kilometers northeast of Odessa, according to the latest calculations there are deposited 1.25 billion tons of high percentage Bessemer ores (60 to 61% iron content) and also considerable quantities of ferruginous quartz. In Kerch on the easternmost spur of the Crimean Peninsula there are 2.7 billion tons of phosphorous ores with an iron content of 38 to 42%, and in the northern Caucasus there are smaller deposits. The following table shows the importance of Ukrainian ore extraction for the Great
439 Russian realm: /Facing page 160/ /Map XI: Iron Ore and Steel Export from the Soviet Ukraine (Average 1927/1928). The Ukraine was the great source of steel for the industrial works around Moscow and Leningrad./ /161/

316

	Iron Ore Extraction in million tons		
	1913	1932	1935
Krivoy Rog.....	6388	7925	16,594

11: Obermaier--170A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

[Map XI: Iron Ore and Steel Export from the Soviet Ukraine (Average 1927/1928), cf. complete Legend, p. 170]

11: Obermaier --170B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

[Map II: Iron ore and steel Export from the Soviet Union (Average 1927/28)]

11: Obermaier--181 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

In 1926 there were 42.1% Ukrainians in Kiyev, 38.3% in Khar'kov, 17.4% in Odessa, /Facing page 168/ /Map XII: Balance of Trade in the Soviet Ukraine. The diagrams on this page permit a comparison of import and export during the periods before and after the First World War. Note the decrease of exports in agricultural products and the increase of industrial exports/ /Captions:/ 369 162 439

Diagram of
Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union in
1909/11, 1913 and 1934
(in million rubles)

1.
Export, of this trade with Russia
/In circle marked 795:/
Grain 222
Metal and metal goods 90
Products of animal husbandry 56
Other produces 28
Other agricultural products 399

2.
Import
/In circle marked 472:/
Metals and machines 34.5
Naphtha products 33.5
Groceries 33
Leather & leather goods31
Fish 29
Wood products 17
Other products 17
Other finished products 217

3. Export
/In circle marked 744:/
Grain 235
Metals & crude metals 116
Products of animal husbandry 53
Coal 50
Other products 25
Sugar 265

4. Import
/In circle marked 331:/
Wood products 37
Naphtha products 13
Metal goods
Other products 74
Other finished goods 197

5.Export
/In circle marked 720:/
Sugar 160
Coal 140
Grain 50
Ores 10
Metals and machines 360

11: Obermaier--182 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

439 6. Import
/In circle marked 380:/
Naphtha 110
Wood products 70
Fish 20
Products of animal husbandry 5
Other finished products 180

7. Export of various goods from the Soviet Ukraine in 1913, 1928, 1932 and 1934 (in million tons).

8. Coal

9. Ores

10. Iron & steel

11. Grain

12. Sugar

13. Wood

14. Naphtha & naphtha products

15. Various finished products

000/ Also facing page 168/ /Where tractors are worn out harrowing is now done with horses/ /Facing page 169/A/At planting time the seed must be got into the ground within a few days. The tractor is particularly adapted to the cultivation of large
369 areas/A/169/ 35.9% in Dnepropetrovsk, 16.2% in
162 Lwow (1931), 28.9% in Stalin, 29.9% in Krasnodar (chief city of the Kuban region), and 17.8% in Chernovtsy.

*

563 The Jews immediately seized what the Ukrainians had passed by. During the wars with the Turks Catherine II had opened to them the south Ukrainian gubernyas of Taurien, Kherson and Katerinoslav, the present-day Dnepropetrovsk. In 1835 the right of settlement of the Jews was extended to the entire right-bank section of the Ukraine with the exception of the city of Kiyev. The rest of Russia was almost completely free of Jews until 1917. From that time on all of Russia was open to them, and immediately the emigration

1 [For photos, cf. pp. 224-225, category 11c - Analyst]

•439



7. Export of various Soviet Ukraine in 1934 (in million tons)



[Map. XII: Balance of trade in the Soviet Ukraine, cf. complete Legend, pp. 181–182]

439



goods from the
1913, 1928, 1932 and

10. Iron + steel

12. SUGAR

and Naphtha products



15. various finished products



[Map XII: Balance of trade in the Soviet Ukraine]

727 relief and rehabilitation supplies to be delivered until such time as
457 the two republics would be able themselves to pay with suitable means
648 of foreign exchange for their own imports[1].

727 The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement provided for a programme of supplies
439 amounting to 188 million U.S. dollars (approximately five dollars per head
648 of population), to be used for food, clothing, medical, agricultural, and industrial supplies. The agreement stipulated that UNRRA would attempt to deliver the bulk of these supplies to the Ukraine before June 30, 1946; however, because of procurement and transport difficulties, this early completion of the programme proved impossible. On May 30, 1946, therefore, the UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was extended to the end of 1946.

The schedule of supplies to be shipped has changed somewhat since the original programme was decided. As it now exists, about 53 per cent. (by value) of the total supplies are foodstuffs; 27 per cent. industrial supplies, and nearly 9 per cent. clothing. Supplies for the rehabilitation of agriculture will amount to 17,088,000 dollars, the greater part of which has been allocated for seeds. The following table shows by value the UNRRA programme of supplies for the Ukraine, as at March 21, 1947. A more detailed summary will follow in later sections of this report.

TABLE III

UNRRA Programme of Supplies to the Ukrainian S.S.R.
(thousand U.S. dollars)

Food, feed, soap	100,189
Clothing, textiles, footwear	16,856
Medical and sanitation supplies	2,326
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591
Total	188,050

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

In March 1946 a small UNRRA Mission arrived in the Ukraine and established headquarters at Kiev. In subsequent months, some of the mission members have made many visits to various parts of the republic in order to observe the distribution of UNRRA supplies. They report that gigantic efforts are being made to restore the economy, but emphasize the discouraging fact that UNRRA assistance with machinery and other rehabilitation supplies is small in comparison with the tremendous destruction everywhere. The main UNRRA contribution has

1 UNRRA aid to Byelorussia will be dealt with in a future paper.

727
439 been food supplies, which in many Ukrainian towns constituted the only
648 food to be seen in shops in 1946. For fats and oils particularly the Ukrainian population has been entirely dependent on UNRRA aid.

The U.S.S.R.'s Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

727
648 UNRRA assistance to the Ukraine has been of necessity limited in scope and short-term in nature. Long after relief shipments are ended - and they are now all but complete - the Ukraine will still be working to rebuild its factories, cities, and farms. The main task of rehabilitation is therefore a long-term one, and depends upon long-range measures.

727
185 On March 18, 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted a Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, for the rehabilitation and development of the national economy of the Soviet Union. This plan is the fourth of a series of Five-Year Plans[1] designed to increase the productivity of Soviet farming and industry, and in general to raise the standard of living of the whole population. As stated by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the principal aims of the Five-Year Plan in 1946-50 are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of the country, to recover the pre-war level in industry and agriculture, and then considerably to surpass that level.

[652] The new Five-Year Plan provides that nearly one-third of the capital investments for the entire Soviet Union in 1946-50 (49,500 million roubles out of a total of 250,300)[2] are to be spent on the restoration of the Ukraine. Of this 49,500 million, 5,469 million will be used for works under the Ukrainian Republic's jurisdiction.

361
727 In the next five years all the destroyed cities of the Ukraine - particularly Kiev, Kharkov, Chernigov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, Stalino,
362 and Zaporozhie - are to be rebuilt and their municipal services restored. Housing is to be replaced as speedily as possible; in 1946-50, 175,120,000 square feet of state-owned housing are to be built, of which 12.65 million square feet are to be made available by local Soviets. The amount of privately owned housing to be built before 1950 is fixed at 36.3 million square feet.

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185 Also under the Five-Year Plan Ukrainian agriculture is to be rehabilitated; the crop area for 1950 is planned at 30.5 million hectares. By 1950 the Ukraine is scheduled to be producing about 20 per cent. of the grain harvested in the U.S.S.R. (approximately the same tonnage as in pre-war years); 60 per cent. of the sugar beet (about 6 per cent. more than pre-war); and the potato harvest is fixed for 23 million tons, 1½ millions more than in 1940.

000 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport

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1 First Five-Year Plan, 1929-32; second, 1933-37; third, 1938-42.

2 Estimated at 1945 prices.

of Rome as the supreme head of their church, the pioneers of 795
the Union and of the cultural independence of Ukraine wished to throw off the cultural yoke of Poland, thinking that they would acquire equal rights with the Poles once the churches were united. The course of events has showed how much they were mistaken; for the Poles have merely exploited this rapprochement in ecclesiastical affairs as an instrument by means of which, with the help of the Jesuits, they aimed at ruling over the entire East and at completely absorbing the Ukrainian nation.

Western influence can also be detected in the guild-like 441 ●
organisations of the Ukrainian middle-classes in towns like Lviv 871
Kyiv, Lutsk etc., organisations which, in addition to promoting the interests of a particular class or trade, also concerned themselves with church affairs. One of their main aims was the foundation of schools which taught Latin as well as Church Slavonic and Greek.

The most important foundation of those so-called Bro- 874
therhood schools was undoubtedly the Kyiv Academy 795
which owed its supremacy as an intellectual center, not 177
only of Ukraine, but of the whole of Eastern Europe .79
to the activities of such an eminent personality as Metropolitan Peter Mohyla. Mohyla, the son of the governor of Moldavia and educated in Jesuit schools, remained a life-long advocate of western culture and the Catholic Church, the organisation of which served him as a model when he was planning the reform of the Orthodox Church. We are scarcely able to-day to imagine what an enormous revolution and what great boldness of spirit was implied in the idea of introducing Catholic principles and methods into the organisation of the Orthodox Church which had been hostile to Rome for centuries. And yet this unique plan succeeded and could succeed only in Ukraine, for it was here alone that history had prepared the way for the adoption of these plans for realising western ideas. The spirit which inspired Mohyla's activities was wholly directed towards the West, as was clearly expressed in his innovations: in dogma, however, he remained a loyal disciple of the "faith

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

438 [655] In addition to factory industries there exists in Russia a group known as *kustarni* or domestic industries. They are considered so important by the Government that measures are taken by the various authorities to improve their output and conditions, to revive old ones and even to found new ones. Their range is wide, and they are carried on by families, by working syndicates or *artels* (cf. p. 73), or by individuals. In the Ukraine these industries are less well developed than in most parts of Russia, and in some provinces are hardly represented. There are three branches well established. Pottery is manufactured in the Governments of Kiev, Chernigov, and Poltava, where suitable clays are found, and the *kustarni* earthenware of these districts has a good reputation all over the country. Shoes, harness, and other leather goods are produced in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. Combs, buttons, and other objects made from animal horn are also a noted product of Poltava.

(6) Power

371 In the Ukraine power is almost exclusively produced by steam. Electric power is used for the tramways in Odessa and Kiev, but water-power is neglected, and electric drive for factory work is not employed.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(a) *General Characteristics; Markets, Fairs, &c.*

438 441 The trade of the Ukraine consists almost entirely in the movement and marketing of the produce of the land in one form or another. One of its noticeable features is the passage of commodities through several hands before they come into use. Nowhere are found so many middlemen, salesmen, and agents. This is caused principally by the lack of capital in the hands of the producer and a general encumbrance and hypothecation of land, crops, machinery, &c. There is

a very large population of Jews, who have become general tradesmen and brokers to the community. 438 441

The cereal crop is the subject of elaborate commercial transactions, and much of it is sold two or three times before it is harvested. The lack of proper storage leads to the rapid dispersal of the bulk of the surplus crop. Odessa and Nikolaev have corn exchanges where the export of the crop is financed, and there is an exchange for internal cereal trade at Yelisavetgrad.

The sugar trade is subject to Government control. A committee fixes annually the amount of sugar to be placed on the home market and the distribution of supplies to the refineries, the quantity so dealt with paying the minimum excise. After this allocation any surplus remaining is disposed of according to the general state of the market and the stock held over from the previous season, and is allotted for internal use or export. Russia was a signatory to the Sugar Convention of 1907, and agreed that, during the six years from the date of the convention, she should not export in all more than 1,000,000 tons. This specially affected the Ukraine as the principal sugar-producing area in Russia. 458 433 655

The sugar and alcohol markets are at Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa. 438

Wool of the finer sorts called 'Spanish' is dealt in principally at Kharkov, which is also the chief market for leather.

There is a flax market at Novozybkov in the province of Chernigov.

The principal timber markets are Yekaterinoslav and Kherson.

Odessa is a market for a great number of commodities produced in the interior, especially food-stuffs, cattle, tobacco, and vegetable oils.

The custom of transacting important business at fixed fairs is of very long standing in the Ukraine, and, while the importance of every fair tends to decrease at present owing to the adoption of other methods of trading, the fairs continue to be held, and, especially 438 445

(b) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

Organizations to promote trade in the Ukraine are not numerous. The true traders of the country are the native Jews, and to trace their involved dealings is impossible. 441

The sales of the coal and iron are almost wholly controlled by rings and cartels. The most powerful one, the *Prodamet*, or metal sales combine, controlled recently over 80 per cent. of all the iron and steel produced in South Russia and threatened to absorb the entire output. 477

The activities of the *zemstvos* in trade call for mention. These organs of local government actively enter into trade in agricultural machinery, improved seed, and pedigree live-stock, and endeavour to improve the facilities for selling the products of domestic industry. Their aim is to lift the internal commerce of the country from the condition of dependence on speculating middlemen, into which it has almost irretrievably fallen, but their achievements so far only touch the fringe of a deep-seated social trouble. 441 185

There are chambers of commerce at Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Berdyansk, and Mariupol, and there is a branch of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce at Odessa. Odessa, Nikolaev, and Yelisavetgrad have corn exchanges, and coal and iron exchanges exist at Kharkov. 441

(c) *Foreign Interests and Methods of Economic Penetration*

The present state of commerce in the Ukraine provides a wide field for economic penetration from abroad. Agriculture in its first stages is not much affected, but in one case, that of the production of sugar from beet, the secondary stages of manufacture have been much exploited by foreign capital and management. The coal and iron mining industries and the iron and steel manufacturing industries owe their foundation in great measure to foreigners, by whom they are still largely 471 432

a very large population of Jews, who have become general tradesmen and brokers to the community. 438 441

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The custom of transacting important business at fixed fairs is of very long standing in the Ukraine, and, while the importance of every fair tends to decrease at present owing to the adoption of other methods of trading, the fairs continue to be held, and, especially 438 443

438 in petty classes of trade, are still the occasion of much
443 buying and selling. The principal ones are as follows:

At Kiev the so-called Kontraktovaya fair is held from February 5 to 29. The goods dealt in are carpets, woven materials, silk, ready-made clothing, wooden goods, preserved fish, groceries, sugar, flax, iron, machines, coal, and salt. The real importance of the fair lies in its being the meeting-place for traders of all sorts from the neighbouring provinces. Bankers, agriculturists, and manufacturers meet to settle old and to make new contracts (hence its title), to liquidate or renew bills, &c. The turnover is about £250,000.

Poltava has a fair called Illinskaya from July 1 to 31. It is exclusively for the sale of skins, leather, and manufactures thereof. The turnover averages about £100,000.

Kharkov has four annual fairs, named after the religious festivals at which they are held: (1) Kreshenskaya (Epiphany), January 6 to February 1, for trade in manufactured goods, groceries, peltry, and leather. The turnover is about £1,250,000. (2) Troitskaya (Trinity), June 1 to 30, for trade in wool, sheepskins, and manufactured goods. Turnover, about £500,000. (3) Uspenskaya (Assumption), August 1 to 31, for manufactured and colonial goods. Turnover, about £900,000. (4) Pokrovskaya (Intercession of the Virgin), October 1 to 26 for general trade, as at Kreshenskaya. Turnover, about £1,250,000.

Jitomir has a hop fair from September 6 to 14 for the sale of the season's crop, the value of which fluctuates widely from year to year.

A large annual fair, principally for the disposal of wool, is held at Kakhovka.

438 The internal trade of the Ukraine is generally
452 conducted on the basis of a long credit, six to nine months by bill; and the fairs and exchanges give opportunity to gauge the general financial state of the country, which is almost totally dependent upon harvest conditions, and to provide for liquidation or renewal of the floating credit as circumstances require.

731 Most of the UNRRA food supplies delivered to the Ukraine are
262 distributed to ration stores for sale to workers and their dependants.
[443] A large proportion (about 35 per cent.) also goes for communal feeding
265 through dining rooms, health resorts, homes for invalids and the aged, and dining halls of trade schools. Hospitals, childrens' homes, maternity homes, and the like also receive a share (around 10 per cent.) (The food distributed to welfare organizations is delivered free of charge).

731 Apart from the food which UNRRA supplies, the Ukrainian people
262 are dependent on whatever amounts of local produce may appear on
434 various markets. According to the rationing system, the farmers are allowed to retain part of their produce to feed themselves and their dependants, and the farm's livestock; the state then purchases a certain quota for use in feeding the non-farm population. If any surplus then remains, the farmers may keep it, or sell it on the free market at uncontrolled prices.

241 In practice, however, because of the extremely poor harvests in
433 the last two years, Ukrainian farmers have scarcely been able to feed
434 even themselves; and the amounts of domestically produced food which reach the ration stores or the free market have consequently been small.

The following section describes the sources of food supply open to the urban consumers.

The System of Food Distribution

443 In the cities of the Ukraine there are three outlets through which
434 foodstuffs reach the population:

364 (a) the ration stores, where the bulk of foodstuffs are sold
262 at fixed prices to ration-coupon holders;

(b) the so-called gastronoms (commercial stores) where scarce, luxury items are sold; and

(c) the public markets, where collective farmers and peasants bring their surplus produce for sale.

Most of the rural areas and villages of the Ukraine are expected to produce locally enough food to feed the inhabitants; and as they are nearly all considered to be self-supplying, they receive through the central distribution system only sugar and sometimes bread. Their surplus farm produce (that is, food in excess of that needed for feeding people or livestock on the farm and not subject to collection or purchase by the state) is usually brought by the farmers to the public markets for sale to the urban population.
[435] The quantities of produce and the variety of items available in the free public markets vary greatly from season to season and from day to day; Prices are equally unstable.

000 day to day; prices are equally unstable.

Ration Stores

443 Members of the UNRRA Mission have visited ration stores in all the more important cities of the Ukraine. The city of Kiev, for example, has about 300, all of them much alike. The typical ration food store serves from 2,000 to 2,500 families living in the immediate neighbourhood; if a family moves, it changes its ration card registration to a store in its new locality. Some stores, however, serve the employees of a particular factory or organization as well as a neighbourhood; others are limited to special categories of customers, such as veterans, pregnant women and nursing mothers, teachers, doctors, and scientific workers; these stores have a slightly more varied stock of goods; and in the case of shops for pregnant women and nursing mothers, the roster of customers is smaller so that there is no waiting to be served.

737 Except for bread, most of the food sold in Ukrainian ration shops in 1946 was supplied by UNRRA. Many of these relief supplies, however, did not fit into the established rationing system; therefore many rather elaborate substitution schemes had to be devised, particularly for U.S. army C, K and ten-in-one rations, which were often substituted for a variety of foods. These schemes were said to be in effect throughout the Ukraine, local bodies having authority to make minor changes in substitution values to fit whatever stocks of goods were on hand at the moment.

For example, according to the scheme effective in Kiev in March 1946, if a customer was entitled to buy one kilogram of meat or fish monthly, he might possible substitute 15 eggs, or 200 grams of powdered milk, or 800 grams of sausage, or a 600 gram can of UNRRA tushonka[1] provided any of these were available. In lieu of one kilogram of fat rarely available the customer might buy 60 eggs, or two kilos of cheese, or 3 kilograms of sour cream, or 1.6 kilograms of powdered milk, or 400 grams of peanut butter, again provided they were available.

The army ten-in-one rations are packed in two cardboard boxes, labelled "first half" and "second half". In Kiev the "first half" was considered to be equivalent to 500 grams of fat and 1½ kilograms of sugar; while the "second half" was equivalent to 2 kilograms of meat and 500 grams of sugar.

In Poltava in April 1946 one U.S. army K ration was being considered the equivalent of 800 grams of meat or 206 grams of fat; one C ration, equal to 925 grams of meat or 310 grams of fat; the first half of a ten-in-one ration equalled 1,500 grams of meat or 500 grams of fat, and the second half of a ten-in-one ration, four kilograms of meat or 1,350 grams of fat.

A canned meat mixture.

Gastronoms

443 434 262 554 461 In addition to the ration stores, Kiev has about five gastronoms, or commercial stores, where unrationed goods are for sale. Most of the gastronoms are stocked almost entirely with delicacies, such as Siberian crabmeat, live carp in water tanks, a little fresh meat, salami, candy, biscuits, and Russian cigarettes. (No UNRRA goods are sold in such stores). Until September 1946 the prices in gastronoms were so high that only a relatively small part of the population could afford to buy. The gastronoms were patronized primarily by those with high earnings - professors, theatrical stars, scientists, artists, high ranking army officers, skilled technicians, etc. One of their main purposes was to show the average worker that some luxuries did exist, and thus encourage him to raise his skills and productivity. Another purpose was to provide a special reward for various kinds of meritorious service. For example, war heroes and top generals were entitled to a 40 per cent discount on all purchases made at a gastronom. Moreover, workers who had stayed at the same factory for six years or more were entitled to a 20 per cent discount, and office workers with similar service to 10 per cent.

[435] In September 1946, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to abolish differences between the higher "commercial" prices and the low prices of rationed goods, the prices in gastronoms were lowered and certain ration prices, raised somewhat.

[465] At the same time, taking into account the difficulties which average and low-paid workers would encounter as a result of higher ration prices, the Council of Ministers decided to increase all salaries of less than 900 roubles a month. Thus, those workers who previously had earned up to 300 roubles a month received an increase of 110 roubles; those who had earned up to 500 roubles, another 80. Similar increases were allowed in pensions and in students' stipends.

So far as UNRRA food is concerned, the increases in ration prices have affected meat, fish, fats and oils, other categories of UNRRA food supplies particularly milk, cheese, and army rations were not affected.

434 435 The following table shows the increases in ration store prices.

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TABLE XXVII

Ukraine: Prices of Rationed Food
(in roubles per kilogram)

	Before October 1, 1946	After October 1, 1946	Percentage increase
Bread (black with rye)	0.9	3.2	255
Bread (whole wheat)	1.8	6.0	240
Meat tushonka	16.6	32.0	87
Pork in gravy	20.5	35.3	72
Meat and vegetables	10.0	15.3	53
Pork and rice	15.7	30.7	90
Meat and corn	10.0	17.7	77
Herrings in tomato sauce	11.5	25.0	117
Herrings in natural oil	17.2	37.5	118
Smoked cod	9.8	18.0	84
Lard	18.0	36.0	100

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

Public Markets

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[474]
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The third kind of outlet for the distribution of food to the urban population is the public markets (officially called "Collective Farm Markets"). Their importance as a source of supplementary food is difficult generally to assess. On the one hand, extremely high prices plus the inconstancy or inadequacy of supplies prevent any group in the population from depending on the public markets for any substantial part of its diet; on the other hand, the variety of food sometimes available impels many to supplement the limited amounts and kinds of foods secured at the ration stores by purchases in the public markets. While prices are fixed and rigidly controlled in the ration stores, there is no control of prices whatever in the public markets, and the seller and purchaser usually agree on the price after a rather elaborate process of bargaining. On account of the limitations in supply, the selling prices are usually dear.

There are striking differences between the fixed, ration store prices and the uncontrolled market place prices. For example, in July 1946 (before ration prices were raised) white bread which - depending on the extraction rate of flour - was selling in ration stores at 90 kopecks[1] to 2.7 roubles a kilogram was selling in the public markets at 28.5 to

1 There are 160 kopecks to a rouble

443 41.6 roubles a kilogram. Butter, which was almost never available,
435 in the ration stores at 24 roubles a kilogram, and in the public
262 markets, at 150. The price of sugar in the public markets was, on July 10, four to five times the ration store price.

443 In addition to these products for which there are comparable prices in the ration stores, the public markets also offered certain foodstuffs
262 which were seldom or never available in the ration stores. In the
433 public markets of Kiev dressed beef was selling for 70 roubles a kilogram on June 5, 1946, and 60 roubles on July 6; milk, which on June 3 brought 15 roubles a litre was selling for 12 to 14 roubles on July 6. The fall in the price of tomatoes illustrates the play of demand and supply; when the first fresh tomatoes arrived on the public markets, they brought 15 roubles for each small tomato; by the end of July the price had fallen to 3.5 or 4 roubles for large size tomatoes of the best quality. Similar price reductions occurred in other vegetables and fruits; in each case, however, prices were still extremely high; even when the crops had been harvested, the demand remained far greater than the supply.

The extent of the shortages may be gathered from a report by the UNRRA Mission in June 1946, when a tour of Kiev's two great public markets revealed only one pound of meat, several fowls, small quantities of milk and butter from nearby farms, fifteen small sausages being sold from one can, and a few miscellaneous titbits such as matches, cigarettes, and candy from a ten-in-one ration.

Present supplies are even more attenuated. Ration scales have been cut, and this naturally increases the demand for supplies in the public markets. As the demand grows and supplies dwindle, prices rise even higher. The next table compares free market prices in June 1946, July 1946, and January 1947.

TABLE XXVIII

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Ukraine: Food Prices in a Typical Public Market
(in roubles)

	June 1946	July 1946	January 1947
Bread, kilo	22.5	23.0	50.0 - 55.0
Meat "	about 60.0	70 - 100	60.0
Fish "	-	-	65.0
Milk, litre	16.0	15.0	16.0
Butter, kilo	190.0	190.0	230.0
Eggs, dozen	42.0	48.0	-
Cereals (various) kilo	-	50.0	-
Sugar	-	100.0	-
Vegetable oil	-	200.0	200.0

- Very little or none on sale. Supplies vary greatly but are never very large.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

UNRRA Supplies and the Food Situation

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[+33]

Until the produce from local farms became available in the spring and summer of 1946, the diet of the urban population of the Ukraine depended principally, apart from bread, on UNRRA food supplies, which in the beginning consisted almost entirely of U.S. army rations, plus some dried and evaporated milk and tushonka. Urgently needed fats and oils were slow in arriving; up to May only 8,596 tons had been received in the Ukraine. The shortage was critical, since domestic production was providing a rate of only 4 to 5 kilograms of fats a year per person, as compared with 12.8 in 1940 and 22 kilograms in 1929.

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Very little food was being received from other parts of the Soviet Union, and a protracted dry spell was threatening the 1946 harvest. Official rations for almost all categories of consumers were low;

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Co-operative Organisations

The beginning of co-operative organisations in Dnipro-Ukraine and Western Ukraine date from the seventies and eighties of the 19th century. Foreign ideas and organisations supplied the model (especially English — Rochdale) e. g. the German foundations by Schulze — Delitzsch and Reiffeisen for credit co-operative societies. But they developed along other lines, their development being determined by legal and economic conditions which were nowhere the same — in the Russian Empire or Eastern Ukraine, in Austria-Hungary and the states which succeeded it and above all in Poland and therefore in Western Ukraine. In Dnipro-Ukraine the first co-operative society was founded in Kharkiv in 1866. The founder was M. Ballin, a landed proprietor and a man who was animated by co-operative ideals. He also wrote and was altogether a pioneer of the co-operative movement. Other co-operatives followed in the large towns but it was only after 1897 that general progress was marked when the statutes of a new co-operative society did not need to be approved by the Ministry of the Interior but only by the local governor. This is the time when Vasyl Domanytskyj, the Ukrainian champion of the co-operative movement wrote and worked. 474

Before World War I co-operative shops were the commonest co-operative organisation in Ukraine. Of the 6 510 co-operative organisations in existence on January 1, 1914. 1 075 (i. e. 47.2 %) were shops, while the 2 370 co-operative credit societies were only 36.4 % of the total. Dnipro-Ukraine had 31 of all the co-operative shops in pre-war Russia (10 080) while it had only 19 % of the co-operative credit societies (12 995) and an average of only 22 % of all co-operative organisations (29 060) 474 462

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDJ

474 The formation of unions was difficult and made little progress till 1917.

● 452 Credit co-operative societies began in Dnipro-Ukraine in 1868 when the first Savings and Credit Society was founded in the town of Hadyach. Two years later Halahan, a big landed proprietor, founded a second in the village of Sokyryntsi and also in the Poltava district. The development of the movement was checked by the restrictions of Russian legislation. The state offered its support through the State Bank which in 1895 opened a special department as an office for the "control of small credit institutes". But the support of the state was not particularly effective and the very bureaucratic methods of control were not adapted to further a genuine co-operative spirit.

By the end of the century 295 organisations for savings and credit had been founded. And then a new form of credit co-operative society appeared. The law of 1895 had permitted the foundation of credit co-operatives without a capital that had first been paid in by members. The basic capital was credited by the State bank and had to be paid back gradually. This mutual loan type of bank appealed to the poor rural population. In 1897 the first Mutual Loan Bank in the whole empire was opened in the village of Ivankivtsi, in the district of Poltava. During the first year of the war 70 % of the credit co-operatives in Eastern Ukraine were of this new type.

Productive co-operative organisations found in Dnipro-Ukraine a new form in agricultural concerns. Since the middle of the nineties they had been founded and promoted by M. Levytskyj, their indefatigable champion and organiser. Each of these co-operative societies was based on a contract, according to which the land of the members was managed in common and the produce divided among the members or their families.

It would be wrong to conclude that the Ukrainian rural population inclined either to communism or to the colkhose form of farming. These societies were formed for concrete purposes and after these were attained and the members — not without the support of the patrons — had enlarged their holdings, the societies were dissolved. Most of the 125 rural productive co-operative societies founded after 1902 scarcely

lasted 2—3 years. A co-operative organisation was also formed in particular when land was to be purchased. 474 452

From 1906 on many productive co-operative societies were also founded in towns and they lasted much longer. World War I was favorable to their development (army orders etc.).

Legislation and administrative authorities in imperial Russia were opposed to the formation of co-operative unions. In 1909 the first union of credit co-operative societies on Ukrainian territories was founded in Berdianske, and this was followed up to the Revolution of 1917 by a few unions, though there was no central organisation.

Co-operative organisations in Eastern Ukraine before World War I were characterised by difficulties of development, especially wherever there was an attempt to extend the scope beyond purely local needs and by the lack of generous legislation. Prominent among the circumstances of that time was the distrust of governing circles against all forms of co-operation, no matter in what nation. The national point of view was therefore disregarded; it was indeed impossible for a national Ukrainian policy of economy to develop under the Tsars. But it was evident soon after the outbreak of the Revolution that strong national powers were behind the co-operative movement. 474

The Revolution and political independence gave a tremendous impulse to the co-operative movement in Ukraine. National and co-operative forces were closely interwoven. Numerous men of the people came from the ranks of the co-operative organisation to take responsible offices in the state; the Ukrainian state, which could not look for support to any national capitalist vested interests, found effective help in the co-operative organisations. In 1917 the "Dniprosojus" was founded as the central body of the Ukrainian co-operative stores and on January 1, 1919, it counted 80 unions with 8 000 co-operative stores and 540 similar organisations (these figures increased later to 200 and 14 000 respectively). The central body operated productive plants of its own, fulfilled cultural functions etc.

The "Ukrainbank" also first saw light in 1917 and on January 1, 1919, it united more than 130 unions with several thousand

474 eigners. Circles round the "Prosvita", a society concerned with the culture and education of the people and later also with economics, were mainly responsible for the work of spreading economic ideas and forming organisations. This activity increased in intensity after the first national meeting of the Ukrainians in Lviv (1880).

After conducting a public campaign the "Prosvita" proceeded to further and found credit societies, grain silos, stores and trading societies. It also functioned through travelling teachers and courses, it granted bursaries for the study of economics abroad, founded vocational schools, experimental farms etc.

But amalgamation in a universal organisation at that time had also disadvantages for economic development. And as organisations the economic societies were not the most suitable. It was only when co-operative societies were founded that national economic efforts found their final and best form of organisation.

● 452 Individual credit co-operative societies appeared as early as
474 1873, when the "Vira", the first credit co-operative society, was established in Tysmenytsia (it still exists to-day); but the growth of a sound system was not assured till the central body was organised in Lviv in 1898. At the end of 1911 this union comprised 320 credit co-operative societies, while about 100 were not members of the union. The local government erected an organisation which comprised 723 loan banks, 184 of which were Ukrainian. But this organisation was developed along Polish lines and was never of great significance for the development of a Ukrainian economic system.

It was typical for this "classical home of usury" in the years before the war that the credit co-operative societies far exceeded all other such organisations. After the first World War the central body founded in Lviv in 1898 was called "Centrobank" But credit co-operative organisations had to yield their priority of place to agricultural trading or productive co-operative organisations.

the very beginning, for at the moment the primary need was for 423
food and the peasants were compelled to live upon what they could 427
raise. It was not long before the returning prosperity commenced new differentiations in the villages. The poorer peasants began to take advantage of the provisions that they could lease their newly acquired land, and while the Russian law provided that a lease could run for only three years, the Ninth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets soon lengthened this term to 13 years and liberalized the laws for hired labor.

The result was that by 1926, the poor peasants had leased 1,181,000 hectares and 53.9% of the peasants who had at least ten hectares rented additional land.

In a word, under the New Economic Policy conditions began, 185
in fact, to return to what had been the situation prior to the 423
revolution, with the exception that the great land owners had disappeared, but as they had been largely Russian or Polish, their departure only increased the Ukrainian influence in the villages and made them more homogeneous than they had been before.

The Commissariat of Agriculture endeavored during these [645]
years of reconstruction, to maintain as independent a position as possible. It established its own independent services, its own research stations which were concerned with Ukrainian agricultural problems, its own breeding stations and its own bureaus for study and development of the various branches of agriculture, and it did its best to separate these from the similar services directed by Moscow and not concerned with the particular problems of Ukraine.

The peasants responded to this with their own efforts. In 1922, [452]
with the famine still raging, they secured permission from Moscow to establish the so-called Selo-Pomich (or Village Aid) to provide credit for the peasants. This finally persuaded the Cheka to hand over part of the golden objects which they had stolen from the churches, and it used the capital thus secured to buy seed corn in America. It then loaned this to the peasants and when the harvest came, the loan was repaid in kind and more credit was then extended. [During NEP -- Analyst]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

438 in petty classes of trade, are still the occasion of much
443 buying and selling. The principal ones are as follows:

At Kiev the so-called Kontraktovaya fair is held from February 5 to 29. The goods dealt in are carpets, woven materials, silk, ready-made clothing, wooden goods, preserved fish, groceries, sugar, flax, iron, machines, coal, and salt. The real importance of the fair lies in its being the meeting-place for traders of all sorts from the neighbouring provinces. Bankers, agriculturists, and manufacturers meet to settle old and to make new contracts (hence its title), to liquidate or renew bills, &c. The turnover is about £250,000.

Poltava has a fair called Illinskaya from July 1 to 31. It is exclusively for the sale of skins, leather, and manufactures thereof. The turnover averages about £100,000.

Kharkov has four annual fairs, named after the religious festivals at which they are held: (1) Kreshenskaya (Epiphany), January 6 to February 1, for trade in manufactured goods, groceries, peltry, and leather. The turnover is about £1,250,000. (2) Troitskaya (Trinity), June 1 to 30, for trade in wool, sheepskins, and manufactured goods. Turnover, about £500,000. (3) Uspenskaya (Assumption), August 1 to 31, for manufactured and colonial goods. Turnover, about £900,000. (4) Pokrovskaya (Intercession of the Virgin), October 1 to 26 for general trade, as at Kreshenskaya. Turnover, about £1,250,000.

Jitomir has a hop fair from September 6 to 14 for the sale of the season's crop, the value of which fluctuates widely from year to year.

A large annual fair, principally for the disposal of wool, is held at Kakhovka.

438 The internal trade of the Ukraine is generally
452 conducted on the basis of a long credit, six to nine months by bill; and the fairs and exchanges give opportunity to gauge the general financial state of the country, which is almost totally dependent upon harvest conditions, and to provide for liquidation or renewal of the floating credit as circumstances require.

grain. The bank's net profits in 1904 were £1,200,000, 453
and in 1910 £2,400,000. The capital is £5,000,000, 652
and the reserve £500,000.

The Land Bank of the Nobility was founded after the liberation of the serfs to make advances on land, to finance the nobility involved in the transfer of part of their estates to the peasants, and to prevent the ruinous hypothecation of their land elsewhere.

The Peasants' Land Bank, founded in 1883, renders similar services to the peasants, advancing money on land to increase peasant holdings, to purchase agricultural machinery or live-stock, and for other objects.

The State Savings Banks carry out the function their title suggests, and also undertake certain minor insurance business. Branches can be opened in all towns and villages. The management is supervised by the Imperial State Bank. The banks were started in 1862 with 140,000 accounts and £850,000 in deposits, and in 1907 had 6,940,000 accounts and £128,000,000 in deposits.

Joint-stock land banks form the next group of 453
important banks. There are four in the Ukraine, with resources as follows:

Bank.	*Share Capital.*	*Reserves.*	*Bonds in circulation.*
	£	£	£
Kharkov	1,170,000	200,000	12,000,000
Poltava	800,000	600,000	11,000,000
Bessarabia–Taurida . .	700,000	500,000	11,000,000
Kiev	600,000	400,000	9,500,000

These banks advance money on agricultural security on a business basis, and make considerable profits.

Mutual credit associations form another group, and 452
are spread all over the country, their aggregate turnover being very great. They vary very much in size and extent of operations, but in general their rate of interest is high.

Trading banks form the last great group. They 453
are usually joint-stock concerns, and are carried on according to the German model, their foundation being

11: Obermaier--93 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

/91/ [Galicia] Self-Aid [Volhynia]

555 Galicia and Volhynia are parts of the ghetto of the world, lying between Cracow and Odessa. There is no question about the fact that anyone who can here compete commercially with the Jews and politically with the Poles has certain abilities. The Ukrainians of Galicia have a talent for organization. If their business methods are often primitive according to our conceptions, it is not their fault. Where proper money is scarce, as is the case among all small peasants of the East and Southeast, it is replaced by some marketable goods: people unhesitatingly deal in eggs. Ukrainian cooperatives tried very hard to change these conditions; they were equally adept in ancient barter as in international business involving clearing and regulations pertaining to payments and foreign exchange.

555 [436] 476

Jews and cooperatives waged a bitter fight against each other. But where usury and chain businesses of ill repute flourish, cooperatives have an easy time of it. Before the First World War the usurers demanded a 100% interest. Now they say: "I am giving you money; good, - but you must sell me your calves, your geese, your chickens and your eggs." For a zentner of seed they demand two zentner of produce from the harvest. In the gin shops they manage to obtain, by fraudulent means, the best pastures of the Huzul country, only to rent them to the former owners. If the cooperative makes its way into such villages which are under Jewish domination, it soon has the peasants on its side, and since no one buys from the Jew, no one sells to him and his inn is avoided, he must sooner or later pack up his belongings. /92/

[452]

For the Ukrainians the Jewish problem is a problem of food. Wherever people have ambitions and where they desire to improve their basic way of living, they run up against Jews. Jews

563

Ukraine Under the Soviets

185 474 241 The peasants also revived and breathed new life into the co-operatives which had been broken up during the period of Militant Communism. In 1923 they established another cooperative organization, the Selo-Tekhnyka (Village Machines) which purchased more expensive agricultural machinery and rented it out to the peasants for the appropriate agricultural work. These points became the centre of mechanization and were in effect the first ●[453] tractor stations. In 1924 they established the First Agricultural Bank, a sort of private institution which at one time had more loans outstanding than had the Ukrainian State Bank which was, of course, closely supervised by Moscow.

185 369 All these efforts* met with marked success and agriculture speedily began to revive. The peasants became more prosperous and their holdings of livestock rapidly increased, although they did not reach the pre-war level. This, in its turn, created a new demand for manufactured products and restored the factories to operation, and with them the conditions in the cities began to improve.

185 471 [475] Similar concessions were made to industry, but with one important difference. The larger and more important industrial plants were not turned back to their former owners who were, as before, allowed no voice or influence in their direction. They were taken from the workers who had seized and abused them during the period of Militant Communism and placed under the supervision of government trusts. These were either regional in character or confined to a single branch of industry. In either case, they were under the control of a more or less trusted group of men among whom Communists were in the leading positions, but while they received certain credits from the state, they were more or less autonomous and they were allowed to go through regular commercial transactions and encouraged to show profits in their annual reports. There was thus again a source of encouragement both for the directors and the workers, and slowly but surely the level of industry began to rise.

The smaller plants were very often leased to individuals who were allowed to employ hired labor and the hope was given to these that their taxes would be at such a level that they, too, could

* [NEP attempts to restore peasant prosperity -- Analyst]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

471 managed and financed. Russia has not been able to
433 find capital for new projects, with the result that within the last twenty-five years numerous undertakings have been started with foreign money. Official lists show that the nation most largely interested is France, Belgium and Great Britain coming next. The fortunes of these enterprises have varied, but in general their success has not been great in proportion to the original capital.

453 The last quarter of a century has also seen the
491 foundation of a number of trading banks with Russian titles and boards of directors at least nominally Russian. Their resources, however, are largely provided and completely controlled from Germany. These institutions have admittedly acquired a controlling interest in most of the concerns above mentioned, often at a very moderate outlay, and have supplied additional loan capital at profitable rates of interest. One and the same bank has in many cases obtained control over every stage in the production of a manufactured article, from the winning of the raw material onward, of course drawing its profit from every undertaking concerned. Certain British concerns have held out and kept their shares in their own hands, but financial institutions governed by German capitalists have a preponderating hold on those industries of the Ukraine which are large enough to repay their attention—that is, on the coal, iron, and allied industries of the Donets, and the sugar industries of the Kiev district.

The foreign interests in the Ukraine lie principally in the industrial concerns above mentioned. British interests are not strong, and are chiefly represented by some collieries and ironworks at Alexandrovsk and the general properties of the New Russia Co., Ltd., at Hughesovka and elsewhere (cf. p. 86).

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Government.	1906.	1910.
	Roubles.	*Roubles.*
Yekaterinoslav . .	5,210,000	8,241,000
Poltava . . .	6,737,000	8,750,000
Taurida . . .	3,599,000	4,576,000
Kharkov . . .	5,753,000	9,168,000
Kherson . . .	3,808,000	5,542,000

652 634

652 652 Thirty-one towns in the Ukraine have municipal administrations, and can raise taxes and contract loans for purposes similar to those of the *zemstvo* budgets. A considerable debt has been incurred. The towns of Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa have borrowed money for municipal purposes in foreign markets; of a total debt of 53,000,000 roubles, these three towns account for 35,000,000 roubles.

652 652 651 The *mirs* or local communes can also raise some taxes for purely local purposes. Obligatory taxes are levied for local communal administration, provision of granaries for storing food-stuffs, upkeep of local roads on peasant lands, and insurance against fire and inundations. Facultative powers of taxation are in the hands of the *mirs* for the building and maintenance of churches, schools, and hospitals, and other special local needs. There is a great deal of irregularity in the levying and administration of these taxes.

(2) Banking

453 652 The banks of the Ukraine fall into several well-defined groups. In the first place come banks which are State or semi-State institutions. These are the Imperial State Bank, the Land Bank of the Nobility, the Peasants' Land Bank, and the State Savings Bank.

The Imperial State Bank is a Government institution with a wide sphere of activity. It controls the currency and note issue, being the only bank issuing notes. It undertakes general banking and bill broking, besides having close relations with the Treasury for revenue, loan, and other purposes. It makes large loans to private banks; up to 1910 the total amount was £189,000,000. It also advances money on merchandise, principally on

grain. The bank's net profits in 1904 were £1,200,000, 453 and in 1910 £2,400,000. The capital is £5,000,000, 652 and the reserve £500,000.

The Land Bank of the Nobility was founded after the liberation of the serfs to make advances on land, to finance the nobility involved in the transfer of part of their estates to the peasants, and to prevent the ruinous hypothecation of their land elsewhere.

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Mutual credit associations form another group, and 952 are spread all over the country, their aggregate turnover being very great. They vary very much in size and extent of operations, but in general their rate of interest is high.

Trading banks form the last great group. They are usually joint-stock concerns, and are carried on according to the German model, their foundation being

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

453 often due to German enterprise. They interest themselves in all sorts of industrial concerns, and even promote new ones. The following banks of this class have branches in the Ukraine: Discount Bank of Petrograd, Petrograd International Commercial Bank, Russian Bank for Foreign Trade, Union Bank, Volga-Kama Bank, Bank of Commerce and Industry, Azov-Don Bank, Russo-Asiatic Bank, and Commercial Bank of Siberia. One or two Moscow banking firms also have a few branches. The Russo-French Bank and the Russian and English Bank are joint-stock concerns founded specially to look after the Russian trade of the two countries in question. The Crédit Lyonnais appears to be the only purely foreign bank which has branches in the Ukraine.

(3) Principal Fields of Investment

000 The lack of capital in Russia, and the backward state of the industrial and commercial life of the Ukraine, offer innumerable openings to the foreign investor. The rivers should be canalized and systematically used for traffic; more railways and tramways are needed, and at least some water-power could be industrially used. Lastly, the iron and steel trades could be developed greatly. Unless, however, labour problems can be simplified, and the quality of native labour much improved, a great risk will always attach to the investment of capital in the Ukraine.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

A Ukraine proverb runs: 'The harvest is the Almighty!' This gives the clue to the whole economic situation of the country. Great as are the industries in the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions, these are a foreign growth, largely dependent on capital and management from abroad, and worked mainly by immigrants from Great Russia. Agricultural problems, therefore, are the chief concern of those interested to see the Ukraine prosperous. The task before them is

439 counted for 790 million roubles and were higher by 1/3 than the turnovers with countries outside of Russia (470 million roubles). As regards exports, this proportion was not very unfavorable, as exports to non-Ukrainian areas of Russia exceeded those abroad only by 1/6. But imports from non-Ukrainian Russia were three and a half times more than those from foreign countries.

Most of the exports were not sent to Russia proper but to Poland, White Ruthenia and the Baltic provinces. The majority of imports came from Russia itself (cotton products). These facts reflect the political situation.

439 The balance of trade in Dnipro-Ukraine (1909—1911) was
●457 favorable expressed both in absolute and relative values. Exports were 350 % of imports in trade with foreign countries and 115 % in trade with areas in Russia, approximately 170 % in all "foreign" trade. The balance in money was 263, 60, 323 million roubles respectively. It was very high (55.5 %) in comparison with the turnover in trade with foreign countries (475 mill. r.). The figure indicating the extent to which the balance of trade was favorable was much lower (7 %) for the larger turnover (792 mill. r.) with non-Ukrainian areas within Russia, while it was approximately 26 % for the entire turnover (1267 million roubles).

In 1913 balance and turnover had increased to 414 (for foreign trade to 272) and 1 600 million roubles respectively for all trade with countries outside of Ukraine but the relation of one to the other remained the same (26 %). The relation of export to import trade also remained the same (170 %) as both had increased to the same extent. The absolute value of the favorable balance of trade for Dnipro-Ukraine had risen, though relatively it had remained the same. In the entire Russian balance of trade before World War I, on the other hand, the favorable balance sank from 429 million roubles (1591—1162) in 1911 to 347 (1519—1172) in the following year and to 146 million roubles (1520—1374) in the last year before the war. Without Dnipro-Ukraine the Russian balance of trade was unfavorable by 268 million roubles.

727 first visited Kremenchug, they reported it as over 90 per cent.
361 destroyed. "About 50,000 inhabitants have returned and are living
362 in dugouts, cellars, and rubble shacks. Reconstruction is progressing slowly because of the shortage of materials. The only industries operating are a small machine shop for bridge repair parts, a textile factory, and one wing of a cigarette factory which happened to escape destruction. One bakery is being repaired... All grain elevators and flour mills, which constituted the chief pre-war industry, are completely destroyed."

Poltava (Population in 1939: 130,305).

In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission reported Poltava about 80 per cent. destroyed. "About 100,000 of the inhabitants have returned and are living under conditions only slightly better than Kremenchug. On the main street only one building is intact. The Mayor estimated that reconstruction would take at least fifteen years. The locomotive repair shop and a stocking factory are the only industries operating two years after liberation."

Other Cities

In Zaporozhie (population in 1939: 289,188) 75 per cent. of the homes and virtually all industry were destroyed[1]. Stalino, the industrial and mining centre of the Donets Basin, has been described as a shadow of its former self. Its pre-war population was 510,000. During the war about 100,000 of the people were driven into slavery by the Germans. Another 80,000 men, women, and children were thrust into one of the mines to die. Seventy-five per cent. of all the buildings in the city were destroyed; and of these only 30 per cent. were in a condition to be restored. All the mines in the area were flooded; and from one pit alone over 3,300,000 tons of water had been pumped by August 1946[2].

The Ukraine's Application for UNRRA Assistance

727 In the summer of 1945 the government of the U.S.S.R. transmitted
648 to the Director General of UNRRA a request for assistance in rehabilitating
457 those areas of the Soviet Union which had suffered most heavily because of the war and the German occupation. In August 1945 at the Third Session of the UNRRA Council, the Soviet delegate strongly requested that 700 million U.S. dollars be allocated for relief work in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Republics. At the same Council Session the applications of Byelorussia and the Ukraine for membership in UNRRA were unanimously accepted, and the two republics were requested to send delegates to the Third Council meetings.

In December 1945 agreements were signed between UNRRA and the governments of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics providing for

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1 UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

2 Soviet News, London, August 22, 1946.

727 relief and rehabilitation supplies to be delivered until such time as
459 the two republics would be able themselves to pay with suitable means
648 of foreign exchange for their own imports[1].

727 The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement provided for a programme of supplies
439 amounting to 188 million U.S. dollars (approximately five dollars per head
648 of population), to be used for food, clothing, medical, agricultural, and industrial supplies. The agreement stipulated that UNRRA would attempt to deliver the bulk of these supplies to the Ukraine before June 30, 1946; however, because of procurement and transport difficulties, this early completion of the programme proved impossible. On May 30, 1946, therefore, the UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was extended to the end of 1946.

The schedule of supplies to be shipped has changed somewhat since the original programme was decided. As it now exists, about 53 per cent. (by value) of the total supplies are foodstuffs; 27 per cent. industrial supplies, and nearly 9 per cent. clothing. Supplies for the rehabilitation of agriculture will amount to 17,088,000 dollars, the greater part of which has been allocated for seeds. The following table shows by value the UNRRA programme of supplies for the Ukraine, as at March 21, 1947. A more detailed summary will follow in later sections of this report.

TABLE - III

UNRRA Programme of Supplies to the Ukrainian S.S.R.
(thousand U.S. dollars)

Food, feed, soap	100,189
Clothing, textiles, footwear	16,856
Medical and sanitation supplies	2,326
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591
Total	188,050

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

In March 1946 a small UNRRA Mission arrived in the Ukraine and established headquarters at Kiev. In subsequent months, some of the mission members have made many visits to various parts of the republic in order to observe the distribution of UNRRA supplies. They report that gigantic efforts are being made to restore the economy, but emphasize the discouraging fact that UNRRA assistance with machinery and other rehabilitation supplies is small in comparison with the tremendous destruction everywhere. The main UNRRA contribution has

1 UNRRA aid to Byelorussia will be dealt with in a future paper.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

423 Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge
474 and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

473 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Ukrainian SSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

185 Art. 11. The economic life of the Ukrainian SSR is determined and directed by
471 the State National Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the independence of the socialist country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

461 Art. 12. In the Ukrainian SSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Ukrainian SSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Ukrainian SSR voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Ukrainian SSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

695 Art. 91. In all courts of the Ukrainian SSR cases are heard in public, unless otherwise provided for by law, and the accused is guaranteed the right to be defended by counsel.

693 Art. 92. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

Art. 93. Supreme supervisory power to ensure the strict observance of the law by all Ministries and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by officials and citizens within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR generally, is exercised by the Procurator-General of the USSR directly and also through the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 94. The Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR is appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 95. Regional procurators are appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 96. Area, district and city procurators are appointed by the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR, subject to the approval of the Procurator-General of the USSR, for a term of five years.

Art. 97. The organs of the Procurator's Office perform their functions independently of any local organs whatsoever, being subordinate solely to the Procurator-General of the USSR.

Chapter VIII. Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens

641 Art. 98. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with
461 its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment.

Art. 99. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to rest and leisure.

The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the fixing of the working
[466] day for factory and office workers at eight hours and the reduction of the working day to seven or six hours for arduous trades and to four hours in workshops where conditions of work are exceptionally arduous; by the institution of annual vacations with full pay for factory and office workers; and by the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest-homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

641 Art. 100. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or disability.

This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance
65 of factory and office workers at State expense, free medical service for the working people, and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

871 Art. 101. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to education.

This right is ensured by universal compulsory elementary education;
641 by free education up to and including the seventh grade; by the system of State stipends to students who have distinguished themselves in higher educational establishments; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language; and by the organization in the factories, State farms and machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.

464 cuts wages." A few days later 'Za Industriyalizatsiiu' deals with the same subject: "The fluctuation of workers in the Molotov automobile factory is great, especially among those who have been newly employed. In the course of eleven months in 1936 over 12,000 workers have moved away. The shortage of housing is often given as the chief reason for the mass flight. Inasmuch as the machines are idle, the wages of the workers are greatly reduced... The workers wait for the machines eight to ten days a month. The management succeeds in providing normal or semi-normal working conditions for only a few of the workers - for the famous Stakhanov-workers." (125) Very

125. Quoted by Keyserlingk, The Russian worker lives in this way, page 22.

similar are the conditions in the new combine "Zaporishstali" where in 1935, 9151 workers were taken on and 7675 released; this is reported by Visti on May 22, 1939. The same paper reports on May 17, 1939 that 331 young farmers from the region of Chernigov were sent into the coal mines of the Donets Basin.

433 At the beginning of the second Five Year
●461 Plan, Bolshevik employers with the help of the erstwhile farmer Isotov refuted those false prophets who, like Marx and Lenin, maintained that people would lead a secure, carefree and enjoyable life in the socialist state with little work and high wages. After special preparations the miner Isotov turned out 40 to 60 percent more than he had previously averaged. Isotov's first effort was particularly celebrated and propagandized. It served as a pretext for the introduction of the Udarnik or shock-worker movement. Two years later, when this impulse had abated just as had the previous enthusiasm of the first Five Year Plan, the big, powerful peasant boy Alexei Stakhanov fell

433 into the same trap. Instead of extracting 7 to
461 8 tons from a pit, Stakhanov now came up with 105 tons of coal. /176/ The familiar Isotov propagandistic fireworks were repeated, and as before many workers suddenly discovered how much more they could have been producing. They suddenly worked so fast that their hands grew hot. Instead of 590 crank shafts a forger could now mold 1027 in one shift, instead of 15 to 20 spindles women workers now managed 140, and instead of 320 pairs of shoes a shoemaker now made 3000 pairs. What good did it do that many refused to play the game any longer? Their achievements were measured according to the records set by the Stakhanov workers, and their wages decreased. In February 1936, the record-establishing frenzy reached its climax in the so-called Stakhanov Month when the world was to be shown what the Soviet Union was capable of achieving. Pravda gave an account of the results of this month of superior achievements on March 19th, 1936: "During the Stakhanov Month industry stood under the sign of bungling. Often the quality of the products decreased, defective products increased, and in many factories the state plan was not carried out..." The hatred of the workers toward the Stakhanov workers who were contemptuously regarded as ambitious yes men, went so far that they were sometimes even put out of the way. Nevertheless, the authorities continued to organize Stakhanov days, weeks and decades throughout the year, until the fever finally abated. Apparently the efforts had not resulted in favorable experiences. Mashinostroenie of December 23rd, 1937 gives a small picture of the expenses incurred during this time by a Soviet factory proprietor: "In the course of a week of the Stakhanov decade, 18,765 pistons had to be discarded as defective in the piston workshop alone of the factory 'Red Trade Union International'. The management of the factory has resigned

438 itself to such an extent to the mass production of
461 discards that it regards this condition as an unavoidable fact and builds up its production program on the score of 35 percent discards." (126)

126. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 32.

000 /Facing page 176/ /An important agricultural product: sunflowers. The seeds are removed from the receptacle with small sticks, and are then taken to the oil mills/7/Facing page 177/ /Picture of a village in the more well-timbered West Ukraine where the houses are built of wood/7/177/

445 In the spring of 1937, two years after the introduction of the Stakhanov System, the average gross wages of the Soviet worker, according to the official figures of the Moscow Statistical Office, amounted to 212 rubles monthly. (127) In the

127. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 33.

meantime there has hardly been any change in these figures. From these 212 rubles about 10 percent are deducted (128) so that the worker has 191 rubles left over per month to cover his living expenses. If he had no rent to pay, with this amount he could buy 106 kilograms of white bread or 44 kilograms of groats or 119 liters of milk or 29.5 kilograms of sweet cherries; or he could consume 24 canteen meals a month or buy 19 kilograms of margarine. He could also acquire three pairs of sneakers or a pair of cheap men's shoes, provided they are even available in a normal size, - usually there are only outsizes in stock in the state stores and cooperatives, for the Jews have shifted the marketable goods to the open market where their cost is multiple. There would not be enough for a man's suit of the cheapest

7 [For plates, cf. pp. 226-227, category 116-Analyse]

433 of the working time in July of this year...The Stalingrad plant presents a similar picture." (131) Where there is no needle there are no

131. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 25.

clothes. Pravda of May 8, 1939, criticizes the decrease in coal mining in the Donbas as follows: "The mine which determines the fate of the entire trust is behind schedule. It would seem as though the scandalous production which has lasted for a considerable time now would have been given serious consideration. The management of the mine is now trying to explain the poor production by the fact that the workers are leaving in order to attend to their spring planting." Visti of June 10, 1939, supplements this by reporting that the constant decrease of coal mining in the Donets Basin is forcing the economic management of Soviet Ukraine to increase the production of brown coal and turf.

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562 By reason of the Soviet Constitution, the
● 461 East Ukrainian woman has an equal position with
594 the man. This means that she has the same meager
[465] rights and the same heavy duties. Since the wages of the man are not adequate to support the family, the woman must also earn some of the daily bread. Thus the woman is a worker. The elimination of Sundays and holidays, the long trips to work, the standing-in-line for hours to get food, the shifting of days off in the different plants, the incredible housing shortage, the rearing of children in institutions, the easy divorces of "couples living together" - all this disrupts the family.
594 The devastating consequences which are bound to
161 result from the disregard /181/ of the family,

SU 474 433 438 472 which the kolkhoz members were permitted to keep[1] were performing this task, furnishing the city markets with meat, dairy products, eggs, poultry, vegetables, fruit, honey, mushrooms, and berries.

SU 474 [442 434] In April 1940, in order to provide a wider incentive for the kolkhoz members to increase their collective production, the system of delivery assessments was radically changed. Whereas the basis for grain deliveries to the government had previously been the amount of land sown or, in the case of meat, milk, eggs and poultry, the size of the herd or flock, the new basis for assessments was the amount of land held by the kolkhoz; and any production above the fixed rates could be retained by the kolkhoz for distribution among the members according to labour days.

U 461 474 241 446 A second decree applying to the Ukraine alone established supplementary pay for increasing the crop yield or productiveness in the raising of livestock. This decree directed the collectives of the Ukraine to assign various sections of the field or garden to work teams, working to produce a fixed quota. If the production did not exceed the quota, the members were paid only by the labour day; but if a team produced above the quota, it received part of the excess as bonus.

SU 423 In 1934 the Soviet Government decided to permit individual members of the kolkhozes to keep private farmsteads within the limits of ¼ to 1 hectare. A year later the code for the kolkhozes (called the "Stalin Code") confirmed these rights. It also secured forever the land held by the kolkhozes:

> "All boundaries formerly separating plots of land belonging to members of co-operatives are herby abolished, and all their holdings are pooled together to be used in common...the land occupied by the kolkhozes (as all land in the U.S.S.R.) is public government property. It is...secured to the kolkhozes for use without time limit, that is in perpetuity, and not subject to buying, selling or leasing to anyone by the co-operative... All agricultural production on kolkhoz land, shall be carried on by the members of the kolkhoz, jointly, co-operatively... Out of the land held in common a small part shall be set aside for the use of each household (for truck gardening, orchards, etc.)... The dimensions...may vary...from ¼ to ½ hectare and in certain regions up to one hectare".

1 [SIC-- ANALYST]

Gastronoms

443 434 262 554 461 In addition to the ration stores, Kiev has about five gastronoms, or commercial stores, where unrationed goods are for sale. Most of the gastronoms are stocked almost entirely with delicacies, such as Siberian crabmeat, live carp in water tanks, a little fresh meat, salami, candy, biscuits, and Russian cigarettes. (No UNRRA goods are sold in such stores). Until September 1946 the prices in gastronoms were so high that only a relatively small part of the population could afford to buy. The gastronoms were patronized primarily by those with high earnings - professors, theatrical stars, scientists, artists, high ranking army officers, skilled technicians, etc. One of their main purposes was to show the average worker that some luxuries did exist, and thus encourage him to raise his skills and productivity. Another purpose was to provide a special reward for various kinds of meritorious service. For example, war heroes and top generals were entitled to a 40 per cent discount on all purchases made at a gastronom. Moreover, workers who had stayed at the same factory for six years or more were entitled to a 20 per cent discount, and office workers with similar service to 10 per cent.

[435] In September 1946, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to abolish differences between the higher "commercial" prices and the low prices of rationed goods, the prices in gastronoms were lowered and certain ration prices, raised somewhat.

[465] At the same time, taking into account the difficulties which average and low-paid workers would encounter as a result of higher ration prices, the Council of Ministers decided to increase all salaries of less than 900 roubles a month. Thus, those workers who previously had earned up to 300 roubles a month received an increase of 110 roubles; those who had earned up to 500 roubles, another 80. Similar increases were allowed in pensions and in students' stipends.

So far as UNRRA food is concerned, the increases in ration prices have affected meat, fish, fats and oils, other categories of UNRRA food supplies particularly milk, cheese, and army rations were not affected.

434 435 The following table shows the increases in ration store prices.

262 [434] For example, light workers were entitled to only 1,820 calories[1] a day from rationed foods, and office workers, only 1,236. Supplementary non-rationed foods were obtainable, but only in limited quantities and at high prices.

262 433 461 The inadequate diet which everyone had been receiving since the was was undoubtedly responsible for lowered work efficiency, and added to the shortage of machinery and equipment, for delayed reconstruction. For example, although up to October 1946 heavy workers were entitled to official rations providing 3,757 calories a day, the greater part of their diet consisted of bread and cereals. Because of the great livestock shortage, there was scarcely any meat available on the ration. Fairly typical was the situation of 13,000 workers engaged in rebuilding the Ukraine's largest steel mill at Zaporozhie, who during April 1946 received only 750 grams of fat (about 26½ ounces) and less than two pounds of meat per person, a diet clearly inadequate for heavy labour.

262 758 Patients in a Kremenchug hospital received a diet composed chiefly of bread, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of butter or lard, which provided about 1,200 calories daily - a level radically below the emergency subsistence rate of 1,900 calories defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

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1 Compare all caloric rates with the emergency subsistence food consumption levels defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as the minima necessary to prevent serious malnutrition leading to disease and the danger of civil unrest. For European countries, these levels are as follows:

Emergency Subsistence Caloric Intake

Category	Calories per day	Category	Calories per day
0 - 2 years	1,000	Normal consumers (male)	1,900
3 - 5 "	1,250	Sedentary (female)	1,600
6 - 9 "	1,500	Moderate workers	2,000
10 - 17 years	2,000	Heavy workers	2,500
Pregnant and nursing women	2,000	Very heavy workers	3,000

1 [SIC - - ANALYST]

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Workers of various skills	1,788
Students	560
Liberal professions (journalists, writers, merchants, artists, etc.)	313
Teachers	252
Engineers	343
Administrators	178
Jurists	11

Compared to the occupational differences in nationalist activity, differences of age and sex played a minor role. There is little information on the activity of women. Evidently they carried on most of the welfare work; one German report states that a major reason for permitting the functioning of the Ukrainian Red Cross was a desire to absorb the energies of the women intellectuals, who had been highly "politicized" by the Soviet regime.[23] There are a few cases of prominent nationalist work by women, for example, by the poet Olena Teliha who headed the OUN-M literary circle in Kiev until its suppression by the Germans. In general, nationalist observers agree that the women were less active politically than the men. While there is too little evidence to warrant a firm conclusion on this score, it is just possible that the nationalist movements neglected a useful source of support, which was certainly tapped by the Communist underground.[24] 462 186

Youth, on the other hand, played a prominent part in nationalist work. While a large number of Mel'nyk supporters were drawn from the older generation, and the OUN-B made special efforts to capture the younger group, there was here no "conflict of generations" in respect to adherence to the two factions. Since only physically active persons were useful in the east, even the Mel'nyk organizizers were predominantly youthful, and thus could approach their contemporaries more readily. The strength of the youth organizations dominated by the OUN-M in Kiev and Zhitomir has already been described. Other young men, of course, rejected both nationalist groups as too extreme, and formed centers of their own, while still others appear to have arisen in complete independence of outside stimulation. Thus the whole administra- 186 883 [668*]

[Occupation specialization of Ukrainian émigré group in Bohemia - Moravia--Analyst]

[23] USSR Exhibit 278.

[24] PS 3876.

Everything in West Ukraine is education work.

462 The woman, too, is brought up in order to play her
512 part properly within the family: she must see
515 to it that everyone eats from his own plate, that everyone sleeps in his own bed - not eight on a wide chest -, that clothing is taken off at night and that shirts are changed; airing the rooms is not to be forgotten, and it is unhealthy for children not to get out of the house a single time the whole winter long. Fresh air does no harm. But where to get the shoes and warm clothes for the little ones?

575 A further, very important society was the
871 "Ridna /96/ Shkola" ("National School"). It closed the worst gaps which the Poles had hewn into the Ukrainian school system. There were 3662 Ukrainian public schools in Galicia when the Poles took over undivided rule. In 1937/1938 there were only 496 left. All the rest of the schools were Polonized, so that in the academic year 1937/1938 only 59,300 of over one million Ukrainian school children were able to attend purely Ukrainian schools. Among 307 state secondary schools in Poland, there were only five Ukrainian classical schools in the academic year 1936/1937. All of the 1094 state technical schools were Polish and naturally also all higher institutions of learning. The means at the disposal of the "Ridna Shkola" - needless to say - were not by any means adequate to teach all Ukrainian children their mother tongue. Nevertheless, by means of the savings of its 104,000 members, it was able to maintain 540 kindergartens, 33 public schools, 12 classical schools, 11 colleges, 16 schools for specialists and professionals and 4 boarding schools. (53) The

53. Taken from the respective annual reports of the West Ukrainian cooperatives and self-aid organizations.

tension between Poland and the Ukraine in the

594 161 this seed of all political life, may be surmised from the census of January 1939. On the basis of the estimated increase during the period of the New Economic Policy, the Soviet Union should have had 183 million inhabitants. Instead there were 170 million all told. There are 13 million souls missing - twice the number of the Czech nation!

462 The book entitled 'Woman in Socialistic Ukraine which appeared in Kiyev in 1937, tells of the triumphs of the Ukrainian woman, not in love and not in the family, but in the field of industry. According to this book, the Ukrainian woman has already "conquered" her position in all branches of industry, coal mines not excepted. In 1936, women comprised the following percentages of the total number of workers: in the building industry 18.3 percent, in the mining industry 26.3 percent, in the chemical industry 26.3 percent in the iron-industry 20.9 percent, and in the construction of machines 21.1 percent. There were 14,274 women engineers and technicians in 1936, and nearly half of the total number of physicians were women (9398). Moreover, the woman of Soviet Ukraine - always according to this book - takes an active part in the defense of the state as pilot, teacher, auto technician, as members of the parachute troops and so forth.

[29] On the subject ot the wardrobe of these industrious workers it is divulged that 37 percent of all Ukrainian women own two or more coats, 24.4 percent own two or more cloth or silk dresses, 40.5 percent have five changes of underwear and 38.7 percent have two or more pairs of leather shoes. It is taken for granted that all the other women have only one coat, one cloth or silk dress, one pair of shoes and no more than four changes of underwear.

And their feminine ambition? "Hanna Bondarenko, railroad engineer on the line 'Voroshilov',

462 ran her train 900 kilometers without changing engines. The train personnel consisted entirely of women." This according to Izvestiia of November 21, 1938. Pravda /182/ of May 4th, 1939 has a report of the modern types of feminine desires of the Ukrainian women in the Donets Basin: In the Voroshilovgrad region the number of housewives who express a desire to work in the mines increases every day. Recently 190 housewives were taken on in the mines of the Krasnoluky district. In Shaft Number 151 the women mine workers challenged their husbands to a competition. Comrade Khodonovich entered into competition with her husband who works as a locksmith in the same pit. Twelve of the housewives employed, systematically produced 130 to 150 percent of the norm." Under the pseudonym "sundries" behind which a Jew may be hiding, an enthusiastic admirer of this womanly existence writes: "Women, their work-blouses stretched tight over their breasts, their checked cap with a visor pulled over their short hair, with hard eyes that know no maidenly dreams, drive the motor trucks madly from one hall to another through long avenues that seem to meet in perspective. Women with hands that do not know how to hold children grasp red-hot rods with iron tongs and let them send forth sparks under pneumatic hammers. Is it a man or woman, this human form in leather here at the clattering mold, there in the hellish concert of the grindery?"(132)

132. Sundries: Russia Close Up, page 140.

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185 At the beginning of the third Five Year Plan, the Moscow Review of June 10th, 1937 wrote among other things: "The rapid development of mass well-being and culture will in general be one of the distinguishing features of the third Five Year Plan. At this point every possibility of comparison with America ceases. For that sort of thing

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433 During all this time the livestock of the Ukraine (see next
231 Section), was being slowly and laboriously built up by gifts from the
262 rest of the Union, by levies on Germany, and by natural increase.
731 Meat was very scarce, since no-one was willing to slaughter and further deplete the slender herds. Cows, used for draught purposes, gave little milk. Now added to these intense shortages of meat, fat and dairy products was another great deficiency of cereals and bread, hitherto the mainstay of the Ukrainian post-war diet.

U
241 The 1946 harvest cannot, at the most optimistic estimate, be
433 reckoned at more than 40 per cent. of 1940 in cereals and vegetables per hectare sown.[1] There is no fodder for the jealously guarded
231 animals; shelter for them is also very scarce since the people themselves are only now moving out of dugouts. If the animals are slaughtered, the small supplies of dairy products and meat will soon disappear; and the problem of draught power will remain as acute as ever.

U
241 There is an agricultural dilemma in the Ukraine which a good
433 harvest would have gone far to break. Although extensive and con-
464 tinued demobilisations have been taking place, there is a great shortage of labour on the farms.[2] If manpower is taken from the farms to help produce the machinery necessary to liberate further men from the land, there may not be enough farm workers left to produce sufficient food for the factory workers. The poor harvest has aggravated this vicious circle.

The Soviet Government has attempted in various ways to meet this problem not only in the Ukraine, but throughout the Union. Everyone who is able to work does so; young people, old people, women. The
U women who worked during the war have remained part of the labour force in both industry and agriculture, and an increasing number are being
● [462] recruited. In the Ukraine in 1946, women composed at least 60 - 70 per cent. of the farm working force.

SU
[464 At the same time as steps are being taken to concentrate more
241] workers in agriculture, the organization of the collective farms is
474 being overhauled and geared to higher efficiency. To accomplish this,
647 the Soviet Council of Ministers created on September 19, 1946, a Collective Farm Council, whose main tasks will be to elaborate measures for the improvement of collective farming. This Council which is authorized to call conferences of collective farm representatives when necessary, was set up for the purpose of "establishing strict control over the observation of collective farm statutes and for the solution
● of questions of the collective farm structure." One of their primary

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1 One must also bear in mind the reduced area under cultivation.

2 The war losses are felt very acutely.

11: Obermaier--94 J-3(no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Galicia] [Volhynia] European Jews E14

U 563 are found in the villages and cities, everywhere except at hard peasant labor. As early as 1900, E.J. 162 74% of all Jews earning a livelihood in Russia, Poland and Galicia were in commerce, in the credit system, in crafts and in industry. In 1931 there U [463] were 158,400 Jews living in villages in East Galicia alone, that is 3% of the people living in the country; in the cities, on the other hand, there were 454,900 Jews or 37.3% of the urban population. (51) In 1929 the various trades were

51. Seraphim, Jewry in East European Area, p. 340.

50% in the hands of Jews, and in Volhynia a total of 73% of all tailors, shoemakers, tanners, bakers, furriers, blacksmiths, watchmakers and other artisans were Jews.

U 563 In spite of the fact that the Ukrainians lived in such close proximity to Jews, they kept their cultural life free of Jewish influence and their race free from Jewish blood.

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U 476 "More important than selling and profit is the community which has become happy and morally strong as a result of proper training by means of cooperative work and self-aid." These words were not, as might be supposed, spoken at a major assembly of German cooperatives; they were coined at Lwów by the head of the Ukrainian cooperatives. They were addressed to the West Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian cooperatives were of unusual national significance; they improved the wretched condition of the peasants and educated the latter to think in terms of the common welfare; and they offered to Ukrainian intelligentsia a real, albeit meager possibility of existence. How can condi- U 162 tions in the country be anything but miserable if 60% of the peasants own dwarf farms with less than

Seventeen ingredients are supposed to go into
262a the favorite dish of the Ukrainians, borscht, a soured beet soup. The Ukrainian cuisine also favors porridges made from various cereals, cooked in water and served with milk, cream or fat. The Ukrainian also loves his boiled vareniki, thinly rolled dough filled with pot cheese, chopped meat, cabbage or fruit. In West Ukraine the poor farmers must be content with potatoes, rye bread and turnips. The gentlemen farmers among the Ukrainians are the wealthy Kuban Cossacks who /135/ consume bacon and milk for breakfast, borscht, groats, fowl or fish for dinner, and fruit, cold borscht, melons and bacon in the afternoon, and vareniki in the evening. This is how it was in the Kuban paradise in the good old days.

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5D When the cold east wind silently passes through the steppes or the west wind brings snow and wraps the Ukraine in white, when communication practically ceases between the villages, and nights and sleep are long, then the women sit down to their spindles and the men fetch their looms from
463 from the sheds. All the family clothing, the underwear and linen for the house that is needed
286 throughout the year, is made by hand during the long cold winter months, just as it was in our country /Germany/ in medieval households before the days of urban craftsmen. They make rope shoes and shoes of leather in regions where the ground is stony; they weave linen and woolen fabrics, sew shirts - during the hot summer often the only article of women's clothing except for their narrow aprons - and cut winter jackets from sheep
[53] skins. They embroider lovely bright-colored patterns in endless variety on the shirts and the smooth skins of the furs, on tablecloths and towels, for the artistic talents of the Ukrainian people are incomparable. They carve in wood, model in clay and paint it, and weave carpets.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

517 than a decade earlier in fostering national culture. Evidently even
186 the repeated Communist purges could not wholly eradicate the permeation of the educational system by nationalist ideas. Indeed, Skrypnyk and other Communists of that period were praised openly by writers in the war years as defenders of the Ukrainian "national idea," [11] and Skrypnyk's plan for an orthographical commission to set standards for Ukrainian publications was formally revived. It should be noticed, however, that direct links between nationalist leaders of the war period and the Skrypnyk group were very few. Moreover, the Russophile leaders were also predominantly intellectuals.[12] The general conclusion appears to be that the intellectuals (using the term in the Western sense) as a group were the most disaffected stratum in Soviet society capable of assuming a leadership role. Of great significance is the fact that a very high proportion of all those who were active in nationalist life under the German occupation had direct reasons for resentment against the Soviet regime, either because they had been barred from intellectual work or because they had been imprisoned for anti-Soviet activity. Also they had a wider historical perspective and hence were quicker to react to the new situation.

463 The second most important group was composed of engineers
186 and other technical specialists like agronomy experts and chemists. Several of these were closely associated with academic life. Others seem to have been drawn from the operating staffs of Soviet industrial establishments, as in the great metallurgical center of Krivoi Rog, where a group of young men composed predominantly of engineers took over the rebuilding of city life soon after the Soviet troops withdrew.[13] One of their number became mayor, was active in nationalist work, probably in connection with the OUN-B, and as a result was executed by the Germans.[14] The most active local recruit of the OUN-M in Kiev, who

[11] Victor Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[12] Although two of their most prominent leaders (Bohatyrchuk and the mayor of Vinnitsa) were physicians, they were also occupants of academic chairs.

[13] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 22, 1941, p. 3.

[14] MS E; Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), p. 39.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

led the organization after the West Ukrainian and émigré leaders had been forced to withdraw, was an engineer. On the whole, however, it may be said that engineers were more concerned with material reconstruction than politics, and did not play proportionately as significant a role as did engineers in the nationalist movements abroad and in Galicia.

The predominance of intellectuals and technical specialists in the nationalist movement imparted a certain specific color to the activities. In the first place, from the purely administrative point of view, the lack of trained men was a serious handicap. While the purely material aspects of city life were carried on about as well as might have been hoped in view of the destruction, shortages, and German obstruction, the conduct of public administration was far from adequate. This was, indeed, one of the major causes of the downfall of the OUN-M regime in Kiev, whether the worst defects consisted of favoritism and speculation by officials, or simply poor organizational and human relations. Nationalist fervor, enthusiasm, facility in the use of literary Ukrainian, were no substitutes for managerial skills and personnel psychology. Yet it was precisely these abilities which intellectuals who were excluded from public life, as were Soviet Ukrainian educators suspected of adherence to the Skrypnyk group, could not acquire. At the same time, so much of their energy had been turned in upon their academic and cultural cultivation of things Ukrainian, such as language and history, that the intellectuals failed to place the emotional and abstract aspects of the nationalist cause in a balanced framework when the opportunity for action arose. It cannot be said that the intellectuals were less courageous than others might have been in striving for national ends in the face of German terrorism; many lost their lives, although, as has been pointed out in the case of some of the small-city editors, others were sometimes found to act as pliant tools for the occupiers. It does, however, appear that persons more inclined to take a functional instead of an emotional approach to administration might have been more successful in evading German demands.

Very striking is the almost total lack of legal expression among almost all participants in administrative work. Probably the basic reason for this omission was that lawyers were few and far between among non-Communist elements in the Ukraine. A con-

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Workers of various skills	1,788
Students	560
Liberal professions (journalists, writers, merchants, artists, etc.)	313
Teachers	252
Engineers	343
Administrators	178
Jurists	11

Compared to the occupational differences in nationalist activity, differences of age and sex played a minor role. There is little information on the activity of women. Evidently they carried on most of the welfare work; one German report states that a major reason for permitting the functioning of the Ukrainian Red Cross was a desire to absorb the energies of the women intellectuals, who had been highly "politicized" by the Soviet regime.[23] There are a few cases of prominent nationalist work by women, for example, by the poet Olena Teliha who headed the OUN-M literary circle in Kiev until its suppression by the Germans. In general, nationalist observers agree that the women were less active politically than the men. While there is too little evidence to warrant a firm conclusion on this score, it is just possible that the nationalist movements neglected a useful source of support, which was certainly tapped by the Communist underground.[24] 462 186

Youth, on the other hand, played a prominent part in nationalist work. While a large number of Mel'nyk supporters were drawn from the older generation, and the OUN-B made special efforts to capture the younger group, there was here no "conflict of generations" in respect to adherence to the two factions. Since only physically active persons were useful in the east, even the Mel'nyk organizers were predominantly youthful, and thus could approach their contemporaries more readily. The strength of the youth organizations dominated by the OUN-M in Kiev and Zhitomir has already been described. Other young men, of course, rejected both nationalist groups as too extreme, and formed centers of their own, while still others appear to have arisen in complete independence of outside stimulation. Thus the whole administra- 186 883 [668*]

[Occupation specialization of Ukrainian émigré group in Bohemia - Moravia--Analyst]

[23] USSR Exhibit 278.

[24] PS 3876.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

or Poland, because before 1905 opposition to the Russian Government was less marked. Besides, many Russian Liberals, even of official position, treated the Ukrainian movement as an interesting variation of Russian life. 177

(D) Social

The class divisions into titled aristocracy, nobles, townsmen, merchants, and peasants, existed as in other parts of the Russian Empire, but, roughly speaking, a different ethnic element corresponded to each social division. The titled aristocracy was mainly Polish in the western parts (with the name Polish Ukrainians) and Russian in the eastern. With but few exceptions, the same could be said of the class of landed nobles, in which the Great Russians formed the majority; Poles, Germans and others were the minority. The Ukrainian landed noble was almost unknown; and the townsmen of the large towns were also in a great majority non-Ukrainian, being chiefly Great Russians and Jews (in Berdichev the Jews form 78·4 per cent. of the population; in Yekaterinoslav, 40 per cent.), and, in the western Ukraine, Russian, Polish, German, Greek, &c. The Jews were mainly traders and shopkeepers, while the Great Russians and the foreigners were manufacturers. 565 563 184

But few of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia* took part in the industrial life of the country, about one-third of them belonging to the professional classes, i.e. doctors, Government officials, lawyers, and teachers. The Ukrainian professional classes originated from the ex-Cossacks and the townsmen rather than from the peasants, since there is a great distinction between the peasants and other members of the community. The Ukrainian nobles, it must be remembered, have in most cases become russified, and partly also polonized. The distinction between the peasant and other classes is not based on economic grounds, for some peasants in the Ukraine are very rich. It lies chiefly in their cultural condition, in their education, or rather lack 565 [463]

101 among themselves. They can be divided into three well-defined tribes
162 —the Lemki on the Slovak border, the Boiki in the centre, and the Huculs in the eastern tip of Ruthenia.

The most interesting tribe are the Huculs. They have preserved
186 their tribal characteristics better than their kinsmen. Their standard of education is higher, and they are more conscious and proud of their national individuality. When the Hungarians invaded Ruthenia after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Huculs offered the stiffest resistance, and during the war they were the core of the partisan force fighting against the totalitarian powers. Like the other Ruthenian
463 mountaineers, the Huculs are largely wood-cutters and raftsmen. But
342 they are distinguished by their skill as carpenters and wood-carvers. This is clearly reflected in their mode of life. Their wooden-cottages are neatly built and furnished and impress the visitor by their scrupulous cleanliness. Their tribal individuality and artistic skill find expression in the numerous carvings with which they like to decorate their unpainted houses.

181 The neighbouring Boiki have also, to some extent, preserved their
511 pride in racial individuality, and their mode of life, though more primitive, has some interesting features. They are kind-hearted, sincere and hospitable, in spite of their poverty. Though less proud than the Huculs, they fly into a temper when crossed, and impulsive outspoken-
342 ness is one of their traits. They live in cottages and huts which they like to paint in blue and brown, and this makes their exterior rather attractive. But the interior does not always live up to the façade. The better-off Boiki manage to live in fairly decent cottages with two or more rooms, but the huts of the poor often consist of one room only—a dark room with no chimney, one small window, and some roughly
352 made furniture. Some have no bedsteads in the true sense of the word; along the whole wall of the room one may find a long "plank-bed" where the grown-ups sleep at the one end and the children at the other. When the children grow up they sleep on separate beds of the same kind. Unlike the Hucul houses, the Boiki huts have no wooden
342 floors. The domestic animals often share the same room with their
511 masters in winter, sleeping on the bare earth. For many families such a room is therefore a kitchen, living room, bedroom, hall and stable in one.

511 Much the same applies to the Lemki tribe who live partly on Slovak territory. They are the poorest Ruthenian tribe and their racial
181 character has undergone a certain deterioration. Their standard of life is often appalling, the hygiene leaves much to be desired, and they have the largest number of illiterates, though some improvement has taken place under the Republic.

000 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The

439 world export of grain; Ukraine played a leading part in the export of wheat, rye and barley (20.21 % and 25 % respectively of the world export).

The bulk of the exports did not go to Russia which drew its supplies from the Volga Basin and the East. Part went to White Ruthenia, Poland and the Baltic, if it was not ear-marked for Central and Western Europe. And Ukrainian cattle were not greatly in demand in the Russian market, which is one reason why cattle-rearing never developed very satisfactorily.

5. The preponderance of foreigners in industry

433 was partly due to Ukrainian concentration in agriculture. It
● 464 is quite true that, at the outset, Ukraine was not interested in mining and industry. On the other hand the Russians, by Nature less bound to the poorer soil on which they had settled, immigrated to mining and industrial areas of Ukraine. This produced dangerous national islands. The work done by Ukrainian laborers in the Donets area was better than in the Ural, even if it did not reach the standards of Central and Western Europe.

471 In Ukraine industry foreigners predominated even more as investors of capital than as laborers, more capital coming from countries abroad than from Russia. Before World War I about 400 million roubles were invested in Dnipro Ukraine alone, where the value of mining and industrial products amounted to 170 million roubles. 95 % of the capital invested in heavy industry was of foreign origin; 80 % of the pig-iron produced in 1913 came from 10 concerns with French capital (out of a total of 16 in the Russia of those days); they represented an investment of more than 112 million roubles. Of the 103 million roubles of French capital invested in coal mines, 82 millions were accounted for by the Donets Basin. Ten of the 12 concerns run with Belgian capital were in Ukraine.

6. Ukraine's relations to Russia as a colony

439 find expression in the economy of Dnipro Ukraine where certain industries were neglected and deprived of funds in favor of Russian areas. And this is no result of a balance between an agrarian and an industrial country for it was not to the North and the East that agricultural produce was exported

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Industry and Mining

1. Fundamental Facts

433 It lay in the nature of her situation as a colony of Russia that only those branches of industry in Ukraine were promoted which utilised raw materials that were locally abundant and difficult to transport over long distances. It was impossible, for instance, to develop a modern textile industry. Even if it cost twice as much to transport cotton from New York to Moscow via Murmansk as via Odessa and Kharkiv and even if the industrial area in Central Russia had to import coal from the Donets Basin, Ukraine was nevertheless dependent on Russia for manufactured goods.

433 311 ●464 Labor was originally more plentiful in Russia than in Ukraine. The population on the upper reaches of the Volga and the Oka was more apt to seek employment in trade and industry, as the soil in those areas yielded poorer harvests and the percentage of forest land was higher. In Ukraine, on the other hand, farmers were loth to leave the good Black Earth. And that is why it was long impossible there to make labor a decisive factor in placing industries. This could be done only much later in the larger towns, and even then it made little difference to the general trend. But it is characteristic for Ukraine that sources of raw material have determined the location of industry, coal-mines and hydro-electric works being geographically fixed and altogether there are more industries, the raw materials of which are more difficult to transport than their products. The proportion of plants whose location is determined by the presence of raw materials is three times higher in Ukraine than in the industrial states of Central and Western Europe.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

464 labour is very fluid in Donbass; an annual turnover of 40–50 per cent is estimated.

Soviet official information concerning the iron-ore industry 135 of Krivoy Rog is probably more reliable than that concerning 316 Donbass. The reserves of iron ore of high quality (40 per cent iron) are reckoned at 1100 million tons; some Ukrainian economists put these in excess of 3000 million tons. Mining in the Krivoy Rog (south-west of Ekaterinoslav and south-east of Elizavetgrad) began in the nineties and attained considerable proportions by the beginning of the present century. For the years 1913–16 average output was about 5 million tons per annum. According to Soviet statistics, output for 1938 was round 18 million tons.

Conditions for the development of metallurgical industry are extraordinarily favourable in New Russia: on one side of the Dniepr coal, and on the other iron. This is not all: along the banks of the Dniepr itself, round Nikopol and Khvochevatka, to the south of the old ground of the Zaporogian *Sech*, are rich mines of manganese, the quality of which is little inferior to that of the Georgian deposits at Chiaturi. According to the estimates of Ukrainian economists, reserves on the Dniepr amount to about 400 million tons: even if these estimates are exaggerated, there can be no doubt that the deposit is one of the most valuable in the world.

The production of the Dniepr manganese mines has risen from 260,000 tons in 1916 to over 1,000,000 tons in 1938. If the U.S.S.R. is the principal world producer, the Ukraine alone ranks before British India and South Africa (from which two latter countries it is worth recalling that Germany imported 585,000 tons in 1937).

The deposits of coal in Donbass, of iron at Krivoy Rog and of manganese round Nikopol are connected by railway lines which function probably more efficiently than any others in U.S.S.R. The juxtaposition of the mineral deposits and the metallurgical plants ensures full loads both ways. Only 18 per cent of Donets coal is exported outside the Ukraine, and only 5 per cent of the iron ore; the balance is consumed by the South Russian industries. Manganese, on the other hand, is exported abroad in large quantities.

325 Important metallurgical plants (70 per cent of the capital of 103 which had been found by French and Belgian houses) existed in the South of Russia prior to the Revolution. In the 'Eastern' (Donets-Azov) group were included the following works: 'The New Russian' (station, Yuzovka, recalling the name of the Welshman Hughes); 'The Russo-Belgian' (Enakievo); 'The Kramatorsky' (Kramatorskaya); 'The Konstantinovsky' (Konstantinovskaya); 'The Donets-Yuriev' (Alchevskaya); 'The Nikopol-Mariupol'

with very uncertain success, fluctuating from periods of relatively satisfactory cooperation with the Poles to embittered boycott of an unbearably oppressive regime.[26] 186 665

Some West Ukrainians soon rejected the road of accommodation to the Polish government; in the early twenties they turned to Communism as the champion of both nationalist aspirations and social needs. While the Ukrainians of Galicia were not so badly off economically as were those in the East Ukraine before and after the war of 1914, they suffered from a high ratio of population to available land, from inadequate agricultural productivity, and above all from the fact that the vast majority of bureaucratic and urban jobs which would have served as the natural outlets for their sons, compelled by ambition or lack of employment to leave the land, were absorbed by Poles and Jews. In Volhynia, conditions were much worse; probably they were as bad, as far as purely economic circumstances went, as those within the Soviet Ukraine prior to 1930. Consequently, a broad economic basis for Communist propaganda existed; under the circumstances in which a nationalist Ukrainian Communist regime appeared to be taking form in Kiev, this propaganda appealed strongly to the nationalist element among West Ukrainians as well. As a result, two Communist-front organizations, the Ukrainian Party of Labor (Ukraïns'ka Partiia Pratsi) and the Peasants-Workers Association (Selians'ko-Robitnycha Partiia—Sel-Rob) had considerable success, especially in Volhynia. More serious from the strictly nationalist point of view, a large number of the students, the backbone of the new generation which would have to carry on national life, was attracted to the Communist program.[27] 186 668* [464] [665]

At the same time, an extreme movement of a different type attracted wide support. The movement which is commonly known in American scholarship as "integral nationalism" arose in Western Europe at the close of the nineteenth century, considerably before Communism became a factor of any real political importance. It is generally recognized that one of the first exponents

[26] See Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939).

[27] See especially Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

The Russian Danube Steam Navigation Co. traded 505
from Odessa to Danube river ports. It had a fleet of eleven vessels, with a tonnage of 9,000.

The following foreign lines had regular sailings to Odessa: Thos. Wilson, Sons & Co., thrice weekly, from Hull; J. R. Ellerman, Ltd., fortnightly, from Liverpool; James Moss & Co., every four weeks, from Liverpool; the Messageries Maritimes, fortnightly, from Marseilles; and the Deutsche Levante Linie, monthly, from Genoa.

Tramp steamers of many nationalities are attracted in great numbers to Ukraine ports in the autumn for the shipment of the cereal crop, and there is seldom any lack of cargo space.

The foreign lines with regular services appear capable of meeting the normal demand on their cargo space. The Russian lines require Government support, as shipping under the Russian flag is not as a rule commercially successful.

(c) *Telegraphic Communication*

Telegraphic communication with foreign countries is 206
dependent mainly on cable lines not situated in the Ukraine, which has only one cable, from Odessa to Constantinople, the joint property of the Indo-European Telegraph Co. and the Eastern Telegraph Co. Telegrams for the East are sent *via* the Kertch station of the Indo-European Telegraph Co.; those for northern Europe or America, *via* Petrograd and thence by various cable lines.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(a) *Supply of Labour; Emigration and Immigration* 464

The line of cleavage between agricultural and other 166
labour is not so sharp in the Ukraine as in most other communities. The claims of agriculture are the greater by far, but the increase in the number of landless peasants who find it difficult to live in the country

464 districts through the long winter has led to the crea-
[166] tion of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the
[563] country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel,
[511] Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful,
221 but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any
511 branch of industry. The State makes no effort to
565 regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

this class are often compelled to accept badly-paid 466
work in the towns, and both men and women have 511
often to make long and laborious journeys on foot in 565
search of employment.

A large class engaged in domestic industries, whether as masters or as servants, make a very poor living, frequently working very long hours under bad sanitary conditions.

In the coal and iron industries there are some concerns, 466
particularly those capitalized from abroad, which look well after their work-people, provide housing, secure good supplies of provisions at moderate prices, and take other measures to ameliorate labour conditions. In consequence, however, of works and mines being often situated on land rented on short-term leases, many employers cannot afford to lay out money on such objects, and conditions for labour are generally bad. So difficult is it to attract labour, that mine-owners have sometimes sought to secure convict labour from the Government.

The peculiar characteristic of labour in the Ukraine 166
is its mobility, which often occasions unexpected 464
crises. Superstition, epidemics of disease, and more obscure causes lead to vast movements of labourers from a district at very short notice.

The *artels*, which are labour organizations peculiar to 467
Russia, have an important influence on the supply and quality of certain labour. An *artel* is an association of workers, the general principles of which are: (1) all members must be actual workers; (2) all have equal rights in the organization; and (3) every member is responsible for the obligations contracted by the *artel*. The organization is usually non-capitalistic or has a very small capital.

In general there are two classes of *artels*, those of workers in producing trades and those of workers who provide service. The former are engaged in carpentering, cabinet-making, printing, linen-weaving, dairy-work, fishing, &c. The second group comprises stevedores, packers, customs agents, bank porters, com-

11: Obermaier--170 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

464 The tremendous increase in popula-
361 tion which the Ukraine showed after the liberation of peasants in 1861 found employment in the growing industry and in railroad construction, insofar as the surplus population did not prefer emigration to Siberia and eastern Asia. When there was less work on the farms, the farmers and farmers' sons traveled into the industrial regions, only to return to their villages at planting and harvest time. Thus a stock of Ukrainian industrial workers could not be formed; foreign Russian manpower immigrated and remained for good. In 1918 and 1919, when the Muscovite Bolsheviks broke into the Ukraine and the Russian industrial workers reinforce their ranks, the absence of a Ukrainian industrial working class was to make itself disastrously felt.

316 The world thinks of the Ukraine more as a granary than as asource of valuable raw materials. And yet, there are considerable treasures buried in Ukrainian soil. The reserve of iron ore in the Ukraine is the third largest in the world. At Krivoy Rog, 250 kilometers northeast of Odessa, according to the latest calculations there are deposited 1.25 billion tons of high percentage Bessemer ores (60 to 61% iron content) and also considerable quantities of ferruginous quartz. In Kerch on the easternmost spur of the Crimean Peninsula there are 2.7 billion tons of phosphorous ores with an iron content of 38 to 42%, and in the northern Caucasus there are smaller deposits. The following table shows the importance of Ukrainian ore extraction for the Great
439 Russian realm: /Facing page 160/ /Map XI: Iron Ore and Steel Export from the Soviet Ukraine (Average 1927/1928). The Ukraine was the great source of steel for the industrial works around Moscow and Leningrad./ /161/

316

	Iron Ore Extraction in million tons		
	1913	1932	1935
Krivoy Rog.....	6388	7925	16,594

433 the Soviet Union was to be increased according to the most modern methods. The industrialization of the agrarian country was based on existing industrial plants which were enlarged, on the opening-up of new sources of power and the establishment of large industrial combines. Foreign enterprises and above all foreign specialists assisted in a decisive way in the carrying-out of the first Five Year Plan. But the first and still fresh impulse of industrial development was broken even in 1932 at the beginning of the second Five Year Plan, the increased production figures for iron and coal to the contrary notwithstanding. Meanwhile, systems of stimulating production were introduced, such as the Udarniki Movement in 1933 (shocktroop workers) and the Stakhanov Movement of 1936, whereby production was actually increased. During the second Five Year Plan the number of industrial workers in Soviet Ukraine increased essentially more slowly than during the first. [44] In 1929 there were somewhat over 600,000 "independent workers" in the entire Soviet Ukraine, more than half of whom were coal and metal workers. In 1931 their number had increased to 900,000, in 1933 to over 1 million, and in 1935, to barely 1.2 million workers - female workers not included. (105)

105. Kubiyovich: Atlas of the Ukraine and the Area Bordering it, page 46.

By far the greater number of industries of the present Soviet Ukrainian economy still stem from the pre-war period, as for example almost all factories for agricultural machines. The only revolutionary step in this branch of economy is the merging of individual enterprises and the changing of names. The firm "Heim, Odessa" became the Bolshevik factory "October Revolution", "Fuchs, Kleiner, Berger and Zagorelin, Katerynoslav"

505 as the Dnester, Bug and Donets, because it is not regulated. The Donets has too little water to assume the importance it could have as the only river in the industrial area.

504 Odessa is the most important seaport of the Ukraine, and next in importance comes Novorossiysk on the Caucasian coast. Both of them turn over more than two million tons of goods annually. Next come Mykolayov at the mouth of the Bug and Maryupil on the Sea of Azov, with a turn-over of more than a million tons annually, as well as Kherson at the mouth of the Dneper and Theodosia in the Crimea with more than half a million tons each.(124)

124. Kubiyovich: Atlas, page 48.

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000 When workers are satisfied with their jobs and the general living conditions of their dwellings, they do not like to change. Constant change of a crew of workers of an enterprise is a definite sign that something is wrong, that the workers are not satisfied. For the employers it is no pleasure constantly to be obliged to train new
• 464 people and test their reliability. In the Ukraine workmen very often leave factories and pits in order to find employment in other enterprises. The official organ of heavy industry 'Za Industriyalizatsiiu' writes about this on December 15, 1936: "The fluctuation of workmen in the Donets Basin is enormous. It even exceeds that of former years. In eleven months of 1936, 231,000 new workmen moved to the coal pits, while 233,000 moved away; again in 1935, 210,000 came, 219,000 left. The crew changes all the time... People also leave the mines because of low wages. /175/ In pit number 18 many of the workers hired, earned only 100 to 200 rubels a month. Disorganization

464 cuts wages." A few days later 'Za Industriyalizatsiiu' deals with the same subject: "The fluctuation of workers in the Molotov automobile factory is great, especially among those who have been newly employed. In the course of eleven months in 1936 over 12,000 workers have moved away. The shortage of housing is often given as the chief reason for the mass flight. Inasmuch as the machines are idle, the wages of the workers are greatly reduced... The workers wait for the machines eight to ten days a month. The management succeeds in providing normal or semi-normal working conditions for only a few of the workers - for the famous Stakhanov-workers." (125) Very

125. Quoted by Keyserlingk, The Russian worker lives in this way, page 22.

similar are the conditions in the new combine "Zaporishstali" where in 1935, 9151 workers were taken on and 7675 released; this is reported by Visti on May 22, 1939. The same paper reports on May 17, 1939 that 331 young farmers from the region of Chernigov were sent into the coal mines of the Donets Basin.

433 461 At the beginning of the second Five Year Plan, Bolshevik employers with the help of the erstwhile farmer Isotov refuted those false prophets who, like Marx and Lenin, maintained that people would lead a secure, carefree and enjoyable life in the socialist state with little work and high wages. After special preparations the miner Isotov turned out 40 to 60 percent more than he had previously averaged. Isotov's first effort was particularly celebrated and propagandized. It served as a pretext for the introduction of the Udarnik or shock-worker movement. Two years later, when this impulse had abated just as had the previous enthusiasm of the first Five Year Plan, the big, powerful peasant boy Alexei Stakhanov fell

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433 During all this time the livestock of the Ukraine (see next
231 Section), was being slowly and laboriously built up by gifts from the
262 rest of the Union, by levies on Germany, and by natural increase.
731 Meat was very scarce, since no-one was willing to slaughter and further deplete the slender herds. Cows, used for draught purposes, gave little milk. Now added to these intense shortages of meat, fat and dairy products was another great deficiency of cereals and bread, hitherto the mainstay of the Ukrainian post-war diet.

U
241 The 1946 harvest cannot, at the most optimistic estimate, be
433 reckoned at more than 40 per cent. of 1940 in cereals and vegetables per hectare sown.[1] There is no fodder for the jealously guarded
231 animals; shelter for them is also very scarce since the people themselves are only now moving out of dugouts. If the animals are slaughtered, the small supplies of dairy products and meat will soon disappear; and the problem of draught power will remain as acute as ever.

U
241 There is an agricultural dilemma in the Ukraine which a good
433 harvest would have gone far to break. Although extensive and con-
464 tinued demobilizations have been taking place, there is a great shortage of labour on the farms.[2] If manpower is taken from the farms to help produce the machinery necessary to liberate further men from the land, there may not be enough farm workers left to produce sufficient food for the factory workers. The poor harvest has aggravated this vicious circle.

The Soviet Government has attempted in various ways to meet this problem not only in the Ukraine, but throughout the Union. Everyone who is able to work does so; young people, old people, women. The
U women who worked during the war have remained part of the labour force in both industry and agriculture, and an increasing number are being
[462] recruited. In the Ukraine in 1946, women composed at least 60 - 70 per cent. of the farm working force.

SU
[464 At the same time as steps are being taken to concentrate more
241 workers in agriculture, the organization of the collective farms is
474 being overhauled and geared to higher efficiency. To accomplish this,
647 the Soviet Council of Ministers created on September 19, 1946, a Collective Farm Council, whose main tasks will be to elaborate measures for the improvement of collective farming. This Council which is authorized to call conferences of collective farm representatives when necessary, was set up for the purpose of "establishing strict control over the observation of collective farm statutes and for the solution of questions of the collective farm structure." One of their primary

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1 One must also bear in mind the reduced area under cultivation.

2 The war losses are felt very acutely.

Coal

316 433 The coal centre of the Ukraine is the basin of the Donets River, a tributary of the Don. In 1913 the Donets region was producing 80 per cent. of all the coal turned out in the entire Russian Empire. (23 million tons of the 29.2 million total); and even in 1940, when the production of other coal areas in the U.S.S.R. had been greatly expanded, and many new areas explored and put into operation, Donets mines still accounted for more than half the total output (83.8 million tons of the entire Soviet Union production of 164.6 million).

Since about 70 per cent. of all the fuel consumed in the U.S.S.R. is supplied by coal,[1] the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian coal industry is of tremendous importance to the economy of the Soviet Union.

727 316 It is now over three years since the Soviet Army drove the Germans out of the Donets Basin. Before their rout, the enemy flooded the mines and burned engineering plants, miners' settlements, and cities. Restoration work was started soon after the liberation of the Basin, but it was estimated that to restore coal output to the pre-war level it would be necessary to pump 650 million cubic metres of water out of the mines and to restore 1,565 miles of mine galleries.[2] Today, the towns of the Donets Basin are a mass of scaffolding, as war-devastated houses, buildings, and roads continue to be repaired. Mine derricks dot the landscape; and water is being pumped in a steady stream from the mine pits. At the Chelyuskin Mine which before the war was one of the biggest and best equipped in the Donets, over nine million cubic metres of water had been pumped by the middle of December 1946; and about 20 miles of galleries had been restored. Coal output averaged a thousand tons a day.

By January 1947 about 142 major coal mines of the 279 operating prior to the war had been restored, and 430 smaller ones, rehabilitated or built anew, were in operation. Production was nearly half of pre-war.[3]

[362] As regards housing for Donets workers, it is planned within the next five years not only to restore the houses demolished by the Germans, but also to build another 20 million square feet of housing space in the Donets Basin; in 1946 alone over four million square feet of floor [464] space had been reconstructed. Thousands of miners are being helped to build their own homes; and measures are being taken to increase their food supplies.

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1 Moscow Radio feature, "Sidelights on Soviet Life," cited in Soviet Monitor, London, January 29, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946

3 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-
Ruthenians

Shepherds blow huge horns to round up their sheep by night

511 In the narrow valleys and on their slopes are cottages and straggling
464 villages where the Ruthenian uplanders live. Nearly, all the huts are
made of wood and are flanked by gardens with patches of sunflowers.
241 In the higher altitudes the land consists mainly of meadows, and such
311 meagre fields as there are yield scanty crops of oats, potatoes or hemp—
not sufficient to live on. No wonder that during the summer months it
is chiefly women and children who can be found at home; the menfolk
either fell trees in the forest or earn their living as seasonal labourers
in the towns and villages of the more prosperous South.

101 These lonely mountains and forests breed a people with a distinct
162 character of their own. Living as they do in seclusion, they not only
differ from their Slovak neighbours but show distinct regional differences

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hun-
241 garians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent
438 vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here
341 imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

162 porizha 244 %, Kryvyj Rih 156.6 %, Staline 170 %, Konstanty-
361 nivka 233 %, towns in the Right and Left Bank areas decreased.

The increase in urban population in the Ukraine Soviet Republic is most probably due to foreign immigration. Housing has become worse practically everywhere; it is difficult to imagine that the immigrants can continue to live permanently under such wretched conditions.

474 The rural population was composed almost entirely of members of colkhoses. They possessed almost the entire agricultural land in common, all agricultural machinery and draught animals and much of the other livestock. There remained for personal use only small plots round the cottages, the cottages themselves and a few head of cattle (no horses), pigs and poultry.

474 Every member had to work on the soil of the colkhose. His
465 wages were reckoned according to the number of days he had worked and these were calculated according to time and kind of work performed. The amount of grain left after fulfilling obligations to the state and payment for hire of machines and tractors, seed, cattle-breeding expenses, rate of amortisation etc. represented the wages. They were paid in kind and (a smaller proportion) in money. This meant that variations in harvest yield were almost exclusively expressed by what was left for wages. In the first years of the colkhose system, members often received 2-3 kg of grain for a day's work; as their energy was not fully utilised in the colkhose and as the members of the family who were unable to work had also to live from these meager earnings, famine arose in the early thirties in Ukraine, bringing a great increase in the death-rate. Later, wages are said to have been raised but the Soviet statistics do not show whether the wages listed (15 kg and more per day) applied to entire Ukraine or to individual colkhoses. The incomes of the various colkhose members also varied, as administrative jobs were better paid than work in fields and stables, and as several members revealed "propriety instincts" for extending or exploiting their own small share at the expense of the common property.

The proportion of farms managed by individuals decreased to less than 1 % of the entire agricultural area. The men employed at machinery and tractor centers, which seemed to attract all the mechanics required for the colkhose system, formed a privileged class. It depended on them whether an agricultural operation was carried through at the right time. This group was mainly composed of young people and non-Ukrainians. In 1934 some 797 600 were employed on the land and in forests in the Ukraine Soviet Republic. The Soviet officials, not so important numerically as on account of their influence, formed another group of the rural population. Finally, in the country districts there was a fairly large group of teaching and medical staffs and agricultural experts, mostly of Ukrainian peasant origin, as foreigners could not stand life in Ukrainian villages for long. 162 565

Urban population had a large percentage of foreigners, the main social groups being laborers in industry and commerce and the Soviet officials. The number of industrial laborers within the frontiers of the Ukraine Soviet Republic on January 1st, 1936 was 1 308 000. But this figure kept varying constantly, as many of the workers from country districts were not satisfied with conditions of life in the towns and changed jobs frequently or tried to get back home. The Soviet Government fought against these difficulties for years without being able to solve them. This group also included a great number of young people who grew up in post-war conditions. Their nationality varied; about half of the industrial proletariat in Ukraine was of Ukrainian origin. As a rule, material standards were not high. The average wage in 1934 amounted to 166.4 roubles a month, but this figure is not a clear indication of the individual's earning capacity as piece-work was general. In individual cases, where the Stakhanov system (whereby maximum output of labor was achieved) was introduced, higher than average wages were earned. In recent years real wages declined as a result of abolishing the cards which had entitled workmen to certain privileges in buying food and industrial products. Wage earners in Soviet business concerns were similarly situated to those in industrial plants but as the former were less important than the latter in the general scheme of Soviet economy, their develop- 162 369 465 434

465 434 ment has been slower and they have not yet reached the same degree of intensity of labor which we found in factories. Jews play a great part in commercial life.

162 465 511 647 Among the lower categories of civil servants, Ukrainians were in the majority from the beginning, while representatives of foreign nationalities increased in the higher services. The average salary of Soviet officials throws little light on the standard of living in this group of the population because the difference between higher and lower employees is again considerable. Incomes in the lower ranks were very small while the higher officials had a life of ease and could on occasion even afford luxury. Engineers are among the most privileged while teachers and actors are much worse off. The legal status of the Soviet official was entirely insecure; they lived constantly under threat of a "purge" or of being denounced as disturbing the process of Soviet economy. The higher ranks of bureaucrats were here in special danger.

162 The small group of the professional class (doctors, writers, lawyers), in spite of their freedom, was dependent on the apparatus of the Soviet State. The group of outcasts was most to be pitied, i. e. those who had been expelled by the regime from social intercourse, e. g. merchants, artisans, and priests. After identity cards were introduced and "socially dangerous" persons removed, this group greatly decreased.

162 127 697 Another group, finally, is formed by Ukrainians living outside the frontiers of Ukrainian territory, who as "Kurkuls", "Pests", "Saboteurs" were sent to concentration camps in the North and in Siberia. The "Nationalists" are also included in this group. And the colonisation of remote frontier areas in Soviet Russia required forest laborers, miners and factory workers, who had to help in the coal mines of Siberia and in building up industrial concerns in Central Asia. It is impossible to give statistics for the proportion of Ukrainians in this group, but they cannot be ignored as they will certainly return home and play an important rôle in Ukraine whenever the general situation is altered.

162 127 In Ukrainian areas outside of the Soviet Union, conditions resemble those obtaining in Western Europe. The Ukrainian

country for less populated districts in the east, while, on the slightest 166
suspicions, whole families were deported, separated and exiled, and 626
their places taken by people from other Soviet republics who were brought in to destroy the racial unity that formerly existed in the villages.

To appreciate the difficulties of the peasants on the collective 241
farms, we must remember that the involved bureaucratic system 651
had ample opportunities for extorting the grain for little or no 474
payment. Thus the Motor Transport Stations which controlled 465
all the machinery were supported by payments from the collective farms of grain and other products in kind and this usually approached 21.5% of the total yield, while the Stations took over 23% of the crop for the government. Another 15% was retained by the kolhosp for sowing and for various insurance funds that were prescribed by law and another 18% was kept for fodder and for the compensation of the full-time administrators. Thus, there was barely a quarter of the produce left to be distributed among the working population and this was the variable quantity since all of the payments and collections were based not on the actual harvest but on the harvest as planned by the central authorities. Thus, in the case of a bad harvest, the share allotted for distribution was the part that was cut and the government, so far as possible was provided with its expected supply.

This amount was divided among the individuals and families on the basis of the labor days which they had worked. In the beginning a labor day meant labor for a day, no matter how many hours of labor were required, but even before World War II, this simple definition was replaced by a specification that it covered a definite amount of work and it might very easily happen that a slow or poor workman would have to work more than one day to make a labor day. Thus, there was the possibility of still further exploitation of the workmen, who could not know accurately until the end of the year on what they could count.

There was also distributed, likewise in proportion to labor days, a certain sum of money which the kolhosp received from the government in return for the sale of grain over the amount col-

[1 after 1933 famine - - Analyst]

341 lected for the tax in kind. This was a negligible sum and the
651 average member rarely received more than one ruble per labor
474 day. This sum was, of course, insufficient to provide for the
465 goods which the family needed to purchase, and since their share
[511] of the grain was rarely sufficient to feed them, their situation became hopeless, while of other products the individual received about one litre of oil, fifty kilograms of potatoes, thirty-five kilograms of fruit, and five-tenths kilograms of meat and fat.

[435] The real significance of these figures is shown in the prices that were charged in the state stores.[1] There a kilogram of bread cost ninety kopecks, ten eggs brought eight rubles, a kilogram of beef twenty-four rubles, and a pair of boots four hundred and fifty rubles, while a farmer's suit of clothes cost five hundred rubles.

[422] It made the peasant really dependent upon his individual plot of land if he was to secure any necessities.[1] This was far too small and its use was bound with many restrictions. Thus, no family was allowed to hold more than one cow and two calves, one sow, up to ten goats, an undefined number of chickens and up to twenty beehives. In the beginning it was possible for the peasant to secure a certain amount of food for these animals from the common store. He was allowed to retain the manure and it was thus possible for him to improve his own individual plot and thus to secure larger returns. It was a liberal application of such principles that had rendered possible the general improvement which was noticeable during the years 1934-6, when the government was endeavoring to make the system of collective farms workable.

It can be easily seen that the system of allowing individual incomes was based on a principle opposite that of the New Economic Policy, for it would require scarcely a legislative enactment to reduce these amounts while the New Economic Policy presented a norm of profit to the workers. Yet with each year, once the government was convinced of its success, it found it possible in various ways to tap this new source of income for its own purposes.

The favorite method was by taxation. Thus, by 1939 if we should assume that the average family received in cash four hun-

1 [Ukraine - after 1933 famine -- Analyst]

dred and eighty karbovantsy, they would be required to pay 241
twenty-two and a half karb. in taxes, twenty in rent, fifty as a 651
special tax and they would be required to volunteer to take at 474
least two hundred in government bonds. 465

Even this did not cover the total payments to the government. With its usual love of double-talk and subterfuge, the government, which controlled every branch of human activity in the USSR, talked of the establishment of socialism and levied indirect taxes on all transactions so that the actual cost to the villagers of any manufactured article was about three times what it cost the government as producer. The whole subject was carefully veiled as a state secret to protect the Soviet Union against capitalist intrigues but the unfortunate population were the unwilling contributors to this new order of life.

Under such conditions it is extremely difficult to pierce the veil [652]
of percentages as to cost and production and give a reliable estimate as to the amount of money received for the government or the relationship between the sums spent in maintaining the operation of the Moscow-controlled factories in Ukraine and the amount spent upon the needs of the population either individually, as families or as citizens of the UkSSR or of the UkSSR as a governmental unity within the Soviet sphere. From those figures which the Soviet has let out, it is possible to see that the yearly budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has run from 2½-5% of the budget of the USSR while the population has been at least 18% of the total population.

With the villages compelled to yield the last pound of grain, 369
etc., that could be extracted by force, and receiving in return 511
almost no manufactured goods, the position of the city workmen and the intelligentsia was little better. The wages of the workmen were always insufficient, the housing conditions were hardly endurable, and the only point of betterment was that the larger places and some of the plants especially favored by the regime received more manufactured goods of a poor quality and at a high price which the fortunate people might be able to secure.

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a 474
result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred 434
karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one 241
thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on [554]
these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for [665]
show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satisfactory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer is little better, although he 465
receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, 731
there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 con- 185
tinued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

[Post - WORLD WAR II - 1945 -- Analyst]

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy industries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, 83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia.

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peasants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property was taken into the collective farms (*Communist*, Kharkov, December 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater.

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administration, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc.

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

433 itself to such an extent to the mass production of
461 discards that it regards this condition as an unavoidable fact and builds up its production program on the score of 35 percent discards." (126)

126. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 32.

000 /Facing page 176/ /An important agricultural product: sunflowers. The seeds are removed from the receptacle with small sticks, and are then taken to the oil mills/*/Facing page 177/ /Picture of a village in the more well-timbered West Ukraine where the houses are built of wood/*/177/

465 In the spring of 1937, two years after the introduction of the Stakhanov System, the average gross wages of the Soviet worker, according to the official figures of the Moscow Statistical Office, amounted to 212 rubles monthly. (127) In the

127. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 33.

meantime there has hardly been any change in these figures. From these 212 rubles about 10 percent are deducted (128) so that the worker has 191 rubles left over per month to cover his living expenses. If he had no rent to pay, with this amount he could buy 106 kilograms of white bread or 44 kilograms of groats or 119 liters of milk or 29.5 kilograms of sweet cherries; or he could consume 24 canteen meals a month or buy 19 kilograms of margarine. He could also acquire three pairs of sneakers or a pair of cheap men's shoes, provided they are even available in a normal size, - usually there are only outsizes in stock in the state stores and cooperatives, for the Jews have shifted the marketable goods to the open market where their cost is multiple. There would not be enough for a man's suit of the cheapest

*[For plates, cf. pp. 226-227, category 116-Analyse]

465 quality. For this the worker, if he does not spend any kopeks for food and housing, must work one and one-half months, and two months for the cheapest winter coat. Three colored shirts eat up a month's wages. For the same amount he could buy his wife three summer dresses of poor quality or three sets of underwear or three blouses. (129)

129. Statement of a German specialist in Kiyev.

Far too often the life of the Soviet Ukraine worker is exhausted in the struggle for his daily bread, for clothing and shelter, and yet before the war he was the best paid in Russia. Undoubtedly
345 the Bolsheviks have done a great deal of building,
466 but they neglected the building of houses in favor
185 of the building of clubhouses and palaces for cultural purposes, veritable giant structures of cement and steel where in the evening the locksmiths and metal founders then assemble "in order to hear lectures on Shakespeare". "For in human history there is an urge that has never before been recognized in the great masses...for art and literature. The famous tractor brigade of the Pasha Angelin comes forth with songs, and the workers of the Khar'kov tractor factory organize their own opera. Hundreds of groups of worker and kolhosp newspapers flaunt poems, stories and essays written by forge and tractor workers."

He whose thoughts take flight on the wings of Pegasus will find his hands only mechanically at
433 work. Among the construction workers the "never-before recognized urge of the great masses...for art and literature" expresses itself in the following way, according to Pravda of July 16, 1937: "The brick production program for the year could only be 19 percent accomplished in the first five months of the year, and the two subsequent months have also brought no change. The construct-

433 of the working time in July of this year...The Stalingrad plant presents a similar picture." (131) Where there is no needle there are no

131. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 25.

clothes. Pravda of May 8, 1939, criticizes the decrease in coal mining in the Donbas as follows: "The mine which determines the fate of the entire trust is behind schedule. It would seem as though the scandalous production which has lasted for a considerable time now would have been given serious consideration. The management of the mine is now trying to explain the poor production by the fact that the workers are leaving in order to attend to their spring planting." Visti of June 10, 1939, supplements this by reporting that the constant decrease of coal mining in the Donets Basin is forcing the economic management of Soviet Ukraine to increase the production of brown coal and turf.

*

562 By reason of the Soviet Constitution, the
461 East Ukrainian woman has an equal position with
594 the man. This means that she has the same meager
[465] rights and the same heavy duties. Since the wages of the man are not adequate to support the family, the woman must also earn some of the daily bread. Thus the woman is a worker. The elimination of Sundays and holidays, the long trips to work, the standing-in-line for hours to get food, the shifting of days off in the different plants, the incredible housing shortage, the rearing of children in institutions, the easy divorces of "couples living together" - all this disrupts the family.
594 The devastating consequences which are bound to
161 result from the disregard /181/ of the family,

SU 474 433 438 472 which the kolkhoz members were permitted to keep[1] were performing this task, furnishing the city markets with meat, dairy products, eggs, poultry, vegetables, fruit, honey, mushrooms, and berries.

SU 474 [442 434] In April 1940, in order to provide a wider incentive for the kolkhoz members to increase their collective production, the system of delivery assessments was radically changed. Whereas the basis for grain deliveries to the government had previously been the amount of land sown or, in the case of meat, milk, eggs and poultry, the size of the herd or flock, the new basis for assessments was the amount of land held by the kolkhoz; and any production above the fixed rates could be retained by the kolkhoz for distribution among the members according to labour days.

U 461 474 241 466 A second decree applying to the Ukraine alone established supplementary pay for increasing the crop yield or productiveness in the raising of livestock. This decree directed the collectives of the Ukraine to assign various sections of the field or garden to work teams, working to produce a fixed quota. If the production did not exceed the quota, the members were paid only by the labour day; but if a team produced above the quota, it received part of the excess as bonus.

SU 423 In 1934 the Soviet Government decided to permit individual members of the kolkhozes to keep private farmsteads within the limits of ¼ to 1 hectare. A year later the code for the kolkhozes (called the "Stalin Code") confirmed these rights. It also secured forever the land held by the kolkhozes:

> "All boundaries formerly separating plots of land belonging to members of co-operatives are herby abolished, and all their holdings are pooled together to be used in common...the land occupied by the kolkhozes (as all land in the U.S.S.R.) is public government property. It is...secured to the kolkhozes for use without time limit, that is in perpetuity, and not subject to buying, selling or leasing to anyone by the co-operative... All agricultural production on kolkhoz land, shall be carried on by the members of the kolkhoz, jointly, co-operatively... Out of the land held in common a small part shall be set aside for the use of each household (for truck gardening, orchards, etc.)... The dimensions...may vary...from ¼ to ½ hectare and in certain regions up to one hectare".

1 [SIC-- ANALYST]

Gastronoms

443 434 262 554 461 In addition to the ration stores, Kiev has about five gastronoms, or commercial stores, where unrationed goods are for sale. Most of the gastronoms are stocked almost entirely with delicacies, such as Siberian crabmeat, live carp in water tanks, a little fresh meat, salami, candy, biscuits, and Russian cigarettes. (No UNRRA goods are sold in such stores). Until September 1946 the prices in gastronoms were so high that only a relatively small part of the population could afford to buy. The gastronoms were patronized primarily by those with high earnings - professors, theatrical stars, scientists, artists, high ranking army officers, skilled technicians, etc. One of their main purposes was to show the average worker that some luxuries did exist, and thus encourage him to raise his skills and productivity. Another purpose was to provide a special reward for various kinds of meritorious service. For example, war heroes and top generals were entitled to a 40 per cent discount on all purchases made at a gastronom. Moreover, workers who had stayed at the same factory for six years or more were entitled to a 20 per cent discount, and office workers with similar service to 10 per cent.

[435] In September 1946, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to abolish differences between the higher "commercial" prices and the low prices of rationed goods, the prices in gastronoms were lowered and certain ration prices, raised somewhat.

[465] At the same time, taking into account the difficulties which average and low-paid workers would encounter as a result of higher ration prices, the Council of Ministers decided to increase all salaries of less than 900 roubles a month. Thus, those workers who previously had earned up to 300 roubles a month received an increase of 110 roubles; those who had earned up to 500 roubles, another 80. Similar increases were allowed in pensions and in students' stipends.

So far as UNRRA food is concerned, the increases in ration prices have affected meat, fish, fats and oils, other categories of UNRRA food supplies particularly milk, cheese, and army rations were not affected.

434 435 The following table shows the increases in ration store prices.

The crying need of the Ukrainians was for consumer goods. 433
Odesa and Kharkiv requested that they might be given the power 185
to build textile mills to supply the needs of the local population. 656
The request was denied, for the authorities had decided that the textile industry was to be concentrated in the RSFSR. The iron and steel cities requested that they might be given the permission to build factories to complete the fabrication of certain delicate types of machinery. The request was refused because it was to be only in the Moscow area that such articles were to be made. It was to be the task of Ukraine to furnish the raw material, the iron ore from Kryvy Rih, the coal of the Donbas, and to prepare the semi-finished pig-iron and other forms of semi-fabricated material that were needed by the central plants.

The plan not only provided for construction. It went even further and specified the exact amount of products that were to be turned out by each individual plant. While it was possible to secure some profits from the over-fulfillment of the plan, regardless of the effect that this might have upon the plan as a whole, any under-fulfillment was treated as a gross failure of obligation to the state.

This led, in turn, to additional restrictions on the freedom of [466] ● the workers. Punishments were ordered for tardiness, for absence from employment even for a single day without a satisfactory reason, for an attempt to change the place of employment. These regulations were not the product of the governing bodies of the republics but of the Union authorities themselves and they were transmitted from Moscow to the national republics through the liaison between the All-Union commissariats and their subordinate organs.

It was the same with agriculture. Moscow knew what each collective farm, each kolkhoz, each sovkhoz was to furnish, and woe to the group that failed. The famine had been the result and that had been used to break the spirit of resistance of the Ukrainian villagers. The government specified the acreage that was to be devoted to wheat, to barley, to all of the crops that could be raised and it did no good if the local agronomists pointed out new

1/1 [1930's - after famine -- Analyst]

727 Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the
661 title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors
[241] merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

[538] By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, [466] who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

668 These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba—Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

668 This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian
725 forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

722 In the same way, the authorities gathered up in frenzied haste machinery, finished products, and records and started them likewise to the east with the hope of setting them up somewhere in a safe place and using them to increase the Soviet war potential. All this was a hurried and confused process, for it was contradicted by the Soviet orders to reduce the Ukraine to a heap of ruins and to leave nothing available for the invaders.

[814] [661] The clash between these two ideas was vividly reflected in the destruction of Kiev. Some sections of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR were hurriedly packed on trains and moved to Ufa. Other sections for little better reasons were abandoned in the general confusion or were mined for immediate destruction. Priceless books and records, no less than boilers and lathes, shared the two fates, while Kiev, thoroughly mined, was exploded and set on fire without regard for the needs of the people. The Soviet authorities, well aware that they could not evacuate the entire population, destroyed the food supplies of those who were left behind while other detachments massacred the helpless population indiscriminately.

The situation at Kharkiv and Odesa was far better and far more logical for the Soviets had a few days longer to sort out what they wished to remove and what they wanted to destroy, but even in these places there was the same wanton destruction which conflicted with the avowed aims of the Soviet authorities.

Then ensued a series of mutual recriminations, and it is still not clear in regard to many buildings and institutions whether the bulk of the damage and the losses were caused by Nazi or by Communist actions. Some 3500 carloads of machinery were shipped alone from the city of Zaporyzhzhya and most of this material was packed at night in utter darkness with no special care as to where it was being sent.

[466] The same situation confronted the workers, some 5,000,000 of whom were evacuated from the Ukraine and landed in rough factories that were hastily erected somewhere in Asia. These sometimes lacked even roofs and means of heating when the mercury dropped to 45° below zero.

727 their posts and the vast majority of those who were Communists
316 received more or less sinecures above ground. Their places were
[466] taken by forcing the Ukrainian peasants, including a large percentage of young girls, to work in the pits with the minimum of safeguards. Little money was appropriated for the restoration of the damaged housing, for as the writer Korniychuk declared in one of his works, "Ukraine was so thankful for the success of Stalin that they did not care how they lived, for if he had perished, life would not be worth living under any circumstances."

727 With this attitude prominently emphasized by the leading propagandists, it is easy to see that the resources and energies of the population were directed by force rather toward those items that would advance the importance and the convenience of Moscow, than those that would be of advantage to the local population.

[496] The one exception was the necessity for rebuilding immediately and strengthening the railroad communications between the Donbas, Moscow, Leningrad and the Black Sea ports—in other words, the extreme eastern part of the Ukraine which was slated for a special development with roads and railroads linking the country up with the Russian centres rather than with the other Ukrainian centres to the west for these were regarded as exposed centres in case of a new outbreak of hostilities and were to be neglected until they were masked by the extension of Soviet power over the satellite countries.

474 The collectivized agriculture was in little better shape. In
341 that part of the Ukraine which had been under Soviet control before 1939, the authorities revived the collective farms but they had been so badly ruined that at first the authorities were often willing to be more considerate of the members. Immediately after the war they allowed them to group themselves into links or permanent sections of some eight to ten people who would thus come to feel themselves a distinct unit in the collective farm. It did not take long for the more rigid Communists to decide that this sense of permanence was in a way a defiance of the principles of collectivization, for very often members of the same household, if it were at all numerous, would group themselves into a link. In such cases the link became more prosperous, for it was in a way

a revival of that form of family agriculture which had long been 474
popular in the Ukraine before the collectivization. Furthermore, 241
it was soon suspected that the links varied in their delivery of supplies to the government, sometimes in inverse proportion to their own readiness to work. The peasants likewise as in the early days of the NEP devoted more attention to their own private plots of land, a phenomenon that had been noticed even before World War II.

The Soviet authorities had several answers to such develop- 474
ments. On the one hand, they finally forbade the operation of the 241
permanent links which had developed to the point where they 466●
threatened the objective of collectivization, the turning of the [423]
peasant farmer into a paid proletarian worker in agriculture. On the other hand they reduced the size again of the individual plot of land and they forced the peasants to give up animal raising on their plots by charging them for even the straw from the collective farms and the wild fodder that grew in abandoned places. Then again, they levied a tax on the products of these plots and this, plus the reduction of the allotment, rendered it impossible for the peasant to improve his lot except through increased work on the collective farm. In the meanwhile the steady raising of the quota of work required for one labor day made it impossible for the average peasant, unless he was a Stakhanovist (i.e. a person who cooperated with the central regime and thereby received favorable assignments) to complete one labor day within one calendar day, no matter how long hours he worked. This had been a favorite device of the Russian landlords as we learn from Radishchev's *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*, a famous Russian radical work of the end of the eighteenth century but a modern version of it was adapted by the Russian Communist leaders and used effectively.

Even these measures were not the desirable solution. This was 474
first proposed by Khrushchov in 1947, and while it was at first 241
looked upon with some disfavor, it was finally deemed suitable by 665
the slave-drivers of the Kremlin, and Khrushchov, after a period of mild disfavor, was promoted to the Politburo, and another Russian, Melnikov, placed in charge of Ukraine. This was the

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

decrease of popular support for Germany in the Ukraine. There is good evidence that the population was at first sympathetic to the German efforts to recruit labor voluntarily.[70] Moreover, a large number of nationalist Ukrainians supported the measure; they not only wanted to help Germany win the war against the Soviet Union, but believed that it would be a valuable cultural experience for young Ukrainians to come into contact with advanced German technology and with Western European culture in general. To them it was means of drawing the Ukrainian nation away from its too-close association with the Russians and the "Asiatics" of their empire and of establishing a European orientation for their country.[71]

Unhappily for these visions, the methods used by the Germans in dealing with the volunteer workers soon dried up the supply. They were frequently given miserable transportation and poor accommodations on arrival in Germany. Highly trained workers and professional men who had volunteered in order to increase their technical ability by experience in Germany were assigned to common labor.[72] Most important, however, the Ukrainians, like other *Ostarbeiter,* were forced to wear a humiliating badge distinguishing them from Western Europeans; they were forbidden social contacts with the latter and, in order to implement this decree, were excluded from motion-picture theaters, restaurants, and other public places. The erstwhile willing worker felt that the Germans regarded him (as many did) as nothing but a Bolshevik prisoner.[73]

When this policy of segregation resulted in lack of volunteers, force was used; mandatory labor service for young men and women was officially introduced in the Reichskommissariat on September 21, 1942,[74] but in practice compulsion had long been employed. In reply to the inevitable evasion of this order, the most demoralizing of tricks—such as seizure of worshippers at

[70] Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete in Heeresgebiet B, First Lieutenant Theurer, October 7, 1942, PS 054 (hereafter referred to as PS 054).

[71] E.g., *Krakivs'ki Visti,* February 6, 1942, p. 2.

[72] PS 054.

[73] Opinion report for period June 12–July 14, 1942, Auslandbriefprüfstelle, Gruppe VIII, PS 302 (hereafter referred to as PS 302).

[74] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* September 22, 1942, p. 3.

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466
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church services and invitations by German authorities to theatrical performances at which all were arrested—were utilized. Force and brutal retaliation, such as burning of villages from which the potential workers ran away, were frequently applied.[75] The conscripts were sent a thousand miles to Germany in unheated cattle cars, sealed with barbed wire. Still worse, there was no just selection of those most suited for departure, no systematic registration.[76] Mothers of small children were sometimes taken; sons and husbands who were the only support of their families were conscripted without adequate provision for the families' maintenance.[77]

The horror of such treatment was perhaps the single most important cause of popular revulsion against the Germans. In addition to all its material hardships, the mere idea of forced transportation to a distant and unknown land recalled the generations-old terror of banishment to Siberia.[78] The extent of the program was so enormous that every family was touched; it became a universal evil. Of the total population of Kiev, thirty-eight thousand persons (over 10 percent) were delivered to the *Ostarbeiter* program within the first ten months of German occupation.[79] In the southern *Generalbezirke* somewhat smaller numbers appear to have been involved[80] but in the crucial *Bezirk* of Zhitomir, one hundred and seventy thousand (about 6 percent of the population) were taken by mid-1943, and thirty thousand more were to follow.[81] In all, as early as August, 1943, one out of every forty inhabitants of the Ukraine had been deported to Germany as forced laborers,[82] and by the end of the occupation the number of

[75] Auslandbriefprüfstelle, report for September 11–November 11, 1942, PS 018 (hereafter referred to as PS 018).

[76] Landesbauernführer Körner, Die neue deutsche Ukraine-Politik, PS 1198 (hereafter referred to as PS 1198).

[77] Occ E-4 (1); PS 054.

[78] Oral report of Generalkommissar Leyser (Zhitomir) to Rosenberg, June 17, 1943, PS 265 (hereafter referred to as PS 265).

[79] Commander of the SP and the SS, Kiev, to Commander of the SP and the SS, Ukraine, July 20, 1942, NO 1603 (hereafter referred to as NO 1603).

[80] Only about 1 percent from *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev by mid-1942 (Conference of Sauckel and Reichskommissariat officials in Kiev, August 12, 1942, NO 1606; hereafter referred to as NO 1606).

[81] PS 265.

[82] According to Sauckel, director of the *Ostarbeiter* program, at a Führer Conference, August 20, 1943, NO 1831 (hereafter referred to as NO 1831).

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Ukrainian workers in Germany totaled one and one-half million.[83]

The suffering caused by the actions of the Germans described above[1] did not directly affect the activity of the nationalist elements, as did their repressive attitude toward education, religion, culture, and local administration. Indirectly, however, it played an enormous part in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine during the German occupation. One effect was a general subordination of all thought, all activity, to the demands of self-preservation. The constant struggle to keep alive resulted in a reduction of the energy and attention which could be devoted to all political questions, including nationalism. On the other hand, the sheer impossibility of coming to terms with the German authority, regardless of how ready one might be to sacrifice all independence to do so, led many to seek a political movement which promised deliverance. A vast number, of course, turned back to Communism, hoping that the experience of near-defeat would lead to a modification of Moscow's policies. For others, however, the only rational solution appeared to be the nationalist parties. 668*

Weak as they were after the waves of suppressions during the six months from September, 1941, to February, 1942, the two OUN groups endeavored to meet this challenge. Of the two factions, the Bandera group appears to have made the easiest, but not the most thorough-going adjustment. Its ability to adjust at a rather shallow level was due to several factors. The members of the OUN-B were nearly all young, and their movement placed little emphasis on systematic ideology. When they went to the East Ukraine, they carried a large number of slogans and romantic pledges as baggage.[84] These either attracted or antagonized

[83] PS 1198.

[84] One of these oaths, as discovered by the German police, reads:

"On my honor, for the fame of the fallen heroes, for the holy blood spilled, for my Ukrainian earth and the majesty of my Ukrainian homeland, I swear that I will struggle with all my strength and with my life for a free and Ukrainian state. With my heart, my soul, and my whole being I confess that only the Ukrainian revolution can give power to the Ukrainian state and the people. Unto death I will stand on the battlefield in order to build a national Ukrainian State. No one and nothing at all can hold me back from the path of the Ukrainian national revolution, neither difficulties nor death. I will carry out every command of my leader. I swear on the Ukraine, that I will loyally and honestly carry out

[1] [See category 116, pp. 118-124 -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

874 that number of inhabitants, had 541 students in its medi-
727 cal school.[37] Medical institutes were also reopened in Stalino,
186 Dniepropetrovsk, and Vinnitsa, and perhaps in other cities, although it is doubtful if any of these were the centers of nationalist youth organization which the faculty in Kiev became under the leadership of the OUN-M.[38]

The educational structure described in the preceding paragraph was designed for adolescents or young adults, and thus could be used for direct propagation of nationalist concepts. It was, of course, partly for this reason that the Germans confined advanced training within such narrow limits. Even these restrictions were not the end of the difficulties faced in inculcating a nationalist type of education in those about to assume the role of citizens,
● [466] for the technical schools were frequently emptied of their students and faculty to meet the demands of the *Ostarbeiter* recruiters. The elementary schools were also drained of teachers by the *Ostarbeiter* program, and the pupils, though too young for forced labor, were decimated by famine and plague. If the task of building national consciousness had to be viewed as a long-term one, then the four-year elementary school offered a considerable field for cultivation.[39]

191 The problem confronting the nationalist leaders in education
727 was twofold: they had to ensure a basis for the development of an independent Ukraine by making certain that all instruction
872 was in the Ukrainian language, so that the rising generation
186 would be fully at home in this speech; and they had to replace the Communist ideology by a positive nationalist concept. The first task was relatively uncomplicated, though far from easy in practice. In line with their policy of encouraging the purely nonpolitical aspects of Ukrainian nationality, the Germans ordered all instruction to be in Ukrainian. The nationalist directors enthusiastically supported this rule, but it was sometimes difficult to enforce it, since even teachers who were themselves nationalist in sentiment were not always able to conduct classes in Ukrainian.[40]

[37] Occ E-4 (1); *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 10, 1942, p. 1.

[38] See Chapter V.

[39] In Kiev alone there were fifty elementary schools with 17,000 students (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2).

[40] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 4; M. Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki*

727 661 "The course of ruthless brutality in treating the inhabitants of the country by principles and methods used in past centuries against coloured slave peoples, and the fact sneering at every sound policy that the disregard of this nation found its expression not only in the treatment of the people but was expressed at every possible and impossible opportunity again and again and was in addition printed and published in pamphlets, is a proof of the complete lack of instinct in handling of foreign peoples, which, with regard to its consequences, cannot be called other than shocking and catastrophic".

Frauenfeld shows this 'policy with the blacksmith's hammer' which would not see the inevitable reaction of the Ukrainians on such barbarism:

"There must be a naivety bordering on narrow-mindedness to believe that in the 20th century a nation having a shocking tragic history but, however, having a historical past, even if it is of another breed than the German people, — undoubtedfully has certain qualities of race and character, will permit itself to be degraded and insulted permanently and will also delightedly place its working power and capacities at the service of the tyrant".

Frauenfeld quotes the words of the Reichskommissar Erich Koch, who during a journey from Rivne (Rovno) to Kiev said to his staff:

"If I should find a Ukrainian worthy to sit with me at one table I must shoot him".

Frauenfeld cites examples from the work of the German administration headed by Erich Koch: the closing of schools, theatres, libraries, inattentiveness to epidemics among the Ukrainians, deliberate furtherance of the dying out of the Ukrainian people. As Frauenfeld witnesses, his collegues were very satisfied with the spreading of epidemics in Ukraine: "The Ukrainian needs no physicians; if an epidemic breaks out, thousands and tens of thousands will perish".

● 466 727 661 For the needs of the German economy the German Nazi Government took working power from Ukraine. Frauenfeld writes about this:

"There was, for instance, the enlisting for work in Germany. That was carried out in a way that bears close comparison with the Bolshevik deportations to Siberia. From camps surrounded by barbed wire, from grated waggons to the encircling and searching of villages by surprise, and nocturnal levying in which people were taken in GPU manner out of their beds, the whole technique of the Arab slave hunters among the negroes of Africa in past centuries was used".

464 districts through the long winter has led to the crea-
[166] tion of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the
[563] country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel,
[511] Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful,
221 but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any
511 branch of industry. The State makes no effort to
565 regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

this class are often compelled to accept badly-paid 466
work in the towns, and both men and women have 511
often to make long and laborious journeys on foot in 565
search of employment.

A large class engaged in domestic industries, whether as masters or as servants, make a very poor living, frequently working very long hours under bad sanitary conditions.

In the coal and iron industries there are some concerns, 466
particularly those capitalized from abroad, which look well after their work-people, provide housing, secure good supplies of provisions at moderate prices, and take other measures to ameliorate labour conditions. In consequence, however, of works and mines being often situated on land rented on short-term leases, many employers cannot afford to lay out money on such objects, and conditions for labour are generally bad. So difficult is it to attract labour, that mine-owners have sometimes sought to secure convict labour from the Government.

The peculiar characteristic of labour in the Ukraine 166
is its mobility, which often occasions unexpected 464
crises. Superstition, epidemics of disease, and more obscure causes lead to vast movements of labourers from a district at very short notice.

The *artels*, which are labour organizations peculiar to 467
Russia, have an important influence on the supply and quality of certain labour. An *artel* is an association of workers, the general principles of which are: (1) all members must be actual workers; (2) all have equal rights in the organization; and (3) every member is responsible for the obligations contracted by the *artel*. The organization is usually non-capitalistic or has a very small capital.

In general there are two classes of *artels*, those of workers in producing trades and those of workers who provide service. The former are engaged in carpentering, cabinet-making, printing, linen-weaving, dairy-work, fishing, &c. The second group comprises stevedores, packers, customs agents, bank porters, com-

465 quality. For this the worker, if he does not spend any kopeks for food and housing, must work one and one-half months, and two months for the cheapest winter coat. Three colored shirts eat up a month's wages. For the same amount he could buy his wife three summer dresses of poor quality or three sets of underwear or three blouses. (129)

129. Statement of a German specialist in Kiyev.

Far too often the life of the Soviet Ukraine worker is exhausted in the struggle for his daily bread, for clothing and shelter, and yet before the war he was the best paid in Russia. Undoubtedly
345 the Bolsheviks have done a great deal of building,
•466 but they neglected the building of houses in favor
185 of the building of clubhouses and palaces for cultural purposes, veritable giant structures of cement and steel where in the evening the locksmiths and metal founders then assemble "in order to hear lectures on Shakespeare". "For in human history there is an urge that has never before been recognized in the great masses...for art and literature. The famous tractor brigade of the Pasha Angelin comes forth with songs, and the workers of the Khar'kov tractor factory organize their own opera. Hundreds of groups of worker and kolhosp newspapers flaunt poems, stories and essays written by forge and tractor workers."

He whose thoughts take flight on the wings of Pegasus will find his hands only mechanically at
433 work. Among the construction workers the "never-before recognized urge of the great masses...for art and literature" expresses itself in the following way, according to Pravda of July 16, 1937: "The brick production program for the year could only be 19 percent accomplished in the first five months of the year, and the two subsequent months have also brought no change. The construct-

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

695 Art. 91. In all courts of the Ukrainian SSR cases are heard in public, unless otherwise provided for by law, and the accused is guaranteed the right to be defended by counsel.

693 Art. 92. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

Art. 93. Supreme supervisory power to ensure the strict observance of the law by all Ministries and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by officials and citizens within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR generally, is exercised by the Procurator-General of the USSR directly and also through the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 94. The Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR is appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 95. Regional procurators are appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 96. Area, district and city procurators are appointed by the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR, subject to the approval of the Procurator-General of the USSR, for a term of five years.

Art. 97. The organs of the Procurator's Office perform their functions independently of any local organs whatsoever, being subordinate solely to the Procurator-General of the USSR.

Chapter VIII. Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens

641 Art. 98. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to work, that is, are
461 guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment.

Art. 99. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to rest and leisure.

The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the fixing of the working
[466] day for factory and office workers at eight hours and the reduction of the working day to seven or six hours for arduous trades and to four hours in workshops where conditions of work are exceptionally arduous; by the institution of annual vacations with full pay for factory and office workers; and by the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest-homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

641 Art. 100. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or disability.

This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance
657 of factory and office workers at State expense, free medical service for the working people, and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

871 Art. 101. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to education.

This right is ensured by universal compulsory elementary education;
641 by free education up to and including the seventh grade; by the system of State stipends to students who have distinguished themselves in higher educational establishments; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language; and by the organization in the factories, State farms and machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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work in the towns, and both men and women have 511
often to make long and laborious journeys on foot in 565
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In the coal and iron industries there are some concerns, 466
particularly those capitalized from abroad, which look well after their work-people, provide housing, secure good supplies of provisions at moderate prices, and take other measures to ameliorate labour conditions. In consequence, however, of works and mines being often situated on land rented on short-term leases, many employers cannot afford to lay out money on such objects, and conditions for labour are generally bad. So difficult is it to attract labour, that mine-owners have sometimes sought to secure convict labour from the Government.

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crises. Superstition, epidemics of disease, and more obscure causes lead to vast movements of labourers from a district at very short notice.

The *artels*, which are labour organizations peculiar to 467 ●
Russia, have an important influence on the supply and quality of certain labour. An *artel* is an association of workers, the general principles of which are: (1) all members must be actual workers; (2) all have equal rights in the organization; and (3) every member is responsible for the obligations contracted by the *artel*. The organization is usually non-capitalistic or has a very small capital.

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9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

467 missionaires, dock and wharf labourers, outdoor servants, &c. The members of *artels* in the second group always receive employment in preference to other workers, as their trustworthiness is guaranteed by the *artel*, and the fact of their membership is some guarantee that they are efficient.

The *artels* are democratic and useful institutions, and, in a country where promptness and trustworthiness are somewhat rare qualities, they play a most valuable part in giving a measure of confidence and security to both employers and workmen.

(2) Agriculture

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

243 The agricultural industry is the largest in the Ukraine, and employs the great majority of the [434] population. The black-soil region extends over most of the area, only the Governments of Kiev, Podolia, and Chernigov, and the borders of the Black Sea, lying [433] outside it. It follows that the suitability of the Ukraine [437] for cereals is equal to that of any part of the world, and its surplus crops form a considerable proportion of the world's food-supply.

243 The mean area under cultivation in the period 1901–5 433 was 52,000,000 acres, producing 20,700,000 tons annually. Of this total, 45,600,000 acres were under breadstuff crops, and produced 15,000,000 tons. For the year 1914, the figures were 56,300,000 acres, producing 23,000,000 tons. Of this 50,400,000 acres were under breadstuff crops, with a return of 15,900,000 tons.

243 *Rye* is the principal crop, and is produced on the 439 peasants' lands more largely than any other cereal. It is the staple breadstuff of the country, and the internal consumption absorbs a large part of the crop, a minor quantity only being exported. In some years the crop is not sufficient for the home demand, and the peasants have to use imported flour or substitutes.

Wheat is next in importance, and provides the largest surplus for export. It is mainly grown on

3: Mirchuk

Ukraine RD1

433, 311, 471, 438

[For location of mineral deposits and other raw materials and indications of their importance to the economy of Ukraine, see category 116, pp. 146-188. For location and productivity of various industries, see pp. 164-188.]

139 world export of grain; Ukraine played a leading part in the export of wheat, rye and barley (20.21 % and 25 % respectively of the world export).

The bulk of the exports did not go to Russia which drew its supplies from the Volga Basin and the East. Part went to White Ruthenia, Poland and the Baltic, if it was not ear-marked for Central and Western Europe. And Ukrainian cattle were not greatly in demand in the Russian market, which is one reason why cattle-rearing never developed very satisfactorily.

5. The preponderance of foreigners in industry

133 was partly due to Ukrainian concentration in agriculture. It
464 is quite true that, at the outset, Ukraine was not interested in mining and industry. On the other hand the Russians, by Nature less bound to the poorer soil on which they had settled, immigrated to mining and industrial areas of Ukraine. This produced dangerous national islands. The work done by Ukrainian laborers in the Donets area was better than in the Ural, even if it did not reach the standards of Central and Western Europe.

●471 In Ukraine industry foreigners predominated even more as investors of capital than as laborers, more capital coming from countries abroad than from Russia. Before World War I about 400 million roubles were invested in Dnipro Ukraine alone, where the value of mining and industrial products amounted to 170 million roubles. 95 % of the capital invested in heavy industry was of foreign origin; 80 % of the pig-iron produced in 1913 came from 10 concerns with French capital (out of a total of 16 in the Russia of those days); they represented an investment of more than 112 million roubles. Of the 103 million roubles of French capital invested in coal mines, 82 millions were accounted for by the Donets Basin. Ten of the 12 concerns run with Belgian capital were in Ukraine.

6. Ukraine's relations to Russia as a colony

439 find expression in the economy of Dnipro Ukraine where certain industries were neglected and deprived of funds in favor of Russian areas. And this is no result of a balance between an agrarian and an industrial country for it was not to the North and the East that agricultural produce was exported

316



Diagram 8.

Share of Ukraine in the world production of manganese ore (1896—1937)

327 quity are first-rate in Ukraine. Heavy industry in Ukraine
● 471 was characterised from the beginning by the capitalist features that predominated in European production: protective duties and state orders greatly furthered development without handicapping other industrial centers. Pig-iron in Ukraine gradually rose to 19 % of the amount produced in all Russia. In the period 1887—1899 fifteen blast furnaces were added to the two which had been in operation since 1872. In 1913, ten of these were in the coalfields of the Donets Basin, two in the ore areas at Kryvyj Rih and Kerch and five between them. 48 blast furnaces produced 62 000 t each per year, while the 66 blast furnaces of the Ural only produced 12 800 t each and the 14 in the Central Russian area 12 100 t each and even the 11 modern furnaces in Congress Poland produced only 37 500 t each.

The following features were characteristic for Ukraine in contrast to the industrial area of the Ural:

1) a tendency to large-scale production, 2) an inclination for mass production, 3) a striving for concentration in production,

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl



Production of pig iron in Ukraine (1870—1937: in million t).

so that fewer intermediate products were put on the market, 327
4) a tendency to form cartels or trusts, 5) much foreign capital, 471
6) a readier response to the influence of crises.

In 1887 pig-iron production in Ukraine amounted to 67 000 t 327
and exceeded the figures for its two weaker rivals and in 1896 (636 000 t) the figure for the Ural. In 1900 it supplied the half and in 1913 $^2/_3$ of the production in the whole of Russia and 4% of that in the world, coming fifth in the pig-iron areas. As a producer of steel, Ukraine came fifth with a total production of

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Trade

Domestic and Foreign Trade

● 471 It was characteristic of the Ukrainian territory that trade was largely in the hands of aliens. To counteract this an efficient system of co-operative organisations grew up and spread over other provinces than trade. This phenomenon will be treated later as an independent feature.

439 The foreign trade of Ukraine is of great importance for many other European countries. It must not be judged by conditions of recent years when trade between Ukraine and the rest of Europe has been depressed and any considerable trade in merchandise has only existed with the USSR. We must return to the time before the first World War if we wish to get a true picture of the natural possibilities of exchange of merchandise between Ukraine and the countries of Central and Western Europe, though we must also bear in mind the changes that have taken place in Ukrainian economy and in the entire position of world trade.

Balance and Trade before 1914

No exact balance of trade can be calculated for the Ukrainian national territory for the years before the first World War. Statistics were drawn up in Russia for Dnipro-Ukraine, but they only included 9 provinces, viz. Volynia, Kyiv, Podolia, Chernyhiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson, Tauria (the last three names were often combined as the "South Steppe" or "New Russia"). Parts of Ukrainian territory were omitted from these statistics, e. g. the Kholm district, districts in Podlakhia, in the province of Kursk and Voronesh etc., and the Ukrainian part of the Kuban area was quite isolated. So that

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

had been based. '"Liberal" tendencies began already in 1932 in the sense that *kolkhozniki* (individual members of the *Kolkhozy*) were allowed to keep their own cattle (Decree of 4 February 1932). Subsequently, in 1935, *kolkhozniki* were accorded the right to farm their own private allotments within the boundaries of the *Kolkhozy*. 474 423 656

These modifications in policy soon gave positive results. It is difficult to say whether the *Kolkhozy* have come to be accepted by the peasantry as the permanent basis of rural life. At the same time there can be no doubt that the grant of certain rights of private farming to the *kolkhozniki*, combined with a relatively free market, has tended to a notable improvement in the conditions of peasant life. In consequence food production throughout the whole country has again increased.

There are now four forms of farming in existence side by side in the Soviet countryside: 423

(*a*) *Sovkhozy* (State farms); 471

(*b*) Individual farms; 433

(*c*) *Kolkhozy* (Collective farms);

(*d*) Allotments belonging to the *kolkhozniki* within the area of the *Kolkhozy*.

The relative importance of these different types of farm can be judged from the areas allotted to each in the 'sowing plan' of 1936: *Sovkhozy* covered 16 million hectares; individual farms, 5 million; *Kolkhozy*, 108 million; *kolkhozniki* holdings, 8 million.

Obviously, the *Kolkhozy* constitute the most important source of agricultural production. On an estimated yield of 8·3 quintals per hectare, the *Kolkhoz* pays 1·7 quintals to the state in taxes; 3·3 to the governmental 'machine stations' which provide and maintain plant; the balance goes to the *kolkhozniki*. The *Kolkhozy*, with a sowing area of rather over 100 million hectares and a yield of 7 quintals per hectare, supply the state organizations with about 150 million quintals (approximately 15 million tons) surplus over the consumption of the rural population. This reckoning is, of course, purely theoretical, but, in 1934, when bread rations existed for the town population, the administration did distribute about 10 million tons of bread.

The importance of the *kolkhozniki* (who are allowed to cultivate from ¼ hectare to 1 hectare each) lies in the production of vegetables and fruit and, to a certain extent, of livestock. The Plan for 1937 estimated that individual farmers and *kolkhozniki* possessed 29 million head of cattle as compared with 4½ million owned by the *Kolkhozy* over their vastly greater acreage. The private farmers and

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

423 *kolkhozniki* were reckoned to be even richer in pigs, of which they
471 counted 15 million against 5 million on the *Kolkhozy* and an even
433 lesser number on the *Sovkhozy*. The tiny bits of land which belong to the *kolkhozniki* personally, as well as their domestic animals, have become a school of individual farming which has grown up in the middle of 'the Socialist experiment' as a compromise with the dictates of economics and human nature. In twenty-eight towns in 1938, 82 per cent rye flour, 74 per cent wheat flour, 86 per cent beef, 93 per cent milk, 97 per cent eggs, 87 per cent potatoes, and 72 per cent cabbages, were brought to market by *kolkhozniki* and individual farmers, and only the balance came from the state and collective farms. True the official statisticians could find comfort in the fact that as against the general balance of state commerce which amounted to 100 milliards of roubles the free market only absorbed 16 milliards: but the free market shows a definite tendency to grow and in four years has doubled its transactions.

656 The successful private initiative of the *kolkhozniki* has already
423 begun to weigh upon the minds of the protagonists of the integral Revolution. In the spring of 1938 a Government Decree proclaimed that 'abuses are observed on those allotments of land which are given over to *kolkhozniki* for the personal cultivation of kitchen-gardens or other domestic needs. These abuses consist in the fact that the allotments are sometimes not situated next to the habitations of the *kolkhozniki*, but lie in the middle of *Kolkhoz* lands and exceed the size allowed by the law. The worst part of it all is that these allotments have become the principal care of *kolkhozniki*, and that they show negligence in the accomplishment of their duties in collective farming. It has also been affirmed that these allotments are sometimes cultivated by people who are not members of *Kolkhozy*. A stop has to be put to this state of things as it leads to the development of bourgeois tendencies. The dangerous influence of *kulaki*, who have succeeded in escaping, is suspected.' As a result of this situation, Stalin, by a Decree of 15 August 1939, ordered a 'verification' of all allotments taken over by *kolkhozniki* for personal cultivation: he took the opportunity to recall the law which provided that such allotments were not to exceed ¼ or ½ a hectare. It was also declared that all allotments in isolated situations in the middle of *Kolkhoz* land were illegal and should be abolished: special attention was directed to *Kolkhozy* lying in the Ukraine and Western Russia. *Kolkhozniki*, whose individual allotments were to be abolished, were themselves to be expelled from their *Kolkhozy* and united in new *Kolkhozy* in regions where 'new land' could be found. For this purpose attention was directed to the lands beyond the Volga, in

CHAPTER THREE

The Period of Militant Communism

Any interpretation of the so-called period of Militant Communism which extended from the Soviet seizure of power to the spring of 1921 must rest upon the individual estimation of the sincerity and idealism of Lenin and his associates. If we assume that they had a real belief in the principles of Marxism as it developed into Communism, the period must seem one of disillusionment on the world, national and regional scale. If, on the other hand, the stress is to be laid upon their seizure and maintenance of power, the period becomes a further step in the total disintegration of society in the former Russian Empire and in the destruction of all those institutions and conceptions handed down from the past or developed by the democratic Ukrainian National Republic. 000

On the world scale it became almost immediately obvious that the world revolution as projected and preached by Lenin and Trotsky in 1918 was not going to occur in the immediate future. The failure of the Communists to secure control of Germany and the defeat of Bela Kun in Hungary reduced the Communist International from an association of revolutionary representatives of Communist nations and governments to a gathering of exiled and embittered conspirators totally dependent upon the will of the Russian Communists in the Kremlin. This, even had Lenin been sincere, would have inevitably inspired him with the idea of collecting the territory of the Russian Empire for his own advantage.

In the first heat of enthusiasm the Petrograd Soviet had confiscated all property, nationalized land and industry and embarked on a series of far-reaching changes. They thought of the land question in terms of the use of land by the village community and of 471

[After Soviet seizure of power -- Analyst]

● 471 industry and factories by the workers and they did their best to inflame the workers and peasants against the great landlords and the factory owners and administrators. In this they succeeded admirably and the already low standard of living in the Russian Empire began to drop lower and lower.

Under such conditions it became more and more necessary for the Soviet leaders in Moscow to make renewed efforts to master Ukraine and to inject some apparent vitality into their puppet, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. In this they were finally successful, but even though the Communists came back into Ukraine, they did not venture to destroy the fiction of Ukrainian independence, although they had no intention of allowing it to develop.

642 648 From the moment of its formation and adoption of a Communist Constitution on March 14, 1919, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic declared itself an independent and sovereign state. It was recognized with all due pomp and formality by Lenin, who again stressed it in his *Letters to the Workmen and Peasants of Ukraine* in his efforts to strengthen the opposition to Denikin. The Ukrainian Soviet Government was represented at the Conference in Riga that ended the Soviet-Polish War in the fall of 1920. The travesty was continued when, in December of the same year, Lenin concluded with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic a formal treaty of alliance in which Ukraine, for purposes of defense, graciously handed over to Moscow the commissariats of war, navy, foreign trade, railroads, finances, labor, posts and telegraphs and the Supreme Council of National Economy. It still retained the right to have its own diplomatic representatives in Poland, Germany and Austria, countries which had recognized the Ukrainian National Republic, and there were still preserved Ukrainian military schools to train officers for the Ukrainian army in both Kharkiv, the capital of Soviet Ukraine, and Kiev.

Still all this was merely a sham arrangement, for the bulk of the forces that fought against the Ukrainian National Republic were Russian and they operated with no regard for the feelings even of the Ukrainian Communists. They moved at will over Ukrainian territory, collected supplies at will and shipped them

Ukraine Under the Soviets

185 474 241 The peasants also revived and breathed new life into the co-operatives which had been broken up during the period of Militant Communism. In 1923 they established another cooperative organization, the Selo-Tekhnyka (Village Machines) which purchased more expensive agricultural machinery and rented it out to the peasants for the appropriate agricultural work. These points became the centre of mechanization and were in effect the first [453] tractor stations. In 1924 they established the First Agricultural Bank, a sort of private institution which at one time had more loans outstanding than had the Ukrainian State Bank which was, of course, closely supervised by Moscow.

185 369 All these efforts* met with marked success and agriculture speedily began to revive. The peasants became more prosperous and their holdings of livestock rapidly increased, although they did not reach the pre-war level. This, in its turn, created a new demand for manufactured products and restored the factories to operation, and with them the conditions in the cities began to improve.

185 471 [475] Similar concessions were made to industry, but with one important difference. The larger and more important industrial plants were not turned back to their former owners who were, as before, allowed no voice or influence in their direction. They were taken from the workers who had seized and abused them during the period of Militant Communism and placed under the supervision of government trusts. These were either regional in character or confined to a single branch of industry. In either case, they were under the control of a more or less trusted group of men among whom Communists were in the leading positions, but while they received certain credits from the state, they were more or less autonomous and they were allowed to go through regular commercial transactions and encouraged to show profits in their annual reports. There was thus again a source of encouragement both for the directors and the workers, and slowly but surely the level of industry began to rise.

The smaller plants were very often leased to individuals who were allowed to employ hired labor and the hope was given to these that their taxes would be at such a level that they, too, could

* [NEP attempts to restore peasant prosperity -- Analyst]

show profits. The very small shops and plants were in some cases 185
taken back by their former owners when they had survived and any 471
provisions about the use of hired labor were tacitly forgotten in the first flush of the New Economic Policy.

All of these measures were interpreted by the great mass of the Ukrainian people as a recognition of the validity of human experience. There were, of course, keen realists who gave full credence to the declarations of Lenin that the Soviets had never wavered in their objections and were using these concessions only as a means of reviving the life of the country and strengthening their own position. At first this did not seem to be true and it was only as conditions really settled down and a semblance of prosperity returned that it became possible to note the steadily increasing pressure which the government exerted.

In the same way the currency reforms were not without their 185
own influence. In 1923 the government introduced a new cur- 652
rency, the chervonets, which was ostensibly based on a gold stand- 435
ard, to take the place of the old depreciated paper. Nevertheless, the latter was allowed to circulate in the rural districts with the result that its value continued to fall and it became more and more difficult for the peasants to satisfy their needs for manufactured goods which were priced in the new currency. This produced the so-called "scissors," for with the restoration of industry, the value of manufactures continued to rise, while the prices of agricultural products continually fell.

The political system was still not clear.[1] The new regulations 642
were introduced in the Council of Commissars in Moscow and it 665
was emphatically stated that they were for the Russian Soviet 645
Federated Socialist Republic, but Ukraine and also the other Soviet Republics put into practice the same resolutions, often without any decree by the ostensibly independent government.

The key to this enigma lay in the nature of Communist discipline. In theory and on paper the Soviet regime was thoroughly democratic in the broad sense of the word. There was an elaborate scheme of elections to the village and the higher Soviets, and even though this was weighted very heavily to provide increased repre-

[1] [During NEW ECONOMIC POLICY -- Analyst]

CHAPTER NINE

The Five Year Plan

Lenin and the Communists had never made any concealment of the fact that the New Economic Policy was only a passing concession to put an end to the stagnation and demoralization which had resulted from the civil war and the period of Militant Communism. It was not the adoption of a definite plan for the future nor was it a sign of a growing rapprochement with capitalism or a gesture toward the rest of the world, as the partisans of the Soviets abroad tried to make it appear. [125] 656 471 661

With each step of the recovery of the economy of Ukraine and of the Soviet Union as a whole, unobstrusive steps were taken to remove the various concessions which had been made. Year by year, from about 1925, new regulations were introduced by the Commissariat of Finance, one of the All-Union Commissariats which had the definite object of suppressing not only the concessions but of tightening up the restrictions on individual life and preparing the way for socialism and communism. By one device or another, the Nepmen were broken. Now the government forbade the state trusts to sell to them as individual traders either raw materials or finished or semi-finished products. Agreements which had been freely made by the government were either suddenly cancelled or were perverted. Obviously false charges were brought against the various individuals and they were fined exorbitantly or they were arrested and deported. By the fall of 1927 the sector of private trade had been almost completely liquidated and the way was open for the central government to do what it would with the situation.

With the Nepmen disposed of, the way was open for a similar attack upon the wealthier classes of the peasants and those who

656 had profited by the operation of the Ukrainian land code which,
471 as we have seen, was less rigid than were the similar arrangements
661 in the RSFSR, where the land society was organized far more on
[427] the lines of a collective than it was in Ukraine. It was always possible to apply individually any of the laws against the leasing of land or the employment of hired help, for in both cases the provisions had been left vague and indefinite, so that the authorities could act whenever they so desired. As a matter of fact, as one of the first measures the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic reduced the period on which a lease could be made from thirteen to six years and thus it was easily possible to upset many of the calculations that had been made by the richer and more progressive landowners.

[435] At the same time the closing of the official markets rendered it possible for the government to force the peasants to dispose of their grain at the officially pegged prices which in the grain-growing districts were considerably lower than they were in the less fertile areas of the north. If this did not produce the desired results, it was equally possible to demand the grain tax in kind and to compel the peasants to turn over, free of charge and under the guise of payments, additional supplies. All these measures, which were introduced in many cases personally and not by districts, caused the peasants to feel themselves becoming steadily more impoverished and less able to resist the demands of the government.

631 On the other hand, the All-Union Commissariats which took
642 precedence over those in the individual Soviet republics and which were, in reality, staffed only by Russian Communists, effectively broke the power of the localities or of the republics to have any special voice in the management of their own affairs. This was, in its turn, skilfully explained by stressing the superior requirements of the Union which, on any closer analysis, turned out to be the interests of the Russian area. Thus, at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a Russian who was at the time the chief of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission remarked in an unambiguous manner: "It seems to me that we must assign perfectly clear tasks, to emphasize that the national

[1925, during relinquishment of NEP -- Analyst]

436 the more favored because the Soviets equated in value the Polish zloty and the Soviet karbovanets. When we take into consideration the fact that prior to the war a pound of meat in Poland cost four zloty and in the UkSSR twenty-five to thirty karbovantsy, the vast purchasing power of the Soviet officials can be seen. Then in December, to ruin the native population, they arbitrarily stopped the zloty as legal tender, so that the Ukrainian population lost everything, except those fortunate persons who had succeeded in exchanging their Polish money for German marks by clandestine trade across the border.

191 This swarm of officials was of various kinds. Those who were attached to fields like military affairs, the railroads, the posts and telegraphs, etc., i.e. those branches which were directly under the All-Union Commissariats, made no concealment of the fact that Russian was from now on to be the chief language. Other sections which were under the Commissariats in Kiev first adopted Ukrainian as their official tongue, but by the middle of 1940 they, too, had passed over to the use of Russian, exactly as had been done in all the offices in Kiev.

661 By the end of November,[1] when the supplies in the stores were
471 already becoming exhausted, the actual work of nationalization commenced. The former owners were often thrown out, if their establishments had been of any size, and as former wealthy individuals they were refused food tickets and other privileges on the ground that they belonged to the non-laboring element and were enemies of the people. This meant that they were compelled to sell upon the black market everything that they had been able to save or which they possessed and which had not been confiscated, and during the winter many of them, like the Polish landlowners and the police who fell into Communist hands, were deported under atrocious and inhuman conditions to Kazakhstan and Central Asia to disappear.

[665] On the other hand, the Soviets introduced at once the idea of dining halls for the workers and special stores for Communists and higher functionaries where they could secure easily and cheaply whatever there was to be obtained in Western Ukraine.

[1] [1939--Analyst]

At the same time the nationalization of the land was commenced 423
and this gave a good excuse for the elimination of another class 471
of formerly prosperous people, whether they were Poles or Ukrainians. At first this was carried out along the lines of the Ukrainian land code of 1922, for the authorities were eager to get crops in when spring came. Still, during the summer of 1940 they began to urge the formation of collective farms. The peasants in some of the more backward regions listened to these ideas willingly, but in the better areas where agriculture was on a far higher and more efficient plane than in large sections of eastern Ukraine, they were very cool and meetings had to be postponed again and again if disorders were to be averted in the middle of the war. Still the Soviet authorities felt that they could waste some time until a real peace was restored and their hands were definitely free.

In regard to the educational establishments and all questions 661
of organization, they acted without delay. In the first days of the 814
occupation, the Soviet commissars seized the property of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and prevented all further work by confiscating the building and its contents and preventing all further publications. On January 14, 1940, they forced the complete self-liquidation of the Society. The president, Prof. Rakovsky, at once fled to the west and during the next uncertain months a large part of the active members made their way to Krakow in the Polish Government General, where they endeavored to resume their work. The Society was then turned into a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR and was placed under the control of the administration in Kiev, while part of its collections and its work was placed under the University of Lviv, which was now ostensibly Ukrainianized and given the name of Ivan Franko, the great Western Ukrainian scholar and writer. This was not for long, for very soon here, too, the lecturers to win Soviet approval began to switch over from Ukrainian to Russian.

All other societies of every kind were abolished and fitted into 655
the Soviet scheme of things. The cooperative network, especially such great societies as the Maslosoyuz (Dairy Cooperative Society) and the People's Trade were made governmental organs. Various

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

496 From Bakhmach an alternative line runs via Bryansk to Moscow.

In a south-south-east direction a third line goes to Yelisavetgrad, Nikolaev, and Kherson.

A fourth line runs eastward to Poltava and Kharkov.

Lastly, a line in a south-west direction goes to Vinnitsa, whence a line runs westward to Proskurov and Kamenets Podolsk (with two short branches to the Galician frontier), and another line runs southward to Odessa.

2. From Kharkov a line runs northward to Byelgorod, Kursk, Orel, and Moscow.

Another goes in a south-east direction to the Donets coal and iron region, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-Don, and the Azov ports.

A third line goes east and north-east *via* Kupyansk to Voronezh and Tambov.

A fourth goes southward to Pavlograd and Yekaterinoslav.

3. From Yekaterinoslav a line runs in a north-west direction to Alexandria, Byelaya Tserkov, Fastov, and Kiev.

A line to the Donets coal and iron region goes eastward, with branches to the Azov ports, Berdyansk, Mariupol, and Taganrog.

Another line runs south to Alexandrovsk, Melitopol, and the Crimea.

None of the three great railway centres, however, is touched by a long new line which runs from Bakhmach in the Government of Chernigov, *via* Piryatin, Cherkassi, and Vosnesensk, to Odessa, thus giving to a badly-served district an outlet for its share of the cereal export trade.

A network of short lines serves the Donets coal region and the Krivoy-Rog iron region, with connexions to Yekaterinoslav and the ports.

●471 496 *Finance; Relations to Government.*—Five separate concerns are interested in the Ukraine railways—the South-Western Railway, the Southern Railway, the Yekaterininsky Railway, the Moscow–Kiev–Voronezh

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Railway, and the South-Eastern Railway. The first three belong to the State, and almost the whole of their mileage is in the Ukraine; the other two are privately owned, and some portion of their mileage is outside the Ukraine boundaries. 471 496

It is not possible to procure figures for the working of that proportion which is inside the limits of the Ukraine, and the figures for 1912, given below, are for the entire systems:

	Length of line. Miles.	*Gross receipts. Million roubles.*	*Nett receipts. Million roubles.*	*Weight carried. Million tons.*
South-Western Railway	2,604	73	30·4	15
Southern Railway	2,042	66	30·5	22
Yekaterininsky Railway	1,871	60	26·9	26
Moscow–Kiev–Voronezh Railway	1,652	37	16·2	10
South-Eastern Railway	2,168	55	24·6	11
Total	10,337	291	128·6	84

The Yekaterininsky line was constructed by the State; the Southern and South-Western lines were recently purchased from private owners.

The Moscow–Kiev–Voronezh Railway is a private concern with a share capital of £1,500,000. Debentures to the value of £35,000,000 have been issued at 4–4½ per cent. at different periods. The State has power to take over the line at any time on a basis agreed upon in the original concession. There is a State guarantee on the loan capital.

The South-Eastern Railway has only a portion of its line in the Ukraine, mainly in or near the Donets region. The share capital is about £3,000,000. Debentures and other loan capital amount to about £18,800,000. The State has power to purchase the line at short notice on terms fixed in the original concession. There is no State guarantee on the capital or loans. A number of lines in the Donets region,

496 formerly belonging to the South-Eastern Railway,
471 have been recently acquired by the State.

The money markets of Paris, London, and Amsterdam appear to be those principally interested in the loans of these railways; the financial circles of Berlin and Vienna are concerned in a lesser degree.

655 Up to the year 1889 railway rates in Russia were in
471 a state of chaos. The Government then took the matter in hand, and during the years 1893–4 inaugurated a system which, with modifications, has remained in use. The zone method is applied to both goods and passengers, with a diminishing rate for each additional zone entered by the traffic. Cereal rates received special consideration, and differential tariffs exist for the carriage to Black Sea and Azov ports of cereals destined for export. Preferential rates are also granted on coal, iron and manganese intended for export.

496 *Adequacy to Economic Needs: Possibilities of Expansion.*—Taken as a whole, the railways of the Ukraine are not adequate to the needs of the country. In the Donets region railway extension by private enterprise has kept fairly level with industrial needs, and new projects were recently being actively promoted. In the agricultural portion of the country, however, the lack of railways is a serious handicap to all kinds of industry. The greater portion of the mileage is single line, and the rolling stock is of poor capacity and not kept in good repair.

499 A number of lines are under construction in the Donets basin to link up existing ones or to serve new mines recently opened, and a new line is being constructed to connect Yekaterinoslav with Kherson and Nikolaev by a direct route.

000 A projected line is the Podolian Railway, which would run from Shepetovka to Kamenets Podolsk, a distance of 149 miles. By another project a railway running due north from Jitomir *via* Mosir and Mohilev to Vitebsk would give a direct main line between Petrograd and Odessa, which does not at present exist, a detour *via* Kiev being necessary.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The construction of light railways in agricultural districts would be of great benefit to the country, but no steps have as yet been taken towards this end.

(*d*) *Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones*

In organization the Russian postal system much resembles that of other European countries, but in extent it is considerably below the average standard. Rural districts are poorly served, although a special effort to improve their facilities has recently been made. Russia is a member of the Universal Postal Union.

Owing to delay and loss of ordinary correspondence, an immense quantity is sent by registered post, especially commercial correspondence, but also newspapers and periodicals.

Parcel post and the sending of goods 'cash on delivery' are in working, but the regulations as to packing, &c., are minute and very vexatious, though necessary to prevent theft in transit.

The facilities for transmitting money through the post are freely made use of, particularly by peasants working at a distance from their homes. In 1910 there were over 40,000,000 dispatches of this kind, their total value being upwards of £200,000,000.

Telegraphs.—Of the total length of telegraph wire for public use in Russia, more than one-third is owned by the private railway companies, the remainder by the postal department. Charges are low, but the service is moderate. Much use is made of 'urgent' telegrams at triple rates to ensure prompt and correct delivery.

Telephones.—The telephone system is fairly well developed in towns in the Ukraine. Private enterprise first entered the field, a company worked by the Bell Telephone Syndicate obtaining a concession for an installation at Odessa in 1895. Shortly afterwards the State established systems at Kiev, Kharkov, and other towns. Still later the *zemstvos* in certain districts interested themselves, and many systems

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

206 471 have been opened and worked under their auspices and control. The most notable development has been in the districts of Bakhmut (Government of Yekaterinoslav), Lebedyenski (Kharkov), and Lokhivitski (Poltava). Mariupol and district has communication with Bakhmut and other places on the Donets coalfield. Otherwise trunk communication is confined to a line connecting Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson.

The instruments of private telephone installations are usually of the Bell Co.'s make. The State and the *zemstvos* have generally installed instruments made by Ericsson, Stockholm.

(2) External

(*a*) *Ports*

504 *Accommodation.*—The Ukraine is not lacking in good natural ports on the Black Sea: Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson are capable of handling great quantities of traffic. On the Azov Sea, Berdyansk and Mariupol share the trade, but in their case purely artificial harbours have had to be constructed at great expense, as the coast has no natural harbour.

There are no tides, any variations of depth of water being caused by wind of great force or long persistence from one quarter.

Odessa is the most frequented port of the Russian Black Sea coast. There is a good depth of water in the bay, but it is much exposed to the two most dangerous winds which blow on the coast, viz. the south and the south-east. The outer harbour is formed by a mole known as the eastern mole, which has a curve to the eastward, and a detached breakwater 1,400 yds. in length parallel with the shore. The eastern entrance has 24–30 ft. of water, and the western 17 ft., and both have an entrance width of 300 yds. This outer harbour is safe from all winds, and gives commodious anchorage.

The inner harbour is formed by five moles which divide it into four parts. The two western moles

Apiculture is common in the northern Ukraine and vast quantities of honey are produced, but its quality suffers from the prevalent ignorance of scientific methods of bee-keeping, and it does not command a good price. 251

Disease among domestic animals causes great ravages. 252 Cattle-plague epidemics are of annual occurrence and cause heavy losses, the proportion of fatal cases being very high. The other most prevalent troubles appear to be anthrax, frounce in horses, and pneumo-enteritis amongst swine. The last disease has made great inroads of latter years, a large proportion of cases being fatal. The proportion of live-stock per 100 inhabitants shows decrease under almost every head, a slight increase in horses or pigs in some Governments by no means counterbalancing the all-round continuous shrinkage.

(*b*) *Land Tenure*[1] *and Methods of Cultivation*

As regards tenure, land in the Ukraine falls into three main classes: (1) land owned privately, mainly in large estates, but a small proportion in farm-holdings by successful peasants; (2) land termed *nadyel*, owned almost entirely by peasant communes; and (3) land owned by the Orthodox Church or the Crown, or granted as appanages to members of the Imperial family. The following table shows the total acreage, and the proportion belonging to each of these classes: 421 471

		Percentage of		
Government.	*Total area in millions of acres.*	*Private property.*	*Nadyel.*	*Church and Crown land, &c.*
Volhynia	15,484	48·9	39·8	11·3
Podolia	9,873	44·4	48·0	7·6
Chernigov	11,836	41·7	53·1	5·2
Kiev	12,484	45·2	45·6	9·2
Kherson	16,591	51·5	37·3	11·2
Poltava	11,331	45·1	52·3	2·6
Kharkov	12,141	35·8	59·2	5·0
Yekaterinoslav	15,041	50·4	45·4	4·2
Taurida	7,099	52·6	37·2	10·2
Total	111,880	Average 46·2	46·4	

[1] See also p. 50.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

(b) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

Organizations to promote trade in the Ukraine are not numerous. The true traders of the country are the native Jews, and to trace their involved dealings is impossible. 441

The sales of the coal and iron are almost wholly controlled by rings and cartels. The most powerful one, the *Prodamet*, or metal sales combine, controlled recently over 80 per cent. of all the iron and steel produced in South Russia and threatened to absorb the entire output. 477

The activities of the *zemstvos* in trade call for mention. These organs of local government actively enter into trade in agricultural machinery, improved seed, and pedigree live-stock, and endeavour to improve the facilities for selling the products of domestic industry. Their aim is to lift the internal commerce of the country from the condition of dependence on speculating middlemen, into which it has almost irretrievably fallen, but their achievements so far only touch the fringe of a deep-seated social trouble. 441 185

There are chambers of commerce at Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Berdyansk, and Mariupol, and there is a branch of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce at Odessa. Odessa, Nikolaev, and Yelisavetgrad have corn exchanges, and coal and iron exchanges exist at Kharkov. 441

(c) *Foreign Interests and Methods of Economic Penetration*

The present state of commerce in the Ukraine provides a wide field for economic penetration from abroad. Agriculture in its first stages is not much affected, but in one case, that of the production of sugar from beet, the secondary stages of manufacture have been much exploited by foreign capital and management. The coal and iron mining industries and the iron and steel manufacturing industries owe their foundation in great measure to foreigners, by whom they are still largely 471 432

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

471 managed and financed. Russia has not been able to
433 find capital for new projects, with the result that within the last twenty-five years numerous undertakings have been started with foreign money. Official lists show that the nation most largely interested is France, Belgium and Great Britain coming next. The fortunes of these enterprises have varied, but in general their success has not been great in proportion to the original capital.

453 The last quarter of a century has also seen the
491 foundation of a number of trading banks with Russian titles and boards of directors at least nominally Russian. Their resources, however, are largely provided and completely controlled from Germany. These institutions have admittedly acquired a controlling interest in most of the concerns above mentioned, often at a very moderate outlay, and have supplied additional loan capital at profitable rates of interest. One and the same bank has in many cases obtained control over every stage in the production of a manufactured article, from the winning of the raw material onward, of course drawing its profit from every undertaking concerned. Certain British concerns have held out and kept their shares in their own hands, but financial institutions governed by German capitalists have a preponderating hold on those industries of the Ukraine which are large enough to repay their attention—that is, on the coal, iron, and allied industries of the Donets, and the sugar industries of the Kiev district.

The foreign interests in the Ukraine lie principally in the industrial concerns above mentioned. British interests are not strong, and are chiefly represented by some collieries and ironworks at Alexandrovsk and the general properties of the New Russia Co., Ltd., at Hughesovka and elsewhere (cf. p. 86).

CONSTITUTION

(Fundamental Law)

of the

UKRAINIAN

SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLIC

of January 30, 1937

As amended through November 21, 1949

Chapter I. The Social Structure

642 Art. 1. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

Art. 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists, the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the liberation of the Ukrainian people from national oppression by Tsarism and by the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie and the defeat of the nationalist counter-revolution constitute the political foundation of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 3. In the Ukrainian SSR all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

471 Art. 4. The economic foundation of the Ukrainian SSR is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production established as the result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man.

Art. 5. Socialist property in the Ukrainian SSR exists either in the form of State property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property (the possession of collective farms or co-operative associations).

475 Art. 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, communications, large State-organized 421 agricultural enterprises (State farms, machine and tractor stations and the like), as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of houses in the cities and industrial localities, are State property, that is belong to the whole people.

474 Art. 7. The common enterprises of collective farms and co-operative organizations with their livestock and implements, and the products of the collective farms 421 and co-operative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of collective farms and co-operative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the common collective farm [472] enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small plot of household land and, as its personal property, a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements — in accordance with the regulations of the agricultural artel.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

423 474 Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

472 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Ukrainian SSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

185 471 Art. 11. The economic life of the Ukrainian SSR is determined and directed by the State National Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the independence of the socialist country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

461 Art. 12. In the Ukrainian SSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Ukrainian SSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Ukrainian SSR voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Ukrainian SSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hun-
241 garians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent
438 vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here
341 imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

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113, 175, 795, 474 Ukraine RD1

[For information pertaining to Soviet policies in the Western Ukraine, particularly in regard to the Uniate Church and collectivization, see 26: Anonymous, R1 Soviet Union, Cat. 116.]

162 porizha 244 %, Kryvyj Rih 156.6 %, Staline 170 %, Konstanty-
361 nivka 233 %, towns in the Right and Left Bank areas decreased.

The increase in urban population in the Ukraine Soviet Republic is most probably due to foreign immigration. Housing has become worse practically everywhere; it is difficult to imagine that the immigrants can continue to live permanently under such wretched conditions.

● 474 The rural population was composed almost entirely of members of colkhoses. They possessed almost the entire agricultural land in common, all agricultural machinery and draught animals and much of the other livestock. There remained for personal use only small plots round the cottages, the cottages themselves and a few head of cattle (no horses), pigs and poultry.

474 Every member had to work on the soil of the colkhose. His
465 wages were reckoned according to the number of days he had worked and these were calculated according to time and kind of work performed. The amount of grain left after fulfilling obligations to the state and payment for hire of machines and tractors, seed, cattle-breeding expenses, rate of amortisation etc. represented the wages. They were paid in kind and (a smaller proportion) in money. This meant that variations in harvest yield were almost exclusively expressed by what was left for wages. In the first years of the colkhose system, members often received 2-3 kg of grain for a day's work; as their energy was not fully utilised in the colkhose and as the members of the family who were unable to work had also to live from these meager earnings, famine arose in the early thirties in Ukraine, bringing a great increase in the death-rate. Later, wages are said to have been raised but the Soviet statistics do not show whether the wages listed (15 kg and more per day) applied to entire Ukraine or to individual colkhoses. The incomes of the various colkhose members also varied, as administrative jobs were better paid than work in fields and stables, and as several members revealed "propriety instincts" for extending or exploiting their own small share at the expense of the common property.

175 The Peace of Riga (May 18th, 1921) between Poland and
728 Russia allocated to the former Volynia, Polesya and the district of Kholm, formerly parts of the Russian Empire, while the Ambassadors' Council on March 14th, 1923 added Galicia to Poland's gains. In the Treaty of Riga both partners promised to respect the rights of their minorities while the Ambassadors' Council declared that Poland was to issue laws that would preserve Ukrainian rights and that this was why the Entente Powers relegated their supreme authority to Poland. In reality, throughout the period of Polish supremacy there was little or no attempt to satisfy Ukrainian claims. The Ukrainian Chairs, established at Lviv University by Austria, ceased to exist and the law providing for a Ukrainian university was never implemented. Ukrainian schools were slowly but surely replaced by others where Polish was used either in some or in all classes. Polish became the language of instruction in secondary and vocational schools. The Ukrainian language was not recognised legally either in the administration or in law courts and Ukrainian influence declined in all selfgovernment organisations. Poles colonised Ukrainian areas. A campaign of public opposition was opened against the Ukrainian church: hundreds of churches were shut, above all in the district round Kholm, and the buildings were frequently burned.

175 The reaction of the Ukrainian population was considerable.
871 In the field of education steps were takem to organise private Ukrainian schools; thus in 1934-35 there were 21 Ukrainian secondary schools, 5 continuation vocational schools — mostly in the towns. This is no mean accomplishment in view of the Polish resistance. Besides actual schooling. Ukrainian youth outside of the schools was organised. In 1938 in Galicia alone the Ukrainian Union for Adult Education had half a million members, 84 branches, 3208 reading rooms. 2065 theatrical societies and 1105 choirs (the Union was forbidden by Polish Law outside
175 of Galicia). Cooperative stores also served to support Ukrainian
● 474 interests. In 1935 there were incorporated in the Ukrainian Central Cooperative Organisation 3013 cooperative societies with a membership of 541 508. This organisation of economic self-help had also to struggle against bitter Polish resistance, as expressed in the military pacification of Galicia in 1930 or the

pogroms in the autumn of 1938 when Ukrainian economic establishments and their equipment in towns in Eastern Galicia were almost completely demolished by the Polish mob. The Ukrainians who had been incorporated in Roumania had lived undisturbed under the Austrian Empire. In Bucovina there were Ukrainian elementary and secondary schools and a Ukrainian Chair at Chernivtsi University. The Ukrainian language was recognised in administration and law. Under Roumanian supremacy these rights were all forfeited and replaced by a policy of deliberate denationalisation. The only thing that Ukraine achieved during this period was the introduction of Ukrainian as an optional subject in some elementary schools. Officials who were not Roumanian nationals were dismissed without notice.

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Ukrainian territory which belonged to the Czechoslovakian republic, so-called Carpathian Russia, although it was least significant in area and culture, enjoyed the greatest measure of freedom. It cannot, however, be said that Prague satisfied all the national claims of the Ukrainians.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

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Table 3. The Livestock in Ukraine (1912—1937) in Million of Head.

	1912	16	20	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	37
cattle	6,5	7,7	6,8	7,1	8,3	8,9	8,4	8,4	8,6	7,6	6,3	6,2	5,0	4,4	5,3	6,3	7,8
cows	2,6	3,1	3,7	3,7	3,7	3,9	3,9	3,9	4,0	3,9	3,5	3,4	2,7	2,4	2,5	2,6	3,5
horses	5,6	5,5	3,9	3,8	4,0	4,2	4,6	5,1	5,5	5,6	5,3	4,8	3,7	2,6	2,5	2,6	3,5
pigs	4,4	4,6	5,3	2,4	4,2	3,7	3,7	4,4	7,0	4,2	3,2	3,4	2,6	2,1	4,2	4,7	7,7
sheep	6,2	6,4	6,9	8,4	9,3	9,7	8,7	8,0	8,1	7,0	4,5	3,4	2,1	2,0	2,2	2,8	3,8

In 1912 the number of horses was disproportionately high, viz., 7 millions. With the increasing use of motors, this number was reduced which, from the point of view of economy, was perfectly justifiable. Pig breeding, on the other hand, tended to increase, particularly in the north-west and the Kuban area. In spite of that, there were before World War I only 7.1 million pigs in the country, i. e. 4 % of world stock.

Sheep breeding has declined as a result of intensive management and competition from overseas on the world wool market, above all in fine wools.

Dnipro Ukraine statistics for the year 1916 provide characteristic material for judging the general development as well as the present position. Except for horses which had stopped increasing even before 1908, the figures for 1916 were only temporarily reached in the last year before the series of Five Year Plans. Diagrams 1 and 2).

[474] Collectivisation measures by the Soviets were a great blow to cattle rearing in Ukraine. Rather than hand over cattle to the State for nothing, the peasants slaughtered their stocks wholesale; and, as a result of bad treatment, epidemics and poor feeding, the cattle stocks of collective enterprises greatly declined. In 1933 the number of cattle and horses was only half what it had been in 1928 and pigs and sheep less than a quarter, while the entire stock had been reduced to 2/5, or 38 %. It was only after the colkhose peasants were allowed to keep cattle of their own, that numbers began slowly to rise, though they did not reach the level of 1928.

In Western Ukraine the development of stock-keeping was much more favorable, but the number for the whole of Ukraine was below prewar level, except in the case of pigs.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Co-operative Organisations

The beginning of co-operative organisations in Dnipro-Ukraine and Western Ukraine date from the seventies and eighties of the 19th century. Foreign ideas and organisations supplied the model (especially English — Rochdale) e. g. the German foundations by Schulze — Delitzsch and Reiffeisen for credit co-operative societies. But they developed along other lines, their development being determined by legal and economic conditions which were nowhere the same — in the Russian Empire or Eastern Ukraine, in Austria-Hungary and the states which succeeded it and above all in Poland and therefore in Western Ukraine. In Dnipro-Ukraine the first co-operative society was founded in Kharkiv in 1866. The founder was M. Ballin, a landed proprietor and a man who was animated by co-operative ideals. He also wrote and was altogether a pioneer of the co-operative movement. Other co-operatives followed in the large towns but it was only after 1897 that general progress was marked when the statutes of a new co-operative society did not need to be approved by the Ministry of the Interior but only by the local governor. This is the time when Vasyl Domanytskyj, the Ukrainian champion of the co-operative movement wrote and worked. 474

Before World War I co-operative shops were the commonest co-operative organisation in Ukraine. Of the 6 510 co-operative organisations in existence on January 1, 1914. 1 075 (i. e. 47.2 %) were shops, while the 2 370 co-operative credit societies were only 36.4 % of the total. Dnipro-Ukraine had 31 of all the co-operative shops in pre-war Russia (10 080) while it had only 19 % of the co-operative credit societies (12 995) and an average of only 22 % of all co-operative organisations (29 060) 474 452

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDJ

474 The formation of unions was difficult and made little progress till 1917.

452 Credit co-operative societies began in Dnipro-Ukraine in 1868 when the first Savings and Credit Society was founded in the town of Hadyach. Two years later Halahan, a big landed proprietor, founded a second in the village of Sokyryntsi and also in the Poltava district. The development of the movement was checked by the restrictions of Russian legislation. The state offered its support through the State Bank which in 1895 opened a special department as an office for the "control of small credit institutes". But the support of the state was not particularly effective and the very bureaucratic methods of control were not adapted to further a genuine co-operative spirit.

By the end of the century 295 organisations for savings and credit had been founded. And then a new form of credit co-operative society appeared. The law of 1895 had permitted the foundation of credit co-operatives without a capital that had first been paid in by members. The basic capital was credited by the State bank and had to be paid back gradually. This mutual loan type of bank appealed to the poor rural population. In 1897 the first Mutual Loan Bank in the whole empire was opened in the village of Ivankivtsi, in the district of Poltava. During the first year of the war 70 % of the credit co-operatives in Eastern Ukraine were of this new type.

Productive co-operative organisations found in Dnipro-Ukraine a new form in agricultural concerns. Since the middle of the nineties they had been founded and promoted by M. Levytskyj, their indefatigable champion and organiser. Each of these co-operative societies was based on a contract, according to which the land of the members was managed in common and the produce divided among the members or their families.

It would be wrong to conclude that the Ukrainian rural population inclined either to communism or to the colkhose form of farming. These societies were formed for concrete purposes and after these were attained and the members — not without the support of the patrons — had enlarged their holdings, the societies were dissolved. Most of the 125 rural productive co-operative societies founded after 1902 scarcely

lasted 2—3 years. A co-operative organisation was also formed in particular when land was to be purchased. 474 452

From 1906 on many productive co-operative societies were also founded in towns and they lasted much longer. World War I was favorable to their development (army orders etc.).

Legislation and administrative authorities in imperial Russia were opposed to the formation of co-operative unions. In 1909 the first union of credit co-operative societies on Ukrainian territories was founded in Berdianske, and this was followed up to the Revolution of 1917 by a few unions, though there was no central organisation.

Co-operative organisations in Eastern Ukraine before World War I were characterised by difficulties of development, especially wherever there was an attempt to extend the scope beyond purely local needs and by the lack of generous legislation. Prominent among the circumstances of that time was the distrust of governing circles against all forms of co-operation, no matter in what nation. The national point of view was therefore disregarded; it was indeed impossible for a national Ukrainian policy of economy to develop under the Tsars. But it was evident soon after the outbreak of the Revolution that strong national powers were behind the co-operative movement. 474

The Revolution and political independence gave a tremendous impulse to the co-operative movement in Ukraine. National and co-operative forces were closely interwoven. Numerous men of the people came from the ranks of the co-operative organisation to take responsible offices in the state; the Ukrainian state, which could not look for support to any national capitalist vested interests. found effective help in the co-operative organisations. In 1917 the "Dniprosojus" was founded as the central body of the Ukrainian co-operative stores and on January 1, 1919, it counted 80 unions with 8 000 co-operative stores and 540 similar organisations (these figures increased later to 200 and 14 000 respectively). The central body operated productive plants of its own, fulfilled cultural functions etc.

The "Ukrainbank" also first saw light in 1917 and on January 1, 1919, it united more than 130 unions with several thousand

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDJ

●474 co-operative societies (in 1920 there were 175 unions). As the central body of the credit co-operative organisations, the Ukrainbank took over all paying and credit transactions, and for other co-operative organisations in Ukraine as well.

The "Central" was founded in January 1918 and formed the central organisation of the Ukrainian agricultural co-operative societies. Its functions were to assure the supply of agricultural machinery and other necessary commodities, and, on the other hand, to organise the sale of agricultural produce and to increase agricultural production.

Besides these three most powerful central organisations, there were a number of special unions, the agricultural society for culture "Silskyj Hospodar", a central co-operative publishing concern etc.

In April 1919 the co-operative organisations could be summed up as follows: 7 central organisations, 120 unions of co-operative stores, 43 unions of credit co-operative societies, 7 of agricultural societies, 41 of mixed co-operative societies and 42 of other societies. In 1930 the 100 unions comprising approximately 40 000 co-operative societies and millions of members were finally dissolved, after having been re-organised on lines that were contrary to co-operative ideas.

In the Soviet state no real system of co-operation could exist and the movement soon declined. If any organisation still called itself a co-operative, it was in reality a state distribution agency without the slightest claim to independent activity and the spirit of co-operation. It would be wrong, too, to assume the existence of co-operative principles in collective managements.

In form, indeed, these ranked as "Artjel", that is to say as co-operative organisations. But they were communities formed by force, under the strict control of authorities, whose administration was equally rigid, but without the slightest trace of the spirit of co-operation.

A national system of economy could not stand up against a strongly centralised authority of state that was hostile to nationalities. In the last decades of imperial Russia, however, the national system found articulate expression and it received

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

a great impetus in the years of revolution and political independence. Under the Soviets it became an anomaly and perished not as a result of national competition or of a struggle with the economic forces of other nations but as the victim of a political power that is hostile to all popular movements, and that excluded all national or even co-operative independence. 474

The development of co-operative organisations in Galicia was most interesting from the point of view of national economy. The co-operative organisations in the main area of Western Ukraine which was poorer in national resources and agricultural production, as well as being smaller, were fewer and weaker than in Dnipro-Ukraine. And yet we cannot help remarking the priority of a national economy in purely co-operative ideas.

The Empire of Austria-Hungary was favorable towards the idea of co-operations so that these organisations had not, as in Russia, to fight for their development. And the state exercised no control. In Galicia the apparatus of local government was in the hand of the Poles. But they could not directly suppress Ukrainian economic organisations, even if they hampered their growth. Neither did post-war Poland adopt any positive attitude to co-operative organisations on principle. So Polish measures against Ukrainian co-operative societies were dictated by nationalism, though the state shrank from carrying them out to their logical conclusion, probably out of consideration for international opinion.

An atmosphere of national quarrels and strife against a stronger opponent was therefore characteristic for Ukrainian economic effort in Galicia; this opponent had indeed state authority but was not so overwhelmingly powerful as to hold up the Ukrainian economic and co-operative movement.

The poverty of the peasant population could be relieved only by disinterested activity on the part of educated circles and by the organisation of even the most modest economic forces; big estates and natural wealth were both in the hands of for-

474 eigners. Circles round the "Prosvita", a society concerned with the culture and education of the people and later also with economics, were mainly responsible for the work of spreading economic ideas and forming organisations. This activity increased in intensity after the first national meeting of the Ukrainians in Lviv (1880).

After conducting a public campaign the "Prosvita" proceeded to further and found credit societies, grain silos, stores and trading societies. It also functioned through travelling teachers and courses, it granted bursaries for the study of economics abroad, founded vocational schools, experimental farms etc.

But amalgamation in a universal organisation at that time had also disadvantages for economic development. And as organisations the economic societies were not the most suitable. It was only when co-operative societies were founded that national economic efforts found their final and best form of organisation.

462 Individual credit co-operative societies appeared as early as
474 1873, when the "Vira", the first credit co-operative society, was established in Tysmenytsia (it still exists to-day); but the growth of a sound system was not assured till the central body was organised in Lviv in 1898. At the end of 1911 this union comprised 320 credit co-operative societies, while about 100 were not members of the union. The local government erected an organisation which comprised 723 loan banks, 184 of which were Ukrainian. But this organisation was developed along Polish lines and was never of great significance for the development of a Ukrainian economic system.

It was typical for this "classical home of usury" in the years before the war that the credit co-operative societies far exceeded all other such organisations. After the first World War the central body founded in Lviv in 1898 was called "Centrobank" But credit co-operative organisations had to yield their priority of place to agricultural trading or productive co-operative organisations.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Co-operative stores grew slowly in the towns where there were few Ukrainians. The powerful co-operative founded in Lviv in 1883, the "Narodna Torhovla" assumed the functions of a central organisation in 1907, for all stores. After the first World War, however, it concentrated more and more on the towns and on certain merchandise. Co-operative dairies go back to the local units erected by the "Prosvita". In 1905 a union of dairy co-operatives was organised in Stryj. After the first World War the "Maslosojuz" flourished and became a model, not only of co-operative but also of national economic management. It was far superior to the Polish unions with their large subsidies and even exported butter. 474

Agricultural co-operative societies were amalgamated in the union "Silskyj Hospodar" which was transformed in 1909 in Lviv from the former union for commerce and trade in Peremyshl (1899). After the first World War the re-organised union, under the name of "Centrosojuz" received fresh life and supplied village and district co-operatives, partly with the products of their own co-operative industrial societies, organising the sale and the purchase of grain, cattle, bacon, poultry and especially of eggs, partly exporting them. Its turnover increased in 4 years from 1933—37 by almost 300 %.

Other co-operative societies include above all the insurance society "Dnister" (1891) in Lviv (since 1895 also a co-operative bank). The co-operative bank for trade and industry, the "Prombank" is also worthy of mention. It owed its foundation to the first meeting of Ukrainian engineers (Lviv 1932) and its development was promising. Ukrainian co-operative societies in Galicia are united, both as regards practice and theory, in the "Revision Union of Ukrainian Co-operative Societies". It was founded in accordance with the special Austrian Law of 1903 dealing with co-operative societies (the general law having been passed in 1873) in the next year in Lviv and in 1911 comprised 511 co-operative societies. After the first World War it extended its scope to Volynia, Polesya, Podlakhia and the Kholm district. But these areas as well as the Galician country of the Lemky were withdrawn from it in 1932 and attached to Polish unions.

474 Ukrainian co-operatives in Galicia in 1938 were as follows: Credit co-operatives: 688 (20 % of the entire number, in 1911 60 %), Co-operative stores 126 (not quite 4 %);

Purely dairy co-operatives 143 (more than 4 %), to which, however, must be added the agricultural co-operatives with dairy departments (119 in 1937).

Agricultural co-operatives 2350 (68 %).
Others 16.

Co-operatives of first rank 3423, of second and third (unions) 32.
Members in 1937 = 643 000.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

665 178 191 were to be modernized, and the construction of the great power station of Dnieprostroy was in view. Thousands of engineers, technicians and specialized workers were being sent into the Ukraine and these people not only had no knowledge of the Ukrainian dialect but they found that dialect most inappropriate for correspondence between different Government departments on complicated technical questions. The intensified industrialization of the Ukraine was obviously destined to strengthen greatly all connections with the north and linguistic differences gave promise of frequent and annoying difficulties. Very soon the Ukrainian language came only to be used in the sphere of 'cultural relations'.

Meanwhile Kaganovich, in surveying the various aspects of 'ukrainization', began gradually to investigate the part played in different branches of the administration by 'Ukrainian nationalists' or those suspected of being such.

§ 7. 'THE REVOLUTION AGAINST THE PEASANTS': REPRESSION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

665 423 In 1929 the Communist Revolution was approaching its second and decisive stage: Marxist principles which had conquered the life of the cities were to be imposed on the countryside. But the process of 'collectivizing' agriculture was to prove even more difficult in the Ukraine than it was in the provinces of Great Russia. Individual property in land had always been traditional in the Ukraine, and the background of the social history of the country had been the unending struggle of the peasantry to maintain their right to own the land they worked—against Polish landlords and Cossack and, later, Great Russian landlords. The strength of the Ukrainian peasantry had always been their stubborn determination that each should own his plot of land, and their weakness had been a love of individual freedom degenerating often enough into libertarian anarchy.

423 474 The outlook of the Ukrainian peasant differed widely from that of the Great Russian. The *obshchina*—the old Russian form of possessing (but not of working) land collectively—was unknown in the regions of Chernigov and Poltava and in all right-bank Ukraine. The creation of *kolkhozy* (collective farms) was from the beginning opposed, generally passively and sometimes actively, by the peasantry. And Kaganovich hastened, so soon as peasant opposition developed, to deprive the Ukrainians of the weapon which the national idea might provide. (In Caucasia and Turkestan, during the same period, opposition to collectivization was combined with a renascence and strengthening of local nationalist movements directed

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against the Great Russian hegemony.) The Ukrainian enthusiasts of 423
'cultural acheivements' so recently lauded by Kaganovich himself 474
were now accused of 'maintaining relations with nationalist political organizations in Galicia'. And it was not difficult to prove their connections with open or secret organizations 'suffering under the yoke of Poland'. The existence of such connections had been tolerated and even favoured by the Soviet administration to the extent which they furthered Communist propagandist activities in Poland, but there could be no difficulty, if necessary, in treating them as treason.

In 1930 the first Ukrainian political trial took place in Kharkov. 668
A group of individuals were accused of having relations with 'the 674
Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'—the same organization 661
which had been created before the war under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian Government and which was now supposed to be functioning in Galicia. In the following year, as a result of the growing resistance of the peasants to collectivization, action against Ukrainian 'suspects' became more violent. The peasants were bitterly opposed to the *kolkhozy*, but certainly not on 'national' grounds. Faced with the imminent danger of a peasant revolt, the Soviet administration decided to eliminate all persons who through their origins could be considered to be connected with the peasantry and who might organize this revolt and become its leaders. Regardless of their loyalty to the Soviet régime during the preceding years, there now began a systematic destruction of Ukrainians belonging to the 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'.

In 1931 the Bolsheviks professed to have 'discovered' a Ukrainian 661
organization called 'the National Centre'. Holubovich (former 687
head of the *Rada* Government and participator in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations), Shershel, Mazurenko and other 'ex-politicians' were accused of being the leaders of this secret organization. They were shot. Thousands of arrests followed, the victims of which suffered execution or exile to labour camps which were themselves living cemeteries. Two years later, in 1933, the political police (G.P.U.) declared that they had discovered a real military conspiracy on the part of 'a secret military organization'. After a theatrical trial, Kotsubinsky (Vice-President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars), Kovnar (Commissar for Agriculture), and scores of other persons who had all occupied important posts in the army or the administration were shot. One of the most prominent figures in Ukrainian political life, who from the beginning had associated himself with the Communist Revolution and who had for a long time been an influential member of the Council of People's Com-

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the second was to crush the will of the peasantry. In the first he succeeded as best he could and added to the sensational trials of 1931–3 the discovery of 'a secret Ukrainian organization' which was accused of being in direct touch with the Ukrainian separatists who were working abroad under the leadership of Colonel Konovalets. It was, however, beyond the strength of Postyshev to cope with the chaos which reigned in rural Ukraine during the years 1932–4 as a result of the policy of forced collectivization. Despite the fact that Postyshev 'eliminated' from the Ukrainian Communist Party over a quarter of its total strength, and in spite of thousands of arrests and hundreds of executions, the Party Secretary was accused of 'weakness and lack of energy' and was replaced by a certain Kossior. The late 'dictator' was, after a lapse of time, himself arrested and probably shot together with many of his closest collaborators.

But all the cruel personal dramas which took place under the Secretaryships of Postyshev and Kossior were as nothing compared to the terrible miseries which overtook the Ukrainian countryside during the five years 1930–35 as a result of the introduction of the *kolkhozy*. In their very essence *kolkhozy* were organically opposed to all the traditions and ways of life of the Ukrainian peasantry. Collective farming on a large scale was carried through at the cost of ruining small and 'average' peasant farms through the instrument of the ruthless pressure of the administration. The very rapid development of 'the *kolkhoz* movement' so much admired by Communists all the world over was the result, not of the peasants voluntarily joining the collective farms, but of their being driven on to them often by the use of military force—a fact which Stalin himself acknowledged in his article 'Head-turning from Success' (*Pravda*, 2 March 1930). The immediate consequence of the *kolkhoz* policy was seen in the lowering of agricultural production throughout the whole country which quickly led to the increasing misery of the peasantry, famine and terrible mortality. One of the principal reasons of all this was the *mania grandiosa* which always characterizes the policy of extreme ideologues; having become convinced of the low productive capacity of the smaller *kolkhozy* already set up, the enthusiasts of the Communist Party, in 1930, demanded their enlargement on a 'gigantic' scale. According to the reliable testimony of a member of the Communist Party (the Ukrainian agronomist Mirkevich, the initiator of tractor stations) 'this measure, in a series of regions, was realized in an exceptionally bureaucratic and senseless manner. *Kolkhozy* of 55–100 hectares were suddenly transformed, without any adequate technical preparation, into

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●474 661 423 *kolkhozy* covering some tens of thousands of hectares; as, for instance, the *Kolkhoz* of "Chervony Perekop" in the Government of Kherson which was set up to comprise 50,000 hectares. In some cases, "to simplify matters", a whole region containing hundreds of villages was declared to constitute one *kolkhoz*. All the boundaries between village lands were abolished; then the whole expanse of land arbitrarily included in the *kolkhoz* was divided into farms of several thousand hectares each—without any regard as to where the villages actually lay. Cattle and agricultural machinery were scattered about over scores of kilometres' (*Pravda*, 3 April 1930).

Nevertheless Stalin declared that: 'The time has come to finish with every kind of camouflage: we must destroy the *kulaks* and deprive them of the possibility to work on the land.' At that moment anyone who owned three cows or the equivalent in sheep, pigs, or even chickens, was considered to be a *kulak*. As a result of this policy it was not long before all the larger and more prosperous peasant farms were destroyed. These farms, since the disappearance of the large private estates, had been the principal producers of the agricultural surplus, since it was only the better-off farmers who had a surplus in excess of their needs for disposal in the towns.

474 661 423 668 As early as 1930 the policy of forced collectivization provoked open resistance in the Ukraine, and attempts were made at armed revolt; but geographical conditions did not favour the type of guerilla warfare which was undertaken with considerable determination and success by the peasants in Georgia, and particularly in the Armenian district of Karabagh and by the Tartars of the Daghestan foothills. These agrarian risings in the Ukraine were suppressed with the greatest cruelty and were followed by mass executions and by the transportation of tens of thousands of peasants. The Soviets applied methods which were then almost new in their struggle with the Ukrainian peasantry; they put them into concentration camps where they had to do forced labour. In the region of Odessa, near Tiraspol, a large and prosperous colony of 'Old Believers' completely disappeared. All the men, with the exception of a few youngsters who managed to cross the Dniestr into Bessarabia, were transported, and the women and children simply scattered over the steppe. The construction of the White Sea Canal, so much advertised by the admirers of Soviet methods in Western Europe, cost the lives of many tens of thousands of peasants, as the vast cemeteries along the banks of the northern lakes and rivers bear witness.

Very often the prospect of transportation to the far north or to Siberia caused the peasants, as in old time, to abandon everything

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and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign correspondent who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

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311 and the Middle East have been left in suspense, a territory the size of
648 Europe and new routes into the heart of China and ultimately to the Pacific have been brought under Soviet control. Under these circumstances 'the wheat-fields of the Ukraine' receded again into the background and became of only local importance: the more so since, in the two Soviet 'Economic Plans', interest in South-Eastern Russia has been concentrated on the industrial development of the New Russian region. These conditions are illustrated by the growth of industrial centres like Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Lugansk, Zaporozhie, and the decline of the great grain port of Odessa.

311 The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine has never in fact justified the enthusiasm which it has inspired from the time of the seventeenth-century Polish poet quoted in an earlier context to the more recent period of Herr Hitler and his apostles of *Lebensraum*. The natural conditions of the Ukraine are such that they really generously reward agricultural labour, but they exact always patient, strenuous and systematic toil.

Natural conditions differ greatly over the expanse of the country which Michael Dragomanov considered to constitute 'Greater Ukraine'. The agricultural 'age' of these territories differs in the extreme. In New Russia agriculture is only a century old, while Galicia has supported a numerous population of husbandmen for nearly a thousand years.

162 *Galicia* is one of the oldest agricultural lands of all Europe and
134 conditions there have hardly altered since the days of Daniel and his
311 *boyars*. The Galician earth, black in the eastern part, is tired old soil, impoverished by incessant labour, itself prompted and intensified by
167 the ever-growing care of an ever-growing population to acquire its daily bread. Owing to the density of the population (110, and in some regions 132, inhabitants to the square kilometre) the area of holdings had been reduced to a minimum: 46 per cent of the farms comprise 2 hectares of land and sometimes less; 37 per cent comprise from 2 to 5 hectares. In a countryside where urban life has remained relatively stagnant live 75 per cent of the total population; while all commerce and crafts remain in the hands of the Jews in the large towns and in many of the villages, there is a 50 per cent surplus of hands among agricultural labourers. The peasants, Poles and Ukrainians alike, used to migrate to Germany and France as casual labour; before the last war they emigrated also in large numbers to Canada and the United States.

• 474 These arduous conditions of peasant life gradually developed a capacity for organization. Driven by necessity, the Galician peasantry set up a network of co-operatives for production and

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distribution. These co-operatives formed the basis of a certain national unity which found expression in the political field. 474

Volhynia, partitioned after the war of 1920 between the Poles and the Soviets, is nearly as old an agricultural country as Galicia. Here the strips of rich black earth alternate with sandy and wooded country. Although density of population is not so great as in Galicia, poverty is perhaps even greater, owing to a lack of that capacity for organization which helps the Galician labourers to survive. The large estates of the Polish nobility have long disappeared; after the last war the Polish Government divided up the land. Numerous strips were allotted to Polish soldiers on the expiration of their service—with the intention of strengthening the Polish ethnic and cultural element in the region. The disappearance of the large estates, as in Transylvania and Roumania, had a deleterious effect on agricultural production and on the proper exploitation of the forests. The majority of the people lead a half-starved existence, and the young men dream of emigration to South America. In 1937, 25 per cent of the population of Polish Volhynia had neither bread nor wood. 311 134 241 735

Podolia has been a land of cultivation since the Middle Ages, although the soil was broken up two or three hundred years later than in Galicia and Volhynia. Now, as before the period of war and revolution (1914–20), Podolia remains in a close economic relationship to the other parts of the Ukraine. The black earth of this favoured province is really fruitful and well watered by numerous small rivers; climatic conditions are better than anywhere throughout the Ukraine—rain is plentiful and regular and the winters are short. It was probably the fields and pastures, the hillocks and woods of Podolia which the Polish poet had in mind when he wrote lyrically of 'the birthplace of Ceres and Diana'. Horticulture and apiculture have long flourished there. 311 134

In the past social conditions varied with the political situation according to whether the small landowners (Ukrainian Cossacks) or the Polish landlords were in the ascendant. During the eighteenth century Polish elements had the upper hand and for some time Podolia remained the last refuge of the Polish aristocracy. Polish social influences survived the Three Partitions, and it was only after the Polish Insurrection of 1830 that conditions began to change in favour of the Russian majority in the population. 177

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century this rich land with its soft climate had become very densely populated. By the end of the century Podolia ranked second in density of population of all the regions of the Russian Empire. The Government of Moscow took 162 311

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§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revolution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

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423 1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political
661 and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding
565 chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the
● 474 redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution
[433] against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable: during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to
475 the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the
474 new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—
661 including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

474 As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really
423 serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the
656 Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32, and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

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had been based. '"Liberal" tendencies began already in 1932 in the sense that *kolkhozniki* (individual members of the *Kolkhozy*) were allowed to keep their own cattle (Decree of 4 February 1932). Subsequently, in 1935, *kolkhozniki* were accorded the right to farm their own private allotments within the boundaries of the *Kolkhozy*.

These modifications in policy soon gave positive results. It is difficult to say whether the *Kolkhozy* have come to be accepted by the peasantry as the permanent basis of rural life. At the same time there can be no doubt that the grant of certain rights of private farming to the *kolkhozniki*, combined with a relatively free market, has tended to a notable improvement in the conditions of peasant life. In consequence food production throughout the whole country has again increased.

There are now four forms of farming in existence side by side in the Soviet countryside:

(*a*) *Sovkhozy* (State farms);
(*b*) Individual farms;
(*c*) *Kolkhozy* (Collective farms);
(*d*) Allotments belonging to the *kolkhozniki* within the area of the *Kolkhozy*.

The relative importance of these different types of farm can be judged from the areas allotted to each in the 'sowing plan' of 1936: *Sovkhozy* covered 16 million hectares; individual farms, 5 million; *Kolkhozy*, 108 million; *kolkhozniki* holdings, 8 million.

Obviously, the *Kolkhozy* constitute the most important source of agricultural production. On an estimated yield of 8·3 quintals per hectare, the *Kolkhoz* pays 1·7 quintals to the state in taxes; 3·3 to the governmental 'machine stations' which provide and maintain plant; the balance goes to the *kolkhozniki*. The *Kolkhozy*, with a sowing area of rather over 100 million hectares and a yield of 7 quintals per hectare, supply the state organizations with about 150 million quintals (approximately 15 million tons) surplus over the consumption of the rural population. This reckoning is, of course, purely theoretical, but, in 1934, when bread rations existed for the town population, the administration did distribute about 10 million tons of bread.

The importance of the *kolkhozniki* (who are allowed to cultivate from ¼ hectare to 1 hectare each) lies in the production of vegetables and fruit and, to a certain extent, of livestock. The Plan for 1937 estimated that individual farmers and *kolkhozniki* possessed 29 million head of cattle as compared with 4½ million owned by the *Kolkhozy* over their vastly greater acreage. The private farmers and

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It is important to ascertain the number of Ukrainians who remain in the territory of S.S.R. Ukraine. According to Soviet statistics the urban population, amounting to 8,000,000, numbers only 30 per cent of Ukrainians. Among the rural population Ukrainians are in a majority, though they are not everywhere equally distributed: in some regions there are over 80 per cent; in others (like Odessa) 60 per cent; in the Doners rural areas a little over 50 per cent. In 1926, during the period of 'ukrainization' encouraged by the Government, 24,000,000 out of 30,000,000 registered as Ukrainians, but even 15 per cent of these 'native' Ukrainians gave their mother tongue as Russian. Since that date catastrophes have befallen the rural folk of the Ukraine: about 3,000,000 are reckoned to have perished during the famine of the early thirties, and another 2,000,000 certainly have migrated as a result of conditions which they found intolerable. These losses have not been wholly replaced by natural increase, and there is every reason to think that the number of 'native' Ukrainians in the rural population of the Republic has decreased since 1930 by at least 4,000,000. If at that time the number of persons speaking Ukrainian and considering themselves to be Ukrainians amounted to 20,000,000, there can scarcely be more than 16,000,000 peasants left now. If to these are added the number of Ukrainians living in the towns, the total probably amounts to about 18,000,000. In other words, the Ukrainian population of Soviet Ukraine (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia) amounted to little more than half of the total population. 161 369

This figure is eloquent: the Soviet Government has gone a long way to achieve the result towards which its policy was directed, and in the Ukrainian S.S.R. Ukrainians can no longer be considered to be in a great majority. It follows therefore that nearly half the population (16,000,000 to 17,000,000) are not Ukrainians. Among these alien elements a little less than 2,000,000 are Jews; about 1,000,000 are Moldavians; another million belong to different nationalities—White Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans. The remaining 12,000,000 to 13,000,000 consist either of people born in the Ukraine who do not wish to consider themselves Ukrainians or of 'new-comers' from other parts of the Union. The number of these 'new-comers' must amount to 8,000,000 to 9,000,000.

It is notable that in the last years (since 1930) the Government has used every means to encourage the settlement of these 'new-comers' not only in the industrial areas but also in the purely rural districts. It is obvious that Moscow does not desire vast rural areas with an entirely homogeneous Ukrainian population. The Government prefers groups of *Kolkhozy* on Ukrainian territory to be constituted on the mosaic principle. Each year, from all the Military Districts of the Soviet Union, soldiers who have finished their military service and who have sent in petitions that on account of lack of land they do not wish to return to their original homes are drafted to the new Red Army *Kolkhozy*. These *Kolkhozy*, recruited from the variety of nationalities throughout the Union, are being scattered over some of the best land of the Ukrainian countryside. In some regions there are as many as ten of these military collectivized farms. Reference has already been made to the measures taken by the Government against the bourgeois *kolkhozniki* during the summer of 1939. A new 'movement' of the population is in view in 474 166

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474 U.S.S.R., and there is no doubt that one of the results will be a further weakening of Ukrainian elements where the Government considers them to 166 be still too strong

Secondary Branches of Ukrainian Agriculture

241 In addition to wheat, *rye*, *barley*, *oat* and *maize* crops are important. *Millet* is also grown and forms the base of the broth (*psheno*) which is a favourite dish in the South of Russia (in the North this broth or porridge is made from buck-wheat).

Clover and *lucerne* are comparatively little cultivated, and almost exclusively in right-bank Ukraine and Galicia.

About a million hectares are under *potatoes* in right-bank Ukraine; the bulk of the crop goes to the alcohol distilleries.

Sunflower-seed is important in the production of oil; *hemp* and small quantities of *linseed* and *mustard-seed* are produced for the same purpose.

The cultivation of *hops* was always traditional in Volhynia; in pre-Revolutionary days half of the hop production of the Empire came from Volhynia and right-bank Ukraine. In late years production has greatly declined.

Tobacco, the cultivation of which was introduced by Greek immigrants in the eighteenth century, is a speciality of the districts of Nezhin and Romen. The quality is not good and the cultivation of tobacco has no future in the Ukraine.

Particularly in Podolia and the region of Uman, *kolkhozniki* take great interest in horticulture; about 200,000 hectares are under orchards. On many *Kolkhozy* the *kolkhozniki* occupy themselves on the private cultivation of *tomatoes*, and the Government has set up canning plants in order to encourage this branch of production.

The *vine* grows well on the banks of the Dniepr and the southern Bug, in the neighbourhood of Berdyansk and Odessa, and along the Dniestr. But wine production has not been developed on the scale which it has attained in Bessarabia and the Crimea.

The Soviet Government favours agricultural experiments, and some *Kolkhozy* in the South have tried to cultivate *rice*—so far with little success.

An experiment on a large scale was made in the cultivation of *cotton*. 190,000 hectares between the mouth of the Dniepr and Perekop were reserved, but it is not likely that cotton cultivation in the Ukraine will prove the success which it has in the more suitable climates of Azerbaijan and Turkestan.

Secondary Mineral Resources in the Ukraine

Reserves of different qualities of *lignite* are distributed over many parts of 135 the Ukraine. In view of the abundance of other resources of calorific power, exploitation has not been greatly developed, but output of lignite in the region of Elizavetgrad attains 300,000 tons a year.

A million tons of *peat* is cut annually in Ukraine—about 10 per cent of the output of U.S.S.R.

Bauxites in the Dniepr region are utilized for the Aluminium Works near Dnieprostroy.

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185 The peasants also revived and breathed new life into the co-
● 474 operatives which had been broken up during the period of Militant
241 Communism. In 1923 they established another cooperative organization, the Selo-Tekhnyka (Village Machines) which purchased more expensive agricultural machinery and rented it out to the peasants for the appropriate agricultural work. These points became the centre of mechanization and were in effect the first
[453] tractor stations. In 1924 they established the First Agricultural Bank, a sort of private institution which at one time had more loans outstanding than had the Ukrainian State Bank which was, of course, closely supervised by Moscow.

185 All these efforts* met with marked success and agriculture
369 speedily began to revive. The peasants became more prosperous and their holdings of livestock rapidly increased, although they did not reach the pre-war level. This, in its turn, created a new demand for manufactured products and restored the factories to operation, and with them the conditions in the cities began to improve.

185 Similar concessions were made to industry, but with one im-
471 portant difference. The larger and more important industrial
[475] plants were not turned back to their former owners who were, as before, allowed no voice or influence in their direction. They were taken from the workers who had seized and abused them during the period of Militant Communism and placed under the supervision of government trusts. These were either regional in character or confined to a single branch of industry. In either case, they were under the control of a more or less trusted group of men among whom Communists were in the leading positions, but while they received certain credits from the state, they were more or less autonomous and they were allowed to go through regular commercial transactions and encouraged to show profits in their annual reports. There was thus again a source of encouragement both for the directors and the workers, and slowly but surely the level of industry began to rise.

The smaller plants were very often leased to individuals who were allowed to employ hired labor and the hope was given to these that their taxes would be at such a level that they, too, could

* [NEP attempts to restore peasant prosperity -- Analyst]

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment 642
of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely 631
in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to ad- [475]
minister industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine 423
they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new 474
philosophy[1] looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and 661
determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force 425
them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1] [1927 - Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

423 policy was now changed and the middle and the richer peasants
474 were grouped together and opposed to the poor peasants. This
661 multiplied enormously the hostile and unsympathetic elements of
425 the population but by holding out tempting offers to the poor peasants, the Communists succeeded in fanning anew the flames of class hatred in the villages and in producing the desired effects.

[651] Along with the adoption of the Five Year Plan, the All-Union Congress called for the strengthening of attempts at collectivization. As a result, the amount of grain demanded and the amount of taxes were rapidly raised with the avowed purpose of ruining the kulaks and kurkuls, as they were called in Ukraine. Increased pressure was put upon all classes of the rural population to join collective farms and in some districts this was so effective that almost seventy per cent of the land was turned over for organization on a "voluntary" basis.

As a further step in the same direction there began in 1928 and also in 1929 a furious attack on the richer and middle peasants and a growing insistence on the need of "dekurkulizing" the villages. This meant nothing more or less than the elimination from the countryside of all those people who had prospered under the New Economic Policy. The property of the richer and more prosperous peasants was completely confiscated and they with their families were deprived of all their rights, often including the house where they had lived or the shacks into which they could crawl for shelter. With superb inhumanity the Bolsheviks would drive formerly wealthy peasants and their families from their homes in the middle of winter and leave them without food or clothing and would threaten any of their relatives or friends who dared to give them any relief.

In the first stages of the process, cases were known where some of these richer people were moved out of the Ukraine with their goods and cattle, but as the Communists settled down to their work, they simply seized everything for their own use and that of the collective farms and contented themselves with shooting or deporting their enemies, often to the far north for work in the

forests or to northeastern Siberia for work in the mines and in the more remote parts of the wilderness.[1]

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474
661
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1 A graphic account of this dekurkulization was given in a DP camp by Sh., a former peasant of the district of Kharkiv:

"On May 22, 1929, all my property, tools, cattle, building and clothing were confiscated. I and my family (my wife, six small children and my mother), were left without means of livelihood; we stayed with people like old folks, ate what we were given, although people were forbidden to give to us. On November 27, in spite of the fact that there was snow on the ground and 15 degrees of frost, I and my entire family, without clothes and half-naked, were put out of the house. Until February, 1930 I lived in another house which was half fallen down. On February 28, I, my wife and six children (my mother had disappeared; I do not know where) were arrested and with other dekurkulized persons were sent to the railroad station. There we were packed into freight cars as sardines in a barrel and travelled for 11 days, without knowing our destination. We were fed once every two days. Many perished from cold and exhaustion. We finally reached the station of Makarikha near Kotlas, district of Archangel, and in 40 degrees of frost, we were detrained in the woods in the snow.

"Then all those able to work were driven to forest operations 300 kilometers from Kotlas. They drove us half shod in the intense cold. They fed us on the way 300 grams of bread, 5 grams of barley and 3 grams of salt per person a day. Many died on the way. Many, unable to walk further, were shot on the spot. There we cut wood and they treated us very badly. The norms of work were abnormally high. We lived in huts which were holes we dug ourselves. Of the many thousands of people who came there more than half died of exhaustion, hunger and cold.

"Of the members of the families of kurkuls who remained at the station of Makarikha, more than half froze. Among these were my sons Ivan and Fedir; a third son Hryhory died of exhaustion. Later all the children up to 14, including three of mine, were returned to Ukraine but I have no further news of them. They probably perished. In 1932, first my wife and then I escaped by hiding in cars loaded with wood. I found work in the Don Basin. In 1937 my wife was arrested suddenly and shot in the prison of Artemivsk in the Don Basin. I escaped because I was living under an assumed name. Now I am a DP and living in Germany in an IRO camp."

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423 474 661 425 They followed this up at the end of 1929 by providing for the compulsory collectivization of all the land. Private holding of land was abolished and so was private use. The peasants were forced into collective farms to which they had to contribute all of their livestock, agricultural implements and tools. Then they were left nothing that they could call their own except a small garden plot that was assigned to each family for the purpose of raising those types of vegetables that it was not profitable to raise in large quantities, because the collective farms were occupied with those types of agriculture that were selected for them by the central authorities in Moscow.

The immediate result differed in different places. In Great Russian territory, where the principle of the community ownership of land had definitely taken root, the peasants complied without too much hesitation. In Ukraine and Kuban, where the older style of Ukrainian agriculture had been long in vogue, the peasants became sulky. They killed off large numbers of their cattle and livestock of various kinds. The government, seeing this tremendous loss, then tried to eliminate from the collectives and liquidate in one way or another all of those who had been guilty of disobedience to the order requiring the peasants to contribute all their wealth.

There developed almost a civil war in some sections of the country as discontent rose and the peasants were prepared to die rather than to yield. Nevertheless, this time the government was not prepared to concede anything, as it had in 1921, and despite remarks by Stalin that in some details the Communists had become dizzy from success, the regime held its course and even continued to apply the screws more tightly. The result was the famine of 1932 and 1933.

country for less populated districts in the east, while, on the slightest 166
suspicions, whole families were deported, separated and exiled, and 626
their places taken by people from other Soviet republics who were brought in to destroy the racial unity that formerly existed in the villages.

To appreciate the difficulties of the peasants on the collective 241
farms, we must remember that the involved bureaucratic system 651
had ample opportunities for extorting the grain for little or no 474
payment. Thus the Motor Transport Stations which controlled 465
all the machinery were supported by payments from the collective farms of grain and other products in kind and this usually approached 21.5% of the total yield, while the Stations took over 23% of the crop for the government. Another 15% was retained by the kolhosp for sowing and for various insurance funds that were prescribed by law and another 18% was kept for fodder and for the compensation of the full-time administrators. Thus, there was barely a quarter of the produce left to be distributed among the working population and this was the variable quantity since all of the payments and collections were based not on the actual harvest but on the harvest as planned by the central authorities. Thus, in the case of a bad harvest, the share allotted for distribution was the part that was cut and the government, so far as possible was provided with its expected supply.

This amount was divided among the individuals and families on the basis of the labor days which they had worked. In the beginning a labor day meant labor for a day, no matter how many hours of labor were required, but even before World War II, this simple definition was replaced by a specification that it covered a definite amount of work and it might very easily happen that a slow or poor workman would have to work more than one day to make a labor day. Thus, there was the possibility of still further exploitation of the workmen, who could not know accurately until the end of the year on what they could count.

There was also distributed, likewise in proportion to labor days, a certain sum of money which the kolhosp received from the government in return for the sale of grain over the amount col-

[1 after 1933 famine - - Analyst]

341 lected for the tax in kind. This was a negligible sum and the
651 average member rarely received more than one ruble per labor
474 day. This sum was, of course, insufficient to provide for the
465 goods which the family needed to purchase, and since their share
of the grain was rarely sufficient to feed them, their situation
[511] became hopeless, while of other products the individual received about one litre of oil, fifty kilograms of potatoes, thirty-five kilograms of fruit, and five-tenths kilograms of meat and fat.

[435] The real significance of these figures is shown in the prices that were charged in the state stores.[1] There a kilogram of bread cost ninety kopecks, ten eggs brought eight rubles, a kilogram of beef twenty-four rubles, and a pair of boots four hundred and fifty rubles, while a farmer's suit of clothes cost five hundred rubles.

[422] It made the peasant really dependent upon his individual plot of land if he was to secure any necessities.[1] This was far too small and its use was bound with many restrictions. Thus, no family was allowed to hold more than one cow and two calves, one sow, up to ten goats, an undefined number of chickens and up to twenty beehives. In the beginning it was possible for the peasant to secure a certain amount of food for these animals from the common store. He was allowed to retain the manure and it was thus possible for him to improve his own individual plot and thus to secure larger returns. It was a liberal application of such principles that had rendered possible the general improvement which was noticeable during the years 1934-6, when the government was endeavoring to make the system of collective farms workable.

It can be easily seen that the system of allowing individual incomes was based on a principle opposite that of the New Economic Policy, for it would require scarcely a legislative enactment to reduce these amounts while the New Economic Policy presented a norm of profit to the workers. Yet with each year, once the government was convinced of its success, it found it possible in various ways to tap this new source of income for its own purposes.

The favorite method was by taxation. Thus, by 1939 if we should assume that the average family received in cash four hun-

1 [Ukraine - after 1933 famine -- Analyst]

dred and eighty karbovantsy, they would be required to pay 241
twenty-two and a half karb. in taxes, twenty in rent, fifty as a 651
special tax and they would be required to volunteer to take at 474
least two hundred in government bonds. 465

Even this did not cover the total payments to the government. With its usual love of double-talk and subterfuge, the government, which controlled every branch of human activity in the USSR, talked of the establishment of socialism and levied indirect taxes on all transactions so that the actual cost to the villagers of any manufactured article was about three times what it cost the government as producer. The whole subject was carefully veiled as a state secret to protect the Soviet Union against capitalist intrigues but the unfortunate population were the unwilling contributors to this new order of life.

Under such conditions it is extremely difficult to pierce the veil [652] of percentages as to cost and production and give a reliable estimate as to the amount of money received for the government or the relationship between the sums spent in maintaining the operation of the Moscow-controlled factories in Ukraine and the amount spent upon the needs of the population either individually, as families or as citizens of the UkSSR or of the UkSSR as a governmental unity within the Soviet sphere. From those figures which the Soviet has let out, it is possible to see that the yearly budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has run from 2½-5% of the budget of the USSR while the population has been at least 18% of the total population.

With the villages compelled to yield the last pound of grain, 369
etc., that could be extracted by force, and receiving in return 511
almost no manufactured goods, the position of the city workmen and the intelligentsia was little better. The wages of the workmen were always insufficient, the housing conditions were hardly endurable, and the only point of betterment was that the larger places and some of the plants especially favored by the regime received more manufactured goods of a poor quality and at a high price which the fortunate people might be able to secure.

727 their posts and the vast majority of those who were Communists
316 received more or less sinecures above ground. Their places were
[466] taken by forcing the Ukrainian peasants, including a large percentage of young girls, to work in the pits with the minimum of safeguards. Little money was appropriated for the restoration of the damaged housing, for as the writer Korniychuk declared in one of his works, "Ukraine was so thankful for the success of Stalin that they did not care how they lived, for if he had perished, life would not be worth living under any circumstances."

727 With this attitude prominently emphasized by the leading propagandists, it is easy to see that the resources and energies of the population were directed by force rather toward those items that would advance the importance and the convenience of Moscow, than those that would be of advantage to the local population.

[496] The one exception was the necessity for rebuilding immediately and strengthening the railroad communications between the Donbas, Moscow, Leningrad and the Black Sea ports—in other words, the extreme eastern part of the Ukraine which was slated for a special development with roads and railroads linking the country up with the Russian centres rather than with the other Ukrainian centres to the west for these were regarded as exposed centres in case of a new outbreak of hostilities and were to be neglected until they were masked by the extension of Soviet power over the satellite countries.

● 474 The collectivized agriculture was in little better shape. In
341 that part of the Ukraine which had been under Soviet control before 1939, the authorities revived the collective farms but they had been so badly ruined that at first the authorities were often willing to be more considerate of the members. Immediately after the war they allowed them to group themselves into links or permanent sections of some eight to ten people who would thus come to feel themselves a distinct unit in the collective farm. It did not take long for the more rigid Communists to decide that this sense of permanence was in a way a defiance of the principles of collectivization, for very often members of the same household, if it were at all numerous, would group themselves into a link. In such cases the link became more prosperous, for it was in a way

a revival of that form of family agriculture which had long been popular in the Ukraine before the collectivization. Furthermore, it was soon suspected that the links varied in their delivery of supplies to the government, sometimes in inverse proportion to their own readiness to work. The peasants likewise as in the early days of the NEP devoted more attention to their own private plots of land, a phenomenon that had been noticed even before World War II. 474 241

The Soviet authorities had several answers to such developments. On the one hand, they finally forbade the operation of the permanent links which had developed to the point where they threatened the objective of collectivization, the turning of the peasant farmer into a paid proletarian worker in agriculture. On the other hand they reduced the size again of the individual plot of land and they forced the peasants to give up animal raising on their plots by charging them for even the straw from the collective farms and the wild fodder that grew in abandoned places. Then again, they levied a tax on the products of these plots and this, plus the reduction of the allotment, rendered it impossible for the peasant to improve his lot except through increased work on the collective farm. In the meanwhile the steady raising of the quota of work required for one labor day made it impossible for the average peasant, unless he was a Stakhanovist (i.e. a person who cooperated with the central regime and thereby received favorable assignments) to complete one labor day within one calendar day, no matter how long hours he worked. This had been a favorite device of the Russian landlords as we learn from Radishchev's *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*, a famous Russian radical work of the end of the eighteenth century but a modern version of it was adapted by the Russian Communist leaders and used effectively. 474 241 466 [423]

Even these measures were not the desirable solution. This was first proposed by Khrushchov in 1947, and while it was at first looked upon with some disfavor, it was finally deemed suitable by the slave-drivers of the Kremlin, and Khrushchov, after a period of mild disfavor, was promoted to the Politburo, and another Russian, Melnikov, placed in charge of Ukraine. This was the 474 241 665

474 creation of great "agro-cities" or "agro-settlements" which would
241 unite several collective farms in one great centre which could be
665 more easily controlled by the Communist Party with a smaller number of qualified party members in charge. By the end of 1950 the number of kolhosps (collective farms) had been reduced from 33,653, as at the end of the war, to 14,443. The number of households in one had grown from 163 households to 277. At the same time the number of collective farms in which there were definite party leaders had increased from 42% to 78%. This does not imply a growth in Communist membership, for the number of Communist authorities might, under the new ratio, be reduced by almost 3,000 in personnel. This would be hardly likely but it explains at a glance the increased control that the Communists could exert over the larger groups. It also made it easier by destroying the separated villages to prevent as effective help being given to the U. P. A. and the other anti-Communist movements which lingered on, as the peasants saw that the new era was to be not one of peace but of increased hardships. At the same time, the
423 peasant was made more helpless for his holdings in the neighbor-
241 hood of his home were reduced to 0.15 hectare or approximately a third of an acre.

This area is roughly equivalent to the average American suburban lot of 150 x 100 feet and on this the average peasant family was supposed, no matter how many members it contained, to raise all the vegetables, eggs and milk which the family required for the year and also any other plant or animal requirement which was needed as a cash crop. Even this was now burdened with taxes and the peasant was forbidden to secure anything from the collective farm to assist in his economy, outside of what he secured in his pay for a steadily diminishing number of labor days and the accompanying cash and kind receipts which were apportioned to him for his work.

474 Estimates based on figures from some collective farms show
434 that the average family receives for its year's work, if three or four
241 members work, something in the neighborhood of three hundred pounds of grain, four hundred pounds of potatoes and about one

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a 474
result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred 434
karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one 241
thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on [554]
these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for [665]
show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satisfactory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer is little better, although he 465
receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, 731
there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 con- 185
tinued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

[Post - WORLD WAR II - 1945 -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Komitet Dopomohy), was able, even on the eve of German evacuation, to provide meals for 36,000 persons (children and others unable to work),[22] one sixth of the city's population; its great popularity[23] was of tremendous importance in enabling Bohatyrchuk to secure support for his stand in favor of coalition with anti-Soviet Russians. On the other hand, in Dniepropetrovsk, where the city administration was largely in the hands of pro-Russian elements, the Ukrainians, inspired by an OUN-M organizer, formed a Red Cross organization which acted as a center for nationalist forces.

The nationalist element was more successful in the field of cooperative organization. While each city administration contained a department of trade, the cooperatives, as quasi-public bodies, appear to have been considerably more important as channels of local initiative. Far from being a product of the Communist regime, the cooperative movement was indigenous to both East and West Ukraine, having played an important role before the First World War, when it was already imbued with nationalist overtones.[24] In the NEP period of Soviet rule, and until the late twenties, the cooperatives had been able to maintain a considerable degree of independence and had, at least in the Kharkov region, served as a center for nationalist elements which worked with the Republican government.[25] In the Five Year Plan periods, the urban cooperatives had become adjuncts of the state trading systems, and other cooperatives had been closely integrated into state commercial operations.[26]

[22] *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo*, September 19, 1943, pp. 4–5; see also *Volyn'*, January 28, 1943, p. 3.

[23] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 4.

[24] For abundant details on the complex system of cooperatives developed in the Ukraine prior to 1917, see Eugene M. Kayden and Alexis N. Antsiferov, *The Cooperative Movement in Russia During the War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), a volume in the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, ed. James T. Shotwell, Russian Series, compiled for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. Cooperatives were far more developed in the Ukraine than in most other heavily populated areas of the Russian Empire (*ibid.*, pp. 40, 41, 266–69, 357), and served educational as well as economic development. Kharkov was the chief cooperative center in the Ukraine and was largely independent of the Russian centers.

[25] Interview 73.

[26] Alexander Baikov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 253; Arthur C. Arnold, *Banks, Credit, and Money in Soviet Russia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 477.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

727 When the Germans arrived, surviving leaders of the former
474 independent cooperatives were again able to assert themselves. As early as the winter of 1941–42, there was a total of 643 cooperative organizations in the Kiev region, including forty-eight *raion* food societies which bought agricultural produce and carried on economic organization;[27] in the city of Kharkov there were 150 cooperatives, which maintained close contacts with their sources of food stocks in the countryside.[28] There were, in addition to numerous distributing cooperatives, twenty-eight producing cooperatives in Kiev, in such diverse fields as transport, printing, and haberdashery.[29] The Ukrainbank (All-Ukrainian Cooperative Bank), which had been formed in 1922 for financing all types of cooperatives, but incorporated in the Soviet central Torgbank in 1936, was revived.[30]

727 Moreover, there were more direct links to the nationalist move-
474 ments. An effort was made, with German approval, to organize
186 a general center for the food cooperatives, known as the All-Ukrainian Cooperative Society (Vseukraïns'ka Kooperatyvna Spilka), which coordinated local organizations, published a bulletin, and restored the museum of the history of cooperative development, an institution of considerable significance for nationalist sentiment.[31] Under an old officer of the Ukrainian army, Professor Perevertuna, a close collaborator of the OUN-M, it carried out activities on a large scale in the Kiev area, especially training replacements for the diminished ranks of cooperative workers.[32] In addition to more indirect fostering of nationalist sentiment, its aid to the nationalist cause included employing persons whom the Germans had dismissed from the municipal administration.[33] In early 1943, however, such activities resulted in the execution of the director.[34]

[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.
[28] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 24, 1942, p. 2.
[29] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 5, 1942, p. 2.
[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 10, 1942, p. 4. Cf. Baikov, p. 86, and Arnold, p. 477, for the background of this bank.
[31] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.
[32] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, July 11, 1942, p. 3.
[33] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75.
[34] *Ibid.; Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 585.

applying improved methods of working and in engaging 243
in a selection of varieties as demanded by the mills and the exporters.

The State and local organizations equally try to come to the aid of the cultivators in order to improve the quality and raise the production of this precious grain.

The Soviet State, wishing to substitute itself for all [474] ●
former capitalist enterprises, organized the *sovkhoses* (State agricultural enterprises), where it tried to return to the pre-war traditions of exploitation. The general system of Soviet economy does not, however, permit the organization of the exploitation of wheat on a commercial scale. The figures which we have just cited cannot be applied to the Soviet Ukraine in its present state. Actually agricultural decadence during the Civil War and the period of militant communism and the collectivization of the peasants had disorganized all that which had been done during the preceding epoch for the rational exploitation of this important resource. The widespread utilization of tractors has not yet compensated for the losses which have been sustained. Nevertheless wheat remains and will remain the essential product of Ukrainian soil. It is its most important agricultural potential.

Although the cultivation of maize, almost entirely concentrated in Zone 2,[1] only occupies the fourth place among the cereals of the Ukraine, its importance is great owing to the fact that this country alone produces 65 per cent of the maize of the Soviet Union. On the other hand this crop is a very recommendable phase in the enrichment of the soils, whose supply of water and chemical salts is pitilessly exhausted by the growing of wheat, more so, as in order to replace them the utilization of manure in the southern regions sometimes presents a certain danger owing to the possible droughts.

1 [See category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy industries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, 83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia.

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peasants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property was taken into the collective farms (*Communist,* Kharkov, December 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater.

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administration, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc.

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933: U 661 665

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

6. *The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33*

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation. U 731 656

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*). SU [474] [423] U [474] [423]

Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and 563
disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the 661
Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. [871]
In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories, the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet [665]
and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre (UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on 727
the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the 474
Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form
of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative 563
Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz)*. The Ukrainian co-operative movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Co-operation *(Maslosoyuz)*, supplied dairy products, not only for the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in 563
the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

563 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the
423 Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the
474 big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the masses of the people.[1] It should be pointed out that between the Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR.
661 The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

[1. In Western Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

in the Ukraine more dangerous than the Ukrainian variety, no additional attention was given to the problem of Russian children.

In 1933, however, the offensive against Ukrainian nationalism occasioned a review of the Ukrainization process. Ukrainian nationalism had been considered a dangerous force since 1926, when Shumskii and Khvilovoi — two important figures in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education — were censured for desiring "to orient Ukrainian culture on capitalist Europe rather than on socialist Moscow." The Party became still more alert to signs of nationalism after the uncovering in 1929 of the Society for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, a secret organization headed by such outstanding nationalists as Efremov, Germaize and Nikovskii. But it was the campaign against the collectivization of agriculture which occasioned the intensive campaign against the nationalists. The Party regarded the opposition to collectivization as the result in large part of the nationalists, and it set out to remove them from every branch of political, economic and cultural activity. The central figure in the campaign was Nicholas Skripnik, an "Old Bolshevik" who was accused of having fallen under the influence of his nationalist colleagues and was removed from his position as Commissar of Education in March 1933. Even before his removal, however, the Commissariat of Education and all of its activities were under fire.

Charges of over-Ukrainization of the school system were first launched in an editorial appearing in *Kommunist* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party) in February 1933, and reprinted in other newspapers. The editorial said: "The mistakes and perversions in realizing the Ukrainization of the schools led in a considerable number of places to neglecting and ignoring the interests of the national minorities and especially the needs and requirements of the Russian toiling masses living in the Ukraine. Among responsible circles of the Commissariat there was concocted the 'theory' that the majority of the children in the cities, small towns and other labor centers speak a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon, and that therefore the majority of these children should study in the Ukrainian language. As a result, a significant part of the Russian toiling masses were deprived of schools in their native language and actually subjected to the forced Ukrainization which the Party had condemned in all of its directives."[65] Shortly after this editorial appeared, an article in *Proletarska Pravda* stated that in Kiev only 49 percent of the Russian children and 30 percent of the Jewish children studied in schools conducted in their native languages; that although

[65] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1933.

423 tax collection and, finally, also corresponded
241 to the patriarchal order. It was only in the former Polish Ukraine on the right side of the river that purely private ownership was retained. The Bolshevik NEP now very cleverly fastened on to the community field system.

241 With the restoration of peace and order during the NEP years the social life of the peasant country again attained its equilibrium. The families which before that were broken up or dismembered now came together again. At the same time, great efforts were made to raise the productive capacity of the new family farms by means of technical education, and in this the young farmers were particularly eager to join. At that time, a German observer wrote: "In the activity of the youth organizations in the villages we see an expression of the deep longing to be freed at last from 'the power of darkness' and not always to stand apart while the civilized races divide up the treasures of the earth among themselves." (88)

88. Veit: Farming Economy and Agrarian Set-up of the South Ukraine, page 69.

423 This hopeful development was abruptly inter-
241 rupted by the subsequent third phase of the agra-
474 rian revolution, the transfer of the individual
185 peasant farm to communal ownership of all village inhabitants. It was only by means of collectivism, the coordination of the farms with the communes in the other economic fields, that the Bolshevik regime could last; it was only in this way that one could strike at the root of Ukrainian nationalism, and only thus carry out the Five Year Plan. For industrial development with the purchase of foreign /146/ machines had to be paid for by exporting agricultural products. All that was needed now was a command, in order to maintain the export of the necessary amounts of grain at the prescribed price.

the prescribed price.

According to ideas in Moscow, the score had to come out even. It could not be difficult at last to introduce more modern agricultural methods along with the collective farms. The tractors, it was believed, would surely bring it about. However, Moscow made its figures without consulting the Ukrainian farmer whose individualistic bent and stubborn adherence to private property were to cause the equalizers the worst difficulties imaginable.

Collectivism began in the year 1928 with wonderful promises. In 1929 only 2% of the planted surface of the Ukraine was communal and cultivated according to a plan. In other words, there was resistance along the whole front! Now extortionate taxation was applied. Unlimited taxation in money and grain made the peasants ripe for the "voluntary" adoption of the collective. Hotbeds of resistance were exterminated. There was now no turning back in this agrarian revolution from above, for the Five Year Plan was at stake. A Ukrainian victory would have had incalculable consequences for Moscow. Not in vain had the Muscovites been trained from the time of Ivan the Terrible and particularly by Peter the Great and Catherine to break down stubborness. The methods which the Bolsheviks now used to assert their will were old; it was only the technique that was new.

Compulsory collectivism on a large scale began in 1929 with the suppression of free sales of products from the individual farms with the removal of surplus and with political persecution. There was almost nothing left over from the 1929 harvest. Planting in 1930 was inadequate, for the work of those who were exiled had to be added to the regular work. In 1931 conditions worsened. The lack of draft animals was simply catastrophic, for the farmers had /147/ slaughtered all the cattle that should have been

474 given to the collective without compensation. The
475 country people carried on sabotage wherever possible. The Bolsheviks retaliated with relentless and merciless war. The Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Skrypnyk complained in July 1932 at the Party Conference in the presence of Molotov and Kaganovich: "Absolutely everything has been taken away from us. That is why we are without bread, that is why we are suffering from hunger." (89) There was not enough manpower to bring in

89. Visti for July 11, 1932.

the harvest, so the authorities combed the streets of the cities and forthwith transported in trucks to the villages everyone who could not give a satisfactory account of himself. The gipsy bands - some of them had German passports - escaped toward the west. In the spring of 1933 famine took its toll of countless peasant families in one of the most fertile regions of the earth, and those that remained alive nourished themselves on roots and grass or fled into the cities of stone and wood in order to find bread there. According to accounts of the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, Kosior, at the Party Conference in Kiyev, about 300 million pood of grain was lost in the 1932 harvest, because it was not harvested but it rotted in the fields or at the collection centers. (90) For a long time now it

90. Kovalevskyj: Chervony Terror na Ukraini, p. 123 ff./Red Terror in the Ukraine/

was not the individual farmers who practiced sabotage in order to escape the collective, it was the Kolkhoz (collective farms) themselves that bitterly resisted Moscow's demands. The Ukrainian communists and Soviet officials were

474 accused of collaboration in preventing the warehousing of grain. As early as December 6, 1932
425 the Council of the People's Commissars came to the following decision: "The resistance of those communists who in reality have become leaders of the sabotage, as well as the passive and favorably disposed attitude of various Party organizations toward this sabotage shall be liquidated." (91)

91. Salisnyak: "The Struggle Between the Ukraine and Moscow in the Soviet Union" Nation und Staat, July-November, 1937.

In 1933, after a four-year struggle, the resistance of the Ukrainian people against that new order which seemed to the Muscovites to be the purpose of the state, was broken. Moscow, /148/ without any regard for the victims among its opponent, had fought a hard battle of nationalities and won. The Communist of December 11, 1934 gives a faint picture of the extent of this catastrophe when it reports that during the period of collectivization 200,000 Ukrainian farms were destroyed and their owners along with their families were exiled to North Russia.

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563 The Bolshevik agrarian revolution with all its consequences also did not spare the descendants of those German emigrants who had moved to the Ukraine between 1789 and 1842. The promise of abundant arable land and freedom of religious worship had at one time attracted these sectarians to this country. They were industrious, capable people who rapidly increased their possessions and multiplied. In 1914 there were 600,000 of them in the region of the Black Sea, 100,000 in the North Caucasus and 200,000 in Volhynia,

563 German wheelwrights (Ukrainian: "stel'makh"), carpenters, smiths and locksmiths (Ukrainian:"sl'usar") were very much in demand. Before the First World War there were 100 German shops in Odessa, among them two bookstores. Factories for agricultural machines arose from small beginnings, and they sent their products as far as Siberia. From 80 to 90% of all Bolshevik factories for agricultural machinery were founded by Germans.

The Germans were not spared their toll of blood in the Ukraine. At the beginning of the First World War they had to suffer in the persecutions of the Czarist regime. Then they fought with Denikin and Wrangel against the Bolsheviks and were defeated. Finally the "death taxes" began, which were followed by a new civil war and the famine. No one knows how many of our compatriots lost their lives in these catastrophes. Many emigrated to Canada and the United States as long as they were still able to do so.

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●474 Thus after the Ukraine was prostrate, Moscow could without danger loosen the noose. This was also dictated by the instinct for self-preservation, for bread and meat were urgently needed for the growing industrial areas. The process of making collectives out of small private properties was abandoned. When at the Seventeenth Party Congress in January and February 1934 an urgent recommendation was issued for people to lead a "joyous and happy life", those who had been murdered or who had died of hunger no longer heard it, and for the ones who were exiled it sounded like bitter sarcasm. At the same time concessions were granted in the household and horticultural economy of the members of the collectives. The new collective economy statute of 1935 permits the individual farmer to own /150/ 1 hectare of land, 1 cow and 2 heifers, 5 pigs, 10 sheep or

474 goats and poultry, whereby allowance was made for regional variations. Thus Kuban Cossacks may also keep a horse, and their individual property around the farm can be two hectares in size.

474 233 The census of cattle in 1935 showed that these concessions were necessary. This census showed that livestock in the Soviet Union had been reduced to about one-half from 1928 to 1935. At the same time the minimum during the summer of 1933 had already been overcome, and there was a gradual increase in cattle-raising noticeable. From 1928 to 1935 the number of horses had decreased from 5.5 million to 2.5 million, that of horned cattle from 8.5 to 4.9 million, the number of pigs from 6.9 to 4.8 million, and that of goats and sheep from 9.8 to 1.8 million. Conditions were similar in the Kuban region. (94) The Kolhosp /abbrev. for 'collective farm' in Ukrainian; Kolkhoz in Russian. Editor/ had completely failed

94. Kubiyovich: Atlas of the Ukraine and the Bordering Areas, page 38.

in cattle-raising.

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241 What is it that grows in the region of the Soviet Union settled by Ukrainians? Individual cultures have always been subject to considerable fluctuation. During the NEP period the cultivation of wheat receded and rye cultivation increased. The land was extensively farmed, few horses were kept and more sheep. Then came the Bolsheviks and introduced their "rational method of cultivation". That the result of it is not satisfactory was admitted by Stalin at the Eighteenth Congress in March 1939, when he stated that collectivism in the Soviet Union had, it is true, embraced 93.5% of the entire peasantry, but that he could not

249 the coast of the Black Sea, divides into two wide branches at the Sea of Azov, one of which extends up to the Volga and the other down to Ciscaucasia. In the Kuban region the sunflower occupies up to 30% of the entire cultivated land. The lovely blossoms with their coffee-brown centers and their wreath of yellow rays are improbably large in the Kuban country. Oil mills press out the seeds and manufacture table oil from them. The Kuban "dessert varieties" are valued as a delicacy, the seeds of which are eaten like nuts and are as large as dates. In the last few years the cultivation of cotton has been newly introduced all around the Sea of Azov. But its yield is very small, and the surface cultivated fluctuates from year to year. Between 1931 and 1935 an average of about 300,000 hectares was planted. The attempts to grow rice in the Dnepr plains are also new.

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474 /152/ What is a collective farm? The Bolsheviks distinguish between the so-called Soviet farms, the communes and the artels, both also called kolhosp. The Soviet farm is a government estate in which land, buildings, livestock and goods belong to the state. The Soviet farms are supposed to be model farms for agricultural research; their average size is 1000 to 1200 hectares. They are run by "government officials".

The commune is a composite of peasant farms; the individual farms do not have a particular share of land, and it is cultivated according to a general agricultural plan. Its inventory, buildings and products are the property of the community. The members of the commune receive only a share of the yield which they need to cover their living requirements. The commune did not survive as an organizational form of Bolshevik agriculture, but the artel did. In the latter,

474 the inventory of goods, buildings and land are likewise property of the community, but the agricultural products are distributed on a share basis according to work performed, after expenses and reserves have been deducted. In contrast to the commune, the farm produce consumed by the family and the family's household economy are private. Nominally the farmer is co-owner of the kolhosp which the law describes as "agricultural common property on a cooperative basis". The rights and privileges of the farmer who has "voluntarily" joined are set forth in the statute. No compensation is paid for agricultural property brought in by the individual farm. If a farmer withdraws from the kolhosp, what he has brought in is not returned to him, but he can demand an allowance which, however, is very small and in no wise corresponds to the actual value.

162 Of the total of 44.5 million hectares of land in the Soviet Republic in 1938, 29.7 million hectares fell to the kolhosp, 1.8 million to the separate property of the kolhosp farmers, /Facing
439 page 152/ /Map X: Export of Coal and Sugar from Soviet Ukraine. (Average 1927/1928). The Ukrainian supply to the Great Russian areas of coal and sugar shows a similar development as the distribution of grain. In these products, too, export to foreign countries was small./ /153/ 1.5 million hectares to individual non-collective farmers, 4.2 million hectares to Soviet farms and 7.3 million hectares to other properties. (97)

97. Deminsky: "The Economy of the Ukraine" in Deutsche Berufserziehung, No. 15 and 16, p. 135.

414 From a practical point of view the kolhosp represents a large estate whose land lies round about the estate. All the members of the commune are the estate owners. Since the kolhosps are forbidden to employ outside manpower, a stranger cannot

474 find work in the villages. All able-bodied men and women and also young people are required to cooperate in the kolhosp. These forces are divided into so-called work brigades. Thus there is a brigade for field work, another for the grooming of horses, a third for cattle-raising and dairy farming. The farmer has turned into "comrade fieldworker", the hired man into "comrade groom", and the servant girl into "comrade milkmaid". The brigades are divided up into "lanky" (links of a chain). Since the entire system of co-owners gives ample opportunity to shirk and to blame others for one's negligence, individual "links" are now given the entire cultivation of one section of a field, from ploughing to harvesting. In this way one has, quite unintentionally, gone back more or less to the old order in which the individual farm cultivated its land in a similar manner.

The Bolshevik village community has many shortcomings. Love of work and productivity are negligible, for individual industry scarcely effects the amount of wages. But peasant industriousness cannot be dissociated from a good harvest. Therefore, efforts have been made in recent times to spur on Comrade "farm worker" by means of prizes. Distant Moscow determines the plan for sowing; the political board appoints the supervisor of the farm, although according to the statute he should be elected by the members of the kolhosp. A
475 further source of constant trouble, constant bungl-
474 ing and therefore irrevocable losses are the "machine-tractor stations" (MTS). It was precisely with these state organizations for /154/ agricultural machines that Moscow intended to remove all difficulties in the process of modernizing agriculture. Thus the kolhosp were ordered to deliver all their agricultural machinery there. The MTS were to keep it in order and at the same time constantly enlarge their stock of machines by the purchase of new tractors, ploughs, harrows, mowing

475 machines and threshing machines. At the time of
474 sowing and reaping the MTS with all their machines were to be at the disposal of the kolhosp.

474 Let us now imagine a large estate without draft animals and without machines. Before planting time messengers must be sent to a station that is perhaps 40 to 50 kilometers distant, with the request that machines be sent on a certain day for plowing and sowing and in fall for mowing and threshing. After long months of rest the machines of the central station were suddenly supposed to be in all villages at once. The unreliability of this arrangement is even more evident when climatic conditions demand the quickest possible execution of sowing and reaping. Within a few days the sprouting of the new seed can become decisive. The kernel can be laid into the black earth only when the rich humus is dry enough so that wagons and horses can drive over the field roads without getting stuck. But sowing must take place before the warm wind has dried out the ground. Again, at harvest time, one must take advantage of the proper moment. The grain must be sufficiently ripe but not over-ripe, otherwise it will drop out of the ears. This is the time when the German farmer goes to the field every day in order to test the ripeness of his grain. In the collective farm the idea is to be more progressive. There the agronomic supervisor of the distant MTS knows exactly when the grain at kolhosp XY has reached the proper firmness and when he can send forth his tractors and harvesters.

In 1935 there were 873 machine-tractor-
475 stations in the entire Soviet Ukraine. In 1936 it was estimated that each /155/ MTS had 70 tractors, 16 mowing-threshing machines, 50 threshing machines, 15 traction engines, 15 motors and a crew of 400 men. The supervision of an MTS consists of a technical director, his political representative, a supervising agronomist - there

475 are eight agronomists all together working at an MTS - , the chief bookkeeper and the leading mechanic. These five comrades are the actual lords of the kolhosp of their district. The local leader of a kolhosp is merely the inspector who must follow the directions of the MTS and who all too often has no idea of how to run a farm.

474 As to what these large agricultural projects
475 are like in practice, we have the following reports in the Soviet newspapers: The Communist Khar'kov) of January 8, 1939 announces that in the region of Dniepropetrovsk 82,211 doppelzentner of seed grain are lacking and that in the Khar'kov region 38.5% of the necessary seed is lacking. Visti (kiyev) of March 28, 1939, under the title of: "Sowing and not waiting for the ground to dry out", published the following report by its regional correspondent in Odessa: "After the bad weather field work has begun in the Odessa region. The sun and wind dry out the soil quickly, and the kolhosp of the southern districts of the region have begun sowing individual crops... The kolhosp of 'Spartakus' district have entered the contest in honor of the Eighteenth Plenary Assembly of the Communist Party, and are carrying on their spring sowing on a large scale. More than 1000 hectares of spring crops have already been sown in the district. Comrade Shlef and Comrade Wakker who run the tractors are performing 150% of the average of work per day. During the noon recess the kolhosp agitators help the members of the kolhosp study and memorize the speech of the leader of peoples, Stalin, delivered at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party....But in spite of the present very favorable weather at present, not all the MTS of the Odessa region are ready to plant. In this region /156/ 112 tractors have not been repaired, 69 of which are caterpillar tractors. At the MTS of Andrei-Ivanov, for example, only one out of six caterpillar tractors is repaired; in the Ianiv MTS only one out of four;

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in the Vradiyiv MTS not one of three. As far as the supply of seed grain is concerned, all is not well. As a result of the inactivity and lack of management of the regional office for grain supplies, only 85% of the kolhosp are supplied with select grain. It is incomprehensible why there is a lack of seed grain precisely in those kolhosp that so industriously set about planting. Every day several dozen vehicles drive up to the grain provisioning center of Golovanevsk in order to exchange grain that is unsuitable for planting, and are forced to return without seed grain. In the granary at Golovanevsk there are 2000 doppelzentner of barley which for some reason is not cleaned. The precious spring days are wasted on trips to the elevator...The leaders of those rayons which have in part begun sowing fail to readjust the kolhosp immediately to field work... The MTS are not supplied with fuel quickly enough. As a result of an insufficient supply of fuel field work can come to a standstill even during the first few days of mass sowing. The leaders of the districts and rayons ought to head the contest for a superior Stalin-harvest in honor of the Eighteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party, in which the great masses of kolhosp have determined to take part."

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On June 7 and 8, 1939 a meeting of the active committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine was held in Kiyev. Khrushchov, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the KPU stated that the harvest for this year promised to be a very good one, "but in the Bile Pole district only 18 out of 39 mowing-threshing machines were repaired, and the same was true of 19 out of 64 threshing machines and 2 out of 16 hauling machines. The situation in the /157/manufacture of sugar beets is alarming. The Odessa factory 'The Red

474 Signal' did not...deliver 100 threshing machines.
475 In the Chernigov region 70% of the necessary machine rakes are lacking; there is also a great lack of scythes... It is necessary to train 4000 persons in the handling of mowing-threshing machines, but the proper courses have not yet been organized..."

The "Sotsialistychna Zemlia" Number 114, 1939 complains: "Many kolhosp have no bags. The Storehouses in which the grain is to be kept are not rain-proof. In many kolhosp the repair of agricultural implements had to be suspended and in many others it could not even be begun because of the lack of forge coal. The shops have neither harnesses nor tar nor wagon-grease. In the region of Zhitomir only 160 out of 544 threshing machines were put into working order, and the same was true of only 143 out of 1475 motors." From the report of the representative of the Dnepropetrovsk region, Zadyonchenko, at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, "Izvestiia" of April 6, 1939 says that in 3000 kolhosp there are only 195 Communist organizations; that there were 8 repair shops for 66 MTS, which did not suffice to repair all broken-down tractors. We could fill a book with similar complaints taken from the Soviet press.

The beneficiary of the kolhosp is first of all the Muscovite state that takes as its share up to 25% of the estimated yield at a ridiculously low price. The MTS are paid in kind for their services. Of the rest of the harvest yield the seed grain and animal fodder are segregated and about 10 to 15% of the harvest is set aside as iron reserves, - before the First World War the cautious farmer always stored up the yield of an
474 entire harvest. Finally, the members of the kolhosp receive a certain annual share of provisions, aside from current provisions; what is left over is divided up in proportion to the number of days that have been worked. For some time now an

474 attempt has been made to increase the /158/comrades' interest in the kolhosp by means of prizes.

The most recent development of the Communist village group is characterized by the fact that the farmers tacitly divide up the collective land among themselves. Such a thing is possible only if the kolhosp officials and the village Soviets are in collusion, and if there are free acres besides the lands that are cultivated by the MTS. The Communist is January 29, 1939 confirms this development when it says that in the district of Shmerynka 145 farmers owned more animals than are permissible according to law, and 135 farmers more land than is allowed. The farmers work very industriously on their own land, whereas they neglect the collective farms. At the conference of the Central Committee of the KPU the law passed in April 1939, limiting the ownership of property of the collective farmers - "law against the waste of land" - was discussed, and it was noted that in many districts collective land was divided up. It was said that in this way private ownership of land had reappeared in hidden form. Finally the Visti of June 22, 1939 announced that the "regulation of peasant property" was to take place by November 15, 1939; "regulation", however, means a recent curtailment of peasant private ownership which had been permitted since 1934. This curtailment was also in the interests of the industrial section of Soviet economy, after many workers, mostly peasant sons, went back to their native villages from the industrial areas, because they found better living conditions there.

/159/ Coal, Ore, Petroleum, Workers

642 All the conditions which, according to the teachings of Karl Marx, ought to contribute to the happiness of the workers are fulfilled in the Soviet Union and therefore also in Soviet Ukraine.

CONSTITUTION

(Fundamental Law)

of the

UKRAINIAN

SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLIC

of January 30, 1937

As amended through November 21, 1949

Chapter I. The Social Structure

642 Art. 1. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

Art. 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists, the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the liberation of the Ukrainian people from national oppression by Tsarism and by the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie and the defeat of the nationalist counter-revolution constitute the political foundation of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 3. In the Ukrainian SSR all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

471 Art. 4. The economic foundation of the Ukrainian SSR is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production established as the result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man.

Art. 5. Socialist property in the Ukrainian SSR exists either in the form of State property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property (the possession of collective farms or co-operative associations).

475 421 Art. 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, communications, large State-organized agricultural enterprises (State farms, machine and tractor stations and the like), as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of houses in the cities and industrial localities, are State property, that is belong to the whole people.

474 421 Art. 7. The common enterprises of collective farms and co-operative organizations with their livestock and implements, and the products of the collective farms and co-operative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of collective farms and co-operative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the common collective farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small [472] plot of household land and, as its personal property, a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements — in accordance with the regulations of the agricultural artel.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

423 474 Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

473 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Ukrainian SSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

185 471 Art. 11. The economic life of the Ukrainian SSR is determined and directed by the State National Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the independence of the socialist country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

Art. 12. In the Ukrainian SSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Ukrainian SSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Ukrainian SSR voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Ukrainian SSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

311 According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there
425 were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000
723 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The prin-
cipal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Izmail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

474 Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution
241 of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas
178 from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

475 Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the
407 Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Izmail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

475 In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in
407 June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in
652 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.

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433 which the kolkhoz members were permitted to keep[1] were performing this
438 task, furnishing the city markets with meat, dairy products, eggs,
472 poultry, vegetables, fruit, honey, mushrooms, and berries.

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474 In April 1940, in order to provide a wider incentive for the
[442 kolkhoz members to increase their collective production, the system of
434] delivery assessments was radically changed. Whereas the basis for grain deliveries to the government had previously been the amount of land sown, or, in the case of meat, milk, eggs and poultry, the size of the herd or flock, the new basis for assessments was the amount of land held by the kolkhoz; and any production above the fixed rates could be retained by the kolkhoz for distribution among the members according to labour days.

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461 A second decree applying to the Ukraine alone established supple-
474 mentary pay for increasing the crop yield or productiveness in the
241 raising of livestock. This decree directed the collectives of the
446 Ukraine to assign various sections of the field or garden to work teams, working to produce a fixed quota. If the production did not exceed the quota, the members were paid only by the labour day; but if a team produced above the quota, it received part of the excess as bonus.

SU
423 In 1934 the Soviet Government decided to permit individual members of the kolkhozes to keep private farmsteads within the limits of ¼ to 1 hectare. A year later the code for the kolkhozes (called the "Stalin Code") confirmed these rights. It also secured forever the land held by the kolkhozes:

> "All boundaries formerly separating plots of land belonging to members of co-operatives are herby abolished, and all their holdings are pooled together to be used in common...the land occupied by the kolkhozes (as all land in the U.S.S.R.) is public government property. It is...secured to the kolkhozes for use without time limit, that is in perpetuity, and not subject to buying, selling or leasing to anyone by the co-operative... All agricultural production on kolkhoz land, shall be carried on by the members of the kolkhoz, jointly, co-operatively... Out of the land held in common a small part shall be set aside for the use of each household (for truck gardening, orchards, etc.)... The dimensions...may vary...from ¼ to ½ hectare and in certain regions up to one hectare".

1 [SIC-- ANALYST]

SU The State Farms (sovkhozes)

475 After the revolution, when the large holdings were broken up, a
242 certain number of well-organized estates were preserved as model agricultural stations. These were subsequently turned into State Farms (sovkhozes), the purposes of which was to experiment with seed selection, plant and livestock breeding, fertilizers, etc. The sovkhozes, operating with hired labour, turned over to the government all their pro-
SU duction above the requirements of the sovkhoz workers.

[407] To an even greater extent than the collective farms the State Farms were mechanized. They had the best technical equipment and, compared with the kolkhozes, twice the concentration of tractors per hectare. The sovkhoz workers received wages at specially worked out rates: they had the use of living quarters, dining rooms, and educational and enter-
SU tainment facilities.

[433] The State Farms achieved good results in raising production, both of
SU grain and of industrial crops.

474 However, the basic form of agricultural organization in the U.S.S.R.
475 continued to be the collective farms, which supplied the bulk of food
311 and agricultural raw materials for industry.

372 At the beginning of the third Five Year Plan (1938), there were in the Soviet Union 242,000 collective farms (kolkhozes) embracing 91 per cent. of all the land under cultivation. The kolkhozes had 117.2 million hectares of arable land; the 3,960 State Farms (sovkhozes) had 12.4 million hectares;[1] and 1.5 million individual farmers had 900,000 hectares of arable land.[2]

Collective Farms in the Ukraine

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474 In 1938 the Ukraine contained almost one-ninth of the collective
311 farms in the Soviet Union (27,393 out of 242,392). The total area
433 occupied by the Ukrainian kolkhozes was 34.9 million hectares, of which about 61 per cent. was under cultivation. Like the kolkhozes in other Republics, the Ukrainian collectives made giant strides in the years between 1932-38: they increased in number, from 25,000 to 27,393; they increased their area of cultivation from 18.9 million to 21.4 million hectares;[3] but the greatest increase was in productivity, as the following table shows.

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1 Although the area of the sovkhozes extended to 68 million hectares, their acreage amounted to only 12.4 million hectares.

2 The Socialist Agricultural Economy of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1939

3 In the Ukraine as a whole, however, the cultivated area declined from 26.4 million hectares in 1932 to 25.6 million in 1938.

TABLE VII

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Average Yields of Grain on Ukrainian Collective Farms
(metric tons per hectare)

	Ukraine Average pre-world war I 1901-13	Ukrainian Collectives Average 1932-34	1937-39	1939
Winter rye	0.98	0.83	1.20	1.15
Winter wheat	1.04	0.93	1.43	1.59
Summer wheat	0.70	0.73	0.76	1.03
Summer barley	0.93	0.93	1.26	1.52
Oats	1.07	0.87	1.12	1.23
Millet	0.99	0.61	1.0	1.16
Buckwheat	0.68	0.50	0.58	1.50
Maize	1.11	0.93	1.5	1.57
Average all grains	0.91	0.85	1.23	1.36

Source: Speech delivered by N. Kruschev[1], Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, cited in Agriculture in 1940, A. Mkrtumov, Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940/II.

In the entire Soviet Union the average yield of grain crops increased from 0.7 tons per hectare in 1930 to 0.97 tons per hectare in 1938.

The development of agriculture in the collective farms of the Ukrainian S.S.R. from 1934-38 is further illustrated by the following table, which shows the area under cultivation, yield per hectare and gross output of the principal crops in 1938, all in percentages of 1934.

1 Now Premier of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

TABLE VIII

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Productivity of Ukrainian Collective Farms in 1938
(expressed in percentage of 1934)

	Area under cultivation	Yield per hectare	Gross output
Grain	88.0	176.0	157
Sugar beet	98.0	164.0	161
Sunflower	89.0	208.0	171
Flax	126.0	140.0	290
Cotton	146.0	671.0	986

Source: J. Stutsenko "Productivity of Work in Collective Farms in the Ukrainian S.S.R." Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940/I.

As the table shows, the area under cultivation of grain, sugar beet, and sunflowers decreased somewhat; however, average yields per hectare and total production were increased by 75 to 100 per cent. This increase in productivity was brought about by improved cultivation methods: the use of selected seeds, chemical fertilizers, more scientific crop rotation and above all, by the greater mechanization of labour. As we have seen, the Ukraine had in 1938 nearly a thousand Machine and Tractor Stations, as compared with 657 in 1932. The effect of mechanization in the collectives is best shown by the fact that whereas in 1932 the M.T.S. cultivated 77.1 per cent. of the arable area of the Ukrainian kolkhozes, by 1937 they were serving 98.8 per cent. of the collectives' entire arable land.

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Since 1938 (the last year in which comprehensive agricultural statistics for the U.S.S.R. were published) there has been little information available about agricultural production in the Soviet Union. The figures which have been made public emerge from press or conference reports, and the information is usually very scanty. The immediate pre-war picture is therefore not clear.

We do have, however, the planned 1941 area of cultivation in the U.S.S.R., as well as the percentage of increase over 1940. From these figures we can estimate the sown areas in 1940, as the following tables show.

241 433 In comparing these figures with 1937 production the increases in the area of the Republic must be borne in mind.

Effects of the War on Ukrainian Farming

727 241 474 When the German armies were finally driven out of the Ukraine in 1944 they left most of the Republic's farmsteads completely in ruins. So great was the devastation which they wrecked that even today the full extent of it is not definitely known. It has been estimated by Ukrainian officials, however, that the invaders ruined and plundered 27,110[1] of the Ukraine's collective farms and 872[1] of the state farms, burning the buildings and wrecking or stealing the machinery. The Germans also wrecked over 422,000 collective farm buildings and 425,000 privately owned farm buildings[2], scorched and laid waste millions of hectares of farm land, and destroyed 1,500[1] machine and tractor stations. The consequent losses of machinery were enormous. Fifty-six thousand tractors, 24,000 harvester combines, 30,200 trucks and automobiles used in farming and 1,892,000 other agricultural machines were destroyed or stolen by the Germans. The next table shows the losses compared with pre-war numbers.

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1 Statement by Mr. I.S. Senin, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. at a meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers on February 7, 1947, published in Soviet News, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Department of UNRRA Supplies of the Ukrainian Government, Kiev, April 6, 1946.

The Five-Year Plan in Ukrainian Agriculture

185 According to the Five-Year Plan 1946-50 the crop area of the
311 Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is to reach 30.5 million hectares, of which
474 21.3 million are to be planted on the collective farms. The distribution of major crops is planned as follows.

TABLE XIII

Ukraine: Crop Area in 1950 (Planned)
(hectares)

	Total area	Including on the collective farms
Grain crops	19,600,000	14,100,000
Industrial crops	2,600,000	2,200,000
Melons, potatoes, and other vegetables	2,800,000	1,000,000
Fodder crops	5,400,000	4,000,000

Source: The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

The area sown to sugar beet in 1950 is fixed at 830,000 hectares, and to sunflower, 801,000 hectares. The hopfields are to be rehabilitated, and the area of vineyards growing European varieties of grapes is to be expanded. Measures are to be taken to drain 40,000 hectares and irrigate 30,000 hectares of farm land; and all engineering work needed to ensure normal production is to be restored.

241 Average yields of Ukrainian crops in 1950 are envisaged as follows:
433 grain, 1.42 tons per hectare (compare 1939 average 1.36); flax, 0.42
185 tons; sugar beet, 19 tons; and potatoes, 11.2 tons per hectare.[1]

In the entire Soviet Union in 1950 the grain harvest is planned at 127 million tons, of which the Ukraine is to produce 27.8 million tons, or more than one-fifth. The Ukraine's sugar beet harvest is fixed at 15.7 million tons, representing over 60 per cent. of the sugar beet harvest of the U.S.S.R. in 1950. The production of potatoes is expected to be 23 million tons.

The following table compares these targets with pre-war production.

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1 Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

231 During the war these numbers were greatly reduced: the Germans killed, stole, or drove away 3.311 million horses, 7.594 million head of cattle, 9.355 million pigs, 7.317 million sheep, and over 59.379 million fowl of all kinds.[1]

231 727 474 The collective farms of the Republic suffered most heavily. After the German occupation the collective farms of the Ukraine were left with only 6.3 per cent. of their 1940 herds of cattle, 1.9 per cent. of their pigs, and 3.4 per cent. of their sheep. In practical terms, the Germans had almost completely wiped out collectively-owned livestock.

231 727 In rehabilitating their herds the collective farms have received much assistance from the Soviet Government and the fraternal Republics - Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia and others - which have supplied **hundreds** of thousands of animals. However, the number of livestock in the kolkhozes are still far below pre-war. Most rapid steps were made in the re-stocking of cattle herds, which by early 1946 had reached 66 per cent. of the pre-war number of Ukrainian collective farms; pigs were 23 per cent. of pre-war and sheep and goats, 29 per cent. (Note: the figures in the two preceding paragraphs relate to collective farms alone.)[2]

The following table shows the pre-war numbers of livestock in the Ukraine (pre-1940 boundaries) and in the Soviet Union as a whole.

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946.

231 In the first years after Western Ukraine was incorporated into the
474 Ukrainian S.S.R. there were built up in that region 285 cattle farms, 185 sheep farms, and 112 pig farms. By January 1, 1941, there was a total of 742 livestock farms in Western Ukraine alone.[1]

Bessarabia

231 There are no recent figures available for livestock in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina; in 1935, however, it was estimated that these two regions contained three-quarters of a million cattle, as well as 611,000 pigs, 2,395,000 sheep, and 602,000 horses (a total of 4,340,000 cattle, sheep, pigs and horses).[2] We have no figures as to how much of this livestock was included in the provinces added to the Ukraine.

Ukrainian S.S.R. Livestock: the Five-Year Plan

231 By 1950, according to the Five-Year Plan, the number of horses in
185 the Ukraine should reach 2,629,000, a target which is 60 per cent. lower than the pre-war figure. To attain even this number, a great increase of horses must yet be made. In order partially to compensate, the Five-Year Plan has fixed a great increase in the number of oxen, so that the total number of oxen and horses together in 1950 will be five per cent. higher than before the war.

The following table shows the planned number of livestock in the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 1950.

TABLE XVII

Livestock in the Ukraine, 1950 (Planned)

	Total	Included on the collective farms	Per cent. increase 1950 total over 1940 numbers
Cattle	12,230,000	4,700,000	16
Pigs	9,600,000	3,300,000	7
Sheep and goats	6,780,000	3,100,000	8
Horses	2,629,000	1,363,000	- 60[1]

1 Decrease from 1941 figure.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

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1 Soviet State and Law III, Moscow, 1941.

2 International Institute of Agriculture, Rome.

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TABLE XXVII

Ukraine: Prices of Rationed Food
(in roubles per kilogram)

	Before October 1, 1946	After October 1, 1946	Percentage increase
Bread (black with rye)	0.9	3.2	255
Bread (whole wheat)	1.8	6.0	240
Meat tushonka	16.6	32.0	87
Pork in gravy	20.5	35.3	72
Meat and vegetables	10.0	15.3	53
Pork and rice	15.7	30.7	90
Meat and corn	10.0	17.7	77
Herrings in tomato sauce	11.5	25.0	117
Herrings in natural oil	17.2	37.5	118
Smoked cod	9.8	18.0	84
Lard	18.0	36.0	100

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

Public Markets

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The third kind of outlet for the distribution of food to the urban population is the public markets (officially called "Collective Farm Markets"). Their importance as a source of supplementary food is difficult generally to assess. On the one hand, extremely high prices plus the inconstancy or inadequacy of supplies prevent any group in the population from depending on the public markets for any substantial part of its diet; on the other hand, the variety of food sometimes available impels many to supplement the limited amounts and kinds of foods secured at the ration stores by purchases in the public markets. While prices are fixed and rigidly controlled in the ration stores, there is no control of prices whatever in the public markets, and the seller and purchaser usually agree on the price after a rather elaborate process of bargaining. On account of the limitations in supply, the selling prices are usually dear.

There are striking differences between the fixed, ration store prices and the uncontrolled market place prices. For example, in July 1946 (before ration prices were raised) white bread which - depending on the extraction rate of flour - was selling in ration stores at 90 kopecks[1] to 2.7 roubles a kilogram was selling in the public markets at 28.5 to

1 There are 160 kopecks to a rouble

TABLE XXVIII

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Ukraine: Food Prices in a Typical Public Market
(in roubles)

	June 1946	July 1946	January 1947
Bread, kilo	22.5	23.0	50.0 - 55.0
Meat "	about 60.0	70 - 100	60.0
Fish "	-	-	63.0
Milk, litre	16.0	15.0	16.0
Butter, kilo	190.0	190.0	230.0
Eggs, dozen	42.0	48.0	-
Cereals (various) kilo	-	50.0	-
Sugar	-	100.0	-
Vegetable oil	-	200.0	200.0

- Very little or none on sale. Supplies vary greatly but are never very large.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

UNRRA Supplies and the Food Situation

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Until the produce from local farms became available in the spring and summer of 1946, the diet of the urban population of the Ukraine depended principally, apart from bread, on UNRRA food supplies, which in the beginning consisted almost entirely of U.S. army rations, plus some dried and evaporated milk and tushonka. Urgently needed fats and oils were slow in arriving; up to May only 8,596 tons had been received in the Ukraine. The shortage was critical, since domestic production was providing a rate of only 4 to 5 kilograms of fats a year per person, as compared with 12.8 in 1940 and 22 kilograms in 1929.

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Very little food was being received from other parts of the Soviet Union, and a protracted dry spell was threatening the 1946 harvest. Official rations for almost all categories of consumers were low;

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

423 1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political
661 and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding
565 chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the
474 redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution
[433] against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable: during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to
• 475 the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the
474 new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—
661 including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

474 As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really
423 serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the
656 Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32, and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

185 474 241 The peasants also revived and breathed new life into the co-operatives which had been broken up during the period of Militant Communism. In 1923 they established another cooperative organization, the Selo-Tekhnyka (Village Machines) which purchased more expensive agricultural machinery and rented it out to the peasants for the appropriate agricultural work. These points became the centre of mechanization and were in effect the first [453] tractor stations. In 1924 they established the First Agricultural Bank, a sort of private institution which at one time had more loans outstanding than had the Ukrainian State Bank which was, of course, closely supervised by Moscow.

185 369 All these efforts* met with marked success and agriculture speedily began to revive. The peasants became more prosperous and their holdings of livestock rapidly increased, although they did not reach the pre-war level. This, in its turn, created a new demand for manufactured products and restored the factories to operation, and with them the conditions in the cities began to improve.

185 471 [475] Similar concessions were made to industry, but with one important difference. The larger and more important industrial plants were not turned back to their former owners who were, as before, allowed no voice or influence in their direction. They were taken from the workers who had seized and abused them during the period of Militant Communism and placed under the supervision of government trusts. These were either regional in character or confined to a single branch of industry. In either case, they were under the control of a more or less trusted group of men among whom Communists were in the leading positions, but while they received certain credits from the state, they were more or less autonomous and they were allowed to go through regular commercial transactions and encouraged to show profits in their annual reports. There was thus again a source of encouragement both for the directors and the workers, and slowly but surely the level of industry began to rise.

The smaller plants were very often leased to individuals who were allowed to employ hired labor and the hope was given to these that their taxes would be at such a level that they, too, could

* [NEP attempts to restore peasant prosperity -- Analyst]

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment 642
of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely 631
in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to ad- [475]
minister industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine 423
they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new 474
philosophy looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and 661
determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force 425
them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1927- Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

planation is, of course, that a vast number of city dwellers were [177] Russified Ukrainians. Naturally enough, the nationalist leaders 369 felt that no secure basis for their program could exist as long as 186 the municipalities of the country were islands of foreign culture.

Within the urban group, nationalist efforts and nationalist 369 sentiment were largely concentrated in one social stratum. Na- 186 tionalist movements throughout the world have usually been the 565 work of the middle class. Since there had been no East Ukrainian capitalist middle class of any significance before 1920, and since there was no possibility that one could arise under Soviet conditions, except for a few traders carrying on a precarious business under the NEP, a commercial class continued to be lacking. The 475 counterpart to private commercial enterprise which existed under 565 the Soviet regime, the state trading system, was apparently largely operated by Jews and other non-Ukrainian elements.[2] Unfavorable appraisals of the activity of this system, plus distasteful memories of the "profit-and-run" techniques of the nepmen had produced an unattractive image of the private businessman in the minds of most East Ukrainians.[3] Although, under German occupation, a few gestures were made by some city administrations toward encouraging individual enterprise, the chief factors in production and distribution, insofar as the appalling economic conditions made such activities possible at all, were public and

nationalist movements endeavor to claim as large a proportion as possible of the inhabitants of a disputed area as members of their national group in origin and attitude. It must be remembered, however, that the OUN, and some other Ukrainian nationalist groups, were not democratic in ideology; hence the wishes of a majority at a particular time were of little importance in their eyes. Rather, this failure to possess the adherence of the inhabitants of an area which they regarded as theirs through the "rights" of history and blood served as an additional proof of the iniquities of the Soviet regime and of Russians in general and as a stimulus to more strenuous efforts to "correct" the situation.

[2] Some Ukrainians today (Interview 35) state that many wartime ascriptions of all the evils of the Soviet system to the Jews were highly exaggerated, in most cases a forced concession to Nazi racism, but insist that there was a good deal of anti-Semitism in the Ukraine because Jews predominated in retail distribution, and in the conditions of extreme shortage used their positions for selfish purposes. In view of the occupations of most Jews before the Revolution, their numerical predominance in the state distributive system is probably a fact, and it is fairly obvious that any recognizably alien group in such a position would be resented when they could not satisfy the consumers' wants, whether or not peculation played a role in their activities.

[3] Interview 65.

[475] cooperative enterprises. Hence the development of a middle class
565 on the traditional Western model did not take place.

Actually, in the Ukraine, as in many other countries in which
517 nationalist movements have developed, it was other components
186 of the middle class which played the leading role. These were the intellectuals, the professionals, and the bureaucrats, together with the student body from which they were recruited. All four of these categories, together with a vast number of persons who would in Western usage be classified simply as clerks, technicians, or even custodial personnel, are lumped together in Soviet classifications as "intelligentsia"—i.e., all whose work does not involve a large measure of manual labor.[4] The leaders of the nationalist movements came from a narrower stratum however. The majority of this leadership consisted of intellectuals par excellence; that is, it was drawn from the academic or literary profession.

This crucial statement requires some proof, which is difficult to present in the absence of statistics or the possibility of sampling, both of which are unavailable for obvious reasons. However, the preponderance of intellectuals is indicated indirectly by figures previously cited on the extremely high proportion of persons with higher or secondary education employed in the Kiev city and *raion* administrations in 1942,[5] and by the statements from well-informed participants that these and other administrations, as well as editorial staffs, served as refuges for intellectuals displaced from their normal occupations.[6] Furthermore, the efforts of nationalist groups, whether OUN or local, were directed very largely toward assisting and encouraging the teachers and writers, a factor which suggests that they were closely tied to these segments of the population. For example, Mel'nyk organizers in Kiev in the winter of 1941–42 made special efforts to secure work in the cooperatives for teachers in order to enable them to avoid forced labor for the rebuilding of bridges.[7] Similarly, the strong

[4] For a discussion of the concept in Soviet usage, see Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 324 ff.

[5] See Chapter IX.

[6] See Chapter V.

[7] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 16. According to one account, the Red Cross in Kiev also aided the intelligentsia (along with prisoners of war) to a special degree (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 4, 1942, p. 2).

474 find work in the villages. All able-bodied men and women and also young people are required to cooperate in the kolhosp. These forces are divided into so-called work brigades. Thus there is a brigade for field work, another for the grooming of horses, a third for cattle-raising and dairy farming. The farmer has turned into "comrade fieldworker", the hired man into "comrade groom", and the servant girl into "comrade milkmaid". The brigades are divided up into "lanky" (links of a chain). Since the entire system of co-owners gives ample opportunity to shirk and to blame others for one's negligence, individual "links" are now given the entire cultivation of one section of a field, from ploughing to harvesting. In this way one has, quite unintentionally, gone back more or less to the old order in which the individual farm cultivated its land in a similar manner.

The Bolshevik village community has many shortcomings. Love of work and productivity are negligible, for individual industry scarcely effects the amount of wages. But peasant industriousness cannot be dissociated from a good harvest. Therefore, efforts have been made in recent times to spur on Comrade "farm worker" by means of prizes. Distant Moscow determines the plan for sowing; the political board appoints the supervisor of the farm, although according to the statute he should be elected by the members of the kolhosp. A
475 further source of constant trouble, constant bungl-
474 ing and therefore irrevocable losses are the "machine-tractor stations" (MTS). It was precisely with these state organizations for /154/ agricultural machines that Moscow intended to remove all difficulties in the process of modernizing agriculture. Thus the kolhosp were ordered to deliver all their agricultural machinery there. The MTS were to keep it in order and at the same time constantly enlarge their stock of machines by the purchase of new tractors, ploughs, harrows, mowing

475 machines and threshing machines. At the time of
474 sowing and reaping the MTS with all their machines were to be at the disposal of the kolhosp.

474 Let us now imagine a large estate without draft animals and without machines. Before planting time messengers must be sent to a station that is perhaps 40 to 50 kilometers distant, with the request that machines be sent on a certain day for plowing and sowing and in fall for mowing and threshing. After long months of rest the machines of the central station were suddenly supposed to be in all villages at once. The unreliability of this arrangement is even more evident when climatic conditions demand the quickest possible execution of sowing and reaping. Within a few days the sprouting of the new seed can become decisive. The kernel can be laid into the black earth only when the rich humus is dry enough so that wagons and horses can drive over the field roads without getting stuck. But sowing must take place before the warm wind has dried out the ground. Again, at harvest time, one must take advantage of the proper moment. The grain must be sufficiently ripe but not over-ripe, otherwise it will drop out of the ears. This is the time when the German farmer goes to the field every day in order to test the ripeness of his grain. In the collective farm the idea is to be more progressive. There the agronomic supervisor of the distant MTS knows exactly when the grain at kolhosp XY has reached the proper firmness and when he can send forth his tractors and harvesters.

475 In 1935 there were 873 machine-tractor-stations in the entire Soviet Ukraine. In 1936 it was estimated that each /155/ MTS had 70 tractors, 16 mowing-threshing machines, 50 threshing machines, 15 traction engines, 15 motors and a crew of 400 men. The supervision of an MTS consists of a technical director, his political representative, a supervising agronomist - there

•475 are eight agronomists all together working at an MTS - , the chief bookkeeper and the leading mechanic. These five comrades are the actual lords of the kolhosp of their district. The local leader of a kolhosp is merely the inspector who must follow the directions of the MTS and who all too often has no idea of how to run a farm.

474 As to what these large agricultural projects
475 are like in practice, we have the following reports in the Soviet newspapers: The Communist Khar'kov) of January 8, 1939 announces that in the region of Dniepropetrovsk 82,211 doppelzentner of seed grain are lacking and that in the Khar'kov region 38.5% of the necessary seed is lacking. Visti (kiyev) of March 28, 1939, under the title of: "Sowing and not waiting for the ground to dry out", published the following report by its regional correspondent in Odessa: "After the bad weather field work has begun in the Odessa region. The sun and wind dry out the soil quickly, and the kolhosp of the southern districts of the region have begun sowing individual crops... The kolhosp of 'Spartakus' district have entered the contest in honor of the Eighteenth Plenary Assembly of the Communist Party, and are carrying on their spring sowing on a large scale. More than 1000 hectares of spring crops have already been sown in the district. Comrade Shlef and Comrade Wakker who run the tractors are performing 150% of the average of work per day. During the noon recess the kolhosp agitators help the members of the kolhosp study and memorize the speech of the leader of peoples, Stalin, delivered at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party....But in spite of the present very favorable weather at present, not all the MTS of the Odessa region are ready to plant. In this region /156/ 112 tractors have not been repaired, 69 of which are caterpillar tractors. At the MTS of Andrei-Ivanov, for example, only one out of six caterpillar tractors is repaired; in the Ianiv MTS only one out of four;

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in the Vradiyiv MTS not one of three. As far as the supply of seed grain is concerned, all is not well. As a result of the inactivity and lack of management of the regional office for grain supplies, only 85% of the kolhosp are supplied with select grain. It is incomprehensible why there is a lack of seed grain precisely in those kolhosp that so industriously set about planting. Every day several dozen vehicles drive up to the grain provisioning center of Golovanevsk in order to exchange grain that is unsuitable for planting, and are forced to return without seed grain. In the granary at Golovanevsk there are 2000 doppelzentner of barley which for some reason is not cleaned. The precious spring days are wasted on trips to the elevator...The leaders of those rayons which have in part begun sowing fail to readjust the kolhosp immediately to field work... The MTS are not supplied with fuel quickly enough. As a result of an insufficient supply of fuel field work can come to a standstill even during the first few days of mass sowing. The leaders of the districts and rayons ought to head the contest for a superior Stalin-harvest in honor of the Eighteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party, in which the great masses of kolhosp have determined to take part."

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On June 7 and 8, 1939 a meeting of the active committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine was held in Kiyev. Khrushchov, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the KPU stated that the harvest for this year promised to be a very good one, "but in the Bile Pole district only 18 out of 39 mowing-threshing machines were repaired, and the same was true of 19 out of 64 threshing machines and 2 out of 16 hauling machines. The situation in the /157/manufacture of sugar beets is alarming. The Odessa factory 'The Red

474 Signal' did not...deliver 100 threshing machines.
475 In the Chernigov region 70% of the necessary machine rakes are lacking; there is also a great lack of scythes... It is necessary to train 4000 persons in the handling of mowing-threshing machines, but the proper courses have not yet been organized..."

The "Sotsialistychna Zemlia" Number 114, 1939 complains: "Many kolhosp have no bags. The Storehouses in which the grain is to be kept are not rain-proof. In many kolhosp the repair of agricultural implements had to be suspended and in many others it could not even be begun because of the lack of forge coal. The shops have neither harnesses nor tar nor wagon-grease. In the region of Zhitomir only 160 out of 544 threshing machines were put into working order, and the same was true of only 143 out of 1475 motors." From the report of the representative of the Dnepropetrovsk region, Zadyonchenko, at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, "Izvestiia" of April 6, 1939 says that in 3000 kolhosp there are only 195 Communist organizations; that there were 8 repair shops for 66 MTS, which did not suffice to repair all broken-down tractors. We could fill a book with similar complaints taken from the Soviet press.

The beneficiary of the kolhosp is first of all the Muscovite state that takes as its share up to 25% of the estimated yield at a ridiculously low price. The MTS are paid in kind for their services. Of the rest of the harvest yield the seed grain and animal fodder are segregated and about 10 to 15% of the harvest is set aside as iron reserves, - before the First World War the cautious farmer always stored up the yield of an
474 entire harvest. Finally, the members of the kolhosp receive a certain annual share of provisions, aside from current provisions; what is left over is divided up in proportion to the number of days that have been worked. For some time now an

11: Obermaier--185 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

•45 where the state regulates everything, there is no longer any room for self-maintenance. State commerce is supervised by the various commissariats, which fact does not facilitate its smooth running. The commissariats for internal commerce, for the food industry, for local industry, the "Division for the Welfare of Workers" and other offices also have a voice. In 1935 there were 310,300 workers employed "in 000 the service of Ukrainian commerce". Of this crew the Jews represented 42.8% and the Ukrainians 38.1%. (118)

118: Soviet Trade, Kiyev 1937.

/171/ The Soviet press sometimes tells tales out of school about how Soviet business has developed under the leadership of the Jews who reputedly 433 have a talent for business. Pravda of November 16, 1936, writes of a "fantastic flood of rules and regulations". During the first nine months of 1936, they said, the people's commissar Weizer issued 42,000 orders, decrees and resolutions. Izvestiia of March 14, 1937 writes: "In Rostov on the Don the demand for light articles of clothing is great, but the shops are empty. Summer clothing, suits, underwear, sport clothes, bathing suits, there is nothing of this kind in the fifty-nine shops of the city. There is unbelievable disorder in supplies." On the subject [685] of profiteering Pravda reports on May 25, 1937: "In 1936 deficits, embezzlements and divestments amounted to an enormous sum: in government business 217 million rubles, in the consumer cooperatives 203 million rubles. But these represent only the deficits and embezzlements that were discovered!" Za Industriializatsii of July 17, 1937, gives an interesting glimpse into how the Donets region is supplied with food. "In the regulation of April 29 of this year," writes the periodical, "the council of the people's commis-

CONSTITUTION

(Fundamental Law)

of the

UKRAINIAN

SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLIC

of January 30, 1937

As amended through November 21, 1949

Chapter I. The Social Structure

642 Art. 1. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

Art. 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists, the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the liberation of the Ukrainian people from national oppression by Tsarism and by the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie and the defeat of the nationalist counter-revolution constitute the political foundation of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 3. In the Ukrainian SSR all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

471 Art. 4. The economic foundation of the Ukrainian SSR is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production established as the result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man.

Art. 5. Socialist property in the Ukrainian SSR exists either in the form of State property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property (the possession of collective farms or co-operative associations).

475 421 Art. 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, communications, large State-organized agricultural enterprises (State farms, machine and tractor stations and the like), as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of houses in the cities and industrial localities, are State property, that is belong to the whole people.

474 421 Art. 7. The common enterprises of collective farms and co-operative organizations with their livestock and implements, and the products of the collective farms and co-operative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of collective farms and co-operative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the common collective farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small [472] plot of household land and, as its personal property, a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements — in accordance with the regulations of the agricultural artel.

727 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport
433 are to be rebuilt; the mining of coal is to regain and then to outstrip the pre-war output; the production of machinery and equipment for both light and heavy industry is to be restored; and to do this, iron and steel production is to be increased until it surpasses pre-war. War damaged power stations are to be rehabilitated, and additional ones are to be constructed, particularly in smaller communities.

[185] Altogether the output of industrial enterprises in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is envisaged at 9,200 million roubles, of which the output of state industries under local jurisdiction and of industrial co-operatives is estimated to comprise 3,100 million roubles[1].

The volume of industrial production in the whole U.S.S.R. in 1950 - that is, the last year of the Five-Year Plan - is fixed at 205,000 million roubles (in 1926-27 prices). Compared with 138,500 million roubles in 1940, this represents an increase in industrial output of 48 per cent.

727 Particular stress in the Five-Year Plan is laid on the development
433 of the Western Ukraine and the Transcarpathian Region. Lvov, the main
361 city of the Western Ukraine, is to be developed into a major industrial centre, where there are to be built and put into operation an automobile assembly plant, electrical, telephone, and telegraph-equipment manufacturing plants, a glass works, a knitting mill, and food processing plants.

In the Transcarpathian Region, new light industry plants are to be constructed, and the mining of brown coal (lignite) is to be organized and extended. Provision is to be made for the rehabilitation and development of the woodworking and wood chemical industries and of farming, particularly fruit-growing, viticulture, livestock breeding and apiculture,
[652] as well as of the food processing industries. The farms of the Transcarpathian Region are to be given considerable state assistance in the form of agricultural machines, fertilizers, and credits.

000 A more detailed discussion of the Five-Year Plan in connection with farming and the various industries follows in later sections of this report.

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[475] It must be remembered that a number of enterprises although situated in the Ukrainian Republic are not under the Republic's jurisdiction, but under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union Government.

311 241 [407] [475] Despite a certain reduction in the area under cultivation in the Ukraine, (25,124,900 hectares in 1937 as compared with 26,438,400 in 1932), production rose considerably, reflecting great progress in the mechanization of agriculture. The number of tractors increased from 51,300 in 1932 to 83,900 in 1937. The number of harvesting combines increased in the same period from 4,900 to 26,700. The number of Machine and Tractor Stations grew from 657 to 958. The mechanization of agriculture in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is shown in the following table, which compares the output of energy from draught animals with the energy derived from machines, both in the Ukrainian Republic and in the entire Soviet Union. (It should be noted that, according to Soviet practice, the output of energy is measured in kilowatt hours.)

TABLE V

Output of Energy in Agriculture, 1938
(million kwh)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	Total Soviet Union
[407] Energy from machines	4,211	19,304.2
379] Energy from draught cattle	1,662	14,667.5
Total output of energy in agriculture	5,873	33,971.7

Source : Planned Economy XII, Moscow, 1940.

[178] As the table shows, the percentage of mechanization in the Ukraine was greater than in the entire Soviet Union.

Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

311 According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there
425 were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000
723 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The prinecipal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Izmail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

474 Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution
241 of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas
178 from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

475 Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the
407 Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Izmail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

475 In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in
407 June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in
652 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.

11: Obermaier--93 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

/91/ [Galicia] Self-Aid [Volhynia]

555 Galicia and Volhynia are parts of the ghetto of the world, lying between Cracow and Odessa. There is no question about the fact that anyone who can here compete commercially with the Jews and politically with the Poles has certain abilities. The Ukrainians of Galicia have a talent for organization. If their business methods are often primitive according to our conceptions, it
555 is not their fault. Where proper money is scarce,
[436] as is the case among all small peasants of the East and Southeast, it is replaced by some market-
476 able goods: people unhesitatingly deal in eggs. Ukrainian cooperatives tried very hard to change these conditions; they were equally adept in ancient barter as in international business involving clearing and regulations pertaining to payments and foreign exchange.

Jews and cooperatives waged a bitter fight against each other. But where usury and chain businesses of ill repute flourish, cooperatives
[452] have an easy time of it. Before the First World War the usurers demanded a 100% interest. Now they say: "I am giving you money; good, - but you must sell me your calves, your geese, your chickens and your eggs." For a zentner of seed they demand two zentner of produce from the harvest. In the gin shops they manage to obtain, by fraudulent means, the best pastures of the Huzul country, only to rent them to the former owners. If the cooperative makes its way into such villages which are under Jewish domination, it soon has the peasants on its side, and since no one buys from the Jew, no one sells to him and his inn is avoided, he must sooner or later pack up his belongings. /92/

For the Ukrainians the Jewish problem is a
563 problem of food. Wherever people have ambitions and where they desire to improve their basic way of living, they run up against Jews. Jews

11: Obermaier--94 J-3(no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Galicia] [Volhynia] European Jews E14

U 563 are found in the villages and cities, everywhere except at hard peasant labor. As early as 1900, E.J. 162 74% of all Jews earning a livelihood in Russia, Poland and Galicia were in commerce, in the credit system, in crafts and in industry. In 1931 there U [463] were 158,400 Jews living in villages in East Galicia alone, that is 3% of the people living in the country; in the cities, on the other hand, there were 454,900 Jews or 37.3% of the urban population. (51) In 1929 the various trades were

51. Seraphim, Jewry in East European Area, p. 340.

50% in the hands of Jews, and in Volhynia a total of 73% of all tailors, shoemakers, tanners, bakers, furriers, blacksmiths, watchmakers and other artisans were Jews.

U 563 In spite of the fact that the Ukrainians lived in such close proximity to Jews, they kept their cultural life free of Jewish influence and their race free from Jewish blood.

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U •476 "More important than selling and profit is the community which has become happy and morally strong as a result of proper training by means of cooperative work and self-aid." These words were not, as might be supposed, spoken at a major assembly of German cooperatives; they were coined at Lwów by the head of the Ukrainian cooperatives. They were addressed to the West Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian cooperatives were of unusual national significance; they improved the wretched condition of the peasants and educated the latter to think in terms of the common welfare; and they offered to Ukrainian intelligentsia a real, albeit meager possibility of existence. How can condi- U 162 tions in the country be anything but miserable if 60% of the peasants own dwarf farms with less than

162 five hectares of land, if overpopulation is so great that in 49% of the country there are between 80 and 100 /93/ people and in 51% there are more than 100 persons per square kilometer. (52)

52. Kubiyovich: The Distribution of the Population, page 35.

476 The ideological center of the Ukrainian cooperative system was the "Revised Union of Ukrainian Cooperatives" with its center in Lwów. At the beginning of 1939 it controlled the four departmental provincial centers with a total of 3455 cooperatives and 673,000 members. The four departmental centers were the "Centrobanka" for credit cooperatives (1889 members at the end of 1938, with an annual sale of 70.5 million zloty); the "Centrosoyuz" for the agricultural buying and selling cooperatives, the "Maslosoyuz" for dairy farmers' cooperatives and the "Narodnya Torgovlia" for urban consumer societies. The private capital of the Revised Union amounted to 23 million zloty at the end of 1938, the savings came to over 12 million zloty. The sales receipts of all cooperatives amounted to 159 million zloty.

One is almost tempted to speak of a "Ukrainian autarchy" if one hears how much business the buying and selling cooperatives carried on. Galicia and [241] particularly Podolia with its rich black earth and sheltered valleys is rich in fruit, vegetables, legumes, hemp, grain. Cattle-raising is also [233] intensively carried on, especially in the Carpathian foreland. The peasant brought all these products to the cooperative which was ready to serve him and not to profit by him. The cooperatives maintained collection and sorting centers where the products were turned into "standardized" goods. The same cooperative furnished practically everything a farm household needed: shoes, chicory, sugar, kerosene, headgear, candles, seeds, artificial fertilizer and machines. Much of it

476 was made in the cooperative society's own factories. The society owned cement factories, lime plants, mills, cloth-weaving factories, bakeries, oil presses and even a factory that made boot polish and cosmetics.

439 Whither did Ukrainian goods go? Peas, beans and poultry to England and Belgium, clover seed to Holland, /94/ pigs to Germany, beef cattle via Constanta to Greece, poultry to Germany, Switzerland and to - Palestine, eggs to many countries and in cans, as far as Buenos Aires.

[545] Sociologically noteworthy is the growth of an urban stratum of artisans, merchants and small industrialists. The Ukrainians who, much to their 369 own disadvantage, neglected the cities because of 476 their love for quiet village life, now gradually pushed into the cities, and the credit cooperatives supported them in this.

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741 Of greatest significance for the advancement of Ukrainian culture were the societies for edu- 517 cation and public health. The society for popular 217 education, "Prosvita", was even older than the Ukrainian system of cooperatives, reaching back to 1883. It was a veritable national sanctuary of the Ukrainians. The people are indebted to it for a large part of their cultural advance. The "Prosvita" was an actual school for advanced studies in the country. In 3214 village libraries with 700,000 volumes, two instructive monthly magazines and with inexpensive editions of books, it enabled the village inhabitants who were cut off from all urban culture to obtain the knowledge which alone made it possible for them to assert themselves against their enemies. Besides that, 741 "Prosvita", which on January 1, 1938 numbered 517 360,000 members, and owned 1457 club houses with rooms for meetings, promoted group singing, music, the community theater and folk art. It helped

000 available positions. And yet the proportion of Jews in the total population amounted to -7.1%. (115) On the board of the Commissariat of Inter-

115. Seraphim: The Jewry in East European Area, page 263.

nal Trade in Moscow there were at times 49 Jews among 124 members, and in the foreign trade commissariat there were no less than 55 out of 106. In the finance commissariat "Judaization was complete". With the constant change of leadership in the commissariats, the number of Jews active in the commissariats for communications, for inland and ocean shipping, for heavy industry, agriculture, the food industry and in many other commissariats the Jews occupy the key positions. (116) From there they direct the "mass invasion"

116. Seraphim: The Jewry in the East European Area, page 642 ff.

of the members of their race into the middle and top-rank positions of the administrative and economic system of the Union.

*

476 Today there are only meager remnants left of the East Ukrainian system of cooperatives which was still performing tolerable services during the time of the collectives, - in 1930 there were 40,081 cooperatives with 5.5 million members. (117)

117. Zalotzietskiy: The Spiritual Life of the Ukraine, page 143.

The distribution of goods is handled up to about 80% by state stores;the cooperatives are on the same footing with them. Where the state regulates

(b) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

Organizations to promote trade in the Ukraine are 441
not numerous. The true traders of the country are the native Jews, and to trace their involved dealings is impossible.

The sales of the coal and iron are almost wholly 477
controlled by rings and cartels. The most powerful one, the *Prodamet*, or metal sales combine, controlled recently over 80 per cent. of all the iron and steel produced in South Russia and threatened to absorb the entire output.

The activities of the *zemstvos* in trade call for mention. 441
These organs of local government actively enter into 185
trade in agricultural machinery, improved seed, and pedigree live-stock, and endeavour to improve the facilities for selling the products of domestic industry. Their aim is to lift the internal commerce of the country from the condition of dependence on speculating middlemen, into which it has almost irretrievably fallen, but their achievements so far only touch the fringe of a deep-seated social trouble.

There are chambers of commerce at Odessa, Kiev, 441
Kharkov, Berdyansk, and Mariupol, and there is a branch of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce at Odessa. Odessa, Nikolaev, and Yelisavetgrad have corn exchanges, and coal and iron exchanges exist at Kharkov.

(c) *Foreign Interests and Methods of Economic Penetration*

The present state of commerce in the Ukraine pro- 471
vides a wide field for economic penetration from abroad. 433
Agriculture in its first stages is not much affected, but in one case, that of the production of sugar from beet, the secondary stages of manufacture have been much exploited by foreign capital and management. The coal and iron mining industries and the iron and steel manufacturing industries owe their foundation in great measure to foreigners, by whom they are still largely

poverty of the East Ukraine and the predominance in many 186
nominally Ukrainian places of the Russian language and cul- 626
ture.[75] East Ukrainian students coming to L'vov, on the other hand, had their first opportunity to become infected with the "virus" of "bourgeois nationalism."[76] Aside from producing these 668*
undesired ideological results, the earlier policy failed to prevent underground work by the Nationalist youth of Galicia.

Most of the members of the OUN were not able, of course, to [486]
leave the Soviet-occupied area. It is impossible to secure reliable
evidence concerning the exact extent to which those who re- 668*
mained could carry on their activities, but it is certain that they 661
carefully refrained from open opposition. Nevertheless, late in 1940 the NKVD succeeded in tracking down a large number of Nationalists; they were sentenced to death or prison after a proceeding in L'vov known in the OUN accounts as the "trial of the fifty-nine." Among those sentenced to death was Krymins'kyi, the chief of the OUN movement in Soviet-occupied territories.[77] In all likelihood, he and his companions had sided with Bandera in the dispute with Mel'nyk. Certainly, the remaining members who, in spite of severe losses, were able to continue as an organized underground, were firm adherents of the new leader. The new underground director, John Klymiv, was in fact one of the most fanatical supporters which this fanatical movement of the younger generation could boast.[78] While there were undoubtedly many supporters of Colonel Mel'nyk in Galicia, it is doubtful whether they were active—or rash—enough to form what could be called an underground, although apparently agents kept up sporadic contacts with headquarters in the Generalgouvernement.

The situation in Volhynia was less favorable to Nationalist 668*
activity than that in Galicia, since the OUN had never enrolled such a high proportion of the youth there. Throughout most if not all of the area, Mel'nyk and Bandera apparently had no

[75] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, p. 3.
[76] Interview 51.
[77] See, for example, Mykhailiuk, p. 4. Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, August 17, 1941, p. 4, reprinting an article from *Ukraïns'ki Shchodenni Visti* (L'vov).
[78] Interview 43.

[Non-interference with Ukrainian national aspirations --Analyst]

731 656 the Moscow Government, in 1933, forbade foreign journalists to enter Ukraine.

Back in the summer of 1932 the Ukrainian farmers in Canada addressed the Soviet Red Cross with the proposition to send their grain for gratis distribution among the hungry in Ukraine. But Moscow resolutely refused to accept this gift. The hunger catastrophe of 1932/33 was so great that the population of Ukraine died in masses, and cannibalism and necrophagy spread among the people. The peasants of Ukraine, weakened and decimated by the famine, were forced to enter 'voluntarily' the Soviet collective farms. Though the harvest of 1933 was good, millions of Ukrainians did not live to see it.

The dimensions of the devastations of Ukraine by the famine 'organised' by Soviet Russia were carefully concealed by the Russian Communist Government, and are even now kept secret. Only by chance some foreign correspondents learned about the results of this famine in Ukraine. W. H. Chamberlin writes in his book, *The Confessions of an Individualist:* New York, 1941, on the famine of 1933 as follows:

"There were many rumours of mass starvation, especially in the normally rich farming regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus. The impression that something very abnormal was taking place in the villages was strengthened by the fact that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had introduced a new rule forbidding journalists to travel in Russia without special permission — a permission which was never granted when Ukraine and the North Caucasus were mentioned as destinations. The official explanation of this ruling would have deserved an international mendacity prize. It was that the presence of foreign correspondents would disturb the harvesting operations . . . The ban on journalistic travel was suggestively lifted after the new harvest had been gathered in — after there had been an opportunity to bury the corpses and to remove the outward signs of the famine —".

[486]

The same author writes about his visit to the Ukrainian part of the North Caucasus — the Kuban Region:

"This had been one of the richest and most smiling agricultural regions in Russia . . . There was an amazing lack of domestic animals; one saw none of the dogs that had formerly rushed out barking when we entered Cossack villages. In the first house we entered at random we found that seven members of the family have died of hunger. Three had survived. We did not meet any peasant who did not tell us of the loss of relatives or friends".

On the famine in Ukraine Chamberlin writes:

4. the province of oceanic climate (southern coast of Crimea and that part of Sub-Caucasia that lies along the sea coast) has warm, rainy winters and hot, dry summers. 132

c) Rivers and Seas

The rivers of Ukraine are long and carry much water. They either flow to the Baltic (Syan, Veper, Buh and Narew and other tributaries of the Vistula), or to the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv (Danube with tributaries, Dnister, Buh, Dnipro, Don with Donets etc.). The fact that the main watershed runs through the plains faciliates the construction of a network of canals connecting the seas. The Dnipro (1405 miles long and draining an area of 199 230 sq. miles) is the largest river in Ukraine. Historical settlements lie on its banks and the Ukrainian state developed along its course. For the people of Ukraine it is a sacred river. 133 487

The Buh (497 miles long, draining an area of 24 450 sq. miles) flows into the Black Sea west of the Dnipro. It has not much water and is not navigable.

South-west Ukraine is drained by the Dnister (856 miles long, area of basin 29615 sq. m.). Its course is not regulated either and it is not navigable. The rivers Prut and Cheremosh connect Ukraine with the Danube, while the Don and the Donets form the channel to the Sea of Oziv; the Kuban river drains the Kuban plain.

The Black Sea (area 158 462 sq. miles) connected by the Kerch Strait with the Sea of Oziv (area 14 615 sq. miles) has always been the channel of commerce between the eastern world and the countries round the Mediterranean. Its most important harbors, Odessa, Sevastopil, and Novorossijske are blocked by ice for a short time only; the Sea of Oziv, on the other hand, is too shallow to be navigable.

d) Flora and Fauna

The commonest tree in the northern forest zone is the pine; the birch, the alder, the ash and other species also occur frequently. In the west we find beech and larch, and in the Carpathians the spruce and the fir, and sometimes even the cedar. 137

101 The area of Ukrainian economy corresponds to the expansion of the people, i. e. with the compact Ukrainian territory as settled (930 000 sq. km). Yet the frontiers do not quite coincide and the geographical principle cannot be brought into line with the ethnographical. Colonising efforts that even reached the shore of the Pacific must be left out of account, in spite of the Ukrainian population they represent, as must also large enclaves of foreign nations within Ukraine.

On the other hand we must bear those Ukrainian areas in mind where the Ukrainian population, though not yet in the majority, is still increasing (parts of North Caucasia and the Crimea).

● 487 **2. Ukraine's position in the European system of communications** is fairly central; it is not further from the mouth of the Dnipro to Egypt or Mesopotamia than it is to England, Southwest Germany or Moscow. Ukraine connects the Baltic states with the coasts of the Black Sea, Central Europe with Asia, the lower reaches of the Danube with Russia. Thirty percent (about 2 000 out of 6 000 km) of the route from Berlin or London to the Caspian Sea and thence to India and Western China lies in Ukrainian territory. In Asia Minor, which is near Ukraine, indeed partly connected with it by water, we find the junctions of important long-distance routes (Berlin-Bagdad; Marseilles-Suez-Indochina or Madagascar etc.).

There are no great natural obstacles to communications; even the ridge of the Carpathians is traversed by eight easy passes. From the point of view of communications, the lack of natural frontiers is a great advantage. The watersheds between the rivers flowing to the Black Sea and those to the Baltic Sea are so narrow, low and flat that it is easy to build short canals across them.

3. The geographical situation of Ukraine as a trade center which is not only a result of its position in the system of European communications, was particularly favorable in the Middle Ages. It was largely determined by the priority of overland and river communications over sea trade routes. In Kyiv the trade route to Byzantium intersected the overland route to

the Don which continued to Ityl, the Khazar capital at the mouth 487
of the Volga where two important routes terminated, viz. a caravan road from Bagdad via Khovaresm in the Turkestan of to-day and a road from China via the basin of the Tarim. Communicating routes led via the Pripyat to the Memel and Vistula areas, and via Halych to Hungary or via Cracow to Prague and Regensburg.

But Ukraine forfeited these advantages when Bagdad, Byzantium and Kyiv declined and when the Crusades shifted the main trade routes to the Mediterranean and later when America was discovered and the sea route to India became known. In addition, there were changes in the needs of civilisation; instead of furs, wax and honey, there was now a demand for goods in bulk like grain and timber which had to be transported all too expensively to the West via the Baltic as the Turks blocked the exit to the Mediterranean. The early golden age of Ukraine was the result of favorable trade conditions and it sank when these changed.

4. Black Earth and Granary

The enormous area of 70 million ha black earth produced 433
considerable surplus grain crops. Ukraine became the granary of Europe, but as the structure of the country was wholly agrarian, industry was slow to develop so that towns and industry were flooded by aliens.

Grain was exported in ancient times to Greece and Rome. 439
Grain and cattle were transported from the central Dnipro area to the harbors and markets of Germany. But export trade only began to flourish in earnest when the fertile steppe and the sea coast were re-conquered. Food requirements of European industrial states were supplied from harbors on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov; and yet this improvement in geographical trade conditions was no longer the decisive feature in Ukrainian economy.

Ukraine was responsible for 10 % of the world's production of the four European kinds of grain and was therefore among the leading sources. From 1909—1913 its grain exports accounted to 8.6 million roubles, and to more than a fifth of the entire

from Ukraine, although it is true that Russia had to be supplied 439
with sugar in addition to raw and auxiliary materials (coal, ores, pig-iron, steel etc.). Imports to Ukraine (e. g. textiles) were more than met by exports. But no capital was imported from Russia to set off the active trade balance; this came almost entirely from other countries.

In the common budget of Imperial Russia in the years 651
1909—1913 Ukraine had to supply 20 % of the total revenue 439
while it was allocated only 20 % of the expenditure. Almost half (45—46 %) of the Imperial revenue from Dnipro Ukraine was diverted to other areas of Russia. Three fourths of the funds ear-marked for capitalisation went abroad in the form of interest and dividends; Russia itself utilised revenue from Ukraine to install rival plants that very often manufactured or finished goods derived from Ukraine. Ukraine exported abroad four to nine times as much as she imported and was solely responsible for the fact that Russia had an active trade balance. It is an undisputable fact that Ukraine was an integral part of the economic system of Europe before the First World War.

7. The Russian Eurasian Theory

is that all Eurasian and Asiatic parts of Russia, including 000
peripheral areas like Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan etc. must be united in one great empire. Let us view this problem from the point of view of economic geography.

The features common to that gigantic stretch of territory are the enormous distances between the various centers of production to the frontiers and the sea, the length of time that rivers and seas are ice-bound, sparse population, high costs of transportation, and an unfavorable position with regard to world markets. It must therefore be organised as a self-supporting economy, planned from some center. Western Siberia is the heart of Eurasia.

These facts do not apply to Ukraine. The 2 400 km between 131
the sea and the Semyrjechka area may be Eurasian, while in 487 ●
Europe the least favorable points are less than 600 km from the sea, and this "European" distance from the sea holds for Ukraine where no center is further than 600 km from the Black Sea. The distance between the Kusnets Basin, the chief coal area of

131 Eurasia and the ores in the Ural is more than 2000 km; the
487 coal of the Donets Basin, on the other hand, is about 350—450 km from the iron ore of Kryvyj Rih, while the iron and manganese ores of Kerch are nearer still. The seas in the north of Russia are frozen for 20—26 weeks, while the Black Sea has ice for but 3—4 weeks in the year. Most of its harbors can be kept open all winter by means of ice-breakers. The
[161] density of the population in Ukraine is 59 to the square kilometer which cannot be compared with the figures for Siberia (1 per sq. km) or with the average for USSR (8). Conditions in Ukraine, therefore, are much more akin to those in Europe than are those in the continental heart of Eurasia some 4000 km away. And for Ukraine this fact found expression, for instance, in the fact that it could not profit from the reduced railway freights that were granted for long-distance transportation. The unfavorable position of Moscow and Leningrad as manufacturing centers was a great handicap to the economy of Ukraine which possessed all the conditions necessary for production within its own frontiers but nevertheless had to import goods from there and export raw materials to very low prices.

As long as Russia's face was turned towards Europe, these considerations did not matter much, but they are felt all the more acutely now that the economy of the Soviet Union is definitely planned.

8. The Ukrainian idea of economy

421 with its championship of private property was always entirely different from the "mir" idea, with its farming in common and periodical division of the soil which was characteristic for Russian economy. Exceptions within Ukrainian territory, due to special conditions of time and place, do not alter this fundamental fact.
[566] That serfdom should have been abolished so late was felt to be a great burden by the Ukrainian who had enjoyed personal freedom in his days of political independence. He always connected serfdom with Russian rule which naturally did not help to mitigate his aversion to everything Russian.

433 In national Ukrainian literature, the relationship of different branches of economy is often discussed. It is often maintained that up to the present, development has been along the lines of

491 roads were superior in quality to those in Galicia and the network was denser. The total length of highways in Ukraine was approximately 24 000 km. There was little motor traffic: there was more in Carpatho-Ukraine but in 1937 there were in Ukraine only 13 cars per 10 000 inhabitants (in France 492, England 431, Germany 183).

4. Inland Waterways

133 As regards length and the area of their basins, the rivers of
● 487 Ukraine are among the largest in Europe, but their navigability suffers from frequent windings, shallows and rapids. In summer variations in the water level are a great disadvantage, while in winter the rivers are frozen for 3—4 months. As the rivers melt from the mouth, there is no danger from ice-floes. 90 % of the rivers flow into the Black Sea, some into the Vistula and two insignificant streams into the Caspian Sea. The Dnipro and some of its tributaries are navigable as are also 4 other rivers:

The Dnipro is 2 248 km long and drains an area of 518 500 square kilometers, so that it is the third biggest river in Europe. By the dam it has been made navigable for 1 250 kilometers. Its tributaries, the Pripyat, the Desna and the Seym are also navigable. The total length of the Dnipro navigable network is 3250 kilometers, while 4 300 km of waterways can be used for shipping and floating rafts, i. e. more than $^2/_3$ of the total waterways in Ukraine (6 200 km).

005 Freight traffic on the Dnipro did not reach the pre-war level of 2.7 million t till 1932 and had increased by 1935 to 3.9 million t. Passenger traffic doubled in those years and amounted to 4.8 millions. $^1/_3$ of the goods transported was wood, and $^1/_4$ mineral building materials, more than $^1/_8$ grain, while coal, ore and metal were poorly represented. The important harbor towns on the Dnipro are Kyiv, Dnipropetrivske, Nishnodniprovske and Kherson.

The Dnister (1 372 km long, draining an area of 77 000 sq. km) has been prevented by geological and political conditions from developing any great shipping. Upper reaches and lower belong to two absolutely different political systems. Before the

505 First World War grain, wood, gypsum and building stone (250 000 t) were transported on the river, while later only wood was shipped on the upper reaches.

133 The Kuban (800 km long, with a basin of about 60 000 sq.km) ● 487 has its source in Caucasian glaciers and is navigable all the year round for a stretch of 350 km. It is true that gravel and 505 sandbanks make shipping difficult. In 1935 230 000 t of freight were shipped down the river. The Boh (709 km long, with a basin of 64 000 sq.km) has little water and many rapids. 100 km are navigable, but traffic is negligible. Of the Don (1984 km long, with a basin of 425 000 sq.km) which is the fourth biggest river in Europe, only the navigable lower reaches belong to Ukraine. Goods transported are above all grain, coal, salt-254 000 t in 1935. Conveyance of passengers is negligible.

Its right tributary, the Donets (1 020 km, with a basin of 99 000 km) crosses the Donets Basin and is navigable for a stretch of 350 km. The Buh, Vepr and Syan, Prut, Seret and Tysa are only important for floating down logs.

503 The condition of the Ukrainian waterways is not imposing, though Ukraine comes fourth in Europe with its 6 200 km of navigable rivers. There is no thorough system of regulating the rivers or building canals to connect them, though this has been planned for decades. There are only 200 km of canals. The following artificial systems of communication by water have been planned:

a) reconstruction of the Viking way and the linking up of Leningrad, Kyiv and Kherson (2 canals each 30 km long);

b) a connection between Riga and Kherson, in place of the antiquated route via the Beresina which has existed since 1805;

c) development of the now inadequate route (Oginski-Canal etc. 343 km) between the Dnipro or the Pripyat, Pina and Jasiolda and — via the Shara — the Memel linking Kherson with Königsberg;

d) (Royal canal etc. 233 km) between the Pina and — via the Mukhovets — the Buh and the Vistula, connecting Kherson with Danzig;

000 will occupy us particularly in order that we should be able to disentangle the historical factors which oppose her union with Russia, as well as those which tend to maintain this unity.

But before coming to this, let us try to consider one more geographical circumstance which underlines the unity of the Ukraine and Russia. This is the system of rivers. Here, too, the principles which apply to the 133 Ukraine also apply to the whole of Russia. The whole [487] plain is a region of great rivers, which flow from south to north, or from north to south. It is in the latter direction that the rivers of the Ukraine flow. Their waters are emptied into the Black Sea. Chief among them is the Dnieper, which, owing to its length of 2500 kilometres, occupies third place in Europe, after the Volga and the Danube. It crosses Ukrainian territory from north to south, dividing it into two almost equal parts, while its sources lie in the north, in Great Russia, beyond Ukrainian territory. Thus it forms a natural link between the north and the border regions of the Black Sea. And it is to this great mercantile route, represented by this river, that the Ukrainian territory owes in great measure the rôle it has played in Europe since the tenth century of our era.

The river, too, was a great route of colonization. The first agriculturalists followed the routes which nature herself had provided in the Ukraine as well as in the whole Russian Plain.

000 As we have seen, it is impossible, geographically speaking, to fix the frontiers of the Ukraine. But we have also said, that to determine the subject and to reach the aim of this book, we have to establish approximately the territory which we will call by this name. Having also accepted the Carpathians as the only geographical frontier, we shall keep to this with regard to the whole

River System

The Ukraine as a whole consists of portions of the basins of the Rivers Dnieper (with its tributary the Pripet), Dniester, Bug, and Donets, the last named being the largest affluent of the Don. 133

The *Dnieper*, which rises in the Government of Smolensk, has a total length of about 1,410 miles, and drains an area of 202,140 square miles. It first touches Ukrainian territory at Loyev on the western border of Chernigov, and thence flows in a south-easterly direction to Yekaterinoslav, in a shifting channel which varies greatly in depth and breadth. At Yekaterinoslav the river turns south and then south-west, forming a succession of rapids, so that navigation in this part is only possible when the river is in flood. Artificial canals enable small vessels to proceed when there is low water in the channel. The Dnieper enters the Black Sea below the town of Kherson, by a *liman*, into which the Bug also discharges. 133 487 [502]

The chief tributaries of the Dnieper are: on the right bank, going from north to south, the Berezina, which runs through the Government of Minsk; the Pripet, with its many affluents, among them being the Styr and the Strumen, all of which overflow their banks and help to form the system of marshes which is more fully described in *Russian Poland*, No. 44 of this series (p. 15), and the Ingulets, which flows a little above Kherson into the Dnieper near its outlet to the Black Sea. 133

On the left bank the chief tributaries are the Sosh; the Desna, which flows through Chernigov into the Dnieper just above Kiev; and the Samara, which joins the river at Yekaterinoslav.

There is a regular service of passenger steamers on the Dnieper both above and below the rapids, and also along the Pripet as far as Pinsk. [505]

The *Dniester* rises in Austrian Galicia, and only the last 515 miles of its course, with a drainage area of 16,500 square miles, belong to Russian territory. It reaches the Ukraine provinces near Kamenets Podolsk,

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in the Government of Yekaterinoslav in the Donets 491
coal and iron region.

The second-class roads, described as 'paved throughout', have a mileage of 953. They are under the care of the *zemstvos*, but the expenditure bestowed upon them is small.

The third class of roads, described as 'soil' roads, has by far the greatest mileage, their length being 54,148 miles. In no country of western Europe would they be classed as roads, being merely tracks from point to point, worn by the traffic of the district. They are under the care of the *mirs*, or communes, whose budgets admit of the expenditure of very small sums on their upkeep.

As other means of communication are also few and 491
unsatisfactory, the lack of good roads would be a fatal 489
drawback to any development of the country, were it not for the fact that during three or four months of the year traffic by sledge is almost everywhere possible without special regard to the existence of a road or even a track. As during this period agricultural operations are suspended, an opportunity is afforded of transporting a vast quantity of goods.

(b) *Rivers and Canals*

The rivers of the Ukraine include the middle and 487
lower courses of two large rivers, the Dnieper and the [133]
Dniester. Both are navigable for long distances, and should be of great importance as means of communication. Each, however, suffers from a serious natural defect which much curtails its usefulness, and to remedy which no adequate measures have been taken.

For purposes of navigation the river *Dnieper* falls into two sections known as 'above the rapids' and 'below the rapids'. Between Yekaterinoslav and Alexandrovsk are ten rapids, which are very dangerous and completely prevent navigation. Timber rafts are floated down, but the occupation of steering them is considered most hazardous and is entrusted to local pilots specially trained. Some attempt at improving

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

487 the channel was made early in the nineteenth century, but proved abortive. Proposals to canalize this section
487 have so far had no result. From Loev to Yekaterinoslav, above the rapids, there is passenger traffic,
505 some goods traffic, and a vast traffic in rafted timber. Though some of the timber is floated down the rapids to Kherson, most is brought ashore at Yekaterinoslav, which receives annually some 160,000 tons of building timber, besides other classes of wood. Below the rapids the river is navigable from Alexandrovsk to the mouth.

487 Some of the tributaries of the Dnieper are navigable for some distance from their junction with the main stream—the Pripet (Pripyat) for a short stretch; the Desna, which joins the Dnieper at Kiev, as far as the boundary of the Ukraine near Novgorod Sjeversk; the Psiol to a point west of Poltava; the Ingulets for about 25 miles.

501 The vessels employed in the Dnieper basin are of
487 small tonnage (maximum about 300 tons), and the steamers are almost all either for passenger traffic or for towing the barges in which goods traffic is mainly carried. The maximum loaded depth below the rapids is 12 ft. 10 in.; above the rapids it is considerably less.

The *Dniester* is navigable for the whole of its length in the Ukraine from the Galician frontier to the mouth at Akkerman. There are many dangerous rapids, and the vessels used on the river are small, with a maximum draught of 3 ft. 9 in. The lagoon at the river mouth is so shallow that most vessels discharge at Varnitsa near Bender for carriage by rail to Odessa.

The *Southern Bug* is navigable from Vosnesensk to the mouth at Nikolaev. There is passenger traffic, and the size and draught of vessels is the same as on the Dnieper, below the rapids.

There is some navigation on the river *Styr* in Volhynia from Lutsk to Borobaza, also on the *Western Bug* from the Galician frontier to the point where it leaves the Ukraine, but in both cases only for rafts and vessels of very light draught.

The navigable length of the principal rivers is as follows: 487

	For Shipping. Miles.	For Rafting only. Miles.
Dnieper . .	1,250	136
Desna . .	537	166
Dniester . .	521	35

All the above-mentioned waterways suffer in common from four serious defects. (1) They are frozen for a considerable period of the year. In the basin of the Dnieper traffic was only possible in the first ten years of this century for an average of 230 days above the rapids and 250 below. Other rivers are in a similar case. (2) The volume of water falls rapidly in summer, and in dry seasons lack of water impedes navigation seriously. (3) Wholesale cutting down of the forests on the banks has led to alteration of the beds of the rivers and the splitting up of the channels. (4) Works for the improvement of navigation scarcely exist, not even the most urgent having been undertaken. 487 502

The principal cargoes carried are breadstuffs, wood, and coal. Cereals are embarked in great quantities on the lower Dnieper and Southern Bug for shipment abroad from Kherson and Nikolaev. The upper Dnieper and the Dniester carry timber. 505 439

Navigable canals do not exist in the Ukraine. Should the scheme for a Dvina - Dnieper canal materialize, it would have a noticeable commercial effect upon the towns of Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Alexandrovsk, and Kherson. 503

(c) *Railways*

Railway System.—There are in the Ukraine three great railway centres, viz. Kiev, Kharkov, and Yekaterinoslav. 496

1. From Kiev a line runs in a westerly direction to Sarny and Kovel, continuing thence to Choïm and Warsaw.

A second line goes in a north-easterly direction to Bakhmach, thence *via* Kursk and Orel to Moscow.

TABLE XXI

U 397

Ukraine: Pre-War Production of Long Distance Locomotives

Year	Ukrainian S.S.R number	Soviet Union total number
1928	231	479
1932	431	828
1937	880	1,214

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; and Russia's Economic Front, A. Yugov, New York, 1941.

SU [397] Ukrainian production of long distance locomotives in 1950 is planned to be 1,000. For the Soviet Union as a whole a target of 2,720 has been fixed: this includes 2,200 steam locomotives, 300 diesel, and 220 electric locomotives. The Ukrainian output of freight cars in 1950 is fixed at 55,500 - more than a third of the target for the whole U.S.S.R., which is 146,000 freight cars.

Motor Vehicles

U 397 SU [397] The number of motor vehicles to be produced in 1950 in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is fixed by the new Five-Year Plan at 25,000 while for the entire Soviet Union the output is as follows: 428,000 trucks, 65,600 passenger cars, and 6,400 motor buses. Apparently the destruction of factories producing motor-vehicles was particularly heavy.

The Five-Year Plan provides for the building in the Ukraine of two motor car assembly plants, as well as a works to produce annually 60,000 motor trucks.

Dnieper-Bug Canal[1]

U 503 487 The Dnieper-Bug Canal, cutting through the Pinak bogs and the Brest forest in Byelorussia, is important as the only water outlet towards the west, connecting the Dnieper, Western Bug, and the Black Sea with the Vistula.

It first took shape at the end of the 18th century under the name of the Imperial Canal. But in those days, being shallow and without sluices, it was of little use for navigation. For ten months in the year the canal was dead. Only at high water, in the springtime, could a small quantity of timber be rafted along its course.

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1 Soviet News July 24, 1946.

503 The canal was reconstructed just before the German invasion.
487 In record time, eight months, ten large sluices were built in two
727 stairways of five locks each; and in August 1940 the first river vessels passed through from the Black Sea to the Vistula.

The Germans destroyed these sluices and choked the canal so that all the hydro-technical structures had to be rebuilt anew. The speed of reconstruction was such that by the middle of 1946 vessels and barges were passing freely from the Vistula along the Dnieper with cargoes of timber for the Ukraine.

At present the western Bug is navigable only in April and May. When it has been converted into a normal waterway, effective communication will be established between the Ukrainian and Byelorussian river basins and the Vistula, Oder, Elbe, and Rhine.

3: Mirchuk Ukraine RD1
489

[For transportation systems of Ukraine, see category 116, pp. 189-197.]

Communications

1. Conditions and Modes of Communication

489 The communication system of Ukraine is far from satisfactory, although natural conditions favor the construction of roads and railways and communication by ship. The defects in the Ukrainian network of communication are due rather to historical causes: the fact that it belongs to a state that has never been able to maintain an orderly system of communication is the main reason for the inadequacy of communication routes and facilities in Ukraine.

As the sea forms only 1/4 of the entire frontier of Ukraine and as the nation was shut off from it for centuries by peoples of other races, it never became a main artery of communication for the country. The rivers, once so important as channels of communication and colonisation have declined more and more with the increasing claims made by modern transportation.

Country roads cannot be included in a system of long-distance communication. Geological conditions in some districts are unfavorable but an incapable policy of communications and economy is mainly responsible for the present situation.

2. Railroads

496 The railway is therefore the most important element in the system of communications; 209 million t were transported by rail in 1934 as compared with 5.8 million t by river and 8.5 million t by sea.

The first railroad was constructed in 1863—65 from Odessa to Balta (260 km) and was extended in 1870 to Kirovohrad. This

316 mines of the Krivoi-Rog and secondly the presence between these two centres, in the surroundings of Nikopol, of important deposits of manganese, whose annual extraction exceeds 1,000,000 tons.

Actually the proximity of the mines of Krivoi-Rog, the resources of which, according to the exact estimates of geologists, are considerable (1 milliard 100 million tons of mineral which contains 40 per cent of iron), has allowed the distribution of the whole iron industry of the Ukraine between these two regions—that of the
316 Donietz and that of Krivoi-Rog. This centralization
429 allows one to utilize on the spot the enormous quantities of coal and of employing the railways in the most economical way, thus reducing the transport charges which are a heavy item in relation to a material.

The whole traffic between these two regions goes in two directions. The coal of the Donietz is loaded on trucks which are directed towards the Krivoi-Rog. These trucks return with a load of minerals. Thus a continual exchange takes place between these two centres, resulting in a very small circulation of empty trucks and thus creating one of the essential conditions of a rational exploitation of the railways.

316 The centralization of the Ukrainian metal industry
433 strongly favours its development. The Ukraine to-day occupies one of the leading places in the production of pig-iron (the fourth place, with 6,500,000 tons annually), of steel (third place, with 5,000,000 tons annually), and of sheet-iron (fifth place, with 3,000,000 tons annually).

327 The shaping of the metal and its transformation into metallic manufactured objects is equally concentrated on the borders of these two producing regions. Thus only 18 per cent of the coal of the Donietz and 5 per cent of the raw mineral of the Krivoi-Rog are exported from the Ukraine. The rest is shaped and worked on the

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

433 to enlarge upon the reasons which have determined the destruction of the favourable results which ought to have appeared in this direction. We shall only limit ourselves to enumerating the more important points.

1. The defective distribution due to frequent failures of transport which are expressed by the accumulation of unused manufactured goods in the great industrial centres and by the irregularity of furnishing the factories with raw materials.

2. The very inferior quality of the manufactured goods, the enormous percentage of rejects, the continuous shortage of spare parts required for the normal functioning, and the upkeep of the machines. These defects are due to an insufficient technical staff, to low wages and salaries, and to the police system introduced into the administration of the industries.

3. The lack of co-ordination between the different branches of industry, the poor condition of State commerce, due to the incompetence of the staffs and to the very complex and very slow bureaucratic procedure.

Nevertheless, imperfect though they may be, the new mines and factories exist and under other political and economic conditions, accompanied by the revival of agriculture, of foreign commerce, and of a better functioning of transport, the Ukraine would be put on the same economic level as the best organized and the richest countries of the world.

IV

Means of Communication

496 In no other sector of economic activity does the link
489 between the Ukraine and the rest of Russia become so clearly apparent as in the matter of the organization of

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the railway system. At a superficial glance at the map 7/1496 we immediately see that the main railway lines follow 489 the ancient riverways which unite the Black Sea with the rest of Russia. Towards the north, however, they divide into two important branches, that of Leningrad, the old direction to Novgorod, and that of the new direction to Moscow. The Russian railways radiate from these two centres, Moscow and Leningrad, to end in the numerous ports of the White, Black, or Caspian Sea or the Pacific Ocean or at the western and eastern frontiers of the State.

In this Russia does not differ much from, say, France where, too, the railway network converges towards Paris as a centre.

Forming a part of the Russian railway system, the Ukrainian main lines are only sections or continuations of the Russian main lines, starting, as we have said, from Leningrad or Moscow.

These are the lines : (Leningrad–Jlobin)[1]–Sarny–Kiev. (Leningrad–Vilno–Rovno)–Kazatyne–Odessa. (Moscow–Koursk)–Kharkov–Sinelnikovo (Sebastopol) and (Moscow–Koursk)–Kharkov–Marioupol–(Rostov-on-Don–Caucasus). (Moscow–Briansk)–Koupiansk–Lougansk.

The Ukrainian network, including the continuations of the great Pan-Russian lines, whose length totals 14,500 kilometres (31 kilometres of rail for each 1000 square kilometres and 4·6 kilometres per 10,000 inhabitants), can be divided into four distinct classes :

1. *Lines for the export of corn* uniting the agricultural regions with the ports of the Black Sea. The direction of these lines can only be justified by the conditions of a normal expansion of grain export and the importation of colonial produce, to which the advent of Soviet rule has brought an unfavourable change.

[1] The towns put in brackets are outside Ukrainian territory.

7/1 [see category 116, p.151. --- Analyst]

000 The import and export were characteristic of the pre-Great War Ukrainian economy. To-day these factors are almost absent.

496 At the beginning of the twentieth century a railway called the corn line had been constructed, with termini at Romny and Libava, a port on the Baltic now belonging to Latvia and recently partly given back to Russia by special treaty, for the corn export trade. It is clear that to-day its Ukrainian section, which does not exceed 250 kilometres, has only a very restricted local interest. Recent events may bring some changes here.

The movement of merchandise on the network which, before the Great War, had been most important in the direction from north to south, takes to-day an opposite direction and brings the surplus of cereals from the southern region towards Kharkov and Moscow. As to the most recent grain line, the construction of which had been begun in 1913 and had been completed after the Revolution, connecting Kherson and Nicolaiev to Kharkov via Zaporojie, it has to-day acquired a purely industrial character and serves to transport metal and coal to the factories of Kharkov on the one hand and to those of Kherson and Nicolaiev on the other.

489 496 2. *Means of communication* which serve the mines of Krivoi-Rog and the coal basin of the Donietz. The region of the Donietz has a sufficiently close network and is provided with many lines with a double track which connect the different mines. Nevertheless this network was clearly insufficient already before the last war, when the annual production of coal was only 40 per cent of that of to-day. The enormous accumulation of unused coal at the stations, as a result of the weakness of the transport system, had forced pre-Great War Russia to import coal from England.

The network of the Donbass is linked with the Krivoi-

Kog by a main line which is devoted to the continual 487
exchange of coal for mineral. The stock of this mine 496
is the most powerful of the Union and the average loading per axle (about 4·5 tons) is the highest in Europe. The system of the coal network is characterized by the working of the raw material in the proximity of the districts of extraction. Numerous branch lines are prolonged into supplementary lines which radiate towards the outer regions, to end at the great centres at which the metals are worked. This whole network, destined for the transport of heavy materials, and which dates from the last decades of the nineteenth century, is in general very well constructed and even partly reinforced by electric welding.

The only railway of importance constructed since the 496
October Revolution, which joins the industrial network, is that which links Moscow to Lougansk. The direction of this line confirms the continuation by the Soviet Government of the traditional economic policy, in tending to organize the Russian railway system on the Imperial plan.

3. *Strategic lines* are represented by the line Odessa–Kiev, with a double track and with numerous branches towards the Polish and Rumanian frontiers, some of which continue in a direction of Lvov, others to Kovel, to end at Warsaw.

The exploitation of these mines, since the establishment of the Russo-Polish frontier after 1920, was fundamentally changed. As a result of being cut by the frontier, they had lost their importance as strategic lines, since the principal junctions, such as Kovel or Rovno, specially intended for this purpose, were recently outside the frontiers of the Soviet Ukraine. Parallel to this they had experienced a diminution of traffic owing to the most complete disappearance of trade with Poland.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in the Government of Yekaterinoslav in the Donets coal and iron region. 491

The second-class roads, described as 'paved throughout', have a mileage of 953. They are under the care of the *zemstvos*, but the expenditure bestowed upon them is small.

The third class of roads, described as 'soil' roads, has by far the greatest mileage, their length being 54,148 miles. In no country of western Europe would they be classed as roads, being merely tracks from point to point, worn by the traffic of the district. They are under the care of the *mirs*, or communes, whose budgets admit of the expenditure of very small sums on their upkeep.

As other means of communication are also few and unsatisfactory, the lack of good roads would be a fatal drawback to any development of the country, were it not for the fact that during three or four months of the year traffic by sledge is almost everywhere possible without special regard to the existence of a road or even a track. As during this period agricultural operations are suspended, an opportunity is afforded of transporting a vast quantity of goods. 491 481

(b) *Rivers and Canals*

The rivers of the Ukraine include the middle and lower courses of two large rivers, the Dnieper and the Dniester. Both are navigable for long distances, and should be of great importance as means of communication. Each, however, suffers from a serious natural defect which much curtails its usefulness, and to remedy which no adequate measures have been taken. 487 [133]

For purposes of navigation the river *Dnieper* falls into two sections known as 'above the rapids' and 'below the rapids'. Between Yekaterinoslav and Alexandrovsk are ten rapids, which are very dangerous and completely prevent navigation. Timber rafts are floated down, but the occupation of steering them is considered most hazardous and is entrusted to local pilots specially trained. Some attempt at improving

Production of Building Materials

339 In connection with the reconstruction work being carried out in
185 the Ukraine, the production of building materials is extremely important. The Five-Year Plan lays down that the pre-war production of bricks is to be increased by 50 per cent. of tiles, by 170 per cent. of lime, by 120 per cent., and of gypsum by 190 per cent. The Plan also states that

> "Plants for the production of building materials - including cement, glass, brick, lime, and tile works, plants producing metal fixtures, prefabricated houses, building sections, plumbing fixtures, roofing materials and high tensile gypsum - shall be restored or built and stable local fuel and power supplies created for the building material plants."

The Ukrainian output of cement in 1950 is expected to be 2,065,000 tons as compared with 10,500,000 tons for the entire U.S.S.R.

[323] Under the jurisdiction of the Republic and local authorities there are to be put into operation in the years 1946-50 glass works with a capacity of 11-33 million square feet of glass, brick kilns with a capacity of 9 million bricks, and rolling mills and other building material plants.

Transport

727 The war and the occupation brought great devastation to the
489 transport system of the Ukraine. The greater part of the railroads were partially or completely destroyed, and many hundreds of railway bridges demolished. The port of Odessa on the Black Sea was systematically destroyed - piers, warehouses, elevators, floating cranes, and power supply. The Dnieper-Bug Canal, the only water outlet towards the west, was made impassable by the Germans, who destroyed the sluices, wrecked bridges, sank boats in midstream, and choked the canal with mud.

185 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, provides for the complete rehabili-
489 tation of Ukrainian transport. Railway lines and junctions, and locomotive and car repair works are to be fully restored. A number of railway lines are to be electrified; and west of the Dnieper several narrow gauge lines are to be constructed for closer connection of sugar beet growing areas with sugar refineries.

185 To alleviate the difficult situation in rail transport, motor
489 roads are to be rebuilt and extended. The Moscow-Kharkov highway is
499 to be rehabilitated and improved, and additional motor roads are to be built to connect towns of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with the towns of the North Caucasus and the Crimea. By 1950 the tonnage of freight transported by road should be 16 times the pre-war volume. The number

U 185 489 494 of road passengers should increase 7½ times; and the number of buses, by 3,000.

U 185 489 503 The Five-Year Plan also provides for the expansion of river and sea traffic. Small rivers are to be extensively adapted for navigation, and will also be utilized for local hydro-electric power supplies. Shipbuilding yards are to be rebuilt, and the tonnage of river and sea traffic is to be considerably increased. The freight turnover on small rivers of the Ukraine in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 450,000 metric tons.

Pre-War Traffic

U 489 In 1937 the Ukrainian railways handled 313.1 million metric tons of loads, as compared with 165.7 million in 1932. The river transport carried 7.7 million tons (4.7 million in 1932), while in the same year Ukrainian seaports handled 8.6 million tons as against 6.5 million tons in 1932.

SU 497 U 497 The U.S.S.R.'s system of rail transport is perhaps the weakest link in the Soviet economy. In 1937 the railway network of the entire Soviet Union amounted to only 86,400 kilometres (83,400 kilometres in 1933). The construction of additional lines had by no means kept pace with the expansion of industry and agriculture. The Ukraine in 1937 had some 14,400 kilometres of railway lines; and traffic loads in that year amounted to some 313.1 million metric tons. The inadequacy of the system if compared with other European countries is marked. For example, in France (the area of which was approximately equal to that of pre-war Ukraine) the length of the principal lines open for traffic on January 1, 1938, was 42,000 kilometres.

U 727 497 The war has greatly disrupted Ukrainian rail transport. Locomotives, rolling stock and tracks were heavily damaged or destroyed. The problem of rehabilitation is especially serious, because the lack of adequate transport facilities hinders other rebuilding projects. The locomotives and cars taken as reparations from Germany, being chiefly of narrow gauge, are consequently of no use on most existing Soviet tracks.

Production of Long Distance Locomotives

U 397 Before the war the output of long distance locomotives in the Ukraine was as follows.

496 on the main lines. On side-lines the speed was about half as much. The distance between stations in Dnipro-Ukraine are far too great (10.8 km); in Carpatho-Ukraine and Galicia they are 4.2 and 3.7 respectively.

497 Travel is constantly increasing in Ukraine. In Dnipro-Ukraine the number of passengers rose from 49 millions in 1913 (5.3 mrd. passenger/km) to 60 millions in 1927/28 and to 200 millions in 1935 (11.6 mrd. passenger/km). Goods traffic increased from 95 million t (19.6 mrd. t/km) to 204 million t (51.4 mrd. t/km) in 1935. This increase of 300 % and 115 % respectively corresponded neither to the extension of the railroad net (23 %) nor to the increase in the means of transportation (engines 25 %, trucks 50 %) even if the traction power of the individual engine had greatly increased. (from 143 000 t in 1914 to 221 000 t in 1933).

3. Country Roads

● 491 In Dnipro-Ukraine there are mostly country-roads without side-ditches. They are not artificially built, and are often impassable in spring and autumn, and too dusty in summer so that they can only be used in winter. As they also form the approach to railway stations, they are responsible for gluts or shortages of railroad trucks: sugar factories, in particular, suffer from these circumstances during the beet harvest. Before the first World War there were only 2 770 km of paved highways (and 3 500 km of others). In Volynia and Podolia there were 13 or 15 meters respectively per sq. kilometer, in the districts round Kyiv and Chernyhiv, 5.6 meters each, while in France there were 1125 meters and in Germany 560 meters. Under the first Five-Year Plan serious attempts at improvements were made; the proportion of paved highways in the entire network of roads was to be raised from 2.3 % to 4.5 %. In reality the entire length of paved highways in 1935 amounted to 8 500 km. Northern Caucasia had 600 km of paved highways at this time. Things were much better in Galicia, which had 10 100 km of paved highways. After the First World War, however, Poland neglected road construction. In Carpatho-Ukraine, on the other hand, where there were 2 400 km of paved highways, the

491 roads were superior in quality to those in Galicia and the network was denser. The total length of highways in Ukraine was approximately 24 000 km. There was little motor traffic: there was more in Carpatho-Ukraine but in 1937 there were in Ukraine only 13 cars per 10 000 inhabitants (in France 492, England 431, Germany 183).

4. Inland Waterways

133 As regards length and the area of their basins, the rivers of
487 Ukraine are among the largest in Europe, but their navigability suffers from frequent windings, shallows and rapids. In summer variations in the water level are a great disadvantage, while in winter the rivers are frozen for 3—4 months. As the rivers melt from the mouth, there is no danger from ice-floes. 90 % of the rivers flow into the Black Sea, some into the Vistula and two insignificant streams into the Caspian Sea. The Dnipro and some of its tributaries are navigable as are also 4 other rivers:

The Dnipro is 2 248 km long and drains an area of 518 500 square kilometers, so that it is the third biggest river in Europe. By the dam it has been made navigable for 1 250 kilometers. Its tributaries, the Pripyat, the Desna and the Seym are also navigable. The total length of the Dnipro navigable network is 3250 kilometers, while 4 300 km of waterways can be used for shipping and floating rafts, i. e. more than $^2/_3$ of the total waterways in Ukraine (6 200 km).

005 Freight traffic on the Dnipro did not reach the pre-war level of 2.7 million t till 1932 and had increased by 1935 to 3.9 million t. Passenger traffic doubled in those years and amounted to 4.8 millions. $^1/_3$ of the goods transported was wood, and $^1/_4$ mineral building materials, more than $^1/_8$ grain, while coal, ore and metal were poorly represented. The important harbor towns on the Dnipro are Kyiv, Dnipropetrivske, Nishnodniprovske and Kherson.

The Dnister (1 372 km long, draining an area of 77 000 sq. km) has been prevented by geological and political conditions from developing any great shipping. Upper reaches and lower belong to two absolutely different political systems. Before the

496 4. *Local railway lines*, of which the most important are those which link the large towns and join them to the agricultural regions.

Although certain strategic lines now function as lines of local importance, owing to the change of the frontier, this fact has not remedied the insufficiency of such railways.

The reinforcement of industrial lines, the entire rebuilding of the stations on the strategic lines in the sense of increasing the number of storage lines, as well as the construction of new local lines, must be considered a task of immediate importance so as to avoid the slowing down of the economic development of the country. Actually if the economic potential of the Ukraine is greater or at least equal to that of France on roughly the same extent of territory, the Ukraine only possesses one-third of the rail network of France (14,500 kilometres as compared with 44,000 kilometres). If one adds the almost complete absence of roads to this, especially on the left bank of the Dnieper and in the south of the Ukraine, the inactivity and unproductiveness of the Soviet regime in the sphere of the construction of new lines seems difficult to explain.

491 In reality the Ukrainian network of roads before the Great War was in practice limited to a single road which was maintained in a satisfactory condition and which linked Kiev with the Austrian frontier via Jitomir. As far as we know that was the only motor-car road before the last war in the whole of Europe. This main road had several important local branches leading towards the south and ending at Kamenetz-Podolsk, and leading towards the north in the direction of Korosten and Kowel. Several very narrow carriage roads, whose foundations and surface were very poor, were to be found in the region of Kiev and in Podolia and they were being

maintained by the Zemstvos (local organizations somewhat similar to County Councils, elected by citizens with a certain property census). 491

Quite recently the planning of the organization of the road system of the Soviet Union was put in the hands of the planning commission. It seems that important sums are to be spent on this project. It is almost unnecessary to mention that great economic transformations could be brought about by the construction even of a few thousand kilometres of roads, especially in New Russia where the composition of the soil makes the present tracks absolutely impassable after the slightest rain. Many villages still remain almost isolated from the rest of the world during periods of bad weather and are only connected with their respective centres by telegraph and, in case of their defect, by postmen on horseback.

The question of roads which we have approached allows us a small diversion. We can say a few words about the Zemstvos. This organization was distinguished after the abolition of serfdom as a factor of the first order in the development of the economic organism of the country, of the raising of the well-being of the population, of public hygiene, and of instruction. Having resources resulting from taxes on the land, the Zemstvos were able to cover Ukrainian territory, as also that of the whole of Russia, with a dense network of hospitals, veterinary centres, agricultural advisory bureaux, of experimental fields, of credit and trade co-operatives, and insurance offices, and finally of primary and even technical schools. The personnel of the Zemstvos, recruited among the intelligentsia often belonging to the popular classes, was always conspicuous by its devotion to the cause and did not lack in highly qualified specialists who did not hesitate to sacrifice

647 744 651 657 647

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

000 In general the internal means of communication in the Ukraine are in a defective and backward state. They all require heavy expenditure and extensive works to bring them up to a standard approaching that of Western Europe.

(a) *Roads*

491 The Ministry of the Interior groups the roads under three heads: (1) metalled roads, (2) roads paved throughout their length, and (3) non-paved or soil [653] roads. The metalled roads are constructed and kept up by the State. There are 2,254 miles of first-class road in the Ukraine, of which 923 miles are in the Government of Yekaterinoslav.

The principal lines of first-class roads are as follows:

From Kiev *via* Jitomir, Rovno, and Lutsk to Kovel, 260 miles. This road continues to Brest-Litovsk. There are branch roads from Rovno and Lutsk to Dubno, each about 30 miles in length, and from Dubno a road leads to Krzemenietz, some 20 miles distant.

From Kamenets Podolsk in a northerly direction to Proskurov and Staro-Konstantinov.

From Kiev in a northerly direction to Chernigov, thence to Mohilev and Vitebsk. The length from Kiev to the boundary of the Government of Chernigov is 150 miles.

From Kharkov northwards towards Kursk and Moscow. Thirty miles of this road are in the Government of Kharkov.

The remaining lengths of metalled road are mostly

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in the Government of Yekaterinoslav in the Donets 491
coal and iron region.

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The third class of roads, described as 'soil' roads, has by far the greatest mileage, their length being 54,148 miles. In no country of western Europe would they be classed as roads, being merely tracks from point to point, worn by the traffic of the district. They are under the care of the *mirs*, or communes, whose budgets admit of the expenditure of very small sums on their upkeep.

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(*b*) *Rivers and Canals*

The rivers of the Ukraine include the middle and 487
lower courses of two large rivers, the Dnieper and the [133]
Dniester. Both are navigable for long distances, and should be of great importance as means of communication. Each, however, suffers from a serious natural defect which much curtails its usefulness, and to remedy which no adequate measures have been taken.

For purposes of navigation the river *Dnieper* falls into two sections known as 'above the rapids' and 'below the rapids'. Between Yekaterinoslav and Alexandrovsk are ten rapids, which are very dangerous and completely prevent navigation. Timber rafts are floated down, but the occupation of steering them is considered most hazardous and is entrusted to local pilots specially trained. Some attempt at improving

[Podolia] [Volhynia]

everyone else from among our ranks. 000

Before the First World War it was said of 101
Podolia, which you will reach if you wander farther 181
north and which lies like a plateau over the Dniestr 311
Valley, that bread grows on fence posts there,
/Facing page 16: Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. [000]
View of the lower part of the city/; /Facing page
17: The old fortress of Feodosiya on the Crimea/ *
/17/ and that the fences are woven out of sausages. For the first time there lies before you an immeasurable sea of surging grain. Not a house far and wide, rarely a small wood. A groundless, dusty field road, surprisingly seems to lead into empty space, but where you think it ends, it leads you straight as a die, by means of steep turns into one of those deep valleys which the rivers in the course of thousands of years have carved into the plateaus. Down there the Podolians build their loam huts, the whitewashed walls of which have already greeted you from a distance through the green of the plum and cherry trees. If you follow the river upstream, it will more and more often lead you around ponds, marshes and swamps the nearer you come to its sources. You will see more storks than you have ever seen before in your life.

Almost imperceptibly you will reach Volhynia, 101
the western part of which belonged to Poland up to 491
1939, but was subject to the czar before that. You 361
will notice this immediately by the lack of good roads. For, as everywhere in former Czarist Russia, there are only a few paved roads, but all the more are there roads on which in dry weather you sink into the dust and in wet weather into mud. You will
notice it also by the cities and towns which are 361
even dirtier and more neglected than those of Galicia. You are in the midst of the ghettos of the world. These cities are a jumble of houses, "with an ugly traffic artery in the middle". They are spread out with a total absence of form, as though they had been

* [For plates, cf. pp. 215-216, category 116 — Analyst]

433 sariats of the Soviet Union decided that very shortly a reform in the methods of supplying food and articles of everyday use to miners of the Donets Basin is to take place. Since the time this decree was issued more than two months have elapsed, but nothing has changed. - We have visited the pits of all the different districts of the Donets Basin and have spoken to the men and women workers. We were obliged to conclude that in none of the districts has there been any improvement worth speaking of in the matter of food supply, that, on the contrary, conditions have grown worse to a large extent. We mention as an example the coal mines in the district of Rovenechky. Here there is a working population of 30,000 people; and every day one can see how /172/ long lines form outside the food stores already early in the morning. After these people have patiently waited, usually for several hours, they are told that no food supply whatsoever has arrived, so that they return home without having received anything. We asked a number of leading union officials how the food supply trade is organized. Trade union official Kondratov gave us the following explanation: In our store there is neither sugar nor salt nor groats. Meat is very seldom sold, and is usually of poor quality. Since February of this year we have had salt herring only one single time, other fish we have not even seen." (119)

119. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in This Way, page 44ff.

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491 Like trade, the system of communication is poor in the Ukraine. In 1880, there were in the Northern Ukraine, 210,000 chumak, that is carters and dealers who took care of long-distance trans-

491 portation by land with ox teams. In the three South Ukrainian governments in 1897, 100,000 such ox carts lumbered along on the ancient, worn-out chumak roads which were many hundreds of meters wide. Neither the Polish nor the Russian administration bothered about road building. Even today there are large cities in the Ukraine which are connected with one another only by means of enormously wide country roads. While Galicia during Austrian rule had about 10,000 kilometers of paved roads, and the Czechs built 2400 kilometers of roads in the Carpatho-Ukraine, the Soviet Ukraine succeeded in raising the figure to a full 8900 kilometers of highway in 1935, and the Kuban region to 600 kilometers. In 1935, there were 25,200 kilometers of improved natural roads which approximately correspond to our field roads, and 168,000 kilometers of "natural earth roads" which are impossible during the rainy season and in thaws. (120)

120. Kubiyovich: Geography, page 479 ff.

496/173/ There are only 24,400 kilometers of railways running through the entire Ukrainian area from the Carpatho-Ukraine to the Kuban, from the Black Sea up to the Pirpyat Swamps (in Germany there were 68,548 kilometers of railroads in 1935). The only actual railway junction in this large country is Lwów, from which nine lines emanate. Kiyev and all the other cities are merely intersections of two lines. In the twenty years of their rule the Bolsheviks have built only 1000 kilometers of railroads. (121) They, too, did not

121. Kubiyovich: Geography, page 484.

alleviate the main deficiency of the Ukrainian railway network the lines of which run north and south, toward Moscow and the Baltic: the important

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185 the Ukraine, the production of building materials is extremely important. The Five-Year Plan lays down that the pre-war production of bricks is to be increased by 50 per cent. of tiles, by 170 per cent. of lime, by 120 per cent., and of gypsum by 190 per cent. The Plan also states that

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489 tation of Ukrainian transport. Railway lines and junctions, and locomotive and car repair works are to be fully restored. A number of railway lines are to be electrified; and west of the Dnieper several narrow gauge lines are to be constructed for closer connection of sugar beet growing areas with sugar refineries.

185 To alleviate the difficult situation in rail transport, motor
489 roads are to be rebuilt and extended. The Moscow-Kharkov highway is
494 to be rehabilitated and improved, and additional motor roads are to be built to connect towns of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with the towns of the North Caucasus and the Crimea. By 1950 the tonnage of freight transported by road should be 16 times the pre-war volume. The number

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185
489 of road passengers should increase 7½ times; and the number of buses,
494 by 3,000.

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185 The Five-Year Plan also provides for the expansion of river and
489 sea traffic. Small rivers are to be extensively adapted for navi-
503 gation, and will also be utilized for local hydro-electric power supplies. Shipbuilding yards are to be rebuilt, and the tonnage of river and sea traffic is to be considerably increased. The freight turnover on small rivers of the Ukraine in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 450,000 metric tons.

Pre-War Traffic

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489 In 1937 the Ukrainian railways handled 313.1 million metric tons of loads, as compared with 165.7 million in 1932. The river transport carried 7.7 million tons (4.7 million in 1932), while in the same year Ukrainian seaports handled 8.6 million tons as against 6.5 million tons in 1932.

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497 The U.S.S.R.'s system of rail transport is perhaps the weakest
U link in the Soviet economy. In 1937 the railway network of the entire
497 Soviet Union amounted to only 86,400 kilometres (83,400 kilometres in 1933). The construction of additional lines had by no means kept pace with the expansion of industry and agriculture. The Ukraine in 1937 had some 14,400 kilometres of railway lines; and traffic loads in that year amounted to some 313.1 million metric tons. The inadequacy of the system if compared with other European countries is marked. For example, in France (the area of which was approximately equal to that of pre-war Ukraine) the length of the principal lines open for traffic on January 1, 1938, was 42,000 kilometres.

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727 The war has greatly disrupted Ukrainian rail transport. Locomotives,
497 rolling stock and tracks were heavily damaged or destroyed. The problem of rehabilitation is especially serious, because the lack of adequate transport facilities hinders other rebuilding projects. The locomotives and cars taken as reparations from Germany, being chiefly of narrow gauge, are consequently of no use on most existing Soviet tracks.

Production of Long Distance Locomotives

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397 Before the war the output of long distance locomotives in the Ukraine was as follows.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Communications

1. Conditions and Modes of Communication

489 The communication system of Ukraine is far from satisfactory, although natural conditions favor the construction of roads and railways and communication by ship. The defects in the Ukrainian network of communication are due rather to historical causes: the fact that it belongs to a state that has never been able to maintain an orderly system of communication is the main reason for the inadequacy of communication routes and facilities in Ukraine.

As the sea forms only 1/4 of the entire frontier of Ukraine and as the nation was shut off from it for centuries by peoples of other races, it never became a main artery of communication for the country. The rivers, once so important as channels of communication and colonisation have declined more and more with the increasing claims made by modern transportation.

Country roads cannot be included in a system of long-distance communication. Geological conditions in some districts are unfavorable but an incapable policy of communications and economy is mainly responsible for the present situation.

2. Railroads

490 The railway is therefore the most important element in the system of communications; 209 million t were transported by rail in 1934 as compared with 5.8 million t by river and 8.5 million t by sea.

The first railroad was constructed in 1863—65 from Odessa to Balta (260 km) and was extended in 1870 to Kirovohrad. This

496 was due to the initiative of local authorities and to business circles in Odessa. A connection was desired between the centers of grain production and the harbors of Odessa and Mariupil and the Donets Basin. Moreover Odessa wanted to be linked up with Germany's long-distance communication system.

But the business world of Moscow feared an invasion by foreign capital and wanted to secure the Ukrainian market for itself. So the railway network of Ukraine was developed under the influence of Moscow. The main lines were first of all to connect Petersburg and Moscow with remote areas and the sea and to facilitate the export of grain from Ukraine from harbors on the Black Sea. So the railways in Dnipro-Ukraine run mostly north-west-south-east, which only partly corresponds to historical communications (the Viking road from the Baltic to the Black Sea). The west-east line of communication was mainly of importance within Ukraine. Long-distance connections with Central Europe were not taken into consideration at all. There was no provision made even for convenient connections between Kyiv and Kharkiv, Odessa and other large towns. Some lines to the (north) west were intended to afford facilities for transporting grain to the Baltic ports (Kyiv-Berestya; Kyiv-Kowel; Romen-Libau). The most important line connects the Donets Basin with the ore-fields at the Dnipro-Bend and also with the sugar factories in the Right Bank Region.

The development of railroads in the Donets Basin began as early as 1869 and was continued in the seventies. In the eighties the Zaporizha railway was built. If the transportation of grain had originally determined the line of communications, more importance was now laid on the transportation of coal, ore, and iron. In the second half of the seventies 5.1 million t grain, 1.5 million t coal, 0.4 million t iron and steel were transported. Round about the turn of the century (1898—1902) the corresponding figures are 10.2, 10.6, and 2 and in 1913 = 14.6, 14.6, and 3.4 million t, and, in addition, 6 million t minerals, 3.6 million t wood materials, 2.5 million t sugar beet, 1.7 million t industrial wood, 1.4 million t flour, 0.8 million t salt and 0.6 million t sugar.

The Donets Basin is a great junction, though smaller places are usually selected for the intersection of routes. Kyiv is not a proper junction, as only two lines cross each other here: in Kharkiv, on the other hand, 6 lines meet and make the town one of the most important junctions in Dnipro-Ukraine. 496

But Lviv is the busiest center of communication on Ukrainian territory, 9 lines radiating from it in all directions. 5 lines intersect in Stryj, Stanislaviv and Tarnopil respectively.

The network of railways in Galicia is altogether more centralised and more practically planned for strategical reasons and as a result of the separation from Hungary by the Carpathians. The main-lines run west-east (Cracow-Peremyshl-Lviv-Stanislaviv-Chernivtsi). 5 lines cross the mountains (Popradtal, Lubkovpass, Uzhok, Beskides and the Tatra Pass). 10 lines went to the Russian frontier, but only three were continued on the other side.

The density of the railroad net is also greater in the provinces formerly under Austria-Hungary than in those under Russia, with the exception of the Donets Basin. The figures for the entire Ukrainian territory can be compared with those for the rest of Europe in the middle thirties as follows:

Country	Length in 1000 km	Density per 100 sq. km	Density per 10 000 inhabitants
Germany	54.2	11.5	8.2
France	42.5	7.7	10.1
England	30.8	12.6	6.6
Ukraine	24.4	2.6	4.5
Poland	20.1	5.2	6.0
Italy	17.0	5.5	4.0
Czechoslovakia	13.5	9.6	8.9
Roumania	11.2	3.8	5.9
Belgium	5.0	16.4	6.5
USSR	83.5	0.4	4.9

The intensity of communication by rail was not great. The average speed per hour in Western Ukraine was 60—70 km, in the eastern areas of the national territory 50—60 km, but only

496 on the main lines. On side-lines the speed was about half as much. The distance between stations in Dnipro-Ukraine are far too great (10.8 km); in Carpatho-Ukraine and Galicia they are 4.2 and 3.7 respectively.

497 Travel is constantly increasing in Ukraine. In Dnipro-Ukraine the number of passengers rose from 49 millions in 1913 (5.3 mrd. passenger/km) to 60 millions in 1927/28 and to 200 millions in 1935 (11.6 mrd. passenger/km). Goods traffic increased from 95 million t (19.6 mrd. t/km) to 204 million t (51.4 mrd. t/km) in 1935. This increase of 300 % and 115 % respectively corresponded neither to the extension of the railroad net (23 %) nor to the increase in the means of transportation (engines 25 %, trucks 50 %) even if the traction power of the individual engine had greatly increased. (from 143 000 t in 1914 to 221 000 t in 1933).

3. Country Roads

491 In Dnipro-Ukraine there are mostly country-roads without side-ditches. They are not artificially built, and are often impassable in spring and autumn, and too dusty in summer so that they can only be used in winter. As they also form the approach to railway stations, they are responsible for gluts or shortages of railroad trucks: sugar factories, in particular, suffer from these circumstances during the beet harvest. Before the first World War there were only 2 770 km of paved highways (and 3 500 km of others). In Volynia and Podolia there were 13 or 15 meters respectively per sq. kilometer, in the districts round Kyiv and Chernyhiv, 5.6 meters each, while in France there were 1125 meters and in Germany 560 meters. Under the first Five-Year Plan serious attempts at improvements were made; the proportion of paved highways in the entire network of roads was to be raised from 2.3 % to 4.5 %. In reality the entire length of paved highways in 1935 amounted to 8 500 km. Northern Caucasia had 600 km of paved highways at this time. Things were much better in Galicia, which had 10 100 km of paved highways. After the First World War, however, Poland neglected road construction. In Carpatho-Ukraine, on the other hand, where there were 2 400 km of paved highways, the

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

439 Mariupol. The supply came from the big New Russian estates and from the German, Moldavian and Serb colonies founded in the eighteenth century. Towards the middle of the century the agricultural production of the Ukraine and the New Russian Governments began to form an important proportion of the general production of the Empire, but still these regions could not be called 'the granary of Russia' on account of the continuing lack of proper means of communication with the central provinces. The upper Dniepr and the upper course of the western Dvina were too shallow to serve adequately the needs of modern transport, and as late as the Crimean War the Russian railway system had not been extended south of Moscow.

● 496 The first important imperial trunk lines were constructed during the sixties and seventies: Moscow-Kursk-Kharkov-Rostov-on-the-Don (with branch lines from Kursk to Kiev and from Kharkov to the Crimea); Moscow-Voronezh-Rostov-on-the-Don (with extensions to the northern Caucasus); Petersburg-Vilna-Rovno-Kiev-Odessa; Kharkov-Kremenchug (on the Dniepr)-Nikolaev. Railway construction had taken the 'meridial' direction: the economic axis of the Empire during the three decades 1860–90 ran from 'the industrial north' to 'the agricultural south'.

The new railway system improved the conditions for the export of Ukrainian and New Russian grain through the Black Sea ports. At the same time access to the north was provided by the railway 'diagonal' connecting Orel (on the Moscow-Kursk line) with Riga: this 'diagonal' continued to the south-east through the northern part of the Don region to Tsaritsyn on the lower Volga. Further, a special 'grain line' linked the Ukraine with the Baltic: starting from Kremenchug on the Dniepr, it passed through the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov, White Russia and Lithuania to the new ice-free port of Libava (Libau).

311 It thus began to appear that the Ukrainian and New Russian provinces were indeed to become the granary of the Russian Empire. But the colossal economic potentialities of the outlying [496] quarters of the Empire, which began to come into development during the second half of the nineteenth century, very soon overwhelmed this comparatively modest conception. In the seventies the first 'latitudinal' railway threw a bridge across the Volga at Samara and was continued as far as the southern Urals. The steppes beyond the Volga offered immense new space for agricultural exploitation. In the meantime the conquest of the Caucasus had been completed, and the rapid expansion of the economic life of the Kuban and Terek regions had begun. Soil conditions in the northern

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Caucasus were not inferior to those of New Russia and climatic 311
conditions were much more favourable: rainfall, owing to the proximity of the great Caucasian ranges, was more regular. The Kuban region did actually become a granary. Rostov-on-the-Don grew and flourished in true 'American style'. A new grain port, Novorossiysk, was built and soon became a rival to Odessa.

Further railway development accompanied the exploitation of 496
the Donets coal-mines and the growth of a metallurgical industry 135
centred on the Krivoy Rog iron-ore deposits located to the west of 311
the Dniepr. Two parallel lines were constructed to pass through Ekaterinoslav and the old district of the Zaporogian *Sech*, connecting the Donets basin with Krivoy Rog. Thus, simultaneously with the industrial development in the south and the flowering of the North Caucasian region, a new 'granary' and new regions of great mineral potential began at the turn of the century to impose a 'latitudinal' direction on railway construction: the opening of the great Siberian railway gave almost a priority to the possibilities of agricultural production in western and southern Siberia, and connected Chelyabinsk, through Ekaterinenburg, Vyatka and Vologda, with the Baltic ports. At the same time 'diagonal' development was proceeding far to the south-east through Turkestan to the frontiers of Afghanistan and the Chinese Empire.

The importance of the natural riches of Asiatic Russia came to be 311
realized with an ever-growing force during the reign of Nicholas II 648
(1896–1917). The principal economic axis of the Empire was evidently changing direction from the 'meridial' to the 'latitudinal'. The political policy of the Empire during the same period, with its emphasis on the Balkan Slavs and on the 'Byzantine' dreams of the epoch of Catherine II, was certainly archaistic in tendency and bore no relation to the fundamental realities of Eurasian geography.

The War of 1914–18 brought down in destruction that peculiarly hybrid cultural synthesis which was Romanov Russia; it obliterated at the same time the neo-Byzantine plans of the Pan-Slavists and weakened the whole position of Russia as a European power. The loss of a wide belt of territories (the whole inheritance of two hundred years of Romanov autocracy) between the Arctic and the Black Sea imposed on the new Soviet state the sheer necessity of a 'latitudinal' rather than a 'meridial' development. During the last two decades new efforts have been made to open up the agricultural and mineral wealth of the steppes beyond the Volga and the Ural in western and southern Siberia and of the valleys of the Altai and the Tien-Shan; and, while historic Russian ambitions in the Balkans

727 their posts and the vast majority of those who were Communists
316 received more or less sinecures above ground. Their places were
[466] taken by forcing the Ukrainian peasants, including a large percentage of young girls, to work in the pits with the minimum of safeguards. Little money was appropriated for the restoration of the damaged housing, for as the writer Korniychuk declared in one of his works, "Ukraine was so thankful for the success of Stalin that they did not care how they lived, for if he had perished, life would not be worth living under any circumstances."

727 With this attitude prominently emphasized by the leading propagandists, it is easy to see that the resources and energies of the population were directed by force rather toward those items that would advance the importance and the convenience of Moscow, than those that would be of advantage to the local population.

[496] The one exception was the necessity for rebuilding immediately and strengthening the railroad communications between the Donbas, Moscow, Leningrad and the Black Sea ports—in other words, the extreme eastern part of the Ukraine which was slated for a special development with roads and railroads linking the country up with the Russian centres rather than with the other Ukrainian centres to the west for these were regarded as exposed centres in case of a new outbreak of hostilities and were to be neglected until they were masked by the extension of Soviet power over the satellite countries.

474 The collectivized agriculture was in little better shape. In
341 that part of the Ukraine which had been under Soviet control before 1939, the authorities revived the collective farms but they had been so badly ruined that at first the authorities were often willing to be more considerate of the members. Immediately after the war they allowed them to group themselves into links or permanent sections of some eight to ten people who would thus come to feel themselves a distinct unit in the collective farm. It did not take long for the more rigid Communists to decide that this sense of permanence was in a way a defiance of the principles of collectivization, for very often members of the same household, if it were at all numerous, would group themselves into a link. In such cases the link became more prosperous, for it was in a way

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7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1



MAP No. 5

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433 to enlarge upon the reasons which have determined the destruction of the favourable results which ought to have appeared in this direction. We shall only limit ourselves to enumerating the more important points.

1. The defective distribution due to frequent failures of transport which are expressed by the accumulation of unused manufactured goods in the great industrial centres and by the irregularity of furnishing the factories with raw materials.

2. The very inferior quality of the manufactured goods, the enormous percentage of rejects, the continuous shortage of spare parts required for the normal functioning, and the upkeep of the machines. These defects are due to an insufficient technical staff, to low wages and salaries, and to the police system introduced into the administration of the industries.

3. The lack of co-ordination between the different branches of industry, the poor condition of State commerce, due to the incompetence of the staffs and to the very complex and very slow bureaucratic procedure.

Nevertheless, imperfect though they may be, the new mines and factories exist and under other political and economic conditions, accompanied by the revival of agriculture, of foreign commerce, and of a better functioning of transport, the Ukraine would be put on the same economic level as the best organized and the richest countries of the world.

IV

Means of Communication

496 In no other sector of economic activity does the link
489 between the Ukraine and the rest of Russia become so clearly apparent as in the matter of the organization of

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the railway system. At a superficial glance at the map[2] we immediately see that the main railway lines follow the ancient riverways which unite the Black Sea with the rest of Russia. Towards the north, however, they divide into two important branches, that of Leningrad, the old direction to Novgorod, and that of the new direction to Moscow. The Russian railways radiate from these two centres, Moscow and Leningrad, to end in the numerous ports of the White, Black, or Caspian Sea or the Pacific Ocean or at the western and eastern frontiers of the State.

In this Russia does not differ much from, say, France where, too, the railway network converges towards Paris as a centre.

Forming a part of the Russian railway system, the Ukrainian main lines are only sections or continuations of the Russian main lines, starting, as we have said, from Leningrad or Moscow.

These are the lines : (Leningrad–Jlobin)[1]–Sarny–Kiev. (Leningrad–Vilno–Rovno)–Kazatyne–Odessa. (Moscow–Koursk)–Kharkov–Sinelnikovo (Sebastopol) and (Moscow–Koursk)–Kharkov–Marioupol–(Rostov-on-Don–Caucasus). (Moscow–Briansk)–Koupiansk–Lougansk.

The Ukrainian network, including the continuations of the great Pan-Russian lines, whose length totals 14,500 kilometres (31 kilometres of rail for each 1000 square kilometres and 4·6 kilometres per 10,000 inhabitants), can be divided into four distinct classes :

1. *Lines for the export of corn* uniting the agricultural regions with the ports of the Black Sea. The direction of these lines can only be justified by the conditions of a normal expansion of grain export and the importation of colonial produce, to which the advent of Soviet rule has brought an unfavourable change.

[1] The towns put in brackets are outside Ukrainian territory.

[2] [see category 116, p.151. --- Analyst]

000 The import and export were characteristic of the pre-Great War Ukrainian economy. To-day these factors are almost absent.

496 At the beginning of the twentieth century a railway called the corn line had been constructed, with termini at Romny and Libava, a port on the Baltic now belonging to Latvia and recently partly given back to Russia by special treaty, for the corn export trade. It is clear that to-day its Ukrainian section, which does not exceed 250 kilometres, has only a very restricted local interest. Recent events may bring some changes here.

The movement of merchandise on the network which, before the Great War, had been most important in the direction from north to south, takes to-day an opposite direction and brings the surplus of cereals from the southern region towards Kharkov and Moscow. As to the most recent grain line, the construction of which had been begun in 1913 and had been completed after the Revolution, connecting Kherson and Nicolaiev to Kharkov via Zaporojie, it has to-day acquired a purely industrial character and serves to transport metal and coal to the factories of Kharkov on the one hand and to those of Kherson and Nicolaiev on the other.

489 496 2. *Means of communication* which serve the mines of Krivoi-Rog and the coal basin of the Donietz. The region of the Donietz has a sufficiently close network and is provided with many lines with a double track which connect the different mines. Nevertheless this network was clearly insufficient already before the last war, when the annual production of coal was only 40 per cent of that of to-day. The enormous accumulation of unused coal at the stations, as a result of the weakness of the transport system, had forced pre-Great War Russia to import coal from England.

The network of the Donbass is linked with the Krivoi-

496 4. *Local railway lines*, of which the most important are those which link the large towns and join them to the agricultural regions.

Although certain strategic lines now function as lines of local importance, owing to the change of the frontier, this fact has not remedied the insufficiency of such railways.

The reinforcement of industrial lines, the entire rebuilding of the stations on the strategic lines in the sense of increasing the number of storage lines, as well as the construction of new local lines, must be considered a task of immediate importance so as to avoid the slowing down of the economic development of the country. Actually if the economic potential of the Ukraine is greater or at least equal to that of France on roughly the same extent of territory, the Ukraine only possesses one-third of the rail network of France (14,500 kilometres as compared with 44,000 kilometres). If one adds the almost complete absence of roads to this, especially on the left bank of the Dnieper and in the south of the Ukraine, the inactivity and unproductiveness of the Soviet regime in the sphere of the construction of new lines seems difficult to explain.

491 In reality the Ukrainian network of roads before the Great War was in practice limited to a single road which was maintained in a satisfactory condition and which linked Kiev with the Austrian frontier via Jitomir. As far as we know that was the only motor-car road before the last war in the whole of Europe. This main road had several important local branches leading towards the south and ending at Kamenetz-Podolsk, and leading towards the north in the direction of Korosten and Kowel. Several very narrow carriage roads, whose foundations and surface were very poor, were to be found in the region of Kiev and in Podolia and they were being

Kog by a main line which is devoted to the continual 459
exchange of coal for mineral. The stock of this mine 496
is the most powerful of the Union and the average loading per axle (about 4·5 tons) is the highest in Europe. The system of the coal network is characterized by the working of the raw material in the proximity of the districts of extraction. Numerous branch lines are prolonged into supplementary lines which radiate towards the outer regions, to end at the great centres at which the metals are worked. This whole network, destined for the transport of heavy materials, and which dates from the last decades of the nineteenth century, is in general very well constructed and even partly reinforced by electric welding.

The only railway of importance constructed since the 496
October Revolution, which joins the industrial network, is that which links Moscow to Lougansk. The direction of this line confirms the continuation by the Soviet Government of the traditional economic policy, in tending to organize the Russian railway system on the Imperial plan.

3. *Strategic lines* are represented by the line Odessa–Kiev, with a double track and with numerous branches towards the Polish and Rumanian frontiers, some of which continue in a direction of Lvov, others to Kovel, to end at Warsaw.

The exploitation of these mines, since the establishment of the Russo-Polish frontier after 1920, was fundamentally changed. As a result of being cut by the frontier, they had lost their importance as strategic lines, since the principal junctions, such as Kovel or Rovno, specially intended for this purpose, were recently outside the frontiers of the Soviet Ukraine. Parallel to this they had experienced a diminution of traffic owing to the most complete disappearance of trade with Poland.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The navigable length of the principal rivers is as follows: 487

	For Shipping. Miles.	For Rafting only. Miles.
Dnieper	1,250	136
Desna	537	166
Dniester	521	35

All the above-mentioned waterways suffer in common from four serious defects. (1) They are frozen for a considerable period of the year. In the basin of the Dnieper traffic was only possible in the first ten years of this century for an average of 230 days above the rapids and 250 below. Other rivers are in a similar case. (2) The volume of water falls rapidly in summer, and in dry seasons lack of water impedes navigation seriously. (3) Wholesale cutting down of the forests on the banks has led to alteration of the beds of the rivers and the splitting up of the channels. (4) Works for the improvement of navigation scarcely exist, not even the most urgent having been undertaken. 487 502

The principal cargoes carried are breadstuffs, wood, and coal. Cereals are embarked in great quantities on the lower Dnieper and Southern Bug for shipment abroad from Kherson and Nikolaev. The upper Dnieper and the Dniester carry timber. 505 439

Navigable canals do not exist in the Ukraine. Should the scheme for a Dvina-Dnieper canal materialize, it would have a noticeable commercial effect upon the towns of Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Alexandrovsk, and Kherson. 503

(c) *Railways*

Railway System.—There are in the Ukraine three great railway centres, viz. Kiev, Kharkov, and Yekaterinoslav. 496

1. From Kiev a line runs in a westerly direction to Sarny and Kovel, continuing thence to Choïm and Warsaw.

A second line goes in a north-easterly direction to Bakhmach, thence *via* Kursk and Orel to Moscow.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

496 From Bakhmach an alternative line runs *via* Bryansk to Moscow.

In a south-south-east direction a third line goes to Yelisavetgrad, Nikolaev, and Kherson.

A fourth line runs eastward to Poltava and Kharkov.

Lastly, a line in a south-west direction goes to Vinnitsa, whence a line runs westward to Proskurov and Kamenets Podolsk (with two short branches to the Galician frontier), and another line runs southward to Odessa.

2. From Kharkov a line runs northward to Byelgorod, Kursk, Orel, and Moscow.

Another goes in a south-east direction to the Donets coal and iron region, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-Don, and the Azov ports.

A third line goes east and north-east *via* Kupyansk to Voronezh and Tambov.

A fourth goes southward to Pavlograd and Yekaterinoslav.

3. From Yekaterinoslav a line runs in a north-west direction to Alexandria, Byelaya Tserkov, Fastov, and Kiev.

A line to the Donets coal and iron region goes eastward, with branches to the Azov ports, Berdyansk, Mariupol, and Taganrog.

Another line runs south to Alexandrovsk, Melitopol, and the Crimea.

None of the three great railway centres, however, is touched by a long new line which runs from Bakhmach in the Government of Chernigov, *via* Piryatin, Cherkassi, and Vosnesensk, to Odessa, thus giving to a badly-served district an outlet for its share of the cereal export trade.

A network of short lines serves the Donets coal region and the Krivoy-Rog iron region, with connexions to Yekaterinoslav and the ports.

471 *Finance; Relations to Government.*—Five separate concerns are interested in the Ukraine railways—the South-Western Railway, the Southern Railway, the Yekaterininsky Railway, the Moscow–Kiev–Voronezh

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Railway, and the South-Eastern Railway. The first three belong to the State, and almost the whole of their mileage is in the Ukraine; the other two are privately owned, and some portion of their mileage is outside the Ukraine boundaries. 471 496

It is not possible to procure figures for the working of that proportion which is inside the limits of the Ukraine, and the figures for 1912, given below, are for the entire systems:

	Length of line. Miles.	*Gross receipts. Million roubles.*	*Nett receipts. Million roubles.*	*Weight carried. Million tons.*
South-Western Railway	2,604	73	30·4	15
Southern Railway	2,042	66	30·5	22
Yekaterininsky Railway	1,871	60	26·9	26
Moscow–Kiev–Voronezh Railway	1,652	37	16·2	10
South-Eastern Railway	2,168	55	24·6	11
Total	10,337	291	128·6	84

The Yekaterininsky line was constructed by the State; the Southern and South-Western lines were recently purchased from private owners.

The Moscow–Kiev–Voronezh Railway is a private concern with a share capital of £1,500,000. Debentures to the value of £35,000,000 have been issued at 4–4½ per cent. at different periods. The State has power to take over the line at any time on a basis agreed upon in the original concession. There is a State guarantee on the loan capital.

The South-Eastern Railway has only a portion of its line in the Ukraine, mainly in or near the Donets region. The share capital is about £3,000,000. Debentures and other loan capital amount to about £18,800,000. The State has power to purchase the line at short notice on terms fixed in the original concession. There is no State guarantee on the capital or loans. A number of lines in the Donets region,

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

496 formerly belonging to the South-Eastern Railway,
471 have been recently acquired by the State.

The money markets of Paris, London, and Amsterdam appear to be those principally interested in the loans of these railways; the financial circles of Berlin and Vienna are concerned in a lesser degree.

655 Up to the year 1889 railway rates in Russia were in
497 a state of chaos. The Government then took the matter in hand, and during the years 1893–4 inaugurated a system which, with modifications, has remained in use. The zone method is applied to both goods and passengers, with a diminishing rate for each additional zone entered by the traffic. Cereal rates received special consideration, and differential tariffs exist for the carriage to Black Sea and Azov ports of cereals destined for export. Preferential rates are also granted on coal, iron and manganese intended for export.

496 *Adequacy to Economic Needs: Possibilities of Expansion.*—Taken as a whole, the railways of the Ukraine are not adequate to the needs of the country. In the Donets region railway extension by private enterprise has kept fairly level with industrial needs, and new projects were recently being actively promoted. In the agricultural portion of the country, however, the lack of railways is a serious handicap to all kinds of industry. The greater portion of the mileage is single line, and the rolling stock is of poor capacity and not kept in good repair.

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491 portation by land with ox teams. In the three South Ukrainian governments in 1897, 100,000 such ox carts lumbered along on the ancient, worn-out chumak roads which were many hundreds of meters wide. Neither the Polish nor the Russian administration bothered about road building. Even today there are large cities in the Ukraine which are connected with one another only by means of enormously wide country roads. While Galicia during Austrian rule had about 10,000 kilometers of paved roads, and the Czechs built 2400 kilometers of roads in the Carpatho-Ukraine, the Soviet Ukraine succeeded in raising the figure to a full 8900 kilometers of highway in 1935, and the Kuban region to 600 kilometers. In 1935, there were 25,200 kilometers of improved natural roads which approximately correspond to our field roads, and 168,000 kilometers of "natural earth roads" which are impossible during the rainy season and in thaws. (120)

120. Kubiyovich: Geography, page 479 ff.

496/173/ There are only 24,400 kilometers of railways running through the entire Ukrainian area from the Carpatho-Ukraine to the Kuban, from the Black Sea up to the Pirpyat Swamps (in Germany there were 68,548 kilometers of railroads in 1935). The only actual railway junction in this large country is Lwów, from which nine lines emanate. Kiyev and all the other cities are merely intersections of two lines. In the twenty years of their rule the Bolsheviks have built only 1000 kilometers of railroads. (121) They, too, did not

121. Kubiyovich: Geography, page 484.

alleviate the main deficiency of the Ukrainian railway network the lines of which run north and south, toward Moscow and the Baltic: the important

•496 lateral connections are still wanting. Anyone wishing to go from west to east in the Ukraine is obliged to reckon with a circuitous route and a long period of travel. For instance, you travel 32 hours from the capital of Kiyev to Taganrog on the Sea of Azov which is 700 kilometers distant, even though you go forever over flat steppes; from Kiyev to Kherson 450 kilometers to the south you, travel 16 hours. (122) More-

122. Kubiyovich: Atlas, page 50.

over, the Ukrainian railway network is so wide-meshed that there are large districts which are 40 to 60 kilometers away from the railroad line, as on the lower Dnieper north of the Bug estuary and in the Kuban region. The most traveled stretch is the Moscow-Khar'kov-Donets Basin-Kuban line with more than 10 passenger trains a day. Between Kiyev and Odessa there are five to six passenger trains a day, as well as between Kiyev and Moscow. There is not a single serviceable cross connection except the line between the industrial regions of Krivoy Rog and Donets, which was built in 1884. Between two such important cities as Kiyev and Khar'kov there are only one or two passenger trains a day. Odessa can be reached from the Donets region only by a very roundabout way. Through the lonely reaches of the Western Soviet Ukraine only one or at best two passenger trains run daily. (123)

123. Kubiyovich: Atlas, page 49.

*

505/174/ The most important trade and communications route of the Ukraine until the pre-war period was the Dnieper. It and its tributaries take up 4300 kilometers of the total of 6000 kilometers of navigable rivers in the Ukraine. Shipping is not very important on the rest of the rivers, such

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

SL 311 241 U 311 241

strongly developed. In the left-bank Poles'ye, land has long been cultivated and drained. There are occasional marshy and forested sections, mainly between the Dnieper and the Desna. The chief crops are hemp, tobacco, buckwheat, and leguminous plants. Orchard farming is important. The right-bank wooded steppe is the principal agricultural region of the Ukraine. It combines fertile black earth with a warm and moist climate, and the ready availability of phosphate fertilizer. The sugar beet is predominant and closely linked with the sugar industry. Among the cereals, rye, winter wheat, and oats are most important; potatoes and leguminous crops are also grown. The by-products of sugar refining and fodder crops support large livestock herds raised for dairy products and meat. The growing of fruit is of national importance. Vineyards lie in protected valleys near the Dniester River. The left-bank wooded steppe grows crops similar to those of the right bank. Sugar beets decrease toward the east and are gradually replaced by sunflowers. Similarly, winter wheat gradually makes way for spring wheat. In the southern steppes, where a drier climate prevails, wheat is the most important crop. Rye, corn, and barley are also grown, the latter mainly in the very dry districts. Along the Sea of Azov and westward to the lower Dnieper cotton has been introduced in recent years and is grown without irrigation. Ukrainian cotton is of rather poor quality and produces little fiber. Melons are grown to a great extent, and there are vineyards along the Sea of Azov coast and around Odessa. In the Carpathian realm, the northern foothills abound in wheat and sugar beets. Up-slope dairy farming is important. Agriculture is poorly developed in the Transcarpathian Ukraine. Large areas are covered by forests and pasture land. In the vicinity of the large metropolitan centers, such as Kiev, Khar'kov, L'vov, as well as in the densely inhabited sections of the Donbas, around Krivoy Rog, and along the Dnieper, truck produce and dairy farming are most important.

SL 496 U 496

The intensely developed economy of the Ukraine requires a correspondingly well-developed transportation network. In view of the shallowness of most of the Ukrainian rivers, the railroads bear most of the load. The Ukraine has the densest rail network of the USSR, the chief centers being at L'vov, Kiev, and Khar'kov. Among recently completed lines and spurs, the direct Donbas-Moscow trunk is of the greatest significance. Only since 1932, when the construction of the *Dneproges* dam was completed and an artificial lake was created at the site of the rapids (a former obstacle to navigation), has the Dnieper become the

SL 504 U 504

496 on the main lines. On side-lines the speed was about half as much. The distance between stations in Dnipro-Ukraine are far too great (10.8 km); in Carpatho-Ukraine and Galicia they are 4.2 and 3.7 respectively.

●497 Travel is constantly increasing in Ukraine. In Dnipro-Ukraine the number of passengers rose from 49 millions in 1913 (5.3 mrd. passenger/km) to 60 millions in 1927/28 and to 200 millions in 1935 (11.6 mrd. passenger/km). Goods traffic increased from 95 million t (19.6 mrd. t/km) to 204 million t (51.4 mrd. t/km) in 1935. This increase of 300 % and 115 % respectively corresponded neither to the extension of the railroad net (23 %) nor to the increase in the means of transportation (engines 25 %, trucks 50 %) even if the traction power of the individual engine had greatly increased. (from 143 000 t in 1914 to 221 000 t in 1933).

3. Country Roads

491 In Dnipro-Ukraine there are mostly country-roads without side-ditches. They are not artificially built, and are often impassable in spring and autumn, and too dusty in summer so that they can only be used in winter. As they also form the approach to railway stations, they are responsible for gluts or shortages of railroad trucks: sugar factories, in particular, suffer from these circumstances during the beet harvest. Before the first World War there were only 2 770 km of paved highways (and 3 500 km of others). In Volynia and Podolia there were 13 or 15 meters respectively per sq. kilometer, in the districts round Kyiv and Chernyhiv, 5.6 meters each, while in France there were 1125 meters and in Germany 560 meters. Under the first Five-Year Plan serious attempts at improvements were made; the proportion of paved highways in the entire network of roads was to be raised from 2.3 % to 4.5 %. In reality the entire length of paved highways in 1935 amounted to 8 500 km. Northern Caucasia had 600 km of paved highways at this time. Things were much better in Galicia, which had 10 100 km of paved highways. After the First World War, however, Poland neglected road construction. In Carpatho-Ukraine, on the other hand, where there were 2 400 km of paved highways, the

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

496 formerly belonging to the South-Eastern Railway,
471 have been recently acquired by the State.

The money markets of Paris, London, and Amsterdam appear to be those principally interested in the loans of these railways; the financial circles of Berlin and Vienna are concerned in a lesser degree.

655 Up to the year 1889 railway rates in Russia were in
● 477 a state of chaos. The Government then took the matter in hand, and during the years 1893–4 inaugurated a system which, with modifications, has remained in use. The zone method is applied to both goods and passengers, with a diminishing rate for each additional zone entered by the traffic. Cereal rates received special consideration, and differential tariffs exist for the carriage to Black Sea and Azov ports of cereals destined for export. Preferential rates are also granted on coal, iron and manganese intended for export.

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425 669 the cattle were burned. However, the glorious state did not last long. The farmers lacked seed, machines and draft animals in order to cultivate the land they so easily obtained. Besides, the men who came back from the war and the landless village farmers wanted to have a share in the booty. In the guberniyas of Kiyev and Khar'kov the government claimed the forests and the extensive beet fields. Civil wars, drought and epidemics carried off hundreds of thousands of peasant families during the years of the Bolshevist war. Thus ended the first chapter of the agrarian revolution, so eagerly awaited.

423 241 The New Economic Policy with its tolerance of a "bludgeoned private economy" constituted the second chapter. The peasants obtained their land and their farms on long leases; they could cultivate their land as they pleased, except that the farm could not be carelessly run, otherwise the management of the establishment could pass over into other hands. Nothing was gained by the fact that all the land belonged to the community. The "communal fields" were a Russian form of possession which had found favor at the time of Catherine II in the steppes and in the part of the Ukraine on the left bank of the river. Even though the farmer could not dispose of his land 497 at any time like a free /Facing page 144/ /Map IX: Railroad Communications. The main lines of communication run in a north-south direction, whereas the east-west lines have always been neglected./ /Key: Number of daily passenger trains in 1935./ /145/ 423 241 estate owner, even though he was obliged to acquiesce to the fact that the entire community property was redistributed every 10 to 20 years, nevertheless, he could do as he pleased on his section of land. No less than 88.9% of peasant land in the Ukrainian steppes belonged to the communities, and in North Ukraine, 80.4%. The czars had condoned this form of ownership, because it simplified administration, facilitated

11: Obermaier--152A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

[Map IX: Railroad communications, cf. complete legend, p. 152]

11: Obermaier--152B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

●497



[Map IX: Railroad communications]

U 185 489 494 of road passengers should increase 7½ times; and the number of buses, by 3,000.

U 185 489 503 The Five-Year Plan also provides for the expansion of river and sea traffic. Small rivers are to be extensively adapted for navigation, and will also be utilized for local hydro-electric power supplies. Shipbuilding yards are to be rebuilt, and the tonnage of river and sea traffic is to be considerably increased. The freight turnover on small rivers of the Ukraine in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 450,000 metric tons.

Pre-War Traffic

U 489 In 1937 the Ukrainian railways handled 313.1 million metric tons of loads, as compared with 165.7 million in 1932. The river transport carried 7.7 million tons (4.7 million in 1932), while in the same year Ukrainian seaports handled 8.6 million tons as against 6.5 million tons in 1932.

SU 497 U 497 The U.S.S.R.'s system of rail transport is perhaps the weakest link in the Soviet economy. In 1937 the railway network of the entire Soviet Union amounted to only 86,400 kilometres (83,400 kilometres in 1933). The construction of additional lines had by no means kept pace with the expansion of industry and agriculture. The Ukraine in 1937 had some 14,400 kilometres of railway lines; and traffic loads in that year amounted to some 313.1 million metric tons. The inadequacy of the system if compared with other European countries is marked. For example, in France (the area of which was approximately equal to that of pre-war Ukraine) the length of the principal lines open for traffic on January 1, 1938, was 42,000 kilometres.

U 727 497 The war has greatly disrupted Ukrainian rail transport. Locomotives, rolling stock and tracks were heavily damaged or destroyed. The problem of rehabilitation is especially serious, because the lack of adequate transport facilities hinders other rebuilding projects. The locomotives and cars taken as reparations from Germany, being chiefly of narrow gauge, are consequently of no use on most existing Soviet tracks.

Production of Long Distance Locomotives

U 397 Before the war the output of long distance locomotives in the Ukraine was as follows.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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504 Kryvyj Rih and Nikopil are the chief exports, imports being much less significant.

[503] Since the harnessing of the rapids of the Dnipro, Kherson has developed quickly. The harbor lies on the Dnipro liman which is 60 km long, 5.20 km wide and 5—9 m. deep. Grain and wood are the most important freights handled.

Novorossiiske, the largest harbor in Northern Caucasia is the port for the grain from the Kuban and the Volga areas, and the wood that is transported by rail and on the Volga from Stalingrad, cement from the local factories etc.

Tuapse, in the most easterly area of Ukraine exports grain and, above all, petroleum from Maikop and valuable Caucasian wood. In Theodosia grain and fruit make up the freight while Sevastopil is exclusively a harbor for warships.

Mariupil, an artificial harbor, is the busiest port on the Sea of Oziv. Donets coal is transported for the Kerch furnaces and to countries abroad, also rocksalt from Artemivske and grain. The return freight consists partly of Kerch iron ore for the Donets Basin.

Rostov on the Don exports grain. It had grown at the expense of Taganrih even before the first World War.

Berdianske — not nearly so important as Rostov — owes its trade to the excellent wheat grown in the neighborhood. Henycheske and 10 other small ports play no great part in sea trade.

● 501 The Black Sea mercantile fleet was never very big: in 1913 it had only 416 steamers, 22 motor boats and 887 sailing ships with a total tonnage of 473 000 brt-. It only reached pre-war level under the second Five Year Plan. A large proportion of the trade with foreign countries was always carried on foreign ships. In 1934, for instance, there were far more Greek than native ships in the Russian ports on the Black Sea (with the exception of Odessa) — 1 350 000 net registered tons, 37 % of all shipping, compared with 760 000 net registered tons and 21 % native tonnage.

9: Protnero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD: Ukraine RD1

the channel was made early in the nineteenth century, but proved abortive. Proposals to canalize this section have so far had no result. From Loev to Yekaterinoslav, above the rapids, there is passenger traffic, some goods traffic, and a vast traffic in rafted timber. Though some of the timber is floated down the rapids to Kherson, most is brought ashore at Yekaterinoslav, which receives annually some 160,000 tons of building timber, besides other classes of wood. Below the rapids the river is navigable from Alexandrovsk to the mouth.

Some of the tributaries of the Dnieper are navigable for some distance from their junction with the main stream—the Pripet (Pripyat) for a short stretch; the Desna, which joins the Dnieper at Kiev, as far as the boundary of the Ukraine near Novgorod Sjeversk; the Psiol to a point west of Poltava; the Ingulets for about 25 miles.

The vessels employed in the Dnieper basin are of small tonnage (maximum about 300 tons), and the steamers are almost all either for passenger traffic or for towing the barges in which goods traffic is mainly carried. The maximum loaded depth below the rapids is 12 ft. 10 in.; above the rapids it is considerably less.

The *Dniester* is navigable for the whole of its length in the Ukraine from the Galician frontier to the mouth at Akkerman. There are many dangerous rapids, and the vessels used on the river are small, with a maximum draught of 3 ft. 9 in. The lagoon at the river mouth is so shallow that most vessels discharge at Varnitsa near Bender for carriage by rail to Odessa.

The *Southern Bug* is navigable from Vosnesensk to the mouth at Nikolaev. There is passenger traffic, and the size and draught of vessels is the same as on the Dnieper, below the rapids.

There is some navigation on the river *Styr* in Volhynia from Lutsk to Borobaza, also on the *Western Bug* from the Galician frontier to the point where it leaves the Ukraine, but in both cases only for rafts and vessels of very light draught.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians
165

342



A wooden hut in the Carpathians

Ruthenian lumberjacks making rafts on the Black Tisz

501

River System

The Ukraine as a whole consists of portions of the basins of the Rivers Dnieper (with its tributary the Pripet), Dniester, Bug, and Donets, the last named being the largest affluent of the Don. 133

The *Dnieper*, which rises in the Government of Smolensk, has a total length of about 1,410 miles, and drains an area of 202,140 square miles. It first touches Ukrainian territory at Loyev on the western border of Chernigov, and thence flows in a south-easterly direction to Yekaterinoslav, in a shifting channel which varies greatly in depth and breadth. At Yekaterinoslav the river turns south and then south-west, forming a succession of rapids, so that navigation in this part is only possible when the river is in flood. Artificial canals enable small vessels to proceed when there is low water in the channel. The Dnieper enters the Black Sea below the town of Kherson, by a *liman*, into which the Bug also discharges. 133 487 [502]

The chief tributaries of the Dnieper are: on the right bank, going from north to south, the Berezina, which runs through the Government of Minsk; the Pripet, with its many affluents, among them being the Styr and the Strumen, all of which overflow their banks and help to form the system of marshes which is more fully described in *Russian Poland*, No. 44 of this series (p. 15), and the Ingulets, which flows a little above Kherson into the Dnieper near its outlet to the Black Sea. 133

On the left bank the chief tributaries are the Sosh; the Desna, which flows through Chernigov into the Dnieper just above Kiev; and the Samara, which joins the river at Yekaterinoslav.

There is a regular service of passenger steamers on the Dnieper both above and below the rapids, and also along the Pripet as far as Pinsk. [505]

The *Dniester* rises in Austrian Galicia, and only the last 515 miles of its course, with a drainage area of 16,500 square miles, belong to Russian territory. It reaches the Ukraine provinces near Kamenets Podolsk,

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

133 and then forms the frontier line between the Governments of Podolia and Kherson and the neighbouring province of Bessarabia. It receives no very important tributaries in the Ukraine, though there is a fair number of smaller ones. Navigation is interrupted by the [502] Yampol rapids. For ordinary river craft an artificial canal affords a passage here, but steamboats cannot pass upstream. The depth of the water has lately been increased by a more scientific system of regulation.

The *Bug* rises in Russian Poland and reaches the Ukraine near Vlodava, to the north-west of Volhynia. It forms for some distance the boundary between the Ukraine and Russian Poland, and then flows through Austrian Galicia into the Ukraine at Volochysk. Its winding course follows a south-easterly direction, entering the Black Sea by a *liman*.

The chief tributaries of the Bug within the Ukraine provinces are, on the right bank, the Kedyma and the Chichekleya; and on the left bank the Ingul.

The *Donets* rises in the Government of Kursk, and enters the Ukraine to the north of Kharkov. It then flows to the south-east, leaving the Ukraine at the extreme north-eastern corner of Yekaterinoslav.

(3) Climate

132 Climatic statistics should generally be regarded as approximate.

The following recent figures are available for the South-west Territory—Tarnopol, although actually in Galicia, being taken as typical of the south-west of Volhynia, Berdichev of the south-east of Volhynia and the central part of the Government of Kiev, and Volkovints and Kamenets Podolsk of the Government of Podolia:

	Average Temperature (Fahrenheit).		
	January.	*July.*	*Year.*
Tarnopol . . .	22·5°	66·0°	44·1°
Berdichev . . .	22·3°	65·5°	45·0°
Volkovints . . .	20·5°	65·9°	44·4°
Kamenets Podolsk .	26·1°	68·5°	47·5°

The navigable length of the principal rivers is as follows: 487

	For Shipping. Miles.	For Rafting only. Miles.
Dnieper	1,250	136
Desna	537	166
Dniester	521	35

All the above-mentioned waterways suffer in common from four serious defects. (1) They are frozen for a considerable period of the year. In the basin of the Dnieper traffic was only possible in the first ten years of this century for an average of 230 days above the rapids and 250 below. Other rivers are in a similar case. (2) The volume of water falls rapidly in summer, and in dry seasons lack of water impedes navigation seriously. (3) Wholesale cutting down of the forests on the banks has led to alteration of the beds of the rivers and the splitting up of the channels. (4) Works for the improvement of navigation scarcely exist, not even the most urgent having been undertaken. 487 502

The principal cargoes carried are breadstuffs, wood, and coal. Cereals are embarked in great quantities on the lower Dnieper and Southern Bug for shipment abroad from Kherson and Nikolaev. The upper Dnieper and the Dniester carry timber. 505 439

Navigable canals do not exist in the Ukraine. Should the scheme for a Dvina-Dnieper canal materialize, it would have a noticeable commercial effect upon the towns of Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Alexandrovsk, and Kherson. 503

(c) *Railways*

Railway System.—There are in the Ukraine three great railway centres, viz. Kiev, Kharkov, and Yekaterinoslav. 496

1. From Kiev a line runs in a westerly direction to Sarny and Kovel, continuing thence to Choĭm and Warsaw.

A second line goes in a north-easterly direction to Bakhmach, thence *via* Kursk and Orel to Moscow.

505 First World War grain, wood, gypsum and building stone (250 000 t) were transported on the river, while later only wood was shipped on the upper reaches.

133 487 505 The Kuban (800 km long, with a basin of about 60 000 sq.km) has its source in Caucasian glaciers and is navigable all the year round for a stretch of 350 km. It is true that gravel and sandbanks make shipping difficult. In 1935 230 000 t of freight were shipped down the river. The Boh (709 km long, with a basin of 64 000 sq.km) has little water and many rapids. 100 km are navigable, but traffic is negligible. Of the Don (1984 km long, with a basin of 425 000 sq.km) which is the fourth biggest river in Europe, only the navigable lower reaches belong to Ukraine. Goods transported are above all grain, coal, salt-254 000 t in 1935. Conveyance of passengers is negligible.

Its right tributary, the Donets (1 020 km, with a basin of 99 000 km) crosses the Donets Basin and is navigable for a stretch of 350 km. The Buh, Vepr and Syan, Prut, Seret and Tysa are only important for floating down logs.

● 503 The condition of the Ukrainian waterways is not imposing, though Ukraine comes fourth in Europe with its 6 200 km of navigable rivers. There is no thorough system of regulating the rivers or building canals to connect them, though this has been planned for decades. There are only 200 km of canals. The following artificial systems of communication by water have been planned:

a) reconstruction of the Viking way and the linking up of Leningrad, Kyiv and Kherson (2 canals each 30 km long);

b) a connection between Riga and Kherson, in place of the antiquated route via the Beresina which has existed since 1805;

c) development of the now inadequate route (Oginski-Canal etc. 343 km) between the Dnipro or the Pripyat, Pina and Jasiolda and — via the Shara — the Memel linking Kherson with Königsberg;

d) (Royal canal etc. 233 km) between the Pina and — via the Mukhovets — the Buh and the Vistula, connecting Kherson with Danzig;

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

e) the construction of a canal from the Dnipro, via the Desna and the Bolva (30 km) to the Zizdra and Oka, and so to Moscow and the Volga; 503

f) a canal between the Dnipro and the Donets, via Samara and Vovcha;

g) a connection between Danzig and the Black Sea via the Vistula and the Syan, linking up with the Dnister and perhaps the Prut;

h) a canal between the Caspian and the Black Sea, via the valley of the Manych, a tributary of the Don and the Sea of Oziv.

5. Sea Traffic

The position of Ukraine like a fan, spreading out from the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv is particularly favorable for the export of mass products, while the coast of the Black Sea has not many natural harbors. Ports can, however, be built in the limans of the river-mouths. The coast of the Sea of Oziv is definitely unfavorable. It is only recently that harbor equipment has been mechanised and the harbors themselves improved. 133 504

Odessa is the third largest harbor in Russia, coming after Riga and Leningrad and lying in a bay 30 km north-east of the Dnister liman which is too shallow for shipping. The harbor is well constructed and freezes only for 2—3 weeks, which is easy to manage. Odessa is the only port in Ukraine where exports practically balance imports (in 1913: 2113 and 2061 t. average for 1930—1934: 1234 and 1550 thousand t). These figures refer to the total turn-over, in which figures for coastal trade exceed those for actual exports. In the former the import figures were higher and in the latter the export figures. 505

In Odessa grain forms the biggest part of the freight which also includes sugar, wood, methylated spirits and oil-cake. The imports are groceries, fruit, textile raw materials, chemicals etc. The town had become an important financial center with a stock exchange.

Mykolaiv on the liman of the Boh has a well built harbor with good connections with the hinterland. Grain and ore from 504

Kryvyj Rih and Nikopil are the chief exports, imports being much less significant.

Since the harnessing of the rapids of the Dnipro, Kherson has developed quickly. The harbor lies on the Dnipro liman which is 60 km long, 5.20 km wide and 5—9 m. deep. Grain and wood are the most important freights handled.

Novorossiiske, the largest harbor in Northern Caucasia is the port for the grain from the Kuban and the Volga areas, and the wood that is transported by rail and on the Volga from Stalingrad, cement from the local factories etc.

Tuapse, in the most easterly area of Ukraine exports grain and, above all, petroleum from Maikop and valuable Caucasian wood. In Theodosia grain and fruit make up the freight while Sevastopil is exclusively a harbor for warships.

Mariupil, an artificial harbor, is the busiest port on the Sea of Oziv. Donets coal is transported for the Kerch furnaces and to countries abroad, also rocksalt from Artemivske and grain. The return freight consists partly of Kerch iron ore for the Donets Basin.

Rostov on the Don exports grain. It had grown at the expense of Taganrih even before the first World War.

Berdianske — not nearly so important as Rostov — owes its trade to the excellent wheat grown in the neighborhood. Henycheske and 10 other small ports play no great part in sea trade.

The Black Sea mercantile fleet was never very big: in 1913 it had only 416 steamers, 22 motor boats and 887 sailing ships with a total tonnage of 473 000 brt-. It only reached pre-war level under the second Five Year Plan. A large proportion of the trade with foreign countries was always carried on foreign ships. In 1934, for instance, there were far more Greek than native ships in the Russian ports on the Black Sea (with the exception of Odessa) — 1 350 000 net registered tons, 37 % of all shipping, compared with 760 000 net registered tons and 21 % native tonnage.

647 their career and the assurance of a good income for the meagre appointments as an official. It is sufficient just to glance at the statistics of the Russian Empire in order to realize what a gigantic increase in the development of civilization was reached by the effort of the Russian [871] intellectuals and specialists. Public instruction had developed in these fifty years to an enormous extent, [165] infant mortality had fallen by more than 60 per cent, [164] epidemics had experienced a great fall, as also cattle diseases, and the yield of the land had increased in the [232] southern regions by more than 30 per cent. The improvement of the different breeds of horses and cattle was already evident on the eve of the Great War.

206 The backward country which Russia was supposed to be in the eyes of Westerners, including also the Ukraine, had in 1912 a big network of telephone lines in the country and especially in the region of Vinnitza, where the organization of the Zemstvos was especially active.

505 As to the river system, as we have already seen, it is very poor and is limited to four rivers, the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Boug, and the Donietz, of which the Dnieper alone is of any interest. The transport capacity of this one important river has been for ever spoiled by the rapids which make navigation impossible along a [503] considerable distance. It is only after the building of the *Dnieprogues*, whose gigantic barrage had submerged the rapids along a distance of about one hundred kilometres, that an uninterrupted river route was established, linking the upper Dnieper with the Black Sea.

This river drains the greater part of the Ukraine and has left its mark upon the whole historic and economic evolution of the country.

Before the Great War the annual tonnage of transports

The navigable length of the principal rivers is as follows: 487

	For Shipping. Miles.	For Rafting only. Miles.
Dnieper . .	1,250	136
Desna . .	537	166
Dniester . .	521	35

All the above-mentioned waterways suffer in common from four serious defects. (1) They are frozen for a considerable period of the year. In the basin of the Dnieper traffic was only possible in the first ten years of this century for an average of 230 days above the rapids and 250 below. Other rivers are in a similar case. (2) The volume of water falls rapidly in summer, and in dry seasons lack of water impedes navigation seriously. (3) Wholesale cutting down of the forests on the banks has led to alteration of the beds of the rivers and the splitting up of the channels. (4) Works for the improvement of navigation scarcely exist, not even the most urgent having been undertaken. 487 502

The principal cargoes carried are breadstuffs, wood, and coal. Cereals are embarked in great quantities on the lower Dnieper and Southern Bug for shipment abroad from Kherson and Nikolaev. The upper Dnieper and the Dniester carry timber. 505 439

Navigable canals do not exist in the Ukraine. Should the scheme for a Dvina-Dnieper canal materialize, it would have a noticeable commercial effect upon the towns of Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Alexandrovsk, and Kherson. 503

(c) *Railways*

Railway System.—There are in the Ukraine three great railway centres, viz. Kiev, Kharkov, and Yekaterinoslav. 496

1. From Kiev a line runs in a westerly direction to Sarny and Kovel, continuing thence to Choïm and Warsaw.

A second line goes in a north-easterly direction to Bakhmach, thence *via* Kursk and Orel to Moscow.

U 185 489 494 of road passengers should increase 7½ times; and the number of buses, by 3,000.

U 185 489 503 The Five-Year Plan also provides for the expansion of river and sea traffic. Small rivers are to be extensively adapted for navigation, and will also be utilized for local hydro-electric power supplies. Shipbuilding yards are to be rebuilt, and the tonnage of river and sea traffic is to be considerably increased. The freight turnover on small rivers of the Ukraine in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 450,000 metric tons.

Pre-War Traffic

U 489 In 1937 the Ukrainian railways handled 313.1 million metric tons of loads, as compared with 165.7 million in 1932. The river transport carried 7.7 million tons (4.7 million in 1932), while in the same year Ukrainian seaports handled 8.6 million tons as against 6.5 million tons in 1932.

SU 497 U 497 The U.S.S.R.'s system of rail transport is perhaps the weakest link in the Soviet economy. In 1937 the railway network of the entire Soviet Union amounted to only 86,400 kilometres (83,400 kilometres in 1933). The construction of additional lines had by no means kept pace with the expansion of industry and agriculture. The Ukraine in 1937 had some 14,400 kilometres of railway lines; and traffic loads in that year amounted to some 313.1 million metric tons. The inadequacy of the system if compared with other European countries is marked. For example, in France (the area of which was approximately equal to that of pre-war Ukraine) the length of the principal lines open for traffic on January 1, 1938, was 42,000 kilometres.

U 727 497 The war has greatly disrupted Ukrainian rail transport. Locomotives, rolling stock and tracks were heavily damaged or destroyed. The problem of rehabilitation is especially serious, because the lack of adequate transport facilities hinders other rebuilding projects. The locomotives and cars taken as reparations from Germany, being chiefly of narrow gauge, are consequently of no use on most existing Soviet tracks.

Production of Long Distance Locomotives

U 397 Before the war the output of long distance locomotives in the Ukraine was as follows.

TABLE XXI

U 397

Ukraine: Pre-War Production of Long Distance Locomotives

Year	Ukrainian S.S.R number	Soviet Union total number
1928	231	479
1932	431	828
1937	880	1,214

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; and Russia's Economic Front, A. Yugov, New York, 1941.

SU [397] Ukrainian production of longdistance locomotives in 1950 is planned to be 1,000. For the Soviet Union as a whole a target of 2,720 has been fixed: this includes 2,200 steam locomotives, 300 diesel, and 220 electric locomotives. The Ukrainian output of freight cars in 1950 is fixed at 55,500 - more than a third of the target for the whole U.S.S.R., which is 146,000 freight cars.

Motor Vehicles

U 397 The number of motor vehicles to be produced in 1950 in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is fixed by the new Five-Year Plan at 25,000 while SU [397] for the entire Soviet Union the output is as follows: 428,000 trucks, 65,600 passenger cars, and 6,400 motor buses. Apparently the destruction of factories producing motor-vehicles was particularly heavy.

The Five-Year Plan provides for the building in the Ukraine of two motor car assembly plants, as well as a works to produce annually 60,000 motor trucks.

Dnieper-Bug Canal[1]

U 503 487 The Dnieper-Bug Canal, cutting through the Pinak bogs and the Brest forest in Byelorussia, is important as the only water outlet towards the west, connecting the Dnieper, Western Bug, and the Black Sea with the Vistula.

It first took shape at the end of the 18th century under the name of the Imperial Canal. But in those days, being shallow and without sluices, it was of little use for navigation. For ten months in the year the canal was dead. Only at high water, in the springtime, could a small quantity of timber be rafted along its course.

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1 Soviet News July 24, 1946.

● 503 487 727 The canal was reconstructed just before the German invasion. In record time, eight months, ten large sluices were built in two stairways of five locks each; and in August 1940 the first river vessels passed through from the Black Sea to the Vistula.

The Germans destroyed these sluices and choked the canal so that all the hydro-technical structures had to be rebuilt anew. The speed of reconstruction was such that by the middle of 1946 vessels and barges were passing freely from the Vistula along the Dnieper with cargoes of timber for the Ukraine.

At present the western Bug is navigable only in April and May. When it has been converted into a normal waterway, effective communication will be established between the Ukrainian and Byelorussian river basins and the Vistula, Oder, Elbe, and Rhine.

2: Timoshenko S-4, 5 (no date) 1919 RD1 Ukraine RD1
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The second objection, which involves the question of Russia's need for the Ukrainian ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, is readily refuted by Russian maritime history.

Great Russia Not Dependent on the Black Sea Ports

We grant that, to the casual thinker with little or no knowledge of the trade routes of modern commerce, it may at first appear that Russia cannot live without southern ports, but, while it is true that more than half of the maritime exports of former Russia were on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, those who present this argument forget that the Ukrainian exports composed nearly half of those of the whole Russian Empire. It has already been proved that ethnic Ukraine shipped about two-thirds of the total amount of cereals. If we take these facts into consideration, we must conclude that it was the Ukraine which used the southern ports and not Russia. Nor did Russia export much of her merchandise by way of the Black Sea. The official Russian statistics of the traffic of merchandise by rail show no southern port except Rostov-on-the-Don, which served as an outlet for the products of the territories situated north of the ethnic frontier of the Ukraine and Russia. As to Novorosseysk, that was always the port for the Cossacks of Kuban and of the northern Caucasus. Even the northern regions of the Ukraine, including the governments of Tchernihov, that of Poltava and a part of the government of Kharkov, sent their wheat by the ports of the Baltic and even by Libau and Koenigsberg.

Statistics indicate that imports have never been shipped in by way of the Black Sea to any great extent. The records of Russian foreign commerce for the year 1912 show that 80 per cent of the maritime imports of the old empire of Russia were made by way of the Baltic, so that even the Ukraine received much foreign merchandise by this route. The policy of the Russian Government was always in favor of Baltic ports, to the detriment of those on the Black Sea. Finally speaking, all Russian commercial policy, in which an important item was the railroad rates, was in favor of the Baltic ports.

504 Let us compare for a moment the regions for which the Black and the Baltic Seas serve as ports. That for which the Black Sea affords an outlet does not extend more than 500 or 600 kilometers, while that served by the Baltic ports reaches as far as western Siberia. Thus, the Baltic region exceeds that of the Black Sea by several thousand kilometers.

000 Surely these facts, coupled with even the most cursory consideration of the Russian imperialistic policy, show beyond a doubt that in respect to the direct economic utilization of the southern ports, the setting up of a separate government by the Ukraine does not obstruct any fundamental interests of the Russian people. Briefly stated, Russia proper does not use directly the southern ports except Rostov, which is the outlet of the region of the Don and in part of the lower region of the Volga, but there is not such a vast difference between the Russian and Ukrainian interests that these minor details as to a common use of various ports can not be conciliated by special agreement.

Coal Fields of Ukraine Not Necessary to Great Russia

316 Proceeding directly to the third and last question, that
433 involving coal and iron, we are confronted first of all with the geographic fact that it is really within the ethnographic limits of the Ukraine that are found nearly all the coal fields of Donetz, as well as most of the productive centers of anthracite. More than 90 per cent of the total output of coal of the Donetz basin, during the last years of normal exploitation, came from the Ukrainian regions, while the total production of coal of the Donetz basin reached 70 per cent of the general production of coal of the old Russian Empire, and we may increase this to 85 per cent, if we do not include in the total the output of Russian
[438] Poland. Notwithstanding these percentages of production, the general statistics of railroad traffic, together with the data collected by the Special War Committee on the Supply of Fuel, show that nearly four-fifths of the Ukrainian coal and anthracite was used in Ukraine, one-fifth only being exported to Russia.

e) the construction of a canal from the Dnipro, via the Desna and the Bolva (30 km) to the Zizdra and Oka, and so to Moscow and the Volga; 503

f) a canal between the Dnipro and the Donets, via Samara and Vovcha;

g) a connection between Danzig and the Black Sea via the Vistula and the Syan, linking up with the Dnister and perhaps the Prut;

h) a canal between the Caspian and the Black Sea, via the valley of the Manych, a tributary of the Don and the Sea of Oziv.

5. Sea Traffic

The position of Ukraine like a fan, spreading out from the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv is particularly favorable for the export of mass products, while the coast of the Black Sea has not many natural harbors. Ports can, however, be built in the limans of the river-mouths. The coast of the Sea of Oziv is definitely unfavorable. It is only recently that harbor equipment has been mechanised and the harbors themselves improved. 133 504

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7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

on this river was more than 80 per cent of the river tonnage of the whole country. The ports of the Dnieper had, before the Great War, 360 steamers and more than 1800 other boats. Timber, salt, and corn composed, and still composed to-day, the predominant part of the goods carried by the Dnieper. 505

The insufficient and incompetent management of the river ports and the small tonnage of the ships still do not allow one to-day to increase the river transport of the Ukraine to any noticeable extent.

On the other hand the geographical possibilities of sea transport are enormous. Excellent ports like Odessa and Nikolaiev, lying 600 kilometres from Constantinople and 1000 kilometres from Batoum, can assure the transport of export and import goods on a big scale and especially that of petrol from the Caucasus. Beside [504] Odessa and Nikolaiev, the Ukraine still possesses other ports which are also favoured from a geographical and technical point of view, among them Marioupol, Berdiansk, and Kherson and some smaller ports of local interest.

We have noted that under normal conditions of 433 economic exploitation the Ukraine, thanks to its agricultural and industrial potential, could be put on the level of the richest countries of the world. The continuation of the economic development of the Ukraine is conditioned by the existence of a stable outlet. If it is a question of a surplus of wheat, sugar, and other produce of the land, or of the products of industry, this surplus is to-day dependent on the consuming regions of the rest of Russia. The Ukraine, which consumes 85 per cent of its resources of energy and almost all its minerals in order to transform them locally into manufactured articles, is not only a source of raw materials, as is usually imagined.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

206 471 have been opened and worked under their auspices and control. The most notable development has been in the districts of Bakhmut (Government of Yekaterinoslav), Lebedyenski (Kharkov), and Lokhivitski (Poltava). Mariupol and district has communication with Bakhmut and other places on the Donets coalfield. Otherwise trunk communication is confined to a line connecting Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson.

The instruments of private telephone installations are usually of the Bell Co.'s make. The State and the *zemstvos* have generally installed instruments made by Ericsson, Stockholm.

(2) External

(a) *Ports*

● 504 *Accommodation.*—The Ukraine is not lacking in good natural ports on the Black Sea: Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson are capable of handling great quantities of traffic. On the Azov Sea, Berdyansk and Mariupol share the trade, but in their case purely artificial harbours have had to be constructed at great expense, as the coast has no natural harbour.

There are no tides, any variations of depth of water being caused by wind of great force or long persistence from one quarter.

Odessa is the most frequented port of the Russian Black Sea coast. There is a good depth of water in the bay, but it is much exposed to the two most dangerous winds which blow on the coast, viz. the south and the south-east. The outer harbour is formed by a mole known as the eastern mole, which has a curve to the eastward, and a detached breakwater 1,400 yds. in length parallel with the shore. The eastern entrance has 24–30 ft. of water, and the western 17 ft., and both have an entrance width of 300 yds. This outer harbour is safe from all winds, and gives commodious anchorage.

The inner harbour is formed by five moles which divide it into four parts. The two western moles

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

form the Imperial or Pratique port, the two eastern 504
moles the Quarantine port, the intervening spaces forming the New and Middle harbours. Three-quarters of a mile to the northward is the Petroleum harbour, sheltered by a long mole. Vessels can load up to 26 ft. in the New harbour, up to 21 ft. in the Middle harbour, and up to 24 ft. in the Petroleum harbour.

There is quayage of 4,550 ft. in length in the Pratique harbour, 3,245 ft. in the New harbour, 4,550 ft. in the Quarantine harbour, and 900 ft. in the Petroleum harbour. There is adequate crane-power and railway accommodation alongside the quays, with extensive warehouses and two large grain elevators. There are two floating cranes, each of 25 tons capacity. The port has a floating dry-dock, 381 ft. long, 63 ft. wide, and 19 ft. 6 in. in depth, with a lifting capacity of 4,800 tons. There are two patent slips for small vessels and a repair yard for light repairs.

Many improvements have been projected, including an additional breakwater for the outer harbour and longer quayage in the Middle and Petroleum harbours.

Nikolaev is a river-port situated on the east bank of the Southern Bug. There is a depth of 25 ft. in the river channel up to the town. The granite quay of the commercial harbour is 3,850 ft. in length, and has 26 ft. of water alongside. There are two grain elevators and a good number of cranes. The Cabotage harbour is dredged to a depth of 17 ft.; it is only used by coasters or vessels wintering in the port. A petroleum pier, 900 ft. long, with reservoirs adjacent, is situated above the town.

A new commercial quay, 2,400 ft. in length, was almost completed in 1914. Another, 1,650 ft. in length, was then in construction, but progress on it was reported to be slow.

The naval port and arsenal are situated on the [70]
northern side of the town on the banks of the River Ingul. There is a depth of 25 ft. in the naval port. The heaviest marine repairs can be undertaken.

Kherson is situated on the Dnieper, some 15 miles

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

504 from its mouth. There are two entrances from the sea, the Rvach and Zbarev channels, the former being 22 ft. deep, the latter only 10 ft. There are three loading berths at a quay, respectively 420, 125, and 425 ft. long, but vessels mostly load in the stream from lighters by means of floating cranes, of which there are 22, or by using their own winches. Vessels are allowed to load up to 23 ft. owing to a recent improvement in the channel. A new quay to accommodate 18 steamers is under construction.

Berdyansk roads are protected by a long semi-circular sand-spit from all winds except the south-west. There is 14–16 ft. of water in the roads. The harbour is protected from all winds by a breakwater 700 yds. in length, parallel with and half a mile distant from the shore line in front of the town. A dredged channel, 1½ miles in length and 10½ ft. deep, leads up to the western end of the breakwater. Quay space is at present deficient, but a first-class port is projected and partially under construction. The harbour is being dredged to increase its general depth to 20 ft.

Mariupol harbour consists of an area on the open foreshore enclosed by two moles. The entrance channel is dredged to a depth of 24 ft., and the depth in the anchorage inside the moles is 22–26 ft. Within the harbour, 440 yds. from the shore line and parallel with it, is a breakwater 500 yds. long. The inner harbour inside this breakwater is reserved for vessels loading coal Against the quays, where rails run alongside, there is a minimum depth of 12 ft. and a maximum of 24 ft. There are two hydraulic elevators for loading coal, but much coal and all grain is loaded by hand, and mechanical appliances are greatly needed. Mariupol is considered a harbour of first-class importance, and extensive improvements of all kinds are projected.

505 431 *Nature and Volume of Trade.*—Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson export cereals and other agricultural products; Nikolaev also exports great quantities of iron-ore and Kherson timber. Many vessels arrive in ballast

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

to carry these goods. The imports consist of machinery, manufactured goods, colonial and tropical products, and chemicals; Odessa also imports coal from the Donets region, which is shipped at Mariupol or Taganrog. 505 439 [438]

The export trade of Berdyansk is chiefly coal, iron-ore, and grain. Mariupol principally exports Donets coal. The imports of both places are general, but a large proportion consists of chemicals and particular minerals required in the iron and steel industry in the Government of Yekaterinoslav.

The number and tonnage of the vessels entering the above-mentioned ports in 1910, and the amounts of the exports and imports, are shown in the following table:

	Total vessels entered.	*Tonnage.*	*British vessels entered.*	*Tonnage.*	*Imports (tons).*	*Exports (tons).*
Odessa	848	1,596,217	174	388,136	566,743	1,736,029
Nikolaev	544	1,126,441	315	676,834	178,790	2,070,419
Kherson	152	330,260	131	288,789	104,693	844,919
Berdyansk	180	269,365	38	65,492	28,693	416,451
Mariupol	231	394,451	67	119,242	266,693	1,587,161
				Total	1,145,612	6,654,979

The respective values of the exports and imports are more difficult to ascertain, but the difference in value is certainly not so great as that in weight. For some years before the war, the value of the exports of the whole of Russia exceeded that of her imports by about 40 per cent., and the proportion for the Ukraine ports is probably about the same.

Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Development.—The Ukraine Black Sea ports would appear, on the whole, to be equal to the demands put upon them; in fact, there is severe competition between Odessa and Nikolaev. The recent improvements at Nikolaev have inspired the Odessa authorities to apply for powers to carry out great extensions, but so far these have not been granted, as the central authorities held that there was no prospect of a good return on the capital that would be required. 504 655

504 The port of Kherson is handicapped by the expense and difficulty of keeping open a good channel from the mouth of the Dnieper to the town.

The two Azov ports are in a somewhat congested state, and need additional quay space, loading appliances, and powerful ice-breakers. Their importance for the export of coal and iron-ore as well as of grain is recognized, and it is understood that large sums would be forthcoming to effect improvements.

Two other ports in the Ukraine which are very suitable for development are Ochakov, on the north bank of the Dnieper–Bug estuary, and Shadovsk, which is situated in a land-locked bight a few miles west of the isthmus of Perekop. At present neither is touched by any railway, and they offer no facilities to shipping; but they are so favourably situated that their development at reasonable cost would probably be more beneficial to the Ukraine than expensive improvements at Odessa and Kherson.

(*b*) *Shipping Lines*

505 Before the war Odessa was visited by regular lines of steamers with passenger services, and the other ports by 'tramps' exclusively.

There are several Russian-owned lines. The Russian Volunteer Fleet Association, a subsidized undertaking, made regular voyages between Odessa and Vladivostok with a view to developing trade between Russia and her possessions on the Pacific. This line, which has a fleet of 70 vessels, with a tonnage of about 150,000, is not a commercial success.

The Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Co. provided passenger services in the Black and Azov Seas, and had other lines to Mediterranean ports. Its fleet consisted of 65 vessels, with a tonnage of 150,000.

The Russian Transport and Insurance Co. had a fleet of ten vessels, mostly tramps, with a tonnage of 12,000.

Peter Regier & Son had nine tramp steamers, of a total tonnage of 22,000.

505 as the Dnester, Bug and Donets, because it is not regulated. The Donets has too little water to assume the importance it could have as the only river in the industrial area.

504 Odessa is the most important seaport of the Ukraine, and next in importance comes Novorossiysk on the Caucasian coast. Both of them turn over more than two million tons of goods annually. Next come Mykolayov at the mouth of the Bug and Maryupil on the Sea of Azov, with a turn-over of more than a million tons annually, as well as Kherson at the mouth of the Dneper and Theodosia in the Crimea with more than half a million tons each.(124)

124. Kubiyovich: Atlas, page 48.

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000 When workers are satisfied with their jobs and the general living conditions of their dwellings, they do not like to change. Constant change of a crew of workers of an enterprise is a definite sign that something is wrong, that the workers are not satisfied. For the employers it is no pleasure constantly to be obliged to train new
404 people and test their reliability. In the Ukraine workmen very often leave factories and pits in order to find employment in other enterprises. The official organ of heavy industry 'Za Industriyalizatsiiu' writes about this on December 15, 1936: "The fluctuation of workmen in the Donets Basin is enormous. It even exceeds that of former years. In eleven months of 1936, 231,000 new workmen moved to the coal pits, while 233,000 moved away; again in 1935, 210,000 came, 219,000 left. The crew changes all the time... People also leave the mines because of low wages. /175/ In pit number 18 many of the workers hired, earned only 100 to 200 rubels a month. Disorganization

IV UNRRA ASSISTANCE TO THE UKRAINE

Distribution of UNRRA Supplies

648 731 UNRRA supplies for the Ukraine are handed over to the government at the port of entry (usually Odessa on the Black Sea); and the government is then responsible for arranging distribution.

648 731 647 Like most other countries receiving UNRRA help, the Ukrainian Government has established a special organization to supervise the reception, warehousing, and distribution of all UNRRA goods received. This organization - which has on its staff specialists in food, industrial equipment, agricultural rehabilitation, food processing machinery, medical supplies, transport, accounting and distribution - is called the Department of UNRRA Supplies, and is directly responsible to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

The Department (headed by Mr. V.V. Khomyak) works in close liaison with the various ministries of the Ukrainian Government, and with the UNRRA Mission. On the basis of decisions made by the particular ministries concerned, it draws up plans for the distribution of UNRRA supplies and keeps a central record of their sales and of the proceeds expended by the government for further relief projects.

5:4 648 731 Most UNRRA shipments for both the Ukraine and Byelorussia have arrived through the port of Odessa; and since early 1946 an UNRRA officer has been stationed there to handle problems connected with delivery. Before an UNRRA shipment comes in, the authorities at Odessa are notified of the ship's name, its expected time of arrival, and the nature of its cargo. As soon as possible after the ship lands, discharging of cargo begins. Stevedoring labour is supplied by the port commander's service organization, "Inflot", which also furnishes checkers to work in the ship's hold and on the docks, counting the supplies and reporting any damaged goods. As the cargo is unloaded, perishable items, such as clothing and cheese, are placed in warehouses on the docks, and seeds in a warehouse in the suburbs of Odessa. Packaged goods, such as canned meat, army rations, and juices, are piled on the dock at shipside and finally into freight cars.

648 731 Directives for the distribution of the supplies (based upon decisions of the recipient ministries concerned) are issued by the Department of UNRRA Supplies to the Ministry of Foreign Trade representative in Odessa, whose office then instructs the railroad and barge authorities, providing such information as the name and location of the organization or governmental authority receiving the supplies, and a description of the goods to be delivered.

[65] UNRRA relief supplies are either sold to individual ration-card or permit holders, or distributed to collectives, co-operatives, and other

648 to end) only 202,585 gross long tons of UNRRA supplies had arrived in
731 the Ukraine. These consisted mainly of foodstuffs (three-fourths of the entire tonnage); while slightly less than one-tenth was made up of clothing, textiles and footwear; and 67 tons were medical equipment. Despite the urgent need of agricultural and industrial supplies, only 15,336 and 13,249 tons respectively had reached the Ukraine by the end of June.

By the end of January 1947, UNRRA shipments to the Ukraine from all sources amounted to 407,125 gross long tons; and the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine reported that 372,796 tons of this had reached Soviet
[504] ports. Delays in shipments during December and January were greater than usual because the port of Odessa for the first time in many years was frozen over, and ships lay icebound for days.

The following table shows UNRRA shipments in comparison with the programme.

TABLE XXII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Programme (thousand U.S. dollars)	Shipments to January 31, 1946 (thousand U.S. dollars)	(gross long tons)
Food, feed, soap	100,189	94,587	287,519
Clothing, textiles, and footwear	16,856	16,801	15,095
Medical and sanitation	2,326	1,858	373
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088	14,403	29,070
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591	34,077	75,068
Totals	188,050	161,726	407,125

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Industrial Rehabilitation Supplies

731 As the table shows, 75,068 gross long tons of the total supplies
48 shipped by January 31 were industrial rehabilitation equipment. These supplies have, however, been extremely slow in arriving. Up to the
433 end of June 1946 only 13,249 gross long tons had reached the Ukraine, including United States army surplus equipment of about 20 electric power stations and generators, as well as some raw materials, chiefly rubber, tin, lead, copper and other metals, and welding electrodes. A small number of machines for use in automobile repair shops, and about 90 motor cars and trucks had also arrived; but the slow delivery of machinery to transport materials and process building equipment was a serious defect, since much of the rubble of war damage had been cleared away, and the lack of such supplies was a hindrance to

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
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strongly developed. In the left-bank Poles'ye, land has long been cultivated and drained. There are occasional marshy and forested sections, mainly between the Dnieper and the Desna. The chief crops are hemp, tobacco, buckwheat, and leguminous plants. Orchard farming is important. The right-bank wooded steppe is the principal agricultural region of the Ukraine. It combines fertile black earth with a warm and moist climate, and the ready availability of phosphate fertilizer. The sugar beet is predominant and closely linked with the sugar industry. Among the cereals, rye, winter wheat, and oats are most important; potatoes and leguminous crops are also grown. The by-products of sugar refining and fodder crops support large livestock herds raised for dairy products and meat. The growing of fruit is of national importance. Vineyards lie in protected valleys near the Dniester River. The left-bank wooded steppe grows crops similar to those of the right bank. Sugar beets decrease toward the east and are gradually replaced by sunflowers. Similarly, winter wheat gradually makes way for spring wheat. In the southern steppes, where a drier climate prevails, wheat is the most important crop. Rye, corn, and barley are also grown, the latter mainly in the very dry districts. Along the Sea of Azov and westward to the lower Dnieper cotton has been introduced in recent years and is grown without irrigation. Ukrainian cotton is of rather poor quality and produces little fiber. Melons are grown to a great extent, and there are vineyards along the Sea of Azov coast and around Odessa. In the Carpathian realm, the northern foothills abound in wheat and sugar beets. Up-slope dairy farming is important. Agriculture is poorly developed in the Transcarpathian Ukraine. Large areas are covered by forests and pasture land. In the vicinity of the large metropolitan centers, such as Kiev, Khar'kov, L'vov, as well as in the densely inhabited sections of the Donbas, around Krivoy Rog, and along the Dnieper, truck produce and dairy farming are most important.

SU 496 U 496

The intensely developed economy of the Ukraine requires a correspondingly well-developed transportation network. In view of the shallowness of most of the Ukrainian rivers, the railroads bear most of the load. The Ukraine has the densest rail network of the USSR, the chief centers being at L'vov, Kiev, and Khar'kov. Among recently completed lines and spurs, the direct Donbas-Moscow trunk is of the greatest significance. Only since 1932, when the construction of the *Dneproges* dam was completed and an artificial lake was created at the site of the rapids (a former obstacle to navigation), has the Dnieper become the

SU 504 U 504

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

major navigable through route of the Ukraine. The major ports are Zhdanov and Osipenko on the Sea of Azov, and Kherson, Nikolayev, and Odessa on the Black Sea. Odessa is one of the major maritime trade centers of the USSR.

The Ukraine exports coal, iron and steel, grain, salt, and sugar, and imports cloth from Moscow and Ivanovo, precision tools from Moscow and Leningrad, lumber from Gor'kiy Oblast, along the Volga, or from the Belorussian SSR along the Dnieper, petroleum products from Groznyy (by rail and pipe line) and from Baku (by sea via Batumi-Odessa), and fish from the Lower Volga.

Oblast Survey

The twenty-five oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR can be grouped into seven geographic regions on the basis of physical, economic, and historical factors: the right-bank and the left-bank sections of the wooded steppe, the Donets Basin, the Dnieper bend, the Black Sea lowland, the Ukrainian Poles'ye, and the Western Ukraine.

THE RIGHT-BANK WOODED STEPPE

The right-bank wooded steppe, which is the original settlement area of the Ukrainian people, includes the oblasts of Kamenets-Podol'skiy, Vinnitsa, and Kiev. Its fertile black-earth soils and the warm, humid climate have combined to turn the area into a region of intensive agriculture, a dense population, and a well-developed rail network. Sugar beets are the leading crop. Through careful tilling of the soil, the application of phosphate fertilizer, and the rotation with grains and forage grasses, high yields are obtained which furnish up to three tons of sugar per 2.5 acres. The principal grains are winter wheat, rye, barley, and oats. Leguminous crops (peas, lentils, beans) are extensively grown to restore soil fertility. In connection with the intensive crop cultivation, the raising of hogs and cattle for meat and milk production is also very important. Forage grasses and the by-products of the sugar-refining and associated distilling industries constitute an excellent feed supply. Also connected with the sugar economy of the area are the lignite and peat industries, which fuel the processing plants, the quarrying of limestone (used in the sugar-bleaching process), and the mining of phosphorite, which is converted into fertilizer.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
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region, having 35 percent of the reserves of the USSR, and the site of soda works.

Debal'tsevo is one of the chief rail centers of the Donets Basin.

Chistyakovo, to the south, is a major coal-mining point.

Zhdanov, called Mariupol' until 1948, the principal port for the Donets Basin, on the Sea of Azov, is the seat of the new Azovstal' metallurgical works, one of the largest of the region. It also has the Il'ich works, which produce special steels, shipyards, and fish canneries.

Voroshilovgrad Oblast

Area, 10,300, population, 1,800,000

Voroshilovgrad Oblast is the easternmost division of the Ukrainian SSR. It includes the eastern portion of the Donets Basin and extends northward into a typical Ukrainian wheat and sunflower region. Most of its coal mines produce anthracite.

Voroshilovgrad, formerly called Lugansk, has large locomotive works and metallurgical and pipe-rolling mills and produces enameled goods and mining machinery.

Voroshilovsk (formerly Alchevsk) has metallurgical and coking industries. Just south is the coal-mining city of Parizhskaya Kommuna [Paris commune].

Kadiyevka, called Sergo from 1935 until 1948, and Krasnyy Luch are the two main coal-mining centers of the oblast, with many large satellite towns grouped near by. Almaznaya, southwest of Kadiyevka, produces special steel alloys. Lesser coal centers in the southeastern section of the region are Krasnodon, Sverdlovsk, and Roven'ki.

Rubezhnoye, in the northern coal district, on the Northern Donets, has large chemical (explosives) works, and produces paints and glass.

DNIEPER BEND

THE DNIEPER BEND, which includes Dnepropetrovsk Oblast and the adjacent section of Zaporozh'ye Oblast, is the second center of heavy industry in the Ukraine. Metallurgy, which is largely based on Krivoy Rog iron ore and Nikopol' manganese, is the principal branch of the industry. It receives its coal and flux materials from the Donets Basin. Unlike the Donbas, which frequently suffers from a shortage of water, it is amply supplied with water from the Dnieper River, which is also the source of most of its electric power. The main industrial centers lie

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
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SU 133x u 133

tion. It lies between the Dniester River and the Kiliya arm of the Danube delta and has Moldavian minorities in the northwest and Bulgarian elements in the west, near Bolgrad. The main crops are wheat, barley, and corn in the northwest, where sheep are also extensively raised. Near the Black Sea there are large vineyards and orchards. The oblast is one of the most important wine-producing districts of the USSR. Along the coast there are fisheries and saltworks. Building materials constitute the only mineral resources.

SU 241 u 241

SU 438x [504] u 438 [504]

Izmail (Rumanian *Ismail*) is a port and a fishing center on the Kiliya arm of the Danube delta. It produces caviar and has an active grain and lumber trade.

Kiliya (Rumanian *Chilia Nouă*) is a fishing port on the Danube delta, east of Izmail.

Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy (Rumanian *Cetatea Albă*) was known as Akkerman until 1944. It is a port on the Dniester Liman, trading in wine, fish, and wool. It has fisheries and saltworks and is surrounded by vineyards and orchards.

POLES'YE

SU 311 241 u 311 241

The Ukrainian Poles'ye, which includes the oblasts of Zhitomir and Chernigov and the northern sections of Kiev and Sumy oblasts, is distinguished by a relatively high humidity, wooded terrain (especially in the west), and podsolic soils, similar to its Belorussian counterpart, which adjoins it in the north. Among the sparsely settled population, industries are poorly developed. Intensive crops are grown in the forest clearings, including flax, hemp, potatoes, and forage crops, which support some dairy-cattle herds. In the south, along the border of the wooded steppe zone, sugar beets and tobacco are cultivated. The Poles'ye is the only Ukrainian region (not counting the western oblasts, which have not been long exposed to the Soviet planned economy) where rye acreage exceeds that of wheat. Buckwheat is also grown as a local food staple. Industry is largely based on agricultural and lumber resources. Among the food industries, starch processing and distilling are the chief activities. There are woodworking and furniture plants, porcelain works, tanneries, and hemp and flax retting installations. Among the mineral resources, one should note granite, sandstone, used in the making of refractory bricks, and labradorite. Peat extraction is important as a fuel basis.

491 roads were superior in quality to those in Galicia and the network was denser. The total length of highways in Ukraine was approximately 24 000 km. There was little motor traffic: there was more in Carpatho-Ukraine but in 1937 there were in Ukraine only 13 cars per 10 000 inhabitants (in France 492, England 431, Germany 183).

4. Inland Waterways

133 As regards length and the area of their basins, the rivers of
487 Ukraine are among the largest in Europe, but their navigability suffers from frequent windings, shallows and rapids. In summer variations in the water level are a great disadvantage, while in winter the rivers are frozen for 3—4 months. As the rivers melt from the mouth, there is no danger from ice-floes. 90 % of the rivers flow into the Black Sea, some into the Vistula and two insignificant streams into the Caspian Sea. The Dnipro and some of its tributaries are navigable as are also 4 other rivers:

The Dnipro is 2 248 km long and drains an area of 518 500 square kilometers, so that it is the third biggest river in Europe. By the dam it has been made navigable for 1 250 kilometers. Its tributaries, the Pripyat, the Desna and the Seym are also navigable. The total length of the Dnipro navigable network is 3250 kilometers, while 4 300 km of waterways can be used for shipping and floating rafts, i. e. more than $^2/_3$ of the total waterways in Ukraine (6 200 km).

• 505 Freight traffic on the Dnipro did not reach the pre-war level of 2.7 million t till 1932 and had increased by 1935 to 3.9 million t. Passenger traffic doubled in those years and amounted to 4.8 millions. $^1/_3$ of the goods transported was wood, and $^1/_4$ mineral building materials, more than $^1/_8$ grain, while coal, ore and metal were poorly represented. The important harbor towns on the Dnipro are Kyiv, Dnipropetrivske, Nishnodniprovske and Kherson.

The Dnister (1 372 km long, draining an area of 77 000 sq. km) has been prevented by geological and political conditions from developing any great shipping. Upper reaches and lower belong to two absolutely different political systems. Before the

● 505 First World War grain, wood, gypsum and building stone (250 000 t) were transported on the river, while later only wood was shipped on the upper reaches.

133 487 505 The Kuban (800 km long, with a basin of about 60 000 sq.km) has its source in Caucasian glaciers and is navigable all the year round for a stretch of 350 km. It is true that gravel and sandbanks make shipping difficult. In 1935 230 000 t of freight were shipped down the river. The Boh (709 km long, with a basin of 64 000 sq.km) has little water and many rapids. 100 km are navigable, but traffic is negligible. Of the Don (1984 km long, with a basin of 425 000 sq.km) which is the fourth biggest river in Europe, only the navigable lower reaches belong to Ukraine. Goods transported are above all grain, coal, salt-254 000 t in 1935. Conveyance of passengers is negligible.

Its right tributary, the Donets (1 020 km, with a basin of 99 000 km) crosses the Donets Basin and is navigable for a stretch of 350 km. The Buh, Vepr and Syan, Prut, Seret and Tysa are only important for floating down logs.

503 The condition of the Ukrainian waterways is not imposing, though Ukraine comes fourth in Europe with its 6 200 km of navigable rivers. There is no thorough system of regulating the rivers or building canals to connect them, though this has been planned for decades. There are only 200 km of canals. The following artificial systems of communication by water have been planned:

a) reconstruction of the Viking way and the linking up of Leningrad, Kyiv and Kherson (2 canals each 30 km long);

b) a connection between Riga and Kherson, in place of the antiquated route via the Beresina which has existed since 1805;

c) development of the now inadequate route (Oginski-Canal etc. 343 km) between the Dnipro or the Pripyat, Pina and Jasiolda and — via the Shara — the Memel linking Kherson with Königsberg;

d) (Royal canal etc. 233 km) between the Pina and — via the Mukhovets — the Buh and the Vistula, connecting Kherson with Danzig;

e) the construction of a canal from the Dnipro, via the Desna and the Bolva (30 km) to the Zizdra and Oka, and so to Moscow and the Volga; 503

f) a canal between the Dnipro and the Donets, via Samara and Vovcha;

g) a connection between Danzig and the Black Sea via the Vistula and the Syan, linking up with the Dnister and perhaps the Prut;

h) a canal between the Caspian and the Black Sea, via the valley of the Manych, a tributary of the Don and the Sea of Oziv.

5. Sea Traffic

The position of Ukraine like a fan, spreading out from the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv is particularly favorable for the export of mass products, while the coast of the Black Sea has not many natural harbors. Ports can, however, be built in the limans of the river-mouths. The coast of the Sea of Oziv is definitely unfavorable. It is only recently that harbor equipment has been mechanised and the harbors themselves improved. 133 504

Odessa is the third largest harbor in Russia, coming after Riga and Leningrad and lying in a bay 30 km north-east of the Dnister liman which is too shallow for shipping. The harbor is well constructed and freezes only for 2—3 weeks, which is easy to manage. Odessa is the only port in Ukraine where exports practically balance imports (in 1913: 2113 and 2061 t. average for 1930—1934: 1234 and 1550 thousand t). These figures refer to the total turn-over, in which figures for coastal trade exceed those for actual exports. In the former the import figures were higher and in the latter the export figures. 505

In Odessa grain forms the biggest part of the freight which also includes sugar, wood, methylated spirits and oil-cake. The imports are groceries, fruit, textile raw materials, chemicals etc. The town had become an important financial center with a stock exchange.

Mykolaiv on the liman of the Boh has a well built harbor with good connections with the hinterland. Grain and ore from 504

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Trade in merchandise in the Ukrainian harbors was always 505 characterized by the predominance of coastal traffic (cabotage) and inland transportation (more than 70 % of all shipments) over foreign trade (not quite 30 %) and the latter by the excess of exports over imports. Turnovers in Ukrainian harbors increased with swelling exports and reached a peak in the years 1909—1911, but had a disastrous setback after World War I and even under the second Five Year Plan attained only 15 million t, i. e. less than the 17 million t of pre-war years. Foreign trade decreased more than the entire turnover, imports more than exports, so that it was only the excess of the latter that increased.

The following contributed more than 1 % of the entire merchandise passing through the harbors of the USSR alone: in 1913, first of all grain (43.6 %), then a long way behind, coal (20.3 %), then ores (7.7 %), sugar (2.6 %), metals and metal products (2.6 %), salt (1.8 %), building materials (1.7 %), petroleum (products) (1.1 %), fruit (1.1 %), In 1934 hard coal came first (26.9 %), then petroleum (24.8 %) and grain only third (13.4 %), then ores (7.1 %), metals and metal products (6.6 %), building wood (4.4 %), salt (2.4 %), building materials (2.2 %), sugar (1.3 %). A comparison of these statistics shows the decline in the export of grain and sugar.

While the passenger traffic greatly increased after the First World War, there was practically none with foreign countries, but only between Soviet ports. In 1935, 2.8 million people were transported between the Ukrainian harbors on the Black Sea and the Sea of Oziv and in 1934 1.8 million between ports of the USSR alone, 29.6 % being contributed by Kherson, 28.9 % by Odessa and 18 % by Hola Prystan, otherwise an insignificant port.

their career and the assurance of a good income for the meagre appointments as an official. It is sufficient just to glance at the statistics of the Russian Empire in order to realize what a gigantic increase in the development of civilization was reached by the effort of the Russian intellectuals and specialists. Public instruction had developed in these fifty years to an enormous extent, infant mortality had fallen by more than 60 per cent, epidemics had experienced a great fall, as also cattle diseases, and the yield of the land had increased in the southern regions by more than 30 per cent. The improvement of the different breeds of horses and cattle was already evident on the eve of the Great War.

The backward country which Russia was supposed to be in the eyes of Westerners, including also the Ukraine, had in 1912 a big network of telephone lines in the country and especially in the region of Vinnitza, where the organization of the Zemstvos was especially active.

As to the river system, as we have already seen, it is very poor and is limited to four rivers, the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Boug, and the Donietz, of which the Dnieper alone is of any interest. The transport capacity of this one important river has been for ever spoiled by the rapids which make navigation impossible along a considerable distance. It is only after the building of the *Dnieprogues*, whose gigantic barrage had submerged the rapids along a distance of about one hundred kilometres, that an uninterrupted river route was established, linking the upper Dnieper with the Black Sea.

This river drains the greater part of the Ukraine and has left its mark upon the whole historic and economic evolution of the country.

Before the Great War the annual tonnage of transports

on this river was more than 80 per cent of the river tonnage of the whole country. The ports of the Dnieper had, before the Great War, 360 steamers and more than 1800 other boats. Timber, salt, and corn composed, and still composed to-day, the predominant part of the goods carried by the Dnieper. 505

The insufficient and incompetent management of the river ports and the small tonnage of the ships still do not allow one to-day to increase the river transport of the Ukraine to any noticeable extent.

On the other hand the geographical possibilities of sea transport are enormous. Excellent ports like Odessa and Nikolaiev, lying 600 kilometres from Constantinople and 1000 kilometres from Batoum, can assure the transport of export and import goods on a big scale and especially that of petrol from the Caucasus. Beside [504] Odessa and Nikolaiev, the Ukraine still possesses other ports which are also favoured from a geographical and technical point of view, among them Marioupol, Berdiansk, and Kherson and some smaller ports of local interest.

We have noted that under normal conditions of 433 economic exploitation the Ukraine, thanks to its agricultural and industrial potential, could be put on the level of the richest countries of the world. The continuation of the economic development of the Ukraine is conditioned by the existence of a stable outlet. If it is a question of a surplus of wheat, sugar, and other produce of the land, or of the products of industry, this surplus is to-day dependent on the consuming regions of the rest of Russia. The Ukraine, which consumes 85 per cent of its resources of energy and almost all its minerals in order to transform them locally into manufactured articles, is not only a source of raw materials, as is usually imagined.

River System

The Ukraine as a whole consists of portions of the basins of the Rivers Dnieper (with its tributary the Pripet), Dniester, Bug, and Donets, the last named being the largest affluent of the Don. 133

The *Dnieper*, which rises in the Government of Smolensk, has a total length of about 1,410 miles, and drains an area of 202,140 square miles. It first touches Ukrainian territory at Loyev on the western border of Chernigov, and thence flows in a south-easterly direction to Yekaterinoslav, in a shifting channel which varies greatly in depth and breadth. At Yekaterinoslav the river turns south and then south-west, forming a succession of rapids, so that navigation in this part is only possible when the river is in flood. Artificial canals enable small vessels to proceed when there is low water in the channel. The Dnieper enters the Black Sea below the town of Kherson, by a *liman*, into which the Bug also discharges. 133 487 [502]

The chief tributaries of the Dnieper are: on the right bank, going from north to south, the Berezina, which runs through the Government of Minsk; the Pripet, with its many affluents, among them being the Styr and the Strumen, all of which overflow their banks and help to form the system of marshes which is more fully described in *Russian Poland*, No. 44 of this series (p. 15), and the Ingulets, which flows a little above Kherson into the Dnieper near its outlet to the Black Sea. 133

On the left bank the chief tributaries are the Sosh; the Desna, which flows through Chernigov into the Dnieper just above Kiev; and the Samara, which joins the river at Yekaterinoslav.

There is a regular service of passenger steamers on the Dnieper both above and below the rapids, and also along the Pripet as far as Pinsk. [505]

The *Dniester* rises in Austrian Galicia, and only the last 515 miles of its course, with a drainage area of 16,500 square miles, belong to Russian territory. It reaches the Ukraine provinces near Kamenets Podolsk,

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD: Ukraine RD1

487 the channel was made early in the nineteenth century, but proved abortive. Proposals to canalize this section
487 have so far had no result. From Loev to Yekaterinoslav, above the rapids, there is passenger traffic,
505 some goods traffic, and a vast traffic in rafted timber. Though some of the timber is floated down the rapids to Kherson, most is brought ashore at Yekaterinoslav, which receives annually some 160,000 tons of building timber, besides other classes of wood. Below the rapids the river is navigable from Alexandrovsk to the mouth.

487 Some of the tributaries of the Dnieper are navigable for some distance from their junction with the main stream—the Pripet (Pripyat) for a short stretch; the Desna, which joins the Dnieper at Kiev, as far as the boundary of the Ukraine near Novgorod Sjeversk; the Psiol to a point west of Poltava; the Ingulets for about 25 miles.

501 The vessels employed in the Dnieper basin are of
457 small tonnage (maximum about 300 tons), and the steamers are almost all either for passenger traffic or for towing the barges in which goods traffic is mainly carried. The maximum loaded depth below the rapids is 12 ft. 10 in.; above the rapids it is considerably less.

The *Dniester* is navigable for the whole of its length in the Ukraine from the Galician frontier to the mouth at Akkerman. There are many dangerous rapids, and the vessels used on the river are small, with a maximum draught of 3 ft. 9 in. The lagoon at the river mouth is so shallow that most vessels discharge at Varnitsa near Bender for carriage by rail to Odessa.

The *Southern Bug* is navigable from Vosnesensk to the mouth at Nikolaev. There is passenger traffic, and the size and draught of vessels is the same as on the Dnieper, below the rapids.

There is some navigation on the river *Styr* in Volhynia from Lutsk to Borobaza, also on the *Western Bug* from the Galician frontier to the point where it leaves the Ukraine, but in both cases only for rafts and vessels of very light draught.

The navigable length of the principal rivers is as follows: 487

	For Shipping. Miles.	For Rafting only. Miles.
Dnieper . .	1,250	136
Desna . .	537	166
Dniester . .	521	35

All the above-mentioned waterways suffer in common from four serious defects. (1) They are frozen for a considerable period of the year. In the basin of the Dnieper traffic was only possible in the first ten years of this century for an average of 230 days above the rapids and 250 below. Other rivers are in a similar case. (2) The volume of water falls rapidly in summer, and in dry seasons lack of water impedes navigation seriously. (3) Wholesale cutting down of the forests on the banks has led to alteration of the beds of the rivers and the splitting up of the channels. (4) Works for the improvement of navigation scarcely exist, not even the most urgent having been undertaken. 487 502

The principal cargoes carried are breadstuffs, wood, and coal. Cereals are embarked in great quantities on the lower Dnieper and Southern Bug for shipment abroad from Kherson and Nikolaev. The upper Dnieper and the Dniester carry timber. 505 439

Navigable canals do not exist in the Ukraine. Should the scheme for a Dvina - Dnieper canal materialize, it would have a noticeable commercial effect upon the towns of Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Alexandrovsk, and Kherson. 503

(c) *Railways*

Railway System.—There are in the Ukraine three great railway centres, viz. Kiev, Kharkov, and Yekaterinoslav. 496

1. From Kiev a line runs in a westerly direction to Sarny and Kovel, continuing thence to Choïm and Warsaw.

A second line goes in a north-easterly direction to Bakhmach, thence *via* Kursk and Orel to Moscow.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

504 from its mouth. There are two entrances from the sea, the Rvach and Zbarev channels, the former being 22 ft. deep, the latter only 10 ft. There are three loading berths at a quay, respectively 420, 125, and 425 ft. long, but vessels mostly load in the stream from lighters by means of floating cranes, of which there are 22, or by using their own winches. Vessels are allowed to load up to 23 ft. owing to a recent improvement in the channel. A new quay to accommodate 18 steamers is under construction.

Berdyansk roads are protected by a long semicircular sand-spit from all winds except the southwest. There is 14–16 ft. of water in the roads. The harbour is protected from all winds by a breakwater 700 yds. in length, parallel with and half a mile distant from the shore line in front of the town. A dredged channel, 1½ miles in length and 10½ ft. deep, leads up to the western end of the breakwater. Quay space is at present deficient, but a first-class port is projected and partially under construction. The harbour is being dredged to increase its general depth to 20 ft.

Mariupol harbour consists of an area on the open foreshore enclosed by two moles. The entrance channel is dredged to a depth of 24 ft., and the depth in the anchorage inside the moles is 22–26 ft. Within the harbour, 440 yds. from the shore line and parallel with it, is a breakwater 500 yds. long. The inner harbour inside this breakwater is reserved for vessels loading coal Against the quays, where rails run alongside, there is a minimum depth of 12 ft. and a maximum of 24 ft. There are two hydraulic elevators for loading coal, but much coal and all grain is loaded by hand, and mechanical appliances are greatly needed. Mariupol is considered a harbour of first-class importance, and extensive improvements of all kinds are projected.

●505 431 *Nature and Volume of Trade.*—Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson export cereals and other agricultural products; Nikolaev also exports great quantities of iron-ore and Kherson timber. Many vessels arrive in ballast

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

to carry these goods. The imports consist of machinery, manufactured goods, colonial and tropical products, and chemicals; Odessa also imports coal from the Donets region, which is shipped at Mariupol or Taganrog. 505 439 [438]

The export trade of Berdyansk is chiefly coal, iron-ore, and grain. Mariupol principally exports Donets coal. The imports of both places are general, but a large proportion consists of chemicals and particular minerals required in the iron and steel industry in the Government of Yekaterinoslav.

The number and tonnage of the vessels entering the above-mentioned ports in 1910, and the amounts of the exports and imports, are shown in the following table:

	Total vessels entered.	*Tonnage.*	*British vessels entered.*	*Tonnage.*	*Imports (tons).*	*Exports (tons).*
Odessa	848	1,596,217	174	388,136	566,743	1,736,029
Nikolaev	544	1,126,441	315	676,834	178,790	2,070,419
Kherson	152	330,260	131	288,789	104,693	844,919
Berdyansk	180	269,365	38	65,492	28,693	416,451
Mariupol	231	394,451	67	119,242	266,693	1,587,161
				Total	1,145,612	6,654,979

The respective values of the exports and imports are more difficult to ascertain, but the difference in value is certainly not so great as that in weight. For some years before the war, the value of the exports of the whole of Russia exceeded that of her imports by about 40 per cent., and the proportion for the Ukraine ports is probably about the same.

Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Development.—The Ukraine Black Sea ports would appear, on the whole, to be equal to the demands put upon them; in fact, there is severe competition between Odessa and Nikolaev. The recent improvements at Nikolaev have inspired the Odessa authorities to apply for powers to carry out great extensions, but so far these have not been granted, as the central authorities held that there was no prospect of a good return on the capital that would be required. 504 655

504 The port of Kherson is handicapped by the expense and difficulty of keeping open a good channel from the mouth of the Dnieper to the town.

The two Azov ports are in a somewhat congested state, and need additional quay space, loading appliances, and powerful ice-breakers. Their importance for the export of coal and iron-ore as well as of grain is recognized, and it is understood that large sums would be forthcoming to effect improvements.

Two other ports in the Ukraine which are very suitable for development are Ochakov, on the north bank of the Dnieper–Bug estuary, and Shadovsk, which is situated in a land-locked bight a few miles west of the isthmus of Perekop. At present neither is touched by any railway, and they offer no facilities to shipping; but they are so favourably situated that their development at reasonable cost would probably be more beneficial to the Ukraine than expensive improvements at Odessa and Kherson.

(*b*) *Shipping Lines*

505 Before the war Odessa was visited by regular lines of steamers with passenger services, and the other ports by 'tramps' exclusively.

There are several Russian-owned lines. The Russian Volunteer Fleet Association, a subsidized undertaking, made regular voyages between Odessa and Vladivostok with a view to developing trade between Russia and her possessions on the Pacific. This line, which has a fleet of 70 vessels, with a tonnage of about 150,000, is not a commercial success.

The Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Co. provided passenger services in the Black and Azov Seas, and had other lines to Mediterranean ports. Its fleet consisted of 65 vessels, with a tonnage of 150,000.

The Russian Transport and Insurance Co. had a fleet of ten vessels, mostly tramps, with a tonnage of 12,000.

Peter Regier & Son had nine tramp steamers, of a total tonnage of 22,000.

The Russian Danube Steam Navigation Co. traded 505
from Odessa to Danube river ports. It had a fleet of eleven vessels, with a tonnage of 9,000.

The following foreign lines had regular sailings to Odessa: Thos. Wilson, Sons & Co., thrice weekly, from Hull; J. R. Ellerman, Ltd., fortnightly, from Liverpool; James Moss & Co., every four weeks, from Liverpool; the Messageries Maritimes, fortnightly, from Marseilles; and the Deutsche Levante Linie, monthly, from Genoa.

Tramp steamers of many nationalities are attracted in great numbers to Ukraine ports in the autumn for the shipment of the cereal crop, and there is seldom any lack of cargo space.

The foreign lines with regular services appear capable of meeting the normal demand on their cargo space. The Russian lines require Government support, as shipping under the Russian flag is not as a rule commercially successful.

(c) *Telegraphic Communication*

Telegraphic communication with foreign countries is 206
dependent mainly on cable lines not situated in the Ukraine, which has only one cable, from Odessa to Constantinople, the joint property of the Indo-European Telegraph Co. and the Eastern Telegraph Co. Telegrams for the East are sent *via* the Kertch station of the Indo-European Telegraph Co.; those for northern Europe or America, *via* Petrograd and thence by various cable lines.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(a) *Supply of Labour; Emigration and Immigration* 464

The line of cleavage between agricultural and other 166
labour is not so sharp in the Ukraine as in most other communities. The claims of agriculture are the greater by far, but the increase in the number of landless peasants who find it difficult to live in the country

101 swamps of Polesia. Faggot and fascine paths lead
133 you from village to village, from settlement to settlement. If you visit this swamp land which extends almost to the central Russian plain and is about at large as Hungary including Carpatho-Ukraine, in spring during the time of thaws or during the floods of early summer, people will row you in a boat to their neighbor's. For at these times the rivers creeping in countless bends through lakes, ponds and tributaries of this country, which is only 170 meters above sea level, flood their banks for many weeks, even months. This landscape is unutterably sad, and, it has deprived of laughter the few people it scantily nourishes with fish,
[136] potatoes and oats. Polesia is a land of spooks without equal, where, across the bog through which elk and bison, sure-footed, make their way, there
[137] rises the "pillared hall of centuries-old oaks, lindens, aspens, ash trees, firs, spruces and pines." /19/ The sun rarely shines into this twilight where at night there are mysterious will-o'-the-wisps in this world of mold. Deathly silence prevails in this accursed land which even the birds avoid. You are standing on the border of the Soviet Union.

133 Descending the navigable Pripyat, and traveling eastward halfway to the central Russian plain, you reach, friend, the Dniepr, which comes from the north. You have come to the sacred river of the Ukrainians. They chant its praises in countless songs. This third largest river of Europe flows 2100 kilometers until, exhausted, it empties into the Black Sea. If it happens to be flood time, you will not be able to see from one bank to the other, the river rises to such an extent. It gets to be six, eight, even ten kilometers wide. Herodotus already compared it with the Nile.

● 505 If you now sail south[1] on a Dniepr steamer you will reach Kiyev. Do not be surprised at the numerous vessels which you meet on the river, for

1 [From the confluence of the Dniepr and the Pripyat - Analyst]

505 the mercantile fleet which it carried was, even long before the war, as large as the total mercantile tonnage of the Austro-Hungarian fleet.
346 Even from far off you will see on the hills of the city lying on the right bank the strange cupolas of the Byzantine churches and monasteries. Kiyev was formerly the "Rome of the East", and even today it is the "mother of all Russian cities". Hundreds of thousands of devout pilgrims
788 annually visited the famous cave monastery of Pecherska Lavra, the cathedral of St. Sophia, the Golden Gate and other sacred spots.[1]

133 The churning steamer which you again board in the sprawling, pounding and shrieking harbor section[2] will take you farther downstream. On the west bank the high plateau of the Dniepr Plain rises steeply. If you should wander over this undulating hill country with its fields of wheat and sugar beets, you would see everywhere the traces of Ukraine's past: mighty grave mounds of nomad chieftains, and embankments with which in early times the Ukrainian people protected themselves against Asiatic brigands. /20/ To the left of the stream, in the east, you see nothing but wild thickets of reeds, dense, impenetrable green meadows behind which the Dniepr Plain is hidden.
361 You would find villages there[2] which have as many inhabitants as a medium-sized city and which equal a metropolis in surface area. However, they have remained villages in which peasants live on their homesteads; it is almost a day's journey to their fields. Khar'kov, a small Cossack hamlet in the seventeenth century, and today the second largest city of the Ukraine, is situated on the eastern edge of this plain.

133 In Dniepropetrovsk where formerly the rapids began, you turn eastward, friend, and now reach the steppes. The earth which is swept bare by the eternal east wind and by the dust storms, is completely naked as soon as you ascend the Donets

1 [i.e. In Kiev — Analyst]
2 [i.e. In the Dniepr Plain — Analyst]

496 lateral connections are still wanting. Anyone wishing to go from west to east in the Ukraine is obliged to reckon with a circuitous route and a long period of travel. For instance, you travel 32 hours from the capital of Kiyev to Taganrog on the Sea of Azov which is 700 kilometers distant, even though you go forever over flat steppes; from Kiyev to Kherson 450 kilometers to the south you, travel 16 hours. (122) More-

122. Kubiyovich: Atlas, page 50.

over, the Ukrainian railway network is so wide-meshed that there are large districts which are 40 to 60 kilometers away from the railroad line, as on the lower Dnieper north of the Bug estuary and in the Kuban region. The most traveled stretch is the Moscow-Khar'kov-Donets Basin-Kuban line with more than 10 passenger trains a day. Between Kiyev and Odessa there are five to six passenger trains a day, as well as between Kiyev and Moscow. There is not a single serviceable cross connection except the line between the industrial regions of Krivoy Rog and Donets, which was built in 1884. Between two such important cities as Kiyev and Khar'kov there are only one or two passenger trains a day. Odessa can be reached from the Donets region only by a very roundabout way. Through the lonely reaches of the Western Soviet Ukraine only one or at best two passenger trains run daily. (123)

123. Kubiyovich: Atlas, page 49.

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505/174/ The most important trade and communications route of the Ukraine until the pre-war period was the Dnieper. It and its tributaries take up 4300 kilometers of the total of 6000 kilometers of navigable rivers in the Ukraine. Shipping is not very important on the rest of the rivers, such

505 as the Dnester, Bug and Donets, because it is not regulated. The Donets has too little water to assume the importance it could have as the only river in the industrial area.

504 Odessa is the most important seaport of the Ukraine, and next in importance comes Novorossiysk on the Caucasian coast. Both of them turn over more than two million tons of goods annually. Next come Mykolayov at the mouth of the Bug and Maryupil on the Sea of Azov, with a turn-over of more than a million tons annually, as well as Kherson at the mouth of the Dneper and Theodosia in the Crimea with more than half a million tons each.(124)

124. Kubiyovich: Atlas, page 48.

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000 When workers are satisfied with their jobs and the general living conditions of their dwellings, they do not like to change. Constant change of a crew of workers of an enterprise is a definite sign that something is wrong, that the workers are not satisfied. For the employers it is no pleasure constantly to be obliged to train new
404 people and test their reliability. In the Ukraine workmen very often leave factories and pits in order to find employment in other enterprises. The official organ of heavy industry 'Za Industriyalizatsiiu' writes about this on December 15, 1936: "The fluctuation of workmen in the Donets Basin is enormous. It even exceeds that of former years. In eleven months of 1936, 231,000 new workmen moved to the coal pits, while 233,000 moved away; again in 1935, 210,000 came, 219,000 left. The crew changes all the time... People also leave the mines because of low wages. /175/ In pit number 18 many of the workers hired, earned only 100 to 200 rubels a month. Disorganization

465 ment has been slower and they have not yet reached the same
434 degree of intensity of labor which we found in factories. Jews play a great part in commercial life.

162 Among the lower categories of civil servants, Ukrainians were
465 in the majority from the beginning, while representatives of foreign nationalities increased in the higher services. The average
●511 salary of Soviet officials throws little light on the standard of
647 living in this group of the population because the difference between higher and lower employees is again considerable. Incomes in the lower ranks were very small while the higher officials had a life of ease and could on occasion even afford luxury. Engineers are among the most privileged while teachers and actors are much worse off. The legal status of the Soviet official was entirely insecure; they lived constantly under threat of a "purge" or of being denounced as disturbing the process of Soviet economy. The higher ranks of bureaucrats were here in special danger.

162 The small group of the professional class (doctors, writers, lawyers), in spite of their freedom, was dependent on the apparatus of the Soviet State. The group of outcasts was most to be pitied, i. e. those who had been expelled by the regime from social intercourse, e. g. merchants, artisans, and priests. After identity cards were introduced and "socially dangerous" persons removed, this group greatly decreased.

162 Another group, finally, is formed by Ukrainians living
167 outside the frontiers of Ukrainian territory, who as "Kur-
697 kuls", "Pests", "Saboteurs" were sent to concentration camps in the North and in Siberia. The "Nationalists" are also included in this group. And the colonisation of remote frontier areas in Soviet Russia required forest laborers, miners and factory workers, who had to help in the coal mines of Siberia and in building up industrial concerns in Central Asia. It is impossible to give statistics for the proportion of Ukrainians in this group, but they cannot be ignored as they will certainly return home and play an important rôle in Ukraine whenever the general situation is altered.

162 In Ukrainian areas outside of the Soviet Union, conditions
167 resemble those obtaining in Western Europe. The Ukrainian

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the New Russian Governments) there were over 1 million hectares 433
under beetroot. Just before the last war the annual production of
beet in the Ukraine reached 150 million quintals: i.e. 18 per cent of 244
world production. The production of Ukrainian beet sugar ranked fourth—after that of America, Germany and France. In 1913 the Ukraine produced 11 million quintals of crystallized sugar. This output, together with that of the Polish factories, covered all the needs of the internal market (which during the preceding twenty-five years had augmented fourfold) and provided substantial surplus for export to the Baltic and the Middle East.

In addition to the beet processing plants, about 60 per cent of the alcohol refineries (corn, potatoes) of the Empire were located in the [274]
Ukraine. The production of vegetable oil (particularly from sunflower seed) was also important.

It has been estimated by the Soviet paper *Pravda* that approximately 1 milliard of rubles a year was paid for services on the semi-industrialized estates of landowners throughout Russia: of this sum a considerable proportion was paid for the hire of horse transport (since landowners did not maintain a large number of draught horses but hired from the villages). Of this milliard, about 300,000,000 were paid out in the Ukraine. As the peasant population of the [511]
Ukraine numbered about fifteen millions, some 20 rubles a year per head of the population was earned on 'supplementary' work on the large estates. 'Only owing to the sugar and other agricultural industries could the dense population of the Ukraine exist in such comparatively well-to-do circumstances.'

Thus the agricultural economy of Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, [241]
Chernigov and Poltava was based only partly on the production of cereals. With a population which reached nearly twenty millions, only about 2 million hectares were under wheat, while in New Russia, with a population about half that of the Ukrainian Governments, there were 4 million hectares under wheat. The Ukraine
exported only small quantities of wheat to Poland and White [439]
Russia, which provinces drew the bulk of their supplies from New Russia. The real 'granaries' of Russia which supplied the whole
Empire and exported a surplus abroad were the regions of the [134]
northern Caucasus and Trans-Volga with western Siberia and New Russia (including the Governments of Kherson and Ekaterinoslav with the northern part of Tauris and the southern part of Kharkov) In those regions the black earth really had a virgin quality during the first half of the nineteenth century; and its richness remains exceptional even now.

As a rule, the climatic conditions in the *New Russian Governments* 000

These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown. These were naturally the more 661
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw ma- 433
terials had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood. This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It concentrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in military preparations. Even when peitions were made by the Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR. Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transportation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932 they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 -1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

651 missars issued a decree for the "protection of socialist property."
685 Under this law the stealing of a single ear of grain from a kolhosp
241 granary could be punished by confinement for ten years in a con-
511 centration camp. It was so interpreted that if a peasant picked up a single stalk from the field after the harvest, he was liable for the same punishment. In other words, the peasant could only secure his grain legally from and through the administration of the kolhosp.

With this law on the books, the Ukrainian collective farms could be punished either for failing to protect "socialist property" or they could be attacked for failing to present to the government crops and grain in an amount equal to that foreseen by the plan. This was the easier because there were few of the kolhosps that had been able to sow the area required of them. Lack of intelligent and competent leadership on the farms and the exigencies of the weather made it almost inevitable that there would be deficiencies, especially since the schedules were made up in Moscow and took no account of the local conditions.

As the grain deliveries lagged, the demands increased and on January 24, 1933, the Central Committee of the VKP/b issued a new resolution that "it was regarded as proved that the party organization of Ukraine had not carried out the tasks assigned to it in organizing grain deliveries and executing the grain plan."

To remedy this, the central authorities ordered the formation of political detachments in the machine tractor stations, "the chief basic tasks of which were the insuring of the unconditional and immediate execution by the kolhosps and their members of all their obligations to the state and especially the decisive struggle with the stealing of kolhosp property, the struggle with the manifestations of sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the sharing of the grain supplies and the meat products of the kolhosps."

The leaders of these detachments were given the obligation "to secure the constant lawful and accurate fulfilment of the laws of the Soviet government by administrative and criminal measures against the organizers of the stealing of Soviet property and the

sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the branch of village agriculture." 651 685

The machine tractor stations were staffed by men largely alien to the Ukrainian countryside. The more fanatical Communists were placed in these political detachments and were, in effect, told to supplement or replace the local administration in the exercise of pressure and terror upon both the heads and the members of the kolhosps. To aid them in their work Moscow sent to Ukraine a Russian Pavel Postyshev as a special plenipotentiary of the Central Committee with 7,000 party workers from the Russian Republic. 241 511

The work of these special "commissions" and "brigades" was marked by the utmost severity. They entered the villages, and made the most thorough searches of the houses and barns of every peasant. They dug up the earth, broke into the walls of buildings and the stoves in which the peasants tried to hide their last handfuls of food. They even in places took specimens of the fecal matter from the toilets in the effort to learn in that way by analysis whether the peasants had stolen government property and were eating grain. Wherever they found any, the peasants were severely punished, while the detachments carried off not only grain but everything edible.

The same reports came from every corner of Ukraine. "They requisitioned everything that could be eaten" was the report from the village of Zorich in the district of Poltava. In one village in the district of Odesa, "they collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram" and in other places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove. In at least one of these commissions, Molotov, then head of the Council of Ministers, took a personal part.

The natural result was a famine of unprecedented severity. The villages had been hungry in the autumn. After these searches commenced, they literally starved. An Englishman, M. Magridge, wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1933: "During a recent visit to Ukraine, I have seen a little of the war which the Soviet government is carrying on against the peasants. The fields were 731 661

[result of excessive grain requisitions in 1933 -- Analyst]

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

•[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

166 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the
626 village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past.[1] Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

[1] [after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

341 lected for the tax in kind. This was a negligible sum and the
651 average member rarely received more than one ruble per labor
474 day. This sum was, of course, insufficient to provide for the
465 goods which the family needed to purchase, and since their share
[511] of the grain was rarely sufficient to feed them, their situation became hopeless, while of other products the individual received about one litre of oil, fifty kilograms of potatoes, thirty-five kilograms of fruit, and five-tenths kilograms of meat and fat.

[435] The real significance of these figures is shown in the prices that were charged in the state stores.[1] There a kilogram of bread cost ninety kopecks, ten eggs brought eight rubles, a kilogram of beef twenty-four rubles, and a pair of boots four hundred and fifty rubles, while a farmer's suit of clothes cost five hundred rubles.

[422] It made the peasant really dependent upon his individual plot of land if he was to secure any necessities.[1] This was far too small and its use was bound with many restrictions. Thus, no family was allowed to hold more than one cow and two calves, one sow, up to ten goats, an undefined number of chickens and up to twenty beehives. In the beginning it was possible for the peasant to secure a certain amount of food for these animals from the common store. He was allowed to retain the manure and it was thus possible for him to improve his own individual plot and thus to secure larger returns. It was a liberal application of such principles that had rendered possible the general improvement which was noticeable during the years 1934-6, when the government was endeavoring to make the system of collective farms workable.

It can be easily seen that the system of allowing individual incomes was based on a principle opposite that of the New Economic Policy, for it would require scarcely a legislative enactment to reduce these amounts while the New Economic Policy presented a norm of profit to the workers. Yet with each year, once the government was convinced of its success, it found it possible in various ways to tap this new source of income for its own purposes.

The favorite method was by taxation. Thus, by 1939 if we should assume that the average family received in cash four hun-

1 [Ukraine - after 1933 famine -- Analyst]

dred and eighty karbovantsy, they would be required to pay 241
twenty-two and a half karb. in taxes, twenty in rent, fifty as a 651
special tax and they would be required to volunteer to take at 474
least two hundred in government bonds. 465

Even this did not cover the total payments to the government. With its usual love of double-talk and subterfuge, the government, which controlled every branch of human activity in the USSR, talked of the establishment of socialism and levied indirect taxes on all transactions so that the actual cost to the villagers of any manufactured article was about three times what it cost the government as producer. The whole subject was carefully veiled as a state secret to protect the Soviet Union against capitalist intrigues but the unfortunate population were the unwilling contributors to this new order of life.

Under such conditions it is extremely difficult to pierce the veil [652]
of percentages as to cost and production and give a reliable estimate as to the amount of money received for the government or the relationship between the sums spent in maintaining the operation of the Moscow-controlled factories in Ukraine and the amount spent upon the needs of the population either individually, as families or as citizens of the UkSSR or of the UkSSR as a governmental unity within the Soviet sphere. From those figures which the Soviet has let out, it is possible to see that the yearly budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has run from 2½-5% of the budget of the USSR while the population has been at least 18% of the total population.

With the villages compelled to yield the last pound of grain, 369
etc., that could be extracted by force, and receiving in return 511
almost no manufactured goods, the position of the city workmen and the intelligentsia was little better. The wages of the workmen were always insufficient, the housing conditions were hardly endurable, and the only point of betterment was that the larger places and some of the plants especially favored by the regime received more manufactured goods of a poor quality and at a high price which the fortunate people might be able to secure.

369 They could also, if they still had preserved any valuables, dispose
● 511 of them through the Torgsin stores which sold imported wares for foreign currency and precious metals.

[554] Of course, neither in city or village did any of these restrictions apply to the more important Communists who possessed their own stores at which the government supplied them with the necessary articles to allow them to live in comfort and luxury as a welcome investment for the regime. The line of demarcation between the poor and the rich, the ordinary people and the Communists, became steadily greater, until it was often wider than it had been in the old tsarist Russian empire.

642 All these measures which had been adopted in Moscow were
631 in theory supposed to apply to all sections of the USSR equally, but it was not long before the natives of Ukraine realized that however impartial the laws might seem, they were not sufficiently flexible to take account of local and republican differences. The central regime was interested in advancing and developing the Moscow industrial area and it expended on this in various grandiose efforts, as the Moscow subway, enormous sums of money. It is safe to say that the expenditures in that one area alone equalled the entire budget and money spent by the central government in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It classified Ukraine as one of the regions where the supply of manufactured goods was less necessary.

The crushing of the Ukrainian Communists, the suicide of Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, no less than the complete altering of the land code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the substitution of the new policy of collectivization, showed perfectly well where the real power of the USSR lay in the thirties and it was accompanied by such acts as the introduction of Russian as the
[701] standard language of instruction and of the army. This was followed by the formal transfer of the Ukrainian divisions to the Red Army and a number of other acts which completed the subordination of the UkSSR. Already in 1930, during difficulties on the Soviet-Manchuria borders, the Red Army had not hesitated to

[after 1933 - measures dealing with production, supply etc. --illegible]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668* alien aspects of life in the city. A certain number of local Ukrain-
182 ians accepted this campaign enthusiastically, sometimes carrying it further than the newcomers themselves. Others, although Ukrainian by background, had long been used to employing the Russian language and associating freely with persons of Russian ethnic origin. Consequently, the "purifying" process meant in many cases serious disruption of their accepted way of living and social relationships.

Because of the extreme importance of this factor it is worth describing in some detail a case which provides a striking illustration of the Nationalist psychology during this period. It is contained in the diary of a prominent Kiev author, Arkadii Liubchenko, who was evacuated by the Soviet forces but managed to remain in Kharkov until the German arrival. He then made contact with the Mel'nyk groups (which, as was previously pointed out, pursued the same policy there as in Kiev). Always nationalist, he soon became an enthusiastic convert to the creed of integral nationalism. In December, through his association with the Nationalists, he obtained a post on the Kharkov newspaper, *Nova Ukraïna*. Shortly afterwards, a Kharkov writer named Filipov appeared in the editorial offices; he told Liubchenko that he had prepared an article on the evils of the Communist regime which he wished to publish. When Liubchenko turned it down because it was written in Russian, Filipov protested that his mother had been Ukrainian and that he would submit the article in Ukrainian, as the question of language was indifferent to him. This brought the sneering reply that real Ukrainians, such as those dominating *Nova Ukraïna*, could have nothing to do with one who could not make up his mind whether he was a Ukrainian or a Russian, since such a person was an "internationalist" just like the Bolsheviks.[29] It may easily be imagined what effect such ideas had upon the rebuffed applicant. This is especially the case, since work for an organ like the newspaper was for many not merely a matter of prestige, or even of expression of opinion, but of life
511 and death. With the rapidly deteriorating food situation in Kiev
668 and Kharkov, employment by an agency which was recognized by

* Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 25.

the Germans, and hence able to issue ration cards and provide a small income, was indispensable for most intellectuals.[30] [51] 668*

In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that the German enemies of the Nationalist movement felt that the time was ripe to destroy its prestige by an attack on its principal organ. On December 12, 1941, the SP force seized *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and arrested all the leading editorial workers, including Rohach, Chemeryns'kyi and Oliïnyk.[31] Kandyba, too, was arrested, but by native police in a city *raion* (ward) controlled by the OUN-M; this circumstance allowed him to escape.[32] 204 668* 661

Two days later the newspaper reappeared, as *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* but with a quite different editorial policy. The new editor was Constantine Shtepa, acting rector of the University of Kiev. Of Ukrainian origin, he had been an officer in the tsarist army and, although strongly anti-Soviet, remained a pronounced Russian patriot, desiring the acceptance of the Russian culture and language throughout the Ukraine and the maintenance of governmental ties with Moscow. Consequently, he was a bitter enemy of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.[33] The first issue of his paper contained an article, inspired by the Germans, but acceptable to Shtepa, in which the Nationalists were vigorously attacked for turning what "should have been an informational journal into an organ of their group." The Nationalists, it explained, had refused to heed German warnings that the paper must serve the whole community; consequently Shtepa had taken charge to "popularize" it. What this meant, was clarified by an article on the second page which demanded "work instead of politics." [34] 626 204 668*

Under Shtepa's administration, *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* became extremely subservient to the Germans. In part this was due to the extreme severity and alertness of the German censorship; the edi-

[30] Interview 59. Liubchenko himself (Liubchenko, pp. 60 ff.), when the shoe was on the other foot and he was compelled to seek work in Kiev, found this to be the case.

[31] *OUN u Viini,* p. 73.

[32] L. Dniprova in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.

[33] Record of interrogation of an editor in Kiev, early 1943, who was a specialist in ancient history, the author of *Die Völkerwanderung* and *Das römische Recht* (CXLVa 78, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine) (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 78). The only person fitting this description is Constantine Shtepa.

[34] These articles are reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diiesnist',* January 5, 1942, p. 2.

464 districts through the long winter has led to the crea-
[166] tion of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the
[563] country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel,
• [511] Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful,
221 but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any
511 branch of industry. The State makes no effort to
565 regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

this class are often compelled to accept badly-paid 466
work in the towns, and both men and women have 511
often to make long and laborious journeys on foot in 565
search of employment.

A large class engaged in domestic industries, whether as masters or as servants, make a very poor living, frequently working very long hours under bad sanitary conditions.

In the coal and iron industries there are some concerns, 466
particularly those capitalized from abroad, which look well after their work-people, provide housing, secure good supplies of provisions at moderate prices, and take other measures to ameliorate labour conditions. In consequence, however, of works and mines being often situated on land rented on short-term leases, many employers cannot afford to lay out money on such objects, and conditions for labour are generally bad. So difficult is it to attract labour, that mine-owners have sometimes sought to secure convict labour from the Government.

The peculiar characteristic of labour in the Ukraine 166
is its mobility, which often occasions unexpected 464
crises. Superstition, epidemics of disease, and more obscure causes lead to vast movements of labourers from a district at very short notice.

The *artels*, which are labour organizations peculiar to 467
Russia, have an important influence on the supply and quality of certain labour. An *artel* is an association of workers, the general principles of which are: (1) all members must be actual workers; (2) all have equal rights in the organization; and (3) every member is responsible for the obligations contracted by the *artel*. The organization is usually non-capitalistic or has a very small capital.

In general there are two classes of *artels*, those of workers in producing trades and those of workers who provide service. The former are engaged in carpentering, cabinet-making, printing, linen-weaving, dairy-work, fishing, &c. The second group comprises stevedores, packers, customs agents, bank porters, com-

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

421 425 Land tenure in the Ukraine is at present in an unstable state. The principal factors affecting it are two legal enactments, the first being the law of 1861 abolishing serfdom and providing for the ownership of land by peasants, who previously had held none, and the second being the Stolypin law of 1906 modifying the principle of communal ownership in peasant lands. The law of 1861 provided for land to be taken from private estates and handed over to peasants on a deferred purchase system. The land was not assigned to individuals, but to *mirs* (local communes), which divided it up for cultivation. The law also provided for periodical redistributions of this land, which is known always as the *nadyel* or endowment land. At the present time a good deal of *nadyel* land in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov is held by individual peasant owners, but elsewhere it is all owned by communes. A peculiar principle of this system is the mutual responsibility of all members of the commune for its legal and financial obligations, even should a member have forsaken the locality and the practice of agriculture.

425 511 The great defect of the distribution of 1861 is that it is based on the rural population of that date, with no machinery for providing additional land in proportion to the natural increase of population, which has been very rapid. Two evil results have followed. First, at the periodical redistributions of *nadyel* land the amount available per head has steadily decreased. The holdings have therefore tended to become uneconomical, and a consequent impoverishment of the peasants has taken place, with the natural concomitants of arrears of rent and taxes and an increased burden of debt on the land. Secondly, efforts to purchase or rent further land from private proprietors, in order to increase the available *nadyel* land or supply the wants of prosperous peasants who wish to buy new farms, has led to an enormous increase in the price and rent of land, a rise of three times being frequent and a tenfold rise occasional. To

alleviate these conditions various measures have been 425
adopted, such as the easement or complete extinguish- 511
ing of the burden of the purchase-price of the *nadyel*, the prevention of its frequent redistribution, and the founding of the Peasants' Land Bank by the State to facilitate further purchases of land by the communes. Nevertheless, a result not looked for by the framers 565
of the law abolishing serfdom has followed, namely the creation of a large landless agricultural proletariat, which tends to sink in the social scale, to live partly by industry in the towns, and to be migratory in its habits.

The law of 1906 introduced for the first time the 421
general principle of individual and permanent ownership of *nadyel* lands. It aimed at the breaking up of the *mirs* as no longer fulfilling a need, in the expectation that security of tenure by the individual would lead to a more rational and successful system of cultivation. The period since the promulgation of the law is too short to allow of sound conclusions as to its effect.

The *nadyel* lands are almost entirely cultivated 241
on the three-field system, each unit of land being 311
planted one year with a winter-sown grain, the following year with a spring-sown grain, and lying fallow in the third year. This method causes a disastrous impoverishment of the land, especially as in many cases the minimum of manure, whether animal or chemical, is used. An alternative method must be introduced, or the productiveness of the black-soil land under peasant ownership will continue to shrink as heretofore.

The land held by private owners is in general their 425
perpetual freehold, and can be roughly divided into that 563
held by the nobility in large estates and the smaller holdings purchased from them since the abolition of serfdom by prosperous peasants and others desirous of embarking on agriculture on their own account. There are also a number of foreign colonists, chiefly Germans, descendants of those introduced into the country

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-
Ruthenians

Shepherds blow huge horns to round up their sheep by night

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In the narrow valleys and on their slopes are cottages and straggling villages where the Ruthenian uplanders live. Nearly all the huts are made of wood and are flanked by gardens with patches of sunflowers. In the higher altitudes the land consists mainly of meadows, and such meagre fields as there are yield scanty crops of oats, potatoes or hemp—not sufficient to live on. No wonder that during the summer months it is chiefly women and children who can be found at home; the menfolk either fell trees in the forest or earn their living as seasonal labourers in the towns and villages of the more prosperous South.

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These lonely mountains and forests breed a people with a distinct character of their own. Living as they do in seclusion, they not only differ from their Slovak neighbours but show distinct regional differences

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

101 among themselves. They can be divided into three well-defined tribes
162 —the Lemki on the Slovak border, the Boiki in the centre, and the Huculs in the eastern tip of Ruthenia.

The most interesting tribe are the Huculs. They have preserved
186 their tribal characteristics better than their kinsmen. Their standard of education is higher, and they are more conscious and proud of their national individuality. When the Hungarians invaded Ruthenia after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Huculs offered the stiffest resistance, and during the war they were the core of the partisan force fighting against the totalitarian powers. Like the other Ruthenian
463 mountaineers, the Huculs are largely wood-cutters and raftsmen. But
342 they are distinguished by their skill as carpenters and wood-carvers. This is clearly reflected in their mode of life. Their wooden-cottages are neatly built and furnished and impress the visitor by their scrupulous cleanliness. Their tribal individuality and artistic skill find expression in the numerous carvings with which they like to decorate their unpainted houses.

181 The neighbouring Boiki have also, to some extent, preserved their
511 pride in racial individuality, and their mode of life, though more primitive, has some interesting features. They are kind-hearted, sincere and hospitable, in spite of their poverty. Though less proud than the Huculs, they fly into a temper when crossed, and impulsive outspoken-
342 ness is one of their traits. They live in cottages and huts which they like to paint in blue and brown, and this makes their exterior rather attractive. But the interior does not always live up to the façade. The better-off Boiki manage to live in fairly decent cottages with two or more rooms, but the huts of the poor often consist of one room only—a dark room with no chimney, one small window, and some roughly
352 made furniture. Some have no bedsteads in the true sense of the word; along the whole wall of the room one may find a long "plank-bed" where the grown-ups sleep at the one end and the children at the other. When the children grow up they sleep on separate beds of the same kind. Unlike the Hucul houses, the Boiki huts have no wooden
342 floors. The domestic animals often share the same room with their
511 masters in winter, sleeping on the bare earth. For many families such a room is therefore a kitchen, living room, bedroom, hall and stable in one.

511 Much the same applies to the Lemki tribe who live partly on
Slovak territory. They are the poorest Ruthenian tribe and their racial
181 character has undergone a certain deterioration. Their standard of life is often appalling, the hygiene leaves much to be desired, and they have the largest number of illiterates, though some improvement has taken place under the Republic.

000 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits
317 of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Slatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters
263 cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has
511 to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation — all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Economic development was essential to a country where bread used to be a delicacy and meat or salt a luxury. The Land Reform introduced in the whole of the Republic in 1919 was a right step in this direction, although the standard of living among the peasant population in the mountainous districts still left something to be desired even during the last years of the Republic. Industrial development, too, was promoted, and 459 factories (timber, food, stone, earthenware, glass, chemicals, electricity, metal, paper) sprang up on Ruthenian territory during the twenty years of freedom. An important factor in the industrial development was the electrification of the country which before 1918 had hardly any electricity. Better road and rail communications, too, assisted in Ruthenia's gradual progress.

The work done in Carpathian Ruthenia under the Republic was a promising beginning. The regrettable setback due to the re-occupation of the country is likely to remain a mere episode. For the resistance of the population and the struggle of the partisans indicate that the Ruthenians are aware of their mission as a free people and that they wish to continue on the path of progress on which they embarked when they decided to become a member of the Czechoslovak Republic.

11: Obermaier--98 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Everything in West Ukraine is education work.

462 The woman, too, is brought up in order to play her
512 part properly within the family: she must see
515 to it that everyone eats from his own plate, that everyone sleeps in his own bed - not eight on a wide chest -, that clothing is taken off at night and that shirts are changed; airing the rooms is not to be forgotten, and it is unhealthy for children not to get out of the house a single time the whole winter long. Fresh air does no harm. But where to get the shoes and warm clothes for the little ones?

575 A further, very important society was the
871 "Ridna /96/ Shkola" ("National School"). It closed the worst gaps which the Poles had hewn into the Ukrainian school system. There were 3662 Ukrainian public schools in Galicia when the Poles took over undivided rule. In 1937/1938 there were only 496 left. All the rest of the schools were Polonized, so that in the academic year 1937/1938 only 59,300 of over one million Ukrainian school children were able to attend purely Ukrainian schools. Among 307 state secondary schools in Poland, there were only five Ukrainian classical schools in the academic year 1936/1937. All of the 1094 state technical schools were Polish and naturally also all higher institutions of learning. The means at the disposal of the "Ridna Shkola" - needless to say - were not by any means adequate to teach all Ukrainian children their mother tongue. Nevertheless, by means of the savings of its 104,000 members, it was able to maintain 540 kindergartens, 33 public schools, 12 classical schools, 11 colleges, 16 schools for specialists and professionals and 4 boarding schools. (53) The

53. Taken from the respective annual reports of the West Ukrainian cooperatives and self-aid organizations.

tension between Poland and the Ukraine in the

11:Obermaier--142 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

262 Seventeen ingredients are supposed to go into the favorite dish of the Ukrainians, borscht, a soured beet soup. The Ukrainian cuisine also favors porridges made from various cereals, cooked in water and served with milk, cream or fat. The Ukrainian also loves his boiled vareniki, thinly rolled dough filled with pot cheese, chopped meat, cabbage or fruit. In West Ukraine the poor farmers must be content with potatoes, rye bread and turnips. The gentlemen farmers among the Ukrainians are the wealthy Kuban Cossacks who /135/ consume bacon and milk for breakfast, borscht, groats, fowl or fish for dinner, and fruit, cold borscht, melons and bacon in the afternoon, and vareniki in the evening. This is how it was in the Kuban paradise in the good old days.

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512 When the cold east wind silently passes through the steppes or the west wind brings snow and wraps the Ukraine in white, when communication practically ceases between the villages, and nights and sleep are long, then the women sit down to their spindles and the men fetch their looms from from the sheds. All the family clothing, the 463 underwear and linen for the house that is needed 286 throughout the year, is made by hand during the long cold winter months, just as it was in our country /Germany/ in medieval households before the days of urban craftsmen. They make rope shoes and shoes of leather in regions where the ground is stony; they weave linen and woolen fabrics, sew shirts - during the hot summer often the only article of women's clothing except for their narrow aprons - and cut winter jackets from sheep [53] skins. They embroider lovely bright-colored patterns in endless variety on the shirts and the smooth skins of the furs, on tablecloths and towels, for the artistic talents of the Ukrainian people are incomparable. They carve in wood, model in clay and paint it, and weave carpets.

132 49·3°. Drawbacks for agriculture in New Russia are the prevalence of north and east winds and an irregular and insufficient rainfall. The average rainfall at Yelisavetgrad is 17 in., at Odessa 16 in., at Lugansk 15 in., and at Nikolaev 14 in. The rains in April and May decide the harvest. June is the rainiest month, but from May to September there are droughts. Most places are largely dependent upon wells and ponds constructed in the ravines, which are frequent on the steppes.

The climate of the Ukraine, as a whole, is therefore continental, i. e. the variation between summer and winter temperatures is very great. Sudden variations of temperature are frequent. The rainfall is by no means abundant, and there is a progressive decline towards the south and south-east. The fact, however, that the bulk of the rainfall occurs in the summer favours agricultural operations, even where the annual amount of rainfall is comparatively low. It is only in New Russia that the country suffers seriously from drought.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

312 364 The Ukraine is very backward in regard to sanitary conditions. Less than half the towns have a satisfactory water-supply, and a very small percentage of them a regular drainage system.

164 758 Typhoid, diphtheria, and malaria are very prevalent. To the great majority of the people in the country, doctors are inaccessible, and even in the towns good hospitals and adequate medical attendance are very rare. In the matter of cleanliness, however, the Little Russians compare favourably with the Great Russians. 515

(5) Race and Language

Race

162 563 The population of the Ukraine is composed of a mixture of various races and nationalities, those chiefly represented being Little Russians, Poles, Jews,

11: Obermaier--98 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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tension between Poland and the Ukraine in the

ideology and to make a militant peasantry the foundation and the pillar of the modern Ukrainian state. 538 181

We find an astonishingly simple, but profound synthesis of this entire peasant philosophy, the product of the soil, in "The Soil", a short, moving story by Vasyl Stefanyk, a contemporary poet; "Our destiny is the soil; forsake it and you are lost, cling to it and it will develop all your powers and draw out your very soul in the hollow of its hand; embrace it, subject yourself to it and it will suck the life-blood out of your veins — but in return, you have herds of sheep and horses and full stack-yards; and for your strength it will give you a cabin full of children and grand-children whose laughter is like silver bells and whose cheeks are red as the fruit of the snow ball tree . . ."

The profound love of the Ukrainian for the beauties of Nature springs from his connection with the soil, a love which seems to be firmly anchored in the depths of his soul. This aesthetic sense which is nurtured by natural forms, is reflected by the deep longing to express beauty of form, harmony of color and originality of theme in domestic surroundings, in dress or in the utensils of everyday life. Aesthetic, and not practical considerations always play the most important part, whether it be the construction of a church, the planning of a garden round a cottage, the weaving of an apron or a kerchief, the making of a table or a bench. 181 517

It is obvious that the very rich and valuable folk music and the no less rich and original folk poetry are also based on laws of aesthetic pleasure, derived from intimate intercourse with Nature and experience of her beauties.

And the Ukrainian's traditional and age-long contact with Nature is the tenacious bond between him and his culture and that of Western Europe, while at the same time it distinguishes him from the Muscovite, his neighbor in the North-East. For the latter people had never had any feeling for the soil; it regards agriculture not as an expression of love for Mother Earth, but as a necessity, or as a chance of making money. On the other hand, the Muscovites are the best traders among Slavonic peoples. The real farmer, too firmly rooted in the 181

661 of the old Ukrainian National Republic. The regime arrested and
575 shot as chauvinist counter-revolutionists many of the active workers. Those who were spared at the moment were treated as members of the proscribed classes and were punished by the exclusion of their children from schools, the denial of food cards, etc., all the traditional devices to eliminate the counter-revolutionary and suspected classes.

At the same time the government confiscated all the funds of educational institutions and the private organizations which had, during the Ukrainian National Republic and earlier, been interested in educational and scientific work. It closed the Ukrainian scientific societies in Kharkiv and Kiev and it put an end to all of the pre-Soviet journals, newspapers, and magazines. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been planned during the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky but had not commenced its work, was treated somewhat more leniently and it was allowed to open largely to support the pretext that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was an independent state, although it was made clear that Communist influence would be exerted on its statutes and organization.

● 517 Such a period of intellectual disintegration could not fail to leave its mark on all aspects of Ukrainian culture and art. The older writers who had achieved some prominence before 1914 either retired again into the emigration or they became silent. The younger generation, which was just rising into prominence, was either driven into temporary seclusion or, for the most part, swept into the surging current of events. They felt the leftward urge of many of the intellectuals and tried in one way or another to catch the spirit of the times in their works.

Yet it must be realized that, as in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, there still did not exist a predominant party line in the field of literature and the arts. Writers, painters and dramatists of widely differing tendencies accepted the revolution and loudly protested that they and they alone were the true mouthpieces of the times and greedily sought for support from the commissars.

They were the more fortunate in this because the bulk of the

½ [Eradication of pre-communist cultural organizations in 1920 -- Analyst]

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517 ●
Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645]
through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669]
and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642
munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661]
as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423
tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation[1] 369
It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

[1] [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Early Trials

517 186 The change of economic policy which had ushered in the collectivization of agriculture seemed at first to offer no threat to the cultural movement which was going on in Ukraine. Despite the open criticisms that had been made of Khvylovy and the more secret opposition that Skrypnyk was meeting, the cultural work continued in all its aspects. Politically the Commissariat of Education was still continuing its work, the new literature was proceeding with more and more important works being produced, and outside and somewhat apart from the political life of the day, Ukrainian scholarship was producing ever more serious works.

No one openly thought of overthrowing the regime although latent discontent could be discovered among the entire population. It had been years since there had been any open opposition. The unruly leaders who had appealed to arms had either gone abroad or quieted down and there was no one who was even suspected of the kind of disloyalty that had been widespread during the period of Militant Communism.

186 814 687 661 Then, in 1929, just as the compulsory collectivization was being prepared, the Ukrainian Soviet government announced that it had discovered the evidence of the existence of a secret society, the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine, and it commenced a series of arrests of some of the outstanding intellectual leaders of the scientific world. This resulted in a public trial and condemnation of the accused but for the most part they received relatively light sentences.

Who were involved? For the most part they were individuals who had played more or less important roles in the Ukrainian

accused of having belonged to a subversive League for the Liberation of the Ukraine.[24] That this campaign of suppression coincided with the drive for the collectivization of agriculture in the Ukraine is hardly coincidental. In many respects the Ukrainian peasant was much more profoundly affected by the establishment of the kolkhoz (Ukrainian *kolhosp*), or collective farm, than was the Russian. The former was frequently more prosperous, hence had more to lose; moreover, the lack of a traditional communal agricultural organization in the Ukraine made the new system more alien and repugnant.

It appears certain that the Ukrainian peasantry formed a disproportionate, if not predominant, part of the hapless millions deported as "kulaks" to Siberia or Kazakhstan or driven by famine to the primitive slums of the expanding Soviet cities. Very probably this situation created a potential basis for a national rebellion based on economic and social oppression by alien rulers, just as had the Polish and Russian preponderance in governmental and landowning groups before the war. The Communists were frequently forced to use non-Ukrainians, Russian and Jewish intellectuals, workers from the towns, where they had real support, or persons imported from Russia itself, in order to carry out collectivization. Consequently, it is probable that the suppression of the nationalist intelligentsia at this time was at least in part a precautionary step to destroy a group which was of limited danger in itself yet might have presented a real threat to the Communists if it could have utilized the discontent of the peasants to turn them to nationalism. To what extent the Soviet regime succeeded in eliminating the nationalist intellectuals is one of the principal topics which will be dealt with on the basis of the evidence provided in this study. It should be noted at this point,

[24] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166; T. Skubyts'kyi, "Klassovaia bor'ba v ukrainskoi istoricheskoi literature" (The Class Struggle in Ukrainian Historical Literature), *Istorik-Marksist*, No. 17 (1930), pp. 27–40 (one of the principal Communist assaults on the Hrushevs'kyi school and other "deviationists"). The whole question of the purge of intellectuals, with special reference to historians, is discussed at length by Boris Krupnyts'kyi in "Die Ukrainische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion 1921–1941," in *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas*, 194[illegible], pp. 125–51. For Skrypnyk's official statement, see his *Statti i promovy* (Articles and Speeches) (Kharkov: Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo Ukraïny, 1930), Vol. I: *Spil'ka Vyzvolennia Ukraïny* (The League for the Liberation of the Ukraine), pp. 413–36.

[661] however, that their resistance was undoubtedly crushed between
517 1930 and the closing series of purge trials in 1937–38.[25]

While articulate nationalism was being crushed in the Soviet
186 Ukraine, a somewhat different development was taking place in
[563] the West Ukraine. In Poland the extreme policy of the ruling nationality, which had been chauvinistic enough under the Austrian empire, became still more violent toward the Ukrainians after the reestablishment of the Polish national state. As was previously noted, Petliura's agreement with the Poles had been deeply resented by the Galician Ukrainians. While most nationalists endeavored to smooth over criticism of Petliura personally, especially after his assassination in Paris in 1925, most West Ukrainians gave no support to the émigré UNR government. The West Ukrainians, on the contrary, tried their own approaches to the problem of carrying on Ukrainian life under conditions of oppression by non-totalitarian, but intolerant, alien nationalist governments.

186 One attempted solution was the formation of legally recognized
665 parties which carried on electoral campaigns and sent representatives to the Polish Sejm or parliament where they attempted to protect the interests of their group within the framework of means permitted by the ruling nationality. This type of political activity, together with a wide variety of cultural work aimed at developing Ukrainian culture and maintaining the national distinctiveness of the masses, absorbed the efforts of a very large proportion of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia during the twenties and thirties. In particular, most of the older generation which had been reared under the relatively peaceful and stable conditions of Austrian rule, circles closely associated with the Greek Catholic Church, and most of the liberal professions engaged in this activity. Although there were a number of minor parties, some of which had authoritarian leanings, the majority of this segment of Ukrainian political workers was grouped in the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychne Ob"iednannia—UNDO), which was definitely democratic in character, with varying amounts of Catholic, liberal, and socialist ideology embodied in its program. Its efforts met

[25] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166.

1 [see category 116, p 14--Analyst]

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It was much more difficult to secure a predominant place for 727
the nationalist ideology in the schools. As is usually the case in 186
nationalist indoctrination in the schools, the efforts were concen- 872
trated upon the teaching of history.[41] This was especially important, since the justification of the Ukrainian independence movement is largely based upon the conception of a proud history distinct from that of the people of Moscow. Naturally enough, no Soviet textbooks were acceptable for the teaching of history from this point of view or from the general standpoint of eradicating Communist indoctrination. To some extent the gap was filled by [214]
books published in the year preceding the Soviet war by the educational press of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow.[42] Some texts were printed by the cultural department of the Kiev city administration. An amateurish effort was made also by certain OUN-B organizers to print locally a new version of Ukrainian history with an introduction of their own composition.[43] In view of the great material shortages and the brief time available, however, the lack of printed materials could not be made good. Consequently, a great deal depended on securing the proper teachers. To what extent the many thousands employed in the schools adhered to the nationalist doctrine is of course impossible to determine, but a number of purely indigenous formulations of nationalist concepts to be inculcated in the schools attest to the strength of nationalist feeling. The head of the Mariupol' school system proposed to stress the native language, love of the fatherland, and respect for elders; the educational ideology advocated by the group of young men who reorganized life in Krivoi Rog was instillation of Cossack ideals, the code of the Zaporozhian Sich, which was to lead to a spiritual, moral, and physical regeneration.[44]

Since the formal school program was largely confined to young 186
children, great efforts were also concentrated on developing a 517
voluntary system of adult education. The Prosvita societies had 515

Visti, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 27, 1943, p. 4, quoting D. Nitsenko in *Nova Ukraïna* (Kharkov).

[41] Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4.

[42] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 10, 1941, p. 2.

[43] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 28.

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 29, 1942, p. 2; November 15, 1941, p. 2; and November 18, 1941, p. 3 (referring to an article in *Dzvin* [Krivoi Rog], September, 1941).

186 been founded by the nationalist intelligentsia of the East Ukraine
517 many years before the Revolution. They were now revived, after
575 long suppression by the Communist regime, to carry on the work of developing national culture and inculcating a feeling of national identity. The two aims could be combined because all nationalist Ukrainians felt it essential to instill a love of the indigenous popular arts and customs, emphasizing their distinctive nature. That this effort had a political as well as a cultural sig-
[661] nificance is indicated by the fact that not only the Soviet regime (both before 1941 and upon reconquest, as in Kharkov)[45] but the German police as well attacked the Prosvita societies, and in the Reichskommissariat they were able, for varying periods, to lead only a clandestine life. The desire for national expression was shared by so many, however, that the Germans felt it was impossible to dam up all outlets; therefore the Prosvita was generally permitted, though under close observation.[46] Together with the church (and a few local societies not using the Prosvita name but having the same function), it was one of the few organizations of a nationalist character which was not under direct German control.

533 The work of the Prosvita groups, although arranged in various
517 ways in different localities, may be classified under four general
186 headings. Playing a major role everywhere were musical activities,
575 particularly choral groups, in which the Ukrainians had always excelled, and which served as a powerful intellectual and emotional stimulus to nationalist feeling, since most of the songs were distinctively Ukrainian. In addition, groups of *bandura* players (the *bandura* is a small lute-like stringed instrument indigenous to the Ukraine) were sponsored, and orchestras were
545 trained. In the larger centers, Prosvita collaborated with regular
517 professional musical organizations, such as conservatories and
575 operas, to produce nationalist-inspired performances. For ex-
186 ample, operas were reopened in Kiev and Kharkov, and offered a considerable repertoire of native Ukrainian pieces (*Taras Bul'ba, Natalka Poltavka,* etc.) as well as traditional Western

[45] Cf. *Nastup,* September 26, 1943, p. 3 (based on *Vinnyts'ki Visti,* August 29, 1943), on the destruction of Prosvita and its personnel in Kharkov during the Soviet interlude in February-March, 1943.

[46] MS E; PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

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operas such as *Madame Butterfly* and *Les Cloches de Corneville*. 545
Like other forms of national expression, however, operatic per- 517
formances ran afoul of the Nazi hatred of independent activity. 575
At first, the desirable places in the Kiev opera were reserved for 186
Germans, and then, in December, 1942, the performances were suspended altogether, an action which aroused the indignation of all elements of the population.[47]

Within a matter of days after the Red Army was driven out, active theatrical groups likewise sprang up, usually with Prosvita sponsorship, even in the smaller cities of the East Ukraine. For example, a theater had been started in Zhitomir before the first month of German occupation was past.[48] Even in cities like Chernigov and Simferopol' (in the Crimea), where evidences of nationalist activity were scanty, the theater was soon in full career.[49] Since the players were generally amateurs interested in using this medium of expression of their nationalist feeling, the performances were nationalist in content as well as language (evidently to a greater extent than the opera which, being composed largely of professional performers, was imbued with an "all-Union," i.e., Russian, character, at least behind the scenes).[50] Some presentations were so strongly imbued with nationalist ideology that they were censored by the Germans; the author of one of the most popular, Constantine Hupalo, was arrested for nationalist activity.[51]

Prosvita and related groups sponsored a wide variety of more 517
directly educational activities. These included lectures, valued 575
as a means of propagating knowledge of the language as well as 186
for their content; libraries and reading rooms, vital to the spread of the printed word in view of the extreme scarcity of even periodical literature; nationalist cultural work in the schools; and research and discussion on themes of national history and ethnography. In the more vigorous and less restricted societies, like the

[47] Interrogation of Shtepa, CXLVa 78; PS 1198.

[48] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1 (from *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* [Zhitomir], August 3, 1941).

[49] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 6, 1941, p. 4 (based on an interview with Theodore Pipa, the Chernigov editor).

[50] Cf. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 15, 1942, p. 3.

[51] His play, entitled *The Triumph of Procurator Dal'shii*, was a drama of the Ukrainian nationalist movement under Soviet rule (*OUN u Viini*, p. 74).

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186 Prosvita in Kharkov, these activities were greatly extended. The
515 latter group operated a House of Popular Culture which served
517 as a center for most nationalist organizations in the city, and came close to developing into an unofficial government.[52] Moreover, under the leadership of the energetic Professor V. V. Dubrovs'kyi, it undertook economic as well as purely cultural activities, such as book publishing and the provision of material aid for needy teachers and students.[53] Some indication of the scope of Prosvita's activities in Kharkov is provided by the fact that membership reached one thousand, while four thousand persons attended one of its concert series.[54]

In most places *Prosvita* and other cultural activities appear to have developed quite independently of the Nationalist party organizers from the west. To a certain extent the ideology of the Nationalists, especially that of the OUN-B, made them contemptuous of such gradual and unspectacular methods of developing nationalist strength.[55] To be sure, in centers such as Kiev and Zhitomir, which were strongly permeated by the OUN-M forces, cooperative relations existed between the latter and the local founders of Prosvita, but the Nationalist party did not have the personnel to carry on cultural work itself and apparently did

[52] Cf. Serednopolets'kyi in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 24, 1942, p. 2, on organizations operating in the House of National Culture. Erich Koch, in his letter to Rosenberg of March 16, 1943 (PS 192), complained that the Wehrmacht permitted the Kharkov Prosvita to become a sort of national government, and its role as a political as well as a cultural force is confirmed by Interview 73.

[53] *Nastup*, September 26, 1943, p. 3, based on an interview with a leading member of the Kharkov Prosvita, Professor P. Petrenko, in *Vinnyts'ki Visti*, August 29, 1943.

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 10, 1943, p. 2.

[55] For example, Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: Spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), p. 40, writes that it was necessary for OUN-B members to withdraw from Prosvita, amateur groups, etc., as these (after the introduction of the Reichskommissariat) were only tools of the Germans, and nationalist participation in them gave color to the Communist propaganda which represented the OUN as an agency of the Germans. On the other hand, the clandestine *Biuleten'* (No. 4, previously cited), in calling for an extension of OUN-B activity to all fields of life, criticizes those who condemn activity which is not of a strictly terroristic, revolutionary nature as "Prosvitanstvo."

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not find the Prosvita organization well adapted to its tactic of 517
underground work after German suppression.[56] On the other 575
hand, the extremely important Kharkov Prosvita was organized 186
almost entirely by local residents who had in many cases been associated with the Prosvita of pre-Soviet days, and who were unassociated with, or even to some extent hostile to, the OUN-M.[57] Here again there is strong indication of the survival in the East Ukraine of leadership capable of taking direction of important aspects of national life. That this leadership was directed to such a considerable extent to the less aggressive aspects of national development, however, indicates that a certain gap existed during the war years between nationalism in the East and the West Ukraine.

The means employed in the educational systems and in the 186
cultural societies for propagating the national ideology can be 208
classed for the most part under the heading of oral propaganda. The face-to-face type of communication has a long history of effective use in the east Slavic countries and, under the name "oral agitation," has been widely cultivated as a means of strengthening the Communist regime. Hence the population was used to this type of propaganda. Moreover, it was especially suited [727]
to the work of the nationalist groups, which were seeking to spread ideas frowned upon by the German authorities. The latter could suppress a performance or dissolve a society, arrest or execute a leader, but with their small number of personnel, their ignorance of the language, and their lack of sufficiently numerous and reliable local agents, they could not overhear everything and thus prevent the clever teacher or cultural worker from communicating political concepts to his audience. Since nationalist propagandists were so few and ill-equipped by organization and training to cope with the gigantic task of indoctrinating a population of thirty million, however, the problem of securing access to mass communication media under control of the propaganda departments of the municipal administrations was vitally important. Through such media nationalism might reach thousands

[56] Interview 61.
[57] Interviews 57, 73.

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[475] 565 cooperative enterprises. Hence the development of a middle class on the traditional Western model did not take place.

Actually, in the Ukraine, as in many other countries in which ● 517 186 nationalist movements have developed, it was other components of the middle class which played the leading role. These were the intellectuals, the professionals, and the bureaucrats, together with the student body from which they were recruited. All four of these categories, together with a vast number of persons who would in Western usage be classified simply as clerks, technicians, or even custodial personnel, are lumped together in Soviet classifications as "intelligentsia"—i.e., all whose work does not involve a large measure of manual labor.[4] The leaders of the nationalist movements came from a narrower stratum however. The majority of this leadership consisted of intellectuals par excellence; that is, it was drawn from the academic or literary profession.

This crucial statement requires some proof, which is difficult to present in the absence of statistics or the possibility of sampling, both of which are unavailable for obvious reasons. However, the preponderance of intellectuals is indicated indirectly by figures previously cited on the extremely high proportion of persons with higher or secondary education employed in the Kiev city and *raion* administrations in 1942,[5] and by the statements from well-informed participants that these and other administrations, as well as editorial staffs, served as refuges for intellectuals displaced from their normal occupations.[6] Furthermore, the efforts of nationalist groups, whether OUN or local, were directed very largely toward assisting and encouraging the teachers and writers, a factor which suggests that they were closely tied to these segments of the population. For example, Mel'nyk organizers in Kiev in the winter of 1941–42 made special efforts to secure work in the cooperatives for teachers in order to enable them to avoid forced labor for the rebuilding of bridges.[7] Similarly, the strong

[4] For a discussion of the concept in Soviet usage, see Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 324 ff.

[5] See Chapter IX.

[6] See Chapter V.

[7] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 16. According to one account, the Red Cross in Kiev also aided the intelligentsia (along with prisoners of war) to a special degree (*Krakiv'ki Visti*, December 4, 1942, p. 2).

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East Ukrainian nationalist group in Kharkov took the unusual step of utilizing Prosvita as a relief organization for educators.[8] In addition, the very ability of nationalist elements to maintain themselves in the educational systems when other departments of administration had passed from their hands indicates that the staffs of these branches of administration were especially imbued with nationalism. The comparatively small number of cases and lack of availability of any sampling technique precludes generalization solely on the basis of cases known to the writer of this study. It may be noted, however, that of some sixty East Ukrainians prominent in the nationalist movement whose occupational background is known, about three fifths were either instructors in higher schools, teachers, journalists, or writers. As examples, some of the most prominent may be mentioned. All three mayors of German-occupied Kiev were educators. The chief of the *oblast* administration in Dniepropetrovsk, organized with OUN-B help, was the dean of the electro-technical faculty of the university; later, a member of its medical faculty played the leading role in organizing a "national council" for the OUN-M.[9] The great majority of the Kharkov group, including all of the major organizers of Prosvita, as well as at least two of the OUN-M Ekzekutyva, were university professors; so were the editors of the nationalist-oriented papers in Stalino and Voroshilovgrad (Luhans'k).[10] Among the new Autocephalous bishops, the single East Ukrainian who did not have a clerical background, Professor Haievs'kyi, was also an educator. Writers, while much less prominent, were important. Arkadii Liubchenko, perhaps the best known of all who joined the OUN, has already been described. Most of the nationalist editors were drawn from trained writers, although as in the case of the poet Pronchenko in Krivoi Rog, they appear to have been more often men whose careers were in belles-lettres than professional reporters or editorial workers.

That such a high proportion of available leadership for the nationalist movement came from educators and writers is probably due in part to the leading role played by "national Communist" educational commissars like Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk more

[8] *Nastup*, September 26, 1943, p. 3, referring to *Vinnyts'ki Visti*, August 29, 1943.
[9] Interviews 1, 48.
[10] Interview 66.

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517 than a decade earlier in fostering national culture. Evidently even
186 the repeated Communist purges could not wholly eradicate the permeation of the educational system by nationalist ideas. Indeed, Skrypnyk and other Communists of that period were praised openly by writers in the war years as defenders of the Ukrainian "national idea," [11] and Skrypnyk's plan for an orthographical commission to set standards for Ukrainian publications was formally revived. It should be noticed, however, that direct links between nationalist leaders of the war period and the Skrypnyk group were very few. Moreover, the Russophile leaders were also predominantly intellectuals.[12] The general conclusion appears to be that the intellectuals (using the term in the Western sense) as a group were the most disaffected stratum in Soviet society capable of assuming a leadership role. Of great significance is the fact that a very high proportion of all those who were active in nationalist life under the German occupation had direct reasons for resentment against the Soviet regime, either because they had been barred from intellectual work or because they had been imprisoned for anti-Soviet activity. Also they had a wider historical perspective and hence were quicker to react to the new situation.

463 The second most important group was composed of engineers
186 and other technical specialists like agronomy experts and chemists. Several of these were closely associated with academic life. Others seem to have been drawn from the operating staffs of Soviet industrial establishments, as in the great metallurgical center of Krivoi Rog, where a group of young men composed predominantly of engineers took over the rebuilding of city life soon after the Soviet troops withdrew.[13] One of their number became mayor, was active in nationalist work, probably in connection with the OUN-B, and as a result was executed by the Germans.[14] The most active local recruit of the OUN-M in Kiev, who

[11] Victor Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[12] Although two of their most prominent leaders (Bohatyrchuk and the mayor of Vinnitsa) were physicians, they were also occupants of academic chairs.

[13] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 22, 1941, p. 3.

[14] MS E; Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), p. 39.

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education of children, and self-control.[42] Generally, however, the clergy was unable to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in several villages the latter even objected to returning the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs.[43] 793 186

One of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. How effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of more detailed evidence, but in some cases it evidently did at least provide reading material and some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. There is considerable difference of opinion as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were imbued with Communist ideas.[44] [575] 369 186 875

The great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmitters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for example, the physician, who had been a UNR officer, played the chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. He was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village *feldsher* (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. These constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, who were described as having "no unified outlook," being still "under the influence of Bolshevik ideology." [45] This criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not uncommon in nationalist 565 186 369 517

[42] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

[43] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3.

[44] Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 18, 1941, for favorable reports; and Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28–29, for some criticisms of the rural teachers.

[45] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

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186 writers.[46] To a certain extent it may be due to resentment against
565 the clerical workers' unresponsiveness to nationalist propaganda,
369 or even to simple snobbery toward those aspiring to the title of
517 "intelligentsia" without a formal education. In part it appears, however, to correspond to a real lack of breadth of mind among this lowest group of the Soviet intelligentsia, a deficiency which would have made it difficult to use them for any political or social movement not tied immediately to their customary frame of thinking.

On the other hand, there were often elements in the villages which were available for some sort of political activity. The memory of Petliura was still present; some refused to believe that he was dead, thinking the story to be Communist propaganda.[47] In another area, both the president of the village soviet and the head of one of the collective farms remained behind and organized life in cooperation with nationalist elements.[48] Yet, in another case, a man of some education in one of the villages, who was related to an émigré minister of the UNR, after expressing fervently nationalist sentiments, recoiled with horror at the idea that his auditor might recommend him to the Germans for an official post, fearing the vengeance of Communist agents.[49] The presence of the latter was, indeed, a great handicap to nationalist organization in the rural areas, where the protection of the police force was not so great (especially in partisan-infested areas) as in the towns, and where the naturally cautious peasant hesitated to commit himself until assured the Soviet administration would never return.[50]

186 Since the organized nationalist forces were so few in members,
369 they could not undertake any direct or continuous indoctrination
208 of the rural population, unless they abandoned their efforts to win the cities. They had to rely primarily on the Prosvita branches, the country schools, and the village administrations. Printed material was also used whenever it could be controlled

[46] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 23, 1941, p. 2, reprinting an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti*.

[47] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.

[48] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

[49] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.

[50] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

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the Germans, the Hungarians, and the Poles, allied itself 175
at this moment with the anti-Polish Ruthenian movement, just as it allied itself at the same time with the Czechs and the Croatians. The greater part of the promises of the Austrian Government, given under the pressure of revolutionary events, were not kept afterwards. This applied particularly to those promises which concerned the partition of Galicia into two provinces, that of Polish Cracov and of Ruthenian Eastern Galicia.

Nevertheless this 'springtime,' although of short duration, did not fail to awaken the hopes which had survived so long and which helped the task of Austrian policy. An important social consequence emerged from the events of 1848: the abolition of serfdom thirteen years before the emancipation of the serfs in Russia.

In the following decades Austrian policy developed cleverly between the Poles and the Hungarians, although more inclined towards the first who were more conservative from the social point of view and, consequently, more in tune with the general lines of the policy of Vienna.

The Ruthenian language and instruction continued to enjoy a certain liberty on condition that they did not fall under Pan-Russian influences.

Austrian policy at least had the merit of allowing the 517
Ukrainian language and culture to develop and thus to give birth to an imaginative literature and to a journalistic movement of some importance, having its centre at Lvov, which became the nucleus of Ukrainian intellectual life. Numerous cultural institutions appeared one after another; journals, reviews, literary circles, and finally the Ruthenian University of Lvov.

After the measures of restriction which were taken against Ukrainianism in Russia, the intellectual circles of

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517 the Russian Ukraine had resource to Galician publications and, from time to time, they published their own works in that country. It is as a result of this that the Chevtchenko Society was founded at Lvov, which has since held the predominant place in the Ukrainian movement.

Following the example of Chevtchenko, another influence joined the popular so to say 'folk-lore' tendency of the literary Ukrainian movement: it was the social question, identical with that which dominated the literary spirit of the whole of Russia.

565 The second half of the eighteenth century, which had
668 seen the union of Western Ukraine with Russia and the colonization of the shores of the Black Sea, was at the same time the epoch of the greatest development of the privileges of the aristocracy. We shall not be able to go into the details of this evolution, which would go far beyond the purpose of this book. Let us only note that after the death of Peter the Great in 1725 the new nobility, of military origin, became the greatest political force in the State. This nobility definitely emancipated itself from its old bondage to the State and at the same time transformed the dependence of the peasants, which had hitherto not been unconditional, into a real servitude. Thus Catherine II established in Russia, as also in the Ukraine, a new political and social order which was founded on the privileged position of the aristocracy which had carried her to power, and on the servitude of the peasants. She conferred similar rights on the Ukrainian nobility as those of the aristocracy of the whole empire and, moreover, liberally distributed the new lands to the landlords. Since that time the question of the servitude of the peasants, a distant but direct prelude of the Revolution, became an open wound of the Tsarist regime.

that it was in the interest of Prussia to help the Ukrainian people 175
to cast off the chains of Muscovite slavery. During the Great French 648
Revolution the person of Napoleon was very popular in Ukraine. Ukrainian patriots were pleased by the victories of the French Emperor, and hoped that, after the defeat of Russia in a war with France, the time for the liberation of Ukraine would come, and the odious serfdom would be abolished. But Napoleon had no understanding of the Ukrainian problem. He planned the creation of two states 'Napoléonides' in Ukraine under his protectorate . . .*)

Ukrainian history has gone its own way, different from that of Russia. This has created the peculiar national character of the Ukrainians.

The foreigners who had visited Ukraine in the 17th and 18th 175
centuries pointed out the higher level of civilisation among the 181
Ukrainians in comparison with the Russians, and the highly deve- 517
loped feeling of personal dignity of the Ukrainian people. This love of freedom of the Ukrainian people appeared also in the fight against Tsarist absolutism in Russia, where revolutionaries of Ukrainian origin occupied the first places, Zhelyabov, Kybalchych, Konashevych, Osynsky, Kravchynsky (Stepnyak), Popko, and many other members of the party '*Narodnaya Volya*'.

In the 19th century, under the influence of the ideas of that time (the Great French Revolution, romanticism) the regeneration of the so-called unhistorical pepoples (Serbians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Baltic peoples) began; in the beginning it was the interest for the language and history of the peoples among the educated classes, and the attempt to write in the 'common people's' language. In Ukraine the regeneration of the popular literary language began [538] with the publication of the satirical poem of Ivan Kotlyarevsky *Aeneid:* 1798. In this poem the author underlines his dislike of serfdom and the lords

> "who did not give the people freedom
> and treated them like cattle."

Democratic ideas were widespread in Ukraine; the representatives 175
of the Ukrainian educated classes took an active part in the 186
revolutionary organisations directed towards the fall of the Tsarist régime (the uprising of the 'Decabrists', 1825—26, was most active in Ukraine, near Kiev).

In 1846 a Ukrainian political organisation, *The Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius,* was founded in Kiev. Many prominent representatives of Ukrainian culture like Taras Shevchenko (the

*) *Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes:* Paris 1922.

175 186 greatest Ukrainian poet), Mykola Kostomarov, historian, Panteleimon Kulish, historian and poet, Mykola Hulak, and others, took part in this organisation.

In the declarations of this society the idea of an independent Ukrainian democratic republic was promulgated: "And Ukraine will resurrect from her grave ... And Ukraine will be an independent republic" *(The Books of the Being of the Ukrainian Nation,* the work of the Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius).

The Russian Government punished the members of this society severely and acted rigorously against Ukrainian political and cultural regeneration.

[191] In 1863 the Russian Minister Valuyev declared that "the Ukrainian language did not exist, does not exist and cannot exist." In 1876, by a secret order of the Tsar, the printing and circulation of Ukrainian books, periodicals etc. in the Russian Empire was prohibited. Even the Bible in Ukrainian was forbidden. Ukrainian could not be tought in schools. The Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire was forbidden until 1905. Only the revolution of 1917 made the introduction of Ukrainian in schools possible. This prohibition of the living language of a considerable nation, the instrument of its culture, had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people and is a feature absolutely unique in universal history.

[871] 175 517 The prohibition of the Ukrainian language in the schools and in the press hindered the development of education in Ukraine. The statistics show that the number of schools and the level of education in Ukraine were higher in the 18th century than in the 19th*). On the other hand, the Russian schools separated the educated classes of the Ukrainian nation from their nationality, and put the intelligentsia of Ukrainian origin into the service of Russian culture. Thus, besides the economic exploitation to the advantage of the Russian Empire, Ukraine was deprived of her best intellectual forces which were drowned in the 'Russian Sea'. We can quote here only some names of prominent Ukrainians who, by virtue of circumstances, helped to create the Russian civilisation, and gave their talents for the increase of the Russian Empire: Archbishop Theophan Prokopovych, the deputy of the Patriarch of Moscow Stephan Javorsky, Bishop Dmytro Rostovsky — were prominent Ukrainian scholars of the time of Tsar Peter I. who were forced

*) Thus there were in 1748 in four regiments (Ukraine had a military Cossack administration) of the Hetmanate (for three regiments the figures are missing) 866 elementary schools, i. e., one school for 1000 inhabitants. From this, little or almost nothing remained in the 19th century.

to leave Ukraine and to serve the Muscovite State. The Ukrainian, 175
Prince Alexander Bezborodko, directed for many years Russian 517
foreign policy in the time of Catherine II. (1762—1796) and of
Paul I., who is known, however, to have disliked Russia and
to have dreamt of a free Ukraine. The greatest talents of modern
Russian literature, Gogol and Dostoyevsky, were of Ukrainian
origin; Gogol did not master Russian exactly until the end of his
life, it was strange to him. Far-famed scholars — Maxim Kova-
levsky, sociologist; the philosophers Lesevich and Yurkevich,
Vladimir Vernadsky, geologist, the famous painter Ilya Repin, —
were Ukrainians of whom Russian culture is proud.

The Ukrainians in the provinces of Austria, Galicia and Buko- 175
vina had lost their educated classes under the rule of the Poles and 186
Turks. Here, as well as in the Ukrainian territory to the West of [668]
the Carpathian Mountains, Carpatho-Ukraine, which was under
Hungarian rule, the Ukrainians were principally peasants; the
cities were mostly not-Ukrainian. During the 'Spring of the
Peoples' in 1848 the Ukrainian national movement in Austria and
Hungary also appeared. In Galicia the Ruthenian Supreme Council
— a political representative of the Ukrainians in Austria — was
created. At the elections for the Austrian Parliament the Ukrai-
nians secured a considerable number of mandates. The national
rebirth began also in the Ukrainian territory on the western side
of the Carpathian Mountains. But the reaction which occured in
Austria hindered the Ukrainian national development. The Vienna
Government put the Ukrainians in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine
under Polish and Hungarian rule respectively in order to make the
Poles and Hungarians loyal towards Austria. This enabled the
Poles and Hungarians to conduct a policy of denationalisation
against the Ukrainians. Only at the end of the 19th century, in spite
of great hindrances on the part of the Poles, a Ukrainian political
and cultural life developed in Galicia. In connection with this, [517]
Ukrainian science and literature, prohibited in Kiev, Kharkov, and [814]
Odessa, found a home in Galicia (Lviw), and Bukovina (Cher-
nivtsi). Ukrainians from Tsarist Ukraine published here their
periodicals and books; here, under the direction of the famous
Kievan historian Michael Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian Shevchenko
Scientific Society developed. It was by its energy a real Ukrainian
Academy of Science.

Gradually the Ukrainians in Austria were overcoming the
obstacles created by the ruling class of the Polish nobility, and
secured new mandates in the Austrian Parliament and the Galician
Diet.

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine
687 the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 1/3 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres (*The Bolshevik of Ukraine,* No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture,
517 the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan (1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

871 every teacher in the schools in Ukraine had orders to spread Com-
656 munist propaganda, to fight the appearance of national discontent with the Russian rule by every means, and was obliged to insult the
[814] struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation. In schools, Ukrainian history was falsely interpreted as well as in literature and in films. For instance, clinging to the tradition taken from Tsarist Russia, the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa who at the beginning of the 18th century wanted to free Ukraine from Muscovite dependence, has in Soviet historiography the epithet of a 'traitor' and 'reactionary'. But Tsar Peter I. and Tsar Ivan the Terrible, are glorified by Soviet school and science as 'progressive democratic rulers'.

659 The Ukrainian religious life under the régime of Soviet Russian
661 occupation had to suffer from special persecutions. In 1921, in Soviet Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Autocephal Church, independent of the Moscow Patriarch, was organised. This Church, headed by its idealistic leaders, the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier of the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1918—19 and others, completed a great task for the cultural and moral improvement of the Ukrainian nation. Moscow attempted to destroy the strong organisation of the Ukrainian Autocephal Church with the help of its agents, but did not succeed in this. Then the Soviet Government ruined by bloody repressions the Ukrainian Church after having destroyed its entire hierarchy and masses of its followers (1929).

661 In connection with the 'General Line' which had placed unbear-
●517 able burdens on Ukrainian economy, a mass discontent against Moscow increased among the Ukrainians. The ruthless economic
815 exploitation and political oppression by Russia caused, among the Ukrainian people, a permanent oppositon which appeared in various forms. Therefore, the Moscow Government decided to terrorise the Ukrainian intelligentsia which bore the brunt of the political efforts of the Ukrainian nation. For this purpose a number of trials against the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian science and social life were arranged; the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine with the participation of the prominent member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, Serhy Yefremov, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier, Professor Osyp Hermayze and others in Kharkov, in spring 1930. Thousands of innocent people, especially students, perished in the prisoners' cells of the GPU without any trial. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Academy of Science was exposed to repressions. In place of the imprisoned or expelled members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, the Communists appointed their own people though without scientific merits,
46 but politically faithful to Moscow.

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under 16 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation 423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to [517] education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Russian intellectuals. 186 After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist 631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both within and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.
[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . .* , 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

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185 517 191 [369] ODO

in spite of efforts to produce films and to broadcast programs in the Ukrainian language — potent forces for assimilation to Russian culture. To the goal of assimilation, moreover, much is contributed by the industrialization of the Ukraine: new factories bring rural Ukrainians into the cities where Russian still predominates in social life, and the younger Ukrainians in the city easily adopt the prevailing language. But these forces for assimilation, even though coupled with the inculcation of communist doctrines through the media of education and culture, may be cancelled by a growth of nationalism; and such nationalism may thrive on the shocks of economic disorders and unsuccessful foreign war. The language policy itself promotes the process of assimilation by encouraging bi-lingualism; but by stressing the use of minority languages, it furthers at least a greater temporary diversification. The question of whether the forces of unity are now stronger or weaker than the forces of division can be answered only by the future.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

476 was made in the cooperative society's own factories. The society owned cement factories, lime plants, mills, cloth-weaving factories, bakeries, oil presses and even a factory that made boot polish and cosmetics.

439 Whither did Ukrainian goods go? Peas, beans and poultry to England and Belgium, clover seed to Holland, /94/ pigs to Germany, beef cattle via Constanta to Greece, poultry to Germany, Switzerland and to - Palestine, eggs to many countries and, in cans, as far as Buenos Aires.

[545] Sociologically noteworthy is the growth of an urban stratum of artisans, merchants and small industrialists. The Ukrainians who, much to their 369 own disadvantage, neglected the cities because of 476 their love for quiet village life, now gradually pushed into the cities, and the credit cooperatives supported them in this.

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741 Of greatest significance for the advancement of Ukrainian culture were the societies for edu- •517 cation and public health. The society for popular 217 education, "Prosvita", was even older than the Ukrainian system of cooperatives, reaching back to 1883. It was a veritable national sanctuary of the Ukrainians. The people are indebted to it for a large part of their cultural advance. The "Prosvita" was an actual school for advanced studies in the country. In 3214 village libraries with 700,000 volumes, two instructive monthly magazines and with inexpensive editions of books, it enabled the village inhabitants who were cut off from all urban culture to obtain the knowledge which alone made it possible for them to assert themselves against their enemies. Besides that, 741 "Prosvita", which on January 1, 1938 numbered 517 360,000 members, and owned 1457 club houses with rooms for meetings, promoted group singing, music, the community theater and folk art. It helped

741 517 illiterates to learn to read by means of special courses, and it gave scholarships to worthy students. So, it is not surprising that the Poles did not care for the "Prosvita". Thus in the last ten years all of the 600 local groups in Polesia and Volhynia and 70% of all local groups west of the Shan were dissolved. In 1938 Warsaw intensified its war against the "Prosvita"; in that year 104 local groups /95/ were dissolved and in the first five months of 1939 the same happened even to two district centers with 168 local groups. In spite of that, the Ukrainians organized 375 new local groups from 1936 to 1938.

575 874 Peasants and agriculturists numbering 160,000 united in the "Silskyj Hospodar" ("farmer") in order to arrange for or to obtain agricultural training. The "Silskyj Hospodar" employed approximately 150 social agronomists, that is, agriculturists with diplomas, who supervised improvement of the soil, methods of cultivating, seed production and whole farm establishments. They conducted courses and competitions in which the young farmers who were eager for knowledge actively participated. Special veterinarians of the society and of the dairy farm cooperatives supervised the livestock.

562 575 The Ukrainian women of Galicia were anxious not to be second to the men. Their society "Soyuz Ukrayinok" numbered 60,000 members in 1200 village circles. In the national life of the people the Ukrainian woman occupies a high position, as is the case among all healthy races. In times of national misfortune the mothers are the preservers of the old manners and customs; the children learn the language and the traditional songs from their mothers, to whom the rising generations are entrusted. Their glowing patriotism is not surpassed by the men. At the same time the West Ukrainian woman is deeply religious and tirelessly industrious; she excels in the household.

000 Everything in West Ukraine is education work.

000 All the Ukrainian intelligentsia of Lwów and its environs, men and women, were represented, the consulates of Great Britain and France and many foreigners who love Ukrainian music - all but the Poles.

•577 Intelligentsia - that is, students of the classical schools and universities, teachers, professors, lawyers, the heads of the cooperatives, editors, writers, painters, politicians, architects, graduate agriculturists, engineers, physicians, clergymen. They were all there.* One saw remarkably many clergymen, fine men who have both feet planted firmly on Ukrainian soil. Many of them were Austrian officers in their younger days who also fought for West Ukrainian freedom. They told friends that they were prepared at any time /99/ "to exchange the cassock for a coat of mail". This is no empty talk, for most of them had already paid for their national sentiments in Polish prisons. Their metropolitan, Count Andrei Sheptyckij, is cut from the same pattern. He incurred the hatred of the Poles when he blessed the autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine and half a year later its dead. Before he was drawn to the church, he, the cavalry captain of his Majesty, hunted bears, lynxes and wild boars. The trophies from that gay time are now hanging in the anteroom of the archbishop. Today he is an old man who has been in ill health for a long time. Years ago the tall, vigorous man was often compared to Michelangelo's Moses.

Count Andrei Sheptycki was a member of the Polonized Ukrainian high nobility. Like many Polish aristocrats with Ukrainian coats of arms, his brothers belonged to the Polish szlachta; he alone found his way home to the Ukrainian people. Neither the Poles nor the Ukrainians have a dearth of nobility. In Volhynia "the 16th and 17th centuries fairly seethed with princely houses". Whenever the Polish kings needed warriors for their expeditions, they raised the wealthy peasants to

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*[At a Ukrainian concert in Lwów, incidental to the information - Analyst]

the peerage and gave them rights and privileges 556
for which the newly-created peers were obliged to 565
pay with military service. In this way the lower szlachta increased to many hundreds of thousands of knights and barons who were often not much richer than the ordinary peasants. In the purely Polish regions and in West Ukraine there are still whole villages in which every peasant belongs to the nobility. Whoever was able to present his patent of nobility in Galicia after the partitioning of Poland was recognized as a peer by the Viennese court. In this way arose the Ritter /knights/ von Vitvicky, von Mogylnicki, von Kultshycki and whatever the rest are called.

Whereas the high nobility, with the exception of people like the former Princes Ostrozhsky 565 517 does not play any part in promoting culture in modern times in the Ukraine, the lesser nobility 773 were for a long time practically the only bearers of Ukrainian culture. They made up the clergy almost exclusively. /100/ The pastors with their numerous children were often the only and the inexhaustible source of Ukrainian intelligentsia. Otherwise there were no intellectual professions open to the Ukrainians. Only the Catholics, that is to say, the Poles could become officials.

The Poles held to the old traditions of the lower nobility in their "Union of village szlachta". 565 According to the latest Polish conception, the lower Ukrainian nobility are Ukrainized Poles. By promising them additional land and other material advantages, Warsaw wanted to catch the 400,000 "aristocratic souls". If this had succeeded, the Poles would have come a good deal closer to a majority in Galicia.

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"In this cottage, in this grove 539
A hell I saw! Nothing but slavery 538
And bitter servitude, that never justice knows

517 While the Ukrainian language was being banned from Kiyev, a new flowering of Ukrainian culture was beginning in the West Ukrainian metropolis of Lwów. In 1873 Ukrainian men of learning [741] founded the "Scientific Shevchenko Society", a free academy. The number of Ukrainian chairs at the University grew. Now that all scholarly activity in the Ukrainian language was curtailed in East Ukraine, professors and writers transferred their field of activity to Lwów where a number of different cultural organizations arose. Kiyev as the intellectual hub of all Ukraine was outstripped by Lwów, in fact, even by Czernovits /now Chernovtsy/. Each of these two cities published more than one hundred Ukrainian works in 1894, whereas Kiyev published only ten works of so-called "literature for the home".

The revolution of 1905 only temporarily 177 eased the pressure on Ukrainian cultural life. Freedom of the press and freedom of assembly remained only promises, and the "unity and indivisibility" of the Russian people was nothing but lifeless dogma until in 1917 its defenders were swept away by the seceding peoples.

Despite all difficulties, Lwów remained the 517 cultural center of West Ukraine even after the 668 first World War. Its focal point was the "Scien- [741] tific /104/ Shevchenko Society" which published its own periodicals and scholarly works. The spiritual trend of West Ukrainian intellectuals, in so far as they were not obliged to emigrate, was directed against traditional sentimentality. Young people were reared to think politically, to be ready for action and for dedication. In accordance with the political aims, the subject matter of present-day West Ukrainian literature shows a preference for the re-awakening of the Ukrainian people, for the heroic struggles of the last few decades, and for the heroic in the Ukrainian landscape.

•517 156 [214] Kiyev, Khar'kov and Odessa are the most important centers of East Ukrainian intellectual life. It is there that most of the Ukrainian books, periodicals and newspapers are published. Besides that, the Ukrainian tongue is also printed in many smaller cities. Many of the Soviet Ukrainian authors glorify present conditions; these are the interpreters of Communism, the worshipers of machines and idols. But there are also others, like Khvylovy, who in truthful pamphlets derided the state of affairs, the proletarian wirepullers, their ingenuousness, their venality and their eagerness to work their way up, authors who write with a nationalistic purpose, who are "exposed" and then, like Khvylovy, come to an unfortunate end. "Experts maintain that even in the works of the Ukrainian Communist writers, especially the younger ones, the national feeling cannot be hidden, that an inner schism appears in their works. They do not actually belong to proletarian literature which has remained inwardly foreign to them. How could it be otherwise with such a past!" (56) /Facing page 104/

56. Zalozieckyj, ibid.

439 /Map VIII: Grain Export from the Soviet Ukraine and North Caucasus (Average for 1927/1928) This map differentiates between actual Soviet Ukraine and the North Caucasus regions. Export to foreign countries is insignificant compared to supplies sent to the Greater Russian areas of the Soviet Union situated in the forest belt./ /Key: Grain: ● from Soviet Ukraine, ● from the North Caucasus./

/105/ <u>Trapping Souls</u>

798 On Sunday, May 29, 1939 a unique event took place in the church of St. Peter in Rome:

668 sech sharp shooters, Ievhen Konovalets who, after Petliura reached an understanding with the Poles separated from the dictator. Konovalet's successor is the former chief of staff of the Ukrainian army, chief of the sech sharp shooters Andrey Melnyk who was obliged to flee from Poland in 1938. The OUN has its strongest support in the Ukrainian emigrants in the USA - "Organization for the Political Revival of the Ukraine, New York" -, in Canada and South America. But also among the 150,000 European political refuges and emigrants it has the most adherents of all groups large and small. There are Ukrainian nationalists in almost all Central and West European capitals, among others in Rome, in Paris and in London where the "English-Ukrainian Society" establishes contact with the Ukrainian emigrants in Canada.

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167 /187/ When in the second half of the past century economic conditions became more and more unbearable in the Ukraine, many Ukrainians emigrated; from the Russian Ukraine to East Russia, from Galicia, from Carpatho-Ukraine, and from Bukovina overseas. In 1926, 771,000 Ukrainians lived outside the Ukraine proper in small and large linguistic islands, within European Russia, and 2,138,000 lived in Asia. In the United States there were about 700,000 Ukrainians, primarily workers; in Canada there were 300,000 mostly farmers; in Brazil 50,000 to 60,000, in Argentina 50,000, in the rest of the South American countries 10,000 to 20,000. (134)

134. Kubiyovich: Geography, page 321.

•517 Organizations of compatriots of various kinds keep the Ukrainians together overseas. The closest ties are those between the farmers in

[Vienna] [Prague] [Warsaw] [Paris]

517 Canada. But the numerous Ukrainians in northern America have only insignificant cultural facilities. All the more highly developed is Ukrainian intellectual life among the emigrants in Central Europe. When the Poles, the Rumanians and the Bolsheviks arrived, the Ukrainian professors fled from Lwów, Czernovitz and from the universities of Russia, chiefly to Vienna. This Danubin city had an important Ukrainian tradition at that time. Its position in relation to Galicia was favorable. Many ties bount it to this country which under Austrian rule had experienced an unusual growth.

Thus it was in Vienna that the Ukrainian intellectual world gathered in 1920 to 1921; the scholars had an urge for activity. And so the "Free Ukrainian University" opened its doors on January 17, 1921, solemnly and in the presence of the officials of German Austria. It had two departments, philosophy and law.

Meanwhile the former Sorbonne student Eduard Benevs, at the time secretary of foreign affairs of "Czechoslovakia", knew well what was meant by cultural propaganda. He soon managed to cut off the "Free Ukrainian University" in Vienna. First of all he lured the /188/ poor homeless Ukrainian students to Prague with scholarships and later also attracted their professors. In Prague an active Ukrainian academic life unfolded in the years that followed.

In 1939, the Ukrainian men of learning who lived in foreign countries were active at ten scientific institutes. Six of these are in Prague: the Ukrainian Academic Association, the Ukrainian Historical-Philological Society, the Ukrainian Juridical Society, the Ukrainian Sociological Institute, the Ukrainian Historical Cabinet and the "Museum of the Wars of Independence of the Ukraine". There are two in Warsaw: the Ukrainian Scientific Institute and the Mazepa-Mogyla Academy of Sciences. One is in Paris, the

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[Berlin]

517 Petliura Library. Finally, there is the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin.

/189/ Epilogue

181 After their liberation from the Soviet-Muscovite yoke the Ukrainian people have, for the first time in their recent history, had an opportunity to develop their talents and their natural resources freely and unimpeded for their own benefit. The tremendous amount of work that remains to be done can be estimated only by someone who is familiar with the incomparable misery which war-communism, more than two decades of Bolshevik rule and finally liberation from this rule have brought upon the Ukrainian country and its people. Reconstruction will necessarily be all the more difficult since the Ukrainians have to this day remained a peasant people, without their own artisans, without a merchant class, without officials and almost without a so-called intelligentsia. This fact has been very important for the biological survival of the Ukrainian people, for its seed thus withstood the most dire distress of centuries of suppression. Nevertheless: peasants are not statesmen! Peasants want to plow, sow, reap and tend their cattle. Thus it is not a matter of chance that, aside from its historical struggle against the Asiatic hordes, the most important achievement of the Ukrainian people is of a rural character: in the colonization of the steppes, of Siberian and far-eastern lands the Ukrainians have achieved great things. "In fact," says the well-known Ukrainian geographer Rudnickiy, "the entire life force of the nation was directed toward the one single problem of occupying new areas and cultivating them according to old customs." Nevertheless - "the political idea suffered thereby, as well as Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian city." /190/

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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munist Party was itself in a very serious crisis. After Lenin's death on January 21, 1924, the top Party officials struggled among themselves for political leadership. For this reason, the national question was not even raised at the fourteenth Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party held on December 18 to 31, 1925. The Congress was entirely occupied with ironing out the sharp split within the Party. Despite the strong opposition lead by Sinoviev and Kamenev, who fought for a collective responsibility of the Politburo, the Congress made Stalin the individual dictator of the Party, giving him unrestricted authority.[34]

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Utilizing this struggle between the Russian Communists, Ukrainian writers and historians wrote and published new literature about their past and inspired resistance to Moscow's domination. One of the most influential among these writers with the courage to reject openly Moscow's right to dominate his people was Mykola Khvylovyj. During the revolution he was among the Ukrainian Communists who were misled by Bolshevik slogans and took active part in the struggle against the "bourgeois" national Government of the Ukraine. He believed in the international program of the Russian Communist Party which promised the people "land, liberty and friendship among nations." Under the impact of existing developments, however, Khvylovyj realized that the Russian Bolsheviks nurtured the idea of the "single and indivisible Russia" and that only the forms of oppression were changed. His conclusion was based upon the fact that the Bolshevik recognition of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic was composed of empty phrases and deceptions since the real political force in the Ukraine was concentrated in Russian hands. Khvylovyj now openly declared that his people could survive as a nation and live in freedom and peace only if they are able to secede from Russia. His appeal, "Away from Moscow, back to Europe," was received by Ukrainians with enthusiasm and by the Soviet leaders with considerable anxiety. Referring to the dangerous influence of Khvylovyj's writings, Stalin wrote:

> Khvylovyj's demand for "The immediate russification of the proletariat" of the Ukraine, his opinion that "Ukrainian poetry must get

34 For the story of Stalin's seizure of power see: *XIV. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), December 18-31, 1925*, Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow, 1926), pp. 207-298.

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

> away from the Russian literature and its style as quickly as possible," his assertion that "the ideas of the proletariat are known to us without Moscow art," his enthusiasm for a sort of Messianic role of the "young" Ukrainian intelligentsia and his ludicrous and non-Marxist attempt to divorce culture from politics—all this, and much like it, in the mouth of a Ukrainian Communist now sounds (must sound) more than strange. Whereas the proletarians of Western Europe and their Communist Parties are full of sympathy for "Moscow" the citadel of the international revolutionary movement and of Leninism, whereas the proletarians of Western Europe turn with joy toward the banner waving over Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvylovyj has nothing better to say for "Moscow" than to appeal to Ukrainian public men to get away from "Moscow as quickly as possible!" And this is called internationalism! What can we say of other Ukrainian intellectuals, not belonging to the Communist camp, if Communists begin to talk, and not only talk, but also to write in our Soviet press, in the language of Comrade Khvylovyj?[35]

668 517

Despite the fact that the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic secured for Moscow centralized power, internal developments in the Ukraine were at first not affected as much as many Russian Communists anticipated. On the contrary, the first years of Union status were marked by the promotion of Soviet Ukrainian statehood. Alongside the Kremlin's appointed Commissariats, the Ukraine possessed a well-organized administration of its own and its "Government" took very seriously the creation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. Kharkov and later Kiev defended the interests of the Ukraine with steadfast determination. The growth of a Ukrainian culture national in substance, fostered by Khvylovyj, progressed so rapidly that Stalin was again stirred to an open admission of its danger when he said in 1929:

> If we had nothing else but these discussions about Khvylovyj, which have become so wide and heated in the Ukraine, there would already be enough for profound alarm.[36]

The national question was once again raised at the sixteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party. Stalin proposed a new Nationalities' policy which would promote a culture socialistic in sub-

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35 J. V. Stalin's letter "To Comrade Kaganovich and other members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (B) of Ukraine," dated April 26, 1926, first published in a complete form in *Sotchineniya*, Vol. VIII (Moscow, 1948), pp. 149-154.

36 Cf. Mykola Sciborsky, *Ukraine and Russia* (New York, 1940), p. 43.

744 Europe; and many people used to die every year from tuberculosis and
164 other chest complaints. Severe epidemics—typhoid and dysentry—used
146 to ravage the country every year; inadequate regulation of rivers and stagnant waters gave rise to malaria; undernourishment of large sections of the population was responsible for sporadic pellagra. Venereal diseases were a curse owing to lack of medical attention and of appropriate legislation.

744 This enormous task was tackled with commendable vigour by the authorities of the Republic. In a country which used to have very few
185 doctors, a proper medical service was soon organised; up-to-date hospitals and children's homes were built; Red Cross stations and other hygiene and welfare institutions, set up in many parts of Ruthenia, strove to prevent and combat disease. This systematic effort resulted in a substantial reduction of mortality, while the draining of marshlands and the regulation of streams and ponds considerably checked epidemics.

185 Realising that ignorance is the root of many social evils, the State regarded the raising of the standard of education in Ruthenia as one
871 of its foremost tasks. The achievements in this field were perhaps the most striking. A country, which in 1918 had not more than eighteen elementary schools where children were only partly taught in Ruthenian, possessed 520 Ruthenian schools two years later; and after fifteen years of independence this small country in the Carpathians could boast 1,079 schools of various kinds—elementary, upper, secondary, technical and special schools. The magnitude of this achievement becomes evident when it is borne in mind that it was necessary to educate the requisite number of Ruthenian teachers from among the rising generation.

871 Thanks to these efforts illiteracy among the younger people has become rare. Those Ruthenians who according to the last census of
212 1930 were still unable to read and write were largely middle-aged or
185 old people. But even among them illiteracy has been considerably reduced because evening schools for adults were opened wherever pos-
517 sible. The people of Ruthenia proved to be keen pupils. Within a few years the neglected country had a promising intelligentsia—administrative workers, teachers, journalists, writers, doctors, engineers, composers, artists and scientists. In the thirties more than eighty periodicals, among them ten dailies, appeared in Ruthenia, and the production of books grew from year to year. The innate aptitude for arts and crafts was given a chance of development when a special art school was established in Užhorod, and musical talent, too, received much encouragement. As many as 7.7 per cent of all musical compositions and songs broadcast by Czechoslovak radio stations were the work of Ruthenian musicians.

000 Economic development was essential to a country where bread used

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

of the Soviet State and served the purposes of a centralistic leadership. The Ukrainians, led by Rakovsky and Skrypnik, also made efforts to keep their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, to maintain at least some degree of control over the railway system and postal services in their territory and in general to curtail the prerogatives conferred on the all-Union Peoples Commissariats.[3]

S.U. 631 186 UK. 186 642

The Ukrainians were defeated and Stalin got his centralistic constitution accepted which, in the long run, enabled him to rule in Kharkov and Kiev almost in the same way as in Moscow and Leningrad.

COMMUNIST IRREDENTA AND 'UKRAINIZATION' POLICY

Though ignoring the wishes of the Ukrainians regarding their constitutional status within the U.S.S.R., Stalin offered them a glittering consolation prize; the promise of a future Ukrainian State, to include all the Ukrainian lands which the peace settlement after the First World War had allocated to Rumania, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

This aim was to be achieved with the help of the Comintern and its policy on the national question. Many Ukrainians, though anti-Soviet 'bourgeois nationalists' at heart, were inclined to make peace outwardly with Bolshevism in the first years of the Soviet régime, because world-Communism stood for the most far-reaching fulfilment of Ukrainian national aspirations.

The Fifth World Congress of the Comintern in 1924 included ~~in~~ its resolution on the 'National Question in Central Europe and the Balkans' the following passage 'The Congress . . . considers it necessary for the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania to launch the general slogan of separation of the Ukrainian lands from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and their union with the Soviet Ukraine and through it, with the U.S.S.R.'. The congress was satisfied that the Communist Parties of Poland and Rumania had successfully promoted the demand for Ukrainian self-determination. From the details of the resolution it appeared that the frontiers of a future united Ukraine were to be drawn slightly to the west of the Russian-Polish border as fixed in 1945.[4]

The wish of certain groups of Ukrainian nationalists to come to terms with the Soviet régime was reinforced by an apparent readiness of the Soviet Government to grant to the Ukrainians a certain measure of freedom in the cultural field, provided that they recognized the totalitarian aspirations of the Communist Party. An expression of this policy of communist-nationalist co-operation was the fact that the historian of Ukrainian nationalism, Mikhail Hrushevsky, returned to Kiev in 1924 to take over the direction of the historical section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

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186 For the next few years Ukrainian intellectuals were absorbed with the cultural 'Ukrainization' of the Ukraine, for which Moscow gave a free
● 517 hand while firmly controlling the posts of political command. The Ukrainian language came into its own, a scientific Ukrainian terminology was created, and Ukrainian book production had a boom.

THE FIRST PURGES

186 The Soviet authorities soon discovered that the Ukrainian nationalist
665 renaissance could not be arrested halfway and that cultural nationalism was bound to lead to political nationalism. The Ukrainian nationalists on the other hand, found out that in a totalitarian State like the U.S.S.R. there could be no real freedom, not even for Ukrainian cultural nationalism. From 1926 onwards the contradictions between Ukrainian nationalism and the communist State became more and more noticeable. Before hitting out against the bourgeois Ukrainian nationalist groups which conspired against the Soviet régime, the Kremlin had to make order within the Ukrainian Communist Party itself. The latter had originated from the amalgamation of the Bolsheviks with a genuine home-grown communist movement, the Borotbists. They were a left-wing extremist group called after the Ukrainian émigré newspaper *Borotba* published in Geneva in 1915. From the ideological point of view they had much in common with Marshal Tito's Yugoslav communists. They insisted on unconditional national independence, but in every other respect their aims were indistinguishable from those of the Bolsheviks. In 1919 the Borotbists assumed the title of 'Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists)' and applied for membership of the Communist International. Together with the Ukrainian Bolsheviks proper they formed the first Ukrainian Soviet Government, the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee which organized the fight against General Denikin's White Guards. Lenin valued the co-operation of the Borotbists and stated that the question of Ukrainian independence should be no reason for disunity between them and the Bolsheviks, the more so since a section of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks favoured an independent status for the Ukraine.[5] The merger of the two communist fractions in March 1920 was of great value to the Bolsheviks for the Borotbists exercised considerable influence on the Ukrainian masses.

The Borotbist traditions of Ukrainian communism explain to a considerable extent the particular strength of nationalist heresy within the Ukrainian Communist Party. The first Borotbist deviations were officially labelled as 'Khvylovy-ism' and 'Shumsky-ism' after Mikola Khvylovy, an outstanding Ukrainian writer and Oleksandr Shumsky, Minister of Education. Both Khvylovy and Shumsky scandalized orthodox communists in the middle of the twenties by their outspoken western

1/1 [Cf. cat. 186, pp. 129-130, 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]

11: Obermaier--145 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

The Living faith of pagan times occupies among the people, a position which is equal with the Christian belief. The Orthodox Church, doubtless recognizing how deeply rooted the popular customs are, has tried to reconcile the two.

789 The ancestor cult is particularly important. The Ukrainian people entertain their ancestors on Christmas Eve. The table is set and the whole family are seated at it. Only a few seats are unoccupied - for the ancestors. Their bowls are filled with the traditional Christmas food: cooked wheat with honey and poppy, cooked fish and a cooked fruit mixture. "Little Father Frost" is also invited on Christmas Eve by the master of the house. The peasant steps in front of his house and calls: "Frost, frost, come and have supper with us!" Every guest, even the beggar, is welcome on Christmas Eve, for he might be an ancestor or Father Frost whom even the priest [789] does not forget specially to invite. Hay is laid under the tablecloth on the nights around the winter solstice, for all green things /138/ drive away the evil spirits. The place of honor in the house belongs to the "grandfather", a 533 sheaf of grain, symbolizing the ancestor. In the twelve magical nights between Christmas Eve and the Three Kings the famous koliad, pagan songs about the solstice, with a Christian flavor, exorcise all evil. Jesus Christ, Dazhdboh the sun god, and the Virgin Mary, all three are conjured up in one and the same song, in order to protect these worthy Christians.

527 The carnival belongs to the women; the men 789 have nothing to do with it, although on other occasions they do not scorn merry revels. On a Monday morning the married women of the village gather in the pub in order to begin a week of jolly drinking. This, too, of course, cannot pass without magic. The sorcery revolves about the "koloda", a stick which symbolizes a child. It is wound with tow and is now "born". The women congratulate each other on the "birth" with horilka,

527 789 grain whiskey. The revelry lasts all week just as in the case of a real birth.

527 771 769 The spring festival, the resurrection of nature, has for a long time coincided with the Christian Easter, the resurrection of the Lord, and the burial of Christ with the burial of winter. On Easter Sunday the Christian service and the pagan cult complement each other in a strange way. Scarcely has the priest prayed for the blessing of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost to descend upon his congregation, when the women join hands and dance around the church. It is a custom dating from ancient times to announce to the ancestor the beginning of field work at the spring festival, so that he can give them help and support. "Oh, ancestor!" the women sing on this occasion, "we plow the field, oh ancestor, we announce to you that we plow, that we sow, that we reap!" (82)

82. According to a verbal communication of the Ukrainian ethnographer and archaeologist V. Shcherbakivskyj, Prague.

789 527 The custom of "plowing-under", observed even before the First World War in East Ukraine when the field work begins, is probably unique. Again it is the women who, stark naked, exorcise the magic forces /139/ by drawing a plow over the nocturnal fields, and furrowing the earth amid a great deal of noise. Woe to the man who might eavesdrop on this grandiose fertility rite! The mischief-maker would have to pay dearly for it. (83) The drinking bout which the naked peasant

83. Zelenin: Russian (East Slavic) Folk Studies.

women celebrate near the church after they have finished their magic rite is called "lightning".

533 These are the same women who sing the lovely Ukrainian songs while they are working in the fields in spring and summer; for the Ukrainian be-

533 lieves that song is a part of work, and he has special symbolic songs for every type of work.

527 769 The Monday a week after Easter is dedicated to the ancestors. Well supplied with food and drink, the whole families set out for the cemeteries, just as in the days of Vladimir, in order to observe the death cult. They sit down on the graves of their ancestors, eat the food they have brought, share it with the dead by placing the latters' portion beside the Christian cross made of wood, and they do not forget to empty a small glass of horilka over it. The dead are honored if the visitors leave their graves in an elevated mood.

776 Summer passes by with the customary field work. It is a glorious time, the pumpkins and the melons ripen, the hollyhocks bloom again and people sleep out in the open. The harvest begins not without symbolic rituals; for the spirits must be thanked and one must pray for good weather. When the grain has been stored in the barns, the priest consecrates the harvest wreath, the grains of which are mixed among the seed the following year.

793 In the midst of this strange pagan-Christian world, the priest lives and works as the representative of Christ on earth. He knows the customs of the people from the time he is a child, and he joins in on many occasions. It is not sacrilegious when during a difficult birth he places the church key on the belly of the woman in labor, when he administers the Holy Sacrament to sick cattle or seals graves so that the dead may not /140/ return. Both shepherd and flock most earnestly believe that such deeds are efficacious and pleasing in the sight of God.

771 178 The First World War, the civil wars and finally the Bolshevist cudgel have destroyed this world; faith and superstition, holy mass and the spirit cult were no longer tolerated.

The milk industry, too, is relatively undeveloped in 234
the Ukraine and might even become insufficient to supply the needs of the big towns and the industrial centres if the breeding does not increase in order to be able to overtake the other branches of economic activity.

The general opinion which considers the Ukraine an 000
inexhaustible source of meat and milk seems to be unfounded, at least at the present time. This is all the more true as, while the purchasing power of the native population rises, the insufficiency of the resources in this respect becomes more and more noticeable.

The transformation which the Ukraine has undergone in the sphere of the exploitation of the products of the surface soil since the establishment of the Soviet regime, while leaving aside the crisis in cattle-breeding, has undoubtedly not led to progress.

The trial plantations of cotton, of soho, and of rice, 242
the mechanization of the working of the land by the extensive employment of tractors, seem to be the only advantages which have been given by the new regime to the development of Ukrainian agriculture.

It would seem necessary to note another wealth of the 529 757
Ukrainian soil which does not enter into any of our economic categories—these are the various spas.

In the first instance there are, in the environs of Odessa, two lakes, the Kouialnik and the Khadji-Bey, ancient bays which formed when they were the mouths of rivers since dried up and which are to-day completely separated from the sea. The medicinal value of these two lakes is appreciated by all Russia. Tens of thousands of invalids, especially rheumatics and paralytics, flock there every year for the mud baths which are very rich in iodine salts.

Many parts of the coast of the Black Sea are very 529

529 popular for sea bathing, although the beaches still lack a good tourist organization.

000 Nevertheless this branch of the activities of the country could, under more favourable circumstances, give a stable revenue to the population and thus contribute towards the enrichment of the Ukraine.

III

The Subsoil and Industry

135 Among the mineral riches of the Ukraine the first place belongs to coal and to iron ore.

These two important raw materials are to be found in Zone 2 coal in the Donietz basin and iron ore on the left bank of the Ingouletz (a tributary of the Boug) at Krivoi-Rog.

Besides these two fundamentally important resources the Ukraine possesses important deposits of manganese and aluminium in the surroundings of Nikopol, graphite and soft coal mines, recently discovered in the centre of the country, salt in the Donietz basin, and finally peat and oil wells in Polish Galicia, in the surroundings of Stanislavov. Geological researches recently carried out have led to the discovery of oil on the shores of the Sea of Azov.

433 In order to give an idea of the potential reserves awaiting exploitation in the subsoil of the Ukraine, let us indicate that before the last war production represented 135 gold francs per annum per inhabitant.

316 As a result of its naturally very rich geological structure and of the organization of the extraction of its resources, the basin of the Donietz could be compared with the best coal-producing centres of Europe. Its reserves may be less important than those of Siberia (Kouznetsk),

[see category 116, pp. 139-140 --- Analyst]

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine R01

WESTERN UKRAINE

THE WESTERN UKRAINE includes those areas (except for Izmail Oblast) which were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR after 1939 and later. Six oblasts (Rovno, Volyn', Ternopol', L'vov, Stanislav, and Drogobych) were annexed in the autumn of 1939 following the partition of Poland and the Soviet occupation of its eastern section. Chernovtsy Oblast was formed in the Northern Bukovina and the extreme northern section of Bessarabia after the acquisition of these territories from Rumania, in the summer of 1940. The Transcarpathian Oblast was ceded to the Ukraine according to an agreement with Czechoslovakia in 1945. The Western Ukraine can be roughly considered in four geographical sections: the Carpathian section in the south, on the slopes and in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, the Poles'ye, a northern lowland along the right affluents of the Pripet River, the hilly central section in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, and the Transcarpathian section.

The Carpathian section of the Western Ukraine includes the oblasts of Chernovtsy, Stanislav, and Drogobych. Its economy is based essentially on the mineral resources of the area: petroleum, natural gas, salt, and potash, and on the lumber resources on the slopes. There are a number of health resorts in the valleys.

Chernovtsy Oblast

Area, 3,200, population, 900,000

Chernovtsy Oblast lies along the upper Prut and the Dniester rivers. The forests (mainly beech), building materials, salt, and petroleum are found in the higher foothills. Agriculture puts the emphasis on grains (wheat, corn, and barley), potatoes and sugar beets in the south and on fruit growing along the Dniester, in the northeast. Sheep raising and lumbering are the main activities in the mountains. Sawmilling, woodworking, sugar refining, flour milling, and wine making are the chief rural industries.

Chernovtsy (Rumanian *Cernăuți*) called Chernovitsy until 1944, lies on a terrace above the Prut River. It has large textile and machine industries and produces chemicals, lumber, and food products.

Storozhinets (Rumanian *Storojineț*) is a road center in the agricultural region southwest of Chernovtsy.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R1

manufacture of drilling equipment and the processing of ozocerite. The health resort of Truskavets, with mineral springs, lies just to the east.[1]

Sambor is an agricultural center, with sawmilling, flour-milling, and distilling industries.

Stryy (Polish *Stryj*) is a rail center where there are machine and metalworking industries, producing mainly drilling equipment, and chemical and lumber (matches and furniture) plants. Petroleum and natural gas are secured near by. From the gas wells of Dashava, just northeast of the city, a pipe line has been laid to Kiev during the post-war Five-Year Plan for industrial and domestic consumption.

The Poles'ye, which is wooded in the north, close to the Pripet River, also contains extensive marshy areas. It is the most backward section of the Western Ukraine. Its subsistence crops are rye and potatoes. Industry is poorly developed and is restricted to flour milling, sawmilling, and brickworking in the rural areas.

Rovno Oblast

Area, 8,000, population, 1,200,000

Rovno Oblast is drained by the Goryn and its affluent, the Sluch'. In the south, on the higher ground of the Volyn'-Podolian upland, agriculture produces grains, hops, tobacco, and sugar beets; in the northern section lumbering is the main industry. Granite, cement rock, and slate are quarried.

Rovno (Polish *Równe*) is a rail center having railroad shops, agricultural machinery works, and chemical and lumber industries.

Volyn' Oblast

Area, 7,700, population, 1,100,000

Volyn' Oblast which borders on Poland along the Western Bug River in the west, has some agriculture (grains and tobacco) in the south, but mainly lumbering industries in the north, along the Pripet River and its affluents.

Lutsk (Polish *Łuck*), the capital, lies on a minor rail branch, at the southern edge of the Pripet Marshes. It is an agricultural center and produces agricultural implements, clothing, leather, lumber, and flour.

Vladimir-Volynskiy (Polish *Włodzimierz*) is a rail junction and grain-trading point near the Polish border.

[1 [of Borislav in Drogobych Oblast--Analyst]

538 rical ballads (dumy) which glorify and preserve the whole of the past of Ukraine, are deservedly famous.

533 The Ukrainian folk-song which has been handed down in many collections and manuscripts from the 16th century, enjoys a great reputation both at home and abroad. These songs were sung at Lithuanian and Polish courts (14th - 16th centuries) and before Tsars and boyars in Moscow down to the second half of the 18th century. They were admired in Turkey and Italy too, and found honorable mention as early as 1675 in Herbigny's collection "Religiosae Kijovienses Cryptae".

534 The Ukrainian accompanies his singing on many instruments: there are the "kobza" and the "bandura", stringed instruments of foreign origin, cymbals which are unknown to the Russians, bag-pipes ("duda"), a peculiar kind of flute ("svyril") and the mountain pipe ("trembita"); primitive instruments like the lyre
535 have also persisted. The dance plays a comparatively minor part. Besides the ceremonious dances ("kolo") there are round dances ("hopak", "kozatshok" and "kolomyjka"), and the old sword dance is found among the Hutsuly.

● 531 A richly developed folk-art is on the same level as the folk-poetry and music; it finds expression above all in national costumes and ornaments, in painted Easter eggs, embroidery, in the complicated weaving and wood-carving patterns and in bead-work, ceramics, furniture and household utensils.

291 The ornate costumes often show in their embroidery influen-
531 ces from the East, the South and the Balkans. Particular attention is paid to embroidery on shirts, while women's skirts ("plakhty") and men's coats are often magnificent works of art for which, according to the district, homespun linen and woollen stuffs are used. Embroidery patterns utilise geometric forms as well as conventional flowers and leaves.

352 Furniture consists mainly of benches, a carved table, painted
531 and inlaid chests ("skryni") and a carved pottery cupboard ("mysnyk"). The room is, in addition, decorated with paintings, embroidered towels and carpets; in Eastern Ukraine the stove is also painted.

177 341 [531]

Volynia, Western influences became more pronounced. Even at Kiev we find churches in the gothic style, modified, however, by national and above all by byzantine traditions. A salient feature of byzantine art especially survives. These are the magnificent frescoes, in which this art excels as does, too, the art of the old Russia of Kiev.

During the sixteenth century the influences of the Renaissance were already felt in Galicia, which was still at this epoch the principal centre of Southern Russia. But they were soon supplanted by those of the baroque, which, from the beginning of the seventeenth century, leaves its mark on the whole Ukrainian architecture. It forced the traditional forms of Russian architecture of the byzantine type to recede more and more, to a point at which Grabar asks himself if the Ukrainian art had not undergone a complete denationalization.

Nevertheless a peculiarity belonging to the whole of Russia was responsible for a revival of the national style: the old Russia, a land of forests, overlooked any other constructional material but wood. That which is built of stone obviously cannot be built in the same way as wood. Thus there developed in the Ukraine the special baroque style of the wooden churches, just as the original 'gothic' style in wood had appeared in the north. This exquisite style was most probably created without any Western influences.

The wooden churches not only protected the Ukrainian art from complete denationalization, but their original and national style began to fuse little by little even into the baroque architecture in stone. At the end of the seventeenth century, and in the first years of the eighteenth, this baroque, called 'Cossack,' was almost exclusive to the Ukraine.

In the eighteenth century the 'Cossack baroque' loses itself in the magnificent bloom of the Imperial

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Russian baroque. At the end of the century it is replaced 171
by an equally imperial rococo. The churches built in 341
Kiev by Rastrelli clearly cannot be considered monuments of Ukrainian art. The empire style, originally transformed in Russia into the so-called 'Alexander' style, afterwards dominates in Kiev as in St. Petersburg.

As much as the old Ukrainian architecture has cer- 177
tainly contributed to the later development of the 531
imperial baroque, Ukrainian painting, open to all the Western influences from the seventeenth century onwards, has played a very important part in the development of modern Russian painting. Here the Western influences were often transmitted through the Ukraine and were assimilated there before dissolving in the civilization of the empire. The Ukrainian portraitists Levitsky, Borovsky, and Venetzianov, working at St. Petersburg, had a strong influence on Russian portraitism.

It was also the painter Lossenko and the sculptors Kozlovski and Martos, equally Ukrainians, taught by the Academy of Arts of St. Petersburg, who illustrated the century of Catherine II with their works.

The national originality was also maintained in the popular art, especially in iconography, thanks to the deep traditionalism of the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless Ukrainian iconography had lost much of its austerity in comparison with that of Northern Russia, under the influence of that levelling which came from Poland.

Eastern influences still make themselves felt in the popular art, in the taste for richness of ornamentation, and in the magnificence of colours. Embroideries, tapestries, jewellery, glassware, crockery, and sculptures in wood witness the rich artistic aptitudes of the Ukrainian people and have the just reputation of their value both in Russia and in the whole of Central Europe.

11:Obermaier--142 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

Seventeen ingredients are supposed to go into
262 the favorite dish of the Ukrainians, borscht, a soured beet soup. The Ukrainian cuisine also favors porridges made from various cereals, cooked in water and served with milk, cream or fat. The Ukrainian also loves his boiled vareniki, thinly rolled dough filled with pot cheese, chopped meat, cabbage or fruit. In West Ukraine the poor farmers must be content with potatoes, rye bread and turnips. The gentlemen farmers among the Ukrainians are the wealthy Kuban Cossacks who /135/ consume bacon and milk for breakfast, borscht, groats, fowl or fish for dinner, and fruit, cold borscht, melons and bacon in the afternoon, and vareniki in the evening. This is how it was in the Kuban paradise in the good old days.

*

512 When the cold east wind silently passes through the steppes or the west wind brings snow and wraps the Ukraine in white, when communication practically ceases between the villages, and nights and sleep are long, then the women sit down to their spindles and the men fetch their looms from
463 from the sheds. All the family clothing, the
286 underwear and linen for the house that is needed throughout the year, is made by hand during the long cold winter months, just as it was in our country /Germany/ in medieval households before the days of urban craftsmen. They make rope shoes and shoes of leather in regions where the ground is stony; they weave linen and woolen fabrics, sew shirts - during the hot summer often the only article of women's clothing except for their narrow aprons - and cut winter jackets from sheep
• [53] skins. They embroider lovely bright-colored patterns in endless variety on the shirts and the smooth skins of the furs, on tablecloths and towels, for the artistic talents of the Ukrainian people are incomparable. They carve in wood, Model in clay and paint it, and weave carpets.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hun-
241 garians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent
438 vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here
341 imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians
167

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

Easter eggs from Ruthenia

Ruthenian folk art



341 style. Classicism, which first appeared at the beginning of the 18th century, finds its most complete expression in the magnificent palaces in Baturyn built for the last Ukrainian Hetman Rozumovskyj (Cyrill, 1728—1803) by Charles Cameron, an Englishman, in 1800 in Potshep, from plans by Vallen de la Motte, and in other mansions of Ukrainian magnates. In Ukraine, the classical style underwent three phases of development, corresponding to what Western Europeans know as Louis XIV, Empire and Biedermeier and marks the end of the efforts to achieve an independent architecture in Ukraine. In 1801, at the same time as selfgovernment was abolished for Ukraine, a law was passed, forbidding the erection of churches in Ukrainian style; finished plans were provided from St. Petersburg from which buildings had to be erected in the time to come.

In the second half of the 19th century, architecture in Ukraine was subjected to historical influences deriving from the romantic movement in Western Europe which resulted in a pseudo-Byzantine style. This was introduced into Ukraine by force and did not succeed in reviving architectural impulses there. Before the war, attempts were made to recussitate the baroque style with its national features in connection with the revival of national architecture in wood which was reconstructed by ethnographical experts and propagated mainly by the architects Vasyl Krychevskyj (1872), Serhij Tymoshenko (1881), and others. In the Ukraine of recent times the functional architecture of the west has gained the upper hand, its main monuments being the building of the State Trust at Kharkiv, the electricity works in Kyiv, the cloth factory in Kreminchuk and the buildings of the Dniprelstan.

2. Sculpture

●532 The first traces of sculpture in Ukraine date back to Greek times, but not earlier than the fourth century before Christ. Under the Grand Princes sculpture naturally flourished in connection with the lively building activity of that time; but relatively few monuments have survived and these are not of any particular value. In the 14th and 15th centuries western influences make themselves felt in this province and appear in reliefs as a palimpsest on old Byzantine motives from icono-

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

graphy. The sculpture that has survived from the times of the renaissance — mostly tombs — presents figures in complete armor lying or reclining in a fitting architectural setting, similar to Venetian or North Italian sculpture. Among the most interesting are the tomb of the Grand Prince Constantin Ostrozhskyj "the brave champion and protector of the faith of the East" in the Cave Monastery in Kyiv, bearing the date 1534, the monument to M. Herburt in Lviv Cathedral, a creation of the Nuremberg master P. Labenwolf, and many others. The influence of the renaissance is most noticeable in sculptured ornament, above all in the framework of icons, some splendid examples of which have been preserved in Lviv and Rohatyn. 532

Decorative sculpture developed still further in the baroque era and found new forms of expression in ornament in churches, on graves and in icons carved in wood. The baroque icon settings are fairly complicated in structure, sometimes several stories high, richly carved, with marvellous ornament with unmistakably Ukrainian characteristics; they are, indeed, the greatest creations of the Ukrainian people in the province of sculpture.

The collapse of the Hetman State in the second half of the 18th century was naturally not favorable to cultural life in Ukraine. The creations of Ivan Martos (1752—1835) and Michael Kozlovskyj (1753—1802) belong to the annals of Russian art although both were products of Ukrainian culture. Martos, the more important of the two, a pupil of Canova, later a professor and the rector of the Academy of Art in Petersburg, was the real creator of Russian sculpture, for he not only enriched it with his own works, but inspired a large number of eminent students whom he taught. The same is true of Kozlovskyj, although in his case a too early death cut short his development. Ukrainian culture was the loser; it was robbed of its most able representatives and forced to play a secondary rôle, and in time forfeited all individuality in the province of creative art.

Some sculptors with a deep national consciousness must be mentioned among the pioneers of typically Ukrainian sculpture; they were romantics who emphasised the peculiarity of Ukrainian sculpture by choosing popular or historical subjects. Michael Mykyshyn (1836—1896), the creator of the monument to Bohdan

● 532 Khmelnytskyj, the well-known illustrator of the books of Gogol and Shevchenko was not outstanding in technique but he was distinguished for the powerful sweep of his artistic imagination. Fedir Kamenskyj (1822) who emigrated to America where he was a professor of sculpture in New York till his death, gave us one of the first busts of Shevchenko. Parmen Zabilo (1830—1890) sculpted a monument to Gogol in Nishyn, busts of Shevchenko in Chernyhiv, and of the Ukrainian artist Borowykovskyj, of Galagan and others. Leonid Posen (1849—1921), was famed as the artist of the monument to Kotlyarevskyj with its well-known reliefs representing the literary creations of the founder of Ukrainian literature. Worthy of mention is Vladimir Beclemishev (1861), who brought new life to academic traditions and created noble forms, as is also Fedir Balavenskyj (1864) whose work is a happy union of classical tradition and folklore elements; he created a number of impressive works among which the best known are "The Olympic Games" and "The Triumph of Phryne". His allegorical figures on the edifice of the Red Cross in Kyiv, "Medicine", "Mercy", "Love", and "Life" are of great artistic merit. Peter Wijtovych (1862), a pupil of Zumbusch (Vienna) and Gregor Kuznevych (1871) were contemporaries of Balavenskyj in Galicia. The latter finished his training in Italy, then went to America where he produced monumental works in Cleveland, Pittsburg and Philadelphia. Michael Parashchuk, (born in 1889), who also worked abroad, is a master of the monumental style in commercial architecture. Michael Havryliko (1882—1919), a late romantic, showed great talent and was the artist of the popular plan for the Shevchenko monument in Kyiv in which mastery over form is combined with imagination of wide sweep and a tendency to romanticism.

Modern Ukrainian sculpture reached a level of excellence which guaranteed it a place in the annals of European culture. Its strength lay in the group of artists who carried on the experimental traditions of the monumentalists. Their most classical representative is Bernhard Cratko (born in 1884), professor at the Art Academy in Kyiv, characterised by a synthetic monumental style and a tendency to neo-classicism. Another member of the same group is Nastja Pysarenko with a distinctively indivi-

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

dual style which has inspired a new school that emphasised national elements and permitted of no compromise with regard to style. Konstantin Stakhovskyj, an emigree, is, as a sculptor of animals, a class by himself; his statues from models in the zoos in Berlin, Vienna and London have won general recognition. 532

The neo-romantics, Oksana Laturynska, Fedir Yemets, Bohdan Mukhyn, and Hryhor Kruk form a special group of contemporary sculptors; their works are poems in stone while displaying a most modern understanding and feeling for form. Aleksander Arkhypenko (1887), a Ukrainian sculptor who is known far beyond the confines of his native country, occupies a niche of his own. As long ago as 1913, when he emigrated to America, he managed to arouse great interest in art circles in Europe. He has turned his back on the physical phenomena of the world of nature and tries to express his inner logic and psychology by means of his own and by increased dynamics. But what this sculptor creates is not a product of the Ukrainian spirit; the eccentric, the abnormal, the artificial in his creations has nothing at all to do with the healthy instincts of peasant people rooted in its own soil.

Painting

The actual history of Ukrainian painting, as of Ukrainian art as a whole, begins with the chronicles of the country's history as a state, i. e. at the time when this state first appeared on the stage of the world as a new factor of power. The frescos and mosaics whose brilliant coloring illumined St. Sophia and other monumental churches of the Kyiv state, bear witness to a level of ability that is not often reached in the same province in the Europe of that time. The artists themselves are anonymous, but we may probably assume that the earliest were Greeks whose work was continued by pupils whom they trained on the spot. The best preserved of these monuments are the famous mosaics in the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kyiv, "Pantokrator", the apostles, the evangelists, "Oranta" etc. The most interesting of the frescos in the same church are those depicting secular scenes from the life of the Grand Princes in the 11th century. In the 14th and 15th centuries Ukrainian artists were given

632 commissions, not only in Lithuania, but also in Poland, where they had to compete with artists from Western Europe. It were Ukrainian artists to whom Casimir the Great and Yagello entrusted the execution of the difficult frescos in the churches of Sandomir and Lublin, or in the Royal Castle on the Vavel — to mention only the most important examples. Western influences on the style of the East came from afar. The most certain source was Nuremberg whose artists either personally ventured into Galicia, or sent their creations there. We know that Veit Stoss, Hans Kulmbach, and Dürer's brother worked in Cracow; the picture of the Resurrection in the Lviv National Museum reminds us vividly of a similar composition by Wohlgemuth, the Nuremberg master, and even of an early work in the Munich Pinakothek by Dürer, Wohlgemuth's pupil.

Dutch and Italian influences are also obvious. They are represented in Ukraine above all by Fedushko of Sambir, the most talented artist in the time of the renaissance in Ukraine, whose "Annunciation", painted in 1579, hung in the Ecclesiastical and Archaeological Museum in Zhytomir, (Volynia). This period whose creative impulses were so sensitive to influences from without and so varied in form, prepared the way for the amalgamation of Byzantine and western influences in Ukrainian art that found its finest expression in baroque art. This style, which was spread mainly by the Jesuits, could strike roots in the Cossack areas of Ukraine that were hostile both to Catholicism and Poland only after it had adapted itself to native life; the national features it assumed made it attractive to the taste and the views of ruling circles. Thus arose one of the most interesting and pleasing forms of art in Ukraine: Cossack baroque which developed from Jesuit baroque.

Portrait painting, the subjects of which were originally determined by icon paintings, made great strides towards realism when it included secular subjects and forsook mediaeval traditions for newer forms. While early portraits are characterised by simplicity, but also by depth of psychology, the artists of modern portraits of church dignitaries or Hetmans lay more emphasis on external expression and the representation of power.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Ukrainian painting flourished in the baroque era and had many important representatives, mostly centered round Mohyla's Academy and the Cave Monastery in Kyiv. The pictures of some masters even found recognition abroad; the portrait of the Polish king Sobieski, for instance which was executed by a Ukrainian court-painter, hangs in the Uffici Galleries in Florence. 532

The rococo era in the 18th and 19th centuries marked the separation of the two worlds which had combined in the earlier period to form a higher synthesis; each now went its own way. The old tendency confined itself completely to iconographic representation, sealed itself hermetically against all new influences and thus gradually froze in a rigid formalism; neither in the 18th nor in the 19th century was it able, with very few exceptions, to arouse any marked interest in the public. Modern painting turned from religious subjects to secular and historical painting, reaching such a high level that foreign critics have judged Ukrainian artists at the turn of the 18th century to be the equals of the best English and French masters. Three important Ukrainian painters spring from this period, viz. Demeter Levytskyj (1735—1822), Anton Losenko (1737—1773) and Volodymyr Borovykovskyj (1757—1825), though their work actually belongs to the subsequent period of classicism. These three artists mark the zenith and, at the same time, the end of the development of Ukrainian painting which has found new and characteristic forms of expression in the baroque era that, however, played themselves out in the rococo epoch. The painters we have mentioned are rooted in recent traditions and develop to the full the heritage of the Kyiv school. But neither were they permitted to work on their native soil; they had to go north and enrich an alien culture and, as teachers, train new generations of Russian artists. This policy of exploitation systematically applied by Petersburg to Ukraine, necessarily brought about the impoverishment of Ukrainian art in time; at the same time it uprooted native art, for when artists were transplanted into strange surroundings and no longer had any direct, organic connection with their own people, they were unable to carry on national traditions and train young native artists at home.

● 532 But Ukrainian art finally escaped this danger of being uprooted and losing all national content when artists realised that their power and success were founded on their native soil. Mykola Ge (1831—1894), one of the most important and profound of them and a personal friend of Tolstoi's turns his back on Petersburg at the height of success and thus saves his own talent from ruin. An examination of his works reveals no "Ukrainian subjects"; filled with the spirit of Ukrainian universal wisdom, he refrains from the often banal representation of folk-dances and national scenes from Cossack life and devotes all his power to problems of world-wide import. His last picture, the "Crucification", which was banned by the Russian censor on account of "godlessness", attempts to present this universal tragedy with new methods. Illja Rjepnin (1844—1930) a well-known artist, generally considered to be a Russian, continued to work in Petersburg, while Ivan Stanislavskyj (1860—1907), a fine landscape artist, of partly Polish extraction, was a professor at the Academy of Art in Cracow. Ivan Trush (1869—1941) who died recently, was a pupil of his; he does not treat the Ukrainian landscape but prefers strange, exotic subjects. Another of Stanislavskyj's pupils is Mykola Burachek, professor at the Kyiv Academy of Art, a master of color who can create out of nothing whole symphonies of the most delicate tones.

About the turn of the century a group of Ukrainian artists crystallised under the leadership of Mykola Samokysha (born in 1860) and Serhij Vasylkivskyj (1854—1914), who devoted themselves to the study of the monuments of the glorious past and to ancient Ukrainian art. They published a collection entitled "Ukrainian Antiques" with 20 reproductions of Ukrainian types from history and folk-lore and also "Subjects of Ukrainian Ornament in the 17th and 18th Centuries". This group, to which Ishakevych, Slastjon, Pymonenko, Martynovych, and Zhdakha also belong, concerned itself only with Ukrainian subjects. But the younger generation under the influence of the new ideas from Western Europe and of fresh national impulses at home, goes a step further and attempts an original presentation of these subjects. A number of artists of repute belong here as, for instance, Oleksander Murashko (1875—1919),

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

who, after having had a great success in Paris, Munich and Venice, returned home with the desire to create a new center of art in the midst of national life and thus to secure a place for Ukrainian art in the cultural life of Europe. Such were also the aims of Fedir and Vasyl Krychevskyj, the latter of whom attempted to create a Ukrainian style in all forms of art, his work being appreciated in Germany, England and America. The so-called neo-Byzantine school was a distinctively original feature of those days; in contrast to the contemporary realist movement, it preached a return to the ancient traditions of Ukraine under Byzantium. The main representative of this idea, Mykhajlo Boychuk (1882—1937), discovered himself and his own style after working for a long time in Paris and later in Kyiv, where he found not only a circle of admirers, but where his activity as a teacher helped a whole generation of artists to find their own expression. Typical of these are Ivan Padalka, Osinchuk, and Sedlar — artists who generally worked in all provinces of fine art, producing graphic art, sculpture and particularly applied art. Impressionism in Ukrainian art is represented by Ivan Trush, mentioned above, whose pictures are inspired by a rich personality, and Oleksa Novakivskyj (1872—1936), who studied at the Academy in Cracow and whose Polish professors, such as Matejko, Wyspianski and Malczewski left permanent traces in his sensitive soul. Vasyl Kryzhanivskyj (1891—1926) and Victor Palmov (1888—1926) are expressionists who strive for individual form and typical coloring. Other modern movements like futurism and cubism have also found disciples without, however, leaving deep traces, while neo-classicism has found a worthy representative in Mykola Hlushchenko (1901), who made a name for himself in Berlin and Paris. Petro Kholodnyj (1876—1930) is a personality who fits into no set scheme; it was only after he emigrated that he devoted himself to art and created a whole gallery of paintings in the last ten years of his life, testifying to his infinite energy and great ability.

532

4. Graphic Art

Ukrainian graphic art which flourished in the second half of the 17th century and reached its zenith in the times of

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDJ

● 532 Mazeppa had a great influence in the spread of this form of artistic expression throughout Eastern Europe, and particularly in Muscovy, Poland, Roumania and White Ruthenia.

The founder of the Ukrainian school of graphic art towards the end of the 17th century was Aleksander Tarasevych (1972—1720); he was the greatest master of copper-plate etching in the whole of Eastern Europe and was a pupil of the Augsburg Kilian brothers. We owe him not only illustrations and book ornament but also excellent portraits of contemporaries, of the Czarina Sophia, for instance, of the Hetman Samoylovych, and many others. The 18th century was under the influence of Kyiv, though other centers of engraving sprang up in Lviv, Pochayiv, Chernyhiv, and elsewhere. Unfortunately this branch of art degenerated in time into a trade whose main object was to make money.

The publication about the middle of the 19th century of an album entitled "Ukraine in Pictures" marked a turning-point in this development; it was published by Shevchenko, the talented Ukrainian poet, painter and etcher. The value of this publication probably consists in the fact that it was the first collection of plates portraying subjects from Ukrainian history and folk-lore, produced by a national hero. Shevchenko's initiative was continued by another artist, Leo Zemchuzhnikov (1828—1912), who published a large number of etchings by himself and other contemporary artists under the same title.

Ukrainian graphic art played its part in the general renaissance of the art of book production at the beginning of the 20th century, above all in the province of illustration. Vasyl Krychevskyj, who painted charming landscapes in transparent coloring and was an eminent decorative artist, was a pioneer here; in close collaboration with M. Hrushevskyj, the historian, he studied ancient traditions of book decoration in the times of the Cossacks, creating new forms of expression in national art from his analysis. His suggestions were followed by M. Boychuk who himself practised graphic art and founded an art school which counted many graphic artists among its students. The work of this group of artists is marked by its national character, expressed both in natural and conventionalised forms. George

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD] Ukraine RD1

Narbut (1886—1920), a most gifted graphic artist, opened new prospects for graphic art in Ukraine. Since childhood he had always been particularly attracted by examples of old Ukrainian writing and soon he became an accomplished artist in the art of writing. As a student of drawing, he worked in Holosy's studio in Munich and before the First World War had the reputation of being an excellent black-and-white artist. He found it difficult, however, to create his own style, cut off as he was from the influences of home. It was only after his return to Kyiv in 1917 and through his contact with Vasyl Krychevskyj, Mychajlo Boychuk and their specifically Ukrainian art that his exceptional talent could fully develop. Combining Krychevskyj's subtlety with his own fiery imagination and wild temperament, Narbut found an outlet for all his rich gifts in his Kyiv period. But, just as a meteor suddenly glows and then dies, so he came to a tragic end in Kyiv in 1920. 532

Krychevskyj, Boychuk and Narbut are three stars in the domain of graphic art in Ukraine who will long determine its character. Narbut's pupils are Robert Lisovskyj (1893), who supplemented his studies in Berlin; Leo Lozovskyj (1901—1922) and, perhaps the most gifted of all, Marko Kynarskyj (1893). Boychuk's group includes his wife, Sophie Nalypinska, Olena Sakhnovska (1902), Oleksander Ruban, a master of miniatures cut in wood, and Vasyl Cassian (1896) who studied in Prague and who produces monumental scenes from the lives of workmen and peasants; Krychevskyj counts among his followers M. Aleksiiv, Ivan Mozalevskyj (1890), eminent in black-and-white art and in ivory miniatures. Paul Kovshun (1896—1939) worked in Western Ukraine. He was a many-sided, productive artist who contributed much to the organisation of artistic life. Petro Kholodnyj (sen) and Mykola Butovych (1895), a student of the Leipzig Academy, belonged to his circle. In Bucharest Natalie Guerman-Russova works, in Buenos Aires V. Cymbal, in New York Zubrytskyj, in Paris P. Omelchenko and S. Zarytska who is also a good fresco artist, and Hlushchenko, already mentioned, a black-and-white artist and a water colorist; in Berlin one of the most eminent black-and-white artists, Vasyl Masjutyn, has been working for some years; he is a many-sided

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD'

● 532 artist whose historical portraits of the Hetmans Khmelnytskyj, Mazeppa, and Skoropadskyj are striking revelations in the province of Ukrainian art.

Museums, Archives, and Libraries

217 The earliest Ukrainian collection of historical documents and prehistoric remains was transferred at the beginning of the 19th century to Russian and Polish collections in order to prove the great ages of Russian and Polish culture. The first historical museum was founded in Chernyhiv by Vasyl Tarnovskyj (1837—1899). His example was followed by Ukrainian professors teaching at Russian universities, by scientific expeditions sent to study the country and by archaeological congresses. The Municipal Museum, the Tereshchenko Gallery and the collection of the Khanenko family which developed into the Museum of Fine Art, were founded in Kyiv. In Lviv the Stauropigian Museum was founded in 1889, the National Museum and the Museum of the Shevchenko Society of Learning in 1905. Smaller collections were opened in Poltava, Kamenets Podilskyj, Sambir, Colomea, etc. The Bucovina possesses a collection in Chernivtsi, Carpatho-Ukraine in Uzhhorod. But, nevertheless, anyone who wishes to see the most important collection of Ukrainian folk-lore, must go to the Ethnographical Museum in Petersburg.

The nationalisation of Ukrainian museums under communist rule has had a favorable influence. Measures of conservation, restoration and concentration have raised museums to a considerable level, whereas conditions are not nearly so satisfactory in Western Ukraine where there was no support from the state. The number of museums has grown from 10 in 1914 to at least 90 to-day. The museum of "The War of Liberation" in Prague is worth mentioning, as it is maintained exclusively by contributions from the Ukrainian population.

The biggest library on Ukrainian territory is the Ukrainian "People's Library" attached to the Academy of Learning in Kyiv; it contains 2 000 000 books and also great collections of newspapers, music and picture postcards. Of all publications printed in the Soviet Union a copy was to be sent to this library. In addition it conducted scientific research work, supported

538 It had been enthusiastically received in 1944, when it appeared,
626 and the poet was awarded for it a Stalin Prize. The poem was published and republished by the state publishing houses and then it was suddenly discovered that it was untrue, bourgeois nationalist, etc. and the unfortunate author was forced to repent of his errors. As a matter of fact, even before this, many of the Russian translators had gone out of their way to insert in it various passages celebrating the Volga and the Kremlin as part of the love of Ukraine, but they, too, were reprimanded for trying to improve the work instead of condemning it for its real quality.

In every field of scholarship, literature, art, and music, the same charges have been brought with logical consistency. Anything which would remind the readers of the old pre-Communist life is treated as dangerous, but none of the authors, no matter how they have falsified history or the present, has been able to express the great achievements of the new Soviet Ukraine and to catch its spirit and show how it can in any degree differ from Moscow. At the first sign of any independent judgment, the cry is raised of bourgeois nationalism and the work is suppressed.

545 At the same time the Ukrainian scene is being overloaded with
● 532 things Russian. Russian theatrical companies are continually travel-
626 ling around the republic so as to show the real charity and achievements of the elder brother and inspire a desire for imitation of its life and thought under that all-time world genius, Joseph Stalin. Russian musical ensembles and exhibitions of the works of Russian artists are constantly sent to all the chief cities of the non-Russian republics, not only to acquaint the people with Russian achievements but still more to give them the necessary patterns by which they should plan their lives and work.

538 There are constantly published masses of Ukrainian translations
626 of Russian works and books translated from the other languages used in the USSR and it is almost essential for an author to allude to these and especially to the Georgian people as the people of Stalin, if he wishes to avoid the charge of bourgeois nationalism and the attempt to sow hostility between the brotherly peoples.

000 The situation is even more severe in the field of language.

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Fine Arts in the Ukraine

By M. Buraček

532 /401/ Ukrainian literature had important representatives already in the first half of the nineteenth century whereas the fine arts did not produce any names of importance till the end of the century. But the actual development of the fine arts in the Ukraine started only in the twentieth century, the years after the revolution being the most decisive ones for the further development of the fine arts.

[208] During the civil war art played an important part in propaganda and agitation. Millions of posters, slogans, and illustrations flooded the country. Demonstrations, theatrical performances, manifestations of all sorts of programs of the various "fronts" -- fronts of the industrial areas, of the rural areas, of the educational realm, of sanitary measures -- all these required the cooperation of the artist. A number of "peasant homes" in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk and other cities as well as soldiers' barracks, clubs, etc. were ornamented with fresco paintings, ornaments and decorations.

Easel painting was virtually unknown. This was proved in 1918 in the "Exhibition of Ukrainian Artists", where the paintings exhibited were small in number and had no special qualities. In 1920, in a small room in Kiev, another exhibition of paintings was shown, and once more it had no broad character. Only at the beginning of 1925, at the opening of the so-called Fair of the 'Kontrakty' /a special section of the city of Kiev/ in Kiev, a rather interesting exhibition was shown in which not only painters but also graphic artists and sculptors participated.

When, after the civil war, attention was paid to economic reconstruction, the role of the artist in social life also changed. Draftsmen were employed as illustrators and caricaturists. The publishing houses ordered dust jackets, book illustrations, original type, and the like, from the artists. Painters went to work on portraits of statesmen and theatrical designs. Since that time, art for art's sake is on its way out, and the artists are entering more and more into the service of everyday life and economy. The gap between art and life becomes smaller and smaller. Of course, art is not exclusively dedicated to utilitarian purposes. At the same time, the artists are in search of a new language, of a new style. And eventually the time came when this search brought about a grouping together of the artists in a firm organization.

In 1926, upon the initiative of the artists, F. Krycevs'kyj, Kozik,

532 and B. Pylypenko a group was formed in Kiev under the /402/ name of "Asocijacija Khudozhnykiv chervonoi Ukrainy -- AKhChU" (Association of the Artists of the Red Ukraine). At the same time a second organization was founded, the "Asocijacija revol'ucijnych mytciv Ukrainy -- ARMU" (Association of Revoluationary Artists of the Ukraine), upon the initiative of the President of the Kiev Art Institute, Vrona, and of the artists, M. Bojchuk, Sedl'ar, M. Burachek and others. Finally, in 1927, still another Kiev society was formed, the "Objednann'a suchasnych mytciv Ukrainy -- OSMU" (Association of Contemporary Artist of the Ukraine), founded by the Kiev artists, Taran, Kramarenko, and others.

To the AKhChU belong artists who live in various cities of the Ukraine. In 1927, this Association opened its first exhibition in Kharkov under the title "Chudozhnyk-s'ohodni" ("The Artist of Today"). The purpose of this exhibition was not to show artistic achievements, but to show how the artist works under the new conditions and what possibilities were open to him. The exhibition included paintings, drawings, sketches for scene designs, sculptures, puppets, even artistically woven materials, and embroideries. The exhibition indicated that we do have artistic talents in Kharkov, who must be supported and who create works that are in tune with our present-day society.

The first exhibition of the ARMU took place in March 1927 in the halls of the Museum of Art History in Kharkov. Most of the artists belonging to this Association came from Kiev; some were from Kharkov and Odessa. They represented various styles and were not bound together by a common stylistic principle. There was expressionism (Eleva), constructivism (Ermilov), stylization following old old Ukrainian art and primitivism (Schlechtmann, Misin, Lepkivs'kyj, Padalka), pure painting of the academic style (the dry, colorless but sure draftsman Prof. Saronov), subject-conscious imitators of past masters (Prokhorov with his "Council of Women" and the "Sten'ka"). Moreover, there were the outstanding landscape paintings of Prof. Simonov, impressionistic landscape by M. Burachek and Cerkas'kyj, strong still-life pictures by Taran. The graphic arts and scene designs were likewise represented. Most of the interest focused on the expressionistic scene designs by V. Meller and O. Khvostok.

Next followed an exhibition by the AKhChU which featured the representatives of stylization (Ivanov, Zhuk) and of expressionism (Tkachenko). In general, this exhibition, though weaker than the preceding one, showed more uniformity.

• 532 The fourth exhibition took its cue from the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution. It took place in the newly erected Palace of State Industry, a large edifice in honor of economic socialization. A greater number of works of art were exhibited than in the previous exhibitions. It was an all-Ukrainian exhibition, and all styles of art were exhibited, styles that had hitherto been shown in isolation.

As early as November 1917, when the Ukrainian Academy of Arts was founded, the professors were divided into two stylistic groups. /403/ One group was orientated toward western Europe. These artists found the essence of Ukrainian art in genre pictures and Ukrainian landscapes to which they brought national coloring and the mood of intimacy. The artist used the techniques which general European art had used in the past and is still using today. Members of this group were O. Murashko, M. Burachek, F. Krychevs'kyj, and, in part, T. M. Zhuk as well as J. Narbut. Narbut's talent had a retrospective flavor, and he felt, unlike any other artist, the beauty of ancient popular Ukrainian art. Endowed with a wonderful gift of intuition, he resurrected the Ukrainian graphic arts. He learned by studying the treasures of old Ukrainian art, though he managed eventually to make each of his works of art, which he based upon traditional motives, so unique that the well-known motif appeared renovated. Hence Narbut succeeded in reviving and continuing traditional Ukrainian art.

Aside from this decidedly retrospective school, which attempts to make the present conform to the past, there is still another movement which falls back on the past though it pays stronger tribute to the present time. This movement is represented by Prof. M. Bojchuk. The artists belonging to this school are ardent admirers of the ancient icons, portraits and woodcuts, and they introduce these elements of ancient Ukrainian art into their works of art of today. They use the forms (patterns) of the past and fill them with contemporary content, especially with dynamic forceful revolutionary subjects, subjects that are essentially different from the saints of the icons. This school attempted to express the idea and emotional world of the Ukraine of the revolutionary period, and in doing this the artists adopted all too rigid forms and paid almost no attention to color. To be sure, this school has many healthy roots, but it is rather hopeless to squeeze such subjects as "Execution by a Firing Squad" or "Defense of a City" into ancient molds. It is permissible to start from the saints of the icons and the patterns of our ancient art, but one has to use these elements in an entirely new manner.

In the life system of the USSR art must not be the product of a special group of individuals, but the product of a collective, a work of the total working-class and peasant-class society. Soviet art not

532 only faces the task of serving the masses, but the masses themselves must be drawn into the process of artistic creation. This is the reason why, in addition to the above-mentioned "control" exhibitions, migratory exhibitions are being organized which are shown in the factories and settlements of the provincial cities and serve to make the fine arts popular among the workers and peasants. Such exhibitions are accompanied by lectures and explanations.

At the present time the tasks of our art lie not in the field of formalistic search. The path for our creative efforts lies in the organic relationship with the creative process of the proletariat and of the working peasantry.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians

169

532

346

An Ikon

A Russian church in the capital of Ruthenia

113, 533 Ukraine RD1

[For information pertaining to the musical form of Ukrainian songs, see 7: Lineva, RF1 Great Russia, category 116, p. 62.]

538 rical ballads (dumy) which glorify and preserve the whole of the past of Ukraine, are deservedly famous.

● 533 The Ukrainian folk-song which has been handed down in many collections and manuscripts from the 16th century, enjoys a great reputation both at home and abroad. These songs were sung at Lithuanian and Polish courts (14th - 16th centuries) and before Tsars and boyars in Moscow down to the second half of the 18th century. They were admired in Turkey and Italy too, and found honorable mention as early as 1675 in Herbigny's collection "Religiosae Kijovienses Cryptae".

534 The Ukrainian accompanies his singing on many instruments: there are the "kobza" and the "bandura", stringed instruments of foreign origin, cymbals which are unknown to the Russians, bag-pipes ("duda"), a peculiar kind of flute ("svyril") and the mountain pipe ("trembita"); primitive instruments like the lyre
535 have also persisted. The dance plays a comparatively minor part. Besides the ceremonious dances ("kolo") there are round dances ("hopak", "kozatshok" and "kolomyjka"), and the old sword dance is found among the Hutsuly.

531 A richly developed folk-art is on the same level as the folk-poetry and music; it finds expression above all in national costumes and ornaments, in painted Easter eggs, embroidery, in the complicated weaving and wood-carving patterns and in bead-work, ceramics, furniture and household utensils.

291 The ornate costumes often show in their embroidery influen-
531 ces from the East, the South and the Balkans. Particular attention is paid to embroidery on shirts, while women's skirts ("plakhty") and men's coats are often magnificent works of art for which, according to the district, homespun linen and woollen stuffs are used. Embroidery patterns utilise geometric forms as well as conventional flowers and leaves.

352 Furniture consists mainly of benches, a carved table, painted
531 and inlaid chests ("skryni") and a carved pottery cupboard ("mysnyk"). The room is, in addition, decorated with paintings, embroidered towels and carpets; in Eastern Ukraine the stove is also painted.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Music

● 533 Ukrainian music did not make an appearance in general European musical literature till the end of the 18th century, a fact which may surprise an outsider in a people of more than 40 millions whose songs enjoy world-wide reputation. Here, too, natural development has been held up by political dependence and subjection to a foreign state.

Christmas, spring and harvest songs are probably among the oldest products of Ukrainian music, but also songs about the most important events in human life, such as birth, marriage, and death. Their archaic character points to an origin in far-distinct, nebulous, pre-historic times. After the introduction of Christianity, these songs were subject to Greek influence which finds expression to a certain extent in their structure. But the golden age of the Ukrainian song is from the 16th to the 18th century, i. e. the heroic age of Ukrainian history. History raises a new voice in the lyrical-epic songs, recitative in character, which glorify the heroic deeds of the Cossacks in their battles against the Turks, Tatars and Poles. — This type of song belonged above all to the repertory of the minstrels (Kobsars = singers) organised in a guild of their own to watch over their interests as a profession. Like the Bards and Troubadours of the Middle Ages these minstrels or Kobsars wander far and wide through the plains of Ukraine, welcome guests not only in the mansions of magnates and landed proprietors, but also in the kitchens of farmhouses and simple Cossacks. In its later development the Ukrainian folk-song approaches more closely the musical products of Europe, with their definite separation of minor and major keys and regular harmonies. But in spite of these concessions, characteristic features which

give it its peculiar stamp, were by no means lost. In a letter to an acquaintance Count Tolstoi emphasises that no other national music — not even that of Russia proper — has proclaimed its peculiar character so insistently as the Ukrainian. When we listen to it, the whole history of Ukraine passes before our inward eye, and we understand the character of the people far better that by reading Gogol and Konyskyj (Ukrainian writers). 533

Church music was introduced into Ukraine after the country had become Christian under Grand Prince Volodymyr the Great, whose consort, the Greek princess Joanna, brought to Kyiv not only priests but also church singers. The old chronicler relates that, at the time of Yaroslav the Wise three Greek singers came to ancient Rus with their families and that the "eight-part angelic singing" originated with them. These church songs were modified in the course of centuries when they were handed on from "ear to ear"; in this way they took on many of the characteristics of the Ukrainian folk-song, including the "subsidiarv parts", a special counterpoint feature in this folk music.

The Tatars who destroyed the political structure of Ukraine, left the church in peace. The simple Byzantine forms of church music penetrated into the lives of the people, thereby enriching their still primitive culture. The conquest of Ukraine by Poland and Lithuania and the spread of Roman Catholicism with its polyphonic vocal and instrumental music (mainly organ) forced the Orthodox clergy in Ukraine to cultivate the more complicated choir singing, which, to-day, is still the sole representative of Ukrainian church music. This choir singing, supported by church brotherhoods, was preserved throughout Ukraine till the end of the 17th century, The sons of the rich old Cossack nobility who brought back samples of the music of Western Europe from their tours, also contributed to the music of the country. In Kyiv the peculiar "concerto" form arose in which the tutti of the choir alternated solos. The Italian works of composers as Giovanni Palestrina, Alessandro Scarlatti and their successors, Giuseppe Sarti and Baldassare Galuppi were widely known in Ukraine; under their influence, at the turn of

● 535 the 18th century a specifically Ukrainian "Italian church choir style" was formed, whose most eminent interpreters, the composers of our older music, were Demeter Bortnianskyj (1721—1825), Maksym Berezovskyj (1745—1777), and Artem Wedel (1767—1806). All three were students at the Kyiv Academy, Bortnianskyj and Berezovskyj finished their studies in Italy, the former in Venice, Rome and Naples, the latter in Bologna. The style of church music created by all three, but particularly by Bortnianskyj, was not only supreme in all classes of Ukrainian society, but also acquired a dominating position in other nations of Greek-Orthodox faith. Bortnianskyj, the greatest of the trio, after finishing his studies in Italy, spent the rest of his life as conductor of the court orchestra in St. Petersburg, which explains why he is known throughout the world as a Russian composer in spite of the obvious indications that he belonged to the sphere of Ukrainian culture.

After the North had drained away the best men and when the political situation of Ukraine had became deplorable under the Russian Empire, all independent activity in the province of culture, and consequently of music, gradually ceased. It is true that in the middle of the 19th century the old musical tradition was transplanted from the Dnipro area to Galicia (M. Verbytskyj 1815—1870 and I. Lavrivskyj 1822—1973) but this did not last long and musical culture finally decayed here, too. The creative power of Ukrainian music in the 18th and 19th centuries also found expression in opera and light opera. Bortnianskyj had already written operas, such as "Creonte" and "Quinto Fabio" which were performed in Italy, but in this case music and libretto were too foreign to appeal to Ukrainian society. But with the spread of the romantic movement and its preference for motives from popular life, Ukrainian composers turned for themes to country life or to the heroic deeds of the Cossacks. Thus arose the light opera by Prince Shahovskyj (1777—1846), "Cossack the Rhymester", and the classical musical comedy by Ivan Kotlarevskyj, "Natalka Poltavka", Hulak-Artemovskyj's (1813—1873) opera, "The Zaporog Cossack beyond the Danube", which is strongly reminiscent of Mozart's "Il Seraglio", the opera-like, though often banal setting of

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Shevchenko's "Kateryna" by Mykola Arkas (1852—1909) and many others. 533

Mykola Lysenko (1842—1912), a musician who was successful in all branches of his art, and his successors created a revolution in music in Ukraine. After graduating from the Leipzig Conservatoire Lysenko returned to Ukraine. He took the folk-song as the basis of his compositions but, while it had hitherto been treated as something primitive, Lysenko seeks in it the essence of the musical ego of the Ukrainian people. He tries first to establish the scale of the Ukrainian folk-song and to develop from it a suitable harmony. He worked like a professor of ethnography and investigated the abundant material at his disposal according to scientific methods, no other nation possessing such a rich treasure of songs, both as regards quality and quantity. Without going into a detailed analysis of the Ukrainian folk-song, we may add that most of them are part songs, where each part is independent, and starts one after the other finally combining with the first voice, which results in an original counterpoint and rich harmonious melody. Lysenko was aware of the great wealth of Ukrainian folk-songs, but also of the great difficulty of studying it in its entirety. But the work had to be done as a guarantee of the further organic development of music in Ukraine. He did not consider it right to graft the music of Western Europe onto Ukrainian products, for he was perhaps the first to understand that Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Wagner and Brahms were first and foremost German composers who constructed their works on a scale derived from the German folk-song and that the roots of this folk-song lie deep in German musical consciousness. 814 533

The impulse given by Lysenko expressed itself first in vocal music; M. Leontovych (1877—1921) and K. Stetsenko (1882—1922) are products of the movement which he initiated. Their works are a synthesis of the impressive technique derived from the old vocal music of the 16th century on the one hand and of the Ukrainian folk-song on the other, from which they drew not only their motives but also their inspiration. This explains the enormous success of the Koshyts choir when it toured Europe from capital to capital, from Vienna to Berlin, Paris and London. 533

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDJ

● 533 After the war of 1914—1918, Lysenko's principles began to make themselves felt in instrumental music too, thereby opening new possibilities of development in all provinces, from trifling compositions to symphonies and operas. Stanislav Ludkevytsh (1879) meant a turning-point in the history of Ukrainian music in Western Ukraine; he created music in the European sense, which, on the basis of his own studies and the researches of Filaret Kolessa (1871—1947), the folklorist, penetrates the real being of the Ukrainian folk-song and tries to utilise its materials. His chief merit, however, lies in his having proved that, contrary to the traditional view, it is possible to express the national character in instrumental as well as vocal music, and indeed, if properly managed, orchestration can preserve the individuality of Ukrainian music better than compositions for the voice. The spirit of our folk-song breathes from his compositions, whether it be his great symphony for orchestra, chorus and solos, the "Caucasus", his "Valse melancolique" his "Rhapsody of the Ukrainian Legion", or his small chorus songs, mostly with orchestral accompaniment.

A group of younger composers in Western and Eastern Ukraine have deliberately chosen instrumental music as their mode of expression in order to fill up the gap in this art and thus contribute something essential to the culture of Ukraine. Vasyl Barvinskyj (1888), director of the Ukrainian Academy of Music in Lviv, a neo-romantic, a master of chamber-music, a pupil of Vitezslav Novak (Prague) whose whole work was founded on the Slovakian folk-song, fully utilises the treasures hidden in the Ukrainian folk-song, in his works for the piano, the celio, in solos and symphonic poems. Similar in style is the work of Nestor Nyzhankivskyj (1893—1940), the son of a Ukrainian composer of the 19th century and a pupil of Marx the Austrian composer and pedagogue. The more radical tendency in this group is represented by Zenon Lysko (1895) and Mykola Kolessa (1898), who have liberated themselves from the finished folk-song and merely try to compose in the same spirit. In his work (piano, chamber-music, symphonies) Anton Rudnytskyj breaks away entirely from national music and tries to being Ukrainian music into

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

one line with the extreme tendencies in Europe and with ideals of modern composers. 533

In the Ukrainian Soviet Republic the turn to instrumental music was still more striking than in compositions by musicians in Western Ukraine. The most radical and modern composers, as far as technique and mode of expression are concerned is Boris Latoshynskyj (1895), a professor in the Kyiv Institute of Music and the composer of works for piano, violin, string quartettes, piano trios, symphonies and musical illustrations to films. At first he was under the influence of Russian reformers, but later took to writing atonal music and finally found his way to the source of national Ukrainian music in his overture to 4 Ukrainian songs and his opera, "The Golden Hoop".

Lew Revutskyj (1888) is a strong, rugged personality, though at the beginning he was under the influence of Rahmaninow and Chopin, and later of Scriabin and even of Chaikovsky. These foreign elements, however, were melted in the fire of his individuality to creations which have echoes of the folk-song while providing us with samples of modern Ukrainian music. These include his preludes for the piano, concertos for the piano, symphonies, songs etc. The third representative of great musical forms (sonate, symphony, piano concerto, opera), Victor Kosenko (1896), a professor at the Lysenko Institute in Kyiv, is a more moderate, lyrical nature, Pylyp Kozytskyj (1893), the editor of the review, "Music for the Masses" and Mychajlo Verykivskyj (1896), the conductor of the opera in Kharkiv, form a special group; although both also express themselves in large forms, their special field is the instrumental and vocal miniature. Kozytskyj's forte is vocal music where he continues the glorious traditions of Leontovych. —

p. 239

186 been founded by the nationalist intelligentsia of the East Ukraine
517 many years before the Revolution. They were now revived, after
575 long suppression by the Communist regime, to carry on the work of developing national culture and inculcating a feeling of national identity. The two aims could be combined because all nationalist Ukrainians felt it essential to instill a love of the indigenous popular arts and customs, emphasizing their distinctive nature. That this effort had a political as well as a cultural sig-
[661] nificance is indicated by the fact that not only the Soviet regime (both before 1941 and upon reconquest, as in Kharkov)[45] but the German police as well attacked the Prosvita societies, and in the Reichskommissariat they were able, for varying periods, to lead only a clandestine life. The desire for national expression was shared by so many, however, that the Germans felt it was impossible to dam up all outlets; therefore the Prosvita was generally permitted, though under close observation.[46] Together with the church (and a few local societies not using the Prosvita name but having the same function), it was one of the few organizations of a nationalist character which was not under direct German control.

533 The work of the Prosvita groups, although arranged in various
517 ways in different localities, may be classified under four general
186 headings. Playing a major role everywhere were musical activities,
575 particularly choral groups, in which the Ukrainians had always excelled, and which served as a powerful intellectual and emotional stimulus to nationalist feeling, since most of the songs were distinctively Ukrainian. In addition, groups of *bandura* players (the *bandura* is a small lute-like stringed instrument indigenous to the Ukraine) were sponsored, and orchestras were
545 trained. In the larger centers, Prosvita collaborated with regular
517 professional musical organizations, such as conservatories and
575 operas, to produce nationalist-inspired performances. For ex-
186 ample, operas were reopened in Kiev and Kharkov, and offered a considerable repertoire of native Ukrainian pieces (*Taras Bul'ba, Natalka Poltavka,* etc.) as well as traditional Western

[45] Cf. *Nastup*, September 26, 1943, p. 3 (based on *Vinnyts'ki Visti*, August 29, 1943), on the destruction of Prosvita and its personnel in Kharkov during the Soviet interlude in February-March, 1943.

[46] MS E; PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

197 Ukrainians, the German and Austrian authorities had to use Russian interpreters instead of Ukrainian ones from Galicia. Trained at the Ukrainian University of Lvov, founded by the Austrian Government, and belonging to another religion, being 'uniats' and non-Orthodox, the Galician men of letters, scientists and politicians who invaded the Ukraine after the Revolution of 1917, appeared as foreigners to the native population.

538 In popular Ukrainian poetry one finds no trace of the epic poem of the Russia of Kiev, of which the 'Tales of the Companions of Igor,' written in a language which was still very close to old Slavonic, is a magnificent example. The epic songs of the flourishing epoch of the State of Kiev, still bearing traces of the mixture of Christian and remnants of old pagan conceptions, have been perpetuated far into the north. They are the *byliny*, songs of St. Vladimir and his companions, which were accompanied by some acting, and which the popular *skazitels* still sing in the most distant North Russian lands in the forests on the shore of the White Sea. In the Ukraine a popular epic poetry of a new kind, based on subjects which have not been published, has appeared, inspired by the Cossack struggles. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have left us a few examples.

This poetry is highly lyrical, noble, and melancholy and has developed especially in the following century. It still lives to our days, known under the name of '*doumy*.' Although it speaks of epic deeds, this poetry is profoundly distinguished by that lyricism which characterizes the whole popular Ukrainian poetic art.

[533] 177 Like all the languages of the Russian family, Ukrainian adapts itself wonderfully to song. It is the Ukraine which has taught the whole of Russia the polyphonic song, which even penetrated to the remotest corners of the Russian land. It is possible that this song itself was early influenced in the Ukraine by certain elements of Western music.

early influenced in the Ukraine by certain elements of 000
Western music.

We already know that the beginnings of Ukrainian 533
literature, during the epoch of the State of Kiev, are completely interwoven with those of Russian literature. It is at the end of the sixteenth century that one should look for the first example of a literature already written in a noticeably vulgarized form and which approaches modern Ukrainian.

The struggles which followed the religious union of 197
1596 were accompanied by an intense literary activity in the Ukraine which served almost exclusively polemic ends. The cause of Orthodoxy being that of the lower classes after the defection of a great part of the clergy and of the old aristocracy, it was of necessity that its defenders had to turn to the people. We can also note a broad democratization of ideas in the writings emanating from the Orthodox camp, which favoured the use of a language which one tried to make as intelligible as possible to the masses.

The Orthodox were at first fundamentally opposed to the use of Latin, which their adversaries wished to impose upon them. 'It is because the Slavonic language is the most fertile and the most loved by God, that the devil rises against it, since, by means of simple and diligent reading, it leads towards God, without pagan malice, such as the grammar, the rhetoric, and the dialectic,' wrote the defender of Orthodoxy, the monk of Mount Athos, John Vichinsky, in revolting against the literary code of the Jesuits who were quite strange to the popular soul. He appealed to the people:

'It is better for you to go to church without bishops and priests influenced by the devil, and to guard the purity of Orthodoxy, rather than to blaspheme it and to trample upon it in going to church with bishops and

11: Obermaier--145 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

The Living faith of pagan times occupies among the people, a position which is equal with the Christian belief. The Orthodox Church, doubtless recognizing how deeply rooted the popular customs are, has tried to reconcile the two.

789 The ancestor cult is particularly important. The Ukrainian people entertain their ancestors on Christmas Eve. The table is set and the whole family are seated at it. Only a few seats are unoccupied - for the ancestors. Their bowls are filled with the traditional Christmas food: cooked wheat with honey and poppy, cooked fish and a cooked fruit mixture. "Little Father Frost" is also invited on Christmas Eve by the master of the house. The peasant steps in front of his house and calls: "Frost, frost, come and have supper with us!" Every guest, even the beggar, is welcome on Christmas Eve, for he might be an ancestor or Father Frost whom even the priest [789] does not forget specially to invite. Hay is laid under the tablecloth on the nights around the winter solstice, for all green things /138/ drive away the evil spirits. The place of honor in the house belongs to the "grandfather", a •533 sheaf of grain, symbolizing the ancestor. In the twelve magical nights between Christmas Eve and the Three Kings the famous koliad, pagan songs about the solstice, with a Christian flavor, exorcise all evil. Jesus Christ, Dazhdboh the sun god, and the Virgin Mary, all three are conjured up in one and the same song, in order to protect these worthy Christians.

527 789 The carnival belongs to the women; the men have nothing to do with it, although on other occasions they do not scorn merry revels. On a Monday morning the married women of the village gather in the pub in order to begin a week of jolly drinking. This, too, of course, cannot pass without magic. The sorcery revolves about the "koloda", a stick which symbolizes a child. It is wound with tow and is now "born". The women congratulate each other on the "birth" with horilka,

527 789 grain whiskey. The revelry lasts all week just as in the case of a real birth.

527 771 769 The spring festival, the resurrection of nature, has for a long time coincided with the Christian Easter, the resurrection of the Lord, and the burial of Christ with the burial of winter. On Easter Sunday the Christian service and the pagan cult complement each other in a strange way. Scarcely has the priest prayed for the blessing of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost to descend upon his congregation, when the women join hands and dance around the church. It is a custom dating from ancient times to announce to the ancestor the beginning of field work at the spring festival, so that he can give them help and support. "Oh, ancestor!" the women sing on this occasion, "we plow the field, oh ancestor, we announce to you that we plow, that we sow, that we reap!" (82)

82. According to a verbal communication of the Ukrainian ethnographer and archaeologist V. Shcherbakivskyj, Prague.

789 527 The custom of "plowing-under", observed even before the First World War in East Ukraine when the field work begins, is probably unique. Again it is the women who, stark naked, exorcise the magic forces /139/ by drawing a plow over the nocturnal fields, and furrowing the earth amid a great deal of noise. Woe to the man who might eavesdrop on this grandiose fertility rite! The mischief-maker would have to pay dearly for it. (83) The drinking bout which the naked peasant

83. Zelenin: Russian (East Slavic) Folk Studies.

women celebrate near the church after they have finished their magic rite is called "lightning".

•533 These are the same women who sing the lovely Ukrainian songs while they are working in the fields in spring and summer; for the Ukrainian be-

533 lieves that song is a part of work, and he has special symbolic songs for every type of work.

527 769 The Monday a week after Easter is dedicated to the ancestors. Well supplied with food and drink, the whole families set out for the cemeteries, just as in the days of Vladimir, in order to observe the death cult. They sit down on the graves of their ancestors, eat the food they have brought, share it with the dead by placing the latters' portion beside the Christian cross made of wood, and they do not forget to empty a small glass of horilka over it. The dead are honored if the visitors leave their graves in an elevated mood.

776 Summer passes by with the customary field work. It is a glorious time, the pumpkins and the melons ripen, the hollyhocks bloom again and people sleep out in the open. The harvest begins not without symbolic rituals; for the spirits must be thanked and one must pray for good weather. When the grain has been stored in the barns, the priest consecrates the harvest wreath, the grains of which are mixed among the seed the following year.

793 In the midst of this strange pagan-Christian world, the priest lives and works as the representative of Christ on earth. He knows the customs of the people from the time he is a child, and he joins in on many occasions. It is not sacrilegious when during a difficult birth he places the church key on the belly of the woman in labor, when he administers the Holy Sacrament to sick cattle or seals graves so that the dead may not /140/ return. Both shepherd and flock most earnestly believe that such deeds are efficacious and pleasing in the sight of God.

771 178 The First World War, the civil wars and finally the Bolshevist cudgel have destroyed this world; faith and superstition, holy mass and the spirit cult were no longer tolerated.

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The Ukrainian's tendency to idealise, is also expressed in his relation to the weaker sex which generally enjoys a position of superiority in Ukrainian society. In literature, too, the Ukrainian woman appears in such an idealised and spiritualised form that even her faults, her foibles, do not detract from her spiritual value, but serve rather to enhance her charm and attractiveness. 181 562

The sense for actual reality is almost completely suffocated by the enthusiasm of the soul for the world of the imagination, for the ideal. 19th century drama contains a goodly company of women with a positive attitude to life — national heroines like Marusja Bohuslavka, lovable girls, good and faithful to boredom like Natalie of Poltava, unhappy victims of male seduction like Shevchenko's Kateryna and finally, prophetesses with an air of tragedy like the Ukrainian Cassandra. We must not forget that, except for the last named, these old-fashioned plays are still popular with the Ukrainian public and are performed even to-day, times without number, with great success throughout Ukraine, in the towns as well as in the remotest villages. 181 562 536

Western systems of thought have always been founded on the personal consciousness of the individual. Beginning with Plato in ancient Greece philosophical speculation has always started from individual consciousness as the only evident reality which is disputed by no one, a process which is still more evident in modern philosophy from Descartes on. Fichte's system is based on the philosophy of the ego which elsewhere appears in philosophy as a complete entity, independent of all other features, a sovereign being, which, in the intellectual world, is usually the final foundation of a concrete reality. 812

Here Ukrainians, in contrast to Russians, are decidedly western in outlook. Though they have not produced philosophic systems of th r own based on the ego as the fundamental principle, or the foundation of further speculation, nevertheless their whole intellectual life, their ethical standards and legal code, and still more their actual conduct, are all based on the individual; and to restrict the right of the individual even in the interests of the community, is always resented as an encroachment on the freedom of will. 812 156

The Background of the Communist Triumph

Let us, therefore, look briefly at 175
the outstanding elements of the situation as they were at the beginning of the revolution.

From the time of the organization and Christianization of the Kievan state at the end of the tenth century to the eighteenth century, Ukraine, whether independent, or subject to Poland-Lithuania, or to the Russian Tsars, had remained as a political unit, even though divided. However, in 1775 Catherine II destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich, the centre of the Ukrainian Kozaks, and in 1783 she abolished all Ukrainian political institutions and privileges. From that time the area was divided into *gubernias* as the rest of the Russian Empire and the full Russian methods of administration were introduced.

From that moment, too, the Russian government spared no efforts to destroy every vestige of Ukrainian national and cultural consciousness. The Ukrainian language was treated as a peasant dialect of Russian; the name Ukraine was forbidden and even the substitute Little Russia was treated as a generic term for the area north of the Black Sea, but it did not figure on the political map of the Russian Empire as a distinct entity. The Ukrainian revival in the nineteenth century beginning with the publication of Kotlyarevsky's parody of the *Aeneid* in 1798 was confined to the [536] cultural sphere and could offer little or nothing in the way of administrative experience to the Ukrainian people. Those Ukrainians who entered the Russian service were usually sent to distant areas, while the administrative personnel in Ukraine was chiefly Russian in origin and feeling.

The great estates were largely owned by Russians or by Poles 186
and even many Ukrainian landowners who had succeeded in retaining their holdings were so thoroughly Russianized that they [423] felt little sense of kinship with the peasants on their estates. Ukrainian life was lived chiefly in the villages. The Ukrainian language was not taught in the schools or used in the courts, for all education and administration were in the Russian language. Still the peasants continued their own manner of living with their own traditions and their own tastes and desires.

626 538 It was perfectly natural that a similar situation should develop in Ukraine. The various schools of serious writing, as the *Vaplite,* stood out against this regimentation and ably defended their position, but that position was indefensible in the face of political pressure and without being conscious of any inconsistency, Skrypnyk, as a good Communist and a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was willing to exert pressure to bring the literary organization of Ukraine in line with that of the All-Union Communist Party at the very same time when he was deliberately thwarting the unifying tendencies of that party.

[186] [68] The first sign of the changed order came with the arrest and deportation of M. Ivchenko for his novel *Working Powers* because it endeavored to express in a concrete form the problem of fitting the ideals of the various national groups into the stereotyped formula which was now fashionable. Next came the difficulties of Khvylovy over his novel *Woodsnipes,* despite his willingness to secure an opportunity for further work by the destruction of the second part of the novel.

It must be remembered that the groups which were now being attacked were not by their essential declarations anti-Communist. They reflected, rather, the disillusionment of many people with the prevailing manifestations of Communism, the growing realization that the Communist regime was not giving the people that ideal reality which its teachings indicated they should easily win. [536] That was the gist of the drama by M. Kulish, the *People's Malakhy,* which reflected the contrast between the ideals of a high-minded but somewhat simple village Don Quixote and the realities of life on any particular level. This, as other of his plays, was well presented in the Berezil Theatre, directed by Les Kurbas, a Western Ukrainian who had developed in Kiev into one of the great producers and had pushed the Ukrainian theatrical art to its highest development. Writings of the same character had marked some of the early Russian works of A. N. Tolstoy after the revolution but, being a Great Russian, he was not involved in the endless controversies over the national questions and, like most of the Russian authors, he was able to work out a satisfactory agreement with the

538 interest owing to the traces of popular influences which bring them nearer to the lyrical Ukrainian poetry.

536 It is only in the domain of dramatic art that the national originality could still find expression. For example, the Mysteries and the Fables of the West, the first Ukrainian theatre, is in the beginning the work of clergy who want to edify the people while entertaining them. The students of the Academy of Kiev are its first dramatists, playwrights, and producers. And, just as in the West, it soon loses its serious and strictly religious character. The element of entertainment becomes more and more pronounced. The people acquire a taste for these marionette performances which soon become a truly national amusement. At first they usually represented the Crib of the Nativity and all the events which took place around it. The name of 'Crib' (*vertep*) remained connected with them for ever. But the Madonna and the Child Jesus were soon supplanted by comical characters such as the Devil, the Vagabond Priest, the sly peasant, and the schemer. The social satire, a direct product of popular feeling, became the real purpose of these marionette performances and on holidays and at fairs the people crowded to see them. The Dwarfs Theatre in the Ukraine so pleased the Tsar Alexis of Moscow that he ordered the establishment of 'Comedy Plays' in the theatre of his summer residence, and this despite the protestations, the indignation, and the anathemas of the Muscovite clergy.

538 It is at the end of the eighteenth century that the intellectual and cultural movement in the Ukraine first appears. Ivan Kotliarevsky, considered the 'Father of Ukrainian literature,' called himself 'a simple amateur of the Little Russian tongue.' In reality it is the love of poetic folk-lore which characterizes modern Ukrainian literature, and it is that which labels it among local

668 The society of the 'United Slavs' was only one
186 expression of the great liberating movement, and its failure was the logical consequence of the suppression of the Decembrist insurrection at St. Petersburg on 14 December 1825, which gave it its name.

This failure checked for a long time the attempts of political revolt in the whole of Russia. Nevertheless the intellectual movement continued, always inspired by the same sources and the same ideals.

538 The genius of Chevtchenko determined the path which the whole Ukrainian literature was to follow. It clung especially to the description of popular life, of the peasant life with its sadness and its injustices. Deeply steeped in folk-lore, it was especially inspired by the pity of the disinherited, by this social pity which is a feature of its affinity with the great Russian literature. In the writings of Marko Vovtchok (pen-name of Marie Vilinska Markovitch) in the *Popular Tales*, approved by Chevtchenko himself, we find again the touching picture of the peasant miseries. Later, in Galicia, Franko, Martovitch, and Stefanik give some pretty examples of this literature, more social than national. Parallel to this, in Russian Ukraine, this tradition was pursued until the revolution by Kotsiubinsky, Tobilevitch, and, above all, by Lessia Oukrainka, the niece of Michael Dragomanov, to whom we will presently return.

536 The Ukrainian Theatre experienced a remarkable
545 development towards the end of the nineteenth century. We have already considered the taste of the Ukrainian people for dramatic art, a taste which had already found expression in the old marionette plays. The rise of the new Ukrainian literature could not fail to bring about the development of a modern theatre. As a result a troupe of Ukrainian actors, that of Kropivnitzky, was formed at Kiev and had a great success. The Imperial

Government authorized the creation of a Ukrainian 536
language theatre, limiting, however, the subjects which 545
could be treated. In conforming to the official point of view, according to which Ukrainian was only a local Russian dialect, it forbade the showing of plays other than those which bore a popular and local character. But this restriction could not seriously hinder the development of Ukrainian dramatic art, as it was the chief aim of the whole Ukrainian literature to treat subjects taken from the popular life. The success of the Ukrainian Theatre of Kiev did not fail to find imitators. Amateur troupes were formed almost in all parts of Russia and especially in the country, which successfully exploited the artistic qualities of a people so richly gifted.

As for Galicia, the political movement always 668
continued to develop rapidly here.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century a new figure appeared on the Ukrainian political arena, that of Dragomanov (1851–95), whose role was to become enormous.

Born in Russian Ukraine, he soon joined the intellectual revolutionary circles. Following the example of other revolutionary organizations in Russia, that of *Stara Gromada* of Dragomanov sent him abroad to spread there, as a political *émigré*, the ideas of a revolutionary Ukrainianism. Dragomanov at first allied himself with the Galician circles and settled in Austria, but he could not remain here as a result of his 'too red' ideas. After this he took the road to Geneva, the rallying centre of political *émigrés* from the old Russia. There he founded a political review, *Gromada*, and undertook, from his exile in Geneva, the direction of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia. The impulse which he gave it was extremely vigorous. It led to the formation of a new party, tinted

40th day after death, at Easter, Whitsuntide, and on St. Dimitry's day) special dishes are eaten. 765

The course of the year in Ukraine is accompanied by many old customs which are not to be found among Russians but which resemble those of Southern Slavonic peoples. They spring from the world of Pontium and Greece and Rome; such are the festivals at Christmas ("koljada"), New Year ("novyj rik"), the consecration of water ("shtshedryj vetshir"), Easter ("hayivky"), the beginning of spring ("vesnyanky"), solstice ("kupalo"), the beginning of autumn ("Andrija") etc. They are accompanied by games and country dances, of which there are several thousand. The beginning of the most important agricultural operations is also celebrated (building the house, ploughing, sowing, driving the cows to pasture, hay and grain harvest etc). 796

Ukrainian demonology, founded on ancient animistic beliefs, has, in contrast to the Russian, lost all its terrors; the devil, for instance, is stripped of all horror. Magic and the belief in witchcraft are very probably of more modern, partly Christian origin. There is no higher mythology. The worship of fire and water is more developed and there are some faint traces of the worship of plants. Much of popular belief is preserved in fairy tales, fables, sagas, legends, proverbs and riddles, of which there is an inexhaustible store. Some 4 years ago Savtshenko found 2000 main variants of Ukrainian fairy tales, compared with about 1700 Russian and 1500 White Ruthenian versions. V. Hnatjuk has counted 327 fables of animals (exclusive of variants). We must finally mention the incredible wealth of popular stories and anecdotes. 771 538

But the Ukrainian people's most precious spiritual possession is their folk-poetry, one of the richest in Europe and characterised by aesthetic values, depth of poetic feeling and perfection of form. F. v. Bodenstedt, who published "Die poetische Ukraine" in 1843 put these Ukrainian poems above those of all other nations. Hohol said of them that they comprehended poetry and history and were a monument to the nation's ancestors. Every kind of song is represented, from the traditional songs of ritual and later ballads to the short song of to-day ("Shumky", "Kozatshky", "Kolomyjky" and "Tshabarashky"). These histo-

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The Ukrainian Language

197 Ukrainian belongs to the Slavonic branch of the family of Indogermanic languages and this branch again divides into South Slav, West Slav and East Slav. Ukrainian, with Russian and White Ruthenian, forms the East Slav group which is an intermediary among Slavonic languages. Morphologically Ukrainian is like Russian, phonetically it approaches Serbo-Croatian and, as far as meaning goes, it has much in common with Polish. The north-west area of Ukrainian lies in the region of the home of Slavonic languages.

195 The development of Ukrainian as an independent language dates from the 9th century. Up to the end of the 18th century, old Church Slavonic, which had come with Christianity mainly from Bulgaria, served as the language of literature. With Ukrainian additions this has remained the language of the church up till the present. It is also the vehicle for historical chronicles (the Nestor Chronicle, the Chronicle of Galicia and Volynia) and the Igor Song, the greatest epic of the 12th century. Most of the literary monuments of those days, however, were destroyed in the wars against the Asiatic hordes. And yet the importance of old Church Slavonic as used in Ukraine spread far beyond the frontiers of the country; it became the court language of the Grand Princes of Lithuania and the official 197 language in Moldavia. Literary activity increased in Ukraine 538 in the 17th century but the subjects treated were taken from religion and so Church Slavonic continued to be the vehicle of literary expression. Historical works in the 17th and 18th centuries, the Cossack Chronicles by Velychko, Samovydets and the "History of the Ruthenes" (Istorija Rusow) are written in Church Slavonic with popular Ukrainian and Polish additions and many foreign words. At the same time individual writers are already writing in the national language, for example Nekrashevych, Gavatovych, partly also Skovoroda, while "Dumy", folksongs and anonymous verses are also written in Ukrainian.

About the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries Ukrainian finally managed to establish itself, for which Kotlarevskyj's travesty of the Aeneid (1798) was originally responsible. Literature becomes a national concern (cf. Kvitka-Osnovjanenko, Met-

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lynskyj, Hrebinka etc.). Shevchenko, the greatest Ukrainian poet and Panko Kulish, the most eminent scholar of those days helped to perfect Ukrainian as a literary language. As all these writers came from Eastern Ukraine, the literary language grew from the East Ukrainian dialects of Poltava, Kharkiv and Kyiv. 197 533

In subsequent years Ukrainian became a still finer instrument in the hands of Marko Vovchok, Hlibiv, Konyskyj, Storoshenko and Shashkevych in Galicia and Fedjkovych in Bucovina.

After the Russian government laid a ban on Ukrainian (1876), literary and scientific life was concentrated in Lviv, the Ukrainian center in Austria-Hungary. This meant that western dialects came to their own, for many writers from Eastern Ukraine now published their works in the west (Myrnyj and Nechuj-Levytskyj, novelists; Starytskyj, dramatist and poet; Tobylevych, dramatist and later Hrinchenko, Kotsjubynskyj, Samijlenko and Lesja Ukrayinka, the greatest Ukrainian poetess). Ivan Franko is one of the greatest Ukrainians from the west at this time.

In Galicia a scientific and technical terminology developed so that in 1918 Ukrainian could take its place as the official language of the independent Ukrainian state and later of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The following modern writers have done much to enhance the reputation of Ukrainian as a literary language: Olha Kobylanska, Bohdan Lepkyj, Vasyl Stefanyk (in a literary Pokutish-Volynian dialect), Oleksander Oles, Spyrydon Cherkasenko, Pavlo Tychyna, Maksym Rylskyj, Mykola Khvylovyj, Oleksa Slisarenko, Jurij Janovskyj, Jewhen Malaniuk, Bohdan Ihor Antonych etc.

The scientific study of the Ukrainian language was promoted above all by the Ukrainian Academy of Learning in Kyiv: Ukrainian has up till now been taught in lectures and tutorial courses in the universities of Berlin, Königsberg, Vienna, Münster, Halle, Prague, Naples and Paris. But Ukrainian philology was first studied in the 17th century (Grammar by M. Smotrytskyj in 1618). Two hundred years later A. Pavlovskyj's grammar, the first to deal with Ukrainian as a national language, appeared in Petersburg. And it is a Ukrainian, Oleksander Potebnya (1835—1891) who is the founder of Slavonic philology. 814

181 everywhere clearly reflected in language and literature, in habits and customs, in manifestations of religious life, in the cultural process, in music, art, and philosophy.

● 538 Taras Shevchenko, the intellectual leader of the Ukrainian
181 people and the national poet, was indissolubly bound to the black soil of his home, glebae adscriptus, the son of a serf, for whom a ransom of 2500 roubles had first to be paid by friends before he was physically free from the chains that bound him to the earth. To free him spiritually from Mother Earth was an impossibility, for the poet's soul was so firmly rooted in his native soil, that to have severed it from its roots would have meant spiritual death.

And it is not merely striving for external effect, but a genuine symbol of the spiritual make-up of the Ukrainian people that its national poet, though no more a serf but a fêted artist and poet, welcome in the best society of the Russian capital, is mostly portrayed in peasant costume and is handed down to posterity in this guise. Shevchenko, as a poet, was the people itself, so that external events in his life acquire symbolic significance for the entire nation. Ivan Franko, the most eminent poet of Western Ukraine, also a man of the people, bears witness to the peasantry as the foundation of a new period in the development of man:

"I am a peasant — prologue, not epilogue"

Another prominent champion of intellectual life in Ukraine is Skovoroda, a philosopher who lived in the 18th century. He is the Ukrainian Socrates and is a product of his native country, intimately connected with his surroundings and his time. We should be puzzled by his work if it were viewed apart from his relation to the broad mass of the peasantry; the whole significance of his teaching and influence can only be grasped if we remember that he was in direct contact with those elements in Ukrainian intellectual life which were deeply rooted in and inspired by the Black Earth.

V. Lypynskyj, the Ukrainian historian and sociologist of today, sums up and evaluates this intimacy with the soil in his "Letters to my Brother-Farmers", which appeared in 1921/22. He was the first to emphasise this essential feature of national

ideology and to make a militant peasantry the foundation and the pillar of the modern Ukrainian state. 538 181

We find an astonishingly simple, but profound synthesis of this entire peasant philosophy, the product of the soil, in "The Soil", a short, moving story by Vasyl Stefanyk, a contemporary poet; "Our destiny is the soil; forsake it and you are lost, cling to it and it will develop all your powers and draw out your very soul in the hollow of its hand; embrace it, subject yourself to it and it will suck the life-blood out of your veins — but in return, you have herds of sheep and horses and full stack-yards; and for your strength it will give you a cabin full of children and grand-children whose laughter is like silver bells and whose cheeks are red as the fruit of the snow ball tree . . ."

The profound love of the Ukrainian for the beauties of Nature springs from his connection with the soil, a love which seems to be firmly anchored in the depths of his soul. This aesthetic sense which is nurtured by natural forms, is reflected by the deep longing to express beauty of form, harmony of color and originality of theme in domestic surroundings, in dress or in the utensils of everyday life. Aesthetic, and not practical considerations always play the most important part, whether it be the construction of a church, the planning of a garden round a cottage, the weaving of an apron or a kerchief, the making of a table or a bench. 181 517

It is obvious that the very rich and valuable folk music and the no less rich and original folk poetry are also based on laws of aesthetic pleasure, derived from intimate intercourse with Nature and experience of her beauties.

And the Ukrainian's traditional and age-long contact with Nature is the tenacious bond between him and his culture and that of Western Europe, while at the same time it distinguishes him from the Muscovite, his neighbor in the North-East. For the latter people had never had any feeling for the soil; it regards agriculture not as an expression of love for Mother Earth, but as a necessity, or as a chance of making money. On the other hand, the Muscovites are the best traders among Slavonic peoples. The real farmer, too firmly rooted in the 181

181 earth and in his functions, who remains in the same place for generations, becomes too fixed in his habits and loses the mobility which is naturally the first essential quality of nomad peoples and which brings great advantages in trade.

The Ukrainian view of the world is based very definitely on idealism. The actions and resolutions of the Ukrainian are based not on objective reality as it confronts us, but on an ideal „reality" which contains many elements derived from imagination and fancy. Ukrainian history offers us many examples of this. I quote only two prominent instances:

181 Kostomariv, the Ukrainian historian, inspired by Messianic
●538 ideas, writes a gospel of the Ukrainian people, proclaiming its destiny as a leader in the history of mankind. The aim of this work was to bring new strength to the oppressed nation and to give new content to its life which was founded on a very sad reality; it soared so high in the clouds of idealising speculation, so oblivious of actual facts, that it was scarcely possible to establish a connection between it and real life. While it may be maintained that a people cannot be solely guided by conditions of life here and now, that it cannot do without ideals, that, on the contrary, development and progress are impossible without any inciting aim, even if it is beyond human grasp - nevertheless its efforts to rise must spring from its actual surroundings and not from the fantastic realm of the imagination. — Franko, in spite of the sad experience of his own life of suffering, is also an idealist who believes in man, in his innate goodness, his love of beauty and moral conduct. All the characters in his books, even the worst of them, often display good traits, or at least traces of a positive attitude to life which suffice to keep the chances of improvement open. It is more than obvious that these characters are not bad by nature, but that they have degenerated under the influence of different circumstances. Some critics assert that it was only this belief in an idealised humanity, in the possibility of progress, that gave Franko the moral courage to carry on in spite of bitter disappointment, and to work like one possessed for the welfare of his people and its culture.

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Literature and Science

I.

●538 The literature of the Kyiv period which was mentioned in another connection found best expression in the "Song of Ihor", in which an unknown author sings of the unhappy campaign of the princes Ihor, Vsevolod, Svyatoslav and Volodymyr against the Polovtsy. This heroic epic, which must have been written before 1187, is composed of a series of short, but vivid, impressionist scenes with a tone, a rhythm and a mood of their own. It is by no means an imitation of Homer or of northern sagas or the Nibelungenlied though it is not difficult to detect marked northern elements in the work.

In addition to extensive translations in different fields of monastic literature, the following are worthy of special note as original works: "Ruska Pravda", an imposing monument of ancient Ukrainian law procedure; the "Chronicles", the most important and richest historical sources for the Kyiv era and later times in early Ukrainian history, the oldest — the Nestor Chronicle — being dated about the beginning of the 11th century. We should like to mention shortly a few original writers of theology: Metropolitan Clemens Smolatych (1147—1154) and Bishop Kyrill Turivskyj (1130—1182), a master of rhetoric.

We must assume that only a tiny fraction of the literary production of those times has come down to us and that the great mass of literature has completely disappeared in consequence of the political catastrophes which befell this country. Judging from the high level of what has remained we can regard the Kyiv era as the golden age of Ukrainian literature.

In the Lithuanian period the language and literature of Ukraine continue to develop without, however, attaining the

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level of the earlier times. Western influences become more 538
prominent; it is a time of transition, nor does the Reformation count for much, for even the Ukrainian translation of the Bible by Dr. Franz Skoryna in 1515 was a response to national needs and cannot be derived from external influences. The first [2 13]
Ukrainian books, on the other hand, were printed in 1491—93 by Shveipolt Fiol in a German printing-press in Cracow, and that in connection with the first Ukrainian academy (Ostroh 1577—1640), which had been formed for the purpose of publishing a critical edition of the Bible.

Literary and educative activity was really in the hands of 814
the brotherhoods, which naturally were greatly interested in efforts to unite the churches. Polish literature worthy of note arose, important preliminary work was done in the province of language (Smotrytskyj's Grammar of Church Slavonic 1618), but it was only after Mohyla (1596—1647) re-organised the Academy in Kyiv that a cultural center was formed which was to play a decisive part in the literature of Ukraine for about 200 years.

Theological, rhetorical and philosophical works appear, the history text-book "Synopsis" by I. Gisel (died in 1684) goes through 30 editions, and Gregor Skovoroda (1722—1794), the most eminent philosopher of the 18th century in Eastern Europe and a student at the Kyiv Academy, wrote his books, the real significance of which is only being recognised now.

The cultural renaissance in Ukraine due to the brotherhoods and the Kyiv Academy brought new impetus to other provinces of intellectual life, as for instance dramatic art (Jakob Gavatovych 1598—1679, Mytrophan Dowhalevskyj 18th century. Demeter Rostovskyj, 1651—1705, the writing of history Samuel Velychko, died in 1728, Gregor Hrabyanka, died in 1737, and Gregor Poletyka, died in 1784), and also in plastic art which reached a high level of excellence in the Left Bank Region under Mazeppa's hetmanate. Young men in Ukraine were no longer content 871
with native education; more and more they flocked to foreign, and above all, to German and Italian universities. Hetman Rozumovskyj's (1728—1803) intention to found a native uni-

871 versity in his own residential town of Baturyn was prevented from being realised by pressure from the government of Russia.

●538 But in the darkest of days a renaissance sets in, if slowly and scarcely noticeable. 1798 is the date of the appearance of the "Aeneid" by Ivan Kotlarevskyj (1769—1838). It presents actual life in Ukraine, written after a classical model in the form of a satire and in Ukrainian language, which thus becomes the language of literature and culture. Just at a time of greatest oppression, the greatest Ukrainian poet was born: Taras Shevchenko (1814—1861), the national genius, whose prophetic instinct sensed the course of development of native literature and who devoted his entire energy to furthering it. His poems, collected under the title of "Cobzar" (the popular minstrel) became the bible of every patriotic Ukrainian. He was exiled for his views to Siberia by the government of Russia and suffered great hardships which caused his early death. Shevchenko marked a brilliant end to the development of Ukrainian literature up to that onoment but at the same time, the starting-point for a new movement. Pantelejmon Kulish (1819—1897), a most productive writer of many-sided education, was one of Shevchenko's intimates; he distinguished himself not only as a poet, but also as an ethnographer, a historian, a critic, and a translator. In the second half of the 19th century Michael Drahomaniv (1841—1895), a professor at the university in Kyiv, later in Sophia, a follower of socialism and inclined to internationalism, produced much eminent work, though not always of positive value. About the same time in the area of Ukraine that belonged to Austria, Ivan Franko (1856—1916) was working as a poet, a scholar and a politician of renown, being besides Shevchenko the most important personality in modern Ukraine. Round about the turn of the century there was a great increase in the number of Ukrainian writers; among the best known are Lesja Ukrayinka (1872—1913), the author of wonderful poems in dramatic form; Vasyl Stefanyk (1871—1937), whose short stories often portray the tragic fate of Ukrainian peasants; Les Martovych (1871—1916); an accurate observer of life not only among peasants, but also among the educated provincial classes in Ukraine; Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880), a representative of

Ukrainian decadence, wrote not uninteresting dramas, novels and 538
short stories which, however, had no great influence on the public. The following are the most noteworthy members of the younger generation: Gregor Chuprynka (1879—1919), an impressionist who was shot by the bolshevists; Ol. Oles (1878—1943) worked at Prague as an emigrant; the short-story writer Arkhyp Teslenko (1882—1911) who died early after having been banished to the north by the Imperial Government; Petro Karmanskyj (1878), whose lyrics have a delicate, almost exotic tone; Bohdan Lepkyj (1872—1942), who has written historical novels. Olha Kobylanska (1865—1945) was a worthy representative of Bucovina.

Among the many representatives of the world of science we 814
mention Borys Hrinchenko (1863—1910), the editor of a comprehensive dictionary of the Ukrainian language; Agantangel Krymskyj (1871), a famous orientalist, the organiser of the Ukrainian Academy in Kyiv and the supreme head of the newly created state of Ukraine, Michael Hrushevskyj (1886—1934), the most important Slavonic historian of the present day and author of a monumental book on the history of Ukraine.

The literature of Soviet Ukraine which is completely under 538
the influence of bolshevism and Moscow has produced no talent of merit. Out of the great number of prose writers of novel and short story only a few original writers may be mentioned, such as Mykola Khvylovyj (1893—1933) who was driven by the cruelty of real life to commit suicide; Valeryan Pidmohylnyj (1901), Gregor Kosynka (1899—1935), whose end was tragic, too. Khvylovyj is noteworthy because of his desire to enrich Ukrainian culture with western influence and to keep it aloof from northern ideology; pressure from Moscow, however, forced him to abandon his theory. One great master of lyric poetry has appeared, namely Paul Tychyna (1891), though his gift of song has completely dried up in later years. Volodymyr Sosiura (1898) and Eugen Plushnyk (1898) are only worth mentioning for the variety of the rhythms they use; Valeryan Polishchuk (1897) is the founder of a new kind of meter, the so-called "vers libre". One of the most promising and gifted poets of today is Maksym Rylskyj (1895), a neoclassicist, who tried long

538 to uphold his artistic independence in the face of official pressure. But after many years of an unequal struggle his power of resistance broke down and to-day he writes in accordance with instructions from high places. The works of the dramatist Korniychuk, lately awarded the prize of the Union amounting to 100 000 roubles, are of no great artistic value, but only demonstrate a certain obvious tendency.

II.

814 Scientific work of any significance does not begin in Ukraine until the nineteenth century and is confined for the first decades to history and ethnography. This research, in so far as it was done in the Right Bank Region, received a certain support from the Russian government which, after quelling the Polish rebellion in 1831 wished to produce scientific proof that the areas right of the Dnipro have always been what the official language termed "Russian", and that Polish claims were therefore quite unjustified. Governmental circles in the Left Bank Region were not so interested in that question and so it was left to the private initiative of Ukrainian patriots either to preserve the ancient monuments of the glorious past themselves or to hand them over to the safe keeping of the Society for History and Philology at Kharkiv university.

The first proper attempt to organise Ukrainian research activity on a large scale is connected with the foundation of the "South-West Section of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society" in Kyiv, which united eminent Ukrainian scholars of the day for the purpose of working together. In a short time the society had acquired a high reputation in European scientific circles, which it owed as much to the results of its research as to its valuable publications. Then came the unhappy year 1876, when it was forbidden to speak or write Ukrainian and when the Kyiv Geographical Society was dissolved. Thus every possibility of scientific work was closed and scholars were forced by the pressure of altered circumstances to transfer their activity to one of the institutes affiliated to the universities and here, protected by the cloak of officialdom, continue working for Ukraine.

for Austria as for Galicia. The part which this theater had to play in the renaissance of the Ukrainian people in its western areas was similar to that of the Ukrainian stage within the Russian empire. The difficulties with which actors and stage-managers had to cope were no less great, though of a different nature; for its fate was not determined by the Russian censor or the almighty governor general, but by its empty purse. Ukrainians living in Austria-Hungary had no capital at their disposal for the support of the theater and Polish influence on the government in Vienna was so powerful that it was able to prevent the granting of all subsidies to the Ukrainian theater. This situation is expressed by the fact that the four million tax-paying Ukrainians in the Habsburg Empire had not one single permanent theater, but were compelled to be content with travelling companies up to the war of 1914. It is clear that matters were not improved after the debâcle of 1918, when Galicia was annexed to Poland. When Ukrainians in Lviv attempted to build a theater with their own money on a site that had been purchased before, the Polish authorities managed to prevent the realisation of the plan. 538

In Galicia, too, repertories of theatrical companies consisted mainly of subjects from rural life. It is due to this and to the fact that these companies had no permanent home, but also toured through all the smaller towns in Galicia, that the influence of the theater on the population was greater and deeper than that exercised by urban drama of higher artistic merit. Its direct appeal, its proximity to real life aroused in the mass of the Ukrainian peasants the feeling and the demand for dramatic representations. As a result of the fruitful, if most laborious, detailed work accomplished by Ukrainian artists, amateur theatrical societies were formed in almost every village here as elsewhere throughout Ukraine, which, as they attracted young people, exercised a great educational influence.

CHAPTER SIX

The Literary Renaissance

At the beginning of the Ukrainian struggle for independence, the time was ripe for a new period in the literature. There were still living some of the old masters of the nineteenth century as Ivan Levytsky-Nechuy, who died shortly after the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic. Lesya Ukrainka and Kotsyubynsky, the two foremost of the writers of the next generation, had died in 1913 and Oles, the representative of the generation of 1905, was in retirement. 538

This cleared the way for a younger group, as Tychyna and Rylsky, who were already testing their abilities when the First World War broke out.

The outbreak of the struggle in 1917 called back into life such publications as the *Literary-Historical Journal* which had been suppressed in 1914 by the imperial Russian government. It attracted to its pages the leading men of the older generation who were largely populist in their political views and in it appeared the writings of such men as Prof. M. Hrushevsky, Vynnychenko, Samiylenko, Oles, Vorony, G. Chuprynka and L. Starytska-Chernyakivska. The list of contributors includes most of the people who had already established their reputation and the journal had a short but distinguished career.

When the Ukrainian National Republic finally was overthrown and the Soviet regime established, many of these older writers disappeared from Ukraine. Oles retired to Prague, and Vynnychenko and many others made their way to Western Europe. Even those who remained in Ukraine found themselves out of sympathy with the new government and relapsed into silence, but even this

538 did not save them for many were arrested and executed at various times.

It was only natural that the period of the civil war was not conducive to the production of artistic literature. For those who were willing to cooperate, there were many posts open in the government, but the pressure of public affairs distracted them and left them little time for belles-lettres. For others who had less taste for political and public life, the obvious course was to retire to the villages and there meditate and work in silence with scanty hope for the immediate publishing of their works. This was the course largely pursued by Tychyna and Rylsky and their friends, together with many of the Symbolists.

However, during 1917 and 1918 new almanacs and journals put in an appearance and these could hardly fail to express the political struggles, for some of them, as *Mystetstvo* (Art), were definitely leftist in character and others were the product of various groups and schools of writers.

[626] With the final establishment of Soviet power, the literature lost most of the freedom which it had acquired in the years of struggle. The Communists lost no time in suppressing all the old publications and in establishing their own. These were more or less strictly censored. and it was impossible from the beginning to publish any work which might awaken the suspicions of the new regime.

At the same time in Ukraine, as in the RSFSR, the Communist attitude toward literature was not clearly defined. The new authorities spread over the country a whole chain of Proletkult (Proletarian Art) centres with the idea of a speedy development of a new proletarian art. Yet the experiment was not too successful and, as an outcome of the similar developments in Petrograd and Moscow, these were soon suppressed but not until they had created a taste for writing in many of the younger and often uneducated generation, who were attracted by the slogans and the hopes inspired by the Communists.

This marked a definite break with the past and it was sufficient to eliminate from their commanding positions most of the older

men. However, there was no official attitude adopted toward 538 ● literature, no definite command to write in accordance with a definite style, provided that the authors stayed away from subjects that seemed to be openly anti-Communist.

The authors who were closest to the new regime were those that had approached Communism through the Left Social Revolutionists (the Borotbisty) and who considered themselves a "proletarian" group in the new terminology. Many of the earlier members of this group, as the impressionistic poet Vasyl Chumak and the prose impressionist Andry Zalyochy and also Hnat Mykhaylychenko, were killed during the civil wars or in various uprisings. In a sense they were fortunate and so was the outstanding novelist, Vasyl Blakytny, who died in 1925. Blakytny's death was widely lamented as the death of a distinguished author of revolutionary romanticism, but it was only a few years later when he, like the other Borotbisty, was accused of "unreliability," his works were officially banned and the plaque which marked the house where he died was removed.

Artistically, the Symbolists, as Tychyna, were technically the most advanced on the literary side. They were consciously trying to adapt the Western, and especially the French, conceptions of Symbolism to Ukrainian and without going into the decadent features of French Symbolism, they sought to acclimate in Ukrainian many of the devices and the metres that had been worked out in the West.

Close to them was the group of the Neo-Classicists headed by Mykola Zerov. The members of this group, too, endeavored to produce high art with as few political overtones as possible. The group, which also included the poet Maksym Rylsky, sought to draw their inspiration from the classical world and they stressed the ancient connections between the Black Sea and the classical world of the Mediterranean.

Both the Symbolists and the Neo-Classicists were in their hearts more or less hostile to the revolution, in so far as it was a destroyer of cultural values but they were anything but reactionaries or anti-Communists in the ordinary sense of the word. They were

638 rather far removed from the developments of the present, interested in literature and literary criticism and standing for the preservation of cultural values.

In view of the relations between the Communists in Ukraine and those in the RSFSR, it was only natural that all of the literary debates that went on in Moscow should find an echo in Ukraine. This was the period when Bukharin, Trotsky and Lunacharsky were debating very seriously the relations between the Communists, the proletarian writers and the so-called "fellow-travellers" who sympathized more or less sincerely with the revolution but who had not taken the full step and become members of the Communist Party. It was in this latter group that the greater Russian writers of the day were to be found and many of them had already achieved fame before the revolution. In 1925 they succeeded in obtaining what seemed to be a certain recognition by the party and it was on the basis of these decisions and this standard that both the Symbolists and the Neo-Classicists continued to be able to publish.

At the same time Ukrainian literature could not be considered as a mere reflection of any of these groups. There was still too much consciousness of Ukrainian independence to make the more able authors merely blind imitators of a foreign literature. Besides, [177] the contacts which still existed with Western Ukraine under Polish rule[1] brought it about that even the Eastern Ukrainians were influenced both by the Polish and Austrian developments and writers as Stefanyk were read almost as much in Kiev and Kharkiv as they were in Lviv and Stanislaviv.

The taking over by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty of the Commissariat for Education could not fail to have a definite effect upon the leftist writers who dreamed of establishing not only a proletarian literature but also a Ukrainian proletarian literature, and with this purpose in mind there developed at the capital of Kharkiv and also in Kiev and elsewhere a new series of literary schools and movements, each of which based itself upon its own interpretation of the revolution. They started in general from two contradictory positions, depending on whether they stressed

1 [after Communist rule was established in Ukraine -- Analyst]

the revolutionary ardor of the peasants or that of the proletariat 538 and this was roughly parallel to the division between the peasant and the factory writers in the RSFSR.

Thus the organization, the *Plough,* as its name implies, was the organ of that group which emphasized the role of the peasants and their connection with the proletariat. They admitted to membership every one who wished to write, provided he belonged to the "laboring element." Naturally, with such a slogan, much of their work was not of a high order but the leaders considered their work as educational and they did not object when the more competent and trained writers dropped away or joined other organizations.

Opposed to them was the *Hart* (the Tempering of Steel) which existed from 1923 to 1925. This based itself far more solidly on the proletarian writers of the cities. It stressed urban and factory life and saw the triumph of Communism transforming the peasantry into a type far more like that of the city proletariat than that of the old, independent farmer. Yet this group, too, was very soon torn by questions over the relations between the Russian and Ukrainian Communists and it split up after the publication of its first almanac.

The sharpest defender of a definite Ukrainian line in the *Hart* was Mykola Khvylovy and he very soon split away from the more moderates and those seeking a closer alliance with the Russians. He formed the group *Urbino* in 1925 and out of this grew the *Vaplite,* the Free Academy of Proletarian Literature, which became the rallying ground for all of the more consciously alert members of the leftist and Communist groups. It was with the *Vaplite* that there were associated most of these men, as Arkady Lyubchenko, Yury Yanovsky, Petro Panch, the dramatist Mykola Kulish, the theatrical producer Les Kurbas and such poets as Tychyna, Mykhaylo (Mike) Yohansen and Mykola Bazhan. This was the outstanding literary development of the period of Ukrainization and under the leadership of Khvylovy, they took a definite political stand on all the questions of the day.

There were similar groups in Kiev. Thus there was formed

538 the *Aspis* (Association of Proletarian Writers) in 1923 and from this, in its turn, was developed the *Lanka* or Link in 1924-6 and later the *MARS* (the Workshop of the Revolutionary Word), 1926-8 with such members as Evhen Pluzhnyk, Dmytro Falkivsky and T. Osmachka. They sought to keep themselves somewhat free from excessive flattery of the government and in general shared the general attitude of the *Vaplite* in Kharkiv.

Another movement which had appeared just before the revolution was Futurism which, in the person of its leader, Mykhaylo Semenko, denied totally the artistic value of all preceding literary schools. The revolution gave this, too, the possibility of boasting that by its denial of the past it was the true mouthpiece for revolutionary art, even though its successes were relatively slight and many of its productions were almost unintelligible to the general public. The Futurists, too, engaged in the usual process of splitting and recombining during the height of this period, when the authors were still relatively free to express their own thoughts.

Beyond these again was the great mass of the proletarian authors. These were men, usually of less artistic ability, who listened eagerly to the general slogans put out by the Communists in Moscow and Kharkiv. They followed blindly the established formulas for the production of Communist literature. They had, in fact, the general attitude of the Russian On-Guardists and they were more renowned for their reliability and skill in following the general line of the Party than they were for their literary originality or their moral and artistic integrity. They were in general the literary hacks of the day, often with slight preliminary education, and proletarian in more senses than one.

Thus during the period of Ukrainization, the literature moved along two distinct planes. Leaving aside those authors who endeavored to work in an anti-political world, there were those who blindly followed the political line and those men who ventured to think for themselves but along the lines of Communist thought. These latter were the logical outcome of the ideas of the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty and the proclamation of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. At times they could even

be critical of the actual developments of the day but in their hearts they accepted the general articles of belief and sought to give them a fuller significance. The way was open to make them a loyal opposition to the regime and for several years they seemed to be attaining the position which they desired. 638

CHAPTER EIGHT

Mykola Khvylovy

Shumsky and Skrypnyk, as Commissars for Education, defended the position of the Ukrainian language in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and among the Ukrainians in the entire USSR. They worked to break down the anti-Ukrainian attitude that had existed from the beginning in the Communist Party of Ukraine, but as men holding public office and busied with the political and administrative problems that were thus raised, they did not go further. The additional step to point out the road for this newly conscious Ukrainian Communism was taken by Mykola Khvylovy. 538 186

Khvylovy, who was born in 1891, was already well known as a Communist writer. A fearless author of strong convictions, he had worked his way early in the Civil War to the position of the Communists and had served as a commissar in the Ukrainian Communist Army. He was now one of the recognized Communist writers and moving spirit of the leading literary group, the *Vaplite* (the All-Ukrainian Academy of Proletarian Literature), the members of which were devoted to him.

Khvylovy was an ardent admirer of Trotsky and when the break came between Trotsky and Stalin, he took the side of the former and held, with him, that the cause of counter-revolution had triumphed and that the rise of a Soviet bureaucracy was merely a return to the old unhappy state. Khvylovy had become a Communist solely because of his belief that it was only through Communism and Communist teachings that humanity could achieve its goal of liberation and self-development and he was impatient with anything that seemed to contradict this theory.

538 186 He was at the same time an ardent Ukrainian. He could not bear to see the subordinate position which Ukraine and the Ukrainian Communist Party held in the USSR and he resented the already obvious attempts to present Moscow as the supreme representative of Communism and of a general Communist culture.

In 1925, he began to publish a weekly pamphlet as a supplement to the central newspaper *Visti* under the title *Culture and Life*. In this he advocated the development of an independent Ukrainian Communist culture which would be distinct from that of Moscow. His first articles, which were purely literary in character, started a lively controversy in the press and in public meetings. It was difficult to attack him, for he based his arguments entirely upon the official statements of the Communist Party and he revealed the inconsistency which existed in these official statements. The entire Ukrainian section of the KP/b/U was aroused and so was the whole of Ukrainian society. Here was a popular writer who dared, in the name of Ukrainian Communism, to take the statements of the Communist Party (KP/b/U) seriously and to draw the logical conclusions from them. These articles he then republished in book form, *Quo Vadis* (1925), *Thoughts against the Current* (1926) and *The Sociological Equivalent* (1927).

Khvylovy's original arguments had urged the necessity for the new Communist Ukrainian literature to assimilate and build itself upon the great European cultural and literary tradition as exemplified in its greatest and noblest writers and thinkers and not to confine itself to being, as it had been too often in the past, a mere appanage and colony of Russia. He deplored the already evident tendency of Ukrainian Communist literature to base itself on the pronunciamentos of Moscow without testing and analyzing them and this led him to proclaim as his slogan "Away from Moscow."

"The ideas of the proletariat we all know without the guidance of Moscow. Only the young Ukrainian nation, the Ukrainian proletariat and its Communist intelligentsia are the true bearers of the great revolutionary socialist ideas and they must not orient themselves on the centre of All-Union Philistinism, on the Moscow sirens. They need to orient themselves on themselves and Europe, but not

on the Europe of Spengler, which is declining and which we all 538
hate, but on the Europe of the great civilization, the Europe of 186
Goethe, Darwin, Byron, Newton, Marx, etc. That is the Europe that the first legions of the Asiatic Renaissance cannot dispense with."

In another article he wrote. "Russia is an independent country. Independent. We too are independent. Insofar as our literature has its own path of development, we must ask ourselves the question as to which of the world literatures it is to follow. It is not the Russian in any case. This is positive without any reservations. Ukrainian poetry must flee from Russian literature as rapidly as it can. The reason is that Russian literature has dominated us for centuries as the master of the situation and has trained our psychology to slavish imitation. To base our young art upon it means the halting of our development.

"The time has come to put an end to all Little Russianism, to Ukrainophilism and to Prosvitaism (an allusion to the net of elementary Ukrainian educational institutions existing before the Communist Revolution), and also to ragtag Moscophilism."

The ideas which Khvylovy expressed about literature had a far wider significance, for they could be applied to every aspect of Ukrainian life and activity. As the discussion shifted to the broader questions that were involved, Stalin, who was engrossed in the struggle with Trotsky, interfered personally. He wrote in April, 1926, as general secretary of the VKP/b [the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] to the KP/b/U: "If the Western European proletariat look with longing on the banner which waves in Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvylovy has nothing else to say in favor of Moscow but to urge the Ukrainian workers to flee from Moscow. What is to be said about the other Ukrainian intellectuals of the non-Communist camp, if the Communists begin to speak and not only speak but write in our Soviet press in the words of Khvylovy?"

This was the signal for a new series of attacks on Khvylovy by the complacent russifiers in the Communist Party of Ukraine. All the members of the Executive Committee except Shumsky joined

538 in the attack and so did their satellites, but Khvylovy stood his
186 ground and reiterated more strongly his demands for an independent Ukrainian cultural development and repeated Trotsky's attacks on Moscow as the centre of the new Philistinism which had devoured the revolution.

By the end of the year, Khvylovy and the *Vaplite* found it necessary to prepare a formal letter of apology and self-accusation for publication. However humble and self-accusing he was in this letter, he was thoroughly insincere, for he had no intention of changing his course and in a few weeks he resumed his hammering at the forces and advocates of Moscow. He merely sought to gain time to let his words sink in more deeply into the consciousness of the Ukrainian people. His opponents recognized this and throughout 1926 and 1927, they ceaselessly attacked him. In fact, at the end of 1927, at the Tenth Congress of the KP/b/, Kaganovich declared that Khvylovy was an "echo of the bourgeois and kurkuls who base their hopes for the restoration of a bourgeois government in Ukraine on the forces of an armed foreign imperialism."

Khvylovy's article on *Ukraine or Little Russia* was refused publication by the *Visti* on the orders of the party authorities and renewed efforts were made to silence him. This it was impossible to do decisively until the final expulsion of Trotsky from the Communist Party, for the leading representatives of Moscow could not be sure until that time that many of the expressions used by the daring writer would not be incorporated into the principles of the party itself, even though Trotsky had never been known for any pro-Ukrainianism.

To make his cause more vocal, Khvylovy began to express his basic ideas not only in his publicistic articles but in his artistic stories and novels which were very popular among all classes of literate Ukrainians. The climax came with his *Woodsnipes,* the first part of which appeared in 1928.

This was strictly a propaganda novel written with all of Khvylovy's artistic skill. In this he depicts types of his Ukrainian opponents, the Russian Bolshevists, the typical careerists, and the character of Aglaya, the new Ukrainian type who speaks in the words

and with the views of the author. She denounces the gloomy devils in the Moscow chauvinists who were bent upon the enslavement of Ukraine in the name of the International. "It is the same Russian intelligent-internationalist, who willingly talks about the self-determination of nations . . . only not of those which are in the Soviet Union. Here it sees only followers of Petlyura and does not notice its own interference. It here thinks that Ukrainian culture exists . . . as an Austrian intrigue. He points out to Europe the achievements of the Russian genius and leads out into the arena the other peoples of the Union, as the Russian tsarism maintained its own zoo for the people it had conquered. In a word, he is an internationalist who, behind his cosmopolitanism, preserves his own zoological nationalism." 538 186

The second part of the novel was completed and Khvylovy went abroad. As a result of the storm that this novel aroused, the journal of the *Vaplite* was suppressed. The moment was apparently chosen in the hope that Khvylovy would maintain his position and be forced into emigration, from which his influence in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic would be lessened, if not destroyed. Instead, Khvylovy promised to have the manuscript of the second part destroyed and returned to Ukraine.

"By destroying the *Woodsnipes* and thus buying the right to return home . . . and to continue the struggle in more limited forms," wrote Yur. D., in the introduction to the Salzburg edition of the book,—"Khvylovy assured the possibility of the appearance of a numbers of plays by Kulish, of the pieces of the Berezil, his own compilation of the *Literary Fair,* the Ukrainian films of Dovzhenko, the Ukrainization of the higher schools,—in a word he postponed for five years the assassination of the great cultural renaissance."

The other members of the *Vaplite* joined in their own way with Khvylovy in painting the contrasts between the high ideals set forth in the decrees of the Communist party and the sordid reality of the Bolshevik bureaucracy in the Ukraine, who were making no attempt to turn the visions of the party principles into the life of the people. All of the writers were attacked as Khvylovy and

538 sooner or later silenced, even though for some time they worked
186 with him in publishing the *Literary Fair,* a medley of works of all kinds with pungent introductions and comments.

This tendency became so marked that in 1927, Andry Khvylya, one of the most faithful supporters of the official line of the Party declared of the story of Valeriyan Pidmohylny, the *Third Revolution,* "It makes it seem as if Makhno was at the head of the revolutionary movement, that the villagers were with him, as their earth bore them, and that the Bolsheviks were running after Makhno and collecting cream, . . . that the Communist Party were a group of plotters, who had no connection with the masses but through espionage were profiting by the great deeds of other people." Khvylovy found another Communist ally in the person of Volobuyiv. He was a young Ukrainian economist who utilized the materials on the Ukraine prepared by Prof. V. Dobrohayev and published in the central organ of the KP/b/U, the *Bolshevik of Ukraine,* a series of articles which showed the extent of the exploitation of Ukraine by Moscow. He proved clearly that Moscow was carrying out a colonial policy in respect to Ukraine, instead of treating it as an equal republic. This was a sensational revelation for the twenties. Later the works of both Volobuyiv and Khvylovy were condemned by Moscow as anti-Communist and Volobuyiv, shortly after 1933, was exiled to a Siberian prison.

The growing pressure upon Ukraine, the forced collectivization which was beginning and the beginning of the great famine of 1932-3, completed the disillusionment of Khvylovy, who up to this time had maintained a stubborn faith in the principles of Communism and its aspirations for a better future for the common man. His later works made it clear that he had lost all hope that the revolution would accomplish anything except a continuation of the streams of blood that were beginning again to flow throughout Ukraine. Yet there was nothing for him to do but to continue his work.

186 National Republic, who had gone abroad after its collapse and
814 who had been invited back to take part in the work of the Ukrain-
687 ian Academy of Sciences. The government produced what seemed
661 to be definite evidence against these people but the curious fact
[538] was that this evidence was strangely inconsistent with all of their previous activity. On the prisoner's bench were such men as Serhey Yefremiv, the leading scholar of Ukrainian literature and a relative conservative, the academiciam Mykhaylo Slabchenko, a former Social Democrat, Prof. Joseph Hermayze, a former member of the Executive Committee of the same party, and the well-known writer L. Starytska-Chernyakivska, who was close to Efremiv and who had more or less dropped out of the modern literary movement and was living in practical retirement.

The Soviet record of the trial strongly suggests that all those factions which, during the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic had utterly failed to come to any agreement, had somehow or other composed their differences in the days when Ukrainian sentiments seemed to be dominant in the ranks of the Communist Party and when there were outstanding Communists, like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, pleading the Ukrainian cause. Yet, as was to be the case in almost all of the later trials, the court record based upon the testimony of the NKVD did not give any clue to the treasonable acts of which the defendants were accused and if they did, the stories passed belief. There was, likewise, no indication of the serious plans on which the organization was working or any details of its formal organization.

All the information that was revealed suggested that it was a definitely anti-Communist movement engineered by a group of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who objected to the Communist program of Ukrainization. There was no hint that the accused had any connection with the derussification program of Skrypnyk or the demand of Khvylovy and his friends of the *Vaplite* for the development of a definite Ukrainian Communism. The Society for the Liberation of Ukraine appeared like a ghost from the past and the prosecution seemed to have the tacit support of even those elements which were working for Ukrainization.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Turning of the Cultural Tide

The Ukrainian Communists did not realize what they were 186
doing when they launched their campaign against the bourgeois 814
intellectuals and the aged scholars in the Academy of Sciences. For the first time since the period of Ukrainization had started, they had definitely called the attention of Moscow to the existence in Ukraine of a survival of the old independent mode of thinking which had animated the Ukrainian leaders in the struggle for an independent state of their own and they had coined a name for it, bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism. That was to recur again and again and lead to their own ruin.

It is remarkable that neither Skrypnyk nor Khvylovy realized [829]
this earlier. Both men in their own way were seriously threatening the unity of the Soviet Union, to which as an ideal they were loyal. Both men, Skrypnyk in the political field and Khvylovy in literature, realized the danger to Ukraine of substituting Russianism for Communism. Both men accepted in different senses the basic ideals of Communism and both believed in a Communist International which would offer all peoples full rights of cultural and political development. Neither one understood that the Comintern was a shadow structure which was totally dependent upon the forces operating in Moscow and that the situation in 1928 and 1929 was basically different from that ten years before.

In the RSFSR the charter of liberty for the fellow travellers 626
which had been promulgated in 1925 was practically abolished by 538
the granting of extreme power of control to Averbakh and the RAPP (the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) which, to all intents and purposes, was issuing orders as to how the writers should support the Five Year Plan.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

626 It was perfectly natural that a similar situation should develop
538 in Ukraine. The various schools of serious writing, as the *Vaplite,* stood out against this regimentation and ably defended their position, but that position was indefensible in the face of political pressure and without being conscious of any inconsistency, Skrypnyk, as a good Communist and a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was willing to exert pressure to bring the literary organization of Ukraine in line with that of the All-Union Communist Party at the very same time when he was deliberately thwarting the unifying tendencies of that party.

[186] The first sign of the changed order came with the arrest and
[68] deportation of M. Ivchenko for his novel *Working Powers* because it endeavored to express in a concrete form the problem of fitting the ideals of the various national groups into the stereotyped formula which was now fashionable. Next came the difficulties of Khvylovy over his novel *Woodsnipes,* despite his willingness to secure an opportunity for further work by the destruction of the second part of the novel.

It must be remembered that the groups which were now being attacked were not by their essential declarations anti-Communist. They reflected, rather, the disillusionment of many people with the prevailing manifestations of Communism, the growing realization that the Communist regime was not giving the people that ideal reality which its teachings indicated they should easily win.
[536] That was the gist of the drama by M. Kulish, the *People's Malakhy,* which reflected the contrast between the ideals of a high-minded but somewhat simple village Don Quixote and the realities of life on any particular level. This, as other of his plays, was well presented in the Berezil Theatre, directed by Les Kurbas, a Western Ukrainian who had developed in Kiev into one of the great producers and had pushed the Ukrainian theatrical art to its highest development. Writings of the same character had marked some of the early Russian works of A. N. Tolstoy after the revolution but, being a Great Russian, he was not involved in the endless controversies over the national questions and, like most of the Russian authors, he was able to work out a satisfactory agreement with the

Stalin policies. This was not true of the Ukrainian authors who felt a steadily increasing pressure from the Communist authorities. 626 538

The vast majority of the more mediocre authors who had sought to follow unhesitatingly the party line found it very natural to form themselves into the VUSPP (the All-Ukrainian Society of Proletarian Writers) in 1927. They published a monthly journal, *Hart* and the *Literary Journal,* and to show their real internationalism they supported a Russian proletarian journal, the *Krasnoye Slovo* (the Red Word) and a Jewish paper, *Di Royte Welt.* It was only natural that this group should seek support by applying for membership in the VOAPP (the All-Union Society of Proletarian Writers) which, of course, was completely under the domination of the Russian Section, the RAPP. They thus became the thinking or unthinking agents by which the Russians could direct their blows against Ukrainian literature.

On the other hand, there came during these years a similar concentration of those writers who rejected bourgeois ideas but who still were working to develop a Ukrainian Communism in the true sense of the word. Yet they were forced to shift their positions constantly and hence there came a hectic but yet vital series of publications.

The Futurists who denied the value of the past and worked in experimental efforts were naturally the opponents of Khvylovy and the *Vaplite* and finally, in 1927, they united with some of the other radical groups (in the literary sense) to form the *New Generation* which continually published declarations of policy and of adherence to Communist ideas, but this group also drew upon itself the criticism of the VUSPP because it aimed for the adaptation of literature to the Ukrainian scene.

On the other hand, the *Vaplite* was very soon compelled to disband. It did so voluntarily but the bulk of the abler writers immediately started to publish the *Literaturny Yarmarok* (The Literary Fair) in which, under the guise of apolitical writing, they poured out scarcely veiled criticism of their opponents. This, too, was soon under attack and then it was reorganized as the *Prolitfront* (the Union of Studies of the Proletarian Literary Front). This

626 device was also too obvious, for the new journal continued to
538 criticize the Russian policy and in 1931 it was forced to disband and most of the members who wanted to continue to write passed into the VUSPP, which, with all its rigid adherence to the party line, could not be too sure as to what that party line really was.

At one point in his career Skrypnyk, who was in many ways opposed to Khvylovy, dreamed of the establishment of a Federation of the Unions of Revolutionary Writers of Ukraine. He succeeded in forcing this upon the Futurists and many smaller leftist groups and also the *New Generation,* but his failure to make this real in 1931 was but a sign of the future.

By this time the VUSPP, along with the RAPP, had become the dominating force politically and Skrypnyk was forced to give up his endeavors and to allow most of his Federation members to join the VUSPP. This was but another step in the decay of all literary schools and it reflected the period of uncertainty and of a definite degree of opposition to the domination of the RAPP.

By the end of the twenties, the opportunities for independent thinking in literature had grown exceedingly few and scattered. There were still, in general, only the two currents of Ukrainian and Russian Communism, and the former was definitely beginning to wane under the continual attacks that were delivered both by its opponents and the Communist Party through its official organs.
[186] Still, up until 1931, Ukrainian literature continued to develop and the literary disputes, often over minor points of literature, thought and culture, animated society and lent a zest to the various writings. These now more than ever began to reflect a growing apprehension over the conditions as they were and the impossibility of equating the ideals of Communism and the realities of the Russian domination of the country.

[656] A more decided blow was given by the decree of April 23, 1932. This ended all literary discussions and abolished all literary societies and groups throughout the entire Soviet Union. In place of these, Stalin announced the establishment of a single society throughout the entire Union, the All-Union Association of Soviet Writers, and turned this over to Maksim Gorky, perhaps the most prominent

Russian writer of the day but a man who was bitterly anti-Ukrainian 636
and scornful of the national cultures of all the Soviet Republics. 538
His object seems to have been in Ukraine to force the literature to accept the Russian pattern. The new doctrine of socialist realism was promulgated and it was very soon made clear that the destruction of the VUSPP and all the old groups was not a step toward the restoration of freedom for creation but a new move to strengthen, on a somewhat different basis, the government's control over everything that was published.

It was highly significant for this that at the early meetings of the Ukrainian Section, its organizer, I. Kulyk, appeared in the uniform of a frontier guard of the NKVD as a silent warning to all of those who might be regarded as heretical in any sense. Furthermore Zhdanov as a member of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party, explained the situation. In his keynote speech, he declared:

"Comrade Stalin has called our writers engineers of human souls. What does that mean? What obligations does it lay upon them? It means first that they must know life, so as to represent it faithfully in artistic works, to represent it not scholastically or in a dead way, not simply as an objective realism but to picture reality in its revolutionary development. In this the truth and historical concreteness of artistic representation must coincide with the tasks of the ideal reworking and development of the working people in the spirit of socialism. This method of artistic literature and of literary criticism are what we call the method of socialist realism."

Whatever might have been the effect of the new organization on Russian literature, which had been handicapped by the domination of the RAPP, its effect on Ukrainian literature could not fail to be disastrous. In effect, it standardized all literature on the Russian model and it indicated that henceforth literature and literary men were to be treated as organs of the Communist Party and of the Moscow regime. It was the definite answer to the efforts of the Ukrainian writers of nearly all the conflicting schools to adapt literature to their own purposes and ideals. It took away from the writers all inspiration and desire to use their talents for their own

626 artistic enjoyment and it rendered it possible for the central govern-
538 ment to abolish that sense of republican patriotism which had been so marked during the preceding period in all the non-Russian republics.

626 In place of the ideas of the old Ukrainian life which was being
538 brought to an end by the compulsory collectivization and the
178 establishment of the collective farms, in place of the old visions of the unity of the Ukrainian people and those ideals of a new national life that had dominated Ukrainian literature from the time of Shevchenko, in place of the efforts to establish in Ukrainian literature all those branches of art and culture which were stirring in Western Europe, there was now given to the writers, young and old, the command to celebrate and to glorify the actual process of socialist construction in Ukraine, as elsewhere. By 1934 Kulyk, as the organizer of the Ukrainian section, could write of the definite end of the old bourgeois nationalist sentiment as preached by Yefremiv and of the efforts of Khvylovy to reorient the psychology of Ukrainian literature on that of Europe. In his article on the modern Ukrainian literature in a volume on the *Literature of the Peoples of the USSR* published in 1934, he could pass over in silence, for obvious reasons, all of the great names which had appeared during the preceding ten years and shower his praise upon the young proletarian writers who were willing to follow blindly and, to the best of their ability, the new course.

There were, of course, some of the older and even of the more prominent men who were willing to compromise with the new regime. Among them the outstanding figures were Tychyna and Rylsky. Both of them, after consideration and treatment by the authorities, tried to bend their works to the new ideas but there were many who were unwilling or unable to be untrue to their artistic faith and for them there was not even the choice of silence or writing. They were compelled to conform or vanish and it was not long after the organization of the All-Union Society of Soviet Writers when this was made abundantly clear.

basis with Ukrainian. He established Russian theatres in the larger 191
cities and sent them Russian companies from Leningrad and Moscow 636
to show the greatness of Russian art, while at the same time he had [545]
Les Kurbas arrested at the end of the year and closed the Berezil Theatre, the leading company in Ukraine, and even abolished its name as Catherine the Great had abolished the name of the Zaporozhian Sich one hundred fifty years before.

The fundamental object was to re-Russianize Ukraine as rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this idea, Zatonsky even suggested that the students should be encouraged to talk a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian in the hope that they could thus be more quickly induced to accept the alien tongue. That was a rash thought, for as soon as it was reported to Moscow, there came a strong protest from Gorky that such a procedure could only injure the purity of the Russian language by mixing foreign elements in it. Zatonsky hurriedly withdrew his suggestions but it was too late and only a few years later he was to pay the penalty for his rash proposal.

It was small wonder that Khvylovy, who knew well that he [762]
was threatened with arrest and execution, committed suicide in despair on May 13, 1933 and he was followed on July 6, by Skrypnyk who was too familiar with the workings of Russian Communism not to realize that he would be steadily demoted until he could be finished off without comment as a fallen idol.

The terror and the destruction proceeded apace and after the 661
murder of Kirov in Leningrad on December 21, 1934, new in- 538
vestigations were ordered and it was discovered that the bulk of the Ukrainian authors were involved in the conspiracy. In a very short time their ranks were almost completely decimated. In the same month H. Kosynka, O. Vlyzko, I. Krushelnytsky, K. Burevy, and D. Falkivsky were shot on various pretenses. Nearly all the former members of the *Vaplite,* the Neo-Classicists, the groups connected with the MARS in Kiev and the *New Generation,* were liquidated in one way or another, either by execution or deportation and deportation was practically the equivalent of death, for scarcely one of the deported ever returned to the Ukraine or made

[reference to forced Russification of Ukraine, 1933 -- Analyst]

661 his presence or his present place of dwelling known to any of his
538 friends.

It would be too long to mention the list of names, but among them were all the outstanding names of the preceding years, Kulish, Yalovy, Yohansen, Epik, Zerov, Dray-Khmara, Kosynka, Pidmohylny, Semenko, Vuzko, etc. These men were not only put out of the way but every attempt was made to prove that they had never existed. Their books were removed from the libraries and bookstores and, so far as possible, even references to them and their work were expunged from encyclopedias and reference books and the movement which they represented and which, but a short time before, had been patronized by the Commissariat of Education was rendered non-existent. Only the name of Khvylovy remained as an example of anti-Russian work and he was presented as a pupil of Petlyura, Hrushevsky and the Western imperialists and a believer in bourgeois nationalism, a term which was now extended to cover anything hostile to the general line of the Party.

Faced with the certainty of sharing the fate of their colleagues[1]
626 some of even the more prominent authors began to waver. Among
538 this number were Tychyna and, a little more reluctantly, Rylsky. In fact, it required a term in prison to bring the latter to an appreciation of the beauties of the new order. Both proved themselves valuable converts, even if they were compelled to forget all their old mannerisms and perfections of style and produce tasteless propaganda poetry, while the official organs boasted of their slow but steady growth in realism. Thus, in 1934 Kulyk could say of Tychyna, "The collection of *The Party Leads* represents an unquestionable achievement. Nevertheless we should be rendering poor service to Tychyna himself if we failed to point out the uneven tenor, and sometimes even hesitation, in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to him. Stronger organizational ties with the realities, emancipation from artificial, at times purely bookish culture, such are the conditions on which depends further progress by Tychyna along the new road chosen by this great Ukrainian poet." Rylsky and Bazhan were treated in the same way, while such writers as Panch and Holovko were told it was their task to get over the

[1] [Persecution, during Russification of Ukraine, 1933 -- Analyst]

old notion that "Mother Ukraine" had the same interest in all her 626
sons, whether they were working men, peasants or intellectual 538
nationalists. Both of them later revised their works under the kind leadership of the Party.

The proletarian writers and those who were content to write upon the prescribed or recommended themes were in their element. Kyrylenko and Mykytenko wrote glowingly and woodenly about collectivization and the elimination of the kulaks, "the dregs of society." Korniychuk, a young dramatist, presented in his plays all the appropriate Five Year plan subjects and gloried in the defeat of the old in the factories and on the collective farms. Everything in the literary field that glorified the Communist Party and rejected those ideas which had flourished under the preceding regime was applauded and the successful received honors and wealth and Stalin prizes for literary achievement.

The same development or retrogression[1] was to be noted in the 626
more purely scientific fields, especially where they touched studies 814
dealing with the Ukrainian language, history or culture. Skrypnyk had removed some of the more distinguished members of the Academy of Science. Postyshev purged most of their followers and then he went on to reorganize the institution in the Communist way. The Academy was changed into a series of separate institutes, each of which was subject only to a carefully chosen Presidium.

Then, at the end of 1934 all of those institutes connected with the old Historical Section and which dealt with such subjects as Ukrainian archaeology, history, history of law, Western Ukraine, etc. were abolished. The study of the humanities was practically ended and the old staff was excluded. There were left only institutes of language and material culture to care for the past and all other subjects were handed over to the network of the VUAMLIN, the reorganized and strengthened network of Marxo-Leninist institutes, which could serve as a more reliable means of spreading Communist doctrine in a pseudo-scientific form. They created a new complex of societies as the Society of Marxist Historians, all of which had the avowed purpose of glorifying the regime at the expense of any form of scientific truth.

[1] [1933-- Analyst]

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Lyubchenko, who had been appointed the Prime Minister of the UkSSR on the single program of suppressing Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, was called to Moscow to confront the self-confessed leaders of the nationalists and, on his return to Kiev, he shot himself. His successor, Bondarenko, disappeared without a trace. 661 687

Who were these self-confessed leaders? Prominent among them was A. Khvylya, who had been the champion of the general line against Khvylovy and Skrypnyk and who had been the dominant figure in the attack on the Ukrainian literary men and scholars. For years he had resorted to all kinds of attacks to bring Ukrainian grammar and language closer to Russian. He now "voluntarily" confessed that he had worked against the "elder brother" and had joined and aided in developing a secret military force several million strong for the sole purpose of separating Ukraine from the USSR and he swore that in this he had the active aid of Lyubchenko and most of the officials of the UkSSR. Finis.

Zatonsky, the Commissar of Education, was accused of another crime. He had drawn years before the fire of Gorky for suggesting that a mixed language be introduced into Ukrainian schools as the means of absorbing Ukrainian into Russian. He had speedily withdrawn his recommendations under fire and all had seemed forgiven. It was not, and Zatonsky disappeared in the holocaust.

It then came the turn of the writers. Men like Kulyk, who had run roughshod over the older writers and had called for their liquidation, were now found guilty of bourgeois nationalism and with them most of the authors who had emerged during the shattering of the Ukrainian renaissance and who had celebrated the turning of the Ukraine into a collectivized and industrialized state. Each and every one of them confessed that they had been guilty of bourgeois nationalism and they received the due reward for their crimes. [538]

There was hardly a family in Ukraine which did not suffer the accusation of at least one member. The survivors who have escaped abroad have given lurid tales of the extent to which the feeling of distrust and suspicion spread among all classes of the

626 sian patriot for signing the Treaty of Pereyaslav and bringing the
814 Zaporozhian Kozaks under Muscovite domination. It was so in
661 every branch of historical study. In back of the conception of the Soviet man and Soviet patriotism began to emerge with ever greater clarity the conception of Russian patriotism, as the doctrine of the "elder brother" who had given culture and civilization to the other nations of the Soviet Union became clearer and clearer.

626 It was the same thing in language. Khvylya and his friends
814 had been working on a Ukrainian-Russian dictionary but this was
191 immediately criticized by *Pravda* for its divisive tendencies, and the guilty compilers were liquidated. A new edition was started in 1938 on still a new principle. The Ukrainian and Russian words were to have the same number of synonyms and these were to have identical value. If, in any particular case, this did not prove to be true, it was so much the worse for the Ukrainian. If there were more words in Ukrainian to express various shades of one idea that there were in Russian, the words were banned. If there were fewer, the Russian words were supplied in order to show the influence that Russian had had upon the cultural development of Ukrainian.

The result was the reverse of what Zatonsky had proposed. He had suggested a mixed language with the idea that the Ukrainians would develop by practice toward the use of standard Russian. Now the new Commissariat of Education was introducing Russian into Ukrainian, forbidding the use of Ukrainian syntactical constructions which had no parallel in Russian in order to train the Ukrainians to speak Russian by infiltrating it into their native speech. The result would have been perhaps the same, but the important difference was that it preserved the supremacy of the Russian language in a pure form and corrupted the Ukrainian beyond recognition.

●538 This procedure was too violent, even for many of the poets
191 and writers who were most ardent in their support of the Stalinist
626 regime. Men like Bazhan, who had put his pen entirely at the disposal of Moscow, continued to use some of the forbidden words and even obtained rewards for their obsequious phrases couched in

this taboo language. It was necessary if the whole theory of the USSR was not to fall by the wayside and the authorities in Moscow were becoming aware of the growing danger of Nazism. 538 191 626

They encouraged the writers, as Tychyna and Rylsky, to write narrative and other poems on themes of the old hostility of the Ukrainians to the Polish nobles and to stress the assistance which, in those ancient days, the Ukrainians had received from the Muscovite authorities. They fanned again the fires of the civil war when the Ukrainian Communists, backed by their Muscovite friends and masters, were warring against the Ukrainian National Republic and Petlyura. 538 626

In fact, during these fantastic years, Tychyna, Rylsky, Yanovsky and similar writers, as well as Korniychuk, found it easier to maintain their freedom by this fanning of Ukrainian chauvinism into flame than did those authors who, following the narrow interpretation of socialist realism, sought to trace the transformations in the contemporary life and the growth of confidence in the Russian ideas of industrialization and collectivization. Again and again these men were called to account for allowing their local and national sympathies to run away with them and to include descriptions which were perhaps nostalgic but which could be twisted in the perverse logic of the NKVD into hidden criticisms of the great Stalin, the leaders of the people, and the all-wise and beneficent rule of Moscow.

By 1939, the situation in the Ukraine had changed entirely from what it had been in 1929 when the first five year plan was getting under way. The salient features of the Ukrainian economic life had been destroyed. Yet Moscow was not yet satisfied. 651

Despite the increased taxation and the reduction in the income of the average dweller on a collective farm, the Communist Party demanded each year a larger part of the grain and of the cash income. The voluntary donations for the benefit of the armed forces were increased and steps were begun to demand taxes in kind from the returns which the peasants received from their individual plots. Thus a peasant was required to contribute so many eggs per year to the government, which did not concern itself as to

The libraries were carefully purged of
those authors who had fallen under the displeasure of Moscow 538
during the crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance and their works 626
were forbidden, just as in Eastern Ukraine. The books that were sent from Kiev were chiefly in Russian. Furthermore, those authors, poets, and artists who were still in Western Ukraine now found themselves regimented. They were given elaborate projects but they found that their success depended upon their ability not to express themselves freely but to satisfy the demands of the Soviet authorities. As a result many of them endeavored to get, in one way or another, to the west where even if they were under Nazi rule they still had more possibilities at the time than they did under the highly organized system sponsored by Moscow.

It was thus abundantly evident that the "liberation" of Western 661
Ukraine was but the exchange of one master for a still sterner rule. The realization of this fact came quickly and it very soon evoked a corresponding reaction which began to unite the entire population, the more so as even those few Communists in Western Ukraine who had remained true to their convictions were now seized by the Soviet authorities and punished on the ground that they were Trotskyists or were believers in one of the various deviations from the general line of the party. There were to be no Communists except those who had passed through the Soviet training school and those people who had believed that their Communist faith would be of profit to them found themselves in as wretched a position as had Eastern Ukrainian Communists like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk who had gained nothing by their independence, except death and destruction.

Thus, by the spring of 1941 conditions in Western Ukraine were rapidly assuming the same form that they had taken in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Any hopes that there would be any exception or any toleration for the area were once and for all annihilated when the Soviets attacked Finland and, still more, when, in the summer of 1940, they absorbed and turned into Soviet Republics the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Soviets were shown clearly to be on the march and it was for the people to protect themselves as best they could.

727 Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the
661 title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors
[241] merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

● [538] By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing
[466] Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

668 These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba—Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

668 This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian
725 forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Soviet Ukraine During World War II

In the preceding chapters we have briefly traced the efforts of the Ukrainians to profit by the clash between the two totalitarian powers of Germany and the USSR and the Ukrainian hopes of being recognized as an independent state. These hopes had been thwarted by the Nazi refusal to treat the Ukraine as anything except a field for German expansion and the Western refusal to recognize the Ukrainian struggle for independence. 722 661 538

This, of course, does not tell the entire story. From the earliest days of the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine, many of the leading Ukrainian patriots, writers, artists and scholars, including a large part of the staff of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, had seized the opportunity to retire to the west into the Polish Government General but there were many more who were picked up in the early deportations and deposited along with the Poles in Central Asia. Some of these, during the brief period of friendship between the Poles and the Soviets, were again able to make their way to the west along with General Anders and found themselves again at freedom, while those who had retired to the west were forced to undergo increasing persecution at the hands of the Nazis as these became more desperate. [814]

On the other hand, when the break finally came in 1941 and the Ukrainians, including those mobilized in the Red Army, began to surrender in masses, the Soviets began to deport to the east all of the outstanding people on whom they could lay their hands and whom at the first moment they did not wish to exterminate. In this number there were such Ukrainian writers as Tychyna, Rylsky and others who had showed their loyalty to the regime by their tasteless flattery of the regime in Moscow.

Under such conditions, if the chaos and the disorder were not 722
to be allowed to spread further, it was obvious that something had to be done to improve the morale of the population. This was particularly evident and necessary during the early months when it seemed as if the Nazis might decide to make some concessions to the people. As a result, there were a series of developments undertaken which superficially, at least, offered some concessions to the spirit of the various non-Russian nationalities.

Thus, in 1943 the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR was [814]
allowed to celebrate its twenty fifth anniversary at Ufa in the Bashkir Autonomous Republic and to list its institutes which were scattered throughout Asia. Such an event rendered it possible to blame the Nazis for the destruction of what had not been evacuated. It furnished good propaganda for the Western powers who were already sending copious supplies to the USSR and receiving in return from it only condemnation and criticism.

In the same way, the various writers who had passed the 722
approval of the government were assigned posts as newspaper 538
correspondents in the Red Army where they could sing the praises 626
of Stalin. Yet, at the same time, they were encouraged to write articles and poems which would reflect the hostility to the Nazis and again and again the censorship was relaxed for men like Sosyura to write poems in praise of the Ukraine, of its past, its present and its future.

Others like Yanovsky and Bazhan were allowed to emphasize [198]
the separation between the traditional Ukrainian speech and the jargon that had been put out in the various Ukrainian-Russian [814]
dictionaries after the breaking of the Ukrainian Renaissance. They were allowed to assemble collaborators to compile a more conservative dictionary and to revamp the system of orthography which had been the work of such pronounced Russian sympathizers as Khvylya during the preceding period.

Yet, these concessions were more apparent than real, for under 722
the wartime conditions, those Ukrainian scholars that had the 814
apparent confidence of the government were scattered far and wide. They were living perforce under abnormal conditions and

000 in an ideal organization. Stalin, by his policy in the thirties, blew away that mirage but it required a World War for him to annihilate it.

Soon after the Germans attacked, Stalin dissolved the Comintern to please his Western allies and to dupe them. He substituted the Slav Congress and when he secured the assent of the Big Three to liberate the Slavs, he highly developed this.

186 As the Red Army, now transformed by fiat of the Council of
728 Commissars of the USSR into the Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies, "liberated" one Slav capital after another, they were followed by cultural missions who talked to the enthusiastic multitudes on the Slav Brotherhood of Nations in terms of 1848, Peter, the Third Rome and Stalin. Rylsky and Tychyna, Korniychuk and Yanovsky, all the outstanding Ukrainian writers who had yielded to the Russian cause and survived the purges, spoke. They praised the new situation and the democratic powers admired this.

665 It was only a sham because soon there was established the Cominform. Its seat was not in Moscow but its spirit was there. The object of the Cominform was not to create a new and equal gathering of Communist humanity, not the ostensible idea of the Comintern but it was to inform the Communists among the Slavs and elsewhere of the approach to Communism by the elder Communists of the world, the Muscovite Great Russians.

● [538] In the purely cultural sphere the answer was the condemnation of formalism, and still more of internationalism. Formalism was a technical school of literary criticism which had contributed something to the study of literature and culture. It was an attempt to put technique above content, or rather to judge content by technique and its advocates, sometimes great scholars in a narrow field, basked in the light of the admiration of their friends, until they considered themselves great.

814 Internationalism was something else. Its content had been ex-
665 pressed by the Protopope Avvakum in 1666 when he announced at his trial in Moscow that all Orthodox Christians had to come to Moscow to learn. Now it was the same. History was to be periodicized between A. M. and P. M. (Ante Muscoviae and Post

Muscoviam, Before and After Moscow). If the before was leading 814
up to a Moscow discovery, it was good; if not, it was bad. 665

This was proclaimed by Zhdanov of the Politbiuro in 1946 [546]
when, under the highest auspices, he began his attack. On September 4 of that year, at a meeting of the Umiom of Soviet Writers in Moscow, he lashed out at various films which had been recently produced and at several Russian authors, especially Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova, for not producing a true picture of Soviet reality. Then, warming to his task, he explicitly declared that literature 538
had to be entirely at the service of the Communist Party and that 626
it was the duty of every Soviet writer to lash and scourge the 665
decadent bourgeois west. He berated many of the authors for wishing to learn from the bourgeois writers at the very moment when Soviet literature, the most revolutionary literature in the world, was a hundred times higher and more beautiful than the literature of the bourgeois west.

The speech of Zhdanov was the open proclamation of war against all foreign influences in Soviet literature and it was directed against some of the most respected figures, who were apparently silenced. Even Tikhonov was removed from his post at the head [558]
of the Union of Soviet Writers for not having exerted himself more strongly against these dangerous heresies.

Yet this speech was not really the beginning, for some weeks before the question was fully brought into the open, at a meeting of the KP/b/U, Khrushchov, the Russian who held the post as First Secretary of the KP/b/U, had received from the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow full and definite instructions as to the means to be adopted for purging Ukrainian literature and science and for suppressing all traces of bourgeois nationalism. His remarks were reprinted in part by *Pravda* in Moscow, which summarized them in these words.

"The TsK KP/b/U had not paid sufficient attention to ideological work, does not give enough weight to the selecting and the ideological and political education of the cadres in the fields of science, literature and art, has not organized in the press a wide criticism of the hostile bourgeois-nationalist ideology. As a result

538 626 665 in some books, journals and newspaper articles and in the lectures of some Ukrainian historians and literary men there are ideological mistakes and perversions, and efforts to revive the bourgeois nationalist conceptions of the historian Hrushevsky and his 'school.'"

[814] 538 626 The weight of the attack fell upon the Institute of Language and Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR for two books which it had published. One was the first volume of a *History of Ukraine* which had appeared in 1943 and the other was *An Outline of the History of Ukrainian Literature* which had appeared in 1945. The authors of both books were accused of having failed to periodicize Ukrainian history and literature according to the Marxo-Leninist tradition and of having followed Hrushevsky and Yefremiv in being deceived by external political events. They were charged with remarks that could be interpreted as maintaining an early separation of Ukrainian culture from Russian, when it was a fact that the three brotherly nations, the Great Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, had had a joint culture until the fourteenth century, after which the Great Russians became the truest heirs and interpreters of the whole. They were charged with idealizing the old bourgeois nationalists as V. Naumenko and O. Levytsky, of admiring the old state of patriarchal private property and of failing to realize the great ideological gulf between Shevchenko, who stood in the tradition of Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, etc., and Kulish who was a liberal and not a revolutionist. They were condemned for having a good word for such nationalist counter-revolutionists as Vynnychenko and Oles and for calling a competent poet, I. Steshchenko, who had been a minister under Petlyura. They forced their own flatterer, Rylsky, to leave his post as head of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukraine for not having taken a sufficiently firm stand in condemning the mistakes of the other writers, and for a while he was in disfavor.

The accusations penned in Moscow and printed in *Pravda* and the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* were reprinted in the Ukrainian papers with even more vulgarity and abuse. They poured out their venom at nearly all the writers and historians who regarded the use of the Ukrainian language as expressing the feelings and the

culture of the Ukrainian people. They condemned nationalist 638
praise of Kotlyarevsky for introducing national pride and feeling 626
into his *Eneida,* the first book in the Ukrainian vernacular published in 1798. They accused the writers and scholars of deliberately trying to drive a wedge between the Russian and Ukrainian people and of refusing to see, because of their bourgeois nationalist prejudices, that the great Ukrainian writers of the nineteenth century had always drawn their inspiration and been close to the progressive Russian writers, as Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, and they denied the existence of any Western European influence on Ukrainian literature, since all the influence had come from the Russians. They found influences of Gorky on Lesya Ukrainka and cited as her models Russian works which appeared after her works were in print. All this made no difference, for the Marxo-Leninists were in sole possession of the truth and their word was law.

Stalin had declared that the new Soviet literature and culture was to be Communist in content and national in form but it was very soon realized that even this was to be interpreted in a special sense. Any excessive attention paid by writers to descriptions of the Ukrainian landscape which did not bring a glorification of the new factories was treated as an antiquated sympathy with the old patriarchal Ukraine and its bourgeois nationalism. Any mention of the Zaporozhian Sich and the Kozak past, unless it was connected very definitely with the union and longing of the Kozaks for Muscovite rule, was declared to be treasonable and bourgeois nationalist in essence. Thus, step by step the authorities in Moscow and their mouthpieces in Ukraine limited more and more closely the possibility of describing or singing of any of the characteristic features of Ukrainian life and the historic past, while the Great Russians were given free rein to glorify the past of Russia even under the tsars, for it was there that the seeds of the Communist Party were planted and flourished.

This process of tracking down bourgeois nationalism perhaps reached the limits of its absurdity in 1951 when the Soviet critics discovered dangerous thoughts in the war poem of Volodymyr Sosyura, *Love Ukraine.* It was a graceful, but hardly a great poem.

538 626 It had been enthusiastically received in 1944, when it appeared, and the poet was awarded for it a Stalin Prize. The poem was published and republished by the state publishing houses and then it was suddenly discovered that it was untrue, bourgeois nationalist, etc. and the unfortunate author was forced to repent of his errors. As a matter of fact, even before this, many of the Russian translators had gone out of their way to insert in it various passages celebrating the Volga and the Kremlin as part of the love of Ukraine, but they, too, were reprimanded for trying to improve the work instead of condemning it for its real quality.

In every field of scholarship, literature, art, and music, the same charges have been brought with logical consistency. Anything which would remind the readers of the old pre-Communist life is treated as dangerous, but none of the authors, no matter how they have falsified history or the present, has been able to express the great achievements of the new Soviet Ukraine and to catch its spirit and show how it can in any degree differ from Moscow. At the first sign of any independent judgment, the cry is raised of bourgeois nationalism and the work is suppressed.

545 532 626 At the same time the Ukrainian scene is being overloaded with things Russian. Russian theatrical companies are continually travelling around the republic so as to show the real charity and achievements of the elder brother and inspire a desire for imitation of its life and thought under that all-time world genius, Joseph Stalin. Russian musical ensembles and exhibitions of the works of Russian artists are constantly sent to all the chief cities of the non-Russian republics, not only to acquaint the people with Russian achievements but still more to give them the necessary patterns by which they should plan their lives and work.

538 626 There are constantly published masses of Ukrainian translations of Russian works and books translated from the other languages used in the USSR and it is almost essential for an author to allude to these and especially to the Georgian people as the people of Stalin, if he wishes to avoid the charge of bourgeois nationalism and the attempt to sow hostility between the brotherly peoples.

000 The situation is even more severe in the field of language.

The Soviet Cultural Policy in the Ukraine After the War

The situation is even more severe in the field of language. 191
Korniychuk after World War II emphasized that Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism was not to be sought only by a consideration of the contents of books and paintings. It was reflected in a still more dangerous form in the language of the books themselves. Any author who showed a predilection for the use of the older forms of the language or sought to develop it in any way other than the Communist Party desired was thereby convicting himself of holding nationalistic sentiments and of being dangerously reactionary. He thus accused of bourgeois nationalism even those writers as Yanovsky who had been most rigorous in following the party line in content. 626 538

The real significance of this statement of Korniychuk's is shown by the *Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary* which finally appeared in 1948 under the editorship of L. A. Bulakhovsky and M. F. Rylsky. The work was published in Moscow, although it bore the stamp of the Institute of Language Study of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR. 191 626 814

In this the authors made no concealment of their program, for they definitely stated that their work was based upon the "spoken" Ukrainian of the government offices (where it was the most corrupted by Russian words), and not the older Ukrainian language as spoken before the introduction of the Bolshevik reforms. They added, too, that they had supplied from Russian whatever was lacking in Ukrainian, for "thanks to the Russian language, the Ukrainian has been able to acquire the capacity to respond to the needs of socialist construction and to satisfy the cultural needs of the Ukrainian people." [198]

Stripped of its Communist jargon, this passage merely means that the Moscow authorities have decided to carry on their policy of russification in a new way. They have recognized the gap between the older Ukrainian language and the hodgepodge which they have produced and they are now insisting on using the words of the older usage in their most narrow and restricted sense, and by refusing to recognize any possibility of development in Ukrainian or any changes in it, they are forcing Ukrainian to become a dead language and by an inverted purism are planning to compel

191 the Ukrainians to recognize that Russian and Russian alone is in
626 a position to grow and develop.
814 This is entirely in line with the new philological policy dictated by Stalin after his repudiation of the late Prof. Marr and what was commonly known as Marrism, a theory that Stalin had sponsored for many years. Now he was willing to argue that Russian as the language of the USSR was not only the Russian language as the language of the Russian people but it was also in a new sense a zonal language, the approved language of Socialism and Communism and, as such, it had already absorbed all that it needed and its mission was to replace all those languages which were spoken by people who had awaked to the truth of the Moscow doctrines.

626 Thus the new theories of language study that were officially
814 accepted in Moscow opened new vistas for cultural oppression and perversion of the Ukrainian masses. They were a signal for renewed efforts, not only to control the Ukrainian cultural life in the present and the future but their efforts were extended to the past and the scholars were set to carry out an artificial restatement of Ukrainian history, literature and culture from the earliest known periods.

538 It is small wonder then that the modern post-war Ukrainian
626 literature is becoming more and more a pallid and bloodless imitation of the stereotyped patterns required for Great Russian and that even those authors who have sold themselves to the Stalinist regime are unable to produce anything of real value or of even mediocre excellence. They are turning out the average propaganda material against the imperialistic Americans on the lines ordered by the Politiburo with never a thought except the income and perquisites which they are slated to receive and the constant terror lest at some moment by an unfortunate slip they may be accused justly or unjustly of that terrible crime of bourgeois nationalism and lose in an instant all that they have worked for years to win.

The cultural pressure exerted on eastern Ukraine is spread likewise with even more force over those portions in the West which had been formerly under Poland or Czechoslovakia. Here, as former parts of the old Hapsburg monarchy, the writers had had

more opportunity to absorb the current thought of the west than 538
they had had in eastern Ukraine. Therefore, the pressure against 626
them has been applied even more strongly and still more Russians have been sent to remodel the life in Lviv than was necessary for Kiev. The process of russification was started later but it has been pushed more energetically. The net result is the same,—the impoverishment of Ukrainian culture as a whole and the substitution for it of a shabby form of Russian Muscovite Communist culture, which is to be tolerated only until there can be a full absorption.

Yet that process has not been so easy. Hardly a week passes 661
that some of the higher units in the Soviet service do not discover a new nest of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, and most frequently among the members and officers of the KP/b/U. It has been made evident that the Russian Communists cannot hope to achieve their goal until they have eliminated the entire Ukrainian population. They are trying to do it, but despite the millions of their victims and their attempts to separate the Ukrainian children from their parents and to rear them as slaves for Russian factories, they have not succeeded in winning the population to their views.

From the cultural point of view, the post-war period has been even more depressing than were the thirties. It has been drabber, like the lives of the people, but it has not served as yet to eliminate that spark of hope which alone preserved the Ukrainians during the hard periods of tsarism when they were subjects and slaves on their own territories, which were not their own to govern or to develop.

p. 3

I. THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM

[27] DURING the summer and autumn of 1941 the German armies rolled across the plains of the Ukraine; by November the entire Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was in their hands. Observers everywhere were aware of the significance of the conquest of [241] this huge area with its thirty-five million inhabitants. The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine, famous as the "granary of the USSR," the gigantic industrial complex of the Donets basin, and the rich mineral deposits were weighed in appraising the loss of the Soviet Union and the gain of Germany. While the political effects of the conquest received less attention at the time, in some ways they were even more important than the economic effects.

186 While there is a tradition of separate political development in the Ukraine,[1] modern nationalism—the doctrine that persons of a distinctive culture should constitute an independent state—came late to the area. To a close observer, the first stirrings of nationalism among educated groups in the Ukraine would have been apparent early in the nineteenth century, and by the middle [538] of that century Taras Shevchenko, the greatest name in Ukrainian literature, was giving poetic expression to nationalist aspirations. It was considerably later, however, that definitely political [268x] organizations were formed to establish the claim of the Ukraine to nationhood.[2] For the student of contemporary politics, it is precisely this late emergence of Ukrainian nationalism which

[1] The term "Ukraine" is used throughout this study (except in cases when another meaning is clearly implied) to refer to the territory comprised in the Ukrainian SSR in 1945. Essentially the same area (with the exception of the Carpatho-Ukraine, which is discussed briefly at several points in this study) was included in the Ukrainian SSR in 1941. This territory corresponds fairly closely—except, as noted in Chapter XI, in the east—to the Ukrainian "ethnographical" territory, the area in which the indigenous population speaks Ukrainian.

[2] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 12.

Fundamentally, though, it is not to the criteria of religion, 186
folkways, or language that the adherents of Ukrainian nationalism have appealed; more basic has been the evocation of a common historical tradition, the claim that the Ukrainian people, once great and independent, had lost its heritage. In the Europe of the turn of the century there were, to the superficial observer, two classes of nations, those which were embodied in independent states and those which were not.[9] Actually, the second group was almost as sharply subdivided into the "historic" nations, which had the memory of having possessed within modern times a stable state form, and those which were not so fortunate. Among the former may be mentioned the Poles, whose republic had vanished only a century previously, and the Czechs, who still preserved a vestige of their ancient state in the Crown of Bohemia. For groups like the Latvians, the Slovenes, and the inhabitants of the Ukraine, however, no such obvious rallying points of statehood existed; hence, the pages of history had to be searched to provide a comparable symbol of unity.

Since it was vital to the emerging nation that its language and 186
its history be embodied in works which could inspire loyalty, it 668*
was only natural that the leaders of the nationalist movement 538
should have been writers. The national poet Shevchenko has already been mentioned, and he was but one of many writers, such as Nicholas Kostomarov and John Franko. Historians, headed by Michael Hrushevs'kyi, who perhaps more than any other deserves the title of father of Ukrainian nationalism, were equally important.[10] The early leaders of the movement were almost without exception intellectuals—men more at home with words than deeds—a fact which was to have great significance for the future development of Ukrainian nationalism.

Part of the effort to stimulate the historical sense of the people 186
of the Ukraine centers around an endeavor to demonstrate that 668*
their ethnic and spiritual ancestor was the people of Kievan "Rus" and to deny that the Russians were descended from the medieval state of Kiev. Much greater energy is devoted, however,

[9] This concept is expressed in Hugh Seton-Watson's *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), pp. 268–69.
[10] Cf. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution*, p. 9.

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197 Ukrainians, the German and Austrian authorities had to use Russian interpreters instead of Ukrainian ones from Galicia. Trained at the Ukrainian University of Lvov, founded by the Austrian Government, and belonging to another religion, being 'uniats' and non-Orthodox, the Galician men of letters, scientists and politicians who invaded the Ukraine after the Revolution of 1917, appeared as foreigners to the native population.

538 In popular Ukrainian poetry one finds no trace of the epic poem of the Russia of Kiev, of which the 'Tales of the Companions of Igor,' written in a language which was still very close to old Slavonic, is a magnificent example. The epic songs of the flourishing epoch of the State of Kiev, still bearing traces of the mixture of Christian and remnants of old pagan conceptions, have been perpetuated far into the north. They are the *byliny*, songs of St. Vladimir and his companions, which were accompanied by some acting, and which the popular *skazitels* still sing in the most distant North Russian lands in the forests on the shore of the White Sea. In the Ukraine a popular epic poetry of a new kind, based on subjects which have not been published, has appeared, inspired by the Cossack struggles. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have left us a few examples.

This poetry is highly lyrical, noble, and melancholy and has developed especially in the following century. It still lives to our days, known under the name of '*doumy*.' Although it speaks of epic deeds, this poetry is profoundly distinguished by that lyricism which characterizes the whole popular Ukrainian poetic art.

[533] 177 Like all the languages of the Russian family, Ukrainian adapts itself wonderfully to song. It is the Ukraine which has taught the whole of Russia the polyphonic song, which even penetrated to the remotest corners of the Russian land. It is possible that this song itself was early influenced in the Ukraine by certain elements of Western music.

nor to beat the superior of a monastery to such an extent 793
that the unfortunate one died a short time after), Mohila was the personification of the reaction against the democracy of the preceding epoch in the bosom of Orthodoxy. When still an Archimandrite of the 538
Monastery of the Caves at Kiev, he established there, at his own expense, a school which was afterwards to become the famous Kiev Academy. It was to Rome that he sent those monks to study who were destined to become the first teachers, and it was from Latin that he translated his *Ritual*, a book which was read throughout Russia. As a result the people of Kiev became disturbed on learning that the teaching of the Academy was that of Latin scholasticism, and that the Latin language occupied a predominant place.

Greek and Latin naturally remained subjects of teaching, but the whole religious literature suffered from the effect of the forms of eloquence which were then being used in the Catholic world.

We know the role which was played by the Academy [874]
of Kiev in the development of Imperial Russian civilization, and it was Mohila himself who first proposed, though prematurely, in 1640, to found a school on the Kiev model in Moscow. But the artificial character of the religious literature, of which the Academy was the centre, delayed for long the blossoming of literary genius in the Ukraine.

The current of popular inspiration having been slowed down, that which was printed in the eighteenth century had almost no literary or national value. The famous printing press of the Monastery of Potchaiev, in Western Volynia, generally limited itself to editing the books required for divine service in old Slavonic. Amongst its other publications only the collection of religious poems, the 'Bogoglasnik,' presents some

538 interest owing to the traces of popular influences which bring them nearer to the lyrical Ukrainian poetry.

536 It is only in the domain of dramatic art that the national originality could still find expression. For example, the Mysteries and the Fables of the West, the first Ukrainian theatre, is in the beginning the work of clergy who want to edify the people while entertaining them. The students of the Academy of Kiev are its first dramatists, playwrights, and producers. And, just as in the West, it soon loses its serious and strictly religious character. The element of entertainment becomes more and more pronounced. The people acquire a taste for these marionette performances which soon become a truly national amusement. At first they usually represented the Crib of the Nativity and all the events which took place around it. The name of 'Crib' (*vertep*) remained connected with them for ever. But the Madonna and the Child Jesus were soon supplanted by comical characters such as the Devil, the Vagabond Priest, the sly peasant, and the schemer. The social satire, a direct product of popular feeling, became the real purpose of these marionette performances and on holidays and at fairs the people crowded to see them. The Dwarfs Theatre in the Ukraine so pleased the Tsar Alexis of Moscow that he ordered the establishment of 'Comedy Plays' in the theatre of his summer residence, and this despite the protestations, the indignation, and the anathemas of the Muscovite clergy.

538 It is at the end of the eighteenth century that the intellectual and cultural movement in the Ukraine first appears. Ivan Kotliarevsky, considered the 'Father of Ukrainian literature,' called himself 'a simple amateur of the Little Russian tongue.' In reality it is the love of poetic folk-lore which characterizes modern Ukrainian literature, and it is that which labels it among local

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Russian literatures. It is in this spirit that Kotliarevsky 538
published his comic poem, the *Travesty of Aeneid*, in 1798, the first great Ukrainian literary work, followed by a light comedy, *Natalka Poltavka*, which had a great success in Russia during a century and which is played to-day in all the countries of the Ukrainian language. Under the influence of German romanticism a particular interest arose in the Russian literary world for all that which was connected with the folk-lore, the language, and the customs of the people, as well as for their traditions and their art. Thus the first efforts of Kotliarevsky were well received by the literary circles of St. Petersburg and his *Travesty of Aeneid* remained one of the favourite readings of several Russian generations.

Encouraged by the great Slavophile movement which broke with all exaggerated Westernization, Russian writers turned to all the manifestations of the popular genius and, quite naturally, also to that of the Ukraine.

Just as in the eighteenth century the religious language and culture of Southern Russia had brought about the literary awakening of Moscow, in allowing the Russian language to free itself from its archaic forms, so, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ukraine, her romantic past, the charm of her nature, and of her popular life, inspired Russian literature and poetry. The same period saw the birth of two Ukrainian geniuses who for ever occupy places of a high order in universal literature: Gogol (1809–52) and Chevtchenko (1814–61). Nicholas Gogol wrote only in Russian, not because he 538
was forced to do so by some exterior factors, or because 192
he ignored Ukrainian, but because the greatness and the diversity of his talent passed beyond the possibilities of expression of the literary Ukrainian language. Despite the picturesqueness and the indisputable richness of its forms, this language never went beyond the literary

538 form of popular idiom. Thus, in the domain of literary,
192 scientific, philosophic, and technical vocabulary, it is incomparably less developed than the Russian language. The pictures of town life, of the life of the upper layers of society, which dominated, during the whole of the nineteenth century, as the subject of imaginative writings and particularly of the novel, are not easily expressed in the Ukrainian language. Some expressions and words, necessary for this, are missing. We even take the liberty of expressing the opinion, which may seem bold, that the reading of *Crime and Punishment*, of *War and Peace*, of *Oblomov*, or of *Dead Souls* in Russian would be of greater value to a Ukrainian than the translation of these works into his mother-tongue. Moreover, the translations of these immortal works into other great European languages seem to us to be closer to the form, the contents, and the ideas expressed by them than their translations into the Ukrainian language, which so much resembles Russian. Therefore every work of Gogol belongs, without any doubt, to the Russian literature without being, for this reason, foreign
538 to the Ukrainian world. A traditionalist, profoundly pious, to a point of being irritated by the Russian 'Intelligentsia,' already imbued with positivist ideas, he loved the whole Russia with an ardent and passionate love. He was hurt by the spectacle of desertions and cowardice which characterized the Russian life of his time, of all those open wounds which he was able to distinguish and to depict with an unrivalled sarcasm. Like the Slavophiles and later Dostoievski, he hoped that the salvation would come from the deeper forces dormant in the Orthodox Church and in the Russian Monarchy. The Ukrainian chauvinists of our day sometimes describe him as a renegade, an opinion which it is unnecessary to contradict. One only has to re-read

his works consecrated to the Ukraine to feel the love Gogol felt for his native land, for the popular Ukrainian soul, and for her heroic and romantic traditions. Rather let us allow the present-day Ukrainian politician, M. Alexander Shoulgine, to speak, who has written in his book, *The Ukraine against Moscow*, the title of which already indicates his hostility to Russia: 'Could I ever remember without a pang what I felt each time in my childhood, on hearing or reading *The Vigils of the Ukraine* or the history of the tragic struggle of *Taras Boulba*.' And he added that many Ukrainians have confessed to him to the 'awakening of their patriotic feeling' when reading these works. Does not this remark, coming from a convinced separatist, confirm that Russian language suffices to awaken in a Ukrainian his most intimate, most secret passions of the soul? If the Ukrainian language is dear and indispensable to a Ukrainian, he is equally in need of Russian. It opens to him the broader spiritual and intellectual horizons and unites him with the community of great peoples. In this the closeness of Russian and Ukrainian literature gives the Ukrainians a position far superior to that of the small Slavonic nations such as the Slovaks, Serbs, or Slovenes. And the fanatics who make themselves ridiculous by treating Gogol as a renegade, are they not similar to the French Provençals, admirers of the Mistral, who would reproach a Jean Giono for writing in French and not in Provençal?

On the contrary, Taras Chevtchenko, who was considered the model of Ukrainianism, wrote in Southern Ukrainian. Born of a family of serfs and himself a serf in his early youth, he has carried the force of poetic expression of the Ukrainian language to a point which had not been reached before and which has not been equalled since. The sadness of the life of the peasant

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538 serfs, the dreams of past glories, such as they live in the popular songs, are the principal themes of Chevtchenko. We find in them both romanticism and a strong expression of social aspirations. In placing Chevtchenko on the level of the greatest European poets we are obliged to state that the subjects which inspire his poetical works are more limited than those of a Poushkine or a Mickiewicz.

Chevtchenko, the peasant and man of the people, was an instinctive revolutionary in the political sense of the term. He revolts against autocracy and against the lords, and with all his force he appeals for aid for his oppressed brothers and for the struggle for freedom which fascinates him. Though his poetic feeling was high and his lyricism rich, his subjects never go beyond the limited circle of the struggles of the serfs with the lords. One can easily imagine the effect which his poems produced in the circles of the Russian intelligentsia, in which he had been triumphantly received, as they were also dreaming of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.

668 The Universities of Kharkov and of Kiev, founded
538 by the Imperial Government, one in 1805 and the other in 1834, were the rallying centres of the intellectual movements of Southern Russia. They produced the celebrated historian Kostomarov, who became the spokesman of Liberalism and of the cultural awakening of the Ukraine.

The active enthusiasm of these young intellectuals with revolutionary tendencies led to the creation of a secret society in Kiev, the 'Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius,' which was almost immediately discovered by the police. The conspirators took the road to Siberia. In 1847 Chevtchenko was condemned to seven years of service as a simple soldier in a far-away garrison. This relatively light sentence—followed, it is true, by the prohibition of writing and painting (he was a painter of talent at the same time as a poet)—was

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imposed on a revolutionary with destructive ideas and 668
not on a nationalist Ukrainian. It is only after the 538
accession of the Emperor Alexander II in 1855, when a more Liberal mood became apparent in Russia, that the deportees of Kiev were able to return to Europe.

Some years later Chevtchenko died. Kostomarov, on the contrary, settled at the University of St. Petersburg where, during long years, he wrote his great historical works. Having become a well-known historian and, with age, more moderate, he nevertheless remained, during the whole of his life, a regionalist patriot of the Ukraine, which he wanted to see included in the framework of a great Russian Federation governed by Liberal principals. Even the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, despite its revolutionary extremism, had had no more than federalist ideas and had never dreamed of the separation of the Ukraine from Russia. This is confirmed by the Ukrainian historian of note, M. E. Borschak, in his interesting study, published in the *Slav World*. He writes that 'the Ukrainian movement was then free of any ideas of separatism, of which we did not find any traces when analysing its ideology.'

Let us repeat again: The struggle, in the Ukraine as in the whole of Russia, was begun in the name of Liberalism and of Social Reform against an existing political and social order, not against Russia in the name of the Ukraine, and in this the Ukrainian movement differed deeply from the national movements of the ethnically non-Russian groups. At the time when thousands of Poles, poor and rich, peasants and aristocrats, socialists or monarchists, were being deported to Siberia for wishing to separate Poland from Russia, *not a single Ukrainian* joined the convoys of political deportees as a partisan of the autonomy or the independence of his country. If thousands of Ukrainians settled in the

668 Siberian *taiga*, it was for having been republicans or
538 socialists or for having struggled against Tsarism but not against Russia.

538 Sometimes it is claimed that Chevtchenko was personally hostile to everything Russian. But he seems to have been nothing of the kind. An admirer of the 'noble spirit' of Gogol, Chevtchenko himself wrote his personal diary in Russian and he has left us no less than eleven novels and some poetry written in the same language, of which two poems were written before his exile. By conviction and by temperament a revolutionary, Chevtchenko felt himself intimately united with the opposition circles in Great Russia and belonged, as such, to the great family of Russian men of letters.

[609] On the other hand, always true to the popular feelings and sharing with the Ukrainian peasants the hostility towards the German and particularly towards the estate-owners and the school-teachers, he vituperates, in his *Epistle to Compatriots*, against their subjection to German intellectual and cultural influence. When speaking of his young compatriots he says that they blamed their parents 'as they have not taught them to chatter in German in their childhood.' And Chevtchenko laments that 'Ukraine, such are your sons, your young flowers, watered with ink in the German hothouses.' He equally revolts against the vanity of Ukrainian youth, taught by German scholars of whose infallibility they are convinced:

> 'I have seen everything, I know everything.
> There is no hell nor paradise,
> Nor God:
> There is nought but I,
> And the small angular German,
> And nothing more. This is enough, little brother,
> But what do you represent in reality?
> . . . As the German says: we do not know.'

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Sometimes these laments bear a character of bitter irony. The pretended infallibility of German opinion concerning the fate and the history of the Ukrainian people exasperates him. 'The German will tell you: You are Mongolians. Yes, Mongolians, nude descendants of Tamerlaine clothed in gold. The German will tell you: You are Slavs. Yes, Slavs, unworthy great-grandsons of glorious ancestors.' 538

While ironizing about the faithful pupils of the German school he continues: 'They spoke according to German precepts in such a way that the German himself, though a great professor, could understand nothing of it . . . at Sitch the German, full of wisdom, grows the potato and you buy it and eat it for your health and you glorify the Zaporoges . . . but by whose blood has this earth been fertilized to produce the potatoes? . . . Her own children have led the Ukraine to the edge of the precipice, they have crucified her worse than the Poles, they want to teach them, at least they pretend it . . . they want to train this blind old man which is the Ukraine under German influence.' (*Kobzar.*)

For him the German question was not only one of literature since he, his sister, and his two brothers were serfs of the German estate-owner Engelhardt, who was noted for his coarseness and the absence of any culture.

The Liberal era which began in Russia with the accession of Alexander II gave broad satisfaction to the aspirations of the circles of the former opposition. The liberation of the serfs in 1861, the inauguration of municipalities elected by the people, the radical reforms based on the permanence of judges, and the establishment of juries and judicial guarantees, eliminated the major reasons for the old revolutionary leanings. A wide movement of reconciliation began to develop which would probably have benefited the Ukraine as 668 175

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 186 The society of the 'United Slavs' was only one expression of the great liberating movement, and its failure was the logical consequence of the suppression of the Decembrist insurrection at St. Petersburg on 14 December 1825, which gave it its name.

This failure checked for a long time the attempts of political revolt in the whole of Russia. Nevertheless the intellectual movement continued, always inspired by the same sources and the same ideals.

538 The genius of Chevtchenko determined the path which the whole Ukrainian literature was to follow. It clung especially to the description of popular life, of the peasant life with its sadness and its injustices. Deeply steeped in folk-lore, it was especially inspired by the pity of the disinherited, by this social pity which is a feature of its affinity with the great Russian literature. In the writings of Marko Vovtchok (pen-name of Marie Vilinska Markovitch) in the *Popular Tales*, approved by Chevtchenko himself, we find again the touching picture of the peasant miseries. Later, in Galicia, Franko, Martovitch, and Stefanik give some pretty examples of this literature, more social than national. Parallel to this, in Russian Ukraine, this tradition was pursued until the revolution by Kotsiubinsky, Tobilevitch, and, above all, by Lessia Oukrainka, the niece of Michael Dragomanov, to whom we will presently return.

536 545 The Ukrainian Theatre experienced a remarkable development towards the end of the nineteenth century. We have already considered the taste of the Ukrainian people for dramatic art, a taste which had already found expression in the old marionette plays. The rise of the new Ukrainian literature could not fail to bring about the development of a modern theatre. As a result a troupe of Ukrainian actors, that of Kropivnitzky, was formed at Kiev and had a great success. The Imperial

that it was in the interest of Prussia to help the Ukrainian people to cast off the chains of Muscovite slavery. During the Great French Revolution the person of Napoleon was very popular in Ukraine. Ukrainian patriots were pleased by the victories of the French Emperor, and hoped that, after the defeat of Russia in a war with France, the time for the liberation of Ukraine would come, and the odious serfdom would be abolished. But Napoleon had no understanding of the Ukrainian problem. He planned the creation of two states 'Napoléonides' in Ukraine under his protectorate . . .*) 175 648

Ukrainian history has gone its own way, different from that of Russia. This has created the peculiar national character of the Ukrainians.

The foreigners who had visited Ukraine in the 17th and 18th centuries pointed out the higher level of civilisation among the Ukrainians in comparison with the Russians, and the highly developed feeling of personal dignity of the Ukrainian people. This love of freedom of the Ukrainian people appeared also in the fight against Tsarist absolutism in Russia, where revolutionaries of Ukrainian origin occupied the first places, Zhelyabov, Kybalchych, Konashevych, Osynsky, Kravchynsky (Stepnyak), Popko, and many other members of the party '*Narodnaya Volya*'. 175 181 517

In the 19th century, under the influence of the ideas of that time (the Great French Revolution, romanticism) the regeneration of the so-called unhistorical pepoples (Serbians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Baltic peoples) began; in the beginning it was the interest for the language and history of the peoples among the educated classes, and the attempt to write in the 'common people's' language. In Ukraine the regeneration of the popular literary language began with the publication of the satirical poem of Ivan Kotlyarevsky *Aeneid:* 1798. In this poem the author underlines his dislike of serfdom and the lords [533]

> "who did not give the people freedom
> and treated them like cattle."

Democratic ideas were widespread in Ukraine; the representatives of the Ukrainian educated classes took an active part in the revolutionary organisations directed towards the fall of the Tsarist régime (the uprising of the 'Decabrists', 1825—26, was most active in Ukraine, near Kiev). 175 186

In 1846 a Ukrainian political organisation, *The Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius,* was founded in Kiev. Many prominent representatives of Ukrainian culture like Taras Shevchenko (the

*) *Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes:* Paris 1922.

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine
687 the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 1/3 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres (*The Bolshevik of Ukraine*, No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the
517 Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
● [538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan (1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

175 whether Polish or Ukrainian, who were loyal to the Tsar, and to some extent also the Ukrainian peasants, at the expense of the Polish-Ukrainian middle class of landowners (*szlachta*), or the middle-class urban *intelligentsia* of Ukrainian nationality, who generally used the Russian language. Hence it was in these two latter classes that the spirit of protest still existed in spite of its apparent hopelessness. The expression of 538 this spirit of protest is to be found in the literature it produced, though this has obvious traces of Polish and Great Russian influence. Ukrainians such as Kapnist, Gogol, Velichko, Hanenko, Artemenski, and Hrebinka, were educated at the universities of Moscow and Kharkov, and wrote in the Russian language. To the same literary school belong Ivan Kotlarevski (1769–1839), the 'father' of Ukrainian literature, the first to write in Ukrainian as well as in Russian, and the Pole, Chodakowski, who was the first to study and collect the folk-lore of the Ukraine.

In the west of the Russian Ukraine a school of Ukrainian Polish poets arose, who wrote in Polish, but took as their subject the Ukraine and her liberation from Russia. Eminent among these were A. Malczewski, S. Goszynski, 175 B. Zaleski, and M. Czaikowski. Between 1803 and 1825, Adam Czartoryski and Tadeusz Czacki, two Polish Liberal nobles, acting for the Polish Education Committee under the then Liberal government of Alexander I, started numerous schools radiating from two chief centres—Krzemenietz, where a Catholic lyceum, and Human, where a Uniat college was founded. In 1818 a Masonic Lodge was instituted in Poltava, with the object of bringing about an understanding between the Liberals of Poland, the Ukraine, and Russia; and in 1825 an important meeting was held at Jitomir (*Slovyanskoye Sobranie*) of Dekabrist Russians, Poles, and Ukrainian *intelligentsia*—the latter still using the Polish and Russian languages. From 1825 dates the propaganda of the *lirniki* or Liberals, who wandered with their harps among the people like mediaeval bards, instilling into the Ukrainian peasants the ideas

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

of the abolition of serfdom and of freedom from Russia. 175
Most of these Liberals, as for example Rzewuski and Padurva, were Poles, or the products of Polish culture.

The Polish Rising of 1831.—This rising received much active support from the *intelligentsia* in the part of the Ukraine concerned; and the greatest of Ukrainian [538] poets, Shevchenko (born 1814), was influenced by Polish middle-class Liberalism and Polish literature. The University of Kharkov, founded in 1805, had until 1831 many Polish professors lecturing in their own language. But this Polish cultural and political influence was checked when the Polish colleges in Vilna and Krzemenietz were suppressed in 1832, and a Russian university was founded at Kiev in 1834. This latter was at first distinctly governmental and official in character, but by the middle of the nineteenth century it had produced a new school of writers of far more active revolutionary tendencies than were ever manifested by the Kharkov circle. Apart from the Polish and Dekabrist risings and the literary attempts of polonized and russified Ukrainians, the first part of the nineteenth century is marked by a passive submission of the masses to the military and autocratic regime of Russia.

(*b*) *Russian, Polish, and Austrian Rivalry; Growth of Nationalism in the Ukraine* (1846–1914).—The modern nationalist movement in the Ukraine began with the foundation of a purely Ukrainian society called the 'Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood' in Kiev about 1846. This society had not merely the literary object of promoting the Ukrainian language, until then only in oral use among the peasants, but also a far-reaching political programme. Friendly feelings towards Polish and Russian Liberals still existed, and a federation of autonomous Slavonic states was aimed at. In this federation the Ukraine was to form two states, West Little Russia and East Little Russia. The creators of the society were the most prominent Ukrainian literary men, the poet Shevchenko, the historian Kostomarov, and the journalist Kulish.

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pay with military service. In this way the lower szlachta increased to many hundreds of thousands of knights and barons who were often not much richer than the ordinary peasants. In the purely Polish regions and in West Ukraine there are still whole villages in which every peasant belongs to the nobility. Whoever was able to present his patent of nobility in Galicia after the partitioning of Poland was recognized as a peer by the Viennese court. In this way arose the Ritter /knights/ von Vitvicky, von Mogylnicki, von Kultshycki and whatever the rest are called.

Whereas the high nobility, with the exception of people like the former Princes Ostrozhsky, 565 517 does not play any part in promoting culture in modern times in the Ukraine, the lesser nobility 793 were for a long time practically the only bearers of Ukrainian culture. They made up the clergy almost exclusively. /100/ The pastors with their numerous children were often the only and the inexhaustible source of Ukrainian intelligentsia. Otherwise there were no intellectual professions open to the Ukrainians. Only the Catholics, that is to say, the Poles could become officials.

The Poles held to the old traditions of the lower nobility in their "Union of village szlachta". 565 According to the latest Polish conception, the lower Ukrainian nobility are Ukrainized Poles. By promising them additional land and other material advantages, Warsaw wanted to catch the 400,000 "aristocratic souls". If this had succeeded, the Poles would have come a good deal closer to a majority in Galicia.

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And bitter servitude, that never justice knows

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Spent my mother's strength
And drove her, young, into the grave...
And helplessly among his brood -
For we were naked then and young -
My father worked himself to death
And died a slave...And we, orphaned now,
Abandoned our little hut
And moved away..." (54)

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538 Taras Shevchenko is the author of this poem. With him begins a new period of progress for the Ukrainian people after the end of Cossack glory and the period of greatest decline. One of the first to lay the foundation for this development which has not yet ceased, is Ivan Kotliarevskyj with whom begins the period of modern Ukrainian literature freed from Byzantinism and religion bonds. /101/ This was toward the end of the eighteenth century. His travesty of Virgil's Aeneid appeared in 1798 and was the first work to be printed in the Ukrainian popular tongue which from then on becomes the literary language of the Ukrainians. In 1818 the first grammar [177] follows. Around this time the ideas of the German Romanticists also come in and enduringly influence the Ukrainian intellectual world. People study their native language, tradition, folklore and history and in doing so, discover a past whose richness was scarcely imagined.

But the national impulses of the Ukrainian romanticists remain a "melancholy national feeling" until, around 1840, Taras Shevchenko stirs up the slumbering spirits. "The song of this poet had truly the effect of the resurrection trumpet of the archangel." Thus Panyko Kulish, the versatile brain of the Ukrainian in-

538 tellectual world at that time, characterized the influence of Shevchenko. His landlord had had him educated as a painter in Warsaw and Petersburg. By means of a lottery, the friends of the 24-year-old artist obtained the 2500 rubles necessary to buy off a serf. Shevchenko enjoyed his freedom from 1838 to 1847. Then he was arrested in Kiyev along with many other Ukrainian poets, authors and scholars. They all belonged to the "Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood" which inscribed on its banner the federation of all Slavic republics on a democratic basis. Taras Shevchenko was exiled to ten years of labor on a fortress in the Kirghiz steppes. "Writing and painting are prohibited!" the Czar noted in his own handwriting on the margin of the sentence. Four years after he was released the artist died far from home in Petersburg.

Merely a poet! And yet the nine years of freedom between serfdom and exile sufficed this tremendous spirit to build a bridge across the centuries - from the age of the Cossacks up to the new Ukrainian nationalism. Merely a poet, but what an explosive force was hidden in his /102/ ballads and poems, what effects were produced by his conjuring up of the past, his song of songs on freedom and his call to action! His "Kobsar" ('kobsar' was the name of the singers of famous folk epics from the time of the Cossacks) clothed all the national-political demands of the Ukrainian people in a sweeping poetic form and by this very means reached all classes of people.

*

539 "Hills upon hills, cloud-encircled,
Sown with sorrow, drenched in blood...
There, full of mercy, We shackled
Freedom and pursued her as she wandered
About the land, hungry, naked...Here lie

857 Before the age of twelve or thirteen, boys and girls rarely ever play together or have any other contact with each other. Whenever children are seen at play, a strict separation of the sexes is noticed. This is not the result of any special instruction on the part of the parents, and still less the outcome of imitation. [562] Besides their different spheres of interest, the boys manifest a certain pride and self-consciousness which causes them to band together, leaving the girls to themselves. With puberty, however, boys and girls mix freely and seek each other's company. Peasant children scarcely recognize any distinction between rich and poor; the sons and daughters of the wealthy associate with those of the poor without consciousness of superiority or inferiority on either side.[71]

538 861 598 The philosophy of parents with regard to the training of their children, in so far as they can be said to have one, is summed up in the following proverbial expressions: "The granting of freedom to children means the constraint of the parents"; [72] or, "Give the children freedom and you will find yourself in slavery." [73] Other examples of folk wisdom reveal a similar attitude: "A child will not grow up without a rod." "Do not give in to a child." "Love your child with your heart and drive it with your hands." [74] "Love your child like your soul, and shake it like the pear tree." [75] The burden of rearing children, although actually not very heavy, is, nevertheless, a source of complaint and finds expression in proverbs, *e.g.*, "To feed a child is like carrying a rock." "Small children don't let you sleep, and big ones don't let you live." "Whoever has no children does not know what trouble is." [76] Other proverbs reflect an opposite attitude towards children: "A mother of ten is a joy." [77] "If God grants children, He will provide for them." [78]

SAMUEL KOENIG

[71] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 8–9. [72] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[113] [73] Franko, I., "Halicko-ruski narodni prypowidky," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (vols. xvi, xxiii–xxiv, Lwów, 1905–1908), xvi, 562.

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 563–564. [75] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 8.

[76] Franko, *op. cit.*, pp. 564, 600. [77] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 179.

[78] Franko, *op. cit.*, p. 598.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

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Soviet Russia has often followed in the footsteps of Czarist Russia, but as far as the appraisal of the Ukraine is concerned there is no continuity between old and new Russia. Czarist Russia simply denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation and denounced all Ukrainian national feeling as 'South Russian separatism'. Soviet policy, on the other hand, has encouraged Ukrainian nationalism in as far as it was able to serve Russia's territorial expansion. The most spectacular territorial advance which the Soviet Union has made since 1939 was that realized under the slogan 'unification of all Ukrainian lands in one national State'. In the course of this unification the Soviet Union not only re-annexed territories which Russia had lost in the Civil War but also occupied territories which had ceased to be 'Russian' ever since the Middle Ages, such as Eastern Galicia with the city of Lvov.

UK. [101]

There cannot be the slightest doubt about the existence of a Ukrainian nation which some Russian nationalists tried to deny in the past, but it would be a mistake to consider the Ukrainians, despite their numbers, as a nation equal in character to the French, Italians, Spaniards, etc., as the extremists among the Ukrainian nationalists would like to represent it. The Ukrainians cannot claim to be historically and culturally a nation so complete that they could afford to cut themselves loose from their Russian neighbours and exist without them.

All foreign invaders fighting Russia had illusions in this respect; they all believed in a separation of Ukraine and Muscovy and conducted their political warfare accordingly. The Swedish King, Charles XII, allied himself with the Ukrainian Cossack Hetman Mazeppa; Napoleon came to Russia with the project of a Ukrainian State, 'Napoleonide', cutting Russia off from the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. The Third Reich of Adolf Hitler also tried to play up the Ukrainian issue against Great Russia.

'LITTLE RUSSIA' AND 'NEW RUSSIA'

UK. 101 186 538

There is every justification in the demand for a genuinely autonomous Ukraine but there is no logic and no life in an anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalist ideology. Neither Russian and Ukrainian history, nor the area of Russian and Ukrainian settlement, nor even Russian and Ukrainian literature can be separated from each other. Gogol, for instance, who wrote in Russian only, can be claimed by the Ukrainians not only because he was born in 'Little Russia', as the Ukraine used to be called in Czarist times, but also because some of his great works are devoted to his homeland, including the most Ukrainian literary work *Taras Bulba*. The Ukrainians have failed to produce any Ukrainian-writing poet or writer who even approximates to the importance of a Gogol.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

Nor is Gogol an isolated example. Count Alexey Tolstoy too belongs 101
to some extent to the Ukraine and no Ukrainian poet has succeeded in [186]
paying to his homeland a more beautiful lyrical tribute than Tolstoy's [238]

Were the Ukraine 'Little Russia' only, the land of the Cossacks, the problem would be more straightforward; but the Ukraine is, apart from minor territories, at least Little Russia plus New Russia. New Russia comprises those territories along the shores of the Black Sea which were incorporated into the Russian Empire for the most part under Catherine the Great. It was only by the amalgamation of Little Russia with a large part of New Russia that the Ukraine obtained a sea-coast and was able to include within its borders places like Odessa, Kherson, Mariupol and Nikolayev whose history was in no way linked with that of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmans. New Russia became a true microcosm of Europe. [167] Just as the ancient and medieval history of New Russia is a mosaic of the history of many peoples which had settled on the northern shores of the Black Sea, traded with the goods and products of its hinterlands and founded states, a history of Greeks and Scythians, Khazars, Goths, Genoese and Tartars, so too the history of modern New Russia is a tale of all sorts of races. People from many lands transformed the steppe into arable soil, built ports and railway lines and developed the industry of the Donets Basin. New Russia was a little America in the sense of being a melting-pot of European races, with the difference, however, that not all pioneer settlers forgot the language of their forefathers in the Ukrainian-Russian surroundings.* The people who brought New Russia into being included sons of every nation of the Balkans, many Germans and even individual Frenchmen who assumed high administrative posts there. At least one Briton played a distinguished part in the development of New Russia, John Hughes, a pioneer of coal-mining in the Donets region, to whose initiative is due the foundation of the big industrial centre now called Stalino. (Until the early twenties the place was called after him 'Yuzovka'.)

UKRAINIAN DIASPORA IN THE U.S.S.R.

Whilst Russians and other peoples shared with the Ukrainians the credit 167
for the colonization of what is to-day the Ukrainian S.S.R., millions of Ukrainians now live dispersed all over the Soviet Union.

The Ukraine, being a densely populated country, was able to contri-

* An ethnical group of colonists in New Russia, who were completely assimilated by their 563
Russian-Ukrainian surroundings, were the Serbs, of whom about 100,000 came to the Southern Ukraine between 1739 and 1752. The Serbs colonized two Ukrainian regions, one on the right bank of the Dnieper, originally called 'New Serbia', and the other in the Donets Basin, called 'Slavyanoserbia'. A century after the Serbian pioneer immigration into New Russia the Serb element could no longer be traced in any population statistics of the Russian Empire.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrain- 000
ian peasantry.

While the armed struggle of Ukrainian nationalists was confined to 186
a small fringe along the Ukrainian border, the Soviet Government had 814
to face more subtle forms of opposition throughout the Soviet Ukraine. 661
One of the outstanding features of the post-war development in the Ukraine was that the same cultural institutions which in the purges of the thirties had been compelled to change their nationalistic Ukrainian personnel from top to bottom, were again involved in difficulties with the Soviet authorities.

This was particularly true of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and especially of its Institute for Language and Literature and its Institute for History. The former produced in 1945 an *Essay on the History of Ukrainian Literature*, whose authors stressed the dependence of Ukrainian literature on the West and 'concealed that Russian and Ukrainian literatures exercised a mutual fertilizing influence on each other in the course of centuries'.[19]

Even more serious 'nationalist excesses' were committed in the field of history writing. It seems that practically all major historical works which the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences published in 1941–5 contained 'serious mistakes of a nationalistic character'. For several years the party and state authorities did not pay much attention to the works of Ukrainian academicians; but after 1946–7 the leading party organs restarted to analyse Ukrainian historical writings and pointed out that Ukrainian historians had never, in fact, succeeded in overcoming the influence of the nationalistic-bourgeois school of Professor Hrushevsky.[20]

In the light of official Soviet admissions the ideological consolidation of the Ukraine seemed not to have advanced by a single inch since the days when Hrushevsky was still the teacher of the historians and Khvylovy, the authority for those dealing with problems of Ukrainian literature. Twenty years after Khvylovy's first expulsion from the Communist Party, and fifteen years after his suicide, orthodox Ukrainian Bolsheviks were still haunted by the fear of 'Khvylovy-ist ideas' and were active in opposing them.

The first step in the purge of Ukrainian literature in the post-war 186
period was the replacement of the editorial boards of the three leading 661
Ukrainian literary journals *Vitchizna* (Fatherland), *Dnipro* (Dnieper) 538
and *Radyansky Lviv* (Soviet Lvov). All three journals had been accused of systematically printing nationalist novels and articles. As the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers was obviously responsible for ideological offences committed in literary journals published on Ukrainian territory, the purge had to be extended to this organization as well. The leading personalities of the writers' union, including its president,

*[Cf. cat. 116, pp. 30-31, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

186 Maxim Rilsky*, were dismissed in November 1946. Rilsky, one of the
661 most outstanding poets of the Soviet Ukraine, was charged with being a
538 'prisoner of bourgeois nationalism'. He had not only 'sinned' in his works but he had also delivered a particularly objectionable lecture, 'Kiev in the history of the Ukraine', in which he 'idealized the old patriarchal order and depicted in rosy idyllic colours the conditions under the rule of landowners and bourgeois'. Together with Rilsky a whole group of Ukrainian writers was accused of nationalism, 'Khvylovy-ism' and reactionary tendencies, including I. Senchenko, Y. Yanovsky and P. Panch.[21]

Maxim Rilsky was replaced as president of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers by A. Y. Korneichuk, author of a large number of political plays, who had always accurately interpreted the party line and had earned nothing but praise from the supreme Soviet leadership. It was Korneichuk's task to lead Ukrainian literature on the road of strict Soviet Patriotism and 'Socialist Realism'. Indeed, Ukrainian writers, publishing houses and literary journals became more careful and it appeared during a certain period as if Korneichuk had really succeeded in his assignment. The 'Festival of Ukrainian Art and Literature' held in Moscow in June 1951 showed, however, that this was a deception. The festival gave the members of the Bolshevik Politbureau an opportunity of getting a closer look at Ukrainian cultural life. They found that Ukrainian authors and artists had still not overcome their ideological mistakes. Even Korneichuk himself who was expected to give a good example to his fellow-writers had committed a serious offence. He had written a libretto for the opera 'Bogdan Khmelnitsky', which, from the official point of view, was not sufficiently anti-Polish and not eloquent
[626] enough in its pro-Russian bias. Through its mouthpiece, *Pravda*, the Politbureau not only denounced Korneichuk and other writers for ideological distortions but also reprimanded the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party for having neglected the political education of the Ukrainian intellectual élite. The Ukrainian Central Committee, mindful of what had happened to the Ukrainian Communist leaders in the thirties, immediately pledged itself to remedy the situation.[23]

THE UKRAINE AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET 'WORLD POLITICS'

648 After having fulfilled its original mission of bringing all Ukrainian lands
645 into the fold of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ukraine was given a new task.

* Rilsky, like most great poets of the Soviet Ukraine, has a 'nationalistic past'. In 1934 he and another poet laureate of the Ukraine, Pavel Tychina, were rebuked for their 'hesitation' in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to them. Yet another contemporary Ukrainian poet, Mikola Bazhan, who is not only like Tychina a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet but also a Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Government, used to be likewise blamed for the 'nationalistic soil in which his creations have been rooted'.[24]

113, 539 Ukraine RD1

[For a brief analysis of the texts of old Ukrainian folk songs see 7:Lineva, RF1 Great Russia, category 116, pp. 47-51.]

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54. Quoted from Ukrainian Literature in the Service of its Nation, page 8.

538 Taras Shevchenko is the author of this poem. With him begins a new period of progress for the Ukrainian people after the end of Cossack glory and the period of greatest decline. One of the first to lay the foundation for this development which has not yet ceased, is Ivan Kotliarevskyj with whom begins the period of modern Ukrainian literature freed from Byzantinism and religious bonds. /101/ This was toward the end of the eighteenth century. His travesty of Virgil's Aeneid appeared in 1798 and was the first work to be printed in the Ukrainian popular tongue which from then on becomes the literary language of the Ukrainians. In 1818 the first grammar [177] follows. Around this time the ideas of the German Romanticists also come in and enduringly influence the Ukrainian intellectual world. People study their native language, tradition, folklore and history and in doing so, discover a past whose richness was scarcely imagined.

But the national impulses of the Ukrainian romanticists remain a "melancholy national feeling" until, around 1840, Taras Shevchenko stirs up the slumbering spirits. "The song of this poet had truly the effect of the resurrection trumpet of the archangel." Thus Panyko Kulish, the versatile brain of the Ukrainian in-

538 tellectual world at that time, characterized the influence of Shevchenko. His landlord had had him educated as a painter in Warsaw and Petersburg. By means of a lottery, the friends of the 24-year-old artist obtained the 2500 rubles necessary to buy off a serf. Shevchenko enjoyed his freedom from 1838 to 1847. Then he was arrested in Kiyev along with many other Ukrainian poets, authors and scholars. They all belonged to the "Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood" which inscribed on its banner the federation of all Slavic republics on a democratic basis. Taras Shevchenko was exiled to ten years of labor on a fortress in the Kirghiz steppes. "Writing and painting are prohibited!" the Czar noted in his own handwriting on the margin of the sentence. Four years after he was released the artist died far from home in Petersburg.

Merely a poet! And yet the nine years of freedom between serfdom and exile sufficed this tremendous spirit to build a bridge across the centuries - from the age of the Cossacks up to the new Ukrainian nationalism. Merely a poet, but what an explosive force was hidden in his /102/ ballads and poems, what effects were produced by his conjuring up of the past, his song of songs on freedom and his call to action! His "Kobsar" ('kobsar' was the name of the singers of famous folk epics from the time of the Cossacks) clothed all the national-political demands of the Ukrainian people in a sweeping poetic form and by this very means reached all classes of people.

*

•539 "Hills upon hills, cloud-encircled,
Sown with sorrow, drenched in blood...
There, full of mercy, We shackled
Freedom and pursued her as she wandered
About the land, hungry, naked...Here lie

•539

Untold hosts of hirelings.
And tears? Blood? Verily enough
To sate all czars,
To drown them and their progeny
In widows' tears... The tears of maidens
Shed throughout full nights of longing,
The burning pain of mothers' tears,
Our hoary fathers' tears of blood
No stream could hold, - ah no,
A sea, a fiery sea!... Oh honor
To all dogs and tyrants
And to the Czar, our little father."(55)

55. "Taras Shevchenko" in Beiträge zur Ukrainekunde, Number 6, Berlin 1937.

*

177 558 The political concept of an "indivisible Russia" suggests the suppression of all Ukrainian movements toward independence, even if they be merely of a cultural nature. In accordance with this, and on the basis of the principle followed by the Russian Minister of Education Valuiev: "There is no separate Little Russian language, there never was and never can be", Moscow issued a general printed statement prohibiting all /103/ Ukrainian writings. Ukrainian culture which is 700 years older than the Muscovite culture based on it was simply declared invalid. Belletristic works by Ukrainian pens may appear only in Russian spelling. All writing was sharply censured, concerts, lectures and theatrical performances were forbidden. Later the theatrical prohibition was relaxed a bit, but for each Ukrainian play a Russian one of equal length had to be performed. Since members of the higher classes would be unrefined if they spoke Ukrainian, actors portraying persons from cultivated circles has to speak only Russian even to Ukrainian plays.

661 after two months of office for alleged treasonable contacts with Ukrain-
665 ian separatists. After Bondarenko, Vlas Y. Chubar, a Vice-Premier in
668 the Central Government, became Ukrainian Premier. He was purged in the spring of 1938. Together with the three Prime Ministers, Lyubchenko, Bondarenko and Chubar, a large number of Ukrainian ministers, high officials and party dignitaries were removed from their posts including the party secretaries, Kosior and Postyshev, once so powerful. The purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party was so thorough that of the thirteen members forming the Ukrainian Politbureau in April 1937 not one was left by June 1938. One of the last prominent Ukrainian communists to disappear was Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky, the President of the Ukrainian S.S.R. There is no evidence of Petrovsky, Kosior or Chubar ever having been sentenced by a court. No public trial of a Ukrainian communist leader seems to have taken place after March 1938 when Grigory Fyodorovich Grinko, Finance Minister of the U.S.S.R. was sentenced to death as a 'Ukrainian nationalist' and 'Polish spy'.

To clear up the situation in the Ukraine, Stalin, early in 1938, appointed two new men to the key positions of that republic. The party secretary of Moscow, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchov became first party secretary of the Ukraine and M. A. Burmistenko second secretary. From the point of view of the Kremlin, Burmistenko's appointment was a mistake. He mysteriously vanished during the Nazi invasion of the Ukraine and may even have deserted to the enemy. Khrushchov, on the other hand, was the right man for the job. When taking it over he made a statement extremely characteristic of the entire communist Ukraine policy. He declared that the traitors to party and country would be annihilated to the last man just as Taras Bulba had killed the betrayer of his own people.

[539] The Cossack Ataman, Taras Bulba, the hero of Gogol's famous novel, slew his son, Andriy, who fell in love with a beautiful Polish girl, betrayed his homeland, his Orthodox faith and fought against his own people. Seen through modern eyes, Andriy is but a symbol of Polish, Western and Catholic orientation among the Ukrainians.

Yet Taras Bulba had still another son, Ostap, who represents the daring loyal Cossack fighter bravely enduring all tortures by the Poles who put him to death. The death of Ostap is the prelude to the triumph of Ostap's cause: 120,000 Cossacks appear on the horizon of the Ukraine, a victorious army sweeping away the enemies, the Poles. Taras died in this great struggle but before his death he pronounced a last curse upon the Poles and forecast the final triumph of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar'. 'The time will come', said Taras, 'when there will be no power in the world which will not be conquered by him'.

Theater

545 When the Jesuits, in the pursuit of their plans of conquest, introduced Polish drama into Ukraine at the beginning of the 17th century in the form of a school-play, the orthodox inhabitants opened a defensive campaign and founded theaters in the schools as a means of promoting their own culture. And these days are not really so far behind us; in the second half of the 19th century, this time under Russian supremacy, the theater was the only opportunity where the Ukrainian word could be heard and the only place where Ukrainian sentiment could express itself without fear of Russian censorship. When in the eighties and nineties of last century the Ukrainian theater could point to a number of great artistic and celebrated triumphant successes not only in Ukraine but also in the large towns of Russia, and was even allowed to give performances in the Tsar's palace — General Drenteln, Governor of almost half Ukraine, forbade all performances in Ukrainian areas under his jurisdiction. To protests the governor replied not untruthfully that while the Ukrainian theater in Petersburg was merely drama, it was first and foremost politics at home. We must bear in mind this national function of the Ukrainian theater if we wish to evaluate its development and achievements in the last three centuries properly.

The theater in Ukraine is characterised further by the revolutionary form of its development. It is on the stage in Ukraine that new ideas are ruthlessly opposed to what is older and what has not perhaps completely forfeited its right to exist. But there is no room for two gods. Determined by such circumstances an organic transition from one period to another seems almost impossible and history itself seems to be merely the sum of

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

separate and unconnected periods. This lack of tradition, of a gradual transition, of grafting the new on the old and vice-versa has certain advantages, as well as great disadvantages; it is favorable to the appearance of strong personalities who are not handicapped by obligations to the past and are therefore able to devote their entire energy to realising new ideas. 545

The third special characteristic of the Ukrainian theater is the fact that, during its entire existence, it has always been only a "theater for the people", and not only that the widest circles of the population were greatly interested in the performances and in the work and lives of Ukrainian actors but that, corresponding to the social structure of the Ukrainian people, it has always been a peasant theater, presenting, above all, the problems of peasant life.

As already mentioned, school plays gave a characteristic stamp to the earliest period of the Ukrainian drama. The school which has handed down the oldest examples of this art was the school of the Lviv Brotherhood, famous in its day. The examples we have of those early school dramas are most primitive, being mostly merely dialogues that were spoken at the Holy Grave or, when there was any special occasion in the Brotherhood School, in the courtyard of the church. Besides those dialogues which were always based on religious subjects, interludes have also come down to us, two of which by Jacob Gavatovych, dating from 1619, are distinguished in form and style from their primitive predecessors. A fairly complicated drama of the 17th century, called "A Play about the Destruction of Hell" marks the transition from those dialogues to a more developed form of dramatic art; it is written in verse, in the lively language of everyday and for a large caste, among which Christ suddenly appears as an actor on the stage. The plays belonging to the Kyiv circle which arose in the 18th century in the Brotherhood School that as well as in Mohyla's famous Academy in Kyiv, were transitional in character. In this connection we must not omit to mention a dramatist at the end of the 17th century, Danylo Tuptalo (monk's name Demeter Rostovskyj).

Theophan Prokopovych, a collaborator of Peter the Great and a great scholar connected with Mohyla's Academy in Kyiv,

● 545 thoroughly reformed the school theater. In his theory of poetry Prokopovych issued set dramatic rules according to which the new plays, called by him tragicomedies, were to be acted. His theories had not such lasting influence as his play "Vladimir", a play that served as a model to all dramatists of the time and whose rules were so slavishly observed by succeeding writers that this entire branch of art was gradually petrified and died.

The second great period in the history of the Ukrainian theater which lasted from the beginning of the 19th century till the present day, began with the performance of a comedy from the life of the people called "Natalka Poltavka" (Natalie from Poltava). It was interspersed with songs and, both as literature and as a stage show, has become one of the classical masterpieces of dramatic art in Ukraine. Ivan Kotlarevskyj, the author, was able to book such a great success because, besides his talents as a writer, he was director of the theater in Poltava and was in possession of considerable stage technique. After this auspicious start, Ukrainian theaters sprang up like mushrooms after rain; talented actors appear, among them Shchepkin, Solenyk, Rekanovskyj, and Marko Kropyvnytskyj (1841—1910) whose genius found outlet in reforming later features of the theater in Ukraine. The repertory of the theater also grows as some of the most gifted writers in the first half of the 19th century begin to write for the stage. Among these are Kvitka (1778—1843), Shevchenko, Kostomariv and others. The subjects that proved most suitable for the stage at that time were characteristic scenes from the life of the people with the Ukrainian landscape as a background and also events from Ukrainian history, but above all the deeds of the Zaporog Cossacks, the heroes of Ukraine.

These national tendencies of the Ukrainian theater could not escape the argus eyes of the imperial government, intent on forcing all the nations within the great empire to become Russians. In 1876 a secret circular was therefore sent round all administrative authorities forbidding the speaking or writing of Ukrainian. The stage was the first position that the Ukrainian language was able to re-take. Under the pressure of public

opinion the ban on Ukrainian was lifted for the theater after 545 five years.

This victory gave the Ukrainian theater a tremendous impetus as the only form of expression open to national life. The stage in Ukraine attracted more talented actors than the Russian theater could count on for the performance of popular plays; we mention only a few of the most important, such as Kropyvnytskyj (1841—1910), Zankovetska (1860), Saksahanskyj (1858), Sadovskyj (1856—1936), then dramatic critics like Starytskyj (1840—1904) who was also an exceptional stage-manager, Tobylevych (1845—1907) and others. Finally composers like Nishchynskyj (1832—1896) and Lysenko utilised this newly opened province of art in order to give expression to their ideas.

The Ukrainian troupes of actors were in those days simply called the "Meininger" in Russia (the famous theater in Meiningen was at that time at the height of its fame). And the epithet was not unmerited. For, in the same way as the celebrated German ensemble, the Ukrainian owed its unparalleled success to its harmonious management and its efforts to achieve truth in the settings of its plays. And the decisive triumph of the national idea was behind this purely artistic success. The Ukrainian language which was completely forbidden rang out unexpectedly, but all the more convincingly, from the advanced outpost of a popular stage. The sound of the Ukrainian language, of the Ukrainian folk-song, the beauty of the national costume, the magic of the Ukrainian landscape, the poetry of national traditions which the higher powers wished to stamp out at all costs, all this was displayed like a pageant to the spectators who were in danger of forgetting that they, too, were children of the Ukrainian people.

Up till the revolution of 1905 the theater in Ukraine was represented by travelling ensembles. New avenues were opened after the Russo-Japanese War and the changes that followed it. All restrictions were removed with one stroke of ~~the pen~~ and theater managers were permitted to extend their repertories beyond subjects from peasant life and to turn their attention to the theater in the West. It was, of course, easy to drop prohibitions that had existed up till now; but it was not so simple to

●545 transform suddenly the often gifted actors who had always played peasant and Cossack rôles into players who were capable of giving a satisfactory presentation of a modern play. This aim was not completely attained till the short period of Ukrainian independence in 1918.

At this time there were two theaters in the capital which attempted to win popular support by their whole equipment, the excellence of their castes, and their sympathy with western theaters. "Oedipus Rex" which the "Young Theater" had been preparing for almost two years was an enormous success. Les Kurbas (1887), the manager and the soul of the ensemble became famous overnight. The "Young Theater" was mobile, thoroughly alive and inspired by youthful enthusiasm and a determination to work, though imperfections were bound to appear occasionally. The second modern stage, the "State Theater", was forced by its character to devote its attention to the absolute control of all means of presentation. Its head was Aleksander Zaharov (1877) and its performances were perhaps not always very lively, but they were all the more solid.

After the occupation of Ukraine by the bolshevists, the theater in Ukraine, as elsewhere in the Union, was used as an instrument of wide-spread propaganda. It was greatly extended for this purpose, so that opera-houses and also some ordinary theaters are to be found in several towns. Peasant life, however, was now banned from the stage and replaced by urban life of neutral nationality and to a large extent coinciding with the life of the working classes. The change that took place here may perhaps be briefly summed up by saying that under the influence of bolshevist reality Ukrainian dramatic art has been transformed into dramatic art in Ukraine.

In Western Ukraine the strong Polish interest in the country and the great difficulties imposed by the Polish government prevented Ukrainian dramatic art from establishing itself at first. It was only after Galicia was annexed by Austria in 1772 that the first attempts at dramatic representation were given in Greek-United theological colleges by students, and therefore without female rôles. The Ukrainian theater proper, with secular actors, only saw light in 1848, a year that was as significant

basis with Ukrainian. He established Russian theatres in the larger /91
cities and sent them Russian companies from Leningrad and Moscow 636
to show the greatness of Russian art, while at the same time he had [545]
Les Kurbas arrested at the end of the year and closed the Berezil Theatre, the leading company in Ukraine, and even abolished its name as Catherine the Great had abolished the name of the Zaporozhian Sich one hundred fifty years before.

The fundamental object was to re-Russianize Ukraine as rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this idea, Zatonsky even suggested that the students should be encouraged to talk a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian in the hope that they could thus be more quickly induced to accept the alien tongue. That was a rash thought, for as soon as it was reported to Moscow, there came a strong protest from Gorky that such a procedure could only injure the purity of the Russian language by mixing foreign elements in it. Zatonsky hurriedly withdrew his suggestions but it was too late and only a few years later he was to pay the penalty for his rash proposal.

It was small wonder that Khvylovy, who knew well that he [762]
was threatened with arrest and execution, committed suicide in despair on May 13, 1933 and he was followed on July 6, by Skrypnyk who was too familiar with the workings of Russian Communism not to realize that he would be steadily demoted until he could be finished off without comment as a fallen idol.

The terror and the destruction proceeded apace[1] and after the 661
murder of Kirov in Leningrad on December 21, 1934, new in- 538
vestigations were ordered and it was discovered that the bulk of the Ukrainian authors were involved in the conspiracy. In a very short time their ranks were almost completely decimated. In the same month H. Kosynka, O. Vlyzko, I. Krushelnytsky, K. Burevy, and D. Falkivsky were shot on various pretenses. Nearly all the former members of the *Vaplite,* the Neo-Classicists, the groups connected with the MARS in Kiev and the *New Generation,* were liquidated in one way or another, either by execution or deportation and deportation was practically the equivalent of death, for scarcely one of the deported ever returned to the Ukraine or made

[1] [reference to forced Russification of Ukraine, 1933 - Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

655 firms were turned into branches of one commissariat or another. By the spring, while there had not yet been a full communization of the country, the process was well advanced and no resident of Western Ukraine could doubt as to the future of the area.

659 In Eastern Galicia, where the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite was the predominant religion, the Metropolitan Archbishop Andry Sheptytsky was not personally touched.1 He was placed under more or less surveillance and found it impossible to exercise his normal activity. However, all the religious schools and seminaries under his charge were closed, the church and monastic lands were seized, and all ecclesiastical printing was suppressed. Finally, the clergy were compelled to hand over to the representatives of the government all the baptismal and other records which were incorporated in the work of the ZATS, the Soviet bureau of vital statistics. The clergy were treated as a non-working class [661] and were thus deprived of all means of livelihood, except for the free-will offerings of their impoverished parishioners.

In the eastern sections, where the Orthodox Church predominated, the same regulations were put into force with the additional proviso that the clergy had to transfer their allegiance from the Polish Orthodox Church to the locum tenens of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow. This was a first step in improving relations between the locum tenens and the Soviet government and in making the authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church a definite instrument of the government in the spreading of Russian Communism.

● 545 On the other hand, there was a considerable patronage of Ukrainian art. Certain scholars were rather favored. The Ukrainian theatre was supported on a more liberal scale than it had been under the Polish rule and there were in some quarters hopes that there might be a happy future. It was again a short dream, for [626] as 1940 came to a close, there began again the insistant but unobtrusive attempts at russification. Russian theatrical companies began to visit Lviv and other cities. The publications of the publishing firms of Lviv fell off and once more they found it necessary ooo to produce Russian books. The libraries were carefully purged of

1 [1940 -- under Russian occupation -- Analyst]

538 It had been enthusiastically received in 1944, when it appeared,
626 and the poet was awarded for it a Stalin Prize. The poem was published and republished by the state publishing houses and then it was suddenly discovered that it was untrue, bourgeois nationalist, etc. and the unfortunate author was forced to repent of his errors. As a matter of fact, even before this, many of the Russian translators had gone out of their way to insert in it various passages celebrating the Volga and the Kremlin as part of the love of Ukraine, but they, too, were reprimanded for trying to improve the work instead of condemning it for its real quality.

In every field of scholarship, literature, art, and music, the same charges have been brought with logical consistency. Anything which would remind the readers of the old pre-Communist life is treated as dangerous, but none of the authors, no matter how they have falsified history or the present, has been able to express the great achievements of the new Soviet Ukraine and to catch its spirit and show how it can in any degree differ from Moscow. At the first sign of any independent judgment, the cry is raised of bourgeois nationalism and the work is suppressed.

545 At the same time the Ukrainian scene is being overloaded with
532 things Russian. Russian theatrical companies are continually travel-
626 ling around the republic so as to show the real charity and achievements of the elder brother and inspire a desire for imitation of its life and thought under that all-time world genius, Joseph Stalin. Russian musical ensembles and exhibitions of the works of Russian artists are constantly sent to all the chief cities of the non-Russian republics, not only to acquaint the people with Russian achievements but still more to give them the necessary patterns by which they should plan their lives and work.

538 There are constantly published masses of Ukrainian translations
626 of Russian works and books translated from the other languages used in the USSR and it is almost essential for an author to allude to these and especially to the Georgian people as the people of Stalin, if he wishes to avoid the charge of bourgeois nationalism and the attempt to sow hostility between the brotherly peoples.

000 The situation is even more severe in the field of language.

186 been founded by the nationalist intelligentsia of the East Ukraine
517 many years before the Revolution. They were now revived, after
575 long suppression by the Communist regime, to carry on the work of developing national culture and inculcating a feeling of national identity. The two aims could be combined because all nationalist Ukrainians felt it essential to instill a love of the indigenous popular arts and customs, emphasizing their distinctive nature. That this effort had a political as well as a cultural sig-
[661] nificance is indicated by the fact that not only the Soviet regime (both before 1941 and upon reconquest, as in Kharkov)[45] but the German police as well attacked the Prosvita societies, and in the Reichskommissariat they were able, for varying periods, to lead only a clandestine life. The desire for national expression was shared by so many, however, that the Germans felt it was impossible to dam up all outlets; therefore the Prosvita was generally permitted, though under close observation.[46] Together with the church (and a few local societies not using the Prosvita name but having the same function), it was one of the few organizations of a nationalist character which was not under direct German control.

533 The work of the Prosvita groups, although arranged in various
517 ways in different localities, may be classified under four general
186 headings. Playing a major role everywhere were musical activities,
575 particularly choral groups, in which the Ukrainians had always excelled, and which served as a powerful intellectual and emotional stimulus to nationalist feeling, since most of the songs were distinctively Ukrainian. In addition, groups of *bandura* players (the *bandura* is a small lute-like stringed instrument indigenous to the Ukraine) were sponsored, and orchestras were
545 trained. In the larger centers, Prosvita collaborated with regular
517 professional musical organizations, such as conservatories and
575 operas, to produce nationalist-inspired performances. For ex-
186 ample, operas were reopened in Kiev and Kharkov, and offered a considerable repertoire of native Ukrainian pieces (*Taras Bul'ba, Natalka Poltavka,* etc.) as well as traditional Western

[45] Cf. *Nastup,* September 26, 1943, p. 3 (based on *Vinnyts'ki Visti,* August 29, 1943), on the destruction of Prosvita and its personnel in Kharkov during the Soviet interlude in February-March, 1943.

[46] MS E; PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

operas such as *Madame Butterfly* and *Les Cloches de Corneville*. 545
Like other forms of national expression, however, operatic per- 517
formances ran afoul of the Nazi hatred of independent activity. 575
At first, the desirable places in the Kiev opera were reserved for 186
Germans, and then, in December, 1942, the performances were suspended altogether, an action which aroused the indignation of all elements of the population.[47]

Within a matter of days after the Red Army was driven out, active theatrical groups likewise sprang up, usually with Prosvita sponsorship, even in the smaller cities of the East Ukraine. For example, a theater had been started in Zhitomir before the first month of German occupation was past.[48] Even in cities like Chernigov and Simferopol' (in the Crimea), where evidences of nationalist activity were scanty, the theater was soon in full career.[49] Since the players were generally amateurs interested in using this medium of expression of their nationalist feeling, the performances were nationalist in content as well as language (evidently to a greater extent than the opera which, being composed largely of professional performers, was imbued with an "all-Union," i.e., Russian, character, at least behind the scenes).[50] Some presentations were so strongly imbued with nationalist ideology that they were censored by the Germans; the author of one of the most popular, Constantine Hupalo, was arrested for nationalist activity.[51]

Prosvita and related groups sponsored a wide variety of more 517
directly educational activities. These included lectures, valued 575
as a means of propagating knowledge of the language as well as 186
for their content; libraries and reading rooms, vital to the spread of the printed word in view of the extreme scarcity of even periodical literature; nationalist cultural work in the schools; and research and discussion on themes of national history and ethnography. In the more vigorous and less restricted societies, like the

[47] Interrogation of Shtepa, CXLVa 78; PS 1198.

[48] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1 (from *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* [Zhitomir], August 3, 1941).

[49] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 6, 1941, p. 4 (based on an interview with Theodore Pipa, the Chernigov editor).

[50] Cf. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 15, 1942, p. 3.

[51] His play, entitled *The Triumph of Procurator Dal'shii*, was a drama of the Ukrainian nationalist movement under Soviet rule (*OUN u Viini*, p. 74).

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 186 The society of the 'United Slavs' was only one expression of the great liberating movement, and its failure was the logical consequence of the suppression of the Decembrist insurrection at St. Petersburg on 14 December 1825, which gave it its name.

This failure checked for a long time the attempts of political revolt in the whole of Russia. Nevertheless the intellectual movement continued, always inspired by the same sources and the same ideals.

538 The genius of Chevtchenko determined the path which the whole Ukrainian literature was to follow. It clung especially to the description of popular life, of the peasant life with its sadness and its injustices. Deeply steeped in folk-lore, it was especially inspired by the pity of the disinherited, by this social pity which is a feature of its affinity with the great Russian literature. In the writings of Marko Vovtchok (pen-name of Marie Vilinska Markovitch) in the *Popular Tales*, approved by Chevtchenko himself, we find again the touching picture of the peasant miseries. Later, in Galicia, Franko, Martovitch, and Stefanik give some pretty examples of this literature, more social than national. Parallel to this, in Russian Ukraine, this tradition was pursued until the revolution by Kotsiubinsky, Tobilevitch, and, above all, by Lessia Oukrainka, the niece of Michael Dragomanov, to whom we will presently return.

536 545 The Ukrainian Theatre experienced a remarkable development towards the end of the nineteenth century. We have already considered the taste of the Ukrainian people for dramatic art, a taste which had already found expression in the old marionette plays. The rise of the new Ukrainian literature could not fail to bring about the development of a modern theatre. As a result a troupe of Ukrainian actors, that of Kropivnitzky, was formed at Kiev and had a great success. The Imperial

Government authorized the creation of a Ukrainian 536
language theatre, limiting, however, the subjects which 545
could be treated. In conforming to the official point of view, according to which Ukrainian was only a local Russian dialect, it forbade the showing of plays other than those which bore a popular and local character. But this restriction could not seriously hinder the development of Ukrainian dramatic art, as it was the chief aim of the whole Ukrainian literature to treat subjects taken from the popular life. The success of the Ukrainian Theatre of Kiev did not fail to find imitators. Amateur troupes were formed almost in all parts of Russia and especially in the country, which successfully exploited the artistic qualities of a people so richly gifted.

As for Galicia, the political movement always 668
continued to develop rapidly here.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century a new figure appeared on the Ukrainian political arena, that of Dragomanov (1851–95), whose role was to become enormous.

Born in Russian Ukraine, he soon joined the intellectual revolutionary circles. Following the example of other revolutionary organizations in Russia, that of *Stara Gromada* of Dragomanov sent him abroad to spread there, as a political *émigré*, the ideas of a revolutionary Ukrainianism. Dragomanov at first allied himself with the Galician circles and settled in Austria, but he could not remain here as a result of his 'too red' ideas. After this he took the road to Geneva, the rallying centre of political *émigrés* from the old Russia. There he founded a political review, *Gromada*, and undertook, from his exile in Geneva, the direction of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia. The impulse which he gave it was extremely vigorous. It led to the formation of a new party, tinted

Muscoviam, Before and After Moscow). If the before was leading 814
up to a Moscow discovery, it was good; if not, it was bad. 665

This was proclaimed by Zhdanov of the Politbiuro in 1946 [546]
when, under the highest auspices, he began his attack. On September 4 of that year, at a meeting of the Umiom of Soviet Writers in Moscow, he lashed out at various films which had been recently produced and at several Russian authors, especially Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova, for not producing a true picture of Soviet reality. Then, warming to his task, he explicitly declared that literature 538
had to be entirely at the service of the Communist Party and that 626
it was the duty of every Soviet writer to lash and scourge the 665
decadent bourgeois west. He berated many of the authors for wishing to learn from the bourgeois writers at the very moment when Soviet literature, the most revolutionary literature in the world, was a hundred times higher and more beautiful than the literature of the bourgeois west.

The speech of Zhdanov was the open proclamation of war against all foreign influences in Soviet literature and it was directed against some of the most respected figures, who were apparently silenced. Even Tikhonov was removed from his post at the head [558]
of the Union of Soviet Writers for not having exerted himself more strongly against these dangerous heresies.

Yet this speech was not really the beginning, for some weeks before the question was fully brought into the open, at a meeting of the KP/b/U, Khrushchov, the Russian who held the post as First Secretary of the KP/b/U, had received from the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow full and definite instructions as to the means to be adopted for purging Ukrainian literature and science and for suppressing all traces of bourgeois nationalism. His remarks were reprinted in part by *Pravda* in Moscow, which summarized them in these words.

"The TsK KP/b/U had not paid sufficient attention to ideological work, does not give enough weight to the selecting and the ideological and political education of the cadres in the fields of science, literature and art, has not organized in the press a wide criticism of the hostile bourgeois-nationalist ideology. As a result

776 he may take the form of either sex, the Devil himself is a male.[4] Sometimes he appears as a chimney sweep, when he has wings like a bat, tangled horns like a ram, and a tail.[5] The Devil can change his shape to suit his fancy, and can assume almost any form, e.g., that of a baby, a cow, a pig, an insect, a worm, or a straw.[6] Even when visible in no concrete form, he may nevertheless be present. When one sees a flash of light from afar at dusk, or hears a sudden whisper or rustle, one is certain it is the Devil, whose unseen presence is felt everywhere.[7] The Devil fears nothing save God, the cross, and holy water.[8] Nevertheless, he is mortal, and is particularly vulnerable to lightning. During a thunderstorm he seeks any available cover, but Elijah's arrow discovers him, and destroys him and his shelter.[9] His ordinary abode is hell, whence he ascends at night to pursue his baneful activities on earth.[10]

● 551 776 The people, as a rule, carefully avoid mentioning the name of the Devil (*didko* or *czort*). To utter it would be blasphemy (*lichoslowyty*), and to blaspheme against the Devil is a serious sin (*hrich welykyj*).[11] The people, therefore, usually resort to a circumlocution and call him *win* (he), *tot szczezby* (that one, may he be lost!), *zlyj duch* (the evil spirit),[12] or *neczystyj* (the unclean one).[13] His name may be mentioned, however, in extreme anger,[14] or he may be called familiarly by a nickname, such as Fedko or Chitko.[15] To some individuals, who have formed a pact with the Devil and have sold him their souls, he is harmless and even exceedingly helpful in attaining power and wealth.

113 [4] Kaindl, R. F., *Die Huzulen* (Wien, 1894), p. 81.
[5] Onyščuk, *op. cit.*, XI, 72.
[6] Kolberg, O., *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 232.
[7] *Idem.*
[8] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie* (Kraków, 4 vols., 1882-9), III, 86n.
[9] Zelenin, *op. cit.*, p. 397.
[10] Kaindl, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[11] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 81 n.
[12] *Idem.*
[13] Kaindl. *op. cit.*, p. 83.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 84.
[15] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 232.

777 various prophecies as to the future of the child, but final decision rests with the oldest, whose judgment prevails. These same judges grant the child a star, which shines only so long as he [776] lives; upon his death it falls to earth. Every person at birth likewise receives a guardian angel, whose duty it is to protect him throughout his life. Before starting any new task, and especially when in danger, the peasant calls upon his ministering angel for assistance, saying: "Guardian angel, help me!"[31] Since one's fate is determined at birth, one can do little to change it. This explains, in the popular mind, why one man is poor and another rich, one healthy and another sick, why one lives long and another dies young. It also explains why there are all kinds of children in the world, and why even children of the same parents often differ so markedly.[32]

845 A deformed or mentally deficient child is ascribed to the act 732 of an evil spirit, particularly the *diwa-baba*. Such a child has a large head, is always lean, and can never be satiated. With his tremendous appetite he suckles so ravenously that his mother's breast finally withers away. Such a child causes constant trouble, is retarded in its growth and short-lived, and does not reach a stature commensurate with his age until after death.[33]

II. Christening Ceremonies

851 While great secrecy surrounds pregnancy and birth, the 553 ceremonies that follow are ushered in with the greatest publicity. As soon as she has attended to the child and the mother, the midwife begins to make preparations for the christening (*chrestyny*), [777] which must take place immediately. A child who is allowed to remain unbaptized over night is exposed to all sorts of dangers. If at all possible, therefore, an infant is taken to church to be baptized on the very day it is born, even though the hour be late in the evening, the weather extremely unfavourable, and the distance considerable.[34] While the father, who takes

[113]

[31] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [32] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 287.

[33] Kaindl, R. F., "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi (Braunschweig, 1899), 256.

[34] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 113; Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6.

While the father, who takes
851 a passive part throughout the ceremony,[35] busies himself with
608 supplying the assembled guests with drinks, the *baba* repairs to
553 the village to invite the godparents (*kumy*) to the christening. The number of men and women asked to act in this capacity ranges from a single couple to as many as fifteen, depending upon the wealth and social status of the parents. The most desirable godparents are the couple who acted as best man and
851 maid of honour at the wedding of the parents.[36] A pregnant
608 woman, too, is considered a most acceptable godmother, for a
784 child held during baptism by such a woman is assured of good
777 luck. An enceinte woman, however, seldom consents to play the rôle, since her own child may be harmed thereby.[37] The wealthier and more prominent the godparents, the more desirable they are. If the parents have been unfortunate in rearing children, however, they invite a couple of wandering beggars to act as godparents and treat them with the greatest of courtesy. This, it is asserted, will change the luck of the parents, and will make the child grow and be healthy.[38] For two women to reciprocate as godmothers is considered not only unwise but a downright sin.[39] Near neighbours, too, make anything but good godparents. Since the two families live in close contact, it is almost inevitable that a quarrel shall sometime arise between them, and tradition as well as propriety strongly disapproves of unfriendly relations with one's *kumy*.[40] Contrary to what one might expect, for a gypsy to hold a child at baptism is supposed to bring it good luck, especially in trade and horse-raising.[41]

851 The midwife approaches the people selected as godparents
608 with these words: "May God grant you health! The mother
553 of the baby has sent me to ask you to do her the favour of holding her child during baptism." If they agree to undertake the function, they either follow her to the house a little later or else promise to meet her in the church at a designated hour.

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[35] According to D. Zelenin, *Russische (Ostslavische) Volkskunde* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1927), p. 295, the passivity may be explained by the fact that he is, like his wife, considered unclean.

[36] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 208–211.

[37] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. o.

[38] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

[39] *Idem.*

[40] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[41] *Idem.*

851 553 Upon returning home, she swathes the baby and takes a piece of bread and a knife, but does not leave the house until the mother has wiped the infant with her shirt to protect it from the evil eye. On the doorstep the *baba* makes the sign of the cross over the child, and sometimes another woman sprinkles it with holy water. The same procedure is repeated on the other side of the door. Here, however, the midwife sticks her knife into the door, and leaves it for some member of the household to remove later.[42]

If the godparents have come to the house, they follow the midwife, each carrying a long piece of linen (*kryżmo*) and a candle, while the father bears a hen, two loaves of bread, and a " head " of salt as a present for the priest. At the church, all kneel down while some of the godparents remove the swaddling clothes and two others hold the sides of the *kryżmo* on which the infant is placed. The priest, after lighting the candles and handing them back to the participants, reads a prayer, then turns to them and repeats thrice the question : " Do you renounce the evil spirit? " To this, the *baba* and the godparents, turning their heads to the door, reply : " We renounce! " The priest next asks them : " Are you willing to serve God and Jesus Christ? " Each godparent then hands over to the priest his piece of linen, which later becomes the property of the child. After these preliminaries comes the actual christening, which differs little from the usual Catholic ceremony. The name given the child is usually that of the saint who presides over that particular day. For boys, the most popular names are Iwan, Hryć, Hawrylo, Nykola, Michajło, and Petro ; for girls, Maryja, Katerina, Hanna, and Paraska.[43] Children, even twins, are usually baptized in church ; only in the case of triplets does the priest go [793] to the house of the parents to perform the ceremony. Among the highlanders, it is believed that a widowed priest who learns of the birth of triplets, and goes voluntarily to the house, is allowed to remarry.[44] After the ceremony the sexton extin-

[113] [42] Kolberg, *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 49 ; Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

[43] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, pp. 49–50 ; *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[44] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6 ; ordinarily a uniate priest is allowed to marry only once—prior to his being ordained.

23: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1939 RD1 Ukraine RD1

851 553 guishes the candles, appropriates half of them himself, and returns the rest to the participants, who must light them again in the room where the mother is confined.[45] If the candles are not easily extinguished, it is a sign that the baptized child will have a long life.[46]

851 574 In some localities the godparents leave immediately after the close of the ceremony for the house of the parents, where a festive dinner is served; in most places, however, they return to their homes and go to the party in the evening.[47] The midwife, upon her return, greets the mother with these words: "You have given us the child born; we, however, return it to you [777] sacrificed and baptized." She then places the infant on a black fur coat (*kożuch*), which is thought to bring luck, and hands it over on the coat to the mother.[48]

At the christening dinner the father again plays a most inconspicuous rôle, the midwife and the godparents being the principal [431] actors. Each guest brings presents of foodstuffs, chiefly beans, peas, eggs, cheese, salt, and bread. After a flood of greetings and congratulations, the women give their presents to the mother, placing them on her bed, while the men hand their gifts, usually loaves of bread, to the father.[49]

After these preliminaries, the guests seat themselves at the table. The master of the house serves each of them with a drink of whisky, and the midwife or the cook places before each an appetizer consisting of a piece of meat or another delicacy. The courses served at this meal are as numerous and elaborate as those of a wedding dinner. They usually include meat with gravy, *holubci* (grouts enveloped in cabbage leaves), *pirohy* (potatoes or grouts enveloped in dough), sour cream, *borszcz* (beet soup), and many other dishes, depending, of course, upon the economic status of the parents. Whisky is lavishly provided, and each guest offers a toast before every drink. It is interesting to note that, if the baby be a boy, the godparents,

[45] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[46] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[47] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[113] [48] Jandaurek, J., *Das Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien und das Herzogtum Bukowina* (Wien, 1884), p. 62.

[49] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

* [christening -- Analyst]

termed" and here by poor treatment at least forty percent of the 731
ten thousand gathered in, died. 661

The urban population felt the shortage because of the reduction of the bread ration for the unemployed to two hundred grams a day. The majority could not patronize the commercial shops for they had nothing with which to pay and the legal allowance of other products as fat, sugar and barley were either reduced or omitted. Even the more highly qualified of the intelligentsia were obliged to sell all their trinkets and gold teeth to secure some food. The prices allowed were ridiculous. One teacher at these stores received for a silver dollar "500 grams of sugar, a piece of soap and 200 grams of rice."

Physicians were forbidden to enter "hunger" in the records of illness and death. They were ordered to give as the cause of death "BBO" (absence of white corpuscles). Sometimes it was recorded as "childish" or "old age" weakness, "paralysis of the heart," "diarrhea," all symptoms of death by starvation.

It is impossible to estimate accurately the number of deaths, 165
for even the indefatigable NKVD gave up the attempt to list the 731
deaths along the roads, in the fields, and in the streets of the cities. 661
Villages died out and this was indicated by the use of black flags on certain houses. In these cases no attempt was made to keep the records in order. The so-called "therapeutic hospitals" did not turn over their records or admit to their files the workers of the ZATS (The Records of the Acts of the Civil Population), who were the collaborators of the NKVD. Thus, in one of these therapeutic hospitals in Kiev there were at least 5,000 deaths from starvation that were not recorded in the official statistics.

Of course, none of these hardships were felt by the highly placed [554]
Communists and party officials. They received their food through party channels which were not accessible to the ordinary residents of the city or the kolhosps.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the number who perished in the famine, but it was approximately 4,800,000. This is certainly an underestimate, although certain other calculations will place the number between five and six million.

[-famine in Ukraine, 1933-- Analyst]

369 They could also, if they still had preserved any valuables, dispose
511 of them through the Torgsin stores which sold imported wares for foreign currency and precious metals.

[554] Of course, neither in city or village did any of these restrictions apply to the more important Communists who possessed their own stores at which the government supplied them with the necessary articles to allow them to live in comfort and luxury as a welcome investment for the regime. The line of demarcation between the poor and the rich, the ordinary people and the Communists, became steadily greater, until it was often wider than it had been in the old tsarist Russian empire.

642 All these measures which had been adopted in Moscow[1] were
631 in theory supposed to apply to all sections of the USSR equally, but it was not long before the natives of Ukraine realized that however impartial the laws might seem, they were not sufficiently flexible to take account of local and republican differences. The central regime was interested in advancing and developing the Moscow industrial area and it expended on this in various grandiose efforts, as the Moscow subway, enormous sums of money. It is safe to say that the expenditures in that one area alone equalled the entire budget and money spent by the central government in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It classified Ukraine as one of the regions where the supply of manufactured goods was less necessary.

The crushing of the Ukrainian Communists, the suicide of Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, no less than the complete altering of the land code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the substitution of the new policy of collectivization, showed perfectly well where the real power of the USSR lay in the thirties and it was accompanied by such acts as the introduction of Russian as the
[701] standard language of instruction and of the army. This was followed by the formal transfer of the Ukrainian divisions to the Red Army and a number of other acts which completed the subordination of the UkSSR. Already in 1930, during difficulties on the Soviet-Manchuria borders, the Red Army had not hesitated to

1 [after 1933 - measures dealing with production, supply etc. --illegible]

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a 474
result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred 434
karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one 241
thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on [559]
these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for [665]
show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satisfactory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer[1] is little better, although he 465
receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, 731
there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 con- 185
tinued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

1 [Post - WORLD WAR II - 1945 -- Analyst]

German arrival.[10] In the less sheltered districts, however, Soviet repression was horrible. According to German secret reports, four thousand Ukrainian political prisoners were butchered in the NKVD cellars of L'vov alone, and several times as many were deported eastward. Many of the latter were killed later when their captors could no longer hurry them on ahead of the German advance.[11] Meanwhile tens of thousands of Soviet officials and their dependents, along with a considerable portion of the large Jewish population of Galicia, streamed eastward to escape a similar fate at the hands of the German totalitarians. 668* [661]

On June 30, in the midst of the disorganization caused by these events, the advance units of the Wehrmacht reached L'vov. With them came the first groups of Bandera's followers. Some of these came legally in "Nachtigall"; others, including Iaroslav Stets'ko, came illegally, though with the incidental assistance of some German front-line units.[12] Having arrived in the Galician capital, the OUN-B was in a favorable position. The months of isolation from the world outside the Soviet Union had prevented most of the citizens of L'vov from hearing of the internal conflict of the OUN. Moreover, the horror of the last days of Soviet occupation made the Germans seem like providential deliverers; the close contact enjoyed by the Bandera leaders with uniformed Wehrmacht soldiers greatly enhanced their prestige in their compatriots' eyes. [554]

Just what assurances the Bandera adherents gave of their backing by the Germans, just how far they themselves believed they could rely on German support, is impossible to determine. Whatever inducements they used, immediately after their arrival the OUN-B group named Dr. George Polans'kyi, a prominent citizen, mayor, and succeeded in having a national representation "elected"; this they called together the same evening. They had hoped to secure the L'vov state theater, a hall of appropriate size and dignity for the gathering, but, finding it requisitioned by the German army, they were forced to resort to the small meeting 668* 642

[10] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 6, 1941, p. 3.

[11] Report of the SP and the SD *Einsatzgruppen*, July 31, 1941, p. 13, NO 2151 (hereafter referred to as NO 2151).

[12] Interview 24.

657 ing World War II, the Soviet Government abolished the Ukrainian
798 Greek-Catholic Church by force, against the will of the popula-
661 tion, and destroyed the hierarchy of this Church. The Ukrainian Greek Catholics who were in union with Rome were ordered to become subordinate to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow, who is backed by the Soviet Government.

000 The struggle of the Ukrainians against Russian imperialism did not cease after World War II. It is being conducted in various forms. In this struggle other peoples who are oppressed by Russia, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkestan, participate. Thus a common front of freedom-loving peoples against despotic Russia is being created.

656 In 1949, Moscow has permitted Ukraine to use an own flag and
186 an own different anthem. However, this cannot be regarded an ex-
661 tension of the rights of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. It seems to be more an attempt to bring the so-called satellite countries to the Ukrainian level.

Moscow is watching attentively every expression of Ukrainian political thought and national sentiment, and wants to have everything under its control. The Decade of Ukrainian Culture held in Moscow in July 1951, ended with rebukes and threats against the participants of the Decade, and a 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists whom Moscow imputes 'bourgeois nationalism'. Only the Russian Communists have beeen beyond any doubt as regards their 'internationalism'; there was no case that the manifestations of nationalism among the Russian Communists had been condemned by the Communist Party. On the contrary, Moscow is cultivating an exaggerated national pride among the Russian people. The Ukrainian Communists are under a especially heavy control of
[554] Moscow. No Ukrainian has been General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This position has always been occupied by people sent from Moscow: Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Khrushchev, finally Melnikov.

'Titoism' is no isolated phenomenon in the relations between imperialist Russia and Yugoslavia. Similar trends hostile to Russian imperialism have existed among Ukrainian Communists since the first days of Soviet Russian occupation in Ukraine. The Russian terrorism prevented these trends, however, from getting strong. Nevertheless, they exist clandestinely. Moscow's persecution of 'burgeois nationalism' among the Ukrainian Communists gives an eloquent proof of Ukrainian opposition against Russian imperalism.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 Government. The centres of the Shtundists are in the
798 Kherson Government (the districts of Yelisavetgrad and Odessa), in the Kiev Government (the districts of Tarashchansk, Skirsk, and Zvenigorodsk), in the Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Poltava Governments, and to a less extent in Chernigov, Podolia, and Bessarabia. In their boycott of official churches, ikons, and priests, of military service, and to a great extent of the Government itself, the Shtundists are akin to other sectaries. One branch of Ukrainian sectaries combines the teaching of the Shtundists and that of the Baptists, and are called Neo-Baptists. The sectaries in the Ukraine, as elsewhere, were suppressed by the Russian Government, but those who have studied the question (e.g. Prugavin[1]) state that they number more than 20,000,000.

793 *Position of the Clergy.*—On the whole it is true that the Uniat clergy in Eastern Galicia, Choïm, Polesia, and wherever the Uniat Church is found, as well as the leaders of the sects in the other parts of the Ukraine, exercise enormous influence over religious and social
554 life. The persecutions they have undergone have strengthened their prestige among the peasants and even among the *intelligentsia.* The influence of the Russian Orthodox clergy, though many of them have been of Ukrainian nationality, has been limited to the religious sphere, since socially they have been generally regarded as Government officials by the peasants and still more by the *intelligentsia.*

The clergy in the Ukraine are on the whole less educated than in Great Russia, i. e. they are mostly 'seminarists', not 'academicians'. The Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, once known for its learning, has degenerated into a monastery in which some of the monks are illiterate. For the last twenty-five years the highest positions all over the Empire have been in the hands of the monastic clergy; and there was acute hostility between them and the secular clergy, who in

[1] See V. Anderson, *Old Believers and Sectaries*, Petrograd, 1908 (Russ.); also T. I. Buthevich, *Survey of Russian Sects and their Creeds*, Kharkov, 1910 (Russ.).

Gastronoms

443 434 262 554 461 In addition to the ration stores, Kiev has about five gastronoms, or commercial stores, where unrationed goods are for sale. Most of the gastronoms are stocked almost entirely with delicacies, such as Siberian crabmeat, live carp in water tanks, a little fresh meat, salami, candy, biscuits, and Russian cigarettes. (No UNRRA goods are sold in such stores). Until September 1946 the prices in gastronoms were so high that only a relatively small part of the population could afford to buy. The gastronoms were patronized primarily by those with high earnings - professors, theatrical stars, scientists, artists, high ranking army officers, skilled technicians, etc. One of their main purposes was to show the average worker that some luxuries did exist, and thus encourage him to raise his skills and productivity. Another purpose was to provide a special reward for various kinds of meritorious service. For example, war heroes and top generals were entitled to a 40 per cent discount on all purchases made at a gastronom. Moreover, workers who had stayed at the same factory for six years or more were entitled to a 20 per cent discount, and office workers with similar service to 10 per cent.

[435] In September 1946, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to abolish differences between the higher "commercial" prices and the low prices of rationed goods, the prices in gastronoms were lowered and certain ration prices, raised somewhat.

[465] At the same time, taking into account the difficulties which average and low-paid workers would encounter as a result of higher ration prices, the Council of Ministers decided to increase all salaries of less than 900 roubles a month. Thus, those workers who previously had earned up to 300 roubles a month received an increase of 110 roubles; those who had earned up to 500 roubles, another 80. Similar increases were allowed in pensions and in students' stipends.

So far as UNRRA food is concerned, the increases in ration prices have affected meat, fish, fats and oils, other categories of UNRRA food supplies particularly milk, cheese, and army rations were not affected.

434 435 The following table shows the increases in ration store prices.

11: Obermaier--93 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

/91/ [Galicia] Self-Aid [Volhynia]

•555 Galicia and Volhynia are parts of the ghetto of the world, lying between Cracow and Odessa. There is no question about the fact that anyone who can here compete commercially with the Jews and politically with the Poles has certain abilities. The Ukrainians of Galicia have a talent for organization. If their business methods are often primitive according to our conceptions, it
555 is not their fault. Where proper money is scarce,
[436] as is the case among all small peasants of the East and Southeast, it is replaced by some market-
476 able goods: people unhesitatingly deal in eggs. Ukrainian cooperatives tried very hard to change these conditions; they were equally adept in ancient barter as in international business involving clearing and regulations pertaining to payments and foreign exchange.

Jews and cooperatives waged a bitter fight against each other. But where usury and chain businesses of ill repute flourish, cooperatives
[452] have an easy time of it. Before the First World War the usurers demanded a 100% interest. Now they say: "I am giving you money; good, - but you must sell me your calves, your geese, your chickens and your eggs." For a zentner of seed they demand two zentner of produce from the harvest. In the gin shops they manage to obtain, by fraudulent means, the best pastures of the Huzul country, only to rent them to the former owners. If the cooperative makes its way into such villages which are under Jewish domination, it soon has the peasants on its side, and since no one buys from the Jew, no one sells to him and his inn is avoided, he must sooner or later pack up his belongings. /92/

For the Ukrainians the Jewish problem is a
563 problem of food. Wherever people have ambitions and where they desire to improve their basic way of living, they run up against Jews. Jews

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

565 of education, and in their occupations. The bulk
[162] (86·4 per cent.) of the Ukrainians are peasants and agriculturists. The percentage of people living in the country is in the Government of Kharkov, 85; in Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 88; Chernigov, 91; Taurida, 80; Kherson, 70. The percentage of peasants is almost the same, e. g. Kharkov, 90; Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 87; Chernigov, 86; Taurida, 73;
[163] Kherson, 61. The average increase in population is higher than in any other province in European Russia; consequently, though many peasants have become, during the last twenty-five years, workmen in the newly started industries, the general number of agricultural peasants remains unchanged.

421 *Land Tenure*[1].—While Great Russia is at present
428 a country of communal land-ownership (*mir*), in the
177 Ukraine or Little Russia individual or, strictly speaking, family ownership and communal ownership exist
[556] together (cf. p. 78). The *mir* in Great Russia appears to have been introduced in the sixteenth century, when the Moscow Government established serfdom and imposed heavy taxation, for it was easier to make the whole village responsible for the taxes than the separate families. However, in the north or, properly speaking, Novgorod Russ. the land, as a general rule, belonged to one large family or clan, composed of from two to six houses (the owners of which bore the same name), and called *pyechishche* (large stove). The ownership was hereditary, and hence the land became more and more subdivided, so that families owned more or less according to the number of children. There was no readjustment of the land as in the case of the *mir*. The *pyechishche* of Novgorod was known in Kiev-Russ as *ognishche* (meaning a large fire); and the term *ognishchanin* (meaning a member of the *ognishche*) is found in the Kiev law (*Russkaya*
428 *Pravda*). Connected with that form of tenure is a custom, which even now is found sometimes in the Ukraine, of minorate, according to which the younger

[1] See also p. 77.

000 All the Ukrainian intelligentsia of Lwów and its environs, men and women, were represented, the consulates of Great Britain and France and many foreigners who love Ukrainian music - all but the Poles.

517 Intelligentsia - that is, students of the classical schools and universities, teachers, professors, lawyers, the heads of the cooperatives, editors, writers, painters, politicians, architects, graduate agriculturists, engineers, physicians, clergymen. They were all there.* One saw remarkably many clergymen, fine men who have both feet planted firmly on Ukrainian soil. Many of them were Austrian officers in their younger days who also fought for West Ukrainian freedom. They told friends that they were prepared at any time /99/ "to exchange the cassock for a coat of mail". This is no empty talk, for most of them had already paid for their national sentiments in Polish prisons. Their metropolitan, Count Andrei Sheptyckij, is cut from the same pattern. He incurred the hatred of the Poles when he blessed the autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine and half a year later its dead. Before he was drawn to the church, he, the cavalry captain of his Majesty, hunted bears, lynxes and wild boars. The trophies from that gay time are now hanging in the anteroom of the archbishop. Today he is an old man who has been in ill health for a long time. Years ago the tall, vigorous man was often compared to Michelangelo's Moses.

Count Andrei Sheptycki was a member of the Polonized Ukrainian high nobility. Like many Polish aristocrats with Ukrainian coats of arms, his brothers belonged to the Polish szlachta; he alone found his way home to the Ukrainian people. Neither the Poles nor the Ukrainians have a dearth of nobility. In Volhynia "the 16th and 17th centuries fairly seethed with princely houses". Whenever the Polish kings needed warriors for their expeditions, they raised the wealthy peasants to

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* [At a Ukrainian concert in Lwów, incidental to the information - Analyst]

the peerage and gave them rights and privileges 556
for which the newly-created peers were obliged to 565
pay with military service. In this way the lower szlachta increased to many hundreds of thousands of knights and barons who were often not much richer than the ordinary peasants. In the purely Polish regions and in West Ukraine there are still whole villages in which every peasant belongs to the nobility. Whoever was able to present his patent of nobility in Galicia after the partitioning of Poland was recognized as a peer by the Viennese court. In this way arose the Ritter /knights/ von Vitvicky, von Mogylnicki, von Kultshycki and whatever the rest are called.

Whereas the high nobility, with the exception of people like the former Princes Ostrozhsky 565
does not play any part in promoting culture in 517
modern times in the Ukraine, the lesser nobility 793
were for a long time practically the only bearers of Ukrainian culture. They made up the clergy almost exclusively. /100/ The pastors with their numerous children were often the only and the inexhaustible source of Ukrainian intelligentsia. Otherwise there were no intellectual professions open to the Ukrainians. Only the Catholics, that is to say, the Poles could become officials.

The Poles held to the old traditions of the lower nobility in their "Union of village szlachta". 565
According to the latest Polish conception, the lower Ukrainian nobility are Ukrainized Poles. By promising them additional land and other material advantages, Warsaw wanted to catch the 400,000 "aristocratic souls". If this had succeeded, the Poles would have come a good deal closer to a majority in Galicia.

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"In this cottage, in this grove 539
A hell I saw! Nothing but slavery 538
And bitter servitude, that never justice knows

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

who had been associated with the *Rada* and the 'Directoria'. Both 668
parties had their reasons for conciliation. So far as the Soviet 656
authorities were concerned the appearance of prominent non-Bolsheviks in the administration enabled them to improve their relations with the peasantry and to convince them that Lenin's New Economic Policy was indeed, in his own words, 'in earnest and for long'. It does not follow that the peasants had ever been particularly enthusiastic for the nationalist ideology of the *Rada* and the 'Directoria'; but the Ukrainian nationalist leaders, owing to their social origins, were nearer to the peasantry than the men at the head of the various Committees of the Communist Party and the Soviet administration. The latter were either 'new-comers' from the north or representatives of the local Jewish 'intelligentsia' or men drawn from the 'proletariat' of industrial centres. They owed their rise generally to their revolutionary services in the streets of the great cities. The former collaborators of Vinnichenko and Petlyura, on the other hand, were either peasants by origin or they belonged to the typically Ukrainian 'half-intelligentsia' of the countryside.

In encouraging these men to work with the Communist Party, the Soviet authorities did not contemplate allowing them to play a part in the political life of the country, and in this respect they kept them under the strictest control. On the other hand, they were allowed wide scope in the field of 'cultural work', because the Bolsheviks understood that these people would interpret 'cultural work' in the form of hasty 'ukrainization' which in its tendency to supplant the remnants of 'the imperial culture' in the Ukraine would serve purposes which the Bolsheviks themselves had in view. 'Ukrainization' was, in the view of the Bolsheviks, a harmless occupation for the active intellectual element in the Ukraine during a difficult period of transition—an occupation which at the same time would tend to tone down past bitterness and to divert renewing energies into a comparatively harmless channel. In Caucasia, where the Bolsheviks had to do with tougher men among whom the national idea had deeper roots, they were to find that within ten years the same policy was to produce formidable difficulties.

The first to set the example of going over to the Soviets was none [557] other than the patriarch of the Ukrainian movement himself, Professor Hrushevsky, who was rewarded with the Presidency of the newly founded Ukrainian Academy in Kiev. Hrushevsky was followed by the former President of the Council of Ministers of the *Rada* Government, Holubovich, by the General Secretary to the *Rada*, Khrystyuk, and a number of other prominent radicals and separatists.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The Debacle

The Ukrainian Communists, as Skrypnyk and Khvylovy, could not fail to be horrified at the spreading famine which broke out in the autumn of 1932 and raged throughout the winter. Whatever they might have thought in the beginning of the compulsory collectivization, they were aghast at its results. They could not fail to recognize that it meant the end of the old Ukrainian life which they had tried to remodel in accordance with their own ideals and that it meant a widening breach with the outside world. They could not fail to see that it meant the ending of that world Communism in which they had tried to believe and in which they saw the hope of humanity and justice.

They could hardly fail to recognize almost immediately how they had played into the hands of the enemies of Ukraine by their attacks on the older scholars, for they were now to learn that they had unwittingly forged the tool that was to be used against them.

Postyshev arrived in Ukraine in January, 1933, to superintend and make more rigid the rules for the collection of grain. He brought with him his own staff, his own detachments of the NKVD, and while he nominally had the post of second secretary, he had the instructions from Stalin that made him the complete dictator. He soon showed what that meant.

Among his earliest acts was the removal of Chubar from his post as head of the Soviet of People's Commissars and he replaced him with the more pliable P. Lyubchenko, a former Borotbist. Skrypnyk was forthwith demoted from Commissar of Education to Chairman of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission, a position of no special importance, once the conduct of all Ukrainian life

661 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in
558 Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist
[665] Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which
[814] had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

Postyshev's object was the rerussification of the country, for it
191 had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many
626 of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian news-
[871] papers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

Muscoviam, Before and After Moscow). If the before was leading up to a Moscow discovery, it was good; if not, it was bad. 814 665

This was proclaimed by Zhdanov of the Politbiuro in 1946 [546] when, under the highest auspices, he began his attack. On September 4 of that year, at a meeting of the Umiom of Soviet Writers in Moscow, he lashed out at various films which had been recently produced and at several Russian authors, especially Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova, for not producing a true picture of Soviet reality. Then, warming to his task, he explicitly declared that literature had to be entirely at the service of the Communist Party and that it was the duty of every Soviet writer to lash and scourge the decadent bourgeois west. He berated many of the authors for wishing to learn from the bourgeois writers at the very moment when Soviet literature, the most revolutionary literature in the world, was a hundred times higher and more beautiful than the literature of the bourgeois west. 538 626 665

The speech of Zhdanov was the open proclamation of war against all foreign influences in Soviet literature and it was directed against some of the most respected figures, who were apparently silenced. Even Tikhonov was removed from his post at the head of the Union of Soviet Writers for not having exerted himself more strongly against these dangerous heresies. [558]

Yet this speech was not really the beginning, for some weeks before the question was fully brought into the open, at a meeting of the KP/b/U, Khrushchov, the Russian who held the post as First Secretary of the KP/b/U, had received from the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow full and definite instructions as to the means to be adopted for purging Ukrainian literature and science and for suppressing all traces of bourgeois nationalism. His remarks were reprinted in part by *Pravda* in Moscow, which summarized them in these words.

"The TsK KP/b/U had not paid sufficient attention to ideological work, does not give enough weight to the selecting and the ideological and political education of the cadres in the fields of science, literature and art, has not organized in the press a wide criticism of the hostile bourgeois-nationalist ideology. As a result

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

●[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine
687 the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 1/3 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres (*The Bolshevik of Ukraine*, No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the
517 Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. *Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan* (1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1. Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

11: Obermaier--87 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[Galicia]* [Volhynia]

Galicia and Volhynia bore the main burden of 668
the struggle of nationalities. The fight was carried on in a legal manner through self-supporting organizations such as economic cooperative societies, private schools and societies of public interest, and illegally through revolutionary secret organizations threatening the state. The first of these secret societies was the "Ukrainian Military Organization" (UVO). Its members were primarily soldiers of the former West Ukrainian army. A second sabotage organization, that of the Communists, worked hand in glove with the UVO. The UVO was /86/ dissolved in 1928 by Polish agents, which was not a particularly clever achievement, considering the poverty of its members. The same happened to the Ukrainian Communists at the hands of delegated Jews who acted upon orders from the Warsaw office of the Komintern. Meanwhile a new terroristic secret society had been formed, the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN), which has caused the Polish authorities the greatest concern, especially since October 1938. All attempts to dissolve the OUN from within or to neutralize it by creating groups of Polonophiles have failed. Elements that could be bought were often enough obliged to pay for their treason with death.

Two years after the founding of the OUN* in 668
late summer of 1930, the farms and estates of Polish settlers in Galicia went up in flames and 579
in some places the harvest burned up in the fields. Also, telegraph wires were cut. Since it was hard to sell grain, Polish landowners used the terrorist methods of the OUN in individual regions as an excuse to collect insurance fraudulently; they set fire to their own buildings. The answer of the Poles to the wave of sabotage of the OUN* 558
can be read between the lines of the petition of 60 members of the British House of Commons to the

* [i.e., Ukrainian Terroristic Secret Society - Analyst]

11: Obermaier--88 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Galicia] [Volhynia]

558 League of Nations: "With special reference to recent uprisings in East Galicia, we recognize the right and the necessity of the Polish government to maintain order within its boundaries. However, we should like to point out the fact which, coinciding as it does with an eye-witness account, seems indisputable, namely, that penal expeditions were sent out to at least 700 villages, even though against the majority of them no evidence of terroristic or unconstitutional action could be produced, that hundreds of men, women and children were beaten - some of the procedures were so cruel that the victims were bedridden for weeks thereafter, some were crippled for life and some were killed. Thousands of people were arrested and many libraries, clubs /87/ and cooperative shops were plundered and destroyed. The fourteenth cavalry regiment in particular seems to have loosed its reins in the villages; they punished the peasants indiscriminately. These actions against the Ukrainian minority seem to be a violation of Article One which states: 'Poland agrees to guarantee all inhabitants without distinction as to birth, nationality, language, race or religion, full and complete protection of life and liberty...'"

An investigation on the spot by the International Women's League showed the following: "...One terrible feature of the whole procedure was the refusal to grant medical attention to the victims. The doctors were forbidden to leave the cities and go into the villages. The peasants who undertook to travel to the cities for medical treatment were sent back by the police. In many cases the wounds became gangrenous and death or lifelong suffering were the results." The Chicago Daily News observed at that time: "Under the guidance of an iron hand Poland is steering toward its magnificent future." (49)

49. Quoted by Svystun: Ukraine, the Poorest Spot of Europe, pages 32, 20, 26.

[Galicia] [Volhynia]

668 of Polish agitation for dissolution and the Charybdis of Ukrainian nationalism, declared itself willing to work with Poland provided autonomy was granted and a status of "legal competence" was established. On May ninth the UNDO in the Sejm adopted the authorization law for the president of the state, in order not to give Poland an excuse for dissolving the cooperatives.

558 In the summer of 1939 the Polish-Ukrainian relationship resembled a sort of guerilla war. Here and there a house was set on fire, a bullet through a window found its victim, Polish colonists or officials were driven out of a village, a police raid was shot down - and in turn, the Polish bayonets raged mercilessly. To take only two cases at random: on May 8, 1939 Ukrainian representatives in the Sejm placed an interpellation before the Minister of the Interior, according to which the Polish police had seriously injured 16 persons, among them 8 women and girls, with blows administered with the butt end of a gun, at a funeral in an East Galician village. On the same day police officials in the district of Polyana killed a Ukrainian peasant and an eleven-year-old boy by shooting. Several Ukrainians were injured. In a second interpellation there was a complaint that in Libukhora in East Galicia a first lieutenant, a sergeant major and a soldier coerced by means of blows, the cashier and acting head of the Ukrainian library to burn the library which consisted of 300 volumes. On May ninth the Polish Prime Minister, General Skladovski, replied to another Ukrainian interpellation of April twenty-ninth. There were three incidents mentioned: a military assault on the dwelling of the Ukrainian pastor Tustanovich in Komarnyky, a military attack in Zalisci on 63 Ukrainians who were maltreated, and the maltreatment by the police of 17 Ukrainian peasants in Cholhyni. In all three cases the Polish Premier's answers were evasive.

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Untold hosts of hirelings.
And tears? Blood? Verily enough
To sate all czars,
To drown them and their progeny
In widows' tears... The tears of maidens
Shed throughout full nights of longing,
The burning pain of mothers' tears,
Our hoary fathers' tears of blood
No stream could hold, - ah no,
A sea, a fiery sea!... Oh honor
To all dogs and tyrants
And to the Czar, our little father."(55)

55. "Taras Shevchenko" in Beiträge zur Ukrainekunde, Number 6, Berlin 1937.

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177 558 The political concept of an "indivisible Russia" suggests the suppression of all Ukrainian movements toward independence, even if they be merely of a cultural nature. In accordance with this, and on the basis of the principle followed by the Russian Minister of Education Valuiev: "There is no separate Little Russian language, there never was and never can be", Moscow issued a general printed statement prohibiting all /103/ Ukrainian writings. Ukrainian culture which is 700 years older than the Muscovite culture based on it was simply declared invalid. Belletristic works by Ukrainian pens may appear only in Russian spelling. All writing was sharply censured, concerts, lectures and theatrical performances were forbidden. Later the theatrical prohibition was relaxed a bit, but for each Ukrainian play a Russian one of equal length had to be performed. Since members of the higher classes would be unrefined if they spoke Ukrainian, actors portraying persons from cultivated circles has to speak only Russian even to Ukrainian plays.

593 meetings ("posydilky" and "Vetshernytsi"), and even at the
584 street meetings that are held at night ("vulytsja"); marriage is
591 seldom an affair of arrangement. After marriage, children generally leave their parents' home; a father often provides a home of his own for a son who wishes to marry.

586 Divorce is rare in the country. An unlucky choice of a conjugal
836 partner is borne with patience. Up till recently, in spite of the fact that boys and girls are constantly thrown together at work and at play, a high standard of chastity prevailed and illicit sexual intercourse was the exception. A "pokrytka" who has been seduced by a Russian soldier ("saldatka") or a foreigner (mostly a Pole) has no easy lot in the country. The whole family is deeply ashamed when the "bundling" custom ("komora") which is still practised in some parts of the country reveals that the
183 bride is no longer a virgin. Customs have been strengthened
561 by the respect for national traditions, a deep religious feeling and tolerance. Birth, baptism, marriage, death and burial are accompanied by very many, original, symbolic customs, dating partly from before the birth of Christ. For instance, the old custom of duly "recognising" the newborn has been preserved as well as the ceremony of the baptismal banquet which marks the reception of the newly born child into the community.

585 In the varied wedding customs which generally take the better part of three days, there are memories of the days when the men of the tribe kidnapped or bought their brides. A marriage in a national setting has many dramatic effects and is accompanied by a whole series of symbolical actions and choruses. They remind us of the original rôle of the family in society. Customs from the world of the Grand Princes have been preserved in those marriage rites as in the ritualistic folk-songs, while the influence of the church is confined to the
765 actual ceremony in the church. The wake ("posyzhinja") and the wake games, which are dying out, are echoes of ancestor-worship and intended to prevent the dead from returning to life. The custom of special laments for the dead ("holosinnia") and the funeral banquet (formerly "tryzna") have persisted; on the many days of commemoration of the dead (e. g. on the

The Ukrainian's tendency to idealise, is also expressed in his relation to the weaker sex which generally enjoys a position of superiority in Ukrainian society. In literature, too, the Ukrainian woman appears in such an idealised and spiritualised form that even her faults, her foibles, do not detract from her spiritual value, but serve rather to enhance her charm and attractiveness. 181 562

The sense for actual reality is almost completely suffocated by the enthusiasm of the soul for the world of the imagination, for the ideal. 19th century drama contains a goodly company of women with a positive attitude to life — national heroines like Marusja Bohuslavka, lovable girls, good and faithful to boredom like Natalie of Poltava, unhappy victims of male seduction like Shevchenko's Kateryna and finally, prophetesses with an air of tragedy like the Ukrainian Cassandra. We must not forget that, except for the last named, these old-fashioned plays are still popular with the Ukrainian public and are performed even to-day, times without number, with great success throughout Ukraine, in the towns as well as in the remotest villages. 181 562 536

Western systems of thought have always been founded on the personal consciousness of the individual. Beginning with Plato in ancient Greece philosophical speculation has always started from individual consciousness as the only evident reality which is disputed by no one, a process which is still more evident in modern philosophy from Descartes on. Fichte's system is based on the philosophy of the ego which elsewhere appears in philosophy as a complete entity, independent of all other features, a sovereign being, which, in the intellectual world, is usually the final foundation of a concrete reality. 812

Here Ukrainians, in contrast to Russians, are decidedly western in outlook. Though they have not produced philosophic systems of th r own based on the ego as the fundamental principle, or the foundation of further speculation, nevertheless their whole intellectual life, their ethical standards and legal code, and still more their actual conduct, are all based on the individual; and to restrict the right of the individual even in the interests of the community, is always resented as an encroachment on the freedom of will. 812 156

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Government.	Total.	Little Russians.	Great Russians.	White Russians.	Jews.	Germans.	Moldavians.	Poles.	Bulgarians.
1. Volhynia . .	2,989,482	2,095,579 (i. e. 70 per cent. of total population)	104,889	3,794	394,774	171,331	—	184,161	—
2. Podolia . . .	3,018,299	2,442,819 (81 per cent.)	98,984	—	369,306	4,069	26,764	69,156	—
3. Kiev . . .	3,559,229	2,819,145 (80 per cent.)	209,427	5,389	430,489	14,707	—	68,791	—
4. Chernigov . .	2,297,854	1,526,072 (66 per cent.)	495,963	151,466	113,787	5,306	—	3,302	—
5. Poltava . . .	2,778,151	2,583,133 (93 per cent.)	72,941	—	110,352	4,579	—	3,891	—
6. Kharkov . .	2,492,316	2,009,411 (81 per cent.)	440,936	10,258	12,650	9,080	—	5,910	—
7. Yekaterinoslav .	2,113,674	1,456,369 (69 per cent.)	364,974	14,052	99,152	80,979	9,175	12,365	—
8. Kherson (rural) .	2,733,612	1,462,039 (54 per cent.)	575,375	22,958	322,537	123,453	147,218	30,894	25,685
Odessa . . .	403,815	37,925 (9 per cent.)	198,233	1,267	124,511	10,248	488	17,395	600
9. Taurida [1] . .	1,447,790	611,121 (42 per cent.)	404,463	9,726	55,418	78,305	—	10,112	41,260

[1] The Little Russians only claim the mainland of the Government of Taurida. Allowing a third of the population in 1897 to represent residents in Taurida without the Crimea (which is an under-estimate), a total of about 22,867,000 is reached for the population in the whole of the Ukraine. Out of this total the Little Russians in the Ukraine amounted in 1897 to 17,043,613 or 74 per cent.

162 562

741 illiterates to learn to read by means of special
517 courses, and it gave scholarships to worthy students. So, it is not surprising that the Poles did not care for the "Prosvita". Thus in the last ten years all of the 600 local groups in Polesia and Volhynia and 70% of all local groups west of the Shan were dissolved. In 1938 Warsaw intensified its war against the "Prosvita"; in that year 104 local groups /95/ were dissolved and in the first five months of 1939 the same happened even to two district centers with 168 local groups. In spite of that, the Ukrainians organized 375 new local groups from 1936 to 1938.

575 Peasants and agriculturists numbering 160,000
874 united in the "Silskyj Hospodar" ("farmer") in order to arrange for or to obtain agricultural training. The "Silskyj Hospodar" employed approximately 150 social agronomists, that is, agriculturists with diplomas, who supervised improvement of the soil, methods of cultivating, seed production and whole farm establishments. They conducted courses and competitions in which the young farmers who were eager for knowledge actively participated. Special veterinarians of the society and of the dairy farm cooperatives supervised the livestock.

562 The Ukrainian women of Galicia were anxious
575 not to be second to the men. Their society "Soyuz Ukrayinok" numbered 60,000 members in 1200 village circles. In the national life of the people the Ukrainian woman occupies a high position, as is the case among all healthy races. In times of national misfortune the mothers are the preservers of the old manners and customs; the children learn the language and the traditional songs from their mothers, to whom the rising generations are entrusted. Their glowing patriotism is not surpassed by the men. At the same time the West Ukrainian woman is deeply religious and tirelessly industrious; she excels in the household.

000 Everything in West Ukraine is education work.

181 would possess the favorable characteristic of obstinate perseverance; stubborness cannot replace it.

By nature the Ukrainian is an Easterner, that is to say he prefers the irrational, and his emotion outweighs his will. "The Eastern nature is characterized by rapid unexpected transitions from unprovoked and therefore short-lived enthusiasm and activity to complete, likewise unjustified quietism and apathy, which in history often expresses itself in a sudden transition from an imposing advance to epochs of complete deterioration." (80)

80. Zalozieckyj: The Spiritual Life of the Ukraine in the Past and Present.

• 562 The Ukrainians are proud of their women. The Ukrainian woman is slender and tall, usually with black hair and black eyes. Folksongs sing of her thick eyebrows and her beautiful legs. The Ukrainian gynecologist Yuriy Lypa says of the Ukrainian woman that she never comes under the domination of a man; that like no other woman of Europe she is associated with things warlike. For, according to tradition, the Amazons lived between the Dnieper and the Don. Her relationship to man is strictly regulated, in spite of great passion and hot blood. It is based on pride and a consciousness of dignity. She must exert strong will power in order to keep herself within the bounds she sets for herself. She is cruel toward herself, but especially toward other women who overstep these bounds. Kulish, an outstanding Ukrainian historian, author and ethnographer, attributes to women the creation of those tender Ukrainian love songs which are so full of harmony and restraint. It is said that the actual realm of the Ukrainian woman is her family, where she occupies the dominating position as mother. The Ukrainian woman is more prac-

562 tical than her husband. She cares for the family as an entity, /133/ which is why Ukrainian common law knows no divorce. The so-called mother's inheritance which may not be touched by her husband is proof, it is said, of her material independence. In critical moments of his life the man consults with his wife or his mother. It is said that the Ukrainian woman has a considerable share in the development of the new Ukrainian nationalism. As early as the turn of the century the women's periodical Rodnij Krai (place of publication Poltava) contained demands for a purification of the nation and the race from foreign elements; the racial unity of the Ukrainians was particularly emphasized. (81)

81. Yuriy Lypa: "The Ukrainian Woman" in Die Frau, April 1938.

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361 About the villages of the Russians and the Ukrainians Shevchenko wrote in his Turkestan diary - he kept it hidden in his boot tops - that the Russian, in contrast to the Ukrainian, is born with a dislike of everything green. "A village of Great Russia, according to a statement of Gogol, is a heap of rough beams piled one on top of the other, with black holes in place of windows, surrounded by eternal dirt and eternal winter. There is not a single green twig to be seen. Behind the village there extend impenetrable forests - but it seems as though the village had purposely crept out of this impenetrable garden onto the highway and spread out in two rows along the road, built inns and on the village square a little church and a pub, and that was all it needed. Such an antipathy against the beauties of nature is inconceivable. How different the Ukraine! The white friendly little houses in town and city nestle in

433 of the working time in July of this year...The Stalingrad plant presents a similar picture." (131) Where there is no needle there are no

131. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 25.

clothes. Pravda of May 8, 1939, criticizes the decrease in coal mining in the Donbas as follows: "The mine which determines the fate of the entire trust is behind schedule. It would seem as though the scandalous production which has lasted for a considerable time now would have been given serious consideration. The management of the mine is now trying to explain the poor production by the fact that the workers are leaving in order to attend to their spring planting." Visti of June 10, 1939, supplements this by reporting that the constant decrease of coal mining in the Donets Basin is forcing the economic management of Soviet Ukraine to increase the production of brown coal and turf.

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562 By reason of the Soviet Constitution, the
461 East Ukrainian woman has an equal position with
594 the man. This means that she has the same meager
[465] rights and the same heavy duties. Since the wages of the man are not adequate to support the family, the woman must also earn some of the daily bread. Thus the woman is a worker. The elimination of Sundays and holidays, the long trips to work, the standing-in-line for hours to get food, the shifting of days off in the different plants, the incredible housing shortage, the rearing of children in institutions, the easy divorces of "couples living together" - all this disrupts the family.
594 The devastating consequences which are bound to
161 result from the disregard /181/ of the family,

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 102. Women in the Ukrainian SSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life.

[562] The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education and by State protection of the interests of mother and child, State aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers, maternity leave with full pay and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

[563] Art. 103. Equality of rights of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality and also any propagation of racial or national exclusiveness, hatred and contempt - are punishable by law.

[659] Art. 104. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the Ukrainian SSR is separated from the State and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

Art. 105. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed by law:

(a) Freedom of speech;
(b) Freedom of the press;
(c) Freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
(d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

[575] Art. 106. In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are ensured the right to unite in public organizations — trade unions, co-operative associations, youth organizations, sport and defence organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and State.

[694] Art. 107. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

Art. 108. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

Art. 109. The Ukrainian SSR affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 110. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to abide by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, to observe the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

[685] [421] Art. 111. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to safeguard and strengthen public socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperity and culture of all the working people.

Persons committing offences against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.

Art. 112. Universal military service is law.

Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honourable duty of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

[687] Art. 113. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR. Treason to the country — violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the State, espionage — is punishable with all the severity of the law and is the most heinous of crimes.

Chapter IX. The Electoral System

666 Art. 114. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies — of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages — are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

Art. 115. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the Ukrainian SSR who have reached the age of 18, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

[641] Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR who has reached the age of 21, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities may be elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 116. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

[562] Art. 117. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

Art. 118. Citizens serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

Art. 119. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Working People's Deputies from the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of villages and cities to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.

Art. 120. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.

857 Before the age of twelve or thirteen, boys and girls rarely ever play together or have any other contact with each other. Whenever children are seen at play, a strict separation of the sexes is noticed. This is not the result of any special instruction on the part of the parents, and still less the outcome of imitation. [562] Besides their different spheres of interest, the boys manifest a certain pride and self-consciousness which causes them to band together, leaving the girls to themselves. With puberty, however, boys and girls mix freely and seek each other's company. Peasant children scarcely recognize any distinction between rich and poor; the sons and daughters of the wealthy associate with those of the poor without consciousness of superiority or inferiority on either side.[71]

538 861 593 The philosophy of parents with regard to the training of their children, in so far as they can be said to have one, is summed up in the following proverbial expressions: "The granting of freedom to children means the constraint of the parents";[72] or, "Give the children freedom and you will find yourself in slavery."[73] Other examples of folk wisdom reveal a similar attitude: "A child will not grow up without a rod." "Do not give in to a child." "Love your child with your heart and drive it with your hands."[74] "Love your child like your soul, and shake it like the pear tree."[75] The burden of rearing children, although actually not very heavy, is, nevertheless, a source of complaint and finds expression in proverbs, *e.g.*, "To feed a child is like carrying a rock." "Small children don't let you sleep, and big ones don't let you live." "Whoever has no children does not know what trouble is."[76] Other proverbs reflect an opposite attitude towards children: "A mother of ten is a joy."[77] "If God grants children, He will provide for them."[78]

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[71] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 8–9.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[113] [73] Franko, I., "Halicko-ruski narodni prypowidky," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (vols. xvi, xxiii–xxiv, Lwów, 1905–1908), xvi, 562.

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 563–564.

[75] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 8.

[76] Franko, *op. cit.*, pp. 564, 600.

[77] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 179.

[78] Franko, *op. cit.*, p. 598.

National Minorities in Ukraine

162 Minorities in Ukraine amount to 20 % in purely Ukrainian
●563 territory and to 24.7 % in other parts of the country and are the consequence of long domination by foreigners and the immigration that entailed. The same cause is responsible for increasing Jewish immigration; Jews have always appeared to assist the spread of Russian influence in the East and Polish in the West.

175 Contemporary minorities rarely date earlier than the second
167 half of the 18th century, if we except a few peripheral areas in
563 the west, the Tatars in Crimea and Russian colonisation in the east in the 17th century. Several earlier efforts made by the Polish Government and individual magnates to colonise the Right Bank region of Ukraine were unsuccessful; the first wave spent itself in the 16th century in the rebellion of Khmelnytskyj, while later colonists were completely absorbed by the native Ukrainian population. The Roman Catholic faith was able to persist only in a few places. A similar fate overtook Roumanian expansion in the 14th and 15th centuries in the Carpathians; it left traces in names and in the legal code of the settlements.

167 The Russians form the largest minority. Apart from the
563 common colonisation of the Don area, it was only after the catastrophe at Poltava (1709) that Russians slowly penetrated into Ukraine. More numerous Russian settlers did not arrive till after there was no longer a Hetman (1764) and after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress (1775). At the same time the Turks were driven back from the Black Sea; the Ukrainian population, which had suffered great losses in the struggles with Turks and Tatars, was unable to tackle this job alone. But the Russians, who had been systematically settled, were disinclined to cultivate the steppe and preferred to move into the r ing towns as officials, artisans and laborers.

Ten thousands of German colonists took their place, settled by Catherine II in the former Governments of Kherson, Taurien, and Katerynoslav, later also in Southern Bessarabia. At the same time Emperor Joseph II settled German colonists in

Southern Galicia and Bucovina. Immigrants who were of the same faith as the Ukrainians also arrived at this time from Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Roumania (partly also from Armenia). 167 563

In the eighteen eighties the Russian Peasants' Bank settled tens of thousands of Polish, German and Czech colonists in Volynia. By far the majority of Poles in Galicia and in the Kholm district also settled there as late as the second half of the 19th century, in Volynia and Polessia even in the 20th (in many cases after 1920). Single Polish settlements in the Right Bank region (especially in Podolia) are later in origin. Elsewhere the Polish population has been preserved in the towns only, the workshops and estates belonging to Polish landed proprietors. Even the "most Polish" area of Ukraine, the Markhlevitskyj district in Eastern Volynia, which was formed artificially for political reasons, only had 28 332 Poles, of whom, however, only 10 715 actually spoke Polish. 162 563 167

After the end of the 18th century Eastern Galicia was almost purely Ukrainian; there were Poles only in the towns, in the administration and in connection with big estates. This fact was emphatically recorded by Graf Pergen, an eminent Austrian official, after Galicia was transferred to Austria (1772). The official census reports for 1846 and 1851 still represented the Galician province of the Austrian empire as predominantly Ukrainian; 50.1 % (2 441 771) Ukrainians as compared with 40.9 % (1 994 802) Poles. The statistics for 1857 are: 45.2 % Ukrainians, 42.7 % Poles, 2.5 % Germans and 9.7 % Jews. 162 563

The Polish element has been artificially increased only since 1867, and then only slowly. In taking the census, the actual state of affairs was camouflaged by tricks of statistics; the Jews, for instance, were counted as Poles, thus increasing the number of the latter in the census of 1910 by more than 800 000; another paper trick was played on Roman Catholic Ukrainians, who had mostly been converted in the course of recent years by cunning and force from the Greek Catholic United Faith to Roman (in Poland synonymous with Polish) Catholicism. Although they spoke no Polish and had otherwise the same interests as other Ukrainians, most of them were

162 listed as Poles, thus increasing the number of the latter by
● 563 almost half a million.

Every decade more and more united Catholics who were known to be of Ukrainian nationality were entered as Poles. In 1910 there were already 235 328 such "Greek Catholic Poles"; in 1921 there were 359 000 till the number of such Poles amounted to almost half a million. This explains what would otherwise be inexplicable: that the number of Ukrainians should have decreased from 4 880 312 in 1910 to 3873 223 in 1921, i. e. by 1 006 599, while in the same period the number of Poles is alleged to have risen from 15 319 734 (1910) to 18 820 163, i. e. by 3 500 429. As this was not sufficient to justify Poland's existence as a Great Power, the special group of „naives" was introduced, which was put down tentatively in 1921 as 41 000 and then, quite brazenly in 1931 as 707 000 (i. e. 2.2 % of the entire population of Poland, these being mostly Polesian Ukrainians). In addition to these tricks of statistics, a frank campaign of denationalisation was launched after the First World War by Poland with the support of the Roman Catholic Church. The following table shows how things developed:

Year	Greek Catholic	Roman Catholic
1869	64.2 %	21.84 %
1900	62.8 %	23.51 %
1910	61.7 %	25.31 %
1921	60.8 %	27.80 %
1931	60.1 %	28.50 %

This was the origin of the legend that Eastern Galicia was a country of mixed population to which Poland had a right, having contributed her share to the native population.

It is well known that Jews are aliens in Ukraine, and that they only appeared in Galicia in the wake of the Poles. Thanks to Polish support, the number of Jews in Ukraine has been almost doubled; it rose from 6.9 % to 12.8 % (1910).

In spite of political influences, the minorities have never succeeded in settling on areas of any extent. They are more strongly represented on the periphery and it is only in manufacturing towns that we find them in greater numbers living together. Of the 40 422 places in Soviet Ukraine, for

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instance 36 569, or 90.1 % were Ukrainian according to the statistics of 1925 and only 1769 or 4.5 % predominantly Russian, 1043 or 2.8 % predominantly German, 407 or 1.0 % predominantly Polish and about 200 predominantly Jewish (0.5%) and 148 (0.4 %) predominantly Moldavian. 162 563

Circumstances are similar in the so-called „mixed" Eastern Galicia; according to official statistics before World War I there were 3298 village communities, i. e. 88.7 % with a Ukrainian majority and scarcely 436 places (11.6 %) with a majority of Poles or other nationals.

The Russian Minority

Russians form the largest minority on Ukrainian territory. It is true that the Russian population has been slowly decreasing, but probably it still amounts to-day to 5 000 000 i. e. a little less than 10 % of the entire population. According to the calculation of the Ukrainian Bureau for Statistics and Economics for 1933, the Russian minority in Central Ukraine amounted to 4 615 000 = 9.7 % and over the entire territory (including mixed zones) to 8 074 000 = 15 %. The number of Russians has decreased most in Soviet Ukraine, amounting to 2 677 200 or 9.2 % of the entire population in 1926. There are no Russians either in Galicia or Carpatho-Ukraine and in Bucovina less than 3 000. In North-West Ukraine, too, they scarcely ever amount to more than 2 % of the entire population and occur only in scattered groups in the towns of Volynia, Polesya and the Kholm District.

It is surprising that the percentage of Russians should be so low just on the ethnographical frontiers of Russia. These frontier areas of North Ukraine, Volynia, Podolia, and the former departments of Chernyhiv and Poltava are purely Ukrainian with a very small Russian population amounting to between 0.3 % — 1 %. The proportion of Russians in the entire Right Bank population amounts only to 2.6 % (in country districts alone, even to 0.7 % only).

North-West Ukraine and the colonised areas of Northern Caucasia, on the other hand, are mixed regions where Russians and Ukrainians are rivals for supremacy. In the eastern foothills

of Ukrainian Northern Caucasia the proportion is 57.3 % Russians to 33.4 % Ukrainians; some places, too, in the Donets Basin are to be regarded as areas of Russian colonisation. But even here, in spite of official support, the Russians only count 31.4 % of the entire population and, in the towns, are constantly making way for more Ukrainians so that towns that used to be predominantly Russian had, in 1926 even, no more than 48.9 % Russians.

The proportion of Russians in the population south of Kursk and Voronesh and in the surroundings of Kharkiv is relatively large. It dates from the early 18th century and is supported by the Russian population in Kharkiv (37 %). The average figure for the Russian population of these areas amounts to 22.5 % of the entire population.

In spite of a considerable Russian population in the harbor towns, Ukrainians contribute largely to the population of the area round the Sea of Oziv and the Black Sea. It is true that there are still 663 000 Russians, but they are everywhere in the minority.

Proportion of Russians in Population

Rayon	general (%)	urban (%)	rural (%)
Melitopil	25.0	39.7	24.0
Odessa	23.3	38.1	8.2
Mariupil	18.5	46.7	10.6
Mykolajiv	15.7	39.5	9.9
Kherson	11.4	31.0	7.7
Autonomous Republic of Moldavia	8.5	23.3	6.5

In the industrial districts of the West (Kryvyj Rih, Zaporizha, and Dnipropetrovske), the proportion of Russians scarcely reached the figure for the entire Ukraine — it amounts to 8.9 % (25.1 % in the towns, 5 % in the country).

From the above it is obvious that the Russian population is greatest in large towns and industrial and mining areas. But the statement that the towns in Eastern Ukraine have a Russian majority must not be repeated for it was no longer true even

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in the second half of the 19th century. Even in those days the proportion of Ukrainians in the larger towns (with the exception of government capitals) amounted to 40.5 % (compared with 29.2 % Russians and 25.6 % Jews) and in the smaller towns to 52.4 % (compared with 21.8 % Russians and 21.0 % Jews). The total urban population in the Gouvernments of Chernyhiv, Poltava and Kharkiv had then a Ukrainian majority, while the Ukrainians were relatively in the majority in the towns in the Gouvernment of Katerynoslav.

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This development has been continued. The census of 1925 produced even more favorable results: in the towns there were then 38.49 % Ukrainians, 29.4 % Jews, 27.22 % Russians, and 2.03 % Poles. 14 towns show a considerable majority of Ukrainians (up to 92.33 %); in 14 more the Ukrainians were relatively the strongest national group. The proportion of Ukrainians in the south also increased astonishingly, as may be seen from the figures for the harbor town of Mykolajiv (1897 = 8.8 %, 1923 = 17.5 % Ukrainians) or for Kherson (1897 = 19.5 %, 1920 = 40.4 %).

Jews

Before World War I there were 3 795 760 Jews, i. e. 8.2 % of the entire population of Ukraine. They were massed in the provinces that used to be Polish and were later Austro-Hungarian and also in the northern districts of the Right Bank Ukraine, in Volynia and Podolia where, at that time, they contributed 12.2—12.6 % of the entire population. There are most Jews in the east of Carpatho-Ukraine (more than 25 %), in the Kholm district (on an average 15.3 %), in the districts of Berdychiv (23.1 %), Odessa (22 %), Chernivtsi (21.4 %), Brest-Litovsk (20.8 %) and Pinsk (19.5 %). On the right bank of the Dnipro the Jewish share in the population was considerably smaller while on the left bank where Jews were forbidden to settle until the great Revolution, it was quite small; with the exception of Kharkiv it varied from 2—3 %.

The Jews lived for preference in the towns; in the country they were scattered as shop-keepers, inn-keepers, tenant farmers and artisans. But there were also a good number of towns where

162 the Jewish population was insignificant (e. g. Dmytrievsko
● 563 0.5 %, Vovchansk 1.1 %, Okhtyrka 1.3 %, Melitopil 3.4 %, Kamenske 4.1 %, Slovanske 4.4 %, Bila Tserkva 5.5 %, Berdiansk 8.1 %). Among the larger towns Stalino had 10.7 %, Kharkiv 19.5 % and Mykolajiv 21 % Jews.

For some time the number of Jews has been decreasing, partly as a result of emigration and partly because of the shifting of the peasant population. At the beginning of World War II there were probably about 2.5 million Jews. The last eight years have brought about a complete change and not even approximate figures can be given.

Poles

Official statistics list the Poles as third of the minorities in Ukraine. In 1914 they were responsible for 2 079 500 souls i. e. 4.5 % of the entire Ukrainian population. Of these 1 270 400 = 21.8 % were in Austrian and more than 809 000 = 2 % in Russian Ukraine (including the Kholm district and Volynia). At the outbreak of World War II there must have been 1 880 934 Poles (= 3.6 % of the entire population) on the Ukrainian ethnographical territory (1 608 900 in Poland, 246 034 in Soviet Ukraine and approximately 25 000 in Roumania). In the areas belonging to Poland they form about 18 % of the entire population and are more concentrated only in Lviv and the larger towns. In the foothills of the Carpathians, south of the Dnister, in spite of the vicinity of the ethnographical frontier, there were relatively few Poles (less than 5 % on the average in the west and less than 10 % in the east). Circumstances in Polessya and Volynia are similar. Nor have the towns in Western Ukraine a majority of Poles; in Lviv about half the population are Poles. In 1931 in all the towns in Eastern Galicia there were 26.9 % Ukrainians, in the administration area of Stanislaviv 33.8 % and in Podlakhia and Polesya 31.2 % and 31.64 respectively. In Eastern Ukraine there were 476 435 = 1.6 % Poles in 1926. They lived scattered only in 12 rayons of the Right Bank Ukraine, in Volynia and Podolia and, with the exception of Zhytomir (12.5 %) and Proskuriv (10.2 %) they accounted for less than 5 % of the entire population. 48.4 % of these

"Poles" listed Ukrainian as their mother-tongue (56.7 % even in the country), while 7 % spoke Russian. 162 563

Germans

The Germans, who cannot be very numerous in Ukraine today, amounted in 1914 to 871 270 souls = 1.9 % of the entire population. They lived mostly in three compact colonies (area round Black Sea, Kholm district, Volynia and Carpathian foothills). By 1935 they had decreased to 693 000 = 1.2 % of the entire population. In the Black Sea area they had an absolute majority in the rayons of Grossliebenthal, K. Liebknecht, Luxemburg, Prishib, Engels, Vysokopolje and Molotshna. Germans were settled in 12 of the 41 rayons of Soviet Ukraine. Most Germans lived in the country; there were communities of several thousand Germans in Odessa, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovske, Zaporizha and Mykolajiv.

Other minorities

The 460 000 Roumanians are to be found chiefly in the Moldavian Republic (0.89 %) where, however, they only constitute 30.1 % of the entire population (compared with 48.5 % Ukrainians). Otherwise Roumanians live in Bucovina and in the Bessarabian areas of Akkerman and Khotin.

The 160 000 Greeks live mostly in Mariupil and Stavropil.

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of General Denikin had occupied the Donets coalfields and was 669
nearing Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov, while General Wrangel was advancing into the Volga basin from the northern Caucasus and on 30 June entered Tsaritsyn.

The Poles were taking advantage of the Russian Civil War by advancing into White Russia and Volhynia where, since April, they had been fighting with Bolshevik detachments which had been sent into the western Governments after the capture of Kiev from the 'Petlyurians'. Petlyura, also, had not exhausted his resources: his retreat into Podolia only served to renew his potentialities. At Kamenets-Podolsk, Petrushevich, 'the Dictator of Eastern Galicia', under pressure from the Poles, gave over the command of his own forces to Petlyura, and the latter now found himself at the head of about 40,000 men, of which some half were ex-soldiers of the old Austrian Army who had either come from Galicia or who were returning there from captivity in Russia. Among these former soldiers of Austria was a considerable number of officers, who were an important factor, since Petlyura's own men consisted only of armed peasants. Owing to the complete ruin of these lands and the impossibility of finding peaceful employment, service even in Petlyura's army had become a profession which at least procured food from day to day. Petlyura's troops were well armed out of the military stores which the Germans had abandoned or of which they had been deprived.

Some fighting with the Bolsheviks took place along the railway line Zhmerinka-Birzula, but what made the 'Petlyurian' campaign for ever memorable in Podolia was the extent and cruelty of their pogroms against the Jewish population. Pogroms began in January during the retreat of the 'Petlyurians' from the Kiev region when a particularly brutal slaughter took place at Belaya Tserkov. They continued in Podolia throughout the months of February, March and April, and what was probably the greatest pogrom of all time was enacted in the frontier town of Proskurov. The killings somewhat abated when the more disciplined Galician ex-soldiers became numerous in Petlyura's ranks.

All the combatants in the Civil War of 1919 took part in Jewish [563]
pogroms—the bands of the 'free' *atamans*, the 'Petlyurians', the 'White' Volunteers, the Bolsheviks and the Poles, but the 'Petlyurians' undoubtedly distinguished themselves most in this direction. According to official Jewish sources (*Ostjüdische Archiven*, Berlin) the 'Petlyurians' killed off 17,000 persons; the 'free' *atamans* 8000; the Volunteer Armies are accused of having 5000 to their score; the Soviet troops 1000; and the Polish Army several hundreds (Autumn

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642 who had always lived in the *Quartier Latin* in Paris; Zatonsky and
669 Skrypnik were the first Ukrainian politicians to go over to the
635 Bolsheviks.

This same Committee, on 14 February, two or three weeks after the occupation of Kiev, announced the federation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with 'the All-Russian Republic of Workers and Peasants'. Subsequently, on 9 March, 'according to the Revolutionary order' 'the First Ukrainian Congress of Soldiers', Peasants' and Workers' Delegates' was called together. This body received for approval 'the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic'. Seven months had not elapsed before nine-tenths of the territory of this first Ukrainian Soviet Republic had fallen into the hands of the Volunteer Army.

In spite of the ephemeral character of the first Ukrainian Soviet Republic it is worth considering the theoretical basis on which this state was founded, since its structure illustrates Lenin's conceptions as to the treatment of nationalities within the Communist State.

656 Following the November *coup d'état* two documents were
● 563 published in Russia which had an 'ideological' importance in relation to the formation of national republics. The first was a 'Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the Nations Forming Part of Russia'; it concluded as follows:

'According to the Will of the Congress of Soviets, the Council of People's Commissars has decided to adopt as a foundation for its activities in the question of nationalities the following principles:

(1) The equality and sovereign rights of all the nationalities of Russia;

(2) The right of self-determination of all these nationalities, including the right to form independent states;

(3) The abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations;

(4) The free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.'

The document bears the signature of Dzhugashvili-Stalin, Commissar for Nationalities, and of Ulianov-Lenin, President of the Council of People's Commissars.

The second document is a 'Declaration of the Rights of Oppressed Nationalities', dated 24 January 1918 and approved by the 3rd Congress of All-Russian Soviets. The setting up by this Congress of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was based on the following principles: 'Russia is proclaimed the Republic of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. The Soviet Republic is constituted on the basis of a free union of free

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nationalities as a Federation of Soviet National Republics. Striving to create the really free and voluntary union of the working classes of all the nationalities of Russia, the 3rd Congress of Soviets will limit itself to the establishment of the principles only on which the Federation of the Soviet Republics in Russia will be built, allowing the workers and peasants of every nationality to take independent decisions in their own Soviet Congresses as to whether and on what conditions they wish to take part in the Federal Government and other Federal institutions.' 656 563

The Federation, having been accepted by the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee in February 1919, was approved by the 1st Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the following month. It is clear that this declaration remained in force when, after the collapse of the Volunteer movement and the failure of the 'Petlyurians', the Soviets were restored in the Ukraine. And it is a notable fact that, notwithstanding the considerable changes in the constitution of U.S.S.R. which were introduced between the years 1920 and 1936, the Ukrainians together with the other 'minority nationalities' retained the right, in theory, to opt out of the Union. Only at the 8th Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, summoned to discuss 'the Stalin Constitution' of 1936, were certain limitations (not included in the published texts of the Constitution) introduced by Stalin himself. 'So that the right [of a Republic] to leave the Union shall not be an ephemeral right it is necessary:

(*a*) that the Republic should not be surrounded on all sides by territories of the Soviet Union, but should lie on its boundaries, because in the opposite case it would be impossible for her to leave the Union;

(*b*) that the population of the Republic should not be less than a certain minimum, because in the opposite case she would not be able to defend herself against the attacks of Imperialist beasts of prey;

(*c*) that in the population one nationality should form a compact majority.'

During the years 1921–2 the Ukrainian Soviets were otherwise engaged than in studying constitutional questions. The liquidation of the Volunteer Army in the Crimea and the suppression of the numerous bands of the *atamans* prolonged the period of warfare and the Red Armies terrorized the exhausted countryside. Many towns were becoming deserted, and vast stretches of land were left fallow by a peasantry which had neither the courage nor the security to sow or to reap. Black typhus decimated the destitute population, and in the winter of 1920–21 a serious famine developed which became worse during the spring and summer months. Although the 731

731 conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

656 The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

656 563 669 The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

656 642 The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

668 656 In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The predominance of the non-Ukrainian elements in the organs of administration and in educational institutions is of course explained by the fact that the Ukrainian people remained overwhelmingly peasant, and there had been in the nineteenth century, and even earlier, a large and heterogeneous alien element in the towns. Nevertheless Kaganovich, in his speech to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in 1927, was at pains to demonstrate the success of 'ukrainization'. 'Among us', he said with that graceful Jewish facility for identifying himself with the people among whom he had come, 'our Ukrainian culture has developed on a grand scale. Ukrainian culture has made such progress in all branches in these last years that even the most eager Ukrainian nationalists never dreamed of such rapid development. In primary schools Ukrainians are taught by Ukrainians in the Ukrainian language. The high schools are gradually becoming completely "ukrainized"; Ukrainian books and press are at present developing to an extent unknown in all the history of the Ukraine. In our Council of People's Commissars, which is the supreme administrative organ of our government, 13 out of 20 members are Ukrainian. In our Party's Executive Committee, 66 per cent are Ukrainians, 25 per cent are Russians, 14 per cent are Jews.'

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Kaganovich's emphasis on the predominance of Ukrainians on the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party is, of course, meaningless, since in the Soviet hierarchy all power is vested in the Secretaries of the various regional and local Committees of the Communist Party, who are themselves responsible not to the members of the Committees but to the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. Stalin filled this latter position, and Kaganovich himself was his nominee sent from Moscow with complete power over the regional and local Committees in the Ukraine. Kaganovich's successor, 'the dictator' Postyshev, who only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was another importation from Moscow—as is Khrushchov, who is at present (1939) governing the Ukraine.

While Kaganovich was praising 'the achievements of "ukrainization"' he was already considering means of putting some limit on these achievements. In this same year when he made his genial speech before the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party under his influence issued a decree making Russian the second official language in the Ukraine. The First Five Year Plan was then beginning, and one of the most important features of this Plan was the wide development of industry in the Ukraine. The coal and metallurgical industries

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4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

appointed as First Counsellor in the four capitals (Vienna was included) where the Ukrainians had had independent representation. This arrangement continued until 1925, when such appointments began to be considered only as 'desirable'. Ukrainian Communists soon vanished from important positions in the Soviet embassies and legations, and for the last thirteen years the Ukrainian S.S.R. has had not even the shadow of formal representation abroad. 648

(13) *The Ukrainians in Poland*

The Paris Conference, in 1919, only recognized the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia pending a solution of 'the Russian Question'. The Polish position in Galicia was finally affirmed by the Council of the League of Nations (15 March 1923), but the Polish Government undertook to establish a 'gradual' autonomy for the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia. 563 668

The Ukrainians claimed that not less than three and a half millions of the population of Eastern Galicia were of Ukrainian stock, and they reckoned another three millions in Western Galicia, the Kholm region, and the Polish districts of Polesia and Volhynia.

The Polish census of 1939 admitted only 1,600,000 Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, while the population of Russian origin in other regions of Poland was not allowed to be even in part Ukrainian. This great disparity in estimates can be explained by the fact that the Poles described as 'Russians' all those elements, formerly 'pro-Muscovite', who were lukewarm in their support of the separatist version of the Ukrainian national movement.

The Polish Government had some success in detaching from the Ukrainian nationalists a section of the rural population who were flattered by the discovery that they were in fact 'russified Polish *szlachta*'. It was affirmed that during the preceding two centuries many families of the lesser Polish nobility had become so impoverished that they had disappeared into the mass of the peasantry and had become the victims of systematic methods of russification. The movement of the so-called 'Szlachta Zagrodowa' (Smallholder Gentry) had great success, and the journal of the association, *Pobudki*, claimed recently that the number of 'russified *szlachta*' who were expected 'to return to the bosom of their mother Poland' amounted to 700,000 persons. Thus, if those who desired to remain Russian and those who desired to become Poles (together with real Poles, Jews, Armenians, and Germans) are deducted from the Ukrainian estimate, it will be found that the total number of *conscious* Ukrainians in all Galicia did not exceed two millions.

These two millions remain, however, an important factor in the Galician borderland where Polish, German, Russian, Roumanian and Hungarian interests are in dangerous conflict, and the energetic activities of Ukrainian groups and political parties continued to exercise a disturbing influence on the life of the Polish State during the whole period 1919–39.

The most important Ukrainian party is U.N.D.O. (The Ukrainian National Democratic Union (*Obyedinenie*)), which rose to importance about 1925 under the leadership of Dmitro Levitsky. The party could claim a membership of over one million, and it published a series of papers of which *Diio* (Action) in Lvov was the most important. The ultimate aim of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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U.N.D.O. was a united and independent Ukraine; but working within the structure of the Polish State the party refrained from advocating 'separatism at home' and claimed independence only for 'enslaved' Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet Government regarded U.N.D.O. as the most dangerous, because the most serious, of all Ukrainian political groups.

Relations between the Polish Government and U.N.D.O. were far from cordial during the years 1925–30. Both sides, however, were seeking compromise and the U.N.D.O. leaders, though they failed to acquire legalized autonomy, appeared temporarily satisfied with the position of *de facto* autonomy which they had attained through their social, educational and co-operative organizations (*Selsky Hospodar* (The Country Farmer), *Dnistr*, *Maslosoyuz* (Butter League), etc.). The policy of 'peace with Poland' was supported by the Ukrainian Catholic and Uniate organizations under the leadership of the Uniate Metropolitan, Count Szepticki with the periodicals, *Meta* (Aim), *Nedilya* (Week). On the other hand, certain fractions of U.N.D.O. maintained a hostile attitude towards the Polish Government, voiced in the papers *Nash Prapor* (Our Standard), *Nash Klych* (Our Warcry). Communist influences were noticeable in the propaganda of these fractions.

Abroad the U.N.D.O. was on the best of terms with the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic. Antagonism to Poland had become a tradition in Prague since 1920, when the passage of arms to Poland during the war with the Soviets had been refused. Ukrainian refugees, from both Soviet Ukraine and Galicia, were sure of a kindly reception in the Czech capital, which between the years 1925–35 became, if not the Ukrainian political centre, at least the cultural and educational focus where the idea of a Greater Ukraine, independent and sovereign, was openly preached in the high schools (in many of which special Ukrainian courses were available for students).

The intense interest shown by the leaders of the Third Reich in the Ukrainian problem—an interest which provoked the series of trials, banishments and executions in Soviet Ukraine—aroused the anxiety of the Polish Government. By no means confident of the loyalty of the population of Eastern Galicia, Kholm, and Volhynia, the Poles decided to accelerate the 'polonization' of these regions. This 'polonizing' process took unfortunate and sometimes arbitrary and violent forms: prohibition in some districts of the use of the Ukrainian or Russian languages, and the revival of the old struggle against the Orthodox and even against the Uniate Churches. A great number of Orthodox and Uniate churches were closed or 'turned back' into Catholic ones.

It would have been difficult to discover methods more likely to revive the age-old historic struggle 'for land and faith' between Poles and Ukrainians. A hatred of 'the Polish orientation' was quickly roused among the Ukrainian peasantry, and the moderate sections of U.N.D.O. with their policy of compromise began to lose ground. The U.N.D.O. party organization was forced to denounce the basis of conciliation reached in 1930 and confirmed in 1935. At the moment of the German attack on Poland, U.N.D.O. announced its loyalty to the Polish state, but the foundations of this loyalty had been sapped by the mistakes of the Polish politicians. It was Stalin, not Hitler, who reaped the benefit.

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From time to time the struggle between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia took an acute form and was accompanied by industrial strikes, peasant riots and acts of terrorism against the administration. These methods, violent and illegal, were not approved by U.N.D.O., but they were stimulated both by secret Communist organizations and by the unofficial Ukrainian Party which called itself the Ukrainian National Union (U.N.U.). U.N.U. repudiated all compromise with Poland, and proclaimed an armed struggle against her. Comparable in its organization and tactics to the I.R.A. (on which it was probably modelled to carry on a struggle in geographical and social conditions in some ways similar to those of Ireland), the U.N.U. organized a network of secret militarized groups all over Galicia. Galicia was looked on as a territory where the 'Army Corps' of U.N.U. was 'quartered': the territory was divided into four districts corresponding to 'Divisions', which were further divided into 'Regiments', 'Battalions' and 'Companies'. Some scores of thousands of men, young for the most part, and fanatically devoted to 'the cause', joined U.N.U. 563 668

At the head of the movement stood the bold and adventurous figure of Colonel Konovalets. A former officer of the Austrian Army, Konovalets had led the troops of the 'Directoria' which drove Skoropadsky from Kiev in December 1918. Later he had quarrelled with Petlyura on account of the latter's 'Polish orientation'.

Already in the twenties Konovalets had sought favour and aid in Germany. He was not the only one: about 1924 a certain Poltavets-Ostranitsa, who called himself 'Hetman', appeared in Munich with the same object. Konovalets, however, was much more successful than his rivals, and, towards 1930, he established firm relations with German political and military circles, and at the same time made really effective the secret organization of U.N.U. in Galicia. A newspaper of U.N.U., *Ukrainske Slovo* (Ukrainian Word) was published in Paris; other publications appeared in Germany.

The keen interest with which the Nazi leaders regarded the Ukrainian problem lent a serious meaning to the conspiratorial activities of Colonel Konovalets, who was not ashamed to express openly his 'German orientation'. In 1933 negotiations were set on foot between U.N.U. and representatives of the Nazi Party concerning 'preparatory measures' which were to be taken for the creation of a future 'Ukrainian, White Russian and Lithuanian State'. The German negotiators were principally interested in the organization of a potential 'Ukrainian Government'. The lack of suitable candidates for political office among his own supporters led Konovalets to make contact with the remnants of Petlyura's followers, among whom several 'ex-cabinet ministers' were to be found. There was a project to open relations with Ukrainian nationalists who had remained in Soviet Ukraine, and Konovalets was also in touch with the former Hetman Skoropadsky, who was living at Wannsee near Berlin. Konovalets obviously aimed at organizing a 'united Ukrainian front', and the Ukrainians undoubtedly lost one who might have proved a resolute national leader, when the colonel was killed in a café in Rotterdam by the explosion of a bomb in the form of a cigarette-box which was handed to him by a man presumed to have been a Soviet agent.

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For U.N.U. the death of Konovalets was an even greater blow than it first appeared. Deprived of leadership, the organization began to go to pieces. The Polish police succeeded in arresting numbers of leaders of the regional organizations, and the movement's German supporters began to lose confidence in the conspiratorial method.

Both the moderate and the extremist Ukrainian political parties in Poland, the U.N.D.O. and the U.N.U., were born in Galicia in the atmosphere of the local political struggle. Distinct from these parties were the representatives of the erstwhile Ukrainian Popular Republic who had settled in Poland. This group continued to consider itself as the 'legal government' of Russian Ukraine with Andrew Levitsky as 'president' and several 'cabinet ministers' and 'diplomatic representatives' in different countries (Mazeppa, Prokopovich, A. Shulgin, General Salsky and others). Part of these 'Petlyurians' lived in Poland, others in Prague and Paris, where they published their periodical *Trizub* (Trident, the emblem on Vladimir's coins). Contrasting in this respect with the Galician political parties, which did not put their social programme in the first place, these former adherents of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic', faithful to the traditions of the *Rada* and *Directoria*, had retained their socialist tendencies but in a very moderate form.

It is a curious fact that this group of 'the Ukrainian Popular Republic' enjoyed until recently not only the support of the Czech Government, with whose ideology it had much in common, but also that of the Polish Government, which at the same time was incapable of establishing normal durable relations with the Galician Ukrainians. The politicians of the U.P.R. kept themselves apart not only from the extremists of the U.N.U. but also from the moderates of the U.N.D.O. They did not of course preach separatism in regard to Poland, and as the years passed they became much more tolerant on the subject of the exact status of the Ukraine in the event of the downfall of the Soviet régime and the revival of a Russian state. Konovalets had tried to enlist them for 'the United Ukrainian front' patronized by the Third Reich, but such an orientation could scarcely attract the 'Petlyurians', penetrated by democratic and even socialist tendencies. Some of them remained faithful to the 'Polish orientation' of Petlyura himself, others struck up friendship with the Parisian group of *La Revue de Prométhée*—a periodical published by the representatives of different nationalities which had formed part of the Russian Empire and are now under Soviet dominion. *Les Prométhéens* are drastically opposed to the Soviet régime, denounce the absence of real autonomy in the Soviet Union and stand ultimately for a 'federal state of nationalities'. The Ukrainians who participate in this movement therefore abandon the idea of 'integral separatism' and profess opinions in the spirit of those expressed once upon a time by Michael Dragomanov.

Former 'Petlyurians' are at present less opposed to the ideas of which Hetman Skoropadsky was the symbol than they were at the time when they began their armed struggle against him. The ex-Hetman has retained a certain influence on Ukrainians and admirers of his title can be met in many parts of the world—in Paris and London, in Canada and the United States. His son Danylo is considered by them as 'the lawful successor' of the now ageing Paul.

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Outside Poland, Ukrainians are to be found in many European and American countries. Political and academic circles of Ukrainian intelligentsia are grouped round periodicals of varying views, but these circles consist of scores, perhaps, of persons out of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian land labourers who have migrated from over-populated Galicia. After the war and revolution thousands of fugitives from the South of Russia and Volhynia joined them. In the Ukrainian press from time to time appear statements that the number of Ukrainians in Western Europe reaches 500,000, in Canada over a million, in the United States about 700,000 and in South America 200,000. These figures are undoubtedly exaggerated. In France the number of refugees from the South of Russia who can be considered 'Ukrainians' did not exceed a few scores of thousands, and the same must be said about Czechoslovakia and Balkan countries. However, among the Polish agricultural workers and miners in France (900,000) a third came from Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. And there is no doubt that hundreds of thousands have migrated from Galicia to the United States and especially to Canada where, owing to hard work and a certain capacity for organization, brought over from their native land, many have attained prosperity. America is the land where emigrants from Europe keep together according to their nationality more than anywhere else. The Ukrainian emigration in Canada and the United States has retained a vivid interest in everything pertaining to Ukrainian nationality. It has its own press, publishes its books, teaches its language and history in its schools. The Ukrainians in America consider it their duty to respond to the appeals of the different Ukrainian parties and groups which have remained in Europe. Therefore echoes of all the different tendencies of Ukrainian political life can be found in Canada and the United States: 'pro-Russians' who do not wish to be called 'Ukrainians', adherents of U.N.D.O., followers of Colonel Konovalets, partisans of Petlyura and the 'Petlyurians', admirers of 'the young Hetman' Danylo Skoropadsky. However, purely ideological discussions are not so acute there as among the different 'fractions' in Europe. 'The united Ukrainian front' would have a better chance in emigration, because its basis would not be so much political activity, as a common historical tradition and a common love of the Ukrainian land.

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(14) *Literature on the Ukrainian Question*

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Numerous papers, mostly by well-known Ukrainian writers and political leaders, have appeared in the *Slavonic and East European Review*. These papers have made available to English readers information on various aspects of the Ukrainian Question. The following should be noted:

Vol. v, No. 13, p. 169, Kolessa, A., 'Bibliography of the Ukrainian Language'.
ix, No. 27, p. 367, Paneyko, B., 'Galicia and the Polish-Ukrainian Problem'.
Ibid. p. 88, Skorowski, S., 'The Ukrainian Problem in Poland'.
x, No. 28, p. 116, Loś, S., 'Ukrainian Question in Poland'.
Ibid. p. 138, Borshak, E., 'Relations of England and Ukraine.'
xii, No. 35, p. 323, Mazepa, I., 'Ukrainia under Bolshevist Rule' (valuable, based on careful study of the Ukrainian Soviet press).
Ibid. No. 36, p. 622, Doroshenko, D., 'The Uniat Church in Galicia'.

563 Rumania ED1

[For information on the status of Ukrainians within Rumania, 1940-41, see 5: Manning, RD1 Ukraine, cat. 116, pp. 165-166. --Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

186 563 The cities of Kiev, Kharkiv and Odesa had a large Russian population. The administrative, commercial and financial institutions were largely in Russian hands and the directors and leaders of these, whatever their political disagreements, were united in opposing the efforts of the Ukrainians to secure even that minimum of rights that they were guaranteed by Russian imperial law. The Russian element in Ukraine, radical or conservative, acted as a [316] unit during the fateful years 1917-1920. On the other hand, the miners and workers in the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih, the centre of the Ukrainian coal and iron industry, were in very large part likewise Russian and the ideology of St. Petersburg, especially in its radical aspects, was dominant throughout this part of the Ukrainian territory. Many of the most bitter opponents of Ukrainian rights were, in fact, Russian radical miners and workers from this area.

The Jewish population of Ukraine, a large minority, was little interested in the Ukrainian problem. Insofar as they were not actively sharing in the movement for special Jewish institutions, the majority, with certain conspicuous exceptions, were strong supporters of Russian unity, either conservative or radical or, like Leon Trotsky, they were at the service of any government which was opposed to the Ukrainian demands.

186 668 Thus in 1917 the strength of the Ukrainian movement was to be found in the villages. Here Ukrainian life was lived, Ukrainian thoughts and ambitions were sponsored and it was here that the vision of an old and a future independent Ukraine found its chief support. Even so, that population was itself divided, not according to the class principle but on an ideological pattern which included members of all classes and walks of life.

186 565 668 When the revolution broke out in 1917 or, to be more precise, when the tsarist regime collapsed, there were four main divisions in Ukrainian society and they were made clear within a very few months.

The first of these were the nationalists and the advocates of the restoration of order in the country. At the very beginning of the

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

After the expulsion of the Soviet Forces from Western Ukraine in 1920, the territory, including Eastern Galicia and Lviv, had remained under Polish rule and had been subjected to a policy of Polonization and colonization by a Polish population. There had been during the period between the wars many clashes and much unpleasantness between the two nationalities and the ill will thus generated promised disastrous consequences for Poland in case of a new war. At the same time the Polish domination had never threatened the fundamental forms of Ukrainian social life, as had been the case in the UkSSR; the Ukrainians had a certain representation in the Polish Parliament, and they had been allowed, despite hindrances, to develop their own economic life. With the possible exception of the one district of Boryslav, there was very little Communism among the population, who were well aware of the handicaps under which their brothers in the UkSSR were living. At the same time the Nazi refusal to support the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine in the spring of 1939 had placed them on their guard against the Nazis. 636 563

Thus, when World War II broke out on September 1, 1939, the revolt of the Ukrainians which many Poles expected did not take place. However, the Polish government in the first days arrested and placed in concentration camps many of the Ukrainian leaders but they were freed by the rapid advance of the German forces and the Polish retreat, which forced into Lviv and the neighborhood many thousands of refugees. [661] [726]

On August 23, 1939, when the Nazis and the Soviets signed a non-aggression treaty, it was provided that if Poland were disintegrated, Germany and the USSR would divide the territory 728

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

The Western Ukrainian Reaction

000 To appreciate the next step in the relations between the Western Ukrainians and the Soviets, it is necessary to go back and look briefly at the conditions that existed under Polish rule. The two peoples were distinctly hostile but their relations were very different from those between the Eastern Ukrainians and the Russians.

● 563 The old Austro-Hungarian Empire, unlike the Russian, had not denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, even though it had not favored their development save as a counterbalance to the Poles in Eastern Galicia. Yet there was a considerable number of Western Ukrainians who had been trained to fill the lower offices in the old Hapsburg system. They had the right of voting for the provincial diets and when the Hapsburg Empire disintegrated, they immediately voted for the establishment of a Western Ukrainian Republic. When this failed to establish itself and to win recognition by the Western powers and the League of Nations, the vast majority of the Western Ukrainians under the leadership of the UNDO voted for representatives to the Polish Parliament and continued the struggle in a legal and parliamentary manner to win rights for themselves.

668 A minority which was finally organized into the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Col. Evhen Konovalets continued the illegal and revolutionary struggle through sabotage and terroristic attacks on outstanding anti-Ukrainian Poles. It was in vain that the Polish government endeavored to suppress this group by the forced pacification of Eastern Galicia and by other violent tactics and, after the murder of Colonel Konovalets, his place was taken by Colonel Melnyk.

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CHAPTER NINETEEN

The Soviets and the Ukrainians in Rumania

648 563 The agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union[1] had stated that the former was not interested in the fate of Bukovyna and Bessarabia, both of which contained a large Ukrainian population. It was therefore obvious that once the Soviet hands were freed from the Soviet-Finnish war, they would endeavor to acquire these additional territories.

In both Bukovyna and Bessarabia the Ukrainian cause had been less developed, although there had been far more work in Bukovyna than in Bessarabia, which had been under Russian rule. The Ukrainian uprising in Chernivtsy had not been successful in 1918 and when the territory was added to Rumania, that country put a stop to all Ukrainian work, including education although a Ukrainian theatre had developed and there was considerable secret work being done.

As a result, there was a sense of stagnation which was very different from the situation in the lands under Poland. There was less sense of coordination and when in June, 1940, the Soviets requested Rumania to hand over the new provinces, Rumania had only to submit. Most of Bukovyna and the part of Bessarabia inhabited by Ukrainians were annexed to the UkSSR. The rest of Bessarabia was added to the Moldavian ASSR, which was later raised to the dignity of a Union Republic and intended for propaganda use against Rumania.

648 631 The Soviet policy was then much the same as it had been in the area taken over from Poland. There was the same amount of propaganda declaring the "liberation" of the country from the Rumanian nobles and from international capitalism. There was

1 [1939--Analyst]

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648 the same voting for annexation to the USSR, the same enthusiastic
631 reception in Moscow, and the same process of nationalization, of the arrest of outstanding figures, and the same destruction of the established forms of life in both areas.

The Soviets were, however, less advanced in these provinces for the application of their system required time and their stay in the area was eight months less than it was in the territory taken from Poland.

The anti-Communist leaders fled either into Rumania proper
[668] or Germany or made their way to the Polish Government General in Krakow. On the other hand, despite the attempts to seal off the country, the OUN found ways of extending its influence into Bukovyna and appealed to the more alert classes of the population.

In general the Ukrainians in these two areas formed rather a
● 563 secluded enclave in the general mass of Ukrainian history and they did not play a role in proportion to their numbers. They thus scarcely enter into the account, although for a while, in 1941, there was organized a force of some 2,000 who sought to impede the Rumanian return to the country. Yet, their opposition was fruitless and when they endeavored to cut their way out, they were either destroyed by the Germans or dispersed.

CHAPTER TWENTY

The German Attack on the Soviets

During the period from 1939 to 1941, the German 648
policy toward those Ukrainians who had escaped from the Soviet 563
occupation into the Polish Government General was not too severe. It was possible for the Ukrainians in Krakow and elsewhere to carry on a considerable amount of educational work, to form themselves into relief organizations and, in general, to work for the establishment of normal relations.

When the breach between the two totalitarian states came on 721
June 22, 1941, the Germans pushed ahead rapidly not only in the Baltic area but also in Ukraine. By June 30, they had occupied Lviv with the aid of some Ukrainian units, both from Carpatho-Ukraine and from Galicia.

During these days the Ukrainians had high hopes that the Germans would seriously liberate them from Bolshevik tyranny and wherever they had the slightest possibility, they endeavored to seize the cities so as to put a stop to the massacres which the Communists were perpetrating before they fell back. In some places they were successful but in Lviv, the Communists killed over [661]
10,000 prisoners, before their bloody regime could be brought to an end.

In the first days of the war, although there were no clear 642
promises made to the Ukrainians, the impression grew that there would be established some form of a Ukrainian administration. The political leaders set up a Ukrainian government and appointed Yaroslav Stetsko as the first head of the state on June 30, 1941. A short time later this was broadened by the appointment of a Committee of Seniors under the leadership of Dr. Kost Levytsky, who had been the Prime Minister of the Republic of Western

[661] however, that their resistance was undoubtedly crushed between 517 1930 and the closing series of purge trials in 1937–38.[25]

While articulate nationalism was being crushed in the Soviet 186 Ukraine, a somewhat different development was taking place in [563] the West Ukraine. In Poland the extreme policy of the ruling nationality, which had been chauvinistic enough under the Austrian empire, became still more violent toward the Ukrainians after the reestablishment of the Polish national state. As was previously noted,[1] Petliura's agreement with the Poles had been deeply resented by the Galician Ukrainians. While most nationalists endeavored to smooth over criticism of Petliura personally, especially after his assassination in Paris in 1925, most West Ukrainians gave no support to the émigré UNR government. The West Ukrainians, on the contrary, tried their own approaches to the problem of carrying on Ukrainian life under conditions of oppression by non-totalitarian, but intolerant, alien nationalist governments.

186 One attempted solution was the formation of legally recognized 665 parties which carried on electoral campaigns and sent representatives to the Polish Sejm or parliament where they attempted to protect the interests of their group within the framework of means permitted by the ruling nationality. This type of political activity, together with a wide variety of cultural work aimed at developing Ukrainian culture and maintaining the national distinctiveness of the masses, absorbed the efforts of a very large proportion of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia during the twenties and thirties. In particular, most of the older generation which had been reared under the relatively peaceful and stable conditions of Austrian rule, circles closely associated with the Greek Catholic Church, and most of the liberal professions engaged in this activity. Although there were a number of minor parties, some of which had authoritarian leanings, the majority of this segment of Ukrainian political workers was grouped in the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychne Ob''iednannia—UNDO), which was definitely democratic in character, with varying amounts of Catholic, liberal, and socialist ideology embodied in its program. Its efforts met

[25] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166.

1 [see category 116, p 14 -- Analyst]

p. 46

III. RETRENCHMENT AND REVOLT

● 563 BY THE END of September, 1939, it appeared that Germany had definitely abandoned the Ukrainian nationalists. The agreement which allowed the Soviet Union to occupy the territory of Poland up to the line of the Bug and the San meant in effect that the compact Ukrainian area in Galicia, the Ukrainian land which possessed the strongest nationalist feeling, had passed under the control of the Soviet regime. There remained, however, a few small areas of Ukrainian settlement under German control in what was now designated as the Generalgouvernement Polen. Aside from several minute border districts, these were the Lemko region and the Chelm (Kholm) region. The Lemko area is a rugged stretch on the northern slope of the Carpathians, extending from Przemysl (Peremyshl') almost to Cracow. The majority of its population was a hardy if impoverished group of mountaineers who spoke the Lemko dialect of the Ukrainian language. Under the Polish regime this group had been subjected to the same repression which was exercised against the population of eastern Galicia, but the low economic potential of the area discouraged the Poles from expanding significantly into the hill region.

563 795 In the Chelm district, on the other hand, a violent policy of denationalization had been carried out. This area, which had always contained a mixed population, was further complicated ethnographically by changes in religion. Originally a large part of the population, including the great majority of the Ukrainians, had been Greek Catholic, as were their brothers in Galicia. Under Alexander II, however, a harsh policy of repression had prevailed, the aim of which was the destruction of the Greek Catholic Church and strengthening of the Orthodox Church. Numerous Greek rite parishes were forcibly transferred to the Orthodox Church,

and a number of Latin rite churches which were accused of 563
ministering to Greek Catholics who resisted transfer to Ortho- 795
doxy were also seized.[1] Either because they originally had some sympathy for Orthodoxy, or because they became accustomed to it over the decades, many of the "converted" congregations had retained some ties with it after the area had become a part of Poland. Stimulated by part of the Latin clergy (the Greek Catholic hierarchy opposed the step), the Polish government seized many of the churches or, in some cases, even burnt them to the ground. The Orthodox priests were expelled and replaced by Catholic pastors of the Latin, not the Greek, rite. The small supply of intellectuals made it difficult for other Ukrainian communities to aid the Ukrainians of Chelm, and, as a result, the policy of denationalization had considerable success.[2]

For over twenty months these small and handicapped areas 1668*
were to serve as the principal territorial base of Ukrainian nationalist efforts. The reason that they were able to fulfill this function arose from the deliberately ambiguous nature of German policy toward the Ukrainian movements during this period. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which was a formal barrier to the use of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment to disrupt the Soviet Union, was, indeed, merely regarded as a truce by the Nazi leaders, but the duration of the truce was viewed as indefinite. Any overt encouragement of the Ukrainian nationalists would be looked upon by the Soviet Union as an unfriendly gesture, if not as preparation for an attack; consequently, Hitler was determined to use extreme caution in dealing with the Ukrainians as long as he felt that amicable relations with the Soviet Union were in his interest.[3] At the same time, the Machiavellian strain in Nazi

[1] Adrien Boudou, *Le Saint-Siège et la Russie: Leurs Relations Diplomatiques au XIXe Siecle* (Paris: Editions Spès, 1925), II, 440.

[2] Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 335; Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), p. 279*n;* and especially Volodymyr Kubiiovych, "Die ukrainische Volksgruppe," *Das Generalgouvernement,* I (December, 1940), 14–19.

[3] This is shown not only by Hitler's express order to exercise caution in dealing with the Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement in order to avoid difficulties with Russia (Memorandum for the files concerning the session of the RVA [Reichsverteidigungsausschuss], Warsaw, March 2, 1940, EC 300; hereafter referred to as EC 300), but also by the fact that even much later he requested Bormann

1 [Lemko and Chelm regions -- Analyst]

668* thinking impelled the German rulers to regard Ukrainian nationalism as an ace in the hole for future contingencies. In order to maintain its vigor, it was necessary to give it a certain minimum of encouragement, however indirect and covert.

● 563 Moreover, the presence of several hundred thousand Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement offered the opportunity to put into practice another favorite maxim of the Florentine theorist: *Divide et impera.*[4] The aim of this principle as adapted to Nazi policy was the destruction of the national consciousness of the peoples of the Generalgouvernement, so that they might be absorbed in the "higher" German nation if "racially suitable" or maintained as docile Helots if they were "biologically inferior." The first step in this policy was to splinter the nationalities by promoting a feeling of ethnic distinctiveness in each subgroup and by favoring the smaller groups in the appointment of local civil and police authorities.[5] In line with this policy, the small Ukrainian group in the Generalgouvernement was to be favored at the expense of the Poles, who were regarded as the most dangerous opponents of German interests in this area. In March, 1940, Hitler expressed his personal eagerness to utilize the anti-Polish attitude of the Ukrainians. In order to avoid difficulties with the Soviet Union, however, he directed that no "Ukrainian national party" or similar wide representation be formed but that their role be confined to a consultative one within the Generalgouvernement.[6] In line with this dictum, Frank, the chief of the Generalgouvernement administration, told his subordinates a month later that, while he would by no means permit the founda-

to see that Leibbrandt's work UdSSR (which was strongly pro-Ukrainian) not be spread even among Nazi members, since it might fall into the wrong hands with bad results for German-Russian relations (Bormann to Rosenberg, November 25, 1940, CXLIII 258, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine; hereafter referred to as CXLIII 258.)

[4] The exact phrase employed by Governor Frank to describe his policy toward the nationalities in the Generalgouvernement (Extracts from the diary of Hans Frank, Abteilungsleitersitzung, Cracow, April 12, 1940, p. 6, USSR Exhibit 223; hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit 223.)

[5] Memorandum containing the general policy outlined by Himmler and approved by Hitler on the treatment of the Eastern Peoples, May, 1940, NO 1880 (hereafter referred to as NO 1880). Actually, Himmler wanted to split the Lemkos off from the main body of Ukrainians; there is no evidence that any substantial effort was made to do so, however.

[6] EC 300.

tion of an extensive national community organization by the Ukrainians, he could allow the formation of a self-help and welfare organization.[7] 563

The Nazi tactic envisaged using Ukrainian national feeling as a counterweight to Polish sentiment to bolster German rule in the Generalgouvernement. After the Poles had been destroyed as a national entity, then the Ukrainians, too, would be absorbed by the Germans or reduced to Helot status. Because the first stage of the process required a lenient attitude toward the Ukrainians, however, it was possible for nationalist groups in the Generalgouvernement to carry on limited but significant activity. Several months before Hitler had made his decision concerning the formation of a Ukrainian welfare body, the Ukrainians of the Generalgouvernement themselves proceeded to create a rudimentary national organization. This step was not prevented because a number of the subordinate officials, particularly Dr. Fritz Arlt, the chief of the nationalities section in the Generalgouvernement, realized the need for securing the friendship of the Ukrainians and endeavored to use their superiors' purely tactical leniency toward this group to grant the Ukrainians a measure of national expression.[8] 668*

The organizational work was begun with the construction of a wide variety of community organizations wherever considerable numbers of Ukrainians were found. For example, a Ukrainian National Council was formed in the San River area, a Ukrainian National Committee in Jaroslaw (Iaroslav), and a Ukrainian Central Committee in Chelm.[9] At first there appeared to be a certain amount of rivalry between these centers, which were evidently improvised by local groups without much consideration of broader political interests.[10] The more far-sighted elements of the Ukrainian group in the Generalgouvernement were anxious, however, to establish as strong a position as possible, and realized [623]

[7] USSR Exhibit 223.

[8] This statement is based on interviews with German officials concerned and with Ukrainians who were the beneficiaries of their temperate policy toward the Ukrainian community. Interviews 8, 11, 36, 46.

[9] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 29, 1942, p. 3.

[10] I have no substantial evidence that the incipient conflict in the OUN created any difficulties at this stage of the development of community organization.

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[214] of new school texts in Ukrainian, as well as popular editions of
204 Ukrainian works.[16] Still more important, it began the publication
668* of a newspaper which stood head and shoulders above any other Ukrainian publication in the German-dominated areas. *Krakivs'ki Visti* (Cracow News, as it was named after the Germans forbade the use of "Ukrainian" in the title) was one of the few papers which did not become a party organ but consistently served as a forum for a broad variety of Ukrainian viewpoints. Moreover, it was the only paper of this nature which possessed considerable material resources and attracted numerous contributions from writers of real talent. It was subjected to a censorship stricter than that inflicted on Ukrainian papers in Greater Germany (although much less severe than that of the papers later established under German rule farther east); nevertheless, it was able to reflect a considerable range of Ukrainian life and thought. As a result it is an invaluable witness of the events of the war years.

563 From the standpoint of Ukrainian national interests, the favor-
178 able policy of the Germans toward the group's cultural develop-
871 ment was particularly valuable in enabling it to regain some of the ground lost under the Polish repression. It would take a lengthy volume to detail the ways in which the Ukrainians were able to improve their situation in this respect during the early war years. A single statistic will suffice, however, to indicate the general nature of the gains made. In the school year 1942–43 there were 4,173 Ukrainian-language schools in the Generalgouvernement,[17] while on the corresponding territory before 1939 there were only 2,510—of which only 457 were exclusively Ukrainian.[18] The most marked advance took place in the Chelm area, where, in the autumn of 1939, a large influx of intellectuals fleeing Soviet rule in eastern Galicia brought a new vigor to the cultural life of the Ukrainian community.[19]

[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 2, 1942, p. 3.

[17] This refers of course to the enlarged Generalgouvernement, which included eastern Galicia. It is, however, indicative of an extension of the Ukrainian educational system which was if anything even more pronounced in the areas west of the San and the Bug.

[18] P. Isaiïv, article on Ukrainian schools in the Generalgouvernement during the Second World War, *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva,* p. 952; Buell, p. 279. The remainder were "mixed" schools which Buell says were given over to Polish teachers.

[19] Iurii (George) Tarkovych, "Zabuti Zemli" (Forgotten Lands), *Krakivs'ki Visti,* May 10, 1942, p. 1.

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To round out the picture, however, one must add that the methods employed by the Ukrainians to win ground back from the Poles were not limited to cultural development. In line with the policy described above, the Germans frequently appointed mayors of ethnographically mixed towns from among the Ukrainian element, thus giving the latter a decided advantage in the civil administration. The separate police system was also staffed in a manner favorable to the Ukrainians, although the Germans closely supervised this force. Nevertheless, in numerous cases their position in the police detachments enabled the Ukrainians to harass and even to attack the Poles.[20]

While the Ukrainian nationalist forces were being strengthened by the creation of a new base in the Generalgouvernement, the OUN was being gravely weakened by a fierce internal conflict. The fundamental causes of this conflict have been examined in the preceding chapters. Its catalytic element was the liberation of the most active leaders of the younger generation from the Polish prisons.

In Cracow, where most went, they came into contact with the comrades with whom they had fought and suffered before their imprisonment, and a new grouping rapidly coalesced. The nominal leader was Volodymyr Lopatyns'kyi, who was the official director of the *krai* OUN—i.e., the organization on Ukrainian ethnographical territory in Poland.[21] Along with him came other young men who had long been active in the struggle against the Polish authorities—John Gavrusevych, Iaroslav Horbovyi, Leo Rebet, and many others. For the most part these men, vigorous as they were, had been confined, by the nature of their conspiratorial work, to Poland, and consequently were not very familiar with the broader aspects of the OUN. They were a hardened group of rebels, remarkably courageous and inured to a life of insecurity, but deprived by this very training of

[20] Activity report of the chief of the Ordnungspolizei, November 11, 1940, Occ E-2 (11), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-2 [11]). This German official reported that "lack of proper training" enabled the Ukrainian auxiliary police to take a partisan, even a vicious attitude toward the Poles, and gave as an example the necessity of arresting two Ukrainian officers who had failed to hinder attacks on Poles by armed Ukrainians.

[21] Interviews 24, 75.

decrease of popular support for Germany in the Ukraine. There is good evidence that the population was at first sympathetic to the German efforts to recruit labor voluntarily.[70] Moreover, a large number of nationalist Ukrainians supported the measure; they not only wanted to help Germany win the war against the Soviet Union, but believed that it would be a valuable cultural experience for young Ukrainians to come into contact with advanced German technology and with Western European culture in general. To them it was means of drawing the Ukrainian nation away from its too-close association with the Russians and the "Asiatics" of their empire and of establishing a European orientation for their country.[71]

Unhappily for these visions, the methods used by the Germans in dealing with the volunteer workers soon dried up the supply. They were frequently given miserable transportation and poor accommodations on arrival in Germany. Highly trained workers and professional men who had volunteered in order to increase their technical ability by experience in Germany were assigned to common labor.[72] Most important, however, the Ukrainians, like other *Ostarbeiter,* were forced to wear a humiliating badge distinguishing them from Western Europeans; they were forbidden social contacts with the latter and, in order to implement this decree, were excluded from motion-picture theaters, restaurants, and other public places. The erstwhile willing worker felt that the Germans regarded him (as many did) as nothing but a Bolshevik prisoner.[73]

When this policy of segregation resulted in lack of volunteers, force was used; mandatory labor service for young men and women was officially introduced in the Reichskommissariat on September 21, 1942,[74] but in practice compulsion had long been employed. In reply to the inevitable evasion of this order, the most demoralizing of tricks—such as seizure of worshippers at

[70] Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete in Heeresgebiet B, First Lieutenant Theurer, October 7, 1942, PS 054 (hereafter referred to as PS 054).

[71] E.g., *Krakivs'ki Visti,* February 6, 1942, p. 2.

[72] PS 054.

[73] Opinion report for period June 12–July 14, 1942, Auslandbriefprüfstelle, Gruppe VIII, PS 302 (hereafter referred to as PS 302).

[74] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* September 22, 1942, p. 3.

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been curbed by a stronger legal tradition. Perhaps by coincidence 633
the administrations in Zhitomir and Kharkov were comparatively 563
tolerant of minority groups, and awakened no such violent opposition from Russophile elements as in Kiev. Indeed, as has already been pointed out, the Zhitomir administration in 1941 included a Pole and a Russian in prominent posts, apparently working in harmony with other officials, while the nationalist group in Kharkov during the occupation attracted the lasting support of at least one academician of Russian origin. These groups were also able to avoid destruction by the Germans, in spite of considerable harassment, perhaps because their activities were not so violent as to arouse the public outcry which served as an excuse for the attack on the Kiev group.

The severe shortage of lawyers was paralleled by an even 633
greater lack of administrators with experience in posts of great 186
responsibility. This deficiency doubtless arose primarily from the fact that persons holding high administrative posts were almost universally strong adherents of the Communist regime. In a number of cases, leading Soviet officials such as chairmen of city soviets organized underground sabotage against German installations or led partisan groups for the Communist cause, and the large majority no doubt evacuated with the Red Army. It would have been difficult in any case for such a highly placed member of the Soviet regime to join the nationalist cause, as he would probably have been executed in short order by the *Einsatzgruppen*, whose tasks included the killing of all "kommissars." Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that no Soviet military, party, or state official of any importance, as far as is known to the present writer, ever joined the Ukrainian nationalist cause, either through the local groups in the East Ukraine or through the prisoner-of-war camps, although several from these groups did join the Vlasov movement.

What the East Ukraine lacked in trained legal and administrative personnel, the West Ukrainian organizers failed to supply. Indeed, they appear not to have seen the need. They recognized the desirability of sending in journalists (the West Ukrainians were more effective as editors, although the extremely propa-

previously described.[3] Under the conditions of German repression 668*
the nationalist parties could not afford to devote their limited strength to maintaining the initial advantage gained in these comparatively unimportant areas. By 1943, under the impact of rapidly growing Soviet partisan operations, nationalist activity seems to have ceased in Polessia west of the Dnieper.

South of Polessia runs a broad band of territory which falls into 133
the natural vegetation region of the wooded steppe, i.e., a region of mixed prairie and woods. In contrast to the rather poor gray soil of most of Polessia, it is a land well suited for intensive agriculture, and as a result has supported for centuries the densest agricultural population of the East Ukraine.

As in the case of Polessia, the principal dividing line within the 631
wooded steppe region is the Dnieper River. The area west of the river forms the heart of what have been known in Ukrainian history as the "Right Bank" lands. Kiev and the surrounding district had been acquired by the Russian tsar in the eighteenth century, but most of the area west of the Dnieper remained under Polish rule until 1792. The section closest to the river had had a considerable share in the Cossack tradition, but the more westerly sections, which were included in the historic provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, were deeply affected by the independent Cossack movement only during the height of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's career. This meant that serfdom had a longer and more [566]
oppressive history there than in the regions to the south and the east. While the peasants were thoroughly Ukrainian in language [563]
and customs, the cities included many Poles and Russians and an especially high percentage of Jews, who comprised from one third to one half of the urban population. This concentration of Jews, too, was a result of the historical background of the region; Poland had tolerated them, while the tsars had forbidden them to leave the Pale formed by the lands acquired in 1793 and later.[4]

Since the "Right Bank" was immediately contiguous to the 668*
nationalist bases in the West Ukraine, it was natural that the na-

[3] See Chapter V.

[4] Actually, the Pale included all the Ukraine in the nineteenth century, but Jews were less numerous on the "Left Bank."

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[133] culture of the more northern region. The reasons for the smaller
175 farm population are historical rather than purely economic, however. Most of the area was fully settled many generations later than the more northern regions, for it was the principal area of conflict of the Slavic settlers moving down from the north and the Tatar warriors based on the Crimea. The major instrument of colonization was the Cossack fortress settlement or *sich*. In the mid-seventeenth century the Cossacks accepted the suzerainty of the Orthodox tsar, but it was only in the late eighteenth century, after the Russian conquest of the Crimean Tatars, that the steppe
• [563] was fully opened to peaceful development. These new lands, frequently called "Southern Russia," came to include considerable bodies of non-Ukrainian settlers, mostly Russians, but also large numbers of Germans and Serbs. In 1917 the Provisional Government in Petrograd strongly rejected demands of the Ukrainian Rada for the extension of its authority to the *guberniias* of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida, the last three corresponding roughly to the southern steppe region, since it felt they were not Ukrainian in character.[32]

369 The northern section of the steppe region, comprising the northern halves of the *Generalbezirke* Nikolaev and Dniepropetrovsk, did contain a preponderantly Ukrainian peasantry. The presence of two very important natural resources—the iron mines of Krivoi Rog and the water power of the Dnieper rapids—had led to rapid industrialization of this area during the period of the Soviet Five Year Plans, with a consequent large increase in the urban population. According to the census of 1939 five of the fifteen Ukrainian cities of over one hundred thousand population
369 lay in this region.[33] At the start of the period of industrialization,
563 in 1926, the city population was very largely non-Ukrainian. For example, Ukrainians formed less than half the total in Kirovograd (then Zinovevsk), Jews being the next largest ethnic group, closely followed by Russians.[34] In Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'e the

[32] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 72–73.

[33] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 250–53.

[34] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Recensement de la Population de l'URSS*, XIII (Moscow, 1929), 13–14.

proportion of Jews was somewhat lower, but the Ukrainians were 369
even fewer, numbering scarcely more than one third of the popula- 563
tion.[35]

The figures for Kirovograd in 1942 are hardly enough upon 186
which to base generalizations.[36] Apparently, however, a great shift to Ukrainian national affiliation, much larger than that which took place in the average northern city, had occurred. As in the case of the other figures, it is not certain that this represents a real change, although it is probable that a large part of the interwar growth was composed of Ukrainian peasants. A number of circumstances suggest, however, that part of the difference arose from a real shift in allegiance of numerous elements of Russian origin, i.e., a shift induced not so much by expectation that persons classing themselves as Ukrainians would have a favored position in a new Ukrainian state, as by a sincere feeling of belonging to a "Ukraine" defined on a geographic rather than an ethnic basis. The readiness of technical specialists, who took the lead in Krivoi Rog, to adopt with enthusiasm Ukrainian symbols, while devoting their major attention to economic reconstruction, suggests that this acceptance of a territorial basis of national identity may have played a role, while the support of Russian cultural and political tendencies by a similar group in Dniepropetrovsk indicates the instability of this choice. Apparently the situation was something like this: as long as the Ukrainian state which the Germans seemed to favor appeared to be an instrument for the overthrow of Communism and the rebuilding of new life, it was readily acceptable; when it became a romantic creed of ethnocentrism it was repugnant as an obstacle to the satisfaction

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] See Appendix. The necessity for caution in interpreting the extremely great shift in Kirovograd is indicated by the fact that the only other large city in the area for which data are available, Dniepropetrovsk, showed a comparatively small shift. It will be recalled, however, that the latter city was under a Russophile administration. Unfortunately, there is no information available concerning the tendencies of the city administration in Kirovograd for the time the census was taken. It is mathematically demonstrable, however, that the decline of the Russian group can be accounted for in Kirovograd only on the basis of a shift of persons formerly classed as Russians to the Ukrainian group, unless one of two rather unlikely assumptions is made, namely that (1) the Russian population actually declined between 1926 and 1941, or (2) numerous Jews later exterminated listed themselves as Russians in 1926.

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a large center as Dnieprodzerzhinsk had a nationalist mayor and a 186
nationalist editor.[48]

The extreme south, the coastal strip along the Black Sea and 361
the Sea of Azov, from Odessa to Osipenko (Berdianka), had had a still shorter history of settlement than the area immediately to the north. Best suited of all Ukrainian lands to large-scale wheat farming with a small agricultural working force, it had a relatively sparse rural population, very mixed ethnically, with many German villages and some districts of Russian majority. The cities were still more heterogeneous, with Ukrainians forming a small minority in the larger ones, according to the census of 1926.

The study of conditions in this area is seriously hampered by 727
the fact that the western third fell to Rumanian-occupied Trans- 523
nistria. To prepare the way for the annexation of Transnistria, and, in addition, to gratify the desire of high officials for loot and profiteering, the Rumanians sent in a large number of their own administrators.[49] Since the rather backward Moldavians comprised only a small proportion of the total population, one of the Slavic elements had to be tolerated. Believing that German victory would lead eventually to the creation of an independent Ukraine, which would inevitably demand the land west of the Dniester as an irredenta, the Rumanians favored the Russians; the position of Russian nationalist elements in Odessa resembled that of the Mel'nyk group in Kiev and Zhitomir before their suppression by the Germans. Russian was an official language, along with Rumanian and German; a Russian theater was opened; several Russian publications were started.[50] The guiding organization of the Russians was a group called the Union of Russian Officers, which had the St. George cross as its emblem and evidently was strongly tsarist in its ideology.[51] It is said to have maintained contacts with émigré groups in Serbia and elsewhere and to have refused cooperation with the Vlasov movement.[52] At any

[48] Interview 10; *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, June 14, 1942, p. 7.

[49] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, February 7, 1943, p. 1, based on a Zentraleuropa agency report.

[50] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 17, 1943, p. 3; Interview 18; Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 122.

[51] Clandestine publication from Odessa region previously cited.

[52] *Ibid.*; Interview 18.

737 rate, with Rumanian encouragement, it was bitterly anti-Ukrain-
563 ian, adopting the slogan, "The Ukraine never was, is not, and never will be." [53]

668* Since this group and its Rumanian backers controlled all aspects of cultural and public life, any open Ukrainian nationalist activity even of a cultural nature was suppressed. A clandestine publication and a considerable amount of postwar testimony indicate that the OUN-B maintained a strong underground organization, started by a division of the southern task force even before Rumanian occupation began and later reinforced from the headquarters in Dniepropetrovsk.[54] They are said to have been able to operate an illegal printing press in Odessa and to have kept a nucleus group there.[55] A great deal of their attention was directed to the Rumanian-occupied rural areas to the north, and especially to southern Podolia, where they conducted a propaganda effort to induce the Ukrainian villagers to resist colonization by Moldavians.[56]

To the east, the southern part of the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev was more open to Ukrainian activity. The mayor of Nikolaev was a Mel'nyk adherent.[57] In the second-largest city of the area, Kherson, the Bandera group built a considerable organization, including the assistant mayor and the police chief, but was apparently liquidated by the SP by the end of 1941.[58] Nevertheless, the mayor, apparently an ethnic German, assisted the Ukrainian intellectuals in organizing cultural activity many months after the OUN-B had been suppressed.[59] The newspaper, too, is said to have been edited by a nationalist journalist.[60] In this city and the *Bezirk* capital, the Autonomous Church was active, having formed

[53] Interview 18.

[54] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 45; Mstyslav Z. Chubai, *Reid organizatoriv OUN vid Popradu do Chorne More* (The Raid of the Organizers of the OUN from Poprad to the Black Sea) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 48 ff.; Interview 18; clandestine publication from Odessa area previously cited.

[55] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 45.

[56] Clandestine publication from Odessa area previously cited.

[57] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, October 2, 1941, pp. 3–4, NO 3137 (hereafter referred to as NO 3137).

[58] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, January 14, 1942, p. 30, NO 3279 (hereafter referred to as NO 3279).

[59] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, September 5, 1943, p. 6.

[60] Interview 42.

"all over the Union." Consequently, the area could be expected to be very lukewarm in its reaction to the nationalist movements. This tendency was reinforced by the great distance of the region from the stimulation center in the West Ukraine—Stalino is nearly one thousand miles from L'vov—and by the lack of strong historical ties with the Ukraine. Two special factors also played a role: the suppression of the Kiev OUN-M group came before a nationalist revival could get under way in the area, and the news frightened the few nationalist Ukrainians away from public life; and the German army authorities who were in charge were reluctant to permit even the formal and linguistic ascendancy permitted Ukrainians elsewhere.[65] Finally, even according to an OUN organizer active in the area, the Ukrainians were inclined from long habit to allow the Russians priority.[66]

As a result, in a large number of cities in the Donbas, including Slaviansk, Artemovsk (Bakhmut), Debal'tsevo, and Snezhnoe, the Russians succeeded in establishing a cultural ascendancy without, however, its taking on much political significance. This ascendancy included, in particular, the publication of Russian-language newspapers, which as a rule were not allowed in the former Ukrainian Soviet Republic.[67] A number of Ukrainian-language papers were also founded, some expressly designed for the rural population. In Stalino, with the help of OUN-B organizers, a nationalist editor was able to transform an originally Russian paper into a Ukrainian organ, while for a time Ukrainian-language papers with nationalist tendencies were published in Voroshilovgrad and Kramatorskaia (Kramators'ka).[68] In Enakievo an administration of Ukrainians was installed with the aid of Italian troops which occupied the town, while Ukrainian officials were also found in other city administrations.[69] All efforts at nationalist organization were hampered by the fact that the area was not conquered until late 1941, and, except for a brief period in 1942, they lay within a short distance of the front. A few OUN-M organizers were active in the area, and a considerable Bandera net-

[65] PS 051.
[66] Interview 66.
[67] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 23, 1942, p. 3.
[68] Interview 66.
[69] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 12, 1942, p. 3.

attractive town not only of the Ukraine but of the whole 361
of Russia. Its magnificent public gardens amaze the visitors. It is excelled by Odessa from the point of view of town organization but excels it by far from the æsthetic point of view. Its [2]University of St. Vladimir and its [874]
Polytechnic School enjoyed a great reputation in Russia.

Among the other towns with a European appearance one can mention Nicolaiev, the port at the mouth of the Boug; Vinnitza, the capital of Podolia, and to-day perhaps Dniepropetrovsk, which has the School of Mines, founded some years before the Great War. These cities have modern public buildings, up-to-date railway stations, good networks of tramways, etc.

In the domain of the organization and the appearance of the towns and the houses, the difference between Zone 1 and 2[2] is great. In Zone 1 the country-side is better organized and possesses better roads, while the telephone system had appeared there before the last war, etc. On the other hand the towns which, as we have already shown, are almost all small, can hardly be called such at all.

The towns of Zone 2[2] are new towns which have had the benefit of modern organization, while the country-side still has a colonial appearance, without roads, with numerous isolated hamlets and farms, far removed from each other.

Now a few words about the ethnical composition of 162
the population of the Ukraine. The most important 563
minorities living on Ukrainian territory are the following:

First of all the Great Russians; workers, officials, and some colonists in the eastern and southern parts, especially in the New Russia. Then the Jews, very numerous (about 2,500,000), almost all traders, artisans, or members of the free professions before the Revolution; to-day employees in commerce, in the State co-operatives

[2] [Kiev--Analyst]
[2] [see category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

162 where they represent 30 per cent of the employees,
563 artisans, and workers in heavy and light industry.

The Germans, mostly agriculturalists, very rich before the Revolution, are concentrated in the districts of Odessa, Kherson, and in Northern Taurida.

According to information from German sources, and especially according to articles which had recently appeared in *Deutschtum im Auslande*, the number of German colonists in these regions had been, in 1914, about 750,000, of whom only 50,000 to 60,000 inhabited the great towns. Before the Revolution 2,500,000 hectares belonged to them. It is after 1840 that German colonization became intensified in the New Russia. Originally the Imperial Government had granted 600,000 hectares of excellent land to the colonists. Thanks to their labour and to the favourable economic conditions after 1840 and right up to 1914, the German colonists were able to acquire nearly 2,000,000 hectares at the expense of private owners descended from the nobility.

563 The German colonists always lived quite apart from the peasant community, enjoying a special legislation which granted them very important privileges in economic matters, especially in all that concerned the rights of succession. They had powerful economic organizations such as the Land Bank of Kherson (with a branch at Odessa) and numerous credit and trading co-operatives. In cultural and religious matters the German colonists also remained separated from their Ukrainian and Great Russian partners. Catholic and reformed parish schools were to be found in almost every German village, of whom some even possessed secondary schools and especially *Realschulen* based on the German schools of the same name, in which, though the general teaching was in Russian, German history and German geography had a predominant place.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Nevertheless, if the economic level of the German colonists was much higher than that of the Ukrainian peasants, their cultural level always remained very low. The majority among them were distinguished by coarseness and extreme obscurantism. 563

That which remains of this important minority, partly repatriated to the fatherland, dispersed by the Civil War, or exterminated as *koulaks*,[1] belongs to-day to the community of collective peasants.

The Poles are not numerous in the Soviet part of the Ukraine. The landowners have left the country. There remain the farmers, the workers, and the employees, especially in the service of the railway.

In Polish Galicia the Ukrainian population is, as everywhere, almost entirely agrarian. The Poles are the landowners, the officials, and the military. The Jews are traders, industrialists, and members of the free professions.

This division of activity according to the ethnical groups has played a very great role in the political struggle which had developed in the Ukraine during the period of the civil war of 1917–20. The native population had always been hostile to other non-Russian nationalities, not as a result of an instinctive or infused xenophobia, but for reasons of a purely social order. The Poles were landowners to them, the Jews traders and bankers, and the Germans privileged foreigners to whom one had granted the lands to the detriment of the native population.

Besides these important minorities it is equally necessary to note the Bulgarian colonists, as well as the Moldavians and Macedonians, whose most important occupation was the cultivation of vegetables and especially the growing of melons, as well as sheep rearing,

[1] Rich peasants.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563 and the Greeks who competed with the merchant Jews in the great ports, where they formed very united and wealthy autonomous communities which to-day have been repatriated or dispersed.

II

Agriculture

241 Fundamentally an agricultural land, the Ukraine is particularly the land of cereals.

The incomparable richness of these lands, her temperate climate, and the aptitude of her population have made this branch of human activity the fundamental wealth of the country.

134 311 With the exception of the forest regions of the north-west, where sandy soil is met, nearly all the lands of the Ukraine are arable and actually only a few tens of thousands of hectares of waste land remain, which serve as natural pasturages and give an excellent hay which is very well suited for horses.

243 About 25,000,000 hectares are sown, of which 20,000,000 are growing cereals.

The abundance of nitrates in the surface layer of the earth, and its capillary structure, perfect for irrigation, allow the cultivation of the most valuable of cereals—[311] wheat. The area that has been sown with this cereal occupies more than 35 per cent of the worked land of the Ukraine and its production rises to 90,000,000 quintals, representing almost 8 per cent of the world harvest and 18 per cent of the European harvest.

The cultivation of wheat seems to develop from year to year at the expense of barley and of rye, cereals of inferior quality.

From the end of the nineteenth century wheat has

2. *Soviet Russia and Democratic Ukraine*

668 Bolshevism was the consequence of the previous development of the Russian people, who never had had in their history any free political order. Soviet dictatorship did not meet with any serious resistance in Russia proper. The Russians showed in their attitude towards the Communist rule their traditional 'sense of obedience', as it was expressed by a Russian publicist (Guber, *On the Change of the Sign-Posts:* Prague, 1922)*). Another situation arose in Ukraine and other non-Russian regions of the former Tsarist Empire. The Russian Communist organisation in Ukraine was weak and had no support among the Ukrainian population. Among the Russian and Jewish workers in Ukraine the influence of Democratic Socialism, '*Menshevism*', also predominated. Thus, under the leadership of the Ukrainian Central Council all parties, Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish and Polish, acted together against the plans of the Russian Bolsheviks to establish dictatorship in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council blamed Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia, and began to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine, independent of the Soviet Russian Government. In its '*III. Universal*' from November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed Ukraine a democratic republic. In this document we read:

668 631

"In the Ukrainian Democratic Republic all liberties will be guaranteed: freedom of speech, printing, religion, meetings, associations, strikes, inviolability of person and domicile, the right to use local languages in intercourse with all offices. The Ukrainian nation had fought for long years for its national liberty, and now having attained it, will firmly protect the freedom of national development of all nationalities remaining in Ukraine; therefore we announce to the Russian, Jewish, Polish and other peoples in Ukraine a national and personal autonomy to secure their right and liberty of self-government in matters of their national life . . ."

[563]

In the III. Universal the Ukrainian Central Council fixed the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly for December 27, 1917.

The Ukrainian Government did not want to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers which the Russian Communist Government under Lenin's direction was aiming at. Therefore the Ukrainian Central Council in its '*Universal*' of November 20, 1917,

*) The well known Russian writer Maxim Gorki wrote on the passivity of the Russians towards their oppressors that the "Russians could suffer more than work consciously and honestly" (*Communist International*, No. 3, Moscow 1919).

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728
Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669
of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrai- 665
nian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. *The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)*

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185
Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed 423
simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discon- [563] ●
tent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727
exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The represen- 565
tatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

669 December 12, 1918, a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as [661] against 'Russian followers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parliament and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian 668 National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians 186 in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the 642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

nian territories. This Polish policy held the Ukrainian military forces that were fighting against the Russian Red Army constantly in tension, and hindered the work of the Ukrainian Government. 726

The Ukrainian Galician Army took part in the struggle against the Soviet Russian occupation immediately after the termination of the war with the Poles. The Galician Ukrainians wanted to strengthen the Ukrainian state on the Dnieper, together with the forces of Eastern Ukraine, in order to decide later the historic quarrel for Galicia with Poland.

15. Ukraine between 'Red' and 'White' Russia (1919)

In June 1919, the Ukrainian Government, headed by the Social-Democrat Martos (from August Isaac Mazepa, Social-Democrat, was Prime Minister), took up its residence in Kamenets in Podolia. The united Ukrainian Armies were under the command of General Yunakiw, former Professor of the Military Academy in Petersburg. The Government of Ukraine made efforts to secure legality and order in its territory, particularly it resolutely fought the excesses of various dark elements against the Jewish population. In the Government of theUkrainian Democratic Republic there was a special Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority — Pinkhos Krasny (Jewish People's Party); the deputy Minister of Labour was the Jewish Social-Democrat Prof. Salomon Goldelman. 642 563

The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against Russian Bolshevism as well as the entire Ukrainian problem were in 1919 unknown to the world. Against the Ukrainian liberation movement Communist propaganda was made throughout the world, trying to describe the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as a reactionary state. On the other hand, the propaganda of the Russian 'Whites' and of the Poles permeated decisive political circles abroad resulting in the conviction that the Ukrainian movement was the same as Russian Bolshevism. Therefore the Ukrainian Republic which had led a heroic struggle against Soviet Russia was blockaded by the Western Great Powers as 'infected by Bolshevism'. Because of this blockade the Ukrainian Army was in want of arms, supplies, medicaments. Only by contraband from Rumania was it possible to receive something for the Ukrainian armed forces. Under these circumstances it happened frequently that the Ukrainian Army fought with arms captured on the front from the enemy. But in spite of all these difficulties the united Army of the Ukrainian Republic had considerable successes in the battles with the Soviet Russian troops and, on August 31, 1919, took Kiev, the capital of 669 [705]

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER IV

THE UKRAINIANS OUTSIDE SOVIET UKRAINE AFTER 1920

I. The Ukrainians in Poland

563 186 After the signing of the Treaty of Riga (1921) between Soviet Russia and Poland, about 6 million Ukrainians remained under Polish rule (Galicia, Volhynia, Polissia, Pidlyasha, Kholm Region). The case of Galicia as that of a former Austrian territory appeared from time to time in international policy. The members of the Ukrainian National Council of Galicia remaining in Western Europe demanded the right of free self-determination for this territory. In February 1921, the Council of the League of Nations stated in its resolution: "Galicia lies outside the borders of Poland", "Poland is only the actual occupant of Galicia". But this and other resolutions could not remove the Polish rule in Galicia. Poland did not care for the resolutions of the League of Nations. However, in order to appease foreign public opinion, the Polish Diet passed in September, 1922, a bill on the autonomy of the Counties into which Galicia had been divided in 1920, and a bill on the creation of a Ukrainian University. In November 1922, elections to the Polish Diet took place. The Ukrainians, having regard to the special situation of Galicia, did not take part in these elections. In other Ukrainian territories under Polish rule, particularly in Volhynia, the Ukrainian political parties attained at these elections a great victory.

On March 15, 1923, in a resolution of the Conference of the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan in Paris, the frontiers of the Riga Treaty between Poland and the USSR were recognised "with regard to the fact that Poland had admitted with respect to Eastern Galicia that the ethnographic situation demanded unconditionally an autonomous order".

563 661 But the Polish authorities had no intention to grant political autonomy to the Ukrainians. Even the rights of the Ukrainians for cultural development were narrowly restricted in Poland. Against the Ukrainians in Poland, a police régime was introduced. In 1920 there were in the Polish concentration camps many thousands

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and 563
disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the 661
Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. [871]
In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories, the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet [665]
and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre (UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on 727
the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the 474
Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form
of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative 563
Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz)*. The Ukrainian co-operative movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Co-operation *(Maslosoyuz)*, supplied dairy products, not only for the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in 563
the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

●563 unity to move into the towns or to emigrate the Ukrainian peasants were pauperised.

These conditions were favourable to the growing of extremist trends in Ukrainian political life: communism on the one hand and nationalism on the other.

668 The policy of 'Ukrainisation' in Eastern Ukraine was exploited
661 by Communist propaganda: the 'Ukrainisation' in Soviet Ukraine, adversited by Moscow, did not remain without influence on the
563 population of the Western Ukrainian territories. The Communists of Western Ukraine served Soviet Russia as a 'fifth column' among the Ukrainians in Poland.

The Polonisation of Ukrainian schools, the colonisation of Ukrainian territory with Poles, the refusal to admit Ukrainians to Government service, the persecutions of the Ukrainian press, of educational and economic organisations — all this gave the basis for the creation of illegal Ukrainian groups which began the fight
[725] against the Polish régime with terror. In 1920 the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) was created in Galicia and organised attacks on the representatives of the Polish Government. Later UVO fused with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded at a Congress in Vienna in 1929 under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets. The Polish Government took advantage of the terrorist acts and sabotage attributed to the members of OUN to destroy the Ukrainian cultural and economic life. In September 1930, Polish troops and police undertook a terrible 'pacification' among the Ukrainian population in towns and villages. Polish soldiers and policemen severely beat more than 15,000 Ukrainians, mostly cultural and economic workers, who had not anything in common with the terrorist activity and often were resolute opponents of terror. Many victims of this 'pacification' died after terrible sufferings. A great number of Ukrainian economic and educational institutions — co-operative societies, schools, reading halls and libraries were destroyed.

After the 'pacification', the oppressions against the Ukrainians in Poland grew worse and the Polish colonisation of Ukrainian territories was increased by state funds. In September 1934, the delegates of the Polish Government declared at the Session of the League of Nations that Poland did not have any obligations towards the resolutions of the peace treaties regarding the protection of the rights of the national minorities in Poland.

By this action the Polish Government violated even formally the obligations accepted by Poland in the Peace Treaties in regard to the national minorities.

The Polish policy aimed at the disintegration of the national life 563
of the 6 million Ukrainians through attempts to divide them into 661
different 'tribes' which were given various names in official sta- 798
tistics: 'Polishchuk', 'Hutsul', 'Ruthenian', 'Boyko', 'Lemko', and even 'Orthodox' and 'Aborigines'. Against the Orthodox as well as against the Greek Catholic Ukrainians a policy of systematic Polonisation was applied by forcible conversion of the Ukrainians to Roman Catholicism which in the conditions of the Polish State was equivalent to Polonisation. In Ukrainian regions the Poles organised on the eve of World War II 'dragonnades' in order to convert the Greek Orthodox Ukrainians to the Roman Catholic Church: armed Polish gangs drove through the villages, destroyed the Orthodox Churches, beat the Ukrainians, looted their property, and forced them by this terrorism to turn Catholic. Thus the Polish Chauvinists protected by the Polish Government destroyed in 1938 more than 100 Ukrainian Churches, among them many medieval and of great artistic value and forced many Ukrainian communities to accept Roman Catholicism. In vain the Ukrainian deputies to the Polish Diet protested against this Polish violence, in vain the Metropolitan of the Greek Orthodox Church in Poland Dionysios and the Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church in Lviw Count Szeptycki rose their voices. The Polish oppression caused a strong opposition and resistance among the Ukrainians in Poland, which the Polish Government tried to suppress by new persecutions.

In the entire Polish policy between the two World Wars the fear 000
of the Ukrainian national movement is undoubtfully apparent. The Polish Government did not wish the creation of an independent Ukraine, fearing that a Ukrainian state would later demand union with the Ukrainian provinces of Poland. Even the small Carpatho-Ukraine, which had proclaimed its autonomy in autumn 1938, seemed dangerous to Poland as giving a 'bad example' for the Ukrainian population in Poland. This was one of the reasons why the Polish Government helped to destroy Czechoslovakia and supported the Hungarian claims on Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939.

In September 1939, the Ukrainian territories which after the 661
Treaty of Riga were under Polish rule, were occupied by the Soviet 563
Army in accordance with the German-Russian Pact of August 23, 1939, signed in Moscow. This 'liberation of Western Ukraine' brought to the population of these territories a time of terror and oppression. Thousands of Ukrainians of all classes were deported to the East, many of them did not come back.

The local Ukrainian Communists also were suspected by the Soviet authorities, they were not admitted to influential positions
and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism.'

563 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the
423 Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the
474 big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the masses of the people. It should be pointed out that between the Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR.
661 The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

[1. In [illegible] Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

though this population had accepted in a friendly manner the Soviet rule, hoping for an improvement of their situation. When Rumania in alliance with Germany joined the war against USSR in 1941, the Rumanian authorities on their part terrorised the Ukrainian population of Bukovina and Bessarabia. At the end of the war Bukovina and Bessarabia were joined with USSR again. The Communist terror turned with even greater vehemence against the Ukrainians there. Especially from Bukovina a great part of the Ukrainian population had been deported into the Eastern regions of the USSR. The cities were filled with foreign elements, colonists from Russia were brought into the villages.

3. The Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine)

After 1919 Carpatho-Ukraine, which had been for centuries under Hungarian rule, was attached to Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian population of this country consists mostly of peasants. The towns had a Jewish and Hungarian population. The Czech authorities in Carpatho-Ukraine (official name Carpatho-Ruthenia) favoured for some time the development of Ukrainian schools. But from 1925 the Prague Government began to support the Russophile group that despised the Ukrainian language as 'peasant' and used a strange mixture of the Church-Slavonic, Ukrainian, and Russian languages. In reality, these 'Russophiles' were adherents of Hungary and received support from Budapest too. The entire administration in Carpatho-Ukraine came into the hands of the Czech bureaucracy. According to the Treaty of Saint Germain, Carpatho-Ukraine was guaranteed autonomy inside the boundaries of CSR, but the Czechoslovakian Government permanently deferred its realisation.

At the end of 1938 Germany launched strong pressure against Czechoslovakia exploiting the national problem of this country, (Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians). The Prague Government changed the centralistic Constitution to a federative one. For the Carpathian Ukraine the Prague Government recognised an autonomous statute with a separate Diet and Government. Against this the neighbour states — Hungary and Poland — reacted vehemently. In February 1939, the elections to the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine took place. After the separation of Slovakia from Bohemia the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed the independence of this country (March 16, 1939). But with Hitler's and Mussolini's consent the Hungarian troops occupied Carpatho-Ukraine after stubborn fighting against the Ukrainian volunteers.

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

●563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under 162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation 423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the [517] Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Russian intellectuals. 186 After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist 601 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest: to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czechoslovakia met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrainian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Economic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrainian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrainian emigration developed.

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed a considerable activity.

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name of their enslaved brethren.

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western territories of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily *Svoboda*. The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton, Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will*. There are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools, from American and Canadian Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, farmers. The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about 1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest political organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Communist Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian

[668] like *Ukrainian Daily News* in New York. However, the Com-
●573 munist agency in America and Canada did not attain the success it
575 had hoped. Among the Ukrainian emigration, the democratic organisations have decisive influence.

In South America too, in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and other countries, there are Ukrainian emigrants. These are mostly workers and farmers. They have their cultural and political organisations and publish periodicals in Ukrainian.

The central organisations of the Ukrainians in USA, Ukrainian Congress Committee (UCC), in Canada, Canadian Ukrainian Committee (CUC) and of the countries of South America, created in 1948 the Pan-American Ukrainian Conference for the co-ordination of their activities in the interest of the oppressed Ukrainian people.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

132 49·3°. Drawbacks for agriculture in New Russia are the prevalence of north and east winds and an irregular and insufficient rainfall. The average rainfall at Yelisavetgrad is 17 in., at Odessa 16 in., at Lugansk 15 in., and at Nikolaev 14 in. The rains in April and May decide the harvest. June is the rainiest month, but from May to September there are droughts. Most places are largely dependent upon wells and ponds constructed in the ravines, which are frequent on the steppes.

The climate of the Ukraine, as a whole, is therefore continental, i. e. the variation between summer and winter temperatures is very great. Sudden variations of temperature are frequent. The rainfall is by no means abundant, and there is a progressive decline towards the south and south-east. The fact, however, that the bulk of the rainfall occurs in the summer favours agricultural operations, even where the annual amount of rainfall is comparatively low. It is only in New Russia that the country suffers seriously from drought.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

312 The Ukraine is very backward in regard to sanitary
364 conditions. Less than half the towns have a satisfactory water-supply, and a very small percentage of them a regular drainage system.

164 Typhoid, diphtheria, and malaria are very prevalent.
758 To the great majority of the people in the country, doctors are inaccessible, and even in the towns good hospitals and adequate medical attendance are very
515 rare. In the matter of cleanliness, however, the Little Russians compare favourably with the Great Russians.

(5) Race and Language

Race

162 The population of the Ukraine is composed of
● 563 a mixture of various races and nationalities, those chiefly represented being Little Russians, Poles, Jews,

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Germans, Moldavians, and Bulgarians. There are also a certain number of Cossacks, but these are of Little Russian origin. The large majority of the inhabitants of the Ukraine are Little Russians, as will be seen by the tables given below. The origin of the Little Russians and their precise relation to the other branches of the Slav family are still a matter of dispute, but it is possible that they are of purer stock than the Great Russians, though they have assimilated Polish and Tatar elements, while the Great Russians have been largely influenced by the Finns.

The *Poles* live chiefly in the western Ukraine, occupying the Governments of Volhynia and Podolia, and the Kiev and Berdichev districts in the Government of Kiev. The large estates are chiefly in their hands, and they are tenants of many others, while they also fill important positions in the sugar trade and in general carry much weight in the social and economic life of the western and central Ukraine. They are Roman Catholics.

The *Jews*, who form a most important commercial, industrial, and political group, are found in the Governments of Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev (except in the capital), Chernigov, Poltava, Kherson, Yekaterinoslav (except in Yalta), and Taurida. The town of Berdichev, in particular, is a Jewish stronghold. Many of the largest estates are mortgaged to the Jews, although they tend to live in the towns, where they succeed as good business men and middle men. Statistics for the Jewish population in the Ukraine given in the *Recueil de matériaux sur la situation économique des Israelites de Russie, d'après l'enquête de la 'Jewish Colonisation Association'*, 1908, do not show a large increase over the figures of 1897.

As regards the *Germans*, Swabian colonies have existed at Odessa since 1803, and the famous Liebental agricultural colony between the Dniester and the Black Sea was founded in 1812. Below the falls of the Dnieper and in Taurida there are Mennonite colonies from West and East Prussia. There are also German agriculturists

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162 563 in Volhynia, who have done excellent work in draining the marshes. The Germans make their agriculture pay, and commercially they have penetrated to every town in the Ukraine. They also control many of the large estates and possess considerable financial influence. Their religion is Lutheran, Roman Catholic, or Mennonite. From a comparison of the table on p. 11 with figures for 1915 given by Dr. Max Friederichsen, it appears that the Germans in the Ukraine have decreased by about 50,000 since 1897. Many have emigrated to America; others have been assimilated.

There are many *Moldavians* engaged in agriculture in the districts of Tyraspol, Yelisavetgrad, Ananiev, and Kherson. They form 6 per cent. of the population in the Government of Kherson, and 0·2 per cent. in that of Yekaterinoslav. Their religion is Orthodox Greek, as is also that of the *Bulgarians*. The latter are to be found chiefly in the districts of Berdyansk, Melitopol, Tyraspol, and round Odessa, and make excellent farmers. Though they speak Bulgarian, most of them understand Russian.

The *Cossacks* are energetic farmers, and have extensive farms. In their methods they are far in advance of the ordinary Little or Great Russians.

Among other nationalities are some *Czechs* in southwest Volhynia, and a certain number of *White Russians*, chiefly in the northern part of the Government of Chernigov.

The following are the figures given by the official Russian census in 1897 for the different races in the governments composing the Ukraine:

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or Poland, because before 1905 opposition to the Russian Government was less marked. Besides, many Russian Liberals, even of official position, treated the Ukrainian movement as an interesting variation of Russian life. 177

(D) Social

The class divisions into titled aristocracy, nobles, townsmen, merchants, and peasants, existed as in other parts of the Russian Empire, but, roughly speaking, a different ethnic element corresponded to each social division. The titled aristocracy was mainly Polish in the western parts (with the name Polish Ukrainians) and Russian in the eastern. With but few exceptions, the same could be said of the class of landed nobles, in which the Great Russians formed the majority; Poles, Germans and others were the minority. The Ukrainian landed noble was almost unknown; and the townsmen of the large towns were also in a great majority non-Ukrainian, being chiefly Great Russians and Jews (in Berdichev the Jews form 78·4 per cent. of the population; in Yekaterinoslav, 40 per cent.), and, in the western Ukraine, Russian, Polish, German, Greek, &c. The Jews were mainly traders and shopkeepers, while the Great Russians and the foreigners were manufacturers. 565 563 184

But few of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia* took part in the industrial life of the country, about one-third of them belonging to the professional classes, i. e. doctors, Government officials, lawyers, and teachers. The Ukrainian professional classes originated from the ex-Cossacks and the townsmen rather than from the peasants, since there is a great distinction between the peasants and other members of the community. The Ukrainian nobles, it must be remembered, have in most cases become russified, and partly also polonized. The distinction between the peasant and other classes is not based on economic grounds, for some peasants in the Ukraine are very rich. It lies chiefly in their cultural condition, in their education, or rather lack 565 [463]

565 so efficiently without the help of educated foreigners
184 for some generations to come.

003 *The Ukraine and Great Russia.*—The future of the Ukraine affects Great Russia in the first instance. If the Ukraine is permanently severed from Great Russia, the latter will have to limit itself to the 'Moscow-Siberian' Empire, for it is hardly likely that any other native states formed within the limits of the former Russian Empire (Azerbaijan, Esthonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, the North Caucasian Republic, White Russia) would then belong to her. There seems to be a similarity between these states and the Ukraine, in that they all refuse to recognize Russian suzerainty, though they may possibly join Russia as states with equal rights. The Ukraine is the largest and richest of these states, so that she might play a determining part in their negotiation with Great Russia if she produces the necessary statesman. On the other hand, small as these other states are, they are more homogeneous ethnically and more advanced culturally than the Ukraine, and are able, with the exception of White Russia, to carry on political and economic affairs by themselves.

The Ukraine and Poland.—Poland and the Ukraine are neighbours who supplement each other in the economic sphere; and Poland has many men of education and enterprise. But good relations depend largely on the issue of the political conflict within the Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists claim Galicia as far as the River San, while the Poles, especially the Galician Poles, claim it all for Poland. The ethnic boundary is roughly along the River Bug. In the Eastern Galician problem lies the most serious danger of quarrel.

563 The next interest of Poland is in her minorities in Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev. They consist of noble landowners or professionals in the towns, some of them men whose families have lived there for the last four or five centuries. The reverse is the case of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. The Polish minorities in the Russian Ukraine are much smaller, but in

education and social standard they have a more important position. The satisfaction of the claims of the Polish 'historic minority' will depend on the form of the future Government in the Ukraine, and is bound up with similar claims on the part of the Great-Russians and other nationalities. 563

The Ukraine and Rumania.—The Ruthenians of the Bukovina and of Northern Hungary are more closely related to the Eastern Galicians than to the Russian Ukrainians. Though their number does not reach much more than a quarter of a million, the Ukrainian propagandists have, from 1914 onwards, claimed the Bukovina and also parts of Northern Hungary. Their claims conflict here with those of the Rumanians. ~~The~~ desire of Rumania and Poland to have a common frontier is thus opposed both by Galician Ukrainians and by Russian Ukrainian nationalists. 000

The Ukraine and the Jews.—Though hating the Jews, the Ukrainian nationalists need them economically as people of superior financial capacity and economic education. As there is no class of Ukrainians which could rival the Jews in these respects (though other countries with large Jewish minorities, e. g. Poland and Rumania, have evolved such a class in the last fifty years), the Ukrainians have so far given in to the the Jewish demands[1] for racial autonomy. 563

[1] After the Congress of the Representatives of the peoples of former Russia (September 27–30, 1917, at Kiev), the Rada issued on January 9, 1918, a 'Law concerning National Personal Autonomy', in virtue of which Great-Russians and Poles and Jews have been offered such autonomies. Skoropadski suppressed it, but the Directory revived it in December 1918.

464 districts through the long winter has led to the crea-
[166] tion of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the
[563] country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel,
[511] Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful,
221 but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any
511 branch of industry. The State makes no effort to
565 regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

alleviate these conditions various measures have been 425
adopted, such as the easement or complete extinguish- 511
ing of the burden of the purchase-price of the *nadyel*, the prevention of its frequent redistribution, and the founding of the Peasants' Land Bank by the State to facilitate further purchases of land by the communes. Nevertheless, a result not looked for by the framers 565
of the law abolishing serfdom has followed, namely the creation of a large landless agricultural proletariat, which tends to sink in the social scale, to live partly by industry in the towns, and to be migratory in its habits.

The law of 1906 introduced for the first time the 421
general principle of individual and permanent ownership of *nadyel* lands. It aimed at the breaking up of the *mirs* as no longer fulfilling a need, in the expectation that security of tenure by the individual would lead to a more rational and successful system of cultivation. The period since the promulgation of the law is too short to allow of sound conclusions as to its effect.

The *nadyel* lands are almost entirely cultivated 241
on the three-field system, each unit of land being 311
planted one year with a winter-sown grain, the following year with a spring-sown grain, and lying fallow in the third year. This method causes a disastrous impoverishment of the land, especially as in many cases the minimum of manure, whether animal or chemical, is used. An alternative method must be introduced, or the productiveness of the black-soil land under peasant ownership will continue to shrink as heretofore.

The land held by private owners is in general their 425
perpetual freehold, and can be roughly divided into that 563
held by the nobility in large estates and the smaller holdings purchased from them since the abolition of serfdom by prosperous peasants and others desirous of embarking on agriculture on their own account. There are also a number of foreign colonists, chiefly Germans, descendants of those introduced into the country

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648 hands, will be regulated in the separate treaties with the Ukrainian People's Republic, which form an essential part of the present peace treaty, and, so far as is practicable, will enter into force simultaneously therewith.

ARTICLE IX.—The agreements made in this treaty constitute an indivisible whole.

ARTICLE X.—For the interpretation of this treaty the German and Ukrainian text is authoritative for the relations between Germany and the Ukraine; the German, Hungarian, and Ukrainian text for the relations between Turkey and the Ukraine.

Final prescription. The present peace treaty will be ratified. The ratified documents shall be exchanged as soon as possible. So far as nothing therein prescribes otherwise, the peace treaty comes into force on its ratification. (Here follow the signatures.)

A supplementary treaty of twenty-eight articles was signed between Germany and the Ukraine on the same day. It deals with the resumption of consular relations, the revival of 'treaties, arrangements and agreements which were in force between Germany and Russia before the war', exchange of prisoners, compensation for damage, &c. (*The New Europe*, February 28, 1918.)

III

THE GERMAN COLONISTS IN S. RUSSIA (from F. Stach, *Survey of the History of the Colonists in S. Russia and their Present Life.* Moscow, 1916.)

175 563 REALIZING that in the southern territories acquired by Russia in the eighteenth century only colonists with a certain amount of culture could introduce a settled life and develop the resources of the country, Catherine the Great published a manifesto on December 4, 1762, inviting foreign colonists. As a result, 102 colonies were established on the Lower Volga in the Saratov and Samara Governments, 6 in Chernigov, 1 in Voronezh, 2 in Lifland, and 6 in the Petrograd Government. A further manifesto followed on July 22, 1763, enlarging the privileges of the colonists, which were very considerable.

This manifesto was the basis of the colonies of Russia. On March 19, 1764, a supplementary act was issued granting 30 desyatines of land to each family and prescribing the method of settling and rights of inheritance. The land was to pass to youngest son; this measure would force the father to teach

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elder sons various industries. Another manifesto of July 19, 1785, promised freedom from all taxation for 6 years. 115 563

The first party of settlers from Danzig, many of whom were Mennonite sectaries, arrived at Kremenchug in 1787. On September 6, 1800, Paul I proclaimed special privileges to the Mennonites of Novorossiya (Governments of Kherson, Taurida, Yekaterinoslav, and the Don Cossacks' Territory); 65 desyatines were granted to each family, and it was promised that they would never be called up for military and other duties against their wish. Further regulations concerning the colonists appeared in 1804.

In the reign of Alexander I, in 1818, a new Care Committee for South-Russian Colonies (Governments of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Taurida, and Bessarabia) was established in Yekaterinoslav 1818–22; it migrated to Kishinev a little later. On July 1, 1833, the Committee was limited in power and transferred to Odessa. It existed till July 4, 1871, when it was cancelled and all Russian colonists were placed under the general law. In 1874 they, together with the others, were made amenable to conscription.

Relations between the colonists and the Russians.—Before the Crimean War, and even down to 1860, the Russian towns had very little to do with the colonists, except in the case of those colonies which were situated in the neighbourhood of Odessa, Yekaterinoslav, Nikolaev, Simferopol, Chernigov, Voronezh, Samara, Saratov, and Petrograd. At first intercourse arose from commercial relations. But the influence of colonists on the Nogai was much greater after about 1809 and 1835 when the Nogai received land for permanent settlements. T. Kornis, a colonist of Orlovo, was responsible for helping some 17,000 Nogai to settle down. When the *dukhobors* of Tambov and Voronezh migrated to the neighbourhood of the Mennonites, they were greatly helped by them.

The Ministry of Public Property published in 1846 a report showing that at that time the colonists occupied 1,424,619 desyatines of land (1,309,945 arable). Their number was 95,342 men and 88,293 women, and they were chiefly engaged in agriculture, then cattle-breeding, butter-making, fruit cultivation, tobacco plantation, vegetable-growing, silk industry, wine plantation, and various applied industries.

In agriculture, so early as 1870, they used harvest machines, and in 1905 steam and electrical agricultural machines. In the sixties the Russian, Serbian, and Bulgarian colonists began to imitate the Germans, so that now their methods in agriculture are very much alike. During the last 50 years many colonists bought large private landed estates, especially in the Dneprovsk

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district; but for the last 25 years there has been a tendency to sell all land to the Russian colonists and migrate to the towns.

The Russian language was introduced in the schools of the colonists in 1860; and in 1871 their schools were taken over by the Ministry of Education.

The German colonies are chiefly found in the Governments of Taurida, Volhynia, and Yekaterinoslav.

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LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE[1]

By HAROLD R. WEINSTEIN

000 One of the most painful lessons mankind has learned since the rise of nationalism in the last hundred years is that language diversity fosters conflicts between states and among peoples living within one state but speaking different languages. Conversely, language uniformity makes for unity. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries most governments have strongly desired such uniformity. In some countries, as in America, assimilation into one language has been achieved by allowing national groups the free use of their native languages, and by relying upon the advance of education and of commercial and industrial development to break down the barriers u ●563 those languages erect between various linguistic groups. In the period 191 before the First World War, many governments sought language uniformity by forcibly repressing the languages of minorities, by Ger- SU 563 manizing, Magyarizing, Russifying their national minority groups. Of 191 no government was this more true than of that of the old Russian Empire, in which the "minorities" — that is, the groups other than the Great-Russians — constituted over half the population. But by attempting to suppress the languages of the Ukrainians, Georgians, u Tatars and so on, the Tsarist régime did not achieve its goal of [186] unity; rather, it aroused a host of nationalist movements which put language repression first on the bill of grievances against the government and which helped drive Tsarism to its death.

u Lenin believed that the Tsarist method defeated its own ends and 829 that the goal of unity had to be approached by other paths. First of 191 all, literacy would have to precede any attempt to obtain language SU uniformity: as long as none other than oral means of communication 829 existed between the minorities and the Russians, the Russian lan- 191 guage could not really permeate the minorities and break down their national horizons. Literacy, of course, could be most easily reached by universal education in the minority languages themselves. Then, once the art of reading was mastered and great cultural vistas were opened to the minorities, they would be in a position to go ahead and adopt Russian as a second language. The Russian language would appeal to them because it is the language of a stronger culture than

122 [1] This study is based on material gathered for a book on the policy of the Soviet Union with regard to national minorities. The book is being written under a grant from the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, and it is being sponsored by Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes and Geroid Tanquary Robinson of Columbia University.

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those the minorities possessed; and the necessity for knowing Russian would be heightened by drawing the minorities into the industrial, commercial and political life of the country as a whole. Meanwhile, literacy in the minority languages would facilitate the spread of communist doctrines stressing the international solidarity of the working-class against capitalism. To achieve unity while allowing the free use of minority languages might be the long — and perhaps very dangerous — way around, but Lenin believed it would be the only effective way in a backward, heterogeneous country like Russia.

The Soviet leaders were so certain that eventual lingustic uniformity could be attained only through temporary diversity that they went further in emphasizing minority languages than any state has ever gone: they made vigorous attempts to foster the actual use of the minority languages, to "nationalize" (i.e., "Ukrainize," "Armenianize," "Tartarize") political organizations, administrative apparatus, factory managements, trade-unions, military units, newspapers, books, theatres and schools, among the minorities. In their desire to retreat from the old Imperial policy of Russification, they leaned over so far backward that they introduced the element of compulsion in the opposite direction: they forced the national minorities and the Russians living among them to use the local languages in political, economic and cultural life, stopping short only at the threshold of the individual's private world. The ultimate effect of this policy upon the increase or decrease of nationalism among the minorities is not yet apparent, and the fate of such nationalism may hinge upon such factors as economic prosperity, political liberty and developments in the field of international relations; but the process of nationalizing the political, economic and cultural life of the minorities is an experiment which deserves more attention from the non-Soviet political and scholarly world than it has received.

In the field of education, the Soviet régime has followed a four-fold policy: first to establish a school system embracing all children; secondly, to promote the spread of communist doctrines by integrating them into the curriculum; thirdly, to nationalize the school system by introducing the languages of the minorities as the languages of instruction in schools attended by children of the minorities; and, fourthly, to pave the way for eventual assimilation by providing for the study of Russian as a separate subject in the schools of the minorities. The first two aspects of this policy are complex subjects, each of which deserves a separate study. The present discussion will therefore treat only of the linguistic phases of the Soviet educational policy: the nationalization of education — that is, the use of minority

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At this time, when the whole problem of Ukrainizing the highly Russianized Don Basin and other industrial regions in the Ukraine was being attacked, the failure to Ukrainize the school system was frequently mentioned.[41] Even a directive of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in January 1930, stated that in the industrial regions only the schools for general education and for extirpating illiteracy had been Ukrainized; and the directive ordered the Commissariat of Education to examine the faculty members of the technical and higher schools on their knowledge of Ukrainian, and to take steps to insure that these people possessed such a knowledge.[42] 874 171 656

During 1930 and 1931 the reports on the Ukrainization of technical and higher schools were limited largely to items of "self-criticism" which pointed out obstacles or found fault with specific institutions and individuals. The professors in the Medical Institute in Kharkov now knew Ukrainian, but the process of Ukrainization was being retarded by the lack of Ukrainian text-books.[43] In the Lisenko Theatrical Institute in Kiev the classes were conducted in Ukrainian, but the reporter complained that extra-class work was still being carried on in Russian.[44] An investigation of the Institute of Consumer Coöperation and of the Veterinary Institute revealed that the majority of the students still spoke Russian among themselves and that two professors of the former institution refused to instruct their classes in Ukrainian.[45] Both professors and students in the Construction Institute and the Chemical Institute were reported to be hostile to the use of Ukrainian: one of the professors had been discharged for this reason, and the students had declared Ukrainization to be proper only for the middle schools. Because the library lacked Ukrainian books and only three of the hundred and twenty-two journals received were in Ukrainian, the administration of the Chemical Institute was upbraided for opposition to Ukrainization.[46] The Textile and Mining Institutes were also cited as examples of the failure to Ukrainize properly.[47]

The years up to 1933 constituted the high-pressure period of Ukrainization; after 1933 the government concentrated its attention chiefly upon suppressing the tendency to "over-Ukrainize," where such a tendency was discernible, and upon rectifying the results of this tendency which had already appeared. This was not a new pol- 871 563 652

[41] E. g., *Komsomolec Ukraini*, May 16, 1929, June 26, 1929.
[42] *Proletari*, Jan. 3, 1930. [43] *Ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1930.
[44] *Proletarska Pravda*, Sept. 22, 1931. [45] *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1931.
[46] *Ibid.*, June 30, 1931. [47] *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1931.

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icy; it was, rather, a change of emphasis from one part of the linguistic policy to another. Ukrainian schools for Ukrainian children remained, but now the stress was placed upon schools for the national minorities within the Ukrainian majority, and particularly for the Russian inhabitants of the Ukraine.

The Ukrainization of education, it has been noted, was not intended to apply to schools in areas where there were members of non-Ukrainian nationalities living compactly. On the contrary, the educational policy anticipated that every child should have an opportunity to study in his or her mother tongue. This was stated in all of the important legislation on the languages in the school system, beginning with the preliminary order of the Commissariat of Education in 1919.[48] A law of 1924 had altered the rule on the required size of classes, in order to facilitate the establishment of small schools serving scattered groups of the minority peoples.[49] Other laws and directives in the period from 1924 to 1928 contained clauses ordering increased funds for general and technical education for the minorities, the preparation of teachers for their schools and the publication of textbooks in their languages.[50] Steps were frequently taken by the Commissariat of Education to expand the network of schools serving these peoples.[51] The Commissariat contained a special Council of National Minorities, consisting of Jewish, Latvian, German, Polish, Bulgarian, Czech and Moldavian bureaus; and the provincial departments of education had inspectors for minority education, sometimes separate inspectors for German, Jewish, Polish or Czech schools.[52] Finally, the Communist Party itself, through its directives and the speeches of its leaders in the period from 1924 to 1928, constantly warned that during the process of Ukrainization the interests of the minorities were to be protected.[53]

Efforts to provide schools for the minorities received much publicity between 1924 and 1928. Only a few reports can be cited. In

[48] See especially *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1919, sec. 260, p. 347; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, pp. 626–627. See above pp. 129–130. [49] *Ibid.*, 1924, part 1, sec. 300, p. 933.

[50] E. g. *Visti*, Dec. 10, 1924; *Kommunist*, July 3, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, Apr. 8, 1928.

[51] E.g. *Visti*, Mar. 9, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, July 23, 1927.

[52] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1925, part 1, sec. 218, p. 587; 1925, part 1, sec. 285, p. 10; 1926, part 1, sec. 106, p. 221.

[53] E.g. the directive of the Central Committee of the Party in *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925; the resolution of the Kiev Regional Party Committee in *Proletarska Pravda*, July 15, 1926; the speech of Liubchenko (chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars) in *ibid.*, May 11, 1926; speeches of Kaganovich (secretary of the Central Committee of the Party) and of Skripnik (Commissar of Education) and the resolution of the 10th Congress of the Party in *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii (Bilšovikiv) Ukraini, 20–29 Listopada 1927 p. Stenografičnii zvit* (Kharkov, 1928), pp. 126, 444, 574; the resolution of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade-Unions in *Proletarska Pravda*, Apr. 7, 1928.

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Chernigov the school assigned to the Jewish language — which in the Soviet Union means Yiddish rather than Hebrew — was using that language even before the schools for Ukrainian children were using Ukrainian.[54] A report from Kiev described a campaign undertaken to draw Polish students into the Polish Pedagogical Institute, into the Polish departments of the technical schools, and into other Polish educational units.[55] In the meanwhile, the Jewish Pedagogical Institute in Kiev was being moved into a new building provided by the Commissariat of Education, and elementary schools were being established for Czechs and Assyrians.[56] Dnepropetrovsk reported that its German school was being enlarged.[57] The city of Kharkov found it could not open a school for Koreans (!) because no teachers were available, and the Kharkov City Committee of the Party asked the Vladivostok City Committee and the Communist University of the Toiling East to supply a few Korean teachers.[58]

No evidence that Kharkov ever succeeded in opening a Korean school has come into the hands of the author; but in 1926 the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. complimented the Ukrainian Republic on its attention to the educational needs of the minorities; and the school statistics for 1927 indicated that a considerable number of children of the minorities were studying in their own languages. Of all the pupils in general (four and seven year) schools, 2.9 percent studied in Jewish schools; 1.4 percent in German schools; 0.9 percent in Polish schools and 0.8 percent in schools using other minority languages: Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Tartar, Swedish, Greek, Assyrian and Moldavian.[59] Schools using both Ukrainian or Russian and some other language or languages embraced 2.1 percent of all the pupils. Since Jews composed 5.4 percent of the total population, Poles 1.6 percent, Germans 1.4 percent and other minorities 2.1 percent, it is evident that many of the children of the smaller nationalities went to Ukrainian or Russian schools. This fact can probably be accounted for in part by the lack of buildings and teachers, by the scattered distribution of the smaller minorities and by the indifference of the smaller nationalities themselves. The Jews, for example, have tended to assimilate into the Russian nationality in the large cities and into the Ukrainian nationality in the smaller towns and villages. The younger generation of Jews favor Russian or Ukrainian as their social language, and many Jewish parents prefer to put their

[54] *Visti*, Oct. 2, 1924.
[55] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 24, 1926.
[56] *Ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1926.
[57] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1926.
[58] *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925.
[59] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–25.

871 children into Russian or Ukrainian schools. One reporter in 1933 gave
563 evidence to show that some Jewish parents had desired their children
656 to attend non-Jewish schools, but that pressure had been brought to bear upon them by zealous officials to send their children to the Jewish schools newly constructed for them.[60]

As an illustration of the attitude of the children themselves, an experience of the author may be pertinent. Upon visiting a Jewish school in Kiev, he observed that some of the pupils were carrying Russian text-books; and to the enquiry as to whether no Yiddish books existed for those subjects, several pupils replied: "Oh, yes; but we like to read the Russian texts better than the Yiddish." The school happened to be located in the old Jewish section of Kiev, and undoubtedly the children were sent to this school either because they spoke Yiddish at home (but not amongst themselves) or because of the superior facilities offered by a new institution; and if they had been able to decide for themselves, it is possible that many of these children would have chosen to attend Russian or even Ukrainian
[191] schools. Russian is the language of a culture stronger than the secular non-Hebrew culture conveyed by the Yiddish language in the Soviet Union; Russian is also the language spoken in Moscow and generally throughout the U.S.S.R.; and all those pupils, and parents, too, who ever expect to move freely about the Union must have complete mastery of the Russian language. What is true of the Jews is also true of the Poles, Germans, Czechs and others.

874 That the children of the minorities had to master the Russian and
563 Ukrainian languages if they desired to continue their education on
191 the higher levels is indicated by the nature of the technical and higher educational institutions in the Ukraine. It was impossible to set up an electrical engineering institute for a handful of Poles or Assyrians, or to establish every type of higher educational institution for the Jews. Hence, as the statistics for 1927 indicated, most of the technical and higher educational institutions taught in Ukrainian, Russian or a mixture of the two. Of the students in the lower technical schools (technical schools other than technicums) only 1.4 percent studied in Jewish schools, 0.1 percent in Polish schools, 0.3 percent in German schools, 0.1 percent in the schools of other minorities, and 3.0 percent studied in schools that had one or more of the minority languages together with either Russian or Ukrainian or both.[61] There were no institutes using exclusively the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian minority languages, although 3.9 percent of the students studied

[60] *Proletarska Pravda*, Mar. 29, 1933.
[61] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–51.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in institutes that conducted part of their work in Russian or Ukrainian and part in other languages. Of the students in the technicums, 1.5 percent studied in technicums using the Jewish language, 0.5 percent in those using Polish, 0.7 percent in those using German, 0.5 per cent in those using other non-Russian minority languages, and 0.5 percent in technicums using Russian or Ukrainian and one or more of the other languages. These figures do not signify that the Jewish, Polish or German children were deprived of a chance to study in technical and higher schools; on the contrary, the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian student body in these establishments, as will be noted below, was relatively larger than the Ukrainian and Russian student body.

The work of establishing schools using the languages of the smaller nationalities continued after 1927; in fact, it was given additional impetus by the campaign of 1933–35 against nationalist influences in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education. But before examining the effects of this campaign, it is necessary to note the attitude toward Russian schools. At the core of the process of Ukrainization was the transformation of Russian into Ukrainian schools; and it was not surprising that there appeared in at least some areas a tendency to deprive the Russian-speaking population of an opportunity to study in Russian schools. This was, to be sure, not at all the intention of the government. In its decree in expanding general education, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee ordered that "special attention be directed toward assuring schools with instruction in the Russian language for all children of the Russian nationality."[62] But, as has been noted above, the proportion of pupils studying in Ukrainian schools in some places — especially in the larger cities — was greater than the proportion of Ukrainians in the population. A writer in *Proletarska Pravda* (*Proletarian Truth*) claimed in 1926 that the general schools in Kiev were being over-Ukrainized.[63] He was answered by another writer, who argued that whereas the criticism was based on an examination of the number of *schools*, there was still a larger proportion of *classes* being held in Russian than the proportion of Russians in the total population; and the second writer denounced the first for bringing grist to the mill of the enemies of the Soviet national policy.[64] The criticism was proven correct by the school statistics for 1927; but since the process of Ukrainization was in full swing and since at this time the Party considered the Russian nationalists

[62] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1926, part 1, sec. 453, p. 1246.
[63] *Proletarska Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1926. [64] *Ibid.*

in the Ukraine more dangerous than the Ukrainian variety, no additional attention was given to the problem of Russian children.

In 1933, however, the offensive against Ukrainian nationalism occasioned a review of the Ukrainization process. Ukrainian nationalism had been considered a dangerous force since 1926, when Shumskii and Khvilovoi — two important figures in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education — were censured for desiring "to orient Ukrainian culture on capitalist Europe rather than on socialist Moscow." The Party became still more alert to signs of nationalism after the uncovering in 1929 of the Society for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, a secret organization headed by such outstanding nationalists as Efremov, Germaize and Nikovskii. But it was the campaign against the collectivization of agriculture which occasioned the intensive campaign against the nationalists. The Party regarded the opposition to collectivization as the result in large part of the nationalists, and it set out to remove them from every branch of political, economic and cultural activity. The central figure in the campaign was Nicholas Skripnik, an "Old Bolshevik" who was accused of having fallen under the influence of his nationalist colleagues and was removed from his position as Commissar of Education in March 1933. Even before his removal, however, the Commissariat of Education and all of its activities were under fire.

Charges of over-Ukrainization of the school system were first launched in an editorial appearing in *Kommunist* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party) in February 1933, and reprinted in other newspapers. The editorial said: "The mistakes and perversions in realizing the Ukrainization of the schools led in a considerable number of places to neglecting and ignoring the interests of the national minorities and especially the needs and requirements of the Russian toiling masses living in the Ukraine. Among responsible circles of the Commissariat there was concocted the 'theory' that the majority of the children in the cities, small towns and other labor centers speak a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon, and that therefore the majority of these children should study in the Ukrainian language. As a result, a significant part of the Russian toiling masses were deprived of schools in their native language and actually subjected to the forced Ukrainization which the Party had condemned in all of its directives."[65] Shortly after this editorial appeared, an article in *Proletarska Pravda* stated that in Kiev only 49 percent of the Russian children and 30 percent of the Jewish children studied in schools conducted in their native languages; that although

[65] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1933.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

some of the others studied in mixed Ukrainian-Russian or Ukrainian-Jewish schools, they were "mechanically transferred" after the first four years to classes using Ukrainian.[66] 871 191 656

Zatonski, who replaced Skripnik as Commissar of Education, stated that the Ukrainization of Russian children had taken place in Kharkov and in the Don Basin as well as in Kiev; and he pointed to Krasnolutzki District, where the number of Russian schools had dropped from twenty in 1930 to twelve in 1932.[67] He also declared that in Kherson and Makiivitz there were no Russian elementary schools at all; and that in some places there had been a voluntary Ukrainization of Russian children because the buildings and equipment provided for the Russian schools were greatly inferior to those of the Ukrainian schools.[68] Additional evidence was forthcoming in 1934 and 1935 to show some enforced Ukrainization of Polish children and of those of other minorities, as well as of some of the Russian children; and this situation was denounced as an example of "deliberate nationalist wrecking."[69] [563]

This campaign against over-Ukrainization, however, was not intended to lead to a revival of the Russification policy. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was adamant on this point. He explained in 1933 that the results of over-Ukrainization would have to be eliminated because this was demanded by internationalism, "by the brotherly interests of the toilers of all the nationalities in the Ukraine."[70] But, he went on, the Russian nationalists would not be allowed to take advantage of mistakes already committed in order to reverse the policy of Ukrainization; on the contrary, there would be a further drive for "Bolshevik Ukrainization." A similar view was taken in 1934 by Postishev, the assistant secretary of the Central Committee and the official most actively engaged in hunting down the Ukrainian nationalists.[71]

According to the latest available material, the Ukrainization of education has kept pace with the expansion of general education, and a greater proportion of pupils were studying in Ukrainian schools in 1937 than in 1927. By 1937 the general schools embraced 5,364,800 children as compared with 1,678,100 in 1913 — an increase of 319 percent over the pre-War year; and whereas twenty-two of every thousand people attended elementary school in the Kiev Educational District in 1912, in 1937 the figure for all of the Ukraine had risen to 871 162 212

[66] *Ibid.*, Mar. 29, 1933. [67] *Visti*, May 1, 1933. [68] *Ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1933.
[69] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1934 (speech of Zatonski); Aug. 22, 1934, Jan. 5, 1935.
[70] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1933. [71] *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1934.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both within and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.
[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . .* , 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

361 tossed down on the land, without any relationship to it. "The absence of public buildings alone had [342] a depressive effect. These wooden huts on a slope, supported by stakes as though by high stilts, seemed merely to have been set down as chance would have it, less secure and permanent than nomad tents which the next day perhaps might already be taken down again. It scarcely seemed worthwhile to lay out a few roadways provisionally. For the rest, there was not a trace of a city plan, of a systematizing, architectural hand. Everything seemed temporary and unfinished, simply amassed, never shaped. The expression "shanty town" applied in a special /18/ sense to these places. Our criteria of beautifully compact city plans do not apply. Never concentrated within the area most difficult to attack, never held together by walls and moats, these Russian clusters of houses and courtyards which can scarcely be called cities any more, gradually become lost in the distance, without shape or outline: mirror images of the landscape that bears them, of the language that echoes in them, of the way of thinking of the people they house." (9)

9. Tintrup: War in the Ukraine, pages 23 and 24.

101 If you would now turn east in the direction of Kiyev, you would come through numerous rambling 361 villages with streets. They contain attractive ●563 farms where until recently you would have been warmly welcomed with German sounds. The Volhynia Germans lived here. But you continue northward 101 until the Volhynia plateau with a gradual incline 133 sinks into the Polesian swamps. You avoid this marsh land by turning northeast, and thus come to the extreme northwest tip of the Ukrainian area of settlement, Podlakhia, whose waters flow toward the Baltic. The primeval forests of Bila Vesha are gloomy, but even more gruesome are the deep

/91/ [Galicia] Self-Aid [Volhynia]

555 Galicia and Volhynia are parts of the ghetto of the world, lying between Cracow and Odessa. There is no question about the fact that anyone who can here compete commercially with the Jews and politically with the Poles has certain abilities. The Ukrainians of Galicia have a talent for organization. If their business methods are often primitive according to our conceptions, it is not their fault. Where proper money is scarce, as is the case among all small peasants of the East and Southeast, it is replaced by some marketable goods: people unhesitatingly deal in eggs. Ukrainian cooperatives tried very hard to change these conditions; they were equally adept in ancient barter as in international business involving clearing and regulations pertaining to payments and foreign exchange.

555 [436] 476

Jews and cooperatives waged a bitter fight against each other. But where usury and chain businesses of ill repute flourish, cooperatives have an easy time of it. Before the First World War the usurers demanded a 100% interest. Now they say: "I am giving you money; good, - but you must sell me your calves, your geese, your chickens and your eggs." For a zentner of seed they demand two zentner of produce from the harvest. In the gin shops they manage to obtain, by fraudulent means, the best pastures of the Huzul country, only to rent them to the former owners. If the cooperative makes its way into such villages which are under Jewish domination, it soon has the peasants on its side, and since no one buys from the Jew, no one sells to him and his inn is avoided, he must sooner or later pack up his belongings. /92/

[452]

For the Ukrainians the Jewish problem is a problem of food. Wherever people have ambitions and where they desire to improve their basic way of living, they run up against Jews. Jews

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11: Obermaier--94 J-3(no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Galicia] [Volhynia] European Jews E14

U 563 are found in the villages and cities, everywhere
E.J. 162 except at hard peasant labor. As early as 1900, 74% of all Jews earning a livelihood in Russia, Poland and Galicia were in commerce, in the credit system, in crafts and in industry. In 1931 there
U [463] were 158,400 Jews living in villages in East Galicia alone, that is 3% of the people living in the country; in the cities, on the other hand, there were 454,900 Jews or 37.3% of the urban population. (51) In 1929 the various trades were

51. Seraphim, Jewry in East European Area, p. 340.

50% in the hands of Jews, and in Volhynia a total of 73% of all tailors, shoemakers, tanners, bakers, furriers, blacksmiths, watchmakers and other artisans were Jews.

U 563 In spite of the fact that the Ukrainians lived in such close proximity to Jews, they kept their cultural life free of Jewish influence and their race free from Jewish blood.

*

U 476 "More important than selling and profit is the community which has become happy and morally strong as a result of proper training by means of cooperative work and self-aid." These words were not, as might be supposed, spoken at a major assembly of German cooperatives; they were coined at Lwów by the head of the Ukrainian cooperatives. They were addressed to the West Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian cooperatives were of unusual national significance; they improved the wretched condition of the peasants and educated the latter to think in terms of the common welfare; and they offered to Ukrainian intelligentsia a real, albeit meager possibility of existence. How can condi-
U 162 tions in the country be anything but miserable if 60% of the peasants own dwarf farms with less than

871 of the universities which were for a long time forbidden, the "technical institutes" and the more advanced type of these, the "institutes for popular education". In recent times universities have again been revived.

In this connection it may be said that the obligation to attend elementary school begins at the age of eight and ends at the age of twelve. Two-thirds of the elementary pupils leave school before their four years are up. The subjects of instruction of the first few grades of the workers' school include, among other things: 1. Lenin - revolutionary, Communist, protector of workers and peasants; his death, short biography. 2. The Czar and the workers in the year 1905. 3. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. (68) - The "professional schools" are regular

68. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Union, page 40.

schools for fifteen- and eighteen-year-olds, corresponding somewhat to our German agricultural and business schools. The "workers' schools", on the other hand, are attended only at certain hours by factory apprentices. /124/ The "workers' academies" are somewhat like the former German people's universities. The course of study lasts four years; it entitles the graduate to register in universities without having to take any kind of entrance examinations. The Party schools train agitators and propagandists; the technical schools and institutes train engineers, chemists and specialists in various fields in a three-year, and in some cases a four- and five-year course of study. While the process of Ukrainization was [563] going on in 1928, there were among all university students in the Ukraine 15.8% Russians, 23% Jews, 56% Ukrainians and the rest students of other nationalities. (69) In 1933 and 1934 universities

69. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Union, page 98.

474 accused of collaboration in preventing the ware-
425 housing of grain. As early as December 6, 1932 the Council of the People's Commissars came to the following decision: "The resistance of those communists who in reality have become leaders of the sabotage, as well as the passive and favorably disposed attitude of various Party organizations toward this sabotage shall be liquidated." (91)

91. Salisnyak: "The Struggle Between the Ukraine and Moscow in the Soviet Union" Nation und Staat, July-November, 1937.

In 1933, after a four-year struggle, the resistance of the Ukrainian people against that new order which seemed to the Muscovites to be the purpose of the state, was broken. Moscow, /148/ without any regard for the victims among its opponent, had fought a hard battle of nationalities and won. The Communist of December 11, 1934 gives a faint picture of the extent of this catastrophe when it reports that during the period of collectivization 200,000 Ukrainian farms were destroyed and their owners along with their families were exiled to North Russia.

*

•563 The Bolshevik agrarian revolution with all its consequences also did not spare the descendants of those German emigrants who had moved to the Ukraine between 1789 and 1842. The promise of abundant arable land and freedom of religious worship had at one time attracted these sectarians to this country. They were industrious, capable people who rapidly increased their possessions and multiplied. In 1914 there were 600,000 of them in the region of the Black Sea, 100,000 in the North Caucasus and 200,000 in Volhynia,

•563 which at that time belonged entirely to Russia. (92) These 900,000 German colonists cultivated

92. Stumpp: Achievements and Importance of the German Colonists in Russia, in Deutschtum im Ausland, Number 5, 1939, page 251.

4.9 million desiatiny*/desiatina, pl. desiatiny: Russian measure of land = 2.70 acres. Editor/ of land or an area as large as Alsace Lorraine, Baden and Württemberg combined. They had been given 700,000 desiatiny as colonization land, and bought an additional 4.2 million desiatiny since then.

These Germans achieved important things in agriculture. They introduced the iron plough and agricultural machinery into the Ukraine. Their attempt to plant forests in the steppes in order to check the eternal wind of the steppes and the severe dust storms did not bring the success desired. But they magically produced vineyards and orchards on soil that no one cared to cultivate. In the North Caucasus, on the other hand, they tried in vain to cultivate grapes and silkworms, before establishing tree nurseries which were to become famous throughout the realm of the czars. In 20 years they sold 20 million of the finer sorts of fruit trees from these nurseries and an equal number of berry bushes and /149/ ornamental trees. Besides that they developed the breeding of Ardennes horses and valuable beef cattle. (93) But this does not exhaust

93. Strumpp: Achievements and Importance of the German Colonists in Russia, page 256.

the achievements of the German colonists. They invented a special way of weaving light cotton fabrics which are very well adapted to the climate.

563 German wheelwrights (Ukrainian: "stelmakh"), carpenters, smiths and locksmiths (Ukrainian:"sl'usar") were very much in demand. Before the First World War there were 100 German shops in Odessa, among them two bookstores. Factories for agricultural machines arose from small beginnings, and they sent their products as far as Siberia. From 80 to 90% of all Bolshevik factories for agricultural machinery were founded by Germans.

The Germans were not spared their toll of blood in the Ukraine. At the beginning of the First World War they had to suffer in the persecutions of the Czarist regime. Then they fought with Denikin and Wrangel against the Bolsheviks and were defeated. Finally the "death taxes" began, which were followed by a new civil war and the famine. No one knows how many of our compatriots lost their lives in these catastrophes. Many emigrated to Canada and the United States as long as they were still able to do so.

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474 Thus after the Ukraine was prostrate, Moscow could without danger loosen the noose. This was also dictated by the instinct for self-preservation, for bread and meat were urgently needed for the growing industrial areas. The process of making collectives out of small private properties was abandoned. When at the Seventeenth Party Congress in January and February 1934 an urgent recommendation was issued for people to lead a "joyous and happy life", those who had been murdered or who had died of hunger no longer heard it, and for the ones who were exiled it sounded like bitter sarcasm. At the same time concessions were granted in the household and horticultural economy of the members of the collectives. The new collective economy statute of 1935 permits the individual farmer to own /150/ 1 hectare of land, 1 cow and 2 heifers, 5 pigs, 10 sheep or

11: Obermaier--182 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

439 6. Import
/In circle marked 380:/
Naphtha 110
Wood products 70
Fish 20
Products of animal husbandry 5
Other finished products 180

7. Export of various goods from the Soviet Ukraine in 1913, 1928, 1932 and 1934 (in million tons).

8. Coal
9. Ores

10. Iron & steel

11. Grain

12. Sugar

13. Wood

14. Naphtha & naphtha products

15. Various finished products

000/ Also facing page 168/ /Where tractors are worn out harrowing is now done with horses/ /Facing page 169/A/At planting time the seed must be got into the ground within a few days. The tractor is particularly adapted to the cultivation of large
369 areas/A/169/ 35.9% in Dnepropetrovsk, 16.2% in
162 Lwow (1931), 28.9% in Stalin, 29.9% in Krasnodar (chief city of the Kuban region), and 17.8% in Chernovtsy.

*

• 563 The Jews immediately seized what the Ukrainians had passed by. During the wars with the Turks Catherine II had opened to them the south Ukrainian gubernyas of Taurien, Kherson and Katerinoslav, the present-day Dnepropetrovsk. In 1835 the right of settlement of the Jews was extended to the entire right-bank section of the Ukraine with the exception of the city of Kiyev. The rest of Russia was almost completely free of Jews until 1917. From that time on all of Russia was open to them, and immediately the emigration

1 [For plates, cf. pp. 224-225, category 11c - Analyst]

•563 of Jews who had been crowded together in the Ukraine began into the interior of Russia. The process of urbanization of the Jewish population was in full swing even before the First World War. Al-
[162] ready by the year 1897 77.4% of the 1.2 million Jews in Russian Ukraine lived in cities, where they made up 22.7% of the population. (113)

113. Seraphim: The Jewry in East European Area, page 322.

Meanwhile the urbanization continued. The proportion of Jews in the total urban population of the district of Kiyev came to 28% in 1926, in the Odessa district it was 31%, in Dniepropetrovsk 32%, in Podolia 54.7%, in the highly industrial Donets region only 9.1%. (114)

114. Seraphim: The Jewry in East European Area, page 333.

ooo Even though the Jews controlled almost the entire wholesale and retail trade in the Ukraine before the First World War, and were extremely influential in banking, this was not true of the apparatus of government. Gone today are the traders who realized fat profits on the 4000 Ukrainian fairs, who bought from wholesale dealers and wandered through the country as barterers; private trade has been shattered and the banks are state-controlled, but the influence of the Jews is greater than ever. As early as 1926 they had established themselves in government positions far beyond those that were open to them, and ruled over the Ukrainian and Russian people. In the municipal Soviets they had 20.1% of all positions, in the trade unions 38.1%; in /170/ the judiciary they had 18.9%, in finance administration 19.4%, in the cooperatives 26.8%, in the credit system 35.1% and in public affairs even 44.2% of all

181 The innermost feelings of the Ukrainians in the days of their liberation is described by a German war correspondent a few weeks after the Bolsheviks were driven out of Kiyev, in the following words of a Ukrainian physician in Kiyev: "You Germans must be very patient with us! You must help us as though we were schoolchildren to whom one must teach the most elementary aspects of life step by step! You must give us strength once more to believe in humanity! For we are not ourselves. We are pitiful, down-trodden, homeless creatures, human beings deprived of all that was sacred, who night and day have lived in the fear of being deported, exiled or shot because of our very existence." (135)

135. "Kiew - der Blutegel der Ukraine," Kiyev, the leech of the Ukraine, by the war correspondent, Erwin Kirchhof.

000 What, therefore, is to become of this country where intelligent men voice such shattering words? Now that the Bolsheviks have been driven out, there will first of all have to be a thorough stock-taking of the Ukrainian people to determine the presence of living cells capable of growth and development, in order that we may then, with careful consideration, be able to build, stone by stone, a new and better future. Too much in the way of diversified wealth and talent in the Ukraine has been destroyed or stunted by Muscovite imperialists, beginning with Peter the Great down to Stalin, the strangler, to make possible the achievement of such a tremendous task of reconstruction within a few years.

/Map in pocket of book/

The Peoples of the Ukraine

183 182 The distribution in 1939 of peoples and ethnic

•563 groups living in Ukrainian territory. For each
162 race there are two, sometimes even three degrees of density shown: a highly concentrated area of 90 percent (however without regard to Jews who in some areas constitute 10 percent and more of the population), then a majority area of 90 percent, and finally an area where no group has the absolute majority and where the relative majority is shown. The Ukraine is most compactly settled in the center as well as toward the west, north and south, whereas in the east it is loosely settled. Here a motley aspect of ethnic intermingling appeared; peoples live next to each other who racially, culturally and in matters of religion belong to the most diverse ethnic groups: Ukrainians and Great Russians, Central European Germans, Turko-Tatars, Mongolian peoples, as well as those small, heterogeneous mountain tribes of the Caucasus, that represent remnants of peoples in areas of regression.

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RD1 Ukraine RD1

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P.213	P.209		
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Schematic diagram to end map

p.206 (2)

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•563
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/Key/

1. Ukrainians
   - over 90 percent
   - 50-90 percent
   - relative majority

2. Russians
   - over 90 percent
   - 50-90 percent
   - relative majority

8. Greeks
   - 50-90 percent
   - relative majority

9. Hungarians
   - 50-90 percent
   - relative majority

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563
162

Rumanians
over 90 percent
50-90 percent
relative majority

Germans
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

Tatars
50-90 percent
relative majority

Kalmuchs
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

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563
162

Slovaks
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

Ruthenians
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

Caucasian Mtn. tribes
over 90 percent
50-90 percent

Bulgarians
50-90 percent

Armenians
50-90 percent

11:Obermaier--210 J-3 (no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

Poles
over 90 percent

50-90 percent

Nogai
50-90 percent

Kirgiz or Kazakh
50-90 percent

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162

11:Obermaier--212 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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162



11:Obermaier--213 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

11:Obermaier--214 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 79. On the expiration of the terms of office of the regional, area, district, city settlement or village Soviets of Working People's Deputies, their executive and administrative organs retain their powers until the newly elected Soviets shall have formed new executive and administrative organs.

Chapter VI. The Budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

[643] 644 [645] Art. 80. The state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is drawn up by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and submitted by it to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for its approval.

Upon its approval by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is published for general information.

Art. 81. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Budget Commission, which reports its conclusions on the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet.

Art. 82. The report on the fulfilment of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and published for general information.

651 652 Art. 83. The budgets of the regional, area, district, city, settlement and village Soviets include the revenues from the local economy, deductions from the state revenues collected within their territory and likewise receipts from local taxes and imposts in amounts fixed by the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter VII. The Courts and the Procurator's Office

692 Art. 84. In the Ukrainian SSR justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Regional and Area Courts, the Special Courts of the USSR established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the People's Courts.

[693] Art. 85. In all Courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

Art. 86. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is the highest judicial organ of the Ukrainian SSR. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR.

[646] Art. 87. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for a term of five years.

Art. 88. Regional and area courts are elected by regional and area Soviets of Working People's Deputies for a term of five years.

Art. 89. People's courts are elected by the citizens of the district on basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of three years.

695 [563] Art. 90. Judicial proceedings in the Ukrainian SSR are conducted in the Ukrainian language, persons not knowing the language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 102. Women in the Ukrainian SSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life.

[562] The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education and by State protection of the interests of mother and child, State aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers, maternity leave with full pay and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

[563] Art. 103. Equality of rights of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality and also any propagation of racial or national exclusiveness, hatred and contempt - are punishable by law.

[659] Art. 104. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the Ukrainian SSR is separated from the State and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

Art. 105. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed by law:

(a) Freedom of speech;
(b) Freedom of the press;
(c) Freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
(d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

[575] Art. 106. In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are ensured the right to unite in public organizations — trade unions, co-operative associations, youth organizations, sport and defence organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and State.

[694] Art. 107. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

Art. 108. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

Art. 109. The Ukrainian SSR affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hun-
241 garians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent
438 vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here
341 imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip
317 of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Siatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters
263 cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has
511 to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation—all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

Nor is Gogol an isolated example. Count Alexey Tolstoy too belongs to some extent to the Ukraine and no Ukrainian poet has succeeded in paying to his homeland a more beautiful lyrical tribute than Tolstoy's.

Were the Ukraine 'Little Russia' only, the land of the Cossacks, the problem would be more straightforward; but the Ukraine is, apart from minor territories, at least Little Russia plus New Russia. New Russia comprises those territories along the shores of the Black Sea which were incorporated into the Russian Empire for the most part under Catherine the Great. It was only by the amalgamation of Little Russia with a large part of New Russia that the Ukraine obtained a sea-coast and was able to include within its borders places like Odessa, Kherson, Mariupol and Nikolayev whose history was in no way linked with that of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmans. New Russia became a true microcosm of Europe. Just as the ancient and medieval history of New Russia is a mosaic of the history of many peoples which had settled on the northern shores of the Black Sea, traded with the goods and products of its hinterlands and founded states, a history of Greeks and Scythians, Khazars, Goths, Genoese and Tartars, so too the history of modern New Russia is a tale of all sorts of races. People from many lands transformed the steppe into arable soil, built ports and railway lines and developed the industry of the Donets Basin. New Russia was a little America in the sense of being a melting-pot of European races, with the difference, however, that not all pioneer settlers forgot the language of their forefathers in the Ukrainian-Russian surroundings.* The people who brought New Russia into being included sons of every nation of the Balkans, many Germans and even individual Frenchmen who assumed high administrative posts there. At least one Briton played a distinguished part in the development of New Russia, John Hughes, a pioneer of coal-mining in the Donets region, to whose initiative is due the foundation of the big industrial centre now called Stalino. (Until the early twenties the place was called after him 'Yuzovka'.)

UKRAINIAN DIASPORA IN THE U.S.S.R.

Whilst Russians and other peoples shared with the Ukrainians the credit for the colonization of what is to-day the Ukrainian S.S.R., millions of Ukrainians now live dispersed all over the Soviet Union.

The Ukraine, being a densely populated country, was able to contri-

* An ethnical group of colonists in New Russia, who were completely assimilated by their Russian-Ukrainian surroundings, were the Serbs, of whom about 100,000 came to the Southern Ukraine between 1739 and 1752. The Serbs colonized two Ukrainian regions, one on the right bank of the Dnieper, originally called 'New Serbia', and the other in the Donets Basin, called 'Slavyanoserbia'. A century after the Serbian pioneer immigration into New Russia the Serb element could no longer be traced in any population statistics of the Russian Empire.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

that meeting the Ukrainian Communist Party decided that Great Russian chauvinism had ceased to be the main danger in the Ukraine and that Ukraine nationalism had become enemy number one. The decision constituted an important landmark in the history of the Soviet Ukraine and the prelude to a purge on a tremendous scale. 661 186 665

Skrypnik drew his conclusions from the 'new situation' by committing suicide less than four weeks after the decisive meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Executive Committee. Skrypnik's disappearance, whilst affecting the situation in the Ukraine in general, was particularly important in the field of Ukrainian cultural policy. After Skrypnik's death Postyshev and Kosior stopped the 'Ukrainization of the Ukraine', a favourite slogan of Ukrainian communists up to 1933, and started a determined campaign against 'over-Ukrainization'. 'Fight against over-Ukrainization' was in reality nothing else than the recapture by the Great Russians of some of the positions which had been lost to the Ukrainians, particularly in the Donets Basin. There is no doubt that the Ukrainization had been overdone and had actually led to the imposition of the Ukrainian language on non-Ukrainians, particularly in the schools. [563]

THE 'GREAT PURGE'

In 1934 and 1935 the party leadership discovered a big terrorist organization of Borotbists in Kiev and Kharkov, as well as an alleged 'Nationalist-Trotskyite Bloc'.[6] In 1936 the situation seemed to be more stable in the Ukraine, but 1937 was again a disastrous year for that country. Official Soviet statements claimed that in 1937 Ukrainian nationalism had made particularly extensive efforts to detach the Ukrainian S.S.R. from Russia by plotting with German and Polish fascists. Some of the plots and conspiracies uncovered had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism and were simply Ukrainian off-shoots of anti-Stalin currents within the All-Union Communist Party. It is true, however, that the Ukraine suffered much more during the big purge of 1937–38 than any other Soviet Republic. Moreover, the purge went on in the Ukraine after it had been ended on the whole in other parts of the Soviet Union. 661 665 668

The new chain of dramatic incidents started in the Ukraine in the summer of 1937, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Panas Petrovich Lyubchenko, committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest, trial and execution. Lyubchenko had been Prime Minister for three years during which he had made himself conspicuous by his passionate speeches denouncing Hitler's plans of aggression. Lyubchenko was a former Borotbist and thus suspect to the Kremlin. He was charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian fascist party and allying it to the 'right-wing Trotskyite centre'.[7] Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, was arrested

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

She was to serve Soviet diplomacy in the wider international arena. UK. 648
The turning point in the mission of the Ukraine came early in 1944 645
with the setting up of a Ukrainian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Ukrainian Foreign Office came into being under the decree of S.U.
February 1st, 1944, providing for the establishment of People's Commis- 635
sariats (later Ministries) for Foreign Affairs in all the sixteen Soviet 648
Republics. It was clear, however, that this decree, despite its general character, had the primary object of giving the Ukraine a new formal status in international affairs. To a much lesser extent this was true regarding Byelorussia, whilst little practical use was made of the foreign offices of the other Soviet Republics.

For a short while the real meaning of the creation of a Ukrainian and of a Byelorussian Foreign Office was not quite clear. At first it looked as if the central Government intended to make a real concession to the two Soviet Republics which had so heavily suffered by the war. The impression was confirmed by a statement of the veteran Ukrainian Bolshevik, Dimitry Manuilsky. Speaking in his capacity as Ukrainian Foreign Minister he announced in 1945 that the Ukrainian S.S.R. was 'ready at any time to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with any country'. Addressing over 400 foreign journalists, at a press conference in San Francisco, Manuilsky added that the Ukrainian Government would 'consider with gratitude any proposals by other States with regard to foreign relations'.[24] Soon after this statement had been made the Kremlin apparently regretted its generous gesture and the Ukraine was not allowed to establish consular and diplomatic missions abroad. A British offer to exchange consular representatives between the United Kingdom and the Ukrainian S.S.R. was turned down.

While the Ukraine is not supposed to have consuls and diplomats she UK.
has been encouraged to send delegates to international conferences [648]
and to the United Nations. These delegates do not defend the interests of even a communist Ukrainian State, but only those of the centralized Soviet Empire. The Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations has frequently been ordered to effect this or that tactical move whenever the delegation of the U.S.S.R. desired to remain in the background.

NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE UKRAINE

UK.
During the inter-war period the Ukrainian S.S.R. was still a multi- 563
national State despite the clear preponderance of the Ukrainians. S.U.
National minorities represented about 20 per cent of the total popula- 563
tion of the Ukraine in its pre-war frontiers. With the two most important minorities, Russians and Jews, we are dealing in another context. It suffices to underline with regard to both these minority groups that they acted as a brake on separatist Ukrainian tendencies, thus fulfilling a

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
[Greeks] UKRAINE RD1

[Bulgarians]
UK. 563
S.U. 563

useful function from the point of view of the central state authorities.

The smaller minorities such as Bulgars, Greeks and Germans were of little political importance but their survival constituted an interesting reminder that the Ukraine and particularly its southern parts owed a great deal to foreign colonists.

For the non-Ukrainian population of the Ukraine twenty-seven national districts had been called into being, including eight Russian, nine German, one Polish and three each for Bulgars, Greeks and Jews. Besides, there were twelve Czech and three Albanian National Village Soviets.

The events of the war left the Russian minority in the Ukraine more or less untouched but led to the annihilation or considerable reduction in size of most of the other minority groups such as the Germans, Greeks, Jews and Bulgars and only a few remnants of the previous elaborate system of National Districts and National Village Soviets persisted.

1. GREEKS. Most Greeks of the Ukraine had been subject to an enforced exodus similar to that of the German colonists. They had played a remarkable role in colonizing the south-eastern corner of the Ukraine, the area north of the Azov Sea. They had not only established a large number of villages but had also founded the town of Mariupol in 1775. Right up to the beginning of the twentieth century Mariupol still had a considerable number of Greek inhabitants.

Under the Bolshevik régime, Mariupol, one of the big centres of Soviet heavy industry, lost not only its Greek inhabitants but also its Greek name, and in 1948 assumed that of a Russian communist, A. A. Zhdanov, a native of the city.

The All-Union Communist Party tried to educate the 'Soviet Greeks' into reliable Soviet citizens. Although more than half of the 285,000 'Soviet Greeks' lived in the Ukraine, it was considered preferable to concentrate the work of cultural and political enlightenment in the Greek language not on Ukrainian territory but in the city of Rostov-on-Don, within easy reach of both the Greek settlements of the Ukraine and the Greek minority groups scattered in the Northern Caucasus region. Rostov became the headquarters of a Greek communist publishing house from which the Greek language newspaper *Kommunistis* and Greek communist pamphlets were dispatched both to the 'Azov Sea Greeks' and to the Northern Caucasus Greeks.

However, this propaganda seems to have been of little avail since the 'Soviet Greeks' appeared to have been 'unreliable' at the time of the German military advance. Many of them were deported by the Soviet authorities, most probably to Soviet Asia.

2. BULGARIANS. The 'Soviet Greeks' had never been of much use for propaganda intended for Greece proper; their National Districts were created for reasons of administrative convenience only. The Bulgarian

National Districts were a different matter. The most important of these Bulgarian National Districts received the name of Vasil Kolarov, a Bulgarian communist leader, who, after the abortive Bulgarian communist *coup d'état* of 1923, lived as an exile in the Soviet Union. The creation of the 'Kolarov District' in the Dniepropetrovsk Province with the 'capital' Kolarovka was thus a deliberate gesture to stimulate the illegal Communist Party in Bulgaria and to show its supporters that a little Soviet Bulgaria was alive inside the U.S.S.R. even if Bulgarian reaction frustrated the establishment of a Soviet Republic in the real Bulgaria for the time being. UK 563 S.U. 563

During the German occupation of the Ukraine many Russian Bulgars – they numbered 114,000 in 1939 – were repatriated to Bulgaria. After the end of the war at least a part of these evacuees were brought back to the Soviet Union, but there is no evidence of a survival of the Bulgarian National Districts.

3. ALBANIANS. There has been definite news that the 3,000 Albanians of the Soviet Ukraine have survived the war and have maintained their three Village Soviets in the Azov District of the Melitopol Province. The best evidence that this small minority remained in favour with the authorities was the fact that a fairly comprehensive study of their customs was published after the Second World War.[25] Also at least some of the Czech Village Soviets and collective farms of the Ukraine seem to have remained and their example was used as propaganda for collectivized agriculture in Czechoslovakia proper.

THE 'POLISH POLICY' OF THE UKRAINE

The most important nationality problem for the pre-war Ukraine was the Polish problem, just as the Ukrainian problem was the most serious nationality problem of pre-war Poland. S.U. 162 UK [162]

However unfavourable the drawing of the Soviet-Polish frontiers of 1921 had been from the Ukrainian point of view, 782,334 Poles lived, according to the 1926 census, within the borders of the U.S.S.R., of whom 476,435 were in the Ukraine itself, 97,948 in Byelorussia, and 197,827 dispersed over the R.S.F.S.R. Polish statisticians, and apparently also some Polish communists in Russia, have never accepted this figure, and have asserted that the total number of Poles amounted to 1,500,000.[26]

During the inter-war period Soviet policy considered the 'Soviet Poles' primarily as a potential revolutionary vanguard. The official Soviet view was that however small the Polish minority in the Ukraine, it was its duty to develop a proletarian Polish culture within the U.S.S.R. which could influence the Poles on the other side of the border. This idea was rejected by some prominent Polish communists who thought that the S.U. 563

The proportion of farms managed by individuals decreased to less than 1 % of the entire agricultural area. The men employed at machinery and tractor centers, which seemed to attract all the mechanics required for the colkhose system, formed a privileged class. It depended on them whether an agricultural operation was carried through at the right time. This group was mainly composed of young people and non-Ukrainians. In 1934 some 797 600 were employed on the land and in forests in the Ukraine Soviet Republic. The Soviet officials, not so important numerically as on account of their influence, formed another group of the rural population. Finally, in the country districts there was a fairly large group of teaching and medical staffs and agricultural experts, mostly of Ukrainian peasant origin, as foreigners could not stand life in Ukrainian villages for long. 162 565

Urban population had a large percentage of foreigners, the main social groups being laborers in industry and commerce and the Soviet officials. The number of industrial laborers within the frontiers of the Ukraine Soviet Republic on January 1st, 1936 was 1 308 000. But this figure kept varying constantly, as many of the workers from country districts were not satisfied with conditions of life in the towns and changed jobs frequently or tried to get back home. The Soviet Government fought against these difficulties for years without being able to solve them. This group also included a great number of young people who grew up in post-war conditions. Their nationality varied; about half of the industrial proletariat in Ukraine was of Ukrainian origin. As a rule, material standards were not high. The average wage in 1934 amounted to 166.4 roubles a month, but this figure is not a clear indication of the individual's earning capacity as piece-work was general. In individual cases, where the Stakhanov system (whereby maximum output of labor was achieved) was introduced, higher than average wages were earned. In recent years real wages declined as a result of abolishing the cards which had entitled workmen to certain privileges in buying food and industrial products. Wage earners in Soviet business concerns were similarly situated to those in industrial plants but as the former were less important than the latter in the general scheme of Soviet economy, their develop- 162 369 465 434

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revolution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

423 1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political
661 and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding
● 565 chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the
474 redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution
[433] against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable: during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to
475 the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the
474 new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—
661 including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

474 As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really
423 serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the
656 Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32, and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

Ukraine Under the Soviets

186 The cities of Kiev, Kharkiv and Odesa had a large Russian
563 population. The administrative, commercial and financial institutions were largely in Russian hands and the directors and leaders of these, whatever their political disagreements, were united in opposing the efforts of the Ukrainians to secure even that minimum of rights that they were guaranteed by Russian imperial law. The Russian element in Ukraine, radical or conservative, acted as a
[316] unit during the fateful years 1917-1920. On the other hand, the miners and workers in the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih, the centre of the Ukrainian coal and iron industry, were in very large part likewise Russian and the ideology of St. Petersburg, especially in its radical aspects, was dominant throughout this part of the Ukrainian territory. Many of the most bitter opponents of Ukrainian rights were, in fact, Russian radical miners and workers from this area.

The Jewish population of Ukraine, a large minority, was little interested in the Ukrainian problem. Insofar as they were not actively sharing in the movement for special Jewish institutions, the majority, with certain conspicuous exceptions, were strong supporters of Russian unity, either conservative or radical or, like Leon Trotsky, they were at the service of any government which was opposed to the Ukrainian demands.

186 Thus in 1917 the strength of the Ukrainian movement was to
668 be found in the villages. Here Ukrainian life was lived, Ukrainian thoughts and ambitions were sponsored and it was here that the vision of an old and a future independent Ukraine found its chief support. Even so, that population was itself divided, not according to the class principle but on an ideological pattern which included members of all classes and walks of life.

186 When the revolution broke out in 1917 or, to be more precise,
● 565 when the tsarist regime collapsed, there were four main divisions in
668 Ukrainian society and they were made clear within a very few months.

The first of these were the nationalists and the advocates of the restoration of order in the country. At the very beginning of the

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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century Mykola Mikhnovsky had issued a call for an independent state and for a while he had exerted a strong influence upon such future Ukrainian leaders as Symon Petlyura, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Volodymyr Chekhovsky, but his ideas of placing national liberation in the forefront seemed too extreme for his adherents and by 1917 many of these had in a sense fallen away from his advanced position.

On the other hand, two and a half years of war had shown to many of the Ukrainian officers and men in the Russian army the need of a disciplined force to uphold the national cause. Some of the Ukrainian regiments had early joined the forces of the Revolution, had adopted the Ukrainian flag and introduced Ukrainian as the language of command. Now at the Military Congresses which were held in Kiev in 1917, they took a strong stand in their demands that the Ukrainian National Rada adopt a firm policy toward St. Petersburg and the Provisional Government and they were willing to go much further than the Rada in the setting up of independent governmental machinery.

Opposed to this group were the great mass of the peasants. They were little aware of the involved task of governing or even maintaining order. It would be hardly fair to say that they were anarchistic in temperament. They had rather maintained almost unconsciously their Ukrainian character. Few of them had been further from their villages than the nearest administrative centre and they could not see the necessity of substituting another regime on a broad scale for the fallen tsarist system. For decades they had attributed all their hardships and difficulties to the tsar, the bureaucrats and the police, and with all three vanished, they had no desire to replace them. It seemed to them that the land was intended by God for their use, and once the landlords were dispossessed, they were ready to forget the past and live in peace and quiet with their neighbors. Two and a half years of war had taught them the folly of organized destruction and they willingly accepted the position that a new world had come into being in which there was no need for complicated forms of government, for the collection of taxes and the enforced maintenance of order.

186 565 668 They believed that the Revolution had almost automatically given them all that they desired—the right to use their own language, to have that language placed on a par with Russian and the right to secure their own land and to live peacefully upon it.

186 565 668 665 Between these two groups stood the bulk of the Ukrainian intellectuals grouped in the Social Revolutionist and Social Democratic Parties, each of which was modelled on its Russian equivalent. Yet we must not delude ourselves into thinking that these were political parties in any sense known to the Western world and America, where there has been a long record of political activity. They were before the Revolution rather conspiratorial and debating groups, busied with theorizing about all manner of political questions and (except where they had an opportunity to take part in the work of the zemstvos) without practical experience. A few of their members had served in the First Duma in 1906 but this had been dissolved within a couple of months by Tsar Nicholas II and each succeeding duma had become less representative. Thus the number of those intellectuals who had had practical political experience even in the conduct of elections was very small, while the debators, students, theoreticians, etc. in these parties cared more for the proper solution of ideas than for their application to practical life.

Neither of these groups existed as distinct Ukrainian parties. They tended largely to follow the leadership of the similar Russian groups; they had learned to employ the same methods, listened to the same leaders, and their demands as Ukrainians were loosely connected with their social and political theories. They were conscious, but only potentially active, nationalists and at the moment when it was necessary to make rapid decisions, they hesitated and splintered on the importance which they assigned to national and to economic and social measures.

The Social Revolutionists, largely intellectuals from the villages, were at first the more important. They were populists and non-Marxian socialists who voiced the desires of the peasants for the ownership of their land. They called for the confiscation of the large estates, for they did not believe that any one should have

larger holdings than he and his family could work. Since the land in Ukraine was held individually and the village community was only a figment of Russian law, they differed sharply from the Russian Social Revolutionists who stressed the existence of the community with an emphasis on the almost annual redistribution of land. Finally, they set themselves up as a Ukrainian party but still grouped around the journal *Narodnya Volya* (The People's Will), the traditional name for a Social Revolutionist paper.

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By the autumn of 1917 this party had definitely split. The left, which stressed the economic and social aspects of the party, established another journal *Borotba* (The Struggle). This was soon followed by a formal schism and the creation of a new Social Revolutionist Party (Borotbisty) with the name taken from their paper. It was only natural that the relations between this group and the Bolshevik Great Russians tended to become closer as radical ideas gained strength in the country.

The numerically smaller Social Democratic Party was purely Marxian and it spoke primarily for the Ukrainian factory workers. Like the Russian Party, it was divided between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, with the latter drifting steadily toward the Social Revolutionists and even some of the bourgeois groups. On the other hand, the efforts of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks to establish their own party met with continual opposition. The Marxian theories of the withering away of the state had long been used by Lenin and some of the German Social Democratic leaders as weapons against the Poles in both the Russian Empire and Germany, and the same ban was now applied to the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. If they wished approval by the central authorities, they were told to become merely a Ukrainian section of the Russian Party. If they persevered in their efforts, they were read out of the party which in Ukraine was dominated by the Russian factory workers and the Russian miners from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih.

The position of the Ukrainian Social Democrats and especially the Bolsheviks was thus much more difficult than that of the less organized and more spontaneous Social Revolutionists. Strict party

186 discipline hampered them at every turn and ardent Ukrainians as
● 565 Mykola Skrypnyk, a personal and trusted friend of the Russian
668 Bolshevik leaders, refused to make any schism in the party, even
665 though he and his Ukrainian friends quite regularly appealed for recognition as a separate party, especially after the Bolsheviks recognized the existence of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

He, as an old Bolshevik, however, refused to cooperate with those Ukrainian Bolsheviks who dared to risk a fight with the central committee in Moscow and who finally tried to set up a Ukrainian Communist Party.

[648] The greatest weakness of both of these intellectual groups was their lack of appreciation of the importance of foreign policies. It was with great hesitation that their representatives in the Central Rada in the summer of 1917 approached the Russian Provisional Government to include a Ukrainian representative in all Russian diplomatic missions. They had had few or no representatives in the pre-revolutionary Russian diplomatic service; relatively few of them had been abroad, even to Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; they had no distinguished Ukrainian emigrants abroad who could speak to the world with the great authority of Ignace Jan Paderewski, Thomas G. Masaryk or Michael I. Pupin and during the crucial early months they largely neglected any consideration of foreign policy.

They wasted precious time in futile negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government over questions of federalism and they turned rather slowly toward the idea of independence. At each move of the more nationally conscious toward this goal, a certain portion of the more leftist members drew away toward the appropriate Russian camp in the name of internationalism and thus became the unconscious tools by which both the Provisional Government and later the Bolsheviks hoped to retain their control of the wealth of Ukraine.

It was this vagueness on the part of many of the intellectuals which kept them from being true intermediaries between the nationalist and military groups and the great mass of the peasants. It weakened the energy and zeal of some of the Ukrainian regi-

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ments which had declared for the Ukrainian cause immediately after the outbreak of the revolution and facilitated the development of pacifist opinion in the rank and file. So when, at the end of 1917, actual fighting started between the Russian Communists and the Ukrainian Central Rada, the armed forces of the new state were not as well prepared as they had been some months previously, and it was necessary to start again under almost new and more unfavorable conditions.

The pressure of events and the necessity for defense against the Red and the White invaders brought together the more consciously nationalist elements, first to declare the independence of Ukraine and then to organize, but the economic and social divergences were never solved. The dissolution of the Central Rada by the Germans and their support of a conservative government only embittered the political feuds and encouraged the rise of peasant leaders who were content to operate in their own areas and switched sides as questions of the moment moved them. All this weakened the sounder forces of the state and created the bewildering succession of such forms of government as the Rada, the Hetmanate of Skoropadsky and the Directory under Petlyura and gave the struggle at times a bizarre appearance as the different forces raised by the different political groups now combined against one or other of the invaders, only to separate when the other became the more pressing danger.

Under such conditions the central authority was finally overwhelmed and those people who were most strongly committed to a free and independent Ukrainian state withdrew from the country. The Soviet regime was able to take control. This did not, however, end the difficulties for there soon came a revelation that all was not yet well and harmonized. The peasants continued to be restless. The guerilla leaders did not at once cease their activity. Above all, the country was ruined but the relations between the Russians and the Ukrainians were not yet solved.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

731 There is the frequent idea that the famine was specifically
661 directed against the rich peasants and the kurkuls. This is utterly
[565] false, for these had been liquidated earlier. The blow of 1933 fell chiefly upon the poorer classes who had always supported the Soviet regime and who regarded their suffering in the beginning as a mistake which Moscow would do its best to correct. In the same way it was the Ukrainian workmen of the smaller cities who bore the brunt of the hardships. It was the direct triumph of the Russian Bolsheviks over the Ukrainian poor.

185 Another proof that the famine occurred in connection with
731 the plans of Moscow was the fact that Postyshev, besides his official post, held that of general inspector of the Ministry of Grain Production for resettlement. It turned out later that he was given the general task of preparing a plan for an immigration into Ukraine from various portions of the Soviet Union. The dislocation of the population was worked out in detail. Millions of Russians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, etc., were to be sent in to complete the work of rerussification. Especial pains were devoted to the regions close to Russia on the Left Bank of the Dnieper and there was talk at one time of annexing to the Russian Republic the Kharkiv-Donbas industrial region, but this did not fall in with the plans of Stalin.

The result of the famine was the final stabilization of the collec-
[423] tive system of agriculture and the breaking of the old mode of life throughout the whole of Ukraine. More than that, it established the fact that in the economic sphere Moscow could direct Ukrainian life as it would. It overawed the population for the moment but it did not reconcile them to their fate and it went hand in hand with the attempt to exterminate the old Ukrainian cultural life.

[Ukraine, 1933 -- Analysis]

186 based its authority on symbols of universality rather than national
668* exclusivism.[15]

186 The claims of the Russian Empire to acceptance, however,
665 were weakened by its failure to solve social questions. However
565 much cultural differences and historical memories may have contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, it is difficult to conceive how it could have arisen had it not to a large extent corresponded with a basic cleavage in the social structure of the Ukraine. There, to an unusual degree, nationality coincided with economic class. The Ukrainians were, with the exception of a small intelligentsia, almost entirely peasants; the landowners and officials were Poles or Russians, while the commercial bourgeoisie was largely Jewish. Under such circumstances, any nationalist movement was likely to become a class movement as well, a movement whose leaders would stress agrarian reform and liberation of the peasant from "exploiting" groups.

186 It was in this way, of course, that Ukrainian nationalism be-
668* came a rival of Communism. Basically, Communism[16] in the Russian Empire in the period before and during the Revolution of 1917, was a movement of townspeople. Both its ideology and its practical possibilities induced it to seek especially the support of the urban industrial workers, led and inspired by a group of dissident intellectuals. The latter were drawn from all the nations of the tsarist realm, but were predominantly Russian and Jewish. The workers were predominantly Russian, and those few Ukrainian laborers who had settled permanently in the cities prior to 1917 had for the most part become Russified in speech and consciousness. But the Communist leadership, with its sharp insight into the real social conditions of the country, realized that no purely urban movement could succeed in a country four-fifths peasant; hence, it sought, especially after the March Revolution

[15] An especially interesting treatment of this aspect of the Russian Empire is presented by Hans Rothfels in *Reich, Staat und Nation im deutsch-baltischen Denken: Vortrag bei der öffentlichen Sitzung der Gelehrten Gesellschaft zu Königsberg am 12 Januar 1930, Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, 7. Jahr. Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse, Heft 4* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1930).

[16] Actually the "Bolshevik" faction of the Social Democratic Party in Russia did not adopt the designation "Communist" until 1917. To avoid confusion, however, the latter term has been used throughout this study for the essentially continuous movement.

nationalist who lived through the period, describes the former as 186
persons who thought on a "planetary" level, desiring to solve 668*
all the world's problems at once and regarding the claims of national affinity as "parochial." One, his schoolmate, was Volodymyr Zatons'kyi, who was later to become one of the most implacable of Communist officials in the Ukraine. Even before the war, he, according to the writer, refused to have anything to do with Ukrainian cultural activities, like the Prosvita [enlightenment] [575]
society in the city of Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamianets-Podils'k), where they were students. Rather, he associated with "foreigners," Russians and Jews, and was rapidly drawn into the revolutionary socialist movement.[20] The basis for a choice in this generation of young intellectuals appears to have been chance, or the psychological make-up of the individual, which was reinforced increasingly by the cumulative impact of associations formed after the initial choice was taken. Thus by the time the revolutionary conflicts drew to a close, the educated classes in the Ukraine were
deeply split. Even more divided was the real foundation of any 565
independence movement, the peasants. They—or at least those 668*
who were somewhat more prosperous than the average—had 641
initially welcomed the Ukrainian governments. The increasing impotence of the new regimes and their preoccupation with factional strife and unrealistic programs instead of practical measures caused much indifference or disaffection among the peasants. In the judgment of one of the ablest students of the revolutionary period, however, the Ukrainian peasant preferred a nationalist government to either a Red or a "White" administration supporting a central regime.[21]

That the Communists were victors in the physical struggle is 642
no proof of greater popular support, for much of their strength

[20] Vyktor (Victor) Prykhodko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[21] William H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944). Moreover, one of the best Communist historians of the revolutionary period in the Ukraine, M. G. Rafes, a former adherent of the Jewish Bund, says the "natural" development of the peasants (and workers, especially in the sugar refineries in the small towns) was to "national socialism," "the Ukraine for the Ukrainian peasants," although he of course adds that they were inspired by the "reactionary bourgeois intelligentsia"; see *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine: Evoliutsiia i raskol "Bunda"* (Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine: The Evolution and Division of the "Bund") (Moscow, 1920), p. 8.

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employable men. From the point of view of political sentiment, 633
as will be shown, the composition of the administrative force [565]
made it even more significant, for over one fourth were of the upper levels of the intelligentsia—those having a higher education—while another 35 percent were probably of the Soviet "intelligentsia," since they possessed secondary educations.[11] The city administrations, with their appurtenances of schools and publications, thus served as refuges for the intellectual class in general, which was shorn of its customary economic role by the terrible dislocations of war. Consequently the orientation of the structure in which they found a place could play a vital role in determining the direction this group's sentiments would take.

At least two East Ukrainian mayors,[12] in addition to Bahazii, 186
lost their lives for too ardent devotion to the nationalist cause. 633
Even when they were not in conflict with the occupying power, the mayors knew that their positions singled them out for Communist vengeance, from either secret agents or the returning Red Army. That a considerable group of officials was found to remain true to the nationalist cause—even if a bit timidly at times—is an indication that a considerable reservoir of leadership for nationalism existed in the East Ukraine.

While the city administration as a whole was both a symbol 727
of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy and an instrument for ad- 633
vancing the nationalist cause, the individual departments were frequently of equal or greater significance. Their importance derived in large measure from the fact that administrative divisions entrusted with very important functions were frequently operated in considerable independence of the central municipal administration.

In practice the amount of authority exercised by any major official depended more on his own character and his relations with the German authorities than upon any formal apportionment of power. This was especially the case in the large cities, where in addition to the *Stadtkommissar* who stood above the native mayor, there were German officials in charge of each of

[11] *Ibid.*
[12] In Kamenets-Podolsk and Poltava.

planation is, of course, that a vast number of city dwellers were [177] Russified Ukrainians. Naturally enough, the nationalist leaders 369 felt that no secure basis for their program could exist as long as 186 the municipalities of the country were islands of foreign culture.

Within the urban group, nationalist efforts and nationalist 369 sentiment were largely concentrated in one social stratum. Na- 186 tionalist movements throughout the world have usually been the 565 work of the middle class. Since there had been no East Ukrainian capitalist middle class of any significance before 1920, and since there was no possibility that one could arise under Soviet conditions, except for a few traders carrying on a precarious business under the NEP, a commercial class continued to be lacking. The 475 counterpart to private commercial enterprise which existed under 565 the Soviet regime, the state trading system, was apparently largely operated by Jews and other non-Ukrainian elements.[2] Unfavorable appraisals of the activity of this system, plus distasteful memories of the "profit-and-run" techniques of the nepmen had produced an unattractive image of the private businessman in the minds of most East Ukrainians.[3] Although, under German occupation, a few gestures were made by some city administrations toward encouraging individual enterprise, the chief factors in production and distribution, insofar as the appalling economic conditions made such activities possible at all, were public and

nationalist movements endeavor to claim as large a proportion as possible of the inhabitants of a disputed area as members of their national group in origin and attitude. It must be remembered, however, that the OUN, and some other Ukrainian nationalist groups, were not democratic in ideology; hence the wishes of a majority at a particular time were of little importance in their eyes. Rather, this failure to possess the adherence of the inhabitants of an area which they regarded as theirs through the "rights" of history and blood served as an additional proof of the iniquities of the Soviet regime and of Russians in general and as a stimulus to more strenuous efforts to "correct" the situation.

[2] Some Ukrainians today (Interview 35) state that many wartime ascriptions of all the evils of the Soviet system to the Jews were highly exaggerated, in most cases a forced concession to Nazi racism, but insist that there was a good deal of anti-Semitism in the Ukraine because Jews predominated in retail distribution, and in the conditions of extreme shortage used their positions for selfish purposes. In view of the occupations of most Jews before the Revolution, their numerical predominance in the state distributive system is probably a fact, and it is fairly obvious that any recognizably alien group in such a position would be resented when they could not satisfy the consumers' wants, whether or not peculation played a role in their activities.

[3] Interview 65.

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[475] cooperative enterprises. Hence the development of a middle class
565 on the traditional Western model did not take place.

Actually, in the Ukraine, as in many other countries in which
517 nationalist movements have developed, it was other components
186 of the middle class which played the leading role. These were the intellectuals, the professionals, and the bureaucrats, together with the student body from which they were recruited. All four of these categories, together with a vast number of persons who would in Western usage be classified simply as clerks, technicians, or even custodial personnel, are lumped together in Soviet classifications as "intelligentsia"—i.e., all whose work does not involve a large measure of manual labor.[4] The leaders of the nationalist movements came from a narrower stratum however. The majority of this leadership consisted of intellectuals par excellence; that is, it was drawn from the academic or literary profession.

This crucial statement requires some proof, which is difficult to present in the absence of statistics or the possibility of sampling, both of which are unavailable for obvious reasons. However, the preponderance of intellectuals is indicated indirectly by figures previously cited on the extremely high proportion of persons with higher or secondary education employed in the Kiev city and *raion* administrations in 1942,[5] and by the statements from well-informed participants that these and other administrations, as well as editorial staffs, served as refuges for intellectuals displaced from their normal occupations.[6] Furthermore, the efforts of nationalist groups, whether OUN or local, were directed very largely toward assisting and encouraging the teachers and writers, a factor which suggests that they were closely tied to these segments of the population. For example, Mel'nyk organizers in Kiev in the winter of 1941–42 made special efforts to secure work in the cooperatives for teachers in order to enable them to avoid forced labor for the rebuilding of bridges.[7] Similarly, the strong

[4] For a discussion of the concept in Soviet usage, see Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 324 ff.

[5] See Chapter IX.

[6] See Chapter V.

[7] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukrains'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 16. According to one account, the Red Cross in Kiev also aided the intelligentsia (along with prisoners of war) to a special degree (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 4, 1942, p. 2).

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activist movement like the OUN to youth, or by the latter's desire in other cases to rearrange life to suit themselves. There is a faint suggestion that the Soviet regime may already have become the "old order" against which revolutionary youth is wont to rebel. On the other hand, these very qualities which made the nationalist *political* movement attractive to the younger generation had the effect of keeping it antagonistic to religion. As has already been pointed out, there is almost universal agreement that youth in the East Ukraine was cool, even hostile, to the churches.[29] In the south, the Protestants and dissident Orthodox groups seem to have been somewhat more successful, but they had no direct relation to the nationalist movement.[30]

The OUN-B, it will be recalled, placed special emphasis on securing the allegiance of youth, since its young agitators were unable to attract the support of the intelligentsia.[31] There is a small amount of evidence to indicate that the nationalist movements attracted a broader occupational group from the youth than from among its elders. So little is known concerning the role of the laboring classes, however, that no conclusions can be offered. Historically, the working class in the East Ukraine had been predominantly Russian or Russified. The working class was also generally more loyal to the Soviet system than most of the other social groups. Even if the Ukrainian claim that a large influx of dispossessed peasants and their children during the thirties had resulted in a Ukrainization of the urban laboring class be accepted, there is no evidence that such persons became interested in politics or had any important part in nationalist activity. Probably those who were mature when they left the village continued to be peasants in outlook, while a few rose into the intelligentsia, acquiring its coloration.

As frequently observed in this study, the disproportion of material available is no sure indication of a corresponding difference in the importance of factors involved. Since in many instances only fragmentary evidence is at hand, what is presented may be

[29] Cf. articles in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 12, 1941, p. 3; October 3, 1942, p. 2.

[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 3, 1942, p. 2; PS 1693.

[31] See the clandestine leaflet from the Odessa area previously referred to for sharp OUN-B criticism of the intelligentsia as tools of the Germans.

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000 drawn too heavily from particular sources or may too greatly concern special aspects. In the case of urban-rural differences in nationalist activity, it is certain that such a bias exists in the character and extent of the evidence. For one thing, any single activity in a city of some size, such as the development of a Prosvita society, or the control of an administration, is sufficiently important to merit a place in contemporary reports, while a similar rural activity, conducted on a much smaller scale but equally important in its limited area, would probably pass unrecorded. Since the main channels of communication—newspapers and personal contacts of West Ukrainian and émigrés with local figures—were predominantly urban, they would naturally leave behind many more reports on city developments. Perhaps most important is the fact that the higher degree of articulateness of urban dwellers, in the Ukraine as elsewhere, tends to give them a disproportionate share in the written expression which later becomes the historical record.

565 186 369 In the cities, there was no positive goal to compete with the nationalist movements for the hopes and enthusiasms of the populace. The terrible deprivations, the German executions, the *Ostarbeiter* program, the fear of Communist agents, were factors which had a far greater significance for the average urban person than did the efforts of the nationalist movements; but a general effect was to promote passivity and resignation. On the land, however, a positive goal was before all eyes, which for a large segment of the peasantry far outweighed any prospect of national independence, however desirable that might be in itself.[32] This transcendent goal was the destruction of the collectivized system of agriculture and its replacement by a system in which individual initiative and the demands of the peasants would play a greater part. The nature of the agrarian question and the Germans' fumbling efforts to use the peasants' desire to gain support, while retaining the old restrictive kolkhoz system to make exploitation of the peasant easier, has already been described in general terms; it would exceed the scope of this study to treat the subject itself

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[32] This is implied even by nationalist writers; for example, Iurii Tarkovych notes that the first question of peasants in the area between Kiev and Chernigov was, "When will the land be divided?" (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3).

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in greater detail. It is absolutely essential to stress the key nature of this problem, however, for it is almost beyond doubt that any movement which had offered a fully satisfactory solution to the agrarian problem would have won the adherence of the mass of the peasantry, regardless of its stand on the national question.

Superficially, the situation in the countryside was satisfactory from the nationalist standpoint. It is true that certain peasant traits of a distinctively national character had been subjected to erosion by the developments of the Soviet period. The handicrafts, including making of the national costume, had almost vanished under the joint impact of material shortages and growing availability of factory products.[33] The physical appearance of the villages had been altered too and much of their distinctiveness lost through the Soviet destruction of the cemeteries.[34]

In the more basic matter of language, the changes had not been so great, although in some areas at least many "town words" in the "all-Soviet" (i.e., Russian) tongue had been introduced.[35] From the point of view of developing replenishments for the intellectual elite from peasant stock, the situation was worse, however, for the Ukrainian tongue was frequently scorned as the speech of "Ivany i Maryny z kolhospu"—"Johns and Marys off the farm."[36] Even more significant, the mere fact that the peasants spoke Ukrainian, and even had a certain affection for the language as their mother tongue, did not necessarily prove that they possessed any consciousness of nationality. A Ukrainian visitor to one of the villages in the Taganrog district of the lower Don, just beyond the border of the Ukrainian SSR, reported that all the inhabitants spoke pure Ukrainian and retained Ukrainian customs. When addressed as Ukrainians, however, they denied the appellation, insisting that the "Ukrainians" lived over to the west, across the border. The nationalist reporter pointed out the identity of speech and manners with the population to the west, but they replied, "Yes, they are our brothers," yet persisted in denying that they were themselves Ukrainian.[37]

[33] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 26, 1942, p. 3.
[34] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 15, 1942, p. 4.
[35] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1942, p. 3.
[36] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3.
[37] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 22, 1942, p. 2.

186 The means at hand to stimulate a sense of nationality among
565 the peasants were rather meager. Most important, undoubtedly,
795 was the church. Within a few months after the Communists were driven out, many hundreds of parishes had been reestablished.[38] Undoubtedly the older people who had received some religious training welcomed the reappearance of the clergy. Baptisms and marriages took place in large numbers, and the churches were well attended. Since the Germans forbade the use of public funds for payment of the salaries of the clergy, the latter had to depend on the generosity of their flocks or the produce of their own land. Apparently the parishioners responded by furnishing their pastors with sufficient income in kind.[39] In most areas, there developed a conflict between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous clergy. At first, the latter (or, in the "Left Bank" region, simply the clergy consecrated in the orthodox fashion who used the Slavonic liturgy) predominated in the villages, but as more Autocephalous priests were consecrated, and more of the older priests came to accept the Ukrainian language service, they evidently won the support of the peasantry. Strange as it may seem in view of reputed village conservatism, the living language was apparently more popular as a religious vehicle in the country than in the town,[40] and cases are recorded in which the peasants actually drove out the priest who persisted in the use of Slavonic.[41]

793 Religion as a stimulus to nationalist feeling was, however, sub-
186 ject to severe limitations. One was the inadequate background of the clergy. Many were simple peasants up to the time of their consecration, although an effort was made to train them in short courses. Where such a man was of sound character and good common sense, as was the case in one Podolian village, he could accomplish a good deal. There, according to the report, the priest, one of the local peasants until his recent consecration, was highly respected for his good example. His sermons stressed brotherly love, the importance of industriousness, mutual assistance, proper

[38] See Chapter XI.

[39] PS 1693.

[40] Report from a *gimnaziia* teacher in Poltava (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3); *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

[41] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

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education of children, and self-control.[42] Generally, however, the clergy was unable to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in several villages the latter even objected to returning the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs.[43]

One of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. How effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of more detailed evidence, but in some cases it evidently did at least provide reading material and some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. There is considerable difference of opinion as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were imbued with Communist ideas.[44]

The great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmitters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for example, the physician, who had been a UNR officer, played the chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. He was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village *feldsher* (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. These constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, who were described as having "no unified outlook," being still "under the influence of Bolshevik ideology." [45] This criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not uncommon in nationalist

[42] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.
[43] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3.
[44] Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 18, 1941, for favorable reports; and Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28–29, for some criticisms of the rural teachers.
[45] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

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186 writers.[46] To a certain extent it may be due to resentment against
565 the clerical workers' unresponsiveness to nationalist propaganda,
369 or even to simple snobbery toward those aspiring to the title of
517 "intelligentsia" without a formal education. In part it appears, however, to correspond to a real lack of breadth of mind among this lowest group of the Soviet intelligentsia, a deficiency which would have made it difficult to use them for any political or social movement not tied immediately to their customary frame of thinking.

On the other hand, there were often elements in the villages which were available for some sort of political activity. The memory of Petliura was still present; some refused to believe that he was dead, thinking the story to be Communist propaganda.[47] In another area, both the president of the village soviet and the head of one of the collective farms remained behind and organized life in cooperation with nationalist elements.[48] Yet, in another case, a man of some education in one of the villages, who was related to an émigré minister of the UNR, after expressing fervently nationalist sentiments, recoiled with horror at the idea that his auditor might recommend him to the Germans for an official post, fearing the vengeance of Communist agents.[49] The presence of the latter was, indeed, a great handicap to nationalist organization in the rural areas, where the protection of the police force was not so great (especially in partisan-infested areas) as in the towns, and where the naturally cautious peasant hesitated to commit himself until assured the Soviet administration would never return.[50]

186 Since the organized nationalist forces were so few in members,
369 they could not undertake any direct or continuous indoctrination
208 of the rural population, unless they abandoned their efforts to win the cities. They had to rely primarily on the Prosvita branches, the country schools, and the village administrations. Printed material was also used whenever it could be controlled

[46] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 23, 1941, p. 2, reprinting an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti*.
[47] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.
[48] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[49] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.
[50] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

517 the Russian Ukraine had resource to Galician publications and, from time to time, they published their own works in that country. It is as a result of this that the Chevtchenko Society was founded at Lvov, which has since held the predominant place in the Ukrainian movement.

Following the example of Chevtchenko, another influence joined the popular so to say 'folk-lore' tendency of the literary Ukrainian movement: it was the social question, identical with that which dominated the literary spirit of the whole of Russia.

565 668 The second half of the eighteenth century, which had seen the union of Western Ukraine with Russia and the colonization of the shores of the Black Sea, was at the same time the epoch of the greatest development of the privileges of the aristocracy. We shall not be able to go into the details of this evolution, which would go far beyond the purpose of this book. Let us only note that after the death of Peter the Great in 1725 the new nobility, of military origin, became the greatest political force in the State. This nobility definitely emancipated itself from its old bondage to the State and at the same time transformed the dependence of the peasants, which had hitherto not been unconditional, into a real servitude. Thus Catherine II established in Russia, as also in the Ukraine, a new political and social order which was founded on the privileged position of the aristocracy which had carried her to power, and on the servitude of the peasants. She conferred similar rights on the Ukrainian nobility as those of the aristocracy of the whole empire and, moreover, liberally distributed the new lands to the landlords. Since that time the question of the servitude of the peasants, a distant but direct prelude of the Revolution, became an open wound of the Tsarist regime.

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728
Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669
of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrai- 665
nian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185
Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed 423
simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agricul-
ture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discon- [563]
tent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727
exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The represen- 565
tatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

727 state. On the contrary, they wished to suppress the Ukrainian move-
565 ment and to make Ukraine a centre for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia', of course, headed by a Tsar. About these plans Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs after World War I. He hoped that a restored Russian Empire would be a reliable ally of Germany out of gratitide for the abolition of the Bolshevik régime.

642 On April 28, 1918, a detachment of German troops entered the
727 hall where the sessions of the Ukrainian Central Council took place
565 in order to arrest some Ukrainian Ministers. On the next day, on April 29, under the protection of the German troops, a congress of big landowners was called. At this congress General Paul Skoropadsky was declared Hetman of Ukraine, with the prior consent of the German authorities.

Skoropadsky belonged to the class of the big landowners, and, though he was of Ukrainian descent, had had no connections with the Ukrainian national movement before the revolution of 1917.

In his first order Skoropadsky wrote: "I declare myself Hetman of the whole Ukraine". He announced the abolition of the Ukrainian Central Council and replaced the name 'Ukrainian Democratic Republic' by 'Ukrainian State'. Skoropadsky repealed all laws and orders of the Ukrainian Central Council and the Russian Provisional Government; thus Ukraine had in this respect returned to the conditions before the Revolution.

The reactionary ways of the Skoropadsky Government that favoured the big landowners had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people; the masses of peasants and workers, that recently had fought with arms the terror of the Russian Communists under the banner of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic, were placed by the policy of the Skoropadsky Government into
[cc1] a desperate situation. The big landowners who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities organised 'punitive expeditions' against the Ukrainian peasantry with their armed gangs having support from German and Austrian army detachments. Heavy contributions, looting, and destruction of the peasants' property, together with mass executions of Ukrainian peasants and workers, caused immense indignation against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austrian occupation forces among the Ukrainian people. Against the reactionary régime which dominated in Ukraine, Communist propaganda met with approbation among the Ukrainian masses, unexpected even by Moscow.

727 The Chief of Staff of the German armies in Ukraine, General
642 Groener, in order to appease Ukrainian public opinion had declared after the putsch of April 29, 1918, that "the Hetman was given in-

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy industries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, 83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia. 185 [433] [465]

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peasants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property was taken into the collective farms (*Communist,* Kharkov, December 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater. 474 241 661 565

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administration, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc. 871 [241]

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

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or Poland, because before 1905 opposition to the Russian Government was less marked. Besides, many Russian Liberals, even of official position, treated the Ukrainian movement as an interesting variation of Russian life. 177

(D) Social

The class divisions into titled aristocracy, nobles, townsmen, merchants, and peasants, existed as in other parts of the Russian Empire, but, roughly speaking, a different ethnic element corresponded to each social division. The titled aristocracy was mainly Polish in the western parts (with the name Polish Ukrainians) and Russian in the eastern. With but few exceptions, the same could be said of the class of landed nobles, in which the Great Russians formed the majority; Poles, Germans and others were the minority. The Ukrainian landed noble was almost unknown; and the townsmen of the large towns were also in a great majority non-Ukrainian, being chiefly Great Russians and Jews (in Berdichev the Jews form 78·4 per cent. of the population; in Yekaterinoslav, 40 per cent.), and, in the western Ukraine, Russian, Polish, German, Greek, &c. The Jews were mainly traders and shopkeepers, while the Great Russians and the foreigners were manufacturers. 565 563 184

But few of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia* took part in the industrial life of the country, about one-third of them belonging to the professional classes, i. e. doctors, Government officials, lawyers, and teachers. The Ukrainian professional classes originated from the ex-Cossacks and the townsmen rather than from the peasants, since there is a great distinction between the peasants and other members of the community. The Ukrainian nobles, it must be remembered, have in most cases become russified, and partly also polonized. The distinction between the peasant and other classes is not based on economic grounds, for some peasants in the Ukraine are very rich. It lies chiefly in their cultural condition, in their education, or rather lack 565 [463]

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565 of education, and in their occupations. The bulk
[162] (86·4 per cent.) of the Ukrainians are peasants and agriculturists. The percentage of people living in the country is in the Government of Kharkov, 85; in Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 88; Chernigov, 91; Taurida, 80; Kherson, 70. The percentage of peasants is almost the same, e. g. Kharkov, 90; Poltava, 89; Yekaterinoslav, 87; Chernigov, 86; Taurida, 73;
[163] Kherson, 61. The average increase in population is higher than in any other province in European Russia; consequently, though many peasants have become, during the last twenty-five years, workmen in the newly started industries, the general number of agricultural peasants remains unchanged.

421 *Land Tenure*[1].—While Great Russia is at present
428 a country of communal land-ownership (*mir*), in the
177 Ukraine or Little Russia individual or, strictly speaking, family ownership and communal ownership exist
[556] together (cf. p. 78). The *mir* in Great Russia appears to have been introduced in the sixteenth century, when the Moscow Government established serfdom and imposed heavy taxation, for it was easier to make the whole village responsible for the taxes than the separate families. However, in the north or, properly speaking, Novgorod Russ. the land, as a general rule, belonged to one large family or clan, composed of from two to six houses (the owners of which bore the same name), and called *pyechishche* (large stove). The ownership was hereditary, and hence the land became more and more subdivided, so that families owned more or less according to the number of children. There was no readjustment of the land as in the case of the *mir*. The *pyechishche* of Novgorod was known in Kiev-Russ as *ognishche* (meaning a large fire); and the term *ognishchanin* (meaning a member of the *ognishche*) is found in the Kiev law (*Russkaya*
428 *Pravda*). Connected with that form of tenure is a custom, which even now is found sometimes in the Ukraine, of minorate, according to which the younger

[1] See also p. 77.

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son inherits his father's house, since the elder son has 428
started a new house and received his share during his father's life. If a member of the *ognishche* had not enough land, he migrated.

This old custom of family ownership was the basis 421
of the Cossack communities, which differed from the 177
mir in that, as the Cossacks gave little attention to 525
cultivation and paid no taxes, the re-allotment of their lands was not necessary, though in theory every Cossack had the same right to the land. However, towards the end of the seventeenth century, the 'elders' of the Cossacks began to appropriate more land than the commoners. After Russia had subdued the Ukraine, the commoners were turned into peasants (in 1763 and 1783), and the 'elders' were given titles of nobility in 1785. After the final introduction of serfdom into the Ukraine, the taxes were equally imposed, and therefore communal ownership on the Moscow lines was introduced, though it never had such success as in Great Russia. Remnants of *ognishches* still exist in the Governments of Chernigov and Poltava, whither it was brought by the Ukrainian colonists, though individual ownership is now predominant. In some cases, though each house owns some land privately, there are other lands, meadows, and fishing rights which belong to all the village community, and are re-allotted from time to time.

In the Ukraine, as it was immediately before the 421
war, all the land was divided into individual and communal property. The individual property consisted of (1) State lands, (2) Imperial family appanages, (3) Church and monastery lands, (4) town lands, (5) nobles' lands, and (6) lands belonging to others than nobles. The communal property was held by the peasant and village communities. Individual ownership prevails in the Governments of Yekaterinoslav (50·4 per cent. in 1905), Kherson (51·5 per cent.), Taurida (52·6 per cent.). Then come the Governments of the south-west, Volhynia (48·9 per cent.), Kiev (45·2 per cent.), Podolia (44·4 per cent.). The eastern

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of Volhynia and Podolia conditions are better, and the peasants have larger holdings, though only 16 per cent. own above five *desyatines*; in Kharkov, 33 per cent. own above five *desyatines*. In no place do the Ukrainian peasants equal in land-ownership the German and Czech colonists. The average holding among the German colonists is from 10 to 12 *desyatines*, and they specialize in cattle-breeding. The Czechs are concentrated in south-western Volhynia (in the districts of Dubno, Rovno, and Lutsk); and their average holding is 13 *desyatines*. The peasants' holdings are in a striking contrast to the big estates. In the Kiev Government there are some 43 estates of above 5,000 *desyatines* each, mostly owned by the nobles (some of them descendants of the old independent dukes, *knaz*) of Russian, Polish, or German nationality. 421

About 10 per cent. of the inhabitants of the Governments of Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, Taurida, Kiev, and Chernigov are occupied in industries other than agricultural. Trade occupies between 6 and 7 per cent. of the population in the Governments of Kherson, Kiev, Podolia, and Taurida. 162

General Observations

Ukrainian Nationalism.—The feeling of nationality, as it exists to-day, dates from Chmielnicki's rising in 1648. The old history of Kiev-Russ is common to Great Russians, White Russians, and the Ukrainians (Little Russians), and has been continued after the Tatar invasions chiefly in Great Russia, while the Ukraine ever since has been subject to one of her neighbours. Since Chmielnicki's time, the Ukrainian nationality has made progress only in one direction, i.e. in producing a small but energetic *intelligentsia*, which does not consider itself Russian or Polish in addition to being Ukrainian, though it is obliged to seek its higher education in Russia, Poland, and other foreign countries. The national feeling of this class is 186 565

186 different from that of the bulk of the peasants, whose
565 local differences in dialects and customs are sufficiently great to obscure the idea of national unity understood by the *intelligentsia*. Not only has the Dnieper peasant no conception of a Ruthenian in Eastern Galicia, but he knows very little more about the Don or Kuban Ukrainian. But all these peasants, now as in the time of Chmielnicki, are conscious of their social and economic disabilities, and also of the fact that all the business and management of the country is in the hands of rich and educated foreigners.

Hence, the so-called feeling of nationality of the Ukrainian peasant is based on social unrest; and nationalist enthusiasm was aroused on that ground by the Rada and the Soviets of 1917, as it had been by Chmielnicki 250 years before. As soon as Chmielnicki's rising became political rather than social in aim, it failed, and even its foreign supporters did not save it. The same can be said about the nationalist movement of the Rada Directory of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia*. It went down before the Soviets because it was too political, while the Soviets are more intent upon social conditions.

The military strength of the Ukrainian nationalists is less now than it was in the time of Chmielnicki, since the strong military class of original Cossacks on which Chmielnicki relied either disappeared through successful Russian repressions or else amalgamated with the present Cossack community of the Don and the Kuban, which is only partly Ukrainian and has different political and social predilections. On the other hand, the rivalry between Russia, Austria, and the Poles, and the respective propaganda of the three rivals, have created among the *intelligentsia* of the Ukraine a feeling of self-confidence and a political programme that surpass Chmielnicki's and Mazeppa's dreams. In the struggle between Nationalist and Socialist interests, the bulk of the population has in the last three years given precedence to the latter; and it is still uncertain whether the peasants will care to support the

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ideals of the *intelligentsia*, if the latter cannot provide them with the economic advantages to which they aspire. 186 565

The *Ukrainian territory* claimed by the propagandist literature, i. e. from San to Don, never formed a political unit, either independently or under the sway of any empire. It is a well-defined geographical unit with most favourable economic conditions, but the people living in these lands do not form a homogeneous nation of one linguistic, social, and cultural type. The essentially Ukrainian country lies on both sides of the Dnieper. In the Don and Kuban regions, the Ukrainian colonists were preceded by the Great-Russian colonists, in Eastern Galicia by the Poles. But it is true that during the time of the greatest Russian oppression Eastern Galicia played the part of Piedmont for the *intelligentsia* from the Russian Ukraine. The nine [162] Governments grouped by the Russian Administration into (1) South-west Territory (Podolia, Volhynia, and Kiev), (2) Malorossiya (Chernigov, Poltava, and Kharkov), and (3) Novorossiya (only Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav out of the five Governments of Novorossiya), have a population which is preponderantly Ukrainian in the rural districts; in the towns the Ukrainians are outnumbered by Jews, Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans, Italians, &c.

It is remarkable how small a part is played by the *intelligentsia* in industry and trade, in the Church, and in legal and educational institutions. All Ukrainians are agriculturists, but in most cases they are merely labourers, not concerned with the management of agricultural industries. Since 1905, however, the co-operative societies have brought to the Ukrainian peasant the social education which the *mir* gave to the Great-Russian peasant in the two last centuries. The claim, therefore, that these nine Governments are Ukrainian means that people speaking various Ukrainian dialects and having similar customs inhabit them, though, so far, they have not managed it politically, socially, or culturally, and are hardly likely to do 184 565

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565 so efficiently without the help of educated foreigners
184 for some generations to come.

000 *The Ukraine and Great Russia.*—The future of the Ukraine affects Great Russia in the first instance. If the Ukraine is permanently severed from Great Russia, the latter will have to limit itself to the 'Moscow-Siberian' Empire, for it is hardly likely that any other native states formed within the limits of the former Russian Empire (Azerbaijan, Esthonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, the North Caucasian Republic, White Russia) would then belong to her. There seems to be a similarity between these states and the Ukraine, in that they all refuse to recognize Russian suzerainty, though they may possibly join Russia as states with equal rights. The Ukraine is the largest and richest of these states, so that she might play a determining part in their negotiation with Great Russia if she produces the necessary statesman. On the other hand, small as these other states are, they are more homogeneous ethnically and more advanced culturally than the Ukraine, and are able, with the exception of White Russia, to carry on political and economic affairs by themselves.

The Ukraine and Poland.—Poland and the Ukraine are neighbours who supplement each other in the economic sphere; and Poland has many men of education and enterprise. But good relations depend largely on the issue of the political conflict within the Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists claim Galicia as far as the River San, while the Poles, especially the Galician Poles, claim it all for Poland. The ethnic boundary is roughly along the River Bug. In the Eastern Galician problem lies the most serious danger of quarrel.

563 The next interest of Poland is in her minorities in Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev. They consist of noble landowners or professionals in the towns, some of them men whose families have lived there for the last four or five centuries. The reverse is the case of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. The Polish minorities in the Russian Ukraine are much smaller, but in

464 districts through the long winter has led to the crea-
[166] tion of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the
[563] country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel,
[511] Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful,
221 but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any
511 branch of industry. The State makes no effort to
565 regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

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this class are often compelled to accept badly-paid 466
work in the towns, and both men and women have 511
often to make long and laborious journeys on foot in 565
search of employment.

A large class engaged in domestic industries, whether as masters or as servants, make a very poor living, frequently working very long hours under bad sanitary conditions.

In the coal and iron industries there are some concerns, 466
particularly those capitalized from abroad, which look well after their work-people, provide housing, secure good supplies of provisions at moderate prices, and take other measures to ameliorate labour conditions. In consequence, however, of works and mines being often situated on land rented on short-term leases, many employers cannot afford to lay out money on such objects, and conditions for labour are generally bad. So difficult is it to attract labour, that mine-owners have sometimes sought to secure convict labour from the Government.

The peculiar characteristic of labour in the Ukraine 166
is its mobility, which often occasions unexpected 464
crises. Superstition, epidemics of disease, and more obscure causes lead to vast movements of labourers from a district at very short notice.

The *artels*, which are labour organizations peculiar to 467
Russia, have an important influence on the supply and quality of certain labour. An *artel* is an association of workers, the general principles of which are: (1) all members must be actual workers; (2) all have equal rights in the organization; and (3) every member is responsible for the obligations contracted by the *artel*. The organization is usually non-capitalistic or has a very small capital.

In general there are two classes of *artels*, those of workers in producing trades and those of workers who provide service. The former are engaged in carpentering, cabinet-making, printing, linen-weaving, dairy-work, fishing, &c. The second group comprises stevedores, packers, customs agents, bank porters, com-

alleviate these conditions various measures have been 425
adopted, such as the easement or complete extinguish- 511
ing of the burden of the purchase-price of the *nadyel*, the prevention of its frequent redistribution, and the founding of the Peasants' Land Bank by the State to facilitate further purchases of land by the communes. Nevertheless, a result not looked for by the framers 565
of the law abolishing serfdom has followed, namely the creation of a large landless agricultural proletariat, which tends to sink in the social scale, to live partly by industry in the towns, and to be migratory in its habits.

The law of 1906 introduced for the first time the 421
general principle of individual and permanent ownership of *nadyel* lands. It aimed at the breaking up of the *mirs* as no longer fulfilling a need, in the expectation that security of tenure by the individual would lead to a more rational and successful system of cultivation. The period since the promulgation of the law is too short to allow of sound conclusions as to its effect.

The *nadyel* lands are almost entirely cultivated 241
on the three-field system, each unit of land being 311
planted one year with a winter-sown grain, the following year with a spring-sown grain, and lying fallow in the third year. This method causes a disastrous impoverishment of the land, especially as in many cases the minimum of manure, whether animal or chemical, is used. An alternative method must be introduced, or the productiveness of the black-soil land under peasant ownership will continue to shrink as heretofore.

The land held by private owners is in general their 425
perpetual freehold, and can be roughly divided into that 563
held by the nobility in large estates and the smaller holdings purchased from them since the abolition of serfdom by prosperous peasants and others desirous of embarking on agriculture on their own account. There are also a number of foreign colonists, chiefly Germans, descendants of those introduced into the country

476 was made in the cooperative society's own factories. The society owned cement factories, lime plants, mills, cloth-weaving factories, bakeries, oil presses and even a factory that made boot polish and cosmetics.

439 Whither did Ukrainian goods go? Peas, beans and poultry to England and Belgium, clover seed to Holland, /94/ pigs to Germany, beef cattle via Constanta to Greece, poultry to Germany, Switzerland and to - Palestine, eggs to many countries and in cans, as far as Buenos Aires.

[545] Sociologically noteworthy is the growth of an urban stratum of artisans, merchants and small industrialists. The Ukrainians who, much to their 369 own disadvantage, neglected the cities because of 476 their love for quiet village life, now gradually pushed into the cities, and the credit cooperatives supported them in this.

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741 Of greatest significance for the advancement of Ukrainian culture were the societies for edu- 517 cation and public health. The society for popular 217 education, "Prosvita", was even older than the Ukrainian system of cooperatives, reaching back to 1883. It was a veritable national sanctuary of the Ukrainians. The people are indebted to it for a large part of their cultural advance. The "Prosvita" was an actual school for advanced studies in the country. In 3214 village libraries with 700,000 volumes, two instructive monthly magazines and with inexpensive editions of books, it enabled the village inhabitants who were cut off from all urban culture to obtain the knowledge which alone made it possible for them to assert themselves against their enemies. Besides that, 741 "Prosvita", which on January 1, 1938 numbered 517 360,000 members, and owned 1457 club houses with rooms for meetings, promoted group singing, music, the community theater and folk art. It helped

000 All the Ukrainian intelligentsia of Lwów and its environs, men and women, were represented, the consulates of Great Britain and France and many foreigners who love Ukrainian music - all but the Poles.

Intelligentsia - that is, students of the 577 classical schools and universities, teachers, professors, lawyers, the heads of the cooperatives, editors, writers, painters, politicians, architects, graduate agriculturists, engineers, physicians, clergymen. They were all there.* One saw remarkably many clergymen, fine men who have both feet planted firmly on Ukrainian soil. Many of them were Austrian officers in their younger days who also fought for West Ukrainian freedom. They told friends that they were prepared at any time /99/ "to exchange the cassock for a coat of mail". This is no empty talk, for most of them had already paid for their national sentiments in Polish prisons. Their metropolitan, Count Andrei Sheptyckij, is cut from the same pattern. He incurred the hatred of the Poles when he blessed the autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine and half a year later its dead. Before he was drawn to the church, he, the cavalry captain of his Majesty, hunted bears, lynxes and wild boars. The trophies from that gay time are now hanging in the anteroom of the archbishop. Today he is an old man who has been in ill health for a long time. Years ago the tall, vigorous man was often compared to Michelangelo's Moses.

Count Andrei Sheptycki was a member of the Polonized Ukrainian high nobility. Like many Polish aristocrats with Ukrainian coats of arms, his brothers belonged to the Polish szlachta; he alone found his way home to the Ukrainian people. Neither the Poles nor the Ukrainians have a dearth of nobility. In Volhynia "the 16th and 17th centuries fairly seethed with princely houses". Whenever the Polish kings needed warriors for their 556 565 expeditions, they raised the wealthy peasants to

* [At a Ukrainian concert in Lwów, incidental to the information - Analyst]

the peerage and gave them rights and privileges 556
for which the newly-created peers were obliged to 565
pay with military service. In this way the lower
szlachta increased to many hundreds of thousands
of knights and barons who were often not much
richer than the ordinary peasants. In the purely
Polish regions and in West Ukraine there are still
whole villages in which every peasant belongs to
the nobility. Whoever was able to present his
patent of nobility in Galicia after the partition-
ing of Poland was recognized as a peer by the
Viennese court. In this way arose the Ritter
/knights/ von Vitvicky, von Mogylnicki, von
Kultshycki and whatever the rest are called.

Whereas the high nobility, with the except- 565
ion of people like the former Princes Ostrozhsky, 517
does not play any part in promoting culture in
modern times in the Ukraine, the lesser nobility 793
were for a long time practically the only bearers
of Ukrainian culture. They made up the clergy
almost exclusively. /100/ The pastors with their
numerous children were often the only and the in-
exhaustible source of Ukrainian intelligentsia.
Otherwise there were no intellectual professions
open to the Ukrainians. Only the Catholics, that
is to say, the Poles could become officials.

The Poles held to the old traditions of the
lower nobility in their "Union of village szlachta". 565
According to the latest Polish conception, the
lower Ukrainian nobility are Ukrainized Poles.
By promising them additional land and other
material advantages, Warsaw wanted to catch the
400,000 "aristocratic souls". If this had suc-
ceeded, the Poles would have come a good deal
closer to a majority in Galicia.

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"In this cottage, in this grove 539
A hell I saw! Nothing but slavery 538
And bitter servitude, that never justice knows

131 Eurasia and the ores in the Ural is more than 2000 km; the
487 coal of the Donets Basin, on the other hand, is about 350—450 km from the iron ore of Kryvyj Rih, while the iron and manganese ores of Kerch are nearer still. The seas in the north of Russia are frozen for 20—26 weeks, while the Black Sea has ice for but 3—4 weeks in the year. Most of its harbors can be kept open all winter by means of ice-breakers. The
[161] density of the population in Ukraine is 59 to the square kilometer which cannot be compared with the figures for Siberia (1 per sq. km) or with the average for USSR (8). Conditions in Ukraine, therefore, are much more akin to those in Europe than are those in the continental heart of Eurasia some 4000 km away. And for Ukraine this fact found expression, for instance, in the fact that it could not profit from the reduced railway freights that were granted for long-distance transportation. The unfavorable position of Moscow and Leningrad as manufacturing centers was a great handicap to the economy of Ukraine which possessed all the conditions necessary for production within its own frontiers but nevertheless had to import goods from there and export raw materials to very low prices.

As long as Russia's face was turned towards Europe, these considerations did not matter much, but they are felt all the more acutely now that the economy of the Soviet Union is definitely planned.

8. The Ukrainian idea of economy

421 with its championship of private property was always entirely different from the "mir" idea, with its farming in common and periodical division of the soil which was characteristic for Russian economy. Exceptions within Ukrainian territory, due to special conditions of time and place, do not alter this fundamental fact.
[566] That serfdom should have been abolished so late was felt to be a great burden by the Ukrainian who had enjoyed personal freedom in his days of political independence. He always connected serfdom with Russian rule which naturally did not help to mitigate his aversion to everything Russian.

433 In national Ukrainian literature, the relationship of different branches of economy is often discussed. It is often maintained that up to the present, development has been along the lines of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Kharkov, in its scenery and social conditions, resembles rather the 311
neighbouring districts of the Government of Kursk, while in the 162
south-east it is already really part of New Russia.

Climatic conditions on the left bank are rather less favourable 132
than on the right bank of the Dniepr: there is a lighter rainfall which is not so evenly distributed; the winters are more severe and the region of Kharkov endures a distinctly 'continental' climate. Prince Shcherbatov, a former minister of the Imperial Government, writes that: 'One of the most important factors in agriculture is rainfall, which does not always occur under favourable conditions in the Ukraine. Most of the rain comes in summer and often takes the form of downpours which impede work in the fields and harvesting; and in the spring there is often not enough rain. Rainfall is better distributed on the right bank of the Dniepr than in other parts. The difficult climatic conditions in the Ukraine liken the average black earth harvests to average harvests in Central Europe on an average soil.'

During the nineteenth century conditions in left-bank Ukraine 311
tended to favour the growth of a prosperous class of small farmers who supplanted the big landowners of the period of Peter I and Catherine II. These conditions derived from the shortage of labour on big estates which followed the opening up of the New Russian territories and from the wave of speculation which induced landowners to sell out their properties on the left bank of the Dniepr in order to participate in 'the rush' for the new lands. Left-bank Ukraine became a country of large peasant farms covering 10, 20, 30 and as much as 50 hectares, while a number of smaller 'working' landowners retained estates up to 100, 150 and 200 hectares. Land was worth in these parts 500 rubles (about £50 sterling on the pre-war exchange) a hectare.

At the same time the growth of these large farms in the Governments of left-bank Ukraine combined with a natural increase in the population to create a serious problem of 'over-crowding'. In the eighteenth century a numerous class of peasantry had existed who did not own any land of their own at all, but who merely possessed cottages and vegetable gardens and the right to graze their stock on common pasture lands. Following the Emancipation of the Serfs in 566 ●
1861, the number of landless peasants showed a rapid increase. The small parcels of land allotted to the liberated serfs were soon redistributed between the thrifty and the shiftless; and the division of large estates did not contribute to the establishment of agricultural industries which might have provided a living for the less fortunate. Already in the eighties symptoms of over-population were noticeable 000

previously described.[3] Under the conditions of German repression 668*
the nationalist parties could not afford to devote their limited strength to maintaining the initial advantage gained in these comparatively unimportant areas. By 1943, under the impact of rapidly growing Soviet partisan operations, nationalist activity seems to have ceased in Polessia west of the Dnieper.

South of Polessia runs a broad band of territory which falls into 133
the natural vegetation region of the wooded steppe, i.e., a region of mixed prairie and woods. In contrast to the rather poor gray soil of most of Polessia, it is a land well suited for intensive agriculture, and as a result has supported for centuries the densest agricultural population of the East Ukraine.

As in the case of Polessia, the principal dividing line within the 631
wooded steppe region is the Dnieper River. The area west of the river forms the heart of what have been known in Ukrainian history as the "Right Bank" lands. Kiev and the surrounding district had been acquired by the Russian tsar in the eighteenth century, but most of the area west of the Dnieper remained under Polish rule until 1792. The section closest to the river had had a considerable share in the Cossack tradition, but the more westerly sections, which were included in the historic provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, were deeply affected by the independent Cossack movement only during the height of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's career. This meant that serfdom had a longer and more [566]
oppressive history there than in the regions to the south and the east. While the peasants were thoroughly Ukrainian in language [563]
and customs, the cities included many Poles and Russians and an especially high percentage of Jews, who comprised from one third to one half of the urban population. This concentration of Jews, too, was a result of the historical background of the region; Poland had tolerated them, while the tsars had forbidden them to leave the Pale formed by the lands acquired in 1793 and later.[4]

Since the "Right Bank" was immediately contiguous to the 668*
nationalist bases in the West Ukraine, it was natural that the na-

[3] See Chapter V.

[4] Actually, the Pale included all the Ukraine in the nineteenth century, but Jews were less numerous on the "Left Bank."

175 troops conquered the fortress of the Ukrainian Cossacks — the Zaporovian Sich. The remainder of the Zaporovian Cossacks migrated to the Turkish province at the mouth of the Danube, and founded there a new centre under the protectorate of the Sultan. The lands of the Zaporovian Army, that had been defended against the Tartar hordes in a fierce struggle lasting for hundreds of years, the Russian Government granted to its magnates, first of all to favourites of Catherine II.

175 648 The Western Ukrainian territories, which, by the Polish-Muscovite treaty of 1667, had remained in the Polish State after the dismemberment of Poland at the end of the 18th century, were incorporated partly by Russia and partly by Austria (Galicia 1772). Bukovina too, which had formerly belonged to Turkey, became a province of Austria in 1774. Carpatho-Ukraine had belonged to Hungary since the Middle Ages (cities Užhorod-Ungvar, Mukačevo-Munkacs).

181 175 [566] The struggle of the Ukrainians for independence under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—57) had abolished serfdom in the greater part of Ukraine. It was the ideal of the masses of the Ukrainian people to live free, independent like the free Ukrainian Cossacks. After the abolition of the autonomous rights of Ukraine at the end of the 18th century serfdom for the Ukrainian peasants was introduced in Ukraine in the Muscovite way. But against this oppression the masses of the Ukrainian people rose often in revolt.

Historical evolution has developed in the Ukrainian people an aspiration for freedom and defence of human dignity. Voltaire wrote in his *History of Charles XII.*: "L'Ukraine a toujours aspiré à être libre" (Ukraine has always aspired to be free). "This is a nation that wants freedom," wrote the prominent Ukrainian writer of the 17th century, the Archbishop of Chernigov, Lazar Baranovych, to the Muscovite Tsar Alexey Mikhaylovich.

The conviction prevailed among the Ukrainians that Ukraine was not dependent on Russia but was only associated in the person of the Monarch. In the political dialogue *Dispute of Little Russia with Great Russia* at the end of the 18th century we read the following words of 'Little Russia' addressing 'Great Russia': "Do not think thou art my lord, but thine and mine sovereign is our common master."

175 648 The Ukrainian patriots could not forget the loss of liberty and independence, and looked for understanding of the Ukrainian case to foreign countries. In 1793 the well known Ukrainian patriot Vasyl Kapnist tried to persuade the Prussian Minister Hertzberg

model in clay and paint it, and weave carpets.

574 The long winter days pass pleasantly when people visit each other and work in a neighbor's house for a change. They tell each other legends of epic proportions from the nation's past, ghost stories and village gossip.

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776 The life of the Ukrainian people is full of profound symbolism. As is the case with many other things in this country, religion still has many primitive elements. There is no other Christian people that has preserved as much pre-Christian, heathen ideology down to our own day as the Ukrainians have. /136/ For, besides God and the devil, the world beyond is inhabited by many good and evil spirits that also move about in our world, crossing the path of man in hundreds of ways, and bringing him good things or bad. One must be on one's guard against these mighty foes; one must keep away from them and not anger them. The good spirits should be offered thanks and sacrifices. Primitive magic! For the spirit of the field which can be a bird or some other animal, a swath of ripe grain must be left untouched, otherwise it might take its departure. The spirit of the field can also be a female creature, a rusalka or nymph. In spring, when the rusalki dance in the grain field, one may not cross the fields.

The domestic spirit is a faithful friend of the house who has picked out a place for himself beside the warm stove. He protects the house; danger is near when he whimpers or groans. If people move they manifestly invite him to go along by offering him bread and salt.

You protect yourself from the forest spirit who rules over the beasts of the forest and can turn into a fox or wolf by swearing loudly. You protect yourself from the whirlwind by exorcism

851 guishes the candles, appropriates half of them himself, and
553 returns the rest to the participants, who must light them again in the room where the mother is confined.[45] If the candles are not easily extinguished, it is a sign that the baptized child will have a long life.[46]

851 In some localities the godparents leave immediately after the
574 close of the ceremony for the house of the parents, where a festive dinner is served; in most places, however, they return to their homes and go to the party in the evening.[47] The midwife, upon her return, greets the mother with these words: "You have given us the child born; we, however, return it to you
[777] sacrificed and baptized." She then places the infant on a black fur coat (*kożuch*), which is thought to bring luck, and hands it over on the coat to the mother.[48]

At the christening dinner the father again plays a most inconspicuous rôle, the midwife and the godparents being the principal
[431] actors. Each guest brings presents of foodstuffs, chiefly beans, peas, eggs, cheese, salt, and bread. After a flood of greetings and congratulations, the women give their presents to the mother, placing them on her bed, while the men hand their gifts, usually loaves of bread, to the father.[49]

After these preliminaries, the guests seat themselves at the table. The master of the house serves each of them with a drink of whisky, and the midwife or the cook places before each an appetizer consisting of a piece of meat or another delicacy. The courses served at this meal are as numerous and elaborate as those of a wedding dinner. They usually include meat with gravy, *holubci* (grouts enveloped in cabbage leaves), *pirohy* (potatoes or grouts enveloped in dough), sour cream, *borszcz* (beet soup), and many other dishes, depending, of course, upon the economic status of the parents. Whisky is lavishly provided, and each guest offers a toast before every drink. It is interesting to note that, if the baby be a boy, the godparents,

[45] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[46] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[47] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[113] [48] Jandaurek, J., *Das Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien und das Herzogtum Bukowina* (Wien, 1884), p. 62.

[49] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

*[christening -- Analyst]

851 in drinking, imitate the motions of a person cutting straw,
● 574 while in the case of a girl the motions are those of a woman washing clothes.[50]

Towards the end of the dinner the *baba* drinks an individual toast to each of the godparents and throws what remains in the glass at the ceiling. She then hands them each a goblet of whisky on a plate. After offering a toast and emptying his goblet, each puts a few coins on the plate, which the midwife takes individually to the mother. In some localities it is customary for the oldest godmother to put the infant upon a pillow and carry it around from guest to guest while holding a candle in her other hand; a younger godmother follows her with a plate, upon which everyone, beginning with the father, places some money as a gift for the child; the midwife, meanwhile, makes little bouquets of herbs and distributes them among the guests, receiving from each a few coins for herself.[51]

The christening festivities are marked by great hilarity, drinking, and the singing of songs designed for the occasion. When begun in the evening, they are prolonged far into the night, the men sometimes spending the whole night at the party; when begun in the morning, they last throughout the day. The parents keep open house. People come and go all day, bringing gifts and drinking to the health of the mother and child. The festivities may be extended to the second and even the third day—celebrations lasting a whole week are by no means rare—the parents being expected to supply the thronging visitors with food and drink.[52] Indeed, christening parties, along with wedding and funeral celebrations, have been the major cause in the impoverishment of many a peasant household.[53]

844 The midwife is formally dismissed on the third day, when she comes to carry out the hay and to change the bedding. She receives in payment a few coins, a loaf of bread, and, in the case of a firstborn child, also a piece of linen.[54] In a little ceremony, which marks the dismissal, the mother thrice pours water over

[50] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209–210; *Przemyskie*, p. 50.

[51] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 212; *Przemyskie*, p. 50.

[52] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210. [53] *Idem*.

[54] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 119–120.

844 the hands of the midwife and dries them with the linen presented to the latter. Then both women shake hands over the child, and beg one another three times for forgiveness for the troubles each has had to undergo.[55]

846 783 The mother is considered strictly unclean for three days, the period of the midwife's attendance. Nevertheless, she usually leaves her bed on the second or third day and performs her routine tasks about the house. She must not, however, go farther than thirty-five steps from the dwelling, lest she defile the fields which she might pass.[56] Indeed, she may not even take these few steps without carrying a knife with her.[57] The period during which the mother is not considered entirely clean lasts from three to six weeks, depending upon the locality. At the termination of this period a formal purification ceremony (*wywid* = leading out) is performed in the church by the priest. On the day of the ceremony, the midwife comes to take the mother to church. The latter dresses up in her best clothes, and is sprinkled by the midwife with holy water. Taking the baby in her arms, and carrying a knife, a few keys, some garlic, and a piece of bread, she follows the midwife to the church. Arriving at the entrance, she kneels with the child in her arms and awaits the priest. When he enters, she follows him to the small altar where the christening took place some weeks before. Here the priest, after performing a special ceremony, pronounces her entirely clean.[58]

852 608 574 After the purification rite, often as much as two years later, comes a ceremony which, more than any other, reveals the closeness of the bond that must have once existed between godparents and child. The parents of the child inquire of the godparents whether they will accept a present of *kolaczy*, twisted loaves of wheat bread, from which the ceremony is named *kolaczyny*. If the godparents agree, as they invariably do, the parents set a day for the celebration. Should the godparents have acted in the same capacity at the baptism of other children,

[55] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[56] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 7.

[57] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 119.

[58] *Idem.*

852 608 574 they invite all the parents of such children to participate in the celebration. On the appointed day the godparents prepare a festive dinner for the parents, who bring a goodly supply of whisky and six *kolaczy* each. If the child is still alive, the parents give the *kolaczy* to the godparents immediately, saying: "Please, *kumy*, accept the *kolaczy*; from God they come large, from us small." But if the child has died in the meantime, they first light candles and then place them and the loaves of bread on the floor, saying: "Please accept the *kolaczy* for the welfare of the soul of N. N."[59]

Friends and neighbours, as well as relatives, are invited to the *kolaczyny*, and all participate in the singing, dancing, and games that follow the dinner and often last till the next morning. The parents, when they depart, are given back one of the *kolaczy*, and in addition receive a calf, a sheep, a lamb, or a pig, depending upon the means of the godparents, as a gift for the child. Around the neck of such animal they always tie a red ribbon. If the godparent has no animal to give, he presents his godchild with a piece of clothing.[60]

III. Childhood

842 Only when a boy is born, as a rule, do the parents feel proud. A peasant, asked what "God gave him," will answer: "*Chlopcie!*" (a boy); but if the baby be a girl, he will reply: "*Detynu!*" (a child), as though trying to avoid mentioning its sex.[61]

854 For some time the mother keeps her infant in bed beside her, mainly in order to keep close watch over it. After a while, however, it is put into a cradle, a box made of boards, suspended by means of ropes from the bar above the mother's bed. It is hung at the foot of the bed so that it can easily be rocked at night. A red apple is usually suspended on a string above the head of the baby—to provide it with something to look at and play with.[62] Boxes on rockers, too, are quite common.[63] Special care is taken to assure the child undisturbed sleep. A visitor

[59] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 7.
[60] *Idem.*
[61] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 19.
[62] Szychiewicz, *op. cit.*, iii, 7.
[63] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 101.

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hun-
241 garians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent
438 vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here
341 imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

subordinate, that the Ukapist appeal for inclusion was definitely 665
rejected and that the group was offered the choice of suppression or of self-liquidation. They accordingly accepted the voluntary decision and signed thus their own death warrants as had the Borotbisty by their early submission.

All three parties had the same general attitude toward all non-Communists and bourgeois groups. They were in general agreement that these had to be destroyed and driven from political and social importance. Thus, all adopted a hostile attitude toward the nationalists who had supported Petlyura and the Ukrainian National Republic. They attacked the remains of the Social Revolutionists, the Social Democrats, and all the non-Marxian or Marxian groups that did not accept a strict Communism. They dissolved the organizations and seized their property, while they imprisoned many of the older leaders and tried to humiliate them in the eyes of the Ukrainian public.

Thus in 1921, they staged in Kharkiv a public trial of the [687]
members of the Executive Committee of the Social Revolutionists. The list included V. Holubovych, the Prime Minister at the time of Brest-Litovsk, N. Petrenko, P. Hubenko (Ostap Vyshnya), Lyzanivsky and many others. They were charged with hostility to the "government of workers and peasants" but apparently the regime was not too sure of its ground and merely sentenced them to relatively short terms in prison.

It was not only the politicians who suffered, for the new regime[1] 661
attacked every institution which it did not control. In 1920 575 ●
it abolished all Ukrainian professional organizations and trades unions, including such as the Poltava Society of Workers in Co-operatives and similar groups in Kiev, Kharkiv, and other cities. Then, by arrests of the leaders of the cooperative societies, it forced new elections and put into power only those persons who had the direct approval of the Russian Bolsheviks.

It was next the turn of the purely cultural organizations. All the societies of the Prosvita (Enlightenment) which operated a chain of reading rooms, schools, libraries, theatres, etc. were disbanded on the ground that they were connected with the Rada

[1] [Ukrainian Soviet Republic -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

661 of the old Ukrainian National Republic. The regime arrested and
575 shot as chauvinist counter-revolutionists many of the active workers. Those who were spared at the moment were treated as members of the proscribed classes and were punished by the exclusion of their children from schools, the denial of food cards, etc., all the traditional devices to eliminate the counter-revolutionary and suspected classes.

At the same time the government confiscated all the funds of educational institutions and the private organizations which had, during the Ukrainian National Republic and earlier, been interested in educational and scientific work. It closed the Ukrainian scientific societies in Kharkiv and Kiev and it put an end to all of the pre-Soviet journals, newspapers, and magazines. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been planned during the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky but had not commenced its work, was treated somewhat more leniently and it was allowed to open largely to support the pretext that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was an independent state, although it was made clear that Communist influence would be exerted on its statutes and organization.

517 Such a period of intellectual disintegration could not fail to leave its mark on all aspects of Ukrainian culture and art. The older writers who had achieved some prominence before 1914 either retired again into the emigration or they became silent. The younger generation, which was just rising into prominence, was either driven into temporary seclusion or, for the most part, swept into the surging current of events. They felt the leftward urge of many of the intellectuals and tried in one way or another to catch the spirit of the times in their works.

Yet it must be realized that, as in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, there still did not exist a predominant party line in the field of literature and the arts. Writers, painters and dramatists of widely differing tendencies accepted the revolution and loudly protested that they and they alone were the true mouthpieces of the times and greedily sought for support from the commissars.

They were the more fortunate in this because the bulk of the

[Eradication of pre-communist cultural organizations in 1920 -- Analyst]

nationalist who lived through the period, describes the former as 186
persons who thought on a "planetary" level, desiring to solve 668*
all the world's problems at once and regarding the claims of national affinity as "parochial." One, his schoolmate, was Volodymyr Zatons'kyi, who was later to become one of the most implacable of Communist officials in the Ukraine. Even before the war, he, according to the writer, refused to have anything to do with Ukrainian cultural activities, like the Prosvita [enlightenment] [575]
society in the city of Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamianets-Podils'k), where they were students. Rather, he associated with "foreigners," Russians and Jews, and was rapidly drawn into the revolutionary socialist movement.[20] The basis for a choice in this generation of young intellectuals appears to have been chance, or the psychological make-up of the individual, which was reinforced increasingly by the cumulative impact of associations formed after the initial choice was taken. Thus by the time the revolutionary conflicts drew to a close, the educated classes in the Ukraine were
deeply split. Even more divided was the real foundation of any 565
independence movement, the peasants. They—or at least those 668*
who were somewhat more prosperous than the average—had 641
initially welcomed the Ukrainian governments. The increasing impotence of the new regimes and their preoccupation with factional strife and unrealistic programs instead of practical measures caused much indifference or disaffection among the peasants. In the judgment of one of the ablest students of the revolutionary period, however, the Ukrainian peasant preferred a nationalist government to either a Red or a "White" administration supporting a central regime.[21]

That the Communists were victors in the physical struggle is 642
no proof of greater popular support, for much of their strength

[20] Vyktor (Victor) Prykhodko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[21] William H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944). Moreover, one of the best Communist historians of the revolutionary period in the Ukraine, M. G. Rafes, a former adherent of the Jewish Bund, says the "natural" development of the peasants (and workers, especially in the sugar refineries in the small towns) was to "national socialism," "the Ukraine for the Ukrainian peasants," although he of course adds that they were inspired by the "reactionary bourgeois intelligentsia"; see *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine: Evoliutsiia i raskol "Bunda"* (Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine: The Evolution and Division of the "Bund") (Moscow, 1920), p. 8.

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It was much more difficult to secure a predominant place for 727
the nationalist ideology in the schools. As is usually the case in 186
nationalist indoctrination in the schools, the efforts were concen- 872
trated upon the teaching of history.[41] This was especially impor-
tant, since the justification of the Ukrainian independence move-
ment is largely based upon the conception of a proud history
distinct from that of the people of Moscow. Naturally enough, no
Soviet textbooks were acceptable for the teaching of history from
this point of view or from the general standpoint of eradicating
Communist indoctrination. To some extent the gap was filled by [314]
books published in the year preceding the Soviet war by the
educational press of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cra-
cow.[42] Some texts were printed by the cultural department of the
Kiev city administration. An amateurish effort was made also
by certain OUN-B organizers to print locally a new version of
Ukrainian history with an introduction of their own composi-
tion.[43] In view of the great material shortages and the brief time
available, however, the lack of printed materials could not be
made good. Consequently, a great deal depended on securing the
proper teachers. To what extent the many thousands employed in
the schools adhered to the nationalist doctrine is of course im-
possible to determine, but a number of purely indigenous formu-
lations of nationalist concepts to be inculcated in the schools
attest to the strength of nationalist feeling. The head of the
Mariupol' school system proposed to stress the native language,
love of the fatherland, and respect for elders; the educational
ideology advocated by the group of young men who reorganized
life in Krivoi Rog was instillation of Cossack ideals, the code of
the Zaporozhian Sich, which was to lead to a spiritual, moral,
and physical regeneration.[44]

Since the formal school program was largely confined to young 186
children, great efforts were also concentrated on developing a 517
voluntary system of adult education. The Prosvita societies had 515

Visti, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 27, 1943, p. 4, quoting D. Nitsenko in *Nova Ukraïna* (Kharkov).

[41] Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4.

[42] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 10, 1941, p. 2.

[43] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 28.

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 29, 1942, p. 2; November 15, 1941, p. 2; and November 18, 1941, p. 3 (referring to an article in *Dzvin* [Krivoi Rog], September, 1941).

186 been founded by the nationalist intelligentsia of the East Ukraine
517 many years before the Revolution. They were now revived, after
575 long suppression by the Communist regime, to carry on the work of developing national culture and inculcating a feeling of national identity. The two aims could be combined because all nationalist Ukrainians felt it essential to instill a love of the indigenous popular arts and customs, emphasizing their distinctive nature. That this effort had a political as well as a cultural sig-
[661] nificance is indicated by the fact that not only the Soviet regime (both before 1941 and upon reconquest, as in Kharkov)[45] but the German police as well attacked the Prosvita societies, and in the Reichskommissariat they were able, for varying periods, to lead only a clandestine life. The desire for national expression was shared by so many, however, that the Germans felt it was impossible to dam up all outlets; therefore the Prosvita was generally permitted, though under close observation.[46] Together with the church (and a few local societies not using the Prosvita name but having the same function), it was one of the few organizations of a nationalist character which was not under direct German control.

533 The work of the Prosvita groups, although arranged in various
517 ways in different localities, may be classified under four general
186 headings. Playing a major role everywhere were musical activities,
575 particularly choral groups, in which the Ukrainians had always excelled, and which served as a powerful intellectual and emotional stimulus to nationalist feeling, since most of the songs were distinctively Ukrainian. In addition, groups of *bandura* players (the *bandura* is a small lute-like stringed instrument indigenous to the Ukraine) were sponsored, and orchestras were
545 trained. In the larger centers, Prosvita collaborated with regular
517 professional musical organizations, such as conservatories and
575 operas, to produce nationalist-inspired performances. For ex-
186 ample, operas were reopened in Kiev and Kharkov, and offered a considerable repertoire of native Ukrainian pieces (*Taras Bul'ba, Natalka Poltavka,* etc.) as well as traditional Western

[45] Cf. *Nastup*, September 26, 1943, p. 3 (based on *Vinnyts'ki Visti*, August 29, 1943), on the destruction of Prosvita and its personnel in Kharkov during the Soviet interlude in February-March, 1943.

[46] MS E: PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

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operas such as *Madame Butterfly* and *Les Cloches de Corneville.* 545
Like other forms of national expression, however, operatic per- 517
formances ran afoul of the Nazi hatred of independent activity. 575
At first, the desirable places in the Kiev opera were reserved for 186
Germans, and then, in December, 1942, the performances were suspended altogether, an action which aroused the indignation of all elements of the population.[47]

Within a matter of days after the Red Army was driven out, active theatrical groups likewise sprang up, usually with Prosvita sponsorship, even in the smaller cities of the East Ukraine. For example, a theater had been started in Zhitomir before the first month of German occupation was past.[48] Even in cities like Chernigov and Simferopol' (in the Crimea), where evidences of nationalist activity were scanty, the theater was soon in full career.[49] Since the players were generally amateurs interested in using this medium of expression of their nationalist feeling, the performances were nationalist in content as well as language (evidently to a greater extent than the opera which, being composed largely of professional performers, was imbued with an "all-Union," i.e., Russian, character, at least behind the scenes).[50] Some presentations were so strongly imbued with nationalist ideology that they were censored by the Germans; the author of one of the most popular, Constantine Hupalo, was arrested for nationalist activity.[51]

Prosvita and related groups sponsored a wide variety of more 517
directly educational activities. These included lectures, valued 575
as a means of propagating knowledge of the language as well as 186
for their content; libraries and reading rooms, vital to the spread of the printed word in view of the extreme scarcity of even periodical literature; nationalist cultural work in the schools; and research and discussion on themes of national history and ethnography. In the more vigorous and less restricted societies, like the

[47] Interrogation of Shtepa, CXLVa 78; PS 1198.

[48] *Ukraïns'ka Diïsnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1 (from *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* [Zhitomir], August 3, 1941).

[49] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 6, 1941, p. 4 (based on an interview with Theodore Pipa, the Chernigov editor).

[50] Cf. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 15, 1942, p. 3.

[51] His play, entitled *The Triumph of Procurator Dal'shii*, was a drama of the Ukrainian nationalist movement under Soviet rule (*OUN u Viini*, p. 74).

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186 Prosvita in Kharkov, these activities were greatly extended. The
● 575 latter group operated a House of Popular Culture which served
517 as a center for most nationalist organizations in the city, and came close to developing into an unofficial government.[52] Moreover, under the leadership of the energetic Professor V. V. Dubrovs'kyi, it undertook economic as well as purely cultural activities, such as book publishing and the provision of material aid for needy teachers and students.[53] Some indication of the scope of Prosvita's activities in Kharkov is provided by the fact that membership reached one thousand, while four thousand persons attended one of its concert series.[54]

In most places *Prosvita* and other cultural activities appear to have developed quite independently of the Nationalist party organizers from the west. To a certain extent the ideology of the Nationalists, especially that of the OUN-B, made them contemptuous of such gradual and unspectacular methods of developing nationalist strength.[55] To be sure, in centers such as Kiev and Zhitomir, which were strongly permeated by the OUN-M forces, cooperative relations existed between the latter and the local founders of Prosvita, but the Nationalist party did not have the personnel to carry on cultural work itself and apparently did

[52] Cf. Serednopolets'kyi in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* February 24, 1942, p. 2, on organizations operating in the House of National Culture. Erich Koch, in his letter to Rosenberg of March 16, 1943 (PS 192), complained that the Wehrmacht permitted the Kharkov Prosvita to become a sort of national government, and its role as a political as well as a cultural force is confirmed by Interview 73.

[53] *Nastup,* September 26, 1943, p. 3, based on an interview with a leading member of the Kharkov Prosvita, Professor P. Petrenko, in *Vinnyts'ki Visti,* August 29, 1943.

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* February 10, 1943, p. 2.

[55] For example, Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: Spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), p. 40, writes that it was necessary for OUN-B members to withdraw from Prosvita, amateur groups, etc., as these (after the introduction of the Reichskommissariat) were only tools of the Germans, and nationalist participation in them gave color to the Communist propaganda which represented the OUN as an agency of the Germans. On the other hand, the clandestine *Biuleten'* (No. 4, previously cited), in calling for an extension of OUN-B activity to all fields of life, criticizes those who condemn activity which is not of a strictly terroristic, revolutionary nature as "Prosvitanstvo."

not find the Prosvita organization well adapted to its tactic of 517
underground work after German suppression.[56] On the other 575
hand, the extremely important Kharkov Prosvita was organized 186
almost entirely by local residents who had in many cases been associated with the Prosvita of pre-Soviet days, and who were unassociated with, or even to some extent hostile to, the OUN-M.[57] Here again there is strong indication of the survival in the East Ukraine of leadership capable of taking direction of important aspects of national life. That this leadership was directed to such a considerable extent to the less aggressive aspects of national development, however, indicates that a certain gap existed during the war years between nationalism in the East and the West Ukraine.

The means employed in the educational systems and in the 186
cultural societies for propagating the national ideology can be 208
classed for the most part under the heading of oral propaganda. The face-to-face type of communication has a long history of effective use in the east Slavic countries and, under the name "oral agitation," has been widely cultivated as a means of strengthening the Communist regime. Hence the population was used to this type of propaganda. Moreover, it was especially suited [727] to the work of the nationalist groups, which were seeking to spread ideas frowned upon by the German authorities. The latter could suppress a performance or dissolve a society, arrest or execute a leader, but with their small number of personnel, their ignorance of the language, and their lack of sufficiently numerous and reliable local agents, they could not overhear everything and thus prevent the clever teacher or cultural worker from communicating political concepts to his audience. Since nationalist propagandists were so few and ill-equipped by organization and training to cope with the gigantic task of indoctrinating a population of thirty million, however, the problem of securing access to mass communication media under control of the propaganda departments of the municipal administrations was vitally important. Through such media nationalism might reach thousands

[56] Interview 61.
[57] Interviews 57, 73.

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education of children, and self-control.[42] Generally, however, the clergy was unable to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in several villages the latter even objected to returning the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs.[43]

One of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. How effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of more detailed evidence, but in some cases it evidently did at least provide reading material and some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. There is considerable difference of opinion as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were imbued with Communist ideas.[44]

The great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmitters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for example, the physician, who had been a UNR officer, played the chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. He was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village *feldsher* (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. These constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, who were described as having "no unified outlook," being still "under the influence of Bolshevik ideology." [45] This criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not uncommon in nationalist

[42] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

[43] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3.

[44] Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 18, 1941, for favorable reports; and Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28–29, for some criticisms of the rural teachers.

[45] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest: to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czechoslovakia met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrainian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Economic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrainian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrainian emigration developed. 167 563 873

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed a considerable activity. [815]

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name of their enslaved brethren. 563 186

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western territories of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily *Svoboda*. The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton, Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will*. There are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools, from American and Canadian Ukrainians. 563 575

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, farmers. The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about 1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest political organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Communist Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian [162] 563 575 668

[468] like *Ukrainian Daily News* in New York. However, the Com-
563 munist agency in America and Canada did not attain the success it
575 had hoped. Among the Ukrainian emigration, the democratic organisations have decisive influence.

In South America too, in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and other countries, there are Ukrainian emigrants. These are mostly workers and farmers. They have their cultural and political organisations and publish periodicals in Ukrainian.

The central organisations of the Ukrainians in USA, Ukrainian Congress Committee (UCC), in Canada, Canadian Ukrainian Committee (CUC) and of the countries of South America, created in 1948 the Pan-American Ukrainian Conference for the co-ordination of their activities in the interest of the oppressed Ukrainian people.

741 illiterates to learn to read by means of special
517 courses, and it gave scholarships to worthy students. So, it is not surprising that the Poles did not care for the "Prosvita". Thus in the last ten years all of the 600 local groups in Polesia and Volhynia and 70% of all local groups west of the Shan were dissolved. In 1938 Warsaw intensified its war against the "Prosvita"; in that year 104 local groups /95/ were dissolved and in the first five months of 1939 the same happened even to two district centers with 168 local groups. In spite of that, the Ukrainians organized 375 new local groups from 1936 to 1938.

575 Peasants and agriculturists numbering 160,000
874 united in the "Silskyj Hospodar" ("farmer") in order to arrange for or to obtain agricultural training. The "Silskyj Hospodar" employed approximately 150 social agronomists, that is, agriculturists with diplomas, who supervised improvement of the soil, methods of cultivating, seed production and whole farm establishments. They conducted courses and competitions in which the young farmers who were eager for knowledge actively participated. Special veterinarians of the society and of the dairy farm cooperatives supervised the livestock.

562 The Ukrainian women of Galicia were anxious
575 not to be second to the men. Their society "Soyuz Ukrayinok" numbered 60,000 members in 1200 village circles. In the national life of the people the Ukrainian woman occupies a high position, as is the case among all healthy races. In times of national misfortune the mothers are the preservers of the old manners and customs; the children learn the language and the traditional songs from their mothers, to whom the rising generations are entrusted. Their glowing patriotism is not surpassed by the men. At the same time the West Ukrainian woman is deeply religious and tirelessly industrious; she excels in the household.

000 Everything in West Ukraine is education work.

11: Obermaier--98 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Everything in West Ukraine is education work.

462 The woman, too, is brought up in order to play her
512 part properly within the family: she must see
515 to it that everyone eats from his own plate, that everyone sleeps in his own bed - not eight on a wide chest -, that clothing is taken off at night and that shirts are changed; airing the rooms is not to be forgotten, and it is unhealthy for children not to get out of the house a single time the whole winter long. Fresh air does no harm. But where to get the shoes and warm clothes for the little ones?

575 A further, very important society was the
871 "Ridna /96/ Shkola" ("National School"). It closed the worst gaps which the Poles had hewn into the Ukrainian school system. There were 3662 Ukrainian public schools in Galicia when the Poles took over undivided rule. In 1937/1938 there were only 496 left. All the rest of the schools were Polonized, so that in the academic year 1937/1938 only 59,300 of over one million Ukrainian school children were able to attend purely Ukrainian schools. Among 307 state secondary schools in Poland, there were only five Ukrainian classical schools in the academic year 1936/1937. All of the 1094 state technical schools were Polish and naturally also all higher institutions of learning. The means at the disposal of the "Ridna Shkola" - needless to say - were not by any means adequate to teach all Ukrainian children their mother tongue. Nevertheless, by means of the savings of its 104,000 members, it was able to maintain 540 kindergartens, 33 public schools, 12 classical schools, 11 colleges, 16 schools for specialists and professionals and 4 boarding schools. (53) The

53. Taken from the respective annual reports of the West Ukrainian cooperatives and self-aid organizations.

tension between Poland and the Ukraine in the

•575 first half of 1939 threatened the educational
871 work of the "Ridna Shkola" just as it did that of the women's society, the society of agriculturists, the "Provista" and the cooperatives.

The efforts of the Ukrainians to raise the
871 level of popular education are admirable. When
873 at the beginning of their rule in Galicia the Poles deprived the Ukrainians of their few professorial chairs, the Ukrainians forthwith founded a "Secret University" which gave its lectures during 1922 and 1923 in private houses. At the end of each lecture the professors who were taken partly from universities of East Ukraine, partly from Austrian universities, announced to their listeners the time and place of their next lecture. In the end this "university" collapsed and the lecturers were arrested.

873 Two years after the enactment of the Ukrain-
ian law of autonomy of 1922 a Ukrainian univer-
178 sity was supposed to have been founded - but in the summer of 1939 there was not yet a single Ukrainian professorial chair. In Lwów a Polish professor lectured on Ukrainian literature in the
241 Polish language, in /Facing page 96/ /Map VII: Agricultural Zones Under Cultivation. In the wooded zones of the north rye, oats and potatoes predominate. In the northern zones of steppes, wheat and sugar beets are added (winter wheat in the west and summer wheat in the east). A third zone on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and in the foreland of the Caucasus produces wheat, corn and barley. Adjoining this toward the west there is a corn-growing zone (with wheat in the north and barley in the south), whereas toward the northeast there is a zone extending to the middle part of the Volga with summer wheat and rye. Around the Caspian Sea is the pasture area of desert steppes, in the mountains, woodland and grasslands with some barley cultivation. The cultivation of cotton which has been recently undertaken along the coasts of the Black Sea and

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 102. Women in the Ukrainian SSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life.

[562] The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education and by State protection of the interests of mother and child, State aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers, maternity leave with full pay and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

[563] Art. 103. Equality of rights of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality and also any propagation of racial or national exclusiveness, hatred and contempt - are punishable by law.

[659] Art. 104. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the Ukrainian SSR is separated from the State and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

Art. 105. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed by law:

(a) Freedom of speech;
(b) Freedom of the press;
(c) Freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
(d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

[575] Art. 106. In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are ensured the right to unite in public organizations — trade unions, co-operative associations, youth organizations, sport and defence organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and State.

[694] Art. 107. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

Art. 108. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

Art. 109. The Ukrainian SSR affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Yekaterinoslav, 5 per cent.; Poltava, 4 per cent.; Taurida, 4 per cent.; Kharkov, 0·5 per cent. only.

Like the Orthodox Church, the Jewish community has its sects. There are two such sects in the Ukraine; and their members exercise a great moral influence, and form a bridge between the Turkish and Jewish populations of the Ukraine. They are called Karaimy and Krymchaki, and live chiefly in the towns of the Taurida and Kherson Governments. They number about 12,000. These people, using mostly Tatar dialects, are supposed to be descendants of Jewish pre-Christian colonies in the Crimea and the Turkic Khazars of the Middle Ages, who were of Jewish faith. The Karaimy disapprove of the Talmud, and base all their beliefs on the Law of Moses. They differ from other Jewish communities in their cleanliness, their absolute honesty in business, and their great sense of social duties. Hence their wealth is evenly distributed in their communities.

(c) *Mohammedans.*—The largest Mohammedan colony is found in the Taurida government (187,940, or 13 per cent.), but their schools are less efficient and their culture is much lower than that of the Mohammedans of the Volga or of Turkestan.

(B) Educational

The last census, taken in 1897,[1] gives the following figures:

Name of Government.	*Total population in 1,000's.*	*No. of literates in 1,000's.*	*Per cent. of literates.*
Podolia . .	3,018	450	14·5
Kharkov . .	2,492	384	15·4
Poltava . .	2,778	446	16·1
Volhynia . .	2,989	495	16·5
Kiev . . .	3,559	598	16·8
Chernigov . .	2,298	402	17·5
Yekaterinoslav .	2,114	433	20·5
Kherson . .	2,734	657	24·1
Taurida . .	1,448	380	26·2
	23,430	4,243	average 18·2

[1] From *The Ukrainian Movement as a Stage in South Russian Separatism*, Shchegolev (Kiev, 1912), p. 364.

a criminal existence, they showed themselves more ready to co- 668
operate.

Unfortunately, during this preliminary period discord broke out [578]
in the OUN. One faction under Stepan Bandera objected to the leadership of Colonel Melnyk and demanded the change of several prominent leaders. When this was refused, a split came in the organization with Melnyk at the head of one faction and Bandera in control of the other. It is very possible that this split was the result of German intrigue to prevent the formation of a strong Ukrainian movement but it had the result of weakening it, even though both Bandera and Melnyk fell into German hands and were imprisoned during the rest of the war. Their followers continued and intensified the feud and even came to armed clashes.

Both factions of the OUN and similar groups strengthened themselves first along the borders and commenced to smuggle arms and ammunition from the west, so as to be prepared to act in case there came an armed clash between Germany and the USSR. Then, as the months passed, the network extended further into the country and the OUN became organized on a territorial basis under a Country Executive and the Country Leader, who were assisted by expert advisers on military affairs and propaganda.

While the two imperialistic powers were still friends, there was little possibility for open sabotage. The chief work of the Ukrainian patriotic underground was the spreading of the national spirit, the encouraging of the spirits of the oppressed, and the secret education of the masses in the hope of later action. They sought to counterbalance the Soviet propaganda and their efforts to enlist the young people in the Komsomols and train them as Communists. They worked upon some of the eastern Ukrainians who were moved by the Soviet regime to the west and they brought it about that some of these remained behind and joined their ranks when the break finally came in 1941.

Despite the efforts of the leaders to hold their followers in check, they were not always successful for some of the younger members were so enraged by the Bolshevik tactics that they could not be restrained from attempting individual acts of reprisal. These

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To round out the picture, however, one must add that the methods employed by the Ukrainians to win ground back from the Poles were not limited to cultural development. In line with the policy described above, the Germans frequently appointed mayors of ethnographically mixed towns from among the Ukrainian element, thus giving the latter a decided advantage in the civil administration. The separate police system was also staffed in a manner favorable to the Ukrainians, although the Germans closely supervised this force. Nevertheless, in numerous cases their position in the police detachments enabled the Ukrainians to harass and even to attack the Poles.[20]

While the Ukrainian nationalist forces were being strengthened by the creation of a new base in the Generalgouvernement, the OUN was being gravely weakened by a fierce internal conflict. The fundamental causes of this conflict have been examined in the preceding chapters. Its catalytic element was the liberation of the most active leaders of the younger generation from the Polish prisons.

In Cracow, where most went, they came into contact with the comrades with whom they had fought and suffered before their imprisonment, and a new grouping rapidly coalesced. The nominal leader was Volodymyr Lopatyns'kyi, who was the official director of the *krai* OUN—i.e., the organization on Ukrainian ethnographical territory in Poland.[21] Along with him came other young men who had long been active in the struggle against the Polish authorities—John Gavrusevych, Iaroslav Horbovyi, Leo Rebet, and many others. For the most part these men, vigorous as they were, had been confined, by the nature of their conspiratorial work, to Poland, and consequently were not very familiar with the broader aspects of the OUN. They were a hardened group of rebels, remarkably courageous and inured to a life of insecurity, but deprived by this very training of

[20] Activity report of the chief of the Ordnungspolizei, November 11, 1940, Occ E-2 (11), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-2 [11]). This German official reported that "lack of proper training" enabled the Ukrainian auxiliary police to take a partisan, even a vicious attitude toward the Poles, and gave as an example the necessity of arresting two Ukrainian officers who had failed to hinder attacks on Poles by armed Ukrainians.

[21] Interviews 24, 75.

668* the opportunity to consider theoretical and complex questions. ●578 There were among them, however, two young men who had recently had the opportunity of observing the workings of the organizational headquarters at first hand. One was Dmytro Myron, who was later to prove to be a talented organizer of undergrounds in the East Ukraine. The other was Iaroslav Stets'ko.[22]

Among the entire group, Stets'ko (a priest's son) was distinguished by his quick intelligence and ability to generalize his experiences in the form of political prescriptions. Like most of the others, he had been sentenced to imprisonment in connection with the mass trial of OUN members in 1936. However, he had not been proved to have been as deeply implicated as many, and consequently was released before the outbreak of war. Taking an active part in the organizational work of the OUN, he was called to Rome by Mel'nyk in the summer of 1939 to help in preparation of the Second Congress. Stets'ko's role in Rome is not entirely clear. According to one version, he was relieved of his preparatory duties by Stsibors'kyi when he proved unable to carry them out satisfactorily;[23] if this is true, the implied rebuke was hardly likely to increase his love for his supplanter, and might indeed have sown a seed of resentment against the entire leadership. At any rate, it appears clear that the Provid was not prescient enough to seize the opportunity to secure the lasting loyalty of this brilliant young OUN member.

668* In retrospect, at least, Stets'ko was doubtful of the wisdom of the policy he saw being implemented by the older men. It was a cautious policy, and a particularly distasteful aspect of its caution, according to Stets'ko, was the care taken to maintain good relations with Germany, in spite of the repeated disappointments which that power had inflicted on the Ukrainians. Before the close of the Rome meeting, however, Stets'ko had a reassuring conversation with Mel'nyk; after this, he temporarily threw his support behind his chief. Mel'nyk might have had some qualms about exalting himself as the chief of the Provid. In his youthful enthusiasm Stets'ko was willing to accept—at least in theory—

[22] Jaroslaw Stecko.
[23] Interview 67.

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the full implications of the authoritarian strain in OUN ideology. 668*
In an enthusiastic speech he praised Mel'nyk as a great leader, a heroic fighter, and called for unswerving loyalty to him such as had been accorded Konovalets'—"The leader is dead, long live the leader!" [24]

By the beginning of 1940, Stets'ko, under the impact of the 668*
fresh defeat of the OUN policy of alignment with the Germans 578
and the stimulation of more impatient members of his group, had begun to express grave doubts concerning the official leaders of the party. His abilities made him a valuable member of the emerging faction, but it was not the kind of body which seeks its leader among intellectuals. The basic charge which it made against the older generation was that it was timid, lacking in determination; consequently, it was fitting that the rebel group chose a leader who possessed to an unusual degree the qualities of inflexible will and readiness for desperate action. This leader was found in the peasant-born chief of the terrorist group which had carried out the attacks on the Polish officials—Stephen Bandera.

By January, 1940, the new alignment was sufficiently solidified for Bandera and Lopatyns'kyi to be able to go to Mel'nyk in Rome with a series of demands.[25] It is not clear precisely what these demands were, for the participants in the clash have held to opposite versions. According to Bandera's supporters, the kernel of their declaration was a demand for a change in orientation of OUN policy to make it less dependent on the Germans. In particular, they say their leaders demanded that Mel'nyk take the headquarters of the organization to a neutral state, and from this vantage point bring about cooperation between the OUN and the Western powers in forming a legion composed of Ukrainians in France to aid Finland in her defense against Soviet

[24] Text in *Nastup*, December 13, 1941, p. 3. This article was of course published long after the break, in order to discredit the Bandera followers. There is no doubt that an article of this general tenor was written, however. The discussion of this opening phase has been based primarily on interviews (24 and 67) with Ukrainian leaders particularly well acquainted with both sides of this early stage of the controversy.

[25] Stepan (Stephen) Bandera, "V desiatu richnytsiu stvorennia Revoliutsiinoho Provodu OUN" (On the Tenth Anniversary of the Creation of the Revolutionary Directorate of the OUN), *Surma* (February-March, 1950), p. 6

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668* attack.[26] While these contentions have a certain air of plausibility, 578 in view of the past and future collaboration of the group around Mel'nyk with the Germans, the adherents of the official leader point out that Bandera himself cooperated with the Germans when it suited his purpose and that Mel'nyk followers in France worked with zeal for just such a legion as Bandera's supporters assert *they* proposed.[27]

While the content of many of the demands presented by Bandera and Lopatyns'kyi is disputed, it is generally agreed that the most precisely formulated item concerned a change in the composition of the Provid. The *krai* leaders demanded the dismissal of Baranovs'kyi,[28] Senyk, and Stsibors'kyi. Because of the influence exercised by the two last-named leaders, compliance with this demand would have meant a real revolution in the direction of the OUN, especially since Bandera and his companion urged that they be replaced by adherents of the younger group. Aside from the intrinsic importance of this element of the dispute, however, the reasons presented by the two emissaries do much to reveal the psychology of the young rebels.

The charge made against Senyk harks back to the earliest stages of dissension between the two generations in the Nationalist organization. When Bandera, Stets'ko, and the other Galician terrorists were arrested for attacks on Polish government officials, they were confronted with a mass of written evidence of conspiracy which made their defense hopeless, under the conditions prevailing in Poland. This material was obtained by the Poles from Czech officials, who had in turn obtained it in some unknown manner. What is clear, however, is that Senyk, in his capacity as administrative assistant to Konovalets', had initially prepared the documents. The *krai* group was bitter over this occurrence, attributing it to Senyk's negligence in preparing such dangerous documents and then in failing to safeguard them prop-

* Unlike the projected UNR legion mentioned in the preceding chapter, the OUN plan called for an armed unit entirely separate from the émigré Polish forces.

[27] Interview 52.

[28] For the involved charges against Baranovs'kyi, see *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 37; Interview 75.

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erly. Whether they were correct in this judgment is hard to determine, but one can readily understand how such a feeling could develop into hatred during the harsh years in prison. More fundamentally, however, the accusation indicates the difficult position of those who endeavor to direct a fanatic underground movement from outside the country where the movement must exist and suffer. It also sharply illuminates the basic tension between the man of action, of revolutionary *élan,* and the administrator who is never quite regarded as pulling his share of the load.

The accusation against Stsibors'kyi is even more revealing. Several years previously, when he was an editor of *Ukraïnske Slovo,* the OUN organ in Paris, Stsibors'kyi had been approached in the newspaper office by a Communist agent who tried to persuade him to betray the national cause. Instead of throwing the man out, so the story goes, Stsibors'kyi had engaged him in an ideological debate. The Bandera group now alleged that Stsibors'kyi had failed to act promptly because he was really considering the Communist's proposal, and bolstered their charge by asserting that the presence of Stsibors'kyi's sister in Kiev gave the Soviet network a grip on him. In view of Stsibors'kyi's vigor in the anti-Communist cause, before and after the incident, this accusation appears highly implausible. The emphasis on the culpability of his arguing with the Communist is, on the other hand, highly illuminating. As has been indicated, Stsibors'kyi was a born theorist, a man who served the movement primarily by words. Paradoxically, his own theory emphasized will, the need for action, and the primacy of the *Volkgeist.* It remained—a sort of poetic retribution—that his most extreme disciples, trained to condemn the rationalist, turned first against his reputation, and then in deadly earnest against his person.[29]

[29] The preceding discussion of the reasons for the split has been based primarily on interviews (especially 24, 52, 67, 75) with several of the principal protagonists and their close adherents. Published sources which deal with the controversy include Bandera and *OUN u Viini,* pp. 34–35, which represent the opposing viewpoints. Somewhat more impartial (though leaning toward the Mel'nyk side) is Vasyl' Rudko ("R. Lisovii"), "Rozlam v OUN" (The Split in the OUN), *Ukraïns'ki Visiti,* May 25, 1949, p. 3, and October 27, 1949, p. 3. Rudko also avoids attributing too much importance to the ostensible grounds of the split emphasized by both sides and correctly stresses that the principal source of conflict was a difference in temperament and background between the two generations.

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668* 578 Whatever discussion may have taken place over the *krai* representatives' other proposals, there is no question but that Mel'nyk firmly rejected the demand to dismiss his colleagues. His critics assert that this action is evidence of his inflexibility, or even of his haughty attitude toward the younger members of the organization. His admirers maintain that it is convincing proof of his devotion to principle, his loyalty to faithful companions. Whichever judgment is correct, the failure to reach an agreement soon led to open conflict. Bandera and Lopatyns'kyi returned home, and on February 10, at a secret conclave of the Galician youth leaders in Cracow, Bandera was designated the chief of a new, "revolutionary" Provid.[30]

Most of the remainder of 1940 was spent in a sharp struggle of the opposing factions to consolidate positions and win over uncommitted elements. At first the contest was conducted with some restraint on both sides. There remained some possibility of reconciliation.[31] Antagonism between the rival factions was greatly exacerbated, however, by efforts of the *krai* group to win over some of the senior members of the organization. Nearly all of the latter felt it was the height of presumption for the younger men to form a counter-directorate. Moreover, they asserted that the attempts of the Bandera followers to gain their sympathy amounted to urging them to betray their comrades; thus they felt the proposals were dishonorable as well as impertinent.[32] On the other hand, the young generation felt that it was merely attempting to overthrow an inflexible and arbitrary leadership in order to carry out the true aims of the organization. Consequently they bitterly resented the scornful rejection accorded them by the older men.

Matters came to a head with a series of coups and counter-coups in midsummer. For example, a group of young Bandera adherents tried to take over the headquarters of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow. The administrative officials, most of whom were not affiliated with the OUN, regarded them with more annoyance than outright hostility, but when Colonel Sushko

[30] Bandera, p. 4.

[31] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, October 19, 1941, p. 2; Bohdan Mykhailiuk, *Bunt Bandery* (Bandera's Rebellion) (1950), pp. 52 ff.

[32] *OUN u Viini*, p. 37.

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returned he quickly ejected them.[33] Then, in August, he led a small group of his followers, probably drawn from the auxiliary police units in which he was active, in a raid on the Bandera headquarters in Cracow, which resulted in the disruption of their clandestine press and the seizure of a number of documents.[34] By that time all negotiations for reunion had been broken off, and by November the conflict flared up in open violence in the streets of Cracow.[35]

The conflict constantly grew more bitter, not only in the Generalgouvernement, but also in Greater Germany. Here all Ukrainians (except the adherents of the Het'man's Hromada, who, as has been pointed out, were in the great majority East Ukrainians) were supposed to be joined in the UNO (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Ob"iednannia—Ukrainian National Union) which was accorded semiofficial recognition by the German authorities. Officially the organization was nonpartisan; it recognized nationalism as the guiding ideology, however, and in practice was a social and welfare adjunct of the OUN.[36] At the head of this group stood Colonel Tymosh Omel'chenko who, like the other leading members, was a strong supporter of the Nationalists. Like most of their generation, these men sided with Mel'nyk and the "legitimate" Provid when the younger generation broke away. They ordered all members to report attempts at "disruptive work"[37] and eventually cleansed the organization of active supporters of Bandera.[38] Their stand was of importance, for the UNO was constantly growing in numbers and strength in this period, due to the heavy influx of Ukrainians from the areas occupied by Hungary and the USSR. Whereas in 1937 it had only a few score members, nearly four hundred were added in 1938, about two thousand in 1939, and almost eleven thousand in 1940.[39] Since the Ukrainian immigrants were largely factory and agricultural workers, branches were formed in numerous towns throughout

[33] Interview 9.
[34] *OUN u Viini*, p. 33n; Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 4.
[35] *Nastup*, November 16, 1940; *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, December 1, 1940, p. 1.
[36] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, January 10, 1943, p. 3.
[37] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, September 10, 1940, p. 2.
[38] Cf. Occ E-4 (5).
[39] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, January 10, 1943, p. 8.

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668 578 Germany proper, the Protectorate, and the districts newly annexed from Poland.[40] As they were unable to control the accepted organization, however, Bandera's supporters rapidly set about forming cells of their own. Thus by 1941 there were parallel and antagonistic centers of Ukrainian life in many towns and industrial establishments in Greater Germany.[41]

In their efforts to win control of the nationalist movement, both parties resorted to arguments as well as organizational pressure. Much of this was oral, especially on the part of the *krai* group which, in comparison with the Mel'nyk following, possessed neither the physical plant nor the experienced polemicists for a press contest. They stressed the hesitancy and failures of the older Provid, argued that it was dependent on foreigners, and asserted that the other generation of leaders wished to revert to a purely military, tactical organization of the UVO type, leaving political and ideological questions to the legal parties like the UNDO.[42] Fundamentally, however, as previously indicated, the rebels' appeal was to youth, will, action.

The rebuttal offered by Mel'nyk's supporters is easier to follow because it could be expressed in openly published periodicals, although in a somewhat veiled form. Part of the defense was provided by nonmembers, especially by church leaders. Bishop John Buchko, who was considered to be a close associate of Sheptyts'kyi, and who later headed the entire Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, was vigorous in his praise of Mel'nyk. The bishop was at the time in America, where he was making a pastoral visit to Ukrainian immigrants; in an interview in New York he was reported to have declared that the Ukrainian Nationalists represented the flower of the nation and to have said they possessed in Mel'nyk an outstanding personality as

[40] That is, Posen and West Prussia; the UNO did not exist in the Generalgouvernement.

[41] As was indicated somewhat later by the ability of Bandera's followers to obtain from groups of Ukrainians working in Germany the submission of numerous petitions for his release from imprisonment. These documents may be found in Occ E-4 (9), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [9]). See also the denunciation of "diversive work" among Ukrainian workers in Germany in *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, March 30, 1941, p. 1.

[42] Bandera, p. 2. Unfortunately, I have not been able to secure any of the semiclandestine publications of this period. Substantially the same arguments are repeated in a clandestine publication of April, 1942 (*Biuleten'*, No. 4, pp. 5–7).

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leader.[43] As previously noted, Monsignor Voloshyn likewise chose this time to praise Mel'nyk above other Nationalist leaders. In spite of the prestige of their authors, however, it is questionable whether such statements were conducive to strengthening Mel'nyk's position in view of the pronounced anticlericalism of the youthful circles.[44]

A major part of the Mel'nyk adherents' argument, however, consisted of emphasis on the duty, in an authoritarian organization such as the OUN, of subordination to the leadership. As has been shown, Mel'nyk's own character and views rendered this line somewhat ineffective. Nevertheless, the party organs came to carry more and more eulogies of the director, and theoretical discussions of the nature of his position became more frequent.[45] A major problem for any authoritarian organization is the establishment of the legitimacy of the leader. If force cannot quell doubts, appeal must be made to his sanction by some figure of the past who is held in veneration by all. Therefore it was firmly asserted that Konovalets' had designated Mel'nyk as his successor, and that Mel'nyk had called the Rome congress in compliance with his long-range instructions.[46] Those "calling themselves nationalists" yet falling into the "democratic-liberal vices" of individual defiance of authority and party intrigue were roundly denounced.[47] Somewhat later, in stressing the military duty of members of the OUN to observe discipline, one spokesman of the "legitimate" group declared that exclusion from the organization meant "moral death." [48]

There remained yet another area in which the struggle for power was waged. It has been noted that nearly all of the in-

[43] *Nastup*, October 19, 1940, p. 3.

[44] Other influential elements supported Mel'nyk, or at least condemned the tactics of Bandera's followers, but were more guarded in their criticism. Kubiiovych wrote an article deploring the political rashness and violence of the youth (*Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, March 30, 1941, p. 1). A number of professors addressed an appeal for national unity above party interests to Ukrainian youths in the higher schools in Greater Germany (*Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 10, 1941, p. 1).

[45] E.g., on December 14, 1940, *Nastup* devoted the entire first page to Mel'nyk on the occasion of his birthday; again, on December 21, almost all of page 1 was devoted to him.

[46] *Nastup*, October 5, 1940, p. 1.

[47] *Nastup*, October 12, 1940, p. 1.

[48] *Nastup*, May 24, 1941, p. 4.

668* fluential older members rejected the proposals of the Bandera
578 group for alliance. There was one exception—Iarii. The adopted Ukrainian had for some time been at odds with Mel'nyk concerning, it is said, financial accounting and his own desire for freedom from Mel'nyk's control in negotiating with the Germans.[49] In the emergence of a new center Iarii evidently saw an opportunity to escape distasteful subordination to what he considered an émigré clique which was hopelessly confused as to its real aims. Consequently, he broke completely with the old Provid and brought his valuable contacts to the *krai* group, in whose youthful energy he saw the only hope for developing a liberation force.[50] In so doing, however, he helped turn many Ukrainian elements against the new movement, for it appeared strange that among members of the Provid the foreigner alone should have joined Bandera's group. Almost from the beginning this circumstance appears to have given rise to the suspicion that foreign powers—the Soviet Union as well as Germany—had inspired the rebellion to weaken the Nationalist movement.[51] Just what Iarii's relationship to the Germans was is hard to determine, but it appears fairly certain that rumors that he was connected with the Communists are unfounded.

668* Such suspicions did not, however, prevent the *krai* group from proceeding with its organization. As will be shown, a strong network of underground workers was maintained in Soviet-occupied Galicia under authority of the insurgent Provid. In the Generalgouvernement, too, considerable progress was registered. In March, 1941, a general conference of the "OUN-B[andera]" was held in Cracow, called, in rejection of the Rome conference, the "Second Congress of the OUN."[52] By this time, a large part of the younger generation was included in the new movement, and already sub-factions were beginning to appear. On the one hand, the "activists," Bandera and his first lieutenant, Stets'ko, remained

[49] Interview 67.

[50] According to a letter which Iarii wrote to me, dated Easter, 1953.

[51] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, September 10, 1940, p. 2.

[52] Mykola (Nicholas) Lebed', *UPA: Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia* (UPA: The Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) (Presove Biuro UHVR, 1946), p. 14; Petro Mirchuk, *Akt vidnovlennia ukraïns'koï derzhavnosty, 30 chervnia 1941 roku* (The Act of Renewal of Ukrainian Statehood, June 30, 1941) (New York: Holovna Uprava Organizatsiï Oborony Chotyr'okh Svobid Ukraïny, 1952), p. 17.

668* important event in the development of the Zhitomir base—the arrival there of the major leaders of the party, who came to take personal direction of the campaign to win the east. Mel'nyk himself remained behind, perhaps because his departure would have aroused German mistrust, but the top level of the Provid was represented by both Senyk and Stsibors'kyi. With them came Dr. Kandyba, the son of a famous East Ukrainian poet, then still living in emigration. Kandyba, best known as "Ol'zhych," was a young man, still in his thirties. Though trained as an archeologist, for several years he had been very prominent in the ranks of OUN leadership just below the level of the Provid. He was now placed in direct charge of all the advance groups in the East Ukraine.[60]

The three leaders had crossed Galicia in the middle of August, stopping briefly in L'vov. They were careful not to advertise their journey; apparently neither here nor in crossing the border into Volhynia—where a special pass was officially required—were they molested by the Germans. The OUN-M has always denied that there was any agreement with the latter concerning this expedition, but it is highly probable that the Wehrmacht officials in control knew about it, at least unofficially. At any rate, once they had reached Zhitomir, in the last days of August, the OUN leaders acted quite openly. However, their mission came to an abrupt end.

668* 578 At seven thirty on the warm summer evening of August 30, as Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, returning from a gathering of the regional police, were approaching the main street intersection of Zhitomir, a young man approached them from behind and fired two or three pistol shots. One penetrated the back of Senyk's neck; he died instantly. Stsibors'kyi was shot through both cheeks and bled to death a few hours later.[61]

The assassin was shot down by Ukrainian and German policemen as he attempted to flee; a vehicle from the German police command came up immediately afterwards and removed the body. Consequently it was difficult to determine who had insti-

[60] *OUN u Viini*, p. 54.

[61] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3; and the report of an eyewitness to the crime, Interview 35.

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gated the murder. The man's passport, however, indicated that his name was Stephen Kozyi, and that he was a West Ukrainian.[62] Almost at once the Mel'nyk adherents accused the OUN-B of having ordered the assassination, asserting that Kozyi was a member of their group. Strong support was given to their allegation by the following circumstances: (1) the bitter attacks leveled by the OUN-B against the two murdered leaders;[63] (2) the fact, attested in a secret report by one of the most competent German specialists on the Ukraine, that Bandera followers distributed leaflets in Kiev justifying the assassinations shortly after they had occurred;[64] (3) the existence of a secret directive by the OUN-B Provid stating that Mel'nyk leaders were not to be allowed to reach Kiev. Mel'nyk adherents at the time referred to a "death sentence" passed on the two leaders "long before" by the Bandera leadership. Discussing entirely separate events, a pro-Bandera writer has recently declared that the rules of the "Second Bandera Congress" of the OUN forbade "Mel'nyk divergentists" working in the Ukraine.[65] That the OUN-M leaders knew the Bandera supporters might resort to violence is fairly certain. OUN-M sympathizers reported soon after the murders that Senyk and Stsibors'kyi had been warned by friends against the dangers from the rival faction.[66] After the war an official OUN-M source quoted a general warning issued by Mel'nyk in the spring of 1941 concerning his opponents' plans to kill OUN-M leaders.[67]

The OUN-B, on the other hand, has always denied complicity in the crime. It asserts that the deed was the work either of German agents, who intended to weaken the OUN-M by depriving it of leaders who had occasionally opposed German policies and who at the same time intended to arouse Ukrainian opinion against the Bandera group, or of Communists intent on causing conflict between the two Nationalist parties. Some credence is given to the latter theory by the fact that immediately after the

[62] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3; Interview 35.

[63] An article by a "nonparty correspondent" in *Nastup*, October 11, 1941, p. 4, declared that Bandera had proclaimed long before that Senyk and Stsibors'kyi would be the first whom he would destroy "in the Ukrainian lands."

[64] PS 053.

[65] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 1; Chubai, p. 54.

[66] Mykola Halahan in *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, September 28, 1941, p. 2.

[67] This is quoted in *OUN u Vinni*, p. 43.

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668* 578 event the OUN-M accounts described Kazyi as a "hardened Communist," who had, however, turned to the Bandera party.[68] It is difficult to tell whether there was any basis for this statement, for the Mel'nyk adherents were endeavoring to link Bandera's followers to Moscow, which, they assert, had inspired these murders as it had those of Petliura and Konovalets'.[69] Since then, however, there have been rumors that a Ukrainian who was admittedly a former Communist had been in touch with Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, leading to the suspicion that Soviet agents may have planted a betrayer in their entourage.

In view of these discrepancies, it is impossible to be sure who the real authors of the crime were. Knowing the principles and temperament of the Bandera group, however, one must admit that such a deed might not have been repugnant to them. The issuance of a categorical order like that mentioned above, in the heated atmosphere of the period, could very well have led a reckless young member of the OUN-B to the commission of murder. Whether a direct order for the act was given, or whether the consequences of the general order were envisaged by the Bandera Provid at the time it was issued, are questions which can scarcely be answered.

The bloody deed had two immediate results. In the first place it enormously increased the tension between the two factions of the OUN. The Mel'nyk group immediately launched a violent press campaign against the opposing party. It alleged that the OUN-B had carried out a whole series of assassinations of Mel'nyk members in the preceding three months. These are supposed to have included the regional director John Mitsyk and his deputy, Alexander Kuts, in Volhynia, and two leaders of the OUN-M advance groups, Shul'ha and Shubs'kyi.[70] An editorial in *Nastup* declared that "the time of amnesty for them [the Bandera adherents] is past, their sins cannot be forgiven."[71] Mel'nyk, however, refused to countenance violent reprisals. In the same

[68] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3.

[69] *Nastup*, October 4, 1941, p. 4; cf. Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 101, October 2, 1941, pp. 3–4, NO 3157 (hereafter referred to as NO 3157).

[70] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3; *OUN u Viini*, p. 48.

[71] *Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3.

issue of *Nastup* he laid full responsibility for the crime on the "divergentists," but merely ordered all Ukrainians to refrain from contact with them and expressed the hope that the tragedy would purge Ukrainian life of crime and anarchy.[72] 668* 518

Whatever responsibility they may have borne for the assassinations, the Bandera followers were quickly visited with retribution. The Germans arrested all OUN-B members in Zhitomir itself, and a number were executed. During the early part of September, SS *Einsatzgruppen* arrested and executed most of the members of three of the subgroups of the southern task force, at Balta, Nikolaev, and the Crimean city of Dzhankoi.[73] In Nikolaev at least, the OUN-M adherents denounced their pro-Bandera rivals to the Germans.[74] The expedition to the southern peninsula had been a favorite project of the OUN-B, and its complete annihilation was a severe blow to their hopes. Moreover, although some members were able to go underground, OUN-B activity in Kirovograd and Krivoi Rog (Krivyi Rih) and other places in the south-central Ukraine was seriously crippled. Still more disheartening, the sections of the northern task forces which had been heading for Kiev to "proclaim" the Ukrainian state there, as had been done in L'vov, were broken up by the Germans in Vasil'kov (Vasyl'kiv) and Fastov (Fastiv).[75] Some of the members fled to Polessia, where they hid in the forests; a few apparently slipped by secretly into the capital. Significantly for the direction of future operations, the chief remaining center of the OUN-B was in Dniepropetrovsk. 668* 661

That indignation over the murders prompted this far-reaching repression of the Bandera party is improbable in view of the contempt in which the SS at least held all Ukrainians. Neverthe-

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[73] Matla, p. 22. That the arrests were not all part of a concerted plan is indicated by the fact that part were carried out by the Rumanians in their area of occupation. The latter warned the Ukrainians to get out of this area but told them they did not care what they did on the other side of the line of demarcation (cf. Chubai, p. 56). The executions in Zhitomir evidently took place immediately after the assassinations (Ie. Stakhiv, p. 39). On the destruction of the Crimean groups see also Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the *Einsatzgruppen* of the SP and the SD in the USSR, December, 1941, NO 2659 (hereafter referred to as NO 2659).

[74] The accusation to this effect in Matla, p. 22, is confirmed by NO 3187.

[75] PS 053.

[Killing of Senyk & Stsibors'kyi, August 30, 1941 -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

661 reserved for the capital. A number of OUN-M activities there,
668* without being considered important enough to require drastic action, had contributed to a feeling of irritation on the part of the
[204] Himmler henchmen. A famous poetess, Olena Teliha, had created an unauthorized Nationalist literary periodical, *Litvary*. A youth group Sich was considered potentially dangerous. A Ukrainian National Council (Rada) had been formed by the Mel'nyk group to act as a symbol of unity in the East Ukraine and, they hoped, eventually to become the central organ of nationalist activities. The risks involved in such activity, in view of the attitude of the real rulers of Germany, were fully understood by the Wehrmacht officers, one of whom advised the Ukrainians to transform the Council into a more innocuous Aid Committee. When this advice was refused, the Council was formally dissolved (November 17), and went underground.[25] The SP authorities were aware of the organ's continued existence, and while they regarded it as too insignificant for immediate suppression, it increased their distrust of the Nationalists.[26] With this background, one can understand why the first blow fell upon the legal, but extremely Nationalist, *Ukraïns'ke Slovo*. Its large circulation—over fifty thousand [27]—gave it, in the eyes of the police, the potentiality of dangerous influence. Moreover, the editorial staff of this organ, as was previously noted, was composed very largely of West Ukrainians and old émigrés; these elements were regarded as especially dangerous by the SS leadership.

668* Unfortunately for the Nationalist cause, during their two months' activity in Kiev the newcomers had also lost ground in
578 local opinion. Some of the antipathy which they aroused stemmed from the fact that they were outsiders; even those who had been born in the East Ukraine or, like Kandyba, whose father had been born there, had long been out of touch with the local population. With some justification, because they were better organized, had clearer concepts of what they wanted, and were used to displaying initiative, the OUN group took a leading, oc-

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[26] PS 3876.
[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 15, 1942, p. 5.

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casionally a monopolistic part in municipal activities. As was 668*
inevitable, they sometimes exhibited an attitude of superiority; 578 ●
even when they behaved more tactfully, many local inhabitants nevertheless were inclined to suspect that they harbored such an attitude. Their presence in municipal offices, even when they were on a plane of equality with local officeholders, was bound to lead to some friction. Moreover, emphasis on the principle of integral nationalism meant the neglect of social welfare and civil rights questions which were of great concern to the local population after twenty years of Soviet rule. The "leader principle," which was expressed in the East Ukraine in as extreme terms as Mel'nyk ever permitted it in the emigration, was alien to the native inhabitants. The slogan "Petliura, Konovalets', Mel'nyk—three names, one idea" was at first meaningless to the average East Ukrainian, since the second and third of these names were unknown to him. When their meaning was explained, the phrase signified to many that after Petliura's death the nationalist movement had fallen into the hands of leaders from the half-alien West Ukraine.[28]

All of these irritations might have been accepted, however, had 668*
it not been for an ideological theme which resulted in more prac- 186
tical discomfort. The Nationalist creed required emphasis on the "purity" of the Ukrainian people. According to the OUN leaders' belief, this "purity" had been endangered by the intrusion of Russian elements—the physical immigration of Russians, who had become especially numerous in Kiev bureaucratic and intellectual circles, and the penetration of Russian influences into Ukrainian culture and speech. The extent of this penetration will be discussed in a later chapter; it is necessary to point out its importance here, however, in order to understand the Kiev reaction to OUN policy. The Nationalists set about radically "purging"

[28] Surviving OUN-M publications of this period are rare, many existing only in private collections. *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk* of September 28, 1941, p. 3 contains a reprint of a leaflet distributed in the East Ukraine describing Mel'nyk as the successor of Konovalets', who in turn was a successor of Petliura, "killed by the Jew Shvartsvart." For a criticism of OUN propaganda in the East Ukraine during this period, and notes on the reaction of the local population, see the account of the East Ukrainian émigré Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

surrounding areas, as because it exerted influence upon them. The 668*
chief channels by which it did so were the Prosvita organizations, the newspaper, and the church. A leader of the independent nationalist group estimates that its influence, exercised primarily through the Prosvita, reached as far west as Lubny and Poltava,[16] and there is evidence that it also played a part in organization as far south as the northern Donbas.[17] *Nova Ukraïna* was also widely known, serving as a model for nationalist editors in the "Left Bank" region who wanted to pursue as independent a line as possible and hence rejected the guidance of *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*.

The special role played by the church of Kharkov merits more 793
than passing mention. When the Germans arrived, they found 578
that an elderly prelate, Archbishop Theophilus, had survived the 186
Soviet period. Seventy-six years old, a native of a village of the Khoral (Khorol) region in the heart of the "Left Bank" Ukraine, he had become a priest in 1885.[18] With the aid of local clergymen, he reassumed control of ecclesiastical life in Kharkov in late 1941 and claimed to be in charge of the entire "Left Bank" as Metropolitan of the Ukraine.[19] Many—especially in the Autocephalous Church—criticized him because he was consecrated bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church (in 1923) and because he continued to use Old Slavonic in the liturgy.[20] Others, however, saw him as a Ukrainian patriot, since he was Ukrainian by birth, spoke pure Ukrainian, celebrated a service in commemoration of Kruty, and praised the Ukrainian newspaper.[21] At any rate the dissidents were able to make little progress against him; only two Lypkivite priests had survived, while Theophilus's clergy numbered more than one hundred.[22] However, the latter appear to have been subjected to very loose control by the archbishop and

[16] *Ibid.*
[17] Interview 68.
[18] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 15, 1943, p. 3.
[19] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 5, 1943, p. 2; March 6, 1942, p. 3.
[20] Interview 69. A letter to Archbishop Hilarion from one of his former pupils in the Kharkov area, asking his advice on reorganization of the church, suggests that all were not satisfied with Theophilus' ascendancy, even at an early date (*Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, February 10, 1942, p. 4).
[21] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 5, 1942, p. 4; January 24, 1943, p. 2; May 15, 1943, p. 3.
[22] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, February 10, 1942, p. 4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 5, 1943, p. 2.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

793 to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services accord-
●578 ing to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of
186 the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left" as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

668* It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

727 Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor
661 were shot by German police; the city passed under the control
204 of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.

[24] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.

[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.

[26] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.

[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.

[28] Interview 47.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

727 April 1918. The capital of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' had all the appearance of a big Russian town living an animated and even boisterous life owing to the presence of large numbers of Russian and foreign 'guests'. Except for the names of certain shops which were written up in Ukrainian and the picturesque uniforms of the *Rada* regiments, there was no indication of 'the beginning of a new life'. Ukrainian was only spoken in Government offices and during the sittings of the *Rada*. This official language imported from Galicia was not always easily understood by the inhabitants of Russian Ukraine.

In the environment of the Union of *Khliboroby* and of the fashionable fugitives from the north the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* easily found a convenient person who could be the head of the administration which was to replace the Government of the *Rada*.

General Paul Skoropadsky had the advantage of being a descendant of that amiable and pliable Hetman who had been chosen by Peter the Great to succeed Mazeppa. An officer of the Chevaliers Gardes Regiment, he had distinguished himself during the war, first in command of a Guards Brigade and later of a Guards Division. Of Ukrainian origin and property, he belonged to a wealthy and distinguished family. Furthermore, General Skoropadsky was endowed with the necessary ambition, and had no objection to undertaking an important political role even if it should be a difficult one. He had many connections with the Union of Cornraisers and had established excellent relations with the German Command, which now designated him as their chosen 'Head of the State' when the propitious moment for his elevation should arise.

727 642 [579] That moment arrived when at last the *Rada* learned about the Order issued by Field-Marshal Eichhorn, and peasant riots—provoked by the Order—broke out in the southern parts of the Governments of Kiev and Poltava. The members of the *Rada* were in a state of agitation; not only Petlyura and the extremists were urging opposition to the German measures, but also some of the cabinet ministers—including Lubinsky, that incorrigibly eloquent 'student' of the Congress of Brest-Litovsk. The German Command was well aware of the movement of opinion in the *Rada* and on 24 April they signed a formal agreement with Skoropadsky. Lüdendorff approved the choice of 'a man with whom one can work well' (Lüdendorff, *War Memoirs*, p. 624). On the same day the *Rada* declared the Order of Field-Marshal Eichhorn to be illegal and non-existent. Two days later, during a sitting of the *Rada*, a detachment of German soldiers entered the hall under the command of an officer who gave the abrupt order, 'Hands up!' The outraged deputies were searched for

11: Obermaier--87 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[Galicia]* [Volhynia]

Galicia and Volhynia bore the main burden of 668
the struggle of nationalities. The fight was carried
on in a legal manner through self-supporting organizations such as economic cooperative societies, private schools and societies of public interest, and illegally through revolutionary secret organizations threatening the state. The first of these secret societies was the "Ukrainian Military Organization" (UVO). Its members were primarily soldiers of the former West Ukrainian army. A second sabotage organization, that of the Communists, worked hand in glove with the UVO. The UVO was /86/ dissolved in 1928 by Polish agents, which was not a particularly clever achievement, considering the poverty of its members. The same happened to the Ukrainian Communists at the hands of delegated Jews who acted upon orders from the Warsaw office of the Komintern. Meanwhile a new terroristic secret society had been formed, the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN), which has caused the Polish authorities the greatest concern, especially since October 1938. All attempts to dissolve the OUN from within or to neutralize it by creating groups of Polonophiles have failed. Elements that could be bought were often enough obliged to pay for their treason with death.

Two years after the founding of the OUN,* in 668
late summer of 1930, the farms and estates of
Polish settlers in Galicia went up in flames and 579
in some places the harvest burned up in the fields.
Also, telegraph wires were cut. Since it was hard to sell grain, Polish landowners used the terrorist methods of the OUN in individual regions as an excuse to collect insurance fraudulently; they set fire to their own buildings. The answer
of the Poles to the wave of sabotage of the OUN* 558
can be read between the lines of the petition of 60 members of the British House of Commons to the

* [i.e., Ukrainian Terroristic Secret Society - Analyst]

593 meetings ("posydilky" and "Vetshernytsi"), and even at the
●584 street meetings that are held at night ("vulytsja"); marriage is
591 seldom an affair of arrangement. After marriage, children generally leave their parents' home; a father often provides a home of his own for a son who wishes to marry.

586 Divorce is rare in the country. An unlucky choice of a conjugal
836 partner is borne with patience. Up till recently, in spite of the fact that boys and girls are constantly thrown together at work and at play, a high standard of chastity prevailed and illicit sexual intercourse was the exception. A "pokrytka" who has been seduced by a Russian soldier ("saldatka") or a foreigner (mostly a Pole) has no easy lot in the country. The whole family is deeply ashamed when the "bundling" custom ("komora") which is still practised in some parts of the country reveals that the
183 bride is no longer a virgin. Customs have been strengthened
561 by the respect for national traditions, a deep religious feeling and tolerance. Birth, baptism, marriage, death and burial are accompanied by very many, original, symbolic customs, dating partly from before the birth of Christ. For instance, the old custom of duly "recognising" the newborn has been preserved as well as the ceremony of the baptismal banquet which marks the reception of the newly born child into the community.

585 In the varied wedding customs which generally take the better part of three days, there are memories of the days when the men of the tribe kidnapped or bought their brides. A marriage in a national setting has many dramatic effects and is accompanied by a whole series of symbolical actions and choruses. They remind us of the original rôle of the family in society. Customs from the world of the Grand Princes have been preserved in those marriage rites as in the ritualistic folk-songs, while the influence of the church is confined to the
765 actual ceremony in the church. The wake ("posyzhinja") and the wake games, which are dying out, are echoes of ancestor-worship and intended to prevent the dead from returning to life. The custom of special laments for the dead ("holosinnia") and the funeral banquet (formerly "tryzna") have persisted; on the many days of commemoration of the dead (e. g. on the

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3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

In the northern zone of the country, including northern parts 144
of the Kyiv and Chernyhiv areas and Northern Volynia purely Nordic elements prevail, alongside of Subnordic, Nordic and Laponoid mixtures; the middle zone is mostly Dinaric, above all in Podolia and Southern Volynia, Eastern Galicia (without the Hutsuly and Bojky) and in the extreme east of the Kharkiv area.

But the Dinaric domain proper is the southern zone of Ukraine, including Carpathian Ukraine, the Hutsul area, Bucovina, Southern Podolia and all adjacent territory in the south and south-east including the Crimea and the Kuban area. Ukrainians in this area are definitely short-headed, darkish, tall, (about 5 ft. 9) and most resemble the South Slavs. On the middle reaches of the Dnister, the Prut and the Boh there are more marked traces of the Mediterranean race.

A certain deliberateness and modesty are characteristic for 157
the Ukrainian who is most sensitive to impressions from without, though he reacts slowly to them. He is of balanced, even temperament and has humor and irony which help him to cope with the irritations of everyday life. He judges life from the standpoint of feeling; favorable climatic conditions and the relatively easy work in the fields betray him into a certain quiescence. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian loves his work and is most active in intellectual, artistic and practical provinces. On the other hand, hard times both in the past and at present have made him suspicious and increased his innate individualism. In social intercourse, for instance, although he is friendly, he is reserved rather than importunate. Revenge and cruelty are foreign to his nature.

As is the case with most old peasant peoples, the relation- 156
ship of the Ukrainian to others is based on definite forms, that express social culture, good manners, courtesy and hospitality. Contrary to the Russian custom, authority in the home is 593 ●
shared by the head of the house and his wife; the functions of the latter extend beyond the duties of housekeeping and the upbringing of children and she has a say in all economic questions. Children enjoy a relatively generous amount of freedom and may be present at the customary morning and evening

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152 Love plays a great part in all spheres of life in Ukraine,
593 though it is less connected with eroticism than in other countries; it is first and foremost the product or the accompaniment of the relation between mother and child. Maternal love, in all its possible manifestations, is one of the spiritual prisms through which most of the phenomena of public and private life are regarded and acquire their particular color. Love comprehends an enormous complex of motives which have found expression in literature, art and music.

812 I do not intend to dwell on the manifestations of this emotion in daily life. But I should like to refer to Jurkevych, one of the few Ukrainian philosophers in the 19th century who gave his coutrymen what may be called a philosophy of the heart, a system ruthlessly opposed to the materialism at that time in vogue and also to the almost mechanical rationalism and intellectualism.

In analysing problems of contemporary philosophy, Jurkevych comes to the conclusion that a system of philosophy expressed in functions of the reason is quite incapable of including the entire and real human being. A certain modesty with regards to the limits of human knowledge is characteristic for Ukrainian philosophers. These limits are the result of the fact that human reason and its capacity of knowing the world hide another, more profound, function of the human spirit on which reason is based and which provides it with possibilities of development. This original function of the human spirit, which is fully acknowledged by Skovoroda but mentioned by I. T. Stavrovetskyj as early as the 17th century, is the human heart. The philosophy of the heart which Jurkevych has developed in his work on „The Heart and Its Importance for the Psychic Life of Man" is the most characteristic feature of the transition from Platonism to recent philosophy; but it is directly opposed to Kant and his school.

I have deliberately dwelt on Jurkevych as a representative of Ukrainian philosophy, as his theory is doubtless influenced by certain characteristics typical for the Ukrainian view of life. One of Jurkevych's pupils, Vladimir Solowjev, later a famous Russian thinker, when writing of his teacher, rightly emphasises

857 Before the age of twelve or thirteen, boys and girls rarely ever play together or have any other contact with each other. Whenever children are seen at play, a strict separation of the sexes is noticed. This is not the result of any special instruction on the part of the parents, and still less the outcome of imitation. [562] Besides their different spheres of interest, the boys manifest a certain pride and self-consciousness which causes them to band together, leaving the girls to themselves. With puberty, however, boys and girls mix freely and seek each other's company. Peasant children scarcely recognize any distinction between rich and poor; the sons and daughters of the wealthy associate with those of the poor without consciousness of superiority or inferiority on either side.[71]

538 861 593 The philosophy of parents with regard to the training of their children, in so far as they can be said to have one, is summed up in the following proverbial expressions: "The granting of freedom to children means the constraint of the parents";[72] or, "Give the children freedom and you will find yourself in slavery."[73] Other examples of folk wisdom reveal a similar attitude: "A child will not grow up without a rod." "Do not give in to a child." "Love your child with your heart and drive it with your hands."[74] "Love your child like your soul, and shake it like the pear tree."[75] The burden of rearing children, although actually not very heavy, is, nevertheless, a source of complaint and finds expression in proverbs, *e.g.*, "To feed a child is like carrying a rock." "Small children don't let you sleep, and big ones don't let you live." "Whoever has no children does not know what trouble is."[76] Other proverbs reflect an opposite attitude towards children: "A mother of ten is a joy."[77] "If God grants children, He will provide for them."[78]

SAMUEL KOENIG

[71] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 8–9.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[113] [73] Franko, I., "Halicko-ruski narodni prypowidky," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (vols. xvi, xxiii–xxiv, Lwów, 1905–1908), xvi, 562.

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 563–564.

[75] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 8.

[76] Franko, *op. cit.*, pp. 564, 600.

[77] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 179.

[78] Franko, *op. cit.*, p. 598.

433 of the working time in July of this year...The Stalingrad plant presents a similar picture." (131) Where there is no needle there are no

131. Keyserlingk: The Russian Worker Lives in this way, page 25.

clothes. Pravda of May 8, 1939, criticizes the decrease in coal mining in the Donbas as follows: "The mine which determines the fate of the entire trust is behind schedule. It would seem as though the scandalous production which has lasted for a considerable time now would have been given serious consideration. The management of the mine is now trying to explain the poor production by the fact that the workers are leaving in order to attend to their spring planting." Visti of June 10, 1939, supplements this by reporting that the constant decrease of coal mining in the Donets Basin is forcing the economic management of Soviet Ukraine to increase the production of brown coal and turf.

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562 By reason of the Soviet Constitution, the
461 East Ukrainian woman has an equal position with
594 the man. This means that she has the same meager
[465] rights and the same heavy duties. Since the wages of the man are not adequate to support the family, the woman must also earn some of the daily bread. Thus the woman is a worker. The elimination of Sundays and holidays, the long trips to work, the standing-in-line for hours to get food, the shifting of days off in the different plants, the incredible housing shortage, the rearing of children in institutions, the easy divorces of "couples living together" - all this disrupts the family.
594 The devastating consequences which are bound to
161 result from the disregard /181/ of the family,

594 16 this seed of all political life, may be surmised from the census of January 1939. On the basis of the estimated increase during the period of the New Economic Policy, the Soviet Union should have had 183 million inhabitants. Instead there were 170 million all told. There are 13 million souls missing - twice the number of the Czech nation!

462 The book entitled 'Woman in Socialistic Ukraine which appeared in Kiyev in 1937, tells of the triumphs of the Ukrainian woman, not in love and not in the family, but in the field of industry. According to this book, the Ukrainian woman has already "conquered" her position in all branches of industry, coal mines not excepted. In 1936, women comprised the following percentages of the total number of workers: in the building industry 18.3 percent, in the mining industry 26.3 percent, in the chemical industry 26.3 percent in the iron-industry 20.9 percent, and in the construction of machines 21.1 percent. There were 14,274 women engineers and technicians in 1936, and nearly half of the total number of physicians were women (9398). Moreover, the woman of Soviet Ukraine - always according to this book - takes an active part in the defense of the state as pilot, teacher, auto technician, as members of the parachute troops and so forth.

[29] On the subject ot the wardrobe of these industrious workers it is divulged that 37 percent of all Ukrainian women own two or more coats, 24.4 percent own two or more cloth or silk dresses, 40.5 percent have five changes of underwear and 38.7 percent have two or more pairs of leather shoes. It is taken for granted that all the other women have only one coat, one cloth or silk dress, one pair of shoes and no more than four changes of underwear.

And their feminine ambition? "Hanna Bondarenko, railroad engineer on the line 'Voroshilov',

While the father, who takes
851 a passive part throughout the ceremony,[35] busies himself with
608 supplying the assembled guests with drinks, the *baba* repairs to
553 the village to invite the godparents (*kumy*) to the christening. The number of men and women asked to act in this capacity ranges from a single couple to as many as fifteen, depending upon the wealth and social status of the parents. The most desirable godparents are the couple who acted as best man and
851 maid of honour at the wedding of the parents.[36] A pregnant
608 woman, too, is considered a most acceptable godmother, for a
784 child held during baptism by such a woman is assured of good
777 luck. An enceinte woman, however, seldom consents to play the rôle, since her own child may be harmed thereby.[37] The wealthier and more prominent the godparents, the more desirable they are. If the parents have been unfortunate in rearing children, however, they invite a couple of wandering beggars to act as godparents and treat them with the greatest of courtesy. This, it is asserted, will change the luck of the parents, and will make the child grow and be healthy.[38] For two women to reciprocate as godmothers is considered not only unwise but a downright sin.[39] Near neighbours, too, make anything but good godparents. Since the two families live in close contact, it is almost inevitable that a quarrel shall sometime arise between them, and tradition as well as propriety strongly disapproves of unfriendly relations with one's *kumy*.[40] Contrary to what one might expect, for a gypsy to hold a child at baptism is supposed to bring it good luck, especially in trade and horse-raising.[41]

851 The midwife approaches the people selected as godparents
608 with these words: "May God grant you health! The mother
553 of the baby has sent me to ask you to do her the favour of holding her child during baptism." If they agree to undertake the function, they either follow her to the house a little later or else promise to meet her in the church at a designated hour.

[113]

[35] According to D. Zelenin, *Russische (Ostslavische) Volkskunde* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1927), p. 295, the passivity may be explained by the fact that he is, like his wife, considered unclean.

[36] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 208–211.

[37] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 0.

[38] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

[39] *Idem.*

[40] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[41] *Idem.*

844 the hands of the midwife and dries them with the linen presented to the latter. Then both women shake hands over the child, and beg one another three times for forgiveness for the troubles each has had to undergo.[55]

846 783 The mother is considered strictly unclean for three days, the period of the midwife's attendance. Nevertheless, she usually leaves her bed on the second or third day and performs her routine tasks about the house. She must not, however, go farther than thirty-five steps from the dwelling, lest she defile the fields which she might pass.[56] Indeed, she may not even take these few steps without carrying a knife with her.[57] The period during which the mother is not considered entirely clean lasts from three to six weeks, depending upon the locality. At the termination of this period a formal purification ceremony (*wywid* = leading out) is performed in the church by the priest. On the day of the ceremony, the midwife comes to take the mother to church. The latter dresses up in her best clothes, and is sprinkled by the midwife with holy water. Taking the baby in her arms, and carrying a knife, a few keys, some garlic, and a piece of bread, she follows the midwife to the church. Arriving at the entrance, she kneels with the child in her arms and awaits the priest. When he enters, she follows him to the small altar where the christening took place some weeks before. Here the priest, after performing a special ceremony, pronounces her entirely clean.[58]

852 608 574 After the purification rite, often as much as two years later, comes a ceremony which, more than any other, reveals the closeness of the bond that must have once existed between godparents and child. The parents of the child inquire of the godparents whether they will accept a present of *kolaczy*, twisted loaves of wheat bread, from which the ceremony is named *kolaczyny*. If the godparents agree, as they invariably do, the parents set a day for the celebration. Should the godparents have acted in the same capacity at the baptism of other children,

[55] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[56] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 7.

[57] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 119.

[58] *Idem.*

852 they invite all the parents of such children to participate in the
608 celebration. On the appointed day the godparents prepare a
574 festive dinner for the parents, who bring a goodly supply of whisky and six *kolaczy* each. If the child is still alive, the parents give the *kolaczy* to the godparents immediately, saying: "Please, *kumy*, accept the *kolaczy*; from God they come large, from us small." But if the child has died in the meantime, they first light candles and then place them and the loaves of bread on the floor, saying: "Please accept the *kolaczy* for the welfare of the soul of N. N."[59]

Friends and neighbours, as well as relatives, are invited to the *kolaczyny*, and all participate in the singing, dancing, and games that follow the dinner and often last till the next morning. The parents, when they depart, are given back one of the *kolaczy*, and in addition receive a calf, a sheep, a lamb, or a pig, depending upon the means of the godparents, as a gift for the child. Around the neck of such animal they always tie a red ribbon. If the godparent has no animal to give, he presents his godchild with a piece of clothing.[60]

III. Childhood

842 Only when a boy is born, as a rule, do the parents feel proud. A peasant, asked what "God gave him," will answer: "*Chlopcie!*" (a boy); but if the baby be a girl, he will reply: "*Detynu!*" (a child), as though trying to avoid mentioning its sex.[61]

854 For some time the mother keeps her infant in bed beside her, mainly in order to keep close watch over it. After a while, however, it is put into a cradle, a box made of boards, suspended by means of ropes from the bar above the mother's bed. It is hung at the foot of the bed so that it can easily be rocked at night. A red apple is usually suspended on a string above the head of the baby—to provide it with something to look at and play with.[62] Boxes on rockers, too, are quite common.[63] Special care is taken to assure the child undisturbed sleep. A visitor

[59] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 7.
[60] *Idem.*
[61] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 19.
[62] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 101.
[63] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iii, 7.

668 Siberian *taiga*, it was for having been republicans or
538 socialists or for having struggled against Tsarism but not against Russia.

538 Sometimes it is claimed that Chevtchenko was personally hostile to everything Russian. But he seems to have been nothing of the kind. An admirer of the 'noble spirit' of Gogol, Chevtchenko himself wrote his personal diary in Russian and he has left us no less than eleven novels and some poetry written in the same language, of which two poems were written before his exile. By conviction and by temperament a revolutionary, Chevtchenko felt himself intimately united with the opposition circles in Great Russia and belonged, as such, to the great family of Russian men of letters.

●[609] On the other hand, always true to the popular feelings and sharing with the Ukrainian peasants the hostility towards the German and particularly towards the estate-owners and the school-teachers, he vituperates, in his *Epistle to Compatriots*, against their subjection to German intellectual and cultural influence. When speaking of his young compatriots he says that they blamed their parents 'as they have not taught them to chatter in German in their childhood.' And Chevtchenko laments that 'Ukraine, such are your sons, your young flowers, watered with ink in the German hothouses.' He equally revolts against the vanity of Ukrainian youth, taught by German scholars of whose infallibility they are convinced:

> 'I have seen everything, I know everything.
> There is no hell nor paradise,
> Nor God:
> There is nought but I,
> And the small angular German,
> And nothing more. This is enough, little brother,
> But what do you represent in reality?
> . . . As the German says: we do not know.'

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-
Ruthenians

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
563 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
464 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hun-
241 garians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent
438 vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here
341 imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

again, after the offensive of General Brusilov had broken the Austro-Hungarian Front at several points. Part of Volhynia was cleared of the enemy and the Russians again invaded Galicia, occupying Stanislavov and also Czernowitz and the whole of the Bukovina. The Front was again removed from the region of Kiev. 175

Under the influence of the Russian victories the Roumanians entered the war, but they proved to be unprepared for serious conflict. A Russian army was sent to check the German invasion in Moldavia, and a new 'Roumanian Front' was created, so that the battle-line now ran from the Baltic to the Black Sea. During the winter of 1916–17 the South-Western Front was stabilized. Headquarters were planning a new offensive in the spring against Lvov and believed in its ultimate success. Peace and quiet reigned in Kiev and in the neighbourhood of the Front. (1)

§2. HRUSHEVSKY AND VINNICHENKO: THE UKRAINIANS AT BREST-LITOVSK

When the news of the February Revolution (February according to the Old Style, March according to the New) in Petrograd reached Kiev neither the authorities nor the populace would at first credit the truth of it. However, it was not long before the events which had taken place in the northern capital were repeated in Kiev and the cities of the Ukraine. 669 208

The process of decomposition which was destroying the armies of the North-Western and Western Fronts infected somewhat later the forces on the South-Western and Roumanian Fronts. As for the Ukrainian national movement, no one thought about it during those first days of revolution. With the exception of Finland, where the revolutionary movement was accompanied by a wave of feeling in favour of national independence, in no part of the Russian Empire were nationalist aspirations the motive of the Revolution. The first impulse of the masses, irrespective of their nationality, was to look upon the Revolution as a means of ending the war which had lasted too long. The other motives which soon made themselves apparent were everywhere of a social nature.

The state of mind of the masses found expression in the institution of 'Councils (*Soviety*) of Soldiers', Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates', in the creation of which all the leading socialist groups and parties took a hand. People of all nationalities participated in these Soviets; Georgian politicians, who for a generation had played a leading role in Russian radical movements, made themselves par- 208 623

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

208 623 668

ticularly prominent (Chkheidze, Tsereteli and Chenkeli really dominated the first Petrograd Soviet).

At this early period the great majority of the Ukrainian population were really more indifferent to 'the Ukrainian movement' than they had been before the war. The soldiers in the trenches were only interested in two things: in an immediate return to their homes and in their participation in the land distribution which was to be a feature of the agrarian reforms in the new Russia. If in a comparatively short time 'the Ukrainian movement' became a factor of importance in revolutionary Russia, it was only owing to the exceptional energy and insistence of the small group of men who were leading the Ukrainian nationalists.

Already in March Professor Hrushevsky had made his appearance in Kiev; he was joined by one of the activists of 1905, Vinnichenko, who during that earlier phase had called himself a 'Ukrainian Social Democrat'. The journalist Simon Petlyura, who was destined to become the most picturesque of the Ukrainian leaders, also turned up in Kiev.(2) At the beginning of 1917 Petlyura had found himself in the modest post of accountant in one of the branches of the 'Union of the Towns' which, together with the 'Union of Zemstvos', had been largely concerned with the supply problems of the war. These two Unions became the stronghold of the Ukrainian nationalists; in Kiev alone there were 6000 people employed on the 'Union of Zemstvos' and 2000 on the 'Union of the Towns'. Branches of the two Unions existed in all the towns of the Ukraine and the staffs consisted for the greater part of 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'—just the social strata where, before the war, the Ukrainian nationalists had been gaining recruits.

Without losing any time, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko gathered round themselves in Kiev an active group who shared their ideas, and they began to organize a 'Ukrainian Conference'. The sponsors of the Conference sent 'invitations' to 'elect delegates' from the nine Governments which they considered as constituting the territory of the Ukraine (three Governments on the right and three on the left bank of the Dniepr and the three Governments of New Russia). The elections were held 'according to the Revolutionary ways': in other words, delegates arrived in Kiev on the authority of some small 'circle' or club or of a 'Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' which might have consisted of five or six people. There appeared also 'self-appointed delegates'—deserters from the Front and 'new-comers' from Galicia.

No one was particularly astonished at this strange assembly, since 'revolutionary enthusiasm' reigned supreme throughout the whole

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

tion of an extensive national community organization by the Ukrainians, he could allow the formation of a self-help and welfare organization.[7] 563

The Nazi tactic envisaged using Ukrainian national feeling as a counterweight to Polish sentiment to bolster German rule in the Generalgouvernement. After the Poles had been destroyed as a national entity, then the Ukrainians, too, would be absorbed by the Germans or reduced to Helot status. Because the first stage of the process required a lenient attitude toward the Ukrainians, however, it was possible for nationalist groups in the Generalgouvernement to carry on limited but significant activity. Several months before Hitler had made his decision concerning the formation of a Ukrainian welfare body, the Ukrainians of the Generalgouvernement themselves proceeded to create a rudimentary national organization. This step was not prevented because a number of the subordinate officials, particularly Dr. Fritz Arlt, the chief of the nationalities section in the Generalgouvernement, realized the need for securing the friendship of the Ukrainians and endeavored to use their superiors' purely tactical leniency toward this group to grant the Ukrainians a measure of national expression.[8] 668*

The organizational work was begun with the construction of a wide variety of community organizations wherever considerable numbers of Ukrainians were found. For example, a Ukrainian National Council was formed in the San River area, a Ukrainian National Committee in Jaroslaw (Iaroslav), and a Ukrainian Central Committee in Chelm.[9] At first there appeared to be a certain amount of rivalry between these centers, which were evidently improvised by local groups without much consideration of broader political interests.[10] The more far-sighted elements of the Ukrainian group in the Generalgouvernement were anxious, however, to establish as strong a position as possible, and realized [623]

[7] USSR Exhibit 223.

[8] This statement is based on interviews with German officials concerned and with Ukrainians who were the beneficiaries of their temperate policy toward the Ukrainian community. Interviews 8, 11, 36, 46.

[9] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 29, 1942, p. 3.

[10] I have no substantial evidence that the incipient conflict in the OUN created any difficulties at this stage of the development of community organization.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov 21, 1949]

644 Art. 121. Elections of deputies to Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR are held by electoral districts on the following bases:

[634] in elections to regional Soviets - one deputy for every 15,000 to 30,000 of the population, depending upon its size;

[633] in elections to district and area Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population; in a district or area whose population does not exceed 25,000, twenty-five deputies are elected, and in a district or area whose population exceeds 60,000, not more than sixty deputies are elected;

[632] in elections to city Soviets or city district Soviets - one deputy for every 350 to 900 of the population, depending upon its size; in a city or city district whose population does not exceed 12,000, thirty-five deputies are elected;

in elections to the Kiev and Kharkov city Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population;

[631] in elections to village or settlement Soviets - one deputy for every 100 of the population; in a village or settlement whose population does not exceed 1,000, nine deputies are elected, and where the population exceeds 2,500, not more than twenty-five deputies.

The basis of representation for each regional, district, city, village and settlement Soviet of Working People's Deputies is fixed in the "Ordinance Concerning Elections to Regional, District, City, Village and Settlement Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR," within the range of the bases of representation indicated in the present article.

Art. 122. Candidates for elections are nominated according to electoral district.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Art. 123. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time upon decision of the majority of the electors in the manner established by law.

Chapter X. Arms, Flag, Capital

186 Art. 124. The state arms of the Ukrainian SSR are a sickle and hammer of gold in relief, placed crosswise, handles down against a red background in the rays of the rising sun, and surrounded by ears of wheat, which are placed symmetrically, from bottom to top, forming a circle. Between the tops of the ears of wheat is a red star. At the bottom of the wreath are the words, "Ukrainian SSR" on a red band, and at the bottom of the ears of corn the words, "Workers of all Countries United!" in the Russian language on the right, and in the Ukrainian language on the left.

Art. 125. The state flag of the Ukrainian SSR is of cloth divided into two horizontal bands of color: the upper band, in red, is two-thirds of the width of the flag, and the lower band, in azure, is one-third of the width of the flag. In the upper part of the flag, about one-third of the distance from the staff, are a hammer and sickle of gold and above them a five-pointed star with a gold border.

The relation of width to length of the flag is 1:2.

Art. 126. The Capital of the Ukrainian SSR is the City of Kiev.

Chapter XI. Procedure for Amending the Constitution

642 Art. 127. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR may be amended only by de-
646 cision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of the Supreme Soviet.

631 defensive and compelled to fight a rearguard action for maintaining
642 its existence.

Step by step, Stalin and the Russian Communist Party was changing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into a Russian empire with its non-Russian dependencies and, despite the Constitution of the Union and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, it was becoming ever more and more clear that the latter was to be treated merely as a geographical colony of the new Russian-dominated union, with no attention to its wishes or its needs.

This had been evident from almost the first days of the Five Year Plan. Whatever might have been the original blueprint of this, it early became evident that the Soviet Union could only carry out its work of industrialization and collectivization, if everything were forced into a single plan. In connection with this, the various republic commissariats had been reduced to All-Union commissariats and all independent power of judgment or planning had been removed from the local organs. If it were a question of developing a mine, of building a new factory, of introducing a new and more profitable crop, of constructing a new road or railroad, the authorities of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had to refer the matter to Moscow and receive the permission to act from the central authorities of the Union. How could it be otherwise?

The central government had assumed the responsibility for the development of the country and it could not carry this on, if the local communities or republics had the power to meet any but the most primitive needs without consultation and permission. Moscow had decided how industry was to be developed, which branches were to be built in the RSFSR, which in Ukraine, which in the other republics. That plan was almost absolute and, warned by the fate of the fallen Communist leaders, the new successors were ultra-cautious in venturing to express an opinion.

[625] The OGPU had been remodelled into the NKVD, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but this was placed under the same Yagoda who had been the head of the OGPU and he merely assumed greater powers and greater responsibilities for the safeguarding of the Soviet order.

[1930's - After famine -- Analyst]

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

The old newspapers ceased at once to appear[1] but the new occupants started in all of the main cities new Communist news- 728
papers as the *Free Ukraine* in Lviv and the *Soviet Ukraine* in [204]
Stanyslaviv. They allowed also a Communist Polish newspaper the *Red Flag* and a similar paper in Yiddish.

The old officials were at first encouraged to return to their [661]
posts, whether they were Polish or not but in a very short time they began to disappear and they were replaced by Ukrainian-speaking persons, some from the neighborhood and some from eastern Ukraine. At almost the same time, while preparations were begun for the proposed plebiscite, the authorities quietly picked up and incarcerated most of the old political leaders, especially those of the UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic League, the representatives of those parties that had sought a normalization of relations with the Poles.

In the same slow and unobstrusive way the Polish police of the [625]
different cities were replaced by a "national militia." This was composed of armed groups of young men who more or less volunteered for the work of maintaining order. The Ukrainian and the Jewish organizations tried to bring these self-appointed groups under control but this proved a difficult task for, in many cases, the new Soviet authorities had encouraged some of the more lawless and tumultuous elements to undertake the work so as to profit themselves by the resultant chaos and to facilitate the calling in of their own people.

This era of anxiety on the part of the population and of extreme 728
moderation on the part of the occupying forces lasted for almost 666
a month, while preparations were being made for the election of representatives of all organizations, factories, and groups to a National Assembly for the consideration of reunion with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Meetings were held everywhere, at which attendance was compulsory, and everywhere there was expressed by selected speakers the gratitude of the people for their liberation from the Polish lords and the imperialistic capitalists. Khrushchov and other high functionaries arrived from Kiev to conduct these elections and to superintend the preparation of the lists of delegates. Yet it was almost at once noted that while there

1 [1939, Russian occupation of Poland -- Analyst]

To round out the picture, however, one must add that the methods employed by the Ukrainians to win ground back from the Poles were not limited to cultural development. In line with the policy described above, the Germans frequently appointed mayors of ethnographically mixed towns from among the Ukrainian element, thus giving the latter a decided advantage in the civil administration. The separate police system was also staffed in a manner favorable to the Ukrainians, although the Germans closely supervised this force. Nevertheless, in numerous cases their position in the police detachments enabled the Ukrainians to harass and even to attack the Poles.[20]

While the Ukrainian nationalist forces were being strengthened by the creation of a new base in the Generalgouvernement, the OUN was being gravely weakened by a fierce internal conflict. The fundamental causes of this conflict have been examined in the preceding chapters. Its catalytic element was the liberation of the most active leaders of the younger generation from the Polish prisons.

In Cracow, where most went, they came into contact with the comrades with whom they had fought and suffered before their imprisonment, and a new grouping rapidly coalesced. The nominal leader was Volodymyr Lopatyns'kyi, who was the official director of the *krai* OUN—i.e., the organization on Ukrainian ethnographical territory in Poland.[21] Along with him came other young men who had long been active in the struggle against the Polish authorities—John Gavrusevych, Iaroslav Horbovyi, Leo Rebet, and many others. For the most part these men, vigorous as they were, had been confined, by the nature of their conspiratorial work, to Poland, and consequently were not very familiar with the broader aspects of the OUN. They were a hardened group of rebels, remarkably courageous and inured to a life of insecurity, but deprived by this very training of

[20] Activity report of the chief of the Ordnungspolizei, November 11, 1940, Occ E-2 (11), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-2 [11]). This German official reported that "lack of proper training" enabled the Ukrainian auxiliary police to take a partisan, even a vicious attitude toward the Poles, and gave as an example the necessity of arresting two Ukrainian officers who had failed to hinder attacks on Poles by armed Ukrainians.

[21] Interviews 24, 75.

p. 73

IV. THE OPENING OF THE UKRAINE

LONG BEFORE the Western world guessed his intentions Hitler had 704
begun preparations for a campaign against the Soviet Union. As 668*
early as 1940 the Germans surreptitiously formed military train- 725
ing units for Ukrainians. Their enlistment was concealed by official statements that the units were for *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans) only, and the purpose of the units was disguised by designating the Reichsarbeitdienst (Reich Labor Service) to be the supervising agency in the Generalgouvernement. Under this [625]
camouflage large numbers of Ukrainians were trained for police duty. More advanced training was carried out in Germany under direction of the Wehrmacht. In a number of camps instructors for future Ukrainian police units and interpreters for liaison with the German army were prepared.[1] At first, the chief Ukrainian organizer of this work was Colonel Sushko, and the training units were under the influence of the Mel'nyk group. After the split had fully developed, however, Bandera elements secured the upper hand in many of the groups, which were predominantly composed of young men fitted for active field service.[2]

Either because they were naturally interested in employing the young and physically qualified Ukrainians in the Bandera party for the forthcoming campaign, or because they were dissatisfied with the previous efforts of the OUN-M (Mel'nyk group) to pursue a somewhat independent course, the Germans turned more and more to the insurgent faction. This was especially the case when, in the early spring of 1941, the comparatively unconcealed development of Ukrainian units was begun by the Wehrmacht.

[1] Stepan (Stephen) Huliak, "Polk im. Kholodnoho Iaru v Rivnomu" (The Kholodnyi Iar Regiment in Rovno), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (August-September, 1952), p. 7.

[2] MS D.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

tives coming from the west. Numerous local citizens, mostly 668*
young men but including also several administrative officials, joined the Nationalist organization. Support was so strong, in fact, that a new district organization (Kraieva Ekzekutyva) of the Mel'nyk party could be formed, headed by the son of the chief of the *oblast* administration and another local leader.[56] Generally speaking, OUN-M influence was predominant in the civic life of Zhitomir as the summer of 1941 drew to a close.

The first OUN-M organizers appear to have arrived with the 668* 625
Wehrmacht. Foremost among them was Bohdan Konyk, a Gali-
cian, who was especially concerned with police organization. At the end of July, with the help of a young Carpatho-Ukrainian journalist, George Tarkovych, whose numerous articles are a major source for this period, he went with German authorization to a nearby camp of Soviet war prisoners and selected volunteers for the police force.[57] Zakhvalins'kyi, an East Ukrainian by origin who had once been a member of the Ukrainian Republican Army but who had lived for many years as a common worker in France, was made commander. He was an adherent of Mel'nyk. As his deputy, a local nonparty man, Kalenda, was chosen, while the commander's adjutant was a Bukovinian member of the Mel'nyk party.[58]

A major task of the police force was to prepare an organization
for installation in Kiev, as soon as the capital should fall into 668* [204]
German hands. The same purpose was evident in the formation of a newspaper, *Ukraïns'ke Slovo;* this organ was destined for transfer to Kiev as soon as possible. Consequently, the chief propaganda workers of the eastern group of the OUN-M were active in its creation. Among them were John Rohach, a Carpatho-Ukrainian, Iaroslav Chemeryns'kyi, one of the leading émigré writers, and Peter Oliïnyk. Under their direction, a number of able local journalists were recruited, though not all of them were adherents of the Mel'nyk party.[59]

All of these preparations served as a backdrop for the most

[56] Interviews 12, 65; cf. V. Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 10, 1941, p. 2; *OUN u Viini,* p. 53.
[57] Cf. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 21, 1942, p. 2; Interview 35.
[58] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 10, 1941, p. 2; Interview 65.
[59] *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, pp. 3-5; Interviews 3, 65.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

chief of administration.[9] Having achieved this post, he repaid the 727
organization which had assisted him by using his influence to 633
secure the adherence to the OUN-M of the most important officials.[10]

While most of the economic and cultural divisions of the city 668*
government were left in the hands of local men, the OUN forces 208
took care to organize the most important branches—propaganda 625
and police—under their own followers. Zakhvalins'kyi was 727
brought from Zhitomir to take command of the police units, but after a short period, in which his alleged incompetence and dissolute life made him objectionable to his party, he was replaced by one of the Galician leaders, Roman Bidar. Kandyba soon arrived to take charge of propaganda activity. With him came the staff of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* headed by John Rohach. The newspaper was to be printed in Kiev, but the destruction of the principal press by the explosions forced the editors to continue publication for some weeks in Zhitomir.[11]

Having captured Kiev, the German armies rapidly pushed on 668*
to the east, taking with them most of the interpreters and advisers 727
who had formed an essential part of the OUN-M "conquest" of Zhitomir and Kiev. By the end of October, they had reached Kharkov, where Konyk took the lead in propaganda work. He and his assistants succeeded in recruiting a considerable number of the local intelligentsia for their organization but, as will be shown later, failed in their attempt to attain a high degree of success similar to that in Kiev.[12]

Lest repeated reference to collaboration of the Mel'nyk forces with the Wehrmacht lead to an exaggerated conception of the role of the OUN-M in the operations of the German army, it should be pointed out that the latter employed many Slavic interpreters and advisers in addition to the Mel'nyk followers. Some of these were Ukrainians, of all political persuasions, including Bandera supporters. Strong efforts were made to get rid of the latter after the decision to suppress their party, but for a

[9] Bahazii assumed the post on November 1 (*Nastup,* December 20, 1941, p. 2).
[10] Interviews 53, 65.
[11] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 21, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, p. 3; Interview 65.
[12] See Chapter X.

727 the departments of administration. In such cases the department
633 heads who were on good terms with their German superiors seem to have been able to pursue courses substantially independent of the mayor, and this was also to an extent true of the firmer or more clever of those who wished to exert their own authority even without special German support. Consequently, it sometimes happened that one or more sections of a municipal administration were strongholds of nationalist activity, while the city as a whole was administered by elements opposed to Ukrainian independence.

Under the Soviet system, the municipal administrations had included departments of finance, communal economy, internal trade, health, popular education, social security, and cadres, as well as a general department, a planning commission, and sometimes departments of local manufacturing and agriculture. In the city administrations under German occupation, there was evidently some consolidation of departments, but in general the Soviet division was little changed, except for the elimination of the planning commission. On the other hand, several new departments were added for functions which had been performed by higher Soviet administrative levels but which the Germans wished to allocate, under their own control, to the cities. One was the propaganda department, which will be discussed somewhat later. Another was the juridical department, which operated a system of lower courts.[13] It was, however, of little or no importance as a channel of nationalist activity. Much more significant in this
625 respect were the police departments. Some indications of their
727 activity in nationalist affairs have already been given. The Ger-
633 mans, of course, exerted great efforts to keep this element of authority, the only branch of the local administration which could have offered armed resistance to their rule, under firm control. Since the police power was regularly in the hands of German SP officials, who frequently maintained only a nominal subordination to the *Stadtkommissar,* the Ukrainian chief of this department was correspondingly independent of the mayor.

[13] On the legal system in the Reichskommissariat, see Nicholas Laskovs'kyi, "Practicing Law in the Occupied Ukraine," *American Slavic and East European Review,* XI (April, 1952), 124 ff.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Moreover, since there were several German police authorities— 727
ordinary security police, secret police, railway police—operating 625
in the same area, unified at the top but having different Ukrain- 633
ian subchiefs operating under them, the possibility of several competing or antagonistic influences existed. In spite of the special concern of the Reichskommissariat to root out all OUN members in the police, the latter were able for many months to maintain their positions in several cities. For example, while the city administrations of Vinnitsa and Dniepropetrovsk were in the hands of Russophile elements opposed to Ukrainian nationalism, the police chief in the former city[14] and the Ukrainian in charge of the secret police in the latter[15] were supporters of the OUN. Close as was the supervision of the German police authorities, it was obviously impossible for them to watch every action of their subordinates, so that possession of such support within the police force was of great value to the nationalist groups.

In the wave of repression in Kiev in December, 1941, the fact 186
that his sympathizers controlled the police in the *raion* in which 625
he was arrested allowed the chief of the OUN-M in the East 727
Ukraine, Dr. Kandyba, to secure his release, thus enabling him to prolong his activities for more than two years.[16] Moreover, the presence of nationalist elements in the police force served to prevent the control of these groups by secret Communist agents, who were successful in penetrating the police in a number of places in the southern Ukraine, and for a while in Kiev itself, through the German practice of retaining the Soviet *militsiia* as a matter of convenience.[17] Whatever value the nationalist penetration of the police force may have had in this connection was largely offset by the odium which attached to the nationalist groups when it became known to the population that they were collaborating with the Germans in this fashion. Moreover, the ill repute of the police was sometimes increased by the actions of the nationalists themselves who used the police as an instrument for terrorizing non-Ukrainians.[18]

[14] Interview 1.
[15] Interviews 1, 18.
[16] L. Dniprova, article in *Ukrains'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.
[17] Interview 59.
[18] It is said that the Ukrainian police in Kiev, when ordered to secure hostages

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 68. The superior Soviets of Working People's Deputies have the right to annul decisions and orders of inferior Soviets of Working People's Deputies and of their Executive Committees.

634 Art. 69. The regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments and Administrations of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Art
a General Department
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry
a Department of Public Education
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Department of Roads

and the following Administrations:

a Cinematographic Administration
a Light Industry Administration
a Local Fuel Industry Administration
an Agricultural Administration
a Food Industry Administration
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the Region, the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the Union-Republican Ministries of the Timber Industry, Meat and Dairy Industry, Building Materials Industry, Fish Industry and Textile Industry:

a Department of the Timber Industry
a Department of the Meat and Dairy Industry
a Department of the Building Materials Industry
a Department of the Fish Industry
a Department of the Textile Industry.

[625] Art. 70. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Justice of the Union set up their own administrations under the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies, in accordance with the conditions of the region and on the basis of the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Art. 71. The Departments and Administrations of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the corresponding regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 72. The area Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees carry on their work on the basis of the laws voted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and orders of the Regional Soviet of Workers' Deputies and their Executive Committees.

632 Art. 73. The district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

632

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Roads
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Public Education
a General Department
a Department of Agriculture
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committees and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the district, the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the respective regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies:

a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry.

[625] Art. 74. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security set up their Departments under the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies in accordance with the conditions of the district, on the basis of the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR and subject to confirmation by the corresponding regional Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 75. The Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

633 Art. 76. The city Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Public Health
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Public Education
a General Department
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the city's industry and its municipal and suburban economy,

a Department of Local Industry and
a Department of Agriculture.

Art. 77. The Departments of the city Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the respective city Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies or directly to the corresponding Departments of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 78. The Departments of city Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Kiev are subordinate in their activities both to the Kiev Soviet of Working People's Deputies and its Executive Committee as well as to the corresponding Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directly.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

871 Ukrainian schools were again started; a number of Communist newspapers began to appear in the Ukrainian language; and generally the usual 'Galician technique' of opening Ukrainian publishing centres, museums, libraries, theatres and so forth was followed (incidentally many Galicians made their appearance in Soviet Ukraine
• 626 during this period). The official 'state ideology' of Marxism was of course made obligatory for everyone, and the new volumes of Hrushevsky's fundamental history of the Ukraine which were now published in Kiev revealed that in his old age the distinguished professor had come to appreciate the truth of the doctrine of historical materialism.

The population remained as indifferent to measures of 'ukrainization' as it had in the *Rada* days, although now there were more numerous manifestations of it than in the past. Although Ukrainian had become a kind of official language, few appeared to have any taste for its use, either in the administration or in private life. One of the authors of *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, who occupied an administrative post in one of the Soviet institutions in the Ukraine between the years 1921 and 1924, confesses that he never once wrote a line in Ukrainian during the whole course of his employment.

665 In 1925 Kaganovich made his appearance in the Ukraine in the role of leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Stalin's future brother-in-law was also one of his most intimate friends, and at that time Stalin had already secured almost absolute power in the Soviet Union. Kaganovich's mission was to make a thorough inspection of the personnel of the Party in the Ukraine and to eliminate the 'unreliable and opportunist elements'.

At the same time Kaganovich had an opportunity of coming to the conclusion that Communism in the Ukraine was not at that date an overwhelming success. According to statistics published some time later by the Central Committee of the Party, out of every 10,000 inhabitants of the Ukraine the ratio of Communists was as follows: Jews, 155; Great Russians and 'new-comers', 88; Ukrainians, 39. About 15 per cent of women had joined Communist organisations—a far lower proportion than in the north. The proportion of Ukrainian students in the high schools which had been opened to form 'responsible Ukrainian workers and specialists' was disappointingly low in comparison to the number of their Jewish fellows: in the Social-Economic Faculty there were 1500 Ukrainians to 1000 Jews; in the Industrial-Technical Faculty, 2600 Ukrainians to 2200 Jews; in the Medical Faculty only 2000 Ukrainians to 2200 Jews; whereas the proportion of Ukrainians to Jews in the whole population was 10 to 1.

538 did not save them for many were arrested and executed at various times.

It was only natural that the period of the civil war was not conducive to the production of artistic literature. For those who were willing to cooperate, there were many posts open in the government, but the pressure of public affairs distracted them and left them little time for belles-lettres. For others who had less taste for political and public life, the obvious course was to retire to the villages and there meditate and work in silence with scanty hope for the immediate publishing of their works. This was the course largely pursued by Tychyna and Rylsky and their friends, together with many of the Symbolists.

However, during 1917 and 1918 new almanacs and journals put in an appearance and these could hardly fail to express the political struggles, for some of them, as *Mystetstvo* (Art), were definitely leftist in character and others were the product of various groups and schools of writers.

[626] With the final establishment of Soviet power, the literature lost most of the freedom which it had acquired in the years of struggle. The Communists lost no time in suppressing all the old publications and in establishing their own. These were more or less strictly censored. and it was impossible from the beginning to publish any work which might awaken the suspicions of the new regime.

At the same time in Ukraine, as in the RSFSR, the Communist attitude toward literature was not clearly defined. The new authorities spread over the country a whole chain of Proletkult (Proletarian Art) centres with the idea of a speedy development of a new proletarian art. Yet the experiment was not too successful and, as an outcome of the similar developments in Petrograd and Moscow, these were soon suppressed but not until they had created a taste for writing in many of the younger and often uneducated generation, who were attracted by the slogans and the hopes inspired by the Communists.

This marked a definite break with the past and it was sufficient to eliminate from their commanding positions most of the older

the place of the old bureaucrats. They therefore turned the universities into technical schools of a rather inferior character, unlike the situation in Russia, where despite all the changes there was still preserved the fiction of university teaching and research. It was made clear that the teachers were not supposed to busy themselves with more advanced subjects for these were now the province of the Academy. Still there was a steady stream of young people into its influence and for several years it could well be said that there had never been a time when Ukrainian scholarship was so free and untrammeled. 814 873

The Academy in Kiev was, of course, the highest organ of scientific studies but it was not isolated, for some of the academicians, like Dmytro Bahaly, set up in Kharkiv a Chair of Scientific Research like an institute and Slabchenko did the same in Odesa. The example of these were followed in smaller cities and similar research centres were opened in Poltava, Chernihiv, Nizhin, Dnipropetrovsk, Kamyanets Podilsky, Vinnytsya, Zhytomir, Mykolayiv and Luhansk. 814

In the early years there was a constant effort to establish closer relations with the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the other scholarly institutions in Western Ukraine, and for some years there was an active interchange of views between the scholars of the two sections. Several outstanding Western Ukrainians were elected to membership in the Kiev Academy and the scholars went back and forth across the boundary with considerable freedom and cooperated in the development of Ukrainian studies.

In the field of history and of economics, it was necessary for the scholars[1] to pay some slight attention to the Marxo-Leninist ideas. They could not too openly contradict them but it was usually possible, by the addition of a few official quotations, to speak quite plainly with regard for scientific truth and accuracy. [626]

Even these restrictions were far laxer when it came to studies of language and material culture. The All-Ukrainian Archaeological Society and the Society for the Preservation of the Antiquities of Ukraine sent out expeditions to all parts of the country.

1 [of Western Ukraine -- Analyst]

The Scholarly Revival

The development during these years[1] was not only in the humanities but it extended to all fields of science, especially those that had to do with the study of the Ukrainian resources and agriculture. Young geologists, biologists, etc. found convenient opportunities for the use of their talents, and their studies revealed new and often unsuspected potentialities in the country. 815

All this work, which was under the Commissariat of Education, was treated kindly by the former Borotbisty and Ukapisty who were in control of the Commissariat. At times they grumbled that more was not being done in the field and under the principles of Marxo-Leninism, but they did not use their power to suppress or hinder the work. In a sense they looked at it with a certain lack of comprehension and criticism. It is not too much to say that this intellectual and scholarly activity proceeded outside the range of Communist interests and was allowed far more free scope than was possible in the case of the writers or the administration. 815 626

The only answer which the more rigid Communists found was the establishment of a large chain of Marxo-Leninist Institutes which were ostensibly devoted to the study of the philosophy of Communism and to the working out of Communist sciences on the same pattern as those in Moscow. These reflected the actual state of Communist thinking and were really schools for propaganda and not for scientific study in any sense of the word. They were liberally supported and they were frequently able to secure their pick of the more talented and ambitious scholars who were willing to rise through the established channels of Communism, rather than by the more exacting service of true knowledge.

It was not until 1927 that Skrypnyk, with all of his Ukrainian patriotism, hearkened to the Communist protests that there were no Communists in the Academy of Sciences and he insisted that a certain number of prominent Communists should be admitted. It was, of course, done but not without grumbling, for the members of the Academy had been very careful as to the type of man whom they elected and as to his scholarly abilities and reputation. They felt, deservedly, that the addition of these new members would lower the standards of the Academy but there was no way out.

1 [after establishment of Ukrainian Soviet Republic--Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

815
626 This was to be the signal for the ending of the old system of relatively free thought. It was the first step in the approaching changes that were to wreak havoc on every form of Ukrainian life and bring to an untimely end the rapidly developing Ukrainian Renaissance.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Turning of the Cultural Tide

The Ukrainian Communists did not realize what they were 186
doing when they launched their campaign against the bourgeois 814
intellectuals and the aged scholars in the Academy of Sciences. For the first time since the period of Ukrainization had started, they had definitely called the attention of Moscow to the existence in Ukraine of a survival of the old independent mode of thinking which had animated the Ukrainian leaders in the struggle for an independent state of their own and they had coined a name for it, bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism. That was to recur again and again and lead to their own ruin.

It is remarkable that neither Skrypnyk nor Khvylovy realized [829]
this earlier. Both men in their own way were seriously threatening the unity of the Soviet Union, to which as an ideal they were loyal. Both men, Skrypnyk in the political field and Khvylovy in literature, realized the danger to Ukraine of substituting Russianism for Communism. Both men accepted in different senses the basic ideals of Communism and both believed in a Communist International which would offer all peoples full rights of cultural and political development. Neither one understood that the Comintern was a shadow structure which was totally dependent upon the forces operating in Moscow and that the situation in 1928 and 1929 was basically different from that ten years before.

In the RSFSR the charter of liberty for the fellow travellers 626
which had been promulgated in 1925 was practically abolished by 538
the granting of extreme power of control to Averbakh and the RAPP (the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) which, to all intents and purposes, was issuing orders as to how the writers should support the Five Year Plan.

● 626 538 It was perfectly natural that a similar situation should develop in Ukraine. The various schools of serious writing, as the *Vaplite,* stood out against this regimentation and ably defended their position, but that position was indefensible in the face of political pressure and without being conscious of any inconsistency, Skrypnyk, as a good Communist and a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was willing to exert pressure to bring the literary organization of Ukraine in line with that of the All-Union Communist Party at the very same time when he was deliberately thwarting the unifying tendencies of that party.

[186] [68] The first sign of the changed order came with the arrest and deportation of M. Ivchenko for his novel *Working Powers* because it endeavored to express in a concrete form the problem of fitting the ideals of the various national groups into the stereotyped formula which was now fashionable. Next came the difficulties of Khvylovy over his novel *Woodsnipes,* despite his willingness to secure an opportunity for further work by the destruction of the second part of the novel.

It must be remembered that the groups which were now being attacked were not by their essential declarations anti-Communist. They reflected, rather, the disillusionment of many people with the prevailing manifestations of Communism, the growing realization that the Communist regime was not giving the people that ideal reality which its teachings indicated they should easily win. [536] That was the gist of the drama by M. Kulish, the *People's Malakhy,* which reflected the contrast between the ideals of a high-minded but somewhat simple village Don Quixote and the realities of life on any particular level. This, as other of his plays, was well presented in the Berezil Theatre, directed by Les Kurbas, a Western Ukrainian who had developed in Kiev into one of the great producers and had pushed the Ukrainian theatrical art to its highest development. Writings of the same character had marked some of the early Russian works of A. N. Tolstoy after the revolution but, being a Great Russian, he was not involved in the endless controversies over the national questions and, like most of the Russian authors, he was able to work out a satisfactory agreement with the

Stalin policies. This was not true of the Ukrainian authors who felt a steadily increasing pressure from the Communist authorities. 626 538

The vast majority of the more mediocre authors who had sought to follow unhesitatingly the party line found it very natural to form themselves into the VUSPP (the All-Ukrainian Society of Proletarian Writers) in 1927. They published a monthly journal, *Hart* and the *Literary Journal,* and to show their real internationalism they supported a Russian proletarian journal, the *Krasnoye Slovo* (the Red Word) and a Jewish paper, *Di Royte Welt.* It was only natural that this group should seek support by applying for membership in the VOAPP (the All-Union Society of Proletarian Writers) which, of course, was completely under the domination of the Russian Section, the RAPP. They thus became the thinking or unthinking agents by which the Russians could direct their blows against Ukrainian literature.

On the other hand, there came during these years a similar concentration of those writers who rejected bourgeois ideas but who still were working to develop a Ukrainian Communism in the true sense of the word. Yet they were forced to shift their positions constantly and hence there came a hectic but yet vital series of publications.

The Futurists who denied the value of the past and worked in experimental efforts were naturally the opponents of Khvylovy and the *Vaplite* and finally, in 1927, they united with some of the other radical groups (in the literary sense) to form the *New Generation* which continually published declarations of policy and of adherence to Communist ideas, but this group also drew upon itself the criticism of the VUSPP because it aimed for the adaptation of literature to the Ukrainian scene.

On the other hand, the *Vaplite* was very soon compelled to disband. It did so voluntarily but the bulk of the abler writers immediately started to publish the *Literaturny Yarmarok* (The Literary Fair) in which, under the guise of apolitical writing, they poured out scarcely veiled criticism of their opponents. This, too, was soon under attack and then it was reorganized as the *Prolitfront* (the Union of Studies of the Proletarian Literary Front). This

626 device was also too obvious, for the new journal continued to
538 criticize the Russian policy and in 1931 it was forced to disband and most of the members who wanted to continue to write passed into the VUSPP, which, with all its rigid adherence to the party line, could not be too sure as to what that party line really was.

At one point in his career Skrypnyk, who was in many ways opposed to Khvylovy, dreamed of the establishment of a Federation of the Unions of Revolutionary Writers of Ukraine. He succeeded in forcing this upon the Futurists and many smaller leftist groups and also the *New Generation,* but his failure to make this real in 1931 was but a sign of the future.

By this time the VUSPP, along with the RAPP, had become the dominating force politically and Skrypnyk was forced to give up his endeavors and to allow most of his Federation members to join the VUSPP. This was but another step in the decay of all literary schools and it reflected the period of uncertainty and of a definite degree of opposition to the domination of the RAPP.

By the end of the twenties, the opportunities for independent thinking in literature had grown exceedingly few and scattered. There were still, in general, only the two currents of Ukrainian and Russian Communism, and the former was definitely beginning to wane under the continual attacks that were delivered both by its opponents and the Communist Party through its official organs.
[186] Still, up until 1931, Ukrainian literature continued to develop and the literary disputes, often over minor points of literature, thought and culture, animated society and lent a zest to the various writings. These now more than ever began to reflect a growing apprehension over the conditions as they were and the impossibility of equating the ideals of Communism and the realities of the Russian domination of the country.

A more decided blow was given by the decree of April 23, 1932.
[656] This ended all literary discussions and abolished all literary societies and groups throughout the entire Soviet Union. In place of these, Stalin announced the establishment of a single society throughout the entire Union, the All-Union Association of Soviet Writers, and turned this over to Maksim Gorky, perhaps the most prominent

Russian writer of the day but a man who was bitterly anti-Ukrainian 636 ●
and scornful of the national cultures of all the Soviet Republics. 538
His object seems to have been in Ukraine to force the literature to accept the Russian pattern. The new doctrine of socialist realism was promulgated and it was very soon made clear that the destruction of the VUSPP and all the old groups was not a step toward the restoration of freedom for creation but a new move to strengthen, on a somewhat different basis, the government's control over everything that was published.

It was highly significant for this that at the early meetings of the Ukrainian Section, its organizer, I. Kulyk, appeared in the uniform of a frontier guard of the NKVD as a silent warning to all of those who might be regarded as heretical in any sense. Furthermore Zhdanov as a member of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party, explained the situation. In his keynote speech, he declared:

"Comrade Stalin has called our writers engineers of human souls. What does that mean? What obligations does it lay upon them? It means first that they must know life, so as to represent it faithfully in artistic works, to represent it not scholastically or in a dead way, not simply as an objective realism but to picture reality in its revolutionary development. In this the truth and historical concreteness of artistic representation must coincide with the tasks of the ideal reworking and development of the working people in the spirit of socialism. This method of artistic literature and of literary criticism are what we call the method of socialist realism."

Whatever might have been the effect of the new organization on Russian literature, which had been handicapped by the domination of the RAPP, its effect on Ukrainian literature could not fail to be disastrous. In effect, it standardized all literature on the Russian model and it indicated that henceforth literature and literary men were to be treated as organs of the Communist Party and of the Moscow regime. It was the definite answer to the efforts of the Ukrainian writers of nearly all the conflicting schools to adapt literature to their own purposes and ideals. It took away from the writers all inspiration and desire to use their talents for their own

626 538 artistic enjoyment and it rendered it possible for the central government to abolish that sense of republican patriotism which had been so marked during the preceding period in all the non-Russian republics.

626 538 178 In place of the ideas of the old Ukrainian life which was being brought to an end by the compulsory collectivization and the establishment of the collective farms, in place of the old visions of the unity of the Ukrainian people and those ideals of a new national life that had dominated Ukrainian literature from the time of Shevchenko, in place of the efforts to establish in Ukrainian literature all those branches of art and culture which were stirring in Western Europe, there was now given to the writers, young and old, the command to celebrate and to glorify the actual process of socialist construction in Ukraine, as elsewhere. By 1934 Kulyk, as the organizer of the Ukrainian section, could write of the definite end of the old bourgeois nationalist sentiment as preached by Yefremiv and of the efforts of Khvylovy to reorient the psychology of Ukrainian literature on that of Europe. In his article on the modern Ukrainian literature in a volume on the *Literature of the Peoples of the USSR* published in 1934, he could pass over in silence, for obvious reasons, all of the great names which had appeared during the preceding ten years and shower his praise upon the young proletarian writers who were willing to follow blindly and, to the best of their ability, the new course.

There were, of course, some of the older and even of the more prominent men who were willing to compromise with the new regime. Among them the outstanding figures were Tychyna and Rylsky. Both of them, after consideration and treatment by the authorities, tried to bend their works to the new ideas but there were many who were unwilling or unable to be untrue to their artistic faith and for them there was not even the choice of silence or writing. They were compelled to conform or vanish and it was not long after the organization of the All-Union Society of Soviet Writers when this was made abundantly clear.

661 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in
558 Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist
[665] Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which
[814] had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

Postyshev's object was the rerussification of the country, for it
191 had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many
●626 of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian news-
[871] papers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

basis with Ukrainian. He established Russian theatres in the larger cities and sent them Russian companies from Leningrad and Moscow to show the greatness of Russian art, while at the same time he had Les Kurbas arrested at the end of the year and closed the Berezil Theatre, the leading company in Ukraine, and even abolished its name as Catherine the Great had abolished the name of the Zaporozhian Sich one hundred fifty years before. 191 636 [545]

The fundamental object was to re-Russianize Ukraine as rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this idea, Zatonsky even suggested that the students should be encouraged to talk a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian in the hope that they could thus be more quickly induced to accept the alien tongue. That was a rash thought, for as soon as it was reported to Moscow, there came a strong protest from Gorky that such a procedure could only injure the purity of the Russian language by mixing foreign elements in it. Zatonsky hurriedly withdrew his suggestions but it was too late and only a few years later he was to pay the penalty for his rash proposal.

It was small wonder that Khvylovy, who knew well that he was threatened with arrest and execution, committed suicide in despair on May 13, 1933 and he was followed on July 6, by Skrypnyk who was too familiar with the workings of Russian Communism not to realize that he would be steadily demoted until he could be finished off without comment as a fallen idol. [762]

The terror and the destruction proceeded apace and after the murder of Kirov in Leningrad on December 21, 1934, new investigations were ordered and it was discovered that the bulk of the Ukrainian authors were involved in the conspiracy. In a very short time their ranks were almost completely decimated. In the same month H. Kosynka, O. Vlyzko, I. Krushelnytsky, K. Burevy, and D. Falkivsky were shot on various pretenses. Nearly all the former members of the *Vaplite,* the Neo-Classicists, the groups connected with the MARS in Kiev and the *New Generation,* were liquidated in one way or another, either by execution or deportation and deportation was practically the equivalent of death, for scarcely one of the deported ever returned to the Ukraine or made 661 538

1 [reference to forced Russification of Ukraine, 1932 - Analyst]

661 538 his presence or his present place of dwelling known to any of his friends.

It would be too long to mention the list of names, but among them were all the outstanding names of the preceding years, Kulish, Yalovy, Yohansen, Epik, Zerov, Dray-Khmara, Kosynka, Pidmohylny, Semenko, Vuzko, etc. These men were not only put out of the way but every attempt was made to prove that they had never existed. Their books were removed from the libraries and bookstores and, so far as possible, even references to them and their work were expunged from encyclopedias and reference books and the movement which they represented and which, but a short time before, had been patronized by the Commissariat of Education was rendered non-existent. Only the name of Khvylovy remained as an example of anti-Russian work and he was presented as a pupil of Petlyura, Hrushevsky and the Western imperialists and a believer in bourgeois nationalism, a term which was now extended to cover anything hostile to the general line of the Party.

●626 538 Faced with the certainty of sharing the fate of their colleagues, some of even the more prominent authors began to waver. Among this number were Tychyna and, a little more reluctantly, Rylsky. In fact, it required a term in prison to bring the latter to an appreciation of the beauties of the new order. Both proved themselves valuable converts, even if they were compelled to forget all their old mannerisms and perfections of style and produce tasteless propaganda poetry, while the official organs boasted of their slow but steady growth in realism. Thus, in 1934 Kulyk could say of Tychyna, "The collection of *The Party Leads* represents an unquestionable achievement. Nevertheless we should be rendering poor service to Tychyna himself if we failed to point out the uneven tenor, and sometimes even hesitation, in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to him. Stronger organizational ties with the realities, emancipation from artificial, at times purely bookish culture, such are the conditions on which depends further progress by Tychyna along the new road chosen by this great Ukrainian poet." Rylsky and Bazhan were treated in the same way, while such writers as Panch and Holovko were told it was their task to get over the

[Persecution, during Russification of Ukraine, 1933 -- Analyst

old notion that "Mother Ukraine" had the same interest in all her 626 ●
sons, whether they were working men, peasants or intellectual 538
nationalists. Both of them later revised their works under the kind leadership of the Party.

The proletarian writers and those who were content to write upon the prescribed or recommended themes were in their element. Kyrylenko and Mykytenko wrote glowingly and woodenly about collectivization and the elimination of the kulaks, "the dregs of society." Korniychuk, a young dramatist, presented in his plays all the appropriate Five Year plan subjects and gloried in the defeat of the old in the factories and on the collective farms. Everything in the literary field that glorified the Communist Party and rejected those ideas which had flourished under the preceding regime was applauded and the successful received honors and wealth and Stalin prizes for literary achievement.

The same development or retrogression[1] was to be noted in the 626
more purely scientific fields, especially where they touched studies 814
dealing with the Ukrainian language, history or culture. Skrypnyk had removed some of the more distinguished members of the Academy of Science. Postyshev purged most of their followers and then he went on to reorganize the institution in the Communist way. The Academy was changed into a series of separate institutes, each of which was subject only to a carefully chosen Presidium.

Then, at the end of 1934 all of those institutes connected with the old Historical Section and which dealt with such subjects as Ukrainian archaeology, history, history of law, Western Ukraine, etc. were abolished. The study of the humanities was practically ended and the old staff was excluded. There were left only institutes of language and material culture to care for the past and all other subjects were handed over to the network of the VUAMLIN, the reorganized and strengthened network of Marxo-Leninist institutes, which could serve as a more reliable means of spreading Communist doctrine in a pseudo-scientific form. They created a new complex of societies as the Society of Marxist Historians, all of which had the avowed purpose of glorifying the regime at the expense of any form of scientific truth.

[1] [1933-- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

●626 814 191 In the field of studies in the Ukrainian language,[1] under the leadership of A. Khvylya who had already distinguished himself by his attacks on the entire process of Ukrainization, new steps were taken to counteract all that had been gained by any school of thought.

In the beginning Naum Kaganovich had tried to show that the scholars of the preceding period had worked under the influence of "populist" theories of language. He was soon forced to change this to a statement that the work had been "bourgeois nationalist," the favorite slogan for anything that was not Russian. In his article, *The Language Theory of Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism,* he wrote: "Here under the conception of the people emerge the kurkul circles; the bourgeois nationalists have shaped the development of the Ukrainian language on the speech of the kurkuls." In another passage he declared: "By this approach to the people the bourgeois nationalists understand the removal from the language of everything that is connected with the October revolution, the removal of all features which bring it closer to the language of the Russian proletariat and the workers of the other republics of the USSR and the implanting of everything that is outmoded, conservative and permeated with the nationalist bourgeois spirit."

It was easy to see at what these new "scholars" were aiming. The old arguments as to whether the local dialects of the peasants or the newer literary language which had been developed for over a century was the better Ukrainian were now replaced by the definite statement that the proper form was that which was the language of the more "advanced" classes, i.e. the Communists and their sympathizers, who were the least connected with any special area and were the least affected by any considerations of locality or traditional culture or usage. Even during Ukrainization the Communists of high rank coming from Moscow had been officially relieved of the task of learning Ukrainian. Now this was expanded and those who, of their own volition, learned a few words were adjudged the best authorities on Ukrainian because of their Communist knowledge and standing.

The new authorities set themselves the task of rooting out those

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

attempts which the "bourgeois nationalists" had made to bring together the Ukrainians of the east and of the west. They declared that the preceding group had sought to bring back capitalism and to separate Ukrainian from the "brotherly" Russian and to remodel it on Polish and German standards. They attacked any system of orthography and transliteration which differed from that used in Russian and in their attacks on Polonisms in Ukrainian they went so far as to call Polish any Ukrainian form which differed from the Russian, even when the Polish word in fact had the same form as the Russian and differed from the Ukrainian. 626 814 191

In the small dictionaries that were printed only those words were admitted that revealed Russian relations and the academician Krymsky once remarked of one of these that it was merely a Russian-Russian dictionary, so far had the process been carried.

In 1933 Khvylya published a new orthography for Ukrainian. This repudiated the work that had been done earlier to bring together Eastern and Western Ukrainian and sought to take as the standard those Ukrainian dialects that had been most thoroughly russianized, although at the same time he carefully avoided explaining the policy on which he was working.

Thus, during these years there developed a definite policy of disintegrating the language from within. It was based very definitely upon the old theories of the nineteenth century, that Ukrainian was merely a corrupt form of Russian and could not have any independent development, but such a statement which would have satisfied Nicholas I and Belinsky was not expressed clearly. It was enveloped in a mass of Communist jargon which appealed to the great names of Bolshevik ideology and covered a complete ignorance of any of the facts of language or of popular usage.

At the same time in another field Postyshev saw the opportunity to deliver further blows under the guise of progress and of satisfying Ukrainian aspirations. He moved the capital of the Ukrainian Republic back to Kiev from Kharkiv.[1] There were good reasons for this. The Soviet regime had been established at Kharkiv, because it was nearer to the Russian boundary and hence could more easily receive support from Russian military sources during the 633

[1] [1933 -- Analyst]

the eighteenth century, the bell-tower of the Kiev-Kiril-Troitsky 346
Monastery of the eighteenth century built by the architect Ivan 661
Hryhorovych-Barsky, the Church of Sts. Borys and Hlib of the 633
eighteenth century, the Church of the Birth of Christ and the "good Nicholas," built by Andry Melensky at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Church of the Tithes, the celebrated statue of Samson by Hryhorovych-Barsky, and a long series of other monuments and buildings.

Almost all of these buildings came from those periods when the Ukrainians were the most free from Russian influence or, as in the case of the Mazepa baroque, had the closest contacts with the West. It was a deliberate part of the Communist attempt to rewrite the Ukrainian past.

Of course, their excuse was that the old primarily ecclesiastical culture stood in marked contradiction to the modern era of industrialization and collectivization, the "glorious age of Stalin" which called for the development of a new type of architecture. Still, in a surprising number of cases these new buildings did not make their appearance and the ground was left empty or covered with insignificant structures which could better have been placed on the site of those half-ruined shacks and hovels which were the real expressions of the Communist paradise.

The primary object was the annihilation of the Ukrainian spirit 626 ●
and represented part of the broad general movement which had 186
been launched for the rerussification of the country and the stopping in every way of that spontaneous outburst of development which had been called into being by the downfall of tsarism and the founding of the Ukrainian National Republic. The general debacle was now complete.

Within four years, before the ending of the first Five Year Plan a situation had been brought about which seemed to the Soviet authorities a guarantee of their final victory over what they were pleased to call bourgeois nationalism but which was, in realty, the logical outgrowth of the Ukrainian aspirations throughout the centuries.

[in destruction of churches & monuments of past in Kiev--Analyst

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

166 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the
• 626 village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past.* Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

* [after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

country for less populated districts in the east, while, on the slightest 166
suspicions, whole families were deported, separated and exiled, and 626
their places taken by people from other Soviet republics who were brought in to destroy the racial unity that formerly existed in the villages.

To appreciate the difficulties of the peasants on the collective 241
farms, we must remember that the involved bureaucratic system 651
had ample opportunities for extorting the grain for little or no 474
payment. Thus the Motor Transport Stations which controlled 465
all the machinery were supported by payments from the collective farms of grain and other products in kind and this usually approached 21.5% of the total yield, while the Stations took over 23% of the crop for the government. Another 15% was retained by the kolhosp for sowing and for various insurance funds that were prescribed by law and another 18% was kept for fodder and for the compensation of the full-time administrators. Thus, there was barely a quarter of the produce left to be distributed among the working population and this was the variable quantity since all of the payments and collections were based not on the actual harvest but on the harvest as planned by the central authorities. Thus, in the case of a bad harvest, the share allotted for distribution was the part that was cut and the government, so far as possible was provided with its expected supply.

This amount was divided among the individuals and families on the basis of the labor days which they had worked. In the beginning a labor day meant labor for a day, no matter how many hours of labor were required, but even before World War II, this simple definition was replaced by a specification that it covered a definite amount of work and it might very easily happen that a slow or poor workman would have to work more than one day to make a labor day. Thus, there was the possibility of still further exploitation of the workmen, who could not know accurately until the end of the year on what they could count.

There was also distributed, likewise in proportion to labor days, a certain sum of money which the kolhosp received from the government in return for the sale of grain over the amount col-

[1 after 1933 famine - - Analyst]

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
166 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

[During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

simply Russians was constantly increased. It was almost forbidden 626
to mention the name Ukrainian in connection with the older settlers 186
in Kuban, along the Don, in the Green Wedge along the Amur, etc. [191]
and it was a matter of perplexity as to what language they could be said to speak or what dialect in connection with later studies of the dialects of the Russian language. It was inadmissible to regard them as speaking a peasant dialect in view of the attitude of the authorities in recognizing some sort of Ukrainian, but it was even worse to believe that Ukrainian could exist in those regions and so they were simply passed over and forgotten, while the newcomers, usually being under some kind of a ban, were simply treated as Russian deportees.

Even this was not the whole story, for in such cities as Vinnytsya 661
during these same years the population was slaughtered by the thousands and buried secretly in carefully hidden burial places which were then turned into parks and playgrounds to conceal the extent of the crimes. This was repeated in many places but the situation in Vinnytsya attracted especial attention because during the War, the Germans found the places of burial and revealed the thousands of bodies of the victims, many of whom had been buried alive. The extent of these massacres was as great as was the killing of the Polish officers in Katyn, which was likewise brought to light during the war.

By the time the census of 1939 was taken and this was the last 162
one published, the growth of the number of Russians and the diminution of Ukrainians showed clearly that there was a large scale transfer of nationality which completely reversed the figures in some sections of Asia without regard for the natural laws of reproduction and mortality.

In this atmosphere the nature of the intellectual and literary 626
work in the UkSSR can well be imagined. The Ukrainian scholars 814
were forced to accept the full Russian theories of the Ukrainian 661
past. This led to a complete revaluation of all the "outstanding figures." In 1933 the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was condemned on the ground that he was a typical representative of the noble classes. By the outbreak of World War II he became a Rus-

1 [1936-1938 -- Analyst]

626 sian patriot for signing the Treaty of Pereyaslav and bringing the
814 Zaporozhian Kozaks under Muscovite domination. It was so in
661 every branch of historical study. In back of the conception of the Soviet man and Soviet patriotism began to emerge with ever greater clarity the conception of Russian patriotism, as the doctrine of the "elder brother" who had given culture and civilization to the other nations of the Soviet Union became clearer and clearer.

626 It was the same thing in language. Khvylya and his friends
814 had been working on a Ukrainian-Russian dictionary but this was
191 immediately criticized by *Pravda* for its divisive tendencies, and the guilty compilers were liquidated. A new edition was started in 1938 on still a new principle. The Ukrainian and Russian words were to have the same number of synonyms and these were to have identical value. If, in any particular case, this did not prove to be true, it was so much the worse for the Ukrainian. If there were more words in Ukrainian to express various shades of one idea that there were in Russian, the words were banned. If there were fewer, the Russian words were supplied in order to show the influence that Russian had had upon the cultural development of Ukrainian.

The result was the reverse of what Zatonsky had proposed. He had suggested a mixed language with the idea that the Ukrainians would develop by practice toward the use of standard Russian. Now the new Commissariat of Education was introducing Russian into Ukrainian, forbidding the use of Ukrainian syntactical constructions which had no parallel in Russian in order to train the Ukrainians to speak Russian by infiltrating it into their native speech. The result would have been perhaps the same, but the important difference was that it preserved the supremacy of the Russian language in a pure form and corrupted the Ukrainian beyond recognition.

538 This procedure was too violent, even for many of the poets
191 and writers who were most ardent in their support of the Stalinist
626 regime. Men like Bazhan, who had put his pen entirely at the disposal of Moscow, continued to use some of the forbidden words and even obtained rewards for their obsequious phrases couched in

this taboo language. It was necessary if the whole theory of the USSR was not to fall by the wayside and the authorities in Moscow were becoming aware of the growing danger of Nazism. 538 191 626

They encouraged the writers, as Tychyna and Rylsky, to write narrative and other poems on themes of the old hostility of the Ukrainians to the Polish nobles and to stress the assistance which, in those ancient days, the Ukrainians had received from the Muscovite authorities. They fanned again the fires of the civil war when the Ukrainian Communists, backed by their Muscovite friends and masters, were warring against the Ukrainian National Republic and Petlyura. 538 626

In fact, during these fantastic years, Tychyna, Rylsky, Yanovsky and similar writers, as well as Korniychuk, found it easier to maintain their freedom by this fanning of Ukrainian chauvinism into flame than did those authors who, following the narrow interpretation of socialist realism, sought to trace the transformations in the contemporary life and the growth of confidence in the Russian ideas of industrialization and collectivization. Again and again these men were called to account for allowing their local and national sympathies to run away with them and to include descriptions which were perhaps nostalgic but which could be twisted in the perverse logic of the NKVD into hidden criticisms of the great Stalin, the leaders of the people, and the all-wise and beneficent rule of Moscow.

By 1939, the situation in the Ukraine had changed entirely from what it had been in 1929 when the first five year plan was getting under way. The salient features of the Ukrainian economic life had been destroyed. Yet Moscow was not yet satisfied. 651

Despite the increased taxation and the reduction in the income of the average dweller on a collective farm, the Communist Party demanded each year a larger part of the grain and of the cash income. The voluntary donations for the benefit of the armed forces were increased and steps were begun to demand taxes in kind from the returns which the peasants received from their individual plots. Thus a peasant was required to contribute so many eggs per year to the government, which did not concern itself as to

655 firms were turned into branches of one commissariat or another. By the spring, while there had not yet been a full communization of the country, the process was well advanced and no resident of Western Ukraine could doubt as to the future of the area.

659 In Eastern Galicia, where the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite was the predominant religion, the Metropolitan Archbishop Andry Sheptytsky was not personally touched.[1] He was placed under more or less surveillance and found it impossible to exercise his normal activity. However, all the religious schools and seminaries under his charge were closed, the church and monastic lands were seized, and all ecclesiastical printing was suppressed. Finally, the clergy were compelled to hand over to the representatives of the government all the baptismal and other records which were incorporated in the work of the ZATS, the Soviet bureau of vital statistics. The clergy were treated as a non-working class [661] and were thus deprived of all means of livelihood, except for the free-will offerings of their impoverished parishioners.

In the eastern sections, where the Orthodox Church predominated, the same regulations were put into force with the additional proviso that the clergy had to transfer their allegiance from the Polish Orthodox Church to the locum tenens of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow. This was a first step in improving relations between the locum tenens and the Soviet government and in making the authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church a definite instrument of the government in the spreading of Russian Communism.

545 On the other hand, there was a considerable patronage of Ukrainian art. Certain scholars were rather favored. The Ukrainian theatre was supported on a more liberal scale than it had been under the Polish rule and there were in some quarters hopes that there might be a happy future. It was again a short dream, for [626] as 1940 came to a close, there began again the insistant but unobtrusive attempts at russification. Russian theatrical companies began to visit Lviv and other cities. The publications of the publishing firms of Lviv fell off and once more they found it necessary ooo to produce Russian books. The libraries were carefully purged of

[1] [1940 -- under Russian occupation -- Analyst]

The libraries were carefully purged of
those authors who had fallen under the displeasure of Moscow 538
during the crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance and their works 626
were forbidden, just as in Eastern Ukraine. The books that were sent from Kiev were chiefly in Russian. Furthermore, those authors,-poets, and artists who were still in Western Ukraine now found themselves regimented. They were given elaborate projects but they found that their success depended upon their ability not to express themselves freely but to satisfy the demands of the Soviet authorities. As a result many of them endeavored to get, in one way or another, to the west where even if they were under Nazi rule they still had more possibilities at the time than they did under the highly organized system sponsored by Moscow.

It was thus abundantly evident that the "liberation" of Western 661
Ukraine was but the exchange of one master for a still sterner rule. The realization of this fact came quickly and it very soon evoked a corresponding reaction which began to unite the entire population, the more so as even those few Communists in Western Ukraine who had remained true to their convictions were now seized by the Soviet authorities and punished on the ground that they were Trotskyists or were believers in one of the various deviations from the general line of the party. There were to be no Communists except those who had passed through the Soviet training school and those people who had believed that their Communist faith would be of profit to them found themselves in as wretched a position as had Eastern Ukrainian Communists like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk who had gained nothing by their independence, except death and destruction.

Thus, by the spring of 1941 conditions in Western Ukraine were rapidly assuming the same form that they had taken in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Any hopes that there would be any exception or any toleration for the area were once and for all annihilated when the Soviets attacked Finland and, still more, when, in the summer of 1940, they absorbed and turned into Soviet Republics the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Soviets were shown clearly to be on the march and it was for the people to protect themselves as best they could.

Under such conditions, if the chaos and the disorder were not 722
to be allowed to spread further, it was obvious that something had to be done to improve the morale of the population. This was particularly evident and necessary during the early months when it seemed as if the Nazis might decide to make some concessions to the people. As a result, there were a series of developments undertaken which superficially, at least, offered some concessions to the spirit of the various non-Russian nationalities.

Thus, in 1943 the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR was [814]
allowed to celebrate its twenty fifth anniversary at Ufa in the Bashkir Autonomous Republic and to list its institutes which were scattered throughout Asia. Such an event rendered it possible to blame the Nazis for the destruction of what had not been evacuated. It furnished good propaganda for the Western powers who were already sending copious supplies to the USSR and receiving in return from it only condemnation and criticism.

In the same way, the various writers who had passed the 722
approval of the government were assigned posts as newspaper 538
correspondents in the Red Army where they could sing the praises 626
of Stalin. Yet, at the same time, they were encouraged to write articles and poems which would reflect the hostility to the Nazis and again and again the censorship was relaxed for men like Sosyura to write poems in praise of the Ukraine, of its past, its present and its future.

Others like Yanovsky and Bazhan were allowed to emphasize [198]
the separation between the traditional Ukrainian speech and the
jargon that had been put out in the various Ukrainian-Russian [814]
dictionaries after the breaking of the Ukrainian Renaissance. They were allowed to assemble collaborators to compile a more conservative dictionary and to revamp the system of orthography which had been the work of such pronounced Russian sympathizers as Khvylya during the preceding period.

Yet, these concessions were more apparent than real, for under 722
the wartime conditions, those Ukrainian scholars that had the 814
apparent confidence of the government were scattered far and wide. They were living perforce under abnormal conditions and

185 are a few large projects planned in the eastern part of the country which can be made immediately accessible to the Moscow Industrial area but which will be of little value to the Ukrainian population, for even the resorts along the coast of the Black Sea have now been definitely placed under a Union Commissariat and are being improved to accommodate the higher officials from the centre. The whole strength of the Soviet Union is being exerted to build up the industrial centres in the Urals and further to the east.

During these years there has been little progress made in many fields, and few or none of the evacuated personnel which formerly managed the factories have been returned. It is the same with machinery.

[166] On the other hand, where factories have been restored, the new directors have usually been sent down from Moscow to administer them, and so have the responsible workmen. The deportation from the villages still continues as the native population are removed to Siberia or elsewhere and non-Ukrainians are sent in, in accordance with a definite scheme for breaking up the homogeneity of the population.

665 Despite all this, there has scarcely passed a month in which
• 626 the central authorities in Moscow have not stressed defects in the working of the Ukrainian branch of the party. They have found continued failures to perform the required deliveries, a lack of ideological work and definite wrecking and deliberate sabotage due to bourgeois nationalist feelings on the part of the party leaders in the Ukraine. There has been a consistent and unrelenting attack on everything that has been done in the country, while the heads of the collective farms and the other institutions have been attacked and changed for nationalist deviations.

000 The conclusion is irresistible that it is not the intention of the central authority in Moscow to relax its pressure until it has annihilated the last point in the UkSSR which differs in the slightest degree from the rules prevailing in the RSFSR and that in the meantime it, despite its lip service to the cause of a federation, is working for a complete standardization, not only in the field of economics but in every other field as well.

Muscoviam, Before and After Moscow). If the before was leading 814
up to a Moscow discovery, it was good; if not, it was bad. 665

This was proclaimed by Zhdanov of the Politbiuro in 1946 [546]
when, under the highest auspices, he began his attack. On September 4 of that year, at a meeting of the Umiom of Soviet Writers in Moscow, he lashed out at various films which had been recently produced and at several Russian authors, especially Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova, for not producing a true picture of Soviet reality. Then, warming to his task, he explicitly declared that literature 538
had to be entirely at the service of the Communist Party and that 626
it was the duty of every Soviet writer to lash and scourge the 665
decadent bourgeois west. He berated many of the authors for wishing to learn from the bourgeois writers at the very moment when Soviet literature, the most revolutionary literature in the world, was a hundred times higher and more beautiful than the literature of the bourgeois west.

The speech of Zhdanov was the open proclamation of war against all foreign influences in Soviet literature and it was directed against some of the most respected figures, who were apparently silenced. Even Tikhonov was removed from his post at the head [558]
of the Union of Soviet Writers for not having exerted himself more strongly against these dangerous heresies.

Yet this speech was not really the beginning, for some weeks before the question was fully brought into the open, at a meeting of the KP/b/U, Khrushchov, the Russian who held the post as First Secretary of the KP/b/U, had received from the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow full and definite instructions as to the means to be adopted for purging Ukrainian literature and science and for suppressing all traces of bourgeois nationalism. His remarks were reprinted in part by *Pravda* in Moscow, which summarized them in these words.

"The TsK KP/b/U had not paid sufficient attention to ideological work, does not give enough weight to the selecting and the ideological and political education of the cadres in the fields of science, literature and art, has not organized in the press a wide criticism of the hostile bourgeois-nationalist ideology. As a result

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in some books, journals and newspaper articles and in the lectures of some Ukrainian historians and literary men there are ideological mistakes and perversions, and efforts to revive the bourgeois nationalist conceptions of the historian Hrushevsky and his 'school.' "

[814]
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The weight of the attack fell upon the Institute of Language and Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR for two books which it had published. One was the first volume of a *History of Ukraine* which had appeared in 1943 and the other was *An Outline of the History of Ukrainian Literature* which had appeared in 1945. The authors of both books were accused of having failed to periodicize Ukrainian history and literature according to the Marxo-Leninist tradition and of having followed Hrushevsky and Yefremiv in being deceived by external political events. They were charged with remarks that could be interpreted as maintaining an early separation of Ukrainian culture from Russian, when it was a fact that the three brotherly nations, the Great Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, had had a joint culture until the fourteenth century, after which the Great Russians became the truest heirs and interpreters of the whole. They were charged with idealizing the old bourgeois nationalists as V. Naumenko and O. Levytsky, of admiring the old state of patriarchal private property and of failing to realize the great ideological gulf between Shevchenko, who stood in the tradition of Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, etc., and Kulish who was a liberal and not a revolutionist. They were condemned for having a good word for such nationalist counter-revolutionists as Vynnychenko and Oles and for calling a competent poet, I. Steshchenko, who had been a minister under Petlyura. They forced their own flatterer, Rylsky, to leave his post as head of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukraine for not having taken a sufficiently firm stand in condemning the mistakes of the other writers, and for a while he was in disfavor.

The accusations penned in Moscow and printed in *Pravda* and the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* were reprinted in the Ukrainian papers with even more vulgarity and abuse. They poured out their venom at nearly all the writers and historians who regarded the use of the Ukrainian language as expressing the feelings and the

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culture of the Ukrainian people. They condemned nationalist 638
praise of Kotlyarevsky for introducing national pride and feeling 626
into his *Eneida,* the first book in the Ukrainian vernacular published in 1798. They accused the writers and scholars of deliberately trying to drive a wedge between the Russian and Ukrainian people and of refusing to see, because of their bourgeois nationalist prejudices, that the great Ukrainian writers of the nineteenth century had always drawn their inspiration and been close to the progressive Russian writers, as Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, and they denied the existence of any Western European influence on Ukrainian literature, since all the influence had come from the Russians. They found influences of Gorky on Lesya Ukrainka and cited as her models Russian works which appeared after her works were in print. All this made no difference, for the Marxo-Leninists were in sole possession of the truth and their word was law.

Stalin had declared that the new Soviet literature and culture was to be Communist in content and national in form but it was very soon realized that even this was to be interpreted in a special sense. Any excessive attention paid by writers to descriptions of the Ukrainian landscape which did not bring a glorification of the new factories was treated as an antiquated sympathy with the old patriarchal Ukraine and its bourgeois nationalism. Any mention of the Zaporozhian Sich and the Kozak past, unless it was connected very definitely with the union and longing of the Kozaks for Muscovite rule, was declared to be treasonable and bourgeois nationalist in essence. Thus, step by step the authorities in Moscow and their mouthpieces in Ukraine limited more and more closely the possibility of describing or singing of any of the characteristic features of Ukrainian life and the historic past, while the Great Russians were given free rein to glorify the past of Russia even under the tsars, for it was there that the seeds of the Communist Party were planted and flourished.

This process of tracking down bourgeois nationalism perhaps reached the limits of its absurdity in 1951 when the Soviet critics discovered dangerous thoughts in the war poem of Volodymyr Sosyura, *Love Ukraine.* It was a graceful, but hardly a great poem.

538 It had been enthusiastically received in 1944, when it appeared,
● 626 and the poet was awarded for it a Stalin Prize. The poem was published and republished by the state publishing houses and then it was suddenly discovered that it was untrue, bourgeois nationalist, etc. and the unfortunate author was forced to repent of his errors. As a matter of fact, even before this, many of the Russian translators had gone out of their way to insert in it various passages celebrating the Volga and the Kremlin as part of the love of Ukraine but they, too, were reprimanded for trying to improve the work instead of condemning it for its real quality.

In every field of scholarship, literature, art, and music, the same charges have been brought with logical consistency. Anything which would remind the readers of the old pre-Communist life is treated as dangerous, but none of the authors, no matter how they have falsified history or the present, has been able to express the great achievements of the new Soviet Ukraine and to catch its spirit and show how it can in any degree differ from Moscow. At the first sign of any independent judgment, the cry is raised of bourgeois nationalism and the work is suppressed.

545 At the same time the Ukrainian scene is being overloaded with
532 things Russian. Russian theatrical companies are continually travel-
626 ling around the republic so as to show the real charity and achievements of the elder brother and inspire a desire for imitation of its life and thought under that all-time world genius, Joseph Stalin. Russian musical ensembles and exhibitions of the works of Russian artists are constantly sent to all the chief cities of the non-Russian republics, not only to acquaint the people with Russian achievements but still more to give them the necessary patterns by which they should plan their lives and work.

538 There are constantly published masses of Ukrainian translations
626 of Russian works and books translated from the other languages used in the USSR and it is almost essential for an author to allude to these and especially to the Georgian people as the people of Stalin, if he wishes to avoid the charge of bourgeois nationalism and the attempt to sow hostility between the brotherly peoples.

000 The situation is even more severe in the field of language.

The Soviet Cultural Policy in the Ukraine After the War

The situation is even more severe in the field of language. 191
Korniychuk after World War II emphasized that Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism was not to be sought only by a consideration of the contents of books and paintings. It was reflected in a still more dangerous form in the language of the books themselves. Any author who showed a predilection for the use of the older forms of the language or sought to develop it in any way other than the Communist Party desired was thereby convicting himself of holding nationalistic sentiments and of being dangerously reactionary. He thus accused of bourgeois nationalism even those writers as Yanovsky who had been most rigorous in following the party line in content. 626 538

The real significance of this statement of Korniychuk's is shown by the *Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary* which finally appeared in 1948 under the editorship of L. A. Bulakhovsky and M. F. Rylsky. The work was published in Moscow, although it bore the stamp of the Institute of Language Study of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR. 191 626 814

In this the authors made no concealment of their program, for they definitely stated that their work was based upon the "spoken" Ukrainian of the government offices (where it was the most corrupted by Russian words), and not the older Ukrainian language as spoken before the introduction of the Bolshevik reforms. They added, too, that they had supplied from Russian whatever was lacking in Ukrainian, for "thanks to the Russian language, the Ukrainian has been able to acquire the capacity to respond to the needs of socialist construction and to satisfy the cultural needs of the Ukrainian people." [198]

Stripped of its Communist jargon, this passage merely means that the Moscow authorities have decided to carry on their policy of russification in a new way. They have recognized the gap between the older Ukrainian language and the hodgepodge which they have produced and they are now insisting on using the words of the older usage in their most narrow and restricted sense, and by refusing to recognize any possibility of development in Ukrainian or any changes in it, they are forcing Ukrainian to become a dead language and by an inverted purism are planning to compel

191 the Ukrainians to recognize that Russian and Russian alone is in
626 a position to grow and develop.
814 This is entirely in line with the new philological policy dictated by Stalin after his repudiation of the late Prof. Marr and what was commonly known as Marrism, a theory that Stalin had sponsored for many years. Now he was willing to argue that Russian as the language of the USSR was not only the Russian language as the language of the Russian people but it was also in a new sense a zonal language, the approved language of Socialism and Communism and, as such, it had already absorbed all that it needed and its mission was to replace all those languages which were spoken by people who had awaked to the truth of the Moscow doctrines.

626 Thus the new theories of language study that were officially
814 accepted in Moscow opened new vistas for cultural oppression and perversion of the Ukrainian masses. They were a signal for renewed efforts, not only to control the Ukrainian cultural life in the present and the future but their efforts were extended to the past and the scholars were set to carry out an artificial restatement of Ukrainian history, literature and culture from the earliest known periods.

538 It is small wonder then that the modern post-war Ukrainian
626 literature is becoming more and more a pallid and bloodless imitation of the stereotyped patterns required for Great Russian and that even those authors who have sold themselves to the Stalinist regime are unable to produce anything of real value or of even mediocre excellence. They are turning out the average propaganda material against the imperialistic Americans on the lines ordered by the Politiburo with never a thought except the income and perquisites which they are slated to receive and the constant terror lest at some moment by an unfortunate slip they may be accused justly or unjustly of that terrible crime of bourgeois nationalism and lose in an instant all that they have worked for years to win.

The cultural pressure exerted on eastern Ukraine is spread likewise with even more force over those portions in the West which had been formerly under Poland or Czechoslovakia. Here, as former parts of the old Hapsburg monarchy, the writers had had

more opportunity to absorb the current thought of the west than 538
they had had in eastern Ukraine. Therefore, the pressure against 626
them has been applied even more strongly and still more Russians have been sent to remodel the life in Lviv than was necessary for Kiev. The process of russification was started later but it has been pushed more energetically. The net result is the same,—the impoverishment of Ukrainian culture as a whole and the substitution for it of a shabby form of Russian Muscovite Communist culture, which is to be tolerated only until there can be a full absorption.

Yet that process has not been so easy. Hardly a week passes 661
that some of the higher units in the Soviet service do not discover a new nest of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, and most frequently among the members and officers of the KP/b/U. It has been made evident that the Russian Communists cannot hope to achieve their goal until they have eliminated the entire Ukrainian population. They are trying to do it, but despite the millions of their victims and their attempts to separate the Ukrainian children from their parents and to rear them as slaves for Russian factories, they have not succeeded in winning the population to their views.

From the cultural point of view, the post-war period has been even more depressing than were the thirties. It has been drabber, like the lives of the people, but it has not served as yet to eliminate that spark of hope which alone preserved the Ukrainians during the hard periods of tsarism when they were subjects and slaves on their own territories, which were not their own to govern or to develop.

time was allotted to the process of registering "popular approval" for incorporation of the occupied lands in the Soviet Union. A "Ukrainian National Congress," "elected" immediately after the Soviet invasion, met on October 26; on November 1 the head of its plenary committee, M. I. Panchyshyn, sent a request for admission to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; on November 15, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet) of the latter division of the Soviet state approved the request; thus East and West Ukraine were "united." [59]

In spite of the complete replacement of independent press and political organizations by Communist agencies, however, a strong effort was made in the early months to attract support for the new regime. Perhaps one reason for this attempt was the desire to influence Ukrainians still outside the enlarged Soviet Ukrainian Republic, especially in the Generalgouvernement. In a protocol to the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, which had defined the frontier between the parts of Poland annexed by the two totalitarian powers, it was provided that the government of the USSR should place no obstacles in the way of migration of ethnic Germans from eastern Poland to Germany. This secured for the Nazis the right to "bring home" the tens of thousands of German-speaking Volhynians. In return, Germany acknowledged an equal right of Belorussians and Ukrainians to migrate to the Soviet Union.[60] In accordance with a further provision of the protocol, a Soviet "repatriation" commission was allowed to travel through the Lemko region in early 1940;[61] by the end of June, it had induced only thirty-five hundred Ukrainians to cross the border into the Soviet Union, however.[62]

[59] S. M. Belousov and O. P. Ohloblyn, *Zakhidna Ukraïna* (The West Ukraine) (Kiev: Akademiia Nauk URSR, Instytut Istoriï Ukraïny, 1940), pp. 108 ff.

[60] Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*, eds. Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington: Department of State, 1948), pp. 104–5.

[61] *Krakauer Zeitung*, February 18–19, 1940, p. 6, reports the departure of one thousand Ukrainians from this area after a visit of the Soviet commissioners.

[62] According to *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, pp. 2–3. In an article which was remarkably hostile to the Soviet regime, in view of the latter's publicly cordial relations with Germany at that time, the Nationalist paper stated that the "intensive propaganda" of the Soviet commission, aided by "the pro-Russian intelligentsia" but combatted by "healthy Ukrainian elements," had resulted in the meager migration

The campaign to win friends in Galicia and Volhynia was in part negative; measures which were most likely to inflame anti-Soviet sentiments were avoided. The church was not entirely suppressed, though it was sharply criticized.[63] Its real property was confiscated and the religious orders disbanded.[64] The Soviet authorities weakened the influence of the church on the youth by liquidating the Catholic school system and forcibly inducting the children into Communist organizations.[65] However, the person of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was respected.[66] The part of the intelligentsia which was not prominent in politics was allowed to remain at large, although persons in callings such as the law sometimes found it necessary to turn to nonprofessional work.[67] On the more positive side, the Ukrainian language was given a far greater scope than it had enjoyed under Polish rule. In particular, the University of L'vov was formally Ukrainized in language and personnel, although it is said that the resistance of remaining Polish professors to lecturing in Ukrainian was not harshly dealt with.[68] Students from the East Ukrainian universities were brought on tours to the West Ukraine, and L'vov students made Communist-sponsored trips to Kiev.[69] Other ele-

661 626 [198] 186

cited. Either this is one of the not too infrequent examples of ability of the Prague publication to print items contrary to German policy, or someone in authority gave the signal for an anti-Soviet attitude even at that early date. In the latter case it may have been a subtle riposte in the hidden conflict over Soviet demands for Bukovina. On the other hand, as early as March the *Krakauer Zeitung* printed a report by a German who had visited the villages of the Lemko area. He praised the young Ukrainians, noting that they wore the national blue and yellow colors and greeted him with "Heil Hitler!" and "Slava Ukraïna!" (Glory to the Ukraine) (*Krakauer Zeitung*, March 7, 1940, p. 5). [167]

[63] See F. Iastrebov, "Uniats'ke dukhovenstvo na sluzhbi u polskoho panstva" (The Uniate Clergy in the Service of the Polish Aristocracy), *Komunist*, October 9, 1939, p. 2.

[64] "Die Tragödie der ukrainisch-katholischen Kirche," *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, January, 1952, p. 14.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 18, 1942, p. 4; Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), p. 112.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] Interview 36.

[68] For the official Soviet version see M. Marchenko (the new rector of the University of L'vov), "L'vivs'kyi Universytet na novykh shliakhakh" (L'vov University on New Paths), *Komunist*, December 16, 1939, p. 2.

[69] Interview 51; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, on a trip of about forty students of the L'vov veterinary school to Kiev in the spring of 1940.

186 ments of the Galician population—teachers, physicians, artists—were brought to Kiev to participate in Ukrainian cultural activities.[70]

626 After a comparatively short time, however, the Soviet administration appears to have become convinced that this "generous" 186 treatment of Ukrainian national aspirations was unrewarding. About the middle of 1940, the Ukrainian occupation troops, which had evidently been on too friendly terms with the local population, were withdrawn and replaced by units recruited in Central Asia.[71] A strip along the border with the Generalgouvernement was cleared of its population to a depth of several miles, [423] and crossing was made almost impossible.[72] A start was made in the collectivization of agriculture.[73] No less important than these deliberate measures perhaps was the sending of tens of thousands of "carpetbagger" Soviet state, party, and army officials to the West Ukraine, where by their alien aspect (many were Russian) and their sheer numbers they severely irritated the local population.[74]

While it is impossible to know what the Soviet motives for introducing a harsher policy were, one may guess that the negative reaction of the population to the "tolerant" epoch played a part. The Soviet authorities probably discovered soon that the student exchanges had an effect opposite to that intended, for the West Ukrainian students were disagreeably surprised by the material

[70] Arthur W. Just, in *Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5.

[71] Mykhailo Kohut, "Iak zhylo halyts'ke selo pid bol'shevykamy" (How a Galician Village Lived under the Bolsheviks), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; Report of interview with Dr. H. J. Beyer (a German official who had been active in Galicia), *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, July 16, 1941, p. 3.

[72] *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, p. 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 10, 1940, p. 3, based on an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

[73] Kohut in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 25, 1941, p. 2, and May 17, 1942, p. 4.

[74] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 13, 1942, p. 4, states that, due to the influx of Polish refugees from the German military campaign and the arrival of Soviet officials, the population of L'vov increased from 318,000 to 450,000 under Soviet occupation. On August 14, 1941, it printed a letter from L'vov stating that Soviet officials and their families in L'vov had numbered 100,000. Just (*Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5) concludes from the number of votes cast in the Soviet election in Stanislav in the summer of 1940 that the population of that city must have increased by over 40,000, 1,000 of whom, he says, were NKVD officers.

poverty of the East Ukraine and the predominance in many 186
nominally Ukrainian places of the Russian language and cul- 626
ture.[75] East Ukrainian students coming to L'vov, on the other hand, had their first opportunity to become infected with the "virus" of "bourgeois nationalism." [76] Aside from producing these 668*
undesired ideological results, the earlier policy failed to prevent underground work by the Nationalist youth of Galicia.

Most of the members of the OUN were not able, of course, to [486]
leave the Soviet-occupied area. It is impossible to secure reliable evidence concerning the exact extent to which those who re- 668*
mained could carry on their activities, but it is certain that they 661
carefully refrained from open opposition. Nevertheless, late in 1940 the NKVD succeeded in tracking down a large number of Nationalists; they were sentenced to death or prison after a proceeding in L'vov known in the OUN accounts as the "trial of the fifty-nine." Among those sentenced to death was Krymins'kyi, the chief of the OUN movement in Soviet-occupied territories.[77] In all likelihood, he and his companions had sided with Bandera in the dispute with Mel'nyk. Certainly, the remaining members who, in spite of severe losses, were able to continue as an organized underground, were firm adherents of the new leader. The new underground director, John Klymiv, was in fact one of the most fanatical supporters which this fanatical movement of the younger generation could boast.[78] While there were undoubtedly many supporters of Colonel Mel'nyk in Galicia, it is doubtful whether they were active—or rash—enough to form what could be called an underground, although apparently agents kept up sporadic contacts with headquarters in the Generalgouvernement.

The situation in Volhynia was less favorable to Nationalist 668*
activity than that in Galicia, since the OUN had never enrolled such a high proportion of the youth there. Throughout most if not all of the area, Mel'nyk and Bandera apparently had no

[75] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, p. 3.
[76] Interview 51.
[77] See, for example, Mykhailiuk, p. 4. Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, August 17, 1941, p. 4, reprinting an article from *Ukraïns'ki Shchodenni Visti* (L'vov).
[78] Interview 43.

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668* organizations, though agents were probably present.[79] The UNR, on the other hand, as will be described, was able to establish loose connections with a group which had been formed by nationalist youths in the remote Kostopol' (Kostopil')-Liudvipol' (Liudvypil') area near the former border between Polish and Soviet Volhynia.

626 668* [161] The situation in Bukovina prior to June, 1940, had in many respects closely paralleled that which existed in Galicia before September, 1939. The small Ukrainian population (about one quarter of a million persons) was subjected to a denationalizing policy by the Rumanian government, which included severe limitations on the use of Ukrainian in education and restriction of the press and of cultural activities. As in Galicia, there was a legal press and party, however, which endeavored to work within the scope permitted by the Rumanian authorities. There was also a fairly large section of the OUN, working underground. Corresponding —less closely—to Volhynia, was a considerable area of Ukrainian settlement in southern Bessarabia. This section of the Ukrainian ethnic group, however, was so backward culturally and so cut off geographically from contact with districts in which nationalism was strong that it appears to have played almost no role in the nationalist movements of the war period.

648 In June, 1940, while Germany was still occupied with the final phases of the French campaign, the Soviet Union began to press claims for territorial cessions from Rumania. It had long been recognized that Moscow would seize the first favorable moment to secure the retrocession of Bessarabia, the annexation of which by Rumania it had never recognized. Demands for Bukovina, however, apparently came as something of a shock to the German negotiators who were preparing a settlement of the Russian demands. They objected on the grounds that Bukovina had never been a part of the Russian Empire and that it contained a large

[79] Mel'nyk adherents have since claimed that their organizers who had been in Volhynia for a considerable time were killed by Bandera followers shortly before or after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war; see Mykhailiuk, p. 88; O. Shuliak, *V im'ia pravdy: Do istorii povstanoho rukhu v Ukraini* (In the Name of Truth: On the History of the Insurrectionary Movement in the Ukraine) (Rotterdam, 1947), p. 10.

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the Germans, and hence able to issue ration cards and provide a small income, was indispensable for most intellectuals.[30] [51] 668*

In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that the German enemies of the Nationalist movement felt that the time was ripe to destroy its prestige by an attack on its principal organ. On December 12, 1941, the SP force seized *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and arrested all the leading editorial workers, including Rohach, Chemeryns'kyi and Oliïnyk.[31] Kandyba, too, was arrested, but by native police in a city *raion* (ward) controlled by the OUN-M; this circumstance allowed him to escape.[32] 204 668* 661

Two days later the newspaper reappeared, as *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* but with a quite different editorial policy. The new editor was Constantine Shtepa, acting rector of the University of Kiev. Of Ukrainian origin, he had been an officer in the tsarist army and, although strongly anti-Soviet, remained a pronounced Russian patriot, desiring the acceptance of the Russian culture and language throughout the Ukraine and the maintenance of governmental ties with Moscow. Consequently, he was a bitter enemy of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.[33] The first issue of his paper contained an article, inspired by the Germans, but acceptable to Shtepa, in which the Nationalists were vigorously attacked for turning what "should have been an informational journal into an organ of their group." The Nationalists, it explained, had refused to heed German warnings that the paper must serve the whole community; consequently Shtepa had taken charge to "popularize" it. What this meant, was clarified by an article on the second page which demanded "work instead of politics." [34] 626 204 668*

Under Shtepa's administration, *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* became extremely subservient to the Germans. In part this was due to the extreme severity and alertness of the German censorship; the edi-

[30] Interview 59. Liubchenko himself (Liubchenko, pp. 60 ff.), when the shoe was on the other foot and he was compelled to seek work in Kiev, found this to be the case.

[31] *OUN u Viini,* p. 73.

[32] L. Dniprova in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.

[33] Record of interrogation of an editor in Kiev, early 1943, who was a specialist in ancient history, the author of *Die Völkerwanderung* and *Das römische Recht* (CXLVa 78, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine) (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 78). The only person fitting this description is Constantine Shtepa.

[34] These articles are reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* January 5, 1942, p. 2.

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204 tor himself was compelled to publish over his own signature arti-
626 cles composed by the German propaganda section, although Ger-
668 man records show that he vigorously and courageously criticized Nazi policy in private discussions with German officials.[35]

The nationalists were deeply antagonized by these articles which attacked the foundations of their movement by denying the historical equality of Ukrainian culture with the Russian. Shtepa apparently went far beyond even the Communist newspapers in this respect, reverting to the "Little Russian" tradition which was so abhorrent to all nationalist Ukrainians.[36] However sincere his Russian nationalism may have been, for a man of Ukrainian origin, writing in the Ukrainian language, in the Ukrainian capital, to denounce the Ukrainian nationalist movement could only be regarded in nationalist circles as an act of high treason.

727 During the late autumn, while the *Einsatzgruppen* were crushing the OUN-M groups, the administration of the Reichskommissariat was being established throughout the "Right Bank" Ukraine, while the area east of the Dnieper remained under Wehrmacht control. According to the plans laid in the Ostministerium, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was eventually to include all of the pre-1941 Soviet Ukraine except Transnistria, Galicia, and the areas acquired by the USSR from Rumania in 1940. In addition, it was to have its boundary extended roughly due east in a line passing south of Kursk to the Volga, where it was to embrace the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.[37] In the northwest the Reichskommissariat was to embrace approximately two tiers of *raions* in the southern part of the pre-1941 Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, including Brest, Pinsk, and the greater part of the railroad connecting these towns with Gomel.[38]

By the end of August, the process of pacifying the western

[35] CXLVa 78.

[36] *Biuleten'* (Bulletin), No. 9–10 of the OUN-B (late 1942), pp. 14–15. This clandestine publication was furnished me by Nicholas Lebed'.

[37] Memorandum, Die neuen Ostgebiete, June 16, 1941, PS 1033 (hereafter referred to as PS 1033); Rosenberg to Alfred Meyer, October 20, 1941, PS 1057 (hereafter referred to as PS 1057).

[38] PS 1057; Memorandum, Die Zivilverwaltung im besetzten Osten, Part II, Reichskommissariat Ukraine, PS 702 (hereafter referred to as PS 702).

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659 Empire collapsed and a considerable body of Orthodox believers
795 came under Polish dominion, an effort was made to establish a separate hierarchy in Poland. The leader in this effort was Dionysius, a Russian bishop who, with recognition from the Patriarch of Constantinople, became Metropolitan of Warsaw and head of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in I oland.[3] In addition to the Belorussian archbishop of Pinsk, there were four bishops in Volhynia: Archbishop Alexius, with his residence in the famous Pochaïvs'ka Lavra (monastery), and his vicars Polykarp, bishop of Lutsk; Anthony (Martsenko), bishop of Kamen Kashirsk (Kamin Koshyrs'k); and Simon, bishop of Ostriz. These bishops were Ukrainian but subject to Dionysius.[4]

795 When the Soviet Union acquired Volhynia in September, 1939, its efforts to convert the Russian Orthodox Church into an auxiliary of the Soviet government were already well under way. A special deputy of Patriarch Sergius of Moscow, Nicholas, Exarch of the West Ukraine, was sent to coordinate the church of the newly occupied area with the government-approved ecclesiastical organization. The existing bishops were not deposed, with the exception of Alexander of Pinsk. The latter was not molested physically, but his ecclesiastical jurisdiction, now in the Belorussian Soviet Republic, was divided between a bishop of Brest and a bishop of Pinsk sent from Moscow.[5]

While it is not likely that Alexius or his adherents (including Polykarp) were pleased with the subjugation of their province by Moscow, they appear to have conformed to the Orthodox tradition of submission to the secular power, even when the latter is not basically sympathetic to the Orthodox religion. Although it
[626] did not suppress the Orthodox Church, the Soviet government imposed severe restrictions and onerous financial obligations upon it, as well as upon the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. As a result, many of the priests fled, or took up secular occupations.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48; Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1.

[4] *UAPTs (Ukrainskaia Avtokefalnaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov')* (UAPTs [Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church]), by "A. V." (Pravoslavnyi Beloruss, 1951; mimeographed), p. 2; cf. Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1. There was also a Bishop Timothy (Shreter) in a monastery in the Generalgouvernement, but he played no role in the controversies which followed, and appears to have been burned to death when Germans destroyed his monastery (Occ E-4 [1]).

[5] Occ E-4 (1); *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

727 of the determined efforts of Erich Koch and his cohorts to bring
634 every aspect of life under their control, the sheer extent of the Ukraine and the size of its population prevented complete success. For example, in the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev, there were only five hundred Germans on the administrative staff, charged with governing a population of 1,920,000, in an area of nearly seventeen thousand square miles.[3]

191 The limitations on control arising from the small number of
634 German personnel available were made yet narrower by the
727 language barrier. The extent to which the Wehrmacht was dependent on nationalists as interpreters has already been described. Since few Reichskommissariat officials knew the Slavic languages and yet in general rejected the use of émigrés or West Ukrainians as aides, they were thrown back on local interpreters and assistants as intermediaries between themselves and the masses. Supposedly
626 reliable persons, often ethnic Germans, were employed. These
634 physical limitations, however, compelled the German officials to
727 concentrate on keeping the "commanding heights" of the administration—economic controls, armed force, and means of communication—in their hands, while turning over most other aspects of public affairs to administrators drawn from the native population. In these fields they could lay down policy and occasionally intervene brutally to punish real or fancied violations of their directives. They could play one group against another and thereby secure a check on the development of movements threatening to pass from German control. They could place all aspects of life under a crushing weight of fear and material deprivation. Lacking a body of supporters extending down to the smallest units of society, however, they could not enforce a positive program of indoctrination and—except in an intermittent and incomplete fashion—they could not prevent those who were in contact with the masses of the population from imparting their own ideological tinge to their activities.

634 The physical limitations of German power meant that the
727 local administrative machinery in the East Ukraine was to a large extent left to the inhabitants. Local men were of course especially predominant in the administration of rural areas, but

[3] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, December 2, 1942, p. 1; *Volyn'*, February 25, 1943, p. 4.

186 permitted to determine his own nationality. There was an enormous increase in the proportion of persons claiming Ukrainian nationality as compared to the Soviet census of 1926, which had been conducted in the same fashion. That many factors were involved in the shift is indicated by the extreme variations from city to city, which will be touched upon in a later chapter. There [626] is, moreover, little doubt that pressures, ranging from fear of the nationalist-dominated police (which, in Zhitomir at least, took the census) to desire to obtain material benefits reserved for Ukrainians only, were significant. There is no question, however, that a large number of those who claimed Ukrainian nationality in 1941–42 were influenced by a desire to "climb upon the band wagon" by obtaining affiliation with the national group which they thought would be in favor in the future. The nationalist mayor of Kiev, Leontii Forostivs'kyi, during whose administration the census in the capital was taken, freely admits the importance of this factor.[7]

633 From a material standpoint, too, the municipal administration played a considerable role in the provision of support for nationalist activity. The funds at its disposal were not inconsiderable, the Kharkov city budget amounting to the equivalent of some eight million dollars annually.[8] The number of municipal employees was also sizable. In Kiev the total under Bahazii's direction, evidently largely dependent on the central municipal authority for their positions, was twenty thousand.[9] This figure was regarded as so excessive by the Germans that it figured in the charges made against him, but several months after his arrest the number employed by the city—apparently the purely administrative branches only, exclusive of education and manufacturing and commercial enterprises—was still 1,138, and 1,065 more were working for the *raions*.[10] Even the smaller figures are quite significant in a city whose total population had by that time sunk to 350,000, an extremely small percentage of which consisted of

[7] Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyïv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), p. 50.

[8] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, May 23–24, 1943, p. 2, quotes Mayor Semenenko as saying the budget for the last quarter of 1942 totaled 50,000,000 *karbovontsi* (10 *k.* = 1 RM = $0.40).

[9] PS 192.

[10] *Ukrains'ka Diiznist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Like the cooperative movement, popular education had long 727
been a cornerstone of Ukrainian nationalism, more important in 658
many respects than direct political action. In the conflict between 871
the national Communists in the Ukraine and the Stalinist central- 626
ists, it was especially the commissars of education, such as Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk, who had led the fight for Ukrainization of cultural life. Consequently it was natural that nationalist Ukrainians were determined to control the municipal departments of education under German occupation.

A major aim of the Reichskommissar and his henchmen, however, was to prevent the development of a cultured Ukrainian class, to convert the people into a race of submissive peasants. Rosenberg's vision of a university in Kiev went by the board, and the standard schooling for every Ukrainian child was set at four years.[35] Few material injuries were as deeply resented as this drastic curb on the opportunities for education. Since there were real shortages of materials, books, and teachers, the Ukrainians held to the hope that the restriction did not represent a permanent policy, even in the face of the closing of *gimnaziias* which had been reopened under the army administration through the efforts of the local population itself.[36]

To a limited extent the ban on secondary and higher educa- 874
tion was evaded by the extensive use made of a loophole in the 727
German regulations which allowed the reopening of technical 186
schools. The enormous loss of artisans and professionally trained persons incurred by the annihilation of the Jewish inhabitants compelled even the power-mad Nazis to recognize the need for training Ukrainians in such occupations. A large number of technical secondary schools, agricultural schools, and even institutes of higher education like medical faculties, were permitted. The extent to which these facilities were utilized by the Ukrainian population is indicated by the fact that the enrollment of the Kiev medical institute reached 2,000 in 1943 when the total population of the city was only 300,000, while Kherson, with a fifth

[35] Report of Rosenberg to Hitler, August 11, 1942, PS 42 (hereafter referred to as PS 42); PS 1198.

[36] E.g., in Berdichev (*Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3, quoting *Nova Doba* [Berdichev] for September 1), Zhitomir (Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941), and Belaia Tserkov' (*Nationalist*, December 20, 1941, p. 2).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

liberality was a desire to carry propaganda to the numerous de- 727
serters who, if they were afraid to submit to German authority, 204
might join the Red partisans. Consequently, papers were fostered 186
in the swamp and wooded regions, even in small towns such as Ovruch, Olevsk, and Shchors. Indeed, the propaganda section of the army itself played a major role in founding newspapers, and even provided for the journalistic staffs in Zhitomir, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov the services of a competent and comparatively neutral Galician journalist, Peter Sahaidachnyi.

However, as was previously noted, the OUN-M took a leading role in establishing the papers in Zhitomir and Kiev. Its importance was also considerable in a number of the smaller cities. In Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, and Krivoi Rog, on the other hand, the initiative was taken by persons who had been journalists under the Soviet regime. In Krivoi Rog, Michael Pronchenko, a writer and poet who had been imprisoned by the Soviet regime, but later worked for the local Communist paper, upon Red army evacuation, took over the Communist press and, with the aid of other young men, began publishing a paper called *Dzvin* (The Bell).[61] In Kharkov, it was a former member of the staff of the defunct *Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna* who proposed immediately after the German arrival to start a newspaper under the name of *Novyi Chas* (The New Times).[62] It was some weeks before the paper could actually be started; the name then became *Nova Ukraïna,* and a large number of Mel'nyk adherents were on the staff. The chief editor and a majority of his subordinates, however, were local persons unaffiliated with the OUN. In a number of places Bandera organizers, too, assisted local men to establish papers.

When the Reichskommissariat took over the bulk of the East 626
Ukraine, a quite different policy was pursued; the outspokenly 204
nationalist organs were suppressed, their staffs executed. Even 186
the official policy of the Reichskommissariat, presumably ap- 727
proved by the Ostministerium, provided that all matters concerning newspapers in the native language should be submitted to the Press and Enlightenment Division of the Reichskommissariat.

[61] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 15, 1941, p. 3; Interview 7.
[62] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), pp. 7–9.

204 Newspapers were to be held to the minimum necessary to satisfy
626 the Ukrainian desire for news, and they were to be founded only
727 where "politically unobjectionable" journalists and adequate cen-
186 sorship machinery were available.[63] Nevertheless, as even this directive indicates, the need for a Ukrainian press could not be questioned. It was absolutely essential to have some means of reaching the population with directives, of quieting rumors, and of playing up the few positive features of the German administration. Since there were very few German personnel who could write Ukrainian, local men had to be turned to, although strong requests for newspapers were frequently refused when the Germans felt the burden of providing censors outweighed possible gains in propaganda or administrative convenience.

204 While important as a symbol of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy, the newspaper had certain severe limitations as a vehicle for nationalist ideology. Its frequency and size limited its utility. There were a few dailies, but the vast majority of newspapers appeared much less frequently, as the following figures on East Ukrainian newspapers show:[64]

Papers issued	
daily	5
three times a week	18
twice a week	25
weekly	9
unknown	41
TOTAL	98

Moreover, none exceeded four pages, and a large number could print only one page (being printed on the back of Soviet posters, etc.). This sharp curtailment was due primarily to the extremely severe paper shortage, especially in the south. *Nova Ukraïna* in Kharkov was forced to reduce its printing from fifty thousand to twenty-five thousand daily;[65] the daily *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* had to limit publication to three times a week; one paper in the Taurida *Generalbezirk* had to issue one copy of each number to each commune in the area, rather than to individuals.[66]

[63] PS 702.

[64] Figures compiled from numerous sources. It is very probable that the papers marked "unknown" appeared infrequently.

[65] *Krakiva'ki Visti*, August 21, 1942, p. 3.

[66] PS 1693.

204 If all the limited space available had been at the editor's dis-
636 posal, it would have sufficed for the expression of a wide range of
737 political comments. Actually, a large part, usually the front page, was taken up with "news," mostly military or concerning the allegedly superior attributes of the Germans.[67] Another large body of material consisted of notices and orders of the German administration. Furthermore, the editors were frequently compelled to write, or to print over their signatures, editorials prepared by the German propaganda officers stressing some point (usually fictitious), such as the joys of the *Ostarbeiter* program or the rapid progress of land distribution, which the authorities desired to have propagandized. There was also a considerable number of articles of a factual nature, designed to "educate" the Ukrainians on some topic such as agricultural technique, in which the Germans thought them to be deficient; these were frequently translated from the German press. A certain number of notices of the activity of Ukrainian agencies—the local administrations, the church, cultural activity—was permitted under close surveillance against political propaganda. A very small number of articles on history, literature, and other cultural topics was allowed.

204 These limitations came close to placing the Ukrainian editor in
737 a strait jacket. It is almost universally recognized by persons who
636 were active in journalism at this time, however, that there were
186 a few points at which the jacket might be stretched enough to justify the effort to use the newspaper as an outlet for nationalist expression. The few literary articles permitted, while deprived of overt political content, could be used to a certain extent to

[67] With the exception of a few issues of *Ukrains'ke Slovo* and *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo* from Kiev, the actual copies of these East Ukrainian papers have uniformly disappeared, so that it is impossible to make an investigation based on direct inspection. Their disappearance is readily explained by the hasty evacuation of the Ukraine by the German forces, the danger of having German organs on one's person in a flight to the West when one might fall into Soviet hands, and above all by the desperate need for paper of any kind for ordinary household uses. As a matter of fact, extensive, but by no means complete sets were gathered by the Institute for the Study of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Prague, as well as by certain émigré newspapers. The former collection, however, remained in the Czechoslovak capital after the end of the war and eventually fell into Soviet hands after the Communist coup (Interview 30). As a result, the presentation followed here must be based almost entirely on postwar information, and especially upon the numerous descriptions of East Ukrainian newspapers and reprints of their articles contained in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

stress themes which were basic to the formation of national pride, 186 themes such as the nobility of Ukrainian literature, the separate 204 development of Ukrainian and Russian history, and the value of 626 Ukrainian folkways. Articles ostensibly directed against Com- 727 munists or Jews could contain oblique thrusts at Moscow and the Russians as well; sometimes such articles did indeed represent extremes of xenophobia. Even the articles giving purely factual accounts of Ukrainian activity were prized by the nationalists, since they brought to the public's attention phases of national life which had been prohibited by the Soviets. The fact that a considerable number of such items could be found for reprinting in the relatively free West Ukrainian and émigré presses (although of course the articles so treated were far from representative) indicates that the censorship barrier was not insuperable, and simple a priori consideration of the difficulty of securing alert and reliable censors for such a large body of publications substantiates this assertion.

While it was therefore true that the newspapers could be used, to a limited extent, for nationalist propaganda, the fact that they were edited by writers known to be nationalists had a certain negative effect on the regard in which the nationalist cause was held by the population, since the newspapers were obviously tools of the Germans. Communist propaganda—and Bandera propaganda after the OUN-B workers were forced from editorial posts —made a great deal of this fact. The most courageous nationalist editors tried to overcome this accusation of serving German interests by occasional sly attacks on the Germans, using the "Aesopian" language which the subjects of the Soviet empire had been forced to learn. Thus one editor, when ordered to write an article glorifying the *Ostarbeiter* program, described in glowing terms the luxurious dining cars on the trains to Germany; few Ukrainians observing the miserable cattle cars actually provided could miss the irony.[68] Not a few editors were willing to pursue such dangerous tactics.

As far as can be detected, the only papers which were controlled by pro-Russian elements (aside from the Russian-language papers) were *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo, Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta,*

[68] Interview 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

204 and possibly one or two of the Ukrainian-language papers in the
727 Donbas. A number of papers in the latter area and a few in the
186 southwest Ukraine were influenced by Bandera agents, although
626 edited by local people, and maintained a semblance of independence from German control. The important papers in Vinnitsa and Proskurov remained under OUN-M editors, who, however, had to exert the utmost care to avoid arrest. Some papers, like a group in the area northwest of Poltava, which were led by a young resident of Mirgorod (Myrhorod), Michael Voskobiinyk, who was the editor of the paper there, did what they could to propagate nationalist sentiment, while others in the same district were completely subservient to the Germans.[69]

It is probably safe to say that the majority of editors would have liked to insert nationalist themes in their papers, and did so in the early days before the repression. The terrible danger to which they were exposed, however, seems to have induced most to go even further than was necessary for safety's sake in eliminating every vestige of independent writing and in slavishly following the German line. This was, as some of them were ready to admit, largely a heritage from the spirit-crushing Soviet regime, for West Ukrainians in similar positions were willing to display more initiative even though exposed to greater risks.[70] It was also very probably due to the fact that the editors lacked any experience in journalism, for many had been teachers or had followed other professions which left them ill-prepared for their new tasks. The suspicion which attached to any who had worked for the
727 Soviet press, and had thus been compelled to write anti-German
186 material, forced journalists with Soviet experience to be especially
204 cautious.[71] Whatever the reasons, on the whole the East Ukrain-

[69] Interview 47.

[70] This was admitted by an East Ukrainian in *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk* in a sharp criticism of the editorial staffs who continued the Soviet tradition of complete subservience to authority in journalism, so that in some cases the Germans themselves had to urge them to be more enterprising (March 22, 1945, p. 1).

[71] One of the causes for the dismissal of Pronchenko from directorship of *Dzvin* was the accusation by his enemies that he had written an article against Hitler in a Soviet paper (MS E); Liubchenko feared that a similar charge would be made against him, and wrote that Shtepa told him outright that persons active in the Soviet press could not be employed on *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo*, although this may simply have been an excuse to avoid hiring the nationalist writer (Liubchenko, pp. 26, 64).

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

186 661 538 Maxim Rilsky*, were dismissed in November 1946. Rilsky, one of the most outstanding poets of the Soviet Ukraine, was charged with being a 'prisoner of bourgeois nationalism'. He had not only 'sinned' in his works but he had also delivered a particularly objectionable lecture, 'Kiev in the history of the Ukraine', in which he 'idealized the old patriarchal order and depicted in rosy idyllic colours the conditions under the rule of landowners and bourgeois'. Together with Rilsky a whole group of Ukrainian writers was accused of nationalism, 'Khvylovy-ism' and reactionary tendencies, including I. Senchenko, Y. Yanovsky and P. Panch.[21]

Maxim Rilsky was replaced as president of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers by A. Y. Korneichuk, author of a large number of political plays, who had always accurately interpreted the party line and had earned nothing but praise from the supreme Soviet leadership. It was Korneichuk's task to lead Ukrainian literature on the road of strict Soviet Patriotism and 'Socialist Realism'. Indeed, Ukrainian writers, publishing houses and literary journals became more careful and it appeared during a certain period as if Korneichuk had really succeeded in his assignment. The 'Festival of Ukrainian Art and Literature' held in Moscow in June 1951 showed, however, that this was a deception. The festival gave the members of the Bolshevik Politbureau an opportunity of getting a closer look at Ukrainian cultural life. They found that Ukrainian authors and artists had still not overcome their ideological mistakes. Even Korneichuk himself who was expected to give a good example to his fellow-writers had committed a serious offence. He had written a libretto for the opera 'Bogdan Khmelnitsky', which, from the official point of view, was not sufficiently anti-Polish and not eloquent enough in its pro-Russian bias. Through its mouthpiece, *Pravda*, the [626] Politbureau not only denounced Korneichuk and other writers for ideological distortions but also reprimanded the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party for having neglected the political education of the Ukrainian intellectual élite. The Ukrainian Central Committee, mindful of what had happened to the Ukrainian Communist leaders in the thirties, immediately pledged itself to remedy the situation.[22]

THE UKRAINE AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET 'WORLD POLITICS'

648 645 After having fulfilled its original mission of bringing all Ukrainian lands into the fold of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ukraine was given a new task.

* Rilsky, like most great poets of the Soviet Ukraine, has a 'nationalistic past'. In 1934 he and another poet laureate of the Ukraine, Pavel Tychina, were rebuked for their 'hesitation' in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to them. Yet another contemporary Ukrainian poet, Mikola Bazhan, who is not only like Tychina a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet but also a Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Government, used to be likewise blamed for the 'nationalistic soil in which his creations have been rooted'.[23]

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

a balance of trade for Ukraine did not even cover the whole of the central part of the Ukrainian national territory, to say nothing of the areas that are linked up with Russia. 439

Nor did Ukrainian Galicia form an independent unit of [631] administration in Austria; it was administered together with a Polish area, as was the same with the Ukrainian part of Bucovina, which was under Roumanian administration, and Carpatho-Ukraine under Hungarian administration. An approximately exact balance can therefore be calculated only for Dnipro-Ukraine; for the remainder, general estimates only can be given.

Kryvchenko's figures for 1909—1911 give the best idea of the balance of trade for Dnipro-Ukraine before World War I. 1909—1911 were the last normal years for export trade via the Black Sea before the wars between Turkey and Italy and the Balkan wars. In the case of Ukraine which was not an independent state, a distinction must be made between export to foreign countries proper and export to other parts of the Russian empire. And the same distinction must be made for imports. The actual volume of Ukrainian imports or exports is obtained by adding these two categories, and the same holds for other sections of Ukrainian national territory. The "Russian exports from the Ukrainian provinces of the empire to foreign countries" would result in a low figure, which is by no means correct but which is sometimes quoted. The following are the characteristic features of the Dnipro-Ukrainian balance of trade before the first World War; the distinction already mentioned between exports and imports both beyond the frontiers and in trading with other parts of Russia, the latter category being a little in excess of the former; the fact that it was definitely favorable, both absolutely and relatively, particularly as regards foreign countries; the predominant share of agriculture in exports; the difference between the volume and quality of manufactured goods exported to foreign countries and those exported to other parts of Russia; the predominance of finished industrial commodities imported. Turnovers in foreign trade varied greatly, according to whether foreign countries or other parts of the Russian empire were concerned. In 1909—1911 the latter ac-

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

whether it has been properly used. For instance, one of the Ukrainian *Kolkhozy* reported that it had accomplished 50 per cent of the Sowing Plan when in reality it had only accomplished 2 per cent of it' (*Pravda*, 14 June, 1932). The harvest is continually assessed 'by the look of it in the fields' before it has been gathered in. Over a series of years the harvest has been between 20 and 30 per cent less than reports showed it to be. 113

The comparisons between Soviet actuality and pre-Revolutionary conditions are often unconvincing because Soviet statistics do not take quality into consideration. For instance, according to Soviet statistics, the output of peat has risen by 30 per cent. In reality, only the percentage of moisture retained in the peat accepted for delivery has risen.

In the *Times* article on 'The Plight of the Plan' (29 January, 1938) this question of quantity being the chief concern, irrespective of quality, in all the most important branches of industry in Soviet Ukraine, is discussed: 'The coal-mines show impressive figures but quantity is the chief concern. This has risen threefold or fourfold in the last decades, but recent disclosures indicate that the calorific value of the coal leaving Soviet mines is less even than that of the output in old Russia. The production of iron ore has gone up at a similar rate, but the final result is similar.' Cf. Makcheef, Th. (Maksheev), 'Heavy Industry in the Soviet Union,' *Contemporary Russia*, II, 2, London, 1938.

The Territory of Soviet Ukraine

Out of the 588,000 sq. km. claimed for 'Greater Ukraine', Soviet Ukraine occupied (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia in September 1939) 452,000. This area represents 2·1 per cent of the whole extent of the U.S.S.R. Soviet Ukraine occupies the territory of eight former Governments of the Empire: Kharkov, Chernigov (less five northern districts), Poltava, Ekaterinoslav (now renamed Dniepropetrovsk), Kherson, Podolia, Volhynia (excluding, until September 1939, the western districts annexed to Poland in 1921), Kiev. Three northern districts of the former Government of Tauris (Berdyansk, Melitopol, Dnieprovsk) are also included. The Putivl district of the former Kursk Government as well as some villages of the former Orel Government are also deemed to form part of the Ukraine. 131

In 1924 an 'Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic' was formed out of the Podolian districts of Balta and Tulchin along the Dniestr in order to give a semblance of self-government to the Roumanian-speaking villages of that region. The area of A.S.S.R. Moldavia is 8288 sq. km. and the population 572,000. The capital is located at Tiraspol.

The capital of the Ukrainian S.S.R. until 1934 was Kharkov; it is now Kiev.

In 1925 the administrative divisions of the area occupied by the Republic were reorganized into 40 Districts, 662 Regions, and 10,733 village and town Soviets. In 1929 the Districts were abolished out of economy and 7 *Oblasti* (Provinces) were established, roughly equivalent in size to the former Governments. These are: Vinnitsa (formerly Podolia), Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkov, Chernigov and Donets. Seven 'National Minority' Regions have been set up, and also 366 'National Minority' village Soviets 631

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

63/ in localities where non-Ukrainian elements predominate—Great Russians, White Russians, Greeks, Germans, Moldavians, Jews.

The largest towns of Soviet Ukraine are Kiev (625,000), Kharkov (650,000), Odessa (550,000), Dniepropetrovsk (former Ekaterinoslav, 325,000). Lvov, in 'Greater Ukraine', recently annexed to Soviet Ukraine, has 375,000 inhabitants. It is characteristic of current economic trends that the population has grown in Kharkov and decreased in Odessa (700,000 in 1916). Industrial centres have grown rapidly: Lugansk, Mariupol, Zaporozhie (formerly Alexandrovsk) have each of them over 100,000 inhabitants; Nikolaev and Kherson have each about 100,000. There are no large towns in Central and Western Ukraine: the most important of them, Vinnitsa and Poltava, have not more than 80,000 inhabitants each. Now we have Czernowitz (Chernovtsy), Kishinev and Jassy, each about 120,000.

The Population of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

161 The Census of 1 January 1933 gave the population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. as 31,901,000 persons. The figures for the more recent Census of 1937 are not sufficiently clear. (It is well known that the Government was displeased at the incompetent way in which this latter Census was carried out, and Stalin himself has expressed his dissatisfaction.) At any rate it is not denied that the increase of population in the Ukraine during the five years 1933–7 was at a rate lower than that for the whole Union calculated (with obvious exaggeration) at 16 per cent. The rate of increase in the Ukraine was considerably lower than in many of the eastern parts of the Union, notably Turkestan and the Kirghiz steppe—for which the obviously fantastic figures of 30 per cent and even 40 per cent were given. For the Ukraine the official increase was 6·6 per cent. On the basis of the figures for 1933, therefore, the population, allowing for increase, amounts to about 34,000,000 for 1938–9.

On the same territory about 30,000,000 people lived in 1917. In view of the fact that the normal increase in Russia before the Revolution was reckoned at 1·5 per cent p.a. and in some localities at 2 per cent p.a., the population of the Ukraine, under the social and political conditions existing under the Imperial régime, should have reached about 40,000,000 by the present day, even had there been a continuance of the movement of migration to Asiatic Russia which marked the turn of the century.

The history of the growth of population in the Ukraine during the last twenty years is of course far more complex than the bare figures would indicate. There was a terrible mortality, owing first to the Revolution and Civil War, and secondly to the two periods of famine and to the general deterioration in social and sanitary conditions. Again, parallel to a considerable migration of the peasantry, particularly during the famine periods, there was a constant flow of industrial workers from the north as a result of the Economic Plans. It is difficult therefore to avoid the following conclusions: that the growth of population during the two decades since the Revolution has been abnormally slow, but at the same time the change in the *composition* of the population has been rapid. The Ukrainians were continually disappearing or leaving their homeland while new elements were replacing them, mostly 'new-comers' from Central and Northern Russia.

the independence of the Ukrainian Communist regime in the hope 665
that sooner or later they would be admitted to the Communist International as an independent national Communist Party. They therefore willingly accepted the doctrines of the International, which was little more than the third facet of the ruling block. By 1925 the situation had so far developed that their aspirations for this were definitely checked and even this theoretical opposition was eliminated by compelling the Ukapisty to enter into the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party, or else.

This situation makes clear the relations that existed between 661
Ukraine and Russia during the early years of the New Economic Policy. As agriculture and industry revived in Ukraine, it was suggested that the Ukrainian government send aid to its Communist brothers. That suggestion was a command, and just as the Muscovite bands under Militant Communism scoured Ukraine for food, so under the New Economic Policy, the so-called Ukrainian government began to drain off the wealth of the country for the charitable purpose of helping its Russian brothers.

The vagueness and the ambiguity of this system was partially 631
cleared up by the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty establishing this was signed on December 30, 1922, just as Lenin was becoming paralyzed and unable to function efficiently. It bound together the various Soviet Republics, while at the same time it paid lip service to the right of any of these Republics to secede. Of course, this was from the beginning an empty phrase, for the only people who had the power to declare the secession was the Council of Soviets of the Federal Republic and they were Communists assigned to their posts by Moscow and bound to obey the orders of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In addition to this, a surprising number of the ruling group of the Russian Soviet Republic now took over the corresponding posts in the Union and thus added still a fourth facet to their varied activity.

The Constitution, which was formally adopted at a Union 631
Congress of Soviets on July 6, 1923, went still further in providing 642
for the government of the Union. The Commissariats were divided 645

631 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of
642 Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications,
645 Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent
327 exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that
185 the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

432 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921,
241 which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the
185

656 had profited by the operation of the Ukrainian land code which,
471 as we have seen, was less rigid than were the similar arrangements
661 in the RSFSR, where the land society was organized far more on
[427] the lines of a collective than it was in Ukraine. It was always possible to apply individually any of the laws against the leasing of land or the employment of hired help, for in both cases the provisions had been left vague and indefinite, so that the authorities could act whenever they so desired. As a matter of fact, as one of the first measures the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic reduced the period on which a lease could be made from thirteen to six years and thus it was easily possible to upset many of the calculations that had been made by the richer and more progressive landowners.

At the same time the closing of the official markets rendered
[435] it possible for the government to force the peasants to dispose of their grain at the officially pegged prices which in the grain-growing districts were considerably lower than they were in the less fertile areas of the north. If this did not produce the desired results, it was equally possible to demand the grain tax in kind and to compel the peasants to turn over, free of charge and under the guise of payments, additional supplies. All these measures, which were introduced in many cases personally and not by districts, caused the peasants to feel themselves becoming steadily more impoverished and less able to resist the demands of the government.

● 631 On the other hand, the All-Union Commissariats which took
642 precedence over those in the individual Soviet republics and which were, in reality, staffed only by Russian Communists, effectively broke the power of the localities or of the republics to have any special voice in the management of their own affairs. This was, in its turn, skilfully explained by stressing the superior requirements of the Union which, on any closer analysis, turned out to be the interests of the Russian area. Thus, at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a Russian who was at the time the chief of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission remarked in an unambiguous manner: "It seems to me that we must assign perfectly clear tasks, to emphasize that the national

[1925, during relinquishment of NEP -- Analyst]

republics are to fulfill certain functions in the economic system of 631
our Union, and that on the basis of the fulfillment of a certain 642
mission, which is to be a part of the joint mission—the industrialization of our Union—is to be founded the growth of the economy of the national republics."

In the next few years the sense of these remarks was to become perfectly clear, although it was apparently not noticed even by the more ardent Ukrainian Communists. It was to the effect that the economy of the national republics was to be fitted into the general picture of the Union and that the planning committees were to coordinate their work in such a way that there would be little or no place left for the initiative of the authorities of any republic. This did not require any action by any of the various republican governments, for step by step the central regime in Moscow gradually made more and more of the local Commissariats mere operating agencies under the control of All-Union Commissariats as these were increased in number and in scope by the vote of the Presidium of the Union or by the decisions of the All-Union Communist Party.

In this connection the final liquidation of the Ukapisty as a 665
group in 1925 was significant. They had definitely cherished the hope that sooner or later they would be able to win recognition as a special Ukrainian Communist Party with their own seat in the Communist International. That was now becoming merely a subsidiary organ of the Russian Communist Party and there was no longer any reason for maintaining the fiction of an independent existence. The foreign Communist Parties had definitely sunk to being poor relations of the Russian Party or the All-Union Party. Their representatives were exiles from their native lands under Russian protection and under those conditions they speedily ceased to have any voice in the work of the Comintern, which existed only as a Russian propaganda organ abroad. It was therefore unrealistic for the Ukrainian Communists to build any real hopes on the Comintern or on the building of a separate Ukrainian Communism and the abolition of the Ukapisty was but a formal recognition of this fact.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

186 Yet this obvious truth apparently was overlooked by Skrypnyk
●631 and, to a lesser extent, even by Khvylovy, who was absorbed in his everwidening discussion of the cultural significance of Ukrainian Communism and the role and mission of the Ukrainian Communists. While these were talking and arguing about certain ideas, the central authorities in Moscow were cleverly laying plans for removing from the field of practical politics and administration the very basis of local government for which they were fighting.

631 In the same way, reform of the administrative divisions was under way with the concealed purpose of changing the boundaries of the local sub-divisions, so that they would have a purely economic basis. This was done by the elimination of the central areas, the *gubernias* and the *okrugs* and the introduction of a two-step system of administration, the *kray* or *oblast* and the *rayon* or region, which was designed on a purely economic purpose and was admirably adapted for the elimination of local and even republic feeling.

By these and other administrative measures the essential features of the New Economic Policy were eliminated but they were done so gradually and locally that a large part of the population only realized the situation when the process was too far advanced to be affected by any scattered protests.

665 At the end of 1927 Trotsky was expelled from the Communist
642 Party and this ended the long feud between him and Stalin for the control of the Party. Trotsky had quite consistently fought the New Economic Policy as a needless concession to capitalism and within a few months of his rival's defeat, Stalin reversed his policy and openly adopted a more rigid system of controls similar to those which he had attacked Trotsky for urging.

As a matter of fact the pretext for a distinction between the Soviet government and the Communist Party was wearing thin. It was a needless piece of propaganda, once the regime felt itself sufficiently strong. There was no longer the need of maintaining non-party men in places of apparent authority and with his practical sense, Stalin speedily allowed the system to lapse into the limbo of obscurity and made the Communist Party openly what it was, the dictatorial party dominated directly from Moscow.

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment 642
of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely 631
in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to administer industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout [475] the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine 423
they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new 474
philosophy[1] looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and 661
determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force 425
them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1] [1917- Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

CHAPTER TEN

The Famine

In 1921, the great famine which had swept over Ukraine 731
had been the result of a failure of the crops, a prolonged drought and the excesses of Militant Communism which had demoralized the country. The Soviets, more or less unwillingly, allowed the despatch of foreign assistance and this saved the lives of millions. There was to be no interference in the punishment of the obstinate peasants this time.

In the fall of 1929, just as compulsory collectivization was being 641
introduced, the government in Moscow made an important change 645
in the agricultural set-up, for it transferred the Commissariat of 631
Agriculture to the central group by establishing an All-Union Commissariat which was to be in control of all agriculture in the Soviet Union. This meant that in Ukraine all of the work which had been previously done by the local authorities was now transferred to Moscow. The republic commissariats ceased to have the power to pursue individual plans for improving the conditions of the soil, for varying the crops as their own advisers decided or as the population felt it necessary. Everything was to be done from the centre and the Ukrainian Soviet Government was compelled to hand over all of its research stations and other institutions to Muscovite control. This put a stop to the intensive development of Ukrainian agriculture which had been fostered by the Ukrainian land code and introduced the new system in which the peasants were in the same position as the workers in the factories.

At the same time[1] the central regime ceased to make public the 433
actual figures of production on the ground that they might betray to outside nations important facts as to the Soviet development. From this time on estimates and achievements were given only in

[1] [1929 – All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture was established 93 -- Analyst]

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

p. 13 blanc

The Thirties

● 631 With the completion of the compulsory collectivization, the 642 ending of the famine and the destruction of the Ukrainian cultural renaissance, the country entered a new phase. The position in which it found itself was almost the opposite of the twenties. As, at the end of Militant Communism, the land was ruined and exhausted, so it was again. The number of domestic animals had dropped almost to the level of the earlier period, agriculture had been rendered prostrate, and material well-being had disappeared as the peasants were forced to labor on the collective farms.

On the other hand, there was none of that excitement and desire for work that had accompanied the introduction and development of the New Economic Policy, when the relaxation of the restrictions and the end of the lawlessness of Militant Communism had restored the possibility of profit to the people and when they could hope to see the results of their own labor.

More than that, the earlier period had been marked by the belief of the Ukrainian Communists that they could find an independent place in the Communist International. Then there was a conflict between those who wished a development of Ukrainian ideals and traditions, a union of the old and the new, and those who adopted a strictly Russian point of view. Now there was only one dominating force—the Russian. It had been made clear that there was to be no open antagonism. The Russian point of view was the only one that could hope to find acceptance in Communism, the Communist International had become a mere adjunct of the Russian Communist Party, all Ukrainian sympathies and expressions were banned, and the Ukrainian spirit was forced on the

631 defensive and compelled to fight a rearguard action for maintaining
642 its existence.

Step by step, Stalin and the Russian Communist Party was changing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into a Russian empire with its non-Russian dependencies and, despite the Constitution of the Union and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, it was becoming ever more and more clear that the latter was to be treated merely as a geographical colony of the new Russian-dominated union, with no attention to its wishes or its needs.[1]

This had been evident from almost the first days of the Five Year Plan. Whatever might have been the original blueprint of this, it early became evident that the Soviet Union could only carry out its work of industrialization and collectivization, if everything were forced into a single plan. In connection with this, the various republic commissariats had been reduced to All-Union commissariats and all independent power of judgment or planning had been removed from the local organs. If it were a question of developing a mine, of building a new factory, of introducing a new and more profitable crop, of constructing a new road or railroad, the authorities of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had to refer the matter to Moscow and receive the permission to act from the central authorities of the Union. How could it be otherwise?

The central government had assumed the responsibility for the development of the country and it could not carry this on, if the local communities or republics had the power to meet any but the most primitive needs without consultation and permission. Moscow had decided how industry was to be developed, which branches were to be built in the RSFSR, which in Ukraine, which in the other republics. That plan was almost absolute and, warned by the fate of the fallen Communist leaders, the new successors were ultra-cautious in venturing to express an opinion.

[625] The OGPU had been remodelled into the NKVD, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but this was placed under the same Yagoda who had been the head of the OGPU and he merely assumed greater powers and greater responsibilities for the safeguarding of the Soviet order.

[1] [1930's - After famine -- Analyst]

369 They could also, if they still had preserved any valuables, dispose
511 of them through the Torgsin stores which sold imported wares for foreign currency and precious metals.

[554] Of course, neither in city or village did any of these restrictions apply to the more important Communists who possessed their own stores at which the government supplied them with the necessary articles to allow them to live in comfort and luxury as a welcome investment for the regime. The line of demarcation between the poor and the rich, the ordinary people and the Communists, became steadily greater, until it was often wider than it had been in the old tsarist Russian empire.

642 All these measures which had been adopted in Moscow were
● 631 in theory supposed to apply to all sections of the USSR equally, but it was not long before the natives of Ukraine realized that however impartial the laws might seem, they were not sufficiently flexible to take account of local and republican differences. The central regime was interested in advancing and developing the Moscow industrial area and it expended on this in various grandiose efforts, as the Moscow subway, enormous sums of money. It is safe to say that the expenditures in that one area alone equalled the entire budget and money spent by the central government in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It classified Ukraine as one of the regions where the supply of manufactured goods was less necessary.

The crushing of the Ukrainian Communists, the suicide of Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, no less than the complete altering of the land code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the substitution of the new policy of collectivization, showed perfectly well where the real power of the USSR lay in the thirties and it was accompanied by such acts as the introduction of Russian as the
[701] standard language of instruction and of the army. This was followed by the formal transfer of the Ukrainian divisions to the Red Army and a number of other acts which completed the subordination of the UkSSR. Already in 1930, during difficulties on the Soviet-Manchuria borders, the Red Army had not hesitated to

[after 1933 - measures dealing with production, supply etc. --]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

greet the Communist Party with news of its victories and allowed this even to take precedence over a notice to the Soviet government which had hitherto claimed to be predominant. 631 642

To regularize all these changes of practice, Stalin ordered a new constitution and this was approved on December 5, 1936. It was a marvel of inconsistencies, for it was drawn up to express all of the old slogans and the modern facts.

Here was, in Article 17, the old talk of the right of free withdrawal of any Union Republic from the USSR but there was also a provision that the Supreme Soviet could annul any action of any Union Republic contrary to its wishes. There was a careful definition of the three classes of Commissariats but when the book is read critically it is easily seen that the only subjects within the competence of the Union Republics were Education, Local Industry, Communal Economy and Social Security and their decisions could legally be upset by Moscow. Article 15 provided for almost full independence, subject to Article 14, which made the Presidium of the Moscow Communist Party and of the USSR the almost undisputed master of the Union Republics, and Art. XIII, read in conjunction with this, made it possible for the Presidium to amend or change any article of the entire Constitution.

Along with all the democratic phrases in many articles was the confirmation of the unified state budget and the provision that any act of any subordinate Soviet could be easily nullified.

At the moment the democratic nations of the west were so preoccupied with the threat offered by the Nazis that they were thinking only of efforts to make a common popular front with the Soviets. They found a convenient possibility in the new Constitution and they were little disposed to pay any attention to all those phrases which formally and almost explicitly nullified all that they wished to see.

Thus, the legal basis was provided for the extension of the power of the Moscow government. Once the new Constitution was adopted and in force, the last rights of the Union Republics were nullified *de jure* as well as *de facto* and the central government was

631 642 given a free hand in its work of bending all the Union Republics to its will. The stamp of state approval was set upon the new system of administration and with that accomplished, there was small reason why the regime should not go further with its work of russification and unification.

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities
166 continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

[During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

in the eastern Ukraine in the course of twenty years. At first their 728
actions were moderate but with the passage of time they began to develop and to reveal those tendencies which had marked their course in the east.

The first task was the reorganization of the country geographically. On September 28,[1] they had come to a new agreement with [648]
the Germans, whereby Germany had given up her claims to Lithuania in return for the area between the San and the Buh Rivers. So the Soviets assigned Wilno and its territory to an independent Lithuania; they annexed the region further south to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the rest to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This left to the Germans four sections of Western Ukraine, Kholmshchyna, Pidlyashshya, Posannya, and Lemkivshchyna, which were included in the Polish Government General and were governed directly by the Nazis, who allowed the appointment of a Ukrainian Central Committee to represent the Ukrainians before the higher authorities, especially in question of relief, etc.

The Soviet territory[2] was divided into six districts with their 728
centres at Lviv, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil, Rivne and 631
Lutsk. Each of these was then divided into rayons or regions with about 25,000 population. The centres of these regions were often small towns but the division was made quite arbitrarily and each centre was amply provided with bureaucratic machinery.

The economic condition of the country was extremely bad and [433]
the only saving feature was that the harvest had already been gathered, so that there was a good chance for a large part of the agricultural population, even of the poor, to survive during the winter. Yet the influx of refugees fleeing before the German advance filled the cities and the severance of connections with the west prevented the arrival of any more manufactured goods or supplies and, of course, none came from the east.

On the contrary, there came a new swarm of Soviet officials who 436
were themselves amazed at the wealth of goods in what, to the natives, seemed impoverished markets. They brought with them liberal sums of money to buy whatever they wished and they were

1 [1939 -- Analyst]
2 [of occupied Poland -- Analyst]

CHAPTER NINETEEN

The Soviets and the Ukrainians in Rumania

648 563 The agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union[1] had stated that the former was not interested in the fate of Bukovyna and Bessarabia, both of which contained a large Ukrainian population. It was therefore obvious that once the Soviet hands were freed from the Soviet-Finnish war, they would endeavor to acquire these additional territories.

In both Bukovyna and Bessarabia the Ukrainian cause had been less developed, although there had been far more work in Bukovyna than in Bessarabia, which had been under Russian rule. The Ukrainian uprising in Chernivtsy had not been successful in 1918 and when the territory was added to Rumania, that country put a stop to all Ukrainian work, including education although a Ukrainian theatre had developed and there was considerable secret work being done.

As a result, there was a sense of stagnation which was very different from the situation in the lands under Poland. There was less sense of coordination and when in June, 1940, the Soviets requested Rumania to hand over the new provinces, Rumania had only to submit. Most of Bukovyna and the part of Bessarabia inhabited by Ukrainians were annexed to the UkSSR. The rest of Bessarabia was added to the Moldavian ASSR, which was later raised to the dignity of a Union Republic and intended for propaganda use against Rumania.

648 631 The Soviet policy was then much the same as it had been in the area taken over from Poland. There was the same amount of propaganda declaring the "liberation" of the country from the Rumanian nobles and from international capitalism. There was

1 [1939--Analyst]

[164 blank]

648 the same voting for annexation to the USSR, the same enthusiastic
631 reception in Moscow, and the same process of nationalization, of the arrest of outstanding figures, and the same destruction of the established forms of life in both areas.

The Soviets were, however, less advanced in these provinces for the application of their system required time and their stay in the area was eight months less than it was in the territory taken from Poland.

The anti-Communist leaders fled either into Rumania proper
[668] or Germany or made their way to the Polish Government General in Krakow. On the other hand, despite the attempts to seal off the country, the OUN found ways of extending its influence into Bukovyna and appealed to the more alert classes of the population.

In general the Ukrainians in these two areas formed rather a
563 secluded enclave in the general mass of Ukrainian history and they did not play a role in proportion to their numbers. They thus scarcely enter into the account, although for a while, in 1941, there was organized a force of some 2,000 who sought to impede the Rumanian return to the country. Yet, their opposition was fruitless and when they endeavored to cut their way out, they were either destroyed by the Germans or dispersed.

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.
727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "war-mongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representa-
[701] tive in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

Western world, the Soviet Union conferred upon the Ukrainian 631
Soviet Republic the right to have its own anthem and its own 648
national flag.

These actions were not to be interpreted as a concession from Moscow, although they were presented in that guise. They were rather intended to strengthen the Soviet position in international affairs and by an appearance of generosity to facilitate the reduction of the satellite states to the same position as that held by the Union Republics. In this sense they were a response to the centralizing tendencies which were now to be expressed in a still stronger form.

As soon as hostilities ended and even before the Soviets were 665
assured of all their hopes, they began to purge again the Ukrainian 661
Communist Party and within a few months some 38% of the high officials were removed on the ground of bourgeois nationalism. All those who had not retreated to the east or could not show that they were working throughout the war as zealous Soviet partisans were summarily exiled as bourgeois nationalists. In the same way, when the enforced return of displaced persons began under the Yalta Agreement, very few were allowed to return to their homes. The vast majority were either executed for surrendering to the Germans or were sent to the labor camps in the far north and east for reeducation.

The Fourth Five Year Plan which was commenced in 1946 727
was very definitely devoted to the restoration of the country after the ravages of the war and to the increase of the Soviet capacity for defense. It was only in Ukraine and Byelorussia that the restoration had to absorb the energies of a considerable majority of the population, for while there were areas in the neighborhood of Leningrad and Stalingrad which had been badly devastated, the situation in the Ukraine was far worse. The cities and factories had been destroyed, the mines had been flooded and the population were living as best they might among the ruins which had been left by the two invading armies.

At the same time the work of restoration went very slowly. [316]
Less than one third of the miners of the Donbas had returned to

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

and the other non-Russian peoples that were conquered by the 000
tsars, reconquered by the Soviets and now in the name of Great Russian Communism subjected to a new period of russification.

At the same time, there is no new evidence that the regime of Malenkov is any more tolerant of the national differences or feelings of the non-Russian peoples than was the previous regime. The steady rise in influence of Khrushchov suggests the opposite and a still greater pressure upon Ukraine.

Since World War II, the attitude of the Kremlin toward the 642
Ukrainians has perceptibly hardened. The Ukrainian Soviet Social- 631
ist Republic is a member of the United Nations. It has its own government, its own flag, its own national anthem. Yet, by the orders of the Kremlin, no diplomat from outside the iron curtain is admitted to its capital of Kiev. Its government conducts all of its affairs through Moscow.

The Ukrainians are to-day the slaves of Moscow in their own country. They are liable to be deported across its boundaries at any moment and their places taken by Russians or persons from anywhere within the Soviet orbit. They are compelled to think Russian thoughts, to interpret their past, their present and their future in terms acceptable to their elder brothers, the Great Russians. The slightest deviation from that path is met with the grim charge of bourgeois nationalism, the gravest offence in the entire list of crimes.

That same process in earlier stages is taking place in all the 000
Soviet satellites. Step by step, the culture of the other countries is being remodelled on the Russian Soviet pattern. The Russian language is being introduced and forced into the dominant place. Step by step, their national traditions are being spurned, corrupted and altered, so that they will be worthy members of the Soviet Union under Russian Communist leadership. Their contacts with the outside world are being cut off, while the Moscow radio blares out day and night the statements that the Russians are the friends of peace while the nations outside are warmongers and imperialists.

We might be tempted to believe that Moscow is right but we

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

but subject to Rosenberg in matters of broad policy.[15] Rosenberg 727
realized that this vague directive would mean little unless he could count on the cooperation of the man chosen to head the Reichskommissariat. Consequently, he voiced an alarmed protest when Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia, and already widely known for his stubbornness and brutality, was suggested for the post. Since Hitler, evidently regarding Rosenberg as an impractical dreamer, wanted a determined and ruthless man in the Ukraine, Koch was nevertheless appointed.[16]

This appointment was the harbinger of worse defeats for Ros- 727
enberg's "mild" policy toward the Ukrainians. Another aspect of 631
Nazi policy, however, aroused immediate indignation among the Ukrainian nationalists. This was a decision to keep east Galicia in the "German settlement area," i.e., to attach it to the Generalgouvernement rather than to the future Reichskommissariat. The immediate ground for this partition of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory was the desire to maintain a direct connection between the Greater Reich and Rumania, about whose continued loyalties the Nazi leaders harbored strong doubts.[17] However, a few weeks later the "unreliable" Danubian kingdom was permitted to administer all of the Ukrainian territory between the Dniester and the Southern Bug.[18] The Rumanians obviously intended eventually to incorporate the area, which they called Transnistria, into their state. Since most Ukrainian nationalist circles already hated Rumania, it is understandable that this second amputation of Ukrainian ethnographic territory was especially painful, even though the region was near the bottom of the scale of definitely Ukrainian areas in cultural development and national consciousness.[19]

[15] Chancellery Director Lammers to Rosenberg, July 18, 1941, transmitting Führerbefehl of July 17, 1941, NG 1280 (hereafter referred to as NG 1280).

[16] Memorandum, Führerhauptquartier, July 16, 1941, PS 1221 (hereafter referred to as PS 1221).

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] PS 197. At the conference of July 16 (*ibid.*) it had been tentatively decided to give Rumania only a slight territorial increase east of the pre-1939 border of the Dniester River; the decision was altered sometime within the next six weeks.

[19] On August 31, *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk* had the temerity to attack the decision openly, raising the question, "Is it possible that Ukrainian land beyond the Dniester, soaked with Cossack blood, can be transferred to Rumanian administration?" On the same page the UNO organ criticized the annexation of Galicia to

part of this vast area had gone so far that a conference between 727
Koch's and Rosenberg's officials on the one hand, and representatives of the army on the other, could plan the transfer to the Reichskommissariat.[39] This was accomplished gradually in the next three months.[40]

The introduction of the Reichskommissariat did not change the 727
general basis of the provisional organization established by the 631
Wehrmacht.[41] However, it introduced an entirely new spirit. It brought under strict control many aspects of Ukrainian life in which the Wehrmacht had left a relatively free hand to the inhabitants. The entire "Right Bank" was divided into five *Generalbezirke* with headquarters in Rovno, Zhitomir, Kiev, Nikolaev, and Dniepropetrovsk.[42] Under each *Generalkommissar* were about twenty *Gebietskommissare,* each of whom governed a *Kreisgebiet,* comprising an average of four *raions.* The Ukrainian administration operated in general only at this lowest level.[43] There were elders or *starostas* in charge of each village and a Ukrainian chief of the *raion* administration. While there were Ukrainians above this level in consultative or specialist posts,[44]

[39] PS 197.

[40] Former Polish Volhynia was transferred as early as the end of August (*Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* January 24, 1942, p. 3).

[41] There had already been set up an army administration composed of *Ortskommandanturen* (local commands) and *Feldkommandanturen* (regional commands). These military government offices had established order and begun the work of rebuilding economic and social life. Alongside them had already been installed police groups, recruited and directed by the Wehrmacht Abwehr but composed primarily of Ukrainians, as previously described. These, however, were being brought under the control of the SS police agencies. Moreover, the Wirtschaftstab-Ost had installed a Wirtschafts-Inspektion Süd, with a network of economic officers including especially the *Landwirtschaftsführer* (*La-Führer,* agricultural director) in each *raion,* who were charged with directing the economy in accordance with German needs. Cf. PS 053.

[42] PS 702. The initial organization of areas west of the Dnieper included the Soviet *oblasts* of Rovno, Volhynia, Kamenets-Podolsk, Zhitomir, Vinnitsa, Kiev, Kirovograd, and parts of Nikolaev, Dniepropretrovsk, Poltava, Zaporozh'e, Pinsk, and Brest. On September 1, 1942, the remaining parts of the Dniepropetrovsk, Poltava, and Zaporozh'e *oblasts* east of the Dnieper were transferred to the Reichskommissariat. Somewhat earlier a sixth *Generalbezirk,* Taurien, had been formed, to include the southern parts of the Zaporozh'e and Nikolaev *oblasts* (cf. *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* September 2, 1943, p. 3).

[43] There was, however, an advisory council at the *Generalbezirk* level in at least one instance—Zhitomir (cf. *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* February 25, 1942, p. 2).

[44] The adjective "Ukrainian" is used by the Germans to describe these officials, but it refers merely to persons resident within the territorial limits of the Ukraine. Actually, many were Russian, and a special effort was made by the

727 there was no unified framework of native administration, with the
●631 exception of the towns where there was a Ukrainian chief of administration, regardless of the size of the place involved. In the larger cities, which were not included in *Kreisgebiete,* the Ukrainian "mayors," however, were closely subjected to German *Stadtkommissare.*

727 Just as important as his administrative structure, was Koch's
668* personal attitude toward the Ukrainians he was to govern. To
661 him, they were simply an inferior race, a colonial people to be exploited for Germany's interests. "They are too inferior to be compared with Germans,"[45] and "the least German worker is worth a thousand times more than the population there"[46] are typical expressions of his attitude. Consequently, this former petty railway official felt highly offended when the Ukrainian intelligentsia endeavored to organize a national life of its own. The whole tone of his administration implied that the Ukrainians were a sort of child-people, which could not achieve any degree of culture worthy of consideration; those who endeavored to do so were simply half-educated émigré agitators who must be dealt with severely, so that the simple but useful "peasants" (i.e., all non-agitators) would not be disturbed in their task of producing for the Germans.

One of the first results of Koch's determination to crush all centers of autonomous life was the destruction of the Nationalist forces remaining "above ground" in Kiev. After the suppression of the West Ukrainian force, there was still a large group of East Ukrainian supporters of the Mel'nyk organization who openly

Wehrmacht to recruit ethnic Germans (PS 197; Extracts from the Situation Report of the commander of Heeresgebiet B, Abteilung VII, October 10, 1942, PS 051; hereafter referred to as PS 051), although the latter turned out frequently to be Communist spies deliberately left behind by the Soviet regime (Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte, December 15, 1941, PS 1682; (hereafter referred to as PS 1682). Even when the *Volksdeutsche* were anti-Communist, they were frequently disliked by the Ukrainian Nationalists as Russophiles.

[45] Koch to Rosenberg, March 16, 1943, PS 192 (hereafter referred to as PS 192).

[46] Report of Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe B to Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Generalquartiermeister, Abteilung Kriegsverwaltung, April 1, 1943, PS 1130 (hereafter referred to as PS 1130), is based on an oral report of Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Claßen who was present at the Nazi Party meeting in Kiev (March 5, 1943) in which Koch made the remark.

previously described.[3] Under the conditions of German repression 668*
the nationalist parties could not afford to devote their limited strength to maintaining the initial advantage gained in these comparatively unimportant areas. By 1943, under the impact of rapidly growing Soviet partisan operations, nationalist activity seems to have ceased in Polessia west of the Dnieper.

South of Polessia runs a broad band of territory which falls into 133
the natural vegetation region of the wooded steppe, i.e., a region of mixed prairie and woods. In contrast to the rather poor gray soil of most of Polessia, it is a land well suited for intensive agriculture, and as a result has supported for centuries the densest agricultural population of the East Ukraine.

As in the case of Polessia, the principal dividing line within the 631
wooded steppe region is the Dnieper River. The area west of the river forms the heart of what have been known in Ukrainian history as the "Right Bank" lands. Kiev and the surrounding district had been acquired by the Russian tsar in the eighteenth century, but most of the area west of the Dnieper remained under Polish rule until 1792. The section closest to the river had had a considerable share in the Cossack tradition, but the more westerly sections, which were included in the historic provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, were deeply affected by the independent Cossack movement only during the height of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's career. This meant that serfdom had a longer and more [566]
oppressive history there than in the regions to the south and the east. While the peasants were thoroughly Ukrainian in language [563]
and customs, the cities included many Poles and Russians and an especially high percentage of Jews, who comprised from one third to one half of the urban population. This concentration of Jews, too, was a result of the historical background of the region; Poland had tolerated them, while the tsars had forbidden them to leave the Pale formed by the lands acquired in 1793 and later.[4]

Since the "Right Bank" was immediately contiguous to the 668*
nationalist bases in the West Ukraine, it was natural that the na-

[3] See Chapter V.

[4] Actually, the Pale included all the Ukraine in the nineteenth century, but Jews were less numerous on the "Left Bank."

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

794 established its own organization, installing a bishop in Zhitomir,
186 as well as the energetic Ihor in Belaia Tserkov'. Ihor was replaced for a time by Emmanuel, but when the latter passed over to the Autonomous Church, he took a new post in western Volhynia, perhaps because he found the rather strong nationalist atmosphere in Belaia Tserkov' unpleasant. The fact that the Autonomous Church was able to maintain such a strong organization indicates that sentiment in the rural areas was not always ardently nationalist, even in the most "pure" of Ukrainian lands.

631 The wooded steppe region east of the Dnieper, the "Left Bank," constituted the second half of the traditional Ukrainian heartland. The western part had been for centuries under Polish and Lithuanian rule, coming under Moscow in the late seventeenth century, together with Kiev. The eastern part, roughly equivalent to the Kharkov *oblast,* had never been under Polish rule, but had owed allegiance to the tsars. It served as a refuge for serfs escaping from their Polono-Lithuanian masters, and hence was known as the "Slobozhanshchyna" or "Free Land." Since even the western part of the "Left Bank" had been annexed by the Russian Empire long before the partitions of Poland, however, its history diverged considerably from that of the "Right Bank."

668* The most interesting nationalist developments in this region during 1941–43 took place in Kharkov. While Kharkov was always claimed as the second city of the Ukraine, it never occupied the place in nationalist thinking which Kiev held, and the fact that the Russian ethnic and linguistic element there was strong aroused less indignation. Some account of the differences in the nationalist movements in Kiev and Kharkov has already been given. The essential divergence arose from the fact that the OUN-M organizers reached the latter city only in November, when their period of grace was already running out. Enthusiasm was great enough for them to secure powerful support from local people. A strong *ekzekutyva* was formed with a mayor of one of the city *raions,* an ardently nationalist professor, George Boiko, and several other local people, in addition to Kononenko, the chief West Ukrainian organizer, as members.[12] The adherence of

OUN u Viini (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75; Interview 57.

became a *fait accompli* (in 1054) its repercussions in Russia were at first very small. 175X 177

Before as after, the Russian princes maintained the most intimate relations with the Western courts to which they are bound by marriages. One cannot detect any trace of enmity towards the Western Christians. Quite on the contrary the Igumen Daniel, who goes from Kiev to Jerusalem to pray on the tomb of our Saviour, feels himself fraternally connected with the Francian crusaders who are fighting in the Holy Land. In Kiev itself there are Latin monasteries and the Russian princes make donations to them. The hour has not yet arrived when the aggressive attitude of the western neighbours of Russia will arouse her enmity.

The relations which, at this epoch, existed between Russia and the West were all the more natural as their way of living had many features in common. The princely courts of Russia, with their *drouzhina* (their retainers), their military character cemented by the personal loyalty towards their overlord, their love of feasts, the songs, accompanied by the sound of the *gouslis* and by characteristic gestures, and their chivalrous idealism, all this brought them near to those of the West.

On the other hand, also like the mediæval kingdoms of the West, the Russia of Kiev, although united under St. Vladimir and Yaroslav the Wise, is still far from being a fully united State, such as had existed in Byzantium and as we know it to-day.

Under the protecting power of a prince, who kept outside enemies at bay and maintained order in the interior, the country is composed of a federation of lands and cities who have their rights and privileges and are ruled by their elders and by their popular assemblies, the *vetchi*, which deal directly with the 175X 631 643

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

prince or with his lieutenant, the *possadnik*, giving this or that assistance in return for various protections.

These autonomous territories, *zemli* and *volosti*, are related to the ancient Slavonic federations which existed before the creation of the State of Kiev. The local dynasties which made their appearance here and there have all disappeared at the moment of the coming of the Varengians. There is not, in the whole of Russia of Kiev, another princely house but that of St. Vladimir. But the regional peculiarities could not be eliminated so easily. And it is thus that the territory of the Polianes becomes the 'Land of Kiev' as such, that of the Severianes the 'Great Land of Tchernigov,' in the west the 'Land of Volynia' retains its own characteristics, while at the foot of the Carpathians, in 'Galicia,' the elements of several tribes are fused. In the north the *volosti* correspond roughly to the old territories of the tribes. Blood relationship definitely ceased to play a role. Instead of the ties of relationship, common interests alone, resulting from being territorial neighbours, are the only ties between the inhabitants of a 'Land.'[1]

On the other hand the economic development of the towns has increased their political importance. It is they who are now at the head of the 'Lands.' The largest city of each of these territories becomes the spokesman of the whole *volost*, although all the inhabitants of the latter can, if they have the means, participate with equal rights in the deliberations of the chief city.

The princely power in Russia is therefore in no way absolute. The conception of a monarchical, unitarian, and hereditary power is not yet born.

The dynastic position is attuned to the customs which

[1] See Map No. 2.

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER II

UKRAINE DURING THE REVOLUTION 1917—1920

1. *The Ukrainian Central Council*

000 In March 1917, the revolution overthrew the Tsarist Government in Russia. This enabled the oppressed peoples of the former Tsarist Empire to declare their rights for political self-determination. These were: the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, White Ruthenians (Byelorussians), the Caucasian peoples (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidjanians), the peoples of Turkestan and above all the most numerous nation after the Russians, — the Ukrainians.

668 In March 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council in Kiev was formed from the representatives of the Ukrainian political organisations as representative of the Ukrainian nation. Ukrainian congresses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, also elected their deputies to the Central Council, and thus this organ became a provisional Parliament of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council tried first to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine through an agreement with the Russian Provisional Government of Prince Lvov-Kerensky.

But the Ukrainian efforts to attain autonomy met with the resolute opposition of the Russian Provisional Government and of the Russian political parties. The centralist tradition of Tsarist Russia continued to live in Russian political parties with the same vigour even after the fall of the régime. The delegates of the Central Council applied to the Russian Provisional Government in Petersburg to recognise by a public act the right of the Ukrainian nation to autonomy within the Russian state. The Russian Government refused this demand, declaring that the problem of autonomy for Ukraine should be decided by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. This reply could not satisfy the Ukrainians. For it was evident that the Russian Constituent Assembly, with the centralist efforts of the Russian parties having a majority would refuse the autonomous rights of non-Russian peoples.

Thus the Ukrainian Central Council began to realise the necessity for Ukraine to establish an autonomous order itself, without taking into notice the threats of the Russian political parties and

the Russian Government. Under these conditions the Ukrainian Central Council issued its '*Universal*' (Declaration) to the Ukrainian nation on June 10, 1917 (old style), which contained among other statements the following words: 668 636

"Ukraine shall be free ... The Ukrainian nation shall have the right to organise its life itself. A Ukrainian Assembly of the Ukrainian nation (Diet), elected in general, equal, direct and secret ballot, shall secure order in Ukraine. All laws securing this order here, in Ukraine, can be issued only by our Ukrainan Assembly".

The policy of the Ukrainian Central Council, of which the great majority was composed of the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties, met with strenous attacks on the part of the Russians. Only the leader of the Russian Communists, Lenin, for tactical reasons seeking support among the Ukrainians in the struggle of his party against the Provisional Government, made the following hypocritical statement:

"No democrat can deny the right of Ukraine for a free separation from Russia (*Pravda* 15. 6. 1917). In reality, Lenin and his party were enemies of the national self-determination of Ukraine and other nations oppressed by Russia. The Russian Communist Government showed it immediately after having seized power in Russia on November 7, 1917.

The development of the Ukrainian political movement forced the Russian Provisional Government to begin negotiations with the Ukrainian Central Council. In summer 1917, an agreement was reached, and the representatives of the parties of all national minorities sent their delegates to the Ukrainian Central Council. But the policy of Kerensky's Russian Government continued to hinder the creation of an autonomous order in Ukraine. The Petersburg Government recognised the rights of autonomy only for the northern part of Ukraine and kept the whole of southern Ukraine under its administration. But even for the realisation of this restricted autonomy the Russian Government put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Central Council. At the end of September 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council passed a resolution to call a separate Constituent Assembly for Ukraine. The Russian Provisional Government, for this reason, began a legal prosecution against the Central Council. But at this time a revolt happened in Russia, the Bolshevik Party seized power (November 7, 1917). This created a new situation in the relations between Ukraine and Russia.

2. *Soviet Russia and Democratic Ukraine*

668 Bolshevism was the consequence of the previous development of the Russian people, who never had had in their history any free political order. Soviet dictatorship did not meet with any serious resistance in Russia proper. The Russians showed in their attitude towards the Communist rule their traditional 'sense of obedience', as it was expressed by a Russian publicist (Guber, *On the Change of the Sign-Posts:* Prague, 1922)*). Another situation arose in Ukraine and other non-Russian regions of the former Tsarist Empire. The Russian Communist organisation in Ukraine was weak and had no support among the Ukrainian population. Among the Russian and Jewish workers in Ukraine the influence of Democratic Socialism, '*Menshevism*', also predominated. Thus, under the leadership of the Ukrainian Central Council all parties, Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish and Polish, acted together against the plans of the Russian Bolsheviks to establish dictatorship in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council blamed Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia, and began to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine, independent of the Soviet Russian Government. In its '*III. Universal*' from November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed Ukraine a democratic republic. In this document we read:

668 ●631

"In the Ukrainian Democratic Republic all liberties will be guaranteed: freedom of speech, printing, religion, meetings, associations, strikes, inviolability of person and domicile, the right to use local languages in intercourse with all offices. The Ukrainian nation had fought for long years for its national liberty, and now having attained it, will firmly protect the freedom of national development of all nationalities remaining in Ukraine; therefore we announce to the Russian, Jewish, Polish and other peoples in Ukraine a national and personal autonomy to secure their right and liberty of self-government in matters of their national life . . ."

[563]

In the III. Universal the Ukrainian Central Council fixed the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly for December 27, 1917.

The Ukrainian Government did not want to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers which the Russian Communist Government under Lenin's direction was aiming at. Therefore the Ukrainian Central Council in its '*Universal*' of November 20, 1917,

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*) The well known Russian writer Maxim Gorki wrote on the passivity of the Russians towards their oppressors that the "Russians could suffer more than work consciously and honestly" (*Communist International*, No. 3, Moscow 1919).

declared: "Until the peace every citizen of the Ukrainian Republic, together with the citizens of all peoples of the Russian Republic, shall stand firmly on their positions at the front and in the hinterland". u 668 631

The Soviet Russian Government was from the beginning hostile to the national claims of Ukraine and other peoples. Relying on its own military force and the support of Communist groups among the various peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Russian Government was planning the conquest of Ukraine and other territories that did not recognise Soviet dictatorship.

3. Elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Russia and in Ukraine

At the end of November, 1917, in Ukraine and Russia, elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly took place. These elections in Ukraine were free, with full freedom of press and propaganda for all parties, among them the Communist. These elections showed the great difference between the political situation in Russia and in Ukraine. In Russia the adherents of Soviet dictatorship (the Communists and the party of the Left Socialists-Revolutionaries), especially in the big cities like Moscow and Petersburg, had considerable gains. This gave the Communists and Left Socialists-Revolutionaries the basis for holding power in Russia; for they had the masses of friendly workers and peasants behind them. In Ukraine at these elections the Ukrainian Socialist parties, opponents of Soviet dictatorship, won (the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries got together approximately 3/4 of all cast votes). The Russian Communist Party, in spite of the immense resources from Russia for propaganda, gained in Ukraine less than 10% of the votes. In the big cities, among the workers, the Russian Communists were in a minority too; this explains the uncertainty of the Communists in Ukraine at that time in the struggle for the dictatorship of their party. u [666] 665 5u 665

The historian of the Communist movement in Ukraine, M. Popov, remarks that even in the big industrial centres in Ukraine "the local Communists had a lack of determination to take power into the hands of the Soviets", *History of the Communist Party 'Bolsheviks' of Ukraine:* Kharkov, 1929.

4. The Problem of Peace with the Central Powers

At the end of 1917 the Russian front against the Central Powers was decaying in a catastrophic way. This decay was hastened by the ruthless Communist propaganda for an immediate peace. In u. 648

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
656 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

● [631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Congress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

is looked at by the majority of the Communist Party in Ukraine, 186
and here in Russia even more, as some sort of strategy, a diplomatic 668
game".

Rakovsky explained that, through the proclamation of the Soviet Union, Moscow had gained ten and twenty times more power in comparison with the previous state. Therefore Rakovsky demanded that the Government of the whole Union in Moscow should surrender 9/10 of its competence, and that this be transferred to the separate Soviet Republics. Together with the Commissar of the Interior of Soviet Ukraine of that time, Skypnyk, Rakovsky demanded that the relations between Ukraine and Russia should be these of a confederation.

Skrypnyk protested at the Congress of the Russian CP against the disregard of the national and cultural rights of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army that led to a forced Russification of Ukrainians. He regretted that Ukrainian schools were not allowed for the 7 millions of Ukrainians in the Russian Soviet Republic, [162] outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Skrypnyk sharply criticised the nationalism of the Russian Communists in Ukraine who did not admit the Ukrainian language in public and Party institutions.

The Russian Communist N. Bukharin stated in a speech at the 12th Congress of the Party that the Communist organisation in Ukraine had a Russian-Jewish composition with a very small number of Ukrainians. And in the meantime, Bukharin said, — "in Ukraine there is a very strong national movement" (*Records of the 12th Congress of the Russian CP*).

However, the demands of those Communists who wished to re- 631
strict Russian centralism and enlarge the rights of the separate Soviet Republics did not attain a majority at the Congress of the Russian CP. In July 1923, the strictly centralist Constitution of the USSR was ratified. Besides the theoretical declaration of the equality of rights of nations and the 'right of separation' of the peoples from Russia this constitution actually concentrates all power in the hands of Moscow, so that the acts and orders of the 'All-Union Government' are valid even then if the separate Soviet Republics would protest against them.

The policy of Soviet Ukrainisation was limited mostly to those 186
institutions which had to deal with the peasants. But in the towns 665
and industrial centres the Russian Communists tried to prevent the admission of the Ukrainian language by every means. For this reason quarrels between Ukrainian and Russian Communists arose in the ranks of the Communist Party in Ukraine. Thus the Communist Alexander Shumsky, the Commissar of Education in

[In the year 1922 -- Analyst]

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under 182 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation 422 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to [511] education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Russian intellectuals. 186 After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist 631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

11: Obermaier--30 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

175 The wars which broke out among the local princes after Monomakh's death belong to the darkest chapter in the history of the Kiyev Rus. Actually the kingdom ceased to exist. Nothing remained to hold it together, neither dynastic ties nor marauding expeditions, nor the church, which was powerless. For 35 years, from 1146 to 1181 there were ceaseless struggles for the throne
728 of Kiyev, and an almost /Facing page 32/ /Map 1:
631 Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938. The Ukraine was divided between four states as a result of the Peace of Riga on March 18, 1921 between the Soviet Union and Poland, the transfer of Bessarabia to Rumania, and the edicts of St. Germain and Trianon. In the west Poland was given West Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia), Carpatho-Ukraine passed from Hungary to Czechoslovakia, small parts of Carpatho-Ukraine, Bukovina and Bessarabia went to Rumania, while the major portion of Ukraine was left to the Soviet Union which established the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic on one part of Ukrainian national soil./ /Keys to the map: -.-.-. state boundaries, ——boundaries of the Soviet Republics, ---boundaries of the autonomous Soviet Republics, -..-..- boundaries of the autonomous territories, ... boundaries of the territories (oblasts), administration centers un-
175 derlined./ /33/ uninterrupted war was waged for sovereignty within the leading principality. The princes of Suzdal in the north waged the most bitter and brutal fight of all for supremacy. They whose descendants are to become the princes of Moscow do not shrink from an alliance with the khans of Polovtsi against Kiyev. More than once these hordes devastated the unfortunate country. Finally in 1155 Georgii Dolgorukov, Prince of Suzdal, was victorious over Kiyev, and fourteen years later the splendor of this city which had not seen its equal throughout eastern Europe melts away in the flare of Suzdal-Polovtsi pillage. (17)

17. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 91.

11: Obermaier--30A J-3(no date)1942RD1 Ukraine RD1

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[Map I: Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938, cf. complete legend p. 30]

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•631

[MAP 2 Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938]

C 178 186 order to win over the audacious swashbucklers as allies in the wars with the sultans who were also their mortal enemies. For the Cossacks were proud of their Christian Greek-Orthodox faith, and were ready to die for it at any time. "Whoever is willing to be put on the rack for his Christian faith, to be quartered, to endure all kinds of tortures for the sacred cross, whoever does not fear death, let him follow us. You should not fear death; you cannot avoid it. This is the life of the Cossacks." (29) With these promising words

29. Puluy: The Ukraine, Prague, 1915, page 7, quoted from Istoriia Vossoiedineniia Rus. /History of the Unification of Russia/

they invited their troops to join the military campaign. And they all came.

C 726 181 648 Wild, death-defying daredevils were these Cossacks, typical landsknechts by nature who enjoyed combat for its own sake, who fought under the banner of "freedom and Christianity", who today have a skirmish with the heathen hordes and tomorrow with the Catholic Polish armies, and then again are willing to protect the Poles from their enemies. Twice within four years they saved the Polish army from destruction: in 1618 from a threatening Muscovite siege and in 1621 at Khotyn from the Ottoman army which, allegedly 300,000 lances strong, was ready to overrun Poland. Nevertheless, four years later the Cossacks once again matched their strength against the Poles.

C 726 648 The fame of the warriors of the sech spread to all lands. It was the time of the Thirty Years' War and brave riders were sought after in all camps. Pope Clement VIII had already sent messengers into the sech at the end of the sixteenth century, with the message that they "form an anti-Turkish

U 631 C 712 /Facing page 48/ /Map III: The Ukraine at the time

11: Obermaier--47 J-3(no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Cossacks RD2

of the Union of Lublin (1569)/ /Key: National boundaries. Boundary between Lithuania and Poland before 1569. Boundary between Poland and Lithuania after 1569. Boundaries of provinces. Western boundary of the Ukrainian voivodeship. Regimental command of the registered Cossacks./ /49/ league" (30) Emperor Rudolph II U 631 C 712 C 726 648

30. Borshchak: The Ukraine in Western Literature, page 132.

likewise ordered couriers to be sent to the hetman to persuade him to fight against the Turks. (31)

31. Ukraine and the Church Union, page 26.

In 1620 the "Nieuwe Tijdinghe", a Dutch newspaper, prints the report that the Cossacks are fighting their way through Hungary and Moravia and have captured the city of Trenčin for the emperor; 4000 people were killed. (32) The fact that the

32. Borshchak: The Ukraine in Western Literature, page 140.

Cossacks fought on the side of the emperor in the first period of the Thirty Years' War is also confirmed by the English in the Calendar of State Papers 1910. A small Cossack division fought with Ferdinand II against the Protestants in the battle of Bila Hora (White Mountain). Again, Mazarin fetched himself a corps of Cossacks which, under the command of Chmielnicki and under the banners of Condé, even took part in the famous siege of Dunkirk. (33) Pierre Chevalier, the agent of the C 726 648 181

33. Borshchak: The Ukraine in Western Literature, page 313.

French cardinal, tells us about it in his history

[Text resumes here — Analyst]

11: Obermaier--47A J3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Cossacks RD2

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

[Map III: The Ukraine at the time of the Union of Lublin (1569), cf. complete legend pp. 46-47]

11: Obermaier--47B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Cossacks RD2

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[Map III Ukraine at the time of the union of Lublin (1569)]

648 Ukraine for the Muscovite realm, strained every
175 effort to fight for the country. The Pan-Russian counter-revolutionary armies also proved themselves opponents not to be underestimated. "The campaigns of Denikin, Kolchak, Iudenich and other Russian generals clearly proved that there were only two forces fighting in the Russian civil war: the old Czarist absolutism against the new Bolshevik despotism. And both of them fought with equal ferocity against the Ukraine." (41)

41. Danko: The Nation in Soviet Chains, page 25.

*

726 A surprise attack of the Ukrainian troops
on Lwów set off the Polish-West Ukrainian War.
175 For weeks wild fighting raged in the streets of the city; finally the Poles succeeded in bringing in troops and forcing the Ukrainians out of Lwów during the night of November 22, 1918. The victors exercised bloody reprisals on the Ukrainian population; they destroyed Ukrainian property and dragged many respected citizens into concentration camps from which they were never to return. The Jews expiated for their neutrality with a three-day pogrom, during which whole blocks of houses went up in flames.

[631] After the loss of Lwów, the West Ukrainian
642 state included about 40,000 square kilometers with
648 four million /64/ inhabitants, among them three
726 million Ukrainians. To destroy this dwarf state
175 was the firm intention of the leaders of the Polish state of eighteen million. The Ukrainian government now had its seat at Stanislawów; Dr. Ievgen Petrushevych was the head of the state. He and many other men who were responsible for the fate of West Ukraine still regarded it as "an incident, a misunderstanding, an error" that there was any fighting at all between Poles and Ukrainians. Heedless of the front which was expanding day by

175 "miracle on the Vistula" took place: the Bol-
726 sheviks turned around and halted beyond the Sbrucz.

175 At the peace negotiations in Riga the part-
726 ners of Andrusov met after two and a half cent-
728 uries for a partition of the Ukraine. The Russians conceded the Poles the western parts of Polesia, Volhynia and Podolia, Lublin and Podlakhia in the Riga Treaty of March 18, 1921. The protest of Petliura who was not admitted to the negotiations remained unheard. Was it blind hatred of the Bolsheviks, a commission of the Poles or burning patriotism, which, after this bitter disappointment, again drove him across the borders with a small band of followers? Whatever it is, the guerilla war which the ex-dictator unleashes in East Ukraine does not change anything in his country's fate, which was definitively sealed at Riga. /80/

175 Driven out of his home for the last time and
726 again disarmed by the Poles, he was nevertheless permitted to kindle rebellions in East Ukraine from within the Polish state. If the East Ukrainians bled to death and the Bolsheviks had internal difficulties, this could only please Warsaw. When the Bolsheviks finally cruelly quelled these uprisings - according to accounts in the Communist of February 23, 1923, 6000 groups of rebels were discovered and destroyed in 1921 -, Petliura, the ally of Pilsudski at the conquest of Kiyev, was now merely a troublesome foreigner in Poland. As such he was banished. /Facing page
728 80/ /Map V: The Ukraine Before the First World War (1914). At the end of the eighteenth century
●631 the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom disintegrated. From that time on the main part of the Ukraine belonged to the Czar's realm. Parts of West Ukraine in so-called East Galicia and Bukovina, along with Chernovtsy went to Austria, Ukrainian territory in the Carpathians to Hungary./ /Key inside map: -.-.-. National boundaries. ...Provincial boundar-

[Ruthenians]

728 ics in Austria and boundaries of the various gub-
• 631 ermyas in Russia./

/81/

Fair Play

186 In the winter of 1938/39 the Ukrainian peasants in Poland were no longer recognizable. If after the pacification of 1930 they went about for many years bent and timid like beaten dogs, they now carried their heads higher. It was as though they felt a fresh breeze, and whenever they had business with Polish officials they omitted expressions of due respect, in fact they became cynical. They stood around in groups, talked in the most animated fashion, nudged each other meaningfully and sometimes laughed out loud.

[186] What happened? Since the end of October
101 1938, there was the "Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy"
642 beyond the Carpathians. There on the southern slopes of the Carpathians live the Ukrainian tribes of Lemki, Boyki and the Huzul. On poor soil they eke out a precarious living as small farmers, woodsmen and shepherds. In the warmer season many of them hire themselves out as harvest workers in the fertile Hungarian lowlands, and there they also trade in carriage grease. Before the First World War they shipped salt to Warsaw and fruit even as far as Moscow. Ruthenia, as their little country was once called, always belonged to the Kingdom bearing the crown of Stephen. After the downfall of the Hapsburg monarchy Czech insatiability succeeded in having "Carpatho-Russia" - that is what Ruthenia was now called - assigned to the Czechs by the edict of Saint-Germain. The "autonomy" which the little country was promised on paper in the edict remained an unfulfilled dream for its inhabitants. "Carpatho-Russia" was a province abounding in forests, which Prague could and would exploit. It was only after the solution of the Sudeten

11: Obermaier--82A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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[Map IV: The Ukraine before the First world war (1914), cf. complete legend, pp. 81-82]

11: Obermaier--82B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

[Map V "the Ukraine before the First World War (1914)"]

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

42 Art. 14. The Ukrainian SSR reserves the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Art. 15. The territory of the Ukrainian SSR may not be altered without its consent.

[101] Art. 15a. The Ukrainian SSR has its own Republican military formations.

[149] Art. 15b. The Ukrainian SSR has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

Art. 16. The laws of the USSR are binding within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

[141] Art. 17. Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a citizen of the USSR.
Citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR equal rights with citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

63 Art. 18. The Ukrainian SSR consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Transcarpathian, Zaporozhye, Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltava, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumi, Ternopol, Kharkov, Kherson, Chernigov and Chernovitsi Regions.

Art. 19. The jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, embraces:

a) Adoption of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and control over its observance;

b) Submission of the formation of new regions constituting part of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for confirmation;

c) Establishment of the boundaries, and of the division into districts, of regions;

d) Legislation of the Ukrainian SSR;

e) Maintenance of public order and safeguarding the rights of citizens;

f) Approval of the national-economic plan of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Approval of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR and of the report on its fulfilment;

h) Determination of state and local taxes, imposts and non-tax revenues in conformity with the laws of the USSR;

i) Direction of the fulfilment of the local budgets of the regions;

j) Direction of insurance and savings;

k) Administration of the banks, industrial, agricultural and trading enterprises and organizations subordinate to the Republic, as well as direction of local industry;

l) Control and superintendence of the condition and administration of enterprises subordinate to the Union;

m) Establishment of the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests and waters;

n) Direction of dwelling houses and the municipal economy, dwelling house construction and the modernization of cities and other inhabited places;

o) Road building; direction of local transport and communications;

p) Labour legislation;

q) Direction of social maintenance;

r) Direction of elementary, secondary and higher education;

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949

645

The Ministry of Cinematography
The Ministry of Light Industry
The Ministry of Forestry
The Ministry of the Timber and Paper Industry
The Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Industry
The Ministry of Public Health
The Ministry of the Building Materials Industry
The Ministry of the Fish Industry
The Ministry of the Food Industry
The Ministry of State Farms
The Ministry of Agriculture
The Ministry of Trade
The Ministry of Finance
The Ministry of Justice

Art. 49. The following Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR are Republican Ministries:

The Ministry of the Housing Construction Industry
The Ministry of Motor Transport
The Ministry of the Furniture and Carpentry Industries
The Ministry of the Municipal Economy
The Ministry of Local Industry
The Ministry of the Local Fuel Industry
The Ministry of Education
The Ministry of Social Maintenance.

Art. 50. The Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, within the limits of the jurisdiction of their respective Ministries, issue orders and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, of the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and of the orders and instructions of the Union-Republican Ministries of the USSR, and verify their execution.

Art. 51. Each Union-Republican Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directs the branch of state administration of the Ukrainian SSR entrusted to it, with the exception of only a limited number of enterprises, according to a list confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and is subordinate both to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and the corresponding Union-Republican Ministry of the USSR.

Art. 52. Each Republican Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directs the branch of state administration entrusted to it and is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 53. The Government of the Ukrainian SSR or a Minister of the Ukrainian SSR to whom a question of a member of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is addressed must give a verbal or written reply in the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR within a period not exceeding three days.

Chapter V. The Local Organs of State Power

631 Art. 54. The organs of state power in regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages are the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 55. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, districts in big cities, settlements and villages are elected by the

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

63 working people of the respective regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements villages for a term of two years.

Art. 56. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, district cities, settlements and villages direct cultural, political and economic affairs on their territory, draw up the local budgets, direct the work of the organs of administration subordinate to them, ensure the maintenance of public order, assist in strengthening the defensive capacity of the country and ensure the observance of the laws and the protection of the rights of citizens.

Art. 57. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies adopt decisions and issue orders within the limits of the powers vested in them by the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 58. The executive and administrative organ of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies of a region, area, district, city, settlement or village is the Executive Committee elected by it, consisting of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, a Secretary and members.

Art. 59. The executive and administrative organ of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies in a small locality is the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Secretary elected by the Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 60. The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies of a region, area, district, city, settlement or village exercises guidance in cultural, political and economic affairs within its territory on the basis of decisions taken by the corresponding Soviet of Working People's Deputies and superior state organs.

Art. 61. Sessions of regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies are convened by their respective Executive Committees not less than four times a year.

Art. 62. Sessions of district and area Soviets of Working People's Deputies are convened by their respective Executive Committees not less than six times a year.

Art. 63. Sessions of Soviets of Working People's Deputies of cities, settlements and villages are convened by their respective executive organs not less than once a month.

Art. 64. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities or districts in big cities each elect a Chairman and a Secretary for the duration of their sessions to conduct the sittings of the sessions.

Art. 65. The Chairman of a settlement or village Soviet convenes the Soviet and conducts its sittings.

Art. 66. The executive organs of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies are directly accountable both to the Soviets of Working People's Deputies which elected them and to the executive organs of the respective superior Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 67. The superior Executive Committees of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies have the right to annul decisions and orders of inferior Executive Committees and to suspend decisions and orders of inferior Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 68. The superior Soviets of Working People's Deputies have the right to annul decisions and orders of inferior Soviets of Working People's Deputies and of their Executive Committees.

634 Art. 69. The regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments and Administrations of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Art
a General Department
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry
a Department of Public Education
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Department of Roads

and the following Administrations:

a Cinematographic Administration
a Light Industry Administration
a Local Fuel Industry Administration
an Agricultural Administration
a Food Industry Administration
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the Region, the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the Union-Republican Ministries of the Timber Industry, Meat and Dairy Industry, Building Materials Industry, Fish Industry and Textile Industry:

a Department of the Timber Industry
a Department of the Meat and Dairy Industry
a Department of the Building Materials Industry
a Department of the Fish Industry
a Department of the Textile Industry.

625 Art. 70. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Justice of the Union set up their own administrations under the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies, in accordance with the conditions of the region and on the basis of the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Art. 71. The Departments and Administrations of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the corresponding regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 72. The area Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees carry on their work on the basis of the laws voted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and orders of the Regional Soviet of Workers' Deputies and their Executive Committees.

632 Art. 73. The district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 79. On the expiration of the terms of office of the regional, area, district, city settlement or village Soviets of Working People's Deputies, their executive and administrative organs retain their powers until the newly elected Soviets shall have formed new executive and administrative organs.

Chapter VI. The Budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

[643] 644 [645] Art. 80. The state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is drawn up by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and submitted by it to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for its approval.

Upon its approval by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is published for general information.

Art. 81. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Budget Commission, which reports its conclusions on the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet.

Art. 82. The report on the fulfilment of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and published for general information.

[651] 652 Art. 83. The budgets of the regional, area, district, city, settlement and village Soviets include the revenues from the local economy, deductions from the state revenues collected within their territory and likewise receipts from local taxes and imposts in amounts fixed by the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter VII. The Courts and the Procurator's Office

692 Art. 84. In the Ukrainian SSR justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Regional and Area Courts, the Special Courts of the USSR established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the People's Courts.

[693] Art. 85. In all Courts' cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

Art. 86. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is the highest judicial organ of the Ukrainian SSR. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR.

[646] Art. 87. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for a term of five years.

Art. 88. Regional and area courts are elected by regional and area Soviets of Working People's Deputies for a term of five years.

Art. 89. People's courts are elected by the citizens of the district on basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of three years.

695 [563] Art. 90. Judicial proceedings in the Ukrainian SSR are conducted in the Ukrainian language, persons not knowing the language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court.

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

SU 162 U 162 mile. The Donbas shows a density of 260 to 890 per square mile, while the concentration of the population in certain industrial areas goes as high as 525 per square mile. In sharp contrast to these densely settled sections, the northern wooded area of the Poles'ye supports only 50 to 75 persons per square mile, and even less in the marshy portions. The SU southern steppes also show a density of only 95 to 130 per square mile.

361 162 U 261 102 Large villages form the most typical settlement pattern in the Ukraine. Rural population centers of as many as 15,000 or more inhabitants stretch along the river valleys or along dry ravines, where artificial ponds provide the water supply. In many instances villages merge into each other and form a continuous settlement many miles long. Surrounded by orchards and with white-washed, thatched mud huts scattered about in disorderly fashion, they often present a singularly charming appearance.

About one third of the population lives in urban centers. The Ukrainian SSR counts fifteen cities of over 100,000 inhabitants and more than forty cities with a population of over 50,000. The large centers lie mainly in the Donets Basin, along the Dnieper and the shores of the Black Sea, as well as in the western Ukraine.

SU 162 U 162 The national composition of the population of the Ukraine is quite homogeneous. The Ukrainians constitute about 80 percent of the total. Among the more important minorities are the Russians, who live principally in the Donbas and in the northern section, the Belorussians in the northwest, Poles in the west, and Bulgarians in the southwest. Before the Second World War, Jews formed a considerable percentage of the urban population, especially in the right-bank towns and in the western Ukraine. A considerable number of Volga Tatars are also found SU in the Donets Basin.

631 U 51 The Ukrainians constitute the second most important national group in the USSR. Their language, their culture and their mode of life are closely related to those of the Russians. Long split among several powers, the Ukrainians were as late as the end of the eighteenth century under the rule of the Russians (left-bank Ukraine), of the Poles (right-bank Ukraine), and of the Turks (southern steppes). Shortly thereafter the major portion of the Ukrainian people came under Russian rule, but many still remained in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in Rumania. In 1917 the Ukrainian SSR was created, but it was not until the final annexations of territory from Poland (1939), Rumania (1940),

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 Rl Soviet Union Rl
Ukraine RD1

Su 631 U 631

and Czechoslovakia (1945) that most Ukrainians of eastern Europe became united into one territorial entity.

The present administrative-territorial system was introduced into the Ukrainian SSR in 1932 by the creation of seven oblasts. By 1939 the number had increased to fifteen. Following the partition of Poland, in 1939, and the annexation of the Western Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR, six more oblasts (Volyn', Rovno, L'vov, Drogobych, Ternopol', and Stanislav) were added. In 1940 Rumania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR. The extreme northern and southern sections of the territory were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR as the Chernovtsy and Izmail oblasts in view of their predominant Ukrainian population. However, the Ukraine lost the greater part of Moldavian Autonomous SSR (formed in 1924) when the Moldavian territory was joined to the central part of Bessarabia to form the newly constituted Moldavian SSR. Seven districts (rayons) of the Moldavian Autonomous SSR, including those of Balta and Kotovsk remained in the Ukrainian SSR as part of the Odessa Oblast, due to the predominance of a Ukrainian population. In 1945 the western frontier of the Ukrainian SSR was changed in favor of Poland with the adoption of the so-called "Curzon line," which left the city of Przemyśl (Russian *Peremyshl'*) and areas to the northeast and southwest, along the San River, to Poland. In June, 1945, the Carpatho-Ukraine, or Ruthenia, was transferred from Czechoslovakia and constituted into the Transcarpathian (*Zakarpatskaya*) Oblast. At present the Ukrainian SSR is divided into twenty-five oblasts.

Su 438* U 438

The economy of the Ukrainian SSR combines a rich agricultural development with a powerful mining and metallurgical industry, based in particular on the coal of the Donets Basin and the iron ore of Krivoy Rog. As a result of the industrialization of the USSR, the Ukraine became not only a basic grain-exporting region of the USSR, as well as an area of intensive agriculture and agricultural industry, but also the major coal and metallurgical base and heavy-machine construction center of the USSR. The Ukraine has more than one fifth of the total sown area of the USSR and produces one quarter of the grain, two thirds of the sugar, three fifths of the coal and pig iron, one half of the salt and about one fifth of the machines and chemicals.

Su U 316 433

In 1940 the Donets Basin furnished 85 million tons of coal per year. It supplied not only all the industry of the Ukraine itself but also the

23: Shabad N-4 (no date) 1951 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine R01

WESTERN UKRAINE

THE WESTERN UKRAINE includes those areas (except for Izmail Oblast) which were incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR after 1939 and later. Six oblasts (Rovno, Volyn', Ternopol', L'vov, Stanislav, and Drogobych) were annexed in the autumn of 1939 following the partition of Poland and the Soviet occupation of its eastern section. Chernovtsy Oblast was formed in the Northern Bukovina and the extreme northern section of Bessarabia after the acquisition of these territories from Rumania, in the summer of 1940. The Transcarpathian Oblast was ceded to the Ukraine according to an agreement with Czechoslovakia in 1945. The Western Ukraine can be roughly considered in four geographical sections: the Carpathian section in the south, on the slopes and in the foothills of the Carpathian Mountains, the Poles'ye, a northern lowland along the right affluents of the Pripet River, the hilly central section in the Volyn'-Podolian upland, and the Transcarpathian section.

The Carpathian section of the Western Ukraine includes the oblasts of Chernovtsy, Stanislav, and Drogobych. Its economy is based essentially on the mineral resources of the area: petroleum, natural gas, salt, and potash, and on the lumber resources on the slopes. There are a number of health resorts in the valleys.

Chernovtsy Oblast

Area, 3,200, population, 900,000

Chernovtsy Oblast lies along the upper Prut and the Dniester rivers. The forests (mainly beech), building materials, salt, and petroleum are found in the higher foothills. Agriculture puts the emphasis on grains (wheat, corn, and barley), potatoes and sugar beets in the south and on fruit growing along the Dniester, in the northeast. Sheep raising and lumbering are the main activities in the mountains. Sawmilling, woodworking, sugar refining, flour milling, and wine making are the chief rural industries.

Chernovtsy (Rumanian *Cernăuți*) called Chernovitsy until 1944, lies on a terrace above the Prut River. It has large textile and machine industries and produces chemicals, lumber, and food products.

Storozhinets (Rumanian *Storojineț*) is a road center in the agricultural region southwest of Chernovtsy.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Government.	1906.	1910.
	Roubles.	*Roubles.*
Yekaterinoslav . .	5,210,000	8,241,000
Poltava . . .	6,737,000	8,750,000
Taurida . . .	3,599,000	4,576,000
Kharkov . . .	5,753,000	9,168,000
Kherson . . .	3,808,000	5,542,000

Thirty-one towns in the Ukraine have municipal administrations, and can raise taxes and contract loans for purposes similar to those of the *zemstvo* budgets. A considerable debt has been incurred. The towns of Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa have borrowed money for municipal purposes in foreign markets; of a total debt of 53,000,000 roubles, these three towns account for 35,000,000 roubles.

The *mirs* or local communes can also raise some taxes for purely local purposes. Obligatory taxes are levied for local communal administration, provision of granaries for storing food-stuffs, upkeep of local roads on peasant lands, and insurance against fire and inundations. Facultative powers of taxation are in the hands of the *mirs* for the building and maintenance of churches, schools, and hospitals, and other special local needs. There is a great deal of irregularity in the levying and administration of these taxes.

(2) Banking

The banks of the Ukraine fall into several well-defined groups. In the first place come banks which are State or semi-State institutions. These are the Imperial State Bank, the Land Bank of the Nobility, the Peasants' Land Bank, and the State Savings Bank.

The Imperial State Bank is a Government institution with a wide sphere of activity. It controls the currency and note issue, being the only bank issuing notes. It undertakes general banking and bill broking, besides having close relations with the Treasury for revenue, loan, and other purposes. It makes large loans to private banks; up to 1910 the total amount was £189,000,000. It also advances money on merchandise, principally on

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 68. The superior Soviets of Working People's Deputies have the right to annul decisions and orders of inferior Soviets of Working People's Deputies and of their Executive Committees.

634 Art. 69. The regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments and Administrations of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Art
a General Department
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry
a Department of Public Education
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Department of Roads

and the following Administrations:

a Cinematographic Administration
a Light Industry Administration
a Local Fuel Industry Administration
an Agricultural Administration
a Food Industry Administration
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the Region, the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the Union-Republican Ministries of the Timber Industry, Meat and Dairy Industry, Building Materials Industry, Fish Industry and Textile Industry:

a Department of the Timber Industry
a Department of the Meat and Dairy Industry
a Department of the Building Materials Industry
a Department of the Fish Industry
a Department of the Textile Industry.

[625] Art. 70. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Justice of the Union set up their own administrations under the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies, in accordance with the conditions of the region and on the basis of the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Art. 71. The Departments and Administrations of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the corresponding regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 72. The area Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees carry on their work on the basis of the laws voted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and orders of the Regional Soviet of Workers' Deputies and their Executive Committees.

632 Art. 73. The district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

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632

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Roads
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Public Education
a General Department
a Department of Agriculture
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committees and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the district, the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the respective regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies:

a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry,

[629] Art. 74. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security set up their Departments under the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies in accordance with the conditions of the district, on the basis of the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR and subject to confirmation by the corresponding regional Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 75. The Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

633 Art. 76. The city Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Public Health
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Public Education
a General Department
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the city's industry and its municipal and suburban economy,

a Department of Local Industry and
a Department of Agriculture.

Art. 77. The Departments of the city Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the respective city Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies or directly to the corresponding Departments of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 78. The Departments of city Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Kiev are subordinate in their activities both to the Kiev Soviet of Working People's Deputies and its Executive Committee as well as to the corresponding Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directly.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov 21, 1949]

644 Art. 121. Elections of deputies to Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR are held by electoral districts on the following bases:

[634] in elections to regional Soviets - one deputy for every 15,000 to 30,000 of the population, depending upon its size;

[633] in elections to district and area Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population; in a district or area whose population does not exceed 25,000, twenty-five deputies are elected, and in a district or area whose population exceeds 60,000, not more than sixty deputies are elected;

[632] in elections to city Soviets or city district Soviets - one deputy for every 350 to 900 of the population, depending upon its size; in a city or city district whose population does not exceed 12,000, thirty-five deputies are elected;

in elections to the Kiev and Kharkov city Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population;

[631] in elections to village or settlement Soviets - one deputy for every 100 of the population; in a village or settlement whose population does not exceed 1,000, nine deputies are elected, and where the population exceeds 2,500, not more than twenty-five deputies.

The basis of representation for each regional, district, city, village and settlement Soviet of Working People's Deputies is fixed in the "Ordinance Concerning Elections to Regional, District, City, Village and Settlement Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR," within the range of the bases of representation indicated in the present article.

Art. 122. Candidates for elections are nominated according to electoral district.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Art. 123. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time upon decision of the majority of the electors in the manner established by law.

Chapter X. Arms, Flag, Capital

646 Art. 124. The state arms of the Ukrainian SSR are a sickle and hammer of gold in relief, placed crosswise, handles down against a red background in the rays of the rising sun, and surrounded by ears of wheat, which are placed symmetrically, from bottom to top, forming a circle. Between the tops of the ears of wheat is a red star. At the bottom of the wreath are the words, "Ukrainian SSR" on a red band, and at the bottom of the ears of corn the words, "Workers of all Countries United!" in the Russian language on the right, and in the Ukrainian language on the left.

Art. 125. The state flag of the Ukrainian SSR is of cloth divided into two horizontal bands of color: the upper band, in red, is two-thirds of the width of the flag, and the lower band, in azure, is one-third of the width of the flag. In the upper part of the flag, about one-third of the distance from the staff, are a hammer and sickle of gold and above them a five-pointed star with a gold border.

The relation of width to length of the flag is 1:2.

Art. 126. The Capital of the Ukrainian SSR is the City of Kiev.

Chapter XI. Procedure for Amending the Constitution

642 Art. 127. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR may be amended only by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted by a majority of not
646 less than two-thirds of the votes of the Supreme Soviet.

attempts which the "bourgeois nationalists" had made to bring together the Ukrainians of the east and of the west. They declared that the preceding group had sought to bring back capitalism and to separate Ukrainian from the "brotherly" Russian and to remodel it on Polish and German standards. They attacked any system of orthography and transliteration which differed from that used in Russian and in their attacks on Polonisms in Ukrainian they went so far as to call Polish any Ukrainian form which differed from the Russian, even when the Polish word in fact had the same form as the Russian and differed from the Ukrainian. 626 814 191

In the small dictionaries that were printed only those words were admitted that revealed Russian relations and the academician Krymsky once remarked of one of these that it was merely a Russian-Russian dictionary, so far had the process been carried.

In 1933 Khvylya published a new orthography for Ukrainian. This repudiated the work that had been done earlier to bring together Eastern and Western Ukrainian and sought to take as the standard those Ukrainian dialects that had been most thoroughly russianized, although at the same time he carefully avoided explaining the policy on which he was working.

Thus, during these years there developed a definite policy of disintegrating the language from within. It was based very definitely upon the old theories of the nineteenth century, that Ukrainian was merely a corrupt form of Russian and could not have any independent development, but such a statement which would have satisfied Nicholas I and Belinsky was not expressed clearly. It was enveloped in a mass of Communist jargon which appealed to the great names of Bolshevik ideology and covered a complete ignorance of any of the facts of language or of popular usage.

At the same time in another field Postyshev saw the opportunity to deliver further blows under the guise of progress and of satisfying Ukrainian aspirations. He moved the capital of the Ukrainian Republic back to Kiev from Kharkiv.[1] There were good reasons for this. The Soviet regime had been established at Kharkiv, because it was nearer to the Russian boundary and hence could more easily receive support from Russian military sources during the 633

[1] [1933 -- Analyst]

633 civil war. Kiev, as the centre of traditional Ukrainian life, was more liable to sympathy with the Ukrainian national movement, as the Russians had found on more than one occasion. Now, with the country prostrate, it seemed advisable for the Communists to mark their triumph and endeavor to identify themselves with the masses by recognizing Kiev.

Yet, it brought with it another blow to Ukrainian prestige. Of all the cities in Ukraine, Kiev was the richest in the monuments of the past. Therefore, to mark the Communist triumph, they decided to rebuild large portions of the city and to erect buildings that would be worthy of the new regime. It was easy to find as the proper sites the areas where the old Kiev had stood.

346 661 633 From the very first days of Bolshevism and Communism, the regime, with its atheistic trends, had devoted itself to the robbing of the churches. Even the ikonostasis of St. Sophia had been melted down to recover the gold ornaments with which it had been decorated. The museums had been largely pillaged. Some of the contents had been removed to Moscow on various pretexts, but still more had been wantonly destroyed.

Now work began in earnest to wreck the surviving monuments of the past. In quick succession the Communists ruined, blew up or levelled a large number of churches which spoke too strongly of the past greatness of Kiev and the Ukrainians. These included the Cathedral Church of the Golden Domed Monastery of St. Michael of the twelfth century, with a bell-tower of the seventeenth, the Church of the Three Saints of the twelfth century, the cloisters of the Monastery of St. Irena of the eleventh century, the finest monuments of the period of Mazepa at the end of the seventeenth century, including the Cathedrals of the Theophany of the Brotherhood Monastery and the "Great Nicholas" of the Ustyno-Mykolayiv Monastery, the work of the architect Joseph Startsev, with a bell-tower of the late eighteenth or the early nineteenth century, the "Little Nicholas" and the Church of St. George of the eighteenth century, a large number of structures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of the Kievan-Mezhyhirye Monastery of the Transfiguration, the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Podil of

[1933 - Ukraine capital was moved to Kiev from Kharkiv -- Analyst]

the eighteenth century, the bell-tower of the Kiev-Kiril-Troitsky 346
Monastery of the eighteenth century built by the architect Ivan 661
Hryhorovych-Barsky, the Church of Sts. Borys and Hlib of the 633
eighteenth century, the Church of the Birth of Christ and the "good Nicholas," built by Andry Melensky at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Church of the Tithes, the celebrated statue of Samson by Hryhorovych-Barsky, and a long series of other monuments and buildings.

Almost all of these buildings came from those periods when the Ukrainians were the most free from Russian influence or, as in the case of the Mazepa baroque, had the closest contacts with the West. It was a deliberate part of the Communist attempt to rewrite the Ukrainian past.

Of course, their excuse was that the old primarily ecclesiastical culture stood in marked contradiction to the modern era of industrialization and collectivization, the "glorious age of Stalin" which called for the development of a new type of architecture. Still, in a surprising number of cases these new buildings did not make their appearance and the ground was left empty or covered with insignificant structures which could better have been placed on the site of those half-ruined shacks and hovels which were the real expressions of the Communist paradise.

The primary object was the annihilation of the Ukrainian spirit 626
and represented part of the broad general movement which had 186
been launched for the rerussification of the country and the stopping in every way of that spontaneous outburst of development which had been called into being by the downfall of tsarism and the founding of the Ukrainian National Republic. The general debacle was now complete.

Within four years, before the ending of the first Five Year Plan a situation had been brought about which seemed to the Soviet authorities a guarantee of their final victory over what they were pleased to call bourgeois nationalism but which was, in realty, the logical outgrowth of the Ukrainian aspirations throughout the centuries.

[in destruction of churches & monuments of past in Kiev--Analyst

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727 In addition to difficulties presented by the great gaps in material and human resources, there was a continued danger from the "booby traps" of hidden explosive mines and camouflaged Communist agents. The latter were not discovered for some time, but on the fifth day after the German occupation, a large number of mines blew up a considerable section of the center of the city, thoroughly disrupting the work of the Germans and Ukrainians in reestablishing an ordered pattern of life.[4]

●633 727 Immediately after arriving in Kiev, a council of the Mel'nyk leaders—Konyk and Captain Soretits'kyi, who came in the Wehrmacht service, and Iaroslav Haivaz and Roman Bidar, who apparently came without official authorization—decided to install a *Hilfsbürgermeister,* or chief of the municipal administrative apparatus. They chose Alexander Ohloblyn, a well-known historian of the Soviet period. The Wehrmacht authorities readily accepted the council's nomination,[5] an indication of the close cooperation of the OUN-M with the army authorities in the East Ukraine at that time.

Ohloblyn's authority, however, was soon to prove illusory. Volodymyr Bahazii, an instructor from the pedagogical institute, had been appointed as his deputy. Unlike Ohloblyn, Bahazii had greeted the Nationalist leaders and immediately sought to identify himself with them. They soon learned that he was highly ambitious and that he did not stop at attacking his nominal superior, whom he accused of Russophile tendencies.[6] Apparently Bahazii's loyalty to the OUN and his energy in carrying out the reorganization of city life made him indispensable. At any rate, Professor Ohloblyn was soon pushed into the background,[7] and at the end of October, after a disagreement with the German authorities concerning measures to be taken to enhance the welfare of Kiev's citizens, he resigned.[8] Bahazii then became the

[4] Forostivs'kyi, p. 24; PS 053.
[5] Interviews 56, 65.
[6] Interviews 56, 65.
[7] This is evident even in contemporary published accounts. Cf. *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, pp. 3–5, containing an article written by Petro (Peter) Oliïnyk earlier in Kiev, in which Bahazii is described as the "business manager." *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* October 26, 1941, p. 6, describes a meeting of the department heads of the city administration which Ohloblyn opened, but over which Bahazii presided.
[8] Interview 56.

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chief of administration.[9] Having achieved this post, he repaid the 727
organization which had assisted him by using his influence to 633
secure the adherence to the OUN-M of the most important officials.[10]

While most of the economic and cultural divisions of the city 668*
government were left in the hands of local men, the OUN forces 208
took care to organize the most important branches—propaganda 625
and police—under their own followers. Zakhvalins'kyi was 727
brought from Zhitomir to take command of the police units, but after a short period, in which his alleged incompetence and dissolute life made him objectionable to his party, he was replaced by one of the Galician leaders, Roman Bidar. Kandyba soon arrived to take charge of propaganda activity. With him came the staff of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* headed by John Rohach. The newspaper was to be printed in Kiev, but the destruction of the principal press by the explosions forced the editors to continue publication for some weeks in Zhitomir.[11]

Having captured Kiev, the German armies rapidly pushed on 668*
to the east, taking with them most of the interpreters and advisers 727
who had formed an essential part of the OUN-M "conquest" of Zhitomir and Kiev. By the end of October, they had reached Kharkov, where Konyk took the lead in propaganda work. He and his assistants succeeded in recruiting a considerable number of the local intelligentsia for their organization but, as will be shown later, failed in their attempt to attain a high degree of success similar to that in Kiev.[12]

Lest repeated reference to collaboration of the Mel'nyk forces with the Wehrmacht lead to an exaggerated conception of the role of the OUN-M in the operations of the German army, it should be pointed out that the latter employed many Slavic interpreters and advisers in addition to the Mel'nyk followers. Some of these were Ukrainians, of all political persuasions, including Bandera supporters. Strong efforts were made to get rid of the latter after the decision to suppress their party, but for a

[9] Bahazii assumed the post on November 1 (*Nastup,* December 20, 1941, p. 2).
[10] Interviews 53, 65.
[11] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 21, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, p. 3; Interview 65.
[12] See Chapter X.

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186 permitted to determine his own nationality. There was an enormous increase in the proportion of persons claiming Ukrainian nationality as compared to the Soviet census of 1926, which had been conducted in the same fashion. That many factors were involved in the shift is indicated by the extreme variations from city to city, which will be touched upon in a later chapter. There [626] is, moreover, little doubt that pressures, ranging from fear of the nationalist-dominated police (which, in Zhitomir at least, took the census) to desire to obtain material benefits reserved for Ukrainians only, were significant. There is no question, however, that a large number of those who claimed Ukrainian nationality in 1941–42 were influenced by a desire to "climb upon the band wagon" by obtaining affiliation with the national group which they thought would be in favor in the future. The nationalist mayor of Kiev, Leontii Forostivs'kyi, during whose administration the census in the capital was taken, freely admits the importance of this factor.[7]

●633 From a material standpoint, too, the municipal administration played a considerable role in the provision of support for nationalist activity. The funds at its disposal were not inconsiderable, the Kharkov city budget amounting to the equivalent of some eight million dollars annually.[8] The number of municipal employees was also sizable. In Kiev the total under Bahazii's direction, evidently largely dependent on the central municipal authority for their positions, was twenty thousand.[9] This figure was regarded as so excessive by the Germans that it figured in the charges made against him, but several months after his arrest the number employed by the city—apparently the purely administrative branches only, exclusive of education and manufacturing and commercial enterprises—was still 1,138, and 1,065 more were working for the *raions*.[10] Even the smaller figures are quite significant in a city whose total population had by that time sunk to 350,000, an extremely small percentage of which consisted of

[7] Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), p. 50.

[8] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, May 23–24, 1943, p. 2, quotes Mayor Semenenko as saying the budget for the last quarter of 1942 totaled 50,000,000 *karbovontsi* (10 *k.* = 1 RM = $0.40).

[9] PS 192.

[10] *Ukrains'ka Diiamist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

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employable men. From the point of view of political sentiment, 633
as will be shown, the composition of the administrative force [565]
made it even more significant, for over one fourth were of the upper levels of the intelligentsia—those having a higher education—while another 35 percent were probably of the Soviet "intelligentsia," since they possessed secondary educations.[11] The city administrations, with their appurtenances of schools and publications, thus served as refuges for the intellectual class in general, which was shorn of its customary economic role by the terrible dislocations of war. Consequently the orientation of the structure in which they found a place could play a vital role in determining the direction this group's sentiments would take.

At least two East Ukrainian mayors,[12] in addition to Bahazii, 186
lost their lives for too ardent devotion to the nationalist cause. 633
Even when they were not in conflict with the occupying power, the mayors knew that their positions singled them out for Communist vengeance, from either secret agents or the returning Red Army. That a considerable group of officials was found to remain true to the nationalist cause—even if a bit timidly at times—is an indication that a considerable reservoir of leadership for nationalism existed in the East Ukraine.

While the city administration as a whole was both a symbol 727
of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy and an instrument for ad- 633
vancing the nationalist cause, the individual departments were frequently of equal or greater significance. Their importance derived in large measure from the fact that administrative divisions entrusted with very important functions were frequently operated in considerable independence of the central municipal administration.

In practice the amount of authority exercised by any major official depended more on his own character and his relations with the German authorities than upon any formal apportionment of power. This was especially the case in the large cities, where in addition to the *Stadtkommissar* who stood above the native mayor, there were German officials in charge of each of

[11] *Ibid.*
[12] In Kamenets-Podolsk and Poltava.

727 the departments of administration. In such cases the department
633 heads who were on good terms with their German superiors seem to have been able to pursue courses substantially independent of the mayor, and this was also to an extent true of the firmer or more clever of those who wished to exert their own authority even without special German support. Consequently, it sometimes happened that one or more sections of a municipal administration were strongholds of nationalist activity, while the city as a whole was administered by elements opposed to Ukrainian independence.

Under the Soviet system, the municipal administrations had included departments of finance, communal economy, internal trade, health, popular education, social security, and cadres, as well as a general department, a planning commission, and sometimes departments of local manufacturing and agriculture. In the city administrations under German occupation, there was evidently some consolidation of departments, but in general the Soviet division was little changed, except for the elimination of the planning commission. On the other hand, several new departments were added for functions which had been performed by higher Soviet administrative levels but which the Germans wished to allocate, under their own control, to the cities. One was the propaganda department, which will be discussed somewhat later. Another was the juridical department, which operated a system of lower courts.[13] It was, however, of little or no importance as a channel of nationalist activity. Much more significant in this
625 respect were the police departments. Some indications of their
727 activity in nationalist affairs have already been given. The Ger-
625 mans, of course, exerted great efforts to keep this element of authority, the only branch of the local administration which could have offered armed resistance to their rule, under firm control. Since the police power was regularly in the hands of German SP officials, who frequently maintained only a nominal subordination to the *Stadtkommissar,* the Ukrainian chief of this department was correspondingly independent of the mayor.

[13] On the legal system in the Reichskommissariat, see Nicholas Laskovs'kyi, "Practicing Law in the Occupied Ukraine," *American Slavic and East European Review,* XI (April, 1952), 124 ff.

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Moreover, since there were several German police authorities— 727
ordinary security police, secret police, railway police—operating 625
in the same area, unified at the top but having different Ukrain- 633
ian subchiefs operating under them, the possibility of several competing or antagonistic influences existed. In spite of the special concern of the Reichskommissariat to root out all OUN members in the police, the latter were able for many months to maintain their positions in several cities. For example, while the city administrations of Vinnitsa and Dniepropetrovsk were in the hands of Russophile elements opposed to Ukrainian nationalism, the police chief in the former city[14] and the Ukrainian in charge of the secret police in the latter[15] were supporters of the OUN. Close as was the supervision of the German police authorities, it was obviously impossible for them to watch every action of their subordinates, so that possession of such support within the police force was of great value to the nationalist groups.

In the wave of repression in Kiev in December, 1941, the fact 186
that his sympathizers controlled the police in the *raion* in which 625
he was arrested allowed the chief of the OUN-M in the East 727
Ukraine, Dr. Kandyba, to secure his release, thus enabling him to prolong his activities for more than two years.[16] Moreover, the presence of nationalist elements in the police force served to prevent the control of these groups by secret Communist agents, who were successful in penetrating the police in a number of places in the southern Ukraine, and for a while in Kiev itself, through the German practice of retaining the Soviet *militsiia* as a matter of convenience.[17] Whatever value the nationalist penetration of the police force may have had in this connection was largely offset by the odium which attached to the nationalist groups when it became known to the population that they were collaborating with the Germans in this fashion. Moreover, the ill repute of the police was sometimes increased by the actions of the nationalists themselves who used the police as an instrument for terrorizing non-Ukrainians.[18]

[14] Interview 1.
[15] Interviews 1, 18.
[16] L. Dniprova, article in *Ukrains'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.
[17] Interview 59.
[18] It is said that the Ukrainian police in Kiev, when ordered to secure hostages

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led the organization after the West Ukrainian and émigré leaders had been forced to withdraw, was an engineer. On the whole, however, it may be said that engineers were more concerned with material reconstruction than politics, and did not play proportionately as significant a role as did engineers in the nationalist movements abroad and in Galicia.

The predominance of intellectuals and technical specialists in the nationalist movement imparted a certain specific color to the activities. In the first place, from the purely administrative point of view, the lack of trained men was a serious handicap. While the purely material aspects of city life were carried on about as well as might have been hoped in view of the destruction, shortages, and German obstruction, the conduct of public administration was far from adequate. This was, indeed, one of the major causes of the downfall of the OUN-M regime in Kiev, whether the worst defects consisted of favoritism and speculation by officials, or simply poor organizational and human relations. Nationalist fervor, enthusiasm, facility in the use of literary Ukrainian, were no substitutes for managerial skills and personnel psychology. Yet it was precisely these abilities which intellectuals who were excluded from public life, as were Soviet Ukrainian educators suspected of adherence to the Skrypnyk group, could not acquire. At the same time, so much of their energy had been turned in upon their academic and cultural cultivation of things Ukrainian, such as language and history, that the intellectuals failed to place the emotional and abstract aspects of the nationalist cause in a balanced framework when the opportunity for action arose. It cannot be said that the intellectuals were less courageous than others might have been in striving for national ends in the face of German terrorism; many lost their lives, although, as has been pointed out in the case of some of the small-city editors, others were sometimes found to act as pliant tools for the occupiers. It does, however, appear that persons more inclined to take a functional instead of an emotional approach to administration might have been more successful in evading German demands.

Very striking is the almost total lack of legal expression among almost all participants in administrative work. Probably the basic reason for this omission was that lawyers were few and far between among non-Communist elements in the Ukraine. A con-

been curbed by a stronger legal tradition. Perhaps by coincidence 633 the administrations in Zhitomir and Kharkov were comparatively 563 tolerant of minority groups, and awakened no such violent opposition from Russophile elements as in Kiev. Indeed, as has already been pointed out, the Zhitomir administration in 1941 included a Pole and a Russian in prominent posts, apparently working in harmony with other officials, while the nationalist group in Kharkov during the occupation attracted the lasting support of at least one academician of Russian origin. These groups were also able to avoid destruction by the Germans, in spite of considerable harassment, perhaps because their activities were not so violent as to arouse the public outcry which served as an excuse for the attack on the Kiev group.

The severe shortage of lawyers was paralleled by an even 633 greater lack of administrators with experience in posts of great 186 responsibility. This deficiency doubtless arose primarily from the fact that persons holding high administrative posts were almost universally strong adherents of the Communist regime. In a number of cases, leading Soviet officials such as chairmen of city soviets organized underground sabotage against German installations or led partisan groups for the Communist cause, and the large majority no doubt evacuated with the Red Army. It would have been difficult in any case for such a highly placed member of the Soviet regime to join the nationalist cause, as he would probably have been executed in short order by the *Einsatzgruppen,* whose tasks included the killing of all "kommissars." Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that no Soviet military, party, or state official of any importance, as far as is known to the present writer, ever joined the Ukrainian nationalist cause, either through the local groups in the East Ukraine or through the prisoner-of-war camps, although several from these groups did join the Vlasov movement.

What the East Ukraine lacked in trained legal and administrative personnel, the West Ukrainian organizers failed to supply. Indeed, they appear not to have seen the need. They recognized the desirability of sending in journalists (the West Ukrainians were more effective as editors, although the extremely propa-

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633 gandistic nature of much of their work exacerbated the defects
186 already existing in the intellectual nationalist tendencies in the east).[20] They also recognized the need for trained military officers to lead the police units, as well as for organizers of cooperatives, merchants, and other personnel to reorganize economic life.[21] Since the Galicians, unlike their East Ukrainian fellows, had been brought up under the influence of the Roman law tradition transmitted by the Austrian administration and the Catholic Church, one might have thought that they would provide a balancing ele-
[693] ment of legal thought. Actually, although there were numerous lawyers in the legal parties in Galicia, lawyers were even rarer among OUN leaders than among prominent East Ukrainians. Moreover, the whole current of revolutionary romanticism and the glorification of "illegalism" necessarily militated against the development of legalistic elements in the thinking of the nationalist factions. At the same time, of course, underground oppositional work had afforded the western group no experience in the responsibilities of public administration; the older émigrés who might have provided a modicum of such experience were kept out of the East Ukraine by the Germans. As the following statistics on the émigré group in Bohemia-Moravia indicate, however, the possible supply was not great, even if one accepts the figures which were obtained by listing, presumably at their own valuation, persons available to return to the East Ukraine in 1941.[22]

[20] Iu. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 6, 1941, p. 2.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] From a registration by a Ukrainian community organization in Prague, September 28, 1941 (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 4, 1941, p. 3). For comparison, the occupations of the postwar emigration (largely West rather than East Ukrainian, in contrast to the interwar émigré group) may be given:

	ÉMIGRÉS IN GERMANY	
	U. S. Zone (*total 85,646*)	*British Zone* (*total 44,987*)
Peasants	30 percent	44 percent
Workers	16	21
Artisans	18	14
Intellectuals	23	8
Miscellaneous	13	13

(Michael Pap, *Die Probleme der ukrainischen Staatlichkeit und der Emigration*, Inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde vorgelegt der Hohen Philosophischen Fakultät der Ruperts-Carola Universität zu Heidelberg, 1948 [Typescript available in the Library of Congress]).

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

632

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Roads
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Public Education
a General Department
a Department of Agriculture
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committees and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the district, the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the respective regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies:

a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry.

625 Art. 74. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security set up their Departments under the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies in accordance with the conditions of the district, on the basis of the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR and subject to confirmation by the corresponding regional Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 75. The Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

63B Art. 76. The city Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Public Health
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Public Education
a General Department
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the city's industry and its municipal and suburban economy,

a Department of Local Industry and
a Department of Agriculture.

Art. 77. The Departments of the city Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the respective city Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies or directly to the corresponding Departments of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 78. The Departments of city Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Kiev are subordinate in their activities both to the Kiev Soviet of Working People's Deputies and its Executive Committee as well as to the corresponding Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directly.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

circumstances to extract the maximum concessions from the harassed liberal leaders who could not risk a political crisis in the rear of the South-Western Army. 668 642

When the offensive ended in catastrophe with a loss of over 100,000 casualties and 47,000 prisoners, the complete demoralization of the Front and the appearance of thousands of fugitives in Kiev, the ministers of the Provisional Government had no alternative but to capitulate to the *Rada*. On 17 July, in the presence of Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, the existence of 'the General Secretariat' was proclaimed and legalized. 721 642

The disaster at the Front was followed during July by the outbreak of riots and disorders in the interior of Russia. The Soviets openly declared themselves against the Provisional Government, while the Bolshevik faction, after the arrival of Lenin, began to gain strength and made their first attempt to gain power by armed insurrection. 669

The *Rada* began to concentrate what Ukrainian military elements it was able to attract round Kiev; two regiments, named respectively 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky' and 'Polubotok', were in process of formation. Both regiments consisted of undisciplined and disorderly deserters and mutineers. An attempt by the Russian Command to send the 'Ukrainian Regiments' to the Front provoked a real mutiny in the ranks of the 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment', who considered their presence in Kiev 'for the protection of the *Rada*' more necessary than in the firing line. After an encounter at the Central Railway Station at Kiev with a squadron of the Cuirassiers of the Guard, the Ukrainian troops surrendered and were deprived of their weapons. 642 669

Petrograd in the meantime was rejoicing over the suppression of the Bolshevik rising; Lenin had fled to Finland.

This success of the Provisional Government tended to calm both troubled and conspiratorial minds and, under the influence of the German offensive which had begun and which threatened both Kiev and Petrograd, the ministers of the Kerenski Government adopted a firmer attitude in their discussions with the representatives of the *Rada*, who had come to Petrograd to discuss the terms of the Statute which was to regulate the position of the Ukraine. Instead of the Statute only new 'instructions' to the General Secretariat were conceded. The territory of the Ukraine was to consist now of only five Governments: three on the right and two on the left bank of the Dniepr. The Government of Kharkov and the three New Russian Governments were excluded, although the delegates had tried to insist that, in addition to the nine Governments already claimed, Bessarabia and the greater parts of the Governments of Kursk and Voronezh should also form part of the Ukraine. 642 634

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the two factions of the OUN were unable to penetrate institutional channels, it was sometimes possible for nationalist groups limited to specific localities to do so. No appraisal of the strength of nationalism in the East Ukraine during 1941–43 would be complete without an examination of this penetration of the institutional framework by nationalists. In such an examination it is essential to proceed with great caution, for it is all too easy for adherents of Ukrainian nationalist groups to ascribe in retrospect an exaggerated importance to their influence during the years of occupation. It would be tedious to describe the complicated and frequently unsatisfying ways in which the element of fact in inflated postwar accounts has been sought. Suffice it to say at this point that the basic approach has been the testing of the details of proper names, place names, and dates contained in each narration (whether in the form of printed memoir or oral testimony) against the abundant but superficial material contained in the Ukrainian press during the war years. In addition, the available wartime underground publications and German reports have been utilized. In this fashion, at least the extent of the real acquaintance of the narrator with the area he describes can be estimated, and frequently the validity of his assessment of the role of persons and events can be surmised by reading between the lines of descriptions published legally—but with a trace of "Aesopian" language—during the war.

668* 127

Primary targets for the efforts of nationalist elements in their campaign to win access to the East Ukrainian masses were the administrative apparatuses existing at the local level throughout the area of German occupation. The general outline of the machinery of government established by the Nazi regime in the occupied eastern territories has been described, and the policy of the officials in charge traced. The ruthless policy pursued made open activity of the OUN groups impossible, and their failure to understand this fact in time resulted in the slaughter of many of their adherents. The extent to which nationalist administrative officials could survive in the capital has already been indicated, however, and what was true of Kiev was true to a more marked degree of many of the smaller centers of the Ukraine. In spite

[668*] 721 634

727 of the determined efforts of Erich Koch and his cohorts to bring
634 every aspect of life under their control, the sheer extent of the Ukraine and the size of its population prevented complete success. For example, in the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev, there were only five hundred Germans on the administrative staff, charged with governing a population of 1,920,000, in an area of nearly seventeen thousand square miles.[3]

171 The limitations on control arising from the small number of
634 German personnel available were made yet narrower by the
727 language barrier. The extent to which the Wehrmacht was dependent on nationalists as interpreters has already been described. Since few Reichskommissariat officials knew the Slavic languages and yet in general rejected the use of émigrés or West Ukrainians as aides, they were thrown back on local interpreters and assistants as intermediaries between themselves and the masses. Supposedly
626 reliable persons, often ethnic Germans, were employed. These
634 physical limitations, however, compelled the German officials to
727 concentrate on keeping the "commanding heights" of the administration—economic controls, armed force, and means of communication—in their hands, while turning over most other aspects of public affairs to administrators drawn from the native population. In these fields they could lay down policy and occasionally intervene brutally to punish real or fancied violations of their directives. They could play one group against another and thereby secure a check on the development of movements threatening to pass from German control. They could place all aspects of life under a crushing weight of fear and material deprivation. Lacking a body of supporters extending down to the smallest units of society, however, they could not enforce a positive program of indoctrination and—except in an intermittent and incomplete fashion—they could not prevent those who were in contact with the masses of the population from imparting their own ideological tinge to their activities.

634 The physical limitations of German power meant that the
727 local administrative machinery in the East Ukraine was to a large extent left to the inhabitants. Local men were of course especially predominant in the administration of rural areas, but

[3] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, December 2, 1942, p. 1; *Volyn'*, February 25, 1943, p. 4.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

for reasons which will be discussed in the next chapter, little is 34 727
known about their activities in connection with nationalism. The city administrations were more closely supervised by the Germans, but their size prevented them from being completely controlled. In spite of the fact that the populace soon realized that only the shadow of power was permitted the local administrations, the concept of the omnipotence of state control was so well established that even the outer signs of authority behind the nationalist cause were of some importance in winning support for it. Throughout the occupied Ukraine, except for the Donbas, which [191]
was very mixed ethnically, the languages of administration were German and Ukrainian only. Although it is said that the officials who carried on the governmental work in the prescribed language frequently spoke Russian as soon as they had left their desks, and sometimes even wrote their reports and orders in that language,[4] having them translated into Ukrainian, the prestige value of the change was considerable. The same was true of the wide- [186]
spread use of national symbols, which had been forbidden under Soviet rule, such as the trident and the blue and yellow colors; they appeared on the uniforms of the police, as banners decorating the administrative buildings, even on the streetcars. On the other hand, the removal of these symbols, when Russophile elements were introduced into the administration to replace the nationalists, was equally important as a negative token of loss of prestige; the official language, however, always remained [191]
Ukrainian.[5]

Some indication of the influence exerted upon the overt atti- 186
tudes of the inhabitants of the East Ukraine by the apparent ascendancy of Ukrainian nationalism is furnished by nationalities statistics obtained from censuses taken by various city administrations in late 1941 and early 1942,[6] since each citizen was usually

[4] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3.

[5] When the *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* group was arrested, the cultural department of the Kiev city administration was ordered to remove all tridents and Ukrainian flags; see Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 11. In Dniepropetrovsk, the Germans followed up the destruction of the Ukrainian *oblast* administration by removing the trident from the masthead of *Vil'na Ukraïna* (The Free Ukraine), the city's newspaper, and changing its name to *Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta* (Interview 77).

[6] See Appendix.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

In 1910 the revenue receipts from the respective Governments of the Ukraine were as follows: 652

	Roubles.
Volhynia	24,400,000
Podolia	24,300,000
Kiev	128,900,000
Chernigov	18,400,000
Poltava	24,900,000
Kharkov	46,200,000
Yekaterinoslav	37,300,000
Kherson	80,400,000
Taurida	12,800,000
Total	397,600,000

The total revenue of European Russia for the same year was 1,522,800,000 roubles. In the period 1906–10 the revenue showed a good expansion in the Governments of Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, and Kherson. Elsewhere in the Ukraine it appeared to be stationary.

After the Imperial authorities, the *zemstvos* are the most important bodies authorized to raise taxes. 651 652 Their revenue comes from taxes on land, houses, and factory buildings, and from licences for distilleries, 69 per cent. being derived from the land tax. 634 Their expenses are (1) obligatory: local civil administration, upkeep of district roads, bridges, &c., and health service; (2) facultative: public instruction and provision of medical attendance in rural districts. Their functions have gradually spread in a somewhat irregular manner, and vary very much according to the degree of energy shown by the committees. Some have embarked on commercial schemes, such as the installation of telephone systems or trade in agricultural machinery; others perform only the minimum of their duties.

Five Governments of the Ukraine have a *zemstvo* organization, and their budgets of receipts and expenses, which appear to balance exactly, are as follows for the years 1906 and 1910: 652 634

Government.	1906.	1910.
	Roubles.	*Roubles.*
Yekaterinoslav . .	5,210,000	8,241,000
Poltava . . .	6,737,000	8,750,000
Taurida . . .	3,599,000	4,576,000
Kharkov . . .	5,753,000	9,168,000
Kherson . . .	3,808,000	5,542,000

652 634

652 652 Thirty-one towns in the Ukraine have municipal administrations, and can raise taxes and contract loans for purposes similar to those of the *zemstvo* budgets. A considerable debt has been incurred. The towns of Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa have borrowed money for municipal purposes in foreign markets; of a total debt of 53,000,000 roubles, these three towns account for 35,000,000 roubles.

652 652 651 The *mirs* or local communes can also raise some taxes for purely local purposes. Obligatory taxes are levied for local communal administration, provision of granaries for storing food-stuffs, upkeep of local roads on peasant lands, and insurance against fire and inundations. Facultative powers of taxation are in the hands of the *mirs* for the building and maintenance of churches, schools, and hospitals, and other special local needs. There is a great deal of irregularity in the levying and administration of these taxes.

(2) Banking

453 652 The banks of the Ukraine fall into several well-defined groups. In the first place come banks which are State or semi-State institutions. These are the Imperial State Bank, the Land Bank of the Nobility, the Peasants' Land Bank, and the State Savings Bank.

The Imperial State Bank is a Government institution with a wide sphere of activity. It controls the currency and note issue, being the only bank issuing notes. It undertakes general banking and bill broking, besides having close relations with the Treasury for revenue, loan, and other purposes. It makes large loans to private banks; up to 1910 the total amount was £189,000,000. It also advances money on merchandise, principally on

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 68. The superior Soviets of Working People's Deputies have the right to annul decisions and orders of inferior Soviets of Working People's Deputies and of their Executive Committees.

634 Art. 69. The regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments and Administrations of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Art
a General Department
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry
a Department of Public Education
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Department of Roads

and the following Administrations:

a Cinematographic Administration
a Light Industry Administration
a Local Fuel Industry Administration
an Agricultural Administration
a Food Industry Administration
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the Region, the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the Union-Republican Ministries of the Timber Industry, Meat and Dairy Industry, Building Materials Industry, Fish Industry and Textile Industry:

a Department of the Timber Industry
a Department of the Meat and Dairy Industry
a Department of the Building Materials Industry
a Department of the Fish Industry
a Department of the Textile Industry.

[625] Art. 70. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Justice of the Union set up their own administrations under the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies, in accordance with the conditions of the region and on the basis of the laws of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Art. 71. The Departments and Administrations of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the corresponding regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 72. The area Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees carry on their work on the basis of the laws voted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and orders of the Regional Soviet of Workers' Deputies and their Executive Committees.

632 Art. 73. The district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov 21, 1949]

66 Art. 121. Elections of deputies to Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR are held by electoral districts on the following bases:

[34] in elections to regional Soviets - one deputy for every 15,000 to 30,000 of the population, depending upon its size;

[33] in elections to district and area Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population; in a district or area whose population does not exceed 25,000, twenty-five deputies are elected, and in a district or area whose population exceeds 60,000, not more than sixty deputies are elected;

[32] in elections to city Soviets or city district Soviets - one deputy for every 350 to 900 of the population, depending upon its size; in a city or city district whose population does not exceed 12,000, thirty-five deputies are elected;

in elections to the Kiev and Kharkov city Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population;

[23] in elections to village or settlement Soviets - one deputy for every 100 of the population; in a village or settlement whose population does not exceed 1,000, nine deputies are elected, and where the population exceeds 2,500, not more than twenty-five deputies.

The basis of representation for each regional, district, city, village and settlement Soviet of Working People's Deputies is fixed in the "Ordinance Concerning Elections to Regional, District, City, Village and Settlement Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR," within the range of the bases of representation indicated in the present article.

Art. 122. Candidates for elections are nominated according to electoral district.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Art. 123. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time upon decision of the majority of the electors in the manner established by law.

Chapter X. Arms, Flag, Capital

126 Art. 124. The state arms of the Ukrainian SSR are a sickle and hammer of gold in relief, placed crosswise, handles down against a red background in the rays of the rising sun, and surrounded by ears of wheat, which are placed symmetrically, from bottom to top, forming a circle. Between the tops of the ears of wheat is a red star. At the bottom of the wreath are the words, "Ukrainian SSR" on a red band, and at the bottom of the ears of corn the words, "Workers of all Countries United" in the Russian language on the right, and in the Ukrainian language on the left.

Art. 125. The state flag of the Ukrainian SSR is of cloth divided into two horizontal bands of color: the upper band, in red, is two-thirds of the width of the flag, and the lower band, in azure, is one-third of the width of the flag. In the upper part of the flag, about one-third of the distance from the staff, are a hammer and sickle of gold and above them a five-pointed star with a gold border.

The relation of width to length of the flag is 1:2.

Art. 126. The Capital of the Ukrainian SSR is the City of Kiev.

Chapter XI. Procedure for Amending the Constitution

642 Art. 127. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR may be amended only by de-
646 cision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of the Supreme Soviet.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

occupied Lvov, and advanced on Warsaw through Zamość by the same route which the Cossack hordes of Khmelnytsky had followed nearly three centuries before. But the Russians were checked at the gates of Warsaw (15 August), and their subsequent retreat was almost as rapid as their advance and the preceding Polish advance and retreat had been. 721 669

On 12 October an armistice was signed, and in the following year the Peace of Riga was to stabilize conditions on the Russian borderlands for nearly twenty years. Poland retained most of the Ukrainian territory of which she had been in occupation prior to the attack on Kiev—large parts of Volhynia and Polesia as well as about half the area of White Russia. The much disputed Kholm district and all Galicia also remained in Polish hands, although the temporary occupation of these territories had only been authorized by the Paris Conference 'pending the solution of the Russian Question'. As a result of the activities of the tenacious Petlyura and the visionary politicians of the 'Directoria' the Poles received, therefore, about 150,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory and about 5,000,000 Ukrainian-speaking subjects. 728

Simon Petlyura, like so many of the picturesque figures of the Russian Revolution, retired to Paris where, some years later, he was killed by a revolver shot in the Boulevard St Michel. The shot was fired by a young Jew named Schwartzbrod, who stated at his trial that he was taking vengeance on Petlyura for the pogroms committed by the 'Petlyurians'. (8, 9, 10)

§6. THE SOVIETS AND THE GROWTH OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

'The Ukrainian Soviet Republic' had been declared on 18 December 1918 in a proclamation of 'the Military and Revolutionary Committee of the Red Southern Army' signed by Stalin and Rakovski; the proclamation conferred all authority in 'the liberated territory' on 'the Ukrainian workers and the Ukrainian peasants'. On 3 January 1919, the day on which the Red Army entered Kharkov, then still occupied by part of the 1st German Army Corps, a proclamation of 'the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' announced that all authority in the Ukraine was vested in this Committee which had 'the confidence of the working and peasant masses'. This document was signed by the President of the Committee, Manuilsky, and by the following members: Rakovski, Grinko, Zatonsky and Skrypnik. Rakovski was a professional revolutionary, a Bulgarian or Roumanian Jew by origin, 642 669 635

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

642 who had always lived in the *Quartier Latin* in Paris; Zatonsky and
669 Skrypnik were the first Ukrainian politicians to go over to the
635 Bolsheviks.

This same Committee, on 14 February, two or three weeks after the occupation of Kiev, announced the federation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with 'the All-Russian Republic of Workers and Peasants'. Subsequently, on 9 March, 'according to the Revolutionary order' 'the First Ukrainian Congress of Soldiers', Peasants' and Workers' Delegates' was called together. This body received for approval 'the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic'. Seven months had not elapsed before nine-tenths of the territory of this first Ukrainian Soviet Republic had fallen into the hands of the Volunteer Army.

In spite of the ephemeral character of the first Ukrainian Soviet Republic it is worth considering the theoretical basis on which this state was founded, since its structure illustrates Lenin's conceptions as to the treatment of nationalities within the Communist State.

656 Following the November *coup d'état* two documents were
563 published in Russia which had an 'ideological' importance in relation to the formation of national republics. The first was a 'Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the Nations Forming Part of Russia'; it concluded as follows:

'According to the Will of the Congress of Soviets, the Council of People's Commissars has decided to adopt as a foundation for its activities in the question of nationalities the following principles:

(1) The equality and sovereign rights of all the nationalities of Russia;

(2) The right of self-determination of all these nationalities, including the right to form independent states;

(3) The abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations;

(4) The free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.'

The document bears the signature of Dzhugashvili-Stalin, Commissar for Nationalities, and of Ulianov-Lenin, President of the Council of People's Commissars.

The second document is a 'Declaration of the Rights of Oppressed Nationalities', dated 24 January 1918 and approved by the 3rd Congress of All-Russian Soviets. The setting up by this Congress of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was based on the following principles: 'Russia is proclaimed the Republic of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. The Soviet Republic is constituted on the basis of a free union of free

131 constituent autonomous republic, the Moldavian A.S.S.R.[1] On November 1,
[728] 1939, 88,000 square kilometres were added when Western Ukraine, which in 1920 had been annexed by Poland, was re-joined to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

131 Another 21,300 square kilometres were added in June 1940 when
728 Bessarabia (annexed by Rumania in 1918) and Northern Bukovina (another part of Rumania) also were incorporated, making the Ukraine's total area then about 579,000 square kilometres. However, a small decrease occurred in August 1940 when the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. granted the petition of the Moldavian people in Bessarabia to join with a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic to form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war the area of the Ukraine was 575,000 square kilometres (2½ per cent. of the territory of the Soviet Union); and the population was over 40 millions. After the addition of the Transcarpathian region in June 1945, the Ukraine's total area was 587,700 square kilometres; it is approximately the same today. The following table summarizes the changes in the area and population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. from 1939 to June 1941.

● 635 The U.S.S.R. is composed of sixteen Union Soviet Socialist Republics.
642 Within this framework there exist a number of autonomous provinces, national regions and autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. Before August 1940 the Ukrainian S.S.R. included one autonomous republic, the Moldavian A.S.S.R. which was subsequently given full status and became the sixteenth Union Republic. According to Professor Trainin, the Soviet authority on legal questions, the main distinction between autonomous and union republics is that the latter are guaranteed the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. - a right which is not incorporated in the constitutions of the autonomous republics. Another difference regarding status is that whereas in the Soviet of Nationalities (one of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) every Union republic is represented by 25 deputies, the autonomous republic is represented by only 11.

Moldavia

635 648 The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was created on August 2, 1940 by the decree of the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. This Republic consists of a part of the former Moldavian Autonomous S.S. Republic and of a section of Bessarabia incorporated into the Soviet Union. [131 161] The creation of this new Union Republic decreased the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 3,900 square kilometres and a population of 310,000 persons[1].

The Transcarpathian Ukraine[2]

928 In June 1945 an agreement was signed in Moscow between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic that the Transcarpathian Ukraine "...which on the basis of a pact of September 10, 1919, concluded at St.Germain-en-Laye, entered the Czechoslovak Republic with the rank of an Autonomous Republic, will, according to the wish manifested by the population of the Carpatho-Ukraine and on the basis of the friendly agreement of both high contracting parties, unite with its longstanding motherland, the Ukraine, and is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The frontier between Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine, existing since September 29, 1938, will, with modifications described, become the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic..."

Article II of the protocol appended to the Pact said that:

"Persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality living in Czechoslovak territory have the right to opt for Soviet citizenship until January 1, 1946... Czech and Slovak nationals residing or having their permanent domicile in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine have the right to opt for Czechoslovak nationality during the time until January 1, 1946".[3]

131 311 On January 1, 1935, the area of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 12,617 square kilometres. In 1937 about half of this was covered by forests and woods; roughly 239,000 hectares were arable, and about 328,000 hectares were devoted to vineyards, market gardens, and permanent meadows and pastures.

161 As at December 1, 1930, the population of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 725,357, an increase of nearly 121,000 over February 1921.[4]

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1 Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S.Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

2 Called by the Czechs, Sub-Carpathian Rus, or Carpatho-Ukraine.

3 New York Times quoted by Voices of History (1945-46), Gramercy Publishing Company, New York.

4 Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovak Republic, London.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

After the expulsion of the Soviet Forces from Western Ukraine in 1920, the territory, including Eastern Galicia and Lviv, had remained under Polish rule and had been subjected to a policy of Polonization and colonization by a Polish population. There had been during the period between the wars many clashes and much unpleasantness between the two nationalities and the ill will thus generated promised disastrous consequences for Poland in case of a new war. At the same time the Polish domination had never threatened the fundamental forms of Ukrainian social life, as had been the case in the UkSSR; the Ukrainians had a certain representation in the Polish Parliament, and they had been allowed, despite hindrances, to develop their own economic life. With the possible exception of the one district of Boryslav, there was very little Communism among the population, who were well aware of the handicaps under which their brothers in the UkSSR were living. At the same time the Nazi refusal to support the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine in the spring of 1939 had placed them on their guard against the Nazis. 636 503

Thus, when World War II broke out on September 1, 1939, the revolt of the Ukrainians which many Poles expected did not take place. However, the Polish government in the first days arrested and placed in concentration camps many of the Ukrainian leaders but they were freed by the rapid advance of the German forces and the Polish retreat, which forced into Lviv and the neighborhood many thousands of refugees. [661] [726]

On August 23, 1939, when the Nazis and the Soviets signed a non-aggression treaty, it was provided that if Poland were disintegrated, Germany and the USSR would divide the territory 728

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The Ukrainian's individualism is most evident in his attitude to the social order, to the principle of the place of the community in society. He repudiates all forms of communal life which call for strict discipline and absolute obedience, without thinking that such a repudiation may be disastrous for the security of general interests and even, in the long run, for the personal advantage of the individual. His individualism as a social principle regards the individual as an end in himself, while the community is merely the sum or union of individuals and as such is only the means of guaranteeing the welfare of the individual. According to this national viewpoint, society — in Ukrainian "hromada" — is a voluntary union of individuals who, for the moment, are willing to work together for common aims, but who reserve the right to leave the union or even to attack it with every means in their power if they find that it is threatening their personal freedom, or when personal interest is greater than the interest of the community. We find a historical example of this attitude in the well-known military organisation of the Zaporoghian Cossacks, who regarded themselves as independent and free citizens, and only acknowledged their duty towards the community in so far as they considered it essential to the security and welfare of all.

In the history of Ukraine there are only too many cases where an exaggerated individualism prevented the formation of tradition as a supreme factor in building up a state, and where the historical existence of the entire people was at the mercy of conflicting forces which, in the absence of all desire to cooperate, were of necessity detrimental to the future of the state.

The structure of Russian society, called "mir" is diametrically opposed to this; it falls into the other extreme as the intellectual expression of the will of the community which completely absorbs personal independence. The essence and leading principle of the Russian "mir" is the compulsion inherent in the superior agency as the instrument of God's will. All rebellion against this divine compulsion is a grievous sin which the simple Russian cannot be expected to commit. This view was and is the most favorable condition for the birth and development of every absolute regime.

nationalist who lived through the period, describes the former as 186
persons who thought on a "planetary" level, desiring to solve 668*
all the world's problems at once and regarding the claims of national affinity as "parochial." One, his schoolmate, was Volodymyr Zatons'kyi, who was later to become one of the most implacable of Communist officials in the Ukraine. Even before the war, he, according to the writer, refused to have anything to do with Ukrainian cultural activities, like the Prosvita [enlightenment] [575] society in the city of Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamianets-Podils'k), where they were students. Rather, he associated with "foreigners," Russians and Jews, and was rapidly drawn into the revolutionary socialist movement.[20] The basis for a choice in this generation of young intellectuals appears to have been chance, or the psychological make-up of the individual, which was reinforced increasingly by the cumulative impact of associations formed after the initial choice was taken. Thus by the time the revolutionary conflicts drew to a close, the educated classes in the Ukraine were deeply split. Even more divided was the real foundation of any 565
independence movement, the peasants. They—or at least those 668*
who were somewhat more prosperous than the average—had 641
initially welcomed the Ukrainian governments. The increasing impotence of the new regimes and their preoccupation with factional strife and unrealistic programs instead of practical measures caused much indifference or disaffection among the peasants. In the judgment of one of the ablest students of the revolutionary period, however, the Ukrainian peasant preferred a nationalist government to either a Red or a "White" administration supporting a central regime.[21]

That the Communists were victors in the physical struggle is 642
no proof of greater popular support, for much of their strength

[20] Vyktor (Victor) Prykhodko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[21] William H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944). Moreover, one of the best Communist historians of the revolutionary period in the Ukraine, M. G. Rafes, a former adherent of the Jewish Bund, says the "natural" development of the peasants (and workers, especially in the sugar refineries in the small towns) was to "national socialism," "the Ukraine for the Ukrainian peasants," although he of course adds that they were inspired by the "reactionary bourgeois intelligentsia"; see *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine: Evoliutsiia i raskol "Bunda"* (Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine: The Evolution and Division of the "Bund") (Moscow, 1920), p. 8.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

42 Art. 14. The Ukrainian SSR reserves the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Art. 15. The territory of the Ukrainian SSR may not be altered without its consent.

[40] Art. 15a. The Ukrainian SSR has its own Republican military formations.

[49] Art. 15b. The Ukrainian SSR has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

Art. 16. The laws of the USSR are binding within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

[41] Art. 17. Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a citizen of the USSR.
Citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR equal rights with citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

63 Art. 18. The Ukrainian SSR consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Transcarpathian, Zaporozhye, Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltava, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumi, Ternopol, Kharkov, Kherson, Chernigov and Chernovitsi Regions.

Art. 19. The jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, embraces:

a) Adoption of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and control over its observance;

b) Submission of the formation of new regions constituting part of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for confirmation;

c) Establishment of the boundaries, and of the division into districts, of regions;

d) Legislation of the Ukrainian SSR;

e) Maintenance of public order and safeguarding the rights of citizens;

f) Approval of the national-economic plan of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Approval of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR and of the report on its fulfilment;

h) Determination of state and local taxes, imposts and non-tax revenues in conformity with the laws of the USSR;

i) Direction of the fulfilment of the local budgets of the regions;

j) Direction of insurance and savings;

k) Administration of the banks, industrial, agricultural and trading enterprises and organizations subordinate to the Republic, as well as direction of local industry;

l) Control and superintendence of the condition and administration of enterprises subordinate to the Union;

m) Establishment of the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests and waters;

n) Direction of dwelling houses and the municipal economy, dwelling house construction and the modernization of cities and other inhabited places;

o) Road building; direction of local transport and communications;

p) Labour legislation;

q) Direction of social maintenance;

r) Direction of elementary, secondary and higher education;

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

695 Art. 91. In all courts of the Ukrainian SSR cases are heard in public, unless otherwise provided for by law, and the accused is guaranteed the right to be defended by counsel.

695 Art. 92. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

Art. 93. Supreme supervisory power to ensure the strict observance of the law by all Ministries and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by officials and citizens within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR generally, is exercised by the Procurator-General of the USSR directly and also through the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 94. The Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR is appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 95. Regional procurators are appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 96. Area, district and city procurators are appointed by the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR, subject to the approval of the Procurator-General of the USSR, for a term of five years.

Art. 97. The organs of the Procurator's Office perform their functions independently of any local organs whatsoever, being subordinate solely to the Procurator-General of the USSR.

Chapter VIII. Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens

641 461 Art. 98. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment.

Art. 99. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to rest and leisure.

[466] The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the fixing of the working day for factory and office workers at eight hours and the reduction of the working day to seven or six hours for arduous trades and to four hours in workshops where conditions of work are exceptionally arduous; by the institution of annual vacations with full pay for factory and office workers; and by the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest-homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

641 Art. 100. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or disability.

657 This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance of factory and office workers at State expense, free medical service for the working people, and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

871 Art. 101. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to education.

641 This right is ensured by universal compulsory elementary education; by free education up to and including the seventh grade; by the system of State stipends to students who have distinguished themselves in higher educational establishments; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language; and by the organization in the factories, State farms and machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 [562] Art. 102. Women in the Ukrainian SSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life.

The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education and by State protection of the interests of mother and child, State aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers, maternity leave with full pay and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

[563] Art. 103. Equality of rights of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality and also any propagation of racial or national exclusiveness, hatred and contempt - are punishable by law.

[659] Art. 104. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the Ukrainian SSR is separated from the State and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

Art. 105. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed by law:

(a) Freedom of speech;
(b) Freedom of the press;
(c) Freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
(d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

[575] Art. 106. In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are ensured the right to unite in public organizations — trade unions, co-operative associations, youth organizations, sport and defence organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and State.

[694] Art. 107. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

Art. 108. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

Art. 109. The Ukrainian SSR affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 110. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to abide by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, to observe the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

[685] [421] Art. 111. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to safeguard and strengthen public socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperity and culture of all the working people.

Persons committing offences against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.

Art. 112. Universal military service is law.

Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honourable duty of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

[687] Art. 113. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR. Treason to the country — violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the State, espionage — is punishable with all the severity of the law and is the most heinous of crimes.

Chapter IX. The Electoral System

666 Art. 114. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies — of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages — are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

Art. 115. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the Ukrainian SSR who have reached the age of 18, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

[641] Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR who has reached the age of 21, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities may be elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 116. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

[562] Art. 117. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

Art. 118. Citizens serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

Art. 119. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Working People's Deputies from the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of villages and cities to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.

Art. 120. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.

113, 642 Ukraine RD1

[For comparisons of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of January 30, 1937 as amended through November 21, 1949 with other constitutions of the Soviet Union, see 70: American Russian Institute, R1 Soviet Union, category 116.]

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The Different Areas of Ukraine, their Nationality and Political Position

●642 Let us review briefly the political development in the various
177 areas of Ukraine between the two World Wars. Ukrainians
,64 within the Soviet Union were mainly distributed, as we have seen. between the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR) where they had no national rights, and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. By the constitution of July 6th, 1923, Soviet Ukraine is a member of the USSR which adjoined "voluntarily as a member of the union with the formal right to leave it when it likes".

The constitution of Soviet Ukraine was adjusted to that of the USSR. The Congress of Soviets, the Central Executive and its president are the supreme organs of authority. The Council of Commissaries functioned as the Executive Body and it was subject to the authority of the Congress of Soviets and the Central Executive Committee. Three categories of members were comprised in the Council of Ukrainian People's Commissaries: 1. commissaries for agriculture, justice, internal affairs, education, health and social welfare, who acted on their own authority in the provinces under their jurisdiction; 2. "unified" commissaries who had to function according to instructions from the central government, and 3. delegates from the general commissariat of the Union, appointed by different central agencies and dependent on them.

The independence of the various federal republics mainly existed merely on paper, as representatives of the RSFSR were in the majority in the supreme agencies of the USSR. The decisive feature of the organisation was that the composition of all agencies throughout the USSR was regulated by the communist party, which filled all posts with its own members. It, too, was completely centralised and took its orders from the head office of the party in Moscow which it then implemented in the various republics. The expansion of the communist party's function and the limitation of the rights of the individual republics formed the foundation of the growth of the USSR from the very beginning. Numerous amendments to the constitution which

642 177 .64 reached a climax in Stalin's Constitution of December 5th, 1936 helped to liquidate the idea of federation; the principles on which the Soviet Union had been constituted in 1923 were denied, the rights of the federal republics being reduced to a minimum: only 4 Republican People's Commissariats remained (commissariat for education — minus universities; social welfare; local industry; communal management) and all other state functions now fell to the "unified" commissariats of the Central Government (now called unionist - republican). As the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities have, since 1936, been elected by direct and universal franchise, Russian influence gained the upper hand in these corporations, too. It is true that Stalin still recognised the right to leave the Union in principle, but at the same time he publicly stated: "It is obvious that we have no republics who would seriously entertain the idea of leaving the USSR"

While the Central Government was supreme, its relation to the Ukrainian state and nationality underwent numerous and profound changes. At first, communist leaders were inclined to ignore the Ukrainian question. But then they realised that the national movement in Ukraine was an instrument of power and that a respect for minorities was a condition of the growth of bolshevism in countries outside Russia, where the question of nationality had not been solved, the communist party began to display a readiness to make concessions. The educational system of Ukraine was organised, the activity of scientific institutes and the All-Ukrainian Academy in Kyiv supported and Russian officials instructed to learn the Ukrainian language in a short time. Considerable concessions were made to Ukrainian economy and if at the time of the New Economic Plan (NEP 1922-23) centralism was not extinct by any means, it seemed as if a tolerable modus vivendi was emerging.

But in 1929-30 when this system of political economy was liquidated in favor of the first Five Year Plan, there was a complete change. When the collectivist system was introduced it was no longer necessary to pay the respect to Ukrainian peasantry that had hitherto resulted in compromises. From now on,

attention was concentrated on building up a system of social economy within Russia, so that it was no longer necessary to bear in mind national movements in western countries, for the world revolution had been postponed for the meantime. The change in Ukraine took place gradually and in contradiction to public expressions of loyalty. The economic needs of Ukraine were ignored already in the first Five Year Plan, the educational system was restricted and the Academy of Learning came completely under communist influence. Ukrainian officials were replaced by Russians and the standing of Ukraine suffered. Russian, as the language of the Revolution, of Lenin and Stalin, was to be the language of one people which had hitherto used several languages, a fact that had concealed the inner unity that had actually existed. 642 177 .64

This development caused a fresh outbreak of national resistance on the part of the Ukrainians. The movement of the rebels which had at first led to guerilla warfare, ceased about 1921-1922: factors responsible for the cessation of hostilities were the appointment of Ukrainian officials to the administration and the fact that the United Ukrainian Church was tolerated. When this also was forbidden and when the collectivist movement in the country met with the spontaneous resistance of the peasantry, a campaign of terrorism was re-started. "Nationalist" differences appeared even within party organisations: bolshevist dignitaries themselves could not keep clear of the Ukrainian movement. Thus in 1925 Shumskyj, commissary for education in the USSR, a very influential communist, was dismissed; in 1933 Skrypnyk, who held the same office and who was a personal friend of Lenin's, comitted suicide because he was unwilling to confess his "nationalist sins" to the party; his example was followed in 1937 by Lubtshenko, long president of the Council of People's Commissaries, in order not to fall into the hands of the GPU. The number of lesser communist dignitaries who were killed as nationalists or separatists is very great, and still greater is the host of those who did not belong to the communist ranks and who suffered the same fate in the struggle for national rights and political independence. 668

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

country. The Soviets and all sorts of other similar organizations 668
which were supposed to voice the aspirations of 'great masses' had
been organized in the same way. Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, [646]
however, attained their first object, since 'the Ukrainian Conference'
elected from its midst members of 'the Ukrainian *Rada*' which was
to constitute a sort of Parliament for the Ukraine. These events
caused considerable displeasure to the Provisional Government in
Petrograd and it was not long before a struggle developed between
the Provisional Government and the Ukrainian *Rada*.

'Self-determination of nationalities' had always formed part of 668
the moral and political stock-in-trade of the various brands of 642
'liberals', 'democrats' and 'socialists' who composed the Provisional
Government. But the realities of the situation in which they found
themselves imposed on these ideologues a certain moderation in the
application of their super-liberal principles. Harassed on all sides by
self-constituted revolutionary and nationalist groups and factions,
and themselves clinging nervously to the forms of an authority
which was being rapidly dispersed by the cold winds of rising
anarchy, the Provisional Government had recourse to their usual
method of 'persuasion' and they asked the *Rada* to await the end of
the war and the decisions of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

'Persuasion', however, was hopeless with opponents so skilled in
political struggles and intrigue as Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko.
Aware of the weakness of the Petrograd Government, the politicians
of the *Rada* based their tactics on manœuvring for a gradual enlarge-
ment of the powers which they had attributed to themselves, while
they avoided provoking the cabinet of Prince Lvov by premature
demands of too drastic a nature. The *Rada* secured, for instance, the
consent of the Provisional Government to the formation of
Ukrainian national troops. In this case they could appeal to the pre-
cedent which had been created by the formation of Lettish, Georgian
and Armenian national detachments.

Professor Paul Milyukov, a prominent member of the Provisional
Government, describes the relations of Petrograd with the *Rada* in
the following words: 'The Provisional Government was still con-
tinuing to plead with the Ukrainians not to detach themselves from
the Motherland, not to go the fatal way of dividing liberated Russia,
and not to introduce dissensions into the Army at a moment of great
national danger. Weak and devoid of backbone, having itself laid
down its arms, the Government could not but register *post factum*
the triumphs attained by the Ukrainians. Hrushevsky's tactics con-
sisted in proving that "nothing decisive" was taking place. The
fiction that the Government was sanctioning the *Rada's* doings was

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kept up to the end. Summing up all the *pourparlers* one sees how false they were at the core: an enforced fiction on one side and deliberate deception on the other.'

Hrushevsky, according to his own words, put forward only a moderate programme: wide national and territorial autonomy within the Russian Federative Republic; but it was not long before he was shifting his ground and declaring that 'the adherents of an independent Ukraine consent to remain on a common platform with Russians' but that 'the colours of an independent Ukraine would be folded only for a time'.

With the resignations of Milyukov and Guchkov, who were regarded as the firm adversaries of Ukrainian separatism, 'the colours of an independent Ukraine' were duly unfolded. The *Rada* chose from among its members a 'General Secretariat' which was to function as a sort of Ukrainian cabinet. Always in pursuance of their tactics, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko declared that the authority of both the *Rada* and the Secretariat was of a 'purely moral order' and that the organs set up in Kiev were purely 'national organizations'.

Soon, however, Vinnichenko, who had taken upon himself the role of 'Ukrainian Prime Minister', judged that the moment had arrived to proclaim that 'the limits between moral and public legal authority had been effaced' and that 'our moral authority has grown to such an extent as a logical result of events that painlessly, without a struggle, it has transformed itself into the legal rule of a national republic'.

All these manœuvres culminated in the publication of the first 'Universal' of the 'Central *Rada*' on 23 June 1917, according to which the 'Autonomous Ukrainian Republic' came into being, and the 'Central *Rada*' arrogated to itself the right to formulate legislation which would require the sanction of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly only as 'a matter of form'. In this way two authorities came into being claiming sovereign rights in the territory of the Ukraine: the 'moral' authority transformed into the 'legal rule' of the *Rada* on the one side, and on the other the former legitimate authority of the Provisional Government—which was losing ground every day, but which had not completely disappeared.

Under these circumstances several members of the reconstructed cabinet of the Provisional Government hastened to Kiev—Kerenski, Tereshchenko, Nekrasov and Tsereteli. At the time Kerenski was preoccupied with the South-Western Front, where a renewed Russian offensive was to prove to the Allies that the Provisional Government remained faithful to the idea of 'war to a successful end', and it is probable that the *Rada* had chosen this conjunction of

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circumstances to extract the maximum concessions from the harassed liberal leaders who could not risk a political crisis in the rear of the South-Western Army. 668 642

When the offensive ended in catastrophe with a loss of over 100,000 casualties and 47,000 prisoners, the complete demoralization of the Front and the appearance of thousands of fugitives in Kiev, the ministers of the Provisional Government had no alternative but to capitulate to the *Rada*. On 17 July, in the presence of Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, the existence of 'the General Secretariat' was proclaimed and legalized. 721 642

The disaster at the Front was followed during July by the outbreak of riots and disorders in the interior of Russia. The Soviets openly declared themselves against the Provisional Government, while the Bolshevik faction, after the arrival of Lenin, began to gain strength and made their first attempt to gain power by armed insurrection. 669

The *Rada* began to concentrate what Ukrainian military elements it was able to attract round Kiev; two regiments, named respectively 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky' and 'Polubotok', were in process of formation. Both regiments consisted of undisciplined and disorderly deserters and mutineers. An attempt by the Russian Command to send the 'Ukrainian Regiments' to the Front provoked a real mutiny in the ranks of the 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment', who considered their presence in Kiev 'for the protection of the *Rada*' more necessary than in the firing line. After an encounter at the Central Railway Station at Kiev with a squadron of the Cuirassiers of the Guard, the Ukrainian troops surrendered and were deprived of their weapons. 642 669

Petrograd in the meantime was rejoicing over the suppression of the Bolshevik rising; Lenin had fled to Finland.

This success of the Provisional Government tended to calm both troubled and conspiratorial minds and, under the influence of the German offensive which had begun and which threatened both Kiev and Petrograd, the ministers of the Kerenski Government adopted a firmer attitude in their discussions with the representatives of the *Rada*, who had come to Petrograd to discuss the terms of the Statute which was to regulate the position of the Ukraine. Instead of the Statute only new 'instructions' to the General Secretariat were conceded. The territory of the Ukraine was to consist now of only five Governments: three on the right and two on the left bank of the Dniepr. The Government of Kharkov and the three New Russian Governments were excluded, although the delegates had tried to insist that, in addition to the nine Governments already claimed, Bessarabia and the greater parts of the Governments of Kursk and Voronezh should also form part of the Ukraine. 642 634

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Petlyura (who had constituted himself a specialist in military affairs) were resisting fairly well in northern Podolia, but were certainly unable to secure the return of the *Rada* to Kiev. Trotsky's dramatic gesture had, however, simplified the problem. On 17 February the German Government denounced the armistice and ordered the armies of the Eastern Front to begin their advance. It was the only way of breaking the stubbornness of the Bolsheviks and of saving the *Rada* and the peace which it had signed with the promise of a million tons of supplies. (4, 5)

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§3. THE GERMANS IN THE UKRAINE: HETMAN SKOROPADSKY

On 18 February, the German troops, without meeting any resistance, occupied Dvinsk on the road to Petrograd and Lutsk on the road to Kiev.

But it was no easy matter for the Austrians to resume the offensive. The Austro-Hungarian armies had been broken during the first two years of the war in the great battles with the Russians; in 1917 it had only been with German aid that they had succeeded in throwing back the Italians. No danger from without threatened the Habsburg Monarchy, but within the Empire dangers were growing with each day that passed. Hence on 17 February the Vienna Government had informed Berlin that Austro-Hungarian troops would take no part in the renewal of the war on the Eastern Front.

In the meantime, the Poles and Bohemians were in a state of agitation on account of the cession of the Kholm region to the Ukrainians. When the twenty-nine year old 'student' Sevryuk, who had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Czernin and Kühlmann, made his appearance during a session of the Reichsrath on 19 February, Polish and Bohemian deputies met him with hoots and shouts of 'Clear out of here!' The Austro-Hungarian Government was compelled to put forward 'new conditions' in respect of Kholm.

The German troops continued their march through Volhynia in the direction of Kiev, and the Emperor Charles, fearful that the Austrians might fail to secure their share of the promised Ukrainian supplies, changed his mind. On 24 February the Austro-Hungarian divisions on the Eastern Front received the order to advance into the Ukraine. The Austrian decision had, however, already come too late, for on 1 March Kiev was occupied by the Germans and they alone reinstated the *Rada*.

By 3 March the rapid attainment by the Germans of the line Narva-Pskov and their seizure of the districts of Vitebsk, Mohilev

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642 728 and Homel, enabled Lenin to impose what he cynically described as his 'shameful peace' on his colleagues of the Soviets. Clause 6 of the Treaty obliged the Soviet Government 'to conclude peace at once with the Ukrainian People's Republic and to recognize the Treaty of Peace between that State and the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance'.

727 The occupation of the Ukraine was organized on the basis of a special agreement between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Germans left about 500,000 men on the whole of the Eastern Front. Of these, apart from the troops which were stationed in Poland and Lithuania to protect lines of communication, there were about 12 Infantry and 2 Cavalry Divisions occupying the Front against Soviet Russia from Narva to Homel (the 8th and 10th Armies). The remaining 15–16 Infantry and 4 Cavalry Divisions were quartered in the Ukraine (with the exception of a few battalions which were sent to Poti for the protection of the new Georgian Republic from Germany's ally Turkey). The troops in the Ukraine constituted the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* and consisted of the 1st and 20th Army Corps, the 27th (Saxon) and the 22nd and 41st Reserve Corps, together with several independent divisions and detachments. These troops had little in common with the magnificent German armies which had invaded Russia in the first years of the war. The *Heeresgruppe Kiev* contained a veritable mosaic of different battalions—the majority of which consisted of elderly men belonging to Landwehr and Landsturm formations. During the whole period of the German occupation of the Ukraine there was a continuous process of transfer of single battalions and even of small detachments to the Western Front—and this became more noticeable after 8 August, the day which may be said to have marked the turning-point in France. Only the Cavalry Divisions and Artillery approached the standards of the German armies which had formerly been held on the Russian Front. Thus the legend that the military occupation of the Ukraine was 'a mistake', in the sense that important forces were engaged there which might have been decisively employed on the Western Front, seems to be without foundation. Out of all the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* it would have been difficult to select three or four fighting infantry divisions, and less could have been found among the miscellaneous collection of elderly and invalid troops which constituted the so-called 8th and 10th Armies.

The Austro-Hungarian forces in the Ukraine amounted nominally to 250,000 men; but their total in reality was far below this and the number of deserters grew every day.

The Germans from the first began to play the leading role in Kiev.

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728 439 Pest. In April the situation somewhat improved, but it was evident that there was no hope of receiving by the end of July any substantial proportion of the goods which had been stipulated under the Peace Treaty. It became clear that the enthusiastic delegates of the 'Popular Republic' had greatly exaggerated the agricultural wealth of their country. They had had in view 'potential possibilities', but they had quite failed to take into account the actual state of affairs in the spring of 1918. During the whole of the preceding year agrarian disorders had been taking place. The peasants had appropriated lands, and the countryside had been swarming with ex-soldiers who had completely lost their morale and who, although they had quitted the front, had no wish whatever to return to peaceful occupations. Under such conditions the harvest of 1917 had not been gathered as it would have been in normal times; and, furthermore, no one knew to whom what had actually been gathered really belonged. The cattle of the landowners had been in great part slaughtered or driven off when the Red Guards made their appearance in the Ukraine during the winter of 1917; the sugar factories were standing idle. At the same time, the well-to-do peasants had quickly learned to hide their grain and other produce, and they were no more willing to deliver to the Germans than they had been to the Bolsheviks.

As a result of all this, during the whole period of the Occupation, the Germans only succeeded in exporting 9293 wagon-loads of grain; 23,195 wagon-loads of fodder, sugar, cattle, eggs and other products; and 4567 wagon-loads of minerals (coal, manganese)—as a whole 37,000 wagons under the auspices of the *Wirtschaftstelle* and 5000 through 'private initiative'. This tonnage amounted to scarcely a fifth part of what had been expected before 31 July 1918. And even the quantities which Germany succeeded in securing were delivered after the Government of the *Rada* had given place to that of Hetman Skoropadsky, and for the most part during the first three months of the later régime.

[642] 727 The failure of the *Rada* in 'the economic collaboration' with the Germans was the reason for its downfall. When the Germans came into the Ukraine their inspection of stocks of supplies not only revealed the relative scarcity of these stocks but also the chaotic state of Ukrainian economy at that moment. The estates of the landowners had almost completely disappeared, and the peasants had appropriated the land. This action of the agrarian proletariat had, however, received no legal sanction, and the *Rada* had not yet elaborated any land laws. To the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* the practical and not the legal state of affairs was important. Field-Marshal Eichhorn therefore issued an 'Order to the Ukrainian popu-

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727 April 1918. The capital of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' had all the appearance of a big Russian town living an animated and even boisterous life owing to the presence of large numbers of Russian and foreign 'guests'. Except for the names of certain shops which were written up in Ukrainian and the picturesque uniforms of the *Rada* regiments, there was no indication of 'the beginning of a new life'. Ukrainian was only spoken in Government offices and during the sittings of the *Rada*. This official language imported from Galicia was not always easily understood by the inhabitants of Russian Ukraine.

In the environment of the Union of *Khliboroby* and of the fashionable fugitives from the north the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* easily found a convenient person who could be the head of the administration which was to replace the Government of the *Rada*.

General Paul Skoropadsky had the advantage of being a descendant of that amiable and pliable Hetman who had been chosen by Peter the Great to succeed Mazeppa. An officer of the Chevaliers Gardes Regiment, he had distinguished himself during the war, first in command of a Guards Brigade and later of a Guards Division. Of Ukrainian origin and property, he belonged to a wealthy and distinguished family. Furthermore, General Skoropadsky was endowed with the necessary ambition, and had no objection to undertaking an important political role even if it should be a difficult one. He had many connections with the Union of Cornraisers and had established excellent relations with the German Command, which now designated him as their chosen 'Head of the State' when the propitious moment for his elevation should arise.

727 642 [579] That moment arrived when at last the *Rada* learned about the Order issued by Field-Marshal Eichhorn, and peasant riots—provoked by the Order—broke out in the southern parts of the Governments of Kiev and Poltava. The members of the *Rada* were in a state of agitation; not only Petlyura and the extremists were urging opposition to the German measures, but also some of the cabinet ministers—including Lubinsky, that incorrigibly eloquent 'student' of the Congress of Brest-Litovsk. The German Command was well aware of the movement of opinion in the *Rada* and on 24 April they signed a formal agreement with Skoropadsky. Lüdendorff approved the choice of 'a man with whom one can work well' (Lüdendorff, *War Memoirs*, p. 624). On the same day the *Rada* declared the Order of Field-Marshal Eichhorn to be illegal and non-existent. Two days later, during a sitting of the *Rada*, a detachment of German soldiers entered the hall under the command of an officer who gave the abrupt order, 'Hands up!' The outraged deputies were searched for

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arms, after which they were allowed to go home with the exception of a few of their number, including several cabinet ministers, who were arrested on the spot. On the following day, during a meeting of the Union of Cornraisers, Paul Skoropadsky was proclaimed 'Hetman of the Ukraine'. 727 642

Skoropadsky remained Hetman for about seven-and-a-half months and resigned when the Germans were evacuating the Ukraine. Those seven months can be divided into two distinct periods: the first until the middle of August and the second until the end of November. 727 439

During the first period the Germans found that their manœuvre had been crowned with comparative success. In July, particularly, supplies of grain and coal were delivered at a regular and rapid tempo. The Germans, again, succeeded in securing thousands of horses of which they were badly in need, not so much for the cavalry as for the artillery and transport services. In Berlin and Vienna bread reappeared and meat and sugar was to be had in considerable quantities. Skoropadsky's Government turned out to be much more capable than that of the *Rada*, perhaps for the reason that the Hetman did not bother about any ideology whatever. The Foreign Minister, Doroshenko, was not over-burdened with work, but the energetic Minister of the Interior, Igor Kistyakovsky, and the Minister of Commerce, Gutnik, had plenty to do. Berlin and Vienna placed at the disposal of the Government the quantity of Marks necessary to cover the issue of 400,000,000 *karbóvantsi* (about 300,000,000 Marks) issued by the Hetman; and for this reason the *karbóvantsi* enjoyed a greater credit with the people than had the 'paper' of the *Rada*. In the meantime 'a real General', General Ragoza, formerly commanding the 4th Russian Army, undertook the task of organizing the Hetman's army. Not only officers of Ukrainian origin, but officers from all over Russia freely enlisted in it.

The historian of Brest-Litovsk justly remarks that in June 1918 'the Ukraine became for a short time a bourgeois Mecca and thither flocked thousands of refugees from Soviet Russia' (Wheeler-Bennett, p. 323). Kiev rapidly lost even that 'shade of Ukrainism' which it had worn in the *Rada* days. Baron Mumm, the German Minister Resident, was depressed by this aspect of affairs when he wrote to Groener: 'I tried to insist with the President of the Council of Ministers Lizohub that the German Government desires his cabinet to have more of *couleur locale*.' Mumm altogether was not particularly pleased with the *coup d'état*, since the military men had not asked his opinion about it and had not even troubled to let him know before it was accomplished. In another report Mumm suspects the Hetman's Government of being 'pro-Russian', but adds that 'this should 727 642

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727 not be taken too tragically as the Hetman's Government is under my
●642 control and that of the German Staff'. The Austrian Command, which did not like the Hetman on account of his 'independent tone in relation to Vienna', accused Skoropadsky himself of being 'pro-Russian'. Compromising documents were produced from somewhere according to which the Hetman had, in July 1914, denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation, while in July 1917 he was supposed to have spoken of Kiev as a centre of Russian and not of Ukrainian culture. He had also been guilty of advocating the union of all Russian lands in a federal state. The position of the Hetman, however, was then very firm, because he had the sympathy of the military Command who had no interest in the ideological side of the Ukrainian Question.

Baron Mumm and the Austrians were of course very near the truth in their views on Skoropadsky's Government. The Hetman and his cabinet, even if they were Ukrainians by origin, were of less than moderate tendencies in relation to separatism. They only 'tolerated' the separation of Ukraine from Russia while Russia remained in the hands of Lenin and Trotsky. At this time Kiev not only looked forward to the early downfall of the Bolsheviks, but was certain that the excellent relations existing between the Hetman and the German Command was the prelude to German support for the restoration of the Russian Monarchy.

At this time the Ukrainian and Russian conservatives in Kiev were not the only elements who were anticipating a German march on Moscow. The success of the German offensive in France in the spring of 1918 had convinced the Russian factions of the invincibility of the German power. Even Paul Milyukov, the protagonist of the Triple Entente, got into touch with the German Command in Kiev through the Ukrainian Premier Lizohub, who had been a member of the Cadet Party. But the Germans continued to stand where they were, and even the murder of the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Mirbach, did not induce them to expel from Berlin the Soviet representative Joffe, whose staff was at this time propagating
727 Communism in Germany with relative immunity.

Meantime a curious situation had been created on the Don, where the Germans had recognized the Don Cossack *ataman* General Krasnov as head of a separate state. In the north the *ataman* was fighting the Bolsheviks, while on the south he was collaborating with the Volunteer Army in process of formation by General Denikin, who was the favoured protégé of the Entente Powers as the allies of Imperial Russia. Skoropadsky, notwithstanding his dependence on the Germans and the German anxiety to conciliate the Soviet

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Government, managed, with the connivance of German officers, to send some support in men and supplies to Krasnov and, through him, to Denikin. 727

As the summer advanced a serious deterioration took place in conditions in the Ukraine. The German and Austrian troops, weary of the war and in continuous contact with the anarchic and revolutionary incidents of the countryside, were becoming demoralized. After the German disasters on the Western Front at the beginning of August, their mood became mutinous, although it was not until October that open disorders broke out among the German troops in Kharkov, when certain battalions refused transfer to the Western Front.

The German official source (*Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*), published in 1936 with a Preface by Generals Blomberg and von Beck, describes the gradual demoralization of the Occupation troops in the Ukraine. The police functions which fell to the lot of the German troops undermined their morale in the existing situation. Too great temptations existed for soldiers employed in the collection of supplies. 'Illegal commerce and speculation flourished, and it was exceedingly difficult for the military authorities to prevent this on account of the troops being scattered over a vast territory and on account of the necessity of maintaining innumerable small posts. The conduct of isolated German detachments destroyed the prestige of the Occupation troops in the eyes of the local population. Even the authorized trading, the object of which was the despatch of parcels of food to their homes, brought the soldiers into undesirable contact with the population—especially with Jews who had most of this commerce in their hands. Jews were frequently the transmitters of Bolshevik propaganda' (*Rückführung*, pp. 5–6).

The same source gives a gloomy description of the Hetman's Government: 'Unfortunately Hetman Skoropadsky ruled in the Ukraine only with the support of German bayonets. His Government had neither the required authority nor the energy to take drastic measures for restoring law and order in the country. The majority of the population distrusted him on account of his monarchical and pro-Russian tendencies and on account of his support of important landowners. That population stood either for a Republic and friendship with the Entente or simply for the Bolsheviks. The peasants were clamouring most of all for a solution of the agrarian problem, the decision of which the Hetman's Government could not take upon itself. To judge by the beginning made, it was scarcely possible to form a Hetman's army. There were too many officers and too few soldiers—especially too few of those soldiers who later turned out trustworthy' (*ibid.* pp. 8–9). 642

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642 727 Already in the month of April, before the *Rada* fell, peasant risings had flared up in the Governments of Kiev and Poltava in answer to German expeditions in search of supplies. Under Skoropadsky the execution of Eichhorn's Order was carried through in a firmer fashion—with the aid of German detachments; but it was accompanied with extremely dangerous moral consequences, not only for the Occupation troops but also for the Ukrainian Government. In many cases landowners applied to the Hetman for the re-establishment of their rights of property or for the restoration of order in their localities, but the Hetman, who had no trusty police force nor army of his own, had to ask the Occupation authorities for the aid of their troops. This was not refused, since the interest of the landowners coincided with that of the German Command. Among the peasants were many ex-soldiers who had left the Front, but who had taken their rifles with them. Shots were fired sometimes, and harsh reprisals followed on the spot, or at least arrests and military tribunals. There is nothing more perilous for any Government than 'to enforce order' with the aid of foreign soldiers. After two or three months the rural population, including the more prosperous peasants, were unanimous in their hatred of the Hetman and the Germans. Attacks on small German posts guarding railway stations, bridges and depots became more frequent. German soldiers disappeared through shots fired round a corner or the sudden thrust of a knife. These incidents caused fear and anger among the German soldiers—not so much against the local inhabitants as against their own commanders. The Hetman's Government contributed to the 'revolutionizing' of the Ukraine and, indirectly, to that of the Army of Occupation. (6)

727 Eichhorn and Skoropadsky were criticized in some Austro-German circles. The Austrians were displeased in part that a Russian general and not an Austrian Archduke should have been put at the head of the Ukrainian realm. They were also suspicious of ultimate German designs on the Ukraine, since they considered that this territory should properly be regarded as within the sphere of Habsburg policy. On 13 June General Waldstetter wrote in a secret report to Vienna that 'Germany pursues in the Ukraine definite economic and political objectives. She wants to keep for ever a safe way open to Mesopotamia and Arabia through Baku and Persia. The way to the East goes through Kiev, Ekaterinoslav and Sevastopol and from there by sea to Batum and Trebizond.' Somewhat later the Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Occupation troops, General Kraus, reported to his Government: 'On the one hand the German Command is consciously upholding the Mon-

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soldiers were electing Soviets; and on the 11th that an armistice had been signed on the Western Front. 727 668

The question of the evacuation of the German troops immediately arose and it was clear that this would present enormous difficulties. Lvov was seized by Galician Ukrainians; Lublin and Warsaw by the Poles: neither were willing to let troop trains through. From Kiev only one line of railway remained: Kovel-Brest-Litovsk-Belostok.

The news of the crash of the German Front in the West and of the impending evacuation of the Ukraine by the Germans was naturally the signal for a Ukrainian movement directed against the Hetman's Government. On 20 November, during street riots in Kiev, twenty people were killed. A whole Ukrainian Division declared itself against the Hetman and began to march from Konotop on Kiev; it was stopped by German troops. Large bands of 'Reds' appeared near Kharkov. New Russia was swarming with brigands who had armed themselves with what the Austrians had left behind. This was only the beginning.

The principal politicians of the 'National Union' were also on the alert and each of them acted according to his disposition. Vinnichenko formed a 'Directoria' of five members from the different Ukrainian Socialist parties, while Petlyura hastened to Belaya Tserkov, where he easily raised a mutiny against the Hetman in the crack regiment which had been christened with the romantic name of 'The Zaporogian Sech Rifles' and which had been recruited largely out of the Russian war prisoners from Rastatt who had been given the 'special education in the Ukrainian spirit'.

§ 4. *DIE RÜCKFÜHRUNG DES OSTHEERES*

Between Petlyura and Vinnichenko dissensions immediately arose not only on questions of principle: they were personal enemies. Vinnichenko wanted the Ukraine to be proclaimed a 'State of Workers and Peasants', but not subject to Moscow. Petlyura turned out to be a politician of a more practical turn of mind: he understood well enough that it would not be long before the Moscow Soviets would swallow up Vinnichenko's Ukraine. He also understood that it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to conciliate the sympathy and interest of the Entente powers if the Ukrainian nationalists were to gain sufficient time to establish any sort of stable régime. Petlyura was not a bad organizer and his firmness made him popular with the soldiers. Therefore he was the master of the situation. 642●

Partly in consequence of Petlyura's 'Universal' and partly in response to Vinnichenko's proclamations which were plastered all over 669

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669 the Ukraine—even in the streets of the Hetman's capital, but most of all because of the peasants' overwhelming desire 'to get rid of the Germans', armed groups and detachments appeared everywhere. These bodies paid no particular heed to the self-appropriated authority of the 'Directoria' but obeyed their improvised *atamans* and 'colonels'.

642 Skoropadsky could not help realizing that his position had suddenly become desperate. His cabinet was powerless in every respect, and the last hope that remained was to get into touch with the victors in the war through the leaders of the 'White' Volunteer Army to which they were according their support. General Denikin had already issued an Order to the Volunteer Army in which he proclaimed that he assumed command 'of all the forces in the South of Russia'. This Order of course was intended to apply to 'the armed forces' in the Crimea and the Ukraine, and it was inferred that the thousands of Russian officers in Kiev and Odessa were now under the command of General Denikin's unofficial representative in Kiev, General Lomnovski. A 'South Russian Centre' consisting of several conservative professors and fugitive politicians who were all hoping and working for a united Russia was set up in Kiev. The trouble was, however, that neither the officers nor the politicians were able to protect the Hetman against the rising anger of the armed peasantry. The Volunteer Army was far away in Rostov-on-Don and the northern Caucasus and the Allied forces in Roumania were no nearer to the scared remnants of Skoropadsky's class régime in Kiev. In Odessa, it is true, the French Consul Hainnot soon made his appearance as the representative of the victorious Entente. He came in touch with Prince Dolgoruki, the Commander-in-Chief of the Hetman's troops, and promised him the speedy intervention of French forces in the Ukraine. At the same time Hainnot warned the German Command in Kiev that any leniency on their part towards the mutinous Ukrainian elements, 'especially any sort of agreement with them, would not be tolerated'. Hainnot went on to threaten the Germans with reprisals 'should any arms or munitions be given to the Ukrainians or if Kiev were surrendered to them' (*Rückführung*, p. 40). The French Consul, however, had no force at his disposal, and his promises and threats were made on his own initiative and on the advice of his Russian friends rather than as the result of instructions from his Government.

Skoropadsky and all the Russians in Kiev found themselves, as before, defended only by German bayonets. To make the situation still more paradoxical these German bayonets were now as a matter of fact at the disposal of the German 'Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies'

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which had been set up in Kiev and which openly sympathized with the Bolsheviks. Finally, on 28 November 1918, Skoropadsky, gambling on Hainnot's promises and on the understanding between the Entente and the Volunteer Army, issued a proclamation in which he declared the Ukraine to be a part of 'the great Russian realm'. He was too late to save either himself or the conservative interest in Kiev. 642

Ukrainian detachments were approaching Kiev from all sides. As early as 15–20 November all sorts of *atamans* and 'colonels' had occupied Kharkov and Poltava and even Rovno to the west of Kiev. On 19 November remnants of the army which remained loyal to the Hetman were defeated at Vasilkov by the 'Petlyurians'. Kiev would have been taken if the Germans had not been ready to defend it. 669 727

Notwithstanding the almost complete collapse of discipline among the troops of the German Occupation, some grounds for collaboration had been found between the Soldiers' Soviets and the Command. 'Only one impulse reigned among the troops, every soldier had only one thought: "Home! Home! Home!—at any price!"' (*Rückführung*, p. 40). The winter had set in, snow had fallen and the horrors of Napoleon's retreat haunted the minds of the Germans. The officers had little difficulty in persuading the men that it was necessary to hold Kiev for the time being as a centre from which the evacuation could be organized.

But the defence of Kiev and other large towns and important railway junctions by the Germans was interpreted by the population as a continued support of the Hetman. By spreading its propaganda against Skoropadsky the 'Directoria' was exciting the people against the Germans; in fact the association and exploitation of the two hatreds secured the maximum number of adherents for Petlyura. The peasants had many accounts to settle with the Germans, while considerations of a material order were eloquent enough. The rumour circulated that the Germans who were leaving the Ukraine were taking away with them a lot of money and great quantities of goods. There was an overwhelming desire not to allow them to do this and to take away from them all that they had appropriated. A logical development of this train of thought was the decision to deprive the Germans of their weapons and munitions: their artillery and machine-guns, rifles, lorries, carts, horses—and finally even their warm clothing and their money.

Attacks on railway stations began in many districts with the object of preventing the evacuation of the German troops. The German Command soon realized that under such conditions it had become an utter impossibility to organize the evacuation even along the lines

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669 which were still available after the events in Poland: Kiev-Kovel-
727 Brest-Litovsk (for the 20th Army Corps and the 22nd and 27th Reserve Corps); and Bakhmach-Pinsk-Brest-Litovsk (for the 1st Army Corps and the 41st Reserve Corps). It became an absolute necessity to come to an agreement with Petlyura, and such an agreement was concluded on 2 December in Kiev. An 'armistice' was arranged during the duration of which the 'Directoria' undertook to make itself responsible for the organization of transport facilities. But with all the goodwill in the world Petlyura and the members of the 'Directoria' were able to give little real assistance in that direction —and that little only in the immediate neighbourhood of Kiev. In other parts of the Ukraine the struggle against the retreating Germans continued to assume more and more violent forms. In Kharkov *ataman* Barbashev and his staff had to be arrested before the Germans could board the promised train. At the important junctions of Bakhmach and Kasatin, the gangs in control continued to refuse to allow trains to pass through *en route* for Kovel and Homel. 'It was simply by a miracle that, up to 12 December, we succeeded in despatching 126 trains' (*Rückführung*). By this time skirmishes between German detachments and the local population had spread all over the Ukraine.

The numerous Ukrainian bands in Volhynia became a real danger to the Germans. Fighting took place 'with changing luck' in Berdichev, where a Bavarian Brigade beat back successive attacks by strong 'Petlyurian' forces. At the station of Zhmerinka the 'Petlyurians' defeated two Landwehr cavalry regiments with a loss of more than 200 killed and wounded. The disorganized Germans were disarmed and driven away from the railway line in the direction of the Galician frontier. On 7–8 December hot encounters took place for the stations of Sarny, Iskorost and Birzula. The Germans took several thousands of prisoners, but it was difficult to know what to do with them for, if set free, they would join new bands and reappear in a few days.

On 6 December *pourparlers* with Petlyura were renewed, and on the 11th, at the station of Kasatin, a definite agreement was concluded. Petlyura insisted with some reason that if his troops were to obey him it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to return to its capital —Kiev. A peaceful continuation of the German evacuation could only be procured by the immediate surrender of Kiev to the Ukrainians.

●642 The first consequence of the Kasatin Agreement was the resignation of the Hetman and his Government. On 14 December, after a short affair with the remaining troops of the Hetman, the ragged

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bands of the 'Directoria' under the command of Colonel Konovalets entered Kiev. In their wake, on the 19th, arrived the 'Directoria' with Petlyura and Vinnichenko at its head. 642●

During the Kasatin *pourparlers* the German Command had considered it a question of honour to stipulate that the Russian officers and men who were serving the Hetman should be allowed to go free after surrendering their arms. This condition was only partly kept. Some officers, among them General Count Keller, who had tried to organize resistance in the town itself, were shot on the spot. Another five hundred officers were arrested and kept prisoners in the Kiev Museum. Later they were divided into groups and distributed among different prisons; a number of them, under pretext that they had tried to escape, faced firing squads; after 29 December those who remained alive were sent off to Germany (*Rückführung*, p. 52). 669 727

The surrender of Kiev resulted in a change for the better in the conditions of the German evacuation. The Germans had to accept certain limitations on the disposal of military stores: the troops were allowed to take with them only machine-guns for one company in every regiment; guns for three batteries in every artillery regiment, etc. The balance had to be 'delivered to the Ukrainian Army'.

By the end of December the Command of the former *Heeresgruppe Kiev* had migrated first to Kovel and then to Brest-Litovsk. The evacuation was proceeding almost normally, although in some localities the troop trains were attacked and disarmed, and often the Germans could only secure uninterrupted passage by the payment of large sums of money. By the middle of January the bulk of the Army of Occupation had quitted the territory of the Ukraine, and was concentrated in the railway triangle: Brest-Litovsk-Pinsk-Kovel. But troops in left-bank Ukraine were still having a difficult time because the Bolsheviks had appeared there as rivals to the 'Directoria'.

On 9 November, when the first news arrived of the German Revolution, Lenin had denounced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. As a result, both the Ukraine of the Hetman and the Ukraine of the 'Directoria' found themselves in a state of war with the Soviets. The Bolsheviks had adherents enough in left-bank Ukraine and the industrial centres of New Russia: already in November they tried to take Poltava; at Ekaterinoslav, after the Austrians left, the Red Republic was proclaimed; and Soviets were set up in the mining towns of the Donets upon the departure of the Germans. At Kharkov the Staff of the 1st Army Corps and a certain number of German troops remained, but these could not protect the officials of the 'Directoria' when, on 3 January 1919, 8000 armed 'Reds' entered the city. The Germans in Kharkov found themselves in a parlous

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Volunteers in order to continue a joint struggle against the Bolsheviks and, if need be, against the Poles. 669 648

The remnants of the 'Petlyurians' went off into Podolia, where they renewed their brutal pogroms against the Jews. During the latter part of November and December they were decimated by a serious epidemic of black typhus which overtook them in the neighbourhood of Zhmerinka. 642

Having lost his army and almost alone, Petlyura betook himself to the Polish lines, where on 2 December he put his hand to a secret agreement, in the name of the 'Directoria', whereby he abandoned all claims on Galicia and 'recognized' Polish rule over Kholm, Polesia and Western Podolia—regions which were already in occupation of the Polish Army. On 24 December the 'Directoria' ceased to exist and gave over its phantom authority to a 'cabinet' formed by one Isaac Mazeppa, an ex-employee of the Union of Zemstvos.

In the meantime catastrophe had overtaken the Volunteer Army. Having occupied Kiev and Chernigov during September, the 'Whites' had reached Kursk and even Orel by the end of October. Their line was now dangerously extended and the advance succumbed to a sudden flanking attack delivered to the north of Kharkov. A serious defeat at Kromy to the south-west of Orel forced them out of the whole area between Kursk and Kharkov. Their collapse was now even more rapid than their progress had been. Kiev was evacuated, and within a few weeks all the Ukraine, in circumstances which grew more perilous every day. 669

The Volunteer Army had never been popular among the peasantry. During the preceding three years the peasants had lived through an evil nightmare of change and upheaval. They distrusted 'the officers' army' and suspected it, not without reason, of being the instrument whereby 'the former order' would be restored. In many cases the officials hastily appointed by General Denikin had contributed to this distrust by an ill-considered restoration of the rights of property in districts which they had been sent to administer. Though the peasant had never found any benefit from 'the new order' he was stubbornly opposed to a return to 'the old ways'. This frame of mind was the principal cause of the chaos which reigned in the rear of the White Army and it was more conducive to the catastrophe of the autumn of 1919 than either the unfortunate strategy of General Denikin or the superior abilities of the Red Army chiefs.

'The struggle which in 1919 drenched the Ukraine in blood recalled by its cruelties the Cossack risings of the seventeenth

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occupied Lvov, and advanced on Warsaw through Zamość by the same route which the Cossack hordes of Khmelnytsky had followed nearly three centuries before. But the Russians were checked at the gates of Warsaw (15 August), and their subsequent retreat was almost as rapid as their advance and the preceding Polish advance and retreat had been. 721 669

On 12 October an armistice was signed, and in the following year the Peace of Riga was to stabilize conditions on the Russian borderlands for nearly twenty years. Poland retained most of the Ukrainian territory of which she had been in occupation prior to the attack on Kiev—large parts of Volhynia and Polesia as well as about half the area of White Russia. The much disputed Kholm district and all Galicia also remained in Polish hands, although the temporary occupation of these territories had only been authorized by the Paris Conference 'pending the solution of the Russian Question'. As a result of the activities of the tenacious Petlyura and the visionary politicians of the 'Directoria' the Poles received, therefore, about 150,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory and about 5,000,000 Ukrainian-speaking subjects. 728

Simon Petlyura, like so many of the picturesque figures of the Russian Revolution, retired to Paris where, some years later, he was killed by a revolver shot in the Boulevard St Michel. The shot was fired by a young Jew named Schwartzbrod, who stated at his trial that he was taking vengeance on Petlyura for the pogroms committed by the 'Petlyurians'. (8, 9, 10)

§6. THE SOVIETS AND THE GROWTH OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

'The Ukrainian Soviet Republic' had been declared on 18 December 1918 in a proclamation of 'the Military and Revolutionary Committee of the Red Southern Army' signed by Stalin and Rakovski; the proclamation conferred all authority in 'the liberated territory' on 'the Ukrainian workers and the Ukrainian peasants'. On 3 January 1919, the day on which the Red Army entered Kharkov, then still occupied by part of the 1st German Army Corps, a proclamation of 'the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' announced that all authority in the Ukraine was vested in this Committee which had 'the confidence of the working and peasant masses'. This document was signed by the President of the Committee, Manuilsky, and by the following members: Rakovski, Grinko, Zatonsky and Skrypnik. Rakovski was a professional revolutionary, a Bulgarian or Roumanian Jew by origin, 642 669 635

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642 669 635 who had always lived in the *Quartier Latin* in Paris; Zatonsky and Skrypnik were the first Ukrainian politicians to go over to the Bolsheviks.

This same Committee, on 14 February, two or three weeks after the occupation of Kiev, announced the federation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with 'the All-Russian Republic of Workers and Peasants'. Subsequently, on 9 March, 'according to the Revolutionary order' 'the First Ukrainian Congress of Soldiers', Peasants' and Workers' Delegates' was called together. This body received for approval 'the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic'. Seven months had not elapsed before nine-tenths of the territory of this first Ukrainian Soviet Republic had fallen into the hands of the Volunteer Army.

In spite of the ephemeral character of the first Ukrainian Soviet Republic it is worth considering the theoretical basis on which this state was founded, since its structure illustrates Lenin's conceptions as to the treatment of nationalities within the Communist State.

656 563 Following the November *coup d'état* two documents were published in Russia which had an 'ideological' importance in relation to the formation of national republics. The first was a 'Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the Nations Forming Part of Russia'; it concluded as follows:

'According to the Will of the Congress of Soviets, the Council of People's Commissars has decided to adopt as a foundation for its activities in the question of nationalities the following principles:

(1) The equality and sovereign rights of all the nationalities of Russia;

(2) The right of self-determination of all these nationalities, including the right to form independent states;

(3) The abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations;

(4) The free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.'

The document bears the signature of Dzhugashvili-Stalin, Commissar for Nationalities, and of Ulianov-Lenin, President of the Council of People's Commissars.

The second document is a 'Declaration of the Rights of Oppressed Nationalities', dated 24 January 1918 and approved by the 3rd Congress of All-Russian Soviets. The setting up by this Congress of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was based on the following principles: 'Russia is proclaimed the Republic of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. The Soviet Republic is constituted on the basis of a free union of free

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731 conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

656 The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

656 563 669 The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

656 642 The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

668 656 In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

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661 bands in the Ukraine. At the time of the 'purge' he occupied the highest military post in the Ukraine: that of Officer Commanding the Kiev Military District. The drama in the Ukraine did not end with the execution of Yakir; during the years 1935–7 several thousands of persons occupying important posts in the Red Army and in the Soviet administration were arrested and shot or exiled to concentration camps in Siberia and the North of Russia. This whirlwind of arrests and executions even carried away with it Postyshev and Kossior, the former instruments of 'the Revolution against the peasants'.

[701 186] In the meantime the last remnants of the national Ukrainian Army, which had flourished in the years 1923–9, disappeared. Units of the Ukrainian Army, based on the system of 'territorial Divisions' in the Red Army, had been quartered in the Ukraine alongside the troops 'of the Union'. The struggle with the peasantry had made it desirable to abolish the territorial system in the Ukraine as well as in other parts of the Union. The Ukrainian units were broken up and distributed to other parts of the country and their place was taken by regiments recruited in Great Russia. After the execution of the staff of the Kiev Command and the senior personnel of many of the Ukrainian regiments, nothing remained of the Ukrainian Army except the names of certain 'Red' regiments which were retained for the sake of form; but the Ukrainian language continued to be used in units where the rank and file were predominantly of Ukrainian origin.

642 Stalin's Constitution of 1936—which evoked such enthusiasm among European Communists and which was even hailed in the capitalist Press of Western countries as a laudable 'return to democratic institutions' in contrast to the dictatorships of Central Europe—was a cynical accompaniment to the slaughter of so many thousands of Party members which was going on at that time within 'the Soviet Paradise'. Stalin's Constitution marked the final abandonment of the theory that the minority nationalities ranked as equal partners with Great Russia within the Soviet Union. The 'union of different states' was now transformed into one integral state (Paragraph 13: 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a unified state'). According to Paragraph 14 all authority on questions relating to international affairs, the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, the organization of defence and the command of the armed forces, foreign trade, the safety of the state, the management of all banks, all forms of transport, the principles of land distribution, the basis of public instruction, hygiene, and criminal and civil laws, was reposed in the Central Government.

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Section (*c*) of the same Paragraph reserved all questions of finance, including the local budgets of the constituent republics, to the discretion of the Central Government. 642

Paragraph 60 provided that the Parliaments of the Republics could make changes in their respective constitutions, but that these changes must correspond to the spirit of the Constitution of the Union. Under Paragraph 69 the Central Government retained the right to veto any decisions taken by the governments of the local republics. As has already been stated, Stalin did not consider it necessary to deprive the national republics of the illusory right of opting out of the Union. At the same time he not only retained the conception of the Constitution of 1923 which provided for a special representation of the minority nationalities in the central legislature, but his pleasing sense of the ridiculous in regard to the automatic reactions of his admirers in foreign countries induced him to give orders for the members of this body to be elected. In this Chamber of Nationalities the Ukrainians have rather less than 200 representatives out of 574—a figure which corresponds probably to the relative numerical importance of their population in relation to the other nationalities in the Union. Any advantage which might theoretically accrue from this representation is lost at the joint sittings of 'the two Chambers of the Superior Council', when the delegates of the nationalities find themselves in a minority among 1143 of their colleagues.

Stalin would have been but a poor Marxist if he had forgotten that the laws regulating the political existence of the Soviet Ukraine would only correspond to the actual state of things if they expressed 'economic realities'. Though strengthened by the new Constitution of the Union, the link between the Ukraine and Great Russia would still remain only theoretical, in the Marxist view, if the Soviet Government had not succeeded in absorbing the economic life of the Ukraine into that of the rest of the Union and welding out of the two an indestructible whole. (11, 12)

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND ADDITIONS TO CHAPTER VI

(1) *The Austrians and Russians in Galicia*

A full documentation of the Austrian repression of the *Promoskovity* in Galicia is to be found in the Telerhof Almanack published in several series by the Galicians after the war (*Telerhofsky Almanakh*, 1–4, Lvov, 1926–9). 113

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with the period March–November 1917. A series of interesting articles on the subject from the pen of Milyukov has been published recently in the Parisian Russian daily newspaper *Posledniya Novosti* (The Latest News), 19 March–1 April 1939. For the Ukrainian point of view see D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy* (1917–23), Uzhhorod, 1935; Vinnichenko, *Vozrozhdenie Natsii* (The Resurrection of a Nation), vols. I–III, Vienna, 1925. 113

(4) *The Ukrainians at Brest-Litovsk*

A vivid description of the course of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and of the part played by the delegates of the *Rada* is given in the scholarly work of J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*, London, 1938. An Appendix gives the text of the Peace Treaty with the Ukraine, and a valuable Bibliography is included.

The reminiscences of the leading personalities at Brest-Litovsk have been published in English translations: Hoffmann, *War Diaries and Other Papers*, London, 1929; Czernin, *In the World War*, London, 1919; Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk*, London, 1919; *My Life*, London, 1935.

(5) *The First 'Siege' of Kiev by the Bolsheviks*

This 'siege' continued for about ten days—from 30 January to 8 February 1918. The first Bolshevik detachments approached the city from the left bank of the Dniepr. The city is situated on the high right bank and presented a perfect target for the Red artillery. Most of the damage was done by an armoured train mounting naval guns, which destroyed, among other architectural features, the block of flats built by Professor Hrushevsky when he decided to settle in the city. When other Bolshevik detachments and the 'Ukrainian regiments' which had gone over to them appeared on the right bank, further resistance became impossible. The brunt of the defence was borne, not by the supporters of Holubovich and Vinnichenko, but by volunteer detachments consisting of officers, students and even schoolboys; many young lives were lost. 669

(6) *The Austro-German Occupation of the Ukraine and the Régime of Skoropadsky*

Most interesting material is revealed in the documents published by the Soviets in an anonymous book entitled *Krakh Nemetskoy Okkupatsii na Ukraine: Sbornik Dokumentov izdannykh Gosizdatom* (The Crash of the German Occupation in the Ukraine: Collection of Documents published by the State Publishing Organization), Moscow, 1936. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of these documents which fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks after they occupied Kiev (some of the documents are reproduced in facsimile). It will be difficult, however, for the reader to agree with the deductions made by the Soviet editor. He affirms, for instance, that the Occupation troops were unable to deal with the resistance of 'the great popular masses', and that whole German divisions were employed in putting down workmen's strikes and peasant risings. These assertions are not confirmed by any document. In the documents reference is only made to the assassination of 727 642 113

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727 isolated landowners and to the sending of punitive detachments to certain districts.

642 The principal reason for the downfall of the German occupation of the Ukraine was, of course, the defeat of the German Armies on the Western Front. The 8th of August is the date which marks a break in the frame of mind of the German Command in Kiev. This can be noted in the documents published in Germany: *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*, Berlin, 1936.

113 Wheeler-Bennett describes the situation in the Ukraine in these terms: 'The early months of the Skoropadsky regime were marked by a substantial economic revival; the landowners, industrialists and bourgeois being anxious to co-operate with the new government and the agencies of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.... Passive resistance in certain districts was coupled with acts of sabotage in others. In Odessa an aeroplane factory was set on fire, numerous munition dumps were exploded and trains wrecked.'

See also on the same subject: Pierre Brégy and Prince Serge Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, Paris, 1939, pp. 207–8. (Eng. translation, London, 1940.)

(7) *Activities of the Bolshevik 'Peace Delegation' in Kiev*

727 The German authorities were well informed of the subversive activities of the Soviet 'Peace Delegation' in Kiev, but they ignored them—as they ignored the assassination of their Ambassador, Count Mirbach in Moscow, and of their Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Eichhorn in Kiev, in order to avoid the precipitation of a further conflict with the Soviet Government at the moment of crisis on the Western Front. In order to produce incontrovertible proof of the Soviet activities, the Hetman's Minister of the Interior, Igor Kistyanovsky, had recourse to a very original mode of action. With the aid of the Ukrainian police, he arranged 'a brigands' attack on the train in which Rakovski and Manuilsky were returning to Moscow. In order to give reality to the attack 'the brigands' confiscated all the valuables and personal possessions of the two delegates, together with the mass of compromising documents which Kistyanovsky desired to lay hands on and which he afterwards presented to Baron Mumm for perusal. The revelations failed, however, to change the German attitude.

(8) *Revolution and Civil War in the Ukraine*, 1919–20

113 Ukrainian historians of the Revolution and Civil War are often exceedingly biased in their accounts of military operations; see, for instance, Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy*, quoted above. General Denikin, also, cannot set aside his prejudices in writing of the 'Petlyurians' who not infrequently fought on his side against the Soviet forces; see General A. Denikin, *Ocherki Russkoy Smuty* (Sketches of the Russian Trouble), vols. I–V, Berlin, 1925–9.

Much interesting material concerning the Volunteer Army is to be found in the almanack published in Berlin: *Beloe Delo* (The White Cause), vols. I–VI, 1924–7. In the Soviet periodical, *Voyna i Revolutsia* (War and Revolution), 1932–5, many episodes of the fighting against the 'Whites', the 'Petlyurians' and the Poles are described.

For the Anglo-French intervention see James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia*, 1918, Baltimore, 1936.

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CHAPTER ONE

The Background of the Communist Triumph

No idea could be more erroneous than that the triumph of Communism in Ukraine and the destruction of the Ukrainian National Republic, which had declared its independence on January 22, 1918. was the choice of the Ukrainian people themselves. It did not suit their desires or their interests, and the methods which Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin adopted to master Ukraine were essentially the same as those by which the iron curtain has been pushed steadily to the west. Ukraine was the testing ground for the development of the Communist methods of conquest, just as it has been the testing ground for all the Communist methods of control of their helpless satellites.

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From the moment when he arrived in Petrograd in April, 1917, Lenin commenced a policy of disintegration. The collapse of tsarist Russia had destroyed all of the organized forces of law and order throughout the empire, and it was no easy task to restore these in an area where there had not been allowed for centuries a popular government resting upon the will of the people and staffed by experienced democratic administrators. Under such conditions, Lenin's propaganda of self-determination for all the peoples of the empire fell upon ready ears, as did his efforts to promote class conflict on every hand. At the same time his promises to the Great Russians constantly called, under one guise or another, for the restoration of Russian unity even while his talk of internationalism and the Communist International seemed to imply a world Communist regime in which all peoples would be equal. It was this policy of lying and deceiving until the moment for successful armed intervention came that gave him the dominating position.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

642 648 He enjoyed an immense advantage in the fact that the civil war between the Whites and the Reds was largely fought on Ukrainian territory and thus compelled the young Ukrainian government to fight upon two fronts throughout the entire period, while for some time the new republic was forced also to oppose the Poles in the [131] west. Lying as Ukraine did on the shore of the Black Sea, the armed forces of General Denikin, who was heading the effort to create an anti-Communist monolithic Russian government, could only reach Moscow by crossing Ukrainian territory. It was only across Ukrainian territory that the supplies sent to him by the Western nations after the ending of World War I could be delivered and it was his policy to allow no manifestation of Ukrainianism in any form, for he intended to continue that denial of Ukrainian existence that had characterized the old tsarist regime.

His efforts in this direction were aided by the unfortunate failure of the Western democratic powers which had triumphed in the war to understand either the nature of Bolshevism or the desires of the various national movements. At the same time his success was rendered impossible by the refusal of the West to back him in his efforts to restore all or most of the social and political order which had vanished with the abdication of the Tsar.

Thus with the White Russians and the Ukrainians locked in a desperate struggle, the way was open for Lenin to move with relative freedom on his path of disintegration and of conquest. He did not fail to take advantage of every opportunity, and the advances and retreats during the period from 1917 to 1920 and even later were but a preliminary for the later tactics of Communism.

On the other hand it cannot be denied that there existed in Ukraine certain factors which also worked to his advantage. The political and social system prevailing up to 1917 had not given any training in self-government to the Ukrainian people and in the midst of war and revolution they had to start on the most elementary tasks of popular education, while at the same time they corrected fundamental abuses in the economic situation and created and administered a government. Let us, therefore, look briefly at

CHAPTER TWO

The Foundation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

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As the power of the Provisional Government in Petrograd declined and more and more responsibility was assumed by the Central Rada in Kiev, relations between Petrograd and Kiev grew rapidly worse and the conception of Ukrainian independence gained strength in all circles, except among the Russian population of Ukraine. The seizure of power in Petrograd by Lenin could not fail to hasten the progress of separation.

During the summer and autumn of 1917 Lenin had advocated the widest application of the principle of self-determination and encouraged the non-Russian peoples to demand separation from the Provisional Government. He and his friends had hardly come into power, when he showed at once the cynicism and hypocrisy of his entire policy. The Central Rada in Kiev and the vast majority of the soviets in Ukraine repudiated the demand for the confiscation of all property, the expropriation of the land and the turning over of the control of all industry to the workers, although in the Third Universal it did provide for "state control over production in the interests of Ukraine and Russia" and declared that all land not worked directly by the owners was to become the property of the workers. For all intents and purposes, the Third Universal which was issued on November 20, 1917, did its best to separate Ukrainian affairs from Bolshevik control without as yet resorting to a declaration of formal independence.

This produced a very unsatisfactory situation, for the Bolsheviks attacked the efforts of the Secretary of the Rada for Military Affairs to effect an understanding with the old Russian Army

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186 Headquarters at Mohylev and with the other national groups which
642 were rapidly making common cause with the Central Rada in
665 their opposition to the extreme measures of the Petrograd Soviet. The Council of Commissars in Petrograd claimed to speak for the whole of the former Russia in its efforts to make peace with the Germans. When the Rada denied this and approached the other non-Russian peoples, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd formally accused the Rada of withdrawing Ukrainian troops from the front, of disarming Bolshevik units in Ukraine and of allowing the Don Cossack forces to retire to their homeland across Ukrainian territory. On December 17, it hypocritically recognized the right of Ukraine to independence but threatened war on the Rada if it did not meet the conditions of the Council of People's Commissars.

At the same time the Bolsheviks in the Kiev Soviet arranged an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the hope of putting pressure on the Rada. The attempt missed fire for the Congress proved to be under the influence of the anti-Bolshevik parties and adopted resolutions declaring that the Ukrainians had not thrown off the power of the Tsar to accept the domination of the Commissars. The Bolshevik spokesman Zatonsky was unable to make himself heard above the opposition and only 80 members supported the Soviet demands.

As a result of this failure Vasili Shakhray and Zatonsky left Kiev for Kharkiv where they joined a Congress of Soviets largely from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih. There, on December 20, they established a new Ukrainian Rada under Russian Communist control and set up a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were joined by a group of Ukrainian Bolsheviks including Neronovych and George Kotsyubynsky, the son of the well-known Ukrainian author who had been a friend of Gorky.

[701] The so-called Ukrainian army loyal to this new regime was composed almost exclusively of Russian troops and was under the open command of a Russian officer, Michael A. Muravyev. This force occupied Kiev on February 7, 1918 and held the city for about three weeks. Its actions showed clearly the nature of the government. Under the pretext of liberating the Ukrainians from

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the control of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and the Rada, it abolished all Ukrainian newspapers and its disorderly elements not only executed members of the Ukrainian and Russian bourgeoisie but also Ukrainian Communists and radicals who used the Ukrainian language in their hearing. 186 642 665

In the meantime the Bolsheviks had opened negotiations with the Germans in Brest-Litovsk where Trotsky claimed to speak for the entire former Russian Empire. To circumvent this, the Rada formally declared the full independence of Ukraine and sent delegates to the peace conference. As a balance to this, Trotsky introduced into the conference the representatives of this new Ukrainian Soviet Republic who claimed to be the spokesmen for the Ukrainian peasants and proletariat. Their arguments did not convince the Germans and Austrians, who saw greater possibilities of profit by recognizing the Ukrainian National Republic, so as to secure without fighting a large part of the Ukrainian grain supplies. The Ukrainian National Republic signed this agreement with misgivings, for, in fact, it threw the Rada into the power of the Germans and ended all chance of assistance from the Allied democratic powers which had previously regarded Lenin as the tool of the German General Staff. Now, with the conclusion of this peace, they extended their ill-will to the Ukrainian Central Rada. 648 186 642 665 [728]

The immediate result was German assistance to the Rada and the Soviet forces were quickly forced out of Ukraine and back into Great Russian territory. The leaders of the Ukrainian Soviet government were members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and could not raise the question as to whether or not their new state was actually independent, and whether it could be, if it did not have its own Communist Party associated on a par with the Russian Party in the Communist International.

This brief Communist interlude in Ukraine should have been most instructive to both the Allied powers and the Germans, but neither drew the true lessons from it. The Allies, who were still opposed to the principles of Bolshevism and were annoyed by the speeches of Zinovyev and Chicherin, became more friendly disposed to the Russian Whites and gave up their efforts to win through

648 invoking the democratic principles of self-determination the support
186 of any of the non-Russian peoples. The Germans, on the other
642 hand, after aiding the Rada to return, dispersed it on the ground
665 that it was too radical, but when a more conservative regime was set up under Hetman Skoropadsky, they did not give this honest support. They sought only for Ukrainian supplies and by their actions they weakened the power of the Hetman and strengthened discontent against his regime without allowing him to do anything that would weaken the power of the Communists.

The situation became almost ridiculously complicated. Germany, anxious to secure troops for the Western Front, was, by the spring of 1918, at peace with both the Commissars of Moscow and the government of Ukraine. It was therefore opposed to both the White Russians and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Even the Czechoslovaks on their way to Vladivostok, thanks to the negotiations between President Masaryk and Muravyev, were on friendly terms with the Ukrainian Communists and had difficulties with the Ukrainian government and the Germans. As soon as they crossed into the Russian Soviet Republic, they had difficulties with the Russian Communists and the Germans and found their support among a part of the White Russians. It was the same situation as in the far north where the Germans backed the White Finnish forces under Mannerheim against the red Finns who were the favored party of their friend and associate, Moscow. Yet all the time there was no Ukrainian Communist Party, for the Ukrainian Communists owed their prime allegiance to the Russian Communist Party which was, in theory at least, on the opposite side in the general disturbed situation.

To the Communists, as Skrypnyk, Shakhray and George Pyatakov who had played an important role in the Communist occupation of Kiev, this seemed a serious gap and at a meeting in Tahanrih in April they triumphed over the Communists from Katerynoslav who had insisted upon remaining merely a part of the Russian Communist Party. Their victory was of short duration, for when there came an organization meeting in Moscow on July 5, the Russian authorities definitely made it clear that they would not tolerate

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the existence of a Ukrainian Communist Party. Bela Kun warned that in the international civil war that was to be begun, great efforts were to be made not to allow it to assume anything of a national character, but to keep it restricted and fought on class lines. They were also informed that they could in this new struggle have no relations with Mensheviks or any Ukrainian Social Revolutionists or Social Democrats. A few months later Stalin was elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian party as a symbol of the dependence in which the party was to be kept.

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The first people to appreciate fully the dilemma in which the Ukrainian Communists found themselves were the Ukrainian Communist leaders who had established, with Russian help, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were quickly taught that as long as the control of their Party was not in their own hands, they were completely helpless and at the mercy of the Russians.

Shakhray, who had endeavored to argue at Kiev in December, 1917 that the Ukrainian Communists were to be counted as Ukrainians, very soon in Russia became so disgusted that he resigned from the Russian Communist Party and retired to Saratov to establish a Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He criticized the extreme policy of centralization carried on by the Russian Communists.

Along with S. Mazlakh, he published a book entitled *The Wave—What is being done in Ukraine and with Ukraine.* This book, which was often quoted later by Skrypnyk and his associates, was the theoretical basis for Ukrainian Communism. Shakhray tried to foster discontent against the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky by stressing his relations with both the German forces in Ukraine and the White Russian refugees who had taken shelter in that country. He declared that Ukrainian independence could only be consistently won by the Ukrainian Communists, for they, as the Ukrainian proletariat, were the only people who could advocate and carry through a real revolution in view of the treachery of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, he attributed the Communist failure in Ukraine to the fact that the Party was entirely under

648 Russian control and looked at the cause of the Communists through
186 the eyes of the Russian colonists in Ukraine who were, in accord-
642 ance with the Russian imperialistic tradition, working not for
665 Ukraine but for Moscow.

He soon left Saratov for Kuban and here he was captured and killed by the Denikin forces. Mazlakh, who had remained a member of the Russian Communist Party, was later shot by them for nationalism. The third Commissar for War, Neronovych, became disillusioned and on the entrance of German troops into Ukraine he gave up politics but he fell into the hands of the Ukrainian National Army and was shot. Thus, the first attempts of the Russian Communist Party to seize Ukraine and expel the Ukrainian National government ended disastrously and relatively few of the early leaders survived. Most of them paid the penalty for their actions to one of the contending forces, with the Bolsheviks executing then or later the larger number.

During the summer of 1918 while Hetman Skoropadsky remained in power, the chief work which the Communists could hope to do in Ukraine was through their mission in Kiev under the leadership of D. Z. Manuilsky. This was ostensibly engaged in negotiations for a definite peace treaty between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. In reality, Manuilsky was almost openly intriguing with the tacit consent of the Germans who had no desire to see their own position in Moscow jeopardized, as their armies were being driven back on the Western Front. Manuilsky was also able to notice the constant splitting of the leftist Ukrainian parties, which, in their hostility to the policies of the Hetman, tended to move nearer to the Communist position.

The disintegration in both the Social Revolutionist and the Social Democrat ranks became steadily more marked during the summer of 1918. When the German armies collapsed and the Hetman could no longer retain his post, a Directory of five men, including Petlyura and Vynnychenko, set themselves up at the news of the abdication of the German Emperor and they soon recovered Kiev. At the same time the left wing of the Social

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Revolutionists (Borotbisty) refused to recognize the new Directory and drifted rapidly toward the Bolshevik position. 648 186

The Kremlin, sensing the great change in the Ukrainian situation, at once refurbished the idea of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Its real head was now Christian Rakovsky, a Rumanian with Bulgarian citizenship who had never been in Ukraine, but its nominal leaders were Pyatakov and George Kotsyubynsky. These moved from Kursk along the railroad lines into Ukraine at the end of December but Chicherin, in his telegrams to the Directory, categorically denied that the Russians were supporting this movement in any way. He laid all the responsibility upon the Ukrainian Communists. The ruse did not work and finally on January 16, 1919, the Directory, in which Vynnychenko's star was sinking, declared war. 642 665

This was opposed by the left wing of the Social Democrats who were very influential in the Directory. On January 10-12, the two wings definitely parted and the left adopted the name of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Independent) and insisted upon the establishment of a non-Communist Soviet Republic. The right wing, in view of the weakness of the Ukrainian proletariat, advocated instead a Congress of Workers which would include both peasants and the city proletariat. When war actually started, the left wing split again between those who were willing to stand for an independent Ukraine and those who refused to act against Russia under any circumstances. The latter took the name of USDRP (Independent Lefts).

It was not long before the Borotbisty and the USDRP (Independent Lefts) began negotiations for merging. Both were convinced of the superiority of the Soviet form of democratic government and both were convinced that any Communist government would inevitably recognize the essential rights of the Ukrainian people. In this respect they were far more naive than were the leaders of the first Ukrainian Communist regime who had already become completely disillusioned at the contrast between the theories and the practice of Lenin and his associates. They refused to cooperate with Petlyura and the Directory and, in effect, they with-

648 drew from its support a considerable section of the Ukrainian in-
186 tellectuals at a crucial moment.

642 On the other hand, with their own armies they fought against
665 the White Russians of Denikin, because they saw in these merely an attempt to restore the old order. Yet they declined to be included in the organized army of the Directory and by their independent actions they made more difficult the burden of the army commanders. They encouraged the formation in the country of independent military bands which added to the growing chaos. To emphasize their position they again changed their name to the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and constantly sought to ingratiate themselves with the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party which had again succeeded in reoccupying Kiev and in forcing the Directory to flee.

On the other hand, the USDRP (Independents), almost as true admirers of the Soviet system but far more critical of the Russian influence, did merge their forces for the fighting against Denikin with the forces of the Directory. In the summer of 1919, this group, under the influence of the Khmelevtsevs of Kobilyaky in Poltavshchyna, commenced again to review their position. After the death of their leaders in a crossing of the Dnieper and after the defeat of Denikin, they decided to adopt the appellation of Communists and to rename themselves the Ukrainian Communist Party without any additional description title. Thus, they took the name of Ukapisty and as such they dragged on an independent existence for some years, confidently expecting that they would ultimately receive national and international recognition from the Comintern, the Communist International.

This endless splitting and regrouping of the various parties proved a headache to the Directory which was trying to organize the country for defense against both of the Russian invaders. The individual armed forces, acting independently, aided in wrecking the economy and this inspired peasant leaders of various kinds to seek the control of their own native regions. Some of these men proved themselves able, if short-sighted, leaders. Some, as Nestor Makhno, were unadulterated anarchists who saw no need of any

central regime. Others were mere adventurers thrown into prominence by the course of events and willing to shift their principles for the sake of a momentary personal advantage. Others were patriots with no broader vision than their home districts. 648 186 642 665

As a result, throughout 1919 there were some 328 revolts against the extending power of the Russian Communist forces which were fanning out over Ukraine, slaughtering and robbing as they went but still unable to secure a definite control of the villages.

As opposed to this welter of conflicting ideals, the policy of the Russian dominated Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party was simplicity and clarity itself. This supported the paper independence of the Ukrainian Soviet regime and openly avowed its intention of subjugating the country and of exploiting it for the benefit of Moscow. Their purposes were even openly avowed at the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies on March 22, 1919, when Shlikhter, a Ukrainian German and one of the commissars appointed by Moscow to collect grain, declared: "You all remember how Ukraine began to become Soviet; with every day of the advance of the Red Army, we and you felt more easy; the rich grain-producing Ukraine is ours. We have four central military divisions collecting and on them we rest all our hopes. We have a mass of workmen sent in (from Moscow to Ukraine), who know how to search all the Ukrainian villages. We always remember that the eyes of the proletariat of Russia are turned toward Ukraine."

These remarks represented the cynical attitude of Lenin and the Communists. They ignored the statements as to a Ukrainian Soviet Republic that were being made by Lenin and others to woo the various leftist Ukrainian parties. They were safe speeches made to reassure the Great Russians that the Bolsheviks still had a monolithic outlook, even though they were prepared to go to almost any lengths to create a paper regime which would insure and facilitate the plundering of the rich grain-producing Ukraine. They told, more or less, the truth, that was not recognized by the more idealistic theoreticians, that the Ukrainian Communists were, in fact, the dupes and victims of the Moscow regime which cared nothing for the Ukrainian people, or even the Ukrainian proletariat.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

648 186 642 665

By the end of 1919 the Ukrainian Soviet regime was so satisfied with the success of its raiding and collecting parties that it felt able to proclaim an amnesty and to disarm the population completely. To accomplish the latter purpose, new Russian forces were sent into the country, the villages were thoroughly searched and disarmed. The peasants were tiring of the apparently endless exactions of the independent commanders and they turned against many of the patriotic partisan bands and declined to give them further support. This broke the movement and even the alliance of Petlyura with the Poles and the short occupation of Kiev by the combined armies in the spring of 1920 did not suffice to restore the old enthusiasm for the hard-pressed Directory.

By the end of 1920, when the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet delegations met the Poles in Riga in October, 1920, the fighting was nearly over. The Poles signed a treaty of peace without consulting their Ukrainian allies of the Ukrainian National Republic. There was nothing for the forces of the Directory to do but to retire abroad and continue their unsuccessful efforts to secure Western assistance. This was not forthcoming. The French were interested in aggrandizing Poland as a bulwark against Germany; the other allies were openly supporting Denikin through a misinterpreted friendship with the Russian people and there did not seem to be left even a spark of the principles enunicated but a short time before in Wilson's attitude toward self-determination and the rights of people to govern themselves. The struggle was ended and the Ukrainians were left at the mercy of their Russian overlords, now back in a new guise.

471 industry and factories by the workers and they did their best to inflame the workers and peasants against the great landlords and the factory owners and administrators. In this they succeeded admirably and the already low standard of living in the Russian Empire began to drop lower and lower.

Under such conditions it became more and more necessary for the Soviet leaders in Moscow to make renewed efforts to master Ukraine and to inject some apparent vitality into their puppet, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. In this they were finally successful, but even though the Communists came back into Ukraine, they did not venture to destroy the fiction of Ukrainian independence, although they had no intention of allowing it to develop.

642 648 From the moment of its formation and adoption of a Communist Constitution on March 14, 1919, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic declared itself an independent and sovereign state. It was recognized with all due pomp and formality by Lenin, who again stressed it in his *Letters to the Workmen and Peasants of Ukraine* in his efforts to strengthen the opposition to Denikin. The Ukrainian Soviet Government was represented at the Conference in Riga that ended the Soviet-Polish War in the fall of 1920. The travesty was continued when, in December of the same year, Lenin concluded with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic a formal treaty of alliance in which Ukraine, for purposes of defense, graciously handed over to Moscow the commissariats of war, navy, foreign trade, railroads, finances, labor, posts and telegraphs and the Supreme Council of National Economy. It still retained the right to have its own diplomatic representatives in Poland, Germany and Austria, countries which had recognized the Ukrainian National Republic, and there were still preserved Ukrainian military schools to train officers for the Ukrainian army in both Kharkiv, the capital of Soviet Ukraine, and Kiev.

Still all this was merely a sham arrangement, for the bulk of the forces that fought against the Ukrainian National Republic were Russian and they operated with no regard for the feelings even of the Ukrainian Communists. They moved at will over Ukrainian territory, collected supplies at will and shipped them

to Russia and they behaved in every way as if they were in their own territory. 642 648

The key to this enigma[1] is to be found in the fact that the Ukrainian Communist Party was not regarded as an independent Communist Party with a seat in the Comintern, but was merely a branch of the Russian Communist Party. Its officers were therefore appointed at will and changed at the pleasure of the Russian Party. Its discipline and actions were controlled by Moscow and any independent Ukrainian development could be countermanded by a mere word from the centre. By this extremely simple device Lenin could maintain his hold over the Ukrainian Communists, even in the unlikely case that the Comintern was revitalized by the Communist seizure of power in another of the large states. 665

The policy did not fail to arouse criticism, even during the wars, by some of the Ukrainian members of the Party. In 1920, a "fraction of the federalists" was formed under Yu. Lapchynsky with the aid of S. Kirychenko, P. Slynko and E. Kasyanenko. It was naturally dissolved as soon as its importance was recognized, and its leaders were expelled from the Party. They accordingly joined the Ukapisty and only returned when that voluntarily liquidated itself some years later.

There were thus at the moment of the ending of the Civil Wars three Communist Parties in Ukraine, the official KP/b/U, the branch of the Russian Party, the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and the Ukapisty, i.e. the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The Borotbisty were the first to go. They had been formed out of the Left Social Revolutionists and were less sure of their Marxian knowledge but they contained many of the leftist Ukrainian intellectuals who valued the development of Ukrainian culture. The group had been praised by Lenin for its great part in the defeat of Denikin. In the spring of 1920, the proposal was made that they fully join the Ukrainian Branch of the Russian Communist Party. Shumsky and Blakytny led the affirmative. The spokesmen for the opposition were Poloz and Panas Lyubchenko, who was later to be the head of the UkSSR and to commit suicide in 1937. The

1 [sham independence of Ukraine from 1919 on -- Analyst]

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517
Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645]
through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669]
and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642
munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661]
as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423
tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation[1] 369
It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

[1] [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

show profits. The very small shops and plants were in some cases 185
taken back by their former owners when they had survived and any 471
provisions about the use of hired labor were tacitly forgotten in the first flush of the New Economic Policy.

All of these measures were interpreted by the great mass of the Ukrainian people as a recognition of the validity of human experience. There were, of course, keen realists who gave full credence to the declarations of Lenin that the Soviets had never wavered in their objections and were using these concessions only as a means of reviving the life of the country and strengthening their own position. At first this did not seem to be true and it was only as conditions really settled down and a semblance of prosperity returned that it became possible to note the steadily increasing pressure which the government exerted.

In the same way the currency reforms were not without their 185
own influence. In 1923 the government introduced a new cur- 652
rency, the chervonets, which was ostensibly based on a gold stand- 435
ard, to take the place of the old depreciated paper. Nevertheless, the latter was allowed to circulate in the rural districts with the result that its value continued to fall and it became more and more difficult for the peasants to satisfy their needs for manufactured goods which were priced in the new currency. This produced the so-called "scissors," for with the restoration of industry, the value of manufactures continued to rise, while the prices of agricultural products continually fell.

The political system was still not clear. The new regulations 642
were introduced in the Council of Commissars in Moscow and it 665
was emphatically stated that they were for the Russian Soviet 645
Federated Socialist Republic, but Ukraine and also the other Soviet Republics put into practice the same resolutions, often without any decree by the ostensibly independent government.

The key to this enigma lay in the nature of Communist discipline. In theory and on paper the Soviet regime was thoroughly democratic in the broad sense of the word. There was an elaborate scheme of elections to the village and the higher Soviets, and even though this was weighted very heavily to provide increased repre-

[During NEW ECONOMIC POLICY -- Analyst]

642 665 645 sentation for the city proletariat where the Communists felt themselves strongest, it was always possible to defend the system.

Yet this does not tell the full story, for though non-party men were elected to the lower and local Soviets, the number of Communists increased steadily in the higher. These Communists were themselves classified as members of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party and they were bound by party discipline to obey all the instructions given by the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

There was thus, in reality, two governments in both Ukraine and the Russian Republic. There was first the republic government theoretically responsible to the people and thus transmitting the wishes of the people upward, even though the highest republic authorities were the direct appointees of Moscow. There was likewise the domination, more or less veiled, of the Communist Party, a government which only transmitted instructions from the top down. In the early days, and indeed for a considerable period, it is often difficult to determine whether certain measures came into effect because they had been approved by the Council of Commissars in Moscow or because they had the backing of the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party which was a monolithic organization, responsible only to its chiefs. It was in a sense a theoretical question for, by the period of the New Economic Policy, the Council of Commissars, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the control of the Communist International rested in the hands of the same men who functioned in three different capacities but still formed a well-knit body. Even though the legal relations between Ukraine and Russia rested on the vague treaties and agreements made during the period of Militant Communism and the civil wars, the Ukrainian Soviet government could be practically overruled at any moment and on any point on which it disagreed with the wishes of Moscow.

665 Since all non-Communist organizations had been dissolved[1] the only possible opposition could come from the Ukapisty, the Ukrainian Communist Party. This was composed of a small number of brilliant men, confirmed Communists, who insisted upon preserving

[1] [After establishing Ukraine Soviet Republic, 919 - - Analyst]

the independence of the Ukrainian Communist regime in the hope 665
that sooner or later they would be admitted to the Communist International as an independent national Communist Party. They therefore willingly accepted the doctrines of the International, which was little more than the third facet of the ruling block. By 1925 the situation had so far developed that their aspirations for this were definitely checked and even this theoretical opposition was eliminated by compelling the Ukapisty to enter into the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party, or else.

This situation makes clear the relations that existed between 661
Ukraine and Russia during the early years of the New Economic Policy. As agriculture and industry revived in Ukraine, it was suggested that the Ukrainian government send aid to its Communist brothers. That suggestion was a command, and just as the Muscovite bands under Militant Communism scoured Ukraine for food, so under the New Economic Policy, the so-called Ukrainian government began to drain off the wealth of the country for the charitable purpose of helping its Russian brothers.

The vagueness and the ambiguity of this system was partially 631
cleared up by the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty establishing this was signed on December 30, 1922, just as Lenin was becoming paralyzed and unable to function efficiently. It bound together the various Soviet Republics, while at the same time it paid lip service to the right of any of these Republics to secede. Of course, this was from the beginning an empty phrase, for the only people who had the power to declare the secession was the Council of Soviets of the Federal Republic and they were Communists assigned to their posts by Moscow and bound to obey the orders of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In addition to this, a surprising number of the ruling group of the Russian Soviet Republic now took over the corresponding posts in the Union and thus added still a fourth facet to their varied activity.

The Constitution, which was formally adopted at a Union 631
Congress of Soviets on July 6, 1923, went still further in providing 642
for the government of the Union. The Commissariats were divided 645

631 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of
642 Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications,
645 Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent
327 exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that
185 the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

432 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921,
241 which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the
185

656 had profited by the operation of the Ukrainian land code which,
471 as we have seen, was less rigid than were the similar arrangements
661 in the RSFSR, where the land society was organized far more on
[427] the lines of a collective than it was in Ukraine. It was always possible to apply individually any of the laws against the leasing of land or the employment of hired help, for in both cases the provisions had been left vague and indefinite, so that the authorities could act whenever they so desired. As a matter of fact, as one of the first measures the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic reduced the period on which a lease could be made from thirteen to six years and thus it was easily possible to upset many of the calculations that had been made by the richer and more progressive landowners.

At the same time the closing of the official markets rendered
[435] it possible for the government to force the peasants to dispose of their grain at the officially pegged prices which in the grain-growing districts were considerably lower than they were in the less fertile areas of the north. If this did not produce the desired results, it was equally possible to demand the grain tax in kind and to compel the peasants to turn over, free of charge and under the guise of payments, additional supplies. All these measures, which were introduced in many cases personally and not by districts, caused the peasants to feel themselves becoming steadily more impoverished and less able to resist the demands of the government.

631 On the other hand, the All-Union Commissariats which took
● 642 precedence over those in the individual Soviet republics and which were, in reality, staffed only by Russian Communists, effectively broke the power of the localities or of the republics to have any special voice in the management of their own affairs. This was, in its turn, skilfully explained by stressing the superior requirements of the Union which, on any closer analysis, turned out to be the interests of the Russian area. Thus, at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a Russian who was at the time the chief of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission remarked in an unambiguous manner: "It seems to me that we must assign perfectly clear tasks, to emphasize that the national

[1925, during relinquishment of NEP -- Analyst]

republics are to fulfill certain functions in the economic system of 631
our Union, and that on the basis of the fulfillment of a certain 642
mission, which is to be a part of the joint mission—the industrialization of our Union—is to be founded the growth of the economy of the national republics."

In the next few years the sense of these remarks was to become perfectly clear, although it was apparently not noticed even by the more ardent Ukrainian Communists. It was to the effect that the economy of the national republics was to be fitted into the general picture of the Union and that the planning committees were to coordinate their work in such a way that there would be little or no place left for the initiative of the authorities of any republic. This did not require any action by any of the various republican governments, for step by step the central regime in Moscow gradually made more and more of the local Commissariats mere operating agencies under the control of All-Union Commissariats as these were increased in number and in scope by the vote of the Presidium of the Union or by the decisions of the All-Union Communist Party.

In this connection the final liquidation of the Ukapisty as a 665
group in 1925 was significant. They had definitely cherished the hope that sooner or later they would be able to win recognition as a special Ukrainian Communist Party with their own seat in the Communist International. That was now becoming merely a subsidiary organ of the Russian Communist Party and there was no longer any reason for maintaining the fiction of an independent existence. The foreign Communist Parties had definitely sunk to being poor relations of the Russian Party or the All-Union Party. Their representatives were exiles from their native lands under Russian protection and under those conditions they speedily ceased to have any voice in the work of the Comintern, which existed only as a Russian propaganda organ abroad. It was therefore unrealistic for the Ukrainian Communists to build any real hopes on the Comintern or on the building of a separate Ukrainian Communism and the abolition of the Ukapisty was but a formal recognition of this fact.

186 Yet this obvious truth apparently was overlooked by Skrypnyk
631 and, to a lesser extent, even by Khvylovy, who was absorbed in his everwidening discussion of the cultural significance of Ukrainian Communism and the role and mission of the Ukrainian Communists. While these were talking and arguing about certain ideas, the central authorities in Moscow were cleverly laying plans for removing from the field of practical politics and administration the very basis of local government for which they were fighting.

631 In the same way, reform of the administrative divisions was under way with the concealed purpose of changing the boundaries of the local sub-divisions, so that they would have a purely economic basis. This was done by the elimination of the central areas, the *gubernias* and the *okrugs* and the introduction of a two-step system of administration, the *kray* or *oblast* and the *rayon* or region, which was designed on a purely economic purpose and was admirably adapted for the elimination of local and even republic feeling.

By these and other administrative measures the essential features of the New Economic Policy were eliminated but they were done so gradually and locally that a large part of the population only realized the situation when the process was too far advanced to be affected by any scattered protests.

665 At the end of 1927 Trotsky was expelled from the Communist
● 642 Party and this ended the long feud between him and Stalin for the control of the Party. Trotsky had quite consistently fought the New Economic Policy as a needless concession to capitalism and within a few months of his rival's defeat, Stalin reversed his policy and openly adopted a more rigid system of controls similar to those which he had attacked Trotsky for urging.

As a matter of fact the pretext for a distinction between the Soviet government and the Communist Party was wearing thin. It was a needless piece of propaganda, once the regime felt itself sufficiently strong. There was no longer the need of maintaining non-party men in places of apparent authority and with his practical sense, Stalin speedily allowed the system to lapse into the limbo of obscurity and made the Communist Party openly what it was, the dictatorial party dominated directly from Moscow.

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment 642 ●
of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely 631
in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to ad- [475]
minister industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine 423
they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new 474
philosophy[1] looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and 661
determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force 425
them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1] [1927- Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

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The Thirties

631 With the completion of the compulsory collectivization, the
● 642 ending of the famine and the destruction of the Ukrainian cultural renaissance, the country entered a new phase. The position in which it found itself was almost the opposite of the twenties. As, at the end of Militant Communism, the land was ruined and exhausted, so it was again. The number of domestic animals had dropped almost to the level of the earlier period, agriculture had been rendered prostrate, and material well-being had disappeared as the peasants were forced to labor on the collective farms.

On the other hand, there was none of that excitement and desire for work that had accompanied the introduction and development of the New Economic Policy, when the relaxation of the restrictions and the end of the lawlessness of Militant Communism had restored the possibility of profit to the people and when they could hope to see the results of their own labor.

More than that, the earlier period had been marked by the belief of the Ukrainian Communists that they could find an independent place in the Communist International. Then there was a conflict between those who wished a development of Ukrainian ideals and traditions, a union of the old and the new, and those who adopted a strictly Russian point of view. Now there was only one dominating force—the Russian. It had been made clear that there was to be no open antagonism. The Russian point of view was the only one that could hope to find acceptance in Communism, the Communist International had become a mere adjunct of the Russian Communist Party, all Ukrainian sympathies and expressions were banned, and the Ukrainian spirit was forced on the

631 defensive and compelled to fight a rearguard action for maintaining
●642 its existence.

Step by step, Stalin and the Russian Communist Party was changing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into a Russian empire with its non-Russian dependencies and, despite the Constitution of the Union and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, it was becoming ever more and more clear that the latter was to be treated merely as a geographical colony of the new Russian-dominated union, with no attention to its wishes or its needs.[1]

This had been evident from almost the first days of the Five Year Plan. Whatever might have been the original blueprint of this, it early became evident that the Soviet Union could only carry out its work of industrialization and collectivization, if everything were forced into a single plan. In connection with this, the various republic commissariats had been reduced to All-Union commissariats and all independent power of judgment or planning had been removed from the local organs. If it were a question of developing a mine, of building a new factory, of introducing a new and more profitable crop, of constructing a new road or railroad, the authorities of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had to refer the matter to Moscow and receive the permission to act from the central authorities of the Union. How could it be otherwise?

The central government had assumed the responsibility for the development of the country and it could not carry this on, if the local communities or republics had the power to meet any but the most primitive needs without consultation and permission. Moscow had decided how industry was to be developed, which branches were to be built in the RSFSR, which in Ukraine, which in the other republics. That plan was almost absolute and, warned by the fate of the fallen Communist leaders, the new successors were ultra-cautious in venturing to express an opinion.

[625] The OGPU had been remodelled into the NKVD, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but this was placed under the same Yagoda who had been the head of the OGPU and he merely assumed greater powers and greater responsibilities for the safeguarding of the Soviet order.

[1] [1930's - After famine -- Analyst]

369 They could also, if they still had preserved any valuables, dispose
511 of them through the Torgsin stores which sold imported wares for foreign currency and precious metals.

[554] Of course, neither in city or village did any of these restrictions apply to the more important Communists who possessed their own stores at which the government supplied them with the necessary articles to allow them to live in comfort and luxury as a welcome investment for the regime. The line of demarcation between the poor and the rich, the ordinary people and the Communists, became steadily greater, until it was often wider than it had been in the old tsarist Russian empire.

642 All these measures which had been adopted in Moscow were
631 in theory supposed to apply to all sections of the USSR equally, but it was not long before the natives of Ukraine realized that however impartial the laws might seem, they were not sufficiently flexible to take account of local and republican differences. The central regime was interested in advancing and developing the Moscow industrial area and it expended on this in various grandiose efforts, as the Moscow subway, enormous sums of money. It is safe to say that the expenditures in that one area alone equalled the entire budget and money spent by the central government in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It classified Ukraine as one of the regions where the supply of manufactured goods was less necessary.

The crushing of the Ukrainian Communists, the suicide of Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, no less than the complete altering of the land code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the substitution of the new policy of collectivization, showed perfectly well where the real power of the USSR lay in the thirties and it was accompanied by such acts as the introduction of Russian as the
[701] standard language of instruction and of the army. This was followed by the formal transfer of the Ukrainian divisions to the Red Army and a number of other acts which completed the subordination of the UkSSR. Already in 1930, during difficulties on the Soviet-Manchuria borders, the Red Army had not hesitated to

1 [after 1933 - measures dealing with production, supply etc. --illegible]

greet the Communist Party with news of its victories and allowed 631
this even to take precedence over a notice to the Soviet govern- 642
ment which had hitherto claimed to be predominant.

To regularize all these changes of practice, Stalin ordered a new constitution and this was approved on December 5, 1936. It was a marvel of inconsistencies, for it was drawn up to express all of the old slogans and the modern facts.

Here was, in Article 17, the old talk of the right of free withdrawal of any Union Republic from the USSR but there was also a provision that the Supreme Soviet could annul any action of any Union Republic contrary to its wishes. There was a careful definition of the three classes of Commissariats but when the book is read critically it is easily seen that the only subjects within the competence of the Union Republics were Education, Local Industry, Communal Economy and Social Security and their decisions could legally be upset by Moscow. Article 15 provided for almost full independence, subject to Article 14, which made the Presidium of the Moscow Communist Party and of the USSR the almost undisputed master of the Union Republics, and Art. XIII, read in conjunction with this, made it possible for the Presidium to amend or change any article of the entire Constitution.

Along with all the democratic phrases in many articles was the confirmation of the unified state budget and the provision that any act of any subordinate Soviet could be easily nullified.

At the moment the democratic nations of the west were so preoccupied with the threat offered by the Nazis that they were thinking only of efforts to make a common popular front with the Soviets. They found a convenient possibility in the new Constitution and they were little disposed to pay any attention to all those phrases which formally and almost explicitly nullified all that they wished to see.

Thus, the legal basis was provided for the extension of the power of the Moscow government. Once the new Constitution was adopted and in force, the last rights of the Union Republics were nullified *de jure* as well as *de facto* and the central government was

631 given a free hand in its work of bending all the Union Republics to
642 its will. The stamp of state approval was set upon the new system of administration and with that accomplished, there was small reason why the regime should not go further with its work of russification and unification.

CHAPTER TWENTY

The German Attack on the Soviets

During the period from 1939 to 1941, the German 648
policy toward those Ukrainians who had escaped from the Soviet 563
occupation into the Polish Government General was not too severe. It was possible for the Ukrainians in Krakow and elsewhere to carry on a considerable amount of educational work, to form themselves into relief organizations and, in general, to work for the establishment of normal relations.

When the breach between the two totalitarian states came on 721
June 22, 1941, the Germans pushed ahead rapidly not only in the Baltic area but also in Ukraine. By June 30, they had occupied Lviv with the aid of some Ukrainian units, both from Carpatho-Ukraine and from Galicia.

During these days the Ukrainians had high hopes that the Germans would seriously liberate them from Bolshevik tyranny and wherever they had the slightest possibility, they endeavored to seize the cities so as to put a stop to the massacres which the Communists were perpetrating before they fell back. In some places they were successful but in Lviv, the Communists killed over [661]
10,000 prisoners, before their bloody regime could be brought to an end.

In the first days of the war, although there were no clear 642
promises made to the Ukrainians, the impression grew that there would be established some form of a Ukrainian administration. The political leaders set up a Ukrainian government and appointed Yaroslav Stetsko as the first head of the state on June 30, 1941. A short time later this was broadened by the appointment of a Committee of Seniors under the leadership of Dr. Kost Levytsky, who had been the Prime Minister of the Republic of Western

642 Ukraine in 1918. These developments had the support of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, although he knew that they did not yet rest on organized public sentiment.

It was well recognized by the influential Ukrainians that the situation was very different from what it had been at the end of the Hapsburg monarchy, but they went through the motions of setting up a government on the possibility that the Germans would allow them some real concessions and that it would be mutually advantageous to be already prepared for all eventualities.

721 648 It is perhaps possible that a part of the German armed forces looked with a certain toleration at these developments, for at least a part of the officer class realized that the task of the German government would be greatly facilitated, if they were able to normalize the situation and win some support from the population, as they had in the Polish Government General. This did not suit the Nazi element who believed that the advance of the German [661] forces was only to secure more *Lebensraum* for Germany. This faction struck and struck hard at the new regime and secured the arrest of Stetsko, Levytsky, Bandera and Melnyk, all of whom were taken to prison in Germany where they were kept for nearly four years.

The arrest of the leaders, while it was a crushing blow, still was not completely fatal. The advance of the German troops was so rapid on the way to Kiev that the Ukrainian leaders continued for some months to inspire the population not to resist the Germans, the more so as the western regiments of the Red Army surrendered in large masses. Thus when Kiev fell, some 675,000 of the Red Army surrendered with scarcely a blow.

On the other hand, the Soviets attempted to devastate the country before they withdrew, shooting the Ukrainian intelligentsia indiscriminately and trying to seize as many as they could for evacuation beyond the Urals. They demolished factories, tried to remove finished articles and mined the cities before they abandoned them. Then, when they exploded the mines, they spread the story that the total work of demolition had been carried on by the Germans.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Ukraine After World War II

At the conclusion of World War II, Stalin and the officials 000
of the USSR were ready for the next step. They had satisfactorily fooled the Western powers, they had entered the UkSSR and the Byelorussian SSR in the United Nations and they had secured from the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the British Commonwealth of Nations the right to return (by force, if necessary) persons with USSR citizenship. They had decorated the Allied leaders with medals commemorating the Russian conquerors of the past and they were ready to move ahead. They were sure that no one would care to ask about the fate of the unfortunate victims of the German slave camps because every American and Western civil or military authority of high rank had become convinced of the humaneness of Stalin and his group.

The Ukraine had been thoroughly devastated, as we have seen. 433
Its factories and its fields had been laid waste. That part of its 642
machinery which had not been wantonly destroyed by one of the 727
two contesting invaders had been carted to work outside of the UkSSR. But even so, Ukraine was not quiet.

The population, even that part which had been more favorably disposed to the Soviets because of the persecution by the Nazis, had hoped that with the return of peace and the Soviet victory there might be an improvement in living conditions, an increase of consumer goods, a relaxation of some of the austerity that had marked the years before 1941. They were almost at once to be disillusioned, for they very soon found that out of the scanty stores of food which they had preserved from the greedy Nazis they were supposed to make generous gifts for the benefit of Stalin and the elder

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
●642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.
727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "warmongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representa-
[701] tive in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

and the other non-Russian peoples that were conquered by the tsars, reconquered by the Soviets and now in the name of Great Russian Communism subjected to a new period of russification. 000

At the same time, there is no new evidence that the regime of Malenkov is any more tolerant of the national differences or feelings of the non-Russian peoples than was the previous regime. The steady rise in influence of Khrushchov suggests the opposite and a still greater pressure upon Ukraine.

Since World War II, the attitude of the Kremlin toward the Ukrainians has perceptibly hardened. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a member of the United Nations. It has its own government, its own flag, its own national anthem. Yet, by the orders of the Kremlin, no diplomat from outside the iron curtain is admitted to its capital of Kiev. Its government conducts all of its affairs through Moscow. 642 631

The Ukrainians are to-day the slaves of Moscow in their own country. They are liable to be deported across its boundaries at any moment and their places taken by Russians or persons from anywhere within the Soviet orbit. They are compelled to think Russian thoughts, to interpret their past, their present and their future in terms acceptable to their elder brothers, the Great Russians. The slightest deviation from that path is met with the grim charge of bourgeois nationalism, the gravest offence in the entire list of crimes.

That same process in earlier stages is taking place in all the Soviet satellites. Step by step, the culture of the other countries is being remodelled on the Russian Soviet pattern. The Russian language is being introduced and forced into the dominant place. Step by step, their national traditions are being spurned, corrupted and altered, so that they will be worthy members of the Soviet Union under Russian Communist leadership. Their contacts with the outside world are being cut off, while the Moscow radio blares out day and night the statements that the Russians are the friends of peace while the nations outside are warmongers and imperialists. 000

We might be tempted to believe that Moscow is right but we

in 1917, through the instrumentality of the soviets, to draw the villager into the revolutionary movement. At this point the Communists encountered the opposition of the Ukrainian nationalists. In the confusion and disorganization following the overthrow of the tsar in March, the Ukrainian nationalists had been able to pass from the stage of a quasi-legal group of parties, intent primarily on arousing an attachment to cultural nationalism, to a real, if shaky, political force. From the spring of 1917 to the summer of 1920, this force, though now no longer representing a single "movement," was able to maintain a series of Ukrainian governments on the soil of the Ukraine.

It is no purpose of this study to detail the nature of these governments which have been described elsewhere in comprehensive fashion.[17] For future reference, however, it is necessary at least to list them. The first, formed in April, 1917, was known as the Ukrainian Central Rada (*rada* means council and is the equivalent of the Russian word *soviet*), but during the first months of its activity it was really a semiautonomous administrative organ admitting the supremacy of the Provisional Government in Petrograd. Democratic and strongly socialist in its ideology, the Rada was the creation of the leftist intellectual groups which had predominated in the national movement before the war. It declared Ukrainian independence in January, 1918, but when it collided with the demands of the Germans, who occupied the Ukraine in February, 1918, the Rada was ousted. It was replaced by a quasi-monarchial regime under a member of the landowning aristocracy, Paul Skoropads'kyi, a descendant of a *het'man* or chieftain of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. After the armistice of November, 1918, this government, no longer supported by German troops, fell, and was replaced by a new regime, known as the Ukrainian People's Republic (Ukraïns'ka Narodna Respublika—UNR). This government lasted nearly two years, but was subject to extreme vicissitudes because of the strength of the Communist effort to conquer the Ukraine, attempts of the White anti-Bolshevik armies to reincorporate it in Russia, and the desire of Poland to extend her sphere of influence to the Dnieper. The administration, known as the "Directory," soon came under the

[17] Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution.*

The administration, known as the "Directory", soon came under the control of its most forceful member, Simon Petliura, who, through his military command, acquired such fame in this period that among the less educated elements of the Ukrainian population his name has since been synonymous with the struggle for national independence.

Because they represented a measure of stability, the successive Ukrainian governments attracted the support of many persons who desired a regime independent of Communism. To be sure, many persons in the Ukraine who desired the establishment of a firm authority supported the conservative military commands of Denikin and Wrangel, the White generals. Before the latter became prominent, however, the equally conservative authority of the Het'man attracted the support of a considerable section of the upper classes of the tsarist society, including a number of military officers.[18] Once they had accepted the idea of an independent Ukraine, several of the officers, like Generals Vsevolod Petriv and Michael Omelianovych-Pavlenko, remained adherents of the nationalist Ukrainian regime which succeeded Skoropads'kyi, and were of valuable assistance because of their professional skill.[19] On the other hand, except for Skoropads'kyi's group, the leadership of Ukrainian nationalism remained predominantly in the hands of intellectuals throughout the revolutionary period, and even many of the Het'man's followers were writers and scholars. The educated youth of the Ukraine was divided between those who desired to join in the Bolshevik movement and those who chose the way of a left-wing nationalism. Victor Prykhod'ko, a

[1918–1920 -- Analyst]

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 158–59.

[19] The biographies of these officers are extremely interesting because of the light they throw on the process of Ukrainization of tsarist aristocrats. Thus General Petriv had more Norwegian and Finnish than Ukrainian ancestry, but his family had been settled in the Ukraine for several generations; it is said that "his national consciousness was awakened" by association with ardently nationalist Finnish and Swedish officers from the grand duchy of Finland while on duty in Warsaw in 1904. Actually, the fact that the division of which he was chief of staff when the October Revolution took place was 80 percent Ukrainian may have decided him to throw in his lot with the national movement (cf. *Za Ukrainu*, January 28, 1945, p. 2, and February 1, 1945, p. 2). Omelianovych-Pavlenko was the son of a Don Cossack general and a Georgian princess, but being stationed in Odessa when the Bolshevik Revolution took place, he joined the Ukrainians. See Myroslav Martynets', "Gen.-Polk. M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko," (Colonel-General M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA*, August–September, 1952, p. 1).

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nationalist who lived through the period, describes the former as 186
persons who thought on a "planetary" level, desiring to solve 668*
all the world's problems at once and regarding the claims of national affinity as "parochial." One, his schoolmate, was Volodymyr Zatons'kyi, who was later to become one of the most implacable of Communist officials in the Ukraine. Even before the war, he, according to the writer, refused to have anything to do with Ukrainian cultural activities, like the Prosvita [enlightenment] [575]
society in the city of Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamianets-Podils'k), where they were students. Rather, he associated with "foreigners," Russians and Jews, and was rapidly drawn into the revolutionary socialist movement.[20] The basis for a choice in this generation of young intellectuals appears to have been chance, or the psychological make-up of the individual, which was reinforced increasingly by the cumulative impact of associations formed after the initial choice was taken. Thus by the time the revolutionary conflicts drew to a close the educated classes in the Ukraine were
deeply split. Even more divided was the real foundation of any 565
independence movement, the peasants. They—or at least those 668*
who were somewhat more prosperous than the average—had 641
initially welcomed the Ukrainian governments. The increasing impotence of the new regimes and their preoccupation with factional strife and unrealistic programs instead of practical measures caused much indifference or disaffection among the peasants. In the judgment of one of the ablest students of the revolutionary period, however, the Ukrainian peasant preferred a nationalist government to either a Red or a "White" administration supporting a central regime.[21]

That the Communists were victors in the physical struggle is 642
no proof of greater popular support, for much of their strength

[20] Vyktor (Victor) Prykhodko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[21] William H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944). Moreover, one of the best Communist historians of the revolutionary period in the Ukraine, M. G. Rafes, a former adherent of the Jewish Bund, says the "natural" development of the peasants (and workers, especially in the sugar refineries in the small towns) was to "national socialism," "the Ukraine for the Ukrainian peasants," although he of course adds that they were inspired by the "reactionary bourgeois intelligentsia"; see *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine: Evoliutsiia i raskol "Bunda"* (Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine: The Evolution and Division of the "Bund") (Moscow, 1920), p. 8.

642 came from the Russian workers of the cities, or from outside the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government under Petliura was to a considerable extent discredited, because it had failed to devote sufficient attention to the needs of the peasantry and to [648] establish law and order. Moreover, by an eleventh-hour alliance with Poland, it had compromised its claim to represent the entire Ukrainian nation. This resulted from the fact that Galicia, which, upon the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy had formed its own West Ukrainian Republic, was surrendered to the Warsaw regime as a price for aid in the east, a solution in which most Galicians refused to acquiesce. Nevertheless, Poland and the Soviet Union made peace, and shortly afterwards the remnants of the Ukrainian army and bureaucracy retreated across the border for internment in Poland. From this sanctuary a group of a few hundred under Colonel George Tiutiunnyk sortied in October, 1921, for a last desperate raid into the Soviet-occupied Ukraine.[22]

After that the East Ukraine lay under Communist rule, which could no longer be challenged by military force. For a time, however, it appeared as if the rising tide of nationalist sentiment—it rose even among those who had long been adherents of Marxist doctrines—might bring about what arms had failed to accomplish. To understand this situation it is necessary to recall that the Communists under Lenin had modified their original stand in order to appeal to the nationalism of the non-Russians. In January, 1918, soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Third Congress of Soviets asserted a theoretical right of all the nations of the tsarist empire to go their several ways, to secede from the Bolshevik government in Moscow. At the same time, it deprived this right of any content by insisting that it be exercised only by the "toiling masses." Although the Communist Party's stand was more ambiguously phrased, its insistence that the interests of the toilers were represented only by the Communist Party and that the non-Russian Communist Parties formed inseparable parts of the central Bolshevik organization, in fact rendered self-determination a fiction. During the following years, the central Party [661] leadership used armed force when possible to insure that these local Communist Parties, thus reduced to mere branches of a

[22] Mazepa, III, 96–105.

German arrival.[10] In the less sheltered districts, however, Soviet repression was horrible. According to German secret reports, four thousand Ukrainian political prisoners were butchered in the NKVD cellars of L'vov alone, and several times as many were deported eastward. Many of the latter were killed later when their captors could no longer hurry them on ahead of the German advance.[11] Meanwhile tens of thousands of Soviet officials and their dependents, along with a considerable portion of the large Jewish population of Galicia, streamed eastward to escape a similar fate at the hands of the German totalitarians. 668* [661]

On June 30, in the midst of the disorganization caused by these events, the advance units of the Wehrmacht reached L'vov. With them came the first groups of Bandera's followers. Some of these came legally in "Nachtigall"; others, including Iaroslav Stets'ko, came illegally, though with the incidental assistance of some German front-line units.[12] Having arrived in the Galician capital, the OUN-B was in a favorable position. The months of isolation from the world outside the Soviet Union had prevented most of the citizens of L'vov from hearing of the internal conflict of the OUN. Moreover, the horror of the last days of Soviet occupation made the Germans seem like providential deliverers; the close contact enjoyed by the Bandera leaders with uniformed Wehrmacht soldiers greatly enhanced their prestige in their compatriots' eyes. [554]

Just what assurances the Bandera adherents gave of their backing by the Germans, just how far they themselves believed they could rely on German support, is impossible to determine. Whatever inducements they used, immediately after their arrival the OUN-B group named Dr. George Polans'kyi, a prominent citizen, mayor, and succeeded in having a national representation "elected"; this they called together the same evening. They had hoped to secure the L'vov state theater, a hall of appropriate size and dignity for the gathering, but, finding it requisitioned by the German army, they were forced to resort to the small meeting 668* 642

[10] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 6, 1941, p. 3.

[11] Report of the SP and the SD *Einsatzgruppen*, July 31, 1941, p. 13, NO 2151 (hereafter referred to as NO 2151).

[12] Interview 24.

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room of the Prosvita society.[13] When the group assembled, Stets'ko addressed it, saying that the congress of émigrés in Cracow had already laid the foundation for a Ukrainian government. He then proceeded to proclaim the Ukrainian state. It is worth presenting the contents of this proclamation in full since it provides an excellent indication of the thinking of Bandera's group.[14]

Act of Proclamation of the Ukrainian State

1. By the will of the Ukrainian people, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the direction of STEPHEN BANDERA proclaims the renewal of the Ukrainian State, for which a whole generation of the best sons of the Ukraine spilled its blood.

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which under the direction of its creator and leader EUGENE KONOVALETS' during the past decades of bloody Muscovite-Bolshevik subjugation carried on a stubborn struggle for freedom, calls upon the entire Ukrainian people not to lay down its arms until a Sovereign Ukrainian State is formed in all the Ukrainian lands.

The sovereign Ukrainian government assures the Ukrainian people of regularity and order [*lad i poriadok*], multi-sided development of all its forces, and satisfaction of its demands.

2. In the western lands of the Ukraine a Ukrainian government is created which will be subordinated to a Ukrainian national administration which will be created in the capital of the Ukraine —Kiev.

3. The Ukrainian national-revolutionary army, which is being created on Ukrainian soil, will continue to fight against the Muscovite occupation for a Sovereign All-Ukrainian State and a new, just order in the whole world.

Long live the Sovereign Ukrainian State!

Long live the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists!

[13] *Ibid.;* Mirchuk, p. 30; Interview 21.

[14] The translation is from an early typewritten copy of the proclamation furnished me by Volodymyr Stakhiv. A printed version in Mirchuk (p. 32) is entitled *Act of Renewal of the Ukrainian State,* a significant change in view of the frequent ridicule of the proclamation by writers opposed to Bandera as an effort to "proclaim" a Ukrainian state which had been in existence since 1918. Other differences are not important.

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Long live the director of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—STEPHEN BANDERA!

The City of L'vov, June 30, 1941, 8 P.M.
Head of the National Congress
Iaroslav Stets'ko

The meeting at which the *akt*—as this proclamation has come to be known in Ukrainian polemics—was made was of comparatively small importance because of the hasty manner of its calling and the small number of people present. Nevertheless, the gathering was immediately dignified by the title of "National Assembly." Considerably more important than the initial proclamation was the fact that, in the confusion attendant upon the Red army's withdrawal and the German entry, the Ukrainians had been able to secure access to the L'vov radio station.[15] Consequently, soon after the *akt* was proclaimed, Stets'ko was able to broadcast it. Moreover, during the day, certain of Stets'ko's followers, including in particular the Reverend John Hryn'okh, chaplain of "Nachtigall," were able to gain access to the bedridden Metropolitan. Without going into details concerning their relations with Mel'nyk (they later asserted that Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi "must" have known about the conflict), they informed him of their plans for proclaiming the Ukrainian state and asked his support.[16] Apparently convinced that the group had the backing of the Germans, and hoping for a quick establishment of Ukrainian independence, the Metropolitan wrote a pastoral letter in which he exhorted the people to support the newly proclaimed government, saying that "the sacrifices which the final attainment of our goals require demand above all dutiful obedience to the just orders of the government which do not conflict with God's laws." Moreover, he declared:

We greet the victorious German Army as deliverer from the enemy. We render our obedient homage to the government which has been

[15] Interviews 21, 24, 63; Mirchuk, p. 30; Vasyl' Rudko ("R. Lisovii"), "Rozlam v OUN" (The Split in the OUN), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, November 3, 1949, p. 3.

[16] Interviews 24, 63. They base their statement on the fact that Sheptyts'kyi was in close touch with Klymiv, the OUN-B chief in east Galicia.

erected. We recognize Mr. Iaroslav Stets'ko as Head of the State Administration of the Ukraine.[17] 668* 642

The pastoral letter was read over the radio by Father Hryn'okh the same morning. It appears to have removed any doubts which may have been lingering in the minds of most of the prominent Ukrainians in L'vov concerning the authenticity of the Stets'ko government.

The Bandera leaders went ahead rapidly to consolidate their victory. They felt the need of a name which would carry greater prestige than that of the young enthusiast Stets'ko, who had, as Bandera's deputy, already declared himself chief of state. Consequently, they prevailed upon the aged Constantine Levits'kyi, who had been released from prison several months before the war broke out, to accept the post of president of a parliament or Council of Seniors. At the same time, the Bandera group prepared to establish a "cabinet," which was to have included men from a wide group of parties. Stets'ko himself was to be "premier," since he feared that a nonparty man might give way to German pressure. Bandera adherents were to be placed in such key posts as deputy war minister, which was to be held by Shukevych; minister of security, to be held by Lebed'; and minister of political coordination, to be held by Klymiv.[18] 668* 642 645

The Bandera government, however, was not to live long enough to bring these plans to fruition. The proclamation of the government in the Prosvita hall had deeply disturbed the Wehrmacht officers who had organized "Nachtigall." They knew that it would induce a violent reaction among the ruling Nazis in Berlin, whereas the Wehrmacht group had hoped that by careful procedure they could secure the gradual development of a friendly, autonomous Ukrainian regime, at least in Galicia, without high party circles' realizing what was happening. Some of them were also alarmed at the possibility that the wide publica- 668*

[17] This quotation is taken from a contemporary leaflet copy of the pastoral letter.

[18] Interview 24; Mirchuk, pp. 35–36. Mirchuk lists Petriv as war minister, while a contemporary German SD report (NO 4529) has Iarii in that post. The same report lists Klymiv as minister of security, but the evidence available to me makes it appear probable that Lebed' held the post; possibly the latter's clandestine role made it necessary to keep his appointment secret.

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When the February Revolution broke out in St. Petersburg no political Ukrainian movement developed in the early stages. Quite naturally the intellectual circles obtained more liberty to spread their ideas, which were not anti-Russian.

The municipal elections undertaken at Kiev almost immediately after the February Revolution, and which had undoubtedly taken advantage of all the liberties which characterized the first days of all revolutions, gave a result which clearly shows the almost complete non-existence of a Ukrainian political movement. In fact, of ninety municipal councillors the so-called Ukrainian parties obtained only six places, and that was in the capital of the Ukraine itself.

All classes of society hoped that the Provisional Government which replaced the Monarchy would be able to maintain the front and would allow the country to convoke a National Assembly which would decide the future political regime on the whole territory of the former Russian Empire. As soon as the active members of the Ukrainian political organizations of Galicia entered the Russian Ukraine they organized a kind of Ukrainian committee at Kiev, which started its autonomist political work. On 24 March 1917 the Ukrainian Associations spread over the whole territory were called upon to send their representatives to Kiev to form the first nucleus of a future Ukrainian Parliament. Although only the representatives of such Associations which had declared themselves Ukrainian were invited to this assembly, and although the direction of the assembly was entrusted to Galician Ukrainians, under the Presidency of Professor Hrouchevsky, not only was the idea of separatism absent, but the autonomous aspirations were of the most mild kind. This first assembly of Ukrainian deputies took the name of 'Rada' (the name

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of the Cossack Assembly of the time of Bogdan Khmelnitsky), which means 'Diet' or 'Council' in Ukrainian. Once installed, it tried to establish relations with the central Provisional Government, whose power became more and more fictitious. The menace of a Bolshevik *coup d'état* hung over the Government of St. Petersburg, a fact which allowed the Rada to justify its own establishment in declaring itself alone capable of protecting the Ukraine from Bolshevik invasion. This political manœuvre had many chances of success. The Ukrainian peasant was fundamentally hostile to Bolshevism, to the social levelling, and to the collectivization of the land. Nevertheless, anxious for the peace which the Bolsheviks had promised, the Ukrainian peasant lent them his ear. The leaders of the Rada, loyal to the principles of the 'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine,' were also not opposed to the idea of an immediate peace and their promises to preserve the Ukraine from Bolshevism and to conclude peace with the central powers was their most important trump card. The Provisional Government, in a state of complete disintegration and without any remaining support, hastened to recognize the Rada as a political organization, although no election in the proper sense of the word had taken place at the time of its formation. A statute, known under the name of 'Universal,' was instituted on Ukrainian territory. After the agreement between the Provisional Government and the Rada, Ukrainian autonomy was recognized but was limited to questions of language and culture and to the organization of local administration.

All other important questions, including the agrarian question, were left to the future National Pan-Russian Assembly. The administrative activity of the Rada was, at the beginning, limited to the town of Kiev alone, where its assemblies took place. During the summer of

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175 668 642 1917 the propaganda agents of the Rada covered the whole country where they organized meetings and distributed pamphlets. They tried to persuade the proprietors of land that their aspirations would be more easily realized within the framework of an autonomous State and underlined the impotence of the Central Government in the face of a Bolshevik attack. The Ukrainian peasant, like that of the Volga and of Siberia and like the Cossacks of the Don, opposed the revolutionary theories, and it is in these countries that they met with the strongest opposition. The Rada could not have a better justification of its authority in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasant than the statement that the Bolshevik movement, of Great Russian origin, was imported into the Ukraine from the outside, which, moreover, was true. The title which the Ukrainian anarchist, Nestor Makhno, gave to his book on the Civil War, *The Russian Revolution in the Ukraine*, is singularly significant. The leaders of the Rada were careful not to proclaim their separatist ideas openly, knowing that such ideas would never find the support of the popular masses. Profiting, however, by the decay of the Provisional Government, they formed, with its consent, a sort of Ministry which took the name of 'General Secretariat,' and which declared itself the supreme power in the Ukraine on 29 July of the same year. The agrarian movement which spread over the whole territory of the Ukraine aimed especially at the great landowners, most of whom, especially in the west, were Poles. Thus the real popular movement took the form of the ancient quarrel between the peasants and the lords and developed quite independently of the Ukrainian movement represented by the Rada. When, in October 1917, the Provisional Government fell as the result of a Bolshevik insurrection, the only official

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authority existing in the Ukraine was represented by the General Secretariat of the Central Ukrainian Rada. 175 668 642

The peasants, hostile to Bolshevism, did not find any other political organization on which they could lean. Mistrusting the organizations of the Right (which were later to form the political nucleus of the White Armies) and equally fearing the local democratic municipalities where the intellectual and Jewish elements dominated, openly hostile to the working class which was almost entirely Bolshevized and consisted of non-Ukrainian elements, the farmers seemed to tend more and more towards the support of the Rada which seemed to be the only force capable of realizing their aspirations. Nevertheless the first clash between the elements which accepted the idea of an autonomous Ukraine and those which rallied to Bolshevism, was not to the advantage of the first. The agrarian question meant much to them. The Ukrainian Rada was unable to formulate a clear policy with regard to this most important question. Its resistance to the anarchical division of the lands, supported by the Bolsheviks, rapidly reduced the number of its supporters and the already small authority enjoyed by the General Secretariat in the eyes of the peasant mass. Nevertheless, on 20 November, the Rada proclaimed a democratic Ukrainian Republic. It is at this period that the allied military missions then resident at Kiev recognized *de facto* the Ukrainian Republic. At the same time the fourth 'Universal' was promulgated, one of the articles of which declared that the independence of the Ukraine was considered indispensable only because the rest of the Russian territory had fallen to the power of the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to remember this detail because it again proves that, even in politically favourable circumstances, the Rada did not dare openly to declare its separatism. This act did not increase the

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175 authority of the Ukrainian Government. No local
642 municipal or other organization took the slightest note
668 of its existence. Every department, every district, and every town governed itself and tried to resist the advance of the Bolsheviks. Not having any military forces or police organizations at their disposal, these local governments were unable to resist the attacks of the Red Guards and the armed soldiers, returned from the front and supported by Moscow. Soon the whole Ukraine elected local Soviet governments and the Rada, which hastened to proclaim, on 22 January 1918, the independence of the Ukraine, was obliged to flee on the 29th of the same month, seeking refuge at Jitomir. One of its most active members, Simon Petlioura, tried to organize anti-Bolshevik troops composed of peasants and prisoners of Galician origin. He succeeded in forming several units which, although unsatisfactory from a military point of view, cut a better figure than the bands of soldiers which were leaving the front. These military units, known under the name of '*haidamaks*,' formed small nuclei of resistance in the towns and villages and halted the Soviet offensive here and there. The more the Bolsheviks advanced towards the west, the more this resistance became effective, especially in Southern Podolia, where the Ukrainian organizations, supported by Galician prisoners, by Polish legionaries, and even by certain circles of purely Russian sympathies but hostile to Bolshevism, still retained some vestiges of power.

48 The insufficiency of technical, administrative, and
727 intellectual personnel did not allow the Ukrainians to give their civil and military organizations the force necessary for defeating the revolutionary movement directed by the Communist Party. On 9 February the Ukrainian Government, acting as a sovereign government, and despite the firm opposition of a large part of

its members, especially of Petlioura, decided to send its 648
representatives to Brest-Litovsk to conclude a peace 727
with the central empires. This idea met with the sympathy of the Austro-German authorities whose negotiations for a peace with the Soviet Government had already lasted a long time.

The peace which was dictated by the German general staff was signed by the Rada. As compensation for the efforts of the central empires, who promised to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism, the Rada accepted German occupation and agreed to supply 1,000,000 tons of grain of which Germany and Austria had immediate need. Under the threat of German bayonets the representatives of Lenin also had to recognize the independence of the Ukraine. Already the Austro-German troops were making their entry into Ukrainian territory while meeting with only a feeble resistance of the armed units of the local Soviet governments and the remnants of the fleeing Imperial Army.

The only aim of the Austro-German military command was to obtain the stores of grain and of other food products which they hoped to find in abundance in the Ukraine. Yet, for political reasons, the Governments 727
of the central empires decided to support the fiction of Ukrainian independence under their protection. The entry of the troops was followed by the proclamation composed more or less in these terms: 'At the request of your Rada we have decided to enter your country in order to protect you from Bolshevik anarchy and to give you the possibility of developing in complete alliance with our two empires.'

One can say that no citizen took this declaration seriously and that the occupation was considered as an invasion by enemy troops. The Ukrainian Government 642
was established at Kiev[1] and was composed of three 727

[1] [i.e. in 1919--- Analyst]

642 727 political groups: the separatists of the right, the national democrats, and the federalist social democrats. Thus, as these names show, the Ukrainian Government formed by the Austro-Germans was not homogeneous in the matter of its partisanship of independence.

721 The Austro-Germans did not take this farce of political independence any more seriously than did the population. Their attitude was simply that of conquerors. 'For every German soldier killed, ten *Russian* soldiers, chosen among the population of the district where the crime has been committed, will be immediately shot,' the terrified inhabitants of Kremenetz (town of Volynia) (Order No. 2, town of Kremenetz, 28 February 1918) read on the posters signed by the commandant of the Austrian division a few days after the proclamation of official friendship. The 'friendly country' closely resembled a colonial conquest. The general staff of the army of General Eichhorn reported to the commander of the eastern front on 4 May 1918: 'The Austro-German troops would have no difficulty in maintaining order and public tranquillity from the moment we renounce the fiction of a friendly country. We are still obliged to obtain the permission of the Ukrainian commissioners, who are confused and irritated, for some of our actions.'

643 Meanwhile two points of view existed in Austro-German circles concerning the subject of the independence of the Ukraine. The army considered the Ukraine a conquered enemy country which had to furnish, with the least possible delay, agricultural produce in accordance with the terms of peace.

On the other hand diplomatic circles saw in the independence, fictitious though it was, the future of German diplomacy, based on the partition of the succession of the dismembered Russian Empire. Parallel to

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648 The Minister of the Reich at Kiev, Muhm, a subtler man, expressed himself differently though in the same sense: 'I am convinced that it is necessary to maintain the fiction of a friendly independent country in the Ukraine. . . . We shall completely destroy the little authority which remains with the Ukrainian Government if we were to show too coarsely that it is only a toy in our hands.'

191 177 Disarmed, enslaved by the great force of the army of the central empires, the Ukraine was not in the position of an independent State. The Ukrainian language, imported from Galicia, was not spoken in the country. Only official documents and administrative notices were written in Ukrainian. Not a single private business ever used this language either for correspondence or advertising. In the schools and universities Russian continued to be used. The circulation of newspapers in the Ukrainian language was very small, while the Russian papers which agreed not to carry on open propaganda against the troops of occupation appeared everywhere and were actually the only ones read by the population.

727 642 The Ukrainian Government, composed of politicians having absolutely no administrative experience, soon proved to be incapable of organizing the supply of grain as promised to the armies of the central empires. The Germans then decided to change the regime. The organizations of landowners, small and big, which supplied corn and other agricultural produce to the forces of occupation, were favoured by the Austro-German authorities. It is unnecessary to point out that no Ukrainian political idea influenced the creation of these organizations. The Germans selected their association, known under the name of '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*,[1]

[1] '*Khliborobiv*' means farmers in Ukrainian. '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*' means association of farmers.

[i.e. in 1919. --- Analyst]

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as a base for the new Government which had to replace the Rada and which, in their opinion, would be better capable of organizing the supply of agricultural produce. On 29 April 1918, on the day after the proclamation of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Republic, the German troops interrupted the session of the Rada in the building which it occupied and forced the deputies to leave the hall. The Rada was dissolved. The landowners, the *khliboroby*, in agreement with the Austro-German general staff, elected the Hetman of the whole Ukraine in the person of General Pavlo Skoropadsky, the leader of the popular Democratic Party and descendant of the genuine Hetman of the Ukraine, but in fact a brilliant officer of the Russian Imperial Guards.

The German authorities thought that the new Government, from which the politicians were excluded, would be more in tune with their interests. In agreement with the General Hetman they appointed the new Cabinet. This Cabinet was composed of landowners, some experts, and a representative of commercial and industrial circles of the country in the person of a rich Jewish industrialist of Odessa, Goutnik. All the Ministers were people of openly Russian sympathies. Thus the bluff of the independent Ukraine received the approval of the same State which had invented it. The German Minister in Kiev, Muhm, wrote in his report to the chief of the German general staff, Groener: 'I insisted, when speaking to M. Lizogoub, the Premier, on the fact that the German Government wanted to see a Cabinet with a greater *couleur locale*.[1] In another report Muhm says that the greater part of the Ministers of the Hetman are not far removed from russophile ideas. 'Nevertheless,' he added, 'one must not take this too much to heart as the Government is continually under

[1] In French in the original text.

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645 my control and under that of the German general staff.'

An amusing, but true, story described the political position of the Ministers of the Government of the Hetman. The anecdote concerns the General Ragoza, the War Minister, whose sympathies were in no way Ukrainian. In October 1918 the Russian newspaper *Goloss Kieva* published a so-called order of the day of General Denikine, Commander-in-Chief of the White Army, declaring himself supreme chief of the armed forces on Ukrainian territory. His representative Colonel B., adorning himself with the uniform of the Imperial Army, presented himself without the slightest regard for etiquette to General Ragoza to inform him of the order of General Denikine and requested that the War Minister of the Ukraine would put himself at his disposal. The Minister was so taken aback that he began to assure the envoy of his loyalty to Russia and hastily gave his signature to prove his sincerity. The Russian officers living in Kiev took advantage of this incident to appear in the streets in their most brilliant uniforms of the old Russian Army and invited the population to decorate the city with the Imperial colours. It is unnecessary to say that the order was enthusiastically received by the population. The joke is that it was only a trick played by a Russian newspaper in Kiev, as this order of General Denikine had never existed.

648 642 The personality of the Hetman himself was also not very reassuring to the idea of Ukrainian independence. Here are the informations which were sent to Kiev on 30 May 1918 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich: 'In June 1914 Skoropadsky presented an *aide-mémoire* to the Imperial Government in which he denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, identifying them with the Russian people.' 'The whole Ukrainian

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movement is only the product of Austrian intrigues,' 648 he explained in this document. In July 1917, we are 642 also informed by this document, Skoropadsky published an open letter in which he called Kiev 'the centre of *Russian* culture,' and concluded that it would be necessary to take the initiative to 'unify all the *Russian* lands in a federal organism.'

All these testimonies show the illusory independence of the Ukraine under German occupation.[1] It is easy to understand that the Russian reactionary circles in the first place, and even other more moderate circles, should have considered the establishment of the Government of the Hetman, whose separatist convictions were more than doubtful, a happy event. The superficial Ukrainization, which continued more or less effectively under the fictitious power of the Rada, ceased almost completely under the Hetman. Only the official journal and some insignificant leaflets continued to be published in Ukrainian. Russian again became if not the official at least the semi-official language and the only one actually used in the administrative offices. The Russian circles considered the Government of the Hetman a provisional one which, supported by the Austro-German military forces and entrenched behind the fiction of an independent Ukraine, was able to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism. In their eyes the Government of the Ukraine was only a political and economic base for the future anti-Bolshevik movement in the whole Russian territory, able to serve as a springboard to the White

[1] All the documents which we quote here are contained in the book that appeared in Moscow in 1936 under the name of *The Failure of the German Occupation of the Ukraine*, a book which contains the secret correspondence of the Austro-German authorities in the Ukraine with their respective Governments. The Soviets of the soldiers of the Austro-German units in flight transmitted these documents of enormous value to the Soviet Government.

648 [642] Army which was being organized in the territory of the Don Cossacks and in the Northern Caucasus. They were not far wrong. The Government of the 'Independent Ukraine,' considered to be anti-Russian, supplied the Volunteer Army,[1] on whose standards the device 'the one and indivisible Russia' was inscribed, with arms and ammunition. Entire trains proceeded to Rostov-on-Don, transporting officers, cadets, and civilians wishing to serve in the Volunteer Army. Even at Kiev the White military organization enjoyed a certain amount of liberty. A tacit collaboration developed under the half-sympathetic eyes of the central empires, between the command of the White Army and the Ukrainian Government of Kiev. This tolerance on the part of the Austro-Germans found its explanation in the imminence of their defeat on the western front. Thus Ukrainian politics and especially the support of Bolshevism which they considered an involuntary ally, having ranged Russia among the neutrals, no longer had any sense. The Austro-German authorities began to take an interest in the opponents of Communism and of Ukrainianism and even looked to the Don Cossacks with a view to collaboration, those same Cossacks who, though well organized since the October Revolution as an independent State, had never expressed the desire of separating from the Russian Empire.

642 727 423 The internal policy of the new Government, completely at the service of the forces of occupation, was characterized by the support of private property and particularly of the landowners. This policy led to the proclamation of new laws regarding the return of estates to the landowners, of which they had been deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles of 1917.

[1] The name which was officially used by the White Army which, at the beginning, did not resort to any mobilization and only filled its ranks with volunteers.

deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles 642
of 1917. The application of these laws was followed 727
by violent repressions on the part of the Austro-German Army. Punitive expeditions against the peasants became very frequent and summary executions became general throughout the country. The hate of the peasant population was directed against the Austro-Germans and soon reached its peak. The soldiers of the armies of occupation no longer dared to go out after sunset, except in groups. Knives, directed by mysterious hands, frequently found the backs of Austro-German infantry men. The Civil War was in full blast. The Government, incapable of acting without looking for the support of the military forces of the invader, did not escape either hate or contempt and could only maintain itself until the complete reversal of the situation, which was not slow to come. The defeat of the German forces and the armistice forced the troops of occupation to leave Ukrainian territory. It is unnecessary to say that, hated by the popular masses, deprived of all support, and with a doubtful ideology of Ukrainian independence, the Hetman could not continue to govern. Also, as 668
soon as the Austro-German forces began to retire, revolutionary propaganda began to flood the Ukrainian country-side. The former Ukrainian politicians, dismissed from their posts after the establishment of the Hetmanate, put themselves at the head of this movement and received, at first, the unconditional support of the peasants and even of certain military units of the Austro-Germany Army in which the Galician element predominated. Thus, led by Simon Petlioura, the peasants 669
marched on Kiev in order to depose the Hetman. Received everywhere with enthusiasm, they had no difficulty in precipitating the retreat of the Austro-German troops, and rapidly occupied the greater part

Poles. First the Galician question was raised immediately 648
after the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy (in October
1918). Following the example of all the nationalities
which had been a part of it, the Ukrainians of Galicia [642]
formed a national council at Lvov, which proclaimed the
independence of the Western Ukrainian Republic. After
the fall of Skoropadsky this new republic was eager to
unite with the Directorate of Petlioura. The Act of
Union was proclaimed in January 1919. But the Poles
did not think on the same lines. During the same 726
January 1919, Poles and Ukrainians already fought 648
each other furiously in the streets of Lvov. The arrival
of the Polish troops of General Haller, formed in
France, quickly turned the tide. A regular army of
80,000 men represented a very important force in
Eastern Europe where, from the Carpathians to the
Pacific, an immense territory was plunged into anarchy.
For General Haller there was no question of a Western
Ukrainian Republic, but only one of a Little Poland, a
simple province of the reborn Great Poland. As we
had already seen, the detachments of the Polish Army
of Haller threw themselves, in April of the same year,
against the vanguards of the Red Army. Recently
restored, the Polish State already claimed the frontiers
applying before the first partition, that is to say the
annexation of White Russia and the Ukraine up to the
Dnieper. While the Petliourians, the Reds, and the
Whites faced each other on both sides of the Dnieper,
the Poles seized the greater part of Volynia and of
White Russia and entered Minsk. But the Poles did not
seem to exploit their success, most probably in order
to give the Red Army the chance to destroy the White
Army which, in case of victory, might transform itself
into a national Russian Army, dangerous from the
point of the territorial pretensions of Great Poland.

728 Government, hostile in principle to everything connected with Russian national tradition, could put its signature on such a document, considered as an even greater national humiliation than the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Ukrainian separatist movement, doubly compromised by its agreements with the central empires and with Poland, foundered as a result of general contempt.

648 Soon the Allied Powers recognized the Polish domina-
728 tion over the whole of Galicia, at first as a temporary measure. It became definite on 15 March 1923. Poland agreed to establish an autonomous regime here, but this promise had never been honoured. From this date, too, Poland exercised her absolute power over a considerable part of the Ukrainian people.

000 The Soviet attitude to the Ukrainian question at that time is not of great interest and does not furnish new factors which could throw new light on the problem.

If Soviet policy with regard to this problem seems confused and inconsequent, this is so because it is not determined by a firm and well-established point of view, but by two factors which are outside this question: by the reaction of the Ukrainian population to the 'social experience' to which it is subjected and by the attitude of Germany and Poland to the Ukrainian problem.

642 Immediately after the establishment of Soviet rule on Ukrainian territory, and in full agreement with Marxist theories, the right of peoples to determine their own fate was proclaimed and naturally also affected the Ukraine, as every other member of the Soviet Union. Thus the Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine was founded. The Constitution even gave it the official right of ceding from the U.S.S.R. This is the official aspect. In practice the Ukraine became an integral part of the Soviet Union and completely dependent on the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

175 people deteriorated also in consequence of the religious persecutions of Ukrainians by the Polish State. For these reasons, in 1648 the great Ukrainian revolution against Poland broke out under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—1657), the Hetman of the Cossack Army.

[642] 175 648 In consequence of the revolution of 1648 the Ukrainian Cossack Republic was created headed by an elected Chief of State (Hetman). The official name of this State was 'Zaporovian Army' (Exercitus Zaporoviensis) with Tchyhyryn as Capital. Leaning upon the Cossacks and the free peasantry, the Ukrainian Republic could defend itself against the united forces of Poland and the Crimean Horde for several years. Having lost the hope for a settlement with Poland on the principle of equality, the Ukrainian Government concluded a treaty with the Muscovite Tsar in Pereyaslav, in 1654. The Muscovite Tsar promised the Ukrainians assistance against Poland and the Tartars. The treaty of Pereyaslav secured for Ukraine its own army, administration, and an independent foreign policy.

The transition of Ukraine towards Moscow in the 17th century provided the basis for the rise of the Muscovite state. The Ukrainian revolution of 1648 weakened Poland considerably.

Under the protectorate of the Tsar of Moscow Ukraine did not find security for its liberty, prosperity and progress. The Swedish King Charles X. Gustav understood this well when he wrote to his Ambassador to the Ukrainian Government, in 1657: "Moscow does not tolerate a free nation"*). When it had become evident that the Tsar of Moscow tried to reduce or to abolish the rights of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Government of B. Khmelnitsky planned the annulment of the alliance with Moscow, and concluded treaties with Sweden and Transylvania to secure the independence of Ukraine (1656 and 1657). The Ukrainian Government put forward the demand for the frontiers of the Ukrainian State as '*ius totius Ukrainae antiquae vel Roxolaniae*' up to the Vistula, the Ukrainian ethnographic frontier of that time. In the treaty with Sweden of 1657, Ukraine was recognised as a free nation dependent on no one (*'gens libera, nulli subiecta'*).

Against the Ukrainian aspirations for independence Poland and Moscow acted in common. By the treaty of Andrusov of 1667, Ukraine was divided among these countries on the Dnieper line. Turkey and the Crimean Horde interfered with the struggle in Ukraine. In these wars, lasting nearly 30 years, Ukraine on the western bank of the Dnieper River was disastrously devastated. In

*) *Archives of South-West Russia*, Part III, Vol. VI: Kiev 1908.

669 Government' was window-dressing for the further advance of the Russian Communist troops in Ukraine.

At this time the Russian and Jewish Socialist parties in Ukraine issued protests against the attack of the Soviet Russian troops on the democratic Ukraine. In December 1917, a conference of the Russian Social-Democrat organisations in Ukraine (the so-called Mensheviks) in Kiev declared that it "brands with indignation the new infamous deed of the Bolshevik Government, that in its blunt fanaticism and irresponsibility came to declare war on Ukraine".

In the session of the All-Ukrainian Congress of the Councils of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies in Kiev on December 18, 1917, the delegate of the Jewish Social-Democrat 'Bund', Zolotarev, declared that "the Jewish proletariat will defend Ukraine together with the Ukrainian nation against the attack of the violators".

At the same Congress the leader of the Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Schatz, in his speech laid stress on the fact that "now in Russia only one organising force has remained — the Ukrainian democracy and its organ — the Central Council"

Ukraine refused to accept Soviet dictatorship and entered an unequal struggle with overwhelming Communist forces invading [642] from Russia. The Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed the independence of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic by a special Act ('*IV. Universal*') of January 22, 1918. It is significant that even some Russian Communist organisations in Ukraine declared against the attack of Soviet Russia on Ukraine.

One of the commanders of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the Communist Antonov-Ovseyenko, writes in his memoirs that in December 1917, the leader of the Communsit organisations in Kharkov demanded that he should not make war against the Ukrainian Government, with regard to the "special situation in Ukraine in connection with the national problem" (*Comments on the Civil War*, vol. I, p. 55). On this disposition of the Communists in Ukraine Antonov remarks:

"The local Communists are very irresolute, are looking for coalition with opportunists, do not want and do not try to give our troops any assistance" (*Comments on the Civil War*).

Another commander of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine, Colonel Muravyev, wired Antonov from Odessa on February 21, 1918, about the disposition of the workers: "I do not want to carry responsibility for anything that is happening here, if the local Soviets do not want to defend the revolution, their own government" (Antonov, *Comments*, p. 169).

727 state. On the contrary, they wished to suppress the Ukrainian move-
565 ment and to make Ukraine a centre for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia', of course, headed by a Tsar. About these plans Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs after World War I. He hoped that a restored Russian Empire would be a reliable ally of Germany out of gratitide for the abolition of the Bolshevik régime.

●642 On April 28, 1918, a detachment of German troops entered the
727 hall where the sessions of the Ukrainian Central Council took place
565 in order to arrest some Ukrainian Ministers. On the next day, on April 29, under the protection of the German troops, a congress of big landowners was called. At this congress General Paul Skoropadsky was declared Hetman of Ukraine, with the prior consent of the German authorities.

Skoropadsky belonged to the class of the big landowners, and, though he was of Ukrainian descent, had had no connections with the Ukrainian national movement before the revolution of 1917.

In his first order Skoropadsky wrote: "I declare myself Hetman of the whole Ukraine". He announced the abolition of the Ukrainian Central Council and replaced the name 'Ukrainian Democratic Republic' by 'Ukrainian State'. Skoropadsky repealed all laws and orders of the Ukrainian Central Council and the Russian Provisional Government; thus Ukraine had in this respect returned to the conditions before the Revolution.

The reactionary ways of the Skoropadsky Government that favoured the big landowners had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people; the masses of peasants and workers, that recently had fought with arms the terror of the Russian Communists under the banner of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic, were placed by the policy of the Skoropadsky Government into
[cc1] a desperate situation. The big landowners who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities organised 'punitive expeditions' against the Ukrainian peasantry with their armed gangs having support from German and Austrian army detachments. Heavy contributions, looting, and destruction of the peasants' property, together with mass executions of Ukrainian peasants and workers, caused immense indignation against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austrian occupation forces among the Ukrainian people. Against the reactionary régime which dominated in Ukraine, Communist propaganda met with approbation among the Ukrainian masses, unexpected even by Moscow.

727 The Chief of Staff of the German armies in Ukraine, General
642 Groener, in order to appease Ukrainian public opinion had declared after the putsch of April 29, 1918, that "the Hetman was given in-

structions that the government he formed had to stand entirely by the principle of a Ukrainian state, without any orientation towards Moscow or Poland". Nevertheless, Skoropadsky's Government consisted in its majority of Russians of reactionary trends who distinguished themselves by a hostile attitude towards the Ukrainian national movement. 227 642

The Ukrainian political parties had no confidence in the Skoropadsky régime, they considered it to be an outrage upon the Ukrainian national independence.

Against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austro-Hungarian troops which supported it, mass uprisings began in order to restore the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. Of course, the reaction in Ukraine was 'water to the mill' of Communist propaganda. Moscow knew how to use this situation for its advantage. [669]

At the end of the summer of 1918, the members of the Skoropadsky Government prepared to restore 'indivisible Russia'. Skoropadsky issued an order on November 14, 1918, in which he stated that Ukraine "had the duty to fight first for the creation of an All-Russian Federation, the principal aim of which will be the restoration of Great Russia".

10. The Restoration of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1918) — The Government of the Directory 669

Against the federation of Ukraine with Russia proclaimed by Skoropadsky, and against the reactionary régime in general, the masses of the Ukrainian people arose under the leadership of the Directory, which was elected by the Ukrainian National League (15. 11. 1918). The Ukrainian National League was created by the Ukrainian democratic parties in summer 1918. The principal aim of the League was the struggle against the Russian reaction in Ukraine which prevailed there under Skoropadsky's rule. When the League received news on Skoropadsky's plans for the 'Federation' with the Russia of the White Generals, it began to prepare armed forces in due time. The National League and the Directory had as their members prominent leaders of the Ukrainian Central Council like V. Vynnychenko, S. Petlura, both members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party, M. Shapoval, Socialist-Revolutionary, and others. Summoned by the Directory, hundreds of thousands of the Ukrainian population in cities and villages joined the uprising. Only in Kiev the Skoropadsky Government held out for some time, leaning upon small detachments of Russian Monarchists and the decisive support of the German troops. On

669 December 12, 1918, a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as [661] against 'Russian followers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parliament and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian 668 National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians 186 in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the 642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

tories that had been formerly under Russian and Austrian rule. 186
The Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic issued a 642
special Act on January 22, 1919, in Kiev which declared:

"From this day, the parts of Ukraine — the Western-Ukrainian Democratic Republic, Galicia, Bukovina and Hungarian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) and the Great Ukraine on the Dnieper, unite. The ancient hopes which the best sons of Ukraine had lived and died for become reality. From now there is one indivisible independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic".

Relying on this Act, the delegation from Western Ukraine, numbering 65 people, took part in the Congress of Ukraine which had been called to Kiev on January 23, 1919.

The Western-Ukrainian Republic, from the first days of its [726]
existence, had to fight in a heavy struggle against the Poles who 728
pretended to rule in Galicia even after the dissolution of Austria. The Poles invaded the Western Ukrainian Republic after having concentrated large forces on this front. The Ukrainian Government asked the Entente Powers and the Paris Peace Conference for mediation in the Polish-Ukrainian war. In February 1919, a Mission of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia headed by the French General Berthélemy, and with the participation of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy. This Mission presented to the Poles and Ukrainians a plan for an armistice on February 28, 1919. According to this plan, until the final decision of the Peace Conference, the territory of Galicia eastwards of the Bug and Stryj Rivers should remain under Ukrainian administration, while the Western part of Galicia should be administered by the Polish authorities. The Galician territory which remained under Ukrainian administration should be recognised by the Big Powers 'de facto' as an independent state, and the Ukrainian Army should be recognised and trained with the assistance of the Entente Powers. The Ukrainian Government did not accept the demarcation line proposed by the Mission of General Berthélemy as unfavourable for Ukraine. In May 1919, a new Mission of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia, headed by General Botha (South Africa). General Botha's Mission altered the previous armistice draft, and the Ukrainian Government agreed to accept it. However, the Poles rejected this plan.

The small country — Ukrainian Galicia — had to strain all her 726
forces in order to hold the front against the whole might of Poland. From Eastern Ukraine Galicia could not receive any considerable help, because the Ukrainian forces had to fight the Skoropadsky

confusion among the masses of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrai- 669
nians who had overthrown the reactionary Skoropadsky Govern- 726
ment installed by the Germans, looked at the French troops with great distrust, for they might renew the rule of the big landowners in Ukraine. In the meantime the policy of the leaders of the French Army in Ukraine was hostile to the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The attempts of the Ukrainian Government to come to an agreement with the French were fruitless. These negotiations produced only material for Communist propaganda, that the Ukrainian Government 'sold the interests of the Ukrainian nation to the Western imperialists'. The Communist propaganda spread among the Ukrainian Army too. The consequences of this propaganda were disastrous; Ukrainian soldiers deserted the front against the Russian Red Army and some detachments even went over to the side of the Soviet Army. *Thus the French intervention supported only the growth of Communist influence in Ukraine.*

The Government of Ukraine also made attempts to come to an agreement with the Soviet Government. But Moscow remained, as always, hostile to an independent democratic Ukraine and had only one aim — to take possession of the rich Ukrainian territory. The [642] Ukrainian Government, formed in December 1918, was headed by the Social-Democrat Volodymyr Chekhivsky. This Government consisted predominantly of Socialists and had also a representative of the Jewish Social-Democratic Party (Poale-Zion), A. Revutsky, as Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority. All that did not restrain Moscow from calling the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic 'capitalist'.

To the protests of the Ukrainian Government against the attack of the Russian Red Army on Ukraine the Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin replied hypocritically: "The military actions on Ukrainian territory are a matter for the Army of the Directory and the Army of the Ukrainian Soviet Government which is entirely independent."

Against this statement the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in its wire of January 9, 1919, declared.

"The Directory sees clearly the aim of the Government of the People's Commissars; it wants to bring Ukraine, rich in grain, coal and other products, with the aid of the 'Bolshevik Soviets', under its rule and turn her into its colony."

Before the advance of the Russian Red Army the Ukrainian 726
Government was forced to leave Kiev, its capital, at the beginning 669
of February 1919. In Vinnitsa the Socialist members of the 642
Directory quitted the Government. The member of the Directory

669 and Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army, S. Petlura,
726 Social-Democrat, retired from the Party. He was elected President
of the Directory in place of Vynnychenko. A Government was
642 formed without the participation of Socialists with Prof. Serhy Ostapenko as Premier. In Ukrainian political circles there was a hope that Ostapenko's 'bourgeois' Government might more easily succeed in coming to an agreement with the French Command in Odessa than a Socialist one. But these hopes failed. The French representatives offered the Ukrainians the choice to become a part of the front of the 'White' Russians against Bolshevism. They refused to discuss the national rights of Ukraine.

The disregard of the Ukrainian national movement revanged itself gravely in the fate of the Franco-Greek troops landing on the coast of the Black Sea. The parts of the Ukrainian Army which had joined the Soviets under the command of Hrihoriev and J. Tyutyunnyk, attacked the Franco-Greek landing forces. These detachments took, on March 1, 1919, Kherson, and on March, 15, Nikolayev, and in the first days of April, Odessa, forcing the French to embark. Thus, because of not fully understanding the Ukrainian problem, the French representatives, through their orientation towards 'White Russia', in spring 1919, helped actually Soviet Russia to occupy Ukrainian territory. By this they strengthened the hopes of the Russian Communists for 'world revolution'. Russian Communists thought that in Ukraine 'the fate of world revolution is being decided'; the title of a book published in 1919 in Moscow was *Where the Fate of World Revolution Is Being Decided.* From Ukraine the Soviet Russian Government planned to send aid through Rumania to the Hungarian Communists, who had proclaimed a Soviet Rupublic in Budapest on 21. 3. 1919. These plans of the Soviet Russian Government failed, for a that very time mass risings and the struggle of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic stopped the advance of the Soviet Russian troops to the West.

642 The Government of Ostapenko, without the participation of
669 Socialists, called 'Cabinet of Agreement with the Entente', was replaced on April 9, 1919, by a new Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic composed of Socialists headed by the Social-Democrat Borys Martos. This Government announced its intention to depend on the own forces of the Ukrainian nation itself. At that time, when the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic remained in the Western provinces of Ukraine (Podolia, Volhynia, Galicia), in Central Ukraine, on the Dnieper River mass uprisings against the Russian Communists developed. Even groups of Ukrai-

nian Communists who wished to create an independent Soviet Ukraine participated in these uprisings. The policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine had a clearly predatory character. The Communist Commissar Schlicher said of the tasks of the Soviet Russian campaign at a session of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919: 642 669

"You all remember that when Ukraine was becoming Soviet with every day of the advance of the Red Army we became easier in our minds; the rich-in-bread Ukraine is ours! . . . We have four central supply detachments. We set all hopes on them. We have a lot of workers we have sent out who will be able to overflow all Ukrainian villages. We shall always remember that the looks of the proletariat of Russia are turned towards Ukraine" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 2: Kharkov, 1928).

Not only by the ruthless pillage were the Ukrainian people put against the Russian Communist dictatorship; by its nationalist policy, too, it roused great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians. The Rumanian Communist Rakovsky, who was appointed by Moscow as Premier of the Soviet Government of Ukraine, declared that the Ukrainian language and culure were 'petty bourgeois' and that the use of the Ukrainian language in public institutions was necessary only for 'Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries'. [186] 656 191

For this reason the 'dictatorship of the Russian culture' was introduced in Ukraine by the Russian Communists as a 'proletarian' one. "The Soviet Government in Ukraine in 1918 made in fact Russian the official language", — writes the Communist N. Popov in his *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine* (1929). Against the declaraions of an 'independent Soviet Ukraine', the Rakovsky Government proclaimed the 'federation' of Ukraine with Russia. There could not be free elections to the Soviets in Ukraine. The power in the villages was given to the 'Comittees of Poor Peasants' consisting often of people sent from Russia. According to the instruction these Comittees were given they had the duty — "to fulfil precisely and relentlessly all orders of the supply authorities . . ."

13. Risings in Ukraine

In spring 1919, when the Soviet Army had reached the Dniester River, Moscow prepared its forces for the support of Soviet Hungary. But at that time the same troops who had fought against the Franco-Greek forces under the command of Hrihoriev, Tyutyunnyk and others, started the fight against the Russian Communists. Of the strength of this movement Rakovsky, Premier of 669

nian territories. This Polish policy held the Ukrainian 726
military forces that were fighting against the Russian Red Army constantly in tension, and hindered the work of the Ukrainian Government.

The Ukrainian Galician Army took part in the struggle against the Soviet Russian occupation immediately after the termination of the war with the Poles. The Galician Ukrainians wanted to strengthen the Ukrainian state on the Dnieper, together with the forces of Eastern Ukraine, in order to decide later the historic quarrel for Galicia with Poland.

15. Ukraine between 'Red' and 'White' Russia (1919)

In June 1919, the Ukrainian Government, headed by the Social- 642
Democrat Martos (from August Isaac Mazepa, Social-Democrat, 563
was Prime Minister), took up its residence in Kamenets in Podolia. The united Ukrainian Armies were under the command of General Yunakiw, former Professor of the Military Academy in Petersburg. The Government of Ukraine made efforts to secure legality and order in its territory, particularly it resolutely fought the excesses of various dark elements against the Jewish population. In the Government of theUkrainian Democratic Republic there was a special Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority — Pinkhos Krasny (Jewish People's Party); the deputy Minister of Labour was the Jewish Social-Democrat Prof. Salomon Goldelman.

The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against Russian Bolshevism 669
as well as the entire Ukrainian problem were in 1919 unknown to the world. Against the Ukrainian liberation movement Communist propaganda was made throughout the world, trying to describe the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as a reactionary state. On the other hand, the propaganda of the Russian 'Whites' and of the Poles permeated decisive political circles abroad resulting in the conviction that the Ukrainian movement was the same as Russian Bolshevism. Therefore the Ukrainian Republic which had led a heroic struggle against Soviet Russia was blockaded by the Western Great Powers as 'infected by Bolshevism'. Because of this [705]
blockade the Ukrainian Army was in want of arms, supplies, medicaments. Only by contraband from Rumania was it possible to receive something for the Ukrainian armed forces. Under these circumstances it happened frequently that the Ukrainian Army fought with arms captured on the front from the enemy. But in spite of all these difficulties the united Army of the Ukrainian Republic had considerable successes in the battles with the Soviet Russian troops and, on August 31, 1919, took Kiev, the capital of

though this population had accepted in a friendly manner the Soviet 728
rule, hoping for an improvement of their situation. When Rumania 661
in alliance with Germany joined the war against USSR in 1941, the [726]
Rumanian authorities on their part terrorised the Ukrainian population of Bukovina and Bessarabia. At the end of the war Bukovina and Bessarabia were joined with USSR again. The Communist terror turned with even greater vehemence against the Ukrainians there. Especially from Bukovina a great part of the Ukrainian population had been deported into the Eastern regions of the USSR. The cities were filled with foreign elements, colonists from Russia were brought into the villages.

3. The Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine)

After 1919 Carpatho-Ukraine, which had been for centuries 563
under Hungarian rule, was attached to Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian population of this country consists mostly of peasants. The towns had a Jewish and Hungarian population. The Czech authorities in Carpatho-Ukraine (official name Carpatho-Ruthenia) favoured for some time the development of Ukrainian schools. But [191]
from 1925 the Prague Government began to support the Russophile group that despised the Ukrainian language as 'peasant' and used a strange mixture of the Church-Slavonic, Ukrainian, and Russian languages. In reality, these 'Russophiles' were adherents of Hungary and received support from Budapest too. The entire administration in Carpatho-Ukraine came into the hands of the Czech bureaucracy. According to the Treaty of Saint Germain, Carpatho-Ukraine was guaranteed autonomy inside the boundaries of CSR, but the Czechoslovakian Government permanently deferred its realisation.

At the end of 1938 Germany launched strong pressure against Czechoslovakia exploiting the national problem of this country, (Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians). The Prague Government changed the centralistic Constitution to a federative one. For the Carpathian Ukraine the Prague Government recognised an autonomous statute with a separate Diet and Government. Against this the neighbour states — Hungary and
Poland — reacted vehemently. In February 1939, the elections to 642
the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine took place. After the separation of 726
Slovakia from Bohemia the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed the independence of this country (March 16, 1939). But with Hitler's and Mussolini's consent the Hungarian troops occupied Carpatho-Ukraine after stubborn fighting against the Ukrainian volunteers.

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phils) of being the result of German intrigue.[1] This again gave rise to a pamphlet, by L. Tschelski, issued in Sofia (1915) by the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, entitled *Is the Ukrainian Movement a German Intrigue?* The Russian Government took severe measures against the members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, who, including the chief leader, Hrushevski, were banished to Siberia, or were forbidden to enter Russia from abroad.

(D) Fourth Period: Since the Russian Revolution of 1917

(*a*) *The Ukraine becomes independent.*—One of the first questions which faced the Provisional Government at the beginning of the Russian Revolution was the demand for an amnesty for the Ukrainian Nationalist offenders, who were allowed to return from Siberia and abroad. Next came the demand for Ukrainian autonomy and the appointment of a special Minister for Ukrainian Affairs, presented by a deputation sent from Kiev to Petrograd on April 6, 1917. Soon afterwards the first Ukrainian National Congress was convened at Kiev (April 19–22), at which some 800 members representative of the *intelligentsia* and the Social Revolutionaries were present. They elected a Central Rada, and declared for an autonomous Ukrainian republic under a Russian federal republic. Professor Hrushevski was elected President. The territory claimed for the Ukrainian state corresponded roughly to the western parts of the Governments of Lublin and Grodno, and the whole of the Governments of Kiev, Poltava, Kherson, Volhynia, Kharkov, Podolia, Yekaterinoslav, and Chernigov, and excluded the Austrian Ukraine. The Congresses of the Ukrainian Soldiers (May 5–7) and of the Ukrainian Peasants (May–June) supported the Rada at this time. But the Petrograd

[1] In answer to a pamphlet by Tschelski, *No Liberator, but an Oppressor of Nations: How Russia freed the Ukraine.* L.L.U., Sofia, 1914.

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668 Government refused to recognize the decisions of the
642 Rada, and thereby strengthened a group of separatists hitherto supported only by the second Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress (June 7). The Rada now issued (June 24) a *Universale*, proclaiming that henceforth the Ukrainian Rada would control Ukrainian affairs and work in federation with the All-Russian Parliament when this should be established; and on June 30 an executive body of the Rada, called the General Secretariat, was appointed.

This step caused anxiety to the Petrograd Government; and on July 12–14 two members of the Duma, Tereschenko and Tseretelli, and subsequently Kerenski, went to Kiev. While granting most of the Ukrainian demands, Kerenski opposed the demand for the formation of a Ukrainian army on the ground that it would mean the break-up of the Russian army. The favourable attitude adopted by Kerenski towards Ukrainian demands caused a split in the Provisional Government of Petrograd; and the Cadets left the Cabinet on July 16.

The reorganized Provisional Government decided to
[669] grant autonomy to the Ukraine, but on July 19 a social revolution broke out in Kiev, and the help of the Provisional Government was sought by the Rada for the restoration of order. But before the formal recognition of Ukrainian autonomy by the Provisional Government, which took place on August 17, other riots broke out in Kiev, this time among the Russian or russified town population, who protested against the 'ukrainization' of South Russia. The recognition of the Provisional Government meant that, until the summoning of the Constituent Assembly, the General Secretariat of the Ukraine was the recognized authority controlling finance, commerce, industry, agriculture, labour, and other domestic affairs. All measures had to be submitted to the Provisional Government. The Ukraine was to consist of the Governments of Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Poltava, and Chernigov; the other Governments mentioned above could be included if

their *zemstvos* so desired. But this measure of autonomy was not accepted. The Rada on August 24 declined to send representatives to the National Council at Moscow, expressed the wish for a separate Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, and asked the Provisional Government to define more clearly its own position.

Meanwhile Russian public opinion, even in revolutionary circles, strongly resented the Ukrainian movement. The resentment was expressed in the communication of the Russian War Office to the *Russkoye-Slovo* of September 2, 1917, in which it was alleged that the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine was conducting espionage in Russia on behalf of Germany, and a separatist Ukrainian propaganda among the Russian prisoners of war, that it was in the pay of the German Foreign Office, and that it was giving help to the German armies. To this communication a reply was given by MM. Melenevski and A. Skoropis-Yelturovski, members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, on October 25, 1917, in Stockholm, in which it was stated that the Austrian and German Governments had no part in the foundation of the League, which had been created in Eastern Galicia with the help of the Ukrainian immigrants; that the League based its hopes on the victory of the Central Powers over Russia; that they expressed the wish that the Central Powers should occupy the Ukraine; that they hoped the Ukraine would be fully independent and essentially democratic; that they carried on a cultural war among the Ukrainian prisoners of war in Germany without the help of the Germans; that the German spy of Ukrainian nationality, Yermolenko, had no connexion with the League; and lastly, that the League accepted money from all friends of the Ukraine, including the German Government, and intended to raise a loan from the German Government.

Then came the fall of the Provisional Government. In the Kerenski-Kornilov affair of 1917 the General Secretariat as well as the Soldiers' and Workmen's Councils of the Ukraine sent their loyal assurances to

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668 the Provisional Government. The idea of forming
642 part of a Russian federal republic was still powerful in the Rada; and on September 26, 1917, a conference of forty different nationalities had met at Kiev to discuss the question of local autonomies under a federal system. Preparations for a Constituent Assembly, which was to include 22 members from the Ukraine and 17 from the Don Cossacks, were set on foot; while propaganda was carried on by the ultra-nationalists and the internationalists, i.e. the Soviets, with a view to boycotting the Russian Constituent Assembly.

642 In November 1917, after Kerenski's Government had been replaced by the Bolshevik Soviets, the Ukraine on the whole was much more in favour of the latter than were the Don Cossacks, who formed on November 9 a confederation of a more conservative character. To save its position among the masses, the Rada underwent a rapid process of evolution, and on November 20 published a *Universale* of a radical character. It proclaimed the 'Ukrainian People's Republic', abolished all private ownership of land, introduced State control of production and an eight-hour day in all factories, removed the death penalty from the statute book, and finally expressed a hope that the Ukrainian National Republic would be federated with the Russian Republic. By doing this the Rada hoped to check Soviet interference; it failed to do so; and from December 19 serious differences between the Rada and the Soviet Government in
642 Petrograd became apparent. The Soviet Government
726 at Petrograd accused the Rada of giving support to the Cadets and of siding with the Don Cossacks in their hostility to the Bolsheviks; while the Rada declared itself a body elected by Revolutionary Democrats in the Ukraine, and refused to co-operate with the Bolsheviks or to send delegates with them to Brest-Litovsk. It finally declared, on December 24, that, as the Russian army was disorganized, it would take military measures for the defence of its borders. Some of the Ukrainian forces mobilized at that time joined

the Russian armies on the Rumanian and south-western fronts. The Soviet Government therefore began to organize the Red Guards against the Rada, which by that time had completed its negotiations with Germany, and on December 27 had sent the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada to Brest-Litovsk. The delegation was composed of Hrushevski, Holubowich, Vinnitchenko, and Petlura, while the intermediary between them and the Austro-German authorities was Wassilko, a member of the Reichsrat and Count Czernin's adviser on Ukrainian affairs. 642 728

On January 11, 1918, the delegates of the Ukrainian Republic were formally recognized at Brest by the Central Powers. This recognition was interpreted by the Rada as meaning the recognition of Ukrainian independence. Vinnitchenko boasted that the French Government had made a gold loan and printed paper money for the Ukraine, and that the Western allies would soon recognize its independence. (The Allied Mission to the Ukraine, sent in December 1917, was interpreted by the Ukrainians as implying such a recognition.) But, while successful at Brest, the Rada's authority in Kiev was shaken by the frequent risings of the Ukrainians of the Soviets (especially at Odessa on January 17 and 28); and the Petrograd Soviets supported the latter, demanding that they should be represented in the Ukrainian delegation. On January 26 the Government at Petrograd broke off relations with the Rada, 'until it is replaced by a Rada of Soviets'. To strengthen its position at Brest, the Rada, on January 28, declared, by 508 votes to 4, for the complete independence of the Ukraine.

(*b*) *German Occupation.*—On February 9 the 'Bread' peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one hand, and the 'Ukrainian People's Republic' (the Rada) on the other. At the same time, however, the report arrived that the Rada had been suppressed by Soviet troops, who declared it to be 'but a sad memory'. On February 20 the British Chargé-d'affaires in Russia 727 642

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denied that Great Britain had recognized the Ukraine as an independent state; while Mr. Balfour gave the same assurance to a member of the Polish National Committee in London, that body having protested against the boundaries of the new state, and against the assigning of Cholm to the Ukraine.

Meanwhile the Russian Soviet army was supporting the Ukrainian Soviets; it forced the Rada to take refuge (March 1) in Jitomir (Volhynia). The Rada now sought protection from the Central Powers. Dr. Seidler made a statement to this effect on March 2 in the Austrian Reichsrat, and soon afterwards the Germans occupied the north-eastern and the Austrians the southern Ukraine. On March 14 the *Vossische Zeitung* declared the Rada to be re-established at Kiev, and ready to ratify the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. But in fact, although the Rada wanted German support in their fight against the Soviets, they could not act against their own people and agree to all the German demands. From the end of March the Germans fought the Soviet troops in the Ukraine, while on the other hand they seized the food supplies of the non-Soviet Ukrainians. The food crisis reached its climax in the middle of April, when the Rada ceased to support the armies of occupation.

Consequently, on April 28, the Ukrainian Rada Government was overthrown by the armies of occupation; and General Skoropadski, a Russian of Ukrainian descent, was placed at the head of affairs, with the title of Hetman. The Rada having refused to abdicate, the Germans on May 7 arrested its members, and attempted to secure the support of the great landowners in their efforts to obtain food. The German Field-Marshal von Eichhorn published a decree re-establishing private ownership of land on a large scale, disarmed the Ukrainian regiments, and organized an army obedient to himself. The opposition to the Germans and to the Hetman Skoropadski, who had dictatorial power and was supported by all who were in favour of the pre-revolutionary regime or were afraid of social

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strife, inspired such desperate acts as burning stores of grain, and aroused Socialist protests in the Austrian Reichsrat. Meanwhile the Moscow Soviet Government came to an agreement with the Ukrainian Rada (May 23), and recognized the Ukraine as an independent state. On June 13–14 the Russo-Ukrainian armistice was formally signed. 642 727

On May 24 a peasant rising broke out all over the Ukraine owing to the drastic measures of the German military officials, who declared the country in a state of siege; the rising was directed against the Germans and the big landowners, who regarded the German army as militia to be used against social disturbances and anarchy. The objects of this rising were stated in the manifesto of the Peasants' Congress at Kiev on June 7. The congress demanded (1) that a Hetman chosen by landowners should be deposed; (2) that the Ukraine should be a 'People's Republic'; (3) that no land should be returned to proprietors; and (4) that a Legislative Assembly should be convoked. This assembly the peasants agreed to support, appealing to the Germans not to oppose the People's Republic. However, the German troops in occupation continued to suppress strife among the peasants and to collect food by severe means, the result being that Von Eichhorn was assassinated in Kiev on July 30. 642 727 669

The Ukraine now became the battleground of five propagandist forces—pro-German, pro-Ally, pro-Russian Federalist, Bolshevik, and Separatist-Nationalist. The Austrian authorities arranged for the evacuation of Lvov by the Polish troops, and the Ukrainians (Ruthenians) seized the city (October 31) and held it for about a month, during which they are said to have had the help of the Ukrainians from Volhynia as well as of the Austrian officers. The Ukrainian (Ruthenian) National Council stated that it had taken over the administration of Eastern Galicia. The Polish Galician Liquidation Commission, established after the retirement of the Austrian authorities, opposed the Ukrainian claims.

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(c) *The Ukraine since the Armistice.*—The government of Skoropadski lasted for a short time after the signing of the armistice in Western Europe; and the conservative elements in the Ukraine, whether Ukrainians, Poles, or Russians, wished that the Western Allies should support Skoropadski and send a fresh army of occupation to replace the German army. Hoping for an Allied recognition, and under pressure from the peasants, Skoropadski introduced some democratic reforms, and dissolved the Germanophil cabinet of Lyssogub. The old Rada, however, reorganized itself into a Directory with Vinnitchenko and Petlura at its head, and replaced Skoropadski's government on December 14, 1918.

as its center. It dealt heavy blows to the Polish-Lithuanian state in the middle of the seventeenth century. The arrows leading from Bazadenk to Lwów point out the direction taken by the army of Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki to Poland./ /Key inside map: ⁝⁝⁝⁝ National boundaries. ⁝⁝⁝⁝ Provincial boundaries. ++++ Western boundaries of the Ukrainian voivodeships in Poland. ←←← Campaign of Bogdan Chmielnicki against Poland in the year 1648. ◇ Cossack regimental command. * Seat of the military order "sech".

/57/ In the "Death Quadrangle"

"In a piercing, frosty north wind" on November 16, 1919 there marched passed each other in the quadrangle of death, silently, without a military salute, the fragmentary, wretched, barefoot detachments of the West Ukrainian supporting troops and the likewise fragmentary, wretched, barefoot East Ukrainian front-rank troops. The former were going east into the East Podolian area of concentration where the remnants of the West Ukrainian army were to capitulate before the 'Pan-Russians'; the others were going west to Central Volhynia where they were to surrender to the Poles. Both left behind the same landmarks along their way: frozen corpses in the ditches." (39) This was the

39. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism in the Years 1918 to 1923, page 389.

funeral march of the last soldiers of the West Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic.

The episode of the new Ukrainian statehood began with the March Revolution in Russia in 1917. In March 22, 1917, a few days after the revolution in Moscow, the "Ukrainian Central Council" was formed in Kiyev, consisting of representatives of

668 the parties. At the same time the process of making
642 Ukrainians of the various divisions of the troops on
175 the front began, so that within a few months the Central Council had about one and one-half to two million Ukrainian soldiers at their disposal. But in spite of this enormous army, the Central Council by and large yielded to the orders of the Kerenskii government of Moscow. Its further policy is characterized by the four manifestoes which it issued up to the time of its dissolution in April 1919. On June 23, 1917 the first manifesto of the Central Council announced the autonomy of the Ukraine. It was to maintain its own parliament, the Central Council, and a /58/ government, the general secretariat. On July sixteenth the second manifesto followed, giving particulars as to what was meant by autonomy, and containing an emphatic declaration for confederacy. In its manifesto of November 19, 1917 after Lenin had already stepped into power, the Central Council still clung to the union with Moscow. Again in this "Universal"-that was what the manifestoes were called - which proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic, there was mention of federation with Moscow. On December fourteenth the Council of
648 People's Commissars in Moscow recognized "the
175 Ukrainian People's Republic and its right to separate completely from Russia or to enter negotiations for a federation or similar relationships." But in the same document of recognition the Council of People's Commissars laid down the condition that the disarming of Red troops in the Ukraine would have to cease and that the Central Council would have to desist from its "counter-revolutionary activity". Should the People's Commissars fail to obtain a satisfactory answer to this demand within 48 hours, "the Council of People's Commissars would assume that the Central Council was in a state of open warfare against the Soviet government." A few days after this recognition coupled with an ultimatum Bolshevik troops broke into the Ukraine. In Khar'kov there was formed a Ukrainian-Bolshevik counter-government, and Moscow's

668 175 destitute mass of humanity, as yet incapable of self-administration, a much too small middle class and a corrupt reactionary society at the head,- these were the elements of the hetman state. But it was the hetman's doom that, for lack of a national Ukrainian conservative stratum, he was obliged to lean more and more on the old domiciled Russian circles who in the end completely won over the Ukrainian head of the state to their reactionary plans. On November 14, 1918 Skoropadskyj set 642 648 175 up an Old Russian government in Kiyev and announced the federation of the Ukraine with a czarist Russia which, however, was never again to arise. Twenty-four hours after the announcement of the annexation of the Ukraine to this fictitious czarist Russia, the revolt of the "Ukrainian National League" against Skoropadskyj and the Old Russian counter-revolutionaries broke out. There begins the period of the second Ukrainian People's Republic, at the head of which is a five-man governing board. At the end of the /61/ seven-month rule of Skoropadskyj, after his flight from the new Ukrainian government, he made the following confession in his last manifesto of December 14, 1918: "God did not give me the strength to attain my goal."

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In the meantime Austria-Hungary also approached its dissolution. On October 10, 1918 in the Imperial Council of Vienna, the Ukrainian parliamentarians from Galicia demanded the right of self-government for the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary; it was only a few days before the collapse of the Empire. On the eighteenth of October the Ukrainian members of the Imperial Council and the Diet in Lwów founded the Ukrainian National Council which on the following day proclaimed the union of all Ukrainian territories in Austria-Hungary. The National Council set up three executive committees and therewith imagined it had done all that

was necessary. Then they believed a telegram of 642
the Western powers containing the confirmation or 648
the order to make use of self-government and found 175
the West Ukrainian state would come fluttering into the house. The parliamentarians who received their political education in the lobbies of the Imperial Council building had complete faith in the magic formula of self-government and were waiting to see what the Western powers would have to say. Action was taken only by several companies of East Galician-Ukrainian troops who in the night of the first of November seized Lwów in a surprise attack. The Galician capital was predominantly inhabited by Poles and Jews, and the Poles immediately countered with a revolt. The Ukrainian National Council was still waiting patiently; it had made no real preparations to take over power in Galicia. Thus its appeals must be directed to the anonymous masses, "To everyone", with the request that they lend a helping hand everywhere and intervene everywhere. Finally on November ninth the government, the temporary state secretariat, was formed and the division of governmental power very neatly handled. The /62/ National Council was to make the laws, the State Secretariat was to see that they were enforced. Then the order was given that all "necessary steps be taken to unite all the Ukrainian provinces into one state". The new state called itself the "West Ukrainian People's Republic". Its alliance with the East "Ukrainian People's Republic" was solemnly announced on January 22, 1919 in Kiyev. The West Ukrainian People's Republic was given the name "Western Territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic". In reality, however, conditions remained as before between the West Ukrainian and the East Ukrainian state, in spite of formal amalgamation. Both states continued to be independent allies, small West Ukraine being the stronger.

The West Ukrainian state was obliged from the beginning to reckon with opponents who were

642 648 175 bent on the most extreme measures. Roman Dmovski, chairman of the Polish National Committee founded in Paris during the war and leader of the Polish delegation at the peace negotiations, was the most bitter enemy of any kind of Ukrainian state. He countered the partition of Great Russia at Brest Litovsk with the partitioning of the Ukraine. It was completely in accordance with his ideas when as early as February 28, 1918, after Brest Litovsk, the Paris National Committee decided completely to destroy Ukrainian state in East Europe at any cost. To this end Polish agents in Paris, London and Washington used all their powers of persuasion on leading politicians and newspapers. They wisely suppressed the fact that Polish plans secretly included the entire Ukraine west of the Dniepr which had fallen to Russia in the partitions of Poland. These opponents of independent Ukrainian state were augmented: the Polish army of General Haller, which was formed in the summer of 1918 on French soil and which was recognized as the "confederate army" on the twenty-eighth of September, arrived in Poland.

West Ukraine could be nothing more than booty or a tool in the hands of the Allies. Inasmuch as France /63/ wanted to build up against Germany a Poland that was as strong as possible, it was best that Poland subjugate West Ukraine and thus exclude any threat from the rear. Only Foch for a time entertained the plan of erecting a Ukrainian vassal state and of throwing in its soldiers against the Bolsheviks. For the English Liberals, West Ukraine was an object of barter which could be used as an extortionary measure against the French, or, if there was no other way, could be made into a mandate state under the supervision of the League of Nations.

648 175 The fiercest enemies of the East Ukrainian statehood, however, were the Bolsheviks who, fully aware of the fateful significance of a loss of the

648 Ukraine for the Muscovite realm, strained every
175 effort to fight for the country. The Pan-Russian counter-revolutionary armies also proved themselves opponents not to be underestimated. "The campaigns of Denikin, Kolchak, Iudenich and other Russian generals clearly proved that there were only two forces fighting in the Russian civil war: the old Czarist absolutism against the new Bolshevik despotism. And both of them fought with equal ferocity against the Ukraine." (41)

41. Danko: The Nation in Soviet Chains, page 25.

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726 A surprise attack of the Ukrainian troops
on Lwów set off the Polish-West Ukrainian War.
175 For weeks wild fighting raged in the streets of the city; finally the Poles succeeded in bringing in troops and forcing the Ukrainians out of Lwów during the night of November 22, 1918. The victors exercised bloody reprisals on the Ukrainian population; they destroyed Ukrainian property and dragged many respected citizens into concentration camps from which they were never to return. The Jews expiated for their neutrality with a three-day pogrom, during which whole blocks of houses went up in flames.

After the loss of Lwów, the West Ukrainian
[631] state included about 40,000 square kilometers with
•642 four million /64/ inhabitants, among them three
648 million Ukrainians. To destroy this dwarf state
726 was the firm intention of the leaders of the Polish
175 state of eighteen million. The Ukrainian government now had its seat at Stanislawów; Dr. Ievgen Petrushevych was the head of the state. He and many other men who were responsible for the fate of West Ukraine still regarded it as "an incident, a misunderstanding, an error" that there was any fighting at all between Poles and Ukrainians. Heedless of the front which was expanding day by

642 648 726 175 day and of the increasingly bloody battles, they abandoned themselves to the illusion that these misunderstandings would merely have to be cleared up and all would be well. They believed that patience was required until the Allies carried out the right of self-government for which the Ukrainians alone were obliged to fight with weapons. "The fact that individual destinies must be determined by the will of the individual - such points of view which are so familiar to conquering nations, were completely foreign to the 'Ukrainian National Council', all the more since there was not a single, in any way outstanding, personality in leading political circles, who would have been capable in a critical situation to grasp the reins and direct events." (42)

42. Kuchabskyj: West Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 52.

175 726 The war which at the beginning was carried on with a few thousand men on both sides was in full force by the end of December. At this time the Ukrainians successfully mobilized their fighting manpower up to 35 years of age. Then, however, they made the mistake of abandoning warfare in the open country and of leaving the initiative to the Poles who, in keeping with their reckless methods, made use of it. In spite of the fact that the Ukrainian front which ran northward from the Carpathians presented considerable deficiencies along its approximately 250-kilometer length, that the battalions, for example, were strung together loosely and without a unified supreme command, nevertheless the Polish troops which arrived from mid-January on suffered heavy defeats. Thus General Romer /Facing page 64/ /Above: A typical Ukrainian church made of wood, in the Carpathians. Below: Ukrainian peasant woman baking bread./ /Facing page 65/ /The Ukrainian landscape is full

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[This plate not processed for files — Analyst]

[Ruthenians]

728 ies in Austria and boundaries of the various gub-
631 ermyas in Russia./

/81/

Fair Play

186 In the winter of 1938/39 the Ukrainian peasants in Poland were no longer recognizable. If after the pacification of 1930 they went about for many years bent and timid like beaten dogs, they now carried their heads higher. It was as though they felt a fresh breeze, and whenever they had business with Polish officials they omitted expressions of due respect, in fact they became cynical. They stood around in groups, talked in the most animated fashion, nudged each other meaningfully and sometimes laughed out loud.

[186] What happened? Since the end of October
101 1938, there was the "Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy"
•642 beyond the Carpathians. There on the southern slopes of the Carpathians live the Ukrainian tribes of Lemki, Boyki and the Huzul. On poor soil they eke out a precarious living as small farmers, woodsmen and shepherds. In the warmer season many of them hire themselves out as harvest workers in the fertile Hungarian lowlands, and there they also trade in carriage grease. Before the First World War they shipped salt to Warsaw and fruit even as far as Moscow. Ruthenia, as their little country was once called, always belonged to the Kingdom bearing the crown of Stephen. After the downfall of the Hapsburg monarchy Czech insatiability succeeded in having "Carpatho-Russia" - that is what Ruthenia was now called - assigned to the Czechs by the edict of Saint-Germain. The "autonomy" which the little country was promised on paper in the edict remained an unfulfilled dream for its inhabitants. "Carpatho-Russia" was a province abounding in forests, which Prague could and would exploit. It was only after the solution of the Sudeten

[Ruthenians]

101 crisis when the centralistic /82/power of the
642 Czechs slackened and the Slovaks stubbornly insisted on their autonomy, that the "Carpatho-Ukrainians" - this is the name they henceforth adopted - were also granted a certain autonomy.

186 This seeming independence, nothing more than a weak, short-lived light which the Hungarian storm was to blow out only a few months later, in March 1939, sufficed, however to nourish vigorously the hopes of West Ukrainians north of the Carpathians. Therefore Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy was more important to them than sunshine and rain. This was the great event which they were discussing and on account of which they even neglected their fields. Just as all Ukrainians from the Kuban to the Carpathians honor the same heroes in their common folksongs, the seafarers of the Rus and the Cossacks of the sech, just as they shared the experience and the suffering of the wars of liberation between 1917 and 1923, so they now regarded as their own good fortune the fact that a piece of land, if only a small one, was apparently under independent Ukrainian administration.

In Ruska Lane and on the "Ring" in Lwów the newly-awakened Ukrainian self-awareness made itself felt in demonstrations. In the middle of October and the beginning of November 1938, the Ukrainians of Lwów protested against the foes of the "Silver Land". Not only in the Galician metropolis, but also in Przemysl, in Stryj, in all of West Ukrainia, the Ukrainians mustered: cries of abuse against Poland and cries of "Slava Ukrajini!" - "Glory to - the Ukraine!" - were heard, and the national anthem was repeated innumerable times. It did not cool the hot passions to have Poles on these occasions beat to death a few Ukrainians or shoot them down. The fever of hope that they might shake off Polish domination seized them. Ukrainian daily papers filled their front pages exclusively with reports from Carpatho-Ukraine.

661 general secretary of the KPU, Kossier, was appar-
665 ently justified in saying: "The fact that we have
000 shattered nationalism, /Facing page 120/ /Ukrainian girl drawing water./*/Facing page 121/ /What a wealth of imagination and highly developed skill is disclosed in these pretty handmade national costumes!/*/121/ that we have organized our work properly in the country, this has determined our successes in the year 1933." (67)

67. Izvestiia" Number 19 and Number 20, 1934, in Nation und Staat, page 107.

000 Several years later these fierce foes of the Ukrainian people were themselves to be "unmasked". They were, for example, the friend of Postyshev, Ioina Iakir, at that time supreme commander of the Red Army in the Ukraine who had raged furiously against the nationalists at the Seventeenth Congress, and the People's Commissar Tsatonskyj who was shot in 1937 because of counterrevolutionary activities. Tastonskyj's successor, Khomenko, was relieved of his office on April 9, 1939.

642 From the time that Moscow once more obtained for itself, with bullet and bayonet, a separatist Ukraine, the freedom of the country has been constantly curtailed. When the period of "integral centralization" with the Five Year Plans, began the branch office of the Foreign Commissariat in Khar'kov was eliminated, the Ukrainians were removed from leading positions in economy and the government, and the individual commissariats and whatever important commanding positions there were, were little by little turned over to Moscow.

The democratic Constitution of November 1936 tops the skyscraper of integral centralism. Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution are merely a gesture, according to which "every Soviet republic exercises supreme power quite as a matter of course"

*[For plates, cf. pp. 221-222, category 116 - Analyse]

642 and "every republic of the Union has its constitution which takes into consideration the peculiarities of this republic..."; and Article 17 which avers that "every republic of the Union retains the right of voluntary withdrawal from the USSR" is merely an empty phrase, for the laws of the entire Bolshevik realm have equal power in all the federated republics and take precedence over the laws of the federated republics. Anyone who would dare to put into effect in his federated state the "right of voluntary withdrawal" from the Union, would be presented with Article 133 of the same Constitution, which says: "Defending his country is the /122/ most sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Treason like violating an oath, going over to the enemy, damaging the military forces of the state and espionage will be avenged as the greatest crime with all the force of the law." If it should occur to a Ukrainian to agitate for the right of voluntary withdrawal from the Union of his federated republic, which is "guaranteed" him in Article 17, Article 123 could be cited to prevent him from doing so, which makes punishable "any propaganda of a racial or nationally exclusive nature".

642 645 Now, what is the "independent exercise of supreme power" in the Ukraine like? Article 77 of the Constitution[1] clarifies this point, the People's Commissariats of Moscow are alone competent in matters pertaining to defense, foreign policy, foreign trade, traffic, the entire postal system, heavy industry and defense industry. But since the Constitution went into effect further commissariats of the Federated Republics have been subordinated to the Moscow offices, so that only education, local industry, municipal economy and social welfare have remained in Ukrainian hands. These are subject to the supervision of the national office. Under such circumstances it does not matter how the administrative system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is built up,

1 [i.e. of November 1936 — Analyst]

642 inasmuch as the entire governmental hierarchy
645 from the village council /soviet/to the head of the state is merely a body of sheriffs whose duty is to see that the orders from Moscow are carried out.

000 In place of the nationalization of non-Russian peoples, which was given up in 1930, there have come up since 1936 the slogans about the "common socialistic fatherland", the "great Soviet people", the "love of the Soviet homeland". Besides that, the theory of the Russian people as the "leading people of the Revolution" is being quite systematically disseminated. The chauvinism of Great Russia which Stalin so mercilessly exposed to shame at the Party Congress of 1930 bids fair /123/ to recapturing for the Great Russian people the same position it had at the time of the White Czars.

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871 Since Ukrainization was discontinued,[7] the education of Ukrainian youth goes on strictly according to the principles of the Marx-Lenin doctrine. Woe to the educator against whom it can be proved that he is departing from this course. Thousands of scholars and pedagogues had to give up their lives because of such mistakes.

The basic type of school in Soviet Ukraine, just as throughout the Soviet realm, is the "seven-grade work school" which roughly corresponds to an elementary school. Attendance in the four lower grades is obligatory, in the three higher ones, voluntary. The young Ukrainian, after he has graduated from the work school, may enter the "professional school" (a sort of technical school) or the "workers' school" for factory apprentices. The adult worker may enroll as auditor in the "workers' academy". There are also "Party schools", such as the "Pan-Ukrainian Institute for Communist Education", and, in place

7 [At the 16th All-Union Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union in June 1930 - Analyst]

474 attempt has been made to increase the /158/comrades' interest in the kolhosp by means of prizes.

The most recent development of the Communist village group is characterized by the fact that the farmers tacitly divide up the collective land among themselves. Such a thing is possible only if the kolhosp officials and the village Soviets are in collusion, and if there are free acres besides the lands that are cultivated by the MTS. The Communist is January 29, 1939 confirms this development when it says that in the district of Shmerynka 145 farmers owned more animals than are permissible according to law, and 135 farmers more land than is allowed. The farmers work very industriously on their own land, whereas they neglect the collective farms. At the conference of the Central Committee of the KPU the law passed in April 1939, limiting the ownership of property of the collective farmers - "law against the waste of land" - was discussed, and it was noted that in many districts collective land was divided up. It was said that in this way private ownership of land had reappeared in hidden form. Finally the Visti of June 22, 1939 announced that the "regulation of peasant property" was to take place by November 15, 1939; "regulation", however, means a recent curtailment of peasant private ownership which had been permitted since 1934. This curtailment was also in the interests of the industrial section of Soviet economy, after many workers, mostly peasant sons, went back to their native villages from the industrial areas, because they found better living conditions there.

/159/ Coal, Ore, Petroleum, Workers

•642 All the conditions which, according to the teachings of Karl Marx, ought to contribute to the happiness of the workers are fulfilled in the Soviet Union and therefore also in Soviet Ukraine.

642 On one-sixth of the world all the treasures within the earth and all that grows on top of it belong to the workers, as well as all mines, factories, and means of communication. The workers distribute the goods, they make the laws, determine the working hours, wages and prices; they also establish the deductions from wages and salaries and make out the taxes. Everyone must work, there are no persons of independent means and no capitalistic employers who can fatten on profits. The workers are the sovereign lords in the Soviet Union, and nothing prevents them from enjoying the enormous wealth of their country. Stalin had this theory in mind when he stated in his introduction to the new constitution in November 1936: "... in the field of political economy of the Soviet Union we now have a new socialistic economy which knows no depressions and no unemployment, no misery and no profit, and which grants its citizens every possibility for a life of comfort and civilization."

According to this definition, life in the Ukraine should be the most attractive; here is the country richest in natural resources in eastern Europe, with a pleasant, sunny climate. The raw 135 materials are happily balanced and are found within favorable distances between each other. There is coal, iron ore, manganese ore, water power, oil, turf, salt, potassium salts, phosphate and kaolin. There is lacking, with the exception of a certain amount of mercury and nickle, only colored metals.

361 /160/ The exploitation of Ukrainian natural resources is comparatively recent. The Englishman Hughes John established industry in the 1870s in the Donets region, and shortly thereafter Frenchmen and Belgians founded the ore industry near Krivoy Rog. The present-day industrial cities developed from the barracks of the first workers' 000 settlements. The tremendous increase in popula-

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

648 Hetman of the Ukraine (April 29, 1918) did not change the situation, since a large majority of the people considered him head of a puppet government created with the help of German bayonets and, therefore, subservient to German dictation.

After the defeat of the Central powers by the Western allies at the end of 1918, the German sponsored Government was replaced by a new Ukrainian Government called "Directorium" under the leadership of Simon Petliura. At the same time, the Soviet Government annulled the Brest-Litovsk treaty and ordered its military forces to enter the Ukraine. A new war between the Ukraine and Soviet Russia began. Since the Germans had prevented the formation of a Ukrainian army, the Bolsheviks were at an advantage. In desperation, Petliura made a last attempt to combat Bolshevik aggression by concluding a very unfavorable military alliance with the Polish Government under Pilsudski's leadership.[20] The advance of the United Polish-Ukrainian Army during the summer of 1920 was reversed by a Bolshevik counter offensive. As a result, the allied forces were driven out of the Ukraine. Subsequently, the Soviet and Polish Governments agreed, in the treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, to divide the Ukrainian territories between themselves.

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642 668 After the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, Bolsheviks formed an "independent" Soviet Ukrainian Government, the members of which, directly appointed by the Kremlin, were totally subordinated to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. At this time, Stalin was in a position to openly reveal the true meaning of the Bolshevik proclamations concerning the right of non-Russian nations to self-determination when he wrote:

> We are in favor of the separation of India, Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, and the other colonies from the entente, for here separation implies the liberation of these oppressed countries from Imperialism, thus undermining the position of Imperialism and strengthening the position of revolution. We are against the separation of the border regions from Russia since separation would here involve Imperialist servitude for the border regions, thus undermining the revolutionary power of Russia and strengthening the position of Imperialism.[21]

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20 Winston S. Churchill attached great importance to this alliance as is obvious from his book, *The Aftermath* (New York, 1929), pp. 277-278.

21 Stalin's preface to his "Sbornik statei," 1920. Cf. *Sotchineniya*, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 372.

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668 the Ukrainian people. This was especially obvious when the Congress adopted a resolution calling for the liquidation of the "independence" of various Soviet Republics because, the Soviet leaders claimed, "not a single Soviet Republic, taken alone, can regard itself as secure against economic exhaustion and military destruction on the part of world Imperialism."[24] In order to eliminate the potential opposition and distrust among the non-Russian Communists, the Congress formally condemned Great Russian chauvinism as harmful, because of its colonizing spirit, to the cause of Communism. This condemnation, however, did not have any practical significance. The Soviet Commissars in the Ukraine continued the policy of strict centralization and Russification. The Ukrainian Communists could not tolerate this policy without losing face; and they demanded that the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party recall its Commissars. This demand was flatly rejected by the Kremlin with an admonition: the Soviet officials in the Ukraine must be accepted as the only executive force. Much to Lenin's surprise, the Ukrainian Communist Party at the end of 1921 dismissed the Kremlin-appointed Commissars from their duties and elected members from their own ranks for the important positions. This independent attitude of the Ukrainian Communists annoyed the Russian leaders so much that Lenin was obliged to intervene personally in the matter. In his speech at the eleventh Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party, Lenin warned that, despite the recognition of the Ukraine as an independent Soviet Republic, the Bolsheviks would not permit Ukrainian leaders to deviate from the Party principles. Lenin further informed the Congress that he had assigned "Comrade" Ordzonikidze and the Central Committee to investigate the whole matter. He admitted that, according to them, it would require ten years to compile a detailed report on the events in the Ukraine. "One thing," Lenin said, "is clear, that despite the unanimously-adopted instructions of the Central Committee, the group (appointed by the Kremlin) was replaced by the local group."[25]

● 642 668 The internal difficulties and independent attitude taken by the non-Russian Communists forced the Soviet leaders in Moscow to press their original plan of more centralization. On December 29, 1922, the plenipotentiary delegates of the Russian (R.S.F.S.R.), the Ukrain-

24 "The Immediate Tasks of the Party in Connection with the National Problem" Resolution adopted by the Tenth Congress.

25 *XI. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B) March 27-April 1922*, Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow), p. 31.

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

ian (UKR.S.S.R.), the Byelo-Russian (W.R.S.S.R.) and the Transcaucasian (T.S.F.S.R.—Georgia, Azerbaidzan and Armenia) Socialist Republics concluded, under Moscow's auspices, a treaty providing amalgamation into a single federated state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The terms of the treaty gave the Central Soviet Government in Moscow practically unlimited power.[26] The Russian Communist Party secured its legal right to intervene in the internal affairs of the member States and to suppress the opposition against Moscow among the non-Russian Communists. However, the non-Russian leaders of the Soviet Republics were reluctant to surrender their positions and the struggle between Russian and non-Russian Communists continued with even more fervor. 642 668

The controversy over the national policy reached its climax at the twelfth Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party. In his report, Stalin spoke at length on the internal and international significance of the national question.[27] For the first time he attacked not only Great Russian chauvinism but also local nationalism as an equal danger to the Soviet regime. Referring to the penetration of elements with a Great Russian spirit into the highest ranks of the Communist Party, Stalin said: 668

> It is not accidental, comrades, that the Smenovekhists[28] have recruited a large number of supporters from among the Soviet officials. That is by no means accidental. Nor is it accidental that Messrs. the Smenovekhists are lauding the Bolshevik Communists, saying, as it were, 'You may talk as much as you like about Bolshevism, you may prate as much as you like about your internationalist tendencies, but we know that what Denikin failed to do, you will do; that you, Bolsheviks have resurrected, or at least are going to resurrect the great idea of a Great Russia.'[29]

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26 The Russian Communist Party was in a position to adopt any resolution, since the great majority of the Party members were Russians. At the eleventh Congress, for example, when the question of amalgamation of the republics was raised and the resolution for strict centralization approved, the delegates consisted of 341 Russians, 77 Jews, 10 Tartars, 12 Armenians, 9 Georgians, 19 Latvians, 8 Kirghizs and 46 others.

27 *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), op. cit.*, p. 441.

28 ". . . Smenovechovzy—former members of the White Army who now recognized the victory of the Red Army as a national victory, the deliverance of Russia from western Europe, and the birth of a new Russian empire of Asiatic orientation . . . (p. 137). . . . The name 'Smenovechovzy' has been coined after a collection of essays entitled 'Smena Vech,' 'the change of signposts' (Prague, 1931). A collection of essays published in 1909, called 'Vechi' advocated a change of policy by the Russian intelligentsia. In the 'Smena Vech' the change was to take the form of recognizing Bolshevism as a national government." (pp. 386-387) W. Gurian, *Bolshevism: Theory and Practice* (New York, 1932).

29 *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), op. cit.*, p. 442.

16: American Russian Institute RD1 Ukraine RD1
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[For the complete text of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of January 30, 1937 as amended through November 21, 1949, see category 116, entire source.]

CONSTITUTION

(Fundamental Law)

of the

UKRAINIAN

SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLIC

of January 30, 1937

As amended through November 21, 1949

Chapter I. The Social Structure

642 Art. 1. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

Art. 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists, the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the liberation of the Ukrainian people from national oppression by Tsarism and by the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie and the defeat of the nationalist counter-revolution constitute the political foundation of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 3. In the Ukrainian SSR all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

471 Art. 4. The economic foundation of the Ukrainian SSR is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production established as the result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man.

Art. 5. Socialist property in the Ukrainian SSR exists either in the form of State property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property (the possession of collective farms or co-operative associations).

475 Art. 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, communications, large State-organized 421 agricultural enterprises (State farms, machine and tractor stations and the like), as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of houses in the cities and industrial localities, are State property, that is belong to the whole people.

474 Art. 7. The common enterprises of collective farms and co-operative organizations with their livestock and implements, and the products of the collective farms 421 and co-operative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of collective farms and co-operative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the common collective farm [472] enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small plot of household land and, as its personal property, a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements — in accordance with the regulations of the agricultural artel.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

423 474 Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

472 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Ukrainian SSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

185 471 Art. 11. The economic life of the Ukrainian SSR is determined and directed by the State National Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the independence of the socialist country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

461 Art. 12. In the Ukrainian SSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Ukrainian SSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Ukrainian SSR voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Ukrainian SSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

[42] Art. 14. The Ukrainian SSR reserves the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Art. 15. The territory of the Ukrainian SSR may not be altered without its consent.

[40] Art. 15a. The Ukrainian SSR has its own Republican military formations.

[49] Art. 15b. The Ukrainian SSR has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

Art. 16. The laws of the USSR are binding within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

[41] Art. 17. Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a citizen of the USSR. Citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR equal rights with citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

63 Art. 18. The Ukrainian SSR consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Transcarpathian, Zaporozhye, Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltava, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumi, Ternopol, Kharkov, Kherson, Chernigov and Chernovitsi Regions.

Art. 19. The jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, embraces:

a) Adoption of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and control over its observance;

b) Submission of the formation of new regions constituting part of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for confirmation;

c) Establishment of the boundaries, and of the division into districts, of regions;

d) Legislation of the Ukrainian SSR;

e) Maintenance of public order and safeguarding the rights of citizens;

f) Approval of the national-economic plan of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Approval of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR and of the report on its fulfilment;

h) Determination of state and local taxes, imposts and non-tax revenues in conformity with the laws of the USSR;

i) Direction of the fulfilment of the local budgets of the regions;

j) Direction of insurance and savings;

k) Administration of the banks, industrial, agricultural and trading enterprises and organizations subordinate to the Republic, as well as direction of local industry;

l) Control and superintendence of the condition and administration of enterprises subordinate to the Union;

m) Establishment of the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests and waters;

n) Direction of dwelling houses and the municipal economy, dwelling house construction and the modernization of cities and other inhabited places;

o) Road building; direction of local transport and communications;

p) Labour legislation;

q) Direction of social maintenance;

r) Direction of elementary, secondary and higher education;

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

642 s) Direction of the cultural, educational and scientific organizations and institutions of the Ukrainian SSR, and administration of the cultural, educational and scientific organizations and institutions of all-Republican importance;

t) Direction of public health and administration of institutions of public health of all-Republican importance;

u) Direction and organization of physical culture and sports;

v) Organization of the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR;

w) Granting the rights of citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR;

x) Legislation concerning marriage and the family;

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1 [Cf. cat. 116, p. 2-4 -- Analyst]

[UKRAINIAN CONSTITUTION AS OF NOV 21, 1949]

66 Art. 121. Elections of deputies to Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR are held by electoral districts on the following bases:

[634] in elections to regional Soviets - one deputy for every 15,000 to 30,000 of the population, depending upon its size;

[633] in elections to district and area Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population; in a district or area whose population does not exceed 25,000, twenty-five deputies are elected, and in a district or area whose population exceeds 60,000, not more than sixty deputies are elected;

[632] in elections to city Soviets or city district Soviets - one deputy for every 350 to 900 of the population, depending upon its size; in a city or city district whose population does not exceed 12,000, thirty-five deputies are elected;

in elections to the Kiev and Kharkov city Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population;

[631] in elections to village or settlement Soviets - one deputy for every 100 of the population; in a village or settlement whose population does not exceed 1,000, nine deputies are elected, and where the population exceeds 2,500, not more than twenty-five deputies.

The basis of representation for each regional, district, city, village and settlement Soviet of Working People's Deputies is fixed in the "Ordinance Concerning Elections to Regional, District, City, Village and Settlement Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR," within the range of the bases of representation indicated in the present article.

Art. 122. Candidates for elections are nominated according to electoral district.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Art. 123. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time upon decision of the majority of the electors in the manner established by law.

Chapter X. Arms, Flag, Capital

186 Art. 124. The state arms of the Ukrainian SSR are a sickle and hammer of gold in relief, placed crosswise, handles down against a red background in the rays of the rising sun, and surrounded by ears of wheat, which are placed symmetrically, from bottom to top, forming a circle. Between the tops of the ears of wheat is a red star. At the bottom of the wreath are the words, "Ukrainian SSR" on a red band, and at the bottom of the ears of corn the words, "Workers of all Countries United!" in the Russian language on the right, and in the Ukrainian language on the left.

Art. 125. The state flag of the Ukrainian SSR is of cloth divided into two horizontal bands of color: the upper band, in red, is two-thirds of the width of the flag, and the lower band, in azure, is one-third of the width of the flag. In the upper part of the flag, about one-third of the distance from the staff, are a hammer and sickle of gold and above them a five-pointed star with a gold border.

The relation of width to length of the flag is 1:2.

Art. 126. The Capital of the Ukrainian SSR is the City of Kiev.

Chapter XI. Procedure for Amending the Constitution

642 Art. 127. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR may be amended only by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted by a majority of not
646 less than two-thirds of the votes of the Supreme Soviet.

131 constituent autonomous republic, the Moldavian A.S.S.R.[1] On November 1,
[728] 1939, 88,000 square kilometres were added when Western Ukraine, which in 1920 had been annexed by Poland, was re-joined to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

131 Another 21,300 square kilometres were added in June 1940 when
728 Bessarabia (annexed by Rumania in 1913) and Northern Bukovina (another part of Rumania) also were incorporated, making the Ukraine's total area then about 579,000 square kilometres. However, a small decrease occurred in August 1940 when the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. granted the petition of the Moldavian people in Bessarabia to join with a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic to form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war the area of the Ukraine was 575,000 square kilometres ($2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the territory of the Soviet Union); and the population was over 40 millions. After the addition of the Transcarpathian region in June 1945, the Ukraine's total area was 587,700 square kilometres; it is approximately the same today. The following table summarizes the changes in the area and population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. from 1939 to June 1941.

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635 The U.S.S.R. is composed of sixteen Union Soviet Socialist Republics.
642 Within this framework there exist a number of autonomous provinces, national regions and autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. Before August 1940 the Ukrainian S.S.R. included one autonomous republic, the Moldavian A.S.S.R. which was subsequently given full status and became the sixteenth Union Republic. According to Professor Trainin, the Soviet authority on legal questions, the main distinction between autonomous and union republics is that the latter are guaranteed the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. - a right which is not incorporated in the constitutions of the autonomous republics. Another difference regarding status is that whereas in the Soviet of Nationalities (one of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) every Union republic is represented by 25 deputies, the autonomous republic is represented by only 11.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

THE UKRAINE

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According to the 1926 census there were but 8 per cent Great Russians in the Ukraine, but these were mostly town-dwellers and proletarian elements and thus were able to play a considerable part in the political history of the Ukrainian S.S.R. since, according to Bolshevik principles, city workers necessarily lead the peasants, and the towns the countryside.

The towns of the Ukraine during the inter-war period had been not only bi-national Russian-Ukrainian but tri-national Russian-Ukrainian-Jewish, with the Jews frequently gravitating culturally to the Russian side. In Kiev, the largest Ukrainian city, the Ukrainians were originally the smallest ethnical group of the three. The 1926 census showed that Kiev's population consisted of 25·4 per cent Ukrainians, 36·2 per cent Russians, 32·1 per cent Jews and 3 per cent Poles. After 1926 the balance improved in favour of the Ukrainians but basically Kiev remained a Ukrainian-Russian-Jewish city. Kharkov, almost equal in size to Kiev, had in 1933 48 per cent Ukrainian inhabitants, whilst there were 30·3 per cent Russians and 17·7 per cent Jews. Of all the big cities of the Ukraine, Odessa, the capital of 'New Russia' has always been the least Ukrainian. Even including Odessa's country district the Ukrainians accounted for only 41 per cent of the total population against 23 per cent Russians and 20 per cent Jews. In the city of Odessa there were 17·5 per cent Ukrainians against 38·6 per cent Russians and 36·4 per cent Jews. Dniepropetrovsk, the fourth largest city of the Ukraine, in 1933 comprised 36 per cent Ukrainians, 31·5 per cent Russians and 26·6 per cent Jews.

The drastic reduction in the number of Jews through Hitlerite massacres and evacuation during the war improved the position of the Ukrainians in the cities of the Western and Central Ukraine, but in the industrial regions of the Eastern Ukraine the Ukrainians cannot keep pace with the tempo of urbanization and the needs of manpower. The two eastern border provinces of the Ukraine, Voroshilovgrad and Stalino, making up the Donets Basin, are inhabited by an international working-class, in particular by a strong Russian element, and are steadily growing in importance in relation to the Ukraine as a whole. The population of the Stalino Province rose by 91 per cent between 1926 and 1939 and that of the Voroshilovgrad Province by 37 per cent during the same period. The growth of the Stalino Province can be even better assessed by comparing the numbers of inhabitants of its three largest towns in 1926 and 1939. Stalino, the provincial centre rose from 174,000 to 462,000, Makeyevka from 79,421 to 240,000, Mariupol from 64,000 to 222,000.

STALINIST CENTRALISM VERSUS UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY

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The fact that Russians and Ukrainians are from the historical, geographical and ethnical point of view objectively inseparable calls for a certain

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

S.U. 631 186 UK. 186 642

co-ordination of the affairs of the two peoples. The Bolshevik régime has failed to bring about this co-ordination. The Russian-Ukrainian union as determined by the constitutions of 1923 and 1936 amounted to a subordination of the Ukraine to Moscow and indirectly to the Great Russians.

The foundation of the U.S.S.R. on December 30th, 1922, constituted in itself a triumph for the Russian people and a defeat for the Ukrainians. It signified the end of the loose constitutional ties which during the first years of the Soviet régime existed between Great Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and the peoples of Transcaucasia. A firm centralistic organization – the U.S.S.R. – took the place of the treaty relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidzhan. Stalin, in his capacity of Peoples Commissar for Nationalities, played a leading part in this process of transformation which rendered a great service to Russian nationalism but ignored the aspirations of the non-Russian peoples.

It is easy to understand why Stalin followed in the footsteps of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great in his desire for a strong centralistic Russian State. He knew the strength of local nationalism and distrusted many of the local Communists. He thought that the future of the Soviet Union could not be left in their hands and that Moscow, the capital of the Russian people, was the only suitable centre of gravity of the Soviet State. This is the psychological background against which the foundation of the U.S.S.R. has to be considered. Lenin was still alive when the U.S.S.R. was proclaimed and Stalin was then by no means all-powerful. That is why the discussions preceding the foundation of the Soviet Union took place in an atmosphere of comparative freedom. Both Stalin and his opponents clearly showed their cards.

The opposition to the formation of a centralized Soviet Union, as Stalin conceived it, was led by the Ukraine with the prominent participation of Georgia. The principal spokesman of the Ukraine in the discussion on constitutional issues was Khristian Rakovsky, an old Bolshevik, whom Stalin later on never ceased to consider as a dangerous 'wrecker'. Rakovsky was no Ukrainian himself, but a Bulgarian who at the First Congress of the Comintern in March 1919 represented the 'Revolutionary Balkan Federation'. There is no doubt that Rakovsky, strongly aided by the old Ukrainian Bolshevik, Mikola Skrypnik, proved to be an excellent defender of the interests of the Ukrainian and indirectly of all non-Russian communists of Soviet Russia.

Rakovsky and Skrypnik wanted to preserve the statehood of the Ukraine and opposed to Stalin's 'Union', a loose 'confederation' of Soviet Republics. Instead of Stalin's 'Soviet of Nationalities' Rakovsky proposed a 'Council of States'. He further rejected the establishment of the 'Presidium of the Central Executive Committee', which until the new Stalin Constitution of 1936 was the most powerful constitutional organ

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

of the Soviet State and served the purposes of a centralistic leadership. The Ukrainians, led by Rakovsky and Skrypnik, also made efforts to keep their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, to maintain at least some degree of control over the railway system and postal services in their territory and in general to curtail the prerogatives conferred on the all-Union Peoples Commissariats.[3]

S.U. 631 186 UK. 186 642

The Ukrainians were defeated and Stalin got his centralistic constitution accepted which, in the long run, enabled him to rule in Kharkov and Kiev almost in the same way as in Moscow and Leningrad.

COMMUNIST IRREDENTA AND 'UKRAINIZATION' POLICY

Though ignoring the wishes of the Ukrainians regarding their constitutional status within the U.S.S.R., Stalin offered them a glittering consolation prize; the promise of a future Ukrainian State, to include all the Ukrainian lands which the peace settlement after the First World War had allocated to Rumania, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

This aim was to be achieved with the help of the Comintern and its policy on the national question. Many Ukrainians, though anti-Soviet 'bourgeois nationalists' at heart, were inclined to make peace outwardly with Bolshevism in the first years of the Soviet régime, because world-Communism stood for the most far-reaching fulfilment of Ukrainian national aspirations.

The Fifth World Congress of the Comintern in 1924 included ~~in~~ its resolution on the 'National Question in Central Europe and the Balkans' the following passage 'The Congress . . . considers it necessary for the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania to launch the general slogan of separation of the Ukrainian lands from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and their union with the Soviet Ukraine and through it, with the U.S.S.R.'. The congress was satisfied that the Communist Parties of Poland and Rumania had successfully promoted the demand for Ukrainian self-determination. From the details of the resolution it appeared that the frontiers of a future united Ukraine were to be drawn slightly to the west of the Russian-Polish border as fixed in 1945.[4]

The wish of certain groups of Ukrainian nationalists to come to terms with the Soviet régime was reinforced by an apparent readiness of the Soviet Government to grant to the Ukrainians a certain measure of freedom in the cultural field, provided that they recognized the totalitarian aspirations of the Communist Party. An expression of this policy of communist-nationalist co-operation was the fact that the historian of Ukrainian nationalism, Mikhail Hrushevsky, returned to Kiev in 1924 to take over the direction of the historical section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

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4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

113 Telerhof was the largest concentration camp for 'pro-Russians'; at times their number reached 10,000, and about 2000 died during the typhus epidemic. The Austrian authorities later acknowledged that 'among the people arrested in the war zone were many who were arrested by mistake or upon false denunciations'. (See also D. Yavorsky, *Dumy o Rodine* (Thoughts about my Native Land), Lvov, 1923.)

For the relations between the Russian troops and the population, see General A. A. Brusilov, *A Soldier's Note Book*, London, 1930; also Bernard Pares, *My Russian Memories*, London, 1925.

Russian blunders have been described with many exaggerations in Ukrainian 'separatist' literature. For a more balanced view see D. Doroshenko, 'Voyna i Revolutsia na Ukraine', in the periodical *Istorik i Sovremennik* ('War and Revolution in the Ukraine,' in *The Historian and Contemporary*), vols. I–V, Berlin, 1923.

(2) *Biographical Note on Vinnichenko and Petlyura*

● 643 *Mark Vinnichenko* belonged to the Ukrainian intelligentsia. He failed to complete his studies on account of revolutionary activities which he started when a boy at a Gymnasium and on account of which he had to leave the University of Kiev after his first year.

During the period 1906–14 Vinnichenko wrote novels (in Russian) which were quite widely read. The themes were not political but rather romantic, and the author delighted in the delineation of psychological conflicts which were intended for the imagination of readers who were not too exacting. Vinnichenko had tuberculosis and he seems to have been consumed by an 'inner fever' which can often be observed in persons who are suffering from that malady.

People who knew Vinnichenko do not deny that he possessed a certain honesty of purpose which was generally not one of the distinctive traits of his colleagues in the *Rada*.

Simon Petlyura was quite a different type. He was the son of a simple cabman, but received his education in the Poltava Gymnasium. Later he became a book-keeper in a commercial undertaking in Moscow, and collaborated in a periodical which appeared before the war called *Ukrainian Life* (in Russian). Petlyura belonged to a milieu which produced many capable and energetic men in the years preceding the war. It was such men, for instance, who had created the widespread co-operative movement in Russia. Many representatives of this class worked successfully during the war in the Unions of Towns and the Unions of Zemstvos. In contrast to Vinnichenko, Petlyura was eloquent neither in his speech nor with his pen. He was a man of action and practical capacity rather than a propagandist of ideals. However, unlike many of his more vocal and emotional collaborators, he maintained an irreconcilable attitude towards the Bolsheviks to the end; his assassin, Schwartzbrod, may well have been a (possibly unconscious) agent of the G.P.U.

(3) *The Conflict Between the Rada and the Provisional Government*

113 See Paul Milyukov, *Istoriya Vtoroy Russkoy Revolutsii* (History of the Second Russian Revolution), vols. I–III, Sofia, 1921; Bernard Pares, *The Downfall of the Russian Monarchy*, London, 1939; and other works dealing

became a *fait accompli* (in 1054) its repercussions in Russia were at first very small. 175x 177

Before as after, the Russian princes maintained the most intimate relations with the Western courts to which they are bound by marriages. One cannot detect any trace of enmity towards the Western Christians. Quite on the contrary the Igumen Daniel, who goes from Kiev to Jerusalem to pray on the tomb of our Saviour, feels himself fraternally connected with the Francian crusaders who are fighting in the Holy Land. In Kiev itself there are Latin monasteries and the Russian princes make donations to them. The hour has not yet arrived when the aggressive attitude of the western neighbours of Russia will arouse her enmity.

The relations which, at this epoch, existed between Russia and the West were all the more natural as their way of living had many features in common. The princely courts of Russia, with their *drouzhina* (their retainers), their military character cemented by the personal loyalty towards their overlord, their love of feasts, the songs, accompanied by the sound of the *gouslis* and by characteristic gestures, and their chivalrous idealism, all this brought them near to those of the West.

On the other hand, also like the mediæval kingdoms of the West, the Russia of Kiev, although united under St. Vladimir and Yaroslav the Wise, is still far from being a fully united State, such as had existed in Byzantium and as we know it to-day.

Under the protecting power of a prince, who kept outside enemies at bay and maintained order in the interior, the country is composed of a federation of lands and cities who have their rights and privileges and are ruled by their elders and by their popular assemblies, the *vetchi*, which deal directly with the 175x 631 643

x175 prince or with his lieutenant, the *possadnik*, giving this
631 or that assistance in return for various protections.
643 These autonomous territories, *zemli* and *volosti*, are related to the ancient Slavonic federations which existed before the creation of the State of Kiev. The local dynasties which made their appearance here and there have all disappeared at the moment of the coming of the Varengians. There is not, in the whole of Russia of Kiev, another princely house but that of St. Vladimir. But the regional peculiarities could not be eliminated so easily. And it is thus that the territory of the Polianes becomes the 'Land of Kiev' as such, that of the Severianes the 'Great Land of Tchernigov,' in the west the 'Land of Volynia' retains its own characteristics, while at the foot of the Carpathians, in 'Galicia,' the elements of several tribes are fused. In the north the *volosti* correspond roughly to the old territories of the tribes. Blood relationship definitely ceased to play a role. Instead of the ties of relationship, common interests alone, resulting from being territorial neighbours, are the only ties between the inhabitants of a 'Land.'[1]

On the other hand the economic development of the towns has increased their political importance. It is they who are now at the head of the 'Lands.' The largest city of each of these territories becomes the spokesman of the whole *volost*, although all the inhabitants of the latter can, if they have the means, participate with equal rights in the deliberations of the chief city.

x175 The princely power in Russia is therefore in no way
643 absolute. The conception of a monarchical, unitarian, and hereditary power is not yet born.

The dynastic position is attuned to the customs which

[1] See Map No. 2.

7:Bregy & Oboiensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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rule the private life of the Slavonic populations in Eastern Europe. The *whole* land of Russia is the property of the *entire* princely house descended from St. Vladimir, as every Slavonic family which occupies and cultivates a plot of land owns it in common.

The senior of St. Vladimir's descendants will occupy the throne of Kiev and will be, in some ways, the first amongst equals of this family community of princes, as the eldest of a family presides at its discussions and represents it generally. Not the hereditary right, descending to the eldest son, but solely the age of the individual counts, one brother succeeds another, to make room for the oldest among the nephews.

This system, which was established in Russia in the middle of the eleventh century, after the death of Yaroslav the Wise, foresees the breaking up of the country among the members of the reigning house and an almost continuous redistribution of domains, just as in the Slavonic agricultural communities, where redistribution of individual lots took place almost every year. The change of management will be general if the oldest member of the family, the Grand Prince of Kiev, dies. His place will be taken by any prince, even of younger lines, who is the oldest at that moment. In going to Kiev, he cedes the domain which he possessed to the one who is next to him in age, etc.

This typically Slavonic method of government maintained the idea of the unity of the 'Russian Land.' While it was applied, no one branch of the princely house could take root in any given territory and so become the local dynasty of any single part of Russia. That prince who had first received a domain in the far north-east, exchanged it after some years for a richer territory in the south, finally to reach the throne of Kiev, bringing with him his *drouzhina* (retainers), his

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

boyars (nobles), and his armed men, who also moved from one end of the country to the other. A town, on the contrary, which was dissatisfied with its present master, called on a prince whose domains were at the farthest confines of Russia, but whose father, formerly having been in their country, was well remembered there. 175x 643

As long as the old centre of the Russian Land, Kiev, remained prosperous, no princely branch was anxious to enclose itself on its territory and to prefer its interests, except a few more distant branches, who were already for some time localized in far-away territories which had been granted them as permanent domains. All the other princes hoped one day to obtain possession of the best parts of the country and even to reach the throne of Kiev.

This system had the drawback of fomenting various dynastic discords. The princes fought without respite against each other in order to enforce their rights. The ruin of the southern part of Russia, which began in the territory of Kiev, was the inevitable result of these discords. It was this that was understood by the unknown author of the 'Tale of the Companions of Igor'[1] when he implored all the Russian princes to unite their forces against the pagans. In order to keep the commercial routes across the Steppe open and to drive back the nomads, always ready to invade the Russian lands situated in the forest zone, the united forces of the whole of Russia were indispensable. It is thus that St. Vladimir assembled his troops in the north to resist the incursions of the formidable Petcheneges, fierce warriors of the Steppe. 175x

During the twelfth century the routes of the Steppe became more and more dangerous and the incursions

[1] Famous epic poem of the twelfth century which inspired the Opera, *Prince Igor*, of Borodin.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

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1 [GF, cat. 116, p. 2-4--Analyst]

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

643 Art. 29. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for all its activities.

Art. 30. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR:

a) Convenes the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR;

b) Issues decrees;

c) Gives interpretations of the laws of the Ukrainian SSR in operation;

d) Conducts nation-wide polls (referendums);

e) Annuls decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and likewise decisions and orders of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies, if they do not conform to law;

f) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, releases and appoints Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Grants the rights of citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR;

h) Confers titles of honour of the Ukrainian SSR and grants awards;

i) Exercises the right of pardoning citizens convicted by judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR;

j) Appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives of the Ukrainian SSR to foreign states;

k) Receives the letters of credence and recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to it by foreign states.

643 646 Art. 31. Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR twice a year.

Extraordinary sessions are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR at its discretion or on the demand of one-third of the deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

646 Art. 32. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Credentials Committee to verify the credentials of the members of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

On the report of the Credentials Committee, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR decides whether to recognize the credentials of deputies or to annul their election.

Art. 33. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, when it deems necessary, appoints commissions of investigation and audit on any matter.

It is the duty of all institutions and officials to comply with the demands of such commissions and to submit to them all necessary materials and documents.

Art. 34. A member of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR may not be prosecuted or arrested without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, or, when the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is not in session, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

643 646 [666] Art. 35. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR orders new elections to be held within a period not exceeding two months from the date of expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

643 Art. 36. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of
646 the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR retains its powers until the newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR shall have formed a new Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 37. The newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is convened by the outgoing Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR not later than three months after the elections.

645 Art. 38. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR appoints the Government
[644] of the Ukrainian SSR, namely, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter IV. The Organs of State Administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

Art. 39. The highest executive and administrative organ of state power of the Ukrainian SSR is the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 40. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR is responsible and accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, or, in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 41. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, and of the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and verifies their execution.

Art. 42. Decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR are binding throughout the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 43. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR:

a) Coordinates and directs the work of the Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR and of other institutions under its jurisdiction; coordinates and verifies the work of the authorized representatives of the all-Union Ministries;

b) Adopts measures to carry out the national-economic plan;

c) Adopts measures to fulfil the state and local budgets of the Ukrainian SSR;

d) Adopts measures for the maintenance of public order, for the protection of the interests of the state, and for the safeguarding of the rights of citizens;

e) Directs and verifies the work of the Executive Committees of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies;

f) Sets up, whenever necessary, special Committees and Central Administrations under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR for economic and cultural affairs;

g) Directs the organization of the military formations of the Ukrainian SSR;

h) Exercises guidance in the sphere of the relations of the Ukrainian SSR with foreign states, on the basis of the general procedure established by the USSR governing the relations of Union Republics with foreign states.

Art. 44. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR has the right to annul decisions and orders of Executive Committees of regional Soviets of Working

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

All authority was vested in the hands of the Commander of *Heeresgruppe Kiev*, Field-Marshal Eichhorn. To Kiev was sent also General Groener, who had a great reputation for his organizing capacity (amongst his collaborators was 'enigmatic' Meissner, who later was to play a certain role in the entourages of President Hindenburg and of the Führer Hitler). The representative of the German Foreign Office was Baron Mumm. Vienna sent as minister Count Forgacs, who, as minister in Belgrad in 1914, had his share of responsibility for the events which immediately preceded the outbreak of war. 727

Dissensions began between the Allies from the very first moment. Hoffmann, who was in Kovno, kept himself well-informed about what was going on in Kiev. He wrote in his diary: 'Endless troubles with the Austrians in Ukraine. They are behaving with their usual meanness when the knife is not at their throat. It is a pity that the Italians do not attack.' Quarrels broke out on account of the delimitation of the respective German and Austrian zones. The role of the Austrians in the advance into the Ukraine had been modest enough, since they arrived too late to take part in any operations with the exception of 'the capture' of Odessa. Nevertheless, their zone of occupation spread over all the south. At the end of March an agreement was at last reached. On the Black Sea the Austrians retained Odessa and Kherson; the Germans Nikolaev and Sevastopol. Three Governments, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, Podolia and the southern strip in Volhynia, were reserved as the Austrian zone. In this wise, the Crimea, which shortly passed into German hands, was separated by the Austrian zone from the rest of the territories in German occupation.

The gradual advance eastward of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* continued. The 22nd Reserve Corps remained in Volhynia: the 27th Reserve (Saxon) Corps was in Kiev: the 41st Reserve Corps, after crossing the Dniepr, occupied the Government of Chernigov, the 20th Army Corps that of Poltava: the 1st Army Corps marched into Kharkov on 20 April. General Groener, who was concerned to collect coal supplies, gave the order in May for the 215th Infantry Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division to march into the south-east into the Donets coal basin as far as the boundaries of the Don Cossack region, where an independent Government had been set up. At the same time the 212th Infantry Division occupied Melitopol and the northern part of the Government of Tauris, while the 15th Landwehr Division was sent to the Crimea and Sevastopol. By the middle of May the occupation had been accomplished.

The Government of the *Rada* had returned to Kiev with the German troops. An interesting light is thrown on the characters of 645

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

645 the principal persons in this Government by the correspondence which passed between the Austrian and German authorities and their Governments—a part of which subsequently fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks and has been published by them (*The Crash of the German Occupation in Ukraine*, 1936, inf. p. 335). In his reports to Vienna the Austrian Chief of Staff, General Waldstetter, found Vsevolod Holubovich, the President of the Council of Ministers, 'eloquent, imaginative—a man of theories with no character at all; put there by the Germans'. Lubinsky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was 'a beardless young man extremely well read in Socialist and revolutionary literature; entirely in the hands of the Germans'. Zhukovski, the Minister for War, 'seems to me pro-Russian; he is an ex-Colonel of the General Staff and tries hard to appear before his colleagues as an untainted Socialist and revolutionary from head to foot; in reality a German puppet'. The same source gives a curious characterization of Hrushevsky. 'Hrushevsky—President of the *Rada*, a frightened old man all of a tremble; his old bones are supposed to give the *Rada* a noble patina worthy of so august an assembly. Holds on for all he is worth to the German Command and shows no sympathy at all towards Austria.' Hrushevsky had certainly changed with the times.

646 The *Rada* was composed of several hundred deputies, belonging to different Ukrainian parties; amongst them were National Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, Social Democrats and Social Federalists. Separatist tendencies prevailed, but among the more definitely Socialist groups it was possible to observe a more or less veiled distrust of and hostility towards the Austro-German authorities and the obedient cabinet which they had installed in Kiev. The more prominent representatives of these sentiments included Vinnichenko and Petlyura.

668 After its return to Kiev the *Rada* embarked on the purely academic task of elaborating a constitution for the Ukraine. The Occupation authorities were not much interested in this 'august assembly' and had 'no illusions about its importance'. General Hoffmann wrote at the time: 'The difficulty in the Ukraine is that the Central *Rada* has only our rifles behind it. The moment we withdraw our troops their authority will collapse at once' (Hoffmann, p. 207). The historian of the Brest-Litovsk peace, who has studied the documents of the period with great thoroughness, comes to the conclusion that: 'The separatist movement had no roots in the country and the people as a whole were completely indifferent to national self-determination; this had been thrust upon them by a group of political dreamers whose power was derived from the presence of German bayonets.'

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517
Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645]
through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669]
and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642
munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661]
as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423
tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation.[1] 369
It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

[1] [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

the very beginning, for at the moment the primary need was for 423
food and the peasants were compelled to live upon what they could 427
raise. It was not long before the returning prosperity commenced new differentiations in the villages. The poorer peasants began to take advantage of the provisions that they could lease their newly acquired land, and while the Russian law provided that a lease could run for only three years, the Ninth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets soon lengthened this term to 13 years and liberalized the laws for hired labor.

The result was that by 1926, the poor peasants had leased 1,181,000 hectares and 53.9% of the peasants who had at least ten hectares rented additional land.

In a word, under the New Economic Policy conditions began, 185
in fact, to return to what had been the situation prior to the 423
revolution, with the exception that the great land owners had disappeared, but as they had been largely Russian or Polish, their departure only increased the Ukrainian influence in the villages and made them more homogeneous than they had been before.

The Commissariat of Agriculture endeavored during these [645] ●
years of reconstruction to maintain as independent a position as possible. It established its own independent services, its own research stations which were concerned with Ukrainian agricultural problems, its own breeding stations and its own bureaus for study and development of the various branches of agriculture, and it did its best to separate these from the similar services directed by Moscow and not concerned with the particular problems of Ukraine.

The peasants responded to this with their own efforts. In 1922, [452]
with the famine still raging, they secured permission from Moscow to establish the so-called Selo-Pomich (or Village Aid) to provide credit for the peasants. This finally persuaded the Cheka to hand over part of the golden objects which they had stolen from the churches, and it used the capital thus secured to buy seed corn in America. It then loaned this to the peasants and when the harvest came, the loan was repaid in kind and more credit was then extended. [During NEP -- Analyst]

show profits. The very small shops and plants were in some cases 185
taken back by their former owners when they had survived and any 471
provisions about the use of hired labor were tacitly forgotten in the first flush of the New Economic Policy.

All of these measures were interpreted by the great mass of the Ukrainian people as a recognition of the validity of human experience. There were, of course, keen realists who gave full credence to the declarations of Lenin that the Soviets had never wavered in their objections and were using these concessions only as a means of reviving the life of the country and strengthening their own position. At first this did not seem to be true and it was only as conditions really settled down and a semblance of prosperity returned that it became possible to note the steadily increasing pressure which the government exerted.

In the same way the currency reforms were not without their 185
own influence. In 1923 the government introduced a new cur- 652
rency, the chervonets, which was ostensibly based on a gold stand- 435
ard, to take the place of the old depreciated paper. Nevertheless, the latter was allowed to circulate in the rural districts with the result that its value continued to fall and it became more and more difficult for the peasants to satisfy their needs for manufactured goods which were priced in the new currency. This produced the so-called "scissors," for with the restoration of industry, the value of manufactures continued to rise, while the prices of agricultural products continually fell.

The political system was still not clear.[1] The new regulations 642
were introduced in the Council of Commissars in Moscow and it 665
was emphatically stated that they were for the Russian Soviet 645
Federated Socialist Republic, but Ukraine and also the other Soviet Republics put into practice the same resolutions, often without any decree by the ostensibly independent government.

The key to this enigma lay in the nature of Communist discipline. In theory and on paper the Soviet regime was thoroughly democratic in the broad sense of the word. There was an elaborate scheme of elections to the village and the higher Soviets, and even though this was weighted very heavily to provide increased repre-

[During NEW ECONOMIC POLICY -- Analyst]

642 sentation for the city proletariat where the Communists felt themselves strongest, it was always possible to defend the system.
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645 Yet this does not tell the full story, for though non-party men were elected to the lower and local Soviets, the number of Communists increased steadily in the higher. These Communists were themselves classified as members of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party and they were bound by party discipline to obey all the instructions given by the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

There was thus, in reality, two governments in both Ukraine and the Russian Republic. There was first the republic government theoretically responsible to the people and thus transmitting the wishes of the people upward, even though the highest republic authorities were the direct appointees of Moscow. There was likewise the domination, more or less veiled, of the Communist Party, a government which only transmitted instructions from the top down. In the early days, and indeed for a considerable period, it is often difficult to determine whether certain measures came into effect because they had been approved by the Council of Commissars in Moscow or because they had the backing of the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party which was a monolithic organization, responsible only to its chiefs. It was in a sense a theoretical question for, by the period of the New Economic Policy, the Council of Commissars, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the control of the Communist International rested in the hands of the same men who functioned in three different capacities but still formed a well-knit body. Even though the legal relations between Ukraine and Russia rested on the vague treaties and agreements made during the period of Militant Communism and the civil wars, the Ukrainian Soviet government could be practically overruled at any moment and on any point on which it disagreed with the wishes of Moscow.

665 Since all non-Communist organizations had been dissolved[1] the only possible opposition could come from the Ukapisty, the Ukrainian Communist Party. This was composed of a small number of brilliant men, confirmed Communists, who insisted upon preserving

[1] [After establishing Ukraine Soviet Republic, 919 - -Analyst]

the independence of the Ukrainian Communist regime in the hope 665
that sooner or later they would be admitted to the Communist International as an independent national Communist Party. They therefore willingly accepted the doctrines of the International, which was little more than the third facet of the ruling block. By 1925 the situation had so far developed that their aspirations for this were definitely checked and even this theoretical opposition was eliminated by compelling the Ukapisty to enter into the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party, or else.

This situation makes clear the relations that existed between 661
Ukraine and Russia during the early years of the New Economic Policy. As agriculture and industry revived in Ukraine, it was suggested that the Ukrainian government send aid to its Communist brothers. That suggestion was a command, and just as the Muscovite bands under Militant Communism scoured Ukraine for food, so under the New Economic Policy, the so-called Ukrainian government began to drain off the wealth of the country for the charitable purpose of helping its Russian brothers.

The vagueness and the ambiguity of this system was partially 631
cleared up by the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty establishing this was signed on December 30, 1922, just as Lenin was becoming paralyzed and unable to function efficiently. It bound together the various Soviet Republics, while at the same time it paid lip service to the right of any of these Republics to secede. Of course, this was from the beginning an empty phrase, for the only people who had the power to declare the secession was the Council of Soviets of the Federal Republic and they were Communists assigned to their posts by Moscow and bound to obey the orders of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In addition to this, a surprising number of the ruling group of the Russian Soviet Republic now took over the corresponding posts in the Union and thus added still a fourth facet to their varied activity.

The Constitution, which was formally adopted at a Union 631
Congress of Soviets on July 6, 1923, went still further in providing 642
for the government of the Union. The Commissariats were divided 645

631 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of
642 Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications,
● 645 Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent
327 exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that
185 the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

432 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921,
241 which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the
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Ukraine Under the Soviets

186 snapped up by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty in the Commis-
191 sariat for Education. In a short time they worked so effectively
665 that nearly all the books published in Ukraine and about 85% of the newspapers were put out in Ukrainian. The circulation of these Ukrainian publications in the villages increased rapidly and aided in producing a sense of relief among the peasants and a tolerance of the situation which was in sharp contrast to the prevailing mood of a few years before.

[871] A network of Ukrainian schools was set up throughout the country with instruction in the native language and the number of students grew rapidly from among the peasant classes. It had been centuries since the Ukrainian language had reached such a state of popularity. The theatres produced plays in Ukrainian as the chief part of their repertory. The cities assumed a markedly Ukrainian appearance and the leaders could look with satisfaction on their results.

871 The one difficulty was the low level of the instruction in many
186 places but this was equally characteristic of the Russian terrain.[1] The revolution and the Bolshevik laws had abolished the old Russian system of education and had eliminated from the schools the bulk of the older intelligentsia and their children who, on one excuse or another, were excluded from all opportunities for study. The old disciplines were abolished and the Soviet school entered upon a chaotic period. Nevertheless, the changes which the former Borotbist Hrynko introduced, including the establishment of seven year schools which gave the students the right to enter upon a three year course in various technical schools, served to increase rapidly the number of young and partly trained Ukrainians who were available for posts in the government service and who thereby freed the organization from its dependence upon Russian-trained people.

● 645 In 1925, he[2] was succeeded in the post of Commissar by O.
871 Shumsky, likewise a Borotbist, who had held the post of Ukrainian
186 Minister in Warsaw. He had come back in 1923 to become the
665 Director of Agitation and Propaganda for the Central Committee of the KP/b/U. An ardent believer in the Ukrainian cause, he

[1] [1923 -- Analyst]

[2] [Hrynko, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

opposed very strenuously all the Russifying influences in the Party and insisted, as a matter of principle, that only Ukrainian Communists should be promoted to prominent posts in the Ukrainian Communist organizations. He even went so far as to insist, when Kaganovich was sent from Moscow as Secretary of the Ukrainian section of the party, that he be removed and replaced by Chubar, an old Bolshevik, and he recommended that Hrynko should be made the head of the state. 645 871 186 665

Kaganovich, who had been rather on the side of Shumsky in many of his enterprises, now turned against him on the ground that he was breaking Communist discipline and, in a short time, Shumsky was removed and transferred to Moscow, where he received a post as head of the trade unions. From there he was moved to Leningrad to become head of a school of economics, but by this time his star was setting. Shumsky, on more charges, was sent to a concentration camp near the Finnish border. According to the story, he was assured that he had a chance to escape. He tried it and was shot. His leading assistants, Maksymovych, Vasylkiv and Turyansky, were branded as Shumkyists and punished accordingly. [681]

His successor, M. Skrypnyk, took up his work as Commissar of Education under even better auspices. Unlike his predecessors, who had entered the Communist Party from the ranks of the Borotbisty or the Ukapisty and who thereby risked the charge of being Ukrainian nationalists and having bourgeois-nationalist sympathies, Skrypnyk had been an old member of the Russian Social Democratic Party (Bolsheviks). He had been a personal friend of Lenin long before the Revolution. He had been arrested several times by the tsarist government, had taken an active part in the October Revolution of 1917 and was a disciplined member of the party. He was thus above reproach so far as his party standing was concerned.

From the time of the foundation of the Ukrainian National Republic, Skrypnyk had been one of the outstanding Ukrainians in the Communist Party. From the beginning he had taken the definite stand that the Communist organization in Ukraine should be thoroughly Ukrainian, independent of the Russian Communist Party and with a seat in the Comintern. He believed that Ukraine

645 871 186 665 should naturally have a Soviet government and be an independent state with all the rights and perquisites of the RSFSR and he regarded the war between the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the Ukrainian National Republic as a civil war in which the Soviet Russians naturally came to the aid of the Soviet Ukrainians. At the same time he believed equally strongly that this assistance should be that of a brother-nation and should have no elements of a foreign occupation.

He was a disciplined Communist and he always acted in accordance with the strictest Communist tradition. He never joined any faction or questioned the vote of his superiors but he remained firm in his convictions, and while he was always in the minority and was willing to yield superficially, he always seized the next opportunity to advance substantially the same points but in a somewhat different form. He was on friendly terms with Stalin and he came to his post after a definite interview with Stalin and with instructions that put him in a position second only to Kaganovich.

The appointment of Skrypnyk with his Communist record showed very well that in 1927 the VKP (the All-Union Communist Party) was still playing with the idea of making the Communist International a real gathering of supposed equals, united under the leadership of a central body in Moscow. It was a tacit recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a political entity, but it was equally the recognition of a Marxian Socialist culture which might lead to some of the later developments of Stalinism. The appointment insured Stalin of the aid of the true Ukrainian Communists in the coming battle between him and the left deviationists.

Once in his own mind Skrypnyk had answered the problem, he did not waver. He accepted the Marxian doctrine that by the development of an urban proletariat he could develop the Ukrainians to the point where they would be justified in demanding an entrance into the Comintern as an independent nation. He interpreted the cases of Czechoslovakia and Latvia as exactly that, since the proletariats of Prague and Brno, as well as Riga, had forced

national independence and he set himself to do the same in Kiev and Kharkiv. 645 871

Without wavering in his devotion to the principles of Communism, he attacked the problem in the broadest possible way. 186 665 He stimulated derussification by supporting the Ukrainian press, theatre and schools. Under his influence and work, the cities, including Kharkiv, where Ukrainian influence had been relatively weak, came to be predominantly Ukrainian and in smaller places it became very rare to hear Russian spoken. The State Printing House and the smaller cooperative publishing houses produced almost nothing that was not in Ukrainian and during the few years that he remained in control, there were more Ukrainian books published than in the preceding century and a half.

Skrypnyk was still not satisfied. He extended his activity and patronage of things Ukrainian to all those areas in the RSFSR where Ukrainians were living in compact settlements. He provided Ukrainian papers, books and theatres for those who were living in Kurshchyna, Voronizhshchyna, along the Volga, Kuban, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan and the Far East. He sent educated men and women to establish schools and other cultural institutions and, for the first time in history, efforts were made to establish a real community of interests among all the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

More than that, he held out a friendly hand to Western Ukraine, [648] which was under Polish rule. Although by this time the entire control of foreign affairs was concentrated in Moscow, Skrypnyk was allowed to arrange for a Ukrainian consul in Lviv and Yur. Lapchynsky, a former Ukapist, was appointed to the post. The consul's duty was to win support for the Communists in Eastern Galicia and, in pursuance of this purpose, Skrypnyk, too, paid a visit to Lviv. He had a certain success in his work and a few Western Ukrainians, as S. Rudnytsky, who came from Prague to become the head of the Ukrainian Institute of Geography and Cartography in Kharkiv, and the mathematician Chaykivsky, entered the UkSSR. They formed a special club in Kharkiv and had their own literary organization "Western Ukraine." Skrypnyk

645 871 186 665 even worked out a plan to recruit 8,000 teachers in Western Ukraine to undertake Ukrainian work in the Donbas where the Russian influence was strongest.

At the same time Skrypnyk was a determined Communist and he lost no opportunity for advancing the doctrines of the movement, even at the risk of doing violence to those Ukrainian ideals in which he believed. Thus, in 1928, he demanded a reformation of [815] the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been working feverishly in the same cause of Ukrainization but which, from his point of view, was insufficiently Marxist and Communist. In 1929 he won his point and the Academy was forced to elect to membership seven Communists who were chosen for their knowledge of the subject and not for their scientific ability. One of the seven was Skrypnyk himself, and among the others were O. Shlikhter and Zatonsky, the veteran from the earlier Ukrainian Communist movement. He soon promoted Shlikhter to a prominent position and refused to confirm the election of the non-Communist scholar, Krymsky, to the post of secretary. At the same time he forced the election of several Western Ukrainian members, so that for a few years the Academy did become a real centre to represent all Ukrainian scholarship.

Thus, in this complex process Skrypnyk played at times a curious and often contradictory role. He was at once the head of the Ukrainian movement and of the Communist movement in the country and he never realized or noticed the contradictory character of his actions, like Tito in the early years of his dealing with Moscow. Still, during his term of office the Ukrainian movement reached its height and seemed to be flourishing.

CHAPTER TEN

The Famine

In 1921, the great famine which had swept over Ukraine 731
had been the result of a failure of the crops, a prolonged drought and the excesses of Militant Communism which had demoralized the country. The Soviets, more or less unwillingly, allowed the despatch of foreign assistance and this saved the lives of millions. There was to be no interference in the punishment of the obstinate peasants this time.

In the fall of 1929, just as compulsory collectivization was being 841
introduced, the government in Moscow made an important change 645
in the agricultural set-up, for it transferred the Commissariat of 631
Agriculture to the central group by establishing an All-Union Commissariat which was to be in control of all agriculture in the Soviet Union. This meant that in Ukraine all of the work which had been previously done by the local authorities was now transferred to Moscow. The republic commissariats ceased to have the power to pursue individual plans for improving the conditions of the soil, for varying the crops as their own advisers decided or as the population felt it necessary. Everything was to be done from the centre and the Ukrainian Soviet Government was compelled to hand over all of its research stations and other institutions to Muscovite control. This put a stop to the intensive development of Ukrainian agriculture which had been fostered by the Ukrainian land code and introduced the new system in which the peasants were in the same position as the workers in the factories.

At the same time[1] the central regime ceased to make public the 433
actual figures of production on the ground that they might betray to outside nations important facts as to the Soviet development. From this time on estimates and achievements were given only in

[1] [1929 – All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture was established 93 --Analyst]

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The Debacle

The Ukrainian Communists, as Skrypnyk and Khvylovy, could not fail to be horrified at the spreading famine which broke out in the autumn of 1932 and raged throughout the winter. Whatever they might have thought in the beginning of the compulsory collectivization, they were aghast at its results. They could not fail to recognize that it meant the end of the old Ukrainian life which they had tried to remodel in accordance with their own ideals and that it meant a widening breach with the outside world. They could not fail to see that it meant the ending of that world Communism in which they had tried to believe and in which they saw the hope of humanity and justice.

They could hardly fail to recognize almost immediately how they had played into the hands of the enemies of Ukraine by their attacks on the older scholars, for they were now to learn that they had unwittingly forged the tool that was to be used against them.

Postyshev arrived in Ukraine in January, 1933, to superintend and make more rigid the rules for the collection of grain. He brought with him his own staff, his own detachments of the NKVD, and while he nominally had the post of second secretary, he had the instructions from Stalin that made him the complete dictator. He soon showed what that meant.

Among his earliest acts was the removal of Chubar from his post as head of the Soviet of People's Commissars and he replaced him with the more pliable P. Lyubchenko, a former Borotbist. Skrypnyk was forthwith demoted from Commissar of Education to Chairman of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission, a position of no special importance, once the conduct of all Ukrainian life

erected. We recognize Mr. Iaroslav Stets'ko as Head of the State Administration of the Ukraine.[17] 668* 642

The pastoral letter was read over the radio by Father Hryn'okh the same morning. It appears to have removed any doubts which may have been lingering in the minds of most of the prominent Ukrainians in L'vov concerning the authenticity of the Stets'ko government.

The Bandera leaders went ahead rapidly to consolidate their victory. They felt the need of a name which would carry greater prestige than that of the young enthusiast Stets'ko, who had, as Bandera's deputy, already declared himself chief of state. Consequently, they prevailed upon the aged Constantine Levits'kyi, who had been released from prison several months before the war broke out, to accept the post of president of a parliament or Council of Seniors. At the same time, the Bandera group prepared to establish a "cabinet," which was to have included men from a wide group of parties. Stets'ko himself was to be "premier," since he feared that a nonparty man might give way to German pressure. Bandera adherents were to be placed in such key posts as deputy war minister, which was to be held by Shukevych; minister of security, to be held by Lebed'; and minister of political coordination, to be held by Klymiv.[18] 668* 642 645

The Bandera government, however, was not to live long enough to bring these plans to fruition. The proclamation of the government in the Prosvita hall had deeply disturbed the Wehrmacht officers who had organized "Nachtigall." They knew that it would induce a violent reaction among the ruling Nazis in Berlin, whereas the Wehrmacht group had hoped that by careful procedure they could secure the gradual development of a friendly, autonomous Ukrainian regime, at least in Galicia, without high party circles' realizing what was happening. Some of them were also alarmed at the possibility that the wide publica- 668*

[17] This quotation is taken from a contemporary leaflet copy of the pastoral letter.

[18] Interview 24; Mirchuk, pp. 35–36. Mirchuk lists Petriv as war minister, while a contemporary German SD report (NO 4529) has Iarii in that post. The same report lists Klymiv as minister of security, but the evidence available to me makes it appear probable that Lebed' held the post; possibly the latter's clandestine role made it necessary to keep his appointment secret.

as a base for the new Government which had to replace 727
the Rada and which, in their opinion, would be better 642
capable of organizing the supply of agricultural produce. On 29 April 1918, on the day after the proclamation of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Republic, the German troops interrupted the session of the Rada in the building which it occupied and forced the deputies to leave the hall. The Rada was dissolved. The landowners, the *khliboroby*, in agreement with the Austro-German general staff, elected the Hetman of the whole Ukraine in the person of General Pavlo Skoropadsky, the leader of the popular Democratic Party and descendant of the genuine Hetman of the Ukraine, but in fact a brilliant officer of the Russian Imperial Guards.

The German authorities thought that the new Govern- 727
ment, from which the politicians were excluded, would 645
be more in tune with their interests. In agreement with the General Hetman they appointed the new Cabinet. This Cabinet was composed of landowners, some experts, and a representative of commercial and industrial circles of the country in the person of a rich Jewish industrialist of Odessa, Goutnik. All the Ministers were people of openly Russian sympathies. Thus the bluff of the independent Ukraine received the approval of the same State which had invented it. The German Minister in Kiev, Muhm, wrote in his report to the chief of the German general staff, Groener: 'I insisted, when speaking to M. Lizogoub, the Premier, on the fact that the German Government wanted to see a Cabinet with a greater *couleur locale*.[1] In another report Muhm says that the greater part of the Ministers of the Hetman are not far removed from russophile ideas. 645
'Nevertheless,' he added, 'one must not take this too much to heart as the Government is continually under

[1] In French in the original text.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

645 my control and under that of the German general staff.'

An amusing, but true, story described the political position of the Ministers of the Government of the Hetman. The anecdote concerns the General Ragoza, the War Minister, whose sympathies were in no way Ukrainian. In October 1918 the Russian newspaper *Goloss Kieva* published a so-called order of the day of General Denikine, Commander-in-Chief of the White Army, declaring himself supreme chief of the armed forces on Ukrainian territory. His representative Colonel B., adorning himself with the uniform of the Imperial Army, presented himself without the slightest regard for etiquette to General Ragoza to inform him of the order of General Denikine and requested that the War Minister of the Ukraine would put himself at his disposal. The Minister was so taken aback that he began to assure the envoy of his loyalty to Russia and hastily gave his signature to prove his sincerity. The Russian officers living in Kiev took advantage of this incident to appear in the streets in their most brilliant uniforms of the old Russian Army and invited the population to decorate the city with the Imperial colours. It is unnecessary to say that the order was enthusiastically received by the population. The joke is that it was only a trick played by a Russian newspaper in Kiev, as this order of General Denikine had never existed.

648 642 The personality of the Hetman himself was also not very reassuring to the idea of Ukrainian independence. Here are the informations which were sent to Kiev on 30 May 1918 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich: 'In June 1914 Skoropadsky presented an *aide-mémoire* to the Imperial Government in which he denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, identifying them with the Russian people.' 'The whole Ukrainian

642 and "every republic of the Union has its constitution which takes into consideration the peculiarities of this republic..."; and Article 17 which avers that "every republic of the Union retains the right of voluntary withdrawal from the USSR" is merely an empty phrase, for the laws of the entire Bolshevik realm have equal power in all the federated republics and take precedence over the laws of the federated republics. Anyone who would dare to put into effect in his federated state the "right of voluntary withdrawal" from the Union, would be presented with Article 133 of the same Constitution, which says: "Defending his country is the /122/ most sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Treason like violating an oath, going over to the enemy, damaging the military forces of the state and espionage will be avenged as the greatest crime with all the force of the law." If it should occur to a Ukrainian to agitate for the right of voluntary withdrawal from the Union of his federated republic, which is "guaranteed" him in Article 17, Article 123 could be cited to prevent him from doing so, which makes punishable "any propaganda of a racial or nationally exclusive nature".

642 Now, what is the "independent exercise of
645 supreme power" in the Ukraine like? Article 77 of the Constitution[1] clarifies this point, the People's Commissariats of Moscow are alone competent in matters pertaining to defense, foreign policy, foreign trade, traffic, the entire postal system, heavy industry and defense industry. But since the Constitution went into effect further commissariats of the Federated Republics have been subordinated to the Moscow offices, so that only education, local industry, municipal economy and social welfare have remained in Ukrainian hands. These are subject to the supervision of the national office. Under such circumstances it does not matter how the administrative system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is built up,

1 [i.e. of November 1936 — Analyst]

642 inasmuch as the entire governmental hierarchy
645 from the village council /soviet/to the head of the state is merely a body of sheriffs whose duty is to see that the orders from Moscow are carried out.

000 In place of the nationalization of non-Russian peoples, which was given up in 1930, there have come up since 1936 the slogans about the "common socialistic fatherland", the "great Soviet people", the "love of the Soviet homeland". Besides that, the theory of the Russian people as the "leading people of the Revolution" is being quite systematically disseminated. The chauvinism of Great Russia which Stalin so mercilessly exposed to shame at the Party Congress of 1930 bids fair /123/ to recapturing for the Great Russian people the same position it had at the time of the White Czars.

*

871 Since Ukrainization was discontinued,[7] the education of Ukrainian youth goes on strictly according to the principles of the Marx-Lenin doctrine. Woe to the educator against whom it can be proved that he is departing from this course. Thousands of scholars and pedagogues had to give up their lives because of such mistakes.

The basic type of school in Soviet Ukraine, just as throughout the Soviet realm, is the "seven-grade work school" which roughly corresponds to an elementary school. Attendance in the four lower grades is obligatory, in the three higher ones, voluntary. The young Ukrainian, after he has graduated from the work school, may enter the "professional school" (a sort of technical school) or the "workers' school" for factory apprentices. The adult worker may enroll as auditor in the "workers' academy". There are also "Party schools", such as the "Pan-Ukrainian Institute for Communist Education", and, in place

7 [At the 16th All-Union Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union in June 1930- Analyst]

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

643 Art. 36. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of
646 the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR retains its powers until the newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR shall have formed a new Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 37. The newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is convened by the outgoing Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR not later than three months after the elections.

645 Art. 38. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR appoints the Government
[644] of the Ukrainian SSR, namely, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter IV. The Organs of State Administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

Art. 39. The highest executive and administrative organ of state power of the Ukrainian SSR is the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 40. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR is responsible and accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, or, in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 41. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, and of the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and verifies their execution.

Art. 42. Decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR are binding throughout the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 43. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR:

a) Coordinates and directs the work of the Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR and of other institutions under its jurisdiction; coordinates and verifies the work of the authorized representatives of the all-Union Ministries;

b) Adopts measures to carry out the national-economic plan;

c) Adopts measures to fulfil the state and local budgets of the Ukrainian SSR;

d) Adopts measures for the maintenance of public order, for the protection of the interests of the state, and for the safeguarding of the rights of citizens;

e) Directs and verifies the work of the Executive Committees of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies;

f) Sets up, whenever necessary, special Committees and Central Administrations under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR for economic and cultural affairs;

g) Directs the organization of the military formations of the Ukrainian SSR;

h) Exercises guidance in the sphere of the relations of the Ukrainian SSR with foreign states, on the basis of the general procedure established by the USSR governing the relations of Union Republics with foreign states.

Art. 44. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR has the right to annul decisions and orders of Executive Committees of regional Soviets of Working

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

645 People's Deputies and likewise to suspend decisions and orders of regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR has the right to annul orders and instructions of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 45. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and consists of:

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR;
The Vice-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR;
The Chairman of the Planning Commission of the Ukrainian SSR;
The Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, namely:
- The Minister of Motor Transport
- The Minister of Internal Affairs
- The Minister of State Control
- The Minister of State Security
- The Minister of the Housing Construction Industry
- The Minister of Foreign Affairs
- The Minister of the Armed Forces
- The Minister of Cinematography
- The Minister of the Municipal Economy
- The Minister of Light Industry
- The Minister of Forestry
- The Minister of the Timber and Paper Industry
- The Minister of the Furniture and Carpentry Industries
- The Minister of the Local Fuel Industry
- The Minister of Local Industry
- The Minister of the Meat and Dairy Industry
- The Minister of Education
- The Minister of Public Health
- The Minister of the Building Materials Industry
- The Minister of State Farms
- The Minister of the Fish Industry
- The Minister of Agriculture
- The Minister of Social Maintenance
- The Minister of Trade
- The Minister of Finance
- The Minister of the Food Industry
- The Minister of Justice

The Chairman of the Committee on Cultural and Educational Institutions;
The Chairman of the Committee on Arts;
The Chief of the Administration of Higher Education.

Art. 46. The Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR direct the branches of state administration which come within the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 47. The Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR are either Union-Republican or Republican Ministries.

Art. 48. The following Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR are Union-Republican Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR:
- The Ministry of Internal Affairs
- The Ministry of State Control
- The Ministry of State Security
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- The Ministry of the Armed Forces

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The Ministry of Cinematography
The Ministry of Light Industry
The Ministry of Forestry
The Ministry of the Timber and Paper Industry
The Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Industry
The Ministry of Public Health
The Ministry of the Building Materials Industry
The Ministry of the Fish Industry
The Ministry of the Food Industry
The Ministry of State Farms
The Ministry of Agriculture
The Ministry of Trade
The Ministry of Finance
The Ministry of Justice

Art. 49. The following Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR are Republican Ministries:

The Ministry of the Housing Construction Industry
The Ministry of Motor Transport
The Ministry of the Furniture and Carpentry Industries
The Ministry of the Municipal Economy
The Ministry of Local Industry
The Ministry of the Local Fuel Industry
The Ministry of Education
The Ministry of Social Maintenance.

Art. 50. The Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, within the limits of the jurisdiction of their respective Ministries, issue orders and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, of the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and of the orders and instructions of the Union-Republican Ministries of the USSR, and verify their execution.

Art. 51. Each Union-Republican Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directs the branch of state administration of the Ukrainian SSR entrusted to it, with the exception of only a limited number of enterprises, according to a list confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and is subordinate both to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and the corresponding Union-Republican Ministry of the USSR.

Art. 52. Each Republican Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directs the branch of state administration entrusted to it and is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 53. The Government of the Ukrainian SSR or a Minister of the Ukrainian SSR to whom a question of a member of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is addressed must give a verbal or written reply in the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR within a period not exceeding three days.

Chapter V. The Local Organs of State Power

631 Art. 54. The organs of state power in regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages are the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 55. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, districts in big cities, settlements and villages are elected by the

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 79. On the expiration of the terms of office of the regional, area, district, city settlement or village Soviets of Working People's Deputies, their executive and administrative organs retain their powers until the newly elected Soviets shall have formed new executive and administrative organs.

Chapter VI. The Budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

[643] 644 [645] Art. 80. The state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is drawn up by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and submitted by it to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for its approval.

Upon its approval by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is published for general information.

Art. 81. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Budget Commission, which reports its conclusions on the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet.

Art. 82. The report on the fulfilment of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and published for general information.

651 652 Art. 83. The budgets of the regional, area, district, city, settlement and village Soviets include the revenues from the local economy, deductions from the state revenues collected within their territory and likewise receipts from local taxes and imposts in amounts fixed by the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter VII. The Courts and the Procurator's Office

692 Art. 84. In the Ukrainian SSR justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Regional and Area Courts, the Special Courts of the USSR established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the People's Courts.

[693] Art. 85. In all Courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

Art. 86. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is the highest judicial organ of the Ukrainian SSR. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR.

[646] Art. 87. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for a term of five years.

Art. 88. Regional and area courts are elected by regional and area Soviets of Working People's Deputies for a term of five years.

Art. 89. People's courts are elected by the citizens of the district on basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of three years.

695 [563] Art. 90. Judicial proceedings in the Ukrainian SSR are conducted in the Ukrainian language, persons not knowing the language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court.

262 745 434 Expectant and nursing mothers are usually at work, and have standard leaves with pay and special privileges; thus, if working, they receive rations appropriate to the occupational group, plus special food allowances; and if not working, dependents' rations plus these allowances. The supplements are as follows, monthly: cereals, 1.2 kilograms; butter (or substitute), 0.8 kilograms; sugar 0.6 kilograms; vegetables, 2.0 kilograms; milk (fresh or dried) 12 litres. Their approximate calories from rations alone are, therefore:

If light workers	1,682 plus 512 -	2,194	calories daily
If employees	1,144 plus 512 -	1,656	" "
If dependents	704 plus 512 -	1,216	" "

In the last case it is almost possible to assume that the husband is well paid and will be able to buy products in the open market.

262 Even if the established ration scales for all groups could be met, they would not provide an adequate, balanced diet. Particularly the rations for women and children are very light in fat, first-class protein, and calcium. They provide less than half the low League of Nation's standard for daily full-cream milk requirements of the expectant mother. But even these inadequate scales are seldom supplied.

262 434 Since mid-October 1946, the honouring of ration cards has, because of the increasing food shortages, become more and more irregular. In December 1946, for instance, large groups of persons in the Kiev area received only bread, sugar, and a few tins of vegetables on their cards. No meat, fish or fats were available. By the middle of January 1947, the situation had grown even more stringent, and only bread was supplied on the ration.

At the same time, the amount of food available off the ration has decreased almost to the vanishing point. Cereals and white bread have practically disappeared from the open market; and when they are available, the price is beyond the reach of the average person.

262 181 164 369 The effects of the poor diet are already to be seen. The people generally show a noticeable lack of their former livelinoes, energy and cheerfulness. Moreover, according to the Medical Officer of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, clinical starvation has made its appearance in the smaller villages of the Republic: protein dropsy and avitaminosis are increasing; and among the townspeople there is great incidence of skin infections and respiratory and nasopharyngeal conditions.

645 744 262 In order to meet some of the medical aspects which may arise out of the present food situation, the Ministry of Health has taken the following steps.

645 744 262 (a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

241 727 The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

731 649 262 UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

186 Maxim Rilsky*, were dismissed in November 1946. Rilsky, one of the
661 most outstanding poets of the Soviet Ukraine, was charged with being a
538 'prisoner of bourgeois nationalism'. He had not only 'sinned' in his works but he had also delivered a particularly objectionable lecture, 'Kiev in the history of the Ukraine', in which he 'idealized the old patriarchal order and depicted in rosy idyllic colours the conditions under the rule of landowners and bourgeois'. Together with Rilsky a whole group of Ukrainian writers was accused of nationalism, 'Khvylovy-ism' and reactionary tendencies, including I. Senchenko, Y. Yanovsky and P. Panch.[21]

Maxim Rilsky was replaced as president of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers by A. Y. Korneichuk, author of a large number of political plays, who had always accurately interpreted the party line and had earned nothing but praise from the supreme Soviet leadership. It was Korneichuk's task to lead Ukrainian literature on the road of strict Soviet Patriotism and 'Socialist Realism'. Indeed, Ukrainian writers, publishing houses and literary journals became more careful and it appeared during a certain period as if Korneichuk had really succeeded in his assignment. The 'Festival of Ukrainian Art and Literature' held in Moscow in June 1951 showed, however, that this was a deception. The festival gave the members of the Bolshevik Politbureau an opportunity of getting a closer look at Ukrainian cultural life. They found that Ukrainian authors and artists had still not overcome their ideological mistakes. Even Korneichuk himself who was expected to give a good example to his fellow-writers had committed a serious offence. He had written a libretto for the opera 'Bogdan Khmelnitsky', which, from the official point of view, was not sufficiently anti-Polish and not eloquent
[626] enough in its pro-Russian bias. Through its mouthpiece, *Pravda*, the Politbureau not only denounced Korneichuk and other writers for ideological distortions but also reprimanded the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party for having neglected the political education of the Ukrainian intellectual élite. The Ukrainian Central Committee, mindful of what had happened to the Ukrainian Communist leaders in the thirties, immediately pledged itself to remedy the situation.[22]

THE UKRAINE AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET 'WORLD POLITICS'

648 After having fulfilled its original mission of bringing all Ukrainian lands
645 into the fold of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ukraine was given a new task.

* Rilsky, like most great poets of the Soviet Ukraine, has a 'nationalistic past'. In 1934 he and another poet laureate of the Ukraine, Pavel Tychina, were rebuked for their 'hesitation' in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to them. Yet another contemporary Ukrainian poet, Mikola Bazhan, who is not only like Tychina a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet but also a Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Government, used to be likewise blamed for the 'nationalistic soil in which his creations have been rooted'.[23]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

She was to serve Soviet diplomacy in the wider international arena. UK. 648
The turning point in the mission of the Ukraine came early in 1944 645
with the setting up of a Ukrainian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Ukrainian Foreign Office came into being under the decree of S.U.
February 1st, 1944, providing for the establishment of People's Commis- 635
sariats (later Ministries) for Foreign Affairs in all the sixteen Soviet 648
Republics. It was clear, however, that this decree, despite its general character, had the primary object of giving the Ukraine a new formal status in international affairs. To a much lesser extent this was true regarding Byelorussia, whilst little practical use was made of the foreign offices of the other Soviet Republics.

For a short while the real meaning of the creation of a Ukrainian and of a Byelorussian Foreign Office was not quite clear. At first it looked as if the central Government intended to make a real concession to the two Soviet Republics which had so heavily suffered by the war. The impression was confirmed by a statement of the veteran Ukrainian Bolshevik, Dimitry Manuilsky. Speaking in his capacity as Ukrainian Foreign Minister he announced in 1945 that the Ukrainian S.S.R. was 'ready at any time to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with any country'. Addressing over 400 foreign journalists, at a press conference in San Francisco, Manuilsky added that the Ukrainian Government would 'consider with gratitude any proposals by other States with regard to foreign relations'.[24] Soon after this statement had been made the Kremlin apparently regretted its generous gesture and the Ukraine was not allowed to establish consular and diplomatic missions abroad. A British offer to exchange consular representatives between the United Kingdom and the Ukrainian S.S.R. was turned down.

While the Ukraine is not supposed to have consuls and diplomats she UK.
has been encouraged to send delegates to international conferences [648]
and to the United Nations. These delegates do not defend the interests of even a communist Ukrainian State, but only those of the centralized Soviet Empire. The Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations has frequently been ordered to effect this or that tactical move whenever the delegation of the U.S.S.R. desired to remain in the background.

NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE UKRAINE

UK.
During the inter-war period the Ukrainian S.S.R. was still a multi- 563
national State despite the clear preponderance of the Ukrainians. S.U.
National minorities represented about 20 per cent of the total popula- 563
tion of the Ukraine in its pre-war frontiers. With the two most important minorities, Russians and Jews, we are dealing in another context. It suffices to underline with regard to both these minority groups that they acted as a brake on separatist Ukrainian tendencies, thus fulfilling a

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

country. The Soviets and all sorts of other similar organizations 668
which were supposed to voice the aspirations of 'great masses' had been organized in the same way. Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, [646]
however, attained their first object, since 'the Ukrainian Conference' elected from its midst members of 'the Ukrainian *Rada*' which was to constitute a sort of Parliament for the Ukraine. These events caused considerable displeasure to the Provisional Government in Petrograd and it was not long before a struggle developed between the Provisional Government and the Ukrainian *Rada*.

'Self-determination of nationalities' had always formed part of 668
the moral and political stock-in-trade of the various brands of 642
'liberals', 'democrats' and 'socialists' who composed the Provisional Government. But the realities of the situation in which they found themselves imposed on these ideologues a certain moderation in the application of their super-liberal principles. Harassed on all sides by self-constituted revolutionary and nationalist groups and factions, and themselves clinging nervously to the forms of an authority which was being rapidly dispersed by the cold winds of rising anarchy, the Provisional Government had recourse to their usual method of 'persuasion' and they asked the *Rada* to await the end of the war and the decisions of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

'Persuasion', however, was hopeless with opponents so skilled in political struggles and intrigue as Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko. Aware of the weakness of the Petrograd Government, the politicians of the *Rada* based their tactics on manœuvring for a gradual enlargement of the powers which they had attributed to themselves, while they avoided provoking the cabinet of Prince Lvov by premature demands of too drastic a nature. The *Rada* secured, for instance, the consent of the Provisional Government to the formation of Ukrainian national troops. In this case they could appeal to the precedent which had been created by the formation of Lettish, Georgian and Armenian national detachments.

Professor Paul Milyukov, a prominent member of the Provisional Government, describes the relations of Petrograd with the *Rada* in the following words: 'The Provisional Government was still continuing to plead with the Ukrainians not to detach themselves from the Motherland, not to go the fatal way of dividing liberated Russia, and not to introduce dissensions into the Army at a moment of great national danger. Weak and devoid of backbone, having itself laid down its arms, the Government could not but register *post factum* the triumphs attained by the Ukrainians. Hrushevsky's tactics consisted in proving that "nothing decisive" was taking place. The fiction that the Government was sanctioning the *Rada's* doings was

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

645 the principal persons in this Government by the correspondence which passed between the Austrian and German authorities and their Governments—a part of which subsequently fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks and has been published by them (*The Crash of the German Occupation in Ukraine*, 1936, inf. p. 335). In his reports to Vienna the Austrian Chief of Staff, General Waldstetter, found Vsevolod Holubovich, the President of the Council of Ministers, 'eloquent, imaginative—a man of theories with no character at all; put there by the Germans'. Lubinsky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was 'a beardless young man extremely well read in Socialist and revolutionary literature; entirely in the hands of the Germans'. Zhukovski, the Minister for War, 'seems to me pro-Russian; he is an ex-Colonel of the General Staff and tries hard to appear before his colleagues as an untainted Socialist and revolutionary from head to foot; in reality a German puppet'. The same source gives a curious characterization of Hrushevsky. 'Hrushevsky—President of the *Rada*, a frightened old man all of a tremble; his old bones are supposed to give the *Rada* a noble patina worthy of so august an assembly. Holds on for all he is worth to the German Command and shows no sympathy at all towards Austria.' Hrushevsky had certainly changed with the times.

● 646 The *Rada* was composed of several hundred deputies, belonging to different Ukrainian parties; amongst them were National Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, Social Democrats and Social Federalists. Separatist tendencies prevailed, but among the more definitely Socialist groups it was possible to observe a more or less veiled distrust of and hostility towards the Austro-German authorities and the obedient cabinet which they had installed in Kiev. The more prominent representatives of these sentiments included Vinnichenko and Petlyura.

668 After its return to Kiev the *Rada* embarked on the purely academic task of elaborating a constitution for the Ukraine. The Occupation authorities were not much interested in this 'august assembly' and had 'no illusions about its importance'. General Hoffmann wrote at the time: 'The difficulty in the Ukraine is that the Central *Rada* has only our rifles behind it. The moment we withdraw our troops their authority will collapse at once' (Hoffmann, p. 207). The historian of the Brest-Litovsk peace, who has studied the documents of the period with great thoroughness, comes to the conclusion that: 'The separatist movement had no roots in the country and the people as a whole were completely indifferent to national self-determination; this had been thrust upon them by a group of political dreamers whose power was derived from the presence of German bayonets.'

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER II

UKRAINE DURING THE REVOLUTION 1917—1920

1. *The Ukrainian Central Council*

000 In March 1917, the revolution overthrew the Tsarist Government in Russia. This enabled the oppressed peoples of the former Tsarist Empire to declare their rights for political self-determination. These were: the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, White Ruthenians (Byelorussians), the Caucasian peoples (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidjanians), the peoples of Turkestan and above all the most numerous nation after the Russians, — the Ukrainians.

668 63 [646] In March 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council in Kiev was formed from the representatives of the Ukrainian political organisations as representative of the Ukrainian nation. Ukrainian congresses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, also elected their deputies to the Central Council, and thus this organ became a provisional Parliament of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council tried first to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine through an agreement with the Russian Provisional Government of Prince Lvov-Kerensky.

But the Ukrainian efforts to attain autonomy met with the resolute opposition of the Russian Provisional Government and of the Russian political parties. The centralist tradition of Tsarist Russia continued to live in Russian political parties with the same vigour even after the fall of the régime. The delegates of the Central Council applied to the Russian Provisional Government in Petersburg to recognise by a public act the right of the Ukrainian nation to autonomy within the Russian state. The Russian Government refused this demand, declaring that the problem of autonomy for Ukraine should be decided by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. This reply could not satisfy the Ukrainians. For it was evident that the Russian Constituent Assembly, with the centralist efforts of the Russian parties having a majority would refuse the autonomous rights of non-Russian peoples.

Thus the Ukrainian Central Council began to realise the necessity for Ukraine to establish an autonomous order itself, without taking into notice the threats of the Russian political parties and

phils) of being the result of German intrigue.[1] This again gave rise to a pamphlet, by L. Tschelski, issued in Sofia (1915) by the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, entitled *Is the Ukrainian Movement a German Intrigue?* The Russian Government took severe measures against the members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, who, including the chief leader, Hrushevski, were banished to Siberia, or were forbidden to enter Russia from abroad. 175

(D) Fourth Period: Since the Russian Revolution of 1917

(*a*) *The Ukraine becomes independent.*—One of the first questions which faced the Provisional Government at the beginning of the Russian Revolution was the demand for an amnesty for the Ukrainian Nationalist offenders, who were allowed to return from Siberia and abroad. Next came the demand for Ukrainian autonomy and the appointment of a special Minister for Ukrainian Affairs, presented by a deputation sent from Kiev to Petrograd on April 6, 1917. Soon afterwards the first Ukrainian National Congress was convened at Kiev (April 19–22), at which some 800 members representative of the *intelligentsia* and the Social Revolutionaries were present. They elected a Central Rada, and declared for an autonomous Ukrainian republic under a Russian federal republic. Professor Hrushevski was elected President. The territory claimed for the Ukrainian state corresponded roughly to the western parts of the Governments of Lublin and Grodno, and the whole of the Governments of Kiev, Poltava, Kherson, Volhynia, Kharkov, Podolia, Yekaterinoslav, and Chernigov, and excluded the Austrian Ukraine. The Congresses of the Ukrainian Soldiers (May 5–7) and of the Ukrainian Peasants (May–June) supported the Rada at this time. But the Petrograd 668 642 [646] [131]

[1] In answer to a pamphlet by Tschelski, *No Liberator, but an Oppressor of Nations: How Russia freed the Ukraine.* L.L.U., Sofia, 1914.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

642 s) Direction of the cultural, educational and scientific organizations and institutions of the Ukrainian SSR, and administration of the cultural, educational and scientific organizations and institutions of all-Republican importance;

t) Direction of public health and administration of institutions of public health of all-Republican importance;

u) Direction and organization of physical culture and sports;

v) Organization of the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR;

w) Granting the rights of citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR;

x) Legislation concerning marriage and the family;

y) Amnesty and pardon of citizens convicted by judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR;

z) Organization of the military formations of the Ukrainian SSR;

aa) Establishment of the representation of the Ukrainian SSR in international relations.

Chapter III. The Higher Organs of State Power of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

646 Art. 20. The highest organ of state power in the Ukrainian SSR is the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 21. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is elected for a term of four years by the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR voting by election districts on the basis of one deputy for every 100,000 of the population.

Art. 22. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR exercises all rights vested in the Ukrainian SSR in accordance with Articles 13 and 19 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, in so far as they do not, by virtue of the Constitution, come within the jurisdiction of organs of the Ukrainian SSR that are accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, that is, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 23. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is the sole legislative organ of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 24. A law is considered adopted if passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR by a simple majority vote.

[643] Art. 25. Laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR are published over the signatures of the President and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 26. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and two Vice-Chairmen.

Art. 27. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR presides at the sittings of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainain SSR and has charge of the conduct of its business and proceedings.

643 Art. 28. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, consisting of a President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary of the Presidium and fifteen members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

1 [CF, cat. 116, p. 2-4--Analyst]

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

643 Art. 29. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for all its activities.

Art. 30. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR:

a) Convenes the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR;

b) Issues decrees;

c) Gives interpretations of the laws of the Ukrainian SSR in operation;

d) Conducts nation-wide polls (referendums);

e) Annuls decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and likewise decisions and orders of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies, if they do not conform to law;

f) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, releases and appoints Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Grants the rights of citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR;

h) Confers titles of honour of the Ukrainian SSR and grants awards;

i) Exercises the right of pardoning citizens convicted by judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR;

j) Appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives of the Ukrainian SSR to foreign states;

k) Receives the letters of credence and recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to it by foreign states.

643 Art. 31. Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR are convened
646 by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR twice a year.

Extraordinary sessions are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR at its discretion or on the demand of one-third of the deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

646 Art. 32. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Credentials Committee to verify the credentials of the members of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

On the report of the Credentials Committee, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR decides whether to recognise the credentials of deputies or to annul their election.

Art. 33. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, when it deems necessary, appoints commissions of investigation and audit on any matter.

It is the duty of all institutions and officials to comply with the demands of such commissions and to submit to them all necessary materials and documents.

Art. 34. A member of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR may not be prosecuted or arrested without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, or, when the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is not in session, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

643 Art. 35. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of
646 the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR orders
[666] new elections to be held within a period not exceeding two months from the date of expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

643 Art. 36. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of
644 the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR retains its powers until the newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR shall have formed a new Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 37. The newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is convened by the outgoing Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR not later than three months after the elections.

645 Art. 38. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR appoints the Government
[646] of the Ukrainian SSR, namely, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter IV. The Organs of State Administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

Art. 39. The highest executive and administrative organ of state power of the Ukrainian SSR is the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 40. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR is responsible and accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, or, in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 41. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, and of the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and verifies their execution.

Art. 42. Decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR are binding throughout the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 43. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR:

a) Coordinates and directs the work of the Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR and of other institutions under its jurisdiction; coordinates and verifies the work of the authorized representatives of the all-Union Ministries;

b) Adopts measures to carry out the national-economic plan;

c) Adopts measures to fulfil the state and local budgets of the Ukrainian SSR;

d) Adopts measures for the maintenance of public order, for the protection of the interests of the state, and for the safeguarding of the rights of citizens;

e) Directs and verifies the work of the Executive Committees of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies;

f) Sets up, whenever necessary, special Committees and Central Administrations under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR for economic and cultural affairs;

g) Directs the organization of the military formations of the Ukrainian SSR;

h) Exercises guidance in the sphere of the relations of the Ukrainian SSR with foreign states, on the basis of the general procedure established by the USSR governing the relations of Union Republics with foreign states.

Art. 44. The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR has the right to annul decisions and orders of Executive Committees of regional Soviets of Working

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 79. On the expiration of the terms of office of the regional, area, district, city settlement or village Soviets of Working People's Deputies, their executive and administrative organs retain their powers until the newly elected Soviets shall have formed new executive and administrative organs.

Chapter VI. The Budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

652 Art. 80. The state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is drawn up by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and submitted by it to the Supreme Soviet of the 646 Ukrainian SSR for its approval.
Upon its approval by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR the [645] state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is published for general information.

Art. 81. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Budget Commission, which reports its conclusions on the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet.

Art. 82. The report on the fulfilment of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and published for general information.

651 Art. 83. The budgets of the regional, area, district, city, settlement and village Soviets include the revenues from the local economy, deductions from the 652 state revenues collected within their territory and likewise receipts from local taxes and imposts in amounts fixed by the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter VII. The Courts and the Procurator's Office

692 Art. 84. In the Ukrainian SSR justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Regional and Area Courts, the Special Courts of the USSR established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the People's Courts.

[693] Art. 85. In all Courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

Art. 86. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is the highest judicial organ of the Ukrainian SSR. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR.

[646] Art. 87. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for a term of five years.

Art. 88. Regional and area courts are elected by regional and area Soviets of Working People's Deputies for a term of five years.

Art. 89. People's courts are elected by the citizens of the district on basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of three years.

695 Art. 90. Judicial proceedings in the Ukrainian SSR are conducted in the Ukrainian language, persons not knowing the language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an [563] interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court.

[UKRAINIAN CONSTITUTION AS OF NOV 21, 1949]

66 Art. 121. Elections of deputies to Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR are held by election districts on the following bases:

in elections to regional Soviets - one deputy for every 15,000 to 30,000 of
[31] the population, depending upon its size;

in elections to district and area Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the
[32] population; in a district or area whose population does not exceed 25,000, twenty-five deputies are elected, and in a district or area whose population exceeds 60,000, not more than sixty deputies are elected;

in elections to city Soviets or city district Soviets - one deputy for every
[33] 350 to 900 of the population, depending upon its size; in a city or city district whose population does not exceed 12,000, thirty-five deputies are elected;

in elections to the Kiev and Kharkov city Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population;

in elections to village or settlement Soviets - one deputy for every 100 of
[23] the population; in a village or settlement whose population does not exceed 1,000, nine deputies are elected, and where the population exceeds 2,500, not more than twenty-five deputies.

The basis of representation for each regional, district, city, village and settlement Soviet of Working People's Deputies is fixed in the "Ordinance Concerning Elections to Regional, District, City, Village and Settlement Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR," within the range of the bases of representation indicated in the present article.

Art. 122. Candidates for elections are nominated according to electoral district.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Art. 123. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time upon decision of the majority of the electors in the manner established by law.

Chapter X. Arms, Flag, Capital

186 Art. 124. The state arms of the Ukrainian SSR are a sickle and hammer of gold in relief, placed crosswise, handles down against a red background in the rays of the rising sun, and surrounded by ears of wheat, which are placed symmetrically, from bottom to top, forming a circle. Between the tops of the ears of wheat is a red star. At the bottom of the wreath are the words, "Ukrainian SSR" on a red band, and at the bottom of the ears of corn the words, "Workers of all Countries United!" in the Russian language on the right, and in the Ukrainian language on the left.

Art. 125. The state flag of the Ukrainian SSR is of cloth divided into two horizontal bands of color: the upper band, in red, is two-thirds of the width of the flag, and the lower band, in azure, is one-third of the width of the flag. In the upper part of the flag, about one-third of the distance from the staff, are a hammer and sickle of gold and above them a five-pointed star with a gold border.

The relation of width to length of the flag is 1:2.

Art. 126. The Capital of the Ukrainian SSR is the City of Kiev.

Chapter XI. Procedure for Amending the Constitution

642 Art. 127. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR may be amended only by de-
646 cision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of the Supreme Soviet.

465 434 ment has been slower and they have not yet reached the same degree of intensity of labor which we found in factories. Jews play a great part in commercial life.

162 465 511 647 Among the lower categories of civil servants, Ukrainians were in the majority from the beginning, while representatives of foreign nationalities increased in the higher services. The average salary of Soviet officials throws little light on the standard of living in this group of the population because the difference between higher and lower employees is again considerable. Incomes in the lower ranks were very small while the higher officials had a life of ease and could on occasion even afford luxury. Engineers are among the most privileged while teachers and actors are much worse off. The legal status of the Soviet official was entirely insecure; they lived constantly under threat of a "purge" or of being denounced as disturbing the process of Soviet economy. The higher ranks of bureaucrats were here in special danger.

162 The small group of the professional class (doctors, writers, lawyers), in spite of their freedom, was dependent on the apparatus of the Soviet State. The group of outcasts was most to be pitied, i. e. those who had been expelled by the regime from social intercourse, e. g. merchants, artisans, and priests. After identity cards were introduced and "socially dangerous" persons removed, this group greatly decreased.

162 167 697 Another group, finally, is formed by Ukrainians living outside the frontiers of Ukrainian territory, who as "Kurkuls", "Pests", "Saboteurs" were sent to concentration camps in the North and in Siberia. The "Nationalists" are also included in this group. And the colonisation of remote frontier areas in Soviet Russia required forest laborers, miners and factory workers, who had to help in the coal mines of Siberia and in building up industrial concerns in Central Asia. It is impossible to give statistics for the proportion of Ukrainians in this group, but they cannot be ignored as they will certainly return home and play an important rôle in Ukraine whenever the general situation is altered.

162 167 In Ukrainian areas outside of the Soviet Union, conditions resemble those obtaining in Western Europe. The Ukrainian

maintained by the Zemstvos (local organizations somewhat similar to County Councils, elected by citizens with a certain property census). 491

Quite recently the planning of the organization of the road system of the Soviet Union was put in the hands of the planning commission. It seems that important sums are to be spent on this project. It is almost unnecessary to mention that great economic transformations could be brought about by the construction even of a few thousand kilometres of roads, especially in New Russia where the composition of the soil makes the present tracks absolutely impassable after the slightest rain. Many villages still remain almost isolated from the rest of the world during periods of bad weather and are only connected with their respective centres by telegraph and, in case of their defect, by postmen on horseback.

The question of roads which we have approached allows us a small diversion. We can say a few words about the Zemstvos. This organization was distinguished after the abolition of serfdom as a factor of the first order in the development of the economic organism of the country, of the raising of the well-being of the population, of public hygiene, and of instruction. Having resources resulting from taxes on the land, the Zemstvos were able to cover Ukrainian territory, as also that of the whole of Russia, with a dense network of hospitals, veterinary centres, agricultural advisory bureaux, of experimental fields, of credit and trade co-operatives, and insurance offices, and finally of primary and even technical schools. The personnel of the Zemstvos, recruited among the intelligentsia often belonging to the popular classes, was always conspicuous by its devotion to the cause and did not lack in highly qualified specialists who did not hesitate to sacrifice 647 744 657 657 647

647 their career and the assurance of a good income for the meagre appointments as an official. It is sufficient just to glance at the statistics of the Russian Empire in order to realize what a gigantic increase in the development of civilization was reached by the effort of the Russian [871] intellectuals and specialists. Public instruction had developed in these fifty years to an enormous extent, [165] infant mortality had fallen by more than 60 per cent, [164] epidemics had experienced a great fall, as also cattle diseases, and the yield of the land had increased in the [232] southern regions by more than 30 per cent. The improvement of the different breeds of horses and cattle was already evident on the eve of the Great War.

206 The backward country which Russia was supposed to be in the eyes of Westerners, including also the Ukraine, had in 1912 a big network of telephone lines in the country and especially in the region of Vinnitza, where the organization of the Zemstvos was especially active.

505 As to the river system, as we have already seen, it is very poor and is limited to four rivers, the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Boug, and the Donietz, of which the Dnieper alone is of any interest. The transport capacity of this one important river has been for ever spoiled by the rapids which make navigation impossible along a [503] considerable distance. It is only after the building of the *Dnieprogues*, whose gigantic barrage had submerged the rapids along a distance of about one hundred kilometres, that an uninterrupted river route was established, linking the upper Dnieper with the Black Sea.

This river drains the greater part of the Ukraine and has left its mark upon the whole historic and economic evolution of the country.

Before the Great War the annual tonnage of transports

IV UNRRA ASSISTANCE TO THE UKRAINE

Distribution of UNRRA Supplies

648 731 UNRRA supplies for the Ukraine are handed over to the government at the port of entry (usually Odessa on the Black Sea); and the government is then responsible for arranging distribution.

648 731 647 Like most other countries receiving UNRRA help, the Ukrainian Government has established a special organization to supervise the reception, warehousing, and distribution of all UNRRA goods received. This organization - which has on its staff specialists in food, industrial equipment, agricultural rehabilitation, food processing machinery, medical supplies, transport, accounting and distribution - is called the Department of UNRRA Supplies, and is directly responsible to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

The Department (headed by Mr. V.V. Khomyak) works in close liaison with the various ministries of the Ukrainian Government, and with the UNRRA Mission. On the basis of decisions made by the particular ministries concerned, it draws up plans for the distribution of UNRRA supplies and keeps a central record of their sales and of the proceeds expended by the government for further relief projects.

5:4 648 731 Most UNRRA shipments for both the Ukraine and Byelorussia have arrived through the port of Odessa; and since early 1946 an UNRRA officer has been stationed there to handle problems connected with delivery. Before an UNRRA shipment comes in, the authorities at Odessa are notified of the ship's name, its expected time of arrival, and the nature of its cargo. As soon as possible after the ship lands, discharging of cargo begins. Stevedoring labour is supplied by the port commander's service organization, "Inflot", which also furnishes checkers to work in the ship's hold and on the docks, counting the supplies and reporting any damaged goods. As the cargo is unloaded, perishable items, such as clothing and cheese, are placed in warehouses on the docks, and seeds in a warehouse in the suburbs of Odessa. Packaged goods, such as canned meat, army rations, and juices, are piled on the dock at shipside and finally into freight cars.

648 731 Directives for the distribution of the supplies (based upon decisions of the recipient ministries concerned) are issued by the Department of UNRRA Supplies to the Ministry of Foreign Trade representative in Odessa, whose office then instructs the railroad and barge authorities, providing such information as the name and location of the organization or governmental authority receiving the supplies, and a description of the goods to be delivered.

[6:5] UNRRA relief supplies are either sold to individual ration-card or permit holders, or distributed to collectives, co-operatives, and other

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

The Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon World

It is sad but true that the Ukrainians and the Anglo-Saxon world have never developed through the centuries that close and constant relationship which has existed in the case of so many other peoples. There have been moments of contact but these have never lasted and did not until the present time result in a steady stream of interest. — Yet this unfortunate fact has been due rather to the history of the two peoples and to their geographical locations than to any deliberate neglect on either part. The Anglo-Saxon race, taking its rise from England, an island on the northwestern coast of Europe, was chiefly concerned with areas that it could reach by sea. During its long centuries of oppression, Ukraine was completely landlocked. It was cut off from the Black Sea by the Tatars. It was hemmed in on the north and east by Moscow and on the west where it formed part of the Polish-Lithuanian state, there was little encouragement for foreigners to travel to it. 175 648

It is interesting, however, that in all of the periods when Ukraine was playing an important rôle in European affairs, knowledge of it reached England, but almost invariably it was by means more or less connected with the sea.

Let us look first at the Kyiv period, when Kyiv was one of the great capitals of Christian Europe and when it far surpassed in wealth and culture any of the western capitals. At this period the bonds between Kyiv-Rus and Scandinavia were close. Even Volodymyr after the death of his father Svyatoslav was obliged to retire to Scandinavia and return with Varangian troops before he could establish himself on the throne. It was the same period when England was being ruled by King Canute the Dane. The Northmen, sailing back and forth across the North Sea, could not fail to carry news of the exploits of their Varangian cousins. A little later one of the daughters of Yaroslav was married to King Harold Hardraga, the King of Norway, who was later to fall in 1066 at the battle of Stamford Bridge only a few days before his conqueror King Harold II, the last Saxon King of England, was destined to fall before William of Normandy at Hastings. Later a daughter of Harold married Volodymyr Mono-

175 makh. Thus by the nature of events, during this period when
648 both England and Ukraine were connected with the Scandinavian north, the court of Kyiv became well-known to English and especially Saxon nobles fleeing from their enemies in their own land. It brought about a personal acquaintance which had no deep roots and which ended with the disintegration of Kyiv and the absorption of England into the area of the Norman influence.

Nevertheless there was established at Kyiv a Scotch Benedictine Monastery in the eleventh century which continued until the Mongol invasion. It would be interesting to know whether this was a purely missionary establishment in the hope of introducing the western traditions into Kyiv or whether the monks had fled from the Norman conquest and the border disturbances, since at that time the King of Scotland was connected by marriage with the Saxon royal family and strove in vain to assist them against the new conquerors. At all events their residence in Kyiv was marked by signs of close friendship between them and the clergy and population of Kyiv.

After the Tatar conquest, we find that the Metropolitan Ruthenus Petrus, the Ruthenian Metropolitan Peter, was present at the First Council of Lyons in 1245. He had been installed as Metropolitan of Kyiv about 1242 with the aid of the patriotic groups, especially Prince Mykhajlo of Chernyhiv, who was later martyred by the Tatars. It is interesting that his presence at the Council in an attempt to secure the aid of the West has been recorded only by two English chroniclers of the Council, a fact that suggests some personal friendship which had perhaps been formed at Lyons.

Then came the Middle Ages, the period of the Crusades, and the constant wars of England and France. It was a period, in Ukraine, when there was not much to attract foreigners. The English were finding themselves on the sea and their sailors appeared quite frequently in Baltic ports and in the White Sea, but the latter were in far closer relations with Moscow than with Ukraine, especially as the Muscovites completely ignored the Ukrainian Orthodox at this period.

As we might expect, it was the exploits of the Cossacks that reawakened interest and this time the English inspiration to learn more of the Ukrainians was largely derived from their relations with Constantinople. It was the sea-raids of the Cossacks that won their attention and the importance of these were stressed by the Patriarch Cyril Loukaris, who was very familiar with the situation in Ukraine. As a young man, the nephew of the then acting Patriarch, he had taught in Wilno. He was a friend of Count Constantin Ostrozhskyj and he was present at the Council at Brest. Ever after he retained his friendship with the leaders of Ukraine, Moldavia, and Vallakhia, and so he remained posted on the progress of the Orthodox in Ukraine and the history of the Cossack movement. 175 648

The English ambassador at Constantinople in the early seventeenth century, Thomas Roe, who played an important rôle in the religious conflicts in that city, was a strong supporter and friend of Cyril. He made many reports on the Cossacks and their raids and even attempted to save the life of the Cossack leader Samuil Koretsky, who had been taken prisoner by the Turkish forces, by pleading for him in the name of the King of England. Roe also, as a friend of Prince Gabriel Bethlen of Transylvania, may perhaps have been the author of the plan to unite the Ukrainian Orthodox with the Transylvanian Calvinists and the Swedes for overthrowing Poland during the Thirty Years' War. At the same time Yuryj Nemyrych who was later to succeed in arranging an alliance between Ukraine and Sweden was a student in England.

The revolt of Khmelnytskyj in 1648 was frequently noticed in the English newspapers which compared the Cossacks' leader to Oliver Cromwell. There are constant rumors that there was some correspondence between the two men but this has never been proved, perhaps because of the destruction of many of the documents of the day. It is, however, said that the radical Cossack leader who played an important rôle during part of the period, Maksym Kryvonos, Maxim of the Crooked Nose, was a Scotsman. He appears and disappears mysteriously in the course of the Cossack movement. He was far more bitter in his hatred than Khmelnytskyj and it is perhaps conceivable that

175 he was a fanatic Protestant who had come to the Cossacks to
648 stir them up to increased and unreasoning bitterness.

During the years after the Cossack uprising, several Englishmen who were either in Poland or in Russia made lengthy reports on the life of the Cossacks, but the next important event in Ukrainian history, the revolt of Mazeppa, again aroused considerable interest, no less so because Peter the Great in an endeavour to break support for Charles XII of Sweden had apparently at one time thought of making the Duke of Marlborough the master of Ukraine. Nothing of course came of this plan but the English ambassador in Russia, Charles Lord Whitworth, reported on the actions of Mazeppa and the destruction of Baturin by the Muscovite armies.

After the defeat of Charles XII at Poltava, English diplomatic circles joined the Swedes in the effort to stop the advance of Peter the Great against that country. This brought them into contact with Phillip Orlyk, who was elected Hetman after the death of Mazeppa, and who spent years in Sweden and Turkey in an effort to form a coalition against Peter and restore freedom to Ukraine. None of Orlyk's hopes materialised but when he was in Turkey, he had the active support of the British ambassador who put pressure upon the Turks to counterbalance the demands of the Russians that he be surrendered.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed the destruction of the political liberties of Ukraine and the general temper of the times tended to accept Ukraine as definitely part of Russia. England's opposition to Russian expansion became more and more felt in Asia and in the Balkans, where Russia was trying to bring under her control the other Orthodox Slavs. It was a period when Western Europe abandoned any hope of securing allies from the oppressed nations of Russia, even though there was a growing interest in the cultures of the different Slav peoples.

Thus by the time of World War I, the British authorities like the Americans were inclined to accept the statements of the Tsarist diplomats that the Ukrainian movement was solely a product of German propaganda and even after the Russian

Revolution, they did not seriously consider the situation which was then presented. At the same time, the French were so interested in the restoration of Poland that they had little inclination to listen to representatives of a people who were in opposition to their friends. 175 648

We thus see that the chief relations between England and Ukraine were to be found in the diplomatic sphere and in the reports of travellers and the works of various professors who were interested in the Slav languages and literatures, while the professors of history in the later periods were inclined to accept the various Russian theories of their own history, which were of course opposed to Ukraine. There was no opportunity for any large-scale personal acquaintance with the Ukrainians or their problems, and in this the Ukrainian situation followed closely the general pattern of British relations with the other countries of Eastern Europe.

Then at the end of the nineteenth century, a new situation arose in the United States and a little later in Canada. There came a relatively large-scale immigration of Ukrainians who settled chiefly in the factory and mining centers of the Eastern United States and the prairie farming regions in Western Canada. Most of these new immigrants came from Western Ukraine which was under the domination of Austria-Hungary as a wave of the great migration of peoples from that area. The difference in their choice of occupations in the United States and Canada was largely due to the difference between the methods adopted by the two countries in dealing with new arrivals. In the United States, they were allowed to find employment as they would and they gravitated to areas where there was already a considerable population of Slavs from Austria-Hungary. In Canada they were encouraged by the government to settle on still unoccupied land in the northwest and were given opportunities for acquiring their own land, as immigrants had been in the United States a half century before. 167

Relatively few of the Ukrainian educated class came to the New World. The vast majority were peasants who hoped in the beginning to acquire the money in a few years to return to their old homes and live there in relative comfort. They were only

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669 1917—April 1921). The 'Petlyurians' also occupy first place for the number of organized pogroms—493, or together with the 'free' *atamans*—852; the Volunteers follow with 233; the Soviets with 106; and the Poles with 32. How far Petlyura himself was guilty in the organization of these pogroms it is difficult to say. Arnold Margolin, himself a Jew, relates that Petlyura was extremely depressed by pogroms, and 'with tears in his eyes implored his men not to commit them'. But to persuade these 'last of the *Haydamaky*' to any moderation was no easy task.

Petlyura can scarcely be accused of having seriously favoured pogroms as part of a considered policy, since both he and the 'Directoria' were making every effort to attract the favourable attention of the representatives of the victorious Entente powers. Immediately after the Armistice a report had been addressed to Consul Hainnot, which was subsequently forwarded to General d'Anselm in Odessa and to General Berthelot, who was at that time in Jassy. This report was intended to establish the fact that the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' was a quite normal, strictly democratic, and independent state. Although the French did not hesitate to drive away the detachments of the 'Directoria' by force of arms from the vicinity of Odessa, in January 1919 they went so far as to send a representative to Kiev in the person of General Tabouis. The British, at the same time, contented themselves with the despatch to Kiev of a member of the Consular Service. Altogether the impression gained ground in Kiev that the Ukraine had been reserved as a zone of French interest, while the British were more concerned with the Caucasian area and with the Volunteer Army.

The 'Directoria' viewed the question of its representation at the Paris Peace Conference as a matter of particular importance. A Delegation was hastily formed which included the 'Western Ukrainians' of Galicia with the engineer Sidorenko at their head; the 'Directoria' was represented by their 'Foreign Minister', A. Shulgin; and the numerous Jewish population of the Ukraine had a spokesman in Arnold Margolin. This Delegation, together with others of Governments which had been formed or which had tried to form themselves out of different parts of the Russian Empire, had not been invited to Paris by anyone and was recognized by no one. The Secretary of the Ukrainian Delegation, I. Borshak, summarizing the results of the work done between January and March 1919, reported to the 'Directoria': 'All asked us for information about the Ukrainian Question, but none gave any positive answer. No one promised to recognize our independence. The usual answer was: "Wait till the Conference discusses the Russian

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Question!" There was talk on general topics—the territory, the numbers of the population, our relation with the Bolsheviks and General Denikin. Official French circles were against the Ukraine. Other states, the U.S.A., England and Japan, were on their guard and were only interested in the means at our disposal for struggling against the Bolsheviks' (I. Borshak, *Ukraine at the Peace Conference*). 648 668

The French were mainly concerned for the interest of Poland and the 'Directoria' undoubtedly made a serious tactical mistake when they involved the fate of Galicia with that of the Russian Ukraine. Furthermore, so soon after the recent hard struggle with Germany, the representatives of the Allies were not inclined to regard with favour envoys from the *de facto* succession states of the Russian Empire the Governments of which had owed their origin to German diplomacy and German bayonets.

Another member of the Ukrainian Delegation, Arnold Margolin, complains of 'the influence of Russians' who, from the monarchist groups to radical leaders like Kerenski, Avksentiev and Chaykovski, were all united in the belief that Russia 'one and indivisible' would be resuscitated. Margolin proposed that all 'the oppressed nationalities of the former Empire—not only Ukrainians, but also Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, the Cossacks of the Don and the Kuban, the Mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus and the White Russians adjoining the Polish provinces—should be invited to the Conference'. But when Margolin obtained an interview with Lansing, the latter told him frankly that 'he knew only one Russia which might perhaps become a federative state after she had got rid of the Bolsheviks'. Margolin betook himself to England, but there he found that people were only interested in the successes of the 'White' Armies of Denikin and Kolchak and believed in their ultimate victory. After having failed to raise interest in the fate of the 'oppressed nationalities' of the Russian Empire, Margolin broached the question of the fate of the Jews, but here too he found that people were not interested. In 1919 it was well remembered that the Jewish population of Poland and the Ukraine had been on the side of the Germans and that German Jews had taken upon themselves the role of intermediaries between the German High Command and the Bolsheviks.

The only practical result of the 'diplomatic relations' between France and the 'Directoria' was a categorical demand on the part of the French that Vinnichenko and another minister, Shakhovsky, should retire—because they were suspected of 'Bolshevism'.

The representatives of the Entente powers appear to have made every effort to unite all the forces which were struggling against

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648 668 the Soviets, but they had no easy task. The Volunteer Army regarded the 'Petlyurians' with scarcely less distaste than it did the Bolsheviks, while the 'Directoria' considered the 'White' movement to be monarchical and reactionary, and the Ukrainian nationalists aimed at separation rather than at federalism. The relation between the Volunteer Army and the Poles was outwardly correct, but each grudged the other success in their 'common struggle' against the Soviets. The Russians were nervous about the Polish campaign in White Russia and Volhynia; the Poles feared the resurrection of a great Russia. The Poles went so far as to hold their advance against the Red Army when this advance could have dealt a decisive blow to the Soviets at the moment of Denikin's greatest success. These dissensions, which were natural enough, in the end allowed the Bolsheviks to extricate themselves from a position which, as Trotsky relates in his memoirs, Lenin at that time regarded as hopeless.

669 In July the Volunteer Army occupied Ekaterinoslav; then Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa; and on the 3rd Kharkov had been taken after some fighting. Regardless of General Wrangel's proposal to halt on the line Tsaritsyn-Ekaterinoslav and to put some order into the disorganized rear, Denikin pressed the advance in a northerly direction towards Moscow and westward on Kiev. As a result his none too numerous forces were widely scattered over an enormous territory.

669 648 648 At the same time Petlyura had begun his advance on Kiev from the west, and this circumstance was one of the reasons for the false manœuvre undertaken by the Volunteer Army. In the end the Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' came up to Kiev at the same time, and the ancient city was taken on 1 September, from the east by the 'Whites' and from the south by the Ukrainians. No good could be expected to result from this simultaneous but separate occupation of Kiev by the rival armies. *Pourparlers* did not result in an agreement. It only became clear that the Galicians were ready to come to an understanding with the 'Whites', but the 'Directoria' was jealous, and stubborn. Petlyura demanded complete independence and vast territories. In his blind hate of 'the Russian monarchists and reactionaries' he secretly appealed for help to the Poles. When in the second half of September armed conflicts between the Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' broke out and the latter were driven out of Kiev towards the west, rumours of Petlyura's negotiations with the Poles set the Galician regiments against him. On 7 November the Galicians, tired of the lack of discipline and inefficiency rife among the 'Petlyurians', decided to desert their leader and to go over to the

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Volunteers in order to continue a joint struggle against the Bolsheviks and, if need be, against the Poles. 669 648

The remnants of the 'Petlyurians' went off into Podolia, where they renewed their brutal pogroms against the Jews. During the latter part of November and December they were decimated by a serious epidemic of black typhus which overtook them in the neighbourhood of Zhmerinka. 642

Having lost his army and almost alone, Petlyura betook himself to the Polish lines, where on 2 December he put his hand to a secret agreement, in the name of the 'Directoria', whereby he abandoned all claims on Galicia and 'recognized' Polish rule over Kholm, Polesia and Western Podolia—regions which were already in occupation of the Polish Army. On 24 December the 'Directoria' ceased to exist and gave over its phantom authority to a 'cabinet' formed by one Isaac Mazeppa, an ex-employee of the Union of Zemstvos.

In the meantime catastrophe had overtaken the Volunteer Army. 669 Having occupied Kiev and Chernigov during September, the 'Whites' had reached Kursk and even Orel by the end of October. Their line was now dangerously extended and the advance succumbed to a sudden flanking attack delivered to the north of Kharkov. A serious defeat at Kromy to the south-west of Orel forced them out of the whole area between Kursk and Kharkov. Their collapse was now even more rapid than their progress had been. Kiev was evacuated, and within a few weeks all the Ukraine, in circumstances which grew more perilous every day.

The Volunteer Army had never been popular among the peasantry. During the preceding three years the peasants had lived through an evil nightmare of change and upheaval. They distrusted 'the officers' army' and suspected it, not without reason, of being the instrument whereby 'the former order' would be restored. In many cases the officials hastily appointed by General Denikin had contributed to this distrust by an ill-considered restoration of the rights of property in districts which they had been sent to administer. Though the peasant had never found any benefit from 'the new order' he was stubbornly opposed to a return to 'the old ways'. This frame of mind was the principal cause of the chaos which reigned in the rear of the White Army and it was more conducive to the catastrophe of the autumn of 1919 than either the unfortunate strategy of General Denikin or the superior abilities of the Red Army chiefs.

'The struggle which in 1919 drenched the Ukraine in blood recalled by its cruelties the Cossack risings of the seventeenth

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113 the Ukraine), Warsaw, 1937; Pierre Brégy and Prince Serge Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, Paris, 1939.

A third group of sources is to be found in the accounts of foreign travellers who have visited the Ukraine during the last two decades. Although few of these would claim to have had a proper opportunity of forming a true impression of the political and social struggle which has been going on in the Ukraine, there are some foreign newspaper correspondents whose knowledge and contacts gave them certain facilities for securing information which no passing tourist (however enthusiastic) could acquire. The most distinguished of these correspondents (up to 1934) was Paul Scheffer of the *Berliner Tageblatt* and Dr Basseches of the *Neue Freie Presse*.

The writer of an article in the *Fortnightly Review* of October 1934 gave an important account of the famine in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava and Kharkov. He confirmed the fact that cases of cannibalism had occurred. One of these cases later became known from Soviet sources, in consequence of a trial which took place in the town of Izyum in the region of Kharkov. A female shopkeeper named Kovaleva was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment for selling human flesh. She confessed that she had also done so during the famine of 1920–21.

648 (12) *The Diplomatic Representation abroad of the Ukrainian S.S.R.*

A curious evolution in the views of the Soviet Government concerning the degree of independence to be enjoyed by the Ukrainian S.S.R. can be traced in the history of the diplomatic representation of the Republic abroad. After the first Constitution of the Ukrainian S.S.R. had been legalized in March 1920, a Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was established in Kharkov—which city had been made the capital of the Ukraine. The first Commissar for Foreign Affairs was Kovalev, who within a month was replaced by Rakovski—at that time also President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. In April 1920, Rakovski appointed his first diplomatic representative abroad in the person of M. Levitsky, who was sent to Prague, although the new Czech Republic had not yet recognized either the Soviet Union or the Ukrainian S.S.R. A little later a certain Aussem arrived as Ukrainian Ambassador in Berlin. In the autumn of 1921 a third Ukrainian diplomat appeared in Warsaw in the person of Shumsky. Not one apparently of the unfortunates who decorated the Ukrainian Foreign Office is alive to-day; all, including Rakovski, were 'eliminated' later—either with or without trial.

In 1920–21 Ukrainian representatives abroad were officially independent of Moscow, but they were under the orders of Rakovski. There existed, however, a secret decision of the Politbureau, according to which the Foreign Office of the U.S.S.R. had the right to send instructions to the Foreign Office of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and could interfere in the activities of the Ukrainian diplomats in the Central European capitals.

This situation continued until the new Constitution of the Union, proclaimed on 6 July 1923. The Ukrainian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was then abolished. The Ukrainian representation abroad was fused with that of U.S.S.R.; but it was agreed that an Ukrainian Communist should be

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appointed as First Counsellor in the four capitals (Vienna was included) where the Ukrainians had had independent representation. This arrangement continued until 1925, when such appointments began to be considered only as 'desirable'. Ukrainian Communists soon vanished from important positions in the Soviet embassies and legations, and for the last thirteen years the Ukrainian S.S.R. has had not even the shadow of formal representation abroad.

(13) *The Ukrainians in Poland*

The Paris Conference, in 1919, only recognized the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia pending a solution of 'the Russian Question'. The Polish position in Galicia was finally affirmed by the Council of the League of Nations (15 March 1923), but the Polish Government undertook to establish a 'gradual' autonomy for the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia.

The Ukrainians claimed that not less than three and a half millions of the population of Eastern Galicia were of Ukrainian stock, and they reckoned another three millions in Western Galicia, the Kholm region, and the Polish districts of Polesia and Volhynia.

The Polish census of 1939 admitted only 1,600,000 Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, while the population of Russian origin in other regions of Poland was not allowed to be even in part Ukrainian. This great disparity in estimates can be explained by the fact that the Poles described as 'Russians' all those elements, formerly 'pro-Muscovite', who were lukewarm in their support of the separatist version of the Ukrainian national movement.

The Polish Government had some success in detaching from the Ukrainian nationalists a section of the rural population who were flattered by the discovery that they were in fact 'russified Polish *szlachta*'. It was affirmed that during the preceding two centuries many families of the lesser Polish nobility had become so impoverished that they had disappeared into the mass of the peasantry and had become the victims of systematic methods of russification. The movement of the so-called 'Szlachta Zagrodowa' (Smallholder Gentry) had great success, and the journal of the association, *Pobudki*, claimed recently that the number of 'russified *szlachta*' who were expected 'to return to the bosom of their mother Poland' amounted to 700,000 persons. Thus, if those who desired to remain Russian and those who desired to become Poles (together with real Poles, Jews, Armenians, and Germans) are deducted from the Ukrainian estimate, it will be found that the total number of *conscious* Ukrainians in all Galicia did not exceed two millions.

These two millions remain, however, an important factor in the Galician borderland where Polish, German, Russian, Roumanian and Hungarian interests are in dangerous conflict, and the energetic activities of Ukrainian groups and political parties continued to exercise a disturbing influence on the life of the Polish State during the whole period 1919–39.

The most important Ukrainian party is U.N.D.O. (The Ukrainian National Democratic Union (*Obyedinenie*)), which rose to importance about 1925 under the leadership of Dmitro Levitsky. The party could claim a membership of over one million, and it published a series of papers of which *Diio* (Action) in Lvov was the most important. The ultimate aim of

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Caucasus were not inferior to those of New Russia and climatic conditions were much more favourable: rainfall, owing to the proximity of the great Caucasian ranges, was more regular. The Kuban region did actually become a granary. Rostov-on-the-Don grew and flourished in true 'American style'. A new grain port, Novorossiysk, was built and soon became a rival to Odessa. 311

Further railway development accompanied the exploitation of the Donets coal-mines and the growth of a metallurgical industry centred on the Krivoy Rog iron-ore deposits located to the west of the Dniepr. Two parallel lines were constructed to pass through Ekaterinoslav and the old district of the Zaporogian *Sech*, connecting the Donets basin with Krivoy Rog. Thus, simultaneously with the industrial development in the south and the flowering of the North Caucasian region, a new 'granary' and new regions of great mineral potential began at the turn of the century to impose a 'latitudinal' direction on railway construction: the opening of the great Siberian railway gave almost a priority to the possibilities of agricultural production in western and southern Siberia, and connected Chelyabinsk, through Ekaterinenburg, Vyatka and Vologda, with the Baltic ports. At the same time 'diagonal' development was proceeding far to the south-east through Turkestan to the frontiers of Afghanistan and the Chinese Empire. 496 135 311

The importance of the natural riches of Asiatic Russia came to be realized with an ever-growing force during the reign of Nicholas II (1896–1917). The principal economic axis of the Empire was evidently changing direction from the 'meridial' to the 'latitudinal'. The political policy of the Empire during the same period, with its emphasis on the Balkan Slavs and on the 'Byzantine' dreams of the epoch of Catherine II, was certainly archaistic in tendency and bore no relation to the fundamental realities of Eurasian geography. 311 648

The War of 1914–18 brought down in destruction that peculiarly hybrid cultural synthesis which was Romanov Russia; it obliterated at the same time the neo-Byzantine plans of the Pan-Slavists and weakened the whole position of Russia as a European power. The loss of a wide belt of territories (the whole inheritance of two hundred years of Romanov autocracy) between the Arctic and the Black Sea imposed on the new Soviet state the sheer necessity of a 'latitudinal' rather than a 'meridial' development. During the last two decades new efforts have been made to open up the agricultural and mineral wealth of the steppes beyond the Volga and the Ural in western and southern Siberia and of the valleys of the Altai and the Tien-Shan; and, while historic Russian ambitions in the Balkans

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311 and the Middle East have been left in suspense, a territory the size of
● 648 Europe and new routes into the heart of China and ultimately to the Pacific have been brought under Soviet control. Under these circumstances 'the wheat-fields of the Ukraine' receded again into the background and became of only local importance: the more so since, in the two Soviet 'Economic Plans', interest in South-Eastern Russia has been concentrated on the industrial development of the New Russian region. These conditions are illustrated by the growth of industrial centres like Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Lugansk, Zaporozhie, and the decline of the great grain port of Odessa.

311 The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine has never in fact justified the enthusiasm which it has inspired from the time of the seventeenth-century Polish poet quoted in an earlier context to the more recent period of Herr Hitler and his apostles of *Lebensraum*. The natural conditions of the Ukraine are such that they really generously reward agricultural labour, but they exact always patient, strenuous and systematic toil.

Natural conditions differ greatly over the expanse of the country which Michael Dragomanov considered to constitute 'Greater Ukraine'. The agricultural 'age' of these territories differs in the extreme. In New Russia agriculture is only a century old, while Galicia has supported a numerous population of husbandmen for nearly a thousand years.

162 *Galicia* is one of the oldest agricultural lands of all Europe and conditions there have hardly altered since the days of Daniel and his
134 *boyars*. The Galician earth, black in the eastern part, is tired old soil,
311 impoverished by incessant labour, itself prompted and intensified by
167 the ever-growing care of an ever-growing population to acquire its daily bread. Owing to the density of the population (110, and in some regions 132, inhabitants to the square kilometre) the area of holdings had been reduced to a minimum: 46 per cent of the farms comprise 2 hectares of land and sometimes less; 37 per cent comprise from 2 to 5 hectares. In a countryside where urban life has remained relatively stagnant live 75 per cent of the total population; while all commerce and crafts remain in the hands of the Jews in the large towns and in many of the villages, there is a 50 per cent surplus of hands among agricultural labourers. The peasants, Poles and Ukrainians alike, used to migrate to Germany and France as casual labour; before the last war they emigrated also in large numbers to Canada and the United States.

474 These arduous conditions of peasant life gradually developed a capacity for organization. Driven by necessity, the Galician peasantry set up a network of co-operatives for production and

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CHAPTER ONE

The Background of the Communist Triumph

No idea could be more erroneous than that the triumph of Communism in Ukraine and the destruction of the Ukrainian National Republic, which had declared its independence on January 22, 1918. was the choice of the Ukrainian people themselves. It did not suit their desires or their interests, and the methods which Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin adopted to master Ukraine were essentially the same as those by which the iron curtain has been pushed steadily to the west. Ukraine was the testing ground for the development of the Communist methods of conquest, just as it has been the testing ground for all the Communist methods of control of their helpless satellites.

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From the moment when he arrived in Petrograd in April, 1917, Lenin commenced a policy of disintegration. The collapse of tsarist Russia had destroyed all of the organized forces of law and order throughout the empire, and it was no easy task to restore these in an area where there had not been allowed for centuries a popular government resting upon the will of the people and staffed by experienced democratic administrators. Under such conditions, Lenin's propaganda of self-determination for all the peoples of the empire fell upon ready ears, as did his efforts to promote class conflict on every hand. At the same time his promises to the Great Russians constantly called, under one guise or another, for the restoration of Russian unity even while his talk of internationalism and the Communist International seemed to imply a world Communist regime in which all peoples would be equal. It was this policy of lying and deceiving until the moment for successful armed intervention came that gave him the dominating position.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

642 He enjoyed an immense advantage in the fact that the civil war
648 between the Whites and the Reds was largely fought on Ukrainian territory and thus compelled the young Ukrainian government to fight upon two fronts throughout the entire period, while for some time the new republic was forced also to oppose the Poles in the
[131] west. Lying as Ukraine did on the shore of the Black Sea, the armed forces of General Denikin, who was heading the effort to create an anti-Communist monolithic Russian government, could only reach Moscow by crossing Ukrainian territory. It was only across Ukrainian territory that the supplies sent to him by the Western nations after the ending of World War I could be delivered and it was his policy to allow no manifestation of Ukrainianism in any form, for he intended to continue that denial of Ukrainian existence that had characterized the old tsarist regime.

His efforts in this direction were aided by the unfortunate failure of the Western democratic powers which had triumphed in the war to understand either the nature of Bolshevism or the desires of the various national movements. At the same time his success was rendered impossible by the refusal of the West to back him in his efforts to restore all or most of the social and political order which had vanished with the abdication of the Tsar.

Thus with the White Russians and the Ukrainians locked in a desperate struggle, the way was open for Lenin to move with relative freedom on his path of disintegration and of conquest. He did not fail to take advantage of every opportunity, and the advances and retreats during the period from 1917 to 1920 and even later were but a preliminary for the later tactics of Communism.

On the other hand it cannot be denied that there existed in Ukraine certain factors which also worked to his advantage. The political and social system prevailing up to 1917 had not given any training in self-government to the Ukrainian people and in the midst of war and revolution they had to start on the most elementary tasks of popular education, while at the same time they corrected fundamental abuses in the economic situation and created and administered a government. Let us, therefore, look briefly at

186 565 668 665 discipline hampered them at every turn and ardent Ukrainians as Mykola Skrypnyk, a personal and trusted friend of the Russian Bolshevik leaders, refused to make any schism in the party, even though he and his Ukrainian friends quite regularly appealed for recognition as a separate party, especially after the Bolsheviks recognized the existence of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

He, as an old Bolshevik, however, refused to cooperate with those Ukrainian Bolsheviks who dared to risk a fight with the central committee in Moscow and who finally tried to set up a Ukrainian Communist Party.

[648] The greatest weakness of both of these intellectual groups was their lack of appreciation of the importance of foreign policies. It was with great hesitation that their representatives in the Central Rada in the summer of 1917 approached the Russian Provisional Government to include a Ukrainian representative in all Russian diplomatic missions. They had had few or no representatives in the pre-revolutionary Russian diplomatic service; relatively few of them had been abroad, even to Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; they had no distinguished Ukrainian emigrants abroad who could speak to the world with the great authority of Ignace Jan Paderewski, Thomas G. Masaryk or Michael I. Pupin and during the crucial early months they largely neglected any consideration of foreign policy.

They wasted precious time in futile negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government over questions of federalism and they turned rather slowly toward the idea of independence. At each move of the more nationally conscious toward this goal, a certain portion of the more leftist members drew away toward the appropriate Russian camp in the name of internationalism and thus became the unconscious tools by which both the Provisional Government and later the Bolsheviks hoped to retain their control of the wealth of Ukraine.

It was this vagueness on the part of many of the intellectuals which kept them from being true intermediaries between the nationalist and military groups and the great mass of the peasants. It weakened the energy and zeal of some of the Ukrainian regi-

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the control of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and the Rada, it abolished 186
all Ukrainian newspapers and its disorderly elements not only 642
executed members of the Ukrainian and Russian bourgeoisie but 665
also Ukrainian Communists and radicals who used the Ukrainian language in their hearing.

In the meantime the Bolsheviks had opened negotiations with 648
the Germans in Brest-Litovsk where Trotsky claimed to speak for 186
the entire former Russian Empire. To circumvent this, the Rada 642
formally declared the full independence of Ukraine and sent dele- 665
gates to the peace conference. As a balance to this, Trotsky intro- [728]
duced into the conference the representatives of this new Ukrainian Soviet Republic who claimed to be the spokesmen for the Ukrainian peasants and proletariat. Their arguments did not convince the Germans and Austrians, who saw greater possibilities of profit by recognizing the Ukrainian National Republic, so as to secure without fighting a large part of the Ukrainian grain supplies. The Ukrainian National Republic signed this agreement with misgivings, for, in fact, it threw the Rada into the power of the Germans and ended all chance of assistance from the Allied democratic powers which had previously regarded Lenin as the tool of the German General Staff. Now, with the conclusion of this peace, they extended their ill-will to the Ukrainian Central Rada.

The immediate result was German assistance to the Rada and the Soviet forces were quickly forced out of Ukraine and back into Great Russian territory. The leaders of the Ukrainian Soviet government were members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and could not raise the question as to whether or not their new state was actually independent, and whether it could be, if it did not have its own Communist Party associated on a par with the Russian Party in the Communist International.

This brief Communist interlude in Ukraine should have been most instructive to both the Allied powers and the Germans, but neither drew the true lessons from it. The Allies, who were still opposed to the principles of Bolshevism and were annoyed by the speeches of Zinovyev and Chicherin, became more friendly disposed to the Russian Whites and gave up their efforts to win through

648 invoking the democratic principles of self-determination the support
186 of any of the non-Russian peoples. The Germans, on the other
642 hand, after aiding the Rada to return, dispersed it on the ground
665 that it was too radical, but when a more conservative regime was set up under Hetman Skoropadsky, they did not give this honest support. They sought only for Ukrainian supplies and by their actions they weakened the power of the Hetman and strengthened discontent against his regime without allowing him to do anything that would weaken the power of the Communists.

The situation became almost ridiculously complicated. Germany, anxious to secure troops for the Western Front, was, by the spring of 1918, at peace with both the Commissars of Moscow and the government of Ukraine. It was therefore opposed to both the White Russians and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Even the Czechoslovaks on their way to Vladivostok, thanks to the negotiations between President Masaryk and Muravyev, were on friendly terms with the Ukrainian Communists and had difficulties with the Ukrainian government and the Germans. As soon as they crossed into the Russian Soviet Republic, they had difficulties with the Russian Communists and the Germans and found their support among a part of the White Russians. It was the same situation as in the far north where the Germans backed the White Finnish forces under Mannerheim against the red Finns who were the favored party of their friend and associate, Moscow. Yet all the time there was no Ukrainian Communist Party, for the Ukrainian Communists owed their prime allegiance to the Russian Communist Party which was, in theory at least, on the opposite side in the general disturbed situation.

To the Communists, as Skrypnyk, Shakhray and George Pyatakov who had played an important role in the Communist occupation of Kiev, this seemed a serious gap and at a meeting in Tahanrih in April they triumphed over the Communists from Katerynoslav who had insisted upon remaining merely a part of the Russian Communist Party. Their victory was of short duration, for when there came an organization meeting in Moscow on July 5, the Russian authorities definitely made it clear that they would not tolerate

the existence of a Ukrainian Communist Party. Bela Kun warned that in the international civil war that was to be begun, great efforts were to be made not to allow it to assume anything of a national character, but to keep it restricted and fought on class lines. They were also informed that they could in this new struggle have no relations with Mensheviks or any Ukrainian Social Revolutionists or Social Democrats. A few months later Stalin was elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian party as a symbol of the dependence in which the party was to be kept.

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The first people to appreciate fully the dilemma in which the Ukrainian Communists found themselves were the Ukrainian Communist leaders who had established, with Russian help, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were quickly taught that as long as the control of their Party was not in their own hands, they were completely helpless and at the mercy of the Russians.

Shakhray, who had endeavored to argue at Kiev in December, 1917 that the Ukrainian Communists were to be counted as Ukrainians, very soon in Russia became so disgusted that he resigned from the Russian Communist Party and retired to Saratov to establish a Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He criticized the extreme policy of centralization carried on by the Russian Communists.

Along with S. Mazlakh, he published a book entitled *The Wave—What is being done in Ukraine and with Ukraine.* This book, which was often quoted later by Skrypnyk and his associates, was the theoretical basis for Ukrainian Communism. Shakhray tried to foster discontent against the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky by stressing his relations with both the German forces in Ukraine and the White Russian refugees who had taken shelter in that country. He declared that Ukrainian independence could only be consistently won by the Ukrainian Communists, for they, as the Ukrainian proletariat, were the only people who could advocate and carry through a real revolution in view of the treachery of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, he attributed the Communist failure in Ukraine to the fact that the Party was entirely under

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648 Russian control and looked at the cause of the Communists through
186 the eyes of the Russian colonists in Ukraine who were, in accord-
642 ance with the Russian imperialistic tradition, working not for
665 Ukraine but for Moscow.

He soon left Saratov for Kuban and here he was captured and killed by the Denikin forces. Mazlakh, who had remained a member of the Russian Communist Party, was later shot by them for nationalism. The third Commissar for War, Neronovych, became disillusioned and on the entrance of German troops into Ukraine he gave up politics but he fell into the hands of the Ukrainian National Army and was shot. Thus, the first attempts of the Russian Communist Party to seize Ukraine and expel the Ukrainian National government ended disastrously and relatively few of the early leaders survived. Most of them paid the penalty for their actions to one of the contending forces, with the Bolsheviks executing then or later the larger number.

During the summer of 1918 while Hetman Skoropadsky remained in power, the chief work which the Communists could hope to do in Ukraine was through their mission in Kiev under the leadership of D. Z. Manuilsky. This was ostensibly engaged in negotiations for a definite peace treaty between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. In reality, Manuilsky was almost openly intriguing with the tacit consent of the Germans who had no desire to see their own position in Moscow jeopardized, as their armies were being driven back on the Western Front. Manuilsky was also able to notice the constant splitting of the leftist Ukrainian parties, which, in their hostility to the policies of the Hetman, tended to move nearer to the Communist position.

The disintegration in both the Social Revolutionist and the Social Democrat ranks became steadily more marked during the summer of 1918. When the German armies collapsed and the Hetman could no longer retain his post, a Directory of five men, including Petlyura and Vynnychenko, set themselves up at the news of the abdication of the German Emperor and they soon recovered Kiev. At the same time the left wing of the Social

Revolutionists (Borotbisty) refused to recognize the new Directory and drifted rapidly toward the Bolshevik position. 648 186

The Kremlin, sensing the great change in the Ukrainian situation, at once refurbished the idea of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. 642 665 Its real head was now Christian Rakovsky, a Rumanian with Bulgarian citizenship who had never been in Ukraine, but its nominal leaders were Pyatakov and George Kotsyubynsky. These moved from Kursk along the railroad lines into Ukraine at the end of December but Chicherin, in his telegrams to the Directory, categorically denied that the Russians were supporting this movement in any way. He laid all the responsibility upon the Ukrainian Communists. The ruse did not work and finally on January 16, 1919, the Directory, in which Vynnychenko's star was sinking, declared war.

This was opposed by the left wing of the Social Democrats who were very influential in the Directory. On January 10-12, the two wings definitely parted and the left adopted the name of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Independent) and insisted upon the establishment of a non-Communist Soviet Republic. The right wing, in view of the weakness of the Ukrainian proletariat, advocated instead a Congress of Workers which would include both peasants and the city proletariat. When war actually started, the left wing split again between those who were willing to stand for an independent Ukraine and those who refused to act against Russia under any circumstances. The latter took the name of USDRP (Independent Lefts).

It was not long before the Borotbisty and the USDRP (Independent Lefts) began negotiations for merging. Both were convinced of the superiority of the Soviet form of democratic government and both were convinced that any Communist government would inevitably recognize the essential rights of the Ukrainian people. In this respect they were far more naive than were the leaders of the first Ukrainian Communist regime who had already become completely disillusioned at the contrast between the theories and the practice of Lenin and his associates. They refused to cooperate with Petlyura and the Directory and, in effect, they with-

648 drew from its support a considerable section of the Ukrainian in-
186 tellectuals at a crucial moment.

642 On the other hand, with their own armies they fought against
665 the White Russians of Denikin, because they saw in these merely an attempt to restore the old order. Yet they declined to be included in the organized army of the Directory and by their independent actions they made more difficult the burden of the army commanders. They encouraged the formation in the country of independent military bands which added to the growing chaos. To emphasize their position they again changed their name to the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and constantly sought to ingratiate themselves with the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party which had again succeeded in reoccupying Kiev and in forcing the Directory to flee.

On the other hand, the USDRP (Independents), almost as true admirers of the Soviet system but far more critical of the Russian influence, did merge their forces for the fighting against Denikin with the forces of the Directory. In the summer of 1919, this group, under the influence of the Khmelevtsevs of Kobilyaky in Poltavshchyna, commenced again to review their position. After the death of their leaders in a crossing of the Dnieper and after the defeat of Denikin, they decided to adopt the appellation of Communists and to rename themselves the Ukrainian Communist Party without any additional description title. Thus, they took the name of Ukapisty and as such they dragged on an independent existence for some years, confidently expecting that they would ultimately receive national and international recognition from the Comintern, the Communist International.

This endless splitting and regrouping of the various parties proved a headache to the Directory which was trying to organize the country for defense against both of the Russian invaders. The individual armed forces, acting independently, aided in wrecking the economy and this inspired peasant leaders of various kinds to seek the control of their own native regions. Some of these men proved themselves able, if short-sighted, leaders. Some, as Nestor Makhno, were unadulterated anarchists who saw no need of any

central regime. Others were mere adventurers thrown into prominence by the course of events and willing to shift their principles for the sake of a momentary personal advantage. Others were patriots with no broader vision than their home districts. 648 186 642 665

As a result, throughout 1919 there were some 328 revolts against the extending power of the Russian Communist forces which were fanning out over Ukraine, slaughtering and robbing as they went but still unable to secure a definite control of the villages.

As opposed to this welter of conflicting ideals, the policy of the Russian dominated Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party was simplicity and clarity itself. This supported the paper independence of the Ukrainian Soviet regime and openly avowed its intention of subjugating the country and of exploiting it for the benefit of Moscow. Their purposes were even openly avowed at the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies on March 22, 1919, when Shlikhter, a Ukrainian German and one of the commissars appointed by Moscow to collect grain, declared: "You all remember how Ukraine began to become Soviet; with every day of the advance of the Red Army, we and you felt more easy; the rich grain-producing Ukraine is ours. We have four central military divisions collecting and on them we rest all our hopes. We have a mass of workmen sent in (from Moscow to Ukraine), who know how to search all the Ukrainian villages. We always remember that the eyes of the proletariat of Russia are turned toward Ukraine."

These remarks represented the cynical attitude of Lenin and the Communists. They ignored the statements as to a Ukrainian Soviet Republic that were being made by Lenin and others to woo the various leftist Ukrainian parties. They were safe speeches made to reassure the Great Russians that the Bolsheviks still had a monolithic outlook, even though they were prepared to go to almost any lengths to create a paper regime which would insure and facilitate the plundering of the rich grain-producing Ukraine. They told, more or less, the truth, that was not recognized by the more idealistic theoreticians, that the Ukrainian Communists were, in fact, the dupes and victims of the Moscow regime which cared nothing for the Ukrainian people, or even the Ukrainian proletariat.

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648 186 642 665 By the end of 1919 the Ukrainian Soviet regime was so satisfied with the success of its raiding and collecting parties that it felt able to proclaim an amnesty and to disarm the population completely. To accomplish the latter purpose, new Russian forces were sent into the country, the villages were thoroughly searched and disarmed. The peasants were tiring of the apparently endless exactions of the independent commanders and they turned against many of the patriotic partisan bands and declined to give them further support. This broke the movement and even the alliance of Petlyura with the Poles and the short occupation of Kiev by the combined armies in the spring of 1920 did not suffice to restore the old enthusiasm for the hard-pressed Directory.

By the end of 1920, when the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet delegations met the Poles in Riga in October, 1920, the fighting was nearly over. The Poles signed a treaty of peace without consulting their Ukrainian allies of the Ukrainian National Republic. There was nothing for the forces of the Directory to do but to retire abroad and continue their unsuccessful efforts to secure Western assistance. This was not forthcoming. The French were interested in aggrandizing Poland as a bulwark against Germany; the other allies were openly supporting Denikin through a misinterpreted friendship with the Russian people and there did not seem to be left even a spark of the principles enunicated but a short time before in Wilson's attitude toward self-determination and the rights of people to govern themselves. The struggle was ended and the Ukrainians were left at the mercy of their Russian overlords, now back in a new guise.

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471 industry and factories by the workers and they did their best to inflame the workers and peasants against the great landlords and the factory owners and administrators. In this they succeeded admirably and the already low standard of living in the Russian Empire began to drop lower and lower.

Under such conditions it became more and more necessary for the Soviet leaders in Moscow to make renewed efforts to master Ukraine and to inject some apparent vitality into their puppet, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. In this they were finally successful, but even though the Communists came back into Ukraine, they did not venture to destroy the fiction of Ukrainian independence, although they had no intention of allowing it to develop.

642 648 From the moment of its formation and adoption of a Communist Constitution on March 14, 1919, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic declared itself an independent and sovereign state. It was recognized with all due pomp and formality by Lenin, who again stressed it in his *Letters to the Workmen and Peasants of Ukraine* in his efforts to strengthen the opposition to Denikin. The Ukrainian Soviet Government was represented at the Conference in Riga that ended the Soviet-Polish War in the fall of 1920. The travesty was continued when, in December of the same year, Lenin concluded with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic a formal treaty of alliance in which Ukraine, for purposes of defense, graciously handed over to Moscow the commissariats of war, navy, foreign trade, railroads, finances, labor, posts and telegraphs and the Supreme Council of National Economy. It still retained the right to have its own diplomatic representatives in Poland, Germany and Austria, countries which had recognized the Ukrainian National Republic, and there were still preserved Ukrainian military schools to train officers for the Ukrainian army in both Kharkiv, the capital of Soviet Ukraine, and Kiev.

Still all this was merely a sham arrangement, for the bulk of the forces that fought against the Ukrainian National Republic were Russian and they operated with no regard for the feelings even of the Ukrainian Communists. They moved at will over Ukrainian territory, collected supplies at will and shipped them

to Russia and they behaved in every way as if they were in their own territory. 642 648

The key to this enigma is to be found in the fact that the Ukrainian Communist Party was not regarded as an independent Communist Party with a seat in the Comintern, but was merely a branch of the Russian Communist Party. Its officers were therefore appointed at will and changed at the pleasure of the Russian Party. Its discipline and actions were controlled by Moscow and any independent Ukrainian development could be countermanded by a mere word from the centre. By this extremely simple device Lenin could maintain his hold over the Ukrainian Communists, even in the unlikely case that the Comintern was revitalized by the Communist seizure of power in another of the large states. 665

The policy did not fail to arouse criticism, even during the wars, by some of the Ukrainian members of the Party. In 1920, a "fraction of the federalists" was formed under Yu. Lapchynsky with the aid of S. Kirychenko, P. Slynko and E. Kasyanenko. It was naturally dissolved as soon as its importance was recognized, and its leaders were expelled from the Party. They accordingly joined the Ukapisty and only returned when that voluntarily liquidated itself some years later.

There were thus at the moment of the ending of the Civil Wars three Communist Parties in Ukraine, the official KP/b/U, the branch of the Russian Party, the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and the Ukapisty, i.e. the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The Borotbisty were the first to go. They had been formed out of the Left Social Revolutionists and were less sure of their Marxian knowledge but they contained many of the leftist Ukrainian intellectuals who valued the development of Ukrainian culture. The group had been praised by Lenin for its great part in the defeat of Denikin. In the spring of 1920, the proposal was made that they fully join the Ukrainian Branch of the Russian Communist Party. Shumsky and Blakytny led the affirmative. The spokesmen for the opposition were Poloz and Panas Lyubchenko, who was later to be the head of the UkSSR and to commit suicide in 1937. The

[Sham independence of Ukraine from 1919 on -- Analyst]

national independence and he set himself to do the same in Kiev and Kharkiv. 645 871

Without wavering in his devotion to the principles of Communism, he attacked the problem in the broadest possible way. 186 665 He stimulated derussification by supporting the Ukrainian press, theatre and schools. Under his influence and work, the cities, including Kharkiv, where Ukrainian influence had been relatively weak, came to be predominantly Ukrainian and in smaller places it became very rare to hear Russian spoken. The State Printing House and the smaller cooperative publishing houses produced almost nothing that was not in Ukrainian and during the few years that he remained in control, there were more Ukrainian books published than in the preceding century and a half.

Skrypnyk was still not satisfied. He extended his activity and patronage of things Ukrainian to all those areas in the RSFSR where Ukrainians were living in compact settlements. He provided Ukrainian papers, books and theatres for those who were living in Kurshchyna, Voronizhshchyna, along the Volga, Kuban, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan and the Far East. He sent educated men and women to establish schools and other cultural institutions and, for the first time in history, efforts were made to establish a real community of interests among all the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

More than that, he held out a friendly hand to Western Ukraine, [648] which was under Polish rule. Although by this time the entire control of foreign affairs was concentrated in Moscow, Skrypnyk was allowed to arrange for a Ukrainian consul in Lviv and Yur. Lapchynsky, a former Ukapist, was appointed to the post. The consul's duty was to win support for the Communists in Eastern Galicia and, in pursuance of this purpose, Skrypnyk, too, paid a visit to Lviv. He had a certain success in his work and a few Western Ukrainians, as S. Rudnytsky, who came from Prague to become the head of the Ukrainian Institute of Geography and Cartography in Kharkiv, and the mathematician Chaykivsky, entered the UkSSR. They formed a special club in Kharkiv and had their own literary organization "Western Ukraine." Skrypnyk

731 the country might have escaped, had it not been for the methods of the government in draining off from the population the last possible reserves of food.

731 185 There can be no doubt that this was done deliberately, for every measure taken by the government was intended to increase the difficulties of the population and to prepare for the final crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance that had been proceeding with ever increasing force. Every measure, too, was intended to render it [648] more difficult for the outside world to secure any actual knowledge of the conditions in the country until it was too late for the world to do more than register vain protests, for it was very definitely at this period that the censorship methods of the government and its apprehensions of what knowledge might bring to the world actively commenced to draw an iron curtain around Ukraine. Foreign correspondents were forbidden to visit Ukraine on one pretext or another and they were forced to send out such news as the government wished or to leave the Soviet Union.

[661] The collectivization and the famine had coincided with the beginning of the attack on Ukrainian scholarship and the arts, as we shall see, but these attacks by their very choice of victims had been directed against those men who had not been closely connected with the Communist Party in the past, even though they had not been entirely hostile. Along with the famine the tide turned, and soon the victims were those persons who had dared to hope for an equality of treatment (with the Great Russians) in the Soviet Union.

The famine was obviously intended not only to crush the population already impoverished by the collectivization but to administer a sound chastisement to all classes who were interested in the preservation and development of local and republic interests.

731 648 The famine was at its height in the winter and spring of 1933 and was only somewhat alleviated after the harvest of that year was brought in. It was only natural that, despite the efforts of the authorities, word of it would gradually seep out, in spite of the censorship. The news was most accessible to the Western Ukrainians, for as yet all communications had not been satisfactorily broken, and early in the summer they began to seek permission to organize relief

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

abroad for the benefit of the sufferers. On July 14, 1933, such a 731
body was already formed in Lviv and soon in the other sections of 648
Western Ukraine, while their appeals were heard by the Ukrainian emigrés abroad.

In August, Theodore Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna had been convinced of the truth of the famine and he appealed for aid for the starving. In the same month the General Secretary of the Congress of European Minorities published his summary of the conditions, as gleaned from all available sources, and the League took action at its meeting in September. In the same month the matter was brought up before the League of Nations in Geneva and relief was referred to the International Red Cross.

The movement spread to the Ukrainians in North America and on November 3, 1933, the sixth convention of the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States appealed to the government of the United States, urging that an impartial commission be sent to Ukraine to report on the truth of these reports.

This growing wave of protests among the Ukrainians and the [208]
emigrants from Ukraine was met by a stony silence on the part of the Soviet authorities, by absolute denial or by charges of unfriendly propaganda. The Soviet government refused to lift its barrier on any visits to Ukraine by foreign journalists or by any foreign visitors until after the harvest of 1933 was brought in and then they induced such journalists as Walter Duranty to recant previous statements as to the extent of the famine and report on September 18, 1933, that the harvest of that year was excellent "and all talk of famine now is ridiculous."

Almost the first detailed account of an American journalist was 731
given by William Henry Chamberlin on May 29, 1934, on his 185
return from the Soviet Union, when he estimated that between four and five million peasants were starving and he also quoted the speech of President Kalinin of the Soviet Union, made the year before, "The collective farmers have passed through a good school. For some, this school was quite ruthless."

This was a polite hint again that it had been the policy of the government to allow the famine to run its course in the hope of

731 breaking any possible opposition on the part of the collective farms
185 and the individual peasants.

The famine then on the domestic scene marked a definite turning point, a definite shift of emphasis in the relations between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, and that shift was extended to the individual Ukrainian. Yet, the very reports that emanated from the stricken country were not without their significance for the world.

731 1933 was a fateful year for Europe. The order to apply the
648 maximum pressure on the Ukrainians came on January 24th. On January 28th, just four days later and before the news could have leaked out, Kurt von Schleicher resigned as Chancellor of Germany and was succeeded by Adolf Hitler. Within a month came the Reichstag fire and all the turmoil connected with the advent of the Nazis to power.

A world that had still not been fully convinced of the dangers of the Communist regime was only too ready to magnify its benefits and its possibilities for good as compared with the apparently more pressing menace of Hitler. The period of the popular fronts began in all the European countries and it coincided with the coming into power of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the American bank crisis.

Under such circumstances, the rumors of the Ukrainian famine were heavily discounted by all except the most bitter anti-Communists and they obtained short hearing before world public opinion. No one wanted to believe these reports, and the troubled conditions when the reaction to the right seemed the menace to a world desirous of peace made it seem logical that the democratic world could secure some aid in its struggle from the Communist regime. All the old talk of the artificiality of the Ukrainian struggle that had circulated in 1918 was now reburnished and repropagandized.

The result might have been expected but it showed Stalin and the Soviet leaders that they had played their course well. They secured recognition by the United States in November of the same year, just as the real news of the extent of the tragedy was beginning

to leak out. Anger and disgust at Hitler was the dominant mood 731
and behind that veil, the Soviet leaders were able to plan their 648
further actions.

It is hard to tell what might have been the result, had the 000
world awakened in that year to a realization of the dangers from the two totalitarian leaders, who were later to unite and start World War II. Yet already the evidence was there, if men would only understand.

In the period of Militant Communism the victims had been chosen more or less at random and the world was largely aghast at the results, even though they did not understand. Now, by deliberate action the same thing was being done on a larger scale and under the guise of law and order. This method proved successful and advanced the Soviet Union to a place of preeminence among nations, while it enabled the authorities to dupe many idealists in other countries.

From this point of view the deportation of the kurkuls in 1930-1 and the famine of 1932-3 represented the use of new methods of terror as an instrument of national policy. That policy was continued in the massacre of the Polish officers in Katyn and the Ukrainian peasants in Vinnytsya. It was continued in the purges that marked the thirties and in the show political trials that have marked the history of Communist rule in the satellite countries. They were the inauguration of a new policy that was not to meet with failure until its extremes began again by their ruthlessness to disturb an uneasy world in the days of the new cold war.

in the eastern Ukraine in the course of twenty years. At first their 728
actions were moderate but with the passage of time they began to develop and to reveal those tendencies which had marked their course in the east.

The first task was the reorganization of the country geographically. On September 28,[1] they had come to a new agreement with [648] the Germans, whereby Germany had given up her claims to Lithuania in return for the area between the San and the Buh Rivers. So the Soviets assigned Wilno and its territory to an independent Lithuania; they annexed the region further south to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the rest to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This left to the Germans four sections of Western Ukraine, Kholmshchyna, Pidlyashshya, Posannya, and Lemkivshchyna, which were included in the Polish Government General and were governed directly by the Nazis, who allowed the appointment of a Ukrainian Central Committee to represent the Ukrainians before the higher authorities, especially in question of relief, etc.

The Soviet territory[2] was divided into six districts with their 728
centres at Lviv, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil, Rivne and 631
Lutsk. Each of these was then divided into rayons or regions with about 25,000 population. The centres of these regions were often small towns but the division was made quite arbitrarily and each centre was amply provided with bureaucratic machinery.

The economic condition of the country was extremely bad and [433]
the only saving feature was that the harvest had already been gathered, so that there was a good chance for a large part of the agricultural population, even of the poor, to survive during the winter. Yet the influx of refugees fleeing before the German advance filled the cities and the severance of connections with the west prevented the arrival of any more manufactured goods or supplies and, of course, none came from the east.

On the contrary, there came a new swarm of Soviet officials who 436
were themselves amazed at the wealth of goods in what, to the natives, seemed impoverished markets. They brought with them liberal sums of money to buy whatever they wished and they were

1 [1939 -- Analyst]
2 [of occupied Poland -- Analyst]

CHAPTER NINETEEN

The Soviets and the Ukrainians in Rumania

648 563 The agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union[1] had stated that the former was not interested in the fate of Bukovyna and Bessarabia, both of which contained a large Ukrainian population. It was therefore obvious that once the Soviet hands were freed from the Soviet-Finnish war, they would endeavor to acquire these additional territories.

In both Bukovyna and Bessarabia the Ukrainian cause had been less developed, although there had been far more work in Bukovyna than in Bessarabia, which had been under Russian rule. The Ukrainian uprising in Chernivtsy had not been successful in 1918 and when the territory was added to Rumania, that country put a stop to all Ukrainian work, including education although a Ukrainian theatre had developed and there was considerable secret work being done.

As a result, there was a sense of stagnation which was very different from the situation in the lands under Poland. There was less sense of coordination and when in June, 1940, the Soviets requested Rumania to hand over the new provinces, Rumania had only to submit. Most of Bukovyna and the part of Bessarabia inhabited by Ukrainians were annexed to the UkSSR. The rest of Bessarabia was added to the Moldavian ASSR, which was later raised to the dignity of a Union Republic and intended for propaganda use against Rumania.

648 631 The Soviet policy was then much the same as it had been in the area taken over from Poland. There was the same amount of propaganda declaring the "liberation" of the country from the Rumanian nobles and from international capitalism. There was

1 [1939--Analyst]

[164 blank]

648 the same voting for annexation to the USSR, the same enthusiastic
631 reception in Moscow, and the same process of nationalization, of the arrest of outstanding figures, and the same destruction of the established forms of life in both areas.

The Soviets were, however, less advanced in these provinces for the application of their system required time and their stay in the area was eight months less than it was in the territory taken from Poland.

The anti-Communist leaders fled either into Rumania proper
[668] or Germany or made their way to the Polish Government General in Krakow. On the other hand, despite the attempts to seal off the country, the OUN found ways of extending its influence into Bukovyna and appealed to the more alert classes of the population.

In general the Ukrainians in these two areas formed rather a
563 secluded enclave in the general mass of Ukrainian history and they did not play a role in proportion to their numbers. They thus scarcely enter into the account, although for a while, in 1941, there was organized a force of some 2,000 who sought to impede the Rumanian return to the country. Yet, their opposition was fruitless and when they endeavored to cut their way out, they were either destroyed by the Germans or dispersed.

CHAPTER TWENTY

The German Attack on the Soviets

During the period from 1939 to 1941, the German 648 ●
policy toward those Ukrainians who had escaped from the Soviet 563
occupation into the Polish Government General was not too severe. It was possible for the Ukrainians in Krakow and elsewhere to carry on a considerable amount of educational work, to form themselves into relief organizations and, in general, to work for the establishment of normal relations.

When the breach between the two totalitarian states came on 721
June 22, 1941, the Germans pushed ahead rapidly not only in the Baltic area but also in Ukraine. By June 30, they had occupied Lviv with the aid of some Ukrainian units, both from Carpatho-Ukraine and from Galicia.

During these days the Ukrainians had high hopes that the Germans would seriously liberate them from Bolshevik tyranny and wherever they had the slightest possibility, they endeavored to seize the cities so as to put a stop to the massacres which the Communists were perpetrating before they fell back. In some places they were successful but in Lviv, the Communists killed over [661]
10,000 prisoners, before their bloody regime could be brought to an end.

In the first days of the war, although there were no clear 642.
promises made to the Ukrainians, the impression grew that there would be established some form of a Ukrainian administration. The political leaders set up a Ukrainian government and appointed Yaroslav Stetsko as the first head of the state on June 30, 1941. A short time later this was broadened by the appointment of a Committee of Seniors under the leadership of Dr. Kost Levytsky, who had been the Prime Minister of the Republic of Western

642 Ukraine in 1918. These developments had the support of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, although he knew that they did not yet rest on organized public sentiment.

It was well recognized by the influential Ukrainians that the situation was very different from what it had been at the end of the Hapsburg monarchy, but they went through the motions of setting up a government on the possibility that the Germans would allow them some real concessions and that it would be mutually advantageous to be already prepared for all eventualities.

721 It is perhaps possible that a part of the German armed forces
• 648 looked with a certain toleration at these developments, for at least a part of the officer class realized that the task of the German government would be greatly facilitated, if they were able to normalize the situation and win some support from the population, as they had in the Polish Government General. This did not suit the Nazi element who believed that the advance of the German
[661] forces was only to secure more *Lebensraum* for Germany. This faction struck and struck hard at the new regime and secured the arrest of Stetsko, Levytsky, Bandera and Melnyk, all of whom were taken to prison in Germany where they were kept for nearly four years.

The arrest of the leaders, while it was a crushing blow, still was not completely fatal. The advance of the German troops was so rapid on the way to Kiev that the Ukrainian leaders continued for some months to inspire the population not to resist the Germans, the more so as the western regiments of the Red Army surrendered in large masses. Thus when Kiev fell, some 675,000 of the Red Army surrendered with scarcely a blow.

On the other hand, the Soviets attempted to devastate the country before they withdrew, shooting the Ukrainian intelligentsia indiscriminately and trying to seize as many as they could for evacuation beyond the Urals. They demolished factories, tried to remove finished articles and mined the cities before they abandoned them. Then, when they exploded the mines, they spread the story that the total work of demolition had been carried on by the Germans.

The German Attack on the Soviets

On August 1, the Germans made a new division of the country 648 ●
and assigned the whole of Galicia to the Polish Government General. 727
At the same time they returned Bukovyna and Bessarabia to Rumania and then set up a new section around Odesa under the name of Transdnistria which they likewise placed under Rumania. It was in vain that the Ukrainians who tried to organize their own national rada in Kiev protested against such actions, for their protests were not received and the Nazis went on with their policy of ignoring all the wishes of the population.

Later in the month, the Germans established the Reichskom- 727
missariat of Ukraine and placed it under the control of a fanatical 661
Nazi, Erich Koch, who set himself during the next years to crush anything and everything that was done to aid the Ukrainians and to win for himself the detested title of the butcher of Ukraine.

In the early months of the German occupation and especially [727]
during the period of rapid military movements, much was done for the rebuilding of the country after the ravages of the Bolsheviks. Nearly 115 Ukrainian newspapers were established, plans were made for the opening of schools and during the transition from the military rule to the rule of Koch, the Ukrainian agents were in the front ranks of the German army, spreading their propaganda and trying to rouse the population against the Bolsheviks.

Yet this work did not please the Germans. Everywhere in eastern Europe the old governments that had been suppressed by the Bolsheviks tried to recreate themselves but everywhere there came the arrests of these leaders and their deportation, so that it was not many months before the sober thought of the liberated peoples turned against the new occupants and the people realized that their hopes were going to be in vain. By the end of 1941, it had been made clear to them that there would be no relaxation of the pressure exerted upon them.

In the Reichskommissariat, which, in fact, represented little more than the right bank of the Dnieper area, for the army retained the control over the regions to the east of the river, it speedily became impossible for the Ukrainians to improve their own condition. The Germans were guided by a strictly logical program.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

menacing their lines of communication and rescuing young Ukrainians who were being deported for labor service in Germany. It was during this year that the leaders came to feel the need for closer cooperation and a unification of their efforts. This was hard to achieve and there were even clashes between different groups of Ukrainian patriots. Yet, toward the beginning of 1943 the more important groups had effected a rough union in the U. P. A., the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which took on the characteristics of an organized military force. 668 725

By the middle of 1943 this army had acquired considerable strength and it was able to deal shattering blows to isolated German detachments and to drive out both the local German administration and any Red partisans that tried to operate in the area around the Pripet marshes. In May, 1943, they were even strong enough to ambush and kill the head of the Nazi S. A., Viktor Lutze, in the neighborhood of Kowel-Brest Litovsk.

The policy of the U. P. A. was to destroy the local German administrations which were scattered in the smaller communities and to avoid battle with the greater concentration of forces in some of the leading centres. In this way the Ukrainians were able to take over the practical administration of large parts of the Ukraine and to restore a considerable amount of normal life, while they checked the deportation of thousands or released them from the slave trains. The U. P. A. during these years had its own training schools, it set up on a small scale its own factories for arms and some of the most necessary manufactures, and it governed with the approval of the Ukrainian population.

At this period it had its own printing presses and put out a large number of journals and books of various kinds. These were not only in Ukrainian but, as the U. P. A. grew in size and strength, it attracted the attention and won the sympathies of all the other nations oppressed by the Russians. It formed units of [648] Byelorussians, Azerbaijanians, Uzbeks, etc. and finally on November 21, 1944, it called the First Conference of the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia, which was attended by some thirty-nine delegates representing thirteen peoples. The Germans

725 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A.
668 had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrain-
[208] ians were loyal to the Soviet Union. This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided
[186] to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army.

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

[651] The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West.

728 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of
● 648 the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

in 1939, now received a new master. As soon as the Soviet forces 728
entered the region in the autumn of 1944, they immediately began 648
a campaign to liberate this area from Czecho-Slovakia and reunite it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was the same old story carried on in the same way as in 1939. There was a mass of petitions apparently prepared by the native population asking for liberation, but these were in reality the work of a handful of carefully selected Communists.

They speedily reached their goal and on June 29, 1945, President Benes of Czechoslovakia recognized the justice of their claims and by an agreement handed over the entire province which was duly reunited with their brothers in Moscow. This brought together under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic nearly all the Ukrainians, except a few who were still living in Poland and in a small stretch of territory which the UkSSR voluntarily ceded to Poland to satisfy the increasing claims of the Polish Communists and their needs in their efforts to cement their power in that state.

At the same time the realization by the Soviet authorities of the seriousness of the situation offered by the U. P. A. and the unrest among the Ukrainians led them to act on both the foreign and the domestic front. On the former they mobilized all of their [208]
friends and dupes abroad to stress the connection of the U. P. A., [725]
the "Bandera bandits," and the Nazi criminals and they achieved considerable success in closing the eyes of the west until they had won considerable victories over the various U. P. A. groups, for too many Western leaders failed to see the inconsistency that they preached. At one and the same time the Soviet authorities boasted of their complete control of the territory of Western Ukraine, thanks to the love of the population for the Red Army and in almost the same breath they declaimed against these armed forces which were holding up the advance of the Red Army and the NKVD in the very areas where the people were thirsting for liberation.

On the domestic front in the autumn of 1945 they sent a large 661
force of men into the Carpathian area under the command of 668
Khrushchov as Premier of the UkSSR and General Ryasny, the 725

722 814 no efforts were made to bring them together or to conduct a revival of the Ukrainian work that had been so ruthlessly and needlessly shattered. It was a wartime device adopted for a passing situation and the masters in the Kremlin well understood that the fury of the war had done more than they had ever dreamed possible for the disintegration of the various Soviet Republics. Once, therefore, the evacuation had taken place, the Soviet leaders had only to sit by and to reap the profits. There would be plenty of time for that later and so the war years seemed an intermission in the relentless pressure that had been exerted in the past.

648 661 [167] It was for the Soviet leaders a far more vital problem to recover the masses of the people who had fled to the west or had been carried away by the Germans and who might, even in case of a victory of the democratic powers, reveal the full force of the Soviet pressure. That was why they welcomed the Yalta Agreement which provided for the compulsory return to the USSR of all refugees and deported persons and why, once peace was restored, they showed such devilish ingenuity in trying to recover the control of every one who could testify from personal experience as to the nature of the Soviet rule.

It was with the greatest surprise and lack of comprehension that the Western leaders became aware of this situation. They had listened eagerly to the Soviet siren songs that it was only Nazi sympathizers and criminals and traitors who did not want to return under the Soviet rule and it required some months before supposedly serious statesmen recovered their equilibrium sufficiently to understand the way in which they had been duped in the middle of the war.

Yet, no sooner had Soviet rule been reestablished than the old processes were revived with even greater energy and vigor. The last masks of independence or of free thought in the cultural or economic fields were torn away and the old persecution and charges were pressed with every increasing zeal.

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.
727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "warmongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
● 648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representa-
[701] tive in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

Western world, the Soviet Union conferred upon the Ukrainian 631
Soviet Republic the right to have its own anthem and its own 648
national flag.

These actions were not to be interpreted as a concession from Moscow, although they were presented in that guise. They were rather intended to strengthen the Soviet position in international affairs and by an appearance of generosity to facilitate the reduction of the satellite states to the same position as that held by the Union Republics. In this sense they were a response to the centralizing tendencies which were now to be expressed in a still stronger form.

As soon as hostilities ended and even before the Soviets were 665
assured of all their hopes, they began to purge again the Ukrainian 661
Communist Party and within a few months some 38% of the high officials were removed on the ground of bourgeois nationalism. All those who had not retreated to the east or could not show that they were working throughout the war as zealous Soviet partisans were summarily exiled as bourgeois nationalists. In the same way, when the enforced return of displaced persons began under the Yalta Agreement, very few were allowed to return to their homes. The vast majority were either executed for surrendering to the Germans or were sent to the labor camps in the far north and east for reeducation.

The Fourth Five Year Plan which was commenced in 1946 727
was very definitely devoted to the restoration of the country after the ravages of the war and to the increase of the Soviet capacity for defense. It was only in Ukraine and Byelorussia that the restoration had to absorb the energies of a considerable majority of the population, for while there were areas in the neighborhood of Leningrad and Stalingrad which had been badly devastated, the situation in the Ukraine was far worse. The cities and factories had been destroyed, the mines had been flooded and the population were living as best they might among the ruins which had been left by the two invading armies.

At the same time the work of restoration went very slowly. [316]
Less than one third of the miners of the Donbas had returned to

ment of a Ukrainian independent state throughout the period, 795
until the Russian Communists secured control and were able to 659
maintain their assumption of power.

In the first stages, while the Communists still hoped for the success of the world revolution, they emphasized their doctrines of atheism and they stressed the conception that "religion was the opium of the people." At the same time they endeavored to disintegrate the Russian Orthodox Church from within by giving their support to the various schemes of reform as the Living Church, etc. They also gave especial favor to various Protestant bodies, as the Baptists, who sought to introduce their ideas, often with marked success.

It was a crucial period for eastern Europe, for the Western 648
nations and America which had been victorious in World War I were not inclined to cement their victory. No matter what they thought of the Communist regime, Great Britain and the United States were still convinced that the victory of a democratic Russia was a certainty and they refused to take any steps to help the non-Russian peoples who were being over-whelmed by the Soviets, lest it prejudice their future relations with Russia. France, obsessed with the fear of Germany, was seeking to restore a greater Poland which would absorb as much as possible of Ukraine. The memory of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk blinded everybody to events as they were taking place.

It was no less critical for the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Allies sympathized with his position but the successful revolt of Mustapha Kemal against the Treaty of Sèvres produced a situation where the Western powers had to fight or surrender. They wished to do neither and with a certain Bolshevik sympathy for Turkey, the Patriarch was obliged to be cautious, until his hands were in a way freed by the settlement of Lausanne.

Hence the leaders of the movement for a Ukrainian Autocephal- 795
ous Orthodox Church were in a way powerless to regulate their relations with Orthodoxy as a whole. They had been unable to secure the support and assistance of any Russian bishops. They

642 came from the Russian workers of the cities, or from outside the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government under Petliura was to a considerable extent discredited, because it had failed to devote sufficient attention to the needs of the peasantry and to [648] establish law and order. Moreover, by an eleventh-hour alliance with Poland, it had compromised its claim to represent the entire Ukrainian nation. This resulted from the fact that Galicia, which, upon the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy had formed its own West Ukrainian Republic, was surrendered to the Warsaw regime as a price for aid in the east, a solution in which most Galicians refused to acquiesce. Nevertheless, Poland and the Soviet Union made peace, and shortly afterwards the remnants of the Ukrainian army and bureaucracy retreated across the border for internment in Poland. From this sanctuary a group of a few hundred under Colonel George Tiutiunnyk sortied in October, 1921, for a last desperate raid into the Soviet-occupied Ukraine.[22]

86 After that the East Ukraine lay under Communist rule, which 665 could no longer be challenged by military force. For a time, however, it appeared as if the rising tide of nationalist sentiment—it rose even among those who had long been adherents of Marxist doctrines—might bring about what arms had failed to accomplish. To understand this situation it is necessary to recall that the Communists under Lenin had modified their original stand in order to appeal to the nationalism of the non-Russians. In January, 1918, soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Third Congress of Soviets asserted a theoretical right of all the nations of the tsarist empire to go their several ways, to secede from the Bolshevik government in Moscow. At the same time, it deprived this right of any content by insisting that it be exercised only by the "toiling masses." Although the Communist Party's stand was more ambiguously phrased, its insistence that the interests of the toilers were represented only by the Communist Party and that the non-Russian Communist Parties formed inseparable parts of the central Bolshevik organization, in fact rendered self-determination a fiction. During the following years, the central Party [661] leadership used armed force when possible to insure that these local Communist Parties, thus reduced to mere branches of a

[22] Mazepa, III, 96–105.

time was allotted to the process of registering "popular approval" for incorporation of the occupied lands in the Soviet Union. A "Ukrainian National Congress," "elected" immediately after the Soviet invasion, met on October 26; on November 1 the head of its plenary committee, M. I. Panchyshyn, sent a request for admission to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; on November 15, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet) of the latter division of the Soviet state approved the request; thus East and West Ukraine were "united." [59]

In spite of the complete replacement of independent press and political organizations by Communist agencies, however, a strong effort was made in the early months to attract support for the new regime. Perhaps one reason for this attempt was the desire to influence Ukrainians still outside the enlarged Soviet Ukrainian Republic, especially in the Generalgouvernement. In a protocol to the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, which had defined the frontier between the parts of Poland annexed by the two totalitarian powers, it was provided that the government of the USSR should place no obstacles in the way of migration of ethnic Germans from eastern Poland to Germany. This secured for the Nazis the right to "bring home" the tens of thousands of German-speaking Volhynians. In return, Germany acknowledged an equal right of Belorussians and Ukrainians to migrate to the Soviet Union.[60] In accordance with a further provision of the protocol, a Soviet "repatriation" commission was allowed to travel through the Lemko region in early 1940;[61] by the end of June, it had induced only thirty-five hundred Ukrainians to cross the border into the Soviet Union, however.[62]

[59] S. M. Belousov and O. P. Ohloblyn, *Zakhidna Ukraïna* (The West Ukraine) (Kiev: Akademiia Nauk URSR, Instytut Istoriï Ukraïny, 1940), pp. 108 ff.

[60] Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*, eds. Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington: Department of State, 1948), pp. 104–5.

[61] *Krakauer Zeitung*, February 18–19, 1940, p. 6, reports the departure of one thousand Ukrainians from this area after a visit of the Soviet commissioners.

[62] According to *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, pp. 2–3. In an article which was remarkably hostile to the Soviet regime, in view of the latter's publicly cordial relations with Germany at that time, the Nationalist paper stated that the "intensive propaganda" of the Soviet commission, aided by "the pro-Russian intelligentsia" but combatted by "healthy Ukrainian elements," had resulted in the meager migration

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668* organizations, though agents were probably present.[70] The UNR, on the other hand, as will be described, was able to establish loose connections with a group which had been formed by nationalist youths in the remote Kostopol' (Kostopil')-Liudvipol' (Liudvypil') area near the former border between Polish and Soviet Volhynia.

626 668* [161] The situation in Bukovina prior to June, 1940, had in many respects closely paralleled that which existed in Galicia before September, 1939. The small Ukrainian population (about one quarter of a million persons) was subjected to a denationalizing policy by the Rumanian government, which included severe limitations on the use of Ukrainian in education and restriction of the press and of cultural activities. As in Galicia, there was a legal press and party, however, which endeavored to work within the scope permitted by the Rumanian authorities. There was also a fairly large section of the OUN, working underground. Corresponding —less closely—to Volhynia, was a considerable area of Ukrainian settlement in southern Bessarabia. This section of the Ukrainian ethnic group, however, was so backward culturally and so cut off geographically from contact with districts in which nationalism was strong that it appears to have played almost no role in the nationalist movements of the war period.

● 648 In June, 1940, while Germany was still occupied with the final phases of the French campaign, the Soviet Union began to press claims for territorial cessions from Rumania. It had long been recognized that Moscow would seize the first favorable moment to secure the retrocession of Bessarabia, the annexation of which by Rumania it had never recognized. Demands for Bukovina, however, apparently came as something of a shock to the German negotiators who were preparing a settlement of the Russian demands. They objected on the grounds that Bukovina had never been a part of the Russian Empire and that it contained a large

[70] Mel'nyk adherents have since claimed that their organizers who had been in Volhynia for a considerable time were killed by Bandera followers shortly before or after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war; see Mykhailiuk, p. 88; O. Shuliak, *V im'ia pravdy: Do istorii povstanoho rukhu v Ukraini* (In the Name of Truth: On the History of the Insurrectionary Movement in the Ukraine) (Rotterdam, 1947), p. 10.

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German colony. Molotov countered that it was the last "missing piece" of the Ukraine, though he agreed to limit his demands to the northern, predominantly Ukrainian part and offered to permit the repatriation of the ethnic German minority.[80] 648

Germany was not ready for a break with the USSR; consequently Rumania was forced to give way. On June 28, her forces evacuated Chernovtsy (Chernivtsi),[81] the Bukovinian capital, and the Red Army took over. The sequence of events was similar to that which had occurred nine months previously in L'vov, but the tempo was quicker. The leading newspaper, *Chas,* was Sovietized and a new Communist organ, *Nova Rada,* founded, though a number of Ukrainian books forbidden under Rumanian rule were authorized.[82] The Ukrainian People's House and other national cultural societies were closed. At the same time, the Soviet press assailed the repressive measures which the Rumanians had taken against Ukrainian cultural life. Soviet writers were indignant at the difficulties experienced by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Chernovtsy, although they denounced the Petliurist elements among them.[83] Numerous leading Ukrainians were not allowed to enjoy their new "intellectual freedom," but were arrested or shot as nationalist "counterrevolutionaries." It is said, however, that the German consul and the commission for evacuating the ethnic Germans succeeded in taking out numerous Ukrainian political leaders and priests of the Orthodox Church.[84] In any case, many thousands of refugees, mostly young people, found their way to Germany, where a large proportion provided an invigorating element for the segment of the OUN which had remained under Mel'nyk.[85] 661 [204]

The subjection of the West Ukraine to Soviet rule brought death or imprisonment to a considerable number of prominent Ukrainians; the entire population was oppressed by a heavy

[80] Ambassador von der Schulenburg in Moscow to Auswärtiges Amt, June 26, 1940, *Nazi-Soviet Relations,* p. 159.

[81] Rumanian Cernăuţi; German Chernowitz.

[82] *Nastup,* August 3, 1940, p. 3.

[83] "Besarabiia i pivnichna chastyna Bukovyny" (Bessarabia and the Northern Part of Bukovina), *Komunist,* June 30, 1940, p. 2; S. Zhurakovych and Ie. Patner, "Misto pod Prutom" (City on the Pruth), *Komunist,* July 5, 1940, p. 3.

[84] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* September 7, 1941, p. 3.

[85] See Chapter IV.

authorities by its rapid development and by its hold on 000
the people. Some months before the declaration of war a monster trial took place at Marmaros-Sziget, in which the adherents of the russophile organizations were tried for high treason. Most of the accused were peasants, which confirms the success of Russian ideas among the popular masses. Many were condemned to long terms of imprisonment. Immediately after the beginning of the war arrests again took place among the same Russian circles. These measures led to another trial at the beginning of 1915, but this time the tribunal sat at Talerhof under martial law and pronounced several death sentences. The account of these repressions against the Russian circles of Galicia by the Austrian Government was brought back by Count Bobrinsky, who served as a liaison agent between the Russian organizations in Kiev and those of Galicia and who was a witness at the first trial.

We have seen that the anti-Ukrainian police measures 648
taken by the Russian Government after the Polish 175
insurrection of 1863 were politically directed against the eventual possibility of Polish-Ukrainian collaboration, which was incidentally unrealizable. These measures did not bring about any political reaction in Russian Ukraine. They only brought the Ukrainian intellectual circles into evidence by their brutality and lack of justification. On the contrary they helped to crystallize the anti-Russian Ukrainian movement in Galicia, which found a loyal supporter in the Austro-Hungarian Government. The ideas developed in the plan of Prince Adam Czartoryski, despite their being out of tune with the whole history of the Ukrainian-Polish relations, were later adopted by certain Austrian circles which, as one knows, had become masters of Galicia after the last partition of Poland. Austria-Hungary

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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intended to put itself in the place of the Great Poland of other days and to create, under the sceptre of the Hapsburgs, a federation of Slavonic lands. In the immediate entourage of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne, the idea of transforming the Austro-Hungarian Empire into a federal State found great favour. The idea of taking advantage of the anti-Russian Ukrainianism of Galicia as a counterweight to Russian power and, at the same time, to Polish pretensions to cultural and political direction of the Ukrainian movement, was quite in tune with this plan. It was the intention of the Austrian politicians to use Ukrainian separatism as a means of creating difficulties behind the Russian front in case of war, and of securing some allies on the other side of the frontier.

In order to attract the sympathies of the Ukrainian intellectuals the Austro-Hungarian Government showed great tolerance towards the cultural institutions of the country, readily authorizing the creation of Ukrainian schools and putting no obstacles in the way of the development of political societies and institutions which, as we have already said, also served to eclipse the Polish influence over the leading circles of Galicia. The Austrian Government did not only authorize the creation of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine,' but gave effective assistance to its development in granting it the means of action, which it did not grant to the political organizations of the other Slavonic minorities. Skoropis-Ioltoukhovsky, Jouk, Dorochenko, and Salisniak, all convinced separatists and extreme anti-Russians, were placed at the head of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine.' The Russian general staff became alarmed by this movement, whose principal aim it suspected—the disorganization, in case of war, of the foundations of the army which would be formed in the

south of Russia. Later on, in 1917, the bulletin which 648
was published at Stockholm by the members of the 175
'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine' confirmed the justified anxiety of the Russian military authorities. This bulletin declared that the 'Union' had taken up a clear-cut position in all that concerned the relations with Russia, in basing all her hopes on the military defeat of the latter. It hoped for the occupation of the Ukraine by the troops of the countries at war with Russia, in order to attain a national independence with the aid of the central empires. Thanks to the great ability of her propagandists and to the continual support of the Austrian Government, the 'Union' was able to obtain considerable financial assistance consisting, apart from the contributions of the Galician and Bucovinian peasants and the Ukrainian colonists in America, of the grant of the 'Friends of Ukrainian Independence,' who belonged to those nationalities who were prepared to go to war with Russia. The accounts of the financial organization of the 'Union' were brought, in 1917, to the Russian military authorities by one of its former collaborators. One can say without exaggeration that the initiative and the elaboration of the programme of the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' can be traced to Austria, which proposed, in case of an offensive in Russian-Ukrainian territory, that the members of this organization should follow her army with the aim of finding supporters of separatism among the native population of Russian Ukraine, and on the other hand for creating the new administration in the conquered country. But the Austrian advance did not take place. The Russian troops invaded Galicia and the most active members of the 'Union' had to take refuge in Vienna. Many of their number simply entered the Austrian secret service after this failure. That which remained of the 'Union'

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

175 continued to receive subsidies from the Austrian Government and engaged in cultural work and autonomous propaganda among the Russian prisoners of Ukrainian nationality.

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This propaganda began immediately after the Austrian defeat in Galicia in 1914. Special camps were organized in which Galician instructors tried to subject the Ukrainian peasants to their influence and to the idea of Ukrainian autonomy. The conditions under which these prisoners lived were better than those of Russian soldiers from other parts of Russia. But soon, owing to her continual military and political defeats, Austria began more and more to make way for Germany, who finally took over the affairs of the 'Union.'

The idea of a confederation of vassal States carved out of the Russian territory developed in Germany in certain intellectual and political circles since the end of the era of Bismarck. The decisive role in the development of these ideas was played by Baltic Germans originating from the Russian Baltic provinces, whose influence, at first purely cultural, became progressively stronger in the Reich.

000 The short-sighted policy of crude and superficial russification, inaugurated in the Baltic provinces in the reign of Alexander III, had exasperated a part of the Baltic nobility and especially of the intellectuals. Their national pride, encouraged by the great rise of Germany in 1870–1, was deeply offended by the policy of russification. Thus these barons and these intellectuals began to turn more and more towards the Reich. Some of them even tried to find a new home in the at last united Reich. They took with them a hate of Russian politics, their contempt of all the native peoples of Eastern Europe and their historical traditions, full of reminiscences of those struggles which the Teutonic order

175 authority of the Ukrainian Government. No local
642 municipal or other organization took the slightest note
668 of its existence. Every department, every district, and every town governed itself and tried to resist the advance of the Bolsheviks. Not having any military forces or police organizations at their disposal, these local governments were unable to resist the attacks of the Red Guards and the armed soldiers, returned from the front and supported by Moscow. Soon the whole Ukraine elected local Soviet governments and the Rada, which hastened to proclaim, on 22 January 1918, the independence of the Ukraine, was obliged to flee on the 29th of the same month, seeking refuge at Jitomir. One of its most active members, Simon Petlioura, tried to organize anti-Bolshevik troops composed of peasants and prisoners of Galician origin. He succeeded in forming several units which, although unsatisfactory from a military point of view, cut a better figure than the bands of soldiers which were leaving the front. These military units, known under the name of '*haidamaks*,' formed small nuclei of resistance in the towns and villages and halted the Soviet offensive here and there. The more the Bolsheviks advanced towards the west, the more this resistance became effective, especially in Southern Podolia, where the Ukrainian organizations, supported by Galician prisoners, by Polish legionaries, and even by certain circles of purely Russian sympathies but hostile to Bolshevism, still retained some vestiges of power.

648 The insufficiency of technical, administrative, and
727 intellectual personnel did not allow the Ukrainians to give their civil and military organizations the force necessary for defeating the revolutionary movement directed by the Communist Party. On 9 February the Ukrainian Government, acting as a sovereign government, and despite the firm opposition of a large part of

its members, especially of Petlioura, decided to send its 648
representatives to Brest-Litovsk to conclude a peace 727
with the central empires. This idea met with the sympathy of the Austro-German authorities whose negotiations for a peace with the Soviet Government had already lasted a long time.

The peace which was dictated by the German general staff was signed by the Rada. As compensation for the efforts of the central empires, who promised to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism, the Rada accepted German occupation and agreed to supply 1,000,000 tons of grain of which Germany and Austria had immediate need. Under the threat of German bayonets the representatives of Lenin also had to recognize the independence of the Ukraine. Already the Austro-German troops were making their entry into Ukrainian territory while meeting with only a feeble resistance of the armed units of the local Soviet governments and the remnants of the fleeing Imperial Army.

The only aim of the Austro-German military command was to obtain the stores of grain and of other food products which they hoped to find in abundance in the Ukraine. Yet, for political reasons, the Governments 727
of the central empires decided to support the fiction of Ukrainian independence under their protection. The entry of the troops was followed by the proclamation composed more or less in these terms: 'At the request of your Rada we have decided to enter your country in order to protect you from Bolshevik anarchy and to give you the possibility of developing in complete alliance with our two empires.'

One can say that no citizen took this declaration seriously and that the occupation was considered as an invasion by enemy troops. The Ukrainian Government 642
was established at Kiev and was composed of three 727
[i.e. in 1919--- Analyst]

642 727 political groups: the separatists of the right, the national democrats, and the federalist social democrats. Thus, as these names show, the Ukrainian Government formed by the Austro-Germans was not homogeneous in the matter of its partisanship of independence.

727 The Austro-Germans did not take this farce of political independence any more seriously than did the population. Their attitude was simply that of conquerors. 'For every German soldier killed, ten *Russian* soldiers, chosen among the population of the district where the crime has been committed, will be immediately shot,' the terrified inhabitants of Kremenetz (town of Volynia) (Order No. 2, town of Kremenetz, 28 February 1918) read on the posters signed by the commandant of the Austrian division a few days after the proclamation of official friendship. The 'friendly country' closely resembled a colonial conquest. The general staff of the army of General Eichhorn reported to the commander of the eastern front on 4 May 1918: 'The Austro-German troops would have no difficulty in maintaining order and public tranquillity from the moment we renounce the fiction of a friendly country. We are still obliged to obtain the permission of the Ukrainian commissioners, who are confused and irritated, for some of our actions.'

648 Meanwhile two points of view existed in Austro-German circles concerning the subject of the independence of the Ukraine. The army considered the Ukraine a conquered enemy country which had to furnish, with the least possible delay, agricultural produce in accordance with the terms of peace.

On the other hand diplomatic circles saw in the independence, fictitious though it was, the future of German diplomacy, based on the partition of the succession of the dismembered Russian Empire. Parallel to

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thus, rivalry began between Austria-Hungary and Germany concerning the question of the predominance of one or the other in the direction of Ukrainian policy. The resentment of Austria, outstripped by Germany in the political and military spheres, has allowed us to have, to-day, possession of genuine documents which reveal the point of view of the central empires on the organization of the Ukrainian State and of its principal leaders. 648

Disappointed by the lack of success of the policy of its Government, the general staff of Austria-Hungary reported, on 16 April 1918, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna the characteristics of the principal Ukrainian statesmen, whose subjection to Germany caused alarm :

'Holoubovitch—Premier—a fanciful theorist, eloquent but without character, appointed by the Germans.

'Lioubinsky—Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—a clean-shaven young man, well versed in Socialist and revolutionary theories. Entirely in the hands of the Germans.

'Joukovski—Minister of War—in my opinion russophile, former Colonel of the Russian General Staff, does all he can to appear a hundredper cent Socialist-revolutionary to his colleagues. Effectively a "German puppet."

'Khristiouk—Secretary-General of the Rada—an intelligent young man, outwardly very smart, apart from that of German sympathies.

'Hrouchevsky—President of the Rada—an old man in the grip of fear and of tremblings, whose decayed old body is intended to give the Rada the noble rust of an honoured senate. He anxiously clings to the German authorities and expresses no sympathy for Austria.'

Despite the cynicism of this document, one must admit that its author, General Waldstatten, did not lack humour or intelligence.

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148 The Minister of the Reich at Kiev, Muhm, a subtler man, expressed himself differently though in the same sense: 'I am convinced that it is necessary to maintain the fiction of a friendly independent country in the Ukraine. . . . We shall completely destroy the little authority which remains with the Ukrainian Government if we were to show too coarsely that it is only a toy in our hands.'

191 177 Disarmed, enslaved by the great force of the army of the central empires, the Ukraine[1] was not in the position of an independent State. The Ukrainian language, imported from Galicia, was not spoken in the country. Only official documents and administrative notices were written in Ukrainian. Not a single private business ever used this language either for correspondence or advertising. In the schools and universities Russian continued to be used. The circulation of newspapers in the Ukrainian language was very small, while the Russian papers which agreed not to carry on open propaganda against the troops of occupation appeared everywhere and were actually the only ones read by the population.

727 642 The Ukrainian Government, composed of politicians having absolutely no administrative experience, soon proved to be incapable of organizing the supply of grain as promised to the armies of the central empires. The Germans then decided to change the regime. The organizations of landowners, small and big, which supplied corn and other agricultural produce to the forces of occupation, were favoured by the Austro-German authorities. It is unnecessary to point out that no Ukrainian political idea influenced the creation of these organizations. The Germans selected their association, known under the name of '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*,[1]

[1] '*Khliborobiv*' means farmers in Ukrainian. '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*' means association of farmers.

[1 i.e. in 1919. --- Analyst]

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645 my control and under that of the German general staff.'

An amusing, but true, story described the political position of the Ministers of the Government of the Hetman. The anecdote concerns the General Ragoza, the War Minister, whose sympathies were in no way Ukrainian. In October 1918 the Russian newspaper *Goloss Kieva* published a so-called order of the day of General Denikine, Commander-in-Chief of the White Army, declaring himself supreme chief of the armed forces on Ukrainian territory. His representative Colonel B., adorning himself with the uniform of the Imperial Army, presented himself without the slightest regard for etiquette to General Ragoza to inform him of the order of General Denikine and requested that the War Minister of the Ukraine would put himself at his disposal. The Minister was so taken aback that he began to assure the envoy of his loyalty to Russia and hastily gave his signature to prove his sincerity. The Russian officers living in Kiev took advantage of this incident to appear in the streets in their most brilliant uniforms of the old Russian Army and invited the population to decorate the city with the Imperial colours. It is unnecessary to say that the order was enthusiastically received by the population. The joke is that it was only a trick played by a Russian newspaper in Kiev, as this order of General Denikine had never existed.

648 642 The personality of the Hetman himself was also not very reassuring to the idea of Ukrainian independence. Here are the informations which were sent to Kiev on 30 May 1918 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich: 'In June 1914 Skoropadsky presented an *aide-mémoire* to the Imperial Government in which he denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, identifying them with the Russian people.' 'The whole Ukrainian

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movement is only the product of Austrian intrigues,' 648
he explained in this document. In July 1917, we are 642
also informed by this document, Skoropadsky published an open letter in which he called Kiev 'the centre of *Russian* culture,' and concluded that it would be necessary to take the initiative to 'unify all the *Russian* lands in a federal organism.'

All these testimonies show the illusory independence of the Ukraine under German occupation.[1] It is easy to understand that the Russian reactionary circles in the first place, and even other more moderate circles, should have considered the establishment of the Government of the Hetman, whose separatist convictions were more than doubtful, a happy event. The superficial Ukrainization, which continued more or less effectively under the fictitious power of the Rada, ceased almost completely under the Hetman. Only the official journal and some insignificant leaflets continued to be published in Ukrainian. Russian again became if not the official at least the semi-official language and the only one actually used in the administrative offices. The Russian circles considered the Government of the Hetman a provisional one which, supported by the Austro-German military forces and entrenched behind the fiction of an independent Ukraine, was able to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism. In their eyes the Government of the Ukraine was only a political and economic base for the future anti-Bolshevik movement in the whole Russian territory, able to serve as a springboard to the White

[1] All the documents which we quote here are contained in the book that appeared in Moscow in 1936 under the name of *The Failure of the German Occupation of the Ukraine*, a book which contains the secret correspondence of the Austro-German authorities in the Ukraine with their respective Governments. The Soviets of the soldiers of the Austro-German units in flight transmitted these documents of enormous value to the Soviet Government.

648 Army which was being organized in the territory of the
[642] Don Cossacks and in the Northern Caucasus. They were not far wrong. The Government of the 'Independent Ukraine,' considered to be anti-Russian, supplied the Volunteer Army,[1] on whose standards the device 'the one and indivisible Russia' was inscribed, with arms and ammunition. Entire trains proceeded to Rostov-on-Don, transporting officers, cadets, and civilians wishing to serve in the Volunteer Army. Even at Kiev the White military organization enjoyed a certain amount of liberty. A tacit collaboration developed under the half-sympathetic eyes of the central empires, between the command of the White Army and the Ukrainian Government of Kiev. This tolerance on the part of the Austro-Germans found its explanation in the imminence of their defeat on the western front. Thus Ukrainian politics and especially the support of Bolshevism which they considered an involuntary ally, having ranged Russia among the neutrals, no longer had any sense. The Austro-German authorities began to take an interest in the opponents of Communism and of Ukrainianism and even looked to the Don Cossacks with a view to collaboration, those same Cossacks who, though well organized since the October Revolution as an independent State, had never expressed the desire of separating from the Russian Empire.

642 The internal policy of the new Government, com-
727 pletely at the service of the forces of occupation, was
423 characterized by the support of private property and particularly of the landowners. This policy led to the proclamation of new laws regarding the return of estates to the landowners, of which they had been deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles of 1917.

[1] The name which was officially used by the White Army which, at the beginning, did not resort to any mobilization and only filled its ranks with volunteers.

727 by the troops of Petlioura. On their part the Soviet authorities took their vengeance in the towns and the country districts on hostages, in proceeding with mass executions of members of the middle classes, intellectuals, rich peasants, and clergy, while the Whites inaugurated the mass hanging of Communist leaders. The interval of the French occupation of Odessa, in April 1919, 669 changed nothing in the situation. The second counter-727 offensive of the Soviets, followed by still more atrocious massacres, ended in putting the whole Ukraine under Soviet domination at the end of the winter of 1920. The Whites, under the command of General Wrangel, entrenched themselves on the Crimean peninsula. The troops of Petlioura were again driven back towards Poland. From this moment a new phase of the Civil War begins in the Ukraine. Guerrilla fighting, led by chiefs of Ukrainian bands such as Makhno, Kosak, and others, known under the name of the *bat'ki* (the fathers), began. They had important forces at their disposal. Under the cover of political ideologies (Makhno was anarchist, the others 'Communists without Jews,' etc.) they devastated the rear of the Soviet front. The personnel of these bands was undoubtedly of peasant extraction. They were mostly the remnants of the Army of Petlioura which had succeeded, after his defeat, in filtering to the rear of the Soviet front. Until a long time after the establishment of the Soviet regime, these bands menaced the communications and disorganized the life of the country. Full-scale military operations would have been required to deal with the *bat'ki*. The Ukraine did not easily submit to Bolshevism.

648 In 1920 a last attempt of foreign intervention in Ukrainian affairs was undertaken by Marshal Pilsudski.

The defeat of the Central Powers led to the unchaining of the eternal struggle between the Ukrainians and the

Poles. First the Galician question was raised immediately 648 after the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy (in October 1918). Following the example of all the nationalities which had been a part of it, the Ukrainians of Galicia [642] formed a national council at Lvov, which proclaimed the independence of the Western Ukrainian Republic. After the fall of Skoropadsky this new republic was eager to unite with the Directorate of Petlioura. The Act of Union was proclaimed in January 1919. But the Poles did not think on the same lines. During the same 726 January 1919, Poles and Ukrainians already fought 648 each other furiously in the streets of Lvov. The arrival of the Polish troops of General Haller, formed in France, quickly turned the tide. A regular army of 80,000 men represented a very important force in Eastern Europe where, from the Carpathians to the Pacific, an immense territory was plunged into anarchy. For General Haller there was no question of a Western Ukrainian Republic, but only one of a Little Poland, a simple province of the reborn Great Poland. As we had already seen, the detachments of the Polish Army of Haller threw themselves, in April of the same year, against the vanguards of the Red Army. Recently restored, the Polish State already claimed the frontiers applying before the first partition, that is to say the annexation of White Russia and the Ukraine up to the Dnieper. While the Petliourians, the Reds, and the Whites faced each other on both sides of the Dnieper, the Poles seized the greater part of Volynia and of White Russia and entered Minsk. But the Poles did not seem to exploit their success, most probably in order to give the Red Army the chance to destroy the White Army which, in case of victory, might transform itself into a national Russian Army, dangerous from the point of the territorial pretensions of Great Poland.

648 While awaiting further developments, Poland occupied herself with the Ukraine.

While the Polish sympathies of Petlioura became more precise, an important, if not the best, part of his troops, recruited among the Galicians of the former Austrian regiments, united, in November 1919, with the Russian Volunteer Army. Later the Galician Army was involved in the general collapse of the Whites. But it had tried the only chance of rescuing the Western Ukraine from Polish domination. Petlioura, safe behind Polish bayonets, appeared as an instrument completely in the service of the new Poland and of her chief, Marshal Pilsudski.

728 648 In December 1919 the representative of Petlioura signed, in the name of the Ukraine, a first declaration which recognized the Polish sovereignty over Galicia, Podolia, and Volynia, a declaration which, on 21 April 1920, was supplemented by a secret treaty of alliance according to the terms of which the popular Ukrainian Republic confirmed the cession to the complete sovereignty of Poland of these lands, in all more than 150,000 square kilometres with almost six million inhabitants, in return for the recognition of Petlioura by Poland as chief of the Ukrainian Government. Poland promised, amongst other things, to support the creation of a Ukrainian State, which had become very small and only included a very narrow territory between the new Polish frontier, very advanced to the east, and the old Polish-Russian frontier of the time before the first partition. This secret treaty was supplemented by a military agreement, which was signed three days later. Its terms guaranteed the formation of allied Ukrainian units, which would be under Polish command, in the territory ceded to the Poles. The railways of the Ukrainian territory were to be entirely at the disposal

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of the Polish troops. No more than the secret convention did the military treaty foresee Polish help, except in the Ukraine on the right bank, which alone interested the Poles. The authors of these agreements were so well aware of the incompatibility of this treaty with the national sentiments of the Ukrainian people that they never dared to publish these acts. Even the members of the Directorate, apart from a few exceptions, were not informed of it. It is only in 1926 that this document was published by Professor S. Cheloukhine, a Ukrainian monarchist and former President of the Law Tribunal of Odessa under the Tsars.

After the signature of the military treaty on 7 May 1920 the Polish troops, followed by Petlioura, entered Kiev. The Polish domination over a large part of the Ukraine seemed re-established. But soon the divisions of the Red Cavalry, commanded by Boudenny,[1] marched towards the east and the Ukrainian peasants, despite their dislike of the Soviet regime, supported them with all means. The former Commander-in-Chief of the south-western front at the time of the Tsar, General Broussilov, proclaimed a national war against Poland and published an appeal to which, raised by a wave of patriotism, many thousands of Tsarist officers replied, though they would never have, till then, agreed to serve in the Soviet Army. We will be unable to study the details of the Russo-Polish War which saw Poland escape from disaster at the decisive battle under the walls of Warsaw.

After the defeat of Warsaw, Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Riga in 1921 and abandoned to Poland that Ukrainian territory which had been ceded to her by Petlioura—Eastern Galicia, Western Volynia, and Polesia. There can be no doubt that only the Soviet

[1] Former Cavalry Adjutant, to-day Marshal of the Soviet Union and Commander-in-Chief of the Moscow Military district.

728 Government, hostile in principle to everything connected with Russian national tradition, could put its signature on such a document, considered as an even greater national humiliation than the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Ukrainian separatist movement, doubly compromised by its agreements with the central empires and with Poland, foundered as a result of general contempt.

648 728 Soon the Allied Powers recognized the Polish domination over the whole of Galicia, at first as a temporary measure. It became definite on 15 March 1923. Poland agreed to establish an autonomous regime here, but this promise had never been honoured. From this date, too, Poland exercised her absolute power over a considerable part of the Ukrainian people.

000 The Soviet attitude to the Ukrainian question at that time is not of great interest and does not furnish new factors which could throw new light on the problem.

If Soviet policy with regard to this problem seems confused and inconsequent, this is so because it is not determined by a firm and well-established point of view, but by two factors which are outside this question: by the reaction of the Ukrainian population to the 'social experience' to which it is subjected and by the attitude of Germany and Poland to the Ukrainian problem.

642 Immediately after the establishment of Soviet rule on Ukrainian territory, and in full agreement with Marxist theories, the right of peoples to determine their own fate was proclaimed and naturally also affected the Ukraine, as every other member of the Soviet Union. Thus the Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine was founded. The Constitution even gave it the official right of ceding from the U.S.S.R. This is the official aspect. In practice the Ukraine became an integral part of the Soviet Union and completely dependent on the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

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661 Oppositionists of the party the opportunity of releasing a veritable ' Petliourization ' of the peasant class and of the small town-dwellers, aiming at the separation of the Ukraine from the U.S.S.R.

648 Since 1936, as a reaction to the policy of the Reich, which tended to unite the different Ukrainian movements under its guidance, the Soviet Government adopted a new Ukrainian policy the official thesis of which was the *brotherly union of the Ukrainian and Great Russian people, as bequeathed by history.*

197 To-day we observe an attempt at bringing the Ukrainian and Russian languages closer together. Ukrainian is being purged of its Polonisms and its Germanisms, imported from Galicia, which ' the enemies of the people ' had tried to implant in the Soviet Ukraine. A system which tends to awaken and to maintain Russian national pride has been inaugurated. The victory of Poltava is no longer the victory of a Tsar who oppressed his people, but the liberation of the Ukrainian workers from the Swedish and Polish aggressors.

000 To sum up, among all the countries subjected to the ' social experiments ' by the heirs of Lenin, the Ukraine bows to them with far greater difficulty than the others. In this she seems to be the obvious prey of separatism, led by foreigners, the declared enemies of her people.

The Soviet Government is alone responsible for the existence of this separatism, which cannot be justified from any point of view and is foreign to the spirit and the interests of the Ukrainian people.

175 people deteriorated also in consequence of the religious persecutions of Ukrainians by the Polish State. For these reasons, in 1648 the great Ukrainian revolution against Poland broke out under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—1657), the Hetman of the Cossack Army.

[642] 175 648 In consequence of the revolution of 1648 the Ukrainian Cossack Republic was created headed by an elected Chief of State (Hetman). The official name of this State was 'Zaporovian Army' (Exercitus Zaporoviensis) with Tchyhyryn as Capital. Leaning upon the Cossacks and the free peasantry, the Ukrainian Republic could defend itself against the united forces of Poland and the Crimean Horde for several years. Having lost the hope for a settlement with Poland on the principle of equality, the Ukrainian Government concluded a treaty with the Muscovite Tsar in Pereyaslav, in 1654. The Muscovite Tsar promised the Ukrainians assistance against Poland and the Tartars. The treaty of Pereyaslav secured for Ukraine its own army, administration, and an independent foreign policy.

The transition of Ukraine towards Moscow in the 17th century provided the basis for the rise of the Muscovite state. The Ukrainian revolution of 1648 weakened Poland considerably.

Under the protectorate of the Tsar of Moscow Ukraine did not find security for its liberty, prosperity and progress. The Swedish King Charles X. Gustav understood this well when he wrote to his Ambassador to the Ukrainian Government, in 1657: "Moscow does not tolerate a free nation"*). When it had become evident that the Tsar of Moscow tried to reduce or to abolish the rights of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Government of B. Khmelnitsky planned the annulment of the alliance with Moscow, and concluded treaties with Sweden and Transylvania to secure the independence of Ukraine (1656 and 1657). The Ukrainian Government put forward the demand for the frontiers of the Ukrainian State as '*iuk totius Ukrainae antiquae vel Roxolaniae*' up to the Vistula, the Ukrainian ethnographic frontier of that time. In the treaty with Sweden of 1657, Ukraine was recognised as a free nation dependent on no one ('*gens libera, nulli subiecta*').

Against the Ukrainian aspirations for independence Poland and Moscow acted in common. By the treaty of Andrusov of 1667, Ukraine was divided among these countries on the Dnieper line. Turkey and the Crimean Horde interfered with the struggle in Ukraine. In these wars, lasting nearly 30 years, Ukraine on the western bank of the Dnieper River was disastrously devastated. In

*) *Archives of South-West Russia*, Part III, Vol. VI: Kiev 1908.

a treaty between Turkey, Moscow, and Poland of 1681, it was 175 determined to depopulate Ukraine between the South Bug and 648 Dnieper Rivers to the Black Sea. The western Ukrainian territories (Volhynia, Galicia etc.) remained under Polish rule. Ukraine to the East of the Dnieper remained under the protectorate of the Muscovite Tsars, preserving restricted autonomous rights, with an elected Hetman as the head of the Government.

Tsar Peter I. planned the abolition of the remains of the autonomous order of Ukraine on the Eastern bank of the Dnieper. In order to defend the freedom of Ukraine, Hetman Ivan Mazeppa concluded an alliance with the Swedish King Charles XII. against Russia in 1708. The battle of Poltava (1709), fatal for Ukraine and Sweden, put an end to the plans of the Ukrainian patriots to restore Ukrainian independence. Nonetheless, for decades even in the second half of the 18th century, the members of the Ukrainian Government which went into exile in 1709, continued in various countries their diplomatic action for the defence of the Ukrainian independence. They were headed by Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, the successor of Mazeppa, and included the son of Hetman Orlyk, Hryhor Orlyk, General in the French service, Fedir Myrovych and others.

After the battle of Poltava the Russian Government restricted [661] the autonomous rights of Ukraine considerably. Tsar Peter I. 175 deliberately destroyed Ukraine in order to oppress her people the more easily, as we are informed by Weber, the Resident of Brunswick-Hannover in Moscow, a contemporary of Tsar Peter I.*). Ukraine was forced to pay heavy contributions, Ukrainians were sent in masses to the North to build Petersburg, the new capital of the Tsars. Many thousands of Ukrainians died from exhaustion while working for the strengthening of Russian Tsarist despotism. At the same time Moscow took from Ukraine its best cultural workers — scholars, artists, artisans. Western civilisation was introduced to Russia principally by Ukrainian intellectuals. (See K. Kharlampovich, *Little Russian Influence on the Great Russian Ecclesiastical Life:* Kazan, 1912; and Pekarsky, *Science and Literature in the Time of Peter* — I — II).

The Tsarina Catherine II. abolished the autonomous Ukrainian Government in 1764. Ukraine was brought to the level of the other provinces of the Tsarist Empire.

The Russian Government decided also to destroy the Zaporovian Army, the nest of democratic liberty in Ukraine. In 1775, Russian

*) Weber, Das veränderte Rußland: Hannover 1729.

175 troops conquered the fortress of the Ukrainian Cossacks — the Zaporovian Sich. The remainder of the Zaporovian Cossacks migrated to the Turkish province at the mouth of the Danube, and founded there a new centre under the protectorate of the Sultan. The lands of the Zaporovian Army, that had been defended against the Tartar hordes in a fierce struggle lasting for hundreds of years, the Russian Government granted to its magnates, first of all to favourites of Catherine II.

175 648 The Western Ukrainian territories, which, by the Polish-Muscovite treaty of 1667, had remained in the Polish State after the dismemberment of Poland at the end of the 18th century, were incorporated partly by Russia and partly by Austria (Galicia 1772). Bukovina too, which had formerly belonged to Turkey, became a province of Austria in 1774. Carpatho-Ukraine had belonged to Hungary since the Middle Ages (cities Užhorod-Ungvar, Mukačevo-Munkacs).

181 175 [-66] The struggle of the Ukrainians for independence under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—57) had abolished serfdom in the greater part of Ukraine. It was the ideal of the masses of the Ukrainian people to live free, independent like the free Ukrainian Cossacks. After the abolition of the autonomous rights of Ukraine at the end of the 18th century serfdom for the Ukrainian peasants was introduced in Ukraine in the Muscovite way. But against this oppression the masses of the Ukrainian people rose often in revolt.

Historical evolution has developed in the Ukrainian people an aspiration for freedom and defence of human dignity. Voltaire wrote in his *History of Charles XII.*: "L'Ukraine a toujours aspiré à être libre" (Ukraine has always aspired to be free). "This is a nation that wants freedom," wrote the prominent Ukrainian writer of the 17th century, the Archbishop of Chernigov, Lazar Baranovych, to the Muscovite Tsar Alexey Mikhaylovich.

The conviction prevailed among the Ukrainians that Ukraine was not dependent on Russia but was only associated in the person of the Monarch. In the political dialogue *Dispute of Little Russia with Great Russia* at the end of the 18th century we read the following words of 'Little Russia' addressing 'Great Russia': "Do not think thou art my lord, but thine and mine sovereign is our common master."

175 648 The Ukrainian patriots could not forget the loss of liberty and independence, and looked for understanding of the Ukrainian case to foreign countries. In 1793 the well known Ukrainian patriot Vasyl Kapnist tried to persuade the Prussian Minister Hertzberg

that it was in the interest of Prussia to help the Ukrainian people 175
to cast off the chains of Muscovite slavery. During the Great French 648
Revolution the person of Napoleon was very popular in Ukraine. Ukrainian patriots were pleased by the victories of the French Emperor, and hoped that, after the defeat of Russia in a war with France, the time for the liberation of Ukraine would come, and the odious serfdom would be abolished. But Napoleon had no understanding of the Ukrainian problem. He planned the creation of two states 'Napoléonides' in Ukraine under his protectorate . . .*)

Ukrainian history has gone its own way, different from that of Russia. This has created the peculiar national character of the Ukrainians.

The foreigners who had visited Ukraine in the 17th and 18th 175
centuries pointed out the higher level of civilisation among the 181
Ukrainians in comparison with the Russians, and the highly deve- 517
loped feeling of personal dignity of the Ukrainian people. This love of freedom of the Ukrainian people appeared also in the fight against Tsarist absolutism in Russia, where revolutionaries of Ukrainian origin occupied the first places, Zhelyabov, Kybalchych, Konashevych, Osynsky, Kravchynsky (Stepnyak), Popko, and many other members of the party '*Narodnaya Volya*'.

In the 19th century, under the influence of the ideas of that time (the Great French Revolution, romanticism) the regeneration of the so-called unhistorical pepoples (Serbians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Baltic peoples) began; in the beginning it was the interest for the language and history of the peoples among the educated classes, and the attempt to write in the 'common people's' language. In Ukraine the regeneration of the popular literary language began [538] with the publication of the satirical poem of Ivan Kotlyarevsky *Aeneid:* 1798. In this poem the author underlines his dislike of serfdom and the lords

> "who did not give the people freedom
> and treated them like cattle."

Democratic ideas were widespread in Ukraine; the representatives 175
of the Ukrainian educated classes took an active part in the 186
revolutionary organisations directed towards the fall of the Tsarist régime (the uprising of the 'Decabrists', 1825—26, was most active in Ukraine, near Kiev).

In 1846 a Ukrainian political organisation, *The Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius,* was founded in Kiev. Many prominent representatives of Ukrainian culture like Taras Shevchenko (the

*) *Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes:* Paris 1922.

648 order to secure the country, the Ukrainian Government began to concentrate in Ukraine the troops that had been separated from the Russian Army. The Ukrainian Government was against a separate peace with the Central Powers, as it was afraid to come under the influence of these nations. Thus in the session of the Ukrainian Central Council on December 25, 1917, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Choulguine, declared:

"The Bolsheviks are preparing to conclude a separate peace. We do not agree with this, we cannot permit that the Germans and Austrians move their regiments against the French and British. We stand for a general peace that would be welcomed by the democracy of the whole world".

[665] Against this policy of the Ukrainian Government the Russian Communist Party acted with demagogic propaganda.

On January 13, 1918, the newspaper of the Russian Communist Party in Kiev *The Proletarian Thought* wrote:

"The Central Council tries to destroy the struggle for peace... The Council is working in this direction by order of the 'allied' imperialists. The workers, soldiers and peasants of Ukraine and Russia know and remember well that, in their struggle for the immediate ending of the slaughter, the Central Council is their determined enemy and a faithful servant of the sharks of capital and of international robbers...".

5. *Great Britain and France Recognise Democratic Ukraine*

The position of the Ukrainian Government in the question of peace attracted the attention of Great Britain and France. At the beginning of December 1917, General Tabouis entered into relations with the Ukrainian Government as Commissioner of the French Republic to the Ukrainian Government. On January 11, 1918, General Tabouis handed to the Ukrainian Government the following declaration:

"Wishing to confirm its friendly intentions towards the Ukrainan Republic, the Government of the French Republic informed me by telegraph, the only present means of communication, that it appointed me as Representative of the French Republic to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic. It will soon be a year that I have been on the territory of Ukraine. In this time I had the opportunity to study the history of Ukraine, I watched with attention the development of its national movement, and I could observe the efforts the Ukrainian Republic had made in order to create and to strengthen the moral and physical forces necessary for the organisation of the state. I have watched all this with

interest that grew steadily and I am happy and proud, President, to 648
see that to-day this interest is notonly personal, for, appointing me as its Representative, the Government of the French Republic approves my efforts and charges me to continue officially the excellent relations that have developed between us. I bring you the official assurance that France, which as the first country is undertaking this decisive step, will support with all her power the Ukrainian Republic in those endeavours she will undertake to continue to walk on that road the Allies had chosen, and on which they will march without hesitation, thoroughly conscious of their rigths and their duties towards the denocracy of the whole world and of humanity ... From this day forward France has entered into official relations with Ukraine".

The Government of Great Britain appointed likewise its representative to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic, Sir Picton Bagge. In his letter to the Ukrainian Government Sir Picton wrote:

"My Government has charged me to assure you of its best intentions. It will support with all its strength the Ukrainian Government in the task it will undertake in creating an efficient administration, securing order and fighting the Central Powers".

6. The War of Soviet Russia against Ukraine

In December 1917, the Russian Bolshevik organisations in Uk- 669
raine, leaning on the Russian arned forces stationed in the Ukrainian cities, tried to overthrow the Government of the Ukrainian Central Council and to set up the dictatorship of the Communist Party. The Ukrainian Government disarmed the Russian armed forces and sent them over the boundaries of Ukraine. After this the Soviet Russian Government put to the Ukrainian Government an ultimatum to stop in Ukraine the disarming of Russian troops, which were friendly to Communst dictatorship, and to return the arms to the troops already disarned.

"If after 48 hours no satisfactory reply will be given, the Council of the People's Commissars will consider the Ukrainian Central Council to be at war with the Government of the Soviets in Russia and Ukraine", so ended the ultimatum of the Russian Communist Government.

For fighting the Ukrainian Democratic Republic the Russian Soviet Government created its puppet 'Government of Soviet Ukraine'. This 'government' took up its residence in Kharkov, captured by troops sent from Russia. The Kharkov 'Ukrainian

669 Ukraine. The 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' headed by Rakovsky left Ukraine and was abolished by order of Lenin. This was a new proof of the complete failure of the Russian Communist policy in Ukraine.

But at the same time the Ukrainian Republic met a new enemy who had claims on Ukraine. This was the Russian Volunteer Army under Denikin. The leaders of this army regarded the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as more dangerous for themselves than the Soviet dictatorship in Moscow. Therefore, in its struggle against the Russian 'Red Army', the Russian 'White Army' attempted before all to take possession of the Ukrainian territory in order to [648] prevent the strengthening of 'Ukrainian separatism'. In vain the Ukrainian Government appealed to the Western Great Powers that they should not admit the attack by the Russian Volunteer Forces on the Ukrainian Army and that they recognise the Government of democratic Ukraine. If in 1919 the Government and Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had been given the least support by the Western Powers, the development of Eastern Europe and even the whole world would have taken another course than happened in fact. In any case, by securing an independent Ukraine, Russian imperialism would not be such a menace to the world as we see it to-day.

[731] When Denikin's troops met the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in Kiev they attacked Ukrainian armed forces weakened by the struggle with the Russian Red Army and decimated by a disastrous typhus epidemic. This epidemic had spread principally in consequence of the blockade of the territory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army had no medicaments, no clothing nor sanitary equipment, the Ukrainian soldiers died in thousands, and there was no help. From the army the epidemic spread among the population of Ukraine.

[72] But even under these incredibly hard conditions the Army of the Ukrainian Republic and the masses of Ukrainian people did not abandon the fight against the new oppressors — the Russian Volunteers — who had abundant support from the Entente Powers. The Russian 'Whites' forbade the Ukrainian language in schools, offices and the press in the Ukrainian territory they had seized. Russian authorities ordered the burning of Ukrainian books. The Denikin Government cruelly persecuted Ukrainian patriots. Even the word 'Ukraine' was forbidden; the expression 'Little Russia' was used instead. The Denikin Government restored the estates of the big landowners in Ukraine.

Against the Denikin régime in Ukraine extensive risings of the

the Ukrainian partisan movement. New requisitions of grain and the taking of arms from the population caused an even greater disappointment among the Ukrainians. The partisan movement which had overthrown Denikin's power turned with new vigour against the Russian Communists. These risings were carried on under the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of arms and supplies did not permit the Ukrainian partisan movement to develop and to attain decisive results in the struggle with the overwhelming forces of the Russian Red Army. 669 661

17. Poland — Ukraine — Russia 1920—21

At the end of 1919, the regular front of the Ukrainian Army broke down. The Ukrainian Army continued the fight against 'White' and 'Red' Russia as guerilla war. The diplomatic Mission of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic headed by Andriy Liwycky, Cabinet member, started negotiations with the Polish Government about the relations between Poland and Ukraine. The consequence of these negotiations was a Convention signed in Warsaw on April 21, 1920. In that time the Government of the Ukrainian Republic headed by Isaac Mazepa was remaining in Ukraine. 648 669 728

According to this Convention a new frontier between Ukraine and Poland was established: those Ukrainian territories Poland had seized in 1919 in the war with the Ukrainians (Galicia, Volhynia etc.) remained on the Polish side. The Polish Government undertook to support the restoration of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic on the territories occupied by Soviet Russia.

The war of Poland and Ukraine against Soviet Russia, which was carried on with changing fortunes did not bring the expected results to the Ukrainians. The Polish leaders thought it more advantageous for themselves to come to an agreement with Soviet Russia after having divided the Ukrainian territories with Moscow (Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921). Poland recognised in Riga the Government of the 'independent' Soviet Ukraine and broke off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army which in fighting against the overwhelming Russian forces, had entered Polish territories together with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1920) was interned. The soldiers of this army, who had fought against Soviet Russia not only for Ukraine but for Poland alike, were placed by the Polish Government in camps in such conditions that many of them died there, or acquired serious diseases.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The conventional tariff is modified in favour of various nations in respect of specified items according to the commercial treaties mentioned below. 651

(d) *Commercial Treaties*

The Ukraine having hitherto formed part of the Russian Empire, the commercial treaties of the Empire have had full force there. Up to the year 1893, notwithstanding any treaties existing, all European nations were on the same footing in relation to the Russian tariff. Since then the following special conventions as to tariffs have been concluded: 648 439

With France.—A treaty of 1893 provides for a reduction of Russian duties on 52 articles of French origin, in exchange for a reduced French tariff on naphtha and its products.

With Serbia.—A treaty of commerce and navigation, signed in 1893, agrees to a decrease of the Russian duty on Serbian fruits, in exchange for Serbian concessions on fish and mineral oils.

With Germany.—By a treaty of commerce signed in 1894, Russia lowered her duties in favour of Germany on 135 articles, in consideration of which she obtained most-favoured-nation treatment from Germany.

With Portugal.—A general convention of 1895 arranged that Russia should benefit by certain reductions of the Portuguese tariff, and that Portuguese cork and cork products should be allowed a 20 per cent. reduction of duty on entering Russia.

With Japan.—A general treaty, signed in 1895, placed Japan, in respect of her commercial relations with Russia, on a similar footing to that of European countries.

With Bulgaria.—In 1897 the Russian tariff on dried meat, eggs, and undressed leather was lowered in favour of Bulgaria, and attar of roses was admitted free of duty. In return, certain general concessions and most-favoured-nation treatment were accorded by Bulgaria to Russia.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

648 Asia generally has peculiar commercial relations with Russia, the duties on both sides being as a rule low, while numerous arrangements for reciprocal concessions have been made, notably with Persia, the Turkish Empire, and China.

(D) FINANCE

(1) Public Finance

652 The Russian Imperial revenue is largely raised in indirect taxes. The budget for 1911 shows the following revenue figures:

		Roubles.
Direct taxes		210,000,000
Indirect taxes:		
Liquor	42,000,000	
Tobacco	69,000,000	
Sugar	123,000,000	
Petroleum	44,000,000	
Matches	18,000,000	
Customs	289,000,000	
		585,000,000
Duties:		
Stamps, fees on transfers, harbour dues, railway dues		169,000,000
Royalties:		
Mines, mints, posts and telegraphs, and spirit monopoly		849,000,000
State property, including railways		765,000,000
Remainder		122,000,000
Total		2,700,000,000

The principal spending departments were the Ministries of Ways and Communications, War, and Finance, and the Public Debt service. These accounted for three-fourths of the expenditure.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

II

648 TEXT OF THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK, BETWEEN THE UKRAINE AND THE CENTRAL POWERS, FEBRUARY 9, 1918

A TREATY of peace between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one part, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other part. The Ukraine people having, in the course of the present world-war, declared itself independent and expressed the wish to restore peace between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Powers at war with Russia, the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey have resolved to agree on a peace treaty with the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic. They thereby desire to take the first step towards a lasting world-peace, honourable for all parties, which shall not only put an end to the horrors of war, but shall also lead to the restoration of friendly relations between the peoples in the political, legal, economic and intellectual realms. To this end the plenipotentiaries of the above-mentioned Governments, namely, for the Imperial German Government, the Foreign Secretary, Baron von Kühlmann; for the joint Austro-Hungarian Government, the Foreign Minister, Count Czernin; for the Bulgarian Government, the Premier, Mr. Radoslavov, and the envoys, Mr. Andrea Toschev, Mr. Ivan Staia Stoyanovitch, the military plenipotentiary, Colonel Peter Gantchev, and Doctor Theodor Anastassov; for the Imperial Ottoman Government, the Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, the Foreign Minister, Nessimi Bey, Hakki Pasha, and General Izzet Pasha; for the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Messrs. Alexander Siewrjuk, Mykola Ljubynsjkyj, and Mykola Lewytsjkyj, members of the Central Rada, have met together at Brest-Litovsk for the inauguration of peace negotiations, and, after submitting their credentials, which were found to be in good and proper form, they have reached agreement on the following conditions:

ARTICLE I.—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one hand, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, declare that the state of war between them is at an end. The contracting parties are resolved henceforth to live in peace and friendship with one another.

ARTICLE II.—(*a*) Between Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and the Ukrainian People's Republic on the other hand, in so far as these two Powers border upon one another, those frontiers will exist which existed before the outbreak of the

present war between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Russia; (*b*) farther north, the frontier of the Ukrainian People's Republic commencing at Tarnegrad, will, in general, follow the line Bilgoraj, Szoezebrzszyn, Krasnostas, Pugaszow, Radin, Meshireyschie, Sarnaki, Melnik, Wysckolitowsk, Kamenietzlitowsk, Pruschany, Wydonovskojcsce. These frontiers will be fixed in detail by a mixed commission according to the ethnographical conditions and with regard to the desires of the population; (*c*) should the Ukrainian People's Republic still have common frontiers with another of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance special agreements will be made thereupon.

ARTICLE III.—The evacuation of occupied territories will begin immediately after the ratification of the present peace treaty. The manner of carrying out the evacuation and the transfer of the evacuated territories will be determined by plenipotentiaries of the interested parties.

ARTICLE IV.—Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties will be entered upon immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty. The widest possible admittance of the respective parties' consuls is to be reserved for special agreements.

ARTICLE V.—The contracting parties mutually renounce reimbursement of their war costs (that is to say the State expenditure for carrying on the war) as well as indemnification for war damages (that is to say those damages which have been suffered by them and their subjects in the war areas through military measures, including all requisitions made in the enemy's country).

ARTICLE VI.—The respective prisoners of war will be permitted to return home, in so far as they do not desire, with the approval of the State concerned, to remain in its territories or proceed to another country. The regulation of questions connected herewith will follow by means of the separate treaties provided for in Article VIII.

(ARTICLE VII is a long clause covering the economic agreements made between the Ukraine and the four enemy Powers. *Inter alia* it provides for 'a reciprocal exchange, until July 31 of the current year, of the surplus of the most important agricultural and industrial products . . . for the purpose of meeting current requirements', and it revives the Russo-German Commercial Treaty of 1894–1904.)

ARTICLE VIII.—The restoration of public and private legal relations (Rechtsbeziehungen), the exchange of prisoners of war and interned civilians, the amnesty question, as well as the question of the treatment of merchantmen in the enemy's

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

648 hands, will be regulated in the separate treaties with the Ukrainian People's Republic, which form an essential part of the present peace treaty, and, so far as is practicable, will enter into force simultaneously therewith.

ARTICLE IX.—The agreements made in this treaty constitute an indivisible whole.

ARTICLE X.—For the interpretation of this treaty the German and Ukrainian text is authoritative for the relations between Germany and the Ukraine; the German, Hungarian, and Ukrainian text for the relations between Turkey and the Ukraine.

Final prescription. The present peace treaty will be ratified. The ratified documents shall be exchanged as soon as possible. So far as nothing therein prescribes otherwise, the peace treaty comes into force on its ratification. (Here follow the signatures.)

A supplementary treaty of twenty-eight articles was signed between Germany and the Ukraine on the same day. It deals with the resumption of consular relations, the revival of 'treaties, arrangements and agreements which were in force between Germany and Russia before the war', exchange of prisoners, compensation for damage, &c. (*The New Europe*, February 28, 1918.)

III

THE GERMAN COLONISTS IN S. RUSSIA (from F. Stach, *Survey of the History of the Colonists in S. Russia and their Present Life.* Moscow, 1916.)

175 563 REALIZING that in the southern territories acquired by Russia in the eighteenth century only colonists with a certain amount of culture could introduce a settled life and develop the resources of the country, Catherine the Great published a manifesto on December 4, 1762, inviting foreign colonists. As a result, 102 colonies were established on the Lower Volga in the Saratov and Samara Governments, 6 in Chernigov, 1 in Voronezh, 2 in Lifland, and 6 in the Petrograd Government. A further manifesto followed on July 22, 1763, enlarging the privileges of the colonists, which were very considerable.

This manifesto was the basis of the colonies of Russia. On March 19, 1764, a supplementary act was issued granting 30 desyatines of land to each family and prescribing the method of settling and rights of inheritance. The land was to pass to youngest son; this measure would force the father to teach

668 642 175 the parties. At the same time the process of making Ukrainians of the various divisions of the troops on the front began, so that within a few months the Central Council had about one and one-half to two million Ukrainian soldiers at their disposal. But in spite of this enormous army, the Central Council by and large yielded to the orders of the Kerenskii government of Moscow. Its further policy is characterized by the four manifestoes which it issued up to the time of its dissolution in April 1919. On June 23, 1917 the first manifesto of the Central Council announced the autonomy of the Ukraine. It was to maintain its own parliament, the Central Council, and a /58/ government, the general secretariat. On July sixteenth the second manifesto followed, giving particulars as to what was meant by autonomy, and containing an emphatic declaration for confederacy. In its manifesto of November 19, 1917 after Lenin had already stepped into power, the Central Council still clung to the union with Moscow. Again in this "Universal"-that was what the manifestoes were called - which proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic, there was mention of federation with Moscow. On December fourteenth the Council of 648 175 People's Commissars in Moscow recognized "the Ukrainian People's Republic and its right to separate completely from Russia or to enter negotiations for a federation or similar relationships." But in the same document of recognition the Council of People's Commissars laid down the condition that the disarming of Red troops in the Ukraine would have to cease and that the Central Council would have to desist from its "counter-revolutionary activity". Should the People's Commissars fail to obtain a satisfactory answer to this demand within 48 hours, "the Council of People's Commissars would assume that the Central Council was in a state of open warfare against the Soviet government." A few days after this recognition coupled with an ultimatum Bolshevik troops broke into the Ukraine. In Khar'kov there was formed a Ukrainian-Bolshevik counter-government, and Moscow's

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war against Kiyev began.

Straightway Bolshevik propaganda made itself felt in the Ukraine. It was easy to unleash revolutionary energies, after the Central Council had prepared the ground with the same arguments, albeit in a weaker form. In the country unbridled peasant rebellion against the squires raged. It was arable land and fine cattle and horses on the farms that the peasants wanted; they did not care who ruled in the cities. This was the state of affairs in the Ukraine when on January 22, 1918 the Central Council in Kiyev in a fourth manifesto proclaimed the sovereign "Ukrainian People's /59/ Republic" and put into effect separation from "indivisible Russia". However, at the same time it did not forget to announce that after the overthrow of Bolshevism, there should again be cooperation with Russia. The manifesto which was meant at last to arouse national passions suppressed for so long, was not heard in the noise of general rebellion. A few days after the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the parliament and the government at Kiyev were surprised by a revolt of Bolsheviks and its members were arrested. If they had not been freed by the Ukrainian sharpshooters of the sech who became the nucleus of the later Ukrainian armies, and the corps of free Cossacks consisting of workmen, these parliamentarians would have faced certain death. It was precisely in those days that the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk recognized the independent Ukrainian People's Republic on February 9, 1918. Vienna was facing a famine and needed grain, so the peace was favorable to the Ukraine. For the adjudication of national sovereignty they were obliged to furnish a half million tons of grain. The "peace for bread" had been signed one day when the Bolsheviks drove the Central Council out of their capital. In March the situation became so threatening for the Ukrainian government that it was obliged to appeal to the Central Powers

•648 for occupation and riddance of the Ukraine from
668 Bolsheviks. Thereupon German and Austro-Hungarian
175 troops occupied the country. In Kiyev the Central Powers established military, diplomatic and political representation. In order to take the wind out of the sails of the vigorous Bolshevik agitation, the Central Council nevertheless saw itself forced to continue its revolutionary activity. Thus, against their will, they led "the country toward a complete social-revolutionary dissolution in which East Ukraine had inevitably to fall victim to the Bolshevism of Moscow." (40)

40. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism.

It is obvious that the conservatively-minded German authorities had no understanding of such governmental tricks as would seriously jeopardize /60/ the furnishing of grain. Therefore they supported the attempt of the former aide-de-camp of the Czar and Russian general of Ukrainian origin, Pavlo Skoropadskyj, to introduce the monarchical office of hetman instead of the Republican Central Council. On April 29, 1918 Pavlo
668 Skoropadskyj, the offspring of a hetman family,
175 proclaimed a new hetman state in the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the indigenous props of this monarchical regime were very weak. If he had not been protected from the beginning by the authority of the army of occupation, the revolutionary masses would have driven him out along with his few dozens of landowners, industrialists, merchants and officers on the very first day. Skoropadskyj's first efforts were directed toward restoring the pre-revolutionary social conditions in the country, during which process his men did not shrink from severe penal expeditions and from the use of the "traditional Russian wisdom" - the club. This led to repeated bloody rebellions on the part of the embittered peasants. An uneducated, fermenting,

668 destitute mass of humanity, as yet incapable of
175 self-administration, a much too small middle class and a corrupt reactionary society at the head,- these were the elements of the hetman state. But it was the hetman's doom that, for lack of a national Ukrainian conservative stratum, he was obliged to lean more and more on the old domiciled Russian circles who in the end completely won over the Ukrainian head of the state to their reactionary plans. On November 14, 1918 Skoropadskyj set
642 up an Old Russian government in Kiyev and announced
• 648 the federation of the Ukraine with a czarist Russia
175 which, however, was never again to arise. Twenty-four hours after the announcement of the annexation of the Ukraine to this fictitious czarist Russia, the revolt of the "Ukrainian National League" against Skoropadskyj and the Old Russian counter-revolutionaries broke out. There begins the period of the second Ukrainian People's Republic, at the head of which is a five-man governing board. At the end of the /61/ seven-month rule of Skoropadskyj, after his flight from the new Ukrainian government, he made the following confession in his last manifesto of December 14, 1918: "God did not give me the strength to attain my goal."

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In the meantime Austria-Hungary also approached its dissolution. On October 10, 1918 in the Imperial Council of Vienna, the Ukrainian parliamentarians from Galicia demanded the right of self-government for the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary; it was only a few days before the collapse of the Empire. On the eighteenth of October the Ukrainian members of the Imperial Council and the Diet in Lwów founded the Ukrainian National Council which on the following day proclaimed the union of all Ukrainian territories in Austria-Hungary. The National Council set up three executive committees and therewith imagined it had done all that

was necessary. Then they believed a telegram of 642
the Western powers containing the confirmation or 648
the order to make use of self-government and found 175
the West Ukrainian state would come fluttering into the house. The parliamentarians who received their political education in the lobbies of the Imperial Council building had complete faith in the magic formula of self-government and were waiting to see what the Western powers would have to say. Action was taken only by several companies of East Galician-Ukrainian troops who in the night of the first of November seized Lwów in a surprise attack. The Galician capital was predominantly inhabited by Poles and Jews, and the Poles immediately countered with a revolt. The Ukrainian National Council was still waiting patiently; it had made no real preparations to take over power in Galicia. Thus its appeals must be directed to the anonymous masses, "To everyone", with the request that they lend a helping hand everywhere and intervene everywhere. Finally on November ninth the government, the temporary state secretariat, was formed and the division of governmental power very neatly handled. The /62/ National Council was to make the laws, the State Secretariat was to see that they were enforced. Then the order was given that all "necessary steps be taken to unite all the Ukrainian provinces into one state". The new state called itself the "West Ukrainian People's Republic". Its alliance with the East "Ukrainian People's Republic" was solemnly announced on January 22, 1919 in Kiyev. The West Ukrainian People's Republic was given the name "Western Territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic". In reality, however, conditions remained as before between the West Ukrainian and the East Ukrainian state, in spite of formal amalgamation. Both states continued to be independent allies, small West Ukraine being the stronger.

The West Ukrainian state was obliged from the beginning to reckon with opponents who were

642 bent on the most extreme measures. Roman Dmovski,
•648 chairman of the Polish National Committee founded
175 in Paris during the war and leader of the Polish delegation at the peace negotiations, was the most bitter enemy of any kind of Ukrainian state. He countered the partition of Great Russia at Brest Litovsk with the partitioning of the Ukraine. It was completely in accordance with his ideas when as early as February 28, 1918, after Brest Litovsk, the Paris National Committee decided completely to destroy Ukrainian state in East Europe at any cost. To this end Polish agents in Paris, London and Washington used all their powers of persuasion on leading politicians and newspapers. They wisely suppressed the fact that Polish plans secretly included the entire Ukraine west of the Dniepr which had fallen to Russia in the partitions of Poland. These opponents of independent Ukrainian state were augmented: the Polish army of General Haller, which was formed in the summer of 1918 on French soil and which was recognized as the "confederate army" on the twenty-eighth of September, arrived in Poland.

West Ukraine could be nothing more than booty or a tool in the hands of the Allies. Inasmuch as France /63/ wanted to build up against Germany a Poland that was as strong as possible, it was best that Poland subjugate West Ukraine and thus exclude any threat from the rear. Only Foch for a time entertained the plan of erecting a Ukrainian vassal state and of throwing in its soldiers against the Bolsheviks. For the English Liberals, West Ukraine was an object of barter which could be used as an extortionary measure against the French, or, if there was no other way, could be made into a mandate state under the supervision of the League of Nations.

The fiercest enemies of the East Ukrainian
648 statehood, however, were the Bolsheviks who, fully
175 aware of the fateful significance of a loss of the

648 Ukraine for the Muscovite realm, strained every
175 effort to fight for the country. The Pan-Russian counter-revolutionary armies also proved themselves opponents not to be underestimated. "The campaigns of Denikin, Kolchak, Iudenich and other Russian generals clearly proved that there were only two forces fighting in the Russian civil war: the old Czarist absolutism against the new Bolshevik despotism. And both of them fought with equal ferocity against the Ukraine." (41)

41. Danko: The Nation in Soviet Chains, page 25.

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726 A surprise attack of the Ukrainian troops on Lwów set off the Polish-West Ukrainian War.
175 For weeks wild fighting raged in the streets of the city; finally the Poles succeeded in bringing in troops and forcing the Ukrainians out of Lwów during the night of November 22, 1918. The victors exercised bloody reprisals on the Ukrainian population; they destroyed Ukrainian property and dragged many respected citizens into concentration camps from which they were never to return. The Jews expiated for their neutrality with a three-day pogrom, during which whole blocks of houses went up in flames.

After the loss of Lwów, the West Ukrainian
[631] state included about 40,000 square kilometers with
642 four million /64/ inhabitants, among them three
648 million Ukrainians. To destroy this dwarf state was the firm intention of the leaders of the Polish
726 state of eighteen million. The Ukrainian govern-
175 ment now had its seat at Stanislawów; Dr. Ievgen Petrushevych was the head of the state. He and many other men who were responsible for the fate of West Ukraine still regarded it as "an incident, a misunderstanding, an error" that there was any fighting at all between Poles and Ukrainians. Heedless of the front which was expanding day by

642 day and of the increasingly bloody battles, they
648 abandoned themselves to the illusion that these
726 misunderstandings would merely have to be cleared
175 up and all would be well. They believed that patience was required until the Allies carried out the right of self-government for which the Ukrainians alone were obliged to fight with weapons. "The fact that individual destinies must be determined by the will of the individual - such points of view which are so familiar to conquering nations, were completely foreign to the 'Ukrainian National Council', all the more since there was not a single, in any way outstanding, personality in leading political circles, who would have been capable in a critical situation to grasp the reins and direct events." (42)

42. Kuchabskyj: West Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 52.

175 The war which at the beginning was carried
726 on with a few thousand men on both sides was in full force by the end of December. At this time the Ukrainians successfully mobilized their fighting manpower up to 35 years of age. Then, however, they made the mistake of abandoning warfare in the open country and of leaving the initiative to the Poles who, in keeping with their reckless methods, made use of it. In spite of the fact that the Ukrainian front which ran northward from the Carpathians presented considerable deficiencies along its approximately 250-kilometer length, that the battalions, for example, were strung together loosely and without a unified supreme command, nevertheless the Polish troops which arrived from mid-January on suffered heavy defeats. Thus General Romer /Facing page 64/ /Above: A typical
000 Ukrainian church made of wood, in the Carpathians. Below: Ukrainian peasant woman baking bread./1 /Facing page 65/ /The Ukrainian landscape is full

1 [This plate not processed for files — Analyst]

11: Obermaier--84 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Volhynia] [Ruthenia]

186 Nothing happened there which their special reporters did not describe in detail. In neighboring Volhynia which, for easier Polonization, was separated from Galicia by a Chinese wall, /83/ and where Ukrainian newspapers from Lwów were forbidden, people paid two zloty, the equivalent of two marks, for the smuggled papers. Radios were much in demand[1] and the cooperatives which ordinarily sold shoelaces, underwear and soap, were suddenly supposed to furnish radio sets. The members wanted it. They brought their zloty, and when these did not suffice they paid in chickens and eggs. Half the village listened to the reports from a friendly broadcasting station in the Ukrainian language, picked up by a common receiving set. The people did not mind at all that they were obliged to stand or squat as close together as sardines in a can.

186 208

The "audition" cost five groschen which amounts to two and one-half pfennig. Anyone who had no money paid with an egg for news taken from the ether. What they heard on these occasions were sometimes their own wish-dreams. The autonomous government, which set up its residence first in Uzhgorod and then, until the country's reintegration into Hungary, in Khust, had great plans. The listeners discussed this with great animation.

648 186 208

The peasants who could write set down on paper the result of long deliberation about existing conditions as well as their wishes for the future, in the form of letters and sent them to the Polish President as well as to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Prime Minister Voloshyn and to a foreign statesman from whom they hoped to get help. Most of these letters got only as far as the office of the voivode. Thereupon Poland's fist became day by day more oppressive. The autonomy of the neighboring small country, however meager it was, was a violent shock to Polish power. Warsaw desired the quickest possible disappearance of Carpatho-Ukraine. On December third the head of

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1 [i.e., 1938-39 among the Ukrainians in Volhynia - Auly]

11: Obermaier--85 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[Ruthenia]

648 the "Camp of National Unity", General Skwarszynski, said in the Sejm: /the Polish parliament/ "... The common boundary with Hungary as a Danubian state and as a people traditionally friendly to us, corresponds not only to our feelings, but also to our interests. Therefore Hungary's aim to /84/ obtain Carpatho-Ukraine must be energetically supported by our foreign policy." The speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Mudryj protest- 186 648 ed against this Polish policy[1] at the same meeting: "We must not forget that the Ukrainian people, on the basis of common blood, common tradition and a common spirit feels itself to be a unified national organism, regardless of what state it lives in and under what governments it falls. No power will crush this feeling of national unity." (48)

48. "Osteuropa", January issue, 1931, page 260.

When Mudryj referred to the devastation caused by the "diversional detachments" in Carpatho-Ukraine, he was silenced.

000 Poland had a bad conscience. The Carpatho-Ukrainian question, unimportant though it was, made it nervous. The great power grew unsure of itself and from old habit tried to set force against the right to live. According to the Polish political thesis only "another dialect" is to separate the Ukrainians from the Poles. If one took away their Greek Orthodox religion and their Cryillic script, they would differ from the Poles merely by reason of their dialect.

However, the Ukrainians have changed tremendously since the days when Emperor Joseph II said, at the end of his journey through Galicia, which was freed after hundreds of years of Polish domination: "The peasant is an unfortunate creature possessing nothing but a human exterior and physical life." In the 150 years that Vienna was their capital, the Ukrainians experienced an ex-

1 [i.e., 1935-37, to aid Hungary to obtain Carpatho-Ukraine - Ed.]

[Ruthenia]

177 traodrinary national, economic and cultural advance, and the war of liberation from 1918 to 1919 became indelibly fixed in their national consciousness. Volhynia, too, awakened as a nation.

186 N wonder, then, that after a mock autonomy
648 was granted by the Polish parliament on September 22, 1922 - in accordance with the request of the Supreme Council of June 25, 1919 - and after the conference of the Parisian emissary /85/ of March 15, 1923, which adjudicated Galicia to the Poles, no wonder that the Ukrainians in Poland have continued to fight against Warsaw's rule with other means. The Ukrainians are helpless against drastic measures such as the introduction of Polish civilian administration or the closing of Ukrainian schools. They suffer national losses especially in the parcelling of large estates, which brings new Polish settlers into the overpopulated country and which leaves the Ukrainian small farmer out in the cold. The Poles have already succeeded in pushing back the western Ukrainian boundary by about thirty kilometers; they are successfully Polonizing Polesia where, because of the extreme backwardness and poverty of the inhabitants, hunger is a stronger motivating power than anything else. In 1905 the Ukrainians already lost 250,000 citizens in Lublin, which was then Russian, and which, after the first World War, became Polish. These people who were forcibly converted to the orthodox faith in 1870 went over to the Roman Catholic Church 35 years later; for their return to the Greek Catholic Church to which they had belonged before that was denied them. But becoming Roman Catholic means becoming Polonized. Once the Polish clergyman has set foot in a town, he is soon followed by the teacher, Polish societies are founded and the village is isolated from the Ukrainian neighborhood as from the area of infection.

184 795 became autocephalous during the Revolution, have dissolved. In the wide realm of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics there is no visible ecclesiastical authority whatsoever. No one knows how many priests are secretly carrying on their duties. Churches are closed and have been transformed into "godless museums" or clubs. East Rome is without power and without priests.

648 795 It was said of Pius XI: "The Holy Father is much concerned about the re-unification of the East. It may be said that he has made this the goal of his life." (58) Pius XII, as may be

58. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 38.

seen by the honor bestowed on Vladimir, cherishes the same plans.

But the Soviet Union remained closed to the emissaries of the Vatican. Everything was done that could be done. In 1918 the Vatican hastened to send an ambassador to Kiyev. But before he arrived the addressee of the credentials, Hetman Skoropadsky, was already fleeing to the West. In 1922 to 1923 papal aid to the starving is supposed to "prepare the ground" for the seed which none other but Nuntius Pacelli scattered when in all secrecy in Berlin, he consecrated a Jesuit organizer as bishop of this charitable work; the Jesuit who is passing through must be consecrated secretly, in order that the Bolsheviks do not become suspicious and that the "simple" father who is apparently only concerned about apportioning the food that is handed out, can unostentatiously appoint five bishops. In this manner the first Catholic prelates are installed in the Ukraine. How often they have made use of their sacred powers and how many Catholic bishops and priests there are today in Soviet Ukraine is not known even in the Vatican.

After this first chapter of Muscovite national policy was completed, the second one began: the "New Economic Policy" (NEP). The Soviet Union was urgently in need of composure, of a breather and recuperation. The Bolsheviks in Moscow, therefore, loosened the reins and introduced the semi-free economy in which land, large enterprises and the banks remained the property of the state, the peasants obtained the usufruct of the land, and a free market could regulate
648 the distribution of goods. Simultaneously with the NEP, Moscow launched a second enterprise: the nationalization of non-Russian peoples. For it was necessary to administer in small doses and in as attractive a form as possible, Bolshevist ideology to the Ukrainians, the White Ruthenians, the Caucasian and all other peoples who were under Moscow's rule. With the XII Congress of the Communist Party in 1922 the policy of Ukrainization was adopted, to be sure only in the area of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic with its 443,000 square kilometers of surface and approximately 23 million Ukrainians, while the many millions of Ukrainians in the White Ruthenian Soviet Republic, the Russian Soviet Republic including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in the Kuban area, on the Volga and in Siberia were at that time already being de-nationalized. During that XII Congress in 1923, the following words were spoken about the Ukraine: "This is one of the problems which threaten to involve Soviet Russia and the Party in the greatest complications. It is one of those problems which, we must admit frankly and honestly, will promulgate civil war if we do not approach it with delicacy and understanding."

The Ukrainian Communists adopted Moscow's
661 slogan without hesitation. To Ukrainize - that
648 meant to give Ukrainians leading positions in the government, in the Party, in the cooperatives, in economy, in the press and in the school system; /114/ it also meant using Ukrainian as the offi-

661 cial language and promoting Ukrainian culture in
all its aspects, in science and art. The process
•648 was carried on so eagerly in all fields that in
the course of it the task of converting people to
Bolshevism seemed almost to be forgotten. In
fact, a Ukrainian national Bolshevist movement was
started, which soon ran into opposition with
Moscow. It was headed by the People's Commisar
for Popular Education, Shumskyj, whose group
openly opposed the "exploitative colonial policy
of Moscow". The situation was not too good within
the Communist Party of the Ukraine. Shumskyj
divulged this in his speech of May 12, 1926:
"Within the Party, the Russian Communist prevails;
he does not trust the Ukrainian Communist and is
hostile toward him." (59)

59. Fedenko: Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R., page 12.

648 How weak the position of Moscow was after the
subjugation of the Ukraine is shown by the Con-
stitution of the Soviet Union of 1923, in which
the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as well as the re-
maining national republics of the Union had to be
formally recognized. The defense system, the
transportation system, finances and foreign pol-
icy were declared to be affairs of the state.
The Foreign Commissariat in Moscow established a
branch in Khar'kov, which at that time was the
Soviet Ukrainian capital.

The process of Ukrainization reached its
661 external climax with the visit of the Ukrainian
648 champion of liberty Colonel Konovalets who in
1918 and 1919 had carried on the bitterest battles
against the Bolsheviks and now visited Kiyev at
the invitation of the President of Soviet Ukraine,
Petrovskyj. Like so many other emigrants he, too,
had let himself be dazzled by Muscovite national-
ist policy. What Petrovsky was able to show his
West Ukrainian guest was indeed astonishing com-

661 pared with that which remained to the Ukrainians
•648 in Poland. The old cultural city on the Dniepr was experiencing a new efflorescence; 70% of all students in Soviet Ukraine were attending Ukrainian schools. There had been nothing like
[214] it since the days of the Cossacks. /115/ Between
[217] 1918 and 1928 the Academy of Sciences published 888 works and numerous libraries were founded. (60) Hundreds of newspapers, periodicals and

60. Tisserand: The Ukraine, Life of a People, page 283.

pamphlets enlightened Ukrainians eager for knowledge in their mother tongue, and poetry and belles-lettres had reached a very high level. But soon black shadows were to fall on this brilliance.

Not yet satisfied with the results of the
661 policy of Ukrainization - in 1929 only 36% of
665 the officials were Ukrainians, the rest Jews and Russians (61) - the Central Committee of the

61. Fedenko: Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R., page 17.

Communist Partv of the Ukraine decided at the end of December, 1929, to intensify the process of nationalization. Especially the working classes were to take an active part in Ukrainian cultural life; Ukrainian theaters were to put on regular performances in the industrial areas; there were to be "Ukrainization cells" formed in the factories, the high union posts and the leading positions in the cooperatives were to be held by Ukrainians, and adherence to the course of nationalization of the administrative system was to be supervised. In this manner the cities were to be Ukrainized. The Commissar of People's Education, Skrypnyk, the successor of Shumskyj, successfully sought both to disseminate Ukrainian literature

665 Ukrainian population prefers to read, whereas the works of Russian authors remain completely unknown in the Ukraine. It goes on to say that this is a very detrimental phenomenon, for Russian culture is important for the entire Soviet Union and for the whole world, while Ukrainian culture is of merely local significance.

Conversely, the Ukrainians accused the Muscovites of chauvinism. Stalin, the Georgian, tried to pronounce a Solomonic judgment at the Sixteenth Party Congress in June 1930 by condemning both Great Russian and Ukrainian nationalism: "Great Russian chauvinism under the communists reflects the efforts of the ruling classes of former Russia to reconstruct their lost privileges of domination over other peoples. As a result, the chauvinism of Great Russia is the chief danger in the national policy of the Communist Party." In accordance with these ideas, the Sixteenth Congress adopted the resolution that the Party should /117/ intensify its fight against Great Russian deviation and the deviations of "local nationalism".

•648 182 As a matter of fact, Ukrainian nationalism was indeed becoming a danger to Bolshevik Moscow. As compared to the period of war-communism, the Ukraine was living in remarkably comfortable circumstances. [369] The fact that the majority of the Ukrainian people, the rural population, enjoyed an adequate subsistence, must have had a positively irritating effect on the urban masses in their wretched circumstances. Was not this an open refutation of the communist doctrine? There was the additional fact that the Ukrainians became more and more importunate with their varied demands, and that the power of the Ukrainian government had increased so much during the NEP period, that finally it headed the opposition of non-Russian peoples in the Council of Nationalities (the second chamber next to the Supreme Council) and forced Moscow several times to change its

[During the NEP period in the Soviet Union — Analyst]

•648 162 budget plans. If things went on in this way the social system of communism would face serious crises as a result of the flourishing peasant economy of the Ukraine - in the regions of Great Russia communal ownership of fields has prevailed since ancient times - and the Muscovite conception of national unity might be seriously threatened by the increasing power of "assembled peoples".

In order to avoid these dangers and also in view of other considerations, Stalin discontinued the New Economic Policy and introduced the period of the Five Year Plans. In spite of the decision of the Sixteenth Party Congress, the way to Russianization was opened, and Ukrainization discontinued; Ukrainian nationalism received a hard blow when free peasant farming was immediately liquidated. There have been untold victims of these revolutionary processes which were attended by violent upheavals from the time Stalin announced his principle of "socialism within one country".

648 185 "Socialism within one country" demanded industrialization as the presupposition for the independence of the socialistic /118/ state. This industrialization had to take place throughout the realm and according to a unified plan. Every form of particularism could only be detrimental - the Ukrainian form doubly so; for in the Ukraine are the coal and metal and the water power reserves of the Dniepr from which horsepower by the millions can be obtained. Such considerations led to the First Five Year Plan, in the course of which Ukrainian economy, heavy industry, finance and particularly agriculture were subordinated to orders from Moscow. The division of private economy was "liquidated".

661 The new system* introduced the purging of the Pan-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the year 1930, where members of the "League for the Liberation of the Ukraine" had entrenched themselves; they were now "unmasked". In a monster trial in

* [i.e., Beginning of the Five year plans — Analyst]

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 parties which came into legal existence sent, together with national minorities, their representatives to the Rada.

At the beginning, the Rada did not aim to separate the Ukraine as an independent state from Russia, but asked, during the negotiations with the Provisional Government, a territorial autonomy in federation with Russia. It further demanded that the Russian Government abstain from interference in Ukrainian internal affairs. However, this modest demand was first rejected by the Provisional Government in Petersburg, and led the majority of the Ukrainian people into believing that the new Government in Russia was prepared to continue the policy of the Tsars regarding the non-Russian people. As a result, the possibility of establishing peaceful and friendly relations among the various nationalities was jeopardized by the Russians themselves.

Taking note of the strong determination on the part of the people, the Ukrainian Central Rada issued, on June 23, 1917, its first universal "declaration" in which the "Autonomous Ukrainian Republic" was proclaimed. Informing the Ukrainian people about the unsuccessful negotiations with the Provisional Government in Petersburg, the Rada declared that "from this day on, we ourselves will create our own destiny." [6] Simultaneously, a General Secretariat, with Wolodymyr Winnichenko at its head, was formed. It took shape as the Ukrainian Government while the Central Rada was reorganized as the revolutionary parliament.

648 During the short life of the Provisional Government, only the Bolshevik Party took the existing facts into account. Lenin, who previously did not believe in a Bolshevik victory in Russia during his lifetime, recognized, after his return from Switzerland in April, 1917, that administrative incapacity and the political blunders of the Provisional Government offered a reasonable chance immediately to seize political power in Russia. Analyzing the situation, Lenin introduced the program of the Bolshevik Party which promoted such revolutionary slogans as self-determination of nations within Russia and their right

6 M. Hrushevsky, *The History of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1945), p. 526.

7 The Seventh (April) Conference of the All-Russian Social-Democratic Labor (Bolshevik) Party, held on May 7-12, 1917 adopted a resolution on the National Question in which the policy toward non-Russian peoples was formulated. Among other points, the resolution stressed: "The right of all nations forming part of Russia to freely secede and form independent states shall be recognized. To negate this right or to fail to take measures guaranteeing its practical realization, is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure and annexation. . . ."

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to secede from Russia.[7] At the beginning, these revolutionary slogans won many sympathizers for the Bolsheviks among non-Russian nations, since it was believed that the Bolshevik Party was the only political group in Russia which would not oppose the creation of the national States. For example, Stalin, whom Lenin deemed an expert on the national question, went so far as to openly denounce the methods of the Provisional Government in dealing with the Ukrainian problems. He declared that the accusation of treason levelled against the leaders of the Ukraine only concealed the plan to destroy the idea of national liberation. Shortly before the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, Stalin wrote:

> No one has the right to interfere in the internal life of nations and to correct their mistakes by force. The nations are independent in the question of their internal life; therefore, they have the right to determine freely their own destiny.[8]

Only at a time of crisis, when the Provisional Government began to lose control over the developments in Russia, did its representatives I. G. Tsereteli, M. Tereschenko and A. Kerensky resume negotiations with the Rada[1] in Kiev. A compromise agreement was concluded on July 11, 1917 in which the Provisional Government recognized "without delay" the autonomy of the Ukraine and the General Secretariat as the governing body of Ukrainian affairs. The result of this agreement was proclaimed in the second universal "declaration" to the Ukrainian people on July 16, 1917. Even then, many representatives of the Provisional Government were reluctant to recognize the existing facts. Prime Minister G. E. Lvoff as well as his Cadet Ministers (Constitutional Democrats) resigned on July 16, 1917 in protest against the "concessions" granted to the Ukrainians.[9]

While the Provisional Government continued the struggle against the Ukraine, the Bolshevik Party recognized, without hesitation, the Ukrainian Rada as the legal government. However, later develop-

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8 J. V. Stalin, "Counter-revolution and the People of Russia," *Sotchineniya*, Vol. 3 (Moscow, 1946), p. 207.

9 The American Ambassador in Russia, Francis, informed the Secretary of State on July 16, 1918: ". . . Cause (of the resignation of the Cadet Ministers) attributed is that Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Posts and Telegraphs who returned yesterday from Ukraine had granted that province concessions with which Cadet party unable to agree. . . ." Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia 1918*, Vol. II (Washington, 1932), p. 646.

1 [the National Central Rada (Council) organized in 1917 — Analyst]

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•648 ments proved that this was only a formal recognition of existing facts and a desire to win confidence among non-Russian people. The Provisional Government's mistakes and incompetence resulted in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, which led to the establishment of the Soviet regime.[10]

648 After the revolution, Stalin was appointed Commissar of Nationalities. Lenin believed that the appointment of the non-Russian Dzugashwili to this post would make the Bolshevik slogans even more acceptable to the non-Russian peoples. He had ready plans for the occupation of the Ukraine and other semi-independent countries but did not have the military might needed to crush their national Governments. Therefore, Lenin turned to the method of infiltrating destructive forces into the Ukraine in order to weaken its independence from within. The Bolsheviks were aware of the fact that, if the Ukraine remained independent, Soviet Russia would have tremendous difficulties in carrying out the plan of "liberation" of other countries in the future. Therefore, the declaration of the right of nations to self-determination, officially proclaimed by the Bolsheviks, proved to be valid only as long as it served the purpose of strengthening the Soviet regime. Once the Bolsheviks were in power, they openly demonstrated that between the policy of white and red Moscow toward the Ukraine there was little or no difference. Recognizing this fact, the formerly subjugated nations were even more determined to promote their liberation from Moscow. On November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian National Rada proclaimed independence by issuing the Third Universal. The Government still believed in an eventual federation with a free Russia, which would recognize Ukrainian independence and would abstain from interference in its internal affairs. This viewpoint was expressed in a note to the Allied powers.[11] Again, the Russian anti-Soviet political and military leaders refused to accept such

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10 Professor Masaryk, former President of the Czechoslovakian Republic and a well known authority on Russia, comments on the easy Bolshevik victory: "The way for Lenin's regime had been prepared by the Provisional Government and by Kerensky, both of whom showed administrative incapacity and entrusted wide spheres of action to bad and incompetent men. . . . Lenin was a logical consequence of Russian illogicality." *The Making of a State, Memories and Observances, 1914-1918* (London, 1927), p. 176.

11 On December 12, 1917, the Secretary of State for International Affairs of the Ukraine, Shulgin, despatched notes to the Allied powers informing them about the desire of the Ukrainian Government to enter into friendly relations with the free States as an independent power. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 650.

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a solution. At a later date, these anti-Soviet forces indirectly helped the Bolsheviks to remain in power.[12]

On December 17, 1917, Lenin dispatched an ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada in which he demanded: recognize the Soviet Government within forty-eight hours or take the consequences of an open war. With this action, the Soviet Government inaugurated the policy of "persuasion" by force. The Rada rejected the Soviet ultimatum in an answer on December 19, 1917, and urged the Ukrainian people to be prepared to defend their freedom.[13] The determination of the Ukrainian people to defend their liberty forced the Bolsheviks to change their tactics. They decided to postpone their open aggression and instead to appeal directly to the Ukrainian masses.

The Bolsheviks inspired a Congress of workers and peasants to meet at Kiev on December 18, 1917. Contrary to their expectations, a large majority of the delegates took an energetic stand for the right of the Rada to represent the Ukrainian people. Only 80 out of a total of 2,000 delegates supported the Bolsheviks. This small minority proceeded to Kharkov, where the Congress of Proletarians (radical elements from Donez Basin, mostly non-Ukrainians), was held. At the session of Decemer 27, 1917, this group proclaimed itself the "only representative body" of the Ukraine and issued an appeal for help to the Soviet Government of Russia. Two days later, the Sovnarcom welcomed, in a special resolution, this "new revolutionary Govern-

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12 In his report "On National Factors in Party and State Development" Stalin stated: "Do not forget such reserves as those constituted by the oppressed peoples, who remain silent, but whose very silence exerts pressure and decides much. This is often not felt, but these peoples live, they exist, and they must not be forgotten. Yes, Comrades, it is dangerous to forget them. Do not forget that if in the rear of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel and Yudenich we had not had the so-called 'aliens,' the oppressed people who disorganized the rear of these generals by their tacit sympathy for the Russian proletarians —comrades, this is a specific factor in our development, this tacit sympathy, which nobody hears or sees, but which decides everything—if it were not for this sympathy, we would not have nailed a single one of these generals. While we were advancing on them, their rear was disintegrating. Why? Because these generals depended on the colonizing elements among the Cossacks, they held out to the oppressed peoples the prospect of further oppression, and the oppressed people were therefore *forced* into our arms while we held aloft the banner of the liberation of these oppressed peoples. That is what decided the fate of these generals; those are the factors which, although thy are obscured by the victories of our armies, in the long run decided everything. This must not be forgotten." *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), Stenograficheskij otchet, April 17-25, 1923* (Glavpolitprosvet, Moscow, 1923), p. 455.

13 Both the Soviet ultimatum as well as the answer of the Ukrainian Government is cited in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918* (New York), pp. 437-438.

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648 668 ment" of the Ukraine and promised it unlimited help.[14] On December 29, 1917, the Red Army under command of former Tsarist Colonel Muraviov invaded the Ukrainian frontiers. The open war between Soviet-Russia and the Ukraine was a reality.[15]

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648 Despite many internal and external difficulties, the Ukrainian Government offered sufficient evidence that the people were capable of governing themselves and of defending their freedom. The Ukraine, by opposing and fighting Bolshevism—increasingly regarded as the new danger to civilization—won the sympathy of many free countries. On January 11, 1918, the French High Commissioner in Kiev, General Tabouis, was instructed by the French Government to accord in its name de-facto recognition of the Ukrainian Independent State. The British Government on January 12, 1918 delegated Bogge, its High Commissioner in Kiev, to wait only for the proper moment to recognize, together with other Allied powers, the Independence of the Ukraine. The United States also considered the recognition of the Ukrainian State after the American Consul General at Moscow informed the Secretary of State of the necessity for such a step.[16]

The Ukrainian Government's efforts to establish friendly relations with foreign countries caused the Bolsheviks to conclude that, despite their promises and changes in method, they were in no position to destroy the power of national revolutions in border countries. Lenin undoubtedly realized that in order to occupy the Ukraine, he must first make peace with external enemies. For this reason he hastened the armistice negotiations, already in progress, with the Central powers at Brest-Litovsk. During the previous negotiations the Soviet delegation, under Joffe's and later under Trotsky's leadership, entirely ignored the existence of an Ukrainian state. They acted as if the Russian delegates were the legal representatives not only of the Rus-

14 Stalin's article, "What is Ukrainian Rada?" *Pravda*, December 29 (15 old style), 1917.

15 At the time when Bolshevik forces terrorized and looted the people of the Ukraine, Stalin wrote: "The people of Russia should know, that the idea of invasion of a foreign territory is strange to the Russian revolution. All people should know, that in contrast to the imperialist policy of national oppression, the Soviet government practices the policy of total liberation." *Pravda*, December 31 (old style), 1917. Cf. J. V. Stalin, *Sotchineniya*, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 25.

16 *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia, op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 655-657.

15: Pap S-4.5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

sian but also of the Ukrainian people. This Soviet attitude reached Kiev, capitol of the Ukraine, at a time when Bolshevik forces were launching a new attack against the Ukraine with the goal of occupying Kiev at all cost. To combat the Soviet tactics at the peace Conference, the Central Rada immediately sent its plenipotentiaries to Brest-Litovsk. For ten days, the Ukrainian delegates demanded a place at the Conference table and were finally admitted to negotiations as an independent power on January 12, 1918. 648

In order to clarify the Ukraine's position in international relations as an independent state, the Central Rada on January 22, 1918 proclaimed total independence in the Fourth Universal.[17] On February 9, 1918, the plenipotentiaries concluded and signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers who officially recognized the sovereignty of the Ukraine.[18] Meanwhile, the Bolshevik forces succeeded in occupying large areas of the Ukraine, including Kiev.

On February 12, 1918, the Ukrainian Government formally requested the Central Powers to intervene and to help in driving out the Bolsheviks. As a result, German and Austrian armies entered the Ukraine and were welcomed by the population as liberators from Red terror and oppression. The swift advance of these forces on the whole front forced the Soviet Government in Petrograd to sign the previously-rejected peace treaty with the Central powers on March 10, 1918, the treaty in which the Bolsheviks also recognized the Ukrainian Independent State. The Ukrainian Government, having resumed full activity, trusted that the Central powers' military command would respect its independence and would not interfere in internal affairs. However, these expectations did not materialize. The Germans not only interterfered in the internal life but, gradually, conducted themselves as conquerors of the country. When the Central Rada protested against the open violation of the treaty by the occupation forces, the German Military command under General Eichorn dissolved the Ukrainian Government on April 26, 1918 and arrested the majority of its members.[19] Even the proclamation of General Pavlo Skoropadskyj as

17 The full text of the Fourth Universal is cited in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 444.

18 For a detailed story on the Brest-Litovsk Peace, see John W. Wheeler, *Brest-Litovsk, The Forgotten Peace* (New York, 1939).

19 For an official report on the Ukrainian-German conflicts as read by German Deputy Scheidemann in the Reichstag Committee in Berlin, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 684.

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

648 Hetman of the Ukraine (April 29, 1918) did not change the situation, since a large majority of the people considered him head of a puppet government created with the help of German bayonets and, therefore, subservient to German dictation.

After the defeat of the Central powers by the Western allies at the end of 1918, the German sponsored Government was replaced by a new Ukrainian Government called "Directorium" under the leadership of Simon Petliura. At the same time, the Soviet Government annulled the Brest-Litovsk treaty and ordered its military forces to enter the Ukraine. A new war between the Ukraine and Soviet Russia began. Since the Germans had prevented the formation of a Ukrainian army, the Bolsheviks were at an advantage. In desperation, Petliura made a last attempt to combat Bolshevik aggression by concluding a very unfavorable military alliance with the Polish Government under Pilsudski's leadership.[20] The advance of the United Polish-Ukrainian Army during the summer of 1920 was reversed by a Bolshevik counter offensive. As a result, the allied forces were driven out of the Ukraine. Subsequently, the Soviet and Polish Governments agreed, in the treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, to divide the Ukrainian territories between themselves.

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642 668 After the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, Bolsheviks formed an "independent" Soviet Ukrainian Government, the members of which, directly appointed by the Kremlin, were totally subordinated to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. At this time, Stalin was in a position to openly reveal the true meaning of the Bolshevik proclamations concerning the right of non-Russian nations to self-determination when he wrote:

> We are in favor of the separation of India, Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, and the other colonies from the entente, for here separation implies the liberation of these oppressed countries from Imperialism, thus undermining the position of Imperialism and strengthening the position of revolution. We are against the separation of the border regions from Russia since separation would here involve Imperialist servitude for the border regions, thus undermining the revolutionary power of Russia and strengthening the position of Imperialism.[21]

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20 Winston S. Churchill attached great importance to this alliance as is obvious from his book, *The Aftermath* (New York, 1929), pp. 277-278.

21 Stalin's preface to his "Sbornik statei," 1920. Cf. *Sotchineniya*, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 372.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

42 Art. 14. The Ukrainian SSR reserves the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Art. 15. The territory of the Ukrainian SSR may not be altered without its consent.

[40] Art. 15a. The Ukrainian SSR has its own Republican military formations.

[48] Art. 15b. The Ukrainian SSR has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

Art. 16. The laws of the USSR are binding within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

[41] Art. 17. Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a citizen of the USSR. Citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR equal rights with citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

63 Art. 18. The Ukrainian SSR consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Transcarpathian, Zaporozhye, Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltava, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumi, Ternopol, Kharkov, Kherson, Chernigov and Chernovitsi Regions.

Art. 19. The jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, embraces:

a) Adoption of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and control over its observance;

b) Submission of the formation of new regions constituting part of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for confirmation;

c) Establishment of the boundaries, and of the division into districts, of regions;

d) Legislation of the Ukrainian SSR;

e) Maintenance of public order and safeguarding the rights of citizens;

f) Approval of the national-economic plan of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Approval of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR and of the report on its fulfilment;

h) Determination of state and local taxes, imposts and non-tax revenues in conformity with the laws of the USSR;

i) Direction of the fulfilment of the local budgets of the regions;

j) Direction of insurance and savings;

k) Administration of the banks, industrial, agricultural and trading enterprises and organisations subordinate to the Republic, as well as direction of local industry;

l) Control and superintendence of the condition and administration of enterprises subordinate to the Union;

m) Establishment of the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests and waters;

n) Direction of dwelling houses and the municipal economy, dwelling house construction and the modernization of cities and other inhabited places;

o) Road building; direction of local transport and communications;

p) Labour legislation;

q) Direction of social maintenance;

r) Direction of elementary, secondary and higher education;

Moldavia

635 648 The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was created on August 2, 1940 by the decree of the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. This Republic consists of a part of the former Moldavian Autonomous S.S. Republic and of a section of Bessarabia incorporated into the Soviet Union. [131 161] The creation of this new Union Republic decreased the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 3,900 square kilometres and a population of 310,000 persons[1].

The Transcarpathian Ukraine[2]

728 In June 1945 an agreement was signed in Moscow between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic that the Transcarpathian Ukraine "...which on the basis of a pact of September 10, 1919, concluded at St.Germain-en-Laye, entered the Czechoslovak Republic with the rank of an Autonomous Republic, will, according to the wish manifested by the population of the Carpatho-Ukraine and on the basis of the friendly agreement of both high contracting parties, unite with its longstanding motherland, the Ukraine, and is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The frontier between Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine, existing since September 29, 1938, will, with modifications described, become the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic..."

Article II of the protocol appended to the Pact said that:

"Persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality living in Czechoslovak territory have the right to opt for Soviet citizenship until January 1, 1946... Czech and Slovak nationals residing or having their permanent domicile in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine have the right to opt for Czechoslovak nationality during the time until January 1, 1946".[3]

131 311 On January 1, 1935, the area of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 12,617 square kilometres. In 1937 about half of this was covered by forests and woods; roughly 239,000 hectares were arable, and about 328,000 hectares were devoted to vineyards, market gardens, and permanent meadows and pastures.

161 As at December 1, 1930, the population of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 725,357, an increase of nearly 121,000 over February 1921.[4]

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1 Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S.Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

2 Called by the Czechs, Sub-Carpathian Rus, or Carpatho-Ukraine.

3 New York Times quoted by Voices of History (1945-46), Gramercy Publishing Company, New York.

4 Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovak Republic, London.

727 first visited Kremenchug, they reported it as over 90 per cent.
361 destroyed. "About 50,000 inhabitants have returned and are living
362 in dugouts, cellars, and rubble shacks. Reconstruction is progressing slowly because of the shortage of materials. The only industries operating are a small machine shop for bridge repair parts, a textile factory, and one wing of a cigarette factory which happened to escape destruction. One bakery is being repaired... All grain elevators and flour mills, which constituted the chief pre-war industry, are completely destroyed."

Poltava (Population in 1939: 130,305).

In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission reported Poltava about 80 per cent. destroyed. "About 100,000 of the inhabitants have returned and are living under conditions only slightly better than Kremenchug. On the main street only one building is intact. The Mayor estimated that reconstruction would take at least fifteen years. The locomotive repair shop and a stocking factory are the only industries operating two years after liberation."

Other Cities

In Zaporozhie (population in 1939: 289,188) 75 per cent. of the homes and virtually all industry were destroyed[1]. Stalino, the industrial and mining centre of the Donets Basin, has been described as a shadow of its former self. Its pre-war population was 510,000. During the war about 100,000 of the people were driven into slavery by the Germans. Another 80,000 men, women, and children were thrust into one of the mines to die. Seventy-five per cent. of all the buildings in the city were destroyed; and of these only 30 per cent. were in a condition to be restored. All the mines in the area were flooded; and from one pit alone over 3,300,000 tons of water had been pumped by August 1946[2].

The Ukraine's Application for UNRRA Assistance

727 In the summer of 1945 the government of the U.S.S.R. transmitted
648 to the Director General of UNRRA a request for assistance in rehabilitating
457 those areas of the Soviet Union which had suffered most heavily because of the war and the German occupation. In August 1945 at the Third Session of the UNRRA Council, the Soviet delegate strongly requested that 700 million U.S. dollars be allocated for relief work in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Republics. At the same Council Session the applications of Byelorussia and the Ukraine for membership in UNRRA were unanimously accepted, and the two republics were requested to send delegates to the Third Council meetings.

In December 1945 agreements were signed between UNRRA and the governments of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics providing for

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1 UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

2 Soviet News, London, August 22, 1946.

727 relief and rehabilitation supplies to be delivered until such time as
459 the two republics would be able themselves to pay with suitable means
648 of foreign exchange for their own imports[1].

727 The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement provided for a programme of supplies
439 amounting to 188 million U.S. dollars (approximately five dollars per head
648 of population), to be used for food, clothing, medical, agricultural, and industrial supplies. The agreement stipulated that UNRRA would attempt to deliver the bulk of these supplies to the Ukraine before June 30, 1946; however, because of procurement and transport difficulties, this early completion of the programme proved impossible. On May 30, 1946, therefore, the UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was extended to the end of 1946.

The schedule of supplies to be shipped has changed somewhat since the original programme was decided. As it now exists, about 53 per cent. (by value) of the total supplies are foodstuffs; 27 per cent. industrial supplies, and nearly 9 per cent. clothing. Supplies for the rehabilitation of agriculture will amount to 17,088,000 dollars, the greater part of which has been allocated for seeds. The following table shows by value the UNRRA programme of supplies for the Ukraine, as at March 21, 1947. A more detailed summary will follow in later sections of this report.

TABLE - III

UNRRA Programme of Supplies to the Ukrainian S.S.R.
(thousand U.S. dollars)

Food, feed, soap	100,189
Clothing, textiles, footwear	16,856
Medical and sanitation supplies	2,326
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591
Total	188,050

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

In March 1946 a small UNRRA Mission arrived in the Ukraine and established headquarters at Kiev. In subsequent months, some of the mission members have made many visits to various parts of the republic in order to observe the distribution of UNRRA supplies. They report that gigantic efforts are being made to restore the economy, but emphasize the discouraging fact that UNRRA assistance with machinery and other rehabilitation supplies is small in comparison with the tremendous destruction everywhere. The main UNRRA contribution has

1 UNRRA aid to Byelorussia will be dealt with in a future paper.

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439 been food supplies, which in many Ukrainian towns constituted the only
648 food to be seen in shops in 1946. For fats and oils particularly the Ukrainian population has been entirely dependent on UNRRA aid.

The U.S.S.R.'s Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

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648 UNRRA assistance to the Ukraine has been of necessity limited in scope and short-term in nature. Long after relief shipments are ended - and they are now all but complete - the Ukraine will still be working to rebuild its factories, cities, and farms. The main task of rehabilitation is therefore a long-term one, and depends upon long-range measures.

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185 On March 18, 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted a Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, for the rehabilitation and development of the national economy of the Soviet Union. This plan is the fourth of a series of Five-Year Plans[1] designed to increase the productivity of Soviet farming and industry, and in general to raise the standard of living of the whole population. As stated by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the principal aims of the Five-Year Plan in 1946-50 are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of the country, to recover the pre-war level in industry and agriculture, and then considerably to surpass that level.

[652] The new Five-Year Plan provides that nearly one-third of the capital investments for the entire Soviet Union in 1946-50 (49,500 million roubles out of a total of 250,300)[2] are to be spent on the restoration of the Ukraine. Of this 49,500 million, 5,469 million will be used for works under the Ukrainian Republic's jurisdiction.

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727 In the next five years all the destroyed cities of the Ukraine - particularly Kiev, Kharkov, Chernigov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, Stalino,
362 and Zaporozhie - are to be rebuilt and their municipal services restored. Housing is to be replaced as speedily as possible; in 1946-50, 175,120,000 square feet of state-owned housing are to be built, of which 12.65 million square feet are to be made available by local Soviets. The amount of privately owned housing to be built before 1950 is fixed at 36.3 million square feet.

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185 Also under the Five-Year Plan Ukrainian agriculture is to be rehabilitated; the crop area for 1950 is planned at 30.5 million hectares. By 1950 the Ukraine is scheduled to be producing about 20 per cent. of the grain harvested in the U.S.S.R. (approximately the same tonnage as in pre-war years); 60 per cent. of the sugar beet (about 6 per cent. more than pre-war); and the potato harvest is fixed for 23 million tons, 1½ millions more than in 1940.

000 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport

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1 First Five-Year Plan, 1929-32; second, 1933-37; third, 1938-42.

2 Estimated at 1945 prices.

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Nevertheless, the 1945 harvest - assisted by lend-lease supplies which were still then available, and (beginning in December 1945) by UNRRA relief deliveries - was furnishing the population a fair amount of cereals and bread. There was, however, very little meat from domestic sources, and only a small amount of fats and oils, as the following table shows.

TABLE XII

Ukraine: Production and Utilization of Fats and Oils, 1945.
(thousand metric tons)

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Oilseeds		
Production		
Total production of oilseeds		496.4
Deduction for seed		53.6
Available for processing		442.8
Utilization		
388 Total production of oil		105.8
Deduction for industrial use (soap manufacture, etc.)		26.7
Available for human consumption		
by urban population	29.0	
by rural population	50.0	
Total		79.1
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
urban population		2.41
rural population		1.86
Average		1.98

433 As the table shows, the Ukrainian people received in 1945 only 4
262 to 5 kilograms of fats - 8 to 18 kilograms less than their pre-war
388 annual consumption rate.

Disaster in 1946

433 Early in 1946 other UNRRA supplies in addition to food began to
241 arrive - seeds, small quantities of fertilizers, and a few farm tools.
648 Throughout the Ukraine great efforts were being made for a successful spring sowing. However, there were still shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, and machinery. None of the 1,600 tractors promised by UNRRA had arrived. Much of the work was still being done by hand, especially where no draught animals were available.

[311] Even despite these drawbacks, it is estimated that about 80 per cent. of the pre-war area was sown; but no figures are available on the acreage planted to individual crops. In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission, describing the difficulties in getting detailed agricultural statistics, stated:

> "....During a recent inspection trip we were informed by the agricultural authorities of the Poltava oblast,[1] one of the best agricultural regions in the Ukraine, that they did not even try to set production goals for their collective farms this year (1946); they simply told each farm to plant as much as possible of whatever crops it could raise with the seed, equipment, draught animals, and manpower available. (For example) We believe that nobody really knows with any degree of accuracy what acreage was planted to oil seeds in the Ukraine this year, what yield may be expected, or how much of the resulting oil will be available for non-farm use."

433 The Ukrainian people set high hopes on the 1946 harvest. However,
241 in the very summer when a good crop would have made all the difference,
648 the greatest drought since 1891 destroyed their prospects. It affected a vast area from Moldavia to the Urals, south to the Kuban and north to Moscow. The earth was parched; and the crops, burnt by the hot summer sun, had little to draw upon because rain and snowfall in the winter of 1945-46 had been poor. Hopes withered with the wheat. The potato crop too was affected: a hot wind out of Asia dried the plants, and dwarfed the tubers.

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1 Oblast: a district similar, for administrative purposes, to a county.

IV UNRRA ASSISTANCE TO THE UKRAINE

Distribution of UNRRA Supplies

648 731 UNRRA supplies for the Ukraine are handed over to the government at the port of entry (usually Odessa on the Black Sea); and the government is then responsible for arranging distribution.

648 731 647 Like most other countries receiving UNRRA help, the Ukrainian Government has established a special organization to supervise the reception, warehousing, and distribution of all UNRRA goods received. This organization - which has on its staff specialists in food, industrial equipment, agricultural rehabilitation, food processing machinery, medical supplies, transport, accounting and distribution - is called the Department of UNRRA Supplies, and is directly responsible to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

The Department (headed by Mr. V.V. Khomyak) works in close liaison with the various ministries of the Ukrainian Government, and with the UNRRA Mission. On the basis of decisions made by the particular ministries concerned, it draws up plans for the distribution of UNRRA supplies and keeps a central record of their sales and of the proceeds expended by the government for further relief projects.

554 648 731 Most UNRRA shipments for both the Ukraine and Byelorussia have arrived through the port of Odessa; and since early 1946 an UNRRA officer has been stationed there to handle problems connected with delivery. Before an UNRRA shipment comes in, the authorities at Odessa are notified of the ship's name, its expected time of arrival, and the nature of its cargo. As soon as possible after the ship lands, discharging of cargo begins. Stevedoring labour is supplied by the port commander's service organization, "Inflot", which also furnishes checkers to work in the ship's hold and on the docks, counting the supplies and reporting any damaged goods. As the cargo is unloaded, perishable items, such as clothing and cheese, are placed in warehouses on the docks, and seeds in a warehouse in the suburbs of Odessa. Packaged goods, such as canned meat, army rations, and juices, are piled on the dock at shipside and finally into freight cars.

648 731 Directives for the distribution of the supplies (based upon decisions of the recipient ministries concerned) are issued by the Department of UNRRA Supplies to the Ministry of Foreign Trade representative in Odessa, whose office then instructs the railroad and barge authorities, providing such information as the name and location of the organization or governmental authority receiving the supplies, and a description of the goods to be delivered.

[554] UNRRA relief supplies are either sold to individual ration-card or permit holders, or distributed to collectives, co-operatives, and other

648 731 [657] enterprises; and in accordance with the provisions of the UNRRA agreement, the Ukrainian Government uses the proceeds for further relief and rehabilitation work within the country. Food and soap supplies for example are sold through regular trade channels to ration-card holders, or are delivered to organizations which use them for factory or community feeding. Clothing also is sold in stores against ration cards, or in the case of workers having a high rate of clothing and shoe consumption, against special orders. Used clothing is distributed free of charge to invalids of the war, families of war dead, pensioners, or other recipients of social welfare. Medical supplies and equipment are transferred free of charge to the Ministry of Health. The distribution of agricultural and industrial equipment varies depending upon the nature of the supplies. Consumable items, such as seeds, jute, bagging, rope and industrial raw materials, are sold to collectives, state farms, co-operatives, or industrial enterprises. Capital equipment such as tractors, food processing machinery, or power generators is delivered free of charge to the recipient ministries or their subsidiary distribution organizations. Tractors in particular are delivered in this way to state-owned Machine Tractor Stations.

Proceeds of Sale of UNRRA Supplies

648 731 652 Up to March 1, 1947, the sale of UNRRA supplies in the Ukraine had provided the government with 3,166,482,000 roubles[1] for additional relief and rehabilitation work in the Republic. Roughly 85 per cent. of this total resulted from sales of UNRRA food; 6 per cent. from the sale of clothing; and 9 per cent. from the sale of miscellaneous raw materials and agricultural supplies.

Of the cumulative proceeds up to March 1, about 21 million roubles had been used to pay the expenses of distribution, and 823,511 roubles had been spent to provide goods and services to the UNRRA Mission. Of the balance then remaining available (3,144,655,500), nearly half had been used for rehabilitation work at the Republican (state) level of government; 1,324,239,000 roubles had been transferred to regional executive committees (the next level of government) for expenditure on local projects; and about 391 million roubles in cash was still available for future use.

State Relief and Rehabilitation Projects

652 657 At the state level rehabilitation work carried on from the beginning of UNRRA deliveries up to March 1, 1947, amounted to 1,429,060,000 roubles, and was divided among four main categories; rehabilitation of the national economy, 74 per cent. of the total state-level expenditures; health services, 14 per cent.; children's institutions and schools, 11 per cent.; and social welfare, 1 per cent.

Rehabilitation of the National Economy. These expenditures are administered by the various ministries having productive capital works

[1] 21.36 roubles equals one pound sterling; 5.40 roubles equals one U.S. dollar (March 1947).

652 under their jurisdiction. For example, capital works, repairs,
657 and equipment for livestock raising centres, piggeries, cattle sheds, slaughterhouses and refrigerators (under the Ministry of Cattle Breeding); vineyards, orchards, repairs of irrigation facilities (under the Ministry of Technical Agricultural Production); repairs to barns and agricultural implements (under the Ministry of Agriculture); and rehabilitation of the brick and ceramic industry (under the Ministry of Home Construction).

Health Services. These expenditures are administered by the Ministry of Health, and include the feeding of patients, and repairs and equipment for hospitals and health service agencies.

[658] Children's Institutions (over four years) and Schools. These expenditures are handled by the Ministry of Education, and include the feeding of children; and capital works, repairs and equipment for schools and children's homes.

Social Welfare Services Directed towards the Betterment of General Well-being. These expenditures are administed by the Ministry of Social Welfare and include such services as repairs and maintenance of social welfare agencies, and assistance to invalids.

Local Rehabilitation

648 As at March 1, 1947, about 41 per cent. of the gross proceeds of
727 UNRRA sales had been transferred to regional executive committees of
185 the government for use in the local and district economy. The local
731 projects - which are undertaken after approval by the state authorities and are subject to regular reporting and inspection - are similar in character to those carried out by the Republican Government Ministries. However, there is a considerable shift in emphasis. For example, at the regional level, nearly 57 per cent. of the total proceeds at their disposal was utilized for health services (hospitals, nurseries), 35 per cent. for children's institutions, 5 per cent. for repairs of public and industrial institutions, and 2 per cent. for the building of schools and repair of clubs.

Deliveries of UNRRA Supplies

648 In the original agreement between UNRRA and the Ukrainian Govern-
731 ment was a provision that the Administration would "strive within the limits of its resources" to procure and deliver the Ukraine's share of relief and rehabilitation supplies before July 1, 1946. In the early months of 1946, however, it became clear that procurement difficulties and transport hold-ups would prevent a great part of the supplies from being delivered in time. The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was therefore extended to the end of 1946.

From December 1945, (when UNRRA deliveries to the Ukraine began) up to June 30, 1946, (the time at which they were originally scheduled

648 731 to end) only 202,585 gross long tons of UNRRA supplies had arrived in the Ukraine. These consisted mainly of foodstuffs (three-fourths of the entire tonnage); while slightly less than one-tenth was made up of clothing, textiles and footwear; and 67 tons were medical equipment. Despite the urgent need of agricultural and industrial supplies, only 15,336 and 13,249 tons respectively had reached the Ukraine by the end of June.

By the end of January 1947, UNRRA shipments to the Ukraine from all sources amounted to 407,125 gross long tons; and the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine reported that 372,796 tons of this had reached Soviet [504] ports. Delays in shipments during December and January were greater than usual because the port of Odessa for the first time in many years was frozen over, and ships lay icebound for days.

The following table shows UNRRA shipments in comparison with the programme.

TABLE XXII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Programme (thousand U.S. dollars)	Shipments to January 31, 1946 (thousand U.S. dollars)	(gross long tons)
Food, feed, soap	100,189	94,587	287,519
Clothing, textiles, and footwear	16,856	16,801	15,095
Medical and sanitation	2,326	1,858	373
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088	14,403	29,070
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591	34,077	75,068
Totals	188,050	161,726	407,125

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Industrial Rehabilitation Supplies

731 48 433 As the table shows, 75,068 gross long tons of the total supplies shipped by January 31 were industrial rehabilitation equipment. These supplies have, however, been extremely slow in arriving. Up to the end of June 1946 only 13,249 gross long tons had reached the Ukraine, including United States army surplus equipment of about 20 electric power stations and generators, as well as some raw materials, chiefly rubber, tin, lead, copper and other metals, and welding electrodes. A small number of machines for use in automobile repair shops, and about 90 motor cars and trucks had also arrived; but the slow delivery of machinery to transport materials and process building equipment was a serious defect, since much of the rubble of war damage had been cleared away, and the lack of such supplies was a hindrance to

731 648 433 rebuilding. Between July 1, 1946, and January 31, 1947, however, another 38,744 tons of industrial supplies arrived, bringing the deliveries up to 51,993 gross long tons.

The following table shows the composition of all industrial supplies shipped to the Ukraine by the end of January 1947

TABLE XXIII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Industrial Equipment up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Transport and telecommunications	620	949
Public utilities	18,975	27,451
Building repair equipment	5,030	3,209
Machine repair equipment	1,041	527
Miscellaneous consumer goods	307	97
Materials, chemicals, engineering stores	7,930	42,684
	174	151
Totals	34,077	75,068

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Many of the metals which have been received are being used in canning factories or in the manufacture of household utensils and dishes. Pipe supplies (the first shipments of which arrived in December) are being used to replace destroyed water and gas mains. Canvas tarpaulin has been distributed for use in mines and on the farms of the Ukraine. Although these supplies have unquestionably filled some of the needs, the UNRRA Mission reports that the quantities are too small and the task of reconstruction too great for them to make much impact.

About one-third of the industrial rehabilitation programme for the Ukraine consists of so-called "protocol" supplies - that is certain items of industrial equipment which in a previous trade agreement the United Kingdom had contracted to furnish to the Soviet Union. After UNRRA assumed responsibility in the Ukraine and Byelorussia, negotiations commenced for the transfer of this equipment through UNRRA. About the middle of 1946 arrangements were concluded; and it was agreed that UNRRA would take over and deliver these "protocol" supplies as part of the industrial rehabilitation programme. Similarly, UNRRA became financially responsible for those "protocol" supplies which had already been delivered to the Soviet Union for use in Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

By March 1, 1947, about 16,720,000 dollars' worth of "protocol"

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433 supplies had been shipped to the Ukraine; remaining "protocol" ship-
648 ments to the Ukraine are expected to amount to 923 tons and 784,617 dollars.

Included in these supplies are power stations, pumps, portable cranes, presses, electric locomotives, and electrical and telephone equipment.

Agricultural Supplies

731 The greater part of the tonnage in agricultural supplies consisted
241 of seeds; by January 31, 1947, 15,669 gross long tons had been shipped.
648 Most of these seeds had arrived in the spring of 1946; however, some of the bags were inadequately labelled, and the contents not easily identifiable. Because of this difficulty the seeds had to be given costly and time-consuming laboratory tests, which delayed distribution. At the same time, 2,600 tons of seeds were reported by the Ukrainian Government to be either diseased or infested with weeds, and therefore unfit for sowing. Negotiations are still in process for the replacement of these defective seeds by suitable types.

[407] As at the end of 1946 the amount of farm machinery which had arrived was small. For example, the UNRRA programme calls for the delivery of 1,600 tractors to the Ukraine, but only 310 had been received by December 31, and these came too late for autumn ploughing. They are being distributed to state owned Machine Tractor Stations for use this spring.

UNRRA shipments have also included 6,692 tons of bagging, 2,090 tons of fishing equipment, and 244 tons of dairy equipment. These are shown in the following table, which summarises agricultural rehabilitation shipments to the end of January.

TABLE XXIV

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Agricultural Supplies up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Bagging	1,672	6,692
Farm machinery	1,517	2,941
Fishing equipment	651	2,090
Food processing equipment	551	1,122
Repair material and hand tools		312
Seeds	9,861	15,669
Dairy and poultry equipment	151	244
Totals	14,403	29,070

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington

Medical Supplies

731 The UNRRA medical and sanitation programme for the Ukraine is
758 extremely small in relation to the needs; and the rate of deliveries
648 has been the poorest of any commodity group.

Up to the end of January 1947 the Administration had shipped to the Ukraine 373 gross long tons of medical and sanitation equipment valued at 1,858,000 dollars, leaving a balance still to be shipped of just over 468,000 dollars.

In a country where the destruction has been so great and where food supplies are so low, a medical programme of 2,326,000 dollars cannot make much impression; however, such equipment as has been received is being used to the best possible advantage.

743 Most of the hospitals and invalids' homes in the Ukraine are operating under appalling difficulties; and the urgency of the need for equipment and medical supplies is everywhere evident. The UNRRA Mission early in 1946 described several hospitals which they had visited in various parts of the Ukraine. Here is their observation of the one at Kremenchug:

"Kremenchug formerly had a good 450-bed general hospital, which was blown up by a thoroughly efficient demolition battalion when the Germans retreated. All equipment, including an 8,000-volume medical library and a well-equipped X-ray laboratory, was demolished. The only buildings which escaped destruction were seven small sheds and storage houses on the outskirts of the hospital grounds.

"The hospital staff recently installed 250 beds in these ramshackle buildings. In a number of wards the windows were bricked up because no glass is available, and the only light came from an unshaded 40-watt electric bulb in the corridor. Paint was flaking off the floor and the walls of the surgery; most of the roofs leaked, there were no indoor toilets; fuel was available to heat only the operating and delivery rooms and the nursery. (Four babies, on an average, are delivered each
743 day). Many of the patients had no gowns and no bed clothes, except
758 what they were able to bring with them. No soap whatever has been available to the hospital for some time; laundry was simply being boiled with a little soda, and the floors were scrubbed with a lye solution. The only surgical equipment we saw was a few dozen scalpels and haemostats in one small cabinet in the corner of the operating room, and two sterilizers.

"The doctor in charge told us that his patients received an average diet of 1,000 to 1,200 calories a day, consisting mostly of bread, potatoes, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of fat. (The low calorie intake is largely due to the inability of the patients to digest the coarse whole-grain rye or wheat bread, which is available in reasonable quantities). Theoretically the hospital is entitled to 2,500 grams

743 758 of meat daily for each thirty patients; but, since there is rarely any meat to be had, it received 400 grams of dried milk as a substitute, or approximately 13 grams per patient each day.

"The hospital was so badly overcrowded that beds had been set up in the corridors and even in the yard. Some of these beds had been salvaged from the ruins of the old hospital, and consequently were badly twisted and charred."

The same general conditions prevailed in most of the hospitals visited. The fact that so much improvement has since been made with so little help promises the best use of future deliveries of UNRRA medical supplies. The programme includes in addition to dressings, drugs and chemicals, X-ray equipment and supplies, surgical instruments, dental equipment, and a penicillin plant.

Clothing

291 [294] 148 731 Since most of the Ukraine's clothing factories were heavily damaged or destroyed in the war, there is a widespread shortage of all articles of wearing apparel. The limited UNRRA programme has fallen considerably short of satisfying all the requirements; however, such supplies as have been sent - particularly textiles and shoes - have been economically used to help the most critical cases.

By the end of January 1947 UNRRA had sent the Ukraine 15,095 gross long tons of clothing valued at 16,801 dollars, leaving an unshipped balance of 55,000 dollars. The following table gives the composition of the shipments.

TABLE XXV

UNRRA Shipments of Clothing to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Finished clothing	779	384
Blankets and comforters	902	522
Cotton textiles	573	321
Woollen textiles	3,487	1,359
Raw wool	2,240	3,729
Footwear	5,697	3,997
Upper leather	575	259
Sole leather	1,274	1,626
Hides	188	381
Miscellaneous textiles	183	149
Miscellaneous footwear	735	2,368
Unclassified	168	n.a.
Totals	16,801	15,095

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

291 In addition to these items, UNRRA has delivered several thousand
731 tons of used clothing and footwear contributed through voluntary
relief organizations in other countries. Most of the contributed
648 supplies are distributed to war invalids or to orphans of the war.

The thousands of pairs of shoes delivered by UNRRA, as well as shoes made in the Ukraine from UNRRA leather, are sold according to a rationing system, with miners and heavy industry workers receiving highest priority. Textiles (also rationed) are sold as piece goods, or are made into garments in Ukrainian workshops for sale to permit holders. UNRRA blankets and comforters are distributed chiefly to hospitals and childrens' homes; and hides and other materials furnished by UNRRA are used in the construction of orthopædic footwear or artificial limbs for wounded veterans.

Food Supplies

731 When the UNRRA Mission first arrived in the Ukraine, no data
241 were available on the republic's exact food situation. The 1945
433 crops sown in a reduced area, under great difficulties of seed,
262 fertilizer, and implement shortages, had yielded only a fraction of pre-war harvests. It was expected, however, that Ukrainian farms would produce enough grain to supply the population with bread and cereals until the 1946-47 harvest. UNRRA food supplies were therefore calculated to provide chiefly meats, fats (or equivalents in the form of army rations), and dairy products.

731 Altogether, UNRRA planned to use 100 million dollars of the
262 Ukrainian budget for food. By the end of January 1947, all but
648 5½ million dollars of this had been shipped, as is shown in the following table.

TABLE XXVI

UNRRA Food Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Grain and grain products	548	3,836
Meat and meat products	30,682	54,245
Fish	4,166	23,240
Dairy products	13,378	33,134
Fats, oils, soap	12,725	41,885
Pulses	615	4,658
Beverages	1,490	3,437
Soup- dehydrated	2,835	9,392
Quartermaster food	27,134	109,055
Other food	206	548
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture surpluses	808	3,689
Totals	94,587	287,519

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

645 744 262 (a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

241 727 The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

731 649 262 UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

S.U. 563 635 UK 698 175 Soviet Russia has often followed in the footsteps of Czarist Russia, but as far as the appraisal of the Ukraine is concerned there is no continuity between old and new Russia. Czarist Russia simply denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation and denounced all Ukrainian national feeling as 'South Russian separatism'. Soviet policy, on the other hand, has encouraged Ukrainian nationalism in as far as it was able to serve Russia's territorial expansion. The most spectacular territorial advance which the Soviet Union has made since 1939 was that realized under the slogan 'unification of all Ukrainian lands in one national State'. In the course of this unification the Soviet Union not only re-annexed territories which Russia had lost in the Civil War but also occupied territories which had ceased to be 'Russian' ever since the Middle Ages, such as Eastern Galicia with the city of Lvov.

UK. [101] There cannot be the slightest doubt about the existence of a Ukrainian nation which some Russian nationalists tried to deny in the past, but it would be a mistake to consider the Ukrainians, despite their numbers, as a nation equal in character to the French, Italians, Spaniards, etc., as the extremists among the Ukrainian nationalists would like to represent it. The Ukrainians cannot claim to be historically and culturally a nation so complete that they could afford to cut themselves loose from their Russian neighbours and exist without them.

All foreign invaders fighting Russia had illusions in this respect; they all believed in a separation of Ukraine and Muscovy and conducted their political warfare accordingly. The Swedish King, Charles XII, allied himself with the Ukrainian Cossack Hetman Mazeppa; Napoleon came to Russia with the project of a Ukrainian State, 'Napoleonide', cutting Russia off from the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. The Third Reich of Adolf Hitler also tried to play up the Ukrainian issue against Great Russia.

'LITTLE RUSSIA' AND 'NEW RUSSIA'

UK. 101 186 538 There is every justification in the demand for a genuinely autonomous Ukraine but there is no logic and no life in an anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalist ideology. Neither Russian and Ukrainian history, nor the area of Russian and Ukrainian settlement, nor even Russian and Ukrainian literature can be separated from each other. Gogol, for instance, who wrote in Russian only, can be claimed by the Ukrainians not only because he was born in 'Little Russia', as the Ukraine used to be called in Czarist times, but also because some of his great works are devoted to his homeland, including the most Ukrainian literary work *Taras Bulba*. The Ukrainians have failed to produce any Ukrainian-writing poet or writer who even approximates to the importance of a Gogol.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

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There was hardly any other territory on the Russian border where the Soviet régime stood such an excellent chance of exploiting social grievances and the discontent of oppressed minorities as in Eastern Poland. Yet the Ukrainians and Byelorussians of Eastern Poland, who according to all logical calculations were bound to become a natural prey to Soviet propaganda, turned away from Russia in protest against compulsory collectivization, political purges and anti-religious propaganda.

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The sympathies which the Soviet Union enjoyed among the poor peasantry of the Western Ukraine in the first years after the October Revolution had almost completely died out by the end of the twenties. Moscow could not even rely on its own 'Communist Party of the Western Ukraine' which frequently took its lead from the anti-Russian 'national deviationists' in the Soviet Ukraine. When the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine split at the beginning of 1928 into 'loyal communists' and Ukrainian nationalists, the latter, led by Vasilkov, had the majority in the Central Committee. The Vasilkov group, said the Comintern organ, *Communist International*, 'was consciously counter-revolutionary and carried out wrecking work and provocations'.[9]

The Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had hardly been reorganized when several party groups again fell victims to Ukrainian anti-Soviet nationalism. In 1935 the official Comintern organ complained about the absence of 'a national liberation struggle on a large scale in both the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia', meaning, of course, a pro-Soviet national liberation struggle.[10]

In 1938 the Comintern journal was forced to admit that the nationalist anti-Soviet organization U.N.D.O., which stood for Ukrainian autonomy inside Poland, was backed by broad masses of the people of the Western Ukraine and that the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had not succeeded 'in penetrating the organizations of Ukrainian nationalists'. The Western Ukrainian Communist Party finally found itself compelled to exchange its demand for self-determination for a demand for autonomy which had been originally branded as a 'bourgeois counter-revolutionary slogan'.[11]

The full extent of the political defeat suffered by Soviet Russia and Comintern propaganda in the Western Ukraine can be realized if one takes into account the active persecution which the Polish authorities conducted against Ukrainian nationalism, the punitive expeditions which they carried out against recalcitrant Ukrainian villages and the almost total disregard of the Polish Government for the cultural needs of the Polish Ukrainians. All these hardships which the Ukrainians of Poland suffered in the inter-war period were insufficient to promote any major co-operation between them and the Soviet régime.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

186 Maxim Rilsky*, were dismissed in November 1946. Rilsky, one of the
661 most outstanding poets of the Soviet Ukraine, was charged with being a
538 'prisoner of bourgeois nationalism'. He had not only 'sinned' in his works but he had also delivered a particularly objectionable lecture, 'Kiev in the history of the Ukraine', in which he 'idealized the old patriarchal order and depicted in rosy idyllic colours the conditions under the rule of landowners and bourgeois'. Together with Rilsky a whole group of Ukrainian writers was accused of nationalism, 'Khvylovy-ism' and reactionary tendencies, including I. Senchenko, Y. Yanovsky and P. Panch.[21]

Maxim Rilsky was replaced as president of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers by A. Y. Korneichuk, author of a large number of political plays, who had always accurately interpreted the party line and had earned nothing but praise from the supreme Soviet leadership. It was Korneichuk's task to lead Ukrainian literature on the road of strict Soviet Patriotism and 'Socialist Realism'. Indeed, Ukrainian writers, publishing houses and literary journals became more careful and it appeared during a certain period as if Korneichuk had really succeeded in his assignment. The 'Festival of Ukrainian Art and Literature' held in Moscow in June 1951 showed, however, that this was a deception. The festival gave the members of the Bolshevik Politbureau an opportunity of getting a closer look at Ukrainian cultural life. They found that Ukrainian authors and artists had still not overcome their ideological mistakes. Even Korneichuk himself who was expected to give a good example to his fellow-writers had committed a serious offence. He had written a libretto for the opera 'Bogdan Khmelnitsky', which, from the official point of view, was not sufficiently anti-Polish and not eloquent
[626] enough in its pro-Russian bias. Through its mouthpiece, *Pravda*, the Politbureau not only denounced Korneichuk and other writers for ideological distortions but also reprimanded the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party for having neglected the political education of the Ukrainian intellectual élite. The Ukrainian Central Committee, mindful of what had happened to the Ukrainian Communist leaders in the thirties, immediately pledged itself to remedy the situation.[22]

THE UKRAINE AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET 'WORLD POLITICS'

648 After having fulfilled its original mission of bringing all Ukrainian lands
645 into the fold of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ukraine was given a new task.

* Rilsky, like most great poets of the Soviet Ukraine, has a 'nationalistic past'. In 1934 he and another poet laureate of the Ukraine, Pavel Tychina, were rebuked for their 'hesitation' in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to them. Yet another contemporary Ukrainian poet, Mikola Bazhan, who is not only like Tychina a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet but also a Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Government, used to be likewise blamed for the 'nationalistic soil in which his creations have been rooted'.[23]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

She was to serve Soviet diplomacy in the wider international arena. UK. 648
The turning point in the mission of the Ukraine came early in 1944 645
with the setting up of a Ukrainian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Ukrainian Foreign Office came into being under the decree of S.U.
February 1st, 1944, providing for the establishment of People's Commis- 635
sariats (later Ministries) for Foreign Affairs in all the sixteen Soviet 648
Republics. It was clear, however, that this decree, despite its general character, had the primary object of giving the Ukraine a new formal status in international affairs. To a much lesser extent this was true regarding Byelorussia, whilst little practical use was made of the foreign offices of the other Soviet Republics.

For a short while the real meaning of the creation of a Ukrainian and of a Byelorussian Foreign Office was not quite clear. At first it looked as if the central Government intended to make a real concession to the two Soviet Republics which had so heavily suffered by the war. The impression was confirmed by a statement of the veteran Ukrainian Bolshevik, Dimitry Manuilsky. Speaking in his capacity as Ukrainian Foreign Minister he announced in 1945 that the Ukrainian S.S.R. was 'ready at any time to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with any country'. Addressing over 400 foreign journalists, at a press conference in San Francisco, Manuilsky added that the Ukrainian Government would 'consider with gratitude any proposals by other States with regard to foreign relations'.[24] Soon after this statement had been made the Kremlin apparently regretted its generous gesture and the Ukraine was not allowed to establish consular and diplomatic missions abroad. A British offer to exchange consular representatives between the United Kingdom and the Ukrainian S.S.R. was turned down.

While the Ukraine is not supposed to have consuls and diplomats she UK.
has been encouraged to send delegates to international conferences [648]
and to the United Nations. These delegates do not defend the interests of even a communist Ukrainian State, but only those of the centralized Soviet Empire. The Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations has frequently been ordered to effect this or that tactical move whenever the delegation of the U.S.S.R. desired to remain in the background.

NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE UKRAINE

During the inter-war period the Ukrainian S.S.R. was still a multi- UK. 563
national State despite the clear preponderance of the Ukrainians. S.U.
National minorities represented about 20 per cent of the total popula- 563
tion of the Ukraine in its pre-war frontiers. With the two most important minorities, Russians and Jews, we are dealing in another context. It suffices to underline with regard to both these minority groups that they acted as a brake on separatist Ukrainian tendencies, thus fulfilling a

259 316 325 651 During the last thirty or forty years, it is true, the economic situation of the Ukraine has changed considerably; three large industries have developed in the country: the sugar industry, the mining and the metal industries. And one is tempted to say that this development was due to Russian protection. But is this quite correct? Undoubtedly the protection had some influence, but not as much as one might suppose. In the first place, one must not forget that in the Ukraine there are natural conditions much more favorable to these industries than in any other part of the Russian Empire. Certainly the sugar, metal and mining interests are among those which depend on the location of their raw materials and can never start in a place where these are lacking. Besides, these industries are infinitely more fostered by transportational advantages than by custom duties. The duties which were imposed on foreign coal did not prevent the importation of English coal into the Baltic provinces nor into Petrograd. On the other hand, even if all custom duties on foreign coal had been suppressed, it would never have penetrated into central Russia and there replaced the fuel of Donetz. As to the sugar, the situation in the Ukraine was perhaps even more favorable. As to metallurgy, it no doubt profited by the protective Russian tax. But there again the role of this tax was not very great. In fact, the products of Ukrainian metallurgy were heavy (rails, beams, tires, wheels, pipes, iron bars, etc.), and their manufacture was only slightly stimulated by the tax because of the great distances over which they had, in any case, to be carried. Protective tariff is much more necessary to those industries which supply finished products of light weight, but of these the Ukraine furnished very few. The textile industry of Moscow and of Poland profited much more by protection, as did many other branches of the industrial activities of central Russia.

Effect of Russian Imperial Methods in Ukraine

369 241 Therefore, by this system, the Ukraine had more loss than profit. She was still a market for Russian and Polish industrial products, for which she paid high prices. But

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

from Ukraine, although it is true that Russia had to be supplied 439
with sugar in addition to raw and auxiliary materials (coal, ores, pig-iron, steel etc.). Imports to Ukraine (e. g. textiles) were more than met by exports. But no capital was imported from Russia to set off the active trade balance; this came almost entirely from other countries.

In the common budget of Imperial Russia in the years 651
1909—1913 Ukraine had to supply 20 % of the total revenue 439
while it was allocated only 20 % of the expenditure. Almost half (45—46 %) of the Imperial revenue from Dnipro Ukraine was diverted to other areas of Russia. Three fourths of the funds ear-marked for capitalisation went abroad in the form of interest and dividends; Russia itself utilised revenue from Ukraine to install rival plants that very often manufactured or finished goods derived from Ukraine. Ukraine exported abroad four to nine times as much as she imported and was solely responsible for the fact that Russia had an active trade balance. It is an undisputable fact that Ukraine was an integral part of the economic system of Europe before the First World War.

7. The Russian Eurasian Theory

is that all Eurasian and Asiatic parts of Russia, including 000
peripheral areas like Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan etc. must be united in one great empire. Let us view this problem from the point of view of economic geography.

The features common to that gigantic stretch of territory are the enormous distances between the various centers of production to the frontiers and the sea, the length of time that rivers and seas are ice-bound, sparse population, high costs of transportation, and an unfavorable position with regard to world markets. It must therefore be organised as a self-supporting economy, planned from some center. Western Siberia is the heart of Eurasia.

These facts do not apply to Ukraine. The 2 400 km between 131
the sea and the Semyrjechka area may be Eurasian, while in 487
Europe the least favorable points are less than 600 km from the sea, and this "European" distance from the sea holds for Ukraine where no center is further than 600 km from the Black Sea. The distance between the Kusnets Basin, the chief coal area of

Ukraine Under the Soviets

423 The natural result was the growing depopulation of the cities.
369 Peasants who had gone into industry now flowed back to their native villages and demanded their share of the land in the hope that they might be able to raise food for themselves and their families. This increased the already overcrowded rural population and intensified the bitterness that was felt among all classes.

The hatred thus aroused was increased by the formation of committees of poor and landless peasants to take over the estates. Yet in Ukraine there was an important sector of the population who had been the owners and proprietors of from two to nearly one hundred acres of land. In some districts these included nearly a quarter of the peasant families and in an attempt to propitiate them the Soviets were frequently inclined to favor them and allow them to retain their holdings instead of dividing them among the more idle and shiftless of the population.

● 651 Yet this did not serve to maintain agricultural production[4] for
661 the crying demand of Moscow was for food. The Communists had abolished all markets and taxes but they substituted for them a rule that the peasants were to turn over their entire crop to the government and should retain for themselves only 31 pounds of grain per month for each member of the family. This naturally dissatisfied the peasants who had been won to the support of the new regime by the promises of the government that they could secure for their own use the land of the state and of the landlords. Each year, as the Soviets tried to enforce the collection, they planted less and less acreage and resorted to more skilful methods of hiding what they did produce in the hope that they might somehow exchange it for those manufactured products of which they were in urgent need.

To counterbalance this, the Russian detachments made more and more extensive raids and they were not satisfied to take merely the legal surplus. They seized everything in the way of food and supplies on which they could lay their hands and, in case of opposition, they ruthlessly shot the peasants without any trial or investigation as counter-revolutionists. In a sense they succeeded in their mission, for the food collectors in 1920 secured in Ukraine 2,560,000

4 [Expropriation of landowners, distribution of land to peasants, 1919-21- Analyst]

tons of grain or about 75% of the total amount that they secured 651 661
in the whole of the former Russian Empire.

This led to new clashes and with the suppression of the larger armed partisan bands, there grew up a new feeling of ugliness that boded ill for the security of the whole regime. The success of the Communists in the industrial centres was thus balanced by their failure to win over any substantial part of the rural population.

In the cities the new regime[1] met with problems of another 433
kind. The workers in the great coal and iron industry where Com- 369
munism was strongest had at a very early date expelled the managers [327]
and foremen and had taken over themselves the operation of the plants, many of which had been ruined in the civil war. Now they found that they were not able to restore production. Industry practically came to a halt and by the end of 1921 there was only one blast furnace operating in Ukraine. The production of pig-iron dropped to 11,300 tons, or barely 3% of the pre-war production. The railroads suffered the same fate. There was no way of repairing them and without a trained administrative staff, they almost stopped functioning. This, in turn, increased unemployment and a lack of food in the cities and once more the city dwellers began to stream out into the country districts.

As a final blow there came in 1920 one of those periods of 731
drought which have recurred sporadically in Ukraine throughout the centuries. In view of the general decay in transportation and the ravages of the war, this became serious and the situation grew even worse when the same phenomenon was repeated in 1921. Between the drought and the raiding detachments, the peasants had no reserves of grain and a famine broke out which cost the lives of several million Ukrainians.

This famine was very definitely the result of Communist mismanagement, plus the drought, but the Soviet regime was unable to take any effective counter-measures. When its extent was realized, the regime allowed through the League of Nations the organization of the American Relief Administration under Herbert Hoover. This collected and sent to the stricken areas large quantities of grain but it carried on its work with such impartiality that

1 [Ukrainian Soviet Republic established 1919 -- Analyst]

CHAPTER FOUR

The New Economic Policy

With the cities prostrate, the land untilled and the people 185
starving, not only in the Ukraine but elsewhere on Soviet-controlled territory, Lenin suddenly changed his policies and introduced various measures which rapidly relieved some of the most glaring defects of the Soviet system. The general term for the new arrangement is the New Economic Policy which more or less remained in force until 1929.

The basis of these measures was a change in the method of 185
collecting taxes and income. Whereas, during the period of Militant 651
Communism, the peasants had been compelled in theory to hand over their entire production to the state with the exception of what they were allowed to retain for their own personal use, they were now assigned a fixed amount which they were to contribute, and the balance they could retain or even sell in the local markets. The decree providing for this was signed March 21, 1921. This gave the peasants a new inspiration to work, for they could begin to make plans rationally and intelligently and could hope to receive some reward for their diligence and industry. This measure was supplemented by others which made it appear that the Bolshevik regime was in some degree returning to the philosophy or the practices of capitalism.

That was undoubtedly the impression that Lenin wanted to 000
convey abroad. There had been signs that some of the European countries were willing to renew commercial relations with the Soviets, and the introduction of the New Economic Policy strengthened these desires. People began to speculate glibly and naively that the practical realities of existence had forced Lenin to admit much that he had previously denied and they predicted that in

423 policy was now changed and the middle and the richer peasants
474 were grouped together and opposed to the poor peasants. This
661 multiplied enormously the hostile and unsympathetic elements of
425 the population but by holding out tempting offers to the poor peasants, the Communists succeeded in fanning anew the flames of class hatred in the villages and in producing the desired effects.

[651] Along with the adoption of the Five Year Plan, the All-Union Congress called for the strengthening of attempts at collectivization. As a result, the amount of grain demanded and the amount of taxes were rapidly raised with the avowed purpose of ruining the kulaks and kurkuls, as they were called in Ukraine. Increased pressure was put upon all classes of the rural population to join collective farms and in some districts this was so effective that almost seventy per cent of the land was turned over for organization on a "voluntary" basis.

As a further step in the same direction there began in 1928 and also in 1929 a furious attack on the richer and middle peasants and a growing insistence on the need of "dekurkulizing" the villages. This meant nothing more or less than the elimination from the countryside of all those people who had prospered under the New Economic Policy. The property of the richer and more prosperous peasants was completely confiscated and they with their families were deprived of all their rights, often including the house where they had lived or the shacks into which they could crawl for shelter. With superb inhumanity the Bolsheviks would drive formerly wealthy peasants and their families from their homes in the middle of winter and leave them without food or clothing and would threaten any of their relatives or friends who dared to give them any relief.

In the first stages of the process, cases were known where some of these richer people were moved out of the Ukraine with their goods and cattle, but as the Communists settled down to their work, they simply seized everything for their own use and that of the collective farms and contented themselves with shooting or deporting their enemies, often to the far north for work in the

433 terms of percentages in reference to a prior date. Still the alreao, published data were so scanty and incomplete that it became increasingly more and more difficult to secure an actual picture of the progress in the Union as a whole and still more so in any of the separate Soviet Republics, for the central regime rarely broke down what little information it gave out among its constituent parts.

651 It was not long before another change was made in the methods
241 of collecting the products from the collective farms. Under the new
661 system, the farms did not contribute according to their crop but according to the amount of land which they proposed to sow. This amount was due to the government, even in those cases where there was a complete failure of the harvest not under the control of the workers. In other words, if a crop failed because of bad weather conditions, the peasants were compelled to hand over just as much produce as if they had had a bumper crop.

It can be easily seen that such a measure was merely another device for weakening the economic position of the village and the independence of the collective farm. At the same time the establishment of official tractor stations in place of the old locally controlled centres which sent crews and machines into the countryside gave the government another weapon for the exertion of pressure upon the peasants and even the Communists who were in charge of the farms and these crews likewise were paid not on the basis of their work but of the theoretical area which was to be sown. Later this was again changed to the total area of the farm whether it was suitable for any special kind of agriculture or not.

These measures only increased the discontent among the peasants who once again began to limit their work to the minimum necessary to maintain themselves on a steadily dropping scale of living. To counter-balance this the Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a decree in February, 1930 allowing the local authorities who were, of course, handpicked by Moscow to resort to extreme measures against the kurkuls, to confiscate their property and then to dispose of them by sending them and their families to concentration camps, to special settlements in the far north or eastern Asia or merely by expelling them from their home district.

[after establishing All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture, 1929 --Analyst]

These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown. These were naturally the more 661
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw ma- 433
terials had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood. This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It concentrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in military preparations. Even when petitions were made by the Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR. Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transportation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932 they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 - 1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

651 missars issued a decree for the "protection of socialist property."
685 Under this law the stealing of a single ear of grain from a kolhosp
241 granary could be punished by confinement for ten years in a con-
511 centration camp. It was so interpreted that if a peasant picked up a single stalk from the field after the harvest, he was liable for the same punishment. In other words, the peasant could only secure his grain legally from and through the administration of the kolhosp.

With this law on the books, the Ukrainian collective farms could be punished either for failing to protect "socialist property" or they could be attacked for failing to present to the government crops and grain in an amount equal to that foreseen by the plan. This was the easier because there were few of the kolhosps that had been able to sow the area required of them. Lack of intelligent and competent leadership on the farms and the exigencies of the weather made it almost inevitable that there would be deficiencies, especially since the schedules were made up in Moscow and took no account of the local conditions.

As the grain deliveries lagged, the demands increased and on January 24, 1933, the Central Committee of the VKP/b issued a new resolution that "it was regarded as proved that the party organization of Ukraine had not carried out the tasks assigned to it in organizing grain deliveries and executing the grain plan."

To remedy this, the central authorities ordered the formation of political detachments in the machine tractor stations, "the chief basic tasks of which were the insuring of the unconditional and immediate execution by the kolhosps and their members of all their obligations to the state and especially the decisive struggle with the stealing of kolhosp property, the struggle with the manifestations of sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the sharing of the grain supplies and the meat products of the kolhosps."

The leaders of these detachments were given the obligation "to secure the constant lawful and accurate fulfilment of the laws of the Soviet government by administrative and criminal measures against the organizers of the stealing of Soviet property and the

sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the branch of village agriculture." 651 685

The machine tractor stations were staffed by men largely alien to the Ukrainian countryside. The more fanatical Communists were placed in these political detachments and were, in effect, told to supplement or replace the local administration in the exercise of pressure and terror upon both the heads and the members of the kolhosps. To aid them in their work Moscow sent to Ukraine a Russian Pavel Postyshev as a special plenipotentiary of the Central Committee with 7,000 party workers from the Russian Republic. 241 511

The work of these special "commissions" and "brigades" was marked by the utmost severity. They entered the villages, and made the most thorough searches of the houses and barns of every peasant. They dug up the earth, broke into the walls of buildings and the stoves in which the peasants tried to hide their last handfuls of food. They even in places took specimens of the fecal matter from the toilets in the effort to learn in that way by analysis whether the peasants had stolen government property and were eating grain. Wherever they found any, the peasants were severely punished, while the detachments carried off not only grain but everything edible.

The same reports came from every corner of Ukraine. "They requisitioned everything that could be eaten" was the report from the village of Zorich in the district of Poltava. In one village in the district of Odesa, "they collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram" and in other places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove. In at least one of these commissions, Molotov, then head of the Council of Ministers, took a personal part.

The natural result was a famine of unprecedented severity. The villages had been hungry in the autumn. After these searches commenced, they literally starved. An Englishman, M. Magridge, wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1933: "During a recent visit to Ukraine, I have seen a little of the war which the Soviet government is carrying on against the peasants. The fields were 731 661

[result of excessive grain requisitions in 1933 -- Analyst]

country for less populated districts in the east, while, on the slightest 166
suspicions, whole families were deported, separated and exiled, and 626
their places taken by people from other Soviet republics who were brought in to destroy the racial unity that formerly existed in the villages.

To appreciate the difficulties of the peasants on the collective 241
farms, we must remember that the involved bureaucratic system 651
had ample opportunities for extorting the grain for little or no 474
payment. Thus the Motor Transport Stations which controlled 465
all the machinery were supported by payments from the collective farms of grain and other products in kind and this usually approached 21.5% of the total yield, while the Stations took over 23% of the crop for the government. Another 15% was retained by the kolhosp for sowing and for various insurance funds that were prescribed by law and another 18% was kept for fodder and for the compensation of the full-time administrators. Thus, there was barely a quarter of the produce left to be distributed among the working population and this was the variable quantity since all of the payments and collections were based not on the actual harvest but on the harvest as planned by the central authorities. Thus, in the case of a bad harvest, the share allotted for distribution was the part that was cut and the government, so far as possible was provided with its expected supply.

This amount was divided among the individuals and families on the basis of the labor days which they had worked. In the beginning a labor day meant labor for a day, no matter how many hours of labor were required, but even before World War II, this simple definition was replaced by a specification that it covered a definite amount of work and it might very easily happen that a slow or poor workman would have to work more than one day to make a labor day. Thus, there was the possibility of still further exploitation of the workmen, who could not know accurately until the end of the year on what they could count.

There was also distributed, likewise in proportion to labor days, a certain sum of money which the kolhosp received from the government in return for the sale of grain over the amount col-

[1 after 1933 famine - - Analyst]

341 lected for the tax in kind. This was a negligible sum and the
651 average member rarely received more than one ruble per labor
474 day. This sum was, of course, insufficient to provide for the
465 goods which the family needed to purchase, and since their share
[511] of the grain was rarely sufficient to feed them, their situation became hopeless, while of other products the individual received about one litre of oil, fifty kilograms of potatoes, thirty-five kilograms of fruit, and five-tenths kilograms of meat and fat.

[435] The real significance of these figures is shown in the prices that were charged in the state stores.[1] There a kilogram of bread cost ninety kopecks, ten eggs brought eight rubles, a kilogram of beef twenty-four rubles, and a pair of boots four hundred and fifty rubles, while a farmer's suit of clothes cost five hundred rubles.

[422] It made the peasant really dependent upon his individual plot of land if he was to secure any necessities.[1] This was far too small and its use was bound with many restrictions. Thus, no family was allowed to hold more than one cow and two calves, one sow, up to ten goats, an undefined number of chickens and up to twenty beehives. In the beginning it was possible for the peasant to secure a certain amount of food for these animals from the common store. He was allowed to retain the manure and it was thus possible for him to improve his own individual plot and thus to secure larger returns. It was a liberal application of such principles that had rendered possible the general improvement which was noticeable during the years 1934-6, when the government was endeavoring to make the system of collective farms workable.

It can be easily seen that the system of allowing individual incomes was based on a principle opposite that of the New Economic Policy, for it would require scarcely a legislative enactment to reduce these amounts while the New Economic Policy presented a norm of profit to the workers. Yet with each year, once the government was convinced of its success, it found it possible in various ways to tap this new source of income for its own purposes.

The favorite method was by taxation. Thus, by 1939 if we should assume that the average family received in cash four hun-

1 [Ukraine - after 1933 famine -- Analyst]

dred and eighty karbovantsy, they would be required to pay twenty-two and a half karb. in taxes, twenty in rent, fifty as a special tax and they would be required to volunteer to take at least two hundred in government bonds. 241 651 474 465

Even this did not cover the total payments to the government. With its usual love of double-talk and subterfuge, the government, which controlled every branch of human activity in the USSR, talked of the establishment of socialism and levied indirect taxes on all transactions so that the actual cost to the villagers of any manufactured article was about three times what it cost the government as producer. The whole subject was carefully veiled as a state secret to protect the Soviet Union against capitalist intrigues but the unfortunate population were the unwilling contributors to this new order of life.

Under such conditions it is extremely difficult to pierce the veil of percentages as to cost and production and give a reliable estimate as to the amount of money received for the government or the relationship between the sums spent in maintaining the operation of the Moscow-controlled factories in Ukraine and the amount spent upon the needs of the population either individually, as families or as citizens of the UkSSR or of the UkSSR as a governmental unity within the Soviet sphere. From those figures which the Soviet has let out, it is possible to see that the yearly budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has run from 2½-5% of the budget of the USSR while the population has been at least 18% of the total population. [652]

With the villages compelled to yield the last pound of grain, etc., that could be extracted by force, and receiving in return almost no manufactured goods, the position of the city workmen and the intelligentsia was little better. The wages of the workmen were always insufficient, the housing conditions were hardly endurable, and the only point of betterment was that the larger places and some of the plants especially favored by the regime received more manufactured goods of a poor quality and at a high price which the fortunate people might be able to secure. 369 511

this taboo language. It was necessary if the whole theory of the USSR was not to fall by the wayside and the authorities in Moscow were becoming aware of the growing danger of Nazism. 538 191 626

They encouraged the writers, as Tychyna and Rylsky, to write narrative and other poems on themes of the old hostility of the Ukrainians to the Polish nobles and to stress the assistance which, in those ancient days, the Ukrainians had received from the Muscovite authorities. They fanned again the fires of the civil war when the Ukrainian Communists, backed by their Muscovite friends and masters, were warring against the Ukrainian National Republic and Petlyura. 538 626

In fact, during these fantastic years, Tychyna, Rylsky, Yanovsky and similar writers, as well as Korniychuk, found it easier to maintain their freedom by this fanning of Ukrainian chauvinism into flame than did those authors who, following the narrow interpretation of socialist realism, sought to trace the transformations in the contemporary life and the growth of confidence in the Russian ideas of industrialization and collectivization. Again and again these men were called to account for allowing their local and national sympathies to run away with them and to include descriptions which were perhaps nostalgic but which could be twisted in the perverse logic of the NKVD into hidden criticisms of the great Stalin, the leaders of the people, and the all-wise and beneficent rule of Moscow.

By 1939, the situation in the Ukraine had changed entirely from what it had been in 1929 when the first five year plan was getting under way. The salient features of the Ukrainian economic life had been destroyed. Yet Moscow was not yet satisfied. 651

Despite the increased taxation and the reduction in the income of the average dweller on a collective farm, the Communist Party demanded each year a larger part of the grain and of the cash income. The voluntary donations for the benefit of the armed forces were increased and steps were begun to demand taxes in kind from the returns which the peasants received from their individual plots. Thus a peasant was required to contribute so many eggs per year to the government, which did not concern itself as to

651 whether or not that peasant was raising hens. The government demanded its share of the manure from the private cattle and it made no difference as to whether or not the individual raised cattle.

423 685 At the same time[1] the heads of the Communist Party sought high and wide for misuse of state property. Again and again they discovered that on collective farms the administration and the peasants were in agreement that the best way to allow some improvement in the general economic situation was to permit the peasant to cultivate and have the income from a slightly larger plot of land. The increased productivity in this way often more than covered the apparent use of state income from the operations of the farm but to the leaders of the Communist Party this was as severe an offence as was the failure to fulfil obligations, for it dared to question the superiority of the policy of collectivization. During 1939, the Party made strenuous efforts to stop such abuses and they even went further in urging and commanding a reduction in the individual allotments of land, which had been the only means of winning even a grudging approval of the Ukrainian peasants for the idea of collectivization.

Of course, with the outbreak of World War II there came a slight relaxation of this pressure, for Stalin and his friends apparently became aware that an excessive attack upon the peasantry might lead them to make common cause with the opponents of the Soviet Union. Yet, this relaxation of pressure was very slight during the years 1939-1941, when the alliance of Stalin and Hitler seemed to be firm and steady and when the Soviet Union was expanding in accordance with its own powers and its own intrigues. In all this the Ukraine remained aloof, closely guarded against the importation of new ideas and the population dragged on their weary existence, scarcely daring to dream that anything could happen to change their unhappy lot.

[1] [1939 -- Analyst]

725 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A.
668 had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrain-
[208] ians were loyal to the Soviet Union. This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided
[186] to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army.

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

●[651] The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West.

728 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of
648 the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

there were 85% Russians and only 8% Ukrainians. With this 656
election system the representatives of the peasants, the most 666
numerous part of the Ukrainian population, made only 12,7% of the members of this Soviet Congress. Finance, national economy, railways, labour — concisely all foundations of the economic life of Ukraine — were concentrated in Moscow. All Ukrainian co-operative organisations were subordinated to Moscow. During [651] 1920 Ukraine had to deliver to Russia 160 million of Pud of grain (1 Pud is 36 lbs.), 6 million Pud meat, 30 million Pud potatoes, 255 million eggs, big consignments of sugar, etc. The Russian Red Army made requisitions for its needs separately and confiscated in the last months of 1920 about 30 million Pud grain in Ukraine (*Collection of Reports of the Government of the USSR:* Kharkov 1921).

No wonder that in consequence of this exploitation the Urkrai- 669
nian partisan movement was spreading. At the end of 1920 there were not less than 40,000 Ukrainian partisans in Ukraine who fought against the Russian Communists as an organised force. Evidence of the extent of this struggle is given to us in the trophies of the Soviet Russian troops seized in the war with the Ukrainian partisans 1920—21: 43 guns, 1,812 machine-guns, 31,788 rifles etc. (*Collection of Reports*). In the course of only one year, 1921, the Soviet Secret Police in Ukraine suppressed 6,000 partisan organisations. (*Communist:* Kharkov, February 11, 1923).

2. The Famine of 1921/22 and the Policy of Soviet Russia in Ukraine 731

The Soviet Russian Government took advantage of the horrible 656
famine of 1921/22 in Ukraine and succeeded in strengthening its rule there. A drought in the fall of 1920 and spring 1921 was followed by a bad harvest, and a great dearth of food arose. A real famine began. However, the policy of the Russian Government in Ukraine, intending to get as much food as possible, did not change. Before the outside world the Russian authorities tried to hide the hunger catastrophe in Ukraine, and directed all foreign aid coming from America and Western Europe into Russia. Though in Ukraine in autumn 1921, millions of the Ukrainian population were starving the Russian Government, nevertheless, took away from the hungry regions the rest of the food stocks, and exported them to Russia. This roused the attention of foreigners who stayed at that time in Ukraine. The American historian H. H. Fisher writes in his book on the famine of 1921/22 that the representatives of the Soviet Russian Government demanded resolutely that it was

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but 000
politically faithful to Moscow.

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also 661
by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of 651
forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though 243
terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists.

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet 661
Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the 665
CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others.

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion 687
from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commis- 186
sar of Education in Ukraine from 1027—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the

439 destinations; and the barley chiefly to Germany. The iron-ore goes mainly to Great Britain and Germany.

(b) *Imports*

As in the case of exports, exact figures for the Ukraine imports cannot be given. In the long list of Russian imports, only three stand out conspicuously —raw cotton, wool, and machinery. Neither imported wool nor cotton is worked in the Ukraine, and the importation of agricultural machinery, though still considerable, is declining. As for commodities under the headings of colonial produce and manufactured goods, the share taken by the Ukraine cannot be estimated, but it is probable that more than half the amount imported through Ukraine ports is consumed beyond the Ukraine boundaries, as the adjacent parts of Russia have greater purchasing power. It may safely be said, however, that the imports of chemical manures, which are increasing rapidly, are largely destined for the Ukraine.

Germany is the principal source of Russia's imports, her share being usually 45–50 per cent. of their total value. Imports from Great Britain represent only 12–14 per cent. of the whole. The rest of the import trade is divided among many countries, none of which contributes as much as 10 per cent. of the total.

(c) *Customs and Tariffs*

651 The Russian tariff is on the whole highly protective, particularly in reference to manufactured articles. As far as possible the duties are levied on weight, only occasionally on value. The tariff contains 218 sections and many sub-classifications.

There is a short free list which includes many kinds of agricultural machinery, live cattle, horses, and cattle food consisting of by-products of manufacture. Certain fertilizing substances and chemicals necessary for tanning and other industries are imported under low duties.

The conventional tariff is modified in favour of various nations in respect of specified items according to the commercial treaties mentioned below. 651

(d) *Commercial Treaties*

The Ukraine having hitherto formed part of the Russian Empire, the commercial treaties of the Empire have had full force there. Up to the year 1893, notwithstanding any treaties existing, all European nations were on the same footing in relation to the Russian tariff. Since then the following special conventions as to tariffs have been concluded: 648 439

With France.—A treaty of 1893 provides for a reduction of Russian duties on 52 articles of French origin, in exchange for a reduced French tariff on naphtha and its products.

With Serbia.—A treaty of commerce and navigation, signed in 1893, agrees to a decrease of the Russian duty on Serbian fruits, in exchange for Serbian concessions on fish and mineral oils.

With Germany.—By a treaty of commerce signed in 1894, Russia lowered her duties in favour of Germany on 135 articles, in consideration of which she obtained most-favoured-nation treatment from Germany.

With Portugal.—A general convention of 1895 arranged that Russia should benefit by certain reductions of the Portuguese tariff, and that Portuguese cork and cork products should be allowed a 20 per cent. reduction of duty on entering Russia.

With Japan.—A general treaty, signed in 1895, placed Japan, in respect of her commercial relations with Russia, on a similar footing to that of European countries.

With Bulgaria.—In 1897 the Russian tariff on dried meat, eggs, and undressed leather was lowered in favour of Bulgaria, and attar of roses was admitted free of duty. In return, certain general concessions and most-favoured-nation treatment were accorded by Bulgaria to Russia.

S: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

In 1910 the revenue receipts from the respective Governments of the Ukraine were as follows: 652

	Roubles.
Volhynia	24,400,000
Podolia	24,300,000
Kiev	128,900,000
Chernigov	18,400,000
Poltava	24,900,000
Kharkov	46,200,000
Yekaterinoslav	37,300,000
Kherson	80,400,000
Taurida	12,800,000
Total	397,600,000

The total revenue of European Russia for the same year was 1,522,800,000 roubles. In the period 1906–10 the revenue showed a good expansion in the Governments of Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, and Kherson. Elsewhere in the Ukraine it appeared to be stationary.

After the Imperial authorities, the *zemstvos* are the most important bodies authorized to raise taxes. 651 652 634 Their revenue comes from taxes on land, houses, and factory buildings, and from licences for distilleries, 69 per cent. being derived from the land tax. Their expenses are (1) obligatory: local civil administration, upkeep of district roads, bridges, &c., and health service; (2) facultative: public instruction and provision of medical attendance in rural districts. Their functions have gradually spread in a somewhat irregular manner, and vary very much according to the degree of energy shown by the committees. Some have embarked on commercial schemes, such as the installation of telephone systems or trade in agricultural machinery; others perform only the minimum of their duties.

Five Governments of the Ukraine have a *zemstvo* organization, and their budgets of receipts and expenses, which appear to balance exactly, are as follows for the years 1906 and 1910: 652 634

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Government.	1906.	1910.
	Roubles.	*Roubles.*
Yekaterinoslav . .	5,210,000	8,241,000
Poltava . . .	6,737,000	8,750,000
Taurida . . .	3,599,000	4,576,000
Kharkov . . .	5,753,000	9,168,000
Kherson . . .	3,808,000	5,542,000

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652 652 Thirty-one towns in the Ukraine have municipal administrations, and can raise taxes and contract loans for purposes similar to those of the *zemstvo* budgets. A considerable debt has been incurred. The towns of Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa have borrowed money for municipal purposes in foreign markets; of a total debt of 53,000,000 roubles, these three towns account for 35,000,000 roubles.

652 632 651 The *mirs* or local communes can also raise some taxes for purely local purposes. Obligatory taxes are levied for local communal administration, provision of granaries for storing food-stuffs, upkeep of local roads on peasant lands, and insurance against fire and inundations. Facultative powers of taxation are in the hands of the *mirs* for the building and maintenance of churches, schools, and hospitals, and other special local needs. There is a great deal of irregularity in the levying and administration of these taxes.

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The Imperial State Bank is a Government institution with a wide sphere of activity. It controls the currency and note issue, being the only bank issuing notes. It undertakes general banking and bill broking, besides having close relations with the Treasury for revenue, loan, and other purposes. It makes large loans to private banks; up to 1910 the total amount was £189,000,000. It also advances money on merchandise, principally on

show profits. The very small shops and plants were in some cases 185
taken back by their former owners when they had survived and any 471
provisions about the use of hired labor were tacitly forgotten in the first flush of the New Economic Policy.

All of these measures were interpreted by the great mass of the Ukrainian people as a recognition of the validity of human experience. There were, of course, keen realists who gave full credence to the declarations of Lenin that the Soviets had never wavered in their objections and were using these concessions only as a means of reviving the life of the country and strengthening their own position. At first this did not seem to be true and it was only as conditions really settled down and a semblance of prosperity returned that it became possible to note the steadily increasing pressure which the government exerted.

In the same way the currency reforms were not without their 185
own influence. In 1923 the government introduced a new cur- 652
rency, the chervonets, which was ostensibly based on a gold stand- 435
ard, to take the place of the old depreciated paper. Nevertheless, the latter was allowed to circulate in the rural districts with the result that its value continued to fall and it became more and more difficult for the peasants to satisfy their needs for manufactured goods which were priced in the new currency. This produced the so-called "scissors," for with the restoration of industry, the value of manufactures continued to rise, while the prices of agricultural products continually fell.

The political system was still not clear.[1] The new regulations 642
were introduced in the Council of Commissars in Moscow and it 665
was emphatically stated that they were for the Russian Soviet 645
Federated Socialist Republic, but Ukraine and also the other Soviet Republics put into practice the same resolutions, often without any decree by the ostensibly independent government.

The key to this enigma lay in the nature of Communist discipline. In theory and on paper the Soviet regime was thoroughly democratic in the broad sense of the word. There was an elaborate scheme of elections to the village and the higher Soviets, and even though this was weighted very heavily to provide increased repre-

[1] [During NEW ECONOMIC POLICY -- Analyst]

dred and eighty karbovantsy, they would be required to pay 241
twenty-two and a half karb. in taxes, twenty in rent, fifty as a 651
special tax and they would be required to volunteer to take at 474
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9: Protector G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

648 Asia generally has peculiar commercial relations
431 with Russia, the duties on both sides being as a rule low, while numerous arrangements for reciprocal concessions have been made, notably with Persia, the Turkish Empire, and China.

(D) FINANCE

(1) Public Finance

652 The Russian Imperial revenue is largely raised in indirect taxes. The budget for 1911 shows the following revenue figures:

		Roubles.
Direct taxes		210,000,000
Indirect taxes:		
Liquor	42,000,000	
Tobacco	69,000,000	
Sugar	123,000,000	
Petroleum	44,000,000	
Matches	18,000,000	
Customs	289,000,000	
		585,000,000
Duties:		
Stamps, fees on transfers, harbour dues, railway dues		169,000,000
Royalties:		
Mines, mint, posts and telegraphs, and spirit monopoly		849,000,000
State property, including railways		765,000,000
Remainder		122,000,000
Total		2,700,000,000

The principal spending departments were the Ministries of Ways and Communications, War, and Finance, and the Public Debt service. These accounted for three-fourths of the expenditure.

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grain. The bank's net profits in 1904 were £1,200,000, 453
and in 1910 £2,400,000. The capital is £5,000,000, 652
and the reserve £500,000.

The Land Bank of the Nobility was founded after the liberation of the serfs to make advances on land, to finance the nobility involved in the transfer of part of their estates to the peasants, and to prevent the ruinous hypothecation of their land elsewhere.

The Peasants' Land Bank, founded in 1883, renders similar services to the peasants, advancing money on land to increase peasant holdings, to purchase agricultural machinery or live-stock, and for other objects.

The State Savings Banks carry out the function their title suggests, and also undertake certain minor insurance business. Branches can be opened in all towns and villages. The management is supervised by the Imperial State Bank. The banks were started in 1862 with 140,000 accounts and £850,000 in deposits, and in 1907 had 6,940,000 accounts and £128,000,000 in deposits.

Joint-stock land banks form the next group of 453
important banks. There are four in the Ukraine, with resources as follows:

Bank.	*Share Capital.*	*Reserves.*	*Bonds in circulation.*
	£	£	£
Kharkov . . .	1,170,000	200,000	12,000,000
Poltava	800,000	600,000	11,000,000
Bessarabia–Taurida . .	700,000	500,000	11,000,000
Kiev	600,000	400,000	9,500,000

These banks advance money on agricultural security on a business basis, and make considerable profits.

Mutual credit associations form another group, and 452
are spread all over the country, their aggregate turnover being very great. They vary very much in size and extent of operations, but in general their rate of interest is high.

Trading banks form the last great group. They 453
are usually joint-stock concerns, and are carried on according to the German model, their foundation being

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 79. On the expiration of the terms of office of the regional, area, district, city settlement or village Soviets of Working People's Deputies, their executive and administrative organs retain their powers until the newly elected Soviets shall have formed new executive and administrative organs.

Chapter VI. The Budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

Art. 80. The state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is drawn up by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and submitted by it to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for its approval.

Upon its approval by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is published for general information.

Art. 81. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Budget Commission, which reports its conclusions on the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet.

Art. 82. The report on the fulfilment of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and published for general information.

Art. 83. The budgets of the regional, area, district, city, settlement and village Soviets include the revenues from the local economy, deductions from the state revenues collected within their territory and likewise receipts from local taxes and imposts in amounts fixed by the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter VII. The Courts and the Procurator's Office

692 Art. 84. In the Ukrainian SSR justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Regional and Area Courts, the Special Courts of the USSR established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the People's Courts.

Art. 85. In all Courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

Art. 86. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is the highest judicial organ of the Ukrainian SSR. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 87. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for a term of five years.

Art. 88. Regional and area courts are elected by regional and area Soviets of Working People's Deputies for a term of five years.

Art. 89. People's courts are elected by the citizens of the district on basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of three years.

695 Art. 90. Judicial proceedings in the Ukrainian SSR are conducted in the Ukrainian language, persons not knowing the language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court.

727
439 been food supplies, which in many Ukrainian towns constituted the only
648 food to be seen in shops in 1946. For fats and oils particularly the Ukrainian population has been entirely dependent on UNRRA aid.

The U.S.S.R.'s Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

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648 UNRRA assistance to the Ukraine has been of necessity limited in scope and short-term in nature. Long after relief shipments are ended - and they are now all but complete - the Ukraine will still be working to rebuild its factories, cities, and farms. The main task of rehabilitation is therefore a long-term one, and depends upon long-range measures.

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185 On March 18, 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted a Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, for the rehabilitation and development of the national economy of the Soviet Union. This plan is the fourth of a series of Five-Year Plans[1] designed to increase the productivity of Soviet farming and industry, and in general to raise the standard of living of the whole population. As stated by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the principal aims of the Five-Year Plan in 1946-50 are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of the country, to recover the pre-war level in industry and agriculture, and then considerably to surpass that level.

[652] The new Five-Year Plan provides that nearly one-third of the capital investments for the entire Soviet Union in 1946-50 (49,500 million roubles out of a total of 250,300)[2] are to be spent on the restoration of the Ukraine. Of this 49,500 million, 5,469 million will be used for works under the Ukrainian Republic's jurisdiction.

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727 In the next five years all the destroyed cities of the Ukraine - particularly Kiev, Kharkov, Chernigov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, Stalino, and Zaporozhie - are to be rebuilt and their municipal services restored.
362 Housing is to be replaced as speedily as possible; in 1946-50, 175,120,000 square feet of state-owned housing are to be built, of which 12.65 million square feet are to be made available by local Soviets. The amount of privately owned housing to be built before 1950 is fixed at 36.3 million square feet.

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185 Also under the Five-Year Plan Ukrainian agriculture is to be rehabilitated; the crop area for 1950 is planned at 30.5 million hectares. By 1950 the Ukraine is scheduled to be producing about 20 per cent. of the grain harvested in the U.S.S.R. (approximately the same tonnage as in pre-war years); 60 per cent. of the sugar beet (about 6 per cent. more than pre-war); and the potato harvest is fixed for 23 million tons, 1½ millions more than in 1940.

000 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport

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1 First Five-Year Plan, 1929-32; second, 1933-37; third, 1938-42.

2 Estimated at 1945 prices.

727 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport
433 are to be rebuilt; the mining of coal is to regain and then to outstrip the pre-war output; the production of machinery and equipment for both light and heavy industry is to be restored; and to do this, iron and steel production is to be increased until it surpasses pre-war. War damaged power stations are to be rehabilitated, and additional ones are to be constructed, particularly in smaller communities.

[185] Altogether the output of industrial enterprises in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is envisaged at 9,200 million roubles, of which the output of state industries under local jurisdiction and of industrial co-operatives is estimated to comprise 3,100 million roubles[1].

The volume of industrial production in the whole U.S.S.R. in 1950 - that is, the last year of the Five-Year Plan - is fixed at 205,000 million roubles (in 1926-27 prices). Compared with 138,500 million roubles in 1940, this represents an increase in industrial output of 48 per cent.

727 Particular stress in the Five-Year Plan is laid on the development
433 of the Western Ukraine and the Transcarpathian Region. Lvov, the main
361 city of the Western Ukraine, is to be developed into a major industrial centre, where there are to be built and put into operation an automobile assembly plant, electrical, telephone, and telegraph-equipment manufacturing plants, a glass works, a knitting mill, and food processing plants.

In the Transcarpathian Region, new light industry plants are to be constructed, and the mining of brown coal (lignite) is to be organized and extended. Provision is to be made for the rehabilitation and development of the woodworking and wood chemical industries and of farming, particularly fruit-growing, viticulture, livestock breeding and apiculture, [652] as well as of the food processing industries. The farms of the Transcarpathian Region are to be given considerable state assistance in the form of agricultural machines, fertilizers, and credits.

000 A more detailed discussion of the Five-Year Plan in connection with farming and the various industries follows in later sections of this report.

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[475] It must be remembered that a number of enterprises although situated in the Ukrainian Republic are not under the Republic's jurisdiction, but under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union Government.

Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

311 According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there
425 were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000
723 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The principal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Izmail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

474 Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution
241 of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas
178 from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

475 Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the
407 Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Izmail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

475 In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in
407 June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in
652 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.

648 enterprises; and in accordance with the provisions of the UNRRA
731 agreement, the Ukrainian Government uses the proceeds for further
relief and rehabilitation work within the country. Food and soap
[657] supplies for example are sold through regular trade channels to
ration-card holders, or are delivered to organizations which use
them for factory or community feeding. Clothing also is sold in
stores against ration cards, or in the case of workers having a high
rate of clothing and shoe consumption, against special orders. Used
clothing is distributed free of charge to invalids of the war, families
of war dead, pensioners, or other recipients of social welfare. Medical
supplies and equipment are transferred free of charge to the Ministry of
Health. The distribution of agricultural and industrial equipment
varies depending upon the nature of the supplies. Consumable items,
such as seeds, jute, bagging, rope and industrial raw materials, are
sold to collectives, state farms, co-operatives, or industrial enter-
prises. Capital equipment such as tractors, food processing machinery,
or power generators is delivered free of charge to the recipient
ministries or their subsidiary distribution organizations. Tractors
in particular are delivered in this way to state-owned Machine Tractor
Stations.

Proceeds of Sale of UNRRA Supplies

648 Up to March 1, 1947, the sale of UNRRA supplies in the Ukraine
731 had provided the government with 3,166,482,000 roubles[1] for additional
relief and rehabilitation work in the Republic. Roughly 85 per cent.
652 of this total resulted from sales of UNRRA food; 6 per cent. from the
sale of clothing; and 9 per cent. from the sale of miscellaneous raw
materials and agricultural supplies.

Of the cumulative proceeds up to March 1, about 21 million roubles had been used to pay the expenses of distribution, and 823,511 roubles had been spent to provide goods and services to the UNRRA Mission. Of the balance then remaining available (3,144,655,500), nearly half had been used for rehabilitation work at the Republican (state) level of government; 1,324,239,000 roubles had been transferred to regional executive committees (the next level of government) for expenditure on local projects; and about 391 million roubles in cash was still available for future use.

State Relief and Rehabilitation Projects

652 At the state level rehabilitation work carried on from the beginning
657 of UNRRA deliveries up to March 1, 1947, amounted to 1,429,060,000 roubles, and was divided among four main categories; rehabilitation of the national economy, 74 per cent. of the total state-level expenditures; health services, 14 per cent.; children's institutions and schools, 11 per cent.; and social welfare, 1 per cent.

Rehabilitation of the National Economy. These expenditures are administered by the various ministries having productive capital works

[1] 21.36 roubles equals one pound sterling; 5.40 roubles equals one U.S. dollar (March 1947).

652 under their jurisdiction. For example, capital works, repairs,
657 and equipment for livestock raising centres, piggeries, cattle sheds, slaughterhouses and refrigerators (under the Ministry of Cattle Breeding); vineyards, orchards, repairs of irrigation facilities (under the Ministry of Technical Agricultural Production); repairs to barns and agricultural implements (under the Ministry of Agriculture); and rehabilitation of the brick and ceramic industry (under the Ministry of Home Construction).

Health Services. These expenditures are administered by the Ministry of Health, and include the feeding of patients, and repairs and equipment for hospitals and health service agencies.

[658] Children's Institutions (over four years) and Schools. These expenditures are handled by the Ministry of Education, and include the feeding of children; and capital works, repairs and equipment for schools and children's homes.

Social Welfare Services Directed towards the Betterment of General Well-being. These expenditures are administed by the Ministry of Social Welfare and include such services as repairs and maintenance of social welfare agencies, and assistance to invalids.

Local Rehabilitation

648 As at March 1, 1947, about 41 per cent. of the gross proceeds of
727 UNRRA sales had been transferred to regional executive committees of
185 the government for use in the local and district economy. The local
731 projects - which are undertaken after approval by the state authorities and are subject to regular reporting and inspection - are similar in character to those carried out by the Republican Government Ministries. However, there is a considerable shift in emphasis. For example, at the regional level, nearly 57 per cent. of the total proceeds at their disposal was utilized for health services (hospitals, nurseries), 35 per cent. for children's institutions, 5 per cent. for repairs of public and industrial institutions, and 2 per cent. for the building of schools and repair of clubs.

Deliveries of UNRRA Supplies

648 In the original agreement between UNRRA and the Ukrainian Govern-
731 ment was a provision that the Administration would "strive within the limits of its resources" to procure and deliver the Ukraine's share of relief and rehabilitation supplies before July 1, 1946. In the early months of 1946, however, it became clear that procurement difficulties and transport hold-ups would prevent a great part of the supplies from being delivered in time. The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was therefore extended to the end of 1946.

From December 1945, (when UNRRA deliveries to the Ukraine began) up to June 30, 1946, (the time at which they were originally scheduled

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

200 In general the internal means of communication in the Ukraine are in a defective and backward state. They all require heavy expenditure and extensive works to bring them up to a standard approaching that of Western Europe.

(a) *Roads*

491 The Ministry of the Interior groups the roads under three heads: (1) metalled roads, (2) roads paved throughout their length, and (3) non-paved or soil [653] roads. The metalled roads are constructed and kept up by the State. There are 2,254 miles of first-class road in the Ukraine, of which 923 miles are in the Government of Yekaterinoslav.

The principal lines of first-class roads are as follows:

From Kiev *via* Jitomir, Rovno, and Lutsk to Kovel, 260 miles. This road continues to Brest-Litovsk. There are branch roads from Rovno and Lutsk to Dubno, each about 30 miles in length, and from Dubno a road leads to Krzemenietz, some 20 miles distant.

From Kamenets Podolsk in a northerly direction to Proskurov and Staro-Konstantinov.

From Kiev in a northerly direction to Chernigov, thence to Mohilev and Vitebsk. The length from Kiev to the boundary of the Government of Chernigov is 150 miles.

From Kharkov northwards towards Kursk and Moscow. Thirty miles of this road are in the Government of Kharkov.

The remaining lengths of metalled road are mostly

Coal: Plans for the Future

185 Under the Five-Year Plan, the coal industry of the Ukraine is to
433 be speedily rehabilitated and further developed, so that by 1950 its
316 output will be 86,100,000 tons, including about 6 million tons of brown coal (lignite).[1] When it is remembered that this target is only 2.3 million tons over 1940 production, the enormous task of rehabilitation confronting the industry is made clear. The difficulties are even more accentuated if one compares the increase of coal production in three pre-war years, from 1937 to 1940, when output leaped from 70 million tons to 83.8 millions.

Plans for increasing the future coal output of the Ukraine include not only the restoration of old mines but also intensive prospecting and the sinking of many new shafts.

"Between 1946-50, coal mines with an aggregate capacity of 77,500,000 tons are to be put into operation in the Stalino and Voroshilovgrad regions of the Ukrainian S.S.R.[2]"; and coal fields in other areas are to be further developed. In particular there are to be put into operation in the Donets Basin and in the western regions of the Ukraine, small coal mines and drifts with a total capacity of 4,600,000 tons of coal, and peat briquette plants with a capacity of 50,000 tons.

The lignite mining industry is to be developed and by 1950 is expected to supply annually some 6 million tons of coal. Five lignite mines operating in the Ukraine in 1946 increased their output in October by three times as compared with April.

135 Large coal supplies are expected from the regions west of the
654 Dnieper, where 11 promising coal deposits are located. Prospecting is in progress there, as well as in the Zlochev, Krenenets, and Kolomya areas of Western Ukraine, where 28 shafts had been sunk by November 1946.[3]

Industrial lignite deposits have also been found in an area of four square miles between Slavgarod and Sinelhikovo (near Dniepropetrovsk) and in the Transcarpathian region.

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1 The coal output of the entire Soviet Union in 1950 is fixed at 250 million tons.

2 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

3 Soviet Monitor, London, November 21, 1946.

135 To the south-east, in the Don and northern Donets valleys,
654 geologists have discovered a number of new coal-bearing areas, and have confirmed that the Donets Basin coal layers stretch far to the east and south.

Other investigations of coal-bearing areas are to begin shortly, particularly around the Azov Sea coast and in other regions bordering the Donets Basin.

Coke

316 The coke output of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is planned to be 15,500,000 tons.

Natural Gas and Oil

315 With the incorporation of Western Ukraine in 1939, the Ukrainian
185 S.S.R. came into possession of oil producing regions. The Five-Year Plan calls for the intensive development of these and other areas of the Ukraine for the increased production of oil and natural gas. Three hundred and twenty-five wells are to be located to add to the
[654] petroleum resources of the western regions; prospecting for commercial deposits of petroleum in the Romny area is to be completed; and there is to be extensive geological exploration for natural gas in the Dragobych Region (Western Ukraine) and on the Azov and Black Sea coasts.

[382] The total output of petroleum in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 325,000 metric tons.

The plan also provides for the building of a gas pipeline from Dashava to Kiev. Already in process of construction, the first section of the pipeline will be completed this year (1947) and will supply gas to more than 30,000 flats and several large industrial plants in Kiev.

Electric Power Stations

377 Electrification has been one of the outstanding features of the Soviet economy. Before the war the Ukrainian Republic possessed a wide network of electric power stations. Best known was the huge Dnieper Dam and Lenin Hydro-electric Station, completed in 1932 near Zaporozhie. This station supplied electric power to a great industrial region: in the north the steel mills of Dniepropetrovsk and Dnieprodzerzhinsk, and to the south-east, the Nikopol manganese mines. These three industrial centres developed quickly after the Dnieper Dam was built; and the abundance of cheap power available from it also gave rise to the growth of a metal and machine-building centre at Zaporozhie.

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Chemical Industry

The chemical industry of the Ukraine is based chiefly on coal deposits, but also on a number of other raw materials to be found there, including lacustrine deposits of sodium chloride (Artemovsk area) and phosphatic rocks (Konstantinovka area).

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[185]

The Five-Year Plan fixes that:

"The chemical plants of the Ukraine, including soda, nitrate, and superphosphate plants, shall be rebuilt, and the potash mines in the regions of Stanislav and Dragobych, and a new superphosphate plant, a paint and varnish plant and a plastics factory built.

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"In 1946-50 geological surveys shall be conducted with a view to locating commercial deposits of potassium salts to a total of 80 million tons, graphite to a total of 7.7 million tons, and gypsum to a total of 7 million tons."

Output in 1950 is fixed by the Plan as follows:

for the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Calcined soda	448,000 tons
Superphosphates	860,000 tons, and
Salt,	1,930,000 tons;

and for the entire Soviet Union:

Calcined soda	800,000 tons, and
Mineral fertilizers, superphosphates, nitrates and potash	5,100,000 tons.

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Light Industry[1]

By the end of 1946 the production of consumer goods in the U.S.S.R. had already revived considerably; output in the different branches ranged from 20 to 50 per cent. above 1945. Reconversion of the factories to peacetime production was largely completed; however, three big tasks remained: to complete the rehabilitation of all light industry enterprises wrecked by the Nazis; to replace the old or worn-out machinery; and to obtain an adequate supply of labour and materials.

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1 Soviet News, London, December 30, 1946, and February 6, 1947.

631 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of
642 Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications,
645 Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

●655 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent
327 exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that
185 the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

432 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921,
241 which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the
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At the same time the nationalization of the land was commenced 423
and this gave a good excuse for the elimination of another class 471
of formerly prosperous people, whether they were Poles or Ukrainians. At first this was carried out along the lines of the Ukrainian land code of 1922, for the authorities were eager to get crops in when spring came. Still, during the summer of 1940 they began to urge the formation of collective farms. The peasants in some of the more backward regions listened to these ideas willingly, but in the better areas where agriculture was on a far higher and more efficient plane than in large sections of eastern Ukraine, they were very cool and meetings had to be postponed again and again if disorders were to be averted in the middle of the war. Still the Soviet authorities felt that they could waste some time until a real peace was restored and their hands were definitely free.

In regard to the educational establishments and all questions 661
of organization, they acted without delay. In the first days of the 814
occupation, the Soviet commissars seized the property of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and prevented all further work by confiscating the building and its contents and preventing all further publications. On January 14, 1940, they forced the complete self-liquidation of the Society. The president, Prof. Rakovsky, at once fled to the west and during the next uncertain months a large part of the active members made their way to Krakow in the Polish Government General, where they endeavored to resume their work. The Society was then turned into a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR and was placed under the control of the administration in Kiev, while part of its collections and its work was placed under the University of Lviv, which was now ostensibly Ukrainianized and given the name of Ivan Franko, the great Western Ukrainian scholar and writer. This was not for long, for very soon here, too, the lecturers to win Soviet approval began to switch over from Ukrainian to Russian.

All other societies of every kind were abolished and fitted into 655
the Soviet scheme of things. The cooperative network, especially such great societies as the Maslosoyuz (Dairy Cooperative Society) and the People's Trade were made governmental organs. Various

655 firms were turned into branches of one commissariat or another. By the spring, while there had not yet been a full communization of the country, the process was well advanced and no resident of Western Ukraine could doubt as to the future of the area.

659 In Eastern Galicia, where the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite was the predominant religion, the Metropolitan Archbishop Andry Sheptytsky was not personally touched.[1] He was placed under more or less surveillance and found it impossible to exercise his normal activity. However, all the religious schools and seminaries under his charge were closed, the church and monastic lands were seized, and all ecclesiastical printing was suppressed. Finally, the clergy were compelled to hand over to the representatives of the government all the baptismal and other records which were incorporated in the work of the ZATS, the Soviet bureau of vital statistics. The clergy were treated as a non-working class [661] and were thus deprived of all means of livelihood, except for the free-will offerings of their impoverished parishioners.

In the eastern sections, where the Orthodox Church predominated, the same regulations were put into force with the additional proviso that the clergy had to transfer their allegiance from the Polish Orthodox Church to the locum tenens of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow. This was a first step in improving relations between the locum tenens and the Soviet government and in making the authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church a definite instrument of the government in the spreading of Russian Communism.

545 On the other hand, there was a considerable patronage of Ukrainian art. Certain scholars were rather favored. The Ukrainian theatre was supported on a more liberal scale than it had been under the Polish rule and there were in some quarters hopes that there might be a happy future. It was again a short dream, for [626] as 1940 came to a close, there began again the insistant but unobtrusive attempts at russification. Russian theatrical companies began to visit Lviv and other cities. The publications of the publishing firms of Lviv fell off and once more they found it necessary 000 to produce Russian books. The libraries were carefully purged of

1 [1940 -- under Russian occupation -- Analyst]

496 formerly belonging to the South-Eastern Railway,
471 have been recently acquired by the State.

The money markets of Paris, London, and Amsterdam appear to be those principally interested in the loans of these railways; the financial circles of Berlin and Vienna are concerned in a lesser degree.

655 Up to the year 1889 railway rates in Russia were in
477 a state of chaos. The Government then took the matter in hand, and during the years 1893–4 inaugurated a system which, with modifications, has remained in use. The zone method is applied to both goods and passengers, with a diminishing rate for each additional zone entered by the traffic. Cereal rates received special consideration, and differential tariffs exist for the carriage to Black Sea and Azov ports of cereals destined for export. Preferential rates are also granted on coal, iron and manganese intended for export.

496 *Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Expansion.*—Taken as a whole, the railways of the Ukraine are not adequate to the needs of the country. In the Donets region railway extension by private enterprise has kept fairly level with industrial needs, and new projects were recently being actively promoted. In the agricultural portion of the country, however, the lack of railways is a serious handicap to all kinds of industry. The greater portion of the mileage is single line, and the rolling stock is of poor capacity and not kept in good repair.

499 A number of lines are under construction in the Donets basin to link up existing ones or to serve new mines recently opened, and a new line is being constructed to connect Yekaterinoslav with Kherson and Nikolaev by a direct route.

000 A projected line is the Podolian Railway, which would run from Shepetovka to Kamenets Podolsk, a distance of 149 miles. By another project a railway running due north from Jitomir *via* Mosir and Mohilev to Vitebsk would give a direct main line between Petrograd and Odessa, which does not at present exist, a detour *via* Kiev being necessary.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

to carry these goods. The imports consist of machinery, manufactured goods, colonial and tropical products, and chemicals; Odessa also imports coal from the Donets region, which is shipped at Mariupol or Taganrog. 505 439 [438]

The export trade of Berdyansk is chiefly coal, iron-ore, and grain. Mariupol principally exports Donets coal. The imports of both places are general, but a large proportion consists of chemicals and particular minerals required in the iron and steel industry in the Government of Yekaterinoslav.

The number and tonnage of the vessels entering the above-mentioned ports in 1910, and the amounts of the exports and imports, are shown in the following table:

	Total vessels entered.	*Tonnage.*	*British vessels entered.*	*Tonnage.*	*Imports (tons).*	*Exports (tons).*
Odessa	848	1,596,217	174	388,136	566,743	1,736,029
Nikolaev	544	1,126,441	315	676,834	178,790	2,070,419
Kherson	152	330,260	131	288,789	104,693	844,919
Berdyansk	180	269,365	38	65,492	28,693	416,451
Mariupol	231	394,451	67	119,242	266,693	1,587,161
				Total	1,145,612	6,654,979

The respective values of the exports and imports are more difficult to ascertain, but the difference in value is certainly not so great as that in weight. For some years before the war, the value of the exports of the whole of Russia exceeded that of her imports by about 40 per cent., and the proportion for the Ukraine ports is probably about the same.

Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Development.—The Ukraine Black Sea ports would appear, on the whole, to be equal to the demands put upon them; in fact, there is severe competition between Odessa and Nikolaev. The recent improvements at Nikolaev have inspired the Odessa authorities to apply for powers to carry out great extensions, but so far these have not been granted, as the central authorities held that there was no prospect of a good return on the capital that would be required. 504 655

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

438 In addition to factory industries there exists in Russia
[655] a group known as *kustarni* or domestic industries. They are considered so important by the Government that measures are taken by the various authorities to improve their output and conditions, to revive old ones and even to found new ones. Their range is wide, and they are carried on by families, by working syndicates or *artels* (cf. p. 73), or by individuals. In the Ukraine these industries are less well developed than in most parts of Russia, and in some provinces are hardly represented. There are three branches well established. Pottery is manufactured in the Governments of Kiev, Chernigov, and Poltava, where suitable clays are found, and the *kustarni* earthenware of these districts has a good reputation all over the country. Shoes, harness, and other leather goods are produced in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov. Combs, buttons, and other objects made from animal horn are also a noted product of Poltava.

(6) Power

371 In the Ukraine power is almost exclusively produced by steam. Electric power is used for the tramways in Odessa and Kiev, but water-power is neglected, and electric drive for factory work is not employed.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(a) *General Characteristics; Markets, Fairs, &c.*

438 The trade of the Ukraine consists almost entirely in
441 the movement and marketing of the produce of the land in one form or another. One of its noticeable features is the passage of commodities through several hands before they come into use. Nowhere are found so many middlemen, salesmen, and agents. This is caused principally by the lack of capital in the hands of the producer and a general encumbrance and hypothecation of land, crops, machinery, &c. There is

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

a very large population of Jews, who have become general tradesmen and brokers to the community. 438 441

The cereal crop is the subject of elaborate commercial transactions, and much of it is sold two or three times before it is harvested. The lack of proper storage leads to the rapid dispersal of the bulk of the surplus crop. Odessa and Nikolaev have corn exchanges where the export of the crop is financed, and there is an exchange for internal cereal trade at Yelisavetgrad.

The sugar trade is subject to Government control. A committee fixes annually the amount of sugar to be placed on the home market and the distribution of supplies to the refineries, the quantity so dealt with paying the minimum excise. After this allocation any surplus remaining is disposed of according to the general state of the market and the stock held over from the previous season, and is allotted for internal use or export. Russia was a signatory to the Sugar Convention of 1907, and agreed that, during the six years from the date of the convention, she should not export in all more than 1,000,000 tons. This specially affected the Ukraine as the principal sugar-producing area in Russia. 437 443 655

The sugar and alcohol markets are at Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa. 438

Wool of the finer sorts called 'Spanish' is dealt in principally at Kharkov, which is also the chief market for leather.

There is a flax market at Novozybkov in the province of Chernigov.

The principal timber markets are Yekaterinoslav and Kherson.

Odessa is a market for a great number of commodities produced in the interior, especially food-stuffs, cattle, tobacco, and vegetable oils.

The custom of transacting important business at fixed fairs is of very long standing in the Ukraine, and, while the importance of every fair tends to decrease at present owing to the adoption of other methods of trading, the fairs continue to be held, and, especially 438 443

292 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The
531 beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia.
574 Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 In the southern part of the country life and people are different.
471 Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the
563 sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich
464 vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the
241 Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hungarians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns,
655 such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works,
438 Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern
361 city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the
341 twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

642 who had always lived in the *Quartier Latin* in Paris; Zatonsky and
669 Skrypnik were the first Ukrainian politicians to go over to the
635 Bolsheviks.

This same Committee, on 14 February, two or three weeks after the occupation of Kiev, announced the federation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with 'the All-Russian Republic of Workers and Peasants'. Subsequently, on 9 March, 'according to the Revolutionary order' 'the First Ukrainian Congress of Soldiers', Peasants' and Workers' Delegates' was called together. This body received for approval 'the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic'. Seven months had not elapsed before nine-tenths of the territory of this first Ukrainian Soviet Republic had fallen into the hands of the Volunteer Army.

In spite of the ephemeral character of the first Ukrainian Soviet Republic it is worth considering the theoretical basis on which this state was founded, since its structure illustrates Lenin's conceptions as to the treatment of nationalities within the Communist State.

656 Following the November *coup d'état* two documents were
563 published in Russia which had an 'ideological' importance in relation to the formation of national republics. The first was a 'Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the Nations Forming Part of Russia'; it concluded as follows:

'According to the Will of the Congress of Soviets, the Council of People's Commissars has decided to adopt as a foundation for its activities in the question of nationalities the following principles:

(1) The equality and sovereign rights of all the nationalities of Russia;

(2) The right of self-determination of all these nationalities, including the right to form independent states;

(3) The abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations;

(4) The free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.'

The document bears the signature of Dzhugashvili-Stalin, Commissar for Nationalities, and of Ulianov-Lenin, President of the Council of People's Commissars.

The second document is a 'Declaration of the Rights of Oppressed Nationalities', dated 24 January 1918 and approved by the 3rd Congress of All-Russian Soviets. The setting up by this Congress of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was based on the following principles: 'Russia is proclaimed the Republic of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. The Soviet Republic is constituted on the basis of a free union of free

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nationalities as a Federation of Soviet National Republics. Striving to create the really free and voluntary union of the working classes of all the nationalities of Russia, the 3rd Congress of Soviets will limit itself to the establishment of the principles only on which the Federation of the Soviet Republics in Russia will be built, allowing the workers and peasants of every nationality to take independent decisions in their own Soviet Congresses as to whether and on what conditions they wish to take part in the Federal Government and other Federal institutions.' 656 563

The Federation, having been accepted by the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee in February 1919, was approved by the 1st Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the following month. It is clear that this declaration remained in force when, after the collapse of the Volunteer movement and the failure of the 'Petlyurians', the Soviets were restored in the Ukraine. And it is a notable fact that, notwithstanding the considerable changes in the constitution of U.S.S.R. which were introduced between the years 1920 and 1936, the Ukrainians together with the other 'minority nationalities' retained the right, in theory, to opt out of the Union. Only at the 8th Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, summoned to discuss 'the Stalin Constitution' of 1936, were certain limitations (not included in the published texts of the Constitution) introduced by Stalin himself. 'So that the right [of a Republic] to leave the Union shall not be an ephemeral right it is necessary:

(*a*) that the Republic should not be surrounded on all sides by territories of the Soviet Union, but should lie on its boundaries, because in the opposite case it would be impossible for her to leave the Union;

(*b*) that the population of the Republic should not be less than a certain minimum, because in the opposite case she would not be able to defend herself against the attacks of Imperialist beasts of prey;

(*c*) that in the population one nationality should form a compact majority.'

During the years 1921–2 the Ukrainian Soviets were otherwise engaged than in studying constitutional questions. The liquidation of the Volunteer Army in the Crimea and the suppression of the numerous bands of the *atamans* prolonged the period of warfare and the Red Armies terrorized the exhausted countryside. Many towns were becoming deserted, and vast stretches of land were left fallow by a peasantry which had neither the courage nor the security to sow or to reap. Black typhus decimated the destitute population, and in the winter of 1920–21 a serious famine developed which became worse during the spring and summer months. Although the 731

731 conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

656 The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

656 563 669 The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

656 642 The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

668 656 In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

who had been associated with the *Rada* and the 'Directoria'. Both parties had their reasons for conciliation. So far as the Soviet authorities were concerned the appearance of prominent non-Bolsheviks in the administration enabled them to improve their relations with the peasantry and to convince them that Lenin's New Economic Policy was indeed, in his own words, 'in earnest and for long'. It does not follow that the peasants had ever been particularly enthusiastic for the nationalist ideology of the *Rada* and the 'Directoria'; but the Ukrainian nationalist leaders, owing to their social origins, were nearer to the peasantry than the men at the head of the various Committees of the Communist Party and the Soviet administration. The latter were either 'new-comers' from the north or representatives of the local Jewish 'intelligentsia' or men drawn from the 'proletariat' of industrial centres. They owed their rise generally to their revolutionary services in the streets of the great cities. The former collaborators of Vinnichenko and Petlyura, on the other hand, were either peasants by origin or they belonged to the typically Ukrainian 'half-intelligentsia' of the countryside.

In encouraging these men to work with the Communist Party, the Soviet authorities did not contemplate allowing them to play a part in the political life of the country, and in this respect they kept them under the strictest control. On the other hand, they were allowed wide scope in the field of 'cultural work', because the Bolsheviks understood that these people would interpret 'cultural work' in the form of hasty 'ukrainization' which in its tendency to supplant the remnants of 'the imperial culture' in the Ukraine would serve purposes which the Bolsheviks themselves had in view. 'Ukrainization' was, in the view of the Bolsheviks, a harmless occupation for the active intellectual element in the Ukraine during a difficult period of transition—an occupation which at the same time would tend to tone down past bitterness and to divert renewing energies into a comparatively harmless channel. In Caucasia, where the Bolsheviks had to do with tougher men among whom the national idea had deeper roots, they were to find that within ten years the same policy was to produce formidable difficulties.

The first to set the example of going over to the Soviets was none other than the patriarch of the Ukrainian movement himself, Professor Hrushevsky, who was rewarded with the Presidency of the newly founded Ukrainian Academy in Kiev. Hrushevsky was followed by the former President of the Council of Ministers of the *Rada* Government, Holubovich, by the General Secretary to the *Rada*, Khrystyuk, and a number of other prominent radicals and separatists.

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231 a high standard of breeding—particularly of draught horses. The Army Remount Department fulfilled a third of its requirements in the south, and there was a considerable export abroad. As a result of the Revolution, breeding suffered probably more than any other branch of rural production. Statistics for 1922 illustrate the disastrous effect of the Revolution on livestock throughout the whole Empire. In 1916 the total head of cattle was about 60 million: in 1922, 23 million. The number of horses in 1916 was estimated at 35 million: in 1922 at 20 million. Sheep numbered 120 million in 1916: 46 million in 1922. In view of the fact that South Russia was the principal field of the Civil War, it is probable that about 50 per cent of the horses and cattle destroyed were lost in this region. It is reckoned that in the Ukraine and New Russia only one-third of the pigs remained and one-quarter of the sheep. Losses in domestic animals are much more difficult to recover than losses in other branches of domestic industry; further, the special conditions of field labour in New Russia required a large proportion of draught oxen and horses.

[656] 433 One of the principal reasons which compelled Lenin to formulate the New Economic Policy was the necessity of restoring the food production of the Soviet Union.

'"War Communism" and attempts to introduce "integral socialism" into the countryside ended in 1922. At that date began the period of "liberalism" in Communist policy in relation to the villages. The peasantry were allowed freedom in the choice of land labour and almost complete freedom in other economic activities. The years between 1922 and 1929 produced excellent results: the lost sowing area was recovered and breeding was resumed. The food question in the country was improving' (Prof. 113 Markov, *Socialist Economy in U.S.S.R.*, Part 2, *Agriculture*, Paris, 1937). By 1929 agricultural production approached pre-war standards (150–160 million quintals of cereals compared with 200 millions average for the years 1909–13). In spite of the fact that, following the break-up of large estates, the peasants had expanded the sown area at the expense of pasture (and according to the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia* were showing a diminishing average on arable of 15–20 per cent as a result of more primitive methods of farming), the breeding of cattle and horses was nearing pre-war figures and the production of pigs was improving.

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423 1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political
661 and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding
565 chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the
474 redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution
[433] against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable: during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to
475 the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the
474 new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—
661 including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

474 As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really
423 serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the
686 Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32, and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

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had been based. '"Liberal" tendencies began already in 1932 in the sense that *kolkhozniki* (individual members of the *Kolkhozy*) were allowed to keep their own cattle (Decree of 4 February 1932). Subsequently, in 1935, *kolkhozniki* were accorded the right to farm their own private allotments within the boundaries of the *Kolkhozy*. 474 423 656

These modifications in policy soon gave positive results. It is difficult to say whether the *Kolkhozy* have come to be accepted by the peasantry as the permanent basis of rural life. At the same time there can be no doubt that the grant of certain rights of private farming to the *kolkhozniki*, combined with a relatively free market, has tended to a notable improvement in the conditions of peasant life. In consequence food production throughout the whole country has again increased.

There are now four forms of farming in existence side by side in the Soviet countryside: 423

(*a*) *Sovkhozy* (State farms); 471
(*b*) Individual farms; 433
(*c*) *Kolkhozy* (Collective farms);
(*d*) Allotments belonging to the *kolkhozniki* within the area of the *Kolkhozy*.

The relative importance of these different types of farm can be judged from the areas allotted to each in the 'sowing plan' of 1936: *Sovkhozy* covered 16 million hectares; individual farms, 5 million; *Kolkhozy*, 108 million; *kolkhozniki* holdings, 8 million.

Obviously, the *Kolkhozy* constitute the most important source of agricultural production. On an estimated yield of 8·3 quintals per hectare, the *Kolkhoz* pays 1·7 quintals to the state in taxes; 3·3 to the governmental 'machine stations' which provide and maintain plant; the balance goes to the *kolkhozniki*. The *Kolkhozy*, with a sowing area of rather over 100 million hectares and a yield of 7 quintals per hectare, supply the state organizations with about 150 million quintals (approximately 15 million tons) surplus over the consumption of the rural population. This reckoning is, of course, purely theoretical, but, in 1934, when bread rations existed for the town population, the administration did distribute about 10 million tons of bread.

The importance of the *kolkhozniki* (who are allowed to cultivate from ¼ hectare to 1 hectare each) lies in the production of vegetables and fruit and, to a certain extent, of livestock. The Plan for 1937 estimated that individual farmers and *kolkhozniki* possessed 29 million head of cattle as compared with 4½ million owned by the *Kolkhozy* over their vastly greater acreage. The private farmers and

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423 *kolkhozniki* were reckoned to be even richer in pigs, of which they
471 counted 15 million against 5 million on the *Kolkhozy* and an even
433 lesser number on the *Sovkhozy*. The tiny bits of land which belong to the *kolkhozniki* personally, as well as their domestic animals, have become a school of individual farming which has grown up in the middle of 'the Socialist experiment' as a compromise with the dictates of economics and human nature. In twenty-eight towns in 1938, 82 per cent rye flour, 74 per cent wheat flour, 86 per cent beef, 93 per cent milk, 97 per cent eggs, 87 per cent potatoes, and 72 per cent cabbages, were brought to market by *kolkhozniki* and individual farmers, and only the balance came from the state and collective farms. True the official statisticians could find comfort in the fact that as against the general balance of state commerce which amounted to 100 milliards of roubles the free market only absorbed 16 milliards: but the free market shows a definite tendency to grow and in four years has doubled its transactions.

656 The successful private initiative of the *kolkhozniki* has already
423 begun to weigh upon the minds of the protagonists of the integral Revolution. In the spring of 1938 a Government Decree proclaimed that 'abuses are observed on those allotments of land which are given over to *kolkhozniki* for the personal cultivation of kitchen-gardens or other domestic needs. These abuses consist in the fact that the allotments are sometimes not situated next to the habitations of the *kolkhozniki*, but lie in the middle of *Kolkhoz* lands and exceed the size allowed by the law. The worst part of it all is that these allotments have become the principal care of *kolkhozniki*, and that they show negligence in the accomplishment of their duties in collective farming. It has also been affirmed that these allotments are sometimes cultivated by people who are not members of *Kolkhozy*. A stop has to be put to this state of things as it leads to the development of bourgeois tendencies. The dangerous influence of *kulaki*, who have succeeded in escaping, is suspected.' As a result of this situation, Stalin, by a Decree of 15 August 1939, ordered a 'verification' of all allotments taken over by *kolkhozniki* for personal cultivation: he took the opportunity to recall the law which provided that such allotments were not to exceed ¼ or ½ a hectare. It was also declared that all allotments in isolated situations in the middle of *Kolkhoz* land were illegal and should be abolished: special attention was directed to *Kolkhozy* lying in the Ukraine and Western Russia. *Kolkhozniki*, whose individual allotments were to be abolished, were themselves to be expelled from their *Kolkhozy* and united in new *Kolkhozy* in regions where 'new land' could be found. For this purpose attention was directed to the lands beyond the Volga, in

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western Siberia, the Altai and the Far East. The execution of Stalin's commands is to be completed by September 1940. It is not to be anticipated that the acute conditions of 1929–34 will be repeated as a result of this new drive against the human nature of the Russian rural masses: the Communist machine has broken the strength of peasant society. At the same time, there is little doubt that the harvest of 1939–40 will not be as abundant as those of 1936–8.

The influence of the Revolution and of the Soviet régime on forestry in the South of Russia has been no less baleful than on other branches of rural industry. At the end of the nineteenth century woods covered 20 per cent of the whole area of the Ukraine; in 1928, according to the most optimistic estimates of Soviet statisticians, they did not occupy more than 7 per cent. Even in such a 'half-steppe' region as Poltava, owing to the care of the Imperial Government and of large landowners, woods had covered 10 per cent of the total area. 'Destruction of forests is one of the greatest evils because it is followed by the formation of deep ravines which drain the district of underground waters. The consequence of the formation of such ravines is that streams carry away valuable soil to the rivers and the sea. Every year thousands of hectares of good black earth are lost to the labourer and only serve to make the Dniepr and its affluents more shallow. The destruction of forests, the formation of ravines, the drying up of underground waters, threaten the future of the Ukraine with the gravest consequences.'

The Soviet Government is well aware of the dark side of its 'achievement' in the agricultural life of the South of Russia. But, as is well known, the Soviet leaders intend to effect a radical change in the balance of productive forces within the Union. Their reasons for this intention are both political and ideological: political because they realize that their dictatorship rests upon the industrial proletariat and has always aroused the antagonism of the peasants; ideological because they are the apostles of the mechanistic conception of life and, hypnotized by the material achievements of the capitalist world, they ape it in their attempt to transform it and can seek nothing more profound than the realization of Stalin's dream 'to catch up and surpass America'.

In 1913 the relation of agricultural to industrial production in Russia was 59·4 to 40·6. Under the original Five Year Plan formulated in 1928 the Soviets aimed at the attainment of a balance which should allocate 80·2 to industry and only 19·8 to agriculture. This fantastic aim was based obviously on the possibilities of bringing into exploitation the vast mineral resources which were known to lie under the soil of the Soviet Union. And all the political ruthless-

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payment of a specific amount of tax in kind and left to the peasant 432
the rest of his crop. In an endeavor to get this grain into Russia, 241
the government offered to buy it but it did not have the funds or 185
the inclination to pay for it at the market price. The financial reforms connected with the introduction of the chervonets could, to a certain degree, make it expedient for the peasant to sell to the government for cash, and as time went on the peasant gained the power of selling his crop for cash but the Moscow control of transportation and the prohibition of large scale trading left him helpless and he saw himself forced to dispose of it locally or to the government. Then the government made a fixed price which was far [435]
below that of the free market, and was often scarcely a third of the amount that the peasant could have secured. This sale of large quantities of agricultural products at a fixed price gradually became the rule and was one of the signs that the period of toleration for private income was coming to an end.

In 1925, the government began to clamp down on the small 656
traders, the Nepmen, who had profited by the opportunities which 661
they had had. Again it had a large choice of measures. Thus, depending on the situation, it could invoke laws against the hiring of labor; it could order the state agencies to refuse to buy from or sell to an obnoxious individual and thus isolate him; it could suspend his ration cards and perquisites, take away his right of voting and thus make him a pariah in the community; it could levy prohibitive taxes which would put him out of business and confiscate his property; or it could find some violation of some other law or regulation and imprison or exile him.

The degree of pressure which was put upon the peasants and 439
the workers varied from year to year. Each year Ukraine was 241
compelled to export more to Russia without regard to the needs of the local population. Thus, the amount of grain rose from 1,050,000 tons in 1924-5 to 3,165,000 tons in 1926-7, when there was a bumper crop, but in 1927-8, when the harvest partially failed and there were signs of need in the country, the amount collected and exported rose to 4,353,000 tons. At the same time, the continually increasing demands aroused again a spirit of oppo-

CHAPTER NINE

The Five Year Plan

Lenin and the Communists had never made any concealment of the fact that the New Economic Policy was only a passing concession to put an end to the stagnation and demoralization which had resulted from the civil war and the period of Militant Communism. It was not the adoption of a definite plan for the future nor was it a sign of a growing rapprochement with capitalism or a gesture toward the rest of the world, as the partisans of the Soviets abroad tried to make it appear. [185] 656 471 661

With each step of the recovery of the economy of Ukraine and of the Soviet Union as a whole, unobstrusive steps were taken to remove the various concessions which had been made. Year by year, from about 1925, new regulations were introduced by the Commissariat of Finance, one of the All-Union Commissariats which had the definite object of suppressing not only the concessions but of tightening up the restrictions on individual life and preparing the way for socialism and communism. By one device or another, the Nepmen were broken. Now the government forbade the state trusts to sell to them as individual traders either raw materials or finished or semi-finished products. Agreements which had been freely made by the government were either suddenly cancelled or were perverted. Obviously false charges were brought against the various individuals and they were fined exorbitantly or they were arrested and deported. By the fall of 1927 the sector of private trade had been almost completely liquidated and the way was open for the central government to do what it would with the situation.

With the Nepmen disposed of, the way was open for a similar attack upon the wealthier classes of the peasants and those who

656 471 661 [427] had profited by the operation of the Ukrainian land code which, as we have seen, was less rigid than were the similar arrangements in the RSFSR, where the land society was organized far more on the lines of a collective than it was in Ukraine. It was always possible to apply individually any of the laws against the leasing of land or the employment of hired help, for in both cases the provisions had been left vague and indefinite, so that the authorities could act whenever they so desired. As a matter of fact, as one of the first measures the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic reduced the period on which a lease could be made from thirteen to six years and thus it was easily possible to upset many of the calculations that had been made by the richer and more progressive landowners.

[435] At the same time, the closing of the official markets rendered it possible for the government to force the peasants to dispose of their grain at the officially pegged prices which in the grain-growing districts were considerably lower than they were in the less fertile areas of the north. If this did not produce the desired results, it was equally possible to demand the grain tax in kind and to compel the peasants to turn over, free of charge and under the guise of payments, additional supplies. All these measures, which were introduced in many cases personally and not by districts, caused the peasants to feel themselves becoming steadily more impoverished and less able to resist the demands of the government.

631 642 On the other hand, the All-Union Commissariats which took precedence over those in the individual Soviet republics and which were, in reality, staffed only by Russian Communists, effectively broke the power of the localities or of the republics to have any special voice in the management of their own affairs. This was, in its turn, skilfully explained by stressing the superior requirements of the Union which, on any closer analysis, turned out to be the interests of the Russian area. Thus, at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a Russian who was at the time the chief of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission remarked in an unambiguous manner: "It seems to me that we must assign perfectly clear tasks, to emphasize that the national

[1925, during relinquishment of NEP -- Analyst]

626 device was also too obvious, for the new journal continued to
538 criticize the Russian policy and in 1931 it was forced to disband and most of the members who wanted to continue to write passed into the VUSPP, which, with all its rigid adherence to the party line, could not be too sure as to what that party line really was.

At one point in his career Skrypnyk, who was in many ways opposed to Khvylovy, dreamed of the establishment of a Federation of the Unions of Revolutionary Writers of Ukraine. He succeeded in forcing this upon the Futurists and many smaller leftist groups and also the *New Generation,* but his failure to make this real in 1931 was but a sign of the future.

By this time the VUSPP, along with the RAPP, had become the dominating force politically and Skrypnyk was forced to give up his endeavors and to allow most of his Federation members to join the VUSPP. This was but another step in the decay of all literary schools and it reflected the period of uncertainty and of a definite degree of opposition to the domination of the RAPP.

By the end of the twenties, the opportunities for independent thinking in literature had grown exceedingly few and scattered. There were still, in general, only the two currents of Ukrainian and Russian Communism, and the former was definitely beginning to wane under the continual attacks that were delivered both by its opponents and the Communist Party through its official organs.
[186] Still, up until 1931, Ukrainian literature continued to develop and the literary disputes, often over minor points of literature, thought and culture, animated society and lent a zest to the various writings. These now more than ever began to reflect a growing apprehension over the conditions as they were and the impossibility of equating the ideals of Communism and the realities of the Russian domination of the country.

A more decided blow was given by the decree of April 23, 1932.
[656] This ended all literary discussions and abolished all literary societies and groups throughout the entire Soviet Union. In place of these, Stalin announced the establishment of a single society throughout the entire Union, the All-Union Association of Soviet Writers, and turned this over to Maksim Gorky, perhaps the most prominent

The crying need of the Ukrainians was for consumer goods. 433
Odesa and Kharkiv requested that they might be given the power 185
to build textile mills to supply the needs of the local population. 656
The request was denied, for the authorities had decided that the textile industry was to be concentrated in the RSFSR. The iron and steel cities requested that they might be given the permission to build factories to complete the fabrication of certain delicate types of machinery. The request was refused because it was to be only in the Moscow area that such articles were to be made. It was to be the task of Ukraine to furnish the raw material, the iron ore from Kryvy Rih, the coal of the Donbas, and to prepare the semi-finished pig-iron and other forms of semi-fabricated material that were needed by the central plants.

The plan not only provided for construction. It went even further and specified the exact amount of products that were to be turned out by each individual plant. While it was possible to secure some profits from the over-fulfillment of the plan, regardless of the effect that this might have upon the plan as a whole, any under-fulfillment was treated as a gross failure of obligation to the state.

This led, in turn, to additional restrictions on the freedom of [466]
the workers. Punishments were ordered for tardiness, for absence from employment even for a single day without a satisfactory reason, for an attempt to change the place of employment. These regulations were not the product of the governing bodies of the republics but of the Union authorities themselves and they were transmitted from Moscow to the national republics through the liaison between the All-Union commissariats and their subordinate organs.

It was the same with agriculture. Moscow knew what each collective farm, each kolkhoz, each sovkhoz was to furnish, and woe to the group that failed. The famine had been the result and that had been used to break the spirit of resistance of the Ukrainian villagers. The government specified the acreage that was to be devoted to wheat, to barley, to all of the crops that could be raised and it did no good if the local agronomists pointed out new

1/1 [1930's - after famine -- Analyst]

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

166 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the
626 village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past.* Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

* [after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

186 [661] [665]

unified Party, should "rule" within each smaller nation which had formed part of the tsarist empire.

Having provided for the initial objective of substantial Communist control, however, the Bolshevik leaders made sweeping statements against "Great Russian chauvinism," and directed that the culture of each nation be "national in form, socialist in content." Encouraged by this apparent desire for development of the national culture at the expense of the Russian cultural supremacy, which had been grafted on their peoples in tsarist days, many of the Communist leaders of the non-Russian nations set about vigorously promoting an independent cultural life as soon as Communist control was established. In the Ukraine, the major leader in the effort during the early twenties was the commissar of education, Alexander Shums'kyi; after his deposition in 1927 he was succeeded by Nicholas Skrypnyk, an even more devoted Communist, but a firm adherent of Ukrainian cultural nationalism.[23] To what extent these men were sincere adherents of Ukrainian nationalism and to what extent the favor they extended to it was motivated by a desire to secure popular support and to curb the overweening power of Moscow in the interest of an internationalism which, to them, was in closer accord with original Communist ideology, it is hard to say. At any rate, they went to very considerable lengths to encourage specifically Ukrainian traits and traditions, especially in scholarship, literature, and the schools. While these Communist supporters of Ukrainian nationalism always formed only one segment of the ruling group in the Ukraine, and hence could not completely eradicate Russian permeation of

[656]

[23]No thorough treatment of the Ukraine under Soviet rule exists. Among the best brief analyses in English are John S. Reshetar, "National Deviation in the Soviet Union," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XII (April, 1953), 162–74; Michael Pap, "Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine," *Review of Politics*, XIV (April, 1952), 204–32; and an older but generally accurate account by Lancelot Lawton, "Ukraina: Europe's Greatest Problem," *East Europe*, III (Spring, 1939), 28–45. The continuation of Hrushevs'kyi's *A History of the Ukraine* by Professor O. J. Frederiksen, based on notes by Luke Mishuha (Chapter XXV) is also useful, as are more general works on the Soviet system, such as Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), Chapter IV, and Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1950), I, 289–307. The sources are, of course, voluminous and highly scattered. I can claim no special mastery of them, although my limited acquaintance leads me to the conclusions cited in the text, which are approximately those of Reshetar and Pap.

nian Communists who wished to create an independent Soviet Ukraine participated in these uprisings. The policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine had a clearly predatory character. The Communist Commissar Schlichter said of the tasks of the Soviet Russian campaign at a session of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919: 642 669

"You all remember that when Ukraine was becoming Soviet with every day of the advance of the Red Army we became easier in our minds; the rich-in-bread Ukraine is ours! . . . We have four central supply detachments. We set all hopes on them. We have a lot of workers we have sent out who will be able to overflow all Ukrainian villages. We shall always remember that the looks of the proletariat of Russia are turned towards Ukraine" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 2: Kharkov, 1928).

Not only by the ruthless pillage were the Ukrainian people put against the Russian Communist dictatorship; by its nationalist policy, too, it roused great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians. The Rumanian Communist Rakovsky, who was appointed by Moscow as Premier of the Soviet Government of Ukraine, declared that the Ukrainian language and culture were 'petty bourgeois' and that the use of the Ukrainian language in public institutions was necessary only for 'Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries'. [186] 656 191

For this reason the 'dictatorship of the Russian culture' was introduced in Ukraine by the Russian Communists as a 'proletarian' one. "The Soviet Government in Ukraine in 1918 made in fact Russian the official language", — writes the Communist N. Popov in his *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine* (1929). Against the declarations of an 'independent Soviet Ukraine', the Rakovsky Government proclaimed the 'federation' of Ukraine with Russia. There could not be free elections to the Soviets in Ukraine. The power in the villages was given to the 'Comittees of Poor Peasants' consisting often of people sent from Russia. According to the instruction these Comittees were given they had the duty — "to fulfil precisely and relentlessly all orders of the supply authorities . . ."

13. Risings in Ukraine

In spring 1919, when the Soviet Army had reached the Dniester River, Moscow prepared its forces for the support of Soviet Hungary. But at that time the same troops who had fought against the Franco-Greek forces under the command of Hrihoriev, Tyutyunnyk and others, started the fight against the Russian Communists. Of the strength of this movement Rakovsky, Premier of 669

people took place. The Ukrainian Government and Army were 669
forced under the pressure of Denikin to leave the temporary capital of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, the city of Kamenets in Podolia, on November 15, 1919. The Ukrainian Army marched into the hinterland of the enemy. The enormous partisan movement in Ukraine in autumn 1919, stopped Denikin's offensive on Moscow. Of this the Russian Red Army took advantage, broke through the front of Denikin and marched into Ukraine again. The front of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, brought into disorder by the war with Denikin, could not be restored at once, and the Soviet Russian troops seized almost the entire territory of Ukraine again.

When the leaders of the Russian Volunteers saw the coming of their definite defeat, they offered the command of the Ukrainian Army which was carrying on a partisan war against the oppressors of Ukraine, an alliance against the Russian Communists. The delegate of the Russian Volunteer Army, Colonel Popov, wrote in January, 1920, to the Ukrainian Supreme Command: "We have what you want — arms, but you have that we have not — the confidence of the population". The Ukrainians declined this offer of the Russian 'Whites' convinced that any alliance with them would bring only damage to the Ukrainian struggle for liberation.

The Army of the Ukrainian Republic began its 'Winter-Campaign', famous in the history of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, in Lubar in Volhynia on December 6, 1919. This army, by order of its Government, made partisan war on the territories of Ukraine against 'White' and 'Red' Russia until May 5, 1920. Only leaning upon the confidence and the active support of the population could this army cover distances of thousands of miles carrying the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of equipment did not allow the Army of the 'Winter Campaign' to accept in its ranks many thousands of Ukrainians who wished to fight actively for the independent Ukraine.

16. The New Tactics of the Russian Communists in Ukraine

The failure of the Soviet Russian policy in Ukraine in 1919 656 ●
caused much discussion among the Communists themselves. By 186
order from Moscow, in October 1919, not only the 'Government of 668
Soviet Ukraine', headed by Rakovsky, was abolished, but also the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Among the Communists who had worked in Ukraine in 1919 a group of the so-called federalists appeared that demanded from Moscow more rights for Ukraine. The leader of this group,

656 G. Lapchinsky, explained that Ukraine must be an independent state
186 and not a Russian colony.

668 The powerful Ukrainian movement forced the Russian Communists to alter for a certain time their tactics in Ukraine. The Soviet Russian Government ordered the Communists to pay attention to the national peculiarities of Ukraine. In December 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution on the recognition by Russia of the independent Soviet Ukraine. Among other matters this resolution states that the "members of the Communist Party in Ukrainian territory are obliged to realise the right of the working masses of learning their mother language in schools, and speaking it in all Soviet institutions".

The resolution recommends the restriction of the requisition of food from the Ukrainian peasants. Besides, this resolution of the Russian CP pointed out that the principal task of Soviet construction in Ukraine was the requisition of arms from the population.

The President of the Soviet Russian Government, Lenin, wrote in *The Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victory over Denikin* on January 4, 1920:

"The independence of Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party. Only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can decide the question on their Soviet Congress — whether Ukraine should be united with Russia or left an independent Republic . . . We want a voluntary union of nations, a union that would not permit violence of one nation against another".

All these declarations of the Russian Communist Party leaders had the aim to lull the vigilance of the masses of the Ukrainian people. In reality the Soviet Russian Government did not even intend to change its imperialist course against Ukraine. Moscow feared the armed Ukrainian people and distrusted them. Therefore, for instance, a conference of the members of the Russian Communist Party in Homel passed the following resolution in October 1919:

"The advance to the South and the organisation of Soviet administration in Ukraine are possible only with the aid of regular disciplined troops, who, in any case, must not be of local origin" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 6: Kharkov, 1926, p. 4).

669 The Soviet Russian troops, after having seized the Ukrainian
661 territory until the spring of 1920, began at once the struggle against

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CHAPTER III

UKRAINE UNDER SOVIET RUSSIAN RULE SINCE 1920

1. The Soviet Régime in Ukraine 1920—21

[656] 668 186 After the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and Lenin's letter to the Ukrainian workers and peasants announcing a new approach to the Ukrainian problem (December 1919; January-1920) the policy of Moscow towards Ukraine did not change in substance. Soviet Russia did not trust even the Communists of Ukrainian nationality or those Russian Communists who wished to meet the Ukrainian national demands even partly. The group of Communists-Federalists headed by G. Lapchinsky published in February 1920, a pamphlet entitled *Project of a Resolution on the Party Policy.* The authors of this pamphlet protested against the rule of the Russian element in Ukraine. They wrote on the "mad, and, for the cause of the revolution, disastrous plan of the occupation of Ukraine by the military and political forces of Soviet Russia. After the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation in the times of the Romanovs and Hapsburgs, every attempt to direct the fate of the country from outside will arouse the growth of nationalism".

[665] In the pamphlet, facts on the full dependence of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Central Committee of the Russian CP are quoted: thus the Communist organisation in Ukraine — "had to fulfil all demands of the Central Committee of the Russian CP, even, if it regarded them injurious to the cause of the revolution in Ukraine".

656 666 Moscow deported the opposing Communists from Ukraine or expelled them from the Party. The Soviet Russian régime in Ukraine thereto was strengthened. For this purpose Moscow gave preponderance to the Russian element in the Soviet administration in Ukraine. For instance, the election system for the 4th Congress of the Soviets in Ukraine in 1920 was the following: from 1000 soldiers of the Red Army one deputy was elected, from 10,000 workers one deputy, and one deputy from 50,000 peasants. It should be remembered that 1920 in the ranks of the Red Army in Ukraine

there were 85% Russians and only 8% Ukrainians. With this 656
election system the representatives of the peasants, the most 666
numerous part of the Ukrainian population, made only 12,7% of the members of this Soviet Congress. Finance, national economy, railways, labour — concisely all foundations of the economic life of Ukraine — were concentrated in Moscow. All Ukrainian co-operative organisations were subordinated to Moscow. During [651]
1920 Ukraine had to deliver to Russia 160 million of Pud of grain (1 Pud is 36 lbs.), 6 million Pud meat, 30 million Pud potatoes, 255 million eggs, big consignments of sugar, etc. The Russian Red Army made requisitions for its needs separately and confiscated in the last months of 1920 about 30 million Pud grain in Ukraine (*Collection of Reports of the Government of the USSR:* Kharkov 1921).

No wonder that in consequence of this exploitation the Urkrai- 669
nian partisan movement was spreading. At the end of 1920 there were not less than 40,000 Ukrainian partisans in Ukraine who fought against the Russian Communists as an organised force. Evidence of the extent of this struggle is given to us in the trophies of the Soviet Russian troops seized in the war with the Ukrainian partisans 1920—21: 43 guns, 1,812 machine-guns, 31,788 rifles etc. *(Collection of Reports).* In the course of only one year, 1921, the Soviet Secret Police in Ukraine suppressed 6,000 partisan organisations. (*Communist:* Kharkov, February 11, 1923).

2. The Famine of 1921/22 and the Policy of Soviet Russia in Ukraine 731

The Soviet Russian Government took advantage of the horrible 656
famine of 1921/22 in Ukraine and succeeded in strengthening its rule there. A drought in the fall of 1920 and spring 1921 was followed by a bad harvest, and a great dearth of food arose. A real famine began. However, the policy of the Russian Government in Ukraine, intending to get as much food as possible, did not change. Before the outside world the Russian authorities tried to hide the hunger catastrophe in Ukraine, and directed all foreign aid coming from America and Western Europe into Russia. Though in Ukraine in autumn 1921, millions of the Ukrainian population were starving the Russian Government, nevertheless, took away from the hungry regions the rest of the food stocks, and exported them to Russia. This roused the attention of foreigners who stayed at that time in Ukraine. The American historian H. H. Fisher writes in his book on the famine of 1921/22 that the representatives of the Soviet Russian Government demanded resolutely that it was

731 "necessary to request the ARA (American Relief Administration) not to split its forces, *but to concentrate them entirely on the Volga*
656 *area*" (p. 248).

Professor Fisher remarks in his book:

"The policy of the Communist Party with respect to the Ukraine famine presents many curious aspects. Not only did the Moscow Government fail to bring the Ukrainian situation to the knowledge of the American Relief Administration as it did other regions much more remote, but it actively discouraged... anything likely to bring the Americans in contact with the Ukraine... Before the ARA had begun its operations (January, 1922) the Moscow and the so-called Kharkov Government did not undertake anything serious for the aid to the hungry people of Ukraine". (H.H.Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia:* New York, 1927). Further, Prof. Fisher says in his book:

"From the first the Moscow Government had discouraged all proposals which tended to bring the ARA into contact with the Ukraine. Litvinov (at that time Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, *P. F.*), had described the port of Odessa, back in the fall of 1921, as out of the question for ARA operations, although it was subsequently used very successfully. It is also significant that, until the ARA had investigated and established outposts in the south, Moscow virtually ignored in its press the famine conditions along the Black Sea..." (p. 252).

731 Prof. Fisher states that the Russian Communist Government
656 exported food from the hungry regions in Ukraine:
437

"It is astonishing enough that these trainloads of food have been loaded in Kiev and Poltava and sent hundreds of miles to the hungry along the Volga, instead of being transported a score or so miles across the Gubernia line to Odessa or Nikolaiev, where there was a first class famine in swing. It is even more astonishing, when one learns... that Odessa Gubernia, with a crop of only seventeen per cent of normal and with people dying of hunger in the streets of its principal town as well as in the huts of its villages, sent sixty-five cars to Central Russia, while Nikolaiev, with a crop only four per cent of normal, and containing in the city of Kherson the most desperately afflicted spot in South Russia, in fact, one of the worst in the entire country, sent eight cars to the Volga" (p. 261).

On the export of grain from Ukraine during the famine of 1921/22 the American historian brings the following facts:

"The Gubernia of Podolia produced a considerable food surplus. The adjoining Gubernia of Odessa had a deficit, and many people were doomed to starve if food were not brought in. According to

the scheme officially outlined for the good of Russia, the surplus 731
food in Podolia should not be used to save the lives of the peasants 656
in Odessa, a few miles away, but should be carried through the 439
starving regions, placed on board a steamer and sold in Hamburg . . ." (p. 323).

A representative of the Relief Committee of Fridtjof Nansen who was in Ukraine at the beginning of 1922 gives the following facts on the famine:

"Eight million souls are starving in the south of the Ukraine, 731
2½ millions of them have absolutely nothing to eat. A further 656
2½ millions are feeding themselves on substitutes, such as hay, 261
dried plants, etc., but are not getting any normal meals; three millions have some supplies, but in such small quantities that they will soon be reckoned in the first and second categories. It may be said that before the end of April 7 million souls will come under these two categories. About 700,000 little children who have been brought into municipal asylums do not receive more than one fifth of the normal portion. Child mortality is tremendous. It reaches 50%. In Zaporoje one million souls are litterally starving. 60% are children. Cannibalism is spreading. Ten thousand people die in Zaporoje daily. All the cattle and the horses have been devoured". (*La famine en Ukraine:* Genève, 1922).

The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee gives a picture of the famine in Ukraine as follows:

"The country side is parched, without trees or plants, almost entirely black. The straw of the roofs is being used to nourish men and animals. People relate that they first ate up all dogs, cats, crows that they could catch and then took to the starving cattle, to boot-leather and furniture wood. You hear accounts and find evidence of necrophagy and cannibalism. You speak with people who have devoured their children, their brothers and sisters. You see skeleton-like human forms lying in the peasant's huts, dying, or waiting without hope, to be rescued by death . . . Usually no one takes the trouble, or no one has sufficient energy to bury the dead".

In the time when the Ukrainian people were starving in masses, 731
the Russian Government took care only of the aid for the hungry 656
along the Volga. The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee in Ukraine wrote in his report of 1922:

"At the beginning of this year one could have seen in famine-stricken districts of the Gouvernement Nikolaiev such proclamations: 'Workers of Nikolaiev: Come to the assistance of the famine-stricken of the Volga region!' This happened at a time when this

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
656 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Co ress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky[1] wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine
687 the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 1/3 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres (*The Bolshevik of Ukraine*, No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the
517 Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. *Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan* (1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

871 every teacher in the schools in Ukraine had orders to spread Com-
656 munist propaganda, to fight the appearance of national discontent with the Russian rule by every means, and was obliged to insult the
[814] struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation. In schools, Ukrainian history was falsely interpreted as well as in literature and in films. For instance, clinging to the tradition taken from Tsarist Russia, the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa who at the beginning of the 18th century wanted to free Ukraine from Muscovite dependence, has in Soviet historiography the epithet of a 'traitor' and 'reactionary'. But Tsar Peter I. and Tsar Ivan the Terrible, are glorified by Soviet school and science as 'progressive democratic rulers'.

659 The Ukrainian religious life under the régime of Soviet Russian
661 occupation had to suffer from special persecutions. In 1921, in Soviet Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Autocephal Church, independent of the Moscow Patriarch, was organised. This Church, headed by its idealistic leaders, the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier of the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1918—19 and others, completed a great task for the cultural and moral improvement of the Ukrainian nation. Moscow attempted to destroy the strong organisation of the Ukrainian Autocephal Church with the help of its agents, but did not succeed in this. Then the Soviet Government ruined by bloody repressions the Ukrainian Church after having destroyed its entire hierarchy and masses of its followers (1929).

661 In connection with the 'General Line' which had placed unbear-
517 able burdens on Ukrainian economy, a mass discontent against Moscow increased among the Ukrainians. The ruthless economic
815 exploitation and political oppression by Russia caused, among the Ukrainian people, a permanent oppositon which appeared in various forms. Therefore, the Moscow Government decided to terrorise the Ukrainian intelligentsia which bore the brunt of the political efforts of the Ukrainian nation. For this purpose a number of trials against the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian science and social life were arranged; the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine with the participation of the prominent member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, Serhy Yefremov, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier, Professor Osyp Hermayze and others in Kharkov, in spring 1930. Thousands of innocent people, especially students, perished in the prisoners' cells of the GPU without any trial. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Academy of Science was exposed to repressions. In place of the imprisoned or expelled members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, the Communists appointed their own people though without scientific merits,
46 but politically faithful to Moscow.

the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933: u 661 665

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

6. *The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33*

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation. u 731 656

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*). Su [474] [423] u [474] [423]

Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

731 the Moscow Government, in 1933, forbade foreign journalists to
656 enter Ukraine.

Back in the summer of 1932 the Ukrainian farmers in Canada addressed the Soviet Red Cross with the proposition to send their grain for gratis distribution among the hungry in Ukraine. But Moscow resolutely refused to accept this gift. The hunger catastrophe of 1932/33 was so great that the population of Ukraine died in masses, and cannibalism and necrophagy spread among the people. The peasants of Ukraine, weakened and decimated by the famine, were forced to enter 'voluntarily' the Soviet collective farms. Though the harvest of 1933 was good, millions of Ukrainians did not live to see it.

The dimensions of the devastations of Ukraine by the famine 'organised' by Soviet Russia were carefully concealed by the Russian Communist Government, and are even now kept secret. Only by chance some foreign correspondents learned about the results of this famine in Ukraine. W. H. Chamberlin writes in his book, *The Confessions of an Individualist:* New York, 1941, on the famine of 1933 as follows:

"There were many rumours of mass starvation, especially in the normally rich farming regions of Ukraine and the North Cau-
[486] casus. The impression that something very abnormal was taking place in the villages was strengthened by the fact that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had introduced a new rule forbidding journalists to travel in Russia without special permission — a permission which was never granted when Ukraine and the North Caucasus were mentioned as destinations. The official explanation of this ruling would have deserved an international mendacity prize. It was that the presence of foreign correspondents would disturb the harvesting operations . . . The ban on journalistic travel was suggestively lifted after the new harvest had been gathered in — after there had been an opportunity to bury the corpses and to remove the outward signs of the famine —".

The same author writes about his visit to the Ukrainian part of the North Caucasus — the Kuban Region:

"This had been one of the richest and most smiling agricultural regions in Russia . . . There was an amazing lack of domestic animals; one saw none of the dogs that had formerly rushed out barking when we entered Cossack villages. In the first house we entered at random we found that seven members of the family have died of hunger. Three had survived. We did not meet any peasant who did not tell us of the loss of relatives or friends".

On the famine in Ukraine Chamberlin writes:

"Poltava had acquired a particularly bad reputation; more than once we heard in Moscow of the carts that moved through the streets in the early morning, picking up dead bodies ... In Moscow it was easy to glib officials to deny to credulous foreigners that there had been any starvation. In Poltava famine could not be denied, although its extent was minimised ... While we were visiting a village called Zhuke, near Poltava, two local officials were carefully steering us into the homes of the petty officials of the local collective farm. Suddenly we decided to go into a house at random. We found a girl of fourteen huddled up on the bench which ran around the wall of the house. Had she a father? Yes, he was at work in the field. A mother? No, her mother and her four brothers and sisters had died during the last winter and spring. And her father, as we found, was still an edinolichnik, a peasant working his own land. Marvellous fatalistic stubbornness of a man who would see almost his whole family starve to death and still refuse to accept the new servitude of the collective farm!" (pp. 154—157). 731 656

In talks with the population and the reprensentatives of the administration, Chamberlin learned that in 1933 there had died of hunger in the Poltava region almost 15%, in the district of Cherkasy in Ukraine about 30%.

Stanley Richardson, correspondent of the American 'Associated Press' sent on September 22, 1933, the following telegram from Moscow to America:

"Soviet Russia has this year such a good harvest that a repetition of the undernourishment which had recently caused heavy losses of people and domestic animals is imposible. These losses one could see during a journey lasting a week through Ukraine and the Caucasus, the granaries of Moscow".

Owing to the Soviet censorship, Richardson could not give any figures about the victims of the famine in Ukraine. He quotes only the words of a Soviet Commissar in Ukraine named Asatkin:

"A great number of cattle and horses had perished. An exceptionally great number of peasants left the famine-stricken territory, looking for better living conditions. Many of them did not return" (*Ukrainian Voice:* Winnipeg, 27. 11. 1933).

A correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* who had been in Ukraine in the fall of 1933 gave a report on the Ukrainian hunger catastrophe, according to official Soviet sources:

In 1932 in Ukraine there had been 5,543,000 horses, in autumn 1933 only 2,772,000 remained — loss of 50%; the number of hogs diminished in the same time from 3,472,000 to 1,390,000; the number of sheep fell from 6,652,000 to 1,543,000. The top Communist

731 officials in Ukraine confirmed to the correspondent of the *Man-*
656 *cher Guardian* that in this country there had been a great mortality from hunger. Comparing the situation of that time in Ukraine and the North Caucasus with the situation in Russia, the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardin* came to the following conclusion when he said:

"It can be definitely stated that no provinces within a radius of several hundred miles of Moscow experienced the Ukrainian and North Caucasian extremities" (*Manchester Guardian:* October 19, and October 21, 1933).

The correspondent of a Jewish Socialist journal in New York, Lang, gave a description of the situation in the summer and autumn of 1933 in Ukraine: he saw how grown-ups and children were starving to death, he had been in totally depopulated villages where the inhabitants had died of hunger or fled from their homes (*Forwards:* 27. 12. 1933).

The American journalist Walter Duranty 'optimistically' estimated the number of the victims of the famine in USSR in 1933 as 5 million people. Of course, the principal part of these victims were in Ukraine, against which the Russian Communist régime was carrying its special policy of exstirpation.

In consequence of the famine and the repressions in Ukraine, principally men had perished. Therefore for instance, in 1932—33 the women in the collective farms in Ukraine were 60—70% of the total (*Communist:* Kharkov, 26. 1. 1934). The extent of child mortality was shown clearly in 1940; in the fall of 1940, the lack of births in 1932/33 forced the authorities to close parallel classes or abstain from opening first classes in many Ukrainian schools, for there where no children! The consequences of the famine in Ukraine could be seen in the decrease of the cultivation plain of the winter crops in autumn 1933: one million hectars less than in 1930 (*Izvestia:* Moscow, 16. 11. 1933).

661 Fully to realise the hypocritical policy of the Russian Commu-
731 nist dictatorship in Ukraine, one must add that Moscow tried to lay the responsibility for the famine in Ukraine on the Ukrainian Com-
656 munists, who, as they pretended, 'had overstepped the Party line'. Many prominent Ukrainian Communists were arrested and shot under the pretext that they had caused the famine in Ukraine as 'agents of foreign capital'.

In the first years of their rule in Ukraine, the Russian Communists dreamt of world revolution and regarded the Ukrainian Western territories under the rule of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia as a bridge for their armed 'march on Europe'. In connection

with this, to a certain degree, was the policy of 'Ukrainisation' directed in Soviet Ukraine: Moscow intended to gain sympathy for the Soviet régime among the population of the Western Ukrainian territories in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The famine of 1932/33 in Soviet Ukraine roused great distrust and dislike of Soviet Russia among the Western Ukrainians. Therefore Soviet Russia destroyed thousands of intellectuals coming from the Western Ukrainian territories, among them Communists as 'agents who had worked for the money of foreign big landowners and capitalists' . . . 731 656 661

which was led by General Kornilov, later by Denikin. In the summer of 1918 the Kuban Region fell into the hands of the Russian Volunteer Army. The leaders of this army wished to make the Kuban Region a base for the restoration of Tsarist Russia. Among the population of the Kuban Region and in the State Council a strong opposition to the Russian Volunteers arose. But Russian influence was stronger: under the pressure of Denikin's army an alliance of the Cossack territories — the Don, Kuban and Terek regions — for the fight against the Russian Communists was formed at the end of 1918. Against those Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks who defended their independence the Russian Volunteers used terroristic methods: President of the Kuban State Council Mykola Ryabovol was murdered in June 1919 in Rostov, prominent members of the State Council were arrested and hanged. This terror by the Russian 'Whites' was the reason that the Kuban Cossacks left the front against the Russian Red Army and repealed the alliance with the Russian Volunteers. At the beginning of 1920 the Kuban State Council according to the will of the population took the Government of the Kuban into its hands. Vasyl Ivanys was appointed Premier. The Kuban leaders wished to get rid of the protectorate of the Russian Volunteers and to continue the struggle against the Soviet Russian Army in alliance with Ukraine and the peoples of the Caucasus. But in April 1920, under pressure of the Soviet Russian Army, the Kuban Government was forced to leave its territory and to move to Crimea, where at that time the Volunteers' Army of General Wrangel was. Being pressed between two forces, both of which fought for domination in Russia, the 'Red' and the 'White' Russians, the Ukrainian Kuban Government could not attain any agreement with them and went abroad.

The Kuban Region was occupied by the Russian Red Army. Soviet Russia refused recognition of the Ukrainian nationality in the Kuban Region for a long time, and carried on a Russification line through the school and press. Only on August 30, 1929, the Commissariat of Education in Moscow decided that the literary language of the Ukrainians inside the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Republic was the language of Ukraine.

But even after this the Russian Communist bureaucracy hindered the development of schools among the Ukrainians in the RSFSR. In December 1933, in the Kuban Region and on other territories of the RSFSR, with a Ukrainian population of 7 millions, all Ukrainian schools, press etc. were abolished by order from Moscow. During the collectivisation and the famine of 1932—33 the population of the Kuban Region had enormous losses. Attempts on a rising

Attempts on a rising

661 were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.[1]

6. *The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East*

167 The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

668 Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrai-
126 nians, mostly farmers, were numbered. At that time a Ukrainian national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops, theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revolution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national, political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrainian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy. The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the develop-
656 ment of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the
191 development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrainians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow*, 1931, p. 33).

7. *The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars*

167 In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

[1] [During collectivization and famine in the Kuban region and the RSFSR 1932-33 -- Analyst]

Of course, the 656 ●
Ukrainian problem has remained from old times for Soviet Russia 661
the basic problem of its internal and foreign policy. The unceasing Russification policy against the Ukrainians is carried on by particularly cunning methods: the Ukrainian language is not yet [191] abolished definitely in the offices of Soviet Ukraine. But that official who speaks Ukrainian also in his family and in private relations becomes in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suspicious, and has to suffer repressions.

The Communist theory of the national problem worked out by Lenin preaches the 'fusion of nations'. Basing on this, the Russian Communist Government is trying to 'fuse' the nations of the Soviet Union with the Russians. Against peoples who oppose forced Russification, ruthless repressions are used by Moscow. Even the mentioning of the national rights of the non-Russian peoples is condemned in the USSR as 'bourgeois nationalism'.

There is a great principal difference between the situation of the 000
Russians and the peoples united by force with this state: though the Russians are not satisfied with the Communist dictatorship, they do not, however, feel national oppression. Even in the new anthem of the USSR it is said that this state was rallied by Great Russia. We can state the efforts of Russian political groups opposing the Communist régime to maintain the rule of the Russian state over the territories conquered by Soviet Russia, even after the eventual fall of the Soviet régime.

As a curious fact we can quote the view of the well-known Communist L. Trotzky, who was assassinated in Mexico during World War II, on the Ukrainian problem. Trotzky demanded in 1939 the full separation of Ukraine from Russia. But Trotzky thought of an independent Ukraine in the form of a Soviet Republic. This naturally deprived his thesis of all seriousness, for Trotzky needed the slogan of an independent Ukraine only as a political argument in polemics against Stalin (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 77/78, 1939).

As the facts prove, the Ukrainian nation has to endure the heaviest oppression in the USSR. Unfortunately, the words of the famous historian of France Charles Seignobos written in 1913 on Ukraine, can be used emphatically to describe the outstanding feature of the present state of the Ukrainian nation: "Here is the most oppressed nation" ("Voici la nation la plus opprimée", *Les Annales des Nationalités:* Paris, 1913).

In its equalising policy, the Soviet Russian Government retains, 659
also, traces of the Tsarist régime in the affairs of Church and reli- 790
gion. Thus, after having seized Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine dur- 661

657 ing World War II, the Soviet Government abolished the Ukrainian
798 Greek-Catholic Church by force, against the will of the popula-
661 tion, and destroyed the hierarchy of this Church. The Ukrainian Greek Catholics who were in union with Rome were ordered to become subordinate to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow, who is backed by the Soviet Government.

000 The struggle of the Ukrainians against Russian imperialism did not cease after World War II. It is being conducted in various forms. In this struggle other peoples who are oppressed by Russia, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkestan, participate. Thus a common front of freedom-loving peoples against despotic Russia is being created.

656 In 1949, Moscow has permitted Ukraine to use an own flag and
186 an own different anthem. However, this cannot be regarded an ex-
661 tension of the rights of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. It seems to be more an attempt to bring the so-called satellite countries to the Ukrainian level.

Moscow is watching attentively every expression of Ukrainian political thought and national sentiment, and wants to have everything under its control. The Decade of Ukrainian Culture held in Moscow in July 1951, ended with rebukes and threats against the participants of the Decade, and a 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists whom Moscow imputes 'bourgeois nationalism'. Only the Russian Communists have beeen beyond any doubt as regards their 'internationalism'; there was no case that the manifestations of nationalism among the Russian Communists had been condemned by the Communist Party. On the contrary, Moscow is cultivating an exaggerated national pride among the Russian people. The Ukrainian Communists are under a especially heavy control of
[554] Moscow. No Ukrainian has been General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This position has always been occupied by people sent from Moscow: Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Khrushchev, finally Melnikov.

'Titoism' is no isolated phenomenon in the relations between imperialist Russia and Yugoslavia. Similar trends hostile to Russian imperialism have existed among Ukrainian Communists since the first days of Soviet Russian occupation in Ukraine. The Russian terrorism prevented these trends, however, from getting strong. Nevertheless, they exist clandestinely. Moscow's persecution of 'burgeois nationalism' among the Ukrainian Communists gives an eloquent proof of Ukrainian opposition against Russian imperalism.

under Tsarism, but a long road had to be travelled before all children 871
would have an opportunity to attend schools. Buildings would have to be constructed, teachers trained, text-books written and published. The Ukrainian government first endeavored to provide "ele- 871
mentary" or four-year schools for all children from eight to twelve 658
years of age, then to expand these schools into "incomplete middle" or seven-year schools, and finally to replace these with "complete middle" or ten-year schools; and, in the meanwhile, the government established technical schools and higher educational institutions to train engineers, doctors, actors and other types of "socialist cadres." This quantitative growth of the school system was matched by its growth qualitatively, as measured from the point of view of the language policy. In spite of the shortages of teachers knowing Ukrainian [191]
and the languages of the other minorities,[1] the almost complete absence of text-books in these languages, and the appearance of considerable opposition on the part of political leaders, of teachers and even of parents, the Russian language was gradually replaced as the medium of instruction by the other languages.

As early as March 1919 an order of the Commissariat of Education 871
of the newly re-established Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic de- 191
clared that the Russification policy was abrogated; that the Commis- 656 ●
sariat would aid in the development of the long-repressed Ukrainian language; and that "in view of the elimination of a governmental language as such, and of the declaration that all local languages are equal, the Commissariat of Education gives the local population the right to determine in which language teaching must be carried on in the schools, safeguarding simultaneously the interests of [other] national groups."[10] Wherever the language of instruction remained Russian, a second language — also chosen by the local population itself — was to be taught as a special subject. In September 1920 this [271]
provisional order was strengthened by a law of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. The law instructed the Commissariat of Education to draw up a plan for schools of all grades and categories with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.[11] Ukrainian was to be studied as an obligatory subject in all teacher-training institutions and was to be used as the language of instruction in some of them. The law also ordered the Government Publishing House to issue "a sufficient quantity of text-books as well as *belles-lettres* and other publications in the Ukrainian language."

1921), pp. 3–6; *Zbirnik Uzakonen ta Rosporiadžen Robitničo-Seljanskogo Urjady Ukraini za 1924 rik*, 1924, part 1, sec. 271, pp. 800–803; Sojuz Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R., *Pjatyysesojuznyi S'ezd Sojuza Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R. Stenografičeski Otčet* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 172–174. [10] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1919, sec. 260, p. 347.

[11] *Ibid.*, 1920, part 1, sec. 509, pp. 712–713.

1 [Prior To 1924 -- Analysis]

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871 191 656 During 1923 and 1924 several laws designed to provide elementary education for all children specified that this education was to be conducted in Ukrainian where that nationality predominated, and in the languages of the "national minorities" (minorities within the Ukrainian nationality — Poles, Germans, Jews, Czechs and so forth) wherever these minorities formed compact groups.[12] The laws outlined a series of practical measures to make this rule effective: teachers knowing Ukrainian were to be assigned to schools in which they were needed; text-books and other reading materials in Ukrainian were to be increased; pedagogical schools and courses were to be transferred to Ukrainian; pedagogical journals were to be Ukrainized; and all classes for teaching illiterates and semi-literates, except those for the non-Ukrainian minorities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian. Provision was also made for the obligatory study of Ukrainian as a separate subject in all schools being conducted in other languages.

These laws gave impetus to the process of Ukrainizing the "general" (elementary, incomplete middle and middle) schools; and the process was aided by the presence of many nationalists who had formerly opposed the Soviet régime but who had been pardoned and put to work in the Commissariat of Education. In 1923, according to a newspaper report, 47 percent of the general schools had been Ukrainized, while plans had been made to provide the Ukrainian pupils with Ukrainian schools by 1925.[13] During the years from 1923 to 1925 the realization of these plans was proceeding most effectively in the rural areas, where the largest proportion of the Ukrainian population was to be found. In the province of Kharkov, for example, 20 percent of the general schools in the school year 1923–24 were still using Russian and 49 percent were "mixed schools" — schools using Russian in some classes and Ukrainian in others; but 69 percent of the schools in the city of Kharkov were still using Russian exclusively.[14] A picture of the manifold difficulties encountered in this transitional period was presented by the district of Krolevetski in the province of Chernigov.[15] In 1924 instruction in the elementary schools was sup- [875] posed to be given in Ukrainian; but a majority of the teachers hardly knew the language, and they actually used a jumble of Ukrainian and Russian. In the middle schools the situation was worse: a majority of the teachers not only did not know Ukrainian, but considered themselves exempt from learning it because they had been former

[12] *Ibid.*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–899; 1924, part 1, sec. 272, p. 801; 1924, part 1, sec. 300, pp. 932–933.

[13] *Visti* (organ of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Executive Committee), Oct. 28, 1923.

[14] *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1923; see also *ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1924. [15] *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1924.

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teachers in the gymnasium and therefore possessed "higher qualifications"; and these teachers showed "active or passive resistance" to Ukrainization. In this district, as in many others, the complaint was made that the schools lacked Ukrainian text-books and other such reading materials.[16]

These difficulties were gradually being overcome. By 1924 the publication of text-books and children's literature in Russian had almost ceased in the Ukraine, and the publishing houses were concentrating on Ukrainian materials.[17] Ukrainian was being taught in all pedagogical schools and teacher-training courses.[18] The results of this step were apparent in 1925. In Chernigov province, for example, 67 percent of the teachers had mastered Ukrainian, and the proportion of Ukrainian schools — which then stood at 54 percent — was being raised as rapidly as the teachers who had recently learned Ukrainian could be transferred to the districts where they were needed.[19]

During 1925 and 1926 the whole process of Ukrainization was raised to the status of a "high-pressure (*udarnaja*) campaign. "Attention was directed even to the *crèches* because, as one writer explained, the early years of a child's life are of the utmost significance in his linguistic development.[20] But a report from Chernigov in 1926 stated that the teachers were agitating among the peasantry against the Ukrainization of the schools; they were "striving with all their forces to discredit the Ukrainian language, to arouse the peasants to adopt resolutions against Ukrainizing the schools, and so on."[21] This was denied by the school officials in the region from which the report emanated,[22] but similar items of news came from other regions. One writer cited a specific teacher in the Don Basin: although she was supposed to teach the Ukrainian language as a separate subject, she could hardly speak it and she referred to it as "a terribly ugly and crude language."[23] Another reporter, again from Chernigov, produced evidence to illustrate the hostility of both parents and teachers: because of this hostility a region with an overwhelmingly Ukrainian population contained thirty-five Russian schools, one Ukrainian and one mixed school.[24]

[16] See *ibid.*, Mar. 4, 1924, Mar. 5, 1924.

[17] *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1924. [18] *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1923.

[19] *Kommunist* (organ of the Central Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine), Mar. 21, 1925.

[20] *Proletarska Pravda* (organ of the Kiev Regional Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, of the Kiev Regional Executive Committee and of the Kiev Regional Trade-Union Council), Aug. 26, 1926.

[21] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926. [22] *Ibid.*, July 25, 1926.

[23] *Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1926. [24] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926.

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871 However, the Ukrainization of education slowly approached its
191 goal. It is impossible to determine the actual number of Ukrainian
● 656 children studying in Ukrainian schools, for the school statistics contained only the total number of children studying in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish and other schools; and while some Ukrainian children studied in non-Ukrainian schools, many non-Ukrainian children studied in Ukrainian schools. However, an approximate idea of the extent of Ukrainization can be gained by comparing the proportion of school children in Ukrainian schools with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. According to the school census of December, 1927, ten years after the Bolshevik Revolution, 75.8 percent of all pupils in elementary schools were in schools conducted entirely in Ukrainian; 6.9 percent were in schools in which some classes were conducted in Ukrainian and some in other languages; and 10.6 per cent were in Russian schools.[25] As the Ukrainians in 1927 were estimated at 80.1 percent of the total population and the Russians at 9.2 percent, the elementary schools might be considered to be nearing the goal of Ukrainization. The seven-year schools, then the predominant type of middle schools, lagged behind the elementary schools because they were relatively more numerous in the Russianized cities; of the pupils in these schools, 60.7 per cent were in Ukrainian schools, 14.7 percent in mixed schools and 15.5 per cent in Russian schools.

In some places, particularly in some cities, the Ukrainization policy overshot its mark. Whereas the Ukrainian population of Kiev was estimated at 41.1 percent of the total population in 1927, 49.8 percent of its school children were attending Ukrainian schools, 5.9 percent mixed schools and 30.6 percent Russian schools.[26] The proportion of pupils in Ukrainian schools was also greater than the proportion of the Ukrainian population in Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk. This situation, as shall be noted below, was regarded unfavorably by some writers in the newspapers, but the charges of "over-Ukrainization" received little attention from the government until after 1933. During the period from 1923 to 1933 the government was concentrating its efforts upon suppressing Russian nationalism and upon providing the Ukrainian and other non-Russian nationalities with schools conducted in their own languages.

874 In this period much attention was also given to the Ukrainization
191 of technical and higher educational institutions, but in these institu-
656 tions the lack of teachers knowing Ukrainian, of text-books and of good-will was an even greater handicap than in the Ukrainization of

[25] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini na 15 Grudnja 1927 (Peperedni Pidsumki Škilnogo Perepisy)*, Kharkov 1928, pp. 20–21. [26] *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

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the general schools. As early as 1923 the government ordered the gradual Ukrainization of various technical schools ("technicums," "workers' faculties," etc.) and of higher educational institutions (medical, art, pedagogical, engineering and other "institutes").[27] Vacancies in their teaching and administrative staffs were to be filled preferably with people knowing Ukrainian; some courses were to be conducted in Ukrainian immediately; all students were obliged to study Ukrainian history, literature, economic geography and language; Ukrainian dictionaries and lists of Ukrainian equivalents for Russian scientific terms were to be issued in order to hasten Ukrainization. After the promulgation of this law the process of Ukrainizing technical and higher educational institutions proceeded under the constant prodding of the Commissariat of Education;[28] but by the summer of 1926 only a small proportion of these schools were considered fully Ukrainized, the chief obstacle being that the faculties did not know Ukrainian: in Odessa and Kharkov, for example, only six percent of the professors in the higher educational institutions had mastered that language.[29] At this time the Central Committee of the Party stepped into the picture and ordered an intensification of efforts to Ukrainize these institutions.[30]

A lively flurry of activity to bring the technical and higher schools into line followed the Central Committee's directive, which was passed along by the local committees.[31] The Commissariat of Education ordered the Ukrainization of all technical schools, except those serving national minorities, by the beginning of the school year 1927–28.[32] The Scientific-Pedagogical Society of the Ukrainian Academy of Science held a series of conferences to improve the teaching of the Ukrainian language, literature and history; to work out and distribute lists of Ukrainian scientific terms; and to establish Ukrainization courses for faculty members.[33] Finally, the Ukrainian government took a long step toward the Ukrainization of these schools when its basic statute on education, adopted in 1927, formulated a series of definite rules pertaining to technical and higher schools.[34] All students entering these institutions were to be examined in their knowledge, unless they had graduated from Ukrainian middle schools. Professors, other teachers and scientific workers were to possess a knowledge of Ukrainian equivalent to that demanded of government officials, and

[27] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . ., 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–897.
[28] E.g. *Kommunist*, Mar. 6, 1925; Mar. 20, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, July 6, 1926.
[29] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 6, 1926. [30] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1926.
[31] This was done, for example, by the Kiev Regional Committee of the Party.—*Ibid.*, July 15, 1926. [32] *Ibid.*, July 14, 1926. [33] *Ibid.*, July 4, 1926, July 22, 1926.
[34] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . ., 1927, part 1, sec. 157, pp. 626–628.

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no professor or other teacher could be appointed unless he could conduct his courses in Ukrainian.[35] Institutions for scientific research and for preparing research workers, including the universities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian; and candidates for degrees in such institutions were not to be accepted until they had passed an examination in that language.

Progress in Ukrainizing the technical and higher educational institutions was indicated by the school census of 1927. The Ukrainian language was used for instruction in educational establishments embracing 14.2 percent of the students in the higher institutes, 33.7 percent of the students in the technicums and 47.4 percent of those in other types of technical schools.[36] Although the actually Ukrainized institutes and technicums were not numerous, many of the others were then undergoing Ukrainization. Establishments using both Ukrainian and Russian contained 74.8 percent of the students in the institutes, 43.7 percent of those in the technicums and 33.3 percent of those in other types of technical schools. Only 7.1 percent of the students in the institutes, 17.7 percent of those in the technicums and 13.7 percent in other technical schools still studied exclusively in Russian.[37]

After 1927 the process of Ukrainization proceeded steadily, but in 1929 the Party and the government still regarded the condition of the higher and technical schools pessimistically. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, stated that a considerable part of the teachers and professors in these institutions were hostile to Ukrainization;[38] and newspaper reports bore him out. In Odessa, for example, Professors Tolstoi and Demetz refused to teach in Ukrainian and considered that all lecturers who did so were "renegades."[39] In 1929 the Commissariat of Education was forced to rule that all students intending to graduate from higher educational institutions would first have to pass an examination in the Ukrainian language equivalent to that demanded of government officials.[40]

[35] Only students and professors coming to the Ukraine from other republics were to be permitted additional time to fulfill the requirements.

[36] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–51. In this period technicums were classified with higher educational institutions rather than with other types of technical or "professional" schools, which were in turn classified as middle schools. The other technical schools included "workers' faculties," "workers' evening professional schools," "schools of the working youth," "long-term courses," "schools of brigade apprenticeship," and "trade-union schools."

[37] This data was given in a speech by Kossior, published in *Proletari* (organ of the central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine and of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade-Unions), July 17, 1930. [38] *Ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1929.

[39] *Komsomolec Ukraini* (organ of the Central Committee of the Leninist Communist Union of the Youth of the Ukraine), Mar. 16, 1929. [40] *Proletari*, Apr. 25, 1919.

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At this time, when the whole problem of Ukrainizing the highly Russianized Don Basin and other industrial regions in the Ukraine was being attacked, the failure to Ukrainize the school system was frequently mentioned.[41] Even a directive of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in January 1930, stated that in the industrial regions only the schools for general education and for extirpating illiteracy had been Ukrainized; and the directive ordered the Commissariat of Education to examine the faculty members of the technical and higher schools on their knowledge of Ukrainian, and to take steps to insure that these people possessed such a knowledge.[42] 874 171 656

During 1930 and 1931 the reports on the Ukrainization of technical and higher schools were limited largely to items of "self-criticism" which pointed out obstacles or found fault with specific institutions and individuals. The professors in the Medical Institute in Kharkov now knew Ukrainian, but the process of Ukrainization was being retarded by the lack of Ukrainian text-books.[43] In the Lisenko Theatrical Institute in Kiev the classes were conducted in Ukrainian, but the reporter complained that extra-class work was still being carried on in Russian.[44] An investigation of the Institute of Consumer Coöperation and of the Veterinary Institute revealed that the majority of the students still spoke Russian among themselves and that two professors of the former institution refused to instruct their classes in Ukrainian.[45] Both professors and students in the Construction Institute and the Chemical Institute were reported to be hostile to the use of Ukrainian: one of the professors had been discharged for this reason, and the students had declared Ukrainization to be proper only for the middle schools. Because the library lacked Ukrainian books and only three of the hundred and twenty-two journals received were in Ukrainian, the administration of the Chemical Institute was upbraided for opposition to Ukrainization.[46] The Textile and Mining Institutes were also cited as examples of the failure to Ukrainize properly.[47]

The years up to 1933 constituted the high-pressure period of Ukrainization; after 1933 the government concentrated its attention chiefly upon suppressing the tendency to "over-Ukrainize," where such a tendency was discernible, and upon rectifying the results of this tendency which had already appeared. This was not a new pol- 871 563 652

[41] E. g., *Komsomolec Ukraini*, May 16, 1929, June 26, 1929.
[42] *Proletari*, Jan. 3, 1930. [43] *Ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1930.
[44] *Proletarska Pravda*, Sept. 22, 1931. [45] *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1931.
[46] *Ibid.*, June 30, 1931. [47] *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1931.

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icy; it was, rather, a change of emphasis from one part of the linguistic policy to another. Ukrainian schools for Ukrainian children remained, but now the stress was placed upon schools for the national minorities within the Ukrainian majority, and particularly for the Russian inhabitants of the Ukraine.

The Ukrainization of education, it has been noted, was not intended to apply to schools in areas where there were members of non-Ukrainian nationalities living compactly. On the contrary, the educational policy anticipated that every child should have an opportunity to study in his or her mother tongue. This was stated in all of the important legislation on the languages in the school system, beginning with the preliminary order of the Commissariat of Education in 1919.[48] A law of 1924 had altered the rule on the required size of classes, in order to facilitate the establishment of small schools serving scattered groups of the minority peoples.[49] Other laws and directives in the period from 1924 to 1928 contained clauses ordering increased funds for general and technical education for the minorities, the preparation of teachers for their schools and the publication of textbooks in their languages.[50] Steps were frequently taken by the Commissariat of Education to expand the network of schools serving these peoples.[51] The Commissariat contained a special Council of National Minorities, consisting of Jewish, Latvian, German, Polish, Bulgarian, Czech and Moldavian bureaus; and the provincial departments of education had inspectors for minority education, sometimes separate inspectors for German, Jewish, Polish or Czech schools.[52] Finally, the Communist Party itself, through its directives and the speeches of its leaders in the period from 1924 to 1928, constantly warned that during the process of Ukrainization the interests of the minorities were to be protected.[53]

Efforts to provide schools for the minorities received much publicity between 1924 and 1928. Only a few reports can be cited. In

[48] See especially *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1919, sec. 260, p. 347; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, pp. 626–627. See above pp. 129–130. [49] *Ibid.*, 1924, part 1, sec. 300, p. 933.

[50] E. g. *Visti*, Dec. 10, 1924; *Kommunist*, July 3, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, Apr. 8, 1928.

[51] E.g. *Visti*, Mar. 9, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, July 23, 1927.

[52] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1925, part 1, sec. 218, p. 587; 1925, part 1, sec. 285, p. 10; 1926, part 1, sec. 106, p. 221.

[53] E.g. the directive of the Central Committee of the Party in *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925; the resolution of the Kiev Regional Party Committee in *Proletarska Pravda*, July 15, 1926; the speech of Liubchenko (chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars) in *ibid.*, May 11, 1926; speeches of Kaganovich (secretary of the Central Committee of the Party) and of Skripnik (Commissar of Education) and the resolution of the 10th Congress of the Party in *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii (Bil'šovikiv) Ukraini, 20–29 Listopada 1927 p. Stenografičnii zvit* (Kharkov, 1928), pp. 126, 444, 574; the resolution of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade-Unions in *Proletarska Pravda*, Apr. 7, 1928.

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Chernigov the school assigned to the Jewish language — which in the Soviet Union means Yiddish rather than Hebrew — was using that language even before the schools for Ukrainian children were using Ukrainian.[54] A report from Kiev described a campaign undertaken to draw Polish students into the Polish Pedagogical Institute, into the Polish departments of the technical schools, and into other Polish educational units.[55] In the meanwhile, the Jewish Pedagogical Institute in Kiev was being moved into a new building provided by the Commissariat of Education, and elementary schools were being established for Czechs and Assyrians.[56] Dnepropetrovsk reported that its German school was being enlarged.[57] The city of Kharkov found it could not open a school for Koreans (!) because no teachers were available, and the Kharkov City Committee of the Party asked the Vladivostok City Committee and the Communist University of the Toiling East to supply a few Korean teachers.[58]

No evidence that Kharkov ever succeeded in opening a Korean school has come into the hands of the author; but in 1926 the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. complimented the Ukrainian Republic on its attention to the educational needs of the minorities; and the school statistics for 1927 indicated that a considerable number of children of the minorities were studying in their own languages. Of all the pupils in general (four and seven year) schools, 2.9 percent studied in Jewish schools; 1.4 percent in German schools; 0.9 percent in Polish schools and 0.8 percent in schools using other minority languages: Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Tartar, Swedish, Greek, Assyrian and Moldavian.[59] Schools using both Ukrainian or Russian and some other language or languages embraced 2.1 percent of all the pupils. Since Jews composed 5.4 percent of the total population, Poles 1.6 percent, Germans 1.4 percent and other minorities 2.1 percent, it is evident that many of the children of the smaller nationalities went to Ukrainian or Russian schools. This fact can probably be accounted for in part by the lack of buildings and teachers, by the scattered distribution of the smaller minorities and by the indifference of the smaller nationalities themselves. The Jews, for example, have tended to assimilate into the Russian nationality in the large cities and into the Ukrainian nationality in the smaller towns and villages. The younger generation of Jews favor Russian or Ukrainian as their social language, and many Jewish parents prefer to put their

[54] *Visti*, Oct. 2, 1924.
[55] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 24, 1926.
[56] *Ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1926.
[57] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1926.
[58] *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925.
[59] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–25.

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871 children into Russian or Ukrainian schools. One reporter in 1933 gave
563 evidence to show that some Jewish parents had desired their children
656 to attend non-Jewish schools, but that pressure had been brought to bear upon them by zealous officials to send their children to the Jewish schools newly constructed for them.[60]

As an illustration of the attitude of the children themselves, an experience of the author may be pertinent. Upon visiting a Jewish school in Kiev, he observed that some of the pupils were carrying Russian text-books; and to the enquiry as to whether no Yiddish books existed for those subjects, several pupils replied: "Oh, yes; but we like to read the Russian texts better than the Yiddish." The school happened to be located in the old Jewish section of Kiev, and undoubtedly the children were sent to this school either because they spoke Yiddish at home (but not amongst themselves) or because of the superior facilities offered by a new institution; and if they had been able to decide for themselves, it is possible that many of these children would have chosen to attend Russian or even Ukrainian
[191] schools. Russian is the language of a culture stronger than the secular non-Hebrew culture conveyed by the Yiddish language in the Soviet Union; Russian is also the language spoken in Moscow and generally throughout the U.S.S.R.; and all those pupils, and parents, too, who ever expect to move freely about the Union must have complete mastery of the Russian language. What is true of the Jews is also true of the Poles, Germans, Czechs and others.

874 That the children of the minorities had to master the Russian and
563 Ukrainian languages if they desired to continue their education on
191 the higher levels is indicated by the nature of the technical and higher educational institutions in the Ukraine. It was impossible to set up an electrical engineering institute for a handful of Poles or Assyrians, or to establish every type of higher educational institution for the Jews. Hence, as the statistics for 1927 indicated, most of the technical and higher educational institutions taught in Ukrainian, Russian or a mixture of the two. Of the students in the lower technical schools (technical schools other than technicums) only 1.4 percent studied in Jewish schools, 0.1 percent in Polish schools, 0.3 percent in German schools, 0.1 percent in the schools of other minorities, and 3.0 percent studied in schools that had one or more of the minority languages together with either Russian or Ukrainian or both.[61] There were no institutes using exclusively the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian minority languages, although 3.9 percent of the students studied

[60] *Proletarska Pravda*, Mar. 29, 1933.
[61] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–51.

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in institutes that conducted part of their work in Russian or Ukrainian and part in other languages. Of the students in the technicums, 1.5 percent studied in technicums using the Jewish language, 0.5 percent in those using Polish, 0.7 percent in those using German, 0.5 per cent in those using other non-Russian minority languages, and 0.5 percent in technicums using Russian or Ukrainian and one or more of the other languages. These figures do not signify that the Jewish, Polish or German children were deprived of a chance to study in technical and higher schools; on the contrary, the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian student body in these establishments, as will be noted below, was relatively larger than the Ukrainian and Russian student body.

The work of establishing schools using the languages of the smaller nationalities continued after 1927; in fact, it was given additional impetus by the campaign of 1933–35 against nationalist influences in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education. But before examining the effects of this campaign, it is necessary to note the attitude toward Russian schools. At the core of the process of Ukrainization was the transformation of Russian into Ukrainian schools; and it was not surprising that there appeared in at least some areas a tendency to deprive the Russian-speaking population of an opportunity to study in Russian schools. This was, to be sure, not at all the intention of the government. In its decree in expanding general education, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee ordered that "special attention be directed toward assuring schools with instruction in the Russian language for all children of the Russian nationality."[62] But, as has been noted above, the proportion of pupils studying in Ukrainian schools in some places — especially in the larger cities — was greater than the proportion of Ukrainians in the population. A writer in *Proletarska Pravda* (*Proletarian Truth*) claimed in 1926 that the general schools in Kiev were being over-Ukrainized.[63] He was answered by another writer, who argued that whereas the criticism was based on an examination of the number of *schools*, there was still a larger proportion of *classes* being held in Russian than the proportion of Russians in the total population; and the second writer denounced the first for bringing grist to the mill of the enemies of the Soviet national policy.[64] The criticism was proven correct by the school statistics for 1927; but since the process of Ukrainization was in full swing and since at this time the Party considered the Russian nationalists

[62] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1926, part 1, sec. 453, p. 1246.
[63] *Proletarska Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1926. [64] *Ibid.*

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in the Ukraine more dangerous than the Ukrainian variety, no additional attention was given to the problem of Russian children.

In 1933, however, the offensive against Ukrainian nationalism occasioned a review of the Ukrainization process. Ukrainian nationalism had been considered a dangerous force since 1926, when Shumskii and Khvilovoi — two important figures in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education — were censured for desiring "to orient Ukrainian culture on capitalist Europe rather than on socialist Moscow." The Party became still more alert to signs of nationalism after the uncovering in 1929 of the Society for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, a secret organization headed by such outstanding nationalists as Efremov, Germaize and Nikovskii. But it was the campaign against the collectivization of agriculture which occasioned the intensive campaign against the nationalists. The Party regarded the opposition to collectivization as the result in large part of the nationalists, and it set out to remove them from every branch of political, economic and cultural activity. The central figure in the campaign was Nicholas Skripnik, an "Old Bolshevik" who was accused of having fallen under the influence of his nationalist colleagues and was removed from his position as Commissar of Education in March 1933. Even before his removal, however, the Commissariat of Education and all of its activities were under fire.

Charges of over-Ukrainization of the school system were first launched in an editorial appearing in *Kommunist* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party) in February 1933, and reprinted in other newspapers. The editorial said: "The mistakes and perversions in realizing the Ukrainization of the schools led in a considerable number of places to neglecting and ignoring the interests of the national minorities and especially the needs and requirements of the Russian toiling masses living in the Ukraine. Among responsible circles of the Commissariat there was concocted the 'theory' that the majority of the children in the cities, small towns and other labor centers speak a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon, and that therefore the majority of these children should study in the Ukrainian language. As a result, a significant part of the Russian toiling masses were deprived of schools in their native language and actually subjected to the forced Ukrainization which the Party had condemned in all of its directives."[65] Shortly after this editorial appeared, an article in *Proletarska Pravda* stated that in Kiev only 49 percent of the Russian children and 30 percent of the Jewish children studied in schools conducted in their native languages; that although

[65] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1933.

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some of the others studied in mixed Ukrainian-Russian or Ukrainian-Jewish schools, they were "mechanically transferred" after the first four years to classes using Ukrainian.[66]

Zatonski, who replaced Skripnik as Commissar of Education, stated that the Ukrainization of Russian children had taken place in Kharkov and in the Don Basin as well as in Kiev; and he pointed to Krasnolutzki District, where the number of Russian schools had dropped from twenty in 1930 to twelve in 1932.[67] He also declared that in Kherson and Makiivitz there were no Russian elementary schools at all; and that in some places there had been a voluntary Ukrainization of Russian children because the buildings and equipment provided for the Russian schools were greatly inferior to those of the Ukrainian schools.[68] Additional evidence was forthcoming in 1934 and 1935 to show some enforced Ukrainization of Polish children and of those of other minorities, as well as of some of the Russian children; and this situation was denounced as an example of "deliberate nationalist wrecking."[69]

This campaign against over-Ukrainization, however, was not intended to lead to a revival of the Russification policy. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was adamant on this point. He explained in 1933 that the results of over-Ukrainization would have to be eliminated because this was demanded by internationalism, "by the brotherly interests of the toilers of all the nationalities in the Ukraine."[70] But, he went on, the Russian nationalists would not be allowed to take advantage of mistakes already committed in order to reverse the policy of Ukrainization; on the contrary, there would be a further drive for "Bolshevik Ukrainization." A similar view was taken in 1934 by Postishev, the assistant secretary of the Central Committee and the official most actively engaged in hunting down the Ukrainian nationalists.[71]

According to the latest available material, the Ukrainization of education has kept pace with the expansion of general education, and a greater proportion of pupils were studying in Ukrainian schools in 1937 than in 1927. By 1937 the general schools embraced 5,364,800 children as compared with 1,678,100 in 1913 — an increase of 319 percent over the pre-War year; and whereas twenty-two of every thousand people attended elementary school in the Kiev Educational District in 1912, in 1937 the figure for all of the Ukraine had risen to

[66] *Ibid.*, Mar. 29, 1933. [67] *Visti*, May 1, 1933. [68] *Ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1933.
[69] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1934 (speech of Zatonski); Aug. 22, 1934, Jan. 5, 1935.
[70] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1933. [71] *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1934.

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schools for the years after 1927; and one might conclude from the lack of such figures in the important statistical collections that Ukrainization has ceased or has been reversed. However, this conclusion would not be consistent with the continued stress on the preparation of "Ukrainian cadres," which was the primary purpose of Ukrainizing these institutions. The need for Ukrainian engineers, agronomists, writers and scientific workers was emphasized both by Kossior and by the resolution of the Thirteenth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1937.[76] Kossior, moreover, stated that there had been a large increase in the number of Ukrainian professors, instructors, scientific workers and candidates for higher degrees. Finally, the number of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technical and higher schools had grown absolutely and relatively. Between 1927 and 1936 the total number of students in the technicums had increased from 29,300 to 133,300; in the workers' faculties, from 7,400 to 53,500; and in the institutes from 28,200 to 108,200.[77] The increase for the technicums was 455 percent, for the workers' faculties 722 percent and for the institutes 384 percent. In the meanwhile, the proportion of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technicums had risen from 58.0 to 75.3 percent; in the workers' faculties from 57.9 to 65.0 percent; and in the institutes from 48.8 to 53.7 percent.[78] The number of students from among the minorities had increased absolutely but had fallen relatively. Since the increasing proportion of the students were Ukrainians (probably chiefly graduates of Ukrainian general schools and therefore favorable to and easily adaptable to courses conducted in Ukrainian), and since the number of Ukrainian faculty members had risen, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the process of Ukrainizing the technical and higher institutions had continued even after the intensive campaign against the nationalists was undertaken in 1933.

As for the obligatory study of the Ukrainian language in the schools of the other nationalities — provided for in laws of 1920 and 1927[79] — no change has taken place. An order of the Commissariat of Education, issued in December 1940 and just received by the author, clearly indicates this fact. The order is designed to facilitate the study of Ukrainian by children who have come from other republics and, having entered non-Ukrainian schools, are handicapped in the study of

[76] *Visti*, May 30, 1937; June 6, 1937. [77] *Socialistična Ukraina* . . . , p. 133.

[78] The percentages for 1927 are taken from *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii (Bilšovikiv) Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–52. The percentages for 1936 are from *Socialistična Ukraina* . . . , p. 152.

[79] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1920, part 1, sec. 509, p. 713; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626.

this subject.[80] Declaring that the mastering of Ukrainian is obligatory for these children as well as for all other pupils in non-Ukrainian schools, the order states that the younger ones shall be sent to lower grades to study Ukrainian; the older ones may continue along with their classmates, and are to be marked leniently in this subject; and all are to be given special assistance in their study of Ukrainian so that by the time they graduate they may be able to fulfill the requirements demanded of the other pupils. Hence, the campaign against nationalism has not altered this aspect of the Ukrainization policy.

Perhaps the most significant result of the campaign against the Ukrainian nationalists was the effort to point up the importance of the Russian language and the value of Russian culture for the Soviet Union's minorities. One aspect of this effort was the greater emphasis placed on the study of the Russian language in the non-Russian schools of the Ukraine. A thorough mastering of Russian, regarded as a "second" and not as a "foreign language," had long been intended by the Party leaders, and had been provided for in the legislation on education. The important law on the Ukrainization of education in 1923 stated that "because the Russian language has all-governmental and all-Union significance and because it joins the Ukrainian people to the culture of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," the study of Russian as an obligatory subject was to be retained in all Ukrainian schools.[81] In the schools of the non-Ukrainian minorities in the Ukraine, either Ukrainian or Russian was to be selected by the population as a subject for obligatory study. The basic statute on education issued in 1927 went still further: both the Ukrainian and the Russian languages were to be taught as obligatory subjects in *all* schools.[82] In explaining the purpose of this clause, Skripnik stated that "now — since the proletarian revolution — the Russian language, once a language of oppression, is the language in which are written the works of Lenin; now the Ukrainians regard it as a brotherly language containing great revolutionary compositions; and in order that after leaving school the Ukrainians may be able to make use of Russian culture, the Russian language is taught as an obligatory subject."[83] This statement, coming from the Commissar of Education, was of considerable importance; but it was later revealed that interest in the Russian language had been lost in the whirl of Ukrainization.

[80] *Zbirnik Nakaziv ta Rosporiadžen Narodnogo Komisariaty Osviti Ukrainskoi R.S.R.*, 1940, sec. 355, p. 14. [81] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, p. 900.
[82] *Ibid.*, 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626. [83] *Proletarska Pravda*, May 9, 1926.

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In 1933 Zatonski censured the nationalists in the Commissariat of Education for neglecting the teaching of Russian which, because it was the means of all-Union communication, "should be taught in all the Ukrainian schools and in the schools of other nationalities."[84] But the real interest in the teaching of Russian appeared in 1937 and 1938, when the Commissariat was again over-hauled. During these years there was another intensified drive against Ukrainian nationalism, as well as against other varieties of opposition to the Party's policies and against every manifestation of inefficiency. Even Zatonskii was removed from his post. And while the renewed attack on nationalism in general was proceeding, a large amount of criticism was directed against the Commissariat of Education for its neglect of the Russian language as a subject of study. The critics — one of whom was E. N. Postnikova, a teacher and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. — stated that because of "the wrecking activities of the bourgeois nationalists," there was a higher percentage of failures in the courses on Russian language and literature than in any other subject.[85] In the first place, not enough time was being allotted to the study of Russian. Secondly, there was a dearth of text-books and of Russian literature in the school libraries: even such works as Gorki's *Mother*, Tolstoi's *War and Peace*, Goncharov's *Oblomov* and the collected works of Lenin were to be found only in Ukrainian translations. Thirdly, the Commissariat had not devoted sufficient attention to methods of teaching Russian and had failed to provide methodological programs for the guidance of teachers. Finally, the knowledge of Russian possessed by the teachers themselves was entirely inadequate; even the graduates of the pedagogical institutes did not know the language well enough to teach it. Since, the critics argued, the pupils themselves were strongly inclined to study Russian, the Commissariat should provide more thorough preparation of teachers, assign more time for this subject, provide more text-books and more Russian literature.

As a result of these criticisms the re-organized Commissariat provided new programs, several of which are in the hands of the author, and it increased the time allotted to the study of Russian. The number of hours specified for the study of languages during the entire period of attendance in the various types of schools, according to the

[84] *Visti*, Aug. 23, 1933.

[85] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), May 16, 1937; *Učitelskaia Gazeta* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), Feb. 27, 1938, Mar. 19, 1938, Mar. 29, 1938.

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871 teaching plans for the school year 1939–40, is contained in the following table:[86]
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I. Schools with Ukrainian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Ukrainian Language	1130 hours	1187 hours
Russian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Ukrainian Language	2068 hours	1994 hours
Russian Language	1131 hours	1221 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

II. Schools with Russian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Russian Language	1130 hours	1147 hours
Ukrainian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Russian Language	2150 hours	2111 hours
Ukrainian Language	955 hours	1022 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

III. Schools with Jewish or Moldavian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Jewish or Moldavian Language	993 hours	989 hours
Ukrainian Language	196 hours	252 hours
Russian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Jewish or Moldavian Language	1383 hours	1350 hours
Ukrainian Language	586 hours	618 hours
Russian Language	1131 hours	1221 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

[86] Narodni Kommissariat Osvita U.R.S.R., *Navčalni plani. počatkovoi ta serednoi školi* (Kiev, 1939) pp. 8–9, 11, 13, 15–17, 19, 21, 23. It may be noted that the plan for the rural elementary schools contained 36 more hours and for the rural middle schools 54 more hours than was assigned to the corresponding urban schools.

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In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both with and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.
[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . .* , 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

IV UNRRA ASSISTANCE TO THE UKRAINE

Distribution of UNRRA Supplies

648 731 UNRRA supplies for the Ukraine are handed over to the government at the port of entry (usually Odessa on the Black Sea); and the government is then responsible for arranging distribution.

648 731 647 Like most other countries receiving UNRRA help, the Ukrainian Government has established a special organization to supervise the reception, warehousing, and distribution of all UNRRA goods received. This organization - which has on its staff specialists in food, industrial equipment, agricultural rehabilitation, food processing machinery, medical supplies, transport, accounting and distribution - is called the Department of UNRRA Supplies, and is directly responsible to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

The Department (headed by Mr. V.V. Khomyak) works in close liaison with the various ministries of the Ukrainian Government, and with the UNRRA Mission. On the basis of decisions made by the particular ministries concerned, it draws up plans for the distribution of UNRRA supplies and keeps a central record of their sales and of the proceeds expended by the government for further relief projects.

564 648 731 Most UNRRA shipments for both the Ukraine and Byelorussia have arrived through the port of Odessa; and since early 1946 an UNRRA officer has been stationed there to handle problems connected with delivery. Before an UNRRA shipment comes in, the authorities at Odessa are notified of the ship's name, its expected time of arrival, and the nature of its cargo. As soon as possible after the ship lands, discharging of cargo begins. Stevedoring labour is supplied by the port commander's service organization, "Inflot", which also furnishes checkers to work in the ship's hold and on the docks, counting the supplies and reporting any damaged goods. As the cargo is unloaded, perishable items, such as clothing and cheese, are placed in warehouses on the docks, and seeds in a warehouse in the suburbs of Odessa. Packaged goods, such as canned meat, army rations, and juices, are piled on the dock at shipside and finally into freight cars.

648 731 Directives for the distribution of the supplies (based upon decisions of the recipient ministries concerned) are issued by the Department of UNRRA Supplies to the Ministry of Foreign Trade representative in Odessa, whose office then instructs the railroad and barge authorities, providing such information as the name and location of the organization or governmental authority receiving the supplies, and a description of the goods to be delivered.

[655] UNRRA relief supplies are either sold to individual ration-card or permit holders, or distributed to collectives, co-operatives, and other

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

maintained by the Zemstvos (local organizations somewhat similar to County Councils, elected by citizens with a certain property census). 491

Quite recently the planning of the organization of the road system of the Soviet Union was put in the hands of the planning commission. It seems that important sums are to be spent on this project. It is almost unnecessary to mention that great economic transformations could be brought about by the construction even of a few thousand kilometres of roads, especially in New Russia where the composition of the soil makes the present tracks absolutely impassable after the slightest rain. Many villages still remain almost isolated from the rest of the world during periods of bad weather and are only connected with their respective centres by telegraph and, in case of their defect, by postmen on horseback.

The question of roads which we have approached allows us a small diversion. We can say a few words about the Zemstvos. This organization was distinguished after the abolition of serfdom as a factor of the first order in the development of the economic organism of the country, of the raising of the well-being of the population, of public hygiene, and of instruction. Having resources resulting from taxes on the land, the Zemstvos were able to cover Ukrainian territory, as also that of the whole of Russia, with a dense network of hospitals, veterinary centres, agricultural advisory bureaux, of experimental fields, of credit and trade co-operatives, and insurance offices, and finally of primary and even technical schools. The personnel of the Zemstvos, recruited among the intelligentsia often belonging to the popular classes, was always conspicuous by its devotion to the cause and did not lack in highly qualified specialists who did not hesitate to sacrifice 647 744 657 657 647

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

695 Art. 91. In all courts of the Ukrainian SSR cases are heard in public, unless otherwise provided for by law, and the accused is guaranteed the right to be defended by counsel.

693 Art. 92. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

Art. 93. Supreme supervisory power to ensure the strict observance of the law by all Ministries and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by officials and citizens within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR generally, is exercised by the Procurator-General of the USSR directly and also through the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 94. The Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR is appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 95. Regional procurators are appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 96. Area, district and city procurators are appointed by the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR, subject to the approval of the Procurator-General of the USSR, for a term of five years.

Art. 97. The organs of the Procurator's Office perform their functions independently of any local organs whatsoever, being subordinate solely to the Procurator-General of the USSR.

Chapter VIII. Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens

641 Art. 98. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with
461 its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment.

Art. 99. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to rest and leisure.

The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the fixing of the working
[466] day for factory and office workers at eight hours and the reduction of the working day to seven or six hours for arduous trades and to four hours in workshops where conditions of work are exceptionally arduous; by the institution of annual vacations with full pay for factory and office workers; and by the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest-homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

641 Art. 100. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or disability.

This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance
657 of factory and office workers at State expense, free medical service for the working people, and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

871 Art. 101. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to education.

This right is ensured by universal compulsory elementary education;
641 by free education up to and including the seventh grade; by the system of State stipends to students who have distinguished themselves in higher educational establishments; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language; and by the organization in the factories, State farms and machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.

648 enterprises; and in accordance with the provisions of the UNRRA
731 agreement, the Ukrainian Government uses the proceeds for further
relief and rehabilitation work within the country. Food and soap
[657] supplies for example are sold through regular trade channels to
ration-card holders, or are delivered to organizations which use
them for factory or community feeding. Clothing also is sold in
stores against ration cards, or in the case of workers having a high
rate of clothing and shoe consumption, against special orders. Used
clothing is distributed free of charge to invalids of the war, families
of war dead, pensioners, or other recipients of social welfare. Medical
supplies and equipment are transferred free of charge to the Ministry of
Health. The distribution of agricultural and industrial equipment
varies depending upon the nature of the supplies. Consumable items,
such as seeds, jute, bagging, rope and industrial raw materials, are
sold to collectives, state farms, co-operatives, or industrial enter-
prises. Capital equipment such as tractors, food processing machinery,
or power generators is delivered free of charge to the recipient
ministries or their subsidiary distribution organizations. Tractors
in particular are delivered in this way to state-owned Machine Tractor
Stations.

Proceeds of Sale of UNRRA Supplies

648 Up to March 1, 1947, the sale of UNRRA supplies in the Ukraine
731 had provided the government with 3,166,482,000 roubles[1] for additional
652 relief and rehabilitation work in the Republic. Roughly 85 per cent.
of this total resulted from sales of UNRRA food; 6 per cent. from the
sale of clothing; and 9 per cent. from the sale of miscellaneous raw
materials and agricultural supplies.

Of the cumulative proceeds up to March 1, about 21 million roubles had been used to pay the expenses of distribution, and 823,511 roubles had been spent to provide goods and services to the UNRRA Mission. Of the balance then remaining available (3,144,655,500), nearly half had been used for rehabilitation work at the Republican (state) level of government; 1,324,239,000 roubles had been transferred to regional executive committees (the next level of government) for expenditure on local projects; and about 391 million roubles in cash was still available for future use.

State Relief and Rehabilitation Projects

652 At the state level rehabilitation work carried on from the beginning
657 of UNRRA deliveries up to March 1, 1947, amounted to 1,429,060,000
roubles, and was divided among four main categories; rehabilitation of
the national economy, 74 per cent. of the total state-level expenditures;
health services, 14 per cent.; children's institutions and schools,
11 per cent.; and social welfare, 1 per cent.

Rehabilitation of the National Economy. These expenditures are administered by the various ministries having productive capital works

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21.36 roubles equals one pound sterling; 5.40 roubles equals one U.S. dollar (March 1947).

652 under their jurisdiction. For example, capital works, repairs,
657 and equipment for livestock raising centres, piggeries, cattle sheds, slaughterhouses and refrigerators (under the Ministry of Cattle Breeding); vineyards, orchards, repairs of irrigation facilities (under the Ministry of Technical Agricultural Production); repairs to barns and agricultural implements (under the Ministry of Agriculture); and rehabilitation of the brick and ceramic industry (under the Ministry of Home Construction).

Health Services. These expenditures are administered by the Ministry of Health, and include the feeding of patients, and repairs and equipment for hospitals and health service agencies.

[658] Children's Institutions (over four years) and Schools. These expenditures are handled by the Ministry of Education, and include the feeding of children; and capital works, repairs and equipment for schools and children's homes.

Social Welfare Services Directed towards the Betterment of General Well-Being. These expenditures are administed by the Ministry of Social Welfare and include such services as repairs and maintenance of social welfare agencies, and assistance to invalids.

Local Rehabilitation

648 As at March 1, 1947, about 41 per cent. of the gross proceeds of
727 UNRRA sales had been transferred to regional executive committees of the government for use in the local and district economy. The local
185 projects - which are undertaken after approval by the state authorities
731 and are subject to regular reporting and inspection - are similar in character to those carried out by the Republican Government Ministries. However, there is a considerable shift in emphasis. For example, at the regional level, nearly 57 per cent. of the total proceeds at their disposal was utilized for health services (hospitals, nurseries), 35 per cent. for children's institutions, 5 per cent. for repairs of public and industrial institutions, and 2 per cent. for the building of schools and repair of clubs.

Deliveries of UNRRA Supplies

648 In the original agreement between UNRRA and the Ukrainian Govern-
731 ment was a provision that the Administration would "strive within the limits of its resources" to procure and deliver the Ukraine's share of relief and rehabilitation supplies before July 1, 1946. In the early months of 1946, however, it became clear that procurement difficulties and transport hold-ups would prevent a great part of the supplies from being delivered in time. The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was therefore extended to the end of 1946.

From December 1945, (when UNRRA deliveries to the Ukraine began) up to June 30, 1946, (the time at which they were originally scheduled

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Like the cooperative movement, popular education had long been a cornerstone of Ukrainian nationalism, more important in many respects than direct political action. In the conflict between the national Communists in the Ukraine and the Stalinist centralists, it was especially the commissars of education, such as Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk, who had led the fight for Ukrainization of cultural life. Consequently it was natural that nationalist Ukrainians were determined to control the municipal departments of education under German occupation. 727 658 871 626

A major aim of the Reichskommissar and his henchmen, however, was to prevent the development of a cultured Ukrainian class, to convert the people into a race of submissive peasants. Rosenberg's vision of a university in Kiev went by the board, and the standard schooling for every Ukrainian child was set at four years.[35] Few material injuries were as deeply resented as this drastic curb on the opportunities for education. Since there were real shortages of materials, books, and teachers, the Ukrainians held to the hope that the restriction did not represent a permanent policy, even in the face of the closing of *gimnaziias* which had been reopened under the army administration through the efforts of the local population itself.[36]

To a limited extent the ban on secondary and higher education was evaded by the extensive use made of a loophole in the German regulations which allowed the reopening of technical schools. The enormous loss of artisans and professionally trained persons incurred by the annihilation of the Jewish inhabitants compelled even the power-mad Nazis to recognize the need for training Ukrainians in such occupations. A large number of technical secondary schools, agricultural schools, and even institutes of higher education like medical faculties, were permitted. The extent to which these facilities were utilized by the Ukrainian population is indicated by the fact that the enrollment of the Kiev medical institute reached 2,000 in 1943 when the total population of the city was only 300,000, while Kherson, with a fifth 874 727 186

[35] Report of Rosenberg to Hitler, August 11, 1942, PS 42 (hereafter referred to as PS 42); PS 1198.

[36] E.g., in Berdichev (*Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3, quoting *Nova Doba* [Berdichev] for September 1), Zhitomir (Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941), and Belaia Tserkov' (*Nationalist*, December 20, 1941, p. 2).

impression on the intellectuals of the smaller towns. OUN-M 668*
writers and propagandists appear to have maintained regular con- 186
tact with them for several months in 1941, and it is apparent that
the Kiev *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* served as a model for many of the new [204]
editors.[8] Schools were opened under the direction of nationalist [658]
educators, Prosvita and theatrical groups were formed, coopera-
tives linked with *Vukospilka* were active. Apparently, too, the
town administrations were largely in Ukrainian hands; the mu- [191]
nicipal authorities in Uman' issued a sweeping order forbidding
the use of the Russian language in any office, school, or enter-
prise under their jurisdiction.[9]

The influence of the nationalists in the towns penetrated to some degree to the countryside in the area west of the Dnieper. For example, nationalist papers like *Nova Doba,* published in [204] Berdichev, seem to have had a moderately large circulation in the villages. There also seem to have been nationalist influences of a purely local character in some places, aside from those brought in by the nationalist parties. Zvenigorodka, a small town about a hundred miles due south of Kiev had been the home of the Free Cossacks, a nationalist organization of the wealthier peasants during the revolutionary period. The group was revived by some of the villagers under the German occupation, and, together with a mimeographed newspaper, served as a focal point for local nationalism.[10]

The influence of the church, especially in the rural areas, was 794
not entirely on the side of Ukrainian nationalism.[1] The Auton- 186
omous clergy under Alexius made an early start in reorganizing
religious life in this region. They established a diocese of Vinnitsa
and Zhitomir, and during most of the period of occupation were
supported by the influential Bishop Damaskin (Maliuti) of Ka-
menets-Podolsk. Damaskin's diocese included nearly five hun-
dred churches, with a hundred and sixty priests.[11] Apparently
most of this large organization, which was overwhelmingly con-
centrated in the rural districts, had no objection to Damaskin's
allegiance to the Russophile church. The Autocephalous Church

[8] Interview 30.
[9] *Nastup,* May 3, 1942, p. 2.
[10] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[11] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 13, 1942, p. 2.

[1] [After Germans had occupied this territory--Analyst]

under Tsarism, but a long road had to be travelled before all children would have an opportunity to attend schools. Buildings would have to be constructed, teachers trained, text-books written and published. The Ukrainian government first endeavored to provide "elementary" or four-year schools for all children from eight to twelve years of age, then to expand these schools into "incomplete middle" or seven-year schools, and finally to replace these with "complete middle" or ten-year schools; and, in the meanwhile, the government established technical schools and higher educational institutions to train engineers, doctors, actors and other types of "socialist cadres." This quantitative growth of the school system was matched by its growth qualitatively, as measured from the point of view of the language policy. In spite of the shortages of teachers knowing Ukrainian and the languages of the other minorities,[1] the almost complete absence of text-books in these languages, and the appearance of considerable opposition on the part of political leaders, of teachers and even of parents, the Russian language was gradually replaced as the medium of instruction by the other languages.

As early as March 1919 an order of the Commissariat of Education of the newly re-established Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic declared that the Russification policy was abrogated; that the Commissariat would aid in the development of the long-repressed Ukrainian language; and that "in view of the elimination of a governmental language as such, and of the declaration that all local languages are equal, the Commissariat of Education gives the local population the right to determine in which language teaching must be carried on in the schools, safeguarding simultaneously the interests of [other] national groups."[10] Wherever the language of instruction remained Russian, a second language — also chosen by the local population itself — was to be taught as a special subject. In September 1920 this provisional order was strengthened by a law of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. The law instructed the Commissariat of Education to draw up a plan for schools of all grades and categories with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.[11] Ukrainian was to be studied as an obligatory subject in all teacher-training institutions and was to be used as the language of instruction in some of them. The law also ordered the Government Publishing House to issue "a sufficient quantity of text-books as well as *belles-lettres* and other publications in the Ukrainian language."

1921), pp. 3–6; *Zbirnik Uzakonen ta Rosporiadžen Robitničo-Seljanskogo Urjady Ukraini za 1924 rik*, 1924, part 1, sec. 271, pp. 800–803; Sojuz Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R., *Pjatyssesojuznyi S'ezd Sojuza Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R. Stenografičeski Otčet* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 172–174.

[10] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . ., 1919, sec. 260, p. 347.

[11] *Ibid.*, 1920, part 1, sec. 509, pp. 712–713.

[1] [Prior to 1924 -- Analysis]

652 under their jurisdiction. For example, capital works, repairs,
657 and equipment for livestock raising centres, piggeries, cattle sheds, slaughterhouses and refrigerators (under the Ministry of Cattle Breeding); vineyards, orchards, repairs of irrigation facilities (under the Ministry of Technical Agricultural Production); repairs to barns and agricultural implements (under the Ministry of Agriculture); and rehabilitation of the brick and ceramic industry (under the Ministry of Home Construction).

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1; Reshetar 5-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 adopting a conciliar form of government for the proposed church.
668 Despite the enactment of many resolutions calling for ecclesiastical independence, little real progress was made during 1917, primarily because other matters of a more immediate nature, especially the agrarian problem and the demand for peace, absorbed public attention. Among other obstacles there was the hesitancy of many priests to challenge the established religious order and the lack of forthright support from the Ukrainian Central Council *(Ukrainska Central'na Rada)* which was the recognized representative body attempting to govern Ukraine at the time.

795 When the government of the Central Council was replaced by
659 that of Hetman Paul Skoropads'kyj in April of 1918 the official attitude toward the organization of a separate church became more sympathetic. A Ministry of Religious Cults was established under the direction of Professor Basil Zin'kivs'kyj, a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the University of Kiev. Plans were made to convoke a *sobor*, or general church conclave, but before this could be done it was necessary to select a new metropolitan archbishop of Kiev to succeed Metropolitan Vladimir, who had been murdered in February while the city was under Bolshevik rule. According to established procedure the metropolitan was to be elected at a diocesan congress, but Zin'kivs'kyj wished to depart from this practice and have all of the Ukrainian dioceses participate in the electoral meeting. His reason for making this request was that the Metropolitan of Kiev is regarded as the ranking hierarch in Ukraine and not merely as the head of another diocese.

However, the Church administration, which was in Russian hands at the time, proceeded to call an ordinary congress of the Kiev diocese thus ignoring Zin'kivs'kyj's proposal. In view of the nature of the Congress' membership it is not surprising that Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovits'kyj of Kharkov was elected. This did not please the Ukrainian nationalists because Anthony had forbidden the clergy of the Kharkov diocese to read the Gospel in Ukrainian, which he termed "a language of the market place." Zin'kivs'kyj wrote in vain to His Holiness Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, requesting that Anthony's election be set aside. The new Metropolitan immediately made plans for his journey to Kiev with the intention of arriving there in the morning, but railway workers, who were aware of the hierarch's anti-nationalist views, delayed the train for nearly ten hours and prevented a ceremonial welcome planned by his supporters.[8]

The German-sponsored Skoropads'kyj Government continued to lend its support to the convocation of the All-Ukrainian *Sobor*

[8] Dmytro Dorošenko, *Istorija Ukrainy* (Užhorod, 1930), II, 322.

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which met on June 20. Metropolitan Anthony as senior bishop was elected to the honorary presidency of the *Sobor*, but Bishop Pimen of the Balta diocese presided over the sessions. A national church did not emerge from these meetings because its adherents controlled no more than a third of the votes. The *Sobor* contented itself with requesting the Government to recognize Anthony as Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, which meant that it wished to have the parishes in Ukraine remain part of the Russian Orthodox Church. On July 9, it enacted a statute for the provisional administration of the Church in Ukraine which granted to the Patriarch of Moscow the right to confirm the election of the Metropolitan of Kiev, hear complaints directed against him and other Ukrainian bishops, bless the convocation of Ukrainian *sobors*, and be prayed for in the performance of every liturgical office in every Ukrainian parish. In effect, the statute provided for autonomy and not the autocephalous status which the nationalist clergy desired.

The statute also conferred upon Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow the right to reject any of its provisions, and the head of the Russian Church did not hesitate to do so. In a letter written to Metropolitan Anthony on September 26, 1918, the Patriarch expressed his willingness to accept the statute, but only if the Orthodox dioceses in Ukraine were to remain "an inseparable part of the one Russian Orthodox Church" on an autonomous basis, and accept decisions of the All-Russian Church *Sobors*. He also insisted upon the right to send his own representative to Ukrainian *sobors* and confirm the ruling hierarch in every Ukrainian diocese.[4] The Patriarch's conditions were not calculated to endear him to the advocates of a national church. Their dissatisfaction found expression in the address which Hetman Skoropads'kyj's new Minister of Cults, Alexander Lotoc'kyj (1870–1939), delivered before the All-Ukrainian *Sobor* on November 12, when it reconvened in Kiev. In no uncertain terms he attacked the Patriarch's autocratic methods and flatly stated that the Government favored an autocephalous church for Ukraine.

However, the conflict remained unresolved because of the collapse of Hetman Skoropads'kyj's regime as a result of the withdrawal of the German army of occupation in conformity with the armistice provisions which had been negotiated in the West. As the Germans withdrew, the Red Army invaded Ukraine and attacked the newly-organized armed forces of the Directory Government, the troops commanded by Symon Petljura. Many of the members of this new Government which succeeded that of Skoropads'kyj were republican socialists who had been prominent in the Central Council *(Rada)* of 1917. While many of these men were secularists

[4] *Ibid.*; Appendix 11 contains the text of the Patriarch's letter.

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795 659 and opposed to the perpetuation of the close relationship between Church and State which had existed under the Hetman's regime, they nevertheless thought it best to recognize the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and did so in a law enacted on January 2, 1919. In the two years of anarchy and civil war which followed, little could be done to further the actual establishment of the Church. The Directory Government's diplomatic envoy in Constantinople, Alexander Lotoc'kyj, attempted in vain to obtain recognition of the Church by the *locum tenens* of the Constantinople Patriarchate in order to assure its canonical status. Metropolitan Dorofej, who was serving as *locum tenens* at the time, refused to decide on recognition, since he was convinced that only a patriarch could take such a step.[5] Lotoc'kyj's efforts had been hampered in Constantinople by the émigré Russian hierarchs, including Metropolitan Anthony and Metropolitan Platon of Odessa, who had found refuge there from the Bolsheviks. They ultimately established themselves as the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad with headquarters in the Yugoslav city of Sremski-Karlovtsi. Their departure from Ukraine, however, meant that the opposition to the national church would be diminished to a slight degree.

795 Thus in 1920 there commenced to function effectively in Kiev an All-Ukrainian Church Council which was a synod composed of priests and deacons. It had the task of promoting the organization of parishes for the new Church and also served as its highest administrative organ. The Russian bishops whom Metropolitan Anthony had left in charge prior to his departure expressed their opposition to this Ukrainian "sectarianism" and forbade the members of the Ukrainian Church Council to celebrate the liturgy. However, the new Church retained control of four of the largest houses of worship in Kiev, including historic St. Sophia's Cathedral, and held the usual Eastern Orthodox religious offices, but conducted them in the Ukrainian language instead of in the archaic and not easily understood Church Slavonic which is the liturgical medium of the Russian Church. Other parishes left the Russian Church and attached themselves to the Ukrainian Church Council, and it soon became evident that this new branch of Eastern Orthodoxy would have to obtain its own episcopate. No bishop of the Russian Church was willing to join the Ukrainians, and when they requested several of them to consecrate two Ukrainian priests as bishops they met with refusals. It was in such an atmosphere of frustration that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor* convened in the Cathedral of St. Sophia on October 14, 1921.

The *Sobor*, in a final, futile attempt to seek a reconciliation with

[5] Alexander Lotoc'kyj, *V. Carhorodi* (Warsaw, 1939), pp. 92 f.

1: Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

779 of greater magnitude or requires more Grace than the other six
795 sacraments which are performed by all priests.

It is claimed that the differentiation which now exists between a
793 bishop and presbyter or priest lies not in the degree or quality of Grace which each enjoys, but only in the functions which each performs. Yet when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church re-established itself in 1921, it did not abolish the episcopacy or argue in a presbyterian manner that the episcopacy has no place in the Church. It merely argued that the exclusive right of bishops to administer the sacrament of holy orders (ordination and consecration) developed as a result of the actual needs of Church life and not on the grounds that bishops possess a greater degree or higher quality of Grace. The Church itself, it is contended, is the source of the differentiation in functions performed by bishops and presbyters or priests. Administrative necessity and the need for unity and stability alone caused the Church to grant to bishops the exclusive right to ordain and consecrate. This right is a purely canonical matter and is therefore, unlike religious dogma, not immutable. It is a practice developed by the Church, and it is consequently possible for the Church to redistribute functions at any time, as its Ukrainian branch did in 1921 when it became necessary to obtain a truly Ukrainian episcopate. This was a drastic step, and it was accompanied by an appeal to the Lord, the Supreme Pastor, before whom the Ukrainians laid their faith, hopes, and prayers.[14]

795 Under Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj's leadership thirty-five bishops
659 were consecrated in the traditional Orthodox manner, and the new Church appeared to be prospering. The Soviet Government had
687 done little to prevent its establishment but within a few years commenced a campaign of gradual suppression. In 1924 and during each of the three succeeding years Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj was placed under arrest. In 1927 he was compelled to resign and a *sobor* elected Nicholas Borec'kyj to succeed him. The new Metropolitan governed the Church until 1930 when it was implicated in the alleged plot of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine *(Spilka Vyzvolennja Ukrāny)*. This clandestine organization was accused of promoting separatist tendencies and desiring to restore private property. Vladimir Čekhivs'kyj, a Social Democrat who had been premier of the anti-Bolshevik Directory Government early in 1919, was charged with having headed the Union's religious section. During the trial of the forty-five leaders of the Union in March and April

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 100 f. Archbishop Teodorovyč (pp. 124 ff.) has cited considerable evidence which indicates that consecration of bishops by a college of presbyters was a practice employed by the Church of Alexandria for more than two centuries preceding the convocation of the First Ecumenical Council in 325 A.D.

1: Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 of 1930 the prosecution alleged that the Church held secret requiems for Symon Petljura, the émigré nationalist, following his murder in 659 Paris.[15] The Ukrainian Church never recovered from the setback 687 which it suffered as a result of the trial. During the 1930's all of the bishops were arrested, and with the advent of World War II there remained only Archbishop Teodorovyč in the United States, the sole surviving hierarch of the original thirty-five.[16]

793 The opportunity to renew the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church came with the Nazi invasion of the 795 Soviet Union. The movement was headed by Bishop Polikarp Sikors'kyj of the diocese of Lutsk in Volynia, who in February of 1942 re-established the Church at a *sobor* in Pinsk and consecrated several bishops. At the same time Bishop Polikarp succeeded in obtaining the support of his nominal superior, Metropolitan Dionisij of Warsaw, who had consecrated him in 1932 and ten years later elevated him to an archbishopric. Polikarp's consecration had been canonical since he had headed part of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Poland, which was recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople during the inter-war period. Thus the renewed Ukrainian Church was not plagued with the charge of "self-consecration" which served the enemies of the national church so well during the

[15] Nicholas Kovalevs'kyj, *Ukraina Pid Červonyin Jarmom* (Lviv, 1936), pp. 72 ff.

[16] The demise of the Church in Ukraine itself did not hinder the development of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the United States and in Canada. Many of the Ukrainian immigrants in both countries desired such a Church, and when the movement first manifested itself in the homeland they were quick to assume the initiative. As early as July 18, 1918, a group of 150 laymen held a church congress in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The participants were members of the Uniat Church, adhering to the Eastern Orthodox ritual but acknowledging the Papacy, who were dissatisfied with the arbitrary nature of its administration and the principle of personal episcopal ownership of all church buildings and parochial property. They also objected to the attempt of the Uniat Church to obtain control of the Peter Mohyla Institute, a Ukrainian educational institution in Saskatoon. When the Uniat bishop denied them the sacraments, they decided to establish a truly national and democratically governed church and return to the Orthodox faith of their forefathers. The new Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada gained adherents from the Russian Orthodox Church which lost whole parishes composed of emigrants from Bukovina; many Uniats also joined the new Church which now has more than two hundred congregations although many of these are rural and small. The Canadian Church, unlike the movement in Ukraine itself, succeeded in obtaining recognition from a canonically consecrated Orthodox hierarch in the United States, the Syrian Metropolitan Germanos, who served as its acting bishop until Archbishop Teodorovyč succeeded him in 1924. The latter also assumed control over the numerically smaller Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, but in 1947 he relinquished the leadership of the Canadian Church which now has a separate hierarch. It is significant that the Canadian Church did not accept the canons which were adopted at the Kiev *Sobor* in 1921, since it wished to be in a position to establish relations with the other branches of the Orthodox Church on the North American continent.

659 795 The spread of Protestantism from Germany to Ukraine was favored by the mere geographical fact of the latter's inclusion in the Polish empire while Poland, as a result of its close connections with Prussia, the Baltic States and Bohemia was for a considerable time a refuge for all sorts of creeds. Moreover, many of the magnates and some of the kings of Poland had shown themselves to be favorably disposed to the new movement, not indeed from any genuine, religious feeling, nor because they were moved by conscience to adopt new ways, but purely from motives of self-interest; for they calculated that, if the reformation was victorious in Poland, the Catholic Church would forfeit its all-powerful influence on life in general and, further, they hoped to acquire for themselves the enormous property which the Catholic Church would have to abandon. Such reasoning, however, did not apply to the Orthodox Church which had little property and which did not constitute a power that was ambitious of yielding political influence; it was inspired by no desire for sovereignty, but, on the contrary, had constantly to defend itself against encroachments from without.

795 The same trends and sympathy for the West gave rise to the movement for the union of the churches whose leaders did not think only of their personal interest but were also inspired by lofty ideals. When, after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow or the third Rome, as it liked to be called, tried to succeed to the position of capital of the Eastern Church, the Ukrainian bishops were faced with a choice between a Moscow that they held to be still uncivilised and Rome, a center of Western culture, and they decided in favor of the latter.

From the point of view of national interests, the dignitaries who joined the Union represented definitely Ukrainian tendencies in contrast to their conservative colleagues who preferred a connection with Moscow which was also orthodox. In support of this contention, we may mention that the Metropolitan Hipatius Potij, a Greek Catholic who was one of the most energetic champions of the Union, displayed particular zeal for the Ukrainian language in which tongue he recited his creed and took his oath to the Pope, although he was completely at home in Latin. By accepting the protection of the mighty Church

655 firms were turned into branches of one commissariat or another. By the spring, while there had not yet been a full communization of the country, the process was well advanced and no resident of Western Ukraine could doubt as to the future of the area.

659 In Eastern Galicia, where the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite was the predominant religion, the Metropolitan Archbishop Andry Sheptytsky was not personally touched.[1] He was placed under more or less surveillance and found it impossible to exercise his normal activity. However, all the religious schools and seminaries under his charge were closed, the church and monastic lands were seized, and all ecclesiastical printing was suppressed. Finally, the clergy were compelled to hand over to the representatives of the government all the baptismal and other records which were incorporated in the work of the ZATS, the Soviet bureau of vital statistics. The clergy were treated as a non-working class [661] and were thus deprived of all means of livelihood, except for the free-will offerings of their impoverished parishioners.

In the eastern sections, where the Orthodox Church predominated, the same regulations were put into force with the additional proviso that the clergy had to transfer their allegiance from the Polish Orthodox Church to the locum tenens of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow. This was a first step in improving relations between the locum tenens and the Soviet government and in making the authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church a definite instrument of the government in the spreading of Russian Communism.

545 On the other hand, there was a considerable patronage of Ukrainian art. Certain scholars were rather favored. The Ukrainian theatre was supported on a more liberal scale than it had been under the Polish rule and there were in some quarters hopes that there might be a happy future. It was again a short dream, for [626] as 1940 came to a close, there began again the insistant but unobtrusive attempts at russification. Russian theatrical companies began to visit Lviv and other cities. The publications of the publishing firms of Lviv fell off and once more they found it necessary 000 to produce Russian books. The libraries were carefully purged of

1 [1940 -- under Russian occupation -- Analyst]

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

The Soviet Religious Policy

000 In any discussion of Soviet Russian-Ukrainian relations, the religious problem is important for it touches many issues which are but dimly understood in the Western world. The latter has been too long content to think of the east of Europe only in terms of power politics, the Eastern Question, and similar problems to bother about the details of a discussion which has been often a matter of life and death to the people involved and which might throw a real light upon the present situation.

795 659 One fact stands out. Rus'-Ukraine was Christianized before the division of the Eastern and Western Churches and the full results of that division were not made evident until the dawn of the modern era. The dominant religious type of religion was that of the Orthodox East and the important See was that of Kiev. Yet Kievan Christianity was never bigoted or exclusive and even after the great Schism of 1054, the princes of Kiev continued to intermarry equally with the noble families of both east and west.

After the Metropolitan, under political pressure, took up his residence in Moscow, Kiev and the Western Ukrainian lands secured a new Metropolitan from the Patriarch of Constantinople. Moscow became the seat of a patriarchate but it was only in 1648 that the Patriarch and the Tsar of Moscow became willing to have any contact with the Orthodox Christians of Kiev. Already in 1596 this attitude had culminated in the establishment of a Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, acknowledging the papacy but maintaining the Eastern Orthodox forms of worship.

In 1686, while the Tsar of Russia was beginning to absorb the Zaporozhian Kozaks, he exerted pressure upon the Patriarch of Constantinople to abolish this new Metropolitanate of Kiev, and in 1686, by the act of Moscow but not of Constantinople, this was done. Once Moscow secured control, it applied the

795 659 Muscovite usages and as its power grew in Ukraine, so did its pretensions. The cultural power of Ukrainian Orthodoxy disappeared in the Russian Sea, while the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite became the dominating religious power in Western Ukraine. Nothing shows more clearly the Muscovite attitude than the fact that it gave a lower rank to the Metropolitan of Kiev than it did to the head of the Georgian Orthodox, when they, too, passed under Russian sovereignty.

As Rus'-Ukraine under tsarist control became only a collection of "Little Russian" gubernias, so the Ukrainian Orthodox became a collection of "Little Russian" diocess, in which there was nothing Ukrainian and so it remained until 1917, while each time that the tsar acquired more Ukrainian lands, the same form of coercion was applied not only to the Ukrainian Orthodox but also to the Catholics whose Byzantine Rite under the Hapsburgs and then under Poland and Czechoslovakia, had developed into a distinct Western Ukrainian religion. Under the leadership of Metropolitan Andry Sheptytsky, a giant physically and intellectually, this process went on rapidly, much to the annoyance of the Poles in the old province of Eastern Galicia.

Finally we must note that when Western Ukraine passed under Poland in 1920, that country forced the establishment of a Polish Orthodox Church for the several million Ukrainians and Byelorussians who were in the revived state. The language of this was Polish and its organization was adopted to the Polish system as it developed in the revived state.

With these preliminary notes, we can now turn to the relations between the Ukraine and the Soviet Russians.

A. The Orthodox

With the Revolution of 1917 and the revival and development of the independence movement among the Ukrainians, there arose also a demand for the revival of an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This was stubbornly opposed by the Provisional Government, Patriarch Tikhon and the Russian Orthodox in Ukraine, the same forces that had haggled and debated the develop-

ment of a Ukrainian independent state throughout the period, 795
until the Russian Communists secured control and were able to 659
maintain their assumption of power.

In the first stages, while the Communists still hoped for the success of the world revolution, they emphasized their doctrines of atheism and they stressed the conception that "religion was the opium of the people." At the same time they endeavored to disintegrate the Russian Orthodox Church from within by giving their support to the various schemes of reform as the Living Church, etc. They also gave especial favor to various Protestant bodies, as the Baptists, who sought to introduce their ideas, often with marked success.

It was a crucial period for eastern Europe, for the Western 648
nations and America which had been victorious in World War I were not inclined to cement their victory. No matter what they thought of the Communist regime, Great Britain and the United States were still convinced that the victory of a democratic Russia was a certainty and they refused to take any steps to help the non-Russian peoples who were being over-whelmed by the Soviets, lest it prejudice their future relations with Russia. France, obsessed with the fear of Germany, was seeking to restore a greater Poland which would absorb as much as possible of Ukraine. The memory of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk blinded everybody to events as they were taking place.

It was no less critical for the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Allies sympathized with his position but the successful revolt of Mustapha Kemal against the Treaty of Sèvres produced a situation where the Western powers had to fight or surrender. They wished to do neither and with a certain Bolshevik sympathy for Turkey, the Patriarch was obliged to be cautious, until his hands were in a way freed by the settlement of Lausanne.

Hence the leaders of the movement for a Ukrainian Autocephal- 795
ous Orthodox Church were in a way powerless to regulate their relations with Orthodoxy as a whole. They had been unable to secure the support and assistance of any Russian bishops. They

the Church flourished and bade fair to restore the traditions of the 795
old Ukrainian Orthodox Church and there were high hopes that sooner or later it would be able to heal the defects in the original consecration.

This was not to be, for after the death of the Patriarch Tikhon 795
the power in the Russian Church passed into the hands of the 659
Metropolitan Sergy who showed himself willing to effect such a compromise with Stalin and Communism as might be necessary. His offer was, to a certain degree, accepted and the Soviet regime, without changing its policy of persecuting all religious activity, began to throw a few crumbs of favor to the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate in Moscow. Slowly but surely, the various Russian divisions, like the Living Church, slipped back into the general organization, and the Soviets soon grasped the possibilities of using Sergy and the Russian organization as a political weapon in their struggle for world domination.

Even before the ending of Ukrainization, the Communists began to put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. The Metropolitan was refused permission to visit the various parishes under his control and to publish journals and other material for his flock. This was followed by more active measures. Metropolitan Lypkivsky was arrested and imprisoned. So were all of the other bishops and by 1930 there was not a single one of the bishops still in Ukraine who was not in prison or dead. The church was broken up and all of its activities stopped, but the spirit that had animated it continued to lie hidden.

When the Germans and the Soviets occupied Poland in 1939, a 795
new possibility was sensed. The so-called Polish Autocephalous [793]
Church was composed overwhelmingly of Ukrainians and Byelorussians, with but a few anti-Communist Russians. Even before 1939, some of these Ukrainian clergy and laity had begun to take steps for the Ukrainianizing of the Church, even though they had been forced to introduce Polish into the services. When the storm broke, Russians like Bishop Sava made their way abroad and joined the Russians in exile. Bishop Oleksy (Hromadsky) in Kremyanets and Bishop Polykarp (Sikorsky) in Lutsk were forced

795 to recognize the Moscow organization, which was coming into favor with Stalin because of its increasing subservience to the Soviet regime. On the other hand, Metropolitan Dionysy, who had been in that part of Ukraine that was included in the Polish Government General, now threw off any attempt at concealment and revived the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, which this time was provided with canonical orders in all grades. He consecrated two new Ukrainian bishops, Ilarion (O. Ohienko) for Kholm and Podlyasie and Palady (Vedybida-Rudemko) for Krakow and Lemkivshchyna.

This marked a new period and when the Germans attacked the USSR in 1941 and occupied it, Polykarp joined them, while Oleksy set up still another group, the Ukrainian Autonomous Church, for he refused to break his connections with Moscow.

795 659 [727] The German permission for the formation in 1942 of a central organization was frankly ambiguous. On the one hand, they were glad of any movement that would rouse the people against Moscow. On the other, in religion as in politics, they were opposed to any movement which would prevent them from carrying out their policy of treating the Ukrainians as a subject and inferior race. As a result, they put every obstacle in the way of a reconciliation between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous groups and threw their support to whichever was the weaker in any given area.

The open support of the Soviet government by Sergy and his associates now under the pressure of war paid off. His protestations of sympathy for Stalin and the Russians were rewarded with medals and other honors. Then, in the autumn of 1943, as the final step in the process, Stalin gave permission for the restoration of the Patriarchate in Moscow and Sergy was duly installed. On his death in 1944, he was succeeded by Aleksey, the former Archbishop of Leningrad, the present Patriarch, and under his leadership the Russian Orthodox Church has embarked upon a policy of securing control for the Soviets of all other Orthodox Churches.

795 In the meanwhile, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church during the war displayed great activity in the occupied Ukraine. It speedily won the support of most of the clergy who were not in

795 in the attempt to revive a native and independent Ukrainian
793 government. This was, of course, prevented by the Germans and the Archbishop remained at Lviv scarcely more free during the German occupation of Ukraine than he had been under the Soviets. He continued his efforts to unite both the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Churches without effect, but he was able to do considerable for the well-being of his people. Still he was no longer free to act openly, although his advice was sought whenever and wherever it could be.

The Soviets reoccupied Lviv on July 27, 1944 and at once set to work more vigorously to introduce their system. Archbishop Sheptytsky did not long survive for he passed away on November 1 of the same year. He was succeeded in his post by Joseph Slipy, who had been one of his outstanding assistants and the rector of the Theological Academy which Metropolitan Sheptytsky had founded in the late twenties, when it had became evident that the Poles would not allow the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviv.

● 659 Metropolitan Slipy had barely been installed in office, when
795 the Soviets showed their hand and began to call for a condemnation
793 of the Vatican by the Ukrainian Catholics and for their union
661 with Moscow. It did not take long for words to turn into actions.

On April 15, 1945, the NKVD surrounded the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv and arrested the Metropolitan, Bishop Budko and Bishop Charnetsky together with many other leaders. They arrested all of the students of the Theological Academy and they likewise seized the Cathedral and turned it over to the Patriarch of Moscow as a Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, they informed the professors of the Theological Seminary that the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite had ceased to exist.

At almost the same time the NKVD gathered in the other Catholic bishops in Western Ukraine, Bishop Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv and his vicar, Bishop Lyatyshevsky, while at the same time the Polish Communist regime seized Bishop Kotsylovsky of Pere-

myshl and his auxiliary bishop, Lakota. Bishops Khomyshyn and Kotsylovsky soon died under the treatment that they received. 659 795

The others were kept in prison and then in 1946, according to the best available information, Metropolitan Slipy and his associates were sent to labor camps in the far north in the Vorkuta coal mines. From that time they have disappeared from sight. 793 661

In 1947, the last Catholic bishop of this rite, Bishop Romzha of Carpatho-Ukraine, while travelling through his diocese "collided" accidentally with a Soviet tank and was killed and this ended the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in their own lands. The following year the Rumanian government followed suit and likewise annihilated the hierarchy of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite in Transylvania. In 1950 the Czech Communist regime arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment Bishop Hoydych and his coadjutor Hopka of the diocese of Prashev in Slovakia.

These actions were followed in each case by attacks upon the lower clergy, who were ordered to accept the supremacy of the Patriarch of Moscow. This was fully in the tradition of the old Russian Church, for each time that the tsars had bitten off a slice of Ukraine, they had applied the same methods to the Catholic hierarchy in the section, to the intent that the Byzantine rite could be performed only under the supervision of the Russian authorities.

In this case in 1945, on July 1, when the Soviet Ukrainian Commissar for Religion, Khodchenko, called on the clergy to recognize the new situation, the professors of the Theological Academy met in Lviv in the Cathedral of St. George and presented a request that they be given the liberties accorded to them on paper by the Stalinist Constitution. The answer was their arrest and imprisonment.

Then the government set to work. They secured the apostasy of one of the foremost of the Ukrainian Catholic priests, Father Kostelnyk, who willingly put himself at the service of the Patriarch and presided over a "sobor" which was called to ratify the switch from the Vatican to the Patriarch. Many of the priests who attended were apparently members of the NKVD in disguise. They willingly applauded Stalin and the Patriarch and armed with this authority,

659 795 793 661

the Soviet regime set to work to seize all the churches and property of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite and preempt it for their own use.

This marked the end of the open existence of the Church. There were still priests who escaped and took refuge with the U. P. A. (the Ukrainian underground) but open worship was at an end. There has been enforced at least a superficial agreement with the Kremlin on all matters of religion. Nevertheless, the latent hatred still exists and it can flare up at any moment when the situation warrants it.

The movements represented by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite still flourish in the emigration, where alone there is any opportunity for free thought. In the meanwhile, the Kremlin is maintaining its position in its traditional Muscovite manner and applying its savage punishments and deportations and executions to prove that Ukraine is happy and contented in following the example of the "elder brother." Yet even so, the number of episodes when Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism appears make it seem as if the officials of both church and state were not too sure that the Ukrainian people fully sympathize with the Patriarch Aleksey in his deification of the foremost man of the ages, who still forbids Communists to have anything to do with the Orthodox Church. That has sold its soul for as little real value as did the Ukrainian Communists in the early years of the struggle.

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VIII. NATIONALISM AND THE CHURCH

THE PRINCIPAL propagators of Ukrainian nationalism in the occupied Ukraine were political groups. They were, however, not the only bearers of the concept of Ukrainian distinctiveness. Religious organizations also played an important role. The relation of the Greek Catholic Church to the nationalist parties has already been discussed. Unlike the political parties, most of which at least claimed to represent the entire Ukrainian nation, however, the Greek Catholic Church was almost wholly confined to Galicia, since the great mass of the East Ukrainian Christians were members of the Orthodox faith. 795 [668*]

In the Orthodox lands, religion and national affiliation have always been closely related. Most of the East and South Slavic peoples identify their church with their national existence. Some of the same characteristics which have enhanced the distinctiveness of these peoples have also formed the basis of divisions among the Orthodox Slavs. One such feature is the lack of a supreme authority within the Orthodox Church. Each body of the church, existing in a given territory in a given period, has a well-defined hierarchy, usually governed by a council of bishops and frequently headed by a patriarch or metropolitan. There is, however, no pope at the head of all Orthodoxy. It is true that the Orthodox Church, like the Roman Catholic Church, recognizes the authority of an ecumenical council, but such a council has not been held in the East for a millennium. [182]

A difficult question arises at this point: how is the "body of the faithful" or "territory" of each group to be defined? This problem has, in fact, been an extremely troublesome one in the history of the Orthodox Church, for in the absence of a central ecclesiastical authority there can be no final solution. In practice an answer has been provided by another characteristic feature 795 659

[See category 116, pp. 36-38 -- Analyst]

795 of the Orthodox Church—its close dependence on the secular
659 authority. Historically, the Orthodox Church has been the official church par excellence; union of church and state is not only a legal expression but a vital reality in the history of Eastern Europe. Consequently, the actual extent of authority of each body of the church has usually coincided with the boundaries of the state in which it exists. A corollary of this coincidence of state and ecclesiastical authority has been the establishment of, or the endeavor to establish, a new hierarchical authority whenever a
[668] major change in state sovereignty has taken place. Moreover, as nationalist movements became powerful in the Orthodox lands in the nineteenth century, they often demanded a separate church organization as a consequence of their growing sense of national distinctiveness, and as a preparation for their separate statehood.

795 Until 1917, almost all Orthodox East Slavs were united in a
659 single state, the Russian Empire, with a single church, the Rus-
186 sian Orthodox Church. Since the seventeenth century this church had lacked the customary patriarch or primate, and was connected to the secular power, and to a considerable degree controlled by it through an imperial official, the Procurator of the Holy Synod. The October Revolution destroyed the formal links between these historically intertwined institutions. At this point, the growing strength of Ukrainian national consciousness gave rise to a demand for state independence. It was in accord with the history of Orthodoxy that this demand should have been accompanied by a parallel movement for the establishment of a church organization independent of Moscow, for that seat of ecclesiastical authority had lost its preeminent prestige through the disestablishment of the Russian Orthodox Church, while its role as a symbol of East Slav unity was necessarily repudiated by those who saw the Ukrainian future as distinct from that of Russia.

000 Had the group desiring continuation of the Russian state (whether as an empire or a constitutional democracy) won out, it is probable that ecclesiastical unity would have been restored, since the Russian church, while it lost many of its privileges after the February Revolution, stood to gain in prestige through the reconstitution of the office of Patriarch of Moscow. Had, on the contrary, an independent Ukrainian state been able to maintain

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

itself for a few years, very likely a separate Ukrainian hierarchy 000
would have been generally recognized. In the situation which followed from the Bolshevik triumph, neither clear-cut solution was achieved. Instead, a large body of the lower clergy and the faithful 795
split off from the Russian hierarchy in the Ukraine. When no 798
member of the episcopacy could be found to consecrate a new bishop for the dissident group, the Ukrainian church body resorted to the "laying on of hands" by priests as a method for consecrating Father Lypkivs'kyi as prelate of their organization. Thus a new Orthodox Church was formed, which rapidly came to embrace the great majority of organized Orthodox believers in the Ukraine; by 1923 it had no less than three thousand parishes and thirty-five bishops, headed by Lypkivs'kyi, then known as Metropolitan Basil.[1] In spite of this apparent prosperity, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, as it was called, lay under the shadow of two great weaknesses. In the first place, it was not recognized by any other body of the Orthodox Church, for the method of consecration of the new bishops was regarded throughout the Orthodox world as uncanonical, a violation of the essential principle of apostolic succession. From the point of view of the traditional believer, the bishops of the new church were illegitimate; consequently, priests ordained by them (but not those who had joined the Autocephalous Church after ordination by a validly consecrated bishop) were not truly endowed with sacerdotal functions. Secondly, and of more immediate significance, the phenomenal growth of the new church was possible only because of the comparatively indulgent attitude shown by the Communist authorities who, at that time, were more antagonistic to the Russian church than to dissident bodies. When the Soviet [661]
power turned to restriction of Ukrainian national activity, as a potential threat to the unity of the USSR, the Autocephalous Church also came under attack. Its entire hierarchy and the great bulk of its clergy were executed or banished in 1929–30.[2]

In view of the close connection between church and state in 659
the Orthodox world, it was only natural that, when the Russian 795

[1] John S. Reshetar, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox Church," *American Slavic and East European Review*, X (February, 1951), 43–45.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

659 795 Empire collapsed and a considerable body of Orthodox believers came under Polish dominion, an effort was made to establish a separate hierarchy in Poland. The leader in this effort was Dionysius, a Russian bishop who, with recognition from the Patriarch of Constantinople, became Metropolitan of Warsaw and head of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland.[3] In addition to the Belorussian archbishop of Pinsk, there were four bishops in Volhynia: Archbishop Alexius, with his residence in the famous Pochaïvs'ka Lavra (monastery), and his vicars Polykarp, bishop of Lutsk; Anthony (Martsenko), bishop of Kamen Kashirsk (Kamin Koshyrs'k); and Simon, bishop of Ostriz. These bishops were Ukrainian but subject to Dionysius.[4]

795 When the Soviet Union acquired Volhynia in September, 1939, its efforts to convert the Russian Orthodox Church into an auxiliary of the Soviet government were already well under way. A special deputy of Patriarch Sergius of Moscow, Nicholas, Exarch of the West Ukraine, was sent to coordinate the church of the newly occupied area with the government-approved ecclesiastical organization. The existing bishops were not deposed, with the exception of Alexander of Pinsk. The latter was not molested physically, but his ecclesiastical jurisdiction, now in the Belorussian Soviet Republic, was divided between a bishop of Brest and a bishop of Pinsk sent from Moscow.[5]

While it is not likely that Alexius or his adherents (including Polykarp) were pleased with the subjugation of their province by Moscow, they appear to have conformed to the Orthodox tradition of submission to the secular power, even when the latter is not basically sympathetic to the Orthodox religion. Although it [626] did not suppress the Orthodox Church, the Soviet government imposed severe restrictions and onerous financial obligations upon it, as well as upon the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. As a result, many of the priests fled, or took up secular occupations.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48; Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1.

[4] *UAPTs (Ukrainskaia Avtokefalnaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov')* (UAPTs [Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church]), by "A. V." (Pravoslavnyi Beloruss, 1951; mimeographed), p. 2; cf. Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1. There was also a Bishop Timothy (Shreter) in a monastery in the Generalgouvernement, but he played no role in the controversies which followed, and appears to have been burned to death when Germans destroyed his monastery (Occ E-4 [1]).

[5] Occ E-4 (1); *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3.

186 The development of Ukrainian political and cultural life in
665 Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians condemned to ruthless Russification under Tsarist rule. When the first modern Ukrainian political organisation in Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, was founded in 1900 (from 1905 this party was named Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party) its first publication *Independent Ukraine* was printed in Austria, in Bukovina.

186 The Ukrainian patriots under Tsarist Russian Government,
668 morally and materially supported the fight of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights; these territories were a Ukrainian Piedmont. For not even the revolution of 1905 gave the Ukrainians in Russia their national rights. Of course, the Ukrainians had their deputies in the Russian 'Duma' who demanded autonomy for Ukraine. But the Ukrainian language was not admitted in the schools, the rights of the Ukrainian press were restricted, and active Ukrainians were persecuted by the Russian authorities. Among the Ukrainians in Russia the fight of the Austrian Ukrainians for the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviw roused great interest. The Russian Government regarded the creation of a Ukrainian University in Galicia as a great danger for the 'indivisible Russia' and sought an agreement with the Polish nationalists in Galicia against the Ukrainian movement. The Russian nationalists regarded the opening of a Ukrainian University in Lviw as a 'casus belli' for Russia against Austria.

668 The Russian Government closely watched the Ukrainian move-
661 ment in Austria and was much alarmed by its successes. In consequence, the Petersburg Government prepared to annex Galicia and Bukovina long before the war of 1914, in order to wipe out 'Mazeppism'. When, in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, a Ukrainian delegation visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to protest against the new prohibition of the Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire, the Minister replied cynically:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once for all . . .".

727 The suppression of the Ukrainian movement was one of the main
661 aims of Tsarist Russian policy in World War I. The occupation of Galicia and Bukovina by the Russian armies in 1914-1917 brought heavy damage to the Ukrainian movement; the Ukrainian schools, press, co-operative societies, scientific and educational institutions
727 were destroyed. Thousands of Ukrainians, Austrian citizens, were
659 deported to Siberia. In the occupied territories a ruthless Russifica-
661 tion was started, and in Galicia the forced conversion of the Greek-

Catholic Ukrainians to Greek Orthodoxy was taking place. The 727
Ukrainian Metropolitan of the Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia, 661
Count Andrew Szeptycki, was arrested and deported to the interior 659
of Russia, and with him numerous Ukrainian clergymen. This
policy of oppression of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina was
cynically referred to by the Russian Government as 'liberation of
subjugated Slav brethren' . . .

871 every teacher in the schools in Ukraine had orders to spread Com-
65 munist propaganda, to fight the appearance of national discontent
with the Russian rule by every means, and was obliged to insult the
[814] struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation. In schools, Ukrainian history was falsely interpreted as well as in literature and in films. For instance, clinging to the tradition taken from Tsarist Russia, the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa who at the beginning of the 18th century wanted to free Ukraine from Muscovite dependence, has in Soviet historiography the epithet of a 'traitor' and 'reactionary'. But Tsar Peter I. and Tsar Ivan the Terrible, are glorified by Soviet school and science as 'progressive democratic rulers'.

659 The Ukrainian religious life under the régime of Soviet Russian
661 occupation had to suffer from special persecutions. In 1921, in Soviet Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Autocephal Church, independent of the Moscow Patriarch, was organised. This Church, headed by its idealistic leaders, the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier of the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1918—19 and others, completed a great task for the cultural and moral improvement of the Ukrainian nation. Moscow attempted to destroy the strong organisation of the Ukrainian Autocephal Church with the help of its agents, but did not succeed in this. Then the Soviet Government ruined by bloody repressions the Ukrainian Church after having destroyed its entire hierarchy and masses of its followers (1929).

661 In connection with the 'General Line' which had placed unbear-
517 able burdens on Ukrainian economy, a mass discontent against
Moscow increased among the Ukrainians. The ruthless economic
815 exploitation and political oppression by Russia caused, among the Ukrainian people, a permanent oppositon which appeared in various forms. Therefore, the Moscow Government decided to terrorise the Ukrainian intelligentsia which bore the brunt of the political efforts of the Ukrainian nation. For this purpose a number of trials against the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian science and social life were arranged; the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine with the participation of the prominent member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, Serhy Yefremov, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier, Professor Osyp Hermayze and others in Kharkov, in spring 1930. Thousands of innocent people, especially students, perished in the prisoners' cells of the GPU without any trial. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Academy of Science was exposed to repressions. In place of the imprisoned or expelled members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, the Communists appointed their own people though without scientific merits,
46 but politically faithful to Moscow.

Of course, the 656
Ukrainian problem has remained from old times for Soviet Russia 661
the basic problem of its internal and foreign policy. The unceasing Russification policy against the Ukrainians is carried on by particularly cunning methods: the Ukrainian language is not yet [191] abolished definitely in the offices of Soviet Ukraine. But that official who speaks Ukrainian also in his family and in private relations becomes in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suspicious, and has to suffer repressions.

The Communist theory of the national problem worked out by Lenin preaches the 'fusion of nations'. Basing on this, the Russian Communist Government is trying to 'fuse' the nations of the Soviet Union with the Russians. Against peoples who oppose forced Russification, ruthless repressions are used by Moscow. Even the mentioning of the national rights of the non-Russian peoples is condemned in the USSR as 'bourgeois nationalism'.

There is a great principal difference between the situation of the 000
Russians and the peoples united by force with this state: though the Russians are not satisfied with the Communist dictatorship, they do not, however, feel national oppression. Even in the new anthem of the USSR it is said that this state was rallied by Great Russia. We can state the efforts of Russian political groups opposing the Communist régime to maintain the rule of the Russian state over the territories conquered by Soviet Russia, even after the eventual fall of the Soviet régime.

As a curious fact we can quote the view of the well-known Communist L. Trotzky, who was assassinated in Mexico during World War II, on the Ukrainian problem. Trotzky demanded in 1939 the full separation of Ukraine from Russia. But Trotzky thought of an independent Ukraine in the form of a Soviet Republic. This naturally deprived his thesis of all seriousness, for Trotzky needed the slogan of an independent Ukraine only as a political argument in polemics against Stalin (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 77/78, 1939).

As the facts prove, the Ukrainian nation has to endure the heaviest oppression in the USSR. Unfortunately, the words of the famous historian of France Charles Seignobos written in 1913 on Ukraine, can be used emphatically to describe the outstanding feature of the present state of the Ukrainian nation: "Here is the most oppressed nation" ("Voici la nation la plus opprimée", *Les Annales des Nationalités:* Paris, 1913).

In its equalising policy, the Soviet Russian Government retains, 659
also, traces of the Tsarist régime in the affairs of Church and reli- 798
gion. Thus, after having seized Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine dur- 661

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 [562] Art. 102. Women in the Ukrainian SSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life.

The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education and by State protection of the interests of mother and child, State aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers, maternity leave with full pay and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

[563] Art. 103. Equality of rights of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality and also any propagation of racial or national exclusiveness, hatred and contempt - are punishable by law.

[659] Art. 104. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the Ukrainian SSR is separated from the State and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

Art. 105. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed by law:

(a) Freedom of speech;
(b) Freedom of the press;
(c) Freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
(d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

[575] Art. 106. In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are ensured the right to unite in public organizations — trade unions, co-operative associations, youth organizations, sport and defence organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and State.

[694] Art. 107. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

Art. 108. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

Art. 109. The Ukrainian SSR affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

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Thus in Russia itself the 'Uniate heresy' was liquidated and it survived only in the Ukrainian territories which until 1918 belonged to the Austrian Empire and after 1918 to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. It was only after the final establishment of the Soviet power in Lvov, the see of the Ukrainian Uniate Metropolitan, that the great historical opportunity presented itself of accomplishing the work of Catherine II and Nicholas I with regard to the Uniate Church.

Soviet interference in Ukrainian church affairs proceeded as follows. In April 1945 the Metropolitan Slepoy, four bishops and several priests of the Uniate Church, all opponents of Orthodoxy and faithful supporters of the Pope were arrested as 'accomplices of German occupants'. One month later a 'Central Initiative Group for Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church' was formed and in April 1946 a Synod in Lvov solemnly proclaimed the union of the two churches. Considering the conditions prevailing in Russia the 'initiative group' could not have been set up, nor could the Lvov Synod be summoned without the active support of the Soviet authorities, and particularly of the 'Plenipotentiary for Religious Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R.'. The decisions of the Lvov Synod were not accepted by a number of parish priests who despite official pressure refused to abandon the Uniate Church. By January 1948 the resistance, according to official Soviet reports, seemed on the whole to be broken.

The Synod of Lvov was an ecclesiastical event only in name. In reality its decisions constituted a victory of the Russian State over Western tendencies in a frontier territory and the Orthodox Church was nothing but the accidental instrument by the help of which the victory was achieved. The Synod was merely an episode in the repression of the Western influences which after the end of the Second World War challenged Bolshevism in almost every sphere of Ukrainian life.[17]

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Apart from receiving additional strength from the Western Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism of the war and post-war period derived inspiration from two diametrically opposed sources. On the one hand, Ukrainian nationalism was encouraged under the German occupation. Without granting to the Ukrainian people the slightest shadow of an independent status, the German occupants favoured and consolidated the negative anti-Russian and anti-Jewish features of Ukrainian nationalism.

On the other hand, official Soviet propaganda also gave a fresh impetus to Ukrainian nationalism by allowing some expression to Ukrainian national hero-worship, for instance, by the creation of a war decoration commemorating the popular Ukrainian Cossack Hetman

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against the Great Russian hegemony.) The Ukrainian enthusiasts of 423
'cultural acheivements' so recently lauded by Kaganovich himself 474
were now accused of 'maintaining relations with nationalist political organizations in Galicia'. And it was not difficult to prove their connections with open or secret organizations 'suffering under the yoke of Poland'. The existence of such connections had been tolerated and even favoured by the Soviet administration to the extent which they furthered Communist propagandist activities in Poland, but there could be no difficulty, if necessary, in treating them as treason.

In 1930 the first Ukrainian political trial took place in Kharkov. 668
A group of individuals were accused of having relations with 'the 674
Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'—the same organization 661
which had been created before the war under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian Government and which was now supposed to be functioning in Galicia. In the following year, as a result of the growing resistance of the peasants to collectivization, action against Ukrainian 'suspects' became more violent. The peasants were bitterly opposed to the *kolkhozy*, but certainly not on 'national' grounds. Faced with the imminent danger of a peasant revolt, the Soviet administration decided to eliminate all persons who through their origins could be considered to be connected with the peasantry and who might organize this revolt and become its leaders. Regardless of their loyalty to the Soviet régime during the preceding years, there now began a systematic destruction of Ukrainians belonging to the 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'.

In 1931 the Bolsheviks professed to have 'discovered' a Ukrainian 661
organization called 'the National Centre'. Holubovich (former 687
head of the *Rada* Government and participator in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations), Shershel, Mazurenko and other 'ex-politicians' were accused of being the leaders of this secret organization. They were shot. Thousands of arrests followed, the victims of which suffered execution or exile to labour camps which were themselves living cemeteries. Two years later, in 1933, the political police (G.P.U.) declared that they had discovered a real military conspiracy on the part of 'a secret military organization'. After a theatrical trial, Kotsubinsky (Vice-President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars), Kovnar (Commissar for Agriculture), and scores of other persons who had all occupied important posts in the army or the administration were shot. One of the most prominent figures in Ukrainian political life, who from the beginning had associated himself with the Communist Revolution and who had for a long time been an influential member of the Council of People's Com-

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•66' 687 missars, Skrypnik, committed suicide in July 1933 in order to avoid arrest.

In that same year Postyshev replaced Kaganovich as 'dictator' in the Ukraine (he only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party). He arrived with orders 'to make an end of the counter-revolution that had woven itself a nest in the Ukraine'. The speech which Postyshev delivered at the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party, soon after entering on his office, indicated the new line of Soviet policy.

'In Ukraine our leading Party members and Comrade Stalin himself are specially hated. The class enemy has been to a good school in this country and has learned how to struggle against Soviet rule. In Ukraine have settled the remnants of many counter-revolutionary parties and organizations. Kharkov has gradually become the centre of attraction for all sorts of nationalistic and other counter-revolutionary organizations. They have all been drawn to this centre and they have spread their webs all over the Ukraine, making use of our Party system for their own ends. You remember, Comrades, when twenty Secretaries of Party Regional Committees dared to declare that it was impossible to fulfil the Harvest Plan' (nos. 15–21 of the *Proletarian*, Kharkov, 1934). At the same Congress the chief of the Ukrainian G.P.U., Beletsky, read a report in which he declared that 'Imperialists, through agents and through the remnants of the inimical classes which we have not destroyed and to which belong all the *kulak* and 'Petlyurian' elements of the Ukrainian villages, will yet prepare in the country criminal activities and diversions against the principal objects of our Ukrainian Economic Plan' (*ibid.*). Beletsky then proceeded to read aloud a proclamation which was supposed to have been seized by the G.P.U. and according to which Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries were 'dreaming about the denationalization of the whole of Ukrainian industry and the re-establishment of large landownership'.

Accusations of this type were of course inventions of the G.P.U., but the speeches of the head of this grim organization and of his political chief Postyshev indicate that the new policy of the Soviets was directed to the destruction both of the institution of private property among the Ukrainian peasants and of their national characteristics of stubborn individualism and love of freedom.

Postyshev had been given two problems to tackle: the first was to root out 'the counter-revolution' alleged to be lurking in the Soviet administration and in the Communist Party in the Ukraine;

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the second was to crush the will of the peasantry. In the first he succeeded as best he could and added to the sensational trials of 1931–3 the discovery of 'a secret Ukrainian organization' which was accused of being in direct touch with the Ukrainian separatists who were working abroad under the leadership of Colonel Konovalets. It was, however, beyond the strength of Postyshev to cope with the chaos which reigned in rural Ukraine during the years 1932–4 as a result of the policy of forced collectivization. Despite the fact that Postyshev 'eliminated' from the Ukrainian Communist Party over a quarter of its total strength, and in spite of thousands of arrests and hundreds of executions, the Party Secretary was accused of 'weakness and lack of energy' and was replaced by a certain Kossior. The late 'dictator' was, after a lapse of time, himself arrested and probably shot together with many of his closest collaborators.

But all the cruel personal dramas which took place under the Secretaryships of Postyshev and Kossior were as nothing compared to the terrible miseries which overtook the Ukrainian countryside during the five years 1930–35 as a result of the introduction of the *kolkhozy*. In their very essence *kolkhozy* were organically opposed to all the traditions and ways of life of the Ukrainian peasantry. Collective farming on a large scale was carried through at the cost of ruining small and 'average' peasant farms through the instrument of the ruthless pressure of the administration. The very rapid development of 'the *kolkhoz* movement' so much admired by Communists all the world over was the result, not of the peasants voluntarily joining the collective farms, but of their being driven on to them often by the use of military force—a fact which Stalin himself acknowledged in his article 'Head-turning from Success' (*Pravda*, 2 March 1930). The immediate consequence of the *kolkhoz* policy was seen in the lowering of agricultural production throughout the whole country which quickly led to the increasing misery of the peasantry, famine and terrible mortality. One of the principal reasons of all this was the *mania grandiosa* which always characterizes the policy of extreme ideologues; having become convinced of the low productive capacity of the smaller *kolkhozy* already set up, the enthusiasts of the Communist Party, in 1930, demanded their enlargement on a 'gigantic' scale. According to the reliable testimony of a member of the Communist Party (the Ukrainian agronomist Mirkevich, the initiator of tractor stations) 'this measure, in a series of regions, was realized in an exceptionally bureaucratic and senseless manner. *Kolkhozy* of 55–100 hectares were suddenly transformed, without any adequate technical preparation, into

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474 *kolkhozy* covering some tens of thousands of hectares; as, for
661 instance, the *Kolkhoz* of "Chervony Perekop" in the Government
423 of Kherson which was set up to comprise 50,000 hectares. In some cases, "to simplify matters", a whole region containing hundreds of villages was declared to constitute one *kolkhoz*. All the boundaries between village lands were abolished; then the whole expanse of land arbitrarily included in the *kolkhoz* was divided into farms of several thousand hectares each—without any regard as to where the villages actually lay. Cattle and agricultural machinery were scattered about over scores of kilometres' (*Pravda*, 3 April 1930).

Nevertheless Stalin declared that: 'The time has come to finish with every kind of camouflage: we must destroy the *kulaks* and deprive them of the possibility to work on the land.' At that moment anyone who owned three cows or the equivalent in sheep, pigs, or even chickens, was considered to be a *kulak*. As a result of this policy it was not long before all the larger and more prosperous peasant farms were destroyed. These farms, since the disappearance of the large private estates, had been the principal producers of the agricultural surplus, since it was only the better-off farmers who had a surplus in excess of their needs for disposal in the towns.

474 As early as 1930 the policy of forced collectivization provoked
661 open resistance in the Ukraine, and attempts were made at armed
423 revolt; but geographical conditions did not favour the type of
668 guerilla warfare which was undertaken with considerable determination and success by the peasants in Georgia, and particularly in the Armenian district of Karabagh and by the Tartars of the Daghestan foothills. These agrarian risings in the Ukraine were suppressed with the greatest cruelty and were followed by mass executions and by the transportation of tens of thousands of peasants. The Soviets applied methods which were then almost new in their struggle with the Ukrainian peasantry; they put them into concentration camps where they had to do forced labour. In the region of Odessa, near Tiraspol, a large and prosperous colony of 'Old Believers' completely disappeared. All the men, with the exception of a few youngsters who managed to cross the Dniestr into Bessarabia, were transported, and the women and children simply scattered over the steppe. The construction of the White Sea Canal, so much advertised by the admirers of Soviet methods in Western Europe, cost the lives of many tens of thousands of peasants, as the vast cemeteries along the banks of the northern lakes and rivers bear witness.

Very often the prospect of transportation to the far north or to Siberia caused the peasants, as in old time, to abandon everything

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and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign correspondent who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

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731 South-Eastern Russia died of hunger in the first months of 1933. As in 1921–2 numerous cases of cannibalism were recorded.

665 In spite of this vast tragedy, self-satisfied and triumphant speeches were a feature of the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets which met at ●661 Kharkov in 1935. 'For glorious Ukraine the last years have been, as in the rest of our country, a period of brilliant unheard of achievements. The rapacious rural *kulak* class has been completely destroyed, annihilated. Never will the heroism of those days be forgotten! Never will the loathing against the oppressors disappear! Those were not idle words which Lenin wrote when he affirmed that the principal enemy of our Bolshevism is the peasant! Thousands of the best sons of our country have lost their lives in the great and ruthless struggle.' 'Against this enemy', in the words of *Pravda*, 'the economic structure which carries along with it joyous culture and a happy life to millions of Ukrainians suffering for centuries from privations has at last triumphed in the country.' Stalin's revolutionary Communist régime proved, as ever, logical. If 'thousands of the best sons of our country' had really lost their lives in 'the great and ruthless struggle' against the peasantry, the peasants had to count their losses in millions.

000 But notwithstanding the brilliant victory proclaimed on the internal front in 1935 the Soviet Government had new reasons for anxiety in the radical change which had taken place in the European situation as a result of the attainment of power by the Nazi Party in Germany. The official doctrine of the Nazi Government was based on 'the right of the German people to an adequate living space', and the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler, in search of a better and happier future, was taking a dangerous interest in the east and south-east of Europe. It was now nearly twenty years since *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*; and the glib attribution of the military catastrophe of Germany in the last war to the evils of Marxism had had the result of reviving in a new generation of Germans all those vague aspirations after world dominion which recur from time to time to compensate that unfortunate people for the frustration which has been their historical lot.

In glowing passages in *Mein Kampf* Adolf Hitler had waxed lyrical on the subject of the Ukraine and the Urals, and the Führer seemed prepared to abandon the oceanic and colonial dreams of William II in favour of a continental imperialism which might carry the Germans into Asia in the first great movement in history of a people from west to east. In 1934 the ten years' Non-Aggression Pact concluded between Germany and Poland appeared to Soviet statesmen to be the first step towards a collaboration in the east at

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the expense of the Soviet Union in which the dream of a revived *Rzecz Pospolita* (never absent from the mind of the ageing Pilsudski) might be combined with a German *Drang nach Osten* which could give to the Third Reich effective predominance over a great economic land empire stretching beyond the Don and the Caucasus to Turkestan and the Altai. At the same time the German understanding with Japan threatened the Far Eastern dominions of the Soviet Union.

'The Ukrainian Question' began to be discussed in the German Press, and from 1934 'the foreign danger' ceased to be only a conventional formula at Soviet political trials. The uneasy masters of the Kremlin began to believe in its reality. The memoirs of the ex-Chekist Krivitski have made it clear that from an early date after Hitler's accession to power Stalin was planning to create a situation in which he might be able to arrive at a compromise with his adversary in Berlin—an event which was eventually consummated between the two parties in August 1939.

A direct collaboration with the Russians, as an alternative to joint aggression with Poland, had always attracted influential circles in Germany—circles which included the majority of those soldiers, technicians and business men who, during the Rapallo period, when many Germans were employed as specialists in Russia, had had excellent opportunities for forming a clear appreciation of realities in the Soviet Union. Many connections, direct and indirect, existed between these men and high officials in the Soviet armed forces, administration and industry.

The unsurpassed genius of Stalin for political manœuvre was never better illustrated than when he succeeded in annihilating all those elements most likely to be in—or in the future to enter into—relations with the Germans. Thus, at the same time, he was able to deprive the Germans of their potential collaborators, and was himself able to assume the position which his victims had intended to occupy vis-à-vis the Germans. From Stalin's point of view the execution of the 'Red' generals in 1935 was a preventive rather than a punitive measure, as were the subsequent widespread 'purges' in the armed forces and among the Communist officials in the national republics in the Ukraine, Caucasia and Central Asia. It was not by accident that the first to be eliminated were those who owed their revolutionary careers to their capacity for enterprise and daring action: the Marshals Tukhachevski, Uborevich and Yakir.

A Jew by origin, Yakir had distinguished himself in Budenny's 'Red Mounted Army' during the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in the summer of 1920, and later during the liquidation of the *atamans*'

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661 bands in the Ukraine. At the time of the 'purge' he occupied the highest military post in the Ukraine: that of Officer Commanding the Kiev Military District. The drama in the Ukraine did not end with the execution of Yakir; during the years 1935–7 several thousands of persons occupying important posts in the Red Army and in the Soviet administration were arrested and shot or exiled to concentration camps in Siberia and the North of Russia. This whirlwind of arrests and executions even carried away with it Postyshev and Kossior, the former instruments of 'the Revolution against the peasants'.

701 186 In the meantime the last remnants of the national Ukrainian Army, which had flourished in the years 1923–9, disappeared. Units of the Ukrainian Army, based on the system of 'territorial Divisions' in the Red Army, had been quartered in the Ukraine alongside the troops 'of the Union'. The struggle with the peasantry had made it desirable to abolish the territorial system in the Ukraine as well as in other parts of the Union. The Ukrainian units were broken up and distributed to other parts of the country and their place was taken by regiments recruited in Great Russia. After the execution of the staff of the Kiev Command and the senior personnel of many of the Ukrainian regiments, nothing remained of the Ukrainian Army except the names of certain 'Red' regiments which were retained for the sake of form; but the Ukrainian language continued to be used in units where the rank and file were predominantly of Ukrainian origin.

642 Stalin's Constitution of 1936—which evoked such enthusiasm among European Communists and which was even hailed in the capitalist Press of Western countries as a laudable 'return to democratic institutions' in contrast to the dictatorships of Central Europe—was a cynical accompaniment to the slaughter of so many thousands of Party members which was going on at that time within 'the Soviet Paradise'. Stalin's Constitution marked the final abandonment of the theory that the minority nationalities ranked as equal partners with Great Russia within the Soviet Union. The 'union of different states' was now transformed into one integral state (Paragraph 13: 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a unified state'). According to Paragraph 14 all authority on questions relating to international affairs, the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, the organization of defence and the command of the armed forces, foreign trade, the safety of the state, the management of all banks, all forms of transport, the principles of land distribution, the basis of public instruction, hygiene, and criminal and civil laws, was reposed in the Central Government.

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§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revolution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

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423 1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political
661 and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding
585 chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the
474 redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution
[433] against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable: during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to
475 the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

474 The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the
661 new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

474 As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really
423 serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the
656 Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32, and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

subordinate, that the Ukapist appeal for inclusion was definitely 665
rejected and that the group was offered the choice of suppression or of self-liquidation. They accordingly accepted the voluntary decision and signed thus their own death warrants as had the Borotbisty by their early submission.

All three parties had the same general attitude toward all non-Communists and bourgeois groups. They were in general agreement that these had to be destroyed and driven from political and social importance. Thus, all adopted a hostile attitude toward the nationalists who had supported Petlyura and the Ukrainian National Republic. They attacked the remains of the Social Revolutionists, the Social Democrats, and all the non-Marxian or Marxian groups that did not accept a strict Communism. They dissolved the organizations and seized their property, while they imprisoned many of the older leaders and tried to humiliate them in the eyes of the Ukrainian public.

Thus in 1921, they staged in Kharkiv a public trial of the [687]
members of the Executive Committee of the Social Revolutionists. The list included V. Holubovych, the Prime Minister at the time of Brest-Litovsk, N. Petrenko, P. Hubenko (Ostap Vyshnya), Lyzanivsky and many others. They were charged with hostility to the "government of workers and peasants" but apparently the regime was not too sure of its ground and merely sentenced them to relatively short terms in prison.

It was not only the politicians who suffered, for the new regime[1] 661
attacked every institution which it did not control. In 1920 575
it abolished all Ukrainian professional organizations and trades unions, including such as the Poltava Society of Workers in Co-operatives and similar groups in Kiev, Kharkiv, and other cities. Then, by arrests of the leaders of the cooperative societies, it forced new elections and put into power only those persons who had the direct approval of the Russian Bolsheviks.

It was next the turn of the purely cultural organizations. All the societies of the Prosvita (Enlightenment) which operated a chain of reading rooms, schools, libraries, theatres, etc. were disbanded on the ground that they were connected with the Rada

1 [Ukrainian Soviet Republic -- Analyst]

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661 575 of the old Ukrainian National Republic. The regime arrested and shot as chauvinist counter-revolutionists many of the active workers. Those who were spared at the moment were treated as members of the proscribed classes and were punished by the exclusion of their children from schools, the denial of food cards, etc., all the traditional devices to eliminate the counter-revolutionary and suspected classes.

At the same time the government confiscated all the funds of educational institutions and the private organizations which had, during the Ukrainian National Republic and earlier, been interested in educational and scientific work. It closed the Ukrainian scientific societies in Kharkiv and Kiev and it put an end to all of the pre-Soviet journals, newspapers, and magazines. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been planned during the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky but had not commenced its work, was treated somewhat more leniently and it was allowed to open largely to support the pretext that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was an independent state, although it was made clear that Communist influence would be exerted on its statutes and organization.

517 Such a period of intellectual disintegration could not fail to leave its mark on all aspects of Ukrainian culture and art. The older writers who had achieved some prominence before 1914 either retired again into the emigration or they became silent. The younger generation, which was just rising into prominence, was either driven into temporary seclusion or, for the most part, swept into the surging current of events. They felt the leftward urge of many of the intellectuals and tried in one way or another to catch the spirit of the times in their works.

Yet it must be realized that, as in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, there still did not exist a predominant party line in the field of literature and the arts. Writers, painters and dramatists of widely differing tendencies accepted the revolution and loudly protested that they and they alone were the true mouthpieces of the times and greedily sought for support from the commissars.

They were the more fortunate in this because the bulk of the

[Eradication of pre-communist cultural organizations in 1920 -- Analyst]

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517
Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645]
through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669]
and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642
munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661]
as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423
tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation.[1] 369
It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

[1] [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

423 The natural result was the growing depopulation of the cities.
369 Peasants who had gone into industry now flowed back to their native villages and demanded their share of the land in the hope that they might be able to raise food for themselves and their families. This increased the already overcrowded rural population and intensified the bitterness that was felt among all classes.

The hatred thus aroused was increased by the formation of committees of poor and landless peasants to take over the estates. Yet in Ukraine there was an important sector of the population who had been the owners and proprietors of from two to nearly one hundred acres of land. In some districts these included nearly a quarter of the peasant families and in an attempt to propitiate them the Soviets were frequently inclined to favor them and allow them to retain their holdings instead of dividing them among the more idle and shiftless of the population.

651 Yet this did not serve to maintain agricultural production[1] for
● 661 the crying demand of Moscow was for food. The Communists had abolished all markets and taxes but they substituted for them a rule that the peasants were to turn over their entire crop to the government and should retain for themselves only 31 pounds of grain per month for each member of the family. This naturally dissatisfied the peasants who had been won to the support of the new regime by the promises of the government that they could secure for their own use the land of the state and of the landlords. Each year, as the Soviets tried to enforce the collection, they planted less and less acreage and resorted to more skilful methods of hiding what they did produce in the hope that they might somehow exchange it for those manufactured products of which they were in urgent need.

To counterbalance this, the Russian detachments made more and more extensive raids and they were not satisfied to take merely the legal surplus. They seized everything in the way of food and supplies on which they could lay their hands and, in case of opposition, they ruthlessly shot the peasants without any trial or investigation as counter-revolutionists. In a sense they succeeded in their mission, for the food collectors in 1920 secured in Ukraine 2,560,000

[1] [Expropriation of landowners, distribution of land to peasants, 1919-21- Analyst]

tons of grain or about 75% of the total amount that they secured 651 661
in the whole of the former Russian Empire.

This led to new clashes and with the suppression of the larger armed partisan bands, there grew up a new feeling of ugliness that boded ill for the security of the whole regime. The success of the Communists in the industrial centres was thus balanced by their failure to win over any substantial part of the rural population.

In the cities the new regime[1] met with problems of another 433
kind. The workers in the great coal and iron industry where Com- 369
munism was strongest had at a very early date expelled the managers [327]
and foremen and had taken over themselves the operation of the plants, many of which had been ruined in the civil war. Now they found that they were not able to restore production. Industry practically came to a halt and by the end of 1921 there was only one blast furnace operating in Ukraine. The production of pig-iron dropped to 11,300 tons, or barely 3% of the pre-war production. The railroads suffered the same fate. There was no way of repairing them and without a trained administrative staff, they almost stopped functioning. This, in turn, increased unemployment and a lack of food in the cities and once more the city dwellers began to stream out into the country districts.

As a final blow there came in 1920 one of those periods of 731
drought which have recurred sporadically in Ukraine throughout the centuries. In view of the general decay in transportation and the ravages of the war, this became serious and the situation grew even worse when the same phenomenon was repeated in 1921. Between the drought and the raiding detachments, the peasants had no reserves of grain and a famine broke out which cost the lives of several million Ukrainians.

This famine was very definitely the result of Communist mismanagement, plus the drought, but the Soviet regime was unable to take any effective counter-measures. When its extent was realized, the regime allowed through the League of Nations the organization of the American Relief Administration under Herbert Hoover. This collected and sent to the stricken areas large quantities of grain but it carried on its work with such impartiality that

1 [Ukrainian Soviet Republic established 1919 -- Analyst]

the independence of the Ukrainian Communist regime in the hope 665
that sooner or later they would be admitted to the Communist International as an independent national Communist Party. They therefore willingly accepted the doctrines of the International, which was little more than the third facet of the ruling block. By 1925 the situation had so far developed that their aspirations for this were definitely checked and even this theoretical opposition was eliminated by compelling the Ukapisty to enter into the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party, or else.

This situation makes clear the relations that existed between 661
Ukraine and Russia during the early years of the New Economic Policy. As agriculture and industry revived in Ukraine, it was suggested that the Ukrainian government send aid to its Communist brothers. That suggestion was a command, and just as the Muscovite bands under Militant Communism scoured Ukraine for food, so under the New Economic Policy, the so-called Ukrainian government began to drain off the wealth of the country for the charitable purpose of helping its Russian brothers.

The vagueness and the ambiguity of this system was partially 631
cleared up by the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty establishing this was signed on December 30, 1922, just as Lenin was becoming paralyzed and unable to function efficiently. It bound together the various Soviet Republics, while at the same time it paid lip service to the right of any of these Republics to secede. Of course, this was from the beginning an empty phrase, for the only people who had the power to declare the secession was the Council of Soviets of the Federal Republic and they were Communists assigned to their posts by Moscow and bound to obey the orders of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In addition to this, a surprising number of the ruling group of the Russian Soviet Republic now took over the corresponding posts in the Union and thus added still a fourth facet to their varied activity.

The Constitution, which was formally adopted at a Union 631
Congress of Soviets on July 6, 1923, went still further in providing 642
for the government of the Union. The Commissariats were divided 645

payment of a specific amount of tax in kind and left to the peasant 432
the rest of his crop. In an endeavor to get this grain into Russia, 241
the government offered to buy it but it did not have the funds or 185
the inclination to pay for it at the market price. The financial reforms connected with the introduction of the chervonets could, to a certain degree, make it expedient for the peasant to sell to the government for cash, and as time went on the peasant gained the power of selling his crop for cash but the Moscow control of transportation and the prohibition of large scale trading left him helpless and he saw himself forced to dispose of it locally or to the government. Then the government made a fixed price which was far [435]
below that of the free market, and was often scarcely a third of the amount that the peasant could have secured. This sale of large quantities of agricultural products at a fixed price gradually became the rule and was one of the signs that the period of toleration for private income was coming to an end.

In 1925, the government began to clamp down on the small 656
traders, the Nepmen, who had profited by the opportunities which 661
they had had. Again it had a large choice of measures. Thus, depending on the situation, it could invoke laws against the hiring of labor; it could order the state agencies to refuse to buy from or sell to an obnoxious individual and thus isolate him; it could suspend his ration cards and perquisites, take away his right of voting and thus make him a pariah in the community; it could levy prohibitive taxes which would put him out of business and confiscate his property; or it could find some violation of some other law or regulation and imprison or exile him.

The degree of pressure which was put upon the peasants and 439
the workers varied from year to year. Each year Ukraine was 241
compelled to export more to Russia without regard to the needs of the local population. Thus, the amount of grain rose from 1,050,000 tons in 1924-5 to 3,165,000 tons in 1926-7, when there was a bumper crop, but in 1927-8, when the harvest partially failed and there were signs of need in the country, the amount collected and exported rose to 4,353,000 tons. At the same time, the continually increasing demands aroused again a spirit of oppo-

CHAPTER NINE

The Five Year Plan

Lenin and the Communists had never made any concealment of the fact that the New Economic Policy was only a passing concession to put an end to the stagnation and demoralization which had resulted from the civil war and the period of Militant Communism. It was not the adoption of a definite plan for the future nor was it a sign of a growing rapprochement with capitalism or a gesture toward the rest of the world, as the partisans of the Soviets abroad tried to make it appear. [125] 656 471 661

With each step of the recovery of the economy of Ukraine and of the Soviet Union as a whole, unobstrusive steps were taken to remove the various concessions which had been made. Year by year, from about 1925, new regulations were introduced by the Commissariat of Finance, one of the All-Union Commissariats which had the definite object of suppressing not only the concessions but of tightening up the restrictions on individual life and preparing the way for socialism and communism. By one device or another, the Nepmen were broken. Now the government forbade the state trusts to sell to them as individual traders either raw materials or finished or semi-finished products. Agreements which had been freely made by the government were either suddenly cancelled or were perverted. Obviously false charges were brought against the various individuals and they were fined exorbitantly or they were arrested and deported. By the fall of 1927 the sector of private trade had been almost completely liquidated and the way was open for the central government to do what it would with the situation.

With the Nepmen disposed of, the way was open for a similar attack upon the wealthier classes of the peasants and those who

656 had profited by the operation of the Ukrainian land code which,
471 as we have seen, was less rigid than were the similar arrangements
● 661 in the RSFSR, where the land society was organized far more on
[427] the lines of a collective than it was in Ukraine. It was always possible to apply individually any of the laws against the leasing of land or the employment of hired help, for in both cases the provisions had been left vague and indefinite, so that the authorities could act whenever they so desired. As a matter of fact, as one of the first measures the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic reduced the period on which a lease could be made from thirteen to six years and thus it was easily possible to upset many of the calculations that had been made by the richer and more progressive landowners.

[435] At the same time[1] the closing of the official markets rendered it possible for the government to force the peasants to dispose of their grain at the officially pegged prices which in the grain-growing districts were considerably lower than they were in the less fertile areas of the north. If this did not produce the desired results, it was equally possible to demand the grain tax in kind and to compel the peasants to turn over, free of charge and under the guise of payments, additional supplies. All these measures, which were introduced in many cases personally and not by districts, caused the peasants to feel themselves becoming steadily more impoverished and less able to resist the demands of the government.

631 On the other hand, the All-Union Commissariats which took
642 precedence over those in the individual Soviet republics and which were, in reality, staffed only by Russian Communists, effectively broke the power of the localities or of the republics to have any special voice in the management of their own affairs.[1] This was, in its turn, skilfully explained by stressing the superior requirements of the Union which, on any closer analysis, turned out to be the interests of the Russian area. Thus, at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a Russian who was at the time the chief of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission remarked in an unambiguous manner: "It seems to me that we must assign perfectly clear tasks, to emphasize that the national

[1] [1925, during relinquishment of NEP -- Analyst]

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment 642
of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely 631
in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to administer industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout [475] the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine 423
they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new 474
philosophy looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and 661
determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force 425
them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1927- Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

423 policy was now changed and the middle and the richer peasants
474 were grouped together and opposed to the poor peasants. This
● 661 multiplied enormously the hostile and unsympathetic elements of
425 the population but by holding out tempting offers to the poor peasants, the Communists succeeded in fanning anew the flames of class hatred in the villages and in producing the desired effects.

[651] Along with the adoption of the Five Year Plan, the All-Union Congress called for the strengthening of attempts at collectivization. As a result, the amount of grain demanded and the amount of taxes were rapidly raised with the avowed purpose of ruining the kulaks and kurkuls, as they were called in Ukraine. Increased pressure was put upon all classes of the rural population to join collective farms and in some districts this was so effective that almost seventy per cent of the land was turned over for organization on a "voluntary" basis.

As a further step in the same direction there began in 1928 and also in 1929 a furious attack on the richer and middle peasants and a growing insistence on the need of "dekurkulizing" the villages. This meant nothing more or less than the elimination from the countryside of all those people who had prospered under the New Economic Policy. The property of the richer and more prosperous peasants was completely confiscated and they with their families were deprived of all their rights, often including the house where they had lived or the shacks into which they could crawl for shelter. With superb inhumanity the Bolsheviks would drive formerly wealthy peasants and their families from their homes in the middle of winter and leave them without food or clothing and would threaten any of their relatives or friends who dared to give them any relief.

In the first stages of the process, cases were known where some of these richer people were moved out of the Ukraine with their goods and cattle, but as the Communists settled down to their work, they simply seized everything for their own use and that of the collective farms and contented themselves with shooting or deporting their enemies, often to the far north for work in the

forests or to northeastern Siberia for work in the mines and in the more remote parts of the wilderness.[1]

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1 A graphic account of this dekurkulization was given in a DP camp by Sh., a former peasant of the district of Kharkiv:

"On May 22, 1929, all my property, tools, cattle, building and clothing were confiscated. I and my family (my wife, six small children and my mother), were left without means of livelihood; we stayed with people like old folks, ate what we were given, although people were forbidden to give to us. On November 27, in spite of the fact that there was snow on the ground and 15 degrees of frost, I and my entire family, without clothes and half-naked, were put out of the house. Until February, 1930 I lived in another house which was half fallen down. On February 28, I, my wife and six children (my mother had disappeared; I do not know where) were arrested and with other dekurkulized persons were sent to the railroad station. There we were packed into freight cars as sardines in a barrel and travelled for 11 days, without knowing our destination. We were fed once every two days. Many perished from cold and exhaustion. We finally reached the station of Makarikha near Kotlas, district of Archangel, and in 40 degrees of frost, we were detrained in the woods in the snow.

"Then all those able to work were driven to forest operations 300 kilometers from Kotlas. They drove us half shod in the intense cold. They fed us on the way 300 grams of bread, 5 grams of barley and 3 grams of salt per person a day. Many died on the way. Many, unable to walk further, were shot on the spot. There we cut wood and they treated us very badly. The norms of work were abnormally high. We lived in huts which were holes we dug ourselves. Of the many thousands of people who came there more than half died of exhaustion, hunger and cold.

"Of the members of the families of kurkuls who remained at the station of Makarikha, more than half froze. Among these were my sons Ivan and Fedir; a third son Hryhory died of exhaustion. Later all the children up to 14, including three of mine, were returned to Ukraine but I have no further news of them. They probably perished. In 1932, first my wife and then I escaped by hiding in cars loaded with wood. I found work in the Don Basin. In 1937 my wife was arrested suddenly and shot in the prison of Artemivsk in the Don Basin. I escaped because I was living under an assumed name. Now I am a DP and living in Germany in an IRO camp."

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423 They followed this up at the end of 1929 by providing for the
474 compulsory collectivization of all the land. Private holding of land
661 was abolished and so was private use. The peasants were forced
425 into collective farms to which they had to contribute all of their livestock, agricultural implements and tools. Then they were left nothing that they could call their own except a small garden plot that was assigned to each family for the purpose of raising those types of vegetables that it was not profitable to raise in large quantities, because the collective farms were occupied with those types of agriculture that were selected for them by the central authorities in Moscow.

The immediate result differed in different places. In Great Russian territory, where the principle of the community ownership of land had definitely taken root, the peasants complied without too much hesitation. In Ukraine and Kuban, where the older style of Ukrainian agriculture had been long in vogue, the peasants became sulky. They killed off large numbers of their cattle and livestock of various kinds. The government, seeing this tremendous loss, then tried to eliminate from the collectives and liquidate in one way or another all of those who had been guilty of disobedience to the order requiring the peasants to contribute all their wealth.

There developed almost a civil war in some sections of the country as discontent rose and the peasants were prepared to die rather than to yield. Nevertheless, this time the government was not prepared to concede anything, as it had in 1921, and despite remarks by Stalin that in some details the Communists had become dizzy from success, the regime held its course and even continued to apply the screws more tightly. The result was the famine of 1932 and 1933.

433 terms of percentages in reference to a prior date. Still the already published data were so scanty and incomplete that it became increasingly more and more difficult to secure an actual picture of the progress in the Union as a whole and still more so in any of the separate Soviet Republics, for the central regime rarely broke down what little information it gave out among its constituent parts.

651 It was not long before another change was made in the methods
241 of collecting the products from the collective farms. Under the new
661 system, the farms did not contribute according to their crop but according to the amount of land which they proposed to sow. This amount was due to the government, even in those cases where there was a complete failure of the harvest not under the control of the workers. In other words, if a crop failed because of bad weather conditions, the peasants were compelled to hand over just as much produce as if they had had a bumper crop.

It can be easily seen that such a measure was merely another device for weakening the economic position of the village and the independence of the collective farm. At the same time the establishment of official tractor stations in place of the old locally controlled centres which sent crews and machines into the countryside gave the government another weapon for the exertion of pressure upon the peasants and even the Communists who were in charge of the farms and these crews likewise were paid not on the basis of their work but of the theoretical area which was to be sown. Later this was again changed to the total area of the farm whether it was suitable for any special kind of agriculture or not.

These measures only increased the discontent among the peasants who once again began to limit their work to the minimum necessary to maintain themselves on a steadily dropping scale of living. To counter-balance this the Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a decree in February, 1930 allowing the local authorities who were, of course, handpicked by Moscow to resort to extreme measures against the kurkuls, to confiscate their property and then to dispose of them by sending them and their families to concentration camps, to special settlements in the far north or eastern Asia or merely by expelling them from their home district.

[after establishing All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture, 1929 --Analyst]

These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown.. These were naturally the more 661
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw ma- 433
terials had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood. This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It concentrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in military preparations. Even when petitions were made by the Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR. Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transportation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932 they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 - 1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the branch of village agriculture." 651 685

The machine tractor stations were staffed by men largely alien to the Ukrainian countryside. The more fanatical Communists were placed in these political detachments and were, in effect, told to supplement or replace the local administration in the exercise of pressure and terror upon both the heads and the members of the kolhosps. To aid them in their work Moscow sent to Ukraine a Russian Pavel Postyshev as a special plenipotentiary of the Central Committee with 7,000 party workers from the Russian Republic. 241 511

The work of these special "commissions" and "brigades" was marked by the utmost severity. They entered the villages, and made the most thorough searches of the houses and barns of every peasant. They dug up the earth, broke into the walls of buildings and the stoves in which the peasants tried to hide their last handfuls of food. They even in places took specimens of the fecal matter from the toilets in the effort to learn in that way by analysis whether the peasants had stolen government property and were eating grain. Wherever they found any, the peasants were severely punished, while the detachments carried off not only grain but everything edible.

The same reports came from every corner of Ukraine. "They requisitioned everything that could be eaten" was the report from the village of Zorich in the district of Poltava. In one village in the district of Odesa, "they collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram" and in other places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove. In at least one of these commissions, Molotov, then head of the Council of Ministers, took a personal part.

The natural result was a famine of unprecedented severity. The villages had been hungry in the autumn. After these searches commenced, they literally starved. An Englishman, M. Magridge, wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1933: "During a recent visit to Ukraine, I have seen a little of the war which the Soviet government is carrying on against the peasants. The fields were 731 661

[result of excessive grain requisitions in 1933 -- Analyst]

731 waste as in a real war and the poverty had spread still further.
661 On one side there were millions of peasants with bodies swollen from hunger; on the other side, soldiers, members of the GPU, carrying out the orders of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They hurled themselves on the region like a pack of locusts and seized everything edible. They shot and hung thousands of peasants, sometimes whole villages; they made of the richest country in the world a melancholy wilderness."

Reports from all sections of Ukraine have listed with depressing regularity the articles of food that were eaten. They included grass, weeds, bark, dead animals, field mice, dogs, cats. Finally, cannibalism broke out and in many places sausages were found that were made of human flesh, either of people who had died or who were killed for food. The extent of this last is shown when in 1936, among the prisoners of Solovki, there were three hundred twenty-five persons guilty of cannibalism, seventy-five men and two hundred and fifty women.

An observer in the spring of 1933 gives this picture of a Ukrainian village: "In the centre of the village, beside the ruins of the church which had been blown up was the bazaar. All the people in it had swollen faces, they were not talkative, but were silent and speechless. Their movements were unsteady, for their legs and arms were swollen. They sold or bought cornstalks, pounded corncobs, a black powder made of Russian thistle, roots, and the lower parts of water plants. This assortment of village wares was a diet which did not save the people from death by starvation but merely by increasing their sufferings, postponed it a little."

The agronome A. S. who in March and April, 1933, was in the villages of Izbinske and Starytsya, Vovchansky region, Kharkiv district, wrote: "The people daily died in dozens. The corpses lay in the houses for several days for there was no one to bury them. Pits were dug in the cemeteries with great difficulty, large enough to hold several persons. The corpses were piled on carts like wood and carried to the pits and thrown in like logs without any of the customary or religious rites. They fell as they would,

head down, or on their side or standing—a terrible sight. The gravedigger of to-day might be a corpse to-morrow." 731 661

The bodies of the dead lay in all the villages, along the roads and in the fields. Special brigades were formed in the villages to bury the dead but they were too weak to collect all the corpses and these were devoured by those dogs which had escaped being eaten and had gone savage. The roads were deserted for it was dangerous for one or two people to walk together because of the danger of attack by robbers who sought to rob them or to kill them for cannibalistic purposes.

Under such conditions many of the people closed up their huts tightly, lighted their stoves and inhaled the fumes to commit suicide.

In the spring, when those who had survived broke from the fields the unripe ears of grain, they were seized by the government agencies on the charge of stealing socialist and government property, while the "light cavalry," the armed Comsomols and the members of the Communist Party, shot these "barbers," as they were called in the press contemptuously, like hares.

Thousands tried to secure work in the state agricultural enterprises (the radhosps). The agronome B. B. wrote: "In going around the experimental station in Poltavshchyna, I saw under a haystack a number of people. To my questions, the manager of the station, a Russian in origin, told me that they were peasants of the neighborhood who had come in large numbers to the radhosp, hoping to find work and thus have the money to buy food. Since they did not have the strength to return home, they lay down under the haystack. Many died there and he added, pointing to fresh earth,' There are the mounds where we buried those individualists. What trouble the Khakhals have been.' "

The younger and more venturesome fled to other Soviet Republics in search of work and food. Thousands departed from Ukraine without permission, for this was not given, and crowded the offices of the railroads, the wharfs and the junctions. They often found a tragic end. Prof. O. O. tells of a case of which he was a witness. "In March, 1933, at the station in Vladikavkaz (Caucasus) there gathered a mass of peasants with bags on their

73/ backs, waiting for a freight train. Agents of the NKVD held them
66/ up and took away their grain. They begged together and singly and prayed but it did not help. Then one peasant climbed out on a high tree near the station and began to cry out about all the horrors of the famine in Ukraine. He cursed the party, the government, its leaders and the NKVD. A crowd quickly gathered and soon came the agents of the NKVD who began to harangue the hearers and urged the "orator" to come down quickly, threatening him with life imprisonment. He was immovable; then the NKVD called for the local fire department who were told to turn their hoses on the tree. The peasant climbed higher and then suddenly threw himself down like a stone."

In the spring of 1933 the starving masses with their gray faces moved into the large cities. They formed lines for the "buying of bread"* or, begging, they surrounded the mills. They died by thousands in the streets of Kharkiv, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, and the other cities. In many cases the police cars simply picked up the dead and dying every morning and carried them out of the city where they were thrown into pits. There were established in the cities and their environs "therapeutic hospitals" near which were vans covered with tarpaulins. These were used to collect the sufferers and the hospitals were simply places to separate the dead and the dying.

The children suffered terribly and thousands were picked up on the streets. Parents often abandoned their children, usually near police stations, in the hope that they would be picked up and taken to refugee camps but here they were little better off. Prof. M. M. testified that near Kharkiv the "NKVD opened a large children's concentration camp, the 'Barracks of death' as it was

[435] * In the beginning of 1933 at the height of the famine in Ukraine, the USSR opened shops in the cities where grain was sold at a doubled price, i.e. commercial prices—4 karb. for 1 kg. of white and 3 karb. for 1 kg. of black bread. The peasant received from the government for the obligatory "sale" of grain 90 kop. for 16 kg. of wheat. These commercial prices had to be paid for in foreign currency or in gold or silver.

termed" and here by poor treatment at least forty percent of the 731
ten thousand gathered in, died. 661

The urban population felt the shortage because of the reduction of the bread ration for the unemployed to two hundred grams a day. The majority could not patronize the commercial shops for they had nothing with which to pay and the legal allowance of other products as fat, sugar and barley were either reduced or omitted. Even the more highly qualified of the intelligentsia were obliged to sell all their trinkets and gold teeth to secure some food. The prices allowed were ridiculous. One teacher at these stores received for a silver dollar "500 grams of sugar, a piece of soap and 200 grams of rice."

Physicians were forbidden to enter "hunger" in the records of illness and death. They were ordered to give as the cause of death "BBO" (absence of white corpuscles). Sometimes it was recorded as "childish" or "old age" weakness, "paralysis of the heart," "diarrhea," all symptoms of death by starvation.

It is impossible to estimate accurately the number of deaths, 165
for even the indefatigable NKVD gave up the attempt to list the 731
deaths along the roads, in the fields, and in the streets of the cities. 661
Villages died out and this was indicated by the use of black flags on certain houses. In these cases no attempt was made to keep the records in order. The so-called "therapeutic hospitals" did not turn over their records or admit to their files the workers of the ZATS (The Records of the Acts of the Civil Population), who were the collaborators of the NKVD. Thus, in one of these therapeutic hospitals in Kiev there were at least 5,000 deaths from starvation that were not recorded in the official statistics.

Of course, none of these hardships were felt by the highly placed [554]
Communists and party officials. They received their food through party channels which were not accessible to the ordinary residents of the city or the kolhosps.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the number who perished in the famine, but it was approximately 4,800,000. This is certainly an underestimate, although certain other calculations will place the number between five and six million.

[-famine in Ukraine, 1933-- Analyst]

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731 There is the frequent idea that the famine was specifically
661 directed against the rich peasants and the kurkuls. This is utterly
[565] false, for these had been liquidated earlier. The blow of 1933 fell chiefly upon the poorer classes who had always supported the Soviet regime and who regarded their suffering in the beginning as a mistake which Moscow would do its best to correct. In the same way it was the Ukrainian workmen of the smaller cities who bore the brunt of the hardships. It was the direct triumph of the Russian Bolsheviks over the Ukrainian poor.

185 Another proof that the famine occurred in connection with
731 the plans of Moscow was the fact that Postyshev, besides his official post, held that of general inspector of the Ministry of Grain Production for resettlement. It turned out later that he was given the general task of preparing a plan for an immigration into Ukraine from various portions of the Soviet Union. The dislocation of the population was worked out in detail. Millions of Russians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, etc., were to be sent in to complete the work of rerussification. Especial pains were devoted to the regions close to Russia on the Left Bank of the Dnieper and there was talk at one time of annexing to the Russian Republic the Kharkiv-Donbas industrial region, but this did not fall in with the plans of Stalin.

The result of the famine was the final stabilization of the collec-
[423] tive system of agriculture and the breaking of the old mode of life throughout the whole of Ukraine. More than that, it established the fact that in the economic sphere Moscow could direct Ukrainian life as it would. It overawed the population for the moment but it did not reconcile them to their fate and it went hand in hand with the attempt to exterminate the old Ukrainian cultural life.

[Ukraine, 1933 -- Analysis]

731 the country might have escaped, had it not been for the methods of the government in draining off from the population the last possible reserves of food.

731 185 There can be no doubt that this was done deliberately, for every measure taken by the government was intended to increase the difficulties of the population and to prepare for the final crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance that had been proceeding with ever [648] increasing force. Every measure, too, was intended to render it more difficult for the outside world to secure any actual knowledge of the conditions in the country until it was too late for the world to do more than register vain protests, for it was very definitely at this period that the censorship methods of the government and its apprehensions of what knowledge might bring to the world actively commenced to draw an iron curtain around Ukraine. Foreign correspondents were forbidden to visit Ukraine on one pretext or another and they were forced to send out such news as the government wished or to leave the Soviet Union.

[661] The collectivization and the famine had coincided with the beginning of the attack on Ukrainian scholarship and the arts, as we shall see, but these attacks by their very choice of victims had been directed against those men who had not been closely connected with the Communist Party in the past, even though they had not been entirely hostile. Along with the famine the tide turned, and soon the victims were those persons who had dared to hope for an equality of treatment (with the Great Russians) in the Soviet Union.

The famine was obviously intended not only to crush the population already impoverished by the collectivization but to administer a sound chastisement to all classes who were interested in the preservation and development of local and republic interests.

731 648 The famine was at its height in the winter and spring of 1933 and was only somewhat alleviated after the harvest of that year was brought in. It was only natural that, despite the efforts of the authorities, word of it would gradually seep out, in spite of the censorship. The news was most accessible to the Western Ukrainians, for as yet all communications had not been satisfactorily broken, and early in the summer they began to seek permission to organize relief

186 National Republic, who had gone abroad after its collapse and
814 who had been invited back to take part in the work of the Ukrain-
687 ian Academy of Sciences. The government produced what seemed
661 to be definite evidence against these people but the curious fact
[538] was that this evidence was strangely inconsistent with all of their previous activity. On the prisoner's bench were such men as Serhey Yefremiv, the leading scholar of Ukrainian literature and a relative conservative, the academiciam Mykhaylo Slabchenko, a former Social Democrat, Prof. Joseph Hermayze, a former member of the Executive Committee of the same party, and the well-known writer L. Starytska-Chernyakivska, who was close to Efremiv and who had more or less dropped out of the modern literary movement and was living in practical retirement.

The Soviet record of the trial strongly suggests that all those factions which, during the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic had utterly failed to come to any agreement, had somehow or other composed their differences in the days when Ukrainian sentiments seemed to be dominant in the ranks of the Communist Party and when there were outstanding Communists, like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, pleading the Ukrainian cause. Yet, as was to be the case in almost all of the later trials, the court record based upon the testimony of the NKVD did not give any clue to the treasonable acts of which the defendants were accused and if they did, the stories passed belief. There was, likewise, no indication of the serious plans on which the organization was working or any details of its formal organization.

All the information that was revealed suggested that it was a definitely anti-Communist movement engineered by a group of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who objected to the Communist program of Ukrainization. There was no hint that the accused had any connection with the derussification program of Skrypnyk or the demand of Khvylovy and his friends of the *Vaplite* for the development of a definite Ukrainian Communism. The Society for the Liberation of Ukraine appeared like a ghost from the past and the prosecution seemed to have the tacit support of even those elements which were working for Ukrainization.

Up to this moment the only open manifestation had been the demand of Skrypnyk that Communists be included in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences but this had apparently been answered satisfactorily and, with slight changes, the Academy was working as before. The most that could be said was that the leaders of Ukrainian thought in the Academy had not properly in their old age kept pace with the development of Marxo-Leninist thought but even this was hardly sufficient for the outburst which was loosed against a group of widely respected scholars. 186 814 687 661

Another curious aspect of the situation was that the most severe sentences were not given to the announced ringleaders and chief culprits but that there was unearthed on the occasion another society, the SUM, the Society of Ukrainian Youth, which consisted of relatively obscure students, village intelligentsia, peasants and workmen who were shot by the hundreds and thousands without being brought before any tribunal. The head of this group, Mykola Pavlushkiv, was involved in the trial but once again there was no indication that any members of the SUM had been engaged in any form of sabotage or anti-governmental work. Members of the organization who have escaped abroad have testified that the SUM was organized only on the basis of personal friendships and never undertook or planned any deliberate acts of sabotage. [883]

The discovery of the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine with its assumed anti-Communist tinge was the signal for the opening of a campaign against the most respected older non-Communist members of the Academy. The usual method was by the device of demanding Communist self-criticism, and criticism. Its practice was brutally simple and effective.

The Communist organs, especially the GPU-NKVD, decided which of these scholars were to be broken ideologically (and morally) and which were to be removed without fanfare. The latter disappeared. The former group were forced to appear for public "self-criticism." This was preceded by a series of attacks in the newspapers as to the mistakes in Marxo-Leninism which the victim had committed.

186 Then, on an appointed day, a meeting was arranged in a large
814 hall to which the public was invited by the display of large
687 placards and other notices. Selected speakers attacked in the most
●661 scurrilous and abusive language various aspects of the work of the accused and ascribed to him the grossest errors. Then came the (obligatory) speeches of those who "wished to speak," i.e. his collaborators and students. These were carefully prepared by the Communist nucleus in the Academy or the Committee. The accused was then compelled to admit his mistakes and promise hereafter to work "in the spirit of Marxo-Leninism and the decrees of the Communist Party." These performances usually lasted for two or three sessions and then the critical "testing" of the work went on in special scientific meetings or scientific publications or in the torture chambers of the GPU. If the accused did not humiliate himself sufficiently or if the collaborators showed themselves insufficiently critical, "rotten liberal," "compromising," "opportunistic" or leaving "ideologically (or class) hostile loopholes," the process was repeated with still more bitterness against the main culprit and his collaborators or witnesses who had attempted to defend him were attacked with equal ferocity and their testimony was sent to the proper places for "consideration."

This was the treatment accorded to Prof. Hrushevsky who, in 1930, was criticized publicly and then arrested and deported to Moscow where he was prevented from doing any work and only after he was completely broken was he sent to a rest-house in the Caucasus to die in 1934. With his removal, the old historical studies almost came to an end. The Academy was reorganized as the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and nearly all the work in the humanities were stopped. The Historical-Philological Section was combined with the Social-Economic Section and nearly all of its special fields were abolished, while at the same time there disappeared a large number of valuable books and collections which were ready for publication.

This destruction of the older scholars in the Academy was justified by grouping Hrushevsky with his historical studies in the same

category of public enemies as Mazepa and Petlyura, and the three came to form a trinity subject to constant attack. Their leading crime was declared to be bourgeois nationalism, the object of which was to separate the Ukrainian from the Russian people and to deny the great significance of the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

In 1931 the Soviet authorities found traces of another organization, the Ukrainian National Centre. This is even more mysterious than was the preceding case, for it involved a number of apolitical figures who were living in retirement, as Holubovych, but at the same time it commenced the liquidation of the leaders of the former Borotbisty and Ukapisty. Still heavier sentences were imposed upon these men and large numbers were deported.

Then came an announcement of the extension to Soviet Ukrainian territory of the work of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Colonel Konovalets, and a number of more prominent Ukrainians were executed or deported for reasons that were never satisfactorily explained.

At the same time the Soviets seem to have spread rumors in connection with collectivization that there were movements for an uprising against the regime. They endeavored to have pseudo-Ukrainian patriots from Poland establish contacts with former officers of the Ukrainian National Republic who had dropped into obscurity and then, at a given signal, called for a revolt and easily overpowered their dupes.

Thus these trials eliminated from Ukrainian life the older scholars who had been trained before the period of Communist rule. They justified in the minds of the emigrés the correctness of their position in refusing to listen to the blandishments of the Ukrainian Soviet government during the apparently rosy years of the New Economic Policy, when it seemed as if there was to be a rapprochement with the West. How far the activity of these men, who had put themselves into the lion's mouth and perished, served to renew the Ukrainian courage and self-reliance has been much debated, especially in view of the fact that they were all destroyed as bourgeois, long before any serious danger seemed to

186 threaten the position of the various groups of Ukrainian Com-
814 munists. Khvylovy, despite the attacks upon him and Skrypnyk, still
687 continued to work for the greater Ukrainization of the population
● 661 and of the cities and, so far, he had not been subjected to any
too severe criticism. That was to come next.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The Debacle

The Ukrainian Communists, as Skrypnyk and Khvylovy, could not fail to be horrified at the spreading famine which broke out in the autumn of 1932 and raged throughout the winter. Whatever they might have thought in the beginning of the compulsory collectivization, they were aghast at its results. They could not fail to recognize that it meant the end of the old Ukrainian life which they had tried to remodel in accordance with their own ideals and that it meant a widening breach with the outside world. They could not fail to see that it meant the ending of that world Communism in which they had tried to believe and in which they saw the hope of humanity and justice.

They could hardly fail to recognize almost immediately how they had played into the hands of the enemies of Ukraine by their attacks on the older scholars, for they were now to learn that they had unwittingly forged the tool that was to be used against them.

Postyshev arrived in Ukraine in January, 1933, to superintend and make more rigid the rules for the collection of grain. He brought with him his own staff, his own detachments of the NKVD, and while he nominally had the post of second secretary, he had the instructions from Stalin that made him the complete dictator. He soon showed what that meant.

Among his earliest acts was the removal of Chubar from his post as head of the Soviet of People's Commissars and he replaced him with the more pliable P. Lyubchenko, a former Borotbist. Skrypnyk was forthwith demoted from Commissar of Education to Chairman of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission, a position of no special importance, once the conduct of all Ukrainian life

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661 558 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

[665] The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

[814] Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

191 626 Postyshev's 1 object was the rerussification of the country, for it had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] [871] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian newspapers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

basis with Ukrainian. He established Russian theatres in the larger 191
cities and sent them Russian companies from Leningrad and Moscow 636
to show the greatness of Russian art, while at the same time he had [545]
Les Kurbas arrested at the end of the year and closed the Berezil Theatre, the leading company in Ukraine, and even abolished its name as Catherine the Great had abolished the name of the Zaporozhian Sich one hundred fifty years before.

The fundamental object was to re-Russianize Ukraine as rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this idea, Zatonsky even suggested that the students should be encouraged to talk a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian in the hope that they could thus be more quickly induced to accept the alien tongue. That was a rash thought, for as soon as it was reported to Moscow, there came a strong protest from Gorky that such a procedure could only injure the purity of the Russian language by mixing foreign elements in it. Zatonsky hurriedly withdrew his suggestions but it was too late and only a few years later he was to pay the penalty for his rash proposal.

It was small wonder that Khvylovy, who knew well that he [762]
was threatened with arrest and execution, committed suicide in despair on May 13, 1933 and he was followed on July 6, by Skrypnyk who was too familiar with the workings of Russian Communism not to realize that he would be steadily demoted until he could be finished off without comment as a fallen idol.

The terror and the destruction proceeded apace[1] and after the 661
murder of Kirov in Leningrad on December 21, 1934, new in- 538
vestigations were ordered and it was discovered that the bulk of the Ukrainian authors were involved in the conspiracy. In a very short time their ranks were almost completely decimated. In the same month H. Kosynka, O. Vlyzko, I. Krushelnytsky, K. Burevy, and D. Falkivsky were shot on various pretenses. Nearly all the former members of the *Vaplite,* the Neo-Classicists, the groups connected with the MARS in Kiev and the *New Generation,* were liquidated in one way or another, either by execution or deportation and deportation was practically the equivalent of death, for scarcely one of the deported ever returned to the Ukraine or made

[1] [reference to forced Russification of Ukraine, 1932 -- Analyst]

661 538 his presence or his present place of dwelling known to any of his friends.

It would be too long to mention the list of names, but among them were all the outstanding names of the preceding years, Kulish, Yalovy, Yohansen, Epik, Zerov, Dray-Khmara, Kosynka, Pidmohylny, Semenko, Vuzko, etc. These men were not only put out of the way but every attempt was made to prove that they had never existed. Their books were removed from the libraries and bookstores and, so far as possible, even references to them and their work were expunged from encyclopedias and reference books and the movement which they represented and which, but a short time before, had been patronized by the Commissariat of Education was rendered non-existent. Only the name of Khvylovy remained as an example of anti-Russian work and he was presented as a pupil of Petlyura, Hrushevsky and the Western imperialists and a believer in bourgeois nationalism, a term which was now extended to cover anything hostile to the general line of the Party.

626 538 Faced with the certainty of sharing the fate of their colleagues, some of even the more prominent authors began to waver. Among this number were Tychyna and, a little more reluctantly, Rylsky. In fact, it required a term in prison to bring the latter to an appreciation of the beauties of the new order. Both proved themselves valuable converts, even if they were compelled to forget all their old mannerisms and perfections of style and produce tasteless propaganda poetry, while the official organs boasted of their slow but steady growth in realism. Thus, in 1934 Kulyk could say of Tychyna, "The collection of *The Party Leads* represents an unquestionable achievement. Nevertheless we should be rendering poor service to Tychyna himself if we failed to point out the uneven tenor, and sometimes even hesitation, in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to him. Stronger organizational ties with the realities, emancipation from artificial, at times purely bookish culture, such are the conditions on which depends further progress by Tychyna along the new road chosen by this great Ukrainian poet." Rylsky and Bazhan were treated in the same way, while such writers as Panch and Holovko were told it was their task to get over the

[Persecution, during Russification of Ukraine, 1933 -- Analysis]

633 civil war. Kiev, as the centre of traditional Ukrainian life, was more liable to sympathy with the Ukrainian national movement, as the Russians had found on more than one occasion. Now, with the country prostrate, it seemed advisable for the Communists to mark their triumph and endeavor to identify themselves with the masses by recognizing Kiev.

Yet, it brought with it another blow to Ukrainian prestige. Of all the cities in Ukraine, Kiev was the richest in the monuments of the past. Therefore, to mark the Communist triumph, they decided to rebuild large portions of the city and to erect buildings that would be worthy of the new regime. It was easy to find as the proper sites the areas where the old Kiev had stood.

346 From the very first days of Bolshevism and Communism, the
661 regime, with its atheistic trends, had devoted itself to the robbing
633 of the churches. Even the ikonostasis of St. Sophia had been melted down to recover the gold ornaments with which it had been decorated. The museums had been largely pillaged. Some of the contents had been removed to Moscow on various pretexts, but still more had been wantonly destroyed.

Now[1] work began in earnest to wreck the surviving monuments of the past. In quick succession the Communists ruined, blew up or levelled a large number of churches which spoke too strongly of the past greatness of Kiev and the Ukrainians. These included the Cathedral Church of the Golden Domed Monastery of St. Michael of the twelfth century, with a bell-tower of the seventeenth, the Church of the Three Saints of the twelfth century, the cloisters of the Monastery of St. Irena of the eleventh century, the finest monuments of the period of Mazepa at the end of the seventeenth century, including the Cathedrals of the Theophany of the Brotherhood Monastery and the "Great Nicholas" of the Ustyno-Mykolayiv Monastery, the work of the architect Joseph Startsev, with a bell-tower of the late eighteenth or the early nineteenth century, the "Little Nicholas" and the Church of St. George of the eighteenth century, a large number of structures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of the Kievan-Mezhyhirye Monastery of the Transfiguration, the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Podil of

1 [1933 - Ukraine Capital was moved to Kiev from Kharkiv -- Analyst]

the eighteenth century, the bell-tower of the Kiev-Kiril-Troitsky 346
Monastery of the eighteenth century built by the architect Ivan 661
Hryhorovych-Barsky, the Church of Sts. Borys and Hlib of the 633
eighteenth century, the Church of the Birth of Christ and the "good Nicholas," built by Andry Melensky at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Church of the Tithes, the celebrated statue of Samson by Hryhorovych-Barsky, and a long series of other monuments and buildings.

Almost all of these buildings came from those periods when the Ukrainians were the most free from Russian influence or, as in the case of the Mazepa baroque, had the closest contacts with the West. It was a deliberate part of the Communist attempt to rewrite the Ukrainian past.

Of course, their excuse was that the old primarily ecclesiastical culture stood in marked contradiction to the modern era of industrialization and collectivization, the "glorious age of Stalin" which called for the development of a new type of architecture. Still, in a surprising number of cases these new buildings did not make their appearance and the ground was left empty or covered with insignificant structures which could better have been placed on the site of those half-ruined shacks and hovels which were the real expressions of the Communist paradise.

The primary object[1] was the annihilation of the Ukrainian spirit 626
and represented part of the broad general movement which had 186
been launched for the rerussification of the country and the stopping in every way of that spontaneous outburst of development which had been called into being by the downfall of tsarism and the founding of the Ukrainian National Republic. The general debacle was now complete.

Within four years, before the ending of the first Five Year Plan a situation had been brought about which seemed to the Soviet authorities a guarantee of their final victory over what they were pleased to call bourgeois nationalism but which was, in realty, the logical outgrowth of the Ukrainian aspirations throughout the centuries.

1 [in destruction of churches & monuments of past in Kiev--Analyst

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Ukraine in the Late Thirties

With the power of Moscow thus defined and reasserted by 668
the free vote of the Moscow-controlled Communist representatives of the various independent republics that formed part of the USSR, the way was open for the next step. Stalin had not only prepared himself legally at home by a clever use of contradictory expressions but he had taken advantage of the good will of the liberals and progressives of the rest of the world by exploiting the distrust which they felt for Hitler and the Nazis and had infiltrated Communists through the media of popular fronts into nearly all the governments that boasted of their democracy.

Next came the bewildering series of trials which were now held 661
in Moscow. In quick succession Yagoda, the dreaded head of 687
the NKVD, was removed from his post, arrested and shot by his successor Yezhov, whose name was soon to become even more detested. Then, in a series of three public trials which extended from the end of 1936 to 1938, nearly all of the old Bolshevik leaders who had played important roles in Soviet life during the period of Lenin's domination were condemned for counter-revolutionary activity and either shot or sentenced to long terms of deportation, from which they did not return. The list included such names as Bukharin, the former theoretician of the Party, Zinovyev, the master of the Leningrad Soviet, the leading supporters of Trotsky, Rykov, etc. At the same time Marshal Tukhachevsky, the commander of the Red Army in its unsuccessful drive against Warsaw in 1920, Marshal Yegorov, the leader of the southern wing of that army with which Stalin himself had served as political commissar and most of the other leading officers were removed and

661 687 suffered the same fate on the ground that they were intriguing with Hitler or with the capitalist imperialists.

The Yezhovshchina, as it was called, raged over the entire territory of the Soviet Union and was directed with especial fury against all the leading men in all walks of life, directors of government offices, directors of factories, directors of collective farms, and army officers, if they could possibly be suspected of being disloyal to the Stalinist regime or of having independent thoughts.

The world looked on in amazement, for the Moscow regime seemed to have gone completely mad in its accusations and suspicions. The charges that were made against the outstanding personalities seemed fantastic and contradicted everything that any one knew of the character and actions of the outstanding Communist leaders. To some it seemed as if the revolution were devouring its own children, for Stalin was executing men for proposing policies which he had later adopted himself, as he had in the case of both the right and left deviationists from the general line of the party. To others it seemed an alarming example of the infiltration of all forms of life by the agents of Nazism. All agreed that the actions were extreme and far reaching.

As the purge of the administrative machinery went on, its range increased. Once the head of a bureau or a factory were implicated, the way was open to charge all of his subordinates who had not denounced him with being accessory to his crimes and they were called up and punished or, in rare cases, were acquitted and promoted. The storm continued until late in 1938 when Yezhov himself was removed and suffered the same fate at the hands of the Georgian Beria, who guided the NKVD through World War II.

If such was the fury in the RSFSR, it can well be imagined what were the results in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian Communists had set the fashion of accusing their opponents of bourgeois nationalism. When the storm broke, Postyshev, who had been sent down in 1933 to wipe out bourgeois nationalism, to organize the famine and to break the Ukrainian renaissance, was among the first to go. He was removed and disappeared at the hands of Kaganovich, who reemerged for a while as the strong man of the

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Lyubchenko, who had been appointed the Prime Minister of the UkSSR on the single program of suppressing Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, was called to Moscow to confront the self-confessed leaders of the nationalists and, on his return to Kiev, he shot himself. His successor, Bondarenko, disappeared without a trace. 661 687

Who were these self-confessed leaders? Prominent among them was A. Khvylya, who had been the champion of the general line against Khvylovy and Skrypnyk and who had been the dominant figure in the attack on the Ukrainian literary men and scholars. For years he had resorted to all kinds of attacks to bring Ukrainian grammar and language closer to Russian. He now "voluntarily" confessed that he had worked against the "elder brother" and had joined and aided in developing a secret military force several million strong for the sole purpose of separating Ukraine from the USSR and he swore that in this he had the active aid of Lyubchenko and most of the officials of the UkSSR. Finis.

Zatonsky, the Commissar of Education, was accused of another crime. He had drawn years before the fire of Gorky for suggesting that a mixed language be introduced into Ukrainian schools as the means of absorbing Ukrainian into Russian. He had speedily withdrawn his recommendations under fire and all had seemed forgiven. It was not, and Zatonsky disappeared in the holocaust.

It then came the turn of the writers. Men like Kulyk, who had run roughshod over the older writers and had called for their liquidation, were now found guilty of bourgeois nationalism and with them most of the authors who had emerged during the shattering of the Ukrainian renaissance and who had celebrated the turning of the Ukraine into a collectivized and industrialized state. Each and every one of them confessed that they had been guilty of bourgeois nationalism and they received the due reward for their crimes. [538]

There was hardly a family in Ukraine which did not suffer the accusation of at least one member. The survivors who have escaped abroad have given lurid tales of the extent to which the feeling of distrust and suspicion spread among all classes of the

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities
166 continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

[During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

simply Russians was constantly increased. It was almost forbidden 626
to mention the name Ukrainian in connection with the older settlers 186
in Kuban, along the Don, in the Green Wedge along the Amur, etc. [191]
and it was a matter of perplexity as to what language they could be said to speak or what dialect in connection with later studies of the dialects of the Russian language. It was inadmissible to regard them as speaking a peasant dialect in view of the attitude of the authorities in recognizing some sort of Ukrainian, but it was even worse to believe that Ukrainian could exist in those regions and so they were simply passed over and forgotten, while the newcomers, usually being under some kind of a ban, were simply treated as Russian deportees.

Even this was not the whole story, for in such cities as Vinnytsya 661
during these same years[1] the population was slaughtered by the thousands and buried secretly in carefully hidden burial places which were then turned into parks and playgrounds to conceal the extent of the crimes. This was repeated in many places but the situation in Vinnytsya attracted especial attention because during the War, the Germans found the places of burial and revealed the thousands of bodies of the victims, many of whom had been buried alive. The extent of these massacres was as great as was the killing of the Polish officers in Katyn, which was likewise brought to light during the war.

By the time the census of 1939 was taken and this was the last 162
one published, the growth of the number of Russians and the diminution of Ukrainians showed clearly that there was a large scale transfer of nationality which completely reversed the figures in some sections of Asia without regard for the natural laws of reproduction and mortality.

In this atmosphere the nature of the intellectual and literary 626
work in the UkSSR can well be imagined. The Ukrainian scholars 814
were forced to accept the full Russian theories of the Ukrainian 661
past. This led to a complete revaluation of all the "outstanding figures." In 1933 the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was condemned on the ground that he was a typical representative of the noble classes. By the outbreak of World War II he became a Rus-

1 [1936-1938 -- Analyst]

626 sian patriot for signing the Treaty of Pereyaslav and bringing the
814 Zaporozhian Kozaks under Muscovite domination. It was so in
● 661 every branch of historical study. In back of the conception of the Soviet man and Soviet patriotism began to emerge with ever greater clarity the conception of Russian patriotism, as the doctrine of the "elder brother" who had given culture and civilization to the other nations of the Soviet Union became clearer and clearer.

626 It was the same thing in language. Khvylya and his friends
814 had been working on a Ukrainian-Russian dictionary but this was
191 immediately criticized by *Pravda* for its divisive tendencies, and the guilty compilers were liquidated. A new edition was started in 1938 on still a new principle. The Ukrainian and Russian words were to have the same number of synonyms and these were to have identical value. If, in any particular case, this did not prove to be true, it was so much the worse for the Ukrainian. If there were more words in Ukrainian to express various shades of one idea that there were in Russian, the words were banned. If there were fewer, the Russian words were supplied in order to show the influence that Russian had had upon the cultural development of Ukrainian.

The result was the reverse of what Zatonsky had proposed. He had suggested a mixed language with the idea that the Ukrainians would develop by practice toward the use of standard Russian. Now the new Commissariat of Education was introducing Russian into Ukrainian, forbidding the use of Ukrainian syntactical constructions which had no parallel in Russian in order to train the Ukrainians to speak Russian by infiltrating it into their native speech. The result would have been perhaps the same, but the important difference was that it preserved the supremacy of the Russian language in a pure form and corrupted the Ukrainian beyond recognition.

538 This procedure was too violent, even for many of the poets
191 and writers who were most ardent in their support of the Stalinist
626 regime. Men like Bazhan, who had put his pen entirely at the disposal of Moscow, continued to use some of the forbidden words and even obtained rewards for their obsequious phrases couched in

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

After the expulsion of the Soviet Forces from Western Ukraine in 1920, the territory, including Eastern Galicia and Lviv, had remained under Polish rule and had been subjected to a policy of Polonization and colonization by a Polish population. There had been during the period between the wars many clashes and much unpleasantness between the two nationalities and the ill will thus generated promised disastrous consequences for Poland in case of a new war. At the same time the Polish domination had never threatened the fundamental forms of Ukrainian social life, as had been the case in the UkSSR; the Ukrainians had a certain representation in the Polish Parliament, and they had been allowed, despite hindrances, to develop their own economic life. With the possible exception of the one district of Boryslav, there was very little Communism among the population, who were well aware of the handicaps under which their brothers in the UkSSR were living. At the same time the Nazi refusal to support the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine in the spring of 1939 had placed them on their guard against the Nazis.

Thus, when World War II broke out on September 1, 1939, the revolt of the Ukrainians which many Poles expected did not take place. However, the Polish government in the first days arrested and placed in concentration camps many of the Ukrainian leaders but they were freed by the rapid advance of the German forces and the Polish retreat, which forced into Lviv and the neighborhood many thousands of refugees.

On August 23, 1939, when the Nazis and the Soviets signed a non-aggression treaty, it was provided that if Poland were disintegrated, Germany and the USSR would divide the territory

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

The old newspapers ceased at once to appear[1] but the new occupants started in all of the main cities new Communist newspapers as the *Free Ukraine* in Lviv and the *Soviet Ukraine* in Stanyslaviv. They allowed also a Communist Polish newspaper the *Red Flag* and a similar paper in Yiddish. 728 [204]

The old officials were at first encouraged to return to their posts, whether they were Polish or not but in a very short time they began to disappear and they were replaced by Ukrainian-speaking persons, some from the neighborhood and some from eastern Ukraine. At almost the same time, while preparations were begun for the proposed plebiscite, the authorities quietly picked up and incarcerated most of the old political leaders, especially those of the UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic League, the representatives of those parties that had sought a normalization of relations with the Poles. [661]

In the same slow and unobstrusive way the Polish police of the different cities were replaced by a "national militia." This was composed of armed groups of young men who more or less volunteered for the work of maintaining order. The Ukrainian and the Jewish organizations tried to bring these self-appointed groups under control but this proved a difficult task for, in many cases, the new Soviet authorities had encouraged some of the more lawless and tumultuous elements to undertake the work so as to profit themselves by the resultant chaos and to facilitate the calling in of their own people. [625]

This era of anxiety on the part of the population and of extreme moderation on the part of the occupying forces lasted for almost a month, while preparations were being made for the election of representatives of all organizations, factories, and groups to a National Assembly for the consideration of reunion with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Meetings were held everywhere, at which attendance was compulsory, and everywhere there was expressed by selected speakers the gratitude of the people for their liberation from the Polish lords and the imperialistic capitalists. Khrushchov and other high functionaries arrived from Kiev to conduct these elections and to superintend the preparation of the lists of delegates. Yet it was almost at once noted that while there 728 666

[1] [1939, Russian occupation of Poland -- Analyst]

436 the more favored because the Soviets equated in value the Polish zloty and the Soviet karbovanets. When we take into consideration the fact that prior to the war a pound of meat in Poland cost four zloty and in the UkSSR twenty-five to thirty karbovantsy, the vast purchasing power of the Soviet officials can be seen. Then in December,[1] to ruin the native population, they arbitrarily stopped the zloty as legal tender, so that the Ukrainian population lost everything, except those fortunate persons who had succeeded in exchanging their Polish money for German marks by clandestine trade across the border.

191 This swarm of officials was of various kinds. Those who were attached to fields like military affairs, the railroads, the posts and telegraphs, etc., i.e. those branches which were directly under the All-Union Commissariats, made no concealment of the fact that Russian was from now on to be the chief language. Other sections which were under the Commissariats in Kiev first adopted Ukrainian as their official tongue, but by the middle of 1940 they, too, had passed over to the use of Russian, exactly as had been done in all the offices in Kiev.

661 471 By the end of November,[1] when the supplies in the stores were already becoming exhausted, the actual work of nationalization commenced. The former owners were often thrown out, if their establishments had been of any size, and as former wealthy individuals they were refused food tickets and other privileges on the ground that they belonged to the non-laboring element and were enemies of the people. This meant that they were compelled to sell upon the black market everything that they had been able to save or which they possessed and which had not been confiscated, and during the winter many of them, like the Polish landlowners and the police who fell into Communist hands, were deported under atrocious and inhuman conditions to Kazakhstan and Central Asia to disappear.

[665] On the other hand, the Soviets introduced at once the idea of dining halls for the workers and special stores for Communists and higher functionaries where they could secure easily and cheaply whatever there was to be obtained in Western Ukraine.

[1] [1939--Analyst]

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

At the same time the nationalization of the land was commenced 423
and this gave a good excuse for the elimination of another class 471
of formerly prosperous people, whether they were Poles or Ukrainians. At first this was carried out along the lines of the Ukrainian land code of 1922, for the authorities were eager to get crops in when spring came. Still, during the summer of 1940 they began to urge the formation of collective farms. The peasants in some of the more backward regions listened to these ideas willingly, but in the better areas where agriculture was on a far higher and more efficient plane than in large sections of eastern Ukraine, they were very cool and meetings had to be postponed again and again if disorders were to be averted in the middle of the war. Still the Soviet authorities felt that they could waste some time until a real peace was restored and their hands were definitely free.

In regard to the educational establishments and all questions 661
of organization, they acted without delay. In the first days of the 814
occupation, the Soviet commissars seized the property of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and prevented all further work by confiscating the building and its contents and preventing all further publications. On January 14, 1940, they forced the complete self-liquidation of the Society. The president, Prof. Rakovsky, at once fled to the west and during the next uncertain months a large part of the active members made their way to Krakow in the Polish Government General, where they endeavored to resume their work. The Society was then turned into a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR and was placed under the control of the administration in Kiev, while part of its collections and its work was placed under the University of Lviv, which was now ostensibly Ukrainianized and given the name of Ivan Franko, the great Western Ukrainian scholar and writer. This was not for long, for very soon here, too, the lecturers to win Soviet approval began to switch over from Ukrainian to Russian.

All other societies of every kind were abolished and fitted into 655
the Soviet scheme of things. The cooperative network, especially such great societies as the Maslosoyuz (Dairy Cooperative Society) and the People's Trade were made governmental organs. Various

655 firms were turned into branches of one commissariat or another. By the spring, while there had not yet been a full communization of the country, the process was well advanced and no resident of Western Ukraine could doubt as to the future of the area.

659 In Eastern Galicia, where the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite was the predominant religion, the Metropolitan Archbishop Andry Sheptytsky was not personally touched.[1] He was placed under more or less surveillance and found it impossible to exercise his normal activity. However, all the religious schools and seminaries under his charge were closed, the church and monastic lands were seized, and all ecclesiastical printing was suppressed. Finally, the clergy were compelled to hand over to the representatives of the government all the baptismal and other records which were incorporated in the work of the ZATS, the Soviet bureau of vital statistics. The clergy were treated as a non-working class [661] and were thus deprived of all means of livelihood, except for the free-will offerings of their impoverished parishioners.

In the eastern sections, where the Orthodox Church predominated, the same regulations were put into force with the additional proviso that the clergy had to transfer their allegiance from the Polish Orthodox Church to the locum tenens of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow. This was a first step in improving relations between the locum tenens and the Soviet government and in making the authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church a definite instrument of the government in the spreading of Russian Communism.

545 On the other hand, there was a considerable patronage of Ukrainian art. Certain scholars were rather favored. The Ukrainian theatre was supported on a more liberal scale than it had been under the Polish rule and there were in some quarters hopes that there might be a happy future. It was again a short dream, for [686] as 1940 came to a close, there began again the insistant but unobtrusive attempts at russification. Russian theatrical companies began to visit Lviv and other cities. The publications of the publishing firms of Lviv fell off and once more they found it necessary 000 to produce Russian books. The libraries were carefully purged of

1 [1940 -- under Russian occupation -- Analyst]

The libraries were carefully purged of
those authors who had fallen under the displeasure of Moscow 538
during the crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance and their works 626
were forbidden, just as in Eastern Ukraine. The books that were sent from Kiev were chiefly in Russian. Furthermore, those authors, poets, and artists who were still in Western Ukraine now found themselves regimented. They were given elaborate projects but they found that their success depended upon their ability not to express themselves freely but to satisfy the demands of the Soviet authorities. As a result many of them endeavored to get, in one way or another, to the west where even if they were under Nazi rule they still had more possibilities at the time than they did under the highly organized system sponsored by Moscow.

It was thus abundantly evident that the "liberation" of Western 661
Ukraine was but the exchange of one master for a still sterner rule. The realization of this fact came quickly and it very soon evoked a corresponding reaction which began to unite the entire population, the more so as even those few Communists in Western Ukraine who had remained true to their convictions were now seized by the Soviet authorities and punished on the ground that they were Trotskyists or were believers in one of the various deviations from the general line of the party. There were to be no Communists except those who had passed through the Soviet training school and those people who had believed that their Communist faith would be of profit to them found themselves in as wretched a position as had Eastern Ukrainian Communists like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk who had gained nothing by their independence, except death and destruction.

Thus, by the spring of 1941 conditions in Western Ukraine were rapidly assuming the same form that they had taken in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Any hopes that there would be any exception or any toleration for the area were once and for all annihilated when the Soviets attacked Finland and, still more, when, in the summer of 1940, they absorbed and turned into Soviet Republics the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Soviets were shown clearly to be on the march and it was for the people to protect themselves as best they could.

CHAPTER TWENTY

The German Attack on the Soviets

During the period from 1939 to 1941, the German 648
policy toward those Ukrainians who had escaped from the Soviet 563
occupation into the Polish Government General was not too severe. It was possible for the Ukrainians in Krakow and elsewhere to carry on a considerable amount of educational work, to form themselves into relief organizations and, in general, to work for the establishment of normal relations.

When the breach between the two totalitarian states came on 721
June 22, 1941, the Germans pushed ahead rapidly not only in the Baltic area but also in Ukraine. By June 30, they had occupied Lviv with the aid of some Ukrainian units, both from Carpatho-Ukraine and from Galicia.

During these days the Ukrainians had high hopes that the Germans would seriously liberate them from Bolshevik tyranny and wherever they had the slightest possibility, they endeavored to seize the cities so as to put a stop to the massacres which the Communists were perpetrating before they fell back. In some places they were successful but in Lviv, the Communists killed over [661] 10,000 prisoners, before their bloody regime could be brought to an end.

In the first days of the war, although there were no clear 642
promises made to the Ukrainians, the impression grew that there would be established some form of a Ukrainian administration. The political leaders set up a Ukrainian government and appointed Yaroslav Stetsko as the first head of the state on June 30, 1941. A short time later this was broadened by the appointment of a Committee of Seniors under the leadership of Dr. Kost Levytsky, who had been the Prime Minister of the Republic of Western

642 Ukraine in 1918. These developments had the support of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, although he knew that they did not yet rest on organized public sentiment.

It was well recognized by the influential Ukrainians that the situation was very different from what it had been at the end of the Hapsburg monarchy, but they went through the motions of setting up a government on the possibility that the Germans would allow them some real concessions and that it would be mutually advantageous to be already prepared for all eventualities.

721 648 It is perhaps possible that a part of the German armed forces looked with a certain toleration at these developments, for at least a part of the officer class realized that the task of the German government would be greatly facilitated, if they were able to normalize the situation and win some support from the population, as they had in the Polish Government General. This did not suit the Nazi element who believed that the advance of the German [661] forces was only to secure more *Lebensraum* for Germany. This faction struck and struck hard at the new regime and secured the arrest of Stetsko, Levytsky, Bandera and Melnyk, all of whom were taken to prison in Germany where they were kept for nearly four years.

The arrest of the leaders, while it was a crushing blow, still was not completely fatal. The advance of the German troops was so rapid on the way to Kiev that the Ukrainian leaders continued for some months to inspire the population not to resist the Germans, the more so as the western regiments of the Red Army surrendered in large masses. Thus when Kiev fell, some 675,000 of the Red Army surrendered with scarcely a blow.

On the other hand, the Soviets attempted to devastate the country before they withdrew, shooting the Ukrainian intelligentsia indiscriminately and trying to seize as many as they could for evacuation beyond the Urals. They demolished factories, tried to remove finished articles and mined the cities before they abandoned them. Then, when they exploded the mines, they spread the story that the total work of demolition had been carried on by the Germans.

On August 1, the Germans made a new division of the country 648
and assigned the whole of Galicia to the Polish Government General. 727
At the same time they returned Bukovyna and Bessarabia to Rumania and then set up a new section around Odesa under the name of Transdnistria which they likewise placed under Rumania. It was in vain that the Ukrainians who tried to organize their own national rada in Kiev protested against such actions, for their protests were not received and the Nazis went on with their policy of ignoring all the wishes of the population.

Later in the month, the Germans established the Reichskom- 727
missariat of Ukraine and placed it under the control of a fanatical 661
Nazi, Erich Koch, who set himself during the next years to crush anything and everything that was done to aid the Ukrainians and to win for himself the detested title of the butcher of Ukraine.

In the early months of the German occupation and especially [727]
during the period of rapid military movements, much was done for the rebuilding of the country after the ravages of the Bolsheviks. Nearly 115 Ukrainian newspapers were established, plans were made for the opening of schools and during the transition from the military rule to the rule of Koch, the Ukrainian agents were in the front ranks of the German army, spreading their propaganda and trying to rouse the population against the Bolsheviks.

Yet this work did not please the Germans. Everywhere in eastern Europe the old governments that had been suppressed by the Bolsheviks tried to recreate themselves but everywhere there came the arrests of these leaders and their deportation, so that it was not many months before the sober thought of the liberated peoples turned against the new occupants and the people realized that their hopes were going to be in vain. By the end of 1941, it had been made clear to them that there would be no relaxation of the pressure exerted upon them.

In the Reichskommissariat which, in fact, represented little more than the right bank of the Dnieper area, for the army retained the control over the regions to the east of the river, it speedily became impossible for the Ukrainians to improve their own condition. The Germans were guided by a strictly logical program.

727 Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the
661 title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors
[341] merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

[538] By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing
[466] Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

668 These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba—Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

668 This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian
725 forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

668 tried to break this up but they were unsuccessful and the police
725 battalion which was assigned to the operation was destroyed. Out of this Conference developed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations which adopted as its program, "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual."

[701] It would take too long to describe the actual nature of the military operations which the U. P. A. carried on. At the height of its power it controlled more than 200,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory and numbered some 220,000 soldiers divided into four main bands: the U. P. A. North, operating in Polissya and northern Volynia; the U. P. A.—West in Eastern Galicia and Kholmshchyna; the U. P. A. —South in northern Bukovyna and the provinces of Kamyanets Podilsky and Vinnytsya; and the U. P. A.—East north of Kiev and Zhytomyr. There were separate detachments in most of the cities and important towns.

[661] To oppose its operations, the Germans resorted to mass executions and on more than one occasion detached forces of one or two divisions to try to destroy its centres. These attempts failed and the U. P. A. by its constant efforts played an important part in isolating the German forces, upsetting their communications and sapping their strength. All this was very costly, for after every major blow the Germans executed large numbers of innocent Ukrainians as their one weapon against the movement.

At first there was relative peace in Galicia, but in the summer of 1943 a Soviet partisan detachment entered the province. The Germans took little action and the U. P. A. came to the support of the population and soon had established strong centres in the Carpathian Mountains, where the difficult terrain facilitated their maintenance of strong positions.

[727] The Germans in the beginning did not want to admit that their policy toward the Ukrainians had evoked such a strong response. Koch and his associates were only too willing to believe that the Ukrainians were an inferior race, undeserving of education or of consideration and they went out of their way to label the U. P. A. the product of Communist intrigue and a movement of support for the Jews, etc.

in 1939, now received a new master. As soon as the Soviet forces 728
entered the region in the autumn of 1944, they immediately began 648
a campaign to liberate this area from Czecho-Slovakia and reunite it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was the same old story carried on in the same way as in 1939. There was a mass of petitions apparently prepared by the native population asking for liberation, but these were in reality the work of a handful of carefully selected Communists.

They speedily reached their goal and on June 29, 1945, President Benes of Czechoslovakia recognized the justice of their claims and by an agreement handed over the entire province which was duly reunited with their brothers in Moscow. This brought together under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic nearly all the Ukrainians, except a few who were still living in Poland and in a small stretch of territory which the UkSSR voluntarily ceded to Poland to satisfy the increasing claims of the Polish Communists and their needs in their efforts to cement their power in that state.

At the same time the realization by the Soviet authorities of the seriousness of the situation offered by the U. P. A. and the unrest among the Ukrainians led them to act on both the foreign and the domestic front. On the former they mobilized all of their [208]
friends and dupes abroad to stress the connection of the U. P. A., [725]
the "Bandera bandits," and the Nazi criminals and they achieved considerable success in closing the eyes of the west until they had won considerable victories over the various U. P. A. groups, for too many Western leaders failed to see the inconsistency that they preached. At one and the same time the Soviet authorities boasted of their complete control of the territory of Western Ukraine, thanks to the love of the population for the Red Army and in almost the same breath they declaimed against these armed forces which were holding up the advance of the Red Army and the NKVD in the very areas where the people were thirsting for liberation.

On the domestic front in the autumn of 1945 they sent a large 661
force of men into the Carpathian area under the command of 668
Khrushchov as Premier of the UkSSR and General Ryasny, the 725

661 Minister of War, to endeavor to suppress these bands. Despite
668 unprecedented torture of the population, the Soviets found that
725 their progress was not so great as they had expected, for few of the Ukrainian units in their forces were enthusiastic about the campaign, when they saw the measures that the government was taking against their own families.

In the spring of 1946, they made another attempt, this time using some fifteen divisions of NKVD troops from the Far East, Siberia and Leningrad under the direct control of General Colonel Moskalenko. The authorities had been goaded to this renewed demonstration of force by the fact that the town of Stanislav in the Carpathian area had been seized by five battalions of the U. P. A. on October 31, 1945 as a discouragement to the Ukrainians to participate in the Soviet elections called for February 10, 1946. Despite the efforts of the Soviet guards, a considerable portion of the population failed to vote and when the attacks upon them were pressed, a detachment of the U. P. A. succeeded on May 3, 1946, in ambushing Moskalenko and killing him and his chief aids. This ended another campaign and still left the U. P. A. in control of parts of the Carpathian area.

668 In addition to these operations on purely Ukrainian territory,
725 the U. P. A. undertook several raids across the borders in order to encourage dissatisfaction with Soviet rule among some of the neighboring peoples. Thus they established contact with similar groups in Slovakia, Byelorussia and Lithuania, while others cut their way across Hungary into Yugoslavia to join forces with the opponents of Communism in that area.

The raids into Slovakia were especially successful throughout 1945 and 1946 and were continued on a smaller scale during the next years. They served as an encouragement for the anti-Communist elements of the population and, of far more importance in the long run, they attracted the attention of Western journalists who for the first time began to realize the extent of the discontent that prevailed in the Soviet Union. More than that, with every step to the West, they were brought closer to the Western Zones of Germany and Austria and several well-armed detachments have

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Soviet Ukraine During World War II

In the preceding chapters we have briefly traced the efforts of the Ukrainians to profit by the clash between the two totalitarian powers of Germany and the USSR and the Ukrainian hopes of being recognized as an independent state. These hopes had been thwarted by the Nazi refusal to treat the Ukraine as anything except a field for German expansion and the Western refusal to recognize the Ukrainian struggle for independence. 722 661 538

This, of course, does not tell the entire story. From the earliest days of the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine, many of the leading Ukrainian patriots, writers, artists and scholars, including a large part of the staff of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, had seized the opportunity to retire to the west into the Polish Government General but there were many more who were picked up in the early deportations and deposited along with the Poles in Central Asia. Some of these, during the brief period of friendship between the Poles and the Soviets, were again able to make their way to the west along with General Anders and found themselves again at freedom, while those who had retired to the west were forced to undergo increasing persecution at the hands of the Nazis as these became more desperate. [814]

On the other hand, when the break finally came in 1941 and the Ukrainians, including those mobilized in the Red Army, began to surrender in masses, the Soviets began to deport to the east all of the outstanding people on whom they could lay their hands and whom at the first moment they did not wish to exterminate. In this number there were such Ukrainian writers as Tychyna, Rylsky and others who had showed their loyalty to the regime by their tasteless flattery of the regime in Moscow.

722 In the same way, the authorities gathered up in frenzied haste machinery, finished products, and records and started them likewise to the east with the hope of setting them up somewhere in a safe place and using them to increase the Soviet war potential. All this was a hurried and confused process, for it was contradicted by the Soviet orders to reduce the Ukraine to a heap of ruins and to leave nothing available for the invaders.

[814] The clash between these two ideas was vividly reflected in the [661] destruction of Kiev. Some sections of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR were hurriedly packed on trains and moved to Ufa. Other sections for little better reasons were abandoned in the general confusion or were mined for immediate destruction. Priceless books and records, no less than boilers and lathes, shared the two fates, while Kiev, thoroughly mined, was exploded and set on fire without regard for the needs of the people. The Soviet authorities, well aware that they could not evacuate the entire population, destroyed the food supplies of those who were left behind while other detachments massacred the helpless population indiscriminately.

The situation at Kharkiv and Odesa was far better and far more logical for the Soviets had a few days longer to sort out what they wished to remove and what they wanted to destroy, but even in these places there was the same wanton destruction which conflicted with the avowed aims of the Soviet authorities.

Then ensued a series of mutual recriminations, and it is still not clear in regard to many buildings and institutions whether the bulk of the damage and the losses were caused by Nazi or by Communist actions. Some 3500 carloads of machinery were shipped alone from the city of Zaporyzhzhya and most of this material was packed at night in utter darkness with no special care as to where it was being sent.

[466] The same situation confronted the workers, some 5,000,000 of whom were evacuated from the Ukraine and landed in rough factories that were hastily erected somewhere in Asia. These sometimes lacked even roofs and means of heating when the mercury dropped to 45° below zero.

722 no efforts were made to bring them together or to conduct a
814 revival of the Ukrainian work that had been so ruthlessly and needlessly shattered. It was a wartime device adopted for a passing situation and the masters in the Kremlin well understood that the fury of the war had done more than they had ever dreamed possible for the disintegration of the various Soviet Republics. Once, therefore, the evacuation had taken place, the Soviet leaders had only to sit by and to reap the profits. There would be plenty of time for that later and so the war years seemed an intermission in the relentless pressure that had been exerted in the past.

648 It was for the Soviet leaders a far more vital problem to
661 recover the masses of the people who had fled to the west or had
[167] been carried away by the Germans and who might, even in case of a victory of the democratic powers, reveal the full force of the Soviet pressure. That was why they welcomed the Yalta Agreement which provided for the compulsory return to the USSR of all refugees and deported persons and why, once peace was restored, they showed such devilish ingenuity in trying to recover the control of every one who could testify from personal experience as to the nature of the Soviet rule.

It was with the greatest surprise and lack of comprehension that the Western leaders became aware of this situation. They had listened eagerly to the Soviet siren songs that it was only Nazi sympathizers and criminals and traitors who did not want to return under the Soviet rule and it required some months before supposedly serious statesmen recovered their equilibrium sufficiently to understand the way in which they had been duped in the middle of the war.

Yet, no sooner had Soviet rule been reestablished than the old processes were revived with even greater energy and vigor. The last masks of independence or of free thought in the cultural or economic fields were torn away and the old persecution and charges were pressed with every increasing zeal.

Western world, the Soviet Union conferred upon the Ukrainian 631
Soviet Republic the right to have its own anthem and its own 648
national flag.

These actions were not to be interpreted as a concession from Moscow, although they were presented in that guise. They were rather intended to strengthen the Soviet position in international affairs and by an appearance of generosity to facilitate the reduction of the satellite states to the same position as that held by the Union Republics. In this sense they were a response to the centralizing tendencies which were now to be expressed in a still stronger form.

As soon as hostilities ended and even before the Soviets were 665
assured of all their hopes, they began to purge again the Ukrainian 661
Communist Party and within a few months some 38% of the high officials were removed on the ground of bourgeois nationalism. All those who had not retreated to the east or could not show that they were working throughout the war as zealous Soviet partisans were summarily exiled as bourgeois nationalists. In the same way, when the enforced return of displaced persons began under the Yalta Agreement, very few were allowed to return to their homes. The vast majority were either executed for surrendering to the Germans or were sent to the labor camps in the far north and east for reeducation.

The Fourth Five Year Plan which was commenced in 1946 127
was very definitely devoted to the restoration of the country after the ravages of the war and to the increase of the Soviet capacity for defense. It was only in Ukraine and Byelorussia that the restoration had to absorb the energies of a considerable majority of the population, for while there were areas in the neighborhood of Leningrad and Stalingrad which had been badly devastated, the situation in the Ukraine was far worse. The cities and factories had been destroyed, the mines had been flooded and the population were living as best they might among the ruins which had been left by the two invading armies.

At the same time the work of restoration went very slowly. [316]
Less than one third of the miners of the Donbas had returned to

more opportunity to absorb the current thought of the west than 538
they had had in eastern Ukraine. Therefore, the pressure against 626
them has been applied even more strongly and still more Russians have been sent to remodel the life in Lviv than was necessary for Kiev. The process of russification was started later but it has been pushed more energetically. The net result is the same,—the impoverishment of Ukrainian culture as a whole and the substitution for it of a shabby form of Russian Muscovite Communist culture, which is to be tolerated only until there can be a full absorption.

Yet that process has not been so easy. Hardly a week passes 661
that some of the higher units in the Soviet service do not discover a new nest of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, and most frequently among the members and officers of the KP/b/U. It has been made evident that the Russian Communists cannot hope to achieve their goal until they have eliminated the entire Ukrainian population. They are trying to do it, but despite the millions of their victims and their attempts to separate the Ukrainian children from their parents and to rear them as slaves for Russian factories, they have not succeeded in winning the population to their views.

From the cultural point of view, the post-war period has been even more depressing than were the thirties. It has been drabber, like the lives of the people, but it has not served as yet to eliminate that spark of hope which alone preserved the Ukrainians during the hard periods of tsarism when they were subjects and slaves on their own territories, which were not their own to govern or to develop.

795 in the attempt to revive a native and independent Ukrainian
793 government. This was, of course, prevented by the Germans and the Archbishop remained at Lviv scarcely more free during the German occupation of Ukraine than he had been under the Soviets. He continued his efforts to unite both the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Churches without effect, but he was able to do considerable for the well-being of his people. Still he was no longer free to act openly, although his advice was sought whenever and wherever it could be.

The Soviets reoccupied Lviv on July 27, 1944 and at once set to work more vigorously to introduce their system. Archbishop Sheptytsky did not long survive for he passed away on November 1 of the same year. He was succeeded in his post by Joseph Slipy, who had been one of his outstanding assistants and the rector of the Theological Academy which Metropolitan Sheptytsky had founded in the late twenties, when it had became evident that the Poles would not allow the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviv.

659 Metropolitan Slipy had barely been installed in office, when
795 the Soviets showed their hand and began to call for a condemnation
793 of the Vatican by the Ukrainian Catholics and for their union
● 661 with Moscow. It did not take long for words to turn into actions.

On April 15, 1945, the NKVD surrounded the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv and arrested the Metropolitan, Bishop Budko and Bishop Charnetsky together with many other leaders. They arrested all of the students of the Theological Academy and they likewise seized the Cathedral and turned it over to the Patriarch of Moscow as a Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, they informed the professors of the Theological Seminary that the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite had ceased to exist.

At almost the same time the NKVD gathered in the other Catholic bishops in Western Ukraine, Bishop Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv and his vicar, Bishop Lyatyshevsky, while at the same time the Polish Communist regime seized Bishop Kotsylovsky of Pere-

myshl and his auxiliary bishop, Lakota. Bishops Khomyshyn and Kotsylovsky soon died under the treatment that they received. 659 795

The others were kept in prison and then in 1946, according to the best available information, Metropolitan Slipy and his associates were sent to labor camps in the far north in the Vorkuta coal mines. From that time they have disappeared from sight. 793 661

In 1947, the last Catholic bishop of this rite, Bishop Romzha of Carpatho-Ukraine, while travelling through his diocese "collided" accidentally with a Soviet tank and was killed and this ended the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in their own lands. The following year the Rumanian government followed suit and likewise annihilated the hierarchy of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite in Transylvania. In 1950 the Czech Communist regime arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment Bishop Hoydych and his coadjutor Hopka of the diocese of Prashev in Slovakia.

These actions were followed in each case by attacks upon the lower clergy, who were ordered to accept the supremacy of the Patriarch of Moscow. This was fully in the tradition of the old Russian Church, for each time that the tsars had bitten off a slice of Ukraine, they had applied the same methods to the Catholic hierarchy in the section, to the intent that the Byzantine rite could be performed only under the supervision of the Russian authorities.

In this case in 1945, on July 1, when the Soviet Ukrainian Commissar for Religion, Khodchenko, called on the clergy to recognize the new situation, the professors of the Theological Academy met in Lviv in the Cathedral of St. George and presented a request that they be given the liberties accorded to them on paper by the Stalinist Constitution. The answer was their arrest and imprisonment.

Then the government set to work. They secured the apostasy of one of the foremost of the Ukrainian Catholic priests, Father Kostelnyk, who willingly put himself at the service of the Patriarch and presided over a "sobor" which was called to ratify the switch from the Vatican to the Patriarch. Many of the priests who attended were apparently members of the NKVD in disguise. They willingly applauded Stalin and the Patriarch and armed with this authority,

659 the Soviet regime set to work to seize all the churches and property
795 of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite and preempt it for
793 their own use.

● 661 This marked the end of the open existence of the Church. There were still priests who escaped and took refuge with the U. P. A. (the Ukrainian underground) but open worship was at an end. There has been enforced at least a superficial agreement with the Kremlin on all matters of religion. Nevertheless, the latent hatred still exists and it can flare up at any moment when the situation warrants it.

The movements represented by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite still flourish in the emigration, where alone there is any opportunity for free thought. In the meanwhile, the Kremlin is maintaining its position in its traditional Muscovite manner and applying its savage punishments and deportations and executions to prove that Ukraine is happy and contented in following the example of the "elder brother." Yet even so, the number of episodes when Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism appears make it seem as if the officials of both church and state were not too sure that the Ukrainian people fully sympathize with the Patriarch Aleksey in his deification of the foremost man of the ages, who still forbids Communists to have anything to do with the Orthodox Church. That has sold its soul for as little real value as did the Ukrainian Communists in the early years of the struggle.

642 came from the Russian workers of the cities, or from outside the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government under Petliura was to a considerable extent discredited, because it had failed to devote sufficient attention to the needs of the peasantry and to [648] establish law and order. Moreover, by an eleventh-hour alliance with Poland, it had compromised its claim to represent the entire Ukrainian nation. This resulted from the fact that Galicia, which, upon the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy had formed its own West Ukrainian Republic, was surrendered to the Warsaw regime as a price for aid in the east, a solution in which most Galicians refused to acquiesce. Nevertheless, Poland and the Soviet Union made peace, and shortly afterwards the remnants of the Ukrainian army and bureaucracy retreated across the border for internment in Poland. From this sanctuary a group of a few hundred under Colonel George Tiutiunnyk sortied in October, 1921, for a last desperate raid into the Soviet-occupied Ukraine.[22]

86 After that the East Ukraine lay under Communist rule, which 665 could no longer be challenged by military force. For a time, however, it appeared as if the rising tide of nationalist sentiment—it rose even among those who had long been adherents of Marxist doctrines—might bring about what arms had failed to accomplish. To understand this situation it is necessary to recall that the Communists under Lenin had modified their original stand in order to appeal to the nationalism of the non-Russians. In January, 1918, soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Third Congress of Soviets asserted a theoretical right of all the nations of the tsarist empire to go their several ways, to secede from the Bolshevik government in Moscow. At the same time, it deprived this right of any content by insisting that it be exercised only by the "toiling masses." Although the Communist Party's stand was more ambiguously phrased, its insistence that the interests of the toilers were represented only by the Communist Party and that the non-Russian Communist Parties formed inseparable parts of the central Bolshevik organization, in fact rendered self-determination a fiction. During the following years, the central Party [661] leadership used armed force when possible to insure that these local Communist Parties, thus reduced to mere branches of a

[22] Mazepa, III, 96–105.

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186 [661] [665]

unified Party, should "rule" within each smaller nation which had formed part of the tsarist empire.

Having provided for the initial objective of substantial Communist control, however, the Bolshevik leaders made sweeping statements against "Great Russian chauvinism," and directed that the culture of each nation be "national in form, socialist in content." Encouraged by this apparent desire for development of the national culture at the expense of the Russian cultural supremacy, which had been grafted on their peoples in tsarist days, many of the Communist leaders of the non-Russian nations set about vigorously promoting an independent cultural life as soon as Communist control was established. In the Ukraine, the major leader in the effort during the early twenties was the commissar of education, Alexander Shums'kyi; after his deposition in 1927 he was succeeded by Nicholas Skrypnyk, an even more devoted Communist, but a firm adherent of Ukrainian cultural nationalism.[23] To what extent these men were sincere adherents of Ukrainian nationalism and to what extent the favor they extended to it was motivated by a desire to secure popular support and to curb the overweening power of Moscow in the interest of an internationalism which, to them, was in closer accord with original Communist ideology, it is hard to say. At any rate, they went to very considerable lengths to encourage specifically Ukrainian traits and traditions, especially in scholarship, literature, and the schools. While these Communist supporters of Ukrainian nationalism always formed only one segment of the ruling group in the Ukraine, and hence could not completely eradicate Russian permeation of

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[23]No thorough treatment of the Ukraine under Soviet rule exists. Among the best brief analyses in English are John S. Reshetar, "National Deviation in the Soviet Union," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XII (April, 1953), 162–74; Michael Pap, "Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine," *Review of Politics*, XIV (April, 1952), 204–32; and an older but generally accurate account by Lancelot Lawton, "Ukraina: Europe's Greatest Problem," *East Europe*, III (Spring, 1939), 28–45. The continuation of Hrushevs'kyi's *A History of the Ukraine* by Professor O. J. Frederiksen, based on notes by Luke Mishuha (Chapter XXV) is also useful, as are more general works on the Soviet system, such as Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), Chapter IV, and Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1950), I, 289–307. The sources are, of course, voluminous and highly scattered. I can claim no special mastery of them, although my limited acquaintance leads me to the conclusions cited in the text, which are approximately those of Reshetar and Pap.

186 Ukrainian cultural life, they nevertheless developed a generation of young people who were accustomed to think and write in the Ukrainian literary language, although many continued to regard the use of Russian as a sign of culture.

Perhaps the Communists of the Skyrypnyk group remained at heart more devoted to Communism than to nationalism. Such was certainly not the case with a very large group of intellectuals, some from the rising generation, others from the group which had supported the national governments of the revolutionary period but later accepted the Soviet regime. Foremost among the latter was Michael Hrushevs'kyi; although he had served for a time as president of the Rada, he decided to return to the Soviet Ukraine when it appeared to offer an outlet for nationalist activity. For him and his group, which consisted predominantly of scholars and men of letters, the real aim was to reverse the Communist prescription by building a culture "socialist in form, national in content." Thus Hrushevs'kyi, who had always accepted a certain amount of socialist doctrine as the basis for needed reforms in the Ukraine, occasionally made room for Marxist ideology in his historical writings but left it clear that the real apex of his values was the Ukrainian nation. Moreover, he and his group persistently maintained that historical and economic links bound the Ukraine more closely to Western Europe than to Russia.

From the Communist point of view, such ideas were dangerous enough in themselves; while Communism could tolerate for a time basically antipathetic forms, it could not allow its own forms to be used as a cover for developing an independent ideology. It 186 appears that Stalin, the most ruthless insister on conformity, 661 moved to crush the "national deviation" of the Ukrainians as soon as his power was sufficient; indeed, the first steps in this direction were taken as early as 1927. The great attack came in 1930, however, with the dismissal of Hrushevs'kyi from his academic post and the suppression of his scholarly organ *Ukraïna*. Along with this attack, which was carried out against all elements of intellectual life—including some obviously devout Marxists like the historian Iavors'kyi—which favored independent development of the Ukraine, went trials of suspect scholars who were

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accused of having belonged to a subversive League for the Liberation of the Ukraine.[24] That this campaign of suppression coincided with the drive for the collectivization of agriculture in the Ukraine is hardly coincidental. In many respects the Ukrainian peasant was much more profoundly affected by the establishment of the kolkhoz (Ukrainian *kolhosp*), or collective farm, than was the Russian. The former was frequently more prosperous, hence had more to lose; moreover, the lack of a traditional communal agricultural organization in the Ukraine made the new system more alien and repugnant.

It appears certain that the Ukrainian peasantry formed a disproportionate, if not predominant, part of the hapless millions deported as "kulaks" to Siberia or Kazakhstan or driven by famine to the primitive slums of the expanding Soviet cities. Very probably this situation created a potential basis for a national rebellion based on economic and social oppression by alien rulers, just as had the Polish and Russian preponderance in governmental and landowning groups before the war. The Communists were frequently forced to use non-Ukrainians, Russian and Jewish intellectuals, workers from the towns, where they had real support, or persons imported from Russia itself, in order to carry out collectivization. Consequently, it is probable that the suppression of the nationalist intelligentsia at this time was at least in part a precautionary step to destroy a group which was of limited danger in itself yet might have presented a real threat to the Communists if it could have utilized the discontent of the peasants to turn them to nationalism. To what extent the Soviet regime succeeded in eliminating the nationalist intellectuals is one of the principal topics which will be dealt with on the basis of the evidence provided in this study. It should be noted at this point,

[24] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166; T. Skubyts'kyi, "Klassovaia bor'ba v ukrainskoi istoricheskoi literature" (The Class Struggle in Ukrainian Historical Literature), *Istorik-Marksist*, No. 17 (1930), pp. 27–40 (one of the principal Communist assaults on the Hrushevs'kyi school and other "deviationists"). The whole question of the purge of intellectuals, with special reference to historians, is discussed at length by Boris Krupnyts'kyi in "Die Ukrainische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion 1921–1941," in *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1941, pp. 125–51. For Skrypnyk's official statement, see his *Statti i promovy* (Articles and Speeches) (Kharkov: Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo Ukraïny, 1930), Vol. I: *Spil'ka Vyzvolennia Ukraïny* (The League for the Liberation of the Ukraine), pp. 413–36.

[661] however, that their resistance was undoubtedly crushed between 517 1930 and the closing series of purge trials in 1937–38.[25]

While articulate nationalism was being crushed in the Soviet 186 Ukraine, a somewhat different development was taking place in [563] the West Ukraine. In Poland the extreme policy of the ruling nationality, which had been chauvinistic enough under the Austrian empire, became still more violent toward the Ukrainians after the reestablishment of the Polish national state. As was previously noted,[1] Petliura's agreement with the Poles had been deeply resented by the Galician Ukrainians. While most nationalists endeavored to smooth over criticism of Petliura personally, especially after his assassination in Paris in 1925, most West Ukrainians gave no support to the émigré UNR government. The West Ukrainians, on the contrary, tried their own approaches to the problem of carrying on Ukrainian life under conditions of oppression by non-totalitarian, but intolerant, alien nationalist governments.

186 One attempted solution was the formation of legally recognized 665 parties which carried on electoral campaigns and sent representatives to the Polish Sejm or parliament where they attempted to protect the interests of their group within the framework of means permitted by the ruling nationality. This type of political activity, together with a wide variety of cultural work aimed at developing Ukrainian culture and maintaining the national distinctiveness of the masses, absorbed the efforts of a very large proportion of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia during the twenties and thirties. In particular, most of the older generation which had been reared under the relatively peaceful and stable conditions of Austrian rule, circles closely associated with the Greek Catholic Church, and most of the liberal professions engaged in this activity. Although there were a number of minor parties, some of which had authoritarian leanings, the majority of this segment of Ukrainian political workers was grouped in the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychne Ob"iednannia—UNDO), which was definitely democratic in character, with varying amounts of Catholic, liberal, and socialist ideology embodied in its program. Its efforts met

[25] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166.

1 [see category 116, p 14 - - Analyst]

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cautious aide, Dr. Baran, however, in his capacity as a director of the largest Ukrainian newspaper, *Dilo,* went with the editor of *Novyi Chas,* Zenon Pelens'kyi, to confer with A. T. Chekaniuk, head of the newly installed press affairs office, concerning continuation of Ukrainian journalistic activities.[55] Then the true nature of the Soviet conquest began to reveal itself. Chekaniuk was already installed in the editorial offices of *Dilo* and evidently perfectly acquainted with the views and backgrounds of his petitioners. He showed them a staff of twenty newly arrived Soviet journalists who were already preparing the publication of *Dilo*'s successor, the Communist *Vil'na Ukraïna.* Then he made it perfectly clear to his "guests" that while some use might be found for their talents if they were properly directed, the direction itself was already, and would remain, completely in the hands of the Communists.[56]

Within a week, several leading figures in the Ukrainian community, including Constantine Levits'kyi and the secretary of the representative committee, John Nymchuk, had been arrested. For the time being, however, the actual members of the delegation to Soviet headquarters were spared, and several managed to escape to German-occupied territory.[57] The leaders of the UNDO were also arrested; Dr. Dmytro Levits'kyi, the head of the party and of the Ukrainian delegation in the Polish parliament, was arrested on September 28 and so were his most important colleagues about the same time. The arrested leaders were sent to Moscow—it is said to the infamous Lubianka prison—and with rare exceptions have not been heard of since.[58] The Communists, after getting rid of the principal nationalist politicians, quickly proceeded with their own political organization of Galicia and Volhynia. Even the official Soviet version indicates that a minimum

[55] Chekaniuk, a specialist in political journalism, was editor of the major Kiev newspaper *Komunist,* and in 1940 became a candidate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

[56] The preceding paragraphs are based largely on Stepan Baran's article, "Zustrich z bol'shevykamy" (Encounter with the Bolsheviks), *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 12, 1942, p. 2, and April 14, 1942, p. 2, confirmed in all essential aspects by Interviews 41, 78.

[57] Baran, "Zustrich," *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 12, 1942, p. 2.

[58] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* March 22, 1942, p. 4. In one town at least, participants in the revolutionary struggle for Ukrainian independence also seem to have been singled out for arrest or execution (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 3, 1941, p. 3).

time was allotted to the process of registering "popular approval" for incorporation of the occupied lands in the Soviet Union. A "Ukrainian National Congress," "elected" immediately after the Soviet invasion, met on October 26; on November 1 the head of its plenary committee, M. I. Panchyshyn, sent a request for admission to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic; on November 15, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet) of the latter division of the Soviet state approved the request; thus East and West Ukraine were "united." [59]

In spite of the complete replacement of independent press and political organizations by Communist agencies, however, a strong effort was made in the early months to attract support for the new regime. Perhaps one reason for this attempt was the desire to influence Ukrainians still outside the enlarged Soviet Ukrainian Republic, especially in the Generalgouvernement. In a protocol to the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, which had defined the frontier between the parts of Poland annexed by the two totalitarian powers, it was provided that the government of the USSR should place no obstacles in the way of migration of ethnic Germans from eastern Poland to Germany. This secured for the Nazis the right to "bring home" the tens of thousands of German-speaking Volhynians. In return, Germany acknowledged an equal right of Belorussians and Ukrainians to migrate to the Soviet Union.[60] In accordance with a further provision of the protocol, a Soviet "repatriation" commission was allowed to travel through the Lemko region in early 1940;[61] by the end of June, it had induced only thirty-five hundred Ukrainians to cross the border into the Soviet Union, however.[62]

[59] S. M. Belousov and O. P. Ohloblyn, *Zakhidna Ukraïna* (The West Ukraine) (Kiev: Akademiia Nauk URSR, Instytut Istoriï Ukraïny, 1940), pp. 108 ff.

[60] Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*, eds. Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington: Department of State, 1948), pp. 104–5.

[61] *Krakauer Zeitung*, February 18–19, 1940, p. 6, reports the departure of one thousand Ukrainians from this area after a visit of the Soviet commissioners.

[62] According to *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, pp. 2–3. In an article which was remarkably hostile to the Soviet regime, in view of the latter's publicly cordial relations with Germany at that time, the Nationalist paper stated that the "intensive propaganda" of the Soviet commission, aided by "the pro-Russian intelligentsia" but combatted by "healthy Ukrainian elements," had resulted in the meager migration

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The campaign to win friends in Galicia and Volhynia was in part negative; measures which were most likely to inflame anti-Soviet sentiments were avoided. The church was not entirely suppressed, though it was sharply criticized.[63] Its real property was confiscated and the religious orders disbanded.[64] The Soviet authorities weakened the influence of the church on the youth by liquidating the Catholic school system and forcibly inducting the children into Communist organizations.[65] However, the person of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was respected.[66] The part of the intelligentsia which was not prominent in politics was allowed to remain at large, although persons in callings such as the law sometimes found it necessary to turn to nonprofessional work.[67] On the more positive side, the Ukrainian language was given a far greater scope than it had enjoyed under Polish rule. In particular, the University of L'vov was formally Ukrainized in language and personnel, although it is said that the resistance of remaining Polish professors to lecturing in Ukrainian was not harshly dealt with.[68] Students from the East Ukrainian universities were brought on tours to the West Ukraine, and L'vov students made Communist-sponsored trips to Kiev.[69] Other ele-

cited. Either this is one of the not too infrequent examples of ability of the Prague publication to print items contrary to German policy, or someone in authority gave the signal for an anti-Soviet attitude even at that early date. In the latter case it may have been a subtle riposte in the hidden conflict over Soviet demands for Bukovina. On the other hand, as early as March the *Krakauer Zeitung* printed a report by a German who had visited the villages of the Lemko area. He praised the young Ukrainians, noting that they wore the national blue and yellow colors and greeted him with "Heil Hitler!" and "Slava Ukraïna!" (Glory to the Ukraine) (*Krakauer Zeitung*, March 7, 1940, p. 5).

[63] See F. Iastrebov, "Uniats'ke dukhovenstvo na sluzhbi u polskoho panstva" (The Uniate Clergy in the Service of the Polish Aristocracy), *Komunist*, October 9, 1939, p. 2.

[64] "Die Tragödie der ukrainisch-katholischen Kirche," *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, January, 1952, p. 14.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 18, 1942, p. 4; Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), p. 112.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] Interview 36.

[68] For the official Soviet version see M. Marchenko (the new rector of the University of L'vov), "L'vivs'kyi Universytet na novykh shliakhakh" (L'vov University on New Paths), *Komunist*, December 16, 1939, p. 2.

[69] Interview 51; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, on a trip of about forty students of the L'vov veterinary school to Kiev in the spring of 1940.

poverty of the East Ukraine and the predominance in many 186
nominally Ukrainian places of the Russian language and cul- 626
ture.[75] East Ukrainian students coming to L'vov, on the other hand, had their first opportunity to become infected with the "virus" of "bourgeois nationalism." [76] Aside from producing these 668*
undesired ideological results, the earlier policy failed to prevent underground work by the Nationalist youth of Galicia.

Most of the members of the OUN were not able, of course, to [486]
leave the Soviet-occupied area. It is impossible to secure reliable evidence concerning the exact extent to which those who re- 668*
mained could carry on their activities, but it is certain that they 661
carefully refrained from open opposition. Nevertheless, late in 1940 the NKVD succeeded in tracking down a large number of Nationalists; they were sentenced to death or prison after a proceeding in L'vov known in the OUN accounts as the "trial of the fifty-nine." Among those sentenced to death was Krymins'kyi, the chief of the OUN movement in Soviet-occupied territories.[77] In all likelihood, he and his companions had sided with Bandera in the dispute with Mel'nyk. Certainly, the remaining members who, in spite of severe losses, were able to continue as an organized underground, were firm adherents of the new leader. The new underground director, John Klymiv, was in fact one of the most fanatical supporters which this fanatical movement of the younger generation could boast.[78] While there were undoubtedly many supporters of Colonel Mel'nyk in Galicia, it is doubtful whether they were active—or rash—enough to form what could be called an underground, although apparently agents kept up sporadic contacts with headquarters in the Generalgouvernement.

The situation in Volhynia was less favorable to Nationalist 668*
activity than that in Galicia, since the OUN had never enrolled such a high proportion of the youth there. Throughout most if not all of the area, Mel'nyk and Bandera apparently had no

[75] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, p. 3.
[76] Interview 51.
[77] See, for example, Mykhailiuk, p. 4. Cf. *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, August 17, 1941, p. 4, reprinting an article from *Ukrains'ki Shchodenni Visti* (L'vov).
[78] Interview 43.

[Non-interference with Ukrainian national aspirations --Analyst]

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German colony. Molotov countered that it was the last "missing piece" of the Ukraine, though he agreed to limit his demands to the northern, predominantly Ukrainian part and offered to permit the repatriation of the ethnic German minority.[80] 648

Germany was not ready for a break with the USSR; consequently Rumania was forced to give way. On June 28, her forces evacuated Chernovtsy (Chernivtsi),[81] the Bukovinian capital, and the Red Army took over. The sequence of events was similar to that which had occurred nine months previously in L'vov, but the tempo was quicker. The leading newspaper, *Chas,* was Sovietized and a new Communist organ, *Nova Rada,* founded, though a number of Ukrainian books forbidden under Rumanian rule were authorized.[82] The Ukrainian People's House and other national cultural societies were closed. At the same time, the Soviet press assailed the repressive measures which the Rumanians had taken against Ukrainian cultural life. Soviet writers were indignant at the difficulties experienced by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Chernovtsy, although they denounced the Petliurist elements among them.[83] Numerous leading Ukrainians were not allowed to enjoy their new "intellectual freedom," but were arrested or shot as nationalist "counterrevolutionaries." It is said, however, that the German consul and the commission for evacuating the ethnic Germans succeeded in taking out numerous Ukrainian political leaders and priests of the Orthodox Church.[84] In any case, many thousands of refugees, mostly young people, found their way to Germany, where a large proportion provided an invigorating element for the segment of the OUN which had remained under Mel'nyk.[85] 661 [204]

The subjection of the West Ukraine to Soviet rule brought death or imprisonment to a considerable number of prominent Ukrainians; the entire population was oppressed by a heavy

[80] Ambassador von der Schulenburg in Moscow to Auswärtiges Amt, June 26, 1940, *Nazi-Soviet Relations,* p. 159.

[81] Rumanian Cernăuţi; German Chernowitz.

[82] *Nastup,* August 3, 1940, p. 3.

[83] "Besarabiia i pivnichna chastyna Bukovyny" (Bessarabia and the Northern Part of Bukovina), *Komunist,* June 30, 1940, p. 2; S. Zhurakovych and Ie. Patner, "Misto pod Prutom" (City on the Pruth), *Komunist,* July 5, 1940, p. 3.

[84] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* September 7, 1941, p. 3.

[85] See Chapter IV.

• 661 weight of fear and by severe limitations on its freedom. These factors were to be of great importance, for they created a state of mind in which the Ukrainians of the area would at least initially welcome any force which opposed the Soviet Union, without close examination of its nature. Soviet occupation covered a relatively short period of time, however, and the policies prescribed by Moscow were tempered in the first months by a desire to avoid 668 alienating the inhabitants. Consequently, the severity of the Communist rule was not sufficient to destroy the material or psychological base for future revival of nationalist strength. In this respect, the severe factional strife which had arisen during the same period in the areas subject to German control was more important, for it meant that at a decisive moment in their history the Ukrainian nationalists could not speak with a single voice.

German arrival.[10] In the less sheltered districts, however, Soviet repression was horrible. According to German secret reports, four thousand Ukrainian political prisoners were butchered in the NKVD cellars of L'vov alone, and several times as many were deported eastward. Many of the latter were killed later when their captors could no longer hurry them on ahead of the German advance.[11] Meanwhile tens of thousands of Soviet officials and their dependents, along with a considerable portion of the large Jewish population of Galicia, streamed eastward to escape a similar fate at the hands of the German totalitarians. 668* [661]

On June 30, in the midst of the disorganization caused by these events, the advance units of the Wehrmacht reached L'vov. With them came the first groups of Bandera's followers. Some of these came legally in "Nachtigall"; others, including Iaroslav Stets'ko, came illegally, though with the incidental assistance of some German front-line units.[12] Having arrived in the Galician capital, the OUN-B was in a favorable position. The months of isolation from the world outside the Soviet Union had prevented most of the citizens of L'vov from hearing of the internal conflict of the OUN. Moreover, the horror of the last days of Soviet occupation made the Germans seem like providential deliverers; the close contact enjoyed by the Bandera leaders with uniformed Wehrmacht soldiers greatly enhanced their prestige in their compatriots' eyes. [554]

Just what assurances the Bandera adherents gave of their backing by the Germans, just how far they themselves believed they could rely on German support, is impossible to determine. Whatever inducements they used, immediately after their arrival the OUN-B group named Dr. George Polans'kyi, a prominent citizen, mayor, and succeeded in having a national representation "elected"; this they called together the same evening. They had hoped to secure the L'vov state theater, a hall of appropriate size and dignity for the gathering, but, finding it requisitioned by the German army, they were forced to resort to the small meeting 668* 642

[10] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 6, 1941, p. 3.

[11] Report of the SP and the SD *Einsatzgruppen*, July 31, 1941, p. 13, NO 2151 (hereafter referred to as NO 2151).

[12] Interview 24.

when they came to the city administrative building on July 9 and placed them under "honorary arrest." [21] 668*

About the same time,1 Bandera (who had never been allowed to leave the Generalgouvernement), Gavrusevych, Bandera's representative in Berlin, Volodymyr Stakhiv, and Stets'ko's assistants, Stariukh and Ilnits'kyi, were arrested.[22] All were assembled in Berlin and questioned thoroughly by both police and Wehrmacht officers. The Germans, however, were obviously proceeding with caution. They realized that at that moment considerable trouble could be caused the advancing German armies by disturbances in Galicia, which would probably be the result of drastic action against the OUN leaders.[23] At the same time, they warned the group of the possible serious consequences of their actions, and urged the leaders to withdraw the *akt* and accept a status in eastern Galicia similar to that of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow. Bandera and his followers refused; however, they were not imprisoned. On the contrary, while nominally under house arrest, they were allowed to carry on their political activities in Berlin; Stets'ko was even able to go to Cracow, where he consulted with Lebed', whom he had secretly delegated to take command of all activities in the Ukrainian lands.[24] 668* 661

Meanwhile, the tide started by the proclamation was still running in Bandera's favor in Galicia. Several non-OUN administrators who had accompanied Stets'ko and Rebet at the time of their arrest were sick with humiliation to see Ukrainians, who had created the impression that they were responsible leaders acting in agreement with the Germans, thus treated as naughty boys who had stepped out of bounds.[25] The majority of the population, on the other hand, was not aware of the real nature of the departure of the Bandera party's leaders. In town after 668*

[21] Interviews 24, 36, 44, 67.

[22] Mirchuk, pp. 38–39.

[23] As the chief of Vineta, the Propaganda Ministry's bureau for dealing with eastern affairs, later wrote: "Bandera and his closest supporters were arrested, but by clever treatment an insurrection was avoided." Taubert to Rosenberg, February 17, 1944, Occ E-4 (1), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [1]).

[24] Mirchuk, p. 39; Interviews 24, 75.

[25] Interview 36.

1 [July 1941 -- Analyst]

issue of *Nastup* he laid full responsibility for the crime on the "divergentists," but merely ordered all Ukrainians to refrain from contact with them and expressed the hope that the tragedy would purge Ukrainian life of crime and anarchy.[72] 668* 518

Whatever responsibility they may have borne for the assassinations,[1] the Bandera followers were quickly visited with retribution. The Germans arrested all OUN-B members in Zhitomir itself, and a number were executed. During the early part of September, SS *Einsatzgruppen* arrested and executed most of the members of three of the subgroups of the southern task force, at Balta, Nikolaev, and the Crimean city of Dzhankoi.[73] In Nikolaev at least, the OUN-M adherents denounced their pro-Bandera rivals to the Germans.[74] The expedition to the southern peninsula had been a favorite project of the OUN-B, and its complete annihilation was a severe blow to their hopes. Moreover, although some members were able to go underground, OUN-B activity in Kirovograd and Krivoi Rog (Krivyi Rih) and other places in the south-central Ukraine was seriously crippled. Still more disheartening, the sections of the northern task forces which had been heading for Kiev to "proclaim" the Ukrainian state there, as had been done in L'vov, were broken up by the Germans in Vasil'kov (Vasyl'kiv) and Fastov (Fastiv).[75] Some of the members fled to Polessia, where they hid in the forests; a few apparently slipped by secretly into the capital. Significantly for the direction of future operations, the chief remaining center of the OUN-B was in Dniepropetrovsk. 668* 661

That indignation over the murders prompted this far-reaching repression of the Bandera party is improbable in view of the contempt in which the SS at least held all Ukrainians. Neverthe-

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[73] Matla, p. 22. That the arrests were not all part of a concerted plan is indicated by the fact that part were carried out by the Rumanians in their area of occupation. The latter warned the Ukrainians to get out of this area but told them they did not care what they did on the other side of the line of demarcation (cf. Chubai, p. 56). The executions in Zhitomir evidently took place immediately after the assassinations (Ie. Stakhiv, p. 39). On the destruction of the Crimean groups see also Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the *Einsatzgruppen* of the SP and the SD in the USSR, December, 1941, NO 2659 (hereafter referred to as NO 2659).

[74] The accusation to this effect in Matla, p. 22, is confirmed by NO 3187.

[75] PS 053.

[1] [Killing of Senyk & Stsibors'kyi, August 30, 1941 -- Analyst]

668* less, SS and security police reports for this period explicitly state
661 that complete suppression was not undertaken until after "the murders of numerous Mel'nyk supporters" by the OUN-B.[76] Apparently the feeling that drastic action would have to be taken against the Bandera party had been building up in SS circles for some weeks. Indignation over Stets'ko's coup, openly placarded appeals of Klymiv for the secret gathering of arms to be used by a future Ukrainian army, and the stubborn persistence of the task forces in heading east undoubtedly played a role. In addition, the SS had gathered a variety of rumors concerning the group, including the plausible one that they were planning a revolt against the Germans and the implausible story that they were inspired by Communist agents. The basic reason for the occurrence of the repression at this time appears to be the desire of SS *Einsatzgruppen* to make a thorough sweep of the East Ukraine in order to bring it completely under German control and to prepare the western part for the introduction of civil administration.[77] The indignation aroused among Mel'nyk supporters by the assassinations and sympathy shown them by many other nationalist Ukrainians were in all probability merely utilized as support for the ruthless destruction of the other Nationalist party.

668* While the two powerful Nationalist parties were engaged in feverish activity in the newly opened Ukraine, the UNR was forced to play a secondary role. As was noted in the preceding chapter, the Livyts'kyi group had established contact with an underground group in the eastern part of former Polish Volhynia. This group, which was formed in loose association with the UNR before the outbreak of war as the Ukraïns'ka Natsional'na Vidrodzhennia (Ukrainian National Rebirth), went underground when the Soviet forces arrived. In 1940 one of its members, Taras Borovets', an operator of a stone quarry in the Kostopol' (Kostopil') area, consulted with Andrew Livyts'kyi, whom he regarded as chief of the Ukrainian state. Following a conference with the

[76] PS 3876.

[77] An analysis by the office of the Reichsaussenminister of the contents of the Activity and Situation Reports Nos. 1–5 of the *Einsatzgruppen* of the SP and the SD in the USSR, July 31–September 31, 1941, NO 2650 (hereafter referred to as NO 2650).

727 While Ukrainian territory was being partitioned, a still more serious danger for the nationalist cause was shaping up. An exception to the authority of the Ostministerium in the occupied areas was the police power, which was lodged in Heinrich Himmler's hands. From the beginning of the campaign the Reichsführer SS had been charged with "establishing order" in the conquered areas in the east. The instruments employed for this task were *Einsatzgruppen,* task forces consisting of specially selected, ruthless police officials, headed by SS officers from Himmler's inner circle. During the stabilization period, these commanders were given powers within the broad range of "pacifying activities" in the rear areas, superseding those of all military commanders. These activities included especially the extermination of the Jewish population and the liquidation of all Communist organizations; "kommissars" and NKVD officials were to be shot outright.

661 668* The causes for conflict between the *Einsatzgruppen* and the Ukrainian nationalists have been suggested in the preceding chapter. At first the Mel'nyk group was spared because it was thought to be politically impotent.[20] During the summer the SP claimed that "the splinter group under Colonel Andrew Mel'nyk, predominantly émigrés, no longer has any political significance," and regarded the OUN-M as a useful counterweight to Bandera's organization. By early November, 1941, however, SP reports were warning that Mel'nyk's group could become dangerous if it was left entirely unwatched because of the struggle against the Bandera party.[21] As soon as the OUN-M revealed ability to build an organization in the East Ukraine, it too was crushed.

668* 661 186 The first major incident of repression against the Mel'nyk forces occurred on November 21, an important anniversary for Ukrainian nationalists. On that date, in 1921, Tiutiunnyk's band,

the Generalgouvernement, as not corresponding to "the principle of nationality" (*Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* August 31, 1941, p. 3). Within the next week, several branches of the UNO in Germany sent petitions directly to Hitler, protesting the transfers of Ukrainian territory; for petitions from the groups in Pilsen, Berlin and Luxemburg, see Occ E-4 (8), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [8]).

[20] NO 2650.

[21] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report of Events in the USSR, No. 133, November 14, 1941, p. 31, NO 2825 (hereafter referred to as NO 2825).

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one of the last important nationalist forces to penetrate the Soviet Ukraine, had made a "last stand" near the little town of Bazar on the edge of the wooded region north of the Kiev-Zhitomir line. The OUN-M now decided to make this anniversary the occasion for a great patriotic demonstration, which a participant has since described in considerable detail.[22] A large group of organizers was sent in from Zhitomir; on the appointed day many thousands streamed to Bazar for commemorative ceremonies. This demonstration of the strength of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment greatly alarmed the Germans, especially since the affair had been the work of an organized group which had secured the complete cooperation of the local Ukrainian authorities. The chief of the Bazar *raion* addressed the crowd, the police under the command of an old Ukrainian officer stood guard, and the police band provided music. All of these features must have indicated to the suspicious German police authorities that the Ukrainians had deliberately flaunted their independence. The reprisals were quick, and crushing. An inquiry was instituted at Bazar, which led to the arrest of several of the organizers; the trail led back to Zhitomir, where about two dozen OUN members, including one of the leaders of Ekzekutyva, were shot. The younger Iatseniuk and Anthony Baranivs'kyi, the remaining OUN leaders there, escaped only by fleeing to the woods. OUN-M influence in Zhitomir was sharply reduced, although few, apparently, of the administrative officials who had sympathized with it were molested.[23]

In the absence of direct evidence, it would be unsafe to conclude that the Bazar demonstration was the cause of the further attacks which were now carried out against the Mel'nyk group. At about the same time, however, drastic repressions of the Nationalists occurred in numerous cities, resulting in the destruction of the small Bukovinian expedition in Nikolaev and of groups in Kamenets-Podolsk (Kam'ianets'-Podil's'k), Chernigov (Chernihiv), and Poltava.[24] The chief repressive campaign was

[22] P. Dub, "V rokovyny demonstratsiĭ v Bazari (spomyn)" (On the Anniversary of the Demonstration in Bazar [In Memoriam]), *Za Samostiinist'* (November, 1946), pp. 8–11; see also *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, pp. 69–72.

[23] Alexander Iatseniuk, for example, remained chief of the *oblast* administration.

[24] *OUN u Viini*, p. 72.

661 reserved for the capital. A number of OUN-M activities there,
668* without being considered important enough to require drastic action, had contributed to a feeling of irritation on the part of the
[204] Himmler henchmen. A famous poetess, Olena Teliha, had created an unauthorized Nationalist literary periodical, *Litvary*. A youth group Sich was considered potentially dangerous. A Ukrainian National Council (Rada) had been formed by the Mel'nyk group to act as a symbol of unity in the East Ukraine and, they hoped, eventually to become the central organ of nationalist activities. The risks involved in such activity, in view of the attitude of the real rulers of Germany, were fully understood by the Wehrmacht officers, one of whom advised the Ukrainians to transform the Council into a more innocuous Aid Committee. When this advice was refused, the Council was formally dissolved (November 17), and went underground.[25] The SP authorities were aware of the organ's continued existence, and while they regarded it as too insignificant for immediate suppression, it increased their distrust of the Nationalists.[26] With this background, one can understand why the first blow fell upon the legal, but extremely Nationalist, *Ukraïns'ke Slovo*. Its large circulation—over fifty thousand [27]—gave it, in the eyes of the police, the potentiality of dangerous influence. Moreover, the editorial staff of this organ, as was previously noted, was composed very largely of West Ukrainians and old émigrés; these elements were regarded as especially dangerous by the SS leadership.

668* Unfortunately for the Nationalist cause, during their two months' activity in Kiev the newcomers had also lost ground in
578 local opinion. Some of the antipathy which they aroused stemmed from the fact that they were outsiders; even those who had been born in the East Ukraine or, like Kandyba, whose father had been born there, had long been out of touch with the local population. With some justification, because they were better organized, had clearer concepts of what they wanted, and were used to displaying initiative, the OUN group took a leading, oc-

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[26] PS 3876.
[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 15, 1942, p. 5.

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the Germans, and hence able to issue ration cards and provide a small income, was indispensable for most intellectuals.[30]

In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that the German enemies of the Nationalist movement felt that the time was ripe to destroy its prestige by an attack on its principal organ. On December 12, 1941, the SP force seized *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and arrested all the leading editorial workers, including Rohach, Chemeryns'kyi and Oliïnyk.[31] Kandyba, too, was arrested, but by native police in a city *raion* (ward) controlled by the OUN-M; this circumstance allowed him to escape.[32]

Two days later the newspaper reappeared, as *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* but with a quite different editorial policy. The new editor was Constantine Shtepa, acting rector of the University of Kiev. Of Ukrainian origin, he had been an officer in the tsarist army and, although strongly anti-Soviet, remained a pronounced Russian patriot, desiring the acceptance of the Russian culture and language throughout the Ukraine and the maintenance of governmental ties with Moscow. Consequently, he was a bitter enemy of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.[33] The first issue of his paper contained an article, inspired by the Germans, but acceptable to Shtepa, in which the Nationalists were vigorously attacked for turning what "should have been an informational journal into an organ of their group." The Nationalists, it explained, had refused to heed German warnings that the paper must serve the whole community; consequently Shtepa had taken charge to "popularize" it. What this meant, was clarified by an article on the second page which demanded "work instead of politics."[34]

Under Shtepa's administration, *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* became extremely subservient to the Germans. In part this was due to the extreme severity and alertness of the German censorship; the edi-

[30] Interview 59. Liubchenko himself (Liubchenko, pp. 60 ff.), when the shoe was on the other foot and he was compelled to seek work in Kiev, found this to be the case.

[31] *OUN u Viini,* p. 73.

[32] L. Dniprova in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.

[33] Record of interrogation of an editor in Kiev, early 1943, who was a specialist in ancient history, the author of *Die Völkerwanderung* and *Das römische Recht* (CXLVa 78, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine) (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 78). The only person fitting this description is Constantine Shtepa.

[34] These articles are reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* January 5, 1942, p. 2.

727 there was no unified framework of native administration, with the
631 exception of the towns where there was a Ukrainian chief of administration, regardless of the size of the place involved. In the larger cities, which were not included in *Kreisgebiete,* the Ukrainian "mayors," however, were closely subjected to German *Stadtkommissare.*

727 Just as important as his administrative structure, was Koch's
668 personal attitude toward the Ukrainians he was to govern. To
661 him, they were simply an inferior race, a colonial people to be exploited for Germany's interests. "They are too inferior to be compared with Germans,"[45] and "the least German worker is worth a thousand times more than the population there"[46] are typical expressions of his attitude. Consequently, this former petty railway official felt highly offended when the Ukrainian intelligentsia endeavored to organize a national life of its own. The whole tone of his administration implied that the Ukrainians were a sort of child-people, which could not achieve any degree of culture worthy of consideration; those who endeavored to do so were simply half-educated émigré agitators who must be dealt with severely, so that the simple but useful "peasants" (i.e., all non-agitators) would not be disturbed in their task of producing for the Germans.

One of the first results of Koch's determination to crush all centers of autonomous life was the destruction of the Nationalist forces remaining "above ground" in Kiev. After the suppression of the West Ukrainian force, there was still a large group of East Ukrainian supporters of the Mel'nyk organization who openly

Wehrmacht to recruit ethnic Germans (PS 197; Extracts from the Situation Report of the commander of Heeresgebiet B, Abteilung VII, October 10, 1942, PS 051; hereafter referred to as PS 051), although the latter turned out frequently to be Communist spies deliberately left behind by the Soviet regime (Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte, December 15, 1941, PS 1682; (hereafter referred to as PS 1682). Even when the *Volksdeutsche* were anti-Communist, they were frequently disliked by the Ukrainian Nationalists as Russophiles.

[45] Koch to Rosenberg, March 16, 1943, PS 192 (hereafter referred to as PS 192).

[46] Report of Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe B to Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Generalquartiermeister, Abteilung Kriegsverwaltung, April 1, 1943, PS 1130 (hereafter referred to as PS 1130), is based on an oral report of Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Classen who was present at the Nazi Party meeting in Kiev (March 5, 1943) in which Koch made the remark.

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carried on a limited activity. Its chief, Bahazii, was just as nationalist as the arrested West Ukrainians. A characteristic instance of his enthusiastic lack of caution occurred about the time that he became mayor. A group of foreign journalists, including several Germans, visited Kiev. In their presence, he expressed his loyalty to the OUN, praising Konovalets' and Mel'nyk as totalitarians, and saying, "The eyes of all Ukrainians are turned toward Mel'nyk." A German officer who was present begged the journalists not to report this remark, knowing it would inflame the Nazi chieftains.[47]

Although Erich Koch and his assistants were in many respects ridiculously ignorant of the true nature of Ukrainian life in Kiev, in view of Bahazii's frankness it was inevitable that they should come to see that he was working for Ukrainian ends, rather than docilely following German orders. Very probably the anti-Nationalist forces on the staff of *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* played a part in stirring up antagonism to the city administration. For example, the paper printed an article by an employee of a municipal office criticizing the émigrés who had returned to Kiev. He complained that thirteen out of forty employees in his section were émigrés who were paid higher salaries than the local officials, although the former were no better qualified and had smaller families.[48] In view of Koch's and his minions' bitter hostility toward émigrés, such remarks must have encouraged them to feel that the Germans would lose no popularity by extinguishing the remaining outside influence in Kiev life.

They were, however, scarcely the real motives behind Bahazii's arrest in early February, 1942. Apparently the German official responsible for the Ukrainian leader's downfall was Generalkommissar Magunia, one of Koch's closest collaborators among the officials of the Reichskommissariat. He worked, of course, in close coordination with the *Sicherheitspolizei;* the charges against Ba-

[47] Whether they ever actually saw the report is questionable since it was apparently printed only in an Italian paper and by the Ukrainian press (*Nastup*, December 6, 1941, p. 1, quoting *La Stampa* [Milan], November 1, 1941).

[48] *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*, January 3, 1942 (reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diiesnist'*, February 1, 1942, p. 2). A major charge against Bahazii was that he maintained too large a staff in the city administration and paid them too much (PS 192).

661 hazii in the police report revolve entirely around his nationalist activities.[49] For example, the head of the section on Religious Confessions is alleged to have threatened the Russophile bishop of Kiev, Panteleimon. Another charge concerned Bahazii's "misappropriation of German property," but the specific act seems to have been his sale of petroleum products (probably of Soviet origin, confiscated by the Germans) to aid the nationalist cause. He was charged, correctly, with being a leader of the underground OUN-M, and a number of organizations controlled by the Nationalists were declared, also with apparent accuracy, to be working under his direction. Probably the charge which carried the greatest weight in the minds of the German officials, however, was that he had endeavored to secure control of the Ukrainian police. As has been previously indicated, the OUN-M did indeed control most of the Ukrainian police in Kiev, but Bahazii was scarcely responsible personally for this. Altogether, the motives behind the overthrow of Bahazii were those which prevailed everywhere in the destruction of Nationalist groups in the Reichskommissariat. The action suited Erich Koch's policy completely; he defended it vigorously against Rosenberg's criticism, displaying his own arrogant stupidity by adding a few incredible charges of his own to the grounds presented in the SP report.[50]

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The repression of Nationalist forces in Kiev extended far beyond the person of Bahazii. The arrests were concentrated in two groups: the surviving literary leaders of the OUN-M League of Ukrainian Writers, headed by Olena Teliha and a young Carpatho-Ukrainian writer, John Irliavs'kyi; and the Sich, headed by a young East Ukrainian journalist, John Koshyk, also an OUN-M member.[51] Altogether, the executions (which followed quickly after the arrests in most cases) accounted for about forty persons,[52] a large number of whom were medical students organized in the

[49] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 191, April 10, 1942, NO 3256 (hereafter referred to as NO 3256).

[50] PS 192.

[51] *OUN u Viini*, p. 74; T. Iak, *Hryb* (The Mushroom), p. 43, a clandestine OUN-M brochure, probably published at the end of German occupation in the East Ukraine.

[52] Iak, p. 43.

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Sich.[53] In addition, several of the principal agencies of national 661
life in Kiev were forced to cease operation, including the Ukrain- 727
ian National Council. Even Prosvita was suspect and was closed 668*
for a while.[54]

These arrests did not completely stamp out the efforts to develop nationalism in Kiev. The underground OUN-M (as well as remnants of an OUN-B conspiratorial group) did what they could to stimulate nationalist feeling. Likewise, the city administration was by no means so drastically altered as had been the editorial staff of the newspaper. The Germans were probably not anxious to destroy all outlets for Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. Rosenberg, in spite of his minor influence, exercised some restraint in this respect, and Koch himself denied being anti-Ukrainian.[55] Undoubtedly his contempt for all Slavs led him to place the Ukrainians and the Russians on an even plane; his favoring of the Russophile element in the journalistic field had very possibly been accidental, or at least merely an effort to establish between the groups a balance which could be manipulated by the Germans.

The drop in prestige of the OUN-M was both sharp and sus- 668*
tained, however, since repression of its groups continued throughout the Reichskommissariat. Moreover, as will be discussed at length later, strong Ukrainian nationalist groups opposed to the OUN ideology appeared in several places; these forces kept up the fight for development of nationalism, thus inhibiting a growth in influence by the OUN. In other areas, news of the suppression of the Kiev group—the dissolution of the National Council appears to have been especially important—caused the cautious to refrain from endeavoring to build up nationalist organizations. Consequently, after February, 1942, the work of the two OUNs was only a relatively small part of the total stream of nationalist and antinationalist forces which must be studied in their geographical, social, and ideological context rather than as parts of a developing narrative.

[53] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi, 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev, 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 19.

[54] PS 192.

[55] *Ibid.*

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police regiment.[75] Each additional UNR officer from the "Bul'ba" forces, aging though he was, was a treasure who was given a post of great importance by his new masters.[76] Similarly, Soviet officers who escaped from prisoner camps or deserted from Red forces were eagerly welcomed. The lack of trained military personnel greatly limited the partisan organization's value as a fighting force.

The presence of many men who had lived under the Soviet system at first acted as a disturbing influence in the organization. The Bandera leadership, having carried the policy of one-party direction to a temporarily successful conclusion, was determined to maintain this position and to prevent the development of an East Ukrainian opposition, which they suspected was infected with Communist attitudes. Their instrument was the SB or Security Service, forged by Lebed' years previously. Though the extent of the "purges" of "unreliable elements" (primarily East Ukrainians, but including some former Mel'nyk partisans, although apparently no old UNR émigrés) is uncertain, there is little question that it was sufficiently great to arouse extreme disaffection among the non-OUN-B elements in the enlarged partisan movement.[77] At the same time, however, the East Ukrainian elements apparently had sufficient influence—or compelling arguments—to secure the adoption of a program calculated to secure support from former Soviet citizens.[78]

At the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN partisan forces on August 21–25, 1943, both Germany and the "Muscovite" Soviet Union were criticized as not really socialist or progressive, while a future national and social revolution or subjugated peoples was prophesied.[79] Greatest emphasis was still placed on armed struggle, rather than on social policy; but a long series of measures evidently calculated to broaden support among the East Ukrainians was proposed. They included destruction of

[75] MS D.

[76] E.g., Colonel Treiko and Colonel Lytvynenko, chief adviser from Andrew Livyts'kyi to Borovets'; MS D.

[77] Shuliak, p. 30; MS D.

[78] See report of a press conference of the UHVR by M. Stiranka in *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, October 11, 1947, p. 3.

[79] *Za samostiinu Ukraïnu: Boiovyi organ OUN* (For Ukrainian Independence: The Military Organ of the OUN) (clandestine), No. 9, December 10, 1943.

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704 ran from just east of Kovel to a point in the Carpathians south of Ternopol'; a key point was the little town of Brody, on the main highway from Rovno to L'vov. Here, in late June, the SS division was put into the line to assist in covering the Galician capital. For three weeks it maintained its position, in the face of fierce Soviet attacks and encircling operations, but by July 20 was no longer effective as a fighting unit. Perhaps 20 percent of its complement fell back with the German armies toward the Carpathians, and half of the remainder escaped to join the UPA or to filter back to the German lines.[29]

661 798 After the victory of Brody, the Red Army rapidly conquered east Galicia, Bukovina, and the Carpatho-Ukraine. By fall, substantially all of the Ukrainian lands were again under the dominion of Moscow. This time the repression exercised by the Communist rulers was harsher and less disguised than it had been five years before. The Greek Catholic Church was attacked ruthlessly. Bishop Slipyi, who had succeeded Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi after the latter's death in late 1944, was arrested and deported to the interior of the Soviet Union. Most of the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church, as well as hundreds of its clergy, were likewise banished. Orthodox priests subservient to the Patriarch of Moscow enlisted the aid of a minority of the Greek Catholic clergy, who renounced their allegiance to Rome and joined in constructing a new hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Galicia. The same tactics were pursued in the Carpatho-Ukraine.[30]

[702] 661 According to reports of refugees from the area, very severe measures were taken against the population at large. Men from the ages of eighteen to fifty are said to have been drafted into the Red Army in a mass, without regard for their state of health.[31] Once enlisted, they were said to be watched over by special *politruks*, given inferior arms, and sent into battle after eight

[29] See numerous contributions to *Brody*, and *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv I. UD UNA*, for detailed descriptions of military operations of this battle and of the other Ukrainian forces serving with the Wehrmacht.

[30] Cf. Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 137 ff.; Mykola D. Chubatyi, "Russian Church Policy in the Ukraine," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, I (Autumn, 1945), 51–53.

[31] SS war reporter Oleh Lysiak in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 2, 1944, p. 3.

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days' training.[32] In addition, there was a renewed collectivization of agriculture and Sovietization of all phases of life. 661

A strong effort appears also to have been made to overcome the nationalism of the West Ukrainians, which the Communists recognized as a danger to their regime. Several months before the Red Army reconquered Galicia, Krushchev, the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, addressing the sixth session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, denounced the nationalists in vitriolic terms. He concentrated his attack upon the nationalist partisans: 661 668x

> If one asks the Ukrainian-German nationalists how many of the German occupiers they destroyed, how many German formations they wiped out, how many bridges they blew up, in order to prevent the aggressors from transporting arms for subjugating and annihilating the Ukrainian people, they can make no reply.[33]

His remarks served to set the theme for Soviet propagandists, who condemned the adherents of Bandera, Mel'nyk, and "Bul'ba" as agents of the Germans, in contrast to the "true patriots of the Soviet fatherland."[34] An obvious effort to split the peasantry and the laboring class from the intellectuals was made. The former were declared deceived, while the latter were said to be the chief propagators of the dangerous doctrine.[35] Soviet propagandists promised that "special attention" would be given to the West Ukrainian intelligentsia, who did not have the "advantage" of having been brought up in Soviet schools, but had been, rather, in "bourgeois" schools, which inculcated "bourgeois ideology," and who, as a result, had aided the "Ukrainian-German nationalist bandits."[36] In view of the usual fate of social elements so

[32] Oleh Lysiak in *Krakauer Zeitung*, November 30, 1944, p. 6.

[33] Dmytro Manuïls'kyi, *Ukraïns'ko-nimets'ki natsionalisty na sluzhbi u fashysts'koi Nimechchyny: Dopovid' 6-ho sichnia 1945 roku na naradi uchyteliv zakhadnykh oblastei Ukraïny* (The Ukrainian-German Nationalists in the Service of Fascist Germany: Report of January 6, 1945, to the Conference of Teachers of the Western *Oblasts* of the Ukraine) (Kiev: Ukraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1945), p. 21.

[34] Ol. Kasimenko, "Ukraïns'ko-nimets'ki natsionalisty—nailiutishi vorohy ukraïns'koho narodu" (The Ukrainian-German Nationalists—the Fiercest Enemies of the Ukrainian People), *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 10, 1944, p. 2.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] "Ideino-politychne vykhovannia inteligentsiï" (Idea-Political Education of the Intelligentsia), *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 12, 1944, p. 1.

668* violently denounced by the Soviet rulers, it is likely that a large [661] part of the intelligentsia was "liquidated as a class."

At the same time,[1] a certain outlet was offered to nationalist 186 feeling, with a class-conscious twist, by emphasizing the heroic 208 feats of certain Ukrainian leaders of Red partisan units in the L'vov area.[37] This theme was relatively subdued, however, probably because there were not enough Ukrainian subjects suitable for glorification. In the Carpatho-Ukraine, where the Red partisans had evidently attracted genuine support as liberators from the de-nationalizing Hungarian regime, the tactic was employed much more extensively. Whole lists of partisan leaders, including at least one priest, were published. Moreover, one partisan was explicitly declared to speak "pure Ukrainian," and apparently all bore Ukrainian names.[38] This propaganda was followed up by the customary practice of forming a People's Committee which requested union of the province with the Soviet Union.[39] Even after the war was ended and the new acquisition securely incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine, however, an article was published which, had it been written by a non-Communist, would have been denounced as "racist." It was stated that some villages in the Carpatho-Ukraine spoke only Magyar, but that their "purely Ukrainian" character was shown by the family names of the inhabitants and their "Slavic appearance."[40]

661 Fortunately for them, the majority of the West Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia did not stay behind to enjoy the benefits of Soviet "re-education." It is one of the strange paradoxes of German-Ukrainian relations during the war, however, that at the very period when Germany was most in need of securing Ukrainian support, and when a minimal amount of such assistance was being developed in the form of the Galician Division, a new wave of repression fell upon the nationalist leaders. This occurred in the fall of 1943; its immediate causes cannot be determined, but it appears that it was basically a result of that tendency to strive for large results by employing force and trickery which marred

[37] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 26, 1945, p. 3.
[38] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 14, 1944, p. 2.
[39] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 23, 1944, p. 2.
[40] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 28, 1945, p. 3.

[1] [after the Ukraine was conquered by the Red Army in 1944-- Analyst]

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so much of German relations with the eastern peoples. One of the first Ukrainian leaders to fall a victim to these methods was Borovets'. About a month before he started on his forlorn trip to Warsaw to obtain help in rebuilding his guerrilla force, German officials interested in the matter had decided that it was necessary to negotiate with the partisan leaders, so that they might discover who they were and arrest them during the course of the negotiations if this appeared to be desirable.[41] Whether there was any direct connection between this plan and the fate which overtook Borovets' is unknown; the procedure used toward him, however, closely paralleled that outlined. After the Wehrmacht had started conversations with "Bul'ba," the police suddenly intervened, arrested him and his assistant Oleh Shtul', and incarcerated them in Sachsenhausen concentration camp along with Bandera and his deputies.[42]

The group was soon joined by the most prominent members of the OUN-M. After Mussolini's overthrow, Eugene Onats'kyi, spokesman of the Ukrainian nationalists in Italy, had written an article criticizing Fascism as a form of government, stating that it sheltered a privileged class. This essay was indiscreetly printed by *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk* and thus came to the attention of the German police, which arrested Onats'kyi on September 29, 1943, but did not transfer him to Sachsenhausen from Regina Coeli prison in Rome until December 12.[43] Throughout his period of confinement, he was closely questioned concerning connections of Mel'nyk and Konovalets' with Ukrainians in Allied countries.[44] Apparently these connections, at least in the forms of inspiring anti-German material in the Allied press and contacts with Ukrainian organizations outside the German orbit, were one reason for the arrest on January 26, 1944, of Mel'nyk himself, together with the Berlin representative of the OUN-M, Dmytro Andriievs'kyi.[45] Apparently the chief grounds for the arrest of the

[41] Memorandum by Taubert, Occ E-4 (1).

[42] Interviews 12, 29, 72; Taras Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba Ukraïny (1917–1950)* (The Armed Struggle of the Ukraine [1917–50]) (1951), p. 12.

[43] Ievhen (Eugene) Onats'kyi, *U babylons'komu poloni (spomyny)* (In Babylonian Captivity [Memoirs]) (Buenos Aires, 1948), p. 15.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[45] Interviews 52, 67; *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 101.

661 OUN-M leaders was the discovery of anti-German clandestine publications of the OUN-M in the East Ukraine and in Kandyba's quarters in L'vov.[46] Kandyba and numerous other members were arrested about the same time, and *Nastup* was suppressed. Three members of the Provid had been killed within the preceding fourteen months, so that of the directorate only the aged generals Kapustians'kyi and Kurmanovych were left at large.[47]

727 Most of the OUN leaders were kept in close confinement throughout the crucial months when the West Ukraine was slipping under Communist domination. By October, when they were released,[48] virtually all of the Ukrainian lands had passed out of German control. There remained, however, some two million persons of Ukrainian origin in the hands of the Germans—thousands of refugees, over a million *Ostarbeiter,* several hundred thousand prisoners of war, and about a quarter of a million auxiliary troops.[49] A few thousand of the last category constituted a remnant of the Galician division, but most of them were scattered throughout various small units of *Osttruppen,* totaling about seven hundred thousand.[50]

[46] *OUN u Viini,* p. 103.

[47] Kandyba and Chemeryns'kyi had replaced the murdered Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, but Chemeryns'kyi was killed by the Germans in the execution of the *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* group in Kiev. Baranovs'kyi had been killed by the OUN-B in Galicia in May, 1943, while Sushko was assassinated, probably by Bandera followers, or possibly by Communists or German police agents who were dissatisfied with his conduct, just thirteen days before the arrest of the other leaders.

[48] Bandera, Mel'nyk, Borovets', and all of their principal adherents were set free, except Kandyba and Gavrusevych, who had died in prison.

[49] Rosenberg wrote Bormann on September 7, 1944 (NO 2997), that there were then one million "legionnaires and volunteers," one million prisoners of war, and two million *Ostarbeiter* drawn from the eastern peoples. It is safe to assume that at least one third of the prisoners of war were Ukrainian (see n. 64, this chapter, below). The figure of two million *Ostarbeiter* appears to be rather low, in view of the total of one and one-half million given for the Ukraine alone (see Chapter V), but it is certain that a considerable majority of the workers from the Soviet Union were drawn from the Ukraine, for it had the bulk of the population which was under German control for a long period, and was, moreover, more completely exploited in this regard than were the army areas and the Reichskommissariat Ostland. Taubert, in a memorandum printed in B. Dvinov, *Vlasovs'koe dvizhenie v svete dokumentov* (The Vlasov Movement in the Light of Documents) (New York, 1950), p. 110, estimated the proportion of Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter* as 60 percent. The figure for military personnel appears a bit high, but it is fairly clear that the Ukrainians totaled at least one quarter of this group (Interview 22 referred to a total of 220,000 Ukrainians in the German forces). Refugees not enrolled in any of these categories were not numerous.

[50] NO 1068.

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itself for a few years, very likely a separate Ukrainian hierarchy 000
would have been generally recognized. In the situation which followed from the Bolshevik triumph, neither clear-cut solution was achieved. Instead, a large body of the lower clergy and the faithful 795
split off from the Russian hierarchy in the Ukraine. When no 798
member of the episcopacy could be found to consecrate a new bishop for the dissident group, the Ukrainian church body resorted to the "laying on of hands" by priests as a method for consecrating Father Lypkivs'kyi as prelate of their organization. Thus a new Orthodox Church was formed, which rapidly came to embrace the great majority of organized Orthodox believers in the Ukraine; by 1923 it had no less than three thousand parishes and thirty-five bishops, headed by Lypkivs'kyi, then known as Metropolitan Basil.[1] In spite of this apparent prosperity, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, as it was called, lay under the shadow of two great weaknesses. In the first place, it was not recognized by any other body of the Orthodox Church, for the method of consecration of the new bishops was regarded throughout the Orthodox world as uncanonical, a violation of the essential principle of apostolic succession. From the point of view of the traditional believer, the bishops of the new church were illegitimate; consequently, priests ordained by them (but not those who had joined the Autocephalous Church after ordination by a validly consecrated bishop) were not truly endowed with sacerdotal functions. Secondly, and of more immediate significance, the phenomenal growth of the new church was possible only because of the comparatively indulgent attitude shown by the Communist authorities who, at that time, were more antagonistic to the Russian church than to dissident bodies. When the Soviet [661] ●
power turned to restriction of Ukrainian national activity, as a potential threat to the unity of the USSR, the Autocephalous Church also came under attack. Its entire hierarchy and the great bulk of its clergy were executed or banished in 1929–30.[2]

In view of the close connection between church and state in 659
the Orthodox world, it was only natural that, when the Russian 795

[1] John S. Reshetar, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox Church," *American Slavic and East European Review*, X (February, 1951), 43–45.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

186 been founded by the nationalist intelligentsia of the East Ukraine
517 many years before the Revolution. They were now revived, after
575 long suppression by the Communist regime, to carry on the work of developing national culture and inculcating a feeling of national identity. The two aims could be combined because all nationalist Ukrainians felt it essential to instill a love of the indigenous popular arts and customs, emphasizing their distinctive nature. That this effort had a political as well as a cultural sig-
[661] nificance is indicated by the fact that not only the Soviet regime (both before 1941 and upon reconquest, as in Kharkov)[45] but the German police as well attacked the Prosvita societies, and in the Reichskommissariat they were able, for varying periods, to lead only a clandestine life. The desire for national expression was shared by so many, however, that the Germans felt it was impossible to dam up all outlets; therefore the Prosvita was generally permitted, though under close observation.[46] Together with the church (and a few local societies not using the Prosvita name but having the same function), it was one of the few organizations of a nationalist character which was not under direct German control.

533 The work of the Prosvita groups, although arranged in various
517 ways in different localities, may be classified under four general
186 headings. Playing a major role everywhere were musical activities,
575 particularly choral groups, in which the Ukrainians had always excelled, and which served as a powerful intellectual and emotional stimulus to nationalist feeling, since most of the songs were distinctively Ukrainian. In addition, groups of *bandura* players (the *bandura* is a small lute-like stringed instrument indigenous to the Ukraine) were sponsored, and orchestras were
545 trained. In the larger centers, Prosvita collaborated with regular
517 professional musical organizations, such as conservatories and
575 operas, to produce nationalist-inspired performances. For ex-
186 ample, operas were reopened in Kiev and Kharkov, and offered a considerable repertoire of native Ukrainian pieces (*Taras Bul'ba, Natalka Poltavka,* etc.) as well as traditional Western

[45] Cf. *Nastup,* September 26, 1943, p. 3 (based on *Vinnyts'ki Visti,* August 29, 1943), on the destruction of Prosvita and its personnel in Kharkov during the Soviet interlude in February-March, 1943.

[46] MS E; PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

793 to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services accord-
578 ing to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of
186 the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left" as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

668* It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

727 Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor
● 661 were shot by German police; the city passed under the control
204 of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.

[24] Dr. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.

[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.

[26] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.

[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.

[28] Interview 47.

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German authorities; in a few other places, including the important towns of Lubny and Akhtyrka (Okhtyrka), editors continued their endeavors to stimulate national feeling.[29] Remarkably, the editor in the former town was a Russian who, after his pro-Ukrainian work brought him to the verge of arrest, was able to secure a new post as editor of a Russian-language paper in the Kursk *oblast*.[30] Most active of all this group, however, was the young editor of the Mirgorod paper, Michael Voskobiinyk, who pursued a line independent of the Nationalists yet modeled on the work of the *Nova Ukraïna* group.[31]

In general, nationalism in the "Left Bank" region under German occupation can be said to have been characterized by more influence of locally led and organized ecclesiastical and political bodies than the area to the west of the Dnieper. Moreover, it was marked by somewhat less friction between the Ukrainian and Russian elements and a willingness of some of the latter group to cooperate with the effort for Ukrainian nationalist revival. Probably the basic reason for this difference is the fact that both OUN groups were suppressed in this area before they could become very influential, and the nationalist structure which was built up afterwards was formed of persons who feared the extremist program of the integral nationalists. It may be also that the history of the region, with its lack of comparatively recent memories of oppression by Polish lords and the relative independence with which nationalist life could develop, created an atmosphere of self-confidence which militated against the more violent aspects of nationalist egoism.

To the south of the wooded steppe belt just discussed lies a broad region of more open steppe; in general the agricultural population of the area is considerably less dense than that of the region just described. The open plain with its very rich black soil and somewhat lesser rainfall lends itself to the cultivation of cereal crops which require smaller amounts of manpower, in contrast to the mixed sugar beet, dairy, potato, and grain agri-

[East of the Dnieper -- Analyst]

[29] Interviews 47, 50.
[30] Interview 47.
[31] *Ibid.*

An important group of Ukrainian politicians, who had formerly supported Petlioura, joined the Bolshevik cause after his defeat. The Soviet Government inaugurated a policy of Ukrainization from the beginning in order to satisfy their ambitions and to show the world their nationalistic Liberalism. But, as under Petlioura, it was a superficial one and never penetrated in fact either into the private life of the citizens or into the sphere of education, or even into the administration.

Although Ukrainian had become the official language, nobody used it and correspondence between official institutions continued, with rare exceptions, in Russian. One of the authors of this book, who held an administrative post in a Soviet enterprise in the Ukraine from 1921 to 1924, had never written a single word in Ukrainian and had never been prosecuted for this defection. It is not because the word 'Odessa' is now written with one 's' instead of two and the word '*plochtchad*' (in Russian a town square) is to-day replaced by the word '*maidan*,' that the Ukraine has ceased to be Russia.

The policy of Ukrainization continued without great changes and in spite of the lack of common sense until 1927, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party suddenly decided to introduce the Russian language as the second official language. One can explain this sudden change by the development of separatist anti-Soviet propaganda, undertaken by secret organizations, formed under the protection of Poland. There occurred in the Ukraine the first wave of purification which was directed against the 'Nationalistic Chauvinists,' accused of spiritual connection with Galician 'counter-revolutionary' elements, which had been affected by the propaganda of Polish 'Fascists.'

The people's commissar for education of the Ukraine,

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

661 Choumsky, and a group of his friends had opposed this policy of the Central Government. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine accused Choumsky himself of 'spiritual connection' with the counter-revolutionaries of the Polish Ukraine and especially with the U.N.D.O., the most important among the Ukrainian political parties in Galicia and working under Polish influence. At that period one still didn't shoot Soviet Ministers. But Choumsky was forced to leave the Ukraine and to accept a small administrative post in Moscow.

186 177 To regain the initiative in the Ukrainian question, the Executive Committee of the Comintern passed a resolution in November 1927 directing the Communist Party in the Polish Ukraine to struggle resolutely for the separation of this country from Poland and for its re-inclusion in the Soviet Ukraine.

On the other hand the inauguration of the first five-year plan, which strengthened the economic ties between the Ukraine and the rest of the Soviet Union, and the creation of the Red Army on a basis of discipline and of modern military science, made the use of Russian necessary throughout the whole Soviet territory.

669 This pro-Russian tendency did not last long. The forced collectivization of the land, undertaken in execution of the five-year plan, turned the Ukrainian peasantry against the Soviet Government. This resistance soon changed into a kind of civil war and became underlined by hundreds of thousands of deportations, by thousands of executions, and by a terrible famine.[1]

The resistance to collectivization, which was incompatible with the spirit and the vital interests of the

[1] See the work of Calvin B. Hoover: *Economic Life in Soviet Russia*, M.R.S., Paris, 1934, in which many pages are given to the question of collectivization.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

peasant proprietors, was so violent and seemed so 669
justified that it carried certain Communist circles of peasant extraction with it, and especially the former *borot'bistes* (Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries of the left) who had accepted the Soviet programme in 1917. A new and violent purification followed.

Fearing a connection between the discontent of the 186
peasants, the opposition within the party, and the 661
nationalist movement supported from abroad, the Soviet Government took Ukrainianism under its control in order to prevent its use by the opponents of collectivization as a weapon against the Soviet regime. This time Ukrainization was pushed to the extreme and was maintained by the huge apparatus of repression. In all the enterprises, and in workers' syndicates, special cells were formed for the propaganda of the Ukrainian language and for the rigorous control of the knowledge of Ukrainian, which had become the obligatory language, established by the officials. The number of Ukrainian teachers was increased, new Ukrainian theatres, clubs, and libraries were created in industrial centres. Russian newspapers were almost completely suppressed. Those who resisted Ukrainization were mercilessly expelled from the administration and everything was put under the direct control of a special commission of the Council of People's Commissars. To all the countless suppressions to which the Soviet citizens were subjected that of the Ukrainization was added.

The attempt to snatch Ukrainianism from the hands of circles socially opposed to the Soviet regime was not successful. A veritable nationalistic anti-Soviet propaganda spread everywhere, supported by the officials of the regime. Then came the second change of policy. 661
Two trials, one of the 'Union for the Deliverance of the Ukraine' and the other of the 'National Centre'

661 took place. From the darkness which characterizes all the Soviet political trials came a beam of light showing the anti-Ukrainian reaction of the general line of the party.

Nevertheless the XVIth Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. had still declared in June 1930 that the 'Pan-Russian Chauvinism' was always 'the principal danger during the present phase.' This declaration was voted for by the Congress after the long speech of Stalin himself, a speech consecrated to 'Soviet Culture,' 'proletarian at its foundation and national in its forms.'

It was in 1933 that the great purification of the Communist Party of the Ukraine took place, with the object of eliminating 'Ukrainian chauvinism.' The instigator of the nationalist opposition, the people's commissar Skrypnik, committed suicide in July, preferring an honest death to a bullet in the back of the neck, preceded by 'spontaneous confessions.' In November, at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the question of the direct relations between the group of Skrypnik and the 'Polish Fascists' was openly discussed. Kossior had even declared that the 'Ukrainian nationalists hidden within the Communist Party' had been in contact with the U.N.O., the terrorist group of Ukrainian *émigrés* led by Colonel Konovaletz (recently assassinated by the G.P.U. at Rotterdam). The question of a Ukrainian organization (U.V.O.), which was said to have been discovered some months before in Soviet territory, was also raised. According to Postychev, the forced Ukrainization of the schools, carried out by Skrypnik, had opened the way for the 'chauvinists' who had profited by it in order to penetrate into various branches of the Soviet administration in pursuing the aim of detaching the Ukraine from the U.S.S.R.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

And for the first time it was said, at this plenary assembly of November 1933, that 'for the moment' the enemy No. 1 in the Ukraine is no longer Pan-Russian chauvinism but Ukrainian chauvinism. 661

The suicide of Skrypnik brought hundreds of his collaborators to the cellars of the G.P.U. at Kharkov. The leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party was given to Postychev, a man in the confidence of Stalin, and of Great Russian origin. He was given two tasks, to purify the Communist Party of elements suspected of sympathies with Ukrainian nationalism, and to check the sabotage by peasants in the *kolkhoses* (collective agricultural enterprises), the new forms of agricultural exploitation. Postychev successfully achieved the first task. More than a quarter of the Communists were expelled from the party and nearly the whole leading personnel was replaced.

As for the second task, despite the bloody suppressions, the war between the Ukrainian peasants and the Soviet Government continued, taking the form of a definite refusal to collaborate with the Soviets. This refusal led to a fall of agricultural production and to a famine, formerly unknown.

As the so-called 'Nationalist' movement was nothing else but an expression of the anti-Soviet social movement, the 'chauvinism' of which was only a pretext, the effects of the purification undertaken by Postychev were soon reduced to nil. Again executions were resumed, followed by very many suicides of Ministers, among whom were two Presidents of the Council. Finally Postychev himself was dismissed, being accused of a lack of energy and vigilance.

In November 1933 Kossior, the successor of Postychev at the head of the Ukrainian general secretariat of the party, declared that Ukrainization had given the National

661 Oppositionists of the party the opportunity of releasing a veritable ' Petliourization ' of the peasant class and of the small town-dwellers, aiming at the separation of the Ukraine from the U.S.S.R.

648 Since 1936, as a reaction to the policy of the Reich, which tended to unite the different Ukrainian movements under its guidance, the Soviet Government adopted a new Ukrainian policy the official thesis of which was the *brotherly union of the Ukrainian and Great Russian people, as bequeathed by history.*

197 To-day we observe an attempt at bringing the Ukrainian and Russian languages closer together. Ukrainian is being purged of its Polonisms and its Germanisms, imported from Galicia, which ' the enemies of the people ' had tried to implant in the Soviet Ukraine. A system which tends to awaken and to maintain Russian national pride has been inaugurated. The victory of Poltava is no longer the victory of a Tsar who oppressed his people, but the liberation of the Ukrainian workers from the Swedish and Polish aggressors.

000 To sum up, among all the countries subjected to the ' social experiments ' by the heirs of Lenin, the Ukraine bows to them with far greater difficulty than the others. In this she seems to be the obvious prey of separatism, led by foreigners, the declared enemies of her people.

The Soviet Government is alone responsible for the existence of this separatism, which cannot be justified from any point of view and is foreign to the spirit and the interests of the Ukrainian people.

a treaty between Turkey, Moscow, and Poland of 1681, it was 175 determined to depopulate Ukraine between the South Bug and 648 Dnieper Rivers to the Black Sea. The western Ukrainian territories (Volhynia, Galicia etc.) remained under Polish rule. Ukraine to the East of the Dnieper remained under the protectorate of the Muscovite Tsars, preserving restricted autonomous rights, with an elected Hetman as the head of the Government.

Tsar Peter I. planned the abolition of the remains of the autonomous order of Ukraine on the Eastern bank of the Dnieper. In order to defend the freedom of Ukraine, Hetman Ivan Mazeppa concluded an alliance with the Swedish King Charles XII. against Russia in 1708. The battle of Poltava (1709), fatal for Ukraine and Sweden, put an end to the plans of the Ukrainian patriots to restore Ukrainian independence. Nonetheless, for decades even in the second half of the 18th century, the members of the Ukrainian Government which went into exile in 1709, continued in various countries their diplomatic action for the defence of the Ukrainian independence. They were headed by Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, the successor of Mazeppa, and included the son of Hetman Orlyk, Hryhor Orlyk, General in the French service, Fedir Myrovych and others.

After the battle of Poltava the Russian Government restricted [661] the autonomous rights of Ukraine considerably. Tsar Peter I. 175 deliberately destroyed Ukraine in order to oppress her people the more easily, as we are informed by Weber, the Resident of Brunswick-Hannover in Moscow, a contemporary of Tsar Peter I.*). Ukraine was forced to pay heavy contributions; Ukrainians were sent in masses to the North to build Petersburg, the new capital of the Tsars. Many thousands of Ukrainians died from exhaustion while working for the strengthening of Russian Tsarist despotism. At the same time Moscow took from Ukraine its best cultural workers — scholars, artists, artisans. Western civilisation was introduced to Russia principally by Ukrainian intellectuals. (See K. Kharlampovich, *Little Russian Influence on the Great Russian Ecclesiastical Life:* Kazan, 1912; and Pekarsky, *Science and Literature in the Time of Peter* — I — II).

The Tsarina Catherine II. abolished the autonomous Ukrainian Government in 1764. Ukraine was brought to the level of the other provinces of the Tsarist Empire.

The Russian Government decided also to destroy the Zaporovian Army, the nest of democratic liberty in Ukraine. In 1775, Russian

*) Weber, Das veränderte Rußland: Hannover 1729.

Catholic Ukrainians to Greek Orthodoxy was taking place. The 727
Ukrainian Metropolitan of the Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia, 661
Count Andrew Szeptycki, was arrested and deported to the interior 659
of Russia, and with him numerous Ukrainian clergymen. This
policy of oppression of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina was
cynically referred to by the Russian Government as 'liberation of
subjugated Slav brethren' . . .

727 state. On the contrary, they wished to suppress the Ukrainian move-
565 ment and to make Ukraine a centre for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia', of course, headed by a Tsar. About these plans Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs after World War I. He hoped that a restored Russian Empire would be a reliable ally of Germany out of gratitide for the abolition of the Bolshevik régime.

642 On April 28, 1918, a detachment of German troops entered the
727 hall where the sessions of the Ukrainian Central Council took place
565 in order to arrest some Ukrainian Ministers. On the next day, on April 29, under the protection of the German troops, a congress of big landowners was called. At this congress General Paul Skoropadsky was declared Hetman of Ukraine, with the prior consent of the German authorities.

Skoropadsky belonged to the class of the big landowners, and, though he was of Ukrainian descent, had had no connections with the Ukrainian national movement before the revolution of 1917.

In his first order Skoropadsky wrote: "I declare myself Hetman of the whole Ukraine". He announced the abolition of the Ukrainian Central Council and replaced the name 'Ukrainian Democratic Republic' by 'Ukrainian State'. Skoropadsky repealed all laws and orders of the Ukrainian Central Council and the Russian Provisional Government; thus Ukraine had in this respect returned to the conditions before the Revolution.

The reactionary ways of the Skoropadsky Government that favoured the big landowners had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people; the masses of peasants and workers, that recently had fought with arms the terror of the Russian Communists under the banner of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic, were placed by the policy of the Skoropadsky Government into
[111] a desperate situation. The big landowners who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities organised 'punitive expeditions' against the Ukrainian peasantry with their armed gangs having support from German and Austrian army detachments. Heavy contributions, looting, and destruction of the peasants' property, together with mass executions of Ukrainian peasants and workers, caused immense indignation against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austrian occupation forces among the Ukrainian people. Against the reactionary régime which dominated in Ukraine, Communist propaganda met with approbation among the Ukrainian masses, unexpected even by Moscow.

727 The Chief of Staff of the German armies in Ukraine, General
642 Groener, in order to appease Ukrainian public opinion had declared after the putsch of April 29, 1918, that "the Hetman was given in-

669 December 12, 1918, a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as [661] against 'Russian followers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parliament and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian 668 National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians 186 in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the 642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

656 G. Lapchinsky, explained that Ukraine must be an independent state
186 and not a Russian colony.

The powerful Ukrainian movement forced the Russian Com-
668 munists to alter for a certain time their tactics in Ukraine. The Soviet Russian Government ordered the Communists to pay attention to the national peculiarities of Ukraine. In December 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution on the recognition by Russia of the independent Soviet Ukraine. Among other matters this resolution states that the "members of the Communist Party in Ukrainian territory are obliged to realise the right of the working masses of learning their mother language in schools, and speaking it in all Soviet institutions".

The resolution recommends the restriction of the requisition of food from the Ukrainian peasants. Besides, this resolution of the Russian CP pointed out that the principal task of Soviet construction in Ukraine was the requisition of arms from the population.

The President of the Soviet Russian Government, Lenin, wrote in *The Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victory over Denikin* on January 4, 1920:

"The independence of Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party. Only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can decide the question on their Soviet Congress — whether Ukraine should be united with Russia or left an independent Republic . . . We want a voluntary union of nations, a union that would not permit violence of one nation against another".

All these declarations of the Russian Communist Party leaders had the aim to lull the vigilance of the masses of the Ukrainian people. In reality the Soviet Russian Government did not even intend to change its imperialist course against Ukraine. Moscow feared the armed Ukrainian people and distrusted them. Therefore, for instance, a conference of the members of the Russian Communist Party in Homel passed the following resolution in October 1919:

"The advance to the South and the organisation of Soviet administration in Ukraine are possible only with the aid of regular disciplined troops, who, in any case, must not be of local origin" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 6: Kharkov, 1926, p. 4).

669 The Soviet Russian troops, after having seized the Ukrainian
●661 territory until the spring of 1920, began at once the struggle against

the Ukrainian partisan movement. New requisitions of grain and the taking of arms from the population caused an even greater disappointment among the Ukrainians. The partisan movement which had overthrown Denikin's power turned with new vigour against the Russian Communists. These risings were carried on under the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of arms and supplies did not permit the Ukrainian partisan movement to develop and to attain decisive results in the struggle with the overwhelming forces of the Russian Red Armv. 669 661

17. Poland — Ukraine — Russia 1920—21

At the end of 1919, the regular front of the Ukrainian Army broke down. The Ukrainian Army continued the fight against 'White' and 'Red' Russia as guerilla war. The diplomatic Mission of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic headed by Andriy Liwycky, Cabinet member, started negotiations with the Polish Government about the relations between Poland and Ukraine. The consequence of these negotiations was a Convention signed in Warsaw on April 21, 1920. In that time the Government of the Ukrainian Republic headed by Isaac Mazepa was remaining in Ukraine. 648 669 728

According to this Convention a new frontier between Ukraine and Poland was established: those Ukrainian territories Poland had seized in 1919 in the war with the Ukrainians (Galicia, Volhynia etc.) remained on the Polish side. The Polish Government undertook to support the restoration of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic on the territories occupied by Soviet Russia.

The war of Poland and Ukraine against Soviet Russia, which was carried on with changing fortunes did not bring the expected results to the Ukrainians. The Polish leaders thought it more advantageous for themselves to come to an agreement with Soviet Russia after having divided the Ukrainian territories with Moscow (Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921). Poland recognised in Riga the Government of the 'independent' Soviet Ukraine and broke off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army which in fighting against the overwhelming Russian forces, had entered Polish territories together with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1920) was interned. The soldiers of this army, who had fought against Soviet Russia not only for Ukraine but for Poland alike, were placed by the Polish Government in camps in such conditions that many of them died there, or acquired serious diseases.

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy industries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, 83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia.

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peasants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property was taken into the collective farms (*Communist*, Kharkov, December 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater.

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administration, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc.

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

871 every teacher in the schools in Ukraine had orders to spread Com-
65½ munist propaganda, to fight the appearance of national discontent with the Russian rule by every means, and was obliged to insult the
[814] struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation. In schools, Ukrainian history was falsely interpreted as well as in literature and in films. For instance, clinging to the tradition taken from Tsarist Russia, the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa who at the beginning of the 18th century wanted to free Ukraine from Muscovite dependence, has in Soviet historiography the epithet of a 'traitor' and 'reactionary'. But Tsar Peter I. and Tsar Ivan the Terrible, are glorified by Soviet school and science as 'progressive democratic rulers'.

659 The Ukrainian religious life under the régime of Soviet Russian
661 occupation had to suffer from special persecutions. In 1921, in Soviet Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Autocephal Church, independent of the Moscow Patriarch, was organised. This Church, headed by its idealistic leaders, the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier of the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1918—19 and others, completed a great task for the cultural and moral improvement of the Ukrainian nation. Moscow attempted to destroy the strong organisation of the Ukrainian Autocephal Church with the help of its agents, but did not succeed in this. Then the Soviet Government ruined by bloody repressions the Ukrainian Church after having destroyed its entire hierarchy and masses of its followers (1929).

661 In connection with the 'General Line' which had placed unbear-
517 able burdens on Ukrainian economy, a mass discontent against Moscow increased among the Ukrainians. The ruthless economic
815 exploitation and political oppression by Russia caused, among the Ukrainian people, a permanent oppositon which appeared in various forms. Therefore, the Moscow Government decided to terrorise the Ukrainian intelligentsia which bore the brunt of the political efforts of the Ukrainian nation. For this purpose a number of trials against the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian science and social life were arranged; the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine with the participation of the prominent member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, Serhy Yefremov, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier, Professor Osyp Hermayze and others in Kharkov, in spring 1930. Thousands of innocent people, especially students, perished in the prisoners' cells of the GPU without any trial. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Academy of Science was exposed to repressions. In place of the imprisoned or expelled members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, the Communists appointed their own people though without scientific merits,
46 but politically faithful to Moscow.

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but 000
politically faithful to Moscow.

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also 661
by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of 651
forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though 243
terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists.

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet 661
Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the 665
CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others.

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion 687
from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commis- 186
sar of Education in Ukraine from 1027—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the

687 186 national problem and encouraged others to do likewise. In Moscow Skrypnyk's theoretical works on the national problem were treated with distrust: for in the CP one is to believe that Lenin and Stalin have given unchangeable dogmas an orthodox Communist is not expected to discuss. In the meantime Skrypnyk in his speeches and articles summoned the Ukrainian Communists to a 'national construction not restricted by anything'. He pointed out that national consciousness should be developed among the masses of Ukrainian people, and that through the development of the national culture certain values should be given to the Ukrainian workers and peasants.

Skrypnyk described the practice of the Russian Communist Party in the national question in the following words:

"For the majority of our Party, Ukraine as a national element did not exist. There was only 'Little Russia', as a part of the indivisible Russia, something uncertain both in its relations with Russia and with regard to its territory and even its language" (Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches*, vol. I, p. 291; Kharkov 1932). Frequently, in the Congresses of the Communist Party, Skrypnyk demanded the organising of Ukrainian schools in the territories of the Russian Soviet Republic inhabited by Ukrainians. These views and demands of Skrypnyk Moscow recognised as 'nationalism', he himself was declared as an 'instrument of intervention'. In order to avoid being the principal figure in a new trial Skrypnyk thought it better to end this life by suicide. This happened on July 6, 1933, on the 10th anniversary of the ratification of the first constitution of the USSR, of which Skrypnyk was one of the co-editors.

661 665 Moscow's fears of the Communist opposition in Ukraine are shown by the dimensions of the 'purge' which had been made among the Communists in Ukraine in 1933. During 1933, 35,5% of the members were expelled from the CP of Ukraine (*Communist*: 1, 2, 1934). In some regions, for instance in that of Kiev, half of the members were expelled from the Communist Party. Many Communist organisations in villages ceased to exist and were replaced by 'political detachments' sent from Russia. In the course of 10 months in 1933, in Ukraine, 237 secretaries of Rayon Committees of the Communist Party, 279 Presidents of Rayon Executive Committees, and 158 Presidents of Rayon Control Commissions were dismissed (*Izvestia*: Moscow 28, 11, 1933).

The purge in the public institutions of Ukraine was directed principally against the Ukrainians. The Communist Mykolenko,

Soviet Union, K2

the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933:

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

6. *The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33*

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation.

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*).

Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

731 656 officials in Ukraine confirmed to the correspondent of the *Mancher Guardian* that in this country there had been a great mortality from hunger. Comparing the situation of that time in Ukraine and the North Caucasus with the situation in Russia, the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardin* came to the following conclusion when he said:

"It can be definitely stated that no provinces within a radius of several hundred miles of Moscow experienced the Ukrainian and North Caucasian extremities" (*Manchester Guardian:* October 19, and October 21, 1933).

The correspondent of a Jewish Socialist journal in New York, Lang, gave a description of the situation in the summer and autumn of 1933 in Ukraine: he saw how grown-ups and children were starving to death, he had been in totally depopulated villages where the inhabitants had died of hunger or fled from their homes (*Forwards:* 27. 12. 1933).

The American journalist Walter Duranty 'optimistically' estimated the number of the victims of the famine in USSR in 1933 as 5 million people. Of course, the principal part of these victims were in Ukraine, against which the Russian Communist régime was carrying its special policy of exstirpation.

In consequence of the famine and the repressions in Ukraine, principally men had perished. Therefore for instance, in 1932—33 the women in the collective farms in Ukraine were 60—70% of the total (*Communist:* Kharkov, 26. 1. 1934). The extent of child mortality was shown clearly in 1940; in the fall of 1940, the lack of births in 1932/33 forced the authorities to close parallel classes or abstain from opening first classes in many Ukrainian schools, for there where no children! The consequences of the famine in Ukraine could be seen in the decrease of the cultivation plain of the winter crops in autumn 1933: one million hectars less than in 1930 (*Izvestia:* Moscow, 16. 11. 1933).

661 731 656 Fully to realise the hypocritical policy of the Russian Communist dictatorship in Ukraine, one must add that Moscow tried to lay the responsibility for the famine in Ukraine on the Ukrainian Communists, who, as they pretended, 'had overstepped the Party line'. Many prominent Ukrainian Communists were arrested and shot under the pretext that they had caused the famine in Ukraine as 'agents of foreign capital'.

In the first years of their rule in Ukraine, the Russian Communists dreamt of world revolution and regarded the Ukrainian Western territories under the rule of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia as a bridge for their armed 'march on Europe'. In connection

with this, to a certain degree, was the policy of 'Ukrainisation' directed in Soviet Ukraine: Moscow intended to gain sympathy for the Soviet régime among the population of the Western Ukrainian territories in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The famine of 1932/33 in Soviet Ukraine roused great distrust and dislike of Soviet Russia among the Western Ukrainians. Therefore Soviet Russia destroyed thousands of intellectuals coming from the Western Ukrainian territories, among them Communists as 'agents who had worked for the money of foreign big landowners and capitalists' . . . 731 656 661

CHAPTER IV

THE UKRAINIANS OUTSIDE SOVIET UKRAINE AFTER 1920

I. The Ukrainians in Poland

563 After the signing of the Treaty of Riga (1921) between Soviet
186 Russia and Poland, about 6 million Ukrainians remained under Polish rule (Galicia, Volhynia, Polissia, Pidlyasha, Kholm Region). The case of Galicia as that of a former Austrian territory appeared from time to time in international policy. The members of the Ukrainian National Council of Galicia remaining in Western Europe demanded the right of free self-determination for this territory. In February 1921, the Council of the League of Nations stated in its resolution: "Galicia lies outside the borders of Poland", "Poland is only the actual occupant of Galicia". But this and other resolutions could not remove the Polish rule in Galicia. Poland did not care for the resolutions of the League of Nations. However, in order to appease foreign public opinion, the Polish Diet passed in September, 1922, a bill on the autonomy of the Counties into which Galicia had been divided in 1920, and a bill on the creation of a Ukrainian University. In November 1922, elections to the Polish Diet took place. The Ukrainians, having regard to the special situation of Galicia, did not take part in these elections. In other Ukrainian territories under Polish rule, particularly in Volhynia, the Ukrainian political parties attained at these elections a great victory.

On March 15, 1923, in a resolution of the Conference of the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan in Paris, the frontiers of the Riga Treaty between Poland and the USSR were recognised "with regard to the fact that Poland had admitted with respect to Eastern Galicia that the ethnographic situation demanded unconditionally an autonomous order".

563 But the Polish authorities had no intention to grant political
●661 autonomy to the Ukrainians. Even the rights of the Ukrainians for cultural development were narrowly restricted in Poland. Against the Ukrainians in Poland, a police régime was introduced. In 1920 there were in the Polish concentration camps many thousands

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and 563
disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the 661
Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. [871]
In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories, the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet [665]
and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre (UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on 727
the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the 474
Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form
of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative 563
Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz)*. The Ukrainian co-operative movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Co-operation *(Maslosoyuz)*, supplied dairy products, not only for the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in 563
the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

563 unity to move into the towns or to emigrate the Ukrainian peasants were pauperised.

These conditions were favourable to the growing of extremist trends in Ukrainian political life: communism on the one hand and nationalism on the other.

668 The policy of 'Ukrainisation' in Eastern Ukraine was exploited
661 by Communist propaganda: the 'Ukrainisation' in Soviet Ukraine, adversited by Moscow, did not remain without influence on the
563 population of the Western Ukrainian territories. The Communists of Western Ukraine served Soviet Russia as a 'fifth column' among the Ukrainians in Poland.

The Polonisation of Ukrainian schools, the colonisation of Ukrainian territory with Poles, the refusal to admit Ukrainians to Government service, the persecutions of the Ukrainian press, of educational and economic organisations — all this gave the basis for the creation of illegal Ukrainian groups which began the fight
[725] against the Polish régime with terror. In 1920 the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) was created in Galicia and organised attacks on the representatives of the Polish Government. Later UVO fused with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded at a Congress in Vienna in 1929 under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets. The Polish Government took advantage of the terrorist acts and sabotage attributed to the members of OUN to destroy the Ukrainian cultural and economic life. In September 1930, Polish troops and police undertook a terrible 'pacification' among the Ukrainian population in towns and villages. Polish soldiers and policemen severely beat more than 15,000 Ukrainians, mostly cultural and economic workers, who had not anything in common with the terrorist activity and often were resolute opponents of terror. Many victims of this 'pacification' died after terrible sufferings. A great number of Ukrainian economic and educational institutions — co-operative societies, schools, reading halls and libraries were destroyed.

After the 'pacification', the oppressions against the Ukrainians in Poland grew worse and the Polish colonisation of Ukrainian territories was increased by state funds. In September 1934, the delegates of the Polish Government declared at the Session of the League of Nations that Poland did not have any obligations towards the resolutions of the peace treaties regarding the protection of the rights of the national minorities in Poland.

By this action the Polish Government violated even formally the obligations accepted by Poland in the Peace Treaties in regard to the national minorities.

The Polish policy aimed at the disintegration of the national life 563
of the 6 million Ukrainians through attempts to divide them into 661
different 'tribes' which were given various names in official sta- 798
tistics: 'Polishchuk', 'Hutsul', 'Ruthenian', 'Boyko', 'Lemko', and even 'Orthodox' and 'Aborigines'. Against the Orthodox as well as against the Greek Catholic Ukrainians a policy of systematic Polonisation was applied by forcible conversion of the Ukrainians to Roman Catholicism which in the conditions of the Polish State was equivalent to Polonisation. In Ukrainian regions the Poles organised on the eve of World War II 'dragonnades' in order to convert the Greek Orthodox Ukrainians to the Roman Catholic Church: armed Polish gangs drove through the villages, destroyed the Orthodox Churches, beat the Ukrainians, looted their property, and forced them by this terrorism to turn Catholic. Thus the Polish Chauvinists protected by the Polish Government destroyed in 1938 more than 100 Ukrainian Churches, among them many medieval and of great artistic value and forced many Ukrainian communities to accept Roman Catholicism. In vain the Ukrainian deputies to the Polish Diet protested against this Polish violence, in vain the Metropolitan of the Greek Orthodox Church in Poland Dionysios and the Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church in Lviw Count Szeptycki rose their voices. The Polish oppression caused a strong opposition and resistance among the Ukrainians in Poland, which the Polish Government tried to suppress by new persecutions.

In the entire Polish policy between the two World Wars the fear 000
of the Ukrainian national movement is undoubtfully apparent. The Polish Government did not wish the creation of an independent Ukraine, fearing that a Ukrainian state would later demand union with the Ukrainian provinces of Poland. Even the small Carpatho-Ukraine, which had proclaimed its autonomy in autumn 1938, seemed dangerous to Poland as giving a 'bad example' for the Ukrainian population in Poland. This was one of the reasons why the Polish Government helped to destroy Czechoslovakia and supported the Hungarian claims on Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939.

In September 1939, the Ukrainian territories which after the 661
Treaty of Riga were under Polish rule, were occupied by the Soviet 563
Army in accordance with the German-Russian Pact of August 23, 1939, signed in Moscow. This 'liberation of Western Ukraine' brought to the population of these territories a time of terror and oppression. Thousands of Ukrainians of all classes were deported to the East, many of them did not come back.

The local Ukrainian Communists also were suspected by the Soviet authorities, they were not admitted to influential positions and were [illegible]

563 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the
423 Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the
big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective
474 farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the
masses of the people. It should be pointed out that between the
Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet
Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was
preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population
of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR.
●661 The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.
[1. In Western Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

Attempts on a [illegible]

661 were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.

6. The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East

167 The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

668 Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrai-
18½ nians, mostly farmers, were numbered. At that time a Ukrainian national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops, theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revolution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national, political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrainian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy. The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the develop-
656 ment of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the
191 development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrainians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow*, 1931, p. 33).

7. The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars

167 In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

[During collectivization and famine in the [illegible] region of the RSFSR 1932-33 -- Holy[illegible]]

CHAPTER V

WORLD WAR II AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

1. Ukraine During World War II.

During World War II, two totalitarian forces contended for domination over Ukrainian territory: Russian Communism and German Nazism. In the first phase of the war the Moscow and Berlin Governments divided Poland between themselves. The USSR occupied the Western Ukrainian territories of Galicia, Volhynia etc., and the Ukrainian territories of Rumania, Bukovina and Bessarabia. By the war with the USSR in 1941, Hitler planned to acquire Ukraine for German colonisation. The German Nazis tried to weaken the Ukrainian population. During the German occupation Galicia was joined with the Polish territories — *Generalgouvernement* — and isolated from the other parts of Ukraine. Hitler gave the territory between the Dniester and the South Bug with Odessa to Rumania. The rest of the Ukrainian territories was put under the rule of Erich Koch as *Reichskommissariat Ukraine.*

The great majority of the population of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality, as well as the population of Russia and the Baltic States hoped that, in consequence of war, the Soviet régime would fall and the time for a free life would come. Completely separated from the outside world, the Soviet citizens did not know anything about Hitler's aims in Eastern Europe, and did not believe the Soviet propaganda. Therefore hundreds of thousands of Jews remained in Ukraine at the beginning of the war, being against the Communist dictatorship and hoping that the German régime would not be worse than the Soviet. The German authorities systematically exstirpated the more active elements among the Ukrainians; especially they terrorised the Ukrainian intelligentsia. A crude description of the rule of the German occupation in Ukraine in 1941—44 we find in the memorandum of A. E. Frauenfeld, the General Commissar of the Crimea, written for Hitler's staff on 10. 2. 1944. Frauenfeld saw the absurdity of the German policy in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine sooner, but dared to write about it only when Hitler's catastrophe became inevitable.

On the policy of Erich Koch in Ukraine Frauenfeld writes in his memorandum:

727 "The course of ruthless brutality in treating the inhabitants of
●661 the country by principles and methods used in past centuries against coloured slave peoples, and the fact sneering at every sound policy that the disregard of this nation found its expression not only in the treatment of the people but was expressed at every possible and impossible opportunity again and again and was in addition printed and published in pamphlets, is a proof of the complete lack of instinct in handling of foreign peoples, which, with regard to its consequences, cannot be called other than shocking and catastrophic".

Frauenfeld shows this 'policy with the blacksmith's hammer' which would not see the inevitable reaction of the Ukrainians on such barbarism:

"There must be a naivety bordering on narrow-mindedness to believe that in the 20th century a nation having a shocking tragic history but, however, having a historical past, even if it is of another breed than the German people, — undoubtedfully has certain qualities of race and character, will permit itself to be degraded and insulted permanently and will also delightedly place its working power and capacities at the service of the tyrant".

Frauenfeld quotes the words of the Reichskommissar Erich Koch, who during a journey from Rivne (Rovno) to Kiev said to his staff:

"If I should find a Ukrainian worthy to sit with me at one table I must shoot him".

Frauenfeld cites examples from the work of the German administration headed by Erich Koch: the closing of schools, theatres, libraries, inattentiveness to epidemics among the Ukrainians, deliberate furtherance of the dying out of the Ukrainian people. As Frauenfeld witnesses, his collegues were very satisfied with the spreading of epidemics in Ukraine: "The Ukrainian needs no physicians; if an epidemic breaks out, thousands and tens of thousands will perish".

466 For the needs of the German economy the German Nazi Govern-
727 ment took working power from Ukraine. Frauenfeld writes about this:

661 "There was, for instance, the enlisting for work in Germany. That was carried out in a way that bears close comparison with the Bolshevik deportations to Siberia. From camps surrounded by barbed wire, from grated waggons to the encircling and searching of villages by surprise, and nocturnal levying in which people were taken in GPU manner out of their beds, the whole technique of the Arab slave hunters among the negroes of Africa in past centuries was used".

727 The Germans did not touch the Soviet collective farms, because
● 661 they regarded them as the best method for exploiting the peasants. On the other hand, the German authorities did not wish to permit the partition of the land, for they prepared Ukraine for German colonisation.

[181] Frauenfeld points out the high physical and moral qualities of the Ukrainians, their highly developed consciousness of personal dignity and their aspiration for education. He witnesses that the closing of schools by the German authorities in Ukraine roused the greatest dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian people:

"The Ukrainians, especially the women, are very desirous of learning, and one could hear from them: 'Under the Bolsheviks we were starving, but we could learn something at least. Under your rule we cannot even learn. This proves that you are our enemies' . .".

The author of the memorandum comes to the conclusion that the Ukrainians should not be exstirpated in the interests of Hitler's 'racial policy'; on the contrary "the often genuine blond and blue-eyed as well as brunette population" should be assimilated for such an assimilation "would be without doubt more desirable and advantageous than many we had absorbed during our history, or are even trying to suck up . . ."*).

725 Against pillage, terror, oppression and humiliation the Ukrai-
668 nian people reacted with great vehemence, in spite of the extraordinary weakening by the previous Soviet terrorism, the famine and the war. In all parts of Ukraine risings broke out. This Ukrainian partisan movement helped to a great extent to defeat the German armies in Ukraine. But this was not a proof of affection of the Ukrainians for Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian partisan movement took place under the banner of an independent Ukraine. The initiative for the creation of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) came from officers of the army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1941.

The Ukrainian Partisan Army turned its weapons after the defeat of Germany against the new oppressor — Soviet Russia.

2. Ukraine after the War

727 In the course of World War II the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians from the Caucasus to the Carpathian Mountains came
000 under the rule of Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian nation, from the

*) Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld, *Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete: 10. 2. 1944* (Document No. 5394, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes).

●661 The Ukrainian nation, from the famine of 1921/22 and later years, suffered under the Soviet terrorist régime great losses of its biological substance. To this were added the enormous losses in World War II, in the risings and from the terror of both totalitarian régimes.

731 In 1946 Ukraine had to suffer from a new famine in consequence of a bad harvest, and it must be stated that the policy of Moscow with respect to hungry Ukraine had not changed; the Ukrainian people received aid from the Communist Government only in a minimum degree. The principal aid came from America.

165 The statistics count the losses of the Ukrainian people during the Soviet Russian rule in Ukraine in millions. In 1917 approximately 30,000,000 people inhabited the territory of Ukraine within the frontiers of Soviet Ukraine before the outbreak of war in 1939. The Soviet statistics gave the figure of 31,000,000 inhabitants of Ukraine in 1933. The census of January 1939 counted a population of only 30,960,000 in Ukraine. These figures show clearly the consequences of the Soviet Russian policy of exstirpation in Ukraine. If a normal increase of population had taken place, the population of Ukraine should have reached at least 40,000,000. Thus Ukraine had had from 1917 to 1939 a loss of 10,000,000 inhabitants! (comp. Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union — History and Prospects:* Geneva, 1946).

An entirely different picture statistics show in Russia: from 78 million in 1926 the Russians grew to 99,3 million in 1939. These figures speak for themselves.

000 After World War II, the Russian Communist dictatorship is playing on the strings of the traditional Russian nationalism and imperialism more than before. 'The great Russian nation', 'the great Russian language' and similar epithets doubtless inspire the Russians and make them an obedient instrument of Moscow's imperialistic policy.

During World War II a new political trend appeared among the Russian emigrants who had fought at the beginning of the revolution in the 'White Armies' against the Communist dictatorship. This was the movement of so-called 'Soviet Patriots', who began to return in masses to Russia, especially from France, inspired by the prospects of the growth of the Russian Empire under Communist leadership.

In the Soviet Union the national movements of the subjugated peoples are officially regarded as the 'principal danger'. Therefore, the Soviet Government is making haste in 'liquidating' entire nations which Moscow has recognised as 'reactionary' — Crimean Tartars, the peoples of the North Caucasus, etc. Of course, the

Of course, the 656
Ukrainian problem has remained from old times for Soviet Russia 661
the basic problem of its internal and foreign policy. The unceasing Russification policy against the Ukrainians is carried on by particularly cunning methods: the Ukrainian language is not yet [191] abolished definitely in the offices of Soviet Ukraine. But that official who speaks Ukrainian also in his family and in private relations becomes in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suspicious, and has to suffer repressions.

The Communist theory of the national problem worked out by Lenin preaches the 'fusion of nations'. Basing on this, the Russian Communist Government is trying to 'fuse' the nations of the Soviet Union with the Russians. Against peoples who oppose forced Russification, ruthless repressions are used by Moscow. Even the mentioning of the national rights of the non-Russian peoples is condemned in the USSR as 'bourgeois nationalism'.

There is a great principal difference between the situation of the 000
Russians and the peoples united by force with this state: though the Russians are not satisfied with the Communist dictatorship, they do not, however, feel national oppression. Even in the new anthem of the USSR it is said that this state was rallied by Great Russia. We can state the efforts of Russian political groups opposing the Communist régime to maintain the rule of the Russian state over the territories conquered by Soviet Russia, even after the eventual fall of the Soviet régime.

As a curious fact we can quote the view of the well-known Communist L. Trotzky, who was assassinated in Mexico during World War II, on the Ukrainian problem. Trotzky demanded in 1939 the full separation of Ukraine from Russia. But Trotzky thought of an independent Ukraine in the form of a Soviet Republic. This naturally deprived his thesis of all seriousness, for Trotzky needed the slogan of an independent Ukraine only as a political argument in polemics against Stalin (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 77/78, 1939).

As the facts prove, the Ukrainian nation has to endure the heaviest oppression in the USSR. Unfortunately, the words of the famous historian of France Charles Seignobos written in 1913 on Ukraine, can be used emphatically to describe the outstanding feature of the present state of the Ukrainian nation: "Here is the most oppressed nation" ("Voici la nation la plus opprimée", *Les Annales des Nationalités:* Paris, 1913).

In its equalising policy, the Soviet Russian Government retains, 659
also, traces of the Tsarist régime in the affairs of Church and reli- 79
gion. Thus, after having seized Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine dur- 661

ing World War II, the Soviet Government abolished the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church by force, against the will of the population, and destroyed the hierarchy of this Church. The Ukrainian Greek Catholics who were in union with Rome were ordered to become subordinate to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow, who is backed by the Soviet Government.

The struggle of the Ukrainians against Russian imperialism did not cease after World War II. It is being conducted in various forms. In this struggle other peoples who are oppressed by Russia, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkestan, participate. Thus a common front of freedom-loving peoples against despotic Russia is being created.

In 1949, Moscow has permitted Ukraine to use an own flag and an own different anthem. However, this cannot be regarded an extension of the rights of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. It seems to be more an attempt to bring the so-called satellite countries to the Ukrainian level.

Moscow is watching attentively every expression of Ukrainian political thought and national sentiment, and wants to have everything under its control. The Decade of Ukrainian Culture held in Moscow in July 1951, ended with rebukes and threats against the participants of the Decade, and a 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists whom Moscow imputes 'bourgeois nationalism'. Only the Russian Communists have beeen beyond any doubt as regards their 'internationalism'; there was no case that the manifestations of nationalism among the Russian Communists had been condemned by the Communist Party. On the contrary, Moscow is cultivating an exaggerated national pride among the Russian people. The Ukrainian Communists are under a especially heavy control of Moscow. No Ukrainian has been General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This position has always been occupied by people sent from Moscow: Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Khrushchev, finally Melnikov.

'Titoism' is no isolated phenomenon in the relations between imperialist Russia and Yugoslavia. Similar trends hostile to Russian imperialism have existed among Ukrainian Communists since the first days of Soviet Russian occupation in Ukraine. The Russian terrorism prevented these trends, however, from getting strong. Nevertheless, they exist clandestinely. Moscow's persecution of 'burgeois nationalism' among the Ukrainian Communists gives an eloquent proof of Ukrainian opposition against Russian imperalism.

After this first chapter of Muscovite national policy was completed, the second one began: the "New Economic Policy" (NEP). The Soviet Union was urgently in need of composure, of a breather and recuperation. The Bolsheviks in Moscow, therefore, loosened the reins and introduced the semi-free economy in which land, large enterprises and the banks remained the property of the state, the peasants obtained the usufruct of the land, and a free market could regulate
648 the distribution of goods. Simultaneously with the NEP, Moscow launched a second enterprise: the nationalization of non-Russian peoples. For it was necessary to administer in small doses and in as attractive a form as possible, Bolshevist ideology to the Ukrainians, the White Ruthenians, the Caucasian and all other peoples who were under Moscow's rule. With the XII Congress of the Communist Party in 1922 the policy of Ukrainization was adopted, to be sure only in the area of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic with its 443,000 square kilometers of surface and approximately 23 million Ukrainians, while the many millions of Ukrainians in the White Ruthenian Soviet Republic, the Russian Soviet Republic including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in the Kuban area, on the Volga and in Siberia were at that time already being de-nationalized. During that XII Congress in 1923, the following words were spoken about the Ukraine: "This is one of the problems which threaten to involve Soviet Russia and the Party in the greatest complications. It is one of those problems which, we must admit frankly and honestly, will promulgate civil war if we do not approach it with delicacy and understanding."

The Ukrainian Communists adopted Moscow's
661 slogan without hesitation. To Ukrainize - that
648 meant to give Ukrainians leading positions in the government, in the Party, in the cooperatives, in economy, in the press and in the school system; /114/ it also meant using Ukrainian as the offi-

661 cial language and promoting Ukrainian culture in
648 all its aspects, in science and art. The process was carried on so eagerly in all fields that in the course of it the task of converting people to Bolshevism seemed almost to be forgotten. In fact, a Ukrainian national Bolshevist movement was started, which soon ran into opposition with Moscow. It was headed by the People's Commisar for Popular Education, Shumskyj, whose group openly opposed the "exploitative colonial policy of Moscow". The situation was not too good within the Communist Party of the Ukraine. Shumskyj divulged this in his speech of May 12, 1926: "Within the Party, the Russian Communist prevails; he does not trust the Ukrainian Communist and is hostile toward him." (59)

59. Fedenko: Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R., page 12.

648 How weak the position of Moscow was after the subjugation of the Ukraine is shown by the Constitution of the Soviet Union of 1923, in which the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as well as the remaining national republics of the Union had to be formally recognized. The defense system, the transportation system, finances and foreign policy were declared to be affairs of the state. The Foreign Commissariat in Moscow established a branch in Khar'kov, which at that time was the Soviet Ukrainian capital.

The process of Ukrainization reached its
661 external climax with the visit of the Ukrainian
648 champion of liberty Colonel Konovalets who in 1918 and 1919 had carried on the bitterest battles against the Bolsheviks and now visited Kiyev at the invitation of the President of Soviet Ukraine, Petrovskyj. Like so many other emigrants he, too, had let himself be dazzled by Muscovite nationalist policy. What Petrovsky was able to show his West Ukrainian guest was indeed astonishing com-

•661 pared with that which remained to the Ukrainians
648 in Poland. The old cultural city on the Dniepr was experiencing a new efflorescence; 70% of all students in Soviet Ukraine were attending Ukrainian schools. There had been nothing like
[214] it since the days of the Cossacks. /115/ Between
[217] 1918 and 1928 the Academy of Sciences published 888 works and numerous libraries were founded. (60) Hundreds of newspapers, periodicals and

60. Tisserand: The Ukraine, Life of a People, page 283.

pamphlets enlightened Ukrainians eager for knowledge in their mother tongue, and poetry and belles-lettres had reached a very high level. But soon black shadows were to fall on this brilliance.

Not yet satisfied with the results of the
661 policy of Ukrainization - in 1929 only 36% of
665 the officials were Ukrainians, the rest Jews and Russians (61) - the Central Committee of the

61. Fedenko: Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R., page 17.

Communist Partv of the Ukraine decided at the end of December, 1929, to intensify the process of nationalization. Especially the working classes were to take an active part in Ukrainian cultural life; Ukrainian theaters were to put on regular performances in the industrial areas; there were to be "Ukrainization cells" formed in the factories, the high union posts and the leading positions in the cooperatives were to be held by Ukrainians, and adherence to the course of nationalization of the administrative system was to be supervised. In this manner the cities were to be Ukrainized. The Commissar of People's Education, Skrypnyk, the successor of Shumskyj, successfully sought both to disseminate Ukrainian literature

665 and raise its standard and to do the same for the
661 theater and films. He even intended to impede the sale of newspapers and books written in Russian. When the first Five Year Plan was drawn up the Ukrainian Economic Council had its own demands to make to the state planning commission. It requested the establishment of industries which should make the Ukraine economically independent of the rest of Russia, as for example, textile factories, leather factories, paper mills and chemical plants.

665 The Pan-Russian Communists had repeatedly warned of such a development. Even in 1927 when Shumskyj was transferred to the north for disciplinary reasons, the Communist Party drew up a memorandum to the Executive Committee of the Comintern /116/ which, among other things, stated: "Before the Revolution we had almost no Ukrainian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia in the cities, now they are increasing every year, they multiply through influx from the villages, they strengthen their positions in the economy and the apparatus of government and endeavor to bring a certain proportion of Soviet officials, workers and Party members under their influence." (62) In this

62. Zaliznyak: The Struggle Between the Ukraine and the Soviet Union, page 669 ff.

memorandum the great danger of nationalistic deviation within the KPU (Communist Party of Ukraine) was emphatically pointed out. "The Disquieting Signal" was the title of a review of Vaganian's book On National Culture, in the official organ of the Russian government publication: The Reader and the Author. To Vaganian's warning of national cultures the government publishing firm adds the remark that there is danger in the fact that in recent times a number of Ukrainian authors have published works which the

648 162 budget plans. If things went on in this way the social system of communism would face serious crises as a result of the flourishing peasant economy of the Ukraine - in the regions of Great Russia communal ownership of fields has prevailed since ancient times - and the Muscovite conception of national unity might be seriously threatened by the increasing power of "assembled peoples".

In order to avoid these dangers and also in view of other considerations, Stalin discontinued the New Economic Policy and introduced the period of the Five Year Plans. In spite of the decision of the Sixteenth Party Congress, the way to Russianization was opened, and Ukrainization discontinued; Ukrainian nationalism received a hard blow when free peasant farming was immediately liquidated. There have been untold victims of these revolutionary processes which were attended by violent upheavals from the time Stalin announced his principle of "socialism within one country".

648 185 "Socialism within one country" demanded industrialization as the presupposition for the independence of the socialistic /118/ state. This industrialization had to take place throughout the realm and according to a unified plan. Every form of particularism could only be detrimental - the Ukrainian form doubly so; for in the Ukraine are the coal and metal and the water power reserves of the Dniepr from which horsepower by the millions can be obtained. Such considerations led to the First Five Year Plan, in the course of which Ukrainian economy, heavy industry, finance and particularly agriculture were subordinated to orders from Moscow. The division of private economy was "liquidated".

• 661 The new system* introduced the purging of the Pan-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in the year 1930, where members of the "League for the Liberation of the Ukraine" had entrenched themselves; they were now "unmasked". In a monster trial in

* [i.e., Beginning of the Five year Plans — Analyst]

•661 Khar'kov, Ukrainian scholars were sentenced to many years' imprisonment and exile - shooting was not yet customary at that time. In 1931 a second national Ukrainian organization, the "National Center", was uncovered, to which members of the Communist Party also belonged. Two years later about 4000 persons were arrested, of whom it was said they belonged to the "organization of Ukrainian revolutionists". Everywhere the GPU - state political division - discovered dangerous Ukrainians. The Secretary of the Central Committee of the KPU, Kossior, stated in this connection at the conference of the active section of the Party in Khar'kov the end of 1932: "The nationalistic elements became particularly active in 1931 and 1932 when every day they penetrated new areas of socialistic development." (63) In the course of the de-

63. The Ukraine and the Nationality Policy of Moscow, page 54.

nationlization of the Ukraine, the People's Commissar Skrypnyk was also obliged to resign. Stalin called to account this collaborator of Lenin, who had been Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet government, because of "nationalistic deviation". Thereupon Skrypnyk committed suicide. In his place the enemy of Ukraine Zatonskyj and the Jew Khait, undertook the task of disciplining and educating the Ukrainian people. /119/

In its desire utterly to exterminate Ukrainian nationalism, the Moscow regime spared no one, neither the peasants who defended themselves against the loss of their property, nor the scholars whose eyes saw beyond Karl Marx' horizon, nor such supernumerary mouths to feed as poets, are in a land of production. Soviet poets in general never had an easy time of it. Whether they wrote love poems and poems about spring, or

•661 whether they remained silent, both could be interpreted as "sabotage against socialistic progress". In this situation an author "steers his boat like an adroit sailor through the stormy waves of Stalin's Party policy and takes care only to save himself." (64) What could be in-

64. The Ukraine and the Nationalities Policy of Moscow, page 82.

terpreted as a crime against Party policy in these purging actions against Ukrainian nationalists is shown by the fate of Grigory Epyks. In his book The First Spring "the true nationalist unmasks" himself in the following words: "He became lost in thought as he pictured to himself Vassa's full bosom, her slender, straight legs that tapered down to her ankles in a gentle curve. Serge feasted his eyes on this picture and began to conjure it up distinctly in his imagination. Vassa's legs did not seem thin, neither were they heavy. Their firm curve began gently at the chiseled knee,descended gradually, swelling proportionately toward the calves, by no means puny, and terminating in the thin, seemingly chiseled ankles. For such legs heavy servitude was probably many a time imposed on the Ukraine by the people of the Orient, and eyes and a soft, deep voice such as Vassa Polubotko had doubtless gave the Ukraine the right to be proud of their daughters." "In this nationalistic admiration of a racy Ukrainian woman," the critics of Epyk stated, "within a theory of national biology, which is actually the theory of race, crass nationalism is revealed." Epyk saved himself from spending his life in a labor camp by writing an appealing letter to the /120/omnipotent Postyshev, from which the latter communicated the following: "By planning terroristic attempts at assassina-

661 tion we have for many successive years carried on actions, in comparison with which the deeds of a highway robber may be called a model of honesty and humanity. I understood that the sentence of the proletarian court must be the following: to deal with me as with a mad dog, to do away with me as with a sick horse, to remove me from the social organism. The Communist Party has magnanimously accepted my penitence. The Party has given me life and the joy of work." (65)

65. The Ukrainian Literature in the Service of its Nation, pages 47 and 48.

661 It was Postyshev whom Stalin sent into the
665 Ukraine at the end of 1932 with a small army of GPU men and whom he ordered to destroy the "national counterrevolution", while Tsatonskyj and Khait were to discover, unmask and correct "national aberrations". After approximately a year's activity Postyshev reported his "successes" to the plenary meeting of the Party actives of the city of Khar'kov in November, 1933. According to this report, 27,400 of a total of 125,000 members of the KPU were expelled in 1933; 1000 nationalists were removed from the People's Commissariat for Public Education and its subordinate organizations in the province, nearly 2000 from the cooperatives and economic organizations, and approximately 300 professors and assistants from scientific institutions. 2500 Ukrainian nationalists were rounded up by Postyshev's agents in central positions of Soviet Ukraine in Khar'kov alone. Finally, 237 Party secretaries of the peripheral administrations, 249 chairman of the executive committees and 158 chairmen of the controlling commissions, as well as 1300 members of the Association of Communist Socialist Youth (Komsomol) were victims of this purge. (66) The

66. Report of Pstyshev at the Party meeting in Khar'kov in November 1933.

661 general secretary of the KPU, Kossier, was appar-
665 ently justified in saying: "The fact that we have
000 shattered nationalism, /Facing page 120/ /Ukrain-
ian girl drawing water./7/Facing page 121/ /What
a wealth of imagination and highly developed
skill is disclosed in these pretty handmade nat-
ional costumes!/7/121/ that we have organized our
work properly in the country, this has determined
our successes in the year 1933." (67)

67. Izvestiia" Number 19 and Number 20, 1934, in Nation und Staat, page 107.

000 Several years later these fierce foes of the Ukrainian people were themselves to be "unmasked". They were, for example, the friend of Postyshev, Ioina Iakir, at that time supreme commander of the Red Army in the Ukraine who had raged furiously against the nationalists at the Seventeenth Congress, and the People's Commissar Tsatonskyj who was shot in 1937 because of counterrevolutionary activities. Tastonskyj's successor, Khomenko, was relieved of his office on April 9, 1939.

642 From the time that Moscow once more obtained for itself, with bullet and bayonet, a separatist Ukraine, the freedom of the country has been constantly curtailed. When the period of "integral centralization" with the Five Year Plans, began the branch office of the Foreign Commissariat in Khar'kov was eliminated, the Ukrainians were removed from leading positions in economy and the government, and the individual commissariats and whatever important commanding positions there were, were little by little turned over to Moscow.

The democratic Constitution of November 1936 tops the skyscraper of integral centralism. Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution are merely a gesture, according to which "every Soviet republic exercises supreme power quite as a matter of course"

7 [For plates, cf. pp. 221-222, category 116 - Analyse]

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668 the cause of Leninism. Only a few weeks before Skrypnyk's death, Khvylovyj, long the subject of refined persecution by the Soviet authorities, had been driven to commit suicide (May, 1933). According to information provided by his close friends, Khvylovyj left a note saying "I am dying because I love life."

668 661 Acting upon Stalin's order to persecute Ukrainian "nationalism," Postishev stated, in a report to the plenary session of the Ukrainian Communist Party, November 19, 1933, that the discovery of Skrypnyk's deviation led to the purging from the Ukrainian Socialist culture of any adherence to Petliura's, Machno's and other national elements. He also declared that within a few months 27,000 members, out of a total membership of 125,000 were expelled from the party, along with 1,300 members of the Comsomol. Relieved of their posts were 240 secretaries of regional committees of the Communist Party, 250 heads of "Ispolkoms," 150 heads of controlling committees, about 1,000 officials of the Commissariat of Education, about 2,000 co-operative workers and 300 professors of various educational institutions beginning with the Ukrainian Academy of Science.[41]

Despite the increase of physical and moral terrorism, Moscow did not succeed in eliminating resistance to its rule in the Ukraine. Early in 1933 the Soviet Secret Police reported the existence of a new well-organized and disciplined underground organization, this time the "Ukrainian Military Organization," whose large membership included commanders of the Red Army, scientific workers and young intelligentsia. The aim of this group was similar to that of the ones previously uncovered, excepting that the Ukrainian Military Organization was preparing a military revolt against the existing order.

The Soviet difficulties in the Ukraine were again illustrated at the seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party. In his report on the dangerous developments in Ukraine, Stalin stated:

> The fall of Skrypnyk and his group in the Ukraine is not exceptional. Similar 'dislocations' are observable among certain comrades in other national republics.[42]

Describing the spread of local nationalism and labeling it as far more perilous for the Soviet rule than Russian chauvinism, Stalin continued:

41 Sciborsky, *Ukraine and Russia*, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

42 *XVII. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B). January 26-February 10. 1934.* Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow, 1934), p. 30.

21 [cf. category 116, pp. 220-22 — Analyst]

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> Only very recently, in the Ukraine, the deviation towards Ukrainian nationalism did not represent the major danger; but when we ceased to fight it and enabled it to grow to the extent that it joined forces with the interventionists, this deviation became the major danger.[43]

The discussion of the national question was brought to a final halt at the seventeenth Congress and the Soviet Government decided to use police terror against the opposition.[44] Following this policy, new purges were instigated and every sign of dissatisfaction with the Bolshevik order was simply suppressed by Stalin's GPU.

The various stages of Soviet tactics in regard to the national policy—the recognition of the independent National Republics, the formation of the Soviet Republics, the amalgamation of the Soviet Republics into a single Union on the basis of a "free" federation, and the liquidation of the formal "Independence" of the Republics—practically places the Russian Communists in the role of promoters of the idea of a "single and indivisible Russia" despite the Bolsheviks' attempts to demonstrate the Soviet regime as an inter-nationalist one The Soviet leaders started from the point where the Tsarist and Provisional governments ended and gradually arrived at the stage of strict centralization and oppression—with only the provision that the Kremlin was no longer in a position to deny, at least theoretically, the existence of the Ukrainian nation and language. The Soviet Russian press, however, was given, as far back as 1936, a green light to recover from the archives of the past such names as Ivan Kalyta, Ivan the Terrible, Tsar Peter the Great, Katherina II and others.

The struggle against the Ukrainian "nationalists" was carried out until "all" independent elements, including many members of the Ukrainian Communist Party, were executed or silenced. Only after the employment of total terror could the Soviet regime officially "boast"

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43 Stalin's report, *ibid.*, p. 32.

44 Describing the tactics of the Ukrainian opposition, Postishev concluded: "The Ukrainian nationalists have an interesting system of distributing their units. Take for example the People's Commissariat of Education. Its director was Yavorsky; Yavorsky went, then came Ozersky; Ozersky went, then came Konyk; all of them proved to be members of the Ukrainian Military Organization, and its leaders at that. Or take the case of the one with the power of attorney in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. There you had Maximovich; Maximovich went, then came Petrenko; Petrenko went, then came Tur—again all members of the UWO (Ukrainian Military Organization), even of its directing clique. It was the same in all the places which they controlled. They maintained the principle of always substituting their own people. Once they got control of a responsible department, they would not let it out of their hands." Postishev's report, *ibid.*, p. 70.

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668 661 of the triumph and success of "brotherly" cooperation among various nations under the leadership of the great Russian people and the "wisest" Stalin. Nevertheless, these proclamations of co-operation were soon negated by existing facts. Again *Pravda* reported new anti-Soviet activity of the "enemies of the People" in the youth organization (Comsomol) in the Ukraine:

> There is uncovered again the unseemly sight of the work of counter-revolutionaries and spies within the Comsomol of the Ukraine. Masking themselves in a base fashion, they carry on disruptive counter-revolutionary work. They consciously fouled the cadres of the Comsomol and the propaganda apparatus and they ruined political education. They served the fascists, conducted spying activities and prepared sabotage and terroristic acts. . . . These enemies of the people placed their own men in executive posts. When these men fell at one post they were immediately transferred into another region.[45]

The resistance of the Ukrainians to Moscow's domination could not be denied. However, such statements had double meaning and were produced by the Soviet press in order to justify the policy of strict centralization and Russification in the Ukraine. Even such a loyal Moscow servant as Liubchenko, President of the Soviet Ukraine, was by now considered as a dangerous and undesirable individual since he was a Ukrainian and could hinder, as Skrypnyk did in the past, the realization of the Soviet Russian policy. For this reason he was compelled to commit suicide on September 11, 1937. In the familiar Bolshevik manner, the Soviet press informed the people that Liubchenko was involved in anti-Soviet connections and, "evidently" afraid to face his responsibility before the Ukrainian people for betraying their interests, had ended his life. Such an interpretation of Liubchenko's death—who in 1934 had praised the GPU for its successful work in "totally" destroying the "nationalist" groups within the Ukrainian Communist Party—gave the Soviet regime the "legal" right to replace most Ukrainians holding higher positions in the Soviet administration by Russians whom the Kremlin could trust. Nevertheless, passive resistance to the existing order was continually felt and could not be wiped out entirely.

186 In 1938 world tension and fear of World War II increased. Therefore, even the rise of national consciousness in the small Carp-

45 *Pravda*, July 25, 1937.

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000 ions and into the promotion of democracy within the Soviet Union.[48]

Numerous difficult problems, which Stalin was anxious to solve in accordance with his plans, forced the "Generalissimo" at the end of the War to follow a cautious policy toward the non-Russian peoples, liberated from the German occupation. First, he needed time for the stabilization of his power inside the Soviet Union. For example, in the Ukraine he had considerable difficulties with the well-organized Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which emerged in 1941 as the reaction against the German terror, and now was engaged in a struggle against the Soviet occupation forces.[49] In addition, there were millions of Soviet citizens in Western Europe, former German slave laborers and prisoners of war, whose return to the Soviet "homeland" was a matter of major importance to the Soviet regime. These people were living witnesses of the failure of the Communist experiments in their countries and could have given tremendous support to the free world in Stalin's planned cold war. Consequently, the Soviet Government was anxious to reach an agreement on the question of repatriation of all Soviet citizens from the Western countries. An agreement on this matter was concluded at the Yalta Conference and was announced by the White House on February 12, 1945. The anxiety of the Soviet Government was abated since the agreement did not provide for an individual choice between political asylum and repatriation but made the return obligatory upon all persons who were Soviet citizens as of September 1, 1939.[50]

661 As soon as the Soviet Government achieved control over the territories occupied by the Red Army, Stalin revealed his true plans with regard to the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. He accused some nationalities of being unworthy of the "privileges" given them

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48 The real meaning of the Soviet promises, alliances and retreats was clearly explained by Stalin in his article on "Strategy and Tactics," 1924. He wrote: "The revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as a means wherewith to link legal work with illegal work, in order to use it as a screen behind which his illegal activities in the revolutionary preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie may be intensified. This is what the revolutionary utilization of reforms and agreements in an imperialist environment means." J. V. Stalin, *Sotchineniya*, Vol. VI (Moscow, 1947), p. 166.

49 According to various information from behind the iron curtain, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is still operating in small detachments especially in the Carpathian mountains.

50 *Department of State Bulletin*, "Repatriation of U. S. and Soviet Citizens" (Washington, 1945), Vol. 14, p. 443.

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661 by the Soviet regime and, as a result, made them collectively responsible for the delayed defeat of the German Army. This condemnation brought about the liquidation of several Soviet nationalities such as the Chechen-Ingush, the Kalmyks, the Crimean Tartars and the Germans of the Volga.[51] With regard to the larger nationalities, like the Ukrainians, the Byelo-Russians, the Caucasians, who also proved to be unreliable during the crisis of 1941-43, Stalin had chosen the policy of total Russification, beginning with wholesale purges and persecutions, especially among the intelligentsia.[52]

661 814 The decision, however, of the Soviet Government to return to the old policy of Russification was met by strong opposition. Ukrainian history, for example, was based (up to 1934 and again during the Second World War) on Hrushevskyj's works. It was, therefore, inconvenient even for the Russian Bolsheviks who were assured of Stalin's support to suddenly reject this interpretation of history since it had previous official approval by the Communists. Facing this situation, Soviet Russian historians were compelled to invent evidence that Hrushevskyj was not a scientist-historian, but a "bourgeois nationalist" who deliberately falsified actual facts in order to prove the differences between the Russian and Ukrainian nations.

One of the striking illustrations of Soviet-Russian difficulties in dealing with Ukrainian history and literature was offered by Litvin in *Bolshevik* (official Party periodical, in an article entitled, "About the History of the Ukrainian People"). In this article, Litvin admitted that the presentation of Ukrainian history and literature had up to this time been based on serious errors and deviations from the Soviet principle. These errors were promoted by the "enemies of the people" who had not yet been liquidated by the Party. He uncovered these deviations and errors in practically all the Soviet-Ukrainian histories used in schools and universities over a period of twenty-five years, and accused most of the Soviet-Ukrainian historians of having

51 P. E. Mosely, "Soviet Policy and Nationality Conflicts in East Central Europe," *The Soviet Union, a Symposium*, W. Gurian, ed. (Notre Dame, 1951), p. 68.

52 Stalin's decision to return to the Tsarist policy of Russification should be considered as a severe blow to all non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, especially if one recalls his statement of what such promotion of Russian chauvinism would mean: "Every attempt to deviate toward great Russian chauvinism is an endeavor to ignore national differences of language, culture and mode of life; an endeavor to prepare the way for the liquidation of the national republics and regions; an endeavor to undermine the principle of national equality." Stalin's report at the XVI. Sjezd Wsesojuznoii Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), (June 26-July 13, 1930) cf. *Sotchineniya*, Vol. XII (Moscow, 1949), p. 362.

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served the anti-Soviet cause. The most inexcusable "crime" of these Soviet-Ukrainian writers was their failure to show that Great Russian literature played a significant role in developing Ukrainian culture. Litvin declared: 661 814

> The uncovery of serious shortcomings and mistakes in various publications of the Academy of Science of Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic by the Central Committees of All-Union Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Ukraine, as well as in many publications of the other Ukrainian publishing houses proved that the known group of historians and litterateurs in Ukraine are not sufficiently armed with the Marxist-Leninist materialistic methods and remain in the prison of bourgeois nationalistic methodology of Hrushevskyj. . . . Bourgeois historian Hrushevskyj developed a fallacious anti-historical conception of the origin and development of the Ukrainian people, as if the Ukrainian people had no relationship with the Russian people, as if the entire historical development of both nations had not proceeded in a genuine friendship, unity and mutual influence, but in a constant antagonism.[53]

In order to discourage Soviet historians from referring in the future to the works of Hrushevskyj, Litvin emphasized that Hrushevskyj had been in constant touch with the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, which directed anti-Soviet uprisings in the territories of the Soviet Ukraine long after the establishment of the Soviet order. Finally, after giving advice on how to write an "acceptable" history of the Ukraine, Litvin concluded that the "Ukrainian" people must wait for scientific works from Soviet historians, who will be able to present concrete proof of the "brotherly" union between the Russian and Ukrainian people and their common loyalty to the Bolsheviks.

Simultaneously with Litvin's accusations, the co-workers of Soviet-Ukrainian journals, newspapers and propaganda were advised to adjust themselves to the new Party line by denouncing and purging the "remnants" of the Ukrainian National elements from Soviet-Ukrainian literature. They were further advised to praise the Soviet order as an achievement of the Great Russian people, who, therefore, must be recognized as the leaders of all nations on the road to Communism.

The climax of the anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian course was

53 Litvin, "About the History of the Ukrainian People," *Bolshevik*, No. 7 (Moscow, 1947), pp. 44-45.

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reached in the summer of 1951. On June 15, a ten-day festival, in which most of the Soviet-Ukrainian writers and poets participated, of Ukrainian art and literature was opened in Moscow. For some reason Stalin did not send his traditional greeting to the festival. But he attended the first performance of the opera, "Bohdan Khmelnitzkyj," the libretto of which was written by a well-known Soviet-Ukrainian writer, A. Korneichuk and his wife, Wanda Wasilevska. The following morning, the Soviet official newspaper, *Pravda,* condemned the libretto and accused its authors of "departure from historical truth." 661

On July 2, *Pravda* published an article which excited much attention in the Soviet Union and abroad. A war-time patriotic and popular poem by the Ukrainian poet, Wolodymyr Sosyura, entitled "Love the Ukraine" (written and repeatedly published in 1944 with the approval of the Soviet officials and reprinted in the Leningrad literary magazine, *Zvezda,* in May, 1951) gave *Pravda* an opportunity to unleash a blast at the ideological defections of Ukrainian writers and artists:

> . . . It is true, in his poem the poet calls for love of the Ukraine. The question arises: *Which* Ukraine is in question, of *which* Ukraine is Sosyura singing? Is he singing of that Ukraine which groaned for centuries under the exploiters' yoke and whose sorrow and bitterness poured out in Taras Shevchenko's angry lines? Or does Sosyura's poem refer to the new, prosperous Soviet Ukraine, created by the will of our people, led by the party of Bolsheviks? It is sufficient to examine Sosyura's poem to remove any doubt that, contrary to the true facts, he is singing of some primordial Ukraine, the Ukraine "in general." . . . Out of time, out of historical epoch—this is the Ukraine in the poet's portrayal.[54]

Following this attack, a series of meetings, at which serious ideological errors were found to exist, were initiated in July and August throughout the Ukraine. Having "proved" that the poem was "bourgeois-nationalistic," *Pravda* accused the editors of Russian journals which published the poem, the Ukrainian Press, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Ukraine of having failed to recognize and to combat the dangerous deviationist tendencies of Ukrainian writers.

In his open letter to the editors of *Pravda,* dated July 10, Sosyura

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54 "Against Ideological Distortions in Literature," Editorial, *Pravda,* July 2, 1951, p. 2.

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abjectly recanted his "unfortunate" errors. In a weird way, possible only under the pressure of Bolshevik terror, Sosyura wrote that he profoundly grasped the fact that the Soviet Ukraine cannot be conceived as separate from the mighty growth of the Soviet multi-national state, and that the Ukraine, after all, owed its present happiness to the fraternal assistance of the great Russian people. "Thanks to the leadership of our Party and of the deeply beloved leader of our peoples, Comrade Stalin, has the Ukraine become what it is," concluded Sosyura.[55]

On July 13, *Pravda* published a decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in which it was admitted that the deficiencies and errors were a result of laxity of the Central Committee in directing ideological-educational work. The Communist Party of the Ukraine pledged itself to take as quickly as possible drastic measures to eliminate serious existing deficiencies and errors in ideological works. It would educate by every means "the intelligentsia and the whole Ukrainian people . . . in the spirit of devotion to the party of Lenin and Stalin."[56]

Many more articles appeared and continued to appear in the Soviet press and journals on the distortion of ideology in Ukrainian literature and arts. The real reason for these accusations were clearly described in *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 15, in an article by the Soviet Ukrainian literary critic, Leonid Novichenko. He wrote:

> (Sosyura) . . . represents the Ukraine as standing alone, without connection with the great Russian people and other peoples of the Soviet Union. . . . The author refuses to see that in the battle to free the Ukraine, the sons of all the peoples of the Soviet Union and, in the first instance, the sons of Great Russia, took part; about them, he rudely and insultingly keeps quiet. . . . Sosyura, while praising a certain "exclusiveness" of the Ukrainian language, considered it possible not even to mention the Russian language, which is to every Ukrainian as much a native language as is Ukrainian itself.

The search for the shortcomings and mistakes in Ukrainian culture was intensified. On July 22, *Pravda Ukrainy* finally discovered that in the Ukraine,

> Too few lectures are being given on the economic and cultural construction of our country, about the eternal friendship of the Russian

55 Sosyura's letter to the editors of Pravda, *Pravda*, July 10, 1941, p. 4.
56 *Pravda*, July 13, 1951.

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> and the Ukrainian peoples and about the struggle against the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

That the Soviet leaders were compelled to refer to bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism as dangerous phenomena after thirty-one years of occupation of the Ukraine, is concrete proof of the Communist failure to destroy the will of its people to live in liberty. Under the pressure of "public" opinion aroused by *Pravda,* the sixth plenary session of the Board of the Union of Soviet Writers of Ukraine was summoned at Kiev on July 30-31. Writers and poets from all over the Ukraine foregathered to discuss the "crisis" of Ukrainian literature. At this session, Sosyura was allowed to read to the assembly his new poem, "Ukraine," especially prepared for this occasion in order to demonstrate how much benefit he had derived from *Pravda's* "just" criticism.

Simultaneously with the anti-Ukrainian campaign, the Soviet officials discovered "nationalist" deviations in Armenia, Azerbaidzan, Turkestan, Byelo-Russia, Estonia, and in the Uzbek and Kazakhs Soviet Republics. The total mobilization of all party workers for the struggle against the dangerous internal "enemies" of the Soviet Russian people was once again underway. As in the past, the accusations of deviationism from the Party line would result in wholesale persecutions and purges of thousands of individuals found "guilty" of this "crime" by the Soviet regime. Such tactics, however, have resulted only in the weakening of the Bolshevik regime since they have driven millions of people into a silent passive opposition hardly to be destroyed.

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Thus history speaks clearly and unmistakably: the Ukraine, with its vast rich soil shelters people whose past demonstrates their yearning not to expand or to rule others, but to be their own masters on their own territories. Their tireless and fearless effort to establish an independent state and to gain their freedom certainly deserves consideration in any plans with regard to Eastern Europe. Freedom is worth fighting for; and it is freedom and equality not for the select few nations, but freedom for all, that will solidify all the peoples who, with God's help, shall one day celebrate a victory over freedom's conqueror—Bolshevism.

orientation. Khvylovy considered that Ukrainian literature should go 665
its own way and look towards Western Europe, no matter whether 186
bourgeois or proletarian. Shumsky advocated that the Ukrainian Communist Party should be independent of the Russian Communist Party.

This crisis within the Ukrainian Communist Party* prompted the 661
Moscow Bolshevik leadership in 1926 to make one of Stalin's principal 665
assistants, L. M. Kaganovich, Ukrainian party secretary for a short 186
period during which the first great purge against the nationalist deviation was carried out. Khvylovy was ejected from the party and Shumsky expelled from the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When Khvylovy repented he was given another chance and re-admitted as a party member, but in 1933 he committed suicide after a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism had been launched.

Admittedly the methods of repression in the Ukraine were comparatively liberal until 1929-30. From that time onwards the oppressive policy of the Soviet State overshadowed in the minds of the Ukrainian nationalists in the U.S.S.R. the contribution which Polish, Rumanian and Czech communists were ready to make for the establishment of a Greater Soviet Ukraine. Many Ukrainian nationalists became convinced that national unity was less vital to the Ukrainians than cultural and [177]
political freedom, in particular that free intercourse with the West which Moscow was unwilling to grant.

The Soviet State inflicted many heavy blows on the representatives 668
of the western orientation among the Ukrainians, but never vanquished 661
it entirely. In this struggle Ukrainian nationalism commanded an almost inexhaustible reservoir of resistance forces. Bloodshed and terror seemed incapable of stamping out the longing for spiritual freedom. Almost every year brought the discovery of a new conspiracy, a new series of trials, a new trend in national Ukrainian deviations. In 1929 the G.P.U. discovered the 'Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy', the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in 1931 the 'Ukrainian National Centre', in 1933 the 'Ukrainian Military Organization' (UVO).

The offensive by the central Government against the Ukraine's trends [814]
towards a more independent existence was conducted not only in the political sphere but also in the field of culture, where the régime had originally granted some scope to Ukrainian nationalism. One of the main bulwarks of Ukrainian nationalism was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The history section of the Academy had turned out to be so anti-Bolshevik that it had to be disbanded altogether while its head, Professor Hrushevsky, was exiled to Russia proper. This banishment of the 'great old man' of Ukrainian nationalism from his place of work showed better than anything else that the policy of reconciliation which Moscow had originally pursued in its relation towards Ukrainian nationalism had been but a short-term manœuvre.

*[Cf. category 665, p. 130 --Analyst]

THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

661 668 423 Political and cultural oppression of Ukrainian nationalism[1] was co-ordinated with a tough fight against the Ukrainian peasant masses opposing the policy of collectivization. Famine, total disorganization of the Ukrainian agriculture and the formation of armed peasant bands were characteristic features of this period. The central Government got the situation in hand by physically annihilating peasant resistance, by making partial concessions on the tempo of collectivization and by thoroughly purging, between 1930 and 1932, the staff of the Ukrainian Peoples' Commissariat for Agriculture of alleged Borotbist wreckers.

THE SKRYPNIK AFFAIR

661 186 665 The Ukrainian crisis in the early thirties culminated in the 'affair Skrypnik', which was the most important single event in Ukrainian history of that period.

After his unsuccessful fight in 1922 as an associate of Rakovsky[2] for a 'Confederation of Soviet Republics' and for the quasi-independence of the Ukraine, Skrypnik in his day-to-day work as Peoples Commissar for the Interior, Justice, and Education tried to save for the Ukraine what could be saved in the way of an autonomous status. One of his main preoccupations was to prevent as far as possible the foundation of all-Union institutions such as the All-Union Agricultural Academy; but he failed.

Skrypnik had been a Marxist since 1897, and a member of the Bolshevik Party since its foundation. After the Revolution he was not just a local Ukrainian figure but became a Vice-Premier in the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nobody could with any shadow of justification denounce Skrypnik as nationalist. Skrypnik, it is true, considered that the central Government should bring proletarian internationalism and justified national aspirations into harmony with each other. 'Our work', he used to say, 'should be organized in such a way as to give the working masses of each nation the possibility of developing its national consciousness as much as possible'.

This conception amounted from an orthodox Bolshevik standpoint to the 'triumph of nationalism over the proletarian revolution' and was bound to get Skrypnik into trouble sooner or later. The men whom Stalin commissioned to liquidate the 'Skrypnik affair' were a Pole, Stanislav Kosior, and a Russian, Pavel Postyshev, first and second secretary respectively of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The final clash occurred on June 10th, 1933, in Kharkov, when Postyshev and Kosior, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, accused Skrypnik of being an enemy of the State and the actual head of the Ukrainian counter-revolution. At

[1] [Cf. cat. 186, pp. 130-131 - Analyst]
[2] [Cf. cat. 642, p 128 - Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Ukraine RD1

that meeting the Ukrainian Communist Party decided that Great Russian chauvinism had ceased to be the main danger in the Ukraine and that Ukraine nationalism had become enemy number one. The decision constituted an important landmark in the history of the Soviet Ukraine and the prelude to a purge on a tremendous scale.

Skrypnik drew his conclusions from the 'new situation' by committing suicide less than four weeks after the decisive meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Executive Committee. Skrypnik's disappearance, whilst affecting the situation in the Ukraine in general, was particularly important in the field of Ukrainian cultural policy. After Skrypnik's death Postyshev and Kosior stopped the 'Ukrainization of the Ukraine', a favourite slogan of Ukrainian communists up to 1933, and started a determined campaign against 'over-Ukrainization'. 'Fight against over-Ukrainization' was in reality nothing else than the recapture by the Great Russians of some of the positions which had been lost to the Ukrainians, particularly in the Donets Basin. There is no doubt that the Ukrainization had been overdone and had actually led to the imposition of the Ukrainian language on non-Ukrainians, particularly in the schools.

THE 'GREAT PURGE'

In 1934 and 1935 the party leadership discovered a big terrorist organization of Borotbists in Kiev and Kharkov, as well as an alleged 'Nationalist-Trotskyite Bloc'.[6] In 1936 the situation seemed to be more stable in the Ukraine, but 1937 was again a disastrous year for that country. Official Soviet statements claimed that in 1937 Ukrainian nationalism had made particularly extensive efforts to detach the Ukrainian S.S.R. from Russia by plotting with German and Polish fascists. Some of the plots and conspiracies uncovered had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism and were simply Ukrainian off-shoots of anti-Stalin currents within the All-Union Communist Party. It is true, however, that the Ukraine suffered much more during the big purge of 1937–38 than any other Soviet Republic. Moreover, the purge went on in the Ukraine after it had been ended on the whole in other parts of the Soviet Union.

The new chain of dramatic incidents started in the Ukraine in the summer of 1937, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Panas Petrovich Lyubchenko, committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest, trial and execution. Lyubchenko had been Prime Minister for three years during which he had made himself conspicuous by his passionate speeches denouncing Hitler's plans of aggression. Lyubchenko was a former Borotbist and thus suspect to the Kremlin. He was charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian fascist party and allying it to the 'right-wing Trotskyite centre'.[7] Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, was arrested

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
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661 665 668 after two months of office for alleged treasonable contacts with Ukrainian separatists. After Bondarenko, Vlas Y. Chubar, a Vice-Premier in the Central Government, became Ukrainian Premier. He was purged in the spring of 1938. Together with the three Prime Ministers, Lyubchenko, Bondarenko and Chubar, a large number of Ukrainian ministers, high officials and party dignitaries were removed from their posts including the party secretaries, Kosior and Postyshev, once so powerful. The purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party was so thorough that of the thirteen members forming the Ukrainian Politbureau in April 1937 not one was left by June 1938. One of the last prominent Ukrainian communists to disappear was Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky, the President of the Ukrainian S.S.R. There is no evidence of Petrovsky, Kosior or Chubar ever having been sentenced by a court. No public trial of a Ukrainian communist leader seems to have taken place after March 1938 when Grigory Fyodorovich Grinko, Finance Minister of the U.S.S.R. was sentenced to death as a 'Ukrainian nationalist' and 'Polish spy'.

To clear up the situation in the Ukraine, Stalin, early in 1938, appointed two new men to the key positions of that republic. The party secretary of Moscow, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchov became first party secretary of the Ukraine and M. A. Burmistenko second secretary. From the point of view of the Kremlin, Burmistenko's appointment was a mistake. He mysteriously vanished during the Nazi invasion of the Ukraine and may even have deserted to the enemy. Khrushchov, on the other hand, was the right man for the job. When taking it over he made a statement extremely characteristic of the entire communist Ukraine policy. He declared that the traitors to party and country would be annihilated to the last man just as Taras Bulba had killed the betrayer of his own people.

[539] The Cossack Ataman, Taras Bulba, the hero of Gogol's famous novel, slew his son, Andriy, who fell in love with a beautiful Polish girl, betrayed his homeland, his Orthodox faith and fought against his own people. Seen through modern eyes, Andriy is but a symbol of Polish, Western and Catholic orientation among the Ukrainians.

Yet Taras Bulba had still another son, Ostap, who represents the daring loyal Cossack fighter bravely enduring all tortures by the Poles who put him to death. The death of Ostap is the prelude to the triumph of Ostap's cause: 120,000 Cossacks appear on the horizon of the Ukraine, a victorious army sweeping away the enemies, the Poles. Taras died in this great struggle but before his death he pronounced a last curse upon the Poles and forecast the final triumph of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar'. 'The time will come', said Taras, 'when there will be no power in the world which will not be conquered by him'.

THE UKRAINE

Stalin and his collaborators see the essence of the Ukrainian problem in the same way as Gogol[1] did by considering it basically as a struggle of Taras against Andriy, the Russian conception of the Ukraine against the Western conception. Krushchov was right in evoking the parallel of Taras Bulba because under the Soviet régime Taras, the faithful watchman in the South of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar', once again killed Andriy when he became attracted by the West and ready to desert both faith and 'Czar'. S.U. 635 186 UK 661 668 665

Krushchov as party secretary went on to kill 'Andriys'. His first victims were leaders of the Ukrainian Communist Youth League who were removed from their posts in December 1938, having been apparently overlooked in previous purges. Khrushchov rarely killed in the physical sense; he rather weeded out all influences and tendencies not in conformity with the narrow views which a Soviet Taras Bulba may have on history, literature, education, etc.

COMINTERN AND 'WESTERN UKRAINE'

In all its internal fights against Ukrainian nationalism the Soviet régime never forgot the 'other Ukraine' beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union. A geopolitical gesture in the summer of 1934 was especially intended for the attention of this 'other Ukraine'. It was the removal of the Ukrainian capital from Kharkov to Kiev, which was equivalent to the transportation of the centre of gravity of the country from the Eastern Ukraine to the Western Ukrainian areas near the Polish border. SU. 648 563

Kharkov had been made the capital of the Soviet Ukraine in December 1919, in an attempt to link the administrative centre of the country as far as possible with the labouring masses of the Donets Basin; but Kiev was the historic capital and Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, liked to play up Kiev against Kharkov. This too was checked by the transfer of the capital. An official Soviet commentator said that the removal of the Ukrainian Government to Kiev, which was celebrated with music and dancing, had an 'extraordinary significance' both for the Ukraine and internationally, and that it was a more important event than the transfer of Russia's capital from Petrograd to Moscow after the October Revolution.[8] S.U. [361]

This latter remark was true in so far as the shifting of the capital constituted a prelude to the annexation by the U.S.S.R. of the Ukrainian territories of Poland. This annexation carried out in 1939, it should be well noted, was by no means a triumph of political strategy but was due to the use of force alone. The failure to win over the population of the Western Ukraine by peaceful means was probably the greatest defeat which the Soviet nationalities policy had suffered on Russia's frontiers. S.U. [728] [635]

1 [Cf. category 116, p134, R1 Sov Union, Analyst]
2 [Cf. category 116, pp 136 ff -- Analyst]

themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrain- 000
ian peasantry.

While the armed struggle of Ukrainian nationalists was confined to 186
a small fringe along the Ukrainian border, the Soviet Government had 814
to face more subtle forms of opposition throughout the Soviet Ukraine. 661
One of the outstanding features of the post-war development in the Ukraine was that the same cultural institutions which in the purges of the thirties had been compelled to change their nationalistic Ukrainian personnel from top to bottom, were again involved in difficulties with the Soviet authorities.

This was particularly true of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and especially of its Institute for Language and Literature and its Institute for History. The former produced in 1945 an *Essay on the History of Ukrainian Literature*, whose authors stressed the dependence of Ukrainian literature on the West and 'concealed that Russian and Ukrainian literatures exercised a mutual fertilizing influence on each other in the course of centuries'.[19]

Even more serious 'nationalist excesses' were committed in the field of history writing. It seems that practically all major historical works which the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences published in 1941–5 contained 'serious mistakes of a nationalistic character'. For several years the party and state authorities did not pay much attention to the works of Ukrainian academicians; but after 1946–7 the leading party organs restarted to analyse Ukrainian historical writings and pointed out that Ukrainian historians had never, in fact, succeeded in overcoming the influence of the nationalistic-bourgeois school of Professor Hrushevsky.[20]

In the light of official Soviet admissions the ideological consolidation of the Ukraine seemed not to have advanced by a single inch since the days when Hrushevsky was still the teacher of the historians and Khvylovy, the authority for those dealing with problems of Ukrainian literature. Twenty years after Khvylovy's first expulsion from the Communist Party, and fifteen years after his suicide, orthodox Ukrainian Bolsheviks were still haunted by the fear of 'Khvylovy-ist ideas' and were active in opposing them.

The first step in the purge of Ukrainian literature in the post-war 186
period was the replacement of the editorial boards of the three leading 661
Ukrainian literary journals *Vitchizna* (Fatherland), *Dnipro* (Dnieper) 538
and *Radyansky Lviv* (Soviet Lvov). All three journals had been accused of systematically printing nationalist novels and articles. As the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers was obviously responsible for ideological offences committed in literary journals published on Ukrainian territory, the purge had to be extended to this organization as well. The leading personalities of the writers' union, including its president,

[Cf. cat. 116, pp. 30-31, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1.Soviet Union
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186 Maxim Rilsky*, were dismissed in November 1946. Rilsky, one of the most outstanding poets of the Soviet Ukraine, was charged with being a 'prisoner of bourgeois nationalism'. He had not only 'sinned' in his works but he had also delivered a particularly objectionable lecture, 'Kiev in the history of the Ukraine', in which he 'idealized the old patriarchal order and depicted in rosy idyllic colours the conditions under the rule of landowners and bourgeois'. Together with Rilsky a whole group of Ukrainian writers was accused of nationalism, 'Khvylovy-ism' and reactionary tendencies, including I. Senchenko, Y. Yanovsky and P. Panch.[21]

661 538

Maxim Rilsky was replaced as president of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers by A. Y. Korneichuk, author of a large number of political plays, who had always accurately interpreted the party line and had earned nothing but praise from the supreme Soviet leadership. It was Korneichuk's task to lead Ukrainian literature on the road of strict Soviet Patriotism and 'Socialist Realism'. Indeed, Ukrainian writers, publishing houses and literary journals became more careful and it appeared during a certain period as if Korneichuk had really succeeded in his assignment. The 'Festival of Ukrainian Art and Literature' held in Moscow in June 1951 showed, however, that this was a deception. The festival gave the members of the Bolshevik Politbureau an opportunity of getting a closer look at Ukrainian cultural life. They found that Ukrainian authors and artists had still not overcome their ideological mistakes. Even Korneichuk himself who was expected to give a good example to his fellow-writers had committed a serious offence. He had written a libretto for the opera 'Bogdan Khmelnitsky', which, from the official point of view, was not sufficiently anti-Polish and not eloquent enough in its pro-Russian bias. Through its mouthpiece, *Pravda*, the Politbureau not only denounced Korneichuk and other writers for ideological distortions but also reprimanded the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party for having neglected the political education of the Ukrainian intellectual élite. The Ukrainian Central Committee, mindful of what had happened to the Ukrainian Communist leaders in the thirties, immediately pledged itself to remedy the situation.[22]

[626]

THE UKRAINE AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET 'WORLD POLITICS'

648 645

After having fulfilled its original mission of bringing all Ukrainian lands into the fold of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ukraine was given a new task.

* Rilsky, like most great poets of the Soviet Ukraine, has a 'nationalistic past'. In 1934 he and another poet laureate of the Ukraine, Pavel Tychina, were rebuked for their 'hesitation' in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to them. Yet another contemporary Ukrainian poet, Mikola Bazhan, who is not only like Tychina a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet but also a Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Government, used to be likewise blamed for the 'nationalistic soil in which his creations have been rooted'.[23]

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the expense of the Soviet Union in which the dream of a revived *Rzecz Pospolita* (never absent from the mind of the ageing Pilsudski) might be combined with a German *Drang nach Osten* which could give to the Third Reich effective predominance over a great economic land empire stretching beyond the Don and the Caucasus to Turkestan and the Altai. At the same time the German understanding with Japan threatened the Far Eastern dominions of the Soviet Union.

'The Ukrainian Question' began to be discussed in the German Press, and from 1934 'the foreign danger' ceased to be only a conventional formula at Soviet political trials. The uneasy masters of the Kremlin began to believe in its reality. The memoirs of the ex-Chekist Krivitski have made it clear that from an early date after Hitler's accession to power Stalin was planning to create a situation in which he might be able to arrive at a compromise with his adversary in Berlin—an event which was eventually consummated between the two parties in August 1939.

A direct collaboration with the Russians, as an alternative to joint aggression with Poland, had always attracted influential circles in Germany—circles which included the majority of those soldiers, technicians and business men who, during the Rapallo period, when many Germans were employed as specialists in Russia, had had excellent opportunities for forming a clear appreciation of realities in the Soviet Union. Many connections, direct and indirect, existed between these men and high officials in the Soviet armed forces, administration and industry.

The unsurpassed genius of Stalin for political manœuvre was never better illustrated than when he succeeded in annihilating all those elements most likely to be in—or in the future to enter into—relations with the Germans. Thus, at the same time, he was able to deprive the Germans of their potential collaborators, and was himself able to assume the position which his victims had intended to occupy vis-à-vis the Germans. From Stalin's point of view the execution of the 'Red' generals in 1935 was a preventive rather than a punitive measure, as were the subsequent widespread 'purges' in the armed forces and among the Communist officials in the national republics in the Ukraine, Caucasia and Central Asia. It was not by accident that the first to be eliminated were those who owed their revolutionary careers to their capacity for enterprise and daring action: the Marshals Tukhachevski, Uborevich and Yakir.

A Jew by origin, Yakir had distinguished himself in Budenny's 'Red Mounted Army' during the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in the summer of 1920, and later during the liquidation of the *atamans*'

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

871 Ukrainian schools were again started; a number of Communist newspapers began to appear in the Ukrainian language; and generally the usual 'Galician technique' of opening Ukrainian publishing centres, museums, libraries, theatres and so forth was followed (incidentally many Galicians made their appearance in Soviet Ukraine 626 during this period). The official 'state ideology' of Marxism was of course made obligatory for everyone, and the new volumes of Hrushevsky's fundamental history of the Ukraine which were now published in Kiev revealed that in his old age the distinguished professor had come to appreciate the truth of the doctrine of historical materialism.

The population remained as indifferent to measures of 'ukrainization' as it had in the *Rada* days, although now there were more numerous manifestations of it than in the past. Although Ukrainian had become a kind of official language, few appeared to have any taste for its use, either in the administration or in private life. One of the authors of *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, who occupied an administrative post in one of the Soviet institutions in the Ukraine between the years 1921 and 1924, confesses that he never once wrote a line in Ukrainian during the whole course of his employment.

665 In 1925 Kaganovich made his appearance in the Ukraine in the role of leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Stalin's future brother-in-law was also one of his most intimate friends, and at that time Stalin had already secured almost absolute power in the Soviet Union. Kaganovich's mission was to make a thorough inspection of the personnel of the Party in the Ukraine and to eliminate the 'unreliable and opportunist elements'.

At the same time Kaganovich had an opportunity of coming to the conclusion that Communism in the Ukraine was not at that date an overwhelming success. According to statistics published some time later by the Central Committee of the Party, out of every 10,000 inhabitants of the Ukraine the ratio of Communists was as follows: Jews, 155; Great Russians and 'new-comers', 88; Ukrainians, 39. About 15 per cent of women had joined Communist organisations—a far lower proportion than in the north. The proportion of Ukrainian students in the high schools which had been opened to form 'responsible Ukrainian workers and specialists' was disappointingly low in comparison to the number of their Jewish fellows: in the Social-Economic Faculty there were 1500 Ukrainians to 1000 Jews; in the Industrial-Technical Faculty, 2600 Ukrainians to 2200 Jews; in the Medical Faculty only 2000 Ukrainians to 2200 Jews; whereas the proportion of Ukrainians to Jews in the whole population was 10 to 1.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The predominance of the non-Ukrainian elements in the organs of administration and in educational institutions is of course explained by the fact that the Ukrainian people remained overwhelmingly peasant, and there had been in the nineteenth century, and even earlier, a large and heterogeneous alien element in the towns. Nevertheless Kaganovich, in his speech to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in 1927, was at pains to demonstrate the success of 'ukrainization'. 'Among us', he said with that graceful Jewish facility for identifying himself with the people among whom he had come, 'our Ukrainian culture has developed on a grand scale. Ukrainian culture has made such progress in all branches in these last years that even the most eager Ukrainian nationalists never dreamed of such rapid development. In primary schools Ukrainians are taught by Ukrainians in the Ukrainian language. The high schools are gradually becoming completely "ukrainized"; Ukrainian books and press are at present developing to an extent unknown in all the history of the Ukraine. In our Council of People's Commissars, which is the supreme administrative organ of our government, 13 out of 20 members are Ukrainian. In our Party's Executive Committee, 66 per cent are Ukrainians, 25 per cent are Russians, 14 per cent are Jews.' 665 563 178

Kaganovich's emphasis on the predominance of Ukrainians on the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party is, of course, meaningless, since in the Soviet hierarchy all power is vested in the Secretaries of the various regional and local Committees of the Communist Party, who are themselves responsible not to the members of the Committees but to the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. Stalin filled this latter position, and Kaganovich himself was his nominee sent from Moscow with complete power over the regional and local Committees in the Ukraine. Kaganovich's successor, 'the dictator' Postyshev, who only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was another importation from Moscow—as is Khrushchov, who is at present (1939) governing the Ukraine.

While Kaganovich was praising 'the achievements of "ukrainization"' he was already considering means of putting some limit on these achievements. In this same year when he made his genial speech before the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party under his influence issued a decree making Russian the second official language in the Ukraine. The First Five Year Plan was then beginning, and one of the most important features of this Plan was the wide development of industry in the Ukraine. The coal and metallurgical industries 665 178 191

665 178 191 were to be modernized, and the construction of the great power station of Dnieprostroy was in view. Thousands of engineers, technicians and specialized workers were being sent into the Ukraine and these people not only had no knowledge of the Ukrainian dialect but they found that dialect most inappropriate for correspondence between different Government departments on complicated technical questions. The intensified industrialization of the Ukraine was obviously destined to strengthen greatly all connections with the north and linguistic differences gave promise of frequent and annoying difficulties. Very soon the Ukrainian language came only to be used in the sphere of 'cultural relations'.

Meanwhile Kaganovich, in surveying the various aspects of 'ukrainization', began gradually to investigate the part played in different branches of the administration by 'Ukrainian nationalists' or those suspected of being such.

§7. 'THE REVOLUTION AGAINST THE PEASANTS': REPRESSION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

665 423 In 1929 the Communist Revolution was approaching its second and decisive stage: Marxist principles which had conquered the life of the cities were to be imposed on the countryside. But the process of 'collectivizing' agriculture was to prove even more difficult in the Ukraine than it was in the provinces of Great Russia. Individual property in land had always been traditional in the Ukraine, and the background of the social history of the country had been the unending struggle of the peasantry to maintain their right to own the land they worked—against Polish landlords and Cossack and, later, Great Russian landlords. The strength of the Ukrainian peasantry had always been their stubborn determination that each should own his plot of land, and their weakness had been a love of individual freedom degenerating often enough into libertarian anarchy.

423 474 The outlook of the Ukrainian peasant differed widely from that of the Great Russian. The *obshchina*—the old Russian form of possessing (but not of working) land collectively—was unknown in the regions of Chernigov and Poltava and in all right-bank Ukraine. The creation of *kolkhozy* (collective farms) was from the beginning opposed, generally passively and sometimes actively, by the peasantry. And Kaganovich hastened, so soon as peasant opposition developed, to deprive the Ukrainians of the weapon which the national idea might provide. (In Caucasia and Turkestan, during the same period, opposition to collectivization was combined with a renascence and strengthening of local nationalist movements directed

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

731 South-Eastern Russia died of hunger in the first months of 1933. As in 1921–2 numerous cases of cannibalism were recorded.

665 661 In spite of this vast tragedy, self-satisfied and triumphant speeches were a feature of the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets which met at Kharkov in 1935. 'For glorious Ukraine the last years have been, as in the rest of our country, a period of brilliant unheard of achievements. The rapacious rural *kulak* class has been completely destroyed, annihilated. Never will the heroism of those days be forgotten! Never will the loathing against the oppressors disappear! Those were not idle words which Lenin wrote when he affirmed that the principal enemy of our Bolshevism is the peasant! Thousands of the best sons of our country have lost their lives in the great and ruthless struggle.' 'Against this enemy', in the words of *Pravda*, 'the economic structure which carries along with it joyous culture and a happy life to millions of Ukrainians suffering for centuries from privations has at last triumphed in the country.' Stalin's revolutionary Communist régime proved, as ever, logical. If 'thousands of the best sons of our country' had really lost their lives in 'the great and ruthless struggle' against the peasantry, the peasants had to count their losses in millions.

000 But notwithstanding the brilliant victory proclaimed on the internal front in 1935 the Soviet Government had new reasons for anxiety in the radical change which had taken place in the European situation as a result of the attainment of power by the Nazi Party in Germany. The official doctrine of the Nazi Government was based on 'the right of the German people to an adequate living space', and the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler, in search of a better and happier future, was taking a dangerous interest in the east and south-east of Europe. It was now nearly twenty years since *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*; and the glib attribution of the military catastrophe of Germany in the last war to the evils of Marxism had had the result of reviving in a new generation of Germans all those vague aspirations after world dominion which recur from time to time to compensate that unfortunate people for the frustration which has been their historical lot.

In glowing passages in *Mein Kampf* Adolf Hitler had waxed lyrical on the subject of the Ukraine and the Urals, and the Führer seemed prepared to abandon the oceanic and colonial dreams of William II in favour of a continental imperialism which might carry the Germans into Asia in the first great movement in history of a people from west to east. In 1934 the ten years' Non-Aggression Pact concluded between Germany and Poland appeared to Soviet statesmen to be the first step towards a collaboration in the east at

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revolution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

186 565 668 They believed that the Revolution had almost automatically given them all that they desired—the right to use their own language, to have that language placed on a par with Russian and the right to secure their own land and to live peacefully upon it.

186 565 668 665 Between these two groups stood the bulk of the Ukrainian intellectuals grouped in the Social Revolutionist and Social Democratic Parties, each of which was modelled on its Russian equivalent. Yet we must not delude ourselves into thinking that these were political parties in any sense known to the Western world and America, where there has been a long record of political activity. They were before the Revolution rather conspiratorial and debating groups, busied with theorizing about all manner of political questions and (except where they had an opportunity to take part in the work of the zemstvos) without practical experience. A few of their members had served in the First Duma in 1906 but this had been dissolved within a couple of months by Tsar Nicholas II and each succeeding duma had become less representative. Thus the number of those intellectuals who had had practical political experience even in the conduct of elections was very small, while the debators, students, theoreticians, etc. in these parties cared more for the proper solution of ideas than for their application to practical life.

Neither of these groups existed as distinct Ukrainian parties. They tended largely to follow the leadership of the similar Russian groups; they had learned to employ the same methods, listened to the same leaders, and their demands as Ukrainians were loosely connected with their social and political theories. They were conscious, but only potentially active, nationalists and at the moment when it was necessary to make rapid decisions, they hesitated and splintered on the importance which they assigned to national and to economic and social measures.

The Social Revolutionists, largely intellectuals from the villages, were at first the more important. They were populists and non-Marxian socialists who voiced the desires of the peasants for the ownership of their land. They called for the confiscation of the large estates, for they did not believe that any one should have

larger holdings than he and his family could work. Since the land in Ukraine was held individually and the village community was only a figment of Russian law, they differed sharply from the Russian Social Revolutionists who stressed the existence of the community with an emphasis on the almost annual redistribution of land. Finally, they set themselves up as a Ukrainian party but still grouped around the journal *Narodnya Volya* (The People's Will), the traditional name for a Social Revolutionist paper. 186 565 668 665

By the autumn of 1917 this party had definitely split. The left, which stressed the economic and social aspects of the party, established another journal *Borotba* (The Struggle). This was soon followed by a formal schism and the creation of a new Social Revolutionist Party (Borotbisty) with the name taken from their paper. It was only natural that the relations between this group and the Bolshevik Great Russians tended to become closer as radical ideas gained strength in the country.

The numerically smaller Social Democratic Party was purely Marxian and it spoke primarily for the Ukrainian factory workers. Like the Russian Party, it was divided between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, with the latter drifting steadily toward the Social Revolutionists and even some of the bourgeois groups. On the other hand, the efforts of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks to establish their own party met with continual opposition. The Marxian theories of the withering away of the state had long been used by Lenin and some of the German Social Democratic leaders as weapons against the Poles in both the Russian Empire and Germany, and the same ban was now applied to the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. If they wished approval by the central authorities, they were told to become merely a Ukrainian section of the Russian Party. If they persevered in their efforts, they were read out of the party which in Ukraine was dominated by the Russian factory workers and the Russian miners from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih.

The position of the Ukrainian Social Democrats and especially the Bolsheviks was thus much more difficult than that of the less organized and more spontaneous Social Revolutionists. Strict party

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

186 discipline hampered them at every turn and ardent Ukrainians as
565 Mykola Skrypnyk, a personal and trusted friend of the Russian
668 Bolshevik leaders, refused to make any schism in the party, even
665 though he and his Ukrainian friends quite regularly appealed for recognition as a separate party, especially after the Bolsheviks recognized the existence of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

He, as an old Bolshevik, however, refused to cooperate with those Ukrainian Bolsheviks who dared to risk a fight with the central committee in Moscow and who finally tried to set up a Ukrainian Communist Party.

[648] The greatest weakness of both of these intellectual groups was their lack of appreciation of the importance of foreign policies. It was with great hesitation that their representatives in the Central Rada in the summer of 1917 approached the Russian Provisional Government to include a Ukrainian representative in all Russian diplomatic missions. They had had few or no representatives in the pre-revolutionary Russian diplomatic service; relatively few of them had been abroad, even to Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; they had no distinguished Ukrainian emigrants abroad who could speak to the world with the great authority of Ignace Jan Paderewski, Thomas G. Masaryk or Michael I. Pupin and during the crucial early months they largely neglected any consideration of foreign policy.

They wasted precious time in futile negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government over questions of federalism and they turned rather slowly toward the idea of independence. At each move of the more nationally conscious toward this goal, a certain portion of the more leftist members drew away toward the appropriate Russian camp in the name of internationalism and thus became the unconscious tools by which both the Provisional Government and later the Bolsheviks hoped to retain their control of the wealth of Ukraine.

It was this vagueness on the part of many of the intellectuals which kept them from being true intermediaries between the nationalist and military groups and the great mass of the peasants. It weakened the energy and zeal of some of the Ukrainian regi-

665 186 565 668

ments which had declared for the Ukrainian cause immediately after the outbreak of the revolution and facilitated the development of pacifist opinion in the rank and file. So when, at the end of 1917, actual fighting started between the Russian Communists and the Ukrainian Central Rada, the armed forces of the new state were not as well prepared as they had been some months previously, and it was necessary to start again under almost new and more unfavorable conditions.

The pressure of events and the necessity for defense against the Red and the White invaders brought together the more consciously nationalist elements, first to declare the independence of Ukraine and then to organize, but the economic and social divergences were never solved. The dissolution of the Central Rada by the Germans and their support of a conservative government only embittered the political feuds and encouraged the rise of peasant leaders who were content to operate in their own areas and switched sides as questions of the moment moved them. All this weakened the sounder forces of the state and created the bewildering succession of such forms of government as the Rada, the Hetmanate of Skoropadsky and the Directory under Petlyura and gave the struggle at times a bizarre appearance as the different forces raised by the different political groups now combined against one or other of the invaders, only to separate when the other became the more pressing danger.

Under such conditions the central authority was finally overwhelmed and those people who were most strongly committed to a free and independent Ukrainian state withdrew from the country. The Soviet regime was able to take control. This did not, however, end the difficulties for there soon came a revelation that all was not yet well and harmonized. The peasants continued to be restless. The guerilla leaders did not at once cease their activity. Above all, the country was ruined but the relations between the Russians and the Ukrainians were not yet solved.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER TWO

The Foundation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

186 642 665 As the power of the Provisional Government in Petrograd declined and more and more responsibility was assumed by the Central Rada in Kiev, relations between Petrograd and Kiev grew rapidly worse and the conception of Ukrainian independence gained strength in all circles, except among the Russian population of Ukraine. The seizure of power in Petrograd by Lenin could not fail to hasten the progress of separation.

During the summer and autumn of 1917 Lenin had advocated the widest application of the principle of self-determination and encouraged the non-Russian peoples to demand separation from the Provisional Government. He and his friends had hardly come into power, when he showed at once the cynicism and hypocrisy of his entire policy. The Central Rada in Kiev and the vast majority of the soviets in Ukraine repudiated the demand for the confiscation of all property, the expropriation of the land and the turning over of the control of all industry to the workers, although in the Third Universal it did provide for "state control over production in the interests of Ukraine and Russia" and declared that all land not worked directly by the owners was to become the property of the workers. For all intents and purposes, the Third Universal which was issued on November 20, 1917, did its best to separate Ukrainian affairs from Bolshevik control without as yet resorting to a declaration of formal independence.

This produced a very unsatisfactory situation, for the Bolsheviks attacked the efforts of the Secretary of the Rada for Military Affairs to effect an understanding with the old Russian Army

186 Headquarters at Mohylev and with the other national groups which
642 were rapidly making common cause with the Central Rada in
● 665 their opposition to the extreme measures of the Petrograd Soviet. The Council of Commissars in Petrograd claimed to speak for the whole of the former Russia in its efforts to make peace with the Germans. When the Rada denied this and approached the other non-Russian peoples, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd formally accused the Rada of withdrawing Ukrainian troops from the front, of disarming Bolshevik units in Ukraine and of allowing the Don Cossack forces to retire to their homeland across Ukrainian territory. On December 17, it hypocritically recognized the right of Ukraine to independence but threatened war on the Rada if it did not meet the conditions of the Council of People's Commissars.

At the same time the Bolsheviks in the Kiev Soviet arranged an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the hope of putting pressure on the Rada. The attempt missed fire for the Congress proved to be under the influence of the anti-Bolshevik parties and adopted resolutions declaring that the Ukrainians had not thrown off the power of the Tsar to accept the domination of the Commissars. The Bolshevik spokesman Zatonsky was unable to make himself heard above the opposition and only 80 members supported the Soviet demands.

As a result of this failure Vasili Shakhray and Zatonsky left Kiev for Kharkiv where they joined a Congress of Soviets largely from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih. There, on December 20, they established a new Ukrainian Rada under Russian Communist control and set up a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were joined by a group of Ukrainian Bolsheviks including Neronovych and George Kotsyubynsky, the son of the well-known Ukrainian author who had been a friend of Gorky.

[701] The so-called Ukrainian army loyal to this new regime was composed almost exclusively of Russian troops and was under the open command of a Russian officer, Michael A. Muravyev. This force occupied Kiev on February 7, 1918 and held the city for about three weeks. Its actions showed clearly the nature of the government. Under the pretext of liberating the Ukrainians from

the control of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and the Rada, it abolished all Ukrainian newspapers and its disorderly elements not only executed members of the Ukrainian and Russian bourgeoisie but also Ukrainian Communists and radicals who used the Ukrainian language in their hearing. 186 642 665

In the meantime the Bolsheviks had opened negotiations with the Germans in Brest-Litovsk where Trotsky claimed to speak for the entire former Russian Empire. To circumvent this, the Rada formally declared the full independence of Ukraine and sent delegates to the peace conference. As a balance to this, Trotsky introduced into the conference the representatives of this new Ukrainian Soviet Republic who claimed to be the spokesmen for the Ukrainian peasants and proletariat. Their arguments did not convince the Germans and Austrians, who saw greater possibilities of profit by recognizing the Ukrainian National Republic, so as to secure without fighting a large part of the Ukrainian grain supplies. The Ukrainian National Republic signed this agreement with misgivings, for, in fact, it threw the Rada into the power of the Germans and ended all chance of assistance from the Allied democratic powers which had previously regarded Lenin as the tool of the German General Staff. Now, with the conclusion of this peace, they extended their ill-will to the Ukrainian Central Rada. 648 186 642 665 [728]

The immediate result was German assistance to the Rada and the Soviet forces were quickly forced out of Ukraine and back into Great Russian territory. The leaders of the Ukrainian Soviet government were members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and could not raise the question as to whether or not their new state was actually independent, and whether it could be, if it did not have its own Communist Party associated on a par with the Russian Party in the Communist International.

This brief Communist interlude in Ukraine should have been most instructive to both the Allied powers and the Germans, but neither drew the true lessons from it. The Allies, who were still opposed to the principles of Bolshevism and were annoyed by the speeches of Zinovyev and Chicherin, became more friendly disposed to the Russian Whites and gave up their efforts to win through

648 invoking the democratic principles of self-determination the support
186 of any of the non-Russian peoples. The Germans, on the other
642 hand, after aiding the Rada to return, dispersed it on the ground
665 that it was too radical, but when a more conservative regime was set up under Hetman Skoropadsky, they did not give this honest support. They sought only for Ukrainian supplies and by their actions they weakened the power of the Hetman and strengthened discontent against his regime without allowing him to do anything that would weaken the power of the Communists.

The situation became almost ridiculously complicated. Germany, anxious to secure troops for the Western Front, was, by the spring of 1918, at peace with both the Commissars of Moscow and the government of Ukraine. It was therefore opposed to both the White Russians and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Even the Czechoslovaks on their way to Vladivostok, thanks to the negotiations between President Masaryk and Muravyev, were on friendly terms with the Ukrainian Communists and had difficulties with the Ukrainian government and the Germans. As soon as they crossed into the Russian Soviet Republic, they had difficulties with the Russian Communists and the Germans and found their support among a part of the White Russians. It was the same situation as in the far north where the Germans backed the White Finnish forces under Mannerheim against the red Finns who were the favored party of their friend and associate, Moscow. Yet all the time there was no Ukrainian Communist Party, for the Ukrainian Communists owed their prime allegiance to the Russian Communist Party which was, in theory at least, on the opposite side in the general disturbed situation.

To the Communists, as Skrypnyk, Shakhray and George Pyatakov who had played an important role in the Communist occupation of Kiev, this seemed a serious gap and at a meeting in Tahanrih in April they triumphed over the Communists from Katerynoslav who had insisted upon remaining merely a part of the Russian Communist Party. Their victory was of short duration, for when there came an organization meeting in Moscow on July 5, the Russian authorities definitely made it clear that they would not tolerate

the existence of a Ukrainian Communist Party. Bela Kun warned that in the international civil war that was to be begun, great efforts were to be made not to allow it to assume anything of a national character, but to keep it restricted and fought on class lines. They were also informed that they could in this new struggle have no relations with Mensheviks or any Ukrainian Social Revolutionists or Social Democrats. A few months later Stalin was elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian party as a symbol of the dependence in which the party was to be kept.

648 186 642 665

The first people to appreciate fully the dilemma in which the Ukrainian Communists found themselves were the Ukrainian Communist leaders who had established, with Russian help, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were quickly taught that as long as the control of their Party was not in their own hands, they were completely helpless and at the mercy of the Russians.

Shakhray, who had endeavored to argue at Kiev in December, 1917 that the Ukrainian Communists were to be counted as Ukrainians, very soon in Russia became so disgusted that he resigned from the Russian Communist Party and retired to Saratov to establish a Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He criticized the extreme policy of centralization carried on by the Russian Communists.

Along with S. Mazlakh, he published a book entitled *The Wave—What is being done in Ukraine and with Ukraine.* This book, which was often quoted later by Skrypnyk and his associates, was the theoretical basis for Ukrainian Communism. Shakhray tried to foster discontent against the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky by stressing his relations with both the German forces in Ukraine and the White Russian refugees who had taken shelter in that country. He declared that Ukrainian independence could only be consistently won by the Ukrainian Communists, for they, as the Ukrainian proletariat, were the only people who could advocate and carry through a real revolution in view of the treachery of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, he attributed the Communist failure in Ukraine to the fact that the Party was entirely under

648 Russian control and looked at the cause of the Communists through
186 the eyes of the Russian colonists in Ukraine who were, in accord-
642 ance with the Russian imperialistic tradition, working not for
● 665 Ukraine but for Moscow.

He soon left Saratov for Kuban and here he was captured and killed by the Denikin forces. Mazlakh, who had remained a member of the Russian Communist Party, was later shot by them for nationalism. The third Commissar for War, Neronovych, became disillusioned and on the entrance of German troops into Ukraine he gave up politics but he fell into the hands of the Ukrainian National Army and was shot. Thus, the first attempts of the Russian Communist Party to seize Ukraine and expel the Ukrainian National government ended disastrously and relatively few of the early leaders survived. Most of them paid the penalty for their actions to one of the contending forces, with the Bolsheviks executing then or later the larger number.

During the summer of 1918 while Hetman Skoropadsky remained in power, the chief work which the Communists could hope to do in Ukraine was through their mission in Kiev under the leadership of D. Z. Manuilsky. This was ostensibly engaged in negotiations for a definite peace treaty between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. In reality, Manuilsky was almost openly intriguing with the tacit consent of the Germans who had no desire to see their own position in Moscow jeopardized, as their armies were being driven back on the Western Front. Manuilsky was also able to notice the constant splitting of the leftist Ukrainian parties, which, in their hostility to the policies of the Hetman, tended to move nearer to the Communist position.

The disintegration in both the Social Revolutionist and the Social Democrat ranks became steadily more marked during the summer of 1918. When the German armies collapsed and the Hetman could no longer retain his post, a Directory of five men, including Petlyura and Vynnychenko, set themselves up at the news of the abdication of the German Emperor and they soon recovered Kiev. At the same time the left wing of the Social

Revolutionists (Borotbisty) refused to recognize the new Directory and drifted rapidly toward the Bolshevik position. 648 186

The Kremlin, sensing the great change in the Ukrainian situation, at once refurbished the idea of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. 642 665 Its real head was now Christian Rakovsky, a Rumanian with Bulgarian citizenship who had never been in Ukraine, but its nominal leaders were Pyatakov and George Kotsyubynsky. These moved from Kursk along the railroad lines into Ukraine at the end of December but Chicherin, in his telegrams to the Directory, categorically denied that the Russians were supporting this movement in any way. He laid all the responsibility upon the Ukrainian Communists. The ruse did not work and finally on January 16, 1919, the Directory, in which Vynnychenko's star was sinking, declared war.

This was opposed by the left wing of the Social Democrats who were very influential in the Directory. On January 10-12, the two wings definitely parted and the left adopted the name of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Independent) and insisted upon the establishment of a non-Communist Soviet Republic. The right wing, in view of the weakness of the Ukrainian proletariat, advocated instead a Congress of Workers which would include both peasants and the city proletariat. When war actually started, the left wing split again between those who were willing to stand for an independent Ukraine and those who refused to act against Russia under any circumstances. The latter took the name of USDRP (Independent Lefts).

It was not long before the Borotbisty and the USDRP (Independent Lefts) began negotiations for merging. Both were convinced of the superiority of the Soviet form of democratic government and both were convinced that any Communist government would inevitably recognize the essential rights of the Ukrainian people. In this respect they were far more naive than were the leaders of the first Ukrainian Communist regime who had already become completely disillusioned at the contrast between the theories and the practice of Lenin and his associates. They refused to cooperate with Petlyura and the Directory and, in effect, they with-

648 drew from its support a considerable section of the Ukrainian in-
186 tellectuals at a crucial moment.

642 On the other hand, with their own armies they fought against
665 the White Russians of Denikin, because they saw in these merely an attempt to restore the old order. Yet they declined to be included in the organized army of the Directory and by their independent actions they made more difficult the burden of the army commanders. They encouraged the formation in the country of independent military bands which added to the growing chaos. To emphasize their position they again changed their name to the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and constantly sought to ingratiate themselves with the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party which had again succeeded in reoccupying Kiev and in forcing the Directory to flee.

On the other hand, the USDRP (Independents), almost as true admirers of the Soviet system but far more critical of the Russian influence, did merge their forces for the fighting against Denikin with the forces of the Directory. In the summer of 1919, this group, under the influence of the Khmelevtsevs of Kobilyaky in Poltavshchyna, commenced again to review their position. After the death of their leaders in a crossing of the Dnieper and after the defeat of Denikin, they decided to adopt the appellation of Communists and to rename themselves the Ukrainian Communist Party without any additional description title. Thus, they took the name of Ukapisty and as such they dragged on an independent existence for some years, confidently expecting that they would ultimately receive national and international recognition from the Comintern, the Communist International.

This endless splitting and regrouping of the various parties proved a headache to the Directory which was trying to organize the country for defense against both of the Russian invaders. The individual armed forces, acting independently, aided in wrecking the economy and this inspired peasant leaders of various kinds to seek the control of their own native regions. Some of these men proved themselves able, if short-sighted, leaders. Some, as Nestor Makhno, were unadulterated anarchists who saw no need of any

central regime. Others were mere adventurers thrown into prominence by the course of events and willing to shift their principles for the sake of a momentary personal advantage. Others were patriots with no broader vision than their home districts. 648 186 642 665

As a result, throughout 1919 there were some 328 revolts against the extending power of the Russian Communist forces which were fanning out over Ukraine, slaughtering and robbing as they went but still unable to secure a definite control of the villages.

As opposed to this welter of conflicting ideals, the policy of the Russian dominated Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party was simplicity and clarity itself. This supported the paper independence of the Ukrainian Soviet regime and openly avowed its intention of subjugating the country and of exploiting it for the benefit of Moscow. Their purposes were even openly avowed at the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies on March 22, 1919, when Shlikhter, a Ukrainian German and one of the commissars appointed by Moscow to collect grain, declared: "You all remember how Ukraine began to become Soviet; with every day of the advance of the Red Army, we and you felt more easy; the rich grain-producing Ukraine is ours. We have four central military divisions collecting and on them we rest all our hopes. We have a mass of workmen sent in (from Moscow to Ukraine), who know how to search all the Ukrainian villages. We always remember that the eyes of the proletariat of Russia are turned toward Ukraine."

These remarks represented the cynical attitude of Lenin and the Communists. They ignored the statements as to a Ukrainian Soviet Republic that were being made by Lenin and others to woo the various leftist Ukrainian parties. They were safe speeches made to reassure the Great Russians that the Bolsheviks still had a monolithic outlook, even though they were prepared to go to almost any lengths to create a paper regime which would insure and facilitate the plundering of the rich grain-producing Ukraine. They told, more or less, the truth, that was not recognized by the more idealistic theoreticians, that the Ukrainian Communists were, in fact, the dupes and victims of the Moscow regime which cared nothing for the Ukrainian people, or even the Ukrainian proletariat.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

648 By the end of 1919 the Ukrainian Soviet regime was so satis-
186 fied with the success of its raiding and collecting parties that it felt
642 able to proclaim an amnesty and to disarm the population com-
665 pletely. To accomplish the latter purpose, new Russian forces were sent into the country, the villages were thoroughly searched and disarmed. The peasants were tiring of the apparently endless exactions of the independent commanders and they turned against many of the patriotic partisan bands and declined to give them further support. This broke the movement and even the alliance of Petlyura with the Poles and the short occupation of Kiev by the combined armies in the spring of 1920 did not suffice to restore the old enthusiasm for the hard-pressed Directory.

By the end of 1920, when the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet delegations met the Poles in Riga in October, 1920, the fighting was nearly over. The Poles signed a treaty of peace without consulting their Ukrainian allies of the Ukrainian National Republic. There was nothing for the forces of the Directory to do but to retire abroad and continue their unsuccessful efforts to secure Western assistance. This was not forthcoming. The French were interested in aggrandizing Poland as a bulwark against Germany; the other allies were openly supporting Denikin through a misinterpreted friendship with the Russian people and there did not seem to be left even a spark of the principles enunicated but a short time before in Wilson's attitude toward self-determination and the rights of people to govern themselves. The struggle was ended and the Ukrainians were left at the mercy of their Russian overlords, now back in a new guise.

to Russia and they behaved in every way as if they were in their own territory. 642 648

The key to this enigma[1] is to be found in the fact that the Ukrainian Communist Party was not regarded as an independent Communist Party with a seat in the Comintern, but was merely a branch of the Russian Communist Party. Its officers were therefore appointed at will and changed at the pleasure of the Russian Party. Its discipline and actions were controlled by Moscow and any independent Ukrainian development could be countermanded by a mere word from the centre. By this extremely simple device Lenin could maintain his hold over the Ukrainian Communists, even in the unlikely case that the Comintern was revitalized by the Communist seizure of power in another of the large states. 665 ●

The policy did not fail to arouse criticism, even during the wars, by some of the Ukrainian members of the Party. In 1920, a "fraction of the federalists" was formed under Yu. Lapchynsky with the aid of S. Kirychenko, P. Slynko and E. Kasyanenko. It was naturally dissolved as soon as its importance was recognized, and its leaders were expelled from the Party. They accordingly joined the Ukapisty and only returned when that voluntarily liquidated itself some years later.

There were thus at the moment of the ending of the Civil Wars three Communist Parties in Ukraine, the official KP/b/U, the branch of the Russian Party, the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and the Ukapisty, i.e. the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The Borotbisty were the first to go. They had been formed out of the Left Social Revolutionists and were less sure of their Marxian knowledge but they contained many of the leftist Ukrainian intellectuals who valued the development of Ukrainian culture. The group had been praised by Lenin for its great part in the defeat of Denikin. In the spring of 1920, the proposal was made that they fully join the Ukrainian Branch of the Russian Communist Party. Shumsky and Blakytny led the affirmative. The spokesmen for the opposition were Poloz and Panas Lyubchenko, who was later to be the head of the UkSSR and to commit suicide in 1937. The

1 [Sham independence of Ukraine from 1919 on -- Analyst]

665 affirmative triumphed, and the Borotbisty were dissolved as a separate group. They were given the nominal right of choosing two members for the Executive Committee of the KP/b/U but this was, of course, an empty phrase, since that Executive Committee was itself but an agent and tool of the Executive Committee in Moscow.

The Ukapisty offered a more serious threat, for they were trained in Marxian dialectics and they knew the weak points in the program of the Moscow centre. They accepted the Marxian analysis of capitalist society and the Leninist theory of imperialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet regime. As regards the question of nationality, they shared the Marxist-Leninist conception but in contrast to the Russian Communist Party they [186] adapted this to suit a non-ruling and enslaved nation. The Ukapisty[1] theoretically based the difference between its attitude and that of the Russian Communist Party on the fact that the latter represented the proletariat of a dominant nation, while they stood for the proletariat of an enslaved nation. Thus the one considered the question of nationality as a question of tactics connected with the spreading of the proletarian revolution; for the other it was a question of program connected with the liberation of the people and itself not only from capitalistic but also from national enslavement. They condemned the Russian Bolshevik practices in Ukraine and, in contrast to the Bolshevik idea of spreading the revolution by armed force (an idea which collapsed with the defeat of the Red Army at Warsaw in 1920 and which was then condemned by Lenin himself), they believed in the "internal forces", i.e. that the revolution would only be organic and lasting if it was carried out by the internal forces of each nation and not if it was introduced by bayonets from abroad. They stood therefore for an independent Ukrainian Soviet state, with its own red army, its own independent economy, and its entrance into the Comintern on an equal footing with all other Communist parties.

The Ukapisty were allowed to exist until 1925 and it was not until the Comintern was willing to declare that it was Muscovite to the core and that all foreign Communist parties were of right

1 [Ukrainian Communist Party -- Analyst]

subordinate, that the Ukapist appeal for inclusion was definitely 665 ● rejected and that the group was offered the choice of suppression or of self-liquidation. They accordingly accepted the voluntary decision and signed thus their own death warrants as had the Borotbisty by their early submission.

All three parties had the same general attitude toward all non-Communists and bourgeois groups. They were in general agreement that these had to be destroyed and driven from political and social importance. Thus, all adopted a hostile attitude toward the nationalists who had supported Petlyura and the Ukrainian National Republic. They attacked the remains of the Social Revolutionists, the Social Democrats, and all the non-Marxian or Marxian groups that did not accept a strict Communism. They dissolved the organizations and seized their property, while they imprisoned many of the older leaders and tried to humiliate them in the eyes of the Ukrainian public.

Thus in 1921, they staged in Kharkiv a public trial of the [687] members of the Executive Committee of the Social Revolutionists. The list included V. Holubovych, the Prime Minister at the time of Brest-Litovsk, N. Petrenko, P. Hubenko (Ostap Vyshnya), Lyzanivsky and many others. They were charged with hostility to the "government of workers and peasants" but apparently the regime was not too sure of its ground and merely sentenced them to relatively short terms in prison.

It was not only the politicians who suffered, for the new regime[1] 661 attacked every institution which it did not control. In 1920 575 it abolished all Ukrainian professional organizations and trades unions, including such as the Poltava Society of Workers in Co-operatives and similar groups in Kiev, Kharkiv, and other cities. Then, by arrests of the leaders of the cooperative societies, it forced new elections and put into power only those persons who had the direct approval of the Russian Bolsheviks.

It was next the turn of the purely cultural organizations. All the societies of the Prosvita (Enlightenment) which operated a chain of reading rooms, schools, libraries, theatres, etc. were disbanded on the ground that they were connected with the Rada

1 [Ukrainian Soviet Republic - - Analyst]

000 the coming years the form of Soviet life would steadily approach that in the Western world.

185 The same reaction was to be seen at home. Many of the more sincere and convinced Communists greatly disliked the concessions to the old order that were made at this time. It seemed to them that their revered master was turning his back upon his old position and they scoffed at the new Nepmen, who were growing wealthy under the new regime.

Lenin was not to be shaken in his policy. His motives in these concessions to capitalism are well expressed in the remarks in the *History of the All-Union Communist Party.* "Militant Communism had tried to take the fortress by frontal assault. It advanced too far and risked being cut off from its base. Lenin made the proposition to retire a few steps, to retreat for a while further to the rear, so as to pass from an assault to a siege, and then, after gaining strength, to return to the assault."

The later sequence of events showed the correctness of this explanation. The New Economic Policy in Lenin's mind was a temporary move which was made in the hope that the economic life of the country would revive. He made no lasting concessions and a careful reading of all the measures shows that they were not motivated by the sense of failure that was ascribed to them by the capitalistic world. Lenin did not put the measures in any form that would definitely bind himself or his successors. They did not provide any guarantees of their permanence, nor did they state any principle that was in contradiction with the basic philosophy of Communism. They were, obviously, a mere tactical manoeuvre in the difficult situation in which the Soviets found themselves.

185 The basic decree was signed in Moscow and was, of course,
665 only applicable to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. It could not therefore be valid without further action in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic which was, by hypothesis, a completely independent and sovereign state. Yet so closely knit together was the fate of the Ukrainian Communist Party with that of Russia that it was not necessary for the Ukrainian Soviet regime to issue immediately any new decree on the subject. It was automatically

[New Economic Policy, March 1921 -- Analyst]

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

assumed that it was equally binding in Ukraine and without any further ado, the Ukrainian peasants were given the right of selling any surplus products exactly as if there had been no independent Ukrainian Soviet government. 185 665

The legal aspects of this decree did not interest the bulk of the Ukrainian peasants. They saw only the relief which it afforded them and the opportunities that it gave. They immediately took advantage of it, and its first effects were to be seen in a surprisingly short time. Of course, there could be no improvement in the national well-being until the harvest and the harvest of 1921 was again reduced by drought, so that with the best of intentions, it was not until 1922 that conditions began to improve.

A new Russian land code was finally adopted on March 3, 1921, and it was, of course, the model to be observed in the Ukraine. Yet this did not suppress the discontent of the Ukrainian peasants. 423 671

In an effort to suppress this smouldering discontent, D. Manuilsky, who was then the Commissar for Agriculture of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee (the revolutionary centre and the provisional government of the country), summoned to Kharkiv a gathering of agronomists from all parts of Ukraine in the First All-Ukrainian Agronomical Congress. He found the more than one thousand present practically united in their assertions that the agricultural laws as developed by the Bolsheviks were inapplicable to the Ukraine. They had been drawn up and approved on March 6, 1919 and they were entirely based on the spirit of the Russian land commune which provided usually for a redistribution of the land every three years, with the supplemental provision that the redistribution should take into account the number of persons in each family. This was all very good when it agreed, as it did in Russia, with the general spirit of the people who were vitally interested in the commune as such. Conditions were different in Ukraine and the purely artificial Land Society was developed. Of course, all the peasants had to become members but the land was divided by households rather than on an individual basis. Furthermore, it was provided in the Ukrainian Code that "The right to land handed over for labor use is without term and

show profits. The very small shops and plants were in some cases 185
taken back by their former owners when they had survived and any 471
provisions about the use of hired labor were tacitly forgotten in the first flush of the New Economic Policy.

All of these measures were interpreted by the great mass of the Ukrainian people as a recognition of the validity of human experience. There were, of course, keen realists who gave full credence to the declarations of Lenin that the Soviets had never wavered in their objections and were using these concessions only as a means of reviving the life of the country and strengthening their own position. At first this did not seem to be true and it was only as conditions really settled down and a semblance of prosperity returned that it became possible to note the steadily increasing pressure which the government exerted.

In the same way the currency reforms were not without their 185
own influence. In 1923 the government introduced a new cur- 652
rency, the chervonets, which was ostensibly based on a gold stand- 435
ard, to take the place of the old depreciated paper. Nevertheless, the latter was allowed to circulate in the rural districts with the result that its value continued to fall and it became more and more difficult for the peasants to satisfy their needs for manufactured goods which were priced in the new currency. This produced the so-called "scissors," for with the restoration of industry, the value of manufactures continued to rise, while the prices of agricultural products continually fell.

The political system was still not clear. The new regulations 642
were introduced in the Council of Commissars in Moscow and it 665
was emphatically stated that they were for the Russian Soviet 645
Federated Socialist Republic, but Ukraine and also the other Soviet Republics put into practice the same resolutions, often without any decree by the ostensibly independent government.

The key to this enigma lay in the nature of Communist discipline. In theory and on paper the Soviet regime was thoroughly democratic in the broad sense of the word. There was an elaborate scheme of elections to the village and the higher Soviets, and even though this was weighted very heavily to provide increased repre-

[During NEW ECONOMIC POLICY -- Analyst]

642 sentation for the city proletariat where the Communists felt them-
665 selves strongest, it was always possible to defend the system.
645 Yet this does not tell the full story, for though non-party men were elected to the lower and local Soviets, the number of Communists increased steadily in the higher. These Communists were themselves classified as members of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party and they were bound by party discipline to obey all the instructions given by the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

There was thus, in reality, two governments in both Ukraine and the Russian Republic. There was first the republic government theoretically responsible to the people and thus transmitting the wishes of the people upward, even though the highest republic authorities were the direct appointees of Moscow. There was likewise the domination, more or less veiled, of the Communist Party, a government which only transmitted instructions from the top down. In the early days, and indeed for a considerable period, it is often difficult to determine whether certain measures came into effect because they had been approved by the Council of Commissars in Moscow or because they had the backing of the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party which was a monolithic organization, responsible only to its chiefs. It was in a sense a theoretical question for, by the period of the New Economic Policy, the Council of Commissars, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the control of the Communist International rested in the hands of the same men who functioned in three different capacities but still formed a well-knit body. Even though the legal relations between Ukraine and Russia rested on the vague treaties and agreements made during the period of Militant Communism and the civil wars, the Ukrainian Soviet government could be practically overruled at any moment and on any point on which it disagreed with the wishes of Moscow.

665 Since all non-Communist organizations had been dissolved[1] the only possible opposition could come from the Ukapisty, the Ukrainian Communist Party. This was composed of a small number of brilliant men, confirmed Communists, who insisted upon preserving

[1] [After establishing Ukraine Soviet Republic, A19 - -Analyst]

the independence of the Ukrainian Communist regime in the hope 665 that sooner or later they would be admitted to the Communist International as an independent national Communist Party. They therefore willingly accepted the doctrines of the International, which was little more than the third facet of the ruling block. By 1925 the situation had so far developed that their aspirations for this were definitely checked and even this theoretical opposition was eliminated by compelling the Ukapisty to enter into the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party, or else.

This situation makes clear the relations that existed between 661 Ukraine and Russia during the early years of the New Economic Policy. As agriculture and industry revived in Ukraine, it was suggested that the Ukrainian government send aid to its Communist brothers. That suggestion was a command, and just as the Muscovite bands under Militant Communism scoured Ukraine for food, so under the New Economic Policy, the so-called Ukrainian government began to drain off the wealth of the country for the charitable purpose of helping its Russian brothers.

The vagueness and the ambiguity of this system was partially 631 cleared up by the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty establishing this was signed on December 30, 1922, just as Lenin was becoming paralyzed and unable to function efficiently. It bound together the various Soviet Republics, while at the same time it paid lip service to the right of any of these Republics to secede. Of course, this was from the beginning an empty phrase, for the only people who had the power to declare the secession was the Council of Soviets of the Federal Republic and they were Communists assigned to their posts by Moscow and bound to obey the orders of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In addition to this, a surprising number of the ruling group of the Russian Soviet Republic now took over the corresponding posts in the Union and thus added still a fourth facet to their varied activity.

The Constitution, which was formally adopted at a Union 631 Congress of Soviets on July 6, 1923, went still further in providing 642 for the government of the Union. The Commissariats were divided 645

CHAPTER FIVE

Ukrainization

The period of the New Economic Policy was likewise the 186
time when the movement for the Ukrainization of the state reached its highest point. This was a complicated political, cultural and scholarly movement which aimed to develop the Ukrainian self-consciousness in every possible way and to establish the proper role of the Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It took many and diverse forms, and while it developed into a definite opposition to Russian influence and Russian methods, it was not primarily so much an anti-Communist as an extra-Communist movement, even though most of its outstanding leaders were tried and tested members of the party.

The basis for the entire movement is to be found in the slight attraction that Communism as a doctrine possessed for the Ukrainian people. As late as 1927 there were only 122,928 Ukrainian Communists, that is, about thirty-nine for each ten thousand of the Ukrainian population. The bulk of the Communists in Ukraine were Russian and the vast majority of these belonged to the urban proletariat or to the workers in the Donets Basin and Kryvy Rih. [665] ● [162]

The general period of disintegration during the civil war and the period of Militant Communism had greatly strengthened the power and self-confidence of the peasants and had weakened the power of the city workmen. This showed Lenin and the dominant group that some method had to be found to win at least the passive support of the countryside if new troubles were to be averted. [369]

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the tenacity with which the 186
Ukrainian peasants, whether they were literate or illiterate, clung 191
to their native language. Lenin had used this characteristic with 665

186 skill and success in encouraging the Ukrainian opposition to the
191 Russian Provisional Government. The proper recognition of the
● 665 language had been one of the most insistent demands put forward by all groups which had later come together in the Ukrainian National Republic. The failure of the Bolsheviks in their early occupation of Ukraine to recognize the Ukrainian language had been one of the surest means of arousing opposition to their course and this time with their power established, the Bolsheviks decided to change their policy. As early as December 6, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party had declared: "In carrying out absolutely the principle of the self-determination of peoples, the Central Committee considers it necessary to repeat again that the Russian Communist Party maintains the recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic." It encouraged the Russians in Ukraine to learn Ukrainian and to aid in developing this as a weapon for the Communist education of the laboring masses.

Yet all was mere verbiage and even Vynnychenko who, at this moment, was sympathetic to the Bolsheviks in his "Letter to the Ukrainian Workmen and Peasants," published in *Forward* (Lviv, 30.10. 2-3, II, 1920), lamented the fact that, despite this, the Ukrainian language did not receive its just due and that many Russian Communists were inclined to look upon even Ukrainian Communists as potential counter-revolutionists.

On the other hand, there was one group of Communists who were sincerely devoted to this goal. They were the former Borotbisty and the Ukapisty who had stressed the need for Ukrainian Communism and who had never lost an opportunity, while stressing their Communist feelings, to express the hope that the Ukrainian Communists might some time be formed into a special party and be duly admitted to the Communist International on a par with all the other Communist parties of the world. They took advantage of the situation offered by the formation of the Union of Soviet Republics and eagerly sought posts in the Commissariat of Education, which was one of the independent republic commissariats. This gave them a very good opportunity to work for the develop-

ment of Ukrainian and Ukrainian culture in a field where there could be little expressed opposition. 186 191

On the other hand, every step for the fostering of Ukrainian or its development was met by the Russian Communists, and especially by those in Ukraine, with the greatest hostility. This went so far that Dmytro Lebid, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the KP/b/U, declared that there was a conflict of two languages and cultures in Ukraine and that it was not the duty of the Communist Party to interfere in this but to allow the dominant culture to win. In this he was actuated as a Russianized Ukrainian by his hostility to his native language and culture but he failed to win support, for it was very obvious that his policy of favoring Russian was only deepening the gulf between the Party and the Ukrainian peasants, the thing that the Moscow authorities were endeavoring at the time to bridge. 665

On August 1, 1923, the Communist Party passed a new decree which said: "The government of the workers and peasants regards it as necessary in the immediate future to concentrate its power on the spreading of a knowledge of the Ukrainian language. The former equality existing hitherto between the two most widely used languages in Ukraine, Ukrainian and Russian, is insufficient. Life, as experience has shown, causes the actual superiority of Russian. To remove this inequality, the government of the workmen and peasants will introduce a series of practical means which, respecting the equality of the languages of all nationalities on Ukrainian territory, must assure to the Ukrainian language that place which corresponds to the number and economic importance of the Ukrainian people in the territory of the UkSSR."

It further provided that Russian officials in Ukraine should learn Ukrainian within a definite period. All this sounded well on paper but the date by which Russian officials had either to learn Ukrainian or be recalled was constantly postponed further into the future, and the highest men who came for but short periods and who represented Moscow in the Ukrainian capital stubbornly refused to make any effort to obey these decrees.

On the other hand, every declaration to this effect was eagerly

186 snapped up by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty in the Commis-
191 sariat for Education. In a short time they worked so effectively
●665 that nearly all the books published in Ukraine and about 85% of the newspapers were put out in Ukrainian. The circulation of these Ukrainian publications in the villages increased rapidly and aided in producing a sense of relief among the peasants and a tolerance of the situation which was in sharp contrast to the prevailing mood of a few years before.

[871] A network of Ukrainian schools was set up throughout the country with instruction in the native language and the number of students grew rapidly from among the peasant classes. It had been centuries since the Ukrainian language had reached such a state of popularity. The theatres produced plays in Ukrainian as the chief part of their repertory. The cities assumed a markedly Ukrainian appearance and the leaders could look with satisfaction on their results.

871 The one difficulty was the low level of the instruction in many
186 places but this was equally characteristic of the Russian terrain.[1] The revolution and the Bolshevik laws had abolished the old Russian system of education and had eliminated from the schools the bulk of the older intelligentsia and their children who, on one excuse or another, were excluded from all opportunities for study. The old disciplines were abolished and the Soviet school entered upon a chaotic period. Nevertheless, the changes which the former Borotbist Hrynko introduced, including the establishment of seven year schools which gave the students the right to enter upon a three year course in various technical schools, served to increase rapidly the number of young and partly trained Ukrainians who were available for posts in the government service and who thereby freed the organization from its dependence upon Russian-trained people.

645 In 1925, he[2] was succeeded in the post of Commissar by O.
871 Shumsky, likewise a Borotbist, who had held the post of Ukrainian
186 Minister in Warsaw. He had come back in 1923 to become the
665 Director of Agitation and Propaganda for the Central Committee of the KP/b/U. An ardent believer in the Ukrainian cause, he

[1] [1923 -- Analyst]

[2] [Hrynko, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

opposed very strenuously all the Russifying influences in the Party and insisted, as a matter of principle, that only Ukrainian Communists should be promoted to prominent posts in the Ukrainian Communist organizations. He even went so far as to insist, when Kaganovich was sent from Moscow as Secretary of the Ukrainian section of the party, that he be removed and replaced by Chubar, an old Bolshevik, and he recommended that Hrynko should be made the head of the state. 645 871 186 665

Kaganovich, who had been rather on the side of Shumsky in many of his enterprises, now turned against him on the ground that he was breaking Communist discipline and, in a short time, Shumsky was removed and transferred to Moscow, where he received a post as head of the trade unions. From there he was moved to Leningrad to become head of a school of economics, but by this time his star was setting. Shumsky, on more charges, was sent to a concentration camp near the Finnish border. According to the story, he was assured that he had a chance to escape. He tried it and was shot. His leading assistants, Maksymovych, Vasylkiv and Turyansky, were branded as Shumkyists and punished accordingly. [687]

His successor, M. Skrypnyk, took up his work as Commissar of Education under even better auspices. Unlike his predecessors, who had entered the Communist Party from the ranks of the Borotbisty or the Ukapisty and who thereby risked the charge of being Ukrainian nationalists and having bourgeois-nationalist sympathies, Skrypnyk had been an old member of the Russian Social Democratic Party (Bolsheviks). He had been a personal friend of Lenin long before the Revolution. He had been arrested several times by the tsarist government, had taken an active part in the October Revolution of 1917 and was a disciplined member of the party. He was thus above reproach so far as his party standing was concerned.

From the time of the foundation of the Ukrainian National Republic, Skrypnyk had been one of the outstanding Ukrainians in the Communist Party. From the beginning he had taken the definite stand that the Communist organization in Ukraine should be thoroughly Ukrainian, independent of the Russian Communist Party and with a seat in the Comintern. He believed that Ukraine

645 should naturally have a Soviet government and be an indepen-
871 dent state with all the rights and perquisites of the RSFSR and
186 he regarded the war between the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and
● 665 the Ukrainian National Republic as a civil war in which the Soviet Russians naturally came to the aid of the Soviet Ukrainians. At the same time he believed equally strongly that this assistance should be that of a brother-nation and should have no elements of a foreign occupation.

He was a disciplined Communist and he always acted in accordance with the strictest Communist tradition. He never joined any faction or questioned the vote of his superiors but he remained firm in his convictions, and while he was always in the minority and was willing to yield superficially, he always seized the next opportunity to advance substantially the same points but in a somewhat different form. He was on friendly terms with Stalin and he came to his post after a definite interview with Stalin and with instructions that put him in a position second only to Kaganovich.

The appointment of Skrypnyk with his Communist record showed very well that in 1927 the VKP (the All-Union Communist Party) was still playing with the idea of making the Communist International a real gathering of supposed equals, united under the leadership of a central body in Moscow. It was a tacit recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a political entity, but it was equally the recognition of a Marxian Socialist culture which might lead to some of the later developments of Stalinism. The appointment insured Stalin of the aid of the true Ukrainian Communists in the coming battle between him and the left deviationists.

Once in his own mind Skrypnyk had answered the problem, he did not waver. He accepted the Marxian doctrine that by the development of an urban proletariat he could develop the Ukrainians to the point where they would be justified in demanding an entrance into the Comintern as an independent nation. He interpreted the cases of Czechoslovakia and Latvia as exactly that, since the proletariats of Prague and Brno, as well as Riga, had forced

national independence and he set himself to do the same in Kiev and Kharkiv. 645 871

Without wavering in his devotion to the principles of Communism, he attacked the problem in the broadest possible way. He stimulated derussification by supporting the Ukrainian press, theatre and schools. Under his influence and work, the cities, including Kharkiv, where Ukrainian influence had been relatively weak, came to be predominantly Ukrainian and in smaller places it became very rare to hear Russian spoken. The State Printing House and the smaller cooperative publishing houses produced almost nothing that was not in Ukrainian and during the few years that he remained in control, there were more Ukrainian books published than in the preceding century and a half. 186 665

Skrypnyk was still not satisfied. He extended his activity and patronage of things Ukrainian to all those areas in the RSFSR where Ukrainians were living in compact settlements. He provided Ukrainian papers, books and theatres for those who were living in Kurshchyna, Voronizhshchyna, along the Volga, Kuban, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan and the Far East. He sent educated men and women to establish schools and other cultural institutions and, for the first time in history, efforts were made to establish a real community of interests among all the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

More than that, he held out a friendly hand to Western Ukraine, which was under Polish rule. Although by this time the entire control of foreign affairs was concentrated in Moscow, Skrypnyk was allowed to arrange for a Ukrainian consul in Lviv and Yur. Lapchynsky, a former Ukapist, was appointed to the post. The consul's duty was to win support for the Communists in Eastern Galicia and, in pursuance of this purpose, Skrypnyk, too, paid a visit to Lviv. He had a certain success in his work and a few Western Ukrainians, as S. Rudnytsky, who came from Prague to become the head of the Ukrainian Institute of Geography and Cartography in Kharkiv, and the mathematician Chaykivsky, entered the UkSSR. They formed a special club in Kharkiv and had their own literary organization "Western Ukraine." Skrypnyk [648]

645 even worked out a plan to recruit 8,000 teachers in Western
871 Ukraine to undertake Ukrainian work in the Donbas where the
186 Russian influence was strongest.

● 665 At the same time Skrypnyk was a determined Communist and he lost no opportunity for advancing the doctrines of the movement, even at the risk of doing violence to those Ukrainian ideals in which he believed. Thus, in 1928, he demanded a reformation of [815] the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been working feverishly in the same cause of Ukrainization but which, from his point of view, was insufficiently Marxist and Communist. In 1929 he won his point and the Academy was forced to elect to membership seven Communists who were chosen for their knowledge of the subject and not for their scientific ability. One of the seven was Skrypnyk himself, and among the others were O. Shlikhter and Zatonsky, the veteran from the earlier Ukrainian Communist movement. He soon promoted Shlikhter to a prominent position and refused to confirm the election of the non-Communist scholar, Krymsky, to the post of secretary. At the same time he forced the election of several Western Ukrainian members, so that for a few years the Academy did become a real centre to represent all Ukrainian scholarship.

Thus, in this complex process Skrypnyk played at times a curious and often contradictory role. He was at once the head of the Ukrainian movement and of the Communist movement in the country and he never realized or noticed the contradictory character of his actions, like Tito in the early years of his dealing with Moscow. Still, during his term of office the Ukrainian movement reached its height and seemed to be flourishing.

republics are to fulfill certain functions in the economic system of 631
our Union, and that on the basis of the fulfillment of a certain 642
mission, which is to be a part of the joint mission—the industrialization of our Union—is to be founded the growth of the economy of the national republics."

In the next few years the sense of these remarks was to become perfectly clear, although it was apparently not noticed even by the more ardent Ukrainian Communists. It was to the effect that the economy of the national republics was to be fitted into the general picture of the Union and that the planning committees were to coordinate their work in such a way that there would be little or no place left for the initiative of the authorities of any republic. This did not require any action by any of the various republican governments, for step by step the central regime in Moscow gradually made more and more of the local Commissariats mere operating agencies under the control of All-Union Commissariats as these were increased in number and in scope by the vote of the Presidium of the Union or by the decisions of the All-Union Communist Party.

In this connection the final liquidation of the Ukapisty as a 665
group in 1925 was significant. They had definitely cherished the hope that sooner or later they would be able to win recognition as a special Ukrainian Communist Party with their own seat in the Communist International. That was now becoming merely a subsidiary organ of the Russian Communist Party and there was no longer any reason for maintaining the fiction of an independent existence. The foreign Communist Parties had definitely sunk to being poor relations of the Russian Party or the All-Union Party. Their representatives were exiles from their native lands under Russian protection and under those conditions they speedily ceased to have any voice in the work of the Comintern, which existed only as a Russian propaganda organ abroad. It was therefore unrealistic for the Ukrainian Communists to build any real hopes on the Comintern or on the building of a separate Ukrainian Communism and the abolition of the Ukapisty was but a formal recognition of this fact.

186 Yet this obvious truth apparently was overlooked by Skrypnyk
631 and, to a lesser extent, even by Khvylovy, who was absorbed in his everwidening discussion of the cultural significance of Ukrainian Communism and the role and mission of the Ukrainian Communists. While these were talking and arguing about certain ideas, the central authorities in Moscow were cleverly laying plans for removing from the field of practical politics and administration the very basis of local government for which they were fighting.

631 In the same way, reform of the administrative divisions was under way with the concealed purpose of changing the boundaries of the local sub-divisions, so that they would have a purely economic basis. This was done by the elimination of the central areas, the *gubernias* and the *okrugs* and the introduction of a two-step system of administration, the *kray* or *oblast* and the *rayon* or region, which was designed on a purely economic purpose and was admirably adapted for the elimination of local and even republic feeling.

By these and other administrative measures the essential features of the New Economic Policy were eliminated but they were done so gradually and locally that a large part of the population only realized the situation when the process was too far advanced to be affected by any scattered protests.

● 665 At the end of 1927 Trotsky was expelled from the Communist
642 Party and this ended the long feud between him and Stalin for the control of the Party. Trotsky had quite consistently fought the New Economic Policy as a needless concession to capitalism and within a few months of his rival's defeat, Stalin reversed his policy and openly adopted a more rigid system of controls similar to those which he had attacked Trotsky for urging.

As a matter of fact the pretext for a distinction between the Soviet government and the Communist Party was wearing thin. It was a needless piece of propaganda, once the regime felt itself sufficiently strong. There was no longer the need of maintaining non-party men in places of apparent authority and with his practical sense, Stalin speedily allowed the system to lapse into the limbo of obscurity and made the Communist Party openly what it was, the dictatorial party dominated directly from Moscow.

661 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in
558 Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist
[665] Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which
[814] had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

Postyshev's[1] object was the rerussification of the country, for it
191 had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many
626 of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian news-
[871] papers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

436 the more favored because the Soviets equated in value the Polish zloty and the Soviet karbovanets. When we take into consideration the fact that prior to the war a pound of meat in Poland cost four zloty and in the UkSSR twenty-five to thirty karbovantsy, the vast purchasing power of the Soviet officials can be seen. Then in December,[1] to ruin the native population, they arbitrarily stopped the zloty as legal tender, so that the Ukrainian population lost everything, except those fortunate persons who had succeeded in exchanging their Polish money for German marks by clandestine trade across the border.

191 This swarm of officials was of various kinds. Those who were attached to fields like military affairs, the railroads, the posts and telegraphs, etc., i.e. those branches which were directly under the All-Union Commissariats, made no concealment of the fact that Russian was from now on to be the chief language. Other sections which were under the Commissariats in Kiev first adopted Ukrainian as their official tongue, but by the middle of 1940 they, too, had passed over to the use of Russian, exactly as had been done in all the offices in Kiev.

661 471 By the end of November,[1] when the supplies in the stores were already becoming exhausted, the actual work of nationalization commenced. The former owners were often thrown out, if their establishments had been of any size, and as former wealthy individuals they were refused food tickets and other privileges on the ground that they belonged to the non-laboring element and were enemies of the people. This meant that they were compelled to sell upon the black market everything that they had been able to save or which they possessed and which had not been confiscated, and during the winter many of them, like the Polish landlowners and the police who fell into Communist hands, were deported under atrocious and inhuman conditions to Kazakhstan and Central Asia to disappear.

[665] On the other hand, the Soviets introduced at once the idea of dining halls for the workers and special stores for Communists and higher functionaries where they could secure easily and cheaply whatever there was to be obtained in Western Ukraine.

[1] [1939--Analyst]

Western world, the Soviet Union conferred upon the Ukrainian Soviet Republic the right to have its own anthem and its own national flag. 631 648

These actions were not to be interpreted as a concession from Moscow, although they were presented in that guise. They were rather intended to strengthen the Soviet position in international affairs and by an appearance of generosity to facilitate the reduction of the satellite states to the same position as that held by the Union Republics. In this sense they were a response to the centralizing tendencies which were now to be expressed in a still stronger form.

As soon as hostilities ended and even before the Soviets were assured of all their hopes, they began to purge again the Ukrainian Communist Party and within a few months some 38% of the high officials were removed on the ground of bourgeois nationalism. All those who had not retreated to the east or could not show that they were working throughout the war as zealous Soviet partisans were summarily exiled as bourgeois nationalists. In the same way, when the enforced return of displaced persons began under the Yalta Agreement, very few were allowed to return to their homes. The vast majority were either executed for surrendering to the Germans or were sent to the labor camps in the far north and east for reeducation. 665 661

The Fourth Five Year Plan which was commenced in 1946 was very definitely devoted to the restoration of the country after the ravages of the war and to the increase of the Soviet capacity for defense. It was only in Ukraine and Byelorussia that the restoration had to absorb the energies of a considerable majority of the population, for while there were areas in the neighborhood of Leningrad and Stalingrad which had been badly devastated, the situation in the Ukraine was far worse. The cities and factories had been destroyed, the mines had been flooded and the population were living as best they might among the ruins which had been left by the two invading armies. 727

At the same time the work of restoration went very slowly. Less than one third of the miners of the Donbas had returned to [316]

a revival of that form of family agriculture which had long been popular in the Ukraine before the collectivization. Furthermore, it was soon suspected that the links varied in their delivery of supplies to the government, sometimes in inverse proportion to their own readiness to work. The peasants likewise as in the early days of the NEP devoted more attention to their own private plots of land, a phenomenon that had been noticed even before World War II. 474 241

The Soviet authorities had several answers to such developments. On the one hand, they finally forbade the operation of the permanent links which had developed to the point where they threatened the objective of collectivization, the turning of the peasant farmer into a paid proletarian worker in agriculture. On the other hand they reduced the size again of the individual plot of land and they forced the peasants to give up animal raising on their plots by charging them for even the straw from the collective farms and the wild fodder that grew in abandoned places. Then again, they levied a tax on the products of these plots and this, plus the reduction of the allotment, rendered it impossible for the peasant to improve his lot except through increased work on the collective farm. In the meanwhile the steady raising of the quota of work required for one labor day made it impossible for the average peasant, unless he was a Stakhanovist (i.e. a person who cooperated with the central regime and thereby received favorable assignments) to complete one labor day within one calendar day, no matter how long hours he worked. This had been a favorite device of the Russian landlords as we learn from Radishchev's *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*, a famous Russian radical work of the end of the eighteenth century but a modern version of it was adapted by the Russian Communist leaders and used effectively. 474 241 466 [423]

Even these measures were not the desirable solution. This was first proposed by Khrushchov in 1947, and while it was at first looked upon with some disfavor, it was finally deemed suitable by the slave-drivers of the Kremlin, and Khrushchov, after a period of mild disfavor, was promoted to the Politburo, and another Russian, Melnikov, placed in charge of Ukraine. This was the 474 241 665

474 creation of great "agro-cities" or "agro-settlements" which would
241 unite several collective farms in one great centre which could be
665 more easily controlled by the Communist Party with a smaller number of qualified party members in charge. By the end of 1950 the number of kolhosps (collective farms) had been reduced from 33,653, as at the end of the war, to 14,443. The number of households in one had grown from 163 households to 277. At the same time the number of collective farms in which there were definite party leaders had increased from 42% to 78%. This does not imply a growth in Communist membership, for the number of Communist authorities might, under the new ratio, be reduced by almost 3,000 in personnel. This would be hardly likely but it explains at a glance the increased control that the Communists could exert over the larger groups. It also made it easier by destroying the separated villages to prevent as effective help being given to the U. P. A. and the other anti-Communist movements which lingered on, as the peasants saw that the new era was to be not one of peace but of increased hardships. At the same time, the
423 peasant was made more helpless for his holdings in the neighbor-
241 hood of his home were reduced to 0.15 hectare or approximately a third of an acre.

This area is roughly equivalent to the average American suburban lot of 150 x 100 feet and on this the average peasant family was supposed, no matter how many members it contained, to raise all the vegetables, eggs and milk which the family required for the year and also any other plant or animal requirement which was needed as a cash crop. Even this was now burdened with taxes and the peasant was forbidden to secure anything from the collective farm to assist in his economy, outside of what he secured in his pay for a steadily diminishing number of labor days and the accompanying cash and kind receipts which were apportioned to him for his work.

474 Estimates based on figures from some collective farms show
434 that the average family receives for its year's work, if three or four
241 members work, something in the neighborhood of three hundred pounds of grain, four hundred pounds of potatoes and about one

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a 474
result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred 434
karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one 241
thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on [554]
these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for [665]
show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satisfactory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer is little better, although he 465
receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, 731
there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 con- 185
tinued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

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185 are a few large projects planned in the eastern part of the country which can be made immediately accessible to the Moscow Industrial area but which will be of little value to the Ukrainian population, for even the resorts along the coast of the Black Sea have now been definitely placed under a Union Commissariat and are being improved to accommodate the higher officials from the centre. The whole strength of the Soviet Union is being exerted to build up the industrial centres in the Urals and further to the east.

During these years there has been little progress made in many fields, and few or none of the evacuated personnel which formerly managed the factories have been returned. It is the same with machinery.

[166] On the other hand, where factories have been restored, the new directors have usually been sent down from Moscow to administer them, and so have the responsible workmen. The deportation from the villages still continues as the native population are removed to Siberia or elsewhere and non-Ukrainians are sent in, in accordance with a definite scheme for breaking up the homogeneity of the population.

665 626 Despite all this, there has scarcely passed a month in which the central authorities in Moscow have not stressed defects in the working of the Ukrainian branch of the party. They have found continued failures to perform the required deliveries, a lack of ideological work and definite wrecking and deliberate sabotage due to bourgeois nationalist feelings on the part of the party leaders in the Ukraine. There has been a consistent and unrelenting attack on everything that has been done in the country, while the heads of the collective farms and the other institutions have been attacked and changed for nationalist deviations.

000 The conclusion is irresistible that it is not the intention of the central authority in Moscow to relax its pressure until it has annihilated the last point in the UkSSR which differs in the slightest degree from the rules prevailing in the RSFSR and that in the meantime it, despite its lip service to the cause of a federation, is working for a complete standardization, not only in the field of economics but in every other field as well.

000 in an ideal organization. Stalin, by his policy in the thirties, blew away that mirage but it required a World War for him to annihilate it.

Soon after the Germans attacked, Stalin dissolved the Comintern to please his Western allies and to dupe them. He substituted the Slav Congress and when he secured the assent of the Big Three to liberate the Slavs, he highly developed this.

186 As the Red Army, now transformed by fiat of the Council of
728 Commissars of the USSR into the Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies, "liberated" one Slav capital after another, they were followed by cultural missions who talked to the enthusiastic multitudes on the Slav Brotherhood of Nations in terms of 1848, Peter, the Third Rome and Stalin. Rylsky and Tychyna, Korniychuk and Yanovsky, all the outstanding Ukrainian writers who had yielded to the Russian cause and survived the purges, spoke. They praised the new situation and the democratic powers admired this.

● 665 It was only a sham because soon there was established the Cominform. Its seat was not in Moscow but its spirit was there. The object of the Cominform was not to create a new and equal gathering of Communist humanity, not the ostensible idea of the Comintern but it was to inform the Communists among the Slavs and elsewhere of the approach to Communism by the elder Communists of the world, the Muscovite Great Russians.

In the purely cultural sphere the answer was the condemnation
[538] of formalism, and still more of internationalism. Formalism was a technical school of literary criticism which had contributed something to the study of literature and culture. It was an attempt to put technique above content, or rather to judge content by technique and its advocates, sometimes great scholars in a narrow field, basked in the light of the admiration of their friends, until they considered themselves great.

814 Internationalism was something else. Its content had been ex-
665 pressed by the Protopope Avvakum in 1666 when he announced at his trial in Moscow that all Orthodox Christians had to come to Moscow to learn. Now it was the same. History was to be periodicized between A. M. and P. M. (Ante Muscoviae and Post

Muscoviam, Before and After Moscow). If the before was leading up to a Moscow discovery, it was good; if not, it was bad. 814 665

This was proclaimed by Zhdanov of the Politbiuro in 1946 [546] when, under the highest auspices, he began his attack. On September 4 of that year, at a meeting of the Umiom of Soviet Writers in Moscow, he lashed out at various films which had been recently produced and at several Russian authors, especially Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova, for not producing a true picture of Soviet reality. Then, warming to his task, he explicitly declared that literature had to be entirely at the service of the Communist Party and that it was the duty of every Soviet writer to lash and scourge the decadent bourgeois west. He berated many of the authors for wishing to learn from the bourgeois writers at the very moment when Soviet literature, the most revolutionary literature in the world, was a hundred times higher and more beautiful than the literature of the bourgeois west. 538 626 665

The speech of Zhdanov was the open proclamation of war against all foreign influences in Soviet literature and it was directed against some of the most respected figures, who were apparently silenced. Even Tikhonov was removed from his post at the head of the Union of Soviet Writers for not having exerted himself more strongly against these dangerous heresies. [558]

Yet this speech was not really the beginning, for some weeks before the question was fully brought into the open, at a meeting of the KP/b/U, Khrushchov, the Russian who held the post as First Secretary of the KP/b/U, had received from the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow full and definite instructions as to the means to be adopted for purging Ukrainian literature and science and for suppressing all traces of bourgeois nationalism. His remarks were reprinted in part by *Pravda* in Moscow, which summarized them in these words.

"The TsK KP/b/U had not paid sufficient attention to ideological work, does not give enough weight to the selecting and the ideological and political education of the cadres in the fields of science, literature and art, has not organized in the press a wide criticism of the hostile bourgeois-nationalist ideology. As a result

538 in some books, journals and newspaper articles and in the lectures
626 of some Ukrainian historians and literary men there are ideological
665 mistakes and perversions, and efforts to revive the bourgeois nationalist conceptions of the historian Hrushevsky and his 'school.' "

[814] The weight of the attack fell upon the Institute of Language
538 and Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR for two
626 books which it had published. One was the first volume of a *History of Ukraine* which had appeared in 1943 and the other was *An Outline of the History of Ukrainian Literature* which had appeared in 1945. The authors of both books were accused of having failed to periodicize Ukrainian history and literature according to the Marxo-Leninist tradition and of having followed Hrushevsky and Yefremiv in being deceived by external political events. They were charged with remarks that could be interpreted as maintaining an early separation of Ukrainian culture from Russian, when it was a fact that the three brotherly nations, the Great Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, had had a joint culture until the fourteenth century, after which the Great Russians became the truest heirs and interpreters of the whole. They were charged with idealizing the old bourgeois nationalists as V. Naumenko and O. Levytsky, of admiring the old state of patriarchal private property and of failing to realize the great ideological gulf between Shevchenko, who stood in the tradition of Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, etc., and Kulish who was a liberal and not a revolutionist. They were condemned for having a good word for such nationalist counter-revolutionists as Vynnychenko and Oles and for calling a competent poet, I. Steshchenko, who had been a minister under Petlyura. They forced their own flatterer, Rylsky, to leave his post as head of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukraine for not having taken a sufficiently firm stand in condemning the mistakes of the other writers, and for a while he was in disfavor.

The accusations penned in Moscow and printed in *Pravda* and the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* were reprinted in the Ukrainian papers with even more vulgarity and abuse. They poured out their venom at nearly all the writers and historians who regarded the use of the Ukrainian language as expressing the feelings and the

186 based its authority on symbols of universality rather than national
668* exclusivism.[15]

186 The claims of the Russian Empire to acceptance, however,
● 665 were weakened by its failure to solve social questions. However
565 much cultural differences and historical memories may have contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, it is difficult to conceive how it could have arisen had it not to a large extent corresponded with a basic cleavage in the social structure of the Ukraine. There, to an unusual degree, nationality coincided with economic class. The Ukrainians were, with the exception of a small intelligentsia, almost entirely peasants; the landowners and officials were Poles or Russians, while the commercial bourgeoisie was largely Jewish. Under such circumstances, any nationalist movement was likely to become a class movement as well, a movement whose leaders would stress agrarian reform and liberation of the peasant from "exploiting" groups.

186 It was in this way, of course, that Ukrainian nationalism be-
668* came a rival of Communism. Basically, Communism[16] in the Russian Empire in the period before and during the Revolution of 1917, was a movement of townspeople. Both its ideology and its practical possibilities induced it to seek especially the support of the urban industrial workers, led and inspired by a group of dissident intellectuals. The latter were drawn from all the nations of the tsarist realm, but were predominantly Russian and Jewish. The workers were predominantly Russian, and those few Ukrainian laborers who had settled permanently in the cities prior to 1917 had for the most part become Russified in speech and consciousness. But the Communist leadership, with its sharp insight into the real social conditions of the country, realized that no purely urban movement could succeed in a country four-fifths peasant; hence, it sought, especially after the March Revolution

[15] An especially interesting treatment of this aspect of the Russian Empire is presented by Hans Rothfels in *Reich, Staat und Nation im deutsch-baltischen Denken: Vortrag bei der öffentlichen Sitzung der Gelehrten Gesellschaft zu Königsberg am 12 Januar 1930, Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, 7. Jahr. Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse, Heft 4* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1930).

[16] Actually the "Bolshevik" faction of the Social Democratic Party in Russia did not adopt the designation "Communist" until 1917. To avoid confusion, however, the latter term has been used throughout this study for the essentially continuous movement.

642 came from the Russian workers of the cities, or from outside the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government under Petliura was to a considerable extent discredited, because it had failed to devote sufficient attention to the needs of the peasantry and to [648] establish law and order. Moreover, by an eleventh-hour alliance with Poland, it had compromised its claim to represent the entire Ukrainian nation. This resulted from the fact that Galicia, which, upon the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy had formed its own West Ukrainian Republic, was surrendered to the Warsaw regime as a price for aid in the east, a solution in which most Galicians refused to acquiesce. Nevertheless, Poland and the Soviet Union made peace, and shortly afterwards the remnants of the Ukrainian army and bureaucracy retreated across the border for internment in Poland. From this sanctuary a group of a few hundred under Colonel George Tiutiunnyk sortied in October, 1921, for a last desperate raid into the Soviet-occupied Ukraine.[22]

86 After that the East Ukraine lay under Communist rule, which 665 could no longer be challenged by military force. For a time, however, it appeared as if the rising tide of nationalist sentiment—it rose even among those who had long been adherents of Marxist doctrines—might bring about what arms had failed to accomplish. To understand this situation it is necessary to recall that the Communists under Lenin had modified their original stand in order to appeal to the nationalism of the non-Russians. In January, 1918, soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Third Congress of Soviets asserted a theoretical right of all the nations of the tsarist empire to go their several ways, to secede from the Bolshevik government in Moscow. At the same time, it deprived this right of any content by insisting that it be exercised only by the "toiling masses." Although the Communist Party's stand was more ambiguously phrased, its insistence that the interests of the toilers were represented only by the Communist Party and that the non-Russian Communist Parties formed inseparable parts of the central Bolshevik organization, in fact rendered self-determination a fiction. During the following years, the central Party [661] leadership used armed force when possible to insure that these local Communist Parties, thus reduced to mere branches of a

[22] Mazepa, III, 96–105.

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186 [661] [665]

unified Party, should "rule" within each smaller nation which had formed part of the tsarist empire.

Having provided for the initial objective of substantial Communist control, however, the Bolshevik leaders made sweeping statements against "Great Russian chauvinism," and directed that the culture of each nation be "national in form, socialist in content." Encouraged by this apparent desire for development of the national culture at the expense of the Russian cultural supremacy, which had been grafted on their peoples in tsarist days, many of the Communist leaders of the non-Russian nations set about vigorously promoting an independent cultural life as soon as Communist control was established. In the Ukraine, the major leader in the effort during the early twenties was the commissar of education, Alexander Shums'kyi; after his deposition in 1927 he was succeeded by Nicholas Skrypnyk, an even more devoted Communist, but a firm adherent of Ukrainian cultural nationalism.[23] To what extent these men were sincere adherents of Ukrainian nationalism and to what extent the favor they extended to it was motivated by a desire to secure popular support and to curb the overweening power of Moscow in the interest of an internationalism which, to them, was in closer accord with original Communist ideology, it is hard to say. At any rate, they went to very considerable lengths to encourage specifically Ukrainian traits and traditions, especially in scholarship, literature, and the schools. While these Communist supporters of Ukrainian nationalism always formed only one segment of the ruling group in the Ukraine, and hence could not completely eradicate Russian permeation of [656]

[23]No thorough treatment of the Ukraine under Soviet rule exists. Among the best brief analyses in English are John S. Reshetar, "National Deviation in the Soviet Union," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XII (April, 1953), 162–74; Michael Pap, "Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine," *Review of Politics*, XIV (April, 1952), 204–32; and an older but generally accurate account by Lancelot Lawton, "Ukraina: Europe's Greatest Problem," *East Europe*, III (Spring, 1939), 28–45. The continuation of Hrushevs'kyi's *A History of the Ukraine* by Professor O. J. Frederiksen, based on notes by Luke Mishuha (Chapter XXV) is also useful, as are more general works on the Soviet system, such as Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), Chapter IV, and Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1950), I, 289–307. The sources are, of course, voluminous and highly scattered. I can claim no special mastery of them, although my limited acquaintance leads me to the conclusions cited in the text, which are approximately those of Reshetar and Pap.

[661] however, that their resistance was undoubtedly crushed between 517 1930 and the closing series of purge trials in 1937–38.[25]

While articulate nationalism was being crushed in the Soviet 186 Ukraine, a somewhat different development was taking place in [563] the West Ukraine. In Poland the extreme policy of the ruling nationality, which had been chauvinistic enough under the Austrian empire, became still more violent toward the Ukrainians after the reestablishment of the Polish national state. As was previously noted,[1] Petliura's agreement with the Poles had been deeply resented by the Galician Ukrainians. While most nationalists endeavored to smooth over criticism of Petliura personally, especially after his assassination in Paris in 1925, most West Ukrainians gave no support to the émigré UNR government. The West Ukrainians, on the contrary, tried their own approaches to the problem of carrying on Ukrainian life under conditions of oppression by non-totalitarian, but intolerant, alien nationalist governments.

186 One attempted solution was the formation of legally recognized 665 parties which carried on electoral campaigns and sent representatives to the Polish Sejm or parliament where they attempted to protect the interests of their group within the framework of means permitted by the ruling nationality. This type of political activity, together with a wide variety of cultural work aimed at developing Ukrainian culture and maintaining the national distinctiveness of the masses, absorbed the efforts of a very large proportion of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia during the twenties and thirties. In particular, most of the older generation which had been reared under the relatively peaceful and stable conditions of Austrian rule, circles closely associated with the Greek Catholic Church, and most of the liberal professions engaged in this activity. Although there were a number of minor parties, some of which had authoritarian leanings, the majority of this segment of Ukrainian political workers was grouped in the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychne Ob"iednannia—UNDO), which was definitely democratic in character, with varying amounts of Catholic, liberal, and socialist ideology embodied in its program. Its efforts met

[25] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166.

1 [see category 116, p 14 -- Analyst]

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with very uncertain success, fluctuating from periods of relatively 186
satisfactory cooperation with the Poles to embittered boycott of 665
an unbearably oppressive regime.[26]

Some West Ukrainians soon rejected the road of accommoda- 186
tion to the Polish government; in the early twenties they turned 668
to Communism as the champion of both nationalist aspirations and social needs. While the Ukrainians of Galicia were not so badly off economically as were those in the East Ukraine before and after the war of 1914, they suffered from a high ratio of population to available land, from inadequate agricultural productivity, and above all from the fact that the vast majority of [664]
bureaucratic and urban jobs which would have served as the natural outlets for their sons, compelled by ambition or lack of employment to leave the land, were absorbed by Poles and Jews. In Volhynia, conditions were much worse; probably they were as bad, as far as purely economic circumstances went, as those within the Soviet Ukraine prior to 1930. Consequently, a broad economic basis for Communist propaganda existed; under the circumstances in which a nationalist Ukrainian Communist regime appeared to be taking form in Kiev, this propaganda appealed strongly to the nationalist element among West Ukrainians as well. As a result, two Communist-front organizations, the [665]
Ukrainian Party of Labor (Ukraïns'ka Partiia Pratsi) and the Peasants-Workers Association (Selians'ko-Robitnycha Partiia—Sel-Rob) had considerable success, especially in Volhynia. More serious from the strictly nationalist point of view, a large number of the students, the backbone of the new generation which would have to carry on national life, was attracted to the Communist program.[27]

At the same time, an extreme movement of a different type attracted wide support. The movement which is commonly known in American scholarship as "integral nationalism" arose in Western Europe at the close of the nineteenth century, considerably before Communism became a factor of any real political importance. It is generally recognized that one of the first exponents

[26] See Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939).

[27] See especially Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

historic Ukrainian lands of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov. The northern part, appropriately known as Polessia, or the "forest land," is of little value for crop growing but contains the only timber industry of significance in the Ukraine.

As the German armies rolled into the Ukraine in 1941, they tended to advance along the main lines of communication, avoiding the difficult, swampy regions. For weeks, or in some cases even months, the less accessible areas were not brought under German control. This circumstance made possible the development of partisan bands which carried on resistance to the occupation authority.

Although, since 1945, Soviet writers have maintained that the plans for guerrilla warfare against the conqueror had been secretly prepared before the outbreak of hostilities, they assert that these plans were known only to the top level of Communist Party officials. It is fairly certain that the order to develop a partisan movement came as a surprise even to most devoted Communists.[2] In July, 1941, after the decision to form partisan detachments was announced, preparations were pushed forward at a rapid rate by the local authorities. The rapidity of the German advance to the line of the Dnieper, however, rendered largely ineffective systematic attempts to form a partisan movement in the Ukraine west of that river. Even east of the Dnieper the panic produced by the seemingly irresistible German drive played havoc with the organization of guerrilla warfare. Many of the secretly selected leaders were swept along, willingly or unwillingly, in the retreat of the Red Army, while others were discovered and executed by the Germans. In a few places, however, small groups made good their escape to forest or swamp hide-outs. In the southern Ukraine one such group of about five hundred men, trained and directed by the Red Army, but largely composed of local Communist and NKVD officials, established a center of opposition in the swamps formed by the Dnieper south of Nikopol' (Nikopil').[3] This group was destroyed by the German forces in

[2] Oleksii Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet* (The Underground *Oblast* Committee in Action), literary editor Evg. Bosniatskii (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950), pp. 12–14.

[3] Report of Feldpolizeidirektor at 444. Sicherungsdivision, November 5, 1941, NOKW 1519 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 1519).

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725 October, but a group of similar size and composition in the Novo
● 665 Moskovsk-Pavlograd (Novomoskovs'k-Pavlohrad) forest east of
669 Dniepropetrovsk was able to hold out until January, 1942.[4]

While the partisan bands in isolated shelters in the southern steppe Ukraine could not survive the first determined German attacks, those in Polessia were more fortunate. The chief areas of operation were the northern sections of the Chernigov and the Sumy *oblasts*. In the Chernigov *oblast* the partisans were led by the first secretary of the *oblast* committee of the Party, Oleksii Fedorov, a veteran of the revolutionary period. Though a hardened Communist, Fedorov had been born in the Dniepropetrovsk area and considered himself a Ukrainian.[5] He, like many other Party leaders, was temporarily swept from his territory by the rapidity of the German advance but returned in the late summer of 1941 and gathered the scattered remnants of his Party apparatus for a struggle against the Germans.[6] In the Sumy *oblast* the underground Party machinery was completely disrupted, but some of the *raion* officials succeeded in forming small partisan groups.[7]

It is clear from the preceding summary that the initial organization of the Red partisans of the Ukraine was carried out by members of the Communist Party and the Soviet state apparatus. These men were impelled both by their interest in maintaining the *status quo* and by the fear of violent death should they fall into German hands, since all "kommissars" and Communist officials were destined for execution by Hitler. Since the war, Soviet authors have admitted, and even exaggerated the role of the Party in the partisan movement, apparently because they wish to emphasize its "guiding role" in all spheres of Soviet life.[8] During the war, however, and especially in its early stages, while some attention was given to the activity of the Communist Party, an

[4] War Diary No. 2 of 213. Sicherungsdivision, Abteilung Ia, January 1–March 31, 1942, NOKW 2872 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2872); Report of Feldpolizeidirektor to Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets 103, January 9, 1942, NOKW 2911 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2911).

[5] Fedorov, p. 31.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 40 ff.

[7] Sidor Kovpak, *Vid Putivlia do Karpat* (From Putivl' to the Carpathians), literary ed. Ie. Herasimov (Kiev: Ukraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1946), pp. 3 ff.

[8] E.g., in Fedorov's work cited earlier in this chapter.

725 effort was made to give the impression that the partisans rep-
665 resented a spontaneous popular uprising against the foreign
669 invader; the "common man" of the occupied areas of the Soviet Union was pictured as a patriot voluntarily assisting the Red Army to overthrow German rule.[9]

725 It is this aspect of the Soviet partisan movement which makes
668* it of particular interest to this study. The partisans in the Ukraine were pictured as motivated by local patriotism, while their leaders were described as successors of Khmelnits'kyi and other legendary heroes. The primary effort in this direction centered about the person of Sidor Kovpak, who became the chieftain of the partisans of the Sumy *oblast*. Kovpak claimed to be a descendant of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. While his enemies declared he was a gypsy—the disarray of his bivouac led even admirers to compare it to a gypsy camp—it appears likely that he was of native Ukrainian origin. He was an old Communist, a veteran of the civil war of 1918–20, but was quite uneducated, and had occupied only minor posts in the Soviet hierarchy. Apparently, however, his rough and earthy manner endeared him to considerable elements of the Ukrainian population, while his evident skill in conducting his partisan operations won him respect.[10]

Kovpak's personal qualities and the fact that his band was formed on Ukrainian soil, made it possible for Soviet propagandists to give some color to their assertion that his partisan organization was a manifestation of Ukrainian patriotism. Closer examination of the groups operating in the northeastern *oblasts* casts considerable doubt on this contention. In the first place, whatever the origins of its members, Kovpak's band was almost certainly formed initially, as were the other partisan groups in 1941, of members of the ruling machine. The commissar Rudnev, said to be the real "brains" of Kovpak's band, for example, was

[9] See, for example, Timofei (Timothy) Strokach, *Partyzany Ukrainy* (The Partisans of the Ukraine) (Moscow: Ukrvydav Ts. K. KP[b]U, 1943). The title sheet of this work describes Strokach as a "deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR."

[10] On Kovpak cf. his memoir previously cited; P. Vershigora, *Liudi s chistoi sovest'iu* (People with Clean Consciences) (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel', 1951), pp. 39, 49, 181, 412; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 23, 1943, p. 3 (for the nature of this source see n. 15 below); V. Andreev, *Narodnaia voina: Zapiski partizana* (The People's War: Sketches of a Partisan) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1952), p. 228.

725 undertaken is an indication of the uncertainty of the ideology
668* and objectives of the little group. "Bul'ba" Borovets' himself, a man of little schooling, apparently was not sure what direction the movement should take, although he had a deep-rooted love for his native country. He continued to maintain ties with the UNR; there were UNR officers with the group much of the time, advising on military matters on which few of the younger members had had experience. Borovets' kept up a precarious line of communication with Andrew Livyts'kyi himself through an old UNR member, Captain Raievs'kyi, who ostensibly carried on the functions of *raionchef* in the Rovno district.[28]

•665 These connections were too discontinuous to provide much
668* guidance, however, even if the enfeebled Warsaw headquarters
727 had had a clear line to offer. At the same time, the group under Borovets' was acting as a refuge for extremely diverse elements seeking an escape from German suppression. As was previously described, Borovets' had made an agreement with the OUN-M by which he was to be sent a number of officers. Apparently this help was slow in arriving. By summer, 1942, however, a few men had appeared; one was the Zhitomir journalist Anthony Baranivs'kyi, who became the Mel'nyk representative at the headquarters of Borovets'.[29] He, of course, adhered to the OUN-M line. A quite different group consisted of the former "left wing" of the Bandera party. Its leaders, Mitrynga, Turchmanovych, Ryvak, and Boris Levits'kyi, were with the task forces destined to proclaim the *akt* in Kiev. When these groups were broken up by the Germans before reaching their goal, the young men escaped arrest but were forced to go into hiding. Then, since the whole tendency of the OUN-B indicated to them that they could no longer hope to secure the adoption of their left-wing program, all except Levits'kyi (who went into hiding in Galicia) fled to Volhynia, where they found a protector in the Polis'ka Sich.[30] There, apparently, they attracted to their ideology a young as-

[28] Oleksander (Alexander) Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy" (An Army without a State), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, December 28, 1950, p. 2.

[29] Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 1, 1951, p. 4; *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 92.

[30] Interview 43.

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sistant of Borovets', Leonidas Shcherbatiuk, son of one of the generals of the Republican army. With his support they founded in the midst of the untutored woodland peasants yet another Ukrainian party. Known as the Ukrainian Popular Democratic Party (*Ukraïns'ka Narodna Demokratychna Partiia*—UNDP), it advocated a program centering on maintenance of ownership of industry, means of transportation, and other large-scale enterprises by the state, with operation in the hands of the workers. At the same time, it condemned authoritarian control and violation of the rights of individuals.[31]

It was this motley group which carried on negotiations with the Soviet partisan Lukin in the autumn of 1942. While differing in details, the Soviet and the nationalist accounts of these discussions agree that the Red emissary demanded formal submission of the nationalist band to Soviet control, while Borovets' and his advisers were united in insisting on limiting an agreement to cooperation against the Germans.[32] Moreover, the Soviet sources frankly admit that the Red partisans were very weak in Volhynia at this time. They were confined almost entirely to the extreme nothern part of the region, where they received support from the powerful Soviet bands in Belorussia. There was one band near Kovel', but it was under the command of a Pole, and apparently was composed of Poles rather than Ukrainians.[33] It is therefore quite understandable that the Soviet leadership may have wished to gain the support of the group under Borovets' until more "reliable" Soviet forces could be formed in Volhynia. It is significant that one of the alleged Communist demands was for an open campaign against the Germans, including particularly the assassination of the Reichskommissar. It is likely that the reason Borovets' gives for rejection of these demands is accurate, for it is in line with the whole tactical policy of his move-

[31] Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 14, 1951, p. 2, maintains that the "proclamation" of the UNDP was made in June, 1943; other sources set the *founding* of the party in 1942, however, and it is certain that the group had a developed ideology before 1943; see Borys Levits'kyi, "Istorychne znachennia rozlamu v OUN" (The Historical Significance of the Split in the OUN), *Vpered*, No. 2 (11) (1950), p. 6.

[32] Medvedev, pp. 85–86; Borovets', "Dva khresty".

[33] G. Lin'kov, *Voina v tylu vraga* (The War in the Rear of the Enemy) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1951), p. 384.

186 The development of Ukrainian political and cultural life in
665 Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians condemned to ruthless Russification under Tsarist rule. When the first modern Ukrainian political organisation in Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, was founded in 1900 (from 1905 this party was named Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party) its first publication *Independent Ukraine* was printed in Austria, in Bukovina.

86 The Ukrainian patriots under Tsarist Russian Government,
668 morally and materially supported the fight of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights; these territories were a Ukrainian Piedmont. For not even the revolution of 1905 gave the Ukrainians in Russia their national rights. Of course, the Ukrainians had their deputies in the Russian 'Duma' who demanded autonomy for Ukraine. But the Ukrainian language was not admitted in the schools, the rights of the Ukrainian press were restricted, and active Ukrainians were persecuted by the Russian authorities. Among the Ukrainians in Russia the fight of the Austrian Ukrainians for the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviw roused great interest. The Russian Government regarded the creation of a Ukrainian University in Galicia as a great danger for the 'indivisible Russia' and sought an agreement with the Polish nationalists in Galicia against the Ukrainian movement. The Russian nationalists regarded the opening of a Ukrainian University in Lviw as a 'casus belli' for Russia against Austria.

668 The Russian Government closely watched the Ukrainian move-
661 ment in Austria and was much alarmed by its successes. In consequence, the Petersburg Government prepared to annex Galicia and Bukovina long before the war of 1914, in order to wipe out 'Mazeppism'. When, in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, a Ukrainian delegation visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to protest against the new prohibition of the Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire, the Minister replied cynically:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once for all . . .".

727 The suppression of the Ukrainian movement was one of the main
661 aims of Tsarist Russian policy in World War I. The occupation of Galicia and Bukovina by the Russian armies in 1914-1917 brought heavy damage to the Ukrainian movement; the Ukrainian schools, press, co-operative societies, scientific and educational institutions
727 were destroyed. Thousands of Ukrainians, Austrian citizens, were
659 deported to Siberia. In the occupied territories a ruthless Russifica-
661 tion was started, and in Galicia the forced conversion of the Greek-

declared: "Until the peace every citizen of the Ukrainian Republic, together with the citizens of all peoples of the Russian Republic, shall stand firmly on their positions at the front and in the hinterland". u 668 631

The Soviet Russian Government was from the beginning hostile to the national claims of Ukraine and other peoples. Relying on its own military force and the support of Communist groups among the various peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Russian Government was planning the conquest of Ukraine and other territories that did not recognise Soviet dictatorship.

3. Elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Russia and in Ukraine

At the end of November, 1917, in Ukraine and Russia, elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly took place. These elections in Ukraine were free, with full freedom of press and propaganda for all parties, among them the Communist. These elections showed the great difference between the political situation in Russia and in Ukraine. In Russia the adherents of Soviet dictatorship (the Communists and the party of the Left Socialists-Revolutionaries), especially in the big cities like Moscow and Petersburg, had considerable gains. This gave the Communists and Left Socialists-Revolutionaries the basis for holding power in Russia; for they had the masses of friendly workers and peasants behind them. In Ukraine at these elections the Ukrainian Socialist parties, opponents of Soviet dictatorship, won (the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries got together approximately 3/4 of all cast votes). The Russian Communist Party, in spite of the immense resources from Russia for propaganda, gained in Ukraine less than 10% of the votes. In the big cities, among the workers, the Russian Communists were in a minority too; this explains the uncertainty of the Communists in Ukraine at that time in the struggle for the dictatorship of their party. u [666] 665 SU 665

The historian of the Communist movement in Ukraine, M. Popov, remarks that even in the big industrial centres in Ukraine "the local Communists had a lack of determination to take power into the hands of the Soviets", *History of the Communist Party 'Bolsheviks' of Ukraine:* Kharkov, 1929.

4. The Problem of Peace with the Central Powers

At the end of 1917 the Russian front against the Central Powers was decaying in a catastrophic way. This decay was hastened by the ruthless Communist propaganda for an immediate peace. In u. 648

648 order to secure the country, the Ukrainian Government began to concentrate in Ukraine the troops that had been separated from the Russian Army. The Ukrainian Government was against a separate peace with the Central Powers, as it was afraid to come under the influence of these nations. Thus in the session of the Ukrainian Central Council on December 25, 1917, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Choulguine, declared:

"The Bolsheviks are preparing to conclude a separate peace. We do not agree with this, we cannot permit that the Germans and Austrians move their regiments against the French and British. We stand for a general peace that would be welcomed by the democracy of the whole world".

[665] Against this policy of the Ukrainian Government the Russian Communist Party acted with demagogic propaganda.

On January 13, 1918, the newspaper of the Russian Communist Party in Kiev *The Proletarian Thought* wrote:

"The Central Council tries to destroy the struggle for peace... The Council is working in this direction by order of the 'allied' imperialists. The workers, soldiers and peasants of Ukraine and Russia know and remember well that, in their struggle for the immediate ending of the slaughter, the Central Council is their determined enemy and a faithful servant of the sharks of capital and of international robbers...".

5. *Great Britain and France Recognise Democratic Ukraine*

The position of the Ukrainian Government in the question of peace attracted the attention of Great Britain and France. At the beginning of December 1917, General Tabouis entered into relations with the Ukrainian Government as Commissioner of the French Republic to the Ukrainian Government. On January 11, 1918, General Tabouis handed to the Ukrainian Government the following declaration:

"Wishing to confirm its friendly intentions towards the Ukrainan Republic, the Government of the French Republic informed me by telegraph, the only present means of communication, that it appointed me as Representative of the French Republic to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic. It will soon be a year that I have been on the territory of Ukraine. In this time I had the opportunity to study the history of Ukraine, I watched with attention the development of its national movement, and I could observe the efforts the Ukrainian Republic had made in order to create and to strengthen the moral and physical forces necessary for the organisation of the state. I have watched all this with

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728
Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669
of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrai- 665
nian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185
Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed 423
simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discon- [563]
tent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727
exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The represen- 565
tatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

CHAPTER III

UKRAINE UNDER SOVIET RUSSIAN RULE SINCE 1920

1. The Soviet Régime in Ukraine 1920—21

[656] 668 186 After the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and Lenin's letter to the Ukrainian workers and peasants announcing a new approach to the Ukrainian problem (December 1919; January 1920) the policy of Moscow towards Ukraine did not change in substance. Soviet Russia did not trust even the Communists of Ukrainian nationality or those Russian Communists who wished to meet the Ukrainian national demands even partly. The group of Communists-Federalists headed by G. Lapchinsky published in February 1920, a pamphlet entitled *Project of a Resolution on the Party Policy.* The authors of this pamphlet protested against the rule of the Russian element in Ukraine. They wrote on the "mad, and, for the cause of the revolution, disastrous plan of the occupation of Ukraine by the military and political forces of Soviet Russia. After the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation in the times of the Romanovs and Hapsburgs, every attempt to direct the fate of the country from outside will arouse the growth of nationalism".

[665] In the pamphlet, facts on the full dependence of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Central Committee of the Russian CP are quoted: thus the Communist organisation in Ukraine — "had to fulfil all demands of the Central Committee of the Russian CP, even, if it regarded them injurious to the cause of the revolution in Ukraine".

656 666 Moscow deported the opposing Communists from Ukraine or expelled them from the Party. The Soviet Russian régime in Ukraine thereto was strengthened. For this purpose Moscow gave preponderance to the Russian element in the Soviet administration in Ukraine. For instance, the election system for the 4th Congress of the Soviets in Ukraine in 1920 was the following: from 1000 soldiers of the Red Army one deputy was elected, from 10,000 workers one deputy, and one deputy from 50,000 peasants. It should be remembered that 1920 in the ranks of the Red Army in Ukraine

is looked at by the majority of the Communist Party in Ukraine, 186
and here in Russia even more, as some sort of strategy, a diplomatic 668
game".

Rakovsky explained that, through the proclamation of the Soviet Union, Moscow had gained ten and twenty times more power in comparison with the previous state. Therefore Rakovsky demanded that the Government of the whole Union in Moscow should surrender 9/10 of its competence, and that this be transferred to the separate Soviet Republics. Together with the Commissar of the Interior of Soviet Ukraine of that time, Skypnyk, Rakovsky demanded that the relations between Ukraine and Russia should be these of a confederation.

Skrypnyk protested at the Congress of the Russian CP against the disregard of the national and cultural rights of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army that led to a forced Russification of Ukrainians. He regretted that Ukrainian schools were not allowed [162]
for the 7 millions of Ukrainians in the Russian Soviet Republic, outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Skrypnyk sharply criticised the nationalism of the Russian Communists in Ukraine who did not admit the Ukrainian language in public and Party institutions.

The Russian Communist N. Bukharin stated in a speech at the 12th Congress of the Party that the Communist organisation in Ukraine had a Russian-Jewish composition with a very small number of Ukrainians. And in the meantime, Bukharin said, — "in Ukraine there is a very strong national movement" (*Records of the 12th Congress of the Russian CP*).

However, the demands of those Communists who wished to re- 631
strict Russian centralism and enlarge the rights of the separate Soviet Republics did not attain a majority at the Congress of the Russian CP. In July 1923, the strictly centralist Constitution of the USSR was ratified. Besides the theoretical declaration of the equality of rights of nations and the 'right of separation' of the peoples from Russia this constitution actually concentrates all power in the hands of Moscow, so that the acts and orders of the 'All-Union Government' are valid even then if the separate Soviet Republics would protest against them.

The policy of Soviet Ukrainisation was limited mostly to those 186
institutions which had to deal with the peasants. But in the towns 665
and industrial centres the Russian Communists tried to prevent the admission of the Ukrainian language by every means. For this reason quarrels between Ukrainian and Russian Communists arose in the ranks of the Communist Party in Ukraine. Thus the Communist Alexander Shumsky, the Commissar of Education in

[In the year 1922 -- Analyst]

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
● 665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine
687 the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 1/3 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres (*The Bolshevik of Ukraine*, No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the
517 Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan (1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[Sl, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but 000
politically faithful to Moscow.

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also 661
by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of 651
forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though 243
terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists.

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet 661
Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the 665
CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others.

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion 687
from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commis- 186
sar of Education in Ukraine from 1027—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the

687 national problem and encouraged others to do likewise. In Moscow
186 Skrypnyk's theoretical works on the national problem were treated with distrust: for in the CP one is to believe that Lenin and Stalin have given unchangeable dogmas an orthodox Communist is not expected to discuss. In the meantime Skrypnyk in his speeches and articles summoned the Ukrainian Communists to a 'national construction not restricted by anything'. He pointed out that national consciousness should be developed among the masses of Ukrainian people, and that through the development of the national culture certain values should be given to the Ukrainian workers and peasants.

Skrypnyk described the practice of the Russian Communist Party in the national question in the following words:

"For the majority of our Party, Ukraine as a national element did not exist. There was only 'Little Russia', as a part of the indivisible Russia, something uncertain both in its relations with Russia and with regard to its territory and even its language" (Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches*, vol. I, p. 291; Kharkov 1932). Frequently, in the Congresses of the Communist Party, Skrypnyk demanded the organising of Ukrainian schools in the territories of the Russian Soviet Republic inhabited by Ukrainians. These views and demands of Skrypnyk Moscow recognised as 'nationalism', he himself was declared as an 'instrument of intervention'. In order to avoid being the principal figure in a new trial Skrypnyk thought it better to end this life by suicide. This happened on July 6, 1933, on the 10th anniversary of the ratification of the first constitution of the USSR, of which Skrypnyk was one of the co-editors.

661 Moscow's fears of the Communist opposition in Ukraine are
665 shown by the dimensions of the 'purge' which had been made among the Communists in Ukraine in 1933. During 1933, 35,5% of the members were expelled from the CP of Ukraine (*Communist:* 1, 2, 1934). In some regions, for instance in that of Kiev, half of the members were expelled from the Communist Party. Many Communist organisations in villages ceased to exist and were replaced by 'political detachments' sent from Russia. In the course of 10 months in 1933, in Ukraine, 237 secretaries of Rayon Committees of the Communist Party, 279 Presidents of Rayon Executive Committees, and 158 Presidents of Rayon Control Commissions were dismissed (*Izvestia:* Moscow 28, 11, 1933).

The purge in the public institutions of Ukraine was directed principally against the Ukrainians. The Communist Mykolenko,

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union R2

the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933:

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

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6. *The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33*

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation.

U 731 656

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*).

SU [474] [423]
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Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and 563
disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the 661
Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. [871]
In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories, the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet [665] ●
and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre (UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on 727
the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the 474
Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form
of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative 563
Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz)*. The Ukrainian co-operative movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Co-operation *(Maslosoyuz)*, supplied dairy products, not only for the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in 563
the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

563 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the
423 Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the
big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective
474 farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the
masses of the people. It should be pointed out that between the
Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet
Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was
preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population
of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first
had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria.
In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that
time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for
10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the
political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians.
From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian.
The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a
separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and
Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the
Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the
Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the
Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian
co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppres-
sions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian
press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed
various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded.
This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 man-
dates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the
development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in
Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was
allowed.

728 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR.
661 The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet
Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to
the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as
1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupa-
tion by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation)
soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.
[1. In the Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

661 pared with that which remained to the Ukrainians
648 in Poland. The old cultural city on the Dniepr was experiencing a new efflorescence; 70% of all students in Soviet Ukraine were attending Ukrainian schools. There had been nothing like it since the days of the Cossacks. /115/ Between
[214] 1918 and 1928 the Academy of Sciences published
[217] 888 works and numerous libraries were founded. (60) Hundreds of newspapers, periodicals and

60. Tisserand: The Ukraine, Life of a People, page 283.

pamphlets enlightened Ukrainians eager for knowledge in their mother tongue, and poetry and belles-lettres had reached a very high level. But soon black shadows were to fall on this brilliance.

Not yet satisfied with the results of the
661 policy of Ukrainization - in 1929 only 36% of
665 the officials were Ukrainians, the rest Jews and Russians (61) - the Central Committee of the

61. Fedenko: Lectures on the Question of Nationalities in the U.S.S.R., page 17.

Communist Partv of the Ukraine decided at the end of December, 1929, to intensify the process of nationalization. Especially the working classes were to take an active part in Ukrainian cultural life; Ukrainian theaters were to put on regular performances in the industrial areas; there were to be "Ukrainization cells" formed in the factories, the high union posts and the leading positions in the cooperatives were to be held by Ukrainians, and adherence to the course of nationalization of the administrative system was to be supervised. In this manner the cities were to be Ukrainized. The Commissar of People's Education, Skrypnyk, the successor of Shumskyj, successfully sought both to disseminate Ukrainian literature

665 and raise its standard and to do the same for the
661 theater and films. He even intended to impede the sale of newspapers and books written in Russian. When the first Five Year Plan was drawn up the Ukrainian Economic Council had its own demands to make to the state planning commission. It requested the establishment of industries which should make the Ukraine economically independent of the rest of Russia, as for example, textile factories, leather factories, paper mills and chemical plants.

665 The Pan-Russian Communists had repeatedly warned of such a development. Even in 1927 when Shumskyj was transferred to the north for disciplinary reasons, the Communist Party drew up a memorandum to the Executive Committee of the Comintern /116/ which, among other things, stated: "Before the Revolution we had almost no Ukrainian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia in the cities, now they are increasing every year, they multiply through influx from the villages, they strengthen their positions in the economy and the apparatus of government and endeavor to bring a certain proportion of Soviet officials, workers and Party members under their influence." (62) In this

62. Zaliznyak: The Struggle Between the Ukraine and the Soviet Union, page 669 ff.

memorandum the great danger of nationalistic deviation within the KPU (Communist Party of Ukraine)was emphatically pointed out. "The Disquieting Signal" was the title of a review of Vaganian's book On National Culture, in the official organ of the Russian government publication: The Reader and the Author. To Vaganian's warning of national cultures the government publishing firm adds the remark that there is danger in the fact that in recent times a number of Ukrainian authors have published works which the

•665 Ukrainian population prefers to read, whereas the works of Russian authors remain completely unknown in the Ukraine. It goes on to say that this is a very detrimental phenomenon, for Russian culture is important for the entire Soviet Union and for the whole world, while Ukrainian culture is of merely local significance.

Conversely, the Ukrainians accused the Muscovites of chauvinism. Stalin, the Georgian, tried to pronounce a Solomonic judgment at the Sixteenth Party Congress in June 1930 by condemning both Great Russian and Ukrainian nationalism: "Great Russian chauvinism under the communists reflects the efforts of the ruling classes of former Russia to reconstruct their lost privileges of domination over other peoples. As a result, the chauvinism of Great Russia is the chief danger in the national policy of the Communist Party." In accordance with these ideas, the Sixteenth Congress adopted the resolution that the Party should /117/ intensify its fight against Great Russian deviation and the deviations of "local nationalism".

648 As a matter of fact, Ukrainian nationalism was indeed becoming a danger to Bolshevik Moscow.
182 As compared to the period of war-communism, the Ukraine was living in remarkably comfortable circumstances. The fact that the majority of the [369] Ukrainian people, the rural population, enjoyed an adequate subsistence, must have had a positively irritating effect on the urban masses in their wretched circumstances. Was not this an open refutation of the communist doctrine? There was the additional fact that the Ukrainians became more and more importunate with their varied demands, and that the power of the Ukrainian government had increased so much during the NEP period, that finally it headed the opposition of non-Russian peoples in the Council of Nationalities (the second chamber next to the Supreme Council) and forced Moscow several times to change its

[During the NEP period in the Soviet Union — Analyst]

661 tion we have for many successive years carried on actions, in comparison with which the deeds of a highway robber may be called a model of honesty and humanity. I understood that the sentence of the proletarian court must be the following: to deal with me as with a mad dog, to do away with me as with a sick horse, to remove me from the social organism. The Communist Party has magnanimously accepted my penitence. The Party has given me life and the joy of work." (65)

65. The Ukrainian Literature in the Service of its Nation, pages 47 and 48.

661 It was Postyshev whom Stalin sent into the Ukraine at the end of 1932 with a small army of •665 GPU men and whom he ordered to destroy the "national counterrevolution", while Tsatonskyj and Khait were to discover, unmask and correct "national aberrations". After approximately a year's activity Postyshev reported his "successes" to the plenary meeting of the Party actives of the city of Khar'kov in November, 1933. According to this report, 27,400 of a total of 125,000 members of the KPU were expelled in 1933; 1000 nationalists were removed from the People's Commissariat for Public Education and its subordinate organizations in the province, nearly 2000 from the cooperatives and economic organizations, and approximately 300 professors and assistants from scientific institutions. 2500 Ukrainian nationalists were rounded up by Postyshev's agents in central positions of Soviet Ukraine in Khar'kov alone. Finally, 237 Party secretaries of the peripheral administrations, 249 chairman of the executive committees and 158 chairmen of the controlling commissions, as well as 1300 members of the Association of Communist Socialist Youth (Komsomol) were victims of this purge. (66) The

66. Report of Pstyshev at the Party meeting in Khar'kov in November 1933.

661 general secretary of the KPU, Kossier, was appar-
●665 ently justified in saying: "The fact that we have
000 shattered nationalism, /Facing page 120/ /Ukrainian girl drawing water./k/Facing page 121/ /What a wealth of imagination and highly developed skill is disclosed in these pretty handmade national costumes!/k/121/ that we have organized our work properly in the country, this has determined our successes in the year 1933." (67)

67. Izvestiia" Number 19 and Number 20, 1934, in Nation und Staat, page 107.

000 Several years later these fierce foes of the Ukrainian people were themselves to be "unmasked". They were, for example, the friend of Postyshev, Ioina Iakir, at that time supreme commander of the Red Army in the Ukraine who had raged furiously against the nationalists at the Seventeenth Congress, and the People's Commissar Tsatonskyj who was shot in 1937 because of counterrevolutionary activities. Tastonskyj's successor, Khomenko, was relieved of his office on April 9, 1939.

642 From the time that Moscow once more obtained for itself, with bullet and bayonet, a separatist Ukraine, the freedom of the country has been constantly curtailed. When the period of "integral centralization" with the Five Year Plans, began the branch office of the Foreign Commissariat in Khar'kov was eliminated, the Ukrainians were removed from leading positions in economy and the government, and the individual commissariats and whatever important commanding positions there were, were little by little turned over to Moscow.

The democratic Constitution of November 1936 tops the skyscraper of integral centralism. Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution are merely a gesture, according to which "every Soviet republic exercises supreme power quite as a matter of course"

k [For plates, cf. pp. 221-222, category 116 - Analyse]

177 sufficient grounds to deal with him in summary pro-
197 ceeding as a "separatist". Pravda of October 16, 1937 even accuses non-Russian students of "mutilating the great Russian language with all kinds of local linguistic rubbish".

The Russian State Publishing House in Moscow is playing a leading role in the language fight. Of 20 monographs which were published up to midsummer 1939 as a result of the great Shevchenko celebrations, no less than 16 were written in Russian and only 4 in the Ukrainian language.

Finally, a favorite method of Russianization is the granting of prizes, free journeys, and privileged places of work and study to young Ukrainians.

*

•645 Young people are supposed to spend their
883 leisure time in the Party organizations of the
867 "Yellow Bills", the "Pioneers" and with the
857 "Communistic Socialistic Youth" (Komsomol). /This is an erroneous reading of the Soviet abbreviation of Komministicheski Soiuz Molodiozh; which means Communist League of Young People. Editor/ There they are divided up into "groups of various interests" where they "can develop and satisfy their most urgent needs". There are those interested in the theater, music, sports, politics, the army and similar things. "From the outposts, from groups, from the clubs, from schools, the young people of talent come into the guardianship of the Pioneers every day, every evening, and there they develop, for they are under the supervision of experts..." (71) What "urgent needs" means is

71: H. Furman: Activity and Life of the Pioneers in the Ukraine.

explained by the Kiyev Visti of March 27, 1939, which says that the children conversation hours

665 in the movies and the /126/ theater are "dedicated
883 to the historic Party Congress". According to
867 Proletarska Pravda of January 5, 1938, popular
857 conversations "about the difficult life of children in capitalist countries, about the international youth movement and the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Council of the USSR are carried on" at such gatherings.

875 The teaching personnel in Soviet Ukraine consists largely of Russians and Jews. In the "pedagogical technical schools" and the "pedagogical institutes" in which educators are trained, the main emphasis is put on a sound knowledge of the Communist doctrine. It is obvious that in the process other subjects, such as language, spelling, history and the like, are neglected. If even in Leningrad "the struggle against illiteracy among the teachers is being intensified", (72)

72. Kommunistische Aufklärung of December 16, 1935, quoted from Richthofen: Bolschewistische Wissenschaft und Kulturpolitik /Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy/, page 75.

what may one expect to find in the provinces! In a single Ukrainian rayon 400 teachers had inadequate knowledge of orthography. (73) The profes-

73. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Ukraine.

sion of the Soviet Ukrainian teacher is certainly
[665] not enticing. The pay is very small; the village schoolmasters are often paid only in kind, and if they wander off into the factories and the teacher shortage becomes too great, the Komsomol sometimes comes to the rescue and "quickly mobilizes 50,000 members as substitutes". (74)

74. Kommunist of May 19, 1931, quoted by Danko; The Nation in Soviet Chains.

876 of a machine and who, like a machine, heedless of personal concerns, unencumbered by spiritual impulses will produce the maximum number of revolutions for as long a time as possible. Only when the entire production of the educational factories is standardized does the individual product adapt itself without friction to the process. If the education of children were left to the families as it was before, the entire experiment would be jeopardized from the beginning, the more so since the Soviet Union is still primarily an agrarian country. For this reason the Bolsheviks replace the irreplacable educational force of the family with children's and young people's homes. This has its advantages: family ties are loosened and finally severed, the poison of Ukrainian nationalism is staved off and God is eliminated.

Thus young people are reared, homines technici who "perform their tasks purely automatically like machines, devoid of any moments of emotion, detached from any family ties and from ethnic groups, free from religious prejudice, merely on the basis of a rationally determined plan. But the machine is cruel; it destroys and crushes everything that stands in its way, for it knows no feelings, no former merits, it does not perceive individual greatness. Everything that towers above the measuring rod of the official pattern is mowed down, has its head cut off".(77)

77. Richthofen: Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy, page 76.

000 /Facing page 128/ /A typical workers' settlement near Krivoy Rog. Everywhere around the industrial cities which have sprung up like mushrooms, such loam huts are built as workers' cottages./A/Facing page 129/ /Richelieu Terrace in Odessa/A/129/

665 883 876 The head of the Komsomol, Kosarev, was justified in making the following statement at the

A [For plates, cf. pp. 222-223, category 116 - Analyst]

665 23rd International Youth Day in Moscow in 1937:
883 "Never in the history of the world have there been
876 and are there such conditions for growth, education and training of the younger generation as have been created for young people among us by the Soviet government, by the Communist Party..." There are countless proofs of the fact that the basic principles of Bolshevik education are refuted by the products of this education.[7] The Komsomolskaja Pravda, number 83, 1935 admits "that the criminal elements in schools developed more actively than the Komsomols and the Pioneers, and therefore drew a large number of students into their sphere of influence", and Pravda of
[681] February 19, 1935 reports that the following punishments are administered to combat hoodlumism among children of from 8 to 12 years: "The expulsion of the hoodlums from school, legal persecution of their parents, the formation of special divisions of militia to combat youthful criminals, and so forth." (78) This picture is

78. Richthofen, Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy, page 75.

rounded off by the introduction on April 7, 1935 of the death penalty for children beginning at the age of 12 for those of them who can be shown to have committed theft, banditry, murder or to have contemplated murder, and by the purges which began in the autumn of 1937 against the members of the Komsomol, especially in the Ukraine.

/130/ In the Village

181 During the years in which Shevchenko stands watch in the searing heat of the Kirghiz Steppes, his friend Kostomariv formulates for the first time the contrasts between Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups. According to this, a tendency toward spirituality prevails in the social and

7 [For a discussion of Bolshevik educational theory and Methods, cf. pp 133-135, category NG-Analyst]

186 For the next few years Ukrainian intellectuals were absorbed with the cultural 'Ukrainization' of the Ukraine, for which Moscow gave a free 517 hand while firmly controlling the posts of political command. The Ukrainian language came into its own, a scientific Ukrainian terminology was created, and Ukrainian book production had a boom.

THE FIRST PURGES

186 The Soviet authorities soon discovered that the Ukrainian nationalist 665 renaissance could not be arrested halfway and that cultural nationalism was bound to lead to political nationalism. The Ukrainian nationalists on the other hand, found out that in a totalitarian State like the U.S.S.R. there could be no real freedom, not even for Ukrainian cultural nationalism. From 1926 onwards the contradictions between Ukrainian nationalism and the communist State became more and more noticeable. Before hitting out against the bourgeois Ukrainian nationalist groups which conspired against the Soviet régime, the Kremlin had to make order within the Ukrainian Communist Party itself. The latter had originated from the amalgamation of the Bolsheviks with a genuine home-grown communist movement, the Borotbists. They were a left-wing extremist group called after the Ukrainian émigré newspaper *Borotba* published in Geneva in 1915. From the ideological point of view they had much in common with Marshal Tito's Yugoslav communists. They insisted on unconditional national independence, but in every other respect their aims were indistinguishable from those of the Bolsheviks. In 1919 the Borotbists assumed the title of 'Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists)' and applied for membership of the Communist International. Together with the Ukrainian Bolsheviks proper they formed the first Ukrainian Soviet Government, the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee which organized the fight against General Denikin's White Guards. Lenin valued the co-operation of the Borotbists and stated that the question of Ukrainian independence should be no reason for disunity between them and the Bolsheviks, the more so since a section of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks favoured an independent status for the Ukraine.[5] The merger of the two communist fractions in March 1920 was of great value to the Bolsheviks for the Borotbists exercised considerable influence on the Ukrainian masses.

The Borotbist traditions of Ukrainian communism explain to a considerable extent the particular strength of nationalist heresy within the Ukrainian Communist Party. The first Borotbist deviations were officially labelled as 'Khvylovy-ism' and 'Shumsky-ism' after Mikola Khvylovy, an outstanding Ukrainian writer and Oleksandr Shumsky, Minister of Education. Both Khvylovy and Shumsky scandalized orthodox communists in the middle of the twenties by their outspoken western

[Cf. cat. 186, pp. 129-130, 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]

orientation. Khvylovy considered that Ukrainian literature should go 665
its own way and look towards Western Europe, no matter whether 186
bourgeois or proletarian. Shumsky advocated that the Ukrainian Communist Party should be independent of the Russian Communist Party.

This crisis within the Ukrainian Communist Party* prompted the 661
Moscow Bolshevik leadership in 1926 to make one of Stalin's principal 665
assistants, L. M. Kaganovich, Ukrainian party secretary for a short 186
period during which the first great purge against the nationalist deviation was carried out. Khvylovy was ejected from the party and Shumsky expelled from the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When Khvylovy repented he was given another chance and re-admitted as a party member, but in 1933 he committed suicide after a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism had been launched.

Admittedly the methods of repression in the Ukraine were comparatively liberal until 1929-30. From that time onwards the oppressive policy of the Soviet State overshadowed in the minds of the Ukrainian nationalists in the U.S.S.R. the contribution which Polish, Rumanian and Czech communists were ready to make for the establishment of a Greater Soviet Ukraine. Many Ukrainian nationalists became convinced that national unity was less vital to the Ukrainians than cultural and [177]
political freedom, in particular that free intercourse with the West which Moscow was unwilling to grant.

The Soviet State inflicted many heavy blows on the representatives 668
of the western orientation among the Ukrainians, but never vanquished 661
it entirely. In this struggle Ukrainian nationalism commanded an almost inexhaustible reservoir of resistance forces. Bloodshed and terror seemed incapable of stamping out the longing for spiritual freedom. Almost every year brought the discovery of a new conspiracy, a new series of trials, a new trend in national Ukrainian deviations. In 1929 the G.P.U. discovered the 'Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy', the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in 1931 the 'Ukrainian National Centre', in 1933 the 'Ukrainian Military Organization' (UVO).

The offensive by the central Government against the Ukraine's trends [814]
towards a more independent existence was conducted not only in the political sphere but also in the field of culture, where the régime had originally granted some scope to Ukrainian nationalism. One of the main bulwarks of Ukrainian nationalism was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The history section of the Academy had turned out to be so anti-Bolshevik that it had to be disbanded altogether while its head, Professor Hrushevsky, was exiled to Russia proper. This banishment of the 'great old man' of Ukrainian nationalism from his place of work showed better than anything else that the policy of reconciliation which Moscow had originally pursued in its relation towards Ukrainian nationalism had been but a short-term manœuvre.

*[Cf. category 665, p. 130 --Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

661 668 423 Political and cultural oppression of Ukrainian nationalism was co-ordinated with a tough fight against the Ukrainian peasant masses opposing the policy of collectivization. Famine, total disorganization of the Ukrainian agriculture and the formation of armed peasant bands were characteristic features of this period. The central Government got the situation in hand by physically annihilating peasant resistance, by making partial concessions on the tempo of collectivization and by thoroughly purging, between 1930 and 1932, the staff of the Ukrainian Peoples' Commissariat for Agriculture of alleged Borotbist wreckers.

THE SKRYPNIK AFFAIR

661 186 665 The Ukrainian crisis in the early thirties culminated in the 'affair Skrypnik', which was the most important single event in Ukrainian history of that period.

After his unsuccessful fight in 1922 as an associate of Rakovsky for a 'Confederation of Soviet Republics' and for the quasi-independence of the Ukraine, Skrypnik in his day-to-day work as Peoples Commissar for the Interior, Justice, and Education tried to save for the Ukraine what could be saved in the way of an autonomous status. One of his main preoccupations was to prevent as far as possible the foundation of all-Union institutions such as the All-Union Agricultural Academy; but he failed.

Skrypnik had been a Marxist since 1897, and a member of the Bolshevik Party since its foundation. After the Revolution he was not just a local Ukrainian figure but became a Vice-Premier in the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nobody could with any shadow of justification denounce Skrypnik as nationalist. Skrypnik, it is true, considered that the central Government should bring proletarian internationalism and justified national aspirations into harmony with each other. 'Our work', he used to say, 'should be organized in such a way as to give the working masses of each nation the possibility of developing its national consciousness as much as possible'.

This conception amounted from an orthodox Bolshevik standpoint to the 'triumph of nationalism over the proletarian revolution' and was bound to get Skrypnik into trouble sooner or later. The men whom Stalin commissioned to liquidate the 'Skrypnik affair' were a Pole, Stanislav Kosior, and a Russian, Pavel Postyshev, first and second secretary respectively of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The final clash occurred on June 10th, 1933, in Kharkov, when Postyshev and Kosior, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, accused Skrypnik of being an enemy of the State and the actual head of the Ukrainian counter-revolution. At

1 [Cf. cat. 186, pp. 130-131 -- Analyst]
2 [Cf. cat. 642, p. 128 -- Analyst]

that meeting the Ukrainian Communist Party decided that Great Russian chauvinism had ceased to be the main danger in the Ukraine and that Ukraine nationalism had become enemy number one. The decision constituted an important landmark in the history of the Soviet Ukraine and the prelude to a purge on a tremendous scale. 661 186 665

Skrypnik drew his conclusions from the 'new situation' by committing suicide less than four weeks after the decisive meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Executive Committee. Skrypnik's disappearance, whilst affecting the situation in the Ukraine in general, was particularly important in the field of Ukrainian cultural policy. After Skrypnik's death Postyshev and Kosior stopped the 'Ukrainization of the Ukraine', a favourite slogan of Ukrainian communists up to 1933, and started a determined campaign against 'over-Ukrainization'. 'Fight against over-Ukrainization' was in reality nothing else than the recapture by the Great Russians of some of the positions which had been lost to the Ukrainians, particularly in the Donets Basin. There is no doubt that the Ukrainization had been overdone and had actually led to the imposition of the Ukrainian language on non-Ukrainians, particularly in the schools. [563]

THE 'GREAT PURGE'

In 1934 and 1935 the party leadership discovered a big terrorist organization of Borotbists in Kiev and Kharkov, as well as an alleged 'Nationalist-Trotskyite Bloc'.[6] In 1936 the situation seemed to be more stable in the Ukraine, but 1937 was again a disastrous year for that country. Official Soviet statements claimed that in 1937 Ukrainian nationalism had made particularly extensive efforts to detach the Ukrainian S.S.R. from Russia by plotting with German and Polish fascists. Some of the plots and conspiracies uncovered had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism and were simply Ukrainian off-shoots of anti-Stalin currents within the All-Union Communist Party. It is true, however, that the Ukraine suffered much more during the big purge of 1937–38 than any other Soviet Republic. Moreover, the purge went on in the Ukraine after it had been ended on the whole in other parts of the Soviet Union. 661 665 668

The new chain of dramatic incidents started in the Ukraine in the summer of 1937, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Panas Petrovich Lyubchenko, committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest, trial and execution. Lyubchenko had been Prime Minister for three years during which he had made himself conspicuous by his passionate speeches denouncing Hitler's plans of aggression. Lyubchenko was a former Borotbist and thus suspect to the Kremlin. He was charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian fascist party and allying it to the 'right-wing Trotskyite centre'.[7] Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, was arrested

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

661 after two months of office for alleged treasonable contacts with Ukrain-
●665 ian separatists. After Bondarenko, Vlas Y. Chubar, a Vice-Premier in
668 the Central Government, became Ukrainian Premier. He was purged in the spring of 1938. Together with the three Prime Ministers, Lyubchenko, Bondarenko and Chubar, a large number of Ukrainian ministers, high officials and party dignitaries were removed from their posts including the party secretaries, Kosior and Postyshev, once so powerful. The purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party was so thorough that of the thirteen members forming the Ukrainian Politbureau in April 1937 not one was left by June 1938. One of the last prominent Ukrainian communists to disappear was Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky, the President of the Ukrainian S.S.R. There is no evidence of Petrovsky, Kosior or Chubar ever having been sentenced by a court. No public trial of a Ukrainian communist leader seems to have taken place after March 1938 when Grigory Fyodorovich Grinko, Finance Minister of the U.S.S.R. was sentenced to death as a 'Ukrainian nationalist' and 'Polish spy'.

To clear up the situation in the Ukraine, Stalin, early in 1938, appointed two new men to the key positions of that republic. The party secretary of Moscow, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchov became first party secretary of the Ukraine and M. A. Burmistenko second secretary. From the point of view of the Kremlin, Burmistenko's appointment was a mistake. He mysteriously vanished during the Nazi invasion of the Ukraine and may even have deserted to the enemy. Khrushchov, on the other hand, was the right man for the job. When taking it over he made a statement extremely characteristic of the entire communist Ukraine policy. He declared that the traitors to party and country would be annihilated to the last man just as Taras Bulba had killed the betrayer of his own people.

[539] The Cossack Ataman, Taras Bulba, the hero of Gogol's famous novel, slew his son, Andriy, who fell in love with a beautiful Polish girl, betrayed his homeland, his Orthodox faith and fought against his own people. Seen through modern eyes, Andriy is but a symbol of Polish, Western and Catholic orientation among the Ukrainians.

Yet Taras Bulba had still another son, Ostap, who represents the daring loyal Cossack fighter bravely enduring all tortures by the Poles who put him to death. The death of Ostap is the prelude to the triumph of Ostap's cause: 120,000 Cossacks appear on the horizon of the Ukraine, a victorious army sweeping away the enemies, the Poles. Taras died in this great struggle but before his death he pronounced a last curse upon the Poles and forecast the final triumph of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar'. 'The time will come', said Taras, 'when there will be no power in the world which will not be conquered by him'.

THE UKRAINE

Stalin and his collaborators see the essence of the Ukrainian problem in the same way as Gogol[1] did by considering it basically as a struggle of Taras against Andriy, the Russian conception of the Ukraine against the Western conception. Krushchov was right in evoking the parallel of Taras Bulba because under the Soviet régime Taras, the faithful watchman in the South of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar', once again killed Andriy when he became attracted by the West and ready to desert both faith and 'Czar'. S.U. 635 186 UK 661 648 665

Krushchov as party secretary went on to kill 'Andriys'. His first victims were leaders of the Ukrainian Communist Youth League who were removed from their posts in December 1938, having been apparently overlooked in previous purges. Khrushchov rarely killed in the physical sense; he rather weeded out all influences and tendencies not in conformity with the narrow views which a Soviet Taras Bulba may have on history, literature, education, etc.

COMINTERN AND 'WESTERN UKRAINE'

In all its internal fights against Ukrainian nationalism the Soviet régime never forgot the 'other Ukraine' beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union. A geopolitical gesture in the summer of 1934 was especially intended for the attention of this 'other Ukraine'. It was the removal of the Ukrainian capital from Kharkov to Kiev, which was equivalent to the transportation of the centre of gravity of the country from the Eastern Ukraine to the Western Ukrainian areas near the Polish border. S.U. 648 563

Kharkov had been made the capital of the Soviet Ukraine in December 1919, in an attempt to link the administrative centre of the country as far as possible with the labouring masses of the Donets Basin; but Kiev was the historic capital and Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, liked to play up Kiev against Kharkov. This too was checked by the transfer of the capital. An official Soviet commentator said that the removal of the Ukrainian Government to Kiev, which was celebrated with music and dancing, had an 'extraordinary significance' both for the Ukraine and internationally, and that it was a more important event than the transfer of Russia's capital from Petrograd to Moscow after the October Revolution.[8] S.U. [361]

This latter remark was true in so far as the shifting of the capital constituted a prelude to the annexation by the U.S.S.R. of the Ukrainian territories of Poland. This annexation carried out in 1939, it should be well noted, was by no means a triumph of political strategy but was due to the use of force alone. The failure to win over the population of the Western Ukraine by peaceful means was probably the greatest defeat which the Soviet nationalities policy had suffered on Russia's frontiers. S.U. [728] [635]

1 [Cf. category 116, p.134, R1 Sov Union - Analyst]
2 [Cf. category 116, pp. 136 ff -- Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

S.U. 563 648 208

There was hardly any other territory on the Russian border where the Soviet régime stood such an excellent chance of exploiting social grievances and the discontent of oppressed minorities as in Eastern Poland. Yet the Ukrainians and Byelorussians of Eastern Poland, who according to all logical calculations were bound to become a natural prey to Soviet propaganda, turned away from Russia in protest against compulsory collectivization, political purges and anti-religious propaganda.

UK 665 668 648

The sympathies which the Soviet Union enjoyed among the poor peasantry of the Western Ukraine in the first years after the October Revolution had almost completely died out by the end of the twenties. Moscow could not even rely on its own 'Communist Party of the Western Ukraine' which frequently took its lead from the anti-Russian 'national deviationists' in the Soviet Ukraine. When the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine split at the beginning of 1928 into 'loyal communists' and Ukrainian nationalists, the latter, led by Vasilkov, had the majority in the Central Committee. The Vasilkov group, said the Comintern organ, *Communist International*, 'was consciously counter-revolutionary and carried out wrecking work and provocations'.[9]

The Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had hardly been reorganized when several party groups again fell victims to Ukrainian anti-Soviet nationalism. In 1935 the official Comintern organ complained about the absence of 'a national liberation struggle on a large scale in both the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia', meaning, of course, a pro-Soviet national liberation struggle.[10]

In 1938 the Comintern journal was forced to admit that the nationalist anti-Soviet organization U.N.D.O., which stood for Ukrainian autonomy inside Poland, was backed by broad masses of the people of the Western Ukraine and that the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had not succeeded 'in penetrating the organizations of Ukrainian nationalists'. The Western Ukrainian Communist Party finally found itself compelled to exchange its demand for self-determination for a demand for autonomy which had been originally branded as a 'bourgeois counter-revolutionary slogan'.[11]

The full extent of the political defeat suffered by Soviet Russia and Comintern propaganda in the Western Ukraine can be realized if one takes into account the active persecution which the Polish authorities conducted against Ukrainian nationalism, the punitive expeditions which they carried out against recalcitrant Ukrainian villages and the almost total disregard of the Polish Government for the cultural needs of the Polish Ukrainians. All these hardships which the Ukrainians of Poland suffered in the inter-war period were insufficient to promote any major co-operation between them and the Soviet régime.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKraine RDI

S.U. 563

affairs, Soviet policy in Transcarpathian Ukraine kept a certain balance between Russian and Ukrainian cultural work in the new province. Russian books and Russian newspapers are now being printed there side by side with Ukrainian ones.

COMMUNISTS AND ANTI-COMMUNISTS IN THE WESTERN UKRAINE

UK. 728

The annexation of the Western Ukraine, whilst increasing on the one hand the might of the Soviet Empire and improving its strategic position, at the same time delayed the internal political consolidation of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

UK. 665

Owing to its notable past failures the Communist Party machinery found it difficult to take root among the people of the Western Ukraine – even after its incorporation into the U.S.S.R. In each of the nine Western Ukrainian provinces (six from Poland, two from Rumania and one from Czechoslovakia), the Communist Party could rely only upon a few thousand loyal Bolsheviks. Thus in the large province of Rovno (formerly Polish), the Communist Party early in 1948 had but 6,000 members of whom more than half joined during the war and in the post-war period.[15] In the Transcarpathian Ukraine the party had in December 1946 only 4,000 members, about one-half per cent of the entire population.[16] This figure included not only local communists but also party and state officials who had come to the province in considerable numbers from beyond the Carpathians.

UK. 668

Together with a minute number of people who could be considered reliable from the Soviet standpoint, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in absorbing the new territories took over a large number of people with a Western anti-Soviet outlook, particularly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian intellectuals. This fresh accession of Ukrainian nationalist elements also encouraged the opposition forces in the 'Old Ukraine'. The great prominence of the historic vanguard role of the Western Ukraine in the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was bound to make itself felt inside the Soviet Ukraine as well. Years of Rumanian and Polish oppression had been unable to obliterate the importance of Western Ukrainian cultural nationalism which had unfolded itself before 1918 under the liberal rule of the Hapsburg monarchy. The Ukrainian nation was, indeed, a recognized political and cultural fact inside the Austrian Empire at a time when Czarist Russia denied the very existence of a Ukrainian nation.

Lvov in Galicia and Chernovitsy in the Bukovina had been centres of a legal Ukrainian national movement and of an openly professed Ukrainian culture long before Kiev and Kharkov. The Western Ukraine had not known that revolutionary Ukrainian-Russian comradeship-in-arms

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

The old newspapers ceased at once to appear[1] but the new occupants started in all of the main cities new Communist news- 728
papers as the *Free Ukraine* in Lviv and the *Soviet Ukraine* in [204]
Stanyslaviv. They allowed also a Communist Polish newspaper the *Red Flag* and a similar paper in Yiddish.

The old officials were at first encouraged to return to their [661]
posts, whether they were Polish or not but in a very short time they began to disappear and they were replaced by Ukrainian-speaking persons, some from the neighborhood and some from eastern Ukraine. At almost the same time, while preparations were begun for the proposed plebiscite, the authorities quietly picked up and incarcerated most of the old political leaders, especially those of the UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic League, the representatives of those parties that had sought a normalization of relations with the Poles.

In the same slow and unobstrusive way the Polish police of the [625]
different cities were replaced by a "national militia." This was composed of armed groups of young men who more or less volunteered for the work of maintaining order. The Ukrainian and the Jewish organizations tried to bring these self-appointed groups under control but this proved a difficult task for, in many cases, the new Soviet authorities had encouraged some of the more lawless and tumultuous elements to undertake the work so as to profit themselves by the resultant chaos and to facilitate the calling in of their own people.

This era of anxiety on the part of the population and of extreme 728
moderation on the part of the occupying forces lasted for almost 666
a month, while preparations were being made for the election of representatives of all organizations, factories, and groups to a National Assembly for the consideration of reunion with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Meetings were held everywhere, at which attendance was compulsory, and everywhere there was expressed by selected speakers the gratitude of the people for their liberation from the Polish lords and the imperialistic capitalists. Khrushchov and other high functionaries arrived from Kiev to conduct these elections and to superintend the preparation of the lists of delegates. Yet it was almost at once noted that while there

[1] [1939, Russian occupation of Poland -- Analyst]

728 were a few well-known persons on the various lists of delegates,
666 the vast majority were either completely unknown or were definitely recognized as representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic or of the occupying forces.

The election on October 22[1] was carried on in the regular Bolshevik fashion with no opportunity for any choice of candidates. Over 90% of the people were marshalled to the polls and it was made clear that they had no choice but to approve the selected list. The response was, of course, practically unanimous and the next step was then in order.

728 On October 26[1] the National Assembly met in Lviv. The delegates, acting under definite orders, elected a presidium which included Stalin and the officials of the UkSSR. The first act was to pass a resolution of gratitude to Stalin and the Soviet leaders for their liberation of the country. Then there were a few laudatory speeches and the resolution was adopted to apply for membership in the USSR, to nationalize trade, industry and the banks, to divide the land of the state, the large landowners and the church among the landless and poor peasants, and to send a delegation to Kiev and Moscow to ask for the incorporation.

[185]

All this was a cut and dried performance to satisfy the Communist love of paper democracy and to justify their occupation of the country under the guise of liberation. There was no discussion allowed and once again the resolution was accepted unanimously.

On November 1[1] the selected delegation met Stalin, and the Presidium of the USSR in Moscow formally welcomed the liberated brothers and annexed their territory to the UkSSR. It was noteworthy that the action of Moscow completely overshadowed any reception at Kiev but this was only natural in view of the nature of the entire enterprise. There were none of those demonstrations that had marked the union of the two sections in the Ukrainian National Republic in 1919, when the vote and the union represented the will of the people.

Once these formalities had been accomplished, the Soviets felt free to act and, at a steadily increasing tempo, they went through in a few months a refined version of what they had accomplished

[1] [1939 -- Analyst]

declared: "Until the peace every citizen of the Ukrainian Republic, together with the citizens of all peoples of the Russian Republic, shall stand firmly on their positions at the front and in the hinterland". U 668 631

The Soviet Russian Government was from the beginning hostile to the national claims of Ukraine and other peoples. Relying on its own military force and the support of Communist groups among the various peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Russian Government was planning the conquest of Ukraine and other territories that did not recognise Soviet dictatorship.

3. Elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Russia and in Ukraine

At the end of November, 1917, in Ukraine and Russia, elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly took place. These elections in Ukraine were free, with full freedom of press and propaganda for all parties, among them the Communist. These elections showed the great difference between the political situation in Russia and in Ukraine. In Russia the adherents of Soviet dictatorship (the Communists and the party of the Left Socialists-Revolutionaries), especially in the big cities like Moscow and Petersburg, had considerable gains. This gave the Communists and Left Socialists-Revolutionaries the basis for holding power in Russia; for they had the masses of friendly workers and peasants behind them. In Ukraine at these elections the Ukrainian Socialist parties, opponents of Soviet dictatorship, won (the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries got together approximately 3/4 of all cast votes). The Russian Communist Party, in spite of the immense resources from Russia for propaganda, gained in Ukraine less than 10% of the votes. In the big cities, among the workers, the Russian Communists were in a minority too; this explains the uncertainty of the Communists in Ukraine at that time in the struggle for the dictatorship of their party. U [666] 665 SU 665

The historian of the Communist movement in Ukraine, M. Popov, remarks that even in the big industrial centres in Ukraine "the local Communists had a lack of determination to take power into the hands of the Soviets", *History of the Communist Party 'Bolsheviks' of Ukraine:* Kharkov, 1929.

4. The Problem of Peace with the Central Powers

At the end of 1917 the Russian front against the Central Powers was decaying in a catastrophic way. This decay was hastened by the ruthless Communist propaganda for an immediate peace. In U. 648

CHAPTER III

UKRAINE UNDER SOVIET RUSSIAN RULE SINCE 1920

1. The Soviet Régime in Ukraine 1020—21

[656] 668 186 After the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and Lenin's letter to the Ukrainian workers and peasants announcing a new approach to the Ukrainian problem (December 1919; January-1920) the policy of Moscow towards Ukraine did not change in substance. Soviet Russia did not trust even the Communists of Ukrainian nationality or those Russian Communists who wished to meet the Ukrainian national demands even partly. The group of Communists-Federalists headed by G. Lapchinsky published in February 1920, a pamphlet entitled *Project of a Resolution on the Party Policy.* The authors of this pamphlet protested against the rule of the Russian element in Ukraine. They wrote on the "mad, and, for the cause of the revolution, disastrous plan of the occupation of Ukraine by the military and political forces of Soviet Russia. After the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation in the times of the Romanovs and Hapsburgs, every attempt to direct the fate of the country f r o m o u t - s i d e will arouse the growth of nationalism".

[665] In the pamphlet, facts on the full dependence of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Central Committee of the Russian CP are quoted: thus the Communist organisation in Ukraine — "had to fulfil all demands of the Central Committee of the Russian CP, even, if it regarded them injurious to the cause of the revolution in Ukraine".

656 Moscow deported the opposing Communists from Ukraine or expelled them from the Party. The Soviet Russian régime in ● 666 Ukraine thereto was strengthened. For this purpose Moscow gave preponderance to the Russian element in the Soviet administration in Ukraine. For instance, the election system for the 4th Congress of the Soviets in Ukraine in 1920 was the following: from 1000 soldiers of the Red Army one deputy was elected, from 10,000 workers one deputy, and one deputy from 50,000 peasants. It should be remembered that 1920 in the ranks of the Red Army in Ukraine

there were 85% Russians and only 8% Ukrainians. With this 656
election system the representatives of the peasants, the most 666
numerous part of the Ukrainian population, made only 12,7% of the members of this Soviet Congress. Finance, national economy, railways, labour — concisely all foundations of the economic life of Ukraine — were concentrated in Moscow. All Ukrainian co-operative organisations were subordinated to Moscow. During [651] 1920 Ukraine had to deliver to Russia 160 million of Pud of grain (1 Pud is 36 lbs.), 6 million Pud meat, 30 million Pud potatoes, 255 million eggs, big consignments of sugar, etc. The Russian Red Army made requisitions for its needs separately and confiscated in the last months of 1920 about 30 million Pud grain in Ukraine (*Collection of Reports of the Government of the USSR:* Kharkov 1921).

No wonder that in consequence of this exploitation the Urkrai- 669
nian partisan movement was spreading. At the end of 1920 there were not less than 40,000 Ukrainian partisans in Ukraine who fought against the Russian Communists as an organised force. Evidence of the extent of this struggle is given to us in the trophies of the Soviet Russian troops seized in the war with the Ukrainian partisans 1920—21: 43 guns, 1,812 machine-guns, 31,788 rifles etc. *(Collection of Reports).* In the course of only one year, 1921, the Soviet Secret Police in Ukraine suppressed 6,000 partisan organisations. (*Communist:* Kharkov, February 11, 1923).

2. The Famine of 1921/22 and the Policy of Soviet Russia in Ukraine 731

The Soviet Russian Government took advantage of the horrible 656
famine of 1921/22 in Ukraine and succeeded in strengthening its rule there. A drought in the fall of 1920 and spring 1921 was followed by a bad harvest, and a great dearth of food arose. A real famine began. However, the policy of the Russian Government in Ukraine, intending to get as much food as possible, did not change. Before the outside world the Russian authorities tried to hide the hunger catastrophe in Ukraine, and directed all foreign aid coming from America and Western Europe into Russia. Though in Ukraine in autumn 1921, millions of the Ukrainian population were starving the Russian Government, nevertheless, took away from the hungry regions the rest of the food stocks, and exported them to Russia. This roused the attention of foreigners who stayed at that time in Ukraine. The American historian H. H. Fisher writes in his book on the famine of 1921/22 that the representatives of the Soviet Russian Government demanded resolutely that it was

[Ukranian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

643 Art. 29. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for all its activities.

Art. 30. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR:

a) Convenes the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR;

b) Issues decrees;

c) Gives interpretations of the laws of the Ukrainian SSR in operation;

d) Conducts nation-wide polls (referendums);

e) Annuls decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and likewise decisions and orders of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies, if they do not conform to law;

f) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, releases and appoints Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Grants the rights of citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR;

h) Confers titles of honour of the Ukrainian SSR and grants awards;

i) Exercises the right of pardoning citizens convicted by judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR;

j) Appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives of the Ukrainian SSR to foreign states;

k) Receives the letters of credence and recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to it by foreign states.

643 646 Art. 31. Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR twice a year.

Extraordinary sessions are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR at its discretion or on the demand of one-third of the deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

646 Art. 32. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Credentials Committee to verify the credentials of the members of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

On the report of the Credentials Committee, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR decides whether to recognize the credentials of deputies or to annul their election.

Art. 33. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, when it deems necessary, appoints commissions of investigation and audit on any matter.

It is the duty of all institutions and officials to comply with the demands of such commissions and to submit to them all necessary materials and documents.

Art. 34. A member of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR may not be prosecuted or arrested without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, or, when the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is not in session, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

643 646 [666] Art. 35. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR orders new elections to be held within a period not exceeding two months from the date of expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 110. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to abide by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, to observe the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

[685] Art. 111. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to safeguard and strengthen public socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation [421] of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperity and culture of all the working people.

Persons committing offences against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.

Art. 112. Universal military service is law.

Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honourable duty of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

[687] Art. 113. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR. Treason to the country — violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the State, espionage — is punishable with all the severity of the law and is the most heinous of crimes.

Chapter IX. The Electoral System

666 Art. 114. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies — of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages — are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

Art. 115. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the Ukrainian SSR who have reached the age of 18, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR who has reached the age of 21, [641] irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities may be elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 116. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

[562] Art. 117. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

Art. 118. Citizens serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

Art. 119. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Working People's Deputies from the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of villages and cities to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.

Art. 120. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.

[UKRAINIAN CONSTITUTION AS OF NOV 21, 1949]

Art. 121. Elections of deputies to Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR are held by electoral districts on the following bases:

in elections to regional Soviets - one deputy for every 15,000 to 30,000 of the population, depending upon its size;

in elections to district and area Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population; in a district or area whose population does not exceed 25,000, twenty-five deputies are elected, and in a district or area whose population exceeds 60,000, not more than sixty deputies are elected;

in elections to city Soviets or city district Soviets - one deputy for every 350 to 900 of the population, depending upon its size; in a city or city district whose population does not exceed 12,000, thirty-five deputies are elected;

in elections to the Kiev and Kharkov city Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population;

in elections to village or settlement Soviets - one deputy for every 100 of the population; in a village or settlement whose population does not exceed 1,000, nine deputies are elected, and where the population exceeds 2,500, not more than twenty-five deputies.

The basis of representation for each regional, district, city, village and settlement Soviet of Working People's Deputies is fixed in the "Ordinance Concerning Elections to Regional, District, City, Village and Settlement Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR," within the range of the bases of representation indicated in the present article.

Art. 122. Candidates for elections are nominated according to electoral district.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Art. 123. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time upon decision of the majority of the electors in the manner established by law.

Chapter X. Arms, Flag, Capital

Art. 124. The state arms of the Ukrainian SSR are a sickle and hammer of gold in relief, placed crosswise, handles down against a red background in the rays of the rising sun, and surrounded by ears of wheat, which are placed symmetrically, from bottom to top, forming a circle. Between the tops of the ears of wheat is a red star. At the bottom of the wreath are the words, "Ukrainian SSR" on a red band, and at the bottom of the ears of corn the words, "Workers of all Countries United" in the Russian language on the right, and in the Ukrainian language on the left.

Art. 125. The state flag of the Ukrainian SSR is of cloth divided into two horizontal bands of color: the upper band, in red, is two-thirds of the width of the flag, and the lower band, in azure, is one-third of the width of the flag. In the upper part of the flag, about one-third of the distance from the staff, are a hammer and sickle of gold and above them a five-pointed star with a gold border.

The relation of width to length of the flag is 1:2.

Art. 126. The Capital of the Ukrainian SSR is the City of Kiev.

Chapter XI. Procedure for Amending the Constitution

Art. 127. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR may be amended only by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of the Supreme Soviet.

727 by the German invaders in the Ukraine, and more than two million had been abducted to slavery in Germany. Of these so deported, a considerable number perished in captivity[1].

The figure of four million Soviet citizens murdered in the Ukraine does not clearly indicate whether all of them were Ukrainians or whether a certain percentage came from other parts of the Soviet Union. No figures have been revealed showing the number of the Ukrainians killed at the front against the German armies and their 162 satellites. However, a comparison of the pre-war and present electorate figures for the Ukraine gives some indication of the decrease, 666 at least of the adult population. On December 12, 1937, the Ukrainian electorate was about 17,540,000; in 1939 this number was increased by the addition of Western Ukraine, which on March 24, 1940, had more than five million voters. But nearly seven years later, in the elections of February 1947, despite the fact that part of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Transcarpathian Ukraine also had been added, the total electorate in the Ukrainian S.S.R. was only 21,545,000.

Damages to Industry and Agriculture

727 The damage which the Germans inflicted on the industry and farming 433 of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics was tremendous, and far exceeded any comparable destruction in Western Europe.

[362] In the Ukraine the Germans destroyed or burned down 714 towns and more than 28,000 hamlets and villages, destroyed more than two million buildings and 540,000 outbuildings, and rendered about 10 million persons homeless (one-fourth of the Ukrainian population)[2].

Agriculture, animal husbandry, and industry were devastated. The coal mines were flooded. Over 16,150 industrial enterprises employing more than two million workers were stripped of machinery and the buildings heavily damaged or destroyed. The Germans wrecked or took away 127,800 electric motors and 81,600 metal-cutting lathes, destroyed railway lines and stations, and post and telegraph offices[2].

727 Tremendous damage was done to Ukrainian agriculture. The Germans 433 ruined and plundered collective farms, state farms and machine and 241 tractor stations.

Millions of hectares of planned fields were destroyed and over 56,000 tractors wrecked. Nearly 1,900,000 agricultural machines and 30,000 automobiles and other motor vehicles were destroyed or taken to Germany[3].

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1 Soviet News, London, June 29, 1946.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

3 Letter to UNRRA from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

1: Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The development of a Ukrainian historiography during the nineteenth century caused some of the nationalist intellectuals, many of whom were sons of priests, to discover that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine did not originally regard itself as bound by the protectorate which Muscovy assumed over the Ukrainian Cossacks as a result of the Perejaslav Treaty of 1654. By 1686, however, the influence of the Muscovites was so great among the Cossacks that the Orthodox Churches of Ukraine and Muscovy were merged on the basis of internal independence; the Cossacks retained the right to elect their metropolitan archbishop but pledged nominal subordination to the Patriarchate of Moscow, which had been established less than a century before, in place of their traditional tie with the Constantinople Patriarchate.

The domain of the Cossacks was gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire, and by the nineteenth century the metropolitan archbishops of Kiev were being appointed by Moscow. Many of these were not natives of Ukraine and had little in common with the local population, whose spiritual needs were ministered to by natives who entered the priesthood of the Russian Church. They employed the archaic Church Slavonic language in the performance of Church offices, but in many parishes sermons were delivered in the peasant vernacular which in the twentieth century was to serve as the basis for the development of literary Ukrainian. By the turn of the century Bishop Parfeny Levyc'kyj of the diocese of Podollia was himself delivering sermons in Ukrainian, and encouraging priests to do so, until he was transferred to the Russian diocese of Tula. The Orthodox seminaries in Kiev and Poltava were hotbeds of Ukrainian nationalist and revolutionary socialist agitation prior to the revolution.[2]

When the Imperial regime collapsed in February of 1917 and was replaced by the Provisional Government, a multitude of functional congresses met in Kiev to give voice to the economic and social objectives of the revolution, and to demand political autonomy for Ukraine. At the same time, they did not neglect to advocate reorganization of the Orthodox Church. Initially their demands were modest, but by the time of the November Revolution the nationalists were asking for an autocephalous Ukrainian Church which would be independent of the State in its internal administration and provide for the use of the Ukrainian language in the celebration of the divine liturgy. Since this was a period in which soviets, or councils, were being formed as political institutions, it is not surprising that there was considerable sentiment in favor of

[2] This is admitted even by a sworn enemy of everything Ukrainian. See A. Carinnyj, *Ukrainskoe Dviženie* (Berlin, 1925), p. 134.

1; Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 adopting a conciliar form of government for the proposed church.
668 Despite the enactment of many resolutions calling for ecclesiastical independence, little real progress was made during 1917, primarily because other matters of a more immediate nature, especially the agrarian problem and the demand for peace, absorbed public attention. Among other obstacles there was the hesitancy of many priests to challenge the established religious order and the lack of forthright support from the Ukrainian Central Council *(Ukrainska Central'na Rada)* which was the recognized representative body attempting to govern Ukraine at the time.

795 When the government of the Central Council was replaced by
659 that of Hetman Paul Skoropads'kyj in April of 1918 the official attitude toward the organization of a separate church became more sympathetic. A Ministry of Religious Cults was established under the direction of Professor Basil Zin'kivs'kyj, a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the University of Kiev. Plans were made to convoke a *sobor*, or general church conclave, but before this could be done it was necessary to select a new metropolitan archbishop of Kiev to succeed Metropolitan Vladimir, who had been murdered in February while the city was under Bolshevik rule. According to established procedure the metropolitan was to be elected at a diocesan congress, but Zin'kivs'kyj wished to depart from this practice and have all of the Ukrainian dioceses participate in the electoral meeting. His reason for making this request was that the Metropolitan of Kiev is regarded as the ranking hierarch in Ukraine and not merely as the head of another diocese.

However, the Church administration, which was in Russian hands at the time, proceeded to call an ordinary congress of the Kiev diocese thus ignoring Zin'kivs'kyj's proposal. In view of the nature of the Congress' membership it is not surprising that Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovits'kyj of Kharkov was elected. This did not please the Ukrainian nationalists because Anthony had forbidden the clergy of the Kharkov diocese to read the Gospel in Ukrainian, which he termed "a language of the market place." Zin'kivs'kyj wrote in vain to His Holiness Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, requesting that Anthony's election be set aside. The new Metropolitan immediately made plans for his journey to Kiev with the intention of arriving there in the morning, but railway workers, who were aware of the hierarch's anti-nationalist views, delayed the train for nearly ten hours and prevented a ceremonial welcome planned by his supporters.[8]

The German-sponsored Skoropads'kyj Government continued to lend its support to the convocation of the All-Ukrainian *Sobor*

[8] Dmytro Dorolenko, *Istorija Ukrainy* (Užhorod, 1930), II, 322.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

attention was concentrated on building up a system of social economy within Russia, so that it was no longer necessary to bear in mind national movements in western countries, for the world revolution had been postponed for the meantime. The change in Ukraine took place gradually and in contradiction to public expressions of loyalty. The economic needs of Ukraine were ignored already in the first Five Year Plan, the educational system was restricted and the Academy of Learning came completely under communist influence. Ukrainian officials were replaced by Russians and the standing of Ukraine suffered. Russian, as the language of the Revolution, of Lenin and Stalin, was to be the language of one people which had hitherto used several languages, a fact that had concealed the inner unity that had actually existed.

642 177 .64

This development caused a fresh outbreak of national resistance on the part of the Ukrainians. The movement of the rebels which had at first led to guerilla warfare, ceased about 1921-1922: factors responsible for the cessation of hostilities were the appointment of Ukrainian officials to the administration and the fact that the United Ukrainian Church was tolerated. When this also was forbidden and when the collectivist movement in the country met with the spontaneous resistance of the peasantry, a campaign of terrorism was re-started. "Nationalist" differences appeared even within party organisations: bolshevist dignitaries themselves could not keep clear of the Ukrainian movement. Thus in 1925 Shumskyj, commissary for education in the USSR, a very influential communist, was dismissed; in 1933 Skrypnyk, who held the same office and who was a personal friend of Lenin's, comitted suicide because he was unwilling to confess his "nationalist sins" to the party; his example was followed in 1937 by Lubtshenko, long president of the Council of People's Commissaries, in order not to fall into the hands of the GPU. The number of lesser communist dignitaries who were killed as nationalists or separatists is very great, and still greater is the host of those who did not belong to the communist ranks and who suffered the same fate in the struggle for national rights and political independence.

668

Sea was reached, serfdom revoked (1861), valuable deposits of coal, iron and manganese were discovered; the population increased considerably, all of which caused other national questions to recede into the background. It was only in 1900 that the first unmistakable signs of the spread of national consciousness among the broad masses began to appear. In this year the Revolutionary Ukraine Party included a demand for an independent Ukraine in its program and the Ukraine movement made great progress in the short constitutional period after 1905. Ukrainian books and reviews, the idea of national societies and unions for adult education began to spread. And yet we must admit to-day that national consciousness among the peasants was slow to awaken; the solution of social questions was felt to be more urgent.

In Galicia more progress was made. At the outbreak of World War I there was already a well-developed system of Ukrainian schools, gymnastic societies and cooperative associations built up in constant conflict with Polish officials. The Ukrainians were loyal in their feelings for Austria; they thought that the victory of the German side would bring their own national struggle immediate advantages.

Revolution and Post-War Years

When war broke out, Ukrainian divisions immediately took part voluntarily in the fighting in the Carpathians. Special camps were erected for Ukrainian prisoners of war in which Ukrainians were separated from the Russians and trained in the spirit of nationalism. In the country itself the Ukraine Central Council was formed at Kyiv after the fall of the Tsar and it demanded the right of self-government from the provisional government in St. Petersburg. This was refused and negotiations were broken off when the bolshevists finally seized power. Towards the end of 1917 Lenin sent bolshevist troops to Kyiv, whereupon the Central Council declared the independence of Ukraine on January 22nd, 1918. Now the misfortune that political power was almost exclusively in the hands of members of the socialist and democratic Left, avenged itself; for those parties had no experience in the political control of a state. No

000 and by the Russian Messianism which had transmuted Panslavism into Communism.

175* On the outbreak of war in 1914, the Ukrainian Question occupied a relatively minor place in the minds of political and military chiefs in Berlin and Vienna. At the same time both Berlin and Vienna contemplated an ultimate solution favourable to their respective views—views which differed in important essentials.

The course of events during the war obliged the Habsburg Monarchy to abandon all ambitious plans and to concentrate on the preservation of existing territory. The Germans, on the other hand, as the war developed, began to take the greatest interest in the Ukraine, especially after 1916 when German troops made their appearance in Podolia and Volhynia and when a year later, the Russian Revolution opened the way wide to the Dniepr and even to the Don. If at the beginning of the war the Ukraine was of interest primarily to Vienna, by the end it had been transferred into Berlin's field of vision.

Despite the drift towards Russia which had been noticeable among both Galician and Russian Ukrainian intellectuals after the Liberal reforms following the Revolution of 1905, Vienna had been encouraged by the weakness of Russia to supplement a more active policy in the Balkans by a more intense interest in the Ukrainians. The Slavs who remained 'loyal to the Habsburg Monarchy' and who were considered to have a historic aversion to Moscow—Poles and Ukrainians—assumed a certain importance.

● 668 A special periodical was founded in Vienna, *Ukrainische Rundschau*, and the Austro-Hungarian Government gave unofficial support to the so-called 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' which openly proclaimed the struggle against Russia and promised in case of war to contribute to Russia's defeat 'by internal upheavals'. The leaders of this Union were certain Ukrainians of some ability—Skoropis-Zholtukovsky, Zhuk, Doroshenko and Zaliznyak. The organization conducted a propaganda on a considerable scale and could dispose of adequate funds which were provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government and supplemented by contributions from prosperous Ukrainians in America. It was proposed that, in the case of war with Russia and the invasion of Russia by the Austrian armies, representatives of the Union, with the help of their supporters in the Russian Ukraine, should organize a form of government which would be acceptable to Vienna. Some hotheads were even talking of a 'Ukrainian kingdom', and named as candidate for the 'Ukrainian throne' Archduke Wilhelm of Habsburg 'Vasili Vishevaniy'.

000 German political circles took a more prosaic view of the Ukrainian

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

predominated. The elections of 1907 had sent sixty-nine Polish deputies to the local *Seym*, and thirty-two Ukrainians. The results of the elections had been regarded as unjust by the Ukrainian political activists, and the struggle against the local Polish hegemony had been intensified; terrorist outrages had culminated finally in the assassination of the Viceroy of Galicia, Count Potocki. Finally, following the intervention of the Central Government in Vienna, the Ukrainians had secured an agreement whereby 27 per cent of the seats in the *Seym* were guaranteed to them in the future. The position was further complicated by the fact that a third of the Ukrainian deputies were stigmatized by their colleagues as 'pro-Russians' (*Promoskovity*). 175*

The five years preceding the war were marked by an acute and growing antagonism, not only between Poles and Ukrainians, but also between the two sections within the local Ukrainian movement. Supported by the Vienna Government, and having at their disposal ten chairs in the University of Lvov, several gymnasiums, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the educational organization of *Prosvita*, libraries, museums, publishers and several daily papers, the anti-Muscovite 'separatists' were always the stronger; but now the movement which had been created by Hrushevsky and his followers was only defending its former positions. The *Promoskovity*, in spite of difficulties, were gaining ground; they had founded their own scientific institute, formed their own academic group, established their own daily papers and their own political 'Russian Organization'. In their struggle with the *Promoskovity* the separatists appealed to the Austro-Hungarian authorities, and in 1912 elaborate lists were prepared of persons suspected of sympathies for Russia. 175*

The events of the war changed in a most decisive manner all the relationships which had been established in Galicia. Simultaneously with mobilization began arrests of 'pro-Russians'. A few weeks later the defeats of the Austrian armies were attributed to 'the treacherous behaviour' of the Galician population. When complete units of Galician Landsturm surrendered without resistance to the enemy, repressions followed throughout the whole province: mass arrests and transportations, and executions—with or without the formality of military courts. All persons of any local importance who were considered 'pro-Russian' were sent to concentration camps—deputies of the *Seym*, priests, schoolmasters, business men and prosperous peasants. The Lvov prisons were filled with hundreds of prisoners who did not know why they had been arrested; and at the notorious camp of Telerhof 7500 unfortunates were interned. 175* 668

The commander of the 8th Russian Army, General Brusilov, 175*

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Galician political factions, but his authority was great among the peasantry of Galicia and that authority might have been used to support the Russian administration had it shown more tolerance in Church affairs. But the Metropolitan was treated with more severity than the known separatist Hrushevsky; he was banished to Russia, where he had to live under provincial police supervision. 175*

In Lvov, at the head of 'The Russian Committee', was a rather anaemic personality, a certain Dudkevich. Owing to the blunders of the Russian administration 'pro-Russian' tendencies did not make any progress during the period of the occupation. As for the Ukrainian separatist movement it was annihilated as a result of the war. 'The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' collapsed, and Doroshenko and Zaliznyak abandoned it. The attempt to form a Ukrainian Legion on the pattern of Pilsudski's Polish Legion had no success. Although the military importance of the Polish Legion was insignificant, the legionaries fought well and it served to form a nucleus for a future political organization. But no one ever heard anything about the military feats of the Ukrainian Legion of Austrian formation. Certain members of 'The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' found, however, new means to induce the Germans to take an interest in them. 668 175*

When in 1915 the Germans captured enormous numbers of Russian prisoners an attempt was made to 'sort' them according to their national origins. Those who called themselves Ukrainians were sent to a special camp at Rastatt where lectures were read to them on Ukrainian subjects by a certain 'Professor' Bezpalko. At the beginning of 1917 about 15,000 Russian soldiers, who had qualified in German eyes as Ukrainians, were assembled in the camp at Rastatt and went through a sort of school of propaganda. A regiment even was formed, called the Taras Shevchenko regiment, numbering about 2000 men, but it did not have time to prove its valour on the German side before the Revolution broke out. When it is remembered that by the beginning of 1917 the number of Russian prisoners in the hands of the Germans was about 3,000,000, of whom between 700,000 and 800,000 were of Ukrainian origin, the success attained by the Germans in exploiting Ukrainian nationalism in the concentration camps does not appear very brilliant.

In the spring of 1915 the Emperor Nicholas II, after the surrender of Przemysl, visited Galicia and made a speech at Lvov in which he spoke of 'an indivisible Russia' reaching as far as the Carpathian Mountains. There were already signs, however, that the Russian dominion in Galicia would not last long. In the early summer a heavy German concentration pierced the Russian front at 175*

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208 623 ticularly prominent (Chkheidze, Tsereteli and Chenkeli really dominated the first Petrograd Soviet).

668 At this early period the great majority of the Ukrainian population were really more indifferent to 'the Ukrainian movement' than they had been before the war. The soldiers in the trenches were only interested in two things: in an immediate return to their homes and in their participation in the land distribution which was to be a feature of the agrarian reforms in the new Russia. If in a comparatively short time 'the Ukrainian movement' became a factor of importance in revolutionary Russia, it was only owing to the exceptional energy and insistence of the small group of men who were leading the Ukrainian nationalists.

Already in March Professor Hrushevsky had made his appearance in Kiev; he was joined by one of the activists of 1905, Vinnichenko, who during that earlier phase had called himself a 'Ukrainian Social Democrat'. The journalist Simon Petlyura, who was destined to become the most picturesque of the Ukrainian leaders, also turned up in Kiev.(2) At the beginning of 1917 Petlyura had found himself in the modest post of accountant in one of the branches of the 'Union of the Towns' which, together with the 'Union of Zemstvos', had been largely concerned with the supply problems of the war. These two Unions became the stronghold of the Ukrainian nationalists; in Kiev alone there were 6000 people employed on the 'Union of Zemstvos' and 2000 on the 'Union of the Towns'. Branches of the two Unions existed in all the towns of the Ukraine and the staffs consisted for the greater part of 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'—just the social strata where, before the war, the Ukrainian nationalists had been gaining recruits.

Without losing any time, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko gathered round themselves in Kiev an active group who shared their ideas, and they began to organize a 'Ukrainian Conference'. The sponsors of the Conference sent 'invitations' to 'elect delegates' from the nine Governments which they considered as constituting the territory of the Ukraine (three Governments on the right and three on the left bank of the Dniepr and the three Governments of New Russia). The elections were held 'according to the Revolutionary ways': in other words, delegates arrived in Kiev on the authority of some small 'circle' or club or of a 'Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' which might have consisted of five or six people. There appeared also 'self-appointed delegates'—deserters from the Front and 'new-comers' from Galicia.

No one was particularly astonished at this strange assembly, since 'revolutionary enthusiasm' reigned supreme throughout the whole

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country. The Soviets and all sorts of other similar organizations 668
which were supposed to voice the aspirations of 'great masses' had been organized in the same way. Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, [646]
however, attained their first object, since 'the Ukrainian Conference' elected from its midst members of 'the Ukrainian *Rada*' which was to constitute a sort of Parliament for the Ukraine. These events caused considerable displeasure to the Provisional Government in Petrograd and it was not long before a struggle developed between the Provisional Government and the Ukrainian *Rada*.

'Self-determination of nationalities' had always formed part of 668
the moral and political stock-in-trade of the various brands of 642
'liberals', 'democrats' and 'socialists' who composed the Provisional Government. But the realities of the situation in which they found themselves imposed on these ideologues a certain moderation in the application of their super-liberal principles. Harassed on all sides by self-constituted revolutionary and nationalist groups and factions, and themselves clinging nervously to the forms of an authority which was being rapidly dispersed by the cold winds of rising anarchy, the Provisional Government had recourse to their usual method of 'persuasion' and they asked the *Rada* to await the end of the war and the decisions of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

'Persuasion', however, was hopeless with opponents so skilled in political struggles and intrigue as Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko. Aware of the weakness of the Petrograd Government, the politicians of the *Rada* based their tactics on manœuvring for a gradual enlargement of the powers which they had attributed to themselves, while they avoided provoking the cabinet of Prince Lvov by premature demands of too drastic a nature. The *Rada* secured, for instance, the consent of the Provisional Government to the formation of Ukrainian national troops. In this case they could appeal to the precedent which had been created by the formation of Lettish, Georgian and Armenian national detachments.

Professor Paul Milyukov, a prominent member of the Provisional Government, describes the relations of Petrograd with the *Rada* in the following words: 'The Provisional Government was still continuing to plead with the Ukrainians not to detach themselves from the Motherland, not to go the fatal way of dividing liberated Russia, and not to introduce dissensions into the Army at a moment of great national danger. Weak and devoid of backbone, having itself laid down its arms, the Government could not but register *post factum* the triumphs attained by the Ukrainians. Hrushevsky's tactics consisted in proving that "nothing decisive" was taking place. The fiction that the Government was sanctioning the *Rada's* doings was

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kept up to the end. Summing up all the *pourparlers* one sees how false they were at the core: an enforced fiction on one side and deliberate deception on the other.'

Hrushevsky, according to his own words, put forward only a moderate programme: wide national and territorial autonomy within the Russian Federative Republic; but it was not long before he was shifting his ground and declaring that 'the adherents of an independent Ukraine consent to remain on a common platform with Russians' but that 'the colours of an independent Ukraine would be folded only for a time'.

With the resignations of Milyukov and Guchkov, who were regarded as the firm adversaries of Ukrainian separatism, 'the colours of an independent Ukraine' were duly unfolded. The *Rada* chose from among its members a 'General Secretariat' which was to function as a sort of Ukrainian cabinet. Always in pursuance of their tactics, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko declared that the authority of both the *Rada* and the Secretariat was of a 'purely moral order' and that the organs set up in Kiev were purely 'national organizations'.

Soon, however, Vinnichenko, who had taken upon himself the role of 'Ukrainian Prime Minister', judged that the moment had arrived to proclaim that 'the limits between moral and public legal authority had been effaced' and that 'our moral authority has grown to such an extent as a logical result of events that painlessly, without a struggle, it has transformed itself into the legal rule of a national republic'.

All these manœuvres culminated in the publication of the first 'Universal' of the 'Central *Rada*' on 23 June 1917, according to which the 'Autonomous Ukrainian Republic' came into being, and the 'Central *Rada*' arrogated to itself the right to formulate legislation which would require the sanction of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly only as 'a matter of form'. In this way two authorities came into being claiming sovereign rights in the territory of the Ukraine: the 'moral' authority transformed into the 'legal rule' of the *Rada* on the one side, and on the other the former legitimate authority of the Provisional Government—which was losing ground every day, but which had not completely disappeared.

Under these circumstances several members of the reconstructed cabinet of the Provisional Government hastened to Kiev—Kerenski, Tereshchenko, Nekrasov and Tsereteli. At the time Kerenski was preoccupied with the South-Western Front, where a renewed Russian offensive was to prove to the Allies that the Provisional Government remained faithful to the idea of 'war to a successful end', and it is probable that the *Rada* had chosen this conjunction of

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circumstances to extract the maximum concessions from the harassed liberal leaders who could not risk a political crisis in the rear of the South-Western Army. 668 642

When the offensive ended in catastrophe with a loss of over 100,000 casualties and 47,000 prisoners, the complete demoralization of the Front and the appearance of thousands of fugitives in Kiev, the ministers of the Provisional Government had no alternative but to capitulate to the *Rada*. On 17 July, in the presence of Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, the existence of 'the General Secretariat' was proclaimed and legalized. 721 642

The disaster at the Front was followed during July by the outbreak of riots and disorders in the interior of Russia. The Soviets openly declared themselves against the Provisional Government, while the Bolshevik faction, after the arrival of Lenin, began to gain strength and made their first attempt to gain power by armed insurrection. 669

The *Rada* began to concentrate what Ukrainian military elements it was able to attract round Kiev; two regiments, named respectively 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky' and 'Polubotok', were in process of formation. Both regiments consisted of undisciplined and disorderly deserters and mutineers. An attempt by the Russian Command to send the 'Ukrainian Regiments' to the Front provoked a real mutiny in the ranks of the 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment', who considered their presence in Kiev 'for the protection of the *Rada*' more necessary than in the firing line. After an encounter at the Central Railway Station at Kiev with a squadron of the Cuirassiers of the Guard, the Ukrainian troops surrendered and were deprived of their weapons. 642 669

Petrograd in the meantime was rejoicing over the suppression of the Bolshevik rising; Lenin had fled to Finland.

This success of the Provisional Government tended to calm both troubled and conspiratorial minds and, under the influence of the German offensive which had begun and which threatened both Kiev and Petrograd, the ministers of the Kerenski Government adopted a firmer attitude in their discussions with the representatives of the *Rada*, who had come to Petrograd to discuss the terms of the Statute which was to regulate the position of the Ukraine. Instead of the Statute only new 'instructions' to the General Secretariat were conceded. The territory of the Ukraine was to consist now of only five Governments: three on the right and two on the left bank of the Dniepr. The Government of Kharkov and the three New Russian Governments were excluded, although the delegates had tried to insist that, in addition to the nine Governments already claimed, Bessarabia and the greater parts of the Governments of Kursk and Voronezh should also form part of the Ukraine. 642 634

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668 When the delegates returned to Kiev there was a regular storm of indignation in the *Rada*. Hrushevsky, however, was receding into the background, and most of the decisions of the *Rada* were now inspired by Vinnichenko. It was he who insisted on acquiescence in the 'instructions' of the Provisional Government. 'The right to possess something', he explained to his disgruntled followers, 'is not given on bits of paper; it is the result of the balance of the forces in conflict, which balance can always change in different circumstances. Let us take what is given to us and let us go on. After all, this is not a peace but an armistice.'(3)

'The different circumstances' which instilled caution into Vinnichenko developed with alarming rapidity. In August, Kerenski, quailing before the spectre of 'counter-revolution', applied to the Bolsheviks for help in order 'to safeguard the conquests of the Revolution'. Taking advantage of this fatal move, the Bolsheviks immediately intensified their propaganda throughout the country in favour of the immediate cessation of the war, and they spread the demand that all power should be transferred to the Soviets of Soldiers, Workers and Peasants as the only true defenders of the Revolution. The Bolshevik agitation, fed upon a progressive disintegration of the social order, ran through the cities of the Ukraine, and Vinnichenko could not help realizing that the ephemeral tactical victories of the *Rada* were nothing compared to the devastating victories of the Bolsheviks and of the extreme left wing of the Social Revolutionaries. After bitter experience, he wrote in his daily paper, *Novaya Rada*, that 'national questions at that time did not have the overwhelming importance which the Central *Rada* wished to ascribe to them'. He even went so far as to avow that the *Rada* and its members were hated and laughed at by the population. 'Everything Ukrainian was laughed at: songs, schools, papers, books. The son was cynically and resentfully making fun of his mother.' The former head of the General Secretariat continued: 'We did not have a strong proletariat conscious of its nationality because, in most cases, it had been denationalized and russified in most of the big towns.' As for the peasantry, according to Vinnichenko: 'We found our principal support among the peasants, not among the poor ones, but among the wealthier ones.' This fact, recognized by Vinnichenko, deserves to be noted.

Notwithstanding the blatant defects of the self-appointed 'organ of moral authority' in Kiev, there were some decent elements upholding the Central *Rada*. Among its six hundred members were men who hoped to build something even on the shaky foundations of Ukrainian autonomy. True, as Vinnichenko himself owns: 'We

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spoke of our success at the elections, but let us be honest amongst ourselves and to others: we availed ourselves of the ignorance of the oppressed masses. It was not they who elected us, but we who imposed ourselves on them.' But among these 'self-elected' were men who were acting in the hope of creating a dam against the raging revolutionary sea. Certain elements of sanity and order were to be found in the *Rada*: men who despaired of finding salvation in the weak and passive Provisional Government, and who hoped to achieve something themselves under the Ukrainian flag.

The candid Vinnichenko goes on to mention that the Central *Rada* 'had dreamed of founding its authority on the support of foreign bourgeois states and on the existing social order'. But if there was no real force on the side of the Provisional Government, there was also none on the side of the *Rada*. 'Our Ukrainian soldiers were not content with the gold-and-blue standard and with new red caps. When they saw that the *Rada* was on the side of the propertied classes, they naturally turned to those who offered them more tangible goods—the Bolsheviks. Not Russian but Ukrainian regiments took Kiev later for the Bolsheviks.'

In August and September 1917, under the growing pressure of Bolshevism, those political tendencies in the *Rada* which were represented by Hrushevsky and his group lost ground seriously. Hrushevsky and his followers had remained true to their 'Austrian orientation' which by 1917 had become an 'Austro-German orientation'. These defeatists in relation to Russia had been counting on Austro-German support because they were aware that the Ukrainian separatist movement could facilitate the attainment of the objectives of the Austro-German Command. But even in defeatism the *Rada* could not compete with the Bolsheviks, for the modest defeatism of the separatists was of little value to the Germans compared with the really gigantic defeatism of the Soviets, which were now entirely in the hands of Lenin and his adherents. The Bolsheviks had worked so successfully for the disintegration of the Front that Riga had now fallen to the Germans and the way lay open to Petrograd. The Germans were already within reach of their objective of a separate peace with Russia, and while the Soviets could answer for the whole of the Russian Front the romantics of the *Rada*—who could not even control the mutinous mobs in the Ukrainian cities—must continue to fail to inspire the interest of the German General Staff.[4]

In September, as the fatal autumn of 1917 approached, Kiev was preoccupied with almost academic activities. Surrounded by a certain amount of pomp, a Congress representing all the nationalities

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668 of the Russian Empire was holding its sessions. About a hundred delegates representing thirteen nationalities and twelve Cossack lands were in attendance, and another six nationalities which had not sent delegates declared their 'adherence to the decisions of the Congress' without taking part in it. The decisions consisted of a plan for converting the structure of the Empire into a federation of autonomous states which were to have common internal and foreign policies. Apparently the Ukrainians were not entirely pleased with the moderate claims of the Congress, and delegates of the *Rada* proceeded to Petrograd to demand that all authority in the Ukraine should be exercised exclusively by the *Rada* and its General Secretariat. They also required the recognition of the right of all nationalities within the Empire to dispose of their own destinies and called for the meeting of a 'Sovereign National Constituent Assembly'. While still waiting in Petrograd for the satisfaction of their demands, the delegates had the exciting experience of being present at the taking of the Winter Palace by the Bolsheviks.

The October Revolution (November by the New Style) did not produce an armed struggle in Kiev as in Petrograd and Moscow. In Kiev Bolshevik elements were neither numerous nor strong: there were no important industrial plants in the ancient city by the Dniepr, and the few thousand proletarians were scattered round the arsenal and the railway workshops. The *Rada* could also rely on a certain number of obedient troops. The downfall of the Provisional Government did not result in the transfer in the Ukraine of its somewhat shadowy authority to the Soviets; such authority as there was remained in the hands of the *Rada*. This fact was underlined in the third 'Universal' published by the *Rada*. It was affirmed that the *Rada* would continue as the organ of power until the convocation of 'the Ukrainian National Constituent Assembly', freely elected, which would form a Government for the whole territory of the Ukrainian Republic. The *Rada* also confirmed its readiness 'to help Russia to become a Federative State of Free and Equal Nations'.

This 'Universal', published on 7–20 November, was regarded as a declaration of war by the newly established Soviet power. There was little chance for the Central *Rada* to emerge victorious from any armed conflict. In November 1917 the authority of the *Rada* only covered the agricultural districts adjacent to Kiev on both banks of the Dniepr. At the Front soldiers' Soviets ruled supreme, and in Kharkov and the big industrial towns of New Russia the Bolsheviks were gaining ground. Scarcely a month had elapsed before the authority of the *Rada* was overthrown in Kharkov, where on 27 December the Bolsheviks proclaimed a 'Provisional Ukrainian

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Soviet Government'. A few days later Red troops took possession of Ekaterinoslav; by the first half of January Mariupol, Odessa and Nikolaev were in Bolshevik hands, and Red detachments were marching from Kharkov through Poltava on Kiev. Foreign intervention remained the only chance for the Government of the Central *Rada*. 668

Although the third 'Universal' had not definitely proclaimed the Ukraine to be an independent republic, the Kiev Government informed the Austro-Hungarian and German authorities of their wish to participate in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations as an independent state. 668 728

At Brest-Litovsk all parties were in a hurry. Lenin was anxious to conclude a peace at any price and as rapidly as possible in order to fulfil the promises he had made to the Soviets of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Delegates; the Germans were concerned to accelerate the liquidation of the Russian Front in order to be able to transfer greater numbers of troops to the Western Front; and they, and more urgently the Austrians, were in desperate need of the supplies which they considered the conclusion of peace would make available to them in Russia. Now the Ukrainians appeared upon the scene in no less haste to secure the salvation of the Kiev Government before it should have been liquidated by the forces of the Russian Revolution.

Representatives of the new Soviet power had crossed the German lines on 27 November, but an armistice had not been signed until 16 December; two days later the Armistice of Focşani had concluded the fighting on the Roumanian Front immediately adjacent to the Ukrainian lands. During the negotiations for an armistice the *Rada* Government had been virtually ignored, for the Bolshevik delegates had been at pains to persuade the Germans that the Ukrainian Republic was nothing more than a fiction which would be swept away by 'the workers and peasants'. But when the news reached Kiev and it became known that negotiations for the signature of a general peace would immediately begin, the *Rada* hastened to declare its wish to participate and, as a reinforcement to its request made by wire, sent emissaries to Vienna in order to take advantage of the old and long-standing connections between the Austrian Government and the Ukrainian separatists.

Peace negotiations started on 8 January 1918 in Brest-Litovsk; Trotsky was at the head of the Soviet Delegation; von Kühlmann and General Hoffmann were the German representatives; and Count Czernin was in charge of Austro-Hungarian interests. Ottoman and Bulgarian Delegations also attended.

Without any special invitation, three young men soon put in their

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appearance—'the three students' they were nicknamed by the representatives of the Russian Revolution and of the two Germanic Empires. Levitsky, Lubinsky and Sevryuk, who declared their wish to take part in the proceedings as the representatives of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic', were three of old Hrushevsky's pupils who had hardly had time to finish their schooling. 668 228

The aspect of the delegates with whom the representatives of the two great Empires had to treat had ceased to astonish anyone in Brest-Litovsk. Compared to the 'Delegates of the Sailors, Soldiers, Workers and Peasants' with whom General Hoffmann and Prince Leopold of Bavaria had been obliged to sit at the same table during the discussions about the armistice, these 'three students' seemed quite ordinary decent young men. They were invited to lunch and dine with the Delegations of 'the bourgeois states'—an amenity which Trotsky forbade to his Soviet comrades.

Count Czernin, although a little 'shocked' by the youth of the Ukrainian delegates, was obliged by the force of circumstances to enter into friendly relations with them. As for the German delegates, they were frankly pleased with the presence of the representatives of the *Rada*, considering that it might make Trotsky more amenable.

Trotsky continued to deny the existence of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic'. Levitsky and his colleagues produced documents which showed that during the last elections in the Ukraine (November 1917) the *Rada* had polled 75 per cent of the votes and the Bolsheviks only 10 per cent. It was difficult to realize in Brest-Litovsk that those were the elections about which Vinnichenko wrote 'it was not they who elected us, but we who imposed ourselves on them'.

Owing to the importance of the negotiations, there also arrived in the wake of 'the three students', the new Prime Minister of the Ukraine, Vsevolod Holubovich, also quite a young man (thirty-four years of age), a sincere enthusiast of the 'Ukrainian national cause'. During the session of 10 January the presence of the Ukrainians at the Conference was officially recognized and Trotsky, 'with a sore heart', had to give his consent to their participation in the discussions.

The Ukrainian delegates soon began to astonish Hoffmann and Czernin by their immoderate demands. They had instructions to exact the annexation to the 'Popular Republic' not only of the Kholm district, which had been allocated to the proposed new Polish state, but also of Galicia and Bukovina which formed parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hoffmann almost yelled at Lubinsky and Sevryuk, who were not much abashed and declared that they would ask for new instructions from Kiev: they felt a certain amount of strength to be on their side. A few days later Count Czernin

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wrote in his diary: 'The Ukrainians no longer lead the negotiations: they dictate their conditions.' 668 728

The situation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire had become critical about 15 January. 'The people are suffering from hunger', pleaded the Archbishop of Cracow; 'bread rations have been cut down by half', wired the Governor of Trieste; 'there is flour in Vienna only till next Monday', came from the Burgomaster of the capital. On the 17th the Emperor Charles wired to Czernin: 'The fate of the monarchy and of the dynasty depends on how soon you will be able to conclude peace in Brest-Litovsk....If peace is not concluded a revolution will break out here.'

It was Czernin's good fortune that at this juncture the Ukrainian delegation received news which obliged it to adopt a less extravagant attitude. The 'Popular Republic' had lost in the first weeks of January all New Russia and nearly all left-bank Ukraine. Trotsky smiled sarcastically when he met 'the three students' and Radek wrote in the Soviet press: 'Let those who want bread scream death to the *Rada*!' Radek's aimable outburst against the Kiev *Rada* indicated that Ukrainian supplies were as badly needed in the Soviet capitals as they were in Vienna. This aspect of affairs was duly appreciated by the Germans, and Hoffmann suddenly became more interested in making peace with the *Rada*. When the Kiev *Rada*, under pressure of a Soviet threat to Kiev, relinquished their claims to Galicia and Bukovina, Hoffmann persuaded Czernin to accept the other conditions, including the demand for Kholm.

On 18 January the negotiations were temporarily interrupted. The Delegations left in quest of fresh instructions from their respective Governments. When after a few days they returned to Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky brought along with him new visitors: the representatives of the 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic' which had chosen Kharkov for its capital. Trotsky warned von Kühlmann and Czernin that the 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic' 'did not recognize any agreements which might be entered into by the *Rada*'.

The German and Austro-Hungarian Delegations came to the decision not to pay any attention to Trotsky's manœuvre. Hoffmann calmly noted in his diary: 'At any time we could support the Ukrainian Government and establish it again.'

On 1 February dissensions were renewed in Brest-Litovsk in a somewhat chaotic atmosphere. The Germans and Austrians had to carry on discussions with three Delegations at the same time: those of the Soviet Government, of the Ukrainian *Rada* and of the Ukrainian Soviet Government. The *Rada* Delegation produced the fourth 'Universal' from Kiev, according to which on 22 January the

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668 728 existence of 'a free and sovereign Ukraine' had been proclaimed. The Government of this new independent state had instructed its delegates to conclude peace 'without paying attention to any obstacles which might arise from other parts of the former Russian Empire'.

In the meantime, on 30 January, 'Red bands' commanded by Muraviëv had approached Kiev and had begun to bombard the city from the left bank of the Dniepr. During the session of 1 February Trotsky could not resist the pleasure of reading out a telegram which announced that some of the Ukrainian regiments of the *Rada* had gone over to the Bolsheviks, and which claimed that the days of the *Rada* were numbered. The Ukrainian delegates, Sevryuk and Lubinsky, responded with sharp denunciations of the Bolsheviks. 'Lubinsky retorted with an hour-long speech which for pure vitriolic opprobrium far exceeded anything that had been heard at this strangest of peace conferences' (Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, p. 210).

But Trotsky's triumph partook only of the theatre, for at the end of this same sitting Count Czernin announced the recognition by the Allied Empires of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' 'as an independent free and sovereign state'.

After this there remained only the technical side of the agreement with the Ukrainians. If Czernin and Kühlmann waited a few days longer it was only in the hope that the threat of a separate peace with the *Rada* might oblige Trotsky to come to his senses. On 8 February the principal clauses of a treaty were established. The basic condition was an obligation on the Ukraine to furnish not less than a million tons of supplies to the Allied Empires. To ensure the fulfilment of this condition an Austro-German Commission was to proceed to Kiev. But it had not been quite in vain that Trotsky had gloomily affirmed during these days that Czernin and Kühlmann were making an agreement with 'legally non-existent persons'. The battle for Kiev was taking place now in Kiev itself. After having signed peace with the Ukraine, Count Czernin wrote in his diary: 'I wonder if the *Rada* is still sitting in Kiev!'

On 10 February Trotsky made his famous declaration, 'Neither peace nor war', which caused Hoffmann to exclaim 'Unerhört!' The Soviet Delegation left Brest-Litovsk the same day. The only tangible result of all the negotiations had been the peace signed with the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic'. But Kiev had now been occupied by the Red Army; the *Rada* had fled to Zhitomir and was getting ready to flee farther west. The small detachments which had remained true to the *Rada* and which had been organized by Simon

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Petlyura (who had constituted himself a specialist in military affairs) were resisting fairly well in northern Podolia, but were certainly unable to secure the return of the *Rada* to Kiev. Trotsky's dramatic gesture had, however, simplified the problem. On 17 February the German Government denounced the armistice and ordered the armies of the Eastern Front to begin their advance. It was the only way of breaking the stubbornness of the Bolsheviks and of saving the *Rada* and the peace which it had signed with the promise of a million tons of supplies. (4, 5)

§3. THE GERMANS IN THE UKRAINE: HETMAN SKOROPADSKY

On 18 February, the German troops, without meeting any resistance, occupied Dvinsk on the road to Petrograd and Lutsk on the road to Kiev.

But it was no easy matter for the Austrians to resume the offensive. The Austro-Hungarian armies had been broken during the first two years of the war in the great battles with the Russians; in 1917 it had only been with German aid that they had succeeded in throwing back the Italians. No danger from without threatened the Habsburg Monarchy, but within the Empire dangers were growing with each day that passed. Hence on 17 February the Vienna Government had informed Berlin that Austro-Hungarian troops would take no part in the renewal of the war on the Eastern Front.

In the meantime, the Poles and Bohemians were in a state of agitation on account of the cession of the Kholm region to the Ukrainians. When the twenty-nine year old 'student' Sevryuk, who had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Czernin and Kühlmann, made his appearance during a session of the Reichsrath on 19 February, Polish and Bohemian deputies met him with hoots and shouts of 'Clear out of here!' The Austro-Hungarian Government was compelled to put forward 'new conditions' in respect of Kholm.

The German troops continued their march through Volhynia in the direction of Kiev, and the Emperor Charles, fearful that the Austrians might fail to secure their share of the promised Ukrainian supplies, changed his mind. On 24 February the Austro-Hungarian divisions on the Eastern Front received the order to advance into the Ukraine. The Austrian decision had, however, already come too late, for on 1 March Kiev was occupied by the Germans and they alone reinstated the *Rada*.

By 3 March the rapid attainment by the Germans of the line Narva-Pskov and their seizure of the districts of Vitebsk, Mohilev

645 the principal persons in this Government by the correspondence which passed between the Austrian and German authorities and their Governments—a part of which subsequently fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks and has been published by them (*The Crash of the German Occupation in Ukraine*, 1936, inf. p. 335). In his reports to Vienna the Austrian Chief of Staff, General Waldstetter, found Vsevolod Holubovich, the President of the Council of Ministers, 'eloquent, imaginative—a man of theories with no character at all; put there by the Germans'. Lubinsky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was 'a beardless young man extremely well read in Socialist and revolutionary literature; entirely in the hands of the Germans'. Zhukovski, the Minister for War, 'seems to me pro-Russian; he is an ex-Colonel of the General Staff and tries hard to appear before his colleagues as an untainted Socialist and revolutionary from head to foot; in reality a German puppet'. The same source gives a curious characterization of Hrushevsky. 'Hrushevsky—President of the *Rada*, a frightened old man all of a tremble; his old bones are supposed to give the *Rada* a noble patina worthy of so august an assembly. Holds on for all he is worth to the German Command and shows no sympathy at all towards Austria.' Hrushevsky had certainly changed with the times.

646 The *Rada* was composed of several hundred deputies, belonging to different Ukrainian parties; amongst them were National Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, Social Democrats and Social Federalists. Separatist tendencies prevailed, but among the more definitely Socialist groups it was possible to observe a more or less veiled distrust of and hostility towards the Austro-German authorities and the obedient cabinet which they had installed in Kiev. The more prominent representatives of these sentiments included Vinnichenko and Petlyura.

668 After its return to Kiev the *Rada* embarked on the purely academic task of elaborating a constitution for the Ukraine. The Occupation authorities were not much interested in this 'august assembly' and had 'no illusions about its importance'. General Hoffmann wrote at the time: 'The difficulty in the Ukraine is that the Central *Rada* has only our rifles behind it. The moment we withdraw our troops their authority will collapse at once' (Hoffmann, p. 207). The historian of the Brest-Litovsk peace, who has studied the documents of the period with great thoroughness, comes to the conclusion that: 'The separatist movement had no roots in the country and the people as a whole were completely indifferent to national self-determination; this had been thrust upon them by a group of political dreamers whose power was derived from the presence of German bayonets.'

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727 the Germans put obstacles in his way when the question came to arresting Bolsheviks well known for their activities and even demanded that he should set at liberty those who were under arrest.'

The assassination of Field-Marshal Eichhorn by a Ukrainian terrorist on 30 July failed to sting the Germans into modifying the cautious and even conciliatory policy which they had adopted towards the Soviets. At the same time the Field-Marshal's successor, General Kirchbach, lacked his personal influence and had not the prestige necessary to counter the doubtful intrigues of Baron Mumm. The latter continued to have relations (directly or through the German Consulate) with the representatives of the *Rada*. 'He insisted that the Hetman's Government should set at liberty Simon Petlyura and other politicians who had been arrested. (7)

727 Intently watching and stimulating the growing unpopularity of
● 668 the Hetman among the peasantry, the representatives of the Ukrainian Socialist parties organized themselves in the 'National Union', to the head of which Vinnichenko was elected. When this had been done, the Union, acting through the German authorities, began to try to secure the admission of some of their members to participation in the Government. Baron Mumm evidently very much doubted the solidity of Skoropadsky's position. At last the German Foreign Office, convinced by his reports, sent Mumm, on 10 October, categorical instructions to support 'the National Ukrainian Movement' and to 'ukrainize' the Government.

727 In October, however, it was plainly evident that the Austro-
668 German Occupation could not endure for many weeks. In that month tempestuous national risings broke out in different parts of the Habsburg Monarchy and the ancient Danubian Empire appeared to be on the verge of dissolution. When the news reached the Austro-Hungarian troops in the Ukraine an irresistible movement swept the ranks for immediate return to their own country. The official German source describes how at the beginning of November disorderly crowds of Austrian soldiers in trains and on foot were going west selling their arms and munitions to the local population. 'A regiment consisting of Italians arrested the Commander and Staff of its Army Corps and declared them to be prisoners of war.' The Germans hastily sent the 7th Landwehr (Württemberg) Division to Odessa in order to clear the town of mutinous Austrian soldiers.

But the officers of the German Army of Occupation did not have to wait long to drain their own cup of bitterness. On 9 November came the news by radio that the Emperor William had abdicated; on the next day that Ebert had formed a Government and that the

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soldiers were electing Soviets; and on the 11th that an armistice had been signed on the Western Front. 727 668

The question of the evacuation of the German troops immediately arose and it was clear that this would present enormous difficulties. Lvov was seized by Galician Ukrainians; Lublin and Warsaw by the Poles: neither were willing to let troop trains through. From Kiev only one line of railway remained: Kovel-Brest-Litovsk-Belostok.

The news of the crash of the German Front in the West and of the impending evacuation of the Ukraine by the Germans was naturally the signal for a Ukrainian movement directed against the Hetman's Government. On 20 November, during street riots in Kiev, twenty people were killed. A whole Ukrainian Division declared itself against the Hetman and began to march from Konotop on Kiev; it was stopped by German troops. Large bands of 'Reds' appeared near Kharkov. New Russia was swarming with brigands who had armed themselves with what the Austrians had left behind. This was only the beginning.

The principal politicians of the 'National Union' were also on the alert and each of them acted according to his disposition. Vinnichenko formed a 'Directoria' of five members from the different Ukrainian Socialist parties, while Petlyura hastened to Belaya Tserkov, where he easily raised a mutiny against the Hetman in the crack regiment which had been christened with the romantic name of 'The Zaporogian Sech Rifles' and which had been recruited largely out of the Russian war prisoners from Rastatt who had been given the 'special education in the Ukrainian spirit'.

§ 4. *DIE RÜCKFÜHRUNG DES OSTHEERES*

Between Petlyura and Vinnichenko dissensions immediately arose not only on questions of principle: they were personal enemies. Vinnichenko wanted the Ukraine to be proclaimed a 'State of Workers and Peasants', but not subject to Moscow. Petlyura turned out to be a politician of a more practical turn of mind: he understood well enough that it would not be long before the Moscow Soviets would swallow up Vinnichenko's Ukraine. He also understood that it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to conciliate the sympathy and interest of the Entente powers if the Ukrainian nationalists were to gain sufficient time to establish any sort of stable régime. Petlyura was not a bad organizer and his firmness made him popular with the soldiers. Therefore he was the master of the situation. 642

Partly in consequence of Petlyura's 'Universal' and partly in response to Vinnichenko's proclamations which were plastered all over 669

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669 1917—April 1921). The 'Petlyurians' also occupy first place for the number of organized pogroms—493, or together with the 'free' *atamans*—852; the Volunteers follow with 233; the Soviets with 106; and the Poles with 32. How far Petlyura himself was guilty in the organization of these pogroms it is difficult to say. Arnold Margolin, himself a Jew, relates that Petlyura was extremely depressed by pogroms, and 'with tears in his eyes implored his men not to commit them'. But to persuade these 'last of the *Haydamaky*' to any moderation was no easy task.

Petlyura can scarcely be accused of having seriously favoured pogroms as part of a considered policy, since both he and the 'Directoria' were making every effort to attract the favourable attention of the representatives of the victorious Entente powers. Immediately after the Armistice a report had been addressed to Consul Hainnot, which was subsequently forwarded to General d'Anselm in Odessa and to General Berthelot, who was at that time in Jassy. This report was intended to establish the fact that the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' was a quite normal, strictly democratic, and independent state. Although the French did not hesitate to drive away the detachments of the 'Directoria' by force of arms from the vicinity of Odessa, in January 1919 they went so far as to send a representative to Kiev in the person of General Tabouis. The British, at the same time, contented themselves with the despatch to Kiev of a member of the Consular Service. Altogether the impression gained ground in Kiev that the Ukraine had been reserved as a zone of French interest, while the British were more concerned with the Caucasian area and with the Volunteer Army.

The 'Directoria' viewed the question of its representation at the Paris Peace Conference as a matter of particular importance. A Delegation was hastily formed which included the 'Western Ukrainians' of Galicia with the engineer Sidorenko at their head; the 'Directoria' was represented by their 'Foreign Minister', A. Shulgin; and the numerous Jewish population of the Ukraine had a spokesman in Arnold Margolin. This Delegation, together with others of Governments which had been formed or which had tried to form themselves out of different parts of the Russian Empire, had not been invited to Paris by anyone and was recognized by no one. The Secretary of the Ukrainian Delegation, I. Borshak, summarizing the results of the work done between January and March 1919, reported to the 'Directoria': 'All asked us for information about the Ukrainian Question, but none gave any positive answer. No one promised to recognize our independence. The usual answer was: "Wait till the Conference discusses the Russian

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Question!" There was talk on general topics—the territory, the numbers of the population, our relation with the Bolsheviks and General Denikin. Official French circles were against the Ukraine. Other states, the U.S.A., England and Japan, were on their guard and were only interested in the means at our disposal for struggling against the Bolsheviks' (I. Borshak, *Ukraine at the Peace Conference*). 648 668

The French were mainly concerned for the interest of Poland and the 'Directoria' undoubtedly made a serious tactical mistake when they involved the fate of Galicia with that of the Russian Ukraine. Furthermore, so soon after the recent hard struggle with Germany, the representatives of the Allies were not inclined to regard with favour envoys from the *de facto* succession states of the Russian Empire the Governments of which had owed their origin to German diplomacy and German bayonets.

Another member of the Ukrainian Delegation, Arnold Margolin, complains of 'the influence of Russians' who, from the monarchist groups to radical leaders like Kerenski, Avksentiev and Chaykovski, were all united in the belief that Russia 'one and indivisible' would be resuscitated. Margolin proposed that all 'the oppressed nationalities of the former Empire—not only Ukrainians, but also Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, the Cossacks of the Don and the Kuban, the Mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus and the White Russians adjoining the Polish provinces—should be invited to the Conference'. But when Margolin obtained an interview with Lansing, the latter told him frankly that 'he knew only one Russia which might perhaps become a federative state after she had got rid of the Bolsheviks'. Margolin betook himself to England, but there he found that people were only interested in the successes of the 'White' Armies of Denikin and Kolchak and believed in their ultimate victory. After having failed to raise interest in the fate of the 'oppressed nationalities' of the Russian Empire, Margolin broached the question of the fate of the Jews, but here too he found that people were not interested. In 1919 it was well remembered that the Jewish population of Poland and the Ukraine had been on the side of the Germans and that German Jews had taken upon themselves the role of intermediaries between the German High Command and the Bolsheviks.

The only practical result of the 'diplomatic relations' between France and the 'Directoria' was a categorical demand on the part of the French that Vinnichenko and another minister, Shakhovsky, should retire—because they were suspected of 'Bolshevism'.

The representatives of the Entente powers appear to have made every effort to unite all the forces which were struggling against

648 the Soviets, but they had no easy task. The Volunteer Army re-
668 garded the 'Petlyurians' with scarcely less distaste than it did the Bolsheviks, while the 'Directoria' considered the 'White' movement to be monarchical and reactionary, and the Ukrainian nationalists aimed at separation rather than at federalism. The relation between the Volunteer Army and the Poles was outwardly correct, but each grudged the other success in their 'common struggle' against the Soviets. The Russians were nervous about the Polish campaign in White Russia and Volhynia; the Poles feared the resurrection of a great Russia. The Poles went so far as to hold their advance against the Red Army when this advance could have dealt a decisive blow to the Soviets at the moment of Denikin's greatest success. These dissensions, which were natural enough, in the end allowed the Bolsheviks to extricate themselves from a position which, as Trotsky relates in his memoirs, Lenin at that time regarded as hopeless.

669 In July the Volunteer Army occupied Ekaterinoslav; then Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa; and on the 3rd Kharkov had been taken after some fighting. Regardless of General Wrangel's proposal to halt on the line Tsaritsyn-Ekaterinoslav and to put some order into the disorganized rear, Denikin pressed the advance in a northerly direction towards Moscow and westward on Kiev. As a result his none too numerous forces were widely scattered over an enormous territory.

669 At the same time Petlyura had begun his advance on Kiev from
648 the west, and this circumstance was one of the reasons for the false
648 manœuvre undertaken by the Volunteer Army. In the end the Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' came up to Kiev at the same time, and the ancient city was taken on 1 September, from the east by the 'Whites' and from the south by the Ukrainians. No good could be expected to result from this simultaneous but separate occupation of Kiev by the rival armies. *Pourparlers* did not result in an agreement. It only became clear that the Galicians were ready to come to an understanding with the 'Whites', but the 'Directoria' was jealous, and stubborn. Petlyura demanded complete independence and vast territories. In his blind hate of 'the Russian monarchists and reactionaries' he secretly appealed for help to the Poles. When in the second half of September armed conflicts between the Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' broke out and the latter were driven out of Kiev towards the west, rumours of Petlyura's negotiations with the Poles set the Galician regiments against him. On 7 November the Galicians, tired of the lack of discipline and inefficiency rife among the 'Petlyurians', decided to desert their leader and to go over to the

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731 conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

656 The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

656 563 669 The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

656 642 The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

• 668 656 In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

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who had been associated with the *Rada* and the 'Directoria'. Both 668 parties had their reasons for conciliation. So far as the Soviet 656 authorities were concerned the appearance of prominent non-Bolsheviks in the administration enabled them to improve their relations with the peasantry and to convince them that Lenin's New Economic Policy was indeed, in his own words, 'in earnest and for long'. It does not follow that the peasants had ever been particularly enthusiastic for the nationalist ideology of the *Rada* and the 'Directoria'; but the Ukrainian nationalist leaders, owing to their social origins, were nearer to the peasantry than the men at the head of the various Committees of the Communist Party and the Soviet administration. The latter were either 'new-comers' from the north or representatives of the local Jewish 'intelligentsia' or men drawn from the 'proletariat' of industrial centres. They owed their rise generally to their revolutionary services in the streets of the great cities. The former collaborators of Vinnichenko and Petlyura, on the other hand, were either peasants by origin or they belonged to the typically Ukrainian 'half-intelligentsia' of the countryside.

In encouraging these men to work with the Communist Party, the Soviet authorities did not contemplate allowing them to play a part in the political life of the country, and in this respect they kept them under the strictest control. On the other hand, they were allowed wide scope in the field of 'cultural work', because the Bolsheviks understood that these people would interpret 'cultural work' in the form of hasty 'ukrainization' which in its tendency to supplant the remnants of 'the imperial culture' in the Ukraine would serve purposes which the Bolsheviks themselves had in view. 'Ukrainization' was, in the view of the Bolsheviks, a harmless occupation for the active intellectual element in the Ukraine during a difficult period of transition—an occupation which at the same time would tend to tone down past bitterness and to divert renewing energies into a comparatively harmless channel. In Caucasia, where the Bolsheviks had to do with tougher men among whom the national idea had deeper roots, they were to find that within ten years the same policy was to produce formidable difficulties.

The first to set the example of going over to the Soviets was none [557] other than the patriarch of the Ukrainian movement himself, Professor Hrushevsky, who was rewarded with the Presidency of the newly founded Ukrainian Academy in Kiev. Hrushevsky was followed by the former President of the Council of Ministers of the *Rada* Government, Holubovich, by the General Secretary to the *Rada*, Khrystyuk, and a number of other prominent radicals and separatists.

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against the Great Russian hegemony.) The Ukrainian enthusiasts of 423
'cultural acheivements' so recently lauded by Kaganovich himself 474
were now accused of 'maintaining relations with nationalist political organizations in Galicia'. And it was not difficult to prove their connections with open or secret organizations 'suffering under the yoke of Poland'. The existence of such connections had been tolerated and even favoured by the Soviet administration to the extent which they furthered Communist propagandist activities in Poland, but there could be no difficulty, if necessary, in treating them as treason.

In 1930 the first Ukrainian political trial took place in Kharkov. 668
A group of individuals were accused of having relations with 'the 674
Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'—the same organization 661
which had been created before the war under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian Government and which was now supposed to be functioning in Galicia. In the following year, as a result of the growing resistance of the peasants to collectivization, action against Ukrainian 'suspects' became more violent. The peasants were bitterly opposed to the *kolkhozy*, but certainly not on 'national' grounds. Faced with the imminent danger of a peasant revolt, the Soviet administration decided to eliminate all persons who through their origins could be considered to be connected with the peasantry and who might organize this revolt and become its leaders. Regardless of their loyalty to the Soviet régime during the preceding years, there now began a systematic destruction of Ukrainians belonging to the 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'.

In 1931 the Bolsheviks professed to have 'discovered' a Ukrainian 661
organization called 'the National Centre'. Holubovich (former 687
head of the *Rada* Government and participator in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations), Shershel, Mazurenko and other 'ex-politicians' were accused of being the leaders of this secret organization. They were shot. Thousands of arrests followed, the victims of which suffered execution or exile to labour camps which were themselves living cemeteries. Two years later, in 1933, the political police (G.P.U.) declared that they had discovered a real military conspiracy on the part of 'a secret military organization'. After a theatrical trial, Kotsubinsky (Vice-President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars), Kovnar (Commissar for Agriculture), and scores of other persons who had all occupied important posts in the army or the administration were shot. One of the most prominent figures in Ukrainian political life, who from the beginning had associated himself with the Communist Revolution and who had for a long time been an influential member of the Council of People's Com-

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474 661 423 *kolkhozy* covering some tens of thousands of hectares; as, for instance, the *Kolkhoz* of "Chervony Perekop" in the Government of Kherson which was set up to comprise 50,000 hectares. In some cases, "to simplify matters", a whole region containing hundreds of villages was declared to constitute one *kolkhoz*. All the boundaries between village lands were abolished; then the whole expanse of land arbitrarily included in the *kolkhoz* was divided into farms of several thousand hectares each—without any regard as to where the villages actually lay. Cattle and agricultural machinery were scattered about over scores of kilometres' (*Pravda*, 3 April 1930).

Nevertheless Stalin declared that: 'The time has come to finish with every kind of camouflage: we must destroy the *kulaks* and deprive them of the possibility to work on the land.' At that moment anyone who owned three cows or the equivalent in sheep, pigs, or even chickens, was considered to be a *kulak*. As a result of this policy it was not long before all the larger and more prosperous peasant farms were destroyed. These farms, since the disappearance of the large private estates, had been the principal producers of the agricultural surplus, since it was only the better-off farmers who had a surplus in excess of their needs for disposal in the towns.

474 661 423 668 As early as 1930 the policy of forced collectivization provoked open resistance in the Ukraine, and attempts were made at armed revolt; but geographical conditions did not favour the type of guerilla warfare which was undertaken with considerable determination and success by the peasants in Georgia, and particularly in the Armenian district of Karabagh and by the Tartars of the Daghestan foothills. These agrarian risings in the Ukraine were suppressed with the greatest cruelty and were followed by mass executions and by the transportation of tens of thousands of peasants. The Soviets applied methods which were then almost new in their struggle with the Ukrainian peasantry; they put them into concentration camps where they had to do forced labour. In the region of Odessa, near Tiraspol, a large and prosperous colony of 'Old Believers' completely disappeared. All the men, with the exception of a few youngsters who managed to cross the Dniestr into Bessarabia, were transported, and the women and children simply scattered over the steppe. The construction of the White Sea Canal, so much advertised by the admirers of Soviet methods in Western Europe, cost the lives of many tens of thousands of peasants, as the vast cemeteries along the banks of the northern lakes and rivers bear witness.

Very often the prospect of transportation to the far north or to Siberia caused the peasants, as in old time, to abandon everything

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and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign correspondent who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

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appointed as First Counsellor in the four capitals (Vienna was included) where the Ukrainians had had independent representation. This arrangement continued until 1925, when such appointments began to be considered only as 'desirable'. Ukrainian Communists soon vanished from important positions in the Soviet embassies and legations, and for the last thirteen years the Ukrainian S.S.R. has had not even the shadow of formal representation abroad. 648

(13) *The Ukrainians in Poland*

The Paris Conference, in 1919, only recognized the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia pending a solution of 'the Russian Question'. The Polish position in Galicia was finally affirmed by the Council of the League of Nations (15 March 1923), but the Polish Government undertook to establish a 'gradual' autonomy for the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia. 563 668

The Ukrainians claimed that not less than three and a half millions of the population of Eastern Galicia were of Ukrainian stock, and they reckoned another three millions in Western Galicia, the Kholm region, and the Polish districts of Polesia and Volhynia.

The Polish census of 1939 admitted only 1,600,000 Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, while the population of Russian origin in other regions of Poland was not allowed to be even in part Ukrainian. This great disparity in estimates can be explained by the fact that the Poles described as 'Russians' all those elements, formerly 'pro-Muscovite', who were lukewarm in their support of the separatist version of the Ukrainian national movement.

The Polish Government had some success in detaching from the Ukrainian nationalists a section of the rural population who were flattered by the discovery that they were in fact 'russified Polish *szlachta*'. It was affirmed that during the preceding two centuries many families of the lesser Polish nobility had become so impoverished that they had disappeared into the mass of the peasantry and had become the victims of systematic methods of russification. The movement of the so-called 'Szlachta Zagrodowa' (Smallholder Gentry) had great success, and the journal of the association, *Pobudki*, claimed recently that the number of 'russified *szlachta*' who were expected 'to return to the bosom of their mother Poland' amounted to 700,000 persons. Thus, if those who desired to remain Russian and those who desired to become Poles (together with real Poles, Jews, Armenians, and Germans) are deducted from the Ukrainian estimate, it will be found that the total number of *conscious* Ukrainians in all Galicia did not exceed two millions.

These two millions remain, however, an important factor in the Galician borderland where Polish, German, Russian, Roumanian and Hungarian interests are in dangerous conflict, and the energetic activities of Ukrainian groups and political parties continued to exercise a disturbing influence on the life of the Polish State during the whole period 1919–39.

The most important Ukrainian party is U.N.D.O. (The Ukrainian National Democratic Union (*Obyedinenie*)), which rose to importance about 1925 under the leadership of Dmitro Levitsky. The party could claim a membership of over one million, and it published a series of papers of which *Diio* (Action) in Lvov was the most important. The ultimate aim of

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U.N.D.O. was a united and independent Ukraine; but working within the structure of the Polish State the party refrained from advocating 'separatism at home' and claimed independence only for 'enslaved' Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet Government regarded U.N.D.O. as the most dangerous, because the most serious, of all Ukrainian political groups.

Relations between the Polish Government and U.N.D.O. were far from cordial during the years 1925–30. Both sides, however, were seeking compromise and the U.N.D.O. leaders, though they failed to acquire legalized autonomy, appeared temporarily satisfied with the position of *de facto* autonomy which they had attained through their social, educational and co-operative organizations (*Selsky Hospodar* (The Country Farmer), *Dnistr*, *Maslosoyuz* (Butter League), etc.). The policy of 'peace with Poland' was supported by the Ukrainian Catholic and Uniate organizations under the leadership of the Uniate Metropolitan, Count Szepticki with the periodicals, *Meta* (Aim), *Nedilya* (Week). On the other hand, certain fractions of U.N.D.O. maintained a hostile attitude towards the Polish Government, voiced in the papers *Nash Prapor* (Our Standard), *Nash Klych* (Our Warcry). Communist influences were noticeable in the propaganda of these fractions.

Abroad the U.N.D.O. was on the best of terms with the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic. Antagonism to Poland had become a tradition in Prague since 1920, when the passage of arms to Poland during the war with the Soviets had been refused. Ukrainian refugees, from both Soviet Ukraine and Galicia, were sure of a kindly reception in the Czech capital, which between the years 1925–35 became, if not the Ukrainian political centre, at least the cultural and educational focus where the idea of a Greater Ukraine, independent and sovereign, was openly preached in the high schools (in many of which special Ukrainian courses were available for students).

The intense interest shown by the leaders of the Third Reich in the Ukrainian problem—an interest which provoked the series of trials, banishments and executions in Soviet Ukraine—aroused the anxiety of the Polish Government. By no means confident of the loyalty of the population of Eastern Galicia, Kholm, and Volhynia, the Poles decided to accelerate the 'polonization' of these regions. This 'polonizing' process took unfortunate and sometimes arbitrary and violent forms: prohibition in some districts of the use of the Ukrainian or Russian languages, and the revival of the old struggle against the Orthodox and even against the Uniate Churches. A great number of Orthodox and Uniate churches were closed or 'turned back' into Catholic ones.

It would have been difficult to discover methods more likely to revive the age-old historic struggle 'for land and faith' between Poles and Ukrainians. A hatred of 'the Polish orientation' was quickly roused among the Ukrainian peasantry, and the moderate sections of U.N.D.O. with their policy of compromise began to lose ground. The U.N.D.O. party organization was forced to denounce the basis of conciliation reached in 1930 and confirmed in 1935. At the moment of the German attack on Poland, U.N.D.O. announced its loyalty to the Polish state, but the foundations of this loyalty had been sapped by the mistakes of the Polish politicians. It was Stalin, not Hitler, who reaped the benefit.

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From time to time the struggle between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia took an acute form and was accompanied by industrial strikes, peasant riots and acts of terrorism against the administration. These methods, violent and illegal, were not approved by U.N.D.O., but they were stimulated both by secret Communist organizations and by the unofficial Ukrainian Party which called itself the Ukrainian National Union (U.N.U.). U.N.U. repudiated all compromise with Poland, and proclaimed an armed struggle against her. Comparable in its organization and tactics to the I.R.A. (on which it was probably modelled to carry on a struggle in geographical and social conditions in some ways similar to those of Ireland), the U.N.U. organized a network of secret militarized groups all over Galicia. Galicia was looked on as a territory where the 'Army Corps' of U.N.U. was 'quartered': the territory was divided into four districts corresponding to 'Divisions', which were further divided into 'Regiments', 'Battalions' and 'Companies'. Some scores of thousands of men, young for the most part, and fanatically devoted to 'the cause', joined U.N.U. 563 668

At the head of the movement stood the bold and adventurous figure of Colonel Konovalets. A former officer of the Austrian Army, Konovalets had led the troops of the 'Directoria' which drove Skoropadsky from Kiev in December 1918. Later he had quarrelled with Petlyura on account of the latter's 'Polish orientation'.

Already in the twenties Konovalets had sought favour and aid in Germany. He was not the only one: about 1924 a certain Poltavets-Ostranitsa, who called himself 'Hetman', appeared in Munich with the same object. Konovalets, however, was much more successful than his rivals, and, towards 1930, he established firm relations with German political and military circles, and at the same time made really effective the secret organization of U.N.U. in Galicia. A newspaper of U.N.U., *Ukrainske Slovo* (Ukrainian Word) was published in Paris; other publications appeared in Germany.

The keen interest with which the Nazi leaders regarded the Ukrainian problem lent a serious meaning to the conspiratorial activities of Colonel Konovalets, who was not ashamed to express openly his 'German orientation'. In 1933 negotiations were set on foot between U.N.U. and representatives of the Nazi Party concerning 'preparatory measures' which were to be taken for the creation of a future 'Ukrainian, White Russian and Lithuanian State'. The German negotiators were principally interested in the organization of a potential 'Ukrainian Government'. The lack of suitable candidates for political office among his own supporters led Konovalets to make contact with the remnants of Petlyura's followers, among whom several 'ex-cabinet ministers' were to be found. There was a project to open relations with Ukrainian nationalists who had remained in Soviet Ukraine, and Konovalets was also in touch with the former Hetman Skoropadsky, who was living at Wannsee near Berlin. Konovalets obviously aimed at organizing a 'united Ukrainian front', and the Ukrainians undoubtedly lost one who might have proved a resolute national leader, when the colonel was killed in a café in Rotterdam by the explosion of a bomb in the form of a cigarette-box which was handed to him by a man presumed to have been a Soviet agent.

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For U.N.U. the death of Konovalets was an even greater blow than it first appeared. Deprived of leadership, the organization began to go to pieces. The Polish police succeeded in arresting numbers of leaders of the regional organizations, and the movement's German supporters began to lose confidence in the conspiratorial method.

Both the moderate and the extremist Ukrainian political parties in Poland, the U.N.D.O. and the U.N.U., were born in Galicia in the atmosphere of the local political struggle. Distinct from these parties were the representatives of the erstwhile Ukrainian Popular Republic who had settled in Poland. This group continued to consider itself as the 'legal government' of Russian Ukraine with Andrew Levitsky as 'president' and several 'cabinet ministers' and 'diplomatic representatives' in different countries (Mazeppa, Prokopovich, A. Shulgin, General Salsky and others). Part of these 'Petlyurians' lived in Poland, others in Prague and Paris, where they published their periodical *Trizub* (Trident, the emblem on Vladimir's coins). Contrasting in this respect with the Galician political parties, which did not put their social programme in the first place, these former adherents of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic', faithful to the traditions of the *Rada* and *Directoria*, had retained their socialist tendencies but in a very moderate form.

It is a curious fact that this group of 'the Ukrainian Popular Republic' enjoyed until recently not only the support of the Czech Government, with whose ideology it had much in common, but also that of the Polish Government, which at the same time was incapable of establishing normal durable relations with the Galician Ukrainians. The politicians of the U.P.R. kept themselves apart not only from the extremists of the U.N.U. but also from the moderates of the U.N.D.O. They did not of course preach separatism in regard to Poland, and as the years passed they became much more tolerant on the subject of the exact status of the Ukraine in the event of the downfall of the Soviet régime and the revival of a Russian state. Konovalets had tried to enlist them for 'the United Ukrainian front' patronized by the Third Reich, but such an orientation could scarcely attract the 'Petlyurians', penetrated by democratic and even socialist tendencies. Some of them remained faithful to the 'Polish orientation' of Petlyura himself, others struck up friendship with the Parisian group of *La Revue de Prométhée*—a periodical published by the representatives of different nationalities which had formed part of the Russian Empire and are now under Soviet dominion. *Les Prométhéens* are drastically opposed to the Soviet régime, denounce the absence of real autonomy in the Soviet Union and stand ultimately for a 'federal state of nationalities'. The Ukrainians who participate in this movement therefore abandon the idea of 'integral separatism' and profess opinions in the spirit of those expressed once upon a time by Michael Dragomanov.

Former 'Petlyurians' are at present less opposed to the ideas of which Hetman Skoropadsky was the symbol than they were at the time when they began their armed struggle against him. The ex-Hetman has retained a certain influence on Ukrainians and admirers of his title can be met in many parts of the world—in Paris and London, in Canada and the United States. His son Danylo is considered by them as 'the lawful successor' of the now ageing Paul.

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Outside Poland, Ukrainians are to be found in many European and American countries. Political and academic circles of Ukrainian intelligentsia are grouped round periodicals of varying views, but these circles consist of scores, perhaps, of persons out of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian land labourers who have migrated from over-populated Galicia. After the war and revolution thousands of fugitives from the South of Russia and Volhynia joined them. In the Ukrainian press from time to time appear statements that the number of Ukrainians in Western Europe reaches 500,000, in Canada over a million, in the United States about 700,000 and in South America 200,000. These figures are undoubtedly exaggerated. In France the number of refugees from the South of Russia who can be considered 'Ukrainians' did not exceed a few scores of thousands, and the same must be said about Czechoslovakia and Balkan countries. However, among the Polish agricultural workers and miners in France (900,000) a third came from Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. And there is no doubt that hundreds of thousands have migrated from Galicia to the United States and especially to Canada where, owing to hard work and a certain capacity for organization, brought over from their native land, many have attained prosperity. America is the land where emigrants from Europe keep together according to their nationality more than anywhere else. The Ukrainian emigration in Canada and the United States has retained a vivid interest in everything pertaining to Ukrainian nationality. It has its own press, publishes its books, teaches its language and history in its schools. The Ukrainians in America consider it their duty to respond to the appeals of the different Ukrainian parties and groups which have remained in Europe. Therefore echoes of all the different tendencies of Ukrainian political life can be found in Canada and the United States: 'pro-Russians' who do not wish to be called 'Ukrainians', adherents of U.N.D.O., followers of Colonel Konovalets, partisans of Petlyura and the 'Petlyurians', admirers of 'the young Hetman' Danylo Skoropadsky. However, purely ideological discussions are not so acute there as among the different 'fractions' in Europe. 'The united Ukrainian front' would have a better chance in emigration, because its basis would not be so much political activity, as a common historical tradition and a common love of the Ukrainian land.

(14) *Literature on the Ukrainian Question*

Numerous papers, mostly by well-known Ukrainian writers and political leaders, have appeared in the *Slavonic and East European Review*. These papers have made available to English readers information on various aspects of the Ukrainian Question. The following should be noted:

Vol. v, No. 13, p. 169, Kolessa, A., 'Bibliography of the Ukrainian Language'.
ix, No. 27, p. 367, Paneyko, B., 'Galicia and the Polish-Ukrainian Problem'.
Ibid. p. 88, Skorowski, S., 'The Ukrainian Problem in Poland'.
x, No. 28, p. 116, Loś, S., 'Ukrainian Question in Poland'.
Ibid. p. 138, Borshak, E., 'Relations of England and Ukraine.'
xii, No. 35, p. 323, Mazepa, I., 'Ukrainia under Bolshevist Rule' (valuable, based on careful study of the Ukrainian Soviet press).
Ibid. No. 36, p. 622, Doroshenko, D., 'The Uniat Church in Galicia'.

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§2. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The late Alexander Guchkov used to say that 'the social revolution begun by Lenin in 1917 was carried through during the following twelve years in the towns and industrial centres only. It did not profoundly affect the countryside until 1929.' Just for this reason Stalin in that ominous year undertook what was to amount to a second and more fundamental revolution in the life of the peoples of Russia.

The condition of the peasantry had so far improved during the years 1922–29 that the Communist régime was able to realize that the peasant was fast becoming the principal and most formidable adversary of the Marxist Revolution. An implacable struggle was therefore initiated against that enemy who had succeeded in recuperating in the social and economic sense, but who was not yet ready to enter the field as an organized political force contending for mastery with a Communist Party which derived its power from the support of the industrial proletariat.

The economic Five Year Plans elaborated by the Soviet régime were dictated by the necessity of reconstructing the social and economic structure of the country in a way which should correspond with the bases of state which the continuance of the political dictatorship of the Communist Party required.

'The main idea of the Soviet Five Year Plans was the accelerated industrialization of U.S.S.R. and, parallel with it in accordance with the political needs of the régime, a rapid collectivization of agriculture. It was always for political rather than for economic reasons that the New Economic Policy, which the Communists had been obliged to put into practice since 1922, was abolished in 1929. The Communist Party, under the leadership of Stalin, proceeded to a new experiment in collectivism in the countryside, using in this case unusually brutal and inhuman methods which completely ruined all more or less prosperous farmers. The peasantry were unable to offer any effective resistance to the authorities, since their risings were only scattered and isolated in character. The peasants chose instinctively the easier way of passive resistance which found expression in the contraction of production and in the careless and unsatisfactory operation of the first collective farms (*Kolkhozy*). As a result of the policy of the Communist Party and of the natural reaction of the peasantry, the country had again to endure a frightful famine which bore its worst aspect in those regions where the percentage of collectivized farms was greatest' (Markov).

The Party had finally triumphed over the peasantry by the end of

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186 The cities of Kiev, Kharkiv and Odesa had a large Russian
563 population. The administrative, commercial and financial institutions were largely in Russian hands and the directors and leaders of these, whatever their political disagreements, were united in opposing the efforts of the Ukrainians to secure even that minimum of rights that they were guaranteed by Russian imperial law. The Russian element in Ukraine, radical or conservative, acted as a
[316] unit during the fateful years 1917-1920. On the other hand, the miners and workers in the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih, the centre of the Ukrainian coal and iron industry, were in very large part likewise Russian and the ideology of St. Petersburg, especially in its radical aspects, was dominant throughout this part of the Ukrainian territory. Many of the most bitter opponents of Ukrainian rights were, in fact, Russian radical miners and workers from this area.

The Jewish population of Ukraine, a large minority, was little interested in the Ukrainian problem. Insofar as they were not actively sharing in the movement for special Jewish institutions, the majority, with certain conspicuous exceptions, were strong supporters of Russian unity, either conservative or radical or, like Leon Trotsky, they were at the service of any government which was opposed to the Ukrainian demands.

186 Thus in 1917 the strength of the Ukrainian movement was to
668 be found in the villages. Here Ukrainian life was lived, Ukrainian thoughts and ambitions were sponsored and it was here that the vision of an old and a future independent Ukraine found its chief support. Even so, that population was itself divided, not according to the class principle but on an ideological pattern which included members of all classes and walks of life.

186 When the revolution broke out in 1917 or, to be more precise,
565 when the tsarist regime collapsed, there were four main divisions in
668 Ukrainian society and they were made clear within a very few months.

The first of these were the nationalists and the advocates of the restoration of order in the country. At the very beginning of the

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century Mykola Mikhnovsky had issued a call for an independent state and for a while he had exerted a strong influence upon such future Ukrainian leaders as Symon Petlyura, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Volodymyr Chekhovsky, but his ideas of placing national liberation in the forefront seemed too extreme for his adherents and by 1917 many of these had in a sense fallen away from his advanced position.

On the other hand, two and a half years of war had shown to many of the Ukrainian officers and men in the Russian army the need of a disciplined force to uphold the national cause. Some of the Ukrainian regiments had early joined the forces of the Revolution, had adopted the Ukrainian flag and introduced Ukrainian as the language of command. Now at the Military Congresses which were held in Kiev in 1917, they took a strong stand in their demands that the Ukrainian National Rada adopt a firm policy toward St. Petersburg and the Provisional Government and they were willing to go much further than the Rada in the setting up of independent governmental machinery.

Opposed to this group were the great mass of the peasants. They were little aware of the involved task of governing or even maintaining order. It would be hardly fair to say that they were anarchistic in temperament. They had rather maintained almost unconsciously their Ukrainian character. Few of them had been further from their villages than the nearest administrative centre and they could not see the necessity of substituting another regime on a broad scale for the fallen tsarist system. For decades they had attributed all their hardships and difficulties to the tsar, the bureaucrats and the police, and with all three vanished, they had no desire to replace them. It seemed to them that the land was intended by God for their use, and once the landlords were dispossessed, they were ready to forget the past and live in peace and quiet with their neighbors. Two and a half years of war had taught them the folly of organized destruction and they willingly accepted the position that a new world had come into being in which there was no need for complicated forms of government, for the collection of taxes and the enforced maintenance of order.

186 565 668 They believed that the Revolution had almost automatically given them all that they desired—the right to use their own language, to have that language placed on a par with Russian and the right to secure their own land and to live peacefully upon it.

186 565 668 665 Between these two groups stood the bulk of the Ukrainian intellectuals grouped in the Social Revolutionist and Social Democratic Parties, each of which was modelled on its Russian equivalent. Yet we must not delude ourselves into thinking that these were political parties in any sense known to the Western world and America, where there has been a long record of political activity. They were before the Revolution rather conspiratorial and debating groups, busied with theorizing about all manner of political questions and (except where they had an opportunity to take part in the work of the zemstvos) without practical experience. A few of their members had served in the First Duma in 1906 but this had been dissolved within a couple of months by Tsar Nicholas II and each succeeding duma had become less representative. Thus the number of those intellectuals who had had practical political experience even in the conduct of elections was very small, while the debators, students, theoreticians, etc. in these parties cared more for the proper solution of ideas than for their application to practical life.

Neither of these groups existed as distinct Ukrainian parties. They tended largely to follow the leadership of the similar Russian groups; they had learned to employ the same methods, listened to the same leaders, and their demands as Ukrainians were loosely connected with their social and political theories. They were conscious, but only potentially active, nationalists and at the moment when it was necessary to make rapid decisions, they hesitated and splintered on the importance which they assigned to national and to economic and social measures.

The Social Revolutionists, largely intellectuals from the villages, were at first the more important. They were populists and non-Marxian socialists who voiced the desires of the peasants for the ownership of their land. They called for the confiscation of the large estates, for they did not believe that any one should have

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larger holdings than he and his family could work. Since the land in Ukraine was held individually and the village community was only a figment of Russian law, they differed sharply from the Russian Social Revolutionists who stressed the existence of the community with an emphasis on the almost annual redistribution of land. Finally, they set themselves up as a Ukrainian party but still grouped around the journal *Narodnya Volya* (The People's Will), the traditional name for a Social Revolutionist paper.

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By the autumn of 1917 this party had definitely split. The left, which stressed the economic and social aspects of the party, established another journal *Borotba* (The Struggle). This was soon followed by a formal schism and the creation of a new Social Revolutionist Party (Borotbisty) with the name taken from their paper. It was only natural that the relations between this group and the Bolshevik Great Russians tended to become closer as radical ideas gained strength in the country.

The numerically smaller Social Democratic Party was purely Marxian and it spoke primarily for the Ukrainian factory workers. Like the Russian Party, it was divided between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, with the latter drifting steadily toward the Social Revolutionists and even some of the bourgeois groups. On the other hand, the efforts of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks to establish their own party met with continual opposition. The Marxian theories of the withering away of the state had long been used by Lenin and some of the German Social Democratic leaders as weapons against the Poles in both the Russian Empire and Germany, and the same ban was now applied to the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. If they wished approval by the central authorities, they were told to become merely a Ukrainian section of the Russian Party. If they persevered in their efforts, they were read out of the party which in Ukraine was dominated by the Russian factory workers and the Russian miners from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih.

The position of the Ukrainian Social Democrats and especially the Bolsheviks was thus much more difficult than that of the less organized and more spontaneous Social Revolutionists. Strict party

186 discipline hampered them at every turn and ardent Ukrainians as
565 Mykola Skrypnyk, a personal and trusted friend of the Russian
668 Bolshevik leaders, refused to make any schism in the party, even
665 though he and his Ukrainian friends quite regularly appealed for recognition as a separate party, especially after the Bolsheviks recognized the existence of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

He, as an old Bolshevik, however, refused to cooperate with those Ukrainian Bolsheviks who dared to risk a fight with the central committee in Moscow and who finally tried to set up a Ukrainian Communist Party.

[648] The greatest weakness of both of these intellectual groups was their lack of appreciation of the importance of foreign policies. It was with great hesitation that their representatives in the Central Rada in the summer of 1917 approached the Russian Provisional Government to include a Ukrainian representative in all Russian diplomatic missions. They had had few or no representatives in the pre-revolutionary Russian diplomatic service; relatively few of them had been abroad, even to Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; they had no distinguished Ukrainian emigrants abroad who could speak to the world with the great authority of Ignace Jan Paderewski, Thomas G. Masaryk or Michael I. Pupin and during the crucial early months they largely neglected any consideration of foreign policy.

They wasted precious time in futile negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government over questions of federalism and they turned rather slowly toward the idea of independence. At each move of the more nationally conscious toward this goal, a certain portion of the more leftist members drew away toward the appropriate Russian camp in the name of internationalism and thus became the unconscious tools by which both the Provisional Government and later the Bolsheviks hoped to retain their control of the wealth of Ukraine.

It was this vagueness on the part of many of the intellectuals which kept them from being true intermediaries between the nationalist and military groups and the great mass of the peasants. It weakened the energy and zeal of some of the Ukrainian regi-

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ments which had declared for the Ukrainian cause immediately after the outbreak of the revolution and facilitated the development of pacifist opinion in the rank and file. So when, at the end of 1917, actual fighting started between the Russian Communists and the Ukrainian Central Rada, the armed forces of the new state were not as well prepared as they had been some months previously, and it was necessary to start again under almost new and more unfavorable conditions.

The pressure of events and the necessity for defense against the Red and the White invaders brought together the more consciously nationalist elements, first to declare the independence of Ukraine and then to organize, but the economic and social divergences were never solved. The dissolution of the Central Rada by the Germans and their support of a conservative government only embittered the political feuds and encouraged the rise of peasant leaders who were content to operate in their own areas and switched sides as questions of the moment moved them. All this weakened the sounder forces of the state and created the bewildering succession of such forms of government as the Rada, the Hetmanate of Skoropadsky and the Directory under Petlyura and gave the struggle at times a bizarre appearance as the different forces raised by the different political groups now combined against one or other of the invaders, only to separate when the other became the more pressing danger.

Under such conditions the central authority was finally overwhelmed and those people who were most strongly committed to a free and independent Ukrainian state withdrew from the country. The Soviet regime was able to take control. This did not, however, end the difficulties for there soon came a revelation that all was not yet well and harmonized. The peasants continued to be restless. The guerilla leaders did not at once cease their activity. Above all, the country was ruined but the relations between the Russians and the Ukrainians were not yet solved.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Ukraine in the Late Thirties

With the power of Moscow thus defined and reasserted by 668 ● the free vote of the Moscow-controlled Communist representatives of the various independent republics that formed part of the USSR, the way was open for the next step. Stalin had not only prepared himself legally at home by a clever use of contradictory expressions but he had taken advantage of the good will of the liberals and progressives of the rest of the world by exploiting the distrust which they felt for Hitler and the Nazis and had infiltrated Communists through the media of popular fronts into nearly all the governments that boasted of their democracy.

Next came the bewildering series of trials which were now held 661 in Moscow. In quick succession Yagoda, the dreaded head of 687 the NKVD, was removed from his post, arrested and shot by his successor Yezhov, whose name was soon to become even more detested. Then, in a series of three public trials which extended from the end of 1936 to 1938, nearly all of the old Bolshevik leaders who had played important roles in Soviet life during the period of Lenin's domination were condemned for counter-revolutionary activity and either shot or sentenced to long terms of deportation, from which they did not return. The list included such names as Bukharin, the former theoretician of the Party, Zinovyev, the master of the Leningrad Soviet, the leading supporters of Trotsky, Rykov, etc. At the same time Marshal Tukhachevsky, the commander of the Red Army in its unsuccessful drive against Warsaw in 1920, Marshal Yegorov, the leader of the southern wing of that army with which Stalin himself had served as political commissar and most of the other leading officers were removed and

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

The Western Ukrainian Reaction

000 To appreciate the next step in the relations between the Western Ukrainians and the Soviets, it is necessary to go back and look briefly at the conditions that existed under Polish rule. The two peoples were distinctly hostile but their relations were very different from those between the Eastern Ukrainians and the Russians.

563 The old Austro-Hungarian Empire, unlike the Russian, had not denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, even though it had not favored their development save as a counterbalance to the Poles in Eastern Galicia. Yet there was a considerable number of Western Ukrainians who had been trained to fill the lower offices in the old Hapsburg system. They had the right of voting for the provincial diets and when the Hapsburg Empire disintegrated, they immediately voted for the establishment of a Western Ukrainian Republic. When this failed to establish itself and to win recognition by the Western powers and the League of Nations, the vast majority of the Western Ukrainians under the leadership of the UNDO voted for representatives to the Polish Parliament and continued the struggle in a legal and parliamentary manner to win rights for themselves.

●668 A minority which was finally organized into the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Col. Evhen Konovalets continued the illegal and revolutionary struggle through sabotage and terroristic attacks on outstanding anti-Ukrainian Poles. It was in vain that the Polish government endeavored to suppress this group by the forced pacification of Eastern Galicia and by other violent tactics and, after the murder of Colonel Konovalets, his place was taken by Colonel Melnyk.

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Ukraine Under the Soviets

668 In 1932, in connection with the suppression of the Ukrainians in the UkSSR, the claim was advanced that the OUN had commenced work in eastern Ukrainian territory. However that might be, the small group continued to operate in Poland. It trained young men in secret military organizations, in operating without detection, and in undercover political education. In this work it was opposed and imitated by some of the legal political bodies, usually of a more leftist but still anti-Communist type, which likewise prepared their own cadres of semi-trained men who would be ready to act, if need arose.

The events of 1939, with the rise and fall of the independent Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine, won many adherents to these groups and organizations, and after the outbreak of the war and the occupation of Western Ukraine by the Communists, the latter advertised their existence by their talk of an active Ukrainian underground.

With the first months of the occupation the network of these groups spread throughout the country but even under these conditions there was little or no cooperation between them and similar Polish groups which persisted in maintaining the Polish supremacy and waited only for the Soviet defeat to reassert their hegemony in the area. Some of the leaders went abroad and there was considerable confusion aroused in their ranks but, by the spring of 1940, when the full weight of the Soviet changes was beginning to be felt by the population, the attitude changed toward these groups and they began to be looked upon as the leaders of the Ukrainians who objected to the introduction of the Communist regime.

The general turmoil that existed with anti-Nazis fleeing to the east, the outstanding Ukrainians trying to get to the west, the sending of members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to the villages as teachers and the general disorganization, gave them relatively good conditions for developing and making their principles and knowledge available to the villagers. These were made aware of the fact that any opposition to the new regime would be instantly punished and as their normal pre-war life was now converted into

a criminal existence, they showed themselves more ready to co- 668
operate.

Unfortunately, during this preliminary period discord broke out [578]
in the OUN. One faction under Stepan Bandera objected to the leadership of Colonel Melnyk and demanded the change of several prominent leaders. When this was refused, a split came in the organization with Melnyk at the head of one faction and Bandera in control of the other. It is very possible that this split was the result of German intrigue to prevent the formation of a strong Ukrainian movement but it had the result of weakening it, even though both Bandera and Melnyk fell into German hands and were imprisoned during the rest of the war. Their followers continued and intensified the feud and even came to armed clashes.

Both factions of the OUN and similar groups strengthened themselves first along the borders and commenced to smuggle arms and ammunition from the west, so as to be prepared to act in case there came an armed clash between Germany and the USSR. Then, as the months passed, the network extended further into the country and the OUN became organized on a territorial basis under a Country Executive and the Country Leader, who were assisted by expert advisers on military affairs and propaganda.

While the two imperialistic powers were still friends, there was little possibility for open sabotage. The chief work of the Ukrainian patriotic underground was the spreading of the national spirit, the encouraging of the spirits of the oppressed, and the secret education of the masses in the hope of later action. They sought to counterbalance the Soviet propaganda and their efforts to enlist the young people in the Komsomols and train them as Communists. They worked upon some of the eastern Ukrainians who were moved by the Soviet regime to the west and they brought it about that some of these remained behind and joined their ranks when the break finally came in 1941.

Despite the efforts of the leaders to hold their followers in check, they were not always successful for some of the younger members were so enraged by the Bolshevik tactics that they could not be restrained from attempting individual acts of reprisal. These

668 usually failed and involved not only the punishment of numbers of the innocent but also called the attention of the Communist leaders to the existence of the organizations and made them more vigilant in tracking down suspects.

Some of the members, to secure more adequate military training, even enlisted in the Red Army, sometimes with the approval of the heads of the underground but this proved an expensive process, for the alerted Communists usually moved these candidates for training well to the east where they would be harmless in case of a general conflict. Numbers of them were sent to the Bashkir ASSR and to the central Russian areas.

By the spring of 1941 there were many members of these underground associations hiding in the forests of Eastern Galicia and Volynia and the Soviets sent out armed detachments to pursue them and to locate the caches of arms which they had not only smuggled in but had taken from the Poles during the last days of the Polish opposition and which they had seized from small and often unsuspecting Soviet detachments. These searches often resulted in armed clashes in which the Red forces often emerged victorious, thanks to the ever greater numbers of soldiers who were assigned to them.

The work of the courriers between the different units and sections became more arduous and dangerous as the Soviets tightened their control over the population and strengthened the border guards on one pretext or another. What had once been a relatively open border, the area between Sokal and Turka, was now guarded by barbed wire and the Ukrainian population, which was suspected of complicity with the underground, was removed.

In the same way, the Soviets prepared one device after another to attack the Executive of this underground movement. They succeeded three times in capturing and trying many of the leading members and in the spring of 1941 they were starting a fourth trial in which they hoped to assert their power and to crush the movement finally. Yet, their plans for this were finally upset by the opening of hostilities between Germany and the USSR.

It was no easy task to organize this movement under the very

eyes of a ruthless invader. Many of the agents who were engaged 668
in it fell into the enemy hands and were executed ruthlessly. It was still harder to bring together the groups that were working for the various Ukrainian parties and to arouse them to a realization that, in the face of the threat from the east, those differences which had seemed so important during the parliamentary struggle against the Poles were to be forgotten in the face of the common danger to all those things which the various parties had in common. Yet they persevered despite heavy losses and by the spring of 1941, while their position still seemed hopeless, they had succeeded in creating a nucleus of organized opposition to Soviet rule which was really widespread and had some repercussions in the ranks of the Red Army, especially among the eastern Ukrainians and some of the other non-Russians who had been mobilized and sent for service in the area.

648 the same voting for annexation to the USSR, the same enthusiastic
631 reception in Moscow, and the same process of nationalization, of the arrest of outstanding figures, and the same destruction of the established forms of life in both areas.

The Soviets were, however, less advanced in these provinces for the application of their system required time and their stay in the area was eight months less than it was in the territory taken from Poland.

The anti-Communist leaders fled either into Rumania proper
[668] or Germany or made their way to the Polish Government General in Krakow. On the other hand, despite the attempts to seal off the country, the OUN found ways of extending its influence into Bukovyna and appealed to the more alert classes of the population.

In general the Ukrainians in these two areas formed rather a
563 secluded enclave in the general mass of Ukrainian history and they did not play a role in proportion to their numbers. They thus scarcely enter into the account, although for a while, in 1941, there was organized a force of some 2,000 who sought to impede the Rumanian return to the country. Yet, their opposition was fruitless and when they endeavored to cut their way out, they were either destroyed by the Germans or dispersed.

727 661 [241] Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

[538] [466] By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

●668 These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba—Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

668 725 This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

menacing their lines of communication and rescuing young Ukrainians who were being deported for labor service in Germany. It was during this year that the leaders came to feel the need for closer cooperation and a unification of their efforts. This was hard to achieve and there were even clashes between different groups of Ukrainian patriots. Yet, toward the beginning of 1943 the more important groups had effected a rough union in the U. P. A., the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which took on the characteristics of an organized military force. 662 725

By the middle of 1943 this army had acquired considerable strength and it was able to deal shattering blows to isolated German detachments and to drive out both the local German administration and any Red partisans that tried to operate in the area around the Pripet marshes. In May, 1943, they were even strong enough to ambush and kill the head of the Nazi S. A., Viktor Lutze, in the neighborhood of Kowel-Brest Litovsk.

The policy of the U. P. A. was to destroy the local German administrations which were scattered in the smaller communities and to avoid battle with the greater concentration of forces in some of the leading centres. In this way the Ukrainians were able to take over the practical administration of large parts of the Ukraine and to restore a considerable amount of normal life, while they checked the deportation of thousands or released them from the slave trains. The U. P. A. during these years had its own training schools, it set up on a small scale its own factories for arms and some of the most necessary manufactures, and it governed with the approval of the Ukrainian population.

At this period it had its own printing presses and put out a large number of journals and books of various kinds. These were not only in Ukrainian but, as the U. P. A. grew in size and strength, it attracted the attention and won the sympathies of all the other nations oppressed by the Russians. It formed units of [648] Byelorussians, Azerbaijanians, Uzbeks, etc. and finally on November 21, 1944, it called the First Conference of the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia, which was attended by some thirty-nine delegates representing thirteen peoples. The Germans

668 tried to break this up but they were unsuccessful and the police
725 battalion which was assigned to the operation was destroyed. Out of this Conference developed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations which adopted as its program, "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual."

[701] It would take too long to describe the actual nature of the military operations which the U. P. A. carried on. At the height of its power it controlled more than 200,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory and numbered some 220,000 soldiers divided into four main bands: the U. P. A. North, operating in Polissya and northern Volynia; the U. P. A.—West in Eastern Galicia and Kholmshchyna; the U. P. A. —South in northern Bukovyna and the provinces of Kamyanets Podilsky and Vinnytsya; and the U. P. A.—East north of Kiev and Zhytomyr. There were separate detachments in most of the cities and important towns.

[661] To oppose its operations, the Germans resorted to mass executions and on more than one occasion detached forces of one or two divisions to try to destroy its centres. These attempts failed and the U. P. A. by its constant efforts played an important part in isolating the German forces, upsetting their communications and sapping their strength. All this was very costly, for after every major blow the Germans executed large numbers of innocent Ukrainians as their one weapon against the movement.

At first there was relative peace in Galicia, but in the summer of 1943 a Soviet partisan detachment entered the province. The Germans took little action and the U. P. A. came to the support of the population and soon had established strong centres in the Carpathian Mountains, where the difficult terrain facilitated their maintenance of strong positions.

[727] The Germans in the beginning did not want to admit that their policy toward the Ukrainians had evoked such a strong response. Koch and his associates were only too willing to believe that the Ukrainians were an inferior race, undeserving of education or of consideration and they went out of their way to label the U. P. A. the product of Communist intrigue and a movement of support for the Jews, etc.

In general, the military unification of the armed groups proceeded more rapidly and favorably than did the political concentration. Here the followers of Bandera established in March, 1944, a temporary committee and at a general assembly in June appointed a Supreme Council of Ukrainian Liberation (the UHVR) which assumed the functions of a government. At the same time, through the agreement of the representatives of the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev, the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv and the National Council of Carpatho-Ukraine, there was formed in September in Kiev the All-Ukrainian National Council (rada) which appointed as its president Prof. Mykola Velychkivsky, the Rector of the Kiev Poytechnic. This was rather under the control of the Melnykivtsy, and was opposed to the UHVR. Yet these differences tended to become academic, in view of the strengthened position of General Taras Chuprynka, the commander of the U. P. A. 668 725

The opposition of the U. P. A. to the German forces was therefore in a sense an opposition behind the lines. It had been facilitated by the German tendency to base their hold on the country through various strong points, while their main forces were advancing to the east and fighting against the Red Army. With the German defeat at Stalingrad in the RSFSR, they began a new retreat and this brought the Soviet forces back into the picture and placed new burdens upon the U. P. A.

In Galicia there had been formed with German toleration a regular Ukrainian division, the Galician Division, on the condition that it would only be employed against the Bolsheviks and would be maintained as a distinct unit. Yet the Germans had no intention of allowing this division to gather strength. They soon replaced the higher officers with Germans and officially called it the 14 Waffen Grenadier Division der Waffen SS., even though in no other case were Slavs of any kind assigned to the SS. This division took part in some battles with the Bolsheviks in the Carpathians. With the breaking of the German front, the German military men made renewed efforts to enroll this division and to create other units in a regular Ukrainian army under General Shandruk but 721

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

The Return of the Communists

The struggle of the U. P. A. against the returning Communists was no less bitter than the struggle with the Nazis but it was under very different conditions and the forces involved were more unequal. In the first place, the bulk of the fighting came after the conclusion of the hostilities of World War II and at a time when the Sovietophilism of the Western democratic powers was at its height. 725 668

The Nazis were during the entire period engaged with the Soviet forces beyond the borders of the Ukraine and while they attempted to maintain their position in the Ukraine, they frequently counted upon their ability to hold the chief road junctions and communities and exerted less effort to keep their garrisons in every separate village. The Soviet policy was to master the entire country and subject every aspect of Ukrainian life to their own power and control. They could therefore the more easily rely upon the use of overwhelming forces and endeavor to maintain a steady and never-ending pressure, while at the same time they could invoke every weapon in their propaganda arsenal to blacken their opponents in the mind of the democratic world.

Then, too, with the ending of formal hostilities there was no longer the possibility that the U. P. A. by its attacks upon one of its enemies could secure the weapons that would serve it in good stead against the other. This had been a marked feature of the earlier campaigns, for the Soviets had reconquered Kharkiv in the late fall of 1942, only to lose it in early 1943 and to recover it again later in the year. The Red Army recovered Kiev on November 6. In the spring of 1944 the Germans were forced to evacuate Lviv but they recovered the city and held it until the end

725 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A.
668 had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrain-
[208] ians were loyal to the Soviet Union. This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided
[186] to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army.

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

[651] The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West.

728 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of
648 the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

in 1939, now received a new master. As soon as the Soviet forces 728
entered the region in the autumn of 1944, they immediately began 648
a campaign to liberate this area from Czecho-Slovakia and reunite it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was the same old story carried on in the same way as in 1939. There was a mass of petitions apparently prepared by the native population asking for liberation, but these were in reality the work of a handful of carefully selected Communists.

They speedily reached their goal and on June 29, 1945, President Benes of Czechoslovakia recognized the justice of their claims and by an agreement handed over the entire province which was duly reunited with their brothers in Moscow. This brought together under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic nearly all the Ukrainians, except a few who were still living in Poland and in a small stretch of territory which the UkSSR voluntarily ceded to Poland to satisfy the increasing claims of the Polish Communists and their needs in their efforts to cement their power in that state.

At the same time the realization by the Soviet authorities of the seriousness of the situation offered by the U. P. A. and the unrest among the Ukrainians led them to act on both the foreign and the domestic front. On the former they mobilized all of their [308]
friends and dupes abroad to stress the connection of the U. P. A., [725]
the "Bandera bandits," and the Nazi criminals and they achieved considerable success in closing the eyes of the west until they had won considerable victories over the various U. P. A. groups, for too many Western leaders failed to see the inconsistency that they preached. At one and the same time the Soviet authorities boasted of their complete control of the territory of Western Ukraine, thanks to the love of the population for the Red Army and in almost the same breath they declaimed against these armed forces which were holding up the advance of the Red Army and the NKVD in the very areas where the people were thirsting for liberation.

On the domestic front in the autumn of 1945 they sent a large 661
force of men into the Carpathian area under the command of 668
Khrushchov as Premier of the UkSSR and General Ryasny, the 725

661 Minister of War, to endeavor to suppress these bands. Despite
● 668 unprecedented torture of the population, the Soviets found that
725 their progress was not so great as they had expected, for few of the Ukrainian units in their forces were enthusiastic about the campaign, when they saw the measures that the government was taking against their own families.

In the spring of 1946, they made another attempt, this time using some fifteen divisions of NKVD troops from the Far East, Siberia and Leningrad under the direct control of General Colonel Moskalenko. The authorities had been goaded to this renewed demonstration of force by the fact that the town of Stanislav in the Carpathian area had been seized by five battalions of the U. P. A. on October 31, 1945 as a discouragement to the Ukrainians to participate in the Soviet elections called for February 10, 1946. Despite the efforts of the Soviet guards, a considerable portion of the population failed to vote and when the attacks upon them were pressed, a detachment of the U. P. A. succeeded on May 3, 1946, in ambushing Moskalenko and killing him and his chief aids. This ended another campaign and still left the U. P. A. in control of parts of the Carpathian area.

668 In addition to these operations on purely Ukrainian territory,
725 the U. P. A. undertook several raids across the borders in order to encourage dissatisfaction with Soviet rule among some of the neighboring peoples. Thus they established contact with similar groups in Slovakia, Byelorussia and Lithuania, while others cut their way across Hungary into Yugoslavia to join forces with the opponents of Communism in that area.

The raids into Slovakia were especially successful throughout 1945 and 1946 and were continued on a smaller scale during the next years. They served as an encouragement for the anti-Communist elements of the population and, of far more importance in the long run, they attracted the attention of Western journalists who for the first time began to realize the extent of the discontent that prevailed in the Soviet Union. More than that, with every step to the West, they were brought closer to the Western Zones of Germany and Austria and several well-armed detachments have

during the past years fought their way into the American Zone, laid down their arms and surrendered. These brought the first really definite information to the West and while they have not received the attention that they deserved, they have undoubtedly encouraged the almost frantic desires of the Great Russian emigrés to pretend that they have an efficient underground operating at home.

The result of these raids produced an impression even upon the Czechs. Before the Communist coup d'état which placed the Communists in control of that country, the Czech Minister of War under Dr. Benes was approached by the Soviet authorities and asked for joint action with the Soviets and the Communist Poles to check the opposition to Soviet rule and to project joint operations on a large scale.

On March 29, 1947, General W. Swierszczewski, the Communist Polish Vice Minister of War, was killed near the town of Baligrod. This again was too startling a revelation of the discontent and on May 12th of the same year, the three governments of the USSR, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia concluded a treaty of mutual assistance against this movement.

Faced by the increasingly organized power of the Communist regimes, the U. P. A. has been obliged to proceed with more caution and it has largely replaced mass movements with operations on a smaller scale with the idea of keeping alive a spirit of resistance within the country. It is becoming increasingly difficult for it to publish and circulate pamphlets but it is still able, in case of necessity, to impede seriously the Soviet attempts at deportation of the Ukrainian population and again and again it is able to damage severely the Motor Tractor Stations.

On March 5, 1950, General Chuprynka, the commander of the U. P. A., was tracked down and killed in the village of Bilohorska in the very neighborhood of Lviv. He had proved himself a more than competent leader and had been the soul of the U. P. A. since its foundation in 1943. His parents, his wife and his children had all perished in the struggle but he had never wavered in his belief in a final victory and he had become an almost legendary figure.

668 His death did not end the fighting, for he was succeeded in
735 command by Colonel Vasyl Koval. Even operations were not suspended, for it is known that late in September of the same year, a detachment of the forces seized the town of Mukachiv in the Carpathians and retired to the mountains with the records of the MVD office there and two prisoners who had made themselves particularly obnoxious by their cruelty and their abuse of the local population.

Thus under the present circumstances the primary task of the U. P. A. is to maintain itself in being as an armed underground, to encourage the population, both of the Ukraine and the other groups oppressed by the Russian Communists, and to carry on certain types of propaganda and of terroristic work which will serve to keep on the anxious seat the masters of the Kremlin. At the moment it does not have the possibility of undertaking by itself those extensive operations that it has done in the past but it is not idle and in the well-hidden bunkers and the forests, it is fostering those traditions which can be again galvanized into activity, if the moment for action arrives.

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.
727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "war-mongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representa-
[701] tive in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

6: Armstrong
668

Ukraine RD1

[For a detailed account of nationalism treated as a political movement both within and outside of the Ukraine during the years of 1939 and 1945, see category 116, entire source]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

alien aspects of life in the city. A certain number of local Ukrainians accepted this campaign enthusiastically, sometimes carrying it further than the newcomers themselves. Others, although Ukrainian by background, had long been used to employing the Russian language and associating freely with persons of Russian ethnic origin. Consequently, the "purifying" process meant in many cases serious disruption of their accepted way of living and social relationships.

Because of the extreme importance of this factor it is worth describing in some detail a case which provides a striking illustration of the Nationalist psychology during this period. It is contained in the diary of a prominent Kiev author, Arkadii Liubchenko, who was evacuated by the Soviet forces but managed to remain in Kharkov until the German arrival. He then made contact with the Mel'nyk groups (which, as was previously pointed out, pursued the same policy there as in Kiev). Always nationalist, he soon became an enthusiastic convert to the creed of integral nationalism. In December, through his association with the Nationalists, he obtained a post on the Kharkov newspaper, *Nova Ukraïna*. Shortly afterwards, a Kharkov writer named Filipov appeared in the editorial offices; he told Liubchenko that he had prepared an article on the evils of the Communist regime which he wished to publish. When Liubchenko turned it down because it was written in Russian, Filipov protested that his mother had been Ukrainian and that he would submit the article in Ukrainian, as the question of language was indifferent to him. This brought the sneering reply that real Ukrainians, such as those dominating *Nova Ukraïna*, could have nothing to do with one who could not make up his mind whether he was a Ukrainian or a Russian, since such a person was an "internationalist" just like the Bolsheviks.[29] It may easily be imagined what effect such ideas had upon the rebuffed applicant. This is especially the case, since work for an organ like the newspaper was for many not merely a matter of prestige, or even of expression of opinion, but of life and death. With the rapidly deteriorating food situation in Kiev and Kharkov, employment by an agency which was recognized by

[29] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 25.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

538 serfs, the dreams of past glories, such as they live in the popular songs, are the principal themes of Chevtchenko. We find in them both romanticism and a strong expression of social aspirations. In placing Chevtchenko on the level of the greatest European poets we are obliged to state that the subjects which inspire his poetical works are more limited than those of a Poushkine or a Mickiewicz.

Chevtchenko, the peasant and man of the people, was an instinctive revolutionary in the political sense of the term. He revolts against autocracy and against the lords, and with all his force he appeals for aid for his oppressed brothers and for the struggle for freedom which fascinates him. Though his poetic feeling was high and his lyricism rich, his subjects never go beyond the limited circle of the struggles of the serfs with the lords. One can easily imagine the effect which his poems produced in the circles of the Russian intelligentsia, in which he had been triumphantly received, as they were also dreaming of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.

668 The Universities of Kharkov and of Kiev, founded
538 by the Imperial Government, one in 1805 and the other in 1834, were the rallying centres of the intellectual movements of Southern Russia. They produced the celebrated historian Kostomarov, who became the spokesman of Liberalism and of the cultural awakening of the Ukraine.

The active enthusiasm of these young intellectuals with revolutionary tendencies led to the creation of a secret society in Kiev, the 'Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius,' which was almost immediately discovered by the police. The conspirators took the road to Siberia. In 1847 Chevtchenko was condemned to seven years of service as a simple soldier in a far-away garrison. This relatively light sentence—followed, it is true, by the prohibition of writing and painting (he was a painter of talent at the same time as a poet)—was

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

imposed on a revolutionary with destructive ideas and 668
not on a nationalist Ukrainian. It is only after the 538
accession of the Emperor Alexander II in 1855, when a more Liberal mood became apparent in Russia, that the deportees of Kiev were able to return to Europe.

Some years later Chevtchenko died. Kostomarov, on the contrary, settled at the University of St. Petersburg where, during long years, he wrote his great historical works. Having become a well-known historian and, with age, more moderate, he nevertheless remained, during the whole of his life, a regionalist patriot of the Ukraine, which he wanted to see included in the framework of a great Russian Federation governed by Liberal principals. Even the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius, despite its revolutionary extremism, had had no more than federalist ideas and had never dreamed of the separation of the Ukraine from Russia. This is confirmed by the Ukrainian historian of note, M. E. Borschak, in his interesting study, published in the *Slav World*. He writes that 'the Ukrainian movement was then free of any ideas of separatism, of which we did not find any traces when analysing its ideology.'

Let us repeat again: The struggle, in the Ukraine as in the whole of Russia, was begun in the name of Liberalism and of Social Reform against an existing political and social order, not against Russia in the name of the Ukraine, and in this the Ukrainian movement differed deeply from the national movements of the ethnically non-Russian groups. At the time when thousands of Poles, poor and rich, peasants and aristocrats, socialists or monarchists, were being deported to Siberia for wishing to separate Poland from Russia, *not a single Ukrainian* joined the convoys of political deportees as a partisan of the autonomy or the independence of his country. If thousands of Ukrainians settled in the

668 Siberian *taiga*, it was for having been republicans or
538 socialists or for having struggled against Tsarism but not against Russia.

538 Sometimes it is claimed that Chevtchenko was personally hostile to everything Russian. But he seems to have been nothing of the kind. An admirer of the 'noble spirit' of Gogol, Chevtchenko himself wrote his personal diary in Russian and he has left us no less than eleven novels and some poetry written in the same language, of which two poems were written before his exile. By conviction and by temperament a revolutionary, Chevtchenko felt himself intimately united with the opposition circles in Great Russia and belonged, as such, to the great family of Russian men of letters.

[609] On the other hand, always true to the popular feelings and sharing with the Ukrainian peasants the hostility towards the German and particularly towards the estate-owners and the school-teachers, he vituperates, in his *Epistle to Compatriots*, against their subjection to German intellectual and cultural influence. When speaking of his young compatriots he says that they blamed their parents 'as they have not taught them to chatter in German in their childhood.' And Chevtchenko laments that 'Ukraine, such are your sons, your young flowers, watered with ink in the German hothouses.' He equally revolts against the vanity of Ukrainian youth, taught by German scholars of whose infallibility they are convinced:

> 'I have seen everything, I know everything.
> There is no hell nor paradise,
> Nor God:
> There is nought but I,
> And the small angular German,
> And nothing more. This is enough, little brother,
> But what do you represent in reality?
> . . . As the German says: we do not know.'

Sometimes these laments bear a character of bitter irony. The pretended infallibility of German opinion concerning the fate and the history of the Ukrainian people exasperates him. 'The German will tell you: You are Mongolians. Yes, Mongolians, nude descendants of Tamerlaine clothed in gold. The German will tell you: You are Slavs. Yes, Slavs, unworthy great-grandsons of glorious ancestors.' 538

While ironizing about the faithful pupils of the German school he continues: 'They spoke according to German precepts in such a way that the German himself, though a great professor, could understand nothing of it . . . at Sitch the German, full of wisdom, grows the potato and you buy it and eat it for your health and you glorify the Zaporoges . . . but by whose blood has this earth been fertilized to produce the potatoes? . . . Her own children have led the Ukraine to the edge of the precipice, they have crucified her worse than the Poles, they want to teach them, at least they pretend it . . . they want to train this blind old man which is the Ukraine under German influence.' (*Kobzar.*)

For him the German question was not only one of literature since he, his sister, and his two brothers were serfs of the German estate-owner Engelhardt, who was noted for his coarseness and the absence of any culture.

The Liberal era which began in Russia with the accession of Alexander II gave broad satisfaction to the aspirations of the circles of the former opposition. The liberation of the serfs in 1861, the inauguration of municipalities elected by the people, the radical reforms based on the permanence of judges, and the establishment of juries and judicial guarantees, eliminated the major reasons for the old revolutionary leanings. A wide movement of reconciliation began to develop which would probably have benefited the Ukraine as 668 175

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 well as the whole empire. The Imperial Government
175 was clearly inclined to the idea of a regime of constitutional monarchy, based on the cultural autonomy of the various Russian territories and on the application of sufficiently broad systems of political autonomy to the ethnically non-Russian majorities.

As before, the Government was in no way opposed to the publication of books and journals in the Ukrainian language.

000 This whole evolution was compromised by the Polish insurrection of 1863. One knows that in 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, Alexander I committed the mistake which the great Catherine had taken care to avoid at the moment of the partition of Poland. He annexed the greater part of the ethnically Polish territory, the Grand duchy of Warsaw. Despite all the attempts at the establishment of an autonomous regime, the 'Polish question' became henceforth the most vulnerable point of internal Russian policy. During the Liberal era of Alexander II the autonomous political regime was naturally intended to be applied first of all to Poland. Nothing came of this attempt except a new and violent Polish insurrection. The insurgents, traditionally attached to the old conception of the Great Poland of former times, maintained the old pretensions to the Ukraine and White Russia. The programme of Prince Adam Czartoryski, the forerunner of the Polish insurrectionist movement, envisaged the co-ordination of the Polish and Ukrainian movement, the latter to be included in the plan of the Polish insurrection, in order to shake the omnipotence of the Russian Empire and to create a Slavonic federation under the direction of a Great Poland on her ruins! The efforts to draw the Ukrainian and the White Russian peasants towards her were to experience a fatal check; the peasants did all they could to facilitate the task of

517 the Russian Ukraine had resource to Galician publications and, from time to time, they published their own works in that country. It is as a result of this that the Chevtchenko Society was founded at Lvov, which has since held the predominant place in the Ukrainian movement.

Following the example of Chevtchenko, another influence joined the popular so to say 'folk-lore' tendency of the literary Ukrainian movement: it was the social question, identical with that which dominated the literary spirit of the whole of Russia.

565 The second half of the eighteenth century, which had
668 seen the union of Western Ukraine with Russia and the colonization of the shores of the Black Sea, was at the same time the epoch of the greatest development of the privileges of the aristocracy. We shall not be able to go into the details of this evolution, which would go far beyond the purpose of this book. Let us only note that after the death of Peter the Great in 1725 the new nobility, of military origin, became the greatest political force in the State. This nobility definitely emancipated itself from its old bondage to the State and at the same time transformed the dependence of the peasants, which had hitherto not been unconditional, into a real servitude. Thus Catherine II established in Russia, as also in the Ukraine, a new political and social order which was founded on the privileged position of the aristocracy which had carried her to power, and on the servitude of the peasants. She conferred similar rights on the Ukrainian nobility as those of the aristocracy of the whole empire and, moreover, liberally distributed the new lands to the landlords. Since that time the question of the servitude of the peasants, a distant but direct prelude of the Revolution, became an open wound of the Tsarist regime.

One knows that the movement of ideas aiming at the abolition of servitude began to appear in the higher layers of society at the epoch of the Napoleonic War. Quite naturally it appeared together with an interest for everything popular and was, at the same time, inspired by the ideas fashionable in the West: on the one hand encyclopædism and voltairianism and on the other freemasonry and carbonarism. It could not fail to spread in the Ukraine, as elsewhere.

Thus a secret society, the 'United Slavs,' was formed, among whose members were not only Ukrainian officers and officials, but also actual Great Russians. A naïve romanticism reigned—oaths were sworn on swords and speeches made in the style of Plutarch, associated with a passionate love of popular traditions and with the desire to lighten the destiny of the peasant masses under the burden of servitude. Following the example of the romantic revolutionaries of the West, the young conspirators dreamed of the epochs of the past and of the Cossack epics, the heroes of which appeared to them as champions of liberty. Kotliarevsky himself, without belonging to the 'United Slavs,' was intimately connected with masonic circles, and his amazing pamphlet, *Travesty of Aeneid*, already denounced the social weaknesses and injustices of the epoch.

Conforming to the ideas of romantic and revolutionary nationalism, the 'United Slavs' aimed at a republican and democratic federation of all the Slavs. Their pro-Ukrainianism represented only a link in the Pan-Slav revolutionary chain, and it was diametrically opposed to a rupture between the Ukraine and Great Russia. One of the principal chiefs of the Ukrainian movement, Gorbatchevsky, wrote in his memoirs, in Russian, that the success of the insurrection 'might have signified a new era in the history of the Russian people.'

668 186 The society of the 'United Slavs' was only one expression of the great liberating movement, and its failure was the logical consequence of the suppression of the Decembrist insurrection at St. Petersburg on 14 December 1825, which gave it its name.

This failure checked for a long time the attempts of political revolt in the whole of Russia. Nevertheless the intellectual movement continued, always inspired by the same sources and the same ideals.

538 The genius of Chevtchenko determined the path which the whole Ukrainian literature was to follow. It clung especially to the description of popular life, of the peasant life with its sadness and its injustices. Deeply steeped in folk-lore, it was especially inspired by the pity of the disinherited, by this social pity which is a feature of its affinity with the great Russian literature. In the writings of Marko Vovtchok (pen-name of Marie Vilinska Markovitch) in the *Popular Tales*, approved by Chevtchenko himself, we find again the touching picture of the peasant miseries. Later, in Galicia, Franko, Martovitch, and Stefanik give some pretty examples of this literature, more social than national. Parallel to this, in Russian Ukraine, this tradition was pursued until the revolution by Kotsiubinsky, Tobilevitch, and, above all, by Lessia Oukrainka, the niece of Michael Dragomanov, to whom we will presently return.

536 545 The Ukrainian Theatre experienced a remarkable development towards the end of the nineteenth century. We have already considered the taste of the Ukrainian people for dramatic art, a taste which had already found expression in the old marionette plays. The rise of the new Ukrainian literature could not fail to bring about the development of a modern theatre. As a result a troupe of Ukrainian actors, that of Kropivnitzky, was formed at Kiev and had a great success. The Imperial

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Government authorized the creation of a Ukrainian 536
language theatre, limiting, however, the subjects which 545
could be treated. In conforming to the official point of view, according to which Ukrainian was only a local Russian dialect, it forbade the showing of plays other than those which bore a popular and local character. But this restriction could not seriously hinder the development of Ukrainian dramatic art, as it was the chief aim of the whole Ukrainian literature to treat subjects taken from the popular life. The success of the Ukrainian Theatre of Kiev did not fail to find imitators. Amateur troupes were formed almost in all parts of Russia and especially in the country, which successfully exploited the artistic qualities of a people so richly gifted.

As for Galicia, the political movement always 668
continued to develop rapidly here.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century a new figure appeared on the Ukrainian political arena, that of Dragomanov (1851–95), whose role was to become enormous.

Born in Russian Ukraine, he soon joined the intellectual revolutionary circles. Following the example of other revolutionary organizations in Russia, that of *Stara Gromada* of Dragomanov sent him abroad to spread there, as a political *émigré*, the ideas of a revolutionary Ukrainianism. Dragomanov at first allied himself with the Galician circles and settled in Austria, but he could not remain here as a result of his 'too red' ideas. After this he took the road to Geneva, the rallying centre of political *émigrés* from the old Russia. There he founded a political review, *Gromada*, and undertook, from his exile in Geneva, the direction of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia. The impulse which he gave it was extremely vigorous. It led to the formation of a new party, tinted

668 with radicalism, the Popular Ukrainian Party, which broke with the old clerical traditions of Galician Ukrainianism.

Dragomanov was a republican and, consequently, above all anti-Tsarist. He had developed under the influence of positivist and socialistic ideas which were strongly tinted with syndicalism in him. He shared fundamentally the leading ideas of the revolutionary movement as it appeared in the west.

Republican and socialist, Dragomanov was the champion of the free existence of the people. These themes, in the spirit of the epoch, were indissolubly united. But Dragomanov was not anti-Russian. He only had a contempt for the chauvinists who, to glorify the Ukraine, wanted to belittle Russia at all costs. 'The Ukrainian Nation,' he writes, 'cannot obtain political liberty by taking the path of separatism, but only together with the other nations and territories of Russia, along the path of federation.' In this he continued the federalist tradition which had been that of the whole Ukrainian political movement. Dragomanov saw the 'Free Russia' as a federation of several national entities, themselves divided in their turn into autonomous territories.

. . . . .

In Galicia, however, the movement was to go far beyond the aims which had been intended by its spiritual fathers. A pronounced hostility to everything Russian appeared in Ukrainian political circles. And the Austrian Government, more and more convinced of the inevitability of a conflict with Russia, began to take an interest in the Ukrainian movement and to give it its support.

The penetration of Ukrainian separatism in Russia met at first with great difficulties. Ukrainianism as a cultural, regionalistic, and even federalist movement had not ceased to exist in Russia. On the eve of the

first Russian revolution, that of 1905, one realized at 668
St. Petersburg and began to understand that this movement was not in itself a danger to the unity of the empire. The Governor-General of Kiev, Kleigels, in a good position to judge it, explained it in precisely this sense in his reports to the Imperial Government. But at the same time the Tsarist police, generally very well informed of everything which concerned it, was convinced that the Ukrainian *separatism* was but a weapon of the Austrians; it considered, moreover, that its success in Russia was almost insignificant.

Among the other expressions of the cultural life of the 177
Ukraine, western influences have been particularly strong 341
in the artistic domain and especially in architecture and in decorative art.

The architecture of Kiev, at the period when it flourished most, had above all been a simple branch of byzantine art, transplanted without any modification to Russia. In the north, however, architectural art, although of byzantine inspiration, soon developed original forms of a purely national character.

Kiev, close to Byzantium, was too profoundly impressed by the splendours of Constantinople to be quite independent of them. The celebrated historian of Russian art, Grabar, notes that at the end of the twelfth century architects from Novgorod were invited to Kiev in order to replace the Greek masters by native Russians and to build churches and palaces in the national style. The people of Kiev were amazed by it.

Besides the more important assimilation in the north, the style of religious architecture (the only which was of importance in the old Russia) was quite similar throughout the whole extent of the old Slav-Norse State.

Later, when the centre of gravity of Southern Russia was moved towards the west to the lands of Galicia and

000 to make the Ukrainian idea one of the principal pivots of German claims.

175 If, under Austrian direction, one did not dare to speak
●668 of separatism to the prisoners, the German general
701 staff, the new master of the Ukrainian movement, thought of the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State, under German control, and gave its propagandists directions in this sense. From 1915 the Little Russians who agreed to declare themselves Ukrainians and not Russians were sent to the camp of Radstadt. In this camp specialists of the Ukrainian question, under the direction of Professor Bezpalko, undertook a series of lectures in which they drew pictures of the independence and liberty of the Cossacks for the benefit of their hearers, appealing to them to reject the 'heinous yoke of Asiatic Muscovy.' Towards the beginning of 1917, that is to say after two years of assiduous work, the German general staff succeeded in recruiting, in the camp, 15,000 prisoners. The regiment of 'Taras Chevtchenko' was created. This regiment consisted of eight companies and had about 1600 men. The soldiers of this regiment, looked upon as undoubted partisans of the independence of the Ukraine under German protection, were armed and equipped in readiness for being used in a possible offensive in South Russian regions. The remainder was divided into four groups:

1. About 1500 men formed the *Sitch* (the name of the ancient Cossack community) and enjoyed the complete confidence of the German authorities with regard to their loyalty to the new Ukrainian cause, without yet being entrusted with arms.

2. The 'apprentices,' about 3000, still considered as not absolutely reliable but already somewhat influenced by the propaganda.

3. The 'candidates,' about 3000, those who were

neutral or indifferent to the question but without marked hostility. 175 668 701

4. Finally the 'opponents,' about 6000, who, although they had agreed to take the name of 'Ukrainians,' were actively opposed to separatist propaganda. They were continually sent to penal work and had to undergo severe and frequent punishments.

Thus of the 15,000 men who, enticed by the promise of an improvement of their lot, had agreed to join the Ukrainian units, one could only rely with difficulty on 3000 (the Chevtchenko regiment and the *Sitch*) who had been really affected by the propaganda. At this period the number of Russian prisoners exceeded 3,000,000, of whom at least 700,000 were Ukrainians, which confirms the absolute failure of this movement.

It would be interesting to remember that from the Russian side the same policy was inaugurated with respect to the prisoners of war of Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Croatian, etc., origin. This move enabled one to establish whole divisions composed of Slavonic minorities. From the beginning of the war Austro-Hungarian military units formed of Slavs, and especially of Czechs, went over to the Russians with their officers, arms, and baggage. Not a single similar case occurred in the Russian Army, which included many entirely Ukrainian regiments. On the contrary, according to the evidence of high Russian and German officers, the Ukrainian regiments were among the best troops, often used as shock units, the most famous of which was the 'Iron Brigade' commanded by General Denikine, future commander of the White Army.

To sum up, the political movements of autonomy and of Ukrainian separatism gave no tangible results despite a subsidized propaganda having the support of such powerful organisms as the central empires.

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When the February Revolution broke out in St. Petersburg no political Ukrainian movement developed in the early stages. Quite naturally the intellectual circles obtained more liberty to spread their ideas, which were not anti-Russian.

The municipal elections undertaken at Kiev almost immediately after the February Revolution, and which had undoubtedly taken advantage of all the liberties which characterized the first days of all revolutions, gave a result which clearly shows the almost complete non-existence of a Ukrainian political movement. In fact, of ninety municipal councillors the so-called Ukrainian parties obtained only six places, and that was in the capital of the Ukraine itself.

All classes of society hoped that the Provisional Government which replaced the Monarchy would be able to maintain the front and would allow the country to convoke a National Assembly which would decide the future political regime on the whole territory of the former Russian Empire. As soon as the active members of the Ukrainian political organizations of Galicia entered the Russian Ukraine they organized a kind of Ukrainian committee at Kiev, which started its autonomist political work. On 24 March 1917 the Ukrainian Associations spread over the whole territory were called upon to send their representatives to Kiev to form the first nucleus of a future Ukrainian Parliament. Although only the representatives of such Associations which had declared themselves Ukrainian were invited to this assembly, and although the direction of the assembly was entrusted to Galician Ukrainians, under the Presidency of Professor Hrouchevsky, not only was the idea of separatism absent, but the autonomous aspirations were of the most mild kind. This first assembly of Ukrainian deputies took the name of 'Rada' (the name

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of the Cossack Assembly of the time of Bogdan Khmelnitsky), which means 'Diet' or 'Council' in Ukrainian. Once installed, it tried to establish relations with the central Provisional Government, whose power became more and more fictitious. The menace of a Bolshevik *coup d'état* hung over the Government of St. Petersburg, a fact which allowed the Rada to justify its own establishment in declaring itself alone capable of protecting the Ukraine from Bolshevik invasion. This political manœuvre had many chances of success. The Ukrainian peasant was fundamentally hostile to Bolshevism, to the social levelling, and to the collectivization of the land. Nevertheless, anxious for the peace which the Bolsheviks had promised, the Ukrainian peasant lent them his ear. The leaders of the Rada, loyal to the principles of the 'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine,' were also not opposed to the idea of an immediate peace and their promises to preserve the Ukraine from Bolshevism and to conclude peace with the central powers was their most important trump card. The Provisional Government, in a state of complete disintegration and without any remaining support, hastened to recognize the Rada as a political organization, although no election in the proper sense of the word had taken place at the time of its formation. A statute, known under the name of 'Universal,' was instituted on Ukrainian territory. After the agreement between the Provisional Government and the Rada, Ukrainian autonomy was recognized but was limited to questions of language and culture and to the organization of local administration.

All other important questions, including the agrarian question, were left to the future National Pan-Russian Assembly. The administrative activity of the Rada was, at the beginning, limited to the town of Kiev alone, where its assemblies took place. During the summer of

175 1917 the propaganda agents of the Rada covered the
●668 whole country where they organized meetings and
642 distributed pamphlets. They tried to persuade the proprietors of land that their aspirations would be more easily realized within the framework of an autonomous State and underlined the impotence of the Central Government in the face of a Bolshevik attack. The Ukrainian peasant, like that of the Volga and of Siberia and like the Cossacks of the Don, opposed the revolutionary theories, and it is in these countries that they met with the strongest opposition. The Rada could not have a better justification of its authority in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasant than the statement that the Bolshevik movement, of Great Russian origin, was imported into the Ukraine from the outside, which, moreover, was true. The title which the Ukrainian anarchist, Nestor Makhno, gave to his book on the Civil War, *The Russian Revolution in the Ukraine*, is singularly significant. The leaders of the Rada were careful not to proclaim their separatist ideas openly, knowing that such ideas would never find the support of the popular masses. Profiting, however, by the decay of the Provisional Government, they formed, with its consent, a sort of Ministry which took the name of 'General Secretariat,' and which declared itself the supreme power in the Ukraine on 29 July of the same year. The agrarian movement which spread over the whole territory of the Ukraine aimed especially at the great landowners, most of whom, especially in the west, were Poles. Thus the real popular movement took the form of the ancient quarrel between the peasants and the lords and developed quite independently of the Ukrainian movement represented by the Rada. When, in October 1917, the Provisional Government fell as the result of a Bolshevik insurrection, the only official

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authority existing in the Ukraine was represented by the General Secretariat of the Central Ukrainian Rada. 175 668 642

The peasants, hostile to Bolshevism, did not find any other political organization on which they could lean. Mistrusting the organizations of the Right (which were later to form the political nucleus of the White Armies) and equally fearing the local democratic municipalities where the intellectual and Jewish elements dominated, openly hostile to the working class which was almost entirely Bolshevized and consisted of non-Ukrainian elements, the farmers seemed to tend more and more towards the support of the Rada which seemed to be the only force capable of realizing their aspirations. Nevertheless the first clash between the elements which accepted the idea of an autonomous Ukraine and those which rallied to Bolshevism, was not to the advantage of the first. The agrarian question meant much to them. The Ukrainian Rada was unable to formulate a clear policy with regard to this most important question. Its resistance to the anarchical division of the lands, supported by the Bolsheviks, rapidly reduced the number of its supporters and the already small authority enjoyed by the General Secretariat in the eyes of the peasant mass. Nevertheless, on 20 November, the Rada proclaimed a democratic Ukrainian Republic. It is at this period that the allied military missions then resident at Kiev recognized *de facto* the Ukrainian Republic. At the same time the fourth 'Universal' was promulgated, one of the articles of which declared that the independence of the Ukraine was considered indispensable only because the rest of the Russian territory had fallen to the power of the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to remember this detail because it again proves that, even in politically favourable circumstances, the Rada did not dare openly to declare its separatism. This act did not increase the

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175 authority of the Ukrainian Government. No local
642 municipal or other organization took the slightest note
668 of its existence. Every department, every district, and every town governed itself and tried to resist the advance of the Bolsheviks. Not having any military forces or police organizations at their disposal, these local governments were unable to resist the attacks of the Red Guards and the armed soldiers, returned from the front and supported by Moscow. Soon the whole Ukraine elected local Soviet governments and the Rada, which hastened to proclaim, on 22 January 1918, the independence of the Ukraine, was obliged to flee on the 29th of the same month, seeking refuge at Jitomir. One of its most active members, Simon Petlioura, tried to organize anti-Bolshevik troops composed of peasants and prisoners of Galician origin. He succeeded in forming several units which, although unsatisfactory from a military point of view, cut a better figure than the bands of soldiers which were leaving the front. These military units, known under the name of '*haidamaks*,' formed small nuclei of resistance in the towns and villages and halted the Soviet offensive here and there. The more the Bolsheviks advanced towards the west, the more this resistance became effective, especially in Southern Podolia, where the Ukrainian organizations, supported by Galician prisoners, by Polish legionaries, and even by certain circles of purely Russian sympathies but hostile to Bolshevism, still retained some vestiges of power.

The insufficiency of technical, administrative, and
727 intellectual personnel did not allow the Ukrainians to give their civil and military organizations the force necessary for defeating the revolutionary movement directed by the Communist Party. On 9 February the Ukrainian Government, acting as a sovereign government, and despite the firm opposition of a large part of

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deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles 642
of 1917. The application of these laws was followed 727
by violent repressions on the part of the Austro-German Army. Punitive expeditions against the peasants became very frequent and summary executions became general throughout the country. The hate of the peasant population was directed against the Austro-Germans and soon reached its peak. The soldiers of the armies of occupation no longer dared to go out after sunset, except in groups. Knives, directed by mysterious hands, frequently found the backs of Austro-German infantry men. The Civil War was in full blast. The Government, incapable of acting without looking for the support of the military forces of the invader, did not escape either hate or contempt and could only maintain itself until the complete reversal of the situation, which was not slow to come. The defeat of the German forces and the armistice forced the troops of occupation to leave Ukrainian territory. It is unnecessary to say that, hated by the popular masses, deprived of all support, and with a doubtful ideology of Ukrainian independence, the Hetman could not continue to govern. Also, as 668
soon as the Austro-German forces began to retire, revolutionary propaganda began to flood the Ukrainian country-side. The former Ukrainian politicians, dismissed from their posts after the establishment of the Hetmanate, put themselves at the head of this movement and received, at first, the unconditional support of the peasants and even of certain military units of the Austro-Germany Army in which the Galician element predominated. Thus, led by Simon Petlioura, the peasants 669
marched on Kiev in order to depose the Hetman. Received everywhere with enthusiasm, they had no difficulty in precipitating the retreat of the Austro-German troops, and rapidly occupied the greater part

to leave Ukraine and to serve the Muscovite State. The Ukrainian, 175
Prince Alexander Bezborodko, directed for many years Russian 517
foreign policy in the time of Catherine II. (1762—1796) and of
Paul I., who is known, however, to have disliked Russia and
to have dreamt of a free Ukraine. The greatest talents of modern
Russian literature, Gogol and Dostoyevsky, were of Ukrainian
origin; Gogol did not master Russian exactly until the end of his
life, it was strange to him. Far-famed scholars — Maxim Kova-
levsky, sociologist; the philosophers Lesevich and Yurkevich,
Vladimir Vernadsky, geologist, the famous painter Ilya Repin, —
were Ukrainians of whom Russian culture is proud.

The Ukrainians in the provinces of Austria, Galicia and Buko- 175
vina had lost their educated classes under the rule of the Poles and 186
Turks. Here, as well as in the Ukrainian territory to the West of [668]
the Carpathian Mountains, Carpatho-Ukraine, which was under
Hungarian rule, the Ukrainians were principally peasants; the
cities were mostly not-Ukrainian. During the 'Spring of the
Peoples' in 1848 the Ukrainian national movement in Austria and
Hungary also appeared. In Galicia the Ruthenian Supreme Council
— a political representative of the Ukrainians in Austria — was
created. At the elections for the Austrian Parliament the Ukrai-
nians secured a considerable number of mandates. The national
rebirth began also in the Ukrainian territory on the western side
of the Carpathian Mountains. But the reaction which occured in
Austria hindered the Ukrainian national development. The Vienna
Government put the Ukrainians in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine
under Polish and Hungarian rule respectively in order to make the
Poles and Hungarians loyal towards Austria. This enabled the
Poles and Hungarians to conduct a policy of denationalisation
against the Ukrainians. Only at the end of the 19th century, in spite
of great hindrances on the part of the Poles, a Ukrainian political
and cultural life developed in Galicia. In connection with this, [517]
Ukrainian science and literature, prohibited in Kiev, Kharkov, and [814]
Odessa, found a home in Galicia (Lviw), and Bukovina (Cher-
nivtsi). Ukrainians from Tsarist Ukraine published here their
periodicals and books; here, under the direction of the famous
Kievan historian Michael Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian Shevchenko
Scientific Society developed. It was by its energy a real Ukrainian
Academy of Science.

Gradually the Ukrainians in Austria were overcoming the
obstacles created by the ruling class of the Polish nobility, and
secured new mandates in the Austrian Parliament and the Galician
Diet.

186 The development of Ukrainian political and cultural life in
665 Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians condemned to ruthless Russification under Tsarist rule. When the first modern Ukrainian political organisation in Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, was founded in 1900 (from 1905 this party was named Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party) its first publication *Independent Ukraine* was printed in Austria, in Bukovina.

86 The Ukrainian patriots under Tsarist Russian Government,
668 morally and materially supported the fight of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights; these territories were a Ukrainian Piedmont. For not even the revolution of 1905 gave the Ukrainians in Russia their national rights. Of course, the Ukrainians had their deputies in the Russian 'Duma' who demanded autonomy for Ukraine. But the Ukrainian language was not admitted in the schools, the rights of the Ukrainian press were restricted, and active Ukrainians were persecuted by the Russian authorities. Among the Ukrainians in Russia the fight of the Austrian Ukrainians for the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviw roused great interest. The Russian Government regarded the creation of a Ukrainian University in Galicia as a great danger for the 'indivisible Russia' and sought an agreement with the Polish nationalists in Galicia against the Ukrainian movement. The Russian nationalists regarded the opening of a Ukrainian University in Lviw as a 'casus belli' for Russia against Austria.

668 The Russian Government closely watched the Ukrainian move-
661 ment in Austria and was much alarmed by its successes. In consequence, the Petersburg Government prepared to annex Galicia and Bukovina long before the war of 1914, in order to wipe out 'Mazeppism'. When, in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, a Ukrainian delegation visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to protest against the new prohibition of the Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire, the Minister replied cynically:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once for all . . .".

727 The suppression of the Ukrainian movement was one of the main
661 aims of Tsarist Russian policy in World War I. The occupation of Galicia and Bukovina by the Russian armies in 1914-1917 brought heavy damage to the Ukrainian movement; the Ukrainian schools, press, co-operative societies, scientific and educational institutions
727 were destroyed. Thousands of Ukrainians, Austrian citizens, were
659 deported to Siberia. In the occupied territories a ruthless Russifica-
661 tion was started, and in Galicia the forced conversion of the Greek-

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CHAPTER II

UKRAINE DURING THE REVOLUTION 1917—1920

1. *The Ukrainian Central Council*

000 In March 1917, the revolution overthrew the Tsarist Government in Russia. This enabled the oppressed peoples of the former Tsarist Empire to declare their rights for political self-determination. These were: the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, White Ruthenians (Byelorussians), the Caucasian peoples (Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaidjanians), the peoples of Turkestan and above all the most numerous nation after the Russians, — the Ukrainians.

668 631 [646] In March 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council in Kiev was formed from the representatives of the Ukrainian political organisations as representative of the Ukrainian nation. Ukrainian congresses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, also elected their deputies to the Central Council, and thus this organ became a provisional Parliament of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council tried first to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine through an agreement with the Russian Provisional Government of Prince Lvov-Kerensky.

But the Ukrainian efforts to attain autonomy met with the resolute opposition of the Russian Provisional Government and of the Russian political parties. The centralist tradition of Tsarist Russia continued to live in Russian political parties with the same vigour even after the fall of the régime. The delegates of the Central Council applied to the Russian Provisional Government in Petersburg to recognise by a public act the right of the Ukrainian nation to autonomy within the Russian state. The Russian Government refused this demand, declaring that the problem of autonomy for Ukraine should be decided by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. This reply could not satisfy the Ukrainians. For it was evident that the Russian Constituent Assembly, with the centralist efforts of the Russian parties having a majority would refuse the autonomous rights of non-Russian peoples.

Thus the Ukrainian Central Council began to realise the necessity for Ukraine to establish an autonomous order itself, without taking into notice the threats of the Russian political parties and

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the Russian Government. Under these conditions the Ukrainian Central Council issued its '*Universal*' (Declaration) to the Ukrainian nation on June 10, 1917 (old style), which contained among other statements the following words: 668 631

"Ukraine shall be free ... The Ukrainian nation shall have the right to organise its life itself. A Ukrainian Assembly of the Ukrainian nation (Diet), elected in general, equal, direct and secret ballot, shall secure order in Ukraine. All laws securing this order here, in Ukraine, can be issued only by our Ukrainan Assembly".

The policy of the Ukrainian Central Council, of which the great majority was composed of the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties, met with strenous attacks on the part of the Russians. Only the leader of the Russian Communists, Lenin, for tactical reasons seeking support among the Ukrainians in the struggle of his party against the Provisional Government, made the following hypocritical statement:

"No democrat can deny the right of Ukraine for a free separation from Russia (*Pravda* 15. 6. 1917). In reality, Lenin and his party were enemies of the national self-determination of Ukraine and other nations oppressed by Russia. The Russian Communist Government showed it immediately after having seized power in Russia on November 7, 1917.

The development of the Ukrainian political movement forced the Russian Provisional Government to begin negotiations with the Ukrainian Central Council. In summer 1917, an agreement was reached, and the representatives of the parties of all national minorities sent their delegates to the Ukrainian Central Council. But the policy of Kerensky's Russian Government continued to hinder the creation of an autonomous order in Ukraine. The Petersburg Government recognised the rights of autonomy only for the northern part of Ukraine and kept the whole of southern Ukraine under its administration. But even for the realisation of this restricted autonomy the Russian Government put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Central Council. At the end of September 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council passed a resolution to call a separate Constituent Assembly for Ukraine. The Russian Provisional Government, for this reason, began a legal prosecution against the Central Council. But at this time a revolt happened in Russia, the Bolshevik Party seized power (November 7, 1917). This created a new situation in the relations between Ukraine and Russia.

2. *Soviet Russia and Democratic Ukraine*

668 Bolshevism was the consequence of the previous development of the Russian people, who never had had in their history any free political order. Soviet dictatorship did not meet with any serious resistance in Russia proper. The Russians showed in their attitude towards the Communist rule their traditional 'sense of obedience', as it was expressed by a Russian publicist (Guber, *On the Change of the Sign-Posts:* Prague, 1922)*). Another situation arose in Ukraine and other non-Russian regions of the former Tsarist Empire. The Russian Communist organisation in Ukraine was weak and had no support among the Ukrainian population. Among the Russian and Jewish workers in Ukraine the influence of Democratic Socialism, '*Menshevism*', also predominated. Thus, under the leadership of the Ukrainian Central Council all parties, Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish and Polish, acted together against the plans of the Russian Bolsheviks to establish dictatorship in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council blamed Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia, and began to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine, in-
668 631 dependent of the Soviet Russian Government. In its '*III. Universal*' from November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed Ukraine a democratic republic. In this document we read:

"In the Ukrainian Democratic Republic all liberties will be guaranteed: freedom of speech, printing, religion, meetings, associations, strikes, inviolability of person and domicile, the right to
[563] use local languages in intercourse with all offices. The Ukrainian nation had fought for long years for its national liberty, and now having attained it, will firmly protect the freedom of national development of all nationalities remaining in Ukraine; therefore we announce to the Russian, Jewish, Polish and other peoples in Ukraine a national and personal autonomy to secure their right and liberty of self-government in matters of their national life . . ."

In the III. Universal the Ukrainian Central Council fixed the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly for December 27, 1917.

The Ukrainian Government did not want to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers which the Russian Communist Government under Lenin's direction was aiming at. Therefore the Ukrainian Central Council in its '*Universal*' of November 20, 1917,

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*) The well known Russian writer Maxim Gorki wrote on the passivity of the Russians towards their oppressors that the "Russians could suffer more than work consciously and honestly" (*Communist International*, No. 3, Moscow 1919).

declared: "Until the peace every citizen of the Ukrainian Republic, together with the citizens of all peoples of the Russian Republic, shall stand firmly on their positions at the front and in the hinterland". u 668 631

The Soviet Russian Government was from the beginning hostile to the national claims of Ukraine and other peoples. Relying on its own military force and the support of Communist groups among the various peoples of the former Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Russian Government was planning the conquest of Ukraine and other territories that did not recognise Soviet dictatorship.

3. Elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Russia and in Ukraine

At the end of November, 1917, in Ukraine and Russia, elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly took place. These elections in Ukraine were free, with full freedom of press and propaganda for all parties, among them the Communist. These elections showed the great difference between the political situation in Russia and in Ukraine. In Russia the adherents of Soviet dictatorship (the Communists and the party of the Left Socialists-Revolutionaries), especially in the big cities like Moscow and Petersburg, had considerable gains. This gave the Communists and Left Socialists-Revolutionaries the basis for holding power in Russia; for they had the masses of friendly workers and peasants behind them. In Ukraine at these elections the Ukrainian Socialist parties, opponents of Soviet dictatorship, won (the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party and the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries got together approximately 3/4 of all cast votes). The Russian Communist Party, in spite of the immense resources from Russia for propaganda, gained in Ukraine less than 10% of the votes. In the big cities, among the workers, the Russian Communists were in a minority too; this explains the uncertainty of the Communists in Ukraine at that time in the struggle for the dictatorship of their party. u [666] 665 SU 665

The historian of the Communist movement in Ukraine, M. Popov, remarks that even in the big industrial centres in Ukraine "the local Communists had a lack of determination to take power into the hands of the Soviets", *History of the Communist Party 'Bolsheviks' of Ukraine:* Kharkov, 1929.

4. The Problem of Peace with the Central Powers

At the end of 1917 the Russian front against the Central Powers was decaying in a catastrophic way. This decay was hastened by the ruthless Communist propaganda for an immediate peace. In u. 648

669 December 12, 1918, a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as [661] against 'Russian followers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parliament and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian 668 National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians 186 in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the 642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

people took place. The Ukrainian Government and Army were 669
forced under the pressure of Denikin to leave the temporary capital of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, the city of Kamenets in Podolia, on November 15, 1919. The Ukrainian Army marched into the hinterland of the enemy. The enormous partisan movement in Ukraine in autumn 1919, stopped Denikin's offensive on Moscow. Of this the Russian Red Army took advantage, broke through the front of Denikin and marched into Ukraine again. The front of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, brought into disorder by the war with Denikin, could not be restored at once, and the Soviet Russian troops seized almost the entire territory of Ukraine again.

When the leaders of the Russian Volunteers saw the coming of their definite defeat, they offered the command of the Ukrainian Army which was carrying on a partisan war against the oppressors of Ukraine, an alliance against the Russian Communists. The delegate of the Russian Volunteer Army, Colonel Popov, wrote in January, 1920, to the Ukrainian Supreme Command: "We have what you want — arms, but you have that we have not — the confidence of the population". The Ukrainians declined this offer of the Russian 'Whites' convinced that any alliance with them would bring only damage to the Ukrainian struggle for liberation.

The Army of the Ukrainian Republic began its 'Winter-Campaign', famous in the history of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, in Lubar in Volhynia on December 6, 1919. This army, by order of its Government, made partisan war on the territories of Ukraine against 'White' and 'Red' Russia until May 5, 1920. Only leaning upon the confidence and the active support of the population could this army cover distances of thousands of miles carrying the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of equipment did not allow the Army of the 'Winter Campaign' to accept in its ranks many thousands of Ukrainians who wished to fight actively for the independent Ukraine.

16. The New Tactics of the Russian Communists in Ukraine

The failure of the Soviet Russian policy in Ukraine in 1919 656
caused much discussion among the Communists themselves. By 186
order from Moscow, in October 1919, not only the 'Government of 668
Soviet Ukraine', headed by Rakovsky, was abolished, but also the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Among the Communists who had worked in Ukraine in 1919 a group of the so-called federalists appeared that demanded from Moscow more rights for Ukraine. The leader of this group,

656 G. Lapchinsky, explained that Ukraine must be an independent state
186 and not a Russian colony.

The powerful Ukrainian movement forced the Russian Com-
●668 munists to alter for a certain time their tactics in Ukraine. The Soviet Russian Government ordered the Communists to pay attention to the national peculiarities of Ukraine. In December 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution on the recognition by Russia of the independent Soviet Ukraine. Among other matters this resolution states that the "members of the Communist Party in Ukrainian territory are obliged to realise the right of the working masses of learning their mother language in schools, and speaking it in all Soviet institutions".

The resolution recommends the restriction of the requisition of food from the Ukrainian peasants. Besides, this resolution of the Russian CP pointed out that the principal task of Soviet construction in Ukraine was the requisition of arms from the population.

The President of the Soviet Russian Government, Lenin, wrote in *The Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victory over Denikin* on January 4, 1920:

"The independence of Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party. Only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can decide the question on their Soviet Congress — whether Ukraine should be united with Russia or left an independent Republic . . . We want a voluntary union of nations, a union that would not permit violence of one nation against another".

All these declarations of the Russian Communist Party leaders had the aim to lull the vigilance of the masses of the Ukrainian people. In reality the Soviet Russian Government did not even intend to change its imperialist course against Ukraine. Moscow feared the armed Ukrainian people and distrusted them. Therefore, for instance, a conference of the members of the Russian Communist Party in Homel passed the following resolution in October 1919:

"The advance to the South and the organisation of Soviet administration in Ukraine are possible only with the aid of regular disciplined troops, who, in any case, must not be of local origin" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 6: Kharkov, 1926, p. 4).

669 The Soviet Russian troops, after having seized the Ukrainian
661 territory until the spring of 1920, began at once the struggle against

CHAPTER III

UKRAINE UNDER SOVIET RUSSIAN RULE SINCE 1920

1. The Soviet Régime in Ukraine 1920—21

[656] After the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and Lenin's letter to the Ukrainian workers and peasants announcing a new approach to the Ukrainian problem (December 1919; January-1920) the policy of Moscow towards Ukraine did not change in substance. Soviet Russia did not trust even the Communists of Ukrainian nationality or those Russian Communists who wished to meet the Ukrainian national demands even partly. The group of Communists-Federalists headed by G. Lapchinsky published in February 1920, a pamphlet entitled *Project of a Resolution on the Party Policy.* The authors of this pamphlet protested against the rule of the Russian element in Ukraine. They wrote on the "mad, and, for the cause of the revolution, disastrous plan of the occupation of Ukraine by the military and political forces of Soviet Russia. After the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation in the times of the Romanovs and Hapsburgs, every attempt to direct the fate of the country from outside will arouse the growth of nationalism".

[665] In the pamphlet, facts on the full dependence of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Central Committee of the Russian CP are quoted: thus the Communist organisation in Ukraine — "had to fulfil all demands of the Central Committee of the Russian CP, even, if it regarded them injurious to the cause of the revolution in Ukraine".

656 Moscow deported the opposing Communists from Ukraine or expelled them from the Party. The Soviet Russian régime in 666 Ukraine thereto was strengthened. For this purpose Moscow gave preponderance to the Russian element in the Soviet administration in Ukraine. For instance, the election system for the 4th Congress of the Soviets in Ukraine in 1920 was the following: from 1000 soldiers of the Red Army one deputy was elected, from 10,000 workers one deputy, and one deputy from 50,000 peasants. It should be remembered that 1920 in the ranks of the Red Army in Ukraine

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
656 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
● 668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Congress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

is looked at by the majority of the Communist Party in Ukraine, 186
and here in Russia even more, as some sort of strategy, a diplomatic 668
game".

Rakovsky explained that, through the proclamation of the Soviet Union, Moscow had gained ten and twenty times more power in comparison with the previous state. Therefore Rakovsky demanded that the Government of the whole Union in Moscow should surrender 9/10 of its competence, and that this be transferred to the separate Soviet Republics. Together with the Commissar of the Interior of Soviet Ukraine of that time, Skypnyk, Rakovsky demanded that the relations between Ukraine and Russia should be these of a confederation.

Skrypnyk protested at the Congress of the Russian CP against the disregard of the national and cultural rights of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army that led to a forced Russification of Ukrainians. He regretted that Ukrainian schools were not allowed for the 7 millions of Ukrainians in the Russian Soviet Republic, [162] outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Skrypnyk sharply criticised the nationalism of the Russian Communists in Ukraine who did not admit the Ukrainian language in public and Party institutions.

The Russian Communist N. Bukharin stated in a speech at the 12th Congress of the Party that the Communist organisation in Ukraine had a Russian-Jewish composition with a very small number of Ukrainians. And in the meantime, Bukharin said, — "in Ukraine there is a very strong national movement" (*Records of the 12th Congress of the Russian CP*).

However, the demands of those Communists who wished to re- 631
strict Russian centralism and enlarge the rights of the separate Soviet Republics did not attain a majority at the Congress of the Russian CP. In July 1923, the strictly centralist Constitution of the USSR was ratified. Besides the theoretical declaration of the equality of rights of nations and the 'right of separation' of the peoples from Russia this constitution actually concentrates all power in the hands of Moscow, so that the acts and orders of the 'All-Union Government' are valid even then if the separate Soviet Republics would protest against them.

The policy of Soviet Ukrainisation was limited mostly to those 186
institutions which had to deal with the peasants. But in the towns 665
and industrial centres the Russian Communists tried to prevent the admission of the Ukrainian language by every means. For this reason quarrels between Ukrainian and Russian Communists arose in the ranks of the Communist Party in Ukraine. Thus the Communist Alexander Shumsky, the Commissar of Education in

[In the year 1922 -- Analyst]

563 unity to move into the towns or to emigrate the Ukrainian peasants were pauperised.

These conditions were favourable to the growing of extremist trends in Ukrainian political life: communism on the one hand and nationalism on the other.

•668 The policy of 'Ukrainisation' in Eastern Ukraine was exploited
661 by Communist propaganda: the 'Ukrainisation' in Soviet Ukraine, adversited by Moscow, did not remain without influence on the
563 population of the Western Ukrainian territories. The Communists of Western Ukraine served Soviet Russia as a 'fifth column' among the Ukrainians in Poland.

The Polonisation of Ukrainian schools, the colonisation of Ukrainian territory with Poles, the refusal to admit Ukrainians to Government service, the persecutions of the Ukrainian press, of educational and economic organisations — all this gave the basis for the creation of illegal Ukrainian groups which began the fight
[725] against the Polish régime with terror. In 1920 the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) was created in Galicia and organised attacks on the representatives of the Polish Government. Later UVO fused with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded at a Congress in Vienna in 1929 under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets. The Polish Government took advantage of the terrorist acts and sabotage attributed to the members of OUN to destroy the Ukrainian cultural and economic life. In September 1930, Polish troops and police undertook a terrible 'pacification' among the Ukrainian population in towns and villages. Polish soldiers and policemen severely beat more than 15,000 Ukrainians, mostly cultural and economic workers, who had not anything in common with the terrorist activity and often were resolute opponents of terror. Many victims of this 'pacification' died after terrible sufferings. A great number of Ukrainian economic and educational institutions — co-operative societies, schools, reading halls and libraries were destroyed.

After the 'pacification', the oppressions against the Ukrainians in Poland grew worse and the Polish colonisation of Ukrainian territories was increased by state funds. In September 1934, the delegates of the Polish Government declared at the Session of the League of Nations that Poland did not have any obligations towards the resolutions of the peace treaties regarding the protection of the rights of the national minorities in Poland.

By this action the Polish Government violated even formally the obligations accepted by Poland in the Peace Treaties in regard to the national minorities.

661 were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.[1]

6. *The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East*

167 The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

668 Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrai-
186 nians, mostly farmers, were numbered. At that time a Ukrainian national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops, theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revolution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national, political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrainian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy. The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the develop-
[656] ment of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the
[191] development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrainians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow*, 1931, p. 33).

7. *The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars*

167 In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

[1] [During collectivization and famine in the Kuban region and the RSFSR, 1932-33 -- Analyst]

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. 167
had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest: to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czecho- 563
slovakia met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the 873
recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrainian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Economic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrainian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrainian emigration developed.

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin [815]
University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed a considerable activity.

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian 563
Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, 186
remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name of their enslaved brethren.

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western terri- 563
tories of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They 575
are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily *Svoboda*. The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton, Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will*. There are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools, from American and Canadian Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, far- [162]
mers. The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about 1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest political organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Com- 563
munist Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the 575
means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian 668

[668] like *Ukrainian Daily News* in New York. However, the Communist agency in America and Canada did not attain the success it had hoped. Among the Ukrainian emigration, the democratic organisations have decisive influence.

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In South America too, in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and other countries, there are Ukrainian emigrants. These are mostly workers and farmers. They have their cultural and political organisations and publish periodicals in Ukrainian.

The central organisations of the Ukrainians in USA, Ukrainian Congress Committee (UCC), in Canada, Canadian Ukrainian Committee (CUC) and of the countries of South America, created in 1948 the Pan-American Ukrainian Conference for the co-ordination of their activities in the interest of the oppressed Ukrainian people.

727 661 The Germans did not touch the Soviet collective farms, because they regarded them as the best method for exploiting the peasants. On the other hand, the German authorities did not wish to permit the partition of the land, for they prepared Ukraine for German colonisation.

[181] Frauenfeld points out the high physical and moral qualities of the Ukrainians, their highly developed consciousness of personal dignity and their aspiration for education. He witnesses that the closing of schools by the German authorities in Ukraine roused the greatest dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian people:

"The Ukrainians, especially the women, are very desirous of learning, and one could hear from them: 'Under the Bolsheviks we were starving, but we could learn something at least. Under your rule we cannot even learn. This proves that you are our enemies' . .".

The author of the memorandum comes to the conclusion that the Ukrainians should not be exstirpated in the interests of Hitler's 'racial policy'; on the contrary "the often genuine blond and blue-eyed as well as brunette population" should be assimilated for such an assimilation "would be without doubt more desirable and advantageous than many we had absorbed during our history, or are even trying to suck up . . ."*).

725 •668 Against pillage, terror, oppression and humiliation the Ukrainian people reacted with great vehemence, in spite of the extraordinary weakening by the previous Soviet terrorism, the famine and the war. In all parts of Ukraine risings broke out. This Ukrainian partisan movement helped to a great extent to defeat the German armies in Ukraine. But this was not a proof of affection of the Ukrainians for Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian partisan movement took place under the banner of an independent Ukraine. The initiative for the creation of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) came from officers of the army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1941.

The Ukrainian Partisan Army turned its weapons after the defeat of Germany against the new oppressor — Soviet Russia.

2. Ukraine after the War

727 In the course of World War II the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians from the Caucasus to the Carpathian Mountains came 000 under the rule of Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian nation, from the

*) Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld, *Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete: 10. 2. 1944* (Document No. 5394, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes).

8: Faden Ko H-4,5 (no date) 1951 RO1 Ukraine RO1

3. *The New Ukrainian Political Emigration*

In consequence of the occupation of all Ukrainian territories by the armies of Soviet Russia, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had to remain outside the borders of their fatherland. In the first years after the termination of the war, the Ukrainian emigrants lived in Displaced Persons' Camps in Germany and Austria. Now the Ukrainians can be seen in all European and American countries, in Australia and New Zealand. These are all people who, for national and political reasons, opposed repatriation into a Ukraine oppressed by the Communist Government. They declared repeatedly, when they were threatened with forced repatriation, that they would sooner commit suicide than fall into the hands of their oppressors. 167 186 668

The Ukrainian emigrants in Europe and America are developing a considerable political and cultural activity. The central institutions of the Ukrainian political parties are remaining in exile where their press is being published, the elementary, secondary and academic schools are being operated — the Ukrainian University in Munich, the Ukrainian Technical University in Germany, until 1945 in Bohemia, and others.

After World War II the Ukrainian émigrés have created more scientific institutions: The Scientific Shevchenko Society, a continuation of the identical Society which had existed in Lviw since 1874, and had been destroyed by the Communist régime, and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science. These Ukrainian Scientific Societies are working effectively and have their branches in Europe and in America. [815]

Under these circumstances, when in Ukraine enslaved by Soviet Russia, the Ukrainian political life is suppressed and cannot show itself freely, the Ukrainian emigrants think it their duty to speak in the name of their nation in the defence of its rights before civilised mankind. For this purpose the leaders of the Ukrainian parties created the Ukrainian National Council in July 1948, as the political representation of the Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainian National Council continues the tradition of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic which had been created through the will of the Ukrainian nation in 1918—1919. Many of the participants of the Ukrainian fight for liberation and many of the leaders of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic are still living. These men believe firmly that the time for the free state existence of the Ukrainian nation will come.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

phils) of being the result of German intrigue.[1] This again gave rise to a pamphlet, by L. Tschelski, issued in Sofia (1915) by the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, entitled *Is the Ukrainian Movement a German Intrigue?* The Russian Government took severe measures against the members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, who, including the chief leader, Hrushevski, were banished to Siberia, or were forbidden to enter Russia from abroad.

(D) Fourth Period: Since the Russian Revolution of 1917

(*a*) *The Ukraine becomes independent.*—One of the first questions which faced the Provisional Government at the beginning of the Russian Revolution was the demand for an amnesty for the Ukrainian Nationalist offenders, who were allowed to return from Siberia and abroad. Next came the demand for Ukrainian autonomy and the appointment of a special Minister for Ukrainian Affairs, presented by a deputation sent from Kiev to Petrograd on April 6, 1917. Soon afterwards the first Ukrainian National Congress was convened at Kiev (April 19–22), at which some 800 members representative of the *intelligentsia* and the Social Revolutionaries were present. They elected a Central Rada, and declared for an autonomous Ukrainian republic under a Russian federal republic. Professor Hrushevski was elected President. The territory claimed for the Ukrainian state corresponded roughly to the western parts of the Governments of Lublin and Grodno, and the whole of the Governments of Kiev, Poltava, Kherson, Volhynia, Kharkov, Podolia, Yekaterinoslav, and Chernigov, and excluded the Austrian Ukraine. The Congresses of the Ukrainian Soldiers (May 5–7) and of the Ukrainian Peasants (May–June) supported the Rada at this time. But the Petrograd

[1] In answer to a pamphlet by Tschelski, *No Liberator, but an Oppressor of Nations: How Russia freed the Ukraine.* L.L.U., Sofia, 1914.

668 Government refused to recognize the decisions of the
642 Rada, and thereby strengthened a group of separatists hitherto supported only by the second Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress (June 7). The Rada now issued (June 24) a *Universale*, proclaiming that henceforth the Ukrainian Rada would control Ukrainian affairs and work in federation with the All-Russian Parliament when this should be established; and on June 30 an executive body of the Rada, called the General Secretariat, was appointed.

This step caused anxiety to the Petrograd Government; and on July 12–14 two members of the Duma, Tereschenko and Tseretelli, and subsequently Kerenski, went to Kiev. While granting most of the Ukrainian demands, Kerenski opposed the demand for the formation of a Ukrainian army on the ground that it would mean the break-up of the Russian army. The favourable attitude adopted by Kerenski towards Ukrainian demands caused a split in the Provisional Government of Petrograd; and the Cadets left the Cabinet on July 16.

The reorganized Provisional Government decided to
[669] grant autonomy to the Ukraine, but on July 19 a social revolution broke out in Kiev, and the help of the Provisional Government was sought by the Rada for the restoration of order. But before the formal recognition of Ukrainian autonomy by the Provisional Government, which took place on August 17, other riots broke out in Kiev, this time among the Russian or russified town population, who protested against the 'ukrainization' of South Russia. The recognition of the Provisional Government meant that, until the summoning of the Constituent Assembly, the General Secretariat of the Ukraine was the recognized authority controlling finance, commerce, industry, agriculture, labour, and other domestic affairs. All measures had to be submitted to the Provisional Government. The Ukraine was to consist of the Governments of Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Poltava, and Chernigov; the other Governments mentioned above could be included if

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

their *zemstvos* so desired. But this measure of autonomy was not accepted. The Rada on August 24 declined to send representatives to the National Council at Moscow, expressed the wish for a separate Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, and asked the Provisional Government to define more clearly its own position.

Meanwhile Russian public opinion, even in revolutionary circles, strongly resented the Ukrainian movement. The resentment was expressed in the communication of the Russian War Office to the *Russkoye Slovo* of September 2, 1917, in which it was alleged that the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine was conducting espionage in Russia on behalf of Germany, and a separatist Ukrainian propaganda among the Russian prisoners of war, that it was in the pay of the German Foreign Office, and that it was giving help to the German armies. To this communication a reply was given by MM. Melenevski and A. Skoropis-Yolturovski, members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, on October 25, 1917, in Stockholm, in which it was stated that the Austrian and German Governments had no part in the foundation of the League, which had been created in Eastern Galicia with the help of the Ukrainian immigrants; that the League based its hopes on the victory of the Central Powers over Russia; that they expressed the wish that the Central Powers should occupy the Ukraine; that they hoped the Ukraine would be fully independent and essentially democratic; that they carried on a cultural war among the Ukrainian prisoners of war in Germany without the help of the Germans; that the German spy of Ukrainian nationality, Yermolenko, had no connexion with the League; and lastly, that the League accepted money from all friends of the Ukraine, including the German Government, and intended to raise a loan from the German Government.

Then came the fall of the Provisional Government. In the Kerenski-Kornilov affair of 1917 the General Secretariat as well as the Soldiers' and Workmen's Councils of the Ukraine sent their loyal assurances to

?: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 the Provisional Government. The idea of forming
642 part of a Russian federal republic was still powerful in the Rada; and on September 26, 1917, a conference of forty different nationalities had met at Kiev to discuss the question of local autonomies under a federal system. Preparations for a Constituent Assembly, which was to include 22 members from the Ukraine and 17 from the Don Cossacks, were set on foot; while propaganda was carried on by the ultra-nationalists and the internationalists, i.e. the Soviets, with a view to boycotting the Russian Constituent Assembly.

642 In November 1917, after Kerenski's Government had been replaced by the Bolshevik Soviets, the Ukraine on the whole was much more in favour of the latter than were the Don Cossacks, who formed on November 9 a confederation of a more conservative character. To save its position among the masses, the Rada underwent a rapid process of evolution, and on November 20 published a *Universale* of a radical character. It proclaimed the 'Ukrainian People's Republic', abolished all private ownership of land, introduced State control of production and an eight-hour day in all factories, removed the death penalty from the statute book, and finally expressed a hope that the Ukrainian National Republic would be federated with the Russian Republic. By doing this the Rada hoped to check Soviet interference; it failed to do so; and from December 19 serious differences between the Rada and the Soviet Government in
642 Petrograd became apparent. The Soviet Government
728 at Petrograd accused the Rada of giving support to the Cadets and of siding with the Don Cossacks in their hostility to the Bolsheviks; while the Rada declared itself a body elected by Revolutionary Democrats in the Ukraine, and refused to co-operate with the Bolsheviks or to send delegates with them to Brest-Litovsk. It finally declared, on December 24, that, as the Russian army was disorganized, it would take military measures for the defence of its borders. Some of the Ukrainian forces mobilized at that time joined

as its center. It dealt heavy blows to the Polish-Lithuanian state in the middle of the seventeenth century. The arrows leading from Bazadenk to Lwów point out the direction taken by the army of Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki to Poland./ /Key inside map: National boundaries. Provincial boundaries. Western boundaries of the Ukrainian voivodeships in Poland. Campaign of Bogdan Chmielnicki against Poland in the year 1648. Cossack regimental command. * Seat of the military order "sech".

/57/ In the "Death Quadrangle"

"In a piercing, frosty north wind" on November 16, 1919 there marched passed each other in the quadrangle of death, silently, without a military salute, the fragmentary, wretched, barefoot detachments of the West Ukrainian supporting troops and the likewise fragmentary, wretched, barefoot East Ukrainian front-rank troops. The former were going east into the East Podolian area of concentration where the remnants of the West Ukrainian army were to capitulate before the 'Pan-Russians'; the others were going west to Central Volhynia where they were to surrender to the Poles. Both left behind the same landmarks along their way: frozen corpses in the ditches." (39) This was the

39. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism in the Years 1918 to 1923, page 389.

funeral march of the last soldiers of the West Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic.

The episode of the new Ukrainian statehood began with the March Revolution in Russia in 1917. In March 22, 1917, a few days after the revolution in Moscow, the "Ukrainian Central Council" was formed in Kiyev, consisting of representatives of

•668 the parties. At the same time the process of making
642 Ukrainians of the various divisions of the troops on
the front began, so that within a few months the
175 Central Council had about one and one-half to two
million Ukrainian soldiers at their disposal. But
in spite of this enormous army, the Central Council
by and large yielded to the orders of the Kerenskii
government of Moscow. Its further policy is characterized by the four manifestoes which it issued up
to the time of its dissolution in April 1919. On
June 23, 1917 the first manifesto of the Central
Council announced the autonomy of the Ukraine. It
was to maintain its own parliament, the Central
Council, and a /58/ government, the general secretariat. On July sixteenth the second manifesto followed, giving particulars as to what was meant by
autonomy, and containing an emphatic declaration
for confederacy. In its manifesto of November 19,
1917 after Lenin had already stepped into power, the
Central Council still clung to the union with Moscow.
Again in this "Universal"-that was what the manifestoes were called - which proclaimed the Ukrainian
People's Republic, there was mention of federation
with Moscow. On December fourteenth the Council of
648 People's Commissars in Moscow recognized "the
175 Ukrainian People's Republic and its right to separate
completely from Russia or to enter negotiations for
a federation or similar relationships." But in the
same document of recognition the Council of People's
Commissars laid down the condition that the disarming
of Red troops in the Ukraine would have to cease and
that the Central Council would have to desist from
its "counter-revolutionary activity". Should the
People's Commissars fail to obtain a satisfactory
answer to this demand within 48 hours, "the Council
of People's Commissars would assume that the Central
Council was in a state of open warfare against the
Soviet government." A few days after this recognition coupled with an ultimatum Bolshevik troops
broke into the Ukraine. In Khar'kov there was formed
a Ukrainian-Bolshevik counter-government, and Moscow's

648 war against Kiyev began.

668 Straightway Bolshevik propaganda made itself felt in the Ukraine. It was easy to unleash revolutionary energies, after the Central Council had prepared the ground with the same arguments, albeit in a weaker form. In the country unbridled peasant rebellion against the squires raged. It was arable land and fine cattle and horses on the farms that the peasants wanted; they did not care who ruled in the cities. This was the state of affairs in the Ukraine when on January 22, 1918 the Central Council in Kiyev in a fourth manifesto proclaimed the sovereign "Ukrainian People's /59/ Republic" and put into effect separation from "indivisible Russia". However, at the same time it did not forget to announce that after the overthrow of Bolshevism, there should again be cooperation with Russia. The manifesto which was meant at last to arouse national passions suppressed for so long, was not heard in the noise of general rebellion. A few days after the proclamation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the parliament and the government at Kiyev were surprised by a revolt of Bolsheviks and its members were arrested. If they had not been freed by the Ukrainian sharpshooters of the sech who became the nucleus of the later Ukrainian armies, and the corps of free Cossacks consisting of workmen, these parliamentarians would have faced certain death. It was precisely in those days that the Central Powers at Brest Litovsk recognized the independent Ukrainian People's Republic on February 9, 1918. Vienna was facing a famine and needed grain, so the peace was favorable to the Ukraine. For the adjudication of national sovereignty they were obliged to furnish a half million tons of grain. The "peace for bread" had been signed one day when the Bolsheviks drove the Central Council out of their capital. In March the situation became so threatening for the Ukrainian government that it was obliged to appeal to the Central Powers

175

64 for occupation and riddance of the Ukraine from
•668 Bolsheviks. Thereupon German and Austro-Hungarian
175 troops occupied the country. In Kiyev the Central Powers established military, diplomatic and political representation. In order to take the wind out of the sails of the vigorous Bolshevik agitation, the Central Council nevertheless saw itself forced to continue its revolutionary activity. Thus, against their will, they led "the country toward a complete social-revolutionary dissolution in which East Ukraine had inevitably to fall victim to the Bolshevism of Moscow." (40)

40. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism.

It is obvious that the conservatively-minded German authorities had no understanding of such governmental tricks as would seriously jeopardize /60/ the furnishing of grain. Therefore they supported the attempt of the former aide-de-camp of the Czar and Russian general of Ukrainian origin, Pavlo Skoropadskyj, to introduce the monarchical office of hetman instead of the Republican Central Council. On April 29, 1918 Pavlo
668 Skoropadskyj, the offspring of a hetman family,
175 proclaimed a new hetman state in the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the indigenous props of this monarchical regime were very weak. If he had not been protected from the beginning by the authority of the army of occupation, the revolutionary masses would have driven him out along with his few dozens of landowners, industrialists, merchants and officers on the very first day. Skoropadskyj's first efforts were directed toward restoring the pre-revolutionary social conditions in the country, during which process his men did not shrink from severe penal expeditions and from the use of the "traditional Russian wisdom" - the club. This led to repeated bloody rebellions on the part of the embittered peasants. An uneducated, fermenting,

•668 destitute mass of humanity, as yet incapable of
175 self-administration, a much too small middle class and a corrupt reactionary society at the head,- these were the elements of the hetman state. But it was the hetman's doom that, for lack of a national Ukrainian conservative stratum, he was obliged to lean more and more on the old domiciled Russian circles who in the end completely won over the Ukrainian head of the state to their reactionary plans. On November 14, 1918 Skoropadskyj set
642 up an Old Russian government in Kiyev and announced
648 the federation of the Ukraine with a czarist Russia
175 which, however, was never again to arise. Twenty-four hours after the announcement of the annexation of the Ukraine to this fictitious czarist Russia, the revolt of the "Ukrainian National League" against Skoropadskyj and the Old Russian counter-revolutionaries broke out. There begins the period of the second Ukrainian People's Republic, at the head of which is a five-man governing board. At the end of the /61/ seven-month rule of Skoropadskyj, after his flight from the new Ukrainian government, he made the following confession in his last manifesto of December 14, 1918: "God did not give me the strength to attain my goal."

*

In the meantime Austria-Hungary also approached its dissolution. On October 10, 1918 in the Imperial Council of Vienna, the Ukrainian parliamentarians from Galicia demanded the right of self-government for the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary; it was only a few days before the collapse of the Empire. On the eighteenth of October the Ukrainian members of the Imperial Council and the Diet in Lwów founded the Ukrainian National Council which on the following day proclaimed the union of all Ukrainian territories in Austria-Hungary. The National Council set up three executive committees and therewith imagined it had done all that

11: Obermaier--87 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[Galicia]* [Volhynia]

Galicia and Volhynia bore the main burden of 668
the struggle of nationalities. The fight was carried on in a legal manner through self-supporting organizations such as economic cooperative societies, private schools and societies of public interest, and illegally through revolutionary secret organizations threatening the state. The first of these secret societies was the "Ukrainian Military Organization" (UVO). Its members were primarily soldiers of the former West Ukrainian army. A second sabotage organization, that of the Communists, worked hand in glove with the UVO. The UVO was /86/ dissolved in 1928 by Polish agents, which was not a particularly clever achievement, considering the poverty of its members. The same happened to the Ukrainian Communists at the hands of delegated Jews who acted upon orders from the Warsaw office of the Komintern. Meanwhile a new terroristic secret society had been formed, the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN), which has caused the Polish authorities the greatest concern, especially since October 1938. All attempts to dissolve the OUN from within or to neutralize it by creating groups of Polonophiles have failed. Elements that could be bought were often enough obliged to pay for their treason with death.

Two years after the founding of the OUN* in 668
late summer of 1930, the farms and estates of Polish settlers in Galicia went up in flames and 579
in some places the harvest burned up in the fields. Also, telegraph wires were cut. Since it was hard to sell grain, Polish landowners used the terrorist methods of the OUN in individual regions as an excuse to collect insurance fraudulently; they set fire to their own buildings. The answer of the Poles to the wave of sabotage of the OUN* 558
can be read between the lines of the petition of 60 members of the British House of Commons to the

* [i.e., Ukrainian Terroristic Secret Society - Analyst]

11: Obermaier--89 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Galicia] [Volhynia]

•668 The Ukrainians bowed to Polish supremacy in helpless inward wrath. They again covered with straw the torn-up roofs of their houses and they built new libraries to replace the ones that had burned, new dairy farm equipment in place of that which had been destroyed. When in 1934 there was a danger of national Ukrainian institutions being abolished, as well as cooperatives, schools, general educational institutions and so forth, the largest Ukrainian party, the "Ukrainian National Democratic Association" (UNDO), whose members ran the cooperatives, decided to give up the opposition against Warsaw and to begin a "policy of normalization". The UNDO became "loyal" in return for which it received seventeen parliamentary mandates. This did not prevent it, however, from calling attention in the very first session of the Sejm to the Polish Law of Autonomy of 1922, and to continue to point this out at the beginning of each new session of the Sejm. Besides the /88/ representatives of the UNDO, there were two other representatives of the clerical group of the Bishop of Stanislav, Khomyshyn, who tried to represent Ukrainian interests in the Sejm. The remaining Ukrainian parties were not admitted to the elections and in turn boycotted them.

The period of normalization of Ukrainian-Polish relations lasted not even four years; this policy was not popular among the Ukrainians. The old hatred between the two nations broke out anew the moment the Carpatho-Ukrainians won their autonomy. Under pressure of public opinion, the UNDO was obliged to go over again to the opposition. "The policy of normalization brought no results because it was not adhered to by the Poles. The Poles trample on their own constitutional laws. Their constitution guarantees to all citizens equal rights and privileges before the law. But in practice there is no equality. It is almost out of the question for Ukrainians to be admitted to official posts, either in the postal system or on

[Galicia] [Volhynia]

668 railways or in the courts, to say nothing of their being made officers in the army. Private enterprises controlled by the state operate on the same principle. Of the 4000 Ukrainian teachers, one-fourth of them are scattered outside the Ukrainian national territory. Three-quarters of our intellectuals are unemployed. There is the additional fact that it is made impossible for our peasants to acquire land; even in cases where there is a partitioning of a large Ukrainian estate, the land is sold to Polish colonists. Our national banks and cooperatives get practically no credit and the little money lent to us is on a short-term basis. Moreover, the Polish government has created two frontier zones from which it can banish every Ukrainian without stating its reasons. In these frontier zones the voivode is sole ruler. Even the district captain can at any time dispossess any priest, teacher or a cooperative official whom he suspects of being nationalistic. In the end, the present

728 /Facing page 88/ /Map VI: Ukraine in the Years 1917-20. At the end of the first World War the Ukrainian People's Republic was created and lasted for a short time. Finally, after involved struggles against three fronts, the Poles in the West, the Bolsheviks in the North and East and the troops of the reactionary generals Denikin and Wrangel, it perished./ /Keys inside: ▨ Region of the Ukrainian state. ▭ Temporary annexes. ////// Boundaries of territory occupied by Ukrainian nationals. ---- Boundaries of the predominantly Ukrainian zone./ /89/ appeasement actions which are being carried out exactly after the 1930 pattern, will force us to give up the normalization policy." (50)

50. Statements made by a leading member of the UNDO party in February, 1939.

11: Obermaier--91 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1
[Galicia] [Volhynia]

•668 The least that the UNDO had to do after the establishment of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy was to formulate the nature of Ukrainian claims to autonomy. At the beginning of December 1938, the proposal for autonomy signed by fifteen representatives was introduced into the Sejm under the title of: "Constitution of the Province of Halicz-Volhynia". According to the title, the proposal refers to the principality of Halicz-Volhynia of the 13th and 14th century. Territorially all areas inhabited by a Ukrainian majority were to belong to the "Province of Halicz-Volhynia", that is to say, East Galicia, Volhynia, Polesia as well as parts of the voivodeship of Lublin, Bialystok and Cracow. According to this, the autonomous territory would have included about one-third of Poland and contained nine million inhabitants. The aim of autonomy was to be "full political equality with the Polish people and the free cultural and economic development of the Ukrainian people within the boundaries of Poland". The proposal provided for the formation of a legislative diet and a provincial office at Lwów. The laws made by the Ukrainian diet were not to extend to external affairs, the army, the national budget and taxes, currency, customs, postal system, communication systems and matters concerning citizenship and the national police. The proposal was so modest that in practice the Ukrainians were to make laws pertaining only to the school system and judicial affairs. But even these minimal demands were refused by Warsaw with the written reply that the proposal is of such a nature that it changes the constitution and would in this case have to be supported by one-fourth of all the representatives.

As early as December 1938, the Ratification Committee of the UNDO, decided in spite of the rejection, to continue the struggle for autonomy. In a subsequent session in April 1939 /90/, the party which was obliged to steer between the Scylla

[Galicia] [Volhynia]

•668 of Polish agitation for dissolution and the Charybdi of Ukrainian nationalism, declared itself willing to work with Poland provided autonomy was granted and a status of "legal competence" was established. On May ninth the UNDO in the Sejm adopted the authorization law for the president of the state, in order not to give Poland an excuse for dissolving the cooperatives.

558 In the summer of 1939 the Polish-Ukrainian relationship resembled a sort of guerilla war. Here and there a house was set on fire, a bullet through a window found its victim, Polish colonists or officials were driven out of a village, a police raid was shot down - and in turn, the Polish bayonets raged mercilessly. To take only two cases at random: on May 8, 1939 Ukrainian representatives in the Sejm placed an interpellation before the Minister of the Interior, according to which the Polish police had seriously injured 16 persons, among them 8 women and girls, with blows administered with the butt end of a gun, at a funeral in an East Galician village. On the same day police officials in the district of Polyana killed a Ukrainian peasant and an eleven-year-old boy by shooting. Several Ukrainians were injured. In a second interpellation there was a complaint that in Libukhora in East Galicia a first lieutenant, a sergeant major and a soldier coerced by means of blows, the cashier and acting head of the Ukrainian library to burn the library which consisted of 300 volumes. On May ninth the Polish Prime Minister, General Skladovski, replied to another Ukrainian interpellation of April twenty-ninth. There were three incidents mentioned: a military assault on the dwelling of the Ukrainian pastor Tustanovich in Komarnyky, a military attack in Zalisci on 63 Ukrainians who were maltreated, and the maltreatment by the police of 17 Ukrainian peasants in Cholhyni. In all three cases the Polish Premier's answers were evasive.

517 While the Ukrainian language was being banned from Kiyev, a new flowering of Ukrainian culture was beginning in the West Ukrainian metropolis of Lwów. In 1873 Ukrainian men of learning [741] founded the "Scientific Shevchenko Society", a free academy. The number of Ukrainian chairs at the University grew. Now that all scholarly activity in the Ukrainian language was curtailed in East Ukraine, professors and writers transferred their field of activity to Lwów where a number of different cultural organizations arose. Kiyev as the intellectual hub of all Ukraine was outstripped by Lwów, in fact, even by Czernovits /now Chernovtsy/. Each of these two cities published more than one hundred Ukrainian works in 1894, whereas Kiyev published only ten works of so-called "literature for the home".

177 The revolution of 1905 only temporarily eased the pressure on Ukrainian cultural life. Freedom of the press and freedom of assembly remained only promises, and the "unity and indivisibility" of the Russian people was nothing but lifeless dogma until in 1917 its defenders were swept away by the seceding peoples.

517 Despite all difficulties, Lwów remained the cultural center of West Ukraine even after the •668 first World War. Its focal point was the "Scien- [741] tific /104/ Shevchenko Society" which published its own periodicals and scholarly works. The spiritual trend of West Ukrainian intellectuals, in so far as they were not obliged to emigrate, was directed against traditional sentimentality. Young people were reared to think politically, to be ready for action and for dedication. In accordance with the political aims, the subject matter of present-day West Ukrainian literature shows a preference for the re-awakening of the Ukrainian people, for the heroic struggles of the last few decades, and for the heroic in the Ukrainian landscape.

795
798 This is a picture of the beginning of the new Union.

/112/ Moscow Educates

000 In one thing Lenin proved superior to his enemies and predecessors: he knew how to utilize the social-revolutionary and nationalist-revolutionary forces in the vast Russian Empire for his own ends. With the explosive material which Hetman Skoropadskyj and the counterrevolutionary general Denikin had piled up anew through their forcible restoration of large estates, he destroyed both opponents. He met the collapse of the idea of a Pan-Russian Empire with the slogan of the revolutionary proletarian unified front of non-Russian peoples of the former czarist realm against the capitalist states. It was only for appearances' sake that he complied with the national wishes of the peoples gathered together under Moscow.

•668 In Russian Ukraine, where at the beginning of the Revolution the national consciousness of the great masses of peasants was not yet deeply rooted, Lenin's tactics did not run against insuperable difficulties. The cultured stratum, already not too large, was divided into two camps, one of which sympathized with Bolshevism, while the other regarded an autonomy within the democratic realm of Great Russia as the most favorable solution of the problem of nationalities. Thus from the beginning Lenin had a part of the Ukrainian people on his side, and he subjugated the rest with the help of Muscovite troops during years of bloody civil wars. True, in November 1917, in the "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia" sovereign rights "including the right of severance and of formation of an independent state" /113/ were promised, but toward the end of the period of the Communist war there was no force left which might have made use of it.

185 exists only in socialism." At the Party Congress in 1939, Stalin corrected these and similar expressions of conceit. He turned against the "fancifulness" of the advance estimates of the last Five Year Plan. The hopes of the proletarian masses of the Union for the promised paradise, nourished for more than twenty years, /183/ were abruptly destroyed by the "father of the people" with his allusion to the sacrifices which are still necessary in order to catch up with the most progressive states. There was still time for that, Stalin said, "and not a little time".

/184/ Emigrants

668 Although the Ukrainian people do not have a state (the Soviet Ukraine is merely a province of Moscow), they have three governments which have their seat in some foreign European country. There is the government of hetman Skoropadskiy which resigned in 1918 and was later revived in exile; then the directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic which originally consisted of five presidents. Its chairman Petliura is dead and its members have scattered. Finally there is a West Ukrainian government. The political emigration [162] from the Soviet Union, Bessarabia, Bukovina and Poland resides almost altogether in Europe. Here it numbers 150,000 souls including the emigrants. Of these about 50,000 East Ukrainians alone are living in what was formerly Poland, 50,000 Ukrainians are living in France, 15,000 without protectorate and 5000 under aprotectorate in Germany, 8000 in Belgium and 5000 each in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The rest are divided up among twelve countries.

The world knows little about the former goverments, nor do they stand out. All of them cling tenaciously to the fiction of their legality. The most active among them is the Petliura govern-

668 ment, although it is the very one which suffered the most annihilating military and diplomatic defeat. Around it cluster the remaining supporters of the East Ukrainian dictator who, in spite of Polish betrayal and the most outrageous treatment, convulsively clung to the talons of the White Eagle. Petliura was murdered in Paris in 1926 just as he was preparing, after Pilsudski's coup d'état, to concoct a new scheme with the Polish dictator. In Ukrainian emigré circles not related to the Petliura group /185/ which consists almost primarily of older people, these gentlemen are regarded as Polish agents. In contrast to the rest of the political emigrants, the Petliura followers lived, as a rule, in tolerable circumstances.

It is worth while to examine the program of the Petliura group more closely, for the latter, together with the Poles, followed the political plans of Pilsudski and Petliura. The goal was to smash the Russian colossus and establish an East Ukrainian state under a Polish protectorate. The means to this end was to be a common front of East Ukrainians with the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, preferably with the peoples of the Caucasus, the Don Cossacks, who regard themselves as a separate people, and the Karelian Finns. The White Ruthenians were to be excluded from this alliance;they, as well as the seven to eight million West Ukrainians, were to be left to the Poles. This Polish-Petliura school of thought regarded the neighboring states "that know what the Soviet Ukraine means", that is to say Finland, the Baltic states and primarily the former Poland, as additional allies against pan-Russian Moscow. In case the Soviet Union was to become involved in a war, there was provision made in Warsaw for the raising of an "army of the Ukrainian people's government" which, as far back as 1919 to 1920, was probably to have the honor of conquering Kiyev,

•668 the pearl for the Poles. The difficult lot of the West Ukrainians under Polish rule left this group completely indifferent, for "they, of course, have their own parliamentary representation in the Polish sejm", as one of the leading men of the group told the author in February 1939 in Warsaw.

The followers of Petliura were anxious to be regarded as liberal democrats. Their adherents resided primarily in Warsaw and in Paris. Here the group published a fortnightly periodical and a monthly information bulletin with Polish intelligence, in which one could occasionally read that "the cabinet held a regular session". /186/

There were only individual West Ukrainians who belonged to the Petliura group. On the other hand, many East Ukrainians belong to the two other political trends of the Ukrainian emigration. These are, first, the conservative followers of the ex-hetman Skoropadskiy, who have in mind some kind of Ukrainian confederacy with a non-Bolshevik Moscow and aim at a monarchy, and secondly, the adherents of the "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN). The hetman followers publish a paper in Chicago; some of them also live in the Reich. The "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" counts among its followers the most active national revolutionary elements of the emigration. The OUN is the only important group with an ideological basis. This young Ukrainian generation formulates modern Ukrainian nationalism on a populariist basis. It is trying to "create a vigorous Ukrainianism, uncompromising in the realization of its national idea". Its goal is an independent state embracing all Ukrainian territories. (133) The leader of this group, until his

133. The Ukraine and the National Policy of Moscow, page 58.

slaying in Amsterdam in 1938, was the head of the

168 sech sharp shooters, Ievhen Konovalets who, after Petliura reached an understanding with the Poles separated from the dictator. Konovalet's successor is the former chief of staff of the Ukrainian army, chief of the sech sharp shooters Andrey Melnyk who was obliged to flee from Poland in 1938. The OUN has its strongest support in the Ukrainian emigrants in the USA - "Organization for the Political Revival of the Ukraine, New York" -, in Canada and South America. But also among the 150,000 European political refuges and emigrants it has the most adherents of all groups large and small. There are Ukrainian nationalists in almost all Central and West European capitals, among others in Rome, in Paris and in London where the "English-Ukrainian Society" establishes contact with the Ukrainian emigrants in Canada.

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169 /187/ When in the second half of the past century economic conditions became more and more unbearable in the Ukraine, many Ukrainians emigrated; from the Russian Ukraine to East Russia, from Galicia, from Carpatho-Ukraine, and from Bukovina overseas. In 1926, 771,000 Ukrainians lived outside the Ukraine proper in small and large linguistic islands, within European Russia, and 2,138,000 lived in Asia. In the United States there were about 700,000 Ukrainians, primarily workers; in Canada there were 300,000 mostly farmers; in Brazil 50,000 to 60,000, in Argentina 50,000, in the rest of the South American countries 10,000 to 20,000. (134)

134. Kubiyovich: Geography, page 321.

517 Organizations of compatriots of various kinds keep the Ukrainians together overseas. The closest ties are those between the farmers in

15: Pap S-4,5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

175 King and to regain their lost independence. However, his appeal was distrusted because of his loyalty to the Tsar. As a result, only a small Cossack force joined the King's army; and it was defeated in the battle of Poltava on July 10, 1709. Russian military units occupied the entire territory of the Ukraine and made it a province of Russia. Gradually, even the existence of a separate Ukrainian nationality was denied by the Russians; but the spirit of lost liberty could not be completely destroyed. The opposition against the Tsar's oppression was felt and later promoted by the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) who, because of his courage, was forced to spend a considerable length of time in exile. The Russian reaction to the stirrings among the Ukrainian masses inspired by Shevchenko was a more severe and inhuman suppression. The lowest point of Russian chauvinism was reached when the Minister of the Interior, Count P. Valuev, issued on June 21, (June 8, old style) 1863 a ukase in which he angrily stated that "a Little Russian (Ukrainian) nationality never has existed, does not exist and cannot exist." [3] On May 18, 1876, Tsar Alexander II signed in Ems a special order prohibiting the use of the Ukrainian language in literature.[4] This order was remitted in 1905 but reimposed in full force in 1914 at the beginning of World War I. The Tsarist policy of oppression of non-Russian peoples was among the factors which contributed to the collapse of its regime in March, 1917.

* * *

•668 After the fall of the monarchy, the non-Russian peoples availed themselves of the first opportunity to regain their freedom.[5] In the Ukraine, a National Central Rada (Council) was spontaneously organized in April, 1917 under the presidency of a well known historian, Mychajlo Hruschevskyj. This National Rada was recognized and welcomed as the representative organ of the Ukraine by the Congress of Ukrainian soldiers in Kiev in 1917, by the Peasants Congress of Ukraine, and by the Worker's Congress, July 1917. The political

3 T. G. Mazaryk, *The Spirit of Russia* (New York, 1919), p. 304.

4 D. Doroshensko, *History of the Ukraine* (Edmonton, 1939), p. 591.

5 The major non-Russian nationalities in the former Russian empire such as the Ukrainians, Byelo-Russians, Georgians, Azerbaijans, Armenians, Kasakhs, etc. have a long history of struggle aaginst Russian imperialism and oppression. However, former historians and Tsarist representatives abroad refer to them as Russians, despite the difference of culture and languages. This oversimplification of the real facts caused much confusion in the Western world in the past. Even today many responsible individuals refer to the Soviet Union simply as Russia.

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 parties which came into legal existence sent, together with national minorities, their representatives to the Rada.

At the beginning, the Rada did not aim to separate the Ukraine as an independent state from Russia, but asked, during the negotiations with the Provisional Government, a territorial autonomy in federation with Russia. It further demanded that the Russian Government abstain from interference in Ukrainian internal affairs. However, this modest demand was first rejected by the Provisional Government in Petersburg, and led the majority of the Ukrainian people into believing that the new Government in Russia was prepared to continue the policy of the Tsars regarding the non-Russian people. As a result, the possibility of establishing peaceful and friendly relations among the various nationalities was jeopardized by the Russians themselves.

Taking note of the strong determination on the part of the people, the Ukrainian Central Rada issued, on June 23, 1917, its first universal "declaration" in which the "Autonomous Ukrainian Republic" was proclaimed. Informing the Ukrainian people about the unsuccessful negotiations with the Provisional Government in Petersburg, the Rada declared that "from this day on, we ourselves will create our own destiny." [6] Simultaneously, a General Secretariat, with Wolodymyr Winnichenko at its head, was formed. It took shape as the Ukrainian Government while the Central Rada was reorganized as the revolutionary parliament.

648 During the short life of the Provisional Government, only the Bolshevik Party took the existing facts into account. Lenin, who previously did not believe in a Bolshevik victory in Russia during his lifetime, recognized, after his return from Switzerland in April, 1917, that administrative incapacity and the political blunders of the Provisional Government offered a reasonable chance immediately to seize political power in Russia. Analyzing the situation, Lenin introduced the program of the Bolshevik Party which promoted such revolutionary slogans as self-determination of nations within Russia and their right

6 M. Hrushevsky, *The History of Ukraine* (New Haven, 1945), p. 526.

7 The Seventh (April) Conference of the All-Russian Social-Democratic Labor (Bolshevik) Party, held on May 7-12, 1917 adopted a resolution on the National Question in which the policy toward non-Russian peoples was formulated. Among other points, the resolution stressed: "The right of all nations forming part of Russia to freely secede and form independent states shall be recognized. To negate this right or to fail to take measures guaranteeing its practical realization, is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure and annexation. . . ."

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648 ments proved that this was only a formal recognition of existing facts and a desire to win confidence among non-Russian people. The Provisional Government's mistakes and incompetence resulted in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, which led to the establishment of the Soviet regime.[10]

648 After the revolution, Stalin was appointed Commissar of Nationalities. Lenin believed that the appointment of the non-Russian Dzugashwili to this post would make the Bolshevik slogans even more acceptable to the non-Russian peoples. He had ready plans for the occupation of the Ukraine and other semi-independent countries but did not have the military might needed to crush their national Governments. Therefore, Lenin turned to the method of infiltrating destructive forces into the Ukraine in order to weaken its independence from within. The Bolsheviks were aware of the fact that, if the Ukraine remained independent, Soviet Russia would have tremendous difficulties in carrying out the plan of "liberation" of other countries in the future. Therefore, the declaration of the right of nations to self-determination, officially proclaimed by the Bolsheviks, proved to be valid only as long as it served the purpose of strengthening the Soviet regime. Once the Bolsheviks were in power, they openly demonstrated that between the policy of white and red Moscow toward the Ukraine there was little or no difference. Recognizing this fact, the formerly subjugated nations were even more determined to promote their liberation from Moscow. On November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian National Rada proclaimed independence by issuing the Third Universal. The Government still believed in an eventual federation with a free Russia, which would recognize Ukrainian independence and would abstain from interference in its internal affairs. This viewpoint was expressed in a note to the Allied powers.[11] Again, the Russian anti-Soviet political and military leaders refused to accept such

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10 Professor Masaryk, former President of the Czechoslovakian Republic and a well known authority on Russia, comments on the easy Bolshevik victory: "The way for Lenin's regime had been prepared by the Provisional Government and by Kerensky, both of whom showed administrative incapacity and entrusted wide spheres of action to bad and incompetent men. . . . Lenin was a logical consequence of Russian illogicality." *The Making of a State, Memories and Observances, 1914-1918* (London, 1927), p. 176.

11 On December 12, 1917, the Secretary of State for International Affairs of the Ukraine, Shulgin, despatched notes to the Allied powers informing them about the desire of the Ukrainian Government to enter into friendly relations with the free States as an independent power. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia,* Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 630.

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a solution. At a later date, these anti-Soviet forces indirectly helped the Bolsheviks to remain in power.[12]

On December 17, 1917, Lenin dispatched an ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada in which he demanded: recognize the Soviet Government within forty-eight hours or take the consequences of an open war. With this action, the Soviet Government inaugurated the policy of "persuasion" by force. The Rada rejected the Soviet ultimatum in an answer on December 19, 1917, and urged the Ukrainian people to be prepared to defend their freedom.[13] The determination of the Ukrainian people to defend their liberty forced the Bolsheviks to change their tactics. They decided to postpone their open aggression and instead to appeal directly to the Ukrainian masses.

The Bolsheviks inspired a Congress of workers and peasants to meet at Kiev on December 18, 1917. Contrary to their expectations, a large majority of the delegates took an energetic stand for the right of the Rada to represent the Ukrainian people. Only 80 out of a total of 2,000 delegates supported the Bolsheviks. This small minority proceeded to Kharkov, where the Congress of Proletarians (radical elements from Donez Basin, mostly non-Ukrainians), was held. At the session of Decemer 27, 1917, this group proclaimed itself the "only representative body" of the Ukraine and issued an appeal for help to the Soviet Government of Russia. Two days later, the Sovnarcom welcomed, in a special resolution, this "new revolutionary Govern-

12 In his report "On National Factors in Party and State Development" Stalin stated: "Do not forget such reserves as those constituted by the oppressed peoples, who remain silent, but whose very silence exerts pressure and decides much. This is often not felt, but these peoples live, they exist, and they must not be forgotten. Yes, Comrades, it is dangerous to forget them. Do not forget that if in the rear of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel and Yudenich we had not had the so-called 'aliens,' the oppressed people who disorganized the rear of these generals by their tacit sympathy for the Russian proletarians —comrades, this is a specific factor in our development, this tacit sympathy, which nobody hears or sees, but which decides everything—if it were not for this sympathy, we would not have nailed a single one of these generals. While we were advancing on them, their rear was disintegrating. Why? Because these generals depended on the colonizing elements among the Cossacks, they held out to the oppressed peoples the prospect of further oppression, and the oppressed people were therefore *forced* into our arms while we held aloft the banner of the liberation of these oppressed peoples. That is what decided the fate of these generals; those are the factors which, although thy are obscured by the victories of our armies, in the long run decided everything. This must not be forgotten." *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), Stenograficheskij otchet, April 17-25, 1923* (Glavpolitprosvet, Moscow, 1923), p. 455.

13 Both the Soviet ultimatum as well as the answer of the Ukrainian Government is cited in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918* (New York), pp. 437-438.

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648 668 ment" of the Ukraine and promised it unlimited help.[14] On December 29, 1917, the Red Army under command of former Tsarist Colonel Muraviov invaded the Ukrainian frontiers. The open war between Soviet-Russia and the Ukraine was a reality.[15]

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648 Despite many internal and external difficulties, the Ukrainian Government offered sufficient evidence that the people were capable of governing themselves and of defending their freedom. The Ukraine, by opposing and fighting Bolshevism—increasingly regarded as the new danger to civilization—won the sympathy of many free countries. On January 11, 1918, the French High Commissioner in Kiev, General Tabouis, was instructed by the French Government to accord in its name de-facto recognition of the Ukrainian Independent State. The British Government on January 12, 1918 delegated Bogge, its High Commissioner in Kiev, to wait only for the proper moment to recognize, together with other Allied powers, the Independence of the Ukraine. The United States also considered the recognition of the Ukrainian State after the American Consul General at Moscow informed the Secretary of State of the necessity for such a step.[16]

The Ukrainian Government's efforts to establish friendly relations with foreign countries caused the Bolsheviks to conclude that, despite their promises and changes in method, they were in no position to destroy the power of national revolutions in border countries. Lenin undoubtedly realized that in order to occupy the Ukraine, he must first make peace with external enemies. For this reason he hastened the armistice negotiations, already in progress, with the Central powers at Brest-Litovsk. During the previous negotiations the Soviet delegation, under Joffe's and later under Trotsky's leadership, entirely ignored the existence of an Ukrainian state. They acted as if the Russian delegates were the legal representatives not only of the Rus-

14 Stalin's article, "What is Ukrainian Rada?" *Pravda*, December 29 (15 old style), 1917.

15 At the time when Bolshevik forces terrorized and looted the people of the Ukraine, Stalin wrote: "The people of Russia should know, that the idea of invasion of a foreign territory is strange to the Russian revolution. All people should know, that in contrast to the imperialist policy of national oppression, the Soviet government practices the policy of total liberation." *Pravda*, December 31 (old style), 1917. Cf. J. V. Stalin, *Sotchineniya*, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 25.

16 *Foreign Relations of the United States, Russia, op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 655-657.

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648 Hetman of the Ukraine (April 29, 1918) did not change the situation, since a large majority of the people considered him head of a puppet government created with the help of German bayonets and, therefore, subservient to German dictation.

After the defeat of the Central powers by the Western allies at the end of 1918, the German sponsored Government was replaced by a new Ukrainian Government called "Directorium" under the leadership of Simon Petliura. At the same time, the Soviet Government annulled the Brest-Litovsk treaty and ordered its military forces to enter the Ukraine. A new war between the Ukraine and Soviet Russia began. Since the Germans had prevented the formation of a Ukrainian army, the Bolsheviks were at an advantage. In desperation, Petliura made a last attempt to combat Bolshevik aggression by concluding a very unfavorable military alliance with the Polish Government under Pilsudski's leadership.[20] The advance of the United Polish-Ukrainian Army during the summer of 1920 was reversed by a Bolshevik counter offensive. As a result, the allied forces were driven out of the Ukraine. Subsequently, the Soviet and Polish Governments agreed, in the treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, to divide the Ukrainian territories between themselves.

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642 668 After the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, Bolsheviks formed an "independent" Soviet Ukrainian Government, the members of which, directly appointed by the Kremlin, were totally subordinated to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. At this time, Stalin was in a position to openly reveal the true meaning of the Bolshevik proclamations concerning the right of non-Russian nations to self-determination when he wrote:

> We are in favor of the separation of India, Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, and the other colonies from the entente, for here separation implies the liberation of these oppressed countries from Imperialism, thus undermining the position of Imperialism and strengthening the position of revolution. We are against the separation of the border regions from Russia since separation would here involve Imperialist servitude for the border regions, thus undermining the revolutionary power of Russia and strengthening the position of Imperialism.[21]

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20 Winston S. Churchill attached great importance to this alliance as is obvious from his book, *The Aftermath* (New York, 1929), pp. 277-278.

21 Stalin's preface to his "Sbornik statei," 1920. Cf. *Sotchineniya*, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 372.

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This explanation of self-determination irritated even the Ukrainian Communists who trusted the Bolshevik slogans and supported Soviet plans during the revolution. Consequently, many of them recognized the new dangers for the Ukrainian people and decided to oppose Russian Imperialism by using the Ukrainian Communist Party as a stronghold against the Centralist attitude of the Russian Communist Party. 668

The open conflict between Ukrainian and Russian Communists which endangered the unity of the proletarian dictatorship arose during the sessions of the 10th Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party. At this Congress, Ukrainian Communist Zatonskyj, delivered a lengthy speech, accusing the Russian Communists of leaning on traditional Russian chauvinistic forces which ignore the gravity of national movements that had arisen during the revolution. He warned that the Ukrainian masses are aware of their national consciousness and would not tolerate a new Russian oppression.[22]

The Ukrainian Bolshevik Skrypnyk, an old friend and co-worker of Lenin, also accused the majority of the members of the Russian Communist Party of chauvinism. He courageously emphasized that the national question was one of the most dangerous problems, one which should be solved if the Soviet Government were to secure its power. Answering these warnings, Stalin bluntly replied that the Bolshevik Party had taken final leave of obsolescent views on self-determination and was not willing to return to this question.[23] However, he advised the Party members to be cautious in dealing with the national problem since the existence of the non-Russian nations could not be denied. The Soviet leaders openly demonstrated that the formal recognition of the Soviet Ukraine as an "independent" state was only a Kremlin maneuver to soften anti-Communist feeling among

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22 Zatonsky further declared: "At present, Russianism received even more rights and began to flourish with a new strength. It exists everywhere and especially among the masses of our Party members; it exists not only in the border regions such as Turkestan among the Russian colonizing elements, who were forced to accept Communism, but it exists here in Moscow in our Central administration. . . . We have to erase from the minds of our comrades the image of the Soviet Federation as a Russian one, since the question is not whether it is a Russian but whether it is a Soviet Federation. When for example, Rumania or Germany or any other country becomes a member of the Soviet Federation will it also be called 'Russian?' Of course not! . . ." *X. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partipi (B), March 8-16, 1921*, Stenograficheskij otchet (Moscow, 1921), p. 110.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

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668 the Ukrainian people. This was especially obvious when the Congress adopted a resolution calling for the liquidation of the "independence" of various Soviet Republics because, the Soviet leaders claimed, "not a single Soviet Republic, taken alone, can regard itself as secure against economic exhaustion and military destruction on the part of world Imperialism."[24] In order to eliminate the potential opposition and distrust among the non-Russian Communists, the Congress formally condemned Great Russian chauvinism as harmful, because of its colonizing spirit, to the cause of Communism. This condemnation, however, did not have any practical significance. The Soviet Commissars in the Ukraine continued the policy of strict centralization and Russification. The Ukrainian Communists could not tolerate this policy without losing face; and they demanded that the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party recall its Commissars. This demand was flatly rejected by the Kremlin with an admonition: the Soviet officials in the Ukraine must be accepted as the only executive force. Much to Lenin's surprise, the Ukrainian Communist Party at the end of 1921 dismissed the Kremlin-appointed Commissars from their duties and elected members from their own ranks for the important positions. This independent attitude of the Ukrainian Communists annoyed the Russian leaders so much that Lenin was obliged to intervene personally in the matter. In his speech at the eleventh Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party, Lenin warned that, despite the recognition of the Ukraine as an independent Soviet Republic, the Bolsheviks would not permit Ukrainian leaders to deviate from the Party principles. Lenin further informed the Congress that he had assigned "Comrade" Ordzonikidze and the Central Committee to investigate the whole matter. He admitted that, according to them, it would require ten years to compile a detailed report on the events in the Ukraine. "One thing," Lenin said, "is clear, that despite the unanimously-adopted instructions of the Central Committee, the group (appointed by the Kremlin) was replaced by the local group."[25]

642 668 The internal difficulties and independent attitude taken by the non-Russian Communists forced the Soviet leaders in Moscow to press their original plan of more centralization. On December 29, 1922, the plenipotentiary delegates of the Russian (R.S.F.S.R.), the Ukrain-

24 "The Immediate Tasks of the Party in Connection with the National Problem" Resolution adopted by the Tenth Congress.

25 *XI. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B) March 27-April 1922*, Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow), p. 31.

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ian (UKR.S.S.R.), the Byelo-Russian (W.R.S.S.R.) and the Transcaucasian (T.S.F.S.R.—Georgia, Azerbaidzan and Armenia) Socialist Republics concluded, under Moscow's auspices, a treaty providing amalgamation into a single federated state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The terms of the treaty gave the Central Soviet Government in Moscow practically unlimited power.[26] The Russian Communist Party secured its legal right to intervene in the internal affairs of the member States and to suppress the opposition against Moscow among the non-Russian Communists. However, the non-Russian leaders of the Soviet Republics were reluctant to surrender their positions and the struggle between Russian and non-Russian Communists continued with even more fervor. 642 668

The controversy over the national policy reached its climax at the twelfth Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party. In his report, Stalin spoke at length on the internal and international significance of the national question.[27] For the first time he attacked not only Great Russian chauvinism but also local nationalism as an equal danger to the Soviet regime. Referring to the penetration of elements with a Great Russian spirit into the highest ranks of the Communist Party, Stalin said: 668

> It is not accidental, comrades, that the Smenovekhists[28] have recruited a large number of supporters from among the Soviet officials. That is by no means accidental. Nor is it accidental that Messrs. the Smenovekhists are lauding the Bolshevik Communists, saying, as it were, 'You may talk as much as you like about Bolshevism, you may prate as much as you like about your internationalist tendencies, but we know that what Denikin failed to do, you will do; that you, Bolsheviks have resurrected, or at least are going to resurrect the great idea of a Great Russia.'[29]

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26 The Russian Communist Party was in a position to adopt any resolution, since the great majority of the Party members were Russians. At the eleventh Congress, for example, when the question of amalgamation of the republics was raised and the resolution for strict centralization approved, the delegates consisted of 341 Russians, 77 Jews, 10 Tartars, 12 Armenians, 9 Georgians, 19 Latvians, 8 Kirghizs and 46 others.

27 *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), op. cit.*, p. 441.

28 ". . . Smenovechovzy—former members of the White Army who now recognized the victory of the Red Army as a national victory, the deliverance of Russia from western Europe, and the birth of a new Russian empire of Asiatic orientation . . . (p. 137). . . . The name 'Smenovechovzy' has been coined after a collection of essays entitled 'Smena Vech,' 'the change of signposts' (Prague, 1931). A collection of essays published in 1909, called 'Vechi' advocated a change of policy by the Russian intelligentsia. In the 'Smena Vech' the change was to take the form of recognizing Bolshevism as a national government." (pp. 386-387) W. Gurian, *Bolshevism: Theory and Practice* (New York, 1932).

29 *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), op. cit.*, p. 442.

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Stalin further stressed that the promotion of the idea of a single and indivisible Russia would forever forfeit the confidence in Russia of the formerly oppressed people. He admitted that hostile tendencies towards Moscow among non-Russian peoples were growing rapidly, and urged the Congress to adopt every possible measure which would win for the Soviet Government respect and "love" in the Republics and which would also make the Soviet Government not merely Russian, but international.

Russian chauvinism had also been bitterly attacked by Skrypnyk, who emphasized the inability of Russians to recognize existing facts. He insisted that not one single point of the resolutions adopted at the tenth Congress had been put into effect. He complained that Ukrainians, living in Russia outside the border of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic and numbering approximately 7,000,000 were left in a cultural and educational void and that Ukrainians in the Red Army were under the pressure of forcible Russification. Skrypnyk further declared:

> There exists only a theoretical admission of the national question; when it is time to act, we show neither will nor force. Great state fictions imbibed at the mother's breast have become instinctive among many comrades. We need only to recall how many of our comrades were painfully touched when our Congress accepted the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and not Russian Soviet Socialist Republics.[30]

In addition, Skrypnyk denounced Stalin's attempt to compare Great-Russian chauvinism with the local nationalism of the non-Russian peoples. He claimed that such an interpretation of the problem would encourage the Russians, employing the excuse of fighting local nationalism, to continue their policy of Russification. Even Rakowskyj, the Kremlin-appointed president of the Soviet Ukraine, who previously rejected the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination, changed his mind after facing reality in the Ukraine and declared that the national question, if it remained ignored, was one which could cause Soviet Russia and the Party tremendous difficulties. He warned that, should the Russians continue the policy of oppression, civil war would be resumed, with even firmer effort on the part of the non-Russian peoples to secede from Russia. Rakowskyj energetically besought a practical solution, based on factual equality, of the

30 *Ibid.*, p. 522.

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problem. With regard to the Ukrainian language, the President stated: 668

> I heard talks among our comrades, that the Ukrainian language is nothing but a fiction of the Galicians (Western Ukrainians). Does this not demonstrate the Great-Russian power feelings of the Russian men, who never experienced a national oppression but on the contrary oppressed other nationalities for hundreds of years?[31]

Answering these warnings and accusations, Stalin replied:

> Besides the right of nations to self-determination, there exists also the right of the working class to consolidate its power and to establish the dictatorship, and to this latter right the right of self-determination is subordinate.[32]

The twelfth Congress passed another resolution on the "National Question," in which the Russian Communist Party pledged to free itself from Russian chauvinism. However, the most important decision of the twelfth Congress was the adoption of the so-called Ukrainianization policy. According to this policy, all Party and State institutions in the Ukraine were advised to use and to promote the Ukrainian language in dealing with the people. The reason behind the acceptance of this policy, was obvious: the Communist Party in the Ukraine could not win influence among the Ukrainian people, since the peasants referred to it as a Russian Party, interested only in the exploitation of their country.[33] By introducing the new policy the Soviet leaders hoped to establish closer contact with the masses. But Ukrainianization became national and revolutionary in substance. In 1925-26, a well-organized opposition group of Ukrainian Communists, led by Shumskyj, Maximovich, Khvylovyj, Volobuyev and others, advocated a type of national Communism which in today's language could be labeled as "Titoism." Volobuyev went so far as to declare that the Soviet Russian economic policy was nothing but a colonial exploitation of the Ukrainian people.

The Kremlin was alerted. The Soviet Russian leaders were aware of the growing dangers of this opposition in the Soviet Republics but were unable to take effective action to combat it. The Russian Com-

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31 *Ibid.*, pp. 528-534.

32 Cf. J. V. Stalin, *Sotchineniya*, Vol. V (Moscow, 1947), p. 265.

33 At the twelfth Congress the delegates were composed as follows: 60.8% Russians, 11.3% Jews, 7.1% Latvians and Estonians, 4.7% Ukrainians, 2.7% Georgians, 2.4% Armenians, 1.2% Byelo-Russians, 1.7% Kirghizs, 1% Tartars, 7.1% others.

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668 munist Party was itself in a very serious crisis. After Lenin's death on January 21, 1924, the top Party officials struggled among themselves for political leadership. For this reason, the national question was not even raised at the fourteenth Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party held on December 18 to 31, 1925. The Congress was entirely occupied with ironing out the sharp split within the Party. Despite the strong opposition lead by Sinoviev and Kamenev, who fought for a collective responsibility of the Politburo, the Congress made Stalin the individual dictator of the Party, giving him unrestricted authority.[34]

668 517 Utilizing this struggle between the Russian Communists, Ukrainian writers and historians wrote and published new literature about their past and inspired resistance to Moscow's domination. One of the most influential among these writers with the courage to reject openly Moscow's right to dominate his people was Mykola Khvylovyj. During the revolution he was among the Ukrainian Communists who were misled by Bolshevik slogans and took active part in the struggle against the "bourgeois" national Government of the Ukraine. He believed in the international program of the Russian Communist Party which promised the people "land, liberty and friendship among nations." Under the impact of existing developments, however, Khvylovyj realized that the Russian Bolsheviks nurtured the idea of the "single and indivisible Russia" and that only the forms of oppression were changed. His conclusion was based upon the fact that the Bolshevik recognition of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic was composed of empty phrases and deceptions since the real political force in the Ukraine was concentrated in Russian hands. Khvylovyj now openly declared that his people could survive as a nation and live in freedom and peace only if they are able to secede from Russia. His appeal, "Away from Moscow, back to Europe," was received by Ukrainians with enthusiasm and by the Soviet leaders with considerable anxiety. Referring to the dangerous influence of Khvylovyj's writings, Stalin wrote:

> Khvylovyj's demand for "The immediate russification of the proletariat" of the Ukraine, his opinion that "Ukrainian poetry must get

34 For the story of Stalin's seizure of power see: *XIV. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), December 18-31, 1925*, Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow, 1926), pp. 207-298.

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> away from the Russian literature and its style as quickly as possible," his assertion that "the ideas of the proletariat are known to us without Moscow art," his enthusiasm for a sort of Messianic role of the "young" Ukrainian intelligentsia and his ludicrous and non-Marxist attempt to divorce culture from politics—all this, and much like it, in the mouth of a Ukrainian Communist now sounds (must sound) more than strange. Whereas the proletarians of Western Europe and their Communist Parties are full of sympathy for "Moscow" the citadel of the international revolutionary movement and of Leninism, whereas the proletarians of Western Europe turn with joy toward the banner waving over Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvylovyj has nothing better to say for "Moscow" than to appeal to Ukrainian public men to get away from "Moscow as quickly as possible!" And this is called internationalism! What can we say of other Ukrainian intellectuals, not belonging to the Communist camp, if Communists begin to talk, and not only talk, but also to write in our Soviet press, in the language of Comrade Khvylovyj?[35]

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Despite the fact that the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic secured for Moscow centralized power, internal developments in the Ukraine were at first not affected as much as many Russian Communists anticipated. On the contrary, the first years of Union status were marked by the promotion of Soviet Ukrainian statehood. Alongside the Kremlin's appointed Commissariats, the Ukraine possessed a well-organized administration of its own and its "Government" took very seriously the creation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. Kharkov and later Kiev defended the interests of the Ukraine with steadfast determination. The growth of a Ukrainian culture national in substance, fostered by Khvylovyj, progressed so rapidly that Stalin was again stirred to an open admission of its danger when he said in 1929:

> If we had nothing else but these discussions about Khvylovyj, which have become so wide and heated in the Ukraine, there would already be enough for profound alarm.[36]

The national question was once again raised at the sixteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party. Stalin proposed a new Nationalities' policy which would promote a culture socialistic in sub-

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[35] J. V. Stalin's letter "To Comrade Kaganovich and other members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (B) of Ukraine," dated April 26, 1926, first published in a complete form in *Sotchineniya*, Vol. VIII (Moscow, 1948), pp. 149-154.

[36] Cf. Mykola Scborsky, *Ukraine and Russia* (New York, 1940), p. 43.

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stance and national only in form. He demanded severe punishment of the advocates of national cultures with hostile tendencies toward Moscow. Postishev, Stalin's deputy in the Ukraine, informed the Congress about the already successful suppression and persecution of the Ukrainian national movement. But he added that many Russian intellectuals in the Ukraine, encouraged by this new policy, suggested that even the Ukrainian language should be supplanted in schools by some kind of new language, possibly Esperanto.[37] He also stated that under the pressure of the Communist Party, the deviationists, Shumskyj and Khvylovyj, admitted their errors and acknowledged the correctness of the Party policy.

At this Congress, new factors relating to Ukrainian-Soviet difficulties were introduced. For the first time in the existence of the Soviet regime, Postishev reported that the O.G.P.U. had uncovered a counter-revolutionary organization in the Ukraine called the "Ukrainian National Socialist Party." Many of the members of this organization, according to Postishev, were Ukrainian Communists. Its primary aim was to form an Independent Democratic Republic. Kaganovich, another Kremlin deputy in the Ukraine, revealed the existence of a second conspiratory counter-revolutionary organization with headquarters in the Ministry of Agriculture.[38] Skrypnyk made a vain attempt to rescue the situation. He blamed Russian chauvinism for the rebirth of Ukrainian nationalism and made clear that the continuation of Soviet-Russian policy in the Ukraine would force more and more Ukrainians into the underground. Skrypnyk complained that the declaration of the right of nations, set forth on November 15, 1917, proved to be for many Russians merely a screen behind which Moscow had hidden a plan for further oppression. For many Russians, he stressed, it was only a tactical maneuver, but for the non-Russian nations, it was a most important document. No wonder, Skrypnyk added, that some Russians go so far as to declare that this important declaration of our Party was valid only until the October revolution, and that after October, it should be considered as a counter-revolutionary slogan. Skrypnyk concluded, "There cannot even be a discussion about any revision of Lenin's policy, nor of any

37 *XVI. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiji (B), June 26-July 13, 1930*, Stenograficheski otchet, Partizdat (Moscow, 1930), p. 108.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 109.

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restrictions, and still less about liquidation of the national federative and autonomous republics." [39]

Aware of the dangerous position in which he placed himself by accusing Russian "Comrades" of chauvinism at a time when Stalin already belonged to that camp, Skrypnyk could not afford to fail to attack the deviationist tendencies of some Ukrainian "Comrades" in the Party. He pledged to help persecute without mercy all elements with nationalistic leanings.

At the beginning of 1930 the Soviet Secret Police uncovered the existence of another Ukrainian conspiratory organization called "Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukrainy" (The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine). The forty-day trial that followed in one of Kharkov's largest theaters disclosed that the organization's political aim was the restoration of the Independent National Ukrainian State and that it was in contact with the Ukrainian political emigrees.[40] More than forty-five well known Ukrainians, among them members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. In addition, some 4,000 members of the Youth Organization, Comsomol, were arrested. But in 1931 the OGPU uncovered still another revolutionary organization called the "National Center." The anti-Soviet underground activities in Ukraine were supported by peasants who opposed the forcible collectivization of land introduced by Bolsheviks with the five year plan in 1928-29.

In spite of all these crises and belligerent relationships between Kiev and Moscow, Skrypnyk continued to advocate the conception of Soviet Ukrainian Statehood, an idea which by now was entirely in contradiction to the official Soviet viewpoint. When he finally demanded the formation of a special Ukrainian Red Army, and the incorporation of the Ukrainian territories still under Russian administration into the Ukraine, Stalin lost his patience and summoned Skrypnyk to Moscow for an explanation. After his return in July, 1933, Skrypnyk (a member of the Communist Party since 1897, coworker of Lenin, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, head of the Council of Nationalities of the U.S.S.R. and Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic) committed suicide, according to the official anouncement. After his death, he was accused of Ukrainian nationalistic leanings and of treasonable disloyalty to

39 *Ibid.*, p. 243.
40 *Ibid.*, p. 243.

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 the cause of Leninism. Only a few weeks before Skrypnyk's death, Khvylovyj, long the subject of refined persecution by the Soviet authorities, had been driven to commit suicide (May, 1933). According to information provided by his close friends, Khvylovyj left a note saying "I am dying because I love life."

668 661 Acting upon Stalin's order to persecute Ukrainian "nationalism," Postishev stated, in a report to the plenary session of the Ukrainian Communist Party, November 19, 1933, that the discovery of Skrypnyk's deviation? led to the purging from the Ukrainian Socialist culture of any adherence to Petliura's, Machno's and other national elements. He also declared that within a few months 27,000 members, out of a total membership of 125,000 were expelled from the party, along with 1,300 members of the Comsomol. Relieved of their posts were 240 secretaries of regional committees of the Communist Party, 250 heads of "Ispolkoms," 150 heads of controlling committees, about 1,000 officials of the Commissariat of Education, about 2,000 co-operative workers and 300 professors of various educational institutions beginning with the Ukrainian Academy of Science.[41]

Despite the increase of physical and moral terrorism, Moscow did not succeed in eliminating resistance to its rule in the Ukraine. Early in 1933 the Soviet Secret Police reported the existence of a new well-organized and disciplined underground organization, this time the "Ukrainian Military Organization," whose large membership included commanders of the Red Army, scientific workers and young intelligentsia. The aim of this group was similar to that of the ones previously uncovered, excepting that the Ukrainian Military Organization was preparing a military revolt against the existing order.

The Soviet difficulties in the Ukraine were again illustrated at the seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party. In his report on the dangerous developments in Ukraine, Stalin stated:

> The fall of Skrypnyk and his group in the Ukraine is not exceptional. Similar 'dislocations' are observable among certain comrades in other national republics.[42]

Describing the spread of local nationalism and labeling it as far more perilous for the Soviet rule than Russian chauvinism, Stalin continued:

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41 Sciborsky, *Ukraine and Russia*, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

42 *XVII. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B). January 26-February 10, 1934*. Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow, 1934), p. 30.

? [cf. category 116, pp. 220-222 — Analyst]

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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> Only very recently, in the Ukraine, the deviation towards Ukrainian nationalism did not represent the major danger; but when we ceased to fight it and enabled it to grow to the extent that it joined forces with the interventionists, this deviation became the major danger.[43]

The discussion of the national question was brought to a final halt at the seventeenth Congress and the Soviet Government decided to use police terror against the opposition.[44] Following this policy, new purges were instigated and every sign of dissatisfaction with the Bolshevik order was simply suppressed by Stalin's GPU.

The various stages of Soviet tactics in regard to the national policy—the recognition of the independent National Republics, the formation of the Soviet Republics, the amalgamation of the Soviet Republics into a single Union on the basis of a "free" federation, and the liquidation of the formal "Independence" of the Republics—practically places the Russian Communists in the role of promoters of the idea of a "single and indivisible Russia" despite the Bolsheviks' attempts to demonstrate the Soviet regime as an inter-nationalist one The Soviet leaders started from the point where the Tsarist and Provisional governments ended and gradually arrived at the stage of strict centralization and oppression—with only the provision that the Kremlin was no longer in a position to deny, at least theoretically, the existence of the Ukrainian nation and language. The Soviet Russian press, however, was given, as far back as 1936, a green light to recover from the archives of the past such names as Ivan Kalyta, Ivan the Terrible, Tsar Peter the Great, Katherina II and others.

The struggle against the Ukrainian "nationalists" was carried out until "all" independent elements, including many members of the Ukrainian Communist Party, were executed or silenced. Only after the employment of total terror could the Soviet regime officially "boast"

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43 Stalin's report, *ibid.*, p. 32.

44 Describing the tactics of the Ukrainian opposition, Postishev concluded: "The Ukrainian nationalists have an interesting system of distributing their units. Take for example the People's Commissariat of Education. Its director was Yavorsky; Yavorsky went, then came Ostrsky; Ostrsky went, then came Konyk; all of them proved to be members of the Ukrainian Military Organization, and its leaders at that. Or take the case of the one with the power of attorney in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. There you had Maximovich; Maximovich went, then came Petrenko; Petrenko went, then came Tur—again all members of the UWO (Ukrainian Military Organization), even of its directing clique. It was the same in all the places which they controlled. They maintained the principle of always substituting their own people. Once they got control of a responsible department, they would not let it out of their hands." Postishev's report, *ibid.*, p. 70.

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668 661 of the triumph and success of "brotherly" cooperation among various nations under the leadership of the great Russian people and the "wisest" Stalin. Nevertheless, these proclamations of co-operation were soon negated by existing facts. Again *Pravda* reported new anti-Soviet activity of the "enemies of the People" in the youth organization (Comsomol) in the Ukraine:

> There is uncovered again the unseemly sight of the work of counter-revolutionaries and spies within the Comsomol of the Ukraine. Masking themselves in a base fashion, they carry on disruptive counter-revolutionary work. They consciously fouled the cadres of the Comsomol and the propaganda apparatus and they ruined political education. They served the fascists, conducted spying activities and prepared sabotage and terroristic acts. . . . These enemies of the people placed their own men in executive posts. When these men fell at one post they were immediately transferred into another region.[45]

The resistance of the Ukrainians to Moscow's domination could not be denied. However, such statements had double meaning and were produced by the Soviet press in order to justify the policy of strict centralization and Russification in the Ukraine. Even such a loyal Moscow servant as Liubchenko, President of the Soviet Ukraine, was by now considered as a dangerous and undesirable individual since he was a Ukrainian and could hinder, as Skrypnyk did in the past, the realization of the Soviet Russian policy. For this reason he was compelled to commit suicide on September 11, 1937. In the familiar Bolshevik manner, the Soviet press informed the people that Liubchenko was involved in anti-Soviet connections and, "evidently" afraid to face his responsibility before the Ukrainian people for betraying their interests, had ended his life. Such an interpretation of Liubchenko's death—who in 1934 had praised the GPU for its successful work in "totally" destroying the "nationalist" groups within the Ukrainian Communist Party—gave the Soviet regime the "legal" right to replace most Ukrainians holding higher positions in the Soviet administration by Russians whom the Kremlin could trust. Nevertheless, passive resistance to the existing order was continually felt and could not be wiped out entirely.

186 In 1938 world tension and fear of World War II increased. Therefore, even the rise of national consciousness in the small Carp-

45 *Pravda*, July 25, 1937.

orientation. Khvylovy considered that Ukrainian literature should go 665
its own way and look towards Western Europe, no matter whether 186
bourgeois or proletarian. Shumsky advocated that the Ukrainian Communist Party should be independent of the Russian Communist Party.

This crisis within the Ukrainian Communist Party* prompted the 661
Moscow Bolshevik leadership in 1926 to make one of Stalin's principal 665
assistants, L. M. Kaganovich, Ukrainian party secretary for a short 186
period during which the first great purge against the nationalist deviation was carried out. Khvylovy was ejected from the party and Shumsky expelled from the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When Khvylovy repented he was given another chance and re-admitted as a party member, but in 1933 he committed suicide after a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism had been launched.

Admittedly the methods of repression in the Ukraine were comparatively liberal until 1929-30. From that time onwards the oppressive policy of the Soviet State overshadowed in the minds of the Ukrainian nationalists in the U.S.S.R. the contribution which Polish, Rumanian and Czech communists were ready to make for the establishment of a Greater Soviet Ukraine. Many Ukrainian nationalists became convinced that national unity was less vital to the Ukrainians than cultural and [177]
political freedom, in particular that free intercourse with the West which Moscow was unwilling to grant.

The Soviet State inflicted many heavy blows on the representatives 668
of the western orientation among the Ukrainians, but never vanquished 661
it entirely. In this struggle Ukrainian nationalism commanded an almost inexhaustible reservoir of resistance forces. Bloodshed and terror seemed incapable of stamping out the longing for spiritual freedom. Almost every year brought the discovery of a new conspiracy, a new series of trials, a new trend in national Ukrainian deviations. In 1929 the G.P.U. discovered the 'Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy', the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in 1931 the 'Ukrainian National Centre', in 1933 the 'Ukrainian Military Organization' (UVO).

The offensive by the central Government against the Ukraine's trends [814]
towards a more independent existence was conducted not only in the political sphere but also in the field of culture, where the régime had originally granted some scope to Ukrainian nationalism. One of the main bulwarks of Ukrainian nationalism was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The history section of the Academy had turned out to be so anti-Bolshevik that it had to be disbanded altogether while its head, Professor Hrushevsky, was exiled to Russia proper. This banishment of the 'great old man' of Ukrainian nationalism from his place of work showed better than anything else that the policy of reconciliation which Moscow had originally pursued in its relation towards Ukrainian nationalism had been but a short-term manœuvre.

*[Cf. category 665, p. 130 -- Analyst]

THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

661 668 423 Political and cultural oppression of Ukrainian nationalism[1] was co-ordinated with a tough fight against the Ukrainian peasant masses opposing the policy of collectivization. Famine, total disorganization of the Ukrainian agriculture and the formation of armed peasant bands were characteristic features of this period. The central Government got the situation in hand by physically annihilating peasant resistance, by making partial concessions on the tempo of collectivization and by thoroughly purging, between 1930 and 1932, the staff of the Ukrainian Peoples' Commissariat for Agriculture of alleged Borotbist wreckers.

THE SKRYPNIK AFFAIR

661 186 665 The Ukrainian crisis in the early thirties culminated in the 'affair Skrypnik', which was the most important single event in Ukrainian history of that period.

After his unsuccessful fight in 1922 as an associate of Rakovsky[2] for a 'Confederation of Soviet Republics' and for the quasi-independence of the Ukraine, Skrypnik in his day-to-day work as Peoples Commissar for the Interior, Justice, and Education tried to save for the Ukraine what could be saved in the way of an autonomous status. One of his main preoccupations was to prevent as far as possible the foundation of all-Union institutions such as the All-Union Agricultural Academy; but he failed.

Skrypnik had been a Marxist since 1897, and a member of the Bolshevik Party since its foundation. After the Revolution he was not just a local Ukrainian figure but became a Vice-Premier in the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nobody could with any shadow of justification denounce Skrypnik as nationalist. Skrypnik, it is true, considered that the central Government should bring proletarian internationalism and justified national aspirations into harmony with each other. 'Our work', he used to say, 'should be organized in such a way as to give the working masses of each nation the possibility of developing its national consciousness as much as possible'.

This conception amounted from an orthodox Bolshevik standpoint to the 'triumph of nationalism over the proletarian revolution' and was bound to get Skrypnik into trouble sooner or later. The men whom Stalin commissioned to liquidate the 'Skrypnik affair' were a Pole, Stanislav Kosior, and a Russian, Pavel Postyshev, first and second secretary respectively of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The final clash occurred on June 10th, 1933, in Kharkov, when Postyshev and Kosior, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, accused Skrypnik of being an enemy of the State and the actual head of the Ukrainian counter-revolution. At

[1] [Cf. cat. 186, pp. 130-131 - Analyst]
[2] [Cf. cat. 642, p128 - Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Ukraine RD1

that meeting the Ukrainian Communist Party decided that Great Russian chauvinism had ceased to be the main danger in the Ukraine and that Ukraine nationalism had become enemy number one. The decision constituted an important landmark in the history of the Soviet Ukraine and the prelude to a purge on a tremendous scale. 661 186 665

Skrypnik drew his conclusions from the 'new situation' by committing suicide less than four weeks after the decisive meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Executive Committee. Skrypnik's disappearance, whilst affecting the situation in the Ukraine in general, was particularly important in the field of Ukrainian cultural policy. After Skrypnik's death Postyshev and Kosior stopped the 'Ukrainization of the Ukraine', a favourite slogan of Ukrainian communists up to 1933, and started a determined campaign against 'over-Ukrainization'. 'Fight against over-Ukrainization' was in reality nothing else than the recapture by the Great Russians of some of the positions which had been lost to the Ukrainians, particularly in the Donets Basin. There is no doubt that the Ukrainization had been overdone and had actually led to the imposition of the Ukrainian language on non-Ukrainians, particularly in the schools. [563]

THE 'GREAT PURGE'

In 1934 and 1935 the party leadership discovered a big terrorist organization of Borotbists in Kiev and Kharkov, as well as an alleged 'Nationalist-Trotskyite Bloc'.[6] In 1936 the situation seemed to be more stable in the Ukraine, but 1937 was again a disastrous year for that country. Official Soviet statements claimed that in 1937 Ukrainian nationalism had made particularly extensive efforts to detach the Ukrainian S.S.R. from Russia by plotting with German and Polish fascists. Some of the plots and conspiracies uncovered had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism and were simply Ukrainian off-shoots of anti-Stalin currents within the All-Union Communist Party. It is true, however, that the Ukraine suffered much more during the big purge of 1937–38 than any other Soviet Republic. Moreover, the purge went on in the Ukraine after it had been ended on the whole in other parts of the Soviet Union. 661 665 668

The new chain of dramatic incidents started in the Ukraine in the summer of 1937, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Panas Petrovich Lyubchenko, committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest, trial and execution. Lyubchenko had been Prime Minister for three years during which he had made himself conspicuous by his passionate speeches denouncing Hitler's plans of aggression. Lyubchenko was a former Borotbist and thus suspect to the Kremlin. He was charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian fascist party and allying it to the 'right-wing Trotskyite centre'.[7] Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, was arrested

661 665 668

after two months of office for alleged treasonable contacts with Ukrainian separatists. After Bondarenko, Vlas Y. Chubar, a Vice-Premier in the Central Government, became Ukrainian Premier. He was purged in the spring of 1938. Together with the three Prime Ministers, Lyubchenko, Bondarenko and Chubar, a large number of Ukrainian ministers, high officials and party dignitaries were removed from their posts including the party secretaries, Kosior and Postyshev, once so powerful. The purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party was so thorough that of the thirteen members forming the Ukrainian Politbureau in April 1937 not one was left by June 1938. One of the last prominent Ukrainian communists to disappear was Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky, the President of the Ukrainian S.S.R. There is no evidence of Petrovsky, Kosior or Chubar ever having been sentenced by a court. No public trial of a Ukrainian communist leader seems to have taken place after March 1938 when Grigory Fyodorovich Grinko, Finance Minister of the U.S.S.R. was sentenced to death as a 'Ukrainian nationalist' and 'Polish spy'.

To clear up the situation in the Ukraine, Stalin, early in 1938, appointed two new men to the key positions of that republic. The party secretary of Moscow, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchov became first party secretary of the Ukraine and M. A. Burmistenko second secretary. From the point of view of the Kremlin, Burmistenko's appointment was a mistake. He mysteriously vanished during the Nazi invasion of the Ukraine and may even have deserted to the enemy. Khrushchov, on the other hand, was the right man for the job. When taking it over he made a statement extremely characteristic of the entire communist Ukraine policy. He declared that the traitors to party and country would be annihilated to the last man just as Taras Bulba had killed the betrayer of his own people.

[539] The Cossack Ataman, Taras Bulba, the hero of Gogol's famous novel, slew his son, Andriy, who fell in love with a beautiful Polish girl, betrayed his homeland, his Orthodox faith and fought against his own people. Seen through modern eyes, Andriy is but a symbol of Polish, Western and Catholic orientation among the Ukrainians.

Yet Taras Bulba had still another son, Ostap, who represents the daring loyal Cossack fighter bravely enduring all tortures by the Poles who put him to death. The death of Ostap is the prelude to the triumph of Ostap's cause: 120,000 Cossacks appear on the horizon of the Ukraine, a victorious army sweeping away the enemies, the Poles. Taras died in this great struggle but before his death he pronounced a last curse upon the Poles and forecast the final triumph of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar'. 'The time will come', said Taras, 'when there will be no power in the world which will not be conquered by him'.

THE UKRAINE

Stalin and his collaborators see the essence of the Ukrainian problem in the same way as Gogol[1] did by considering it basically as a struggle of Taras against Andriy, the Russian conception of the Ukraine against the Western conception. Krushchov was right in evoking the parallel of Taras Bulba because under the Soviet régime Taras, the faithful watchman in the South of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar', once again killed Andriy when he became attracted by the West and ready to desert both faith and 'Czar'. S.U. 635 186 UK 661 668 665

Krushchov as party secretary went on to kill 'Andriys'. His first victims were leaders of the Ukrainian Communist Youth League who were removed from their posts in December 1938, having been apparently overlooked in previous purges. Khrushchov rarely killed in the physical sense; he rather weeded out all influences and tendencies not in conformity with the narrow views which a Soviet Taras Bulba may have on history, literature, education, etc.

COMINTERN AND 'WESTERN UKRAINE'

In all its internal fights against Ukrainian nationalism the Soviet régime never forgot the 'other Ukraine' beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union. A geopolitical gesture in the summer of 1934 was especially intended for the attention of this 'other Ukraine'. It was the removal of the Ukrainian capital from Kharkov to Kiev, which was equivalent to the transportation of the centre of gravity of the country from the Eastern Ukraine to the Western Ukrainian areas near the Polish border. SU. 648 563

Kharkov had been made the capital of the Soviet Ukraine in December 1919, in an attempt to link the administrative centre of the country as far as possible with the labouring masses of the Donets Basin; but Kiev was the historic capital and Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, liked to play up Kiev against Kharkov. This too was checked by the transfer of the capital. An official Soviet commentator said that the removal of the Ukrainian Government to Kiev, which was celebrated with music and dancing, had an 'extraordinary significance' both for the Ukraine and internationally, and that it was a more important event than the transfer of Russia's capital from Petrograd to Moscow after the October Revolution.[8] S.U. [361]

This latter remark was true in so far as the shifting of the capital constituted a prelude to the annexation by the U.S.S.R. of the Ukrainian territories of Poland. This annexation carried out in 1939, it should be well noted, was by no means a triumph of political strategy but was due to the use of force alone. The failure to win over the population of the Western Ukraine by peaceful means was probably the greatest defeat which the Soviet nationalities policy had suffered on Russia's frontiers. S.U. [728] [635]

1 [Cf. category 116, p134, R1 Sov. Union, - Analyst]
2 [Cf. category 116, pp 136 ff -- Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Ukraine RD1

S.U. 563 648 208

There was hardly any other territory on the Russian border where the Soviet régime stood such an excellent chance of exploiting social grievances and the discontent of oppressed minorities as in Eastern Poland. Yet the Ukrainians and Byelorussians of Eastern Poland, who according to all logical calculations were bound to become a natural prey to Soviet propaganda, turned away from Russia in protest against compulsory collectivization, political purges and anti-religious propaganda.

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The sympathies which the Soviet Union enjoyed among the poor peasantry of the Western Ukraine in the first years after the October Revolution had almost completely died out by the end of the twenties. Moscow could not even rely on its own 'Communist Party of the Western Ukraine' which frequently took its lead from the anti-Russian 'national deviationists' in the Soviet Ukraine. When the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine split at the beginning of 1928 into 'loyal communists' and Ukrainian nationalists, the latter, led by Vasilkov, had the majority in the Central Committee. The Vasilkov group, said the Comintern organ, *Communist International*, 'was consciously counter-revolutionary and carried out wrecking work and provocations'.[9]

The Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had hardly been reorganized when several party groups again fell victims to Ukrainian anti-Soviet nationalism. In 1935 the official Comintern organ complained about the absence of 'a national liberation struggle on a large scale in both the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia', meaning, of course, a pro-Soviet national liberation struggle.[10]

In 1938 the Comintern journal was forced to admit that the nationalist anti-Soviet organization U.N.D.O., which stood for Ukrainian autonomy inside Poland, was backed by broad masses of the people of the Western Ukraine and that the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had not succeeded 'in penetrating the organizations of Ukrainian nationalists'. The Western Ukrainian Communist Party finally found itself compelled to exchange its demand for self-determination for a demand for autonomy which had been originally branded as a 'bourgeois counter-revolutionary slogan'.[11]

The full extent of the political defeat suffered by Soviet Russia and Comintern propaganda in the Western Ukraine can be realized if one takes into account the active persecution which the Polish authorities conducted against Ukrainian nationalism, the punitive expeditions which they carried out against recalcitrant Ukrainian villages and the almost total disregard of the Polish Government for the cultural needs of the Polish Ukrainians. All these hardships which the Ukrainians of Poland suffered in the inter-war period were insufficient to promote any major co-operation between them and the Soviet régime.

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affairs, Soviet policy in Transcarpathian Ukraine kept a certain balance between Russian and Ukrainian cultural work in the new province. Russian books and Russian newspapers are now being printed there side by side with Ukrainian ones.

COMMUNISTS AND ANTI-COMMUNISTS IN THE WESTERN UKRAINE

UK. 728

The annexation of the Western Ukraine, whilst increasing on the one hand the might of the Soviet Empire and improving its strategic position, at the same time delayed the internal political consolidation of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

UK. 665

Owing to its notable past failures the Communist Party machinery found it difficult to take root among the people of the Western Ukraine – even after its incorporation into the U.S.S.R. In each of the nine Western Ukrainian provinces (six from Poland, two from Rumania and one from Czechoslovakia), the Communist Party could rely only upon a few thousand loyal Bolsheviks. Thus in the large province of Rovno (formerly Polish), the Communist Party early in 1948 had but 6,000 members of whom more than half joined during the war and in the post-war period.[15] In the Transcarpathian Ukraine the party had in December 1946 only 4,000 members, about one-half per cent of the entire population.[16] This figure included not only local communists but also party and state officials who had come to the province in considerable numbers from beyond the Carpathians.

UK. 668

Together with a minute number of people who could be considered reliable from the Soviet standpoint, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in absorbing the new territories took over a large number of people with a Western anti-Soviet outlook, particularly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian intellectuals. This fresh accession of Ukrainian nationalist elements also encouraged the opposition forces in the 'Old Ukraine'. The great prominence of the historic vanguard role of the Western Ukraine in the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was bound to make itself felt inside the Soviet Ukraine as well. Years of Rumanian and Polish oppression had been unable to obliterate the importance of Western Ukrainian cultural nationalism which had unfolded itself before 1918 under the liberal rule of the Hapsburg monarchy. The Ukrainian nation was, indeed, a recognized political and cultural fact inside the Austrian Empire at a time when Czarist Russia denied the very existence of a Ukrainian nation.

Lvov in Galicia and Chernovitsy in the Bukovina had been centres of a legal Ukrainian national movement and of an openly professed Ukrainian culture long before Kiev and Kharkov. The Western Ukraine had not known that revolutionary Ukrainian-Russian comradeship-in-arms

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UK. 668 which had existed in Ukraine proper, and the Western Ukrainian, quite understandably, never felt that he owed anything to Russia and to the Russians. This mentality of the Western Ukrainian, who had outspoken leanings towards independence, was bound to create considerable difficulties inside the Soviet Ukraine.

The Soviet Government set itself the task of counteracting the recalcitrant Western Ukrainian spirit and of levelling out the differences existing between the 'liberated Western Ukraine' and the rest of the Ukraine in the cultural, economic and political sphere.

RUSSIAN POLICY AND THE UNIATE CHURCH

UK. 795 After the liquidation of all openly anti-Bolshevik movements in the S.U. 795 Western Ukraine and the annihilation of the 'class enemy' in the form of the bourgeoisie and the 'kulaks', there still remained for subjection to the 'levelling-out process' one important bulwark of Westernism: the Uniate Church with over 3,500,000 followers in Eastern Galicia and several hundred thousand in the Bukovina and the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

The Uniate Church had come into existence at the end of the sixteenth century in the interest and under the influence of the Polish State. As time went on the Uniate Church developed into something more than the artificial creation of a ruling caste. It was, in the end, the true expression of an area which is neither West nor East since the Uniate Church combined Eastern rites with a Western cultural and ecclesiastical orientation symbolized by the recognition of the Roman Pope.

S.U. [175] The struggle between Poland and Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though essentially a political one, was largely conducted under the cloak of religious differences. Russia claimed that her aim was to emancipate the Orthodox population of Eastern Poland from 'temptation and humiliation' by the Poles. To push back the influence of the 'Polish' Roman Catholic Church and to carry out the liquidation of the Uniate Church were thus major objectives which Russia pursued in the three partitions of Poland. The Empress Catherine II proclaimed in 1794 that resistance to the reunion of Uniates and Roman Catholics with the Orthodox Church in the territories conquered from the Poles was a criminal offence; and thus about 2,000,000 Roman Catholics and Uniates were 'persuaded' to embrace the Orthodox Church of their ancestors in the course of a few weeks. A church council of the Uniates held in Polotsk in Byelorussia (White Russia) in 1839 brought 1,500,000 Uniates together with their bishops back into the fold of Orthodoxy. In 1874 the last Uniate diocese of Kholm was abolished and 500,000 Uniates willy-nilly transformed into Orthodox congregations.

Sea was reached, serfdom revoked (1861), valuable deposits of 175
coal, iron and manganese were discovered; the population increased considerably, all of which caused other national questions to recede into the background. It was only in 1900 that the 175
first unmistakable signs of the spread of national consciousness 186
among the broad masses began to appear. In this year the 668
Revolutionary Ukraine Party included a demand for an independent Ukraine in its program and the Ukraine movement made great progress in the short constitutional period after 1905. Ukrainian books and reviews, the idea of national societies and unions for adult education began to spread. And yet we must admit to-day that national consciousness among the peasants was slow to awaken; the solution of social questions was felt to be more urgent.

In Galicia more progress was made. At the outbreak of World War I there was already a well-developed system of Ukrainian schools, gymnastic societies and cooperative associations built up in constant conflict with Polish officials. The Ukrainians were loyal in their feelings for Austria; they thought that the victory of the German side would bring their own national struggle immediate advantages.

Revolution and Post-War Years

When war broke out, Ukrainian divisions immediately took 175
part voluntarily in the fighting in the Carpathians. Special 669●
camps were erected for Ukrainian prisoners of war in which Ukrainians were separated from the Russians and trained in the spirit of nationalism. In the country itself the Ukraine Central Council was formed at Kyiv after the fall of the Tsar and it demanded the right of self-government from the provisional government in St. Petersburg. This was refused and negotiations were broken off when the bolshevists finally seized power. Towards the end of 1917 Lenin sent bolshevist troops to Kyiv, whereupon the Central Council declared the independence of Ukraine on January 22nd, 1918. Now the misfortune that political power was almost exclusively in the hands of members of the socialist and democratic Left, avenged itself; for those parties had no experience in the political control of a state. No

175 steps were taken to create a national army. While the peasants
●669 were engaged in carrying out agrarian reforms, they were horrified to hear that the Central Council was planning to do away with private property altogether.

The Central Council was strengthened anew by the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. German and A·· trian troops occupied the whole of Ukraine. But soon the Utopian social policy of the Central Council led to friction with the Germans so that they furthered the coup d'état of April 29th, 1918 whereby Paul Skoropadskyj, the descendant of a former Hetman became the ruler of Ukraine. But Skoropadskyj's policy of conciliation towards conservative and military groups which were more or less indifferent with regard to national problems soon met with opposition with Ukrainian nationalists. When in November 1918 the Hetman announced the federation of the new Russian state to be established from a center in the south area, there was a general rising. The Germans left Ukraine along with the Hetman as the war had meantime drawn to a close and in December 1918 a Council of Rebels took over the government in Kyiv. It had been possible to mobilise the peasantry against Skoropadskyj because they were told that under his authority they would have to give back the land that had been taken from the nobles; but the Council was unable to devise any effective slogan against bolshevism, it being itself entirely under the influence of cosmopolitan and international theories.

So the reunion with Galicia (constituted as "West-Ukrainian Republic" after the fall of the Danube monarchy) that was proclaimed on February 22nd, 1919 in Kyiv was merely the recognition of a principle. The war on two fronts against Poland and the bolshevists overtaxed the powers of the new-born state. In February 1919 Kyiv was lost and shortly after there was only a small part of Podolia still in the Council's hands. In July the government decided to abandon the struggle against Poland and to concentrate its energy against the bolshevists. The united army of Galicia and the Eastern Ukraine beat the bolshevists and towards the end of August Kyiv was re-taken. At this point Denikin's Russian White army attacked the flank of the Ukrainians who were forced to retreat once more. Typhus decimated

the forces. Simon Petlura, who was in command, negotiated with the Poles for an alliance against Russia. All men still fit for service were organised to produce a successful guerilla attack against Denikin's lines of communication and those of the bolshevists. Late in the spring of 1920 the Ukrainians, having once more beaten the bolshevists, formed an alliance with the Poles. A counter-attack by the bolshevists resulted in a common front of Poles and Ukrainians, on the south wing of which the latter defended the Dnister line. After the "miracle on the Vistula" the Poles forgot their allies who had finally to clear out of Podolia at the end of November. 175 669

As a result of these struggles the greatest part of Ukraine became an "independent republic". In reality the country was handed over to the central bolshevist power. Moreover about 7 million Ukrainians were incorporated in Russian territory. The Ambassadors' Council of 1923 allocated Galicia to Poland and that province, as well as the neighboring provinces of Volynia, Polesya and the district of Kholm enjoyed all the advantages of the Polish police system for two decades. Carpathian Ukraine which in 1919 had voluntarily joined Ukraine, was annexed to Czechoslovakia after the end of the war, while Bucovina and Bessarabia fell to Roumania. In spite of this partition of Ukrainian territory the struggles of 1917-1920 cannot be regarded as a failure.

Thanks to them the Ukrainian idea has now become the possession of the entire people.

It is obvious that hard times are ahead of the Ukrainians but the end of the present situation (the whole Ukrainian territory is occupied by the Soviet Union to-day) is in sight. There is a general feeling of injustice that spurs the people's determination to utilise every opportunity of launching a campaign for the life of the national state!

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again, after the offensive of General Brusilov had broken the Austro-Hungarian Front at several points. Part of Volhynia was cleared of the enemy and the Russians again invaded Galicia, occupying Stanislavov and also Czernowitz and the whole of the Bukovina. The Front was again removed from the region of Kiev. 175

Under the influence of the Russian victories the Roumanians entered the war, but they proved to be unprepared for serious conflict. A Russian army was sent to check the German invasion in Moldavia, and a new 'Roumanian Front' was created, so that the battle-line now ran from the Baltic to the Black Sea. During the winter of 1916–17 the South-Western Front was stabilized. Headquarters were planning a new offensive in the spring against Lvov and believed in its ultimate success. Peace and quiet reigned in Kiev and in the neighbourhood of the Front.(1)

§2. HRUSHEVSKY AND VINNICHENKO: THE UKRAINIANS AT BREST-LITOVSK

When the news of the February Revolution (February according to the Old Style, March according to the New) in Petrograd reached Kiev neither the authorities nor the populace would at first credit the truth of it. However, it was not long before the events which had taken place in the northern capital were repeated in Kiev and the cities of the Ukraine. 669 208

The process of decomposition which was destroying the armies of the North-Western and Western Fronts infected somewhat later the forces on the South-Western and Roumanian Fronts. As for the Ukrainian national movement, no one thought about it during those first days of revolution. With the exception of Finland, where the revolutionary movement was accompanied by a wave of feeling in favour of national independence, in no part of the Russian Empire were nationalist aspirations the motive of the Revolution. The first impulse of the masses, irrespective of their nationality, was to look upon the Revolution as a means of ending the war which had lasted too long. The other motives which soon made themselves apparent were everywhere of a social nature.

The state of mind of the masses found expression in the institution of 'Councils (*Soviety*) of Soldiers', Workmen's and Peasants' Delegates', in the creation of which all the leading socialist groups and parties took a hand. People of all nationalities participated in these Soviets; Georgian politicians, who for a generation had played a leading role in Russian radical movements, made themselves par- 208 623

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circumstances to extract the maximum concessions from the harassed liberal leaders who could not risk a political crisis in the rear of the South-Western Army. 668 642

When the offensive ended in catastrophe with a loss of over 100,000 casualties and 47,000 prisoners, the complete demoralization of the Front and the appearance of thousands of fugitives in Kiev, the ministers of the Provisional Government had no alternative but to capitulate to the *Rada*. On 17 July, in the presence of Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, the existence of 'the General Secretariat' was proclaimed and legalized. 721 642

The disaster at the Front was followed during July by the outbreak of riots and disorders in the interior of Russia. The Soviets openly declared themselves against the Provisional Government, while the Bolshevik faction, after the arrival of Lenin, began to gain strength and made their first attempt to gain power by armed insurrection. 669

The *Rada* began to concentrate what Ukrainian military elements it was able to attract round Kiev; two regiments, named respectively 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky' and 'Polubotok', were in process of formation. Both regiments consisted of undisciplined and disorderly deserters and mutineers. An attempt by the Russian Command to send the 'Ukrainian Regiments' to the Front provoked a real mutiny in the ranks of the 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment', who considered their presence in Kiev 'for the protection of the *Rada*' more necessary than in the firing line. After an encounter at the Central Railway Station at Kiev with a squadron of the Cuirassiers of the Guard, the Ukrainian troops surrendered and were deprived of their weapons. 642 669

Petrograd in the meantime was rejoicing over the suppression of the Bolshevik rising; Lenin had fled to Finland.

This success of the Provisional Government tended to calm both troubled and conspiratorial minds and, under the influence of the German offensive which had begun and which threatened both Kiev and Petrograd, the ministers of the Kerenski Government adopted a firmer attitude in their discussions with the representatives of the *Rada*, who had come to Petrograd to discuss the terms of the Statute which was to regulate the position of the Ukraine. Instead of the Statute only new 'instructions' to the General Secretariat were conceded. The territory of the Ukraine was to consist now of only five Governments: three on the right and two on the left bank of the Dniepr. The Government of Kharkov and the three New Russian Governments were excluded, although the delegates had tried to insist that, in addition to the nine Governments already claimed, Bessarabia and the greater parts of the Governments of Kursk and Voronezh should also form part of the Ukraine. 642 634

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soldiers were electing Soviets; and on the 11th that an armistice had been signed on the Western Front. 727 668

The question of the evacuation of the German troops immediately arose and it was clear that this would present enormous difficulties. Lvov was seized by Galician Ukrainians; Lublin and Warsaw by the Poles: neither were willing to let troop trains through. From Kiev only one line of railway remained: Kovel-Brest-Litovsk-Belostok.

The news of the crash of the German Front in the West and of the impending evacuation of the Ukraine by the Germans was naturally the signal for a Ukrainian movement directed against the Hetman's Government. On 20 November, during street riots in Kiev, twenty people were killed. A whole Ukrainian Division declared itself against the Hetman and began to march from Konotop on Kiev; it was stopped by German troops. Large bands of 'Reds' appeared near Kharkov. New Russia was swarming with brigands who had armed themselves with what the Austrians had left behind. This was only the beginning.

The principal politicians of the 'National Union' were also on the alert and each of them acted according to his disposition. Vinnichenko formed a 'Directoria' of five members from the different Ukrainian Socialist parties, while Petlyura hastened to Belaya Tserkov, where he easily raised a mutiny against the Hetman in the crack regiment which had been christened with the romantic name of 'The Zaporogian Sech Rifles' and which had been recruited largely out of the Russian war prisoners from Rastatt who had been given the 'special education in the Ukrainian spirit'.

§ 4. *DIE RÜCKFÜHRUNG DES OSTHEERES*

Between Petlyura and Vinnichenko dissensions immediately arose not only on questions of principle: they were personal enemies. Vinnichenko wanted the Ukraine to be proclaimed a 'State of Workers and Peasants', but not subject to Moscow. Petlyura turned out to be a politician of a more practical turn of mind: he understood well enough that it would not be long before the Moscow Soviets would swallow up Vinnichenko's Ukraine. He also understood that it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to conciliate the sympathy and interest of the Entente powers if the Ukrainian nationalists were to gain sufficient time to establish any sort of stable régime. Petlyura was not a bad organizer and his firmness made him popular with the soldiers. Therefore he was the master of the situation. 642

Partly in consequence of Petlyura's 'Universal' and partly in response to Vinnichenko's proclamations which were plastered all over 669

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669 the Ukraine—even in the streets of the Hetman's capital, but most of all because of the peasants' overwhelming desire 'to get rid of the Germans', armed groups and detachments appeared everywhere. These bodies paid no particular heed to the self-appropriated authority of the 'Directoria' but obeyed their improvised *atamans* and 'colonels'.

642 Skoropadsky could not help realizing that his position had suddenly become desperate. His cabinet was powerless in every respect, and the last hope that remained was to get into touch with the victors in the war through the leaders of the 'White' Volunteer Army to which they were according their support. General Denikin had already issued an Order to the Volunteer Army in which he proclaimed that he assumed command 'of all the forces in the South of Russia'. This Order of course was intended to apply to 'the armed forces' in the Crimea and the Ukraine, and it was inferred that the thousands of Russian officers in Kiev and Odessa were now under the command of General Denikin's unofficial representative in Kiev, General Lomnovski. A 'South Russian Centre' consisting of several conservative professors and fugitive politicians who were all hoping and working for a united Russia was set up in Kiev. The trouble was, however, that neither the officers nor the politicians were able to protect the Hetman against the rising anger of the armed peasantry. The Volunteer Army was far away in Rostov-on-Don and the northern Caucasus and the Allied forces in Roumania were no nearer to the scared remnants of Skoropadsky's class régime in Kiev. In Odessa, it is true, the French Consul Hainnot soon made his appearance as the representative of the victorious Entente. He came in touch with Prince Dolgoruki, the Commander-in-Chief of the Hetman's troops, and promised him the speedy intervention of French forces in the Ukraine. At the same time Hainnot warned the German Command in Kiev that any leniency on their part towards the mutinous Ukrainian elements, 'especially any sort of agreement with them, would not be tolerated'. Hainnot went on to threaten the Germans with reprisals 'should any arms or munitions be given to the Ukrainians or if Kiev were surrendered to them' (*Rückführung*, p. 40). The French Consul, however, had no force at his disposal, and his promises and threats were made on his own initiative and on the advice of his Russian friends rather than as the result of instructions from his Government.

Skoropadsky and all the Russians in Kiev found themselves, as before, defended only by German bayonets. To make the situation still more paradoxical these German bayonets were now as a matter of fact at the disposal of the German 'Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies'

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which had been set up in Kiev and which openly sympathized with the Bolsheviks. Finally, on 28 November 1918, Skoropadsky, gambling on Hainnot's promises and on the understanding between the Entente and the Volunteer Army, issued a proclamation in which he declared the Ukraine to be a part of 'the great Russian realm'. He was too late to save either himself or the conservative interest in Kiev. 642

Ukrainian detachments were approaching Kiev from all sides. As early as 15–20 November all sorts of *atamans* and 'colonels' had occupied Kharkov and Poltava and even Rovno to the west of Kiev. On 19 November remnants of the army which remained loyal to the Hetman were defeated at Vasilkov by the 'Petlyurians'. Kiev would have been taken if the Germans had not been ready to defend it. 669 727

Notwithstanding the almost complete collapse of discipline among the troops of the German Occupation, some grounds for collaboration had been found between the Soldiers' Soviets and the Command. 'Only one impulse reigned among the troops, every soldier had only one thought: "Home! Home! Home!—at any price!"' (*Rückführung*, p. 40). The winter had set in, snow had fallen and the horrors of Napoleon's retreat haunted the minds of the Germans. The officers had little difficulty in persuading the men that it was necessary to hold Kiev for the time being as a centre from which the evacuation could be organized.

But the defence of Kiev and other large towns and important railway junctions by the Germans was interpreted by the population as a continued support of the Hetman. By spreading its propaganda against Skoropadsky the 'Directoria' was exciting the people against the Germans; in fact the association and exploitation of the two hatreds secured the maximum number of adherents for Petlyura. The peasants had many accounts to settle with the Germans, while considerations of a material order were eloquent enough. The rumour circulated that the Germans who were leaving the Ukraine were taking away with them a lot of money and great quantities of goods. There was an overwhelming desire not to allow them to do this and to take away from them all that they had appropriated. A logical development of this train of thought was the decision to deprive the Germans of their weapons and munitions: their artillery and machine-guns, rifles, lorries, carts, horses—and finally even their warm clothing and their money.

Attacks on railway stations began in many districts with the object of preventing the evacuation of the German troops. The German Command soon realized that under such conditions it had become an utter impossibility to organize the evacuation even along the lines

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669 727 which were still available after the events in Poland: Kiev-Kovel-Brest-Litovsk (for the 20th Army Corps and the 22nd and 27th Reserve Corps); and Bakhmach-Pinsk-Brest-Litovsk (for the 1st Army Corps and the 41st Reserve Corps). It became an absolute necessity to come to an agreement with Petlyura, and such an agreement was concluded on 2 December in Kiev. An 'armistice' was arranged during the duration of which the 'Directoria' undertook to make itself responsible for the organization of transport facilities. But with all the goodwill in the world Petlyura and the members of the 'Directoria' were able to give little real assistance in that direction —and that little only in the immediate neighbourhood of Kiev. In other parts of the Ukraine the struggle against the retreating Germans continued to assume more and more violent forms. In Kharkov *ataman* Barbashev and his staff had to be arrested before the Germans could board the promised train. At the important junctions of Bakhmach and Kasatin, the gangs in control continued to refuse to allow trains to pass through *en route* for Kovel and Homel. 'It was simply by a miracle that, up to 12 December, we succeeded in despatching 126 trains' (*Rückführung*). By this time skirmishes between German detachments and the local population had spread all over the Ukraine.

The numerous Ukrainian bands in Volhynia became a real danger to the Germans. Fighting took place 'with changing luck' in Berdichev, where a Bavarian Brigade beat back successive attacks by strong 'Petlyurian' forces. At the station of Zhmerinka the 'Petlyurians' defeated two Landwehr cavalry regiments with a loss of more than 200 killed and wounded. The disorganized Germans were disarmed and driven away from the railway line in the direction of the Galician frontier. On 7–8 December hot encounters took place for the stations of Sarny, Iskorost and Birzula. The Germans took several thousands of prisoners, but it was difficult to know what to do with them for, if set free, they would join new bands and reappear in a few days.

On 6 December *pourparlers* with Petlyura were renewed, and on the 11th, at the station of Kasatin, a definite agreement was concluded. Petlyura insisted with some reason that if his troops were to obey him it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to return to its capital —Kiev. A peaceful continuation of the German evacuation could only be procured by the immediate surrender of Kiev to the Ukrainians.

642 The first consequence of the Kasatin Agreement was the resignation of the Hetman and his Government. On 14 December, after a short affair with the remaining troops of the Hetman, the ragged

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bands of the 'Directoria' under the command of Colonel Konovalets entered Kiev. In their wake, on the 19th, arrived the 'Directoria' with Petlyura and Vinnichenko at its head. 642

During the Kasatin *pourparlers* the German Command had considered it a question of honour to stipulate that the Russian officers and men who were serving the Hetman should be allowed to go free after surrendering their arms. This condition was only partly kept. Some officers, among them General Count Keller, who had tried to organize resistance in the town itself, were shot on the spot. Another five hundred officers were arrested and kept prisoners in the Kiev Museum. Later they were divided into groups and distributed among different prisons; a number of them, under pretext that they had tried to escape, faced firing squads; after 29 December those who remained alive were sent off to Germany (*Rückführung*, p. 52). 669 727

The surrender of Kiev resulted in a change for the better in the conditions of the German evacuation. The Germans had to accept certain limitations on the disposal of military stores: the troops were allowed to take with them only machine-guns for one company in every regiment; guns for three batteries in every artillery regiment, etc. The balance had to be 'delivered to the Ukrainian Army'.

By the end of December the Command of the former *Heeresgruppe Kiev* had migrated first to Kovel and then to Brest-Litovsk. The evacuation was proceeding almost normally, although in some localities the troop trains were attacked and disarmed, and often the Germans could only secure uninterrupted passage by the payment of large sums of money. By the middle of January the bulk of the Army of Occupation had quitted the territory of the Ukraine, and was concentrated in the railway triangle: Brest-Litovsk-Pinsk-Kovel. But troops in left-bank Ukraine were still having a difficult time because the Bolsheviks had appeared there as rivals to the 'Directoria'.

On 9 November, when the first news arrived of the German Revolution, Lenin had denounced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. As a result, both the Ukraine of the Hetman and the Ukraine of the 'Directoria' found themselves in a state of war with the Soviets. The Bolsheviks had adherents enough in left-bank Ukraine and the industrial centres of New Russia: already in November they tried to take Poltava; at Ekaterinoslav, after the Austrians left, the Red Republic was proclaimed; and Soviets were set up in the mining towns of the Donets upon the departure of the Germans. At Kharkov the Staff of the 1st Army Corps and a certain number of German troops remained, but these could not protect the officials of the 'Directoria' when, on 3 January 1919, 8000 armed 'Reds' entered the city. The Germans in Kharkov found themselves in a parlous

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position, since they could no longer move westward owing to the state of war between the Soviets and the Ukrainians which existed all along the railway lines. There was talk about taking a south-easterly direction and going to the Don Cossacks. At last the Soviets gave permission for the Germans to go by a round-about way passing through Kursk, Orel, Polotsk. The Soviet authorities and the population of the 'Red' towns through which the Germans passed inundated the homing soldiers with propaganda and plagued them with organized 'fraternizing'. The morale of these men suffered far more than had that of their fellows from the anarchic attacks of the 'Petlyurians', and the dissolution of discipline and general demoralization reached a pitch unknown among the troops who had had to fight their way out through hundreds of miles of hostile country.

§5. ANARCHY IN THE UKRAINE: SIMON PETLYURA AND 'BATKO' MAKHNO

Having entered Kiev on 19 December, the 'Directoria' did not enjoy its triumph for long. Just as a year before in the anxious but not unprofitable days of Brest-Litovsk, 'Red' forces were moving on the Ukrainian capital. They were converging from three directions: through Konotop, through Poltava, and along the right bank of the Dniepr. At the same time the Poles—the most ancient enemies of Ukrainian nationality—with their own independence scarcely two months old were threatening all the western provinces.

Early in December an armed conflict had broken out between the Galician Ukrainians who wished to exercise the widely proclaimed right of self-determination and the Poles who looked upon Galicia as 'historically a Polish province'. The Poles had possessed themselves of the district of Kholm, promised once upon a time at Brest-Litovsk to the Ukrainians, and they were taking advantage of the opportunity of broadening its boundaries by infringing on the territory of the former Russian Government of Volhynia. Polish detachments had encounters, towards the middle of January, in the neighbourhood of Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynsk with 'Petlyurian' bands who until then had been more agreeably employed in holding up returning German troop-trains.

During the same weeks the 'Western Ukrainian Republic', proclaimed two months earlier in Lvov, got into a very critical position. The relatively weak Polish forces, collected in former Russian Poland after the Armistice, had now been reinforced by the highly trained and excellently disciplined army of General Haller

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formed in France out of prisoners of war who had been captured or who had deserted from the German and Austrian Armies. The armed forces at the disposal of the Polish Government now amounted to some 80,000 men. The whole of Galicia was occupied without much resistance, and after some street fighting the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' was driven out of Lvov. 669 727

The fugitive Government of this 'Republic' sought the aid of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic', and on 23 January the 'Directoria' proclaimed in solemn session 'the union' of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' with the Ukraine. But on the evening of the same day the first mounted patrols of Antonov-Ovseenko entered Kiev. The 'Directoria' surrendered its capital without a struggle and fled to Vinnitsa. This body, on which so much eloquence had been expended and which had shown always such little capacity, now went completely to pieces. When it left Vinnitsa and established itself in Rovno until the arrival of the Bolsheviks there in April, Vinnichenko used to say jokingly: 'The Directoria is a railway carriage and under that carriage is all its territory!' Petlyura, however, went to Kamenets-Podolsk, and at this point on the former Russian frontier the remnants of the Galician troops of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' concentrated after their expulsion from Lvov.

The commanders of the Bolshevik forces did not take much interest in them, since at that time they were occupied in trying to gain possession of the ports along the Black Sea coast.

An extraordinary medley of events had been taking place in Odessa. The 7th German Landwehr Division, sent there in November to take over from the absconding Austrians, was duly cut off from Kiev and found that it could not fight its way through the swarms of 'Petlyurians' who were occupying the station of Birzula. Marching was out of the question owing to the snow-storms and the horrible state of the roads. British and French warships appeared in the harbour rather later in the month, but without disembarking any troops. Encouraged by their presence, the numerous Russian and Polish ex-officers in the city formed national detachments; but on 11 December important Ukrainian forces appeared in the suburbs. The Russian and Polish detachments took refuge in the port under the protection of the Allied naval guns. A week later transports arrived and landed a corps of French troops under General Borius. Hot street fighting began, and the French, with the Russians and Poles, drove the 'Petlyurians' out of the city.

Meantime the Germans were trying to remain strictly neutral. During the previous week the bulk of the Landwehr Division had

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669 727 succeeded in getting away, but there still remained in Odessa about 1600 German troops and a battery of field artillery. The 15th Landwehr Division in Nikolaev was in the same position: it too was cut off from communication with the German Command in Kiev.

French troops were now quartered in Odessa as well as all sorts of national volunteer formations—Russian, Polish and even Roumanian. Greek troops had disembarked at Kherson. The command was vested in the French General d'Anselm, who proceeded to entrust the 15th German Landwehr Division with the maintenance of law and order in Nikolaev.

'Petlyurian' troops and all sorts of *atamans'* detachments and brigand bands had cut off the cities of the coast from the rest of the Ukraine. After the flight of the 'Directoria' from Kiev, the 'Petlyurian' Colonel Grigoriev, who had gone over to the Bolsheviks, became for a time the dominant figure in that strange hinterland of anarchy. In the second half of February all the attempts of the French and the Volunteers to drive away Grigoriev's men from the immediate vicinity of Odessa and to enlarge the zone of occupation ended in failure. During the fighting at Berezovka the French soldiers of the 156th Division showed very little taste for a conflict which they did not understand. Seven tanks which had got stuck in the New Russian mud were left on the battlefield.

This event lent courage to Grigoriev's Bolsheviks, who on 3–5 March made an attempt to attack Nikolaev and Kherson, but were beaten back by a German armoured train. On 9 March Kherson was again attacked by 'Red' forces; the Greek troops in occupation hastened to evacuate the town and embark in their ships and Kherson fell to the Soviets. On 10 March began the evacuation by sea of the 7th Landwehr Division from Odessa and of the 15th Landwehr Division from Nikolaev. In the latter city the bands of Grigoriev entered the burning suburbs while the Germans were still embarking. No one knew what fate would befall Odessa, but on 2 April General d'Anselm received orders from Paris to evacuate. *Ataman* Grigoriev then 'took Odessa'. His troops did not amount to more than 2000 men. An enormous booty of military stores fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

669 These easy triumphs in the ports of the Black Sea did not consolidate the position of the Soviets, which was becoming really critical during the months of May and June 1919. It is true that beyond the Volga the imprudent advance during the spring of Admiral Kolchak's Siberian troops had ended in the defeat of the 'White' forces; at the same time, however, the Volunteer Army

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of General Denikin had occupied the Donets coalfields and was nearing Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov, while General Wrangel was advancing into the Volga basin from the northern Caucasus and on 30 June entered Tsaritsyn. 669

The Poles were taking advantage of the Russian Civil War by advancing into White Russia and Volhynia where, since April, they had been fighting with Bolshevik detachments which had been sent into the western Governments after the capture of Kiev from the 'Petlyurians'. Petlyura, also, had not exhausted his resources: his retreat into Podolia only served to renew his potentialities. At Kamenets-Podolsk, Petrushevich, 'the Dictator of Eastern Galicia', under pressure from the Poles, gave over the command of his own forces to Petlyura, and the latter now found himself at the head of about 40,000 men, of which some half were ex-soldiers of the old Austrian Army who had either come from Galicia or who were returning there from captivity in Russia. Among these former soldiers of Austria was a considerable number of officers, who were an important factor, since Petlyura's own men consisted only of armed peasants. Owing to the complete ruin of these lands and the impossibility of finding peaceful employment, service even in Petlyura's army had become a profession which at least procured food from day to day. Petlyura's troops were well armed out of the military stores which the Germans had abandoned or of which they had been deprived.

Some fighting with the Bolsheviks took place along the railway line Zhmerinka-Birzula, but what made the 'Petlyurian' campaign for ever memorable in Podolia was the extent and cruelty of their pogroms against the Jewish population. Pogroms began in January during the retreat of the 'Petlyurians' from the Kiev region when a particularly brutal slaughter took place at Belaya Tserkov. They continued in Podolia throughout the months of February, March and April, and what was probably the greatest pogrom of all time was enacted in the frontier town of Proskurov. The killings somewhat abated when the more disciplined Galician ex-soldiers became numerous in Petlyura's ranks.

All the combatants in the Civil War of 1919 took part in Jewish pogroms—the bands of the 'free' *atamans*, the 'Petlyurians', the 'White' Volunteers, the Bolsheviks and the Poles, but the 'Petlyurians' undoubtedly distinguished themselves most in this direction. According to official Jewish sources (*Ostjüdische Archiven*, Berlin) the 'Petlyurians' killed off 17,000 persons; the 'free' *atamans* 8000; the Volunteer Armies are accused of having 5000 to their score; the Soviet troops 1000; and the Polish Army several hundreds (Autumn [563]

669 1917—April 1921). The 'Petlyurians' also occupy first place for the number of organized pogroms—493, or together with the 'free' *atamans*—852; the Volunteers follow with 233; the Soviets with 106; and the Poles with 32. How far Petlyura himself was guilty in the organization of these pogroms it is difficult to say. Arnold Margolin, himself a Jew, relates that Petlyura was extremely depressed by pogroms, and 'with tears in his eyes implored his men not to commit them'. But to persuade these 'last of the *Haydamaky*' to any moderation was no easy task.

Petlyura can scarcely be accused of having seriously favoured pogroms as part of a considered policy, since both he and the 'Directoria' were making every effort to attract the favourable attention of the representatives of the victorious Entente powers. Immediately after the Armistice a report had been addressed to Consul Hainnot, which was subsequently forwarded to General d'Anselm in Odessa and to General Berthelot, who was at that time in Jassy. This report was intended to establish the fact that the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' was a quite normal, strictly democratic, and independent state. Although the French did not hesitate to drive away the detachments of the 'Directoria' by force of arms from the vicinity of Odessa, in January 1919 they went so far as to send a representative to Kiev in the person of General Tabouis. The British, at the same time, contented themselves with the despatch to Kiev of a member of the Consular Service. Altogether the impression gained ground in Kiev that the Ukraine had been reserved as a zone of French interest, while the British were more concerned with the Caucasian area and with the Volunteer Army.

The 'Directoria' viewed the question of its representation at the Paris Peace Conference as a matter of particular importance. A Delegation was hastily formed which included the 'Western Ukrainians' of Galicia with the engineer Sidorenko at their head; the 'Directoria' was represented by their 'Foreign Minister', A. Shulgin; and the numerous Jewish population of the Ukraine had a spokesman in Arnold Margolin. This Delegation, together with others of Governments which had been formed or which had tried to form themselves out of different parts of the Russian Empire, had not been invited to Paris by anyone and was recognized by no one. The Secretary of the Ukrainian Delegation, I. Borshak, summarizing the results of the work done between January and March 1919, reported to the 'Directoria': 'All asked us for information about the Ukrainian Question, but none gave any positive answer. No one promised to recognize our independence. The usual answer was: "Wait till the Conference discusses the Russian

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648 668 the Soviets, but they had no easy task. The Volunteer Army regarded the 'Petlyurians' with scarcely less distaste than it did the Bolsheviks, while the 'Directoria' considered the 'White' movement to be monarchical and reactionary, and the Ukrainian nationalists aimed at separation rather than at federalism. The relation between the Volunteer Army and the Poles was outwardly correct, but each grudged the other success in their 'common struggle' against the Soviets. The Russians were nervous about the Polish campaign in White Russia and Volhynia; the Poles feared the resurrection of a great Russia. The Poles went so far as to hold their advance against the Red Army when this advance could have dealt a decisive blow to the Soviets at the moment of Denikin's greatest success. These dissensions, which were natural enough, in the end allowed the Bolsheviks to extricate themselves from a position which, as Trotsky relates in his memoirs, Lenin at that time regarded as hopeless.

669 In July the Volunteer Army occupied Ekaterinoslav; then Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa; and on the 3rd Kharkov had been taken after some fighting. Regardless of General Wrangel's proposal to halt on the line Tsaritsyn-Ekaterinoslav and to put some order into the disorganized rear, Denikin pressed the advance in a northerly direction towards Moscow and westward on Kiev. As a result his none too numerous forces were widely scattered over an enormous territory.

669 648 648 At the same time Petlyura had begun his advance on Kiev from the west, and this circumstance was one of the reasons for the false manœuvre undertaken by the Volunteer Army. In the end the Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' came up to Kiev at the same time, and the ancient city was taken on 1 September, from the east by the 'Whites' and from the south by the Ukrainians. No good could be expected to result from this simultaneous but separate occupation of Kiev by the rival armies. *Pourparlers* did not result in an agreement. It only became clear that the Galicians were ready to come to an understanding with the 'Whites', but the 'Directoria' was jealous, and stubborn. Petlyura demanded complete independence and vast territories. In his blind hate of 'the Russian monarchists and reactionaries' he secretly appealed for help to the Poles. When in the second half of September armed conflicts between the Volunteers and the 'Petlyurians' broke out and the latter were driven out of Kiev towards the west, rumours of Petlyura's negotiations with the Poles set the Galician regiments against him. On 7 November the Galicians, tired of the lack of discipline and inefficiency rife among the 'Petlyurians', decided to desert their leader and to go over to the

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Volunteers in order to continue a joint struggle against the Bolsheviks and, if need be, against the Poles. 669 648

The remnants of the 'Petlyurians' went off into Podolia, where they renewed their brutal pogroms against the Jews. During the latter part of November and December they were decimated by a serious epidemic of black typhus which overtook them in the neighbourhood of Zhmerinka. 642

Having lost his army and almost alone, Petlyura betook himself to the Polish lines, where on 2 December he put his hand to a secret agreement, in the name of the 'Directoria', whereby he abandoned all claims on Galicia and 'recognized' Polish rule over Kholm, Polesia and Western Podolia—regions which were already in occupation of the Polish Army. On 24 December the 'Directoria' ceased to exist and gave over its phantom authority to a 'cabinet' formed by one Isaac Mazeppa, an ex-employee of the Union of Zemstvos.

In the meantime catastrophe had overtaken the Volunteer Army. 669 Having occupied Kiev and Chernigov during September, the 'Whites' had reached Kursk and even Orel by the end of October. Their line was now dangerously extended and the advance succumbed to a sudden flanking attack delivered to the north of Kharkov. A serious defeat at Kromy to the south-west of Orel forced them out of the whole area between Kursk and Kharkov. Their collapse was now even more rapid than their progress had been. Kiev was evacuated, and within a few weeks all the Ukraine, in circumstances which grew more perilous every day.

The Volunteer Army had never been popular among the peasantry. During the preceding three years the peasants had lived through an evil nightmare of change and upheaval. They distrusted 'the officers' army' and suspected it, not without reason, of being the instrument whereby 'the former order' would be restored. In many cases the officials hastily appointed by General Denikin had contributed to this distrust by an ill-considered restoration of the rights of property in districts which they had been sent to administer. Though the peasant had never found any benefit from 'the new order' he was stubbornly opposed to a return to 'the old ways'. This frame of mind was the principal cause of the chaos which reigned in the rear of the White Army and it was more conducive to the catastrophe of the autumn of 1919 than either the unfortunate strategy of General Denikin or the superior abilities of the Red Army chiefs.

'The struggle which in 1919 drenched the Ukraine in blood recalled by its cruelties the Cossack risings of the seventeenth

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

669 century. Thousands of peaceful citizens, principally landowners, Jews and German colonists, were ruthlessly put to death by "Petlyurians" and *atamans*. In their turn the Soviet authorities revenged themselves in the towns and villages on the hostages taken by the Bolsheviks and ordered mass executions of the bourgeoisie, intelligentsia and priests. The "Whites", too, had introduced the custom of hanging Communists' (Brégy and Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, p. 211).

The ultimate expression of rural anarchy during this grim period were the bands of armed peasants which roamed the country, slaughtering, looting and burning. Some of these bands called themselves 'Petlyurians', but most of them were acting on their own risk and peril. The *ataman* or *batko* ('father') was the head of a band consisting of several scores or several hundreds or even several thousands of armed men. The *batky* ruthlessly warred against any kind of authority, and their operations harmed the White Army most. The presence of this evil alone ought to have restrained the Volunteers from advancing too rapidly north, for as the area of occupation expanded and as little attempt was made to provide for adequate administration and policing, the number of the bands grew. Scores of important gangs were engaged in committing every kind of atrocity wherever they went. Zeleny devastated the Governments of Kiev and Poltava; Angel, Poltava and Chernigov; Grigoriev chose the lower course of the Dniepr; Tyutyunnyk, the region of Cherkassy; Struk and Sokolovsky, southern Polesia; and the famous Makhno became the terror of the whole of New Russia. Some of these fellows pretended to some kind of ideology: they were adherents of 'Communism without Jews' or, like Makhno, 'Anarchists'. These 'brigands with a social background' had some remote likeness to the *Haydamaky* of the eighteenth century, but then the *Haydamaky* in their own peculiar way had faith; they put religion before everything, and 'sought justice', not only social justice but also national justice, because they were believers and fought 'for the Ukrainian people oppressed by Polish landlords'.

In the course of the year 1919 *batko* Makhno rendered great services to the Soviets by seriously embarrassing the White Armies during the height of their advance on Moscow. Makhno belonged to what was called the 'half-intelligentsia' of peasant origin and was born in the big village of Gulyay-Pole to the north of Melitopol in New Russia. In 1907 he was exiled to Siberia, where he had to do hard labour for the murder of a policeman. Returning in 1917, owing to the wide amnesty at that time granted to numerous categories of common criminals, he had been cunning enough to

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assume a deep red coloration. Makhno returned to Gulyay-Pole, not as an ex-convict but as an 'anarchist'. The times were not for discussing anarchist theories but rather for applying anarchist practice. Soon the fame of the Gulyay-Pole *ataman* and his feats spread over the steppes between Melitopol and Taganrog. After the Bolshevik *coup d'état* Makhno alternately waged war or made peace with the local Soviets. In the spring of 1919 the Bolsheviks, retreating under the pressure of Denikin's army, had the brilliant idea of providing the *batko* with arms in order that he might harass the advance of the Volunteers.

During the advance on Kharkov the rear of the White Army became a promising field for Makhno's operations. It soon became an urgent necessity to put an end to him. This was done on 5–7 June, when the Caucasian Cossack Division of General Shkuro defeated at Gulyay-Pole great bands of 'Makhnovians'. They scattered but gradually gathered again in August in the neighbourhood of Elizavetgrad. Makhno reappeared as their chief; provided arms which he had secured from Petlyura; gained new recruits, and between 26 September and 7 October undertook his astonishing raid. He moved a distance of 600 kilometres in eleven days, twice defeating detachments of 'Whites' and plundering all the villages and towns which lay on his way. He turned up once more in the vicinity of Gulyay-Pole and thousands of uprooted peasants, deserters and brigands flocked to his standard. He was soon able to take Melitopol, Berdyansk and Mariupol, to make three raids on Ekaterinoslav and even to threaten the Headquarters of General Denikin in Taganrog. Two Army Corps of the Volunteers had to be detached to contain Makhno. The 'Whites', however, did not succeed in putting an end to the 'anarchist *batko*', who proved to possess great talents as a cavalry leader and who even invented 'new steppe-war tactics' (he put all his infantry in peasant carts and transported his machine-guns in wheel-barrows).

The Red Army finally liquidated Makhno's bands in 1920 at the same time as their last campaign against Wrangel in the Crimea. Nestor Makhno himself did not perish, but turned up in Paris, where he learned to earn his livelihood in the peaceful occupation of a cinema studio *figurant*; he died a few years later.

On 20 December 1919 Kiev was evacuated by the Volunteers, and the unfortunate city, about New Year's Day, fell for a third time into the hands of the Soviets. At the end of January the Red Army occupied Nikolaev and Kherson, and on 7 February Odessa fell. A large part of the 'White' forces crossed the border into Roumania and Poland, where they were disarmed.

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Meanwhile Petlyura had not exhausted his resources. He had the skill to persuade Pilsudski that the situation in the Ukraine offered great possibilities for the re-establishment under new conditions of the ancient structure of *Rzecz Pospolita*, which should now spread to the Dniepr and the Black Sea. Petlyura for the moment refrained from raising the issue of left-bank Ukraine, but he persuaded the Polish leader that should he appear at the head of Ukrainian troops in right-bank Ukraine the whole country would rise against the Soviets. To strengthen his influence with the Poles, Petlyura succeeded in forming one Ukrainian Division under the command of Colonel Bezruchko, which was stationed on the confines of Volhynia with the Polish troops who were destined for the campaign.

In the middle of April 1920, when the Red Army was engaged against the Volunteers in the Crimea, Pilsudski concentrated between 50,000 and 60,000 men on the Volhynian border and struck suddenly at Kiev. On 7 May the Poles entered the hapless city on the Dniepr. Petlyura was following in their wake and he fixed his headquarters at Zhitomir from where, with the aid of numerous agents and a flood of proclamations, he hoped 'to mobilize all Ukrainian forces'.

Petlyura's effort was a failure. Not more than 2000 or 3000 needy vagabonds answered the call to arms. The people were utterly weary and exhausted after the events of the last three years, and they fled in terror from any kind of mobilization—'Petlyurian' or Bolshevik. Further, they were not inspired by the appeal to come forward to the aid of the Polish military authorities so suddenly established in their capital.

Pilsudski's adventure in any event had been undertaken six months too late. The Volunteers in the South of Russia were only holding the Crimea, while in the far north General Miller's front had collapsed, and General Yudenich had failed to drive home his attack from Estonia, even though it had reached the suburbs of Petrograd. At the beginning of June the Bolsheviks concentrated considerable forces to the south of Kiev while the new 'Red Mounted Army' numbering 16,000 sabres threatened the long and thinly held line of Polish communications.

On 11 June the Polish retreat began. After some hard fighting in the region of the river Teterev, Colonel Smygly-Rydz succeeded in extricating his army and retreated through Volhynia with heavy losses in men and material. 'The last of the Petlyurians' also left the territory of the Ukraine with numbers greatly reduced—not so much on account of losses in battle as of desertions.

The 'Red Mounted Army' of General Budenny invaded Galicia;

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occupied Lvov, and advanced on Warsaw through Zamość by the same route which the Cossack hordes of Khmelnytsky had followed nearly three centuries before. But the Russians were checked at the gates of Warsaw (15 August), and their subsequent retreat was almost as rapid as their advance and the preceding Polish advance and retreat had been. 721 669

On 12 October an armistice was signed, and in the following year the Peace of Riga was to stabilize conditions on the Russian borderlands for nearly twenty years. Poland retained most of the Ukrainian territory of which she had been in occupation prior to the attack on Kiev—large parts of Volhynia and Polesia as well as about half the area of White Russia. The much disputed Kholm district and all Galicia also remained in Polish hands, although the temporary occupation of these territories had only been authorized by the Paris Conference 'pending the solution of the Russian Question'. As a result of the activities of the tenacious Petlyura and the visionary politicians of the 'Directoria' the Poles received, therefore, about 150,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory and about 5,000,000 Ukrainian-speaking subjects. 728

Simon Petlyura, like so many of the picturesque figures of the Russian Revolution, retired to Paris where, some years later, he was killed by a revolver shot in the Boulevard St Michel. The shot was fired by a young Jew named Schwartzbrod, who stated at his trial that he was taking vengeance on Petlyura for the pogroms committed by the 'Petlyurians'. (8, 9, 10)

§6. THE SOVIETS AND THE GROWTH OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

'The Ukrainian Soviet Republic' had been declared on 18 December 1918 in a proclamation of 'the Military and Revolutionary Committee of the Red Southern Army' signed by Stalin and Rakovski; the proclamation conferred all authority in 'the liberated territory' on 'the Ukrainian workers and the Ukrainian peasants'. On 3 January 1919, the day on which the Red Army entered Kharkov, then still occupied by part of the 1st German Army Corps, a proclamation of 'the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' announced that all authority in the Ukraine was vested in this Committee which had 'the confidence of the working and peasant masses'. This document was signed by the President of the Committee, Manuilsky, and by the following members: Rakovski, Grinko, Zatonsky and Skrypnik. Rakovski was a professional revolutionary, a Bulgarian or Roumanian Jew by origin, 642 669 635

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642 who had always lived in the *Quartier Latin* in Paris; Zatonsky and
669 Skrypnik were the first Ukrainian politicians to go over to the
635 Bolsheviks.

This same Committee, on 14 February, two or three weeks after the occupation of Kiev, announced the federation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with 'the All-Russian Republic of Workers and Peasants'. Subsequently, on 9 March, 'according to the Revolutionary order' 'the First Ukrainian Congress of Soldiers', Peasants' and Workers' Delegates' was called together. This body received for approval 'the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic'. Seven months had not elapsed before nine-tenths of the territory of this first Ukrainian Soviet Republic had fallen into the hands of the Volunteer Army.

In spite of the ephemeral character of the first Ukrainian Soviet Republic it is worth considering the theoretical basis on which this state was founded, since its structure illustrates Lenin's conceptions as to the treatment of nationalities within the Communist State.

656 Following the November *coup d'état* two documents were
563 published in Russia which had an 'ideological' importance in relation to the formation of national republics. The first was a 'Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the Nations Forming Part of Russia'; it concluded as follows:

'According to the Will of the Congress of Soviets, the Council of People's Commissars has decided to adopt as a foundation for its activities in the question of nationalities the following principles:

(1) The equality and sovereign rights of all the nationalities of Russia;

(2) The right of self-determination of all these nationalities, including the right to form independent states;

(3) The abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations;

(4) The free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.'

The document bears the signature of Dzhugashvili-Stalin, Commissar for Nationalities, and of Ulianov-Lenin, President of the Council of People's Commissars.

The second document is a 'Declaration of the Rights of Oppressed Nationalities', dated 24 January 1918 and approved by the 3rd Congress of All-Russian Soviets. The setting up by this Congress of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was based on the following principles: 'Russia is proclaimed the Republic of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. The Soviet Republic is constituted on the basis of a free union of free

731 conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

656 The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

656 563 669 The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

656 642 The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

668 656 In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

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with the period March–November 1917. A series of interesting articles on the subject from the pen of Milyukov has been published recently in the Parisian Russian daily newspaper *Posledniya Novosti* (The Latest News), 19 March–1 April 1939. For the Ukrainian point of view see D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy* (1917–23), Uzhhorod, 1935; Vinnichenko, *Vozrozhdenie Natsii* (The Resurrection of a Nation), vols. I–III, Vienna, 1925. 113

(4) *The Ukrainians at Brest-Litovsk*

A vivid description of the course of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and of the part played by the delegates of the *Rada* is given in the scholarly work of J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*, London, 1938. An Appendix gives the text of the Peace Treaty with the Ukraine, and a valuable Bibliography is included.

The reminiscences of the leading personalities at Brest-Litovsk have been published in English translations: Hoffmann, *War Diaries and Other Papers*, London, 1929; Czernin, *In the World War*, London, 1919; Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk*, London, 1919; *My Life*, London, 1935.

(5) *The First 'Siege' of Kiev by the Bolsheviks*

This 'siege' continued for about ten days—from 30 January to 8 February 1918. The first Bolshevik detachments approached the city from the left bank of the Dniepr. The city is situated on the high right bank and presented a perfect target for the Red artillery. Most of the damage was done by an armoured train mounting naval guns, which destroyed, among other architectural features, the block of flats built by Professor Hrushevsky when he decided to settle in the city. When other Bolshevik detachments and the 'Ukrainian regiments' which had gone over to them appeared on the right bank, further resistance became impossible. The brunt of the defence was borne, not by the supporters of Holubovich and Vinnichenko, but by volunteer detachments consisting of officers, students and even schoolboys; many young lives were lost. 669

(6) *The Austro-German Occupation of the Ukraine and the Régime of Skoropadsky*

Most interesting material is revealed in the documents published by the Soviets in an anonymous book entitled *Krakh Nemetskoy Okkupatsii na Ukraine: Sbornik Dokumentov izdannykh Gosizdatom* (The Crash of the German Occupation in the Ukraine: Collection of Documents published by the State Publishing Organization), Moscow, 1936. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of these documents which fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks after they occupied Kiev (some of the documents are reproduced in facsimile). It will be difficult, however, for the reader to agree with the deductions made by the Soviet editor. He affirms, for instance, that the Occupation troops were unable to deal with the resistance of 'the great popular masses', and that whole German divisions were employed in putting down workmen's strikes and peasant risings. These assertions are not confirmed by any document. In the documents reference is only made to the assassination of 727 642 113

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517
Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645]
through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669] and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642
munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661]
as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423
tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation.[1] 369
It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

[1] [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

historic Ukrainian lands of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov. The 133
northern part,[1] appropriately known as Polessia, or the "forest [313]
land," is of little value for crop growing but contains the only timber industry of significance in the Ukraine.

As the German armies rolled into the Ukraine in 1941, they 727
tended to advance along the main lines of communication, avoid- 725
ing the difficult, swampy regions. For weeks, or in some cases 668*
even months, the less accessible areas were not brought under German control. This circumstance made possible the development of partisan bands which carried on resistance to the occupation authority.

Although, since 1945, Soviet writers have maintained that the 725
plans for guerrilla warfare against the conqueror had been 665
secretly prepared before the outbreak of hostilities, they assert 669
that these plans were known only to the top level of Communist Party officials. It is fairly certain that the order to develop a partisan movement came as a surprise even to most devoted Communists.[2] In July, 1941, after the decision to form partisan detachments was announced, preparations were pushed forward at a rapid rate by the local authorities. The rapidity of the German advance to the line of the Dnieper, however, rendered largely ineffective systematic attempts to form a partisan movement in the Ukraine west of that river. Even east of the Dnieper the panic produced by the seemingly irresistible German drive played havoc with the organization of guerrilla warfare. Many of the secretly selected leaders were swept along, willingly or unwillingly, in the retreat of the Red Army, while others were discovered and executed by the Germans. In a few places, however, small groups made good their escape to forest or swamp hide-outs. In the southern Ukraine one such group of about five hundred men, trained and directed by the Red Army, but largely composed of local Communist and NKVD officials, established a center of opposition in the swamps formed by the Dnieper south of Nikopol' (Nikopil').[3] This group was destroyed by the German forces in

[2] Oleksii Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet* (The Underground *Oblast* Committee in Action), literary editor Evg. Bosniatskii (Moscow: Vocanoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950), pp. 12–14.

[3] Report of Feldpolizeidirektor at 444. Sicherungsdivision, November 5, 1941, NOKW 1519 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 1519).

1 [of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine -- Analyst]

725 October, but a group of similar size and composition in the Novo
665 Moskovsk-Pavlograd (Novomoskovs'k-Pavlohrad) forest east of
669 Dniepropetrovsk was able to hold out until January, 1942.[4]

While the partisan bands in isolated shelters in the southern steppe Ukraine could not survive the first determined German attacks, those in Polessia were more fortunate. The chief areas of operation were the northern sections of the Chernigov and the Sumy *oblasts*. In the Chernigov *oblast* the partisans were led by the first secretary of the *oblast* committee of the Party, Oleksii Fedorov, a veteran of the revolutionary period. Though a hardened Communist, Fedorov had been born in the Dniepropetrovsk area and considered himself a Ukrainian.[5] He, like many other Party leaders, was temporarily swept from his territory by the rapidity of the German advance but returned in the late summer of 1941 and gathered the scattered remnants of his Party apparatus for a struggle against the Germans.[6] In the Sumy *oblast* the underground Party machinery was completely disrupted, but some of the *raion* officials succeeded in forming small partisan groups.[7]

It is clear from the preceding summary that the initial organization of the Red partisans of the Ukraine was carried out by members of the Communist Party and the Soviet state apparatus. These men were impelled both by their interest in maintaining the *status quo* and by the fear of violent death should they fall into German hands, since all "kommissars" and Communist officials were destined for execution by Hitler. Since the war, Soviet authors have admitted, and even exaggerated the role of the Party in the partisan movement, apparently because they wish to emphasize its "guiding role" in all spheres of Soviet life.[8] During the war, however, and especially in its early stages, while some attention was given to the activity of the Communist Party, an

[4] War Diary No. 2 of 213. Sicherungsdivision, Abteilung Ia, January 1–March 31, 1942, NOKW 2872 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2872); Report of Feldpolizeidirektor to Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets 103, January 9, 1942, NOKW 2911 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2911).

[5] Fedorov, p. 31.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 40 ff.

[7] Sidor Kovpak, *Vid Putivlia do Karpat* (From Putivl' to the Carpathians), literary ed. Ie. Herasimov (Kiev: Ukraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1946), pp. 3 ff.

[8] E.g., in Fedorov's work cited earlier in this chapter.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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PARTISAN ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN UKRAINE

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The following set of maps is intended to present schematically the development of partisan activity in the northern Ukraine from the beginning of the German-Soviet war until the reconquest of the major part of the area by the Red Army at the end of 1943. Territorial divisions indicated, from west to east, are the *Generalbezirke* Volhynia-Podolia, Zhitomir, and Kiev, and the Chernigov *oblast* of the army rear area.

The following symbols are used throughout:

- Major centers of Red Partisan groups
- Area in which Red partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control
- Direction of major drives of Red partisans
- Major centers of Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups adhering to Borovets' or Mel'nyk
- Major centers of Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups adhering to Bandera
- Area in which nationalist partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control
- Direction of major drives of nationalist partisans
- Direction of major German counterdrives

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

JULY, 1941–JUNE, 1942

This map represents a number of developments which were not closely related. The nationalist Ukrainian partisan groups represented were irregular forces in the German service used to combat Red partisans, rather than insurgent partisan forces, and the area represented as controlled by them is the area in which the Germans did not install a civil administration prior to November, 1941 (the "Olevsk Republic").

Ψ_1 The Polis'ka Sich after it went underground in November, 1941

Ψ_2 Ukrainian nationalist police (Polis'ka Sich) headquarters, prior to November, 1941

Ψ_1 Major centers of Red partisans in winter and spring of 1942

Ψ_2 Chief recruiting area for Kovpak's Red partisan force in summer, 1942

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JULY–DECEMBER, 1942



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

JANUARY–MAY, 1943

- Major centers of Bandera groups during the winter and early spring of 1943
- Extension of Bandera partisan activity in April and May, 1943
- Major centers of "Bul'ba" and Mel'nyk groups throughout the period
- Major centers of Red partisan activity in winter and early spring of 1943
- Additional centers of Red partisan activity in April and May, 1943
- Route of Kovpak's Red partisan band (Actually the band began its raid in November, 1942, being driven beyond the northern border of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in December, as shown on the map, but for the sake of simplicity all of the band's activities during this first period of its invasion of the "Right Bank" Ukraine have been shown on this map.)

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

JUNE–DECEMBER, 1943

- Major centers of Bandera partisan activity, May–July, 1943
- New headquarters of Bandera group in late summer and autumn, 1943
- Major Mel'nyk and "Bul'ba" bands, May–July, 1943
- Last stronghold of "Bul'ba" group before its dissolution
- Chief points of contact of Red partisan groups with nationalist groups, May–July, 1943
- Route of Kovpak's Carpathian raid
- Major areas of Kovpak's activity in Galicia, July, 1943
- Area to which remnants of Kovpak's band returned in September, 1943
- Approximate lines of combat between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, with the Roman numerals referring to dates as follows:

I October 1, 1943
II November 12, 1943
III December 10, 1943
IV February 15, 1944

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725 effort was made to give the impression that the partisans rep-
665 resented a spontaneous popular uprising against the foreign
669 invader; the "common man" of the occupied areas of the Soviet Union was pictured as a patriot voluntarily assisting the Red Army to overthrow German rule.[9]

725 It is this aspect of the Soviet partisan movement which makes
668* it of particular interest to this study. The partisans in the Ukraine were pictured as motivated by local patriotism, while their leaders were described as successors of Khmelnits'kyi and other legendary heroes. The primary effort in this direction centered about the person of Sidor Kovpak, who became the chieftain of the partisans of the Sumy *oblast*. Kovpak claimed to be a descendant of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. While his enemies declared he was a gypsy—the disarray of his bivouac led even admirers to compare it to a gypsy camp—it appears likely that he was of native Ukrainian origin. He was an old Communist, a veteran of the civil war of 1918–20, but was quite uneducated, and had occupied only minor posts in the Soviet hierarchy. Apparently, however, his rough and earthy manner endeared him to considerable elements of the Ukrainian population, while his evident skill in conducting his partisan operations won him respect.[10]

Kovpak's personal qualities and the fact that his band was formed on Ukrainian soil, made it possible for Soviet propagandists to give some color to their assertion that his partisan organization was a manifestation of Ukrainian patriotism. Closer examination of the groups operating in the northeastern *oblasts* casts considerable doubt on this contention. In the first place, whatever the origins of its members, Kovpak's band was almost certainly formed initially, as were the other partisan groups in 1941, of members of the ruling machine. The commissar Rudnev, said to be the real "brains" of Kovpak's band, for example, was

[9] See, for example, Timofei (Timothy) Strokach, *Partyzany Ukrainy* (The Partisans of the Ukraine) (Moscow: Ukrvydav Ts. K. KP[b]U, 1943). The title sheet of this work describes Strokach as a "deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR."

[10] On Kovpak cf. his memoir previously cited; P. Vershigora, *Liudi s chistoi sovest'iu* (People with Clean Consciences) (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel', 1951), pp. 39, 49, 181, 412; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 23, 1943, p. 3 (for the nature of this source see n. 15 below); V. Andreev, *Narodnaia voina: Zapiski partizana* (The People's War: Sketches of a Partisan) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1952), p. 228.

725 668* Tsuman' area, Kovpak turned south. His route from that point would have taken him directly through the Kremenets centers of the Mel'nyk and Bandera bands, but again he made a detour, this time to the east, skirting the Kremenets area and entering Galicia south of Ternopol' (Tarnopil').[54] The entire march across the area of operations of the nationalist partisans—over 250 miles—took the Red force about three weeks.[55]

725 669 When Kovpak's force entered Galicia in early July, it was only partially successful in achieving its primary objective, disruption of the Drohobich petroleum production.[56] It did, however, cause a severe disturbance of the peace of Galicia. For a long time the OUN-B had been preparing an underground armed force there. When Kovpak's arrival turned the extreme eastern part of the province into a battlefield, this organization (Ukraïns'ka Narodna Samooborona—Ukrainian Popular Self-Defense, a name chosen to conceal its identity with the Volhynian forces) came into the open to fight the Communists.[57] As they had long had numerous scores to settle with the occupation authorities, the young warriors also began sporadic fighting with the Germans.[58] What is most interesting as an indication of the state of feeling in Galicia, however, is the speed with which Kovpak's group melted away

[54] MS D; Kovpak, map. It will be noted that, although a distinct shift in route was made, the deviation was not very great—perhaps twenty miles. One source maintains that Kovpak sent emissaries to the groups at Kremenets to propose cooperation or at least neutrality, but that while they refused, the largest ("Khrin's") numbered only two hundred, and so was quite incapable of attacking Kovpak's more than two thousand men (MS D).

[55] While the force left its swamp headquarters on June 12, it evidently did not enter western Polessia until about the twentieth and was deep in Galicia by July 9 (Kovpak, p. 109, and map).

[56] According to Kovpak the aim was the destruction of the oil fields around Ternopol', the second largest petroleum production center under German control (Kovpak, p. 107). While this is plausible enough, Ukrainian sources have always claimed that the aim of the expedition was disruption of the tranquility of Galicia, and especially interference with recruitment of Galician youths for the German armed forces. Probably the latter purpose occupied at least a secondary place in the minds of the Soviet leaders, since they would scarcely be willing to admit that it was necessary to send a partisan group which had been founded five hundred miles away in order to prevent their former subjects in Galicia from joining the "Fascist" forces.

[57] Lebed', p. 49.

[58] *Ibid.*; Report of "Dr. Frédéric" to Auswärtiges Amt, September 19, 1943, CXLVa 60, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 60); cf. Chapter VII, n. 25.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in the unfavorable environment. When the raid on the oil fields failed, the group headed for the Carpathians. It is apparent even from Kovpak's own account that the powerful force disintegrated within a few weeks of its arrival there. In the latter part of August, Kovpak himself, with part of the band, headed north, reaching the swamp region on September 1 with about three hundred men. His second in command remained behind and was killed, apparently with the majority of the band.[59] Since the Carpathians contain at least as favorable terrain for guerrilla operations as does the Polessian area, where Kovpak's group maintained itself and even grew during months of heavy German attacks, it appears that a decisive factor in the rapid destruction of the band was the hostile attitude of the Galician population.

Kovpak's force had scarcely left Volhynia before the Bandera partisans began to seize control of the nationalist resistance movement. The failure of negotiations with Borovets' induced their commander, Dmytro Kliachkevs'kyi, to adopt the title UPA in an apparent effort to secure the prestige attached to it by "Bul'ba's" earlier start.[60] At the same time, the Bandera partisans regained the services of the most experienced of their commanders, Roman Shukevych, who had been the chief Ukrainian organizer in "Nachtigall." After the dissolution of Stets'ko's government, this unit had been withdrawn from the front, together with "Roland." Both detachments were thoroughly reorganized, certain nationalist members were arrested and the remainder sent as a detachment to fight Red partisans in White Russia.[61] When it appeared likely that the Germans would also suppress this anti-partisan unit, Shukevych escaped to Galicia, arriving in L'vov in the spring of 1943. There the Provid appointed him commander of all OUN-B partisan forces.[62] Moreover, the leaders decided that the refusal of Borovets' and the Mel'nyk forces to accept their proposals for union required forceful action to see that the nationalist partisan struggle did not degenerate into the private

[59] Kovpak, p. 124.
[60] See Chapter IV, n. 79.
[61] Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (June-July, 1952), p. 6; Lebed', p. 22.
[62] Interview 76.

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enterprises of numerous *otamans* or war lords, as had the Ukrainian movement in the last days of Petliura's regime.[63]

Consequently, on July 6, shortly after Kovpak had passed through the area, "Kruk's" force suddenly appeared fully armed before the Mel'nyk detachment of "Khrin" and demanded that it submit to Bandera command. Lack of preparation made resistance impossible; apparently, too, OUN-B propaganda had prepared the ground for the coup. At any rate, the majority of the Mel'nyk group accepted the ultimatum and enrolled in the Bandera force.[64]

Shortly afterwards, Iatseniuk's group was similarly compelled to join the rival forces.[65] After these incidents, the remaining Mel'nyk and independent groups rapidly melted away; they were destroyed by Communists or Bandera partisans, or joined the latter. In mid-August, "Bul'ba's" main force, which had also been seriously weakened, in part because of continued fights with Red partisans, was attacked by an OUN-B group. Two of his principal advisers from the UNR were captured and forced to join the OUN-B group; his wife was also taken prisoner.[66] He himself, together with Shtul', Mitrynga, Raievs'kyi, and other leaders, but with only a handful of fighting men, was driven eastward into Communist-infested territory. Here in November the group encountered a stronger Red force. In the resulting fight, Mitrynga and Raievs'kyi were killed, but Borovets' and Shtul' again managed to escape.[67] This time they took the only course which they felt remained open: they left Volhynia altogether, going to Warsaw to seek German assistance to rebuild their scattered forces.[68] Shcherbatiuk remained as commander of the tiny, demoralized group in Volhynia (which had been renamed the Ukraïns'ka Narodna Revoliutsiina Armiia—Ukrainian People's

[63] Lebed', pp. 41–43.

[64] Shuliak, p. 25; MS D; I. Hirniak, "Tse bulo 6. lypnia 1943. roku" (This was July 6, 1943), *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), July 1, 1951, p. 3. All three sources assert that numerous Mel'nyk adherents were executed by the OUN-B.

[65] Shuliak, p. 27.

[66] *Ibid.*; Hrytsenko in *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 14, 1951, p. 4.

[67] Interviews 50, 72.

[68] Lebed', pp. 41–43, confirms the general nature of these attacks on the "Bul'bist" groups, although he emphasizes their lack of organization and the "bloodless" nature of the OUN-B compulsion.

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Revolutionary Army—UNRA, to distinguish it from the Bandera usurpers of the original title).[69] 669 725

The rapid loss of strength of the Mel'nyk-Borovets' forces presents something of a puzzle. The explanation offered by the representatives of the latter is that they deliberately decided to refrain from entering into a fratricidal struggle. In part this appears to be correct. A major objective of both Borovets' and the Mel'nyk chiefs was to avoid creating a large-scale partisan organization, yet this is what would have been necessary to counter the Bandera group, which was bent on forming just such a powerful force. On the other hand, the assertion of adherents of the defeated party that the first attacks came unexpectedly, yet resulted in a complete surrender, itself implies that it was not calculated avoidance of an internecine struggle which alone led to the defeat. While the Bandera adherents were tightly organized, capable of sudden, prepared action, the other nationalist forces suffered from lack of central organization and competent leadership, since Borovets' was himself inadequately trained to conduct a campaign which required political as well as military experience and yet was unable to secure advice from a single, unified advisory body. Moreover, the very dynamism and *élan* of the Bandera party appear to have attracted popular support; in spite of the comparative lack of military ability of "Kruk," for example, he is said to have been more popular than "Khrin." No doubt, too, their program of mass uprising, while of doubtful wisdom, was, like all forthright action, appealing to active spirits. It is noteworthy that nearly all of the members of the other partisan groups, when compelled to join the OUN-B movement, did so without taking a favorable opportunity to desert. Ukrainians in general have frequently been in the unhappy position of having to choose the lesser evil, which was unquestionably the Bandera movement, ruthless as many of its adherents were. The main concern was to fight on against the alien occupiers.[70] A third factor was the geographical location of the opposing forces. The group under Borovets' occupied excellent terrain, but an

[69] Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba*, p. 12.

[70] This feeling was expressed in a letter from Iatseniuk to Borovets' explaining that he accepted the OUN-B coercion only so that he could continue to fight against the Soviet and German forces (Interview 50).

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extremely exposed position, subjected to constant pressure by the Red partisans coming down from the northeast. Probably "Bul'ba" suffered as much altogether from attacks from them as he did at the hands of the Bandera partisans. The latter, on the other hand, occupied a somewhat more sheltered position in northern Volhynia and had a fairly clear line of communication to their large base in Galicia. Finally, the possession of the Galician source of manpower and leadership, very much larger than any outside source available to the rival groups, gave the OUN-B a decisive advantage, which had been consolidated by the early infiltration of the Volhynian police forces by Bandera organizers.

By fall of 1943 the Bandera group was in substantial control of the country districts of Volhynia and southwestern Polessia.[71] The Germans, of course, held the towns and with difficulty maintained movement on the principal roads, but it was even possible for OUN-B agents to penetrate the Reichskommissariat capital, Rovno, and to kill several of Koch's principal officials in broad daylight.[72] Such a large area east of Rovno was under full control of the insurgents that they set about constructing a "state" apparatus, including military training camps, hospitals, and a school system.[73] The total number of persons involved in the movement —including medical, administrative, and instructional personnel, as well as fighting men—was tens of thousands. Looked at in this fashion, the nationalist claim of a hundred thousand members of the UPA is perhaps not incredible, since a fairly trustworthy source describes one village in which the total personnel reached two thousand. Probably a German estimate of forty thousand (at the end of 1943) is more nearly accurate, however.[74] Included in the forces, according to nationalist accounts, were a number of non-Ukrainian elements—Jewish physicians and deserters from German police units recruited from prisoners of war representing many of the nations of the Soviet Union. The great weakness of the movement, however, was lack of trained officers. For a long time the Bandera partisans had been forced to use as chief of staff an elderly UNR officer ostensibly in command of a Rovno

[71] Occ E-4 (1).
[72] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, November 23, 1943, p. 3; Occ E-4 (1).
[73] Lebed', pp. 29–30.
[74] Occ E-4 (1).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

police regiment.[75] Each additional UNR officer from the "Bul'ba" forces, aging though he was, was a treasure who was given a post of great importance by his new masters.[76] Similarly, Soviet officers who escaped from prisoner camps or deserted from Red forces were eagerly welcomed. The lack of trained military personnel greatly limited the partisan organization's value as a fighting force.

The presence of many men who had lived under the Soviet system at first acted as a disturbing influence in the organization. The Bandera leadership, having carried the policy of one-party direction to a temporarily successful conclusion, was determined to maintain this position and to prevent the development of an East Ukrainian opposition, which they suspected was infected with Communist attitudes. Their instrument was the SB or Security Service, forged by Lebed' years previously. Though the extent of the "purges" of "unreliable elements" (primarily East Ukrainians, but including some former Mel'nyk partisans, although apparently no old UNR émigrés) is uncertain, there is little question that it was sufficiently great to arouse extreme disaffection among the non-OUN-B elements in the enlarged partisan movement.[77] At the same time, however, the East Ukrainian elements apparently had sufficient influence—or compelling arguments—to secure the adoption of a program calculated to secure support from former Soviet citizens.[78]

At the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN partisan forces on August 21–25, 1943, both Germany and the "Muscovite" Soviet Union were criticized as not really socialist or progressive, while a future national and social revolution or subjugated peoples was prophesied.[79] Greatest emphasis was still placed on armed struggle, rather than on social policy; but a long series of measures evidently calculated to broaden support among the East Ukrainians was proposed. They included destruction of

[75] MS D.

[76] E.g., Colonel Treiko and Colonel Lytvynenko, chief adviser from Andrew Livyts'kyi to Borovets'; MS D.

[77] Shuliak, p. 30; MS D.

[78] See report of a press conference of the UHVR by M. Stiranka in *Ukrains'ki Visti*, October 11, 1947, p. 3.

[79] *Za samostiinu Ukrainu: Boiovyi organ OUN* (For Ukrainian Independence: The Military Organ of the OUN) (clandestine), No. 9, December 10, 1943.

deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles 642
of 1917. The application of these laws was followed 727
by violent repressions on the part of the Austro-German Army. Punitive expeditions against the peasants became very frequent and summary executions became general throughout the country. The hate of the peasant population was directed against the Austro-Germans and soon reached its peak. The soldiers of the armies of occupation no longer dared to go out after sunset, except in groups. Knives, directed by mysterious hands, frequently found the backs of Austro-German infantry men. The Civil War was in full blast. The Government, incapable of acting without looking for the support of the military forces of the invader, did not escape either hate or contempt and could only maintain itself until the complete reversal of the situation, which was not slow to come. The defeat of the German forces and the armistice forced the troops of occupation to leave Ukrainian territory. It is unnecessary to say that, hated by the popular masses, deprived of all support, and with a doubtful ideology of Ukrainian independence, the Hetman could not continue to govern. Also, as 668
soon as the Austro-German forces began to retire, revolutionary propaganda began to flood the Ukrainian country-side. The former Ukrainian politicians, dismissed from their posts after the establishment of the Hetmanate, put themselves at the head of this movement and received, at first, the unconditional support of the peasants and even of certain military units of the Austro-Germany Army in which the Galician element predominated. Thus, led by Simon Petlioura, the peasants 669
marched on Kiev in order to depose the Hetman. Received everywhere with enthusiasm, they had no difficulty in precipitating the retreat of the Austro-German troops, and rapidly occupied the greater part

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

669 of Western Ukraine. On 14 December the Hetman had to flee from his capital, after having proclaimed, in an absolutely Platonic way and without achieving any concrete results, the re-incorporation of the Ukraine in Russia! At the same time the Soviet Government 726 annulled the peace of Brest-Litovsk and began troop movements, invading Northern Ukraine on their part. A third force, the White Volunteer Army and the Don Cossacks, also made their appearance on Ukrainian territory. These three forces fell upon the Ukraine and made her a battle-field.

Supported by the remainders of the Austro-Hungarian troops and supplied with war material abandoned by the retreating invaders, the forces of the Directorate (new name of the Ukrainian Provisional Government) seemed to be beginning to be in a privileged position. But the lack of officers, the bad administrative organization and, above all, the unpopularity of separatist Ukrainian ideas, tended to give success to the side of the Soviets, who were able to take control of the popular insurrectionary movement which had so far been in the hands of Petlioura. Soviet military historians, while recognizing the high qualities of the Russian counter-revolutionary army, note that among all the opponents of the Red Army the troops of the Directorate were distinguished by their low fighting effectiveness. On the other hand the rigid policy of General Denikine, chief of the Volunteer Army, prevented its union with the adherents of Petlioura, so as to form a single front against the Soviets. Thus the White General was fighting on two fronts, in the north against the Soviet troops and in the west against the Ukrainian troops. On their side the Ukrainians fought both against the Whites in the east and against the Reds in the north.

At the beginning of 1919 the Soviet offensive took

727 by the troops of Petlioura. On their part the Soviet authorities took their vengeance in the towns and the country districts on hostages, in proceeding with mass executions of members of the middle classes, intellectuals, rich peasants, and clergy, while the Whites inaugurated the mass hanging of Communist leaders. The interval of the French occupation of Odessa, in April 1919, 669 changed nothing in the situation. The second counter-727 offensive of the Soviets, followed by still more atrocious massacres, ended in putting the whole Ukraine under Soviet domination at the end of the winter of 1920. The Whites, under the command of General Wrangel, entrenched themselves on the Crimean peninsula. The troops of Petlioura were again driven back towards Poland. From this moment a new phase of the Civil War begins in the Ukraine. Guerrilla fighting, led by chiefs of Ukrainian bands such as Makhno, Kosak, and others, known under the name of the *bat'ki* (the fathers), began. They had important forces at their disposal. Under the cover of political ideologies (Makhno was anarchist, the others 'Communists without Jews,' etc.) they devastated the rear of the Soviet front. The personnel of these bands was undoubtedly of peasant extraction. They were mostly the remnants of the Army of Petlioura which had succeeded, after his defeat, in filtering to the rear of the Soviet front. Until a long time after the establishment of the Soviet regime, these bands menaced the communications and disorganized the life of the country. Full-scale military operations would have been required to deal with the *bat'ki*. The Ukraine did not easily submit to Bolshevism.

648 In 1920 a last attempt of foreign intervention in Ukrainian affairs was undertaken by Marshal Pilsudski.

The defeat of the Central Powers led to the unchaining of the eternal struggle between the Ukrainians and the

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

661 Choumsky, and a group of his friends had opposed this policy of the Central Government. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine accused Choumsky himself of 'spiritual connection' with the counter-revolutionaries of the Polish Ukraine and especially with the U.N.D.O., the most important among the Ukrainian political parties in Galicia and working under Polish influence. At that period one still didn't shoot Soviet Ministers. But Choumsky was forced to leave the Ukraine and to accept a small administrative post in Moscow.

186 To regain the initiative in the Ukrainian question, the
177 Executive Committee of the Comintern passed a resolution in November 1927 directing the Communist Party in the Polish Ukraine to struggle resolutely for the separation of this country from Poland and for its re-inclusion in the Soviet Ukraine.

On the other hand the inauguration of the first five-year plan, which strengthened the economic ties between the Ukraine and the rest of the Soviet Union, and the creation of the Red Army on a basis of discipline and of modern military science, made the use of Russian necessary throughout the whole Soviet territory.

669 This pro-Russian tendency did not last long. The forced collectivization of the land, undertaken in execution of the five-year plan, turned the Ukrainian peasantry against the Soviet Government. This resistance soon changed into a kind of civil war and became underlined by hundreds of thousands of deportations, by thousands of executions, and by a terrible famine.[1]

The resistance to collectivization, which was incompatible with the spirit and the vital interests of the

[1] See the work of Calvin B. Hoover: *Economic Life in Soviet Russia*, M.R.S., Paris, 1934, in which many pages are given to the question of collectivization.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

peasant proprietors, was so violent and seemed so justified that it carried certain Communist circles of peasant extraction with it, and especially the former *borot'bistes* (Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries of the left) who had accepted the Soviet programme in 1917. A new and violent purification followed. 669

Fearing a connection between the discontent of the peasants, the opposition within the party, and the nationalist movement supported from abroad, the Soviet Government took Ukrainianism under its control in order to prevent its use by the opponents of collectivization as a weapon against the Soviet regime. This time Ukrainization was pushed to the extreme and was maintained by the huge apparatus of repression. In all the enterprises, and in workers' syndicates, special cells were formed for the propaganda of the Ukrainian language and for the rigorous control of the knowledge of Ukrainian, which had become the obligatory language, established by the officials. The number of Ukrainian teachers was increased, new Ukrainian theatres, clubs, and libraries were created in industrial centres. Russian newspapers were almost completely suppressed. Those who resisted Ukrainization were mercilessly expelled from the administration and everything was put under the direct control of a special commission of the Council of People's Commissars. To all the countless suppressions to which the Soviet citizens were subjected that of the Ukrainization was added. 186 661

The attempt to snatch Ukrainianism from the hands of circles socially opposed to the Soviet regime was not successful. A veritable nationalistic anti-Soviet propaganda spread everywhere, supported by the officials of the regime. Then came the second change of policy. Two trials, one of the 'Union for the Deliverance of the Ukraine' and the other of the 'National Centre' 661

interest that grew steadily and I am happy and proud, President, to 648
see that to-day this interest is not only personal, for, appointing me as its Representative, the Government of the French Republic approves my efforts and charges me to continue officially the excellent relations that have developed between us. I bring you the official assurance that France, which as the first country is undertaking this decisive step, will support with all her power the Ukrainian Republic in those endeavours she will undertake to continue to walk on that road the Allies had chosen, and on which they will. march without hesitation, thoroughly conscious of their rigths and their duties towards the democracy of the whole world and of humanity... From this day forward France has entered into official relations with Ukraine".

The Government of Great Britain appointed likewise its representative to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic, Sir Picton Bagge. In his letter to the Ukrainian Government Sir Picton wrote:

"My Government has charged me to assure you of its best intentions. It will support with all its strength the Ukrainian Government in the task it will undertake in creating an efficient administration, securing order and fighting the Central Powers".

6. The War of Soviet Russia against Ukraine

In December 1917, the Russian Bolshevik organisations in Uk- 669
raine, leaning on the Russian armed forces stationed in the Ukrainian cities, tried to overthrow the Government of the Ukrainian Central Council and to set up the dictatorship of the Communist Party. The Ukrainian Government disarmed the Russian armed forces and sent them over the boundaries of Ukraine. After this the Soviet Russian Government put to the Ukrainian Government an ultimatum to stop in Ukraine the disarming of Russian troops, which were friendly to Communist dictatorship, and to return the arms to the troops already disarmed.

"If after 48 hours no satisfactory reply will be given, the Council of the People's Commissars will consider the Ukrainian Central Council to be at war with the Government of the Soviets in Russia and Ukraine", so ended the ultimatum of the Russian Communist Government.

For fighting the Ukrainian Democratic Republic the Russian Soviet Government created its puppet 'Government of Soviet Ukraine'. This 'government' took up its residence in Kharkov, captured by troops sent from Russia. The Kharkov 'Ukrainian

● 667 Government' was window-dressing for the further advance of the Russian Communist troops in Ukraine.

At this time the Russian and Jewish Socialist parties in Ukraine issued protests against the attack of the Soviet Russian troops on the democratic Ukraine. In December 1917, a conference of the Russian Social-Democrat organisations in Ukraine (the so-called Mensheviks) in Kiev declared that it "brands with indignation the new infamous deed of the Bolshevik Government, that in its blunt fanaticism and irresponsibility came to declare war on Ukraine".

In the session of the All-Ukrainian Congress of the Councils of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies in Kiev on December 18, 1917, the delegate of the Jewish Social-Democrat 'Bund', Zolotarev, declared that "the Jewish proletariat will defend Ukraine together with the Ukrainian nation against the attack of the violators".

At the same Congress the leader of the Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Schatz, in his speech laid stress on the fact that "now in Russia only one organising force has remained — the Ukrainian democracy and its organ — the Central Council"

Ukraine refused to accept Soviet dictatorship and entered an unequal struggle with overwhelming Communist forces invading [642] from Russia. The Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed the independence of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic by a special Act ('*IV. Universal*') of January 22, 1918. It is significant that even some Russian Communist organisations in Ukraine declared against the attack of Soviet Russia on Ukraine.

One of the commanders of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the Communist Antonov-Ovseyenko, writes in his memoirs that in December 1917, the leader of the Communsit organisations in Kharkov demanded that he should not make war against the Ukrainian Government, with regard to the "special situation in Ukraine in connection with the national problem" (*Comments on the Civil War*, vol. I, p. 55). On this disposition of the Communists in Ukraine Antonov remarks:

"The local Communists are very irresolute, are looking for coalition with opportunists, do not want and do not try to give our troops any assistance" (*Comments on the Civil War*).

Another commander of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine, Colonel Muravyev, wired Antonov from Odessa on February 21, 1918, about the disposition of the workers: "I do not want to carry responsibility for anything that is happening here, if the local Soviets do not want to defend the revolution, their own government" (Antonov, *Comments*, p. 169).

7. The Policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine in 1918

The behaviour of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine was extremely hostile towards all that was Ukrainian. After the conquest of Kiev in February 1918, the Soviet commander Muravyev in his order Nr. 14 wrote: "We bring this government from the far North on the points of our bayonets, and where we set up our rule we support it with all means by the strength of these bayonets . . ." 669

In the Ukrainian capital Kiev, the Bolshevik troops made a terrible pogrom of all Ukrainian cultural institutions: Ukrainian books, the pictures of Ukrainian writers were destroyed: people who had documents written in Ukrainian were shot, etc. This policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine is attested by the statement of a Communist of Ukrainian origin, Vasyl Shakhray, who was in spring 1918, Commissar of War in the 'People's Secretariat' (this was the name of the Government of Soviet Ukraine appointed from Moscow):

"What a 'Ukrainian Government' is this whose members do not properly know and do not wish to know Ukrainian? . . . What a Ukrainian Minister of War am I, if I have to disarm all Ukrainian troops, for they do not want to go with me to defend the Soviet Government? We have only one military support in our fight with the Central Council — the army that was brought into Ukraine by Antonov, which regards all that is Ukrainian as hostile, counter-revolutionary" (*Annals of the Revolution*, No. 1, p. 162: Kharkov, 1928).

The campaign of the Russian Communists against Ukraine had not only political reasons: it was the desire of the Moscow Government to seize the food resources, grain, sugar and other agricultural products, and the natural resources of the Ukraine, iron ore, coal, etc. With the Communist 'Red Guards' the organisers of requisitions of food for Russia came to Ukraine. The commander of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine, Antonov-Ovseyenko, wired to one of the Russian Commissars in charge of supply on January 23, 1918: "You must appoint your representatives for the Gubernias of Kharkov and Poltava . . . who shall conduct the requisitions of grain according to a fixed plan . . . leaning upon an armed force that has been appointed by Moscow and Petersburg for this front particularly". (*Comments on the Civil War*, vol. 1, p. 184).

The Soviet Russian troops exported from Ukraine to Russia everything they regarded as necessary in masses, even the machines and outfitting of factories. Of course, this pillage roused great discontent among the masses of the Ukrainian people. Even greater

669 indignation was caused by the bloody Communist terror that took thousands of innocent people as its victims. The war of Soviet Russia against Ukraine and the terror by the Russian 'Red Guards' in Ukraine, still strengthened among the Ukrainians the will to fight for their national independence. This was expressed in an essay by the President of the Ukrainian Central Council, Professor Hrushevsky, the most authoritative personality of Ukrainian political life of that time. Hrushevsky wrote:

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"The first matter I have to lay stress on is that from now, in our relations with Moscow, a radical change has taken place. It is vain to look for a possibility of living with the Russians in the boundaries of one state. We had sincerely believed that in a new Russia the Ukrainian nation could find the necessary conditions for its manifold development. Now we have lost this belief. We have convinced ourselves that our ways differ from those of a reactionary or a revolutionary Russia. After the unprecedented barbaric atrocities of the Russian Bolsheviks against the Ukrainian people, after the cruel shelling of the Ukrainian capital by the Soviet Russian troops, in our relations with Russia a new period begins. Ukraine has to continue her struggle for liberation in order to create an independent state. Our social and political ideals must be based not on the examples of oriental despotism, but on the principles of the life and development of civilised Europe, where, before all, human dignity is valued. Ukraine has always stood in her history culturally and politically nearer to Western Europe. If we want to liberate ourselves from foreign violence, we have to conform to the civilised West" (*On the Threshold of New Ukraine:* Kiev, 1918).

8. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

728 The Soviet Russian Government had by its ruthless propaganda for an immediate peace treaty definitely disorganised the front against the Central Powers. Thus the representatives of the Ukrainian Government took part in the peace negotiations with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk. The diplomats of the Central Powers gave the Ukrainian Government in the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegates various facilities in order to secure a 'grain treaty' with Ukraine. For the food situation of the Central Powers at that time was fatal. The peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers was concluded in Brest-Litovsk on February 9, 1918. As at that time a great part of Ukraine was occupied by the Soviet Russian troops, it was in the interest of the Central Powers to interrupt the export of grain to Russia, and to use the food

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728
Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669
of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrai- 665
nian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185
Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed 423
simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discon- [563]
tent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727
exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The represen- 565
tatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

structions that the government he formed had to stand entirely by the principle of a Ukrainian state, without any orientation towards Moscow or Poland". Nevertheless, Skoropadsky's Government consisted in its majority of Russians of reactionary trends who distinguished themselves by a hostile attitude towards the Ukrainian national movement. 227 642

The Ukrainian political parties had no confidence in the Skoropadsky régime, they considered it to be an outrage upon the Ukrainian national independence.

Against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austro-Hungarian troops which supported it, mass uprisings began in order to restore the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. Of course, the reaction in Ukraine was 'water to the mill' of Communist propaganda. Moscow knew how to use this situation for its advantage. [669]

At the end of the summer of 1918, the members of the Skoropadsky Government prepared to restore 'indivisible Russia'. Skoropadsky issued an order on November 14, 1918, in which he stated that Ukraine "had the duty to fight first for the creation of an All-Russian Federation, the principal aim of which will be the restoration of Great Russia".

10. The Restoration of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1918) — The Government of the Directory 669

Against the federation of Ukraine with Russia proclaimed by Skoropadsky, and against the reactionary régime in general, the masses of the Ukrainian people arose under the leadership of the Directory, which was elected by the Ukrainian National League (15. 11. 1918). The Ukrainian National League was created by the Ukrainian democratic parties in summer 1918. The principal aim of the League was the struggle against the Russian reaction in Ukraine which prevailed there under Skoropadsky's rule. When the League received news on Skoropadsky's plans for the 'Federation' with the Russia of the White Generals, it began to prepare armed forces in due time. The National League and the Directory had as their members prominent leaders of the Ukrainian Central Council like V. Vynnychenko, S. Petlura, both members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party, M. Shapoval, Socialist-Revolutionary, and others. Summoned by the Directory, hundreds of thousands of the Ukrainian population in cities and villages joined the uprising. Only in Kiev the Skoropadsky Government held out for some time, leaning upon small detachments of Russian Monarchists and the decisive support of the German troops. On

669 December 12, 1918 a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as [661] against 'Russian fdllowers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parliament and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian 668 National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians 186 in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the 642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

726 régime and were at the same time threatened by the advance of the Russian armies — the 'Red' from the North and the 'White' from the South-East. But the Galician Ukrainians showed even under these unfavourable conditions a considerable talent for organisation, a high level of patriotism and sacrifice. Galician Ukraine weakened by four years of war, isolated from the outside world and alone, could without foreign help, defend herself for more than eight months against an enemy several times stronger (Poland), could organise efficient administration, and secure order and legality on her territory.

The Poles started a new offensive in May 1919 with the forces of General Haller's army which had been organised in France and sent to Poland for the defence against Soviet Russia. The Polish Government used this army against the Ukrainians. Against the fresh Polish forces the Ukrainians with their poor equipment could not stand and had to leave Galicia retreating to Eastern Ukraine.

12. Ukraine in Her Struggle against Soviet Russia in 1919

669 The revolution of the Ukrainian democrats against the Skoro-
726 padsky régime met from the very beginning with the irreconcilable enmity of the Russian Communists. It was well understood in Moscow that the reactionary Skoropadsky régime, in 1918, had weakened the Ukrainian national movement and brought confusion into the masses of the Ukrainian people. It was decided in Moscow to conquer Ukraine once more and for this reason an immense propaganda machine was set going. As soon as the Directory had declared the uprising against Skoropadsky, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party appointed a 'Provisional Workers' and Peasants 'Government of Ukraine'. This 'Government' had the task of making war against the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. In one of its first acts this 'Ukrainian Government' outlawed the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as 'enemies of the people'. Of the five members of this 'Ukrainian Soviet Government' only one, Zatonsky, knew Ukrainian, others were people completely strange to Ukraine.

Against the Soviet Russian troops who invaded Ukraine, the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic fought by military and political means. But the Communists were assisted at that time by the shortsighted policy of the Entente Governments. In December 1918, the French navy landed troops on the shores of the Black Sea to help the army of the Russian Volunteers under General Denikin in the fight for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia'. The appearance of foreign troops in Ukraine caused great

confusion among the masses of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainians who had overthrown the reactionary Skoropadsky Government installed by the Germans, looked at the French troops with great distrust, for they might renew the rule of the big landowners in Ukraine. In the meantime the policy of the leaders of the French Army in Ukraine was hostile to the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The attempts of the Ukrainian Government to come to an agreement with the French were fruitless. These negotiations produced only material for Communist propaganda, that the Ukrainian Government 'sold the interests of the Ukrainian nation to the Western imperialists'. The Communist propaganda spread among the Ukrainian Army too. The consequences of this propaganda were disastrous; Ukrainian soldiers deserted the front against the Russian Red Army and some detachments even went over to the side of the Soviet Army. *Thus the French intervention supported only the growth of Communist influence in Ukraine.* 669 726

The Government of Ukraine also made attempts to come to an agreement with the Soviet Government. But Moscow remained, as always, hostile to an independent democratic Ukraine and had only one aim — to take possession of the rich Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian Government, formed in December 1918, was headed by the Social-Democrat Volodymyr Chekhivsky. This Government consisted predominantly of Socialists and had also a representative of the Jewish Social-Democratic Party (Poale-Zion), A. Revutsky, as Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority. All that did not restrain Moscow from calling the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic 'capitalist'. [642]

To the protests of the Ukrainian Government against the attack of the Russian Red Army on Ukraine the Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin replied hypocritically: "The military actions on Ukrainian territory are a matter for the Army of the Directory and the Army of the Ukrainian Soviet Government which is entirely independent."

Against this statement the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in its wire of January 9, 1919, declared.

"The Directory sees clearly the aim of the Government of the People's Commissars; it wants to bring Ukraine, rich in grain, coal and other products, with the aid of the 'Bolshevik Soviets', under its rule and turn her into its colony."

Before the advance of the Russian Red Army the Ukrainian Government was forced to leave Kiev, its capital, at the beginning of February 1919. In Vinnitsa the Socialist members of the Directory quitted the Government. The member of the Directory 726 669 642

669 and Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army, S. Petlura,
726 Social-Democrat, retired from the Party. He was elected President
of the Directory in place of Vynnychenko. A Government was
642 formed without the participation of Socialists with Prof. Serhy Ostapenko as Premier. In Ukrainian political circles there was a hope that Ostapenko's 'bourgeois' Government might more easily succeed in coming to an agreement with the French Command in Odessa than a Socialist one. But these hopes failed. The French representatives offered the Ukrainians the choice to become a part of the front of the 'White' Russians against Bolshevism. They refused to discuss the national rights of Ukraine.

The disregard of the Ukrainian national movement revanged itself gravely in the fate of the Franco-Greek troops landing on the coast of the Black Sea. The parts of the Ukrainian Army which had joined the Soviets under the command of Hrihoriev and J. Tyutyunnyk, attacked the Franco-Greek landing forces. These detachments took, on March 1, 1919, Kherson, and on March, 15, Nikolayev, and in the first days of April, Odessa, forcing the French to embark. Thus, because of not fully understanding the Ukrainian problem, the French representatives, through their orientation towards 'White Russia', in spring 1919, helped actually Soviet Russia to occupy Ukrainian territory. By this they strengthened the hopes of the Russian Communists for 'world revolution'. Russian Communists thought that in Ukraine 'the fate of world revolution is being decided'; the title of a book published in 1919 in Moscow was *Where the Fate of World Revolution Is Being Decided.* From Ukraine the Soviet Russian Government planned to send aid through Rumania to the Hungarian Communists, who had proclaimed a Soviet Rupublic in Budapest on 21. 3. 1919. These plans of the Soviet Russian Government failed, for a that very time mass risings and the struggle of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic stopped the advance of the Soviet Russian troops to the West.

642 The Government of Ostapenko, without the participation of
669 Socialists, called 'Cabinet of Agreement with the Entente', was replaced on April 9, 1919, by a new Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic composed of Socialists headed by the Social-Democrat Borys Martos. This Government announced its intention to depend on the own forces of the Ukrainian nation itself. At that time, when the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic remained in the Western provinces of Ukraine (Podolia, Volhynia, Galicia), in Central Ukraine, on the Dnieper River mass uprisings against the Russian Communists developed. Even groups of Ukrai-

nian Communists who wished to create an independent Soviet Ukraine participated in these uprisings. The policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine had a clearly predatory character. The Communist Commissar Schlichter said of the tasks of the Soviet Russian campaign at a session of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919: 642 669

"You all remember that when Ukraine was becoming Soviet with every day of the advance of the Red Army we became easier in our minds; the rich-in-bread Ukraine is ours! . . . We have four central supply detachments. We set all hopes on them. We have a lot of workers we have sent out who will be able to overflow all Ukrainian villages. We shall always remember that the looks of the proletariat of Russia are turned towards Ukraine" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 2: Kharkov, 1928).

Not only by the ruthless pillage were the Ukrainian people put against the Russian Communist dictatorship; by its nationalist policy, too, it roused great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians. The Rumanian Communist Rakovsky, who was appointed by Moscow as Premier of the Soviet Government of Ukraine, declared that the Ukrainian language and culture were 'petty bourgeois' and that the use of the Ukrainian language in public institutions was necessary only for 'Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries'. [186] 656 191

For this reason the 'dictatorship of the Russian culture' was introduced in Ukraine by the Russian Communists as a 'proletarian' one. "The Soviet Government in Ukraine in 1918 made in fact Russian the official language", — writes the Communist N. Popov in his *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine* (1929). Against the declarations of an 'independent Soviet Ukraine', the Rakovsky Government proclaimed the 'federation' of Ukraine with Russia. There could not be free elections to the Soviets in Ukraine. The power in the villages was given to the 'Comittees of Poor Peasants' consisting often of people sent from Russia. According to the instruction these Comittees were given they had the duty — "to fulfil precisely and relentlessly all orders of the supply authorities . . ."

13. Risings in Ukraine

In spring 1919, when the Soviet Army had reached the Dniester River, Moscow prepared its forces for the support of Soviet Hungary. But at that time the same troops who had fought against the Franco-Greek forces under the command of Hrihoriev, Tyutyunnyk and others, started the fight against the Russian Communists. Of the strength of this movement Rakovsky, Premier of 669

669 the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine', gives testimony in a book published in 1920 under the title — *Struggle for the Liberation of the Village:*

From April 1, until May 1, 1919, there had been 93 risings against the Soviet Russian regiment in Ukraine; from May 1, until May 15, — 28 risings; from June 1, until June 19, — 207 revolts.

Thus, instead of a 'march on Europe', the Russian Communist army had to fight stubbornly with the masses of the Ukrainian people for the Ukrainian grain.

"Every Pud (36 lbs.) of the requisitioned grain was sprinkled with drops of blood", the Communist Commissar Schlichter wrote later on his supply activities in Ukraine in 1919. The risings in Ukraine happened under the banner of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had permanent contacts with them.

The Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, reorganised on Galician territory, started an offensive against the Communists at the end of May 1919. The Soviet Russian troops pressed by the Ukrainian Army, and under the blows of the Ukrainian partisans, were forced to retreat. Soon the Ukrainian Galician Army joined the fight against the Russian Communists.

14. The Polish Army Occupies Western Ukraine in 1919

726 The hundred thousand strong Ukrainian Galician Army fought against the forces of the whole of Poland from November 1918, until summer 1919. At the end of May 1919, the Rumanians who had seized Bukovina on November 11, 1918, occupied Southern Galicia. On June 25, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Entente passed the following resolution regarding Galician Ukraine:

"In order to protect the persons and the property of the peaceable population of Eastern Galicia against the dangers it is threatened with by the Bolshevik gangs, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided to authorise the forces of the Polish Republic to go on in their military operations as far as the Zbrucz River"*).

Under the pressure of the Polish Army several times stronger than the Ukrainians the latter were forced to leave the territory of Galicia and went over on the territory of Eastern Ukraine. The Polish-Ukrainian war ceased, and between the armies of both states a demarcation line was drawn. However, the Polish Government used every opportunity to extend its occupation over other Ukrai-

*) The former Russo-Austrian frontier.

nian territories. This Polish policy held the Ukrainian military forces that were fighting against the Russian Red Army constantly in tension, and hindered the work of the Ukrainian Government. 726

The Ukrainian Galician Army took part in the struggle against the Soviet Russian occupation immediately after the termination of the war with the Poles. The Galician Ukrainians wanted to strengthen the Ukrainian state on the Dnieper, together with the forces of Eastern Ukraine, in order to decide later the historic quarrel for Galicia with Poland.

15. Ukraine between 'Red' and 'White' Russia (1919)

In June 1919, the Ukrainian Government, headed by the Social-Democrat Martos (from August Isaac Mazepa, Social-Democrat, was Prime Minister), took up its residence in Kamenets in Podolia. The united Ukrainian Armies were under the command of General Yunakiw, former Professor of the Military Academy in Petersburg. The Government of Ukraine made efforts to secure legality and order in its territory, particularly it resolutely fought the excesses of various dark elements against the Jewish population. In the Government of theUkrainian Democratic Republic there was a special Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority — Pinkhos Krasny (Jewish People's Party); the deputy Minister of Labour was the Jewish Social-Democrat Prof. Salomon Goldelman. 642 563

The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against Russian Bolshevism as well as the entire Ukrainian problem were in 1919 unknown to the world. Against the Ukrainian liberation movement Communist propaganda was made throughout the world, trying to describe the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as a reactionary state. On the other hand, the propaganda of the Russian 'Whites' and of the Poles permeated decisive political circles abroad resulting in the conviction that the Ukrainian movement was the same as Russian Bolshevism. Therefore the Ukrainian Republic which had led a heroic struggle against Soviet Russia was blockaded by the Western Great Powers as 'infected by Bolshevism'. Because of this blockade the Ukrainian Army was in want of arms, supplies, medicaments. Only by contraband from Rumania was it possible to receive something for the Ukrainian armed forces. Under these circumstances it happened frequently that the Ukrainian Army fought with arms captured on the front from the enemy. But in spite of all these difficulties the united Army of the Ukrainian Republic had considerable successes in the battles with the Soviet Russian troops and, on August 31, 1919, took Kiev, the capital of 669 [1105]

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

669 Ukraine. The 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' headed by Rakovsky left Ukraine and was abolished by order of Lenin. This was a new proof of the complete failure of the Russian Communist policy in Ukraine.

But at the same time the Ukrainian Republic met a new enemy who had claims on Ukraine. This was the Russian Volunteer Army under Denikin. The leaders of this army regarded the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as more dangerous for themselves than the Soviet dictatorship in Moscow. Therefore, in its struggle against the Russian 'Red Army', the Russian 'White Army' attempted before all to take possession of the Ukrainian territory in order to [648] prevent the strengthening of 'Ukrainian separatism'. In vain the Ukrainian Government appealed to the Western Great Powers that they should not admit the attack by the Russian Volunteer Forces on the Ukrainian Army and that they recognise the Government of democratic Ukraine. If in 1919 the Government and Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had been given the least support by the Western Powers, the development of Eastern Europe and even the whole world would have taken another course than happened in fact. In any case, by securing an independent Ukraine, Russian imperialism would not be such a menace to the world as we see it to-day.

[731] When Denikin's troops met the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in Kiev they attacked Ukrainian armed forces weakened by the struggle with the Russian Red Army and decimated by a disastrous typhus epidemic. This epidemic had spread principally in consequence of the blockade of the territory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army had no medicaments, no clothing nor sanitary equipment, the Ukrainian soldiers died in thousands, and there was no help. From the army the epidemic spread among the population of Ukraine.

[72] But even under these incredibly hard conditions the Army of the Ukrainian Republic and the masses of Ukrainian people did not abandon the fight against the new oppressors — the Russian Volunteers — who had abundant support from the Entente Powers. The Russian 'Whites' forbade the Ukrainian language in schools, offices and the press in the Ukrainian territory they had seized. Russian authorities ordered the burning of Ukrainian books. The Denikin Government cruelly persecuted Ukrainian patriots. Even the word 'Ukraine' was forbidden; the expression 'Little Russia' was used instead. The Denikin Government restored the estates of the big landowners in Ukraine.

Against the Denikin régime in Ukraine extensive risings of the

people took place. The Ukrainian Government and Army were 669
forced under the pressure of Denikin to leave the temporary capital of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, the city of Kamenets in Podolia, on November 15, 1919. The Ukrainian Army marched into the hinterland of the enemy. The enormous partisan movement in Ukraine in autumn 1919, stopped Denikin's offensive on Moscow. Of this the Russian Red Army took advantage, broke through the front of Denikin and marched into Ukraine again. The front of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, brought into disorder by the war with Denikin, could not be restored at once, and the Soviet Russian troops seized almost the entire territory of Ukraine again.

When the leaders of the Russian Volunteers saw the coming of their definite defeat, they offered the command of the Ukrainian Army which was carrying on a partisan war against the oppressors of Ukraine, an alliance against the Russian Communists. The delegate of the Russian Volunteer Army, Colonel Popov, wrote in January, 1920, to the Ukrainian Supreme Command: "We have what you want — arms, but you have that we have not — the confidence of the population". The Ukrainians declined this offer of the Russian 'Whites' convinced that any alliance with them would bring only damage to the Ukrainian struggle for liberation.

The Army of the Ukrainian Republic began its 'Winter-Campaign', famous in the history of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, in Lubar in Volhynia on December 6, 1919. This army, by order of its Government, made partisan war on the territories of Ukraine against 'White' and 'Red' Russia until May 5, 1920. Only leaning upon the confidence and the active support of the population could this army cover distances of thousands of miles carrying the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of equipment did not allow the Army of the 'Winter Campaign' to accept in its ranks many thousands of Ukrainians who wished to fight actively for the independent Ukraine.

16. The New Tactics of the Russian Communists in Ukraine

The failure of the Soviet Russian policy in Ukraine in 1919 656
caused much discussion among the Communists themselves. By 186
order from Moscow, in October 1919, not only the 'Government of 668
Soviet Ukraine', headed by Rakovsky, was abolished, but also the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Among the Communists who had worked in Ukraine in 1919 a group of the so-called federalists appeared that demanded from Moscow more rights for Ukraine. The leader of this group,

656 G. Lapchinsky, explained that Ukraine must be an independent state
186 and not a Russian colony.

The powerful Ukrainian movement forced the Russian Com-
668 munists to alter for a certain time their tactics in Ukraine. The Soviet Russian Government ordered the Communists to pay attention to the national peculiarities of Ukraine. In December 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution on the recognition by Russia of the independent Soviet Ukraine. Among other matters this resolution states that the "members of the Communist Party in Ukrainian territory are obliged to realise the right of the working masses of learning their mother language in schools, and speaking it in all Soviet institutions".

The resolution recommends the restriction of the requisition of food from the Ukrainian peasants. Besides, this resolution of the Russian CP pointed out that the principal task of Soviet construction in Ukraine was the requisition of arms from the population.

The President of the Soviet Russian Government, Lenin, wrote in *The Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victory over Denikin* on January 4, 1920:

"The independence of Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party. Only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can decide the question on their Soviet Congress — whether Ukraine should be united with Russia or left an independent Republic . . . We want a voluntary union of nations, a union that would not permit violence of one nation against another".

All these declarations of the Russian Communist Party leaders had the aim to lull the vigilance of the masses of the Ukrainian people. In reality the Soviet Russian Government did not even intend to change its imperialist course against Ukraine. Moscow feared the armed Ukrainian people and distrusted them. Therefore, for instance, a conference of the members of the Russian Communist Party in Homel passed the following resolution in October 1919:

"The advance to the South and the organisation of Soviet administration in Ukraine are possible only with the aid of regular disciplined troops, who, in any case, must not be of local origin" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 6: Kharkov, 1926, p. 4).

•669 The Soviet Russian troops, after having seized the Ukrainian
661 territory until the spring of 1920, began at once the struggle against

the Ukrainian partisan movement. New requisitions of grain and the taking of arms from the population caused an even greater disappointment among the Ukrainians. The partisan movement which had overthrown Denikin's power turned with new vigour against the Russian Communists. These risings were carried on under the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of arms and supplies did not permit the Ukrainian partisan movement to develop and to attain decisive results in the struggle with the overwhelming forces of the Russian Red Army. 669 661

17. Poland — Ukraine — Russia 1920—21

At the end of 1919, the regular front of the Ukrainian Army broke down. The Ukrainian Army continued the fight against 'White' and 'Red' Russia as guerilla war. The diplomatic Mission of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic headed by Andriy Liwycky, Cabinet member, started negotiations with the Polish Government about the relations between Poland and Ukraine. The consequence of these negotiations was a Convention signed in Warsaw on April 21, 1920. In that time the Government of the Ukrainian Republic headed by Isaac Mazepa was remaining in Ukraine. 648 669 728

According to this Convention a new frontier between Ukraine and Poland was established: those Ukrainian territories Poland had seized in 1919 in the war with the Ukrainians (Galicia, Volhynia etc.) remained on the Polish side. The Polish Government undertook to support the restoration of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic on the territories occupied by Soviet Russia.

The war of Poland and Ukraine against Soviet Russia, which was carried on with changing fortunes did not bring the expected results to the Ukrainians. The Polish leaders thought it more advantageous for themselves to come to an agreement with Soviet Russia after having divided the Ukrainian territories with Moscow (Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921). Poland recognised in Riga the Government of the 'independent' Soviet Ukraine and broke off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army which in fighting against the overwhelming Russian forces, had entered Polish territories together with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1920) was interned. The soldiers of this army, who had fought against Soviet Russia not only for Ukraine but for Poland alike, were placed by the Polish Government in camps in such conditions that many of them died there, or acquired serious diseases.

there were 85% Russians and only 8% Ukrainians. With this 656
election system the representatives of the peasants, the most 666
numerous part of the Ukrainian population, made only 12,7% of the members of this Soviet Congress. Finance, national economy, railways, labour — concisely all foundations of the economic life of Ukraine — were concentrated in Moscow. All Ukrainian co-operative organisations were subordinated to Moscow. During [651] 1920 Ukraine had to deliver to Russia 160 million of Pud of grain (1 Pud is 36 lbs.), 6 million Pud meat, 30 million Pud potatoes, 255 million eggs, big consignments of sugar, etc. The Russian Red Army made requisitions for its needs separately and confiscated in the last months of 1920 about 30 million Pud grain in Ukraine (*Collection of Reports of the Government of the USSR:* Kharkov 1921).

No wonder that in consequence of this exploitation the Urkrai- 669
nian partisan movement was spreading. At the end of 1920 there were not less than 40,000 Ukrainian partisans in Ukraine who fought against the Russian Communists as an organised force. Evidence of the extent of this struggle is given to us in the trophies of the Soviet Russian troops seized in the war with the Ukrainian partisans 1920—21: 43 guns, 1,812 machine-guns, 31,788 rifles etc. *(Collection of Reports).* In the course of only one year, 1921, the Soviet Secret Police in Ukraine suppressed 6,000 partisan organisations. (*Communist:* Kharkov, February 11, 1923).

2. The Famine of 1921/22 and the Policy of Soviet Russia in Ukraine 731

The Soviet Russian Government took advantage of the horrible 656
famine of 1921/22 in Ukraine and succeeded in strengthening its rule there. A drought in the fall of 1920 and spring 1921 was followed by a bad harvest, and a great dearth of food arose. A real famine began. However, the policy of the Russian Government in Ukraine, intending to get as much food as possible, did not change. Before the outside world the Russian authorities tried to hide the hunger catastrophe in Ukraine, and directed all foreign aid coming from America and Western Europe into Russia. Though in Ukraine in autumn 1921, millions of the Ukrainian population were starving the Russian Government, nevertheless, took away from the hungry regions the rest of the food stocks, and exported them to Russia. This roused the attention of foreigners who stayed at that time in Ukraine. The American historian H. H. Fisher writes in his book on the famine of 1921/22 that the representatives of the Soviet Russian Government demanded resolutely that it was

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under 162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation 423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the [517] Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Rus- 186 sian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist 631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

●669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

which was led by General Kornilov, later by Denikin. In the summer of 1918 the Kuban Region fell into the hands of the Russian Volunteer Army. The leaders of this army wished to make the Kuban Region a base for the restoration of Tsarist Russia. Among the population of the Kuban Region and in the State Council a strong opposition to the Russian Volunteers arose. But Russian influence was stronger: under the pressure of Denikin's army an alliance of the Cossack territories — the Don, Kuban and Terek regions — for the fight against the Russian Communists was formed at the end of 1918. Against those Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks who defended their independence the Russian Volunteers used terroristic methods: President of the Kuban State Council Mykola Ryabovol was murdered in June 1919 in Rostov, prominent members of the State Council were arrested and hanged. This terror by the Russian 'Whites' was the reason that the Kuban Cossacks left the front against the Russian Red Army and repealed the alliance with the Russian Volunteers. At the beginning of 1920 the Kuban State Council according to the will of the population took the Government of the Kuban into its hands. Vasyl Ivanys was appointed Premier. The Kuban leaders wished to get rid of the protectorate of the Russian Volunteers and to continue the struggle against the Soviet Russian Army in alliance with Ukraine and the peoples of the Caucasus. But in April 1920, under pressure of the Soviet Russian Army, the Kuban Government was forced to leave its territory and to move to Crimea, where at that time the Volunteers' Army of General Wrangel was. Being pressed between two forces, both of which fought for domination in Russia, the 'Red' and the 'White' Russians, the Ukrainian Kuban Government could not attain any agreement with them and went abroad. 669

The Kuban Region was occupied by the Russian Red Army. Soviet Russia refused recognition of the Ukrainian nationality in the Kuban Region for a long time, and carried on a Russification line through the school and press. Only on August 30, 1929, the Commissariat of Education in Moscow decided that the literary language of the Ukrainians inside the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Republic was the language of Ukraine. 656 191

But even after this the Russian Communist bureaucracy hindered the development of schools among the Ukrainians in the RSFSR. In December 1933, in the Kuban Region and on other territories of the RSFSR, with a Ukrainian population of 7 millions, all Ukrainian schools, press etc. were abolished by order from Moscow. During the collectivisation and the famine of 1932—33 the population of the Kuban Region had enormous losses. Attempts on a rising [891] 000

668 Government refused to recognize the decisions of the
642 Rada, and thereby strengthened a group of separatists hitherto supported only by the second Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress (June 7). The Rada now issued (June 24) a *Universale*, proclaiming that henceforth the Ukrainian Rada would control Ukrainian affairs and work in federation with the All-Russian Parliament when this should be established; and on June 30 an executive body of the Rada, called the General Secretariat, was appointed.

This step caused anxiety to the Petrograd Government; and on July 12–14 two members of the Duma, Tereschenko and Tseretelli, and subsequently Kerenski, went to Kiev. While granting most of the Ukrainian demands, Kerenski opposed the demand for the formation of a Ukrainian army on the ground that it would mean the break-up of the Russian army. The favourable attitude adopted by Kerenski towards Ukrainian demands caused a split in the Provisional Government of Petrograd; and the Cadets left the Cabinet on July 16.

The reorganized Provisional Government decided to
[669] grant autonomy to the Ukraine, but on July 19 a social revolution broke out in Kiev, and the help of the Provisional Government was sought by the Rada for the restoration of order. But before the formal recognition of Ukrainian autonomy by the Provisional Government, which took place on August 17, other riots broke out in Kiev, this time among the Russian or russified town population, who protested against the 'ukrainization' of South Russia. The recognition of the Provisional Government meant that, until the summoning of the Constituent Assembly, the General Secretariat of the Ukraine was the recognized authority controlling finance, commerce, industry, agriculture, labour, and other domestic affairs. All measures had to be submitted to the Provisional Government. The Ukraine was to consist of the Governments of Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Poltava, and Chernigov; the other Governments mentioned above could be included if

strife, inspired such desperate acts as burning stores of grain, and aroused Socialist protests in the Austrian Reichsrat. Meanwhile the Moscow Soviet Government came to an agreement with the Ukrainian Rada (May 23), and recognized the Ukraine as an independent state. On June 13–14 the Russo-Ukrainian armistice was formally signed. 642 727

On May 24 a peasant rising broke out all over the Ukraine owing to the drastic measures of the German military officials, who declared the country in a state of siege; the rising was directed against the Germans and the big landowners, who regarded the German army as militia to be used against social disturbances and anarchy. The objects of this rising were stated in the manifesto of the Peasants' Congress at Kiev on June 7. The congress demanded (1) that a Hetman chosen by landowners should be deposed; (2) that the Ukraine should be a 'People's Republic'; (3) that no land should be returned to proprietors; and (4) that a Legislative Assembly should be convoked. This assembly the peasants agreed to support, appealing to the Germans not to oppose the People's Republic. However, the German troops in occupation continued to suppress strife among the peasants and to collect food by severe means, the result being that Von Eichhorn was assassinated in Kiev on July 30. 642 727 669

The Ukraine now became the battleground of five propagandist forces—pro-German, pro-Ally, pro-Russian Federalist, Bolshevik, and Separatist-Nationalist. The Austrian authorities arranged for the evacuation of Lvov by the Polish troops, and the Ukrainians (Ruthenians) seized the city (October 31) and held it for about a month, during which they are said to have had the help of the Ukrainians from Volhynia as well as of the Austrian officers. The Ukrainian (Ruthenian) National Council stated that it had taken over the administration of Eastern Galicia. The Polish Galician Liquidation Commission, established after the retirement of the Austrian authorities, opposed the Ukrainian claims.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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(c) *The Ukraine since the Armistice.*—The government of Skoropadski lasted for a short time after the signing of the armistice in Western Europe; and the conservative elements in the Ukraine, whether Ukrainians, Poles, or Russians, wished that the Western Allies should support Skoropadski and send a fresh army of occupation to replace the German army. Hoping for an Allied recognition, and under pressure from the peasants, Skoropadski introduced some democratic reforms, and dissolved the Germanophil cabinet of Lyssogub. The old Rada, however, reorganized itself into a Directory with Vinnitchenko and Petlura at its head, and replaced Skoropadski's government on December 14, 1918.

241 It is almost unbelievable that in many regions of the steppe the planted surface is not ploughed up, or in any case only superficially with a land-parer. The purpose is to conserve soil moisture. Often the entire sowing, the entire spring work of the farmer consists of a single process. A light land-parer scratches the surface; it has a box attached to it containing the seed, and the harrow is attached to this "ploughing and sowing machine". With this type of sowing one necessarily reaps a lot of weeds.

243 438 Nevertheless, before the war the Ukraine enjoyed the reputation of being a granary. During the years 1909 to 1913 the country produced on an average of 8.6 million more tons of grain annually than it consumed. The annual export amounted to /144/ an average of 4.3 million tons of wheat alone and 2.7 million tons of barley. (87) Surplus and export dropped considerably

87. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 390.

under Bolshevik rule. In 1934 only one million tons of grain were exported.

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425 669 In 1917, when the Bolsheviks became active, the general feeling in North and Central Ukraine was extremely favorable to an agrarian revolution. The land-hungry peasants were deeply convinced of the fact that the "right of the landowner was an injustice". Whoever promised the peasants that they were to receive all the land they could themselves cultivate, had won them over to his cause. As a matter of fact, in 1917, at the beginning of the revolution, the lands of the estate owners and the large farmers were immediately divided up, in the process of which the estates often went up in flames and

425 the cattle were burned. However, the glorious
669 state did not last long. The farmers lacked seed, machines and draft animals in order to cultivate the land they so easily obtained. Besides, the men who came back from the war and the landless village farmers wanted to have a share in the booty. In the guberniyas of Kiyev and Khar'kov the government claimed the forests and the extensive beet fields. Civil wars, drought and epidemics carried off hundreds of thousands of peasant families during the years of the Bolshevist war. Thus ended the first chapter of the agrarian revolution, so eagerly awaited.

423 The New Economic Policy with its tolerance
241 of a "bludgeoned private economy" constituted the second chapter. The peasants obtained their land and their farms on long leases; they could cultivate their land as they pleased, except that the farm could not be carelessly run, otherwise the management of the establishment could pass over into other hands. Nothing was gained by the fact that all the land belonged to the community. The "communal fields" were a Russian form of possession which had found favor at the time of Catherine II in the steppes and in the part of the Ukraine on the left bank of the river. Even though the farmer could not dispose of his land
497 at any time like a free /Facing page 144/ /Map IX: Railroad Communications. The main lines of communication run in a north-south direction, whereas the east-west lines have always been neglected./ /Key: Number of daily passenger trains
423 in 1935./ /145/ estate owner, even though he was
241 obliged to acquiesce to the fact that the entire community property was redistributed every 10 to 20 years, nevertheless, he could do as he pleased on his section of land. No less than 88.9% of peasant land in the Ukrainian steppes belonged to the communities, and in North Ukraine, 80.4%. The czars had condoned this form of ownership, because it simplified administration, facilitated

186 of the seventeenth century, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. The Kremlin, like Hitler, had no intention of satisfying the essence of Ukrainian national aspirations; all it wanted was to secure a greater degree of Ukrainian co-operation in the war effort, in guerilla fighting and sabotage behind the enemy lines. The Soviet Government could not prevent its wartime emergency measures from being misunderstood and mistaken for some sort of *carte blanche* for future nationalistic deviations.

669 The full extent to which Ukrainian nationalists may have betrayed the Soviet Union during the war with Germany is, of course, impossible [677] to estimate. The Ukrainian Soviet Government indirectly recognized, however, that the militant anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists must have constituted a fairly considerable body by proclaiming an amnesty in 1944 for the members of the U.P.A., the 'Ukrainian Insurgent Army'. This amnesty is unique in the history of the U.S.S.R. since it applied collectively to an entire group notable for its fanatical hatred of the Soviet régime and its contempt for the Russians.

This amnesty offer was so unusual for Soviet conditions that many U.P.A. members refused to take it seriously. The U.P.A. continued to terrorize the Soviet Ukrainian-Polish-Czechoslovak border areas, and in 1945–47 carried out daring raids deep into Czech and Polish territories. The members of the U.P.A. detachments were often referred to as 'Banderovtsy' after their leader Stephen Bandera.

[728] The 'Banderovtsy' exploited for their ends the fact that a comparatively small strip of land in Eastern Poland which was inhabited by Ukrainians was not included in the Ukrainian S.S.R., the area of Kholm and Hrubeshov. According to the nationalities programme of the Comintern the Kholm area was to be included in the Soviet Ukrainian State. The Ukrainian State President, M. S. Grechukha, in a Supreme Soviet debate on February 7th, 1944, also demanded the incorporation of this 'Ukrainian Far West' into the Ukrainian S.S.R.[18] However, the Soviet central Government apparently found it impossible to convince the Western Allies and even the Polish communists that another slice of Poland should be cut off. Thus the Ukraine was denied its 'Far West' and a repatriation of the Ukrainians of the Polish areas concerned was carried out instead.

The activities of the 'Banderovtsy' found particular support among the peasants of the Ukrainian villages of the Polish border area earmarked for evacuation; for one of the foremost tasks of the U.P.A. detachments was to render the evacuation impossible and to prevent by terrorist acts any Polish colonization on former Ukrainian farmland. It has been asserted that the Banderovtsy enjoyed support from local Ukrainian Soviet authorities in the border areas because of their anti-Polish character. This allegation is difficult to check. It is certain, however, that the U.P.A. detachments could not possibly have maintained themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrainian peasantry.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

assumed that it was equally binding in Ukraine and without any further ado, the Ukrainian peasants were given the right of selling any surplus products exactly as if there had been no independent Ukrainian Soviet government. 185 665

The legal aspects of this decree did not interest the bulk of the Ukrainian peasants. They saw only the relief which it afforded them and the opportunities that it gave. They immediately took advantage of it, and its first effects were to be seen in a surprisingly short time. Of course, there could be no improvement in the national well-being until the harvest and the harvest of 1921 was again reduced by drought, so that with the best of intentions, it was not until 1922 that conditions began to improve.

A new Russian land code was finally adopted on March 3, 1921, and it was, of course, the model to be observed in the Ukraine. Yet this did not suppress the discontent of the Ukrainian peasants. 423 671

In an effort to suppress this smouldering discontent, D. Manuilsky, who was then the Commissar for Agriculture of the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee (the revolutionary centre and the provisional government of the country), summoned to Kharkiv a gathering of agronomists from all parts of Ukraine in the First All-Ukrainian Agronomical Congress. He found the more than one thousand present practically united in their assertions that the agricultural laws as developed by the Bolsheviks were inapplicable to the Ukraine. They had been drawn up and approved on March 6, 1919 and they were entirely based on the spirit of the Russian land commune which provided usually for a redistribution of the land every three years, with the supplemental provision that the redistribution should take into account the number of persons in each family. This was all very good when it agreed, as it did in Russia, with the general spirit of the people who were vitally interested in the commune as such. Conditions were different in Ukraine and the purely artificial Land Society was developed. Of course, all the peasants had to become members but the land was divided by households rather than on an individual basis. Furthermore, it was provided in the Ukrainian Code that "The right to land handed over for labor use is without term and

433 can be taken away only in accordance with the provisions of the
● 671 law." This insured the individual household in possession of its own piece of land and made it possible for the more industrious to undertake the improvement of the soil.

By the time that the final form of the Labor Code was established on November 22, 1922, it had become almost essentially different from the Russian Code, although it paid a lip service to the principle of nationalization through the actions of the Land Societies. A further sign of submission was the establishment of maximums on landholding. No household in the densely settled areas could have more than fourteen hectares or, in the less thickly populated areas, forty-eight hectares. The Land Society had the right to decide on the form of exploitation of the land to be carried out but if a family disagreed with the form established, it was entitled to demand the same amount of land but not necessarily the same land that it had contributed. Furthermore, outside of the requirement that all members of household were compelled to labor personally on the land, the provisions dealing with hired labor and the renting of land were left purposely vague or were omitted for further study.

The new code, which was more liberal than that in Russia, was devised in the interests of the landless peasants and also the poor and middle peasants, and definitely ratified the seizure of the estates of the large landowners. Sixty-eight per cent of the landless peasants received small tracts of land and fifty-two percent of those with holdings from two to four hectares were settled under more favorable conditions, or received additional land. On the other hand, 27.2% of those with more than sixteen hectares, the normal holding, and 56.8% of those with more than twenty-five hectares, saw their additional land removed and handed over to their less fortunate neighbors. In a sense this might seem to have been a solution of the crying need of the peasants for land but it brought with it some unexpected results.

423 The civil war had completely destroyed any free capital, and
427 without capital the peasants could not buy the tools, the fertilizers, etc., which they needed to prosper. This made little difference in

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

421 Governments have the smallest percentage of private ownership. Thus, in Kharkov, which contains the greatest number of Great Russians, only 35·8 per cent. of land is privately owned, and in Chernigov 41·7 per cent. The Poltava Government forms an exception; and, as it is a Government in which the Ukrainian population forms between 93 and 95 per cent., it is worth noticing that individual property still forms 45·1 per cent., even though the Stolypin reforms tended to give every facility for the introduction of communal ownership. But, though the Taurida, Kherson, and Yekaterinoslav Governments have the highest percentage of land individually owned, it is owned mostly by the nobles, especially in Yekaterinoslav (67·2 per cent.) and Kherson (63 per cent.), and less by the peasants (Yekaterinoslav, 23·7 per cent., and Kherson, 13·8 per cent.).

Taking into account both the individual and the communal land of the peasants, we find that only in the Governments of Kharkov (59 per cent.), Chernigov (53 per cent.), and Poltava (52 per cent.) do the peasants own above half of the arable land. In Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev, they own between 40 and 48 per cent.; in Yekaterinoslav, 45 per cent.; while in Taurida and Kherson, where only about half the population is Ukrainian and town life is well developed, the percentage is 37.

The amount of land assigned to each family by the [671] Emancipation Law of 1861 was between three and eight acres, though sixteen acres are necessary to support a family. Since then the population has increased by 43 per cent., but the land available for peasant owners has only increased by 20 per cent. (in 1910). This fact has compelled the peasants to rent land, and lies at the bottom of all economic unrest. In the Government of Poltava, where the situation is most acute, some 60 per cent. of the peasants own only from one to three *desyatines*[1] of land, and as few as 4 per cent. have more than five *desyatines*. In the Governments

[1] One *desyatine* = 2·7 acres.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

under Tsarism, but a long road had to be travelled before all children would have an opportunity to attend schools. Buildings would have to be constructed, teachers trained, text-books written and published. The Ukrainian government first endeavored to provide "elementary" or four-year schools for all children from eight to twelve years of age, then to expand these schools into "incomplete middle" or seven-year schools, and finally to replace these with "complete middle" or ten-year schools; and, in the meanwhile, the government established technical schools and higher educational institutions to train engineers, doctors, actors and other types of "socialist cadres." This quantitative growth of the school system was matched by its growth qualitatively, as measured from the point of view of the language policy. In spite of the shortages of teachers knowing Ukrainian and the languages of the other minorities,[1] the almost complete absence of text-books in these languages, and the appearance of considerable opposition on the part of political leaders, of teachers and even of parents, the Russian language was gradually replaced as the medium of instruction by the other languages.

As early as March 1919 an order of the Commissariat of Education of the newly re-established Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic declared that the Russification policy was abrogated; that the Commissariat would aid in the development of the long-repressed Ukrainian language; and that "in view of the elimination of a governmental language as such, and of the declaration that all local languages are equal, the Commissariat of Education gives the local population the right to determine in which language teaching must be carried on in the schools, safeguarding simultaneously the interests of [other] national groups."[10] Wherever the language of instruction remained Russian, a second language — also chosen by the local population itself — was to be taught as a special subject. In September 1920 this provisional order was strengthened by a law of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. The law instructed the Commissariat of Education to draw up a plan for schools of all grades and categories with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.[11] Ukrainian was to be studied as an obligatory subject in all teacher-training institutions and was to be used as the language of instruction in some of them. The law also ordered the Government Publishing House to issue "a sufficient quantity of text-books as well as *belles-lettres* and other publications in the Ukrainian language."

1921), pp. 3–6; *Zbirnik Uzakonen ta Rosporiadžen Robitničo-Seljanskogo Urjady Ukraini za 1924 rik*, 1924, part 1, sec. 271, pp. 800–803; Sojuz Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R., *Pjatyysesojuznyi S'ezd Sojuza Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R. Stenografičeski Otčet* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 172–174. [10] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . ., 1919, sec. 260, p. 347.

[11] *Ibid.*, 1920, part 1, sec. 509, pp. 712–713.

[1] [Prior to 1924 -- Analysis]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD 1

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4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

against the Great Russian hegemony.) The Ukrainian enthusiasts of 423
'cultural acheivements' so recently lauded by Kaganovich himself 474
were now accused of 'maintaining relations with nationalist political organizations in Galicia'. And it was not difficult to prove their connections with open or secret organizations 'suffering under the yoke of Poland'. The existence of such connections had been tolerated and even favoured by the Soviet administration to the extent which they furthered Communist propagandist activities in Poland, but there could be no difficulty, if necessary, in treating them as treason.

In 1930 the first Ukrainian political trial took place in Kharkov. 668
A group of individuals were accused of having relations with 'the 674
Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine'—the same organization 661
which had been created before the war under the protection of the Austro-Hungarian Government and which was now supposed to be functioning in Galicia. In the following year, as a result of the growing resistance of the peasants to collectivization, action against Ukrainian 'suspects' became more violent. The peasants were bitterly opposed to the *kolkhozy*, but certainly not on 'national' grounds. Faced with the imminent danger of a peasant revolt, the Soviet administration decided to eliminate all persons who through their origins could be considered to be connected with the peasantry and who might organize this revolt and become its leaders. Regardless of their loyalty to the Soviet régime during the preceding years, there now began a systematic destruction of Ukrainians belonging to the 'intelligentsia' and 'half-intelligentsia'.

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head of the *Rada* Government and participator in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations), Shershel, Mazurenko and other 'ex-politicians' were accused of being the leaders of this secret organization. They were shot. Thousands of arrests followed, the victims of which suffered execution or exile to labour camps which were themselves living cemeteries. Two years later, in 1933, the political police (G.P.U.) declared that they had discovered a real military conspiracy on the part of 'a secret military organization'. After a theatrical trial, Kotsubinsky (Vice-President of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars), Kovnar (Commissar for Agriculture), and scores of other persons who had all occupied important posts in the army or the administration were shot. One of the most prominent figures in Ukrainian political life, who from the beginning had associated himself with the Communist Revolution and who had for a long time been an influential member of the Council of People's Com-

665 23rd International Youth Day in Moscow in 1937:
883 "Never in the history of the world have there been
876 and are there such conditions for growth, education and training of the younger generation as have been created for young people among us by the Soviet government, by the Communist Party..." There are countless proofs of the fact that the basic principles of Bolshevik education are refuted by the products of this education. The Komsomolskaja Pravda, number 83, 1935 admits "that the criminal elements in schools developed more actively than the Komsomols and the Pioneers, and therefore drew a large number of students into their sphere of influence", and Pravda of [681] February 19, 1935 reports that the following punishments are administered to combat hoodlumism among children of from 8 to 12 years: "The expulsion of the hoodlums from school, legal persecution of their parents, the formation of special divisions of militia to combat youthful criminals, and so forth." (78) This picture is

78. Richthofen, Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy, page 75.

rounded off by the introduction on April 7, 1935 of the death penalty for children beginning at the age of 12 for those of them who can be shown to have committed theft, banditry, murder or to have contemplated murder, and by the purges which began in the autumn of 1937 against the members of the Komsomol, especially in the Ukraine.

/130/ In the Village

181 During the years in which Shevchenko stands watch in the searing heat of the Kirghiz Steppes, his friend Kostomariv formulates for the first time the contrasts between Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups. According to this, a tendency toward spirituality prevails in the social and

[For a discussion of Bolshevik educational theory and methods, cf pp 133-135, category NG-Analyst]

These measures were so vigorously applied that it has been estimated 651
that by the end of 1932, some 2,400,000 persons had been removed 241
from Ukraine to parts unknown. These were naturally the more 661
prosperous, the more progressive and energetic persons who had profited by the New Economic Policy and had accumulated some capital.

The forcing of the peasants into the collective farms and the 185
prohibition of almost all possibilities for the securing of raw ma- 433
terials had a further effect. Under the older system, the Ukrainian 511
peasants had time, during the winter especially, to work at home and to supply themselves most of their need for manufactured articles. They were able to work in leather and in cloth and wood. This was now rendered impossible, for the individual plots were too small to furnish the necessary raw materials and the peasants were forced, if they would satisfy their most immediate needs, to rely upon the goods turned out by the state factories. These goods were always inferior in quality and short in quantity, for the whole point of the Five Year Plan was to develop heavy industry as rapidly as possible and the government took no interest in seeing that the villages were supplied with consumers' goods. It concentrated its attention on those branches which could be of use in military preparations. Even when petitions were made by the Soviets in Odesa and Kharkiv for permission to establish textile factories, they were peremptorily told that the plan provided for the establishment of such plants only in selected parts of the RSFSR. Thus to the local shortage was added the costs of distant transportation, which made the price prohibitive even for the goods that were received.

In 1931 almost the entire grain reserves were removed from 651
Ukraine and the peasants had nothing to carry over, and when in 685
1932 there came a drought in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the 241
peasants had no supplies. 511

This did not bother the authorities. During 1931 and 1932 they collected from the peasants all that they could. The next step was to tighten the laws.

On August 6, 1932 the TsK VKP/b and the Soviet of Com-

[1929-1930 -1st Five Year Plan -- Analyst]

651 missars issued a decree for the "protection of socialist property."
685 Under this law the stealing of a single ear of grain from a kolhosp
241 granary could be punished by confinement for ten years in a con-
511 centration camp. It was so interpreted that if a peasant picked up a single stalk from the field after the harvest, he was liable for the same punishment. In other words, the peasant could only secure his grain legally from and through the administration of the kolhosp.

With this law on the books, the Ukrainian collective farms could be punished either for failing to protect "socialist property" or they could be attacked for failing to present to the government crops and grain in an amount equal to that foreseen by the plan. This was the easier because there were few of the kolhosps that had been able to sow the area required of them. Lack of intelligent and competent leadership on the farms and the exigencies of the weather made it almost inevitable that there would be deficiencies, especially since the schedules were made up in Moscow and took no account of the local conditions.

As the grain deliveries lagged, the demands increased and on January 24, 1933, the Central Committee of the VKP/b issued a new resolution that "it was regarded as proved that the party organization of Ukraine had not carried out the tasks assigned to it in organizing grain deliveries and executing the grain plan."

To remedy this, the central authorities ordered the formation of political detachments in the machine tractor stations, "the chief basic tasks of which were the insuring of the unconditional and immediate execution by the kolhosps and their members of all their obligations to the state and especially the decisive struggle with the stealing of kolhosp property, the struggle with the manifestations of sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the sharing of the grain supplies and the meat products of the kolhosps."

The leaders of these detachments were given the obligation "to secure the constant lawful and accurate fulfilment of the laws of the Soviet government by administrative and criminal measures against the organizers of the stealing of Soviet property and the

sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the branch of village agriculture." 651 685

The machine tractor stations were staffed by men largely alien to the Ukrainian countryside. The more fanatical Communists were placed in these political detachments and were, in effect, told to supplement or replace the local administration in the exercise of pressure and terror upon both the heads and the members of the kolhosps. To aid them in their work Moscow sent to Ukraine a Russian Pavel Postyshev as a special plenipotentiary of the Central Committee with 7,000 party workers from the Russian Republic. 241 511

The work of these special "commissions" and "brigades" was marked by the utmost severity. They entered the villages, and made the most thorough searches of the houses and barns of every peasant. They dug up the earth, broke into the walls of buildings and the stoves in which the peasants tried to hide their last handfuls of food. They even in places took specimens of the fecal matter from the toilets in the effort to learn in that way by analysis whether the peasants had stolen government property and were eating grain. Wherever they found any, the peasants were severely punished, while the detachments carried off not only grain but everything edible.

The same reports came from every corner of Ukraine. "They requisitioned everything that could be eaten" was the report from the village of Zorich in the district of Poltava. In one village in the district of Odesa, "they collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram" and in other places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove. In at least one of these commissions, Molotov, then head of the Council of Ministers, took a personal part.

The natural result was a famine of unprecedented severity. The villages had been hungry in the autumn. After these searches commenced, they literally starved. An Englishman, M. Magridge, wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1933: "During a recent visit to Ukraine, I have seen a little of the war which the Soviet government is carrying on against the peasants. The fields were 731 661

[result of excessive grain requisitions in 1933 -- Analyst]

661 whether or not that peasant was raising hens. The government demanded its share of the manure from the private cattle and it made no difference as to whether or not the individual raised cattle.

423 685 At the same time[1] the heads of the Communist Party sought high and wide for misuse of state property. Again and again they discovered that on collective farms the administration and the peasants were in agreement that the best way to allow some improvement in the general economic situation was to permit the peasant to cultivate and have the income from a slightly larger plot of land. The increased productivity in this way often more than covered the apparent use of state income from the operations of the farm but to the leaders of the Communist Party this was as severe an offence as was the failure to fulfil obligations, for it dared to question the superiority of the policy of collectivization. During 1939, the Party made strenuous efforts to stop such abuses and they even went further in urging and commanding a reduction in the individual allotments of land, which had been the only means of winning even a grudging approval of the Ukrainian peasants for the idea of collectivization.

Of course, with the outbreak of World War II there came a slight relaxation of this pressure, for Stalin and his friends apparently became aware that an excessive attack upon the peasantry might lead them to make common cause with the opponents of the Soviet Union. Yet, this relaxation of pressure was very slight during the years 1939-1941, when the alliance of Stalin and Hitler seemed to be firm and steady and when the Soviet Union was expanding in accordance with its own powers and its own intrigues. In all this the Ukraine remained aloof, closely guarded against the importation of new ideas and the population dragged on their weary existence, scarcely daring to dream that anything could happen to change their unhappy lot.

1 [1939 -- Analyst]

11: Obermaier--185 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

475 where the state regulates everything, there is no longer any room for self-maintenance. State commerce is supervised by the various commissariats, which fact does not facilitate its smooth running. The commissariats for internal commerce, for the food industry, for local industry, the "Division for the Welfare of Workers" and other offices also have a voice. In 1935 there were 310,300 workers employed "in the service of Ukrainian commerce". Of this crew the Jews represented 42.8% and the Ukrainians 38.1%. (118)

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118: Soviet Trade, Kiyev 1937.

/171/ The Soviet press sometimes tells tales out of school about how Soviet business has developed under the leadership of the Jews who reputedly have a talent for business. Pravda of November 16, 1936, writes of a "fantastic flood of rules and regulations". During the first nine months of 1936, they said, the people's commissar Weizer issued 42,000 orders, decrees and resolutions. Izvestiia of March 14, 1937 writes: "In Rostov on the Don the demand for light articles of clothing is great, but the shops are empty. Summer clothing, suits, underwear, sport clothes, bathing suits, there is nothing of this kind in the fifty-nine shops of the city. There is unbelievable disorder in supplies." On the subject of profiteering Pravda reports on May 25, 1937: "In 1936 deficits, embezzlements and divestments amounted to an enormous sum: in government business 217 million rubles, in the consumer cooperatives 203 million rubles. But these represent only the deficits and embezzlements that were discovered!" Za Industriializatsii of July 17, 1937, gives an interesting glimpse into how the Donets region is supplied with food. "In the regulation of April 29 of this year," writes the periodical, "the council of the people's commis-

433

[685]

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 110. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to abide by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, to observe the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

[685] Art. 111. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to safeguard and strengthen public socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation [421] of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperity and culture of all the working people.

Persons committing offences against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.

Art. 112. Universal military service is law.

Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honourable duty of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

[687] Art. 113. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR. Treason to the country — violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the State, espionage — is punishable with all the severity of the law and is the most heinous of crimes.

Chapter IX. The Electoral System

666 Art. 114. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies — of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages — are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

Art. 115. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the Ukrainian SSR who have reached the age of 18, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR who has reached the age of 21, [641] irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities may be elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 116. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

[562] Art. 117. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

Art. 118. Citizens serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

Art. 119. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Working People's Deputies from the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of villages and cities to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.

Art. 120. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.

779 of greater magnitude or requires more Grace than the other six
795 sacraments which are performed by all priests.

It is claimed that the differentiation which now exists between a
793 bishop and presbyter or priest lies not in the degree or quality of Grace which each enjoys, but only in the functions which each performs. Yet when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church re-established itself in 1921, it did not abolish the episcopacy or argue in a presbyterian manner that the episcopacy has no place in the Church. It merely argued that the exclusive right of bishops to administer the sacrament of holy orders (ordination and consecration) developed as a result of the actual needs of Church life and not on the grounds that bishops possess a greater degree or higher quality of Grace. The Church itself, it is contended, is the source of the differentiation in functions performed by bishops and presbyters or priests. Administrative necessity and the need for unity and stability alone caused the Church to grant to bishops the exclusive right to ordain and consecrate. This right is a purely canonical matter and is therefore, unlike religious dogma, not immutable. It is a practice developed by the Church, and it is consequently possible for the Church to redistribute functions at any time, as its Ukrainian branch did in 1921 when it became necessary to obtain a truly Ukrainian episcopate. This was a drastic step, and it was accompanied by an appeal to the Lord, the Supreme Pastor, before whom the Ukrainians laid their faith, hopes, and prayers.[24]

795 Under Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj's leadership thirty-five bishops
659 were consecrated in the traditional Orthodox manner, and the new Church appeared to be prospering. The Soviet Government had
687 done little to prevent its establishment but within a few years commenced a campaign of gradual suppression. In 1924 and during each of the three succeeding years Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj was placed under arrest. In 1927 he was compelled to resign and a *sobor* elected Nicholas Borec'kyj to succeed him. The new Metropolitan governed the Church until 1930 when it was implicated in the alleged plot of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine *(Spilka Vyzvolennja Ukrāny)*. This clandestine organization was accused of promoting separatist tendencies and desiring to restore private property. Vladimir Čekhivs'kyj, a Social Democrat who had been premier of the anti-Bolshevik Directory Government early in 1919, was charged with having headed the Union's religious section. During the trial of the forty-five leaders of the Union in March and April

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 100 f. Archbishop Teodorovyč (pp. 124 ff.) has cited considerable evidence which indicates that consecration of bishops by a college of presbyters was a practice employed by the Church of Alexandria for more than two centuries preceding the convocation of the First Ecumenical Council in 325 A.D.

1: Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 of 1930 the prosecution alleged that the Church held secret requiems
for Symon Petljura, the émigré nationalist, following his murder in
659 Paris.[15] The Ukrainian Church never recovered from the setback
687 which it suffered as a result of the trial. During the 1930's all of the
bishops were arrested, and with the advent of World War II there
remained only Archbishop Teodorovyč in the United States, the
sole surviving hierarch of the original thirty-five.[16]

793 The opportunity to renew the autocephalous status of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church came with the Nazi invasion of the
795 Soviet Union. The movement was headed by Bishop Polikarp
Sikors'kyj of the diocese of Lutsk in Volynia, who in February of
1942 re-established the Church at a *sobor* in Pinsk and consecrated
several bishops. At the same time Bishop Polikarp succeeded in
obtaining the support of his nominal superior, Metropolitan Dionisij
of Warsaw, who had consecrated him in 1932 and ten years later
elevated him to an archbishopric. Polikarp's consecration had been
canonical since he had headed part of the autocephalous Orthodox
Church of Poland, which was recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople during the inter-war period. Thus the renewed Ukrainian Church was not plagued with the charge of "self-consecration" which served the enemies of the national church so well during the

[15] Nicholas Kovalevs'kyj, *Ukraina Pid Červonyin Jarmom* (Lviv, 1936), pp. 72 ff.

[16] The demise of the Church in Ukraine itself did not hinder the development of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the United States and in Canada. Many of the Ukrainian immigrants in both countries desired such a Church, and when the movement first manifested itself in the homeland they were quick to assume the initiative. As early as July 18, 1918, a group of 150 laymen held a church congress in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The participants were members of the Uniat Church, adhering to the Eastern Orthodox ritual but acknowledging the Papacy, who were dissatisfied with the arbitrary nature of its administration and the principle of personal episcopal ownership of all church buildings and parochial property. They also objected to the attempt of the Uniat Church to obtain control of the Peter Mohyla Institute, a Ukrainian educational institution in Saskatoon. When the Uniat bishop denied them the sacraments, they decided to establish a truly national and democratically governed church and return to the Orthodox faith of their forefathers. The new Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada gained adherents from the Russian Orthodox Church which lost whole parishes composed of emigrants from Bukovina; many Uniats also joined the new Church which now has more than two hundred congregations although many of these are rural and small. The Canadian Church, unlike the movement in Ukraine itself, succeeded in obtaining recognition from a canonically consecrated Orthodox hierarch in the United States, the Syrian Metropolitan Germanos, who served as its acting bishop until Archbishop Teodorovyč succeeded him in 1924. The latter also assumed control over the numerically smaller Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, but in 1947 he relinquished the leadership of the Canadian Church which now has a separate hierarch. It is significant that the Canadian Church did not accept the canons which were adopted at the Kiev *Sobor* in 1921, since it wished to be in a position to establish relations with the other branches of the Orthodox Church on the North American continent.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

against the Great Russian hegemony.) The Ukrainian enthusiasts of 423
'cultural acheivements' so recently lauded by Kaganovich himself 474
were now accused of 'maintaining relations with nationalist political organizations in Galicia'. And it was not difficult to prove their connections with open or secret organizations 'suffering under the yoke of Poland'. The existence of such connections had been tolerated and even favoured by the Soviet administration to the extent which they furthered Communist propagandist activities in Poland, but there could be no difficulty, if necessary, in treating them as treason.

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4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

661 ●687 missars, Skrypnik, committed suicide in July 1933 in order to avoid arrest.

In that same year Postyshev replaced Kaganovich as 'dictator' in the Ukraine (he only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party). He arrived with orders 'to make an end of the counter-revolution that had woven itself a nest in the Ukraine'. The speech which Postyshev delivered at the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party, soon after entering on his office, indicated the new line of Soviet policy.

'In Ukraine our leading Party members and Comrade Stalin himself are specially hated. The class enemy has been to a good school in this country and has learned how to struggle against Soviet rule. In Ukraine have settled the remnants of many counter-revolutionary parties and organizations. Kharkov has gradually become the centre of attraction for all sorts of nationalistic and other counter-revolutionary organizations. They have all been drawn to this centre and they have spread their webs all over the Ukraine, making use of our Party system for their own ends. You remember, Comrades, when twenty Secretaries of Party Regional Committees dared to declare that it was impossible to fulfil the Harvest Plan' (nos. 15–21 of the *Proletarian*, Kharkov, 1934). At the same Congress the chief of the Ukrainian G.P.U., Beletsky, read a report in which he declared that 'Imperialists, through agents and through the remnants of the inimical classes which we have not destroyed and to which belong all the *kulak* and 'Petlyurian' elements of the Ukrainian villages, will yet prepare in the country criminal activities and diversions against the principal objects of our Ukrainian Economic Plan' (*ibid.*). Beletsky then proceeded to read aloud a proclamation which was supposed to have been seized by the G.P.U. and according to which Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries were 'dreaming about the denationalization of the whole of Ukrainian industry and the re-establishment of large landownership'.

Accusations of this type were of course inventions of the G.P.U., but the speeches of the head of this grim organization and of his political chief Postyshev indicate that the new policy of the Soviets was directed to the destruction both of the institution of private property among the Ukrainian peasants and of their national characteristics of stubborn individualism and love of freedom.

Postyshev had been given two problems to tackle: the first was to root out 'the counter-revolution' alleged to be lurking in the Soviet administration and in the Communist Party in the Ukraine;

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the second was to crush the will of the peasantry. In the first he succeeded as best he could and added to the sensational trials of 1931–3 the discovery of 'a secret Ukrainian organization' which was accused of being in direct touch with the Ukrainian separatists who were working abroad under the leadership of Colonel Konovalets. It was, however, beyond the strength of Postyshev to cope with the chaos which reigned in rural Ukraine during the years 1932–4 as a result of the policy of forced collectivization. Despite the fact that Postyshev 'eliminated' from the Ukrainian Communist Party over a quarter of its total strength, and in spite of thousands of arrests and hundreds of executions, the Party Secretary was accused of 'weakness and lack of energy' and was replaced by a certain Kossior. The late 'dictator' was, after a lapse of time, himself arrested and probably shot together with many of his closest collaborators.

But all the cruel personal dramas which took place under the Secretaryships of Postyshev and Kossior were as nothing compared to the terrible miseries which overtook the Ukrainian countryside during the five years 1930–35 as a result of the introduction of the *kolkhozy*. In their very essence *kolkhozy* were organically opposed to all the traditions and ways of life of the Ukrainian peasantry. Collective farming on a large scale was carried through at the cost of ruining small and 'average' peasant farms through the instrument of the ruthless pressure of the administration. The very rapid development of 'the *kolkhoz* movement' so much admired by Communists all the world over was the result, not of the peasants voluntarily joining the collective farms, but of their being driven on to them often by the use of military force—a fact which Stalin himself acknowledged in his article 'Head-turning from Success' (*Pravda*, 2 March 1930). The immediate consequence of the *kolkhoz* policy was seen in the lowering of agricultural production throughout the whole country which quickly led to the increasing misery of the peasantry, famine and terrible mortality. One of the principal reasons of all this was the *mania grandiosa* which always characterizes the policy of extreme ideologues; having become convinced of the low productive capacity of the smaller *kolkhozy* already set up, the enthusiasts of the Communist Party, in 1930, demanded their enlargement on a 'gigantic' scale. According to the reliable testimony of a member of the Communist Party (the Ukrainian agronomist Mirkevich, the initiator of tractor stations) 'this measure, in a series of regions, was realized in an exceptionally bureaucratic and senseless manner. *Kolkhozy* of 55–100 hectares were suddenly transformed, without any adequate technical preparation, into

subordinate, that the Ukapist appeal for inclusion was definitely 665
rejected and that the group was offered the choice of suppression or of self-liquidation. They accordingly accepted the voluntary decision and signed thus their own death warrants as had the Borotbisty by their early submission.

All three parties had the same general attitude toward all non-Communists and bourgeois groups. They were in general agreement that these had to be destroyed and driven from political and social importance. Thus, all adopted a hostile attitude toward the nationalists who had supported Petlyura and the Ukrainian National Republic. They attacked the remains of the Social Revolutionists, the Social Democrats, and all the non-Marxian or Marxian groups that did not accept a strict Communism. They dissolved the organizations and seized their property, while they imprisoned many of the older leaders and tried to humiliate them in the eyes of the Ukrainian public.

Thus in 1921, they staged in Kharkiv a public trial of the [687]●
members of the Executive Committee of the Social Revolutionists. The list included V. Holubovych, the Prime Minister at the time of Brest-Litovsk, N. Petrenko, P. Hubenko (Ostap Vyshnya), Lyzanivsky and many others. They were charged with hostility to the "government of workers and peasants" but apparently the regime was not too sure of its ground and merely sentenced them to relatively short terms in prison.

It was not only the politicians who suffered, for the new regime[1] 661
attacked every institution which it did not control. In 1920 575
it abolished all Ukrainian professional organizations and trades unions, including such as the Poltava Society of Workers in Co-operatives and similar groups in Kiev, Kharkiv, and other cities. Then, by arrests of the leaders of the cooperative societies, it forced new elections and put into power only those persons who had the direct approval of the Russian Bolsheviks.

It was next the turn of the purely cultural organizations. All the societies of the Prosvita (Enlightenment) which operated a chain of reading rooms, schools, libraries, theatres, etc. were disbanded on the ground that they were connected with the Rada

1 [Ukrainian Soviet Republic -- Analyst]

opposed very strenuously all the Russifying influences in the Party and insisted, as a matter of principle, that only Ukrainian Communists should be promoted to prominent posts in the Ukrainian Communist organizations. He even went so far as to insist, when Kaganovich was sent from Moscow as Secretary of the Ukrainian section of the party, that he be removed and replaced by Chubar, an old Bolshevik, and he recommended that Hrynko should be made the head of the state. 645 871 186 665

Kaganovich, who had been rather on the side of Shumsky in many of his enterprises, now turned against him on the ground that he was breaking Communist discipline and, in a short time, Shumsky was removed and transferred to Moscow, where he received a post as head of the trade unions. From there he was moved to Leningrad to become head of a school of economics, but by this time his star was setting. Shumsky, on more charges, was sent to a concentration camp near the Finnish border. According to the story, he was assured that he had a chance to escape. He tried it and was shot. His leading assistants, Maksymovych, Vasylkiv and Turyansky, were branded as Shumkyists and punished accordingly. [687]

His successor, M. Skrypnyk, took up his work as Commissar of Education under even better auspices. Unlike his predecessors, who had entered the Communist Party from the ranks of the Borotbisty or the Ukapisty and who thereby risked the charge of being Ukrainian nationalists and having bourgeois-nationalist sympathies, Skrypnyk had been an old member of the Russian Social Democratic Party (Bolsheviks). He had been a personal friend of Lenin long before the Revolution. He had been arrested several times by the tsarist government, had taken an active part in the October Revolution of 1917 and was a disciplined member of the party. He was thus above reproach so far as his party standing was concerned.

From the time of the foundation of the Ukrainian National Republic, Skrypnyk had been one of the outstanding Ukrainians in the Communist Party. From the beginning he had taken the definite stand that the Communist organization in Ukraine should be thoroughly Ukrainian, independent of the Russian Communist Party and with a seat in the Comintern. He believed that Ukraine

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Early Trials

517 The change of economic policy which had ushered in the
186 collectivization of agriculture seemed at first to offer no threat to the cultural movement which was going on in Ukraine. Despite the open criticisms that had been made of Khvylovy and the more secret opposition that Skrypnyk was meeting, the cultural work continued in all its aspects. Politically the Commissariat of Education was still continuing its work, the new literature was proceeding with more and more important works being produced, and outside and somewhat apart from the political life of the day, Ukrainian scholarship was producing ever more serious works.

No one openly thought of overthrowing the regime although latent discontent could be discovered among the entire population. It had been years since there had been any open opposition. The unruly leaders who had appealed to arms had either gone abroad or quieted down and there was no one who was even suspected of the kind of disloyalty that had been widespread during the period of Militant Communism.

186 Then, in 1929, just as the compulsory collectivization was being
814 prepared, the Ukrainian Soviet government announced that it had
●687 discovered the evidence of the existence of a secret society, the
661 Society for the Liberation of Ukraine, and it commenced a series of arrests of some of the outstanding intellectual leaders of the scientific world. This resulted in a public trial and condemnation of the accused but for the most part they received relatively light sentences.

Who were involved? For the most part they were individuals who had played more or less important roles in the Ukrainian

186 National Republic, who had gone abroad after its collapse and
814 who had been invited back to take part in the work of the Ukrain-
687 ian Academy of Sciences. The government produced what seemed
661 to be definite evidence against these people but the curious fact
[538] was that this evidence was strangely inconsistent with all of their previous activity. On the prisoner's bench were such men as Serhey Yefremiv, the leading scholar of Ukrainian literature and a relative conservative, the academiciam Mykhaylo Slabchenko, a former Social Democrat, Prof. Joseph Hermayze, a former member of the Executive Committee of the same party, and the well-known writer L. Starytska-Chernyakivska, who was close to Efremiv and who had more or less dropped out of the modern literary movement and was living in practical retirement.

The Soviet record of the trial strongly suggests that all those factions which, during the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic had utterly failed to come to any agreement, had somehow or other composed their differences in the days when Ukrainian sentiments seemed to be dominant in the ranks of the Communist Party and when there were outstanding Communists, like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, pleading the Ukrainian cause. Yet, as was to be the case in almost all of the later trials, the court record based upon the testimony of the NKVD did not give any clue to the treasonable acts of which the defendants were accused and if they did, the stories passed belief. There was, likewise, no indication of the serious plans on which the organization was working or any details of its formal organization.

All the information that was revealed suggested that it was a definitely anti-Communist movement engineered by a group of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who objected to the Communist program of Ukrainization. There was no hint that the accused had any connection with the derussification program of Skrypnyk or the demand of Khvylovy and his friends of the *Vaplite* for the development of a definite Ukrainian Communism. The Society for the Liberation of Ukraine appeared like a ghost from the past and the prosecution seemed to have the tacit support of even those elements which were working for Ukrainization.

Up to this moment the only open manifestation had been the demand of Skrypnyk that Communists be included in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences but this had apparently been answered satisfactorily and, with slight changes, the Academy was working as before. The most that could be said was that the leaders of Ukrainian thought in the Academy had not properly in their old age kept pace with the development of Marxo-Leninist thought but even this was hardly sufficient for the outburst which was loosed against a group of widely respected scholars. 186 814 687 661

Another curious aspect of the situation was that the most severe sentences were not given to the announced ringleaders and chief culprits but that there was unearthed on the occasion another society, the SUM, the Society of Ukrainian Youth, which consisted of relatively obscure students, village intelligentsia, peasants and workmen who were shot by the hundreds and thousands without being brought before any tribunal. The head of this group, Mykola Pavlushkiv, was involved in the trial but once again there was no indication that any members of the SUM had been engaged in any form of sabotage or anti-governmental work. Members of the organization who have escaped abroad have testified that the SUM was organized only on the basis of personal friendships and never undertook or planned any deliberate acts of sabotage. [883]

The discovery of the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine with its assumed anti-Communist tinge was the signal for the opening of a campaign against the most respected older non-Communist members of the Academy. The usual method was by the device of demanding Communist self-criticism, and criticism. Its practice was brutally simple and effective.

The Communist organs, especially the GPU-NKVD, decided which of these scholars were to be broken ideologically (and morally) and which were to be removed without fanfare. The latter disappeared. The former group were forced to appear for public "self-criticism." This was preceded by a series of attacks in the newspapers as to the mistakes in Marxo-Leninism which the victim had committed.

186 814 687 661

Then, on an appointed day, a meeting was arranged in a large hall to which the public was invited by the display of large placards and other notices. Selected speakers attacked in the most scurrilous and abusive language various aspects of the work of the accused and ascribed to him the grossest errors. Then came the (obligatory) speeches of those who "wished to speak," i.e. his collaborators and students. These were carefully prepared by the Communist nucleus in the Academy or the Committee. The accused was then compelled to admit his mistakes and promise hereafter to work "in the spirit of Marxo-Leninism and the decrees of the Communist Party." These performances usually lasted for two or three sessions and then the critical "testing" of the work went on in special scientific meetings or scientific publications or in the torture chambers of the GPU. If the accused did not humiliate himself sufficiently or if the collaborators showed themselves insufficiently critical, "rotten liberal," "compromising," "opportunistic" or leaving "ideologically (or class) hostile loopholes," the process was repeated with still more bitterness against the main culprit and his collaborators or witnesses who had attempted to defend him were attacked with equal ferocity and their testimony was sent to the proper places for "consideration."

This was the treatment accorded to Prof. Hrushevsky who, in 1930, was criticized publicly and then arrested and deported to Moscow where he was prevented from doing any work and only after he was completely broken was he sent to a rest-house in the Caucasus to die in 1934. With his removal, the old historical studies almost came to an end. The Academy was reorganized as the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and nearly all the work in the humanities were stopped. The Historical-Philological Section was combined with the Social-Economic Section and nearly all of its special fields were abolished, while at the same time there disappeared a large number of valuable books and collections which were ready for publication.

This destruction of the older scholars in the Academy was justified by grouping Hrushevsky with his historical studies in the same

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

category of public enemies as Mazepa and Petlyura, and the three came to form a trinity subject to constant attack. Their leading crime was declared to be bourgeois nationalism, the object of which was to separate the Ukrainian from the Russian people and to deny the great significance of the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

In 1931 the Soviet authorities found traces of another organization, the Ukrainian National Centre. This is even more mysterious than was the preceding case, for it involved a number of apolitical figures who were living in retirement, as Holubovych, but at the same time it commenced the liquidation of the leaders of the former Borotbisty and Ukapisty. Still heavier sentences were imposed upon these men and large numbers were deported.

Then came an announcement of the extension to Soviet Ukrainian territory of the work of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Colonel Konovalets, and a number of more prominent Ukrainians were executed or deported for reasons that were never satisfactorily explained.

At the same time the Soviets seem to have spread rumors in connection with collectivization that there were movements for an uprising against the regime. They endeavored to have pseudo-Ukrainian patriots from Poland establish contacts with former officers of the Ukrainian National Republic who had dropped into obscurity and then, at a given signal, called for a revolt and easily overpowered their dupes.

Thus these trials eliminated from Ukrainian life the older scholars who had been trained before the period of Communist rule. They justified in the minds of the emigrés the correctness of their position in refusing to listen to the blandishments of the Ukrainian Soviet government during the apparently rosy years of the New Economic Policy, when it seemed as if there was to be a rapprochement with the West. How far the activity of these men, who had put themselves into the lion's mouth and perished, served to renew the Ukrainian courage and self-reliance has been much debated, especially in view of the fact that they were all destroyed as bourgeois, long before any serious danger seemed to

186 threaten the position of the various groups of Ukrainian Com-
814 munists. Khvylovy, despite the attacks upon him and Skrypnyk, still
687 continued to work for the greater Ukrainization of the population
661 and of the cities and, so far, he had not been subjected to any too severe criticism. That was to come next.

626 538 It was perfectly natural that a similar situation should develop in Ukraine. The various schools of serious writing, as the *Vaplite,* stood out against this regimentation and ably defended their position, but that position was indefensible in the face of political pressure and without being conscious of any inconsistency, Skrypnyk, as a good Communist and a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was willing to exert pressure to bring the literary organization of Ukraine in line with that of the All-Union Communist Party at the very same time when he was deliberately thwarting the unifying tendencies of that party.

[186] [68] The first sign of the changed order came with the arrest and deportation of M. Ivchenko for his novel *Working Powers* because it endeavored to express in a concrete form the problem of fitting the ideals of the various national groups into the stereotyped formula which was now fashionable. Next came the difficulties of Khvylovy over his novel *Woodsnipes,* despite his willingness to secure an opportunity for further work by the destruction of the second part of the novel.

It must be remembered that the groups which were now being attacked were not by their essential declarations anti-Communist. They reflected, rather, the disillusionment of many people with the prevailing manifestations of Communism, the growing realization that the Communist regime was not giving the people that ideal reality which its teachings indicated they should easily win. [536] That was the gist of the drama by M. Kulish, the *People's Malakhy,* which reflected the contrast between the ideals of a high-minded but somewhat simple village Don Quixote and the realities of life on any particular level. This, as other of his plays, was well presented in the Berezil Theatre, directed by Les Kurbas, a Western Ukrainian who had developed in Kiev into one of the great producers and had pushed the Ukrainian theatrical art to its highest development. Writings of the same character had marked some of the early Russian works of A. N. Tolstoy after the revolution but, being a Great Russian, he was not involved in the endless controversies over the national questions and, like most of the Russian authors, he was able to work out a satisfactory agreement with the

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Ukraine in the Late Thirties

With the power of Moscow thus defined and reasserted by 668
the free vote of the Moscow-controlled Communist representatives of the various independent republics that formed part of the USSR, the way was open for the next step. Stalin had not only prepared himself legally at home by a clever use of contradictory expressions but he had taken advantage of the good will of the liberals and progressives of the rest of the world by exploiting the distrust which they felt for Hitler and the Nazis and had infiltrated Communists through the media of popular fronts into nearly all the governments that boasted of their democracy.

Next came the bewildering series of trials which were now held 661
in Moscow. In quick succession Yagoda, the dreaded head of 687
the NKVD, was removed from his post, arrested and shot by his successor Yezhov, whose name was soon to become even more detested. Then, in a series of three public trials which extended from the end of 1936 to 1938, nearly all of the old Bolshevik leaders who had played important roles in Soviet life during the period of Lenin's domination were condemned for counter-revolutionary activity and either shot or sentenced to long terms of deportation, from which they did not return. The list included such names as Bukharin, the former theoretician of the Party, Zinovyev, the master of the Leningrad Soviet, the leading supporters of Trotsky, Rykov, etc. At the same time Marshal Tukhachevsky, the commander of the Red Army in its unsuccessful drive against Warsaw in 1920, Marshal Yegorov, the leader of the southern wing of that army with which Stalin himself had served as political commissar and most of the other leading officers were removed and

661 suffered the same fate on the ground that they were intriguing
●687 with Hitler or with the capitalist imperialists.

The Yezhovshchina, as it was called, raged over the entire territory of the Soviet Union and was directed with especial fury against all the leading men in all walks of life, directors of government offices, directors of factories, directors of collective farms, and army officers, if they could possibly be suspected of being disloyal to the Stalinist regime or of having independent thoughts.

The world looked on in amazement, for the Moscow regime seemed to have gone completely mad in its accusations and suspicions. The charges that were made against the outstanding personalities seemed fantastic and contradicted everything that any one knew of the character and actions of the outstanding Communist leaders. To some it seemed as if the revolution were devouring its own children, for Stalin was executing men for proposing policies which he had later adopted himself, as he had in the case of both the right and left deviationists from the general line of the party. To others it seemed an alarming example of the infiltration of all forms of life by the agents of Nazism. All agreed that the actions were extreme and far reaching.

As the purge of the administrative machinery went on, its range increased. Once the head of a bureau or a factory were implicated, the way was open to charge all of his subordinates who had not denounced him with being accessory to his crimes and they were called up and punished or, in rare cases, were acquitted and promoted. The storm continued until late in 1938 when Yezhov himself was removed and suffered the same fate at the hands of the Georgian Beria, who guided the NKVD through World War II.

If such was the fury in the RSFSR, it can well be imagined what were the results in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian Communists had set the fashion of accusing their opponents of bourgeois nationalism. When the storm broke, Postyshev, who had been sent down in 1933 to wipe out bourgeois nationalism, to organize the famine and to break the Ukrainian renaissance, was among the first to go. He was removed and disappeared at the hands of Kaganovich, who reemerged for a while as the strong man of the

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Lyubchenko, who had been appointed the Prime Minister of the UkSSR on the single program of suppressing Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, was called to Moscow to confront the self-confessed leaders of the nationalists and, on his return to Kiev, he shot himself. His successor, Bondarenko, disappeared without a trace. 661 687

Who were these self-confessed leaders? Prominent among them was A. Khvylya, who had been the champion of the general line against Khvylovy and Skrypnyk and who had been the dominant figure in the attack on the Ukrainian literary men and scholars. For years he had resorted to all kinds of attacks to bring Ukrainian grammar and language closer to Russian. He now "voluntarily" confessed that he had worked against the "elder brother" and had joined and aided in developing a secret military force several million strong for the sole purpose of separating Ukraine from the USSR and he swore that in this he had the active aid of Lyubchenko and most of the officials of the UkSSR. Finis.

Zatonsky, the Commissar of Education, was accused of another crime. He had drawn years before the fire of Gorky for suggesting that a mixed language be introduced into Ukrainian schools as the means of absorbing Ukrainian into Russian. He had speedily withdrawn his recommendations under fire and all had seemed forgiven. It was not, and Zatonsky disappeared in the holocaust.

It then came the turn of the writers. Men like Kulyk, who had run roughshod over the older writers and had called for their liquidation, were now found guilty of bourgeois nationalism and with them most of the authors who had emerged during the shattering of the Ukrainian renaissance and who had celebrated the turning of the Ukraine into a collectivized and industrialized state. Each and every one of them confessed that they had been guilty of bourgeois nationalism and they received the due reward for their crimes. [538]

There was hardly a family in Ukraine which did not suffer the accusation of at least one member. The survivors who have escaped abroad have given lurid tales of the extent to which the feeling of distrust and suspicion spread among all classes of the

661 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers
681 and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses
631 and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in
166 eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] The object of these purges and these changes was the breaking
[156] up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the
186 interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

[During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

true, it is certain that the killing was unintentional and unpre- 668*
meditated and consequently does not indicate any plan of the 795
nationalists to aid the Autocephalous Church by destroying the chief prelate of the opposing group. That such a plan is even more unlikely is shown by the fact, attested by a source not involved in the dispute, that Alexius was the chief moderating influence in the Autonomous Church.[62] As has been shown, he tried to bring about union, and was on terms of friendship with at least one of the chief Autocephalous churchmen. These circumstances also go far to refute the charge that Alexius was in the service of the German police or, as has also been alleged by nationalist writers, in the service of the NKVD.[63] His personal character, as evidenced by his writings,[64] and the respect in which he was held even by opponents militate against such an accusation, even had not his conciliatory tendency refuted the main burden of the charge that he had fostered the disruption of the church to further the ends of the Germans and the Soviets. The whole incident was in all probability a tragic accident, utilized afterwards as propaganda for the rival groups.

So clear-cut a judgment cannot be offered concerning the sec- 668*
ond incident involving the slaying of an Autonomous bishop. In 687
the late summer of 1943, Emmanuel, then Autonomous bishop of 795
Vladimir Volynsk, was seized by a band of the UPA (controlled at that time by the OUN-B), taken to one of their forest headquarters, and there, after a "trial," executed as a traitor and a spy. Charges similar to those made against Alexius were the basis for the accusation against his colleague, and, in addition, Emmanuel is supposed to have confessed to having acted as an agent for the German police in betraying underground members.[65] Whether this is true cannot be determined, but certain factors cast considerable doubt upon it. The fact that the same charges were made against Alexius, who was very likely innocent, renders suspicious the accusations made against Emmanuel. The latter

[62] CXLVa 66.
[63] Mykola Selez', "Iak diiut stalins'ki agentury?" (How Do the Stalinist Agent Systems Operate?), *Vpered*, May, 1949, p. 11.
[64] See his letter to Sheptyts'kyi in Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 128–30.
[65] Selez', p. 11; Interview 63.

687 was regarded, for another reason, as a traitor, for he had originally 668 been consecrated as bishop of Belaia Tserkov' by the Auto- 795 cephalous Church, and his subsequent defection to the Autonomous Church, on grounds of the dubious canonical validity of the nationalist religious body, must have been a sore blow to Ukrainian nationalist feeling.[66] He had also issued public statements calling for all the faithful to avoid aiding the nationalist partisans; while nearly everyone in a public position in Volhynia (including an OUN member like the editor of *Volyn'*) was forced to make such statements, it appears likely that Emmanuel may have been rather more vigorous and sincere than others in his circumstances.[67] On the other hand, there is no really trustworthy evidence that he engaged in spying, or other indisputably dishonorable activity, and those who knew him best tend to doubt the charge.[68] Consequently, it appears that his death was due to the fanatic and ruthless spirit which dominated the OUN-B in Volhynia at the time.

On the other hand, there is no evidence to implicate the Autocephalous Church in his killing, and all appearances point to its having been decided upon independently by the partisan forces. It is true that Emmanuel's position was especially distasteful to the UPA because of the contrast it offered to the stand of the most active Autocephalous prelate in Volhynia, Bishop Platonius of Rovno, who actively aided the underground, and is said even to have gone to the UPA camp in Derman to offer his support.[69] It should be pointed out, however, that Platonius was comparatively uninfluential in Autocephalous Church councils. The more typical attitude was that of Polykarp—also resident in Volhynia—who offered vigorous protests against German attacks on the clergy and against the brutal treatment of his people,[70] yet never gave open support or encouragement to the rebels. In this policy of submission to the secular power, even to an evil one, Polykarp

[66] Selez', p. 11; *UAPTs*, p. 5.
[67] Cf. his address to the Ukrainian population, in *Volyn'*, August 8, 1943, p. 3.
[68] Interview 38.
[69] *UAPTs*, p. 10; Interview 18.
[70] CXLVa 66. See also the sharp but respectful protest of Hilarion against the shooting of Autocephalous priests in the Generalgouvernement for contacts with escaped prisoners of war in the spring of 1942—long before there was any widespread nationalist partisan activity (Occ E-2 [2]).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

was, according to his own statement, following the tradition of Orthodoxy.[71]

A few months after the tragic episodes just described, nearly all of the East Ukraine was reconquered by the Red Army. The great majority of the Orthodox bishops, of both the Autocephalous and the Autonomous groups, did not await the vengeance which could be expected to follow their opposition to the Soviet plan for using Orthodoxy as a propaganda weapon but fled to the Generalgouvernement. Here they were given considerably more courteous treatment than had been their lot in the Reichskommissariat.[72] Moreover, the Ostministerium felt able at last to push forward its plans for formation of a national church. The project envisaged by Rosenberg's ministry called for union of the two rival branches. Ostensibly this union would have been a compromise, but, like the abortive agreement signed by Alexius, it would have favored the Autocephalous group. The Ostministerium officials in charge of the negotiations were obviously sympathetic to Mstyslav and Hilarion, though somewhat cooler toward Polykarp.[73] On the other hand, they viewed Panteleimon, the real leader of the Autonomous group, as a "Russian" and obstinate; they proposed to induce him to leave the Ukraine altogether by offering him the vacant Orthodox see of Riga.[74] The Autocephalous desire for a union in which there would be for a time "Russian bishops for the Russian minority," who would later be absorbed into the "Ukrainian church," obviously envisaged a relegation of the Autonomous bishops, or at least of those who persisted in favoring Russian cultural and ethnic elements, to an inferior position, yet it was apparently not opposed by the Ostministerium.[75]

[71] CXLVa 66.
[72] *Ibid.*
[73] *Ibid.*
[74] *Ibid.* The nominal leader of the Autonomous Church, elected to succeed Alexius, was Damaskin of Kamenets-Podolsk, who appears by this time to have returned to the Autonomous fold (*cf. Volyn'*, July 1, 1943, p. 3).
[75] CXLVa 66. Although this project could not be carried out, the Ostministerium continued to favor to the limit of its capacities the Ukrainian national group in religious as well as political affairs. Cf. Memorandum of Rosenfelder (specialist in the Ostministerium) to Chef des Führungsstabes Politik, December 14, 1944, concerning plans for increasing the influence of the Autocephalous Church among

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine
687 the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 6/5 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres (*The Bolshevik of Ukraine*, No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the
519 Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan (1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but 000
politically faithful to Moscow.

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also 661
by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of 651
forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though 243
terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists.

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet 661
Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the 665
CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others.

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion 687 ●
from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commis- 186
sar of Education in Ukraine from 1027—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the

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national problem and encouraged others to do likewise. In Moscow Skrypnyk's theoretical works on the national problem were treated with distrust: for in the CP one is to believe that Lenin and Stalin have given unchangeable dogmas an orthodox Communist is not expected to discuss. In the meantime Skrypnyk in his speeches and articles summoned the Ukrainian Communists to a 'national construction not restricted by anything'. He pointed out that national consciousness should be developed among the masses of Ukrainian people, and that through the development of the national culture certain values should be given to the Ukrainian workers and peasants.

Skrypnyk described the practice of the Russian Communist Party in the national question in the following words:

"For the majority of our Party, Ukraine as a national element did not exist. There was only 'Little Russia', as a part of the indivisible Russia, something uncertain both in its relations with Russia and with regard to its territory and even its language" (Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches*, vol. I, p. 291; Kharkov 1932). Frequently, in the Congresses of the Communist Party, Skrypnyk demanded the organising of Ukrainian schools in the territories of the Russian Soviet Republic inhabited by Ukrainians. These views and demands of Skrypnyk Moscow recognised as 'nationalism', he himself was declared as an 'instrument of intervention'. In order to avoid being the principal figure in a new trial Skrypnyk thought it better to end this life by suicide. This happened on July 6, 1933, on the 10th anniversary of the ratification of the first constitution of the USSR, of which Skrypnyk was one of the co-editors.

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Moscow's fears of the Communist opposition in Ukraine are shown by the dimensions of the 'purge' which had been made among the Communists in Ukraine in 1933. During 1933, 35,5% of the members were expelled from the CP of Ukraine (*Communist:* 1, 2, 1934). In some regions, for instance in that of Kiev, half of the members were expelled from the Communist Party. Many Communist organisations in villages ceased to exist and were replaced by 'political detachments' sent from Russia. In the course of 10 months in 1933, in Ukraine, 237 secretaries of Rayon Committees of the Communist Party, 279 Presidents of Rayon Executive Committees, and 158 Presidents of Rayon Control Commissions were dismissed (*Izvestia:* Moscow 28, 11, 1933).

The purge in the public institutions of Ukraine was directed principally against the Ukrainians. The Communist Mykolenko,

in the Ukraine more dangerous than the Ukrainian variety, no additional attention was given to the problem of Russian children.

In 1933, however, the offensive against Ukrainian nationalism occasioned a review of the Ukrainization process. Ukrainian nationalism had been considered a dangerous force since 1926, when Shumskii and Khvilovoi — two important figures in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education — were censured for desiring "to orient Ukrainian culture on capitalist Europe rather than on socialist Moscow." The Party became still more alert to signs of nationalism after the uncovering in 1929 of the Society for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, a secret organization headed by such outstanding nationalists as Efremov, Germaize and Nikovskii. But it was the campaign against the collectivization of agriculture which occasioned the intensive campaign against the nationalists. The Party regarded the opposition to collectivization as the result in large part of the nationalists, and it set out to remove them from every branch of political, economic and cultural activity. The central figure in the campaign was Nicholas Skripnik, an "Old Bolshevik" who was accused of having fallen under the influence of his nationalist colleagues and was removed from his position as Commissar of Education in March 1933. Even before his removal, however, the Commissariat of Education and all of its activities were under fire.

Charges of over-Ukrainization of the school system were first launched in an editorial appearing in *Kommunist* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party) in February 1933, and reprinted in other newspapers. The editorial said: "The mistakes and perversions in realizing the Ukrainization of the schools led in a considerable number of places to neglecting and ignoring the interests of the national minorities and especially the needs and requirements of the Russian toiling masses living in the Ukraine. Among responsible circles of the Commissariat there was concocted the 'theory' that the majority of the children in the cities, small towns and other labor centers speak a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon, and that therefore the majority of these children should study in the Ukrainian language. As a result, a significant part of the Russian toiling masses were deprived of schools in their native language and actually subjected to the forced Ukrainization which the Party had condemned in all of its directives."[65] Shortly after this editorial appeared, an article in *Proletarska Pravda* stated that in Kiev only 49 percent of the Russian children and 30 percent of the Jewish children studied in schools conducted in their native languages; that although

[65] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1933.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 110. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to abide by the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, to observe the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

[685] [421] Art. 111. It is the duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR to safeguard and strengthen public socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperity and culture of all the working people.

Persons committing offences against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.

Art. 112. Universal military service is law.

Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honourable duty of the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

[687] Art. 113. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR. Treason to the country — violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the State, espionage — is punishable with all the severity of the law and is the most heinous of crimes.

Chapter IX. The Electoral System

666 Art. 114. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies — of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of regions, areas, districts, cities, settlements and villages — are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

Art. 115. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the Ukrainian SSR who have reached the age of 18, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

[641] Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR who has reached the age of 21, irrespective of race, or nationality, sex, religion, educational or residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities may be elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 116. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

[562] Art. 117. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

Art. 118. Citizens serving in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

Art. 119. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Working People's Deputies from the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of villages and cities to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.

Art. 120. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 79. On the expiration of the terms of office of the regional, area, district, city settlement or village Soviets of Working People's Deputies, their executive and administrative organs retain their powers until the newly elected Soviets shall have formed new executive and administrative organs.

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led the organization after the West Ukrainian and émigré leaders had been forced to withdraw, was an engineer. On the whole, however, it may be said that engineers were more concerned with material reconstruction than politics, and did not play proportionately as significant a role as did engineers in the nationalist movements abroad and in Galicia. 463 186

The predominance of intellectuals and technical specialists in the nationalist movement imparted a certain specific color to the activities. In the first place, from the purely administrative point of view, the lack of trained men was a serious handicap. While the purely material aspects of city life were carried on about as well as might have been hoped in view of the destruction, shortages, and German obstruction, the conduct of public administration was far from adequate. This was, indeed, one of the major causes of the downfall of the OUN-M regime in Kiev, whether the worst defects consisted of favoritism and speculation by officials, or simply poor organizational and human relations. Nationalist fervor, enthusiasm, facility in the use of literary Ukrainian, were no substitutes for managerial skills and personnel psychology. Yet it was precisely these abilities which intellectuals who were excluded from public life, as were Soviet Ukrainian educators suspected of adherence to the Skrypnyk group, could not acquire. At the same time, so much of their energy had been turned in upon their academic and cultural cultivation of things Ukrainian, such as language and history, that the intellectuals failed to place the emotional and abstract aspects of the nationalist cause in a balanced framework when the opportunity for action arose. It cannot be said that the intellectuals were less courageous than others might have been in striving for national ends in the face of German terrorism; many lost their lives, although, as has been pointed out in the case of some of the small-city editors, others were sometimes found to act as pliant tools for the occupiers. It does, however, appear that persons more inclined to take a functional instead of an emotional approach to administration might have been more successful in evading German demands. 633 727 186

Very striking is the almost total lack of legal expression among almost all participants in administrative work. Probably the basic reason for this omission was that lawyers were few and far between among non-Communist elements in the Ukraine. A con- 693

693 fidential Wehrmacht report ascribes to this lack the difficulty experienced in getting the court system started,[15] and one Ukrainian account states that of two hundred and fifty lawyers in the Kharkov *oblast* under Soviet rule only thirty-five were not Jews.[16] While an anti-Semitic bias in this statement may need to be discounted, it does appear likely that the vast majority of a professional group which was already very small (there are few Western cities where there is only one lawyer per four thousand population!) was largely non-Ukrainian.

Of the few prominent legally trained Ukrainians, none had been able to practice his profession for many years. Alexander Semenenko, the mayor of Kharkov, had been educated as a lawyer under the tsarist regime and had practiced for a time in the early years of Communist rule. In the thirties, however, he was imprisoned for a number of years, and was a fugitive from the NKVD when the German army occupied the city.[17] Volodymyr Dolenko, who with Professor Dubrovs'kyi was the principal organizer of the strong nationalist group in Kharkov, had also been trained as a lawyer under the old regime, and he too had been prevented by the Communists from practicing.[18] Alexander Iatseniuk, head of the Zhitomir *oblast* administration, a judge under Nicholas II, had been relegated to the position of lecturer in a higher school by the Soviets.[19] His administration included a number of other jurists.

693 The want of training in the law was particularly striking in the
186 Ukrainian nationalist movements. The failure to attempt to form a codified set of principles of either a legal or an administrative nature, the frequent arbitrary action in allotting positions on a basis of partisan enthusiasm rather than objectively determinable qualifications, the frequent tendency to accept an extreme nationalist position and then to push it even further, might all have been curbed by a stronger legal tradition.

[15] PS 1693.
[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 4.
[17] *Krakauer Zeitung*, May 14, 1944, p. 4.
[18] Interview 73.
[19] Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2; the reporter states that the directives of the city administration were "precise and factual," not full of "romantic phrases."

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633 gandistic nature of much of their work exacerbated the defects
182 already existing in the intellectual nationalist tendencies in the east).[20] They also recognized the need for trained military officers to lead the police units, as well as for organizers of cooperatives, merchants, and other personnel to reorganize economic life.[21] Since the Galicians, unlike their East Ukrainian fellows, had been brought up under the influence of the Roman law tradition transmitted by the Austrian administration and the Catholic Church, one might have thought that they would provide a balancing ele-
[693] ment of legal thought. Actually, although there were numerous lawyers in the legal parties in Galicia, lawyers were even rarer among OUN leaders than among prominent East Ukrainians. Moreover, the whole current of revolutionary romanticism and the glorification of "illegalism" necessarily militated against the development of legalistic elements in the thinking of the nationalist factions. At the same time, of course, underground oppositional work had afforded the western group no experience in the responsibilities of public administration; the older émigrés who might have provided a modicum of such experience were kept out of the East Ukraine by the Germans. As the following statistics on the émigré group in Bohemia-Moravia indicate, however, the possible supply was not great, even if one accepts the figures which were obtained by listing, presumably at their own valuation, persons available to return to the East Ukraine in 1941.[22]

[20] Iu. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 6, 1941, p. 2.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] From a registration by a Ukrainian community organization in Prague, September 28, 1941 (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 4, 1941, p. 3). For comparison, the occupations of the postwar emigration (largely West rather than East Ukrainian, in contrast to the interwar émigré group) may be given:

	ÉMIGRÉS IN GERMANY	
	U. S. Zone (*total 85,646*)	*British Zone* (*total 44,987*)
Peasants	30 percent	44 percent
Workers	16	21
Artisans	18	14
Intellectuals	23	8
Miscellaneous	13	13

(Michael Pap, *Die Probleme der ukrainischen Staatlichkeit und der Emigration*, Inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde vorgelegt der Hohen Philosophischen Fakultät der Ruperts-Carola Universität zu Heidelberg, 1948 [Typescript available in the Library of Congress]).

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693 Art. 92. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

Art. 93. Supreme supervisory power to ensure the strict observance of the law by all Ministries and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by officials and citizens within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR generally, is exercised by the Procurator-General of the USSR directly and also through the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 94. The Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR is appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 95. Regional procurators are appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

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Chapter VIII. Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens

641 Art. 98. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment *for their work in accordance* with
461 its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment.

Art. 99. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to rest and leisure.

The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the fixing of the working
[466] day for factory and office workers at eight hours and the reduction of the working day to seven or six hours for arduous trades and to four hours in workshops where conditions of work are exceptionally arduous; by the institution of annual vacations with full pay for factory and office workers; and by the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest-homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

641 Art. 100. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or disability.

This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance
657 of factory and office workers at State expense, free medical service for the working people, and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

871 Art. 101. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to education.

This right is ensured by universal compulsory elementary education;
641 by free education up to and including the seventh grade; by the system of State stipends to students who have distinguished themselves in higher educational establishments; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language; and by the organization in the factories, State farms and machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

644 Art. 102. Women in the Ukrainian SSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life.

[562] The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education and by State protection of the interests of mother and child, State aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers, maternity leave with full pay and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

[563] Art. 103. Equality of rights of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality and also any propagation of racial or national exclusiveness, hatred and contempt - are punishable by law.

[659] Art. 104. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the Ukrainian SSR is separated from the State and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognised for all citizens.

Art. 105. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed by law:

(a) Freedom of speech;
(b) Freedom of the press;
(c) Freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
(d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organisations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

[575] Art. 106. In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to develop the organisational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are ensured the right to unite in public organisations — trade unions, co-operative associations, youth organisations, sport and defence organisations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organisations of the working people, both public and State.

[694] Art. 107. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

Art. 108. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

Art. 109. The Ukrainian SSR affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

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465 ment has been slower and they have not yet reached the same
434 degree of intensity of labor which we found in factories. Jews play a great part in commercial life.

162 Among the lower categories of civil servants, Ukrainians were
465 in the majority from the beginning, while representatives of foreign nationalities increased in the higher services. The average
511 salary of Soviet officials throws little light on the standard of
647 living in this group of the population because the difference between higher and lower employees is again considerable. Incomes in the lower ranks were very small while the higher officials had a life of ease and could on occasion even afford luxury. Engineers are among the most privileged while teachers and actors are much worse off. The legal status of the Soviet official was entirely insecure; they lived constantly under threat of a "purge" or of being denounced as disturbing the process of Soviet economy. The higher ranks of bureaucrats were here in special danger.

162 The small group of the professional class (doctors, writers, lawyers), in spite of their freedom, was dependent on the apparatus of the Soviet State. The group of outcasts was most to be pitied, i. e. those who had been expelled by the regime from social intercourse, e. g. merchants, artisans, and priests. After identity cards were introduced and "socially dangerous" persons removed, this group greatly decreased.

162 Another group, finally, is formed by Ukrainians living
167 outside the frontiers of Ukrainian territory, who as "Kur-
697 kuls", "Pests", "Saboteurs" were sent to concentration camps in the North and in Siberia. The "Nationalists" are also included in this group. And the colonisation of remote frontier areas in Soviet Russia required forest laborers, miners and factory workers, who had to help in the coal mines of Siberia and in building up industrial concerns in Central Asia. It is impossible to give statistics for the proportion of Ukrainians in this group, but they cannot be ignored as they will certainly return home and play an important rôle in Ukraine whenever the general situation is altered.

162 In Ukrainian areas outside of the Soviet Union, conditions
167 resemble those obtaining in Western Europe. The Ukrainian

727 In order to understand the development of nationalism during the remaining twenty months of German occupation of the East Ukraine, it is necessary to give some attention to the effects of German policy on aspects of life not directly connected with nationalist feeling. A number of volumes of extremely unpleasant reading could be devoted to the misery which the blind actions of the German rulers inflicted on the long-suffering peoples of the Soviet Union. Here only an extremely brief description of four ill-conceived policies which did most to disrupt the lives of the people of the area, and in particular to affect indirectly the character of the nationalist movements, can be attempted.

727 697 The first, and in many respects the most horrible failure of German policy, resulted in the death of innumerable Soviet prisoners of war. In the summer and fall of 1941, hundreds of thousands of Red army soldiers fell into German hands. Most captures took place because of the swift German advance and the great ascendancy of German arms; but at least in part they resulted from a lack of will to fight for the Communist system and the hope that German imprisonment would soon be followed by a freer life for the Soviet peoples. The German army was quite unprepared for the extent of the surrenders. However, no amount of difficulty in caring for the prisoners can excuse the horrible consequences of their neglect which, unlike most other atrocities committed in the east, was primarily the fault of the Wehrmacht. Inefficiency or brutality of subordinate *Etappentruppen* [rear area troops] was partly to blame, but the basic ruthlessness of many higher officers also played a major role, for it placed a premium on calloused inhumanity on the part of subordinates.[56] Countless thousands of prisoners were shut in barbed-wire enclosures in the open plains. Food was so insufficient that the captives were rapidly reduced to living skeletons; by fall cannibalism had made its appearance.[57] "Gaunt yellow faces protruding from the collars of greatcoats—unabashed human misery," as a Ukrainian visitor to

[56] Cf. the views of high Wehrmacht commanders cited in Chapter VI in connection with suppression of partisans.

[57] Report of Armament Inspector for the Ukraine to Armament Division Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Zur Lage im Reichskommissariat Ukraine, November 29, 1941, PS 2174 (hereafter referred to as PS 2174).

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one of the camps put it.[58] As colder weather approached, typhus combined with starvation to bring about hundreds of thousands of deaths. 727 697

Since many of these camps were located in the Ukraine the population soon became aware of the conditions in them, even though a substantial portion of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were separated out and released by the Germans.[59] Moreover, the inhabitants could scarcely avoid noticing the corpses of prisoners of war shot (perhaps as "kommissars" or Communists) and left lying in the villages.[60] Consequently, a belief that the Germans intended to destroy the Slavic peoples soon became widespread.

A second German failure was less shocking than the treatment of the prisoners of war, but in the long run it had an even more deleterious effect on relations with the Ukrainian population. This was the policy in relation to agriculture. As was noted previously, the major objective of the Nazi leadership in its occupation of the Ukraine was the acquisition of food and raw materials to increase Germany's war potential. This objective involved the necessity of dealing with the question of the kolkhoz, which was the predominant form of agricultural organization in the Soviet Union. 423 727

The problem posed for the German occupiers was not an easy one by any standards. It will be recalled that the chief reason for the introduction of the kolkhoz by Moscow was the prevalence of the "scissors crisis" during the late twenties; this emergency arose fundamentally because the Soviet rulers were unable or unwilling to supply enough consumer goods to induce individual peasants to deliver large quantities of agricultural products. The Germans were faced with the same dilemma, because the needs of their

[58] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 21, 1942, p. 2.

[59] Interview 51; Directive of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Abteilung Kriegsgefangene, June 16, 1941, PS 888 (hereafter referred to as PS 888); *Nastup*, July 12, 1941, p. 2; Amt Ausland Abwehr to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Annex, September 15, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 338 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 338).

[60] Memorandum by First Lieutenant Oberländer, Abwehr II, Heeresgruppe Süd, November 28, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 278 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 278). Oberländer significantly points out that pro-German sentiment in the population had greatly diminished within a few weeks of conquest—i.e., while the Wehrmacht was still the occupying authority.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

661 bands in the Ukraine. At the time of the 'purge' he occupied the highest military post in the Ukraine: that of Officer Commanding the Kiev Military District. The drama in the Ukraine did not end with the execution of Yakir; during the years 1935–7 several thousands of persons occupying important posts in the Red Army and in the Soviet administration were arrested and shot or exiled to concentration camps in Siberia and the North of Russia. This whirlwind of arrests and executions even carried away with it Postyshev and Kossior, the former instruments of 'the Revolution against the peasants'.

[701 186] In the meantime the last remnants of the national Ukrainian Army, which had flourished in the years 1923–9, disappeared. Units of the Ukrainian Army, based on the system of 'territorial Divisions' in the Red Army, had been quartered in the Ukraine alongside the troops 'of the Union'. The struggle with the peasantry had made it desirable to abolish the territorial system in the Ukraine as well as in other parts of the Union. The Ukrainian units were broken up and distributed to other parts of the country and their place was taken by regiments recruited in Great Russia. After the execution of the staff of the Kiev Command and the senior personnel of many of the Ukrainian regiments, nothing remained of the Ukrainian Army except the names of certain 'Red' regiments which were retained for the sake of form; but the Ukrainian language continued to be used in units where the rank and file were predominantly of Ukrainian origin.

642 Stalin's Constitution of 1936—which evoked such enthusiasm among European Communists and which was even hailed in the capitalist Press of Western countries as a laudable 'return to democratic institutions' in contrast to the dictatorships of Central Europe—was a cynical accompaniment to the slaughter of so many thousands of Party members which was going on at that time within 'the Soviet Paradise'. Stalin's Constitution marked the final abandonment of the theory that the minority nationalities ranked as equal partners with Great Russia within the Soviet Union. The 'union of different states' was now transformed into one integral state (Paragraph 13: 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a unified state'). According to Paragraph 14 all authority on questions relating to international affairs, the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, the organization of defence and the command of the armed forces, foreign trade, the safety of the state, the management of all banks, all forms of transport, the principles of land distribution, the basis of public instruction, hygiene, and criminal and civil laws, was reposed in the Central Government.

186 Headquarters at Mohylev and witn the other national groups which
642 were rapidly making common cause with the Central Rada in
665 their opposition to the extreme measures of the Petrograd Soviet. The Council of Commissars in Petrograd claimed to speak for the whole of the former Russia in its efforts to make peace with the Germans. When the Rada denied this and approached the other non-Russian peoples, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd formally accused the Rada of withdrawing Ukrainian troops from the front, of disarming Bolshevik units in Ukraine and of allowing the Don Cossack forces to retire to their homeland across Ukrainian territory. On December 17, it hypocritically recognized the right of Ukraine to independence but threatened war on the Rada if it did not meet the conditions of the Council of People's Commissars.

At the same time the Bolsheviks in the Kiev Soviet arranged an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the hope of putting pressure on the Rada. The attempt missed fire for the Congress proved to be under the influence of the anti-Bolshevik parties and adopted resolutions declaring that the Ukrainians had not thrown off the power of the Tsar to accept the domination of the Commissars. The Bolshevik spokesman Zatonsky was unable to make himself heard above the opposition and only 80 members supported the Soviet demands.

As a result of this failure Vasili Shakhray and Zatonsky left Kiev for Kharkiv where they joined a Congress of Soviets largely from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih. There, on December 20, they established a new Ukrainian Rada under Russian Communist control and set up a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were joined by a group of Ukrainian Bolsheviks including Neronovych and George Kotsyubynsky, the son of the well-known Ukrainian author who had been a friend of Gorky.

•[701] The so-called Ukrainian army loyal to this new regime was composed almost exclusively of Russian troops and was under the open command of a Russian officer, Michael A. Muravyev. This force occupied Kiev on February 7, 1918 and held the city for about three weeks. Its actions showed clearly the nature of the government. Under the pretext of liberating the Ukrainians from

Ukraine Under the Soviets

369 They could also, if they still had preserved any valuables, dispose
511 of them through the Torgsin stores which sold imported wares for foreign currency and precious metals.

[554] Of course, neither in city or village did any of these restrictions apply to the more important Communists who possessed their own stores at which the government supplied them with the necessary articles to allow them to live in comfort and luxury as a welcome investment for the regime. The line of demarcation between the poor and the rich, the ordinary people and the Communists, became steadily greater, until it was often wider than it had been in the old tsarist Russian empire.

642 All these measures which had been adopted in Moscow[1] were
631 in theory supposed to apply to all sections of the USSR equally, but it was not long before the natives of Ukraine realized that however impartial the laws might seem, they were not sufficiently flexible to take account of local and republican differences. The central regime was interested in advancing and developing the Moscow industrial area and it expended on this in various grandiose efforts, as the Moscow subway, enormous sums of money. It is safe to say that the expenditures in that one area alone equalled the entire budget and money spent by the central government in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It classified Ukraine as one of the regions where the supply of manufactured goods was less necessary.

The crushing of the Ukrainian Communists, the suicide of Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, no less than the complete altering of the land code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the substitution of the new policy of collectivization, showed perfectly well where the real power of the USSR lay in the thirties and it was accompanied by such acts as the introduction of Russian as the
• [701] standard language of instruction and of the army. This was followed by the formal transfer of the Ukrainian divisions to the Red Army and a number of other acts which completed the subordination of the UkSSR. Already in 1930, during difficulties on the Soviet-Manchuria borders, the Red Army had not hesitated to

[1] [after 1933 - measures dealing with production, supply etc. - Ukraine]

668 tried to break this up but they were unsuccessful and the police
725 battalion which was assigned to the operation was destroyed. Out of this Conference developed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations which adopted as its program, "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual."

[701] It would take too long to describe the actual nature of the military operations which the U. P. A. carried on. At the height of its power it controlled more than 200,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory and numbered some 220,000 soldiers divided into four main bands: the U. P. A. North, operating in Polissya and northern Volynia; the U. P. A.—West in Eastern Galicia and Kholmshchyna; the U. P. A. —South in northern Bukovyna and the provinces of Kamyanets Podilsky and Vinnytsya; and the U. P. A.—East north of Kiev and Zhytomyr. There were separate detachments in most of the cities and important towns.

[661] To oppose its operations, the Germans resorted to mass executions and on more than one occasion detached forces of one or two divisions to try to destroy its centres. These attempts failed and the U. P. A. by its constant efforts played an important part in isolating the German forces, upsetting their communications and sapping their strength. All this was very costly, for after every major blow the Germans executed large numbers of innocent Ukrainians as their one weapon against the movement.

At first there was relative peace in Galicia, but in the summer of 1943 a Soviet partisan detachment entered the province. The Germans took little action and the U. P. A. came to the support of the population and soon had established strong centres in the Carpathian Mountains, where the difficult terrain facilitated their maintenance of strong positions.

[127] The Germans in the beginning did not want to admit that their policy toward the Ukrainians had evoked such a strong response. Koch and his associates were only too willing to believe that the Ukrainians were an inferior race, undeserving of education or of consideration and they went out of their way to label the U. P. A. the product of Communist intrigue and a movement of support for the Jews, etc.

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.
727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "warmongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representative in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

[701]

p 165

VII. SALVAGE EFFORTS

AT THE VERY TIME when partisan activity was reaching its peak in Volhynia, Ukrainian nationalist elements began the last chapter of their collaboration with the Germans. Strange as it may appear, in this final period, cooperation between these disparate forces was closer than during the abortive "honeymoon" of 1941. The key to this apparent paradox lies in the Ukrainian psychology—a better term than attitude in this case—toward the creation of a national military force and in the German policy toward securing the military collaboration of Eastern Europe. 668*

Few political movements in this century have been as thoroughly obsessed as the Ukrainian nationalist movement with the idea of building military strength. This obsession is readily understandable as far as the OUN parties were concerned, for their ideology emphasized will, force, action. While there was a persistent trend in the senior branch of the OUN toward shaping the movement in a military mold with an emphasis on order and discipline, the younger group was inclined to cast aside all inhibitions to secure the immediate application of violence. To both, however, the army—insofar as it represented sheer power—was a high ideal. Non-Nationalist circles, such as the UNR and the legal parties in Galicia, also placed enormous emphasis upon military organization. When one reflects that in 1919–21 the nationalist movement in both the East and the West Ukraine had been bloodily suppressed by superior organized force, the roots of this concern become discernible. During the revolutionary period the lack of a substantial nucleus of trained military units, similar to those of the Poles, the Bolsheviks, and the White Russian forces had been a terrible handicap to the Ukrainian cause. In the Second World War nationalist leaders were willing to exact great material sacrifices of their people in order to overcome this critical lack. 668* 701

The Ukrainian hopes for the formation in 1941 of a military 000

The final days of the war brought no substantial change in this situation, in which the Ukrainian nationalists were able to maintain their independence of the Vlasov movement, although without being able to gain control of even a majority of the men of Ukrainian ethnic origin in German military service. While there were some efforts, such as a personal meeting between Vlasov and Shandruk, to find a modus vivendi between the two groups, these came to nothing. On the contrary, the Ukrainians went ahead with the setting up of their own national committee. Shandruk became president and the vice-presidents were Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Alexander Semenenko, mayor of Kharkov under the occupation. Thus the "old emigration" (Shandruk was born in Lubny), the West Ukraine, and the Soviet Ukraine were represented.[72] Aside from a certain moderation in German treatment of the Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter*, however, the group was able to accomplish little. In the last weeks of Germany's hopeless struggle the organization was officially recognized and allowed to issue a proclamation in Weimar on March 17, 1945, as the Ukrainian National Committee. The deterioration of German power enabled the Committee to take a strong stand for an independent Ukrainian state, without giving even lip service to alliance with the Germans. However, the document made it clear that the main practical objective was care for the interests of the Ukrainian refugees, workers, and soldiers in Germany.[73]

The proclamation also announced that the Ukrainian soldiers were henceforth to be united in the Ukrainian National Army. Under the circumstances, this could mean little. Nevertheless, in the final days of the war General Shandruk was able to go to the First Division of his forces, and the German general in command formally surrendered his powers to him.[74] Of more practical importance was the fact that Shandruk and other Ukrainian leaders had been able to get in touch with Allied military quarters even before the surrender of the division. While its personnel were of course treated as prisoners of war, their commanders were able to convince the Western authorities that the unit was composed wholly of Galicians. As West Ukrainians, they had thus never

[72] Interviews 9, 22.
[73] From a printed copy furnished me by General Shandruk.
[74] Interview 22, and order by General Freitag already cited.

000 to make the Ukrainian idea one of the principal pivots of German claims.

175 If, under Austrian direction, one did not dare to speak
668 of separatism to the prisoners, the German general
701 staff, the new master of the Ukrainian movement, thought of the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State, under German control, and gave its propagandists directions in this sense. From 1915 the Little Russians who agreed to declare themselves Ukrainians and not Russians were sent to the camp of Radstadt. In this camp specialists of the Ukrainian question, under the direction of Professor Bezpalko, undertook a series of lectures in which they drew pictures of the independence and liberty of the Cossacks for the benefit of their hearers, appealing to them to reject the 'heinous yoke of Asiatic Muscovy.' Towards the beginning of 1917, that is to say after two years of assiduous work, the German general staff succeeded in recruiting, in the camp, 15,000 prisoners. The regiment of 'Taras Chevtchenko' was created. This regiment consisted of eight companies and had about 1600 men. The soldiers of this regiment, looked upon as undoubted partisans of the independence of the Ukraine under German protection, were armed and equipped in readiness for being used in a possible offensive in South Russian regions. The remainder was divided into four groups:

1. About 1500 men formed the *Sitch* (the name of the ancient Cossack community) and enjoyed the complete confidence of the German authorities with regard to their loyalty to the new Ukrainian cause, without yet being entrusted with arms.

2. The 'apprentices,' about 3000, still considered as not absolutely reliable but already somewhat influenced by the propaganda.

3. The 'candidates,' about 3000, those who were

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

neutral or indifferent to the question but without marked hostility. 175 668 701

4. Finally the 'opponents,' about 6000, who, although they had agreed to take the name of 'Ukrainians,' were actively opposed to separatist propaganda. They were continually sent to penal work and had to undergo severe and frequent punishments.

Thus of the 15,000 men who, enticed by the promise of an improvement of their lot, had agreed to join the Ukrainian units, one could only rely with difficulty on 3000 (the Chevtchenko regiment and the *Sitch*) who had been really affected by the propaganda. At this period the number of Russian prisoners exceeded 3,000,000, of whom at least 700,000 were Ukrainians, which confirms the absolute failure of this movement.

It would be interesting to remember that from the Russian side the same policy was inaugurated with respect to the prisoners of war of Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Croatian, etc., origin. This move enabled one to establish whole divisions composed of Slavonic minorities. From the beginning of the war Austro-Hungarian military units formed of Slavs, and especially of Czechs, went over to the Russians with their officers, arms, and baggage. Not a single similar case occurred in the Russian Army, which included many entirely Ukrainian regiments. On the contrary, according to the evidence of high Russian and German officers, the Ukrainian regiments were among the best troops, often used as shock units, the most famous of which was the 'Iron Brigade' commanded by General Denikine, future commander of the White Army.

To sum up, the political movements of autonomy and of Ukrainian separatism gave no tangible results despite a subsidized propaganda having the support of such powerful organisms as the central empires.

even harder pressure was applied against the Ukrainian townsmen. 175
In those times the conversion of an Orthodox Ukrainian to Catholicism meant Polonisation. Since the end of the 16th century a large number of the Ukrainian nobility having accepted Catholicism left their Ukrainian nationality. The same pressure led to the Polonisation of a great part of the Ukrainian townsmen.

The neighbourhood of the Tartars was an obstacle to the normal development of Ukraine.

On the territory between Kiev and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov the stubborn struggle of the Ukrainian nation against the Tartars was carried on for centuries. The Tartars captured people from Ukraine and sold them into slavery in the oriental markets. The last invasion of the Crimean Horde into Ukraine was in 1769.

In spite of this permanent danger from the steppe and under these extremely difficult conditions the Ukrainian nation did not abandon its cultural activity.

Schools, literature, printing, developed in Ukraine. The learned [212] Arab Paul of Aleppo, who visited Ukraine in 1654, wrote in his memoirs that education was common among the Ukrainian people, and that even the Ukrainian women were literate. Academies had also been founded in Ukraine, and were the models and sources of education for all Greek-Orthodox Slav peoples. Ukrainians studied at the Universities of Italy, France, Germany and other countries.

Against the Tartar hordes, the Ukrainians created an organisation of its own — the Cossack Army. From the middle of the 16th [701] century, the centre of the Ukrainian Cossack Army was in the fortress 'Sich', southward of the Dnieper Cataracts. From this the name of 'Zaporovian Army' arose ('porohy' are the rocks in the Dnieper). The Zaporovian Army performed great deeds in fighting the Tartars. The Ukrainian Cossacks under the leadership of Petro Sahaydachny saved Poland from a terrible Turkish force in the battle of Khotin (Bessarabia), in 1621.

When in 1683 Central Europe was threatened by the Turks, the Ukrainian Cossacks were the force without which the Polish King Jan Sobieski could not dare to begin the decisive battle against the Turks before Vienna.

After the Union of Lublin of 1569, the Polish nobles wanted to take possession of the territory the Ukrainian people had defended against the Tartars. The Polish Government planned to abolish the Ukrainian Cossack Army, and to make the Cossacks serfs of the nobility. The nobility wished to lay their hands on the free peasants of Eastern Ukraine who had not known serfdom. The relations between the Polish Government and the masses of the Ukrainian

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

142 Art. 14. The Ukrainian SSR reserves the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Art. 15. The territory of the Ukrainian SSR may not be altered without its consent.

[101] Art. 15a. The Ukrainian SSR has its own Republican military formations.

[148] Art. 15b. The Ukrainian SSR has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

Art. 16. The laws of the USSR are binding within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

[141] Art. 17. Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a citizen of the USSR. Citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR equal rights with citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

631 Art. 18. The Ukrainian SSR consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Transcarpathian, Zaporozhye, Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltava, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumi, Ternopol, Kharkov, Khorson, Chernigov and Chernovitsi Regions.

Art. 19. The jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, embraces:

a) Adoption of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and control over its observance;

b) Submission of the formation of new regions constituting part of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for confirmation;

c) Establishment of the boundaries, and of the division into districts, of regions;

d) Legislation of the Ukrainian SSR;

e) Maintenance of public order and safeguarding the rights of citizens;

f) Approval of the national-economic plan of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Approval of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR and of the report on its fulfilment;

h) Determination of state and local taxes, imposts and non-tax revenues in conformity with the laws of the USSR;

i) Direction of the fulfilment of the local budgets of the regions;

j) Direction of insurance and savings;

k) Administration of the banks, industrial, agricultural and trading enterprises and organizations subordinate to the Republic, as well as direction of local industry;

l) Control and superintendence of the condition and administration of enterprises subordinate to the Union;

m) Establishment of the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests and waters;

n) Direction of dwelling houses and the municipal economy, dwelling house construction and the modernization of cities and other inhabited places;

o) Road building; direction of local transport and communications;

p) Labour legislation;

q) Direction of social maintenance;

r) Direction of elementary, secondary and higher education;

704 ran from just east of Kovel to a point in the Carpathians south of Ternopol'; a key point was the little town of Brody, on the main highway from Rovno to L'vov. Here, in late June, the SS division was put into the line to assist in covering the Galician capital. For three weeks it maintained its position, in the face of fierce Soviet attacks and encircling operations, but by July 20 was no longer effective as a fighting unit. Perhaps 20 percent of its complement fell back with the German armies toward the Carpathians, and half of the remainder escaped to join the UPA or to filter back to the German lines.[29]

661 798 After the victory of Brody, the Red Army rapidly conquered east Galicia, Bukovina, and the Carpatho-Ukraine. By fall, substantially all of the Ukrainian lands were again under the dominion of Moscow. This time the repression exercised by the Communist rulers was harsher and less disguised than it had been five years before. The Greek Catholic Church was attacked ruthlessly. Bishop Slipyi, who had succeeded Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi after the latter's death in late 1944, was arrested and deported to the interior of the Soviet Union. Most of the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church, as well as hundreds of its clergy, were likewise banished. Orthodox priests subservient to the Patriarch of Moscow enlisted the aid of a minority of the Greek Catholic clergy, who renounced their allegiance to Rome and joined in constructing a new hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Galicia. The same tactics were pursued in the Carpatho-Ukraine.[30]

[702] 661 According to reports of refugees from the area, very severe measures were taken against the population at large. Men from the ages of eighteen to fifty are said to have been drafted into the Red Army in a mass, without regard for their state of health.[31] Once enlisted, they were said to be watched over by special *politruks,* given inferior arms, and sent into battle after eight

[29] See numerous contributions to *Brody,* and *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA,* for detailed descriptions of military operations of this battle and of the other Ukrainian forces serving with the Wehrmacht.

[30] Cf. Baran, *Mytropolyt,* pp. 137 ff.; Mykola D. Chubatyi, "Russian Church Policy in the Ukraine," *Ukrainian Quarterly,* I (Autumn, 1945), 51–53.

[31] SS war reporter Oleh Lysiak in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 2, 1944, p. 3.

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Another page was turned. General Haller 726
was obliged to throw his divisions onto the 175
western frontier of Poland. The Treaty of Versailles
was to be signed. No /67/ one knows whether the
Germans may not refuse to sign, ally themselves
with the Bolsheviks and enter a desperate struggle.

It does not seem impossible that a surprise
attack of the Ukrainians may be successful.
Petrushevych named the Russian General A. Grekov,
who had staked everything on the Ukraine, supreme
commander of the West Ukrainian forces. He is
the author of the plans for an offensive which,
under his name, was to enter Ukrainian military
history as one of the most daring deeds.

In the early morning of June 8, 1919 the
Ukrainians began the assault on the town of Chortkov
which had been captured a few days before by the
Poles. "The effect of this advance was baffling.
Several Polish battalions who were defending the
town dispersed and took to wildest flight. Almost
the entire enemy artillery of this division, all
their baggage and several hundred prisoners fell
into the hands of West Ukrainians. In the market-
place of the town a national parade of the Polish
inhabitants of the entire countryside had just
gathered in order to celebrate the 'burial of the
Ukraine'. The fleeing soldiers fell upon this
crowd: 'Run! The Ukrainians are already here!'
- and the entire festively-clothed multitude fled
with the troops, just as they were, abandoning
everything. Then something improbable happened to
the Ukrainians under General Grekov when the news
of the battle of Chortkov reached them. On the
entire West Ukrainian front of 35 kilometers the 726
8000 men whom West Ukrainians engaged in combat 703
pushed forward, and there followed a sudden, pos- 175
itively miraculous transformation in the attitude
of the entire nation. Suddenly they became aware
that they were being led, that they were being

commanded by a real general. The soldier who 726
only yesterday was unable to halt an enemy advance 703
now dashed ahead recklessly. The divisions which 175
throughout the war did not know how to cooperate
with their neighbors /68/ now functioned with a
baffling tactical assurance. They attacked, they
pushed through, they rolled up enemy flanks, they
pursued, they marched into the roar of enemy guns
to help their neighbor to victory. The higher
staff officers who up to that time had known
nothing but caution, suddenly learned how to seek
out the enemy, to find him, to attack, to pursue,
to break into the enemy's rear. The ones who
only yesterday were deserting, those who were
barely able to carry arms, young and old, all now
joined the advancing West Ukrainian troops. A
crowd marched into a village, only to leave it as
a company." (43)

43. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 302.

From the beginning an extreme shortage of 175
infantry munitions imperiled these brilliant 726
victories of West Ukrainia. There were only
enough weapons to equip a bare 20,000 men. On
June ninth and tenth the Ukrainians overran two
Polish divisions who fled in wild panic along with all
the inhabitants. Ten days later they put to
flight five divisions, and on June 27 a new Polish
line of resistance became shaky. It, too, was
destroyed. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians did not
succeed in capturing the badly needed arms and
munitions. At last, only two days' march from
Lwów the offensive was halted. New Polish divisions were thrown in and Pilsudski himself, who
had previously already taken over the supreme
command but had been unable to avoid the last
breakthrough, now gave the command for a counter-
offensive...In its extremity Poland mobilized the

p. 73

IV. THE OPENING OF THE UKRAINE

LONG BEFORE the Western world guessed his intentions Hitler had begun preparations for a campaign against the Soviet Union. As early as 1940 the Germans surreptitiously formed military training units for Ukrainians. Their enlistment was concealed by official statements that the units were for *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans) only, and the purpose of the units was disguised by designating the Reichsarbeitdienst (Reich Labor Service) to be the supervising agency in the Generalgouvernement. Under this camouflage large numbers of Ukrainians were trained for police duty. More advanced training was carried out in Germany under direction of the Wehrmacht. In a number of camps instructors for future Ukrainian police units and interpreters for liaison with the German army were prepared.[1] At first, the chief Ukrainian organizer of this work was Colonel Sushko, and the training units were under the influence of the Mel'nyk group. After the split had fully developed, however, Bandera elements secured the upper hand in many of the groups, which were predominantly composed of young men fitted for active field service.[2]

704 ● 668* 725 [625]

Either because they were naturally interested in employing the young and physically qualified Ukrainians in the Bandera party for the forthcoming campaign, or because they were dissatisfied with the previous efforts of the OUN-M (Mel'nyk group) to pursue a somewhat independent course, the Germans turned more and more to the insurgent faction. This was especially the case when, in the early spring of 1941, the comparatively unconcealed development of Ukrainian units was begun by the Wehrmacht.

[1] Stepan (Stephen) Huliak, "Polk im. Kholodnoho Iaru v Rivnomu" (The Kholodnyi Iar Regiment in Rovno), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (August-September, 1952), p. 7.

[2] MS D.

704 The first such unit was known by the code name "Nachtigall" 668* and was organized in the Generalgouvernement. Nominally, only 725 its enlisted personnel were Ukrainian, while all officers were German. Actually, as the Germans well knew, there was a whole staff of "unofficial" Ukrainian officers, headed by the leader of the "military tendency" in the OUN-B, Roman Shukevych. At first "Nachtigall" had only about one hundred and fifty men, but at the outbreak of war it was expanded to battalion strength.[3]

A second unit, larger but of less political significance, was formed in Austria. Ukrainians were allowed a greater degree of formal authority than in "Nachtigall." In *de facto* command was Colonel Iarii, the dissident member of the old Provid, who was at once highly esteemed by his young subordinates and on the closest personal terms with the Abwehr officers charged with the formation of the units. John Gavrusevych, one of the top leaders of the Bandera group, was in charge of recruitment; his source of manpower lay in the large Ukrainian colony in Austria. Up to 1940, the chief Ukrainian organization in the latter territory was the student Sich in Vienna, which was dominated by the OUN. This association continued loyal to Mel'nyk, but most of the numerous Ukrainian factory workers turned to the new movement. It was among the latter that Gavrusevych secured the majority of his recruits, although about one quarter were secured from among the students, particularly those in the medical school in Graz. Care was taken to keep the force—which was called by the organizers Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists)—in the hands of the Bandera group, although only half of the members actually belonged to [714] the new party. Unlike "Nachtigall," which was clad in Wehrmacht *feldgrau,* "Roland," as the military unit composed of the Druzhyny was called, wore uniforms similar to those of the Galician section of the Ukrainian army of revolutionary days.[4]

668* As is apparent from the above description, the Wehrmacht units were prepared on a rather *ad hoc* basis, with the active

[3] Nykon Nalyvaiko, "Legiony v natsional'nykh viinakh" (Legions in National Wars), *Narod'na Volia* (October 27, 1949), p. 2.

[4] Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (June-July, 1952), p. 4; MS A.

668* northern task force reached Zhitomir, where it helped a group of local people set up a very impermanent administration, and aroused an equally transitory wave of enthusiasm among some of the younger citizens.[33] The southern force covered an even greater distance; it traveled across Galicia during July, carrying on propaganda work; reached Vinnitsa by the end of the month; and on September 2 was in Dniepropetrovsk (Katerynoslav or, more romantically, Sicheslav), five hundred miles from its starting point.[34]

668* Less picturesque, but of potentially greater value, were the military units under control of the Bandera group. As was previously noted, "Nachtigall" had taken part in the occupation of L'vov, where its leaders were of great value in organizing the city for the Bandera party. Although the Wehrmacht officers accompanying the group were aware of the roles of Father Hryn'okh, Shukevych, and Lopatyns'kyi in the *akt,* they protected them from the arrest.[35] The unit continued eastward with the Wehrmacht, in late August reaching Vinnitsa where its members made secret contact with the southern task force.[36]

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"Roland," on the other hand, had no direct connection with the activities in Galicia. Before the outbreak of war, it was sent across Hungary to the Rumanian part of Bukovina. There were considerable difficulties with the Rumanians because of efforts of the Ukrainian nationalists to establish contact with local Ukrainians who were Rumanian subjects. After the outbreak of war, however, the unit was sent with the German advance through Bessarabia, across the Dniester, and into the Ukrainian ethnographical territory north of Tiraspol' where it remained until early September.[37]

668* While the newest Ukrainian nationalist party was achieving widespread, though transitory successes, its chief rival was not idle. The defection of the bulk of the Galician youth had indeed dealt a heavy blow to the "legitimate" OUN under Mel'nyk. Nevertheless, it retained several very important assets. In the first place,

[33] Ievhen Stakhiv, p. 39.
[34] Matla, p. 9.
[35] Interview 63.
[36] *Ibid.;* Matla, pp. 9–10.
[37] Ortyns'kyi, p. 4; MS A.

000 force under German aegis were frustrated by the Nazi contempt for the peoples of the East. Somewhat later, even as the organized nationalist forces were being suppressed, renewed hope arose that the Wehrmacht would insist on the building of a Ukrainian army. These Ukrainian expectations were not wholly unfounded, for the bitter experiences of the winter battles around Moscow and Kharkov and the growing Red partisan threat convinced many high army commanders that if the Soviet system was to be defeated help must be secured from the Kremlin's former subjects. A leader in this group was General von Schenkendorff, who proposed as early as March, 1942, that a national "Russian government" dependent on Germany should be formed to act as a
● 704 rallying point for native armed forces.[1] With the aid of officers moved less by sympathy for the aspirations of the East European peoples than by a willingness to grasp for promising expedients, *Hilfswillige* ("Hiwis," auxiliary) units and *Ostlegionen* were recruited by the Wehrmacht from among prisoners of war to carry on service operations for the army and to combat partisans. In the late winter of 1941–42, some of these units were used as independent detachments in the front line. The success of this experiment induced Wehrmacht circles to plan extensive employment of former Soviet troops.[2]

Men from the Caucasus and Central Asia were preferred as recruits by the Germans, but Slavs were also enlisted. The chief Slavic detachments seem to have been the "Cossack hundreds." These groups were linguistically and ethnically heterogeneous, for the name appealed at once to the traditions of the Ukrainians and to the Russian-speaking Cossacks of the Don and the Kuban. News of their employment spread quickly, and by May Ukrainian circles as far away as L'vov were convinced that the Germans had employed "Ukrainian" forces in the front line on the Isthmus of Kerch and that they would soon use Ukrainian troops in large numbers.[3] Closer to the zone of operation the stories were more

[1] PS 1685.
[2] PS 1686.
[3] Report from L'vov for week of May 22, 1942, contained in summary of Hauptabteilung Propaganda, Cracow, May 30, 1942, Occ E-2 (2), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-2 [2]). Cf. also a citation from *Vil'ne Slovo* (Drogobych), January 15, 1942, in *Nastup*, February 15, 1942, p. 4.

precise; the Ukrainian newspapers in Kiev and Mariupol' reported that several Ukrainian detachments were fighting on the Crimean front, and even mentioned the name of a commander, while they observed that preparations were being made for training 150,000 Ukrainian soldiers.[4] 704

The ambitious plans of the Wehrmacht group soon encountered a most formidable obstacle. Hitler had a deep-seated antipathy toward granting the "inferior" and "untrustworthy" Slavs the right to bear arms. In August, 1942, he intervened personally to limit military utilization of volunteers from the Soviet nationalities to small anti-partisan formations.[5] The Wehrmacht officers did not abandon their long-range intentions of forming an army of former Soviet soldiers to help fight Stalin, but these leaders were forced to move cautiously. In the fall of 1942, their efforts became centered around Andrew Vlasov, an officer well known among the second echelon of Soviet generals, who had been captured a few months previously. The German officers envisaged him as the spokesman of all the anti-Communist elements from the Soviet Union. For a time they were successful in securing some support for Vlasov even in the Ostministerium, although Rosenberg never fully trusted him, since he knew Vlasov, a Russian, would not endorse the Rosenberg plan of partitioning the Soviet state.[6] 000

During the winter of 1942–43 Rosenberg and the army felt, though mistakenly, that there was a chance of gradually winning Hitler's sanction for a limited program of quasi-autonomy for the peoples of the occupied USSR, a step which would secure their active support for the war against their former rulers. At the same time that he was bolstering his shaky prestige by collaboration

[4] *Nastup*, February 15, 1942, p. 4, quoting *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* for January 14, 1942; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 30, 1942, p. 3, quoting *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta*, No. 32.

[5] Directive No. 46 to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht on partisan fighting, from Führerhauptquartier, August 18, 1942, PS 477 (hereafter referred to as PS 477).

[6] Various aspects of the Vlasov movement have been thoroughly discussed in Jürgen Thorwald's *Wen sie verderben wollen* (Stuttgart: Steingrüben Verlag, 1952), George Fischer's *The Soviet Opposition to Stalin* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), and in a forthcoming study on German policy toward the occupied USSR by Alexander Dallin. Consequently, no effort has been made to discuss this movement except insofar as it came into direct contact with the Ukrainian nationalists.

000 with the Wehrmacht, Rosenberg also sought allies in the SS. His contacts there were utilized in March, 1943, in a scheme to form a "Ukrainian national representation" which, as envisaged by Rosenberg, would evidently have the dual purpose of securing greater Ukrainian support for the German war effort and preventing Vlasov's obtaining too important a role. Probably with the help of SS Brigadeführer Ohlendorf, Dr. Kinkelin, one of the higher officials of the Ostministerium, composed a list of four Kiev officials. A special effort was made to secure "pure Ukrainians" who were in close contact with the peasant. Remarkably enough, however, all four appear to have favored the Russophile element in Kiev municipal life.[7] The question of how such a "national committee" would have been received by nationalist Ukrainians went unanswered, for it remained a paper scheme. Whether its lack of reality was due to obstruction of the SS, which desired an instrument to reduce the partisan danger but continued to despise all Slavs, or whether it arose from Hitler's direct intervention is difficult to say.[8] At any rate, by the summer of 1943 the project had been dropped, along with the more grandiose plans for Vlasov's political activity.

704 668 The Ukrainians, however, who had looked with deep suspicion on the rise of Vlasov, now found in an unexpected quarter new encouragement in their hopes for a national army.[9] Although the SS continued to oppose the larger plans for arousing the Slavs against Communism, SS officers, extremely powerful in the Generalgouvernement, persuaded Himmler's coterie to authorize the large-scale recruitment of Galician Ukrainians for the Waffen SS. The continued outward loyalty of the population of Galicia, which made the province, prior to Kovpak's incursion, one of the most peaceful of Germany's conquests, was a powerful argument in favor of concessions to the West Ukrainians. Europeans

[7] They were Vadym Maikovs'kyi, Theodore Babak, Volodymyr Labuts'kyi, and George Kandiiv. Temporary list of members for a Ukrainian National Committee, by Dr. Kinkelin, CXLVa 77, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 77).

[8] The latter's decision to restrict Vlasov operations was made about this time. See George Fischer, "Vlasov and Hitler," *Journal of Modern History*, XXIII (March, 1951), 64.

[9] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, May 30, 1943, p. 3.

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classified as "Nordics" were already enrolled in special military formations under Himmler. This new departure in SS policy, made at a time when the higher SS officials were toying with the idea of backing a Ukrainian national representation, enabled the "inferior" Slavs to secure a footing in the ranks of the elite troops.

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The creation of SS Division Galicia, as the unit was called, was hedged about with restrictions. The word "Ukrainian" was excluded from the designation. Overt reference to "political" implications of the formation was rigorously forbidden.[10] Nevertheless, the creation of the division was supported by most of the leading elements in Galicia. Formation of the division was officially announced on May 4, 1943, when the president of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Kubiiovych, issued a proclamation urging its support.[11] While Colonel Sushko was not active in the new project,[12] General Kurmanovych spoke in favor of the division on the L'vov radio.[13] Other Mel'nyk supporters like Michael Khronoviat played leading roles in its development, and pro OUN-M organs gave it great publicity.[14] The position of the rival nationalist group was less clear. Being illegal, the OUN-B could not take part openly in the drive to establish the military unit even had it desired to do so. Since the war, Bandera supporters have used this circumstance to maintain that they always opposed this form of collaboration with the Germans, and have denounced the other nationalist groups for supporting it. It is fairly clear, however, that while the OUN-B did not officially countenance the project, or lend extensive support, it did not really work against the creation of the division. Shukevych is said

[10] Interview 70. A letter (in the possession of Dr. Liubomyr Makarushka) from Bauer to Schenk and Bisantz (all officials in the Generalgouvernement), dated August 18, 1943, states that Makarushka should be warned against ascribing political importance to the "military council" formed in connection with the organization of the division.

[11] This proclamation was printed in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 6, 1943, p. 1. It recalled the heroic feats of the Ukrainian Galician Army and the students who defended Kiev at Kruty; at the same time it appealed to realism and national interest and emphasized the Bolshevik danger. It warned that the matter was a case of "now or never."

[12] Evidently out of pique because he was not given a leading role (Interview 36).

[13] *Nastup*, May 16, 1943, p. 2.

[14] *Ibid.; Nastup*, May 23, 1943, p. 6, and May 30, 1943, p. 3.

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704 to have felt that it offered a valuable opportunity for Ukrainian
668* youths to secure military training.[15] This would be in accord with his well-known proclivity for emphasizing the technical military needs of the nationalist movement, and it is the more plausible because just at that time his efforts to build up the UPA were being severely hampered by a dearth of young officers. In order to obtain cadres for future operations, and in order to prevent the new unit from falling into the hands of those opposed to OUN-B aims, he ordered a considerable number of his followers to enter its ranks, where they occupied prominent positions;[16] other Bandera adherents, attracted by the opportunity for active service, joined without such authorization.[17]

The Galician Division, however, never came under the control of either OUN party to the same extent as had the earlier German-organized Ukrainian formations. The prime organizer and highest ranking Ukrainian officer in it (the commanding staff was German) was Dmytro Paliïv, formerly a leader of one of the smaller legal parties in Poland.[18] With him were associated a large number of UNDO members like Liubomyr Makarushka,[19] while numerous old UNR officers like Generals Petriv[20] and Omelianovych-Pavlenko[21] lent their moral support.

The almost universal support given to a creation of the SS, the very organization which had done most to suppress Ukrainian nationalism, was reinforced in the spring of 1943 by the view which most Ukrainian nationalists took of the future course of events. Much as they hated the Nazis, and little as they hoped for real help from them, they hated and feared the Communists still more. That the prospects of German victory, never very high after the failure to take Moscow, were extremely remote was apparent to all after the winter of Stalingrad. Many Ukrainian

[15] Bohdan Pidhainyi, "Dva shliakhy—odna meta" (Two Routes—One Goal), in Oleh Lysiak (ed.), *Brody: Zbirnyk stattei i narysiv* (Brody: A Collection of Articles and Sketches) (Munich: Bratstvo kol. Voiakiv Pershoï UD UNA, 1951), p. 59.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] Interview 58.

[18] Interviews 36, 58.

[19] Interview 70; *Nastup*, May 16, 1943, p. 2.

[20] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 9, 1943, p. 1.

[21] Myroslav Martynets', "Gen.-Polk. M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko" (Colonel-General Omelianovych-Pavlenko), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (August-September, 1952), p. 1.

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leaders hoped for a protracted struggle in which both of the totalitarian powers would be so weakened that they would be forced to surrender their domination of Eastern Europe. They thought that Great Britain and the United States, in accordance with either the plain meaning of the Atlantic Charter or elementary principles of the balance of power, would prevent the complete subjugation of this area by the Soviet Union. What they anticipated was a period of anarchy in the area between Russia and Germany, like that of 1918, in which the nation which possessed organized military forces would be able to assert itself. Some felt that the UPA could fill this need, but many felt that in view of the UPA's low military value the nationalist movement must seize the chance to form a real army under German auspices which could later be used independently, even against its sponsors.[22]

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The nationalist leaders were also encouraged to support the Galician Division by certain favorable conditions which they exacted from the Germans. According to Nationalist accounts, the unit was to be used only against the Soviet forces and never against the Western Allies; thus it would be in a position, they thought, to come to terms with the latter when the opportunity arose. Whether or not the Germans officially agreed to this stipulation, it is certain that the condition was observed. More significantly, the political training and indoctrination of the soldiers, instead of being in the hands of Nazi ideologists, was left to the

[22] See especially Nykon Nalyvaiko, "Legiony v natsionalnykh viinakh" (Legions in National Wars), *Narodna Volia*, October 27, 1949, p. 2, and November 3, 1949, p. 3; Ivan Hryn'okh, "Dyviziia Halychyna i ukraïns'ke pidpillia" (The Galician Division and the Ukrainian Underground), in *Brody*, pp. 52 ff.; and the clandestine publication, *Za Samostiinu Ukraïnu*, No. 9, December 10, 1943, which gives the official position of the "Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN [B]" on the role of Ukrainian forces in the event of German collapse. The Bandera followers stated that the Western Allies (especially Britain) wanted a prolongation of the war on the eastern front with mutual weakening of Germany and the Soviet Union, so that they could have a free hand on the continent. They continued that Moscow, being discredited in the eyes of the eastern nations, could not maintain its imperialism, a circumstance which gave the Ukraine an opportunity to become the natural leader of these peoples. It is significant that, while the report of this conference called for struggle against Germany and glorified the UPA, in other places it emphasized repeatedly the need for armed forces without specifying that they be insurgent. There was no condemnation of the Galician Division.

704 668* nationalist leadership. Moreover, in contrast to the usual Waffen SS practice, each detachment was allowed its chaplain.[23]

000 The considerations just discussed played a considerable part in securing the support of both the Autocephalous Orthodox Church[24] and the Greek Catholic Church for the formation of the Galician Division. Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi had originally greeted the German army as a liberator from Communist tyranny. He soon discovered that the Wehrmacht officers, with whom he at first established cordial relations, were not the real representatives of German power. The horrible excesses of the SP, especially its massacre of thousands of Jews, caused a sharp change in Sheptyts'kyi's attitude. He was especially alarmed by the SP use of Ukrainian police for their murders, and is said to have sent a direct demand to Himmler that this practice be stopped. At any rate, a secret report to the German foreign office provides almost conclusive evidence that the Metropolitan was adamantly opposed to the Nazi anti-Semitic outrages and that by late 1943 he had come to regard Nazism as even a greater evil than Communism.[25] Nevertheless, he personally favored the creation of the Galician Division, and sent one of his clergy, Dr. Laba, to act as chief chaplain.[26] Bishop Joseph Slipyi conducted a service in St. George

[23] Interviews 46, 58, 63.

[24] The son of Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), the vicarial bishop of Kiev, joined the division; see Report by an unidentified official of the Ostministerium to Rosenberg, June 30, 1944, CXLVa 66, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 66).

[25] CXLVa 60. This document was submitted as a secret report, under the pseudonym "Dr. Frédéric," to the German foreign office by a fairly well-known French student of East Europe, who had become an active collaborator with the Germans. On a visit to L'vov in the late summer of 1943 this man talked with a number of Ukrainians, including the Metropolitan. The report appears to reflect the Metropolitan's attitudes accurately, and in large measure substantiates accounts such as those of Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), pp. 114–115, and Father Mykhailo Sopuliak, "Pam'iati velykoho Mytropolyta" (Memories of the Great Metropolitan), *Chas*, December 14, 1947, p. 3. This, and the following paragraph, is also based on Il'ko (Elie) Borshchak, *Un Prélat Ukrainien: Le Metropolite Cheptyskyj (1865–1944)* (Paris: Editions Franco-Ukrainiennes, 1946), pp. 55–56; and on Interview 63.

[26] SS Obergruppenführer Berger to Himmler, July 26, 1943, HH 263, in Hoover Library. The same file contains a sermon delivered by Father Laba in which he calls upon the Galicians to help "Hitler and the German people" destroy Bolshevism. An accompanying letter from Berger to another SS official, Brandt (July 22, 1943), notes that Laba's sermons contain "dangerous expressions," but that "we will soon pull this tooth." Himmler's own attitude is indicated by Brandt's

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Cathedral in L'vov, celebrating the inauguration of the division.[27] 000

German permission to provide chaplains and the absence of Nazi indoctrination among the soldiers helped make the unit acceptable to the church. The chief reason which induced the Metropolitan to sanction the project, however, was similar to that which motivated other nationalist leaders. He felt that German defeat was only a matter of time and that the small military support which the division could provide for the faltering Wehrmacht could not be decisive. At the same time, he thought the existence of a nationalist military force of some strength would be invaluable in the chaos which would succeed a German collapse and might even be necessary to preserve the lives of a considerable portion of the Ukrainian population of Galicia. Sheptyts'kyi's chief concern in this connection was aroused by extremist elements among the Poles who were killing their opponents among the Ukrainians, just as the OUN-B was slaughtering Poles in Volhynia.

More than twelve months were spent in recruiting and organizing the division. The response of the young men to the call for enlistment was so great that the quota set for the unit was overfilled many times, and tens of thousands had to be rejected.[28] Nevertheless, the SS officers in control appear to have been suspicious of the loyalty of their command and hesitant to use it. Meanwhile, the Nazis' vast conquests in the Ukraine were falling into the hands of the Red Army. In March, 1943, the Soviet forces took Kharkov, only to lose it in May. They captured Kharkov once again, and September, 1943, brought them from Kharkov to the gates of Kiev. There they halted a month, but the remaining fall and winter of 1943–44 ended with the reconquest of practically all of the pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine, plus most of Volhynia. 704

It was not until the summer of 1944 that the real battle for Galicia was joined. At this point, the SS command finally decided to commit the new Ukrainian division to battle. The front

statement that his chief was willing to use the influence of the clergy in the division, but that if they began to agitate they would be thrown out, and the Metropolitan himself would have to bear part of the consequences.

[27] *Nastup*, May 16, 1943, p. 2.

[28] Interview 44.

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704 ran from just east of Kovel to a point in the Carpathians south of Ternopol'; a key point was the little town of Brody, on the main highway from Rovno to L'vov. Here, in late June, the SS division was put into the line to assist in covering the Galician capital. For three weeks it maintained its position, in the face of fierce Soviet attacks and encircling operations, but by July 20 was no longer effective as a fighting unit. Perhaps 20 percent of its complement fell back with the German armies toward the Carpathians, and half of the remainder escaped to join the UPA or to filter back to the German lines.[29]

661 798 After the victory of Brody, the Red Army rapidly conquered east Galicia, Bukovina, and the Carpatho-Ukraine. By fall, substantially all of the Ukrainian lands were again under the dominion of Moscow. This time the repression exercised by the Communist rulers was harsher and less disguised than it had been five years before. The Greek Catholic Church was attacked ruthlessly. Bishop Slipyi, who had succeeded Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi after the latter's death in late 1944, was arrested and deported to the interior of the Soviet Union. Most of the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church, as well as hundreds of its clergy, were likewise banished. Orthodox priests subservient to the Patriarch of Moscow enlisted the aid of a minority of the Greek Catholic clergy, who renounced their allegiance to Rome and joined in constructing a new hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Galicia. The same tactics were pursued in the Carpatho-Ukraine.[30]

[702] 661 According to reports of refugees from the area, very severe measures were taken against the population at large. Men from the ages of eighteen to fifty are said to have been drafted into the Red Army in a mass, without regard for their state of health.[31] Once enlisted, they were said to be watched over by special *politruks*, given inferior arms, and sent into battle after eight

[29] See numerous contributions to *Brody*, and *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA*, for detailed descriptions of military operations of this battle and of the other Ukrainian forces serving with the Wehrmacht.

[30] Cf. Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 137 ff.; Mykola D. Chubatyi, "Russian Church Policy in the Ukraine," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, I (Autumn, 1945), 51–53.

[31] SS war reporter Oleh Lysiak in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 2, 1944, p. 3.

Za Ukrainu, were kept in the hands of nationalist editors, who were able to direct oblique attacks on Vlasov.[63] 668* 204

Nevertheless, it is certain that Vlasov was given some advantages, and secured considerable success, in his efforts to recruit prisoners of war of all Soviet nationalities for his Russian Liberation Army (Rossiskaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia—ROA). Even according to Ukrainian nationalist sources, only half of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were fully "nationally conscious," and many could not even speak the Ukrainian language.[64] Moreover, Vlasov was able to secure a number of high-ranking ex-Soviet officers of Ukrainian origin for his staff, including the commander of the first ROA division, General Buniachenko. Altogether, units, in various stages of integration in the ROA, totaled three hundred thousand by January, 1945, and of this number perhaps 35 to 40 percent were of Ukrainian ethnic stock.[65] 727 704

Apparently no direct threats or compulsion were used to secure adherence of civilians to the KONR.[66] On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalist sources maintain that the apparent German favor enjoyed by Vlasov was a powerful inducement to the de-

[63] For example, the latter newspaper published the translation of an article from *Das Schwartze Korps* (an SS organ) harshly criticizing Russian émigrés, on January 18, 1945, p. 2.

[64] M. Les', "Chomu ia buv 'Vlasovtsem'?" (Why was I a "Vlasovite"?), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (October-November, 1952), p. 3, states that 50 percent of the Ukrainian prisoners were "nationally conscious," 40 percent somewhat so, and 10 percent not at all. A contemporary account (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 23, 1941, p. 2) states that many of the letters addressed by Ukrainian prisoners to the newspaper which the Germans had established for them (*Nova Doba*) were in Russian, but notes that they were sent to the Ukrainian rather than the Russian paper, *Klich.* The latter also carried material evidently intended for a Ukrainian audience. Other contemporary accounts of the prisoners differ as to whether they could speak the Ukrainian language. One insists that 80 percent were "nationally conscious," and that the Russian prisoners accepted the fact that the Ukrainians were "separatists" without anger, for while the latter wanted an independent state they had always lived peacefully with the Russians and other minorities in the Ukraine (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 5, 1941, p. 2).

[65] Unsigned list of units from the eastern peoples, January, 1945, NO 5800 (hereafter referred to as NO 5800). For the percentage of Ukrainians see Les', p. 3, and MS H, which states that Vlasov told Shandruk that 70 percent of the first ROA division were Ukrainians. If so, this figure must have been reached by including persons with very little Ukrainian nationalist feeling whom the Russian National Socialist leader, Bronislav Kaminskii, recruited in the Lokot' area on the border of the Ukrainian and Russian Soviet Republics, since (according to Thorwald, p. 44) Kaminskii's brigade alone formed more than a third of this division.

[66] Interview 45.

704 moralized and physically worn-out prisoners to accept his invita-
727 tion as a way out of confinement. They assert that a number of the units formed from prisoners or from the auxiliary units brought back by the Wehrmacht in its retreat abandoned the ROA, even without German permission, to join nationalist Ukrainian forces.[67] To a certain degree, this assertion is supported by one of the German officers most closely associated with the eastern military units, who states that difficulties were experienced in subordinating Ukrainian or mixed Ukrainian-Russian units which had been under German commanders to Russian officers from the ROA, although there was generally no objection to attachment to Vlasov's over-all command.[68]

704 In addition to this struggle for influence within groups which were subordinated to General Vlasov, there was an entirely separate military organization for the Ukrainians. The Galician division was reformed as the First Ukrainian Division, and organization of a second division to be composed of East Ukrainians was begun.[69] These and a number of other units, totaling seventy-five thousand men, were classified as the Ukrainian Liberation Army (Ukraïns'ke Vyzvol'ne Voisko—UVV) under command of General Shandruk, though each unit was actually commanded by a German officer.[70] In contradistinction to the ROA units, which wore the St. Andrew's cross, a centuries-old Russian symbol, the Ukrainian units were permitted the *trizub* [trident] as their national emblem. Borovets', who had been released from prison after a few months, was commissioned to form a parachute detachment to land behind the Soviet lines to aid the partisan struggle.[71]

The final days of the war brought no substantial change in

[67] A. Kovach, *Ukraïns'ka vyzvol'na borot'ba i "Vlasovshchyna"* (The Ukrainian Liberation Struggle and the "Vlasov Affair") ("Germany," 1948), p. 51, states that 65 percent of the trainees in the Dabensdorf officers' school of the ROA were of Ukrainian origin.

[68] Interview 15; MS C.

[69] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 8, 1944, p. 3.

[70] General Shandruk has in his possession a mimeographed copy of an order from the German general, Freitag, turning over command of the First (Galician) Ukrainian Division to him, but only on April 27, 1945. See also Oleh Lysiak, "Volyns'kyi Batalion" (The Volhynian Battalion), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (March, 1951), p. 2.

[71] Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba*, p. 15; Interview 37.

nian territories. This Polish policy held the Ukrainian 726
military forces that were fighting against the Russian Red Army constantly in tension, and hindered the work of the Ukrainian Government.

The Ukrainian Galician Army took part in the struggle against the Soviet Russian occupation immediately after the termination of the war with the Poles. The Galician Ukrainians wanted to strengthen the Ukrainian state on the Dnieper, together with the forces of Eastern Ukraine, in order to decide later the historic quarrel for Galicia with Poland.

15. Ukraine between 'Red' and 'White' Russia (1919)

In June 1919, the Ukrainian Government, headed by the Social- 642
Democrat Martos (from August Isaac Mazepa, Social-Democrat, 563
was Prime Minister), took up its residence in Kamenets in Podolia. The united Ukrainian Armies were under the command of General Yunakiw, former Professor of the Military Academy in Petersburg. The Government of Ukraine made efforts to secure legality and order in its territory, particularly it resolutely fought the excesses of various dark elements against the Jewish population. In the Government of theUkrainian Democratic Republic there was a special Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority — Pinkhos Krasny (Jewish People's Party); the deputy Minister of Labour was the Jewish Social-Democrat Prof. Salomon Goldelman.

The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against Russian Bolshevism 669
as well as the entire Ukrainian problem were in 1919 unknown to the world. Against the Ukrainian liberation movement Communist propaganda was made throughout the world, trying to describe the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as a reactionary state. On the other hand, the propaganda of the Russian 'Whites' and of the Poles permeated decisive political circles abroad resulting in the conviction that the Ukrainian movement was the same as Russian Bolshevism. Therefore the Ukrainian Republic which had led a heroic struggle against Soviet Russia was blockaded by the Western Great Powers as 'infected by Bolshevism'. Because of this [705]
blockade the Ukrainian Army was in want of arms, supplies, medicaments. Only by contraband from Rumania was it possible to receive something for the Ukrainian armed forces. Under these circumstances it happened frequently that the Ukrainian Army fought with arms captured on the front from the enemy. But in spite of all these difficulties the united Army of the Ukrainian Republic had considerable successes in the battles with the Soviet Russian troops and, on August 31, 1919, took Kiev, the capital of

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

form the Imperial or Pratique port, the two eastern 504
moles the Quarantine port, the intervening spaces forming the New and Middle harbours. Three-quarters of a mile to the northward is the Petroleum harbour, sheltered by a long mole. Vessels can load up to 26 ft. in the New harbour, up to 21 ft. in the Middle harbour, and up to 24 ft. in the Petroleum harbour.

There is quayage of 4,550 ft. in length in the Pratique harbour, 3,245 ft. in the New harbour, 4,550 ft. in the Quarantine harbour, and 900 ft. in the Petroleum harbour. There is adequate crane-power and railway accommodation alongside the quays, with extensive warehouses and two large grain elevators. There are two floating cranes, each of 25 tons capacity. The port has a floating dry-dock, 381 ft. long, 63 ft. wide, and 19 ft. 6 in. in depth, with a lifting capacity of 4,800 tons. There are two patent slips for small vessels and a repair yard for light repairs.

Many improvements have been projected, including an additional breakwater for the outer harbour and longer quayage in the Middle and Petroleum harbours.

Nikolaev is a river-port situated on the east bank of the Southern Bug. There is a depth of 25 ft. in the river channel up to the town. The granite quay of the commercial harbour is 3,850 ft. in length, and has 26 ft. of water alongside. There are two grain elevators and a good number of cranes. The Cabotage harbour is dredged to a depth of 17 ft.; it is only used by coasters or vessels wintering in the port. A petroleum pier, 900 ft. long, with reservoirs adjacent, is situated above the town.

A new commercial quay, 2,400 ft. in length, was almost completed in 1914. Another, 1,650 ft. in length, was then in construction, but progress on it was reported to be slow.

The naval port and arsenal are situated on the [70] ●
northern side of the town on the banks of the River Ingul. There is a depth of 25 ft. in the naval port. The heaviest marine repairs can be undertaken.

Kherson is situated on the Dnieper, some 15 miles

704 The first such unit was known by the code name "Nachtigall" 668* and was organized in the Generalgouvernement. Nominally, only 725 its enlisted personnel were Ukrainian, while all officers were German. Actually, as the Germans well knew, there was a whole staff of "unofficial" Ukrainian officers, headed by the leader of the "military tendency" in the OUN-B, Roman Shukevych. At first "Nachtigall" had only about one hundred and fifty men, but at the outbreak of war it was expanded to battalion strength.[3]

A second unit, larger but of less political significance, was formed in Austria. Ukrainians were allowed a greater degree of formal authority than in "Nachtigall." In *de facto* command was Colonel Iarii, the dissident member of the old Provid, who was at once highly esteemed by his young subordinates and on the closest personal terms with the Abwehr officers charged with the formation of the units. John Gavrusevych, one of the top leaders of the Bandera group, was in charge of recruitment; his source of manpower lay in the large Ukrainian colony in Austria. Up to 1940, the chief Ukrainian organization in the latter territory was the student Sich in Vienna, which was dominated by the OUN. This association continued loyal to Mel'nyk, but most of the numerous Ukrainian factory workers turned to the new movement. It was among the latter that Gavrusevych secured the majority of his recruits, although about one quarter were secured from among the students, particularly those in the medical school in Graz. Care was taken to keep the force—which was called by the organizers Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists)—in the hands of the Bandera group, although only half of the members actually belonged to [714] the new party. Unlike "Nachtigall," which was clad in Wehrmacht *feldgrau,* "Roland," as the military unit composed of the Druzhyny was called, wore uniforms similar to those of the Galician section of the Ukrainian army of revolutionary days.[4]

668* As is apparent from the above description, the Wehrmacht units were prepared on a rather *ad hoc* basis, with the active

[3] Nykon Nalyvaiko, "Legiony v natsional'nykh viinakh" (Legions in National Wars), *Narod'na Volia* (October 27, 1949), p. 2.

[4] Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (June-July, 1952), p. 4; MS A.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 kept up to the end. Summing up all the *pourparlers* one sees how false
642 they were at the core: an enforced fiction on one side and deliberate deception on the other.'

Hrushevsky, according to his own words, put forward only a moderate programme: wide national and territorial autonomy within the Russian Federative Republic; but it was not long before he was shifting his ground and declaring that 'the adherents of an independent Ukraine consent to remain on a common platform with Russians' but that 'the colours of an independent Ukraine would be folded only for a time'.

With the resignations of Milyukov and Guchkov, who were regarded as the firm adversaries of Ukrainian separatism, 'the colours of an independent Ukraine' were duly unfolded. The *Rada* chose from among its members a 'General Secretariat' which was to function as a sort of Ukrainian cabinet. Always in pursuance of their tactics, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko declared that the authority of both the *Rada* and the Secretariat was of a 'purely moral order' and that the organs set up in Kiev were purely 'national organizations'.

Soon, however, Vinnichenko, who had taken upon himself the role of 'Ukrainian Prime Minister', judged that the moment had arrived to proclaim that 'the limits between moral and public legal authority had been effaced' and that 'our moral authority has grown to such an extent as a logical result of events that painlessly, without a struggle, it has transformed itself into the legal rule of a national republic'.

All these manœuvres culminated in the publication of the first 'Universal' of the 'Central *Rada*' on 23 June 1917, according to which the 'Autonomous Ukrainian Republic' came into being, and the 'Central *Rada*' arrogated to itself the right to formulate legislation which would require the sanction of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly only as 'a matter of form'. In this way two authorities came into being claiming sovereign rights in the territory of the Ukraine: the 'moral' authority transformed into the 'legal rule' of the *Rada* on the one side, and on the other the former legitimate authority of the Provisional Government—which was losing ground every day, but which had not completely disappeared.

Under these circumstances several members of the reconstructed cabinet of the Provisional Government hastened to Kiev—Kerenski, Tereshchenko, Nekrasov and Tsereteli. At the time Kerenski was preoccupied with the South-Western Front, where a renewed Russian offensive was to prove to the Allies that the Provisional Government remained faithful to the idea of 'war to a successful
[721] end', and it is probable that the *Rada* had chosen this conjunction of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

circumstances to extract the maximum concessions from the harassed liberal leaders who could not risk a political crisis in the rear of the South-Western Army. 668 642

When the offensive ended in catastrophe with a loss of over 100,000 casualties and 47,000 prisoners, the complete demoralization of the Front and the appearance of thousands of fugitives in Kiev, the ministers of the Provisional Government had no alternative but to capitulate to the *Rada*. On 17 July, in the presence of Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, the existence of 'the General Secretariat' was proclaimed and legalized. 721 642

The disaster at the Front was followed during July by the outbreak of riots and disorders in the interior of Russia. The Soviets openly declared themselves against the Provisional Government, while the Bolshevik faction, after the arrival of Lenin, began to gain strength and made their first attempt to gain power by armed insurrection. 669

The *Rada* began to concentrate what Ukrainian military elements it was able to attract round Kiev; two regiments, named respectively 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky' and 'Polubotok', were in process of formation. Both regiments consisted of undisciplined and disorderly deserters and mutineers. An attempt by the Russian Command to send the 'Ukrainian Regiments' to the Front provoked a real mutiny in the ranks of the 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment', who considered their presence in Kiev 'for the protection of the *Rada*' more necessary than in the firing line. After an encounter at the Central Railway Station at Kiev with a squadron of the Cuirassiers of the Guard, the Ukrainian troops surrendered and were deprived of their weapons. 642 669

Petrograd in the meantime was rejoicing over the suppression of the Bolshevik rising; Lenin had fled to Finland.

This success of the Provisional Government tended to calm both troubled and conspiratorial minds and, under the influence of the German offensive which had begun and which threatened both Kiev and Petrograd, the ministers of the Kerenski Government adopted a firmer attitude in their discussions with the representatives of the *Rada*, who had come to Petrograd to discuss the terms of the Statute which was to regulate the position of the Ukraine. Instead of the Statute only new 'instructions' to the General Secretariat were conceded. The territory of the Ukraine was to consist now of only five Governments: three on the right and two on the left bank of the Dniepr. The Government of Kharkov and the three New Russian Governments were excluded, although the delegates had tried to insist that, in addition to the nine Governments already claimed, Bessarabia and the greater parts of the Governments of Kursk and Voronezh should also form part of the Ukraine. 642 634

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Petlyura (who had constituted himself a specialist in military affairs) were resisting fairly well in northern Podolia, but were certainly unable to secure the return of the *Rada* to Kiev. Trotsky's dramatic gesture had, however, simplified the problem. On 17 February the German Government denounced the armistice and ordered the armies of the Eastern Front to begin their advance. It was the only way of breaking the stubbornness of the Bolsheviks and of saving the *Rada* and the peace which it had signed with the promise of a million tons of supplies.(4, 5)

§3. THE GERMANS IN THE UKRAINE: HETMAN SKOROPADSKY

On 18 February, the German troops, without meeting any resistance, occupied Dvinsk on the road to Petrograd and Lutsk on the road to Kiev.

But it was no easy matter for the Austrians to resume the offensive. The Austro-Hungarian armies had been broken during the first two years of the war in the great battles with the Russians; in 1917 it had only been with German aid that they had succeeded in throwing back the Italians. No danger from without threatened the Habsburg Monarchy, but within the Empire dangers were growing with each day that passed. Hence on 17 February the Vienna Government had informed Berlin that Austro-Hungarian troops would take no part in the renewal of the war on the Eastern Front.

In the meantime, the Poles and Bohemians were in a state of agitation on account of the cession of the Kholm region to the Ukrainians. When the twenty-nine year old 'student' Sevryuk, who had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Czernin and Kühlmann, made his appearance during a session of the Reichsrath on 19 February, Polish and Bohemian deputies met him with hoots and shouts of 'Clear out of here!' The Austro-Hungarian Government was compelled to put forward 'new conditions' in respect of Kholm.

The German troops continued their march through Volhynia in the direction of Kiev, and the Emperor Charles, fearful that the Austrians might fail to secure their share of the promised Ukrainian supplies, changed his mind. On 24 February the Austro-Hungarian divisions on the Eastern Front received the order to advance into the Ukraine. The Austrian decision had, however, already come too late, for on 1 March Kiev was occupied by the Germans and they alone reinstated the *Rada*.

By 3 March the rapid attainment by the Germans of the line Narva-Pskov and their seizure of the districts of Vitebsk, Mohilev

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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669

Meanwhile Petlyura had not exhausted his resources. He had the skill to persuade Pilsudski that the situation in the Ukraine offered great possibilities for the re-establishment under new conditions of the ancient structure of *Rzecz Pospolita*, which should now spread to the Dniepr and the Black Sea. Petlyura for the moment refrained from raising the issue of left-bank Ukraine, but he persuaded the Polish leader that should he appear at the head of Ukrainian troops in right-bank Ukraine the whole country would rise against the Soviets. To strengthen his influence with the Poles, Petlyura succeeded in forming one Ukrainian Division under the command of Colonel Bezruchko, which was stationed on the confines of Volhynia with the Polish troops who were destined for the campaign.

In the middle of April 1920, when the Red Army was engaged against the Volunteers in the Crimea, Pilsudski concentrated between 50,000 and 60,000 men on the Volhynian border and struck suddenly at Kiev. On 7 May the Poles entered the hapless city on the Dniepr. Petlyura was following in their wake and he fixed his headquarters at Zhitomir from where, with the aid of numerous agents and a flood of proclamations, he hoped 'to mobilize all Ukrainian forces'.

Petlyura's effort was a failure. Not more than 2000 or 3000 needy vagabonds answered the call to arms. The people were utterly weary and exhausted after the events of the last three years, and they fled in terror from any kind of mobilization—'Petlyurian' or Bolshevik. Further, they were not inspired by the appeal to come forward to the aid of the Polish military authorities so suddenly established in their capital.

Pilsudski's adventure in any event had been undertaken six months too late. The Volunteers in the South of Russia were only holding the Crimea, while in the far north General Miller's front had collapsed, and General Yudenich had failed to drive home his attack from Estonia, even though it had reached the suburbs of Petrograd. At the beginning of June the Bolsheviks concentrated considerable forces to the south of Kiev while the new 'Red Mounted Army' numbering 16,000 sabres threatened the long and thinly held line of Polish communications.

On 11 June the Polish retreat began. After some hard fighting in the region of the river Teterev, Colonel Smygly-Rydz succeeded in extricating his army and retreated through Volhynia with heavy losses in men and material. 'The last of the Petlyurians' also left the territory of the Ukraine with numbers greatly reduced—not so much on account of losses in battle as of desertions.

The 'Red Mounted Army' of General Budenny invaded Galicia;

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

occupied Lvov, and advanced on Warsaw through Zamość by the same route which the Cossack hordes of Khmelnytsky had followed nearly three centuries before. But the Russians were checked at the gates of Warsaw (15 August), and their subsequent retreat was almost as rapid as their advance and the preceding Polish advance and retreat had been. 721 669

On 12 October an armistice was signed, and in the following year the Peace of Riga was to stabilize conditions on the Russian borderlands for nearly twenty years. Poland retained most of the Ukrainian territory of which she had been in occupation prior to the attack on Kiev—large parts of Volhynia and Polesia as well as about half the area of White Russia. The much disputed Kholm district and all Galicia also remained in Polish hands, although the temporary occupation of these territories had only been authorized by the Paris Conference 'pending the solution of the Russian Question'. As a result of the activities of the tenacious Petlyura and the visionary politicians of the 'Directoria' the Poles received, therefore, about 150,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory and about 5,000,000 Ukrainian-speaking subjects. 728

Simon Petlyura, like so many of the picturesque figures of the Russian Revolution, retired to Paris where, some years later, he was killed by a revolver shot in the Boulevard St Michel. The shot was fired by a young Jew named Schwartzbrod, who stated at his trial that he was taking vengeance on Petlyura for the pogroms committed by the 'Petlyurians'. (8, 9, 10)

§6. THE SOVIETS AND THE GROWTH OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

'The Ukrainian Soviet Republic' had been declared on 18 December 1918 in a proclamation of 'the Military and Revolutionary Committee of the Red Southern Army' signed by Stalin and Rakovski; the proclamation conferred all authority in 'the liberated territory' on 'the Ukrainian workers and the Ukrainian peasants'. On 3 January 1919, the day on which the Red Army entered Kharkov, then still occupied by part of the 1st German Army Corps, a proclamation of 'the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' announced that all authority in the Ukraine was vested in this Committee which had 'the confidence of the working and peasant masses'. This document was signed by the President of the Committee, Manuilsky, and by the following members: Rakovski, Grinko, Zatonsky and Skrypnik. Rakovski was a professional revolutionary, a Bulgarian or Roumanian Jew by origin, 642 669 635

CHAPTER TWENTY

The German Attack on the Soviets

During the period from 1939 to 1941, the German 648
policy toward those Ukrainians who had escaped from the Soviet 563
occupation into the Polish Government General was not too severe. It was possible for the Ukrainians in Krakow and elsewhere to carry on a considerable amount of educational work, to form themselves into relief organizations and, in general, to work for the establishment of normal relations.

When the breach between the two totalitarian states came on 721
June 22, 1941, the Germans pushed ahead rapidly not only in the Baltic area but also in Ukraine. By June 30, they had occupied Lviv with the aid of some Ukrainian units, both from Carpatho-Ukraine and from Galicia.

During these days the Ukrainians had high hopes that the Germans would seriously liberate them from Bolshevik tyranny and wherever they had the slightest possibility, they endeavored to seize the cities so as to put a stop to the massacres which the Communists were perpetrating before they fell back. In some places they were successful but in Lviv, the Communists killed over [661]
10,000 prisoners, before their bloody regime could be brought to an end.

In the first days of the war, although there were no clear 642
promises made to the Ukrainians, the impression grew that there would be established some form of a Ukrainian administration. The political leaders set up a Ukrainian government and appointed Yaroslav Stetsko as the first head of the state on June 30, 1941. A short time later this was broadened by the appointment of a Committee of Seniors under the leadership of Dr. Kost Levytsky, who had been the Prime Minister of the Republic of Western

642 Ukraine in 1918. These developments had the support of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, although he knew that they did not yet rest on organized public sentiment.

It was well recognized by the influential Ukrainians that the situation was very different from what it had been at the end of the Hapsburg monarchy, but they went through the motions of setting up a government on the possibility that the Germans would allow them some real concessions and that it would be mutually advantageous to be already prepared for all eventualities.

721 648 It is perhaps possible that a part of the German armed forces looked with a certain toleration at these developments, for at least a part of the officer class realized that the task of the German government would be greatly facilitated, if they were able to normalize the situation and win some support from the population, as they had in the Polish Government General. This did not suit the Nazi element who believed that the advance of the German [661] forces was only to secure more *Lebensraum* for Germany. This faction struck and struck hard at the new regime and secured the arrest of Stetsko, Levytsky, Bandera and Melnyk, all of whom were taken to prison in Germany where they were kept for nearly four years.

The arrest of the leaders, while it was a crushing blow, still was not completely fatal. The advance of the German troops was so rapid on the way to Kiev that the Ukrainian leaders continued for some months to inspire the population not to resist the Germans, the more so as the western regiments of the Red Army surrendered in large masses. Thus when Kiev fell, some 675,000 of the Red Army surrendered with scarcely a blow.

On the other hand, the Soviets attempted to devastate the country before they withdrew, shooting the Ukrainian intelligentsia indiscriminately and trying to seize as many as they could for evacuation beyond the Urals. They demolished factories, tried to remove finished articles and mined the cities before they abandoned them. Then, when they exploded the mines, they spread the story that the total work of demolition had been carried on by the Germans.

In general, the military unification of the armed groups pro- 668
ceeded more rapidly and favorably than did the political concen- 725
tration. Here the followers of Bandera established in March, 1944, a temporary committee and at a general assembly in June appointed a Supreme Council of Ukrainian Liberation (the UHVR) which assumed the functions of a government. At the same time, through the agreement of the representatives of the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev, the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv and the National Council of Carpatho-Ukraine, there was formed in September in Kiev the All-Ukrainian National Council (rada) which appointed as its president Prof. Mykola Velychkivsky, the Rector of the Kiev Poytechnic. This was rather under the control of the Melnykivtsy, and was opposed to the UHVR. Yet these differences tended to become academic, in view of the strengthened position of General Taras Chuprynka, the commander of the U. P. A.

The opposition of the U. P. A. to the German forces was therefore in a sense an opposition behind the lines. It had been facilitated by the German tendency to base their hold on the country through various strong points, while their main forces were advancing to the east and fighting against the Red Army. With the German defeat at Stalingrad in the RSFSR, they began a new retreat and this brought the Soviet forces back into the picture and placed new burdens upon the U. P. A.

In Galicia there had been formed with German toleration a 721 ●
regular Ukrainian division, the Galician Division, on the condition that it would only be employed against the Bolsheviks and would be maintained as a distinct unit. Yet the Germans had no intention of allowing this division to gather strength. They soon replaced the higher officers with Germans and officially called it the 14 Waffen Grenadier Division der Waffen SS., even though in no other case were Slavs of any kind assigned to the SS. This division took part in some battles with the Bolsheviks in the Carpathians. With the breaking of the German front, the German military men made renewed efforts to enroll this division and to create other units in a regular Ukrainian army under General Shandruk but

721 it was already too late. There had been too much bad blood created during the earlier years when the Nazi commanders expressed their contempt for everything Ukrainian to accomplish anything in the hour of German defeat. Germany had lost her chance and in the last days of the war, the Galician Division made its way to the west, surrendered, and was interned in Italy.

000 The development of the U. P. A., with its constant warfare against the Germans, was a clear result of the German fantastic attitude, with all of its arrogance. Had they been willing to cooperate in the first days of 1941, they might easily have secured considerable resources in men and supplies from these people who had been suffering under the Bolsheviks. They avoided any such action and it was their own stubbornness that kept them from receiving the help which they might have had. For years they did not want any assistance from the Slavs and by the time that they had learned their lesson the war was so nearly over that they could not profit.

Yet the German defeat did not produce peace. No one of the Ukrainians doubted that the receding of the German wave would produce a new Soviet invasion and as the Germans retired to the west, the U. P. A. and its associated organs prepared for a new struggle.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Soviet Ukraine During World War II

In the preceding chapters we have briefly traced the efforts of the Ukrainians to profit by the clash between the two totalitarian powers of Germany and the USSR and the Ukrainian hopes of being recognized as an independent state. These hopes had been thwarted by the Nazi refusal to treat the Ukraine as anything except a field for German expansion and the Western refusal to recognize the Ukrainian struggle for independence. 722 661 538

This, of course, does not tell the entire story. From the earliest days of the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine, many of the leading Ukrainian patriots, writers, artists and scholars, including a large part of the staff of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, had seized the opportunity to retire to the west into the Polish Government General but there were many more who were picked up in the early deportations and deposited along with the Poles in Central Asia. Some of these, during the brief period of friendship between the Poles and the Soviets, were again able to make their way to the west along with General Anders and found themselves again at freedom, while those who had retired to the west were forced to undergo increasing persecution at the hands of the Nazis as these became more desperate. [814]

On the other hand, when the break finally came in 1941 and the Ukrainians, including those mobilized in the Red Army, began to surrender in masses, the Soviets began to deport to the east all of the outstanding people on whom they could lay their hands and whom at the first moment they did not wish to exterminate. In this number there were such Ukrainian writers as Tychyna, Rylsky and others who had showed their loyalty to the regime by their tasteless flattery of the regime in Moscow.

722 In the same way, the authorities gathered up in frenzied haste machinery, finished products, and records and started them likewise to the east with the hope of setting them up somewhere in a safe place and using them to increase the Soviet war potential. All this was a hurried and confused process, for it was contradicted by the Soviet orders to reduce the Ukraine to a heap of ruins and to leave nothing available for the invaders.

[814] [661] The clash between these two ideas was vividly reflected in the destruction of Kiev. Some sections of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR were hurriedly packed on trains and moved to Ufa. Other sections for little better reasons were abandoned in the general confusion or were mined for immediate destruction. Priceless books and records, no less than boilers and lathes, shared the two fates, while Kiev, thoroughly mined, was exploded and set on fire without regard for the needs of the people. The Soviet authorities, well aware that they could not evacuate the entire population, destroyed the food supplies of those who were left behind while other detachments massacred the helpless population indiscriminately.

The situation at Kharkiv and Odesa was far better and far more logical for the Soviets had a few days longer to sort out what they wished to remove and what they wanted to destroy, but even in these places there was the same wanton destruction which conflicted with the avowed aims of the Soviet authorities.

Then ensued a series of mutual recriminations, and it is still not clear in regard to many buildings and institutions whether the bulk of the damage and the losses were caused by Nazi or by Communist actions. Some 3500 carloads of machinery were shipped alone from the city of Zaporyzhzhya and most of this material was packed at night in utter darkness with no special care as to where it was being sent.

[466] The same situation confronted the workers, some 5,000,000 of whom were evacuated from the Ukraine and landed in rough factories that were hastily erected somewhere in Asia. These sometimes lacked even roofs and means of heating when the mercury dropped to 45° below zero.

Under such conditions, if the chaos and the disorder were not 722
to be allowed to spread further, it was obvious that something had to be done to improve the morale of the population. This was particularly evident and necessary during the early months when it seemed as if the Nazis might decide to make some concessions to the people. As a result, there were a series of developments undertaken which superficially, at least, offered some concessions to the spirit of the various non-Russian nationalities.

Thus, in 1943 the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR was [814]
allowed to celebrate its twenty fifth anniversary at Ufa in the Bashkir Autonomous Republic and to list its institutes which were scattered throughout Asia. Such an event rendered it possible to blame the Nazis for the destruction of what had not been evacuated. It furnished good propaganda for the Western powers who were already sending copious supplies to the USSR and receiving in return from it only condemnation and criticism.

In the same way, the various writers who had passed the 722
approval of the government were assigned posts as newspaper 538
correspondents in the Red Army where they could sing the praises 626
of Stalin. Yet, at the same time, they were encouraged to write articles and poems which would reflect the hostility to the Nazis and again and again the censorship was relaxed for men like Sosyura to write poems in praise of the Ukraine, of its past, its present and its future.

Others like Yanovsky and Bazhan were allowed to emphasize [198]
the separation between the traditional Ukrainian speech and the jargon that had been put out in the various Ukrainian-Russian [814]
dictionaries after the breaking of the Ukrainian Renaissance. They were allowed to assemble collaborators to compile a more conservative dictionary and to revamp the system of orthography which had been the work of such pronounced Russian sympathizers as Khvylya during the preceding period.

Yet, these concessions were more apparent than real, for under 722
the wartime conditions, those Ukrainian scholars that had the 814
apparent confidence of the government were scattered far and wide. They were living perforce under abnormal conditions and

722 814 no efforts were made to bring them together or to conduct a revival of the Ukrainian work that had been so ruthlessly and needlessly shattered. It was a wartime device adopted for a passing situation and the masters in the Kremlin well understood that the fury of the war had done more than they had ever dreamed possible for the disintegration of the various Soviet Republics. Once, therefore, the evacuation had taken place, the Soviet leaders had only to sit by and to reap the profits. There would be plenty of time for that later and so the war years seemed an intermission in the relentless pressure that had been exerted in the past.

648 661 [167] It was for the Soviet leaders a far more vital problem to recover the masses of the people who had fled to the west or had been carried away by the Germans and who might, even in case of a victory of the democratic powers, reveal the full force of the Soviet pressure. That was why they welcomed the Yalta Agreement which provided for the compulsory return to the USSR of all refugees and deported persons and why, once peace was restored, they showed such devilish ingenuity in trying to recover the control of every one who could testify from personal experience as to the nature of the Soviet rule.

It was with the greatest surprise and lack of comprehension that the Western leaders became aware of this situation. They had listened eagerly to the Soviet siren songs that it was only Nazi sympathizers and criminals and traitors who did not want to return under the Soviet rule and it required some months before supposedly serious statesmen recovered their equilibrium sufficiently to understand the way in which they had been duped in the middle of the war.

Yet, no sooner had Soviet rule been reestablished than the old processes were revived with even greater energy and vigor. The last masks of independence or of free thought in the cultural or economic fields were torn away and the old persecution and charges were pressed with every increasing zeal.

727 Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the
661 title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors
[241] merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

[538] By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing
[466] Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

668 These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba–Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

668 This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian
• 725 forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

menacing their lines of communication and rescuing young Ukrainians who were being deported for labor service in Germany. It was during this year that the leaders came to feel the need for closer cooperation and a unification of their efforts. This was hard to achieve and there were even clashes between different groups of Ukrainian patriots. Yet, toward the beginning of 1943 the more important groups had effected a rough union in the U. P. A., the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which took on the characteristics of an organized military force. 668 725

By the middle of 1943 this army had acquired considerable strength and it was able to deal shattering blows to isolated German detachments and to drive out both the local German administration and any Red partisans that tried to operate in the area around the Pripet marshes. In May, 1943, they were even strong enough to ambush and kill the head of the Nazi S. A., Viktor Lutze, in the neighborhood of Kowel-Brest Litovsk.

The policy of the U. P. A. was to destroy the local German administrations which were scattered in the smaller communities and to avoid battle with the greater concentration of forces in some of the leading centres. In this way the Ukrainians were able to take over the practical administration of large parts of the Ukraine and to restore a considerable amount of normal life, while they checked the deportation of thousands or released them from the slave trains. The U. P. A. during these years had its own training schools, it set up on a small scale its own factories for arms and some of the most necessary manufactures, and it governed with the approval of the Ukrainian population.

At this period it had its own printing presses and put out a large number of journals and books of various kinds. These were not only in Ukrainian but, as the U. P. A. grew in size and strength, it attracted the attention and won the sympathies of all the other nations oppressed by the Russians. It formed units of [618] Byelorussians, Azerbaijanians, Uzbeks, etc. and finally on November 21, 1944, it called the First Conference of the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia, which was attended by some thirty-nine delegates representing thirteen peoples. The Germans

668 tried to break this up but they were unsuccessful and the police
●725 battalion which was assigned to the operation was destroyed. Out of this Conference developed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations which adopted as its program, "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual."

[701] It would take too long to describe the actual nature of the military operations which the U. P. A. carried on. At the height of its power it controlled more than 200,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory and numbered some 220,000 soldiers divided into four main bands: the U. P. A. North, operating in Polissya and northern Volynia; the U. P. A.—West in Eastern Galicia and Kholmshchyna; the U. P. A. —South in northern Bukovyna and the provinces of Kamyanets Podilsky and Vinnytsya; and the U. P. A.—East north of Kiev and Zhytomyr. There were separate detachments in most of the cities and important towns.

[661] To oppose its operations, the Germans resorted to mass executions and on more than one occasion detached forces of one or two divisions to try to destroy its centres. These attempts failed and the U. P. A. by its constant efforts played an important part in isolating the German forces, upsetting their communications and sapping their strength. All this was very costly, for after every major blow the Germans executed large numbers of innocent Ukrainians as their one weapon against the movement.

At first there was relative peace in Galicia, but in the summer of 1943 a Soviet partisan detachment entered the province. The Germans took little action and the U. P. A. came to the support of the population and soon had established strong centres in the Carpathian Mountains, where the difficult terrain facilitated their maintenance of strong positions.

[127] The Germans in the beginning did not want to admit that their policy toward the Ukrainians had evoked such a strong response. Koch and his associates were only too willing to believe that the Ukrainians were an inferior race, undeserving of education or of consideration and they went out of their way to label the U. P. A. the product of Communist intrigue and a movement of support for the Jews, etc.

In general, the military unification of the armed groups proceeded more rapidly and favorably than did the political concentration. Here the followers of Bandera established in March, 1944, a temporary committee and at a general assembly in June appointed a Supreme Council of Ukrainian Liberation (the UHVR) which assumed the functions of a government. At the same time, through the agreement of the representatives of the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev, the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv and the National Council of Carpatho-Ukraine, there was formed in September in Kiev the All-Ukrainian National Council (rada) which appointed as its president Prof. Mykola Velychkivsky, the Rector of the Kiev Poytechnic. This was rather under the control of the Melnykivtsy, and was opposed to the UHVR. Yet these differences tended to become academic, in view of the strengthened position of General Taras Chuprynka, the commander of the U. P. A. 668 725

The opposition of the U. P. A. to the German forces was therefore in a sense an opposition behind the lines. It had been facilitated by the German tendency to base their hold on the country through various strong points, while their main forces were advancing to the east and fighting against the Red Army. With the German defeat at Stalingrad in the RSFSR, they began a new retreat and this brought the Soviet forces back into the picture and placed new burdens upon the U. P. A.

In Galicia there had been formed with German toleration a regular Ukrainian division, the Galician Division, on the condition that it would only be employed against the Bolsheviks and would be maintained as a distinct unit. Yet the Germans had no intention of allowing this division to gather strength. They soon replaced the higher officers with Germans and officially called it the 14 Waffen Grenadier Division der Waffen SS., even though in no other case were Slavs of any kind assigned to the SS. This division took part in some battles with the Bolsheviks in the Carpathians. With the breaking of the German front, the German military men made renewed efforts to enroll this division and to create other units in a regular Ukrainian army under General Shandruk but 721

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

The Return of the Communists

The struggle of the U. P. A. against the returning Communists was no less bitter than the struggle with the Nazis but it was under very different conditions and the forces involved were more unequal. In the first place, the bulk of the fighting came after the conclusion of the hostilities of World War II and at a time when the Sovietophilism of the Western democratic powers was at its height. 725 668

The Nazis were during the entire period engaged with the Soviet forces beyond the borders of the Ukraine and while they attempted to maintain their position in the Ukraine, they frequently counted upon their ability to hold the chief road junctions and communities and exerted less effort to keep their garrisons in every separate village. The Soviet policy was to master the entire country and subject every aspect of Ukrainian life to their own power and control. They could therefore the more easily rely upon the use of overwhelming forces and endeavor to maintain a steady and never-ending pressure, while at the same time they could invoke every weapon in their propaganda arsenal to blacken their opponents in the mind of the democratic world.

Then, too, with the ending of formal hostilities there was no longer the possibility that the U. P. A. by its attacks upon one of its enemies could secure the weapons that would serve it in good stead against the other. This had been a marked feature of the earlier campaigns, for the Soviets had reconquered Kharkiv in the late fall of 1942, only to lose it in early 1943 and to recover it again later in the year. The Red Army recovered Kiev on November 6. In the spring of 1944 the Germans were forced to evacuate Lviv but they recovered the city and held it until the end

725 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A.
668 had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrain-
[208] ians were loyal to the Soviet Union. This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided
[186] to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army.

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

[651] The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West.

728 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of
648 the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

661 Minister of War, to endeavor to suppress these bands. Despite
668 unprecedented torture of the population, the Soviets found that
725 their progress was not so great as they had expected, for few of the Ukrainian units in their forces were enthusiastic about the campaign, when they saw the measures that the government was taking against their own families.

In the spring of 1946, they made another attempt, this time using some fifteen divisions of NKVD troops from the Far East, Siberia and Leningrad under the direct control of General Colonel Moskalenko. The authorities had been goaded to this renewed demonstration of force by the fact that the town of Stanislav in the Carpathian area had been seized by five battalions of the U. P. A. on October 31, 1945 as a discouragement to the Ukrainians to participate in the Soviet elections called for February 10, 1946. Despite the efforts of the Soviet guards, a considerable portion of the population failed to vote and when the attacks upon them were pressed, a detachment of the U. P. A. succeeded on May 3, 1946, in ambushing Moskalenko and killing him and his chief aids. This ended another campaign and still left the U. P. A. in control of parts of the Carpathian area.

668 In addition to these operations on purely Ukrainian territory,
725 the U. P. A. undertook several raids across the borders in order to encourage dissatisfaction with Soviet rule among some of the neighboring peoples. Thus they established contact with similar groups in Slovakia, Byelorussia and Lithuania, while others cut their way across Hungary into Yugoslavia to join forces with the opponents of Communism in that area.

The raids into Slovakia were especially successful throughout 1945 and 1946 and were continued on a smaller scale during the next years. They served as an encouragement for the anti-Communist elements of the population and, of far more importance in the long run, they attracted the attention of Western journalists who for the first time began to realize the extent of the discontent that prevailed in the Soviet Union. More than that, with every step to the West, they were brought closer to the Western Zones of Germany and Austria and several well-armed detachments have

during the past years fought their way into the American Zone, laid down their arms and surrendered. These brought the first really definite information to the West and while they have not received the attention that they deserved, they have undoubtedly encouraged the almost frantic desires of the Great Russian emigrés to pretend that they have an efficient underground operating at home. 668 725

The result of these raids produced an impression even upon the Czechs. Before the Communist coup d'état which placed the Communists in control of that country, the Czech Minister of War under Dr. Benes was approached by the Soviet authorities and asked for joint action with the Soviets and the Communist Poles to check the opposition to Soviet rule and to project joint operations on a large scale.

On March 29, 1947, General W. Swierszczewski, the Communist Polish Vice Minister of War, was killed near the town of Baligrod. This again was too startling a revelation of the discontent and on May 12th of the same year, the three governments of the USSR, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia concluded a treaty of mutual assistance against this movement.

Faced by the increasingly organized power of the Communist regimes, the U. P. A. has been obliged to proceed with more caution and it has largely replaced mass movements with operations on a smaller scale with the idea of keeping alive a spirit of resistance within the country. It is becoming increasingly difficult for it to publish and circulate pamphlets but it is still able, in case of necessity, to impede seriously the Soviet attempts at deportation of the Ukrainian population and again and again it is able to damage severely the Motor Tractor Stations.

On March 5, 1950, General Chuprynka, the commander of the U. P. A., was tracked down and killed in the village of Bilohorska in the very neighborhood of Lviv. He had proved himself a more than competent leader and had been the soul of the U. P. A. since its foundation in 1943. His parents, his wife and his children had all perished in the struggle but he had never wavered in his belief in a final victory and he had become an almost legendary figure.

668 His death did not end the fighting, for he was succeeded in
●735 command by Colonel Vasyl Koval. Even operations were not suspended, for it is known that late in September of the same year, a detachment of the forces seized the town of Mukachiv in the Carpathians and retired to the mountains with the records of the MVD office there and two prisoners who had made themselves particularly obnoxious by their cruelty and their abuse of the local population.

Thus under the present circumstances the primary task of the U. P. A. is to maintain itself in being as an armed underground, to encourage the population, both of the Ukraine and the other groups oppressed by the Russian Communists, and to carry on certain types of propaganda and of terroristic work which will serve to keep on the anxious seat the masters of the Kremlin. At the moment it does not have the possibility of undertaking by itself those extensive operations that it has done in the past but it is not idle and in the well-hidden bunkers and the forests, it is fostering those traditions which can be again galvanized into activity, if the moment for action arrives.

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IV. THE OPENING OF THE UKRAINE

LONG BEFORE the Western world guessed his intentions Hitler had 704
begun preparations for a campaign against the Soviet Union. As 668*
early as 1940 the Germans surreptitiously formed military train- 725●
ing units for Ukrainians. Their enlistment was concealed by official statements that the units were for *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans) only, and the purpose of the units was disguised by designating the Reichsarbeitdienst (Reich Labor Service) to be the supervising agency in the Generalgouvernement. Under this [625]
camouflage large numbers of Ukrainians were trained for police duty. More advanced training was carried out in Germany under direction of the Wehrmacht. In a number of camps instructors for future Ukrainian police units and interpreters for liaison with the German army were prepared.[1] At first, the chief Ukrainian organizer of this work was Colonel Sushko, and the training units were under the influence of the Mel'nyk group. After the split had fully developed, however, Bandera elements secured the upper hand in many of the groups, which were predominantly composed of young men fitted for active field service.[2]

Either because they were naturally interested in employing the young and physically qualified Ukrainians in the Bandera party for the forthcoming campaign, or because they were dissatisfied with the previous efforts of the OUN-M (Mel'nyk group) to pursue a somewhat independent course, the Germans turned more and more to the insurgent faction. This was especially the case when, in the early spring of 1941, the comparatively unconcealed development of Ukrainian units was begun by the Wehrmacht.

[1] Stepan (Stephen) Huliak, "Polk im. Kholodnoho Iaru v Rivnomu" (The Kholodnyi Iar Regiment in Rovno), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (August-September, 1952), p. 7.

[2] MS D.

704 The first such unit was known by the code name "Nachtigall" 668* and was organized in the Generalgouvernement. Nominally, only 725 its enlisted personnel were Ukrainian, while all officers were German. Actually, as the Germans well knew, there was a whole staff of "unofficial" Ukrainian officers, headed by the leader of the "military tendency" in the OUN-B, Roman Shukevych. At first "Nachtigall" had only about one hundred and fifty men, but at the outbreak of war it was expanded to battalion strength.[8]

A second unit, larger but of less political significance, was formed in Austria. Ukrainians were allowed a greater degree of formal authority than in "Nachtigall." In *de facto* command was Colonel Iarii, the dissident member of the old Provid, who was at once highly esteemed by his young subordinates and on the closest personal terms with the Abwehr officers charged with the formation of the units. John Gavrusevych, one of the top leaders of the Bandera group, was in charge of recruitment; his source of manpower lay in the large Ukrainian colony in Austria. Up to 1940, the chief Ukrainian organization in the latter territory was the student Sich in Vienna, which was dominated by the OUN. This association continued loyal to Mel'nyk, but most of the numerous Ukrainian factory workers turned to the new movement. It was among the latter that Gavrusevych secured the majority of his recruits, although about one quarter were secured from among the students, particularly those in the medical school in Graz. Care was taken to keep the force—which was called by the organizers Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists)—in the hands of the Bandera group, although only half of the members actually belonged to [714] the new party. Unlike "Nachtigall," which was clad in Wehrmacht *feldgrau,* "Roland," as the military unit composed of the Druzhyny was called, wore uniforms similar to those of the Galician section of the Ukrainian army of revolutionary days.[4]

668* As is apparent from the above description, the Wehrmacht units were prepared on a rather *ad hoc* basis, with the active

[8] Nykon Nalyvaiko, "Legiony v natsional'nykh viinakh" (Legions in National Wars), *Narod'na Volia* (October 27, 1949), p. 2.

[4] Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (June-July, 1952), p. 4; MS A.

6; Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

PENETRATION OF NATIONALIST GROUPS INTO THE EAST UKRAINE

SUMMER AND AUTUMN, 1941

Routes of principal groups:

- - - - OUN-B(andera) task forces (*pokhidny hrupy*)

-·-·- Wehrmacht auxiliary units under influence of OUN-B(andera) ("Roland" and "Nachtigall")

——— OUN-M(el'nyk) groups

..... Bukovinian groups adhering to the OUN-M(el'nyk)

The boundaries shown are those of the pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668* northern task force reached Zhitomir, where it helped a group of local people set up a very impermanent administration, and aroused an equally transitory wave of enthusiasm among some of the younger citizens.[33] The southern force covered an even greater distance; it traveled across Galicia during July, carrying on propaganda work; reached Vinnitsa by the end of the month; and on September 2 was in Dniepropetrovsk (Katerynoslav or, more romantically, Sicheslav), five hundred miles from its starting point.[34]

668* 704 725 Less picturesque, but of potentially greater value, were the military units under control of the Bandera group. As was previously noted, "Nachtigall" had taken part in the occupation of L'vov, where its leaders were of great value in organizing the city for the Bandera party. Although the Wehrmacht officers accompanying the group were aware of the roles of Father Hryn'okh, Shukevych, and Lopatyns'kyi in the *akt,* they protected them from the arrest.[35] The unit continued eastward with the Wehrmacht, in late August reaching Vinnitsa where its members made secret contact with the southern task force.[36]

"Roland," on the other hand, had no direct connection with the activities in Galicia. Before the outbreak of war, it was sent across Hungary to the Rumanian part of Bukovina. There were considerable difficulties with the Rumanians because of efforts of the Ukrainian nationalists to establish contact with local Ukrainians who were Rumanian subjects. After the outbreak of war, however, the unit was sent with the German advance through Bessarabia, across the Dniester, and into the Ukrainian ethnographical territory north of Tiraspol' where it remained until early September.[37]

668* While the newest Ukrainian nationalist party was achieving widespread, though transitory successes, its chief rival was not idle. The defection of the bulk of the Galician youth had indeed dealt a heavy blow to the "legitimate" OUN under Mel'nyk. Nevertheless, it retained several very important assets. In the first place,

[33] Ievhen Stakhiv, p. 39.
[34] Matla, p. 9.
[35] Interview 63.
[36] *Ibid.*; Matla, pp. 9–10.
[37] Ortyns'kyi, p. 4; MS A.

historic Ukrainian lands of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov. The northern part, appropriately known as Polessia, or the "forest land," is of little value for crop growing but contains the only timber industry of significance in the Ukraine.

As the German armies rolled into the Ukraine in 1941, they tended to advance along the main lines of communication, avoiding the difficult, swampy regions. For weeks, or in some cases even months, the less accessible areas were not brought under German control. This circumstance made possible the development of partisan bands which carried on resistance to the occupation authority.

Although, since 1945, Soviet writers have maintained that the plans for guerrilla warfare against the conqueror had been secretly prepared before the outbreak of hostilities, they assert that these plans were known only to the top level of Communist Party officials. It is fairly certain that the order to develop a partisan movement came as a surprise even to most devoted Communists.[2] In July, 1941, after the decision to form partisan detachments was announced, preparations were pushed forward at a rapid rate by the local authorities. The rapidity of the German advance to the line of the Dnieper, however, rendered largely ineffective systematic attempts to form a partisan movement in the Ukraine west of that river. Even east of the Dnieper the panic produced by the seemingly irresistible German drive played havoc with the organization of guerrilla warfare. Many of the secretly selected leaders were swept along, willingly or unwillingly, in the retreat of the Red Army, while others were discovered and executed by the Germans. In a few places, however, small groups made good their escape to forest or swamp hide-outs. In the southern Ukraine one such group of about five hundred men, trained and directed by the Red Army, but largely composed of local Communist and NKVD officials, established a center of opposition in the swamps formed by the Dnieper south of Nikopol' (Nikopil').[3] This group was destroyed by the German forces in

[2] Oleksii Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet* (The Underground *Oblast* Committee in Action), literary editor Evg. Bosniatskii (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950), pp. 12–14.

[3] Report of Feldpolizeidirektor at 444. Sicherungsdivision, November 5, 1941, NOKW 1519 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 1519).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

725 October, but a group of similar size and composition in the Novo
665 Moskovsk-Pavlograd (Novomoskovs'k-Pavlohrad) forest east of
669 Dniepropetrovsk was able to hold out until January, 1942.[4]

While the partisan bands in isolated shelters in the southern steppe Ukraine could not survive the first determined German attacks, those in Polessia were more fortunate. The chief areas of operation were the northern sections of the Chernigov and the Sumy *oblasts*. In the Chernigov *oblast* the partisans were led by the first secretary of the *oblast* committee of the Party, Oleksii Fedorov, a veteran of the revolutionary period. Though a hardened Communist, Fedorov had been born in the Dniepropetrovsk area and considered himself a Ukrainian.[5] He, like many other Party leaders, was temporarily swept from his territory by the rapidity of the German advance but returned in the late summer of 1941 and gathered the scattered remnants of his Party apparatus for a struggle against the Germans.[6] In the Sumy *oblast* the underground Party machinery was completely disrupted, but some of the *raion* officials succeeded in forming small partisan groups.[7]

It is clear from the preceding summary that the initial organization of the Red partisans of the Ukraine was carried out by members of the Communist Party and the Soviet state apparatus. These men were impelled both by their interest in maintaining the *status quo* and by the fear of violent death should they fall into German hands, since all "kommissars" and Communist officials were destined for execution by Hitler. Since the war, Soviet authors have admitted, and even exaggerated the role of the Party in the partisan movement, apparently because they wish to emphasize its "guiding role" in all spheres of Soviet life.[8] During the war, however, and especially in its early stages, while some attention was given to the activity of the Communist Party, an

[4] War Diary No. 2 of 213. Sicherungsdivision, Abteilung Ia, January 1–March 31, 1942, NOKW 2872 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2872); Report of Feldpolizeidirektor to Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets 103, January 9, 1942, NOKW 2911 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2911).

[5] Fedorov, p. 31.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 40 ff.

[7] Sidor Kovpak, *Vid Putivlia do Karpat* (From Putivl' to the Carpathians), literary ed. Ie. Herasimov (Kiev: Ukraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1946), pp. 3 ff.

[8] E.g., in Fedorov's work cited earlier in this chapter.

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PARTISAN ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN UKRAINE

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The following set of maps is intended to present schematically the development of partisan activity in the northern Ukraine from the beginning of the German-Soviet war until the reconquest of the major part of the area by the Red Army at the end of 1943. Territorial divisions indicated, from west to east, are the *Generalbezirke* Volhynia-Podolia, Zhitomir, and Kiev, and the Chernigov *oblast* of the army rear area.

The following symbols are used throughout:

- Major centers of Red Partisan groups
- Area in which Red partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control
- Direction of major drives of Red partisans
- Major centers of Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups adhering to Borovets' or Mel'nyk
- Major centers of Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups adhering to Bandera
- Area in which nationalist partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control
- Direction of major drives of nationalist partisans
- Direction of major German counterdrives

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

JULY, 1941–JUNE, 1942

This map represents a number of developments which were not closely related. The nationalist Ukrainian partisan groups represented were irregular forces in the German service used to combat Red partisans, rather than insurgent partisan forces, and the area represented as controlled by them is the area in which the Germans did not install a civil administration prior to November, 1941 (the "Olevsk Republic").

$_1$ The Polis'ka Sich after it went underground in November, 1941

$_2$ Ukrainian nationalist police (Polis'ka Sich) headquarters, prior to November, 1941

$_1$ Major centers of Red partisans in winter and spring of 1942

$_2$ Chief recruiting area for Kovpak's Red partisan force in summer, 1942

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JULY-DECEMBER, 1942



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JANUARY–MAY, 1943

- Major centers of Bandera groups during the winter and early spring of 1943
- Extension of Bandera partisan activity in April and May, 1943
- Major centers of "Bul'ba" and Mel'nyk groups throughout the period
- Major centers of Red partisan activity in winter and early spring of 1943
- Additional centers of Red partisan activity in April and May, 1943
- Route of Kovpak's Red partisan band (Actually the band began its raid in November, 1942, being driven beyond the northern border of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in December, as shown on the map, but for the sake of simplicity all of the band's activities during this first period of its invasion of the "Right Bank" Ukraine have been shown on this map.)

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

JUNE–DECEMBER, 1943

- Major centers of Bandera partisan activity, May–July, 1943
- New headquarters of Bandera group in late summer and autumn, 1943
- Major Mel'nyk and "Bul'ba" bands, May–July, 1943
- Last stronghold of "Bul'ba" group before its dissolution
- Chief points of contact of Red partisan groups with nationalist groups, May–July, 1943
- Route of Kovpak's Carpathian raid
- Major areas of Kovpak's activity in Galicia, July, 1943
- Area to which remnants of Kovpak's band returned in September, 1943
- Approximate lines of combat between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, with the Roman numerals referring to dates as follows:

I October 1, 1943
II November 12, 1943
III December 10, 1943
IV February 15, 1944

725 effort was made to give the impression that the partisans rep-
665 resented a spontaneous popular uprising against the foreign
669 invader; the "common man" of the occupied areas of the Soviet Union was pictured as a patriot voluntarily assisting the Red Army to overthrow German rule.[9]

725 It is this aspect of the Soviet partisan movement which makes
668* it of particular interest to this study. The partisans in the Ukraine were pictured as motivated by local patriotism, while their leaders were described as successors of Khmelnits'kyi and other legendary heroes. The primary effort in this direction centered about the person of Sidor Kovpak, who became the chieftain of the partisans of the Sumy *oblast*. Kovpak claimed to be a descendant of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. While his enemies declared he was a gypsy—the disarray of his bivouac led even admirers to compare it to a gypsy camp—it appears likely that he was of native Ukrainian origin. He was an old Communist, a veteran of the civil war of 1918–20, but was quite uneducated, and had occupied only minor posts in the Soviet hierarchy. Apparently, however, his rough and earthy manner endeared him to considerable elements of the Ukrainian population, while his evident skill in conducting his partisan operations won him respect.[10]

Kovpak's personal qualities and the fact that his band was formed on Ukrainian soil, made it possible for Soviet propagandists to give some color to their assertion that his partisan organization was a manifestation of Ukrainian patriotism. Closer examination of the groups operating in the northeastern *oblasts* casts considerable doubt on this contention. In the first place, whatever the origins of its members, Kovpak's band was almost certainly formed initially, as were the other partisan groups in 1941, of members of the ruling machine. The commissar Rudnev, said to be the real "brains" of Kovpak's band, for example, was

[9] See, for example, Timofei (Timothy) Strokach, *Partyzany Ukraïny* (The Partisans of the Ukraine) (Moscow: Ukrvydav Ts. K. KP[b]U, 1943). The title sheet of this work describes Strokach as a "deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR."

[10] On Kovpak cf. his memoir previously cited; P. Vershigora, *Liudi s chistoi sovest'iu* (People with Clean Consciences) (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel', 1951), pp. 39, 49, 181, 412; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 23, 1943, p. 3 (for the nature of this source see n. 15 below); V. Andreev, *Narodnaia voina: Zapiski partizana* (The People's War: Sketches of a Partisan) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1952), p. 228.

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a professional army political officer, who had been engaged in Party work in the Sumy *oblast*.[11] Moreover, it is at least a peculiar coincidence that its nucleus was formed in the Putivl' *raion* which, with parts of the neighboring districts, forms the only enclave of Russian-speaking peasantry in the northern Ukraine.[12]

Although Party and governmental functionaries formed the original nucleus of the partisan movement, they were soon joined by large numbers of Red Army soldiers who had been cut off from the main body of Soviet troops by the German advance. Such soldiers were, of course, drawn from all parts of the USSR, and were not specifically Ukrainian. Moreover, those soldiers who, in the first stages of the war, cared to take the desperate course of joining partisans were frequently adherents of the regime, led by officers of the political section of the army (commissars and *politruks*) or by NKVD men. Such, for example, was Alexander Saburov, who was to be exceeded in fame only by Kovpak among the partisans in the Ukraine. Saburov had, to be sure, been an NKVD official in Kiev at the outbreak of the war, but he was a native of the Ural region.[13]

Soviet sources are much more reticent concerning the nature of the group directing the Red partisans from outside the occupied areas. Nikita Krushchev (then first secretary of the Party in the Ukraine, although born in the Kursk *oblast*, probably of Russian origin) is said to have played a major part, while Demian Korotchenko, a Ukrainian (then second secretary) even visited the partisan bands on German-occupied soil.[14] The chief direction of the movement was, however, in the hands of the Ukrainian Staff of the Partisan Movement. Little can be gathered from Soviet sources concerning this body. It is known, however, that

[11] Vershigora, p. 39.

[12] Putivl' is the only town in the Ukraine, with the exception of the Donbas and Kiev, in which the Germans allowed the publication of a Russian-language newspaper. Since the Wehrmacht made a practice of maintaining newspapers in other Ukrainian areas where there was a danger of disaffection (e.g., in Polessia in the autumn of 1941), it appears that they felt the need for propaganda to *Russians* in the Putivl' area.

[13] Anatolii Shyian, *Partyzans'kyi Krai* (Partisan Territory) (Kiev: Ukraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1946), pp. 19, 32.

[14] Fedorov, p. 475; Vershigora, p. 397. A prewar source (Lancelot Lawton, "Ukraina: Europe's Greatest Problem," *East Europe*, III [Spring, 1939], 39) maintains that Korotchenko was a Russian whose real name was Korotchenkov.

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●725 its chief was Timothy A. Strokach, a high-ranking veteran of
668* years of service in the NKVD frontier troops. In 1943, Strokach's adjutant, Alexander Ruzanov, was captured by the Germans, and according to articles published in the press of the occupied territories, described the channels through which the NKVD controlled the partisan movement.[15] While such a propaganda story must be viewed with considerable suspicion, the numerous details of the account attributed to Ruzanov lend it plausibility, and many can be checked against independent evidence. For example, he is said to have revealed that M. S. Spivak, "a typical civilian Chekist," was second in command of the partisan movement. This seems plausible, since Spivak's post as secretary for cadres of the Communist Party of the Ukraine was closely associated with NKVD work, and Spivak is described by a recent Soviet partisan memoir as one of a group of leading officials who greeted the Ukrainian partisan leaders when they arrived in Moscow in late 1942.[16]

While the above evidence concerning the composition of the central directing body of the partisans of the Ukraine is not entirely conclusive, taken together with other evidence from Soviet memoirs and German documents concerning the role of NKVD officers in the partisan movement,[17] it suggests very strongly that the NKVD played a major role in the development of the Red partisans. This suggestion supports the view previously expressed that the partisan movement was an artificial creation of the Soviet regime and that its leaders were tested adherents of the regime, drawn from all the geographic regions and ethnic areas of the Ukraine. It appears safe to conclude that the formation of the Red partisan movement offers no proof of a "rallying" of Ukrainian patriots to the side of the Soviet system.

[15] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 23, 1943, p. 3, contains one of these articles, which states that it is based on accounts in *Ukrains'kyi Dobrovolets'* and *Nova Doba*. A German-language version was published in *Der Deutsche in Transnistrien*, November 28, 1943, p. 2. Strokach was a candidate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, and is said (by Ruzanov) to have been deputy People's Commissar of the Interior of the Ukraine. After the war Strokach became Deputy Minister of the Interior of the Ukraine, and later (1953) Minister.

[16] Fedorov, p. 474.

[17] Cf. NOKW 1519.

This does not, however, imply that in its later stages, after it had been organized and developed by the Party cadres, the partisan movement was unable to obtain some support among the Ukrainian people. The partisans were frequently much weaker than the total forces which the Germans could employ against them; consequently, it was essential that they secure the aid of local men for scouting, concealment, and sabotage of German offensives. While some of their arms and ammunition, as well as medical supplies, could be flown in, they had to rely on the inhabitants of the area in which they operated for food and for replacements for men lost in action. Moreover, a primary function of the units was political as well as military: they were intended to maintain a vestige of Soviet authority in areas far away from the direct control of the rulers in the Kremlin. 725 ● 668 *

In order to secure local support both compulsion and persuasion were employed. Compulsion was used to requisition food and equipment needed, to draft men into the guerrilla units, and to inhibit collaboration with the Germans. Methods employed frequently included killing the families of those who entered the German police or administrative organs, as well as the collaborators themselves.[18] The mere fact that the partisans could move about in force induced the cautious peasants to believe that Soviet victory was possible and that, consequently, it would be dangerous to side with the regime's enemies. Persuasion, however, would probably have been ineffective had it not been for the atrocities practiced by the Germans, especially the *Ostarbeiter* agencies, which led thousands of persons, mostly young and fit for partisan service, to flee to the woods.[19] The German failure to carry out the land reform, by depriving the peasants of a motive for resisting the return of the Soviet forces, was also a major cause of partisan success. The partisans made strong efforts to win over the peasants, in some cases even paying for requisitioned food supplies. According to a German report, one Red [727]

[18] Report of Gebietskommissar Steudel in Kazatin, November 8–December 28, 1943, PS 1702 (hereafter referred to as PS 1702); PS 3943, February 12, 1943.

[19] Those who obeyed the order to report for the *Ostarbeiter* program were threatened by the partisans, while the order itself often served as a pass to join a partisan unit (Occ E-4 [1]).

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partisan band even distributed land to the peasants in the area it controlled.[20]

The early development and continued strength of the Red partisans, arising in part from reinforcements sent them from the chief power base of the Soviets in the unconquered areas, enabled them to dominate the only regions suitable for guerrilla warfare east of the Dnieper. Therefore the nationalists could not have established partisan forces there unless they had possessed overwhelming popular support.[21] The possibility of such support was decreased by the fact that many elements opposed to the Germans were drawn into the Communist underground and partisan units before the nationalists could develop their organizations. Moreover, the nationalist groups were too small, too harried by the Germans, and too remote from their base in Galicia to constitute cadres for a large-scale partisan movement. It took months of struggle to maintain a bare existence underground and to find a program which appealed to the masses before the nationalists were ready for activity of any importance. By then the Germans were in full retreat; guerrilla warfare against them would have had little value.[22]

Volhynia, close to the main base in Galicia, and more penetrated by nationalist ideology, offered a more favorable field for Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups. The people of Volhynia suffered almost as much as did those in the German-occupied East Ukraine. However, the Bandera organizers, who were predominantly Galician, needed much preparation to acquire real strength in the area. Consequently, for more than

[20] PS 1685; PS 051.

[21] There are unsubstantiated accounts of a few small groups. See, for example, the description of a band supposed to have been wiped out by Red partisans in the Chernigov region in early 1943, in "Persha Ukraïns'ka Partyzanka" (The First Ukrainian Partisan Group), *Vpered* (January, 1950), pp. 13–14.

[22] Most of these deficiencies were not present in Galicia. To the majority of the people of Galicia, however, the release from Soviet tyranny was so welcome that the thought of conflict with the "liberators" appeared ridiculous; see Mykola (Nicholas) Lebed', *UPA: Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia* (UPA: The Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) (Presove Biuro UHVR, 1946), p. 17, which hints at this lack of support. Moreover, the tranquility of the area and the comparative freedom of movement of nationalist elements made Galicia a valuable base of organization and recruitment for the nationalist forces, which they long hesitated to disturb by violent action.

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a year they confined themselves to surreptitious propaganda, penetration of the police units, and preparation of secret arms caches.[23] What the Bandera organization was unwilling to risk, in spite of the large number of its youthful adherents and the proximity of its Galician base, the Mel'nyk faction obviously could not attempt, even when its break with the Germans might have made resistance desirable. Consequently, the only Ukrainian nationalist organization which could remotely be described as a partisan group during the first year of the Reichskommissariat's administration of Volhynia was the Polis'ka Sich (Polessian stronghold) under Borovets'.

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It is extremely difficult to ascertain just what activities the UPA carried out during 1942. That it fought sporadically with small groups of Red partisans in the winter and spring appears certain.[24] It is also certain that it existed illegally, in defiance of a German order for its dissolution,[25] and that it gathered arms surreptitiously, and it is reasonably sure that some of its members from time to time had armed encounters with German security forces. It is, however, by no means certain that the group carried out open attacks against the Germans, or that the latter were entirely dissatisfied with the state of affairs in which the illegal band kept a region of difficult terrain and low economic potential from serving as a Red base behind the German lines. Moreover, as Borovets' himself has pointed out, it was never the intention of his movement to engage in a large-scale military campaign, but rather to retain a small staff which could draw support and recruits from the sympathetic Polessian peasantry.[26]

That the group was of some importance within these limits is indicated by the fact that in the late summer of 1942 the Soviet partisans in Polessia felt it worth while to send an emissary, Alexander Lukin, to negotiate for common action against the Germans.[27] The mere fact, however, that such negotiations could be

[23] PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

[24] At least all its critics, as well as its adherents, agree on this point.

[25] PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

[26] Taras Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba Ukraïny (1917–1950)* (The Armed Struggle of the Ukraine [1917–50]), 1951, pp. 10–11.

[27] Dmitrii Medvedev, *Sil'nye dukhom* (The Strong in Spirit) (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Soiuza SSSR, 1951), p. 83; Taras Borovets', "Dva Khresty" (Two Crosses), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, Christmas issue, January 7, 1949.

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725 undertaken is an indication of the uncertainty of the ideology
668* and objectives of the little group. "Bul'ba" Borovets' himself, a man of little schooling, apparently was not sure what direction the movement should take, although he had a deep-rooted love for his native country. He continued to maintain ties with the UNR; there were UNR officers with the group much of the time, advising on military matters on which few of the younger members had had experience. Borovets' kept up a precarious line of communication with Andrew Livyts'kyi himself through an old UNR member, Captain Raievs'kyi, who ostensibly carried on the functions of *raionchef* in the Rovno district.[28]

665 These connections were too discontinuous to provide much
668* guidance, however, even if the enfeebled Warsaw headquarters
727 had had a clear line to offer. At the same time, the group under Borovets' was acting as a refuge for extremely diverse elements seeking an escape from German suppression. As was previously described, Borovets' had made an agreement with the OUN-M by which he was to be sent a number of officers. Apparently this help was slow in arriving. By summer, 1942, however, a few men had appeared; one was the Zhitomir journalist Anthony Baranivs'kyi, who became the Mel'nyk representative at the headquarters of Borovets'.[29] He, of course, adhered to the OUN-M line. A quite different group consisted of the former "left wing" of the Bandera party. Its leaders, Mitrynga, Turchmanovych, Ryvak, and Boris Levits'kyi, were with the task forces destined to proclaim the *akt* in Kiev. When these groups were broken up by the Germans before reaching their goal, the young men escaped arrest but were forced to go into hiding. Then, since the whole tendency of the OUN-B indicated to them that they could no longer hope to secure the adoption of their left-wing program, all except Levits'kyi (who went into hiding in Galicia) fled to Volhynia, where they found a protector in the Polis'ka Sich.[30] There, apparently, they attracted to their ideology a young as-

[28] Oleksander (Alexander) Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy" (An Army without a State), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, December 28, 1950, p. 2.

[29] Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 1, 1951, p. 4; *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 92.

[30] Interview 43.

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sistant of Borovets', Leonidas Shcherbatiuk, son of one of the generals of the Republican army. With his support they founded in the midst of the untutored woodland peasants yet another Ukrainian party. Known as the Ukrainian Popular Democratic Party (*Ukrains'ka Narodna Demokratychna Partiia*—UNDP), it advocated a program centering on maintenance of ownership of industry, means of transportation, and other large-scale enterprises by the state, with operation in the hands of the workers. At the same time, it condemned authoritarian control and violation of the rights of individuals.[31]

It was this motley group which carried on negotiations with the Soviet partisan Lukin in the autumn of 1942. While differing in details, the Soviet and the nationalist accounts of these discussions agree that the Red emissary demanded formal submission of the nationalist band to Soviet control, while Borovets' and his advisers were united in insisting on limiting an agreement to cooperation against the Germans.[32] Moreover, the Soviet sources frankly admit that the Red partisans were very weak in Volhynia at this time. They were confined almost entirely to the extreme nothern part of the region, where they received support from the powerful Soviet bands in Belorussia. There was one band near Kovel', but it was under the command of a Pole, and apparently was composed of Poles rather than Ukrainians.[33] It is therefore quite understandable that the Soviet leadership may have wished to gain the support of the group under Borovets' until more "reliable" Soviet forces could be formed in Volhynia. It is significant that one of the alleged Communist demands was for an open campaign against the Germans, including particularly the assassination of the Reichskommissar. It is likely that the reason Borovets' gives for rejection of these demands is accurate, for it is in line with the whole tactical policy of his move-

[31] Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," *Ukrains'ki Visti*, January 14, 1951, p. 2, maintains that the "proclamation" of the UNDP was made in June, 1943; other sources set the *founding* of the party in 1942, however, and it is certain that the group had a developed ideology before 1943; see Borys Levitskyi, "Istorychne znachennia rozlamu v OUN" (The Historical Significance of the Split in the OUN), *Vpered*, No. 2 (11) (1950), p. 6.

[32] Medvedev, pp. 83–86; Borovets', "Dva khresty".

[33] G. Lin'kov, *Voina v tylu vraga* (The War in the Rear of the Inemy) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1951) p. 384.

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668* ment. He maintains that such action at that time would have been
725 suicidal for the group and that it would have brought extreme suffering on the Volhynian people.[34]

When Borovets' could protract the negotiations no longer, Lukin flew back to Moscow; then the Red partisans began to move against the band they had hoped to use as an ally. In the late summer of 1942 the number of Soviet partisans sent in by air to northern Volhynia, or crossing the Pripet swamps from Belorussia, increased to the point where they became a real threat both to the nationalist group and to the German administration. By autumn the entire forest area west of the Dnieper was within their field of operation.

The unrest was soon increased by the arrival of the arch-guerrilla, Kovpak. In August he had flown from his Briansk hide-out to Moscow, to confer (by his own account) with Stalin himself. The Soviet dictator asked him—according to his memoirs and those of other Red partisans—whether it would be possible to make a raid in force on the "Right Bank" region, west of the Dnieper. Apparently the small, scattered partisan forces there were not contributing enough to the Soviet war effort; moreover, Stalin felt the need of convincing his former subjects of the reality of Red power by sending in a force of real strength. Kovpak agreed to make the expedition, and set off late in October.[35] His passage across the Chernigov *oblast* was easy because of the strength of Fedorov's partisan forces there; on November 10 the mobile force crossed the Dnieper into the Reichskommissariat. The point at which the crossing was made was in the extreme north of Erich Koch's domain, above the confluence of the Pripet and the Dnieper,[36] in what had formed part of the Belorussian Soviet Republic. Throughout the first half of the winter, Kovpak was careful to keep within this extreme northern strip, which had the advantage of containing the most inaccessible terrain. His activities at this time could scarcely include showing the Soviet flag to a real Ukrainian population, though in late

[34] Borovets', "Dva khresty."

[35] Kovpak, pp. 78–82.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 85–87, and map at end of that volume. Apparently a considerable number of Red partisans were sent about the same time by air to the western area.

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November the group penetrated southern Polessia near Olevsk, the former headquarters of the Polis'ka Sich.[37] The greatest single victory of Kovpak's group in this period was the temporary capture of the *Kreisgebiet* capital, Lelchitsi, on November 26.[38] After that, German counterattacks became extremely heavy, and Kovpak's men appear to have spent a miserable two months evading the Germans in the frozen swamps along the middle course of the Pripet River.[39] In February, however, he headed south, cutting across a corner of "Bul'ba's" territory, then striking eastward through *Generalbezirk* Zhitomir.

While Red forces were pushing down from the northeast, the Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement was beginning to acquire real significance, although the nationalists were compelled to give some ground in northeastern Volhynia to the stronger Red partisans.[40] The SS and the Wehrmacht were agreed on the necessity of harsh measures to combat the Communist partisan threat. From the beginning, even those Wehrmacht generals who generally took a reasonable attitude toward the peoples of the east advocated the harshest measures toward partisans. For example, Field-Marshal von Reichenau based his policy on the concept that the Germans must be more feared than the partisans; he ordered that all who did not aid the fight against the latter be regarded as enemies, and that men who did not hinder or report partisan activities be "draconically" treated.[41] This policy was

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 88; this corresponds with reports of a shift of Red partisan activity to the Stolin-Sarny-Olevsk triangle in PS 3943, February 12, 1942.

[38] Reichskommissar Ukraine to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, December 10, 1942, CXLV 488, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLV 488).

[39] Report of Höherer SS und Polizeiführer Russland-Süd, Ukraine, und Nordost, December 26, 1942, NO 1128 (hereafter referred to as NO 1128); PS 3943, February 12, 1943. According to one of the leaders of the Soviet partisans in Belorussia, Kovpak established an airport on one of the frozen lakes of the region. With the help of the Soviet Belorussian partisans he was able to defend it until German bombing finally broke the ice (Lin'kov, p. 386).

[40] Cf. Lin'kov, p. 375.

[41] Directive Verhalten der Truppe im Ostraum, October 10, 1941, USSR Exhibit 12 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit 12). See also a memorandum by Chef des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Field-Marshal Keitel, which stated that security troops in the rear areas would suffice only if they were allowed to proceed "draconically" without the requirement of juridical process, to convince the population that resistance would have terrible consequences (PS 459, July 23, 1941, hereafter referred to as PS 459).

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668 *rigorously carried out in the fall of 1942.[43] The drastic reprisals carried out in western Volhynia and Polessia injured the patriotic 725 Ukrainian peasantry as frequently as they did Communist sympathizers. 727 Consequently, the Ukrainian police were reluctant to take part in such suppression of their own compatriots, and especially in the brutal conscription for the *Ostarbeiter* program. The only alternative was desertion; in the fall thousands joined the forest refugees from burned villages and forced labor drives.[43] Unlike the latter, however, the police deserters were trained and frequently already organized by nationalists for opposition to the 725 Germans. The command of the OUN-B in Galicia was reluctant 668* to destroy its grip on the legal forces and risk a campaign of open resistance to the Germans at this time; but when they saw that the police units they dominated were breaking up anyway, and were in danger of passing over to the Communist guerrillas, they decided to begin a large-scale partisan movement. This step was taken in late November; by the early part of 1943 the activity of the Bandera groups was already considerable.[44]

There were two major centers of OUN-B activity. The first comprised the western part of the area which had been most ravaged by fighting between Red partisans and Germans, especially after Kovpak's passage to the southeast. Its extent may be defined by the quadrilateral formed by the towns of Kovel', Vladimirets (Volodimirets'), Kostopol', and Lutsk, although the chief operations were evidently carried out in the eastern section of this area.[45] A poor, woodland area, where the peasant popula-

[43] How drastic these measures could be in practice is shown by the reprisal burning of nine villages in the Petrikov area, leaving the peasants to shift for themselves in the dead of winter, although the *Gebietskommissar* himself asserted they were innocent of aiding the partisans (Occ E-4 [1]). The main "pacifying" campaign was carried out in Volhynia in September and early October, 1942 (NO 1128); cf. Lebed', p. 24, on the slaughter of nationalist adherents due to Communist provocation.

[44] Lebed', p. 26.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 24; the extent of German repression and Communist activity, which threatened to serve as an outlet for popular indignation, led the OUN-B to start operations before it really wished to do so (Interview 76).

[46] Lebed', pp. 24–25; PS 3943, March 19, 1943, ascribes (probably incorrectly, since the Germans were not fully informed of the nature of the nationalist bands) the attacks east of the Rovno-Lutsk road to a "Bul'bist" group. The western section of this area was partly controlled by large Polish police forces recruited to take the deserting Ukrainians' place. A savage struggle between them and the nationalists (especially the Bandera partisans), inflicting fearful hardships on the civilian population, was carried on all through 1943.

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tion, while not extremely nationalist, appears to have viewed the nationalists with favor after the brutalities inflicted by the Communists and Germans, it made an ideal base for the nationalist activity. 725● 668*

A second base was established in Volhynia proper, southwest of Rovno. The activities there, however, were much more circumscribed than those farther north, because the wooded areas were smaller and the possibility of counterattack by the Germans greater. The nucleus of the Bandera forces in this area appears to have been a group of about one hundred men under a leader whose pseudonym was "Kruk." Evidently a small police unit which had broken away from its German command, it was encamped in the forest near Kremenets. Living near it on amicable terms, was a group under the command of a Mel'nyk officer known as "Khrin."[46] Both groups were really underground rather than partisan bands; they carried on such activities as raids on German convoys, "jail deliveries," and attacks on small German detachments to secure arms. It appears that they endeavored to maintain an appearance of subordination to German orders, or at least lack of hostility, for their position was too exposed to permit the luxury of open warfare.[47] They were of some importance, however, because they were in a section where the peasantry was very sympathetic to the nationalist cause, and because they formed a natural link between the headquarters in Galicia and the zones of more intense activity farther north.

In addition to the OUN-B centers just described, and the Mel'nyk group under "Khrin," there were several other small groups scattered over the area southwest of a line extending from Rovno through Lutsk to Kovel'. Little bands of Mel'nyk supporters hid in the woods near Dubno, Lutsk, and Vladimir Volynsk (Volodymyr Volyns'k); a group of dissidents who had been members

[46] The most detailed account is in MS D, which gives the strength of "Khrin's" group (with which the author of the manuscript served) as 140 in the spring of 1943, 500 in early June, and 200 a month later when Kovpak arrived. Apparently "Kruk's" group was weaker until June, when it began to forge ahead.

[47] The nature of these groups is of course a highly controversial subject. Cf. especially O. Shuliak, *V im'ia pravdy: Do istorii povstanoho rukhu v Ukraini* (In the Name of Truth: On the History of the Insurrectionary Movement in the Ukraine) (Rotterdam, 1947), p. 18; Oleh Lysiak, "Volyns'kyi Batalion" (The Volhynian Battalion), *Visti Bratstva kol. Volakiv 1. UD UNA* (March, 1951), p. 2; Vershigora, p. 400.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

of the OUN-B, known as the Front of Ukrainian Revolutionists (Front Ukraïns'kykh Revolutsionistsiv), was allied to them, while an *Otaman*, Voloshyn-Berchak, led a group of Free Cossacks in the Kremenets region.[48] By far the most important detachment, aside from the Bandera group, however, was that of Borovets', which had automatically (somewhat against the desires of its leader) swelled in numbers as the fugitives and police not affiliated with the Bandera forces sought a rallying point. Moreover, as the general confusion in Volhynia led the Mel'nyk OUN to take more open action, support from this quarter increased. One of the chief Mel'nyk leaders in Volhynia, Oleh Shtul', had for a long time been carrying on surreptitious resistance activities while ostensibly acting as an agent for a Ukrainian newspaper; now he permanently attached himself to the "Bul'ba" headquarters as representative of the OUN-M.[49] Moreover, young Iatseniuk, who had lived in Volhynia illegally for more than a year after his escape from Zhitomir, took the name "Volynets'" and formed a group operating southeast of Borovets', with a base a short distance inside the frontier east of Korets. It was the only nationalist partisan group based within the frontier of the pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine; as it was led by a man familiar with Soviet conditions who had wide connections in the Zhitomir area, it was useful for carrying out "propaganda raids" in the *Generalbezirk* Zhitomir.[50]

It was only natural that the dispersion and lack of unitary direction of the nationalist partisan forces aroused concern; the first proposal for a single command was evidently made by Borovets'. The Bandera forces sent negotiators to him. Both parties were agreed that some higher center was necessary, for the lack of such authority might lead to the degeneration of the nationalist partisan movement into mere banditry. "Bul'ba" wanted the creation of an all-party front comprising UNDP, UNR, OUN-M, and OUN-B. The Mel'nyk followers agreed to his proposals, no doubt feeling that they already had the "inside track" with the partisan commander. The Bandera group, on the other hand, in

[48] Shuliak, p. 25; MS D; Interview 60.
[49] Interview 12.
[50] *Ibid.*; Shuliak, p. 27.

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accord with the guiding principle of their movement, demanded political direction by their Provid, although in return they were willing to recognize Borovets' as over-all commander of military operations. They offered as ground for rejecting the proposal the obvious impracticability of associating the UNR, whose leadership in Warsaw could be reached only infrequently, in a political directorate which had to control so shifting a force as the partisans. Of equal importance—at least according to Borovets' and his supporters—was the latter's insistence on maintaining the "conspiratorial" nature of the movement, i.e., the use of a nucleus staff with most of the followers carrying on their normal activities. The Bandera group, on the other hand, unquestionably desired a large-scale movement of open resistance, which would have meant "deconspiration," the revelation of the identity of the adherents of the nationalist partisan movement. In May, when no agreement could be reached, the negotiations were broken off.[51]

This severance of contacts, however, had no immediately serious consequences, for shortly afterwards a dramatic change in the situation in the whole western area took place with the arrival of the major Red partisan force. After he turned away from former Polish Volhynia, Kovpak pushed across the northern parts of the Zhitomir and Kiev *Generalbezirke*. Although German attacks forced him to keep on the move, the whole area north of the Zhitomir-Kiev line was so infested by Red partisans that it never again came under effective German control.[52] By May, however, Kovpak's own band was back in the northern swamp area. Then came orders from Moscow for a still more extensive operation, a penetration of Galicia.

The shortest route for Kovpak's forces lay directly across western Polessia and Volhynia, passing slightly north of Rovno. At a point in the neighborhood of Liudvipol', in the heart of "Bul'ba's" territory, however, the Kovpak group turned sharply to the northeast, traversing the Tsuman' area, which was a section dominated by the Bandera group.[53] Having reached the

[51] Cf. Lebed', pp. 41–43; Shuliak, pp. 20 ff.; Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba*, p. 12.
[52] PS 265.
[53] Kovpak, map; MS D.

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725 668 Tsuman' area, Kovpak turned south. His route from that point would have taken him directly through the Kremenets centers of the Mel'nyk and Bandera bands, but again he made a detour, this time to the east, skirting the Kremenets area and entering Galicia south of Ternopol' (Tarnopil').[54] The entire march across the area of operations of the nationalist partisans—over 250 miles—took the Red force about three weeks.[55]

725 669 When Kovpak's force entered Galicia in early July, it was only partially successful in achieving its primary objective, disruption of the Drohobich petroleum production.[56] It did, however, cause a severe disturbance of the peace of Galicia. For a long time the OUN-B had been preparing an underground armed force there. When Kovpak's arrival turned the extreme eastern part of the province into a battlefield, this organization (Ukraïns'ka Narodna Samooborona—Ukrainian Popular Self-Defense, a name chosen to conceal its identity with the Volhynian forces) came into the open to fight the Communists.[57] As they had long had numerous scores to settle with the occupation authorities, the young warriors also began sporadic fighting with the Germans.[58] What is most interesting as an indication of the state of feeling in Galicia, however, is the speed with which Kovpak's group melted away

[54] MS D; Kovpak, map. It will be noted that, although a distinct shift in route was made, the deviation was not very great—perhaps twenty miles. One source maintains that Kovpak sent emissaries to the groups at Kremenets to propose cooperation or at least neutrality, but that while they refused, the largest ("Khrin's") numbered only two hundred, and so was quite incapable of attacking Kovpak's more than two thousand men (MS D).

[55] While the force left its swamp headquarters on June 12, it evidently did not enter western Polessia until about the twentieth and was deep in Galicia by July 9 (Kovpak, p. 109, and map).

[56] According to Kovpak the aim was the destruction of the oil fields around Ternopol', the second largest petroleum production center under German control (Kovpak, p. 107). While this is plausible enough, Ukrainian sources have always claimed that the aim of the expedition was disruption of the tranquility of Galicia, and especially interference with recruitment of Galician youths for the German armed forces. Probably the latter purpose occupied at least a secondary place in the minds of the Soviet leaders, since they would scarcely be willing to admit that it was necessary to send a partisan group which had been founded five hundred miles away in order to prevent their former subjects in Galicia from joining the "Fascist" forces.

[57] Lebed', p. 49.

[58] *Ibid.*; Report of "Dr. Frédéric" to Auswärtiges Amt, September 19, 1943, CXLVa 60, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 60); cf. Chapter VII, n. 25.

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in the unfavorable environment. When the raid on the oil fields failed, the group headed for the Carpathians. It is apparent even from Kovpak's own account that the powerful force disintegrated within a few weeks of its arrival there. In the latter part of August, Kovpak himself, with part of the band, headed north, reaching the swamp region on September 1 with about three hundred men. His second in command remained behind and was killed, apparently with the majority of the band.[59] Since the Carpathians contain at least as favorable terrain for guerrilla operations as does the Polessian area, where Kovpak's group maintained itself and even grew during months of heavy German attacks, it appears that a decisive factor in the rapid destruction of the band was the hostile attitude of the Galician population.

Kovpak's force had scarcely left Volhynia before the Bandera partisans began to seize control of the nationalist resistance movement. The failure of negotiations with Borovets' induced their commander, Dmytro Kliachkevs'kyi, to adopt the title UPA in an apparent effort to secure the prestige attached to it by "Bul'ba's" earlier start.[60] At the same time, the Bandera partisans regained the services of the most experienced of their commanders, Roman Shukevych, who had been the chief Ukrainian organizer in "Nachtigall." After the dissolution of Stets'ko's government, this unit had been withdrawn from the front, together with "Roland." Both detachments were thoroughly reorganized, certain nationalist members were arrested and the remainder sent as a detachment to fight Red partisans in White Russia.[61] When it appeared likely that the Germans would also suppress this antipartisan unit, Shukevych escaped to Galicia, arriving in L'vov in the spring of 1943. There the Provid appointed him commander of all OUN-B partisan forces.[62] Moreover, the leaders decided that the refusal of Borovets' and the Mel'nyk forces to accept their proposals for union required forceful action to see that the nationalist partisan struggle did not degenerate into the private

[59] Kovpak, p. 124.
[60] See Chapter IV, n. 79.
[61] Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (June-July, 1952), p. 6; Lebed', p. 22.
[62] Interview 76.

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enterprises of numerous *otamans* or war lords, as had the Ukrainian movement in the last days of Petliura's regime.[63]

Consequently, on July 6, shortly after Kovpak had passed through the area, "Kruk's" force suddenly appeared fully armed before the Mel'nyk detachment of "Khrin" and demanded that it submit to Bandera command. Lack of preparation made resistance impossible; apparently, too, OUN-B propaganda had prepared the ground for the coup. At any rate, the majority of the Mel'nyk group accepted the ultimatum and enrolled in the Bandera force.[64]

Shortly afterwards, Iatseniuk's group was similarly compelled to join the rival forces.[65] After these incidents, the remaining Mel'nyk and independent groups rapidly melted away; they were destroyed by Communists or Bandera partisans, or joined the latter. In mid-August, "Bul'ba's" main force, which had also been seriously weakened, in part because of continued fights with Red partisans, was attacked by an OUN-B group. Two of his principal advisers from the UNR were captured and forced to join the OUN-B group; his wife was also taken prisoner.[66] He himself, together with Shtul', Mitrynga, Raievs'kyi, and other leaders, but with only a handful of fighting men, was driven eastward into Communist-infested territory. Here in November the group encountered a stronger Red force. In the resulting fight, Mitrynga and Raievs'kyi were killed, but Borovets' and Shtul' again managed to escape.[67] This time they took the only course which they felt remained open: they left Volhynia altogether, going to Warsaw to seek German assistance to rebuild their scattered forces.[68] Shcherbatiuk remained as commander of the tiny, demoralized group in Volhynia (which had been renamed the Ukraïns'ka Narodna Revoliutsiina Armiia—Ukrainian People's

[63] Lebed', pp. 41–43.

[64] Shuliak, p. 25; MS D; I. Hirniak, "Tse bulo 6. lypnia 1943. roku" (This was July 6, 1943), *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), July 1, 1951, p. 3. All three sources assert that numerous Mel'nyk adherents were executed by the OUN-B.

[65] Shuliak, p. 27.

[66] *Ibid.*; Hrytsenko in *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 14, 1951, p. 4.

[67] Interviews 50, 72.

[68] Lebed', pp. 41–43, confirms the general nature of these attacks on the "Bul'bist" groups, although he emphasizes their lack of organization and the "bloodless" nature of the OUN-B compulsion.

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Revolutionary Army—UNRA, to distinguish it from the Bandera usurpers of the original title).[69] 669 725

The rapid loss of strength of the Mel'nyk-Borovets' forces presents something of a puzzle. The explanation offered by the representatives of the latter is that they deliberately decided to refrain from entering into a fratricidal struggle. In part this appears to be correct. A major objective of both Borovets' and the Mel'nyk chiefs was to avoid creating a large-scale partisan organization, yet this is what would have been necessary to counter the Bandera group, which was bent on forming just such a powerful force. On the other hand, the assertion of adherents of the defeated party that the first attacks came unexpectedly, yet resulted in a complete surrender, itself implies that it was not calculated avoidance of an internecine struggle which alone led to the defeat. While the Bandera adherents were tightly organized, capable of sudden, prepared action, the other nationalist forces suffered from lack of central organization and competent leadership, since Borovets' was himself inadequately trained to conduct a campaign which required political as well as military experience and yet was unable to secure advice from a single, unified advisory body. Moreover, the very dynamism and *élan* of the Bandera party appear to have attracted popular support; in spite of the comparative lack of military ability of "Kruk," for example, he is said to have been more popular than "Khrin." No doubt, too, their program of mass uprising, while of doubtful wisdom, was, like all forthright action, appealing to active spirits. It is noteworthy that nearly all of the members of the other partisan groups, when compelled to join the OUN-B movement, did so without taking a favorable opportunity to desert. Ukrainians in general have frequently been in the unhappy position of having to choose the lesser evil, which was unquestionably the Bandera movement, ruthless as many of its adherents were. The main concern was to fight on against the alien occupiers.[70] A third factor was the geographical location of the opposing forces. The group under Borovets' occupied excellent terrain, but an

[69] Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba*, p. 12.

[70] This feeling was expressed in a letter from Iatseniuk to Borovets' explaining that he accepted the OUN-B coercion only so that he could continue to fight against the Soviet and German forces (Interview 50).

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669 extremely exposed position, subjected to constant pressure by
725 the Red partisans coming down from the northeast. Probably "Bul'ba" suffered as much altogether from attacks from them as he did at the hands of the Bandera partisans. The latter, on the other hand, occupied a somewhat more sheltered position in northern Volhynia and had a fairly clear line of communication to their large base in Galicia. Finally, the possession of the Galician source of manpower and leadership, very much larger than any outside source available to the rival groups, gave the OUN-B a decisive advantage, which had been consolidated by the early infiltration of the Volhynian police forces by Bandera organizers.

By fall of 1943 the Bandera group was in substantial control of the country districts of Volhynia and southwestern Polessia.[71] The Germans, of course, held the towns and with difficulty maintained movement on the principal roads, but it was even possible for OUN-B agents to penetrate the Reichskommissariat capital, Rovno, and to kill several of Koch's principal officials in broad daylight.[72] Such a large area east of Rovno was under full control of the insurgents that they set about constructing a "state" apparatus, including military training camps, hospitals, and a school system.[73] The total number of persons involved in the movement —including medical, administrative, and instructional personnel, as well as fighting men—was tens of thousands. Looked at in this fashion, the nationalist claim of a hundred thousand members of the UPA is perhaps not incredible, since a fairly trustworthy source describes one village in which the total personnel reached two thousand. Probably a German estimate of forty thousand (at the end of 1943) is more nearly accurate, however.[74] Included in the forces, according to nationalist accounts, were a number of non-Ukrainian elements—Jewish physicians and deserters from German police units recruited from prisoners of war representing many of the nations of the Soviet Union. The great weakness of the movement, however, was lack of trained officers. For a long time the Bandera partisans had been forced to use as chief of staff an elderly UNR officer ostensibly in command of a Rovno

[71] Occ E-4 (1).
[72] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, November 23, 1943, p. 3; Occ E-4 (1).
[73] Lebed', pp. 29–30.
[74] Occ E-4 (1).

police regiment.[75] Each additional UNR officer from the "Bul'ba" forces, aging though he was, was a treasure who was given a post of great importance by his new masters.[76] Similarly, Soviet officers who escaped from prisoner camps or deserted from Red forces were eagerly welcomed. The lack of trained military personnel greatly limited the partisan organization's value as a fighting force.

The presence of many men who had lived under the Soviet system at first acted as a disturbing influence in the organization. The Bandera leadership, having carried the policy of one-party direction to a temporarily successful conclusion, was determined to maintain this position and to prevent the development of an East Ukrainian opposition, which they suspected was infected with Communist attitudes. Their instrument was the SB or Security Service, forged by Lebed' years previously. Though the extent of the "purges" of "unreliable elements" (primarily East Ukrainians, but including some former Mel'nyk partisans, although apparently no old UNR émigrés) is uncertain, there is little question that it was sufficiently great to arouse extreme disaffection among the non-OUN-B elements in the enlarged partisan movement.[77] At the same time, however, the East Ukrainian elements apparently had sufficient influence—or compelling arguments—to secure the adoption of a program calculated to secure support from former Soviet citizens.[78]

At the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN partisan forces on August 21–25, 1943, both Germany and the "Muscovite" Soviet Union were criticized as not really socialist or progressive, while a future national and social revolution or subjugated peoples was prophesied.[79] Greatest emphasis was still placed on armed struggle, rather than on social policy; but a long series of measures evidently calculated to broaden support among the East Ukrainians was proposed. They included destruction of

[75] MS D.

[76] E.g., Colonel Treiko and Colonel Lytvynenko, chief adviser from Andrew Livyts'kyi to Borovets'; MS D.

[77] Shuliak, p. 30; MS D.

[78] See report of a press conference of the UHVR by M. Stiranka in *Ukrains'ki Visti*, October 11, 1947, p. 3.

[79] *Za samostiinu Ukrainu: Boiovyi organ OUN* (For Ukrainian Independence: The Military Organ of the OUN) (clandestine), No. 9, December 10, 1943.

668* It seems quite clear that a great many, at least of the leaders of the UHVR, like the leaders of the OUN in the East Ukraine many months earlier, were only partly convinced of the value of the new program of political, social, and economic gains. They had, however, come to see that vast numbers of East Ukrainians, by this time heavily represented in the partisan movement, would accept no ideology which failed to embrace such a program. Consequently, nationalist leaders were determined to win popular support for nationalism by presenting it as the surest road to political liberty and social welfare. Regardless of the motivations of the West Ukrainian leaders, however, it is clear that by 1944 contact with East Ukrainians had resulted in a sweeping change in the ideological position of the dominant nationalist group.

[725] From the strictly military viewpoint, the activities of the Ukrainian nationalist partisans were of slight significance. Even from the immediate political standpoint, it is questionable whether they achieved anything of importance, for by the time the Germans were inclined to make concessions, their authority was already on the verge of being overthrown by the Red Army. The "deconspiration" of the UPA undoubtedly inflicted considerable suffering upon the people of Volhynia, since it exposed the nationalist elements to the Soviet authorities. On the other side of the ledger must be placed the facts that the nationalist partisan movement undoubtedly prevented the spread of Red partisans to Volhynia and demonstrated that neither in that province nor in Galicia was there widespread sympathy for the Soviet guerrilla groups. Moreover, the fact that the Ukrainians, almost alone among east European nations, were able to carry on an armed struggle, even to a limited extent and for a comparatively short time, against both the German and the Soviet forces was an important psychological stimulus to nationalist feeling.

563 unity to move into the towns or to emigrate the Ukrainian peasants were pauperised.

These conditions were favourable to the growing of extremist trends in Ukrainian political life: communism on the one hand and nationalism on the other.

668 661 563 The policy of 'Ukrainisation' in Eastern Ukraine was exploited by Communist propaganda: the 'Ukrainisation' in Soviet Ukraine, adversited by Moscow, did not remain without influence on the population of the Western Ukrainian territories. The Communists of Western Ukraine served Soviet Russia as a 'fifth column' among the Ukrainians in Poland.

The Polonisation of Ukrainian schools, the colonisation of Ukrainian territory with Poles, the refusal to admit Ukrainians to Government service, the persecutions of the Ukrainian press, of educational and economic organisations — all this gave the basis for the creation of illegal Ukrainian groups which began the fight [725] against the Polish régime with terror. In 1920 the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) was created in Galicia and organised attacks on the representatives of the Polish Government. Later UVO fused with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded at a Congress in Vienna in 1929 under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets. The Polish Government took advantage of the terrorist acts and sabotage attributed to the members of OUN to destroy the Ukrainian cultural and economic life. In September 1930, Polish troops and police undertook a terrible 'pacification' among the Ukrainian population in towns and villages. Polish soldiers and policemen severely beat more than 15,000 Ukrainians, mostly cultural and economic workers, who had not anything in common with the terrorist activity and often were resolute opponents of terror. Many victims of this 'pacification' died after terrible sufferings. A great number of Ukrainian economic and educational institutions — co-operative societies, schools, reading halls and libraries were destroyed.

After the 'pacification', the oppressions against the Ukrainians in Poland grew worse and the Polish colonisation of Ukrainian territories was increased by state funds. In September 1934, the delegates of the Polish Government declared at the Session of the League of Nations that Poland did not have any obligations towards the resolutions of the peace treaties regarding the protection of the rights of the national minorities in Poland.

By this action the Polish Government violated even formally the obligations accepted by Poland in the Peace Treaties in regard to the national minorities.

727 661 The Germans did not touch the Soviet collective farms, because they regarded them as the best method for exploiting the peasants. On the other hand, the German authorities did not wish to permit the partition of the land, for they prepared Ukraine for German colonisation.

[181] Frauenfeld points out the high physical and moral qualities of the Ukrainians, their highly developed consciousness of personal dignity and their aspiration for education. He witnesses that the closing of schools by the German authorities in Ukraine roused the greatest dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian people:

"The Ukrainians, especially the women, are very desirous of learning, and one could hear from them: 'Under the Bolsheviks we were starving, but we could learn something at least. Under your rule we cannot even learn. This proves that you are our enemies' . . .".

The author of the memorandum comes to the conclusion that the Ukrainians should not be exstirpated in the interests of Hitler's 'racial policy'; on the contrary "the often genuine blond and blue-eyed as well as brunette population" should be assimilated for such an assimilation "would be without doubt more desirable and advantageous than many we had absorbed during our history, or are even trying to suck up . . ."*).

725 668 Against pillage, terror, oppression and humiliation the Ukrainian people reacted with great vehemence, in spite of the extraordinary weakening by the previous Soviet terrorism, the famine and the war. In all parts of Ukraine risings broke out. This Ukrainian partisan movement helped to a great extent to defeat the German armies in Ukraine. But this was not a proof of affection of the Ukrainians for Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian partisan movement took place under the banner of an independent Ukraine. The initiative for the creation of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) came from officers of the army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1941.

The Ukrainian Partisan Army turned its weapons after the defeat of Germany against the new oppressor — Soviet Russia.

2. Ukraine after the War

727 000 In the course of World War II the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians from the Caucasus to the Carpathian Mountains came under the rule of Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian nation, from the

*) Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld, *Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete: 10. 2. 1944* (Document No. 5394, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes).

162 cent. of the total, as compared with 32.8 per cent. for the entire Soviet Union. Next to the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukraine has a higher percentage of urban population than any other Union Republic.

The German-Soviet War

726 On June 22, 1941, the German armies, supported by their satellites, including the Rumanians and the Hungarians, attacked the Soviet Union on a 1,500 mile front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. Nearly six weeks later the Germans started their main thrust against Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; on September 21, after a fierce struggle, the Soviet troops evacuated the city. It was another two months before the Germans reached Kharkov and Rostov.

727 [725] For the second time in this century the Ukraine was subjected to occupation and devastation by the Germans. However, the Soviet policy of scorching the earth in retreat had aggravated normal military destruction; and in addition, the Ukrainians conducted heroic guerilla warfare against the enemy occupation forces. As a result, the Germans found the fruits of conquest "rather disappointing"[1] For example, in the Ukraine it was possible in the autumn of 1941 to carry out only a small fraction of the average sowing. In the western part of the Ukraine, very few industrial plants remained intact; the Nikolayev naval yards, the Dnieper dam and power station, and the metallurgical plants of the Dniepropetrovsk district were all either crippled or destroyed.

726 The German occupation of the Ukraine lasted nearly three and a half years. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad early in 1943 was the turning point of the war and the beginning of the big Soviet offensives.

In the winter campaign of 1943-44 the Soviet troops won important victories in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, completed the liberation of the Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhie and Zhitomir regions and almost the whole of the Rovno and Kirovograd regions, as well as of a number of districts in other areas.[2] In April and May 1944 they liberated Odessa, and in August, Western Ukraine. The liberation of the whole Ukraine was completed by November 1944.

727 The years of hard fighting took a very heavy toll all along the western front of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian S.S.R. sustained enormous losses.

War Losses of Population

At the Kiev trial of German war criminals in January 1946 it was disclosed that more than four million Soviet citizens had been murdered

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1 The Russian Campaigns of 1941-43, W.E.D.Allen and Paul Muratoff, Penguin Books, London, 1944.

2 Soviet War News, London, February 24, 1944.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

After the expulsion of the Soviet Forces from Western 636
Ukraine in 1920, the territory, including Eastern Galicia and Lviv, 503
had remained under Polish rule and had been subjected to a policy of Polonization and colonization by a Polish population. There had been during the period between the wars many clashes and much unpleasantness between the two nationalities and the ill will thus generated promised disastrous consequences for Poland in case of a new war. At the same time the Polish domination had never threatened the fundamental forms of Ukrainian social life, as had been the case in the UkSSR; the Ukrainians had a certain representation in the Polish Parliament, and they had been allowed, despite hindrances, to develop their own economic life. With the possible exception of the one district of Boryslav, there was very little Communism among the population, who were well aware of the handicaps under which their brothers in the UkSSR were living. At the same time the Nazi refusal to support the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine in the spring of 1939 had placed them on their guard against the Nazis.

Thus, when World War II broke out on September 1, 1939, [661]
the revolt of the Ukrainians which many Poles expected did not [726]
take place. However, the Polish government in the first days arrested and placed in concentration camps many of the Ukrainian leaders but they were freed by the rapid advance of the German forces and the Polish retreat, which forced into Lviv and the neighborhood many thousands of refugees.

On August 23, 1939, when the Nazis and the Soviets signed a 728
non-aggression treaty, it was provided that if Poland were disintegrated, Germany and the USSR would divide the territory

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

669 of Western Ukraine. On 14 December the Hetman had to flee from his capital, after having proclaimed, in an absolutely Platonic way and without achieving any concrete results, the re-incorporation of the Ukraine in Russia! At the same time the Soviet Government 726 annulled the peace of Brest-Litovsk and began troop movements, invading Northern Ukraine on their part. A third force, the White Volunteer Army and the Don Cossacks, also made their appearance on Ukrainian territory. These three forces fell upon the Ukraine and made her a battle-field.

Supported by the remainders of the Austro-Hungarian troops and supplied with war material abandoned by the retreating invaders, the forces of the Directorate (new name of the Ukrainian Provisional Government) seemed to be beginning to be in a privileged position. But the lack of officers, the bad administrative organization and, above all, the unpopularity of separatist Ukrainian ideas, tended to give success to the side of the Soviets, who were able to take control of the popular insurrectionary movement which had so far been in the hands of Petlioura. Soviet military historians, while recognizing the high qualities of the Russian counter-revolutionary army, note that among all the opponents of the Red Army the troops of the Directorate were distinguished by their low fighting effectiveness. On the other hand the rigid policy of General Denikine, chief of the Volunteer Army, prevented its union with the adherents of Petlioura, so as to form a single front against the Soviets. Thus the White General was fighting on two fronts, in the north against the Soviet troops and in the west against the Ukrainian troops. On their side the Ukrainians fought both against the Whites in the east and against the Reds in the north.

At the beginning of 1919 the Soviet offensive took

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

place, which succeeded, towards the end of March of 726
the same year, in clearing the Ukraine of the troops of the Ukrainian Directorate.

Following closely after the routed Ukrainian troops, the Red Army penetrated into Volynia where it met the Polish troops commanded by General Haller. From the month of July the Soviet Army slowly began to retreat from Polish territory. At the same time, encouraged by the retreat of the Soviet forces, the troops of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' (Galicia), defeated by the Poles and united with Petlioura, made an incursion into Ukrainian territory. Though not friendly to the Poles, these troops had also no great desire to fight against the Russians, Red or otherwise, but the Directorate of Petlioura, which hoped to obtain a foothold in the Ukraine, ended their indifference by promises and threats.

At the same time the great offensive of Denikine was developing with amazing rapidity. In August Kiev was taken by assault, in the east by the Whites and in the south by the troops of Petlioura. The discussion between the two armies led to nothing and finally the Whites displaced the Ukrainians and pursued them towards the south-east. At the beginning of October 1919 the victory of the Whites seemed more and more probable. General Denikine held Kharkov, Odessa, and Kiev, while Petlioura, under pressure of the Whites, was fighting a retreating action in the direction of Galicia. He hoped for the support of Poland, which cost him his popularity in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasants. The struggles which, in 1919, soaked the 727
Ukraine in blood, crealled the Cossack insurrections of the seventeenth century by their atrocities. Thousands of inhabitants, and especially landowners, Jews, and German colonists, were massacred in a frightful manner

Poles. First the Galician question was raised immediately 648
after the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy (in October
1918). Following the example of all the nationalities
which had been a part of it, the Ukrainians of Galicia [642]
formed a national council at Lvov, which proclaimed the
independence of the Western Ukrainian Republic. After
the fall of Skoropadsky this new republic was eager to
unite with the Directorate of Petlioura. The Act of
Union was proclaimed in January 1919. But the Poles
did not think on the same lines. During the same 726
January 1919, Poles and Ukrainians already fought 648
each other furiously in the streets of Lvov. The arrival
of the Polish troops of General Haller, formed in
France, quickly turned the tide. A regular army of
80,000 men represented a very important force in
Eastern Europe where, from the Carpathians to the
Pacific, an immense territory was plunged into anarchy.
For General Haller there was no question of a Western
Ukrainian Republic, but only one of a Little Poland, a
simple province of the reborn Great Poland. As we
had already seen, the detachments of the Polish Army
of Haller threw themselves, in April of the same year,
against the vanguards of the Red Army. Recently
restored, the Polish State already claimed the frontiers
applying before the first partition, that is to say the
annexation of White Russia and the Ukraine up to the
Dnieper. While the Petliourians, the Reds, and the
Whites faced each other on both sides of the Dnieper,
the Poles seized the greater part of Volynia and of
White Russia and entered Minsk. But the Poles did not
seem to exploit their success, most probably in order
to give the Red Army the chance to destroy the White
Army which, in case of victory, might transform itself
into a national Russian Army, dangerous from the
point of the territorial pretensions of Great Poland.

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

tories that had been formerly under Russian and Austrian rule. The Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic issued a special Act on January 22, 1919, in Kiev which declared: 182 692

"From this day, the parts of Ukraine — the Western-Ukrainian Democratic Republic, Galicia, Bukovina and Hungarian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) and the Great Ukraine on the Dnieper, unite. The ancient hopes which the best sons of Ukraine had lived and died for become reality. From now there is one indivisible independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic".

Relying on this Act, the delegation from Western Ukraine, numbering 65 people, took part in the Congress of Ukraine which had been called to Kiev on January 23, 1919.

The Western-Ukrainian Republic, from the first days of its existence, had to fight in a heavy struggle against the Poles who pretended to rule in Galicia even after the dissolution of Austria. The Poles invaded the Western Ukrainian Republic after having concentrated large forces on this front. The Ukrainian Government asked the Entente Powers and the Paris Peace Conference for mediation in the Polish-Ukrainian war. In February 1919, a Mission of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia headed by the French General Berthélemy, and with the participation of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy. This Mission presented to the Poles and Ukrainians a plan for an armistice on February 28, 1919. According to this plan, until the final decision of the Peace Conference, the territory of Galicia eastwards of the Bug and Stryj Rivers should remain under Ukrainian administration, while the Western part of Galicia should be administered by the Polish authorities. The Galician territory which remained under Ukrainian administration should be recognised by the Big Powers 'de facto' as an independent state, and the Ukrainian Army should be recognised and trained with the assistance of the Entente Powers. The Ukrainian Government did not accept the demarcation line proposed by the Mission of General Berthélemy as unfavourable for Ukraine. In May 1919, a new Mission of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia, headed by General Botha (South Africa). General Botha's Mission altered the previous armistice draft, and the Ukrainian Government agreed to accept it. However, the Poles rejected this plan. [726] 728

The small country — Ukrainian Galicia — had to strain all her forces in order to hold the front against the whole might of Poland. From Eastern Ukraine Galicia could not receive any considerable help, because the Ukrainian forces had to fight the Skoropadsky 726

726 régime and were at the same time threatened by the advance of the Russian armies — the 'Red' from the North and the 'White' from the South-East. But the Galician Ukrainians showed even under these unfavourable conditions a considerable talent for organisation, a high level of patriotism and sacrifice. Galician Ukraine weakened by four years of war, isolated from the outside world and alone, could without foreign help, defend herself for more than eight months against an enemy several times stronger (Poland), could organise efficient administration, and secure order and legality on her territory.

The Poles started a new offensive in May 1919 with the forces of General Haller's army which had been organised in France and sent to Poland for the defence against Soviet Russia. The Polish Government used this army against the Ukrainians. Against the fresh Polish forces the Ukrainians with their poor equipment could not stand and had to leave Galicia retreating to Eastern Ukraine.

12. Ukraine in Her Struggle against Soviet Russia in 1919

669 726 The revolution of the Ukrainian democrats against the Skoropadsky régime met from the very beginning with the irreconcilable enmity of the Russian Communists. It was well understood in Moscow that the reactionary Skoropadsky régime, in 1918, had weakened the Ukrainian national movement and brought confusion into the masses of the Ukrainian people. It was decided in Moscow to conquer Ukraine once more and for this reason an immense propaganda machine was set going. As soon as the Directory had declared the uprising against Skoropadsky, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party appointed a 'Provisional Workers' and Peasants 'Government of Ukraine'. This 'Government' had the task of making war against the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. In one of its first acts this 'Ukrainian Government' outlawed the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as 'enemies of the people'. Of the five members of this 'Ukrainian Soviet Government' only one, Zatonsky, knew Ukrainian, others were people completely strange to Ukraine.

Against the Soviet Russian troops who invaded Ukraine, the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic fought by military and political means. But the Communists were assisted at that time by the shortsighted policy of the Entente Governments. In December 1918, the French navy landed troops on the shores of the Black Sea to help the army of the Russian Volunteers under General Denikin in the fight for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia'. The appearance of foreign troops in Ukraine caused great

confusion among the masses of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrai- 669
nians who had overthrown the reactionary Skoropadsky Govern- 726
ment installed by the Germans, looked at the French troops with great distrust, for they might renew the rule of the big landowners in Ukraine. In the meantime the policy of the leaders of the French Army in Ukraine was hostile to the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The attempts of the Ukrainian Government to come to an agreement with the French were fruitless. These negotiations produced only material for Communist propaganda, that the Ukrainian Government 'sold the interests of the Ukrainian nation to the Western imperialists'. The Communist propaganda spread among the Ukrainian Army too. The consequences of this propaganda were disastrous; Ukrainian soldiers deserted the front against the Russian Red Army and some detachments even went over to the side of the Soviet Army. *Thus the French intervention supported only the growth of Communist influence in Ukraine.*

The Government of Ukraine also made attempts to come to an agreement with the Soviet Government. But Moscow remained, as always, hostile to an independent democratic Ukraine and had only one aim — to take possession of the rich Ukrainian territory. The [642]
Ukrainian Government, formed in December 1918, was headed by the Social-Democrat Volodymyr Chekhivsky. This Government consisted predominantly of Socialists and had also a representative of the Jewish Social-Democratic Party (Poale-Zion), A. Revutsky, as Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority. All that did not restrain Moscow from calling the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic 'capitalist'.

To the protests of the Ukrainian Government against the attack of the Russian Red Army on Ukraine the Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin replied hypocritically: "The military actions on Ukrainian territory are a matter for the Army of the Directory and the Army of the Ukrainian Soviet Government which is entirely independent."

Against this statement the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in its wire of January 9, 1919, declared.

"The Directory sees clearly the aim of the Government of the People's Commissars; it wants to bring Ukraine, rich in grain, coal and other products, with the aid of the 'Bolshevik Soviets', under its rule and turn her into its colony."

Before the advance of the Russian Red Army the Ukrainian 726
Government was forced to leave Kiev, its capital, at the beginning 669
of February 1919. In Vinnitsa the Socialist members of the 642
Directory quitted the Government. The member of the Directory

669 and Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army, S. Petlura,
726 Social-Democrat, retired from the Party. He was elected President
642 of the Directory in place of Vynnychenko. A Government was formed without the participation of Socialists with Prof. Serhy Ostapenko as Premier. In Ukrainian political circles there was a hope that Ostapenko's 'bourgeois' Government might more easily succeed in coming to an agreement with the French Command in Odessa than a Socialist one. But these hopes failed. The French representatives offered the Ukrainians the choice to become a part of the front of the 'White' Russians against Bolshevism. They refused to discuss the national rights of Ukraine.

The disregard of the Ukrainian national movement revanged itself gravely in the fate of the Franco-Greek troops landing on the coast of the Black Sea. The parts of the Ukrainian Army which had joined the Soviets under the command of Hrihoriev and J. Tyutyunnyk, attacked the Franco-Greek landing forces. These detachments took, on March 1, 1919, Kherson, and on March, 15, Nikolayev, and in the first days of April, Odessa, forcing the French to embark. Thus, because of not fully understanding the Ukrainian problem, the French representatives, through their orientation towards 'White Russia', in spring 1919, helped actually Soviet Russia to occupy Ukrainian territory. By this they strengthened the hopes of the Russian Communists for 'world revolution'. Russian Communists thought that in Ukraine 'the fate of world revolution is being decided'; the title of a book published in 1919 in Moscow was *Where the Fate of World Revolution Is Being Decided.* From Ukraine the Soviet Russian Government planned to send aid through Rumania to the Hungarian Communists, who had proclaimed a Soviet Rupublic in Budapest on 21. 3. 1919. These plans of the Soviet Russian Government failed, for a that very time mass risings and the struggle of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic stopped the advance of the Soviet Russian troops to the West.

642 The Government of Ostapenko, without the participation of
669 Socialists, called 'Cabinet of Agreement with the Entente', was replaced on April 9, 1919, by a new Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic composed of Socialists headed by the Social-Democrat Borys Martos. This Government announced its intention to depend on the own forces of the Ukrainian nation itself. At that time, when the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic remained in the Western provinces of Ukraine (Podolia, Volhynia, Galicia), in Central Ukraine, on the Dnieper River mass uprisings against the Russian Communists developed. Even groups of Ukrai-

669 the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine', gives testimony in a book published in 1920 under the title — *Struggle for the Liberation of the Village:*

From April 1, until May 1, 1919, there had been 93 risings against the Soviet Russian regiment in Ukraine; from May 1, until May 15, — 28 risings; from June 1, until June 19, — 207 revolts.

Thus, instead of a 'march on Europe', the Russian Communist army had to fight stubbornly with the masses of the Ukrainian people for the Ukrainian grain.

"Every Pud (36 lbs.) of the requisitioned grain was sprinkled with drops of blood", the Communist Commissar Schlichter wrote later on his supply activities in Ukraine in 1919. The risings in Ukraine happened under the banner of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had permanent contacts with them.

The Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, reorganised on Galician territory, started an offensive against the Communists at the end of May 1919. The Soviet Russian troops pressed by the Ukrainian Army, and under the blows of the Ukrainian partisans, were forced to retreat. Soon the Ukrainian Galician Army joined the fight against the Russian Communists.

14. The Polish Army Occupies Western Ukraine in 1919

●726 The hundred thousand strong Ukrainian Galician Army fought against the forces of the whole of Poland from November 1918, until summer 1919. At the end of May 1919, the Rumanians who had seized Bukovina on November 11, 1918, occupied Southern Galicia. On June 25, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Entente passed the following resolution regarding Galician Ukraine:

"In order to protect the persons and the property of the peaceable population of Eastern Galicia against the dangers it is threatened with by the Bolshevik gangs, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided to authorise the forces of the Polish Republic to go on in their military operations as far as the Zbrucz River"*).

Under the pressure of the Polish Army several times stronger than the Ukrainians the latter were forced to leave the territory of Galicia and went over on the territory of Eastern Ukraine. The Polish-Ukrainian war ceased, and between the armies of both states a demarcation line was drawn. However, the Polish Government used every opportunity to extend its occupation over other Ukrai-

*) The former Russo-Austrian frontier.

nian territories. This Polish policy held the Ukrainian military forces that were fighting against the Russian Red Army constantly in tension, and hindered the work of the Ukrainian Government. 726

The Ukrainian Galician Army took part in the struggle against the Soviet Russian occupation immediately after the termination of the war with the Poles. The Galician Ukrainians wanted to strengthen the Ukrainian state on the Dnieper, together with the forces of Eastern Ukraine, in order to decide later the historic quarrel for Galicia with Poland.

15. Ukraine between 'Red' and 'White' Russia (1919)

In June 1919, the Ukrainian Government, headed by the Social-Democrat Martos (from August Isaac Mazepa, Social-Democrat, was Prime Minister), took up its residence in Kamenets in Podolia. The united Ukrainian Armies were under the command of General Yunakiw, former Professor of the Military Academy in Petersburg. The Government of Ukraine made efforts to secure legality and order in its territory, particularly it resolutely fought the excesses of various dark elements against the Jewish population. In the Government of theUkrainian Democratic Republic there was a special Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority — Pinkhos Krasny (Jewish People's Party); the deputy Minister of Labour was the Jewish Social-Democrat Prof. Salomon Goldelman. 642 563

The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against Russian Bolshevism as well as the entire Ukrainian problem were in 1919 unknown to the world. Against the Ukrainian liberation movement Communist propaganda was made throughout the world, trying to describe the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as a reactionary state. On the other hand, the propaganda of the Russian 'Whites' and of the Poles permeated decisive political circles abroad resulting in the conviction that the Ukrainian movement was the same as Russian Bolshevism. Therefore the Ukrainian Republic which had led a heroic struggle against Soviet Russia was blockaded by the Western Great Powers as 'infected by Bolshevism'. Because of this blockade the Ukrainian Army was in want of arms, supplies, medicaments. Only by contraband from Rumania was it possible to receive something for the Ukrainian armed forces. Under these circumstances it happened frequently that the Ukrainian Army fought with arms captured on the front from the enemy. But in spite of all these difficulties the united Army of the Ukrainian Republic had considerable successes in the battles with the Soviet Russian troops and, on August 31, 1919, took Kiev, the capital of 669 [705]

though this population had accepted in a friendly manner the Soviet 728
rule, hoping for an improvement of their situation. When Rumania 661
in alliance with Germany joined the war against USSR in 1941, the [726]
Rumanian authorities on their part terrorised the Ukrainian population of Bukovina and Bessarabia. At the end of the war Bukovina and Bessarabia were joined with USSR again. The Communist terror turned with even greater vehemence against the Ukrainians there. Especially from Bukovina a great part of the Ukrainian population had been deported into the Eastern regions of the USSR. The cities were filled with foreign elements, colonists from Russia were brought into the villages.

3. The Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine)

After 1919 Carpatho-Ukraine, which had been for centuries 563
under Hungarian rule, was attached to Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian population of this country consists mostly of peasants. The towns had a Jewish and Hungarian population. The Czech authorities in Carpatho-Ukraine (official name Carpatho-Ruthenia) favoured for some time the development of Ukrainian schools. But [191]
from 1925 the Prague Government began to support the Russophile group that despised the Ukrainian language as 'peasant' and used a strange mixture of the Church-Slavonic, Ukrainian, and Russian languages. In reality, these 'Russophiles' were adherents of Hungary and received support from Budapost too. The entire administration in Carpatho-Ukraine came into the hands of the Czech bureaucracy. According to the Treaty of Saint Germain, Carpatho-Ukraine was guaranteed autonomy inside the boundaries of CSR, but the Czechoslovakian Government permanently deferred its realisation.

At the end of 1938 Germany launched strong pressure against Czechoslovakia exploiting the national problem of this country, (Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians). The Prague Government changed the centralistic Constitution to a federative one. For the Carpathian Ukraine the Prague Government recognised an autonomous statute with a separate Diet and Government. Against this the neighbour states — Hungary and
Poland — reacted vehemently. In February 1939, the elections to 642
the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine took place. After the separation of 726
Slovakia from Bohemia the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed the independence of this country (March 16, 1939). But with Hitler's and Mussolini's consent the Hungarian troops occupied Carpatho-Ukraine after stubborn fighting against the Ukrainian volunteers.

as its center. It dealt heavy blows to the Polish-Lithuanian state in the middle of the seventeenth century. The arrows leading from Bazadenk to Lwów point out the direction taken by the army of Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki to Poland./ /Key inside map: National boundaries. Provincial boundaries. Western boundaries of the Ukrainian voivodeships in Poland. Campaign of Bogdan Chmielnicki against Poland in the year 1648. Cossack regimental command. * Seat of the military order "sech".

/57/ In the "Death Quadrangle"

"In a piercing, frosty north wind" on November 16, 1919 there marched passed each other in 'the quadrangle of death, silently, without a military salute, the fragmentary, wretched, barefoot detachments of the West Ukrainian supporting troops and the likewise fragmentary, wretched, barefoot East Ukrainian front-rank troops. The former were going east into the East Podolian area of concentration where the remnants of the West Ukrainian army were to capitulate before the 'Pan-Russians'; the others were going west to Central Volhynia where they were to surrender to the Poles. Both left behind the same landmarks along their way: frozen corpses in the ditches." (39) This was the

39. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism in the Years 1918 to 1923, page 389.

funeral march of the last soldiers of the West Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic.

The episode of the new Ukrainian statehood began with the March Revolution in Russia in 1917. On March 22, 1917, a few days after the revolution in Moscow, the "Ukrainian Central Council" was formed in Kiyev, consisting of representatives of

648 Ukraine for the Muscovite realm, strained every
175 effort to fight for the country. The Pan-Russian counter-revolutionary armies also proved themselves opponents not to be underestimated. "The campaigns of Denikin, Kolchak, Iudenich and other Russian generals clearly proved that there were only two forces fighting in the Russian civil war: the old Czarist absolutism against the new Bolshevik despotism. And both of them fought with equal ferocity against the Ukraine." (41)

41. Danko: The Nation in Soviet Chains, page 25.

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• 726 A surprise attack of the Ukrainian troops
on Lwów set off the Polish-West Ukrainian War.
175 For weeks wild fighting raged in the streets of the city; finally the Poles succeeded in bringing in troops and forcing the Ukrainians out of Lwów during the night of November 22, 1918. The victors exercised bloody reprisals on the Ukrainian population; they destroyed Ukrainian property and dragged many respected citizens into concentration camps from which they were never to return. The Jews expiated for their neutrality with a three-day pogrom, during which whole blocks of houses went up in flames.

[631] After the loss of Lwów, the West Ukrainian
state included about 40,000 square kilometers with
642 four million /64/ inhabitants, among them three
648 million Ukrainians. To destroy this dwarf state
was the firm intention of the leaders of the Polish
726 state of eighteen million. The Ukrainian govern-
175 ment now had its seat at Stanislawów; Dr. Ievgen Petrushevych was the head of the state. He and many other men who were responsible for the fate of West Ukraine still regarded it as "an incident, a misunderstanding, an error" that there was any fighting at all between Poles and Ukrainians. Heedless of the front which was expanding day by

642 day and of the increasingly bloody battles, they
648 abandoned themselves to the illusion that these
726 misunderstandings would merely have to be cleared
175 up and all would be well. They believed that patience was required until the Allies carried out the right of self-government for which the Ukrainians alone were obliged to fight with weapons. "The fact that individual destinies must be determined by the will of the individual - such points of view which are so familiar to conquering nations, were completely foreign to the 'Ukrainian National Council', all the more since there was not a single, in any way outstanding, personality in leading political circles, who would have been capable in a critical situation to grasp the reins and direct events." (42)

42. Kuchabskyj: West Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 52.

175 The war which at the beginning was carried
726 on with a few thousand men on both sides was in full force by the end of December. At this time the Ukrainians successfully mobilized their fighting manpower up to 35 years of age. Then, however, they made the mistake of abandoning warfare in the open country and of leaving the initiative to the Poles who, in keeping with their reckless methods, made use of it. In spite of the fact that the Ukrainian front which ran northward from the Carpathians presented considerable deficiencies along its approximately 250-kilometer length, that the battalions, for example, were strung together loosely and without a unified supreme command, nevertheless the Polish troops which arrived from mid-January on suffered heavy defeats. Thus Gen-
000 eral Romer /Facing page 64/ /Above: A typical Ukrainian church made of wood, in the Carpathians. Below: Ukrainian peasant woman baking bread./1 /Facing page 65/ /The Ukrainian landscape is full

1 [This plate not processed for files — Analyst]

000 of unique charm. - In spite of their poverty, Ukrainian peasants keep their loam huts clean.[7]
•726 /65/ along with 5000 men was defeated and shortly
175 thereafter other Polish detachments north of Lwów were destroyed.

And now the Ukrainians fell into a situation which was somehow reminiscent of the siege of Lwów by hetman Chmielnicki in 1648. It was again Lwów that was besieged and cut off from the rest of the world. The city seemed hopelessly lost, there was even no water. At this point when the war was developing favorably for the Ukrainians and when it could only be a few days before Lwów fell into their hands as a trump which might even overtrump the Western Powers, they ceased hostilities as a result of the promises of a French military mission. "...If, in turn, you accept our proposal we shall take steps toward the recognition of your sovereignty...". But the peace terms of the French General Berthelemy seemed so severe to the Ukrainians that after three days they resumed the fight. The brief pause sufficed for the Poles to recover. Morale in the Ukrainian army was also no longer of the best after the prospects of peace had been shattered. The soldiers lived through a severe winter. Some of them were in need of coats, and even more, or a corps of officers which might have served as a moral support to them during the long months of life in the trenches. Five hundred soldiers and one officer! That represents a catastrophic dearth of officers. Gangs of East Ukrainian peasants sent to help, caused mutiny and plunder so that they were decimated and sent back over the border.

To what extent the Ukrainian general staff had already lost the leadership of its troops was proved by the vote which it took among the individual battalions upon the armistice command of the Entente of March 19, 1919. Whereas the Ukrainian army, in response to it, declared itself

7 [For plate, see p. 219, category 116 - Analyse]

for the armistice, the Poles who started a general offensive on March eighteenth, paid no attention to the wishes of their allies /66/ in Paris. On the contrary, without running up against any opposition worth mentioning, they built up a favorable starting point for a new offensive, extending from the Carpathians to Volhynia. General Haller worked out the plans, unconcerned over the fact that the Supreme Council in Paris was already preparing the armistice terms. For the Council attached importance to a rapid ending of hostilities in order that Bolshevik Moscow may be all the more rapidly and positively destroyed. Polish attacks on the first and second Ukrainian army corps announced the impending catastrophe. The Ukrainian soldiers were tired of war; they marauded, mutinied, plundered, left the trenches and simply went home. No wonderthat the two army corps were defeated in "wildest flight". At this point General Haller prepared for what he considered would be the mortal blow. The disintegrated Ukrainian front was faced with nine Polish infantry divisions, among them two Haller divisions equipped in the best possible manner by the French. In most cases the Poles stormed empty ditches and deserted villages; occasionally they broke up local resistance. The defeat of the Ukrainians was complete.

At this moment, slowly, guardedly, two Rumanian divisions pushed across the crests of the Carpathians into southeastern Galicia and captured the only infantry supply base still left the Ukrainians.

The remnants of the exhausted West Ukrainian army marched eastward with its baggage and accompanied by fleeing civilians toward an unknown destination, while in East Ukraine Bolsheviks drove the remnants of the East Ukrainian army westward. Ievgen Petrushevych rose up to become dictator of his wandering West Ukrainian state.

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Another page was turned. General Haller 726 was obliged to throw his divisions onto the 175 western frontier of Poland. The Treaty of Versailles was to be signed. No /67/ one knows whether the Germans may not refuse to sign, ally themselves with the Bolsheviks and enter a desperate struggle.

It does not seem impossible that a surprise attack of the Ukrainians may be successful. Petrushevych named the Russian General A. Grekov, who had staked everything on the Ukraine, supreme commander of the West Ukrainian forces. He is the author of the plans for an offensive which, under his name, was to enter Ukrainian military history as one of the most daring deeds.

In the early morning of June 8, 1919 the Ukrainians began the assault on the town of Chortkov which had been captured a few days before by the Poles. "The effect of this advance was baffling. Several Polish battalions who were defending the town dispersed and took to wildest flight. Almost the entire enemy artillery of this division, all their baggage and several hundred prisoners fell into the hands of West Ukrainians. In the market-place of the town a national parade of the Polish inhabitants of the entire countryside had just gathered in order to celebrate the 'burial of the Ukraine'. The fleeing soldiers fell upon this crowd: 'Run! The Ukrainians are already here!' - and the entire festively-clothed multitude fled with the troops, just as they were, abandoning everything. Then something improbable happened to the Ukrainians under General Grekov when the news of the battle of Chortkov reached them. On the entire West Ukrainian front of 35 kilometers the 726 8000 men whom West Ukrainians engaged in combat 703 pushed forward, and there followed a sudden, pos- 175 itively miraculous transformation in the attitude of the entire nation. Suddenly they became aware that they were being led, that they were being

commanded by a real general. The soldier who 726
only yesterday was unable to halt an enemy advance 703
now dashed ahead recklessly. The divisions which 175
throughout the war did not know how to cooperate with their neighbors /68/ now functioned with a baffling tactical assurance. They attacked, they pushed through, they rolled up enemy flanks, they pursued, they marched into the roar of enemy guns to help their neighbor to victory. The higher staff officers who up to that time had known nothing but caution, suddenly learned how to seek out the enemy, to find him, to attack, to pursue, to break into the enemy's rear. The ones who only yesterday were deserting, those who were barely able to carry arms, young and old, all now joined the advancing West Ukrainian troops. A crowd marched into a village, only to leave it as a company." (43)

43. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 302.

From the beginning an extreme shortage of 175
infantry munitions imperiled these brilliant 726
victories of West Ukrainia. There were only enough weapons to equip a bare 20,000 men. On June ninth and tenth the Ukrainians overran two Polish divisions who fled in wild panic along with all the inhabitants. Ten days later they put to flight five divisions, and on June 27 a new Polish line of resistance became shaky. It, too, was destroyed. Nevertheless, the Ukrainians did not succeed in capturing the badly needed arms and munitions. At last, only two days' march from Lwów the offensive was halted. New Polish divisions were thrown in and Pilsudski himself, who had previously already taken over the supreme command but had been unable to avoid the last breakthrough, now gave the command for a counter-offensive...In its extremity Poland mobilized the

•726 175 Supreme Council in Paris which on June 25 already drew up the following decision which was to be communicated to West Ukrainia: "In order to protect life and property of the peaceable inhabitants of East Galicia from the dangers which threaten them at the hands of the Bolshevik mobs, the 'Supreme Council' ...has resolved to empower the forces of the Polish Republic to carry on their operations as far as the Sbrucz River."

With new, completely equipped divisions the /69/ Poles began their offensive on June 28, 1919, exactly half an hour before General Grekov also ordered a new attack. The proportion of forces was too unequal, a Ukrainian victory became impossible. The Ukrainian army retreated amid constant counterattacks. Various positions could not be defended at all, because whole divisions had not a single cartridge. Thus the Ukrainians reached the river which forms the boundary between Galicia and East Ukraine. "A giant baggage train dragging the entire supplies of the army into the uncertain future, columns of civilian refugees, more than a hundred thousand people, left their homes. Among them was an army of over 60,000 men comprising the quartermaster corps, over 20,000 of these fighting forces." On July 16 the rear guard crossed the Sbrucz.

An eyewitness dramatically described the end of the Polish-West Ukrainian War: "These were dreadful days! From one side came Poles, from the other Bolsheviks. The territory of both Ukrainian states now comprised only a narrow strip along the bank of the Sbrucz River. In this area could be heard the booming of guns from the east and the west...Endless files of West Ukrainian army service corps marched past...From afar cannon boomed: this was the West Ukrainian artillery which held off the Polish attack with greatest bravery to give the service corps time

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175 to retreat with the sick and wounded and with the supplies. There was still some ammunition for the cannons, the foot soldiers had none left. The latter helped their artillery wherever they could hold off the Poles with blank weapons, and they defended with their bodies the last fields of their West Ukrainian homeland." (44)

44. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 319.

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175 The same tragedy accompanied the battles of the East Ukrainians. Shortly after the summons of the Directorate which was secretly elected by the "Ukrainian National League" and was headed /70/ by the writer Volodimir Vynnychenko and the former bank official and journalist Simon Petliura, the army of the Directorate marched from Bila Cerkva to Kiyev. It consisted of 4 companies of infantry, 1 battery of field guns, 12 heavy machine guns and half a squadron of cavalry. Hetman Skoropadskyj threw all the forces he could spare at that moment into the troops of the Directorate: 3 battalions of infantry. At Fastiv, not far from Kiyev, the sech sharpshooters of the Directorate, after a heroic struggle, turned the tide of the battle in which a battalion of Russian officers was annihilated up to the last man, in their favor. "The effect of the battle was tremendous. With one blow, as though suddenly paralyzed, the counterrevolution in the Ukraine, specifically in Kiyev, gave itself up as lost. On the other hand, the entire East Ukraine arose at the first report of this victory as though at a magic word. Hundreds of thousands of peasants from all over stormed the cities and towns. The entire East Ukraine resembled a storm-lashed ocean." (45)

45. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 109.

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175 /75/ After its withdrawal from East Galicia,
• 726 the West Ukrainian army joined the remnants of the army of the Directorate. "Quadrangle of death", this is the name given to the region between the Polish border and Kiyev and southward toward the Dniestr. There was no longer any escape for the Ukrainians; they were encircled by enemies from whom they either became isolated, as from the Rumanians in the southwest and the Poles in the west, or else are engaged in combat as by the Bolsheviks and the all-Russian, counterrevolutionary Denikin army. In spite of the union of West and East Ukraine on January 22, 1919, the West and East Ukrainian ministers rule side by side wherever the "capital" happens to be. Petrushevych still believed in the necessity of an independent West Ukrainian government. He was convinced that the Entente will surely give authority to such a government upon the expected rebirth of the West Ukrainian People's Republic. The dictator was possessed "of that firmness which is commonly called character". As though the supreme council of war had not already on June 25, 1919, when Grekov's victorious troops were still standing at the gates of Lwów, pronounced the death sentence over West Ukraine! Dmovskij remained the victor. The Ukrainian peace delegation whose members were at variance with one another, and who had even had difficulty entering the country, had been given no opportunity whatsoever to speak. Other peoples were given to states in which they never grew up; the Ukrainians were strangled in the midst of the fight for their state.

After the various divisions of their armies were united, the dictators Petliura and Petrushevych decided on an offensive against Kiyev. Once again with their fight for the capital of the country,

175 they wished to prove to all the world the Ukrain-
● 176 ian will for independence. By the middle of July 1919, one month after the tragic crossing of the Sbrucz, the entire country between the Pripyat swamps in the north almost to Odessa in the south, from Sbrucz halfway to Kiyev, was conquered, and the outlines of the "quadrangle of death" pushed forward and extended. /76/ The influx of volunteers and rich spoils made possible the establishment of an army of 100,000 men with whom the assault on Kiyev could most probably be risked.

Once again Petliura tried to lead his strange form of a state out of its dreadful isolation. He offered to cover the flanks of the army of Denikin, the all-Russian counterrevolutionist. The general whom England supported in return for the tacit surrender of the oil fields of Baku, had just begun an impetuous course of victory which was to lead his armies made up primarily of Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks and Russian-Ukrainian Don Cossacks, east of the Dniepr to Moscow. Bolshevik rule seemed to be nearing its end. Supported by America and Japan because of prospects of concessions, Admiral Kolchak was fighting in Siberia against Lenin's troops. The nucleus of Kolchak's army consisted of the Czech Legion. North of the Arctic Ocean, with Archangel as the port of embarkation, English, Americans and Italians under the leadership of General Gurko threatened the Bolshevik state which was being attacked from Esthonia by the army of intervention under General Iudenich. - No, Denikin with his 200,000 victorious soldiers did not need to have his flanks protected by the Ukrainian separatist and rebel leader! Denikin instructed General Bredov to push on toward Kiyev in forced marches. Meanwhile Petliura pushed ahead a part of his now quite respectable army against the Fourteenth Army Corps of the Bolsheviks concentrated north of Odessa and

115 threatened - what a chaos! - in the east simul-
116 taneously by Denikin and by rebellious peasants. On this occasion the Ukrainians destroyed one Bolshevik division completely. Their offensive against Kiyev also hit the mark; the capital was occupied during the night of August 31, 1919 by the Ukrainian armies.

In a state of mad delusion Denikin, on the following day, snatched /77/ Kiyev from the Ukrainians who in their hatred of Bolshevism were certainly a match for the all-Russian reactionary general. What a fateful day! From the east Denikin's troops caught the guards on the Dniepr bridge unawares and entered the city when the Ukrainians were just making their solemn entry. With the salvos which were breaking in the midst of the parade of the unsuspecting victors, a simply grotesque battle began. The war which Petliura always wanted to avoid, broke out. Lenin can triumph - he got a breather while his enemies were murdering each other, and he threw the forces that were relased in this way into the front, which was most seriously threatened. The crime of the reactionary was punished on the spot. His victorious troops advanced to within 300 miles of Moscow when the Bolshevik Cavalry General Budienny attacked them and literally ran them down. The catastrophe which thus broke over the proud general and his world was crushing. Budienny destroyed corps after corps of the Denikin army, whose chaotically retreating soldiers, moreover, perished in the deluge of a wild peasant insurrection.

The physical and spiritual resistance of the Ukrainians was broken by the cowardly attack on Kiyev. Upon the ranks of discouraged and despairing soldiers who retreated into the "quadrangle of death" there descended a new enemy: spotted typhus. Without food, without underwear, without shoes, without clothing, without sanitary supplies, without weapons, without medicine - the Entente had forbidden the importation of drugs - they

175 726 dragged themselves away from the pursuing enemy. Whither? No one could answer this question. "In the railroad stations along the front hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers lay dying, without any kind of human help; and hundreds marched and fought while they were infected and broke down in the camps." By the end of October 1919, the two armies numbered 6000 men, of which 4000 were West Ukrainians. They were concentrated in the region of Kamenets in Podolia. /78/

The end was ghastly, like a vision of inferno. The "scourge of God", typhus, also lashed down upon the troops of Denikin which, exhausted by the epidemic and discouraged by the defeat at the hands of Budienny, had gathered together southeast of the remnants of the Ukrainian army. "Then suddenly the phantom of the 'all-Russian' counter-revolution loomed up: ruins of Denikin's army ignored the West Ukrainian frontal troops and everywhere pushed on only against the East Ukrainian divisions, in order to wreak revenge on the East Ukrainians at the last minute, before the victorious Bolshevism was to banish to the grave that 'all-Russian' ghost. This 'assault' of a few hundred pestilence-stricken 'all-Russians" against an equally few pestilence-stricken East Ukrainians was horrible. Everywhere the wreckage consisting of East Ukrainians surrendered, almost without a struggle, just as the 'all-Russians', who were in a state of even greater disintegration than the East Ukrainians, would surely have surrendered if it had occurred to the East Ukrainians to take them their positions."

In this way the Greater Ukrainian state perished. "In a piercing, frosty northwind there marched in the 'quadrangle of death', silently..."

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After the victory of the Bolsheviks over their

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enemies Warsaw trembled at the thought of the moment when the Muscovites would begin their assault on young Poland in order to take it back into the folds of "indivisible Russia". Pilsudski awaited the attack which he would have liked to forestall, in the spring of 1920. For this preventive war Petliura, with the remnants of the East Ukrainian army which were sitting in concentration camps - the remnants of the West Ukrainian army put themselves under Bolshevik protection and were in part fighting on that side against the Poles, - is just good enough. With blissful confidence the head of the erstwhile Ukrainian People's Republic signed an alliance with the Poles. Petliura renounced /79/ West Ukraine, although it was precisely the West Ukrainians with their undeniable talent for organization and their picked troops who had made possible for him the unprecedented fight for freedom. In return the Poles promised him the formation of a new East Ukrainian state under their patronage. On April 17, 1920 Pilsudski's divisions and the faithful followers of Petliura set out for the east, and, as a matter of fact, they reached Kiyev. Petliura's troops were the bait with which they endeavored to catch the West Ukrainians fighting on the side of the Bolsheviks; they actually succeeded in catching them. A large number of West Ukrainians who had become Bolsheviks went over to the Poles and were disarmed. The Bolsheviks took this occasion to shoot the officers of the Ukrainian divisions that have remained faithful to them.

Polish rule in Kiyev lasted only five weeks, until June eleventh. Then Budienny followed close on the heels of the Poles, as he did previously on Denikin's troops. The honor of covering the headless retreat of the Poles with Ukrainian blood fell on Petliura. The elite of the French general staff finally halted the Russians not far from Warsaw, and then caused them to retreat. The

175 "miracle on the Vistula" took place: the Bol-
726 sheviks turned around and halted beyond the Sbrucz.

175 At the peace negotiations in Riga the part-
726 ners of Andrusov met after two and a half cent-
728 uries for a partition of the Ukraine. The Rus-
sians conceded the Poles the western parts of Polesia, Volhynia and Podolia, Lublin and Podlakhia in the Riga Treaty of March 18, 1921. The protest of Petliura who was not admitted to the negotiations remained unheard. Was it blind hatred of the Bolsheviks, a commission of the Poles or burning patriotism, which, after this bitter disappointment, again drove him across the borders with a small band of followers? Whatever it is, the guerilla war which the ex-dictator unleashes in East Ukraine does not change anything in his country's fate, which was definitively sealed at Riga. /80/

175 Driven out of his home for the last time and
726 again disarmed by the Poles, he was nevertheless permitted to kindle rebellions in East Ukraine from within the Polish state. If the East Ukrainians bled to death and the Bolsheviks had internal difficulties, this could only please Warsaw. When the Bolsheviks finally cruelly quelled these uprisings - according to accounts in the Communist of February 23, 1923, 6000 groups of rebels were discovered and destroyed in 1921 -, Petliura, the ally of Pilsudski at the conquest of Kiyev, was now merely a troublesome foreigner in Poland. As such he was banished. /Facing page
728 80/ /Map V: The Ukraine Before the First World
631 War (1914). At the end of the eighteenth century the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom disintegrated. From that time on the main part of the Ukraine belonged to the Czar's realm. Parts of West Ukraine in so-called East Galicia and Bukovina, along with Chernovtsy went to Austria, Ukrainian territory in the Carpathians to Hungary./ /Key inside map: -.-.-. National boundaries. ...Provincial boundar-

162 cent. of the total, as compared with 32.8 per cent. for the entire Soviet Union. Next to the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukraine has a higher percentage of urban population than any other Union Republic.

The German-Soviet War

726 On June 22, 1941, the German armies, supported by their satellites, including the Rumanians and the Hungarians, attacked the Soviet Union on a 1,500 mile front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. Nearly six weeks later the Germans started their main thrust against Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; on September 21, after a fierce struggle, the Soviet troops evacuated the city. It was another two months before the Germans reached Kharkov and Rostov.

727 [725] For the second time in this century the Ukraine was subjected to occupation and devastation by the Germans. However, the Soviet policy of scorching the earth in retreat had aggravated normal military destruction; and in addition, the Ukrainians conducted heroic guerilla warfare against the enemy occupation forces. As a result, the Germans found the fruits of conquest "rather disappointing"[1] For example, in the Ukraine it was possible in the autumn of 1941 to carry out only a small fraction of the average sowing. In the western part of the Ukraine, very few industrial plants remained intact; the Nikolayev naval yards, the Dnieper dam and power station, and the metallurgical plants of the Dniepropetrovsk district were all either crippled or destroyed.

726 The German occupation of the Ukraine lasted nearly three and a half years. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad early in 1943 was the turning point of the war and the beginning of the big Soviet offensives.

In the winter campaign of 1943-44 the Soviet troops won important victories in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, completed the liberation of the Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhie and Zhitomir regions and almost the whole of the Rovno and Kirovograd regions, as well as of a number of districts in other areas.[2] In April and May 1944 they liberated Odessa, and in August, Western Ukraine. The liberation of the whole Ukraine was completed by November 1944.

727 The years of hard fighting took a very heavy toll all along the western front of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian S.S.R. sustained enormous losses.

War Losses of Population

At the Kiev trial of German war criminals in January 1946 it was disclosed that more than four million Soviet citizens had been murdered

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1 The Russian Campaigns of 1941-43, W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Penguin Books, London, 1944.

2 Soviet War News, London, February 24, 1944.

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642 728 and Homel, enabled Lenin to impose what he cynically described as his 'shameful peace' on his colleagues of the Soviets. Clause 6 of the Treaty obliged the Soviet Government 'to conclude peace at once with the Ukrainian People's Republic and to recognize the Treaty of Peace between that State and the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance'.

727 The occupation of the Ukraine was organized on the basis of a special agreement between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Germans left about 500,000 men on the whole of the Eastern Front. Of these, apart from the troops which were stationed in Poland and Lithuania to protect lines of communication, there were about 12 Infantry and 2 Cavalry Divisions occupying the Front against Soviet Russia from Narva to Homel (the 8th and 10th Armies). The remaining 15–16 Infantry and 4 Cavalry Divisions were quartered in the Ukraine (with the exception of a few battalions which were sent to Poti for the protection of the new Georgian Republic from Germany's ally Turkey). The troops in the Ukraine constituted the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* and consisted of the 1st and 20th Army Corps, the 27th (Saxon) and the 22nd and 41st Reserve Corps, together with several independent divisions and detachments. These troops had little in common with the magnificent German armies which had invaded Russia in the first years of the war. The *Heeresgruppe Kiev* contained a veritable mosaic of different battalions—the majority of which consisted of elderly men belonging to Landwehr and Landsturm formations. During the whole period of the German occupation of the Ukraine there was a continuous process of transfer of single battalions and even of small detachments to the Western Front—and this became more noticeable after 8 August, the day which may be said to have marked the turning-point in France. Only the Cavalry Divisions and Artillery approached the standards of the German armies which had formerly been held on the Russian Front. Thus the legend that the military occupation of the Ukraine was 'a mistake', in the sense that important forces were engaged there which might have been decisively employed on the Western Front, seems to be without foundation. Out of all the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* it would have been difficult to select three or four fighting infantry divisions, and less could have been found among the miscellaneous collection of elderly and invalid troops which constituted the so-called 8th and 10th Armies.

The Austro-Hungarian forces in the Ukraine amounted nominally to 250,000 men; but their total in reality was far below this and the number of deserters grew every day.

The Germans from the first began to play the leading role in Kiev.

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All authority was vested in the hands of the Commander of *Heeresgruppe Kiev*, Field-Marshal Eichhorn. To Kiev was sent also General Groener, who had a great reputation for his organizing capacity (amongst his collaborators was 'enigmatic' Meissner, who later was to play a certain role in the entourages of President Hindenburg and of the Führer Hitler). The representative of the German Foreign Office was Baron Mumm. Vienna sent as minister Count Forgacs, who, as minister in Belgrad in 1914, had his share of responsibility for the events which immediately preceded the outbreak of war. 727

Dissensions began between the Allies from the very first moment. Hoffmann, who was in Kovno, kept himself well-informed about what was going on in Kiev. He wrote in his diary: 'Endless troubles with the Austrians in Ukraine. They are behaving with their usual meanness when the knife is not at their throat. It is a pity that the Italians do not attack.' Quarrels broke out on account of the delimitation of the respective German and Austrian zones. The role of the Austrians in the advance into the Ukraine had been modest enough, since they arrived too late to take part in any operations with the exception of 'the capture' of Odessa. Nevertheless, their zone of occupation spread over all the south. At the end of March an agreement was at last reached. On the Black Sea the Austrians retained Odessa and Kherson; the Germans Nikolaev and Sevastopol. Three Governments, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, Podolia and the southern strip in Volhynia, were reserved as the Austrian zone. In this wise, the Crimea, which shortly passed into German hands, was separated by the Austrian zone from the rest of the territories in German occupation.

The gradual advance eastward of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* continued. The 22nd Reserve Corps remained in Volhynia: the 27th Reserve (Saxon) Corps was in Kiev: the 41st Reserve Corps, after crossing the Dniepr, occupied the Government of Chernigov, the 20th Army Corps that of Poltava: the 1st Army Corps marched into Kharkov on 20 April. General Groener, who was concerned to collect coal supplies, gave the order in May for the 215th Infantry Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division to march into the south-east into the Donets coal basin as far as the boundaries of the Don Cossack region, where an independent Government had been set up. At the same time the 212th Infantry Division occupied Melitopol and the northern part of the Government of Tauris, while the 15th Landwehr Division was sent to the Crimea and Sevastopol. By the middle of May the occupation had been accomplished.

The Government of the *Rada* had returned to Kiev with the German troops. An interesting light is thrown on the characters of 645

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Pest. In April the situation somewhat improved, but it was evident that there was no hope of receiving by the end of July any substantial proportion of the goods which had been stipulated under the Peace Treaty. It became clear that the enthusiastic delegates of the 'Popular Republic' had greatly exaggerated the agricultural wealth of their country. They had had in view 'potential possibilities', but they had quite failed to take into account the actual state of affairs in the spring of 1918. During the whole of the preceding year agrarian disorders had been taking place. The peasants had appropriated lands, and the countryside had been swarming with ex-soldiers who had completely lost their morale and who, although they had quitted the front, had no wish whatever to return to peaceful occupations. Under such conditions the harvest of 1917 had not been gathered as it would have been in normal times; and, furthermore, no one knew to whom what had actually been gathered really belonged. The cattle of the landowners had been in great part slaughtered or driven off when the Red Guards made their appearance in the Ukraine during the winter of 1917; the sugar factories were standing idle. At the same time, the well-to-do peasants had quickly learned to hide their grain and other produce, and they were no more willing to deliver to the Germans than they had been to the Bolsheviks.

As a result of all this, during the whole period of the Occupation, the Germans only succeeded in exporting 9293 wagon-loads of grain; 23,195 wagon-loads of fodder, sugar, cattle, eggs and other products; and 4567 wagon-loads of minerals (coal, manganese)—as a whole 37,000 wagons under the auspices of the *Wirtschaftstelle* and 5000 through 'private initiative'. This tonnage amounted to scarcely a fifth part of what had been expected before 31 July 1918. And even the quantities which Germany succeeded in securing were delivered after the Government of the *Rada* had given place to that of Hetman Skoropadsky, and for the most part during the first three months of the latter régime.

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The failure of the *Rada* in 'the economic collaboration' with the Germans was the reason for its downfall. When the Germans came into the Ukraine their inspection of stocks of supplies not only revealed the relative scarcity of these stocks but also the chaotic state of Ukrainian economy at that moment. The estates of the landowners had almost completely disappeared, and the peasants had appropriated the land. This action of the agrarian proletariat had, however, received no legal sanction, and the *Rada* had not yet elaborated any land laws. To the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* the practical and not the legal state of affairs was important. Field-Marshal Eichhorn therefore issued an 'Order to the Ukrainian popu-

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lation', calling on them to resume agricultural production 'to the maximum extent'. The harvest was to belong to him who would plough and sow, whether he was the legal owner of the land or the peasant who had taken possession of it. If the peasant proved unable to sow, the landowner was to do it, and the peasant was to put no obstacle in his way. Persons guilty of disobedience to this Order were to be brought to trial and punished, not by the Ukrainian civil courts but by the military tribunals of the Occupation.

Not only was this Order issued without the knowledge of the *Rada*, but the *Rada* heard of it only two weeks later. The German authorities were well aware that Eichhorn's Order would arouse opposition among the peasants and also among numerous groups in the *Rada* itself. Such opposition, however, would afford a suitable pretext to put an end to a Government which had proved its incapacity for 'economic collaboration'.

A month's experience of the country had been enough to indicate to the Occupation authorities the only section of the population which was likely to help them to fulfil General Groener's plan with efficiency and rapidity. It did not require much perspicacity to observe that the stocks of sugar, vegetable oil and spirit on large estates where the landlord had owned the factories were greatly in excess of those accumulated by the peasantry. Furthermore, it always proved much more difficult to extract grain from peasants, who were guiltily conscious of having recently pillaged neighbouring granaries. The liberal Government of the *Rada* had not refused to sanction the formation of a landowners' union when the latter proposed to organize to defend their interests. Of course this union, in accord with the spirit of the times, had to be called a Union of Cornraisers (*Khliboroby*); but it was recruited not only from prosperous peasants who owned 20–30 hectares of land, but also from many middle-class and even aristocratic landowners. The Union maintained an aspect sufficiently 'democratic' to avoid provoking the radical majority of the *Rada*, but it had close connections with Russian conservative circles whose influence was beginning to make itself felt in Kiev.

The terms of the Soviet-Ukrainian 'peace' were still under negotiation, but the armistice imposed by the Germans continued in force, and the situation provided favourable opportunities for the higher classes of Russian society to leave Petrograd and Moscow and make their way to the Ukraine. Furthermore, after the chaotic demobilization of the army, thousands of Russian officers had gathered in Kiev. These officers were certainly in no hurry to go back 'into the hands of the Soviets'. Kiev presented a very strange picture in

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•727 April 1918. The capital of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' had all the appearance of a big Russian town living an animated and even boisterous life owing to the presence of large numbers of Russian and foreign 'guests'. Except for the names of certain shops which were written up in Ukrainian and the picturesque uniforms of the *Rada* regiments, there was no indication of 'the beginning of a new life'. Ukrainian was only spoken in Government offices and during the sittings of the *Rada*. This official language imported from Galicia was not always easily understood by the inhabitants of Russian Ukraine.

In the environment of the Union of *Khliboroby* and of the fashionable fugitives from the north the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* easily found a convenient person who could be the head of the administration which was to replace the Government of the *Rada*.

General Paul Skoropadsky had the advantage of being a descendant of that amiable and pliable Hetman who had been chosen by Peter the Great to succeed Mazeppa. An officer of the Chevaliers Gardes Regiment, he had distinguished himself during the war, first in command of a Guards Brigade and later of a Guards Division. Of Ukrainian origin and property, he belonged to a wealthy and distinguished family. Furthermore, General Skoropadsky was endowed with the necessary ambition, and had no objection to undertaking an important political role even if it should be a difficult one. He had many connections with the Union of Cornraisers and had established excellent relations with the German Command, which now designated him as their chosen 'Head of the State' when the propitious moment for his elevation should arise.

727 642 [579] That moment arrived when at last the *Rada* learned about the Order issued by Field-Marshal Eichhorn, and peasant riots—provoked by the Order—broke out in the southern parts of the Governments of Kiev and Poltava. The members of the *Rada* were in a state of agitation; not only Petlyura and the extremists were urging opposition to the German measures, but also some of the cabinet ministers—including Lubinsky, that incorrigibly eloquent 'student' of the Congress of Brest-Litovsk. The German Command was well aware of the movement of opinion in the *Rada* and on 24 April they signed a formal agreement with Skoropadsky. Lüdendorff approved the choice of 'a man with whom one can work well' (Lüdendorff, *War Memoirs*, p. 624). On the same day the *Rada* declared the Order of Field-Marshal Eichhorn to be illegal and non-existent. Two days later, during a sitting of the *Rada*, a detachment of German soldiers entered the hall under the command of an officer who gave the abrupt order, 'Hands up!' The outraged deputies were searched for

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arms, after which they were allowed to go home with the exception of a few of their number, including several cabinet ministers, who were arrested on the spot. On the following day, during a meeting of the Union of Cornraisers, Paul Skoropadsky was proclaimed 'Hetman of the Ukraine'. 727 642

Skoropadsky remained Hetman for about seven-and-a-half months and resigned when the Germans were evacuating the Ukraine. Those seven months can be divided into two distinct periods: the first until the middle of August and the second until the end of November. 727 439

During the first period the Germans found that their manœuvre had been crowned with comparative success. In July, particularly, supplies of grain and coal were delivered at a regular and rapid tempo. The Germans, again, succeeded in securing thousands of horses of which they were badly in need, not so much for the cavalry as for the artillery and transport services. In Berlin and Vienna bread reappeared and meat and sugar was to be had in considerable quantities. Skoropadsky's Government turned out to be much more capable than that of the *Rada*, perhaps for the reason that the Hetman did not bother about any ideology whatever. The Foreign Minister, Doroshenko, was not over-burdened with work, but the energetic Minister of the Interior, Igor Kistyakovsky, and the Minister of Commerce, Gutnik, had plenty to do. Berlin and Vienna placed at the disposal of the Government the quantity of Marks necessary to cover the issue of 400,000,000 *karbóvantsi* (about 300,000,000 Marks) issued by the Hetman; and for this reason the *karbóvantsi* enjoyed a greater credit with the people than had the 'paper' of the *Rada*. In the meantime 'a real General', General Ragoza, formerly commanding the 4th Russian Army, undertook the task of organizing the Hetman's army. Not only officers of Ukrainian origin, but officers from all over Russia freely enlisted in it.

The historian of Brest-Litovsk justly remarks that in June 1918 'the Ukraine became for a short time a bourgeois Mecca and thither flocked thousands of refugees from Soviet Russia' (Wheeler-Bennett, p. 323). Kiev rapidly lost even that 'shade of Ukrainism' which it had worn in the *Rada* days. Baron Mumm, the German Minister Resident, was depressed by this aspect of affairs when he wrote to Groener: 'I tried to insist with the President of the Council of Ministers Lizohub that the German Government desires his cabinet to have more of *couleur locale*.' Mumm altogether was not particularly pleased with the *coup d'état*, since the military men had not asked his opinion about it and had not even troubled to let him know before it was accomplished. In another report Mumm suspects the Hetman's Government of being 'pro-Russian', but adds that 'this should 727 642

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727 642 not be taken too tragically as the Hetman's Government is under my control and that of the German Staff'. The Austrian Command, which did not like the Hetman on account of his 'independent tone in relation to Vienna', accused Skoropadsky himself of being 'pro-Russian'. Compromising documents were produced from somewhere according to which the Hetman had, in July 1914, denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation, while in July 1917 he was supposed to have spoken of Kiev as a centre of Russian and not of Ukrainian culture. He had also been guilty of advocating the union of all Russian lands in a federal state. The position of the Hetman, however, was then very firm, because he had the sympathy of the military Command who had no interest in the ideological side of the Ukrainian Question.

Baron Mumm and the Austrians were of course very near the truth in their views on Skoropadsky's Government. The Hetman and his cabinet, even if they were Ukrainians by origin, were of less than moderate tendencies in relation to separatism. They only 'tolerated' the separation of Ukraine from Russia while Russia remained in the hands of Lenin and Trotsky. At this time Kiev not only looked forward to the early downfall of the Bolsheviks, but was certain that the excellent relations existing between the Hetman and the German Command was the prelude to German support for the restoration of the Russian Monarchy.

At this time the Ukrainian and Russian conservatives in Kiev were not the only elements who were anticipating a German march on Moscow. The success of the German offensive in France in the spring of 1918 had convinced the Russian factions of the invincibility of the German power. Even Paul Milyukov, the protagonist of the Triple Entente, got into touch with the German Command in Kiev through the Ukrainian Premier Lizohub, who had been a member of the Cadet Party. But the Germans continued to stand where they were, and even the murder of the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Mirbach, did not induce them to expel from Berlin the Soviet representative Joffe, whose staff was at this time propagating
727 Communism in Germany with relative immunity.

Meantime a curious situation had been created on the Don, where the Germans had recognized the Don Cossack *ataman* General Krasnov as head of a separate state. In the north the *ataman* was fighting the Bolsheviks, while on the south he was collaborating with the Volunteer Army in process of formation by General Denikin, who was the favoured protégé of the Entente Powers as the allies of Imperial Russia. Skoropadsky, notwithstanding his dependence on the Germans and the German anxiety to conciliate the Soviet

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Government, managed, with the connivance of German officers, to send some support in men and supplies to Krasnov and, through him, to Denikin. 727

As the summer advanced a serious deterioration took place in conditions in the Ukraine. The German and Austrian troops, weary of the war and in continuous contact with the anarchic and revolutionary incidents of the countryside, were becoming demoralized. After the German disasters on the Western Front at the beginning of August, their mood became mutinous, although it was not until October that open disorders broke out among the German troops in Kharkov, when certain battalions refused transfer to the Western Front.

The German official source (*Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*), published in 1936 with a Preface by Generals Blomberg and von Beck, describes the gradual demoralization of the Occupation troops in the Ukraine. The police functions which fell to the lot of the German troops undermined their morale in the existing situation. Too great temptations existed for soldiers employed in the collection of supplies. 'Illegal commerce and speculation flourished, and it was exceedingly difficult for the military authorities to prevent this on account of the troops being scattered over a vast territory and on account of the necessity of maintaining innumerable small posts. The conduct of isolated German detachments destroyed the prestige of the Occupation troops in the eyes of the local population. Even the authorized trading, the object of which was the despatch of parcels of food to their homes, brought the soldiers into undesirable contact with the population—especially with Jews who had most of this commerce in their hands. Jews were frequently the transmitters of Bolshevik propaganda' (*Rückführung*, pp. 5–6).

The same source gives a gloomy description of the Hetman's Government: 'Unfortunately Hetman Skoropadsky ruled in the Ukraine only with the support of German bayonets. His Government had neither the required authority nor the energy to take drastic measures for restoring law and order in the country. The majority of the population distrusted him on account of his monarchical and pro-Russian tendencies and on account of his support of important landowners. That population stood either for a Republic and friendship with the Entente or simply for the Bolsheviks. The peasants were clamouring most of all for a solution of the agrarian problem, the decision of which the Hetman's Government could not take upon itself. To judge by the beginning made, it was scarcely possible to form a Hetman's army. There were too many officers and too few soldiers—especially too few of those soldiers who later turned out trustworthy' (*ibid.* pp. 8–9). 642

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642 727 Already in the month of April, before the *Rada* fell, peasant risings had flared up in the Governments of Kiev and Poltava in answer to German expeditions in search of supplies. Under Skoropadsky the execution of Eichhorn's Order was carried through in a firmer fashion—with the aid of German detachments; but it was accompanied with extremely dangerous moral consequences, not only for the Occupation troops but also for the Ukrainian Government. In many cases landowners applied to the Hetman for the re-establishment of their rights of property or for the restoration of order in their localities, but the Hetman, who had no trusty police force nor army of his own, had to ask the Occupation authorities for the aid of their troops. This was not refused, since the interest of the landowners coincided with that of the German Command. Among the peasants were many ex-soldiers who had left the Front, but who had taken their rifles with them. Shots were fired sometimes, and heavy reprisals followed on the spot, or at least arrests and military tribunals. There is nothing more perilous for any Government than 'to enforce order' with the aid of foreign soldiers. After two or three months the rural population, including the more prosperous peasants, were unanimous in their hatred of the Hetman and the Germans. Attacks on small German posts guarding railway stations, bridges and depots became more frequent. German soldiers disappeared through shots fired round a corner or the sudden thrust of a knife. These incidents caused fear and anger among the German soldiers—not so much against the local inhabitants as against their own commanders. The Hetman's Government contributed to the 'revolutionizing' of the Ukraine and, indirectly, to that of the Army of Occupation. (6)

727 Eichhorn and Skoropadsky were criticized in some Austro-German circles. The Austrians were displeased in part that a Russian general and not an Austrian Archduke should have been put at the head of the Ukrainian realm. They were also suspicious of ultimate German designs on the Ukraine, since they considered that this territory should properly be regarded as within the sphere of Habsburg policy. On 13 June General Waldstetter wrote in a secret report to Vienna that 'Germany pursues in the Ukraine definite economic and political objectives. She wants to keep for ever a safe way open to Mesopotamia and Arabia through Baku and Persia. The way to the East goes through Kiev, Ekaterinoslav and Sevastopol and from there by sea to Batum and Trebizond.' Somewhat later the Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Occupation troops, General Kraus, reported to his Government: 'On the one hand the German Command is consciously upholding the Mon-

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archical movement, and on the other hand the German Mi[illegible]r Resident Mumm is doing all he can to democratize the Ukraine. [illegible] the whole they want to isolate from us both the conservative and le[illegible] elements and enforce their own influence.' In his turn Mumm complained of the Austrians to Berlin: 'They are trying to secure the complete independence from the Kiev Government of that part of the Ukraine which is occupied by Austro-Hungarian troops.'

It is difficult to ascertain what in reality were the German plans for the future of the Ukraine during the summer of 1918. The High Command did not look very far ahead and believed with justice that the future of the Ukraine was being decided on the battlefields of France. When, in August, Lüdendorff ceased to believe in ultimate victory, he lost all interest in the Ukraine. Of course in those circles whose function it was to study the political and economic problems of the war (typical of which was the noted economist Dr Rohrbach who had been in Kiev) were discussed those theories which linked the destinies of the Ukraine 'for ever' with Germany. The Emperor William, in his missive to the *atamen* of the Don Cossacks, General Krasnov, expressed his own views on the future of Russia, which was to be divided into four independent states—'the Ukraine', 'the South-Eastern Union', 'Central Russia' and 'Siberia'. These views, by the way, were very far from what the patriotic advocates of a 'Russia one and indivisible' were at that time hoping for from the German Emperor.

In September the Emperor received the Hetman at his Headquarters in Spa with all the honours due to 'the head of an independent state'. The visit, however, did not contribute to raise the prestige of Skoropadsky.

Eichhorn, Skoropadsky and Mumm were also criticized by General Hoffmann and Dr Rohrbach. In their opinion, the policy of Eichhorn, supported by Lüdendorff, was pushing the Ukraine back into the arms of Russia. These critics, however, failed to take notice of the more evident danger of the presence in Kiev of a Soviet delegation, with Rakovski or Manuilsky at its head, which had appeared on the pretext of concluding the peace negotiations between the Soviets and the Hetman's Government. Professor Mohilansky writes in his memoirs (*Archives of the Russian Revolution*, vol. XI) that the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior 'possessed numerous documents which testified with absolute certainty that the Bolshevik delegation in Kiev was spreading Bolshevik propaganda in the Ukraine and spent millions in organizing railway strikes and armed revolts. At the beginning of September the Minister of the Interior made a report to the Council of Ministers to the effect that

•727 the Germans put obstacles in his way when the question came to arresting Bolsheviks well known for their activities and even demanded that he should set at liberty those who were under arrest.'

The assassination of Field-Marshal Eichhorn by a Ukrainian terrorist on 30 July failed to sting the Germans into modifying the cautious and even conciliatory policy which they had adopted towards the Soviets. At the same time the Field-Marshal's successor, General Kirchbach, lacked his personal influence and had not the prestige necessary to counter the doubtful intrigues of Baron Mumm. The latter continued to have relations (directly or through the German Consulate) with the representatives of the *Rada*. He insisted that the Hetman's Government should set at liberty Simon Petlyura and other politicians who had been arrested.(7)

727 668 Intently watching and stimulating the growing unpopularity of the Hetman among the peasantry, the representatives of the Ukrainian Socialist parties organized themselves in the 'National Union', to the head of which Vinnichenko was elected. When this had been done, the Union, acting through the German authorities, began to try to secure the admission of some of their members to participation in the Government. Baron Mumm evidently very much doubted the solidity of Skoropadsky's position. At last the German Foreign Office, convinced by his reports, sent Mumm, on 10 October, categorical instructions to support 'the National Ukrainian Movement' and to 'ukrainize' the Government.

727 668 In October, however, it was plainly evident that the Austro-German Occupation could not endure for many weeks. In that month tempestuous national risings broke out in different parts of the Habsburg Monarchy and the ancient Danubian Empire appeared to be on the verge of dissolution. When the news reached the Austro-Hungarian troops in the Ukraine an irresistible movement swept the ranks for immediate return to their own country. The official German source describes how at the beginning of November disorderly crowds of Austrian soldiers in trains and on foot were going west selling their arms and munitions to the local population. 'A regiment consisting of Italians arrested the Commander and Staff of its Army Corps and declared them to be prisoners of war.' The Germans hastily sent the 7th Landwehr (Württemberg) Division to Odessa in order to clear the town of mutinous Austrian soldiers.

But the officers of the German Army of Occupation did not have to wait long to drain their own cup of bitterness. On 9 November came the news by radio that the Emperor William had abdicated; on the next day that Ebert had formed a Government and that the

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soldiers were electing Soviets; and on the 11th that an armistice had been signed on the Western Front. 727 668

The question of the evacuation of the German troops immediately arose and it was clear that this would present enormous difficulties. Lvov was seized by Galician Ukrainians; Lublin and Warsaw by the Poles: neither were willing to let troop trains through. From Kiev only one line of railway remained: Kovel-Brest-Litovsk-Belostok.

The news of the crash of the German Front in the West and of the impending evacuation of the Ukraine by the Germans was naturally the signal for a Ukrainian movement directed against the Hetman's Government. On 20 November, during street riots in Kiev, twenty people were killed. A whole Ukrainian Division declared itself against the Hetman and began to march from Konotop on Kiev; it was stopped by German troops. Large bands of 'Reds' appeared near Kharkov. New Russia was swarming with brigands who had armed themselves with what the Austrians had left behind. This was only the beginning.

The principal politicians of the 'National Union' were also on the alert and each of them acted according to his disposition. Vinnichenko formed a 'Directoria' of five members from the different Ukrainian Socialist parties, while Petlyura hastened to Belaya Tserkov, where he easily raised a mutiny against the Hetman in the crack regiment which had been christened with the romantic name of 'The Zaporogian Sech Rifles' and which had been recruited largely out of the Russian war prisoners from Rastatt who had been given the 'special education in the Ukrainian spirit'.

§4. *DIE RÜCKFÜHRUNG DES OSTHEERES*

Between Petlyura and Vinnichenko dissensions immediately arose not only on questions of principle: they were personal enemies. Vinnichenko wanted the Ukraine to be proclaimed a 'State of Workers and Peasants', but not subject to Moscow. Petlyura turned out to be a politician of a more practical turn of mind: he understood well enough that it would not be long before the Moscow Soviets would swallow up Vinnichenko's Ukraine. He also understood that it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to conciliate the sympathy and interest of the Entente powers if the Ukrainian nationalists were to gain sufficient time to establish any sort of stable régime. Petlyura was not a bad organizer and his firmness made him popular with the soldiers. Therefore he was the master of the situation. 642

Partly in consequence of Petlyura's 'Universal' and partly in response to Vinnichenko's proclamations which were plastered all over 669

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which had been set up in Kiev and which openly sympathized with the Bolsheviks. Finally, on 28 November 1918, Skoropadsky, gambling on Hainnot's promises and on the understanding between the Entente and the Volunteer Army, issued a proclamation in which he declared the Ukraine to be a part of 'the great Russian realm'. He was too late to save either himself or the conservative interest in Kiev. 642

Ukrainian detachments were approaching Kiev from all sides. As early as 15–20 November all sorts of *atamans* and 'colonels' had occupied Kharkov and Poltava and even Rovno to the west of Kiev. On 19 November remnants of the army which remained loyal to the Hetman were defeated at Vasilkov by the 'Petlyurians'. Kiev would have been taken if the Germans had not been ready to defend it. 669 727

Notwithstanding the almost complete collapse of discipline among the troops of the German Occupation, some grounds for collaboration had been found between the Soldiers' Soviets and the Command. 'Only one impulse reigned among the troops, every soldier had only one thought: "Home! Home! Home!—at any price!"' (*Rückführung*, p. 40). The winter had set in, snow had fallen and the horrors of Napoleon's retreat haunted the minds of the Germans. The officers had little difficulty in persuading the men that it was necessary to hold Kiev for the time being as a centre from which the evacuation could be organized.

But the defence of Kiev and other large towns and important railway junctions by the Germans was interpreted by the population as a continued support of the Hetman. By spreading its propaganda against Skoropadsky the 'Directoria' was exciting the people against the Germans; in fact the association and exploitation of the two hatreds secured the maximum number of adherents for Petlyura. The peasants had many accounts to settle with the Germans, while considerations of a material order were eloquent enough. The rumour circulated that the Germans who were leaving the Ukraine were taking away with them a lot of money and great quantities of goods. There was an overwhelming desire not to allow them to do this and to take away from them all that they had appropriated. A logical development of this train of thought was the decision to deprive the Germans of their weapons and munitions: their artillery and machine-guns, rifles, lorries, carts, horses—and finally even their warm clothing and their money.

Attacks on railway stations began in many districts with the object of preventing the evacuation of the German troops. The German Command soon realized that under such conditions it had become an utter impossibility to organize the evacuation even along the lines

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669 which were still available after the events in Poland: Kiev-Kovel-
727 Brest-Litovsk (for the 20th Army Corps and the 22nd and 27th Reserve Corps); and Bakhmach-Pinsk-Brest-Litovsk (for the 1st Army Corps and the 41st Reserve Corps). It became an absolute necessity to come to an agreement with Petlyura, and such an agreement was concluded on 2 December in Kiev. An 'armistice' was arranged during the duration of which the 'Directoria' undertook to make itself responsible for the organization of transport facilities. But with all the goodwill in the world Petlyura and the members of the 'Directoria' were able to give little real assistance in that direction —and that little only in the immediate neighbourhood of Kiev. In other parts of the Ukraine the struggle against the retreating Germans continued to assume more and more violent forms. In Kharkov *atamian* Barbashev and his staff had to be arrested before the Germans could board the promised train. At the important junctions of Bakhmach and Kasatin, the gangs in control continued to refuse to allow trains to pass through *en route* for Kovel and Homel. 'It was simply by a miracle that, up to 12 December, we succeeded in despatching 126 trains' (*Rückführung*). By this time skirmishes between German detachments and the local population had spread all over the Ukraine.

The numerous Ukrainian bands in Volhynia became a real danger to the Germans. Fighting took place 'with changing luck' in Berdichev, where a Bavarian Brigade beat back successive attacks by strong 'Petlyurian' forces. At the station of Zhmerinka the 'Petlyurians' defeated two Landwehr cavalry regiments with a loss of more than 200 killed and wounded. The disorganized Germans were disarmed and driven away from the railway line in the direction of the Galician frontier. On 7–8 December hot encounters took place for the stations of Sarny, Iskorost and Birzula. The Germans took several thousands of prisoners, but it was difficult to know what to do with them for, if set free, they would join new bands and reappear in a few days.

On 6 December *pourparlers* with Petlyura were renewed, and on the 11th, at the station of Kasatin, a definite agreement was concluded. Petlyura insisted with some reason that if his troops were to obey him it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to return to its capital —Kiev. A peaceful continuation of the German evacuation could only be procured by the immediate surrender of Kiev to the Ukrainians.

642 The first consequence of the Kasatin Agreement was the resignation of the Hetman and his Government. On 14 December, after a short affair with the remaining troops of the Hetman, the ragged

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bands of the 'Directoria' under the command of Colonel Konovalets entered Kiev. In their wake, on the 19th, arrived the 'Directoria' with Petlyura and Vinnichenko at its head. 642

During the Kasatin *pourparlers* the German Command had considered it a question of honour to stipulate that the Russian officers and men who were serving the Hetman should be allowed to go free after surrendering their arms. This condition was only partly kept. Some officers, among them General Count Keller, who had tried to organize resistance in the town itself, were shot on the spot. Another five hundred officers were arrested and kept prisoners in the Kiev Museum. Later they were divided into groups and distributed among different prisons; a number of them, under pretext that they had tried to escape, faced firing squads; after 29 December those who remained alive were sent off to Germany (*Rückführung*, p. 52). 669 727

The surrender of Kiev resulted in a change for the better in the conditions of the German evacuation. The Germans had to accept certain limitations on the disposal of military stores: the troops were allowed to take with them only machine-guns for one company in every regiment; guns for three batteries in every artillery regiment, etc. The balance had to be 'delivered to the Ukrainian Army'.

By the end of December the Command of the former *Heeresgruppe Kiev* had migrated first to Kovel and then to Brest-Litovsk. The evacuation was proceeding almost normally, although in some localities the troop trains were attacked and disarmed, and often the Germans could only secure uninterrupted passage by the payment of large sums of money. By the middle of January the bulk of the Army of Occupation had quitted the territory of the Ukraine, and was concentrated in the railway triangle: Brest-Litovsk-Pinsk-Kovel. But troops in left-bank Ukraine were still having a difficult time because the Bolsheviks had appeared there as rivals to the 'Directoria'.

On 9 November, when the first news arrived of the German Revolution, Lenin had denounced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. As a result, both the Ukraine of the Hetman and the Ukraine of the 'Directoria' found themselves in a state of war with the Soviets. The Bolsheviks had adherents enough in left-bank Ukraine and the industrial centres of New Russia: already in November they tried to take Poltava; at Ekaterinoslav, after the Austrians left, the Red Republic was proclaimed; and Soviets were set up in the mining towns of the Donets upon the departure of the Germans. At Kharkov the Staff of the 1st Army Corps and a certain number of German troops remained, but these could not protect the officials of the 'Directoria' when, on 3 January 1919, 8000 armed 'Reds' entered the city. The Germans in Kharkov found themselves in a parlous

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position, since they could no longer move westward owing to the state of war between the Soviets and the Ukrainians which existed all along the railway lines. There was talk about taking a south-easterly direction and going to the Don Cossacks. At last the Soviets gave permission for the Germans to go by a round-about way passing through Kursk, Orel, Polotsk. The Soviet authorities and the population of the 'Red' towns through which the Germans passed inundated the homing soldiers with propaganda and plagued them with organized 'fraternizing'. The morale of these men suffered far more than had that of their fellows from the anarchic attacks of the 'Petlyurians', and the dissolution of discipline and general demoralization reached a pitch unknown among the troops who had had to fight their way out through hundreds of miles of hostile country.

§5. ANARCHY IN THE UKRAINE: SIMON PETLYURA AND 'BATKO' MAKHNO

Having entered Kiev on 19 December, the 'Directoria' did not enjoy its triumph for long. Just as a year before in the anxious but not unprofitable days of Brest-Litovsk, 'Red' forces were moving on the Ukrainian capital. They were converging from three directions: through Konotop, through Poltava, and along the right bank of the Dniepr. At the same time the Poles—the most ancient enemies of Ukrainian nationality—with their own independence scarcely two months old were threatening all the western provinces.

Early in December an armed conflict had broken out between the Galician Ukrainians who wished to exercise the widely proclaimed right of self-determination and the Poles who looked upon Galicia as 'historically a Polish province'. The Poles had possessed themselves of the district of Kholm, promised once upon a time at Brest-Litovsk to the Ukrainians, and they were taking advantage of the opportunity of broadening its boundaries by infringing on the territory of the former Russian Government of Volhynia. Polish detachments had encounters, towards the middle of January, in the neighbourhood of Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynsk with 'Petlyurian' bands who until then had been more agreeably employed in holding up returning German troop-trains.

During the same weeks the 'Western Ukrainian Republic', proclaimed two months earlier in Lvov, got into a very critical position. The relatively weak Polish forces, collected in former Russian Poland after the Armistice, had now been reinforced by the highly trained and excellently disciplined army of General Haller

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formed in France out of prisoners of war who had been captured or who had deserted from the German and Austrian Armies. The armed forces at the disposal of the Polish Government now amounted to some 80,000 men. The whole of Galicia was occupied without much resistance, and after some street fighting the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' was driven out of Lvov. 669 727

The fugitive Government of this 'Republic' sought the aid of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic', and on 23 January the 'Directoria' proclaimed in solemn session 'the union' of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' with the Ukraine. But on the evening of the same day the first mounted patrols of Antonov-Ovseenko entered Kiev. The 'Directoria' surrendered its capital without a struggle and fled to Vinnitsa. This body, on which so much eloquence had been expended and which had shown always such little capacity, now went completely to pieces. When it left Vinnitsa and established itself in Rovno until the arrival of the Bolsheviks there in April, Vinnichenko used to say jokingly: 'The Directoria is a railway carriage and under that carriage is all its territory!' Petlyura, however, went to Kamenets-Podolsk, and at this point on the former Russian frontier the remnants of the Galician troops of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' concentrated after their expulsion from Lvov.

The commanders of the Bolshevik forces did not take much interest in them, since at that time they were occupied in trying to gain possession of the ports along the Black Sea coast.

An extraordinary medley of events had been taking place in Odessa. The 7th German Landwehr Division, sent there in November to take over from the absconding Austrians, was duly cut off from Kiev and found that it could not fight its way through the swarms of 'Petlyurians' who were occupying the station of Birzula. Marching was out of the question owing to the snow-storms and the horrible state of the roads. British and French warships appeared in the harbour rather later in the month, but without disembarking any troops. Encouraged by their presence, the numerous Russian and Polish ex-officers in the city formed national detachments; but on 11 December important Ukrainian forces appeared in the suburbs. The Russian and Polish detachments took refuge in the port under the protection of the Allied naval guns. A week later transports arrived and landed a corps of French troops under General Borius. Hot street fighting began, and the French, with the Russians and Poles, drove the 'Petlyurians' out of the city.

Meantime the Germans were trying to remain strictly neutral. During the previous week the bulk of the Landwehr Division had

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669 succeeded in getting away, but there still remained in Odessa
727 about 1600 German troops and a battery of field artillery. The 15th Landwehr Division in Nikolaev was in the same position: it too was cut off from communication with the German Command in Kiev.

French troops were now quartered in Odessa as well as all sorts of national volunteer formations—Russian, Polish and even Roumanian. Greek troops had disembarked at Kherson. The command was vested in the French General d'Anselm, who proceeded to entrust the 15th German Landwehr Division with the maintenance of law and order in Nikolaev.

'Petlyurian' troops and all sorts of *atamans*' detachments and brigand bands had cut off the cities of the coast from the rest of the Ukraine. After the flight of the 'Directoria' from Kiev, the 'Petlyurian' Colonel Grigoriev, who had gone over to the Bolsheviks, became for a time the dominant figure in that strange hinterland of anarchy. In the second half of February all the attempts of the French and the Volunteers to drive away Grigoriev's men from the immediate vicinity of Odessa and to enlarge the zone of occupation ended in failure. During the fighting at Berezovka the French soldiers of the 156th Division showed very little taste for a conflict which they did not understand. Seven tanks which had got stuck in the New Russian mud were left on the battlefield.

This event lent courage to Grigoriev's Bolsheviks, who on 3–5 March made an attempt to attack Nikolaev and Kherson, but were beaten back by a German armoured train. On 9 March Kherson was again attacked by 'Red' forces; the Greek troops in occupation hastened to evacuate the town and embark in their ships and Kherson fell to the Soviets. On 10 March began the evacuation by sea of the 7th Landwehr Division from Odessa and of the 15th Landwehr Division from Nikolaev. In the latter city the bands of Grigoriev entered the burning suburbs while the Germans were still embarking. No one knew what fate would befall Odessa, but on 2 April General d'Anselm received orders from Paris to evacuate. *Ataman* Grigoriev then 'took Odessa'. His troops did not amount to more than 2000 men. An enormous booty of military stores fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

669 These easy triumphs in the ports of the Black Sea did not consolidate the position of the Soviets, which was becoming really critical during the months of May and June 1919. It is true that beyond the Volga the imprudent advance during the spring of Admiral Kolchak's Siberian troops had ended in the defeat of the 'White' forces; at the same time, however, the Volunteer Army

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with the period March–November 1917. A series of interesting articles on the subject from the pen of Milyukov has been published recently in the Parisian Russian daily newspaper *Poslednyia Novosti* (The Latest News), 19 March–1 April 1939. For the Ukrainian point of view see D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy* (1917–23), Uzhhorod, 1935; Vinnichenko, *Vozrozhdenie Natsii* (The Resurrection of a Nation), vols. I–III, Vienna, 1925. 113

(4) *The Ukrainians at Brest-Litovsk*

A vivid description of the course of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and of the part played by the delegates of the *Rada* is given in the scholarly work of J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*, London, 1938. An Appendix gives the text of the Peace Treaty with the Ukraine, and a valuable Bibliography is included.

The reminiscences of the leading personalities at Brest-Litovsk have been published in English translations: Hoffmann, *War Diaries and Other Papers*, London, 1929; Czernin, *In the World War*, London, 1919; Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk*, London, 1919; *My Life*, London, 1935.

(5) *The First 'Siege' of Kiev by the Bolsheviks*

This 'siege' continued for about ten days—from 30 January to 8 February 1918. The first Bolshevik detachments approached the city from the left bank of the Dniepr. The city is situated on the high right bank and presented a perfect target for the Red artillery. Most of the damage was done by an armoured train mounting naval guns, which destroyed, among other architectural features, the block of flats built by Professor Hrushevsky when he decided to settle in the city. When other Bolshevik detachments and the 'Ukrainian regiments' which had gone over to them appeared on the right bank, further resistance became impossible. The brunt of the defence was borne, not by the supporters of Holubovich and Vinnichenko, but by volunteer detachments consisting of officers, students and even schoolboys; many young lives were lost. 669

(6) *The Austro-German Occupation of the Ukraine and the Régime of Skoropadsky*

Most interesting material is revealed in the documents published by the Soviets in an anonymous book entitled *Krakh Nemetskoy Okkupatsii na Ukraine: Sbornik Dokumentov izdannykh Gosizdatom* (The Crash of the German Occupation in the Ukraine: Collection of Documents published by the State Publishing Organization), Moscow, 1936. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of these documents which fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks after they occupied Kiev (some of the documents are reproduced in facsimile). It will be difficult, however, for the reader to agree with the deductions made by the Soviet editor. He affirms, for instance, that the Occupation troops were unable to deal with the resistance of 'the great popular masses', and that whole German divisions were employed in putting down workmen's strikes and peasant risings. These assertions are not confirmed by any document. In the documents reference is only made to the assassination of 727 642 113

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isolated landowners and to the sending of punitive detachments to certain districts.

The principal reason for the downfall of the German occupation of the Ukraine was, of course, the defeat of the German Armies on the Western Front. The 8th of August is the date which marks a break in the frame of mind of the German Command in Kiev. This can be noted in the documents published in Germany: *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*, Berlin, 1936.

Wheeler-Bennett describes the situation in the Ukraine in these terms: 'The early months of the Skoropadsky regime were marked by a substantial economic revival; the landowners, industrialists and bourgeois being anxious to co-operate with the new government and the agencies of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.... Passive resistance in certain districts was coupled with acts of sabotage in others. In Odessa an aeroplane factory was set on fire, numerous munition dumps were exploded and trains wrecked.'

See also on the same subject: Pierre Brégy and Prince Serge Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, Paris, 1939, pp. 207–8. (Eng. translation, London, 1940.)

(7) *Activities of the Bolshevik 'Peace Delegation' in Kiev*

727

The German authorities were well informed of the subversive activities of the Soviet 'Peace Delegation' in Kiev, but they ignored them—as they ignored the assassination of their Ambassador, Count Mirbach in Moscow, and of their Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Eichhorn in Kiev, in order to avoid the precipitation of a further conflict with the Soviet Government at the moment of crisis on the Western Front. In order to produce incontrovertible proof of the Soviet activities, the Hetman's Minister of the Interior, Igor Kistyanovsky, had recourse to a very original mode of action. With the aid of the Ukrainian police, he arranged 'a brigands' attack on the train in which Rakovski and Manuilsky were returning to Moscow. In order to give reality to the attack 'the brigands' confiscated all the valuables and personal possessions of the two delegates, together with the mass of compromising documents which Kistyanovsky desired to lay hands on and which he afterwards presented to Baron Mumm for perusal. The revelations failed, however, to change the German attitude.

(8) *Revolution and Civil War in the Ukraine*, 1919–20

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Ukrainian historians of the Revolution and Civil War are often exceedingly biased in their accounts of military operations; see, for instance, Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy*, quoted above. General Denikin, also, cannot set aside his prejudices in writing of the 'Petlyurians' who not infrequently fought on his side against the Soviet forces; see General A. Denikin, *Ocherki Russkoy Smuty* (Sketches of the Russian Trouble), vols. I–V, Berlin, 1925–9.

Much interesting material concerning the Volunteer Army is to be found in the almanack published in Berlin: *Beloe Delo* (The White Cause), vols. I–VI, 1924–7. In the Soviet periodical, *Voyna i Revolutsia* (War and Revolution), 1932–5, many episodes of the fighting against the 'Whites', the 'Petlyurians' and the Poles are described.

For the Anglo-French intervention see James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia*, 1918, Baltimore, 1936.

On August 1, the Germans made a new division of the country 648
and assigned the whole of Galicia to the Polish Government General. 727
At the same time they returned Bukovyna and Bessarabia to Rumania and then set up a new section around Odesa under the name of Transdnistria which they likewise placed under Rumania. It was in vain that the Ukrainians who tried to organize their own national rada in Kiev protested against such actions, for their protests were not received and the Nazis went on with their policy of ignoring all the wishes of the population.

Later in the month, the Germans established the Reichskom- 727
missariat of Ukraine and placed it under the control of a fanatical 661
Nazi, Erich Koch, who set himself during the next years to crush anything and everything that was done to aid the Ukrainians and to win for himself the detested title of the butcher of Ukraine.

In the early months of the German occupation and especially [727]
during the period of rapid military movements, much was done for the rebuilding of the country after the ravages of the Bolsheviks. Nearly 115 Ukrainian newspapers were established, plans were made for the opening of schools and during the transition from the military rule to the rule of Koch, the Ukrainian agents were in the front ranks of the German army, spreading their propaganda and trying to rouse the population against the Bolsheviks.

Yet this work did not please the Germans. Everywhere in eastern Europe the old governments that had been suppressed by the Bolsheviks tried to recreate themselves but everywhere there came the arrests of these leaders and their deportation, so that it was not many months before the sober thought of the liberated peoples turned against the new occupants and the people realized that their hopes were going to be in vain. By the end of 1941, it had been made clear to them that there would be no relaxation of the pressure exerted upon them.

In the Reichskommissariat which, in fact, represented little more than the right bank of the Dnieper area, for the army retained the control over the regions to the east of the river, it speedily became impossible for the Ukrainians to improve their own condition. The Germans were guided by a strictly logical program.

727 661 [241] Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

[538] [466] By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

668 These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba—Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

668 725 This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

668 tried to break this up but they were unsuccessful and the police
725 battalion which was assigned to the operation was destroyed. Out of this Conference developed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations which adopted as its program, "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual."

[701] It would take too long to describe the actual nature of the military operations which the U. P. A. carried on. At the height of its power it controlled more than 200,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory and numbered some 220,000 soldiers divided into four main bands: the U. P. A. North, operating in Polissya and northern Volynia; the U. P. A.—West in Eastern Galicia and Kholmshchyna; the U. P. A. —South in northern Bukovyna and the provinces of Kamyanets Podilsky and Vinnytsya; and the U. P. A.—East north of Kiev and Zhytomyr. There were separate detachments in most of the cities and important towns.

[661] To oppose its operations, the Germans resorted to mass executions and on more than one occasion detached forces of one or two divisions to try to destroy its centres. These attempts failed and the U. P. A. by its constant efforts played an important part in isolating the German forces, upsetting their communications and sapping their strength. All this was very costly, for after every major blow the Germans executed large numbers of innocent Ukrainians as their one weapon against the movement.

At first there was relative peace in Galicia, but in the summer of 1943 a Soviet partisan detachment entered the province. The Germans took little action and the U. P. A. came to the support of the population and soon had established strong centres in the Carpathian Mountains, where the difficult terrain facilitated their maintenance of strong positions.

[727] The Germans in the beginning did not want to admit that their policy toward the Ukrainians had evoked such a strong response. Koch and his associates were only too willing to believe that the Ukrainians were an inferior race, undeserving of education or of consideration and they went out of their way to label the U. P. A. the product of Communist intrigue and a movement of support for the Jews, etc.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Ukraine After World War II

At the conclusion of World War II, Stalin and the officials 000
of the USSR were ready for the next step. They had satisfactorily fooled the Western powers, they had entered the UkSSR and the Byelorussian SSR in the United Nations and they had secured from the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the British Commonwealth of Nations the right to return (by force, if necessary) persons with USSR citizenship. They had decorated the Allied leaders with medals commemorating the Russian conquerors of the past and they were ready to move ahead. They were sure that no one would care to ask about the fate of the unfortunate victims of the German slave camps because every American and Western civil or military authority of high rank had become convinced of the humaneness of Stalin and his group.

The Ukraine had been thoroughly devastated, as we have seen. 433
Its factories and its fields had been laid waste. That part of its 642
machinery which had not been wantonly destroyed by one of the 727
two contesting invaders had been carted to work outside of the UkSSR. But even so, Ukraine was not quiet.

The population, even that part which had been more favorably disposed to the Soviets because of the persecution by the Nazis, had hoped that with the return of peace and the Soviet victory there might be an improvement in living conditions, an increase of consumer goods, a relaxation of some of the austerity that had marked the years before 1941. They were almost at once to be disillusioned, for they very soon found that out of the scanty stores of food which they had preserved from the greedy Nazis they were supposed to make generous gifts for the benefit of Stalin and the elder

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.

● 727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "warmongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representa-
[701] tive in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

Western world, the Soviet Union conferred upon the Ukrainian 631
Soviet Republic the right to have its own anthem and its own 648
national flag.

These actions were not to be interpreted as a concession from Moscow, although they were presented in that guise. They were rather intended to strengthen the Soviet position in international affairs and by an appearance of generosity to facilitate the reduction of the satellite states to the same position as that held by the Union Republics. In this sense they were a response to the centralizing tendencies which were now to be expressed in a still stronger form.

As soon as hostilities ended and even before the Soviets were 665
assured of all their hopes, they began to purge again the Ukrainian 661
Communist Party and within a few months some 38% of the high officials were removed on the ground of bourgeois nationalism. All those who had not retreated to the east or could not show that they were working throughout the war as zealous Soviet partisans were summarily exiled as bourgeois nationalists. In the same way, when the enforced return of displaced persons began under the Yalta Agreement, very few were allowed to return to their homes. The vast majority were either executed for surrendering to the Germans or were sent to the labor camps in the far north and east for reeducation.

The Fourth Five Year Plan which was commenced in 1946 727 ●
was very definitely devoted to the restoration of the country after the ravages of the war and to the increase of the Soviet capacity for defense. It was only in Ukraine and Byelorussia that the restoration had to absorb the energies of a considerable majority of the population, for while there were areas in the neighborhood of Leningrad and Stalingrad which had been badly devastated, the situation in the Ukraine was far worse. The cities and factories had been destroyed, the mines had been flooded and the population were living as best they might among the ruins which had been left by the two invading armies.

At the same time the work of restoration went very slowly. [316]
Less than one third of the miners of the Donbas had returned to

727 their posts and the vast majority of those who were Communists
316 received more or less sinecures above ground. Their places were
[466] taken by forcing the Ukrainian peasants, including a large percentage of young girls, to work in the pits with the minimum of safeguards. Little money was appropriated for the restoration of the damaged housing, for as the writer Korniychuk declared in one of his works, "Ukraine was so thankful for the success of Stalin that they did not care how they lived, for if he had perished, life would not be worth living under any circumstances."

727 With this attitude prominently emphasized by the leading propagandists, it is easy to see that the resources and energies of the population were directed by force rather toward those items that would advance the importance and the convenience of Moscow, than those that would be of advantage to the local population.

[496] The one exception was the necessity for rebuilding immediately and strengthening the railroad communications between the Donbas, Moscow, Leningrad and the Black Sea ports—in other words, the extreme eastern part of the Ukraine which was slated for a special development with roads and railroads linking the country up with the Russian centres rather than with the other Ukrainian centres to the west for these were regarded as exposed centres in case of a new outbreak of hostilities and were to be neglected until they were masked by the extension of Soviet power over the satellite countries.

474 The collectivized agriculture was in little better shape. In
341 that part of the Ukraine which had been under Soviet control before 1939, the authorities revived the collective farms but they had been so badly ruined that at first the authorities were often willing to be more considerate of the members. Immediately after the war they allowed them to group themselves into links or permanent sections of some eight to ten people who would thus come to feel themselves a distinct unit in the collective farm. It did not take long for the more rigid Communists to decide that this sense of permanence was in a way a defiance of the principles of collectivization, for very often members of the same household, if it were at all numerous, would group themselves into a link. In such cases the link became more prosperous, for it was in a way

795 to recognize the Moscow organization, which was coming into favor with Stalin because of its increasing subservience to the Soviet regime. On the other hand, Metropolitan Dionysy, who had been in that part of Ukraine that was included in the Polish Government General, now threw off any attempt at concealment and revived the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, which this time was provided with canonical orders in all grades. He consecrated two new Ukrainian bishops, Ilarion (O. Ohienko) for Kholm and Podlyasie and Palady (Vedybida-Rudemko) for Krakow and Lemkivshchyna.

This marked a new period and when the Germans attacked the USSR in 1941 and occupied it, Polykarp joined them, while Oleksy set up still another group, the Ukrainian Autonomous Church, for he refused to break his connections with Moscow.

795 659 The German permission for the formation in 1942 of a central organization was frankly ambiguous. On the one hand, they were glad of any movement that would rouse the people against Moscow. ●[727] On the other, in religion as in politics, they were opposed to any movement which would prevent them from carrying out their policy of treating the Ukrainians as a subject and inferior race. As a result, they put every obstacle in the way of a reconciliation between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous groups and threw their support to whichever was the weaker in any given area.

The open support of the Soviet government by Sergy and his associates now under the pressure of war paid off. His protestations of sympathy for Stalin and the Russians were rewarded with medals and other honors. Then, in the autumn of 1943, as the final step in the process, Stalin gave permission for the restoration of the Patriarchate in Moscow and Sergy was duly installed. On his death in 1944, he was succeeded by Aleksey, the former Archbishop of Leningrad, the present Patriarch, and under his leadership the Russian Orthodox Church has embarked upon a policy of securing control for the Soviets of all other Orthodox Churches.

795 In the meanwhile, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church during the war displayed great activity in the occupied Ukraine. It speedily won the support of most of the clergy who were not in

p. 3

I. THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM

●[7b] DURING the summer and autumn of 1941 the German armies rolled across the plains of the Ukraine; by November the entire Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was in their hands. Observers everywhere were aware of the significance of the conquest of [241] this huge area with its thirty-five million inhabitants. The agricultural wealth of the Ukraine, famous as the "granary of the USSR," the gigantic industrial complex of the Donets basin, and the rich mineral deposits were weighed in appraising the loss of the Soviet Union and the gain of Germany. While the political effects of the conquest received less attention at the time, in some ways they were even more important than the economic effects.

186 While there is a tradition of separate political development in the Ukraine,[1] modern nationalism—the doctrine that persons of a distinctive culture should constitute an independent state—came late to the area. To a close observer, the first stirrings of nationalism among educated groups in the Ukraine would have been apparent early in the nineteenth century, and by the middle [538] of that century Taras Shevchenko, the greatest name in Ukrainian literature, was giving poetic expression to nationalist aspirations. It was considerably later, however, that definitely political [668*] organizations were formed to establish the claim of the Ukraine to nationhood.[2] For the student of contemporary politics, it is precisely this late emergence of Ukrainian nationalism which

[1] The term "Ukraine" is used throughout this study (except in cases when another meaning is clearly implied) to refer to the territory comprised in the Ukrainian SSR in 1945. Essentially the same area (with the exception of the Carpatho-Ukraine, which is discussed briefly at several points in this study) was included in the Ukrainian SSR in 1941. This territory corresponds fairly closely—except, as noted in Chapter XI, in the east—to the Ukrainian "ethnographical" territory, the area in which the indigenous population speaks Ukrainian.

[2] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 12.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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V. REPRESSION AND REICHSKOMMISSARIAT

THE DRASTIC MEASURES taken by the Germans against the Bandera forces seemingly had cleared the field for the activity of the OUN-M. Like the apparent advantage gained by Bandera's group in the early summer, this opportunity soon proved to be an illusion. For some two months, however, Mel'nyk's adherents were able to carry on far-reaching activities in the central Ukraine. Since the beginning of this period coincided with the capture of Kiev by German troops, and the Ukraine's second city, Kharkov, fell before it ended, the interlude was of great importance in enabling the OUN-M to spread the doctrine of Nationalism in the former Soviet area. 668*

On September 19, 1941, the Germans occupied Kiev. Two or three days later, the first groups of Mel'nyk adherents arrived from the base in Zhitomir, and rapidly set about organizing national life in the city.[1] This was a difficult task at best because the Soviet forces had inflicted severe injuries on the city before leaving. A large part of this damage consisted of physical destruction, especially of industrial facilities and means of communication.[2] Even more serious from the point of view of rebuilding an anti-Communist, national civil life was the wholesale deportation of intelligentsia. For example, only five of the members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences were left, the others having been evacuated to what the Communist government called the "new cultural capital" of the Ukraine, Ufa, in the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.[3] 727 ● 668* 167

[1] Interview 65.

[2] Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), pp. 21–23.

[3] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 16, 1941, p. 2, and February 25, 1942, p. 4; *Ukrains'ke Diiamist'*, November 1, 1941, p. 1.

● 727 In addition to difficulties presented by the great gaps in material and human resources, there was a continued danger from the "booby traps" of hidden explosive mines and camouflaged Communist agents. The latter were not discovered for some time, but on the fifth day after the German occupation, a large number of mines blew up a considerable section of the center of the city, thoroughly disrupting the work of the Germans and Ukrainians in reestablishing an ordered pattern of life.[4]

633 727 Immediately after arriving in Kiev, a council of the Mel'nyk leaders—Konyk and Captain Soretits'kyi, who came in the Wehrmacht service, and Iaroslav Haivaz and Roman Bidar, who apparently came without official authorization—decided to install a *Hilfsbürgermeister,* or chief of the municipal administrative apparatus. They chose Alexander Ohloblyn, a well-known historian of the Soviet period. The Wehrmacht authorities readily accepted the council's nomination,[5] an indication of the close cooperation of the OUN-M with the army authorities in the East Ukraine at that time.

Ohloblyn's authority, however, was soon to prove illusory. Volodymyr Bahazii, an instructor from the pedagogical institute, had been appointed as his deputy. Unlike Ohloblyn, Bahazii had greeted the Nationalist leaders and immediately sought to identify himself with them. They soon learned that he was highly ambitious and that he did not stop at attacking his nominal superior, whom he accused of Russophile tendencies.[6] Apparently Bahazii's loyalty to the OUN and his energy in carrying out the reorganization of city life made him indispensable. At any rate, Professor Ohloblyn was soon pushed into the background,[7] and at the end of October, after a disagreement with the German authorities concerning measures to be taken to enhance the welfare of Kiev's citizens, he resigned.[8] Bahazii then became the

[4] Forostivs'kyi, p. 24; PS 053.

[5] Interviews 56, 65.

[6] Interviews 56, 65.

[7] This is evident even in contemporary published accounts. Cf. *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, pp. 3–5, containing an article written by Petro (Peter) Oliinyk earlier in Kiev, in which Bahazii is described as the "business manager." *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk,* October 26, 1941, p. 6, describes a meeting of the department heads of the city administration which Ohloblyn opened, but over which Bahazii presided.

[8] Interview 56.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

chief of administration.[9] Having achieved this post, he repaid the organization which had assisted him by using his influence to secure the adherence to the OUN-M of the most important officials.[10]

While most of the economic and cultural divisions of the city government were left in the hands of local men, the OUN forces took care to organize the most important branches—propaganda and police—under their own followers. Zakhvalins'kyi was brought from Zhitomir to take command of the police units, but after a short period, in which his alleged incompetence and dissolute life made him objectionable to his party, he was replaced by one of the Galician leaders, Roman Bidar. Kandyba soon arrived to take charge of propaganda activity. With him came the staff of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* headed by John Rohach. The newspaper was to be printed in Kiev, but the destruction of the principal press by the explosions forced the editors to continue publication for some weeks in Zhitomir.[11]

Having captured Kiev, the German armies rapidly pushed on to the east, taking with them most of the interpreters and advisers who had formed an essential part of the OUN-M "conquest" of Zhitomir and Kiev. By the end of October, they had reached Kharkov, where Konyk took the lead in propaganda work. He and his assistants succeeded in recruiting a considerable number of the local intelligentsia for their organization but, as will be shown later, failed in their attempt to attain a high degree of success similar to that in Kiev.[12]

Lest repeated reference to collaboration of the Mel'nyk forces with the Wehrmacht lead to an exaggerated conception of the role of the OUN-M in the operations of the German army, it should be pointed out that the latter employed many Slavic interpreters and advisers in addition to the Mel'nyk followers. Some of these were Ukrainians, of all political persuasions, including Bandera supporters. Strong efforts were made to get rid of the latter after the decision to suppress their party, but for a

[9] Bahazii assumed the post on November 1 (*Nastup*, December 20, 1941, p. 2).
[10] Interviews 53, 65.
[11] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakiv'ki Visti*, January 21, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup*, November 8, 1941, p. 3; Interview 65.
[12] See Chapter X.

668 considerable time this aim was not fully achieved. Moreover, 727 there were numerous Het'manites and followers of the UNR. Among the latter, for example, was Peter Sahaidachnyi, who had charge of the initial operation of the most important Ukrainian newspapers.[13] Others were Russian émigrés, and many were Baltic Germans who had a command of the Russian language. The aim of the Wehrmacht was to establish a peaceful, orderly area behind the front as quickly as possible; employment of qualified persons, regardless of their political orientation, was necessary in order to do this. It is of course true that certain individual officers favored the Ukrainians,[14] but the ascendancy of the Mel'nyk group in this period was primarily due to its ability to profit from the absence of any other organized party with regular contact with the local population.

727 The real fate of Nationalist activity in the Ukraine, however, was being decided in Berlin, in quarters remote from the Wehrmacht officers who pursued the policy just described. Months before the outbreak of war, Hitler had decided to form a special agency for the affairs of the territories to be conquered from the Soviet Union. This department was called the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete (Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories); it was placed under the direction of Alfred Rosenberg. Rosenberg, a Balt by origin, and the principal theoretician of the National Socialist Party, had long been interested in the peoples of the Soviet Union. He was a strong believer in the policy of weakening Russia, whether it remained Communist or not. Consequently, he regarded with favor Ukrainian nationalist efforts to separate from Russia, so long as the groups involved did not threaten other German aims.

At the same time that the Ostministerium, as the new department was often called, was initiated, Hitler decided to create a number of huge satrapies in the eastern area; chief among them was the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. This region was to be under the supervision of an official with a large measure of authority,

[13] Interview 79.

[14] Notably Dr. Hans Koch and his collaborator in the Abwehr, Professor Oberländer.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

but subject to Rosenberg in matters of broad policy.[15] Rosenberg 727 ● realized that this vague directive would mean little unless he could count on the cooperation of the man chosen to head the Reichskommissariat. Consequently, he voiced an alarmed protest when Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia, and already widely known for his stubbornness and brutality, was suggested for the post. Since Hitler, evidently regarding Rosenberg as an impractical dreamer, wanted a determined and ruthless man in the Ukraine, Koch was nevertheless appointed.[16]

This appointment was the harbinger of worse defeats for Ros- 727 enberg's "mild" policy toward the Ukrainians. Another aspect of 631 Nazi policy, however, aroused immediate indignation among the Ukrainian nationalists. This was a decision to keep east Galicia in the "German settlement area," i.e., to attach it to the Generalgouvernement rather than to the future Reichskommissariat. The immediate ground for this partition of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory was the desire to maintain a direct connection between the Greater Reich and Rumania, about whose continued loyalties the Nazi leaders harbored strong doubts.[17] However, a few weeks later the "unreliable" Danubian kingdom was permitted to administer all of the Ukrainian territory between the Dniester and the Southern Bug.[18] The Rumanians obviously intended eventually to incorporate the area, which they called Transnistria, into their state. Since most Ukrainian nationalist circles already hated Rumania, it is understandable that this second amputation of Ukrainian ethnographic territory was especially painful, even though the region was near the bottom of the scale of definitely Ukrainian areas in cultural development and national consciousness.[19]

[15] Chancellery Director Lammers to Rosenberg, July 18, 1941, transmitting Führerbefehl of July 17, 1941, NG 1280 (hereafter referred to as NG 1280).

[16] Memorandum, Führerhauptquartier, July 16, 1941, PS 1221 (hereafter referred to as PS 1221).

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] PS 197. At the conference of July 16 (*ibid.*) it had been tentatively decided to give Rumania only a slight territorial increase east of the pre-1939 border of the Dniester River; the decision was altered sometime within the next six weeks.

[19] On August 31, *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk* had the temerity to attack the decision openly, raising the question, "Is it possible that Ukrainian land beyond the Dniester, soaked with Cossack blood, can be transferred to Rumanian administration?" On the same page the UNO organ criticized the annexation of G-'icia to

727 While Ukrainian territory was being partitioned, a still more serious danger for the nationalist cause was shaping up. An exception to the authority of the Ostministerium in the occupied areas was the police power, which was lodged in Heinrich Himmler's hands. From the beginning of the campaign the Reichsführer SS had been charged with "establishing order" in the conquered areas in the east. The instruments employed for this task were *Einsatzgruppen,* task forces consisting of specially selected, ruthless police officials, headed by SS officers from Himmler's inner circle. During the stabilization period, these commanders were given powers within the broad range of "pacifying activities" in the rear areas, superseding those of all military commanders. These activities included especially the extermination of the Jewish population and the liquidation of all Communist organizations; "kommissars" and NKVD officials were to be shot outright.

661 668* The causes for conflict between the *Einsatzgruppen* and the Ukrainian nationalists have been suggested in the preceding chapter. At first the Mel'nyk group was spared because it was thought to be politically impotent.[20] During the summer the SP claimed that "the splinter group under Colonel Andrew Mel'nyk, predominantly émigrés, no longer has any political significance," and regarded the OUN-M as a useful counterweight to Bandera's organization. By early November, 1941, however, SP reports were warning that Mel'nyk's group could become dangerous if it was left entirely unwatched because of the struggle against the Bandera party.[21] As soon as the OUN-M revealed ability to build an organization in the East Ukraine, it too was crushed.

668* 661 186 The first major incident of repression against the Mel'nyk forces occurred on November 21, an important anniversary for Ukrainian nationalists. On that date, in 1921, Tiutiunnyk's band,

the Generalgouvernement, as not corresponding to "the principle of nationality" (*Ukrains'kyi Visnyk,* August 31, 1941, p. 3). Within the next week, several branches of the UNO in Germany sent petitions directly to Hitler, protesting the transfers of Ukrainian territory; for petitions from the groups in Pilsen, Berlin and Luxemburg, see Occ E-4 (8), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [8]).

[20] NO 2650.

[21] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report of Events in the USSR, No. 133, November 14, 1941, p. 31, NO 2825 (hereafter referred to as NO 2825).

204 626 668 tor himself was compelled to publish over his own signature articles composed by the German propaganda section, although German records show that he vigorously and courageously criticized Nazi policy in private discussions with German officials.[35]

The nationalists were deeply antagonized by these articles which attacked the foundations of their movement by denying the historical equality of Ukrainian culture with the Russian. Shtepa apparently went far beyond even the Communist newspapers in this respect, reverting to the "Little Russian" tradition which was so abhorrent to all nationalist Ukrainians.[36] However sincere his Russian nationalism may have been, for a man of Ukrainian origin, writing in the Ukrainian language, in the Ukrainian capital, to denounce the Ukrainian nationalist movement could only be regarded in nationalist circles as an act of high treason.

727 During the late autumn, while the *Einsatzgruppen* were crushing the OUN-M groups, the administration of the Reichskommissariat was being established throughout the "Right Bank" Ukraine, while the area east of the Dnieper remained under Wehrmacht control. According to the plans laid in the Ostministerium, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was eventually to include all of the pre-1941 Soviet Ukraine except Transnistria, Galicia, and the areas acquired by the USSR from Rumania in 1940. In addition, it was to have its boundary extended roughly due east in a line passing south of Kursk to the Volga, where it was to embrace the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.[37] In the northwest the Reichskommissariat was to embrace approximately two tiers of *raions* in the southern part of the pre-1941 Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, including Brest, Pinsk, and the greater part of the railroad connecting these towns with Gomel.[38]

By the end of August, the process of pacifying the western

[35] CXLVa 78.

[36] *Biuleten'* (Bulletin), No. 9–10 of the OUN-B (late 1942), pp. 14–15. This clandestine publication was furnished me by Nicholas Lebed'.

[37] Memorandum, Die neuen Ostgebiete, June 16, 1941, PS 1033 (hereafter referred to as PS 1033); Rosenberg to Alfred Meyer, October 20, 1941, PS 1057 (hereafter referred to as PS 1057).

[38] PS 1057; Memorandum, Die Zivilverwaltung im besetzten Osten, Part II, Reichskommissariat Ukraine, PS 702 (hereafter referred to as PS 702).

part of this vast area had gone so far that a conference between Koch's and Rosenberg's officials on the one hand, and representatives of the army on the other, could plan the transfer to the Reichskommissariat.[39] This was accomplished gradually in the next three months.[40] 727

The introduction of the Reichskommissariat did not change the general basis of the provisional organization established by the Wehrmacht.[41] However, it introduced an entirely new spirit. It brought under strict control many aspects of Ukrainian life in which the Wehrmacht had left a relatively free hand to the inhabitants. The entire "Right Bank" was divided into five *Generalbezirke* with headquarters in Rovno, Zhitomir, Kiev, Nikolaev, and Dniepropetrovsk.[42] Under each *Generalkommissar* were about twenty *Gebietskommissare,* each of whom governed a *Kreisgebiet,* comprising an average of four *raions.* The Ukrainian administration operated in general only at this lowest level.[43] There were elders or *starostas* in charge of each village and a Ukrainian chief of the *raion* administration. While there were Ukrainians above this level in consultative or specialist posts,[44] 727 631

[39] PS 197.

[40] Former Polish Volhynia was transferred as early as the end of August (*Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* January 24, 1942, p. 3).

[41] There had already been set up an army administration composed of *Ortskommandanturen* (local commands) and *Feldkommandanturen* (regional commands). These military government offices had established order and begun the work of rebuilding economic and social life. Alongside them had already been installed police groups, recruited and directed by the Wehrmacht Abwehr but composed primarily of Ukrainians, as previously described. These, however, were being brought under the control of the SS police agencies. Moreover, the Wirtschaftstab-Ost had installed a Wirtschafts-Inspektion Süd, with a network of economic officers including especially the *Landwirtschaftsführer* (*La-Führer,* agricultural director) in each *raion,* who were charged with directing the economy in accordance with German needs. Cf. PS 053.

[42] PS 702. The initial organization of areas west of the Dnieper included the Soviet *oblasts* of Rovno, Volhynia, Kamenets-Podolsk, Zhitomir, Vinnitsa, Kiev, Kirovograd, and parts of Nikolaev, Dniepropretrovsk, Poltava, Zaporozh'e, Pinsk, and Brest. On September 1, 1942, the remaining parts of the Dniepropetrovsk, Poltava, and Zaporozh'e *oblasts* east of the Dnieper were transferred to the Reichskommissariat. Somewhat earlier a sixth *Generalbezirk,* Taurien, had been formed, to include the southern parts of the Zaporozh'e and Nikolaev *oblasts* (cf. *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* September 2, 1943, p. 3).

[43] There was, however, an advisory council at the *Generalbezirk* level in at least one instance—Zhitomir (cf. *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* February 25, 1942, p. 2).

[44] The adjective "Ukrainian" is used by the Germans to describe these officials, but it refers merely to persons resident within the territorial limits of the Ukraine. Actually, many were Russian, and a special effort was made by the

727 there was no unified framework of native administration, with the
631 exception of the towns where there was a Ukrainian chief of administration, regardless of the size of the place involved. In the larger cities, which were not included in *Kreisgebiete,* the Ukrainian "mayors," however, were closely subjected to German *Stadtkommissare.*

727 Just as important as his administrative structure, was Koch's
668* personal attitude toward the Ukrainians he was to govern. To
661 him, they were simply an inferior race, a colonial people to be exploited for Germany's interests. "They are too inferior to be compared with Germans,"[45] and "the least German worker is worth a thousand times more than the population there"[46] are typical expressions of his attitude. Consequently, this former petty railway official felt highly offended when the Ukrainian intelligentsia endeavored to organize a national life of its own. The whole tone of his administration implied that the Ukrainians were a sort of child-people, which could not achieve any degree of culture worthy of consideration; those who endeavored to do so were simply half-educated émigré agitators who must be dealt with severely, so that the simple but useful "peasants" (i.e., all non-agitators) would not be disturbed in their task of producing for the Germans.

One of the first results of Koch's determination to crush all centers of autonomous life was the destruction of the Nationalist forces remaining "above ground" in Kiev. After the suppression of the West Ukrainian force, there was still a large group of East Ukrainian supporters of the Mel'nyk organization who openly

Wehrmacht to recruit ethnic Germans (PS 197; Extracts from the Situation Report of the commander of Heeresgebiet B, Abteilung VII, October 10, 1942, PS 051; hereafter referred to as PS 051), although the latter turned out frequently to be Communist spies deliberately left behind by the Soviet regime (Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte, December 15, 1941, PS 1682; (hereafter referred to as PS 1682). Even when the *Volksdeutsche* were anti-Communist, they were frequently disliked by the Ukrainian Nationalists as Russophiles.

[45] Koch to Rosenberg, March 16, 1943, PS 192 (hereafter referred to as PS 192).

[46] Report of Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe B to Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Generalquartiermeister, Abteilung Kriegsverwaltung, April 1, 1943, PS 1130 (hereafter referred to as PS 1130), is based on an oral report of Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Classen who was present at the Nazi Party meeting in Kiev (March 5, 1943) in which Koch made the remark.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

carried on a limited activity. Its chief, Bahazii, was just as nationalist as the arrested West Ukrainians. A characteristic instance of his enthusiastic lack of caution occurred about the time that he became mayor. A group of foreign journalists, including several Germans, visited Kiev. In their presence, he expressed his loyalty to the OUN, praising Konovalets' and Mel'nyk as totalitarians, and saying, "The eyes of all Ukrainians are turned toward Mel'nyk." A German officer who was present begged the journalists not to report this remark, knowing it would inflame the Nazi chieftains.[47]

Although Erich Koch and his assistants were in many respects ridiculously ignorant of the true nature of Ukrainian life in Kiev, in view of Bahazii's frankness it was inevitable that they should come to see that he was working for Ukrainian ends, rather than docilely following German orders. Very probably the anti-Nationalist forces on the staff of *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* played a part in stirring up antagonism to the city administration. For example, the paper printed an article by an employee of a municipal office criticizing the émigrés who had returned to Kiev. He complained that thirteen out of forty employees in his section were émigrés who were paid higher salaries than the local officials, although the former were no better qualified and had smaller families.[48] In view of Koch's and his minions' bitter hostility toward émigrés, such remarks must have encouraged them to feel that the Germans would lose no popularity by extinguishing the remaining outside influence in Kiev life.

They were, however, scarcely the real motives behind Bahazii's arrest in early February, 1942. Apparently the German official responsible for the Ukrainian leader's downfall was Generalkommissar Magunia, one of Koch's closest collaborators among the officials of the Reichskommissariat. He worked, of course, in close coordination with the *Sicherheitspolizei;* the charges against Ba-

[47] Whether they ever actually saw the report is questionable since it was apparently printed only in an Italian paper and by the Ukrainian press (*Nastup*, December 6, 1941, p. 1, quoting *La Stampa* [Milan], November 1, 1941).

[48] *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*, January 3, 1942 (reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diiimist'*, February 1, 1942, p. 2). A major charge against Bahazii was that he maintained too large a staff in the city administration and paid them too much (PS 192).

hazii in the police report revolve entirely around his nationalist activities.[49] For example, the head of the section on Religious Confessions is alleged to have threatened the Russophile bishop of Kiev, Panteleimon. Another charge concerned Bahazii's "misappropriation of German property," but the specific act seems to have been his sale of petroleum products (probably of Soviet origin, confiscated by the Germans) to aid the nationalist cause. He was charged, correctly, with being a leader of the underground OUN-M, and a number of organizations controlled by the Nationalists were declared, also with apparent accuracy, to be working under his direction. Probably the charge which carried the greatest weight in the minds of the German officials, however, was that he had endeavored to secure control of the Ukrainian police. As has been previously indicated, the OUN-M did indeed control most of the Ukrainian police in Kiev, but Bahazii was scarcely responsible personally for this. Altogether, the motives behind the overthrow of Bahazii were those which prevailed everywhere in the destruction of Nationalist groups in the Reichskommissariat. The action suited Erich Koch's policy completely; he defended it vigorously against Rosenberg's criticism, displaying his own arrogant stupidity by adding a few incredible charges of his own to the grounds presented in the SP report.[50]

The repression of Nationalist forces in Kiev extended far beyond the person of Bahazii. The arrests were concentrated in two groups: the surviving literary leaders of the OUN-M League of Ukrainian Writers, headed by Olena Teliha and a young Carpatho-Ukrainian writer, John Irliavs'kyi; and the Sich, headed by a young East Ukrainian journalist, John Koshyk, also an OUN-M member.[51] Altogether, the executions (which followed quickly after the arrests in most cases) accounted for about forty persons,[52] a large number of whom were medical students organized in the

[49] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 191, April 10, 1942, NO 3256 (hereafter referred to as NO 3256).

[50] PS 192.

[51] *OUN u Viini*, p. 74; T. Iak, *Hryb* (The Mushroom), p. 43, a clandestine OUN-M brochure, probably published at the end of German occupation in the East Ukraine.

[52] Iak, p. 43.

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Sich.[53] In addition, several of the principal agencies of national 661
life in Kiev were forced to cease operation, including the Ukrain- 727●
ian National Council. Even Prosvita was suspect and was closed 668*
for a while.[54]

These arrests did not completely stamp out the efforts to develop nationalism in Kiev. The underground OUN-M (as well as remnants of an OUN-B conspiratorial group) did what they could to stimulate nationalist feeling. Likewise, the city administration was by no means so drastically altered as had been the editorial staff of the newspaper. The Germans were probably not anxious to destroy all outlets for Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. Rosenberg, in spite of his minor influence, exercised some restraint in this respect, and Koch himself denied being anti-Ukrainian.[55] Undoubtedly his contempt for all Slavs led him to place the Ukrainians and the Russians on an even plane; his favoring of the Russophile element in the journalistic field had very possibly been accidental, or at least merely an effort to establish between the groups a balance which could be manipulated by the Germans.

The drop in prestige of the OUN-M was both sharp and sus- 668*
tained, however, since repression of its groups continued throughout the Reichskommissariat. Moreover, as will be discussed at length later, strong Ukrainian nationalist groups opposed to the OUN ideology appeared in several places; these forces kept up the fight for development of nationalism, thus inhibiting a growth in influence by the OUN. In other areas, news of the suppression of the Kiev group—the dissolution of the National Council appears to have been especially important—caused the cautious to refrain from endeavoring to build up nationalist organizations. Consequently, after February, 1942, the work of the two OUNs was only a relatively small part of the total stream of nationalist and antinationalist forces which must be studied in their geographical, social, and ideological context rather than as parts of a developing narrative.

[53] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukrains'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi, 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev, 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 19.

[54] PS 122.

[55] *Ibid.*

•727 In order to understand the development of nationalism during the remaining twenty months of German occupation of the East Ukraine, it is necessary to give some attention to the effects of German policy on aspects of life not directly connected with nationalist feeling. A number of volumes of extremely unpleasant reading could be devoted to the misery which the blind actions of the German rulers inflicted on the long-suffering peoples of the Soviet Union. Here only an extremely brief description of four ill-conceived policies which did most to disrupt the lives of the people of the area, and in particular to affect indirectly the character of the nationalist movements, can be attempted.

727 697 The first, and in many respects the most horrible failure of German policy, resulted in the death of innumerable Soviet prisoners of war. In the summer and fall of 1941, hundreds of thousands of Red army soldiers fell into German hands. Most captures took place because of the swift German advance and the great ascendancy of German arms; but at least in part they resulted from a lack of will to fight for the Communist system and the hope that German imprisonment would soon be followed by a freer life for the Soviet peoples. The German army was quite unprepared for the extent of the surrenders. However, no amount of difficulty in caring for the prisoners can excuse the horrible consequences of their neglect which, unlike most other atrocities committed in the east, was primarily the fault of the Wehrmacht. Inefficiency or brutality of subordinate *Etappentruppen* [rear area troops] was partly to blame, but the basic ruthlessness of many higher officers also played a major role, for it placed a premium on calloused inhumanity on the part of subordinates.[56] Countless thousands of prisoners were shut in barbed-wire enclosures in the open plains. Food was so insufficient that the captives were rapidly reduced to living skeletons; by fall cannibalism had made its appearance.[57] "Gaunt yellow faces protruding from the collars of greatcoats—unabashed human misery," as a Ukrainian visitor to

[56] Cf. the views of high Wehrmacht commanders cited in Chapter VI in connection with suppression of partisans.

[57] Report of Armament Inspector for the Ukraine to Armament Division Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Zur Lage im Reichskommissariat Ukraine, November 29, 1941, PS 2174 (hereafter referred to as PS 2174).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

one of the camps put it.[58] As colder weather approached, typhus combined with starvation to bring about hundreds of thousands of deaths. 727 697

Since many of these camps were located in the Ukraine the population soon became aware of the conditions in them, even though a substantial portion of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were separated out and released by the Germans.[59] Moreover, the inhabitants could scarcely avoid noticing the corpses of prisoners of war shot (perhaps as "kommissars" or Communists) and left lying in the villages.[60] Consequently, a belief that the Germans intended to destroy the Slavic peoples soon became widespread.

A second German failure was less shocking than the treatment of the prisoners of war, but in the long run it had an even more deleterious effect on relations with the Ukrainian population. This was the policy in relation to agriculture. As was noted previously, the major objective of the Nazi leadership in its occupation of the Ukraine was the acquisition of food and raw materials to increase Germany's war potential. This objective involved the necessity of dealing with the question of the kolkhoz, which was the predominant form of agricultural organization in the Soviet Union. 423 727

The problem posed for the German occupiers was not an easy one by any standards. It will be recalled that the chief reason for the introduction of the kolkhoz by Moscow was the prevalence of the "scissors crisis" during the late twenties; this emergency arose fundamentally because the Soviet rulers were unable or unwilling to supply enough consumer goods to induce individual peasants to deliver large quantities of agricultural products. The Germans were faced with the same dilemma, because the needs of their

[58] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakiv'ki Visti*, January 21, 1942, p. 2.

[59] Interview 51; Directive of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Abteilung Kriegsgefangene, June 16, 1941, PS 888 (hereafter referred to as PS 888); *Nastup*, July 12, 1941, p. 2; Amt Ausland Abwehr to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Annex, September 15, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 338 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 338).

[60] Memorandum by First Lieutenant Oberländer, Abwehr II, Heeresgruppe Süd, November 28, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 278 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 278). Oberländer significantly points out that pro-German sentiment in the population had greatly diminished within a few weeks of conquest—*i.e.*, while the Wehrmacht was still the occupying authority.

423 fighting forces required that very little production be diverted to
727 consumer goods. Moreover, their situation was in many respects more difficult than that of the Kremlin in 1929, for the material basis for the reconstruction of individual farms—buildings, equipment, livestock—was often lacking. Under these circumstances, a return to individual operation of agriculture would probably have meant a sharp net decline in productivity and a still greater decline in surpluses available for delivery.

On the other hand, the Germans had strong reasons for favoring the dissolution of the collective-farm system, as a salient feature of the Soviet system which they affected to despise. More than any other aspect of the Soviet system, the kolkhoz appears to have been hated by large numbers of the peasants. While it is questionable whether this hatred was universally felt, it was undoubtedly a very strong sentiment among the older groups of the population, those most ready on other grounds to cooperate with the Germans.[61]

Faced with this dilemma, the German rulers followed a tactic of compromise and deceit. They promised to dissolve the kolkhoz, stipulating reasonably enough, but in opposition to the desire of the peasant for immediate acquisition of land, that the process be gradual. First, the kolkhoz was to be transformed into a *Gemeinwirtschaft* (*hromads'ke hospodarstvo*) or community enterprise; the only signficant immediate effect was the increase in the *dvor* or garden allotment permitted each household. In a second stage, to follow in the near future, the *Gemeinwirtschaft* was to be transformed into a *Landbaugenossenschaft* (*khliborobs'ka spilka*) or agricultural association. At this stage each household was to receive a definite section of land, and be rewarded in proportion to the harvest from this land, although many of the major agricultural operations were to be performed in common to overcome the extreme dearth of draft animals, tractors, tractor fuel, and implements.[62]

Where the program was carried out without proscrastination,

[61] PS 3876.

[62] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, February 28, 1942, p. 3. A final stage, the *Einzelhof*, or individual farm, was envisaged by the planners, but very rarely, if ever, instituted.

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most of the peasantry seem to have responded favorably.[63] Frustrating delays ensued throughout a large part of the Ukraine, however, especially in the Reichskommissariat. In part they were due to misplaced German thoroughness in requiring exact surveys of the land before proceeding to its division among the households in the *Landbaugenossenschaft*. More serious was the deliberate obstruction of Koch and others who, feeling that the program would leave some small segment of life free of their control, argued that it would result in reduced deliveries. As a result, only 10 percent instead of the planned 20 percent of *Gemeinwirtschaften* were converted to *Landbaugenossenschaften*.[64] In spite of the meager practical results, the de-collectivization program was a favorite theme of Koch's propaganda, doubtless because he allowed so little else of a positive nature even to be discussed. In the end, however, the constantly broken pledges unquestionably caused a loss of faith in the Germans, even a willingness to return to the known evils of the Soviet system. The peasant's saying, "A bad mother is still better than a step-mother who makes many promises," indicated his judgment of the German agricultural policy.[65]

The problem of securing agricultural supplies was closely connected with that of supplying the Ukrainian urban population with food. One way in which the Germans sought to obtain most of the farm products for their own use was to make practically no provision for feeding the city dwellers. This was especially true during the first winter. The concept was simple: the starving urban population would find some means, through barter or otherwise, of inducing the peasants to part with an extra, hidden supply of food beyond that which the Germans had been able to

[63] Cf. for example Report of Ortskommandantur Melitopol', July 8, 1942, PS 1693 (hereafter referred to as PS 1693); Report No. 7 of Representative of Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte and Stab des Befehlshabers des ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte Captain Müller, March 24, 1942, to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, PS 1686 (hereafter referred to as PS 1686).

[64] Memorandum by Bräutigam, October 25, 1942, PS 294 (hereafter referred to as PS 294).

[65] Situation report, Wirtschaftinspektorat Süd Ic, April, 1942, NG 1089 (hereafter referred to as NG 1089); Memorandum of Generalkommissar for the Crimea, Alfred Frauenfeld, to Himmler, February 10, 1944, NO 5394 (hereafter referred to as NO 5394).

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extract from them.[66] To a certain extent, of course, this was true. Private individuals, as in the days after the Revolution, traveled about the countryside endeavoring to get something to eat in return for whatever they had to give the peasant. The city administrations and welfare committees did what they could to secure food for their clients; indeed this was one reason the Germans allowed these suspect organizations to function at all, for they were thereby relieved of the necessity of attending to such matters. The resources at the hands of these organs were, however, infinitesimal compared to the needs.[67] This was especially true since the most valuable materials left in the cities were requisitioned by the Germans.[68]

The peasants in turn had little to sell. They had lived under the regimented planned economy of the Soviets, which prevented the individual from accumulating a private stock of agricultural products, rather than the loose system of tsarist days, when the more prosperous peasants could usually find a little more to sell if the price was attractive enough. Extremely heavy requisitions by the Wehrmacht, especially in the form of unauthorized seizures, had also depleted the supplies available. The result was a severe shortage of food in the cities, especially in the larger ones such as Kiev and Kharkov, which brought famine and the pestilences associated with it in the winter and spring of 1942.[69]

Like the agricultural policy and the starvation of the cities, the *Ostarbeiter* program was the result of ruthless efforts to increase the German war potential. Unlike the former policies, however, its evils do not even have the excuse of short-run expediency. The concept of bringing foreign workers to the armaments factories was, in itself, reasonable enough. Moreover, properly handled, it might very well have resulted in an increase rather than a

[66] PS 2174.

[67] During the terrible winter of 1941–42, the social welfare department of the Kiev municipal administration dispensed only about 100,000 *karbovontsi* (i.e., rubles; nominally the equivalent of 10,000 RM or about $4,000) per month; at the time, milk was 20 *k.* a liter, potatoes about 250 *k.* a hundredweight (*Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1). This monetary outlay may, of course, have been supplemented by food obtained by barter.

[68] For example, a charge brought against the Bahazii administration was that it had used newsprint to barter for food with the small towns (Interview 59). Cf. also p. 116 above.

[69] According to Oberländer (USSR Exhibit No. 278).

decrease of popular support for Germany in the Ukraine. There is good evidence that the population was at first sympathetic to the German efforts to recruit labor voluntarily.[70] Moreover, a large number of nationalist Ukrainians supported the measure; they not only wanted to help Germany win the war against the Soviet Union, but believed that it would be a valuable cultural experience for young Ukrainians to come into contact with advanced German technology and with Western European culture in general. To them it was means of drawing the Ukrainian nation away from its too-close association with the Russians and the "Asiatics" of their empire and of establishing a European orientation for their country.[71] 727 466 167

Unhappily for these visions, the methods used by the Germans in dealing with the volunteer workers soon dried up the supply. They were frequently given miserable transportation and poor accommodations on arrival in Germany. Highly trained workers and professional men who had volunteered in order to increase their technical ability by experience in Germany were assigned to common labor.[72] Most important, however, the Ukrainians, like other *Ostarbeiter,* were forced to wear a humiliating badge distinguishing them from Western Europeans; they were forbidden social contacts with the latter and, in order to implement this decree, were excluded from motion-picture theaters, restaurants, and other public places. The erstwhile willing worker felt that the Germans regarded him (as many did) as nothing but a Bolshevik prisoner.[73] 727 466 167 523

When this policy of segregation resulted in lack of volunteers, force was used; mandatory labor service for young men and women was officially introduced in the Reichskommissariat on September 21, 1942,[74] but in practice compulsion had long been employed. In reply to the inevitable evasion of this order, the most demoralizing of tricks—such as seizure of worshippers at 727 466 167

[70] Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete in Heeresgebiet B, First Lieutenant Theurer, October 7, 1942, PS 054 (hereafter referred to as PS 054).

[71] E.g., *Krakivs'ki Visti,* February 6, 1942, p. 2.

[72] PS 054.

[73] Opinion report for period June 12–July 14, 1942, Auslandbriefprüfstelle, Gruppe VIII, PS 302 (hereafter referred to as PS 302).

[74] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* September 22, 1942, p. 3.

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church services and invitations by German authorities to theatrical performances at which all were arrested—were utilized. Force and brutal retaliation, such as burning of villages from which the potential workers ran away, were frequently applied.[75] The conscripts were sent a thousand miles to Germany in unheated cattle cars, sealed with barbed wire. Still worse, there was no just selection of those most suited for departure, no systematic registration.[76] Mothers of small children were sometimes taken; sons and husbands who were the only support of their families were conscripted without adequate provision for the families' maintenance.[77]

The horror of such treatment was perhaps the single most important cause of popular revulsion against the Germans. In addition to all its material hardships, the mere idea of forced transportation to a distant and unknown land recalled the generations-old terror of banishment to Siberia.[78] The extent of the program was so enormous that every family was touched; it became a universal evil. Of the total population of Kiev, thirty-eight thousand persons (over 10 percent) were delivered to the *Ostarbeiter* program within the first ten months of German occupation.[79] In the southern *Generalbezirke* somewhat smaller numbers appear to have been involved[80] but in the crucial *Bezirk* of Zhitomir, one hundred and seventy thousand (about 6 percent of the population) were taken by mid-1943, and thirty thousand more were to follow.[81] In all, as early as August, 1943, one out of every forty inhabitants of the Ukraine had been deported to Germany as forced laborers,[82] and by the end of the occupation the number of

[75] Auslandbriefprüfstelle, report for September 11–November 11, 1942, PS 018 (hereafter referred to as PS 018).

[76] Landesbauernführer Körner, Die neue deutsche Ukraine-Politik, PS 1198 (hereafter referred to as PS 1198).

[77] Occ E-4 (1); PS 054.

[78] Oral report of Generalkommissar Leyser (Zhitomir) to Rosenberg, June 17, 1943, PS 265 (hereafter referred to as PS 265).

[79] Commander of the SP and the SS, Kiev, to Commander of the SP and the SS, Ukraine, July 20, 1942, NO 1603 (hereafter referred to as NO 1603).

[80] Only about 1 percent from *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev by mid-1942 (Conference of Sauckel and Reichskommissariat officials in Kiev, August 12, 1942, NO 1606; hereafter referred to as NO 1606).

[81] PS 265.

[82] According to Sauckel, director of the *Ostarbeiter* program, at a Führer Conference, August 20, 1943, NO 1831 (hereafter referred to as NO 1831).

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Ukrainian workers in Germany totaled one and one-half million.[83]

The suffering caused by the actions of the Germans described above, did not directly affect the activity of the nationalist elements, as did their repressive attitude toward education, religion, culture, and local administration. Indirectly, however, it played an enormous part in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine during the German occupation. One effect was a general subordination of all thought, all activity, to the demands of self-preservation. The constant struggle to keep alive resulted in a reduction of the energy and attention which could be devoted to all political questions, including nationalism. On the other hand, the sheer impossibility of coming to terms with the German authority, regardless of how ready one might be to sacrifice all independence to do so, led many to seek a political movement which promised deliverance. A vast number, of course, turned back to Communism, hoping that the experience of near-defeat would lead to a modification of Moscow's policies. For others, however, the only rational solution appeared to be the nationalist parties. 668*

Weak as they were after the waves of suppressions during the six months from September, 1941, to February, 1942, the two OUN groups endeavored to meet this challenge. Of the two factions, the Bandera group appears to have made the easiest, but not the most thorough-going adjustment. Its ability to adjust at a rather shallow level was due to several factors. The members of the OUN-B were nearly all young, and their movement placed little emphasis on systematic ideology. When they went to the East Ukraine, they carried a large number of slogans and romantic pledges as baggage.[84] These either attracted or antagonized

[83] PS 1198.

[84] One of these oaths, as discovered by the German police, reads:

"On my honor, for the fame of the fallen heroes, for the holy blood spilled, for my Ukrainian earth and the majesty of my Ukrainian homeland, I swear that I will struggle with all my strength and with my life for a free and Ukrainian state. With my heart, my soul, and my whole being I confess that only the Ukrainian revolution can give power to the Ukrainian state and the people. Unto death I will stand on the battlefield in order to build a national Ukrainian State. No one and nothing at all can hold me back from the path of the Ukrainian national revolution, neither difficulties nor death. I will carry out every command of my leader. I swear on the Ukraine, that I will loyally and honestly carry out

[See category 116, pp. 118-124 -- Analyst]

historic Ukrainian lands of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov. The northern part, appropriately known as Polessia, or the "forest land," is of little value for crop growing but contains the only timber industry of significance in the Ukraine.

As the German armies rolled into the Ukraine in 1941, they tended to advance along the main lines of communication, avoiding the difficult, swampy regions. For weeks, or in some cases even months, the less accessible areas were not brought under German control. This circumstance made possible the development of partisan bands which carried on resistance to the occupation authority.

Although, since 1945, Soviet writers have maintained that the plans for guerrilla warfare against the conqueror had been secretly prepared before the outbreak of hostilities, they assert that these plans were known only to the top level of Communist Party officials. It is fairly certain that the order to develop a partisan movement came as a surprise even to most devoted Communists.[2] In July, 1941, after the decision to form partisan detachments was announced, preparations were pushed forward at a rapid rate by the local authorities. The rapidity of the German advance to the line of the Dnieper, however, rendered largely ineffective systematic attempts to form a partisan movement in the Ukraine west of that river. Even east of the Dnieper the panic produced by the seemingly irresistible German drive played havoc with the organization of guerrilla warfare. Many of the secretly selected leaders were swept along, willingly or unwillingly, in the retreat of the Red Army, while others were discovered and executed by the Germans. In a few places, however, small groups made good their escape to forest or swamp hide-outs. In the southern Ukraine one such group of about five hundred men, trained and directed by the Red Army, but largely composed of local Communist and NKVD officials, established a center of opposition in the swamps formed by the Dnieper south of Nikopol' (Nikopil').[3] This group was destroyed by the German forces in

[2] Oleksii Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet* (The Underground *Oblast* Committee in Action), literary editor Evg. Bosniatskii (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950), pp. 12–14.

[3] Report of Feldpolizeidirektor at 444. Sicherungsdivision, November 5, 1941, NOKW 1519 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 1519).

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This does not, however, imply that in its later stages, after it had been organized and developed by the Party cadres, the partisan movement was unable to obtain some support among the Ukrainian people. The partisans were frequently much weaker than the total forces which the Germans could employ against them; consequently, it was essential that they secure the aid of local men for scouting, concealment, and sabotage of German offensives. While some of their arms and ammunition, as well as medical supplies, could be flown in, they had to rely on the inhabitants of the area in which they operated for food and for replacements for men lost in action. Moreover, a primary function of the units was political as well as military: they were intended to maintain a vestige of Soviet authority in areas far away from the direct control of the rulers in the Kremlin.

In order to secure local support both compulsion and persuasion were employed. Compulsion was used to requisition food and equipment needed, to draft men into the guerrilla units, and to inhibit collaboration with the Germans. Methods employed frequently included killing the families of those who entered the German police or administrative organs, as well as the collaborators themselves.[18] The mere fact that the partisans could move about in force induced the cautious peasants to believe that Soviet victory was possible and that, consequently, it would be dangerous to side with the regime's enemies. Persuasion, however, would probably have been ineffective had it not been for the atrocities practiced by the Germans, especially the *Ostarbeiter* agencies, which led thousands of persons, mostly young and fit for partisan service, to flee to the woods.[19] The German failure to carry out the land reform, by depriving the peasants of a motive for resisting the return of the Soviet forces, was also a major cause of partisan success. The partisans made strong efforts to win over the peasants, in some cases even paying for requisitioned food supplies. According to a German report, one Red

[18] Report of Gebietskommissar Steudel in Kazatin, November 8–December 28, 1943, PS 1702 (hereafter referred to as PS 1702); PS 3943, February 12, 1943.

[19] Those who obeyed the order to report for the *Ostarbeiter* program were threatened by the partisans, while the order itself often served as a pass to join a partisan unit (Occ E-4 [1]).

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725 undertaken is an indication of the uncertainty of the ideology
668* and objectives of the little group. "Bul'ba" Borovets' himself, a man of little schooling, apparently was not sure what direction the movement should take, although he had a deep-rooted love for his native country. He continued to maintain ties with the UNR; there were UNR officers with the group much of the time, advising on military matters on which few of the younger members had had experience. Borovets' kept up a precarious line of communication with Andrew Livyts'kyi himself through an old UNR member, Captain Raievs'kyi, who ostensibly carried on the functions of *raionchef* in the Rovno district.[28]

665 These connections were too discontinuous to provide much
668* guidance, however, even if the enfeebled Warsaw headquarters
727 had had a clear line to offer. At the same time, the group under Borovets' was acting as a refuge for extremely diverse elements seeking an escape from German suppression. As was previously described, Borovets' had made an agreement with the OUN-M by which he was to be sent a number of officers. Apparently this help was slow in arriving. By summer, 1942, however, a few men had appeared; one was the Zhitomir journalist Anthony Baranivs'kyi, who became the Mel'nyk representative at the headquarters of Borovets'.[29] He, of course, adhered to the OUN-M line. A quite different group consisted of the former "left wing" of the Bandera party. Its leaders, Mitrynga, Turchmanovych, Ryvak, and Boris Levits'kyi, were with the task forces destined to proclaim the *akt* in Kiev. When these groups were broken up by the Germans before reaching their goal, the young men escaped arrest but were forced to go into hiding. Then, since the whole tendency of the OUN-B indicated to them that they could no longer hope to secure the adoption of their left-wing program, all except Levits'kyi (who went into hiding in Galicia) fled to Volhynia, where they found a protector in the Polis'ka Sich.[30] There, apparently, they attracted to their ideology a young as-

[28] Oleksander (Alexander) Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy" (An Army without a State), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, December 28, 1950, p. 2.

[29] Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 1, 1951, p. 4; *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 92.

[30] Interview 43.

November the group penetrated southern Polessia near Olevsk, the former headquarters of the Polis'ka Sich.[37] The greatest single victory of Kovpak's group in this period was the temporary capture of the *Kreisgebiet* capital, Lelchitsi, on November 26.[38] After that, German counterattacks became extremely heavy, and Kovpak's men appear to have spent a miserable two months evading the Germans in the frozen swamps along the middle course of the Pripet River.[39] In February, however, he headed south, cutting across a corner of "Bul'ba's" territory, then striking eastward through *Generalbezirk* Zhitomir.

While Red forces were pushing down from the northeast, the Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement was beginning to acquire real significance, although the nationalists were compelled to give some ground in northeastern Volhynia to the stronger Red partisans.[40] The SS and the Wehrmacht were agreed on the necessity of harsh measures to combat the Communist partisan threat. From the beginning, even those Wehrmacht generals who generally took a reasonable attitude toward the peoples of the east advocated the harshest measures toward partisans. For example, Field-Marshal von Reichenau based his policy on the concept that the Germans must be more feared than the partisans; he ordered that all who did not aid the fight against the latter be regarded as enemies, and that men who did not hinder or report partisan activities be "draconically" treated.[41] This policy was

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 89; this corresponds with reports of a shift of Red partisan activity to the Stolin-Sarny-Olevsk triangle in PS 3943, February 12, 1943.

[38] Reichskommissar Ukraine to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, December 10, 1942, CXLV 488, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLV 488).

[39] Report of Höherer SS und Polizeiführer Russland-Süd, Ukraine, und Nordost, December 26, 1942, NO 1128 (hereafter referred to as NO 1128); PS 3943, February 12, 1943. According to one of the leaders of the Soviet partisans in Belorussia, Kovpak established an airport on one of the frozen lakes of the region. With the help of the Soviet Belorussian partisans he was able to defend it until German bombing finally broke the ice (Lin'kov, p. 386).

[40] Cf. Lin'kov, p. 375.

[41] Directive Verhalten der Truppe im Ostraum, October 10, 1941, USSR Exhibit 12 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit 12). See also a memorandum by Chef des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Field-Marshal Keitel, which stated that security troops in the rear areas would suffice only if they were allowed to proceed "draconically" without the requirement of juridical process, to convince the population that resistance would have terrible consequences (PS 459, July 23, 1941, hereafter referred to as PS 459).

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rigorously carried out in the fall of 1942.[42] The drastic reprisals carried out in western Volhynia and Polessia injured the patriotic Ukrainian peasantry as frequently as they did Communist sympathizers. Consequently, the Ukrainian police were reluctant to take part in such suppression of their own compatriots, and especially in the brutal conscription for the *Ostarbeiter* program. The only alternative was desertion; in the fall thousands joined the forest refugees from burned villages and forced labor drives.[43] Unlike the latter, however, the police deserters were trained and frequently already organized by nationalists for opposition to the Germans. The command of the OUN-B in Galicia was reluctant to destroy its grip on the legal forces and risk a campaign of open resistance to the Germans at this time; but when they saw that the police units they dominated were breaking up anyway, and were in danger of passing over to the Communist guerrillas, they decided to begin a large-scale partisan movement. This step was taken in late November; by the early part of 1943 the activity of the Bandera groups was already considerable.[44]

There were two major centers of OUN-B activity. The first comprised the western part of the area which had been most ravaged by fighting between Red partisans and Germans, especially after Kovpak's passage to the southeast. Its extent may be defined by the quadrilateral formed by the towns of Kovel', Vladimirets (Volodimirets'), Kostopol', and Lutsk, although the chief operations were evidently carried out in the eastern section of this area.[45] A poor, woodland area, where the peasant popula-

[42] How drastic these measures could be in practice is shown by the reprisal burning of nine villages in the Petrikov area, leaving the peasants to shift for themselves in the dead of winter, although the *Gebietskommissar* himself asserted they were innocent of aiding the partisans (Occ E-4 [1]). The main "pacifying" campaign was carried out in Volhynia in September and early October, 1942 (NO 1128); cf. Lebed', p. 24, on the slaughter of nationalist adherents due to Communist provocation.

[43] Lebed', p. 26.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 24; the extent of German repression and Communist activity, which threatened to serve as an outlet for popular indignation, led the OUN-B to start operations before it really wished to do so (Interview 76).

[45] Lebed', pp. 24–25; PS 3943, March 19, 1943, ascribes (probably incorrectly, since the Germans were not fully informed of the nature of the nationalist bands) the attacks east of the Rovno-Lutsk road to a "Bul'bist" group. The western section of this area was partly controlled by large Polish police forces recruited to take the deserting Ukrainians' place. A savage struggle between them and the nationalists (especially the Bandera partisans), inflicting fearful hardships on the civilian population, was carried on all through 1943.

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661 OUN-M leaders was the discovery of anti-German clandestine publications of the OUN-M in the East Ukraine and in Kandyba's quarters in L'vov.[46] Kandyba and numerous other members were arrested about the same time, and *Nastup* was suppressed. Three members of the Provid had been killed within the preceding fourteen months, so that of the directorate only the aged generals Kapustians'kyi and Kurmanovych were left at large.[47]

727 Most of the OUN leaders were kept in close confinement throughout the crucial months when the West Ukraine was slipping under Communist domination. By October, when they were released,[48] virtually all of the Ukrainian lands had passed out of German control. There remained, however, some two million persons of Ukrainian origin in the hands of the Germans—thousands of refugees, over a million *Ostarbeiter,* several hundred thousand prisoners of war, and about a quarter of a million auxiliary troops.[49] A few thousand of the last category constituted a remnant of the Galician division, but most of them were scattered throughout various small units of *Osttruppen,* totaling about seven hundred thousand.[50]

[46] *OUN u Viini,* p. 103.

[47] Kandyba and Chemeryns'kyi had replaced the murdered Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, but Chemeryns'kyi was killed by the Germans in the execution of the *Ukrains'ke Slovo* group in Kiev. Baranovs'kyi had been killed by the OUN-B in Galicia in May, 1943, while Sushko was assassinated, probably by Bandera followers, or possibly by Communists or German police agents who were dissatisfied with his conduct, just thirteen days before the arrest of the other leaders.

[48] Bandera, Mel'nyk, Borovets', and all of their principal adherents were set free, except Kandyba and Gavrusevych, who had died in prison.

[49] Rosenberg wrote Bormann on September 7, 1944 (NO 2997), that there were then one million "legionnaires and volunteers," one million prisoners of war, and two million *Ostarbeiter* drawn from the eastern peoples. It is safe to assume that at least one third of the prisoners of war were Ukrainian (see n. 64, this chapter, below). The figure of two million *Ostarbeiter* appears to be rather low, in view of the total of one and one-half million given for the Ukraine alone (see Chapter V), but it is certain that a considerable majority of the workers from the Soviet Union were drawn from the Ukraine, for it had the bulk of the population which was under German control for a long period, and was, moreover, more completely exploited in this regard than were the army areas and the Reichskommissariat Ostland. Taubert, in a memorandum printed in B. Dvinov, *Vlasovs'koe dvizhenie v svete dokumentov* (The Vlasov Movement in the Light of Documents) (New York, 1950), p. 110, estimated the proportion of Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter* as 60 percent. The figure for military personnel appears a bit high, but it is fairly clear that the Ukrainians totaled at least one quarter of this group (Interview 22 referred to a total of 220,000 Ukrainians in the German forces). Refugees not enrolled in any of these categories were not numerous.

[50] NO 1068.

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The Nazi leaders wished to use this considerable reserve of manpower to bolster their collapsing defenses. The major part of their efforts centered around Vlasov, who at last was given a comparatively free hand to organize an anti-Soviet political center and military units of division size. Vlasov was backed by Himmler and a number of the other high officials of the SS, who were by now ready to seize any possibility of staving off defeat. At the same time, other Nazi circles, including SS officers as well as the Ostministerium officials, endeavored to form a central Ukrainian political body. A major motive, after the evacuation of the West Ukraine in the summer of 1944, was to establish liaison with the nationalist partisans.[51] Dr. Fritz Arlt, the Waffen SS officer who had played a prominent part in dealing with the Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement in 1939–41, was a central figure in the efforts to form a Ukrainian national committee. Apparently both Mel'nyk and Bandera refused to discuss such proposals while they were in prison.[52] Soon after his release on September 27, 1944, however, Bandera suggested to Arlt that he approach Dr. Horbovyi, an OUN-B member who had played a leading role in organizing the Ukrainian National Committee in Cracow in June, 1941. Arlt could reach no agreement with Horbovyi, however, and turned to Mel'nyk, who had been released on October 17. Mel'nyk was apparently able to secure an agreement among all important nationalist leaders, including Bandera, Livyts'kyi, and Skoropads'kyi, on the stand to be taken in relation to the German proposals, but the demands which the nationalists made could not be accepted by Arlt and his collaborators.[53]

Unable to induce the major Ukrainian nationalist leaders to take the lead in forming a national committee under conditions acceptable to the Nazi rulers, Arlt turned to elements which had

[51] The intentions of Arlt and the Ostministerium are outlined by Berger in the memorandum in Dvinov (pp. 109–11). Although Dvinov's work is highly tendentious, this document appears to be authentic.

[52] *OUN u Viini*, p. 106; Interview 51. The Mel'nyk and Bandera accounts agree—except that each side says that it persuaded the other not to form a committee to cooperate with the Germans.

[53] Arlt to Rosenberg, November 21, 1944, NO 3039 (hereafter referred to as NO 3039); apparently the demands correspond to those contained in the petition quoted below on p. 182.

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668* so far been less active in politics during the war. The first two
727 Ukrainian leaders offered the post of chairman of a national committee, General Petriv and Professor Mazepa, declined, in view of the risks which, with German defeat almost certain, such a position involved. Finally, however, General Paul Shandruk, a UNR officer and a close associate of Andrew Livyts'kyi, accepted, with the blessing of the latter, Bandera, and Mel'nyk.[54] As Shandruk and his associates saw the matter, it was absolutely necessary to have a Ukrainian committee recognized by the Germans, not only to avoid subordination of all Ukrainians in Germany to Vlasov, which would prevent their seizing an opportunity for independent negotiations with the Allies, but because the sheer existence of the *Ostarbeiter* and prisoners required that their compatriots be in a position to exercise influence in their behalf. To them, the loss of prestige involved in collaboration with an infamous and moribund power was not sufficient to outweigh these considerations.[55]

668* At the same time, Vlasov and his associates were busily endeavoring to secure a Ukrainian representation which would accept their claim to leadership and would agree to postpone any decision on independence for the Ukraine until after the Soviet rulers had been overthrown. Most Ukrainians whom they approached refused to cooperate, being convinced that if a predominantly Russian group such as Vlasov's ever succeeded in replacing the Communists in the Kremlin, it would create conditions which would make impossible a free expression of the wishes of the Ukrainian people on the question of union with Russia. Nevertheless, Vlasov succeeded in securing the support of a certain number of prominent Ukrainians for a Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (Komitet Osvobozhdeniia Narodov Rossii—KONR), which met in Prague on November 14, 1944. It is remarkable that practically all of these were from the single city of Kiev.[56] In part this appears to be due to the fact that

[54] Interviews 9, 22. One informant (Interview 24) states that while the Bandera followers would not give their approval officially, they felt that Shandruk performed a highly useful and patriotic function.

[55] Interview 22.

[56] These included Theodore Bohatyrchuk and George Muzichenko, who signed the Manifesto of Prague; Constantine Shtepa and Eugene Arkypenko, chief editor

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Za Ukrainu, were kept in the hands of nationalist editors, who were able to direct oblique attacks on Vlasov.[63] 668* 204

Nevertheless, it is certain that Vlasov was given some advantages, and secured considerable success, in his efforts to recruit prisoners of war of all Soviet nationalities for his Russian Liberation Army (Rossiskaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia—ROA). Even according to Ukrainian nationalist sources, only half of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were fully "nationally conscious," and many could not even speak the Ukrainian language.[64] Moreover, Vlasov was able to secure a number of high-ranking ex-Soviet officers of Ukrainian origin for his staff, including the commander of the first ROA division, General Buniachenko. Altogether, units, in various stages of integration in the ROA, totaled three hundred thousand by January, 1945, and of this number perhaps 35 to 40 percent were of Ukrainian ethnic stock.[65] 727 704

Apparently no direct threats or compulsion were used to secure adherence of civilians to the KONR.[66] On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalist sources maintain that the apparent German favor enjoyed by Vlasov was a powerful inducement to the de-

[63] For example, the latter newspaper published the translation of an article from *Das Schwartze Korps* (an SS organ) harshly criticizing Russian émigrés, on January 18, 1945, p. 2.

[64] M. Les', "Chomu ia buv 'Vlasovtsem'?" (Why was I a "Vlasovite"?), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (October-November, 1952), p. 3, states that 50 percent of the Ukrainian prisoners were "nationally conscious," 40 percent somewhat so, and 10 percent not at all. A contemporary account (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 23, 1941, p. 2) states that many of the letters addressed by Ukrainian prisoners to the newspaper which the Germans had established for them (*Nova Doba*) were in Russian, but notes that they were sent to the Ukrainian rather than the Russian paper, *Klich.* The latter also carried material evidently intended for a Ukrainian audience. Other contemporary accounts of the prisoners differ as to whether they could speak the Ukrainian language. One insists that 80 percent were "nationally conscious," and that the Russian prisoners accepted the fact that the Ukrainians were "separatists" without anger, for while the latter wanted an independent state they had always lived peacefully with the Russians and other minorities in the Ukraine (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 5, 1941, p. 2).

[65] Unsigned list of units from the eastern peoples, January, 1945, NO 5800 (hereafter referred to as NO 5800). For the percentage of Ukrainians see Les', p. 3, and MS H, which states that Vlasov told Shandruk that 70 percent of the first ROA division were Ukrainians. If so, this figure must have been reached by including persons with very little Ukrainian nationalist feeling whom the Russian National Socialist leader, Bronislav Kaminskii, recruited in the Lokot' area on the border of the Ukrainian and Russian Soviet Republics, since (according to Thorwald, p. 44) Kaminskii's brigade alone formed more than a third of this division.

[66] Interview 45.

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704 moralized and physically worn-out prisoners to accept his invita-
727 tion as a way out of confinement. They assert that a number of the units formed from prisoners or from the auxiliary units brought back by the Wehrmacht in its retreat abandoned the ROA, even without German permission, to join nationalist Ukrainian forces.[67] To a certain degree, this assertion is supported by one of the German officers most closely associated with the eastern military units, who states that difficulties were experienced in subordinating Ukrainian or mixed Ukrainian-Russian units which had been under German commanders to Russian officers from the ROA, although there was generally no objection to attachment to Vlasov's over-all command.[68]

704 In addition to this struggle for influence within groups which were subordinated to General Vlasov, there was an entirely separate military organization for the Ukrainians. The Galician division was reformed as the First Ukrainian Division, and organization of a second division to be composed of East Ukrainians was begun.[69] These and a number of other units, totaling seventy-five thousand men, were classified as the Ukrainian Liberation Army (Ukraïns'ke Vyzvol'ne Voisko—UVV) under command of General Shandruk, though each unit was actually commanded by a German officer.[70] In contradistinction to the ROA units, which wore the St. Andrew's cross, a centuries-old Russian symbol, the Ukrainian units were permitted the *trizub* [trident] as their national emblem. Borovets', who had been released from prison after a few months, was commissioned to form a parachute detachment to land behind the Soviet lines to aid the partisan struggle.[71]

000 The final days of the war brought no substantial change in

[67] A. Kovach, *Ukraïns'ka vyzvol'na borot'ba i "Vlasovshchyna"* (The Ukrainian Liberation Struggle and the "Vlasov Affair") ("Germany," 1948), p. 51, states that 65 percent of the trainees in the Dabensdorf officers' school of the ROA were of Ukrainian origin.

[68] Interview 15; MS C.

[69] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 8, 1944, p. 3.

[70] General Shandruk has in his possession a mimeographed copy of an order from the German general, Freitag, turning over command of the First (Galician) Ukrainian Division to him, but only on April 27, 1945. See also Oleh Lysiak, "Volyns'kyi Batalion" (The Volhynian Battalion), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv I. UD UNA* (March, 1951), p. 2.

[71] Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba*, p. 15; Interview 37.

795 While the basic reason for the foundation of a new church, 727 and its rapid growth at the expense of the body under Alexius, was the nationalist feeling of the Ukrainians, which demanded a fully national church divorced from any connection, however theoretical, with Russia, German policy had also played a role in division of the Orthodox communion. Fundamentally, Nazi policy was permeated with violent hatred of all religion. The guiding principle for selection of German officials for the east ensured that this basic theme would persist in the application of policy: "The whole Christian outlook makes one incapable of carrying on work in the east, for the community of the hymnbook is put ahead of the needs of the Reich."[36] Within this blanket opposition to the church, however, even the fanatical anticlericalism of Rosenberg and his staff permitted compromises to secure tactical advantages. In their eyes, Catholic Christianity was the chief religious danger in the east. The leaders of the Catholic Church had long hoped for an opportunity to bring their doctrines to the peoples of the Soviet Union. On the outbreak of war, they attempted to send a number of priests, including several trained in the Ukrainian College in Rome, as missionaries. The Ostministerium rigorously opposed this endeavor, and with the exception of a few clergymen who were able to penetrate the Ukraine as chaplains in the Italian army, the Vatican's efforts were thwarted.[37] Similarly, the efforts of Polish Catholics to conduct activities in the East Ukraine, even among the considerable body of communicants of the Latin rite in Volhynia, were quickly suppressed.[38]

In contrast to the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church was not to be opposed openly, provided it was not Russian dominated but Ukrainian in character. Moreover, any other purely Ukrainian sects were to be permitted. It was hoped that by allowing a multitude of religious bodies, the Orthodox Church as such

[36] Memorandum on personnel for the east, from the Rosenberg files, July 9, 1941, PS 1040 (hereafter referred to as PS 1040).

[37] Directive by Alfred Meyer, "Die Frage der konfessionellen Verbände," July 29, 1941, PS 1047 (hereafter referred to as PS 1047). On the training of missionaries of the Greek Catholic rite for missionary work in the USSR after the conquest, see also Aldo Valori, *La Campagna di Russia* (Rome: Grafica Nazionale Editrice, 1951), I, 244.

[38] PS 058.

would be weakened, for "the corruption and cultural backwardness of the clergy prepared the ground for Bolshevism."[39] When, however, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was founded as a distinctively national church, it appeared to the Ostministerium to be a useful means of furthering its aim of strengthening Ukrainian nationalism and driving a wedge between the Ukrainian and the Russian elements. Consequently, it felt that the Autocephalous Church under the leadership of Polykarp should be recognized and accorded a position of distinct superiority in comparison to the Autonomous Church headed by Alexius.[40]

As was frequently the case, the policy formulated in Rosenberg's ministry failed of all practical results in the Ukraine. The Reichskommissariat decided to pursue a diametrically opposed course. Thus it proclaimed confessional freedom in June, 1942, but ordered all ecclesiastical organization limited to individual *Generalbezirke*.[41] In particular, it decided a little later to order the dissolution of the governing bodies of both the Autonomous and the Autocephalous Churches, the *sobors* headed by Alexius and Polykarp respectively.[42]

One reason for this decision to restrict religious organization was undoubtedly the fact that the Autocephalous Church had shown great vigor in organizing a new hierarchy. In May a second *sobor* of Autocephalous bishops had gathered in Kiev and consecrated no less than seven new bishops. The majority had been Volhynian priests, but two were laymen who had played prominent roles in the development of the new church body: Stephen Skrypnyk, who became bishop of Pereiaslav as Mstyslav, and a Kiev professor, Haievs'kyi, who became Bishop Sylvester.[43] Strong

[39] PS 1047.

[40] Draft of a directive of Rosenberg to the Reichskommissare Ostland and Ukraine, May 13, 1942, CXLVa 15, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 15). I do not know whether the directive was ever actually sent, but it certainly expresses the opinion of the predominant group in the Ostministerium, as opposed to that of Koch's officials.

[41] Report by an unidentified official of the Ostministerium to Rosenberg, June 30, 1944, CXLVa 66, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 66).

[42] Directive of Reichskommissar Ukraine (signed by Dargel, head of the political section) to the Generalkommissare, October 1, 1942, CXLVa 20, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 20).

[43] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 28, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup*, July 12, 1942, p. 2.

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795 efforts were made to secure the support of all the surviving Lypkyvites, with great success, apparently because there was no demand for reconsecration, although at first there was friction between the new and the old Autocephalous bodies.[44] The new consecrations raised the total number of the higher clergy to fourteen: two archbishops (Polykarp and Alexander, Hilarion being still a member of the hierarchy of the Polish church, i.e., that in the Generalgouvernement) and twelve bishops, with five hundred parishes and a still greater number of priests under their author-
● 727 ity.[45] The vigor and unity of the church alone was sufficient to
795 make it repugnant to those Germans who feared any independent center of Ukrainian life. For example, the Generalkommissar in Nikolaev wrote Erich Koch expressing his fear that the Autocephalous Church, which was strong in the northern part of his area, was becoming a "national church," and said that all priests were being closely watched.[46] Koch himself conceived a violent antipathy for Mstyslav, whom he described as "Skrypnyk, a prominent Ukrainian politician in Kiev," asserting that the bishop was trying to turn the Wehrmacht against the Reichskommissariat officials.[47]

As a result of these feelings of distrust, the Reichskommissariat refused to follow the policy of favoring the Autocephalous Church as against the Autonomous Church. With the desertion of the nationalist Ukrainians, the latter was coming more and more to be the confession of Russophile elements in the Ukraine, or at least of those elements which favored equality between Russians and Ukrainians in cultural and political life. In an effort to build up a counterweight to the nationalist forces, the Reichskommissariat officials began to favor the Autonomous Church. First the Reichskommissar decided that a balance should be maintained

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 3; Dmytro Doroshenko in *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 10, 1942, p. 1.

[45] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 1, 1942, p. 4, based on information from Bishop Mstyslav. Apparently in addition to the bishops I have referred to as adhering to the Autocephalous Church, a new member of the hierarchy, Korenistov, was consecrated as bishop of Brest and auxiliary of Alexander of Pinsk. Doroshenko in *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 10, 1942, p. 1, also refers to fourteen members of the UAP hierarchy.

[46] April, 1942, CXLVa 474, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 474).

[47] PS 192.

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between the two churches.[48] Later his henchmen used the Autonomous Church as a means of weakening the Autocephalous Church when the latter threatened to become powerful. The reverse tactic was also used occasionally, but the general tendency appears to be that taken by the Stadtkommissar of Kiev, who openly indicated the preference of the German officials for the Russian-oriented church by transferring to it in a public ceremony the principal cathedral of the city, St. Vladimir's (St. Volodymyr's).[49] 727 795

The general policy of the Reichskommissariat toward union of the two Orthodox bodies was governed by the same principle of doing everything which would weaken forces which might slip beyond its control. In May, when it appeared that the nascent strength of the Autocephalous group might be curbed by securing its subordination to Alexius, this line of action was favored, though in a tentative way, because the specter of a single united church, whatever its stand on the national question, was also abhorrent to the autocratic Nazi group.[50] By October, when the Autocephalous Church had become so strong that Alexius was obliged to seek unification on terms favorable to it, the Germans intervened to render abortive all attempts at conciliation.[51] Actually, the negotiations between Alexius on the one side and Polykarp, Mstyslav, and Nikanor on the other, proceeded so far that on October 8, 1942, an act of union was signed. A new synod of bishops, consisting of Polykarp and Alexius as metropolitans, with Alexander, Simon (an Autonomous bishop) and Nikanor as members, and Mstyslav as secretary, was to be formed. Thus the Autocephalous group would have obtained a clear majority in the directing body. The episcopal sees were to be so rearranged as to allow places for all or most of the bishops hitherto consecrated by both groups.[52] The strong German inter-

[48] CXLVa 20.

[49] *Volyn'*, May 2, 1943, p. 4.

[50] On May 4, 1942, at a conference in Rovno, an official of the Reichskommissariat expressed the wishes of the German authorities that the two churches unite, but declared that the Germans would maintain neutrality and not intervene at that time to secure union (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 14, 1942, p. 3).

[51] The directive of the Reichskommissar Ukraine to the Generalkommissare previously cited (CXLVa 20) provided that all efforts at union should be opposed.

[52] *Nastup*, November 15, 1942, p. 2; *Ukrains'ka Diiznist'*, December 10, 1942, p. 2.

727 vention, however, combined with the opposition of a number
795 of Autonomous bishops, headed by Panteleimon, forced Alexius to retract his signature.[53]

795 From what has just been said, one would assume that there
668* would be a close connection between the Autocephalous Church, which within a few months had come to be the church of most believing Ukrainian nationalists, and the nationalist parties. To a certain extent this is true, for many members of the latter, who were prevented by the danger of violent death from pursuing any national political activities, turned to the cultivation of the church as a means for expressing and propagating their feelings. A number of the leading members of the Autocephalous Church were affiliated with the UNR, and the Het'man group also displayed great interest in religious development, in line with its conservative and traditionalist principles. More particularly, Mstyslav, the member of the UAP hierarchy who was most intimately acquainted with and interested in political affairs, was an old adherent of the UNR.[54]

668* As has been previously indicated, however, the really active parties in the East Ukraine were the two factions of the OUN. Hence the fact that the church leaders tended to associate with other groupings acted as a certain impediment to close collaboration. Moreover, a strong element in both wings of the OUN was opposed to religion in principle. This ideological bias against utilizing the church as a major instrument of national expression was undoubtedly given greatly increased weight by the experience
668* of the nationalists in the East Ukraine. The churches—both Au-
771 tonomous and Autocephalous—had no difficulty in attracting communicants, for there were many millions who had longed for the remembered solace of religion throughout the years of Communist oppression. These adherents of the church were, however, drawn very largely from the lower classes, the less educated elements of the population, especially the peasantry.[55] Since the OUN groups—as will be shown—concentrated their efforts on the intelligentsia, they placed comparatively little emphasis on

[53] *Ukrains'ka Diiznist'*, December 10, 1942, p. 2.

[54] Interview 69.

[55] See Chapter IX for details and sources on the attitude of the social classes and age groups toward religion.

the two factions of the OUN were unable to penetrate institutional channels, it was sometimes possible for nationalist groups limited to specific localities to do so. No appraisal of the strength of nationalism in the East Ukraine during 1941–43 would be complete without an examination of this penetration of the institutional framework by nationalists. In such an examination it is essential to proceed with great caution, for it is all too easy for adherents of Ukrainian nationalist groups to ascribe in retrospect an exaggerated importance to their influence during the years of occupation. It would be tedious to describe the complicated and frequently unsatisfying ways in which the element of fact in inflated postwar accounts has been sought. Suffice it to say at this point that the basic approach has been the testing of the details of proper names, place names, and dates contained in each narration (whether in the form of printed memoir or oral testimony) against the abundant but superficial material contained in the Ukrainian press during the war years. In addition, the available wartime underground publications and German reports have been utilized. In this fashion, at least the extent of the real acquaintance of the narrator with the area he describes can be estimated, and frequently the validity of his assessment of the role of persons and events can be surmised by reading between the lines of descriptions published legally—but with a trace of "Aesopian" language—during the war.

668* 127

Primary targets for the efforts of nationalist elements in their campaign to win access to the East Ukrainian masses were the administrative apparatuses existing at the local level throughout the area of German occupation. The general outline of the machinery of government established by the Nazi regime in the occupied eastern territories has been described, and the policy of the officials in charge traced. The ruthless policy pursued made open activity of the OUN groups impossible, and their failure to understand this fact in time resulted in the slaughter of many of their adherents. The extent to which nationalist administrative officials could survive in the capital has already been indicated, however, and what was true of Kiev was true to a more marked degree of many of the smaller centers of the Ukraine. In spite

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727 of the determined efforts of Erich Koch and his cohorts to bring
634 every aspect of life under their control, the sheer extent of the Ukraine and the size of its population prevented complete success. For example, in the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev, there were only five hundred Germans on the administrative staff, charged with governing a population of 1,920,000, in an area of nearly seventeen thousand square miles.[3]

191 The limitations on control arising from the small number of
634 German personnel available were made yet narrower by the
727 language barrier. The extent to which the Wehrmacht was dependent on nationalists as interpreters has already been described. Since few Reichskommissariat officials knew the Slavic languages and yet in general rejected the use of émigrés or West Ukrainians as aides, they were thrown back on local interpreters and assistants as intermediaries between themselves and the masses. Supposedly
121 reliable persons, often ethnic Germans, were employed. These
634 physical limitations, however, compelled the German officials to
727 concentrate on keeping the "commanding heights" of the administration—economic controls, armed force, and means of communication—in their hands, while turning over most other aspects of public affairs to administrators drawn from the native population. In these fields they could lay down policy and occasionally intervene brutally to punish real or fancied violations of their directives. They could play one group against another and thereby secure a check on the development of movements threatening to pass from German control. They could place all aspects of life under a crushing weight of fear and material deprivation. Lacking a body of supporters extending down to the smallest units of society, however, they could not enforce a positive program of indoctrination and—except in an intermittent and incomplete fashion—they could not prevent those who were in contact with the masses of the population from imparting their own ideological tinge to their activities.

634 The physical limitations of German power meant that the
727 local administrative machinery in the East Ukraine was to a large extent left to the inhabitants. Local men were of course especially predominant in the administration of rural areas, but

[3] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, December 2, 1942, p. 1; *Volyn'*, February 25, 1943, p. 4.

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for reasons which will be discussed in the next chapter, little is 634
known about their activities in connection with nationalism. The 727
city administrations were more closely supervised by the Germans, but their size prevented them from being completely controlled. In spite of the fact that the populace soon realized that only the shadow of power was permitted the local administrations, the concept of the omnipotence of state control was so well established that even the outer signs of authority behind the nationalist cause were of some importance in winning support for it. Throughout the occupied Ukraine, except for the Donbas, which [191]
was very mixed ethnically, the languages of administration were German and Ukrainian only. Although it is said that the officials who carried on the governmental work in the prescribed language frequently spoke Russian as soon as they had left their desks, and sometimes even wrote their reports and orders in that language,[4] having them translated into Ukrainian, the prestige value of the change was considerable. The same was true of the wide- [186]
spread use of national symbols, which had been forbidden under Soviet rule, such as the trident and the blue and yellow colors; they appeared on the uniforms of the police, as banners decorating the administrative buildings, even on the streetcars. On the other hand, the removal of these symbols, when Russophile elements were introduced into the administration to replace the nationalists, was equally important as a negative token of loss of prestige; the official language, however, always remained [191]
Ukrainian.[5]

Some indication of the influence exerted upon the overt atti- 186
tudes of the inhabitants of the East Ukraine by the apparent ascendancy of Ukrainian nationalism is furnished by nationalities statistics obtained from censuses taken by various city administrations in late 1941 and early 1942,[6] since each citizen was usually

[4] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3.

[5] When the *Ukrains'ke Slovo* group was arrested, the cultural department of the Kiev city administration was ordered to remove all tridents and Ukrainian flags; see Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukrains'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 11. In Dniepropetrovsk, the Germans followed up the destruction of the Ukrainian *oblast* administration by removing the trident from the masthead of *Vil'na Ukraïna* (The Free Ukraine), the city's newspaper, and changing its name to *Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta* (Interview 77).

[6] See Appendix.

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employable men. From the point of view of political sentiment, 633
as will be shown, the composition of the administrative force [565]
made it even more significant, for over one fourth were of the upper levels of the intelligentsia—those having a higher education—while another 35 percent were probably of the Soviet "intelligentsia," since they possessed secondary educations.[11] The city administrations, with their appurtenances of schools and publications, thus served as refuges for the intellectual class in general, which was shorn of its customary economic role by the terrible dislocations of war. Consequently the orientation of the structure in which they found a place could play a vital role in determining the direction this group's sentiments would take.

At least two East Ukrainian mayors,[12] in addition to Bahazii, 186
lost their lives for too ardent devotion to the nationalist cause. 633
Even when they were not in conflict with the occupying power, the mayors knew that their positions singled them out for Communist vengeance, from either secret agents or the returning Red Army. That a considerable group of officials was found to remain true to the nationalist cause—even if a bit timidly at times—is an indication that a considerable reservoir of leadership for nationalism existed in the East Ukraine.

While the city administration as a whole was both a symbol 727 ●
of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy and an instrument for ad- 633
vancing the nationalist cause, the individual departments were frequently of equal or greater significance. Their importance derived in large measure from the fact that administrative divisions entrusted with very important functions were frequently operated in considerable independence of the central municipal administration.

In practice the amount of authority exercised by any major official depended more on his own character and his relations with the German authorities than upon any formal apportionment of power. This was especially the case in the large cities, where in addition to the *Stadtkommissar* who stood above the native mayor, there were German officials in charge of each of

[11] *Ibid.*
[12] In Kamenets-Podolsk and Poltava.

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727 the departments of administration. In such cases the department
633 heads who were on good terms with their German superiors seem to have been able to pursue courses substantially independent of the mayor, and this was also to an extent true of the firmer or more clever of those who wished to exert their own authority even without special German support. Consequently, it sometimes happened that one or more sections of a municipal administration were strongholds of nationalist activity, while the city as a whole was administered by elements opposed to Ukrainian independence.

Under the Soviet system, the municipal administrations had included departments of finance, communal economy, internal trade, health, popular education, social security, and cadres, as well as a general department, a planning commission, and sometimes departments of local manufacturing and agriculture. In the city administrations under German occupation, there was evidently some consolidation of departments, but in general the Soviet division was little changed, except for the elimination of the planning commission. On the other hand, several new departments were added for functions which had been performed by higher Soviet administrative levels but which the Germans wished to allocate, under their own control, to the cities. One was the propaganda department, which will be discussed somewhat later. Another was the juridical department, which operated a system of lower courts.[13] It was, however, of little or no importance as a channel of nationalist activity. Much more significant in this
625 respect were the police departments. Some indications of their
727 activity in nationalist affairs have already been given. The Ger-
633 mans, of course, exerted great efforts to keep this element of authority, the only branch of the local administration which could have offered armed resistance to their rule, under firm control. Since the police power was regularly in the hands of German SP officials, who frequently maintained only a nominal subordination to the *Stadtkommissar,* the Ukrainian chief of this department was correspondingly independent of the mayor.

[13] On the legal system in the Reichskommissariat, see Nicholas Laskovs'kyi, "Practicing Law in the Occupied Ukraine," *American Slavic and East European Review,* XI (April, 1952), 124 ff.

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Moreover, since there were several German police authorities— ordinary security police, secret police, railway police—operating in the same area, unified at the top but having different Ukrainian subchiefs operating under them, the possibility of several competing or antagonistic influences existed. In spite of the special concern of the Reichskommissariat to root out all OUN members in the police, the latter were able for many months to maintain their positions in several cities. For example, while the city administrations of Vinnitsa and Dniepropetrovsk were in the hands of Russophile elements opposed to Ukrainian nationalism, the police chief in the former city[14] and the Ukrainian in charge of the secret police in the latter[15] were supporters of the OUN. Close as was the supervision of the German police authorities, it was obviously impossible for them to watch every action of their subordinates, so that possession of such support within the police force was of great value to the nationalist groups.

In the wave of repression in Kiev in December, 1941, the fact that his sympathizers controlled the police in the *raion* in which he was arrested allowed the chief of the OUN-M in the East Ukraine, Dr. Kandyba, to secure his release, thus enabling him to prolong his activities for more than two years.[16] Moreover, the presence of nationalist elements in the police force served to prevent the control of these groups by secret Communist agents, who were successful in penetrating the police in a number of places in the southern Ukraine, and for a while in Kiev itself, through the German practice of retaining the Soviet *militsiia* as a matter of convenience.[17] Whatever value the nationalist penetration of the police force may have had in this connection was largely offset by the odium which attached to the nationalist groups when it became known to the population that they were collaborating with the Germans in this fashion. Moreover, the ill repute of the police was sometimes increased by the actions of the nationalists themselves who used the police as an instrument for terrorizing non-Ukrainians.[18]

[14] Interview 1.
[15] Interviews 1, 18.
[16] L. Dniprova, article in *Ukrains'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.
[17] Interview 59.
[18] It is said that the Ukrainian police in Kiev, when ordered to secure hostages

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747 Of less obvious importance than the police sections, but never-
737 theless of great significance were the agencies concerned with health, social security, and welfare. The extreme limitations placed upon the efforts of the local administrations to maintain their starving citizens have already been described. Nevertheless, the fact that they could carry on activity was of some importance, both from the practical standpoint and from that of providing the population with token participation in administration. The Germans were undoubtedly content to leave this arduous and thankless task to the local leaders. Welfare activities were in part the responsibility of municipal departments, in part the function of volunteer organizations. This duplication gave rise to the possibility of conflicting political trends in the same field of operation. In Kiev the head of the welfare department, until his consecration as an Autocephalous bishop, was Professor Haievs'kyi,[19] and even after his resignation the department seems to have been in the hands of nationalist elements. The paucity of the resources available to this section has been indicated in a preceding chapter; nevertheless, it was able to arrange for the provision of buildings for care of the distressed.[20] At the same time, the Ukrainian Red Cross, which had been formed as an organ of the city government and which had carried on extensive operations in relieving the horrible conditions in the prisoner-of-war camps, had been dissolved by the Germans. Apparently this action was due in part to its use by Nationalist elements as a screen for their activities, but more particularly to its humane exertions. Its leader, Professor Theodore Bohatyrchuk, who, after having welcomed collaboration with the OUN-M group, had become disgusted with its excesses in Kiev, now turned to support of the Russophile element.[21] His organization, which was reformed as the All-Ukrainian Aid Committee (Vseukraïns'kyi

after explosions set off by Communist agents in Kiev in the autumn of 1941, arrested only Russians, scores of whom were then shot (Interviews 19, 59). However, a German order provided that Ukrainians were not to be taken as hostages while Russians were to be arrested for this purpose (Order of Befehlshaber des Ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiet Süd, August 16, 1941, NOKW 1691; hereafter referred to as NOKW 1691).

[19] *Ukraïns'ka Diiïmist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Interviews 19, 71.

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Komitet Dopomohy), was able, even on the eve of German evacuation, to provide meals for 36,000 persons (children and others unable to work),[22] one sixth of the city's population; its great popularity[23] was of tremendous importance in enabling Bohatyrchuk to secure support for his stand in favor of coalition with anti-Soviet Russians. On the other hand, in Dniepropetrovsk, where the city administration was largely in the hands of pro-Russian elements, the Ukrainians, inspired by an OUN-M organizer, formed a Red Cross organization which acted as a center for nationalist forces.

The nationalist element was more successful in the field of cooperative organization. While each city administration contained a department of trade, the cooperatives, as quasi-public bodies, appear to have been considerably more important as channels of local initiative. Far from being a product of the Communist regime, the cooperative movement was indigenous to both East and West Ukraine, having played an important role before the First World War, when it was already imbued with nationalist overtones.[24] In the NEP period of Soviet rule, and until the late twenties, the cooperatives had been able to maintain a considerable degree of independence and had, at least in the Kharkov region, served as a center for nationalist elements which worked with the Republican government.[25] In the Five Year Plan periods, the urban cooperatives had become adjuncts of the state trading systems, and other cooperatives had been closely integrated into state commercial operations.[26]

[22] *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo*, September 19, 1943, pp. 4–5; see also *Volyn'*, January 28, 1943, p. 3.

[23] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 4.

[24] For abundant details on the complex system of cooperatives developed in the Ukraine prior to 1917, see Eugene M. Kayden and Alexis N. Antsiferov, *The Cooperative Movement in Russia During the War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), a volume in the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, ed. James T. Shotwell, Russian Series, compiled for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. Cooperatives were far more developed in the Ukraine than in most other heavily populated areas of the Russian Empire (*ibid.*, pp. 40, 41, 266–69, 357), and served educational as well as economic development. Kharkov was the chief cooperative center in the Ukraine and was largely independent of the Russian centers.

[25] Interview 73.

[26] Alexander Baikov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 253; Arthur C. Arnold, *Banks, Credit, and Money in Soviet Russia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 477.

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●727 474 When the Germans arrived, surviving leaders of the former independent cooperatives were again able to assert themselves. As early as the winter of 1941–42, there was a total of 643 cooperative organizations in the Kiev region, including forty-eight *raion* food societies which bought agricultural produce and carried on economic organization;[27] in the city of Kharkov there were 150 cooperatives, which maintained close contacts with their sources of food stocks in the countryside.[28] There were, in addition to numerous distributing cooperatives, twenty-eight producing cooperatives in Kiev, in such diverse fields as transport, printing, and haberdashery.[29] The Ukraïnbank (All-Ukrainian Cooperative Bank), which had been formed in 1922 for financing all types of cooperatives, but incorporated in the Soviet central Torgbank in 1936, was revived.[30]

727 474 186 Moreover, there were more direct links to the nationalist movements. An effort was made, with German approval, to organize a general center for the food cooperatives, known as the All-Ukrainian Cooperative Society (Vseukraïns'ka Kooperatyvna Spilka), which coordinated local organizations, published a bulletin, and restored the museum of the history of cooperative development, an institution of considerable significance for nationalist sentiment.[31] Under an old officer of the Ukrainian army, Professor Perevertuna, a close collaborator of the OUN-M, it carried out activities on a large scale in the Kiev area, especially training replacements for the diminished ranks of cooperative workers.[32] In addition to more indirect fostering of nationalist sentiment, its aid to the nationalist cause included employing persons whom the Germans had dismissed from the municipal administration.[33] In early 1943, however, such activities resulted in the execution of the director.[34]

[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.
[28] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 24, 1942, p. 2.
[29] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 5, 1942, p. 2.
[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 10, 1942, p. 4. Cf. Baikov, p. 86, and Arnold, p. 477, for the background of this bank.
[31] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.
[32] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, July 11, 1942, p. 3.
[33] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75.
[34] *Ibid.; Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 585.

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Like the cooperative movement, popular education had long been a cornerstone of Ukrainian nationalism, more important in many respects than direct political action. In the conflict between the national Communists in the Ukraine and the Stalinist centralists, it was especially the commissars of education, such as Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk, who had led the fight for Ukrainization of cultural life. Consequently it was natural that nationalist Ukrainians were determined to control the municipal departments of education under German occupation.

A major aim of the Reichskommissar and his henchmen, however, was to prevent the development of a cultured Ukrainian class, to convert the people into a race of submissive peasants. Rosenberg's vision of a university in Kiev went by the board, and the standard schooling for every Ukrainian child was set at four years.[35] Few material injuries were as deeply resented as this drastic curb on the opportunities for education. Since there were real shortages of materials, books, and teachers, the Ukrainians held to the hope that the restriction did not represent a permanent policy, even in the face of the closing of *gimnaziias* which had been reopened under the army administration through the efforts of the local population itself.[36]

To a limited extent the ban on secondary and higher education was evaded by the extensive use made of a loophole in the German regulations which allowed the reopening of technical schools. The enormous loss of artisans and professionally trained persons incurred by the annihilation of the Jewish inhabitants compelled even the power-mad Nazis to recognize the need for training Ukrainians in such occupations. A large number of technical secondary schools, agricultural schools, and even institutes of higher education like medical faculties, were permitted. The extent to which these facilities were utilized by the Ukrainian population is indicated by the fact that the enrollment of the Kiev medical institute reached 2,000 in 1943 when the total population of the city was only 300,000, while Kherson, with a fifth

[35] Report of Rosenberg to Hitler, August 11, 1942, PS 42 (hereafter referred to as PS 42); PS 1198.

[36] E.g., in Berdichev (*Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3, quoting *Nova Doba* [Berdichev] for September 1), Zhitomir (Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941), and Belaia Tserkov' (*Nationalist*, December 20, 1941, p. 2).

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874 that number of inhabitants, had 541 students in its medi-
727 cal school.[37] Medical institutes were also reopened in Stalino,
186 Dniepropetrovsk, and Vinnitsa, and perhaps in other cities, although it is doubtful if any of these were the centers of nationalist youth organization which the faculty in Kiev became under the leadership of the OUN-M.[38]

The educational structure described in the preceding paragraph was designed for adolescents or young adults, and thus could be used for direct propagation of nationalist concepts. It was, of course, partly for this reason that the Germans confined advanced training within such narrow limits. Even these restrictions were not the end of the difficulties faced in inculcating a nationalist type of education in those about to assume the role of citizens,
[446] for the technical schools were frequently emptied of their students and faculty to meet the demands of the *Ostarbeiter* recruiters. The elementary schools were also drained of teachers by the *Ostarbeiter* program, and the pupils, though too young for forced labor, were decimated by famine and plague. If the task of building national consciousness had to be viewed as a long-term one, then the four-year elementary school offered a considerable field for cultivation.[39]

191 The problem confronting the nationalist leaders in education
727 was twofold: they had to ensure a basis for the development of an independent Ukraine by making certain that all instruction
872 was in the Ukrainian language, so that the rising generation
186 would be fully at home in this speech; and they had to replace the Communist ideology by a positive nationalist concept. The first task was relatively uncomplicated, though far from easy in practice. In line with their policy of encouraging the purely nonpolitical aspects of Ukrainian nationality, the Germans ordered all instruction to be in Ukrainian. The nationalist directors enthusiastically supported this rule, but it was sometimes difficult to enforce it, since even teachers who were themselves nationalist in sentiment were not always able to conduct classes in Ukrainian.[40]

[37] Occ E-4 (1); *Ukrains'ka Diiznist'*, October 10, 1942, p. 1.

[38] See Chapter V.

[39] In Kiev alone there were fifty elementary schools with 17,000 students (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2).

[40] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 4; M. Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki*

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It was much more difficult to secure a predominant place for the nationalist ideology in the schools. As is usually the case in nationalist indoctrination in the schools, the efforts were concentrated upon the teaching of history.[41] This was especially important, since the justification of the Ukrainian independence movement is largely based upon the conception of a proud history distinct from that of the people of Moscow. Naturally enough, no Soviet textbooks were acceptable for the teaching of history from this point of view or from the general standpoint of eradicating Communist indoctrination. To some extent the gap was filled by books published in the year preceding the Soviet war by the educational press of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow.[42] Some texts were printed by the cultural department of the Kiev city administration. An amateurish effort was made also by certain OUN-B organizers to print locally a new version of Ukrainian history with an introduction of their own composition.[43] In view of the great material shortages and the brief time available, however, the lack of printed materials could not be made good. Consequently, a great deal depended on securing the proper teachers. To what extent the many thousands employed in the schools adhered to the nationalist doctrine is of course impossible to determine, but a number of purely indigenous formulations of nationalist concepts to be inculcated in the schools attest to the strength of nationalist feeling. The head of the Mariupol' school system proposed to stress the native language, love of the fatherland, and respect for elders; the educational ideology advocated by the group of young men who reorganized life in Krivoi Rog was instillation of Cossack ideals, the code of the Zaporozhian Sich, which was to lead to a spiritual, moral, and physical regeneration.[44]

Since the formal school program was largely confined to young children, great efforts were also concentrated on developing a voluntary system of adult education. The Prosvita societies had

Visti, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 27, 1943, p. 4, quoting D. Nitsenko in *Nova Ukraïna* (Kharkov).

[41] Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4.

[42] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 10, 1941, p. 2.

[43] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 28.

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 29, 1942, p. 2; November 15, 1941, p. 2; and November 18, 1941, p. 3 (referring to an article in *Dzvin* [Krivoi Rog], September, 1941).

not find the Prosvita organization well adapted to its tactic of underground work after German suppression.[86] On the other hand, the extremely important Kharkov Prosvita was organized almost entirely by local residents who had in many cases been associated with the Prosvita of pre-Soviet days, and who were unassociated with, or even to some extent hostile to, the OUN-M.[87] Here again there is strong indication of the survival in the East Ukraine of leadership capable of taking direction of important aspects of national life. That this leadership was directed to such a considerable extent to the less aggressive aspects of national development, however, indicates that a certain gap existed during the war years between nationalism in the East and the West Ukraine.

The means employed in the educational systems and in the cultural societies for propagating the national ideology can be classed for the most part under the heading of oral propaganda. The face-to-face type of communication has a long history of effective use in the east Slavic countries and, under the name "oral agitation," has been widely cultivated as a means of strengthening the Communist regime. Hence the population was used to this type of propaganda. Moreover, it was especially suited to the work of the nationalist groups, which were seeking to spread ideas frowned upon by the German authorities. The latter could suppress a performance or dissolve a society, arrest or execute a leader, but with their small number of personnel, their ignorance of the language, and their lack of sufficiently numerous and reliable local agents, they could not overhear everything and thus prevent the clever teacher or cultural worker from communicating political concepts to his audience. Since nationalist propagandists were so few and ill-equipped by organization and training to cope with the gigantic task of indoctrinating a population of thirty million, however, the problem of securing access to mass communication media under control of the propaganda departments of the municipal administrations was vitally important. Through such media nationalism might reach thousands

[86] Interview 61.
[87] Interviews 57, 73.

186 where oral methods by the same number of agitators reached
208 scores and live theatrical performances reached hundreds.

The principal activity of the propaganda department of a
204 727 Ukrainian municipal administration under German occupation
186 centered around the local newspaper, for other media such as the radio and motion pictures were under complete German control. It is worth devoting considerable attention to journalistic activity throughout the East Ukraine because of the value such study can have in elucidating the whole problem of the extent of nationalist activity in that area. Newspapers not only reached large numbers, but represented a symbol of authoritative pronouncement to a people accustomed to viewing the statements of the Soviet press as announcements of policy not subject to question.[58]

However much the German authorities may have feared the existence of a Ukrainian press, it was absolutely essential for them to authorize and support it for their own purposes. Under the Wehrmacht administration, especially in the early days, a very nonrestrictive policy was pursued, as was indicated by the ideologically independent nature of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* in Zhitomir and Kiev. General ground rules laid down included prohibition of the term "Ukraine" in the sense of a state, rather than as a territorial expression; insistence on reference to Germany as the "protector" of the Ukraine, rather than as an "ally"; and designation of the Wehrmacht as "saviors" rather than "occupiers."[59] Under army control newspapers sprang up in scores of towns, including all of the important cities of the East Ukraine, although in at least one (Poltava) the establishment of a paper was considerably delayed by the unwillingness of any officer to accept the responsibility of censoring it.[60] One reason for the Wehrmacht's

[58] There is considerably more information available on newspaper activity than on other politically significant aspects of the East Ukraine. Since many of the observers who have written accounts of the war period were themselves journalists, they naturally paid considerable attention to this field of activity. Moreover, the West Ukrainian newspapers published during the same period, which furnish the principal source of material on the East Ukraine, were also especially interested in journalistic enterprises. Consequently, one must guard against the assumption that the real importance of these newspapers was as great as the attention devoted to them indicates. Nevertheless, they were unquestionably very significant as means of transmitting nationalism and reflecting national feeling.

[59] PS 053.

[60] USSR Exhibit 278.

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liberality was a desire to carry propaganda to the numerous deserters who, if they were afraid to submit to German authority, might join the Red partisans. Consequently, papers were fostered in the swamp and wooded regions, even in small towns such as Ovruch, Olevsk, and Shchors. Indeed, the propaganda section of the army itself played a major role in founding newspapers, and even provided for the journalistic staffs in Zhitomir, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov the services of a competent and comparatively neutral Galician journalist, Peter Sahaidachnyi.

However, as was previously noted, the OUN-M took a leading role in establishing the papers in Zhitomir and Kiev. Its importance was also considerable in a number of the smaller cities. In Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, and Krivoi Rog, on the other hand, the initiative was taken by persons who had been journalists under the Soviet regime. In Krivoi Rog, Michael Pronchenko, a writer and poet who had been imprisoned by the Soviet regime, but later worked for the local Communist paper, upon Red army evacuation, took over the Communist press and, with the aid of other young men, began publishing a paper called *Dzvin* (The Bell).[61] In Kharkov, it was a former member of the staff of the defunct *Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna* who proposed immediately after the German arrival to start a newspaper under the name of *Novyi Chas* (The New Times).[62] It was some weeks before the paper could actually be started; the name then became *Nova Ukraïna*, and a large number of Mel'nyk adherents were on the staff. The chief editor and a majority of his subordinates, however, were local persons unaffiliated with the OUN. In a number of places Bandera organizers, too, assisted local men to establish papers.

When the Reichskommissariat took over the bulk of the East Ukraine, a quite different policy was pursued; the outspokenly nationalist organs were suppressed, their staffs executed. Even the official policy of the Reichskommissariat, presumably approved by the Ostministerium, provided that all matters concerning newspapers in the native language should be submitted to the Press and Enlightenment Division of the Reichskommissariat.

[61] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 15, 1941, p. 3; Interview 7.

[62] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), pp. 7–9.

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204 Newspapers were to be held to the minimum necessary to satisfy
626 the Ukrainian desire for news, and they were to be founded only
727 where "politically unobjectionable" journalists and adequate cen-
186 sorship machinery were available.[63] Nevertheless, as even this directive indicates, the need for a Ukrainian press could not be questioned. It was absolutely essential to have some means of reaching the population with directives, of quieting rumors, and of playing up the few positive features of the German administration. Since there were very few German personnel who could write Ukrainian, local men had to be turned to, although strong requests for newspapers were frequently refused when the Germans felt the burden of providing censors outweighed possible gains in propaganda or administrative convenience.

204 While important as a symbol of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy, the newspaper had certain severe limitations as a vehicle for nationalist ideology. Its frequency and size limited its utility. There were a few dailies, but the vast majority of newspapers appeared much less frequently, as the following figures on East Ukrainian newspapers show:[64]

Papers issued	
daily	5
three times a week	18
twice a week	25
weekly	9
unknown	41
TOTAL	98

Moreover, none exceeded four pages, and a large number could print only one page (being printed on the back of Soviet posters, etc.). This sharp curtailment was due primarily to the extremely severe paper shortage, especially in the south. *Nova Ukraïna* in Kharkov was forced to reduce its printing from fifty thousand to twenty-five thousand daily;[65] the daily *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* had to limit publication to three times a week; one paper in the Taurida *Generalbezirk* had to issue one copy of each number to each commune in the area, rather than to individuals.[66]

[63] PS 702.

[64] Figures compiled from numerous sources. It is very probable that the papers marked "unknown" appeared infrequently.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 21, 1942, p. 3.

[66] PS 1098.

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204 626 ●727 If all the limited space available had been at the editor's disposal, it would have sufficed for the expression of a wide range of political comments. Actually, a large part, usually the front page, was taken up with "news," mostly military or concerning the allegedly superior attributes of the Germans.[67] Another large body of material consisted of notices and orders of the German administration. Furthermore, the editors were frequently compelled to write, or to print over their signatures, editorials prepared by the German propaganda officers stressing some point (usually fictitious), such as the joys of the *Ostarbeiter* program or the rapid progress of land distribution, which the authorities desired to have propagandized. There was also a considerable number of articles of a factual nature, designed to "educate" the Ukrainians on some topic such as agricultural technique, in which the Germans thought them to be deficient; these were frequently translated from the German press. A certain number of notices of the activity of Ukrainian agencies—the local administrations, the church, cultural activity—was permitted under close surveillance against political propaganda. A very small number of articles on history, literature, and other cultural topics was allowed.

204 727 626 186 These limitations came close to placing the Ukrainian editor in a strait jacket. It is almost universally recognized by persons who were active in journalism at this time, however, that there were a few points at which the jacket might be stretched enough to justify the effort to use the newspaper as an outlet for nationalist expression. The few literary articles permitted, while deprived of overt political content, could be used to a certain extent to

[67] With the exception of a few issues of *Ukrains'ke Slovo* and *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo* from Kiev, the actual copies of these East Ukrainian papers have uniformly disappeared, so that it is impossible to make an investigation based on direct inspection. Their disappearance is readily explained by the hasty evacuation of the Ukraine by the German forces, the danger of having German organs on one's person in a flight to the West when one might fall into Soviet hands, and above all by the desperate need for paper of any kind for ordinary household uses. As a matter of fact, extensive, but by no means complete sets were gathered by the Institute for the Study of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Prague, as well as by certain émigré newspapers. The former collection, however, remained in the Czechoslovak capital after the end of the war and eventually fell into Soviet hands after the Communist coup (Interview 30). As a result, the presentation followed here must be based almost entirely on postwar information, and especially upon the numerous descriptions of East Ukrainian newspapers and reprints of their articles contained in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

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stress themes which were basic to the formation of national pride, 186 themes such as the nobility of Ukrainian literature, the separate 204 development of Ukrainian and Russian history, and the value of 626 Ukrainian folkways. Articles ostensibly directed against Com- 727 munists or Jews could contain oblique thrusts at Moscow and the Russians as well; sometimes such articles did indeed represent extremes of xenophobia. Even the articles giving purely factual accounts of Ukrainian activity were prized by the nationalists, since they brought to the public's attention phases of national life which had been prohibited by the Soviets. The fact that a considerable number of such items could be found for reprinting in the relatively free West Ukrainian and émigré presses (although of course the articles so treated were far from representative) indicates that the censorship barrier was not insuperable, and simple a priori consideration of the difficulty of securing alert and reliable censors for such a large body of publications substantiates this assertion.

While it was therefore true that the newspapers could be used, to a limited extent, for nationalist propaganda, the fact that they were edited by writers known to be nationalists had a certain negative effect on the regard in which the nationalist cause was held by the population, since the newspapers were obviously tools of the Germans. Communist propaganda—and Bandera propaganda after the OUN-B workers were forced from editorial posts —made a great deal of this fact. The most courageous nationalist editors tried to overcome this accusation of serving German interests by occasional sly attacks on the Germans, using the "Aesopian" language which the subjects of the Soviet empire had been forced to learn. Thus one editor, when ordered to write an article glorifying the *Ostarbeiter* program, described in glowing terms the luxurious dining cars on the trains to Germany; few Ukrainians observing the miserable cattle cars actually provided could miss the irony.[68] Not a few editors were willing to pursue such dangerous tactics.

As far as can be detected, the only papers which were controlled by pro-Russian elements (aside from the Russian-language papers) were *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo, Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta,*

[68] Interview 3.

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204 and possibly one or two of the Ukrainian-language papers in the
●727 Donbas. A number of papers in the latter area and a few in the
186 southwest Ukraine were influenced by Bandera agents, although
626 edited by local people, and maintained a semblance of independence from German control. The important papers in Vinnitsa and Proskurov remained under OUN-M editors, who, however, had to exert the utmost care to avoid arrest. Some papers, like a group in the area northwest of Poltava, which were led by a young resident of Mirgorod (Myrhorod), Michael Voskobiinyk, who was the editor of the paper there, did what they could to propagate nationalist sentiment, while others in the same district were completely subservient to the Germans.[69]

It is probably safe to say that the majority of editors would have liked to insert nationalist themes in their papers, and did so in the early days before the repression. The terrible danger to which they were exposed, however, seems to have induced most to go even further than was necessary for safety's sake in eliminating every vestige of independent writing and in slavishly following the German line. This was, as some of them were ready to admit, largely a heritage from the spirit-crushing Soviet regime, for West Ukrainians in similar positions were willing to display more initiative even though exposed to greater risks.[70] It was also very probably due to the fact that the editors lacked any experience in journalism, for many had been teachers or had followed other professions which left them ill-prepared for their new tasks. The suspicion which attached to any who had worked for the
727 Soviet press, and had thus been compelled to write anti-German
186 material, forced journalists with Soviet experience to be especially
204 cautious.[71] Whatever the reasons, on the whole the East Ukrain-

[69] Interview 47.

[70] This was admitted by an East Ukrainian in *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk* in a sharp criticism of the editorial staffs who continued the Soviet tradition of complete subservience to authority in journalism, so that in some cases the Germans themselves had to urge them to be more enterprising (March 22, 1945, p. 1).

[71] One of the causes for the dismissal of Pronchenko from directorship of *Dzvin* was the accusation by his enemies that he had written an article against Hitler in a Soviet paper (MS E); Liubchenko feared that a similar charge would be made against him, and wrote that Shtepa told him outright that persons active in the Soviet press could not be employed on *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo*, although this may simply have been an excuse to avoid hiring the nationalist writer (Liubchenko, pp. 26, 64).

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ians, when deprived of Nationalist support, made a rather poor showing as journalists. With some notable exceptions,[72] they did not measure up to the standards of the West Ukrainians or of old veterans of the Republican period like Nicholas Stasiuk, the editor of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta*. As will be shown, the administrative officials were also generally drawn from the intelligentsia, especially those of the academic or teaching profession, and had not been trained for the roles they assumed. That they nevertheless made a better showing of independence and devotion to national aims may possibly be explained by the fact that the Soviet regime had encouraged an attitude of limited self-assertion in local administrative bodies, so long as no questions of policy were at stake, while newspaper staffs were much more rigidly confined to transmission of Communist Party-inspired material and even more minutely controlled. Many persons of initiative must have felt it was better to take posts in which real service of a nonpolitical nature could be rendered, rather than assume the unattractive function of mouthpiece for a repressive regime. The question of the characteristics of the East Ukrainian intellectual can be considered in a larger context in the next chapter.

[72] Among these were Voskobiinyk, Hrynenko (Zhitomir), and a number of editorial writers in Kharkov, as well as those mentioned earlier as founding newspapers, although their careers were generally limited to a few weeks.

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led the organization after the West Ukrainian and émigré leaders had been forced to withdraw, was an engineer. On the whole, however, it may be said that engineers were more concerned with material reconstruction than politics, and did not play proportionately as significant a role as did engineers in the nationalist movements abroad and in Galicia.

The predominance of intellectuals and technical specialists in the nationalist movement imparted a certain specific color to the activities. In the first place, from the purely administrative point of view, the lack of trained men was a serious handicap. While the purely material aspects of city life were carried on about as well as might have been hoped in view of the destruction, shortages, and German obstruction, the conduct of public administration was far from adequate. This was, indeed, one of the major causes of the downfall of the OUN-M regime in Kiev, whether the worst defects consisted of favoritism and speculation by officials, or simply poor organizational and human relations. Nationalist fervor, enthusiasm, facility in the use of literary Ukrainian, were no substitutes for managerial skills and personnel psychology. Yet it was precisely these abilities which intellectuals who were excluded from public life, as were Soviet Ukrainian educators suspected of adherence to the Skrypnyk group, could not acquire. At the same time, so much of their energy had been turned in upon their academic and cultural cultivation of things Ukrainian, such as language and history, that the intellectuals failed to place the emotional and abstract aspects of the nationalist cause in a balanced framework when the opportunity for action arose. It cannot be said that the intellectuals were less courageous than others might have been in striving for national ends in the face of German terrorism; many lost their lives, although, as has been pointed out in the case of some of the small-city editors, others were sometimes found to act as pliant tools for the occupiers. It does, however, appear that persons more inclined to take a functional instead of an emotional approach to administration might have been more successful in evading German demands.

Very striking is the almost total lack of legal expression among almost all participants in administrative work. Probably the basic reason for this omission was that lawyers were few and far between among non-Communist elements in the Ukraine. A con-

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793 to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services accord-
578 ing to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of
186 the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left" as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

668 It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

● 737 Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor
661 were shot by German police; the city passed under the control
204 of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.
[24] D. Myronovych in *Krakiv'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakiv'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.
[26] *L'viv'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.
[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.
[28] Interview 47.

German authorities; in a few other places, including the important towns of Lubny and Akhtyrka (Okhtyrka), editors continued their endeavors to stimulate national feeling.[29] Remarkably, the editor in the former town was a Russian who, after his pro-Ukrainian work brought him to the verge of arrest, was able to secure a new post as editor of a Russian-language paper in the Kursk *oblast*.[30] Most active of all this group, however, was the young editor of the Mirgorod paper, Michael Voskobiinyk, who pursued a line independent of the Nationalists yet modeled on the work of the *Nova Ukraïna* group.[31]

In general, nationalism in the "Left Bank" region under German occupation can be said to have been characterized by more influence of locally led and organized ecclesiastical and political bodies than the area to the west of the Dnieper. Moreover, it was marked by somewhat less friction between the Ukrainian and Russian elements and a willingness of some of the latter group to cooperate with the effort for Ukrainian nationalist revival. Probably the basic reason for this difference is the fact that both OUN groups were suppressed in this area before they could become very influential, and the nationalist structure which was built up afterwards was formed of persons who feared the extremist program of the integral nationalists. It may be also that the history of the region, with its lack of comparatively recent memories of oppression by Polish lords and the relative independence with which nationalist life could develop, created an atmosphere of self-confidence which militated against the more violent aspects of nationalist egoism.

To the south of the wooded steppe belt just discussed lies a broad region of more open steppe; in general the agricultural population of the area is considerably less dense than that of the region just described. The open plain with its very rich black soil and somewhat lesser rainfall lends itself to the cultivation of cereal crops which require smaller amounts of manpower, in contrast to the mixed sugar beet, dairy, potato, and grain agri-

[Eact of the Dnieper -- Analyst]

[29] Interviews 47, 50.
[30] Interview 47.
[31] *Ibid.*

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Zaporozh'e.[40] Apparently these men were executed by the Germans; no further reports on nationalist activity in Zaporozh'e are available. This obscurity surrounding OUN-B activities makes itself felt especially in any effort to trace the relationships between OUN-B organizers and locally active groups. In Krivoi Rog, the mayor, Sherstiuk, the editors, Pronchenko and Potapenko, and a number of other local figures were strongly nationalist in sentiment, but whether they were ever adherents of the Bandera movement, or were brought into its organization, is a matter of dispute between the survivors of the Krivoi Rog group and OUN-B members familiar with the area.[41] What appears most likely is that an initial "honeymoon" of cooperation was succeeded by strife arising from the uncompromising demands of the OUN-B for adherence to the integral nationalist line.[42] 668*

In the case of Dniepropetrovsk, some corroboration of postwar accounts is furnished by a German police report. An OUN-B group arrived soon after the German army entered the city. Under the Galician organizer Rehei, who was helped by the Wehrmacht commander, a new *oblast* administration was established to offset the locally formed city administration.[43] Apparently the local group was at first neutral on the Russo-Ukrainian question, but the fanatic demands of the OUN-B and its efforts at counter-organization drove the local group completely into the Russian alignment, which was tolerated by the German police authorities after they dispersed the Bandera group. At least one prominent 668* 727●

[40] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 143, December 8, 1941, p. 5, NO 2827 (hereafter referred to as NO 2827).

[41] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 29–31; Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukrains'koho narodu na skhidno-ukrains'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: Spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukrains'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), pp. 39, 41, 45, 53; MS E; Interviews 7, 66.

[42] That this was the case is indicated by an article in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 15, 1941, p. 2, evidently based on discussions with Pronchenko and Potapenko. It contained the complaint that the newspaper *Dzvin* would have little space left for the news of the day if it was necessary to print "catechisms on the *trizub* or the national name," essays on the development of National Socialism, the New Europe, etc. See also MS E.

[43] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 132, November 12, 1941, pp. 10–11, NO 3830 (hereafter referred to as NO 3830).

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member actually joined the Natsional'no-Trudovoi Soiuz (NTS—National Workers' Union), the Russian counterpart to the OUN. When the OUN parties, including a relatively important Mel'nyk group which was especially active in educational circles, continued their work underground, they were able to gain or regain some support, partly as a reaction to the lengths to which the Russophile element, especially the Autonomous Church, went, and partly also because of an increasing moderation in their own ideology.[44]

No simple conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of these complex situations. The picture is further complicated by a tendency, illustrated in a number of instances, for Russians living in the Ukraine to accept a moderate Ukrainian nationalist position when not exposed to the pressure of an extreme Nationalist and strongly anti-Russian ideology. One strong adherent of the Ukrainian ethnic nationalist position was much impressed on finding in Novomirgorod (Novomyrhorod), near Kirovograd, a young teacher and his wife who both felt themselves to be Ukrainian, although born in Russia, and who "hated the Bolsheviks just as much as we do."[45] In another small town in the area (Novo Ukrainka) a nationalist organizer found most of the teachers to be "still under the influence of Communist ideology," which probably meant among other things that they did not consider the "purity" of Ukrainian culture of the greatest importance.[46] There seems to have been a fairly widespread tendency on the part of many Ukrainians and of many Russians living in the Ukraine, to reject any ethnic national creed in favor of some ideology based on territorial identity. It would not do to overemphasize this factor, however, for there was considerable support, especially in the northwestern area around the see of Kirovograd, for the Autocephalous Church,[47] which stressed the Ukrainian language, and isolated smaller places like Pavlograd were real centers of devotion to all things Ukrainian. Even such

[44] Interview 1.
[45] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 2, 1942, p. 3.
[46] Matla, p. 28.
[47] On the question of language to be used in church service, cf. Chapter VIII.

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a large center as Dnieprodzerzhinsk had a nationalist mayor and a 186
nationalist editor.[48]

The extreme south, the coastal strip along the Black Sea and 361
the Sea of Azov, from Odessa to Osipenko (Berdianka), had had a still shorter history of settlement than the area immediately to the north. Best suited of all Ukrainian lands to large-scale wheat farming with a small agricultural working force, it had a relatively sparse rural population, very mixed ethnically, with many German villages and some districts of Russian majority. The cities were still more heterogeneous, with Ukrainians forming a small minority in the larger ones, according to the census of 1926.

The study of conditions in this area is seriously hampered by 727●
the fact that the western third fell to Rumanian-occupied Trans- 53
nistria. To prepare the way for the annexation of Transnistria, and, in addition, to gratify the desire of high officials for loot and profiteering, the Rumanians sent in a large number of their own administrators.[49] Since the rather backward Moldavians comprised only a small proportion of the total population, one of the Slavic elements had to be tolerated. Believing that German victory would lead eventually to the creation of an independent Ukraine, which would inevitably demand the land west of the Dniester as an irredenta, the Rumanians favored the Russians; the position of Russian nationalist elements in Odessa resembled that of the Mel'nyk group in Kiev and Zhitomir before their suppression by the Germans. Russian was an official language, along with Rumanian and German; a Russian theater was opened; several Russian publications were started.[50] The guiding organization of the Russians was a group called the Union of Russian Officers, which had the St. George cross as its emblem and evidently was strongly tsarist in its ideology.[51] It is said to have maintained contacts with émigré groups in Serbia and elsewhere and to have refused cooperation with the Vlasov movement.[52] At any

[48] Interview 10; *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, June 14, 1942, p. 7.

[49] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, February 7, 1943, p. 1, based on a Zentraleuropa agency report.

[50] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 17, 1943, p. 3; Interview 18; Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 122.

[51] Clandestine publication from Odessa region previously cited.

[52] *Ibid.*; Interview 18.

●737 rate, with Rumanian encouragement, it was bitterly anti-Ukrain-
563 ian, adopting the slogan, "The Ukraine never was, is not, and never will be."[53]

668* Since this group and its Rumanian backers controlled all aspects of cultural and public life, any open Ukrainian nationalist activity even of a cultural nature was suppressed. A clandestine publication and a considerable amount of postwar testimony indicate that the OUN-B maintained a strong underground organization, started by a division of the southern task force even before Rumanian occupation began and later reinforced from the headquarters in Dniepropetrovsk.[54] They are said to have been able to operate an illegal printing press in Odessa and to have kept a nucleus group there.[55] A great deal of their attention was directed to the Rumanian-occupied rural areas to the north, and especially to southern Podolia, where they conducted a propaganda effort to induce the Ukrainian villagers to resist colonization by Moldavians.[56]

To the east, the southern part of the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev was more open to Ukrainian activity. The mayor of Nikolaev was a Mel'nyk adherent.[57] In the second-largest city of the area, Kherson, the Bandera group built a considerable organization, including the assistant mayor and the police chief, but was apparently liquidated by the SP by the end of 1941.[58] Nevertheless, the mayor, apparently an ethnic German, assisted the Ukrainian intellectuals in organizing cultural activity many months after the OUN-B had been suppressed.[59] The newspaper, too, is said to have been edited by a nationalist journalist.[60] In this city and the *Bezirk* capital, the Autonomous Church was active, having formed

[53] Interview 18.

[54] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 45; Mstyslav Z. Chubai, *Reid organizatoriv OUN vid Popradu do Chorne More* (The Raid of the Organizers of the OUN from Poprad to the Black Sea) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 48 ff.; Interview 18; clandestine publication from Odessa area previously cited.

[55] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 45.

[56] Clandestine publication from Odessa area previously cited.

[57] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, October 2, 1941, pp. 3–4, NO 3137 (hereafter referred to as NO 3137).

[58] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, January 14, 1942, p. 30, NO 3279 (hereafter referred to as NO 3279).

[59] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, September 5, 1943, p. 6.

[60] Interview 42.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

an archdiocese of Kherson at an early date.[61] As was related previously, the *Generalkommissar* was suspicious of the Autocephalous Church and urged that steps be taken against it when it grew strong in the north of his area. Later, Michael (Khoroshyi), bishop of Kirovograd, was to come to Nikolaev as archbishop, and was recognized by the *Generalkommissar*,[62] but the pro-Russian ecclesiastical group seems to have maintained a strong position. On the other hand, the extremely large shift in national affiliation in Kherson indicated by the city census suggests that the same factor of adoption of loyalty to the Ukraine as a territorial entity may have been at work here as well as farther north.[63] Farther east along the coast, in the *Generalbezirk* Taurien (Taurida), with its capital in Melitopol' (Melitopil'), there appears to have been little effort at nationalist organization; the newspapers, police, and other agencies were Ukrainian, but seem to have been completely subject to German control.[64]

Beyond the coastal strip just discussed lies the most easterly section of the Ukrainian SSR, the Donbas. This area, in which agriculture takes the form of large-scale wheat farming, as in the far south, is known as the "Ruhr"—or better, one of the "Ruhrs"—of the Soviet Union. Its industry, which grew at a tremendous pace in the interwar period, is based primarily upon rich coal deposits. Its five cities of more than one hundred thousand population in 1939 had nearly tripled their total number of inhabitants since the previous census. It is probable that this increase resulted in a substantial gain for the Ukrainian ethnic component, which previously had been very small, as the surrounding peasantry is largely, though not overwhelmingly, Ukrainian. As far as the technical staffs, which composed the bulk of the educated class, are concerned, however, Ukrainian nationalist observers themselves admit that the great majority was drawn from

[61] *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, January 20, 1942, p. 1. The archbishop was Anthony (Martsenko), who received his appointment in 1941 from the Sobor of Volhynian Bishops. Up to the time of the definite split between the Autonomous and the Autocephalous churches he was apparently still sympathetic to the Ukrainian nationalists as his secretary is reported to have been an OUN member (NO 3279).

[62] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, March 6, 1943, p. 5.

[63] See Appendix.

[64] PS 1695.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

175 authority of the Ukrainian Government. No local
642 municipal or other organization took the slightest note
668 of its existence. Every department, every district, and every town governed itself and tried to resist the advance of the Bolsheviks. Not having any military forces or police organizations at their disposal, these local governments were unable to resist the attacks of the Red Guards and the armed soldiers, returned from the front and supported by Moscow. Soon the whole Ukraine elected local Soviet governments and the Rada, which hastened to proclaim, on 22 January 1918, the independence of the Ukraine, was obliged to flee on the 29th of the same month, seeking refuge at Jitomir. One of its most active members, Simon Petlioura, tried to organize anti-Bolshevik troops composed of peasants and prisoners of Galician origin. He succeeded in forming several units which, although unsatisfactory from a military point of view, cut a better figure than the bands of soldiers which were leaving the front. These military units, known under the name of '*haidamaks*,' formed small nuclei of resistance in the towns and villages and halted the Soviet offensive here and there. The more the Bolsheviks advanced towards the west, the more this resistance became effective, especially in Southern Podolia, where the Ukrainian organizations, supported by Galician prisoners, by Polish legionaries, and even by certain circles of purely Russian sympathies but hostile to Bolshevism, still retained some vestiges of power.

648 The insufficiency of technical, administrative, and
727 intellectual personnel did not allow the Ukrainians to give their civil and military organizations the force necessary for defeating the revolutionary movement directed by the Communist Party. On 9 February the Ukrainian Government, acting as a sovereign government, and despite the firm opposition of a large part of

its members, especially of Petlioura, decided to send its 648
representatives to Brest-Litovsk to conclude a peace 727
with the central empires. This idea met with the sympathy of the Austro-German authorities whose negotiations for a peace with the Soviet Government had already lasted a long time.

The peace which was dictated by the German general staff was signed by the Rada. As compensation for the efforts of the central empires, who promised to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism, the Rada accepted German occupation and agreed to supply 1,000,000 tons of grain of which Germany and Austria had immediate need. Under the threat of German bayonets the representatives of Lenin also had to recognize the independence of the Ukraine. Already the Austro-German troops were making their entry into Ukrainian territory while meeting with only a feeble resistance of the armed units of the local Soviet governments and the remnants of the fleeing Imperial Army.

The only aim of the Austro-German military command was to obtain the stores of grain and of other food products which they hoped to find in abundance in the Ukraine. Yet, for political reasons, the Governments 727
of the central empires decided to support the fiction of Ukrainian independence under their protection. The entry of the troops was followed by the proclamation composed more or less in these terms: 'At the request of your Rada we have decided to enter your country in order to protect you from Bolshevik anarchy and to give you the possibility of developing in complete alliance with our two empires.'

One can say that no citizen took this declaration seriously and that the occupation was considered as an invasion by enemy troops. The Ukrainian Government 642
was established at Kiev and was composed of three 727
[i.e. in 1919--- Analyst]

642 727 political groups: the separatists of the right, the national democrats, and the federalist social democrats. Thus, as these names show, the Ukrainian Government formed by the Austro-Germans was not homogeneous in the matter of its partisanship of independence.

727 The Austro-Germans did not take this farce of political independence any more seriously than did the population. Their attitude was simply that of conquerors. 'For every German soldier killed, ten *Russian* soldiers, chosen among the population of the district where the crime has been committed, will be immediately shot,' the terrified inhabitants of Kremenetz (town of Volynia) (Order No. 2, town of Kremenetz, 28 February 1918) read on the posters signed by the commandant of the Austrian division a few days after the proclamation of official friendship. The 'friendly country' closely resembled a colonial conquest. The general staff of the army of General Eichhorn reported to the commander of the eastern front on 4 May 1918: 'The Austro-German troops would have no difficulty in maintaining order and public tranquillity from the moment we renounce the fiction of a friendly country. We are still obliged to obtain the permission of the Ukrainian commissioners, who are confused and irritated, for some of our actions.'

648 Meanwhile two points of view existed in Austro-German circles concerning the subject of the independence of the Ukraine. The army considered the Ukraine a conquered enemy country which had to furnish, with the least possible delay, agricultural produce in accordance with the terms of peace.

On the other hand diplomatic circles saw in the independence, fictitious though it was, the future of German diplomacy, based on the partition of the succession of the dismembered Russian Empire. Parallel to

148 The Minister of the Reich at Kiev, Muhm, a subtler man, expressed himself differently though in the same sense: 'I am convinced that it is necessary to maintain the fiction of a friendly independent country in the Ukraine. . . . We shall completely destroy the little authority which remains with the Ukrainian Government if we were to show too coarsely that it is only a toy in our hands.'

191 177 Disarmed, enslaved by the great force of the army of the central empires, the Ukraine[1] was not in the position of an independent State. The Ukrainian language, imported from Galicia, was not spoken in the country. Only official documents and administrative notices were written in Ukrainian. Not a single private business ever used this language either for correspondence or advertising. In the schools and universities Russian continued to be used. The circulation of newspapers in the Ukrainian language was very small, while the Russian papers which agreed not to carry on open propaganda against the troops of occupation appeared everywhere and were actually the only ones read by the population.

727 642 The Ukrainian Government, composed of politicians having absolutely no administrative experience, soon proved to be incapable of organizing the supply of grain as promised to the armies of the central empires. The Germans then decided to change the regime. The organizations of landowners, small and big, which supplied corn and other agricultural produce to the forces of occupation, were favoured by the Austro-German authorities. It is unnecessary to point out that no Ukrainian political idea influenced the creation of these organizations. The Germans selected their association, known under the name of '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*,[1]

[1] '*Khliborobiv*' means farmers in Ukrainian. '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*' means association of farmers.

[1 [i.e. in 1919. --- Analyst]

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as a base for the new Government which had to replace 727
the Rada and which, in their opinion, would be better 642
capable of organizing the supply of agricultural produce. On 29 April 1918, on the day after the proclamation of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Republic, the German troops interrupted the session of the Rada in the building which it occupied and forced the deputies to leave the hall. The Rada was dissolved. The landowners, the *khliboroby*, in agreement with the Austro-German general staff, elected the Hetman of the whole Ukraine in the person of General Pavlo Skoropadsky, the leader of the popular Democratic Party and descendant of the genuine Hetman of the Ukraine, but in fact a brilliant officer of the Russian Imperial Guards.

The German authorities thought that the new Govern- 727
ment, from which the politicians were excluded, would 645
be more in tune with their interests. In agreement with the General Hetman they appointed the new Cabinet. This Cabinet was composed of landowners, some experts, and a representative of commercial and industrial circles of the country in the person of a rich Jewish industrialist of Odessa, Goutnik. All the Ministers were people of openly Russian sympathies. Thus the bluff of the independent Ukraine received the approval of the same State which had invented it. The German Minister in Kiev, Muhm, wrote in his report to the chief of the German general staff, Groener: 'I insisted, when speaking to M. Lizogoub, the Premier, on the fact that the German Government wanted to see a Cabinet with a greater *couleur locale*.[1] In another report Muhm says that the greater part of the Ministers of the Hetman are not far removed from russophile ideas. 645
'Nevertheless,' he added, 'one must not take this too much to heart as the Government is continually under

[1] In French in the original text.

648 Army which was being organized in the territory of the
[642] Don Cossacks and in the Northern Caucasus. They were not far wrong. The Government of the 'Independent Ukraine,' considered to be anti-Russian, supplied the Volunteer Army,[1] on whose standards the device 'the one and indivisible Russia' was inscribed, with arms and ammunition. Entire trains proceeded to Rostov-on-Don, transporting officers, cadets, and civilians wishing to serve in the Volunteer Army. Even at Kiev the White military organization enjoyed a certain amount of liberty. A tacit collaboration developed under the half-sympathetic eyes of the central empires, between the command of the White Army and the Ukrainian Government of Kiev. This tolerance on the part of the Austro-Germans found its explanation in the imminence of their defeat on the western front. Thus Ukrainian politics and especially the support of Bolshevism which they considered an involuntary ally, having ranged Russia among the neutrals, no longer had any sense. The Austro-German authorities began to take an interest in the opponents of Communism and of Ukrainianism and even looked to the Don Cossacks with a view to collaboration, those same Cossacks who, though well organized since the October Revolution as an independent State, had never expressed the desire of separating from the Russian Empire.

642 The internal policy of the new Government, com-
● 727 pletely at the service of the forces of occupation, was
423 characterized by the support of private property and particularly of the landowners. This policy led to the proclamation of new laws regarding the return of estates to the landowners, of which they had been deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles of 1917.

[1] The name which was officially used by the White Army which, at the beginning, did not resort to any mobilization and only filled its ranks with volunteers.

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deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles 642
of 1917. The application of these laws was followed 727
by violent repressions on the part of the Austro-German Army. Punitive expeditions against the peasants became very frequent and summary executions became general throughout the country. The hate of the peasant population was directed against the Austro-Germans and soon reached its peak. The soldiers of the armies of occupation no longer dared to go out after sunset, except in groups. Knives, directed by mysterious hands, frequently found the backs of Austro-German infantry men. The Civil War was in full blast. The Government, incapable of acting without looking for the support of the military forces of the invader, did not escape either hate or contempt and could only maintain itself until the complete reversal of the situation, which was not slow to come. The defeat of the German forces and the armistice forced the troops of occupation to leave Ukrainian territory. It is unnecessary to say that, hated by the popular masses, deprived of all support, and with a doubtful ideology of Ukrainian independence, the Hetman could not continue to govern. Also, as 668
soon as the Austro-German forces began to retire, revolutionary propaganda began to flood the Ukrainian country-side. The former Ukrainian politicians, dismissed from their posts after the establishment of the Hetmanate, put themselves at the head of this movement and received, at first, the unconditional support of the peasants and even of certain military units of the Austro-Germany Army in which the Galician element predominated. Thus, led by Simon Petlioura, the peasants 669
marched on Kiev in order to depose the Hetman. Received everywhere with enthusiasm, they had no difficulty in precipitating the retreat of the Austro-German troops, and rapidly occupied the greater part

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place, which succeeded, towards the end of March of 726
the same year, in clearing the Ukraine of the troops of the Ukrainian Directorate.

Following closely after the routed Ukrainian troops, the Red Army penetrated into Volynia where it met the Polish troops commanded by General Haller. From the month of July the Soviet Army slowly began to retreat from Polish territory. At the same time, encouraged by the retreat of the Soviet forces, the troops of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' (Galicia), defeated by the Poles and united with Petlioura, made an incursion into Ukrainian territory. Though not friendly to the Poles, these troops had also no great desire to fight against the Russians, Red or otherwise, but the Directorate of Petlioura, which hoped to obtain a foothold in the Ukraine, ended their indifference by promises and threats.

At the same time the great offensive of Denikine was developing with amazing rapidity. In August Kiev was taken by assault, in the east by the Whites and in the south by the troops of Petlioura. The discussion between the two armies led to nothing and finally the Whites displaced the Ukrainians and pursued them towards the south-east. At the beginning of October 1919 the victory of the Whites seemed more and more probable. General Denikine held Kharkov, Odessa, and Kiev, while Petlioura, under pressure of the Whites, was fighting a retreating action in the direction of Galicia. He hoped for the support of Poland, which cost him his popularity in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasants. The struggles which, in 1919, soaked the 727
Ukraine in blood, crealled the Cossack insurrections of the seventeenth century by their atrocities. Thousands of inhabitants, and especially landowners, Jews, and German colonists, were massacred in a frightful manner

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

727 by the troops of Petlioura. On their part the Soviet authorities took their vengeance in the towns and the country districts on hostages, in proceeding with mass executions of members of the middle classes, intellectuals, rich peasants, and clergy, while the Whites inaugurated the mass hanging of Communist leaders. The interval of the French occupation of Odessa, in April 1919, 669 changed nothing in the situation. The second counter-727 offensive of the Soviets, followed by still more atrocious massacres, ended in putting the whole Ukraine under Soviet domination at the end of the winter of 1920. The Whites, under the command of General Wrangel, entrenched themselves on the Crimean peninsula. The troops of Petlioura were again driven back towards Poland. From this moment a new phase of the Civil War begins in the Ukraine. Guerrilla fighting, led by chiefs of Ukrainian bands such as Makhno, Kosak, and others, known under the name of the *bat'ki* (the fathers), began. They had important forces at their disposal. Under the cover of political ideologies (Makhno was anarchist, the others 'Communists without Jews,' etc.) they devastated the rear of the Soviet front. The personnel of these bands was undoubtedly of peasant extraction. They were mostly the remnants of the Army of Petlioura which had succeeded, after his defeat, in filtering to the rear of the Soviet front. Until a long time after the establishment of the Soviet regime, these bands menaced the communications and disorganized the life of the country. Full-scale military operations would have been required to deal with the *bat'ki*. The Ukraine did not easily submit to Bolshevism.

648 In 1920 a last attempt of foreign intervention in Ukrainian affairs was undertaken by Marshal Pilsudski.

The defeat of the Central Powers led to the unchaining of the eternal struggle between the Ukrainians and the

186 The development of Ukrainian political and cultural life in
665 Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians condemned to ruthless Russification under Tsarist rule. When the first modern Ukrainian political organisation in Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, was founded in 1900 (from 1905 this party was named Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party) its first publication *Independent Ukraine* was printed in Austria, in Bukovina.

186 The Ukrainian patriots under Tsarist Russian Government,
668 morally and materially supported the fight of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights; these territories were a Ukrainian Piedmont. For not even the revolution of 1905 gave the Ukrainians in Russia their national rights. Of course, the Ukrainians had their deputies in the Russian 'Duma' who demanded autonomy for Ukraine. But the Ukrainian language was not admitted in the schools, the rights of the Ukrainian press were restricted, and active Ukrainians were persecuted by the Russian authorities. Among the Ukrainians in Russia the fight of the Austrian Ukrainians for the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviw roused great interest. The Russian Government regarded the creation of a Ukrainian University in Galicia as a great danger for the 'indivisible Russia' and sought an agreement with the Polish nationalists in Galicia against the Ukrainian movement. The Russian nationalists regarded the opening of a Ukrainian University in Lviw as a 'casus belli' for Russia against Austria.

668 The Russian Government closely watched the Ukrainian move-
661 ment in Austria and was much alarmed by its successes. In consequence, the Petersburg Government prepared to annex Galicia and Bukovina long before the war of 1914, in order to wipe out 'Mazeppism'. When, in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, a Ukrainian delegation visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to protest against the new prohibition of the Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire, the Minister replied cynically:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once for all . . .".

● 727 The suppression of the Ukrainian movement was one of the main
661 aims of Tsarist Russian policy in World War I. The occupation of Galicia and Bukovina by the Russian armies in 1914-1917 brought heavy damage to the Ukrainian movement; the Ukrainian schools, press, co-operative societies, scientific and educational institutions
727 were destroyed. Thousands of Ukrainians, Austrian citizens, were
659 deported to Siberia. In the occupied territories a ruthless Russifica-
661 tion was started, and in Galicia the forced conversion of the Greek-

Catholic Ukrainians to Greek Orthodoxy was taking place. The 727
Ukrainian Metropolitan of the Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia, 661
Count Andrew Szeptycki, was arrested and deported to the interior 657
of Russia, and with him numerous Ukrainian clergymen. This policy of oppression of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina was cynically referred to by the Russian Government as 'liberation of subjugated Slav brethren'...

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728
Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669
of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrai- 665
nian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. *The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)*

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185
Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed 423
simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discon- [563]
tent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727
exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The represen- 565
tatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

727 state. On the contrary, they wished to suppress the Ukrainian move-
565 ment and to make Ukraine a centre for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia', of course, headed by a Tsar. About these plans Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs after World War I. He hoped that a restored Russian Empire would be a reliable ally of Germany out of gratitide for the abolition of the Bolshevik régime.

642 On April 28, 1918, a detachment of German troops entered the
727 hall where the sessions of the Ukrainian Central Council took place
565 in order to arrest some Ukrainian Ministers. On the next day, on April 29, under the protection of the German troops, a congress of big landowners was called. At this congress General Paul Skoropadsky was declared Hetman of Ukraine, with the prior consent of the German authorities.

Skoropadsky belonged to the class of the big landowners, and, though he was of Ukrainian descent, had had no connections with the Ukrainian national movement before the revolution of 1917.

In his first order Skoropadsky wrote: "I declare myself Hetman of the whole Ukraine". He announced the abolition of the Ukrainian Central Council and replaced the name 'Ukrainian Democratic Republic' by 'Ukrainian State'. Skoropadsky repealed all laws and orders of the Ukrainian Central Council and the Russian Provisional Government; thus Ukraine had in this respect returned to the conditions before the Revolution.

The reactionary ways of the Skoropadsky Government that favoured the big landowners had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people; the masses of peasants and workers, that recently had fought with arms the terror of the Russian Communists under the banner of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic, were placed by the policy of the Skoropadsky Government into
[661] a desperate situation. The big landowners who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities organised 'punitive expeditions' against the Ukrainian peasantry with their armed gangs having support from German and Austrian army detachments. Heavy contributions, looting, and destruction of the peasants' property, together with mass executions of Ukrainian peasants and workers, caused immense indignation against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austrian occupation forces among the Ukrainian people. Against the reactionary régime which dominated in Ukraine, Communist propaganda met with approbation among the Ukrainian masses, unexpected even by Moscow.

727 The Chief of Staff of the German armies in Ukraine, General
642 Groener, in order to appease Ukrainian public opinion had declared after the putsch of April 29, 1918, that "the Hetman was given in-

structions that the government he formed had to stand entirely by the principle of a Ukrainian state, without any orientation towards Moscow or Poland". Nevertheless, Skoropadsky's Government consisted in its majority of Russians of reactionary trends who distinguished themselves by a hostile attitude towards the Ukrainian national movement. 227 642

The Ukrainian political parties had no confidence in the Skoropadsky régime, they considered it to be an outrage upon the Ukrainian national independence.

Against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austro-Hungarian troops which supported it, mass uprisings began in order to restore the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. Of course, the reaction in Ukraine was 'water to the mill' of Communist propaganda. Moscow knew how to use this situation for its advantage. [669]

At the end of the summer of 1918, the members of the Skoropadsky Government prepared to restore 'indivisible Russia'. Skoropadsky issued an order on November 14, 1918, in which he stated that Ukraine "had the duty to fight first for the creation of an All-Russian Federation, the principal aim of which will be the restoration of Great Russia".

10. The Restoration of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1918) — The Government of the Directory 669

Against the federation of Ukraine with Russia proclaimed by Skoropadsky, and against the reactionary régime in general, the masses of the Ukrainian people arose under the leadership of the Directory, which was elected by the Ukrainian National League (15. 11. 1918). The Ukrainian National League was created by the Ukrainian democratic parties in summer 1918. The principal aim of the League was the struggle against the Russian reaction in Ukraine which prevailed there under Skoropadsky's rule. When the League received news on Skoropadsky's plans for the 'Federation' with the Russia of the White Generals, it began to prepare armed forces in due time. The National League and the Directory had as their members prominent leaders of the Ukrainian Central Council like V. Vynnychenko, S. Petlura, both members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party, M. Shapoval, Socialist-Revolutionary, and others. Summoned by the Directory, hundreds of thousands of the Ukrainian population in cities and villages joined the uprising. Only in Kiev the Skoropadsky Government held out for some time, leaning upon small detachments of Russian Monarchists and the decisive support of the German troops. On

669 Ukraine. The 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' headed by Rakovsky left Ukraine and was abolished by order of Lenin. This was a new proof of the complete failure of the Russian Communist policy in Ukraine.

But at the same time the Ukrainian Republic met a new enemy who had claims on Ukraine. This was the Russian Volunteer Army under Denikin. The leaders of this army regarded the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as more dangerous for themselves than the Soviet dictatorship in Moscow. Therefore, in its struggle against the Russian 'Red Army', the Russian 'White Army' attempted before all to take possession of the Ukrainian territory in order to [648] prevent the strengthening of 'Ukrainian separatism'. In vain the Ukrainian Government appealed to the Western Great Powers that they should not admit the attack by the Russian Volunteer Forces on the Ukrainian Army and that they recognise the Government of democratic Ukraine. If in 1919 the Government and Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had been given the least support by the Western Powers, the development of Eastern Europe and even the whole world would have taken another course than happened in fact. In any case, by securing an independent Ukraine, Russian imperialism would not be such a menace to the world as we see it to-day.

[731] When Denikin's troops met the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in Kiev they attacked Ukrainian armed forces weakened by the struggle with the Russian Red Army and decimated by a disastrous typhus epidemic. This epidemic had spread principally in consequence of the blockade of the territory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army had no medicaments, no clothing nor sanitary equipment, the Ukrainian soldiers died in thousands, and there was no help. From the army the epidemic spread among the population of Ukraine.

[727] But even under these incredibly hard conditions the Army of the Ukrainian Republic and the masses of Ukrainian people did not abandon the fight against the new oppressors — the Russian Volunteers — who had abundant support from the Entente Powers. The Russian 'Whites' forbade the Ukrainian language in schools, offices and the press in the Ukrainian territory they had seized. Russian authorities ordered the burning of Ukrainian books. The Denikin Government cruelly persecuted Ukrainian patriots. Even the word 'Ukraine' was forbidden; the expression 'Little Russia' was used instead. The Denikin Government restored the estates of the big landowners in Ukraine.

Against the Denikin régime in Ukraine extensive risings of the

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and 563
disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the 661
Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. [871]
In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories, the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet [665]
and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre (UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on 727
the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the 474
Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form
of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative 563
Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz)*. The Ukrainian co-operative movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Co-operation *(Maslosoyuz)*, supplied dairy products, not only for the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in 563
the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under 162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation 423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%. The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the [517] Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Russian intellectuals. 186 After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist 631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created their Military Council and their Military Government. In October 1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council', with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region, and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

CHAPTER V

WORLD WAR II AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

1. Ukraine During World War II.

During World War II, two totalitarian forces contended for domination over Ukrainian territory: Russian Communism and German Nazism. In the first phase of the war the Moscow and Berlin Governments divided Poland between themselves. The USSR occupied the Western Ukrainian territories of Galicia, Volhynia etc., and the Ukrainian territories of Rumania, Bukovina and Bessarabia. By the war with the USSR in 1941, Hitler planned to acquire Ukraine for German colonisation. The German Nazis tried to weaken the Ukrainian population. During the German occupation Galicia was joined with the Polish territories — *Generalgouvernement* — and isolated from the other parts of Ukraine. Hitler gave the territory between the Dniester and the South Bug with Odessa to Rumania. The rest of the Ukrainian territories was put under the rule of Erich Koch as *Reichskommissariat Ukraine.* 727 661

The great majority of the population of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality, as well as the population of Russia and the Baltic States hoped that, in consequence of war, the Soviet régime would fall and the time for a free life would come. Completely separated from the outside world, the Soviet citizens did not know anything about Hitler's aims in Eastern Europe, and did not believe the Soviet propaganda. Therefore hundreds of thousands of Jews remained in Ukraine at the beginning of the war, being against the Communist dictatorship and hoping that the German régime would not be worse than the Soviet. The German authorities systematically exstirpated the more active elements among the Ukrainians; especially they terrorised the Ukrainian intelligentsia. A crude description of the rule of the German occupation in Ukraine in 1941—44 we find in the memorandum of A. E. Frauenfeld, the General Commissar of the Crimea, written for Hitler's staff on 10. 2. 1944. Frauenfeld saw the absurdity of the German policy in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine sooner, but dared to write about it only when Hitler's catastrophe became inevitable.

On the policy of Erich Koch in Ukraine Frauenfeld writes in his memorandum:

727 661 "The course of ruthless brutality in treating the inhabitants of the country by principles and methods used in past centuries against coloured slave peoples, and the fact sneering at every sound policy that the disregard of this nation found its expression not only in the treatment of the people but was expressed at every possible and impossible opportunity again and again and was in addition printed and published in pamphlets, is a proof of the complete lack of instinct in handling of foreign peoples, which, with regard to its consequences, cannot be called other than shocking and catastrophic".

Frauenfeld shows this 'policy with the blacksmith's hammer' which would not see the inevitable reaction of the Ukrainians on such barbarism:

"There must be a naivety bordering on narrow-mindedness to believe that in the 20th century a nation having a shocking tragic history but, however, having a historical past, even if it is of another breed than the German people, — undoubtedfully has certain qualities of race and character, will permit itself to be degraded and insulted permanently and will also delightedly place its working power and capacities at the service of the tyrant".

Frauenfeld quotes the words of the Reichskommissar Erich Koch, who during a journey from Rivne (Rovno) to Kiev said to his staff:

"If I should find a Ukrainian worthy to sit with me at one table I must shoot him".

Frauenfeld cites examples from the work of the German administration headed by Erich Koch: the closing of schools, theatres, libraries, inattentiveness to epidemics among the Ukrainians, deliberate furtherance of the dying out of the Ukrainian people. As Frauenfeld witnesses, his collegues were very satisfied with the spreading of epidemics in Ukraine: "The Ukrainian needs no physicians; if an epidemic breaks out, thousands and tens of thousands will perish".

466 727 661 For the needs of the German economy the German Nazi Government took working power from Ukraine. Frauenfeld writes about this:

"There was, for instance, the enlisting for work in Germany. That was carried out in a way that bears close comparison with the Bolshevik deportations to Siberia. From camps surrounded by barbed wire, from grated waggons to the encircling and searching of villages by surprise, and nocturnal levying in which people were taken in GPU manner out of their beds, the whole technique of the Arab slave hunters among the negroes of Africa in past centuries was used".

727 661 The Germans did not touch the Soviet collective farms, because they regarded them as the best method for exploiting the peasants. On the other hand, the German authorities did not wish to permit the partition of the land, for they prepared Ukraine for German colonisation.

[181] Frauenfeld points out the high physical and moral qualities of the Ukrainians, their highly developed consciousness of personal dignity and their aspiration for education. He witnesses that the closing of schools by the German authorities in Ukraine roused the greatest dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian people:

"The Ukrainians, especially the women, are very desirous of learning, and one could hear from them: 'Under the Bolsheviks we were starving, but we could learn something at least. Under your rule we cannot even learn. This proves that you are our enemies' . .".

The author of the memorandum comes to the conclusion that the Ukrainians should not be exstirpated in the interests of Hitler's 'racial policy'; on the contrary "the often genuine blond and blue-eyed as well as brunette population" should be assimilated for such an assimilation "would be without doubt more desirable and advantageous than many we had absorbed during our history, or are even trying to suck up . . ."*).

725 668 Against pillage, terror, oppression and humiliation the Ukrainian people reacted with great vehemence, in spite of the extraordinary weakening by the previous Soviet terrorism, the famine and the war. In all parts of Ukraine risings broke out. This Ukrainian partisan movement helped to a great extent to defeat the German armies in Ukraine. But this was not a proof of affection of the Ukrainians for Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian partisan movement took place under the banner of an independent Ukraine. The initiative for the creation of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) came from officers of the army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1941.

The Ukrainian Partisan Army turned its weapons after the defeat of Germany against the new oppressor — Soviet Russia.

2. Ukraine after the War

727 000 In the course of World War II the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians from the Caucasus to the Carpathian Mountains came under the rule of Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian nation, from the

*) Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld, *Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete: 10. 2. 1944* (Document No. 5394, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes).

the Russian armies on the Rumanian and south- 642
western fronts. The Soviet Government therefore 728
began to organize the Red Guards against the Rada, which by that time had completed its negotiations with Germany, and on December 27 had sent the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada to Brest-Litovsk. The delegation was composed of Hrushevski, Holubowich, Vinnitchenko, and Petlura, while the intermediary between them and the Austro-German authorities was Wassilko, a member of the Reichsrat and Count Czernin's adviser on Ukrainian affairs.

On January 11, 1918, the delegates of the Ukrainian Republic were formally recognized at Brest by the Central Powers. This recognition was interpreted by the Rada as meaning the recognition of Ukrainian independence. Vinnitchenko boasted that the French Government had made a gold loan and printed paper money for the Ukraine, and that the Western allies would soon recognize its independence. (The Allied Mission to the Ukraine, sent in December 1917, was interpreted by the Ukrainians as implying such a recognition.) But, while successful at Brest, the Rada's authority in Kiev was shaken by the frequent risings of the Ukrainians of the Soviets (especially at Odessa on January 17 and 28); and the Petrograd Soviets supported the latter, demanding that they should be represented in the Ukrainian delegation. On January 26 the Government at Petrograd broke off relations with the Rada, 'until it is replaced by a Rada of Soviets'. To strengthen its position at Brest, the Rada, on January 28, declared, by 508 votes to 4, for the complete independence of the Ukraine.

(*b*) *German Occupation.*—On February 9 the 'Bread' 727 ●
peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Germany, 642
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one hand, and the 'Ukrainian People's Republic' (the Rada) on the other. At the same time, however, the report arrived that the Rada had been suppressed by Soviet troops, who declared it to be 'but a sad memory'. On February 20 the British Chargé-d'affaires in Russia

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

642 denied that Great Britain had recognized the Ukraine
727 as an independent state; while Mr. Balfour gave the same assurance to a member of the Polish National Committee in London, that body having protested against the boundaries of the new state, and against the assigning of Cholm to the Ukraine.

Meanwhile the Russian Soviet army was supporting the Ukrainian Soviets; it forced the Rada to take refuge (March 1) in Jitomir (Volhynia). The Rada now sought protection from the Central Powers. Dr. Seidler made a statement to this effect on March 2 in the Austrian Reichsrat, and soon afterwards the Germans occupied the north-eastern and the Austrians the southern Ukraine. On March 14 the *Vossische Zeitung* declared the Rada to be re-established at Kiev, and ready to ratify the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. But in fact, although the Rada wanted German support in their fight against the Soviets, they could not act against their own people and agree to all the German demands. From the end of March the Germans fought the Soviet troops in the Ukraine, while on the other hand they seized the food supplies of the non-Soviet Ukrainians. The food crisis reached its climax in the middle of April, when the Rada ceased to support the armies of occupation.

Consequently, on April 28, the Ukrainian Rada Government was overthrown by the armies of occupation; and General Skoropadski, a Russian of Ukrainian descent, was placed at the head of affairs, with the title of Hetman. The Rada having refused to abdicate, the Germans on May 7 arrested its members, and attempted to secure the support of the great landowners in their efforts to obtain food. The German Field-Marshal von Eichhorn published a decree re-establishing private ownership of land on a large scale, disarmed the Ukrainian regiments, and organized an army obedient to himself. The opposition to the Germans and to the Hetman Skoropadski, who had dictatorial power and was supported by all who were in favour of the pre-revolutionary regime or were afraid of social

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

strife, inspired such desperate acts as burning stores of grain, and aroused Socialist protests in the Austrian Reichsrat. Meanwhile the Moscow Soviet Government came to an agreement with the Ukrainian Rada (May 23), and recognized the Ukraine as an independent state. On June 13–14 the Russo-Ukrainian armistice was formally signed.

On May 24 a peasant rising broke out all over the Ukraine owing to the drastic measures of the German military officials, who declared the country in a state of siege; the rising was directed against the Germans and the big landowners, who regarded the German army as militia to be used against social disturbances and anarchy. The objects of this rising were stated in the manifesto of the Peasants' Congress at Kiev on June 7. The congress demanded (1) that a Hetman chosen by landowners should be deposed; (2) that the Ukraine should be a 'People's Republic'; (3) that no land should be returned to proprietors; and (4) that a Legislative Assembly should be convoked. This assembly the peasants agreed to support, appealing to the Germans not to oppose the People's Republic. However, the German troops in occupation continued to suppress strife among the peasants and to collect food by severe means, the result being that Von Eichhorn was assassinated in Kiev on July 30.

The Ukraine now became the battleground of five propagandist forces—pro-German, pro-Ally, pro-Russian Federalist, Bolshevik, and Separatist-Nationalist. The Austrian authorities arranged for the evacuation of Lvov by the Polish troops, and the Ukrainians (Ruthenians) seized the city (October 31) and held it for about a month, during which they are said to have had the help of the Ukrainians from Volhynia as well as of the Austrian officers. The Ukrainian (Ruthenian) National Council stated that it had taken over the administration of Eastern Galicia. The Polish Galician Liquidation Commission, established after the retirement of the Austrian authorities, opposed the Ukrainian claims.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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(c) *The Ukraine since the Armistice.*—The government of Skoropadski lasted for a short time after the signing of the armistice in Western Europe; and the conservative elements in the Ukraine, whether Ukrainians, Poles, or Russians, wished that the Western Allies should support Skoropadski and send a fresh army of occupation to replace the German army. Hoping for an Allied recognition, and under pressure from the peasants, Skoropadski introduced some democratic reforms, and dissolved the Germanophil cabinet of Lyssogub. The old Rada, however, reorganized itself into a Directory with Vinnitchenko and Petlura at its head, and replaced Skoropadski's government on December 14, 1918.

162 cent. of the total, as compared with 32.8 per cent. for the entire Soviet Union. Next to the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukraine has a higher percentage of urban population than any other Union Republic.

The German-Soviet War

726 On June 22, 1941, the German armies, supported by their satellites, including the Rumanians and the Hungarians, attacked the Soviet Union on a 1,500 mile front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. Nearly six weeks later the Germans started their main thrust against Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; on September 21, after a fierce struggle, the Soviet troops evacuated the city. It was another two months before the Germans reached Kharkov and Rostov.

●727 [725] For the second time in this century the Ukraine was subjected to occupation and devastation by the Germans. However, the Soviet policy of scorching the earth in retreat had aggravated normal military destruction; and in addition, the Ukrainians conducted heroic guerilla warfare against the enemy occupation forces. As a result, the Germans found the fruits of conquest "rather disappointing"[1] For example, in the Ukraine it was possible in the autumn of 1941 to carry out only a small fraction of the average sowing. In the western part of the Ukraine, very few industrial plants remained intact; the Nikolayev naval yards, the Dnieper dam and power station, and the metallurgical plants of the Dniepropetrovsk district were all either crippled or destroyed.

726 The German occupation of the Ukraine lasted nearly three and a half years. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad early in 1943 was the turning point of the war and the beginning of the big Soviet offensives.

In the winter campaign of 1943-44 the Soviet troops won important victories in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, completed the liberation of the Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhie and Zhitomir regions and almost the whole of the Rovno and Kirovograd regions, as well as of a number of districts in other areas.[2] In April and May 1944 they liberated Odessa, and in August, Western Ukraine. The liberation of the whole Ukraine was completed by November 1944.

727 The years of hard fighting took a very heavy toll all along the western front of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian S.S.R. sustained enormous losses.

War Losses of Population

At the Kiev trial of German war criminals in January 1946 it was disclosed that more than four million Soviet citizens had been murdered

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1 The Russian Campaigns of 1941-43, W.E.D.Allen and Paul Muratoff, Penguin Books, London, 1944.

2 Soviet War News, London, February 24, 1944.

727 by the German invaders in the Ukraine, and more than two million had been abducted to slavery in Germany. Of these so deported, a considerable number perished in captivity[1].

The figure of four million Soviet citizens murdered in the Ukraine does not clearly indicate whether all of them were Ukrainians or whether a certain percentage came from other parts of the Soviet Union. No figures have been revealed showing the number of the Ukrainians killed at the front against the German armies and their satellites. However, a comparison of the pre-war and present electorate figures for the Ukraine gives some indication of the decrease, at least of the adult population. On December 12, 1937, the Ukrainian electorate was about 17,540,000; in 1939 this number was increased by the addition of Western Ukraine, which on March 24, 1940, had more than five million voters. But nearly seven years later, in the elections of February 1947, despite the fact that part of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Transcarpathian Ukraine also had been added, the total electorate in the Ukrainian S.S.R. was only 21,545,000.

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Damages to Industry and Agriculture

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433 The damage which the Germans inflicted on the industry and farming of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics was tremendous, and far exceeded any comparable destruction in Western Europe.

[362] In the Ukraine the Germans destroyed or burned down 714 towns and more than 28,000 hamlets and villages, destroyed more than two million buildings and 540,000 outbuildings, and rendered about 10 million persons homeless (one-fourth of the Ukrainian population)[2].

Agriculture, animal husbandry, and industry were devastated. The coal mines were flooded. Over 16,150 industrial enterprises employing more than two million workers were stripped of machinery and the buildings heavily damaged or destroyed. The Germans wrecked or took away 127,800 electric motors and 81,600 metal-cutting lathes, destroyed railway lines and stations, and post and telegraph offices[2].

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241 Tremendous damage was done to Ukrainian agriculture. The Germans ruined and plundered collective farms, state farms and machine and tractor stations.

Millions of hectares of planted fields were destroyed and over 56,000 tractors wrecked. Nearly 1,900,000 agricultural machines and 30,000 automobiles and other motor vehicles were destroyed or taken to Germany[3].

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1 Soviet News, London, June 29, 1946.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

3 Letter to UNRRA from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

727 [231] Seven and a half million head of cattle, 3.3 million horses, 9.3 million pigs, 7.3 million sheep and 59.4 million fowls were killed or taken away[1]. The invaders also stole from the collective farms and from private citizens of the Ukrainian S.S.R. over 12 million tons of farm products, including 9½ million tons of grain and flour[2].

The rehabilitation and rebuilding of liberated areas began at once whilst the war was still on; but although the Ukrainian S.S.R. received great assistance from other republics of the Soviet Union, it must be borne in mind that important economic regions of other republics of the Soviet Union were also devastated by the war.

According to the report on material damage issued by the U.S.S.R.'s Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes of the German-Fascist Invaders, the damage caused to the national economy of the U.S.S.R. and to the individual residents of villages and towns is estimated at more than 679,000 million roubles in terms of 1941 prices.

The damage to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic alone is estimated at 285,000 million roubles[3].

Thus according to the statement of the Soviet State Commission, the damages to the Ukrainian S.S.R. are about 40-42 per cent. of the total damages to the Soviet Union.

Damage caused to the Ukraine by the German invasion is estimated by the Ukrainian Paper Suchasne I Maibutne (Present and Future) at 100,000 million dollars[4].

Destruction of Ukrainian Cities

727 361 Following are summaries of the destruction which occurred in some of the most important of the Ukraine's cities.

Kiev (Population in 1939: 846,293).

According to the report of the Extraordinary State Commission, the material damage caused by the German invaders in Kiev was as follows:

They destroyed 940 buildings of state and public institutions and

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Letter from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

3 Soviet News, London, September 18, 1945.
(The official exchange value in March 1947 was 5.40 roubles equal one U.S. dollar; 21.36 roubles equal one pound sterling).

4 Soviet Monitor, TASS (Soviet News Agency) London, July 11, 1946.

727 361 ,742 municipally owned houses (more than 22 million square feet of housing space) and 3,600 privately owned houses comprising 5½ million square feet of space.

[361] As a result more than 200,000 inhabitants of Kiev have been made homeless.

The Germans gutted Kiev's industrial plants of their equipment and shipped it to Germany. They destroyed the buildings of industrial enterprises including the machine-building plants "Bolshevik" and "Red Excavator", which had supplied industry, agriculture and transport with machinery, implements, and spare parts.

They blew up the textile mills, a spinning and knitting mill, the Gorky clothing factory, the first, fourth and eighth shoe factories, and other plants; blew up, destroyed or burned down the electric-power stations, the trolley cars and trolley buses, the water supply system and the drainage system. They destroyed mechanized bakeries and other establishments.

[368] The very important railway junction Kiev-Darnitza was destroyed with all its tracks, equipment, and installations as well as all station buildings and the depot at the station Kiev I.

City of Kharkov (Population in 1939: 833,432).

In connection with the third anniversary of the liberation of Kharkov, "the second capital of the Ukraine", the following figures on destruction and the extent of rehabilitation have been made known.

727 361 362 Before the war Kharkov had 41 million square feet of housing floor space. The Germans destroyed about half of all the flats. In the three years since liberation, six million square feet of housing floor space have been restored. The people of Kharkov have also restored 293 big plants and factories, including the famous tractor works, an electro-mechanical plant, a turbo-generator works and machine tool, and agricultural implements and other plants[1].

Dniepropetrovsk (Population in 1939: 500,662).

In this city 30 per cent. of the homes, 80 per cent. of the industry, and 70 per cent. of schools and other cultural institutions were destroyed. The UNRRA Mission reports that reconstruction has been very slow, and is hampered by shortages of food, shelter and equipment. In 1946 many of the residents of Dniepropetrovsk were still living in huts contrived of straw and clay, under a tar paper roof.

Kremenchug (Population in 1939: 89,553).

In April 1946, when members of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946.

727 first visited Kremenchug, they reported it as over 90 per cent.
361 destroyed. "About 50,000 inhabitants have returned and are living
362 in dugouts, cellars, and rubble shacks. Reconstruction is progressing slowly because of the shortage of materials. The only industries operating are a small machine shop for bridge repair parts, a textile factory, and one wing of a cigarette factory which happened to escape destruction. One bakery is being repaired... All grain elevators and flour mills, which constituted the chief pre-war industry, are completely destroyed."

Poltava (Population in 1939: 130,305).

In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission reported Poltava about 80 per cent. destroyed. "About 100,000 of the inhabitants have returned and are living under conditions only slightly better than Kremenchug. On the main street only one building is intact. The Mayor estimated that reconstruction would take at least fifteen years. The locomotive repair shop and a stocking factory are the only industries operating two years after liberation."

Other Cities

In Zaporozhie (population in 1939: 289,188) 75 per cent. of the homes and virtually all industry were destroyed[1]. Stalino, the industrial and mining centre of the Donets Basin, has been described as a shadow of its former self. Its pre-war population was 510,000. During the war about 100,000 of the people were driven into slavery by the Germans. Another 80,000 men, women, and children were thrust into one of the mines to die. Seventy-five per cent. of all the buildings in the city were destroyed; and of these only 30 per cent. were in a condition to be restored. All the mines in the area were flooded; and from one pit alone over 3,300,000 tons of water had been pumped by August 1946[2].

The Ukraine's Application for UNRRA Assistance

727 In the summer of 1945 the government of the U.S.S.R. transmitted
648 to the Director General of UNRRA a request for assistance in rehabilitating
457 those areas of the Soviet Union which had suffered most heavily because of the war and the German occupation. In August 1945 at the Third Session of the UNRRA Council, the Soviet delegate strongly requested that 700 million U.S. dollars be allocated for relief work in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Republics. At the same Council Session the applications of Byelorussia and the Ukraine for membership in UNRRA were unanimously accepted, and the two republics were requested to send delegates to the Third Council meetings.

In December 1945 agreements were signed between UNRRA and the governments of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics providing for

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1 UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

2 Soviet News, London, August 22, 1946.

727 relief and rehabilitation supplies to be delivered until such time as
457 the two republics would be able themselves to pay with suitable means
648 of foreign exchange for their own imports[1].

727 The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement provided for a programme of supplies
439 amounting to 188 million U.S. dollars (approximately five dollars per head
648 of population), to be used for food, clothing, medical, agricultural, and industrial supplies. The agreement stipulated that UNRRA would attempt to deliver the bulk of these supplies to the Ukraine before June 30, 1946; however, because of procurement and transport difficulties, this early completion of the programme proved impossible. On May 30, 1946, therefore, the UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was extended to the end of 1946.

The schedule of supplies to be shipped has changed somewhat since the original programme was decided. As it now exists, about 53 per cent. (by value) of the total supplies are foodstuffs; 27 per cent. industrial supplies, and nearly 9 per cent. clothing. Supplies for the rehabilitation of agriculture will amount to 17,088,000 dollars, the greater part of which has been allocated for seeds. The following table shows by value the UNRRA programme of supplies for the Ukraine, as at March 21, 1947. A more detailed summary will follow in later sections of this report.

TABLE - III

UNRRA Programme of Supplies to the Ukrainian S.S.R.
(thousand U.S. dollars)

Food, feed, soap	100,189
Clothing, textiles, footwear	16,856
Medical and sanitation supplies	2,326
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591
Total	188,050

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

In March 1946 a small UNRRA Mission arrived in the Ukraine and established headquarters at Kiev. In subsequent months, some of the mission members have made many visits to various parts of the republic in order to observe the distribution of UNRRA supplies. They report that gigantic efforts are being made to restore the economy, but emphasize the discouraging fact that UNRRA assistance with machinery and other rehabilitation supplies is small in comparison with the tremendous destruction everywhere. The main UNRRA contribution has

1 UNRRA aid to Byelorussia will be dealt with in a future paper.

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439 been food supplies, which in many Ukrainian towns constituted the only
648 food to be seen in shops in 1946. For fats and oils particularly the Ukrainian population has been entirely dependent on UNRRA aid.

The U.S.S.R.'s Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

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648 UNRRA assistance to the Ukraine has been of necessity limited in scope and short-term in nature. Long after relief shipments are ended - and they are now all but complete - the Ukraine will still be working to rebuild its factories, cities, and farms. The main task of rehabilitation is therefore a long-term one, and depends upon long-range measures.

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185 On March 18, 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted a Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, for the rehabilitation and development of the national economy of the Soviet Union. This plan is the fourth of a series of Five-Year Plans[1] designed to increase the productivity of Soviet farming and industry, and in general to raise the standard of living of the whole population. As stated by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the principal aims of the Five-Year Plan in 1946-50 are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of the country, to recover the pre-war level in industry and agriculture, and then considerably to surpass that level.

[652] The new Five-Year Plan provides that nearly one-third of the capital investments for the entire Soviet Union in 1946-50 (49,500 million roubles out of a total of 250,300)[2] are to be spent on the restoration of the Ukraine. Of this 49,500 million, 5,469 million will be used for works under the Ukrainian Republic's jurisdiction.

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727 In the next five years all the destroyed cities of the Ukraine - particularly Kiev, Kharkov, Chernigov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, Stalino,
362 and Zaporozhie - are to be rebuilt and their municipal services restored. Housing is to be replaced as speedily as possible; in 1946-50, 175,120,000 square feet of state-owned housing are to be built, of which 12.65 million square feet are to be made available by local Soviets. The amount of privately owned housing to be built before 1950 is fixed at 36.3 million square feet.

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185 Also under the Five-Year Plan Ukrainian agriculture is to be rehabilitated; the crop area for 1950 is planned at 30.5 million hectares. By 1950 the Ukraine is scheduled to be producing about 20 per cent. of the grain harvested in the U.S.S.R. (approximately the same tonnage as in pre-war years); 60 per cent. of the sugar beet (about 6 per cent. more than pre-war); and the potato harvest is fixed for 23 million tons, 1½ millions more than in 1940.

000 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport

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1 First Five-Year Plan, 1929-32; second, 1933-37; third, 1938-42.

2 Estimated at 1945 prices.

727 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport
433 are to be rebuilt; the mining of coal is to regain and then to outstrip the pre-war output; the production of machinery and equipment for both light and heavy industry is to be restored; and to do this, iron and steel production is to be increased until it surpasses pre-war. War damaged power stations are to be rehabilitated, and additional ones are to be constructed, particularly in smaller communities.

[185] Altogether the output of industrial enterprises in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is envisaged at 9,200 million roubles, of which the output of state industries under local jurisdiction and of industrial co-operatives is estimated to comprise 3,100 million roubles[1].

The volume of industrial production in the whole U.S.S.R. in 1950 - that is, the last year of the Five-Year Plan - is fixed at 205,000 million roubles (in 1926-27 prices). Compared with 138,500 million roubles in 1940, this represents an increase in industrial output of 48 per cent.

727 Particular stress in the Five-Year Plan is laid on the development
433 of the Western Ukraine and the Transcarpathian Region. Lvov, the main
361 city of the Western Ukraine, is to be developed into a major industrial centre, where there are to be built and put into operation an automobile assembly plant, electrical, telephone, and telegraph-equipment manufacturing plants, a glass works, a knitting mill, and food processing plants.

In the Transcarpathian Region, new light industry plants are to be constructed, and the mining of brown coal (lignite) is to be organized and extended. Provision is to be made for the rehabilitation and development of the woodworking and wood chemical industries and of farming, particularly fruit-growing, viticulture, livestock breeding and apiculture, [652] as well as of the food processing industries. The farms of the Transcarpathian Region are to be given considerable state assistance in the form of agricultural machines, fertilizers, and credits.

000 A more detailed discussion of the Five-Year Plan in connection with farming and the various industries follows in later sections of this report.

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[475] It must be remembered that a number of enterprises although situated in the Ukrainian Republic are not under the Republic's jurisdiction, but under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union Government.

241 433 In comparing these figures with 1937 production the increases in the area of the Republic must be borne in mind.

Effects of the War on Ukrainian Farming

727 241 474 When the German armies were finally driven out of the Ukraine in 1944 they left most of the Republic's farmsteads completely in ruins. So great was the devastation which they wrecked that even today the full extent of it is not definitely known. It has been estimated by Ukrainian officials, however, that the invaders ruined and plundered 27,110[1] of the Ukraine's collective farms and 872[1] of the state farms, burning the buildings and wrecking or stealing the machinery. The Germans also wrecked over 422,000 collective farm buildings and 423,000 privately owned farm buildings[2], scorched and laid waste millions of hectares of farm land, and destroyed 1,300[1] machine and tractor stations. The consequent losses of machinery were enormous. Fifty-six thousand tractors, 24,000 harvester combines, 30,200 trucks and automobiles used in farming and 1,892,000 other agricultural machines were destroyed or stolen by the Germans. The next table shows the losses compared with pre-war numbers.

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1 Statement by Mr. I.S. Senin, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. at a meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers on February 7, 1947, published in Soviet News, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Department of UNRRA Supplies of the Ukrainian Government, Kiev, April 6, 1946.

TABLE XI

Ukraine: War Losses of Farm Machinery

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	Number before the war	Destroyed or wrecked by the Germans
Tractors	over 90,000[1]	56,000[2]
Harvester combines	" 31,000[1]	24,000[2]
Trucks and cars used in agriculture	" 50,000[1]	30,200[3]
Other farm machines	n.a.	1,892,000[3]

1 Source: Mr. Baranovsky, Member of the UNRRA Council for the Ukrainian S.S.R. Speech at the Fourth Session of the UNRRA Council on March 20, 1946, Atlantic City, UNRRA Journal, Volume IV, No.6.

2 Source: Statement of the Soviet Commission on Material Damage Caused by the German-Fascist Invaders, Soviet News, September 18, 1945.

3 Source: Letter to the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine from Mr. V.V. Khoryak, Chief, Ukrainian Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

In addition to the spoilage of buildings, machinery and land, the Germans seized, slaughtered, or drove away millions of farm animals, and stole from the collective farms or from private citizens of the Ukraine over 12 million tons of farm produce, including 9.5 million tons of grain and flour[1].

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In the period immediately after liberation agriculture was slowly restarted, almost entirely by hand and in the most adverse conditions. Transport was highly disorganized and at the same time had to carry military traffic. On the heels of the victorious Soviet army the evacuated collective farmers were returning with their few animals to their wrecked farms. The flocks and herds were decimated or non-existent. Everywhere there were tremendous shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, machinery and manpower to do the work. In most districts in 1945 only 50 to 60 per cent. of the pre-war area could be sown. Many of the crops were sown late because of difficulty in cultivating the land; and when harvesting time came, much of the reaping and threshing had to be done by hand. Average yields of all crops were very low.

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1 Department of UNRRA Supplies of the Ukrainian Government, Kiev, April 6, 1946.

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Nevertheless, the 1945 harvest - assisted by lend-lease supplies which were still then available, and (beginning in December 1945) by UNRRA relief deliveries - was furnishing the population a fair amount of cereals and bread. There was, however, very little meat from domestic sources, and only a small amount of fats and oils, as the following table shows.

TABLE XII

Ukraine: Production and Utilization of Fats and Oils, 1945.
(thousand metric tons)

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Oilseeds		
Production		
Total production of oilseeds		496.4
Deduction for seed		53.6
Available for processing		442.8
Utilization		
338 Total production of oil		105.8
Deduction for industrial use (soap manufacture, etc.)		26.7
Available for human consumption		
by urban population	29.0	
by rural population	50.0	
Total		79.1
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
urban population		2.41
rural population		1.86
Average		1.98

[p2 8]

TABLE XII (Continued)

727
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258
262

Animal fat

Production		74.7
Imports		12.5[1]
Available for consumption		
by urban population	32.7	
by rural population	54.5	
Total		87.2
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
by urban population		2.73
by rural population		2.0
Average		2.19

Summary (Oils and Fats)

All fat and oil resources			
Vegetable oils		105.8	
Animal fats		74.7	
Total production		180.5	
Imports		12.5[1]	
Available for distribution		193.0	
Consumption			
Technical purposes		26.7	
Food			
Urban	61.7		
Rural	104.6		
Total food		166.3	
Total consumption		193.0	
Average consumption			Kilograms per person per year
by urban population			5.14
by rural population			3.86
Average			4.17

1 Available from Lend-lease

Source: Ukrainian Department of UNRRA Supplies, Kiev, May 15, 1946.

231 During the war these numbers were greatly reduced: the Germans killed, stole, or drove away 3.311 million horses, 7.594 million head of cattle, 9.355 million pigs, 7.317 million sheep, and over 59.379 million fowl of all kinds.[1]

231 727 474 The collective farms of the Republic suffered most heavily. After the German occupation the collective farms of the Ukraine were left with only 6.3 per cent. of their 1940 herds of cattle, 1.9 per cent. of their pigs, and 3.4 per cent. of their sheep. In practical terms, the Germans had almost completely wiped out collectively-owned livestock.

231 727 In rehabilitating their herds the collective farms have received much assistance from the Soviet Government and the fraternal Republics - Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia and others - which have supplied hundreds of thousands of animals. However, the number of livestock in the kolkhozes are still far below pre-war. Most rapid steps were made in the re-stocking of cattle herds, which by early 1946 had reached 66 per cent. of the pre-war number of Ukrainian collective farms; pigs were 23 per cent. of pre-war and sheep and goats, 29 per cent. (Note: the figures in the two preceding paragraphs relate to collective farms alone.)[2]

The following table shows the pre-war numbers of livestock in the Ukraine (pre-1940 boundaries) and in the Soviet Union as a whole.

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946.

III INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT

135 311 433 Ukrainian industry is based chiefly on rich deposits of coal in the Donets Basin, iron ore in the Krivoi Rog district (where the ore contains 60 per cent. metal), and manganese ore in the Nikopol area. To utilize this great natural wealth a very large metallurgical and machine-building industry has been bult up in the Ukraine. At the same time, many food factories including sugar refineries, have been created to process the food so abundantly produced by Ukrainian farms. In the period between wars, the share of the Ukraine in the country's industrial output declined somewhat, not because of slackened activity - on the contrary, Ukrainian industry continued to be even more intensively developed - but because the policy of the U.S.S.R. was to decentralize, and to expand and develop those areas, particularly the eastern ones which previously had no industry. This lengthening of the industrial pace naturally brought about a certain change in emphasis, so that whereas by 1938 the productivity of Soviet industry as a whole had increased to about eight times the output of Tsarist Russia in 1913; the proportion of Ukrainian output in the total was lessened. For example, in 1928 the Krivoi Rog district of the Ukraine produced 78 per cent. of all the iron ore in the U.S.S.R.; but in 1937, although this district was producing more, its share in the total was only 47 per cent.

War Damage to Industry

727 433 Before they were finally driven from the Ukraine the Germans furiously set about wrecking those Ukrainian industries which still survived. They stripped the plants of equipment and destroyed the buildings; they flooded the coal mines; they completed the destruction of the famous Lenin Hydro-Electric Power Station and the Dnieper Dam - both of which had been partially disabled by the retreating Soviet Army troops on August 28, 1941.

The damage to all branches of industry was tremendous and will take many years to repair, particularly since the shortages of labour and equipment, as well as the scarcity of food have been a hindrance at every step. Some of the difficulties were destribed in a report of the UNRRA Mission after visits to several of the larger Ukrainian cities in May 1946.

"In our cable...we outlined the condition and needs of industrial plants in six principal Ukrainian cities visited by members of the Mission during May. The pattern is fairly uniform. Many plants were completely destroyed and those which still stood were usually heavily damaged and almost universally gutted of all modern equipment. Included among those industries hardest hit are the heavy capital goods industries, machine tool manufacturing industries, and power stations, as well as the rolling and stationary stock of all forms of transportation, and equipment for processing building materials. So great is

727 the destruction that there are competing calls upon the limited
433 supplies of manpower, equipment and materials. We observed many instances of ingenious adaptation and salvaging of old and antiquated machinery; yet restoration was everywhere slow and complicated by lack of equipment to move away the rubble, transport the materials, produce the electric energy, and repair the streets, sewers, and gas and electric lines. There is a vicious circle. Iron and steel, for example, are needed to repair electric power stations and rebuild houses; efforts to restore these basic industries and facilities are constantly delayed because there is not enough shelter; and neither shelter nor the industries and community facilities can be replaced until there are more cranes, tractors and trucks. Low-calorie diets, induced by lack of foodstuffs, cause low efficiency and slow production. The food UNRRA is shipping has sustained the people, though, to be sure, it has not been sufficient to compensate for local shortages; the country may somewhat accelerate its industrial rehabilitation - especially of shelter and water supplies - when the equipment items on the UNRRA programme arrive. Meanwhile it is slowly restoring those parts of its economy which will respond to manpower aided by a minimum amount of mechanical equipment."

Industrial Aims of the Five-Year Plan

185 The great importance of rehabilitating Ukrainian industry and the
727 share which Ukrainian industry has to take in the entire Soviet Union economy are shown by the new Five-Year Plan.

By comparing the aims for 1950 with pre-war production figures, it is possible to have some impression of the destruction which occurred in the Ukraine during the war.

The table which follows shows the planned ratio of Ukrainian output in 1950 to the output of the entire Soviet Union. Where possible, pre-war figures have been included.

TABLE XVIII

Share of Ukrainian Industry in Total Soviet Production

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1940

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. total	Ukraine (per cent. of total)
	(thousand metric tons)		
Pig iron	9,200	14,900	61
Steel	8,600	18,400	47
Coal	83,800	164,600	51
Tractors (units)	n.a.	176,000[1]	n.a.
Locomotives (units)	880[2]	1,214[2]	72[2]
Sugar	1,790[2]	2,378[2]	75[2]

1950 (planned)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. total	Ukraine (per cent. of total)
	(thousand metric tons)		
Pig iron	9,700	19,500	49.7
Steel	8,800	25,400	34.6
Coal	86,100	250,000	34.4
Tractors (units)	25,000	112,000	22.3
Locomotives (units)	1,000	2,720	40.0
Sugar	1,637	2,400	68.2
Metallurgical equipment	n.a.	n.a.	33.9

1 1938 figure
2 1937 figures

Note: n.a. means not available.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, September 1, 1946; The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50; Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace, A. Yugov, C.A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London, 1941.

Progress in 1946

At the beginning of 1947 the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. issued a statement describing the progress in rehabilitation and development made during 1946. According to this statement the gross output of industry in the entire U.S.S.R. increased by 20 per cent. in 1946 as compared with 1945. About 800 government enterprises had been built, restored, or launched during the year. Navigation was opened on restored canals. A series of steps were also taken in 1946 to expand Soviet trade and consolidate the currency. Wages and salaries of low and medium-paid workers were raised.

SU
464 The number of workers and employees in the national economy of the
874 U.S.S.R. increased by 3 million. Vocational schools and factory training centres graduated thousands of skilled workers, and improved the skill of several millions already employed.

SU
727 Of the districts which suffered occupation, economic rehabilitation
433 as well as capital construction amounting to 17,500 million roubles in
652 1946 made it possible to increase their industrial output by 28 per cent. as compared with 1945. Pravda writes - "the factories, mills, pits, power stations, towns and villages which were destroyed by the enemy are being revived one by one...."[1]

In the Ukraine

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●727 The Ukraine has been likened to one big building site, where more
433 than 500,000 workers are engaged in restoring industrial plants and
327 municipal buildings.[2] In the Donets Basin, the coal output of 1946 was 30 per cent. higher than that of 1945. In the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, 21 blast furnaces, 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries were at work by January 1947. Of 104 machine-building factories to be restored, 102 were already producing goods, and mastering the production of improved types of machinery. The Kharkov transport machine-building works was preparing to build long-distance steam engines; and the tractor works was increasing its production, as were many other factories.

U
727 In 1946 the Kharkov turbo-generator works made a 100,000 kilowatt
433 turbine and one of 50,000 kilowatts. At Dniepropetrovsk, a lorry
393 factory was being built; and in Odessa and Lvov, automobile assembly
398 works were under construction. Great work was also being done in the development of light industry, food processing, chemical works, and other branches of industry.

U
727 After three years' work of restoration the Dnieper Dam had been
433 rebuilt in the main, and the housing for the power station erected.
377 By the end of 1946 the capacity of Ukrainian power stations had reached 70 per cent. of pre-war.

U
362 Since the liberation over 104.5 million square feet of floor space
368 had been restored in the Ukraine. Over half a million of the 590,000 houses destroyed by the Germans were restored or built anew in Ukrainian villages; and more than 13,000 cultural institutions in the villages and 118,000 auxiliary buildings on the farms.[2]

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1 Pravda, quoted by Soviet News, London, January 22, 1946

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

Coal

316 The coal centre of the Ukraine is the basin of the Donets River,
433 a tributary of the Don. In 1913 the Donets region was producing 80 per cent. of all the coal turned out in the entire Russian Empire. (23 million tons of the 29.2 million total); and even in 1940, when the production of other coal areas in the U.S.S.R. had been greatly expanded, and many new areas explored and put into operation, Donets mines still accounted for more than half the total output (85.8 million tons of the entire Soviet Union production of 164.6 million).

Since about 70 per cent. of all the fuel consumed in the U.S.S.R. is supplied by coal,[1] the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian coal industry is of tremendous importance to the economy of the Soviet Union.

● 727
316 It is now over three years since the Soviet Army drove the Germans out of the Donets Basin. Before their rout, the enemy flooded the mines and burned engineering plants, miners' settlements, and cities. Restoration work was started soon after the liberation of the Basin, but it was estimated that to restore coal output to the pre-war level it would be necessary to pump 650 million cubic metres of water out of the mines and to restore 1,565 miles of mine galleries.[2] Today, the towns of the Donets Basin are a mass of scaffolding, as war-devastated houses, buildings, and roads continue to be repaired. Mine derricks dot the landscape; and water is being pumped in a steady stream from the mine pits. At the Chelyuskin Mine which before the war was one of the biggest and best equipped in the Donets, over nine million cubic metres of water had been pumped by the middle of December 1946; and about 20 miles of galleries had been restored. Coal output averaged a thousand tons a day.

By January 1947 about 142 major coal mines of the 279 operating prior to the war had been restored, and 430 smaller ones, rehabilitated or built anew, were in operation. Production was nearly half of pre-war.[3]

[362] As regards housing for Donets workers, it is planned within the next five years not only to restore the houses demolished by the Germans, but also to build another 20 million square feet of housing space in the Donets Basin; in 1946 alone over four million square feet of floor
[464] space had been reconstructed. Thousands of miners are being helped to build their own homes; and measures are being taken to increase their food supplies.

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1 Moscow Radio feature, "Sidelights on Soviet Life," cited in Soviet Monitor, London, January 29, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946

3 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947

727 In August 1941 the retreating Soviet army troops partially disabled
377 the Dnieper Dam and power station to prevent its falling into enemy hands. This destruction was later completed by the Germans. When the Soviet Army recaptured the region, they found that 35 of the dam's 48 piers had been blown up, and all the generators destroyed. Damage to the power house alone was estimated at 500,000,000 roubles.

Reconstruction work began in February 1944, when the war was still on. Three years later the assembly of the first power unit of 72,000 kilowatt capacity was completed; and on March 3, 1947, the Lenin Hydro-electric Station supplied its first post-war currency to the industry of the Dnieper Valley.

There are over 11,000 men and women engaged on the restoration job, which has involved repairing the dam and the underwater structures, building the housing for the power station, and mounting the machines. Another two power units are to be assembled later this year.

After the expulsion of the Germans from the Ukraine, the capacity of the Republic's power stations was only 0.4 per cent. of pre-war. By the end of August 1946 restored capacity had reached 47 per cent. In the Donets Basin 70 per cent. had been restored, and in the Stalino area, 79 per cent. In the city of Lvov (Western Ukraine) the pre-war capacity of its electric power stations had been surpassed by 18 per cent. In the first seven months of 1946 much had been accomplished: some 400 power stations, including 215 hydro-electric plants, had been launched in the Ukraine; and it was expected that 750 more power stations would be completed by the end of the year.

The Five-Year Plan fixes the 1950 output of electric power in the Ukraine at 13,690 million kilowatt hours. The total capcity of Ukrainian power stations is to be increased in 1946-50 by 2,57_,000 kilowatts. The Five-Year Plan directs that:-

"The Lenin Hydro-electric Station on the Dnieper shall be rebuilt. Small hydro-electric power plants with a total capacity of 203,000 kilowatts shall be built to meet the requirements of agriculture and local consumers. Plant aggregating 95,000 kilowatts shall be put into operation at municipal electric power stations."

The restoration of electric power facilities will assist greatly in rehabilitating other sections of the Soviet economy

Iron and Steel

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327 The Five-Year Plan for the Ukrainian S.S.R. envisages an output in
433 1950 of 9.7 million tons of pig iron, and 8.8 million tons of steel.

In order to accomplish this, the iron and steel plants of the Donets Basin and the Dnieper region are to be rehabilitated; and there are to be put into operation 30 blast furnaces with an aggregate annual capacity of 9 million tons of pig-iron, steel smelting units with a

Progress in Rebuilding

327 727 In 1946, nearly all of the ferrous metal plants in the Donets were put into working order once more. The biggest blast furnace in the Ukraine started operating again in the Azovstal works; two other blast furnaces were put into operation, one in the Dzerzhinsky works at Dnieprodzerzhinsk and the other in the Makeyevka iron and steel works, where the mounting of a great blooming mill was also completed. The open hearth furnace at the Petrovsky works, two coke batteries of the Dzerzhinsky works, coke battery No.2 at the Mariupol coke and chemical works, the rolling mills at Yenakievo and Kramatorsk, and a number of other units of the iron and steel industry started operations.[1]

Altogether by the end of 1946 there were 21 blast furnaces,[2] 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries at work in the Ukrainian S.S.R.[3]

The iron mines in the Krivoi Rog basin (Ukraine) had been 85 per cent. restored. Another five big iron mines are to be put into operation this year, and by 1950 ore extraction in the Krivoi Rog area is expected to surpass the pre-war output.[4]

However, the task of reconstruction is still immense. Many of the large plants are still greatly disabled. The largest iron and steel plant in the Ukraine (at Zaporoshie) was systematically destroyed by the Germans.

This factory, with its three blast furnaces, ten open-hearth furnaces, strip and rolling mills, and 25,000 kilowatt generator, was still expanding when the war broke out. A small amount of light equipment was evacuated, but the bulk of equipment and all of the structures housing it were damaged or destroyed. Soviet engineers estimate that 65 per cent. of the value of the equipment was destroyed. Total restoration costing seven hundred million roubles will take from three to four years. Full restoration will require vast amounts of iron and steel for repairing the plant, of mechanical equipment for operating the plant; and of materials to rebuild the houses of the workers.[5]

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1 Soviet News, London, January 23, 1947.

2 On January 1, 1935, there were 55 blast furnaces in the Ukraine (55 per cent. of total U.S.S.R. capacity) and 117 open-hearth furnaces (40 per cent. of total U.S.S.R. capacity).

3 Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

4 Soviet Monitor, London, January 28, 1947.

5 UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

Heavy Industry Building in 1947.[1]

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727 Reconstruction and building will be on a wider scale in 1947, as heavy improvements are introduced. Mechanization is being extended in blast furnaces, open-hearths, and metal-rolling shops; and ore and coal stores are being equipped with modern cranes.

In the Donets Basin in 1947 the Stalino Metal Works are to put into operation another blast furnace, martin oven and rolling mill.[2] At the Azovstal works the two blast furnaces of 1,000 cubic metres each will be enlarged to 1,300 cubic metres. Also at the Azovstal works, which in the past did not produce any rolled metal, are being built a blooming mill, which will be the largest in the south, and a rolling mill. New blooming mills and rail rolling mills are also to start at the Petrovsky works in Dniepropetrovsk, and at the Dzerzhinsky works in Dnieprodzerzhinsk. New pipe-rolling workshops will be added at the Nikopol Yuzhno-Trubny and the Dniepropetrovsk works.

At the Zaporozhstal works in 1947 several workshops will be added; and a power station and a 1,300 cubic metre blast furnace will begin working in the first half of the year. Among the most urgent tasks at this plant is the reconstruction of machines producing sheet metal for automobile production.

Equipment for Iron and Steel Mills

According to the new Five-Year Plan, the Ukrainian output of equipment for iron and steel mills in 1950 has been fixed at 35,000 tons; the total production of the entire Soviet Union has been fixed at 102,900 tons (of which 66,700 are to be produced by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic).

Production of Tractors

727 Before the war there were about 90,000 tractors in operation on
407 Ukrainian farms. During the occupation, 56,000 of these were wrecked
433 or stolen by the Germans, who also completely destroyed the well-known tractor factory at Kharkov. Because of the particularly great need of tractors in the Ukraine, this factory was rebuilt with great vigour; and production resumed. By February 1947 the Kharkov Tractor Works had produced 3,000 tractors since the restoration of the plant.

The 1950 output of tractors in the Ukraine is expected to be 25,000; for the entire Soviet Union, production has been fixed at 112,000 tractors.

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1 See U.S.S.R. Deputy Minister for the Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, Radio Moscow, February 3, 1947, B.B.C. Digest of World Broadcasts No. 274, London, February 5, 1947.

2 Soviet Monitor, London, January 2, 1947.

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Chemical Industry

The chemical industry of the Ukraine is based chiefly on coal deposits, but also on a number of other raw materials to be found there, including lacustrine deposits of sodium chloride (Artornovsk area) and phosphatic rocks (Konstantinovka area).

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[185]

The Five-Year Plan fixes that:

"The chemical plants of the Ukraine, including soda, nitrate, and superphosphate plants, shall be rebuilt, and the potash mines in the regions of Stanislav and Dragobych, and a new superphosphate plant, a paint and varnish plant and a plastics factory built.

U
[654]

"In 1946-50 geological surveys shall be conducted with a view to locating commercial deposits of potassium salts to a total of 80 million tons, graphite to a total of 7.7 million tons, and gypsum to a total of 7 million tons."

Output in 1950 is fixed by the Plan as follows:

for the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Calcined soda	448,000 tons
Superphosphates	860,000 tons, and
Salt,	1,930,000 tons;

and for the entire Soviet Union:

Calcined soda	800,000 tons, and
Mineral fertilizers, superphosphates, nitrates and potash	5,100,000 tons.

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Light Industry[1]

By the end of 1946 the production of consumer goods in the U.S.S.R. had already revived considerably; output in the different branches ranged from 20 to 50 per cent. above 1945. Reconversion of the factories to peacetime production was largely completed; however, three big tasks remained: to complete the rehabilitation of all light industry enterprises wrecked by the Nazis; to replace the old or worn-out machinery; and to obtain an adequate supply of labour and materials.

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1 Soviet News, London, December 30, 1946, and February 6, 1947.

Food Industries

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727 The damage suffered by the Soviet food industry during the German
25 occupation - not counting the destruction of livestock and crops - has
U been estimated at 17,000 million roubles. Restoration work was begun
727 while the war was still on, and by May 1947, 3,200 food factories had
25 been rebuilt. A fairly large proportion of these restored factories
433 must have been in the Ukraine, where, according to the Soviet Monitor[1] 1,600 out of 1,822 pre-war food factories had been restored by November 6, 1946. The rehabilitated factories had exceeded their 11 months' food output programme by production valued at 12 million roubles (146 million roubles over the corresponding period of 1945).

Sugar

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257 Before the war the output of sugar in the Ukraine was as follows.

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TABLE XX

Pre-War Sugar Production: Ukraine and U.S.S.R.
(metric tons)

Year	Soviet Union total	Ukrainian S.S.R.
1928	1,221,200	1,086,400
1932	826,800	559,700
1937	2,377,500	1,789,800

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; and Statistical Yearbooks of the League of Nations, Geneva, 1936 and 1939.

The Five-Year Plan establishes that in 1946-50 sugar refineries in the Ukraine shall be restored or built capable of handling upwards of 67,000 tons of sugar beet per day. By 1950, according to plan, the output of granulated sugar in the Ukraine will reach 1,637,000 tons, (in the entire Soviet Union, 2.4 million tons).

Forestry

U
[311] In January 1935 the forest area of the Ukrainian S.S.R. was
313 3,845,000 hectares - about 0.5 per cent. of the forest area of the entire U.S.S.R.[2] The number of sawing frames in the Republic was 703 out of the Soviet Union total of 6,500 (total capacity, 18.4 million cubic metres).[3] Considering the relatively small forest

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1 November 11, 1946

2 Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1936.

3 Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940, II.

Production of Building Materials

339 In connection with the reconstruction work being carried out in
185 the Ukraine, the production of building materials is extremely important. The Five-Year Plan lays down that the pre-war production of bricks is to be increased by 50 per cent. of tiles, by 170 per cent. of lime, by 120 per cent., and of gypsum by 190 per cent. The Plan also states that

> "Plants for the production of building materials - including cement, glass, brick, lime, and tile works, plants producing metal fixtures, prefabricated houses, building sections, plumbing fixtures, roofing materials and high tensile gypsum - shall be restored or built and stable local fuel and power supplies created for the building material plants."

The Ukrainian output of cement in 1950 is expected to be 2,065,000 tons as compared with 10,500,000 tons for the entire U.S.S.R.

[323] Under the jurisdiction of the Republic and local authorities there are to be put into operation in the years 1946-50 glass works with a capacity of 11-33 million square feet of glass, brick kilns with a capacity of 9 million bricks, and rolling mills and other building material plants.

Transport

• 727 The war and the occupation brought great devastation to the
489 transport system of the Ukraine. The greater part of the railroads were partially or completely destroyed, and many hundreds of railway bridges demolished. The port of Odessa on the Black Sea was systematically destroyed - piers, warehouses, elevators, floating cranes, and power supply. The Dnieper-Bug Canal, the only water outlet towards the west, was made impassable by the Germans, who destroyed the sluices, wrecked bridges, sank boats in midstream, and choked the canal with mud.

185 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, provides for the complete rehabili-
489 tation of Ukrainian transport. Railway lines and junctions, and locomotive and car repair works are to be fully restored. A number of railway lines are to be electrified; and west of the Dnieper several narrow gauge lines are to be constructed for closer connection of sugar beet growing areas with sugar refineries.

185 To alleviate the difficult situation in rail transport, motor
489 roads are to be rebuilt and extended. The Moscow-Kharkov highway is
494 to be rehabilitated and improved, and additional motor roads are to be built to connect towns of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with the towns of the North Caucasus and the Crimea. By 1950 the tonnage of freight transported by road should be 16 times the pre-war volume. The number

U 185 489 494 of road passengers should increase 7½ times; and the number of buses, by 3,000.

U 185 489 503 The Five-Year Plan also provides for the expansion of river and sea traffic. Small rivers are to be extensively adapted for navigation, and will also be utilized for local hydro-electric power supplies. Shipbuilding yards are to be rebuilt, and the tonnage of river and sea traffic is to be considerably increased. The freight turnover on small rivers of the Ukraine in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 450,000 metric tons.

Pre-War Traffic

U 489 In 1937 the Ukrainian railways handled 313.1 million metric tons of loads, as compared with 165.7 million in 1932. The river transport carried 7.7 million tons (4.7 million in 1932), while in the same year Ukrainian seaports handled 8.6 million tons as against 6.5 million tons in 1932.

SU 497 U 497 The U.S.S.R.'s system of rail transport is perhaps the weakest link in the Soviet economy. In 1937 the railway network of the entire Soviet Union amounted to only 86,400 kilometres (83,400 kilometres in 1933). The construction of additional lines had by no means kept pace with the expansion of industry and agriculture. The Ukraine in 1937 had some 14,400 kilometres of railway lines; and traffic loads in that year amounted to some 313.1 million metric tons. The inadequacy of the system if compared with other European countries is marked. For example, in France (the area of which was approximately equal to that of pre-war Ukraine) the length of the principal lines open for traffic on January 1, 1938, was 42,000 kilometres.

U 727 497 The war has greatly disrupted Ukrainian rail transport. Locomotives, rolling stock and tracks were heavily damaged or destroyed. The problem of rehabilitation is especially serious, because the lack of adequate transport facilities hinders other rebuilding projects. The locomotives and cars taken as reparations from Germany, being chiefly of narrow gauge, are consequently of no use on most existing Soviet tracks.

Production of Long Distance Locomotives

U 397 Before the war the output of long distance locomotives in the Ukraine was as follows.

503 The canal was reconstructed just before the German invasion.
487 In record time, eight months, ten large sluices were built in two
727 stairways of five locks each; and in August 1940 the first river vessels passed through from the Black Sea to the Vistula.

The Germans destroyed these sluices and choked the canal so that all the hydro-technical structures had to be rebuilt anew. The speed of reconstruction was such that by the middle of 1946 vessels and barges were passing freely from the Vistula along the Dnieper with cargoes of timber for the Ukraine.

At present the western Bug is navigable only in April and May. When it has been converted into a normal waterway, effective communication will be established between the Ukrainian and Byelorussian river basins and the Vistula, Oder, Elbe, and Rhine.

652 under their jurisdiction. For example, capital works, repairs,
657 and equipment for livestock raising centres, piggeries, cattle sheds, slaughterhouses and refrigerators (under the Ministry of Cattle Breeding); vineyards, orchards, repairs of irrigation facilities (under the Ministry of Technical Agricultural Production); repairs to barns and agricultural implements (under the Ministry of Agriculture); and rehabilitation of the brick and ceramic industry (under the Ministry of Home Construction).

Health Services. These expenditures are administered by the Ministry of Health, and include the feeding of patients, and repairs and equipment for hospitals and health service agencies.

[658] Children's Institutions (over four years) and Schools. These expenditures are handled by the Ministry of Education, and include the feeding of children; and capital works, repairs and equipment for schools and children's homes.

Social Welfare Services Directed towards the Betterment of General Well-being. These expenditures are administed by the Ministry of Social Welfare and include such services as repairs and maintenance of social welfare agencies, and assistance to invalids.

Local Rehabilitation

648 As at March 1, 1947, about 41 per cent. of the gross proceeds of
●727 UNRRA sales had been transferred to regional executive committees of the government for use in the local and district economy. The local
185 projects - which are undertaken after approval by the state authorities
731 and are subject to regular reporting and inspection - are similar in character to those carried out by the Republican Government Ministries. However, there is a considerable shift in emphasis. For example, at the regional level, nearly 57 per cent. of the total proceeds at their disposal was utilized for health services (hospitals, nurseries), 35 per cent. for children's institutions, 5 per cent. for repairs of public and industrial institutions, and 2 per cent. for the building of schools and repair of clubs.

Deliveries of UNRRA Supplies

648 In the original agreement between UNRRA and the Ukrainian Govern-
731 ment was a provision that the Administration would "strive within the limits of its resources" to procure and deliver the Ukraine's share of relief and rehabilitation supplies before July 1, 1946. In the early months of 1946, however, it became clear that procurement difficulties and transport hold-ups would prevent a great part of the supplies from being delivered in time. The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was therefore extended to the end of 1946.

From December 1945, (when UNRRA deliveries to the Ukraine began) up to June 30, 1946, (the time at which they were originally scheduled

645 744 262 (a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

241 727 The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

731 649 262 UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.

175 The Peace of Riga (May 18th, 1921) between Poland and
728 Russia allocated to the former Volynia, Polesya and the district of Kholm, formerly parts of the Russian Empire, while the Ambassadors' Council on March 14th, 1923 added Galicia to Poland's gains. In the Treaty of Riga both partners promised to respect the rights of their minorities while the Ambassadors' Council declared that Poland was to issue laws that would preserve Ukrainian rights and that this was why the Entente Powers relegated their supreme authority to Poland. In reality, throughout the period of Polish supremacy there was little or no attempt to satisfy Ukrainian claims. The Ukrainian Chairs, established at Lviv University by Austria, ceased to exist and the law providing for a Ukrainian university was never implemented. Ukrainian schools were slowly but surely replaced by others where Polish was used either in some or in all classes. Polish became the language of instruction in secondary and vocational schools. The Ukrainian language was not recognised legally either in the administration or in law courts and Ukrainian influence declined in all selfgovernment organisations. Poles colonised Ukrainian areas. A campaign of public opposition was opened against the Ukrainian church: hundreds of churches were shut, above all in the district round Kholm, and the buildings were frequently burned.

175 The reaction of the Ukrainian population was considerable.
871 In the field of education steps were taken to organise private Ukrainian schools; thus in 1934-35 there were 21 Ukrainian secondary schools, 5 continuation vocational schools — mostly in the towns. This is no mean accomplishment in view of the Polish resistance. Besides actual schooling. Ukrainian youth outside of the schools was organised. In 1938 in Galicia. alone the Ukrainian Union for Adult Education had half a million members, 84 branches, 3208 reading rooms. 2065 theatrical societies and 1105 choirs (the Union was forbidden by Polish Law outside
175 of Galicia). Cooperative stores also served to support Ukrainian
474 interests. In 1935 there were incorporated in the Ukrainian Central Cooperative Organisation 3013 cooperative societies with a membership of 541 508. This organisation of economic self-help had also to struggle against bitter Polish resistance, as expressed in the military pacification of Galicia in 1930 or the

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Soviet Government'. A few days later Red troops took possession of Ekaterinoslav; by the first half of January Mariupol, Odessa and Nikolaev were in Bolshevik hands, and Red detachments were marching from Kharkov through Poltava on Kiev. Foreign intervention remained the only chance for the Government of the Central *Rada*. 668

Although the third 'Universal' had not definitely proclaimed the Ukraine to be an independent republic, the Kiev Government informed the Austro-Hungarian and German authorities of their wish to participate in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations as an independent state. 668 728

At Brest-Litovsk all parties were in a hurry. Lenin was anxious to conclude a peace at any price and as rapidly as possible in order to fulfil the promises he had made to the Soviets of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Delegates; the Germans were concerned to accelerate the liquidation of the Russian Front in order to be able to transfer greater numbers of troops to the Western Front; and they, and more urgently the Austrians, were in desperate need of the supplies which they considered the conclusion of peace would make available to them in Russia. Now the Ukrainians appeared upon the scene in no less haste to secure the salvation of the Kiev Government before it should have been liquidated by the forces of the Russian Revolution.

Representatives of the new Soviet power had crossed the German lines on 27 November, but an armistice had not been signed until 16 December; two days later the Armistice of Focşani had concluded the fighting on the Roumanian Front immediately adjacent to the Ukrainian lands. During the negotiations for an armistice the *Rada* Government had been virtually ignored, for the Bolshevik delegates had been at pains to persuade the Germans that the Ukrainian Republic was nothing more than a fiction which would be swept away by 'the workers and peasants'. But when the news reached Kiev and it became known that negotiations for the signature of a general peace would immediately begin, the *Rada* hastened to declare its wish to participate and, as a reinforcement to its request made by wire, sent emissaries to Vienna in order to take advantage of the old and long-standing connections between the Austrian Government and the Ukrainian separatists.

Peace negotiations started on 8 January 1918 in Brest-Litovsk; Trotsky was at the head of the Soviet Delegation; von Kühlmann and General Hoffmann were the German representatives; and Count Czernin was in charge of Austro-Hungarian interests. Ottoman and Bulgarian Delegations also attended.

Without any special invitation, three young men soon put in their

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appearance—'the three students' they were nicknamed by the representatives of the Russian Revolution and of the two Germanic Empires. Levitsky, Lubinsky and Sevryuk, who declared their wish to take part in the proceedings as the representatives of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic', were three of old Hrushevsky's pupils who had hardly had time to finish their schooling.

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The aspect of the delegates with whom the representatives of the two great Empires had to treat had ceased to astonish anyone in Brest-Litovsk. Compared to the 'Delegates of the Sailors, Soldiers, Workers and Peasants' with whom General Hoffmann and Prince Leopold of Bavaria had been obliged to sit at the same table during the discussions about the armistice, these 'three students' seemed quite ordinary decent young men. They were invited to lunch and dine with the Delegations of 'the bourgeois states'—an amenity which Trotsky forbade to his Soviet comrades.

Count Czernin, although a little 'shocked' by the youth of the Ukrainian delegates, was obliged by the force of circumstances to enter into friendly relations with them. As for the German delegates, they were frankly pleased with the presence of the representatives of the *Rada*, considering that it might make Trotsky more amenable.

Trotsky continued to deny the existence of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic'. Levitsky and his colleagues produced documents which showed that during the last elections in the Ukraine (November 1917) the *Rada* had polled 75 per cent of the votes and the Bolsheviks only 10 per cent. It was difficult to realize in Brest-Litovsk that those were the elections about which Vinnichenko wrote 'it was not they who elected us, but we who imposed ourselves on them'.

Owing to the importance of the negotiations, there also arrived in the wake of 'the three students', the new Prime Minister of the Ukraine, Vsevolod Holubovich, also quite a young man (thirty-four years of age), a sincere enthusiast of the 'Ukrainian national cause'. During the session of 10 January the presence of the Ukrainians at the Conference was officially recognized and Trotsky, 'with a sore heart', had to give his consent to their participation in the discussions.

The Ukrainian delegates soon began to astonish Hoffmann and Czernin by their immoderate demands. They had instructions to exact the annexation to the 'Popular Republic' not only of the Kholm district, which had been allocated to the proposed new Polish state, but also of Galicia and Bukovina which formed parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hoffmann almost yelled at Lubinsky and Sevryuk, who were not much abashed and declared that they would ask for new instructions from Kiev: they felt a certain amount of strength to be on their side. A few days later Count Czernin

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wrote in his diary: 'The Ukrainians no longer lead the negotiations: they dictate their conditions.' 668 728

The situation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire had become critical about 15 January. 'The people are suffering from hunger', pleaded the Archbishop of Cracow; 'bread rations have been cut down by half', wired the Governor of Trieste; 'there is flour in Vienna only till next Monday', came from the Burgomaster of the capital. On the 17th the Emperor Charles wired to Czernin: 'The fate of the monarchy and of the dynasty depends on how soon you will be able to conclude peace in Brest-Litovsk....If peace is not concluded a revolution will break out here.'

It was Czernin's good fortune that at this juncture the Ukrainian delegation received news which obliged it to adopt a less extravagant attitude. The 'Popular Republic' had lost in the first weeks of January all New Russia and nearly all left-bank Ukraine. Trotsky smiled sarcastically when he met 'the three students' and Radek wrote in the Soviet press: 'Let those who want bread scream death to the *Rada*!' Radek's aimable outburst against the Kiev *Rada* indicated that Ukrainian supplies were as badly needed in the Soviet capitals as they were in Vienna. This aspect of affairs was duly appreciated by the Germans, and Hoffmann suddenly became more interested in making peace with the *Rada*. When the Kiev *Rada*, under pressure of a Soviet threat to Kiev, relinquished their claims to Galicia and Bukovina, Hoffmann persuaded Czernin to accept the other conditions, including the demand for Kholm.

On 18 January the negotiations were temporarily interrupted. The Delegations left in quest of fresh instructions from their respective Governments. When after a few days they returned to Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky brought along with him new visitors: the representatives of the 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic' which had chosen Kharkov for its capital. Trotsky warned von Kühlmann and Czernin that the 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic' 'did not recognize any agreements which might be entered into by the *Rada*'.

The German and Austro-Hungarian Delegations came to the decision not to pay any attention to Trotsky's manœuvre. Hoffmann calmly noted in his diary: 'At any time we could support the Ukrainian Government and establish it again.'

On 1 February dissensions were renewed in Brest-Litovsk in a somewhat chaotic atmosphere. The Germans and Austrians had to carry on discussions with three Delegations at the same time: those of the Soviet Government, of the Ukrainian *Rada* and of the Ukrainian Soviet Government. The *Rada* Delegation produced the fourth 'Universal' from Kiev, according to which on 22 January the

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668 existence of 'a free and sovereign Ukraine' had been proclaimed.
●728 The Government of this new independent state had instructed its delegates to conclude peace 'without paying attention to any obstacles which might arise from other parts of the former Russian Empire'.

In the meantime, on 30 January, 'Red bands' commanded by Muraviëv had approached Kiev and had begun to bombard the city from the left bank of the Dniepr. During the session of 1 February Trotsky could not resist the pleasure of reading out a telegram which announced that some of the Ukrainian regiments of the *Rada* had gone over to the Bolsheviks, and which claimed that the days of the *Rada* were numbered. The Ukrainian delegates, Sevryuk and Lubinsky, responded with sharp denunciations of the Bolsheviks. 'Lubinsky retorted with an hour-long speech which for pure vitriolic opprobrium far exceeded anything that had been heard at this strangest of peace conferences' (Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, p. 210).

But Trotsky's triumph partook only of the theatre, for at the end of this same sitting Count Czernin announced the recognition by the Allied Empires of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' 'as an independent free and sovereign state'.

After this there remained only the technical side of the agreement with the Ukrainians. If Czernin and Kühlmann waited a few days longer it was only in the hope that the threat of a separate peace with the *Rada* might oblige Trotsky to come to his senses. On 8 February the principal clauses of a treaty were established. The basic condition was an obligation on the Ukraine to furnish not less than a million tons of supplies to the Allied Empires. To ensure the fulfilment of this condition an Austro-German Commission was to proceed to Kiev. But it had not been quite in vain that Trotsky had gloomily affirmed during these days that Czernin and Kühlmann were making an agreement with 'legally non-existent persons'. The battle for Kiev was taking place now in Kiev itself. After having signed peace with the Ukraine, Count Czernin wrote in his diary: 'I wonder if the *Rada* is still sitting in Kiev!'

On 10 February Trotsky made his famous declaration, 'Neither peace nor war', which caused Hoffmann to exclaim 'Unerhört!' The Soviet Delegation left Brest-Litovsk the same day. The only tangible result of all the negotiations had been the peace signed with the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic'. But Kiev had now been occupied by the Red Army; the *Rada* had fled to Zhitomir and was getting ready to flee farther west. The small detachments which had remained true to the *Rada* and which had been organized by Simon

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Petlyura (who had constituted himself a specialist in military affairs) were resisting fairly well in northern Podolia, but were certainly unable to secure the return of the *Rada* to Kiev. Trotsky's dramatic gesture had, however, simplified the problem. On 17 February the German Government denounced the armistice and ordered the armies of the Eastern Front to begin their advance. It was the only way of breaking the stubbornness of the Bolsheviks and of saving the *Rada* and the peace which it had signed with the promise of a million tons of supplies. (4, 5)

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§3. THE GERMANS IN THE UKRAINE: HETMAN SKOROPADSKY

On 18 February, the German troops, without meeting any resistance, occupied Dvinsk on the road to Petrograd and Lutsk on the road to Kiev.

But it was no easy matter for the Austrians to resume the offensive. The Austro-Hungarian armies had been broken during the first two years of the war in the great battles with the Russians; in 1917 it had only been with German aid that they had succeeded in throwing back the Italians. No danger from without threatened the Habsburg Monarchy, but within the Empire dangers were growing with each day that passed. Hence on 17 February the Vienna Government had informed Berlin that Austro-Hungarian troops would take no part in the renewal of the war on the Eastern Front.

In the meantime, the Poles and Bohemians were in a state of agitation on account of the cession of the Kholm region to the Ukrainians. When the twenty-nine year old 'student' Sevryuk, who had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Czernin and Kühlmann, made his appearance during a session of the Reichsrath on 19 February, Polish and Bohemian deputies met him with hoots and shouts of 'Clear out of here!' The Austro-Hungarian Government was compelled to put forward 'new conditions' in respect of Kholm.

The German troops continued their march through Volhynia in the direction of Kiev, and the Emperor Charles, fearful that the Austrians might fail to secure their share of the promised Ukrainian supplies, changed his mind. On 24 February the Austro-Hungarian divisions on the Eastern Front received the order to advance into the Ukraine. The Austrian decision had, however, already come too late, for on 1 March Kiev was occupied by the Germans and they alone reinstated the *Rada*.

By 3 March the rapid attainment by the Germans of the line Narva-Pskov and their seizure of the districts of Vitebsk, Mohilev

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642 728 and Homel, enabled Lenin to impose what he cynically described as his 'shameful peace' on his colleagues of the Soviets. Clause 6 of the Treaty obliged the Soviet Government 'to conclude peace at once with the Ukrainian People's Republic and to recognize the Treaty of Peace between that State and the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance'.

727 The occupation of the Ukraine was organized on the basis of a special agreement between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Germans left about 500,000 men on the whole of the Eastern Front. Of these, apart from the troops which were stationed in Poland and Lithuania to protect lines of communication, there were about 12 Infantry and 2 Cavalry Divisions occupying the Front against Soviet Russia from Narva to Homel (the 8th and 10th Armies). The remaining 15–16 Infantry and 4 Cavalry Divisions were quartered in the Ukraine (with the exception of a few battalions which were sent to Poti for the protection of the new Georgian Republic from Germany's ally Turkey). The troops in the Ukraine constituted the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* and consisted of the 1st and 20th Army Corps, the 27th (Saxon) and the 22nd and 41st Reserve Corps, together with several independent divisions and detachments. These troops had little in common with the magnificent German armies which had invaded Russia in the first years of the war. The *Heeresgruppe Kiev* contained a veritable mosaic of different battalions—the majority of which consisted of elderly men belonging to Landwehr and Landsturm formations. During the whole period of the German occupation of the Ukraine there was a continuous process of transfer of single battalions and even of small detachments to the Western Front—and this became more noticeable after 8 August, the day which may be said to have marked the turning-point in France. Only the Cavalry Divisions and Artillery approached the standards of the German armies which had formerly been held on the Russian Front. Thus the legend that the military occupation of the Ukraine was 'a mistake', in the sense that important forces were engaged there which might have been decisively employed on the Western Front, seems to be without foundation. Out of all the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* it would have been difficult to select three or four fighting infantry divisions, and less could have been found among the miscellaneous collection of elderly and invalid troops which constituted the so-called 8th and 10th Armies.

The Austro-Hungarian forces in the Ukraine amounted nominally to 250,000 men; but their total in reality was far below this and the number of deserters grew every day.

The Germans from the first began to play the leading role in Kiev.

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But if the Occupation authorities were not much interested in the *Rada*, they could not help being interested in the Government which depended upon the *Rada* and which had undertaken, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, to procure supplies and raw materials for Germany and Austria. In order to comply with the formalities of diplomatic etiquette, the all-important clause of the Treaty had been worded in a somewhat vague and delicate way. Clause 7 ran as follows: 'The contracting parties mutually undertake to enter into economic relations without delay and to organize the exchange of goods on the basis of the following stipulations: until 31 July of the current year a reciprocal exchange of the surplus of their most important agricultural and industrial products for the purpose of meeting current requirements.' It proceeds to lay down that 'the quantities and classes of products shall be decided in the future by a special mixed commission'. It had only been in private conversations between the respective Delegations that the million tons had been mentioned.

The energetic and experienced Groener was entrusted with the realization of Clause 7, and for this purpose he established in Kiev the *Deutsche Ukrainische Kaufmännische Wirtschaftstelle*. This institution elaborated a detailed and rational mode of action. The Mixed Commission set up under the Peace Treaty sat for a long time before it could assess the classes and quantities of goods to be extracted from the Ukraine. At last, on 8 April, a Protocol was signed which formed a special Appendix to the Peace Treaty, and according to which the Government of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' undertook to send to Germany and Austria-Hungary a million tons of grain, 400 million eggs, cattle to the weight of about 46,000 tons, a great number of horses, a considerable quantity of coal, manganese, fodder, sugar, lard, etc. After the Protocol was signed it was not long before it became apparent that the theoretical calculations of General Groener would not be easy to realize in practice.

Field-Marshal Eichhorn himself gave vent to his scepticism when he grumbled that 'the whole trouble is that we have to treat this Ukraine as a friendly country'. But Baron Mumm hastened to retort: 'In my opinion it is absolutely necessary to keep up the fiction that the Ukraine is a friendly and independent country; otherwise we shall completely destroy the already shaky authority of the *Rada*.' General Hoffmann had no great confidence in all the methodical plans of General Groener and expressed the view that it would have been much better to have entrusted the whole business to Jewish intermediaries. By March, instead of the promised 300 train-loads of grain, only one train had arrived for Vienna and one for Buda-

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728 439 Pest. In April the situation somewhat improved, but it was evident that there was no hope of receiving by the end of July any substantial proportion of the goods which had been stipulated under the Peace Treaty. It became clear that the enthusiastic delegates of the 'Popular Republic' had greatly exaggerated the agricultural wealth of their country. They had had in view 'potential possibilities', but they had quite failed to take into account the actual state of affairs in the spring of 1918. During the whole of the preceding year agrarian disorders had been taking place. The peasants had appropriated lands, and the countryside had been swarming with ex-soldiers who had completely lost their morale and who, although they had quitted the front, had no wish whatever to return to peaceful occupations. Under such conditions the harvest of 1917 had not been gathered as it would have been in normal times; and, furthermore, no one knew to whom what had actually been gathered really belonged. The cattle of the landowners had been in great part slaughtered or driven off when the Red Guards made their appearance in the Ukraine during the winter of 1917; the sugar factories were standing idle. At the same time, the well-to-do peasants had quickly learned to hide their grain and other produce, and they were no more willing to deliver to the Germans than they had been to the Bolsheviks.

As a result of all this, during the whole period of the Occupation, the Germans only succeeded in exporting 9293 wagon-loads of grain; 23,195 wagon-loads of fodder, sugar, cattle, eggs and other products; and 4567 wagon-loads of minerals (coal, manganese)—as a whole 37,000 wagons under the auspices of the *Wirtschafistelle* and 5000 through 'private initiative'. This tonnage amounted to scarcely a fifth part of what had been expected before 31 July 1918. And even the quantities which Germany succeeded in securing were delivered after the Government of the *Rada* had given place to that of Hetman Skoropadsky, and for the most part during the first three months of the later régime.

[642] 727 The failure of the *Rada* in 'the economic collaboration' with the Germans was the reason for its downfall. When the Germans came into the Ukraine their inspection of stocks of supplies not only revealed the relative scarcity of these stocks but also the chaotic state of Ukrainian economy at that moment. The estates of the landowners had almost completely disappeared, and the peasants had appropriated the land. This action of the agrarian proletariat had, however, received no legal sanction, and the *Rada* had not yet elaborated any land laws. To the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* the practical and not the legal state of affairs was important. Field-Marshal Eichhorn therefore issued an 'Order to the Ukrainian popu-

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

occupied Lvov, and advanced on Warsaw through Zamość by the same route which the Cossack hordes of Khmelnytsky had followed nearly three centuries before. But the Russians were checked at the gates of Warsaw (15 August), and their subsequent retreat was almost as rapid as their advance and the preceding Polish advance and retreat had been. 721 669

On 12 October an armistice was signed, and in the following year the Peace of Riga was to stabilize conditions on the Russian borderlands for nearly twenty years. Poland retained most of the Ukrainian territory of which she had been in occupation prior to the attack on Kiev—large parts of Volhynia and Polesia as well as about half the area of White Russia. The much disputed Kholm district and all Galicia also remained in Polish hands, although the temporary occupation of these territories had only been authorized by the Paris Conference 'pending the solution of the Russian Question'. As a result of the activities of the tenacious Petlyura and the visionary politicians of the 'Directoria' the Poles received, therefore, about 150,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory and about 5,000,000 Ukrainian-speaking subjects. 728

Simon Petlyura, like so many of the picturesque figures of the Russian Revolution, retired to Paris where, some years later, he was killed by a revolver shot in the Boulevard St Michel. The shot was fired by a young Jew named Schwartzbrod, who stated at his trial that he was taking vengeance on Petlyura for the pogroms committed by the 'Petlyurians'. (8, 9, 10)

§6. THE SOVIETS AND THE GROWTH OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

'The Ukrainian Soviet Republic' had been declared on 18 December 1918 in a proclamation of 'the Military and Revolutionary Committee of the Red Southern Army' signed by Stalin and Rakovski; the proclamation conferred all authority in 'the liberated territory' on 'the Ukrainian workers and the Ukrainian peasants'. On 3 January 1919, the day on which the Red Army entered Kharkov, then still occupied by part of the 1st German Army Corps, a proclamation of 'the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' announced that all authority in the Ukraine was vested in this Committee which had 'the confidence of the working and peasant masses'. This document was signed by the President of the Committee, Manuilsky, and by the following members: Rakovski, Grinko, Zatonsky and Skrypnik. Rakovski was a professional revolutionary, a Bulgarian or Roumanian Jew by origin, 642 669 635

the control of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and the Rada, it abolished 186
all Ukrainian newspapers and its disorderly elements not only 642
executed members of the Ukrainian and Russian bourgeoisie but 665
also Ukrainian Communists and radicals who used the Ukrainian language in their hearing.

In the meantime the Bolsheviks had opened negotiations with 648
the Germans in Brest-Litovsk where Trotsky claimed to speak for 186
the entire former Russian Empire. To circumvent this, the Rada 642
formally declared the full independence of Ukraine and sent dele- 665
gates to the peace conference. As a balance to this, Trotsky intro- [728]
duced into the conference the representatives of this new Ukrainian Soviet Republic who claimed to be the spokesmen for the Ukrainian peasants and proletariat. Their arguments did not convince the Germans and Austrians, who saw greater possibilities of profit by recognizing the Ukrainian National Republic, so as to secure without fighting a large part of the Ukrainian grain supplies. The Ukrainian National Republic signed this agreement with misgivings, for, in fact, it threw the Rada into the power of the Germans and ended all chance of assistance from the Allied democratic powers which had previously regarded Lenin as the tool of the German General Staff. Now, with the conclusion of this peace, they extended their ill-will to the Ukrainian Central Rada.

The immediate result was German assistance to the Rada and the Soviet forces were quickly forced out of Ukraine and back into Great Russian territory. The leaders of the Ukrainian Soviet government were members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and could not raise the question as to whether or not their new state was actually independent, and whether it could be, if it did not have its own Communist Party associated on a par with the Russian Party in the Communist International.

This brief Communist interlude in Ukraine should have been most instructive to both the Allied powers and the Germans, but neither drew the true lessons from it. The Allies, who were still opposed to the principles of Bolshevism and were annoyed by the speeches of Zinovyev and Chicherin, became more friendly disposed to the Russian Whites and gave up their efforts to win through

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

After the expulsion of the Soviet Forces from Western Ukraine in 1920, the territory, including Eastern Galicia and Lviv, had remained under Polish rule and had been subjected to a policy of Polonization and colonization by a Polish population. There had been during the period between the wars many clashes and much unpleasantness between the two nationalities and the ill will thus generated promised disastrous consequences for Poland in case of a new war. At the same time the Polish domination had never threatened the fundamental forms of Ukrainian social life, as had been the case in the UkSSR; the Ukrainians had a certain representation in the Polish Parliament, and they had been allowed, despite hindrances, to develop their own economic life. With the possible exception of the one district of Boryslav, there was very little Communism among the population, who were well aware of the handicaps under which their brothers in the UkSSR were living. At the same time the Nazi refusal to support the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine in the spring of 1939 had placed them on their guard against the Nazis. 636 563

Thus, when World War II broke out on September 1, 1939, the revolt of the Ukrainians which many Poles expected did not take place. However, the Polish government in the first days arrested and placed in concentration camps many of the Ukrainian leaders but they were freed by the rapid advance of the German forces and the Polish retreat, which forced into Lviv and the neighborhood many thousands of refugees. [661] [726]

On August 23, 1939, when the Nazis and the Soviets signed a non-aggression treaty, it was provided that if Poland were disintegrated, Germany and the USSR would divide the territory 728

● 728 roughly along the line of the Narev, the Vistula, and the San. This gave to the USSR the bulk of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian territories included in pre-war Poland and Germany also expressed her disinterest in the fate of Bukovyna and Bessarabia, where there was a Ukrainian population under Rumanian rule.

The collapse of the Polish forces before the German onslaught was so rapid that by September 17, 1939, the city of Lviv was practically in German hands. Then the Soviets, hiding their aggressive designs under the pretext that they were liberating their Ukrainian and Byelorussian brothers from the rule of the Polish lords and capitalists, declared that the Polish government had come to an end and that the Red Army was crossing the Polish border to restore and unite the population with the Soviet republics. At the approach of the Red Armies the Germans withdrew, and Lviv and the old Eastern Galicia remained in Soviet hands.

The Soviet army had advanced with either anti-Polish or anti-capitalist slogans without any opposition, but it was met with little real enthusiasm, for the Western Ukrainians were apprehensive as to what the future might bring. Some of the more openly anti-Communist leaders dropped out of sight or made their way into German-occupied territory. The bulk of the population remained passive, for they remembered the Russian invasion of 1914 and knew what those Ukrainians who had cooperated suffered when the Austro-Hungarian government returned the next year, and they could not believe that this time the Soviets would be any more fortunate.

The first days of the occupation were devoted to a conscious Ukrainization of the territory. The bulk of the population assisted in rounding up of the Polish police and security forces which had made themselves objectionable during the Polish domination, and without any hesitation unfurled the old Ukrainian blue and yellow national flag. The co-operation of the old Ukrainian political leaders was politely rejected but there was a large number of young, educated Ukrainians without special political experience whose aid was welcomed.

ooo The old newspapers ceased at once to appear, but the new

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

The old newspapers ceased at once to appear[1] but the new occupants started in all of the main cities new Communist newspapers as the *Free Ukraine* in Lviv and the *Soviet Ukraine* in Stanyslaviv. They allowed also a Communist Polish newspaper the *Red Flag* and a similar paper in Yiddish. 728 [204]

The old officials were at first encouraged to return to their posts, whether they were Polish or not but in a very short time they began to disappear and they were replaced by Ukrainian-speaking persons, some from the neighborhood and some from eastern Ukraine. At almost the same time, while preparations were begun for the proposed plebiscite, the authorities quietly picked up and incarcerated most of the old political leaders, especially those of the UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic League, the representatives of those parties that had sought a normalization of relations with the Poles. [661]

In the same slow and unobstrusive way the Polish police of the different cities were replaced by a "national militia." This was composed of armed groups of young men who more or less volunteered for the work of maintaining order. The Ukrainian and the Jewish organizations tried to bring these self-appointed groups under control but this proved a difficult task for, in many cases, the new Soviet authorities had encouraged some of the more lawless and tumultuous elements to undertake the work so as to profit themselves by the resultant chaos and to facilitate the calling in of their own people. [625]

This era of anxiety on the part of the population and of extreme moderation on the part of the occupying forces lasted for almost a month, while preparations were being made for the election of representatives of all organizations, factories, and groups to a National Assembly for the consideration of reunion with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Meetings were held everywhere, at which attendance was compulsory, and everywhere there was expressed by selected speakers the gratitude of the people for their liberation from the Polish lords and the imperialistic capitalists. Khrushchov and other high functionaries arrived from Kiev to conduct these elections and to superintend the preparation of the lists of delegates. Yet it was almost at once noted that while there 728 666

[1] [1939, Russian occupation of Poland -- Analyst]

728 666 were a few well-known persons on the various lists of delegates, the vast majority were either completely unknown or were definitely recognized as representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic or of the occupying forces.

The election on October 22[1] was carried on in the regular Bolshevik fashion with no opportunity for any choice of candidates. Over 90% of the people were marshalled to the polls and it was made clear that they had no choice but to approve the selected list. The response was, of course, practically unanimous and the next step was then in order.

728 [185] On October 26[1] the National Assembly met in Lviv. The delegates, acting under definite orders, elected a presidium which included Stalin and the officials of the UkSSR. The first act was to pass a resolution of gratitude to Stalin and the Soviet leaders for their liberation of the country. Then there were a few laudatory speeches and the resolution was adopted to apply for membership in the USSR, to nationalize trade, industry and the banks, to divide the land of the state, the large landowners and the church among the landless and poor peasants, and to send a delegation to Kiev and Moscow to ask for the incorporation.

All this was a cut and dried performance to satisfy the Communist love of paper democracy and to justify their occupation of the country under the guise of liberation. There was no discussion allowed and once again the resolution was accepted unanimously.

On November 1[1] the selected delegation met Stalin, and the Presidium of the USSR in Moscow formally welcomed the liberated brothers and annexed their territory to the UkSSR. It was noteworthy that the action of Moscow completely overshadowed any reception at Kiev but this was only natural in view of the nature of the entire enterprise. There were none of those demonstrations that had marked the union of the two sections in the Ukrainian National Republic in 1919, when the vote and the union represented the will of the people.

Once these formalities had been accomplished, the Soviets felt free to act and, at a steadily increasing tempo, they went through in a few months a refined version of what they had accomplished

[1] [1939 -- Analyst]

in the eastern Ukraine in the course of twenty years. At first their 728 ●
actions were moderate but with the passage of time they began to develop and to reveal those tendencies which had marked their course in the east.

The first task was the reorganization of the country geographically. On September 28,[1] they had come to a new agreement with [648]
the Germans, whereby Germany had given up her claims to Lithuania in return for the area between the San and the Buh Rivers. So the Soviets assigned Wilno and its territory to an independent Lithuania; they annexed the region further south to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the rest to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This left to the Germans four sections of Western Ukraine, Kholmshchyna, Pidlyashshya, Posannya, and Lemkivshchyna, which were included in the Polish Government General and were governed directly by the Nazis, who allowed the appointment of a Ukrainian Central Committee to represent the Ukrainians before the higher authorities, especially in question of relief, etc.

The Soviet territory[2] was divided into six districts with their 728
centres at Lviv, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil, Rivne and 631
Lutsk. Each of these was then divided into rayons or regions with about 25,000 population. The centres of these regions were often small towns but the division was made quite arbitrarily and each centre was amply provided with bureaucratic machinery.

The economic condition of the country was extremely bad and [433]
the only saving feature was that the harvest had already been gathered, so that there was a good chance for a large part of the agricultural population, even of the poor, to survive during the winter. Yet the influx of refugees fleeing before the German advance filled the cities and the severance of connections with the west prevented the arrival of any more manufactured goods or supplies and, of course, none came from the east.

On the contrary, there came a new swarm of Soviet officials who 436
were themselves amazed at the wealth of goods in what, to the natives, seemed impoverished markets. They brought with them liberal sums of money to buy whatever they wished and they were

[1] [1939 -- Analyst]
[2] [of occupied Poland -- Analyst]

in 1939, now received a new master. As soon as the Soviet forces 728
entered the region in the autumn of 1944, they immediately began 648
a campaign to liberate this area from Czecho-Slovakia and reunite it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It was the same old story carried on in the same way as in 1939. There was a mass of petitions apparently prepared by the native population asking for liberation, but these were in reality the work of a handful of carefully selected Communists.

They speedily reached their goal and on June 29, 1945, President Benes of Czechoslovakia recognized the justice of their claims and by an agreement handed over the entire province which was duly reunited with their brothers in Moscow. This brought together under the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic nearly all the Ukrainians, except a few who were still living in Poland and in a small stretch of territory which the UkSSR voluntarily ceded to Poland to satisfy the increasing claims of the Polish Communists and their needs in their efforts to cement their power in that state.

At the same time the realization by the Soviet authorities of the seriousness of the situation offered by the U. P. A. and the unrest among the Ukrainians led them to act on both the foreign and the domestic front. On the former they mobilized all of their [208]
friends and dupes abroad to stress the connection of the U. P. A., [725]
the "Bandera bandits," and the Nazi criminals, and they achieved considerable success in closing the eyes of the west until they had won considerable victories over the various U. P. A. groups, for too many Western leaders failed to see the inconsistency that they preached. At one and the same time the Soviet authorities boasted of their complete control of the territory of Western Ukraine, thanks to the love of the population for the Red Army and in almost the same breath they declaimed against these armed forces which were holding up the advance of the Red Army and the NKVD in the very areas where the people were thirsting for liberation.

On the domestic front in the autumn of 1945 they sent a large 661
force of men into the Carpathian area under the command of 668
Khrushchov as Premier of the UkSSR and General Ryasny, the 725

000 in an ideal organization. Stalin, by his policy in the thirties, blew away that mirage but it required a World War for him to annihilate it.

Soon after the Germans attacked, Stalin dissolved the Comintern to please his Western allies and to dupe them. He substituted the Slav Congress and when he secured the assent of the Big Three to liberate the Slavs, he highly developed this.

186 As the Red Army, now transformed by fiat of the Council of
● 728 Commissars of the USSR into the Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies, "liberated" one Slav capital after another, they were followed by cultural missions who talked to the enthusiastic multitudes on the Slav Brotherhood of Nations in terms of 1848, Peter, the Third Rome and Stalin. Rylsky and Tychyna, Korniychuk and Yanovsky, all the outstanding Ukrainian writers who had yielded to the Russian cause and survived the purges, spoke. They praised the new situation and the democratic powers admired this.

665 It was only a sham because soon there was established the Cominform. Its seat was not in Moscow but its spirit was there. The object of the Cominform was not to create a new and equal gathering of Communist humanity, not the ostensible idea of the Comintern but it was to inform the Communists among the Slavs and elsewhere of the approach to Communism by the elder Communists of the world, the Muscovite Great Russians.

In the purely cultural sphere the answer was the condemnation
[538] of formalism, and still more of internationalism. Formalism was a technical school of literary criticism which had contributed something to the study of literature and culture. It was an attempt to put technique above content, or rather to judge content by technique and its advocates, sometimes great scholars in a narrow field, basked in the light of the admiration of their friends, until they considered themselves great.

814 Internationalism was something else. Its content had been ex-
665 pressed by the Protopope Avvakum in 1666 when he announced at his trial in Moscow that all Orthodox Christians had to come to Moscow to learn. Now it was the same. History was to be periodicized between A. M. and P. M. (Ante Muscoviae and Post

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

648 While awaiting further developments, Poland occupied herself with the Ukraine.

While the Polish sympathies of Petlioura became more precise, an important, if not the best, part of his troops, recruited among the Galicians of the former Austrian regiments, united, in November 1919, with the Russian Volunteer Army. Later the Galician Army was involved in the general collapse of the Whites. But it had tried the only chance of rescuing the Western Ukraine from Polish domination. Petlioura, safe behind Polish bayonets, appeared as an instrument completely in the service of the new Poland and of her chief, Marshal Pilsudski.

728 648 In December 1919 the representative of Petlioura signed, in the name of the Ukraine, a first declaration which recognized the Polish sovereignty over Galicia, Podolia, and Volynia, a declaration which, on 21 April 1920, was supplemented by a secret treaty of alliance according to the terms of which the popular Ukrainian Republic confirmed the cession to the complete sovereignty of Poland of these lands, in all more than 150,000 square kilometres with almost six million inhabitants, in return for the recognition of Petlioura by Poland as chief of the Ukrainian Government. Poland promised, amongst other things, to support the creation of a Ukrainian State, which had become very small and only included a very narrow territory between the new Polish frontier, very advanced to the east, and the old Polish-Russian frontier of the time before the first partition. This secret treaty was supplemented by a military agreement, which was signed three days later. Its terms guaranteed the formation of allied Ukrainian units, which would be under Polish command, in the territory ceded to the Poles. The railways of the Ukrainian territory were to be entirely at the disposal

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

of the Polish troops. No more than the secret convention did the military treaty foresee Polish help, except in the Ukraine on the right bank, which alone interested the Poles. The authors of these agreements were so well aware of the incompatibility of this treaty with the national sentiments of the Ukrainian people that they never dared to publish these acts. Even the members of the Directorate, apart from a few exceptions, were not informed of it. It is only in 1926 that this document was published by Professor S. Cheloukhine, a Ukrainian monarchist and former President of the Law Tribunal of Odessa under the Tsars.

After the signature of the military treaty on 7 May 1920 the Polish troops, followed by Petlioura, entered Kiev. The Polish domination over a large part of the Ukraine seemed re-established. But soon the divisions of the Red Cavalry, commanded by Boudenny,[1] marched towards the east and the Ukrainian peasants, despite their dislike of the Soviet regime, supported them with all means. The former Commander-in-Chief of the south-western front at the time of the Tsar, General Broussilov, proclaimed a national war against Poland and published an appeal to which, raised by a wave of patriotism, many thousands of Tsarist officers replied, though they would never have, till then, agreed to serve in the Soviet Army. We will be unable to study the details of the Russo-Polish War which saw Poland escape from disaster at the decisive battle under the walls of Warsaw.

After the defeat of Warsaw, Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Riga in 1921 and abandoned to Poland that Ukrainian territory which had been ceded to her by Petlioura—Eastern Galicia, Western Volynia, and Polesia. There can be no doubt that only the Soviet

[1] Former Cavalry Adjutant, to-day Marshal of the Soviet Union and Commander-in-Chief of the Moscow Military district.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

728 Government, hostile in principle to everything connected with Russian national tradition, could put its signature on such a document, considered as an even greater national humiliation than the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Ukrainian separatist movement, doubly compromised by its agreements with the central empires and with Poland, foundered as a result of general contempt.

648 728 Soon the Allied Powers recognized the Polish domination over the whole of Galicia, at first as a temporary measure. It became definite on 15 March 1923. Poland agreed to establish an autonomous regime here, but this promise had never been honoured. From this date, too, Poland exercised her absolute power over a considerable part of the Ukrainian people.

000 The Soviet attitude to the Ukrainian question at that time is not of great interest and does not furnish new factors which could throw new light on the problem.

If Soviet policy with regard to this problem seems confused and inconsequent, this is so because it is not determined by a firm and well-established point of view, but by two factors which are outside this question: by the reaction of the Ukrainian population to the 'social experience' to which it is subjected and by the attitude of Germany and Poland to the Ukrainian problem.

642 Immediately after the establishment of Soviet rule on Ukrainian territory, and in full agreement with Marxist theories, the right of peoples to determine their own fate was proclaimed and naturally also affected the Ukraine, as every other member of the Soviet Union. Thus the Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine was founded. The Constitution even gave it the official right of ceding from the U.S.S.R. This is the official aspect. In practice the Ukraine became an integral part of the Soviet Union and completely dependent on the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

669 indignation was caused by the bloody Communist terror that took thousands of innocent people as its victims. The war of Soviet Russia against Ukraine and the terror by the Russian 'Red Guards' in Ukraine, still strengthened among the Ukrainians the will to fight for their national independence. This was expressed in an essay by the President of the Ukrainian Central Council, Professor Hrushevsky, the most authoritative personality of Ukrainian political life of that time. Hrushevsky wrote:

186

"The first matter I have to lay stress on is that from now, in our relations with Moscow, a radical change has taken place. It is vain to look for a possibility of living with the Russians in the boundaries of one state. We had sincerely believed that in a new Russia the Ukrainian nation could find the necessary conditions for its manifold development. Now we have lost this belief. We have convinced ourselves that our ways differ from those of a reactionary or a revolutionary Russia. After the unprecedented barbaric atrocities of the Russian Bolsheviks against the Ukrainian people, after the cruel shelling of the Ukrainian capital by the Soviet Russian troops, in our relations with Russia a new period begins. Ukraine has to continue her struggle for liberation in order to create an independent state. Our social and political ideals must be based not on the examples of oriental despotism, but on the principles of the life and development of civilised Europe, where, before all, human dignity is valued. Ukraine has always stood in her history culturally and politically nearer to Western Europe. If we want to liberate ourselves from foreign violence, we have to conform to the civilised West" (*On the Threshold of New Ukraine:* Kiev, 1918).

8. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

●728 The Soviet Russian Government had by its ruthless propaganda for an immediate peace treaty definitely disorganised the front against the Central Powers. Thus the representatives of the Ukrainian Government took part in the peace negotiations with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk. The diplomats of the Central Powers gave the Ukrainian Government in the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegates various facilities in order to secure a 'grain treaty' with Ukraine. For the food situation of the Central Powers at that time was fatal. The peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers was concluded in Brest-Litovsk on February 9, 1918. As at that time a great part of Ukraine was occupied by the Soviet Russian troops, it was in the interest of the Central Powers to interrupt the export of grain to Russia, and to use the food

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728
Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669
of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrai- 665
nian territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185
Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed
simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agricul- 423
ture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discon- [563]
tent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727
exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The represen- 565
tatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

tories that had been formerly under Russian and Austrian rule. 186
The Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic issued a 642
special Act on January 22, 1919, in Kiev which declared:

"From this day, the parts of Ukraine — the Western-Ukrainian Democratic Republic, Galicia, Bukovina and Hungarian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) and the Great Ukraine on the Dnieper, unite. The ancient hopes which the best sons of Ukraine had lived and died for become reality. From now there is one indivisible independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic".

Relying on this Act, the delegation from Western Ukraine, numbering 65 people, took part in the Congress of Ukraine which had been called to Kiev on January 23, 1919.

The Western-Ukrainian Republic, from the first days of its [726]
existence, had to fight in a heavy struggle against the Poles who 728
pretended to rule in Galicia even after the dissolution of Austria. The Poles invaded the Western Ukrainian Republic after having concentrated large forces on this front. The Ukrainian Government asked the Entente Powers and the Paris Peace Conference for mediation in the Polish-Ukrainian war. In February 1919, a Mission of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia headed by the French General Berthélemy, and with the participation of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy. This Mission presented to the Poles and Ukrainians a plan for an armistice on February 28, 1919. According to this plan, until the final decision of the Peace Conference, the territory of Galicia eastwards of the Bug and Stryj Rivers should remain under Ukrainian administration, while the Western part of Galicia should be administered by the Polish authorities. The Galician territory which remained under Ukrainian administration should be recognised by the Big Powers 'de facto' as an independent state, and the Ukrainian Army should be recognised and trained with the assistance of the Entente Powers. The Ukrainian Government did not accept the demarcation line proposed by the Mission of General Berthélemy as unfavourable for Ukraine. In May 1919, a new Mission of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia, headed by General Botha (South Africa). General Botha's Mission altered the previous armistice draft, and the Ukrainian Government agreed to accept it. However, the Poles rejected this plan.

The small country — Ukrainian Galicia — had to strain all her 726
forces in order to hold the front against the whole might of Poland. From Eastern Ukraine Galicia could not receive any considerable help, because the Ukrainian forces had to fight the Skoropadsky

the Ukrainian partisan movement. New requisitions of grain and the taking of arms from the population caused an even greater disappointment among the Ukrainians. The partisan movement which had overthrown Denikin's power turned with new vigour against the Russian Communists. These risings were carried on under the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of arms and supplies did not permit the Ukrainian partisan movement to develop and to attain decisive results in the struggle with the overwhelming forces of the Russian Red Armv. 669 661

17. Poland — Ukraine — Russia 1920—21

At the end of 1919, the regular front of the Ukrainian Army broke down. The Ukrainian Army continued the fight against 'White' and 'Red' Russia as guerilla war. The diplomatic Mission of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic headed by Andriy Liwycky, Cabinet member, started negotiations with the Polish Government about the relations between Poland and Ukraine. The consequence of these negotiations was a Convention signed in Warsaw on April 21, 1920. In that time the Government of the Ukrainian Republic headed by Isaac Mazepa was remaining in Ukraine. 648 669 728

According to this Convention a new frontier between Ukraine and Poland was established: those Ukrainian territories Poland had seized in 1919 in the war with the Ukrainians (Galicia, Volhynia etc.) remained on the Polish side. The Polish Government undertook to support the restoration of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic on the territories occupied by Soviet Russia.

The war of Poland and Ukraine against Soviet Russia, which was carried on with changing fortunes did not bring the expected results to the Ukrainians. The Polish leaders thought it more advantageous for themselves to come to an agreement with Soviet Russia after having divided the Ukrainian territories with Moscow (Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921). Poland recognised in Riga the Government of the 'independent' Soviet Ukraine and broke off diplomatic relations with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army which in fighting against the overwhelming Russian forces, had entered Polish territories together with the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1920) was interned. The soldiers of this army, who had fought against Soviet Russia not only for Ukraine but for Poland alike, were placed by the Polish Government in camps in such conditions that many of them died there, or acquired serious diseases.

563 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the
423 Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the
474 big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the masses of the people. It should be pointed out that between the Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR.
661 The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

[2. In Western Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

though this population had accepted in a friendly manner the Soviet 728
rule, hoping for an improvement of their situation. When Rumania 661
in alliance with Germany joined the war against USSR in 1941, the [726]
Rumanian authorities on their part terrorised the Ukrainian population of Bukovina and Bessarabia. At the end of the war Bukovina and Bessarabia were joined with USSR again. The Communist terror turned with even greater vehemence against the Ukrainians there. Especially from Bukovina a great part of the Ukrainian population had been deported into the Eastern regions of the USSR. The cities were filled with foreign elements, colonists from Russia were brought into the villages.

3. The Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine)

After 1919 Carpatho-Ukraine, which had been for centuries 563
under Hungarian rule, was attached to Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian population of this country consists mostly of peasants. The towns had a Jewish and Hungarian population. The Czech authorities in Carpatho-Ukraine (official name Carpatho-Ruthenia) favoured for some time the development of Ukrainian schools. But [191]
from 1925 the Prague Government began to support the Russophile group that despised the Ukrainian language as 'peasant' and used a strange mixture of the Church-Slavonic, Ukrainian, and Russian languages. In reality, these 'Russophiles' were adherents of Hungary and received support from Budapest too. The entire administration in Carpatho-Ukraine came into the hands of the Czech bureaucracy. According to the Treaty of Saint Germain, Carpatho-Ukraine was guaranteed autonomy inside the boundaries of CSR, but the Czechoslovakian Government permanently deferred its realisation.

At the end of 1938 Germany launched strong pressure against Czechoslovakia exploiting the national problem of this country, (Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians). The Prague Government changed the centralistic Constitution to a federative one. For the Carpathian Ukraine the Prague Government recognised an autonomous statute with a separate Diet and Government. Against this the neighbour states — Hungary and
Poland — reacted vehemently. In February 1939, the elections to 642
the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine took place. After the separation of 726
Slovakia from Bohemia the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed the independence of this country (March 16, 1939). But with Hitler's and Mussolini's consent the Hungarian troops occupied Carpatho-Ukraine after stubborn fighting against the Ukrainian volunteers.

8: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 the Provisional Government. The idea of forming
642 part of a Russian federal republic was still powerful in the Rada; and on September 26, 1917, a conference of forty different nationalities had met at Kiev to discuss the question of local autonomies under a federal system. Preparations for a Constituent Assembly, which was to include 22 members from the Ukraine and 17 from the Don Cossacks, were set on foot; while propaganda was carried on by the ultra-nationalists and the internationalists, i.e. the Soviets, with a view to boycotting the Russian Constituent Assembly.

642 In November 1917, after Kerenski's Government had been replaced by the Bolshevik Soviets, the Ukraine on the whole was much more in favour of the latter than were the Don Cossacks, who formed on November 9 a confederation of a more conservative character. To save its position among the masses, the Rada underwent a rapid process of evolution, and on November 20 published a *Universale* of a radical character. It proclaimed the 'Ukrainian People's Republic', abolished all private ownership of land, introduced State control of production and an eight-hour day in all factories, removed the death penalty from the statute book, and finally expressed a hope that the Ukrainian National Republic would be federated with the Russian Republic. By doing this the Rada hoped to check Soviet interference; it failed to do so; and from December 19 serious differences between the Rada and the Soviet Government in
642 Petrograd became apparent. The Soviet Government
● 728 at Petrograd accused the Rada of giving support to the Cadets and of siding with the Don Cossacks in their hostility to the Bolsheviks; while the Rada declared itself a body elected by Revolutionary Democrats in the Ukraine, and refused to co-operate with the Bolsheviks or to send delegates with them to Brest-Litovsk. It finally declared, on December 24, that, as the Russian army was disorganized, it would take military measures for the defence of its borders. Some of the Ukrainian forces mobilized at that time joined

the Russian armies on the Rumanian and south-western fronts. The Soviet Government therefore began to organize the Red Guards against the Rada, which by that time had completed its negotiations with Germany, and on December 27 had sent the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada to Brest-Litovsk. The delegation was composed of Hrushevski, Holubowich, Vinnitchenko, and Petlura, while the intermediary between them and the Austro-German authorities was Wassilko, a member of the Reichsrat and Count Czernin's adviser on Ukrainian affairs. 642 728

On January 11, 1918, the delegates of the Ukrainian Republic were formally recognized at Brest by the Central Powers. This recognition was interpreted by the Rada as meaning the recognition of Ukrainian independence. Vinnitchenko boasted that the French Government had made a gold loan and printed paper money for the Ukraine, and that the Western allies would soon recognize its independence. (The Allied Mission to the Ukraine, sent in December 1917, was interpreted by the Ukrainians as implying such a recognition.) But, while successful at Brest, the Rada's authority in Kiev was shaken by the frequent risings of the Ukrainians of the Soviets (especially at Odessa on January 17 and 28); and the Petrograd Soviets supported the latter, demanding that they should be represented in the Ukrainian delegation. On January 26 the Government at Petrograd broke off relations with the Rada, 'until it is replaced by a Rada of Soviets'. To strengthen its position at Brest, the Rada, on January 28, declared, by 508 votes to 4, for the complete independence of the Ukraine.

(*b*) *German Occupation.*—On February 9 the 'Bread' peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one hand, and the 'Ukrainian People's Republic' (the Rada) on the other. At the same time, however, the report arrived that the Rada had been suppressed by Soviet troops, who declared it to be 'but a sad memory'. On February 20 the British Chargé-d'affaires in Russia 727 642

175 The wars which broke out among the local princes after Monomakh's death belong to the darkest chapter in the history of the Kiyev Rus. Actually the kingdom ceased to exist. Nothing remained to hold it together, neither dynastic ties nor marauding expeditions, nor the church, which was powerless. For 35 years, from 1146 to 1181 there were ceaseless struggles for the throne
•728 of Kiyev, and an almost /Facing page 32/ /Map 1:
631 Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938. The Ukraine was divided between four states as a result of the Peace of Riga on March 18, 1921 between the Soviet Union and Poland, the transfer of Bessarabia to Rumania, and the edicts of St. Germain and Trianon. In the west Poland was given West Ukraine (Galicia and Volhynia), Carpatho-Ukraine passed from Hungary to Czechoslovakia, small parts of Carpatho-Ukraine, Bukovina and Bessarabia went to Rumania, while the major portion of Ukraine was left to the Soviet Union which established the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic on one part of Ukrainian national soil./ /Keys to the map: -.-.-. state boundaries, ——boundaries of the Soviet Republics, ---boundaries of the autonomous Soviet Republics, -..-..- boundaries of the autonomous territories, ... boundaries of the territories (oblasts), administration centers underlined./ /33/ uninterrupted war was waged for
175 sovereignty within the leading principality. The princes of Suzdal in the north waged the most bitter and brutal fight of all for supremacy. They whose descendants are to become the princes of Moscow do not shrink from an alliance with the khans of Polovtsi against Kiyev. More than once these hordes devastated the unfortunate country. Finally in 1155 Georgii Dolgorukov, Prince of Suzdal, was victorious over Kiyev, and fourteen years later the splendor of this city which had not seen its equal throughout eastern Europe melts away in the flare of Suzdal-Polovtsi pillage. (17)

17. Grushevskyj: History of the Ukraine, page 91.

11: Obermaier--30A J-3(no date)1942RD1 Ukraine RD1

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631

[Map I: Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938, cf. complete legend p. 30]

11: Obermaier--30B J3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

•728
631

[MAP 2 Ukraine at the beginning of the year 1938]

175 "miracle on the Vistula" took place: the Bol-
726 sheviks turned around and halted beyond the Sbrucz.

175 At the peace negotiations in Riga the part-
726 ners of Andrusov met after two and a half cent-
•728 uries for a partition of the Ukraine. The Russians conceded the Poles the western parts of Polesia, Volhynia and Podolia, Lublin and Podlakhia in the Riga Treaty of March 18, 1921. The protest of Petliura who was not admitted to the negotiations remained unheard. Was it blind hatred of the Bolsheviks, a commission of the Poles or burning patriotism, which, after this bitter disappointment, again drove him across the borders with a small band of followers? Whatever it is, the guerilla war which the ex-dictator unleashes in East Ukraine does not change anything in his country's fate, which was definitively sealed at Riga. /80/

175 Driven out of his home for the last time and
726 again disarmed by the Poles, he was nevertheless permitted to kindle rebellions in East Ukraine from within the Polish state. If the East Ukrainians bled to death and the Bolsheviks had internal difficulties, this could only please Warsaw. When the Bolsheviks finally cruelly quelled these uprisings - according to accounts in the Communist of February 23, 1923, 6000 groups of rebels were discovered and destroyed in 1921 -, Petliura, the ally of Pilsudski at the conquest of Kiyev, was now merely a troublesome foreigner in Poland. As such he was banished. /Facing page
728 80/ /Map V: The Ukraine Before the First World
631 War (1914). At the end of the eighteenth century the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom disintegrated. From that time on the main part of the Ukraine belonged to the Czar's realm. Parts of West Ukraine in so-called East Galicia and Bukovina, along with Chernovtsy went to Austria, Ukrainian territory in the Carpathians to Hungary./ /Key inside map: -.-.-. National boundaries. ...Provincial boundar-

[Ruthenians]

•728 ies in Austria and boundaries of the various gub-
631 ermyas in Russia./

/81/

Fair Play

186 In the winter of 1938/39 the Ukrainian peasants in Poland were no longer recognizable. If after the pacification of 1930 they went about for many years bent and timid like beaten dogs, they now carried their heads higher. It was as though they felt a fresh breeze, and whenever they had business with Polish officials they omitted expressions of due respect, in fact they became cynical. They stood around in groups, talked in the most animated fashion, nudged each other meaningfully and sometimes laughed out loud.

[186] What happened? Since the end of October
101 1938, there was the "Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy"
642 beyond the Carpathians. There on the southern slopes of the Carpathians live the Ukrainian tribes of Lemki, Boyki and the Huzul. On poor soil they eke out a precarious living as small farmers, woodsmen and shepherds. In the warmer season many of them hire themselves out as harvest workers in the fertile Hungarian lowlands, and there they also trade in carriage grease. Before the First World War they shipped salt to Warsaw and fruit even as far as Moscow. Ruthenia, as their little country was once called, always belonged to the Kingdom bearing the crown of Stephen. After the downfall of the Hapsburg monarchy Czech insatiability succeeded in having "Carpatho-Russia" - that is what Ruthenia was now called - assigned to the Czechs by the edict of Saint-Germain. The "autonomy" which the little country was promised on paper in the edict remained an unfulfilled dream for its inhabitants. "Carpatho-Russia" was a province abounding in forests, which Prague could and would exploit. It was only after the solution of the Sudeten

11: Obermaier--82A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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631

[Map IV: The Ukraine before the First world war (1914), cf. complete legend, pp. 81-82]

11: Obermaier--82B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

[Map V the Ukraine before the First World War (1914)]

[Galicia] [Volhynia]

668 railways or in the courts, to say nothing of their being made officers in the army. Private enterprises controlled by the state operate on the same principle. Of the 4000 Ukrainian teachers, one-fourth of them are scattered outside the Ukrainian national territory. Three-quarters of our intellectuals are unemployed. There is the additional fact that it is made impossible for our peasants to acquire land; even in cases where there is a partitioning of a large Ukrainian estate, the land is sold to Polish colonists. Our national banks and cooperatives get practically no credit and the little money lent to us is on a short-term basis. Moreover, the Polish government has created two frontier zones from which it can banish every Ukrainian without stating its reasons. In these frontier zones the voivode is sole ruler. Even the district captain can at any time dispossess any priest, teacher or a cooperative official whom he suspects of being nationalistic. In the end, the present

•728 /Facing page 88/ /Map VI: Ukraine in the Years 1917-20. At the end of the first World War the Ukrainian People's Republic was created and lasted for a short time. Finally, after involved struggles against three fronts, the Poles in the West, the Bolsheviks in the North and East and the troops of the reactionary generals Denikin and Wrangel, it perished./ /Keys inside: Region of the Ukrainian state. Temporary annexes. Boundaries of territory occupied by Ukrainian nationals. Boundaries of the predominantly Ukrainian zone./ /89/ appeasement actions which are being carried out exactly after the 1930 pattern, will force us to give up the normalization policy." (50)

50. Statements made by a leading member of the UNDO party in February, 1939.

11: Obermaier--90A J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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[Map VI: Ukraine in the years 1917-20, cf. complete legend, p. 90]

11: Obermaier--90B J-3 (no date) 1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

•728



[Map VI: Ukraine in the years 1917-20]

131 constituent autonomous republic, the Moldavian A.S.S.R.[1] On November 1,
[728] 1939, 88,000 square kilometres were added when Western Ukraine, which in 1920 had been annexed by Poland, was re-joined to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

131 Another 21,300 square kilometres were added in June 1940 when
728 Bessarabia (annexed by Rumania in 1918) and Northern Bukovina (another part of Rumania) also were incorporated, making the Ukraine's total area then about 579,000 square kilometres. However, a small decrease occurred in August 1940 when the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. granted the petition of the Moldavian people in Bessarabia to join with a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic to form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war the area of the Ukraine was 575,000 square kilometres (2½ per cent. of the territory of the Soviet Union); and the population was over 40 millions. After the addition of the Transcarpathian region in June 1945, the Ukraine's total area was 587,700 square kilometres; it is approximately the same today. The following table summarizes the changes in the area and population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. from 1939 to June 1941.

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635 The U.S.S.R. is composed of sixteen Union Soviet Socialist Republics.
642 Within this framework there exist a number of autonomous provinces, national regions and autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. Before August 1940 the Ukrainian S.S.R. included one autonomous republic, the Moldavian A.S.S.R. which was subsequently given full status and became the sixteenth Union Republic. According to Professor Trainin, the Soviet authority on legal questions, the main distinction between autonomous and union republics is that the latter are guaranteed the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. - a right which is not incorporated in the constitutions of the autonomous republics. Another difference regarding status is that whereas in the Soviet of Nationalities (one of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) every Union republic is represented by 25 deputies, the autonomous republic is represented by only 11.

TABLE I

Area and Population of the Ukrainian S.S.R., 1939-40

	Area (thousand square kilometres)	Population (millions)
131 161 Area Ukrainian S.S.R. January 1939	469.7	30.96
Territories added:		
Western Ukraine (added November 1939)	88.0	8.0
Part of Bessarabia	15.3	1.05
Northern Bukovina (both added June 1940)	6.0	0.5
	579.0	40.51
Territories transferred:		
Part of the Moldavian A.S.S.R. (together with part of Bessarabia, created the Moldavian S.S.R., August 1940)	3.9	0.31
Totals August 1940	575.1	40.20

Source : Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S.Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

● 728 131 162 In June 1945 the Transcarpathian Ukraine was ceded by Czechoslovakia to the Ukrainian S.S.R. This transfer added about 12,600 square kilometres area and a population of about 750,000. The details of the various cessions of territory are given below.

Soviet-Polish Frontiers

In the autumn of 1939, after the collapse of the Polish State and the occupation of Western Poland by German troops, the Soviet Government decided to take under its protection the life and property of the population of Eastern Poland, that is, Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, inhabited mainly by Ukrainians and Byelorussians. When they were seized by Poland in 1920, these territories were ethnographically and economically part of the Soviet Union. Their return to the Soviet Union increased the area and population of the Byelorussian S.S.R. by 108,000 square kilometres and 4.8 million inhabitants; and of the Ukraine, by 88,000 square kilometres and 8 million people.

In August 1945, a slight adjustment of frontiers took place between Poland and the Soviet Union. A treaty was signed which, in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference in February 1945, established the Polish-Soviet boundary roughly along the Curzon Line, with some deviations in favour of Poland. As a result of this, Poland was given back a small strip of the territory which had been incorporated in the Soviet Union in 1939.

000 Soviet Union in 1939.

101 In the years before its reunion with the Ukrainian S.S.R. Western Ukraine was relatively undeveloped, as compared with the industrial and agricultural expansion which was taking place in the Ukraine itself. The backwardness of Western Ukraine before its incorporation into the Soviet Union is shown by the following table, which compares per person output in 1938 of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with that of Western Ukraine.

TABLE II

433 Per Person Output of Western Ukraine and of Ukrainian S.S.R., 1938

	Western Ukraine	Ukrainian S.S.R.
Electro power (kilowatt hours)	13.05	305
Cement (kilograms)	12.2	39.7
Bricks (pieces)	17.0	50.3
Sugar (kilograms)	5.9	58.9
Soap (kilograms)	0.5	2.58

Source : Planned Economy, State Planning Commission, Moscow, 1940.

Transfer to the U.S.S.R. of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina

728 On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Government communicated with the Rumanian Minister in Moscow concerning Bessarabia[1]. In 1918, said the communication, Rumania, "taking advantage of the military weakness of Russia....(seized) a part of her territory, namely, Bessarabia, which is principally occupied by Ukrainians..." The Soviet Government, never having recognized any justice in Rumania's claims to Bessarabia, demanded the immediate return of this territory to the Soviet Union. The communication also stated that "... the return of Bessarabia is organically connected with the question of the return to the Soviet Union of that part of the Bukovina the majority of whose population is connected with the Soviet Union not only through the community of their historic destinies but through the similarity of their language and national Constitutions".

It was therefore proposed that Northern Bukovina, as well as Bessarabia, should be given to the Soviet Union, and that the transfer should take place immediately. On June 27, 1940, after the Rumanian Government's acceptance of the Soviet Proposals, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were re-joined to the Ukrainian Republic. The total area of these two ceded territories was 50,400 square kilometres, of which 21,300 were added to the Ukraine, and 29,100 square kilometres were incorporated into the newly created Moldavian S.S.R.

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1 The Bulletin of International News, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, July 13, 1940.

Moldavia

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648 The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was created on August 2, 1940 by the decree of the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R. This Republic consists of a part of the former Moldavian Autonomous S.S. Republic and of a section of Bessarabia incorporated into the Soviet Union.
[131 The creation of this new Union Republic decreased the Ukrainian S.S.R.
161] by 3,900 square kilometres and a population of 310,000 persons[1].

The Transcarpathian Ukraine[2]

● 728 In June 1945 an agreement was signed in Moscow between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic that the Transcarpathian Ukraine "...which on the basis of a pact of September 10, 1919, concluded at St.Germain-en-Laye, entered the Czechoslovak Republic with the rank of an Autonomous Republic, will, according to the wish manifested by the population of the Carpatho-Ukraine and on the basis of the friendly agreement of both high contracting parties, unite with its longstanding motherland, the Ukraine, and is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The frontier between Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine, existing since September 29, 1938, will, with modifications described, become the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Republic..."

Article II of the protocol appended to the Pact said that:

"Persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality living in Czechoslovak territory have the right to opt for Soviet citizenship until January 1, 1946... Czech and Slovak nationals residing or having their permanent domicile in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine have the right to opt for Czechoslovak nationality during the time until January 1, 1946".[3]

131
311 On January 1, 1935, the area of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 12,617 square kilometres. In 1937 about half of this was covered by forests and woods; roughly 239,000 hectares were arable, and about 328,000 hectares were devoted to vineyards, market gardens, and permanent meadows and pastures.

161 As at December 1, 1930, the population of the Transcarpathian Ukraine was 725,357, an increase of nearly 121,000 over February 1921.[4]

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1 Territory and Population of the U.S.S.R., S.Sulkevich, Moscow, 1940.

2 Called by the Czechs, Sub-Carpathian Rus, or Carpatho-Ukraine.

3 New York Times quoted by Voices of History (1945-46), Gramercy Publishing Company, New York.

4 Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovak Republic, London.

728 The progress in construction and rehabilitation which has taken place since the incorporation of this region into the Ukraine was revealed at a meeting of the Soviet of Nationalities on October 16, 1946, when the representative of the Transcarpathian Ukraine summed up the achievements in 1946. Nearly 300 enterprises had been restored, and nine machine and tractor stations had been set up to assist the peasants in working the fields. Much had been done in 1946 to abolish illiteracy; there were opened over 100 schools, including 75 elementary, seven technical, 27 secondary, four music schools for children, and one school for surgeons' assistants and midwives.

At the end of December it was stated that 35 new factories had started functioning in the Transcarpathian Region in 1946[1]. Moreover, as compared with 1945 when there was not a single coal mine, 8 mines were working in 1946. There had also been definite progress in building up consumer goods industries. A clothing and a shoe factory had begun working in Vinogradov, and a knitted goods mill in Mukachevo. Some 200 light industries have been opened in various parts of the region.

Population of the Ukraine

The Ukraine is inhabited largely by Ukrainians, and also by Russians, Jews, and Poles. Most of the population is literate, and in 1939 there were many technical and vocational schools, as well as scientific research institutes and about 40,000 libraries.

At the census of January 17, 1939 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had 30,960,221 inhabitants; an increase of 6.6 per cent. as compared with December 1926. The greatest increase had occurred in the towns, largely as a result of the migration of country people to new industries. Thus from 1926 to 1939 the urban population more than doubled (5,373,553 to 11,195,620) while the number of rural inhabitants decreased by 16½ per cent. (23,669,381 to 19,764,601).

The same was true for the entire Soviet Union. From 147,027,915 in December 1926, its total population increased by 15.9 per cent. to 170,467,186 in January 1939, the urban population having grown from 26.3 million to 55.9 millions; and the rural population having fallen from 120.7 million to 114.5 million.

The principal cities of the Ukraine with their population on January 17, 1939, are Kiev, the capital (population, 846,293); Kharkov, capital of the Ukraine before 1934 (833,432), the part of Odessa on the Black Sea (604,223), Dniepropetrovsk on the Dnieper River (500,662), Stalino, industrial centre of the Donets Basin (462,395), and Nikolayev (167,108).

In January 1939 the urban population of the Ukraine was 36.2 per

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, December 29, 1946.

Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

311 According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there
425 were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000
723 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The principal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Izmail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

474 Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution
241 of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas
178 from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

475 Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the
407 Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Izmail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

475 In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in
407 June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in
652 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.

TABLE XIV

185 Ukraine: Planned Production in 1950 Compared with 1940 and 1913 (see Note)
433
241

(million metric tons)

	1913	1940	1950
Grain	20	28	27.8
Sugar beet	8.9	14.8	15.7
Potatoes	about 5[1]	21.5	23

1 According to the report in Pravda, the potato harvest in 1940 was "over 4 times" that of 1913.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, August 28, 1946.

[728] Note: In comparing the 1950 target figures with pre-war production it is important to bear in mind the territorial revisions which occurred in the Ukraine after 1939, when she regained Western Ukraine and part of Bessarabia, lost a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic (which, together with the Moldavian Section of Bessarabia, then became a separate Union Republic), and added Northern Bukovina and Transcarpathian Ukraine.

[131] Thus the present area of the Ukraine exceeds its 1938 area by approximately 118,000 kilometres (11,800,000 hectares). However, we do not know precisely how much of this is agricultural land. The arable land in Western Ukraine before the war amounted to 4 million hectares; that of Transcarpathian Ukraine, to 239,000 hectares. In the parts of Bessarabia and Bukovina which were ceded to the Soviet Union, 3,285,800 hectares were classified as arable. If we roughly divide this between Moldavia and the Ukraine in proportion to the total ex-Rumanian area incorporated in each, about 1,300,000 hectares of agricultural land would have been added to the Ukraine in its share of Bessarabia; and the arable area of present-day Ukraine would exceed the 1937 cultivated area by about 5½ million hectares, the potential total being 30.6 million. The fact that the Five-Year Plan fixes the Ukraine's 1950 area of cultivation at 30.5 million hectares seems to support this assumption.

311
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Livestock

231 In 1941 the number of livestock in the Ukraine was estimated at 30.4 million, including 10.5 million cattle and 4.6 million horses.[1]

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1 Statement on March 20, 1946, by Mr. Baranovsky, Ukrainian delegate to the UNRRA Fourth Council Session, published in the "UNRRA Journal", March 21, 1946.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKraine RDI

S.U. 563

affairs, Soviet policy in Transcarpathian Ukraine kept a certain balance between Russian and Ukrainian cultural work in the new province. Russian books and Russian newspapers are now being printed there side by side with Ukrainian ones.

COMMUNISTS AND ANTI-COMMUNISTS IN THE WESTERN UKRAINE

UK. 728

The annexation of the Western Ukraine, whilst increasing on the one hand the might of the Soviet Empire and improving its strategic position, at the same time delayed the internal political consolidation of the Ukrainian S.S.R.

UK. 665

Owing to its notable past failures the Communist Party machinery found it difficult to take root among the people of the Western Ukraine – even after its incorporation into the U.S.S.R. In each of the nine Western Ukrainian provinces (six from Poland, two from Rumania and one from Czechoslovakia), the Communist Party could rely only upon a few thousand loyal Bolsheviks. Thus in the large province of Rovno (formerly Polish), the Communist Party early in 1948 had but 6,000 members of whom more than half joined during the war and in the post-war period.[15] In the Transcarpathian Ukraine the party had in December 1946 only 4,000 members, about one-half per cent of the entire population.[16] This figure included not only local communists but also party and state officials who had come to the province in considerable numbers from beyond the Carpathians.

UK. 669

Together with a minute number of people who could be considered reliable from the Soviet standpoint, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in absorbing the new territories took over a large number of people with a Western anti-Soviet outlook, particularly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian intellectuals. This fresh accession of Ukrainian nationalist elements also encouraged the opposition forces in the 'Old Ukraine'. The great prominence of the historic vanguard role of the Western Ukraine in the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was bound to make itself felt inside the Soviet Ukraine as well. Years of Rumanian and Polish oppression had been unable to obliterate the importance of Western Ukrainian cultural nationalism which had unfolded itself before 1918 under the liberal rule of the Hapsburg monarchy. The Ukrainian nation was, indeed, a recognized political and cultural fact inside the Austrian Empire at a time when Czarist Russia denied the very existence of a Ukrainian nation.

Lvov in Galicia and Chernovitsy in the Bukovina had been centres of a legal Ukrainian national movement and of an openly professed Ukrainian culture long before Kiev and Kharkov. The Western Ukraine had not known that revolutionary Ukrainian-Russian comradeship-in-arms

186 of the seventeenth century, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. The Kremlin, like Hitler, had no intention of satisfying the essence of Ukrainian national aspirations; all it wanted was to secure a greater degree of Ukrainian co-operation in the war effort, in guerilla fighting and sabotage behind the enemy lines. The Soviet Government could not prevent its wartime emergency measures from being misunderstood and mistaken for some sort of *carte blanche* for future nationalistic deviations.

669 The full extent to which Ukrainian nationalists may have betrayed the Soviet Union during the war with Germany is, of course, impossible [727] to estimate. The Ukrainian Soviet Government indirectly recognized, however, that the militant anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists must have constituted a fairly considerable body by proclaiming an amnesty in 1944 for the members of the U.P.A., the 'Ukrainian Insurgent Army'. This amnesty is unique in the history of the U.S.S.R. since it applied collectively to an entire group notable for its fanatical hatred of the Soviet régime and its contempt for the Russians.

This amnesty offer was so unusual for Soviet conditions that many U.P.A. members refused to take it seriously. The U.P.A. continued to terrorize the Soviet Ukrainian-Polish-Czechoslovak border areas, and in 1945–47 carried out daring raids deep into Czech and Polish territories. The members of the U.P.A. detachments were often referred to as 'Banderovtsy' after their leader Stephen Bandera.

[728] The 'Banderovtsy' exploited for their ends the fact that a comparatively small strip of land in Eastern Poland which was inhabited by Ukrainians was not included in the Ukrainian S.S.R., the area of Kholm and Hrubeshov. According to the nationalities programme of the Comintern the Kholm area was to be included in the Soviet Ukrainian State. The Ukrainian State President, M. S. Grechukha, in a Supreme Soviet debate on February 7th, 1944, also demanded the incorporation of this 'Ukrainian Far West' into the Ukrainian S.S.R.[18] However, the Soviet central Government apparently found it impossible to convince the Western Allies and even the Polish communists that another slice of Poland should be cut off. Thus the Ukraine was denied its 'Far West' and a repatriation of the Ukrainians of the Polish areas concerned was carried out instead.

The activities of the 'Banderovtsy' found particular support among the peasants of the Ukrainian villages of the Polish border area earmarked for evacuation; for one of the foremost tasks of the U.P.A. detachments was to render the evacuation impossible and to prevent by terrorist acts any Polish colonization on former Ukrainian farmland. It has been asserted that the Banderovtsy enjoyed support from local Ukrainian Soviet authorities in the border areas because of their anti-Polish character. This allegation is difficult to check. It is certain, however, that the U.P.A. detachments could not possibly have maintained themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrainian peasantry.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

nationalities as a Federation of Soviet National Republics. Striving to create the really free and voluntary union of the working classes of all the nationalities of Russia, the 3rd Congress of Soviets will limit itself to the establishment of the principles only on which the Federation of the Soviet Republics in Russia will be built, allowing the workers and peasants of every nationality to take independent decisions in their own Soviet Congresses as to whether and on what conditions they wish to take part in the Federal Government and other Federal institutions.' 656 563

The Federation, having been accepted by the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee in February 1919, was approved by the 1st Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the following month. It is clear that this declaration remained in force when, after the collapse of the Volunteer movement and the failure of the 'Petlyurians', the Soviets were restored in the Ukraine. And it is a notable fact that, notwithstanding the considerable changes in the constitution of U.S.S.R. which were introduced between the years 1920 and 1936, the Ukrainians together with the other 'minority nationalities' retained the right, in theory, to opt out of the Union. Only at the 8th Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, summoned to discuss 'the Stalin Constitution' of 1936, were certain limitations (not included in the published texts of the Constitution) introduced by Stalin himself. 'So that the right [of a Republic] to leave the Union shall not be an ephemeral right it is necessary:

(*a*) that the Republic should not be surrounded on all sides by territories of the Soviet Union, but should lie on its boundaries, because in the opposite case it would be impossible for her to leave the Union;

(*b*) that the population of the Republic should not be less than a certain minimum, because in the opposite case she would not be able to defend herself against the attacks of Imperialist beasts of prey;

(*c*) that in the population one nationality should form a compact majority.'

During the years 1921–2 the Ukrainian Soviets were otherwise engaged than in studying constitutional questions. The liquidation of the Volunteer Army in the Crimea and the suppression of the numerous bands of the *atamans* prolonged the period of warfare and the Red Armies terrorized the exhausted countryside. Many towns were becoming deserted, and vast stretches of land were left fallow by a peasantry which had neither the courage nor the security to sow or to reap. Black typhus decimated the destitute population, and in the winter of 1920–21 a serious famine developed which became worse during the spring and summer months. Although the 731

●731 conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

656 The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

656 563 669 The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

656 642 The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

668 656 In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

and to wander off into the steppe 'where the eyes look'. Until the 474
Bolsheviks erected barbed wire all along the frontier, the Volhynian 661
peasants used to cross the Polish border in large bodies with their 423
women and children and cattle—sometimes a thousand strong and 668
more—with the merciless detachments of the G.P.U. hot in pursuit, held off by an armed rear-guard. According to reports appearing in the Polish Press in 1932 great numbers of these fugitive peasants were held in quarantine camps in Poland. At the same time gangs of fugitives from Central Russia and the Ukraine made their way into Transcaucasia under the leadership of ex-soldiers; conditions here, where a struggle against forced collectivization was also in progress, were little better than in the Ukraine, and large numbers, Russians and Tartars and Tats from the Talish region, forced their way across the Araks frontier into the northern provinces of Iran.

The abolition of small and 'average' farming, the disorganization 731 ●
in the newly formed *kolkhozy*, the passive resistance of the peasants, 166
and the bestial brutality of the methods which accompanied the 661
enforcement of the new system, brought about the famine of 1932–3. The first news of famine in the Ukraine came from the Polish frontier in the autumn of 1932. It became known that domestic animals were perishing wholesale and that the mortality among the population was enormous. Already, even in the summer, there was no more bread in the Ukraine. Millions of human beings were set in motion. Part of these great crowds infested the towns in the hope of being able to survive until the next harvest. But the main flow of movement was directed towards the northern Caucasus, the regions beyond the Volga, Siberia and Turkestan. In many districts only the old people remained where they were in the hope of somehow surviving on potatoes. There were wide districts which were almost completely abandoned by the population. Whole villages went to ruin, and the once prosperous gardens and fields were abandoned to weeds.

Early in 1933, before the time of spring sowing, orders were issued to drive back the migrant hordes by force to their villages. Great numbers of peasants who were arrested and coralled in camps died because they were not fed. Those who returned to their lands, sick and hungry, found that they had to set to work with spades and staves because only about a fifth part of the horses remained and most of these were too weak to work. A particular foreign corre- 731
spondent who obtained permission to travel in the regions of Kiev, Chernigov, Kharkov and Poltava in the autumn of 1933, affirms that, according to statements which were made to him in the offices of the local administrations, about 10 per cent of the population of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

● 731 South-Eastern Russia died of hunger in the first months of 1933. As in 1921–2 numerous cases of cannibalism were recorded.

665 In spite of this vast tragedy, self-satisfied and triumphant speeches
661 were a feature of the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets which met at Kharkov in 1935. 'For glorious Ukraine the last years have been, as in the rest of our country, a period of brilliant unheard of achievements. The rapacious rural *kulak* class has been completely destroyed, annihilated. Never will the heroism of those days be forgotten! Never will the loathing against the oppressors disappear! Those were not idle words which Lenin wrote when he affirmed that the principal enemy of our Bolshevism is the peasant! Thousands of the best sons of our country have lost their lives in the great and ruthless struggle.' 'Against this enemy', in the words of *Pravda*, 'the economic structure which carries along with it joyous culture and a happy life to millions of Ukrainians suffering for centuries from privations has at last triumphed in the country.' Stalin's revolutionary Communist régime proved, as ever, logical. If 'thousands of the best sons of our country' had really lost their lives in 'the great and ruthless struggle' against the peasantry, the peasants had to count their losses in millions.

000 But notwithstanding the brilliant victory proclaimed on the internal front in 1935 the Soviet Government had new reasons for anxiety in the radical change which had taken place in the European situation as a result of the attainment of power by the Nazi Party in Germany. The official doctrine of the Nazi Government was based on 'the right of the German people to an adequate living space', and the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler, in search of a better and happier future, was taking a dangerous interest in the east and south-east of Europe. It was now nearly twenty years since *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*; and the glib attribution of the military catastrophe of Germany in the last war to the evils of Marxism had had the result of reviving in a new generation of Germans all those vague aspirations after world dominion which recur from time to time to compensate that unfortunate people for the frustration which has been their historical lot.

In glowing passages in *Mein Kampf* Adolf Hitler had waxed lyrical on the subject of the Ukraine and the Urals, and the Führer seemed prepared to abandon the oceanic and colonial dreams of William II in favour of a continental imperialism which might carry the Germans into Asia in the first great movement in history of a people from west to east. In 1934 the ten years' Non-Aggression Pact concluded between Germany and Poland appeared to Soviet statesmen to be the first step towards a collaboration in the east at

tons of grain or about 75% of the total amount that they secured 651 661
in the whole of the former Russian Empire.

This led to new clashes and with the suppression of the larger armed partisan bands, there grew up a new feeling of ugliness that boded ill for the security of the whole regime. The success of the Communists in the industrial centres was thus balanced by their failure to win over any substantial part of the rural population.

In the cities the new regime[1] met with problems of another 433
kind. The workers in the great coal and iron industry where Com- 369
munism was strongest had at a very early date expelled the managers [327]
and foremen and had taken over themselves the operation of the plants, many of which had been ruined in the civil war. Now they found that they were not able to restore production. Industry practically came to a halt and by the end of 1921 there was only one blast furnace operating in Ukraine. The production of pig-iron dropped to 11,300 tons, or barely 3% of the pre-war production. The railroads suffered the same fate. There was no way of repairing them and without a trained administrative staff, they almost stopped functioning. This, in turn, increased unemployment and a lack of food in the cities and once more the city dwellers began to stream out into the country districts.

As a final blow there came in 1920 one of those periods of 731 ●
drought which have recurred sporadically in Ukraine throughout the centuries. In view of the general decay in transportation and the ravages of the war, this became serious and the situation grew even worse when the same phenomenon was repeated in 1921. Between the drought and the raiding detachments, the peasants had no reserves of grain and a famine broke out which cost the lives of several million Ukrainians.

This famine was very definitely the result of Communist mismanagement, plus the drought, but the Soviet regime was unable to take any effective counter-measures. When its extent was realized, the regime allowed through the League of Nations the organization of the American Relief Administration, under Herbert Hoover. This collected and sent to the stricken areas large quantities of grain but it carried on its work with such impartiality that

[1] [Ukrainian Soviet Republic established 1919 -- Analyst]

● 73/ it ignored for humanitarian motives the discontent of the peasants and its operations enabled the Soviet regime to master a storm which would otherwise have endangered its very existence. It is interesting in this connection that the Soviet regime only with the greatest reluctance allowed relief work to be carried on in the Ukraine, where the famine conditions were the worst. Their only interest was in the Volga area inhabited by Great Russians and they tried to use the assumed independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as an excuse for refusing to allow help to be extended.

ooo Thus by the spring of 1922 the policy of Militant Communism had broken down at every point. The system had shown its political, economic and cultural bankruptcy and its sole success had been among certain groups of idealists abroad who were infatuated with the resolution with which the Soviets had broken with the old order. Yet this was a poor foundation and it was obvious that something drastic had to be done, if the Soviet system was to be saved.

CHAPTER TEN

The Famine

In 1921, the great famine which had swept over Ukraine 731 ●
had been the result of a failure of the crops, a prolonged drought and the excesses of Militant Communism which had demoralized the country. The Soviets, more or less unwillingly, allowed the despatch of foreign assistance and this saved the lives of millions. There was to be no interference in the punishment of the obstinate peasants this time.

In the fall of 1929, just as compulsory collectivization was being 641
introduced, the government in Moscow made an important change 645
in the agricultural set-up, for it transferred the Commissariat of 631
Agriculture to the central group by establishing an All-Union Commissariat which was to be in control of all agriculture in the Soviet Union. This meant that in Ukraine all of the work which had been previously done by the local authorities was now transferred to Moscow. The republic commissariats ceased to have the power to pursue individual plans for improving the conditions of the soil, for varying the crops as their own advisers decided or as the population felt it necessary. Everything was to be done from the centre and the Ukrainian Soviet Government was compelled to hand over all of its research stations and other institutions to Muscovite control. This put a stop to the intensive development of Ukrainian agriculture which had been fostered by the Ukrainian land code and introduced the new system in which the peasants were in the same position as the workers in the factories.

At the same time[1] the central regime ceased to make public the 433
actual figures of production on the ground that they might betray to outside nations important facts as to the Soviet development. From this time on estimates and achievements were given only in

[1] [1929 – All-Union Commissariat of Agriculture was established 93 --Amlyst]

sabotage of the income of the party and the government in the branch of village agriculture." 651 685

The machine tractor stations were staffed by men largely alien to the Ukrainian countryside. The more fanatical Communists were placed in these political detachments and were, in effect, told to supplement or replace the local administration in the exercise of pressure and terror upon both the heads and the members of the kolhosps. To aid them in their work Moscow sent to Ukraine a Russian Pavel Postyshev as a special plenipotentiary of the Central Committee with 7,000 party workers from the Russian Republic. 241 511

The work of these special "commissions" and "brigades" was marked by the utmost severity. They entered the villages, and made the most thorough searches of the houses and barns of every peasant. They dug up the earth, broke into the walls of buildings and the stoves in which the peasants tried to hide their last handfuls of food. They even in places took specimens of the fecal matter from the toilets in the effort to learn in that way by analysis whether the peasants had stolen government property and were eating grain. Wherever they found any, the peasants were severely punished, while the detachments carried off not only grain but everything edible.

The same reports came from every corner of Ukraine. "They requisitioned everything that could be eaten" was the report from the village of Zorich in the district of Poltava. In one village in the district of Odesa, "they collected all the grain, potatoes, beets to the last kilogram" and in other places they even took half-baked loaves of bread from the stove. In at least one of these commissions, Molotov, then head of the Council of Ministers, took a personal part.

The natural result was a famine of unprecedented severity. The villages had been hungry in the autumn. After these searches commenced, they literally starved. An Englishman, M. Magridge, wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1933: "During a recent visit to Ukraine, I have seen a little of the war which the Soviet government is carrying on against the peasants. The fields were 731 661

[result of excessive grain requisitions in 1933 -- Analyst]

731 waste as in a real war and the poverty had spread still further.
661 On one side there were millions of peasants with bodies swollen from hunger; on the other side, soldiers, members of the GPU, carrying out the orders of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They hurled themselves on the region like a pack of locusts and seized everything edible. They shot and hung thousands of peasants, sometimes whole villages; they made of the richest country in the world a melancholy wilderness."

Reports from all sections of Ukraine have listed with depressing regularity the articles of food that were eaten. They included grass, weeds, bark, dead animals, field mice, dogs, cats. Finally, cannibalism broke out and in many places sausages were found that were made of human flesh, either of people who had died or who were killed for food. The extent of this last is shown when in 1936, among the prisoners of Solovki, there were three hundred twenty-five persons guilty of cannibalism, seventy-five men and two hundred and fifty women.

An observer in the spring of 1933 gives this picture of a Ukrainian village: "In the centre of the village, beside the ruins of the church which had been blown up was the bazaar. All the people in it had swollen faces, they were not talkative, but were silent and speechless. Their movements were unsteady, for their legs and arms were swollen. They sold or bought cornstalks, pounded corncobs, a black powder made of Russian thistle, roots, and the lower parts of water plants. This assortment of village wares was a diet which did not save the people from death by starvation but merely by increasing their sufferings, postponed it a little."

The agronome A. S. who in March and April, 1933, was in the villages of Izbinske and Starytsya, Vovchansky region, Kharkiv district, wrote: "The people daily died in dozens. The corpses lay in the houses for several days for there was no one to bury them. Pits were dug in the cemeteries with great difficulty, large enough to hold several persons. The corpses were piled on carts like wood and carried to the pits and thrown in like logs without any of the customary or religious rites. They fell as they would,

head down, or on their side or standing—a terrible sight. The gravedigger of to-day might be a corpse to-morrow." 731 661

The bodies of the dead lay in all the villages, along the roads and in the fields. Special brigades were formed in the villages to bury the dead but they were too weak to collect all the corpses and these were devoured by those dogs which had escaped being eaten and had gone savage. The roads were deserted for it was dangerous for one or two people to walk together because of the danger of attack by robbers who sought to rob them or to kill them for cannibalistic purposes.

Under such conditions many of the people closed up their huts tightly, lighted their stoves and inhaled the fumes to commit suicide.

In the spring, when those who had survived broke from the fields the unripe ears of grain, they were seized by the government agencies on the charge of stealing socialist and government property, while the "light cavalry," the armed Comsomols and the members of the Communist Party, shot these "barbers," as they were called in the press contemptuously, like hares.

Thousands tried to secure work in the state agricultural enterprises (the radhosps). The agronome B. B. wrote: "In going around the experimental station in Poltavshchyna, I saw under a haystack a number of people. To my questions, the manager of the station, a Russian in origin, told me that they were peasants of the neighborhood who had come in large numbers to the radhosp, hoping to find work and thus have the money to buy food. Since they did not have the strength to return home, they lay down under the haystack. Many died there and he added, pointing to fresh earth,' There are the mounds where we buried those individualists. What trouble the Khakhals have been.' "

The younger and more venturesome fled to other Soviet Republics in search of work and food. Thousands departed from Ukraine without permission, for this was not given, and crowded the offices of the railroads, the wharfs and the junctions. They often found a tragic end. Prof. O. O. tells of a case of which he was a witness. "In March, 1933, at the station in Vladikavkaz (Caucasus) there gathered a mass of peasants with bags on their

73/ backs, waiting for a freight train. Agents of the NKVD held them
66/ up and took away their grain. They begged together and singly and prayed but it did not help. Then one peasant climbed out on a high tree near the station and began to cry out about all the horrors of the famine in Ukraine. He cursed the party, the government, its leaders and the NKVD. A crowd quickly gathered and soon came the agents of the NKVD who began to harangue the hearers and urged the "orator" to come down quickly, threatening him with life imprisonment. He was immovable; then the NKVD called for the local fire department who were told to turn their hoses on the tree. The peasant climbed higher and then suddenly threw himself down like a stone."

In the spring of 1933 the starving masses with their gray faces moved into the large cities. They formed lines for the "buying of bread"* or, begging, they surrounded the mills. They died by thousands in the streets of Kharkiv, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, and the other cities. In many cases the police cars simply picked up the dead and dying every morning and carried them out of the city where they were thrown into pits. There were established in the cities and their environs "therapeutic hospitals" near which were vans covered with tarpaulins. These were used to collect the sufferers and the hospitals were simply places to separate the dead and the dying.

The children suffered terribly and thousands were picked up on the streets. Parents often abandoned their children, usually near police stations, in the hope that they would be picked up and taken to refugee camps but here they were little better off. Prof. M. M. testified that near Kharkiv the "NKVD opened a large children's concentration camp, the 'Barracks of death' as it was

[435] * In the beginning of 1933 at the height of the famine in Ukraine, the USSR opened shops in the cities where grain was sold at a doubled price, i.e. commercial prices—4 karb. for 1 kg. of white and 3 karb. for 1 kg. of black bread. The peasant received from the government for the obligatory "sale" of grain 90 kop. for 16 kg. of wheat. These commercial prices had to be paid for in foreign currency or in gold or silver.

termed" and here by poor treatment at least forty percent of the 731 ●
ten thousand gathered in, died. 661

The urban population felt the shortage because of the reduction of the bread ration for the unemployed to two hundred grams a day. The majority could not patronize the commercial shops for they had nothing with which to pay and the legal allowance of other products as fat, sugar and barley were either reduced or omitted. Even the more highly qualified of the intelligentsia were obliged to sell all their trinkets and gold teeth to secure some food. The prices allowed were ridiculous. One teacher at these stores received for a silver dollar "500 grams of sugar, a piece of soap and 200 grams of rice."

Physicians were forbidden to enter "hunger" in the records of illness and death. They were ordered to give as the cause of death "BBO" (absence of white corpuscles). Sometimes it was recorded as "childish" or "old age" weakness, "paralysis of the heart," "diarrhea," all symptoms of death by starvation.

It is impossible to estimate accurately the number of deaths, 165
for even the indefatigable NKVD gave up the attempt to list the 731
deaths along the roads, in the fields, and in the streets of the cities. 661
Villages died out and this was indicated by the use of black flags on certain houses. In these cases no attempt was made to keep the records in order. The so-called "therapeutic hospitals" did not turn over their records or admit to their files the workers of the ZATS (The Records of the Acts of the Civil Population), who were the collaborators of the NKVD. Thus, in one of these therapeutic hospitals in Kiev there were at least 5,000 deaths from starvation that were not recorded in the official statistics.

Of course, none of these hardships were felt by the highly placed [554]
Communists and party officials. They received their food through party channels which were not accessible to the ordinary residents of the city or the kolhosps.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the number who perished in the famine, but it was approximately 4,800,000. This is certainly an underestimate, although certain other calculations will place the number between five and six million.

[-famine in Ukraine, 1933-- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

● 731 There is the frequent idea that the famine was specifically
661 directed against the rich peasants and the kurkuls. This is utterly
[565] false, for these had been liquidated earlier. The blow of 1933 fell chiefly upon the poorer classes who had always supported the Soviet regime and who regarded their suffering in the beginning as a mistake which Moscow would do its best to correct. In the same way it was the Ukrainian workmen of the smaller cities who bore the brunt of the hardships. It was the direct triumph of the Russian Bolsheviks over the Ukrainian poor.

185 Another proof that the famine occurred in connection with
731 the plans of Moscow was the fact that Postyshev, besides his official post, held that of general inspector of the Ministry of Grain Production for resettlement. It turned out later that he was given the general task of preparing a plan for an immigration into Ukraine from various portions of the Soviet Union. The dislocation of the population was worked out in detail. Millions of Russians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, etc., were to be sent in to complete the work of rerussification. Especial pains were devoted to the regions close to Russia on the Left Bank of the Dnieper and there was talk at one time of annexing to the Russian Republic the Kharkiv-Donbas industrial region, but this did not fall in with the plans of Stalin.

The result of the famine was the final stabilization of the collec-
[423] tive system of agriculture and the breaking of the old mode of life throughout the whole of Ukraine. More than that, it established the fact that in the economic sphere Moscow could direct Ukrainian life as it would. It overawed the population for the moment but it did not reconcile them to their fate and it went hand in hand with the attempt to exterminate the old Ukrainian cultural life.

[Ukraine, 1933 -- Analyse]

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Famine, the Soviets and the World

It is impossible to overestimate the significance of this 731 artificially induced famine in what had been one of the richest portions of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Taken in connection with the collectivization of agriculture which had served already to uproot and exile or liquidate many of the most industrious and successful parts of the population of the Ukraine, it was distinctly noticed that the history of the Soviet Union had entered a new phase which might be glossed over for public consumption but still represented a formidable menace to the general development of the entire area.

During the years of the New Economic Policy and the period of [178] Ukrainization, much had been accomplished, not only to repair the damages of the Civil War and the period of Militant Communism, but great strides had been made in the development of Ukrainian culture. The collectivization of 1929-31 had, in a sense, menaced some of the economic gains but while the menace of Moscow was being felt on the material field, it had not hitherto been regarded in the same way culturally. It is true that there had been going on a great debate between Khvylovy and his rivals but it is doubtful if either Khvylovy or Skrypnyk had fully appreciated the forces that were now unleashed.

There had never been any question that every few decades Ukraine had undergone severe droughts which had produced local famines, especially in the Ukrainian steppes. The disorders of Militant Communism had coincided with one of these periods and had produced the situation in 1921-2. Still, at that time, for his own purposes, Lenin had allowed relief to be sent from abroad to the victims. The agricultural situation in 1931-3 was not so serious and

731 the country might have escaped, had it not been for the methods of the government in draining off from the population the last possible reserves of food.

731 185 There can be no doubt that this was done deliberately, for every measure taken by the government was intended to increase the difficulties of the population and to prepare for the final crushing of the Ukrainian renaissance that had been proceeding with ever [648] increasing force. Every measure, too, was intended to render it more difficult for the outside world to secure any actual knowledge of the conditions in the country until it was too late for the world to do more than register vain protests, for it was very definitely at this period that the censorship methods of the government and its apprehensions of what knowledge might bring to the world actively commenced to draw an iron curtain around Ukraine. Foreign correspondents were forbidden to visit Ukraine on one pretext or another and they were forced to send out such news as the government wished or to leave the Soviet Union.

[661] The collectivization and the famine had coincided with the beginning of the attack on Ukrainian scholarship and the arts, as we shall see, but these attacks by their very choice of victims had been directed against those men who had not been closely connected with the Communist Party in the past, even though they had not been entirely hostile. Along with the famine the tide turned, and soon the victims were those persons who had dared to hope for an equality of treatment (with the Great Russians) in the Soviet Union.

The famine was obviously intended not only to crush the population already impoverished by the collectivization but to administer a sound chastisement to all classes who were interested in the preservation and development of local and republic interests.

731 648 The famine was at its height in the winter and spring of 1933 and was only somewhat alleviated after the harvest of that year was brought in. It was only natural that, despite the efforts of the authorities, word of it would gradually seep out, in spite of the censorship. The news was most accessible to the Western Ukrainians, for as yet all communications had not been satisfactorily broken, and early in the summer they began to seek permission to organize relief

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

abroad for the benefit of the sufferers. On July 14, 1933, such a 731 ●
body was already formed in Lviv and soon in the other sections of 648
Western Ukraine, while their appeals were heard by the Ukrainian emigrés abroad.

In August, Theodore Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna had been convinced of the truth of the famine and he appealed for aid for the starving. In the same month the General Secretary of the Congress of European Minorities published his summary of the conditions, as gleaned from all available sources, and the League took action at its meeting in September. In the same month the matter was brought up before the League of Nations in Geneva and relief was referred to the International Red Cross.

The movement spread to the Ukrainians in North America and on November 3, 1933, the sixth convention of the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States appealed to the government of the United States, urging that an impartial commission be sent to Ukraine to report on the truth of these reports.

This growing wave of protests among the Ukrainians and the [208]
emigrants from Ukraine was met by a stony silence on the part of the Soviet authorities, by absolute denial or by charges of unfriendly propaganda. The Soviet government refused to lift its barrier on any visits to Ukraine by foreign journalists or by any foreign visitors until after the harvest of 1933 was brought in and then they induced such journalists as Walter Duranty to recant previous statements as to the extent of the famine and report on September 18, 1933, that the harvest of that year was excellent "and all talk of famine now is ridiculous."

Almost the first detailed account of an American journalist was 731
given by William Henry Chamberlin on May 29, 1934, on his 185
return from the Soviet Union, when he estimated that between four and five million peasants were starving and he also quoted the speech of President Kalinin of the Soviet Union, made the year before, "The collective farmers have passed through a good school. For some, this school was quite ruthless."

This was a polite hint again that it had been the policy of the government to allow the famine to run its course in the hope of

731 breaking any possible opposition on the part of the collective farms
185 and the individual peasants.

The famine then on the domestic scene marked a definite turning point, a definite shift of emphasis in the relations between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, and that shift was extended to the individual Ukrainian. Yet, the very reports that emanated from the stricken country were not without their significance for the world.

731 1933 was a fateful year for Europe. The order to apply the
648 maximum pressure on the Ukrainians came on January 24th. On January 28th, just four days later and before the news could have leaked out, Kurt von Schleicher resigned as Chancellor of Germany and was succeeded by Adolf Hitler. Within a month came the Reichstag fire and all the turmoil connected with the advent of the Nazis to power.

A world that had still not been fully convinced of the dangers of the Communist regime was only too ready to magnify its benefits and its possibilities for good as compared with the apparently more pressing menace of Hitler. The period of the popular fronts began in all the European countries and it coincided with the coming into power of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the American bank crisis.

Under such circumstances, the rumors of the Ukrainian famine were heavily discounted by all except the most bitter anti-Communists and they obtained short hearing before world public opinion. No one wanted to believe these reports, and the troubled conditions when the reaction to the right seemed the menace to a world desirous of peace made it seem logical that the democratic world could secure some aid in its struggle from the Communist regime. All the old talk of the artificiality of the Ukrainian struggle that had circulated in 1918 was now reburnished and repropagandized.

The result might have been expected but it showed Stalin and the Soviet leaders that they had played their course well. They secured recognition by the United States in November of the same year, just as the real news of the extent of the tragedy was beginning

to leak out. Anger and disgust at Hitler was the dominant mood 731
and behind that veil, the Soviet leaders were able to plan their 648
further actions.

It is hard to tell what might have been the result, had the 000
world awakened in that year to a realization of the dangers from the two totalitarian leaders, who were later to unite and start World War II. Yet already the evidence was there, if men would only understand.

In the period of Militant Communism the victims had been chosen more or less at random and the world was largely aghast at the results, even though they did not understand. Now, by deliberate action the same thing was being done on a larger scale and under the guise of law and order. This method proved successful and advanced the Soviet Union to a place of preeminence among nations, while it enabled the authorities to dupe many idealists in other countries.

From this point of view the deportation of the kurkuls in 1930-1 and the famine of 1932-3 represented the use of new methods of terror as an instrument of national policy. That policy was continued in the massacre of the Polish officers in Katyn and the Ukrainian peasants in Vinnytsya. It was continued in the purges that marked the thirties and in the show political trials that have marked the history of Communist rule in the satellite countries. They were the inauguration of a new policy that was not to meet with failure until its extremes began again by their ruthlessness to disturb an uneasy world in the days of the new cold war.

thousand karbovantsy in money. When we remember that, as a 474
result of the Soviet tax system, a pair of shoes cost five hundred 434
karbovantsy and a suit of average quality a little more than one 241
thousand karbovantsy, we can see how dependent the average peasant is upon his small plot on which his egg tax is, whether he raises eggs or not, two hundred per year. In addition, from his cash resources he must buy the grain for his hens or raise it on his own plot.

It is small wonder that the foreign visitor is not welcomed on [554]
these collective farms except in a few places which are kept for [665]
show. In all of them the Communist heads receive very satisfactory living conditions with opportunities to purchase supplies at very moderate prices in shops devised for Communist administrators, and it is these administrators, and the Communists of the Motor Tractor Stations and the MVD who receive almost the entire income that is allotted to the collective farm.

The position of the city laborer is little better, although he 465
receives in connection with his plant the opportunity of securing whatever the factory heads feel like giving him for food in the factory dining rooms.

In 1946-7, before Western Ukraine was fully Communized, 731
there was another drought in the black earth region and once again starvation hung as a spectre over the entire population. Those who had the strength and courage to get to Western Ukraine in search of food were surprised how much food there was still to be found in those areas where the peasants were still allowed to use their own energy, skill and knowledge even on their own small farms which still looked like paradise to those poor devils who had passed through the period of the thirties.

Still later, collectivization was introduced into Western Ukraine and the other accompaniments of the regime in the east were at once apparent.

The Fifth Five Year Plan which was adopted in 1950 con- 185
tinued and intensified the process. From the figures which has been revealed, it is obvious that the increases which have been demanded of the Ukraine in this period are relatively minor. There

[Post-WORLD WAR II -1945 -- Analyst]

669 Ukraine. The 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' headed by Rakovsky left Ukraine and was abolished by order of Lenin. This was a new proof of the complete failure of the Russian Communist policy in Ukraine.

But at the same time the Ukrainian Republic met a new enemy who had claims on Ukraine. This was the Russian Volunteer Army under Denikin. The leaders of this army regarded the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as more dangerous for themselves than the Soviet dictatorship in Moscow. Therefore, in its struggle against the Russian 'Red Army', the Russian 'White Army' attempted before all to take possession of the Ukrainian territory in order to [648] prevent the strengthening of 'Ukrainian separatism'. In vain the Ukrainian Government appealed to the Western Great Powers that they should not admit the attack by the Russian Volunteer Forces on the Ukrainian Army and that they recognise the Government of democratic Ukraine. If in 1919 the Government and Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had been given the least support by the Western Powers, the development of Eastern Europe and even the whole world would have taken another course than happened in fact. In any case, by securing an independent Ukraine, Russian imperialism would not be such a menace to the world as we see it to-day.

[731] When Denikin's troops met the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in Kiev they attacked Ukrainian armed forces weakened by the struggle with the Russian Red Army and decimated by a disastrous typhus epidemic. This epidemic had spread principally in consequence of the blockade of the territory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army had no medicaments, no clothing nor sanitary equipment, the Ukrainian soldiers died in thousands, and there was no help. From the army the epidemic spread among the population of Ukraine.

[727] But even under these incredibly hard conditions the Army of the Ukrainian Republic and the masses of Ukrainian people did not abandon the fight against the new oppressors — the Russian Volunteers — who had abundant support from the Entente Powers. The Russian 'Whites' forbade the Ukrainian language in schools, offices and the press in the Ukrainian territory they had seized. Russian authorities ordered the burning of Ukrainian books. The Denikin Government cruelly persecuted Ukrainian patriots. Even the word 'Ukraine' was forbidden; the expression 'Little Russia' was used instead. The Denikin Government restored the estates of the big landowners in Ukraine.

Against the Denikin régime in Ukraine extensive risings of the

there were 85% Russians and only 8% Ukrainians. With this 656
election system the representatives of the peasants, the most 666
numerous part of the Ukrainian population, made only 12,7% of the members of this Soviet Congress. Finance, national economy, railways, labour — concisely all foundations of the economic life of Ukraine — were concentrated in Moscow. All Ukrainian co-operative organisations were subordinated to Moscow. During [651]
1920 Ukraine had to deliver to Russia 160 million of Pud of grain (1 Pud is 36 lbs.), 6 million Pud meat, 30 million Pud potatoes, 255 million eggs, big consignments of sugar, etc. The Russian Red Army made requisitions for its needs separately and confiscated in the last months of 1920 about 30 million Pud grain in Ukraine (*Collection of Reports of the Government of the USSR:* Kharkov 1921).

No wonder that in consequence of this exploitation the Urkrai- 669
nian partisan movement was spreading. At the end of 1920 there were not less than 40,000 Ukrainian partisans in Ukraine who fought against the Russian Communists as an organised force. Evidence of the extent of this struggle is given to us in the trophies of the Soviet Russian troops seized in the war with the Ukrainian partisans 1920—21: 43 guns, 1,812 machine-guns, 31,788 rifles etc. *(Collection of Reports).* In the course of only one year, 1921, the Soviet Secret Police in Ukraine suppressed 6,000 partisan organisations. (*Communist:* Kharkov, February 11, 1923).

2. The Famine of 1921/22 and the Policy of Soviet Russia in Ukraine 731

The Soviet Russian Government took advantage of the horrible 656
famine of 1921/22 in Ukraine and succeeded in strengthening its rule there. A drought in the fall of 1920 and spring 1921 was followed by a bad harvest, and a great dearth of food arose. A real famine began. However, the policy of the Russian Government in Ukraine, intending to get as much food as possible, did not change. Before the outside world the Russian authorities tried to hide the hunger catastrophe in Ukraine, and directed all foreign aid coming from America and Western Europe into Russia. Though in Ukraine in autumn 1921, millions of the Ukrainian population were starving the Russian Government, nevertheless, took away from the hungry regions the rest of the food stocks, and exported them to Russia. This roused the attention of foreigners who stayed at that time in Ukraine. The American historian H. H. Fisher writes in his book on the famine of 1921/22 that the representatives of the Soviet Russian Government demanded resolutely that it was

● 731 656 "necessary to request the ARA (American Relief Administration) not to split its forces, *but to concentrate them entirely on the Volga area*" (p. 248).

Professor Fisher remarks in his book:

"The policy of the Communist Party with respect to the Ukraine famine presents many curious aspects. Not only did the Moscow Government fail to bring the Ukrainian situation to the knowledge of the American Relief Administration as it did other regions much more remote, but it actively discouraged... anything likely to bring the Americans in contact with the Ukraine... Before the ARA had begun its operations (January, 1922) the Moscow and the so-called Kharkov Government did not undertake anything serious for the aid to the hungry people of Ukraine" (H. H. Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia:* New York, 1927). Further, Prof. Fisher says in his book:

"From the first the Moscow Government had discouraged all proposals which tended to bring the ARA into contact with the Ukraine. Litvinov (at that time Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, *P. F.*), had described the port of Odessa, back in the fall of 1921, as out of the question for ARA operations, although it was subsequently used very successfully. It is also significant that, until the ARA had investigated and established outposts in the south, Moscow virtually ignored in its press the famine conditions along the Black Sea..." (p. 252).

731 656 459 Prof. Fisher states that the Russian Communist Government exported food from the hungry regions in Ukraine:

"It is astonishing enough that these trainloads of food have been loaded in Kiev and Poltava and sent hundreds of miles to the hungry along the Volga, instead of being transported a score or so miles across the Gubernia line to Odessa or Nikolaiev, where there was a first class famine in swing. It is even more astonishing, when one learns... that Odessa Gubernia, with a crop of only seventeen per cent of normal and with people dying of hunger in the streets of its principal town as well as in the huts of its villages, sent sixty-five cars to Central Russia, while Nikolaiev, with a crop only four per cent of normal, and containing in the city of Kherson the most desperately afflicted spot in South Russia, in fact, one of the worst in the entire country, sent eight cars to the Volga" (p. 261).

On the export of grain from Ukraine during the famine of 1921/22 the American historian brings the following facts:

"The Gubernia of Podolia produced a considerable food surplus. The adjoining Gubernia of Odessa had a deficit, and many people were doomed to starve if food were not brought in. According to

the scheme officially outlined for the good of Russia, the surplus food in Podolia should not be used to save the lives of the peasants in Odessa, a few miles away, but should be carried through the starving regions, placed on board a steamer and sold in Hamburg . . ." (p. 323).

A representative of the Relief Committee of Fridtjof Nansen who was in Ukraine at the beginning of 1922 gives the following facts on the famine:

"Eight million souls are starving in the south of the Ukraine, 2½ millions of them have absolutely nothing to eat. A further 2½ millions are feeding themselves on substitutes, such as hay, dried plants, etc., but are not getting any normal meals; three millions have some supplies, but in such small quantities that they will soon be reckoned in the first and second categories. It may be said that before the end of April 7 million souls will come under these two categories. About 700,000 little children who have been brought into municipal asylums do not receive more than one fifth of the normal portion. Child mortality is tremendous. It reaches 50%. In Zaporoje one million souls are litterally starving. 60% are children. Cannibalism is spreading. Ten thousand people die in Zaporoje daily. All the cattle and the horses have been devoured". (*La famine en Ukraine:* Genève, 1922).

The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee gives a picture of the famine in Ukraine as follows:

"The country side is parched, without trees or plants, almost entirely black. The straw of the roofs is being used to nourish men and animals. People relate that they first ate up all dogs, cats, crows that they could catch and then took to the starving cattle, to boot-leather and furniture wood. You hear accounts and find evidence of necrophagy and cannibalism. You speak with people who have devoured their children, their brothers and sisters. You see skeleton-like human forms lying in the peasant's huts, dying, or waiting without hope, to be rescued by death . . . Usually no one takes the trouble, or no one has sufficient energy to bury the dead".

In the time when the Ukrainian people were starving in masses, the Russian Government took care only of the aid for the hungry along the Volga. The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee in Ukraine wrote in his report of 1922:

"At the beginning of this year one could have seen in famine-stricken districts of the Gouvernement Nikolaiev such proclamations: 'Workers of Nikolaiev: Come to the assistance of the famine-stricken of the Volga region!' This happened at a time when this

●731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
656 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Co[illegible]ress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union, R2

the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933:

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

6. *The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33*

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation.

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*).

Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

731 656 the Moscow Government, in 1933, forbade foreign journalists to enter Ukraine.

Back in the summer of 1932 the Ukrainian farmers in Canada addressed the Soviet Red Cross with the proposition to send their grain for gratis distribution among the hungry in Ukraine. But Moscow resolutely refused to accept this gift. The hunger catastrophe of 1932/33 was so great that the population of Ukraine died in masses, and cannibalism and necrophagy spread among the people. The peasants of Ukraine, weakened and decimated by the famine, were forced to enter 'voluntarily' the Soviet collective farms. Though the harvest of 1933 was good, millions of Ukrainians did not live to see it.

The dimensions of the devastations of Ukraine by the famine 'organised' by Soviet Russia were carefully concealed by the Russian Communist Government, and are even now kept secret. Only by chance some foreign correspondents learned about the results of this famine in Ukraine. W. H. Chamberlin writes in his book, *The Confessions of an Individualist:* New York, 1941, on the famine of 1933 as follows:

"There were many rumours of mass starvation, especially in the normally rich farming regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus. The impression that something very abnormal was taking place in the villages was strengthened by the fact that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had introduced a new rule forbidding journalists to travel in Russia without special permission — a permission which was never granted when Ukraine and the North Caucasus were mentioned as destinations. The official explanation of this ruling would have deserved an international mendacity prize. It was that the presence of foreign correspondents would disturb the harvesting operations . . . The ban on journalistic travel was suggestively lifted after the new harvest had been gathered in — after there had been an opportunity to bury the corpses and to remove the outward signs of the famine —".

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The same author writes about his visit to the Ukrainian part of the North Caucasus — the Kuban Region:

"This had been one of the richest and most smiling agricultural regions in Russia . . . There was an amazing lack of domestic animals; one saw none of the dogs that had formerly rushed out barking when we entered Cossack villages. In the first house we entered at random we found that seven members of the family have died of hunger. Three had survived. We did not meet any peasant who did not tell us of the loss of relatives or friends".

On the famine in Ukraine Chamberlin writes:

"Poltava had acquired a particularly bad reputation; more than once we heard in Moscow of the carts that moved through the streets in the early morning, picking up dead bodies ... In Moscow it was easy to glib officials to deny to credulous foreigners that there had been any starvation. In Poltava famine could not be denied, although its extent was minimised ... While we were visiting a village called Zhuke, near Poltava, two local officials were carefully steering us into the homes of the petty officials of the local collective farm. Suddenly we decided to go into a house at random. We found a girl of fourteen huddled up on the bench which ran around the wall of the house. Had she a father? Yes, he was at work in the field. A mother? No, her mother and her four brothers and sisters had died during the last winter and spring. And her father, as we found, was still an edinolichnik, a peasant working his own land. Marvellous fatalistic stubbornness of a man who would see almost his whole family starve to death and still refuse to accept the new servitude of the collective farm!" (pp. 154—157). 731 656

In talks with the population and the reprensentatives of the administration, Chamberlin learned that in 1933 there had died of hunger in the Poltava region almost 15%, in the district of Cherkasy in Ukraine about 30%.

Stanley Richardson, correspondent of the American 'Associated Press' sent on September 22, 1933, the following telegram from Moscow to America:

"Soviet Russia has this year such a good harvest that a repetition of the undernourishment which had recently caused heavy losses of people and domestic animals is imposible. These losses one could see during a journey lasting a week through Ukraine and the Caucasus, the granaries of Moscow".

Owing to the Soviet censorship, Richardson could not give any figures about the victims of the famine in Ukraine. He quotes only the words of a Soviet Commissar in Ukraine named Asatkin:

"A great number of cattle and horses had perished. An exceptionally great number of peasants left the famine-stricken territory, looking for better living conditions. Many of them did not return" (*Ukrainian Voice:* Winnipeg, 27. 11. 1933).

A correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* who had been in Ukraine in the fall of 1933 gave a report on the Ukrainian hunger catastrophe, according to official Soviet sources:

In 1932 in Ukraine there had been 5,543,000 horses, in autumn 1933 only 2,772,000 remained — loss of 50%; the number of hogs diminished in the same time from 3,472,000 to 1,390,000; the number of sheep fell from 6,652,000 to 1,543,000. The top Communist

● 731 656 officials in Ukraine confirmed to the correspondent of the *Mancher Guardian* that in this country there had been a great mortality from hunger. Comparing the situation of that time in Ukraine and the North Caucasus with the situation in Russia, the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardin* came to the following conclusion when he said:

"It can be definitely stated that no provinces within a radius of several hundred miles of Moscow experienced the Ukrainian and North Caucasian extremities" (*Manchester Guardian:* October 19, and October 21, 1933).

The correspondent of a Jewish Socialist journal in New York, Lang, gave a description of the situation in the summer and autumn of 1933 in Ukraine: he saw how grown-ups and children were starving to death, he had been in totally depopulated villages where the inhabitants had died of hunger or fled from their homes (*Forwards:* 27. 12. 1933).

The American journalist Walter Duranty 'optimistically' estimated the number of the victims of the famine in USSR in 1933 as 5 million people. Of course, the principal part of these victims were in Ukraine, against which the Russian Communist régime was carrying its special policy of exstirpation.

In consequence of the famine and the repressions in Ukraine, principally men had perished. Therefore for instance, in 1932—33 the women in the collective farms in Ukraine were 60—70% of the total (*Communist:* Kharkov, 26. 1. 1934). The extent of child mortality was shown clearly in 1940; in the fall of 1940, the lack of births in 1932/33 forced the authorities to close parallel classes or abstain from opening first classes in many Ukrainian schools, for there where no children! The consequences of the famine in Ukraine could be seen in the decrease of the cultivation plain of the winter crops in autumn 1933: one million hectars less than in 1930 (*Izvestia:* Moscow, 16. 11. 1933).

661 731 656 Fully to realise the hypocritical policy of the Russian Communist dictatorship in Ukraine, one must add that Moscow tried to lay the responsibility for the famine in Ukraine on the Ukrainian Communists, who, as they pretended, 'had overstepped the Party line'. Many prominent Ukrainian Communists were arrested and shot under the pretext that they had caused the famine in Ukraine as 'agents of foreign capital'.

In the first years of their rule in Ukraine, the Russian Communists dreamt of world revolution and regarded the Ukrainian Western territories under the rule of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia as a bridge for their armed 'march on Europe'. In connection

with this, to a certain degree, was the policy of 'Ukrainisation' directed in Soviet Ukraine: Moscow intended to gain sympathy for the Soviet régime among the population of the Western Ukrainian territories in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The famine of 1932/33 in Soviet Ukraine roused great distrust and dislike of Soviet Russia among the Western Ukrainians. Therefore Soviet Russia destroyed thousands of intellectuals coming from the Western Ukrainian territories, among them Communists as 'agents who had worked for the money of foreign big landowners and capitalists' . . . 731 656 661

661 The Ukrainian nation, from the famine of 1921/22 and later years, suffered under the Soviet terrorist régime great losses of its biological substance. To this were added the enormous losses in World War II, in the risings and from the terror of both totalitarian régimes.

●731 In 1946 Ukraine had to suffer from a new famine in consequence of a bad harvest, and it must be stated that the policy of Moscow with respect to hungry Ukraine had not changed; the Ukrainian people received aid from the Communist Government only in a minimum degree. The principal aid came from America.

165 The statistics count the losses of the Ukrainian people during the Soviet Russian rule in Ukraine in millions. In 1917 approximately 30,000,000 people inhabited the territory of Ukraine within the frontiers of Soviet Ukraine before the outbreak of war in 1939. The Soviet statistics gave the figure of 31,000,000 inhabitants of Ukraine in 1933. The census of January 1939 counted a population of only 30,960,000 in Ukraine. These figures show clearly the consequences of the Soviet Russian policy of exstirpation in Ukraine. If a normal increase of population had taken place, the population of Ukraine should have reached at least 40,000,000. Thus Ukraine had had from 1917 to 1939 a loss of 10,000,000 inhabitants! (comp. Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union — History and Prospects:* Geneva, 1946).

An entirely different picture statistics show in Russia: from 78 million in 1926 the Russians grew to 99,3 million in 1939. These figures speak for themselves.

000 After World War II, the Russian Communist dictatorship is playing on the strings of the traditional Russian nationalism and imperialism more than before. 'The great Russian nation', 'the great Russian language' and similar epithets doubtless inspire the Russians and make them an obedient instrument of Moscow's imperialistic policy.

During World War II a new political trend appeared among the Russian emigrants who had fought at the beginning of the revolution in the 'White Armies' against the Communist dictatorship. This was the movement of so-called 'Soviet Patriots', who began to return in masses to Russia, especially from France, inspired by the prospects of the growth of the Russian Empire under Communist leadership.

In the Soviet Union the national movements of the subjugated peoples are officially regarded as the 'principal danger'. Therefore, the Soviet Government is making haste in 'liquidating' entire nations which Moscow has recognised as 'reactionary' — Crimean Tartars, the peoples of the North Caucasus, etc. Of course, the

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433 During all this time the livestock of the Ukraine (see next
231 Section), was being slowly and laboriously built up by gifts from the
262 rest of the Union, by levies on Germany, and by natural increase.
731 Meat was very scarce, since no-one was willing to slaughter and further deplete the slender herds. Cows, used for draught purposes, gave little milk. Now added to these intense shortages of meat, fat and dairy products was another great deficiency of cereals and bread, hitherto the mainstay of the Ukrainian post-war diet.

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241 The 1946 harvest cannot, at the most optimistic estimate, be
433 reckoned at more than 40 per cent. of 1940 in cereals and vegetables per hectare sown.[1] There is no fodder for the jealously guarded
231 animals; shelter for them is also very scarce since the people themselves are only now moving out of dugouts. If the animals are slaughtered, the small supplies of dairy products and meat will soon disappear; and the problem of draught power will remain as acute as ever.

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241 There is an agricultural dilemma in the Ukraine which a good
433 harvest would have gone far to break. Although extensive and con-
464 tinued demobilizations have been taking place, there is a great shortage of labour on the farms.[2] If manpower is taken from the farms to help produce the machinery necessary to liberate further men from the land, there may not be enough farm workers left to produce sufficient food for the factory workers. The poor harvest has aggravated this vicious circle.

The Soviet Government has attempted in various ways to meet this problem not only in the Ukraine, but throughout the Union. Everyone who is able to work does so; young people, old people, women. The
U women who worked during the war have remained part of the labour force in both industry and agriculture, and an increasing number are being
[462] recruited. In the Ukraine in 1946, women composed at least 60 - 70 per cent. of the farm working force.

SU
[464 At the same time as steps are being taken to concentrate more
241] workers in agriculture, the organization of the collective farms is
474 being overhauled and geared to higher efficiency. To accomplish this,
647 the Soviet Council of Ministers created on September 19, 1946, a Collective Farm Council, whose main tasks will be to elaborate measures for the improvement of collective farming. This Council which is authorized to call conferences of collective farm representatives when necessary, was set up for the purpose of "establishing strict control over the observation of collective farm statutes and for the solution
900 of questions of the collective farm structure." One of their primary

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1 One must also bear in mind the reduced area under cultivation.

2 The war losses are felt very acutely.

IV UNRRA ASSISTANCE TO THE UKRAINE

Distribution of UNRRA Supplies

648 731 UNRRA supplies for the Ukraine are handed over to the government at the port of entry (usually Odessa on the Black Sea); and the government is then responsible for arranging distribution.

648 731 647 Like most other countries receiving UNRRA help, the Ukrainian Government has established a special organization to supervise the reception, warehousing, and distribution of all UNRRA goods received. This organization - which has on its staff specialists in food, industrial equipment, agricultural rehabilitation, food processing machinery, medical supplies, transport, accounting and distribution - is called the Department of UNRRA Supplies, and is directly responsible to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

The Department (headed by Mr. V.V. Khomyak) works in close liaison with the various ministries of the Ukrainian Government, and with the UNRRA Mission. On the basis of decisions made by the particular ministries concerned, it draws up plans for the distribution of UNRRA supplies and keeps a central record of their sales and of the proceeds expended by the government for further relief projects.

5:4 648 731 Most UNRRA shipments for both the Ukraine and Byelorussia have arrived through the port of Odessa; and since early 1946 an UNRRA officer has been stationed there to handle problems connected with delivery. Before an UNRRA shipment comes in, the authorities at Odessa are notified of the ship's name, its expected time of arrival, and the nature of its cargo. As soon as possible after the ship lands, discharging of cargo begins. Stevedoring labour is supplied by the port commander's service organization, "Inflot", which also furnishes checkers to work in the ship's hold and on the docks, counting the supplies and reporting any damaged goods. As the cargo is unloaded, perishable items, such as clothing and cheese, are placed in warehouses on the docks, and seeds in a warehouse in the suburbs of Odessa. Packaged goods, such as canned meat, army rations, and juices, are piled on the dock at shipside and finally into freight cars.

6:4 731 Directives for the distribution of the supplies (based upon decisions of the recipient ministries concerned) are issued by the Department of UNRRA Supplies to the Ministry of Foreign Trade representative in Odessa, whose office then instructs the railroad and barge authorities, providing such information as the name and location of the organization or governmental authority receiving the supplies, and a description of the goods to be delivered.

[6:5] UNRRA relief supplies are either sold to individual ration-card or permit holders, or distributed to collectives, co-operatives, and other

648 enterprises; and in accordance with the provisions of the UNRRA
731 agreement, the Ukrainian Government uses the proceeds for further relief and rehabilitation work within the country. Food and soap
[657] supplies for example are sold through regular trade channels to ration-card holders, or are delivered to organizations which use them for factory or community feeding. Clothing also is sold in stores against ration cards, or in the case of workers having a high rate of clothing and shoe consumption, against special orders. Used clothing is distributed free of charge to invalids of the war, families of war dead, pensioners, or other recipients of social welfare. Medical supplies and equipment are transferred free of charge to the Ministry of Health. The distribution of agricultural and industrial equipment varies depending upon the nature of the supplies. Consumable items, such as seeds, jute, bagging, rope and industrial raw materials, are sold to collectives, state farms, co-operatives, or industrial enterprises. Capital equipment such as tractors, food processing machinery, or power generators is delivered free of charge to the recipient ministries or their subsidiary distribution organizations. Tractors in particular are delivered in this way to state-owned Machine Tractor Stations.

Proceeds of Sale of UNRRA Supplies

648 Up to March 1, 1947, the sale of UNRRA supplies in the Ukraine
731 had provided the government with 3,166,482,000 roubles[1] for additional relief and rehabilitation work in the Republic. Roughly 85 per cent.
652 of this total resulted from sales of UNRRA food; 6 per cent. from the sale of clothing; and 9 per cent. from the sale of miscellaneous raw materials and agricultural supplies.

Of the cumulative proceeds up to March 1, about 21 million roubles had been used to pay the expenses of distribution, and 823,511 roubles had been spent to provide goods and services to the UNRRA Mission. Of the balance then remaining available (3,144,655,500), nearly half had been used for rehabilitation work at the Republican (state) level of government; 1,324,239,000 roubles had been transferred to regional executive committees (the next level of government) for expenditure on local projects; and about 391 million roubles in cash was still available for future use.

State Relief and Rehabilitation Projects

652 At the state level rehabilitation work carried on from the beginning
657 of UNRRA deliveries up to March 1, 1947, amounted to 1,429,060,000 roubles, and was divided among four main categories; rehabilitation of the national economy, 74 per cent. of the total state-level expenditures; health services, 14 per cent.; children's institutions and schools, 11 per cent.; and social welfare, 1 per cent.

Rehabilitation of the National Economy. These expenditures are administered by the various ministries having productive capital works

[1] 21.36 roubles equals one pound sterling; 5.40 roubles equals one U.S. dollar (March 1947).

652 under their jurisdiction. For example, capital works, repairs,
657 and equipment for livestock raising centres, piggeries, cattle sheds, slaughterhouses and refrigerators (under the Ministry of Cattle Breeding); vineyards, orchards, repairs of irrigation facilities (under the Ministry of Technical Agricultural Production); repairs to barns and agricultural implements (under the Ministry of Agriculture); and rehabilitation of the brick and ceramic industry (under the Ministry of Home Construction).

Health Services. These expenditures are administered by the Ministry of Health, and include the feeding of patients, and repairs and equipment for hospitals and health service agencies.

[658] Children's Institutions (over four years) and Schools. These expenditures are handled by the Ministry of Education, and include the feeding of children; and capital works, repairs and equipment for schools and children's homes.

Social Welfare Services Directed towards the Betterment of General Well-being. These expenditures are administed by the Ministry of Social Welfare and include such services as repairs and maintenance of social welfare agencies, and assistance to invalids.

Local Rehabilitation

648 As at March 1, 1947, about 41 per cent. of the gross proceeds of
727 UNRRA sales had been transferred to regional executive committees of
185 the government for use in the local and district economy. The local projects - which are undertaken after approval by the state authorities
731 and are subject to regular reporting and inspection - are similar in character to those carried out by the Republican Government Ministries. However, there is a considerable shift in emphasis. For example, at the regional level, nearly 57 per cent. of the total proceeds at their disposal was utilized for health services (hospitals, nurseries), 35 per cent. for children's institutions, 5 per cent. for repairs of public and industrial institutions, and 2 per cent. for the building of schools and repair of clubs.

Deliveries of UNRRA Supplies

648 In the original agreement between UNRRA and the Ukrainian Govern-
731 ment was a provision that the Administration would "strive within the limits of its resources" to procure and deliver the Ukraine's share of relief and rehabilitation supplies before July 1, 1946. In the early months of 1946, however, it became clear that procurement difficulties and transport hold-ups would prevent a great part of the supplies from being delivered in time. The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was therefore extended to the end of 1946.

From December 1945, (when UNRRA deliveries to the Ukraine began) up to June 30, 1946, (the time at which they were originally scheduled

648 to end) only 202,585 gross long tons of UNRRA supplies had arrived in
731 the Ukraine. These consisted mainly of foodstuffs (three-fourths of the entire tonnage); while slightly less than one-tenth was made up of clothing, textiles and footwear; and 67 tons were medical equipment. Despite the urgent need of agricultural and industrial supplies, only 15,336 and 13,249 tons respectively had reached the Ukraine by the end of June.

By the end of January 1947, UNRRA shipments to the Ukraine from all sources amounted to 407,125 gross long tons; and the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine reported that 372,796 tons of this had reached Soviet
[504] ports. Delays in shipments during December and January were greater than usual because the port of Odessa for the first time in many years was frozen over, and ships lay icebound for days.

The following table shows UNRRA shipments in comparison with the programme.

TABLE XXII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Programme (thousand U.S. dollars)	Shipments to January 31, 1946 (thousand U.S. dollars)	(gross long tons)
Food, feed, soap	100,189	94,587	287,519
Clothing, textiles, and footwear	16,856	16,801	15,095
Medical and sanitation	2,326	1,858	373
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088	14,403	29,070
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591	34,077	75,068
Totals	188,050	161,726	407,125

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Industrial Rehabilitation Supplies

731 As the table shows, 75,068 gross long tons of the total supplies
48 shipped by January 31 were industrial rehabilitation equipment. These supplies have, however, been extremely slow in arriving. Up to the
433 end of June 1946 only 13,249 gross long tons had reached the Ukraine, including United States army surplus equipment of about 20 electric power stations and generators, as well as some raw materials, chiefly rubber, tin, lead, copper and other metals, and welding electrodes. A small number of machines for use in automobile repair shops, and about 90 motor cars and trucks had also arrived; but the slow delivery of machinery to transport materials and process building equipment was a serious defect, since much of the rubble of war damage had been cleared away, and the lack of such supplies was a hindrance to

731 rebuilding. Between July 1, 1946, and January 31, 1947, however,
648 another 38,744 tons of industrial supplies arrived, bringing the
433 deliveries up to 51,993 gross long tons.

The following table shows the composition of all industrial supplies shipped to the Ukraine by the end of January 1947

TABLE XXIII

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Industrial Equipment up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Transport and telecommunications	620	949
Public utilities	18,975	27,451
Building repair equipment	5,030	3,209
Machine repair equipment	1,041	527
Miscellaneous consumer goods	307	97
Materials, chemicals, engineering stores	7,930	42,684
	174	151
Totals	34,077	75,068

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Many of the metals which have been received are being used in canning factories or in the manufacture of household utensils and dishes. Pipe supplies (the first shipments of which arrived in December) are being used to replace destroyed water and gas mains. Canvas tarpaulin has been distributed for use in mines and on the farms of the Ukraine. Although these supplies have unquestionably filled some of the needs, the UNRRA Mission reports that the quantities are too small and the task of reconstruction too great for them to make much impact.

About one-third of the industrial rehabilitation programme for the Ukraine consists of so-called "protocol" supplies - that is certain items of industrial equipment which in a previous trade agreement the United Kingdom had contracted to furnish to the Soviet Union. After UNRRA assumed responsibility in the Ukraine and Byelorussia, negotiations commenced for the transfer of this equipment through UNRRA. About the middle of 1946 arrangements were concluded; and it was agreed that UNRRA would take over and deliver these "protocol" supplies as part of the industrial rehabilitation programme. Similarly, UNRRA became financially responsible for those "protocol" supplies which had already been delivered to the Soviet Union for use in Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

By March 1, 1947, about 16,720,000 dollars' worth of "protocol"

731
433 supplies had been shipped to the Ukraine; remaining "protocol" ship-
648 ments to the Ukraine are expected to amount to 923 tons and 784,617 dollars.

Included in these supplies are power stations, pumps, portable cranes, presses, electric locomotives, and electrical and telephone equipment.

Agricultural Supplies

731 The greater part of the tonnage in agricultural supplies consisted
241 of seeds; by January 31, 1947, 15,669 gross long tons had been shipped.
648 Most of these seeds had arrived in the spring of 1946; however, some of the bags were inadequately labelled, and the contents not easily identifiable. Because of this difficulty the seeds had to be given costly and time-consuming laboratory tests, which delayed distribution. At the same time, 2,600 tons of seeds were reported by the Ukrainian Government to be either diseased or infested with weeds, and therefore unfit for sowing. Negotiations are still in process for the replacement of these defective seeds by suitable types.

[407] As at the end of 1946 the amount of farm machinery which had arrived was small. For example, the UNRRA programme calls for the delivery of 1,600 tractors to the Ukraine, but only 310 had been received by December 31, and these came too late for autumn ploughing. They are being distributed to state owned Machine Tractor Stations for use this spring.

UNRRA shipments have also included 6,692 tons of bagging, 2,090 tons of fishing equipment, and 244 tons of dairy equipment. These are shown in the following table, which summarizes agricultural rehabilitation shipments to the end of January.

TABLE XXIV

UNRRA Shipments to the Ukraine of Agricultural Supplies up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Bagging	1,672	6,692
Farm machinery	1,517	2,941
Fishing equipment	651	2,090
Food processing equipment	551	1,122
Repair material and hand tools		312
Seeds	9,861	15,669
Dairy and poultry equipment	151	244
Totals	14,403	29,070

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

Medical Supplies

731 The UNRRA medical and sanitation programme for the Ukraine is
758 extremely small in relation to the needs; and the rate of deliveries
648 has been the poorest of any commodity group.

Up to the end of January 1947 the Administration had shipped to the Ukraine 373 gross long tons of medical and sanitation equipment valued at 1,858,000 dollars, leaving a balance still to be shipped of just over 468,000 dollars.

In a country where the destruction has been so great and where food supplies are so low, a medical programme of 2,326,000 dollars cannot make much impression; however, such equipment as has been received is being used to the best possible advantage.

743 Most of the hospitals and invalids' homes in the Ukraine are operating under appalling difficulties; and the urgency of the need for equipment and medical supplies is everywhere evident. The UNRRA Mission early in 1946 described several hospitals which they had visited in various parts of the Ukraine. Here is their observation of the one at Kremenchug:

"Kremenchug formerly had a good 450-bed general hospital, which was blown up by a thoroughly efficient demolition battalion when the Germans retreated. All equipment, including an 8,000-volume medical library and a well-equipped X-ray laboratory, was demolished. The only buildings which escaped destruction were seven small sheds and storage houses on the outskirts of the hospital grounds.

"The hospital staff recently installed 250 beds in these ramshackle buildings. In a number of wards the windows were bricked up because no glass is available, and the only light came from an unshaded 40-watt electric bulb in the corridor. Paint was flaking off the floor and the walls of the surgery; most of the roofs leaked, there were no indoor toilets; fuel was available to heat only the operating and delivery rooms and the nursery. (Four babies, on an average, are delivered each
743 day). Many of the patients had no gowns and no bed clothes, except
758 what they were able to bring with them. No soap whatever has been available to the hospital for some time; laundry was simply being boiled with a little soda, and the floors were scrubbed with a lye solution. The only surgical equipment we saw was a few dozen scalpels and haemostats in one small cabinet in the corner of the operating room, and two sterilizers.

"The doctor in charge told us that his patients received an average diet of 1,000 to 1,200 calories a day, consisting mostly of bread, potatoes, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of fat. (The low calorie intake is largely due to the inability of the patients to digest the coarse whole-grain rye or wheat bread, which is available in reasonable quantities). Theoretically the hospital is entitled to 2,500 grams

743 758 of meat daily for each thirty patients; but, since there is rarely any meat to be had, it received 400 grams of dried milk as a substitute, or approximately 13 grams per patient each day.

"The hospital was so badly overcrowded that beds had been set up in the corridors and even in the yard. Some of these beds had been salvaged from the ruins of the old hospital, and consequently were badly twisted and charred."

The same general conditions prevailed in most of the hospitals visited. The fact that so much improvement has since been made with so little help promises the best use of future deliveries of UNRRA medical supplies. The programme includes in addition to dressings, drugs and chemicals, X-ray equipment and supplies, surgical instruments, dental equipment, and a penicillin plant.

Clothing

291 [294] 648 731 Since most of the Ukraine's clothing factories were heavily damaged or destroyed in the war, there is a widespread shortage of all articles of wearing apparel. The limited UNRRA programme has fallen considerably short of satisfying all the requirements; however, such supplies as have been sent - particularly textiles and shoes - have been economically used to help the most critical cases.

By the end of January 1947 UNRRA had sent the Ukraine 15,095 gross long tons of clothing valued at 16,801 dollars, leaving an unshipped balance of 55,000 dollars. The following table gives the composition of the shipments.

TABLE XXV

UNRRA Shipments of Clothing to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Finished clothing	779	384
Blankets and comforters	902	522
Cotton textiles	573	321
Woollen textiles	3,487	1,359
Raw wool	2,240	3,729
Footwear	5,697	3,997
Upper leather	575	259
Sole leather	1,274	1,624
Hides	188	381
Miscellaneous textiles	183	149
Miscellaneous footwear	735	2,368
Unclassified	168	n.a.
Totals	16,801	15,095

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

291 In addition to these items, UNRRA has delivered several thousand
●731 tons of used clothing and footwear contributed through voluntary
relief organizations in other countries. Most of the contributed
648 supplies are distributed to war invalids or to orphans of the war.

The thousands of pairs of shoes delivered by UNRRA, as well as shoes made in the Ukraine from UNRRA leather, are sold according to a rationing system, with miners and heavy industry workers receiving highest priority. Textiles (also rationed) are sold as piece goods, or are made into garments in Ukrainian workshops for sale to permit holders. UNRRA blankets and comforters are distributed chiefly to hospitals and childrens' homes; and hides and other materials furnished by UNRRA are used in the construction of orthopædic footwear or artificial limbs for wounded veterans.

Food Supplies

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241 When the UNRRA Mission first arrived in the Ukraine, no data
were available on the republic's exact food situation. The 1945
433 crops sown in a reduced area, under great difficulties of seed,
262 fertilizer, and implement shortages, had yielded only a fraction of
pre-war harvests. It was expected, however, that Ukrainian farms
would produce enough grain to supply the population with bread and
cereals until the 1946-47 harvest. UNRRA food supplies were there-
fore calculated to provide chiefly meats, fats (or equivalents in the
form of army rations), and dairy products.

731 Altogether, UNRRA planned to use 100 million dollars of the
262 Ukrainian budget for food. By the end of January 1947, all but
648 5½ million dollars of this had been shipped, as is shown in the
following table.

TABLE XXVI

UNRRA Food Shipments to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Grain and grain products	548	3,836
Meat and meat products	30,682	54,245
Fish	4,166	23,240
Dairy products	13,378	33,134
Fats, oils, soap	12,725	41,885
Pulses	615	4,658
Beverages	1,490	3,437
Soup- dehydrated	2,835	9,392
Quartermaster food	27,134	109,055
Other food	206	548
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture surpluses	808	3,689
Totals	94,587	287,519

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

731 Most of the UNRRA food supplies delivered to the Ukraine are
262 distributed to ration stores for sale to workers and their dependants.
[443 A large proportion (about 35 per cent.) also goes for communal feeding
265] through dining rooms, health resorts, homes for invalids and the aged, and dining halls of trade schools. Hospitals, childrens' homes, maternity homes, and the like also receive a share (around 10 per cent.) (The food distributed to welfare organizations is delivered free of charge).

731 Apart from the food which UNRRA supplies, the Ukrainian people
26 are dependent on whatever amounts of local produce may appear on
434 various markets. According to the rationing system, the farmers are allowed to retain part of their produce to feed themselves and their dependants, and the farm's livestock; the state then purchases a certain quota for use in feeding the non-farm population. If any surplus then remains, the farmers may keep it, or sell it on the free market at uncontrolled prices.

241 In practice, however, because of the extremely poor harvests in
433 the last two years, Ukrainian farmers have scarcely been able to feed
434 even themselves; and the amounts of domestically produced food which reach the ration stores or the free market have consequently been small.

The following section describes the sources of food supply open to the urban consumers.

The System of Food Distribution

443 In the cities of the Ukraine there are three outlets through which
434 foodstuffs reach the population:

364 (a) the ration stores, where the bulk of foodstuffs are sold
262 at fixed prices to ration-coupon holders;

(b) the so-called gastronoms (commercial stores) where scarce, luxury items are sold; and

(c) the public markets, where collective farmers and peasants bring their surplus produce for sale.

Most of the rural areas and villages of the Ukraine are expected to produce locally enough food to feed the inhabitants; and as they are nearly all considered to be self-supplying, they receive through the central distribution system only sugar and sometimes bread. Their surplus farm produce (that is, food in excess of that needed for feeding people or livestock on the farm and not subject to collection or purchase by the state) is usually brought by the farmers to the public markets for sale to the urban population.
[435 The quantities of produce and the variety of items available in the free public markets vary greatly from season to season and from day to day; Prices are equally unstable.

000 day to day; prices are equally unstable.

Ration Stores

443 Members of the UNRRA Mission have visited ration stores in all
434 the more important cities of the Ukraine. The city of Kiev, for
262 example, has about 300, all of them much alike. The typical ration food store serves from 2,000 to 2,500 families living in the immediate neighbourhood; if a family moves, it changes its ration card registration to a store in its new locality. Some stores, however, serve the employees of a particular factory or organization as well as a neighbourhood; others are limited to special categories of customers, such as veterans, pregnant women and nursing mothers, teachers, doctors, and scientific workers; these stores have a slightly more varied stock of goods; and in the case of shops for pregnant women and nursing mothers, the roster of customers is smaller so that there is no waiting to be served.

721 Except for bread, most of the food sold in Ukrainian ration shops in 1946 was supplied by UNRRA. Many of these relief supplies, however, did not fit into the established rationing system; therefore many rather elaborate substitution schemes had to be devised, particularly for U.S. army C, K and ten-in-one rations, which were often substituted for a variety of foods. These schemes were said to be in effect throughout the Ukraine, local bodies having authority to make minor changes in substitution values to fit whatever stocks of goods were on hand at the moment.

For example, according to the scheme effective in Kiev in March 1946, if a customer was entitled to buy one kilogram of meat or fish monthly, he might possible substitute 15 eggs, or 200 grams of powdered milk, or 800 grams of sausage, or a 600 gram can of UNRRA tushonka[1] provided any of these were available. In lieu of one kilogram of fat rarely available the customer might buy 60 eggs, or two kilos of cheese, or 3 kilograms of sour cream, or 1.6 kilograms of powdered milk, or 400 grams of peanut butter, again provided they were available.

The army ten-in-one rations are packed in two cardboard boxes, labelled "first half" and "second half". In Kiev the "first half" was considered to be equivalent to 500 grams of fat and 1½ kilograms of sugar; while the "second half" was equivalent to 2 kilograms of meat and 500 grams of sugar.

In Poltava in April 1946 one U.S. army K ration was being considered the equivalent of 800 grams of meat or 206 grams of fat; one C ration, equal to 925 grams of meat or 310 grams of fat; the first half of a ten-in-one ration equalled 1,500 grams of meat or 500 grams of fat, and the second half of a ten-in-one ration, four kilograms of meat or 1,330 grams of fat.

A canned meat mixture.

TABLE XXVIII

Ukraine: Food Prices in a Typical Public Market
(in roubles)

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	June 1946	July 1946	January 1947
Bread, kilo	22.5	23.0	50.0 - 55.0
Meat "	about 60.0	70 - 100	60.0
Fish "	-	-	65.0
Milk, litre	16.0	15.0	16.0
Butter, kilo	190.0	190.0	230.0
Eggs, dozen	42.0	48.0	-
Cereals (various) kilo	-	50.0	-
Sugar	-	100.0	-
Vegetable oil	-	200.0	200.0

- Very little or none on sale. Supplies vary greatly but are never very large.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

UNRRA Supplies and the Food Situation

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Until the produce from local farms became available in the spring and summer of 1946, the diet of the urban population of the Ukraine depended principally, apart from bread, on UNRRA food supplies, which in the beginning consisted almost entirely of U.S. army rations, plus some dried and evaporated milk and tushonka. Urgently needed fats and oils were slow in arriving; up to May only 8,596 tons had been received in the Ukraine. The shortage was critical, since domestic production was providing a rate of only 4 to 5 kilograms of fats a year per person, as compared with 12.8 in 1940 and 22 kilograms in 1929.

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Very little food was being received from other parts of the Soviet Union, and a protracted dry spell was threatening the 1946 harvest. Official rations for almost all categories of consumers were low;

262 On the farms of the Ukraine the diet, although in some respects better, was for the most part, restricted and monotonous; bread and cabbage soup were the staple items; meat consumption was negligible and the intake of fats and oils, well below a pound a month per person.

262 The present situation compared with the spring of 1946 is much
731 worse. UNRRA food deliveries to the Ukraine are all but completed.
133 The 1946-47 harvest on which so many hopes were set, proved a dismal disappointment; and other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance. Domestic stocks must therefore last until the next harvest; and the outlook until then is bleak.

434 On October 1, 1946, because of the shortage of domestically
262 produced food and the imminent cessation of UNRRA supplies, Ukrainian rations for all categories of consumers had to be reduced. For most people this meant either that their cereal ration was cancelled, or that their bread quota was lowered or both.

For example, heavy workers, light workers, and employees, - although still receiving the same amount of bread, are no longer entitled to the cereal ration of 2.0, 1.2, and 0.8 kilograms a month respectively. Dependents fare even worse: not only have they lost their cereal ration, but in addition, their bread quota has been cut from 9 to 7.5 kilograms a month. The bread ration for children also has been cut from 12 to 9 kilograms, and their meat from 0.4 to 0.3 kilograms; however, they still receive the same cereal ration as before (0.8 kilograms a month).

Rations for mothers vary of course, according to the occupational category; but their special allowances remain the same, providing approximately 745 extra calories daily.

In terms of calories, these bread and cereal cuts have reduced the diet of heavy workers from 3,757 calories a day to 3,527; light workers are down from 1,820 to 1,682; employees from 1,236 to 1,144; dependents from 895 to 704; and children up to 12, from 1,209 to 973.

The following table shows the ration scales now in effect. Six out of about twelve groups have been chosen to show typical differentiations. Special groups - for example, tuberculosis patients in
[737] institutions - have not been included. It should be noted that dependents are defined as those who are not working and who have
000 passed the age of 55.[1] Mothers usually work and draw, throughout their

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1 Previously the age was 45 years; but it has been raised in an effort to get all non-producers to work.

645 744 262 (a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

241 727 The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

731 649 262 UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.

262
731 Everything depends on this year's harvest (1947-48). Meanwhile, the next three or four months are expected to be the worst period since the famine of 1922. No people in Europe who suffered under German occupation and devastation will continue to suffer from hunger in 1947 as much as will the people of the Ukraine.

777 various prophecies as to the future of the child, but final decision rests with the oldest, whose judgment prevails. These same judges grant the child a star, which shines only so long as he [776] lives; upon his death it falls to earth. Every person at birth likewise receives a guardian angel, whose duty it is to protect him throughout his life. Before starting any new task, and especially when in danger, the peasant calls upon his ministering angel for assistance, saying: "Guardian angel, help me!"[31] Since one's fate is determined at birth, one can do little to change it. This explains, in the popular mind, why one man is poor and another rich, one healthy and another sick, why one lives long and another dies young. It also explains why there are all kinds of children in the world, and why even children of the same parents often differ so markedly.[32]

845 A deformed or mentally deficient child is ascribed to the act ●732 of an evil spirit, particularly the *diwa-baba*. Such a child has a large head, is always lean, and can never be satiated. With his tremendous appetite he suckles so ravenously that his mother's breast finally withers away. Such a child causes constant trouble, is retarded in its growth and short-lived, and does not reach a stature commensurate with his age until after death.[33]

II. Christening Ceremonies

851 While great secrecy surrounds pregnancy and birth, the 553 ceremonies that follow are ushered in with the greatest publicity. As soon as she has attended to the child and the mother, the midwife begins to make preparations for the christening (*chres-* [777] *tyny*), which must take place immediately. A child who is allowed to remain unbaptized over night is exposed to all sorts of dangers. If at all possible, therefore, an infant is taken to church to be baptized on the very day it is born, even though the hour be late in the evening, the weather extremely unfavourable, and the distance considerable.[34] While the father, who takes

[113]

[31] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [32] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 287.

[33] Kaindl, R. F., "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi (Braunschweig, 1899), 256.

[34] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 113; Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

distribution. These co-operatives formed the basis of a certain national unity which found expression in the political field. 474

Volhynia, partitioned after the war of 1920 between the Poles and the Soviets, is nearly as old an agricultural country as Galicia. Here the strips of rich black earth alternate with sandy and wooded country. Although density of population is not so great as in Galicia, poverty is perhaps even greater, owing to a lack of that capacity for organization which helps the Galician labourers to survive. The large estates of the Polish nobility have long disappeared; after the last war the Polish Government divided up the land. Numerous strips were allotted to Polish soldiers on the expiration of their service—with the intention of strengthening the Polish ethnic and cultural element in the region. The disappearance of the large estates, as in Transylvania and Roumania, had a deleterious effect on agricultural production and on the proper exploitation of the forests. The majority of the people lead a half-starved existence, and the young men dream of emigration to South America. In 1937, 25 per cent of the population of Polish Volhynia had neither bread nor wood. 311 134 241 735

Podolia has been a land of cultivation since the Middle Ages, although the soil was broken up two or three hundred years later than in Galicia and Volhynia. Now, as before the period of war and revolution (1914–20), Podolia remains in a close economic relationship to the other parts of the Ukraine. The black earth of this favoured province is really fruitful and well watered by numerous small rivers; climatic conditions are better than anywhere throughout the Ukraine—rain is plentiful and regular and the winters are short. It was probably the fields and pastures, the hillocks and woods of Podolia which the Polish poet had in mind when he wrote lyrically of 'the birthplace of Ceres and Diana'. Horticulture and apiculture have long flourished there. 311 134

In the past social conditions varied with the political situation according to whether the small landowners (Ukrainian Cossacks) or the Polish landlords were in the ascendant. During the eighteenth century Polish elements had the upper hand and for some time Podolia remained the last refuge of the Polish aristocracy. Polish social influences survived the Three Partitions, and it was only after the Polish Insurrection of 1830 that conditions began to change in favour of the Russian majority in the population. 177

Towards the middle of the nineteenth century this rich land with its soft climate had become very densely populated. By the end of the century Podolia ranked second in density of population of all the regions of the Russian Empire. The Government of Moscow took 162 311

434 mothers usually work and draw, throughout their
262 pregnancy and afterwards, their full occupational rations,[1] plus the
145 special allowances indicated. If they do not work, they draw dependents' rations plus their special allowance.

[855] Children up to 14 includes infants from one to seven, who also receive special rations through milk kitchens, nurseries, nursery schools, and kindergartens. These amount to 9.0 litres of milk and 6.0 grams of fats monthly.

434 The employee category includes such occupational groups as office
262 workers, timekeepers, and caretakers. The light workers group includes railway workers, machine builders, etc. The heavy workers group includes moulders, steelworkers, and miners. The latter receive a further additional ration in the form of a hot meal if they do underground work.

(It must be emphasized that the amounts given in the table are official scales, which, even though reduced, cannot regularly be met. Throughout, the figures in brackets refer to scarce items which are authorized, but cannot be supplied.)

TABLE XXIX

Ukrainian Ration Scales from October 1, 1946
(in kilograms per month)

Rationed commodity	Consumer category: Heavy worker	Light worker	Employee	Dependent[1]	Children up to 14
Bread	36.0	18.0	12.0	7.5	9.0
Cereals	nil	nil	nil	nil	(0.8)
Sugar	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	0.3
Meat or fish	(3.2)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.5)	(0.4)
Fats	(0.9)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Butter (or substitute)	nil	nil	nil	nil	.06
Potatoes	(5.0)	"	"	"	nil
Vegetables	(3.0)	"	"	"	(2.0)
Milk, fresh, dried, or evaporated	nil	"	"	"	9.0 scarce
Vitamin juices	"	"	"	"	
Approximate daily calories from rations only	3,527	1,682	1,144	704	973 plus 204 infants

[936] In February 1947 the rations for dependents was again changed, and they are now authorized to receive only bread, 7.5 kilograms monthly.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

1 [As of 1947 -- Analyst]

262 On the farms of the Ukraine the diet, although in some respects better, was for the most part, restricted and monotonous; bread and cabbage soup were the staple items; meat consumption was negligible and the intake of fats and oils, well below a pound a month per person.

262 731 733 The present situation compared with the spring of 1946 is much worse. UNRRA food deliveries to the Ukraine are all but completed. The 1946-47 harvest on which so many hopes were set, proved a dismal disappointment; and other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance. Domestic stocks must therefore last until the next harvest; and the outlook until then is bleak.

434 262 On October 1, 1946, because of the shortage of domestically produced food and the imminent cessation of UNRRA supplies, Ukrainian rations for all categories of consumers had to be reduced. For most people this meant either that their cereal ration was cancelled, or that their bread quota was lowered or both.

For example, heavy workers, light workers, and employees, - although still receiving the same amount of bread, are no longer entitled to the cereal ration of 2.0, 1.2, and 0.8 kilograms a month respectively. Dependents fare even worse: not only have they lost their cereal ration, but in addition, their bread quota has been cut from 9 to 7.5 kilograms a month. The bread ration for children also has been cut from 12 to 9 kilograms, and their meat from 0.4 to 0.3 kilograms; however, they still receive the same cereal ration as before (0.8 kilograms a month).

Rations for mothers vary of course, according to the occupational category; but their special allowances remain the same, providing approximately 745 extra calories daily.

In terms of calories, these bread and cereal cuts have reduced the diet of heavy workers from 3,757 calories a day to 3,527; light workers are down from 1,820 to 1,682; employees from 1,236 to 1,144; dependents from 895 to 704; and children up to 12, from 1,209 to 973.

The following table shows the ration scales now in effect. Six out of about twelve groups have been chosen to show typical differentiations. Special groups - for example, tuberculosis patients in [737] institutions - have not been included. It should be noted that dependents are defined as those who are not working and who have passed the age of 55.[1] Mothers usually work and draw, throughout their

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1 Previously the age was 45 years; but it has been raised in an effort to get all non-producers to work.

476 was made in the cooperative society's own factories. The society owned cement factories, lime plants, mills, cloth-weaving factories, bakeries, oil presses and even a factory that made boot polish and cosmetics.

439 Whither did Ukrainian goods go? Peas, beans and poultry to England and Belgium, clover seed to Holland, /94/ pigs to Germany, beef cattle via Constanta to Greece, poultry to Germany, Switzerland and to - Palestine, eggs to many countries and in cans, as far as Buenos Aires.

[545] Sociologically noteworthy is the growth of an urban stratum of artisans, merchants and small industrialists. The Ukrainians who, much to their 369 own disadvantage, neglected the cities because of 476 their love for quiet village life, now gradually pushed into the cities, and the credit cooperatives supported them in this.

*

741 Of greatest significance for the advancement of Ukrainian culture were the societies for edu- 517 cation and public health. The society for popular 217 education, "Prosvita", was even older than the Ukrainian system of cooperatives, reaching back to 1883. It was a veritable national sanctuary of the Ukrainians. The people are indebted to it for a large part of their cultural advance. The "Prosvita" was an actual school for advanced studies in the country. In 3214 village libraries with 700,000 volumes, two instructive monthly magazines and with inexpensive editions of books, it enabled the village inhabitants who were cut off from all urban culture to obtain the knowledge which alone made it possible for them to assert themselves against their enemies. Besides that, 741 "Prosvita", which on January 1, 1938 numbered 517 360,000 members, and owned 1457 club houses with rooms for meetings, promoted group singing, music, the community theater and folk art. It helped

•741 illiterates to learn to read by means of special
517 courses, and it gave scholarships to worthy students. So, it is not surprising that the Poles did not care for the "Prosvita". Thus in the last ten years all of the 600 local groups in Polesia and Volhynia and 70% of all local groups west of the Shan were dissolved. In 1938 Warsaw intensified its war against the "Prosvita"; in that year 104 local groups /95/ were dissolved and in the first five months of 1939 the same happened even to two district centers with 168 local groups. In spite of that, the Ukrainians organized 375 new local groups from 1936 to 1938.

575 Peasants and agriculturists numbering 160,000
814 united in the "Silskyj Hospodar" ("farmer") in order to arrange for or to obtain agricultural training. The "Silskyj Hospodar" employed approximately 150 social agronomists, that is, agriculturists with diplomas, who supervised improvement of the soil, methods of cultivating, seed production and whole farm establishments. They conducted courses and competitions in which the young farmers who were eager for knowledge actively participated. Special veterinarians of the society and of the dairy farm cooperatives supervised the livestock.

562 The Ukrainian women of Galicia were anxious
575 not to be second to the men. Their society "Soyuz Ukrayinok" numbered 60,000 members in 1200 village circles. In the national life of the people the Ukrainian woman occupies a high position, as is the case among all healthy races. In times of national misfortune the mothers are the preservers of the old manners and customs; the children learn the language and the traditional songs from their mothers, to whom the rising generations are entrusted. Their glowing patriotism is not surpassed by the men. At the same time the West Ukrainian woman is deeply religious and tirelessly industrious; she excels in the household.

000 Everything in West Ukraine is education work.

517 While the Ukrainian language was being banned from Kiyev, a new flowering of Ukrainian culture was beginning in the West Ukrainian metropolis of Lwów. In 1873 Ukrainian men of learning [741] founded the "Scientific Shevchenko Society", a free academy. The number of Ukrainian chairs at the University grew. Now that all scholarly activity in the Ukrainian language was curtailed in East Ukraine, professors and writers transferred their field of activity to Lwów where a number of different cultural organizations arose. Kiyev as the intellectual hub of all Ukraine was outstripped by Lwów, in fact, even by Czernovits /now Chernovtsy/. Each of these two cities published more than one hundred Ukrainian works in 1894, whereas Kiyev published only ten works of so-called "literature for the home".

177 The revolution of 1905 only temporarily eased the pressure on Ukrainian cultural life. Freedom of the press and freedom of assembly remained only promises, and the "unity and indivisibility" of the Russian people was nothing but lifeless dogma until in 1917 its defenders were swept away by the seceding peoples.

517 Despite all difficulties, Lwów remained the 668 cultural center of West Ukraine even after the first World War. Its focal point was the "Scien- [741] tific /104/ Shevchenko Society" which published its own periodicals and scholarly works. The spiritual trend of West Ukrainian intellectuals, in so far as they were not obliged to emigrate, was directed against traditional sentimentality. Young people were reared to think politically, to be ready for action and for dedication. In accordance with the political aims, the subject matter of present-day West Ukrainian literature shows a preference for the re-awakening of the Ukrainian people, for the heroic struggles of the last few decades, and for the heroic in the Ukrainian landscape.

Medical Supplies

731 The UNRRA medical and sanitation programme for the Ukraine is
758 extremely small in relation to the needs; and the rate of deliveries
648 has been the poorest of any commodity group.

Up to the end of January 1947 the Administration had shipped to the Ukraine 373 gross long tons of medical and sanitation equipment valued at 1,858,000 dollars, leaving a balance still to be shipped of just over 468,000 dollars.

In a country where the destruction has been so great and where food supplies are so low, a medical programme of 2,326,000 dollars cannot make much impression; however, such equipment as has been received is being used to the best possible advantage.

●743 Most of the hospitals and invalids' homes in the Ukraine are operating under appalling difficulties; and the urgency of the need for equipment and medical supplies is everywhere evident. The UNRRA Mission early in 1946 described several hospitals which they had visited in various parts of the Ukraine. Here is their observation of the one at Kremenchug:

"Kremenchug formerly had a good 450-bed general hospital, which was blown up by a thoroughly efficient demolition battalion when the Germans retreated. All equipment, including an 8,000-volume medical library and a well-equipped X-ray laboratory, was demolished. The only buildings which escaped destruction were seven small sheds and storage houses on the outskirts of the hospital grounds.

"The hospital staff recently installed 250 beds in these ramshackle buildings. In a number of wards the windows were bricked up because no glass is available, and the only light came from an unshaded 40-watt electric bulb in the corridor. Paint was flaking off the floor and the walls of the surgery; most of the roofs leaked, there were no indoor toilets; fuel was available to heat only the operating and delivery rooms and the nursery. (Four babies, on an average, are delivered each
743 day). Many of the patients had no gowns and no bed clothes, except
758 what they were able to bring with them. No soap whatever has been available to the hospital for some time; laundry was simply being boiled with a little soda, and the floors were scrubbed with a lye solution. The only surgical equipment we saw was a few dozen scalpels and haemostats in one small cabinet in the corner of the operating room, and two sterilizers.

"The doctor in charge told us that his patients received an average diet of 1,000 to 1,200 calories a day, consisting mostly of bread, potatoes, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of fat. (The low calorie intake is largely due to the inability of the patients to digest the coarse whole-grain rye or wheat bread, which is available in reasonable quantities). Theoretically the hospital is entitled to 2,500 grams

743 758 of meat daily for each thirty patients; but, since there is rarely any meat to be had, it received 400 grams of dried milk as a substitute, or approximately 13 grams per patient each day.

"The hospital was so badly overcrowded that beds had been set up in the corridors and even in the yard. Some of these beds had been salvaged from the ruins of the old hospital, and consequently were badly twisted and charred."

The same general conditions prevailed in most of the hospitals visited. The fact that so much improvement has since been made with so little help promises the best use of future deliveries of UNRRA medical supplies. The programme includes in addition to dressings, drugs and chemicals, X-ray equipment and supplies, surgical instruments, dental equipment, and a penicillin plant.

Clothing

291 [294] 148 731 Since most of the Ukraine's clothing factories were heavily damaged or destroyed in the war, there is a widespread shortage of all articles of wearing apparel. The limited UNRRA programme has fallen considerably short of satisfying all the requirements; however, such supplies as have been sent - particularly textiles and shoes - have been economically used to help the most critical cases.

By the end of January 1947 UNRRA had sent the Ukraine 15,095 gross long tons of clothing valued at 16,801 dollars, leaving an unshipped balance of 55,000 dollars. The following table gives the composition of the shipments.

TABLE XXV

UNRRA Shipments of Clothing to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Finished clothing	779	384
Blankets and comforters	902	522
Cotton textiles	573	321
Woollen textiles	3,487	1,359
Row wool	2,240	3,729
Footwear	5,697	3,997
Upper leather	575	259
Sole leather	1,274	1,624
Hides	188	381
Miscellaneous textiles	183	149
Miscellaneous footwear	735	2,368
Unclassified	168	n.a.
Totals	16,801	15,095

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

maintained by the Zemstvos (local organizations somewhat similar to County Councils, elected by citizens with a certain property census). 491

Quite recently the planning of the organization of the road system of the Soviet Union was put in the hands of the planning commission. It seems that important sums are to be spent on this project. It is almost unnecessary to mention that great economic transformations could be brought about by the construction even of a few thousand kilometres of roads, especially in New Russia where the composition of the soil makes the present tracks absolutely impassable after the slightest rain. Many villages still remain almost isolated from the rest of the world during periods of bad weather and are only connected with their respective centres by telegraph and, in case of their defect, by postmen on horseback.

The question of roads which we have approached 647
allows us a small diversion. We can say a few words 744
about the Zemstvos. This organization was distin- 657
guished after the abolition of serfdom as a factor of the
first order in the development of the economic organism 657
of the country, of the raising of the well-being of the population, of public hygiene, and of instruction. Having resources resulting from taxes on the land, the Zemstvos were able to cover Ukrainian territory, as also that of the whole of Russia, with a dense network of hospitals, veterinary centres, agricultural advisory bureaux, of experimental fields, of credit and trade co-operatives, and insurance offices, and finally of primary and even technical schools. The personnel of 647
the Zemstvos, recruited among the intelligentsia often belonging to the popular classes, was always conspicuous by its devotion to the cause and did not lack in highly qualified specialists who did not hesitate to sacrifice

262 745 434 Expectant and nursing mothers are usually at work, and have standard leaves with pay and special privileges; thus, if working, they receive rations appropriate to the occupational group, plus special food allowances; and if not working, dependents' rations plus these allowances. The supplements are as follows, monthly: cereals, 1.2 kilograms; butter (or substitute), 0.8 kilograms; sugar 0.6 kilograms; vegetables, 2.0 kilograms; milk (fresh or dried) 12 litres. Their approximate calories from rations alone are, therefore:

If light workers	1,682 plus 512 -	2,194	calories daily
If employees	1,144 plus 512 -	1,656	" "
If dependents	704 plus 512 -	1,216	" "

In the last case it is almost possible to assume that the husband is well paid and will be able to buy products in the open market.

262 Even if the established ration scales for all groups could be met, they would not provide an adequate, balanced diet. Particularly the rations for women and children are very light in fat, first-class protein, and calcium. They provide less than half the low League of Nation's standard for daily full-cream milk requirements of the expectant mother. But even these inadequate scales are seldom supplied.

262 434 Since mid-October 1946, the honouring of ration cards has, because of the increasing food shortages, become more and more irregular. In December 1946, for instance, large groups of persons in the Kiev area received only bread, sugar, and a few tins of vegetables on their cards. No meat, fish or fats were available. By the middle of January 1947, the situation had grown even more stringent, and only bread was supplied on the ration.

At the same time, the amount of food available off the ration has decreased almost to the vanishing point. Cereals and white bread have practically disappeared from the open market; and when they are available, the price is beyond the reach of the average person.

262 181 144 369 The effects of the poor diet are already to be seen. The people generally show a noticeable lack of their former liveliness, energy and cheerfulness. Moreover, according to the Medical Officer of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, clinical starvation has made its appearance in the smaller villages of the Republic: protein dropsy and avitaminosis are increasing; and among the townspeople there is great incidence of skin infections and respiratory and nasopharyngeal conditions.

645 744 262 In order to meet some of the medical aspects which may arise out of the present food situation, the Ministry of Health has taken the following steps.

645 744 262 (a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

241 727 The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

731 648 262 UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.

24: Cech and Mellor S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified, twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod as well as in other
563 Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip
317 of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Siatinské Doly. Although only two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about 120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface. The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it
263 is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
511 during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions, inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation — all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
764 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians Ruthenians

744 Europe; and many people used to die every year from tuberculosis and
164 other chest complaints. Severe epidemics—typhoid and dysentry—used to ravage the country every year; inadequate regulation of rivers and
146 stagnant waters gave rise to malaria; undernourishment of large sections of the population was responsible for sporadic pellagra. Venereal diseases were a curse owing to lack of medical attention and of appropriate legislation.

744 This enormous task was tackled with commendable vigour by the authorities of the Republic. In a country which used to have very few
185 doctors, a proper medical service was soon organised; up-to-date hospitals and children's homes were built; Red Cross stations and other hygiene and welfare institutions, set up in many parts of Ruthenia, strove to prevent and combat disease. This systematic effort resulted in a substantial reduction of mortality, while the draining of marshlands and the regulation of streams and ponds considerably checked epidemics.

185 Realising that ignorance is the root of many social evils, the State regarded the raising of the standard of education in Ruthenia as one
871 of its foremost tasks. The achievements in this field were perhaps the most striking. A country, which in 1918 had not more than eighteen elementary schools where children were only partly taught in Ruthenian, possessed 520 Ruthenian schools two years later; and after fifteen years of independence this small country in the Carpathians could boast 1,079 schools of various kinds—elementary, upper, secondary, technical and special schools. The magnitude of this achievement becomes evident when it is borne in mind that it was necessary to educate the requisite number of Ruthenian teachers from among the rising generation.

871 Thanks to these efforts illiteracy among the younger people has become rare. Those Ruthenians who according to the last census of
212 1930 were still unable to read and write were largely middle-aged or
185 old people. But even among them illiteracy has been considerably reduced because evening schools for adults were opened wherever pos-
517 sible. The people of Ruthenia proved to be keen pupils. Within a few years the neglected country had a promising intelligentsia—administrative workers, teachers, journalists, writers, doctors, engineers, composers, artists and scientists. In the thirties more than eighty periodicals, among them ten dailies, appeared in Ruthenia, and the production of books grew from year to year. The innate aptitude for arts and crafts was given a chance of development when a special art school was established in Užhorod, and musical talent, too, received much encouragement. As many as 7.7 per cent of all musical compositions and songs broadcast by Czechoslovak radio stations were the work of Ruthenian musicians.

000 Economic development was essential to a country where bread used

434 mothers usually work and draw, throughout their
262 pregnancy and afterwards, their full occupational rations,[1] plus the
745 special allowances indicated. If they do not work, they draw dependents' rations plus their special allowance.

[855] Children up to 14 includes infants from one to seven, who also receive special rations through milk kitchens, nurseries, nursery schools, and kindergartens. Those amount to 9.0 litres of milk and 6.0 grams of fats monthly.

434 The employee category includes such occupational groups as office
262 workers, timekeepers, and caretakers. The light workers group includes railway workers, machine builders, etc. The heavy workers group includes moulders, steelworkers, and miners. The latter receive a further additional ration in the form of a hot meal if they do underground work.

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Meat or fish	(3.2)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.5)	(0.4)
Fats	(0.9)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Butter (or substitute)	nil	nil	nil	nil	.06
Potatoes	(5.0)	"	"	"	nil
Vegetables	(3.0)	"	"	"	(2.0)
Milk, fresh, dried, or evaporated	nil	"	"	"	9.0
Vitamin juices	"	"	"	"	scarce
Approximate daily calories from rations only	3,527	1,682	1,144	704	973 plus 204 infants

[936] In February 1947 the rations for dependents was again changed, and they are now authorized to receive only bread, 7.5 kilograms monthly.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

1 [As of 1947 -- Analyst]

262 745 434 Expectant and nursing mothers are usually at work, and have standard leaves with pay and special privileges; thus, if working, they receive rations appropriate to the occupational group, plus special food allowances; and if not working, dependents' rations plus these allowances. The supplements are as follows, monthly: cereals, 1.2 kilograms; butter (or substitute), 0.8 kilograms; sugar 0.6 kilograms; vegetables, 2.0 kilograms; milk (fresh or dried) 12 litres. Their approximate calories from rations alone are, therefore:

If light workers	1,682 plus 512 -	2,194	calories daily
If employees	1,144 plus 512 -	1,656	" "
If dependents	704 plus 512 -	1,216	" "

In the last case it is almost possible to assume that the husband is well paid and will be able to buy products in the open market.

262 Even if the established ration scales for all groups could be met, they would not provide an adequate, balanced diet. Particularly the rations for women and children are very light in fat, first-class protein, and calcium. They provide less than half the low League of Nation's standard for daily full-cream milk requirements of the expectant mother. But even these inadequate scales are seldom supplied.

262 434 Since mid-October 1946, the honouring of ration cards has, because of the increasing food shortages, become more and more irregular. In December 1946, for instance, large groups of persons in the Kiev area received only bread, sugar, and a few tins of vegetables on their cards. No meat, fish or fats were available. By the middle of January 1947, the situation had grown even more stringent, and only bread was supplied on the ration.

At the same time, the amount of food available off the ration has decreased almost to the vanishing point. Cereals and white bread have practically disappeared from the open market; and when they are available, the price is beyond the reach of the average person.

262 181 144 369 The effects of the poor diet are already to be seen. The people generally show a noticeable lack of their former liveliness, energy and cheerfulness. Moreover, according to the Medical Officer of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, clinical starvation has made its appearance in the smaller villages of the Republic: protein dropsy and avitaminosis are increasing; and among the townspeople there is great incidence of skin infections and respiratory and nasopharyngeal conditions.

645 744 262 In order to meet some of the medical aspects which may arise out of the present food situation, the Ministry of Health has taken the following steps.

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in working out a complex organization after twenty years of near-exclusion from public administration, as well as to delay in securing the approval of Frank and Hitler. On April 13–15, 1940, however, representatives of Ukrainian groups were able to meet openly in Cracow as a steering committee, and in early June this body was formally recognized by Frank as the Ukrainian Central Committee.[13]

The accomplishment was a considerable one, although on paper the new body was extremely limited in its function which, in accordance with Hitler's injunction, was defined as the improvement of the welfare of the Ukrainian population of the Generalgouvernement. For this purpose, the committee was granted the right to prepare a budget covered in part by allocation of funds from the treasury of the Generalgouvernement and was allowed to direct a network of Aid Committees throughout the Ukrainian ethnographical area. Among the more important formal functions of the organization was the distribution of aid received from philanthropic agencies in the United States and from the International Red Cross.[14] As is usually the case with Ukrainian organizations working under the shadow of arbitrary foreign regimes, however, the formal aspect of its activity was not the most important. Officially, the committee had no control over education, but through its relations with the German authorities it was able to exert great influence on the selection of teachers and the provision of instructional facilities. Through its control of welfare funds, it was able to facilitate the attendance of numerous children at the Ukrainian schools.[15] Thus it rendered an important contribution to the reinvigoration of Ukrainian cultural life throughout the area.

This educational activity was carried on in close connection with the development of a Ukrainian press. The November conference, in addition to laying the groundwork for a central representative body, had founded (also under Dr. Kubiiovych's direction) a large-scale publishing agency which issued a series

[13] *Entryklopediia Ukrainoznavstvo* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), pp. 580–82.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Interview 9.

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[746]

extract from them.[66] To a certain extent, of course, this was true. Private individuals, as in the days after the Revolution, traveled about the countryside endeavoring to get something to eat in return for whatever they had to give the peasant. The city administrations and welfare committees did what they could to secure food for their clients; indeed this was one reason the Germans allowed these suspect organizations to function at all, for they were thereby relieved of the necessity of attending to such matters. The resources at the hands of these organs were, however, infinitesimal compared to the needs.[67] This was especially true since the most valuable materials left in the cities were requisitioned by the Germans.[68]

The peasants in turn had little to sell. They had lived under the regimented planned economy of the Soviets, which prevented the individual from accumulating a private stock of agricultural products, rather than the loose system of tsarist days, when the more prosperous peasants could usually find a little more to sell if the price was attractive enough. Extremely heavy requisitions by the Wehrmacht, especially in the form of unauthorized seizures, had also depleted the supplies available. The result was a severe shortage of food in the cities, especially in the larger ones such as Kiev and Kharkov, which brought famine and the pestilences associated with it in the winter and spring of 1942.[69]

Like the agricultural policy and the starvation of the cities, the *Ostarbeiter* program was the result of ruthless efforts to increase the German war potential. Unlike the former policies, however, its evils do not even have the excuse of short-run expediency. The concept of bringing foreign workers to the armaments factories was, in itself, reasonable enough. Moreover, properly handled, it might very well have resulted in an increase rather than a

[66] PS 2174.

[67] During the terrible winter of 1941–42, the social welfare department of the Kiev municipal administration dispensed only about 100,000 *karbovontsi* (i.e., rubles; nominally the equivalent of 10,000 RM or about $4,000) per month; at the time, milk was 20 *k.* a liter, potatoes about 250 *k.* a hundredweight (*Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1). This monetary outlay may, of course, have been supplemented by food obtained by barter.

[68] For example, a charge brought against the Bahazii administration was that it had used newsprint to barter for food with the small towns (Interview 59). Cf. also p. 116 above.

[69] According to Oberländer (USSR Exhibit No. 278).

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747 Of less obvious importance than the police sections, but never-
737 theless of great significance were the agencies concerned with health, social security, and welfare. The extreme limitations placed upon the efforts of the local administrations to maintain their starving citizens have already been described. Nevertheless, the fact that they could carry on activity was of some importance, both from the practical standpoint and from that of providing the population with token participation in administration. The Germans were undoubtedly content to leave this arduous and thankless task to the local leaders. Welfare activities were in part the responsibility of municipal departments, in part the function of volunteer organizations. This duplication gave rise to the possibility of conflicting political trends in the same field of operation. In Kiev the head of the welfare department, until his consecration as an Autocephalous bishop, was Professor Haievs'kyi,[19] and even after his resignation the department seems to have been in the hands of nationalist elements. The paucity of the resources available to this section has been indicated in a preceding chapter; nevertheless, it was able to arrange for the provision of buildings for care of the distressed.[20] At the same time, the Ukrainian Red Cross, which had been formed as an organ of the city government and which had carried on extensive operations in relieving the horrible conditions in the prisoner-of-war camps, had been dissolved by the Germans. Apparently this action was due in part to its use by Nationalist elements as a screen for their activities, but more particularly to its humane exertions. Its leader, Professor Theodore Bohatyrchuk, who, after having welcomed collaboration with the OUN-M group, had become disgusted with its excesses in Kiev, now turned to support of the Russophile element.[21] His organization, which was reformed as the All-Ukrainian Aid Committee (Vseukraïns'kyi

after explosions set off by Communist agents in Kiev in the autumn of 1941, arrested only Russians, scores of whom were then shot (Interviews 19, 59). However, a German order provided that Ukrainians were not to be taken as hostages while Russians were to be arrested for this purpose (Order of Befehlshaber des Ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiet Süd, August 16, 1941, NOKW 1691; hereafter referred to as NOKW 1691).

[19] *Ukraïns'ka Diiïmist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Interviews 19, 71.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Komitet Dopomohy), was able, even on the eve of German evacuation, to provide meals for 36,000 persons (children and others unable to work),[22] one sixth of the city's population; its great popularity[23] was of tremendous importance in enabling Bohatyrchuk to secure support for his stand in favor of coalition with anti-Soviet Russians. On the other hand, in Dniepropetrovsk, where the city administration was largely in the hands of pro-Russian elements, the Ukrainians, inspired by an OUN-M organizer, formed a Red Cross organization which acted as a center for nationalist forces.

The nationalist element was more successful in the field of cooperative organization. While each city administration contained a department of trade, the cooperatives, as quasi-public bodies, appear to have been considerably more important as channels of local initiative. Far from being a product of the Communist regime, the cooperative movement was indigenous to both East and West Ukraine, having played an important role before the First World War, when it was already imbued with nationalist overtones.[24] In the NEP period of Soviet rule, and until the late twenties, the cooperatives had been able to maintain a considerable degree of independence and had, at least in the Kharkov region, served as a center for nationalist elements which worked with the Republican government.[25] In the Five Year Plan periods, the urban cooperatives had become adjuncts of the state trading systems, and other cooperatives had been closely integrated into state commercial operations.[26]

[22] *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo*, September 19, 1943, pp. 4–5; see also *Volyn'*, January 28, 1943, p. 3.

[23] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 4.

[24] For abundant details on the complex system of cooperatives developed in the Ukraine prior to 1917, see Eugene M. Kayden and Alexis N. Antsiferov, *The Cooperative Movement in Russia During the War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), a volume in the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, ed. James T. Shotwell, Russian Series, compiled for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. Cooperatives were far more developed in the Ukraine than in most other heavily populated areas of the Russian Empire (*ibid.*, pp. 40, 41, 266–69, 357), and served educational as well as economic development. Kharkov was the chief cooperative center in the Ukraine and was largely independent of the Russian centers.

[25] Interview 73.

[26] Alexander Baikov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 253; Arthur C. Arnold, *Banks, Credit, and Money in Soviet Russia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 477.

789 To banish hail throughout the year the *hradiwnyk* must act
756 on Christmas Eve. He must neither eat nor drink throughout the day, nor must he spit or talk to anyone. Late at night he undresses completely and betakes himself naked to the field. Here he draws various circles with his magic wand and by uttering his formulas, tries to get the hail to appear before him. The hail, naturally enough, does not appear, and this evokes from the conjuror the following address: "As you are not heeding my call now, so may you remain far from us throughout the year!" With this the conjuration for the whole year is accomplished.[71]

756 How does the weather-man avoid blame for his false predictions and ineffective conjurations, which are necessarily very numerous, and how does he manage to hold the confidence of the people? The answer is obvious: he employs the familiar excuses used by shamans everywhere. After performing his act he asserts that the cloud must disappear and that there will be no hail whatever, or, if for some reason the cloud cannot be dispersed, that he is driving it away to deserted places so that it will hail only there. If, however, his art fails, and someone complains to this effect, then he says that he was unable to do anything because he noticed the impending cloud too late, i.e. when it was over and had already left the limits of his sphere of influence, for, if this occurs, there is nothing one can do to ward off hail in that region.[72] Another stock excuse is that "the weather-man of a neighbouring village, may God punish him, has diverted the hail to our village out of revenge." The people believe this, and so does the conjuror himself.[73]

757 Mention should be made in this connection of the current belief that natural phenomena have a definite influence upon human health. In some localities, when the people hear thunder for the first time in the spring, they throw themselves on the ground and roll around, even though they may be engaged at the time in important work and the earth be muddy. This behaviour is thought to prevent all sorts of aches and especially stomach disorders.[74] In other places, on similar occasions, the

[71] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 253. [72] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 123.
[73] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, i, 55. [74] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 234.

people seize stones and with them beat their foreheads three times, saying: "Stone-head, stone-head, stone-head." This is supposed to make the head as hard as stone, i.e. immune to any ache.[75] 751

The evil spirits residing in natural phenomena can be a source of danger unless one takes the necessary precautions. When it thunders and lightens, one should avoid walking along the road, and should sit down somewhere at the side, because God is shooting at the fleeing Devil and his arrows may accidentally kill the wayfarer.[76] One should do the same in the case of a dust storm, for its indwelling Devil is likely to harm a Christian.[77] One can lessen the severity of a blizzard (*metylycia*), and cause it to subside, by throwing sharp edged sticks at the driving snow. Falling hail can also be rendered harmless by catching the first hailstones, chewing them, and spitting them on the ground; "the horns of the evil spirit are then chewed off," and the hail loses its harmfulness in that locality.[78] 821 789

Part III

Healing by Magic

Disease, like other calamities, is attributed by the people to evil spirits. It is the incessant activities of a multitude of supernatural beings, the people believe, that cause the many afflictions that befall the human body and soul.[79] Epidemic and fatal diseases are personified as supernatural women. The female personification of the plague, according to a popular story, once made a young peasant carry her on his shoulders. Wherever he went people began to die by the thousands. Finally he attempted to get rid of his dread burden by throwing himself into a river. It was he alone, however, who drowned; the plague, being light 753

[75] Kolessa, F. "Ludowy wiruwania na pidhirju," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (Lviw, 1898), v, 77. [113]

[76] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 91. [77] Kolessa, F. *op cit.*, v, 76.

[78] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 234.

[79] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), 160.

sanctioned by the tradition of generations, he looks upon all 755
medicines prescribed by a physician with a certain suspicion.[83]

Popular remedies fall roughly into three categories: (1) amu- [75] •
lets and other prophylactic and precautionary means, (2) incantations, and (3) concoctions, compounded of strange and varied elements from the animal, plant, and mineral worlds. Only in serious, persistent, or complicated cases, or in those ascribed to the direct influence of spirits, e.g. snake-bite, fright,[84] partial paralysis, and stomach disorders,[85] does the peasant consult a professional healer, man or woman: otherwise he uses the standard remedies passed on from generation to generation. Many of the treatments hereinafter to be described, therefore, are often undertaken without the help of a healer.[86]

The healer, who is called *znachor* (fem. *znachorka*) from *znaty* (to know), is not a wizard, nor is he in league with any of the forces of evil. His sole power and function is to combat or counteract ailments by performing conjurations and compounding remedies; he thus plays the role of physician. He is, to be sure, endowed with supernatural powers—he is even referred to as the "earthly god"—but he gets these from God himself.[87] As a matter of fact, the priest and his assistant, it is thought, can sometimes counteract the work of the Devil by ridding a person of his malady. Thus in some sections of the mountains the people commonly seek the aid of the sexton in case of illness. This official inserts a knife between the pages of the church prayer book as many times as are necessary to find the alleged "right place," charging the patient a certain fee for each insertion. He then reads from the book, as if they were written there, the causes and cure of the disease. This practice is said to be slowly becoming obsolete, but it is still not unusual for priests to undertake to cure people by special Masses and prayers and by consecration with holy water.[88]

[83] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 160. [84] *Ibid.*, pp. 167-69.

[85] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 239. [86] *Idem.*

[87] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161; Szuchiewicz, W. *Huculszczyzna* (Lwów, 1902-08, 4 vols.) iv, 297, 312. [113]

[88] Kaindl, R. F. "Aus der Volksueberlieferung der Bojken," *Globus*, lxxix, 152.

753 *wroku* ! " (no evil eye !). Failure to take this precaution may result in harm, even though there is not the slightest intention of so doing.[107]

An individual affected by the " evil eye " first loses suddenly his good humour and complacency, and then becomes sick. The result may even be fatal, particularly if he falls asleep before ridding himself of the evil wrought upon him.[108] All successful, good looking, or otherwise fortunately endowed persons or animals are susceptible to the evil eye. Children, in particular, fall
755 an easy prey, for they have no power to resist. To render her child immune from the effects of a harmful glance which may possibly have been cast upon it during the day, a mother never fails to exorcise the evil before putting her child to sleep. This she does by sucking it out of the forehead of the child and spitting it out into the four corners of the room, signifying the four cardinal directions, so that the evil glance, from whatever direction it may have come, shall disappear whence it came. As she does so, she says : " *Chto ti wrik, naj ti wzme* ! " (Whoever sent you take you back !) A similar precaution is followed many times during the day, if the child feels indisposed.[109]

Adults are cured of the evil eye by a multitude of elaborate methods, including that of " extinguishing coals," already mentioned, and others too numerous to specify. The cure is usually undertaken by an otherwise ordinary person, even a member of the family, who is acquainted with a formula effective against the evil eye. Like the weather-man and healer, such an individual never reveals the secret of his art, for if he did, his charms would lose their effect and he himself might even suffer harm.[110]

751 Persons repeatedly subject to the effects of the evil eye are advised to carry constantly with them a piece of laudanum over which a soothsayer has uttered a special conjuration. Other protective devices, also useful for warding off other evil influences, include the *klokiczka*, a piece of wood consecrated together with Easter bread and carried on a string around the neck, a little mercury inserted in a wooden cross, brass rings and crosses, strings of hair or gut, old coins, certain dried herbs, and other

[107] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 132.
[108] *Idem*.
[109] *Idem*.
[110] *Ibid*., p. 133.

amulets.[111] If a person takes the precaution of muttering under his breath the following formula: "Cover those eyes as the drawers cover the buttocks!" a suspected evil glance will have no effect.[112] 751

To protect a domestic animal from the consequences of the evil eye, a piece of leather from an old shoe is tied to a ribbon and hung about its neck. Sometimes a strip torn off an old pair of drawers is used instead. Crops are saved from harm by planting sticks in different parts of the field or garden and tying to them a few rags, a torn hat, a broken pot, or the like.[113] A person with the evil eye can injure a cow, even without actually seeing it, if he casts a glance at its milk. Hence the precaution is taken, when a customer comes to buy milk, of not letting him into the cellar or other place where it is kept.[114]

Various methods of misleading the spirit responsible for the disease, or of frightening it away, are believed to be effective. Thus to cure a child of a persistent ailment, for example, its mother is often advised to "sell" it. This she does by giving the child to another woman, who carries it out of the house and then goes to a window and says: "With the child I have greeted the sun, the corners of the house, and all the saints: now I greet the mother and beg her to repurchase the child." The woman then brings the infant into the house, where the drinking ceremony (*mohorycz*) which customarily accompanies a sale, takes place. Sometimes a change in name suffices to bring the child back to health. A witch ordinarily uses the name given at baptism; consequently a child whose name has been changed will not heed her call.[115] To cure a fever, cold water is suddenly poured over the head of the patient while he is asleep; this frightens the fever demon and causes it to run away.[116] Fever may also be shamed into leaving the body. The patient goes into a toilet and sleeps there until his chills pass. The fever, offended, then leaves the body.[117] 755

Exuvial magic is sometimes employed to work cures. A per-

[111] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 93.
[112] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 133.
[113] *Ibid.*, p. 134.
[114] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 233.
[115] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 256.
[116] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 173.
[117] *Ibid.*, pp. 173-74.

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[79] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), 160.

753 as a feather, escaped. She was so frightened, nevertheless, that she fled to the forest and forsook her activities, so that the epidemic ceased.[80]

755 One way of avoiding death or serious harm is to propitiate the
782 spirits through vows.

It happens often that a sick person makes a vow (*zarikajet sie*), i.e. a promise, that if he regains his health, he will forego certain pleasures in life, or abstain from some pleasant task. A certain woman, for example, accidentally drove a needle into the palm of her hands, and when the physician, after chloroforming her, removed the needle, the convalescent pledged herself never again to sew embroidered shoulder-pieces on to a shirt of hers. This promise she kept religiously, sewing only on shirts belonging to others. Another woman, in order to rid herself of a headache, promised that she would not spin on Fridays; when relieved, she occupied herself every Friday with a different task in order to avoid spinning. A peasant in order to preserve his cattle during an epidemic that had broken out, solemnly vowed to give up drinking liquor for half a year, and when his cattle were saved he kept his word.[81]

755 Believing in the supernatural causation of disease, the people have little faith in scientific medical treatment, if they do not ignore it altogether. Poverty, though doubtless a factor, is far less important than the conviction, fully compatible with the prevailing conception of disease, that the native medicine-men and their remedies are more reliable than physicians and their medications. That the question of money is not decisive can be seen from the fact that quack doctors often receive larger fees than trained physicians. Even when given free treatment and medicine, an individual often puts aside the medicament and then boasts that he has gotten well because he has not used it.[82] While he places full confidence in his own remedies,

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[80] Woycicki, K. W. *Polnische Volkssagen und Maerchen* (Berlin, 1839), pp. 23-4.

[81] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 160.

[82] Kaindl, R. F. *Die Huzulen* (Wien, 1894), p. 93.

753 *wroku* ! " (no evil eye !). Failure to take this precaution may result in harm, even though there is not the slightest intention of so doing.[107]

An individual affected by the " evil eye " first loses suddenly his good humour and complacency, and then becomes sick. The result may even be fatal, particularly if he falls asleep before ridding himself of the evil wrought upon him.[108] All successful, good looking, or otherwise fortunately endowed persons or animals are susceptible to the evil eye. Children, in particular, fall
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[107] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 132.

[108] *Idem*.

[109] *Idem*.

[110] *Ibid*., p. 133.

indigestion or an acute pain in the stomach, for example, the 755
znachor

> takes a rope and continually mumbles something while making various knots in it. He then hangs the rope, like a bag, around the shoulders of the patient. The formula itself is a secret; we have been told, however, that it is supposed to consist of the enumeration or rehearsing of all the tasks performed in connection with flax from the moment when its seeds are threshed out to the moment when the fabric is completed.[105]

Before undertaking to treat paralysis with herbs, the *znachor* takes a knife, grasps it by the cutting edge, makes the sign of the cross three times over the patient, and utters the following incantation:

> In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, oh, painful pain, malicious and cunning enemy, leave, depart from the born and baptized servant of God. Betake yourself to the crossways, to the swamps, where God's creatures do not go, where squirrels do not peer in, where geese do not hiss, and cocks do not crow. There you shall fly around, there you shall sit, there you shall return, there you shall have something to do in this world.[106]

The people themselves, of course, also employ incantations, and nearly every household has at least one member who knows how to conjure away the common ailments.

Foremost among the ills susceptible to cure by means of incan- 753
tations is the "evil eye" (*uroki*). So widespread and so generally feared is this form of bewitching that the people seem almost constantly to be taking one precaution or another against it. This vigilance becomes understandable when one realizes that any person may cause harm to another, often quite unwittingly, merely by looking at him or talking about him. Especially is this true of a person who has some uncanny quality about his eyes. Since one may possess and exert the evil eye all unknowingly, it is common, in observing or mentioning a person admiringly, to guard against injuring him by adding the phrase: "*n.*

[105] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 168. [106] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, pp. 339-40.

The horse(e.p) is employed especially in healing hæmorrhoids.
(*zolotnyk*). According to popular belief, every person, male or 757
female, has a *zolotnyk* which dwells under his navel. If he lifts 753
a heavy burden, the *zolotnyk* descends and causes hæmorrhoids. The sufferer, after he has been cupped and the painful spot has been smeared with butter, is put in a very warm spot in the room, often in the oven itself, so that he may be properly "steamed up." To effect a permanent cure, however, the *zolotnyk* must be driven back to its "natural" seat. This is usually done by a professional healer, who, with the appropriate incantations, massages the patient's stomach with butter, using only an upward motion.[133]

Syphilis is not regarded with a gravity commensurate with its seriousness, but rather as just another of the numerous maladies with which people become afflicted. Every symptom of this venereal infection is looked upon as a distinct disease having its own cause. When its effects become visible on the nose, it is considered to be a wound caused by water, and its appearance on the palate is diagnosed as due to dust. All the symptoms are treated by smoking very strong tobacco, or by applying concoctions and salves compounded of various herbs.[134] As to the origin of this disease, the people tell the following fantastic story:

> A certain emperor was in love with his daughter-in-law. St. John, of course, reproved him, and made him dance with her at the ball. As a punishment, the emperor put St. John into a dungeon. In the morning the daughter-in-law and the executioner entered the dungeon and cut off St. John's head. At that very moment all food and drink turned into blood. The daughter-in-law then put the head of St. John on a plate and, upon arriving in town, hurled it seventy-six times in the air. Whoever was sprinkled with the blood of St. John's head became afflicted with syphilis.[135]

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Epilepsy is definitely ascribed to an evil spirit. When the [753]
czort (Devil) gets hold of a person, they say, he throws him on the ground and turns his eyes so that he does not see or hear anything.

[133] *Ibid.*, pp. 162-3. [134] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, 57-8.

[135] *Ibid.*, i, p. 45.

titude of mysterious, evil forces which he endeavours either to ally himself with, propitiate, or combat in order to assure himself of good luck or avert the many calamities which these supernatural powers may bring. Magical beliefs and practices are therefore widespread and deeply rooted among the people. Even where the church has opposed and tried to counteract the older notions and usages, its success has been at best only partial. What it often has effected was a change in form, or the substitution of an authorized rite for an ancient magical practice.[2] The priest, for example, sometimes takes the place of the sorcerer by holding a special midnight Mass, the *czorna służba* (black service), at the instigation of a person who wishes to harm an enemy.[3] At other times he acts as medicine man, e.g. by stepping over the back of an ailing parishioner in order to relieve his backache.[4] A case of substitution is noticeable in the rite observed before moving into a newly constructed house. Wherever the old practices of sacrificing a black rooster, as an offering to the Devil or as a preventive against disease, has become extinct, its equivalent has appeared in the solemn consecration of the house by the priest.[5]

Among the Ukrainians, as elsewhere, magical beliefs and practices have two main aspects, which may be termed respectively the black and white arts. While the former has its prime source in the arch enemy of man, the Devil, the latter, which functions mainly to counteract evil influences, relies on some powerful medium, sometimes God himself, to neutralize or overcome the

Russian, people inhabiting South Russia. They occupy the eastern section of the former Austrian province of Galicia, which is at present part of Poland. They number approximately 3,000,000 and belong almost exclusively to the peasant class. Geographically, and to a certain extent also culturally, they may be divided into lowlanders and highlanders, the former inhabiting the plains to the north and the latter the Carpathian mountains to the south.

[2] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Rutenen in der Bukowina und Galizien," *Globus*, lxi, 282.

[3] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Kuzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 277.

[4] Kaindl, R. F. "Neue Beitraege zur Ethnologie und Volkskunde der Huzulen," *Globus*, lxix, 71.

[5] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 282.

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forces of evil. The agents of the former include the witch and the wizard; and those of the latter, the fortune-teller, the soothsayer, the conjuror, and, in cases of sickness, the healer. Between these two groups of "professional" intermediaries between the supernatural and natural worlds stands the ordinary non-professional man or woman, who, by using certain formulas or more concrete means, can also invoke superhuman intervention.

A person associated with powers of evil, though difficult or impossible to recognize by ordinary means, since he usually looks exactly like any other human being, can be singled out much more easily by his actions, and especially by the results he is supposed to obtain. Thus a successful person, it is thought, is necessarily allied in one way or another with the Devil, or his assistants. A man who has luck in hunting or fishing is undoubtedly in communication with the Devil.[6] A woman who repeatedly returns from the woods with her basket full of mushrooms, or whose cow continuously yields more than an average quantity of milk, is nothing but a witch who is using her unholy powers to her own profit and, usually, also the detriment of her neighbours.[7] Indeed, there is not a wealthy or successful person in the village or town who is not in league with the Devil.[8] A peasant, therefore, who has luck with his crops and cattle most likely receives help from evil spirits, and a manufacturer who makes money from his factory in town does so because he has demons to work for him.[9] Thus, although there exist special means of detection, which, as we shall see, are made use of when necessary, mere good fortune is the simplest criterion.

Among individuals occupied with the black art, the witch (*widma*) wields by far the greatest power.[10] Just as after death she becomes the most feared of evil spirits, so during her life she is considered the most dangerous of the Devil's disciples. The

[6] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), iii, 12.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 114. [8] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 229, 232.

[9] Onyščuk, A. "Materyaly do huculskoi demonologii," *Materyaly do Ukrainskoi Etnologii* (Lviw, 1909), xl, 73.

[10] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 280.

754 people know, therefore, of no more derogatory term to apply to a woman than "witch."[11] In her ordinary life, the *widma* resembles other women in every respect; only in action does she take on a weird or unhuman aspect. Then she is found walking around in a totally nude state with her hair in disorder, carrying in her right hand a baking spatula or a broom and in her left a bucket filled with milk stolen from strange cows.[12] She may also appear in the form of a dog, mouse, cat, or other animal,[13] of a flashing, transparent ball rolling in the air,[14] or of sparks escaping from a chimney.[15]

The *widma* is not only a close ally of the Devil, but also a faithful servant ever ready to fulfil his commands. Besides the personal advantage which she derives from her destructive activities, she experiences a devilish pleasure in harming people, especially those whom she considers her enemies. Quiescent during the daytime, she begins her depredations only after
754 dusk (*pidweczer*).[16] Nobody in the house is aware of her ac-
774 tivities, for only her spirit leaves, her body remaining in a sleeping or dormant state. But if her spirit experiences any harm during its nightly excursions, the mark of the injury is registered simultaneously upon the motionless body at home.[17] Its activities finished, the spirit returns to the body, but can re-enter it only if it has remained in exactly the same position as it was left, otherwise the body cannot come to life again. It is enough to turn the body over to prevent the spirit from becoming re-united with it.[18] Thus during the Austro-Prussian war a soldier stayed overnight with a certain family. He became aware that the housewife was a witch and decided to play a trick on her. After her spirit had left, he turned the body over. Since, as a consequence, the spirit could not re-enter it, the woman was found lifeless when morning came. However, when the husband, thinking his wife dead, had summoned his neighbours and begun to make funeral preparations, the soldier

[11] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 280. [12] *Idem*. [13] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 131.

113 [14] Szuchiewicz, W. *Huculszczyzna* (Lwów, 1902-8, 4 vols.) iv, 283.

[15] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 231. [16] *Idem*.

[17] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 131 [18] *Ibid.*, pp. 130-31.

admitted his guilt. The body was then put into its former position, and immediately thereupon it came to life.[19] 154 [774]

Witches form a well defined hierarchy in which four separate grades are distinguished. Those of the first and lowest rank are witches by birth. If a pregnant mother swallows a live coal that has fallen into a dish of food, especially one cooked on Christmas Eve, her child will be born a witch or a wizard, depending upon its sex. A witch of this type has a small tail, and begins her supernatural activities as soon as she grows up. Her association with the Devil having been established by birth rather than by voluntary choice, she is definitely less powerful than one who has acquired her prowess through her own effort. Next in rank and in power is the witch by training, i.e. one who had been trained in the art from earliest childhood by her mother, herself a witch. Some hold that such women also have tails, "but nobody can ever see them, for they succeed in hiding them even from their own husbands." Although higher in rank than the first type, the witch by training, not having chosen her career through her own volition, cannot compare in power to a witch of the third category, one who has allied herself voluntarily with the Devil in her ripe years. Of still greater potency is the witch who has grown up from a foundling girl placed by the Devil himself, through the *diwe baby* (mysterious women), under the care of her foster parents. Within the hierarchy there is constant strife; witches of higher rank assert themselves to the detriment of their inferiors.[20]

Every witch has her speciality, her own sphere of activity which she does not exceed. Thus there are witches of cows (*wid korow*), of sheep (*wid owec*), of goats (*wid kiz*), of ducks (*wid husij*), of swine (*wid swynyj*), etc. Each knows the limit of her power (*znaje wid sebe*), and permits no other, especially one of equal rank, to encroach upon her rights.[21]

The time of the witches' activities is the night, especially the three hours immediately following midnight. Although any night is appropriate, the most opportune times are the nights preceding important holidays, i.e. those before Christmas and Easter, and particularly the eves of SS. George, Onufri, and John,

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 130. [20] *Ibid.*, pp. 111-14. [21] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15.

754 which fall respectively on the twenty-third of April and the twelfth and twenty-fourth of June (Julian calendar).[22] On these special nights the witches usually foregather for sessions with the Devil on the *Lysa Hora* (Bald Mountain), an unapproachable crest in the Carpathians, thought by the people to be the rendezvous for all the witches in the world. Each witch rides to the meetings on the back of her own wizard, or else uses a baking spatula as her steed, urging it on with a broom. The sessions are devoted, first of all, to reports on the accomplishments and to the receiving of future instructions from the Devil, who presides. At these conferences, witches accused of exceeding the prescribed limits of their activities are formally tried, and those convicted are punished. Every witch must attend in person, or, if unable to do so, must send a substitute chosen from among the peasants. Such an individual, although present at the conference, hears nothing of what goes on, except what refers to himself, i.e. to the witch he represents.[23]

The fields of activity of the various witches embrace practically everything of concern to man, from personal affliction to bad luck with cattle and extremes in weather, and the means they employ are equally varied. They need only stare at a person, or animal, to harm him. Much more effective is their spoken work, their curse. Their favourite methods of causing injury, however, are those called " throwing under " (*pidsypuwaty*) and " putting under " (*pidlożyty*). The former consists in scattering ashes or thorns on a path; people or cattle traversing it will then be attacked by serious diseases . A witch may also wash her shirt before sunset and sprinkle the water on a path her victim is to use. This alternative method of " throwing under " causes sundry women's diseases. Similar consequences flow from " putting under," in which the witch puts part of a dead animal, usually a bat wrapped up in a cloth, under the doorstep of the victim. Other means used by witches include herbs gathered on St. John's Day, mercury, and the dried scales of snakes. Witches also have power to send bears and wolves to kill man and cattle. In order to cause famine they sell across the border grain which is in the process of ripening; as a result the

[22] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 280. [23] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 109-10.

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country on the other side has plenty while there is starvation at home.[24] Witches are also held responsible for hails, storms, floods and drought.[25] 754

The commonest speciality of witches, however, is the bewitching or drying up of cows. The methods and means employed are many. Some believe that the *widma* simply milks the cow once in the usual way. Others assert that she takes some milk from the victimized cow, especially on the eve of St. George or St. John, and with it smears the teats of her own cow, which then gives milk in abundance while the udder of the bewitched animal dries up or yields only blood. According to some, the witch need not even actually touch or see the cow she wishes to charm; she has only to think of a particular animal to receive her milk which in such a case flows from a door post, table, bench, or other object in the house.[26] Hence a witch does not actually have to possess a cow in order to have milk. "Marusia of Ispas never had a cow, but nevertheless always enjoyed an abundant supply of milk, and even had enough to sell; this astounded the people greatly until Petro Hyrak once came to her and found her milking a board."[27]

Although hated and despised, a witch must never be openly insulted or mistreated. In mentioning a witch, one should always append a curse, such as: "May she disappear"; "May the Devil stand between her eyes and the bear between her shoulders."[28] [789]

The wizard (*opyr*), although as harmful as his female counterpart, is considered lower in rank and is, in general, less frequently encountered.[29] He is even forced to serve the witch, e.g. as the steed on which she rides to her meetings, but he has the power to counteract any harm she may intend to do him.

[24] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 232-3.

[25] Kaindl, R. F. "Wetterzauberei bei den Rutenen und Huzulen," *Mittheilungen der k.k. geogr. Gesellschaft in Wien*, xxxvii, 637. [113]

[26] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 254.

[27] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 128.

[28] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 231.

[29] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 109.

754 The *opyr* is born, not made. He, too, has a tail, and his sex organs differ from those of a normal man, for which reason he is infertile and childless.[30] Some hold that he changes his sex every month.[31] A *misiecznyk*, as such a person is called, can be identified much more easily than the witch by his unusually rosy cheeks (*wse w lycy czerwonyj*).[32] Wizards, too, have their individual specialities, and they are especially careful not to encroach upon the spheres of activity of the witches. There are, for example, wizards of hunting, of fishing, and of horses.[33] But just as the witches are particularly interested in harming cattle and in diverting the milk of cows, so the wizards centre their chief attention on the weather. They produce torrents, droughts, hail, and snowstorms. For this purpose they gather raindrops, dew, and water from thawing snow into a vessel, and frost, snow, and storms into a bag or the skin of an animal. If a wizard lets so much as one drop of water from his vessel fall into a river, a torrent or flood follows immediately; if he presses upon his bag, frost and snowstorm ensue. Once, it is said, the wizards kept the sun covered by clouds for seven weeks, as a result of which excessive downpours, crop failure, and famine occurred.[34]

754 789 It is obviously of great advantage to the people to detect a witch or wizard operating in their village. Although they can do so at almost any time, there is no more opportune occasion than the eve of a high holiday. Thus in order to determine whether a suspected woman is really a witch, one method is to steal three chips of wood before sunrise on nine consecutive days. When a fire is built with the chips, the woman, if she be really a witch, will not fail to come to the house to borrow something; however she may beg and entreat then, she should never be believed, because only thus does she lose her power to bring harm upon the house.[35]

[30] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 110-13.
[31] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 230.
[32] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 113.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 119.
[34] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 230.
[35] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 281.

755 Although the *znachor*, especially one of reputation, can diagnose and treat any disease, he often specializes in particular ailments, e.g. fevers, paralysis, headaches, or snake-bite. He keeps his formulas and concoctions strictly secret, for a knowledge of them by others would impair if not invalidate his powers.[89] The formulas and recipes are much more numerous and varied than the ailments themselves; for curing fever, for instance, there are not less than seventy-seven remedies, corresponding to seventy-seven causes, i.e. spirits.[90] They range from the simplest prescriptions, e.g. to drink water drawn from a well before sunrise, to the most complicated compounds of herbs, animal and human exuviae and excrements, insects, dirt, etc., accompanied by elaborate verbal formulas and grotesque performances. While certain remedies are the private property of an individual healer and are only effective when performed or suggested by him, others are common knowledge and freely used by the people.

[754] The *znachor* or *znachorka*, is also an expert in inducing love, causing barren women to conceive, foretelling future events, and even settling difficult family problems.[91] Healers of reputation, like expert weather-men, are comparatively few in number—very often only one in a considerable territory—and are widely sought after. People often travel many miles to consult a master healer, and pay large fees for his services.[92]

The *znachor* ascribes his power to his special endowment from God, and his knowledge of the medicinal properties of different ingredients to a secret source which he cannot divulge. Every healer has his own fast-day, when he communes with God.[93] He knows which wells have water containing therapeutic qualities and what herbs are good for particular diseases. He gathers the herbs at certain seasons of the year and at prescribed hours during the day, and keeps them in readiness at his home. It is noteworthy that this mysterious art of healing, being the pro-

[89] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[90] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

[113] [91] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 233.

[92] *Ibid.* p. 277; Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[93] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, iv, 297.

* [healer -- analyst]

755 son suffering from fever, for example, pares the nails of his fingers and toes, and cuts a little hair from the four corners of his head; he then inserts the clippings in the stem of a rotten tree, closes the hole tightly, and runs home as fast as he can, saying: "May you not return until I myself shall come back for you!"[118] Mention might be made here of the belief that hair from one's head should not be thrown on the dung pile, for if a bird should appropriate it in building its nest the person would lose his hair. On the other hand, one can make his hair grow long and thick by throwing a few locks into fire or water.[119]

Human and animal exuviae are also believed to possess valuable curative qualities. Human nails and hair, the bones of meat consecrated on Easter, skin from the head of a dog, the hoof of a horse, and the excrements of domestic animals and fowl all serve as ingredients in the concoctions prepared for different ailments.[120] A cure for a cataract is compounded of the white of an egg, flour, and the dried and pulverized excreta of a child.[121] The excrement of a black cow is one of the ingredients in a remedy for a toothache; pieces of a horse's hoof are used in a fever cure; and the fat of a black cat or a stork forms a necessary element in a concoction to relieve rheumatism.[122] Pain in the eyes is soothed by an application of woman's milk.[123] Warts are removed by wetting them with the foam from a horse's urine. Human urine is considered an emetic and is used as an antidote for alcohol poisoning.[124]

825 754 Among living things, the frog plays the most important role in native medicine. A frog is thought to be endowed with extraordinary powers, which can be used either for good or for evil. A witch, for example, often makes use of a frog, sending it to the house of her enemy to bring affliction upon it. A frog must not be killed; if suspected as the agent of witchcraft, it may only be wrapped up and hung on a beam in the house. A boy who kills a frog may 825 bring death to his father.[125] On the other hand, this amphibian 757 is considered a clean animal. If one is found in a well, for

[118] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, p. 173.
[119] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 235.
[120] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 164.
[121] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[122] *Ibid.*, pp. 164, 167, 171.
[123] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 94.
[124] *Ibid.*, p. 95.
[125] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 137, 144.

753 as a feather, escaped. She was so frightened, nevertheless, that she fled to the forest and forsook her activities, so that the epidemic ceased.[80]

755 782 One way of avoiding death or serious harm is to propitiate the spirits through vows.

> It happens often that a sick person makes a vow (*zarikajet sie*), i.e. a promise, that if he regains his health, he will forego certain pleasures in life, or abstain from some pleasant task. A certain woman, for example, accidentally drove a needle into the palm of her hands, and when the physician, after chloroforming her, removed the needle, the convalescent pledged herself never again to sew embroidered shoulder-pieces on to a shirt of hers. This promise she kept religiously, sewing only on shirts belonging to others. Another woman, in order to rid herself of a headache, promised that she would not spin on Fridays; when relieved, she occupied herself every Friday with a different task in order to avoid spinning. A peasant in order to preserve his cattle during an epidemic that had broken out, solemnly vowed to give up drinking liquor for half a year, and when his cattle were saved he kept his word.[81]

755 Believing in the supernatural causation of disease, the people have little faith in scientific medical treatment, if they do not ignore it altogether. Poverty, though doubtless a factor, is far less important than the conviction, fully compatible with the prevailing conception of disease, that the native medicine-men and their remedies are more reliable than physicians and their medications. That the question of money is not decisive can be seen from the fact that quack doctors often receive larger fees than trained physicians. Even when given free treatment and medicine, an individual often puts aside the medicament and then boasts that he has gotten well because he has not used it.[82] While he places full confidence in his own remedies,

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[80] Woycicki, K. W. *Polnische Volkssagen und Maerchen* (Berlin, 1839), pp. 23-4.

[81] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 160.

[82] Kaindl, R. F. *Die Huzulen* (Wien, 1894), p. 93.

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sanctioned by the tradition of generations, he looks upon all 755 ●
medicines prescribed by a physician with a certain suspicion.[83]

Popular remedies fall roughly into three categories: (1) amu- [751]
lets and other prophylactic and precautionary means, (2) incantations, and (3) concoctions, compounded of strange and varied elements from the animal, plant, and mineral worlds. Only in serious, persistent, or complicated cases, or in those ascribed to the direct influence of spirits, e.g. snake-bite, fright,[84] partial paralysis, and stomach disorders,[85] does the peasant consult a professional healer, man or woman: otherwise he uses the standard remedies passed on from generation to generation. Many of the treatments hereinafter to be described, therefore, are often undertaken without the help of a healer.[86]

The healer, who is called *znachor* (fem. *znachorka*) from *znaty* (to know), is not a wizard, nor is he in league with any of the forces of evil. His sole power and function is to combat or counteract ailments by performing conjurations and compounding remedies; he thus plays the role of physician. He is, to be sure, endowed with supernatural powers—he is even referred to as the "earthly god"—but he gets these from God himself.[87] As a matter of fact, the priest and his assistant, it is thought, can sometimes counteract the work of the Devil by ridding a person of his malady. Thus in some sections of the mountains the people commonly seek the aid of the sexton in case of illness. This official inserts a knife between the pages of the church prayer book as many times as are necessary to find the alleged "right place," charging the patient a certain fee for each insertion. He then reads from the book, as if they were written there, the causes and cure of the disease. This practice is said to be slowly becoming obsolete, but it is still not unusual for priests to undertake to cure people by special Masses and prayers and by consecration with holy water.[88]

[83] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 160. [84] *Ibid.*, pp. 167-69.

[85] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 239. [86] *Idem.*

[87] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161; Szuchiewicz, W. *Huculszczyzna* (Lwów, 1902-08, 4 vols.) iv, 297, 312. [113]

[88] Kaindl, R. F. "Aus der Volksueberlieferung der Bojken," *Globus*, lxxix, 152.

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[92] *Ibid.* p. 237; Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[93] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, iv, 297.

7 [healer -- analyst]

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perty of an individual, can be stolen.[94] Usually, however, it is transmitted from father to son.[95]

That the people, at least those seeking his advice, consider the *znachor* as endowed with unusual powers is obvious. But how does he regard himself? Does he really believe in his art, or does he merely take advantage of the ignorance of the people? There is no doubt that many actually believe in their extraordinary powers and in the effectiveness of their remedies.[96] On the other hand, however, there are those who admit, when pressed hard, that they sometimes delude and even mislead their patients,[97] while others claim—only before intelligent people, of course—that their conjurations really consist largely of Christian prayers, which cannot, at the worst, do any harm to the patient.[98]

The excuse for an obvious failure is the usual one of the shaman, or, for that matter, of quacks all over the world, namely, that the patient did not follow the directions strictly. This the healer usually finds very easy, since he often requires impossible tasks of his patients. He claims, for example, that the recommended water was not drawn from the well in the specified hour or manner, or that the coals over which he pronounced his conjuration were not taken from a "living" fire.[99] In one case two Jewish girls, who had come from afar to a famous *znachor* for a love potion, were sent all the way back on foot to fetch new containers, since those they had brought with them had been used and the potion poured into them would thus have had no effect.[100]

In mild cases and in those of chronic or general ill health, the healer, as a rule, merely offers advice. He tells the patient that his affliction is caused perhaps by the fact that he has built his house on the head of a demon, or that he has unwittingly dug up the root of a lilac bush, or that he has started some task at

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[94] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[95] Kaindl, R. F. "Neue Beitraege zur Ethnologie und Volkskunde der Huzulen," *Globus*, lxix, 74.

[96] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 217.

[97] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxix, p. 74.

[98] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 161.

[99] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, iv, 313.

[100] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxix, 74.

755 an ill-fated hour. His advice may be to move out of the house, destroy it, and build another on the opposite side of the road. After entreaties that this is a most difficult and costly procedure, the *znachor* usually concedes that the transfer of the patient's bed to the orchard, or even to the other side of the room, may suffice to relieve the trouble.[101] Another example of the type of advice offered for a persistent and undefined ailment is the following:

> Go before daybreak to a certain spot across the boundary of the third village, and there you will find a little well; draw some water from it, but before sunrise, take a drink and bathe your eyes, but see to it that no woman meets you, and you will become well in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.[102]

If the Devil, as sometimes happens, has his lodgings in a peasant's house or adjoining barn, some direct means of driving him out must be undertaken. The *znachor*, when called in, sprinkles the house with holy water, drives the cattle into the yard, and, with a whip in his hand, runs into the barn where the Devil is supposed to reside, since some of the cattle are sick. Lashing right and left with the whip at the walls and corners, while the people of the house assist him with sticks and brooms, he finally succeeds in expelling the evil spirit. He then sprinkles the barn with holy water and advises the people to stuff up every crack tightly, because the evil spirit may assume the form of an insect, a worm, or the like and re-enter the barn through the tiniest opening.[103]

For easily diagnosed ailments the medicine-man employs special incantations, usually in conjunction with a more concrete remedy. He need not even visit the sick room, provided he has part of the patient's clothing or a bit of his exuviae over which he can utter his formula.[104] In any case, it is absolutely necessary to have some object, often a stick, a rope, a knife, a coal, or a piece of wax, over which to perform his incantation. To relieve

[101] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 237; Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxix, 152.

[102] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 237. [103] *Ibid.*, p. 239.

[104] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

indigestion or an acute pain in the stomach, for example, the *znachor* 755

> takes a rope and continually mumbles something while making various knots in it. He then hangs the rope, like a bag, around the shoulders of the patient. The formula itself is a secret; we have been told, however, that it is supposed to consist of the enumeration or rehearsing of all the tasks performed in connection with flax from the moment when its seeds are threshed out to the moment when the fabric is completed.[105]

Before undertaking to treat paralysis with herbs, the *znachor* takes a knife, grasps it by the cutting edge, makes the sign of the cross three times over the patient, and utters the following incantation:

> In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, oh, painful pain, malicious and cunning enemy, leave, depart from the born and baptized servant of God. Betake yourself to the crossways, to the swamps, where God's creatures do not go, where squirrels do not peer in, where geese do not hiss, and cocks do not crow. There you shall fly around, there you shall sit, there you shall return, there you shall have something to do in this world.[106]

The people themselves, of course, also employ incantations, and nearly every household has at least one member who knows how to conjure away the common ailments.

Foremost among the ills susceptible to cure by means of incantations is the "evil eye" (*wroki*). So widespread and so generally feared is this form of bewitching that the people seem almost constantly to be taking one precaution or another against it. This vigilance becomes understandable when one realizes that any person may cause harm to another, often quite unwittingly, merely by looking at him or talking about him. Especially is this true of a person who has some uncanny quality about his eyes. Since one may possess and exert the evil eye all unknowingly, it is common, in observing or mentioning a person admiringly, to guard against injuring him by adding the phrase: "*n* 753

[105] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 168. [106] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, pp. 339-40.

753 *wroku* ! " (no evil eye !). Failure to take this precaution may result in harm, even though there is not the slightest intention of so doing.[107]

An individual affected by the " evil eye " first loses suddenly his good humour and complacency, and then becomes sick. The result may even be fatal, particularly if he falls asleep before ridding himself of the evil wrought upon him.[108] All successful, good looking, or otherwise fortunately endowed persons or animals are susceptible to the evil eye. Children, in particular, fall
755 an easy prey, for they have no power to resist. To render her child immune from the effects of a harmful glance which may possibly have been cast upon it during the day, a mother never fails to exorcise the evil before putting her child to sleep. This she does by sucking it out of the forehead of the child and spitting it out into the four corners of the room, signifying the four cardinal directions, so that the evil glance, from whatever direction it may have come, shall disappear whence it came. As she does so, she says : " *Chto ti wrik, naj ti wzme* ! " (Whoever sent you take you back !) A similar precaution is followed many times during the day, if the child feels indisposed.[109]

Adults are cured of the evil eye by a multitude of elaborate methods, including that of " extinguishing coals," already mentioned, and others too numerous to specify. The cure is usually undertaken by an otherwise ordinary person, even a member of the family, who is acquainted with a formula effective against the evil eye. Like the weather-man and healer, such an individual never reveals the secret of his art, for if he did, his charms would lose their effect and he himself might even suffer harm.[110]

751 Persons repeatedly subject to the effects of the evil eye are advised to carry constantly with them a piece of laudanum over which a soothsayer has uttered a special conjuration. Other protective devices, also useful for warding off other evil influences, include the *klokiczka*, a piece of wood consecrated together with Easter bread and carried on a string around the neck, a little mercury inserted in a wooden cross, brass rings and crosses, strings of hair or gut, old coins, certain dried herbs, and other

[107] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 132. [108] *Idem*.

[109] *Idem*. [110] *Ibid*., p. 133.

amulets.[111] If a person takes the precaution of muttering under his breath the following formula: "Cover those eyes as the drawers cover the buttocks!" a suspected evil glance will have no effect.[112] 751

To protect a domestic animal from the consequences of the evil eye, a piece of leather from an old shoe is tied to a ribbon and hung about its neck. Sometimes a strip torn off an old pair of drawers is used instead. Crops are saved from harm by planting sticks in different parts of the field or garden and tying to them a few rags, a torn hat, a broken pot, or the like.[113] A person with the evil eye can injure a cow, even without actually seeing it, if he casts a glance at its milk. Hence the precaution is taken, when a customer comes to buy milk, of not letting him into the cellar or other place where it is kept.[114]

Various methods of misleading the spirit responsible for the disease, or of frightening it away, are believed to be effective. Thus to cure a child of a persistent ailment, for example, its mother is often advised to "sell" it. This she does by giving the child to another woman, who carries it out of the house and then goes to a window and says: "With the child I have greeted the sun, the corners of the house, and all the saints: now I greet the mother and beg her to repurchase the child." The woman then brings the infant into the house, where the drinking ceremony (*mohorycz*) which customarily accompanies a sale, takes place. Sometimes a change in name suffices to bring the child back to health. A witch ordinarily uses the name given at baptism; consequently a child whose name has been changed will not heed her call.[115] To cure a fever, cold water is suddenly poured over the head of the patient while he is asleep; this frightens the fever demon and causes it to run away.[116] Fever may also be shamed into leaving the body. The patient goes into a toilet and sleeps there until his chills pass. The fever, offended, then leaves the body.[117] 755

Exuvial magic is sometimes employed to work cures. A per-

[111] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 93.
[112] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 133.
[113] *Ibid.*, p. 134.
[114] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 233.
[115] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 256.
[116] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 173.
[117] *Ibid.*, pp. 173-74.

755 son suffering from fever, for example, pares the nails of his fingers and toes, and cuts a little hair from the four corners of his head; he then inserts the clippings in the stem of a rotten tree, closes the hole tightly, and runs home as fast as he can, saying: "May you not return until I myself shall come back for you!"[118] Mention might be made here of the belief that hair from one's head should not be thrown on the dung pile, for if a bird should appropriate it in building its nest the person would lose his hair. On the other hand, one can make his hair grow long and thick by throwing a few locks into fire or water.[119]

Human and animal exuviae are also believed to possess valuable curative qualities. Human nails and hair, the bones of meat consecrated on Easter, skin from the head of a dog, the hoof of a horse, and the excrements of domestic animals and fowl all serve as ingredients in the concoctions prepared for different ailments.[120] A cure for a cataract is compounded of the white of an egg, flour, and the dried and pulverized excreta of a child.[121] The excrement of a black cow is one of the ingredients in a remedy for a toothache; pieces of a horse's hoof are used in a fever cure; and the fat of a black cat or a stork forms a necessary element in a concoction to relieve rheumatism.[122] Pain in the eyes is soothed by an application of woman's milk.[123] Warts are removed by wetting them with the foam from a horse's urine. Human urine is considered an emetic and is used as an antidote for alcohol poisoning.[124]

825 754 Among living things, the frog plays the most important role in native medicine. A frog is thought to be endowed with extraordinary powers, which can be used either for good or for evil. A witch, for example, often makes use of a frog, sending it to the house of her enemy to bring affliction upon it. A frog must not be killed; if suspected as the agent of witchcraft, it may only be wrapped up and hung on a beam in the house. A boy who kills a frog may 825 bring death to his father.[125] On the other hand, this amphibian 757 is considered a clean animal. If one is found in a well, for

[118] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, p. 173.
[119] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 235.
[120] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 164.
[121] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[122] *Ibid.*, pp. 164, 167, 171.
[123] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 94.
[124] *Ibid.*, p. 95.
[125] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 137, 144.

The hernia (c.p) is employed especially in healing hæmorrhoids
(*zolotnyk*). According to popular belief, every person, male or 757
female, has a *zolotnyk* which dwells under his navel. If he lifts 753
a heavy burden, the *zolotnyk* descends and causes hæmorrhoids. The sufferer, after he has been cupped and the painful spot has been smeared with butter, is put in a very warm spot in the room, often in the oven itself, so that he may be properly "steamed up." To effect a permanent cure, however, the *zolotnyk* must be driven back to its "natural" seat. This is usually done by a professional healer, who, with the appropriate incantations, massages the patient's stomach with butter, using only an upward motion.[133]

Syphilis is not regarded with a gravity commensurate with its seriousness, but rather as just another of the numerous maladies with which people become afflicted. Every symptom of this venereal infection is looked upon as a distinct disease having its own cause. When its effects become visible on the nose, it is considered to be a wound caused by water, and its appearance on the palate is diagnosed as due to dust. All the symptoms are treated by smoking very strong tobacco, or by applying concoctions and salves compounded of various herbs.[134] As to the origin of this disease, the people tell the following fantastic story:

> A certain emperor was in love with his daughter-in-law. St. John, of course, reproved him, and made him dance with her at the ball. As a punishment, the emperor put St. John into a dungeon. In the morning the daughter-in-law and the executioner entered the dungeon and cut off St. John's head. At that very moment all food and drink turned into blood. The daughter-in-law then put the head of St. John on a plate and, upon arriving in town, hurled it seventy-six times in the air. Whoever was sprinkled with the blood of St. John's head became afflicted with syphilis.[135]

755

Epilepsy is definitely ascribed to an evil spirit. When the [753]
czort (Devil) gets hold of a person, they say, he throws him on the ground and turns his eyes so that he does not see or hear anything.

[133] *Ibid.*, pp. 162-3. [134] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, 57-8.
[135] *Ibid.*, i, p. 45.

755 thing. The victim may be cured by drawing blood from under the nail of his little finger, by pouring cold water over him and then rubbing his hands and head, and by bending his little finger and pressing it tightly. Above all, the stricken person must not be called by name. Epilepsy is also treated by strewing the patient with consecrated herbs cooked in holy water, by putting into his hands a candle once held by a dying person, or by fumigating him with smoke engendered by burning the hair left on a comb after it has been used to dress the hair of a corpse in preparation for a burial.[136]

The cure for tuberculosis actually prescribed by one *znachor* is hardly less fantastic: "Insert some dung under the shoe of a horse and let it remain there for nine days; when this period has elapsed, drive the horse out of the stable and let it gallop down the road; then run after it, catch the dung as it is cast off by the horse, and apply it to your limbs."[137]

Similia similibus curantur is as important a principle in peasant therapeutics as it is in other magical practices. The following remedies are based on this theory. If one gets a chill from drinking cold water, one must, in order to be cured, continue to drink cold water until one vomits. On the other hand, a person who becomes feverish on taking a bath should have a good quantity of water poured over him after he has fallen asleep. A person suffering from a sty, an eye inflammation which is called "barley" (*jiczmen*) in Ukrainian, throws a few kernels of this grain on the fire and runs away as fast as he can in order not to hear the crackling, which is supposed to betoken his cure.[138] The use of a piece of the mad dog's skin in the cure of rabies, as described above, is another illustration of the same principle. 1

Closely akin to the above is the sympathetic or imitative method of healing. A sufferer from a toothache, for example, upon being informed that somebody in the village has just died, goes to the house and touches first the dead man's teeth and then his own, or else takes the deceased's hand and with it touches his own teeth, saying: "May my teeth hurt as do those of the de-

[136] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, i, p. 322. [137] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 237.
[138] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 163, 172.

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ceased!" The toothache immediately disappears and never returns again.[139] One of the multitudinous remedies for fever involves a similar principle. At about 9 or 10 o'clock at night the patient goes to the grave of a recently buried person, scoops up therefrom a handful of earth, and runs home with it as fast as he can, so that, before sunrise, he can mix it with water, drink it, and thereby dispel his chills.[140]

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An excellent illustration of the power ascribed to exuviae is the use of sweat to arouse love. Thus a sorceress sometimes mixes a little perspiration from the sole of a girl's foot with some soot from the chimney, and pronounces a formula over the mixture; if the girl pours this concoction into a drink given to a boy, he will surely fall in love with her and soon marry her.[52] 789 832

When a person faces a serious situation and wants to be sure that the means employed are effective, he resorts, as in some of the above-cited cases, to a professional sorcerer (*czariwnyk*) or soothsayer (*prymiwnyk*) for assistance. Of these practitioners, mostly women, the most proficient are thought to be the Gypsies,[53] and especially the offspring of a Gypsy and a Ukrainian peasant.[54] A sorcerer or sorceress is never born but made. A woman who wants to become a sorceress must fast for nine consecutive days, abstain from ablutions and prayer, indeed, renounce completely her belief in Christ, and carry an undeveloped egg under her left armpit throughout the period. She must not, moreover, reveal the secret of her power, lest she lose her skill. On her dying bed, however, she should tell everything to another woman, in order to avoid the suffering of a lingering death which would otherwise be her fate.[55] 756 791

The sorcerer or soothsayer foretells future happenings by reading the lines of the palm, by extinguishing coals in the manner already mentioned, and by pouring wax upon water and observing the different shapes it takes.[56] To put an end to malicious gossip, 756 787 791

> a soothsayer is called in, and a lock is handed her. She washes the lock in water, brought by the master of the house, walking backward all the way, from an abundant well, and then closes it in order to put an end to the gossip. In case the latter is very menacing, two locks may be washed and shut. Having closed the locks, the soothsayer sweeps all the dirt and dust of the room into the water, and has the inhabitants of the house take off all their clothes and wash themselves with it. Finally she washes the windows too, and then

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

[53] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 291.

[54] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 236.

[55] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 291.

[56] *Idem.*

787 756 pours the water with all its dirt (the gossip) out through the window.[57]

While the female soothsayer occupies herself mainly with 789 prophesying the future, making love magic, and the like, her [758] counterpart specializes in weather control—in banning hail, thunder, snowstorms, and torrents, and in bringing the rains needed to relieve drought. Even in such cases, however, the ordinary man is far from helpless. Armed with formulas and more concrete means, he can avert a calamity even without the aid of a weather expert. It will be convenient, therefore, to examine the weather lore of the people before turning to a consideration of the professional.

789 The layman, first of all, is much given to predicting the weather, which he undertakes with the greatest of confidence, especially 787 at Easter. On this day he forecasts atmospheric changes throughout the year, and these prophecies are not mere pastimes, but are believed in to the extent of letting them determine important economic activities.[58] Work and cattle trading, for example, are done in accordance with these predictions. If it rains on Easter Day, the whole summer will be wet; fair weather foretells a dry summer, and unsettled weather means that in general a good summer is at hand. Aside from these general prophecies the people indulge in more minute predictions on the same day. If fair weather prevails from 1 to 3 a.m., an early and fair spring may be expected, and the price of hay will rise and that of cattle will fall. If the weather is pleasant from early in the morning until noon, then the approaching spring will be fair and the harvest good; if, however, the morning is fair at first but the sky later becomes overcast, the spring will indeed be pleasant, but the time of the maize and potato harvest will be characterized by inclement weather. Further detailed predictions are made from the kind of weather prevailing during the evening and on the following night, and the work in the fields and pastures is planned in accordance therewith.[59]

789 The layman can also, as already intimated, do much to avert hail or relieve drought without calling upon the aid of the weather

[57] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 276. [58] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iii, 8.
[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

789 The village elder, with the aid of his assistants, calls together all the women, old and young, usually on a Sunday, at a certain place, whence they are taken to the nearest lake or river and made to bathe. This is supposed to cause immediate rain. The group of women thus assembled enter the water willingly, or, if they resist, are thrown in by force. There they must stand in their shirts, with the water up to their waists, for a full quarter of an hour. This act is called *baby splawyty* (bathing the women). If it is noticed that any of the women are absent, a trustworthy peasant is sent to the house of the disobedient one to find out the reason for her absence. The only excuses acceptable in this case are absence from the village and serious illness. In the latter case, however, the woman is at least made to urinate and the urine is immediately spilled on the field.

The urine of women, as a matter of fact, is generally held to possess the power of causing rain.

756 789 In order to avert effectively a dangerous hailstorm or an approaching cloudburst, or to end a long-standing drought, it is necessary to secure the services of a professional weather expert. One or more of these men are to be found in practically every village, but not all are considered equally skilful. Those with the greatest repute come from among the mountaineers. Although women are not unknown as weather conjurors, those who excel at the art are usually men. A weather-man of reputation is much sought after and looked up to. His services are in demand over wide territories, and he is well paid and often comparatively wealthy. Travelling from place to place in response to calls, he frequently returns home in the fall with wagons laden with grain obtained for his services.[64]

The weather expert, though versed in all kinds of atmospheric problems, specializes at times in one field, or is at least considered by the people to excel in dealing with one particular kind of phenomenon. The two commonest specialists are the *hradiwnyk* (hail-man) and the *chmarnyk* (rain-man). They are able not only to prevent storms and bring rain but also, if asked,

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to divert the hail or cloudburst to an enemy's field.[65] For this reason they are sometimes looked upon as malevolent persons in league with an evil spirit.[66] 356 789

The *hradiwnyk* or *chmarnyk* may control the weather either in the individual case or for the entire year. His methods differ widely, ranging from the utterance of simple formulas to the institution of elaborate ceremonies involving mysterious instruments. Naturally, the more elaborate the means, the more effective the results are believed to be. To avert a hail or a cloudburst the weather expert must have a special wand, called *koszturnik*. This implement is usually fashioned from a limb broken off from a knobby bladder-knot tree, and it acquires its magical potency by being used to separate a frog and a snake engaged in a life and death struggle. Such struggles often occur in the mountainous region in the spring, and are so fierce that the combatants foam at the mouth. Touching the foam endows the wand with mysterious power. Other instruments widely used by weather-men include the scythe, the hatchet, and sharp tools in general.[67] [778]

Conjuration in the individual case, i.e. whenever a storm approaches, is performed in the following manner. As soon as a hailstorm is in evidence, the *hradiwnyk* repairs to the field, where he either undresses completely or else retains only his shirt. He then takes his hat in one hand and a scythe in the other, and utters his formulas, which are intended to divert the hail to a road, a river, a forest, or the field of an enemy.[68] A wand of the type described above, if the weather-man has one, is, of course, more effective than a scythe. Should such a conjuration prove ineffective, the *hradiwnyk* simply presents his hind part to the hail—a last resort which is considered infallible.[69] An approaching torrent or cloudburst, too, is prevented by simple means. As soon as a heavy cloud appears, the *chmarnyk* runs outdoors and diverts the storm in any desired direction by merely pointing with his wand.[70]

[65] Kaindl, in *Mitt. k.k. geogr. Gesellsch.*, xxxvii, 626.

[66] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 121. [67] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 252, 253.

[68] Kaindl, in *Mitt. k.k. georg. Gesellsch.*, xxxvii, 626. [69] *Idem.*

[70] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 253.

789 To banish hail throughout the year the *hradiwnyk* must act
756 on Christmas Eve. He must neither eat nor drink throughout the day, nor must he spit or talk to anyone. Late at night he undresses completely and betakes himself naked to the field. Here he draws various circles with his magic wand and by uttering his formulas, tries to get the hail to appear before him. The hail, naturally enough, does not appear, and this evokes from the conjuror the following address: "As you are not heeding my call now, so may you remain far from us throughout the year!" With this the conjuration for the whole year is accomplished.[71]

756 How does the weather-man avoid blame for his false predictions and ineffective conjurations, which are necessarily very numerous, and how does he manage to hold the confidence of the people? The answer is obvious: he employs the familiar excuses used by shamans everywhere. After performing his act he asserts that the cloud must disappear and that there will be no hail whatever, or, if for some reason the cloud cannot be dispersed, that he is driving it away to deserted places so that it will hail only there. If, however, his art fails, and someone complains to this effect, then he says that he was unable to do anything because he noticed the impending cloud too late, i.e. when it was over and had already left the limits of his sphere of influence, for, if this occurs, there is nothing one can do to ward off hail in that region.[72] Another stock excuse is that "the weather-man of a neighbouring village, may God punish him, has diverted the hail to our village out of revenge." The people believe this, and so does the conjuror himself.[73]

757 Mention should be made in this connection of the current belief that natural phenomena have a definite influence upon human health. In some localities, when the people hear thunder for the first time in the spring, they throw themselves on the ground and roll around, even though they may be engaged at the time in important work and the earth be muddy. This behaviour is thought to prevent all sorts of aches and especially stomach disorders.[74] In other places, on similar occasions, the

[71] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 253. [72] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 123.
[73] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, i, 55. [74] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 234.

The milk industry, too, is relatively undeveloped in the Ukraine and might even become insufficient to supply the needs of the big towns and the industrial centres if the breeding does not increase in order to be able to overtake the other branches of economic activity. 234

The general opinion which considers the Ukraine an inexhaustible source of meat and milk seems to be unfounded, at least at the present time. This is all the more true as, while the purchasing power of the native population rises, the insufficiency of the resources in this respect becomes more and more noticeable. 000

The transformation which the Ukraine has undergone in the sphere of the exploitation of the products of the surface soil since the establishment of the Soviet regime, while leaving aside the crisis in cattle-breeding, has undoubtedly not led to progress.

The trial plantations of cotton, of soho, and of rice, the mechanization of the working of the land by the extensive employment of tractors, seem to be the only advantages which have been given by the new regime to the development of Ukrainian agriculture. 242

It would seem necessary to note another wealth of the Ukrainian soil which does not enter into any of our economic categories—these are the various spas. 529 757

In the first instance there are, in the environs of Odessa, two lakes, the Kouialnik and the Khadji-Bey, ancient bays which formed when they were the mouths of rivers since dried up and which are to-day completely separated from the sea. The medicinal value of these two lakes is appreciated by all Russia. Tens of thousands of invalids, especially rheumatics and paralytics, flock there every year for the mud baths which are very rich in iodine salts.

Many parts of the coast of the Black Sea are very 529

755 son suffering from fever, for example, pares the nails of his fingers and toes, and cuts a little hair from the four corners of his head; he then inserts the clippings in the stem of a rotten tree, closes the hole tightly, and runs home as fast as he can, saying: "May you not return until I myself shall come back for you!"[118] Mention might be made here of the belief that hair from one's head should not be thrown on the dung pile, for if a bird should appropriate it in building its nest the person would lose his hair. On the other hand, one can make his hair grow long and thick by throwing a few locks into fire or water.[119]

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[118] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, p. 173.
[119] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 235.
[120] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 164.
[121] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[122] *Ibid.*, pp. 164, 167, 171.
[123] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 94.
[124] *Ibid.*, p. 95.
[125] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 137, 144.

example, the water is sure to be pure. It also possesses valuable 825
therapeutic qualities and is consequently employed in treating 757
divers ailments. A cataract, for instance, is cured by applying a tiny living frog to the eye. A sufferer from fever is given brandy in which a frog has been immersed, or is made to carry a frog, wrapped in a piece of cloth, in his bosom until it dies, whereupon the fever disappears. Another fever cure consists in putting three, or sometimes nine, lice into a glass of brandy, which is then given to the unwitting patient to drink.[126]

The range of ingredients in medicinal preparations is almost 757
infinite. Some of the concoctions are harmless, and many are useless, while a considerable number are probably definitely harmful. Liquor is widely used, as though the people were really aware of the therapeutic value of alcohol. A drink or an application of brandy serves as a kind of first-aid in any emergency, and liquor in some form serves either as the base or as an essential ingredient in nearly every compound.

Thus a patient suffering from fever is given a drink of whisky containing ground garlic, or is made to eat a piece of bread wrapped in a cobweb. A swelling is treated by applying to it a hot white onion. Dysentery is cured by having the patient drink brandy to which is added some clay peeled off the oven of a room in which no death has ever occurred. Massage with the fat of a black cat is recommended for rheumatism.[127] A sufferer from diarrhœa is massaged with butter and then bathed in water in which rye straw or dumplings have been boiled.[128] A headache is relieved by pouring cold water from a well over the patient's head until the pain subsides, and a toothache by an application of alcohol, cold water, or a mixture of ground pepper and garlic. A victim of a sore throat may rid himself of the ailment by fastening thin strips of raw bacon, or the excrement of a pig, around his neck, and by gargling his throat with an infusion of laudanum. Inflammation of the lungs is cured by massaging the body with alcohol in which soap and camphor have been diluted, or by an application of leeches. An abscess is treated by applying a salve prepared either of

[126] *Ibid.*, pp. 144, 163, 171, 174. [127] *Ibid.*, pp. 166-67, 171, 174.
[128] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 239.

757 honey mixed with wheat flour or sweet cream, or of wax and linseed oil. For constipation the patient is given a dose of pulverized glass, and for loose bowels, dried bilberries.[129] For indefinite pains or general indisposition, when other remedies have failed, recourse is had to a " cure-all " compounded from nine different grains, usually the following : hay from a meadow never cultivated, rye, wheat, buckwheat, barley, millet, oats, maize, beans, and flaxseed. The hay is boiled in three separate pots and the kernels of the other grains in a fourth. The water of all the vessels is then poured together and given to the patient to drink.[130]

Extensive use is made of fumigation, called " smoking under " (*pidkuryty*). To cure rabies, for example, a piece of skin is cut off the mad dog's head, and the patient is smoked with it. All imaginable herbs, weeds, and dried fruits are burned that their smoke may relieve the sick, especially sufferers from fever. The articles most in demand for purposes of fumigation include pages containing the Ten Commandments written in Hebrew, Jewish Passover bread (*matza*), sticks from a willow broom used for sweeping the church, a shirt in which someone has died, and the dried testicles of a horse.[131]

Blood-letting, either by direct means or by the application of leeches, and cupping are among the most popular of cure-alls. The latter, commonly called *hornec prewernuty* (to turn a pot), is performed in the following manner :

> Women take a pot that has been greased, pour a little water into it in order to form steam, heat it, and then apply its open side to the patient's abdomen, as cuppers do with their cups. The pot is so large, and adheres so fast to the body, that it can hardly be torn off ; it often happens that the cup has to be smashed before it can be removed. One can well imagine what acute pain the patient must experience during this operation, and how pronounced must be the traces left on his skin.[132]

The *hornec* (cup) is employed especially in healing hæmorrhoids

[129] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 94-5. [130] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 162.
[131] *Ibid.*, pp. 171-2. [132] *Ibid.*, p. 162.

The horn(cup) is employed especially in healing hæmorrhoids
(*zolotnyk*). According to popular belief, every person, male or 757
female, has a *zolotnyk* which dwells under his navel. If he lifts 753
a heavy burden, the *zolotnyk* descends and causes hæmorrhoids. The sufferer, after he has been cupped and the painful spot has been smeared with butter, is put in a very warm spot in the room, often in the oven itself, so that he may be properly "steamed up." To effect a permanent cure, however, the *zolotnyk* must be driven back to its "natural" seat. This is usually done by a professional healer, who, with the appropriate incantations, massages the patient's stomach with butter, using only an upward motion.[133]

Syphilis is not regarded with a gravity commensurate with its seriousness, but rather as just another of the numerous maladies with which people become afflicted. Every symptom of this venereal infection is looked upon as a distinct disease having its own cause. When its effects become visible on the nose, it is considered to be a wound caused by water, and its appearance on the palate is diagnosed as due to dust. All the symptoms are treated by smoking very strong tobacco, or by applying concoctions and salves compounded of various herbs.[134] As to the origin of this disease, the people tell the following fantastic story:

> A certain emperor was in love with his daughter-in-law. St. John, of course, reproved him, and made him dance with her at the ball. As a punishment, the emperor put St. John into a dungeon. In the morning the daughter-in-law and the executioner entered the dungeon and cut off St. John's head. At that very moment all food and drink turned into blood. The daughter-in-law then put the head of St. John on a plate and, upon arriving in town, hurled it seventy-six times in the air. Whoever was sprinkled with the blood of St. John's head became afflicted with syphilis.[135]

755

Epilepsy is definitely ascribed to an evil spirit. When the [753]
czort (Devil) gets hold of a person, they say, he throws him on the ground and turns his eyes so that he does not see or hear anything.

[133] *Ibid.*, pp. 162-3. [134] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, 57-8.
[135] *Ibid.*, i, p. 45.

132 49·3°. Drawbacks for agriculture in New Russia are the prevalence of north and east winds and an irregular and insufficient rainfall. The average rainfall at Yelisavetgrad is 17 in., at Odessa 16 in., at Lugansk 15 in., and at Nikolaev 14 in. The rains in April and May decide the harvest. June is the rainiest month, but from May to September there are droughts. Most places are largely dependent upon wells and ponds constructed in the ravines, which are frequent on the steppes.

The climate of the Ukraine, as a whole, is therefore continental, i. e. the variation between summer and winter temperatures is very great. Sudden variations of temperature are frequent. The rainfall is by no means abundant, and there is a progressive decline towards the south and south-east. The fact, however, that the bulk of the rainfall occurs in the summer favours agricultural operations, even where the annual amount of rainfall is comparatively low. It is only in New Russia that the country suffers seriously from drought.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

512 344 The Ukraine is very backward in regard to sanitary conditions. Less than half the towns have a satisfactory water-supply, and a very small percentage of them a regular drainage system.

164 158 Typhoid, diphtheria, and malaria are very prevalent. To the great majority of the people in the country, doctors are inaccessible, and even in the towns good hospitals and adequate medical attendance are very rare. In the matter of cleanliness, however, the Little Russians compare favourably with the Great Russians. 515

(5) Race and Language

Race

162 563 The population of the Ukraine is composed of a mixture of various races and nationalities, those chiefly represented being Little Russians, Poles, Jews,

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Government.	Town Population.	Country Population.
Poltava	363,500	3,352,900
Kharkov	516,200	2,851,500
Yekaterinoslav	406,500	2,883,600
Kherson	1,017,500	2,592,800
Taurida (with the Crimea)	447,200	1,559,300

It is apparent from these figures that a large proportion of the population of the Ukraine is still engaged in agricultural pursuits.

161 Many parts of the Ukraine are very thickly populated. The most densely populated Governments are as follows: Podolia, 243; Kiev, 236; Poltava, 192; Chernigov, 154; Kharkov, 160; Volhynia, 146; Yekaterinoslav, 135; and Kherson, 132 persons per square mile.

Movement

163 165 The population of the Ukraine increases more steadily than that of Great Russia. The following figures are given by the official statistical annual (1914) for the year 1912:

	Births. total.	*Births. per 1,000.*	*Deaths. total.*	*Deaths. per 1,000.*	*Increase. per 1,000.*
Volhynia	154,685	39·0	72,287	18·1	20·9
Podolia	145,401	37·4	73,254	18·9	18·5
Kiev	182,024	39·3	92,109	19·9	19·4
Chernigov	116,411	37·8	59,972	19·5	18·3
Poltava	136,951	37·3	64,801	17·6	19·7
Kharkov	151,064	45·4	73,349	22·0	23·4
Yekaterinoslav	159,233	49·5	72,995	22·7	26·8
Kherson	157,622	44·4	92,227	26·0	18·4
Taurida	85,913	43·7	44,080	22·4	21·3

165 The average mortality is lower in the towns than in the country, owing to the fact that the more robust elements of the population are attracted to the towns, leaving the old men, women, and children behind.

165 758 Infant mortality is often as high as 50 per cent.; this is due to ignorance, insufficient feeding, and the fact that mothers return to work in the fields or factories within a few days of child-birth. The imperfect system of medical aid prevents many cases of births and deaths from ever being officially reported.

Medical Supplies

731 758 648 The UNRRA medical and sanitation programme for the Ukraine is extremely small in relation to the needs; and the rate of deliveries has been the poorest of any commodity group.

Up to the end of January 1947 the Administration had shipped to the Ukraine 373 gross long tons of medical and sanitation equipment valued at 1,858,000 dollars, leaving a balance still to be shipped of just over 468,000 dollars.

In a country where the destruction has been so great and where food supplies are so low, a medical programme of 2,326,000 dollars cannot make much impression; however, such equipment as has been received is being used to the best possible advantage.

743 Most of the hospitals and invalids' homes in the Ukraine are operating under appalling difficulties; and the urgency of the need for equipment and medical supplies is everywhere evident. The UNRRA Mission early in 1946 described several hospitals which they had visited in various parts of the Ukraine. Here is their observation of the one at Kremenchug:

"Kremenchug formerly had a good 450-bed general hospital, which was blown up by a thoroughly efficient demolition battalion when the Germans retreated. All equipment, including an 8,000-volume medical library and a well-equipped X-ray laboratory, was demolished. The only buildings which escaped destruction were seven small sheds and storage houses on the outskirts of the hospital grounds.

"The hospital staff recently installed 250 beds in these ramshackle buildings. In a number of wards the windows were bricked up because no glass is available, and the only light came from an unshaded 40-watt electric bulb in the corridor. Paint was flaking off the floor and the walls of the surgery; most of the roofs leaked, there were no indoor toilets; fuel was available to heat only the operating and delivery rooms and the nursery. (Four babies, on an average, are delivered each 743 day). Many of the patients had no gowns and no bed clothes, except 758 what they were able to bring with them. No soap whatever has been available to the hospital for some time; laundry was simply being boiled with a little soda, and the floors were scrubbed with a lye solution. The only surgical equipment we saw was a few dozen scalpels and haemostats in one small cabinet in the corner of the operating room, and two sterilizers.

"The doctor in charge told us that his patients received an average diet of 1,000 to 1,200 calories a day, consisting mostly of bread, potatoes, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of fat. (The low caloric intake is largely due to the inability of the patients to digest the coarse whole-grain rye or wheat bread, which is available in reasonable quantities). Theoretically the hospital is entitled to 2,500 grams

743 758 of meat daily for each thirty patients; but, since there is rarely any meat to be had, it received 400 grams of dried milk as a substitute, or approximately 13 grams per patient each day.

"The hospital was so badly overcrowded that beds had been set up in the corridors and even in the yard. Some of these beds had been salvaged from the ruins of the old hospital, and consequently were badly twisted and charred."

The same general conditions prevailed in most of the hospitals visited. The fact that so much improvement has since been made with so little help promises the best use of future deliveries of UNRRA medical supplies. The programme includes in addition to dressings, drugs and chemicals, X-ray equipment and supplies, surgical instruments, dental equipment, and a penicillin plant.

Clothing

291 [294] 548 731 Since most of the Ukraine's clothing factories were heavily damaged or destroyed in the war, there is a widespread shortage of all articles of wearing apparel. The limited UNRRA programme has fallen considerably short of satisfying all the requirements; however, such supplies as have been sent - particularly textiles and shoes - have been economically used to help the most critical cases.

By the end of January 1947 UNRRA had sent the Ukraine 15,095 gross long tons of clothing valued at 16,801 dollars, leaving an unshipped balance of 55,000 dollars. The following table gives the composition of the shipments.

TABLE XXV

UNRRA Shipments of Clothing to the Ukraine up to January 31, 1947

	Thousand U.S. dollars	Gross long tons
Finished clothing	779	384
Blankets and comforters	902	522
Cotton textiles	573	321
Woollen textiles	3,487	1,359
Raw wool	2,240	3,729
Footwear	5,697	3,997
Upper leather	575	259
Sole leather	1,274	1,626
Hides	188	381
Miscellaneous textiles	183	149
Miscellaneous footwear	735	2,368
Unclassified	168	n.a.
Totals	16,801	15,095

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

262 [434] For example, light workers were entitled to only 1,320 calories[1] a day from rationed foods, and office workers, only 1,236. Supplementary non-rationed foods were obtainable, but only in limited quantities and at high prices.

262 433 461 The inadequate diet which everyone had been receiving since the war was undoubtedly responsible for lowered work efficiency, and added to the shortage of machinery and equipment, for delayed reconstruction. For example, although up to October 1946 heavy workers were entitled to official rations providing 3,757 calories a day, the greater part of their diet consisted of bread and cereals. Because of the great livestock shortage, there was scarcely any meat available on the ration. Fairly typical was the situation of 13,000 workers engaged in rebuilding the Ukraine's largest steel mill at Zaporoshie, who during April 1946 received only 750 grams of fat (about 26½ ounces) and less than two pounds of meat per person, a diet clearly inadequate for heavy labour.

262 758 Patients in a Kremenchug hospital received a diet composed chiefly of bread, cabbage soup, and 15 grams of butter or lard, which provided about 1,200 calories daily - a level radically below the emergency subsistence rate of 1,900 calories defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

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1 Compare all calorie rates with the emergency subsistence food consumption levels defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as the minima necessary to prevent serious malnutrition leading to disease and the danger of civil unrest. For European countries, these levels are as follows:

Emergency Subsistence Calorie Intake

Category	Calories per day	Category	Calories per day
0 - 2 years	1,000	Normal consumers (male)	1,900
3 - 5 "	1,250	Sedentary (female)	1,600
6 - 9 "	1,500	Moderate workers	2,000
10 - 17 years	2,000	Heavy workers	2,500
Pregnant and nursing women	2,000	Very heavy workers	3,000

1 [SIC - - ANALYST]

basis with Ukrainian. He established Russian theatres in the larger 191
cities and sent them Russian companies from Leningrad and Moscow 636
to show the greatness of Russian art, while at the same time he had [545]
Les Kurbas arrested at the end of the year and closed the Berezil Theatre, the leading company in Ukraine, and even abolished its name as Catherine the Great had abolished the name of the Zaporozhian Sich one hundred fifty years before.

The fundamental object was to re-Russianize Ukraine as rapidly as possible. In pursuance of this idea, Zatonsky even suggested that the students should be encouraged to talk a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian in the hope that they could thus be more quickly induced to accept the alien tongue. That was a rash thought, for as soon as it was reported to Moscow, there came a strong protest from Gorky that such a procedure could only injure the purity of the Russian language by mixing foreign elements in it. Zatonsky hurriedly withdrew his suggestions but it was too late and only a few years later he was to pay the penalty for his rash proposal.

It was small wonder that Khvylovy, who knew well that he [762] ●
was threatened with arrest and execution, committed suicide in despair on May 13, 1933 and he was followed on July 6, by Skrypnyk who was too familiar with the workings of Russian Communism not to realize that he would be steadily demoted until he could be finished off without comment as a fallen idol.

The terror and the destruction proceeded apace[1] and after the 661
murder of Kirov in Leningrad on December 21, 1934, new in- 538
vestigations were ordered and it was discovered that the bulk of the Ukrainian authors were involved in the conspiracy. In a very short time their ranks were almost completely decimated. In the same month H. Kosynka, O. Vlyzko, I. Krushelnytsky, K. Burevy, and D. Falkivsky were shot on various pretenses. Nearly all the former members of the *Vaplite,* the Neo-Classicists, the groups connected with the MARS in Kiev and the *New Generation,* were liquidated in one way or another, either by execution or deportation and deportation was practically the equivalent of death, for scarcely one of the deported ever returned to the Ukraine or made

1 [reference to forced Russification of Ukraine, 1933--Analyst]

133 Plain where lie the coal districts of the Ukraine. The more bleak and unfriendly this industrial country with its black chimneys appears to you, the friendlier the quiet, pale yellow Donets beckons yonder, with its broad, green valley and the white chalk precipices crowned by dark green forests. Now your journey takes you south to the Sea of Azov, across the mouth of the Don to the Caucasian foothills. Immeasurable fields of sun-
101 flowers accompany you into this "second Ukraine".*
133 Here you feel the refreshing breath of the snowy mountains of the Caucasus. You are on the shores of the Argonauts. Virile and full of strength is this untouched land at the foot of the Elbrus. Like the mountains, the people, too, are giants. You have before you the descendants of the flower of the Ukrainian people, of the Zaporogian Cossacks who were settled here by Catherine II.

137 And now turn west, start homeward! The way
[133] leads across the Pontic Plain which extends north of the Black Sea as far as the Danube. On this "racial meadow" you will look in vain for the much-praised wild uncultivated steppe. You are in the land of Taras Bulba. Gogol, a Ukrainian, erected an imperishable monument to the bold Cossack in his tale. /21/ In those days the grass and shrubs of the steppe grew taller than a man, but today you will find only the knee-high herbs of the temporarily fallow fields, and here and there a thicket of wild cherries, mahaleb and thistles. Perhaps you will also come to one of those meadows that have become rare, which in a brief whiff of spring changes its color like a rich woman her clothes, wrapping itself in silver gray during the summer, and adorning itself in moss-green in autumn, when rain finally quenches the cracked earth. Smooth
133 and flat, amorphous as a calm sea, the Pontic Steppe stretches out before you. Burial mounds as
764 large as houses, called kurgany, point the way to the Dniestr. What ghastly secrets may they not

* [i.e. the Caucasian foothills — Analyst]

●%4 harbor! Some kurgany were opened and Scythian princes were found who had taken with them under the earth a retinue of more than 200 riders on horseback and in full armor.

000 You must not overlook the Crimean Peninsula, the Tauris of the Greeks! You pass through a narrow isthmus and find yourself on the Peninsula. Gradually the steppe mounts up to the Yaila Range from the peaks of which daring roads climb down the steep coast to the blue-green Black Sea. Crimea, ancient land of the Tatar! Christ was driven out of the Ukraine; but Mohammed has entrenched himself under the flat roofs of these Tatar villages and cities, in order to receive the prayers of his believers when the sun flames up over the Caucasus or sinks across Bessarabia. Thus southern Crimea with its Tatars, its marble palaces of past Russian grandeur, its groves of olives, mulberries and figs, and its Bolshewik sanatariums, leads a special existence which, in its timeless diversity, will affect you strangely.

361 The mouth of the Dniepr is behind you and Odessa lies in front of you. Catherine II, the great colonizer, erected this city on the bare ground of the steppe. The yellow shell-limestone coast drops steeply into the sea. Straight as a die, quite after the modern European pattern, the third largest city of Ukraine /22/ is laid out. You will miss trees and parks and perhaps you will say it is a cold heap of stones. You forget that Odessa in summer does not have enough water for its inhabitants to drink. The earth is saline and rain extremely sparse.

000 There are still fifty kilometers separating you from the Rumanian border. Beyond the Dniestr you are on Bessarabian soil, and here, too, you will meet Ukrainians. Travel up the imperceptibly rising Bessarabian plain between the Dniestr and the Prut, in the course of which you repeatedly touch on Rumanian soil, and you will reach green Bukovina where the hospitable Muzul will present

593 meetings ("posydilky" and "Vetshernytsi"), and even at the
584 street meetings that are held at night ("vulytsja"); marriage is
591 seldom an affair of arrangement. After marriage, children generally leave their parents' home; a father often provides a home of his own for a son who wishes to marry.

586 Divorce is rare in the country. An unlucky choice of a conjugal
836 partner is borne with patience. Up till recently, in spite of the fact that boys and girls are constantly thrown together at work and at play, a high standard of chastity prevailed and illicit sexual intercourse was the exception. A "pokrytka" who has been seduced by a Russian soldier ("saldatka") or a foreigner (mostly a Pole) has no easy lot in the country. The whole family is deeply ashamed when the "bundling" custom ("komora") which is still practised in some parts of the country reveals that the
183 bride is no longer a virgin. Customs have been strengthened
561 by the respect for national traditions, a deep religious feeling and tolerance. Birth, baptism, marriage, death and burial are accompanied by very many, original, symbolic customs, dating partly from before the birth of Christ. For instance, the old custom of duly "recognising" the newborn has been preserved as well as the ceremony of the baptismal banquet which marks the reception of the newly born child into the community.

585 In the varied wedding customs which generally take the better part of three days, there are memories of the days when the men of the tribe kidnapped or bought their brides. A marriage in a national setting has many dramatic effects and is accompanied by a whole series of symbolical actions and choruses. They remind us of the original rôle of the family in society. Customs from the world of the Grand Princes have been preserved in those marriage rites as in the ritualistic folk-songs, while the influence of the church is confined to the
765 actual ceremony in the church. The wake ("posyzhinja") and the wake games, which are dying out, are echoes of ancestor-worship and intended to prevent the dead from returning to life. The custom of special laments for the dead ("holosinnia") and the funeral banquet (formerly "tryzna") have persisted; on the many days of commemoration of the dead (e. g. on the

40th day after death, at Easter, Whitsuntide, and on St. Dimitry's day) special dishes are eaten. 765

The course of the year in Ukraine is accompanied by many old customs which are not to be found among Russians but which resemble those of Southern Slavonic peoples. They spring from the world of Pontium and Greece and Rome; such are the festivals at Christmas ("koljada"), New Year ("novyj rik"), the consecration of water ("shtshedryj vetshir"), Easter ("hayivky"), the beginning of spring ("vesnyanky"), solstice ("kupalo"), the beginning of autumn ("Andrija") etc. They are accompanied by games and country dances, of which there are several thousand. The beginning of the most important agricultural operations is also celebrated (building the house, ploughing, sowing, driving the cows to pasture, hay and grain harvest etc). 796

Ukrainian demonology, founded on ancient animistic beliefs, has, in contrast to the Russian, lost all its terrors; the devil, for instance, is stripped of all horror. Magic and the belief in witchcraft are very probably of more modern, partly Christian origin. There is no higher mythology. The worship of fire and water is more developed and there are some faint traces of the worship of plants. Much of popular belief is preserved in fairy tales, fables, sagas, legends, proverbs and riddles, of which there is an inexhaustible store. Some 4 years ago Savtshenko found 2000 main variants of Ukrainian fairy tales, compared with about 1700 Russian and 1500 White Ruthenian versions. V. Hnatjuk has counted 327 fables of animals (exclusive of variants). We must finally mention the incredible wealth of popular stories and anecdotes. 771 538

But the Ukrainian people's most precious spiritual possession is their folk-poetry, one of the richest in Europe and characterised by aesthetic values, depth of poetic feeling and perfection of form. F. v. Bodenstedt, who published "Die poetische Ukraine" in 1843 put these Ukrainian poems above those of all other nations. Hohol said of them that they comprehended poetry and history and were a monument to the nation's ancestors. Every kind of song is represented, from the traditional songs of ritual and later ballads to the short song of to-day ("Shumky", "Kozatshky", "Kolomyjky" and "Tshabarashky"). These histo-

it did anything good or bad.[12] During its nightly visits to its old home it enters the room quietly, even though the doors and windows be shut, uncovers the children and rocks them, and sometimes plays practical jokes on the members of the family.[13] It retains the power to harm, however, only for one year after the funeral, and the members of the family consequently fear it most during this period.[14] Especially must it be guarded against on the night following the funeral. On this night the members of the household of the deceased must not go to sleep, but must continue their vigil as in the two preceding nights. Although some of the participants in the post-funeral dinner leave after a few hours, others remain in the house to keep the mourners company. In order to keep awake, the watchers resort to various tricks to evoke laughter and ban sleep. As soon as one dozes off, for example, another smears soot on his face, fastens a rag to his coat, or sews his coat to that of another, and the ensuing laughter causes the napping one to awake.[15]

The other world, it is believed, is very distant, and the journey thither takes many days. The mountaineers believe that the soul travels on horseback,[16] and that the road is beset with obstacles and strewn with thorns. To reach the other world the soul must also cross a fathomless sea. If it is deserving, the Mother of God carries it over the water in a tightly woven net.[17]

The peasant conceives the future world in terms of the one he lives in. In heaven, people continue their daily existence much as they did on earth. They lead, to be sure, a life "where neither the burning sun, nor wind and storm disturb the perfect tranquility." But they occupy houses exactly like those found in the native villages, and they eat food which differs in no way from the regular peasant diet. Shepherds busy themselves tending cattle upon rich pastures, and tillers of the soil do their

[12] Onyšćuk, *op. cit.*, xi, 48.

[13] Kolessa, J., "Narodziny i chrzciny, wesele i pogrzeb u ludu ruskiego," *Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej*, xiii, (Kraków, 1889), 150.

[14] *Ibid.*, xiii, 150.

[15] Kolberg, *op. cit.*, i, 219.

[16] Kandi, in *Globus*, lxvii, 358.

[17] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 274.

The Living faith of pagan times occupies among the people, a position which is equal with the Christian belief. The Orthodox Church, doubtless recognizing how deeply rooted the popular customs are, has tried to reconcile the two.

769 The ancestor cult is particularly important. The Ukrainian people entertain their ancestors on Christmas Eve. The table is set and the whole family are seated at it. Only a few seats are unoccupied - for the ancestors. Their bowls are filled with the traditional Christmas food: cooked wheat with honey and poppy, cooked fish and a cooked fruit mixture. "Little Father Frost" is also invited on Christmas Eve by the master of the house. The peasant steps in front of his house and calls: "Frost, frost, come and have supper with us!" Every guest, even the beggar, is welcome on Christmas Eve, for he might be an ancestor or Father Frost whom even the priest

[789] does not forget specially to invite. Hay is laid under the tablecloth on the nights around the winter solstice, for all green things /138/ drive away the evil spirits. The place of honor in the house belongs to the "grandfather", a

533 sheaf of grain, symbolizing the ancestor. In the twelve magical nights between Christmas Eve and the Three Kings the famous koliad, pagan songs about the solstice, with a Christian flavor, exorcise all evil. Jesus Christ, Dazhdboh the sun god, and the Virgin Mary, all three are conjured up in one and the same song, in order to protect these worthy Christians.

527 The carnival belongs to the women; the men

789 have nothing to do with it, although on other occasions they do not scorn merry revels. On a Monday morning the married women of the village gather in the pub in order to begin a week of jolly drinking. This, too, of course, cannot pass without magic. The sorcery revolves about the "koloda", a stick which symbolizes a child. It is wound with tow and is now "born". The women congratulate each other on the "birth" with horilka,

527 789 grain whiskey. The revelry lasts all week just as in the case of a real birth.

527 771 769 The spring festival, the resurrection of nature, has for a long time coincided with the Christian Easter, the resurrection of the Lord, and the burial of Christ with the burial of winter. On Easter Sunday the Christian service and the pagan cult complement each other in a strange way. Scarcely has the priest prayed for the blessing of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost to descend upon his congregation, when the women join hands and dance around the church. It is a custom dating from ancient times to announce to the ancestor the beginning of field work at the spring festival, so that he can give them help and support. "Oh, ancestor!" the women sing on this occasion, "we plow the field, oh ancestor, we announce to you that we plow, that we sow, that we reap!" (82)

82. According to a verbal communication of the Ukrainian ethnographer and archaeologist V. Shcherbakivskyj, Prague.

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1: Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 ing bishops to be married at all resulted from a reaction which was
793 general in Russia at the time amongst the "white" or married secular clergy against the monopoly which the "black" or celibate regular clergy held on practically all of the episcopal offices. The canons enacted at the 1921 *Sobor* specifically denied the regular clergy any privileges in obtaining bishoprics.

795 Liberalism also made itself felt in the administration of the Ukrainian Church, which was based on the principle of *soborno-pravnist'*, a conciliar and democratic form of ecclesiastical government in which all members of the Church—bishops, priests, and lay representatives—participate co-equally in all of its organs. The *Sobor* of 1921 specifically denied that hierarchs meeting alone could represent the whole Orthodox Ukrainian population. It declared that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor*, which was to meet at least once every five years, "possesses the highest religious, legislative, executive, judicial, and supervisory authority in the Ukrainian Church."[8] In the periods between *sobors* a smaller body, the Church Council, met semi-annually to serve as the highest executive organ and as an interim legislative body for the Church. Part of the Council met on a monthly basis to deal with more immediate matters. On the diocesan and district levels popular assemblies were to operate and each of the former was to elect its own bishop; the elective principle was also to prevail in the individual parishes, the members of which were empowered to select their own pastors with the consent of the diocesan council, a body elected by the diocesan assembly.

● 771 Another characteristic of the Ukrainian Church was its sense of
795 social consciousness, although expressed within a national context. The canons declared that "who utilizes Church life for social, national, political or personal subjugation should be excommunicated from the Church."[9] They specifically condemned all who employed national sentiments in order to renew the rule of the wealthy classes of society. The Russian Church was charged with having betrayed Orthodoxy *(Pravoslavje)* and having become a bulwark of *caroslavje* and *panoslavje*—glorification of tsars and landowners. In this way the new Church attempted to find a place for itself in the new revolutionary order and gain widespread popular support.[10]

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 9. For French translations of some of the documents pertaining to the Ukrainian Church see "L'Église Orthodoxe Panukrainienne créée en 1921 à Kiev," *Orientalia Christiana*, No. 3 (June, 1923), pp. 73 ff.

[10] The Ukrainian Church was not unique as a reformed group in the Russia of this period. A similar movement arose within the Russian Orthodox Church in the form of the "Renovated" or "Living" Church which also endeavored to break the monopoly of the monastic clergy on episcopal offices by permitting bishops to

40th day after death, at Easter, Whitsuntide, and on St. Dimitry's day) special dishes are eaten. 765

The course of the year in Ukraine is accompanied by many old customs which are not to be found among Russians but which resemble those of Southern Slavonic peoples. They spring from the world of Pontium and Greece and Rome; such are the festivals at Christmas ("koljada"), New Year ("novyj rik"), the consecration of water ("shtshedryj vetshir"), Easter ("hayivky"), the beginning of spring ("vesnyanky"), solstice ("kupalo"), the beginning of autumn ("Andrija") etc. They are accompanied by games and country dances, of which there are several thousand. The beginning of the most important agricultural operations is also celebrated (building the house, ploughing, sowing, driving the cows to pasture, hay and grain harvest etc). 796

Ukrainian demonology, founded on ancient animistic beliefs, has, in contrast to the Russian, lost all its terrors; the devil, for instance, is stripped of all horror. Magic and the belief in witchcraft are very probably of more modern, partly Christian origin. There is no higher mythology. The worship of fire and water is more developed and there are some faint traces of the worship of plants. Much of popular belief is preserved in fairy tales, fables, sagas, legends, proverbs and riddles, of which there is an inexhaustible store. Some 4 years ago Savtshenko found 2000 main variants of Ukrainian fairy tales, compared with about 1700 Russian and 1500 White Ruthenian versions. V. Hnatjuk has counted 327 fables of animals (exclusive of variants). We must finally mention the incredible wealth of popular stories and anecdotes. 771 538

But the Ukrainian people's most precious spiritual possession is their folk-poetry, one of the richest in Europe and characterised by aesthetic values, depth of poetic feeling and perfection of form. F. v. Bodenstedt, who published "Die poetische Ukraine" in 1843 put these Ukrainian poems above those of all other nations. Hohol said of them that they comprehended poetry and history and were a monument to the nation's ancestors. Every kind of song is represented, from the traditional songs of ritual and later ballads to the short song of to-day ("Shumky", "Kozatshky", "Kolomyjky" and "Tshabarashky"). These histo-

812 terest and, at the same time, superficial work. The Ukrainian
153 does not treat problems in theory and practice from the point of view of reason, but confronts reality with emotion, takes decision on the spur of the moment and confuses theoretical and practical issues.

157 In connection herewith I shall just touch on the third sphere
●771 of psychological life, namely the will. Seeing that all three
181 functions, reason, feeling and will are closely dependent on each other, the supremacy of the first or the second will necessarily
812 influence the third. A will that is under the control of feeling and not of reason, will not be very strong, steadfast or consistent, but, like the feelings, will fall from one extreme into the other in a brief interval, so that periods of great, superhuman activity and joy in work are followed by times of complete passivity and the idleness of despair. The supremacy of feeling and the predominance of love provide us with a further element in the Ukrainian view of the world, namely the deep feeling for religion which is the main component in all Slav spiritual life. Many scholars of the last century emphasise the supremacy of feeling and the all-important part played by religion as the main characteristics of the spiritual life not only of modern Slavs, but also of their ancestors, whether remote or recent. Attempts have been made to differentiate the historical peculiarity of the Slavs from that of the Romance peoples, in particular from the French and the Germanic nations. Compared with the political French and the philosophical Teutons, the Slavs are, in the widest sense, the religious race.

Quite apart from our opinion of this characteristic, it must not be forgotten that all leading Slavs, whether Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians or Russians, whether philosophers, authors or artists, display an undoubted, if varied religiousness. Even revolutionaries like Bakunin, Herzen and others, though they rejected all belief at the start, were none the less deeply religious men and their fantastic fight against religion was but a negative expression of religious feeling. Atheism in Russia is the expression of an unsatisfied passion for belief, of a passion that refuses to let

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

itself be put off with inadequate creeds, and that, in despair, denies God Himself. 157 771

In spite of this general, common background, expressions of religious feeling in the various Slavonic tribes differ greatly. The Ukrainian is never orthodox in his religious life; he does not cling at all to forms, to externals; rather does he endeavour always to comprehend the essence of a creed or belief. All who have studied the character of the Ukrainian people even superficially must admit that a religious quarrel or still more, a bitter strife over ritual forms such as has become a plague with Russians is quite impossible among Ukrainians. Ukrainian history provides us with interesting and instructive examples of this. When the Kyiv State became Christian and accepted the Byzantine form of the Christian Church, being thereby automatically drawn into the whirlpool of religious strife, the Grand Prince deliberately sought to avoid all dogmatic quarrels and to keep contact with the West, even though he was a member of the Eastern Church and shared in Eastern culture. Unconcerned with the subtleties of dogma, which did not interest Kyiv princes though their church depended on Constantinople, they nevertheless sent ambassadors to the German emperors and to Popes, received delegates from the West and showered gifts on them; they formed family unions with Catholic princes and rulers — in a word, began to smooth the way of mediation between Western and Eastern Europe, a rôle which Ukraine was later to assume. It is true that fierce wars of religion were waged in Ukraine as elsewhere in the 16th and 17th centuries. But here the strife between adherents of the Orthodox Church and Unionists represented in reality the gigantic struggle between two views of the world — the Eastern conservative view and the Western, more progressive one, a struggle which, in addition to religion, comprehended many other factors, such as national feeling and political and cultural standards. At present, too, when Ukrainians must live together under most trying circumstances, church differences scarcely come into play. As a result of his over-individual nature, the Ukrainian is all too ready to utilise every opportunity of arguing with his opponent, but religious feeling is too deeply rooted and com- 181 812

157 pels too much respect for the opinion of others for him to make
771 diverging beliefs an object of strife. Skovoroda, the Ukrainian
181 Socrates, whose spiritual life reflects all the characteristics of
812 the national psyche of the Ukrainian people, expresses his attitude to religious things in a very simple formula, which is perhaps too simple for a philosopher: "Pagan temples and idols were also expressions of Christian belief, being inscribed as they were with the wise, sacred words: gnoti seauton, nosce te ipsum".

According to Skovoroda, God did not reveal His truth to Christians and Hebrews alone, but also to pagans, just as morality cannot be regarded as the monopoly of the Christian world, seeing that it has many eminent champions among the nations of the ancient world. In the province of religion the Ukrainian demands universality, respect for every genuine religious feeling, tolerance of the convictions of others, but not orthodoxy and not the forfeiture of valuable content for the sake of mere form.

181 The Ukrainian view of the world is characterised by an optimism founded on metaphysics and ethics. In spite of the over-
812 whelming catastrophes that have constantly shaken the historical existence of the people to its foundations, in spite of the terrible persecutions to which the heart of the nation, its peasantry, has been exposed for centuries, hope of a better future was never dead, and indeed it rose afresh at the very time when, judged by objective standards, there were practically no prospects of improvement. And yet — in defiance of all foes — the Ukrainian people will and must live and fulfil its destined mission, the motto to which all leading spirits have always sworn allegiance. Of course, Ukrainian public opinion, especially in the higher classes, has also displayed depression caused by temporary circumstances; but though the situation was often extremely critical, Ukrainian history has no proper example of general dissolution, of complete and extensive despair. On the contrary, it is characteristic of Ukrainian mentality to regard the world and its phenomena from the best side and to trust in a favorable issue of all processes. "We'll get along somehow" is the expression, not only of mental balance, of a determination to keep a stiff upper lip, but is at the same time an unmistakable sign

776 world free from them, that they do not even respect Russian churches. As unsubstantial beings who can, however, appear in various familiar guises to man, these servants of the Evil One do not only dwell in places forsaken by God, in bottomless moors and the depths of forests: they are just as much at home in human habitations and even penetrate into the human organism. We may see proof of this belief in the fact that all containers of drinking-water in Russian peasant houses have got some kind of lid, be it ever so primitive. If it is impossible to get a lid, two sticks are laid cross-wise on the vessel so as to prevent the devil from getting into the water. Similarly, we can scarcely find a peasant who, in spite of innate carelessness and dreaminess, will forget to make the sign of the Cross over his mouth when yawning, so as to keep the Evil One from entering into his organism.

On the basis of material at our disposal dealing with the rôle of the devil among Eastern Slavs, we may safely assert that among Ukrainians, as among the peoples of Western Europe, the demonic has lost something of its mystery, originality and power while, in the life of the Great Russian, evil may not be on the same level as good, but it has nevertheless managed to
000 preserve a fairly strong position. Russian dualism, predominant in folk-lore and expressed in the struggle between the Divine Power and the Evil One points plainly to analogy with the dualist beliefs of Oriental religions. Mazdeism in particular, the creed of aryan Iran is decidedly dualistic in character, being constructed on the contrasts between light and darkness, good and evil, salvation and destruction, as they appear in the psychical and moral world. These contrasts can be traced to two gods who are equal in power and who are constantly engaged in strife. Ahriman characterises the cause of the strife and the mutual enmity of these two powers as the ethical devil; for a moral sin, envy of Ormuzd causes Ahriman to conceive the idea of destroying his creations.

●771 It is just here, in the province of ethics, that the diffe-
812 rence in the conceptions of good and evil which we have already noticed in the national beliefs of Russians and Ukrainians, becomes strikingly apparent. For the Ukrainian evil

is, so to speak, the result of teleological conditions. It is in the world not because there is any justification for its existence in itself, and not as a power against which we struggle in vain; evil exists because we need it, because without contrast to it, good could never be brought into the right light. It is not only the evil in us, but the evil around us that seems to be the essential complement of good; the power of good grows in the struggle with evil; injustice furthers the feeling for justice, falsehood and cowardice the feeling for truth, while selfishness calls forth magnanimity. Metaphorically speaking, the devil is for the Ukrainian by no means an almost divine power, inspiring man with inexpressible terror, but a being that draws the poor sinner's attention to his sins, frightens him a little and so shows him the way to improvement and perfection. This belief has produced a thoroughly optimistic view of the world which has found striking and eminent expression in literature.

For the Great Russian, evil is a dreadful power, not a necessary attribute of good but a principle of equal value that can attract disciples and inspire them with enthusiasm. One does not commit evil from carelessness, but from conviction, for the sake of evil, because evil has the same foundation and justification in human nature as good.

This idea of evil has naturally found artistic expression in literature and its main representatives in Russian literature are Dostojevskij and Tolstoi. Tolstoi rejected all positive religion and formed his own view of the world which is characterised by perfect passivity quite opposed to combating evil. His principle of "non-resistance" to evil which he erroneously tries to derive from Christ's original teaching is really anchored in his thoroughly Russian soul and is certainly the unconscious expression of the general Russian belief in the invincibility and omnipotence of evil.

Tolstoi deliberately twists Christ's teaching and attempts to set it up against the Old Testament idea of vengeance and retribution, though there is no justification for this at all. We know that Christ did not come to destroy the law of the prophets but to fulfil it.

727 vention, however, combined with the opposition of a number
795 of Autonomous bishops, headed by Panteleimon, forced Alexius to retract his signature.[53]

795 From what has just been said, one would assume that there
668* would be a close connection between the Autocephalous Church, which within a few months had come to be the church of most believing Ukrainian nationalists, and the nationalist parties. To a certain extent this is true, for many members of the latter, who were prevented by the danger of violent death from pursuing any national political activities, turned to the cultivation of the church as a means for expressing and propagating their feelings. A number of the leading members of the Autocephalous Church were affiliated with the UNR, and the Het'man group also displayed great interest in religious development, in line with its conservative and traditionalist principles. More particularly, Mstyslav, the member of the UAP hierarchy who was most intimately acquainted with and interested in political affairs, was an old adherent of the UNR.[54]

668* As has been previously indicated, however, the really active parties in the East Ukraine were the two factions of the OUN. Hence the fact that the church leaders tended to associate with other groupings acted as a certain impediment to close collaboration. Moreover, a strong element in both wings of the OUN was opposed to religion in principle. This ideological bias against utilizing the church as a major instrument of national expression was undoubtedly given greatly increased weight by the experience
668* of the nationalists in the East Ukraine. The churches—both Au-
●771 tonomous and Autocephalous—had no difficulty in attracting communicants, for there were many millions who had longed for the remembered solace of religion throughout the years of Communist oppression. These adherents of the church were, however, drawn very largely from the lower classes, the less educated elements of the population, especially the peasantry.[55] Since the OUN groups—as will be shown—concentrated their efforts on the intelligentsia, they placed comparatively little emphasis on

[53] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, December 10, 1942, p. 2.

[54] Interview 69.

[55] See Chapter IX for details and sources on the attitude of the social classes and age groups toward religion.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

aspects of nationalist feeling which were prevalent only in the village. More important, the younger generation everywhere, even in the rural areas, was hostile or at least indifferent to religion. Both OUN groups were intent upon winning the allegiance of youth; they soon came to see that any close connection with the church would be interpreted by a large segment of the latter as "reactionary." Hence they abandoned or played down their contacts with the clergy, rather than jeopardize their success with the youth.[56]

While the factors just described prevented any wholehearted collaboration between the church and the nationalist political movements, there were numerous cases in which the two nationalist tendencies moved in parallel paths. This was especially the case in Kiev, where Panteleimon, the most outspokenly pro-Russian of Autonomous bishops, and hence the most obstinate foe of Ukrainian national independence, was opposed to Mstyslav, the most active nationalist among the Autocephalous bishops. Nationalist Ukrainians abstained from any contact with the Autonomous Church there; they had the support of a number of prominent figures in the city administration, including the mayor, Forostivs'kyi, who had himself been a priest under Lypkyvs'kyi. The anti-Nationalist element around Shtepa and Bohatyrchuk was perhaps not so enthusiastic about Panteleimon's church, and appears to have maintained a modicum of good relations with the Autocephalous clergy, but in general the alignment of political groups closely corresponded to confessional differences.[57]

This was even more the case in Dniepropetrovsk, where a strong proponent of a revived Russian Empire, Dimitrius, was installed as Autonomous bishop. The nationalist elements were violently opposed to his policies, and apparently considerable popular opposition was awakened by his efforts to revive the pomp of the old Russian Orthodox Church.[58] On the other hand, strong Russian nationalist elements, encouraged in all likelihood by the strongly Russophile city administration and press, vigor-

[56] Interviews 18, 65, 76.

[57] Interview 19.

[58] Interview 18 supported the statement in *Nastup*, August 22, 1942, that about thirty churches in the Dniepropetrovsk area joined the UAP church when a bishop was named by it for Dniepropetrovsk.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

activist movement like the OUN to youth, or by the latter's desire 186
in other cases to rearrange life to suit themselves. There is a faint 883
suggestion that the Soviet regime may already have become the "old order" against which revolutionary youth is wont to rebel. On the other hand, these very qualities which made the nationalist *political* movement attractive to the younger generation had the effect of keeping it antagonistic to religion. As has already been pointed out, there is almost universal agreement that youth [771] in the East Ukraine was cool, even hostile, to the churches.[29] In the south, the Protestants and dissident Orthodox groups seem to have been somewhat more successful, but they had no direct relation to the nationalist movement.[30]

The OUN-B, it will be recalled, placed special emphasis on 565
securing the allegiance of youth, since its young agitators were 186
unable to attract the support of the intelligentsia.[31] There is a small amount of evidence to indicate that the nationalist movements attracted a broader occupational group from the youth than from among its elders. So little is known concerning the role of the laboring classes, however, that no conclusions can be offered. Historically, the working class in the East Ukraine had been predominantly Russian or Russified. The working class was also generally more loyal to the Soviet system than most of the other social groups. Even if the Ukrainian claim that a large influx of dispossessed peasants and their children during the thirties had resulted in a Ukrainization of the urban laboring class be accepted, there is no evidence that such persons became interested in politics or had any important part in nationalist activity. Probably those who were mature when they left the village continued to be peasants in outlook, while a few rose into the intelligentsia, acquiring its coloration.

As frequently observed in this study, the disproportion of mate- 000
rial available is no sure indication of a corresponding difference in the importance of factors involved. Since in many instances only fragmentary evidence is at hand, what is presented may be

[29] Cf. articles in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 12, 1941, p. 3; October 3, 1942, p. 2.
[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 3, 1942, p. 2; PS 1693.
[31] See the clandestine leaflet from the Odessa area previously referred to for sharp OUN-B criticism of the intelligentsia as tools of the Germans.

131 crystal-clear Poprad eats it way toward Galicia. Along this small stream live Ukrainians; near it lies Velykyi Lypnyk. Its neighbors are Germans, Gorals and Slovaks.

•77 Here lies the border of a strange world, a world whose other edge reaches almost to the Caspian Sea on the threshold of Asia. In it birth, life, death, time and many other things have a different value than elsewhere, other criteria obtain, and every stranger who would attempt to apply his own measure would fail. Even Christ has become different; he does not wear the crown of thorns, but the emperor's crown on his brow. Thus he sits in judgment over mankind. Here other altars are built, not the puritanically strict ones of the evangelical church nor the ostentatious ones of the Catholic, but the magnificent ones of the Byzantine church. The mysticism of this world between the peaks of the High Tatra, the glaciers of the Caucasus and the glistening mirror of the Caspian is already revealed here where Rome, Constantinople and Moscow are an equal distance away. True, the church steeple has an onion-shaped cupola, like any Bavarian one, but beside it two smaller cupolas adorn the roof and the altar conceals a magnificent painted screen, designed to wrap the service in still greater mystery. Like pure gold this iconostasis with the pictures of six prophets /9/ and twelve apostles is spread out before the sanctuary. Its basic tone is blue and yellow, the Ukrainian colors.

76 With God these people communicate through the priest, with the devil, directly. Even though they believe in Christ with deep religiosity, they by no means wish to be on a bad footing with the Evil One. It is not good to have him for an enemy; it is better not to say his name, or he might think he is being called and is expected to come. These people are also on good terms with spirits. The latter must be respected, feared,

527 789 grain whiskey. The revelry lasts all week just as in the case of a real birth.

527 771 769 The spring festival, the resurrection of nature, has for a long time coincided with the Christian Easter, the resurrection of the Lord, and the burial of Christ with the burial of winter. On Easter Sunday the Christian service and the pagan cult complement each other in a strange way. Scarcely has the priest prayed for the blessing of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost to descend upon his congregation, when the women join hands and dance around the church. It is a custom dating from ancient times to announce to the ancestor the beginning of field work at the spring festival, so that he can give them help and support. "Oh, ancestor!" the women sing on this occasion, "we plow the field, oh ancestor, we announce to you that we plow, that we sow, that we reap!" (82)

82. According to a verbal communication of the Ukrainian ethnographer and archaeologist V. Shcherbakivskyj, Prague.

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women celebrate near the church after they have finished their magic rite is called "lightning".

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793 In the midst of this strange pagan-Christian world, the priest lives and works as the representative of Christ on earth. He knows the customs of the people from the time he is a child, and he joins in on many occasions. It is not sacrilegious when during a difficult birth he places the church key on the belly of the woman in labor, when he administers the Holy Sacrament to sick cattle or seals graves so that the dead may not /140/ return. Both shepherd and flock most earnestly believe that such deeds are efficacious and pleasing in the sight of God.

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20: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1937 RD1 Ukraine RD1

MAGICAL BELIEFS AND PRACTICES AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS[1]

Part I

The Black Art and its Representatives

791 To the inhabitants of the plains and plateaus and the majestic-
789 ally rising Carpathians of Southern Poland—the Galician Ukrainian—life in its manifold aspects is pervaded by a mul-

101 [1] The Galician Ukrainians, also known as Ruthenians, are Eastern Slavs, and constitute a branch of the numerous Ukrainian, or Little

771 titude of mysterious, evil forces which he endeavours either to
789 ally himself with, propitiate, or combat in order to assure himself of good luck or avert the many calamities which these supernatural powers may bring. Magical beliefs and practices are therefore widespread and deeply rooted among the people. Even where the church has opposed and tried to counteract the older notions and usages, its success has been at best only partial. What it often has effected was a change in form, or the substitution of an authorized rite for an ancient magical practice.[2] The priest, for example, sometimes takes the place of the sorcerer by holding a special midnight Mass, the *czorna służba* (black service), at the instigation of a person who wishes to harm an enemy.[3] At other times he acts as medicine man, e.g. by stepping over the back of an ailing parishioner in order to relieve his
[342] backache.[4] A case of substitution is noticeable in the rite observed before moving into a newly constructed house. Wherever the old practices of sacrificing a black rooster, as an offering to the Devil or as a preventive against disease, has become extinct, its equivalent has appeared in the solemn consecration of the house by the priest.[5]

154 Among the Ukrainians, as elsewhere, magical beliefs and prac-
791 tices have two main aspects, which may be termed respectively
789 the black and white arts. While the former has its prime source in the arch enemy of man, the Devil, the latter, which functions mainly to counteract evil influences, relies on some powerful medium, sometimes God himself, to neutralize or overcome the

Russian, people inhabiting South Russia. They occupy the eastern section of the former Austrian province of Galicia, which is at present part of Poland. They number approximately 3,000,000 and belong almost exclusively to the peasant class. Geographically, and to a certain extent also culturally, they may be divided into lowlanders and highlanders, the former inhabiting the plains to the north and the latter the Carpathian mountains to the south.

[113] [2] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Rutenen in der Bukowina und Galizien," *Globus*, lxi, 282.

[3] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Kuzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 277.

[4] Kaindl, R. F. "Neue Beitraege zur Ethnologie und Volkskunde der Huzulen," *Globus*, lxix, 71.

[5] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 282.

754 people know, therefore, of no more derogatory term to apply to a woman than "witch."[11] In her ordinary life, the *widma* resembles other women in every respect; only in action does she take on a weird or unhuman aspect. Then she is found walking around in a totally nude state with her hair in disorder, carrying in her right hand a baking spatula or a broom and in her left a bucket filled with milk stolen from strange cows.[12] She may also appear in the form of a dog, mouse, cat, or other animal,[13] of a flashing, transparent ball rolling in the air,[14] or of sparks escaping from a chimney.[15]

The *widma* is not only a close ally of the Devil, but also a faithful servant ever ready to fulfil his commands. Besides the personal advantage which she derives from her destructive activities, she experiences a devilish pleasure in harming people, especially those whom she considers her enemies. Quiescent during the daytime, she begins her depredations only after dusk (*pidweczer*).[16] Nobody in the house is aware of her activities, for only her spirit leaves, her body remaining in a sleeping or dormant state. But if her spirit experiences any harm during its nightly excursions, the mark of the injury is registered simultaneously upon the motionless body at home.[17] Its activities finished, the spirit returns to the body, but can re-enter it only if it has remained in exactly the same position as it was left; otherwise the body cannot come to life again. It is enough to turn the body over to prevent the spirit from becoming re-united with it.[18] Thus during the Austro-Prussian war a soldier stayed overnight with a certain family. He became aware that the housewife was a witch and decided to play a trick on her. After her spirit had left, he turned the body over. Since, as a consequence, the spirit could not re-enter it, the woman was found lifeless when morning came. However, when the husband, thinking his wife dead, had summoned his neighbours and begun to make funeral preparations, the soldier

754 774

[11] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 280. [12] *Idem*. [13] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 131.

113 [14] Szuchiewicz, W. *Huculszczyzna* (Lwów, 1902-8, 4 vols.) iv, 283.

[15] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 231. [16] *Idem*.

[17] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 131. [18] *Ibid*., pp. 130-31.

admitted his guilt. The body was then put into its former position, and immediately thereupon it came to life.[19] 154 [774]

Witches form a well defined hierarchy in which four separate grades are distinguished. Those of the first and lowest rank are witches by birth. If a pregnant mother swallows a live coal that [777] has fallen into a dish of food, especially one cooked on Christmas Eve, her child will be born a witch or a wizard, depending upon its sex. A witch of this type has a small tail, and begins her supernatural activities as soon as she grows up. Her association with the Devil having been established by birth rather than by voluntary choice, she is definitely less powerful than one who has acquired her prowess through her own effort. Next in rank and in power is the witch by training, i.e. one who had been trained in the art from earliest childhood by her mother, herself a witch. Some hold that such women also have tails, "but nobody can ever see them, for they succeed in hiding them even from their own husbands." Although higher in rank than the first type, the witch by training, not having chosen her career through her own volition, cannot compare in power to a witch of the third category, one who has allied herself voluntarily with the Devil in her ripe years. Of still greater potency is the witch who has grown up from a foundling girl placed by the Devil himself, through the *diwe baby* (mysterious women), under the care of her foster parents. Within the hierarchy there is constant strife; witches of higher rank assert themselves to the detriment of their inferiors.[20]

Every witch has her speciality, her own sphere of activity which she does not exceed. Thus there are witches of cows (*wid korow*), of sheep (*wid owec*), of goats (*wid kiz*), of ducks (*wid husij*), of swine (*wid swynyj*), etc. Each knows the limit of her power (*znaje wid sebe*), and permits no other, especially one of equal rank, to encroach upon her rights.[21]

The time of the witches' activities is the night, especially the three hours immediately following midnight. Although any night is appropriate, the most opportune times are the nights preceding important holidays, i.e. those before Christmas and Easter, and particularly the eves of SS. George, Onufri, and John,

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 130. [20] *Ibid.*, pp. 111-14. [21] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15.

21: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1938 RD1 Ukraine RD1

BELIEFS REGARDING THE SOUL AND THE FUTURE WORLD AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS

775 THE departed soul, it is believed by the Ukrainian peasant, does not enter the other world immediately, except in the case of baptized children. It accompanies its body to the place of burial,[1] and returns home with its relatives.[2] When the mourners leave the cemetery, therefore, they are careful to follow the same route as on the outgoing journey, so as not to cause the soul any inconvenience; otherwise it might lose its way, and wander around before finding its way home.[3] Moreover, when the rela-

113 [1] Onyščuk, A. "Materyaly do huculskoi demonologii," *Materyaly do Ukrainshoi Etnologii*, xi (Lviw, 1909), 48.

[2] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna*, (Lwów, 1902-08, 4 vols.) ii, 275.

[3] *Ibid.*, ii, 275.

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p. 157

775 tives and guests sit down to their post-funeral dinner—a meal nearly as elaborate as that at a christening or a wedding [4]—a candle, preferably one used at the funeral, is lit and put on the oven, and beside it are placed a glass of brandy and a morsel of bread, in the conviction that the soul will thus participate in the meal.[5] The mountaineers, for a similar reason, usually scatter a little flour on the table and window sill. In the morning they even prove that the soul has touched the flour by pointing to traces which have unquestionably been left by cockroaches and flies.[6] For several days, bread and brandy or water are offered anew each day.[7] In some localities the relatives visit the grave on the third day after the funeral, and place upon it little loaves of bread, cheese, milk, flour, dried prunes, or other foods. After the priest, who is present on such occasions, has finished his prayer, the food is distributed among the poor.[8] On a Sunday a few weeks later, if possible on Easter Sunday, the visit to the grave and the food offering are repeated.[9] These sacrifices to the dead, called *mesoczky* or *perepiczky*, can be explained in two possible ways; either as gifts of food for actual consumption by the dead, or—as is more likely—as attempts to propitiate the ghost, especially a vampire, and thus escape its evil influences.[10] The people are totally unaware of the meaning of the practice. When asked for an explanation, they reply: "*Tak si hodyt*" (this is as it should be).

Before departing for the other world, the soul roams about on earth for forty days, during which time it makes nightly visits to its former home.[11] According to some, it must spend seven years on earth and revisit all the places where during its lifetime

113 [4] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie*, (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), i, 219.

[5] *Ibid.*, i, 219.

[6] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 275.

[7] Kaindl, R. F. "Die Seele und ihr Aufenthaltsort nach dem Tode in dem Volksglauben der Rutenen und Huzulen," *Globus*, lxvii (Braunschweig, 1895), 358.

[8] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 277.

[9] Kaindl, R. F., *Die Huzulen* (Wien, 1894), p. 129.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 127 n.

[11] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxvii, 357.

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it did anything good or bad.[12] During its nightly visits to its old home it enters the room quietly, even though the doors and windows be shut, uncovers the children and rocks them, and sometimes plays practical jokes on the members of the family.[13] It retains the power to harm, however, only for one year after the funeral, and the members of the family consequently fear it most during this period.[14] Especially must it be guarded against on the night following the funeral. On this night the members of the household of the deceased must not go to sleep, but must continue their vigil as in the two preceding nights. Although some of the participants in the post-funeral dinner leave after a few hours, others remain in the house to keep the mourners company. In order to keep awake, the watchers resort to various tricks to evoke laughter and ban sleep. As soon as one dozes off, for example, another smears soot on his face, fastens a rag to his coat, or sews his coat to that of another, and the ensuing laughter causes the napping one to awake.[15]

The other world, it is believed, is very distant, and the journey thither takes many days. The mountaineers believe that the soul travels on horseback,[16] and that the road is beset with obstacles and strewn with thorns. To reach the other world the soul must also cross a fathomless sea. If it is deserving, the Mother of God carries it over the water in a tightly woven net.[17]

The peasant conceives the future world in terms of the one he lives in. In heaven, people continue their daily existence much as they did on earth. They lead, to be sure, a life "where neither the burning sun, nor wind and storm disturb the perfect tranquility." But they occupy houses exactly like those found in the native villages, and they eat food which differs in no way from the regular peasant diet. Shepherds busy themselves tending cattle upon rich pastures, and tillers of the soil do their

[12] Onyšćuk, *op. cit.*, xi, 48.

[13] Kolessa, J., "Narodziny i chrzciny, wesele i pogrzeb u ludu ruskiego," *Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej*, xiii, (Kraków, 1889), 150.

[14] *Ibid.*, xiii, 150.

[15] Kolberg, *op. cit.*, i, 219.

[16] Kandi, in *Globus*, lxvii, 358.

[17] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 274.

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715 work in fertile wheat fields. They differ from people on earth chiefly in that their faces are eternally beaming with happiness.[18]

The other world is divided into paradise (*raj*) and hell (*peklo*) The latter is divided into two parts—a hot and a cold region. The hot hell, where the fire is sevenfold stronger than on earth, is the abode of all sinners save those who failed to observe the fast days. These go to the cold hell, where a continuous frost prevails such as is experienced on earth only during the severest winters. Paradise is above the clouds, in heaven. Hell, on the other hand, is situated in the centre of the earth, and the road to it leads through impassable swamps and marshes. The throne of God, before which all souls must appear for judgment, is the point of departure for both paradise and hell. Thence lead two ladders, one up and the other down. By the former, the souls of the righteous climb to the abode of everlasting bliss; by the latter, those of the damned descend to the land of eternal torture.

Paradise is an immense, sunny meadow, the entrance to which leads through a door in the clouds. There the cottages of the souls are found, but all are occupied, so that a newcomer must usually wait three days in the judgment hall until God arranges a suitable place for him.[19] Hell, on the other hand, is enveloped in impenetrable darkness. There Satan rakes the eternal fire of sulphur and pitch in which sinners are tormented. The infernal punishments have naturally been influenced greatly by Christian visualization of retribution in the other world, especially by the gruesome scenes displayed even now in pictures in some of the older village churches.[20] To describe them would be superfluous. The peasant harbors, however, some independent and original ideas regarding future punishment which are worth considering, especially since they give an insight into his conception of what acts are sinful and what means of punishment are appropriate.

The principle underlying the peasant's conception of reward and punishment is "like should be paid with like." Thus, miserly people, especially those who have been too stingy to

[18] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxvii, 358.

[19] *Ibid.*, lxvii, 359-60. [20] *Ibid.*, lxvii, 361.

775 present sound cattle to their godchildren, are punished by having only miserable herds in the other world, despite the rich pasture land given to them, while the generous enjoy beautiful cattle, although their meadows are poor. An inconsiderate person, one who would not help another even with a drink of water, is punished by having to lean over a well, fill a glass with water, spill it and refill it again, perpetually repeating this never-ending task. The selfish rich man or "baron," who, while alive, refused to share his spacious home with the poor or to offer them food when they knocked at his door, must ever run to and fro in an empty dismal palace, knocking his head against the wall each time he approaches it, as if trying to break through the walls in order to escape into the free, sunny world where one can enjoy human companionship. The unscrupulous village judge, who used to spend his time in the tavern drinking, is compelled in the future world to drink incessantly the tears of the innocent whom he convicted. Strife over inherited property is punished by turning the heirs into dogs who eternally tug at a corpse from opposite directions. A woman who has committed infanticide must cook the flesh of her child and eat it, repeating the process endlessly, since every Saturday the child is made whole again. A murderer, finally, forever tries to grasp the soul of his victim, who, in the form of a bird, flies in and out of the holes of a tree trunk (the wounds and body of the murdered person), but eternally fails in his endeavour.[21]

SAMUEL KOENIG.

•775 The earth, according to peasant belief, literally teems with spirits of all sorts. Aside from Satan and his demons, however, these are mainly the ghosts of unclean persons more or less recently deceased. Some are exceedingly malevolent and harmful; others are less so, but none are beneficial to man.

Among the most dangerous of supernatural beings are the vampires, the ghosts of deceased witches and wizards. Destructive even in life, they have been released by death from all earthly restraints, and their evil nature, now given full freedom, makes them the most feared element in the imaginary environment. Vampires are of both sexes; males are called *opyry* and females *widmy*. Their corpses are revived at night by the action of the moonbeams, for which reason they are most active during the full moon. Leaving their graves, they first turn their steps to their former homes, to visit their families. An *opyr* who is survived by a widow is said to have intercourse with her. He may even beget offspring in this way, but they are born without bones. A *widma*, on the other hand, is innately modest, and is satisfied to turn loving eyes upon her husband or sweetheart. After visiting their homes, the vampires wander about the houses in the vicinity, rattling the doors and windows and even calling the occupants by name. Sometimes they enter a house by crawling under the door. Once inside, they fasten themselves on the chest of a sleeper and suck his warm blood, before hurrying back to their graves. Vampires usually wander for nine consecutive nights. Besides the harm they do to individuals, they send pestilences upon the village and cause excesses in natural phenomena.[16]

Much less harmful, as well as more restricted in their sphere of activities, are the ghosts of ordinary sinners

113 [16] Wagilewicz, J. "O upiorach i wiedźmach", *Časopis českoho museum* (Quoted by O. Kolgerg, *Pokucie*, III, 209, 211).

775 (*pokutnyky*) and those of persons who have died a violent death. They occupy themselves mainly with praying to God on moonlit nights in front of the church, and with frightening people.[17] Some of them, however, are definitely malignant, especially the ghosts of drowned persons (*topelnyky*). Such ghosts are doomed to roam the earth for seven years. They live in the water, usually near the spot where they met their death, and, like the vampires, are especially active at the full moon.[18] The appearance ascribed to them differs with the locality. Some picture the *topelnyk* as a little man with long hair which reaches to the ground and covers him completely; others describe him as completely covered with fish-like scales.[19] The *topelnyky* are dangerous only to persons on the water, especially to those rowing in a boat. Since their redemption depends upon their success in drowning another person, they are always on the lookout for a victim.[20] In some places no peasant dares to go rowing on a Sunday or holiday, except to attend church or to call a priest or a doctor, under which circumstances the *topelnyky* have no power to harm.[21]

776 The waters also harbour *rusalky*, or nymphs, the ghosts of girls who have died before marriage. Their bodies are half human and half fish-like. They are not, as a rule, harmful, but spend their time singing, praying and telling stories.[22] It is interesting to note that neither the *rusalky* nor the *topelnyky* are really water spirits, i.e. nature spirits, but rather human ghosts who inhabit the waters. This again emphasizes the fact that true nature spirits are almost completely lacking among the Ukrainians. Moreover, the *rusalky* frequently take up their abode in forest glades and

113 [17] Hnatiuk, V., "Znadoby do halicko-ruskoï demonologii," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnik* (Lviw, 1904), XV, 145.

[18] *Ibid*, XV, 154.

[19] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 233.

[20] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna* (Lwów, 4 vols., 1902-8), IV, 283.

[21] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 233.

[22] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, IV, 282.

775 springs, and thus also become spirits of the woods and fields.[23]

Closely related to the water nymphs, but more harmful, are the so-called *mawky*, the ghosts of children who died before baptism. They are pictured as girls with tall, graceful figures, round faces and long tresses. They wear garlands of flowers upon their heads and are clothed in very thin, transparent dresses, but their backs entirely lack any covering of flesh, so that their entrails are externally visible.[24] They roam the world begging to be baptized, and are especially active on the Eve of St. John (Kupalo), on which night they entice people and suck their blood. A person misled by them never returns to his people, and after his death his soul is appropriated by the devil.[25]

776 Of a more definitely daimonic and malicious nature than the aforementioned spirits are the *diwe-baby*, *bohinky*, or, as they are usually called among the mountaineers, the *mamuny*. They are superhuman women, malevolent, full of passionate desire to associate with people, but with cold, unfeeling hearts. In appearance they are tall, lean, and pale-faced, and have long disorderly hair and breasts thrown over their shoulders.[26] The *diwe-baby* live in deep unapproachable caves, which they leave at night on mischief bent. Those of them who have children steal into houses where there are unbaptized infants, snatch them away and leave their own "miserable-looking, swollen, cross-eyed bastards" in their stead. Such foundlings cannot be taught to speak or walk; they howl like inhuman fiends, crawl upon their hands and grow very rapidly. In order to get rid of such a child and to get back her own, a mother must take the foundling, put him on the dung-pile, and beat him with a broom or stick until the *baba*, filled with pity for her child, is finally forced to take it back and to return the stolen

[23] Zelenin, *op. cit.*, p. 392.

[24] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 99.

[25] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, IV, 281.

[26] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 100.

776 infant.[27] The mountaineers, moreover, hold these spirits, some of whom are males, responsible for adultery.[28] The mountaineers likewise believe in a class of supernatural beings, called *czynatary*, who cause quarrels among people. These spirits throw an ant hill full of ants into a burning oven, and just as the ants have no way of escape, so the members of the stricken household cannot help quarreling amongst themselves, and may even go as far as to commit murder.[29]

The so-called *letawica*, or evil spirit of a falling star, is unquestionably the ghost of a wicked being. When it descends to earth it takes on human form of very enticing appearance. It may appear, the people hold, either in male or, less often, in female form, but it is always characterized by youth, beauty, and a slender figure. The *letawica* appears to boys and girls, especially to the latter, in lonely places, when the first promptings of love have been aroused in them. Allured by its display of passion, a girl falls readily into its arms, whereupon it begins sucking the sweetness of youth from her mouth. So passionate is its embrace that the victim gradually loses her freshness, withers, fades and finally dies in its arms.[30]

775 778 According to a widespread popular belief, certain objects or manifestations of nature are fetishes, i.e. they serve as dwellings for evil spirits, and, consequently, must be avoided with great care. One such object is the elder (*byżyna*). One must not dig around it, above all not remove any of its roots, for in them dwells an evil spirit who will cause the hand of any one who disregards the taboo to wither or even bring death to him or to a member of his family.[31] Objects of unusual shape, in particular, are believed to harbour evil

[27] *Ibid.*, III, 100-1.

[28] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit*, IV, 282.

[29] *Ibid.*, IV, 286.

[30] Wagilewicz, *op. cit.* (Quoted by O. Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 103.)

[31] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 235.

775 spirits. A gnarled and crooked tree, for example, should
778 never be felled, lest the anger of its indwelling spirit be aroused. Stones shaped like an egg should not be moved for a similar reason. Crossroads are to be avoided as much as possible, for "the evil spirits, upon being driven out of paradise, have settled there, continuing their malicious activities and causing people all manner of ills".[32] Even natural phenomena may be infested with malevolent spirits. When a whirlwind sucks up a column of dust, the people say that a devil's wedding is taking place. On seeing a twister one must immediately sit down on the ground and recite a formula, especially designed for the occasion; otherwise the whirling dust may get under one's feet and cause them to be crippled.[33]

776 The beings who constitute the spirit environment of the Ukrainian peasant are predominately malevolent. Though a few of them, like the *letawica* and the *topelnyk*, are restricted to a specialized activity, the great majority are capable of causing all kinds of human misery, besides the power they wield over natural forces. They consume the milk from the cows, send sleep upon a man when he is supposed to be keeping watch, uproot trees, roll rocks down from the mountains, send lightning and thunder, cause the death of sheep, and account for the failure of crops. They also cause physical and mental abnormalities, criminal tendencies, and excessive human desires and passions. Deformed children, idiots and imbeciles are the work of vampires and the *diwe-baby*; and murder, quarrels, adultery and sexual irregularities are incited by other malignant ghosts.

[32] Kaindl, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[33] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 91

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of a feeling of confidence, no matter how circumstances may change. 181 812

If we seek the origin of this apparently irrational optimism, we come to the conclusion that its roots lie in prehistoric times and that its motives have been preserved in folklore, tales and fables. The study of extensive Ukrainian material proves conclusively that the belief in the victory of good over evil is part and parcel of the people's faith. The world is ruled by the principle of good; evil, and its personification, the devil, are by no means equal to good and do not have an independent existence of their own. 776 812

Without going into details, we can make the general assertion that in Ukraine the devil is no powerful god who finds satisfaction in the sea of troubles that overwhelms man; his power does not equal that of the good spirit; in the realm of evil he is not supreme over subordinate demons — he is a petty spirit who, by exploiting the weaknesses of God and man, seeks to make unpleasantness for both.

The devil cannot have the mastery over a human being during the latter's life, even if he has promised him his soul. It is fairly easy to summon the devil in order to enter into a contract with him. In drawing up the articles of such a contract, the devil does not display any special intelligence, or even intellectual superiority over his human partner. The Evil One not infrequently gets the worst of a bargain with a simple peasant; he puts himself to no end of trouble in order to get money and honor for man before death, but after he is dead, man always finds a loop-hole in the contract through which he can slip and land happily in Paradise. 776

Thus we see that, for the Ukrainian, far from being an imposing figure, the devil degenerates into something comical and, at times, even pitiable, a being to be exploited or made a fool of by man. In the eternal struggle which it is man's fate to conduct against evil, man is far superior to the devil.

Maksimov assures us that the belief in an unlimited number of evil spirits is firmly rooted in the consciousness of the Great Russian. He believes that there are scarcely any places in the

●776 world free from them, that they do not even respect Russian churches. As unsubstantial beings who can, however, appear in various familiar guises to man, these servants of the Evil One do not only dwell in places forsaken by God, in bottomless moors and the depths of forests: they are just as much at home in human habitations and even penetrate into the human organism. We may see proof of this belief in the fact that all containers of drinking-water in Russian peasant houses have got some kind of lid, be it ever so primitive. If it is impossible to get a lid, two sticks are laid cross-wise on the vessel so as to prevent the devil from getting into the water. Similarly, we can scarcely find a peasant who, in spite of innate carelessness and dreaminess, will forget to make the sign of the Cross over his mouth when yawning, so as to keep the Evil One from entering into his organism.

On the basis of material at our disposal dealing with the rôle of the devil among Eastern Slavs, we may safely assert that among Ukrainians, as among the peoples of Western Europe, the demonic has lost something of its mystery, originality and power while, in the life of the Great Russian, evil may not be on the same level as good, but it has nevertheless managed to
000 preserve a fairly strong position. Russian dualism, predominant in folk-lore and expressed in the struggle between the Divine Power and the Evil One points plainly to analogy with the dualist beliefs of Oriental religions. Mazdeism in particular, the creed of aryan Iran is decidedly dualistic in character, being constructed on the contrasts between light and darkness, good and evil, salvation and destruction, as they appear in the psychical and moral world. These contrasts can be traced to two gods who are equal in power and who are constantly engaged in strife. Ahriman characterises the cause of the strife and the mutual enmity of these two powers as the ethical devil; for a moral sin, envy of Ormuzd causes Ahriman to conceive the idea of destroying his creations.

771 It is just here, in the province of ethics, that the diffe-
812 rence in the conceptions of good and evil which we have already noticed in the national beliefs of Russians and Ukrainians, becomes strikingly apparent. For the Ukrainian evil

/13/ crystal-clear Poprad eats it way toward Galicia. Along this small stream live Ukrainians; near it lies Velykyi Lypnyk. Its neighbors are Germans, Gorals and Slovaks.

/77/ Here lies the border of a strange world, a world whose other edge reaches almost to the Caspian Sea on the threshold of Asia. In it birth, life, death, time and many other things have a different value than elsewhere, other criteria obtain, and every stranger who would attempt to apply his own measure would fail. Even Christ has become different; he does not wear the crown of thorns, but the emperor's crown on his brow. Thus he sits in judgment over mankind. Here other altars are built, not the puritanically strict ones of the evangelical church nor the ostentatious ones of the Catholic, but the magnificent ones of the Byzantine church. The mysticism of this world between the peaks of the High Tatra, the glaciers of the Caucasus and the glistening mirror of the Caspian is already revealed here where Rome, Constantinople and Moscow are an equal distance away. True, the church steeple has an onion-shaped cupola, like any Bavarian one, but beside it two smaller cupolas adorn the roof and the altar conceals a magnificent painted screen, designed to wrap the service in still greater mystery. Like pure gold this iconostasis with the pictures of six prophets /9/ and twelve apostles is spread out before the sanctuary. Its basic tone is blue and yellow, the Ukrainian colors.

• /78/ With God these people communicate through the priest, with the devil, directly. Even though they believe in Christ with deep religiosity, they by no means wish to be on a bad footing with the Evil One. It is not good to have him for an enemy; it is better not to say his name, or he might think he is being called and is expected to come. These people are also on good terms with spirits. The latter must be respected, feared,

776 appeased, exorcised. When the priest of Velykyi Lypnyk consecrates the water of the village brook on the sixth of January, the people believe that the demons are thus driven away.

326 The men of Valykyi Lypnyk are tinkers, a
221 trade which in many places has a bad flavor. It is easy to say that they travel about the country like gypsies. But even though they wander from village to village, a small bundle of tools on their backs, repairing stoves and mending pots, they are, nevertheless, not homeless. As soon as spring comes, poverty drives them out on the road, and only late in the fall when the first white flakes begin to fall, they return to their wives and children with the few groschen they have saved.
241 For land is scarce, the clod of earth small, the soil is poor and the climate harsh.* The women work like drudges for their bit of barley bread and potatoes. With their small cows and a wooden plough they till the lower slopes of the mountain ridges. They sow by hand, harrow, and in the fall they cut off the barely ripe ears of grain with a sickle.
286 In their "spare time" these women* with their
291 strangely narrow faces sit barefoot in their full pleated skirts and pale pink blouses, a charming little cap on their heads, at their looms and tirelessly ply their shuttle back and forth between the taut threads, or press wool into felt for the jackets and trousers of their husbands.
342 The rooms of these "tinkers"* are surprisingly large and clean; the kitchen, living room, /10/ bedroom and work room are all in one. The whole structure with adjoining stable and wagon shed is built of wood, the inside unfinished, the outside
[789] covered with loam. In order that there be no lack of magic, carpenters carve three suns into the central roof beam.

184 How rich these "tinkers" of East Slovakia were with their little plot of free earth, their two or three cows, their barley bread and their loom, compared to their brothers in Carpatho-

*[In the village of Valykyi Lypnyk, Western Ukraine -Analyst]

model in clay and paint it, and weave carpets.

574 The long winter days pass pleasantly when people visit each other and work in a neighbor's house for a change. They tell each other legends of epic proportions from the nation's past, ghost stories and village gossip.

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776 The life of the Ukrainian people is full of profound symbolism. As is the case with many other things in this country, religion still has many primitive elements. There is no other Christian people that has preserved as much pre-Christian, heathen ideology down to our own day as the Ukrainians have. /136/ For, besides God and the devil, the world beyond is inhabited by many good and evil spirits that also move about in our world, crossing the path of man in hundreds of ways, and bringing him good things or bad. One must be on one's guard against these mighty foes; one must keep away from them and not anger them. The good spirits should be offered thanks and sacrifices. Primitive magic! For the spirit of the field which can be a bird or some other animal, a swath of ripe grain must be left untouched, otherwise it might take its departure. The spirit of the field can also be a female creature, a rusalka or nymph. In spring, when the rusalki dance in the grain field, one may not cross the fields.

The domestic spirit is a faithful friend of the house who has picked out a place for himself beside the warm stove. He protects the house; danger is near when he whimpers or groans. If people move they manifestly invite him to go along by offering him bread and salt.

You protect yourself from theforest spirit who rules over the beasts of the forest and can turn into a fox or wolf by swearing loudly. You protect yourself from the whirlwind by exorcism

• Nor by making signs with your fingers. This giant with the full lips can be seen in the bridal procession of the "impure forces". Impure forces are the suicides, the condemned, dead witches and magicians, dogs, cats, mice and human beings who have died unbaptized. It is dangerous to offend the whirlwind. He is a violent spirit, he pulls apart haystacks and stacks of grain, destroys roofs and uproots trees. On St. John's Night the witches ride toward the bare mountain near Kiyev. They are the ones who are responsible for droughts, they disperse clouds and steal stars.

If children are malicious the devil has surely exchanged their souls for an evil spirit; he has exchanged their skin and they become changelings /young imps/.

Female forest spirits, mauka, entice the lonely wanderer to dance and then tickle him to death. No less /137/ dangerous are the vampires who suck a sleeper's blood from his veins. In the case of people who are suspected of being witches, sorcerers or vampires, one cuts their tendons after death, puts a padlock through their lips and binds their hands and feet, in order to prevent them from returning. A custom which probably goes back to the time when the Greeks founded cities and carried on trade along the north coast of the Black Sea, is that of giving passage money to the dead. To this day in the Ukraine, coins are placed on the eyes of the deceased for his journey into the other world.

A spirit is always held responsible for every pain, whether it be in the infected root of a tooth or in the small of the back. Wormwood is the best protection against evil spirits.

The litany of these popular beliefs, which are not merely memories of times long past, but were in daily use in pre-war Ukraine, could be carried on for a long time.

000 The living faith of pagan times occupies

533 lieves that song is a part of work, and he has special symbolic songs for every type of work.

527 769 The Monday a week after Easter is dedicated to the ancestors. Well supplied with food and drink, the whole families set out for the cemeteries, just as in the days of Vladimir, in order to observe the death cult. They sit down on the graves of their ancestors, eat the food they have brought, share it with the dead by placing the latters' portion beside the Christian cross made of wood, and they do not forget to empty a small glass of horilka over it. The dead are honored if the visitors leave their graves in an elevated mood.

776 Summer passes by with the customary field work. It is a glorious time, the pumpkins and the melons ripen, the hollyhocks bloom again and people sleep out in the open. The harvest begins not without symbolic rituals; for the spirits must be thanked and one must pray for good weather. When the grain has been stored in the barns, the priest consecrates the harvest wreath, the grains of which are mixed among the seed the following year.

793 In the midst of this strange pagan-Christian world, the priest lives and works as the representative of Christ on earth. He knows the customs of the people from the time he is a child, and he joins in on many occasions. It is not sacrilegious when during a difficult birth he places the church key on the belly of the woman in labor, when he administers the Holy Sacrament to sick cattle or seals graves so that the dead may not /140/ return. Both shepherd and flock most earnestly believe that such deeds are efficacious and pleasing in the sight of God.

771 178 The First World War, the civil wars and finally the Bolshevist cudgel have destroyed this world; faith and superstition, holy mass and the spirit cult were no longer tolerated.

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SUPERNATURAL BELIEFS AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS

BY SAMUEL KOENIG

116 THE Ukrainian peasant of south-eastern Poland or Galicia looks upon all the forces of nature as actuated by spirits which must be conceived of as mainly ghost-derived. True nature spirits, whatever importance they may once have had, play to-day only a minor role in the folk beliefs of the Galician Ukrainians.[1] In the spirit environment of the peasant, their place is taken by two classes of beings: the Devil with his cohorts, and the ghosts of the dead.[2] It is to these that the various calamities and afflictions that befall man are attributed, and against them that all possible defensive measures are directed.

The most important spirit, and the most generally feared, is the Devil (*didko*). He causes extremes in natural phenomena with all their disastrous results to man. He brings, not only hail and whirlwinds, but also floods and excessive droughts. Indeed, he or his demons lie behind every mysterious force.[3]

As to the appearance of the Devil, popular beliefs are at variance. In general, he is thought to assume human shape, but he is black and has horns and a fiery tongue. Although

113 [1] Even Baba Jeudocha, the personification of the snowstorm, and Did (Old Man), the grim winter god who is symbolically burned some days after Christmas, can hardly be looked upon as strict nature spirits; both are said to have been originally human beings who turned into spirits only after their death. (See Kaindl, R. F., "Wetterzauberei bei den Rutenen und Huzulen," *Mittheilungen der k.k. geogr. Gesellschaft*, XXXVII (Wien, 1894), 631, 636.)

[2] Zelenin, D., *Russische* (*Ostslavische*) *Volkskunde* (Berlin, 1927), p. 384.

[3] Onyščuk, A., "Materyaly do Huculskoï Demonologii," *Materyaly do Ukrainskoï Etnologii* (Lviw, 1909), XI, 72-3.

776 he may take the form of either sex, the Devil himself is a male.[4] Sometimes he appears as a chimney sweep, when he has wings like a bat, tangled horns like a ram, and a tail.[5] The Devil can change his shape to suit his fancy, and can assume almost any form, e.g., that of a baby, a cow, a pig, an insect, a worm, or a straw.[6] Even when visible in no concrete form, he may nevertheless be present. When one sees a flash of light from afar at dusk, or hears a sudden whisper or rustle, one is certain it is the Devil, whose unseen presence is felt everywhere.[7] The Devil fears nothing save God, the cross, and holy water.[8] Nevertheless, he is mortal, and is particularly vulnerable to lightning. During a thunderstorm he seeks any available cover, but Elijah's arrow discovers him, and destroys him and his shelter.[9] His ordinary abode is hell, whence he ascends at night to pursue his baneful activities on earth.[10]

551 The people, as a rule, carefully avoid mentioning the name
776 of the Devil (*didko* or *czort*). To utter it would be blasphemy (*lichoslowyty*), and to blaspheme against the Devil is a serious sin (*hrich welykyj*).[11] The people, therefore, usually resort to a circumlocution and call him *win* (he), *tot szczezby* (that one, may he be lost!), *zlyj duch* (the evil spirit),[12] or *neczystyj* (the unclean one).[13] His name may be mentioned, however, in extreme anger,[14] or he may be called familiarly by a nickname, such as Fedko or Chitko.[15] To some individuals, who have formed a pact with the Devil and have sold him their souls, he is harmless and even exceedingly helpful in attaining power and wealth.

113 [4] Kaindl, R. F., *Die Huzulen* (Wien, 1894), p. 81.
[5] Onyščuk, *op. cit.*, XI, 72.
[6] Kolberg, O., *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 232.
[7] *Idem.*
[8] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie* (Kraków, 4 vols., 1882-9), III, 86n.
[9] Zelenin, *op. cit.*, p. 397.
[10] Kaindl, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[11] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 81 n.
[12] *Idem.*
[13] Kaindl. *op. cit.*, p. 83.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 84.
[15] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 232.

775 (*pokutnyky*) and those of persons who have died a violent death. They occupy themselves mainly with praying to God on moonlit nights in front of the church, and with frightening people.[17] Some of them, however, are definitely malignant, especially the ghosts of drowned persons (*topelnyky*). Such ghosts are doomed to roam the earth for seven years. They live in the water, usually near the spot where they met their death, and, like the vampires, are especially active at the full moon.[18] The appearance ascribed to them differs with the locality. Some picture the *topelnyk* as a little man with long hair which reaches to the ground and covers him completely; others describe him as completely covered with fish-like scales.[19] The *topelnyky* are dangerous only to persons on the water, especially to those rowing in a boat. Since their redemption depends upon their success in drowning another person, they are always on the lookout for a victim.[20] In some places no peasant dares to go rowing on a Sunday or holiday, except to attend church or to call a priest or a doctor, under which circumstances the *topelnyky* have no power to harm.[21]

776 The waters also harbour *rusalky*, or nymphs, the ghosts of girls who have died before marriage. Their bodies are half human and half fish-like. They are not, as a rule, harmful, but spend their time singing, praying and telling stories.[22] It is interesting to note that neither the *rusalky* nor the *topelnyky* are really water spirits, i.e. nature spirits, but rather human ghosts who inhabit the waters. This again emphasizes the fact that true nature spirits are almost completely lacking among the Ukrainians. Moreover, the *rusalky* frequently take up their abode in forest glades and

113 [17] Hnatiuk, V., "Znadoby do halicko-ruskoï demonologii," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnik* (Lviw, 1904), XV, 145.

[18] *Ibid*, XV, 154.

[19] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 233.

[20] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna* (Lwów, 4 vols., 1902-8), IV, 283.

[21] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 233.

[22] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, IV, 282.

775 springs, and thus also become spirits of the woods and fields.[23]

Closely related to the water nymphs, but more harmful, are the so-called *mawky*, the ghosts of children who died before baptism. They are pictured as girls with tall, graceful figures, round faces and long tresses. They wear garlands of flowers upon their heads and are clothed in very thin, transparent dresses, but their backs entirely lack any covering of flesh, so that their entrails are externally visible.[24] They roam the world begging to be baptized, and are especially active on the Eve of St. John (Kupalo), on which night they entice people and suck their blood. A person misled by them never returns to his people, and after his death his soul is appropriated by the devil.[25]

776 Of a more definitely daimonic and malicious nature than the aforementioned spirits are the *diwe-baby*, *bohinky*, or, as they are usually called among the mountaineers, the *mamuny*. They are superhuman women, malevolent, full of passionate desire to associate with people, but with cold, unfeeling hearts. In appearance they are tall, lean, and pale-faced, and have long disorderly hair and breasts thrown over their shoulders.[26] The *diwe-baby* live in deep unapproachable caves, which they leave at night on mischief bent. Those of them who have children steal into houses where there are unbaptized infants, snatch them away and leave their own "miserable-looking, swollen, cross-eyed bastards" in their stead. Such foundlings cannot be taught to speak or walk; they howl like inhuman fiends, crawl upon their hands and grow very rapidly. In order to get rid of such a child and to get back her own, a mother must take the foundling, put him on the dung-pile, and beat him with a broom or stick until the *baba*, filled with pity for her child, is finally forced to take it back and to return the stolen

[23] Zelenin, *op. cit.*, p. 392.

[24] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 99.

[25] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, IV, 281.

[26] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 100.

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776 infant.[27] The mountaineers, moreover, hold these spirits, some of whom are males, responsible for adultery.[28] The mountaineers likewise believe in a class of supernatural beings, called *czynatary*, who cause quarrels among people. These spirits throw an ant hill full of ants into a burning oven, and just as the ants have no way of escape, so the members of the stricken household cannot help quarreling amongst themselves, and may even go as far as to commit murder.[29]

The so-called *letawica*, or evil spirit of a falling star, is unquestionably the ghost of a wicked being. When it descends to earth it takes on human form of very enticing appearance. It may appear, the people hold, either in male or, less often, in female form, but it is always characterized by youth, beauty, and a slender figure. The *letawica* appears to boys and girls, especially to the latter, in lonely places, when the first promptings of love have been aroused in them. Allured by its display of passion, a girl falls readily into its arms, whereupon it begins sucking the sweetness of youth from her mouth. So passionate is its embrace that the victim gradually loses her freshness, withers, fades and finally dies in its arms.[30]

777 778 According to a widespread popular belief, certain objects or manifestations of nature are fetishes, i.e. they serve as dwellings for evil spirits, and, consequently, must be avoided with great care. One such object is the elder (*byzyna*). One must not dig around it, above all not remove any of its roots, for in them dwells an evil spirit who will cause the hand of any one who disregards the taboo to wither or even bring death to him or to a member of his family.[31] Objects of unusual shape, in particular, are believed to harbour evil

[27] *Ibid.*, III, 100-1.

[28] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, IV, 282.

[29] *Ibid.*, IV, 286.

[30] Wagilewicz, *op. cit.* (Quoted by O. Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 103.)

[31] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 235.

775 spirits. A gnarled and crooked tree, for example, should
778 never be felled, lest the anger of its indwelling spirit be aroused. Stones shaped like an egg should not be moved for a similar reason. Crossroads are to be avoided as much as possible, for "the evil spirits, upon being driven out of paradise, have settled there, continuing their malicious activities and causing people all manner of ills".[32] Even natural phenomena may be infested with malevolent spirits. When a whirlwind sucks up a column of dust, the people say that a devil's wedding is taking place. On seeing a twister, one must immediately sit down on the ground and recite a formula, especially designed for the occasion; otherwise the whirling dust may get under one's feet and cause them to be crippled.[33]

776 The beings who constitute the spirit environment of the Ukrainian peasant are predominately malevolent. Though a few of them, like the *letawica* and the *topelnyk*, are restricted to a specialized activity, the great majority are capable of causing all kinds of human misery, besides the power they wield over natural forces. They consume the milk from the cows, send sleep upon a man when he is supposed to be keeping watch, uproot trees, roll rocks down from the mountains, send lightning and thunder, cause the death of sheep, and account for the failure of crops. They also cause physical and mental abnormalities, criminal tendencies, and excessive human desires and passions. Deformed children, idiots and imbeciles are the work of vampires and the *diwe-baby*; and murder, quarrels, adultery and sexual irregularities are incited by other malignant ghosts.

[32] Kaindl, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

[33] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 91

777 various prophecies as to the future of the child, but final decision rests with the oldest, whose judgment prevails. These same judges grant the child a star, which shines only so long as he [776] lives; upon his death it falls to earth. Every person at birth likewise receives a guardian angel, whose duty it is to protect him throughout his life. Before starting any new task, and especially when in danger, the peasant calls upon his ministering angel for assistance, saying: "Guardian angel, help me!"[31] Since one's fate is determined at birth, one can do little to change it. This explains, in the popular mind, why one man is poor and another rich, one healthy and another sick, why one lives long and another dies young. It also explains why there are all kinds of children in the world, and why even children of the same parents often differ so markedly.[32]

845 732 A deformed or mentally deficient child is ascribed to the act of an evil spirit, particularly the *diwa-baba*. Such a child has a large head, is always lean, and can never be satiated. With his tremendous appetite he suckles so ravenously that his mother's breast finally withers away. Such a child causes constant trouble, is retarded in its growth and short-lived, and does not reach a stature commensurate with his age until after death.[33]

II. Christening Ceremonies

851 553 While great secrecy surrounds pregnancy and birth, the ceremonies that follow are ushered in with the greatest publicity. As soon as she has attended to the child and the mother, the midwife begins to make preparations for the christening (*chrestyny*), [777] which must take place immediately. A child who is allowed to remain unbaptized over night is exposed to all sorts of dangers. If at all possible, therefore, an infant is taken to church to be baptized on the very day it is born, even though the hour be late in the evening, the weather extremely unfavourable, and the distance considerable.[34] While the father, who takes

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[31] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [32] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 287.

[33] Kaindl, R. F., "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi (Braunschweig, 1899), 256.

[34] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 113; Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6.

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forces of evil. The agents of the former include the witch and the wizard; and those of the latter, the fortune-teller, the soothsayer, the conjuror, and, in cases of sickness, the healer. Between these two groups of "professional" intermediaries between the supernatural and natural worlds stands the ordinary non-professional man or woman, who, by using certain formulas or more concrete means, can also invoke superhuman intervention. 754 791 789

A person associated with powers of evil, though difficult or impossible to recognize by ordinary means, since he usually looks exactly like any other human being, can be singled out much more easily by his actions, and especially by the results he is supposed to obtain. Thus a successful person, it is thought, is necessarily allied in one way or another with the Devil, or his assistants. A man who has luck in hunting or fishing is undoubtedly in communication with the Devil.[6] A woman who repeatedly returns from the woods with her basket full of mushrooms, or whose cow continuously yields more than an average quantity of milk, is nothing but a witch who is using her unholy powers to her own profit and, usually, also the detriment of her neighbours.[7] Indeed, there is not a wealthy or successful person in the village or town who is not in league with the Devil.[8] A peasant, therefore, who has luck with his crops and cattle most likely receives help from evil spirits; and a manufacturer who makes money from his factory in town does so because he has demons to work for him.[9] Thus, although there exist special means of detection, which, as we shall see, are made use of when necessary, mere good fortune is the simplest criterion. 754

Among individuals occupied with the black art, the witch (*widma*) wields by far the greatest power.[10] Just as after death she becomes the most feared of evil spirits, so during her life she is considered the most dangerous of the Devil's disciples. The 754

[6] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), iii, 12. [113]

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 114. [8] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 229, 232.

[9] Onyščuk, A. "Materyaly do huculskoi demonologii," *Materyaly do Ukrainskoi Etnologii* (Lviw, 1909), xl, 73.

[10] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 280.

admitted his guilt. The body was then put into its former position, and immediately thereupon it came to life.[19] 154 [174]

Witches form a well defined hierarchy in which four separate grades are distinguished. Those of the first and lowest rank are witches by birth. If a pregnant mother swallows a live coal that has fallen into a dish of food, especially one cooked on Christmas Eve, her child will be born a witch or a wizard, depending upon its sex. A witch of this type has a small tail, and begins her supernatural activities as soon as she grows up. Her association with the Devil having been established by birth rather than by voluntary choice, she is definitely less powerful than one who has acquired her prowess through her own effort. Next in rank and in power is the witch by training, i.e. one who had been trained in the art from earliest childhood by her mother, herself a witch. Some hold that such women also have tails, "but nobody can ever see them, for they succeed in hiding them even from their own husbands." Although higher in rank than the first type, the witch by training, not having chosen her career through her own volition, cannot compare in power to a witch of the third category, one who has allied herself voluntarily with the Devil in her ripe years. Of still greater potency is the witch who has grown up from a foundling girl placed by the Devil himself, through the *diwe baby* (mysterious women), under the care of her foster parents. Within the hierarchy there is constant strife; witches of higher rank assert themselves to the detriment of their inferiors.[20] [177]

Every witch has her speciality, her own sphere of activity which she does not exceed. Thus there are witches of cows (*wid korow*), of sheep (*wid owec*), of goats (*wid kiz*), of ducks (*wid husij*), of swine (*wid swynyj*), etc. Each knows the limit of her power (*znaje wid sebe*), and permits no other, especially one of equal rank, to encroach upon her rights.[21]

The time of the witches' activities is the night, especially the three hours immediately following midnight. Although any night is appropriate, the most opportune times are the nights preceding important holidays, i.e. those before Christmas and Easter, and particularly the eves of SS. George, Onufri, and John,

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 130. [20] *Ibid.*, pp. 111-14. [21] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15.

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Part II

The White Art: Counteracting Means

The Ukrainian peasant believes that all calamities can be avoided or removed by conjuration, by the use of mysterious concoctions, or by other magical means. Counteracting the work of the Devil and his associates and inducing good luck are the special business of the professional soothsayer or conjuror, but even the ordinary person with no pretensions to extraordinary power can do much in this direction. Without employing the services of a professional conjuror he can, for instance, ward off evil from his cattle, assure himself of good luck in an enterprise, bring harm to his enemies, force a favourable turn in his love affair, foretell the future, and even banish an impending storm from his fields. 787 [791]

Thus in order to protect their cattle from harm, or to alleviate damage already done, on the eve of St. George people fasten brooms on long poles (*wicky*) to their gates as a notification to witches to leave the farmstead undisturbed.[36] The first milk from a cow that has calved is salted and poured into her drinking water. Old horseshoes are scattered around the yard, since it is thought that cattle stepping over them cannot be bewitched. To remove the spell on a cow, she is given a drink of holy water mixed with petals from a consecrated Palm Sunday branch; to make this potion even more effective some sulphur is added. If a cow has been taken sick and the owner does not know the reason thereof, the best thing to do is to "extinguish some coals." The peasant, or the soothsayer in his stead, throws glowing coals into a bucket of water; if they sink, the cow is bewitched. To bring her back to health it is only necessary to spill the water upon a black dog; the malady then passes to the dog, and the cow recovers. So greatly does the peasant fear possible harm to his cattle, that he often refrains from even the seemingly most innocent expressions. Instead of saying, for example, "The milk is boiling," he says "The milk is warming up."[37] 789 777

[36] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), iii, 124. [113]

[37] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 234-255.

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The most effective way of assuring oneself of good luck and prosperity is to ally oneself in some way with the Devil. The usual method is to sell him one's soul. A person wishing to do this draws up a formal contract, written with blood drawn from his little finger, whereby Satan is obligated to serve him throughout his life but in return gains possession of his soul after death.[38] One who has entered into such a pact with the Devil can share his benefits with another by selling the latter a lesser devil, who will bring him luck in all his undertakings.[39] A person cannot only buy a devil but also make one for himself. To do so he secures a partly developed egg from the body of a dissected hen and keeps it under his arm for nine consecutive days, even when walking and sleeping, taking care the while not to wash himself or comb his hair and, above all, not to pray. If he observes these rules there will hatch out of the egg a little devil, called *chowanec* (the nurtured), who too will serve him only on condition that he promise him his soul after death.[40] Another way of enlisting the services of the Devil is to stand at a crossways after midnight and call him thrice by name, whereupon Satan appears in person and gives the suppliant a coin (*inkluz*) which always brings him good luck.[41]

Any person, it is believed, can attain to supernatural or extraordinary powers if only he has a strong will, determination and courage, and can hold a secret. Thus one can gain control over hail by stealing a piece of wood from the church and having the priest (unwittingly, of course) read twelve masses over it.[42] A thief, to avoid detection, uses a curious amulet consisting of a human shin-bone emptied of its marrow and filled with candle wax. If he walks three times around a house with such a candle, all its occupants sink into a death-like slumber, and he can steal whatever he pleases with no danger of being caught.[43]

Mastery in any of the arts is attainable only with the help of

[38] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 86. [39] *Ibid.*, p. 86. [40] *Ibid.*, pp. 86-7.

[41] Hnatiuk, V. "Znadoby do halicko-ruskoi demonologii," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (Lviw, 1904), xv, 255.

[42] Szuchiewicz, W. *Huculszczyzna*, (Lwów 1902-8, 4 vols.), i, 54.

[43] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Rutenen in der Bukowina und Galizien," *Globus*, lxi, 282.

the Devil. A person desirous of becoming a master builder must 789
rise early on Easter morn, stand on the threshold of his house 777
with an axe in his hand, imitate the motions of one building a house, and say to himself: "I am not greeting the resurrection of Christ but am chopping with my axe." "The priest announces that Christ has arisen, but I say that the foundation beams are laid for a house." He then goes to church, and, when the priest announces "Christ has arisen!" he says: "I am laying the foundation of a house. As great as is this day, so great a master may I be!" With these words he assigns himself to the Devil, who helps him thenceforth to become a real master in his vocation.[44] One who wishes to excel at playing the flute can do so only with similar aid.

Such a person must pay for the instrument as much as is demanded, and, having bought it, carry it home so that no one may see it and bewitch it. Upon arriving home he must dress himself in clothes turned inside out, and then pour brandy or goat's milk into the flute. After closing the instrument tightly, he must carry it to the boundary of two villages, and there bury it where three roads meet. Returning home he must hide himself, so that no one sees him for nine days, during which period he must neither wash, comb, nor pray, but constantly think of the flute, and move his fingers up and down as if playing on it. On the ninth day he goes to get back his flute. Devils await him, playing on flutes and dancing, and the heavenly judges stand to one side and weep. An angel then sits on his right shoulder and a devil on his left; both whisper into his ear until he is forced to follow one of them. When the devils have finally conquered him, they hand him back his flute, upon the condition that his soul belongs to them. After he has emptied the flute of the brandy and washed himself with it, the devils take him with them to instruct him, and keep him until the cock crows, whereupon he becomes a master.[45]

It is within the power of almost any individual to harm his 789
enemies by certain well tested means, almost all of which bear the character of either exuvial or imitative magic. To cause

[44] Szuchiewicz, *Huculszczyzna*, iv, 293. [45] *Idem*.

843 784 789 If a pregnant woman looks fixedly at a person, or for that matter if he stares at her, her child will be pretty or the reverse, depending on that person's appearance. She therefore tries not to look at or be seen by an ugly individual.[6] She also avoids looking at a fisherman, lest her child will have a restless nature.[7] Neither must she watch a horse shaking its head, or her child will be constantly subject to similar behaviour.[8] If, on the other hand, she happens to see a galloping steed, her pregnancy will last twelve months.[9] Upon observing a mouse, an expectant mother must spit and touch her abdomen; otherwise her child will be born with a mark resembling a mouse on its body. A fire in the village may have a similar effect; if a woman is frightened by it and does not spit immediately, her unborn child will have the mark of a flame on its body. Should a pregnant woman eat an apple at the approach of her confinement, warts are likely to appear on the face of her child;[10] and if the apple be a stolen one, the child will grow up to be a thief.[11]

843 Definite signs enable one to predict the sex of an unborn child. If the prospective mother eats her meals with a good appetite, for example, it is a sign that she will have a boy; otherwise her child will be a girl. According to another indication, if the woman is to have a boy large spots appear on her face before her confinement, but if her face remains smooth and white she is sure to have a girl.[12] The destiny of the child, and even of the parents, can be foretold from certain omens. If birth occurs around noon the child is destined to be unfortunate, while a baby born at daybreak will be lucky.[13] The crowing of a cock during birth is a bad omen. The birth of twins presages disaster, *e.g.*, the imminent death of one of the parents or the

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[6] Kolessa, J., "Narodziny i chrzciny, wesele i pogrzeb u ludu ruskiego," *Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej*, xii (Kraków, 1889) 117; Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[7] Kaindl, *ibid.*, p. 4.

[8] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

[9] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[10] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 1.

[11] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[12] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 174.

[13] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

844 impoverishment and consequent ruin of the homestead.[14] According to another version, the birth of twins or triplets is a
777 general punishment from God.[15] Since eating two potatoes,
787 two apples, or two plums would result in her having twins, a pregnant woman is most careful to abstain therefrom.[16] A child born before the ninth month indicates that the woman has been unfaithful to her husband.[17]

843 The Ukrainian peasant woman, as a rule, goes about her daily
844 tasks uninterruptedly until the very onset of labour pains. The mountainee. woman in particular, owing to her robustness, seems to give birth with an unusual ease and unconcern. Besides attending to her routine work in the house, she is occupied at a period very close to her confinement with such work as milking cows, constructing fences, and pitching hay. Only a woman who is constitutionally weak takes to bed when she feels that her accouchement is not far off. Others often deliver their babies wherever they happen to be at the time—in the barn milking, in the field, or anywhere else. Sometimes a woman goes up to the attic, and after a few moments hands her baby down to someone below and then climbs down after it.[18] Women have even been known to return from market with a newborn baby in their arms and a sack full of purchased articles on their backs. In order to avoid leaving blood spots behind her in case she delivers her baby outside of the home, a woman who expects to give birth at any moment often puts on a pair of men's trousers under her dress when leaving the house.

844 Birth itself is surrounded by a mass of practices, again mostly imitative in nature, which are concerned rather with the well-being of the infant than with preserving the health of the mother.[19] When the hour of confinement arrives the husband repairs to call the midwife (*baba*), who is usually a woman with

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[14] Kolessa, J., "Ludowy wiruwania na pidhirju," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk*, v (Lwów, 1898), 83.

[15] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5.

[16] Kolessa, in *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk*, v, 83.

[17] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4. [18] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 2.

[19] Vowk, C., *Studii z Ukrainskoi Etnografii ta Antropologii* (Praha, n.d.), p. 188.

844 obstetrical experience. The first act of the *baba* is to give the mother a generous dose of whisky to ease her pains. Then she makes her walk thrice around the table, opening and loosening all closed, covered, or tied objects, such as benches, shelves, closets, and boxes; this has the effect of easing the birth of the child. This done, the midwife takes consecrated wreaths of herbs and holds them over the fire, to fumigate the confined woman with their smoke. If all this fails to have the desired effect, and the delivery proceeds with difficulty, the *baba* runs to the church and begs the sexton to lend her the girdle worn by the priest at divine service; returning home, she winds this about the woman and the child is then born with the greatest of ease.[20]

A woman usually delivers her baby in either a kneeling or a standing position. At times, when the case is especially difficult, she is led around in the room by two women, who grasp her under the arms. When delivery begins, the mother kneels down upon a cover spread out on the floor and deposits the
844 baby upon it.[21] The midwife takes the child as soon as it is
777 born, and holding it head down, beats thrice with the soles of its feet on the centre beam of the ceiling, so that it will grow up as strong as the beam. She then makes the sign of the cross over it, sprinkles some holy water on its head, and gives it a warm bath. If the baby is a girl, she puts into the bath some honey, mint, and other sweet-smelling herbs, so that it may grow up to be a sweet and pleasant girl.[22] The water of the bath is not poured out until the following morning; otherwise "the sleep of the child will be carried out along with it."[23]

Having cried the child at the fire, bundled it up, and put it on the oven to sleep, the midwife prepares a bed for the mother
844 at the corner of the oven. Under the sheet she puts some hay
784 consecrated with holy water, and on the bar over the bed she hangs a large sheet to separate the bed from the rest of the room.
789 Before the mother lies down, however, the *baba* takes care to tie a piece of garlic on her chest and to place near her, on the

[20] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 211.

[21] *Ibid.*, iii, 174; Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii.

[22] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 175.

[23] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

23: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1939 RD1 Uknaine RD1

844 bed, a knife and some keys, because iron has the power to
784 drive away evil forces.[24]

789 A precaution never forgotten is to light a candle immediately after the delivery; otherwise the baby, not being baptized as yet, would surely be harmed by lurking evil forces. Under no circumstances must the light be extinguished, at least not until holy water is obtained from the priest and sprinkled over the mother, the baby, and the entire room.[25] Besides this essential precaution, a multitude of other means are taken to protect the child and assure its healthy growth. As soon as possible after birth, for example, there is tied to the right wrist of the infant a little sack, called *szkalytoczka*, which contains the following articles: a piece of garlic—to make the child as sharp as this vegetable; a piece of clay from the oven—to make it as immune to the evil eye as is the oven; a piece of coal—to make the eyes of whoever casts upon it an evil glance burn like coal; some dust from the tracks of a dog—so that people will stare at it no more than they do at a dog's tracks. A small wooden cross is likewise hung on the infant's neck.[26] A mother must not turn her back upon her baby lest it turn yellow,[27] or be taken by a superhuman woman, the *diwa-baba*,[28] in exchange for a brat of hers. Nothing in the house may be given away on the day of birth, or the child will be given to sleeplessness. Whoever takes a glance at a newborn infant must spit immediately—to make sure that the child has not been bewitched.[29] Throughout the first night, some member of the family must keep watch, so that nothing may befall the child.[30]

777 A person's destiny, it is believed, is determined immediately upon his birth, at which moment twelve invisible judges convene on the window-sill near the table. Eleven of them pronounce

[24] *Idem.*

[25] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [26] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 4.

[27] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

[113] [28] Regarding the nature of this mysterious woman, see Koenig, S., "Supernatural Beliefs among the Galician Ukrainians," *Folk-Lore*, xlix (Sept. 1938), 274.

[29] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 4–5.

[30] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

777 various prophecies as to the future of the child, but final decision rests with the oldest, whose judgment prevails. These same judges grant the child a star, which shines only so long as he [776] lives; upon his death it falls to earth. Every person at birth likewise receives a guardian angel, whose duty it is to protect him throughout his life. Before starting any new task, and especially when in danger, the peasant calls upon his ministering angel for assistance, saying: "Guardian angel, help me!"[31] Since one's fate is determined at birth, one can do little to change it. This explains, in the popular mind, why one man is poor and another rich, one healthy and another sick, why one lives long and another dies young. It also explains why there are all kinds of children in the world, and why even children of the same parents often differ so markedly.[32]

845 A deformed or mentally deficient child is ascribed to the act 732 of an evil spirit, particularly the *diwa-baba*. Such a child has a large head, is always lean, and can never be satiated. With his tremendous appetite he suckles so ravenously that his mother's breast finally withers away. Such a child causes constant trouble, is retarded in its growth and short-lived, and does not reach a stature commensurate with his age until after death.[33]

II. Christening Ceremonies

851 While great secrecy surrounds pregnancy and birth, the 553 ceremonies that follow are ushered in with the greatest publicity. As soon as she has attended to the child and the mother, the midwife begins to make preparations for the christening (*chrestyny*), [777] which must take place immediately. A child who is allowed to remain unbaptized over night is exposed to all sorts of dangers. If at all possible, therefore, an infant is taken to church to be baptized on the very day it is born, even though the hour be late in the evening, the weather extremely unfavourable, and the distance considerable.[34] While the father, who takes

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[31] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [32] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 287.

[33] Kaindl, R. F., "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi (Braunschweig, 1899), 256.

[34] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 113; Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6.

While the father, who takes

851 a passive part throughout the ceremony,[35] busies himself with
608 supplying the assembled guests with drinks, the *baba* repairs to
553 the village to invite the godparents (*kumy*) to the christening. The number of men and women asked to act in this capacity ranges from a single couple to as many as fifteen, depending upon the wealth and social status of the parents. The most desirable godparents are the couple who acted as best man and
851 maid of honour at the wedding of the parents.[36] A pregnant
608 woman, too, is considered a most acceptable godmother, for a
784 child held during baptism by such a woman is assured of good
777 luck. An enceinte woman, however, seldom consents to play the rôle, since her own child may be harmed thereby.[37] The wealthier and more prominent the godparents, the more desirable they are. If the parents have been unfortunate in rearing children, however, they invite a couple of wandering beggars to act as godparents and treat them with the greatest of courtesy. This, it is asserted, will change the luck of the parents, and will make the child grow and be healthy.[38] For two women to reciprocate as godmothers is considered not only unwise but a downright sin.[39] Near neighbours, too, make anything but good godparents. Since the two families live in close contact, it is almost inevitable that a quarrel shall sometime arise between them, and tradition as well as propriety strongly disapproves of unfriendly relations with one's *kumy*.[40] Contrary to what one might expect, for a gypsy to hold a child at baptism is supposed to bring it good luck, especially in trade and horse-raising.[41]

851 The midwife approaches the people selected as godparents
608 with these words: "May God grant you health! The mother
553 of the baby has sent me to ask you to do her the favour of holding her child during baptism." If they agree to undertake the function, they either follow her to the house a little later or else promise to meet her in the church at a designated hour.

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[35] According to D. Zelenin, *Russische* (*Ostslavische*) *Volkskunde* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1927), p. 295, the passivity may be explained by the fact that he is, like his wife, considered unclean.

[36] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 208–211.

[37] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 0.

[38] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

[39] *Idem.*

[40] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[41] *Idem.*

851 553 guishes the candles, appropriates half of them himself, and returns the rest to the participants, who must light them again in the room where the mother is confined.[45] If the candles are not easily extinguished, it is a sign that the baptized child will have a long life.[46]

851 574 In some localities the godparents leave immediately after the close of the ceremony for the house of the parents, where a festive dinner is served; in most places, however, they return to their homes and go to the party in the evening.[47] The midwife, upon her return, greets the mother with these words: "You have given us the child born; we, however, return it to you [777] sacrificed and baptized." She then places the infant on a black fur coat (*kożuch*), which is thought to bring luck, and hands it over on the coat to the mother.[48]

At the christening dinner the father again plays a most inconspicuous rôle, the midwife and the godparents being the principal [431] actors. Each guest brings presents of foodstuffs, chiefly beans, peas, eggs, cheese, salt, and bread. After a flood of greetings and congratulations, the women give their presents to the mother, placing them on her bed, while the men hand their gifts, usually loaves of bread, to the father.[49]

After these preliminaries, the guests seat themselves at the table. The master of the house serves each of them with a drink of whisky, and the midwife or the cook places before each an appetizer consisting of a piece of meat or another delicacy. The courses served at this meal are as numerous and elaborate as those of a wedding dinner. They usually include meat with gravy, *holubci* (grouts enveloped in cabbage leaves), *pirohy* (potatoes or grouts enveloped in dough), sour cream, *borszcz* (beet soup), and many other dishes, depending, of course, upon the economic status of the parents. Whisky is lavishly provided, and each guest offers a toast before every drink. It is interesting to note that, if the baby be a boy, the godparents,

[45] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[46] Kaindl, *Die Hutulen*, p. 6.

[47] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[113] [48] Jandaurek, J., *Das Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien und das Herzogtum Bukowina* (Wien, 1884), p. 62.

[49] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

*[christening -- Analyst]

20: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1937 RD1 Ukraine RD1

to divert the hail or cloudburst to an enemy's field.[65] For this reason they are sometimes looked upon as malevolent persons in league with an evil spirit.[66] 756 789

The *hradiwnyk* or *chmarnyk* may control the weather either in the individual case or for the entire year. His methods differ widely, ranging from the utterance of simple formulas to the institution of elaborate ceremonies involving mysterious instruments. Naturally, the more elaborate the means, the more effective the results are believed to be. To avert a hail or a cloudburst the weather expert must have a special wand, called *koszturnik*. This implement is usually fashioned from a limb broken off from a knobby bladder-knot tree, and it acquires its magical potency by being used to separate a frog and a snake engaged in a life and death struggle. Such struggles often occur in the mountainous region in the spring, and are so fierce that the combatants foam at the mouth. Touching the foam endows the wand with mysterious power. Other instruments widely used by weather-men include the scythe, the hatchet, and sharp tools in general.[67] [778]

Conjuration in the individual case, i.e. whenever a storm approaches, is performed in the following manner. As soon as a hailstorm is in evidence, the *hradiwnyk* repairs to the field, where he either undresses completely or else retains only his shirt. He then takes his hat in one hand and a scythe in the other, and utters his formulas, which are intended to divert the hail to a road, a river, a forest, or the field of an enemy.[68] A wand of the type described above, if the weather-man has one, is, of course, more effective than a scythe. Should such a conjuration prove ineffective, the *hradiwnyk* simply presents his hind part to the hail—a last resort which is considered infallible.[69] An approaching torrent or cloudburst, too, is prevented by simple means. As soon as a heavy cloud appears, the *chmarnyk* runs outdoors and diverts the storm in any desired direction by merely pointing with his wand.[70]

[65] Kaindl, in *Mitt. k.k. geogr. Gesellsch.*, xxxvii, 626.

[66] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 121. [67] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 252, 253.

[68] Kaindl, in *Mitt. k.k. georg. Gesellsch.*, xxxvii, 626. [69] *Idem.*

[70] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 253.

776 infant.[27] The mountaineers, moreover, hold these spirits, some of whom are males, responsible for adultery.[28] The mountaineers likewise believe in a class of supernatural beings, called *czynatary*, who cause quarrels among people. These spirits throw an ant hill full of ants into a burning oven, and just as the ants have no way of escape, so the members of the stricken household cannot help quarreling amongst themselves, and may even go as far as to commit murder.[29]

The so-called *letawica*, or evil spirit of a falling star, is unquestionably the ghost of a wicked being. When it descends to earth it takes on human form of very enticing appearance. It may appear, the people hold, either in male or, less often, in female form, but it is always characterized by youth, beauty, and a slender figure. The *letawica* appears to boys and girls, especially to the latter, in lonely places, when the first promptings of love have been aroused in them. Allured by its display of passion, a girl falls readily into its arms, whereupon it begins sucking the sweetness of youth from her mouth. So passionate is its embrace that the victim gradually loses her freshness, withers, fades and finally dies in its arms.[30]

775 778 According to a widespread popular belief, certain objects or manifestations of nature are fetishes, i.e. they serve as dwellings for evil spirits, and, consequently, must be avoided with great care. One such object is the elder (*byzyna*). One must not dig around it, above all not remove any of its roots, for in them dwells an evil spirit who will cause the hand of any one who disregards the taboo to wither or even bring death to him or to a member of his family.[31] Objects of unusual shape, in particular, are believed to harbour evil

[27] *Ibid.*, III, 100-1.

[28] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit*, IV, 282.

[29] *Ibid.*, IV, 286.

[30] Wagilewicz, *op. cit.* (Quoted by O. Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 103.)

[31] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 235.

22: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1938 PDI Ukraine RDI

775 spirits. A gnarled and crooked tree, for example, should
778 never be felled, lest the anger of its indwelling spirit be aroused. Stones shaped like an egg should not be moved for a similar reason. Crossroads are to be avoided as much as possible, for "the evil spirits, upon being driven out of paradise, have settled there, continuing their malicious activities and causing people all manner of ills".[32] Even natural phenomena may be infested with malevolent spirits. When a whirlwind sucks up a column of dust, the people say that a devil's wedding is taking place. On seeing a twister one must immediately sit down on the ground and recite a formula, especially designed for the occasion; otherwise the whirling dust may get under one's feet and cause them to be crippled.[33]

776 The beings who constitute the spirit environment of the Ukrainian peasant are predominately malevolent. Though a few of them, like the *letawica* and the *topelnyk*, are restricted to a specialized activity, the great majority are capable of causing all kinds of human misery, besides the power they wield over natural forces. They consume the milk from the cows, send sleep upon a man when he is supposed to be keeping watch, uproot trees, roll rocks down from the mountains, send lightning and thunder, cause the death of sheep, and account for the failure of crops. They also cause physical and mental abnormalities, criminal tendencies, and excessive human desires and passions. Deformed children, idiots and imbeciles are the work of vampires and the *diwe-baby*; and murder, quarrels, adultery and sexual irregularities are incited by other malignant ghosts.

[32] Kaindl, *op. cit.*, p. 83. [33] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, III, 91

795 This was not an easy task, although by March of 1923 the Church had more than three thousand parishes. These were cared for by priests who were ordained by the new Ukrainian hierarchy, since the vast majority of the pre-revolutionary clergymen who were with the Russian Church in Ukraine remained loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate and refused to join the new Church. During the spring of 1922 the Ukrainians, conscious of their *de facto* status, attempted in vain to effect a reconciliation with the other Orthodox churches and obtain recognition by inviting them to send delegates to a meeting in Kiev for the purpose of creating a league of Orthodox churches. The other churches refused to establish any contacts with a group which they regarded as having violated the canons of the Church, which require no less than two hierarchs to consecrate a bishop. Faced with such formidable opposition, the Ukrainian Church had no alternative but to attempt to pursue an independent course. However, before it could do so it needed a rationale for its method of consecration. This was provided by the Most Reverend John Teodorovyč, then Bishop of Vinnica and now Archbishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, in the form of a disquisition on the Grace of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church; he wrote it during the autumn of 1922.

●779 795 713 The Grace of the Holy Spirit, according to Orthodox dogma, is the divine power which is necessary for salvation and which resides in the Church and is dispensed by it through the sacraments.[11] The dispute between the Ukrainian Church and the other Orthodox national churches resulted from contrary views regarding the role which should be granted to tradition as a source of divine knowledge. Archbishop Teodorovyč bases his argument largely on Scriptural writings and contends that the hierarchy or institution of the pastorate in the primary Church, which was established by Christ, was the Apostolate. This body of men, it is claimed, was not above or outside of the Church but was of the Church since Christ "called unto him his disciples: and of them he chose twelve, whom also he named Apostles" (Luke 6:13). Thus the Apostolate, it is argued, could not have been anterior to the Church, nor could it have created the Church, because Christ founded both and selected the Apostolate from the Church.[12]

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marry. It allowed clergymen to cut their hair and shave their beards and for a brief period in the mid-twenties preached the sinfulness of capitalism and temporarily won the support of the Soviet Government which hoped in this way to weaken the Moscow Patriarchate and the traditional Church.

[11] Rev. Frank Gavin, *Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought* (Milwaukee, 1923), p. 219.

[12] Archbishop John Teodorovyč, *Blahodatnist' Jerarkhii Ukrains'koi Avtokefalnoi Cerkvy*, 3rd ed. (Regensburg, 1947), pp. 11 ff.

779 795 793 The act of conciliar consecration performed in Kiev in October of 1921 is justified on the grounds that the Ukrainian Church, although without its own bishops while under Muscovite domination from 1686 to 1921, never lost its Grace. Consecration is a bestowal of Grace which is a gift of God not subject to human control; what is granted by God, it is reasoned, cannot be withheld by any individual who has the task of laying on hands. Bishops alone did not at all times enjoy a monopoly of the right to consecrate since such a doctrine would exclude God who is the sole consecrator. The election of Reverend Lypkivs'kyj as Metropolitan was not a renewal of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church but rather a renewal of the traditional fullness of its structure. The Ukrainian Church continued to possess Grace even when its bishops were being appointed by Moscow. The *Sobor* of 1921, it is contended, merely renewed the function of the episcopacy; prior to that time the Church possessed pastors who were abiding by the instructions which Christ gave to teach and baptize. Apostolic Succession, it is argued, was preserved during the 1686–1921 period in the whole institution of the pastorate in Ukraine and not in the episcopacy alone since it is but one part of the whole hierarchy.

This contention is based on the assumption that the bishops alone cannot be identified with the Apostles since in the primary Church the terms "presbyter" or elder and "bishop" were apparently employed interchangeably in referring to the Apostles. The distinction in rank between the episcopacy and the priesthood, it is argued, was developed later by man. Thus the institution of the pastorate, which includes priests as well as bishops, proceeds from the Apostolate established by Christ. By this logic priests must be regarded as successors of the Apostles no less than bishops are since all of the Apostles were equal in the Grace which they enjoyed. As proof of this, Archbishop Teodorovyč cites Peter's reference to himself as an elder or presbyter (I Peter 5:1) together with Paul's Epistle to Titus; in the latter (Titus 1:5–6), qualifications for elders are laid down and without any apparent interruption in the train of thought the term "bishop" is then substituted for "elder" in the following verse indicating that the two terms were synonymous in the primary Church.[18] A bishop did not and does not enjoy a greater degree of Grace than did a presbyter (elder) or priest since the Grace which Christ bestowed upon the Apostles was of a uniform quality. Mortals cannot attempt to measure Grace. There is no evidence, says Archbishop Teodorovyč, to indicate that the sacrament of holy orders, which is now performed exclusively by bishops, is

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 50 ff. Also see Paul's Epistle to the Philippians 1:1.

779 of greater magnitude or requires more Grace than the other six
795 sacraments which are performed by all priests.

It is claimed that the differentiation which now exists between a
793 bishop and presbyter or priest lies not in the degree or quality of Grace which each enjoys, but only in the functions which each performs. Yet when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church re-established itself in 1921, it did not abolish the episcopacy or argue in a presbyterian manner that the episcopacy has no place in the Church. It merely argued that the exclusive right of bishops to administer the sacrament of holy orders (ordination and consecration) developed as a result of the actual needs of Church life and not on the grounds that bishops possess a greater degree or higher quality of Grace. The Church itself, it is contended, is the source of the differentiation in functions performed by bishops and presbyters or priests. Administrative necessity and the need for unity and stability alone caused the Church to grant to bishops the exclusive right to ordain and consecrate. This right is a purely canonical matter and is therefore, unlike religious dogma, not immutable. It is a practice developed by the Church, and it is consequently possible for the Church to redistribute functions at any time, as its Ukrainian branch did in 1921 when it became necessary to obtain a truly Ukrainian episcopate. This was a drastic step, and it was accompanied by an appeal to the Lord, the Supreme Pastor, before whom the Ukrainians laid their faith, hopes, and prayers.[14]

795 Under Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj's leadership thirty-five bishops
659 were consecrated in the traditional Orthodox manner, and the new Church appeared to be prospering. The Soviet Government had
687 done little to prevent its establishment but within a few years commenced a campaign of gradual suppression. In 1924 and during each of the three succeeding years Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj was placed under arrest. In 1927 he was compelled to resign and a *sobor* elected Nicholas Borec'kyj to succeed him. The new Metropolitan governed the Church until 1930 when it was implicated in the alleged plot of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine *(Spilka Vyzvolennja Ukraïny)*. This clandestine organization was accused of promoting separatist tendencies and desiring to restore private property. Vladimir Čekhivs'kyj, a Social Democrat who had been premier of the anti-Bolshevik Directory Government early in 1919, was charged with having headed the Union's religious section. During the trial of the forty-five leaders of the Union in March and April

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 100 f. Archbishop Teodorovyč (pp. 124 ff.) has cited considerable evidence which indicates that consecration of bishops by a college of presbyters was a practice employed by the Church of Alexandria for more than two centuries preceding the convocation of the First Ecumenical Council in 325 A.D.

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793 795 1920's. However, Archbishop Polikarp had placed himself under the Moscow Patriarchate in 1939 when his diocese was incorporated into the Soviet Union; he now had to bear the onus of disobeying Moscow and in May of 1942 was divested of all sacerdotal position *in absentia*. This did not prevent him from proceeding with the organization of the autocephalous church, although a rival movement for mere autonomy headed by Archbishop Alexei Hromads'kyj served to weaken the effort. When the Nazis retreated from Ukraine, Archbishop Polikarp and eleven other hierarchs obtained refuge in Germany with thousands of other Ukrainian displaced persons.

● 779 795 Two attempts in as many decades to establish an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union have ended in failure with the believers reintegrated into the Russian Church on both occasions. The attempts, although abortive, were made possible by the vague unity of Eastern Orthodoxy which is not organized on the monarchical model. No patriarch is regarded as the head of the whole Church, for this distinction belongs exclusively to Christ (Ephesians 2:20, 5:23; I Corinthians 3:11). What unity the Church possesses is reflected not in its external organization but in the whole episcopacy in accordance with the principle of harmony and corporateness which is *Sobornost*. The autocephalous units of the Church agree on dogma, recognize each other's sacraments as valid, and engage in concelebrations of the liturgy on occasions of great importance. Yet once the principle of autocephaly is accepted it is only logical that there be as many distinct churches, albeit of the same confession, as there are nations and that the boundaries of religious and political jurisdictions coincide. It is a principle which, in the last analysis, leads to a limitation of the universality of Eastern Orthodoxy, since it isolates the various branches of the Church, spelling death to the notion of effective organic unity.

into account. The vision of the great riches of Byzantium fired the imagination of the pagan princes and the occasions were not rare when the peaceful merchants became pirates who even tried to seize the imperial city. Nevertheless peaceful relations between the two countries were always again established, thus facilitating commerce. Several treaties were concluded in the ninth and tenth centuries. From the ninth century Christianity began to penetrate among the Russians. This penetration contributed a great deal to the improvement of these relations and removed more and more amongst the Russians the taste for piracy and their aims of conquests of the capital which had become the source of their new religion. 175x

From the beginning of the tenth century a bishop of the Byzantine rite was installed at Kiev. From this moment the influence of Constantinople on Russia continued to grow, and with it the rise of Christianity. In becoming converted to the Greek religion in 988, St. Vladimir laid the permanent foundations of Russian civilization, in the Ukraine as in Great Russia. 779 175x

The princely power, inspired by Christianity, felt obliged to make the new religion accepted by the whole country. It is the Christian spirit which inspired the 'testament' of Vladimir Monomachus to his sons (at the dawn of the twelfth century). When, while engaged in internal quarrels, such a prince offended this spirit, the Church felt compelled to remind him of his duties of loyalty and of Christian charity. In facing the 'pagans' of the Steppe, the Russians are conscious of being a Christian people and this adds considerable strength to their national solidarity. "Let us henceforth be of one heart and let us defend the Russian lands . . . and if anyone recommences the quarrels he will have all of us against him as well as the Holy Cross," said the princes summoned by Vladimir Monomachus to organize the common defence against the Polovets nomads.

753 as a feather, escaped. She was so frightened, nevertheless, that she fled to the forest and forsook her activities, so that the epidemic ceased.[80]

755 One way of avoiding death or serious harm is to propitiate the
782 spirits through vows.

It happens often that a sick person makes a vow (*zarikajet sie*), i.e. a promise, that if he regains his health, he will forego certain pleasures in life, or abstain from some pleasant task. A certain woman, for example, accidentally drove a needle into the palm of her hands, and when the physician, after chloroforming her, removed the needle, the convalescent pledged herself never again to sew embroidered shoulder-pieces on to a shirt of hers. This promise she kept religiously, sewing only on shirts belonging to others. Another woman, in order to rid herself of a headache, promised that she would not spin on Fridays; when relieved, she occupied herself every Friday with a different task in order to avoid spinning. A peasant in order to preserve his cattle during an epidemic that had broken out, solemnly vowed to give up drinking liquor for half a year, and when his cattle were saved he kept his word.[81]

755 Believing in the supernatural causation of disease, the people have little faith in scientific medical treatment, if they do not ignore it altogether. Poverty, though doubtless a factor, is far less important than the conviction, fully compatible with the prevailing conception of disease, that the native medicine-men and their remedies are more reliable than physicians and their medications. That the question of money is not decisive can be seen from the fact that quack doctors often receive larger fees than trained physicians. Even when given free treatment and medicine, an individual often puts aside the medicament and then boasts that he has gotten well because he has not used it.[82] While he places full confidence in his own remedies,

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[80] Woycicki, K. W. *Polnische Volkssagen und Maerchen* (Berlin, 1839), pp. 23-4.

[81] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 160.

[82] Kaindl, R. F. *Die Huzulen* (Wien, 1894), p. 93.

844 the hands of the midwife and dries them with the linen presented to the latter. Then both women shake hands over the child, and beg one another three times for forgiveness for the troubles each has had to undergo.[55]

846 783 The mother is considered strictly unclean for three days, the period of the midwife's attendance. Nevertheless, she usually leaves her bed on the second or third day and performs her routine tasks about the house. She must not, however, go farther than thirty-five steps from the dwelling, lest she defile the fields which she might pass.[56] Indeed, she may not even take these few steps without carrying a knife with her.[57] The period during which the mother is not considered entirely clean lasts from three to six weeks, depending upon the locality. At the termination of this period a formal purification ceremony (*wywid* = leading out) is performed in the church by the priest. On the day of the ceremony, the midwife comes to take the mother to church. The latter dresses up in her best clothes, and is sprinkled by the midwife with holy water. Taking the baby in her arms, and carrying a knife, a few keys, some garlic, and a piece of bread, she follows the midwife to the church. Arriving at the entrance, she kneels with the child in her arms and awaits the priest. When he enters, she follows him to the small altar where the christening took place some weeks before. Here the priest, after performing a special ceremony, pronounces her entirely clean.[58]

852 608 574 After the purification rite, often as much as two years later, comes a ceremony which, more than any other, reveals the closeness of the bond that must have once existed between godparents and child. The parents of the child inquire of the godparents whether they will accept a present of *kolaczy*, twisted loaves of wheat bread, from which the ceremony is named *kolaczyny*. If the godparents agree, as they invariably do, the parents set a day for the celebration. Should the godparents have acted in the same capacity at the baptism of other children,

[55] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[56] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 7.

[57] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 119.

[58] *Idem.*

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BELIEFS AND PRACTICES RELATING TO BIRTH AND CHILDHOOD AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS

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I. Pregnancy and Birth

Pregnancy, to the Ukrainian peasant, is a phenomenon surrounded by mysterious forces which, if offended in any way, are sure to bring misfortune upon the expectant mother and her unborn child. A pregnant woman is treated with consideration, and is usually showered with wishes for an easy confinement. A person mistreating an expectant mother exposes himself and his household to harm.[1] In the belief that labour pains, especially acute ones, are not inevitable but are caused by evil powers,

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[1] *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, by G. R. Owst, Cambridge, 1933. P. 99. Reinfelden's Moralization is in MS. Egerton 2419.

[1] Kaindl, R. F., *Die Hutzulen: Ihr Leben, ihre Sitten, und ihre Volksüberlieferung* (Wien, 1894), p. 4.

843 the Ukrainian peasant woman keeps her pregnancy as secret as
● 784 possible. The Devil and persons with supernatural powers will
789 thus be kept in ignorance and, consequently, be prevented from interfering in any way with her accouchement.[2] The expectant mother therefore avoids mentioning her condition to any one except the midwife. A husband, for the same reason, dislikes to speak of his wife's pregnancy.[3] Some women, especially among the mountaineers (*huzuls*), even wind about themselves a broad strip of woollen bandage, in order to hide their condition. So tightly is the bandage wrapped that it has a definite effect upon the child, which is usually very small at birth; in order to assure its normal development the midwife, upon delivering it, exclaims: "Now grow!"[4]

[847] A child is, as a rule, a welcome addition to the family. Hence an enceinte woman, legitimately married, rarely attempts abortion or infanticide.[5] On the contrary, she is greatly concerned to give birth to a healthy child, and in order to assure herself of this, she cautiously watches nearly every step she takes and strictly observes a variety of taboos. The precautions and taboos, both before and after birth, are based in most cases on the belief that things or actions produce similar results. In other words, certain objects that the pregnant woman may see or touch, certain foods that she may eat, and certain phenomena that she may observe, hear, or feel, will register a corresponding effect upon her child. Wherever, therefore, the consequences are obviously undesirable, a pregnant woman tries to avoid doing or observing the thing in question, or, if this is impossible, to guard against them by certain means which are usually imitative in nature. A few examples follow.

[13] [2] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie: Obraz Etnograficzny* (4 vols., Kraków, 1882–1889), i, 208.

[3] *Idem.*

[4] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna* (4 vols., Lwów, 1902–1908), ii, 2.

[5] Unmarried girls, on the other hand, very often take steps to dispose of their unborn children. Cf. Koenig, S., "Marriage and the Family among the Galician Ukrainians," in *Studies in the Science of Society*, G. P. Murdock (Editor) (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937), pp. 302–303.

843 If a pregnant woman looks fixedly at a person, or for that matter if he stares at her, her child will be pretty or the reverse, depending on that person's appearance. She therefore tries not to look at or be seen by an ugly individual.[6] She also avoids looking at a fisherman, lest her child will have a restless nature.[7] Neither must she watch a horse shaking its head, or her child will be constantly subject to similar behaviour.[8] If, on the other hand, she happens to see a galloping steed, her pregnancy will last twelve months.[9] Upon observing a mouse, an expectant mother must spit and touch her abdomen; otherwise her child will be born with a mark resembling a mouse on its body. A fire in the village may have a similar effect; if a woman is frightened by it and does not spit immediately, her unborn child will have the mark of a flame on its body. Should a pregnant woman eat an apple at the approach of her confinement, warts are likely to appear on the face of her child;[10] and if the apple be a stolen one, the child will grow up to be a thief.[11]

843 Definite signs enable one to predict the sex of an unborn child. If the prospective mother eats her meals with a good appetite, for example, it is a sign that she will have a boy; otherwise her child will be a girl. According to another indication, if the woman is to have a boy large spots appear on her face before her confinement, but if her face remains smooth and white she is sure to have a girl.[12] The destiny of the child, and even of the parents, can be foretold from certain omens. If birth occurs around noon the child is destined to be unfortunate, while a baby born at daybreak will be lucky.[13] The crowing of a cock during birth is a bad omen. The birth of twins presages disaster, *e.g.*, the imminent death of one of the parents or the

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[6] Kolessa, J., "Narodziny i chrzciny, wesele i pogrzeb u ludu ruskiego," *Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej*, xii (Kraków, 1889) 117; Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[7] Kaindl, *ibid.*, p. 4.

[8] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

[9] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[10] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 1.

[11] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[12] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 174.

[13] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

844 obstetrical experience. The first act of the *baba* is to give the mother a generous dose of whisky to ease her pains. Then she makes her walk thrice around the table, opening and loosening all closed, covered, or tied objects, such as benches, shelves, closets, and boxes; this has the effect of easing the birth of the child. This done, the midwife takes consecrated wreaths of herbs and holds them over the fire, to fumigate the confined woman with their smoke. If all this fails to have the desired effect, and the delivery proceeds with difficulty, the *baba* runs to the church and begs the sexton to lend her the girdle worn by the priest at divine service; returning home, she winds this about the woman and the child is then born with the greatest of ease.[20]

A woman usually delivers her baby in either a kneeling or a standing position. At times, when the case is especially difficult, she is led around in the room by two women, who grasp her under the arms. When delivery begins, the mother kneels down upon a cover spread out on the floor and deposits the
844 baby upon it.[21] The midwife takes the child as soon as it is
777 born, and holding it head down, beats thrice with the soles of its feet on the centre beam of the ceiling, so that it will grow up as strong as the beam. She then makes the sign of the cross over it, sprinkles some holy water on its head, and gives it a warm bath. If the baby is a girl, she puts into the bath some honey, mint, and other sweet-smelling herbs, so that it may grow up to be a sweet and pleasant girl.[22] The water of the bath is not poured out until the following morning; otherwise "the sleep of the child will be carried out along with it."[23]

Having dried the child at the fire, bundled it up, and put it on the oven to sleep, the midwife prepares a bed for the mother
844 at the corner of the oven. Under the sheet she puts some hay
● 784 consecrated with holy water, and on the bar over the bed she hangs a large sheet to separate the bed from the rest of the room.
789 Before the mother lies down, however, the *baba* takes care to tie a piece of garlic on her chest and to place near her, on the

[20] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 211.

[21] *Ibid.*, iii, 174; Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii.

[22] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 175.

[23] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

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844 bed, a knife and some keys, because iron has the power to
784 drive away evil forces.[24]

789 A precaution never forgotten is to light a candle immediately after the delivery; otherwise the baby, not being baptized as yet, would surely be harmed by lurking evil forces. Under no circumstances must the light be extinguished, at least not until holy water is obtained from the priest and sprinkled over the mother, the baby, and the entire room.[25] Besides this essential precaution, a multitude of other means are taken to protect the child and assure its healthy growth. As soon as possible after birth, for example, there is tied to the right wrist of the infant a little sack, called *szkalytoczka*, which contains the following articles: a piece of garlic—to make the child as sharp as this vegetable; a piece of clay from the oven—to make it as immune to the evil eye as is the oven; a piece of coal—to make the eyes of whoever casts upon it an evil glance burn like coal; some dust from the tracks of a dog—so that people will stare at it no more than they do at a dog's tracks. A small wooden cross is likewise hung on the infant's neck.[26] A mother must not turn her back upon her baby lest it turn yellow,[27] or be taken by a superhuman woman, the *diwa-baba*,[28] in exchange for a brat of hers. Nothing in the house may be given away on the day of birth, or the child will be given to sleeplessness. Whoever takes a glance at a newborn infant must spit immediately—to make sure that the child has not been bewitched.[29] Throughout the first night, some member of the family must keep watch, so that nothing may befall the child.[30]

777 A person's destiny, it is believed, is determined immediately upon his birth, at which moment twelve invisible judges convene on the window-sill near the table. Eleven of them pronounce

[24] *Idem.*

[25] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [26] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 4.

[27] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

[113] [28] Regarding the nature of this mysterious woman, see Koenig, S., "Supernatural Beliefs among the Galician Ukrainians," *Folk-Lore*, xlix (Sept. 1938), 274.

[29] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 4–5.

[30] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

While the father, who takes

851 a passive part throughout the ceremony,[35] busies himself with
608 supplying the assembled guests with drinks, the *baba* repairs to
553 the village to invite the godparents (*kumy*) to the christening. The number of men and women asked to act in this capacity ranges from a single couple to as many as fifteen, depending upon the wealth and social status of the parents. The most desirable godparents are the couple who acted as best man and
851 maid of honour at the wedding of the parents.[36] A pregnant
608 woman, too, is considered a most acceptable godmother, for a
784 child held during baptism by such a woman is assured of good
777 luck. An enceinte woman, however, seldom consents to play the rôle, since her own child may be harmed thereby.[37] The wealthier and more prominent the godparents, the more desirable they are. If the parents have been unfortunate in rearing children, however, they invite a couple of wandering beggars to act as godparents and treat them with the greatest of courtesy. This, it is asserted, will change the luck of the parents, and will make the child grow and be healthy.[38] For two women to reciprocate as godmothers is considered not only unwise but a downright sin.[39] Near neighbours, too, make anything but good godparents. Since the two families live in close contact, it is almost inevitable that a quarrel shall sometime arise between them, and tradition as well as propriety strongly disapproves of unfriendly relations with one's *kumy*.[40] Contrary to what one might expect, for a gypsy to hold a child at baptism is supposed to bring it good luck, especially in trade and horse-raising.[41]

851 The midwife approaches the people selected as godparents
608 with these words: "May God grant you health! The mother
553 of the baby has sent me to ask you to do her the favour of holding her child during baptism." If they agree to undertake the function, they either follow her to the house a little later or else promise to meet her in the church at a designated hour.

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[35] According to D. Zelenin, *Russische (Ostslavische) Volkskunde* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1927), p. 295, the passivity may be explained by the fact that he is, like his wife, considered unclean.

[36] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 208–211.

[37] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[38] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

[39] *Idem.*

[40] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[41] *Idem.*

853 regarding food. For this reason she often makes it drink a spoonful of dishwater immediately after birth or weaning.[68]

857 Children mean additional working hands, and hence an increased source of income to the peasant's household. The older the boy or girl gets, the more indispensable does he become in the house, helping his father or mother. When scarcely eight years of age, he runs all sorts of errands, carries his father's lunch out to the distant fields all by himself, rides the horses to water, drives the cattle out to pasture—in a word, learns to depend upon himself. At the age of twelve he already performs practically all the tasks of an adult, sometimes working even harder than his parents.

869 From its very infancy the child is inculcated with various
784 folk beliefs. It is taught; for example, not to spit on the fire, lest it get the mark of a flame on its face; not to eat apples before St. Spas (18th August, O.S.), lest frogs multiply in its belly; never, in the case of a girl, to walk backwards, lest she remain long unmarried; and not to throw away the nails that it bites off its fingers but to hide them in its bosom, for they belong to the Devil, who will demand them after death.[69]

872 The life of a boy is marked by no special ceremonies until the time of courtship. In the case of a girl, the only formal ceremony occurs in her sixth year, when her hair is put up for the first time. Before that age, her tresses fall freely about her shoulders. For the ceremony the mother invites a woman, called *sochtiwna*, who is experienced in such matters. Gathering the girl's hair from her forehead and from the back and both sides of her head, the woman ties the four strands together in the centre, saying: "As I am tying your hair from all four sides that it may adhere together, so may boys, widowers, sons of wealthy parents, and the most distinguished youths of the land seek you from all directions; whoever shall see you shall swoon for you, as a fish does for water." The parents thenceforth usually pay a little more attention to their daughter's appearance; at least they try to see to it that she wears another garment in addition to her shirt.

[68] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 7. [69] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 10.

[70] *Ibid.*, ii, 10–11.

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An excellent illustration of the power ascribed to exuviae is the use of sweat to arouse love. Thus a sorceress sometimes mixes a little perspiration from the sole of a girl's foot with some soot from the chimney, and pronounces a formula over the mixture; if the girl pours this concoction into a drink given to a boy, he will surely fall in love with her and soon marry her.[52] 789 832

When a person faces a serious situation and wants to be sure that the means employed are effective, he resorts, as in some of the above-cited cases, to a professional sorcerer (*czariwnyk*) or soothsayer (*prymiwnyk*) for assistance. Of these practitioners, mostly women, the most proficient are thought to be the Gypsies,[53] and especially the offspring of a Gypsy and a Ukrainian peasant.[54] A sorcerer or sorceress is never born but made. A woman who wants to become a sorceress must fast for nine consecutive days, abstain from ablutions and prayer, indeed, renounce completely her belief in Christ, and carry an undeveloped egg under her left armpit throughout the period. She must not, moreover, reveal the secret of her power, lest she lose her skill. On her dying bed, however, she should tell everything to another woman, in order to avoid the suffering of a lingering death which would otherwise be her fate.[55] 756 791

The sorcerer or soothsayer foretells future happenings by reading the lines of the palm, by extinguishing coals in the manner already mentioned, and by pouring wax upon water and observing the different shapes it takes.[56] To put an end to malicious gossip, 756 787 791

> a soothsayer is called in, and a lock is handed her. She washes the lock in water, brought by the master of the house, walking backward all the way, from an abundant well, and then closes it in order to put an end to the gossip. In case the latter is very menacing, two locks may be washed and shut. Having closed the locks, the soothsayer sweeps all the dirt and dust of the room into the water, and has the inhabitants of the house take off all their clothes and wash themselves with it. Finally she washes the windows too, and then

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 139.
[53] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 291.
[54] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 236.
[55] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 291.
[56] *Idem.*

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756 pours the water with all its dirt (the gossip) out through the
791 window.[57]

While the female soothsayer occupies herself mainly with
789 prophesying the future, making love magic, and the like, her
[759] counterpart specializes in weather control—in banning hail, thunder, snowstorms, and torrents, and in bringing the rains needed to relieve drought. Even in such cases, however, the ordinary man is far from helpless. Armed with formulas and more concrete means, he can avert a calamity even without the aid of a weather expert. It will be convenient, therefore, to examine the weather lore of the people before turning to a consideration of the professional.

789 The layman, first of all, is much given to predicting the weather,
787 which he undertakes with the greatest of confidence, especially at Easter. On this day he forecasts atmospheric changes throughout the year, and these prophecies are not mere pastimes, but are believed in to the extent of letting them determine important economic activities.[58] Work and cattle trading, for example, are done in accordance with these predictions. If it rains on Easter Day, the whole summer will be wet; fair weather foretells a dry summer, and unsettled weather means that in general a good summer is at hand. Aside from these general prophecies the people indulge in more minute predictions on the same day. If fair weather prevails from 1 to 3 a.m., an early and fair spring may be expected, and the price of hay will rise and that of cattle will fall. If the weather is pleasant from early in the morning until noon, then the approaching spring will be fair and the harvest good; if, however, the morning is fair at first but the sky later becomes overcast, the spring will indeed be pleasant, but the time of the maize and potato harvest will be characterized by inclement weather. Further detailed predictions are made from the kind of weather prevailing during the evening and on the following night, and the work in the fields and pastures is planned in accordance therewith.[59]

789 The layman can also, as already intimated, do much to avert hail or relieve drought without calling upon the aid of the weather

[57] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 276. [58] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iii, 8.
[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

843 If a pregnant woman looks fixedly at a person, or for that
784 matter if he stares at her, her child will be pretty or the reverse,
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843 Definite signs enable one to predict the sex of an unborn child. If the prospective mother eats her meals with a good appetite, for example, it is a sign that she will have a boy; otherwise her child will be a girl. According to another indication, if the woman is to have a boy large spots appear on her face before her confinement, but if her face remains smooth and white
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● 787 while a baby born at daybreak will be lucky.[13] The crowing of a cock during birth is a bad omen. The birth of twins presages disaster, *e.g.*, the imminent death of one of the parents or the

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[6] Kolessa, J., "Narodziny i chrzciny, wesele i pogrzeb u ludu ruskiego," *Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej*, xii (Kraków, 1889) 117; Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[7] Kaindl, *ibid.*, p. 4.

[8] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

[9] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[10] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 1.

[11] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[12] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 174.

[13] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

844 impoverishment and consequent ruin of the homestead.[14] Ac-
777 cording to another version, the birth of twins or triplets is a
787 general punishment from God.[15] Since eating two potatoes, two apples, or two plums would result in her having twins, a pregnant woman is most careful to abstain therefrom.[16] A child born before the ninth month indicates that the woman has been unfaithful to her husband.[17]

843 The Ukrainian peasant woman, as a rule, goes about her daily
844 tasks uninterruptedly until the very onset of labour pains. The mountainee. woman in particular, owing to her robustness, seems to give birth with an unusual ease and unconcern. Besides attending to her routine work in the house, she is occupied at a period very close to her confinement with such work as milking cows, constructing fences, and pitching hay. Only a woman who is constitutionally weak takes to bed when she feels that her accouchement is not far off. Others often deliver their babies wherever they happen to be at the time—in the barn milking, in the field, or anywhere else. Sometimes a woman goes up to the attic, and after a few moments hands her baby down to someone below and then climbs down after it.[18] Women have even been known to return from market with a newborn baby in their arms and a sack full of purchased articles on their backs. In order to avoid leaving blood spots behind her in case she delivers her baby outside of the home, a woman who expects to give birth at any moment often puts on a pair of men's trousers under her dress when leaving the house.

844 Birth itself is surrounded by a mass of practices, again mostly imitative in nature, which are concerned rather with the well-being of the infant than with preserving the health of the mother.[19] When the hour of confinement arrives the husband repairs to call the midwife (*baba*), who is usually a woman with

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[14] Kolessa, J., "Ludowy wiruwania na pidhirju," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk*, v (Lwów, 1898), 83.

[15] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5.

[16] Kolessa, in *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk*, v, 83.

[17] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[18] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 2.

[19] Vowk, C., *Studii z Ukrainskoi Etnografii ta Antropologii* (Praha, n.d.), p. 188.

505 the mercantile fleet which it carried was, even long before the war, as large as the total mercantile tonnage of the Austro-Hungarian fleet.
346 Even from far off you will see on the hills of the city lying on the right bank the strange cupolas of the Byzantine churches and monasteries. Kiyev was formerly the "Rome of the East", and even today it is the "mother of all Russian cities". Hundreds of thousands of devout pilgrims
• 788 annually visited the famous cave monastery of Pecherska Lavra, the cathedral of St. Sophia, the Golden Gate and other sacred spots.[1]

133 The churning steamer which you again board in the sprawling, pounding and shrieking harbor section[2] will take you farther downstream. On the west bank the high plateau of the Dniepr Plain rises steeply. If you should wander over this undulating hill country with its fields of wheat and sugar beets, you would see everywhere the traces of Ukraine's past: mighty grave mounds of nomad chieftains, and embankments with which in early times the Ukrainian people protected themselves against Asiatic brigands. /20/ To the left of the stream, in the east, you see nothing but wild thickets of reeds, dense, impenetrable green meadows behind which the Dniepr Plain is hidden.
361 You would find villages there[2] which have as many inhabitants as a medium-sized city and which equal a metropolis in surface area. However, they have remained villages in which peasants live on their homesteads; it is almost a day's journey to their fields. Khar'kov, a small Cossack hamlet in the seventeenth century, and today the second largest city of the Ukraine, is situated on the eastern edge of this plain.

133 In Dniepropetrovsk where formerly the rapids began, you turn eastward, friend, and now reach the steppes. The earth which is swept bare by the eternal east wind and by the dust storms, is completely naked as soon as you ascend the Donets

[1] [i.e. In Kiev — Analyst]
[2] [i.e. In the Dniepr Plain — Analyst]

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians
Ruthenians
163

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Religious procession in a Ruthenian village

How they build churches in Ruthenia

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

776 appeased, exorcised. When the priest of Velykyi Lypnyk consecrates the water of the village brook on the sixth of January, the people believe that the demons are thus driven away.

326 The men of Valykyi Lypnyk are tinkers, a
221 trade which in many places has a bad flavor. It is easy to say that they travel about the country like gypsies. But even though they wander from village to village, a small bundle of tools on their backs, repairing stoves and mending pots, they are, nevertheless, not homeless. As soon as spring comes, poverty drives them out on the road, and only late in the fall when the first white flakes begin to fall, they return to their wives and children with the few groschen they have saved.
241 For land is scarce, the clod of earth small, the soil is poor and the climate harsh.* The women work like drudges for their bit of barley bread and potatoes. With their small cows and a wooden plough they till the lower slopes of the mountain ridges. They sow by hand, harrow, and in the fall they cut off the barely ripe ears of grain with a sickle.
286 In their "spare time" these women* with their
291 strangely narrow faces sit barefoot in their full pleated skirts and pale pink blouses, a charming little cap on their heads, at their looms and tirelessly ply their shuttle back and forth between the taut threads, or press wool into felt for the jackets and trousers of their husbands.
342 The rooms of these "tinkers"* are surprisingly large and clean; the kitchen, living room, /10/ bedroom and work room are all in one. The whole structure with adjoining stable and wagon shed is built of wood, the inside unfinished, the outside
[789] covered with loam. In order that there be no lack of magic, carpenters carve three suns into the central roof beam.

184 How rich these "tinkers" of East Slovakia were with their little plot of free earth, their two or three cows, their barley bread and their loom, compared to their brothers in Carpatho-

*[In the village of Valykyi Lypnyk, Western Ukraine -Analyst]

11: Obermaier--145 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1
The Living faith of pagan times occupies
among the people, a position which is equal with the Christian belief. The Orthodox Church, doubtless recognizing how deeply rooted the popular customs are, has tried to reconcile the two.

769 The ancestor cult is particularly important. The Ukrainian people entertain their ancestors on Christmas Eve. The table is set and the whole family are seated at it. Only a few seats are unoccupied - for the ancestors. Their bowls are filled with the traditional Christmas food: cooked wheat with honey and poppy, cooked fish and a cooked fruit mixture. "Little Father Frost" is also invited on Christmas Eve by the master of the house. The peasant steps in front of his house and calls: "Frost, frost, come and have supper with us!" Every guest, even the beggar, is welcome on Christmas Eve, for he might be an ancestor or Father Frost whom even the priest does not forget specially to invite. Hay is laid [789] under the tablecloth on the nights around the winter solstice, for all green things /138/ drive away the evil spirits. The place of honor in the house belongs to the "grandfather", a 533 sheaf of grain, symbolizing the ancestor. In the twelve magical nights between Christmas Eve and the Three Kings the famous koliad, pagan songs about the solstice, with a Christian flavor, exorcise all evil. Jesus Christ, Dazhdboh the sun god, and the Virgin Mary, all three are conjured up in one and the same song, in order to protect these worthy Christians.

529 The carnival belongs to the women; the men 789 have nothing to do with it, although on other occasions they do not scorn merry revels. On a Monday morning the married women of the village gather in the pub in order to begin a week of jolly drinking. This, too, of course, cannot pass without magic. The sorcery revolves about the "koloda", a stick which symbolizes a child. It is wound with tow and is now "born". The women congratulate each other on the "birth" with horilka,

527 789 grain whiskey. The revelry lasts all week just as in the case of a real birth.

527 971 769 The spring festival, the resurrection of nature, has for a long time coincided with the Christian Easter, the resurrection of the Lord, and the burial of Christ with the burial of winter. On Easter Sunday the Christian service and the pagan cult complement each other in a strange way. Scarcely has the priest prayed for the blessing of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost to descend upon his congregation, when the women join hands and dance around the church. It is a custom dating from ancient times to announce to the ancestor the beginning of field work at the spring festival, so that he can give them help and support. "Oh, ancestor!" the women sing on this occasion, "we plow the field, oh ancestor, we announce to you that we plow, that we sow, that we reap!" (82)

82. According to a verbal communication of the Ukrainian ethnographer and archaeologist V. Shcherbakivskyj, Prague.

789 527 The custom of "plowing-under", observed even before the First World War in East Ukraine when the field work begins, is probably unique. Again it is the women who, stark naked, exorcise the magic forces /139/ by drawing a plow over the nocturnal fields, and furrowing the earth amid a great deal of noise. Woe to the man who might eavesdrop on this grandiose fertility rite! The mischief-maker would have to pay dearly for it. (83) The drinking bout which the naked peasant

83. Zelenin: Russian (East Slavic) Folk Studies.

women celebrate near the church after they have finished their magic rite is called 'lightning".

533 These are the same women who sing the lovely Ukrainian songs while they are working in the fields in spring and summer; for the Ukrainian be-

20: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1937 RD1 Ukraine RD1

MAGICAL BELIEFS AND PRACTICES AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS[1]

PART I

The Black Art and its Representatives

771 To the inhabitants of the plains and plateaus and the majestic-
739 ally rising Carpathians of Southern Poland—the Galician Ukrainian—life in its manifold aspects is pervaded by a mul-

101 [1] The Galician Ukrainians, also known as Ruthenians, are Eastern Slavs, and constitute a branch of the numerous Ukrainian, or Little

titude of mysterious, evil forces which he endeavours either to ally himself with, propitiate, or combat in order to assure himself of good luck or avert the many calamities which these supernatural powers may bring. Magical beliefs and practices are therefore widespread and deeply rooted among the people. Even where the church has opposed and tried to counteract the older notions and usages, its success has been at best only partial. What it often has effected was a change in form, or the substitution of an authorized rite for an ancient magical practice.[2] The priest, for example, sometimes takes the place of the sorcerer by holding a special midnight Mass, the *czorna służba* (black service), at the instigation of a person who wishes to harm an enemy.[3] At other times he acts as medicine man, e.g. by stepping over the back of an ailing parishioner in order to relieve his backache.[4] A case of substitution is noticeable in the rite observed before moving into a newly constructed house. Wherever the old practices of sacrificing a black rooster, as an offering to the Devil or as a preventive against disease, has become extinct, its equivalent has appeared in the solemn consecration of the house by the priest.[5]

Among the Ukrainians, as elsewhere, magical beliefs and practices have two main aspects, which may be termed respectively the black and white arts. While the former has its prime source in the arch enemy of man, the Devil, the latter, which functions mainly to counteract evil influences, relies on some powerful medium, sometimes God himself, to neutralize or overcome the

Russian, people inhabiting South Russia. They occupy the eastern section of the former Austrian province of Galicia, which is at present part of Poland. They number approximately 3,000,000 and belong almost exclusively to the peasant class. Geographically, and to a certain extent also culturally, they may be divided into lowlanders and highlanders, the former inhabiting the plains to the north and the latter the Carpathian mountains to the south.

[2] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Rutenen in der Bukowina und Galizien," *Globus*, lxi, 282.

[3] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Kuzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 277.

[4] Kaindl, R. F. "Neue Beitraege zur Ethnologie und Volkskunde der Huzulen," *Globus*, lxix, 71.

[5] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 282.

forces of evil. The agents of the former include the witch and the wizard; and those of the latter, the fortune-teller, the soothsayer, the conjuror, and, in cases of sickness, the healer. Between these two groups of "professional" intermediaries between the supernatural and natural worlds stands the ordinary non-professional man or woman, who, by using certain formulas or more concrete means, can also invoke superhuman intervention. 754 791 789

A person associated with powers of evil, though difficult or impossible to recognize by ordinary means, since he usually looks exactly like any other human being, can be singled out much more easily by his actions, and especially by the results he is supposed to obtain. Thus a successful person, it is thought, is necessarily allied in one way or another with the Devil, or his assistants. A man who has luck in hunting or fishing is undoubtedly in communication with the Devil.[6] A woman who repeatedly returns from the woods with her basket full of mushrooms, or whose cow continuously yields more than an average quantity of milk, is nothing but a witch who is using her unholy powers to her own profit and, usually, also the detriment of her neighbours.[7] Indeed, there is not a wealthy or successful person in the village or town who is not in league with the Devil.[8] A peasant, therefore, who has luck with his crops and cattle most likely receives help from evil spirits, and a manufacturer who makes money from his factory in town does so because he has demons to work for him.[9] Thus, although there exist special means of detection, which, as we shall see, are made use of when necessary, mere good fortune is the simplest criterion. 754 777

Among individuals occupied with the black art, the witch (*widma*) wields by far the greatest power.[10] Just as after death she becomes the most feared of evil spirits, so during her life she is considered the most dangerous of the Devil's disciples. The 754

[6] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), iii, 12. [113]

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 114. [8] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 229, 232.

[9] Onyščuk, A. "Materyaly do huculskoi demonologii," *Materyaly do Ukrainskoi Etnologii* (Lviw, 1909), xl, 73.

[10] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 280.

country on the other side has plenty while there is starvation at home.[24] Witches are also held responsible for hails, storms, floods and drought.[25] 754

The commonest speciality of witches, however, is the bewitching or drying up of cows. The methods and means employed are many. Some believe that the *widma* simply milks the cow once in the usual way. Others assert that she takes some milk from the victimized cow, especially on the eve of St. George or St. John, and with it smears the teats of her own cow, which then gives milk in abundance while the udder of the bewitched animal dries up or yields only blood. According to some, the witch need not even actually touch or see the cow she wishes to charm; she has only to think of a particular animal to receive her milk which in such a case flows from a door post, table, bench, or other object in the house.[26] Hence a witch does not actually have to possess a cow in order to have milk. "Marusia of Ispas never had a cow, but nevertheless always enjoyed an abundant supply of milk, and even had enough to sell; this astounded the people greatly until Petro Hyrak once came to her and found her milking a board."[27]

Although hated and despised, a witch must never be openly insulted or mistreated. In mentioning a witch, one should always append a curse, such as: "May she disappear"; "May the Devil stand between her eyes and the bear between her shoulders."[28] [789]

The wizard (*opyr*), although as harmful as his female counterpart, is considered lower in rank and is, in general, less frequently encountered.[29] He is even forced to serve the witch, e.g. as the steed on which she rides to her meetings, but he has the power to counteract any harm she may intend to do him.

[24] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 232-3.

[25] Kaindl, R. F. "Wetterzauberei bei den Rutenen und Huzulen," *Mittheilungen der k.k. geogr. Gesellschaft in Wien*, xxxvii, 637. [113]

[26] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 254.

[27] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 128.

[28] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 231.

[29] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 109.

754 The *opyr* is born, not made. He, too, has a tail, and his sex organs differ from those of a normal man, for which reason he is infertile and childless.[30] Some hold that he changes his sex every month.[31] A *misiecznyk*, as such a person is called, can be identified much more easily than the witch by his unusually rosy cheeks (*wse w lycy czerwonyj*).[32] Wizards, too, have their individual specialities, and they are especially careful not to encroach upon the spheres of activity of the witches. There are, for example, wizards of hunting, of fishing, and of horses.[33] But just as the witches are particularly interested in harming cattle and in diverting the milk of cows, so the wizards centre their chief attention on the weather. They produce torrents, droughts, hail, and snowstorms. For this purpose they gather raindrops, dew, and water from thawing snow into a vessel, and frost, snow, and storms into a bag or the skin of an animal. If a wizard lets so much as one drop of water from his vessel fall into a river, a torrent or flood follows immediately; if he presses upon his bag, frost and snowstorm ensue. Once, it is said, the wizards kept the sun covered by clouds for seven weeks, as a result of which excessive downpours, crop failure, and famine occurred.[34]

754 789 It is obviously of great advantage to the people to detect a witch or wizard operating in their village. Although they can do so at almost any time, there is no more opportune occasion than the eve of a high holiday. Thus in order to determine whether a suspected woman is really a witch, one method is to steal three chips of wood before sunrise on nine consecutive days. When a fire is built with the chips, the woman, if she be really a witch, will not fail to come to the house to borrow something; however she may beg and entreat then, she should never be believed, because only thus does she lose her power to bring harm upon the house.[35]

[30] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 110-13.
[31] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 230.
[32] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 113.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 119.
[34] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 230.
[35] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 281.

Part II

The White Art: Counteracting Means

The Ukrainian peasant believes that all calamities can be avoided or removed by conjuration, by the use of mysterious concoctions, or by other magical means. Counteracting the work of the Devil and his associates and inducing good luck are the special business of the professional soothsayer or conjuror, but even the ordinary person with no pretensions to extraordinary power can do much in this direction. Without employing the services of a professional conjuror he can, for instance, ward off evil from his cattle, assure himself of good luck in an enterprise, bring harm to his enemies, force a favourable turn in his love affair, foretell the future, and even banish an impending storm from his fields.

Thus in order to protect their cattle from harm, or to alleviate damage already done, on the eve of St. George people fasten brooms on long poles (*wichy*) to their gates as a notification to witches to leave the farmstead undisturbed.[36] The first milk from a cow that has calved is salted and poured into her drinking water. Old horseshoes are scattered around the yard, since it is thought that cattle stepping over them cannot be bewitched. To remove the spell on a cow, she is given a drink of holy water mixed with petals from a consecrated Palm Sunday branch; to make this potion even more effective some sulphur is added. If a cow has been taken sick and the owner does not know the reason thereof, the best thing to do is to "extinguish some coals." The peasant, or the soothsayer in his stead, throws glowing coals into a bucket of water; if they sink, the cow is bewitched. To bring her back to health it is only necessary to spill the water upon a black dog; the malady then passes to the dog, and the cow recovers. So greatly does the peasant fear possible harm to his cattle, that he often refrains from even the seemingly most innocent expressions. Instead of saying, for example, "The milk is boiling," he says "The milk is warming up."[37]

[36] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), iii, 124.

[37] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 234-255.

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The most effective way of assuring oneself of good luck and prosperity is to ally oneself in some way with the Devil. The usual method is to sell him one's soul. A person wishing to do this draws up a formal contract, written with blood drawn from his little finger, whereby Satan is obligated to serve him throughout his life but in return gains possession of his soul after death.[38] One who has entered into such a pact with the Devil can share his benefits with another by selling the latter a lesser devil, who will bring him luck in all his undertakings.[39] A person cannot only buy a devil but also make one for himself. To do so he secures a partly developed egg from the body of a dissected hen and keeps it under his arm for nine consecutive days, even when walking and sleeping, taking care the while not to wash himself or comb his hair and, above all, not to pray. If he observes these rules there will hatch out of the egg a little devil, called *chowanec* (the nurtured), who too will serve him only on condition that he promise him his soul after death.[40] Another way of enlisting the services of the Devil is to stand at a crossways after midnight and call him thrice by name, whereupon Satan appears in person and gives the suppliant a coin (*inkluz*) which always brings him good luck.[41]

Any person, it is believed, can attain to supernatural or extraordinary powers if only he has a strong will, determination and courage, and can hold a secret. Thus one can gain control over hail by stealing a piece of wood from the church and having the priest (unwittingly, of course) read twelve masses over it.[42] A thief, to avoid detection, uses a curious amulet consisting of a human shin-bone emptied of its marrow and filled with candle wax. If he walks three times around a house with such a candle, all its occupants sink into a death-like slumber, and he can steal whatever he pleases with no danger of being caught.[43]

Mastery in any of the arts is attainable only with the help of

[38] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 86. [39] *Ibid.*, p. 86. [40] *Ibid.*, pp. 86-7.

[41] Hnatiuk, V. "Znadoby do halicko-ruskoi demonologii," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (Lviw, 1904), xv, 255.

[42] Szuchiewicz, W. *Huculszczyzna*, (Lwów 1902-8, 4 vols.), i, 54.

[43] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Rutenen in der Bukowina und Galizien," *Globus*, lxi, 282.

the Devil. A person desirous of becoming a master builder must 789
rise early on Easter morn, stand on the threshold of his house 777
with an axe in his hand, imitate the motions of one building a house, and say to himself: "I am not greeting the resurrection of Christ but am chopping with my axe." "The priest announces that Christ has arisen, but I say that the foundation beams are laid for a house." He then goes to church, and, when the priest announces "Christ has arisen!" he says: "I am laying the foundation of a house. As great as is this day, so great a master may I be!" With these words he assigns himself to the Devil, who helps him thenceforth to become a real master in his vocation.[44] One who wishes to excel at playing the flute can do so only with similar aid.

Such a person must pay for the instrument as much as is demanded, and, having bought it, carry it home so that no one may see it and bewitch it. Upon arriving home he must dress himself in clothes turned inside out, and then pour brandy or goat's milk into the flute. After closing the instrument tightly, he must carry it to the boundary of two villages, and there bury it where three roads meet. Returning home he must hide himself, so that no one sees him for nine days, during which period he must neither wash, comb, nor pray, but constantly think of the flute, and move his fingers up and down as if playing on it. On the ninth day he goes to get back his flute. Devils await him, playing on flutes and dancing, and the heavenly judges stand to one side and weep. An angel then sits on his right shoulder and a devil on his left; both whisper into his ear until he is forced to follow one of them. When the devils have finally conquered him, they hand him back his flute, upon the condition that his soul belongs to them. After he has emptied the flute of the brandy and washed himself with it, the devils take him with them to instruct him, and keep him until the cock crows, whereupon he becomes a master.[45]

It is within the power of almost any individual to harm his 789
enemies by certain well tested means, almost all of which bear the character of either exuvial or imitative magic. To cause

[44] Szuchiewicz, *Huculszczyzna*, iv, 293. [45] *Idem.*

789 the death of his neighbour, a person takes water in which a still-born child has been bathed, pours it into a pot, and, after keeping it for nine days, spills it in front of the neighbour's house; whoever first steps on the unclean place will become crippled and die.[46] One who envies another his good fortune, and wishes to see him unlucky, secretly cuts off a few hairs from his head and mixes them with the excrement of a dog; the victim will thenceforth go "the dog's ways," i.e. fail in everything he undertakes.[47] To bring incessant strife upon a household, one does as follows. Observing a fight among dogs, he disperses them, gathers some of the dust raised in the combat, throws it upon glowing coals, and keeps this mixture for a day and a night; if he scatters this around the enemy's house on the following night before sunrise, there will arise among its occupants a struggle like that witnessed among the dogs.[48]

789 832 There are many ways by which a girl may arouse the love of a young man, and have him eventually marry her. One of them is to throw a little salt on him when he leaves the house, in the conviction that he will run after her as a sheep does after salt.[49] Another means is the following. When the young man has left the house, the girl gathers "his footsteps," i.e. the dust from his foot-prints, and puts the dust on the hinges of the door, believing that he will turn toward her as the door does upon its hinges.[50] A still more effective way of inducing a man to marry a girl, namely, by using part of his clothing, is illustrated by the following case.

Ivan Gajaniuk, a widower, had a maid who was very much in love with him and desired to marry him. With this purpose in mind she went on Pelyp (fasting period) to a famous sorceress known for her wisdom and skill in "bettering" (*lipszyty*). The old woman, upon hearing her wish, told her to come again and bring with her the man's drawers. The maid returned with a pair of underwear, but it belonged to a boy in her master's service. Thus it happened that the boy, and not the master, shortly afterwards married the girl.[51]

[46] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 134. [47] *Ibid.*, p. 135. [48] *Ibid.*, p. 139.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 141. [50] *Ibid.*, p. 141. [51] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

20: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1937 RD1 Ukraine RD1

An excellent illustration of the power ascribed to exuviae is the use of sweat to arouse love. Thus a sorceress sometimes mixes a little perspiration from the sole of a girl's foot with some soot from the chimney, and pronounces a formula over the mixture; if the girl pours this concoction into a drink given to a boy, he will surely fall in love with her and soon marry her.[52]

When a person faces a serious situation and wants to be sure that the means employed are effective, he resorts, as in some of the above-cited cases, to a professional sorcerer (*czariwnyk*) or soothsayer (*prymiwnyk*) for assistance. Of these practitioners, mostly women, the most proficient are thought to be the Gypsies,[53] and especially the offspring of a Gypsy and a Ukrainian peasant.[54] A sorcerer or sorceress is never born but made. A woman who wants to become a sorceress must fast for nine consecutive days, abstain from ablutions and prayer, indeed, renounce completely her belief in Christ, and carry an undeveloped egg under her left armpit throughout the period. She must not, moreover, reveal the secret of her power, lest she lose her skill. On her dying bed, however, she should tell everything to another woman, in order to avoid the suffering of a lingering death which would otherwise be her fate.[55]

The sorcerer or soothsayer foretells future happenings by reading the lines of the palm, by extinguishing coals in the manner already mentioned, and by pouring wax upon water and observing the different shapes it takes.[56] To put an end to malicious gossip,

> a soothsayer is called in, and a lock is handed her. She washes the lock in water, brought by the master of the house, walking backward all the way, from an abundant well, and then closes it in order to put an end to the gossip. In case the latter is very menacing, two locks may be washed and shut. Having closed the locks, the soothsayer sweeps all the dirt and dust of the room into the water, and has the inhabitants of the house take off all their clothes and wash themselves with it. Finally she washes the windows too, and then

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

[53] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 291.

[54] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 236.

[55] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 291.

[56] *Idem.*

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756 pours the water with all its dirt (the gossip) out through the
191 window.[57]

While the female soothsayer occupies herself mainly with
789 prophesying the future, making love magic, and the like, her
[758] counterpart specializes in weather control—in banning hail, thunder, snowstorms, and torrents, and in bringing the rains needed to relieve drought. Even in such cases, however, the ordinary man is far from helpless. Armed with formulas and more concrete means, he can avert a calamity even without the aid of a weather expert. It will be convenient, therefore, to examine the weather lore of the people before turning to a consideration of the professional.

789 The layman, first of all, is much given to predicting the weather,
787 which he undertakes with the greatest of confidence, especially at Easter. On this day he forecasts atmospheric changes throughout the year, and these prophecies are not mere pastimes, but are believed in to the extent of letting them determine important economic activities.[58] Work and cattle trading, for example, are done in accordance with these predictions. If it rains on Easter Day, the whole summer will be wet; fair weather foretells a dry summer, and unsettled weather means that in general a good summer is at hand. Aside from these general prophecies the people indulge in more minute predictions on the same day. If fair weather prevails from 1 to 3 a.m., an early and fair spring may be expected, and the price of hay will rise and that of cattle will fall. If the weather is pleasant from early in the morning until noon, then the approaching spring will be fair and the harvest good; if, however, the morning is fair at first but the sky later becomes overcast, the spring will indeed be pleasant, but the time of the maize and potato harvest will be characterized by inclement weather. Further detailed predictions are made from the kind of weather prevailing during the evening and on the following night, and the work in the fields and pastures is planned in accordance therewith.[59]

789 The layman can also, as already intimated, do much to avert hail or relieve drought without calling upon the aid of the weather

[57] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 276. [58] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iii, 8.
[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

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expert. The simplest means is to toss holy water from an elevated place towards a threatening hail cloud. Another way of averting hail or an approaching storm is to light candles consecrated at Epiphany, or to put an oven spatula and a broom crosswise in front of the door. A further effective way of preventing hail is to take a piece of black cloth which has been used to wrap the feet, light it, and throw it half burned into the open. If this does not help, then the straw upon which someone has died is used instead. The most universal means, however, is the ringing of church bells, specially consecrated for the purpose, for as long as the danger lasts. Individual fields can be insured against hail throughout the year by burying consecrated Easter bread in the corners of the field.[60] An effective annual " insurance policy " can be taken out on Christmas Eve. Among the mountaineers it is the women who are entrusted with this task. After having fasted all day long, they repair with the approach of evening to their gardens and fields. There they walk around with their apron-dresses over their heads uttering their conjuration formulas. Upon their return home they immediately set the table, and, putting upon it their best food, they ask the Hail to enter as a guest, entreating him not to bother them during the year.[61]

The people also know of many ways to bring rain when it is badly needed. The means, once more, range from the simplest to the most complex and elaborate practices. Rain can sometimes be induced by merely plucking some grass with the hand, by overthrowing a cross in the graveyard, or by throwing a poppy-head into a well. Another method is for the woman to refrain from washing clothes in the river, waiting stubbornly for rain. Still another is to kill a rooster on the bank of a river and then throw its blood and head into the water.[62] A curious means for breaking a long drought employed by people of certain villages towards the end of the last century is recorded by Kolberg.[63]

[60] Kaindl, R. F. " Wetterzauberei bei den Rutenen und Huzulen," *Mitt. der k.k. geogr. Gesellsch. in Wien*, xxxvii, 625, 628. [113]

[61] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 253.

[62] Kaindl, in *Mitt. k.k. geogr. Gesellsch.*, xxxvii, 639.

[63] *Pokucie*, iii, 122-3.

789 The village elder, with the aid of his assistants, calls together all the women, old and young, usually on a Sunday, at a certain place, whence they are taken to the nearest lake or river and made to bathe. This is supposed to cause immediate rain. The group of women thus assembled enter the water willingly, or, if they resist, are thrown in by force. There they must stand in their shirts, with the water up to their waists, for a full quarter of an hour. This act is called *baby splawyty* (bathing the women). If it is noticed that any of the women are absent, a trustworthy peasant is sent to the house of the disobedient one to find out the reason for her absence. The only excuses acceptable in this case are absence from the village and serious illness. In the latter case, however, the woman is at least made to urinate and the urine is immediately spilled on the field.

The urine of women, as a matter of fact, is generally held to possess the power of causing rain.

756 789 In order to avert effectively a dangerous hailstorm or an approaching cloudburst, or to end a long-standing drought, it is necessary to secure the services of a professional weather expert. One or more of these men are to be found in practically every village, but not all are considered equally skilful. Those with the greatest repute come from among the mountaineers. Although women are not unknown as weather conjurors, those who excel at the art are usually men. A weather-man of reputation is much sought after and looked up to. His services are in demand over wide territories, and he is well paid and often comparatively wealthy. Travelling from place to place in response to calls, he frequently returns home in the fall with wagons laden with grain obtained for his services.[64]

The weather expert, though versed in all kinds of atmospheric problems, specializes at times in one field, or is at least considered by the people to excel in dealing with one particular kind of phenomenon. The two commonest specialists are the *hradiwnyk* (hail-man) and the *chmarnyk* (rain-man). They are able not only to prevent storms and bring rain but also, if asked,

to divert the hail or cloudburst to an enemy's field.[65] For this reason they are sometimes looked upon as malevolent persons in league with an evil spirit.[66] 756 789

The *hradiwnyk* or *chmarnyk* may control the weather either in the individual case or for the entire year. His methods differ widely, ranging from the utterance of simple formulas to the institution of elaborate ceremonies involving mysterious instruments. Naturally, the more elaborate the means, the more effective the results are believed to be. To avert a hail or a cloudburst the weather expert must have a special wand, called *koszturnik*. This implement is usually fashioned from a limb broken off from a knobby bladder-knot tree, and it acquires its magical potency by being used to separate a frog and a snake engaged in a life and death struggle. Such struggles often occur in the mountainous region in the spring, and are so fierce that the combatants foam at the mouth. Touching the foam endows the wand with mysterious power. Other instruments widely used by weather-men include the scythe, the hatchet, and sharp tools in general.[67] [778]

Conjuration in the individual case, i.e. whenever a storm approaches, is performed in the following manner. As soon as a hailstorm is in evidence, the *hradiwnyk* repairs to the field, where he either undresses completely or else retains only his shirt. He then takes his hat in one hand and a scythe in the other, and utters his formulas, which are intended to divert the hail to a road, a river, a forest, or the field of an enemy.[68] A wand of the type described above, if the weather-man has one, is, of course, more effective than a scythe. Should such a conjuration prove ineffective, the *hradiwnyk* simply presents his hind part to the hail—a last resort which is considered infallible.[69] An approaching torrent or cloudburst, too, is prevented by simple means. As soon as a heavy cloud appears, the *chmarnyk* runs outdoors and diverts the storm in any desired direction by merely pointing with his wand.[70]

[65] Kaindl, in *Mitt. k.k. geogr. Gesellsch.*, xxxvii, 626.

[66] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 121. [67] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 252, 253.

[68] Kaindl, in *Mitt. k.k. geogr. Gesellsch.*, xxxvii, 626. [69] *Idem.*

[70] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 253.

789 To banish hail throughout the year the *hradiwnyk* must act
756 on Christmas Eve. He must neither eat nor drink throughout the day, nor must he spit or talk to anyone. Late at night he undresses completely and betakes himself naked to the field. Here he draws various circles with his magic wand and by uttering his formulas, tries to get the hail to appear before him. The hail, naturally enough, does not appear, and this evokes from the conjuror the following address: "As you are not heeding my call now, so may you remain far from us throughout the year!" With this the conjuration for the whole year is accomplished.[71]

756 How does the weather-man avoid blame for his false predictions and ineffective conjurations, which are necessarily very numerous, and how does he manage to hold the confidence of the people? The answer is obvious: he employs the familiar excuses used by shamans everywhere. After performing his act he asserts that the cloud must disappear and that there will be no hail whatever, or, if for some reason the cloud cannot be dispersed, that he is driving it away to deserted places so that it will hail only there. If, however, his art fails, and someone complains to this effect, then he says that he was unable to do anything because he noticed the impending cloud too late, i.e. when it was over and had already left the limits of his sphere of influence, for, if this occurs, there is nothing one can do to ward off hail in that region.[72] Another stock excuse is that "the weather-man of a neighbouring village, may God punish him, has diverted the hail to our village out of revenge." The people believe this, and so does the conjuror himself.[73]

757 Mention should be made in this connection of the current belief that natural phenomena have a definite influence upon human health. In some localities, when the people hear thunder for the first time in the spring, they throw themselves on the ground and roll around, even though they may be engaged at the time in important work and the earth be muddy. This behaviour is thought to prevent all sorts of aches and especially stomach disorders.[74] In other places, on similar occasions, the

[71] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 253. [72] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 123.
[73] Szuchiewicz, W. *op. cit.*, i, 55. [74] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 234.

people seize stones and with them beat their foreheads three times, saying: "Stone-head, stone-head, stone-head." This is supposed to make the head as hard as stone, i.e. immune to any ache.[75] 751

The evil spirits residing in natural phenomena can be a source of danger unless one takes the necessary precautions. When it thunders and lightens, one should avoid walking along the road, and should sit down somewhere at the side, because God is shooting at the fleeing Devil and his arrows may accidentally kill the wayfarer.[76] One should do the same in the case of a dust storm, for its indwelling Devil is likely to harm a Christian.[77] One can lessen the severity of a blizzard (*metylycia*), and cause it to subside, by throwing sharp edged sticks at the driving snow. Falling hail can also be rendered harmless by catching the first hailstones, chewing them, and spitting them on the ground; "the horns of the evil spirit are then chewed off," and the hail loses its harmfulness in that locality.[78] 821 789

Part III

Healing by Magic

Disease, like other calamities, is attributed by the people to evil spirits. It is the incessant activities of a multitude of supernatural beings, the people believe, that cause the many afflictions that befall the human body and soul.[79] Epidemic and fatal diseases are personified as supernatural women. The female personification of the plague, according to a popular story, once made a young peasant carry her on his shoulders. Wherever he went people began to die by the thousands. Finally he attempted to get rid of his dread burden by throwing himself into a river. It was he alone, however, who drowned; the plague, being light 753

[75] Kolessa, F. "Ludowy wiruwania na pidhirju," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (Lviw, 1898), v, 77. [113]

[76] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 91. [77] Kolessa, F. *op cit.*, v, 76.

[78] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 234.

[79] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), 160.

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BELIEFS AND PRACTICES RELATING TO BIRTH AND CHILDHOOD AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS

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I. Pregnancy and Birth

Pregnancy, to the Ukrainian peasant, is a phenomenon surrounded by mysterious forces which, if offended in any way, are sure to bring misfortune upon the expectant mother and her unborn child. A pregnant woman is treated with consideration, and is usually showered with wishes for an easy confinement. A person mistreating an expectant mother exposes himself and his household to harm.[1] In the belief that labour pains, especially acute ones, are not inevitable but are caused by evil powers,

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[1] *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, by G. R. Owst, Cambridge, 1933. P. 99. Reinfelden's Moralization is in MS. Egerton 2419.

[1] Kaindl, R. F., *Die Huzulen: Ihr Leben, ihre Sitten, und ihre Volksüberlieferung* (Wien, 1894), p. 4.

843 784 789 the Ukrainian peasant woman keeps her pregnancy as secret as possible. The Devil and persons with supernatural powers will thus be kept in ignorance and, consequently, be prevented from interfering in any way with her accouchement.[2] The expectant mother therefore avoids mentioning her condition to any one except the midwife. A husband, for the same reason, dislikes to speak of his wife's pregnancy.[3] Some women, especially among the mountaineers (*huzuls*), even wind about themselves a broad strip of woollen bandage, in order to hide their condition. So tightly is the bandage wrapped that it has a definite effect upon the child, which is usually very small at birth; in order to assure its normal development the midwife, upon delivering it, exclaims: "Now grow!"[4]

[847] A child is, as a rule, a welcome addition to the family. Hence an enceinte woman, legitimately married, rarely attempts abortion or infanticide.[5] On the contrary, she is greatly concerned to give birth to a healthy child, and in order to assure herself of this, she cautiously watches nearly every step she takes and strictly observes a variety of taboos. The precautions and taboos, both before and after birth, are based in most cases on the belief that things or actions produce similar results. In other words, certain objects that the pregnant woman may see or touch, certain foods that she may eat, and certain phenomena that she may observe, hear, or feel, will register a corresponding effect upon her child. Wherever, therefore, the consequences are obviously undesirable, a pregnant woman tries to avoid doing or observing the thing in question, or, if this is impossible, to guard against them by certain means which are usually imitative in nature. A few examples follow.

[13] [2] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie: Obraz Etnograficzny* (4 vols., Kraków, 1882–1889), i, 208.

[3] *Idem.*

[4] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna* (4 vols., Lwów, 1902–1908), ii, 2.

[5] Unmarried girls, on the other hand, very often take steps to dispose of their unborn children. Cf. Koenig, S., "Marriage and the Family among the Galician Ukrainians," in *Studies in the Science of Society*, G. P. Murdock (Editor) (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937), pp. 302–303.

843 If a pregnant woman looks fixedly at a person, or for that
784 matter if he stares at her, her child will be pretty or the reverse,
789 depending on that person's appearance. She therefore tries not to look at or be seen by an ugly individual.[6] She also avoids looking at a fisherman, lest her child will have a restless nature.[7] Neither must she watch a horse shaking its head, or her child will be constantly subject to similar behaviour.[8] If, on the other hand, she happens to see a galloping steed, her pregnancy will last twelve months.[9] Upon observing a mouse, an expectant mother must spit and touch her abdomen; otherwise her child will be born with a mark resembling a mouse on its body. A fire in the village may have a similar effect; if a woman is frightened by it and does not spit immediately, her unborn child will have the mark of a flame on its body. Should a pregnant woman eat an apple at the approach of her confinement, warts are likely to appear on the face of her child;[10] and if the apple be a stolen one, the child will grow up to be a thief.[11]

843 Definite signs enable one to predict the sex of an unborn child. If the prospective mother eats her meals with a good appetite, for example, it is a sign that she will have a boy; otherwise her child will be a girl. According to another indication, if the woman is to have a boy large spots appear on her face before her confinement, but if her face remains smooth and white
844 she is sure to have a girl.[12] The destiny of the child, and even
777 of the parents, can be foretold from certain omens. If birth
787 occurs around noon the child is destined to be unfortunate, while a baby born at daybreak will be lucky.[13] The crowing of a cock during birth is a bad omen. The birth of twins presages disaster, *e.g.*, the imminent death of one of the parents or the

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[6] Kolessa, J., "Narodziny i chrzciny, wesele i pogrzeb u ludu ruskiego," *Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej*, xii (Kraków, 1889) 117; Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[7] Kaindl, *ibid.*, p. 4.

[8] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

[9] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[10] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 1.

[11] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[12] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 174.

[13] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

844 obstetrical experience. The first act of the *baba* is to give the mother a generous dose of whisky to ease her pains. Then she makes her walk thrice around the table, opening and loosening all closed, covered, or tied objects, such as benches, shelves, closets, and boxes; this has the effect of easing the birth of the child. This done, the midwife takes consecrated wreaths of herbs and holds them over the fire, to fumigate the confined woman with their smoke. If all this fails to have the desired effect, and the delivery proceeds with difficulty, the *baba* runs to the church and begs the sexton to lend her the girdle worn by the priest at divine service; returning home, she winds this about the woman and the child is then born with the greatest of ease.[20]

A woman usually delivers her baby in either a kneeling or a standing position. At times, when the case is especially difficult, she is led around in the room by two women, who grasp her under the arms. When delivery begins, the mother kneels down upon a cover spread out on the floor and deposits the baby upon it.[21] The midwife takes the child as soon as it is 844 born, and holding it head down, beats thrice with the soles of 777 its feet on the centre beam of the ceiling, so that it will grow up as strong as the beam. She then makes the sign of the cross over it, sprinkles some holy water on its head, and gives it a warm bath. If the baby is a girl, she puts into the bath some honey, mint, and other sweet-smelling herbs, so that it may grow up to be a sweet and pleasant girl.[22] The water of the bath is not poured out until the following morning; otherwise "the sleep of the child will be carried out along with it."[23]

Having cried the child at the fire, bundled it up, and put it on the oven to sleep, the midwife prepares a bed for the mother at the corner of the oven. Under the sheet she puts some hay 844 consecrated with holy water, and on the bar over the bed she 784 hangs a large sheet to separate the bed from the rest of the room. 789 Before the mother lies down, however, the *baba* takes care to tie a piece of garlic on her chest and to place near her, on the

[20] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 211.

[21] *Ibid.*, iii, 174; Sruchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii

[22] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 175.

[23] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

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844 bed, a knife and some keys, because iron has the power to
784 drive away evil forces.[24]

789 A precaution never forgotten is to light a candle immediately after the delivery; otherwise the baby, not being baptized as yet, would surely be harmed by lurking evil forces. Under no circumstances must the light be extinguished, at least not until holy water is obtained from the priest and sprinkled over the mother, the baby, and the entire room.[25] Besides this essential precaution, a multitude of other means are taken to protect the child and assure its healthy growth. As soon as possible after birth, for example, there is tied to the right wrist of the infant a little sack, called *szkalytoczka*, which contains the following articles: a piece of garlic—to make the child as sharp as this vegetable; a piece of clay from the oven—to make it as immune to the evil eye as is the oven; a piece of coal—to make the eyes of whoever casts upon it an evil glance burn like coal; some dust from the tracks of a dog—so that people will stare at it no more than they do at a dog's tracks. A small wooden cross is likewise hung on the infant's neck.[26] A mother must not turn her back upon her baby lest it turn yellow,[27] or be taken by a superhuman woman, the *diwa-baba*,[28] in exchange for a brat of hers. Nothing in the house may be given away on the day of birth, or the child will be given to sleeplessness. Whoever takes a glance at a newborn infant must spit immediately—to make sure that the child has not been bewitched.[29] Throughout the first night, some member of the family must keep watch, so that nothing may befall the child.[30]

777 A person's destiny, it is believed, is determined immediately upon his birth, at which moment twelve invisible judges convene on the window-sill near the table. Eleven of them pronounce

[24] *Idem.*

[25] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [26] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 4.

[27] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

[113] [28] Regarding the nature of this mysterious woman, see Koenig, S., "Supernatural Beliefs among the Galician Ukrainians," *Folk-Lore*, xlix (Sept. 1938), 274.

[29] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 4–5.

[30] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

titude of mysterious, evil forces which he endeavours either to ally himself with, propitiate, or combat in order to assure himself of good luck or avert the many calamities which these supernatural powers may bring. Magical beliefs and practices are therefore widespread and deeply rooted among the people. Even where the church has opposed and tried to counteract the older notions and usages, its success has been at best only partial. What it often has effected was a change in form, or the substitution of an authorized rite for an ancient magical practice.[2] The priest, for example, sometimes takes the place of the sorcerer by holding a special midnight Mass, the *czorna służba* (black service), at the instigation of a person who wishes to harm an enemy.[3] At other times he acts as medicine man, e.g. by stepping over the back of an ailing parishioner in order to relieve his backache.[4] A case of substitution is noticeable in the rite observed before moving into a newly constructed house. Wherever the old practices of sacrificing a black rooster, as an offering to the Devil or as a preventive against disease, has become extinct, its equivalent has appeared in the solemn consecration of the house by the priest.[5]

Among the Ukrainians, as elsewhere, magical beliefs and practices have two main aspects, which may be termed respectively the black and white arts. While the former has its prime source in the arch enemy of man, the Devil, the latter, which functions mainly to counteract evil influences, relies on some powerful medium, sometimes God himself, to neutralize or overcome the

Russian, people inhabiting South Russia. They occupy the eastern section of the former Austrian province of Galicia, which is at present part of Poland. They number approximately 3,000,000 and belong almost exclusively to the peasant class. Geographically, and to a certain extent also culturally, they may be divided into lowlanders and highlanders, the former inhabiting the plains to the north and the latter the Carpathian mountains to the south.

[2] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Rutenen in der Bukowina und Galizien," *Globus*, lxi, 282.

[3] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Kuzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 277.

[4] Kaindl, R. F. "Neue Beitraege zur Ethnologie und Volkskunde der Huzulen," *Globus*, lxix, 71.

[5] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 282.

forces of evil. The agents of the former include the witch and the wizard; and those of the latter, the fortune-teller, the soothsayer, the conjuror, and, in cases of sickness, the healer. Between these two groups of "professional" intermediaries between the supernatural and natural worlds stands the ordinary non-professional man or woman, who, by using certain formulas or more concrete means, can also invoke superhuman intervention.

A person associated with powers of evil, though difficult or impossible to recognize by ordinary means, since he usually looks exactly like any other human being, can be singled out much more easily by his actions, and especially by the results he is supposed to obtain. Thus a successful person, it is thought, is necessarily allied in one way or another with the Devil, or his assistants. A man who has luck in hunting or fishing is undoubtedly in communication with the Devil.[6] A woman who repeatedly returns from the woods with her basket full of mushrooms, or whose cow continuously yields more than an average quantity of milk, is nothing but a witch who is using her unholy powers to her own profit and, usually, also the detriment of her neighbours.[7] Indeed, there is not a wealthy or successful person in the village or town who is not in league with the Devil.[8] A peasant, therefore, who has luck with his crops and cattle most likely receives help from evil spirits, and a manufacturer who makes money from his factory in town does so because he has demons to work for him.[9] Thus, although there exist special means of detection, which, as we shall see, are made use of when necessary, mere good fortune is the simplest criterion.

Among individuals occupied with the black art, the witch (*widma*) wields by far the greatest power.[10] Just as after death she becomes the most feared of evil spirits, so during her life she is considered the most dangerous of the Devil's disciples. The

[6] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), iii, 12.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 114. [8] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 229, 232.

[9] Onyščuk, A. "Materyaly do huculskoi demonologii," *Materyaly do Ukrainskoi Etnologii* (Lviw, 1909), xl, 73.

[10] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxi, 280.

Part II

The White Art: Counteracting Means

The Ukrainian peasant believes that all calamities can be avoided or removed by conjuration, by the use of mysterious concoctions, or by other magical means. Counteracting the work of the Devil and his associates and inducing good luck are the special business of the professional soothsayer or conjuror, but even the ordinary person with no pretensions to extraordinary power can do much in this direction. Without employing the services of a professional conjuror he can, for instance, ward off evil from his cattle, assure himself of good luck in an enterprise, bring harm to his enemies, force a favourable turn in his love affair, foretell the future, and even banish an impending storm from his fields. 789 [791]

Thus in order to protect their cattle from harm, or to alleviate damage already done, on the eve of St. George people fasten brooms on long poles (*wicky*) to their gates as a notification to witches to leave the farmstead undisturbed.[36] The first milk from a cow that has calved is salted and poured into her drinking water. Old horseshoes are scattered around the yard, since it is thought that cattle stepping over them cannot be bewitched. To remove the spell on a cow, she is given a drink of holy water mixed with petals from a consecrated Palm Sunday branch; to make this potion even more effective some sulphur is added. If a cow has been taken sick and the owner does not know the reason thereof, the best thing to do is to "extinguish some coals." The peasant, or the soothsayer in his stead, throws glowing coals into a bucket of water; if they sink, the cow is bewitched. To bring her back to health it is only necessary to spill the water upon a black dog; the malady then passes to the dog, and the cow recovers. So greatly does the peasant fear possible harm to his cattle, that he often refrains from even the seemingly most innocent expressions. Instead of saying, for example, "The milk is boiling," he says "The milk is warming up."[37] 789 777 [113]

[36] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), iii, 124.

[37] Kaindl, R. F. "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi, 234-255.

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An excellent illustration of the power ascribed to exuviae is the use of sweat to arouse love. Thus a sorceress sometimes mixes a little perspiration from the sole of a girl's foot with some soot from the chimney, and pronounces a formula over the mixture; if the girl pours this concoction into a drink given to a boy, he will surely fall in love with her and soon marry her.[52] 789 832

When a person faces a serious situation and wants to be sure that the means employed are effective, he resorts, as in some of the above-cited cases, to a professional sorcerer (*czariwnyk*) or soothsayer (*prymiwnyk*) for assistance. Of these practitioners, mostly women, the most proficient are thought to be the Gypsies,[53] and especially the offspring of a Gypsy and a Ukrainian peasant.[54] A sorcerer or sorceress is never born but made. A woman who wants to become a sorceress must fast for nine consecutive days, abstain from ablutions and prayer, indeed, renounce completely her belief in Christ, and carry an undeveloped egg under her left armpit throughout the period. She must not, moreover, reveal the secret of her power, lest she lose her skill. On her dying bed, however, she should tell everything to another woman, in order to avoid the suffering of a lingering death which would otherwise be her fate.[55] 756 791

The sorcerer or soothsayer foretells future happenings by reading the lines of the palm, by extinguishing coals in the manner already mentioned, and by pouring wax upon water and observing the different shapes it takes.[56] To put an end to malicious gossip, 756 787 791

> a soothsayer is called in, and a lock is handed her. She washes the lock in water, brought by the master of the house, walking backward all the way, from an abundant well, and then closes it in order to put an end to the gossip. In case the latter is very menacing, two locks may be washed and shut. Having closed the locks, the soothsayer sweeps all the dirt and dust of the room into the water, and has the inhabitants of the house take off all their clothes and wash themselves with it. Finally she washes the windows too, and then

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

[53] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 291.

[54] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 236.

[55] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 291.

[56] *Idem.*

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756 pours the water with all its dirt (the gossip) out through the
791 window.[57]

While the female soothsayer occupies herself mainly with
789 prophesying the future, making love magic, and the like, her
[759] counterpart specializes in weather control—in banning hail, thunder, snowstorms, and torrents, and in bringing the rains needed to relieve drought. Even in such cases, however, the ordinary man is far from helpless. Armed with formulas and more concrete means, he can avert a calamity even without the aid of a weather expert. It will be convenient, therefore, to examine the weather lore of the people before turning to a consideration of the professional.

789 The layman, first of all, is much given to predicting the weather,
787 which he undertakes with the greatest of confidence, especially at Easter. On this day he forecasts atmospheric changes throughout the year, and these prophecies are not mere pastimes, but are believed in to the extent of letting them determine important economic activities.[58] Work and cattle trading, for example, are done in accordance with these predictions. If it rains on Easter Day, the whole summer will be wet; fair weather foretells a dry summer, and unsettled weather means that in general a good summer is at hand. Aside from these general prophecies the people indulge in more minute predictions on the same day. If fair weather prevails from 1 to 3 a.m., an early and fair spring may be expected, and the price of hay will rise and that of cattle will fall. If the weather is pleasant from early in the morning until noon, then the approaching spring will be fair and the harvest good; if, however, the morning is fair at first but the sky later becomes overcast, the spring will indeed be pleasant, but the time of the maize and potato harvest will be characterized by inclement weather. Further detailed predictions are made from the kind of weather prevailing during the evening and on the following night, and the work in the fields and pastures is planned in accordance therewith.[59]

789 The layman can also, as already intimated, do much to avert hail or relieve drought without calling upon the aid of the weather

[57] Kaindl, in *Globus*, lxxvi, 276. [58] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iii, 8.
[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

175 Grand Princes of Kyiv, i. e. the leaders of the Norman Vikings should fetch their Christian faith from Byzantium and we are probably right in maintaining that any other state in the same circumstances would also have been christianised from Byzantium.

175 797 The new religion was at first embraced only by the Princes and their courts, but later it was forced on the people by their superiors and became a bond that united the entire state organism. There was no fear that the people would make a combined and successful stand against Christianity for there was no pagan order of priests to take over leadership in such a contest. The people had only sorcerers in place of priests and so it was possible to christianise the country by peaceful methods though pagan ideas continued to live in popular consciousness for a considerable time. It is quite legitimate therefore, to speak at this time of a "double faith".

175 792 795 The organisation of the church in the Kyiv empire came from Byzantium which was also the home of the higher clergy with the exception of two cases when representatives of the native population were consecrated metropolitans. The conventual orders and the many monasteries, among which the Cave Monastery in Kyiv attained a great reputation throughout the world of orthodoxy, attempted to shape the lives of the people on Christian lines and to realise the ideals of Christianity. The monasteries were the most important and indeed the only centers of cultural life at that time.

175 795 The Tatars who raided Europe in the 13th century destroyed the Kyiv empire and then pushed further west though they were brought to a halt in the battle of Liegnitz in 1241. Nevertheless for centuries the countries of Eastern Europe had to submit to the yoke of East Asiatic nomads.

In the Mongolian era the position of the church was not exactly unfavorable, for the Khans allowed it a certain freedom and state protection. The metropolitans had, however, to fetch the written pardons (Jarlyks) from the horde personally which was a voluntary acknowledgement of their dependence on the secular power. The dignitaries of the orthodox church continued, it is true, to be consecrated by Constantinople, but no longer

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UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

JOHN S. RESHETAR

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EASTERN ORTHODOXY, unlike Roman Catholicism, is organized on the principle of autocephalous national churches—each constituting an independent administrative entity. This fundamental difference between Eastern and Western Christianity causes the thinking Orthodox Christian to be confronted with a dilemma. He wants the Church to be close to the communicant and the clergy to teach him and pray in his own language, and yet if he desires that the whole Church be able to perpetuate itself and propagate the faith, he must grant to it a sufficiently centralized organization and at the same time combat all fissiparous tendencies. Thus, on the surface at least, there appears to be a conflict between Christ's injunction that there be "one fold and one shepherd" (John 10:16) and the actual establishment of national churches which can easily render unto Caesar what may be correctly regarded as "things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21).

While the communicant may ponder over this dilemma, there is in the last analysis little that he can do to reverse centuries of historical development which have led to the woefully loose organization of the present day. The titular head of the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Patriarch of Constantinople, is but *primus inter pares* in his relations with the other patriarchs and branches of the Church. Individual ecclesiastical jurisdictions do not extend across political frontiers, and as a result the national churches have rarely been able to oppose secular rulers. The development of each new national movement in the Orthodox world of Eastern and Southeastern Europe has been accompanied by a demand for a separate national church and has accentuated this divisive tendency.

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While the Orthodox Balkan peoples were acquiring ecclesiastical independence prior to World War I, the Orthodox Ukrainians living in the Russian Empire were denied the national status which would enable them to establish their own church and, instead, were regarded as Little Russians. Studies of the Orthodox Church made at that time by Western scholars contain no reference to its Ukrainian branch since it did not even enjoy a limited autonomy but was regarded as an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church.[1] The

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[1] See Adrian Fortescue's *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, 2nd ed. (London, 1908), pp. 285 ff. That the Orthodox Church in Ukraine exercised considerable influence on the Russian Church is made amply evident in the ponderous study by Constantine V. Khariampovič, *Malorossijskoe Vlijanie na Velikorusskuju Cerkovnuju Žizn'* (Kazan, 1914), which deals with the period beginning in the middle of the sixteenth century and ending in 1762.

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The development of a Ukrainian historiography during the nineteenth century caused some of the nationalist intellectuals, many of whom were sons of priests, to discover that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine did not originally regard itself as bound by the protectorate which Muscovy assumed over the Ukrainian Cossacks as a result of the Perejaslav Treaty of 1654. By 1686, however, the influence of the Muscovites was so great among the Cossacks that the Orthodox Churches of Ukraine and Muscovy were merged on the basis of internal independence; the Cossacks retained the right to elect their metropolitan archbishop but pledged nominal subordination to the Patriarchate of Moscow, which had been established less than a century before, in place of their traditional tie with the Constantinople Patriarchate.

The domain of the Cossacks was gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire, and by the nineteenth century the metropolitan archbishops of Kiev were being appointed by Moscow. Many of these were not natives of Ukraine and had little in common with the local population, whose spiritual needs were ministered to by natives who entered the priesthood of the Russian Church. They employed the archaic Church Slavonic language in the performance of Church offices, but in many parishes sermons were delivered in the peasant vernacular which in the twentieth century was to serve as the basis for the development of literary Ukrainian. By the turn of the century Bishop Parfeny Levyc'kyj of the diocese of Podollia was himself delivering sermons in Ukrainian, and encouraging priests to do so, until he was transferred to the Russian diocese of Tula. The Orthodox seminaries in Kiev and Poltava were hotbeds of Ukrainian nationalist and revolutionary socialist agitation prior to the revolution.[2]

When the Imperial regime collapsed in February of 1917 and was replaced by the Provisional Government, a multitude of functional congresses met in Kiev to give voice to the economic and social objectives of the revolution, and to demand political autonomy for Ukraine. At the same time, they did not neglect to advocate reorganization of the Orthodox Church. Initially their demands were modest, but by the time of the November Revolution the nationalists were asking for an autocephalous Ukrainian Church which would be independent of the State in its internal administration and provide for the use of the Ukrainian language in the celebration of the divine liturgy. Since this was a period in which soviets, or councils, were being formed as political institutions, it is not surprising that there was considerable sentiment in favor of

[2] This is admitted even by a sworn enemy of everything Ukrainian. See A. Carinnyj, *Ukrainskoe Dviženie* (Berlin, 1925), p. 134.

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795 the Russians, invited Metropolitan Michael (Jermakov), the Patriarch's exarch in Ukraine, to attend its sessions, but he countered by declaring it uncanonical. Thus the Ukrainians had no alternative but to establish a hierarchy by consecrating their own metropolitan. Such a consecration has generally been regarded as invalid since it is not effected by means of the "laying on of hands" by at least two bishops and is said to constitute disruption of the Apostolic Succession. Despite this the *Sobor* proceeded to elect the Very Reverend Basil Lypkivs'kyj (1864–1938) as "Metropolitan of Kiev and the whole Ukraine," and arranged a unique form of conciliar consecration, which was performed in St. Sophia's on Sunday, October 23. The Metropolitan-elect was surrounded by a number of priests who laid their hands upon his head; the worshipers who filled the cathedral placed their hands upon one another's shoulders and those who stood immediately behind the consecrating priests touched their robed shoulders. In all other respects the consecration was Orthodox in form. The bishops whom Lypkivs'kyj consecrated after assuming his office had their status challenged by the various Orthodox national churches which also refused to accept the Metropolitan's consecration as canonical.[6]

795 This did not prevent the Ukrainian Church from ordaining
● 793 priests, acquiring additional parishes, and pursuing its program of reformed Orthodoxy. The new Church departed from tradition in permitting clergymen to appear in public wearing nonclerical dress when not performing ceremonial duties. Similarly it allowed them to cut their hair and not grow beards, although Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj retained the appearance of a bishop of the old school. Bishops were permitted to live in the married state, and Lypkivs'kyj himself and all but a few of the persons whom he consecrated continued to live with their wives—a practice which the Orthodox Church does not condone. A bachelor consecrated as a bishop could marry, and priests (and presumably bishops) were allowed to divorce their wives and marry a second time.[7] The practice of allow-

[6] The Russian Church branded this whole procedure as "self-consecration" *(samosvjastvo)* and regarded all priests who were ordained by these hierarchs as apostates, and the sacraments performed by them as invalid and blasphemous. See the brief and biased account of the establishment of the Ukrainian Church in Nicholas Briančaninov, *The Russian Church* (New York, n. d.), pp. 159 ff. Reverend Lypkivs'kyj's ordination into the priesthood had been canonical because he had served as a priest in the Russian Church since 1891 following his graduation from the Kiev Theological Academy. He had demonstrated ability at an early date, and in 1903 he was appointed to the directorship of an ecclesiastical normal school in Kiev. He was removed from this post because of his enthusiasm for the 1905 Revolution; he then accepted a pastorate in a Kiev suburb which he held until he assumed the leadership of the movement for a national church.

[7] See *Dijannja Vseukrains'koho Pravoslavnoho Cerkovnoho Soboru v Kyjevi 1921 roku* (Frankfurt am Main, 1946), pp. 14 f.

795 ing bishops to be married at all resulted from a reaction which was
● 793 general in Russia at the time amongst the "white" or married secular clergy against the monopoly which the "black" or celibate regular clergy held on practically all of the episcopal offices. The canons enacted at the 1921 *Sobor* specifically denied the regular clergy any privileges in obtaining bishoprics.

795 Liberalism also made itself felt in the administration of the Ukrainian Church, which was based on the principle of *soborno-pravnist'*, a conciliar and democratic form of ecclesiastical government in which all members of the Church—bishops, priests, and lay representatives—participate co-equally in all of its organs. The *Sobor* of 1921 specifically denied that hierarchs meeting alone could represent the whole Orthodox Ukrainian population. It declared that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor*, which was to meet at least once every five years, "possesses the highest religious, legislative, executive, judicial, and supervisory authority in the Ukrainian Church."[8] In the periods between *sobors* a smaller body, the Church Council, met semi-annually to serve as the highest executive organ and as an interim legislative body for the Church. Part of the Council met on a monthly basis to deal with more immediate matters. On the diocesan and district levels popular assemblies were to operate and each of the former was to elect its own bishop; the elective principle was also to prevail in the individual parishes, the members of which were empowered to select their own pastors with the consent of the diocesan council, a body elected by the diocesan assembly.

771 Another characteristic of the Ukrainian Church was its sense of
795 social consciousness, although expressed within a national context. The canons declared that "who utilizes Church life for social, national, political or personal subjugation should be excommunicated from the Church."[9] They specifically condemned all who employed national sentiments in order to renew the rule of the wealthy classes of society. The Russian Church was charged with having betrayed Orthodoxy *(Pravoslavje)* and having become a bulwark of *caroslavje* and *panoslavje*—glorification of tsars and landowners. In this way the new Church attempted to find a place for itself in the new revolutionary order and gain widespread popular support.[10]

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 9. For French translations of some of the documents pertaining to the Ukrainian Church see "L'Église Orthodoxe Panukrainienne créée en 1921 à Kiev," *Orientalia Christiana*, No. 3 (June, 1923), pp. 73 ff.

[10] The Ukrainian Church was not unique as a reformed group in the Russia of this period. A similar movement arose within the Russian Orthodox Church in the form of the "Renovated" or "Living" Church which also endeavored to break the monopoly of the monastic clergy on episcopal offices by permitting bishops to

795 This was not an easy task, although by March of 1923 the Church had more than three thousand parishes. These were cared for by priests who were ordained by the new Ukrainian hierarchy, since the vast majority of the pre-revolutionary clergymen who were with the Russian Church in Ukraine remained loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate and refused to join the new Church. During the spring of 1922 the Ukrainians, conscious of their *de facto* status, attempted in vain to effect a reconciliation with the other Orthodox churches and obtain recognition by inviting them to send delegates to a meeting in Kiev for the purpose of creating a league of Orthodox churches. The other churches refused to establish any contacts with a group which they regarded as having violated the canons of the Church, which require no less than two hierarchs to consecrate a bishop. Faced with such formidable opposition, the Ukrainian Church had no alternative but to attempt to pursue an independent course. However, before it could do so it needed a rationale for its method of consecration. This was provided by the Most Reverend John Teodorovyč, then Bishop of Vinnica and now Archbishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, in the form of a disquisition on the Grace of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church; he wrote it during the autumn of 1922.

779 795 713 The Grace of the Holy Spirit, according to Orthodox dogma, is the divine power which is necessary for salvation and which resides in the Church and is dispensed by it through the sacraments.[11] The dispute between the Ukrainian Church and the other Orthodox national churches resulted from contrary views regarding the role which should be granted to tradition as a source of divine knowledge. Archbishop Teodorovyč bases his argument largely on Scriptural writings and contends that the hierarchy or institution of the pastorate in the primary Church, which was established by Christ, was the Apostolate. This body of men, it is claimed, was not above or outside of the Church but was of the Church since Christ "called unto him his disciples: and of them he chose twelve, whom also he named Apostles" (Luke 6:13). Thus the Apostolate, it is argued, could not have been anterior to the Church, nor could it have created the Church, because Christ founded both and selected the Apostolate from the Church.[12]

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marry. It allowed clergymen to cut their hair and shave their beards and for a brief period in the mid-twenties preached the sinfulness of capitalism and temporarily won the support of the Soviet Government which hoped in this way to weaken the Moscow Patriarchate and the traditional Church.

[11] Rev. Frank Gavin, *Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought* (Milwaukee, 1923), p. 219.

[12] Archbishop John Teodorovyč, *Blahodatnist' Jerarkhii Ukrains'koi Avtokefalnoi Cerkvy*, 3rd ed. (Regensburg, 1947), pp. 11 ff.

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779 The act of conciliar consecration performed in Kiev in October
795 of 1921 is justified on the grounds that the Ukrainian Church, although without its own bishops while under Muscovite domina-
● 793 tion from 1686 to 1921, never lost its Grace. Consecration is a bestowal of Grace which is a gift of God not subject to human control; what is granted by God, it is reasoned, cannot be withheld by any individual who has the task of laying on hands. Bishops alone did not at all times enjoy a monopoly of the right to consecrate since such a doctrine would exclude God who is the sole consecrator. The election of Reverend Lypkivs'kyj as Metropolitan was not a renewal of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church but rather a renewal of the traditional fullness of its structure. The Ukrainian Church continued to possess Grace even when its bishops were being appointed by Moscow. The *Sobor* of 1921, it is contended, merely renewed the function of the episcopacy; prior to that time the Church possessed pastors who were abiding by the instructions which Christ gave to teach and baptize. Apostolic Succession, it is argued, was preserved during the 1686–1921 period in the whole institution of the pastorate in Ukraine and not in the episcopacy alone since it is but one part of the whole hierarchy.

This contention is based on the assumption that the bishops alone cannot be identified with the Apostles since in the primary Church the terms "presbyter" or elder and "bishop" were apparently employed interchangeably in referring to the Apostles. The distinction in rank between the episcopacy and the priesthood, it is argued, was developed later by man. Thus the institution of the pastorate, which includes priests as well as bishops, proceeds from the Apostolate established by Christ. By this logic priests must be regarded as successors of the Apostles no less than bishops are since all of the Apostles were equal in the Grace which they enjoyed. As proof of this, Archbishop Teodorovyč cites Peter's reference to himself as an elder or presbyter (I Peter 5:1) together with Paul's Epistle to Titus; in the latter (Titus 1:5–6), qualifications for elders are laid down and without any apparent interruption in the train of thought the term "bishop" is then substituted for "elder" in the following verse indicating that the two terms were synonymous in the primary Church.[18] A bishop did not and does not enjoy a greater degree of Grace than did a presbyter (elder) or priest since the Grace which Christ bestowed upon the Apostles was of a uniform quality. Mortals cannot attempt to measure Grace. There is no evidence, says Archbishop Teodorovyč, to indicate that the sacrament of holy orders, which is now performed exclusively by bishops, is

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 50 ff. Also see Paul's Epistle to the Philippians 1:1.

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779 of greater magnitude or requires more Grace than the other six
795 sacraments which are performed by all priests.

It is claimed that the differentiation which now exists between a
● 793 bishop and presbyter or priest lies not in the degree or quality of Grace which each enjoys, but only in the functions which each performs. Yet when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church re-established itself in 1921, it did not abolish the episcopacy or argue in a presbyterian manner that the episcopacy has no place in the Church. It merely argued that the exclusive right of bishops to administer the sacrament of holy orders (ordination and consecration) developed as a result of the actual needs of Church life and not on the grounds that bishops possess a greater degree or higher quality of Grace. The Church itself, it is contended, is the source of the differentiation in functions performed by bishops and presbyters or priests. Administrative necessity and the need for unity and stability alone caused the Church to grant to bishops the exclusive right to ordain and consecrate. This right is a purely canonical matter and is therefore, unlike religious dogma, not immutable. It is a practice developed by the Church, and it is consequently possible for the Church to redistribute functions at any time, as its Ukrainian branch did in 1921 when it became necessary to obtain a truly Ukrainian episcopate. This was a drastic step, and it was accompanied by an appeal to the Lord, the Supreme Pastor, before whom the Ukrainians laid their faith, hopes, and prayers.[14]

795 Under Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj's leadership thirty-five bishops
659 were consecrated in the traditional Orthodox manner, and the new Church appeared to be prospering. The Soviet Government had
687 done little to prevent its establishment but within a few years commenced a campaign of gradual suppression. In 1924 and during each of the three succeeding years Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj was placed under arrest. In 1927 he was compelled to resign and a *sobor* elected Nicholas Borec'kyj to succeed him. The new Metropolitan governed the Church until 1930 when it was implicated in the alleged plot of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine *(Spilka Vyzvolennja Ukraïny)*. This clandestine organization was accused of promoting separatist tendencies and desiring to restore private property. Vladimir Čekhivs'kyj, a Social Democrat who had been premier of the anti-Bolshevik Directory Government early in 1919, was charged with having headed the Union's religious section. During the trial of the forty-five leaders of the Union in March and April

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 100 f. Archbishop Teodorovyč (pp. 124 ff.) has cited considerable evidence which indicates that consecration of bishops by a college of presbyters was a practice employed by the Church of Alexandria for more than two centuries preceding the convocation of the First Ecumenical Council in 325 A.D.

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795 of 1930 the prosecution alleged that the Church held secret requiems
659 for Symon Petljura, the émigré nationalist, following his murder in
687 Paris.[15] The Ukrainian Church never recovered from the setback which it suffered as a result of the trial. During the 1930's all of the bishops were arrested, and with the advent of World War II there remained only Archbishop Teodorovyč in the United States, the sole surviving hierarch of the original thirty-five.[16]

● 793 The opportunity to renew the autocephalous status of the
795 Ukrainian Orthodox Church came with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The movement was headed by Bishop Polikarp Sikors'kyj of the diocese of Lutsk in Volynia, who in February of 1942 re-established the Church at a *sobor* in Pinsk and consecrated several bishops. At the same time Bishop Polikarp succeeded in obtaining the support of his nominal superior, Metropolitan Dionisij of Warsaw, who had consecrated him in 1932 and ten years later elevated him to an archbishopric. Polikarp's consecration had been canonical since he had headed part of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Poland, which was recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople during the inter-war period. Thus the renewed Ukrainian Church was not plagued with the charge of "self-consecration" which served the enemies of the national church so well during the

[15] Nicholas Kovalevs'kyj, *Ukraïna Pid Červonyin Jarmom* (Lviv, 1936), pp. 72 ff.

[16] The demise of the Church in Ukraine itself did not hinder the development of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the United States and in Canada. Many of the Ukrainian immigrants in both countries desired such a Church, and when the movement first manifested itself in the homeland they were quick to assume the initiative. As early as July 18, 1918, a group of 150 laymen held a church congress in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The participants were members of the Uniat Church, adhering to the Eastern Orthodox ritual but acknowledging the Papacy, who were dissatisfied with the arbitrary nature of its administration and the principle of personal episcopal ownership of all church buildings and parochial property. They also objected to the attempt of the Uniat Church to obtain control of the Peter Mohyla Institute, a Ukrainian educational institution in Saskatoon. When the Uniat bishop denied them the sacraments, they decided to establish a truly national and democratically governed church and return to the Orthodox faith of their forefathers. The new Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada gained adherents from the Russian Orthodox Church which lost whole parishes composed of emigrants from Bukovina; many Uniats also joined the new Church which now has more than two hundred congregations although many of these are rural and small. The Canadian Church, unlike the movement in Ukraine itself, succeeded in obtaining recognition from a canonically consecrated Orthodox hierarch in the United States, the Syrian Metropolitan Germanos, who served as its acting bishop until Archbishop Teodorovyč succeeded him in 1924. The latter also assumed control over the numerically smaller Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, but in 1947 he relinquished the leadership of the Canadian Church which now has a separate hierarch. It is significant that the Canadian Church did not accept the canons which were adopted at the Kiev *Sobor* in 1921, since it wished to be in a position to establish relations with the other branches of the Orthodox Church on the North American continent.

793 795 1920's. However, Archbishop Polikarp had placed himself under the Moscow Patriarchate in 1939 when his diocese was incorporated into the Soviet Union; he now had to bear the onus of disobeying Moscow and in May of 1942 was divested of all sacerdotal position *in absentia*. This did not prevent him from proceeding with the organization of the autocephalous church, although a rival movement for mere autonomy headed by Archbishop Alexei Hromads'kyj served to weaken the effort. When the Nazis retreated from Ukraine, Archbishop Polikarp and eleven other hierarchs obtained refuge in Germany with thousands of other Ukrainian displaced persons.

779 795 Two attempts in as many decades to establish an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union have ended in failure with the believers reintegrated into the Russian Church on both occasions. The attempts, although abortive, were made possible by the vague unity of Eastern Orthodoxy which is not organized on the monarchical model. No patriarch is regarded as the head of the whole Church, for this distinction belongs exclusively to Christ (Ephesians 2:20, 5:23; I Corinthians 3:11). What unity the Church possesses is reflected not in its external organization but in the whole episcopacy in accordance with the principle of harmony and corporateness which is *Sobornost*. The autocephalous units of the Church agree on dogma, recognize each other's sacraments as valid, and engage in concelebrations of the liturgy on occasions of great importance. Yet once the principle of autocephaly is accepted it is only logical that there be as many distinct churches, albeit of the same confession, as there are nations and that the boundaries of religious and political jurisdictions coincide. It is a principle which, in the last analysis, leads to a limitation of the universality of Eastern Orthodoxy, since it isolates the various branches of the Church, spelling death to the notion of effective organic unity.

795 were turned down in an appeal to the Bulgarian Church and they obtained no response from the Patriarch of Constantinople.

[793] Impressed by the sense of urgency and the justice of their cause, the leaders of the movement held a synod in Kiev on October 11, 1921 and proceeded to elect as bishops Father Vasyl Lypkivsky and Father Nestor Sharayevsky. Then, as they had no bishops available for their consecration, the members of the Sobor laid their hands upon them and consecrated them bishops without the participation of any bishops save relics of the saints preserved in Kiev. Lypkivsky was then made Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and he and his associate soon consecrated some 27 other bishops.

Yet the uncanonical nature of this original action drove a wedge between the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the other Orthodox Churches and made certain that it would not later attract any validly consecrated bishops who would regularize the succession. On the other hand, other reforms, as the introduction of Ukrainian into the services in place of the old Church Slavonic, enabled the Russian opponents to classify it with the various movements as the Living Church which the Bolsheviks had fostered in their endeavor to disintegrate the Russian Church from within.

Still later, when the Orthodox in the succession states began to organize and came under the influence of the Patriarch of Constantinople, whose position had grown less critical with the strengthening of the new Turkey, it was too late for him to extend aid to the Ukrainian Orthodox as he did to those living under Polish rule by the recognition of a Polish Autocephalous Church in 1924. Thus the Ukrainian Orthodox were left almost completely isolated to face alone the atheistic Communist and imperialistic Russian Orthodox pressure.

Metropolitan Lypkivsky showed himself a very competent leader. The number of parishes under his control multiplied rapidly and by 1927 the Church had nearly 3,000 parishes and some 10,600 priests. It was no small achievement to establish and develop this under the harsh conditions of Soviet reality and for several years during the height of the movement of Ukrainization,

the Church flourished and bade fair to restore the traditions of the 795
old Ukrainian Orthodox Church and there were high hopes that sooner or later it would be able to heal the defects in the original consecration.

This was not to be, for after the death of the Patriarch Tikhon 795
the power in the Russian Church passed into the hands of the 659
Metropolitan Sergy who showed himself willing to effect such a compromise with Stalin and Communism as might be necessary. His offer was, to a certain degree, accepted and the Soviet regime, without changing its policy of persecuting all religious activity, began to throw a few crumbs of favor to the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate in Moscow. Slowly but surely, the various Russian divisions, like the Living Church, slipped back into the general organization, and the Soviets soon grasped the possibilities of using Sergy and the Russian organization as a political weapon in their struggle for world domination.

Even before the ending of Ukrainization, the Communists began to put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. The Metropolitan was refused permission to visit the various parishes under his control and to publish journals and other material for his flock. This was followed by more active measures. Metropolitan Lypkivsky was arrested and imprisoned. So were all of the other bishops and by 1930 there was not a single one of the bishops still in Ukraine who was not in prison or dead. The church was broken up and all of its activities stopped, but the spirit that had animated it continued to lie hidden.

When the Germans and the Soviets occupied Poland in 1939, a 795
new possibility was sensed. The so-called Polish Autocephalous [793]
Church was composed overwhelmingly of Ukrainians and Byelorussians, with but a few anti-Communist Russians. Even before 1939, some of these Ukrainian clergy and laity had begun to take steps for the Ukrainianizing of the Church, even though they had been forced to introduce Polish into the services. When the storm broke, Russians like Bishop Sava made their way abroad and joined the Russians in exile. Bishop Oleksy (Hromadsky) in Kremyanets and Bishop Polykarp (Sikorsky) in Lutsk were forced

the Soviet service. It reopened churches that had been closed by the Soviets and it cooperated with the Ukrainian patriotic movement. 795

With the return of the Soviet forces, the leaders of the Church retired to the west with a large part of the priests, and the others joined the underground. The Ukrainian Church was again suppressed and brought directly under the Patriarch of Moscow and it is to be noted that the head of the Orthodox Church in the UkSSR, does not hold any special point of honor as does the Catholicus of Georgia, who is still recognized as the head of a satellite Church.

It is thus safe to say that despite the continued existence of the UkSSR as an independent nation for the purposes of the United Nations, there is now no distinctive Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It has been swallowed, as in the days of Peter I, by the great Moscow religious imperialism. It has no independence and it is thoroughly and in all points independent upon the Russian Patriarch in Moscow.

B. The Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite

When in 1939 the Soviet forces by their understanding with the Nazis occupied for the first time Eastern Galicia and the Western Ukrainian lands, they at once set to work to remodel the area on their own standards and to eliminate all the characteristic features of Ukrainian life and culture. This process was, however, rudely interrupted by the German attack in 1941.

The dominant religion in the area was the Greek Catholic Uniat Church, or, to be more precise, Catholicism of the Byzantine Rite. The Metropolitan of this Church, Andry Sheptytsky, was the most respected figure in the entire area and he was a religious and cultural leader in every sense of the word. During this first occupation, Archbishop Sheptytsky was not personally disturbed but he was deprived of his liberty and forced into a semi-retirement. His schools and other institutions were closed, the Church was deprived of its property and a considerable number of priests were punished on various charges. Yet there was no general holocaust. 795 793

In 1941, Archbishop Sheptytsky was one of the leading figures

795 in the attempt to revive a native and independent Ukrainian
● 793 government. This was, of course, prevented by the Germans and the Archbishop remained at Lviv scarcely more free during the German occupation of Ukraine than he had been under the Soviets. He continued his efforts to unite both the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Churches without effect, but he was able to do considerable for the well-being of his people. Still he was no longer free to act openly, although his advice was sought whenever and wherever it could be.

The Soviets reoccupied Lviv on July 27, 1944 and at once set to work more vigorously to introduce their system. Archbishop Sheptytsky did not long survive for he passed away on November 1 of the same year. He was succeeded in his post by Joseph Slipy, who had been one of his outstanding assistants and the rector of the Theological Academy which Metropolitan Sheptytsky had founded in the late twenties, when it had became evident that the Poles would not allow the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviv.

659 Metropolitan Slipy had barely been installed in office, when
795 the Soviets showed their hand and began to call for a condemnation
793 of the Vatican by the Ukrainian Catholics and for their union
661 with Moscow. It did not take long for words to turn into actions.

On April 15, 1945, the NKVD surrounded the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv and arrested the Metropolitan, Bishop Budko and Bishop Charnetsky together with many other leaders. They arrested all of the students of the Theological Academy and they likewise seized the Cathedral and turned it over to the Patriarch of Moscow as a Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, they informed the professors of the Theological Seminary that the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite had ceased to exist.

At almost the same time the NKVD gathered in the other Catholic bishops in Western Ukraine, Bishop Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv and his vicar, Bishop Lyatyshevsky, while at the same time the Polish Communist regime seized Bishop Kotsylovsky of Pere-

myshl and his auxiliary bishop, Lakota. Bishops Khomyshyn and Kotsylovsky soon died under the treatment that they received. 659 795

The others were kept in prison and then in 1946, according to the best available information, Metropolitan Slipy and his associates were sent to labor camps in the far north in the Vorkuta coal mines. From that time they have disappeared from sight. 793 661

In 1947, the last Catholic bishop of this rite, Bishop Romzha of Carpatho-Ukraine, while travelling through his diocese "collided" accidentally with a Soviet tank and was killed and this ended the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in their own lands. The following year the Rumanian government followed suit and likewise annihilated the hierarchy of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite in Transylvania. In 1950 the Czech Communist regime arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment Bishop Hoydych and his coadjutor Hopka of the diocese of Prashev in Slovakia.

These actions were followed in each case by attacks upon the lower clergy, who were ordered to accept the supremacy of the Patriarch of Moscow. This was fully in the tradition of the old Russian Church, for each time that the tsars had bitten off a slice of Ukraine, they had applied the same methods to the Catholic hierarchy in the section, to the intent that the Byzantine rite could be performed only under the supervision of the Russian authorities.

In this case in 1945, on July 1, when the Soviet Ukrainian Commissar for Religion, Khodchenko, called on the clergy to recognize the new situation, the professors of the Theological Academy met in Lviv in the Cathedral of St. George and presented a request that they be given the liberties accorded to them on paper by the Stalinist Constitution. The answer was their arrest and imprisonment.

Then the government set to work. They secured the apostasy of one of the foremost of the Ukrainian Catholic priests, Father Kostelnyk, who willingly put himself at the service of the Patriarch and presided over a "sobor" which was called to ratify the switch from the Vatican to the Patriarch. Many of the priests who attended were apparently members of the NKVD in disguise. They willingly applauded Stalin and the Patriarch and armed with this authority,

659 the Soviet regime set to work to seize all the churches and property
795 of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite and preempt it for
● 793 their own use.
661 This marked the end of the open existence of the Church. There were still priests who escaped and took refuge with the U. P. A. (the Ukrainian underground) but open worship was at an end. There has been enforced at least a superficial agreement with the Kremlin on all matters of religion. Nevertheless, the latent hatred still exists and it can flare up at any moment when the situation warrants it.

The movements represented by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite still flourish in the emigration, where alone there is any opportunity for free thought. In the meanwhile, the Kremlin is maintaining its position in its traditional Muscovite manner and applying its savage punishments and deportations and executions to prove that Ukraine is happy and contented in following the example of the "elder brother." Yet even so, the number of episodes when Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism appears make it seem as if the officials of both church and state were not too sure that the Ukrainian people fully sympathize with the Patriarch Aleksey in his deification of the foremost man of the ages, who still forbids Communists to have anything to do with the Orthodox Church. That has sold its soul for as little real value as did the Ukrainian Communists in the early years of the struggle.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

separation. The Poles were Latin Catholics, while the Ukrainians, [162] though also in obedience to the Pope, were nearly all of the Greek 186 (i.e., Byzantine-Slavonic) rite. Consequently, it is not surprising 668* that the ranks of the clergy provided a large proportion of the 793 awakeners of Galician Ukrainian national feeling. Most prominent of such priests was Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi. He was the scion of a family which was counted among the Polish nobility, but he felt himself to be Ukrainian; his career embraced almost the entire span of Ukrainian nationalist activity, from the turn of the century to the close of the period covered in this study.[13]

The reasons why a Ukrainian nationalist movement arose 186 within the Russian Empire are not so obvious. By the beginning 668* of the twentieth century, the great bulk of prominent men of 177 Ukrainian ethnic origin appear to have been Russified in culture and feeling, even if they occasionally gave signs of remembering that there were different cultural elements in their family backgrounds.[14] That the Russian Empire could have carried out such a large-scale assimilation is a tribute to the degree to which it was supranational, avoiding the narrower concepts of ethno- 186 centrism. Although a strong current had set in since the sixties, 668* when N. T. Danilevskii's *Rossiia i Evropa* (Russia and Europe) heralded the advent of Pan-Slavism based on ethnic Russian hegemony, for many, especially for officials in the governing bureaucracy, the rule of the tsars remained an expression of the ecumenical tradition of empire, a "Third Rome," but one which

[13] See Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora, Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), and Il'ko Borschak (Elie Borschak—this author is better known by the French form of his name), *Un Prèlat Ukrainien: Le Metropolite Cheptychyj (1865–1944)* (Paris: Editions Franco-Ukrainiennes, 1946). The fact that the parish priests of the Greek Catholic rite were allowed to marry meant that their nationalist feeling could be passed on from generation to generation, a factor of considerable significance in providing a continuing body of bearers of the "national ideal."

[14] Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution.*

Two of the best Ukrainian sources for the period are Izaac Mazepa, *Ukraïna v ohni i buri revoliutsiï, 1917–1921* (The Ukraine in the Fire and Storm of the Revolution, 1917–21), 3 vols. (Munich: Prometei, 1950–51), and Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsiï: Istoriia ukraïns'koï revoliutsiï, marets', 1917 r.—hruden', 1919 r.* (The Rebirth of a Nation: A History of the Ukrainian Revolution, March, 1917–December, 1919), 3 vols. (Vienna, 1920).

186 The means at hand to stimulate a sense of nationality among
565 the peasants were rather meager. Most important, undoubtedly,
795 was the church. Within a few months after the Communists were driven out, many hundreds of parishes had been reestablished.[38] Undoubtedly the older people who had received some religious training welcomed the reappearance of the clergy. Baptisms and marriages took place in large numbers, and the churches were well attended. Since the Germans forbade the use of public funds for payment of the salaries of the clergy, the latter had to depend on the generosity of their flocks or the produce of their own land. Apparently the parishioners responded by furnishing their pastors with sufficient income in kind.[39] In most areas, there developed a conflict between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous clergy. At first, the latter (or, in the "Left Bank" region, simply the clergy consecrated in the orthodox fashion who used the Slavonic liturgy) predominated in the villages, but as more Autocephalous priests were consecrated, and more of the older priests came to accept the Ukrainian language service, they evidently won the support of the peasantry. Strange as it may seem in view of reputed village conservatism, the living language was apparently more popular as a religious vehicle in the country than in the town,[40] and cases are recorded in which the peasants actually drove out the priest who persisted in the use of Slavonic.[41]

793 Religion as a stimulus to nationalist feeling was, however, sub-
186 ject to severe limitations. One was the inadequate background of the clergy. Many were simple peasants up to the time of their consecration, although an effort was made to train them in short courses. Where such a man was of sound character and good common sense, as was the case in one Podolian village, he could accomplish a good deal. There, according to the report, the priest, one of the local peasants until his recent consecration, was highly respected for his good example. His sermons stressed brotherly love, the importance of industriousness, mutual assistance, proper

[38] See Chapter XI.

[39] PS 1693.

[40] Report from a *gimnaziia* teacher in Poltava (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3); *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

[41] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

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education of children, and self-control.[42] Generally, however, the clergy was unable to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in several villages the latter even objected to returning the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs.[43]

One of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. How effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of more detailed evidence, but in some cases it evidently did at least provide reading material and some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. There is considerable difference of opinion as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were imbued with Communist ideas.[44]

The great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmitters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for example, the physician, who had been a UNR officer, played the chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. He was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village *feldsher* (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. These constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, who were described as having "no unified outlook," being still "under the influence of Bolshevik ideology."[45] This criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not uncommon in nationalist

[42] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

[43] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3.

[44] Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 18, 1941, for favorable reports; and Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28–29, for some criticisms of the rural teachers.

[45] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

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surrounding areas, as because it exerted influence upon them. The 668*
chief channels by which it did so were the Prosvita organizations, the newspaper, and the church. A leader of the independent nationalist group estimates that its influence, exercised primarily through the Prosvita, reached as far west as Lubny and Poltava,[16] and there is evidence that it also played a part in organization as far south as the northern Donbas.[17] *Nova Ukraïna* was also widely known, serving as a model for nationalist editors in the "Left Bank" region who wanted to pursue as independent a line as possible and hence rejected the guidance of *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*.

The special role played by the church of Kharkov merits more 793 ●
than passing mention. When the Germans arrived, they found 578
that an elderly prelate, Archbishop Theophilus, had survived the 186
Soviet period. Seventy-six years old, a native of a village of the Khoral (Khorol) region in the heart of the "Left Bank" Ukraine, he had become a priest in 1885.[18] With the aid of local clergymen, he reassumed control of ecclesiastical life in Kharkov in late 1941 and claimed to be in charge of the entire "Left Bank" as Metropolitan of the Ukraine.[19] Many—especially in the Autocephalous Church—criticized him because he was consecrated bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church (in 1923) and because he continued to use Old Slavonic in the liturgy.[20] Others, however, saw him as a Ukrainian patriot, since he was Ukrainian by birth, spoke pure Ukrainian, celebrated a service in commemoration of Kruty, and praised the Ukrainian newspaper.[21] At any rate the dissidents were able to make little progress against him; only two Lypkivite priests had survived, while Theophilus's clergy numbered more than one hundred.[22] However, the latter appear to have been subjected to very loose control by the archbishop and

[16] *Ibid.*
[17] Interview 68.
[18] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 15, 1943, p. 3.
[19] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 5, 1943, p. 2; March 6, 1942, p. 3.
[20] Interview 69. A letter to Archbishop Hilarion from one of his former pupils in the Kharkov area, asking his advice on reorganization of the church, suggests that all were not satisfied with Theophilus' ascendancy, even at an early date (*Ukraïns'ka Diismist'*, February 10, 1942, p. 4).
[21] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 5, 1942, p. 4; January 24, 1943, p. 2; May 15, 1943, p. 3.
[22] *Ukraïns'ka Diismist'*, February 10, 1942, p. 4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 5, 1943, p. 2.

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●793 to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services according to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left" as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

668* It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

727 Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor were shot by German police; the city passed under the control of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.
[24] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.
[26] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.
[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.
[28] Interview 47.

priests who are no longer those of God' . . . and he called upon the high clergy to preach the Evangelical Fraternity of all men: 'Have you the right to call yourselves pastors of the Church and even to consider yourselves simply the faithful, if you despise your brother who is born, like you, of the baptismal water and devotion? Be he a serf, a skinner, a sadler, or a tailor, he is your brother, your equal.'

The old Slavonic, so much defended, was not after all sufficiently acceptable as a language of the 'serfs, skinners, sadlers, and tailors' for whom it was meant. Vichinsky was really among the first who brought their Slavonic nearer to the popular idiom. Others followed his example, among them Smotritsky and Zizany.

These beginnings of a broadly popularized literature in a language which was already being called 'Russian' and which we can consider as the old Ukrainian, nevertheless had no future. The intellectual evolution of Southern Russia took another course. Orthodoxy emerged victorious from the struggles which she had to endure, but at the same time she widely adopted, in the Ukraine, the literary forms and the ambiguous style of her adversaries, which excluded or strongly hindered the popular influences.

It is the name of the Metropolitan Peter Mohila, one of the most remarkable representatives of Orthodoxy in the seventeenth century, which remains bound up with the new tendency of influencing intellectual Orthodox life by Latin scholasticism. Himself a descendant of a noble family of Moldavia, Mohila did not have the same bonds with the popular Ukrainian masses as the Orthodox preachers of the first heroic struggles. Very energetic, haughty, extremely violent in the method of his actions (according to his contemporaries he never hesitated to expel those monks who angered him from the monasteries,

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

nor to beat the superior of a monastery to such an extent 793
that the unfortunate one died a short time after), Mohila was the personification of the reaction against the democracy of the preceding epoch in the bosom of Orthodoxy. When still an Archimandrite of the 538
Monastery of the Caves at Kiev, he established there, at his own expense, a school which was afterwards to become the famous Kiev Academy. It was to Rome that he sent those monks to study who were destined to become the first teachers, and it was from Latin that he translated his *Ritual*, a book which was read throughout Russia. As a result the people of Kiev became disturbed on learning that the teaching of the Academy was that of Latin scholasticism, and that the Latin language occupied a predominant place.

Greek and Latin naturally remained subjects of teaching, but the whole religious literature suffered from the effect of the forms of eloquence which were then being used in the Catholic world.

We know the role which was played by the Academy [874]
of Kiev in the development of Imperial Russian civilization, and it was Mohila himself who first proposed, though prematurely, in 1640, to found a school on the Kiev model in Moscow. But the artificial character of the religious literature, of which the Academy was the centre, delayed for long the blossoming of literary genius in the Ukraine.

The current of popular inspiration having been slowed down, that which was printed in the eighteenth century had almost no literary or national value. The famous printing press of the Monastery of Potchaiev, in Western Volynia, generally limited itself to editing the books required for divine service in old Slavonic. Amongst its other publications only the collection of religious poems, the 'Bogoglasnik,' presents some

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 Government. The centres of the Shtundists are in the
798 Kherson Government (the districts of Yelisavetgrad and Odessa), in the Kiev Government (the districts of Tarashchansk, Skirsk, and Zvenigorodsk), in the Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Poltava Governments, and to a less extent in Chernigov, Podolia, and Bessarabia. In their boycott of official churches, ikons, and priests, of military service, and to a great extent of the Government itself, the Shtundists are akin to other sectaries. One branch of Ukrainian sectaries combines the teaching of the Shtundists and that of the Baptists, and are called Neo-Baptists. The sectaries in the Ukraine, as elsewhere, were suppressed by the Russian Government, but those who have studied the question (e.g. Prugavin[1]) state that they number more than 20,000,000.

●793 *Position of the Clergy.*—On the whole it is true that the Uniat clergy in Eastern Galicia, Choïm, Polesia, and wherever the Uniat Church is found, as well as the leaders of the sects in the other parts of the Ukraine, exercise enormous influence over religious and social
[554] life. The persecutions they have undergone have strengthened their prestige among the peasants and even among the *intelligentsia*. The influence of the Russian Orthodox clergy, though many of them have been of Ukrainian nationality, has been limited to the religious sphere, since socially they have been generally regarded as Government officials by the peasants and still more by the *intelligentsia*.

The clergy in the Ukraine are on the whole less educated than in Great Russia, i. e. they are mostly 'seminarists', not 'academicians'. The Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, once known for its learning, has degenerated into a monastery in which some of the monks are illiterate. For the last twenty-five years the highest positions all over the Empire have been in the hands of the monastic clergy; and there was acute hostility between them and the secular clergy, who in

[1] See V. Anderson, *Old Believers and Sectaries*, Petrograd, 1908 (Russ.); also T. I. Buthevich, *Survey of Russian Sects and their Creeds*, Kharkov, 1910 (Russ.).

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Ukraine were mostly of the 'seminarist' type and often of Ukrainian nationality, and hence of peasant descent. In the Ukraine the secular clergy were, if anything, more popular than the monastic. 793

(*b*) *Jews.*—Next in number to the Orthodox are the Jews. Records make it clear that since the seventeenth century the Ukraine has been the centre of the Jewish 'pogrom' movement, and is more anti-Semitic than any other East-European country. A Hebrew-Jewish scholar, Nathan of Zaslavl, has left a document[1] containing the record of terrible atrocities perpetrated by the Ukrainians and Cossacks on the Jews during the Cossacks' War against Poland. The 'pogroms' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may appear less cruel; but, though they were organized by the Russian secret police, it has been proved in the law-courts that the local population was quite ready to fall in with the suggestions of these agents.[2] The reasons for this hatred are partly economic—for the Jews are very successful middlemen between the Ukraine and other countries, and hence in possession of capital, which they lend at a high rate to the peasant—but are also racial, since the hatred between these two races is stronger than that between either Poles or Great Russians and the Jews. All the traditions of the steppe-country peasant are opposed to those of the Jewish townsman. This is shown by the facts that there is hardly any mixed Jewish-Ukrainian population, and that the Jews live chiefly in the towns and industrial settlements where Russians and Poles predominate. The Jews came to the Ukraine on the first wave of colonization from Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 795 798 186

According to data obtained in 1897, the percentage of the Jewish population in the Governments of the Ukraine was as follows: Volhynia, 13·2 per cent.; Podolia, 12·24 per cent.; Kiev, 12·09 per cent.; Kherson, 12 per cent.; Chernigov, 5 per cent.; 795 162

[1] *Jawein Mesula: a Chronicle of Events from 1648 to 1652.* First printed in Vienna, 1656.

[2] I. Luchitski, *Legal Speeches concerning the Jewish Pogroms*, Kiev, 1908 (in Russian).

the peerage and gave them rights and privileges 556
for which the newly-created peers were obliged to 565
pay with military service. In this way the lower szlachta increased to many hundreds of thousands of knights and barons who were often not much richer than the ordinary peasants. In the purely Polish regions and in West Ukraine there are still whole villages in which every peasant belongs to the nobility. Whoever was able to present his patent of nobility in Galicia after the partitioning of Poland was recognized as a peer by the Viennese court. In this way arose the Ritter /knights/ von Vitvicky, von Mogylnicki, von Kultshycki and whatever the rest are called.

Whereas the high nobility, with the exception of people like the former Princes Ostrozhsky 565
does not play any part in promoting culture in 517
modern times in the Ukraine, the lesser nobility 793
were for a long time practically the only bearers of Ukrainian culture. They made up the clergy almost exclusively. /100/ The pastors with their numerous children were often the only and the inexhaustible source of Ukrainian intelligentsia. Otherwise there were no intellectual professions open to the Ukrainians. Only the Catholics, that is to say, the Poles could become officials.

The Poles held to the old traditions of the lower nobility in their "Union of village szlachta". 565
According to the latest Polish conception, the lower Ukrainian nobility are Ukrainized Poles. By promising them additional land and other material advantages, Warsaw wanted to catch the 400,000 "aristocratic souls". If this had succeeded, the Poles would have come a good deal closer to a majority in Galicia.

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"In this cottage, in this grove 539
A hell I saw! Nothing but slavery 538
And bitter servitude, that never justice knows

533 lieves that song is a part of work, and he has special symbolic songs for every type of work.

527 769 The Monday a week after Easter is dedicated to the ancestors. Well supplied with food and drink, the whole families set out for the cemeteries, just as in the days of Vladimir, in order to observe the death cult. They sit down on the graves of their ancestors, eat the food they have brought, share it with the dead by placing the latters' portion beside the Christian cross made of wood, and they do not forget to empty a small glass of horilka over it. The dead are honored if the visitors leave their graves in an elevated mood.

776 Summer passes by with the customary field work. It is a glorious time, the pumpkins and the melons ripen, the hollyhocks bloom again and people sleep out in the open. The harvest begins not without symbolic rituals; for the spirits must be thanked and one must pray for good weather. When the grain has been stored in the barns, the priest consecrates the harvest wreath, the grains of which are mixed among the seed the following year.

793 In the midst of this strange pagan-Christian world, the priest lives and works as the representative of Christ on earth. He knows the customs of the people from the time he is a child, and he joins in on many occasions. It is not sacrilegious when during a difficult birth he places the church key on the belly of the woman in labor, when he administers the Holy Sacrament to sick cattle or seals graves so that the dead may not /140/ return. Both shepherd and flock most earnestly believe that such deeds are efficacious and pleasing in the sight of God.

771 178 The First World War, the civil wars and finally the Bolshevist cudgel have destroyed this world; faith and superstition, holy mass and the spirit cult were no longer tolerated.

851 553 Upon returning home, she swathes the baby and takes a piece of bread and a knife, but does not leave the house until the mother has wiped the infant with her shirt to protect it from the evil eye. On the doorstep the *baba* makes the sign of the cross over the child, and sometimes another woman sprinkles it with holy water. The same procedure is repeated on the other side of the door. Here, however, the midwife sticks her knife into the door, and leaves it for some member of the household to remove later.[42]

If the godparents have come to the house, they follow the midwife, each carrying a long piece of linen (*kryżmo*) and a candle, while the father bears a hen, two loaves of bread, and a " head " of salt as a present for the priest. At the church, all kneel down while some of the godparents remove the swaddling clothes and two others hold the sides of the *kryżmo* on which the infant is placed. The priest, after lighting the candles and handing them back to the participants, reads a prayer, then turns to them and repeats thrice the question : " Do you renounce the evil spirit? " To this, the *baba* and the godparents, turning their heads to the door, reply : " We renounce! " The priest next asks them : " Are you willing to serve God and Jesus Christ? " Each godparent then hands over to the priest his piece of linen, which later becomes the property of the child. After these preliminaries comes the actual christening, which differs little from the usual Catholic ceremony. The name given the child is usually that of the saint who presides over that particular day. For boys, the most popular names are Iwan, Hryć, Hawrylo, Nykola, Michajlo, and Petro ; for girls, Maryja, Katerina, Hanna, and Paraska.[43] Children, even twins, are usually baptized in church ; only in the case of triplets does the priest go [793] to the house of the parents to perform the ceremony. Among the highlanders, it is believed that a widowed priest who learns of the birth of triplets, and goes voluntarily to the house, is allowed to remarry.[44] After the ceremony the sexton extin-

[113] [42] Kolberg, *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 49 ; Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

[43] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, pp. 49–50 ; *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[44] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6 ; ordinarily a uniate priest is allowed to marry only once—prior to his being ordained.

impression on the intellectuals of the smaller towns. OUN-M 668*
writers and propagandists appear to have maintained regular con- 186
tact with them for several months in 1941, and it is apparent that
the Kiev *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* served as a model for many of the new [204]
editors.[8] Schools were opened under the direction of nationalist
educators, Prosvita and theatrical groups were formed, coopera- [258]
tives linked with *Vukospilka* were active. Apparently, too, the
town administrations were largely in Ukrainian hands; the mu- [191]
nicipal authorities in Uman' issued a sweeping order forbidding
the use of the Russian language in any office, school, or enter-
prise under their jurisdiction.[9]

The influence of the nationalists in the towns penetrated to
some degree to the countryside in the area west of the Dnieper.
For example, nationalist papers like *Nova Doba,* published in [204]
Berdichev, seem to have had a moderately large circulation in the
villages. There also seem to have been nationalist influences of
a purely local character in some places, aside from those brought
in by the nationalist parties. Zvenigorodka, a small town about a
hundred miles due south of Kiev had been the home of the Free
Cossacks, a nationalist organization of the wealthier peasants
during the revolutionary period. The group was revived by some
of the villagers under the German occupation, and, together with
a mimeographed newspaper, served as a focal point for local
nationalism.[10]

The influence of the church, especially in the rural areas, was 794
not entirely on the side of Ukrainian nationalism.[1] The Auton- 186
omous clergy under Alexius made an early start in reorganizing
religious life in this region. They established a diocese of Vinnitsa
and Zhitomir, and during most of the period of occupation were
supported by the influential Bishop Damaskin (Maliuti) of Ka-
menets-Podolsk. Damaskin's diocese included nearly five hun-
dred churches, with a hundred and sixty priests.[11] Apparently
most of this large organization, which was overwhelmingly con-
centrated in the rural districts, had no objection to Damaskin's
allegiance to the Russophile church. The Autocephalous Church

[8] Interview 30.
[9] *Nastup,* May 3, 1942, p. 2.
[10] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[11] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 13, 1942, p. 2.

[1] [After Germans had occupied this territory--Analyst]

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794 established its own organization, installing a bishop in Zhitomir,
186 as well as the energetic Ihor in Belaia Tserkov'. Ihor was replaced for a time by Emmanuel, but when the latter passed over to the Autonomous Church, he took a new post in western Volhynia, perhaps because he found the rather strong nationalist atmosphere in Belaia Tserkov' unpleasant. The fact that the Autonomous Church was able to maintain such a strong organization indicates that sentiment in the rural areas was not always ardently nationalist, even in the most "pure" of Ukrainian lands.

631 The wooded steppe region east of the Dnieper, the "Left Bank," constituted the second half of the traditional Ukrainian heartland. The western part had been for centuries under Polish and Lithuanian rule, coming under Moscow in the late seventeenth century, together with Kiev. The eastern part, roughly equivalent to the Kharkov *oblast,* had never been under Polish rule, but had owed allegiance to the tsars. It served as a refuge for serfs escaping from their Polono-Lithuanian masters, and hence was known as the "Slobozhanshchyna" or "Free Land." Since even the western part of the "Left Bank" had been annexed by the Russian Empire long before the partitions of Poland, however, its history diverged considerably from that of the "Right Bank."

668* The most interesting nationalist developments in this region during 1941–43 took place in Kharkov. While Kharkov was always claimed as the second city of the Ukraine, it never occupied the place in nationalist thinking which Kiev held, and the fact that the Russian ethnic and linguistic element there was strong aroused less indignation. Some account of the differences in the nationalist movements in Kiev and Kharkov has already been given. The essential divergence arose from the fact that the OUN-M organizers reached the latter city only in November, when their period of grace was already running out. Enthusiasm was great enough for them to secure powerful support from local people. A strong *ekzekutyva* was formed with a mayor of one of the city *raions,* an ardently nationalist professor, George Boiko, and several other local people, in addition to Kononenko, the chief West Ukrainian organizer, as members.[12] The adherence of

[12] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75; Interview 57.

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work directed by Eugene Stakhiv did what it could to encourage national tendencies among the local Ukrainians.[70] 668*

The city of Mariupol' was an outstanding exception to the conditions prevailing throughout most of the area. While Mariupol' was administratively part of the Donbas, lying in the Stalino *oblast,* it is over fifty miles from the Donets basin itself, on the shore of the Sea of Azov. Like the other cities of the Donbas, however, it had grown enormously, more than tripling in size between the two Soviet censuses. Even after the losses of war, its population numbered 178,358, placing it not far below the largest Ukrainian metropolises.[71] What is remarkable for a city in the Donbas, or indeed in the whole southern area, is that it was under full Ukrainian control. Its well-developed Prosvita society and Ukrainian educational system have already been mentioned. The Orthodox Church is said to have been active and oriented toward Ukrainian nationalism, although here as elsewhere in the far south Protestants and dissident Orthodox sects played an important role.[72] In addition, the mayor was outspokenly nationalist, encouraging the formation of a Ukrainian military force.[73] Probably the guiding spirit in the nationalist development in the city, however, was Nicholas Stasiuk, minister of supply under the Rada in 1918, who had managed to survive the Soviet period by working as a park attendant.[74] He took over the editorship of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* which, although restricted by the paper shortage especially acute in the treeless south, was the second most influential Ukrainian paper on the "Left Bank" (next to *Nova Ukraïna*). While necessarily cautious, its tone was strongly nationalist. Moreover, in addition to Stasiuk, there were a number of nationalist journalists to aid in carrying on the newspaper's work. Stasiuk himself is said not only to have carried on this legal pronationalist activity, but to have assisted the OUN-B underground which made its area base in the city.[75]

186 668* 369 [794] [204]

[70] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 50; Interview 66.

[71] *L'vivs'ki Visti,* August 27, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 24, 1942, p. 2.

[72] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 3, 1942, p. 2.

[73] Cf. Chapter VII.

[74] Interview 66; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 7, 1942, p. 2.

[75] Ie. Stakhiv, pp. 52–54; Interview 66. The nationalist tone of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* is apparent from the considerable number of its articles reprinted in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

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[For information pertaining to Soviet policies in the Western Ukraine, particularly in regard to the Uniate Church and collectivization, see 26: Anonymous, R1 Soviet Union, Cat. 116.]

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UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

JOHN S. RESHETAR

795 186 EASTERN ORTHODOXY, unlike Roman Catholicism, is organized on the principle of autocephalous national churches—each constituting an independent administrative entity. This fundamental difference between Eastern and Western Christianity causes the thinking Orthodox Christian to be confronted with a dilemma. He wants the Church to be close to the communicant and the clergy to teach him and pray in his own language, and yet if he desires that the whole Church be able to perpetuate itself and propagate the faith, he must grant to it a sufficiently centralized organization and at the same time combat all fissiparous tendencies. Thus, on the surface at least, there appears to be a conflict between Christ's injunction that there be "one fold and one shepherd" (John 10:16) and the actual establishment of national churches which can easily render unto Caesar what may be correctly regarded as "things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21).

While the communicant may ponder over this dilemma, there is in the last analysis little that he can do to reverse centuries of historical development which have led to the woefully loose organization of the present day. The titular head of the Eastern Orthodox [793] Church, the Patriarch of Constantinople, is but *primus inter pares* in his relations with the other patriarchs and branches of the Church. Individual ecclesiastical jurisdictions do not extend across political frontiers, and as a result the national churches have rarely been able to oppose secular rulers. The development of each new national movement in the Orthodox world of Eastern and Southeastern Europe has been accompanied by a demand for a separate national church and has accentuated this divisive tendency.

While the Orthodox Balkan peoples were acquiring ecclesiastical independence prior to World War I, the Orthodox Ukrainians living in the Russian Empire were denied the national status which would enable them to establish their own church and, instead, were regarded as Little Russians. Studies of the Orthodox Church made at that time by Western scholars contain no reference to its Ukrainian branch since it did not even enjoy a limited autonomy but was 000 regarded as an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church.[1] The

[1] See Adrian Fortescue's *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, 2nd ed. (London, 1908), pp. 285 ff. That the Orthodox Church in Ukraine exercised considerable influence on the Russian Church is made amply evident in the ponderous study by Constantine V. Khariampovič, *Malorossijskoe Vlijanie na Velikorusskuju Cerkovnuju Žizn'* (Kazan, 1914), which deals with the period beginning in the middle of the sixteenth century and ending in 1762.

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The development of a Ukrainian historiography during the nineteenth century caused some of the nationalist intellectuals, many of whom were sons of priests, to discover that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine did not originally regard itself as bound by the protectorate which Muscovy assumed over the Ukrainian Cossacks as a result of the Perejaslav Treaty of 1654. By 1686, however, the influence of the Muscovites was so great among the Cossacks that the Orthodox Churches of Ukraine and Muscovy were merged on the basis of internal independence; the Cossacks retained the right to elect their metropolitan archbishop but pledged nominal subordination to the Patriarchate of Moscow, which had been established less than a century before, in place of their traditional tie with the Constantinople Patriarchate.

The domain of the Cossacks was gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire, and by the nineteenth century the metropolitan archbishops of Kiev were being appointed by Moscow. Many of these were not natives of Ukraine and had little in common with the local population, whose spiritual needs were ministered to by natives who entered the priesthood of the Russian Church. They employed the archaic Church Slavonic language in the performance of Church offices, but in many parishes sermons were delivered in the peasant vernacular which in the twentieth century was to serve as the basis for the development of literary Ukrainian. By the turn of the century Bishop Parfeny Levyc'kyj of the diocese of Podollia was himself delivering sermons in Ukrainian, and encouraging priests to do so, until he was transferred to the Russian diocese of Tula. The Orthodox seminaries in Kiev and Poltava were hotbeds of Ukrainian nationalist and revolutionary socialist agitation prior to the revolution.[2]

When the Imperial regime collapsed in February of 1917 and was replaced by the Provisional Government, a multitude of functional congresses met in Kiev to give voice to the economic and social objectives of the revolution, and to demand political autonomy for Ukraine. At the same time, they did not neglect to advocate reorganization of the Orthodox Church. Initially their demands were modest, but by the time of the November Revolution the nationalists were asking for an autocephalous Ukrainian Church which would be independent of the State in its internal administration and provide for the use of the Ukrainian language in the celebration of the divine liturgy. Since this was a period in which soviets, or councils, were being formed as political institutions, it is not surprising that there was considerable sentiment in favor of

[2] This is admitted even by a sworn enemy of everything Ukrainian. See A. Catinnyj, *Ukrainskoe Dviženie* (Berlin, 1925), p. 134.

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795 adopting a conciliar form of government for the proposed church.
668 Despite the enactment of many resolutions calling for ecclesiastical independence, little real progress was made during 1917, primarily because other matters of a more immediate nature, especially the agrarian problem and the demand for peace, absorbed public attention. Among other obstacles there was the hesitancy of many priests to challenge the established religious order and the lack of forthright support from the Ukrainian Central Council *(Ukrainska Central'na Rada)* which was the recognized representative body attempting to govern Ukraine at the time.

795 When the government of the Central Council was replaced by
659 that of Hetman Paul Skoropads'kyj in April of 1918 the official attitude toward the organization of a separate church became more sympathetic. A Ministry of Religious Cults was established under the direction of Professor Basil Zin'kivs'kyj, a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the University of Kiev. Plans were made to convoke a *sobor*, or general church conclave, but before this could be done it was necessary to select a new metropolitan archbishop of Kiev to succeed Metropolitan Vladimir, who had been murdered in February while the city was under Bolshevik rule. According to established procedure the metropolitan was to be elected at a diocesan congress, but Zin'kivs'kyj wished to depart from this practice and have all of the Ukrainian dioceses participate in the electoral meeting. His reason for making this request was that the Metropolitan of Kiev is regarded as the ranking hierarch in Ukraine and not merely as the head of another diocese.

However, the Church administration, which was in Russian hands at the time, proceeded to call an ordinary congress of the Kiev diocese thus ignoring Zin'kivs'kyj's proposal. In view of the nature of the Congress' membership it is not surprising that Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovits'kyj of Kharkov was elected. This did not please the Ukrainian nationalists because Anthony had forbidden the clergy of the Kharkov diocese to read the Gospel in Ukrainian, which he termed "a language of the market place." Zin'kivs'kyj wrote in vain to His Holiness Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, requesting that Anthony's election be set aside. The new Metropolitan immediately made plans for his journey to Kiev with the intention of arriving there in the morning, but railway workers, who were aware of the hierarch's anti-nationalist views, delayed the train for nearly ten hours and prevented a ceremonial welcome planned by his supporters.[8]

The German-sponsored Skoropads'kyj Government continued to lend its support to the convocation of the All-Ukrainian *Sobor*

[8] Dmytro Dorolenko, *Istorija Ukrainy* (Užhorod, 1930), II, 322.

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which met on June 20. Metropolitan Anthony as senior bishop was elected to the honorary presidency of the *Sobor*, but Bishop Pimen of the Balta diocese presided over the sessions. A national church did not emerge from these meetings because its adherents controlled no more than a third of the votes. The *Sobor* contented itself with requesting the Government to recognize Anthony as Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, which meant that it wished to have the parishes in Ukraine remain part of the Russian Orthodox Church. On July 9, it enacted a statute for the provisional administration of the Church in Ukraine which granted to the Patriarch of Moscow the right to confirm the election of the Metropolitan of Kiev, hear complaints directed against him and other Ukrainian bishops, bless the convocation of Ukrainian *sobors*, and be prayed for in the performance of every liturgical office in every Ukrainian parish. In effect, the statute provided for autonomy and not the autocephalous status which the nationalist clergy desired.

The statute also conferred upon Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow the right to reject any of its provisions, and the head of the Russian Church did not hesitate to do so. In a letter written to Metropolitan Anthony on September 26, 1918, the Patriarch expressed his willingness to accept the statute, but only if the Orthodox dioceses in Ukraine were to remain "an inseparable part of the one Russian Orthodox Church" on an autonomous basis, and accept decisions of the All-Russian Church *Sobors*. He also insisted upon the right to send his own representative to Ukrainian *sobors* and confirm the ruling hierarch in every Ukrainian diocese.[4] The Patriarch's conditions were not calculated to endear him to the advocates of a national church. Their dissatisfaction found expression in the address which Hetman Skoropads'kyj's new Minister of Cults, Alexander Lotoc'kyj (1870–1939), delivered before the All-Ukrainian *Sobor* on November 12, when it reconvened in Kiev. In no uncertain terms he attacked the Patriarch's autocratic methods and flatly stated that the Government favored an autocephalous church for Ukraine.

However, the conflict remained unresolved because of the collapse of Hetman Skoropads'kyj's regime as a result of the withdrawal of the German army of occupation in conformity with the armistice provisions which had been negotiated in the West. As the Germans withdrew, the Red Army invaded Ukraine and attacked the newly-organized armed forces of the Directory Government, the troops commanded by Symon Petljura. Many of the members of this new Government which succeeded that of Skoropads'kyj were republican socialists who had been prominent in the Central Council *(Rada)* of 1917. While many of these men were secularists

[4] *Ibid.;* Appendix 11 contains the text of the Patriarch's letter.

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795 659 and opposed to the perpetuation of the close relationship between Church and State which had existed under the Hetman's regime, they nevertheless thought it best to recognize the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and did so in a law enacted on January 2, 1919. In the two years of anarchy and civil war which followed, little could be done to further the actual establishment of the Church. The Directory Government's diplomatic envoy in Constantinople, Alexander Lotoc'kyj, attempted in vain to obtain recognition of the Church by the *locum tenens* of the Constantinople Patriarchate in order to assure its canonical status. Metropolitan Dorofej, who was serving as *locum tenens* at the time, refused to decide on recognition, since he was convinced that only a patriarch could take such a step.[5] Lotoc'kyj's efforts had been hampered in Constantinople by the émigré Russian hierarchs, including Metropolitan Anthony and Metropolitan Platon of Odessa, who had found refuge there from the Bolsheviks. They ultimately established themselves as the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad with headquarters in the Yugoslav city of Sremski-Karlovtsi. Their departure from Ukraine, however, meant that the opposition to the national church would be diminished to a slight degree.

795 Thus in 1920 there commenced to function effectively in Kiev an All-Ukrainian Church Council which was a synod composed of priests and deacons. It had the task of promoting the organization of parishes for the new Church and also served as its highest administrative organ. The Russian bishops whom Metropolitan Anthony had left in charge prior to his departure expressed their opposition to this Ukrainian "sectarianism" and forbade the members of the Ukrainian Church Council to celebrate the liturgy. However, the new Church retained control of four of the largest houses of worship in Kiev, including historic St. Sophia's Cathedral, and held the usual Eastern Orthodox religious offices, but conducted them in the Ukrainian language instead of in the archaic and not easily understood Church Slavonic which is the liturgical medium of the Russian Church. Other parishes left the Russian Church and attached themselves to the Ukrainian Church Council, and it soon became evident that this new branch of Eastern Orthodoxy would have to obtain its own episcopate. No bishop of the Russian Church was willing to join the Ukrainians, and when they requested several of them to consecrate two Ukrainian priests as bishops they met with refusals. It was in such an atmosphere of frustration that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor* convened in the Cathedral of St. Sophia on October 14, 1921.

The *Sobor*, in a final, futile attempt to seek a reconciliation with

[5] Alexander Lotoc'kyj, *V. Carborodi* (Warsaw, 1939), pp. 92 f.

795 the Russians, invited Metropolitan Michael (Jermakov), the Patriarch's exarch in Ukraine, to attend its sessions, but he countered by declaring it uncanonical. Thus the Ukrainians had no alternative but to establish a hierarchy by consecrating their own metropolitan. Such a consecration has generally been regarded as invalid since it is not effected by means of the "laying on of hands" by at least two bishops and is said to constitute disruption of the Apostolic Succession. Despite this the *Sobor* proceeded to elect the Very Reverend Basil Lypkivs'kyj (1864–1938) as "Metropolitan of Kiev and the whole Ukraine," and arranged a unique form of conciliar consecration, which was performed in St. Sophia's on Sunday, October 23. The Metropolitan-elect was surrounded by a number of priests who laid their hands upon his head; the worshipers who filled the cathedral placed their hands upon one another's shoulders and those who stood immediately behind the consecrating priests touched their robed shoulders. In all other respects the consecration was Orthodox in form. The bishops whom Lypkivs'kyj consecrated after assuming his office had their status challenged by the various Orthodox national churches which also refused to accept the Metropolitan's consecration as canonical.[6]

795 793 This did not prevent the Ukrainian Church from ordaining priests, acquiring additional parishes, and pursuing its program of reformed Orthodoxy. The new Church departed from tradition in permitting clergymen to appear in public wearing nonclerical dress when not performing ceremonial duties. Similarly it allowed them to cut their hair and not grow beards, although Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj retained the appearance of a bishop of the old school. Bishops were permitted to live in the married state, and Lypkivs'kyj himself and all but a few of the persons whom he consecrated continued to live with their wives—a practice which the Orthodox Church does not condone. A bachelor consecrated as a bishop could marry, and priests (and presumably bishops) were allowed to divorce their wives and marry a second time.[7] The practice of allow-

[6] The Russian Church branded this whole procedure as "self-consecration" *(samosvjastvo)* and regarded all priests who were ordained by these hierarchs as apostates, and the sacraments performed by them as invalid and blasphemous. See the brief and biased account of the establishment of the Ukrainian Church in Nicholas Briančaninov, *The Russian Church* (New York, n. d.), pp. 159 ff. Reverend Lypkivs'kyj's ordination into the priesthood had been canonical because he had served as a priest in the Russian Church since 1891 following his graduation from the Kiev Theological Academy. He had demonstrated ability at an early date, and in 1903 he was appointed to the directorship of an ecclesiastical normal school in Kiev. He was removed from this post because of his enthusiasm for the 1905 Revolution; he then accepted a pastorate in a Kiev suburb which he held until he assumed the leadership of the movement for a national church.

[7] See *Dijannja Vseukrains'koho Pravoslavnoho Cerkovnoho Soboru v Kyjevi 1921 roku* (Frankfurt am Main, 1946), pp. 14 f.

795 ing bishops to be married at all resulted from a reaction which was
793 general in Russia at the time amongst the "white" or married secular clergy against the monopoly which the "black" or celibate regular clergy held on practically all of the episcopal offices. The canons enacted at the 1921 *Sobor* specifically denied the regular clergy any privileges in obtaining bishoprics.

795 Liberalism also made itself felt in the administration of the Ukrainian Church, which was based on the principle of *soborno-pravnist'*, a conciliar and democratic form of ecclesiastical government in which all members of the Church—bishops, priests, and lay representatives—participate co-equally in all of its organs. The *Sobor* of 1921 specifically denied that hierarchs meeting alone could represent the whole Orthodox Ukrainian population. It declared that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor*, which was to meet at least once every five years, "possesses the highest religious, legislative, executive, judicial, and supervisory authority in the Ukrainian Church."[8] In the periods between *sobors* a smaller body, the Church Council, met semi-annually to serve as the highest executive organ and as an interim legislative body for the Church. Part of the Council met on a monthly basis to deal with more immediate matters. On the diocesan and district levels popular assemblies were to operate and each of the former was to elect its own bishop; the elective principle was also to prevail in the individual parishes, the members of which were empowered to select their own pastors with the consent of the diocesan council, a body elected by the diocesan assembly.

771 Another characteristic of the Ukrainian Church was its sense of
795 social consciousness, although expressed within a national context. The canons declared that "who utilizes Church life for social, national, political or personal subjugation should be excommunicated from the Church."[9] They specifically condemned all who employed national sentiments in order to renew the rule of the wealthy classes of society. The Russian Church was charged with having betrayed Orthodoxy *(Pravoslavje)* and having become a bulwark of *caroslavje* and *panoslavje*—glorification of tsars and landowners. In this way the new Church attempted to find a place for itself in the new revolutionary order and gain widespread popular support.[10]

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 9. For French translations of some of the documents pertaining to the Ukrainian Church see "L'Église Orthodoxe Panukrainienne créée en 1921 à Kiev," *Orientalia Christiana*, No. 3 (June, 1923), pp. 73 ff.

[10] The Ukrainian Church was not unique as a reformed group in the Russia of this period. A similar movement arose within the Russian Orthodox Church in the form of the "Renovated" or "Living" Church which also endeavored to break the monopoly of the monastic clergy on episcopal offices by permitting bishops to

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795 This was not an easy task, although by March of 1923 the Church had more than three thousand parishes. These were cared for by priests who were ordained by the new Ukrainian hierarchy, since the vast majority of the pre-revolutionary clergymen who were with the Russian Church in Ukraine remained loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate and refused to join the new Church. During the spring of 1922 the Ukrainians, conscious of their *de facto* status, attempted in vain to effect a reconciliation with the other Orthodox churches and obtain recognition by inviting them to send delegates to a meeting in Kiev for the purpose of creating a league of Orthodox churches. The other churches refused to establish any contacts with a group which they regarded as having violated the canons of the Church, which require no less than two hierarchs to consecrate a bishop. Faced with such formidable opposition, the Ukrainian Church had no alternative but to attempt to pursue an independent course. However, before it could do so it needed a rationale for its method of consecration. This was provided by the Most Reverend John Teodorovyč, then Bishop of Vinnica and now Archbishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, in the form of a disquisition on the Grace of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church; he wrote it during the autumn of 1922.

779 795 713 The Grace of the Holy Spirit, according to Orthodox dogma, is the divine power which is necessary for salvation and which resides in the Church and is dispensed by it through the sacraments.[11] The dispute between the Ukrainian Church and the other Orthodox national churches resulted from contrary views regarding the role which should be granted to tradition as a source of divine knowledge. Archbishop Teodorovyč bases his argument largely on Scriptural writings and contends that the hierarchy or institution of the pastorate in the primary Church, which was established by Christ, was the Apostolate. This body of men, it is claimed, was not above or outside of the Church but was of the Church since Christ "called unto him his disciples: and of them he chose twelve, whom also he named Apostles" (Luke 6:13). Thus the Apostolate, it is argued, could not have been anterior to the Church, nor could it have created the Church, because Christ founded both and selected the Apostolate from the Church.[12]

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marry. It allowed clergymen to cut their hair and shave their beards and for a brief period in the mid-twenties preached the sinfulness of capitalism and temporarily won the support of the Soviet Government which hoped in this way to weaken the Moscow Patriarchate and the traditional Church.

[11] Rev. Frank Gavin, *Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought* (Milwaukee, 1923), p. 219.

[12] Archbishop John Teodorovyč, *Blahodatnist' Jerarkhii Ukrains'koi Avtokefalnoi Cerkvy*, 3rd ed. (Regensburg, 1947), pp. 11 ff.

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779 The act of conciliar consecration performed in Kiev in October
795 of 1921 is justified on the grounds that the Ukrainian Church, although without its own bishops while under Muscovite domination from 1686 to 1921, never lost its Grace. Consecration is a bestowal of Grace which is a gift of God not subject to human control; what is granted by God, it is reasoned, cannot be withheld by any individual who has the task of laying on hands. Bishops alone did not at all times enjoy a monopoly of the right to consecrate since such a doctrine would exclude God who is the sole consecrator. The election of Reverend Lypkivs'kyj as Metropolitan was not a renewal of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church but rather a renewal of the traditional fullness of its structure. The Ukrainian Church continued to possess Grace even when its bishops were being appointed by Moscow. The *Sobor* of 1921, it is contended, merely renewed the function of the episcopacy; prior to that time the Church possessed pastors who were abiding by the instructions which Christ gave to teach and baptize. Apostolic Succession, it is argued, was preserved during the 1686–1921 period in the whole institution of the pastorate in Ukraine and not in the episcopacy alone since it is but one part of the whole hierarchy.

This contention is based on the assumption that the bishops alone cannot be identified with the Apostles since in the primary Church the terms "presbyter" or elder and "bishop" were apparently employed interchangeably in referring to the Apostles. The distinction in rank between the episcopacy and the priesthood, it is argued, was developed later by man. Thus the institution of the pastorate, which includes priests as well as bishops, proceeds from the Apostolate established by Christ. By this logic priests must be regarded as successors of the Apostles no less than bishops are since all of the Apostles were equal in the Grace which they enjoyed. As proof of this, Archbishop Teodorovyč cites Peter's reference to himself as an elder or presbyter (I Peter 5:1) together with Paul's Epistle to Titus; in the latter (Titus 1:5–6), qualifications for elders are laid down and without any apparent interruption in the train of thought the term "bishop" is then substituted for "elder" in the following verse indicating that the two terms were synonymous in the primary Church.[18] A bishop did not and does not enjoy a greater degree of Grace than did a presbyter (elder) or priest since the Grace which Christ bestowed upon the Apostles was of a uniform quality. Mortals cannot attempt to measure Grace. There is no evidence, says Archbishop Teodorovyč, to indicate that the sacrament of holy orders, which is now performed exclusively by bishops, is

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 50 ff. Also see Paul's Epistle to the Philippians 1:1.

779 of greater magnitude or requires more Grace than the other six
795 sacraments which are performed by all priests.

It is claimed that the differentiation which now exists between a
793 bishop and presbyter or priest lies not in the degree or quality of Grace which each enjoys, but only in the functions which each performs. Yet when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church re-established itself in 1921, it did not abolish the episcopacy or argue in a presbyterian manner that the episcopacy has no place in the Church. It merely argued that the exclusive right of bishops to administer the sacrament of holy orders (ordination and consecration) developed as a result of the actual needs of Church life and not on the grounds that bishops possess a greater degree or higher quality of Grace. The Church itself, it is contended, is the source of the differentiation in functions performed by bishops and presbyters or priests. Administrative necessity and the need for unity and stability alone caused the Church to grant to bishops the exclusive right to ordain and consecrate. This right is a purely canonical matter and is therefore, unlike religious dogma, not immutable. It is a practice developed by the Church, and it is consequently possible for the Church to redistribute functions at any time, as its Ukrainian branch did in 1921 when it became necessary to obtain a truly Ukrainian episcopate. This was a drastic step, and it was accompanied by an appeal to the Lord, the Supreme Pastor, before whom the Ukrainians laid their faith, hopes, and prayers.[14]

795 Under Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj's leadership thirty-five bishops
659 were consecrated in the traditional Orthodox manner, and the new Church appeared to be prospering. The Soviet Government had
687 done little to prevent its establishment but within a few years commenced a campaign of gradual suppression. In 1924 and during each of the three succeeding years Metropolitan Lypkivs'kyj was placed under arrest. In 1927 he was compelled to resign and a *sobor* elected Nicholas Borec'kyj to succeed him. The new Metropolitan governed the Church until 1930 when it was implicated in the alleged plot of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine *(Spilka Vyzvolennja Ukraïny)*. This clandestine organization was accused of promoting separatist tendencies and desiring to restore private property. Vladimir Čekhivs'kyj, a Social Democrat who had been premier of the anti-Bolshevik Directory Government early in 1919, was charged with having headed the Union's religious section. During the trial of the forty-five leaders of the Union in March and April

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 100 f. Archbishop Teodorovyč (pp. 124 ff.) has cited considerable evidence which indicates that consecration of bishops by a college of presbyters was a practice employed by the Church of Alexandria for more than two centuries preceding the convocation of the First Ecumenical Council in 325 A.D.

1: Reshetar S-4 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 659 687 of 1930 the prosecution alleged that the Church held secret requiems for Symon Petljura, the émigré nationalist, following his murder in Paris.[15] The Ukrainian Church never recovered from the setback which it suffered as a result of the trial. During the 1930's all of the bishops were arrested, and with the advent of World War II there remained only Archbishop Teodorovyč in the United States, the sole surviving hierarch of the original thirty-five.[16]

793 795 The opportunity to renew the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church came with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The movement was headed by Bishop Polikarp Sikors'kyj of the diocese of Lutsk in Volynia, who in February of 1942 re-established the Church at a *sobor* in Pinsk and consecrated several bishops. At the same time Bishop Polikarp succeeded in obtaining the support of his nominal superior, Metropolitan Dionisij of Warsaw, who had consecrated him in 1932 and ten years later elevated him to an archbishopric. Polikarp's consecration had been canonical since he had headed part of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Poland, which was recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople during the inter-war period. Thus the renewed Ukrainian Church was not plagued with the charge of "self-consecration" which served the enemies of the national church so well during the

[15] Nicholas Kovalevs'kyj, *Ukraïna Pid Červonyin Jarmom* (Lviv, 1936), pp. 72 ff.

[16] The demise of the Church in Ukraine itself did not hinder the development of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the United States and in Canada. Many of the Ukrainian immigrants in both countries desired such a Church, and when the movement first manifested itself in the homeland they were quick to assume the initiative. As early as July 18, 1918, a group of 150 laymen held a church congress in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The participants were members of the Uniat Church, adhering to the Eastern Orthodox ritual but acknowledging the Papacy, who were dissatisfied with the arbitrary nature of its administration and the principle of personal episcopal ownership of all church buildings and parochial property. They also objected to the attempt of the Uniat Church to obtain control of the Peter Mohyla Institute, a Ukrainian educational institution in Saskatoon. When the Uniat bishop denied them the sacraments, they decided to establish a truly national and democratically governed church and return to the Orthodox faith of their forefathers. The new Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada gained adherents from the Russian Orthodox Church which lost whole parishes composed of emigrants from Bukovina; many Uniats also joined the new Church which now has more than two hundred congregations although many of these are rural and small. The Canadian Church, unlike the movement in Ukraine itself, succeeded in obtaining recognition from a canonically consecrated Orthodox hierarch in the United States, the Syrian Metropolitan Germanos, who served as its acting bishop until Archbishop Teodorovyč succeeded him in 1924. The latter also assumed control over the numerically smaller Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, but in 1947 he relinquished the leadership of the Canadian Church which now has a separate hierarch. It is significant that the Canadian Church did not accept the canons which were adopted at the Kiev *Sobor* in 1921, since it wished to be in a position to establish relations with the other branches of the Orthodox Church on the North American continent.

793 1920's. However, Archbishop Polikarp had placed himself under the Moscow Patriarchate in 1939 when his diocese was incorporated
795 into the Soviet Union; he now had to bear the onus of disobeying Moscow and in May of 1942 was divested of all sacerdotal position *in absentia*. This did not prevent him from proceeding with the organization of the autocephalous church, although a rival movement for mere autonomy headed by Archbishop Alexei Hromads'kyj served to weaken the effort. When the Nazis retreated from Ukraine, Archbishop Polikarp and eleven other hierarchs obtained refuge in Germany with thousands of other Ukrainian displaced persons.

779 Two attempts in as many decades to establish an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union have ended in
795 failure with the believers reintegrated into the Russian Church on both occasions. The attempts, although abortive, were made possible by the vague unity of Eastern Orthodoxy which is not organized on the monarchical model. No patriarch is regarded as the head of the whole Church, for this distinction belongs exclusively to Christ (Ephesians 2:20, 5:23; I Corinthians 3:11). What unity the Church possesses is reflected not in its external organization but in the whole episcopacy in accordance with the principle of harmony and corporateness which is *Sobornost*. The autocephalous units of the Church agree on dogma, recognize each other's sacraments as valid, and engage in concelebrations of the liturgy on occasions of great importance. Yet once the principle of autocephaly is accepted it is only logical that there be as many distinct churches, albeit of the same confession, as there are nations and that the boundaries of religious and political jurisdictions coincide. It is a principle which, in the last analysis, leads to a limitation of the universality of Eastern Orthodoxy, since it isolates the various branches of the Church, spelling death to the notion of effective organic unity.

175 Grand Princes of Kyiv, i. e. the leaders of the Norman Vikings should fetch their Christian faith from Byzantium and we are probably right in maintaining that any other state in the same circumstances would also have been christianised from Byzantium.

175 797 The new religion was at first embraced only by the Princes and their courts, but later it was forced on the people by their superiors and became a bond that united the entire state organism. There was no fear that the people would make a combined and successful stand against Christianity for there was no pagan order of priests to take over leadership in such a contest. The people had only sorcerers in place of priests and so it was possible to christianise the country by peaceful methods though pagan ideas continued to live in popular consciousness for a considerable time. It is quite legitimate therefore, to speak at this time of a "double faith".

175 792 ●795 The organisation of the church in the Kyiv empire came from Byzantium which was also the home of the higher clergy with the exception of two cases when representatives of the native population were consecrated metropolitans. The conventual orders and the many monasteries, among which the Cave Monastery in Kyiv attained a great reputation throughout the world of orthodoxy, attempted to shape the lives of the people on Christian lines and to realise the ideals of Christianity. The monasteries were the most important and indeed the only centers of cultural life at that time.

175 795 The Tatars who raided Europe in the 13th century destroyed the Kyiv empire and then pushed further west though they were brought to a halt in the battle of Liegnitz in 1241. Nevertheless for centuries the countries of Eastern Europe had to submit to the yoke of East Asiatic nomads.

In the Mongolian era the position of the church was not exactly unfavorable, for the Khans allowed it a certain freedom and state protection. The metropolitans had, however, to fetch the written pardons (Jarlyks) from the horde personally which was a voluntary acknowledgement of their dependence on the secular power. The dignitaries of the orthodox church continued, it is true, to be consecrated by Constantinople, but no longer

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directly but on the mediation and the recommendation of the Khans. 175 795

In the course of the 14th century after their liberation from the Tatars Ukrainian areas came under the sovereignty of the rulers of Lithuania and were then slowly absorbed by Poland after the union of that country with Lithuania. The position of the orthodox church in Ukraine which had already been weakened by the inroads of Tatars was further shaken by this political development and by the subjection of the country to an alien sovereign. It was degraded within the Polish republic from its former status as a state church to a factor of cultural life that was merely tolerated. It thereby lost authority as there was no executive power behind it and the general disorganisation and decay increased from year to year.

The southern sphere of Eastern European territory and the Ukrainian church were unmistakably characterised by a predilection for the west, and a spiritual kinship with the culture of Central and Western Europe. Even the Kyiv Grand Princes were plainly inclined to the west and, in spite of the dependence of their church on Byzantium, they contracted marriage unions with the Catholic dynasties of several European countries. The Tatar raids interrupted this movement, but only for a short time; for as soon as Ukrainian territory was absorbed first by the principality of Lithuania and then by the Polish state, it immediately formed contact again with the west. It is true that the orthodox church of Ukraine was subject to the Patriarch of Constantinople up to 1685, but spiritually it was turned towards the west. It remained loyal to its dogmas but fetched its spiritual weapons in its fight for equality from the arsenal of the leaders of the western churches, Catholic and Protestant. The educational institutes which trained for the priesthood in Ukraine borrowed their organisation from the Jesuit Colleges. Latin was the language used and Aristotle, and after him Christian Wolff with his systematic methods, reigned supreme. So it is no wonder that the youth trained in such schools was not suffocated by formalism and was therefore able to assimilate and develop new ideas. It was from this conciliatory

175 spirit that all the movements for union with Rome sprang
795 which were so characteristic for orthodoxy in Ukraine.

The orthodox church in the south, in Ukraine, followed its own historical development independent of events in the Muscovite state in the north. Up to the middle of the 17th century it was subject to Constantinople but incorporated within the Polish state and fought with unequal weapons for equality within the organism of a foreign state. But when, after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow, the "third Rome", became more and more supreme in the ecclesiastical and religious life of Eastern Europe, a dilemma arose for orthodox Ukrainians in Poland; they could either remain loyal to a weak Byzantium, or subject themselves to the new power of Moscow, or they could improve their political position and come into closer contact with the general process of culture in Europe by uniting with Rome. The movement for union was therefore determined not by dogma, but, in the first instance, by political and cultural considerations. The year 1596 finally witnessed the union of part of the orthodox Ukrainians with Rome. For, when faced with the choice between Moscow and Rome, most of the Ukrainian bishops decided in favor of the latter and thus created a split within the orthodox church which was to be of far-reaching consequence for the shaping of political events in Eastern Europe. Thus, since the end of the 16th century there were two church organisations on Ukrainian territory, the orthodox which was able to maintain itself chiefly in western areas and the united, which, in the course of time, developed to be the national church of Ukraine. With the increasing political importance of the Cossacks throughout the 17th century, the orthodox church tried to rise again and succeeded, above all in the province of culture, in creating new values which ultimately permeated the whole of Eastern Europe. After the fall of the Cossack state and the incorporation of the most of Ukraine in the Russian Empire in the course of the 18th century, the united church was more and more persecuted and in 1838 was finally banned; the Ukrainian orthodox church, on the other hand, fell increasingly under Russian influence. This process gained in intensity with time so that at the beginning of the 20th century the orthodox church

in Ukraine was one of the most powerful instruments for "freeing" the population from national sentiments. After the establishment of an independent Ukraine in 1918, the orthodox church in Ukraine experienced a fresh, if shortlived, renaissance. It could not last long for, when the bolshevists gained the upper hand, the entire religious life of Ukraine suffered the same treatment as that in other parts of the Soviet Union. In the first years of the Soviet regime when the pressure of the government was bearable, orthodox Ukrainians in Soviet Russia organised themselves into the Ukrainian Independent Church, replacing the Old Slavonic church language by the modern mother-tongue. But when the new order in Eastern Europe grew stronger and all religion was banned from public life, the Ukrainian Independent Church had to cease functioning at home and confined its activity to the numerous circles of emigrants who, especially after World War I, sojourned in western countries.

As already mentioned, the orthodox church in Western Ukraine, in areas like Galicia and Volynia, held its own against the Union. But at the beginning of the 18th century these sections were also won for the idea of the union, which was finally stronger here than anywhere. For, even in the days of Polish supremacy, and still more after the occupation of this area by Austria, the United or Greek-Catholic church developed into a Ukrainian national church which protected the people on the one hand from Russian, and on the other from Polish influence. In the 20th century Count Andreas Sheptytskyj, the Lviv metropolitan of this church, who accomplished much not only as the supreme head of the church but just as much as a national leader, became the symbol of the church's wide-spread significance. So it is no wonder but a procedure of accepted political expediency that, even during the First World War the Russian Government, rightly seeing in the Greek-Catholic church a center of Ukrainian nationalism, arrested the Metropolitan Sheptytskyj immediately after the occupation of Lviv and sent him into exile. Similarly, the report which appeared last year in all newspapers that the several million members of the United Church had submitted to the Patriarch of Moscow after the country was occupied by bolshevist troops and had thus returned

175 to the bosom of orthodoxy, was in the same category. That
795 this did not happen voluntarily but was carried out by means of pressure from above is as certain as the fact that it was not religious and dogmatic consideration but solely political factors that were the motive forces behind this change of front from west to east.

had been known earlier in Western Ukraine as a privilege of 175
the towns (Volodymyr from 1324 and Syanik from 1339) be- 177
comes the basis of organisation for further settlements in newly acquired areas. German artisans and artists are welcome to these areas and the youth of Ukraine are fired with enthusiasm to attend German and Italian universities in order to acquire learning with which they will subsequently enrich life at home. Thus western cultural movements like Humanism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation penetrated at long length the wide-flung steppe. It is true that they sometimes caused effects there that could not have been expected from experience in other countries. This is seen best in the case of the Reformation.

After the amalgamation of the Lithuanian-Ukrainian state with 795
Poland, the Orthodox Church, though already shaken to its foundations, begins to play an important part in public life; after the loss of Ukrainian independence, it becomes a rallying point for national feeling and the difference in creed between the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches coincides with the political difference between Poles and Ukrainians; it was therefore natural that nationalist circles should be absolutely opposed to every further attempt to weaken the Ukrainian Church. It was well known that grievous abuses had crept into the organisation and life of the Orthodox Church, for those abuses arose from the new position it had been forced to assume. From having been an all-powerful state church it was degraded to become a factor in a strange country that was barely tolerated and was therefore unable to control its own administration, all the more as it had no longer a decisive say in making church appointments. It was common property that Orthodoxy in Ukraine was in a critically weak condition of disintegration, but nobody dreamt of opposing it and still less of replacing it by another creed, its fall would have been a severe, if not fatal blow to the entire life of the nation.

Such were the psychological reasons for the fact that the reformation movement found such a weak echo in Ukraine, though the necessity for a change in conditions, for reform, but from within, was felt by all.

659 The spread of Protestantism from Germany to Ukraine was
795 favored by the mere geographical fact of the latter's inclusion in the Polish empire while Poland, as a result of its close connections with Prussia, the Baltic States and Bohemia was for a considerable time a refuge for all sorts of creeds. Moreover, many of the magnates and some of the kings of Poland had shown themselves to be favorably disposed to the new movement, not indeed from any genuine, religious feeling, nor because they were moved by conscience to adopt new ways, but purely from motives of self-interest; for they calculated that, if the reformation was victorious in Poland, the Catholic Church would forfeit its all-powerful influence on life in general and, further, they hoped to acquire for themselves the enormous property which the Catholic Church would have to abandon. Such reasoning, however, did not apply to the Orthodox Church which had little property and which did not constitute a power that was ambitious of yielding political influence; it was inspired by no desire for sovereignty, but, on the contrary, had constantly to defend itself against encroachments from without.

795 The same trends and sympathy for the West gave rise to the movement for the union of the churches whose leaders did not think only of their personal interest but were also inspired by lofty ideals. When, after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow or the third Rome, as it liked to be called, tried to succeed to the position of capital of the Eastern Church, the Ukrainian bishops were faced with a choice between a Moscow that they held to be still uncivilised and Rome, a center of Western culture, and they decided in favor of the latter.

From the point of view of national interests, the dignitaries who joined the Union represented definitely Ukrainian tendencies in contrast to their conservative colleagues who preferred a connection with Moscow which was also orthodox. In support of this contention, we may mention that the Metropolitan Hipatius Potij, a Greek Catholic who was one of the most energetic champions of the Union, displayed particular zeal for the Ukrainian language in which tongue he recited his creed and took his oath to the Pope, although he was completely at home in Latin. By accepting the protection of the mighty Church

of Rome as the supreme head of their church, the pioneers of 795
the Union and of the cultural independence of Ukraine wished to throw off the cultural yoke of Poland, thinking that they would acquire equal rights with the Poles once the churches were united. The course of events has showed how much they were mistaken; for the Poles have merely exploited this rapprochement in ecclesiastical affairs as an instrument by means of which, with the help of the Jesuits, they aimed at ruling over the entire East and at completely absorbing the Ukrainian nation.

Western influence can also be detected in the guild-like 441
organisations of the Ukrainian middle-classes in towns like Lviv 871
Kyiv, Lutsk etc., organisations which, in addition to promoting the interests of a particular class or trade, also concerned themselves with church affairs. One of their main aims was the foundation of schools which taught Latin as well as Church Slavonic and Greek.

The most important foundation of those so-called Bro- 874
therhood schools was undoubtedly the Kyiv Academy 795
which owed its supremacy as an intellectual center, not 177
only of Ukraine, but of the whole of Eastern Europe .79
to the activities of such an eminent personality as Metropolitan Peter Mohyla. Mohyla, the son of the governor of Moldavia and educated in Jesuit schools, remained a life-long advocate of western culture and the Catholic Church, the organisation of which served him as a model when he was planning the reform of the Orthodox Church. We are scarcely able to-day to imagine what an enormous revolution and what great boldness of spirit was implied in the idea of introducing Catholic principles and methods into the organisation of the Orthodox Church which had been hostile to Rome for centuries. And yet this unique plan succeeded and could succeed only in Ukraine, for it was here alone that history had prepared the way for the adoption of these plans for realising western ideas. The spirit which inspired Mohyla's activities was wholly directed towards the West, as was clearly expressed in his innovations: in dogma, however, he remained a loyal disciple of the "faith

874 of his fathers", of the Orthodoxy. He is thus a concrete symbol
795 of the synthesis of two worlds, of the harmonious and complete
177 union of two cultures, of the meeting of East and West and of
.79 the fertilising of Ukrainian Orthodoxy by the Latin spirit of the Roman Catholic Church.

795 The seed scattered by Mohyla bore rich fruit. Hundreds of
874 scholars, writers, politicians and organisers graduated in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries from this unique "alma mater", the Kyiv Academy, equipped with the modern weapons of western learning, to fight first of all for the independence and the honor of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. After completing their studies in Kyiv the Ukrainian patriots of that time go to Germany to appropriate the arguments used by the Reformation against Catholicism, they penetrate to Rome and do not shrink from joining the Roman Church for a season only in order to become better acquainted with their opponent's plans in the very center of his camp. On their return home they develop an energetic campaign in teaching and writing to prepare and train wide circles of less well educated priests for the fight. In order to supply their audiences with intellectual munition, they publish a series of pamphlets directed against the enemy and all manner of apologies in defence of their own cause, utilising the knowledge they had gathered in the West. This leads to an enormous outburst of polemic writing, to an intellectual activity in the country which strikes even foreigners.

177 But the efforts of these champions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy
814 who had been trained in the West, did not stop there; they performed a still more important function in making European influence supreme in the state of Moscow, or the Russia of Peter, as it was then called. Ukraine contributed no mean share to the work of Peter the Great. The foundation and building of the modern Russian Empire was the almost unaided work of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, for the intellectual conditions for the solving of this task were almost completely lacking in Moscow itself. In order to carry out his reforms which soon degenerated into an absolute mania for reform, Peter utilised

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CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

The Soviet Religious Policy

000 In any discussion of Soviet Russian-Ukrainian relations, the religious problem is important for it touches many issues which are but dimly understood in the Western world. The latter has been too long content to think of the east of Europe only in terms of power politics, the Eastern Question, and similar problems to bother about the details of a discussion which has been often a matter of life and death to the people involved and which might throw a real light upon the present situation.

●795 659 One fact stands out. Rus'-Ukraine was Christianized before the division of the Eastern and Western Churches and the full results of that division were not made evident until the dawn of the modern era. The dominant religious type of religion was that of the Orthodox East and the important See was that of Kiev. Yet Kievan Christianity was never bigoted or exclusive and even after the great Schism of 1054, the princes of Kiev continued to intermarry equally with the noble families of both east and west.

After the Metropolitan, under political pressure, took up his residence in Moscow, Kiev and the Western Ukrainian lands secured a new Metropolitan from the Patriarch of Constantinople. Moscow became the seat of a patriarchate but it was only in 1648 that the Patriarch and the Tsar of Moscow became willing to have any contact with the Orthodox Christians of Kiev. Already in 1596 this attitude had culminated in the establishment of a Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, acknowledging the papacy but maintaining the Eastern Orthodox forms of worship.

In 1686, while the Tsar of Russia was beginning to absorb the Zaporozhian Kozaks, he exerted pressure upon the Patriarch of Constantinople to abolish this new Metropolitanate of Kiev, and in 1686, by the act of Moscow but not of Constantinople, this was done. Once Moscow secured control, it applied the

795 659 Muscovite usages and as its power grew in Ukraine, so did its pretensions. The cultural power of Ukrainian Orthodoxy disappeared in the Russian Sea, while the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite became the dominating religious power in Western Ukraine. Nothing shows more clearly the Muscovite attitude than the fact that it gave a lower rank to the Metropolitan of Kiev than it did to the head of the Georgian Orthodox, when they, too, passed under Russian sovereignty.

As Rus'-Ukraine under tsarist control became only a collection of "Little Russian" gubernias, so the Ukrainian Orthodox became a collection of "Little Russian" diocess, in which there was nothing Ukrainian and so it remained until 1917, while each time that the tsar acquired more Ukrainian lands, the same form of coercion was applied not only to the Ukrainian Orthodox but also to the Catholics whose Byzantine Rite under the Hapsburgs and then under Poland and Czechoslovakia, had developed into a distinct Western Ukrainian religion. Under the leadership of Metropolitan Andry Sheptytsky, a giant physically and intellectually, this process went on rapidly, much to the annoyance of the Poles in the old province of Eastern Galicia.

Finally we must note that when Western Ukraine passed under Poland in 1920, that country forced the establishment of a Polish Orthodox Church for the several million Ukrainians and Byelorussians who were in the revived state. The language of this was Polish and its organization was adopted to the Polish system as it developed in the revived state.

With these preliminary notes, we can now turn to the relations between the Ukraine and the Soviet Russians.

A. The Orthodox

With the Revolution of 1917 and the revival and development of the independence movement among the Ukrainians, there arose also a demand for the revival of an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This was stubbornly opposed by the Provisional Government, Patriarch Tikhon and the Russian Orthodox in Ukraine, the same forces that had haggled and debated the develop-

ment of a Ukrainian independent state throughout the period, 795
until the Russian Communists secured control and were able to 659
maintain their assumption of power.

In the first stages, while the Communists still hoped for the success of the world revolution, they emphasized their doctrines of atheism and they stressed the conception that "religion was the opium of the people." At the same time they endeavored to disintegrate the Russian Orthodox Church from within by giving their support to the various schemes of reform as the Living Church, etc. They also gave especial favor to various Protestant bodies, as the Baptists, who sought to introduce their ideas, often with marked success.

It was a crucial period for eastern Europe, for the Western 648
nations and America which had been victorious in World War I were not inclined to cement their victory. No matter what they thought of the Communist regime, Great Britain and the United States were still convinced that the victory of a democratic Russia was a certainty and they refused to take any steps to help the non-Russian peoples who were being over-whelmed by the Soviets, lest it prejudice their future relations with Russia. France, obsessed with the fear of Germany, was seeking to restore a greater Poland which would absorb as much as possible of Ukraine. The memory of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk blinded everybody to events as they were taking place.

It was no less critical for the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Allies sympathized with his position but the successful revolt of Mustapha Kemal against the Treaty of Sèvres produced a situation where the Western powers had to fight or surrender. They wished to do neither and with a certain Bolshevik sympathy for Turkey, the Patriarch was obliged to be cautious, until his hands were in a way freed by the settlement of Lausanne.

Hence the leaders of the movement for a Ukrainian Autocephal- 795
ous Orthodox Church were in a way powerless to regulate their relations with Orthodoxy as a whole. They had been unable to secure the support and assistance of any Russian bishops. They

795 were turned down in an appeal to the Bulgarian Church and they obtained no response from the Patriarch of Constantinople.

[793] Impressed by the sense of urgency and the justice of their cause, the leaders of the movement held a synod in Kiev on October 11, 1921 and proceeded to elect as bishops Father Vasyl Lypkivsky and Father Nestor Sharayevsky. Then, as they had no bishops available for their consecration, the members of the Sobor laid their hands upon them and consecrated them bishops without the participation of any bishops save relics of the saints preserved in Kiev. Lypkivsky was then made Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and he and his associate soon consecrated some 27 other bishops.

Yet the uncanonical nature of this original action drove a wedge between the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the other Orthodox Churches and made certain that it would not later attract any validly consecrated bishops who would regularize the succession. On the other hand, other reforms, as the introduction of Ukrainian into the services in place of the old Church Slavonic, enabled the Russian opponents to classify it with the various movements as the Living Church which the Bolsheviks had fostered in their endeavor to disintegrate the Russian Church from within.

Still later, when the Orthodox in the succession states began to organize and came under the influence of the Patriarch of Constantinople, whose position had grown less critical with the strengthening of the new Turkey, it was too late for him to extend aid to the Ukrainian Orthodox as he did to those living under Polish rule by the recognition of a Polish Autocephalous Church in 1924. Thus the Ukrainian Orthodox were left almost completely isolated to face alone the atheistic Communist and imperialistic Russian Orthodox pressure.

Metropolitan Lypkivsky showed himself a very competent leader. The number of parishes under his control multiplied rapidly and by 1927 the Church had nearly 3,000 parishes and some 10,600 priests. It was no small achievement to establish and develop this under the harsh conditions of Soviet reality and for several years during the height of the movement of Ukrainization,

the Church flourished and bade fair to restore the traditions of the 795 ●
old Ukrainian Orthodox Church and there were high hopes that sooner or later it would be able to heal the defects in the original consecration.

This was not to be, for after the death of the Patriarch Tikhon 795
the power in the Russian Church passed into the hands of the 659
Metropolitan Sergy who showed himself willing to effect such a compromise with Stalin and Communism as might be necessary. His offer was, to a certain degree, accepted and the Soviet regime, without changing its policy of persecuting all religious activity, began to throw a few crumbs of favor to the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate in Moscow. Slowly but surely, the various Russian divisions, like the Living Church, slipped back into the general organization, and the Soviets soon grasped the possibilities of using Sergy and the Russian organization as a political weapon in their struggle for world domination.

Even before the ending of Ukrainization, the Communists began to put obstacles in the way of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. The Metropolitan was refused permission to visit the various parishes under his control and to publish journals and other material for his flock. This was followed by more active measures. Metropolitan Lypkivsky was arrested and imprisoned. So were all of the other bishops and by 1930 there was not a single one of the bishops still in Ukraine who was not in prison or dead. The church was broken up and all of its activities stopped, but the spirit that had animated it continued to lie hidden.

When the Germans and the Soviets occupied Poland in 1939, a 795
new possibility was sensed. The so-called Polish Autocephalous [793]
Church was composed overwhelmingly of Ukrainians and Byelorussians, with but a few anti-Communist Russians. Even before 1939, some of these Ukrainian clergy and laity had begun to take steps for the Ukrainianizing of the Church, even though they had been forced to introduce Polish into the services. When the storm broke, Russians like Bishop Sava made their way abroad and joined the Russians in exile. Bishop Oleksy (Hromadsky) in Kremyanets and Bishop Polykarp (Sikorsky) in Lutsk were forced

795 to recognize the Moscow organization, which was coming into favor with Stalin because of its increasing subservience to the Soviet regime. On the other hand, Metropolitan Dionysy, who had been in that part of Ukraine that was included in the Polish Government General, now threw off any attempt at concealment and revived the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, which this time was provided with canonical orders in all grades. He consecrated two new Ukrainian bishops, Ilarion (O. Ohienko) for Kholm and Podlyasie and Palady (Vedybida-Rudemko) for Krakow and Lemkivshchyna.

This marked a new period and when the Germans attacked the USSR in 1941 and occupied it, Polykarp joined them, while Oleksy set up still another group, the Ukrainian Autonomous Church, for he refused to break his connections with Moscow.

795 659 [727] The German permission for the formation in 1942 of a central organization was frankly ambiguous. On the one hand, they were glad of any movement that would rouse the people against Moscow. On the other, in religion as in politics, they were opposed to any movement which would prevent them from carrying out their policy of treating the Ukrainians as a subject and inferior race. As a result, they put every obstacle in the way of a reconciliation between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous groups and threw their support to whichever was the weaker in any given area.

The open support of the Soviet government by Sergy and his associates now under the pressure of war paid off. His protestations of sympathy for Stalin and the Russians were rewarded with medals and other honors. Then, in the autumn of 1943, as the final step in the process, Stalin gave permission for the restoration of the Patriarchate in Moscow and Sergy was duly installed. On his death in 1944, he was succeeded by Aleksey, the former Archbishop of Leningrad, the present Patriarch, and under his leadership the Russian Orthodox Church has embarked upon a policy of securing control for the Soviets of all other Orthodox Churches.

795 In the meanwhile, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church during the war displayed great activity in the occupied Ukraine. It speedily won the support of most of the clergy who were not in

the Soviet service. It reopened churches that had been closed by the Soviets and it cooperated with the Ukrainian patriotic movement. 795

With the return of the Soviet forces, the leaders of the Church retired to the west with a large part of the priests, and the others joined the underground. The Ukrainian Church was again suppressed and brought directly under the Patriarch of Moscow and it is to be noted that the head of the Orthodox Church in the UkSSR, does not hold any special point of honor as does the Catholicus of Georgia, who is still recognized as the head of a satellite Church.

It is thus safe to say that despite the continued existence of the UkSSR as an independent nation for the purposes of the United Nations, there is now no distinctive Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It has been swallowed, as in the days of Peter I, by the great Moscow religious imperialism. It has no independence and it is thoroughly and in all points independent upon the Russian Patriarch in Moscow.

B. The Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite

When in 1939 the Soviet forces by their understanding with the Nazis occupied for the first time Eastern Galicia and the Western Ukrainian lands, they at once set to work to remodel the area on their own standards and to eliminate all the characteristic features of Ukrainian life and culture. This process was, however, rudely interrupted by the German attack in 1941.

The dominant religion in the area was the Greek Catholic Uniat Church, or, to be more precise, Catholicism of the Byzantine Rite. The Metropolitan of this Church, Andry Sheptytsky, was the most respected figure in the entire area and he was a religious and cultural leader in every sense of the word. During this first occupation, Archbishop Sheptytsky was not personally disturbed but he was deprived of his liberty and forced into a semi-retirement. His schools and other institutions were closed, the Church was deprived of its property and a considerable number of priests were punished on various charges. Yet there was no general holocaust. 795 793

In 1941, Archbishop Sheptytsky was one of the leading figures

795 in the attempt to revive a native and independent Ukrainian
793 government. This was, of course, prevented by the Germans and the Archbishop remained at Lviv scarcely more free during the German occupation of Ukraine than he had been under the Soviets. He continued his efforts to unite both the Ukrainian Catholic and Autocephalous Churches without effect, but he was able to do considerable for the well-being of his people. Still he was no longer free to act openly, although his advice was sought whenever and wherever it could be.

The Soviets reoccupied Lviv on July 27, 1944 and at once set to work more vigorously to introduce their system. Archbishop Sheptytsky did not long survive for he passed away on November 1 of the same year. He was succeeded in his post by Joseph Slipy, who had been one of his outstanding assistants and the rector of the Theological Academy which Metropolitan Sheptytsky had founded in the late twenties, when it had became evident that the Poles would not allow the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviv.

659 Metropolitan Slipy had barely been installed in office, when
795 the Soviets showed their hand and began to call for a condemnation
793 of the Vatican by the Ukrainian Catholics and for their union
661 with Moscow. It did not take long for words to turn into actions.

On April 15, 1945, the NKVD surrounded the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv and arrested the Metropolitan, Bishop Budko and Bishop Charnetsky together with many other leaders. They arrested all of the students of the Theological Academy and they likewise seized the Cathedral and turned it over to the Patriarch of Moscow as a Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, they informed the professors of the Theological Seminary that the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite had ceased to exist.

At almost the same time the NKVD gathered in the other Catholic bishops in Western Ukraine, Bishop Khomyshyn of Stanislaviv and his vicar, Bishop Lyatyshevsky, while at the same time the Polish Communist regime seized Bishop Kotsylovsky of Pere-

myshl and his auxiliary bishop, Lakota. Bishops Khomyshyn and Kotsylovsky soon died under the treatment that they received. 659 795

The others were kept in prison and then in 1946, according to the best available information, Metropolitan Slipy and his associates were sent to labor camps in the far north in the Vorkuta coal mines. From that time they have disappeared from sight. 793 661

In 1947, the last Catholic bishop of this rite, Bishop Romzha of Carpatho-Ukraine, while travelling through his diocese "collided" accidentally with a Soviet tank and was killed and this ended the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in their own lands. The following year the Rumanian government followed suit and likewise annihilated the hierarchy of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite in Transylvania. In 1950 the Czech Communist regime arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment Bishop Hoydych and his coadjutor Hopka of the diocese of Prashev in Slovakia.

These actions were followed in each case by attacks upon the lower clergy, who were ordered to accept the supremacy of the Patriarch of Moscow. This was fully in the tradition of the old Russian Church, for each time that the tsars had bitten off a slice of Ukraine, they had applied the same methods to the Catholic hierarchy in the section, to the intent that the Byzantine rite could be performed only under the supervision of the Russian authorities.

In this case in 1945, on July 1, when the Soviet Ukrainian Commissar for Religion, Khodchenko, called on the clergy to recognize the new situation, the professors of the Theological Academy met in Lviv in the Cathedral of St. George and presented a request that they be given the liberties accorded to them on paper by the Stalinist Constitution. The answer was their arrest and imprisonment.

Then the government set to work. They secured the apostasy of one of the foremost of the Ukrainian Catholic priests, Father Kostelnyk, who willingly put himself at the service of the Patriarch and presided over a "sobor" which was called to ratify the switch from the Vatican to the Patriarch. Many of the priests who attended were apparently members of the NKVD in disguise. They willingly applauded Stalin and the Patriarch and armed with this authority,

659 the Soviet regime set to work to seize all the churches and property
795 of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite and preempt it for
793 their own use.
661 This marked the end of the open existence of the Church. There were still priests who escaped and took refuge with the U. P. A. (the Ukrainian underground) but open worship was at an end. There has been enforced at least a superficial agreement with the Kremlin on all matters of religion. Nevertheless, the latent hatred still exists and it can flare up at any moment when the situation warrants it.

The movements represented by the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite still flourish in the emigration, where alone there is any opportunity for free thought. In the meanwhile, the Kremlin is maintaining its position in its traditional Muscovite manner and applying its savage punishments and deportations and executions to prove that Ukraine is happy and contented in following the example of the "elder brother." Yet even so, the number of episodes when Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism appears make it seem as if the officials of both church and state were not too sure that the Ukrainian people fully sympathize with the Patriarch Aleksey in his deification of the foremost man of the ages, who still forbids Communists to have anything to do with the Orthodox Church. That has sold its soul for as little real value as did the Ukrainian Communists in the early years of the struggle.

p. 46

III. RETRENCHMENT AND REVOLT

563 By the end of September, 1939, it appeared that Germany had definitely abandoned the Ukrainian nationalists. The agreement which allowed the Soviet Union to occupy the territory of Poland up to the line of the Bug and the San meant in effect that the compact Ukrainian area in Galicia, the Ukrainian land which possessed the strongest nationalist feeling, had passed under the control of the Soviet regime. There remained, however, a few small areas of Ukrainian settlement under German control in what was now designated as the Generalgouvernement Polen. Aside from several minute border districts, these were the Lemko region and the Chelm (Kholm) region. The Lemko area is a rugged stretch on the northern slope of the Carpathians, extending from Przemysl (Peremyshl') almost to Cracow. The majority of its population was a hardy if impoverished group of mountaineers who spoke the Lemko dialect of the Ukrainian language. Under the Polish regime this group had been subjected to the same repression which was exercised against the population of eastern Galicia, but the low economic potential of the area discouraged the Poles from expanding significantly into the hill region.

563 795 In the Chelm district, on the other hand, a violent policy of denationalization had been carried out. This area, which had always contained a mixed population, was further complicated ethnographically by changes in religion. Originally a large part of the population, including the great majority of the Ukrainians, had been Greek Catholic, as were their brothers in Galicia. Under Alexander II, however, a harsh policy of repression had prevailed, the aim of which was the destruction of the Greek Catholic Church and strengthening of the Orthodox Church. Numerous Greek rite parishes were forcibly transferred to the Orthodox Church,

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and a number of Latin rite churches which were accused of 563
ministering to Greek Catholics who resisted transfer to Ortho- 795
doxy were also seized.[1] Either because they originally had some sympathy for Orthodoxy, or because they became accustomed to it over the decades, many of the "converted" congregations had retained some ties with it after the area had become a part of Poland. Stimulated by part of the Latin clergy (the Greek Catholic hierarchy opposed the step), the Polish government seized many of the churches or, in some cases, even burnt them to the ground. The Orthodox priests were expelled and replaced by Catholic pastors of the Latin, not the Greek, rite. The small supply of intellectuals made it difficult for other Ukrainian communities to aid the Ukrainians of Chelm, and, as a result, the policy of denationalization had considerable success.[2]

For over twenty months these small and handicapped areas[4] 1668*
were to serve as the principal territorial base of Ukrainian nationalist efforts. The reason that they were able to fulfill this function arose from the deliberately ambiguous nature of German policy toward the Ukrainian movements during this period. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which was a formal barrier to the use of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment to disrupt the Soviet Union, was, indeed, merely regarded as a truce by the Nazi leaders, but the duration of the truce was viewed as indefinite. Any overt encouragement of the Ukrainian nationalists would be looked upon by the Soviet Union as an unfriendly gesture, if not as preparation for an attack; consequently, Hitler was determined to use extreme caution in dealing with the Ukrainians as long as he felt that amicable relations with the Soviet Union were in his interest.[3] At the same time, the Machiavellian strain in Nazi

[1] Adrien Boudou, *Le Saint-Siège et la Russie: Leurs Relations Diplomatiques au XIXe Siecle* (Paris: Editions Spès, 1925), II, 440.

[2] Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 335; Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), p. 279*n;* and especially Volodymyr Kubiiovych, "Die ukrainische Volksgruppe," *Das Generalgouvernement,* I (December, 1940), 14–19.

[3] This is shown not only by Hitler's express order to exercise caution in dealing with the Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement in order to avoid difficulties with Russia (Memorandum for the files concerning the session of the RVA [Reichsverteidigungsausschuss], Warsaw, March 2, 1940, EC 300; hereafter referred to as EC 300), but also by the fact that even much later he requested Bormann

4 [Lemko and Chelm regions -- Analyst]

668* such as the head of the *oblast* (district) administration, Alexander Iatseniuk, the chief of the city administration, Pavlovs'kyi, and nearly all of his department heads.[50] A wide variety of nationalist organizations sprang up, including Prosvita, churches, and an active theater. Local artists appeared on Ukrainian programs permitted by the German-controlled broadcasting station. [871] Schools, including two *gimnaziias* and a pedagogical institute, were reopened, and a local school administration was established.[51]

[369] The population of the city sank to forty-two thousand (including seven thousand Poles and two thousand Russians) after the [438] deportation of the Jews. However, economic life was stimulated by the reopening of a sugar refinery and other industries; markets [795] were reopened and private trade was encouraged.[52] One hundred and seventy-nine physicians were present, a very high number in [883] proportion to the population.[53] An extremely active youth organization, known, like its counterparts in the West Ukraine, as the Sich, was formed; its activities included sports, choral singing, theatricals, and development of an orchestra.[54]

All of these organizations were under the control of nationalist Ukrainians, although the emphasis appeared to be on the formation of a Ukrainian territorial state which would include all persons, of whatever ethnic origin, living on Ukrainian soil. Thus one of the chief administrative officials, the head of the *raion* administration (i.e., the rural area outside the city) was a Pole, and the director of the economic section of the city administration was a Russian.[55] There appears to have been a large measure of cordiality between the local groups and the OUN representa-

[50] Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2; 454th Sicherungsdivision, Section VII, Report of October 4, 1941, NOKW 2129 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2129).

[51] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 1, 1941, p. 1; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24 and 26, 1941, pp. 2 and 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 25, 1942, p. 5; *Nastup*, September 6, 1941, p. 5.

[52] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1, based on *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Zhitomir), August 3, 1941; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[53] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24, 1941, p. 2; many, however, were apparently Jews who were temporarily spared because of their usefulness (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2).

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 2, and *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2.

1 [Zhitomir in the East Ukraine, 1941 -- Analyst]

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VIII. NATIONALISM AND THE CHURCH

THE PRINCIPAL propagators of Ukrainian nationalism in the occupied Ukraine were political groups. They were, however, not the only bearers of the concept of Ukrainian distinctiveness. Religious organizations also played an important role. The relation of the Greek Catholic Church to the nationalist parties has already been discussed. Unlike the political parties, most of which at least claimed to represent the entire Ukrainian nation, however, the Greek Catholic Church was almost wholly confined to Galicia, since the great mass of the East Ukrainian Christians were members of the Orthodox faith. 795 [668*]

In the Orthodox lands, religion and national affiliation have always been closely related. Most of the East and South Slavic peoples identify their church with their national existence. Some of the same characteristics which have enhanced the distinctiveness of these peoples have also formed the basis of divisions among the Orthodox Slavs. One such feature is the lack of a supreme authority within the Orthodox Church. Each body of the church, existing in a given territory in a given period, has a well-defined hierarchy, usually governed by a council of bishops and frequently headed by a patriarch or metropolitan. There is, however, no pope at the head of all Orthodoxy. It is true that the Orthodox Church, like the Roman Catholic Church, recognizes the authority of an ecumenical council, but such a council has not been held in the East for a millennium. [182]

A difficult question arises at this point: how is the "body of the faithful" or "territory" of each group to be defined? This problem has, in fact, been an extremely troublesome one in the history of the Orthodox Church, for in the absence of a central ecclesiastical authority there can be no final solution. In practice an answer has been provided by another characteristic feature 795 659

[See category 116, pp. 36-38 -- Analyst]

●795 of the Orthodox Church—its close dependence on the secular
659 authority. Historically, the Orthodox Church has been the official church par excellence; union of church and state is not only a legal expression but a vital reality in the history of Eastern Europe. Consequently, the actual extent of authority of each body of the church has usually coincided with the boundaries of the state in which it exists. A corollary of this coincidence of state and ecclesiastical authority has been the establishment of, or the endeavor to establish, a new hierarchical authority whenever a
[668] major change in state sovereignty has taken place. Moreover, as nationalist movements became powerful in the Orthodox lands in the nineteenth century, they often demanded a separate church organization as a consequence of their growing sense of national distinctiveness, and as a preparation for their separate statehood.

795 Until 1917, almost all Orthodox East Slavs were united in a
659 single state, the Russian Empire, with a single church, the Rus-
186 sian Orthodox Church. Since the seventeenth century this church had lacked the customary patriarch or primate, and was connected to the secular power, and to a considerable degree controlled by it through an imperial official, the Procurator of the Holy Synod. The October Revolution destroyed the formal links between these historically intertwined institutions. At this point, the growing strength of Ukrainian national consciousness gave rise to a demand for state independence. It was in accord with the history of Orthodoxy that this demand should have been accompanied by a parallel movement for the establishment of a church organization independent of Moscow, for that seat of ecclesiastical authority had lost its preeminent prestige through the disestablishment of the Russian Orthodox Church, while its role as a symbol of East Slav unity was necessarily repudiated by those who saw the Ukrainian future as distinct from that of Russia.

000 Had the group desiring continuation of the Russian state (whether as an empire or a constitutional democracy) won out, it is probable that ecclesiastical unity would have been restored, since the Russian church, while it lost many of its privileges after the February Revolution, stood to gain in prestige through the reconstitution of the office of Patriarch of Moscow. Had, on the contrary, an independent Ukrainian state been able to maintain

itself for a few years, very likely a separate Ukrainian hierarchy 000
would have been generally recognized. In the situation which followed from the Bolshevik triumph, neither clear-cut solution was achieved. Instead, a large body of the lower clergy and the faithful 795
split off from the Russian hierarchy in the Ukraine. When no 798
member of the episcopacy could be found to consecrate a new bishop for the dissident group, the Ukrainian church body resorted to the "laying on of hands" by priests as a method for consecrating Father Lypkivs'kyi as prelate of their organization. Thus a new Orthodox Church was formed, which rapidly came to embrace the great majority of organized Orthodox believers in the Ukraine; by 1923 it had no less than three thousand parishes and thirty-five bishops, headed by Lypkivs'kyi, then known as Metropolitan Basil.[1] In spite of this apparent prosperity, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, as it was called, lay under the shadow of two great weaknesses. In the first place, it was not recognized by any other body of the Orthodox Church, for the method of consecration of the new bishops was regarded throughout the Orthodox world as uncanonical, a violation of the essential principle of apostolic succession. From the point of view of the traditional believer, the bishops of the new church were illegitimate; consequently, priests ordained by them (but not those who had joined the Autocephalous Church after ordination by a validly consecrated bishop) were not truly endowed with sacerdotal functions. Secondly, and of more immediate significance, the phenomenal growth of the new church was possible only because of the comparatively indulgent attitude shown by the Communist authorities who, at that time, were more antagonistic to the Russian church than to dissident bodies. When the Soviet [661]
power turned to restriction of Ukrainian national activity, as a potential threat to the unity of the USSR, the Autocephalous Church also came under attack. Its entire hierarchy and the great bulk of its clergy were executed or banished in 1929–30.[2]

In view of the close connection between church and state in 659
the Orthodox world, it was only natural that, when the Russian 795

[1] John S. Reshetar, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox Churth," *American Slavic and East European Review*, X (February, 1951), 43–45.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

659 Empire collapsed and a considerable body of Orthodox believers
795 came under Polish dominion, an effort was made to establish a separate hierarchy in Poland. The leader in this effort was Dionysius, a Russian bishop who, with recognition from the Patriarch of Constantinople, became Metropolitan of Warsaw and head of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in I oland.[3] In addition to the Belorussian archbishop of Pinsk, there were four bishops in Volhynia: Archbishop Alexius, with his residence in the famous Pochaïvs'ka Lavra (monastery), and his vicars Polykarp, bishop of Lutsk; Anthony (Martsenko), bishop of Kamen Kashirsk (Kamin Koshyrs'k); and Simon, bishop of Ostriz. These bishops were Ukrainian but subject to Dionysius.[4]

795 When the Soviet Union acquired Volhynia in September, 1939, its efforts to convert the Russian Orthodox Church into an auxiliary of the Soviet government were already well under way. A special deputy of Patriarch Sergius of Moscow, Nicholas, Exarch of the West Ukraine, was sent to coordinate the church of the newly occupied area with the government-approved ecclesiastical organization. The existing bishops were not deposed, with the exception of Alexander of Pinsk. The latter was not molested physically, but his ecclesiastical jurisdiction, now in the Belorussian Soviet Republic, was divided between a bishop of Brest and a bishop of Pinsk sent from Moscow.[5]

While it is not likely that Alexius or his adherents (including Polykarp) were pleased with the subjugation of their province by Moscow, they appear to have conformed to the Orthodox tradition of submission to the secular power, even when the latter is not basically sympathetic to the Orthodox religion. Although it
[626] did not suppress the Orthodox Church, the Soviet government imposed severe restrictions and onerous financial obligations upon it, as well as upon the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. As a result, many of the priests fled, or took up secular occupations.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48; Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1.

[4] *UAPTs (Ukrainskaia Avtokefalnaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov')* (UAPTs [Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church]), by "A. V." (Pravoslavnyi Beloruss, 1951; mimeographed), p. 2; cf. Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1. There was also a Bishop Timothy (Shreter) in a monastery in the Generalgouvernement, but he played no role in the controversies which followed, and appears to have been burned to death when Germans destroyed his monastery (Occ E-4 [1]).

[5] Occ E-4 (1); *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3.

In order to satisfy the resulting need for clergymen, Alexius is said to have consecrated a large number of new priests, many of them persons unfitted by background or training for the performance of clerical duties.[6] Thus the fabric of the church was to some extent weakened and demoralized. At the same time, however, the Soviet-allied church in Moscow endeavored to extend its influence into an area which had had few Orthodox communicants since the seventeenth century, by consecrating as bishop of L'vov, under the name of Panteleimon, a priest, Rudyk, who was a native Galician but had always favored a union of the province with Russia.[7]

That there was nothing inherently agreeable in their enforced submission to Soviet control is indicated by the fact that the Orthodox bishops in the West Ukraine, both those who had exercised episcopal functions in Volhynia prior to 1939 and those who owed their status to the Moscow-inspired endeavors to reorganize the Ukrainian church, failed to evacuate with the Red Army when the Germans invaded the region. The sole exception was the Exarch Nicholas, who soon assumed an active role in appealing to the patriotic and religious sentiments of the peoples of the USSR to secure support of the Soviet regime. Under the title of Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, he issued numerous statements against the Germans and the Ukrainian nationalists.[8]

As the German armies drove on beyond the pre-1939 Polish border into areas which had been under Soviet control for twenty years, they discovered that there remained considerable numbers of Orthodox clergymen. For example, there were one hundred in the Zhitomir area alone, and two small churches had remained open in Kiev under Soviet rule.[9] There were also Archbishops

[6] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1941, p. 2; Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 28, 1941, p. 1.

[7] *UAPTs*, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1941, p. 2.

[8] For a report on clandestine propaganda against the Germans in the Ukraine issued over Nicholas's signature, see PS 051. There are a number of reports of Orthodox priests, especially in Kiev, who acted as Soviet agents (cf. Occ E-4 [1]). One of Nicholas's wartime writings was even distributed abroad by the Soviet Union—i.e., Nikolai (Nicholas), Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia (ed.), *The Russian Orthodox Church and the War against Fascism* (Moscow: The Patriarchate of Moscow, 1943). At a later period, Nikolai frequently employed the title Mitropolit Krutitskii, pertaining to the Moscow monastery of which he was titular head.

[9] PS 053.

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795 Anthony (Abashidze) in Kiev, who was, however, too old and crippled to exercise any considerable degree of influence; Anatole in Odessa; Theophilus in Kharkov; and Bishop Damaskin in Kamenets-Podols'k.[10]

As soon as conditions had become somewhat stabilized in the West Ukrainian lands, Alexius and his associates proceeded to call a meeting of all Ukrainian bishops in areas liberated from the Soviet regime. This gathering, known as the Sobor of Volhynian Bishops, met in the Pochaiïvs'ka Lavra in mid-August, 1941, and on August 18 proclaimed the reorganization of the Autonomous Orthodox Church in the Ukraine.[11] Subordination to the Patriarch of Moscow was declared to be in abeyance so long as the Communists maintained control over him, but a nominal canonical adherence of the Ukrainian church to the Patriarch was recognized. At the same time, two new bishops were consecrated to carry out the task of reorganizing church life.[12]

This task was already under way, at least in the Zhitomir area. All surviving priests were registered and their status examined by two archimandrites (monastic archpriests), one sent by Alexius and one from the famous Monastery of the Caves in Kiev.[13] The great majority of the surviving clergy had been consecrated in the old canonically recognized Russian church, since Soviet persecution had greatly reduced the Autocephalous ranks. Some of the latter remained, however, and had to accept reconsecration at the hands of the bishops of the Volhynian Sobor before receiving appointments to parishes. Understandably, this demand for repudiation of the position on the validity of the Autocephalous consecration taken by their deceased leader, Lypkivs'kyi, was deeply resented, especially since many of the priests previously consecrated by Alexius were not, as has been pointed out, models of devotion to the sacerdotal vocation.[14]

[10] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 15, 1941, p. 4.

[11] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[12] *UAPTs*, p. 3, names eight appointed at this time. Contemporary sources refer to two only, and it appears likely that the others were consecrated somewhat later, probably for the most part at the *sobor* in December. Cf. *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3, and *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, January 20, 1941, p. 1.

[13] Fedir S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24, 1941, p. 4; the archimandrite from Kiev, Leontius Fillippovych, was consecrated bishop (as Leontius) at the August *sobor*.

[14] *Ibid.*

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Whether the greatly weakened "Lypkivites," as the Autocephalous adherents were known, could have made any effective objections by themselves is doubtful. There was, however, a powerful ally at hand. During the time when the Soviet authorities were bringing the Volhynian church under their control, Ukrainian influence in Orthodox ecclesiastical life in the Generalgouvernement was greatly increasing, particularly in the Chelm area. As part of the restoration of the Orthodox Church to a position of strength, Dionysius, in October, 1940, consecrated Professor John Ohiienko, who had long been active in religious affairs as a church historian and philologist, as Hilarion, Archbishop of Chelm.[15] Two months later he consecrated a bishop, Palladius, for the small Orthodox population in the Lemko region.[16] Both of these men were strong nationalists. Hilarion in particular had long desired to see the separation of the Ukrainian church from Moscow.[17]

When the Volhynian Sobor was called, Alexander, the archbishop of Pinsk, was not invited, for, it was explained, he was a Belorussian.[18] Nevertheless, his Moscow-appointed successor, Benjamin, was not only present but acted as secretary of the conference. In view of the fact that Alexander's opposition to the Communists had been the cause for Benjamin's appointment, it is understandable that this arrangement excited discontent. Moreover, the position of Dionysius, who had been the superior of all the Volhynian bishops before the Soviet occupation, was unclear.[19] If Soviet occupation of Volhynia had been illegitimate, presumably his authority had only been suspended by physical barrier of the frontier which had separated German-controlled Warsaw from Soviet-occupied territory. Nevertheless, after Soviet evacuation, Alexius had proceeded to reorganize the whole Ukrainian church on the assumption that a reunion with Moscow had been legally constituted, although publicly holding the posi-

[15] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 24, 1940, p. 1.

[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 12, 1941, p. 3. Palladius became bishop of Cracow; this move was viewed by some as an unwarranted invasion by the Orthodox Church of a predominantly Greek Catholic section of the Ukrainian territory. Cf. Mykola Andrusiak in *Nastup*, October 12, 1940, p. 4.

[17] Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 17, 1942, p. 3.

[18] *UAPTs*, p. 3; *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[19] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 27, 1941, p. 3, expresses the indignation felt at the exclusion of the Autocephalous bishops in the Generalgouvernement.

195 tion that this union was inoperative because of continued Soviet control of the church in Moscow. Doubtless influenced by these considerations, Polykarp, the bishop of Lutsk, declined to attend the *sobor,* presenting the excuse of "difficult conditions of communication," although his episcopal see was less than fifty miles from the Pochaïvs'ka Lavra.[20] Shortly afterwards Dionysius appointed Polykarp "vicar" of the Vladimir Volynsk and adjacent Gorukhov (Horukhiv) areas; at the time, apparently neither explicitly rejected Alexius as head of the Orthodox hierarchy in Volhynia.[21]

During the fall of 1941, opposition to Alexius's predominance gradually mounted. In addition to the friction over the investiture of the Lypkivite priests, great resentment arose from the fact that the bishops of Alexius's group were either predominantly of Russian origin or were known for past adherence to the [186] church of Moscow. The acceptance of continued subordination to Moscow, however theoretical the tie might be under the prevailing conditions, was of course resented by the Ukrainian nationalist elements. Moreover, many among the latter, especially the intelligentsia, strongly desired the replacement of the Old Slavonic liturgy by services in the living Ukrainian language, while the Volhynian *sobor* had merely provided for certain prayers in the latter speech.[22] As these points of friction accumulated, prominent Orthodox laymen like Stephen Skrypnyk, the publisher of the newspaper *Volyn'* in Rovno, rallied to the side of the Autocephalous group.[23] On November 28, Polykarp definitely broke with Alexius, declaring the Archbishop's group "anarchical," and repudiated him as ecclesiastical superior.[24] Shortly afterwards, Alexius replied by proclaiming himself Metropolitan of the Ukraine, in accordance with a decision of a second *sobor* of Volhynian bishops.[25]

[20] *UAPTs,* p. 3; *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[21] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist,* November 15, 1941, p. 3. In a move evidently designed to conciliate Polykarp, the *sobor* had named him bishop of Kamenets-Podolsk (*ibid.*).

[22] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[23] Cf. Skrypnyk's article in *Volyn',* reproduced in *L'vivs'ki Visti,* January 11–12, 1942, p. 5, and an article from the Kremenets *Kremianets'kyi Visnyk,* cited in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* October 15, 1941, p. 4.

[24] *L'vivs'ki Visti,* January 11–12, 1942, p. 5 (Skrypnyk's article cited).

[25] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 27, 1941, p. 3.

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While the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine was splitting into two antagonistic factions, the leader of the Greek Catholic Church was endeavoring to effect an ecclesiastical union of all Ukrainians. The separate development of the Greek Catholic Church has been sketched already. It may be pointed out, however, that what had originally been regarded as an instrument of the Poles for consolidating their dominion in the western Ukrainian lands had long since developed into a truly national church, in the sense of being independent of any foreign secular power, although it was largely confined to one province of the Ukraine. Since the Greek Catholic Church of the Ukraine possessed a rite and a body of ecclesiastical regulations quite different from that of the churches of the neighboring Catholic nations, which were of the Latin rite, the mere fact of adherence to it tended to set the Galicians apart as a national entity. As was pointed out, Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi had long been a vigorous supporter of the Ukrainian nationalist movements, although he had tried to turn them away from an extreme nationalism incompatible with Christianity. His influence was naturally greatest among his own coreligionists, but extended also to Ukrainians of the Orthodox faith. Hence Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi felt that the Soviet retreat offered an opportunity for bringing about the union of all Ukrainians in a single national church within the framework of the universal church in which he believed. The immediate opportunity for advancing this desire was a letter, October 21, 1941, to Archbishop Hilarion, congratulating him on his elevation to the episcopacy; Sheptyts'kyi explained that he could not do so before because of the severance of communications between the Soviet- and the German-dominated areas. Together with cordial felicitations, the Metropolitan expressed his hope that Hilarion would play a leading role in cleansing the Ukrainian church of "uncanonical" "Muscovite" influences introduced by Peter the Great, and hoped that this process would prepare the way for union of all the Ukrainian churches.[26] Two months later he addressed a

[26] The text of the letter is printed in Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukrains'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), pp. 123–24.

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795 letter of similar import to all "Orthodox archpriests in the Ukraine and in the Ukrainian lands."[27]

The replies were courteous, but not encouraging. Hilarion answered in a cordial, even humble fashion, but he did not fail to point out that, while the liturgy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had indeed suffered from Russian infiltration, that of the Greek Catholic Church had been permeated with Latin elements, and he suggested that the latter body also needed purification from foreign influences.[28] Alexius likewise replied to the second letter in a friendly fashion, but said that unification could come about only through a change in human nature, perhaps at the end of the world, and expressed the view that, after all, diversity had its advantages in promoting the search for the good.[29] Still not giving up hope, Sheptyts'kyi appealed in an open letter of March 3, 1942, for the support of the Ukrainian Orthodox intelligentsia, who, he said, exerted great influence in their church.[30] This effort was also fruitless. Probably its only result was to play a part in inducing the Autocephalous Church in the Generalgouvernement to present a final reply to his overtures by an uncompromising resolution of the *sobor* of bishops in Warsaw, in May, 1942, to the effect that his wishes could easily be fulfilled, if only all Greek Catholics would join the Autocephalous Church.[31]

000 The failure of the Metropolitan's efforts was doubtless due fundamentally to the deep cleavage which separates Orthodox from Catholic, the former viewing submission to the authority of the Pope as a renunciation of the valid tradition of the Christian church, which they believe that their body has maintained. An additional compelling reason for the rejection of Sheptyts'kyi's overtures in the winter and spring of 1942 was the incontestible fact that gestures of reconciliation with Rome would have been regarded by many of the Orthodox laity as treason, and would therefore very probably have weakened the church which

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 127–28.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 124–27.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 128–30; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 15, 1942, p. 3.
[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 5, 1942, p. 3; Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 130–31.
[31] Baran, *Mytropolyt*, p. 132.

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participated in such measures. This was a vital consideration, for by midwinter the conflict between the two tendencies in the Orthodox Church represented by Alexius and Polykarp had turned into an active struggle for supremacy.

On December 24, 1941, after the second *sobor* of Volhynian bishops had endowed Alexius with the title of metropolitan, Dionysius appointed Polykarp administrator of all Volhynia. Six weeks later, Archbishop Alexander who, it will be recalled, had been left out of the Autonomous Church conference, joined with the Autocephalous Church in Poland in calling a new *sobor* in Pinsk.[32] While Alexander was not a Ukrainian by origin, he now had a fairly clear title according to Orthodox usage to participate in Ukrainian church affairs, since his archiepiscopal see had been included in the territorial limits of the Ukraine, as defined by the boundaries of the Reichskommissariat. He was a welcome support to the group opposed to Alexius, and they made no difficulty about recognizing his authority to call the *sobor*. Since, however, the other authority for calling the conference was Dionysius, the constitutive assembly of the new Ukrainian church was established by non-Ukrainian prelates. The moving spirits, however, were the strongly nationalist Ukrainians, Polykarp and Hilarion. With them went Palladius, the third Ukrainian bishop of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Poland. Together they decided to form a new ecclesiastical body to be known as the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Ukraïns'ka Avtokefal'na Pravoslavna Tserkva—UAPTs), which was to unite as quickly as possible with the remnants of the church of the same name founded by Lypkivs'kyi.[33] Somewhat later Damaskin of Kamenets-Podolsk rejected Alexius and adhered to the new group.[34] Their ranks were also augmented by the consecration as bishops in February of two Volhynian priests, Abramovych and Huba, who became members of the hierarchy as Nikanor and Ihor.[35]

[32] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 22, 1942, p. 4.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 22, 1942, p. 4. Apparently Damaskin later returned to the Autonomous Church.
[35] *Ibid.*; and *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 28, 1942, p. 1.

795 While the basic reason for the foundation of a new church, 727 and its rapid growth at the expense of the body under Alexius, was the nationalist feeling of the Ukrainians, which demanded a fully national church divorced from any connection, however theoretical, with Russia, German policy had also played a role in division of the Orthodox communion. Fundamentally, Nazi policy was permeated with violent hatred of all religion. The guiding principle for selection of German officials for the east ensured that this basic theme would persist in the application of policy: "The whole Christian outlook makes one incapable of carrying on work in the east, for the community of the hymnbook is put ahead of the needs of the Reich." [36] Within this blanket opposition to the church, however, even the fanatical anticlericalism of Rosenberg and his staff permitted compromises to secure tactical advantages. In their eyes, Catholic Christianity was the chief religious danger in the east. The leaders of the Catholic Church had long hoped for an opportunity to bring their doctrines to the peoples of the Soviet Union. On the outbreak of war, they attempted to send a number of priests, including several trained in the Ukrainian College in Rome, as missionaries. The Ostministerium rigorously opposed this endeavor, and with the exception of a few clergymen who were able to penetrate the Ukraine as chaplains in the Italian army, the Vatican's efforts were thwarted.[37] Similarly, the efforts of Polish Catholics to conduct activities in the East Ukraine, even among the considerable body of communicants of the Latin rite in Volhynia, were quickly suppressed.[38]

In contrast to the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church was not to be opposed openly, provided it was not Russian dominated but Ukrainian in character. Moreover, any other purely Ukrainian sects were to be permitted. It was hoped that by allowing a multitude of religious bodies, the Orthodox Church as such

[36] Memorandum on personnel for the east, from the Rosenberg files, July 9, 1941, PS 1040 (hereafter referred to as PS 1040).

[37] Directive by Alfred Meyer, "Die Frage der konfessionellen Verbände," July 29, 1941, PS 1047 (hereafter referred to as PS 1047). On the training of missionaries of the Greek Catholic rite for missionary work in the USSR after the conquest, see also Aldo Valori, *La Campagna di Russia* (Rome: Grafica Nazionale Editrice, 1951), I, 244.

[38] PS 053.

would be weakened, for "the corruption and cultural backwardness of the clergy prepared the ground for Bolshevism."[39] When, however, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was founded as a distinctively national church, it appeared to the Ostministerium to be a useful means of furthering its aim of strengthening Ukrainian nationalism and driving a wedge between the Ukrainian and the Russian elements. Consequently, it felt that the Autocephalous Church under the leadership of Polykarp should be recognized and accorded a position of distinct superiority in comparison to the Autonomous Church headed by Alexius.[40] 795 727

As was frequently the case, the policy formulated in Rosenberg's ministry failed of all practical results in the Ukraine. The Reichskommissariat decided to pursue a diametrically opposed course. Thus it proclaimed confessional freedom in June, 1942, but ordered all ecclesiastical organization limited to individual *Generalbezirke*.[41] In particular, it decided a little later to order the dissolution of the governing bodies of both the Autonomous and the Autocephalous Churches, the *sobors* headed by Alexius and Polykarp respectively.[42]

One reason for this decision to restrict religious organization was undoubtedly the fact that the Autocephalous Church had shown great vigor in organizing a new hierarchy. In May a second *sobor* of Autocephalous bishops had gathered in Kiev and consecrated no less than seven new bishops. The majority had been Volhynian priests, but two were laymen who had played prominent roles in the development of the new church body: Stephen Skrypnyk, who became bishop of Pereiaslav as Mstyslav, and a Kiev professor, Haievs'kyi, who became Bishop Sylvester.[43] Strong 795

[39] PS 1047.

[40] Draft of a directive of Rosenberg to the Reichskommissare Ostland and Ukraine, May 13, 1942, CXLVa 15, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 15). I do not know whether the directive was ever actually sent, but it certainly expresses the opinion of the predominant group in the Ostministerium, as opposed to that of Koch's officials.

[41] Report by an unidentified official of the Ostministerium to Rosenberg, June 30, 1944, CXLVa 66, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 66).

[42] Directive of Reichskommissar Ukraine (signed by Dargel, head of the political section) to the Generalkommissare, October 1, 1942, CXLVa 20, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 20).

[43] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 28, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup*, July 12, 1942, p. 2.

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795 efforts were made to secure the support of all the surviving Lypkyvites, with great success, apparently because there was no demand for reconsecration, although at first there was friction between the new and the old Autocephalous bodies.[44] The new consecrations raised the total number of the higher clergy to fourteen: two archbishops (Polykarp and Alexander, Hilarion being still a member of the hierarchy of the Polish church, i.e., that in the Generalgouvernement) and twelve bishops, with five hundred parishes and a still greater number of priests under their author-
727 ity.[45] The vigor and unity of the church alone was sufficient to
795 make it repugnant to those Germans who feared any independent center of Ukrainian life. For example, the Generalkommissar in Nikolaev wrote Erich Koch expressing his fear that the Autocephalous Church, which was strong in the northern part of his area, was becoming a "national church," and said that all priests were being closely watched.[46] Koch himself conceived a violent antipathy for Mstyslav, whom he described as "Skrypnyk, a prominent Ukrainian politician in Kiev," asserting that the bishop was trying to turn the Wehrmacht against the Reichskommissariat officials.[47]

As a result of these feelings of distrust, the Reichskommissariat refused to follow the policy of favoring the Autocephalous Church as against the Autonomous Church. With the desertion of the nationalist Ukrainians, the latter was coming more and more to be the confession of Russophile elements in the Ukraine, or at least of those elements which favored equality between Russians and Ukrainians in cultural and political life. In an effort to build up a counterweight to the nationalist forces, the Reichskommissariat officials began to favor the Autonomous Church. First the Reichskommissar decided that a balance should be maintained

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 3; Dmytro Doroshenko in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, November 10, 1942, p. 1.

[45] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 1, 1942, p. 4, based on information from Bishop Mstyslav. Apparently in addition to the bishops I have referred to as adhering to the Autocephalous Church, a new member of the hierarchy, Korenistov, was consecrated as bishop of Brest and auxiliary of Alexander of Pinsk. Doroshenko in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, November 10, 1942, p. 1, also refers to fourteen members of the UAP hierarchy.

[46] April, 1942, CXLVa 474, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 474).

[47] PS 192.

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between the two churches.[48] Later his henchmen used the Autonomous Church as a means of weakening the Autocephalous Church when the latter threatened to become powerful. The reverse tactic was also used occasionally, but the general tendency appears to be that taken by the Stadtkommissar of Kiev, who openly indicated the preference of the German officials for the Russian-oriented church by transferring to it in a public ceremony the principal cathedral of the city, St. Vladimir's (St. Volodymyr's).[49]

The general policy of the Reichskommissariat toward union of the two Orthodox bodies was governed by the same principle of doing everything which would weaken forces which might slip beyond its control. In May, when it appeared that the nascent strength of the Autocephalous group might be curbed by securing its subordination to Alexius, this line of action was favored, though in a tentative way, because the specter of a single united church, whatever its stand on the national question, was also abhorrent to the autocratic Nazi group.[50] By October, when the Autocephalous Church had become so strong that Alexius was obliged to seek unification on terms favorable to it, the Germans intervened to render abortive all attempts at conciliation.[51] Actually, the negotiations between Alexius on the one side and Polykarp, Mstyslav, and Nikanor on the other, proceeded so far that on October 8, 1942, an act of union was signed. A new synod of bishops, consisting of Polykarp and Alexius as metropolitans, with Alexander, Simon (an Autonomous bishop) and Nikanor as members, and Mstyslav as secretary, was to be formed. Thus the Autocephalous group would have obtained a clear majority in the directing body. The episcopal sees were to be so rearranged as to allow places for all or most of the bishops hitherto consecrated by both groups.[52] The strong German inter-

[48] CXLVa 20.

[49] *Volyn'*, May 2, 1943, p. 4.

[50] On May 4, 1942, at a conference in Rovno, an official of the Reichskommissariat expressed the wishes of the German authorities that the two churches unite, but declared that the Germans would maintain neutrality and not intervene at that time to secure union (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 14, 1942, p. 3).

[51] The directive of the Reichskommissar Ukraine to the Generalkommissare previously cited (CXLVa 20) provided that all efforts at union should be opposed.

[52] *Nastup*, November 15, 1942, p. 2; *Ukrains'ka Diiesist'*, December 10, 1942, p. 2.

727 vention, however, combined with the opposition of a number
795 of Autonomous bishops, headed by Panteleimon, forced Alexius to retract his signature.[53]

795 From what has just been said, one would assume that there
668* would be a close connection between the Autocephalous Church, which within a few months had come to be the church of most believing Ukrainian nationalists, and the nationalist parties. To a certain extent this is true, for many members of the latter, who were prevented by the danger of violent death from pursuing any national political activities, turned to the cultivation of the church as a means for expressing and propagating their feelings. A number of the leading members of the Autocephalous Church were affiliated with the UNR, and the Het'man group also displayed great interest in religious development, in line with its conservative and traditionalist principles. More particularly, Mstyslav, the member of the UAP hierarchy who was most intimately acquainted with and interested in political affairs, was an old adherent of the UNR.[54]

668* As has been previously indicated, however, the really active parties in the East Ukraine were the two factions of the OUN. Hence the fact that the church leaders tended to associate with other groupings acted as a certain impediment to close collaboration. Moreover, a strong element in both wings of the OUN was opposed to religion in principle. This ideological bias against utilizing the church as a major instrument of national expression was undoubtedly given greatly increased weight by the experience
668* of the nationalists in the East Ukraine. The churches—both Au-
771 tonomous and Autocephalous—had no difficulty in attracting communicants, for there were many millions who had longed for the remembered solace of religion throughout the years of Communist oppression. These adherents of the church were, however, drawn very largely from the lower classes, the less educated elements of the population, especially the peasantry.[55] Since the OUN groups—as will be shown—concentrated their efforts on the intelligentsia, they placed comparatively little emphasis on

[53] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, December 10, 1942. p. 2.

[54] Interview 69.

[55] See Chapter IX for details and sources on the attitude of the social classes and age groups toward religion.

aspects of nationalist feeling which were prevalent only in the village. More important, the younger generation everywhere, even in the rural areas, was hostile or at least indifferent to religion. Both OUN groups were intent upon winning the allegiance of youth; they soon came to see that any close connection with the church would be interpreted by a large segment of the latter as "reactionary." Hence they abandoned or played down their contacts with the clergy, rather than jeopardize their success with the youth.[56]

While the factors just described prevented any wholehearted collaboration between the church and the nationalist political movements, there were numerous cases in which the two nationalist tendencies moved in parallel paths. This was especially the case in Kiev, where Panteleimon, the most outspokenly pro-Russian of Autonomous bishops, and hence the most obstinate foe of Ukrainian national independence, was opposed to Mstyslav, the most active nationalist among the Autocephalous bishops. Nationalist Ukrainians abstained from any contact with the Autonomous Church there; they had the support of a number of prominent figures in the city administration, including the mayor, Forostivs'kyi, who had himself been a priest under Lypkyvs'kyi. The anti-Nationalist element around Shtepa and Bohatyrchuk was perhaps not so enthusiastic about Panteleimon's church, and appears to have maintained a modicum of good relations with the Autocephalous clergy, but in general the alignment of political groups closely corresponded to confessional differences.[57]

This was even more the case in Dniepropetrovsk, where a strong proponent of a revived Russian Empire, Dimitrius, was installed as Autonomous bishop. The nationalist elements were violently opposed to his policies, and apparently considerable popular opposition was awakened by his efforts to revive the pomp of the old Russian Orthodox Church.[58] On the other hand, strong Russian nationalist elements, encouraged in all likelihood by the strongly Russophile city administration and press, vigor-

[56] Interviews 18, 65, 76.

[57] Interview 19.

[58] Interview 18 supported the statement in *Nastup*, August 22, 1942, that about thirty churches in the Dniepropetrovsk area joined the UAP church when a bishop was named by it for Dniepropetrovsk.

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795 668* ously supported Dimitrius. This support resulted in several cases of actual vandalism directed against rival churches. The leader of the Autocephalous Church, Genadius, enjoyed good relations with both Mel'nyk and Bandera groups in the Dnieper city. Genadius aided the Bandera underground workers to escape from the German authorities, while one of his principal assistants was affiliated with the OUN-M, and the university faculty, which was strongly influenced by the Mel'nyk group, taught courses to prepare aspirants for his clergy.[59]

It is necessary to stress the extent—and the limits—of collaboration between the nationalists and the Autocephalous Church because of two incidents which have been widely taken as proof that the latter institution was involved, to an extent that could hardly be compatible with Christian principles, with some of the more violent elements of the OUN. The first incident concerned the head of the Autonomous Church, Archbishop Alexius. Early in the morning of May 7, 1943, the prelate started on a trip from his monastery near Kremenets.[60] He was in a German vehicle, part of a small convoy; why he chose this means of transportation is unclear, but it seems likely that the Germans would have urged a man of his prestige to accept such an accommodation, for as will be remembered the Volhynian roads at this time were in danger of attack from Red partisan bands or from nationalist bands disguised as such. At eight o'clock, as the little convoy was passing through a wood, it was suddenly attacked by a section of "Khrin's" partisan group; in the volley of shots, the occupants of the archbishop's automobile were all killed, and the wrecked vehicle was seized by the partisans. They were shocked to discover the prominent clergyman in a group which they thought included only German officials. Afterwards, however, they asserted that their remorse was dissipated by the finding of papers indicating close collaboration between the archbishop and the German police.[61]

If the above account, which appears to be highly probable, is

[59] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 19, 1942, p. 2; Interview 18.
[60] *UAPTs*, p. 5.
[61] *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, June 1, 1943, p. 2; Baran, *Mytropolyt*, p. 122; Interview 12.

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true, it is certain that the killing was unintentional and unpre- 668*
meditated and consequently does not indicate any plan of the 795
nationalists to aid the Autocephalous Church by destroying the chief prelate of the opposing group. That such a plan is even more unlikely is shown by the fact, attested by a source not involved in the dispute, that Alexius was the chief moderating influence in the Autonomous Church.[62] As has been shown, he tried to bring about union, and was on terms of friendship with at least one of the chief Autocephalous churchmen. These circumstances also go far to refute the charge that Alexius was in the service of the German police or, as has also been alleged by nationalist writers, in the service of the NKVD.[63] His personal character, as evidenced by his writings,[64] and the respect in which he was held even by opponents militate against such an accusation, even had not his conciliatory tendency refuted the main burden of the charge that he had fostered the disruption of the church to further the ends of the Germans and the Soviets. The whole incident was in all probability a tragic accident, utilized afterwards as propaganda for the rival groups.

So clear-cut a judgment cannot be offered concerning the sec- 668*
ond incident involving the slaying of an Autonomous bishop. In 687
the late summer of 1943, Emmanuel, then Autonomous bishop of 795
Vladimir Volynsk, was seized by a band of the UPA (controlled at that time by the OUN-B), taken to one of their forest headquarters, and there, after a "trial," executed as a traitor and a spy. Charges similar to those made against Alexius were the basis for the accusation against his colleague, and, in addition, Emmanuel is supposed to have confessed to having acted as an agent for the German police in betraying underground members.[65] Whether this is true cannot be determined, but certain factors cast considerable doubt upon it. The fact that the same charges were made against Alexius, who was very likely innocent, renders suspicious the accusations made against Emmanuel. The latter

[62] CXLVa 66.
[63] Mykola Selez', "Iak diiut stalins'ki agentury?" (How Do the Stalinist Agent Systems Operate?), *Vpered*, May, 1949, p. 11.
[64] See his letter to Sheptyts'kyi in Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 128–30.
[65] Selez', p. 11; Interview 63.

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687 was regarded, for another reason, as a traitor, for he had originally
668* been consecrated as bishop of Belaia Tserkov' by the Auto-
795 cephalous Church, and his subsequent defection to the Autonomous Church, on grounds of the dubious canonical validity of the nationalist religious body, must have been a sore blow to Ukrainian nationalist feeling.[66] He had also issued public statements calling for all the faithful to avoid aiding the nationalist partisans; while nearly everyone in a public position in Volhynia (including an OUN member like the editor of *Volyn'*) was forced to make such statements, it appears likely that Emmanuel may have been rather more vigorous and sincere than others in his circumstances.[67] On the other hand, there is no really trustworthy evidence that he engaged in spying, or other indisputably dishonorable activity, and those who knew him best tend to doubt the charge.[68] Consequently, it appears that his death was due to the fanatic and ruthless spirit which dominated the OUN-B in Volhynia at the time.

On the other hand, there is no evidence to implicate the Autocephalous Church in his killing, and all appearances point to its having been decided upon independently by the partisan forces. It is true that Emmanuel's position was especially distasteful to the UPA because of the contrast it offered to the stand of the most active Autocephalous prelate in Volhynia, Bishop Platonius of Rovno, who actively aided the underground, and is said even to have gone to the UPA camp in Derman to offer his support.[69] It should be pointed out, however, that Platonius was comparatively uninfluential in Autocephalous Church councils. The more typical attitude was that of Polykarp—also resident in Volhynia—who offered vigorous protests against German attacks on the clergy and against the brutal treatment of his people,[70] yet never gave open support or encouragement to the rebels. In this policy of submission to the secular power, even to an evil one, Polykarp

[66] Selez', p. 11; *UAPTs*, p. 5.
[67] Cf. his address to the Ukrainian population, in *Volyn'*, August 8, 1943, p. 3.
[68] Interview 38.
[69] *UAPTs*, p. 10; Interview 18.
[70] CXLVa 66. See also the sharp but respectful protest of Hilarion against the shooting of Autocephalous priests in the Generalgouvernement for contacts with escaped prisoners of war in the spring of 1942—long before there was any widespread nationalist partisan activity (Occ E-2 [2]).

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was, according to his own statement, following the tradition of Orthodoxy.[71]

A few months after the tragic episodes just described, nearly all of the East Ukraine was reconquered by the Red Army. The great majority of the Orthodox bishops, of both the Autocephalous and the Autonomous groups, did not await the vengeance which could be expected to follow their opposition to the Soviet plan for using Orthodoxy as a propaganda weapon but fled to the Generalgouvernement. Here they were given considerably more courteous treatment than had been their lot in the Reichskommissariat.[72] Moreover, the Ostministerium felt able at last to push forward its plans for formation of a national church. The project envisaged by Rosenberg's ministry called for union of the two rival branches. Ostensibly this union would have been a compromise, but, like the abortive agreement signed by Alexius, it would have favored the Autocephalous group. The Ostministerium officials in charge of the negotiations were obviously sympathetic to Mstyslav and Hilarion, though somewhat cooler toward Polykarp.[73] On the other hand, they viewed Panteleimon, the real leader of the Autonomous group, as a "Russian" and obstinate; they proposed to induce him to leave the Ukraine altogether by offering him the vacant Orthodox see of Riga.[74] The Autocephalous desire for a union in which there would be for a time "Russian bishops for the Russian minority," who would later be absorbed into the "Ukrainian church," obviously envisaged a relegation of the Autonomous bishops, or at least of those who persisted in favoring Russian cultural and ethnic elements, to an inferior position, yet it was apparently not opposed by the Ostministerium.[75]

[71] CXLVa 66.
[72] *Ibid.*
[73] *Ibid.*
[74] *Ibid.* The nominal leader of the Autonomous Church, elected to succeed Alexius, was Damaskin of Kamenets-Podolsk, who appears by this time to have returned to the Autonomous fold (cf. *Volyn'*, July 1, 1943, p. 3).
[75] CXLVa 66. Although this project could not be carried out, the Ostministerium continued to favor to the limit of its capacities the Ukrainian national group in religious as well as political affairs. Cf. Memorandum of Rosenfelder (specialist in the Ostministerium) to Chef des Führungstabes Politik, December 14, 1944, concerning plans for increasing the influence of the Autocephalous Church among

●795 The plans for a nationalist church were frustrated, however, by the refusal of the Autonomous bishops to accept the role assigned them by the Ostministerium and by the impotency of the latter agency to enforce its wishes. Instead of uniting with the other bishops from the Ukraine, the surviving Autonomous hierarchs adhered to the émigré Russian Orthodox Church represented by the Karlovtsi Synod. At least two of them had done so by the beginning of October, 1944, and the remainder soon followed.[76] The coincidence of these steps with the adherence of certain prominent Ukrainians to the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia suggests that the same German forces which encouraged the Vlasov movement may also have supported the decision of the church group. The fact that such a step was taken, however, confirms the appraisal of the Autonomous Church as an organization closely linked to those elements which desired the continuance and the prevalence of Russian culture in the Ukraine and the maintenance of political ties with Russia.

795 668* The organization, tactics, and specific objectives of the Autocephalous Church were distinct from those of the nationalist parties during the war period. The very concept of an independent Ukrainian church served to promote a feeling of Ukrainian national distinctiveness, however, and since the Autocephalous clergy were usually propagators of nationalism, no consideration of the nationalist movements in the Orthodox East Ukraine under German occupation which failed to take into account the role of
795 the Autocephalous Church would be complete. Since the rival

the *Ostarbeiter* at the expense of the Russian Orthodox Church, CXLVa 76, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 76).

[76] Rosenfelder to Chef des Führungsstabes Politik, October 4, 1944, CXLVa 74, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 74); *UAPTs*, p. 6. At least one Autocephalous and three Autonomous bishops remained behind when the Red Army reoccupied the East Ukraine. Two of the former Autonomous bishops, Anthony (Martsenko) and Hiob (Kresovych), were apparently permitted to exercise episcopal functions under Soviet rule. Cf. Wassilij Alexeev, *Russian Orthodox Bishops in the Soviet Union, 1941–1953: Materials for the History of the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR* (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954), pp. 134 ff. (mimeographed, with Russian language text).

Autonomous Church sought to maintain ties with Moscow, it is 795 especially illuminating to compare its influence with that of the nationalist church. Consequently, the activities of the two rival churches will be noted frequently in the following chapters on the East Ukraine.[77]

[77] An important recent work on the church in the Ukraine, Friedrich Heyer's *Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945* (Köln-Braunsfeld: Verlagsgesellschaft Rudolf Müller, 1953), reached me too late for notice in the body of this study. Heyer, who served with the Wehrmacht in the occupied Soviet Union during the Second World War, had numerous personal contacts with leaders of both the Autonomous Church and the Autocephalous Church; in addition, he has apparently been able to utilize notes or other documents concerning ecclesiastical affairs acquired in the course of his military service. In general, his account of church developments corresponds to that which I have given above and in succeeding chapters, and his conclusions are similar except that he ascribes somewhat greater success to the Autonomous Church. While much of his discussion of the wartime period is devoted to purely ecclesiastical affairs which I did not attempt to cover in detail, his work is extremely valuable from the political and sociological standpoint as well. Particularly interesting are his abundant details on the extent of reorganization of religious life in the occupied territories, and his comments on the response of the population to the efforts of the churches.

IX. CHANNELS OF NATIONALIST ACTIVITY

[795] 668* THOUGH the church did in some measure provide an institutional framework through which nationalist sentiment could be expressed, its usefulness for the propagation of a political doctrine was necessarily limited. Such organizational channels were essential to the nationalist movements if they were to achieve large-scale results in the occupied East Ukraine. To be sure, the underground parties themselves provided a network of contacts and a minimum of central direction. In comparison with the vast area to be covered—populated in 1941–43, even after wartime dislocations, by thirty millions—resources under their direct control [208] were microscopic. Clandestine publications could be issued by mimeograph machines or small hand presses and circulated from one trusted individual to another. Such propaganda could, however, reach only a few thousand. As underground groups, the nationalist parties necessarily had extremely small memberships. For example, a group of twelve members of the OUN-B in Kramatorskaia (Kremators'ka) in the Donbas is referred to by one of the leaders of the party in that area as a "big" cell.[1] Again, the entire number of active OUN-M workers in Kiev in late 1942 never exceeded thirty.[2] It is certain that the members of each of the OUN organizations in the chief cities after early 1942 could be counted in dozens and that the total number of active workers in the East Ukraine numbered only a few hundred.

For a conspiratorial organization, however, the number of members is not necessarily a criterion of effectiveness. By infiltrating key positions in public institutions, the nationalist parties might obtain influence out of all proportion to the number of their adherents. Moreover, even when centrally organized parties like

[1] Interview 66.
[2] Interview 65.

p 210

186 The means at hand to stimulate a sense of nationality among
565 the peasants were rather meager. Most important, undoubtedly,
795 was the church. Within a few months after the Communists were driven out, many hundreds of parishes had been reestablished.[38] Undoubtedly the older people who had received some religious training welcomed the reappearance of the clergy. Baptisms and marriages took place in large numbers, and the churches were well attended. Since the Germans forbade the use of public funds for payment of the salaries of the clergy, the latter had to depend on the generosity of their flocks or the produce of their own land. Apparently the parishioners responded by furnishing their pastors with sufficient income in kind.[39] In most areas, there developed a conflict between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous clergy. At first, the latter (or, in the "Left Bank" region, simply the clergy consecrated in the orthodox fashion who used the Slavonic liturgy) predominated in the villages, but as more Autocephalous priests were consecrated, and more of the older priests came to accept the Ukrainian language service, they evidently won the support of the peasantry. Strange as it may seem in view of reputed village conservatism, the living language was apparently more popular as a religious vehicle in the country than in the town,[40] and cases are recorded in which the peasants actually drove out the priest who persisted in the use of Slavonic.[41]

793 Religion as a stimulus to nationalist feeling was, however, sub-
186 ject to severe limitations. One was the inadequate background of the clergy. Many were simple peasants up to the time of their consecration, although an effort was made to train them in short courses. Where such a man was of sound character and good common sense, as was the case in one Podolian village, he could accomplish a good deal. There, according to the report, the priest, one of the local peasants until his recent consecration, was highly respected for his good example. His sermons stressed brotherly love, the importance of industriousness, mutual assistance, proper

[38] See Chapter XI.

[39] PS 1693.

[40] Report from a *gimnaziia* teacher in Poltava (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3); *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

[41] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(A) Religious

(*a*) *Christians.*—Prince Vladimir of Kiev (972–1015) accepted Christianity in its Byzantine form. The first Bishop of Kiev, Michael, a Syrian by birth, was sent by the Patriarch of Constantinople, on whom Kiev was dependent. After the final separation of the Eastern and Western Churches in 1054, the Church of Kiev kept up relations with the Pope for nearly a hundred years. Eventually, however, owing to the influence of Nicephorus, a Greek by birth, who was Metropolitan of Kiev, 1104–20, it followed Constantinople. After the Ukraine passed under Lithuanian and Polish rule, her church history became independent of that of the Great Russian Church. In 1354 the Patriarch of Constantinople appointed Alexis, a Russian by birth, as Metropolitan of Moscow; and in 1362, complying with the request of the Lithuanian prince (a pagan), he appointed another Metropolitan in Kiev for those Ukrainians who were subjects of Lithuania.

The idea of a Graeco-Roman national Church had been occasionally entertained in Western Ukraine; and in 1594 a Synod of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops, led by Rahosa the Metropolitan of Kiev, laid the foundation of the 'Uniat' Church, i. e. a Church of Byzantine ritual and Slavonic language, recognizing the jurisdiction of the Pope. The movement had a double character—national, for it originated with educated and patriotic clergy; and moral, for it aimed at improving the character of the clergy. The Synod of Brest in 1595–6 proclaimed the Union, which was supported by most of the Orthodox bishops, the bishops of Lvov and Przemysl being the last to join it. From the very beginning the Union had to face opposition on the one hand from the educated Ukrainian laymen,

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

● 795 led by Prince Constantine Ostrogski and the Cossacks, and on the other hand from the Polish Catholic bishops, who did not wish to recognize the Uniat bishops as their equals in rights. On the demand of the Orthodox part of the Ukraine, the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophanus, ordained new bishops for the Ukraine to take the place of those who had joined the Uniat Church. At first these were not accepted by the Polish kings; but, under the pressure of Cossack demands, Ladislaus IV divided the bishoprics of the Ukraine between the Uniats and the Orthodox. The Orthodox bishops were installed in Przemysl, Lvov, and Lutsk. In their opposition to the Uniat Church, the Cossacks united with the Russians.

795 At the Polish Partition of 1795, all the sees were
798 Uniat except Lvov and Przemysl, and there were about 12,000,000 professing Uniats. In spite of the fact that all treaties between Poland and Russia (1773, 1775, 1788, 1793, 1795) had expressly guaranteed the toleration of Catholics of both rites, the persecution of Uniats by Russia began almost at once. In 1827 the four Uniat bishoprics of Vilna, Brest, Polotsk, and Lutsk were made into two, the Lithuanian and White Russian. In 1833 forcible conversion was introduced; and in 1839 a sham petition was addressed to the Russian Government by a Uniat priest, Joseph Siemaszko, asking that the Uniat Church should be restored to communion with the State religion. Wholesale massacres and banishments to Siberia began; the last Uniat Bishop of Choïm, Kalinski, was exiled, and a Galician apostate, Popiel, was installed in his place. In 1875 the Union was officially suppressed.

The attitude of the Poles to the Union was changed after the Polish Partitions. The Catholic clergy and people in Russian Poland supported the Uniats in their refusal to attend the Orthodox Church; the Uniats were officially known as 'non-Christians', though unofficially their spiritual needs were attended to by the Uniat or Catholic clergy. The Uniat Church in Galicia supported their countrymen across the

frontier. After the proclamation of religious toleration in 1905, about 200,000 Ukrainians immediately declared themselves Uniats, so that the Russian Government soon found it necessary to restrict the scope of the proclamation. Though the Uniats in Russia were forbidden to join the Catholic Church, many of them became Catholics or sectaries. The last Russian persecution of the Uniat Church took place during the Russian occupation of Galicia in 1915, when the Russian bishop, Eulogius, started a regular campaign to replace Uniat priests by Orthodox clergy, and Uniat Ukrainian by Russian Orthodox schools. Many Uniat priests were banished to Siberia; and the Uniat Metropolitan, Szeptycki, was exiled to a Russian monastic prison. It is uncertain whether the Uniat Church has been gaining ground outside the provinces of Choïm and Polesia. As no statistics have been taken in Russia since the decree of religious toleration in 1905, it is difficult to give a correct estimate of the number of members of the Russian Orthodox Church, but their percentage varies from 75 to 93 in the various Governments of the Russian Ukraine. The Great-Russian sect of the *Raskolniki* (Old Believers) found refuge in the Governments of Kharkov (0·1 per cent. of the population) and Chernigov (0·9 per cent.).

The number of Roman Catholics, chiefly Poles, is higher in the west (in Volhynia the Poles in 1897 formed 6·16 per cent. of the population), but they are only slightly more numerous than the Lutheran Protestants (in Volhynia 5·73 of the population), who are German colonists.

Of great social importance are the peasant sects, of which the chief in the Ukraine is the *Shtunda* (from *Stunde*, since they gather at a definite hour). The doctrines of this Lutheran sect, which originated in Württemberg in 1705, were brought to South Russia by the Württemberg merchants, as the Danzig merchants, who came here after the partitions of Poland, brought with them the teaching of the Mennonite sect. Since 1870 it has been oppressed officially by the Russian

795 Government. The centres of the Shtundists are in the
798 Kherson Government (the districts of Yelisavetgrad and Odessa), in the Kiev Government (the districts of Tarashchansk, Skirsk, and Zvenigorodsk), in the Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Poltava Governments, and to a less extent in Chernigov, Podolia, and Bessarabia. In their boycott of official churches, ikons, and priests, of military service, and to a great extent of the Government itself, the Shtundists are akin to other sectaries. One branch of Ukrainian sectaries combines the teaching of the Shtundists and that of the Baptists, and are called Neo-Baptists. The sectaries in the Ukraine, as elsewhere, were suppressed by the Russian Government, but those who have studied the question (e.g. Prugavin[1]) state that they number more than 20,000,000.

793 *Position of the Clergy.*—On the whole it is true that the Uniat clergy in Eastern Galicia, Choĭm, Polesia, and wherever the Uniat Church is found, as well as the leaders of the sects in the other parts of the Ukraine, exercise enormous influence over religious and social
[554] life. The persecutions they have undergone have strengthened their prestige among the peasants and even among the *intelligentsia.* The influence of the Russian Orthodox clergy, though many of them have been of Ukrainian nationality, has been limited to the religious sphere, since socially they have been generally regarded as Government officials by the peasants and still more by the *intelligentsia.*

The clergy in the Ukraine are on the whole less educated than in Great Russia, i. e. they are mostly 'seminarists', not 'academicians'. The Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, once known for its learning, has degenerated into a monastery in which some of the monks are illiterate. For the last twenty-five years the highest positions all over the Empire have been in the hands of the monastic clergy; and there was acute hostility between them and the secular clergy, who in

[1] See V. Anderson, *Old Believers and Sectaries*, Petrograd, 1908 (Russ.); also T. I. Buthevich, *Survey of Russian Sects and their Creeds*, Kharkov, 1910 (Russ.).

the Ukraine were mostly of the 'seminarist' type and often of Ukrainian nationality, and hence of peasant descent. In the Ukraine the secular clergy were, if anything, more popular than the monastic. 793

(*b*) *Jews.*—Next in number to the Orthodox are the Jews. Records make it clear that since the seventeenth century the Ukraine has been the centre of the Jewish 'pogrom' movement, and is more anti-Semitic than any other East-European country. A Hebrew-Jewish scholar, Nathan of Zaslavl, has left a document[1] containing the record of terrible atrocities perpetrated by the Ukrainians and Cossacks on the Jews during the Cossacks' War against Poland. The 'pogroms' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may appear less cruel; but, though they were organized by the Russian secret police, it has been proved in the law-courts that the local population was quite ready to fall in with the suggestions of these agents.[2] The reasons for this hatred are partly economic—for the Jews are very successful middlemen between the Ukraine and other countries, and hence in possession of capital, which they lend at a high rate to the peasant—but are also racial, since the hatred between these two races is stronger than that between either Poles or Great Russians and the Jews. All the traditions of the steppe-country peasant are opposed to those of the Jewish townsman. This is shown by the facts that there is hardly any mixed Jewish-Ukrainian population, and that the Jews live chiefly in the towns and industrial settlements where Russians and Poles predominate. The Jews came to the Ukraine on the first wave of colonization from Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 795 793 186

According to data obtained in 1897, the percentage of the Jewish population in the Governments of the Ukraine was as follows: Volhynia, 13·2 per cent.; Podolia, 12·24 per cent.; Kiev, 12·09 per cent.; Kherson, 12 per cent.; Chernigov, 5 per cent.; 795 162

[1] *Jawein Mesula: a Chronicle of Events from 1648 to 1652.* First printed in Vienna, 1656.

[2] I. Luchitski, *Legal Speeches concerning the Jewish Pogroms*, Kiev, 1908 (in Russian).

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Yekaterinoslav, 5 per cent.; Poltava, 4 per cent.; Taurida, 4 per cent.; Kharkov, 0·5 per cent. only.

Like the Orthodox Church, the Jewish community has its sects. There are two such sects in the Ukraine; and their members exercise a great moral influence, and form a bridge between the Turkish and Jewish populations of the Ukraine. They are called Karaimy and Krymchaki, and live chiefly in the towns of the Taurida and Kherson Governments. They number about 12,000. These people, using mostly Tatar dialects, are supposed to be descendants of Jewish pre-Christian colonies in the Crimea and the Turkic Khazars of the Middle Ages, who were of Jewish faith. The Karaimy disapprove of the Talmud, and base all their beliefs on the Law of Moses. They differ from other Jewish communities in their cleanliness, their absolute honesty in business, and their great sense of social duties. Hence their wealth is evenly distributed in their communities.

(c) *Mohammedans.*—The largest Mohammedan colony is found in the Taurida government (187,940, or 13 per cent.), but their schools are less efficient and their culture is much lower than that of the Mohammedans of the Volga or of Turkestan.

(B) Educational

The last census, taken in 1897,[1] gives the following figures:

Name of Government.	*Total population in 1,000's.*	*No. of literates in 1,000's.*	*Per cent. of literates.*
Podolia . .	3,018	450	14·5
Kharkov . .	2,492	384	15·4
Poltava . .	2,778	446	16·1
Volhynia . .	2,989	493	16·5
Kiev . . .	3,559	598	16·8
Chernigov . .	2,298	402	17·5
Yekaterinoslav .	2,114	433	20·5
Kherson . .	2,734	657	24·1
Taurida . .	1,448	380	26·2
	23,430	4,243	average 18·2

[1] From *The Ukrainian Movement as a Stage in South Russian Separatism*, Shchegolev (Kiev, 1912), p. 364.

798 collapse seemed inevitable when in 1595 seven Orthodox bishops had approved the Brest Union in principle. But Polish-Jesuit intolerance, unfulfilled promises and disregard of the rights of those who were ready to enter the union made some of the bishops mistrustful and again estranged them. The arrogance with which the Catholic party treated the Orthodox, their public mockery, indeed even maltreatment of the Orthodox priests at that time, caused a chasm so great that to this day it has not been bridged over. At the same time, those who were already Uniats were not much better off. Their "complete equality" with Polish citizens and the Catholic clergy remained an empty promise which it was not in the power of the Uniat bishops to enforce. If the lower priests did not belong to the nobility "they were often seen in torn clothing walking along, whip in hand, beside their horses and oxen, furnishing relays for the state or performing compulsory services as serfs to their master." (57)

57. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 24.

Conditions in the Uniat church improved in those regions that had come under Austrian rule after the partitioning of Poland, whereas in congressional Poland a ukase of the Czar again forcefully opened up the Orthodox heaven to the Uniats. With Peter the Great, who in 1721 had transferred the rights of the patriarchy of Moscow to the Holy Synod, the Czar had become the head of the Orthodox Church.

184 Since the serious crisis of Orthodoxy in
795 the 15th and 16th /107/ century, the opportunity for a reunion of both churches* has never been as favorable as it is at present. The "defender of all Orthodox believers" is dead. The Synod in Moscow as well as the Ukrainian church, which

*[i.e., Catholic-Orthodox - Analyst]

184 795 became autocephalous during the Revolution, have dissolved. In the wide realm of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics there is no visible ecclesiastical authority whatsoever. No one knows how many priests are secretly carrying on their duties. Churches are closed and have been transformed into "godless museums" or clubs. East Rome is without power and without priests.

648 795 It was said of Pius XI: "The Holy Father is much concerned about the re-unification of the East. It may be said that he has made this the goal of his life." (58) Pius XII, as may be

58. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 38.

seen by the honor bestowed on Vladimir, cherishes the same plans.

But the Soviet Union remained closed to the emissaries of the Vatican. Everything was done that could be done. In 1918 the Vatican hastened to send an ambassador to Kiyev. But before he arrived the addressee of the credentials, Hetman Skoropadsky, was already fleeing to the West. In 1922 to 1923 papal aid to the starving is supposed to "prepare the ground" for the seed which none other but Nuntius Pacelli scattered when in all secrecy in Berlin, he consecrated a Jesuit organizer as bishop of this charitable work; the Jesuit who is passing through must be consecrated secretly, in order that the Bolsheviks do not become suspicious and that the "simple" father who is apparently only concerned about apportioning the food that is handed out, can unostentatiously appoint five bishops. In this manner the first Catholic prelates are installed in the Ukraine. How often they have made use of their sacred powers and how many Catholic bishops and priests there are today in Soviet Ukraine is not known even in the Vatican.

Vatican.

000 Many hundreds of Catholic priests trained in the Orthodox ritual are waiting for the moment when the frontiers of the Soviet Union will be opened to the missionaries of Rome. /108/ They have been educated in the numerous special seminaries for priests which were erected at the wish of Pius XI in many dioceses of various countries.

First of all, however, the Orthodox of Poland were to be converted, of which, according to the last census, there were 3.8 million. The overwhelming majority of them were Greek Orthodox after the Brest Union and before their adoption into the Russian Empire. Now they were to be united anew with the Roman Catholic Church, not all at once, by force or from above through the conversion of bishops, but gradually and from below by winning over laymen and the priests. Pius XI who was for many years nuncio in Warsaw and got along well with the Poles, used for this purpose a more recent ritual, the Byzantine-Slavic one, which is more nearly like the purely Orthodox than is the Greek Orthodox, known as Ruthenian
795 in Rome. Externally the Byzantine-Slavic priests
798 with their long beards, their long hair and the klobuk (priest's hat) resemble their Orthodox colleagues. The dogma of this evolving church has not been definitively established. The Roman ecclesiastical congregation of the East is still uncertainly feeling its way along this difficult terrain. The orthodox love the form and even more the profound mysticism of their service which is rich in symbolism. The Vatican has learned from previous mistakes; it does not want to be hasty and arouse distrust. It is necessary to tread softly in places where the figures of saints are shunned as idols and demons and where the pope is regarded as the personified Antichrist. The fathers of the Byzantine-Slavic ritual are open to reason in matters of dogma, but the pope must

be recognized as the supreme shepherd and as infallible in ecclesiastical matters. This is their first condition. The dogma grows shaky on the doctrine about purgatory. The Orthodox Church knows only heaven and hell; and it is not always easy - in spite of the comforting prospect - to convince laymen and priests who are willing to be converted that there is also a purgatory./109/ The question as to whether the new ritual could not get along without this place of purification is at present still being considered in Rome. The problem of the origin of the Holy Spirit who, according to the Roman-Catholic conception forms a unity with God the Father and the Son, and according to the Orthodox belief originates only in God the Father, causes the least difficulties. The Byzantine-Slavic ritual is here permitted to adopt the Orthodox dogma.

Even though the 2000-year-old Roman Church had time carefully to prepare the matter of union, this was not the case with the fast-moving Polish state. Since Misika, a contemporary of Vladimir, introduced West Roman Christianity into Poland, the latter has always been at a disadvantage in its battle over the countries of the Slavic peoples with Orthodox religion, and it has always tried to compensate for this defect by Catholisizing in a headlong fashion. Polish missionary methods have done more harm than good as far as the Vatican is concerned. More than once the Papal See was obliged to curb Polish nationalism; four papal decress forbid the conversion of members of the Union to the Roman Catholic faith. In spite of this the Poles blithely went on "converting".

The most recent attempts at union by Pius XI and Pius XII were from the beginning sorely impeded by the preference shown the Poles by the deceased pope. Pius XI who gave Byzantine-Slavic ritual a new impulse excluded the Greek-Catholic clergy of Galicia, that is to say the Ukrainian priests, from their work of converting their

1945 1948 brothers in Volhynia, in Lublin, in Polesia and in Podlakhia. He placed the clergy of the growing church under the jurisdiction of Polish Roman-Catholic bishops. Instead of Ukrainian priests, the French, Dutch and Poles, Redemptorists, Jesuits and Polish secular priests began missionary work in the Ukraine. It was supervised by an apostolic inspector who could pronounce no ecclesiastical judgment. The seminary for priests in Dubno was directed by Jesuits. /110/ But the thing that embittered all Ukrainians, whether Orthodox or Uniat, most of all against Rome, was the way the Orthodox Ukrainian ecclesiastical possessions seized by Warsaw were wasted on the Poles. The long fight between Ukrainian and Polish clergy about this property was settled by Pius XI in favor of the weaker party. Polish pastors received Ukrainian prebends and Polish colonists 100,000 hectares of land. The metropolitan of Lwów in a pastoral letter which was confiscated, described the papal procedure with regard to Poland as "robbery".

It cannot be denied that the Poles carried on a clever ecclesiastical policy toward the Vatican. Their strongest pressure instrument was probably the autocephalous Polish Church with Russian hierarchy which was subject to the Byzantine patriarch. A separate Orthodox faculty had been provided for it at the Warsaw University. In this way the Papal See could be threatened and its plans thwarted without incurring punishment.

The violent Catholisizing actions of the Poles, known as the "revindication of souls" made the Roman efforts at union extremely difficult. In the process of Polonizing Orthodox Ukrainians, the churches were often the only obstacle that needed to be taken seriously, for where the cultured stratum of society was so thin, the pope and the church were the only national prop the people had.

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The removal of this national stronghold has been systematically carried on for many years by the Poles through methods which could probably be compared with those of the "revindication" of Catherine II.

As early as 1928 the Warsaw government closed approximately 400 Orthodox churches and liquidated the church property belonging to them. The "Ukrainian Self Reliance League of Canada" in a petition to the League of Nations asserted that by closing the Orthodox churches or by transferring them to the Roman Catholic Church "the members of the Greek Orthodox Church are deprived of the right of free /111/ exercise of their religion". The Poles dropped the last controls in the summer of 1938. They banished the few Ukrainian intellectuals from the border region; mounted corps of frontier guards with army chaplains at their head entered the Orthodox villages and a few hours later left the communities which had now become "converted" to Rome. Finally, Warsaw also carried on its missionary work with powder and quickmatch. About this the confiscated "Kuryer Wilenski" of August 26, 1938 reports among other things: "The destruction in the past month of a hundred and more Orthodox churches in the eastern districts of the voivodeship of Lublin at the command of the administrative bodies produced, as we know, first a reaction on the part of the bishop's council of the Orthodox Church in Poland and then also a reaction of the head of the Greek Uniat Church in the form of a manifesto to all believers, as well as incitement of the population in a few towns in which these 'riots' occurred... The Greek Orthodox clergy maintains that in the voivodeship of Lublin 114 Orthodox churches were destroyed by order of the authorities... It cannot be denied that people of the Greek Orthodox faith were profoundly stirred by the fact that their sanctuaries were destroyed."

11:Obermaier--116 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

This is a picture of the beginning of the new Union.

/112/ Moscow Educates

In one thing Lenin proved superior to his enemies and predecessors: he knew how to utilize the social-revolutionary and nationalist-revolutionary forces in the vast Russian Empire for his own ends. With the explosive material which Hetman Skoropadskyj and the counterrevolutionary general Denikin had piled up anew through their forcible restoration of large estates, he destroyed both opponents. He met the collapse of the idea of a Pan-Russian Empire with the slogan of the revolutionary proletarian unified front of non-Russian peoples of the former czarist realm against the capitalist states. It was only for appearances' sake that he complied with the national wishes of the peoples gathered together under Moscow.

In Russian Ukraine, where at the beginning of the Revolution the national consciousness of the great masses of peasants was not yet deeply rooted, Lenin's tactics did not run against insuperable difficulties. The cultured stratum, already not too large, was divided into two camps, one of which sympathized with Bolshevism, while the other regarded an autonomy within the democratic realm of Great Russia as the most favorable solution of the problem of nationalities. Thus from the beginning Lenin had a part of the Ukrainian people on his side, and he subjugated the rest with the help of Muscovite troops during years of bloody civil wars. True, in November 1917, in the "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia" sovereign rights "including the right of severance and of formation of an independent state" /113/ were promised, but toward the end of the period of the Communist war there was no force left which might have made use of it.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
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which had existed in Ukraine proper, and the Western Ukrainian, quite understandably, never felt that he owed anything to Russia and to the Russians. This mentality of the Western Ukrainian, who had outspoken leanings towards independence, was bound to create considerable difficulties inside the Soviet Ukraine.

The Soviet Government set itself the task of counteracting the recalcitrant Western Ukrainian spirit and of levelling out the differences existing between the 'liberated Western Ukraine' and the rest of the Ukraine in the cultural, economic and political sphere.

RUSSIAN POLICY AND THE UNIATE CHURCH

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After the liquidation of all openly anti-Bolshevik movements in the Western Ukraine and the annihilation of the 'class enemy' in the form of the bourgeoisie and the 'kulaks', there still remained for subjection to the 'levelling-out process' one important bulwark of Westernism: the Uniate Church with over 3,500,000 followers in Eastern Galicia and several hundred thousand in the Bukovina and the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

The Uniate Church had come into existence at the end of the sixteenth century in the interest and under the influence of the Polish State. As time went on the Uniate Church developed into something more than the artificial creation of a ruling caste. It was, in the end, the true expression of an area which is neither West nor East since the Uniate Church combined Eastern rites with a Western cultural and ecclesiastical orientation symbolized by the recognition of the Roman Pope.

S.U.
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The struggle between Poland and Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though essentially a political one, was largely conducted under the cloak of religious differences. Russia claimed that her aim was to emancipate the Orthodox population of Eastern Poland from 'temptation and humiliation' by the Poles. To push back the influence of the 'Polish' Roman Catholic Church and to carry out the liquidation of the Uniate Church were thus major objectives which Russia pursued in the three partitions of Poland. The Empress Catherine II proclaimed in 1794 that resistance to the reunion of Uniates and Roman Catholics with the Orthodox Church in the territories conquered from the Poles was a criminal offence; and thus about 2,000,000 Roman Catholics and Uniates were 'persuaded' to embrace the Orthodox Church of their ancestors in the course of a few weeks. A church council of the Uniates held in Polotsk in Byelorussia (White Russia) in 1839 brought 1,500,000 Uniates together with their bishops back into the fold of Orthodoxy. In 1874 the last Uniate diocese of Kholm was abolished and 500,000 Uniates willy-nilly transformed into Orthodox congregations.

THE UKRAINE

Thus in Russia itself the 'Uniate heresy' was liquidated and it survived only in the Ukrainian territories which until 1918 belonged to the Austrian Empire and after 1918 to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. It was only after the final establishment of the Soviet power in Lvov, the see of the Ukrainian Uniate Metropolitan, that the great historical opportunity presented itself of accomplishing the work of Catherine II and Nicholas I with regard to the Uniate Church. UK 795 S.U. 795

Soviet interference in Ukrainian church affairs proceeded as follows. In April 1945 the Metropolitan Slepoy, four bishops and several priests of the Uniate Church, all opponents of Orthodoxy and faithful supporters of the Pope were arrested as 'accomplices of German occupants'. One month later a 'Central Initiative Group for Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church' was formed and in April 1946 a Synod in Lvov solemnly proclaimed the union of the two churches. Considering the conditions prevailing in Russia the 'initiative group' could not have been set up, nor could the Lvov Synod be summoned without the active support of the Soviet authorities, and particularly of the 'Plenipotentiary for Religious Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R.'. The decisions of the Lvov Synod were not accepted by a number of parish priests who despite official pressure refused to abandon the Uniate Church. By January 1948 the resistance, according to official Soviet reports, seemed on the whole to be broken. S.U. 659 UK. 659

The Synod of Lvov was an ecclesiastical event only in name. In reality its decisions constituted a victory of the Russian State over Western tendencies in a frontier territory and the Orthodox Church was nothing but the accidental instrument by the help of which the victory was achieved. The Synod was merely an episode in the repression of the Western influences which after the end of the Second World War challenged Bolshevism in almost every sphere of Ukrainian life.[17]

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Apart from receiving additional strength from the Western Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism of the war and post-war period derived inspiration from two diametrically opposed sources. On the one hand, Ukrainian nationalism was encouraged under the German occupation. Without granting to the Ukrainian people the slightest shadow of an independent status, the German occupants favoured and consolidated the negative anti-Russian and anti-Jewish features of Ukrainian nationalism. UK 186

On the other hand, official Soviet propaganda also gave a fresh impetus to Ukrainian nationalism by allowing some expression to Ukrainian national hero-worship, for instance, by the creation of a war decoration commemorating the popular Ukrainian Cossack Hetman

40th day after death, at Easter, Whitsuntide, and on St. Dimitry's day) special dishes are eaten. 765

The course of the year in Ukraine is accompanied by many old customs which are not to be found among Russians but which resemble those of Southern Slavonic peoples. They spring from the world of Pontium and Greece and Rome; such are the festivals at Christmas ("koljada"), New Year ("novyj rik"), the consecration of water ("shtshedryj vetshir"), Easter ("hayivky"), the beginning of spring ("vesnyanky"), solstice ("kupalo"), the beginning of autumn ("Andrija") etc. They are accompanied by games and country dances, of which there are several thousand. The beginning of the most important agricultural operations is also celebrated (building the house, ploughing, sowing, driving the cows to pasture, hay and grain harvest etc). 796

Ukrainian demonology, founded on ancient animistic beliefs, has, in contrast to the Russian, lost all its terrors; the devil, for instance, is stripped of all horror. Magic and the belief in witchcraft are very probably of more modern, partly Christian origin. There is no higher mythology. The worship of fire and water is more developed and there are some faint traces of the worship of plants. Much of popular belief is preserved in fairy tales, fables, sagas, legends, proverbs and riddles, of which there is an inexhaustible store. Some 4 years ago Savtshenko found 2000 main variants of Ukrainian fairy tales, compared with about 1700 Russian and 1500 White Ruthenian versions. V. Hnatjuk has counted 327 fables of animals (exclusive of variants). We must finally mention the incredible wealth of popular stories and anecdotes. 771 538

But the Ukrainian people's most precious spiritual possession is their folk-poetry, one of the richest in Europe and characterised by aesthetic values, depth of poetic feeling and perfection of form. F. v. Bodenstedt, who published "Die poetische Ukraine" in 1843 put these Ukrainian poems above those of all other nations. Hohol said of them that they comprehended poetry and history and were a monument to the nation's ancestors. Every kind of song is represented, from the traditional songs of ritual and later ballads to the short song of to-day ("Shumky", "Kozatshky", "Kolomyjky" and "Tshabarashky"). These histo-

175 Grand Princes of Kyiv, i. e. the leaders of the Norman Vikings should fetch their Christian faith from Byzantium and we are probably right in maintaining that any other state in the same circumstances would also have been christianised from Byzantium.

175 797 The new religion was at first embraced only by the Princes and their courts, but later it was forced on the people by their superiors and became a bond that united the entire state organism. There was no fear that the people would make a combined and successful stand against Christianity for there was no pagan order of priests to take over leadership in such a contest. The people had only sorcerers in place of priests and so it was possible to christianise the country by peaceful methods though pagan ideas continued to live in popular consciousness for a considerable time. It is quite legitimate therefore, to speak at this time of a "double faith".

175 792 795 The organisation of the church in the Kyiv empire came from Byzantium which was also the home of the higher clergy with the exception of two cases when representatives of the native population were consecrated metropolitans. The conventual orders and the many monasteries, among which the Cave Monastery in Kyiv attained a great reputation throughout the world of orthodoxy, attempted to shape the lives of the people on Christian lines and to realise the ideals of Christianity. The monasteries were the most important and indeed the only centers of cultural life at that time.

175 7 3 The Tatars who raided Europe in the 13th century destroyed the Kyiv empire and then pushed further west though they were brought to a halt in the battle of Liegnitz in 1241. Nevertheless for centuries the countries of Eastern Europe had to submit to the yoke of East Asiatic nomads.

In the Mongolian era the position of the church was not exactly unfavorable, for the Khans allowed it a certain freedom and state protection. The metropolitans had, however, to fetch the written pardons (Jarlyks) from the horde personally which was a voluntary acknowledgement of their dependence on the secular power. The dignitaries of the orthodox church continued, it is true, to be consecrated by Constantinople, but no longer

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

704 ran from just east of Kovel to a point in the Carpathians south of Ternopol'; a key point was the little town of Brody, on the main highway from Rovno to L'vov. Here, in late June, the SS division was put into the line to assist in covering the Galician capital. For three weeks it maintained its position, in the face of fierce Soviet attacks and encircling operations, but by July 20 was no longer effective as a fighting unit. Perhaps 20 percent of its complement fell back with the German armies toward the Carpathians, and half of the remainder escaped to join the UPA or to filter back to the German lines.[29]

661 After the victory of Brody, the Red Army rapidly conquered
●798 east Galicia, Bukovina, and the Carpatho-Ukraine. By fall, substantially all of the Ukrainian lands were again under the dominion of Moscow. This time the repression exercised by the Communist rulers was harsher and less disguised than it had been five years before. The Greek Catholic Church was attacked ruthlessly. Bishop Slipyi, who had succeeded Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi after the latter's death in late 1944, was arrested and deported to the interior of the Soviet Union. Most of the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church, as well as hundreds of its clergy, were likewise banished. Orthodox priests subservient to the Patriarch of Moscow enlisted the aid of a minority of the Greek Catholic clergy, who renounced their allegiance to Rome and joined in constructing a new hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Galicia. The same tactics were pursued in the Carpatho-Ukraine.[30]

[702] According to reports of refugees from the area, very severe
661 measures were taken against the population at large. Men from the ages of eighteen to fifty are said to have been drafted into the Red Army in a mass, without regard for their state of health.[31] Once enlisted, they were said to be watched over by special *politruks*, given inferior arms, and sent into battle after eight

[29] See numerous contributions to *Brody*, and *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA*, for detailed descriptions of military operations of this battle and of the other Ukrainian forces serving with the Wehrmacht.

[30] Cf. Baran, *Mytropolyt*, pp. 137 ff.; Mykola D. Chubatyi, "Russian Church Policy in the Ukraine," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, I (Autumn, 1945), 51–53.

[31] SS war reporter Oleh Lysiak in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 2, 1944, p. 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

itself for a few years, very likely a separate Ukrainian hierarchy 000
would have been generally recognized. In the situation which followed from the Bolshevik triumph, neither clear-cut solution was achieved. Instead, a large body of the lower clergy and the faithful 795
split off from the Russian hierarchy in the Ukraine. When no 798
member of the episcopacy could be found to consecrate a new bishop for the dissident group, the Ukrainian church body resorted to the "laying on of hands" by priests as a method for consecrating Father Lypkivs'kyi as prelate of their organization. Thus a new Orthodox Church was formed, which rapidly came to embrace the great majority of organized Orthodox believers in the Ukraine; by 1923 it had no less than three thousand parishes and thirty-five bishops, headed by Lypkivs'kyi, then known as Metropolitan Basil.[1] In spite of this apparent prosperity, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, as it was called, lay under the shadow of two great weaknesses. In the first place, it was not recognized by any other body of the Orthodox Church, for the method of consecration of the new bishops was regarded throughout the Orthodox world as uncanonical, a violation of the essential principle of apostolic succession. From the point of view of the traditional believer, the bishops of the new church were illegitimate; consequently, priests ordained by them (but not those who had joined the Autocephalous Church after ordination by a validly consecrated bishop) were not truly endowed with sacerdotal functions. Secondly, and of more immediate significance, the phenomenal growth of the new church was possible only because of the comparatively indulgent attitude shown by the Communist authorities who, at that time, were more antagonistic to the Russian church than to dissident bodies. When the Soviet [661]
power turned to restriction of Ukrainian national activity, as a potential threat to the unity of the USSR, the Autocephalous Church also came under attack. Its entire hierarchy and the great bulk of its clergy were executed or banished in 1929–30.[2]

In view of the close connection between church and state in 659
the Orthodox world, it was only natural that, when the Russian 795

[1] John S. Reshetar, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Orthodox Church," *American Slavic and East European Review*, X (February, 1951), 43–45.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

The Polish policy aimed at the disintegration of the national life 563
of the 6 million Ukrainians through attempts to divide them into 661
different 'tribes' which were given various names in official sta- 798
tistics: 'Polishchuk', 'Hutsul', 'Ruthenian', 'Boyko', 'Lemko', and even 'Orthodox' and 'Aborigines'. Against the Orthodox as well as against the Greek Catholic Ukrainians a policy of systematic Polonisation was applied by forcible conversion of the Ukrainians to Roman Catholicism which in the conditions of the Polish State was equivalent to Polonisation. In Ukrainian regions the Poles organised on the eve of World War II 'dragonnades' in order to convert the Greek Orthodox Ukrainians to the Roman Catholic Church: armed Polish gangs drove through the villages, destroyed the Orthodox Churches, beat the Ukrainians, looted their property, and forced them by this terrorism to turn Catholic. Thus the Polish Chauvinists protected by the Polish Government destroyed in 1938 more than 100 Ukrainian Churches, among them many medieval and of great artistic value and forced many Ukrainian communities to accept Roman Catholicism. In vain the Ukrainian deputies to the Polish Diet protested against this Polish violence, in vain the Metropolitan of the Greek Orthodox Church in Poland Dionysios and the Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church in Lviw Count Szeptycki rose their voices. The Polish oppression caused a strong opposition and resistance among the Ukrainians in Poland, which the Polish Government tried to suppress by new persecutions.

In the entire Polish policy between the two World Wars the fear 000
of the Ukrainian national movement is undoubtfully apparent. The Polish Government did not wish the creation of an independent Ukraine, fearing that a Ukrainian state would later demand union with the Ukrainian provinces of Poland. Even the small Carpatho-Ukraine, which had proclaimed its autonomy in autumn 1938, seemed dangerous to Poland as giving a 'bad example' for the Ukrainian population in Poland. This was one of the reasons why the Polish Government helped to destroy Czechoslovakia and supported the Hungarian claims on Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939.

In September 1939, the Ukrainian territories which after the 661
Treaty of Riga were under Polish rule, were occupied by the Soviet 563
Army in accordance with the German-Russian Pact of August 23, 1939, signed in Moscow. This 'liberation of Western Ukraine' brought to the population of these territories a time of terror and oppression. Thousands of Ukrainians of all classes were deported to the East, many of them did not come back.

The local Ukrainian Communists also were suspected by the Soviet authorities, they were not admitted to influential positions and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism.'

Of course, the 656
Ukrainian problem has remained from old times for Soviet Russia 661
the basic problem of its internal and foreign policy. The unceasing Russification policy against the Ukrainians is carried on by particularly cunning methods: the Ukrainian language is not yet [191] abolished definitely in the offices of Soviet Ukraine. But that official who speaks Ukrainian also in his family and in private relations becomes in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suspicious, and has to suffer repressions.

The Communist theory of the national problem worked out by Lenin preaches the 'fusion of nations'. Basing on this, the Russian Communist Government is trying to 'fuse' the nations of the Soviet Union with the Russians. Against peoples who oppose forced Russification, ruthless repressions are used by Moscow. Even the mentioning of the national rights of the non-Russian peoples is condemned in the USSR as 'bourgeois nationalism'.

There is a great principal difference between the situation of the 000
Russians and the peoples united by force with this state: though the Russians are not satisfied with the Communist dictatorship, they do not, however, feel national oppression. Even in the new anthem of the USSR it is said that this state was rallied by Great Russia. We can state the efforts of Russian political groups opposing the Communist régime to maintain the rule of the Russian state over the territories conquered by Soviet Russia, even after the eventual fall of the Soviet régime.

As a curious fact we can quote the view of the well-known Communist L. Trotzky, who was assassinated in Mexico during World War II, on the Ukrainian problem. Trotzky demanded in 1939 the full separation of Ukraine from Russia. But Trotzky thought of an independent Ukraine in the form of a Soviet Republic. This naturally deprived his thesis of all seriousness, for Trotzky needed the slogan of an independent Ukraine only as a political argument in polemics against Stalin (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 77/78, 1939).

As the facts prove, the Ukrainian nation has to endure the heaviest oppression in the USSR. Unfortunately, the words of the famous historian of France Charles Seignobos written in 1913 on Ukraine, can be used emphatically to describe the outstanding feature of the present state of the Ukrainian nation: "Here is the most oppressed nation" ("Voici la nation la plus opprimée", *Les Annales des Nationalités:* Paris, 1913).

In its equalising policy, the Soviet Russian Government retains, 659
also, traces of the Tsarist régime in the affairs of Church and reli- 798
gion. Thus, after having seized Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine dur- 661

659 ing World War II, the Soviet Government abolished the Ukrainian
798 Greek-Catholic Church by force, against the will of the popula-
661 tion, and destroyed the hierarchy of this Church. The Ukrainian Greek Catholics who were in union with Rome were ordered to become subordinate to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow, who is backed by the Soviet Government.

000 The struggle of the Ukrainians against Russian imperialism did not cease after World War II. It is being conducted in various forms. In this struggle other peoples who are oppressed by Russia, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkestan, participate. Thus a common front of freedom-loving peoples against despotic Russia is being created.

656 In 1949, Moscow has permitted Ukraine to use an own flag and
186 an own different anthem. However, this cannot be regarded an ex-
661 tension of the rights of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. It seems to be more an attempt to bring the so-called satellite countries to the Ukrainian level.

Moscow is watching attentively every expression of Ukrainian political thought and national sentiment, and wants to have everything under its control. The Decade of Ukrainian Culture held in Moscow in July 1951, ended with rebukes and threats against the participants of the Decade, and a 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists whom Moscow imputes 'bourgeois nationalism'. Only the Russian Communists have beeen beyond any doubt as regards their 'internationalism'; there was no case that the manifestations of nationalism among the Russian Communists had been condemned by the Communist Party. On the contrary, Moscow is cultivating an exaggerated national pride among the Russian people. The Ukrainian Communists are under a especially heavy control of
[554] Moscow. No Ukrainian has been General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This position has always been occupied by people sent from Moscow: Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Khrushchev, finally Melnikov.

'Titoism' is no isolated phenomenon in the relations between imperialist Russia and Yugoslavia. Similar trends hostile to Russian imperialism have existed among Ukrainian Communists since the first days of Soviet Russian occupation in Ukraine. The Russian terrorism prevented these trends, however, from getting strong. Nevertheless, they exist clandestinely. Moscow's persecution of 'burgeois nationalism' among the Ukrainian Communists gives an eloquent proof of Ukrainian opposition against Russian imperalism.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 led by Prince Constantine Ostrogski and the Cossacks, and on the other hand from the Polish Catholic bishops, who did not wish to recognize the Uniat bishops as their equals in rights. On the demand of the Orthodox part of the Ukraine, the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theophanus, ordained new bishops for the Ukraine to take the place of those who had joined the Uniat Church. At first these were not accepted by the Polish kings; but, under the pressure of Cossack demands, Ladislaus IV divided the bishoprics of the Ukraine between the Uniats and the Orthodox. The Orthodox bishops were installed in Przemysl, Lvov, and Lutsk. In their opposition to the Uniat Church, the Cossacks united with the Russians.

795 At the Polish Partition of 1795, all the sees were
798 Uniat except Lvov and Przemysl, and there were about 12,000,000 professing Uniats. In spite of the fact that all treaties between Poland and Russia (1773, 1775, 1788, 1793, 1795) had expressly guaranteed the toleration of Catholics of both rites, the persecution of Uniats by Russia began almost at once. In 1827 the four Uniat bishoprics of Vilna, Brest, Polotsk, and Lutsk were made into two, the Lithuanian and White Russian. In 1833 forcible conversion was introduced; and in 1839 a sham petition was addressed to the Russian Government by a Uniat priest, Joseph Siemaszko, asking that the Uniat Church should be restored to communion with the State religion. Wholesale massacres and banishments to Siberia began; the last Uniat Bishop of Choïm, Kalinski, was exiled, and a Galician apostate, Popiel, was installed in his place. In 1875 the Union was officially suppressed.

The attitude of the Poles to the Union was changed after the Polish Partitions. The Catholic clergy and people in Russian Poland supported the Uniats in their refusal to attend the Orthodox Church; the Uniats were officially known as 'non-Christians', though unofficially their spiritual needs were attended to by the Uniat or Catholic clergy. The Uniat Church in Galicia supported their countrymen across the

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

frontier. After the proclamation of religious toleration in 1905, about 200,000 Ukrainians immediately declared themselves Uniats, so that the Russian Government soon found it necessary to restrict the scope of the proclamation. Though the Uniats in Russia were forbidden to join the Catholic Church, many of them became Catholics or sectaries. The last Russian persecution of the Uniat Church took place during the Russian occupation of Galicia in 1915, when the Russian bishop, Eulogius, started a regular campaign to replace Uniat priests by Orthodox clergy, and Uniat Ukrainian by Russian Orthodox schools. Many Uniat priests were banished to Siberia; and the Uniat Metropolitan, Szeptycki, was exiled to a Russian monastic prison. It is uncertain whether the Uniat Church has been gaining ground outside the provinces of Choĭm and Polesia. As no statistics have been taken in Russia since the decree of religious toleration in 1905, it is difficult to give a correct estimate of the number of members of the Russian Orthodox Church, but their percentage varies from 75 to 93 in the various Governments of the Russian Ukraine. The Great-Russian sect of the *Raskolniki* (Old Believers) found refuge in the Governments of Kharkov (0·1 per cent. of the population) and Chernigov (0·9 per cent.).

The number of Roman Catholics, chiefly Poles, is higher in the west (in Volhynia the Poles in 1897 formed 6·16 per cent. of the population), but they are only slightly more numerous than the Lutheran Protestants (in Volhynia 5·73 of the population), who are German colonists.

Of great social importance are the peasant sects, of which the chief in the Ukraine is the *Shtunda* (from *Stunde*, since they gather at a definite hour). The doctrines of this Lutheran sect, which originated in Württemberg in 1705, were brought to South Russia by the Württemberg merchants, as the Danzig merchants, who came here after the partitions of Poland, brought with them the teaching of the Mennonite sect. Since 1870 it has been oppressed officially by the Russian

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

795 Government. The centres of the Shtundists are in the
798 Kherson Government (the districts of Yelisavetgrad and Odessa), in the Kiev Government (the districts of Tarashchansk, Skirsk, and Zvenigorodsk), in the Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Poltava Governments, and to a less extent in Chernigov, Podolia, and Bessarabia. In their boycott of official churches, ikons, and priests, of military service, and to a great extent of the Government itself, the Shtundists are akin to other sectaries. One branch of Ukrainian sectaries combines the teaching of the Shtundists and that of the Baptists, and are called Neo-Baptists. The sectaries in the Ukraine, as elsewhere, were suppressed by the Russian Government, but those who have studied the question (e.g. Prugavin[1]) state that they number more than 20,000,000.

793 *Position of the Clergy.*—On the whole it is true that the Uniat clergy in Eastern Galicia, Choĭm, Polesia, and wherever the Uniat Church is found, as well as the leaders of the sects in the other parts of the Ukraine, exercise enormous influence over religious and social
[554] life. The persecutions they have undergone have strengthened their prestige among the peasants and even among the *intelligentsia.* The influence of the Russian Orthodox clergy, though many of them have been of Ukrainian nationality, has been limited to the religious sphere, since socially they have been generally regarded as Government officials by the peasants and still more by the *intelligentsia.*

The clergy in the Ukraine are on the whole less educated than in Great Russia, i. e. they are mostly 'seminarists', not 'academicians'. The Kievo-Pecherskaya Lavra, once known for its learning, has degenerated into a monastery in which some of the monks are illiterate. For the last twenty-five years the highest positions all over the Empire have been in the hands of the monastic clergy; and there was acute hostility between them and the secular clergy, who in

[1] See V. Anderson, *Old Believers and Sectaries*, Petrograd, 1908 (Russ.); also T. I. Buthevich, *Survey of Russian Sects and their Creeds*, Kharkov, 1910 (Russ.).

the Ukraine were mostly of the 'seminarist' type and often of Ukrainian nationality, and hence of peasant descent. In the Ukraine the secular clergy were, if anything, more popular than the monastic. 793

(*b*) *Jews.*—Next in number to the Orthodox are the Jews. Records make it clear that since the seventeenth century the Ukraine has been the centre of the Jewish 'pogrom' movement, and is more anti-Semitic than any other East-European country. A Hebrew-Jewish scholar, Nathan of Zaslavl, has left a document[1] containing the record of terrible atrocities perpetrated by the Ukrainians and Cossacks on the Jews during the Cossacks' War against Poland. The 'pogroms' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may appear less cruel; but, though they were organized by the Russian secret police, it has been proved in the law-courts that the local population was quite ready to fall in with the suggestions of these agents.[2] The reasons for this hatred are partly economic—for the Jews are very successful middlemen between the Ukraine and other countries, and hence in possession of capital, which they lend at a high rate to the peasant—but are also racial, since the hatred between these two races is stronger than that between either Poles or Great Russians and the Jews. All the traditions of the steppe-country peasant are opposed to those of the Jewish townsman. This is shown by the facts that there is hardly any mixed Jewish-Ukrainian population, and that the Jews live chiefly in the towns and industrial settlements where Russians and Poles predominate. The Jews came to the Ukraine on the first wave of colonization from Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 795 798 186

According to data obtained in 1897, the percentage of the Jewish population in the Governments of the Ukraine was as follows: Volhynia, 13·2 per cent.; Podolia, 12·24 per cent.; Kiev, 12·09 per cent.; Kherson, 12 per cent.; Chernigov, 5 per cent.; 795 162

[1] *Jawein Mesula: a Chronicle of Events from 1648 to 1652.* First printed in Vienna, 1656.

[2] I. Luchitski, *Legal Speeches concerning the Jewish Pogroms*, Kiev, 1908 (in Russian).

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517 156 [214] Kiyev, Khar'kov and Odessa are the most important centers of East Ukrainian intellectual life. It is there that most of the Ukrainian books, periodicals and newspapers are published. Besides that, the Ukrainian tongue is also printed in many smaller cities. Many of the Soviet Ukrainian authors glorify present conditions; these are the interpreters of Communism, the worshipers of machines and idols. But there are also others, like Khvylovy, who in truthful pamphlets derided the state of affairs, the proletarian wirepullers, their ingenuousness, their venality and their eagerness to work their way up, authors who write with a nationalistic purpose, who are "exposed" and then, like Khvylovy, come to an unfortunate end. "Experts maintain that even in the works of the Ukrainian Communist writers, especially the younger ones, the national feeling cannot be hidden, that an inner schism appears in their works. They do not actually belong to proletarian literature which has remained inwardly foreign to them. How could it be otherwise with such a past!" (56) /Facing page 104/

56. Zalozieckyj, ibid.

439 /Map VIII: Grain Export from the Soviet Ukraine and North Caucasus (Average for 1927/1928) This map differentiates between actual Soviet Ukraine and the North Caucasus regions. Export to foreign countries is insignificant compared to supplies sent to the Greater Russian areas of the Soviet Union situated in the forest belt./ /Key: Grain: ● from Soviet Ukraine, ● from the North Caucasus./

/105/ <u>Trapping Souls</u>

•798 On Sunday, May 29, 1939 a unique event took place in the church of St. Peter in Rome:

•798 at the papal altar under the mighty canopy the former Imperial Russian diplomat at the court of the sultan and at present Byzantine-Slavic suffragan Monsignor Yevreyinov celebrated a solemn high mass in the Byzantine-Slavic ritual. Pius XII, the cardinals of the Vatican, the Collegium Ruthenum and the Collegium Russorum devoutly attended, and the casual churchgoers marveled at the strange choirs in the ancient Slavic tongue. The Pope ordered this high mass in honor of the same Vladimir the Great and Most Holy who approximately 950 years before had refused to receive the legates of his predecessors on the throne of Peter and who had been baptized in Byzantium.

A new attempt, therefore, to unite the East Roman Church with the West Roman one, a distinct gesture to the 180 million souls of Orthodox Christianity who are to be won over! The goal was often in sight, but again and again reintegration failed. The attempts of the Vatican to convert East Rome, or at least some of its believers, are as old as the separation of the two churches itself. Even the legates who had deposited the papal bulls of excommunication in the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople had returned to Rome via Kiyev. The efforts at reconciliation were never completely given up. In 1418 at the Council of Constance it was the metropolitan of Kiyev who had offered the submission of his followers on condition that the retention of the Slavic liturgy and /106/ ritual be granted. His offer was rejected. Twenty years later many bishops of the East and West Roman Church put their signatures to the solemn reconciliation which was then confirmed in the bull "Laetantur coeli". But this union also failed as a result of the opposition of the Muscovite Grand-Prince Vassily the Blind and the Orthodox believers. Toward the end of the same century the Orthodox Church was close to complete dissolution. Its

•798 collapse seemed inevitable when in 1595 seven Orthodox bishops had approved the Brest Union in principle. But Polish-Jesuit intolerance, unfulfilled promises and disregard of the rights of those who were ready to enter the union made some of the bishops mistrustful and again estranged them. The arrogance with which the Catholic party treated the Orthodox, their public mockery, indeed even maltreatment of the Orthodox priests at that time, caused a chasm so great that to this day it has not been bridged over. At the same time, those who were already Uniats were not much better off. Their "complete equality" with Polish citizens and the Catholic clergy remained an empty promise which it was not in the power of the Uniat bishops to enforce. If the lower priests did not belong to the nobility "they were often seen in torn clothing walking along, whip in hand, beside their horses and oxen, furnishing relays for the state or performing compulsory services as serfs to their master." (57)

57. The Ukraine and the Church Union, page 24.

Conditions in the Uniat church improved in those regions that had come under Austrian rule after the partitioning of Poland, whereas in congressional Poland a ukase of the Czar again forcefully opened up the Orthodox heaven to the Uniats. With Peter the Great, who in 1721 had transferred the rights of the patriarchy of Moscow to the Holy Synod, the Czar had become the head of the Orthodox Church.

184 795 Since the serious crisis of Orthodoxy in the 15th and 16th /107/ century, the opportunity for a reunion of both churches* has never been as favorable as it is at present. The "defender of all Orthodox believers" is dead. The Synod in Moscow as well as the Ukrainian church, which

*[i.e., Catholic-Orthodox - Analyst]

Vatican.

000 Many hundreds of Catholic priests trained in the Orthodox ritual are waiting for the moment when the frontiers of the Soviet Union will be opened to the missionaries of Rome. /108/ They have been educated in the numerous special seminaries for priests which were erected at the wish of Pius XI in many dioceses of various countries.

First of all, however, the Orthodox of Poland were to be converted, of which, according to the last census, there were 3.8 million. The overwhelming majority of them were Greek Orthodox after the Brest Union and before their adoption into the Russian Empire. Now they were to be united anew with the Roman Catholic Church, not all at once, by force or from above through the conversion of bishops, but gradually and from below by winning over laymen and the priests. Pius XI who was for many years nuncio in Warsaw and got along well with the Poles, used for this purpose a more recent ritual, the Byzantine-Slavic one, which is more nearly like the purely Orthodox than is the Greek Orthodox, known as Ruthenian
795 in Rome. Externally the Byzantine-Slavic priests
• 798 with their long beards, their long hair and the klobuk (priest's hat) resemble their Orthodox colleagues. The dogma of this evolving church has not been definitively established. The Roman ecclesiastical congregation of the East is still uncertainly feeling its way along this difficult terrain. The orthodox love the form and even more the profound mysticism of their service which is rich in symbolism. The Vatican has learned from previous mistakes; it does not want to be hasty and arouse distrust. It is necessary to tread softly in places where the figures of saints are shunned as idols and demons and where the pope is regarded as the personified Antichrist. The fathers of the Byzantine-Slavic ritual are open to reason in matters of dogma, but the pope must

be recognized as the supreme shepherd and as infallible in ecclesiastical matters. This is their first condition. The dogma grows shaky on the doctrine about purgatory. The Orthodox Church knows only heaven and hell; and it is not always easy - in spite of the comforting prospect - to convince laymen and priests who are willing to be converted that there is also a purgatory./109/ The question as to whether the new ritual could not get along without this place of purification is at present still being considered in Rome. The problem of the origin of the Holy Spirit who, according to the Roman-Catholic conception forms a unity with God the Father and the Son, and according to the Orthodox belief originates only in God the Father, causes the least difficulties. The Byzantine-Slavic ritual is here permitted to adopt the Orthodox dogma.

Even though the 2000-year-old Roman Church had time carefully to prepare the matter of union, this was not the case with the fast-moving Polish state. Since Misika, a contemporary of Vladimir, introduced West Roman Christianity into Poland, the latter has always been at a disadvantage in its battle over the countries of the Slavic peoples with Orthodox religion, and it has always tried to compensate for this defect by Catholisizing in a headlong fashion. Polish missionary methods have done more harm than good as far as the Vatican is concerned. More than once the Papal See was obliged to curb Polish nationalism; four papal decress forbid the conversion of members of the Union to the Roman Catholic faith. In spite of this the Poles blithely went on "converting".

The most recent attempts at union by Pius XI and Pius XII were from the beginning sorely impeded by the preference shown the Poles by the deceased pope. Pius XI who gave Byzantine-Slavic ritual a new impulse excluded the Greek-Catholic clergy of Galicia, that is to say the Ukrainian priests, from their work of converting their

745 brothers in Volhynia, in Lublin, in Polesia and
748 in Podlakhia. He placed the clergy of the growing church under the jurisdiction of Polish Roman-Catholic bishops. Instead of Ukrainian priests, the French, Dutch and Poles, Redemptorists, Jesuits and Polish secular priests began missionary work in the Ukraine. It was supervised by an apostolic inspector who could pronounce no ecclesiastical judgment. The seminary for priests in Dubno was directed by Jesuits. /110/ But the thing that embittered all Ukrainians, whether Orthodox or Uniat, most of all against Rome, was the way the Orthodox Ukrainian ecclesiastical possessions seized by Warsaw were wasted on the Poles. The long fight between Ukrainian and Polish clergy about this property was settled by Pius XI in favor of the weaker party. Polish pastors received Ukrainian prebends and Polish colonists 100,000 hectares of land. The metropolitan of Lwów in a pastoral letter which was confiscated, described the papal procedure with regard to Poland as "robbery".

It cannot be denied that the Poles carried on a clever ecclesiastical policy toward the Vatican. Their strongest pressure instrument was probably the autocephalous Polish Church with Russian hierarchy which was subject to the Byzantine patriarch. A separate Orthodox faculty had been provided for it at the Warsaw University. In this way the Papal See could be threatened and its plans thwarted without incurring punishment.

The violent Catholisizing actions of the Poles, known as the "revindication of souls" made the Roman efforts at union extremely difficult. In the process of Polonizing Orthodox Ukrainians, the churches were often the only obstacle that needed to be taken seriously, for where the cultured stratum of society was so thin, the pope and the church were the only national prop the people had.

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The removal of this national stronghold has been systematically carried on for many years by the Poles through methods which could probably be compared with those of the "revindication" of Catherine II.

As early as 1928 the Warsaw government closed approximately 400 Orthodox churches and liquidated the church property belonging to them. The "Ukrainian Self Reliance League of Canada" in a petition to the League of Nations asserted that by closing the Orthodox churches or by transferring them to the Roman Catholic Church "the members of the Greek Orthodox Church are deprived of the right of free /111/ exercise of their religion". The Poles dropped the last controls in the summer of 1938. They banished the few Ukrainian intellectuals from the border region; mounted corps of frontier guards with army chaplains at their head entered the Orthodox villages and a few hours later left the communities which had now become "converted" to Rome. Finally, Warsaw also carried on its missionary work with powder and quickmatch. About this the confiscated "Kuryer Wilenski" of August 26, 1938 reports among other things: "The destruction in the past month of a hundred and more Orthodox churches in the eastern districts of the voivodeship of Lublin at the command of the administrative bodies produced, as we know, first a reaction on the part of the bishop's council of the Orthodox Church in Poland and then also a reaction of the head of the Greek Uniat Church in the form of a manifesto to all believers, as well as incitement of the population in a few towns in which these 'riots' occurred... The Greek Orthodox clergy maintains that in the voivodeship of Lublin 114 Orthodox churches were destroyed by order of the authorities... It cannot be denied that people of the Greek Orthodox faith were profoundly stirred by the fact that their sanctuaries were destroyed."

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198 This is a picture of the beginning of the new Union.

/112/ Moscow Educates

000 In one thing Lenin proved superior to his enemies and predecessors: he knew how to utilize the social-revolutionary and nationalist-revolutionary forces in the vast Russian Empire for his own ends. With the explosive material which Hetman Skoropadskyj and the counterrevolutionary general Denikin had piled up anew through their forcible restoration of large estates, he destroyed both opponents. He met the collapse of the idea of a Pan-Russian Empire with the slogan of the revolutionary proletarian unified front of non-Russian peoples of the former czarist realm against the capitalist states. It was only for appearances' sake that he complied with the national wishes of the peoples gathered together under Moscow.

668 In Russian Ukraine, where at the beginning of the Revolution the national consciousness of the great masses of peasants was not yet deeply rooted, Lenin's tactics did not run against insuperable difficulties. The cultured stratum, already not too large, was divided into two camps, one of which sympathized with Bolshevism, while the other regarded an autonomy within the democratic realm of Great Russia as the most favorable solution of the problem of nationalities. Thus from the beginning Lenin had a part of the Ukrainian people on his side, and he subjugated the rest with the help of Muscovite troops during years of bloody civil wars. True, in November 1917, in the "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia" sovereign rights "including the right of severance and of formation of an independent state" /113/ were promised, but toward the end of the period of the Communist war there was no force left which might have made use of it.

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Tables for Conversion of European Metric System into American or Canadian measures

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1 Meter	= 1.0936 yd	1 yard	= 0.9144 m
1 Meter	= 3.2800 ft	1 foot	= 0.3048 m
1 Kilometer	= 0.6214 mi	1 mile	= 1.6094 km
1 Squarekilometer	= 0.3861 sq. mi	1 square mile	= 2.5900 km²
1 Hectare	= 2.4710 acre	1 acre	= 0.4047 ha
1 Kilogramm	= 2.2046 lb	1 pound	= 0.4536 kg
1 metric ton	= 0.9842 t long	1 ton long	= 1.0160 t
1 metric ton	= 1.1023 t short	1 ton short	= 0.9072 t

Yield of Produce per Unit of Land

q/ha (Centners per Hectare) — bu/acre (US or Winchesterbushel per acre)

In converting the number of centners or bushels to get the corresponding number of bushels (per acre) or of centners (per ha) we multiply by one of the following coefficients.

Wheat

q/ha x 14.870 = bu/acre (1 bu = 60 lbs); bu/acre x 6.725 = q/ha

Rye — Maize

q/ha x 15.932 = bu/acre (1 bu = 56 lbs); bu/acre x 6.277 = q/ha

Barley

q/ha x 18.588 = bu/acre (1 bu = 48 lbs); bu/acre x 5.379 = q/ha

Oats

q/ha x 27.882 = bu/acre (1 bu = 32 lbs); bu/acre x 3.587 = q/ha

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The Ukrainian's tendency to idealise is also expressed in his relation to the weaker sex which generally enjoys a position of superiority in Ukrainian society. In literature, too, the Ukrainian woman appears in such an idealised and spiritualised form that even her faults, her foibles, do not detract from her spiritual value, but serve rather to enhance her charm and attractiveness. 181 562

The sense for actual reality is almost completely suffocated by the enthusiasm of the soul for the world of the imagination, for the ideal. 19th century drama contains a goodly company of women with a positive attitude to life — national heroines like Marusja Bohuslavka, lovable girls, good and faithful to boredom like Natalie of Poltava, unhappy victims of male seduction like Shevchenko's Kateryna and finally, prophetesses with an air of tragedy like the Ukrainian Cassandra. We must not forget that, except for the last named, these old-fashioned plays are still popular with the Ukrainian public and are performed even to-day, times without number, with great success throughout Ukraine, in the towns as well as in the remotest villages. 181 562 536

Western systems of thought have always been founded on the personal consciousness of the individual. Beginning with Plato in ancient Greece philosophical speculation has always started from individual consciousness as the only evident reality which is disputed by no one, a process which is still more evident in modern philosophy from Descartes on. Fichte's system is based on the philosophy of the ego which elsewhere appears in philosophy as a complete entity, independent of all other features, a sovereign being, which, in the intellectual world, is usually the final foundation of a concrete reality. 812 ●

Here Ukrainians, in contrast to Russians, are decidedly western in outlook. Though they have not produced philosophic systems of th r own based on the ego as the fundamental principle, or the foundation of further speculation, nevertheless their whole intellectual life, their ethical standards and legal code, and still more their actual conduct, are all based on the individual; and to restrict the right of the individual even in the interests of the community, is always resented as an encroachment on the freedom of will. 812 156

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152 Love plays a great part in all spheres of life in Ukraine,
593 though it is less connected with eroticism than in other countries; it is first and foremost the product or the accompaniment of the relation between mother and child. Maternal love, in all its possible manifestations, is one of the spiritual prisms through which most of the phenomena of public and private life are regarded and acquire their particular color. Love comprehends an enormous complex of motives which have found expression in literature, art and music.

● 812 I do not intend to dwell on the manifestations of this emotion in daily life. But I should like to refer to Jurkevych, one of the few Ukrainian philosophers in the 19th century who gave his coutrymen what may be called a philosophy of the heart, a system ruthlessly opposed to the materialism at that time in vogue and also to the almost mechanical rationalism and intellectualism.

In analysing problems of contemporary philosophy, Jurkevych comes to the conclusion that a system of philosophy expressed in functions of the reason is quite incapable of including the entire and real human being. A certain modesty with regards to the limits of human knowledge is characteristic for Ukrainian philosophers. These limits are the result of the fact that human reason and its capacity of knowing the world hide another, more profound, function of the human spirit on which reason is based and which provides it with possibilities of development. This original function of the human spirit, which is fully acknowledged by Skovoroda but mentioned by I. T. Stavrovetskyj as early as the 17th century, is the human heart. The philosophy of the heart which Jurkevych has developed in his work on „The Heart and Its Importance for the Psychic Life of Man" is the most characteristic feature of the transition from Platonism to recent philosophy; but it is directly opposed to Kant and his school.

I have deliberately dwelt on Jurkevych as a representative of Ukrainian philosophy, as his theory is doubtless influenced by certain characteristics typical for the Ukrainian view of life. One of Jurkevych's pupils, Vladimir Solowjev, later a famous Russian thinker, when writing of his teacher, rightly emphasises

the Ukrainian elements in his nature: "Jurkevych came from the Government of Poltava and was therefore a Ukrainian, a fact which left traces in his language and character." 812

Of course I do not mean to say that the Ukrainian does not fully appreciate the powers of thought, or that he is hostile towards them. On the contrary, the intellectual representatives of the Ukrainian people, such as Drahomaniv and his school, Lesja Ukrayinka, are loyal adherents of rationalism and Ivan Franko bears on his banner the proud motto "ratio vincit". But if we study these men more carefully, we come to the conclusion that their rationalist views are a concession to the spirit of the times and are perhaps more in the nature of a mask which hides the emotion they are loath to admit as the decisive factor in their psychic make-up.

The peculiar character of Ukrainian intellectual life emerges most distinctly from a comparison with the fundamental features of the German psyche: "The peculiar character of German thought", Paul Menzer says in his book on the character of the German spirit, "may be best studied in German philosophy — a belief in system is inherent in it, the view that it must be possible to classify all reality in a series of ideas". This naive belief in the omnipotence of the idea is most apparent in Christian Wolff who thinks it is possible to solve all questions of knowledge, action and feeling by means of the reason. The entire attitude to life is to be regulated by reason, all spontaneous decisions arrived at by impulse are forbidden. There can be no doubt that life, conceived thus, must atrophy, but we must admit the great sweep of such a systematic experiment. In practice, Wolff's philosophy evolved a pedantic training for Germans which, however, had its good effects as confirmed by no less a man than Kant in his famous praise of the spirit of thoroughness. If we construct the direct opposite to the characteristics of the German spirit described by Menzer, we get the Ukrainian way of thinking: in place of exaggerated systematisation a lack of all system often replaced by the intuition of genius which, unconsciously, builds up on feeling; no thoroughness, no pondering, and consequently restricted action, but, on the contrary, too great an expansion of the sphere of in- 812 153

812 terest and, at the same time, superficial work. The Ukrainian
153 does not treat problems in theory and practice from the point of view of reason, but confronts reality with emotion, takes decision on the spur of the moment and confuses theoretical and practical issues.

157 In connection herewith I shall just touch on the third sphere
771 of psychological life, namely the will. Seeing that all three
181 functions, reason, feeling and will are closely dependent on each other, the supremacy of the first or the second will necessarily
812 influence the third. A will that is under the control of feeling and not of reason, will not be very strong, steadfast or consistent, but, like the feelings, will fall from one extreme into the other in a brief interval, so that periods of great, superhuman activity and joy in work are followed by times of complete passivity and the idleness of despair. The supremacy of feeling and the predominance of love provide us with a further element in the Ukrainian view of the world, namely the deep feeling for religion which is the main component in all Slav spiritual life. Many scholars of the last century emphasise the supremacy of feeling and the all-important part played by religion as the main characteristics of the spiritual life not only of modern Slavs, but also of their ancestors, whether remote or recent. Attempts have been made to differentiate the historical peculiarity of the Slavs from that of the Romance peoples, in particular from the French and the Germanic nations. Compared with the political French and the philosophical Teutons, the Slavs are, in the widest sense, the religious race.

Quite apart from our opinion of this characteristic, it must not be forgotten that all leading Slavs, whether Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians or Russians, whether philosophers, authors or artists, display an undoubted, if varied religiousness. Even revolutionaries like Bakunin, Herzen and others, though they rejected all belief at the start, were none the less deeply religious men and their fantastic fight against religion was but a negative expression of religious feeling. Atheism in Russia is the expression of an unsatisfied passion for belief, of a passion that refuses to let

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itself be put off with inadequate creeds, and that, in despair, denies God Himself. 157 771

In spite of this general, common background, expressions of religious feeling in the various Slavonic tribes differ greatly. The Ukrainian is never orthodox in his religious life; he does not cling at all to forms, to externals; rather does he endeavour always to comprehend the essence of a creed or belief. All who have studied the character of the Ukrainian people even superficially must admit that a religious quarrel or still more, a bitter strife over ritual forms such as has become a plague with Russians is quite impossible among Ukrainians. Ukrainian history provides us with interesting and instructive examples of this. When the Kyiv State became Christian and accepted the Byzantine form of the Christian Church, being thereby automatically drawn into the whirlpool of religious strife, the Grand Prince deliberately sought to avoid all dogmatic quarrels and to keep contact with the West, even though he was a member of the Eastern Church and shared in Eastern culture. Unconcerned with the subtleties of dogma, which did not interest Kyiv princes though their church depended on Constantinople, they nevertheless sent ambassadors to the German emperors and to Popes, received delegates from the West and showered gifts on them; they formed family unions with Catholic princes and rulers — in a word, began to smooth the way of mediation between Western and Eastern Europe, a rôle which Ukraine was later to assume. It is true that fierce wars of religion were waged in Ukraine as elsewhere in the 16th and 17th centuries. But here the strife between adherents of the Orthodox Church and Unionists represented in reality the gigantic struggle between two views of the world — the Eastern conservative view and the Western, more progressive one, a struggle which, in addition to religion, comprehended many other factors, such as national feeling and political and cultural standards. At present, too, when Ukrainians must live together under most trying circumstances, church differences scarcely come into play. As a result of his over-individual nature, the Ukrainian is all too ready to utilise every opportunity of arguing with his opponent, but religious feeling is too deeply rooted and com- 181 812

pels too much respect for the opinion of others for him to make diverging beliefs an object of strife. Skovoroda, the Ukrainian Socrates, whose spiritual life reflects all the characteristics of the national psyche of the Ukrainian people, expresses his attitude to religious things in a very simple formula, which is perhaps too simple for a philosopher: "Pagan temples and idols were also expressions of Christian belief, being inscribed as they were with the wise, sacred words: gnoti seauton, nosce te ipsum".

According to Skovoroda, God did not reveal His truth to Christians and Hebrews alone, but also to pagans, just as morality cannot be regarded as the monopoly of the Christian world, seeing that it has many eminent champions among the nations of the ancient world. In the province of religion the Ukrainian demands universality, respect for every genuine religious feeling, tolerance of the convictions of others, but not orthodoxy and not the forfeiture of valuable content for the sake of mere form.

The Ukrainian view of the world is characterised by an optimism founded on metaphysics and ethics. In spite of the overwhelming catastrophes that have constantly shaken the historical existence of the people to its foundations, in spite of the terrible persecutions to which the heart of the nation, its peasantry, has been exposed for centuries, hope of a better future was never dead, and indeed it rose afresh at the very time when, judged by objective standards, there were practically no prospects of improvement. And yet — in defiance of all foes — the Ukrainian people will and must live and fulfil its destined mission, the motto to which all leading spirits have always sworn allegiance. Of course, Ukrainian public opinion, especially in the higher classes, has also displayed depression caused by temporary circumstances; but though the situation was often extremely critical, Ukrainian history has no proper example of general dissolution, of complete and extensive despair. On the contrary, it is characteristic of Ukrainian mentality to regard the world and its phenomena from the best side and to trust in a favorable issue of all processes. "We'll get along somehow" is the expression, not only of mental balance, of a determination to keep a stiff upper lip, but is at the same time an unmistakable sign

of a feeling of confidence, no matter how circumstances may 181
change. 812

If we seek the origin of this apparently irrational optimism, we come to the conclusion that its roots lie in prehistoric times and that its motives have been preserved in folklore, tales and fables. The study of extensive Ukrainian material proves conclusively that the belief in the victory of good over evil is part and parcel of the people's faith. The world is ruled by the principle of good; evil, and its personification, the devil, are by no means equal to good and do not have an independent existence of their own. 776 812

Without going into details, we can make the general assertion that in Ukraine the devil is no powerful god who finds satisfaction in the sea of troubles that overwhelms man; his power does not equal that of the good spirit; in the realm of evil he is not supreme over subordinate demons — he is a petty spirit who, by exploiting the weaknesses of God and man, seeks to make unpleasantness for both.

The devil cannot have the mastery over a human being during the latter's life, even if he has promised him his soul. It is fairly easy to summon the devil in order to enter into a contract with him. In drawing up the articles of such a contract, the devil does not display any special intelligence, or even intellectual superiority over his human partner. The Evil One not infrequently gets the worst of a bargain with a simple peasant; he puts himself to no end of trouble in order to get money and honor for man before death, but after he is dead, man always finds a loop-hole in the contract through which he can slip and land happily in Paradise. 776

Thus we see that, for the Ukrainian, far from being an imposing figure, the devil degenerates into something comical and, at times, even pitiable, a being to be exploited or made a fool of by man. In the eternal struggle which it is man's fate to conduct against evil, man is far superior to the devil.

Maksimov assures us that the belief in an unlimited number of evil spirits is firmly rooted in the consciousness of the Great Russian. He believes that there are scarcely any places in the

776 world free from them, that they do not even respect Russian churches. As unsubstantial beings who can, however, appear in various familiar guises to man, these servants of the Evil One do not only dwell in places forsaken by God, in bottomless moors and the depths of forests: they are just as much at home in human habitations and even penetrate into the human organism. We may see proof of this belief in the fact that all containers of drinking-water in Russian peasant houses have got some kind of lid, be it ever so primitive. If it is impossible to get a lid, two sticks are laid cross-wise on the vessel so as to prevent the devil from getting into the water. Similarly, we can scarcely find a peasant who, in spite of innate carelessness and dreaminess, will forget to make the sign of the Cross over his mouth when yawning, so as to keep the Evil One from entering into his organism.

On the basis of material at our disposal dealing with the rôle of the devil among Eastern Slavs, we may safely assert that among Ukrainians, as among the peoples of Western Europe, the demonic has lost something of its mystery, originality and power while, in the life of the Great Russian, evil may not be on the same level as good, but it has nevertheless managed to 000 preserve a fairly strong position. Russian dualism, predominant in folk-lore and expressed in the struggle between the Divine Power and the Evil One points plainly to analogy with the dualist beliefs of Oriental religions. Mazdeism in particular, the creed of aryan Iran is decidedly dualistic in character, being constructed on the contrasts between light and darkness, good and evil, salvation and destruction, as they appear in the psychical and moral world. These contrasts can be traced to two gods who are equal in power and who are constantly engaged in strife. Ahriman characterises the cause of the strife and the mutual enmity of these two powers as the ethical devil; for a moral sin, envy of Ormuzd causes Ahriman to conceive the idea of destroying his creations.

771 It is just here, in the province of ethics, that the difference in the conceptions of good and evil which we have 812 already noticed in the national beliefs of Russians and Ukrainians, becomes strikingly apparent. For the Ukrainian evil

is, so to speak, the result of teleological conditions. It is in the world not because there is any justification for its existence in itself, and not as a power against which we struggle in vain; evil exists because we need it, because without contrast to it, good could never be brought into the right light. It is not only the evil in us, but the evil around us that seems to be the essential complement of good; the power of good grows in the struggle with evil; injustice furthers the feeling for justice, falsehood and cowardice the feeling for truth, while selfishness calls forth magnanimity. Metaphorically speaking, the devil is for the Ukrainian by no means an almost divine power, inspiring man with inexpressible terror, but a being that draws the poor sinner's attention to his sins, frightens him a little and so shows him the way to improvement and perfection. This belief has produced a thoroughly optimistic view of the world which has found striking and eminent expression in literature.

For the Great Russian, evil is a dreadful power, not a necessary attribute of good but a principle of equal value that can attract disciples and inspire them with enthusiasm. One does not commit evil from carelessness, but from conviction, for the sake of evil, because evil has the same foundation and justification in human nature as good.

This idea of evil has naturally found artistic expression in literature and its main representatives in Russian literature are Dostojevskij and Tolstoi. Tolstoi rejected all positive religion and formed his own view of the world which is characterised by perfect passivity quite opposed to combating evil. His principle of "non-resistance" to evil which he erroneously tries to derive from Christ's original teaching is really anchored in his thoroughly Russian soul and is certainly the unconscious expression of the general Russian belief in the invincibility and omnipotence of evil.

Tolstoi deliberately twists Christ's teaching and attempts to set it up against the Old Testament idea of vengeance and retribution, though there is no justification for this at all. We know that Christ did not come to destroy the law of the prophets but to fulfil it.

the more active elements from maintaining their collaboration 186
with Germany. Few, if any, could foresee that Germany would actually allow the Soviet Union to absorb the West Ukrainian lands.

Perhaps of all Ukrainian nationalist movements the least pre- 162*
pared to cope with the startling changes which took place after August, 1939, was that of Paul Skoropads'kyi. As was previously indicated, this movement had never been strong numerically, even in its days of dominance in the Ukraine. In emigration it was further weakened by the fact that many of its original followers had really been adherents of the Russian monarchy at heart, and saw little advantage in supporting a Ukrainian "monarch" unless he was the only ruler available. It is true that, following these defections, the Het'man and his remaining followers had become much more nationalist in their outlook; it was, however, scarcely possible for them to compete with the OUN in this respect, and they lacked the prestige of the UNR, which could claim lineal descent from those who had first endeavored to realize the dream of a modern Ukrainian state. With the exception of a small group in Great Britain, the bulk of Skoropads'kyi's émigré followers were organized in the Ukraïns'ka Hromada (Ukrainian Community) in Greater Germany, where they claimed some 3,500 members in 1940.[1] Most were middle-aged or older.

What the Het'manites lacked in numerical strength and youthful vigor they had in part made up through the prestige of their
adherents. Foremost among these, until his death in 1931, was [213]
Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, a talented historian and philosopher who is widely acknowledged to have been the most original and profound Ukrainian thinker of the post-1918 era. In the period now under consideration, his influence in the Hromada was continued by a group of able historians headed by Dmytro Doroshenko. The official ideology of the movement was a compromise between the

[1] See the first issue of *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1940, p. 1, the organ of the Het'man group. For a succinct but generally accurate and penetrating summary of the position of this and other Ukrainian groups in mid-1941, see a memorandum from the files of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Occ E-4 (5), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [5]). Since the signature is illegible, I have not been able to determine the name of the author of this memorandum.

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lynskyj, Hrebinka etc.). Shevchenko, the greatest Ukrainian poet and Panko Kulish, the most eminent scholar of those days helped to perfect Ukrainian as a literary language. As all these writers came from Eastern Ukraine, the literary language grew from the East Ukrainian dialects of Poltava, Kharkiv and Kyiv. 197 533

In subsequent years Ukrainian became a still finer instrument in the hands of Marko Vovchok, Hlibiv, Konyskyj, Storoshenko and Shashkevych in Galicia and Fedjkovych in Bucovina.

After the Russian government laid a ban on Ukrainian (1876), literary and scientific life was concentrated in Lviv, the Ukrainian center in Austria-Hungary. This meant that western dialects came to their own, for many writers from Eastern Ukraine now published their works in the west (Myrnyj and Nechuj-Levytskyj, novelists; Starytskyj, dramatist and poet; Tobylevych, dramatist and later Hrinchenko, Kotsjubynskyj, Samijlenko and Lesja Ukrayinka, the greatest Ukrainian poetess). Ivan Franko is one of the greatest Ukrainians from the west at this time.

In Galicia a scientific and technical terminology developed so that in 1918 Ukrainian could take its place as the official language of the independent Ukrainian state and later of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The following modern writers have done much to enhance the reputation of Ukrainian as a literary language: Olha Kobylanska, Bohdan Lepkyj, Vasyl Stefanyk (in a literary Pokutish-Volynian dialect), Oleksander Oles, Spyrydon Cherkasenko, Pavlo Tychyna, Maksym Rylskyj, Mykola Khvylovyj, Oleksa Slisarenko, Jurij Janovskyj, Jewhen Malaniuk, Bohdan Ihor Antonych etc.

The scientific study of the Ukrainian language was promoted above all by the Ukrainian Academy of Learning in Kyiv: Ukrainian has up till now been taught in lectures and tutorial courses in the universities of Berlin, Königsberg, Vienna, Münster, Halle, Prague, Naples and Paris. But Ukrainian philology was first studied in the 17th century (Grammar by M. Smotrytskyj in 1618). Two hundred years later A. Pavlovskyj's grammar, the first to deal with Ukrainian as a national language, appeared in Petersburg. And it is a Ukrainian, Oleksander Potebnya (1835—1891) who is the founder of Slavonic philology. 814

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Several Ukrainian grammars have appeared in German, e. g. "Studien auf dem Gebiete der ruthenischen Sprache" (Studies in Ruthenian) by P. Ogonovski, Lemberg 1880. St. Smal-Stotskyj and Th. Gärtner wrote the "Grammatik der ruthenischen Sprache" (Ruthenian Grammar), Vienna 1913. Two books that served practical purposes were M. Simovych's "Grammatik zum Selbstunterricht" (Grammar for Home Students) and Jaroslav Rudnytskyj's "Lehrbuch der ukrainischen Sprache" (Course in Ukrainian), Leipzig 1940.

B. Hrinchenko compiled the most important dictionary: "Slovar ukraijinskoji movy", Kyiv 1907—1909. The Russian-Ukrainian dictionary published under the auspices of the Ukrainian Academy by A. Krymskyj and S. Jefremov is said to be the best of its kind: "Rosijsko-ukraijinskyj slovnyk" (to the letter P) Kyiv, 1924—1928. A large Ukrainian-German dictionary appeared in 1943. It was compiled by Z. Kuzela and J. Rudnytskyj with the collaboration of Prof. Dr. K. H. Meyer and published by the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at Berlin. V. Kmitsykevych and V. Spilka published a German-Ukrainian dictionary (Czernovitz 1912); others were published by I. Sharovolskyj (Kyiv 1931) and H. Nakonetshna (Leipzig 1939).

874 of his fathers", of the Orthodoxy. He is thus a concrete symbol
795 of the synthesis of two worlds, of the harmonious and complete union of two cultures, of the meeting of East and West and of
177 the fertilising of Ukrainian Orthodoxy by the Latin spirit of
.79 the Roman Catholic Church.

795 The seed scattered by Mohyla bore rich fruit. Hundreds of scholars, writers, politicians and organisers graduated in the
874 course of the 17th and 18th centuries from this unique "alma mater", the Kyiv Academy, equipped with the modern weapons of western learning, to fight first of all for the independence and the honor of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. After completing their studies in Kyiv the Ukrainian patriots of that time go to Germany to appropriate the arguments used by the Reformation against Catholicism, they penetrate to Rome and do not shrink from joining the Roman Church for a season only in order to become better acquainted with their opponent's plans in the very center of his camp. On their return home they develop an energetic campaign in teaching and writing to prepare and train wide circles of less well educated priests for the fight. In order to supply their audiences with intellectual munition, they publish a series of pamphlets directed against the enemy and all manner of apologies in defence of their own cause, utilising the knowledge they had gathered in the West. This leads to an enormous outburst of polemic writing, to an intellectual activity in the country which strikes even foreigners.

177 But the efforts of these champions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy
● 814 who had been trained in the West, did not stop there; they performed a still more important function in making European influence supreme in the state of Moscow, or the Russia of Peter, as it was then called. Ukraine contributed no mean share to the work of Peter the Great. The foundation and building of the modern Russian Empire was the almost unaided work of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, for the intellectual conditions for the solving of this task were almost completely lacking in Moscow itself. In order to carry out his reforms which soon degenerated into an absolute mania for reform, Peter utilised

the powers of the South which, in the 17th and 18th centuries could boast of a brilliant galaxy of scholars while Moscow and the North were still wrapped in darkness. The most important, but by no means all of the intellectual leaders in Ukraine were Herasym and Meletij Smotrytskyj, Christophor Philalet, Ivan Vyshenskyj, Kyrylo Tranquillion Stavrovetskyj, Zahar Kopystenskyj, Jelissej Pletenetskyj, Lavryn Sysanyj, Petro Mohyla, Kassian Sakovych, Taras Zemka, Sylvester Kossov, Lazar Baranovych, Joannykyj Galatovskyj, Dmytro Rostovskyj, Inokentyj Gisel, Stefan Javorskyj, Theophilakt Lopatynskyj, Teophan Prokopovych — and the list is by no means exhausted. The Moscow of these days had very few and not the most prominent names with which to confront this host. It is quite comprehensible that, in these circumstances, Peter I should have had too great a predilection for those products of culture, which had developed in Ukraine under the immediate influence of Western intellectual life. The contribution of Ukraine to the public life of Russia is perhaps best characterised by two men, Stefan Javorskyj and Theophan Prokopovych, both of them students and professors at the Kyiv Academy, the first of whom became "Administrator of the Patriarchal See" after Peter had decided to renounce the patriarchate, while the second was active as a reformer of church administration in Russia and as the Tsar's adviser in all important matters of state.

This process of the mutual penetration of the physical power of the North with the intellectual strength of the South, initiated by Peter the Great's reforms, did not bring lasting blessing to either. It was natural that Ukraine, politically crushed and intellectually exploited to the full by Moscow during the 19th century should have been obliged to lead the shadow of an existence; but neither was Moscow, the fortunate profiteer of this relationship, capable of maintaining the supremacy it owed to the artificial appropriation of European culture, for the products of western culture which had been transplanted from the south as the foundation of public life proved to be too weak to sustain the edifice of the gigantic empire in times of crisis. Even before the catastrophe, in the second half of the

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

Shevchenko's "Kateryna" by Mykola Arkas (1852—1909) and 533
many others.

Mykola Lysenko (1842—1912), a musician who was successful 814
in all branches of his art, and his successors created a revo- 533
lution in music in Ukraine. After graduating from the Leipzig Conservatoire Lysenko returned to Ukraine. He took the folk-song as the basis of his compositions but, while it had hitherto been treated as something primitive, Lysenko seeks in it the essence of the musical ego of the Ukrainian people. He tries first to establish the scale of the Ukrainian folk-song and to develop from it a suitable harmony. He worked like a professor of ethnography and investigated the abundant material at his disposal according to scientific methods, no other nation possessing such a rich treasure of songs, both as regards quality and quantity. Without going into a detailed analysis of the Ukrainian folk-song, we may add that most of them are part songs, where each part is independent, and starts one after the other finally combining with the first voice, which results in an original counterpoint and rich harmonious melody. Lysenko was aware of the great wealth of Ukrainian folk-songs, but also of the great difficulty of studying it in its entirety. But the work had to be done as a guarantee of the further organic development of music in Ukraine. He did not consider it right to graft the music of Western Europe onto Ukrainian products, for he was perhaps the first to understand that Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Wagner and Brahms were first and foremost German composers who constructed their works on a scale derived from the German folk-song and that the roots of this folk-song lie deep in German musical consciousness.

The impulse given by Lysenko expressed itself first in vocal 533
music; M. Leontovych (1877—1921) and K. Stetsenko (1882—1922) are products of the movement which he initiated. Their works are a synthesis of the impressive technique derived from the old vocal music of the 16th century on the one hand and of the Ukrainian folk-song on the other, from which they drew not only their motives but also their inspiration. This explains the enormous success of the Koshyts choir when it toured Europe from capital to capital, from Vienna to Berlin, Paris and London.

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level of the earlier times. Western influences become more 538
prominent; it is a time of transition, nor does the Reformation count for much, for even the Ukrainian translation of the Bible by Dr. Franz Skoryna in 1515 was a response to national needs and cannot be derived from external influences. The first [213]
Ukrainian books, on the other hand, were printed in 1491—93 by Shveipolt Fiol in a German printing-press in Cracow, and that in connection with the first Ukrainian academy (Ostroh 1577—1640), which had been formed for the purpose of publishing a critical edition of the Bible.

Literary and educative activity was really in the hands of 814
the brotherhoods, which naturally were greatly interested in efforts to unite the churches. Polish literature worthy of note arose, important preliminary work was done in the province of language (Smotrytskyj's Grammar of Church Slavonic 1618), but it was only after Mohyla (1596—1647) re-organised the Academy in Kyiv that a cultural center was formed which was to play a decisive part in the literature of Ukraine for about 200 years.

Theological, rhetorical and philosophical works appear, the history text-book "Synopsis" by I. Gisel (died in 1684) goes through 30 editions, and Gregor Skovoroda (1722—1794), the most eminent philosopher of the 18th century in Eastern Europe and a student at the Kyiv Academy, wrote his books, the real significance of which is only being recognised now.

The cultural renaissance in Ukraine due to the brotherhoods and the Kyiv Academy brought new impetus to other provinces of intellectual life, as for instance dramatic art (Jakob Gavatovych 1598—1679, Mytrophan Dowhalevskyj 18th century. Demeter Rostovskyj, 1651—1705, the writing of history Samuel Velychko, died in 1728; Gregor Hrabyanka, died in 1737, and Gregor Poletyka, died in 1784), and also in plastic art which reached a high level of excellence in the Left Bank Region under Mazeppa's hetmanate. Young men in Ukraine were no longer content 871
with native education; more and more they flocked to foreign, and above all, to German and Italian universities. Hetman Rozumovskyj's (1728—1803) intention to found a native uni-

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Ukrainian decadence, wrote not uninteresting dramas, novels and short stories which, however, had no great influence on the public. The following are the most noteworthy members of the younger generation: Gregor Chuprynka (1879—1919), an impressionist who was shot by the bolshevists; Ol. Oles (1878—1943) worked at Prague as an emigrant; the short-story writer Arkhyp Teslenko (1882—1911) who died early after having been banished to the north by the Imperial Government; Petro Karmanskyj (1878), whose lyrics have a delicate, almost exotic tone; Bohdan Lepkyj (1872—1942), who has written historical novels. Olha Kobylanska (1865—1945) was a worthy representative of Bucovina. 538

Among the many representatives of the world of science we mention Borys Hrinchenko (1863—1910), the editor of a comprehensive dictionary of the Ukrainian language; Agantangel Krymskyj (1871), a famous orientalist, the organiser of the Ukrainian Academy in Kyiv and the supreme head of the newly created state of Ukraine, Michael Hrushevskyj (1886—1934), the most important Slavonic historian of the present day and author of a monumental book on the history of Ukraine. 814

The literature of Soviet Ukraine which is completely under the influence of bolshevism and Moscow has produced no talent of merit. Out of the great number of prose writers of novel and short story only a few original writers may be mentioned, such as Mykola Khvylovyj (1893—1933) who was driven by the cruelty of real life to commit suicide; Valeryan Pidmohylnyj (1901), Gregor Kosynka (1899—1935), whose end was tragic, too. Khvylovyj is noteworthy because of his desire to enrich Ukrainian culture with western influence and to keep it aloof from northern ideology; pressure from Moscow, however, forced him to abandon his theory. One great master of lyric poetry has appeared, namely Paul Tychyna (1891), though his gift of song has completely dried up in later years. Volodymyr Sosiura (1898) and Eugen Plushnyk (1898) are only worth mentioning for the variety of the rhythms they use; Valeryan Polishchuk (1897) is the founder of a new kind of meter, the so-called "vers libre". One of the most promising and gifted poets of today is Maksym Rylskyj (1895), a neoclassicist, who tried long 538

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538 to uphold his artistic independence in the face of official pressure. But after many years of an unequal struggle his power of resistance broke down and to-day he writes in accordance with instructions from high places. The works of the dramatist Korniychuk, lately awarded the prize of the Union amounting to 100 000 roubles, are of no great artistic value, but only demonstrate a certain obvious tendency.

II.

814 Scientific work of any significance does not begin in Ukraine until the nineteenth century and is confined for the first decades to history and ethnography. This research, in so far as it was done in the Right Bank Region, received a certain support from the Russian government which, after quelling the Polish rebellion in 1831 wished to produce scientific proof that the areas right of the Dnipro have always been what the official language termed "Russian", and that Polish claims were therefore quite unjustified. Governmental circles in the Left Bank Region were not so interested in that question and so it was left to the private initiative of Ukrainian patriots either to preserve the ancient monuments of the glorious past themselves or to hand them over to the safe keeping of the Society for History and Philology at Kharkiv university.

The first proper attempt to organise Ukrainian research activity on a large scale is connected with the foundation of the "South-West Section of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society" in Kyiv, which united eminent Ukrainian scholars of the day for the purpose of working together. In a short time the society had acquired a high reputation in European scientific circles, which it owed as much to the results of its research as to its valuable publications. Then came the unhappy year 1876, when it was forbidden to speak or write Ukrainian and when the Kyiv Geographical Society was dissolved. Thus every possibility of scientific work was closed and scholars were forced by the pressure of altered circumstances to transfer their activity to one of the institutes affiliated to the universities and here, protected by the cloak of officialdom, continue working for Ukraine.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Thus we find valuable contributions to the history of Ukraine in the collections of scientific works published by the "Society for History and Philology" at Kharkiv university, or in the reports of the "Nestor Society" which was founded at the Kyiv university by Prof. Volodymyr Antonovych (1834—1906). Every student of Ukraine finds a mine of information in the monthly publications of the "Kyiv Antiquities", founded in 1882; for full 25 years this review offered a means of publication to scholars like Mykola Kostomariv (1817—1885), Michael Drahomaniv, Oleksander Lazarevskyj (1834—1907), Orest Levytskyj (1849—1922), Oleksander Potebnia, Ivan Franko, Mykola Sumcov (1854—1924) and many others.

814

As a result of the great pressure on scientific life all over Russia, Ukrainian research in the Empire right down to the Revolution of 1905 could not develop freely on a national basis, the consequence of which was that the most important fields of this work, too, were transferred to Eastern Galicia. In 1873 the "Literary Shevchenko Society" in Lviv was founded with the help of contributions from Ukrainian patriots. After its re-organisation in 1893 into a purely scientific institution, it gradually became the real Ukrainian Academy of Learning. The reputation of the institution was greatly promoted by Michael Hrushevskyj, a Kyiv scholar, who was called to the Chair for Ukrainian History at Lviv university and appointed immediately president of the Society, in which capacity he developed a most beneficial activity. The best proof of this is to be found in the 300 volumes published by the Society from 1873—1914, containing essays in Ukrainian in all provinces of learning.

The revolutionary movement after the Russo-Japanese War which helped to introduce constitutional measures in Russia, brought certain relief to the Ukrainian people; this was first expressed by the foundation of the "Ukrainian Scientific Society" in Kyiv. This society was a center for scholars of all ages and, like its elder sister in Lviv, had a favorable influence on the young generation.

814 In the years before the First World War it published 24 volumes in which we also find articles by foreign scholars, mainly Russians, like Shakhmatov, Korsh, Perets, Ilinskij etc.

873 814 The World War had a paralysing effect on the cultural life of Ukraine as a whole. Hrushevskyj, its intellectual leader at that time, was arrested and exiled, all publication of scientific works stopped. But this depression did not last long, for the time was approaching when revolutionary movements in Russia were to lead to the establishment of Ukrainian independence. As a result of various technical difficulties, the universities in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odessa, hitherto Russian, were left as they were except the foundation of new chairs for Ukrainian history, legal history, Ukrainian language and literature. In addition, two exclusively Ukrainian state universities were founded in Kyiv and Kamenets-Podilskyj as well as the faculty of history and philology in Poltava. Steps were also taken to organise the national archives, the Ukrainian National Gallery and finally the foundation of the Ukrainian Academy of Learning in Kyiv.

At first, the Soviet government did not interfere with the Academy of Learning, and even granted it a modest subsidy. Thanks to the devotion and the determination of Ukrainian scholars who did not leave the country, the Academy developed a lively and extensive activity in the years from 1925 till 1930, — though financial conditions were anything but satisfactory — and took a proper place among similar institutions in the world. But a radical change set in when the Academy, which up till then had been fairly independent, was forced into the service of communist theories; as a result nationally minded scholars were removed and bolshevist party ~~functionaries~~ introduced as members. The scientific level of the Academy sank enormously.

In the areas of Western Ukraine which were allocated to Poland, research activity decreased in comparison to pre-war years, which was mainly due to the lack of money.

As a result of the inflation of the Polish currency, the Shevchenko Society of Learning in Lviv lost much of its funds; it had to dispense with state help so that it could only continue a very restricted publishing activity. When Eastern Galicia was annexed

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by the USSR after the fall of the Polish state, the Shevchenko Society of Learning in Lviv was dissolved in December 1939. 873 814

The great hardships which the Ukrainian people has been exposed to in the last decades forced many intellectuals abroad where they attempted to found new centers of intellectual life. Thus the Ukrainian university in Prague, the college of Agriculture in Podjebrady, the Institute of Pedagogy, the Institute of Sociology, the Academy of Fine Art, the Society for History and Philology, the Society of Ukrainian Doctors and Engineers, the Ukrainian National Museum — all in Prague — came into being. The University, the oldest of the existant institutions, published a series of studies by its members, this being imitated with great zeal by other universities. We are justified in saying that, on the whole, Ukrainian emigrants in Prague were exceedingly active. The Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin also became an important center of Ukrainian scientific research abroad, its function being to develop its activity in close cooperation with European science. The publishing activity of the Ukrainian Institute in Varsaw, which published a series of valuable monographs, is worth mentioning.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Scholarly Revival

● 314 The third great field of development was in the realm of study and research, especially in such fields as concerned Ukraine, its history and culture. This was connected especially with the foundation and development of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and its subordinate institutions.

Ukrainian studies had developed during the nineteenth century and from the very beginning they had played a great part in the arousing of the national consciousness. While the scholars under the tsars were not allowed to touch the fundamental problems in the relation of Moscow and Ukraine and their results, of necessity, were compelled to stress the official line of the tsarist government as to the desire of the Ukrainian people to lose their identity in the Russian Empire, still studies in folklore and in folk-songs could not fail to bring home the great differences in the mentality and aspirations of the two peoples. Ethnography could not fail to show that the customs and the manners, the architecture and the decorations differed in Ukraine from the Great Russian territory and the scholars, if they were sincere and careful, could not fail to notice it and to publicize it.

As soon as the Ukrainian National Republic was set up, the situation changed, for now there was a Ukrainian regime which was not afraid to speak out. There began, despite the hardships and the destruction of the civil war, a new flood of publications in all these fields. By 1918, under the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky, plans were made for the establishment of an Academy of Sciences, its statutes were drawn up, and a few members selected as a nucleus.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

● 814 The changing fortunes of the war compelled the postponement of its realization but the work was not really lost. Soon after the definite formation of the Ukrainian Soviet government, the work was resumed, with those men who had survived leading in the work.

Despite some slight interference of the Soviet authorities, who demanded that history should be treated along the lines of Marxo-Leninism, the Academy succeeded in remaining almost completely autonomous. The period of the New Economic Policy, which seemed to restore the financial position of the country and the more peaceful life, provided a fairly favorable atmosphere. As a result the Academy flourished and in 1924, it was even able to invite Prof. Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, the recognized dean of Ukrainian historical studies, to return to Ukraine and take a position in the Academy.

Hrushevsky accepted the invitation and on his return to Kiev, he renewed the work of the old Ukrainian Scientific Society which had been united with the Academy. As head of the Historical Section, he fostered the creation of a large number of commissions in various branches of study and from 1924 to 1930 he edited a journal *Ukraine* which speedily became the outstanding journal in the field of historical and cultural studies. There was no period of Ukrainian history, no section of Ukrainian archaeology, art, and ethnography which was not assigned to some commission or group in the Academy.

At the same time the Academy was put in charge of most of the libraries, collections and resources of the older universities on Ukrainian territory. This had its good and its bad sides. It materially increased the resources of the Academy and the material at its disposal. On the bad side, it rendered more difficult the position of the younger scholars who were seeking to start upon a career.

814 The various Soviet Commissars of Education had made these
813 changes with the idea of securing large numbers of half-trained men and women who would occupy positions in the new state and take

the place of the old bureaucrats. They therefore turned the universities into technical schools of a rather inferior character, unlike the situation in Russia, where despite all the changes there was still preserved the fiction of university teaching and research. It was made clear that the teachers were not supposed to busy themselves with more advanced subjects for these were now the province of the Academy. Still there was a steady stream of young people into its influence and for several years it could well be said that there had never been a time when Ukrainian scholarship was so free and untrammeled. 814 273

The Academy in Kiev was, of course, the highest organ of scientific studies but it was not isolated, for some of the academicians, like Dmytro Bahaly, set up in Kharkiv a Chair of Scientific Research like an institute and Slabchenko did the same in Odesa. The example of these were followed in smaller cities and similar research centres were opened in Poltava, Chernihiv, Nizhin, Dnipropetrovsk, Kamyanets Podilsky, Vinnytsya, Zhytomir, Mykolayiv and Luhansk. 814

In the early years there was a constant effort to establish closer relations with the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the other scholarly institutions in Western Ukraine, and for some years there was an active interchange of views between the scholars of the two sections. Several outstanding Western Ukrainians were elected to membership in the Kiev Academy and the scholars went back and forth across the boundary with considerable freedom and cooperated in the development of Ukrainian studies.

In the field of history and of economics, it was necessary for the scholars[1] to pay some slight attention to the Marxo-Leninist ideas. They could not too openly contradict them but it was usually possible, by the addition of a few official quotations, to speak quite plainly with regard for scientific truth and accuracy. [626]

Even these restrictions were far laxer when it came to studies of language and material culture. The All-Ukrainian Archaeological Society and the Society for the Preservation of the Antiquities of Ukraine sent out expeditions to all parts of the country.

1 [of Western Ukraine -- Analyst]

●814 The studies for the enrichment of the language developed two opposing tendencies. There was one group, including Evhen Tymchenko and Olena Kurylo, which championed a puristic development. They rested their studies on the older forms and the peasant dialects and sought to remove from the language features which they felt had been erroneously added by the literary men and the colloquialisms of the day. The opposing school, including Ol. Synyavsky and many of the younger men, took the opposite attitude and welcomed the innovations which had been introduced into literature, especially from Western Europe. The discussions revealed the wealth and the variety of the literary resources of Ukrainian and, on the whole, broadened the appreciation of its independent character, even though in their use of terminology many of their words failed to come into common usage owing to the position of scientific Russian.

At the same time the scholars endeavored to coordinate the orthography of the language in the east and in the west, for previously there had been considerable variation in the Galician and Russian Ukrainian. Thus the eastern, following the Russian tradition, did not separate *g* and *h* and there were other differences, especially in the transliteration of European names into the Cyrillic.

To carry this work through there was held in 1927 a special conference in Kharkiv. Scholars were invited from all parts of the Ukrainian world, and after lengthy discussions there was worked out a standard system which represented the general consensus of scholarly opinion and opened a new period in the writing of the language.

At the same time there were published over thirty technical dictionaries and a group of academicians including A. Krymsky, V. Hantsov, K. Holoskevych, M. Hrinchenko and S. Yefremiv, began work on a great Ukrainian dictionary, six volumes of which, from A to P, were published. This was intended to be a general dictionary of the language and to represent all regions where Ukrainian was used, without stressing either archaism or reformation.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Early Trials

517 The change of economic policy which had ushered in the
186 collectivization of agriculture seemed at first to offer no threat to the cultural movement which was going on in Ukraine. Despite the open criticisms that had been made of Khvylovy and the more secret opposition that Skrypnyk was meeting, the cultural work continued in all its aspects. Politically the Commissariat of Education was still continuing its work, the new literature was proceeding with more and more important works being produced, and outside and somewhat apart from the political life of the day, Ukrainian scholarship was producing ever more serious works.

No one openly thought of overthrowing the regime although latent discontent could be discovered among the entire population. It had been years since there had been any open opposition. The unruly leaders who had appealed to arms had either gone abroad or quieted down and there was no one who was even suspected of the kind of disloyalty that had been widespread during the period of Militant Communism.

186 Then, in 1929, just as the compulsory collectivization was being
●814 prepared, the Ukrainian Soviet government announced that it had
687 discovered the evidence of the existence of a secret society, the
661 Society for the Liberation of Ukraine, and it commenced a series of arrests of some of the outstanding intellectual leaders of the scientific world. This resulted in a public trial and condemnation of the accused but for the most part they received relatively light sentences.

Who were involved? For the most part they were individuals who had played more or less important roles in the Ukrainian

186 National Republic, who had gone abroad after its collapse and
814 who had been invited back to take part in the work of the Ukrain-
687 ian Academy of Sciences. The government produced what seemed
661 to be definite evidence against these people but the curious fact
[538] was that this evidence was strangely inconsistent with all of their previous activity. On the prisoner's bench were such men as Serhey Yefremiv, the leading scholar of Ukrainian literature and a relative conservative, the academiciam Mykhaylo Slabchenko, a former Social Democrat, Prof. Joseph Hermayze, a former member of the Executive Committee of the same party, and the well-known writer L. Starytska-Chernyakivska, who was close to Efremiv and who had more or less dropped out of the modern literary movement and was living in practical retirement.

The Soviet record of the trial strongly suggests that all those factions which, during the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic had utterly failed to come to any agreement, had somehow or other composed their differences in the days when Ukrainian sentiments seemed to be dominant in the ranks of the Communist Party and when there were outstanding Communists, like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, pleading the Ukrainian cause. Yet, as was to be the case in almost all of the later trials, the court record based upon the testimony of the NKVD did not give any clue to the treasonable acts of which the defendants were accused and if they did, the stories passed belief. There was, likewise, no indication of the serious plans on which the organization was working or any details of its formal organization.

All the information that was revealed suggested that it was a definitely anti-Communist movement engineered by a group of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who objected to the Communist program of Ukrainization. There was no hint that the accused had any connection with the derussification program of Skrypnyk or the demand of Khvylovy and his friends of the *Vaplite* for the development of a definite Ukrainian Communism. The Society for the Liberation of Ukraine appeared like a ghost from the past and the prosecution seemed to have the tacit support of even those elements which were working for Ukrainization.

Up to this moment the only open manifestation had been the demand of Skrypnyk that Communists be included in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences but this had apparently been answered satisfactorily and, with slight changes, the Academy was working as before. The most that could be said was that the leaders of Ukrainian thought in the Academy had not properly in their old age kept pace with the development of Marxo-Leninist thought but even this was hardly sufficient for the outburst which was loosed against a group of widely respected scholars.

Another curious aspect of the situation was that the most severe sentences were not given to the announced ringleaders and chief culprits but that there was unearthed on the occasion another society, the SUM, the Society of Ukrainian Youth, which consisted of relatively obscure students, village intelligentsia, peasants and workmen who were shot by the hundreds and thousands without being brought before any tribunal. The head of this group, Mykola Pavlushkiv, was involved in the trial but once again there was no indication that any members of the SUM had been engaged in any form of sabotage or anti-governmental work. Members of the organization who have escaped abroad have testified that the SUM was organized only on the basis of personal friendships and never undertook or planned any deliberate acts of sabotage.

The discovery of the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine with its assumed anti-Communist tinge was the signal for the opening of a campaign against the most respected older non-Communist members of the Academy. The usual method was by the device of demanding Communist self-criticism, and criticism. Its practice was brutally simple and effective.

The Communist organs, especially the GPU-NKVD, decided which of these scholars were to be broken ideologically (and morally) and which were to be removed without fanfare. The latter disappeared. The former group were forced to appear for public "self-criticism." This was preceded by a series of attacks in the newspapers as to the mistakes in Marxo-Leninism which the victim had committed.

186 Then, on an appointed day, a meeting was arranged in a large
●814 hall to which the public was invited by the display of large
687 placards and other notices. Selected speakers attacked in the most
661 scurrilous and abusive language various aspects of the work of the accused and ascribed to him the grossest errors. Then came the (obligatory) speeches of those who "wished to speak," i.e. his collaborators and students. These were carefully prepared by the Communist nucleus in the Academy or the Committee. The accused was then compelled to admit his mistakes and promise hereafter to work "in the spirit of Marxo-Leninism and the decrees of the Communist Party." These performances usually lasted for two or three sessions and then the critical "testing" of the work went on in special scientific meetings or scientific publications or in the torture chambers of the GPU. If the accused did not humiliate himself sufficiently or if the collaborators showed themselves insufficiently critical, "rotten liberal," "compromising," "opportunistic" or leaving "ideologically (or class) hostile loopholes," the process was repeated with still more bitterness against the main culprit and his collaborators or witnesses who had attempted to defend him were attacked with equal ferocity and their testimony was sent to the proper places for "consideration."

This was the treatment accorded to Prof. Hrushevsky who, in 1930, was criticized publicly and then arrested and deported to Moscow where he was prevented from doing any work and only after he was completely broken was he sent to a rest-house in the Caucasus to die in 1934. With his removal, the old historical studies almost came to an end. The Academy was reorganized as the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and nearly all the work in the humanities were stopped. The Historical-Philological Section was combined with the Social-Economic Section and nearly all of its special fields were abolished, while at the same time there disappeared a large number of valuable books and collections which were ready for publication.

This destruction of the older scholars in the Academy was justified by grouping Hrushevsky with his historical studies in the same

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category of public enemies as Mazepa and Petlyura, and the three 186
came to form a trinity subject to constant attack. Their leading 814
crime was declared to be bourgeois nationalism, the object of which 687
was to separate the Ukrainian from the Russian people and to deny 661
the great significance of the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

In 1931 the Soviet authorities found traces of another organization, the Ukrainian National Centre. This is even more mysterious than was the preceding case, for it involved a number of apolitical figures who were living in retirement, as Holubovych, but at the same time it commenced the liquidation of the leaders of the former Borotbisty and Ukapisty. Still heavier sentences were imposed upon these men and large numbers were deported.

Then came an announcement of the extension to Soviet Ukrainian territory of the work of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Colonel Konovalets, and a number of more prominent Ukrainians were executed or deported for reasons that were never satisfactorily explained.

At the same time the Soviets seem to have spread rumors in connection with collectivization that there were movements for an uprising against the regime. They endeavored to have pseudo-Ukrainian patriots from Poland establish contacts with former officers of the Ukrainian National Republic who had dropped into obscurity and then, at a given signal, called for a revolt and easily overpowered their dupes.

Thus these trials eliminated from Ukrainian life the older scholars who had been trained before the period of Communist rule. They justified in the minds of the emigrés the correctness of their position in refusing to listen to the blandishments of the Ukrainian Soviet government during the apparently rosy years of the New Economic Policy, when it seemed as if there was to be a rapprochement with the West. How far the activity of these men, who had put themselves into the lion's mouth and perished, served to renew the Ukrainian courage and self-reliance has been much debated, especially in view of the fact that they were all destroyed as bourgeois, long before any serious danger seemed to

186 threaten the position of the various groups of Ukrainian Com-
814 munists. Khvylovy, despite the attacks upon him and Skrypnyk, still
687 continued to work for the greater Ukrainization of the population
661 and of the cities and, so far, he had not been subjected to any too severe criticism. That was to come next.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Turning of the Cultural Tide

The Ukrainian Communists did not realize what they were doing when they launched their campaign against the bourgeois intellectuals and the aged scholars in the Academy of Sciences. For the first time since the period of Ukrainization had started, they had definitely called the attention of Moscow to the existence in Ukraine of a survival of the old independent mode of thinking which had animated the Ukrainian leaders in the struggle for an independent state of their own and they had coined a name for it, bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism. That was to recur again and again and lead to their own ruin. 786 814

It is remarkable that neither Skrypnyk nor Khvylovy realized this earlier. Both men in their own way were seriously threatening the unity of the Soviet Union, to which as an ideal they were loyal. Both men, Skrypnyk in the political field and Khvylovy in literature, realized the danger to Ukraine of substituting Russianism for Communism. Both men accepted in different senses the basic ideals of Communism and both believed in a Communist International which would offer all peoples full rights of cultural and political development. Neither one understood that the Comintern was a shadow structure which was totally dependent upon the forces operating in Moscow and that the situation in 1928 and 1929 was basically different from that ten years before. [829]

In the RSFSR the charter of liberty for the fellow travellers which had been promulgated in 1925 was practically abolished by the granting of extreme power of control to Averbakh and the RAPP (the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) which, to all intents and purposes, was issuing orders as to how the writers should support the Five Year Plan. 626 538

661 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in
558 Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist
[665] Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which
[814] had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

Postyshev's[1] object was the rerussification of the country, for it
191 had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many
626 of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian news-
[871] papers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

old notion that "Mother Ukraine" had the same interest in all her 626
sons, whether they were working men, peasants or intellectual 538
nationalists. Both of them later revised their works under the kind leadership of the Party.

The proletarian writers and those who were content to write upon the prescribed or recommended themes were in their element. Kyrylenko and Mykytenko wrote glowingly and woodenly about collectivization and the elimination of the kulaks, "the dregs of society." Korniychuk, a young dramatist, presented in his plays all the appropriate Five Year plan subjects and gloried in the defeat of the old in the factories and on the collective farms. Everything in the literary field that glorified the Communist Party and rejected those ideas which had flourished under the preceding regime was applauded and the successful received honors and wealth and Stalin prizes for literary achievement.

The same development or retrogression[1] was to be noted in the 626
more purely scientific fields, especially where they touched studies 814
dealing with the Ukrainian language, history or culture. Skrypnyk had removed some of the more distinguished members of the Academy of Science. Postyshev purged most of their followers and then he went on to reorganize the institution in the Communist way. The Academy was changed into a series of separate institutes, each of which was subject only to a carefully chosen Presidium.

Then, at the end of 1934 all of those institutes connected with the old Historical Section and which dealt with such subjects as Ukrainian archaeology, history, history of law, Western Ukraine, etc. were abolished. The study of the humanities was practically ended and the old staff was excluded. There were left only institutes of language and material culture to care for the past and all other subjects were handed over to the network of the VUAMLIN, the reorganized and strengthened network of Marxo-Leninist institutes, which could serve as a more reliable means of spreading Communist doctrine in a pseudo-scientific form. They created a new complex of societies as the Society of Marxist Historians, all of which had the avowed purpose of glorifying the regime at the expense of any form of scientific truth.

[1] [1933-- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

626 814 191 In the field of studies in the Ukrainian language,[1] under the leadership of A. Khvylya who had already distinguished himself by his attacks on the entire process of Ukrainization, new steps were taken to counteract all that had been gained by any school of thought.

In the beginning Naum Kaganovich had tried to show that the scholars of the preceding period had worked under the influence of "populist" theories of language. He was soon forced to change this to a statement that the work had been "bourgeois nationalist," the favorite slogan for anything that was not Russian. In his article, *The Language Theory of Ukrainian Bourgeois Nationalism,* he wrote: "Here under the conception of the people emerge the kurkul circles; the bourgeois nationalists have shaped the development of the Ukrainian language on the speech of the kurkuls." In another passage he declared: "By this approach to the people the bourgeois nationalists understand the removal from the language of everything that is connected with the October revolution, the removal of all features which bring it closer to the language of the Russian proletariat and the workers of the other republics of the USSR and the implanting of everything that is outmoded, conservative and permeated with the nationalist bourgeois spirit."

It was easy to see at what these new "scholars" were aiming. The old arguments as to whether the local dialects of the peasants or the newer, literary language which had been developed for over a century was the better Ukrainian were now replaced by the definite statement that the proper form was that which was the language of the more "advanced" classes, i.e. the Communists and their sympathizers, who were the least connected with any special area and were the least affected by any considerations of locality or traditional culture or usage. Even during Ukrainization the Communists of high rank coming from Moscow had been officially relieved of the task of learning Ukrainian. Now this was expanded and those who, of their own volition, learned a few words were adjudged the best authorities on Ukrainian because of their Communist knowledge and standing.

The new authorities set themselves the task of rooting out those

1 [1933 -- Analyst]

attempts which the "bourgeois nationalists" had made to bring together the Ukrainians of the east and of the west. They declared that the preceding group had sought to bring back capitalism and to separate Ukrainian from the "brotherly" Russian and to remodel it on Polish and German standards. They attacked any system of orthography and transliteration which differed from that used in Russian and in their attacks on Polonisms in Ukrainian they went so far as to call Polish any Ukrainian form which differed from the Russian, even when the Polish word in fact had the same form as the Russian and differed from the Ukrainian.

In the small dictionaries that were printed only those words were admitted that revealed Russian relations and the academician Krymsky once remarked of one of these that it was merely a Russian-Russian dictionary, so far had the process been carried.

In 1933 Khvylya published a new orthography for Ukrainian. This repudiated the work that had been done earlier to bring together Eastern and Western Ukrainian and sought to take as the standard those Ukrainian dialects that had been most thoroughly russianized, although at the same time he carefully avoided explaining the policy on which he was working.

Thus, during these years there developed a definite policy of disintegrating the language from within. It was based very definitely upon the old theories of the nineteenth century, that Ukrainian was merely a corrupt form of Russian and could not have any independent development, but such a statement which would have satisfied Nicholas I and Belinsky was not expressed clearly. It was enveloped in a mass of Communist jargon which appealed to the great names of Bolshevik ideology and covered a complete ignorance of any of the facts of language or of popular usage.

At the same time in another field Postyshev saw the opportunity to deliver further blows under the guise of progress and of satisfying Ukrainian aspirations. He moved the capital of the Ukrainian Republic back to Kiev from Kharkiv.[1] There were good reasons for this. The Soviet regime had been established at Kharkiv, because it was nearer to the Russian boundary and hence could more easily receive support from Russian military sources during the

[1] [1933 -- Analyst]

simply Russians was constantly increased. It was almost forbidden 626
to mention the name Ukrainian in connection with the older settlers 186
in Kuban, along the Don, in the Green Wedge along the Amur, etc. [191]
and it was a matter of perplexity as to what language they could be said to speak or what dialect in connection with later studies of the dialects of the Russian language. It was inadmissible to regard them as speaking a peasant dialect in view of the attitude of the authorities in recognizing some sort of Ukrainian, but it was even worse to believe that Ukrainian could exist in those regions and so they were simply passed over and forgotten, while the newcomers, usually being under some kind of a ban, were simply treated as Russian deportees.

Even this was not the whole story, for in such cities as Vinnytsya 661
during these same years the population was slaughtered by the thousands and buried secretly in carefully hidden burial places which were then turned into parks and playgrounds to conceal the extent of the crimes. This was repeated in many places but the situation in Vinnytsya attracted especial attention because during the War, the Germans found the places of burial and revealed the thousands of bodies of the victims, many of whom had been buried alive. The extent of these massacres was as great as was the killing of the Polish officers in Katyn, which was likewise brought to light during the war.

By the time the census of 1939 was taken and this was the last 162
one published, the growth of the number of Russians and the diminution of Ukrainians showed clearly that there was a large scale transfer of nationality which completely reversed the figures in some sections of Asia without regard for the natural laws of reproduction and mortality.

In this atmosphere the nature of the intellectual and literary 626
work in the UkSSR can well be imagined. The Ukrainian scholars 814
were forced to accept the full Russian theories of the Ukrainian 661
past. This led to a complete revaluation of all the "outstanding figures." In 1933 the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was condemned on the ground that he was a typical representative of the noble classes. By the outbreak of World War II he became a Rus-

[1936-1938 -- Analyst]

626 sian patriot for signing the Treaty of Pereyaslav and bringing the
814 Zaporozhian Kozaks under Muscovite domination. It was so in
661 every branch of historical study. In back of the conception of the Soviet man and Soviet patriotism began to emerge with ever greater clarity the conception of Russian patriotism, as the doctrine of the "elder brother" who had given culture and civilization to the other nations of the Soviet Union became clearer and clearer.

626 It was the same thing in language. Khvylya and his friends
814 had been working on a Ukrainian-Russian dictionary but this was
191 immediately criticized by *Pravda* for its divisive tendencies, and the guilty compilers were liquidated. A new edition was started in 1938 on still a new principle. The Ukrainian and Russian words were to have the same number of synonyms and these were to have identical value. If, in any particular case, this did not prove to be true, it was so much the worse for the Ukrainian. If there were more words in Ukrainian to express various shades of one idea that there were in Russian, the words were banned. If there were fewer, the Russian words were supplied in order to show the influence that Russian had had upon the cultural development of Ukrainian.

The result was the reverse of what Zatonsky had proposed. He had suggested a mixed language with the idea that the Ukrainians would develop by practice toward the use of standard Russian. Now the new Commissariat of Education was introducing Russian into Ukrainian, forbidding the use of Ukrainian syntactical constructions which had no parallel in Russian in order to train the Ukrainians to speak Russian by infiltrating it into their native speech. The result would have been perhaps the same, but the important difference was that it preserved the supremacy of the Russian language in a pure form and corrupted the Ukrainian beyond recognition.

538 This procedure was too violent, even for many of the poets
191 and writers who were most ardent in their support of the Stalinist
626 regime. Men like Bazhan, who had put his pen entirely at the disposal of Moscow, continued to use some of the forbidden words and even obtained rewards for their obsequious phrases couched in

At the same time the nationalization of the land was commenced 423
and this gave a good excuse for the elimination of another class 471
of formerly prosperous people, whether they were Poles or Ukrainians. At first this was carried out along the lines of the Ukrainian land code of 1922, for the authorities were eager to get crops in when spring came. Still, during the summer of 1940 they began to urge the formation of collective farms. The peasants in some of the more backward regions listened to these ideas willingly, but in the better areas where agriculture was on a far higher and more efficient plane than in large sections of eastern Ukraine, they were very cool and meetings had to be postponed again and again if disorders were to be averted in the middle of the war. Still the Soviet authorities felt that they could waste some time until a real peace was restored and their hands were definitely free.

In regard to the educational establishments and all questions 661
of organization, they acted without delay. In the first days of the 814
occupation, the Soviet commissars seized the property of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and prevented all further work by confiscating the building and its contents and preventing all further publications. On January 14, 1940, they forced the complete self-liquidation of the Society. The president, Prof. Rakovsky, at once fled to the west and during the next uncertain months a large part of the active members made their way to Krakow in the Polish Government General, where they endeavored to resume their work. The Society was then turned into a branch of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR and was placed under the control of the administration in Kiev, while part of its collections and its work was placed under the University of Lviv, which was now ostensibly Ukrainianized and given the name of Ivan Franko, the great Western Ukrainian scholar and writer. This was not for long, for very soon here, too, the lecturers to win Soviet approval began to switch over from Ukrainian to Russian.

All other societies of every kind were abolished and fitted into 655
the Soviet scheme of things. The cooperative network, especially such great societies as the Maslosoyuz (Dairy Cooperative Society) and the People's Trade were made governmental organs. Various

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Soviet Ukraine During World War II

In the preceding chapters we have briefly traced the efforts of the Ukrainians to profit by the clash between the two totalitarian powers of Germany and the USSR and the Ukrainian hopes of being recognized as an independent state. These hopes had been thwarted by the Nazi refusal to treat the Ukraine as anything except a field for German expansion and the Western refusal to recognize the Ukrainian struggle for independence.

This, of course, does not tell the entire story. From the earliest days of the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine, many of the leading Ukrainian patriots, writers, artists and scholars, including a large part of the staff of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, had seized the opportunity to retire to the west into the Polish Government General but there were many more who were picked up in the early deportations and deposited along with the Poles in Central Asia. Some of these, during the brief period of friendship between the Poles and the Soviets, were again able to make their way to the west along with General Anders and found themselves again at freedom, while those who had retired to the west were forced to undergo increasing persecution at the hands of the Nazis as these became more desperate.

On the other hand, when the break finally came in 1941 and the Ukrainians, including those mobilized in the Red Army, began to surrender in masses, the Soviets began to deport to the east all of the outstanding people on whom they could lay their hands and whom at the first moment they did not wish to exterminate. In this number there were such Ukrainian writers as Tychyna, Rylsky and others who had showed their loyalty to the regime by their tasteless flattery of the regime in Moscow.

722 In the same way, the authorities gathered up in frenzied haste machinery, finished products, and records and started them likewise to the east with the hope of setting them up somewhere in a safe place and using them to increase the Soviet war potential. All this was a hurried and confused process, for it was contradicted by the Soviet orders to reduce the Ukraine to a heap of ruins and to leave nothing available for the invaders.

[814] [661] The clash between these two ideas was vividly reflected in the destruction of Kiev. Some sections of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR were hurriedly packed on trains and moved to Ufa. Other sections for little better reasons were abandoned in the general confusion or were mined for immediate destruction. Priceless books and records, no less than boilers and lathes, shared the two fates, while Kiev, thoroughly mined, was exploded and set on fire without regard for the needs of the people. The Soviet authorities, well aware that they could not evacuate the entire population, destroyed the food supplies of those who were left behind while other detachments massacred the helpless population indiscriminately.

The situation at Kharkiv and Odesa was far better and far more logical for the Soviets had a few days longer to sort out what they wished to remove and what they wanted to destroy, but even in these places there was the same wanton destruction which conflicted with the avowed aims of the Soviet authorities.

Then ensued a series of mutual recriminations, and it is still not clear in regard to many buildings and institutions whether the bulk of the damage and the losses were caused by Nazi or by Communist actions. Some 3500 carloads of machinery were shipped alone from the city of Zaporyzhzhya and most of this material was packed at night in utter darkness with no special care as to where it was being sent.

[466] The same situation confronted the workers, some 5,000,000 of whom were evacuated from the Ukraine and landed in rough factories that were hastily erected somewhere in Asia. These sometimes lacked even roofs and means of heating when the mercury dropped to 45° below zero.

Under such conditions, if the chaos and the disorder were not 722
to be allowed to spread further, it was obvious that something had to be done to improve the morale of the population. This was particularly evident and necessary during the early months when it seemed as if the Nazis might decide to make some concessions to the people. As a result, there were a series of developments undertaken which superficially, at least, offered some concessions to the spirit of the various non-Russian nationalities.

Thus, in 1943 the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR was [814]
allowed to celebrate its twenty fifth anniversary at Ufa in the Bashkir Autonomous Republic and to list its institutes which were scattered throughout Asia. Such an event rendered it possible to blame the Nazis for the destruction of what had not been evacuated. It furnished good propaganda for the Western powers who were already sending copious supplies to the USSR and receiving in return from it only condemnation and criticism.

In the same way, the various writers who had passed the 722
approval of the government were assigned posts as newspaper 538
correspondents in the Red Army where they could sing the praises 626
of Stalin. Yet, at the same time, they were encouraged to write articles and poems which would reflect the hostility to the Nazis and again and again the censorship was relaxed for men like Sosyura to write poems in praise of the Ukraine, of its past, its present and its future.

Others like Yanovsky and Bazhan were allowed to emphasize [198]
the separation between the traditional Ukrainian speech and the [814]
jargon that had been put out in the various Ukrainian-Russian dictionaries after the breaking of the Ukrainian Renaissance. They were allowed to assemble collaborators to compile a more conservative dictionary and to revamp the system of orthography which had been the work of such pronounced Russian sympathizers as Khvylya during the preceding period.

Yet, these concessions were more apparent than real, for under 722
the wartime conditions, those Ukrainian scholars that had the 814
apparent confidence of the government were scattered far and wide. They were living perforce under abnormal conditions and

722 no efforts were made to bring them together or to conduct a
● 814 revival of the Ukrainian work that had been so ruthlessly and needlessly shattered. It was a wartime device adopted for a passing situation and the masters in the Kremlin well understood that the fury of the war had done more than they had ever dreamed possible for the disintegration of the various Soviet Republics. Once, therefore, the evacuation had taken place, the Soviet leaders had only to sit by and to reap the profits. There would be plenty of time for that later and so the war years seemed an intermission in the relentless pressure that had been exerted in the past.

648 It was for the Soviet leaders a far more vital problem to
661 recover the masses of the people who had fled to the west or had
[167] been carried away by the Germans and who might, even in case of a victory of the democratic powers, reveal the full force of the Soviet pressure. That was why they welcomed the Yalta Agreement which provided for the compulsory return to the USSR of all refugees and deported persons and why, once peace was restored, they showed such devilish ingenuity in trying to recover the control of every one who could testify from personal experience as to the nature of the Soviet rule.

It was with the greatest surprise and lack of comprehension that the Western leaders became aware of this situation. They had listened eagerly to the Soviet siren songs that it was only Nazi sympathizers and criminals and traitors who did not want to return under the Soviet rule and it required some months before supposedly serious statesmen recovered their equilibrium sufficiently to understand the way in which they had been duped in the middle of the war.

Yet, no sooner had Soviet rule been reestablished than the old processes were revived with even greater energy and vigor. The last masks of independence or of free thought in the cultural or economic fields were torn away and the old persecution and charges were pressed with every increasing zeal.

000 in an ideal organization. Stalin, by his policy in the thirties, blew away that mirage but it required a World War for him to annihilate it.

Soon after the Germans attacked, Stalin dissolved the Comintern to please his Western allies and to dupe them. He substituted the Slav Congress and when he secured the assent of the Big Three to liberate the Slavs, he highly developed this.

186 As the Red Army, now transformed by fiat of the Council of
728 Commissars of the USSR into the Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies, "liberated" one Slav capital after another, they were followed by cultural missions who talked to the enthusiastic multitudes on the Slav Brotherhood of Nations in terms of 1848, Peter, the Third Rome and Stalin. Rylsky and Tychyna, Korniychuk and Yanovsky, all the outstanding Ukrainian writers who had yielded to the Russian cause and survived the purges, spoke. They praised the new situation and the democratic powers admired this.

665 It was only a sham because soon there was established the Cominform. Its seat was not in Moscow but its spirit was there. The object of the Cominform was not to create a new and equal gathering of Communist humanity, not the ostensible idea of the Comintern but it was to inform the Communists among the Slavs and elsewhere of the approach to Communism by the elder Communists of the world, the Muscovite Great Russians.

[538] In the purely cultural sphere the answer was the condemnation of formalism, and still more of internationalism. Formalism was a technical school of literary criticism which had contributed something to the study of literature and culture. It was an attempt to put technique above content, or rather to judge content by technique and its advocates, sometimes great scholars in a narrow field, basked in the light of the admiration of their friends, until they considered themselves great.

●814 Internationalism was something else. Its content had been ex-
665 pressed by the Protopope Avvakum in 1666 when he announced at his trial in Moscow that all Orthodox Christians had to come to Moscow to learn. Now it was the same. History was to be periodicized between A. M. and P. M. (Ante Muscoviae and Post

Muscoviam, Before and After Moscow). If the before was leading up to a Moscow discovery, it was good; if not, it was bad. 814 665

This was proclaimed by Zhdanov of the Politbiuro in 1946 [546] when, under the highest auspices, he began his attack. On September 4 of that year, at a meeting of the Umiom of Soviet Writers in Moscow, he lashed out at various films which had been recently produced and at several Russian authors, especially Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova, for not producing a true picture of Soviet reality. Then, warming to his task, he explicitly declared that literature had to be entirely at the service of the Communist Party and that it was the duty of every Soviet writer to lash and scourge the decadent bourgeois west. He berated many of the authors for wishing to learn from the bourgeois writers at the very moment when Soviet literature, the most revolutionary literature in the world, was a hundred times higher and more beautiful than the literature of the bourgeois west. 538 626 665

The speech of Zhdanov was the open proclamation of war against all foreign influences in Soviet literature and it was directed against some of the most respected figures, who were apparently silenced. Even Tikhonov was removed from his post at the head of the Union of Soviet Writers for not having exerted himself more strongly against these dangerous heresies. [558]

Yet this speech was not really the beginning, for some weeks before the question was fully brought into the open, at a meeting of the KP/b/U, Khrushchov, the Russian who held the post as First Secretary of the KP/b/U, had received from the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow full and definite instructions as to the means to be adopted for purging Ukrainian literature and science and for suppressing all traces of bourgeois nationalism. His remarks were reprinted in part by *Pravda* in Moscow, which summarized them in these words.

"The TsK KP/b/U had not paid sufficient attention to ideological work, does not give enough weight to the selecting and the ideological and political education of the cadres in the fields of science, literature and art, has not organized in the press a wide criticism of the hostile bourgeois-nationalist ideology. As a result

538 in some books, journals and newspaper articles and in the lectures
626 of some Ukrainian historians and literary men there are ideological
665 mistakes and perversions, and efforts to revive the bourgeois nationalist conceptions of the historian Hrushevsky and his 'school.' "

[814] The weight of the attack fell upon the Institute of Language
538 and Literature of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR for two
626 books which it had published. One was the first volume of a *History of Ukraine* which had appeared in 1943 and the other was *An Outline of the History of Ukrainian Literature* which had appeared in 1945. The authors of both books were accused of having failed to periodicize Ukrainian history and literature according to the Marxo-Leninist tradition and of having followed Hrushevsky and Yefremiv in being deceived by external political events. They were charged with remarks that could be interpreted as maintaining an early separation of Ukrainian culture from Russian, when it was a fact that the three brotherly nations, the Great Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, had had a joint culture until the fourteenth century, after which the Great Russians became the truest heirs and interpreters of the whole. They were charged with idealizing the old bourgeois nationalists as V. Naumenko and O. Levytsky, of admiring the old state of patriarchal private property and of failing to realize the great ideological gulf between Shevchenko, who stood in the tradition of Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, etc., and Kulish who was a liberal and not a revolutionist. They were condemned for having a good word for such nationalist counter-revolutionists as Vynnychenko and Oles and for calling a competent poet, I. Steshchenko, who had been a minister under Petlyura. They forced their own flatterer, Rylsky, to leave his post as head of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukraine for not having taken a sufficiently firm stand in condemning the mistakes of the other writers, and for a while he was in disfavor.

The accusations penned in Moscow and printed in *Pravda* and the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* were reprinted in the Ukrainian papers with even more vulgarity and abuse. They poured out their venom at nearly all the writers and historians who regarded the use of the Ukrainian language as expressing the feelings and the

The Soviet Cultural Policy in the Ukraine After the War

The situation is even more severe in the field of language. 191
Korniychuk after World War II emphasized that Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism was not to be sought only by a consideration of the contents of books and paintings. It was reflected in a still more dangerous form in the language of the books themselves. Any author who showed a predilection for the use of the older forms of the language or sought to develop it in any way other than the Communist Party desired was thereby convicting himself of holding nationalistic sentiments and of being dangerously reactionary. He thus accused of bourgeois nationalism even those writers as Yanovsky who had been most rigorous in following the party line in content. 626 538

The real significance of this statement of Korniychuk's is shown by the *Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary* which finally appeared in 1948 under the editorship of L. A. Bulakhovsky and M. F. Rylsky. The work was published in Moscow, although it bore the stamp of the Institute of Language Study of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR. 191 626 814

In this the authors made no concealment of their program, for they definitely stated that their work was based upon the "spoken" Ukrainian of the government offices (where it was the most corrupted by Russian words), and not the older Ukrainian language as spoken before the introduction of the Bolshevik reforms. They added, too, that they had supplied from Russian whatever was lacking in Ukrainian, for "thanks to the Russian language, the Ukrainian has been able to acquire the capacity to respond to the needs of socialist construction and to satisfy the cultural needs of the Ukrainian people." [198]

Stripped of its Communist jargon, this passage merely means that the Moscow authorities have decided to carry on their policy of russification in a new way. They have recognized the gap between the older Ukrainian language and the hodgepodge which they have produced and they are now insisting on using the words of the older usage in their most narrow and restricted sense, and by refusing to recognize any possibility of development in Ukrainian or any changes in it, they are forcing Ukrainian to become a dead language and by an inverted purism are planning to compel

191 the Ukrainians to recognize that Russian and Russian alone is in
626 a position to grow and develop.

●814 This is entirely in line with the new philological policy dictated by Stalin after his repudiation of the late Prof. Marr and what was commonly known as Marrism, a theory that Stalin had sponsored for many years. Now he was willing to argue that Russian as the language of the USSR was not only the Russian language as the language of the Russian people but it was also in a new sense a zonal language, the approved language of Socialism and Communism and, as such, it had already absorbed all that it needed and its mission was to replace all those languages which were spoken by people who had awaked to the truth of the Moscow doctrines.

626 Thus the new theories of language study that were officially
814 accepted in Moscow opened new vistas for cultural oppression and perversion of the Ukrainian masses. They were a signal for renewed efforts, not only to control the Ukrainian cultural life in the present and the future but their efforts were extended to the past and the scholars were set to carry out an artificial restatement of Ukrainian history, literature and culture from the earliest known periods.

538 It is small wonder then that the modern post-war Ukrainian
626 literature is becoming more and more a pallid and bloodless imitation of the stereotyped patterns required for Great Russian and that even those authors who have sold themselves to the Stalinist regime are unable to produce anything of real value or of even mediocre excellence. They are turning out the average propaganda material against the imperialistic Americans on the lines ordered by the Politiburo with never a thought except the income and perquisites which they are slated to receive and the constant terror lest at some moment by an unfortunate slip they may be accused justly or unjustly of that terrible crime of bourgeois nationalism and lose in an instant all that they have worked for years to win.

The cultural pressure exerted on eastern Ukraine is spread likewise with even more force over those portions in the West which had been formerly under Poland or Czechoslovakia. Here, as former parts of the old Hapsburg monarchy, the writers had had

to leave Ukraine and to serve the Muscovite State. The Ukrainian, 175
Prince Alexander Bezborodko, directed for many years Russian 517
foreign policy in the time of Catherine II. (1762—1796) and of
Paul I., who is known, however, to have disliked Russia and
to have dreamt of a free Ukraine. The greatest talents of modern
Russian literature, Gogol and Dostoyevsky, were of Ukrainian
origin; Gogol did not master Russian exactly until the end of his
life, it was strange to him. Far-famed scholars — Maxim Kova-
levsky, sociologist; the philosophers Lesevich and Yurkevich,
Vladimir Vernadsky, geologist, the famous painter Ilya Repin, —
were Ukrainians of whom Russian culture is proud.

The Ukrainians in the provinces of Austria, Galicia and Buko- 175
vina had lost their educated classes under the rule of the Poles and 186
Turks. Here, as well as in the Ukrainian territory to the West of [668]
the Carpathian Mountains, Carpatho-Ukraine, which was under-
Hungarian rule, the Ukrainians were principally peasants; the
cities were mostly not-Ukrainian. During the 'Spring of the
Peoples' in 1848 the Ukrainian national movement in Austria and
Hungary also appeared. In Galicia the Ruthenian Supreme Council
— a political representative of the Ukrainians in Austria — was
created. At the elections for the Austrian Parliament the Ukrai-
nians secured a considerable number of mandates. The national
rebirth began also in the Ukrainian territory on the western side
of the Carpathian Mountains. But the reaction which occured in
Austria hindered the Ukrainian national development. The Vienna
Government put the Ukrainians in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine
under Polish and Hungarian rule respectively in order to make the
Poles and Hungarians loyal towards Austria. This enabled the
Poles and Hungarians to conduct a policy of denationalisation
against the Ukrainians. Only at the end of the 19th century, in spite
of great hindrances on the part of the Poles, a Ukrainian political
and cultural life developed in Galicia. In connection with this, [517]
Ukrainian science and literature, prohibited in Kiev, Kharkov, and [814]
Odessa, found a home in Galicia (Lviw), and Bukovina (Cher-
nivtsi). Ukrainians from Tsarist Ukraine published here their
periodicals and books; here, under the direction of the famous
Kievan historian Michael Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian Shevchenko
Scientific Society developed. It was by its energy a real Ukrainian
Academy of Science.

Gradually the Ukrainians in Austria were overcoming the
obstacles created by the ruling class of the Polish nobility, and
secured new mandates in the Austrian Parliament and the Galician
Diet.

871 every teacher in the schools in Ukraine had orders to spread Com-
65 munist propaganda, to fight the appearance of national discontent
with the Russian rule by every means, and was obliged to insult the
[814] struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation. In schools, Ukrai-
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and 'reactionary'. But Tsar Peter I. and Tsar Ivan the Terrible,
are glorified by Soviet school and science as 'progressive demo-
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659 The Ukrainian religious life under the régime of Soviet Russian
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headed by its idealistic leaders, the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky,
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Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1918—19 and others, completed
a great task for the cultural and moral improvement of the Ukrai-
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did not succeed in this. Then the Soviet Government ruined by
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its entire hierarchy and masses of its followers (1929).

661 In connection with the 'General Line' which had placed unbear-
517 able burdens on Ukrainian economy, a mass discontent against
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815 exploitation and political oppression by Russia caused, among the
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efforts of the Ukrainian nation. For this purpose a number of trials
against the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian science
and social life were arranged; the case of the Union for the Libera-
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others in Kharkov, in spring 1930. Thousands of innocent people,
especially students, perished in the prisoners' cells of the GPU with-
out any trial. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Academy of Science
was exposed to repressions. In place of the imprisoned or expelled
members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, the Communists
appointed their own people though without scientific merits,
but politically faithful to Moscow.

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD1

661 by the Soviet regime and, as a result, made them collectively responsible for the delayed defeat of the German Army. This condemnation brought about the liquidation of several Soviet nationalities such as the Chechen-Ingush, the Kalmyks, the Crimean Tartars and the Germans of the Volga.[51] With regard to the larger nationalities, like the Ukrainians, the Byelo-Russians, the Caucasians, who also proved to be unreliable during the crisis of 1941-43, Stalin had chosen the policy of total Russification, beginning with wholesale purges and persecutions, especially among the intelligentsia.[52]

661 The decision, however, of the Soviet Government to return to the old policy of Russification was met by strong opposition. Ukrainian ●814 history, for example, was based (up to 1934 and again during the Second World War) on Hrushevskyj's works. It was, therefore, inconvenient even for the Russian Bolsheviks who were assured of Stalin's support to suddenly reject this interpretation of history since it had previous official approval by the Communists. Facing this situation, Soviet Russian historians were compelled to invent evidence that Hrushevskyj was not a scientist-historian, but a "bourgeois nationalist" who deliberately falsified actual facts in order to prove the differences between the Russian and Ukrainian nations.

One of the striking illustrations of Soviet-Russian difficulties in dealing with Ukrainian history and literature was offered by Litvin in *Bolshevik* (official Party periodical, in an article entitled, "About the History of the Ukrainian People"). In this article, Litvin admitted that the presentation of Ukrainian history and literature had up to this time been based on serious errors and deviations from the Soviet principle. These errors were promoted by the "enemies of the people" who had not yet been liquidated by the Party. He uncovered these deviations and errors in practically all the Soviet-Ukrainian histories used in schools and universities over a period of twenty-five years, and accused most of the Soviet-Ukrainian historians of having

51 P. E. Mosely, "Soviet Policy and Nationality Conflicts in East Central Europe," *The Soviet Union, a Symposium*, W. Gurian, ed. (Notre Dame, 1951), p. 68.

52 Stalin's decision to return to the Tsarist policy of Russification should be considered as a severe blow to all non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, especially if one recalls his statement of what such promotion of Russian chauvinism would mean: "Every attempt to deviate toward great Russian chauvinism is an endeavor to ignore national differences of language, culture and mode of life; an endeavor to prepare the way for the liquidation of the national republics and regions; an endeavor to undermine the principle of national equality." Stalin's report at the XVI. Sjezd Wsesojuznoii Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), (June 26-July 13, 1930) cf. *Sotchinenija*, Vol. XII (Moscow, 1949), p. 362.

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served the anti-Soviet cause. The most inexcusable "crime" of these Soviet-Ukrainian writers was their failure to show that Great Russian literature played a significant role in developing Ukrainian culture. Litvin declared: 661 814

> The uncovery of serious shortcomings and mistakes in various publications of the Academy of Science of Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic by the Central Committees of All-Union Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Ukraine, as well as in many publications of the other Ukrainian publishing houses proved that the known group of historians and litterateurs in Ukraine are not sufficiently armed with the Marxist-Leninist materialistic methods and remain in the prison of bourgeois nationalistic methodology of Hrushevskyj. . . . Bourgeois historian Hrushevskyj developed a fallacious anti-historical conception of the origin and development of the Ukrainian people, as if the Ukrainian people had no relationship with the Russian people, as if the entire historical development of both nations had not proceeded in a genuine friendship, unity and mutual influence, but in a constant antagonism.[53]

In order to discourage Soviet historians from referring in the future to the works of Hrushevskyj, Litvin emphasized that Hrushevskyj had been in constant touch with the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries, which directed anti-Soviet uprisings in the territories of the Soviet Ukraine long after the establishment of the Soviet order. Finally, after giving advice on how to write an "acceptable" history of the Ukraine, Litvin concluded that the "Ukrainian" people must wait for scientific works from Soviet historians, who will be able to present concrete proof of the "brotherly" union between the Russian and Ukrainian people and their common loyalty to the Bolsheviks.

Simultaneously with Litvin's accusations, the co-workers of Soviet-Ukrainian journals, newspapers and propaganda were advised to adjust themselves to the new Party line by denouncing and purging the "remnants" of the Ukrainian National elements from Soviet-Ukrainian literature. They were further advised to praise the Soviet order as an achievement of the Great Russian people, who, therefore, must be recognized as the leaders of all nations on the road to Communism. 661

The climax of the anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian course was

53 Litvin, "About the History of the Ukrainian People," *Bolshevik*, No. 7 (Moscow, 1947), pp. 44-45.

orientation. Khvylovy considered that Ukrainian literature should go 665
its own way and look towards Western Europe, no matter whether 186
bourgeois or proletarian. Shumsky advocated that the Ukrainian Communist Party should be independent of the Russian Communist Party.

This crisis within the Ukrainian Communist Party* prompted the 661
Moscow Bolshevik leadership in 1926 to make one of Stalin's principal 665
assistants, L. M. Kaganovich, Ukrainian party secretary for a short 186
period during which the first great purge against the nationalist deviation was carried out. Khvylovy was ejected from the party and Shumsky expelled from the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When Khvylovy repented he was given another chance and re-admitted as a party member, but in 1933 he committed suicide after a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism had been launched.

Admittedly the methods of repression in the Ukraine were comparatively liberal until 1929-30. From that time onwards the oppressive policy of the Soviet State overshadowed in the minds of the Ukrainian nationalists in the U.S.S.R. the contribution which Polish, Rumanian and Czech communists were ready to make for the establishment of a Greater Soviet Ukraine. Many Ukrainian nationalists became convinced that national unity was less vital to the Ukrainians than cultural and [177]
political freedom, in particular that free intercourse with the West which Moscow was unwilling to grant.

The Soviet State inflicted many heavy blows on the representatives 668
of the western orientation among the Ukrainians, but never vanquished 661
it entirely. In this struggle Ukrainian nationalism commanded an almost inexhaustible reservoir of resistance forces. Bloodshed and terror seemed incapable of stamping out the longing for spiritual freedom. Almost every year brought the discovery of a new conspiracy, a new series of trials, a new trend in national Ukrainian deviations. In 1929 the G.P.U. discovered the 'Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy', the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in 1931 the 'Ukrainian National Centre', in 1933 the 'Ukrainian Military Organization' (UVO).

The offensive by the central Government against the Ukraine's trends [814]
towards a more independent existence was conducted not only in the political sphere but also in the field of culture, where the régime had originally granted some scope to Ukrainian nationalism. One of the main bulwarks of Ukrainian nationalism was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The history section of the Academy had turned out to be so anti-Bolshevik that it had to be disbanded altogether while its head, Professor Hrushevsky, was exiled to Russia proper. This banishment of the 'great old man' of Ukrainian nationalism from his place of work showed better than anything else that the policy of reconciliation which Moscow had originally pursued in its relation towards Ukrainian nationalism had been but a short-term manœuvre.

*[Cf. category 665, p. 130 --Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrain- 000
ian peasantry.

While the armed struggle of Ukrainian nationalists was confined to 186
a small fringe along the Ukrainian border, the Soviet Government had 814
to face more subtle forms of opposition throughout the Soviet Ukraine. 661
One of the outstanding features of the post-war development in the Ukraine was that the same cultural institutions which in the purges of the thirties had been compelled to change their nationalistic Ukrainian personnel from top to bottom, were again involved in difficulties with the Soviet authorities.

This was particularly true of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and especially of its Institute for Language and Literature and its Institute for History. The former produced in 1945 an *Essay on the History of Ukrainian Literature*, whose authors stressed the dependence of Ukrainian literature on the West and 'concealed that Russian and Ukrainian literatures exercised a mutual fertilizing influence on each other in the course of centuries'.[19]

Even more serious 'nationalist excesses' were committed in the field of history writing. It seems that practically all major historical works which the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences published in 1941–5 contained 'serious mistakes of a nationalistic character'. For several years the party and state authorities did not pay much attention to the works of Ukrainian academicians; but after 1946–7 the leading party organs restarted to analyse Ukrainian historical writings and pointed out that Ukrainian historians had never, in fact, succeeded in overcoming the influence of the nationalistic-bourgeois school of Professor Hrushevsky.[20]

In the light of official Soviet admissions the ideological consolidation of the Ukraine seemed not to have advanced by a single inch since the days when Hrushevsky was still the teacher of the historians and Khvylovy the authority for those dealing with problems of Ukrainian literature. Twenty years after Khvylovy's first expulsion from the Communist Party, and fifteen years after his suicide, orthodox Ukrainian Bolsheviks were still haunted by the fear of 'Khvylovy-ist ideas' and were active in opposing them.

The first step in the purge of Ukrainian literature in the post-war 186
period was the replacement of the editorial boards of the three leading 661
Ukrainian literary journals *Vitchizna* (Fatherland), *Dnipro* (Dnieper) 538
and *Radyansky Lviv* (Soviet Lvov). All three journals had been accused of systematically printing nationalist novels and articles. As the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers was obviously responsible for ideological offences committed in literary journals published on Ukrainian territory, the purge had to be extended to this organization as well. The leading personalities of the writers' union, including its president,

[Cf. cat. 116, pp. 30-31, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]

645 even worked out a plan to recruit 8,000 teachers in Western
871 Ukraine to undertake Ukrainian work in the Donbas where the
186 Russian influence was strongest.
665 At the same time Skrypnyk was a determined Communist and he lost no opportunity for advancing the doctrines of the movement, even at the risk of doing violence to those Ukrainian ideals in which he believed. Thus, in 1928, he demanded a reformation of
[815] the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been working feverishly in the same cause of Ukrainization but which, from his point of view, was insufficiently Marxist and Communist. In 1929 he won his point and the Academy was forced to elect to membership seven Communists who were chosen for their knowledge of the subject and not for their scientific ability. One of the seven was Skrypnyk himself, and among the others were O. Shlikhter and Zatonsky, the veteran from the earlier Ukrainian Communist movement. He soon promoted Shlikhter to a prominent position and refused to confirm the election of the non-Communist scholar, Krymsky, to the post of secretary. At the same time he forced the election of several Western Ukrainian members, so that for a few years the Academy did become a real centre to represent all Ukrainian scholarship.

Thus, in this complex process Skrypnyk played at times a curious and often contradictory role. He was at once the head of the Ukrainian movement and of the Communist movement in the country and he never realized or noticed the contradictory character of his actions, like Tito in the early years of his dealing with Moscow. Still, during his term of office the Ukrainian movement reached its height and seemed to be flourishing.

The Scholarly Revival

The development during these years[1] was not only in the humanities but it extended to all fields of science, especially those that had to do with the study of the Ukrainian resources and agriculture. Young geologists, biologists, etc. found convenient opportunities for the use of their talents, and their studies revealed new and often unsuspected potentialities in the country. 815

All this work, which was under the Commissariat of Education, was treated kindly by the former Borotbisty and Ukapisty who were in control of the Commissariat. At times they grumbled that more was not being done in the field and under the principles of Marxo-Leninism, but they did not use their power to suppress or hinder the work. In a sense they looked at it with a certain lack of comprehension and criticism. It is not too much to say that this intellectual and scholarly activity proceeded outside the range of Communist interests and was allowed far more free scope than was possible in the case of the writers or the administration. 815 626

The only answer which the more rigid Communists found was the establishment of a large chain of Marxo-Leninist Institutes which were ostensibly devoted to the study of the philosophy of Communism and to the working out of Communist sciences on the same pattern as those in Moscow. These reflected the actual state of Communist thinking and were really schools for propaganda and not for scientific study in any sense of the word. They were liberally supported and they were frequently able to secure their pick of the more talented and ambitious scholars who were willing to rise through the established channels of Communism, rather than by the more exacting service of true knowledge.

It was not until 1927 that Skrypnyk, with all of his Ukrainian patriotism, hearkened to the Communist protests that there were no Communists in the Academy of Sciences and he insisted that a certain number of prominent Communists should be admitted. It was, of course, done but not without grumbling, for the members of the Academy had been very careful as to the type of man whom they elected and as to his scholarly abilities and reputation. They felt, deservedly, that the addition of these new members would lower the standards of the Academy but there was no way out.

1 [after establishment of Ukrainian Soviet Republic--Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

● 815 626 This was to be the signal for the ending of the old system of relatively free thought. It was the first step in the approaching changes that were to wreak havoc on every form of Ukrainian life and bring to an untimely end the rapidly developing Ukrainian Renaissance.

871 every teacher in the schools in Ukraine had orders to spread Com-
656 munist propaganda, to fight the appearance of national discontent with the Russian rule by every means, and was obliged to insult the
[814] struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation. In schools, Ukrainian history was falsely interpreted as well as in literature and in films. For instance, clinging to the tradition taken from Tsarist Russia, the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa who at the beginning of the 18th century wanted to free Ukraine from Muscovite dependence, has in Soviet historiography the epithet of a 'traitor' and 'reactionary'. But Tsar Peter I. and Tsar Ivan the Terrible, are glorified by Soviet school and science as 'progressive democratic rulers'.

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517 able burdens on Ukrainian economy, a mass discontent against Moscow increased among the Ukrainians. The ruthless economic
●815 exploitation and political oppression by Russia caused, among the Ukrainian people, a permanent oppositon which appeared in various forms. Therefore, the Moscow Government decided to terrorise the Ukrainian intelligentsia which bore the brunt of the political efforts of the Ukrainian nation. For this purpose a number of trials against the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian science and social life were arranged; the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine with the participation of the prominent member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, Serhy Yefremov, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier, Professor Osyp Hermayze and others in Kharkov, in spring 1930. Thousands of innocent people, especially students, perished in the prisoners' cells of the GPU without any trial. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Academy of Science was exposed to repressions. In place of the imprisoned or expelled members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, the Communists appointed their own people though without scientific merits,
46 but politically faithful to Moscow.

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest: to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czechoslovakia met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrainian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Economic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrainian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrainian emigration developed.

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed a considerable activity.

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name of their enslaved brethren.

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western territories of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily *Svoboda*. The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton, Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will*. There are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools, from American and Canadian Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, farmers. The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about 1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest political organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Communist Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian

8: Feden Ko H-4,5 (no date) 1951 RO1 Ukraine RO1

3. *The New Ukrainian Political Emigration*

In consequence of the occupation of all Ukrainian territories by the armies of Soviet Russia, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had to remain outside the borders of their fatherland. In the first years after the termination of the war, the Ukrainian emigrants lived in Displaced Persons' Camps in Germany and Austria. Now the Ukrainians can be seen in all European and American countries, in Australia and New Zealand. These are all people who, for national and political reasons, opposed repatriation into a Ukraine oppressed by the Communist Government. They declared repeatedly, when they were threatened with forced repatriation, that they would sooner commit suicide than fall into the hands of their oppressors. 167 186 668

The Ukrainian emigrants in Europe and America are developing a considerable political and cultural activity. The central institutions of the Ukrainian political parties are remaining in exile where their press is being published, the elementary, secondary and academic schools are being operated — the Ukrainian University in Munich, the Ukrainian Technical University in Germany, until 1945 in Bohemia, and others.

After World War II the Ukrainian émigrés have created more scientific institutions: The Scientific Shevchenko Society, a continuation of the identical Society which had existed in Lviw since 1874, and had been destroyed by the Communist régime, and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science. These Ukrainian Scientific Societies are working effectively and have their branches in Europe and in America. [815]

Under these circumstances, when in Ukraine enslaved by Soviet Russia, the Ukrainian political life is suppressed and cannot show itself freely, the Ukrainian emigrants think it their duty to speak in the name of their nation in the defence of its rights before civilised mankind. For this purpose the leaders of the Ukrainian parties created the Ukrainian National Council in July 1948, as the political representation of the Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainian National Council continues the tradition of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic which had been created through the will of the Ukrainian nation in 1918—1919. Many of the participants of the Ukrainian fight for liberation and many of the leaders of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic are still living. These men believe firmly that the time for the free state existence of the Ukrainian nation will come.

people seize stones and with them beat their foreheads three 751
times, saying: "Stone-head, stone-head, stone-head." This is supposed to make the head as hard as stone, i.e. immune to any ache.[75]

The evil spirits residing in natural phenomena can be a source 821
of danger unless one takes the necessary precautions. When it 789
thunders and lightens, one should avoid walking along the road, and should sit down somewhere at the side, because God is shooting at the fleeing Devil and his arrows may accidentally kill the wayfarer.[76] One should do the same in the case of a dust storm, for its indwelling Devil is likely to harm a Christian.[77] One can lessen the severity of a blizzard (*metylycia*), and cause it to subside, by throwing sharp edged sticks at the driving snow. Falling hail can also be rendered harmless by catching the first hailstones, chewing them, and spitting them on the ground; "the horns of the evil spirit are then chewed off," and the hail loses its harmfulness in that locality.[78]

Part III

Healing by Magic

Disease, like other calamities, is attributed by the people to 753
evil spirits. It is the incessant activities of a multitude of supernatural beings, the people believe, that cause the many afflictions that befall the human body and soul.[79] Epidemic and fatal diseases are personified as supernatural women. The female personification of the plague, according to a popular story, once made a young peasant carry her on his shoulders. Wherever he went people began to die by the thousands. Finally he attempted to get rid of his dread burden by throwing himself into a river. It was he alone, however, who drowned; the plague, being light

[75] Kolessa, F. "Ludowy wiruwania na pidhirju," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (Lviw, 1898), v, 77. [113]

[76] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 91.

[77] Kolessa, F. *op cit.*, v, 76.

[78] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 234.

[79] Kolberg, O. *Pokucie, Obraz Etnograficzny* (Kraków, 1882-89, 4 vols.), 160.

755 son suffering from fever, for example, pares the nails of his fingers and toes, and cuts a little hair from the four corners of his head; he then inserts the clippings in the stem of a rotten tree, closes the hole tightly, and runs home as fast as he can, saying: "May you not return until I myself shall come back for you!"[118] Mention might be made here of the belief that hair from one's head should not be thrown on the dung pile, for if a bird should appropriate it in building its nest the person would lose his hair. On the other hand, one can make his hair grow long and thick by throwing a few locks into fire or water.[119]

Human and animal exuviae are also believed to possess valuable curative qualities. Human nails and hair, the bones of meat consecrated on Easter, skin from the head of a dog, the hoof of a horse, and the excrements of domestic animals and fowl all serve as ingredients in the concoctions prepared for different ailments.[120] A cure for a cataract is compounded of the white of an egg, flour, and the dried and pulverized excreta of a child.[121] The excrement of a black cow is one of the ingredients in a remedy for a toothache; pieces of a horse's hoof are used in a fever cure; and the fat of a black cat or a stork forms a necessary element in a concoction to relieve rheumatism.[122] Pain in the eyes is soothed by an application of woman's milk.[123] Warts are removed by wetting them with the foam from a horse's urine. Human urine is considered an emetic and is used as an antidote for alcohol poisoning.[124]

825 754 Among living things, the frog plays the most important role in native medicine. A frog is thought to be endowed with extraordinary powers, which can be used either for good or for evil. A witch, for example, often makes use of a frog, sending it to the house of her enemy to bring affliction upon it. A frog must not be killed; if suspected as the agent of witchcraft, it may only be wrapped up and hung on a beam in the house. A boy who kills a frog may 825 bring death to his father.[125] On the other hand, this amphibian 757 is considered a clean animal. If one is found in a well, for

[118] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, p. 173.
[119] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 235.
[120] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 164.
[121] *Ibid.*, p. 163.
[122] *Ibid.*, pp. 164, 167, 171.
[123] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 94.
[124] *Ibid.*, p. 95.
[125] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 137, 144.

example, the water is sure to be pure. It also possesses valuable 825
therapeutic qualities and is consequently employed in treating 757
divers ailments. A cataract, for instance, is cured by applying a tiny living frog to the eye. A sufferer from fever is given brandy in which a frog has been immersed, or is made to carry a frog, wrapped in a piece of cloth, in his bosom until it dies, whereupon the fever disappears. Another fever cure consists in putting three, or sometimes nine, lice into a glass of brandy, which is then given to the unwitting patient to drink.[126]

The range of ingredients in medicinal preparations is almost 757
infinite. Some of the concoctions are harmless, and many are useless, while a considerable number are probably definitely harmful. Liquor is widely used, as though the people were really aware of the therapeutic value of alcohol. A drink or an application of brandy serves as a kind of first-aid in any emergency, and liquor in some form serves either as the base or as an essential ingredient in nearly every compound.

Thus a patient suffering from fever is given a drink of whisky containing ground garlic, or is made to eat a piece of bread wrapped in a cobweb. A swelling is treated by applying to it a hot white onion. Dysentery is cured by having the patient drink brandy to which is added some clay peeled off the oven of a room in which no death has ever occurred. Massage with the fat of a black cat is recommended for rheumatism.[127] A sufferer from diarrhœa is massaged with butter and then bathed in water in which rye straw or dumplings have been boiled.[128] A headache is relieved by pouring cold water from a well over the patient's head until the pain subsides, and a toothache by an application of alcohol, cold water, or a mixture of ground pepper and garlic. A victim of a sore throat may rid himself of the ailment by fastening thin strips of raw bacon, or the excrement of a pig, around his neck, and by gargling his throat with an infusion of laudanum. Inflammation of the lungs is cured by massaging the body with alcohol in which soap and camphor have been diluted, or by an application of leeches. An abscess is treated by applying a salve prepared either of

[126] *Ibid.*, pp. 144, 163, 171, 174. [127] *Ibid.*, pp. 166-67, 171, 174.
[128] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, p. 239.

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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The Ukrainian's individualism is most evident in his attitude to the social order, to the principle of the place of the community in society. He repudiates all forms of communal life which call for strict discipline and absolute obedience, without thinking that such a repudiation may be disastrous for the security of general interests and even, in the long run, for the personal advantage of the individual. His individualism as a social principle regards the individual as an end in himself, while the community is merely the sum or union of individuals and as such is only the means of guaranteeing the welfare of the individual. According to this national viewpoint, society — in Ukrainian "hromada" — is a voluntary union of individuals who, for the moment, are willing to work together for common aims, but who reserve the right to leave the union or even to attack it with every means in their power if they find that it is threatening their personal freedom, or when personal interest is greater than the interest of the community. We find a historical example of this attitude in the well-known military organisation of the Zaporoghian Cossacks, who regarded themselves as independent and free citizens, and only acknowledged their duty towards the community in so far as they considered it essential to the security and welfare of all.

In the history of Ukraine there are only too many cases where an exaggerated individualism prevented the formation of tradition as a supreme factor in building up a state, and where the historical existence of the entire people was at the mercy of conflicting forces which, in the absence of all desire to cooperate, were of necessity detrimental to the future of the state.

The structure of Russian society, called "mir" is diametrically opposed to this; it falls into the other extreme as the intellectual expression of the will of the community which completely absorbs personal independence. The essence and leading principle of the Russian "mir" is the compulsion inherent in the superior agency as the instrument of God's will. All rebellion against this divine compulsion is a grievous sin which the simple Russian cannot be expected to commit. This view was and is the most favorable condition for the birth and development of every absolute regime.

In contrast to Western European thought, it is characteristic for the Russian's view of the world that he definitely rejects the personal and always seeks to take his stand on a certain intellectual collectivism. In spite of the zealous efforts of some Russian scholars to explain and water down this quality of the Russian psyche, we must admit the truth of the assertion of the slavophils that the Russian spirit is collectivist, in the sense that it detests personal freedom, all kinds of contract conditions and individual property; that it prefers collectivist forms of economy was illustrated in the past by the traditional and typically Russian "Obshchina". And the collectivist experiments which have been carried out in the Soviet Union in modern times have shown that collectivist measures of the communist government met with no resistance to speak of in Russia proper, while peasants in Ukraine were ready to fight to the death in defense of the principle of private property as the fundament of western culture, and in spite of desperate conditions, actually did so. 156 829

If we wish to evaluate the principles of the Ukrainian view of the world adequately, we must study the structure of his psyche and reveal those qualities and functions that lend it its spiritual character. What strikes us most at the outset is the emphasis on the emotions; the preponderance of feelings over reason. The entire conduct of the Ukrainian is regulated, not by reason, "ratio", so characteristic for the entire philosophy of the Occident, but by profound feeling. This is a characteristic of all Slavs whose passions usually run the whole gamut of emotions. Slavs in general, and Ukrainians in particular, are capable of boundless enthusiasm which, at the first reverse, is followed by equally boundless apathy or despair. They are capable of deep love, which plays a predominant part in their psychical life, but negligible circumstances can often convert this feeling into its opposite, into a hatred for which no reason can be given other than from the emotional point of view. This lack of balance, these extreme variations within the emotions, make it difficult to preserve order and stability within; they are an important and at times decisive handicap to the formation of any system in intellectual work. 152

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Turning of the Cultural Tide

The Ukrainian Communists did not realize what they were 186
doing when they launched their campaign against the bourgeois 814
intellectuals and the aged scholars in the Academy of Sciences. For the first time since the period of Ukrainization had started, they had definitely called the attention of Moscow to the existence in Ukraine of a survival of the old independent mode of thinking which had animated the Ukrainian leaders in the struggle for an independent state of their own and they had coined a name for it, bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism. That was to recur again and again and lead to their own ruin.

It is remarkable that neither Skrypnyk nor Khvylovy realized [829]
this earlier. Both men in their own way were seriously threatening the unity of the Soviet Union, to which as an ideal they were loyal. Both men, Skrypnyk in the political field and Khvylovy in literature, realized the danger to Ukraine of substituting Russianism for Communism. Both men accepted in different senses the basic ideals of Communism and both believed in a Communist International which would offer all peoples full rights of cultural and political development. Neither one understood that the Comintern was a shadow structure which was totally dependent upon the forces operating in Moscow and that the situation in 1928 and 1929 was basically different from that ten years before.

In the RSFSR the charter of liberty for the fellow travellers 626
which had been promulgated in 1925 was practically abolished by 538
the granting of extreme power of control to Averbakh and the RAPP (the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) which, to all intents and purposes, was issuing orders as to how the writers should support the Five Year Plan.

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LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE[1]

By HAROLD R. WEINSTEIN

000 One of the most painful lessons mankind has learned since the rise of nationalism in the last hundred years is that language diversity fosters conflicts between states and among peoples living within one state but speaking different languages. Conversely, language uniformity makes for unity. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries most governments have strongly desired such uniformity. In some countries, as in America, assimilation into one language has been achieved by allowing national groups the free use of their native languages, and by relying upon the advance of education and of commercial and industrial development to break down the barriers those languages erect between various linguistic groups. In the period before the First World War, many governments sought language uniformity by forcibly repressing the languages of minorities, by Germanizing, Magyarizing, Russifying their national minority groups. Of no government was this more true than of that of the old Russian Empire, in which the "minorities" — that is, the groups other than the Great-Russians — constituted over half the population. But by attempting to suppress the languages of the Ukrainians, Georgians, Tatars and so on, the Tsarist régime did not achieve its goal of unity; rather, it aroused a host of nationalist movements which put language repression first on the bill of grievances against the government and which helped drive Tsarism to its death.

Lenin believed that the Tsarist method defeated its own ends and that the goal of unity had to be approached by other paths. First of all, literacy would have to precede any attempt to obtain language uniformity: as long as none other than oral means of communication existed between the minorities and the Russians, the Russian language could not really permeate the minorities and break down their national horizons. Literacy, of course, could be most easily reached by universal education in the minority languages themselves. Then, once the art of reading was mastered and great cultural vistas were opened to the minorities, they would be in a position to go ahead and adopt Russian as a second language. The Russian language would appeal to them because it is the language of a stronger culture than

[1] This study is based on material gathered for a book on the policy of the Soviet Union with regard to national minorities. The book is being written under a grant from the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, and it is being sponsored by Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes and Geroid Tanquary Robinson of Columbia University.

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those the minorities possessed; and the necessity for knowing Russian would be heightened by drawing the minorities into the industrial, commercial and political life of the country as a whole. Meanwhile, literacy in the minority languages would facilitate the spread of communist doctrines stressing the international solidarity of the working-class against capitalism. To achieve unity while allowing the free use of minority languages might be the long — and perhaps very dangerous — way around, but Lenin believed it would be the only effective way in a backward, heterogeneous country like Russia.

The Soviet leaders were so certain that eventual lingustic uniformity could be attained only through temporary diversity that they went further in emphasizing minority languages than any state has ever gone: they made vigorous attempts to foster the actual use of the minority languages, to "nationalize" (i.e., "Ukrainize," "Armenianize," "Tartarize") political organizations, administrative apparatus, factory managements, trade-unions, military units, newspapers, books, theatres and schools, among the minorities. In their desire to retreat from the old Imperial policy of Russification, they leaned over so far backward that they introduced the element of compulsion in the opposite direction: they forced the national minorities and the Russians living among them to use the local languages in political, economic and cultural life, stopping short only at the threshold of the individual's private world. The ultimate effect of this policy upon the increase or decrease of nationalism among the minorities is not yet apparent, and the fate of such nationalism may hinge upon such factors as economic prosperity, political liberty and developments in the field of international relations; but the process of nationalizing the political, economic and cultural life of the minorities is an experiment which deserves more attention from the non-Soviet political and scholarly world than it has received.

In the field of education, the Soviet régime has followed a four-fold policy: first to establish a school system embracing all children; secondly, to promote the spread of communist doctrines by integrating them into the curriculum; thirdly, to nationalize the school system by introducing the languages of the minorities as the languages of instruction in schools attended by children of the minorities; and, fourthly, to pave the way for eventual assimilation by providing for the study of Russian as a separate subject in the schools of the minorities. The first two aspects of this policy are complex subjects, each of which deserves a separate study. The present discussion will therefore treat only of the linguistic phases of the Soviet educational policy: the nationalization of education — that is, the use of minority

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languages as the media of instruction; and the study of Russian as a separate subject.

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In setting out to nationalize education, the Soviet régime has encountered many obstacles: Russian nationalists — and there were some even among the Communists — opposed the policy; text-books and teachers were scarce; and the more backward minorities did not even possess a written language of their own. As the exigencies of space prevent the investigation of all the problems encountered in the nationalization of education, this study will be limited to examining the policy as applied in the Ukraine; that is, to the Ukrainians and to the other minorities — Poles, Jews, Germans and others — living among them. The Ukrainians, it may be noted, are the largest minority in the Soviet Union; they are the most significant from the point of view of current international relations; and the difficulties encountered by the nationalization policy in the Ukraine were sufficiently complex to provide some insight into the policy as a whole.

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Among the Ukrainians, as among the other minorities, the nationalization of education has stemmed from the program on the national question which Lenin formulated before the overthrow of the Tsarist régime. This program, intended to overcome minority nationalism, had to assign a conspicuous place to the language question. To many Ukrainians the treatment of their language by the Imperial government appeared even more onerous than the political oppression which was meted out to Russians and Ukrainians alike. The Ukrainian language was regarded by the government as an uncouth dialect of the Russian language; it was harried from the schools; and it was badgered throughout the literary, scholarly and theatrical worlds. The resulting Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin believed, was a threat to the international unity of the Ukrainian and Russian masses, a unity he regarded as essential for the achievement of socialism; and this Ukrainian nationalism would have to be met with the promise of linguistic equality for the Ukrainians and for all other nationalities. This conception was written into the program on the national question adopted by the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party in 1913, a program which was first intended to apply to a period of "capitalist democracy" but was retained after the establishment of the Soviet government in 1917. The first point in the program stated: "Insofar as national peace is possible in a capitalist society, which is based on exploitation, profits and wrangling, such peace is obtainable only by means of a thoroughly, consistently democratic, republican governmental structure, guaranteeing complete equality to all nations and languages, and by the inclusion in the con-

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stitution of a basic law nullifying every kind of privilege of one nation and every kind of violation of the right of the national minorities."[2]

While defending this point in the program, Lenin explained that he did not desire to turn Russia into a "Babelesque confusion" in which one national group could not communicate with another; and he thought that sooner or later the minorities of Russia would become assimilated, probably through adopting the Russian language he cherished so highly and which he expected would be taught as a subject in the schools.[3] However, Lenin argued, such assimilation could be achieved not by compulsion, not by the Tsarist method of repression, but by the natural process of commercial and industrial development and intercourse. To force the minorities to study the Russian language by "the use of the stick" merely estranged them and turned them against that language. If, on the other hand, the minorities were allowed to use their own language in education, they would willingly accept the study of Russian also and would, as in America, voluntarily use it because of its advantage in economic intercourse. Hence, wherever minorities lived compactly, their languages would be used as the medium of instruction in the schools; and where members of minorities were isolated among other nationalities, they would be given the opportunity to study the language of their nationality.

Although the Provisional Government, ushered in by the February Revolution in 1917, intended to alter the policy of Russification and proclaimed linguistic freedom for the minorities, it did not succeed in overcoming the hostility of the minority nationalists who were then rapidly extending their influence among the peasantry. The Provisional Government, for example, wrangled with the Ukrainian nationalists not only on the question of political autonomy, but also on the expediency of Ukrainizing some of the army units; and in the Ukraine itself the former Tsarist officials remaining at their posts obstructed the Ukrainization of the school system. As the discontent of the peasantry with the land policy of the Provisional Government fed the flames of Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin was more than ever resolved to overcome minority hostility by, among other things, establishing linguistic equality.

After the October Revolution had put the Bolsheviks in control, the Soviet régime introduced into the schools the policy of national

[2] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach i Rešenijach S'ezdov, Konferencii i Plenumov Ts.K., 1898–1932* (Moscow, 1933), I, 238–240.

[3] For the views of Lenin contained in this paragraph, see Lenin, V. I., *Sočinenija* (Moscow, 1935), XVI, pp. 509, 551–554, 595–596; XVII, pp. 66, 89, 114–115, 133, 139–154, 178–181, 361.

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871 languages as the medium of instruction. Lenin stigmatized as "Great-
191 Russian Chauvinists," those people in the Commissariat of Education
186 who favored teaching only in the Russian language; and referring
829 specifically to the Ukrainians in a resolution he wrote for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, he stated that if the Bolsheviks wanted to overcome the hostility of the Ukrainian peasants (a hostility quite clearly evident during the Civil War from 1918 to 1920), the Ukrainian language could not be pushed into the background of either educational or political life.[4] Stalin argued that education in the minority languages would facilitate the raising of the cultural level of the minorities to that of the Russians and would thereby forge bonds of union between them.[5] The educational policy for the minorities, he stated, must have it as its aim: "to develop national culture; to build up a wide network of courses and schools for both general education and vocational and technical training, teaching in the native languages, for the purpose of training Soviet, party, trade-union and economic cadres from among the native people."[6] These views of Lenin and Stalin were incorporated into party resolutions, adopted in the decade after 1919, on education and on national policy generally.[7]

871 It was, of course, much easier to make speeches and pass resolutions than to realize the aims set forth therein. Even in the relatively advanced Ukraine it promised to be very difficult to establish a "wide network" of schools giving instruction in the national languages. The heritage of buildings, school supplies and qualified teachers bequeathed by Tsarism was meager in comparison with the needs of a régime aspiring to universal education: in the Kiev Educational District, for example, only twenty-two of every thousand people attended school in 1913.[8] Educational facilities, moreover, were reduced by the disastrous Civil War, during which constant fighting, famine, typhus, cholera, economic collapse and bankruptcy levied a high tax on the educational system; and the lack of funds and personnel long hampered its recuperation.[9] By 1924 the system approached its status

[4] *Ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 155, 552–554.

[5] J. Stalin, *Stati i Reči ob Ukraine* (Kiev, 1936), pp. 111–112, 194–195.

[6] J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (New York, 1935), p. 208.

[7] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach . . .* I, pp. 155, 637.

[8] The Kiev Educational District comprised the provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Podolia, Volhynia and Chernigov. The number of pupils is from Ministerstvo Narodnogo Prosvieshcheniia, *Vsepodanneiši Otčet, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1915), p. 196. The estimate of the population is from Centralny Statističeski Komitet, *Ežegodnik Rossii, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 33–59.

[9] For the condition of the educational system up to 1924, see *Urkainska Socialistična Radianska Respublika. Zbirnik Spravozdan Narodnich Komisarijativ i centralnich ustanov U.S.R.R. ta Upolnivaženich Narodnich Komisarijativ R.S.F.S.R. 5-mu Vseukrainskomu Z'izdovi Rad Ukraini. Otčet Narodnogo Komisariati Osviti U.S.R.R. za 1920 rik* (*Kharkov*,

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789 the death of his neighbour, a person takes water in which a still-born child has been bathed, pours it into a pot, and, after keeping it for nine days, spills it in front of the neighbour's house; whoever first steps on the unclean place will become crippled and die.[46] One who envies another his good fortune, and wishes to see him unlucky, secretly cuts off a few hairs from his head and mixes them with the excrement of a dog; the victim will thenceforth go "the dog's ways," i.e. fail in everything he undertakes.[47] To bring incessant strife upon a household, one does as follows. Observing a fight among dogs, he disperses them, gathers some of the dust raised in the combat, throws it upon glowing coals, and keeps this mixture for a day and a night; if he scatters this around the enemy's house on the following night before sunrise, there will arise among its occupants a struggle like that witnessed among the dogs.[48]

789 832 There are many ways by which a girl may arouse the love of a young man, and have him eventually marry her. One of them is to throw a little salt on him when he leaves the house, in the conviction that he will run after her as a sheep does after salt.[49] Another means is the following. When the young man has left the house, the girl gathers "his footsteps," i.e. the dust from his foot-prints, and puts the dust on the hinges of the door, believing that he will turn toward her as the door does upon its hinges.[50] A still more effective way of inducing a man to marry a girl, namely, by using part of his clothing, is illustrated by the following case.

Ivan Gajaniuk, a widower, had a maid who was very much in love with him and desired to marry him. With this purpose in mind she went on Pelyp (fasting period) to a famous sorceress known for her wisdom and skill in "bettering" (*lipszyty*). The old woman, upon hearing her wish, told her to come again and bring with her the man's drawers. The maid returned with a pair of underwear, but it belonged to a boy in her master's service. Thus it happened that the boy, and not the master, shortly afterwards married the girl.[51]

[46] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 134. [47] *Ibid.*, p. 135. [48] *Ibid.*, p. 139.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 141. [50] *Ibid.*, p. 141. [51] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

An excellent illustration of the power ascribed to exuviae is the use of sweat to arouse love. Thus a sorceress sometimes mixes a little perspiration from the sole of a girl's foot with some soot from the chimney, and pronounces a formula over the mixture; if the girl pours this concoction into a drink given to a boy, he will surely fall in love with her and soon marry her.[52] 789 832

When a person faces a serious situation and wants to be sure that the means employed are effective, he resorts, as in some of the above-cited cases, to a professional sorcerer (*czariwnyk*) or soothsayer (*prymiwnyk*) for assistance. Of these practitioners, mostly women, the most proficient are thought to be the Gypsies,[53] and especially the offspring of a Gypsy and a Ukrainian peasant.[54] A sorcerer or sorceress is never born but made. A woman who wants to become a sorceress must fast for nine consecutive days, abstain from ablutions and prayer, indeed, renounce completely her belief in Christ, and carry an undeveloped egg under her left armpit throughout the period. She must not, moreover, reveal the secret of her power, lest she lose her skill. On her dying bed, however, she should tell everything to another woman, in order to avoid the suffering of a lingering death which would otherwise be her fate.[55] 756 791

The sorcerer or soothsayer foretells future happenings by reading the lines of the palm, by extinguishing coals in the manner already mentioned, and by pouring wax upon water and observing the different shapes it takes.[56] To put an end to malicious gossip, 756 787 791

> a soothsayer is called in, and a lock is handed her. She washes the lock in water, brought by the master of the house, walking backward all the way, from an abundant well, and then closes it in order to put an end to the gossip. In case the latter is very menacing, two locks may be washed and shut. Having closed the locks, the soothsayer sweeps all the dirt and dust of the room into the water, and has the inhabitants of the house take off all their clothes and wash themselves with it. Finally she washes the windows too, and then

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

[53] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 291.

[54] Kolberg, O. *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 236.

[55] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 291.

[56] *Idem.*

593 meetings ("posydilky" and "Vetshernytsi"), and even at the
584 street meetings that are held at night ("vulytsja"); marriage is
591 seldom an affair of arrangement. After marriage, children generally leave their parents' home; a father often provides a home of his own for a son who wishes to marry.

586 Divorce is rare in the country. An unlucky choice of a conjugal partner is borne with patience. Up till recently, in spite of the
● 836 fact that boys and girls are constantly thrown together at work and at play, a high standard of chastity prevailed and illicit sexual intercourse was the exception. A "pokrytka" who has been seduced by a Russian soldier ("saldatka") or a foreigner (mostly a Pole) has no easy lot in the country. The whole family is deeply ashamed when the "bundling" custom ("komora") which is still practised in some parts of the country reveals that the
183 bride is no longer a virgin. Customs have been strengthened
561 by the respect for national traditions, a deep religious feeling and tolerance. Birth, baptism, marriage, death and burial are accompanied by very many, original, symbolic customs, dating partly from before the birth of Christ. For instance, the old custom of duly "recognising" the newborn has been preserved as well as the ceremony of the baptismal banquet which marks the reception of the newly born child into the community.

585 In the varied wedding customs which generally take the better part of three days, there are memories of the days when the men of the tribe kidnapped or bought their brides. A marriage in a national setting has many dramatic effects and is accompanied by a whole series of symbolical actions and choruses. They remind us of the original rôle of the family in society. Customs from the world of the Grand Princes have been preserved in those marriage rites as in the ritualistic folk-songs, while the influence of the church is confined to the
765 actual ceremony in the church. The wake ("posyzhinja") and the wake games, which are dying out, are echoes of ancestor-worship and intended to prevent the dead from returning to life. The custom of special laments for the dead ("holosinnia") and the funeral banquet (formerly "tryzna") have persisted; on the many days of commemoration of the dead (e. g. on the

852 they invite all the parents of such children to participate in the
608 celebration. On the appointed day the godparents prepare a
574 festive dinner for the parents, who bring a goodly supply of whisky and six *kolaczy* each. If the child is still alive, the parents give the *kolaczy* to the godparents immediately, saying: "Please, *kumy*, accept the *kolaczy*; from God they come large, from us small." But if the child has died in the meantime, they first light candles and then place them and the loaves of bread on the floor, saying: "Please accept the *kolaczy* for the welfare of the soul of N. N."[59]

Friends and neighbours, as well as relatives, are invited to the *kolaczyny*, and all participate in the singing, dancing, and games that follow the dinner and often last till the next morning. The parents, when they depart, are given back one of the *kolaczy*, and in addition receive a calf, a sheep, a lamb, or a pig, depending upon the means of the godparents, as a gift for the child. Around the neck of such animal they always tie a red ribbon. If the godparent has no animal to give, he presents his godchild with a piece of clothing.[60]

III. Childhood

842 Only when a boy is born, as a rule, do the parents feel proud. A peasant, asked what "God gave him," will answer: "*Chlopcie!*" (a boy); but if the baby be a girl, he will reply: "*Detynu!*" (a child), as though trying to avoid mentioning its sex.[61]

854 For some time the mother keeps her infant in bed beside her, mainly in order to keep close watch over it. After a while, however, it is put into a cradle, a box made of boards, suspended by means of ropes from the bar above the mother's bed. It is hung at the foot of the bed so that it can easily be rocked at night. A red apple is usually suspended on a string above the head of the baby—to provide it with something to look at and play with.[62] Boxes on rockers, too, are quite common.[63] Special care is taken to assure the child undisturbed sleep. A visitor

[59] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 7.
[60] *Idem.*
[61] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 19.
[62] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iii, 7.
[63] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 101.

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BELIEFS AND PRACTICES RELATING TO BIRTH AND CHILDHOOD AMONG THE GALICIAN UKRAINIANS

I. Pregnancy and Birth

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Pregnancy, to the Ukrainian peasant, is a phenomenon surrounded by mysterious forces which, if offended in any way, are sure to bring misfortune upon the expectant mother and her unborn child. A pregnant woman is treated with consideration, and is usually showered with wishes for an easy confinement. A person mistreating an expectant mother exposes himself and his household to harm.[1] In the belief that labour pains, especially acute ones, are not inevitable but are caused by evil powers,

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[1] *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, by G. R. Owst, Cambridge, 1933. P. 99. Reinfelden's Moralization is in MS. Egerton 2419.

[1] Kaindl, R. F., *Die Huzulen: Ihr Leben, ihre Sitten, und ihre Volksüberlieferung* (Wien, 1894), p. 4.

843 the Ukrainian peasant woman keeps her pregnancy as secret as
784 possible. The Devil and persons with supernatural powers will
789 thus be kept in ignorance and, consequently, be prevented from interfering in any way with her accouchement.[2] The expectant mother therefore avoids mentioning her condition to any one except the midwife. A husband, for the same reason, dislikes to speak of his wife's pregnancy.[3] Some women, especially among the mountaineers (*hutzuls*), even wind about themselves a broad strip of woollen bandage, in order to hide their condition. So tightly is the bandage wrapped that it has a definite effect upon the child, which is usually very small at birth; in order to assure its normal development the midwife, upon delivering it, exclaims: "Now grow!"[4]

[847] A child is, as a rule, a welcome addition to the family. Hence an enceinte woman, legitimately married, rarely attempts abortion or infanticide.[5] On the contrary, she is greatly concerned to give birth to a healthy child, and in order to assure herself of this, she cautiously watches nearly every step she takes and strictly observes a variety of taboos. The precautions and taboos, both before and after birth, are based in most cases on the belief that things or actions produce similar results. In other words, certain objects that the pregnant woman may see or touch, certain foods that she may eat, and certain phenomena that she may observe, hear, or feel, will register a corresponding effect upon her child. Wherever, therefore, the consequences are obviously undesirable, a pregnant woman tries to avoid doing or observing the thing in question, or, if this is impossible, to guard against them by certain means which are usually imitative in nature. A few examples follow.

[113] [2] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie: Obraz Etnograficzny* (4 vols., Kraków, 1882–1889), i, 208.

[3] *Idem.*

[4] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna* (4 vols., Lwów, 1902–1908), ii, 2.

[5] Unmarried girls, on the other hand, very often take steps to dispose of their unborn children. Cf. Koenig, S., "Marriage and the Family among the Galician Ukrainians," in *Studies in the Science of Society*, G. P. Murdock (Editor) (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937), pp. 302–303.

843 If a pregnant woman looks fixedly at a person, or for that
784 matter if he stares at her, her child will be pretty or the reverse,
789 depending on that person's appearance. She therefore tries not to look at or be seen by an ugly individual.[6] She also avoids looking at a fisherman, lest her child will have a restless nature.[7] Neither must she watch a horse shaking its head, or her child will be constantly subject to similar behaviour.[8] If, on the other hand, she happens to see a galloping steed, her pregnancy will last twelve months.[9] Upon observing a mouse, an expectant mother must spit and touch her abdomen; otherwise her child will be born with a mark resembling a mouse on its body. A fire in the village may have a similar effect; if a woman is frightened by it and does not spit immediately, her unborn child will have the mark of a flame on its body. Should a pregnant woman eat an apple at the approach of her confinement, warts are likely to appear on the face of her child;[10] and if the apple be a stolen one, the child will grow up to be a thief.[11]

843 Definite signs enable one to predict the sex of an unborn child. If the prospective mother eats her meals with a good appetite, for example, it is a sign that she will have a boy; otherwise her child will be a girl. According to another indication, if the woman is to have a boy large spots appear on her face before her confinement, but if her face remains smooth and white
844 she is sure to have a girl.[12] The destiny of the child, and even
777 of the parents, can be foretold from certain omens. If birth
787 occurs around noon the child is destined to be unfortunate, while a baby born at daybreak will be lucky.[13] The crowing of a cock during birth is a bad omen. The birth of twins presages disaster, *e.g.*, the imminent death of one of the parents or the

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[6] Kolessa, J., "Narodziny i chrzciny, wesele i pogrzeb u ludu ruskiego," *Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej*, xii (Kraków, 1889) 117; Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[7] Kaindl, *ibid.*, p. 4.

[8] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

[9] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[10] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 1.

[11] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[12] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 174.

[13] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

844 impoverishment and consequent ruin of the homestead.[14] Ac-
777 cording to another version, the birth of twins or triplets is a
787 general punishment from God.[15] Since eating two potatoes, two apples, or two plums would result in her having twins, a pregnant woman is most careful to abstain therefrom.[16] A child born before the ninth month indicates that the woman has been unfaithful to her husband.[17]

843 The Ukrainian peasant woman, as a rule, goes about her daily
844 tasks uninterruptedly until the very onset of labour pains. The mountainee. woman in particular, owing to her robustness, seems to give birth with an unusual ease and unconcern. Besides attending to her routine work in the house, she is occupied at a period very close to her confinement with such work as milking cows, constructing fences, and pitching hay. Only a woman who is constitutionally weak takes to bed when she feels that her accouchement is not far off. Others often deliver their babies wherever they happen to be at the time—in the barn milking, in the field, or anywhere else. Sometimes a woman goes up to the attic, and after a few moments hands her baby down to someone below and then climbs down after it.[18] Women have even been known to return from market with a newborn baby in their arms and a sack full of purchased articles on their backs. In order to avoid leaving blood spots behind her in case she delivers her baby outside of the home, a woman who expects to give birth at any moment often puts on a pair of men's trousers under her dress when leaving the house.

844 Birth itself is surrounded by a mass of practices, again mostly imitative in nature, which are concerned rather with the well-being of the infant than with preserving the health of the mother.[19] When the hour of confinement arrives the husband repairs to call the midwife (*baba*), who is usually a woman with

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[14] Kolessa, J., "Ludowy wiruwania na pidhirju," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk*, v (Lwów, 1898), 83.

[15] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5.

[16] Kolessa, in *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk*, v, 83.

[17] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[18] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 2.

[19] Vowk, C., *Studii z Ukrainskoi Etnografii ta Antropologii* (Praha, n.d.), p. 188.

843 If a pregnant woman looks fixedly at a person, or for that
784 matter if he stares at her, her child will be pretty or the reverse,
789 depending on that person's appearance. She therefore tries not to look at or be seen by an ugly individual.[6] She also avoids looking at a fisherman, lest her child will have a restless nature.[7] Neither must she watch a horse shaking its head, or her child will be constantly subject to similar behaviour.[8] If, on the other hand, she happens to see a galloping steed, her pregnancy will last twelve months.[9] Upon observing a mouse, an expectant mother must spit and touch her abdomen; otherwise her child will be born with a mark resembling a mouse on its body. A fire in the village may have a similar effect; if a woman is frightened by it and does not spit immediately, her unborn child will have the mark of a flame on its body. Should a pregnant woman eat an apple at the approach of her confinement, warts are likely to appear on the face of her child;[10] and if the apple be a stolen one, the child will grow up to be a thief.[11]

843 Definite signs enable one to predict the sex of an unborn child. If the prospective mother eats her meals with a good appetite, for example, it is a sign that she will have a boy; otherwise her child will be a girl. According to another indication, if the woman is to have a boy large spots appear on her face before her confinement, but if her face remains smooth and white
844 she is sure to have a girl.[12] The destiny of the child, and even
777 of the parents, can be foretold from certain omens. If birth
787 occurs around noon the child is destined to be unfortunate, while a baby born at daybreak will be lucky.[13] The crowing of a cock during birth is a bad omen. The birth of twins presages disaster, *e.g.*, the imminent death of one of the parents or the

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[6] Kolessa, J., "Narodziny i chrzciny, wesele i pogrzeb u ludu ruskiego," *Zbiór Wiadomości do Antropologii Krajowej*, xii (Kraków, 1889) 117; Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 4.

[7] Kaindl, *ibid.*, p. 4.

[8] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

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844 obstetrical experience. The first act of the *baba* is to give the mother a generous dose of whisky to ease her pains. Then she makes her walk thrice around the table, opening and loosening all closed, covered, or tied objects, such as benches, shelves, closets, and boxes; this has the effect of easing the birth of the child. This done, the midwife takes consecrated wreaths of herbs and holds them over the fire, to fumigate the confined woman with their smoke. If all this fails to have the desired effect, and the delivery proceeds with difficulty, the *baba* runs to the church and begs the sexton to lend her the girdle worn by the priest at divine service; returning home, she winds this about the woman and the child is then born with the greatest of ease.[20]

A woman usually delivers her baby in either a kneeling or a standing position. At times, when the case is especially difficult, she is led around in the room by two women, who grasp her under the arms. When delivery begins, the mother kneels down upon a cover spread out on the floor and deposits the
844 baby upon it.[21] The midwife takes the child as soon as it is
777 born, and holding it head down, beats thrice with the soles of its feet on the centre beam of the ceiling, so that it will grow up as strong as the beam. She then makes the sign of the cross over it, sprinkles some holy water on its head, and gives it a warm bath. If the baby is a girl, she puts into the bath some honey, mint, and other sweet-smelling herbs, so that it may grow up to be a sweet and pleasant girl.[22] The water of the bath is not poured out until the following morning; otherwise "the sleep of the child will be carried out along with it."[23]

Having dried the child at the fire, bundled it up, and put it on the oven to sleep, the midwife prepares a bed for the mother
844 at the corner of the oven. Under the sheet she puts some hay
784 consecrated with holy water, and on the bar over the bed she hangs a large sheet to separate the bed from the rest of the room.
789 Before the mother lies down, however, the *baba* takes care to tie a piece of garlic on her chest and to place near her, on the

[20] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 211.

[21] *Ibid.*, iii, 174; Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii,

[22] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 175.

[23] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 117.

23: Koenig E-4 (no date) 1939 RD1 Ukraine RD1

844 bed, a knife and some keys, because iron has the power to
784 drive away evil forces.[24]

789 A precaution never forgotten is to light a candle immediately after the delivery; otherwise the baby, not being baptized as yet, would surely be harmed by lurking evil forces. Under no circumstances must the light be extinguished, at least not until holy water is obtained from the priest and sprinkled over the mother, the baby, and the entire room.[25] Besides this essential precaution, a multitude of other means are taken to protect the child and assure its healthy growth. As soon as possible after birth, for example, there is tied to the right wrist of the infant a little sack, called *szkalytoczka*, which contains the following articles: a piece of garlic—to make the child as sharp as this vegetable; a piece of clay from the oven—to make it as immune to the evil eye as is the oven; a piece of coal—to make the eyes of whoever casts upon it an evil glance burn like coal; some dust from the tracks of a dog—so that people will stare at it no more than they do at a dog's tracks. A small wooden cross is likewise hung on the infant's neck.[26] A mother must not turn her back upon her baby lest it turn yellow,[27] or be taken by a superhuman woman, the *diwa-baba*,[28] in exchange for a brat of hers. Nothing in the house may be given away on the day of birth, or the child will be given to sleeplessness. Whoever takes a glance at a newborn infant must spit immediately—to make sure that the child has not been bewitched.[29] Throughout the first night, some member of the family must keep watch, so that nothing may befall the child.[30]

777 A person's destiny, it is believed, is determined immediately upon his birth, at which moment twelve invisible judges convene on the window-sill near the table. Eleven of them pronounce

[24] *Idem.*

[25] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [26] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 4.

[27] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

[113] [28] Regarding the nature of this mysterious woman, see Koenig, S., "Supernatural Beliefs among the Galician Ukrainians," *Folk-Lore*, xlix (Sept. 1938), 274.

[29] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 4–5.

[30] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

851 574 in drinking, imitate the motions of a person cutting straw, while in the case of a girl the motions are those of a woman washing clothes.[50]

Towards the end of the dinner the *baba* drinks an individual toast to each of the godparents and throws what remains in the glass at the ceiling. She then hands them each a goblet of whisky on a plate. After offering a toast and emptying his goblet, each puts a few coins on the plate, which the midwife takes individually to the mother. In some localities it is customary for the oldest godmother to put the infant upon a pillow and carry it around from guest to guest while holding a candle in her other hand; a younger godmother follows her with a plate, upon which everyone, beginning with the father, places some money as a gift for the child; the midwife, meanwhile, makes little bouquets of herbs and distributes them among the guests, receiving from each a few coins for herself.[51]

The christening festivities are marked by great hilarity, drinking, and the singing of songs designed for the occasion. When begun in the evening, they are prolonged far into the night, the men sometimes spending the whole night at the party; when begun in the morning, they last throughout the day. The parents keep open house. People come and go all day, bringing gifts and drinking to the health of the mother and child. The festivities may be extended to the second and even the third day—celebrations lasting a whole week are by no means rare—the parents being expected to supply the thronging visitors with food and drink.[52] Indeed, christening parties, along with wedding and funeral celebrations, have been the major cause in the impoverishment of many a peasant household.[53]

844 The midwife is formally dismissed on the third day, when she comes to carry out the hay and to change the bedding. She receives in payment a few coins, a loaf of bread, and, in the case of a firstborn child, also a piece of linen.[54] In a little ceremony, which marks the dismissal, the mother thrice pours water over

[50] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209–210; *Przemyskie*, p. 50.

[51] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 212; *Przemyskie*, p. 50.

[52] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210. [53] *Idem*.

[54] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 119–120.

844 the hands of the midwife and dries them with the linen presented to the latter. Then both women shake hands over the child, and beg one another three times for forgiveness for the troubles each has had to undergo.[55]

846 783 The mother is considered strictly unclean for three days, the period of the midwife's attendance. Nevertheless, she usually leaves her bed on the second or third day and performs her routine tasks about the house. She must not, however, go farther than thirty-five steps from the dwelling, lest she defile the fields which she might pass.[56] Indeed, she may not even take these few steps without carrying a knife with her.[57] The period during which the mother is not considered entirely clean lasts from three to six weeks, depending upon the locality. At the termination of this period a formal purification ceremony (*wywid* = leading out) is performed in the church by the priest. On the day of the ceremony, the midwife comes to take the mother to church. The latter dresses up in her best clothes, and is sprinkled by the midwife with holy water. Taking the baby in her arms, and carrying a knife, a few keys, some garlic, and a piece of bread, she follows the midwife to the church. Arriving at the entrance, she kneels with the child in her arms and awaits the priest. When he enters, she follows him to the small altar where the christening took place some weeks before. Here the priest, after performing a special ceremony, pronounces her entirely clean.[58]

852 608 574 After the purification rite, often as much as two years later, comes a ceremony which, more than any other, reveals the closeness of the bond that must have once existed between godparents and child. The parents of the child inquire of the godparents whether they will accept a present of *kolaczy*, twisted loaves of wheat bread, from which the ceremony is named *kolaczyny*. If the godparents agree, as they invariably do, the parents set a day for the celebration. Should the godparents have acted in the same capacity at the baptism of other children,

[55] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[56] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 7.

[57] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 119.

[58] *Idem.*

777 various prophecies as to the future of the child, but final decision rests with the oldest, whose judgment prevails. These same judges grant the child a star, which shines only so long as he [776] lives; upon his death it falls to earth. Every person at birth likewise receives a guardian angel, whose duty it is to protect him throughout his life. Before starting any new task, and especially when in danger, the peasant calls upon his ministering angel for assistance, saying: "Guardian angel, help me!"[31] Since one's fate is determined at birth, one can do little to change it. This explains, in the popular mind, why one man is poor and another rich, one healthy and another sick, why one lives long and another dies young. It also explains why there are all kinds of children in the world, and why even children of the same parents often differ so markedly.[32]

845 A deformed or mentally deficient child is ascribed to the act 732 of an evil spirit, particularly the *diwa-baba*. Such a child has a large head, is always lean, and can never be satiated. With his tremendous appetite he suckles so ravenously that his mother's breast finally withers away. Such a child causes constant trouble, is retarded in its growth and short-lived, and does not reach a stature commensurate with his age until after death.[33]

II. Christening Ceremonies

851 While great secrecy surrounds pregnancy and birth, the 553 ceremonies that follow are ushered in with the greatest publicity. As soon as she has attended to the child and the mother, the midwife begins to make preparations for the christening (*chres-* [777] *tyny*), which must take place immediately. A child who is allowed to remain unbaptized over night is exposed to all sorts of dangers. If at all possible, therefore, an infant is taken to church to be baptized on the very day it is born, even though the hour be late in the evening, the weather extremely unfavourable, and the distance considerable.[34] While the father, who takes

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[31] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 5. [32] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, iv, 287.

[33] Kaindl, R. F., "Zauberglaube bei den Huzulen," *Globus*, lxxvi (Braunschweig, 1899), 256.

[34] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 113; Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6.

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[58] *Idem.*

843 784 789 the Ukrainian peasant woman keeps her pregnancy as secret as possible. The Devil and persons with supernatural powers will thus be kept in ignorance and, consequently, be prevented from interfering in any way with her accouchement.[2] The expectant mother therefore avoids mentioning her condition to any one except the midwife. A husband, for the same reason, dislikes to speak of his wife's pregnancy.[3] Some women, especially among the mountaineers (*hutzuls*), even wind about themselves a broad strip of woollen bandage, in order to hide their condition. So tightly is the bandage wrapped that it has a definite effect upon the child, which is usually very small at birth; in order to assure its normal development the midwife, upon delivering it, exclaims: "Now grow!"[4]

[847] A child is, as a rule, a welcome addition to the family. Hence an enceinte woman, legitimately married, rarely attempts abortion or infanticide.[5] On the contrary, she is greatly concerned to give birth to a healthy child, and in order to assure herself of this, she cautiously watches nearly every step she takes and strictly observes a variety of taboos. The precautions and taboos, both before and after birth, are based in most cases on the belief that things or actions produce similar results. In other words, certain objects that the pregnant woman may see or touch, certain foods that she may eat, and certain phenomena that she may observe, hear, or feel, will register a corresponding effect upon her child. Wherever, therefore, the consequences are obviously undesirable, a pregnant woman tries to avoid doing or observing the thing in question, or, if this is impossible, to guard against them by certain means which are usually imitative in nature. A few examples follow.

[413] [2] Kolberg, O., *Pokucie: Obraz Etnograficzny* (4 vols., Kraków, 1882–1889), i, 208.

[3] *Idem.*

[4] Szuchiewicz, W., *Huculszczyzna* (4 vols., Lwów, 1902–1908), ii, 2.

[5] Unmarried girls, on the other hand, very often take steps to dispose of their unborn children. Cf. Koenig, S., "Marriage and the Family among the Galician Ukrainians," in *Studies in the Science of Society*, G. P. Murdock (Editor) (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1937), pp. 302–303.

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II. Christening Ceremonies

851 553 While great secrecy surrounds pregnancy and birth, the ceremonies that follow are ushered in with the greatest publicity. As soon as she has attended to the child and the mother, the midwife begins to make preparations for the christening (*chrestyny*), [777] which must take place immediately. A child who is allowed to remain unbaptized over night is exposed to all sorts of dangers. If at all possible, therefore, an infant is taken to church to be baptized on the very day it is born, even though the hour be late in the evening, the weather extremely unfavourable, and the distance considerable.[34] While the father, who takes

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[34] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 113; Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6.

While the father, who takes
851 a passive part throughout the ceremony,[35] busies himself with
608 supplying the assembled guests with drinks, the *baba* repairs to
553 the village to invite the godparents (*kumy*) to the christening. The number of men and women asked to act in this capacity ranges from a single couple to as many as fifteen, depending upon the wealth and social status of the parents. The most desirable godparents are the couple who acted as best man and
851 maid of honour at the wedding of the parents.[36] A pregnant
608 woman, too, is considered a most acceptable godmother, for a
784 child held during baptism by such a woman is assured of good
777 luck. An enceinte woman, however, seldom consents to play the rôle, since her own child may be harmed thereby.[37] The wealthier and more prominent the godparents, the more desirable they are. If the parents have been unfortunate in rearing children, however, they invite a couple of wandering beggars to act as godparents and treat them with the greatest of courtesy. This, it is asserted, will change the luck of the parents, and will make the child grow and be healthy.[38] For two women to reciprocate as godmothers is considered not only unwise but a downright sin.[39] Near neighbours, too, make anything but good godparents. Since the two families live in close contact, it is almost inevitable that a quarrel shall sometime arise between them, and tradition as well as propriety strongly disapproves of unfriendly relations with one's *kumy*.[40] Contrary to what one might expect, for a gypsy to hold a child at baptism is supposed to bring it good luck, especially in trade and horse-raising.[41]

851 The midwife approaches the people selected as godparents
608 with these words: "May God grant you health! The mother
553 of the baby has sent me to ask you to do her the favour of holding her child during baptism." If they agree to undertake the function, they either follow her to the house a little later or else promise to meet her in the church at a designated hour.

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[35] According to D. Zelenin, *Russische (Ostslavische) Volkskunde* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1927), p. 295, the passivity may be explained by the fact that he is, like his wife, considered unclean.

[36] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 208–211.

[37] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[38] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

[39] *Idem.*

[40] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[41] *Idem.*

851 553 Upon returning home, she swathes the baby and takes a piece of bread and a knife, but does not leave the house until the mother has wiped the infant with her shirt to protect it from the evil eye. On the doorstep the *baba* makes the sign of the cross over the child, and sometimes another woman sprinkles it with holy water. The same procedure is repeated on the other side of the door. Here, however, the midwife sticks her knife into the door, and leaves it for some member of the household to remove later.[42]

If the godparents have come to the house, they follow the midwife, each carrying a long piece of linen (*kryżmo*) and a candle, while the father bears a hen, two loaves of bread, and a " head " of salt as a present for the priest. At the church, all kneel down while some of the godparents remove the swaddling clothes and two others hold the sides of the *kryżmo* on which the infant is placed. The priest, after lighting the candles and handing them back to the participants, reads a prayer, then turns to them and repeats thrice the question : " Do you renounce the evil spirit? " To this, the *baba* and the godparents, turning their heads to the door, reply : " We renounce! " The priest next asks them : " Are you willing to serve God and Jesus Christ? " Each godparent then hands over to the priest his piece of linen, which later becomes the property of the child. After these preliminaries comes the actual christening, which differs little from the usual Catholic ceremony. The name given the child is usually that of the saint who presides over that particular day. For boys, the most popular names are Iwan, Hryć, Hawrylo, Nykola, Michajlo, and Petro ; for girls, Maryja, Katerina, Hanna, and Paraska.[43] Children, even twins, are usually baptized in church ; only in the case of triplets does the priest go [793] to the house of the parents to perform the ceremony. Among the highlanders, it is believed that a widowed priest who learns of the birth of triplets, and goes voluntarily to the house, is allowed to remarry.[44] After the ceremony the sexton extin-

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[42] Kolberg, *Przemyskie* (Kraków, 1891), p. 49 ; Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 118.

[43] Kolberg, *Przemyskie*, pp. 49–50 ; *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[44] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 6 ; ordinarily a uniate priest is allowed to marry only once—prior to his being ordained.

851 553 guishes the candles, appropriates half of them himself, and returns the rest to the participants, who must light them again in the room where the mother is confined.[45] If the candles are not easily extinguished, it is a sign that the baptized child will have a long life.[46]

851 574 In some localities the godparents leave immediately after the close of the ceremony for the house of the parents, where a festive dinner is served; in most places, however, they return to their homes and go to the party in the evening.[47] The midwife, upon her return, greets the mother with these words: "You have given us the child born; we, however, return it to you [777] sacrificed and baptized." She then places the infant on a black fur coat (*kożuch*), which is thought to bring luck, and hands it over on the coat to the mother.[48]

At the christening dinner the father again plays a most inconspicuous rôle, the midwife and the godparents being the principal [431] actors. Each guest brings presents of foodstuffs, chiefly beans, peas, eggs, cheese, salt, and bread. After a flood of greetings and congratulations, the women give their presents to the mother, placing them on her bed, while the men hand their gifts, usually loaves of bread, to the father.[49]

After these preliminaries, the guests seat themselves at the table. The master of the house serves each of them with a drink of whisky, and the midwife or the cook places before each an appetizer consisting of a piece of meat or another delicacy. The courses served at this meal are as numerous and elaborate as those of a wedding dinner. They usually include meat with gravy, *holubci* (grouts enveloped in cabbage leaves), *pirohy* (potatoes or grouts enveloped in dough), sour cream, *borszcz* (beet soup), and many other dishes, depending, of course, upon the economic status of the parents. Whisky is lavishly provided, and each guest offers a toast before every drink. It is interesting to note that, if the baby be a boy, the godparents,

[45] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[46] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[47] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209.

[113] [48] Jandaurek, J., *Das Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien und das Herzogtum Bukowina* (Wien, 1884), p. 62.

[49] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210.

[christening -- Analyst]

851 574 in drinking, imitate the motions of a person cutting straw, while in the case of a girl the motions are those of a woman washing clothes.[50]

Towards the end of the dinner the *baba* drinks an individual toast to each of the godparents and throws what remains in the glass at the ceiling. She then hands them each a goblet of whisky on a plate. After offering a toast and emptying his goblet, each puts a few coins on the plate, which the midwife takes individually to the mother. In some localities it is customary for the oldest godmother to put the infant upon a pillow and carry it around from guest to guest while holding a candle in her other hand; a younger godmother follows her with a plate, upon which everyone, beginning with the father, places some money as a gift for the child; the midwife, meanwhile, makes little bouquets of herbs and distributes them among the guests, receiving from each a few coins for herself.[51]

The christening festivities are marked by great hilarity, drinking, and the singing of songs designed for the occasion. When begun in the evening, they are prolonged far into the night, the men sometimes spending the whole night at the party; when begun in the morning, they last throughout the day. The parents keep open house. People come and go all day, bringing gifts and drinking to the health of the mother and child. The festivities may be extended to the second and even the third day—celebrations lasting a whole week are by no means rare—the parents being expected to supply the thronging visitors with food and drink.[52] Indeed, christening parties, along with wedding and funeral celebrations, have been the major cause in the impoverishment of many a peasant household.[53]

844 The midwife is formally dismissed on the third day, when she comes to carry out the hay and to change the bedding. She receives in payment a few coins, a loaf of bread, and, in the case of a firstborn child, also a piece of linen.[54] In a little ceremony, which marks the dismissal, the mother thrice pours water over

[50] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 209–210; *Przemyskie*, p. 50.

[51] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 212; *Przemyskie*, p. 50.

[52] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 210. [53] *Idem*.

[54] Kolessa, in *Zbiór Wiad. do Antr. Kraj.*, xiii, 119–120.

844 the hands of the midwife and dries them with the linen presented to the latter. Then both women shake hands over the child, and beg one another three times for forgiveness for the troubles each has had to undergo.[55]

846 783 The mother is considered strictly unclean for three days, the period of the midwife's attendance. Nevertheless, she usually leaves her bed on the second or third day and performs her routine tasks about the house. She must not, however, go farther than thirty-five steps from the dwelling, lest she defile the fields which she might pass.[56] Indeed, she may not even take these few steps without carrying a knife with her.[57] The period during which the mother is not considered entirely clean lasts from three to six weeks, depending upon the locality. At the termination of this period a formal purification ceremony (*wywid* = leading out) is performed in the church by the priest. On the day of the ceremony, the midwife comes to take the mother to church. The latter dresses up in her best clothes, and is sprinkled by the midwife with holy water. Taking the baby in her arms, and carrying a knife, a few keys, some garlic, and a piece of bread, she follows the midwife to the church. Arriving at the entrance, she kneels with the child in her arms and awaits the priest. When he enters, she follows him to the small altar where the christening took place some weeks before. Here the priest, after performing a special ceremony, pronounces her entirely clean.[58]

852 608 574 After the purification rite, often as much as two years later, comes a ceremony which, more than any other, reveals the closeness of the bond that must have once existed between godparents and child. The parents of the child inquire of the godparents whether they will accept a present of *kolaczy*, twisted loaves of wheat bread, from which the ceremony is named *kolaczyny*. If the godparents agree, as they invariably do, the parents set a day for the celebration. Should the godparents have acted in the same capacity at the baptism of other children,

[55] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 6.

[56] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 7.

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[61] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, i, 19.
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23: Koenig E-4 (no 4 (2) 1939 RDI Ukraine RDI

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The swaddling clothes (*pelenky*) consist of linen rags in which the baby is wrapped, after its hands have been fastened to the body by a ribbon or string. A little hay covered by a coarse piece of linen serves as bedding. Once in place, the rags are hardly ever changed, so that they often practically rot away 852 under the child. What the mother seems more concerned with is to assure the child of a healthy growth of hair. Hence when the baby is a month old she cuts off its hair, puts it in a corner of the room, and says: "Look where I am placing your hair, so that in the other world you may know where to get it." This reflects the belief that every person must bring with him to the other world some part of his body. The locks from the head of a girl are usually inserted in the stem of a rotten willow tree, that she may have later a beautiful head of hair.[65]

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434 Mothers usually work and draw, throughout their
262 pregnancy and afterwards, their full occupational rations[1] plus the
745 special allowances indicated. If they do not work, they draw dependents' rations plus their special allowance.

[855] Children up to 14 includes infants from one to seven, who also receive special rations through milk kitchens, nurseries, nursery schools, and kindergartens. These amount to 9.0 litres of milk and 6.0 grams of fats monthly.

434 The employee category includes such occupational groups as office
262 workers, timekeepers, and caretakers. The light workers group includes railway workers, machine builders, etc. The heavy workers group includes moulders, steelworkers, and miners. The latter receive a further additional ration in the form of a hot meal if they do underground work.

(It must be emphasized that the amounts given in the table are official scales, which, even though reduced, cannot regularly be met. Throughout, the figures in brackets refer to scarce items which are authorized, but cannot be supplied.)

TABLE XXIX

Ukrainian Ration Scales from October 1, 1946
(in kilograms per month)

Rationed commodity	Consumer category: Heavy worker	Light worker	Employee	Dependent[1]	Children up to 14
Bread	36.0	18.0	12.0	7.5	9.0
Cereals	nil	nil	nil	nil	(0.8)
Sugar	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	0.3
Meat or fish	(3.2)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.5)	(0.4)
Fats	(0.9)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Butter (or substitute)	nil	nil	nil	nil	.06
Potatoes	(5.0)	"	"	"	nil
Vegetables	(3.0)	"	"	"	(2.0)
Milk, fresh, dried, or evaporated	nil	"	"	"	9.0
Vitamin juices	"	"	"	"	scarce
Approximate daily calories from rations only	3,527	1,682	1,144	704	973 plus 204 infants

[1366] In February 1947 the rations for dependents was again changed, and they are now authorized to receive only bread, 7.5 kilograms monthly.

Source: UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

1 [As of 1947 -- Analyst]

177 sufficient grounds to deal with him in summary pro-
197 ceeding as a "separatist". Pravda of October 16, 1937 even accuses non-Russian students of "mutilating the great Russian language with all kinds of local linguistic rubbish".

The Russian State Publishing House in Moscow is playing a leading role in the language fight. Of 20 monographs which were published up to midsummer 1939 as a result of the great Shevchenko celebrations, no less than 16 were written in Russian and only 4 in the Ukrainian language.

Finally, a favorite method of Russianization is the granting of prizes, free journeys, and privileged places of work and study to young Ukrainians.

*

665 Young people are supposed to spend their
883 leisure time in the Party organizations of the "Yellow Bills", the "Pioneers" and with the
867 "Communistic Socialistic Youth" (Komsomol). /This
857 is an erroneous reading of the Soviet abbreviation of Komministicheski Soiuz Molodiozh; which means Communist League of Young People. Editor/ There they are divided up into "groups of various interests" where they "can develop and satisfy their most urgent needs". There are those interested in the theater, music, sports, politics, the army and similar things. "From the outposts, from groups, from the clubs, from schools, the young people of talent come into the guardianship of the Pioneers every day, every evening, and there they develop, for they are under the supervision of experts..." (71) What "urgent needs" means is

71: H. Furman: Activity and Life of the Pioneers in the Ukraine.

explained by the Kiyev Visti of March 27, 1939, which says that the children conversation hours

665 in the movies and the /126/ theater are "dedicated
883 to the historic Party Congress". According to
867 Proletarska Pravda of January 5, 1938, popular
•857 conversations "about the difficult life of children in capitalist countries, about the international youth movement and the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Council of the USSR are carried on" at such gatherings.

875 The teaching personnel in Soviet Ukraine consists largely of Russians and Jews. In the "pedagogical technical schools" and the "pedagogical institutes" in which educators are trained, the main emphasis is put on a sound knowledge of the Communist doctrine. It is obvious that in the process other subjects, such as language, spelling, history and the like, are neglected. If even in Leningrad "the struggle against illiteracy among the teachers is being intensified", (72)

72. Kommunistische Aufklärung of December 16, 1935, quoted from Richthofen: Bolschewistische Wissenschaft und Kulturpolitik /Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy/, page 75.

what may one expect to find in the provinces! In a single Ukrainian rayon 400 teachers had inadequate knowledge of orthography. (73) The profes-

73. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Ukraine.

sion of the Soviet Ukrainian teacher is certainly
[665] not enticing. The pay is very small; the village schoolmasters are often paid only in kind, and if they wander off into the factories and the teacher shortage becomes too great, the Komsomol sometimes comes to the rescue and "quickly mobilizes 50,000 members as substitutes". (74)

74. Kommunist of May 19, 1931, quoted by Danko; The Nation in Soviet Chains.

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[68] Kaindl, *Die Hutulen*, p. 7. [69] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 10.

[70] *Ibid.*, ii, 10–11.

857 Before the age of twelve or thirteen, boys and girls rarely ever play together or have any other contact with each other. Whenever children are seen at play, a strict separation of the sexes is noticed. This is not the result of any special instruction on the part of the parents, and still less the outcome of imitation. [562] Besides their different spheres of interest, the boys manifest a certain pride and self-consciousness which causes them to band together, leaving the girls to themselves. With puberty, however, boys and girls mix freely and seek each other's company. Peasant children scarcely recognize any distinction between rich and poor; the sons and daughters of the wealthy associate with those of the poor without consciousness of superiority or inferiority on either side.[71]

538 861 593 The philosophy of parents with regard to the training of their children, in so far as they can be said to have one, is summed up in the following proverbial expressions: "The granting of freedom to children means the constraint of the parents"; [72] or, "Give the children freedom and you will find yourself in slavery." [73] Other examples of folk wisdom reveal a similar attitude: "A child will not grow up without a rod." "Do not give in to a child." "Love your child with your heart and drive it with your hands." [74] "Love your child like your soul, and shake it like the pear tree." [75] The burden of rearing children, although actually not very heavy, is, nevertheless, a source of complaint and finds expression in proverbs, *e.g.*, "To feed a child is like carrying a rock." "Small children don't let you sleep, and big ones don't let you live." "Whoever has no children does not know what trouble is." [76] Other proverbs reflect an opposite attitude towards children: "A mother of ten is a joy." [77] "If God grants children, He will provide for them." [78]

SAMUEL KOENIG

[71] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 8–9.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[113] [73] Franko, I., "Halicko-ruski narodni prypowidky," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (vols. xvi, xxiii–xxiv, Lwów, 1905–1908), xvi, 562.

[74] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 8.

[75] *Ibid.*, pp. 563–564.

[76] Franko, *op. cit.*, pp. 564, 600.

[77] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 179.

[78] Franko, *op. cit.*, p. 598.

857 Before the age of twelve or thirteen, boys and girls rarely ever play together or have any other contact with each other. Whenever children are seen at play, a strict separation of the sexes is noticed. This is not the result of any special instruction on the part of the parents, and still less the outcome of imitation. [562] Besides their different spheres of interest, the boys manifest a certain pride and self-consciousness which causes them to band together, leaving the girls to themselves. With puberty, however, boys and girls mix freely and seek each other's company. Peasant children scarcely recognize any distinction between rich and poor; the sons and daughters of the wealthy associate with those of the poor without consciousness of superiority or inferiority on either side.[71]

538 861 598 The philosophy of parents with regard to the training of their children, in so far as they can be said to have one, is summed up in the following proverbial expressions: "The granting of freedom to children means the constraint of the parents";[72] or, "Give the children freedom and you will find yourself in slavery."[73] Other examples of folk wisdom reveal a similar attitude: "A child will not grow up without a rod." "Do not give in to a child." "Love your child with your heart and drive it with your hands."[74] "Love your child like your soul, and shake it like the pear tree."[75] The burden of rearing children, although actually not very heavy, is, nevertheless, a source of complaint and finds expression in proverbs, *e.g.*, "To feed a child is like carrying a rock." "Small children don't let you sleep, and big ones don't let you live." "Whoever has no children does not know what trouble is."[76] Other proverbs reflect an opposite attitude towards children: "A mother of ten is a joy."[77] "If God grants children, He will provide for them."[78]

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[71] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, pp. 8–9.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[113] [73] Franko, I., "Halicko-ruski narodni prypowidky," *Etnograficznyj Zbirnyk* (vols. xvi, xxiii–xxiv, Lwów, 1905–1908), xvi, 562.

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 563–564.

[75] Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, p. 8.

[76] Franko, *op. cit.*, pp. 564, 600.

[77] Kolberg, *Pokucie*, iii, 179.

[78] Franko, *op. cit.*, p. 598.

177 sufficient grounds to deal with him in summary pro-
191 ceeding as a "separatist". Pravda of October 16, 1937 even accuses non-Russian students of "mutilating the great Russian language with all kinds of local linguistic rubbish".

The Russian State Publishing House in Moscow is playing a leading role in the language fight. Of 20 monographs which were published up to midsummer 1939 as a result of the great Shevchenko celebrations, no less than 16 were written in Russian and only 4 in the Ukrainian language.

Finally, a favorite method of Russianization is the granting of prizes, free journeys, and privileged places of work and study to young Ukrainians.

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665 Young people are supposed to spend their
883 leisure time in the Party organizations of the
•867 "Yellow Bills", the "Pioneers" and with the
857 "Communistic Socialistic Youth" (Komsomol). /This is an erroneous reading of the Soviet abbreviation of Komministicheski Soiuz Molodiozh; which means Communist League of Young People. Editor/ There they are divided up into "groups of various interests" where they "can develop and satisfy their most urgent needs". There are those interested in the theater, music, sports, politics, the army and similar things. "From the outposts, from groups, from the clubs, from schools, the young people of talent come into the guardianship of the Pioneers every day, every evening, and there they develop, for they are under the supervision of experts..." (71) What "urgent needs" means is

71: H. Furman: Activity and Life of the Pioneers in the Ukraine.

explained by the Kiyev Visti of March 27, 1939, which says that the children conversation hours

665 in the movies and the /126/ theater are "dedicated
883 to the historic Party Congress". According to
867 Proletarska Pravda of January 5, 1938, popular
857 conversations "about the difficult life of children in capitalist countries, about the international youth movement and the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Council of the USSR are carried on" at such gatherings.

875 The teaching personnel in Soviet Ukraine consists largely of Russians and Jews. In the "pedagogical technical schools" and the "pedagogical institutes" in which educators are trained, the main emphasis is put on a sound knowledge of the Communist doctrine. It is obvious that in the process other subjects, such as language, spelling, history and the like, are neglected. If even in Leningrad "the struggle against illiteracy among the teachers is being intensified", (72)

72. Kommunistische Aufklärung of December 16, 1935, quoted from Richthofen: Bolschewistische Wissenschaft und Kulturpolitik /Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy/, page 75.

what may one expect to find in the provinces! In a single Ukrainian rayon 400 teachers had inadequate knowledge of orthography. (73) The profes-

73. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Ukraine.

sion of the Soviet Ukrainian teacher is certainly
[665] not enticing. The pay is very small; the village schoolmasters are often paid only in kind, and if they wander off into the factories and the teacher shortage becomes too great, the Komsomol sometimes comes to the rescue and "quickly mobilizes 50,000 members as substitutes". (74)

74. Kommunist of May 19, 1931, quoted by Danko; The Nation in Soviet Chains.

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those the minorities possessed; and the necessity for knowing Russian would be heightened by drawing the minorities into the industrial, commercial and political life of the country as a whole. Meanwhile, literacy in the minority languages would facilitate the spread of communist doctrines stressing the international solidarity of the working-class against capitalism. To achieve unity while allowing the free use of minority languages might be the long — and perhaps very dangerous — way around, but Lenin believed it would be the only effective way in a backward, heterogeneous country like Russia.

The Soviet leaders were so certain that eventual lingustic uniformity could be attained only through temporary diversity that they went further in emphasizing minority languages than any state has ever gone: they made vigorous attempts to foster the actual use of the minority languages, to "nationalize" (i.e., "Ukrainize," "Armenianize," "Tartarize") political organizations, administrative apparatus, factory managements, trade-unions, military units, newspapers, books, theatres and schools, among the minorities. In their desire to retreat from the old Imperial policy of Russification, they leaned over so far backward that they introduced the element of compulsion in the opposite direction: they forced the national minorities and the Russians living among them to use the local languages in political, economic and cultural life, stopping short only at the threshold of the individual's private world. The ultimate effect of this policy upon the increase or decrease of nationalism among the minorities is not yet apparent, and the fate of such nationalism may hinge upon such factors as economic prosperity, political liberty and developments in the field of international relations; but the process of nationalizing the political, economic and cultural life of the minorities is an experiment which deserves more attention from the non-Soviet political and scholarly world than it has received.

In the field of education, the Soviet régime has followed a four-fold policy: first to establish a school system embracing all children; secondly, to promote the spread of communist doctrines by integrating them into the curriculum; thirdly, to nationalize the school system by introducing the languages of the minorities as the languages of instruction in schools attended by children of the minorities; and, fourthly, to pave the way for eventual assimilation by providing for the study of Russian as a separate subject in the schools of the minorities. The first two aspects of this policy are complex subjects, each of which deserves a separate study. The present discussion will therefore treat only of the linguistic phases of the Soviet educational policy: the nationalization of education — that is, the use of minority

853 regarding food. For this reason she often makes it drink a spoonful of dishwater immediately after birth or weaning.[68]

857 Children mean additional working hands, and hence an increased source of income to the peasant's household. The older the boy or girl gets, the more indispensable does he become in the house, helping his father or mother. When scarcely eight years of age, he runs all sorts of errands, carries his father's lunch out to the distant fields all by himself, rides the horses to water, drives the cattle out to pasture—in a word, learns to depend upon himself. At the age of twelve he already performs practically all the tasks of an adult, sometimes working even harder than his parents.

869 From its very infancy the child is inculcated with various
784 folk beliefs. It is taught, for example, not to spit on the fire, lest it get the mark of a flame on its face; not to eat apples before St. Spas (18th August, O.S.), lest frogs multiply in its belly; never, in the case of a girl, to walk backwards, lest she remain long unmarried; and not to throw away the nails that it bites off its fingers but to hide them in its bosom, for they belong to the Devil, who will demand them after death.[69]

552 The life of a boy is marked by no special ceremonies until the time of courtship. In the case of a girl, the only formal ceremony occurs in her sixth year, when her hair is put up for the first time. Before that age, her tresses fall freely about her shoulders. For the ceremony the mother invites a woman, called *sochtiwna*, who is experienced in such matters. Gathering the girl's hair from her forehead and from the back and both sides of her head, the woman ties the four strands together in the centre, saying: "As I am tying your hair from all four sides that it may adhere together, so may boys, widowers, sons of wealthy parents, and the most distinguished youths of the land seek you from all directions; whoever shall see you shall swoon for you, as a fish does for water." The parents thenceforth usually pay a little more attention to their daughter's appearance; at least they try to see to it that she wears another garment in addition to her shirt.

[68] Kaindl, *Die Hutzulen*, p. 7.

[69] Szuchiewicz, *op. cit.*, ii, 10.

[70] *Ibid.*, ii, 10–11.

175 The Peace of Riga (May 18th, 1921) between Poland and
728 Russia allocated to the former Volynia, Polesya and the district of Kholm, formerly parts of the Russian Empire, while the Ambassadors' Council on March 14th, 1923 added Galicia to Poland's gains. In the Treaty of Riga both partners promised to respect the rights of their minorities while the Ambassadors' Council declared that Poland was to issue laws that would preserve Ukrainian rights and that this was why the Entente Powers relegated their supreme authority to Poland. In reality, throughout the period of Polish supremacy there was little or no attempt to satisfy Ukrainian claims. The Ukrainian Chairs, established at Lviv University by Austria, ceased to exist and the law providing for a Ukrainian university was never implemented. Ukrainian schools were slowly but surely replaced by others where Polish was used either in some or in all classes. Polish became the language of instruction in secondary and vocational schools. The Ukrainian language was not recognised legally either in the administration or in law courts and Ukrainian influence declined in all selfgovernment organisations. Poles colonised Ukrainian areas. A campaign of public opposition was opened against the Ukrainian church: hundreds of churches were shut, above all in the district round Kholm, and the buildings were frequently burned.

175 The reaction of the Ukrainian population was considerable.
871 In the field of education steps were taken to organise private Ukrainian schools; thus in 1934-35 there were 21 Ukrainian secondary schools, 5 continuation vocational schools — mostly in the towns. This is no mean accomplishment in view of the Polish resistance. Besides actual schooling. Ukrainian youth outside of the schools was organised. In 1938 in Galicia. alone the Ukrainian Union for Adult Education had half a million members, 84 branches, 3208 reading rooms. 2065 theatrical societies and 1105 choirs (the Union was forbidden by Polish Law outside
175 of Galicia). Cooperative stores also served to support Ukrainian
474 interests. In 1935 there were incorporated in the Ukrainian Central Cooperative Organisation 3013 cooperative societies with a membership of 541 508. This organisation of economic self-help had also to struggle against bitter Polish resistance, as expressed in the military pacification of Galicia in 1930 or the

of Rome as the supreme head of their church, the pioneers of 795
the Union and of the cultural independence of Ukraine wished to throw off the cultural yoke of Poland, thinking that they would acquire equal rights with the Poles once the churches were united. The course of events has showed how much they were mistaken; for the Poles have merely exploited this rapprochement in ecclesiastical affairs as an instrument by means of which, with the help of the Jesuits, they aimed at ruling over the entire East and at completely absorbing the Ukrainian nation.

Western influence can also be detected in the guild-like 441
organisations of the Ukrainian middle-classes in towns like Lviv 871
Kyiv, Lutsk etc., organisations which, in addition to promoting the interests of a particular class or trade, also concerned themselves with church affairs. One of their main aims was the foundation of schools which taught Latin as well as Church Slavonic and Greek.

The most important foundation of those so-called Bro- 874
therhood schools was undoubtedly the Kyiv Academy 795
which owed its supremacy as an intellectual center, not 177
only of Ukraine, but of the whole of Eastern Europe .79
to the activities of such an eminent personality as Metropolitan Peter Mohyla. Mohyla, the son of the governor of Moldavia and educated in Jesuit schools, remained a life-long advocate of western culture and the Catholic Church, the organisation of which served him as a model when he was planning the reform of the Orthodox Church. We are scarcely able to-day to imagine what an enormous revolution and what great boldness of spirit was implied in the idea of introducing Catholic principles and methods into the organisation of the Orthodox Church which had been hostile to Rome for centuries. And yet this unique plan succeeded and could succeed only in Ukraine, for it was here alone that history had prepared the way for the adoption of these plans for realising western ideas. The spirit which inspired Mohyla's activities was wholly directed towards the West, as was clearly expressed in his innovations: in dogma, however, he remained a loyal disciple of the "faith

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Education

The history of education and schools in Ukraine dates from the tenth century when Christianity was introduced. The mass of the original native population had little interest in schools and learning so that the real representatives of scholarship were to be found among the higher clergy and at court. Documentary evidence proves that at this time there was a considerable circle of scholars in Kyiv and that Yaroslav the Wise had Greek books translated and founded a library, perhaps the first to be found in the century, in the church of St. Sophia. 871

This work, so important from the point of view of cultural history, accomplished by the Kyiv princes in the province of teaching and education, came to an abrupt end in the 13th century when the Tatar hordes flooded the country. This caused the centers of culture to be shifted still further into the principality of Galicia-Volynia. The same fate overtook the other Ukrainian countries which were annexed to Poland. In spite of the difficulties and unrest prevailing in these areas their level of education was comparatively high, compared with neighboring countries. The Ukrainian language was recognised in the principality of Lithuania as the language of state and court and when the union with Poland took place, original Ukrainian culture was at least equal to Polish. In the course of time, however, this relationship was changed.

Education in Ukrainian territory was exclusively organised by the clergy. This disintegration of the life of the Orthodox Church in the 15th and 16th centuries was therefore of enormous importance for the cultural standing of the country; it was disastrous as, just then, Poland's intellectual life was most

● 871 flourishing and the Jesuits began to launch a campaign of religious propaganda on Ukrainian territory as well. They founded schools which attracted the aristocracy of Ukraine so that this section of society of unquestioned importance for the future of the nation became entirely Polish.

The influence of the Reformation in the 16th century was relatively weak in Ukraine. And yet a desire to improve prevailing conditions did exist and gave indeed rise to the first modest attempts to bring about from within a reform of the Orthodox Church and of the educational system depending on it. Thus, towards the end of the 16th century the first Ukrainian college was organised in Ostroh by Konstantin Ostrozhskyj, the greatest Ukrainian magnate.

The brotherhoods, or guilds, now the only leaders of the Ukrainian nation in its continued struggle for religious and cultural independence, since the nobility had become completely Polish, also sought to promote education. Such centers of mental organisation were formed throughout Ukraine, those in Wilno, Lviv, Brest, Lutsk and later in Kyiv playing the main part. They regarded it as their main function to found schools which, organised on western models, should take up cudgels against the Latin schools and Jesuit colleges. The curricula of these schools included in addition to subjects of a religious nature, Old Slavonic and Greek, grammar, dialectics, rhetoric and themes of philosophy; the Lviv school, as an exception, got permission from the king of Poland to include Latin in its curriculum.

The brotherhoods lacked material means of developing more extensive cultural activity. They therefore had to look round for a new power in Ukrainian life to support them in their struggle against Roman Catholicism and Poland. And this power they found in the Cossacks. As a result of a shift in the center of political power, Kyiv, which was very near the Cossack territory, became once more the center of culture. There at the beginning of the 17th century the college founded by the Metropolitan Mohyla was organised and became an institute which has played an eminent part in the education and culture of entire Eastern Europe. Peter Mohyla, himself a product of Catholic Jesuit education, and related to the most important

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Polish magnates, was all his life a zealous devotee of western culture and of the Catholic Church. His whole activity was inspired by a spirit which certainly was directed towards the west; but as far as dogma was concerned he remained absolutely loyal to the Orthodox Church. It is comprehensible that the school under his direction should have pursued the same policy of reconciliation between points of view that had been hitherto diametrically opposed to each other. Latin was the basis of instruction; but, in addition, Church Slavonic, Greek and Polish were also taught. The greatest attention was paid to theology, but logic, physics and metaphysics were also on the curriculum. 871

The educational work done by different brotherhood schools with the Kyiv Academy at their head, brought a rich harvest. The general level of education rose considerably. But the state's position of dependence was in those days an insuperable barrier to the development of a system of education in Ukraine and to the growth of national pedagogic ideals. As a result of the disastrous outcome of the Cossack wars Ukraine was divided into two spheres of influence. After the partition of Poland about the turn of the 18th century almost the whole Ukrainian territory was occupied by Russia.

The methods applied by the imperial government in the 19th century to make Russians out of Ukrainians were cruel. The Ukrainians were denied all rights to existence as an independent people in the hope that they would be absorbed by the great mass of Russia. It is obvious that there could be no question of a Ukrainian educational system under such circumstances. It was not till the Revolution broke out in 1905 that an improvement, if a brief, set in. An actual renaissance was only possible when the Russian empire collapsed in 1917. During the short period of political independence (1918—1920), two Ukrainian universities were founded in Kyiv and Kamianets Podilskyj, while a host of secondary schools and thousands of elementary schools sprang into being, in all of which Ukrainian was the language of instruction. At the old universities of Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odessa which had been allowed to retain Russian as the vehicle of instruction, new chairs had been established for the Ukrainian language, history, history of the Ukrainian law, and literature.

●871 The professional training of young teachers was already being given in the competent faculties, in pedagogic colleges, training colleges and in the (usually) short courses for training teachers. A large staff of intellectual workers, who would help to educate the people in national culture, was to be trained in a short space of time. By the end of 1918 there existed on Ukrainian territory 47 208 elementary schools, 474 secondary schools for boys, 362 for girls, 91 commercial schools, 9 theological training colleges for priests and 30 church schools. But this natural development was interrupted by the new civil war the final result of which was the creation of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the subjection to Moscow of the entire public life in Ukraine.

In keeping with the principles on which the Bolshevist theory of education was founded, the school had first and foremost to be pressed into the service of a militant communism and thus contribute a good share to the revolutionising of society. Paragraph 12 in the program of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party expressly states that "the school must not merely become a herald of communist principles in general but also an instrument by means of which the organised proletariat could spread ideas of organisation and education among the half-proletarian classes of the population, so that a new generation might arise which would be able to abolish class distinctions entirely and thus finally bring about the realisation of communism."

The basic plan of enlightening the people in the U.S.S.R. included the following: the social education of children, vocational teaching in schools, political enlightenment outside of school, scientific work and an expensive publishing concern as a basic measure for spreading enlightenment. This system of education provided for the needs of communist youth as follows:

1. Social education of children from 4 to 8 years old (children's clubs, gardens, grounds, houses and towns).

2. Social education at school (uniform 7-year school in two sections, one for pupils from 8 to 12, and one for the 12 to 15 years old).

3. Vocational training which started at 15 and included the following stages: 871

a) a vocational school lasting 2 or 3 years giving courses in industrial subjects, machinery, agriculture, medicine and economics, followed by a practical year for the purpose of preparing qualified workers. After graduating from that

b) a technical institute with a course of 3 years for advanced study, the results of which were to be applied to practice. Scientific tasks were performed in

c) institutes with professorial chairs for training highly qualified practical experts and also by

d) academies with a 2 years' course for the purpose of training young scholars and researchers in every province of science.

What cannot fail to strike us in this basic plan is the entire absence of universities and other colleges which are replaced mainly by institutes, academies and faculties for working men. As far as the institutes are concerned, the champions of this system of education maintain that it was only possible to establish them after a severe struggle against the university system, "which preserved important remnants of mediaeval scholastic learning, dissolved scientific research in philosophical thought and had radically reduced the scientific function of the university to a minimum." The universities, therefore, were played out and had to be replaced by another form of higher learning.

The institutes for the education of the public, which were formed out of the old universities with the help of teachers from former teachers' training colleges, are a special group. They possess three faculties, viz. 1. the faculty of social education intended to train teachers for the communal gardens and for the elementary schools, 2. the faculty of vocational training which, as its name implies, had to supply the vocational schools and technical schools with teachers and finally 3. the faculty for political enlightenment; this last faculty trained propagandists and lecturers to enlighten wide circles of the population, teachers 874

874 for party schools, for workmen's clubs and centers of adult education in the country.

● 871 In the course of years this basic scheme underwent many changes till it was adapted to the general Soviet scheme in 1932; by a resolution passed by the Central Executive of the Communist Party on August 25 of that year the 7-year elementary school in Ukraine was transformed into a 10-year school, a third section being added, and the technical schools which had not yet become institutes were put on the same level as the higher schools; new universities had to be founded in order to cope with the difficult tasks of cultural reconstruction. It is not our place here to criticise this or that measure; in order to evaluate these radical reforms properly one would have not only to examine the plans but also their application in practice and the results they achieved.

We are, however, particularly interested in the national element in the general system of communist education which finds articulate expression in the language used.

195 871 In the original Ukrainian Socialist Republic the Ukrainian language was to have priority as the official language; this point of view was approved even in 1920 after the Revolution and steps were taken to make Ukrainian the vehicle of instruction throughout the schools where this had not already been done. Ukrainian nationalists were quick to seize this opportunity of promoting their native tongue and to aim at positive results at least in this province. But the growth in national consciousness among the broad masses of workmen and peasants due to the intensified use of the Ukrainian language began to make communist leading circles in the country uneasy. Russian was introduced as a second official language, by which the authorities hoped to put a brake on nationalism and to prevent Ukrainian influences from becoming too strong. Thus there were throughout Ukraine schools taught in two, and even three languages in order that Russian and Jewish minorities might enjoy their own rights. This preference shown to national minorities greatly handicapped the proper official language, a fact that was the more striking the higher the level of school investigated. The position of Ukrainian was most precarious at the universities,

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as was frankly admitted by the official representatives at the 195
People's Commissariat for education. The shortage of teachers 871
able to lecture in Ukrainian, the lack of Ukrainian text-books and the poor development of Ukrainian scientific terminology were quoted as excuses; sometimes also the hostile attitude of some of the professors.

The same thing could be noticed in the attendance of schools by pupils of different nationality. In all vocational schools there were 53,1 % Ukrainians, 20 % Russians, and 22,5 % Jews while the population was composed as follows: 80 % Ukrainians, 9.2 % Russians, and 5.4 % Jews. Circumstances were even less favorable to the Ukrainians at the universities where the percentage of Ukrainian students sank in proportion as Jewish and Russian quotas increased. The "purges" that were conducted at universities from time to time carried off mainly Ukrainians, thereby still further reducing the proportion of students from the nation to which the majority of the population belonged.

The provinces in Eastern Galicia and Bucovina which had 871
fallen to Austria were incorporated in the general educational system in that country. The efforts of the Ukrainian population in the second half of the 19th century were confined to preserving the national character of the schools. In this they only partially succeeded, as the Poles were hostile to these efforts. To be able to educate their young people along national lines, the Ukrainians founded a series of private schools about the turn of the century which were maintained by public Ukrainian contributions. At the same time a severe struggle arose round Lviv university, which the Polish authorities in Galicia had transformed from an originally German and then Ukrainian-Polish university to an almost entirely Polish center of education. Circumstances were more favorable in Bucovina where the Ukrainians wer tolerated by the Germans to satisfy their national claims.

In consequence of the unhappy outcome of the war between Poland and Ukraine (1919), Eastern Galicia was incorporated in the Polish state, whereby the position of the Ukrainians became much worse than it had been under Austria. According to

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● 871 the last Austrian school statistics there were 2612 elementary schools in Eastern Galicia where Ukrainian was the vehicle of instruction. During the school-year 1927/28 there were only 745 of such elementary schools, and, on the other hand, 2325 taught in Polish and 1635 bilingual schools (Polish and Ukrainian). Matters were worse in the schools in north-western Ukrainian territory, i. e. in Volynia, Polessya, Podlakhia and the Kholm district. In the latter two areas there was not a single Ukrainian elementary school. In the administration of Volynia there were 4 out of 1144 elementary schools taught in Ukrainian, 390 were bilingual and 750 Polish. It is also to be noted that the schools taught in Ukrainian were always inferior schools, for of the 917 Ukrainian elementary schools in Eastern Galicia in 1926, 842 were schools with only one or two rooms.

Following the example of other European states, Poland also developed all kinds of vocational schools. But in the entire Ukrainian territory under Poland there was not a single vocational school taught in Ukrainian and Ukrainians who wished to study at Polish vocational schools met with great difficulties. The Plebiscite Law of July 31, 1924, forbids the Ukrainian population to erect vocational and secondary schools and teachers' training colleges in which Ukrainian is the vehicle of instruction. Bilingual secondary schools only may be founded. In the while on Ukrainian territory under Poland there was not one state Ukrainian vocational school nor one state college for training teachers taught in Ukrainian.

While Lviv was under Austria there were some chairs at the university where lectures were held in Ukrainian, but these were immediately abolished as soon as Poland occupied the town. And it must be recalled that according to the law of September 20, 1922, the Polish government had promised to erect a Ukrainian university within two years, which promise was never fulfilled.

From 1920—1924 there was in Lviv a Ukrainian university with three faculties which was forbidden by the Polish authorities and had to operate secretly. This proved impossible in the long run and the university had to be dissolved. In order to put a stop to Polish penetration the Ukrainian people tried to create a

private school system of their own within the frontiers of Poland. 871
In 1932/33 there were 15 Ukrainian secondary schools, 6 teachers' training colleges, 4 vocational schools, 5 advanced vocational schools, 4 schools for trades and 31 elementary schools. These schools received no subsidy from the state and were subjected to different methods of persecution on the part of Polish school authorities.

In the Bucovina, too, things took a turn for the worse when this country was occupied by Roumania after the dèbâcle of 1918. In 1919 already, Ukrainian schools were forced to make way for Roumanian and after a few years there were neither any more schools taught in Ukrainian nor any Ukrainian chairs at the Chernivtsi university. It was even forbidden to study Ukrainian and teachers were not allowed to give explanations in their mother-tongue to children who did not understand Roumanian. Ukrainian universities in Czechoslovakia deserve special mention; firstly because they offered a refuge to professors who had fled from their home and secondly because they made it possible for a large number of young people to finish their study which the First World War had interrupted. The first to be founded in 1921 was the Ukrainian Free University in Prague which still exists since 1945 in Munich; it has two faculties, a faculty of law and a falculty of arts which comprises departments for history and languages, mathematics and natural science. This university has many and various functions and aims. The national education of youth comes first and so most emphasis is put on those subjects that cannot be taught at foreign universities on account of their specifically Ukrainian character. In addition, they aim at training scientific workers and the professors of the future capable of teaching at Ukrainian schools to be founded later. Other colleges which sprang up in Czechoslovakia soon after the university was founded, were the Agricultural College in Podjebrady, presently at Regensburg, and the Teachers' training College (liquidated in 1930) as well as the Academy of Fine Arts in Prague.

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level of the earlier times. Western influences become more 538
prominent; it is a time of transition, nor does the Reformation count for much, for even the Ukrainian translation of the Bible by Dr. Franz Skoryna in 1515 was a response to national needs and cannot be derived from external influences. The first [213]
Ukrainian books, on the other hand, were printed in 1491—93 by Shveipolt Fiol in a German printing-press in Cracow, and that in connection with the first Ukrainian academy (Ostroh 1577—1640), which had been formed for the purpose of publishing a critical edition of the Bible.

Literary and educative activity was really in the hands of 814
the brotherhoods, which naturally were greatly interested in efforts to unite the churches. Polish literature worthy of note arose, important preliminary work was done in the province of language (Smotrytskyj's Grammar of Church Slavonic 1618), but it was only after Mohyla (1596—1647) re-organised the Academy in Kyiv that a cultural center was formed which was to play a decisive part in the literature of Ukraine for about 200 years.

Theological, rhetorical and philosophical works appear, the history text-book "Synopsis" by I. Gisel (died in 1684) goes through 30 editions, and Gregor Skovoroda (1722—1794), the most eminent philosopher of the 18th century in Eastern Europe and a student at the Kyiv Academy, wrote his books, the real significance of which is only being recognised now.

The cultural renaissance in Ukraine due to the brotherhoods and the Kyiv Academy brought new impetus to other provinces of intellectual life, as for instance dramatic art (Jakob Gavatovych 1598—1679, Mytrophan Dowhalevskyj 18th century. Demeter Rostovskyj, 1651—1705, the writing of history Samuel Velychko, died in 1728; Gregor Hrabyanka, died in 1737, and Gregor Poletyka, died in 1784), and also in plastic art which reached a high level of excellence in the Left Bank Region under Mazeppa's hetmanate. Young men in Ukraine were no longer content 871
with native education; more and more they flocked to foreign, and above all, to German and Italian universities. Hetman Rozumovskyj's (1728—1803) intention to found a native uni-

871 versity in his own residential town of Baturyn was prevented from being realised by pressure from the government of Russia.

538 But in the darkest of days a renaissance sets in, if slowly and scarcely noticeable. 1798 is the date of the appearance of the "Aeneid" by Ivan Kotlarevskyj (1769—1838). It presents actual life in Ukraine, written after a classical model in the form of a satire and in Ukrainian language, which thus becomes the language of literature and culture. Just at a time of greatest oppression, the greatest Ukrainian poet was born: Taras Shevchenko (1814—1861), the national genius, whose prophetic instinct sensed the course of development of native literature and who devoted his entire energy to furthering it. His poems, collected under the title of "Cobzar" (the popular minstrel) became the bible of every patriotic Ukrainian. He was exiled for his views to Siberia by the government of Russia and suffered great hardships which caused his early death. Shevchenko marked a brilliant end to the development of Ukrainian literature up to that onoment but at the same time, the starting-point for a new movement. Pantelejmon Kulish (1819—1897), a most productive writer of many-sided education, was one of Shevchenko's intimates; he distinguished himself not only as a poet, but also as an ethnographer, a historian, a critic, and a translator. In the second half of the 19th century Michael Drahomaniv (1841—1895), a professor at the university in Kyiv, later in Sophia, a follower of socialism and inclined to internationalism, produced much eminent work, though not always of positive value. About the same time in the area of Ukraine that belonged to Austria, Ivan Franko (1856—1916) was working as a poet, a scholar and a politician of renown, being besides Shevchenko the most important personality in modern Ukraine. Round about the turn of the century there was a great increase in the number of Ukrainian writers; among the best known are Lesja Ukrayinka (1872—1913), the author of wonderful poems in dramatic form; Vasyl Stefanyk (1871—1937), whose short stories often portray the tragic fate of Ukrainian peasants; Les Martovych (1871—1916); an accurate observer of life not only among peasants, but also among the educated provincial classes in Ukraine; Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880), a representative of

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

●871 Ukrainian schools were again started; a number of Communist newspapers began to appear in the Ukrainian language; and generally the usual 'Galician technique' of opening Ukrainian publishing centres, museums, libraries, theatres and so forth was followed (incidentally many Galicians made their appearance in Soviet Ukraine 626 during this period). The official 'state ideology' of Marxism was of course made obligatory for everyone, and the new volumes of Hrushevsky's fundamental history of the Ukraine which were now published in Kiev revealed that in his old age the distinguished professor had come to appreciate the truth of the doctrine of historical materialism.

The population remained as indifferent to measures of 'ukrainization' as it had in the *Rada* days, although now there were more numerous manifestations of it than in the past. Although Ukrainian had become a kind of official language, few appeared to have any taste for its use, either in the administration or in private life. One of the authors of *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, who occupied an administrative post in one of the Soviet institutions in the Ukraine between the years 1921 and 1924, confesses that he never once wrote a line in Ukrainian during the whole course of his employment.

665 In 1925 Kaganovich made his appearance in the Ukraine in the role of leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Stalin's future brother-in-law was also one of his most intimate friends, and at that time Stalin had already secured almost absolute power in the Soviet Union. Kaganovich's mission was to make a thorough inspection of the personnel of the Party in the Ukraine and to eliminate the 'unreliable and opportunist elements'.

At the same time Kaganovich had an opportunity of coming to the conclusion that Communism in the Ukraine was not at that date an overwhelming success. According to statistics published some time later by the Central Committee of the Party, out of every 10,000 inhabitants of the Ukraine the ratio of Communists was as follows: Jews, 155; Great Russians and 'new-comers', 88; Ukrainians, 39. About 15 per cent of women had joined Communist organisations—a far lower proportion than in the north. The proportion of Ukrainian students in the high schools which had been opened to form 'responsible Ukrainian workers and specialists' was disappointingly low in comparison to the number of their Jewish fellows: in the Social-Economic Faculty there were 1500 Ukrainians to 1000 Jews; in the Industrial-Technical Faculty, 2600 Ukrainians to 2200 Jews; in the Medical Faculty only 2000 Ukrainians to 2200 Jews; whereas the proportion of Ukrainians to Jews in the whole population was 10 to 1.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

186 snapped up by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty in the Commis-
191 sariat for Education. In a short time they worked so effectively
665 that nearly all the books published in Ukraine and about 85% of the newspapers were put out in Ukrainian. The circulation of these Ukrainian publications in the villages increased rapidly and aided in producing a sense of relief among the peasants and a tolerance of the situation which was in sharp contrast to the prevailing mood of a few years before.

[871] A network of Ukrainian schools was set up throughout the country with instruction in the native language and the number of students grew rapidly from among the peasant classes. It had been centuries since the Ukrainian language had reached such a state of popularity. The theatres produced plays in Ukrainian as the chief part of their repertory. The cities assumed a markedly Ukrainian appearance and the leaders could look with satisfaction on their results.

871 The one difficulty was the low level of the instruction in many
186 places but this was equally characteristic of the Russian terrain.[1] The revolution and the Bolshevik laws had abolished the old Russian system of education and had eliminated from the schools the bulk of the older intelligentsia and their children who, on one excuse or another, were excluded from all opportunities for study. The old disciplines were abolished and the Soviet school entered upon a chaotic period. Nevertheless, the changes which the former Borotbist Hrynko introduced, including the establishment of seven year schools which gave the students the right to enter upon a three year course in various technical schools, served to increase rapidly the number of young and partly trained Ukrainians who were available for posts in the government service and who thereby freed the organization from its dependence upon Russian-trained people.

645 In 1925, he[2] was succeeded in the post of Commissar by O.
871 Shumsky, likewise a Borotbist, who had held the post of Ukrainian
186 Minister in Warsaw. He had come back in 1923 to become the
665 Director of Agitation and Propaganda for the Central Committee of the KP/b/U. An ardent believer in the Ukrainian cause, he

[1] [1923 -- Analyst]

[2] [Hrynko, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

opposed very strenuously all the Russifying influences in the Party and insisted, as a matter of principle, that only Ukrainian Communists should be promoted to prominent posts in the Ukrainian Communist organizations. He even went so far as to insist, when Kaganovich was sent from Moscow as Secretary of the Ukrainian section of the party, that he be removed and replaced by Chubar, an old Bolshevik, and he recommended that Hrynko should be made the head of the state. 645 871 186 665

Kaganovich, who had been rather on the side of Shumsky in many of his enterprises, now turned against him on the ground that he was breaking Communist discipline and, in a short time, Shumsky was removed and transferred to Moscow, where he received a post as head of the trade unions. From there he was moved to Leningrad to become head of a school of economics, but by this time his star was setting. Shumsky, on more charges, was sent to a concentration camp near the Finnish border. According to the story, he was assured that he had a chance to escape. He tried it and was shot. His leading assistants, Maksymovych, Vasylkiv and Turyansky, were branded as Shumkyists and punished accordingly. [681]

His successor, M. Skrypnyk, took up his work as Commissar of Education under even better auspices. Unlike his predecessors, who had entered the Communist Party from the ranks of the Borotbisty or the Ukapisty and who thereby risked the charge of being Ukrainian nationalists and having bourgeois-nationalist sympathies, Skrypnyk had been an old member of the Russian Social Democratic Party (Bolsheviks). He had been a personal friend of Lenin long before the Revolution. He had been arrested several times by the tsarist government, had taken an active part in the October Revolution of 1917 and was a disciplined member of the party. He was thus above reproach so far as his party standing was concerned.

From the time of the foundation of the Ukrainian National Republic, Skrypnyk had been one of the outstanding Ukrainians in the Communist Party. From the beginning he had taken the definite stand that the Communist organization in Ukraine should be thoroughly Ukrainian, independent of the Russian Communist Party and with a seat in the Comintern. He believed that Ukraine

645 should naturally have a Soviet government and be an indepen-
● 871 dent state with all the rights and perquisites of the RSFSR and
186 he regarded the war between the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and
665 the Ukrainian National Republic as a civil war in which the Soviet Russians naturally came to the aid of the Soviet Ukrainians. At the same time he believed equally strongly that this assistance should be that of a brother-nation and should have no elements of a foreign occupation.

He was a disciplined Communist and he always acted in accordance with the strictest Communist tradition. He never joined any faction or questioned the vote of his superiors but he remained firm in his convictions, and while he was always in the minority and was willing to yield superficially, he always seized the next opportunity to advance substantially the same points but in a somewhat different form. He was on friendly terms with Stalin and he came to his post after a definite interview with Stalin and with instructions that put him in a position second only to Kaganovich.

The appointment of Skrypnyk with his Communist record showed very well that in 1927 the VKP (the All-Union Communist Party) was still playing with the idea of making the Communist International a real gathering of supposed equals, united under the leadership of a central body in Moscow. It was a tacit recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a political entity, but it was equally the recognition of a Marxian Socialist culture which might lead to some of the later developments of Stalinism. The appointment insured Stalin of the aid of the true Ukrainian Communists in the coming battle between him and the left deviationists.

Once in his own mind Skrypnyk had answered the problem, he did not waver. He accepted the Marxian doctrine that by the development of an urban proletariat he could develop the Ukrainians to the point where they would be justified in demanding an entrance into the Comintern as an independent nation. He interpreted the cases of Czechoslovakia and Latvia as exactly that, since the proletariats of Prague and Brno, as well as Riga, had forced

national independence and he set himself to do the same in Kiev and Kharkiv. 645 871

Without wavering in his devotion to the principles of Communism, he attacked the problem in the broadest possible way. He stimulated derussification by supporting the Ukrainian press, theatre and schools. Under his influence and work, the cities, including Kharkiv, where Ukrainian influence had been relatively weak, came to be predominantly Ukrainian and in smaller places it became very rare to hear Russian spoken. The State Printing House and the smaller cooperative publishing houses produced almost nothing that was not in Ukrainian and during the few years that he remained in control, there were more Ukrainian books published than in the preceding century and a half. 186 665

Skrypnyk was still not satisfied. He extended his activity and patronage of things Ukrainian to all those areas in the RSFSR where Ukrainians were living in compact settlements. He provided Ukrainian papers, books and theatres for those who were living in Kurshchyna, Voronizhshchyna, along the Volga, Kuban, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan and the Far East. He sent educated men and women to establish schools and other cultural institutions and, for the first time in history, efforts were made to establish a real community of interests among all the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

More than that, he held out a friendly hand to Western Ukraine, which was under Polish rule. Although by this time the entire control of foreign affairs was concentrated in Moscow, Skrypnyk was allowed to arrange for a Ukrainian consul in Lviv and Yur. Lapchynsky, a former Ukapist, was appointed to the post. The consul's duty was to win support for the Communists in Eastern Galicia and, in pursuance of this purpose, Skrypnyk, too, paid a visit to Lviv. He had a certain success in his work and a few Western Ukrainians, as S. Rudnytsky, who came from Prague to become the head of the Ukrainian Institute of Geography and Cartography in Kharkiv, and the mathematician Chaykivsky, entered the UkSSR. They formed a special club in Kharkiv and had their own literary organization "Western Ukraine." Skrypnyk [648]

645 even worked out a plan to recruit 8,000 teachers in Western
871 Ukraine to undertake Ukrainian work in the Donbas where the
186 Russian influence was strongest.
665

At the same time Skrypnyk was a determined Communist and he lost no opportunity for advancing the doctrines of the movement, even at the risk of doing violence to those Ukrainian ideals in which he believed. Thus, in 1928, he demanded a reformation of [815] the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been working feverishly in the same cause of Ukrainization but which, from his point of view, was insufficiently Marxist and Communist. In 1929 he won his point and the Academy was forced to elect to membership seven Communists who were chosen for their knowledge of the subject and not for their scientific ability. One of the seven was Skrypnyk himself, and among the others were O. Shlikhter and Zatonsky, the veteran from the earlier Ukrainian Communist movement. He soon promoted Shlikhter to a prominent position and refused to confirm the election of the non-Communist scholar, Krymsky, to the post of secretary. At the same time he forced the election of several Western Ukrainian members, so that for a few years the Academy did become a real centre to represent all Ukrainian scholarship.

Thus, in this complex process Skrypnyk played at times a curious and often contradictory role. He was at once the head of the Ukrainian movement and of the Communist movement in the country and he never realized or noticed the contradictory character of his actions, like Tito in the early years of his dealing with Moscow. Still, during his term of office the Ukrainian movement reached its height and seemed to be flourishing.

661 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in
558 Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist
[665] Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which
[814] had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

Postyshev's[1] object was the rerussification of the country, for it
191 had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many
626 of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

[204] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian news-
[871] papers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1 [1933 -- Analyst]
122

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in working out a complex organization after twenty years of near-exclusion from public administration, as well as to delay in securing the approval of Frank and Hitler. On April 13–15, 1940, however, representatives of Ukrainian groups were able to meet openly in Cracow as a steering committee, and in early June this body was formally recognized by Frank as the Ukrainian Central Committee.[13]

The accomplishment was a considerable one, although on paper the new body was extremely limited in its function which, in accordance with Hitler's injunction, was defined as the improvement of the welfare of the Ukrainian population of the Generalgouvernement. For this purpose, the committee was granted the right to prepare a budget covered in part by allocation of funds from the treasury of the Generalgouvernement and was allowed to direct a network of Aid Committees throughout the Ukrainian ethnographical area. Among the more important formal functions of the organization was the distribution of aid received from philanthropic agencies in the United States and from the International Red Cross.[14] As is usually the case with Ukrainian organizations working under the shadow of arbitrary foreign regimes, however, the formal aspect of its activity was not the most important. Officially, the committee had no control over education, but through its relations with the German authorities it was able to exert great influence on the selection of teachers and the provision of instructional facilities. Through its control of welfare funds, it was able to facilitate the attendance of numerous children at the Ukrainian schools.[15] Thus it rendered an important contribution to the reinvigoration of Ukrainian cultural life throughout the area.

This educational activity was carried on in close connection with the development of a Ukrainian press. The November conference, in addition to laying the groundwork for a central representative body, had founded (also under Dr. Kubiiovych's direction) a large-scale publishing agency which issued a series

[13] *Entryklopediia Ukrainoznavstvo* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), pp. 580–82.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Interview 9.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[214] of new school texts in Ukrainian, as well as popular editions of
204 Ukrainian works.[16] Still more important, it began the publication
668* of a newspaper which stood head and shoulders above any other Ukrainian publication in the German-dominated areas. *Krakivs'ki Visti* (Cracow News, as it was named after the Germans forbade the use of "Ukrainian" in the title) was one of the few papers which did not become a party organ but consistently served as a forum for a broad variety of Ukrainian viewpoints. Moreover, it was the only paper of this nature which possessed considerable material resources and attracted numerous contributions from writers of real talent. It was subjected to a censorship stricter than that inflicted on Ukrainian papers in Greater Germany (although much less severe than that of the papers later established under German rule farther east); nevertheless, it was able to reflect a considerable range of Ukrainian life and thought. As a result it is an invaluable witness of the events of the war years.

563 From the standpoint of Ukrainian national interests, the favor-
178 able policy of the Germans toward the group's cultural develop-
871 ment was particularly valuable in enabling it to regain some of the ground lost under the Polish repression. It would take a lengthy volume to detail the ways in which the Ukrainians were able to improve their situation in this respect during the early war years. A single statistic will suffice, however, to indicate the general nature of the gains made. In the school year 1942–43 there were 4,173 Ukrainian-language schools in the Generalgouvernement,[17] while on the corresponding territory before 1939 there were only 2,510—of which only 457 were exclusively Ukrainian.[18] The most marked advance took place in the Chelm area, where, in the autumn of 1939, a large influx of intellectuals fleeing Soviet rule in eastern Galicia brought a new vigor to the cultural life of the Ukrainian community.[19]

[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 2, 1942, p. 3.

[17] This refers of course to the enlarged Generalgouvernement, which included eastern Galicia. It is, however, indicative of an extension of the Ukrainian educational system which was if anything even more pronounced in the areas west of the San and the Bug.

[18] P. Isaiïv, article on Ukrainian schools in the Generalgouvernement during the Second World War, *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva,* p. 952; Buell, p. 279. The remainder were "mixed" schools which Buell says were given over to Polish teachers.

[19] Iurii (George) Tarkovych, "Zabuti Zemli" (Forgotten Lands), *Krakivs'ki Visti,* May 10, 1942, p. 1.

668* such as the head of the *oblast* (district) administration, Alexander Iatseniuk, the chief of the city administration, Pavlovs'kyi, and nearly all of his department heads.[50] A wide variety of nationalist organizations sprang up, including Prosvita, churches, and an active theater. Local artists appeared on Ukrainian programs permitted by the German-controlled broadcasting station. [871] Schools, including two *gimnaziias* and a pedagogical institute, were reopened, and a local school administration was established.[51]

[369] The population of the city sank to forty-two thousand (including seven thousand Poles and two thousand Russians) after the [438] deportation of the Jews. However, economic life was stimulated by the reopening of a sugar refinery and other industries; markets were reopened and private trade was encouraged.[52] One hundred [795] and seventy-nine physicians were present, a very high number in [883] proportion to the population.[53] An extremely active youth organization, known, like its counterparts in the West Ukraine, as the Sich, was formed; its activities included sports, choral singing, theatricals, and development of an orchestra.[54]

All of these organizations were under the control of nationalist Ukrainians, although the emphasis appeared to be on the formation of a Ukrainian territorial state which would include all persons, of whatever ethnic origin, living on Ukrainian soil. Thus one of the chief administrative officials, the head of the *raion* administration (i.e., the rural area outside the city) was a Pole, and the director of the economic section of the city administration was a Russian.[55] There appears to have been a large measure of cordiality between the local groups and the OUN representa-

[50] Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2; 454th Sicherungsdivision, Section VII, Report of October 4, 1941, NOKW 2129 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2129).

[51] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 1, 1941, p. 1; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24 and 26, 1941, pp. 2 and 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 25, 1942, p. 5; *Nastup*, September 6, 1941, p. 5.

[52] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1, based on *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Zhitomir), August 3, 1941; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[53] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24, 1941, p. 2; many, however, were apparently Jews who were temporarily spared because of their usefulness (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2).

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 2, and *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2.

1 [Zhitomir in the East Ukraine, 1941 -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Like the cooperative movement, popular education had long 727
been a cornerstone of Ukrainian nationalism, more important in 658
many respects than direct political action. In the conflict between 871
the national Communists in the Ukraine and the Stalinist central- 626
ists, it was especially the commissars of education, such as Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk, who had led the fight for Ukrainization of cultural life. Consequently it was natural that nationalist Ukrainians were determined to control the municipal departments of education under German occupation.

A major aim of the Reichskommissar and his henchmen, however, was to prevent the development of a cultured Ukrainian class, to convert the people into a race of submissive peasants. Rosenberg's vision of a university in Kiev went by the board, and the standard schooling for every Ukrainian child was set at four years.[35] Few material injuries were as deeply resented as this drastic curb on the opportunities for education. Since there were real shortages of materials, books, and teachers, the Ukrainians held to the hope that the restriction did not represent a permanent policy, even in the face of the closing of *gimnaziias* which had been reopened under the army administration through the efforts of the local population itself.[36]

To a limited extent the ban on secondary and higher educa- 874
tion was evaded by the extensive use made of a loophole in the 727
German regulations which allowed the reopening of technical 186
schools. The enormous loss of artisans and professionally trained persons incurred by the annihilation of the Jewish inhabitants compelled even the power-mad Nazis to recognize the need for training Ukrainians in such occupations. A large number of technical secondary schools, agricultural schools, and even institutes of higher education like medical faculties, were permitted. The extent to which these facilities were utilized by the Ukrainian population is indicated by the fact that the enrollment of the Kiev medical institute reached 2,000 in 1943 when the total population of the city was only 300,000, while Kherson, with a fifth

[35] Report of Rosenberg to Hitler, August 11, 1942, PS 42 (hereafter referred to as PS 42); PS 1198.

[36] E.g., in Berdichev (*Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3, quoting *Nova Doba* [Berdichev] for September 1), Zhitomir (Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941), and Belaia Tserkov' (*Nationalist*, December 20, 1941, p. 2).

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

their career and the assurance of a good income for the meagre appointments as an official. It is sufficient just to glance at the statistics of the Russian Empire in order to realize what a gigantic increase in the development of civilization was reached by the effort of the Russian intellectuals and specialists. Public instruction had developed in these fifty years to an enormous extent, infant mortality had fallen by more than 60 per cent, epidemics had experienced a great fall, as also cattle diseases, and the yield of the land had increased in the southern regions by more than 30 per cent. The improvement of the different breeds of horses and cattle was already evident on the eve of the Great War.

The backward country which Russia was supposed to be in the eyes of Westerners, including also the Ukraine, had in 1912 a big network of telephone lines in the country and especially in the region of Vinnitza, where the organization of the Zemstvos was especially active.

As to the river system, as we have already seen, it is very poor and is limited to four rivers, the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Boug, and the Donietz, of which the Dnieper alone is of any interest. The transport capacity of this one important river has been for ever spoiled by the rapids which make navigation impossible along a considerable distance. It is only after the building of the *Dnieprogues*, whose gigantic barrage had submerged the rapids along a distance of about one hundred kilometres, that an uninterrupted river route was established, linking the upper Dnieper with the Black Sea.

This river drains the greater part of the Ukraine and has left its mark upon the whole historic and economic evolution of the country.

Before the Great War the annual tonnage of transports

175 186 greatest Ukrainian poet), Mykola Kostomarov, historian, Panteleimon Kulish, historian and poet, Mykola Hulak, and others, took part in this organisation.

In the declarations of this society the idea of an independent Ukrainian democratic republic was promulgated: "And Ukraine will resurrect from her grave ... And Ukraine will be an independent republic" (*The Books of the Being of the Ukrainian Nation*, the work of the Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius).

The Russian Government punished the members of this society severely and acted rigorously against Ukrainian political and cultural regeneration.

[191] In 1863 the Russian Minister Valuyev declared that "the Ukrainian language did not exist, does not exist and cannot exist." In 1876, by a secret order of the Tsar, the printing and circulation of Ukrainian books, periodicals etc. in the Russian Empire was prohibited. Even the Bible in Ukrainian was forbidden. Ukrainian could not be tought in schools. The Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire was forbidden until 1905. Only the revolution of 1917 made the introduction of Ukrainian in schools possible. This prohibition of the living language of a considerable nation, the instrument of its culture, had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people and is a feature absolutely unique in universal history.

[871] 175 517 The prohibition of the Ukrainian language in the schools and in the press hindered the development of education in Ukraine. The statistics show that the number of schools and the level of education in Ukraine were higher in the 18th century than in the 19th*). On the other hand, the Russian schools separated the educated classes of the Ukrainian nation from their nationality, and put the intelligentsia of Ukrainian origin into the service of Russian culture. Thus, besides the economic exploitation to the advantage of the Russian Empire, Ukraine was deprived of her best intellectual forces which were drowned in the 'Russian Sea'. We can quote here only some names of prominent Ukrainians who, by virtue of circumstances, helped to create the Russian civilisation, and gave their talents for the increase of the Russian Empire: Archbishop Theophan Prokopovych, the deputy of the Patriarch of Moscow Stephan Javorsky, Bishop Dmytro Rostovsky — were prominent Ukrainian scholars of the time of Tsar Peter I. who were forced

*) Thus there were in 1748 in four regiments (Ukraine had a military Cossack administration) of the Hetmanate (for three regiments the figures are missing) 866 elementary schools, i. e., one school for 1000 inhabitants. From this, little or almost nothing remained in the 19th century.

the industrialisation of Russia. The production of the heavy industries in Ukraine gave in 1931 63% of the whole output of coal, 83% of the production of coke and 77% of iron ore of the USSR (*Izvestia:* Moscow, March 1, 1932). "The production of the Ukrainian plants solves the entire problem of metals in the whole Soviet Union" — the Kharkov *Communist* wrote on October 13, 1931. With these demands on the Ukrainian national economy Moscow placed the workers of Ukraine in the worst conditions. In the wage index the Ukrainian metal workers stood in 1931 in the 11th place, the miners in the 19th, the coke workers in the 27th place (*Izvestia:* Moscow, February 1, 1932). The conditions of work, dwelling, social insurance and cultural service of the workers in Ukraine were much worse than in Russia. 185 [433] [465]

The forced collectivisation of the Ukrainian agriculture, started in 1929/30, caused horrible devastation among the Ukrainian peasants. Not less than 200,000 farms were destroyed, their property was taken into the collective farms (*Communist*, Kharkov, December 21, 1934). The owners of these farms, the so-called 'kulaks', were deported together with their families into the North of Russia, where they mostly died of hunger and disease caused by forced labour. If one counts a normal Ukrainian peasant family at least 6 persons the number of those ruined and destroyed by this collectivisation reached 1,200,000 persons. In reality the number of the victims of Stalin's 'General Line' was much greater. 474 241 661 565

This 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' has not only taken the lives of millions of Ukrainian farmers: it has destroyed the best elements among the peasants. These peasants were no 'exploiters': they were able farmers who tilled their land in the sweat of their brows and produced grain for their families and for the market. Due to this absurd and cruel 'liquidation of the kulaks' the shortages in the supply of agricultural products grew enormously.

Simultaneously with the 'General Line' the centralisation in Ukraine to Moscow's advantage was tightened: in the administration, in both economy and cultural work. In November 1929, the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine was abolished and Ukrainian agriculture was subordinated directly to Moscow. The autonomy of Ukraine in the field of education was considerably restricted; in 1931 the separate Commissariat of the Interior in Ukraine was abolished; in 1933 the Commissariat of Justice was subordinated to Moscow, etc. 871 [241]

According to the directives from Moscow the Ukrainian culture had to be 'national in form, Communist in content'. Therefore

871 every teacher in the schools in Ukraine had orders to spread Com-
65 munist propaganda, to fight the appearance of national discontent
with the Russian rule by every means, and was obliged to insult the
[814] struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation. In schools, Ukrai-
nian history was falsely interpreted as well as in literature and in
films. For instance, clinging to the tradition taken from Tsarist
Russia, the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa who at the begin-
ning of the 18th century wanted to free Ukraine from Muscovite
dependence, has in Soviet historiography the epithet of a 'traitor'
and 'reactionary'. But Tsar Peter I. and Tsar Ivan the Terrible,
are glorified by Soviet school and science as 'progressive demo-
cratic rulers'.

659 The Ukrainian religious life under the régime of Soviet Russian
661 occupation had to suffer from special persecutions. In 1921, in
Soviet Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Autocephal Church,
independent of the Moscow Patriarch, was organised. This Church,
headed by its idealistic leaders, the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky,
Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier of the Government of the
Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1918—19 and others, completed
a great task for the cultural and moral improvement of the Ukrai-
nian nation. Moscow attempted to destroy the strong organisation
of the Ukrainian Autocephal Church with the help of its agents, but
did not succeed in this. Then the Soviet Government ruined by
bloody repressions the Ukrainian Church after having destroyed
its entire hierarchy and masses of its followers (1929).

661 In connection with the 'General Line' which had placed unbear-
517 able burdens on Ukrainian economy, a mass discontent against
Moscow increased among the Ukrainians. The ruthless economic
815 exploitation and political oppression by Russia caused, among the
Ukrainian people, a permanent oppositon which appeared in vari-
ous forms. Therefore, the Moscow Government decided to terrorise
the Ukrainian intelligentsia which bore the brunt of the political
efforts of the Ukrainian nation. For this purpose a number of trials
against the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian science
and social life were arranged; the case of the Union for the Libera-
tion of Ukraine with the participation of the prominent member of
the Ukrainian Academy of Science, Serhy Yefremov, Volodymyr
Chekhivsky, former Premier, Professor Osyp Hermayze and
others in Kharkov, in spring 1930. Thousands of innocent people,
especially students, perished in the prisoners' cells of the GPU with-
out any trial. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Academy of Science
was exposed to repressions. In place of the imprisoned or expelled
members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, the Communists
appointed their own people though without scientific merits,
but politically faithful to Moscow.

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and 563
disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the 661
Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. [871]
In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories, the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet [665]
and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre (UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on 727
the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the 474
Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form
of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative 563
Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz)*. The Ukrainian co-operative movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Co-operation *(Maslosoyuz)*, supplied dairy products, not only for the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in 563
the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

which was led by General Kornilov, later by Denikin. In the summer of 1918 the Kuban Region fell into the hands of the Russian Volunteer Army. The leaders of this army wished to make the Kuban Region a base for the restoration of Tsarist Russia. Among the population of the Kuban Region and in the State Council a strong opposition to the Russian Volunteers arose. But Russian influence was stronger: under the pressure of Denikin's army an alliance of the Cossack territories — the Don, Kuban and Terek regions — for the fight against the Russian Communists was formed at the end of 1918. Against those Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks who defended their independence the Russian Volunteers used terroristic methods: President of the Kuban State Council Mykola Ryabovol was murdered in June 1919 in Rostov, prominent members of the State Council were arrested and hanged. This terror by the Russian 'Whites' was the reason that the Kuban Cossacks left the front against the Russian Red Army and repealed the alliance with the Russian Volunteers. At the beginning of 1920 the Kuban State Council according to the will of the population took the Government of the Kuban into its hands. Vasyl Ivanys was appointed Premier. The Kuban leaders wished to get rid of the protectorate of the Russian Volunteers and to continue the struggle against the Soviet Russian Army in alliance with Ukraine and the peoples of the Caucasus. But in April 1920, under pressure of the Soviet Russian Army, the Kuban Government was forced to leave its territory and to move to Crimea, where at that time the Volunteers' Army of General Wrangel was. Being pressed between two forces, both of which fought for domination in Russia, the 'Red' and the 'White' Russians, the Ukrainian Kuban Government could not attain any agreement with them and went abroad. 669

The Kuban Region was occupied by the Russian Red Army. Soviet Russia refused recognition of the Ukrainian nationality in the Kuban Region for a long time, and carried on a Russification line through the school and press. Only on August 30, 1929, the Commissariat of Education in Moscow decided that the literary language of the Ukrainians inside the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Republic was the language of Ukraine. 656 191

But even after this the Russian Communist bureaucracy hindered the development of schools among the Ukrainians in the RSFSR. In December 1933, in the Kuban Region and on other territories of the RSFSR, with a Ukrainian population of 7 millions, all Ukrainian schools, press etc. were abolished by order from Moscow. During the collectivisation and the famine of 1932—33 the population of the Kuban Region had enormous losses. Attempts on a rising [891] 000

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The high percentage of literates in Novorossiya (Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav) is due to the presence of German colonists. In ten Great-Russian Governments (Pskov, Penza, Simbirsk, Tambov, Smolensk, Orel, Kaluga, Riazan, Tula, and Nijni Novgorod) there are 16,302,000 inhabitants, of whom 16·9 per cent. can read and write. Since the census of 1897, education in the Ukraine has been rapidly spreading, thanks chiefly to the *zemstvos*, who supported about half the existing schools. In the Government of Poltava the *zemstvos* spent in 1900 as much as 20 per cent. of their income on education. According to the statistics of Yasnopolski, who bases his calculations on the reports of the Central Statistical Committee in Petrograd, and brings his figures down to 1910, the percentage of literates is as follows: Taurida, 38 per cent.; Kherson, 35; Yekaterinoslav, 29; Chernigov, 25; Kiev, 24; Kharkov, 23; Poltava, 23; Volhynia, 23; Podolia, 20.

Within the territories of the nine Governments which form the Ukraine, there are three universities and several higher educational institutions in Odessa, in Kiev, and in Kharkov. The language and administration are Russian, though Kiev has Chairs of Ukrainian Language and History, recently instituted; and they all gather, especially at Kiev, a fair number of Ukrainian scholars. The three university towns form centres round which other schools are grouped. Kiev is the centre for the South-west Territory, i. e. the Governments of Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia; Odessa is the centre for Novorossiya, i. e. the Governments of Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav; and Kharkov is the centre for Malorossiya, i. e. the Governments of Chernigov, Poltava, and Kharkov. On the whole, education is most advanced in Novorossiya, and Odessa has the greatest number of schools (420), secondary and primary. The Government of Kharkov is very poor in schools, though Kharkov itself possesses about 111; next come the Governments of Podolia, Poltava, and Volhynia.

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those the minorities possessed; and the necessity for knowing Russian would be heightened by drawing the minorities into the industrial, commercial and political life of the country as a whole. Meanwhile, literacy in the minority languages would facilitate the spread of communist doctrines stressing the international solidarity of the working-class against capitalism. To achieve unity while allowing the free use of minority languages might be the long — and perhaps very dangerous — way around, but Lenin believed it would be the only effective way in a backward, heterogeneous country like Russia.

The Soviet leaders were so certain that eventual lingustic uniformity could be attained only through temporary diversity that they went further in emphasizing minority languages than any state has ever gone: they made vigorous attempts to foster the actual use of the minority languages, to "nationalize" (i.e., "Ukrainize," "Armenianize," "Tartarize") political organizations, administrative apparatus, factory managements, trade-unions, military units, newspapers, books, theatres and schools, among the minorities. In their desire to retreat from the old Imperial policy of Russification, they leaned over so far backward that they introduced the element of compulsion in the opposite direction: they forced the national minorities and the Russians living among them to use the local languages in political, economic and cultural life, stopping short only at the threshold of the individual's private world. The ultimate effect of this policy upon the increase or decrease of nationalism among the minorities is not yet apparent, and the fate of such nationalism may hinge upon such factors as economic prosperity, political liberty and developments in the field of international relations; but the process of nationalizing the political, economic and cultural life of the minorities is an experiment which deserves more attention from the non-Soviet political and scholarly world than it has received.

In the field of education, the Soviet régime has followed a four-fold policy: first to establish a school system embracing all children; secondly, to promote the spread of communist doctrines by integrating them into the curriculum; thirdly, to nationalize the school system by introducing the languages of the minorities as the languages of instruction in schools attended by children of the minorities; and, fourthly, to pave the way for eventual assimilation by providing for the study of Russian as a separate subject in the schools of the minorities. The first two aspects of this policy are complex subjects, each of which deserves a separate study. The present discussion will therefore treat only of the linguistic phases of the Soviet educational policy: the nationalization of education — that is, the use of minority

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languages as the media of instruction; and the study of Russian as a separate subject.

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In setting out to nationalize education, the Soviet régime has encountered many obstacles: Russian nationalists — and there were some even among the Communists — opposed the policy; text-books and teachers were scarce; and the more backward minorities did not even possess a written language of their own. As the exigencies of space prevent the investigation of all the problems encountered in the nationalization of education, this study will be limited to examining the policy as applied in the Ukraine; that is, to the Ukrainians and to the other minorities — Poles, Jews, Germans and others — living among them. The Ukrainians, it may be noted, are the largest minority in the Soviet Union; they are the most significant from the point of view of current international relations; and the difficulties encountered by the nationalization policy in the Ukraine were sufficiently complex to provide some insight into the policy as a whole.

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Among the Ukrainians, as among the other minorities, the nationalization of education has stemmed from the program on the national question which Lenin formulated before the overthrow of the Tsarist régime. This program, intended to overcome minority nationalism, had to assign a conspicuous place to the language question. To many Ukrainians the treatment of their language by the Imperial government appeared even more onerous than the political oppression which was meted out to Russians and Ukrainians alike. The Ukrainian language was regarded by the government as an uncouth dialect of the Russian language; it was harried from the schools; and it was badgered throughout the literary, scholarly and theatrical worlds. The resulting Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin believed, was a threat to the international unity of the Ukrainian and Russian masses, a unity he regarded as essential for the achievement of socialism; and this Ukrainian nationalism would have to be met with the promise of linguistic equality for the Ukrainians and for all other nationalities. This conception was written into the program on the national question adopted by the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party in 1913, a program which was first intended to apply to a period of "capitalist democracy" but was retained after the establishment of the Soviet government in 1917. The first point in the program stated: "Insofar as national peace is possible in a capitalist society, which is based on exploitation, profits and wrangling, such peace is obtainable only by means of a thoroughly, consistently democratic, republican governmental structure, guaranteeing complete equality to all nations and languages, and by the inclusion in the con-

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stitution of a basic law nullifying every kind of privilege of one nation and every kind of violation of the right of the national minorities."[2] 871 191 186 829

While defending this point in the program, Lenin explained that he did not desire to turn Russia into a "Babelesque confusion" in which one national group could not communicate with another; and he thought that sooner or later the minorities of Russia would become assimilated, probably through adopting the Russian language he cherished so highly and which he expected would be taught as a subject in the schools.[3] However, Lenin argued, such assimilation could be achieved not by compulsion, not by the Tsarist method of repression, but by the natural process of commercial and industrial development and intercourse. To force the minorities to study the Russian language by "the use of the stick" merely estranged them and turned them against that language. If, on the other hand, the minorities were allowed to use their own language in education, they would willingly accept the study of Russian also and would, as in America, voluntarily use it because of its advantage in economic intercourse. Hence, wherever minorities lived compactly, their languages would be used as the medium of instruction in the schools; and where members of minorities were isolated among other nationalities, they would be given the opportunity to study the language of their nationality.

Although the Provisional Government, ushered in by the February Revolution in 1917, intended to alter the policy of Russification and proclaimed linguistic freedom for the minorities, it did not succeed in overcoming the hostility of the minority nationalists who were then rapidly extending their influence among the peasantry. The Provisional Government, for example, wrangled with the Ukrainian nationalists not only on the question of political autonomy, but also on the expediency of Ukrainizing some of the army units; and in the Ukraine itself the former Tsarist officials remaining at their posts obstructed the Ukrainization of the school system. As the discontent of the peasantry with the land policy of the Provisional Government fed the flames of Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin was more than ever resolved to overcome minority hostility by, among other things, establishing linguistic equality.

After the October Revolution had put the Bolsheviks in control, the Soviet régime introduced into the schools the policy of national

[2] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach i Rešenijach S'ezdov, Konferencii i Plenumov Tz.K., 1898–1932* (Moscow, 1933), I, 238–240.

[3] For the views of Lenin contained in this paragraph, see Lenin, V. I., *Sočinenija* (Moscow, 1935), XVI, pp. 509, 551–554, 595–596; XVII, pp. 66, 89, 114–115, 133, 139–154, 178–181, 361.

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languages as the medium of instruction. Lenin stigmatized as "Great-Russian Chauvinists," those people in the Commissariat of Education who favored teaching only in the Russian language; and referring specifically to the Ukrainians in a resolution he wrote for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, he stated that if the Bolsheviks wanted to overcome the hostility of the Ukrainian peasants (a hostility quite clearly evident during the Civil War from 1918 to 1920), the Ukrainian language could not be pushed into the background of either educational or political life.[4] Stalin argued that education in the minority languages would facilitate the raising of the cultural level of the minorities to that of the Russians and would thereby forge bonds of union between them.[5] The educational policy for the minorities, he stated, must have it as its aim: "to develop national culture; to build up a wide network of courses and schools for both general education and vocational and technical training, teaching in the native languages, for the purpose of training Soviet, party, trade-union and economic cadres from among the native people."[6] These views of Lenin and Stalin were incorporated into party resolutions, adopted in the decade after 1919, on education and on national policy generally.[7]

It was, of course, much easier to make speeches and pass resolutions than to realize the aims set forth therein. Even in the relatively advanced Ukraine it promised to be very difficult to establish a "wide network" of schools giving instruction in the national languages. The heritage of buildings, school supplies and qualified teachers bequeathed by Tsarism was meager in comparison with the needs of a régime aspiring to universal education: in the Kiev Educational District, for example, only twenty-two of every thousand people attended school in 1913.[8] Educational facilities, moreover, were reduced by the disastrous Civil War, during which constant fighting, famine, typhus, cholera, economic collapse and bankruptcy levied a high tax on the educational system; and the lack of funds and personnel long hampered its recuperation.[9] By 1924 the system approached its status

[4] *Ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 155, 552–554.

[5] J. Stalin, *Stati i Reči ob Ukraine* (Kiev, 1936), pp. 111–112, 194–195.

[6] J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (New York, 1935), p. 208.

[7] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach . . .* I, pp. 155, 637.

[8] The Kiev Educational District comprised the provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Podolia, Volhynia and Chernigov. The number of pupils is from Ministerstvo Narodnogo Prosvieshcheniia, *Vsepodanneiši Otčet, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1915), p. 196. The estimate of the population is from Centralny Statističeski Komitet, *Ežegodnik Rossii, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 33–59.

[9] For the condition of the educational system up to 1924, see *Urkainska Socialistična Radianska Respublika. Zbirnik Spravozdan Narodnich Komisarijativ i centralnich ustanov U.S.R.R. ta Upolnivaženich Narodnich Komisarijativ R.S.F.S.R. 5-mu Vseukrainskomu Z'izdovi Rad Ukraini. Otčet Narodnogo Komisariati Osviti U.S.R.R. za 1920 rik* (*Kharkov*,

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under Tsarism, but a long road had to be travelled before all children would have an opportunity to attend schools. Buildings would have to be constructed, teachers trained, text-books written and published. The Ukrainian government first endeavored to provide "elementary" or four-year schools for all children from eight to twelve years of age, then to expand these schools into "incomplete middle" or seven-year schools, and finally to replace these with "complete middle" or ten-year schools; and, in the meanwhile, the government established technical schools and higher educational institutions to train engineers, doctors, actors and other types of "socialist cadres." This quantitative growth of the school system was matched by its growth qualitatively, as measured from the point of view of the language policy. In spite of the shortages of teachers knowing Ukrainian and the languages of the other minorities,[2] the almost complete absence of text-books in these languages, and the appearance of considerable opposition on the part of political leaders, of teachers and even of parents, the Russian language was gradually replaced as the medium of instruction by the other languages.

As early as March 1919 an order of the Commissariat of Education of the newly re-established Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic declared that the Russification policy was abrogated; that the Commissariat would aid in the development of the long-repressed Ukrainian language; and that "in view of the elimination of a governmental language as such, and of the declaration that all local languages are equal, the Commissariat of Education gives the local population the right to determine in which language teaching must be carried on in the schools, safeguarding simultaneously the interests of [other] national groups."[10] Wherever the language of instruction remained Russian, a second language — also chosen by the local population itself — was to be taught as a special subject. In September 1920 this provisional order was strengthened by a law of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. The law instructed the Commissariat of Education to draw up a plan for schools of all grades and categories with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.[11] Ukrainian was to be studied as an obligatory subject in all teacher-training institutions and was to be used as the language of instruction in some of them. The law also ordered the Government Publishing House to issue "a sufficient quantity of text-books as well as *belles-lettres* and other publications in the Ukrainian language."

1921), pp. 3–6; *Zbirnik Uzakonen ta Rosporiadžen Robitničo-Seljanskogo Urjady Ukraini za 1924 rik*, 1924, part 1, sec. 271, pp. 800–803; Sojuz Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R., *Pjatyysesojuznyi S'ezd Sojuza Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R. Stenografičeski Otčet* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 172–174. [10] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1919, sec. 260, p. 347.

[11] *Ibid.*, 1920, part 1, sec. 509, pp. 712–713.

[2] [Prior to 1924 -- Analysis]

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●871 191 256 During 1923 and 1924 several laws designed to provide elementary education for all children specified that this education was to be conducted in Ukrainian where that nationality predominated, and in the languages of the "national minorities" (minorities within the Ukrainian nationality — Poles, Germans, Jews, Czechs and so forth) wherever these minorities formed compact groups.[12] The laws outlined a series of practical measures to make this rule effective: teachers knowing Ukrainian were to be assigned to schools in which they were needed; text-books and other reading materials in Ukrainian were to be increased; pedagogical schools and courses were to be transferred to Ukrainian; pedagogical journals were to be Ukrainized; and all classes for teaching illiterates and semi-literates, except those for the non-Ukrainian minorities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian. Provision was also made for the obligatory study of Ukrainian as a separate subject in all schools being conducted in other languages.

These laws gave impetus to the process of Ukrainizing the "general" (elementary, incomplete middle and middle) schools; and the process was aided by the presence of many nationalists who had formerly opposed the Soviet régime but who had been pardoned and put to work in the Commissariat of Education. In 1923, according to a newspaper report, 47 percent of the general schools had been Ukrainized, while plans had been made to provide the Ukrainian pupils with Ukrainian schools by 1925.[13] During the years from 1923 to 1925 the realization of these plans was proceeding most effectively in the rural areas, where the largest proportion of the Ukrainian population was to be found. In the province of Kharkov, for example, 20 percent of the general schools in the school year 1923–24 were still using Russian and 49 percent were "mixed schools" — schools using Russian in some classes and Ukrainian in others; but 69 percent of the schools in the city of Kharkov were still using Russian exclusively.[14] A picture of the manifold difficulties encountered in this transitional period was presented by the district of Krolevetski in the province of Chernigov.[15] In 1924 instruction in the elementary schools was sup-
[875] posed to be given in Ukrainian; but a majority of the teachers hardly knew the language, and they actually used a jumble of Ukrainian and Russian. In the middle schools the situation was worse: a majority of the teachers not only did not know Ukrainian, but considered themselves exempt from learning it because they had been former

[12] *Ibid.*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–899; 1924, part 1, sec. 272, p. 801; 1924, part 1, sec. 300, pp. 932–933.

[13] *Visti* (organ of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Executive Committee), Oct. 28, 1923.

[14] *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1923; see also *ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1924. [15] *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1924.

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teachers in the gymnasium and therefore possessed "higher qualifications"; and these teachers showed "active or passive resistance" to Ukrainization. In this district, as in many others, the complaint was made that the schools lacked Ukrainian text-books and other such reading materials.[16]

These difficulties were gradually being overcome. By 1924 the publication of text-books and children's literature in Russian had almost ceased in the Ukraine, and the publishing houses were concentrating on Ukrainian materials.[17] Ukrainian was being taught in all pedagogical schools and teacher-training courses.[18] The results of this step were apparent in 1925. In Chernigov province, for example, 67 percent of the teachers had mastered Ukrainian, and the proportion of Ukrainian schools — which then stood at 54 percent — was being raised as rapidly as the teachers who had recently learned Ukrainian could be transferred to the districts where they were needed.[19]

During 1925 and 1926 the whole process of Ukrainization was raised to the status of a "high-pressure (*udarnaja*) campaign." Attention was directed even to the *crèches* because, as one writer explained, the early years of a child's life are of the utmost significance in his linguistic development.[20] But a report from Chernigov in 1926 stated that the teachers were agitating among the peasantry against the Ukrainization of the schools; they were "striving with all their forces to discredit the Ukrainian language, to arouse the peasants to adopt resolutions against Ukrainizing the schools, and so on."[21] This was denied by the school officials in the region from which the report emanated,[22] but similar items of news came from other regions. One writer cited a specific teacher in the Don Basin: although she was supposed to teach the Ukrainian language as a separate subject, she could hardly speak it and she referred to it as "a terribly ugly and crude language."[23] Another reporter, again from Chernigov, produced evidence to illustrate the hostility of both parents and teachers: because of this hostility a region with an overwhelmingly Ukrainian population contained thirty-five Russian schools, one Ukrainian and one mixed school.[24]

[16] See *ibid.*, Mar. 4, 1924, Mar. 5, 1924.

[17] *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1924. [18] *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1923.

[19] *Kommunist* (organ of the Central Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine), Mar. 21, 1925.

[20] *Proletarska Pravda* (organ of the Kiev Regional Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, of the Kiev Regional Executive Committee and of the Kiev Regional Trade-Union Council), Aug. 26, 1926.

[21] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926. [22] *Ibid.*, July 25, 1926.

[23] *Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1926. [24] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926.

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However, the Ukrainization of education slowly approached its goal. It is impossible to determine the actual number of Ukrainian children studying in Ukrainian schools, for the school statistics contained only the total number of children studying in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish and other schools; and while some Ukrainian children studied in non-Ukrainian schools, many non-Ukrainian children studied in Ukrainian schools. However, an approximate idea of the extent of Ukrainization can be gained by comparing the proportion of school children in Ukrainian schools with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. According to the school census of December, 1927, ten years after the Bolshevik Revolution, 75.8 percent of all pupils in elementary schools were in schools conducted entirely in Ukrainian; 6.9 percent were in schools in which some classes were conducted in Ukrainian and some in other languages; and 10.6 per cent were in Russian schools.[25] As the Ukrainians in 1927 were estimated at 80.1 percent of the total population and the Russians at 9.2 percent, the elementary schools might be considered to be nearing the goal of Ukrainization. The seven-year schools, then the predominant type of middle schools, lagged behind the elementary schools because they were relatively more numerous in the Russianized cities; of the pupils in these schools, 60.7 per cent were in Ukrainian schools, 14.7 percent in mixed schools and 15.5 per cent in Russian schools.

In some places, particularly in some cities, the Ukrainization policy overshot its mark. Whereas the Ukrainian population of Kiev was estimated at 41.1 percent of the total population in 1927, 49.8 percent of its school children were attending Ukrainian schools, 5.9 percent mixed schools and 30.6 percent Russian schools.[26] The proportion of pupils in Ukrainian schools was also greater than the proportion of the Ukrainian population in Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk. This situation, as shall be noted below, was regarded unfavorably by some writers in the newspapers, but the charges of "over-Ukrainization" received little attention from the government until after 1933. During the period from 1923 to 1933 the government was concentrating its efforts upon suppressing Russian nationalism and upon providing the Ukrainian and other non-Russian nationalities with schools conducted in their own languages.

In this period much attention was also given to the Ukrainization of technical and higher educational institutions, but in these institutions the lack of teachers knowing Ukrainian, of text-books and of good-will was an even greater handicap than in the Ukrainization of

[25] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini na 15 Grudnja 1927 (Peperedni Pidsumki Škilnogo Perepisy)*, Kharkov, 1928, pp. 20–21. [26] *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

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At this time, when the whole problem of Ukrainizing the highly Russianized Don Basin and other industrial regions in the Ukraine was being attacked, the failure to Ukrainize the school system was frequently mentioned.[41] Even a directive of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in January 1930, stated that in the industrial regions only the schools for general education and for extirpating illiteracy had been Ukrainized; and the directive ordered the Commissariat of Education to examine the faculty members of the technical and higher schools on their knowledge of Ukrainian, and to take steps to insure that these people possessed such a knowledge.[42]

During 1930 and 1931 the reports on the Ukrainization of technical and higher schools were limited largely to items of "self-criticism" which pointed out obstacles or found fault with specific institutions and individuals. The professors in the Medical Institute in Kharkov now knew Ukrainian, but the process of Ukrainization was being retarded by the lack of Ukrainian text-books.[43] In the Lisenko Theatrical Institute in Kiev the classes were conducted in Ukrainian, but the reporter complained that extra-class work was still being carried on in Russian.[44] An investigation of the Institute of Consumer Coöperation and of the Veterinary Institute revealed that the majority of the students still spoke Russian among themselves and that two professors of the former institution refused to instruct their classes in Ukrainian.[45] Both professors and students in the Construction Institute and the Chemical Institute were reported to be hostile to the use of Ukrainian: one of the professors had been discharged for this reason, and the students had declared Ukrainization to be proper only for the middle schools. Because the library lacked Ukrainian books and only three of the hundred and twenty-two journals received were in Ukrainian, the administration of the Chemical Institute was upbraided for opposition to Ukrainization.[46] The Textile and Mining Institutes were also cited as examples of the failure to Ukrainize properly.[47]

The years up to 1933 constituted the high-pressure period of Ukrainization; after 1933 the government concentrated its attention chiefly upon suppressing the tendency to "over-Ukrainize," where such a tendency was discernible, and upon rectifying the results of this tendency which had already appeared. This was not a new pol-

[41] E. g., *Komsomolec Ukraini*, May 16, 1929, June 26, 1929.
[42] *Proletari*, Jan. 3, 1930. [43] *Ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1930.
[44] *Proletarska Pravda*, Sept. 22, 1931. [45] *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1931.
[46] *Ibid.*, June 30, 1931. [47] *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1931.

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icy; it was, rather, a change of emphasis from one part of the linguistic policy to another. Ukrainian schools for Ukrainian children remained, but now the stress was placed upon schools for the national minorities within the Ukrainian majority, and particularly for the Russian inhabitants of the Ukraine.

The Ukrainization of education, it has been noted, was not intended to apply to schools in areas where there were members of non-Ukrainian nationalities living compactly. On the contrary, the educational policy anticipated that every child should have an opportunity to study in his or her mother tongue. This was stated in all of the important legislation on the languages in the school system, beginning with the preliminary order of the Commissariat of Education in 1919.[48] A law of 1924 had altered the rule on the required size of classes, in order to facilitate the establishment of small schools serving scattered groups of the minority peoples.[49] Other laws and directives in the period from 1924 to 1928 contained clauses ordering increased funds for general and technical education for the minorities, the preparation of teachers for their schools and the publication of textbooks in their languages.[50] Steps were frequently taken by the Commissariat of Education to expand the network of schools serving these peoples.[51] The Commissariat contained a special Council of National Minorities, consisting of Jewish, Latvian, German, Polish, Bulgarian, Czech and Moldavian bureaus; and the provincial departments of education had inspectors for minority education, sometimes separate inspectors for German, Jewish, Polish or Czech schools.[52] Finally, the Communist Party itself, through its directives and the speeches of its leaders in the period from 1924 to 1928, constantly warned that during the process of Ukrainization the interests of the minorities were to be protected.[53]

Efforts to provide schools for the minorities received much publicity between 1924 and 1928. Only a few reports can be cited. In

[48] See especially *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1919, sec. 260, p. 347; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, pp. 626–627. See above pp. 129–130.

[49] *Ibid.*, 1924, part 1, sec. 300, p. 933.

[50] E. g. *Visti*, Dec. 10, 1924; *Kommunist*, July 3, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, Apr. 8, 1928.

[51] E.g. *Visti*, Mar. 9, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, July 23, 1927.

[52] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1925, part 1, sec. 218, p. 587; 1925, part 1, sec. 285, p. 10; 1926, part 1, sec. 106, p. 221.

[53] E.g. the directive of the Central Committee of the Party in *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925; the resolution of the Kiev Regional Party Committee in *Proletarska Pravda*, July 15, 1926; the speech of Liubchenko (chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars) in *ibid.*, May 11, 1926; speeches of Kaganovich (secretary of the Central Committee of the Party) and of Skripnik (Commissar of Education) and the resolution of the 10th Congress of the Party in *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii (Bil'shikiv) Ukraini, 20–29 Listopada 1927 p. Stenografičnii zvit* (Kharkov, 1928), pp. 126, 444, 574; the resolution of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade-Unions in *Proletarska Pravda*, Apr. 7, 1928.

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Chernigov the school assigned to the Jewish language — which in the Soviet Union means Yiddish rather than Hebrew — was using that language even before the schools for Ukrainian children were using Ukrainian.[54] A report from Kiev described a campaign undertaken to draw Polish students into the Polish Pedagogical Institute, into the Polish departments of the technical schools, and into other Polish educational units.[55] In the meanwhile, the Jewish Pedagogical Institute in Kiev was being moved into a new building provided by the Commissariat of Education, and elementary schools were being established for Czechs and Assyrians.[56] Dnepropetrovsk reported that its German school was being enlarged.[57] The city of Kharkov found it could not open a school for Koreans (!) because no teachers were available, and the Kharkov City Committee of the Party asked the Vladivostok City Committee and the Communist University of the Toiling East to supply a few Korean teachers.[58]

No evidence that Kharkov ever succeeded in opening a Korean school has come into the hands of the author; but in 1926 the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. complimented the Ukrainian Republic on its attention to the educational needs of the minorities; and the school statistics for 1927 indicated that a considerable number of children of the minorities were studying in their own languages. Of all the pupils in general (four and seven year) schools, 2.9 percent studied in Jewish schools; 1.4 percent in German schools; 0.9 percent in Polish schools and 0.8 percent in schools using other minority languages: Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Tartar, Swedish, Greek, Assyrian and Moldavian.[59] Schools using both Ukrainian or Russian and some other language or languages embraced 2.1 percent of all the pupils. Since Jews composed 5.4 percent of the total population, Poles 1.6 percent, Germans 1.4 percent and other minorities 2.1 percent, it is evident that many of the children of the smaller nationalities went to Ukrainian or Russian schools. This fact can probably be accounted for in part by the lack of buildings and teachers, by the scattered distribution of the smaller minorities and by the indifference of the smaller nationalities themselves. The Jews, for example, have tended to assimilate into the Russian nationality in the large cities and into the Ukrainian nationality in the smaller towns and villages. The younger generation of Jews favor Russian or Ukrainian as their social language, and many Jewish parents prefer to put their

[54] *Visti*, Oct. 2, 1924.
[55] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 24, 1926.
[56] *Ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1926.
[57] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1926.
[58] *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925.
[59] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–25.

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● 871 563 656 children into Russian or Ukrainian schools. One reporter in 1933 gave evidence to show that some Jewish parents had desired their children to attend non-Jewish schools, but that pressure had been brought to bear upon them by zealous officials to send their children to the Jewish schools newly constructed for them.[60]

As an illustration of the attitude of the children themselves, an experience of the author may be pertinent. Upon visiting a Jewish school in Kiev, he observed that some of the pupils were carrying Russian text-books; and to the enquiry as to whether no Yiddish books existed for those subjects, several pupils replied: "Oh, yes; but we like to read the Russian texts better than the Yiddish." The school happened to be located in the old Jewish section of Kiev, and undoubtedly the children were sent to this school either because they spoke Yiddish at home (but not amongst themselves) or because of the superior facilities offered by a new institution; and if they had been able to decide for themselves, it is possible that many of these children would have chosen to attend Russian or even Ukrainian [191] schools. Russian is the language of a culture stronger than the secular non-Hebrew culture conveyed by the Yiddish language in the Soviet Union; Russian is also the language spoken in Moscow and generally throughout the U.S.S.R.; and all those pupils, and parents, too, who ever expect to move freely about the Union must have complete mastery of the Russian language. What is true of the Jews is also true of the Poles, Germans, Czechs and others.

874 563 191 That the children of the minorities had to master the Russian and Ukrainian languages if they desired to continue their education on the higher levels is indicated by the nature of the technical and higher educational institutions in the Ukraine. It was impossible to set up an electrical engineering institute for a handful of Poles or Assyrians, or to establish every type of higher educational institution for the Jews. Hence, as the statistics for 1927 indicated, most of the technical and higher educational institutions taught in Ukrainian, Russian or a mixture of the two. Of the students in the lower technical schools (technical schools other than technicums) only 1.4 percent studied in Jewish schools, 0.1 percent in Polish schools, 0.3 percent in German schools, 0.1 percent in the schools of other minorities, and 3.0 percent studied in schools that had one or more of the minority languages together with either Russian or Ukrainian or both.[61] There were no institutes using exclusively the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian minority languages, although 3.9 percent of the students studied

[60] *Proletarska Pravda*, Mar. 29, 1933.

[61] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48-51

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in institutes that conducted part of their work in Russian or Ukrainian and part in other languages. Of the students in the technicums, 1.5 percent studied in technicums using the Jewish language, 0.5 percent in those using Polish, 0.7 percent in those using German, 0.5 per cent in those using other non-Russian minority languages, and 0.5 percent in technicums using Russian or Ukrainian and one or more of the other languages. These figures do not signify that the Jewish, Polish or German children were deprived of a chance to study in technical and higher schools; on the contrary, the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian student body in these establishments, as will be noted below, was relatively larger than the Ukrainian and Russian student body.

The work of establishing schools using the languages of the smaller nationalities continued after 1927; in fact, it was given additional impetus by the campaign of 1933–35 against nationalist influences in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education. But before examining the effects of this campaign, it is necessary to note the attitude toward Russian schools. At the core of the process of Ukrainization was the transformation of Russian into Ukrainian schools; and it was not surprising that there appeared in at least some areas a tendency to deprive the Russian-speaking population of an opportunity to study in Russian schools. This was, to be sure, not at all the intention of the government. In its decree in expanding general education, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee ordered that "special attention be directed toward assuring schools with instruction in the Russian language for all children of the Russian nationality."[62] But, as has been noted above, the proportion of pupils studying in Ukrainian schools in some places — especially in the larger cities — was greater than the proportion of Ukrainians in the population. A writer in *Proletarska Pravda* (*Proletarian Truth*) claimed in 1926 that the general schools in Kiev were being over-Ukrainized.[63] He was answered by another writer, who argued that whereas the criticism was based on an examination of the number of *schools*, there was still a larger proportion of *classes* being held in Russian than the proportion of Russians in the total population; and the second writer denounced the first for bringing grist to the mill of the enemies of the Soviet national policy.[64] The criticism was proven correct by the school statistics for 1927; but since the process of Ukrainization was in full swing and since at this time the Party considered the Russian nationalists

[62] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1926, part 1, sec. 453, p. 1246.
[63] *Proletarska Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1926. [64] *Ibid.*

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in the Ukraine more dangerous than the Ukrainian variety, no additional attention was given to the problem of Russian children.

In 1933, however, the offensive against Ukrainian nationalism occasioned a review of the Ukrainization process. Ukrainian nationalism had been considered a dangerous force since 1926, when Shumskii and Khvilovoi — two important figures in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education — were censured for desiring "to orient Ukrainian culture on capitalist Europe rather than on socialist Moscow." The Party became still more alert to signs of nationalism after the uncovering in 1929 of the Society for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, a secret organization headed by such outstanding nationalists as Efremov, Germaize and Nikovskii. But it was the campaign against the collectivization of agriculture which occasioned the intensive campaign against the nationalists. The Party regarded the opposition to collectivization as the result in large part of the nationalists, and it set out to remove them from every branch of political, economic and cultural activity. The central figure in the campaign was Nicholas Skripnik, an "Old Bolshevik" who was accused of having fallen under the influence of his nationalist colleagues and was removed from his position as Commissar of Education in March 1933. Even before his removal, however, the Commissariat of Education and all of its activities were under fire.

Charges of over-Ukrainization of the school system were first launched in an editorial appearing in *Kommunist* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party) in February 1933, and reprinted in other newspapers. The editorial said: "The mistakes and perversions in realizing the Ukrainization of the schools led in a considerable number of places to neglecting and ignoring the interests of the national minorities and especially the needs and requirements of the Russian toiling masses living in the Ukraine. Among responsible circles of the Commissariat there was concocted the 'theory' that the majority of the children in the cities, small towns and other labor centers speak a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon, and that therefore the majority of these children should study in the Ukrainian language. As a result, a significant part of the Russian toiling masses were deprived of schools in their native language and actually subjected to the forced Ukrainization which the Party had condemned in all of its directives."[65] Shortly after this editorial appeared, an article in *Proletarska Pravda* stated that in Kiev only 49 percent of the Russian children and 30 percent of the Jewish children studied in schools conducted in their native languages; that although

[65] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1933.

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some of the others studied in mixed Ukrainian-Russian or Ukrainian-Jewish schools, they were "mechanically transferred" after the first four years to classes using Ukrainian.[66]

Zatonski, who replaced Skripnik as Commissar of Education, stated that the Ukrainization of Russian children had taken place in Kharkov and in the Don Basin as well as in Kiev; and he pointed to Krasnolutzki District, where the number of Russian schools had dropped from twenty in 1930 to twelve in 1932.[67] He also declared that in Kherson and Makiivitz there were no Russian elementary schools at all; and that in some places there had been a voluntary Ukrainization of Russian children because the buildings and equipment provided for the Russian schools were greatly inferior to those of the Ukrainian schools.[68] Additional evidence was forthcoming in 1934 and 1935 to show some enforced Ukrainization of Polish children and of those of other minorities, as well as of some of the Russian children; and this situation was denounced as an example of "deliberate nationalist wrecking."[69]

This campaign against over-Ukrainization, however, was not intended to lead to a revival of the Russification policy. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was adamant on this point. He explained in 1933 that the results of over-Ukrainization would have to be eliminated because this was demanded by internationalism, "by the brotherly interests of the toilers of all the nationalities in the Ukraine."[70] But, he went on, the Russian nationalists would not be allowed to take advantage of mistakes already committed in order to reverse the policy of Ukrainization; on the contrary, there would be a further drive for "Bolshevik Ukrainization." A similar view was taken in 1934 by Postishev, the assistant secretary of the Central Committee and the official most actively engaged in hunting down the Ukrainian nationalists.[71]

According to the latest available material, the Ukrainization of education has kept pace with the expansion of general education, and a greater proportion of pupils were studying in Ukrainian schools in 1937 than in 1927. By 1937 the general schools embraced 5,364,800 children as compared with 1,678,100 in 1913 — an increase of 319 percent over the pre-War year; and whereas twenty-two of every thousand people attended elementary school in the Kiev Educational District in 1912, in 1937 the figure for all of the Ukraine had risen to

[66] *Ibid.*, Mar. 29, 1933. [67] *Visti*, May 1, 1933. [68] *Ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1933.
[69] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1934 (speech of Zatonski); Aug. 22, 1934, Jan. 5, 1935.
[70] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1933. [71] *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1934.

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871 one hundred seventeen of every thousand people.[72] The middle schools had expanded greatly by 1937; the fifth to tenth grades embraced 1,927,100 pupils in 1937 as compared with 347,900 pupils in 1928, an increase of 554 percent in ten years.[73]

871 While the school system was expanding quantitatively, the number of children studying in Ukrainian schools was also increasing. During the school year 1935–36, the year that marked the end of the campaign to check over-Ukrainization, 83.0 percent of the pupils in the general schools were studying in the Ukrainian language. This percentage coincides roughly with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. It also represents a higher percentage of pupils in Ukrainian schools than attended such schools in 1927, a fact which resulted from the expansion of middle schools in the rural areas and from the decline in the number of children attending schools in some of the other languages. During the school year 1935–36, 12.7 percent of all the pupils in the general schools studied in Russian, 1.4 percent in Jewish, 1.3 percent in German, 0.5 percent in Moldavian and 0.5 percent in Polish schools.[74] In absolute numbers, there had been an increase between 1927 and 1935–36 in the pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Greek languages; there had been a decline in the number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Swedish and Assyrian languages; and schools had been established for Uzbeks, Belorussians, Kirghiz, Kazaks, Turkomens and Latvians.[75]

874 With regard to the technical and higher educational institutions, the author has no figures on the number of students in the Ukrainized

[72] The figure for the number of pupils in 1937 is taken from *Socizlističeskoe Stroitelstvo Sojuza S.S.S.R., 1933–1938* gg. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1939), p. 163.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[74] *Socialistična Ukraina. Statistični Zbirnik* (Kiev, 1937), p. 222.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 222. *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–26. A comparison of absolute figures for 1927 and 1935–36 must take into account that the statistics for 1927 gave the total number of pupils in mixed schools but not the number studying in various languages used in these schools. The number of pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Czech languages in 1935–36 was greater than the number studying in their own schools in 1927 plus the total number in mixed schools using these languages for some classes. The conclusion that there was a decline in the total number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Assyrian and Swedish languages is arrived at by considering roughly the number of pupils in mixed schools studying in these languages. For example, in 1927 there were 68,836 pupils in Jewish schools; in 1935–36 there were 69,211 pupils studying in the Jewish language; hence, there were 375 more pupils *studying in Jewish* in 1935–36 than had been *attending Jewish schools* in 1927. But in 1927 there were 11,603 pupils in mixed schools using Jewish and either Russian or Ukrainian; in all probability there were more than 375 pupils in these schools who were being taught in Jewish; and by 1935–36 the surplus above 375 had been lost to Jewish classes, indicating a decline in the total number studying in Jewish.

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schools for the years after 1927; and one might conclude from the lack of such figures in the important statistical collections that Ukrainization has ceased or has been reversed. However, this conclusion would not be consistent with the continued stress on the preparation of "Ukrainian cadres," which was the primary purpose of Ukrainizing these institutions. The need for Ukrainian engineers, agronomists, writers and scientific workers was emphasized both by Kossior and by the resolution of the Thirteenth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1937.[76] Kossior, moreover, stated that there had been a large increase in the number of Ukrainian professors, instructors, scientific workers and candidates for higher degrees. Finally, the number of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technical and higher schools had grown absolutely and relatively. Between 1927 and 1936 the total number of students in the technicums had increased from 29,300 to 133,300; in the workers' faculties, from 7,400 to 53,500; and in the institutes from 28,200 to 108,200.[77] The increase for the technicums was 455 percent, for the workers' faculties 722 percent and for the institutes 384 percent. In the meanwhile, the proportion of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technicums had risen from 58.0 to 75.3 percent; in the workers' faculties from 57.9 to 65.0 percent; and in the institutes from 48.8 to 53.7 percent.[78] The number of students from among the minorities had increased absolutely but had fallen relatively. Since the increasing proportion of the students were Ukrainians (probably chiefly graduates of Ukrainian general schools and therefore favorable to and easily adaptable to courses conducted in Ukrainian), and since the number of Ukrainian faculty members had risen, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the process of Ukrainizing the technical and higher institutions had continued even after the intensive campaign against the nationalists was undertaken in 1933.

As for the obligatory study of the Ukrainian language in the schools of the other nationalities — provided for in laws of 1920 and 1927[79] — no change has taken place. An order of the Commissariat of Education, issued in December 1940 and just received by the author, clearly indicates this fact. The order is designed to facilitate the study of Ukrainian by children who have come from other republics and, having entered non-Ukrainian schools, are handicapped in the study of

[76] *Visti*, May 30, 1937; June 6, 1937. [77] *Socialistična Ukraina* . . . , p. 133.

[78] The percentages for 1927 are taken from *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii (Bilšovikiv) Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–52. The percentages for 1936 are from *Socialistična Ukraina* . . . , p. 152.

[79] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1920, part 1, sec. 509, p. 713; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626.

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this subject.[80] Declaring that the mastering of Ukrainian is obligatory for these children as well as for all other pupils in non-Ukrainian schools, the order states that the younger ones shall be sent to lower grades to study Ukrainian; the older ones may continue along with their classmates, and are to be marked leniently in this subject; and all are to be given special assistance in their study of Ukrainian so that by the time they graduate they may be able to fulffill the requirements demanded of the other pupils. Hence, the campaign against nationalism has not altered this aspect of the Ukrainization policy.

Perhaps the most significant result of the campaign against the Ukrainian nationalists was the effort to point up the importance of the Russian language and the value of Russian culture for the Soviet Union's minorities. One aspect of this effort was the greater emphasis placed on the study of the Russian language in the non-Russian schools of the Ukraine. A thorough mastering of Russian, regarded as a "second" and not as a "foreign language," had long been intended by the Party leaders, and had been provided for in the legislation on education. The important law on the Ukrainization of education in 1923 stated that "because the Russian language has all-governmental and all-Union significance and because it joins the Ukrainian people to the culture of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," the study of Russian as an obligatory subject was to be retained in all Ukrainian schools.[81] In the schools of the non-Ukrainian minorities in the Ukraine, either Ukrainian or Russian was to be selected by the population as a subject for obligatory study. The basic statute on education issued in 1927 went still further: both the Ukrainian and the Russian languages were to be taught as obligatory subjects in *all* schools.[82] In explaining the purpose of this clause, Skripnik stated that "now — since the proletarian revolution — the Russian language, once a language of oppression, is the language in which are written the works of Lenin; now the Ukrainians regard it as a brotherly language containing great revolutionary compositions; and in order that after leaving school the Ukrainians may be able to make use of Russian culture, the Russian language is taught as an obligatory subject."[83] This statement, coming from the Commissar of Education, was of considerable importance; but it was later revealed that interest in the Russian language had been lost in the whirl of Ukrainization.

[80] *Zbirnik Nakaziv ta Rosporiadžen Narodnogo Komisariaty Osviti Ukrainskoi R.S.R.*, 1940, sec. 355, p. 14. [81] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, p. 900.
[82] *Ibid.*, 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626. [83] *Proletarska Pravda*, May 9, 1926.

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In 1933 Zatonski censured the nationalists in the Commissariat of Education for neglecting the teaching of Russian which, because it was the means of all-Union communication, "should be taught in all the Ukrainian schools and in the schools of other nationalities."[84] But the real interest in the teaching of Russian appeared in 1937 and 1938, when the Commissariat was again over-hauled. During these years there was another intensified drive against Ukrainian nationalism, as well as against other varieties of opposition to the Party's policies and against every manifestation of inefficiency. Even Zatonskii was removed from his post. And while the renewed attack on nationalism in general was proceeding, a large amount of criticism was directed against the Commissariat of Education for its neglect of the Russian language as a subject of study. The critics — one of whom was E. N. Postnikova, a teacher and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. — stated that because of "the wrecking activities of the bourgeois nationalists," there was a higher percentage of failures in the courses on Russian language and literature than in any other subject.[85] In the first place, not enough time was being alotted to the study of Russian. Secondly, there was a dearth of text-books and of Russian literature in the school libraries: even such works as Gorki's *Mother*, Tolstoi's *War and Peace*, Goncharov's *Oblomov* and the collected works of Lenin were to be found only in Ukrainian translations. Thirdly, the Commissariat had not devoted sufficient attention to methods of teaching Russian and had failed to provide methodological programs for the guidance of teachers. Finally, the knowledge of Russian possessed by the teachers themselves was entirely inadequate; even the graduates of the pedagogical institutes did not know the language well enough to teach it. Since, the critics argued, the pupils themselves were strongly inclined to study Russian, the Commissariat should provide more thorough preparation of teachers, assign more time for this subject, provide more text-books and more Russian literature.

As a result of these criticisms the re-organized Commissariat provided new programs, several of which are in the hands of the author, and it increased the time allotted to the study of Russian. The number of hours specified for the study of languages during the entire period of attendance in the various types of schools, according to the

[84] *Visti*, Aug. 23, 1933.

[85] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), May 16, 1937; *Učitelskaia Gazeta* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), Feb. 27, 1938, Mar. 19, 1938, Mar. 29, 1938.

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871 teaching plans for the school year 1939–40, is contained in the following table:[86]
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I. Schools with Ukrainian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Ukrainian Language	1130 hours	1187 hours
Russian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Ukrainian Language	2068 hours	1994 hours
Russian Language	1131 hours	1221 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

II. Schools with Russian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Russian Language	1130 hours	1147 hours
Ukrainian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Russian Language	2150 hours	2111 hours
Ukrainian Language	955 hours	1022 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

III. Schools with Jewish or Moldavian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Jewish or Moldavian Language	993 hours	989 hours
Ukrainian Language	196 hours	252 hours
Russian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Jewish or Moldavian Language	1383 hours	1350 hours
Ukrainian Language	586 hours	618 hours
Russian Language	1131 hours	1221 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

[86] Narodni Kommissariat Osvita U.R.S.R., *Navčalni plani. počatkovoi ta serednoi školi* (Kiev, 1939) pp. 8–9, 11, 13, 15–17, 19, 21, 23. It may be noted that the plan for the rural elementary schools contained 36 more hours and for the rural middle schools 54 more hours than was assigned to the corresponding urban schools.

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In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 420 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both with and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.
[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . . ,* 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

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Everything in West Ukraine is education work.

462 The woman, too, is brought up in order to play her
512 part properly within the family: she must see
515 to it that everyone eats from his own plate, that everyone sleeps in his own bed - not eight on a wide chest -, that clothing is taken off at night and that shirts are changed; airing the rooms is not to be forgotten, and it is unhealthy for children not to get out of the house a single time the whole winter long. Fresh air does no harm. But where to get the shoes and warm clothes for the little ones?

575 A further, very important society was the
871 "Ridna /96/ Shkola" ("National School"). It closed the worst gaps which the Poles had hewn into the Ukrainian school system. There were 3662 Ukrainian public schools in Galicia when the Poles took over undivided rule. In 1937/1938 there were only 496 left. All the rest of the schools were Polonized, so that in the academic year 1937/1938 only 59,300 of over one million Ukrainian school children were able to attend purely Ukrainian schools. Among 307 state secondary schools in Poland, there were only five Ukrainian classical schools in the academic year 1936/1937. All of the 1094 state technical schools were Polish and naturally also all higher institutions of learning. The means at the disposal of the "Ridna Shkola" - needless to say - were not by any means adequate to teach all Ukrainian children their mother tongue. Nevertheless, by means of the savings of its 104,000 members, it was able to maintain 540 kindergartens, 33 public schools, 12 classical schools, 11 colleges, 16 schools for specialists and professionals and 4 boarding schools. (53) The

53. Taken from the respective annual reports of the West Ukrainian cooperatives and self-aid organizations.

tension between Poland and the Ukraine in the

575 first half of 1939 threatened the educational
871 work of the "Ridna Shkola" just as it did that of the women's society, the society of agriculturists, the "Provista" and the cooperatives.

The efforts of the Ukrainians to raise the
871 level of popular education are admirable. When
873 at the beginning of their rule in Galicia the Poles deprived the Ukrainians of their few professorial chairs, the Ukrainians forthwith founded a "Secret University" which gave its lectures during 1922 and 1923 in private houses. At the end of each lecture the professors who were taken partly from universities of East Ukraine, partly from Austrian universities, announced to their listeners the time and place of their next lecture. In the end this "university" collapsed and the lecturers were arrested.

873 Two years after the enactment of the Ukrain-
ian law of autonomy of 1922 a Ukrainian univer-
178 sity was supposed to have been founded - but in the summer of 1939 there was not yet a single Ukrainian professorial chair. In Lwów a Polish professor lectured on Ukrainian literature in the
241 Polish language, in /Facing page 96/ /Map VII: Agricultural Zones Under Cultivation. In the wooded zones of the north rye, oats and potatoes predominate. In the northern zones of steppes, wheat and sugar beets are added (winter wheat in the west and summer wheat in the east). A third zone on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and in the foreland of the Caucasus produces wheat, corn and barley. Adjoining this toward the west there is a corn-growing zone (with wheat in the north and barley in the south), whereas toward the northeast there is a zone extending to the middle part of the Volga with summer wheat and rye. Around the Caspian Sea is the pasture area of desert steppes, in the mountains, woodland and grasslands with some barley cultivation. The cultivation of cotton which has been recently undertaken along the coasts of the Black Sea and

642 inasmuch as the entire governmental hierarchy
645 from the village council /soviet/to the head of the state is merely a body of sheriffs whose duty is to see that the orders from Moscow are carried out.

000 In place of the nationalization of non-Russian peoples, which was given up in 1930, there have come up since 1936 the slogans about the "common socialistic fatherland", the "great Soviet people", the "love of the Soviet homeland". Besides that, the theory of the Russian people as the "leading people of the Revolution" is being quite systematically disseminated. The chauvinism of Great Russia which Stalin so mercilessly exposed to shame at the Party Congress of 1930 bids fair /123/ to recapturing for the Great Russian people the same position it had at the time of the White Czars.

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•871 Since Ukrainization was discontinued,[2] the education of Ukrainian youth goes on strictly according to the principles of the Marx-Lenin doctrine. Woe to the educator against whom it can be proved that he is departing from this course. Thousands of scholars and pedagogues had to give up their lives because of such mistakes.

The basic type of school in Soviet Ukraine, just as throughout the Soviet realm, is the "seven-grade work school" which roughly corresponds to an elementary school. Attendance in the four lower grades is obligatory, in the three higher ones, voluntary. The young Ukrainian, after he has graduated from the work school, may enter the "professional school" (a sort of technical school) or the "workers' school" for factory apprentices. The adult worker may enroll as auditor in the "workers' academy". There are also "Party schools", such as the "Pan-Ukrainian Institute for Communist Education", and, in place

2 [At the 16th All-Union Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union in June 1930- Analyst]

871 of the universities which were for a long time forbidden, the "technical institutes" and the more advanced type of these, the "institutes for popular education". In recent times universities have again been revived.

In this connection it may be said that the obligation to attend elementary school begins at the age of eight and ends at the age of twelve. Two-thirds of the elementary pupils leave school before their four years are up. The subjects of instruction of the first few grades of the workers' school include, among other things: 1. Lenin - revolutionary, Communist, protector of workers and peasants; his death, short biography. 2. The Czar and the workers in the year 1905. 3. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. (68) - The "professional schools" are regular

68. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Union, page 40.

schools for fifteen- and eighteen-year-olds, corresponding somewhat to our German agricultural and business schools. The "workers' schools", on the other hand, are attended only at certain hours by factory apprentices. /124/ The "workers' academies" are somewhat like the former German people's universities. The course of study lasts four years; it entitles the graduate to register in universities without having to take any kind of entrance examinations. The Party schools train agitators and propagandists; the technical schools and institutes train engineers, chemists and specialists in various fields in a three-year, and in some cases a four- and five-year course of study. While the process of Ukrainization was [563] going on in 1928, there were among all university students in the Ukraine 15.8% Russians, 23% Jews, 56% Ukrainians and the rest students of other nationalities. (69) In 1933 and 1934 universities

69. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Union, page 98.

87/ were established in Kiyev, Khar'kov, Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk.

No research is being carried on either in the institutes or the technical schools or the universities; they are all purely teaching institutions. There are special institutes, so-called research chairs, for research which can be carried on only within the framework of historical materialism. "The researcher is advised to limit his activity to collecting and systematizing material and to avoid drawing conclusions." (70) Since

70. Zalozieckij: Ibid., page 31.

there is only one publisher, the state, scientists often have difficulty publishing their works at all. Thus they often have no choice but to have individual studies lithographed and published in a collected edition of 50 to 100 copies. The students for their part have other worries: they live mostly in dormitories, usually very poorly. To a large extent they also lack the necessary educational equipment.

177/ 197/ The Russianization of the Ukrainian language is part of the nationality fight between Russians and Ukrainians. Forgotten is the time when the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences in the year 1905 emphatically pointed out that the Russian and the Ukrainian language were separate languages. According to the opinion expressed at that time, the Russian literary language should not be imposed upon the Ukrainians, since they have at their disposal a "completely /125/ developed literary language of their own". In 1933 the State Publishing House of Moscow issued textbooks for Ukrainian schools in the new "unified" language. "Unification" means reintroduction of numerous Russian words with Ukrainian endings; it also means the use of Russian phrases which are completely foreign to the Ukrainian language. If a teacher should object to this corruption of the mother tongue of his pupils or not use it, there would be

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

695 Art. 91. In all courts of the Ukrainian SSR cases are heard in public, unless otherwise provided for by law, and the accused is guaranteed the right to be defended by counsel.

695 Art. 92. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

Art. 93. Supreme supervisory power to ensure the strict observance of the law by all Ministries and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by officials and citizens within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR generally, is exercised by the Procurator-General of the USSR directly and also through the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 94. The Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR is appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 95. Regional procurators are appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 96. Area, district and city procurators are appointed by the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR, subject to the approval of the Procurator-General of the USSR, for a term of five years.

Art. 97. The organs of the Procurator's Office perform their functions independently of any local organs whatsoever, being subordinate solely to the Procurator-General of the USSR.

Chapter VIII. Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens

641 461 Art. 98. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment.

Art. 99. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to rest and leisure.

[466] The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the fixing of the working day for factory and office workers at eight hours and the reduction of the working day to seven or six hours for arduous trades and to four hours in workshops where conditions of work are exceptionally arduous; by the institution of annual vacations with full pay for factory and office workers; and by the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest-homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

641 Art. 100. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or disability.

657 This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance of factory and office workers at State expense, free medical service for the working people, and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

● 871 Art. 101. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to education.

641 This right is ensured by universal compulsory elementary education; by free education up to and including the seventh grade; by the system of State stipends to students who have distinguished themselves in higher educational establishments; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language; and by the organization in the factories, State farms and machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.

728 The progress in construction and rehabilitation which has taken place
178 since the incorporation of this region into the Ukraine was revealed at a meeting of the Soviet of Nationalities on October 16, 1946, when the representative of the Transcarpathian Ukraine summed up the achievements in 1946. Nearly 300 enterprises had been restored, and nine machine and tractor stations had been set up to assist the peasants in working
[212 the fields. Much had been done in 1946 to abolish illiteracy; there
871] were opened over 100 schools, including 75 elementary, seven technical, 27 secondary, four music schools for children, and one school for surgeons' assistants and midwives.

433 At the end of December it was stated that 35 new factories had started functioning in the Transcarpathian Region in 1946[1]. Moreover, as compared with 1945 when there was not a single coal mine, 8 mines were working in 1946. There had also been definite progress in building up consumer goods industries. A clothing and a shoe factory had begun working in Vinogradov, and a knitted goods mill in Mukachevo. Some 200 light industries have been opened in various parts of the region.

Population of the Ukraine

162 The Ukraine is inhabited largely by Ukrainians, and also by Russians, Jews, and Poles. Most of the population is literate, and in 1939 there were many technical and vocational schools, as well as scientific research institutes and about 40,000 libraries.

At the census of January 17, 1939 the Ukrainian S.S.R. had 30,960,221 inhabitants; an increase of 6.6 per cent. as compared with December 1926. The greatest increase had occurred in the towns, largely as a result of the migration of country people to new industries. Thus from 1926 to 1939 the urban population more than doubled (5,373,553 to 11,195,620) while the number of rural inhabitants decreased by 16½ per cent. (23,669,381 to 19,764,601).

000 The same was true for the entire Soviet Union. From 147,027,915 in December 1926, its total population increased by 15.9 per cent. to 170,467,186 in January 1939, the urban population having grown from 26.3 million to 55.9 millions; and the rural population having fallen from 120.7 million to 114.5 million.

162 The principal cities of the Ukraine with their population on
[361] January 17, 1939, are Kiev, the capital (population, 846,293), Kharkov, capital of the Ukraine before 1934 (833,432), the part of Odessa on the Black Sea (604,223), Dniepropetrovsk on the Dnieper River (500,662), Stalino, industrial centre of the Donets Basin (462,395), and Nikolayev (167,108).

In January 1939 the urban population of the Ukraine was 36.2 per

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1 Soviet Monitor, London, December 29, 1946.

744 Europe; and many people used to die every year from tuberculosis and
164 other chest complaints. Severe epidemics—typhoid and dysentry—used
146 to ravage the country every year; inadequate regulation of rivers and stagnant waters gave rise to malaria; undernourishment of large sections of the population was responsible for sporadic pellagra. Venereal diseases were a curse owing to lack of medical attention and of appropriate legislation.

744 This enormous task was tackled with commendable vigour by the authorities of the Republic. In a country which used to have very few
185 doctors, a proper medical service was soon organised; up-to-date hospitals and children's homes were built; Red Cross stations and other hygiene and welfare institutions, set up in many parts of Ruthenia, strove to prevent and combat disease. This systematic effort resulted in a substantial reduction of mortality, while the draining of marshlands and the regulation of streams and ponds considerably checked epidemics.

185 Realising that ignorance is the root of many social evils, the State regarded the raising of the standard of education in Ruthenia as one
871 of its foremost tasks. The achievements in this field were perhaps the most striking. A country, which in 1918 had not more than eighteen elementary schools where children were only partly taught in Ruthenian, possessed 520 Ruthenian schools two years later; and after fifteen years of independence this small country in the Carpathians could boast 1,079 schools of various kinds—elementary, upper, secondary, technical and special schools. The magnitude of this achievement becomes evident when it is borne in mind that it was necessary to educate the requisite number of Ruthenian teachers from among the rising generation.

871 Thanks to these efforts illiteracy among the younger people has become rare. Those Ruthenians who according to the last census of
212 1930 were still unable to read and write were largely middle-aged or
185 old people. But even among them illiteracy has been considerably reduced because evening schools for adults were opened wherever pos-
517 sible. The people of Ruthenia proved to be keen pupils. Within a few years the neglected country had a promising intelligentsia—administrative workers, teachers, journalists, writers, doctors, engineers, composers, artists and scientists. In the thirties more than eighty periodicals, among them ten dailies, appeared in Ruthenia, and the production of books grew from year to year. The innate aptitude for arts and crafts was given a chance of development when a special art school was established in Užhorod, and musical talent, too, received much encouragement. As many as 7.7 per cent of all musical compositions and songs broadcast by Czechoslovak radio stations were the work of Ruthenian musicians.

000 Economic development was essential to a country where bread used

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

874 that number of inhabitants, had 541 students in its medi-
727 cal school.[37] Medical institutes were also reopened in Stalino,
186 Dniepropetrovsk, and Vinnitsa, and perhaps in other cities, although it is doubtful if any of these were the centers of nationalist youth organization which the faculty in Kiev became under the leadership of the OUN-M.[38]

The educational structure described in the preceding paragraph was designed for adolescents or young adults, and thus could be used for direct propagation of nationalist concepts. It was, of course, partly for this reason that the Germans confined advanced training within such narrow limits. Even these restrictions were not the end of the difficulties faced in inculcating a nationalist type of education in those about to assume the role of citizens, [466] for the technical schools were frequently emptied of their students and faculty to meet the demands of the *Ostarbeiter* recruiters. The elementary schools were also drained of teachers by the *Ostarbeiter* program, and the pupils, though too young for forced labor, were decimated by famine and plague. If the task of building national consciousness had to be viewed as a long-term one, then the four-year elementary school offered a considerable field for cultivation.[39]

191 The problem confronting the nationalist leaders in education
727 was twofold: they had to ensure a basis for the development of
● 872 an independent Ukraine by making certain that all instruction
186 was in the Ukrainian language, so that the rising generation would be fully at home in this speech; and they had to replace the Communist ideology by a positive nationalist concept. The first task was relatively uncomplicated, though far from easy in practice. In line with their policy of encouraging the purely nonpolitical aspects of Ukrainian nationality, the Germans ordered all instruction to be in Ukrainian. The nationalist directors enthusiastically supported this rule, but it was sometimes difficult to enforce it, since even teachers who were themselves nationalist in sentiment were not always able to conduct classes in Ukrainian.[40]

[37] Occ E-4 (1); *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, October 10, 1942, p. 1.

[38] See Chapter V.

[39] In Kiev alone there were fifty elementary schools with 17,000 students (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2).

[40] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 4; M. Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki*

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It was much more difficult to secure a predominant place for the nationalist ideology in the schools. As is usually the case in nationalist indoctrination in the schools, the efforts were concentrated upon the teaching of history.[41] This was especially important, since the justification of the Ukrainian independence movement is largely based upon the conception of a proud history distinct from that of the people of Moscow. Naturally enough, no Soviet textbooks were acceptable for the teaching of history from this point of view or from the general standpoint of eradicating Communist indoctrination. To some extent the gap was filled by books published in the year preceding the Soviet war by the educational press of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow.[42] Some texts were printed by the cultural department of the Kiev city administration. An amateurish effort was made also by certain OUN-B organizers to print locally a new version of Ukrainian history with an introduction of their own composition.[43] In view of the great material shortages and the brief time available, however, the lack of printed materials could not be made good. Consequently, a great deal depended on securing the proper teachers. To what extent the many thousands employed in the schools adhered to the nationalist doctrine is of course impossible to determine, but a number of purely indigenous formulations of nationalist concepts to be inculcated in the schools attest to the strength of nationalist feeling. The head of the Mariupol' school system proposed to stress the native language, love of the fatherland, and respect for elders; the educational ideology advocated by the group of young men who reorganized life in Krivoi Rog was instillation of Cossack ideals, the code of the Zaporozhian Sich, which was to lead to a spiritual, moral, and physical regeneration.[44]

Since the formal school program was largely confined to young children, great efforts were also concentrated on developing a voluntary system of adult education. The Prosvita societies had

Visti, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 27, 1943, p. 4, quoting D. Nitsenko in *Nova Ukraïna* (Kharkov).

[41] Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4.

[42] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 10, 1941, p. 2.

[43] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 28.

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 29, 1942, p. 2; November 15, 1941, p. 2; and November 18, 1941, p. 3 (referring to an article in *Dzvin* [Krivoi Rog], September, 1941).

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872 In the primary schools only Russian was taught until recently, but in those kept by the *zemstvos* and Ukrainian societies Ukrainian is now also taught. In the secondary schools, which exist only in the larger towns, French and German instruction is given. In the German colonies there are German local schools (private), mostly primary. In the large towns of the western Ukraine and in the Polish colonies and on the large estates there are Polish private schools, which have been officially recognized since 1905. It is impossible to estimate the number of Ukrainians who went to universities, because many of them went to Russian universities outside the Ukraine or to foreign universities; but they can only have been a small percentage of the total number of literates.

204 The majority of the newspapers in the Ukraine were Russian. Each Government and each district had its own *Viedomosti*; and there were many Russian papers in Kiev. There were fewer Polish papers, chiefly in Kiev and the western Ukraine. The Germans had local papers in their colonies. The Ukrainians had, up to 1917, some eighteen newspapers, but some of them were printed abroad. In Kiev there were twelve Ukrainian papers, the most popular of which, *Rada*, was started in 1906; in Mohilev one, in Kharkov one, in Yekaterinoslav one, in Moscow one. One of the earliest Ukrainian papers printed abroad was the *Ruthenische Revue*, subsequently called *Ukrainische Rundschau*, started in 1903 in Vienna. This list does not include the Ukrainian newspapers printed in Eastern Galicia in a slightly different language and character.

(C) Political

171 Political conditions in the Ukraine were very much like those in other parts of the Russian Empire, except for special restrictions aiming at russification, e. g. the refusal to appoint the inhabitants of non-Russian districts to important Government positions. But the russification was not so thorough as in Finland

814 In the years before the First World War it published 24 volumes in which we also find articles by foreign scholars, mainly Russians, like Shakhmatov, Korsh, Perets, Ilinskij etc.

873 814 The World War had a paralysing effect on the cultural life of Ukraine as a whole. Hrushevskyj, its intellectual leader at that time, was arrested and exiled, all publication of scientific works stopped. But this depression did not last long, for the time was approaching when revolutionary movements in Russia were to lead to the establishment of Ukrainian independence. As a result of various technical difficulties, the universities in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odessa, hitherto Russian, were left as they were except the foundation of new chairs for Ukrainian history, legal history, Ukrainian language and literature. In addition, two exclusively Ukrainian state universities were founded in Kyiv and Kamenets-Podilskyj as well as the faculty of history and philology in Poltava. Steps were also taken to organise the national archives, the Ukrainian National Gallery and finally the foundation of the Ukrainian Academy of Learning in Kyiv.

At first, the Soviet government did not interfere with the Academy of Learning, and even granted it a modest subsidy. Thanks to the devotion and the determination of Ukrainian scholars who did not leave the country, the Academy developed a lively and extensive activity in the years from 1925 till 1930, — though financial conditions were anything but satisfactory — and took a proper place among similar institutions in the world. But a radical change set in when the Academy, which up till then had been fairly independent, was forced into the service of communist theories; as a result nationally minded scholars were removed and bolshevist party ~~functionaries~~ introduced as members. The scientific level of the Academy sank enormously.

In the areas of Western Ukraine which were allocated to Poland, research activity decreased in comparison to pre-war years, which was mainly due to the lack of money.

As a result of the inflation of the Polish currency, the Shevchenko Society of Learning in Lviv lost much of its funds; it had to dispense with state help so that it could only continue a very restricted publishing activity. When Eastern Galicia was annexed

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

by the USSR after the fall of the Polish state, the Shevchenko Society of Learning in Lviv was dissolved in December 1939. 873 814

The great hardships which the Ukrainian people has been exposed to in the last decades forced many intellectuals abroad where they attempted to found new centers of intellectual life. Thus the Ukrainian university in Prague, the college of Agriculture in Podjebrady, the Institute of Pedagogy, the Institute of Sociology, the Academy of Fine Art, the Society for History and Philology, the Society of Ukrainian Doctors and Engineers, the Ukrainian National Museum — all in Prague — came into being. The University, the oldest of the existant institutions, published a series of studies by its members, this being imitated with great zeal by other universities. We are justified in saying that, on the whole, Ukrainian emigrants in Prague were exceedingly active. The Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin also became an important center of Ukrainian scientific research abroad, its function being to develop its activity in close cooperation with European science. The publishing activity of the Ukrainian Institute in Varsaw, which published a series of valuable monographs, is worth mentioning.

814 The changing fortunes of the war compelled the postponement of its realization but the work was not really lost. Soon after the definite formation of the Ukrainian Soviet government, the work was resumed, with those men who had survived leading in the work.

Despite some slight interference of the Soviet authorities, who demanded that history should be treated along the lines of Marxo-Leninism, the Academy succeeded in remaining almost completely autonomous. The period of the New Economic Policy, which seemed to restore the financial position of the country and the more peaceful life, provided a fairly favorable atmosphere. As a result the Academy flourished and in 1924, it was even able to invite Prof. Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, the recognized dean of Ukrainian historical studies, to return to Ukraine and take a position in the Academy.

Hrushevsky accepted the invitation and on his return to Kiev, he renewed the work of the old Ukrainian Scientific Society which had been united with the Academy. As head of the Historical Section, he fostered the creation of a large number of commissions in various branches of study and from 1924 to 1930 he edited a journal *Ukraine* which speedily became the outstanding journal in the field of historical and cultural studies. There was no period of Ukrainian history, no section of Ukrainian archaeology, art, and ethnography which was not assigned to some commission or group in the Academy.

At the same time the Academy was put in charge of most of the libraries, collections and resources of the older universities on Ukrainian territory. This had its good and its bad sides. It materially increased the resources of the Academy and the material at its disposal. On the bad side, it rendered more difficult the position of the younger scholars who were seeking to start upon a career.

814 The various Soviet Commissars of Education had made these
● 813 changes with the idea of securing large numbers of half-trained men and women who would occupy positions in the new state and take

the place of the old bureaucrats. They therefore turned the universities into technical schools of a rather inferior character, unlike the situation in Russia, where despite all the changes there was still preserved the fiction of university teaching and research. It was made clear that the teachers were not supposed to busy themselves with more advanced subjects for these were now the province of the Academy. Still there was a steady stream of young people into its influence and for several years it could well be said that there had never been a time when Ukrainian scholarship was so free and untrammeled. 814 873

The Academy in Kiev was, of course, the highest organ of scientific studies but it was not isolated, for some of the academicians, like Dmytro Bahaly, set up in Kharkiv a Chair of Scientific Research like an institute and Slabchenko did the same in Odesa. The example of these were followed in smaller cities and similar research centres were opened in Poltava, Chernihiv, Nizhin, Dnipropetrovsk, Kamyanets Podilsky, Vinnytsya, Zhytomir, Mykolayiv and Luhansk. 814

In the early years there was a constant effort to establish closer relations with the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the other scholarly institutions in Western Ukraine, and for some years there was an active interchange of views between the scholars of the two sections. Several outstanding Western Ukrainians were elected to membership in the Kiev Academy and the scholars went back and forth across the boundary with considerable freedom and cooperated in the development of Ukrainian studies.

In the field of history and of economics, it was necessary for the scholars[1] to pay some slight attention to the Marxo-Leninist ideas. They could not too openly contradict them but it was usually possible, by the addition of a few official quotations, to speak quite plainly with regard for scientific truth and accuracy. [626]

Even these restrictions were far laxer when it came to studies of language and material culture. The All-Ukrainian Archaeological Society and the Society for the Preservation of the Antiquities of Ukraine sent out expeditions to all parts of the country.

1 [of Western Ukraine -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

ism.[29] One drew its strength from the resentment of the Galician soldiers who had borne a heavy part of the burden of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, only to be consigned to second-class citizenship by Poland. The most active were veterans of the Sichovi Stril'tsi (Sich Sharpshooters), a unit which had operated under Colonel Eugene Konovalets' in the East Ukraine. After the collapse of the UNR, the unit disbanded in Galicia; many of its members united in forming an illegal, para-military organization known as the Ukraïns'ka Viis'kova Organizatsiia (Ukrainian Military Organization—UVO). In the bitter struggles with the Poles in the twenties, this group was harshly treated and retaliated with some deeds of violence. Basically, however, it was a military protective group rather than a terrorist underground. 186 668*

As a reaction to Communism, more radically nationalist groups arose. As has been noted, Communist influence threatened to win the bulk of the Ukrainian student population in the early twenties; this was true not only in the legally recognized universities, but also in the underground university established illegally in L'vov by Ukrainian scholars to give academic training to hundreds of the young people to whom the Poles denied admission to institutions of higher education. One of the principal factors in turning the students from Communism to a nationalist movement, which was organized as the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth (Soiuz Ukraïns'koï Natsionalistychnoï Molodi—SUNM), was the work of Dmytro Dontsov. Dontsov, an East Ukrainian by origin, had been an active propagator of nationalism even before the First World War. By the early twenties his teachings had come to resemble those of the integral nationalists, although apparently he derived most of his ideas from the Ger- [873]

* The following account is based on numerous oral and written sources. Three which may be mentioned in particular are V. Martynets', *Ukraïns'ke pidpillia vid UVO do OUN: Spohady i materiialy do peredistorii ta istorii ukraïns'koho organizovanoho natsionalizmu* (The Ukrainian Underground from the UVO to the OUN: Memoirs and Materials Concerning the Prehistory and the History of Organized Ukrainian Nationalism) (Winnipeg, 1949), a voluminous though overly sympathetic account; a series of articles in *Ukraïnets'-Chas*, June 10, 1951, p. 4, June 17, 1951, p. 4, July 1, 1951, p. 4, and August 8, 1951, p. 5, by Bohdan Kravtsiv; and Vasyl' Rudko ("R. Lisovii"), "Rozlam v OUN" (The Split in the OUN), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, May 23, 1949, p. 3.

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. 167
had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest: to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czecho- 563
slovakia met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the 873
recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrainian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Economic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrainian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrainian emigration developed.

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin [815]
University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed a considerable activity.

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian 563
Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, 186
remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name of their enslaved brethren.

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western terri- 563
tories of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They 575
are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily *Svoboda*. The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton, Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will*. There are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools, from American and Canadian Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, far- [162]
mers. The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about 1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest political organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Com- 563
munist Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the 575
means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian 668

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The high percentage of literates in Novorossiya (Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav) is due to the presence of German colonists. In ten Great-Russian Governments (Pskov, Penza, Simbirsk, Tambov, Smolensk, Orel, Kaluga, Riazan, Tula, and Nijni Novgorod) there are 16,302,000 inhabitants, of whom 16·9 per cent. can read and write. Since the census of 1897, education in the Ukraine has been rapidly spreading, thanks chiefly to the *zemstvos*, who supported about half the existing schools. In the Government of Poltava the *zemstvos* spent in 1900 as much as 20 per cent. of their income on education. According to the statistics of Yasnopolski, who bases his calculations on the reports of the Central Statistical Committee in Petrograd, and brings his figures down to 1910, the percentage of literates is as follows: Taurida, 38 per cent.; Kherson, 35; Yekaterinoslav, 29; Chernigov, 25; Kiev, 24; Kharkov, 23; Poltava, 23; Volhynia, 23; Podolia, 20.

Within the territories of the nine Governments which form the Ukraine, there are three universities and several higher educational institutions in Odessa, in Kiev, and in Kharkov. The language and administration are Russian, though Kiev has Chairs of Ukrainian Language and History, recently instituted; and they all gather, especially at Kiev, a fair number of Ukrainian scholars. The three university towns form centres round which other schools are grouped. Kiev is the centre for the South-west Territory, i. e. the Governments of Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia; Odessa is the centre for Novorossiya, i. e. the Governments of Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav; and Kharkov is the centre for Malorossiya, i. e. the Governments of Chernigov, Poltava, and Kharkov. On the whole, education is most advanced in Novorossiya, and Odessa has the greatest number of schools (420), secondary and primary. The Government of Kharkov is very poor in schools, though Kharkov itself possesses about 111; next come the Governments of Podolia, Poltava, and Volhynia.

575 first half of 1939 threatened the educational
891 work of the "Ridna Shkola" just as it did that of the women's society, the society of agriculturists, the "Provista" and the cooperatives.

The efforts of the Ukrainians to raise the
871 level of popular education are admirable. When
873 at the beginning of their rule in Galicia the Poles deprived the Ukrainians of their few professorial chairs, the Ukrainians forthwith founded a "Secret University" which gave its lectures during 1922 and 1923 in private houses. At the end of each lecture the professors who were taken partly from universities of East Ukraine, partly from Austrian universities, announced to their listeners the time and place of their next lecture. In the end this "university" collapsed and the lecturers were arrested.

873 Two years after the enactment of the Ukrain-
ian law of autonomy of 1922 a Ukrainian univer-
178 sity was supposed to have been founded - but in the summer of 1939 there was not yet a single Ukrainian professorial chair. In Lwów a Polish professor lectured on Ukrainian literature in the
241 Polish language, in /Facing page 96/ /Map VII: Agricultural Zones Under Cultivation. In the wooded zones of the north rye, oats and potatoes predominate. In the northern zones of steppes, wheat and sugar beets are added (winter wheat in the west and summer wheat in the east). A third zone on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and in the foreland of the Caucasus produces wheat, corn and barley. Adjoining this toward the west there is a corn-growing zone (with wheat in the north and barley in the south), whereas toward the northeast there is a zone extending to the middle part of the Volga with summer wheat and rye. Around the Caspian Sea is the pasture area of desert steppes, in the mountains, woodland and grasslands with some barley cultivation. The cultivation of cotton which has been recently undertaken along the coasts of the Black Sea and

241 the Sea of Azov also deserves to be mentioned./ /Key inside map: I Rye, potato and oats region. II Wheat and rye region; sub-zone of rye, wheat, potatoes; sub-zone of rye, winter wheat, sugar beets; sub-zone of summer wheat, rye, sugar beets. III Region of wheat, barley, corn; sub-zone of winter wheat, corn, barley, sunflowers. IV Summer wheat and rye zone; cotton. V Region of corn; sub-region of corn, wheat; sub-region of corn, barley. VI Oats and potato region. VII Forest region. VIII Grassland (pastures, alpine pastures, natural meadows). ⊥⊥⊥⊥ Area with abundant millet cultivation. ⊞ Area with abundant buckwheat cultivation. ....Northern boundary of region growing abundant amounts of corn. Intensive horticulture./ /97/ Cracow a Ukrainian
•873 professor lectured in Polish on Ukrainian liter-
178 ature, and in Warsaw Polish and Ukrainian professors lectured in Polish on Ukrainian literature and "History of the East" which meant history of the Ukraine under Polish rule. Moreover, study in Lwów was made very difficult for Ukrainian students. Warsaw wanted the Ukrainians to study in Cracow and in the capital of the country, and to have them taken out of the Ukrainian environment and drawn into the Polish one. In this connection a secret numerus clausus proved very useful: the Ukrainians, in contrast to their smarter Polish colleagues often failed.

*

101 How was the situation in Bukovina? This little country of 5000 square kilometers on the northeast slope of the Carpathians in between the three countries, Poland, Soviet Union and Rumania, was, until its transfer to the Habsburg Kingdom in 1776, purely a colonial country of the Sublime Porte. Under Austria it experienced a rapid rise, and its chief city Czernovits (now Chernovtsy) was given the epithet "Vienna of the

of Rome as the supreme head of their church, the pioneers of 795
the Union and of the cultural independence of Ukraine wished to throw off the cultural yoke of Poland, thinking that they would acquire equal rights with the Poles once the churches were united. The course of events has showed how much they were mistaken; for the Poles have merely exploited this rapprochement in ecclesiastical affairs as an instrument by means of which, with the help of the Jesuits, they aimed at ruling over the entire East and at completely absorbing the Ukrainian nation.

Western influence can also be detected in the guild-like 441
organisations of the Ukrainian middle-classes in towns like Lviv 871
Kyiv, Lutsk etc., organisations which, in addition to promoting the interests of a particular class or trade, also concerned themselves with church affairs. One of their main aims was the foundation of schools which taught Latin as well as Church Slavonic and Greek.

The most important foundation of those so-called Bro- 874 ●
therhood schools was undoubtedly the Kyiv Academy 795
which owed its supremacy as an intellectual center, not 177
only of Ukraine, but of the whole of Eastern Europe .79
to the activities of such an eminent personality as Metropolitan Peter Mohyla. Mohyla, the son of the governor of Moldavia and educated in Jesuit schools, remained a life-long advocate of western culture and the Catholic Church, the organisation of which served him as a model when he was planning the reform of the Orthodox Church. We are scarcely able to-day to imagine what an enormous revolution and what great boldness of spirit was implied in the idea of introducing Catholic principles and methods into the organisation of the Orthodox Church which had been hostile to Rome for centuries. And yet this unique plan succeeded and could succeed only in Ukraine, for it was here alone that history had prepared the way for the adoption of these plans for realising western ideas. The spirit which inspired Mohyla's activities was wholly directed towards the West, as was clearly expressed in his innovations: in dogma, however, he remained a loyal disciple of the "faith

874 of his fathers", of the Orthodoxy. He is thus a concrete symbol
795 of the synthesis of two worlds, of the harmonious and complete union of two cultures, of the meeting of East and West and of
177 the fertilising of Ukrainian Orthodoxy by the Latin spirit of
.79 the Roman Catholic Church.

795 The seed scattered by Mohyla bore rich fruit. Hundreds of scholars, writers, politicians and organisers graduated in the
874 course of the 17th and 18th centuries from this unique "alma mater", the Kyiv Academy, equipped with the modern weapons of western learning, to fight first of all for the independence and the honor of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. After completing their studies in Kyiv the Ukrainian patriots of that time go to Germany to appropriate the arguments used by the Reformation against Catholicism, they penetrate to Rome and do not shrink from joining the Roman Church for a season only in order to become better acquainted with their opponent's plans in the very center of his camp. On their return home they develop an energetic campaign in teaching and writing to prepare and train wide circles of less well educated priests for the fight. In order to supply their audiences with intellectual munition, they publish a series of pamphlets directed against the enemy and all manner of apologies in defence of their own cause, utilising the knowledge they had gathered in the West. This leads to an enormous outburst of polemic writing, to an intellectual activity in the country which strikes even foreigners.

177 But the efforts of these champions of Ukrainian Orthodoxy
814 who had been trained in the West, did not stop there; they performed a still more important function in making European influence supreme in the state of Moscow, or the Russia of Peter, as it was then called. Ukraine contributed no mean share to the work of Peter the Great. The foundation and building of the modern Russian Empire was the almost unaided work of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, for the intellectual conditions for the solving of this task were almost completely lacking in Moscow itself. In order to carry out his reforms which soon degenerated into an absolute mania for reform, Peter utilised

3. Vocational training which started at 15 and included the following stages: 871

a) a vocational school lasting 2 or 3 years giving courses in industrial subjects, machinery, agriculture, medicine and economics, followed by a practical year for the purpose of preparing qualified workers. After graduating from that

b) a technical institute with a course of 3 years for advanced study, the results of which were to be applied to practice. Scientific tasks were performed in

c) institutes with professorial chairs for training highly qualified practical experts and also by

d) academies with a 2 years' course for the purpose of training young scholars and researchers in every province of science.

What cannot fail to strike us in this basic plan is the entire absence of universities and other colleges which are replaced mainly by institutes, academies and faculties for working men. As far as the institutes are concerned, the champions of this system of education maintain that it was only possible to establish them after a severe struggle against the university system, "which preserved important remnants of mediaeval scholastic learning, dissolved scientific research in philosophical thought and had radically reduced the scientific function of the university to a minimum." The universities, therefore, were played out and had to be replaced by another form of higher learning.

The institutes for the education of the public, which were formed out of the old universities with the help of teachers from former teachers' training colleges, are a special group. They possess three faculties, viz. 1. the faculty of social education intended to train teachers for the communal gardens and for the elementary schools, 2. the faculty of vocational training which, as its name implies, had to supply the vocational schools and technical schools with teachers and finally 3. the faculty for political enlightenment; this last faculty trained propagandists and lecturers to enlighten wide circles of the population, teachers 874

874 for party schools, for workmen's clubs and centers of adult education in the country.

871 In the course of years this basic scheme underwent many changes till it was adapted to the general Soviet scheme in 1932; by a resolution passed by the Central Executive of the Communist Party on August 25 of that year the 7-year elementary school in Ukraine was transformed into a 10-year school, a third section being added, and the technical schools which had not yet become institutes were put on the same level as the higher schools; new universities had to be founded in order to cope with the difficult tasks of cultural reconstruction. It is not our place here to criticise this or that measure; in order to evaluate these radical reforms properly one would have not only to examine the plans but also their application in practice and the results they achieved.

We are, however, particularly interested in the national element in the general system of communist education which finds articulate expression in the language used.

195 871 In the original Ukrainian Socialist Republic the Ukrainian language was to have priority as the official language; this point of view was approved even in 1920 after the Revolution and steps were taken to make Ukrainian the vehicle of instruction throughout the schools where this had not already been done. Ukrainian nationalists were quick to seize this opportunity of promoting their native tongue and to aim at positive results at least in this province. But the growth in national consciousness among the broad masses of workmen and peasants due to the intensified use of the Ukrainian language began to make communist leading circles in the country uneasy. Russian was introduced as a second official language, by which the authorities hoped to put a brake on nationalism and to prevent Ukrainian influences from becoming too strong. Thus there were throughout Ukraine schools taught in two, and even three languages in order that Russian and Jewish minorities might enjoy their own rights. This preference shown to national minorities greatly handicapped the proper official language, a fact that was the more striking the higher the level of school investigated. The position of Ukrainian was most precarious at the universities,

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Like the cooperative movement, popular education had long been a cornerstone of Ukrainian nationalism, more important in many respects than direct political action. In the conflict between the national Communists in the Ukraine and the Stalinist centralists, it was especially the commissars of education, such as Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk, who had led the fight for Ukrainization of cultural life. Consequently it was natural that nationalist Ukrainians were determined to control the municipal departments of education under German occupation. 727 658 871 626

A major aim of the Reichskommissar and his henchmen, however, was to prevent the development of a cultured Ukrainian class, to convert the people into a race of submissive peasants. Rosenberg's vision of a university in Kiev went by the board, and the standard schooling for every Ukrainian child was set at four years.[35] Few material injuries were as deeply resented as this drastic curb on the opportunities for education. Since there were real shortages of materials, books, and teachers, the Ukrainians held to the hope that the restriction did not represent a permanent policy, even in the face of the closing of *gimnaziias* which had been reopened under the army administration through the efforts of the local population itself.[36]

To a limited extent the ban on secondary and higher education was evaded by the extensive use made of a loophole in the German regulations which allowed the reopening of technical schools. The enormous loss of artisans and professionally trained persons incurred by the annihilation of the Jewish inhabitants compelled even the power-mad Nazis to recognize the need for training Ukrainians in such occupations. A large number of technical secondary schools, agricultural schools, and even institutes of higher education like medical faculties, were permitted. The extent to which these facilities were utilized by the Ukrainian population is indicated by the fact that the enrollment of the Kiev medical institute reached 2,000 in 1943 when the total population of the city was only 300,000, while Kherson, with a fifth 874 727 186

[35] Report of Rosenberg to Hitler, August 11, 1942, PS 42 (hereafter referred to as PS 42); PS 1198.

[36] E.g., in Berdichev (*Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3, quoting *Nova Doba* [Berdichev] for September 1), Zhitomir (Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941), and Belaia Tserkov' (*Nationalist*, December 20, 1941, p. 2).

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874 that number of inhabitants, had 541 students in its medi-
727 cal school.[37] Medical institutes were also reopened in Stalino,
186 Dniepropetrovsk, and Vinnitsa, and perhaps in other cities, although it is doubtful if any of these were the centers of nationalist youth organization which the faculty in Kiev became under the leadership of the OUN-M.[38]

The educational structure described in the preceding paragraph was designed for adolescents or young adults, and thus could be used for direct propagation of nationalist concepts. It was, of course, partly for this reason that the Germans confined advanced training within such narrow limits. Even these restrictions were not the end of the difficulties faced in inculcating a nationalist type of education in those about to assume the role of citizens,
[466] for the technical schools were frequently emptied of their students and faculty to meet the demands of the *Ostarbeiter* recruiters. The elementary schools were also drained of teachers by the *Ostarbeiter* program, and the pupils, though too young for forced labor, were decimated by famine and plague. If the task of building national consciousness had to be viewed as a long-term one, then the four-year elementary school offered a considerable field for cultivation.[39]

191 The problem confronting the nationalist leaders in education
727 was twofold: they had to ensure a basis for the development of an independent Ukraine by making certain that all instruction
872 was in the Ukrainian language, so that the rising generation
186 would be fully at home in this speech; and they had to replace the Communist ideology by a positive nationalist concept. The first task was relatively uncomplicated, though far from easy in practice. In line with their policy of encouraging the purely nonpolitical aspects of Ukrainian nationality, the Germans ordered all instruction to be in Ukrainian. The nationalist directors enthusiastically supported this rule, but it was sometimes difficult to enforce it, since even teachers who were themselves nationalist in sentiment were not always able to conduct classes in Ukrainian.[40]

[37] Occ E-4 (1); *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, October 10, 1942, p. 1.

[38] See Chapter V.

[39] In Kiev alone there were fifty elementary schools with 17,000 students (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2).

[40] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 4; M. Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki*

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

nor to beat the superior of a monastery to such an extent 793
that the unfortunate one died a short time after), Mohila was the personification of the reaction against the democracy of the preceding epoch in the bosom of Orthodoxy. When still an Archimandrite of the 538
Monastery of the Caves at Kiev, he established there, at his own expense, a school which was afterwards to become the famous Kiev Academy. It was to Rome that he sent those monks to study who were destined to become the first teachers, and it was from Latin that he translated his *Ritual*, a book which was read throughout Russia. As a result the people of Kiev became disturbed on learning that the teaching of the Academy was that of Latin scholasticism, and that the Latin language occupied a predominant place.

Greek and Latin naturally remained subjects of teaching, but the whole religious literature suffered from the effect of the forms of eloquence which were then being used in the Catholic world.

We know the role which was played by the Academy [874] ●
of Kiev in the development of Imperial Russian civilization, and it was Mohila himself who first proposed, though prematurely, in 1640, to found a school on the Kiev model in Moscow. But the artificial character of the religious literature, of which the Academy was the centre, delayed for long the blossoming of literary genius in the Ukraine.

The current of popular inspiration having been slowed down, that which was printed in the eighteenth century had almost no literary or national value. The famous printing press of the Monastery of Potchaiev, in Western Volynia, generally limited itself to editing the books required for divine service in old Slavonic. Amongst its other publications only the collection of religious poems, the 'Bogoglasnik,' presents some

361 It seems to us opportune to give an idea of the Ukraine by describing the urban populations which are, from the point of view of European town life, to a great extent among the best organized Russian towns.

The most European town is Odessa. Founded at the end of the eighteenth century, it has broad and straight avenues and streets bordered by plane trees and acacias and built according to a plan, very well paved, with the most perfect modern drainage systems, with very comfortable houses, and finally with its port which is constructed in accordance with the technically most advanced principles. Odessa can easily compete with the great European towns of the same importance. It is curious that the first governors of Odessa, who have done much for the embellishment of the town, were two French *émigrés*, the Duc de Richelieu and the Comte de Langeron, whose names have been given to two [874] important streets. The University of Odessa, called that of New Russia, has been the cultural centre not only of the southern region of the Ukraine but it also attracted the young people of the Crimea and the Caucasus. Its great commercial activity, its external night life, and its [162] cosmopolitan population, having 43 per cent Jews, 42 per cent Russians (Great Russians and Ukrainians), 6 per cent Greeks, 3 per cent Germans, 2 per cent Poles, 3 per cent Italians, Armenians, Georgians, Tartars, and others, gave it before the Revolution the appearance of a Mediterranean city.

Kharkov, also a University town, is to-day a European city, but, unlike Odessa, it owes its modern appearance to the Soviet regime. During fifteen years it had been the capital of the Ukraine and it has taken advantage of this position by completely changing its appearance which, before the last war, was very poor.

Kiev is a picturesque town lying on the hills of the right bank of the Dnieper. It is undoubtedly the most

attractive town not only of the Ukraine but of the whole 361
of Russia. Its magnificent public gardens amaze the visitors. It is excelled by Odessa from the point of view of town organization but excels it by far from the æsthetic point of view. Its [2]University of St. Vladimir and its [874]
Polytechnic School enjoyed a great reputation in Russia.

Among the other towns with a European appearance one can mention Nicolaiev, the port at the mouth of the Boug; Vinnitza, the capital of Podolia, and to-day perhaps Dniepropetrovsk, which has the School of Mines, founded some years before the Great War. These cities have modern public buildings, up-to-date railway stations, good networks of tramways, etc.

In the domain of the organization and the appearance of the towns and the houses, the difference between Zone 1 and 2[2] is great. In Zone 1 the country-side is better organized and possesses better roads, while the telephone system had appeared there before the last war, etc. On the other hand the towns which, as we have already shown, are almost all small, can hardly be called such at all.

The towns of Zone 2[2] are new towns which have had the benefit of modern organization, while the country-side still has a colonial appearance, without roads, with numerous isolated hamlets and farms, far removed from each other.

Now a few words about the ethnical composition of 162
the population of the Ukraine. The most important 563
minorities living on Ukrainian territory are the following:

First of all the Great Russians; workers, officials, and some colonists in the eastern and southern parts, especially in the New Russia. Then the Jews, very numerous (about 2,500,000), almost all traders, artisans, or members of the free professions before the Revolution; to-day employees in commerce, in the State co-operatives

[1] [Kiev--Analyst]
[2] [see category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

871 However, the Ukrainization of education slowly approached its
191 goal. It is impossible to determine the actual number of Ukrainian
656 children studying in Ukrainian schools, for the school statistics contained only the total number of children studying in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish and other schools; and while some Ukrainian children studied in non-Ukrainian schools, many non-Ukrainian children studied in Ukrainian schools. However, an approximate idea of the extent of Ukrainization can be gained by comparing the proportion of school children in Ukrainian schools with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. According to the school census of December, 1927, ten years after the Bolshevik Revolution, 75.8 percent of all pupils in elementary schools were in schools conducted entirely in Ukrainian; 6.9 percent were in schools in which some classes were conducted in Ukrainian and some in other languages; and 10.6 per cent were in Russian schools.[25] As the Ukrainians in 1927 were estimated at 80.1 percent of the total population and the Russians at 9.2 percent, the elementary schools might be considered to be nearing the goal of Ukrainization. The seven-year schools, then the predominant type of middle schools, lagged behind the elementary schools because they were relatively more numerous in the Russianized cities; of the pupils in these schools, 60.7 per cent were in Ukrainian schools, 14.7 percent in mixed schools and 15.5 per cent in Russian schools.

In some places, particularly in some cities, the Ukrainization policy overshot its mark. Whereas the Ukrainian population of Kiev was estimated at 41.1 percent of the total population in 1927, 49.8 percent of its school children were attending Ukrainian schools, 5.9 percent mixed schools and 30.6 percent Russian schools.[26] The proportion of pupils in Ukrainian schools was also greater than the proportion of the Ukrainian population in Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk. This situation, as shall be noted below, was regarded unfavorably by some writers in the newspapers, but the charges of "over-Ukrainization" received little attention from the government until after 1933. During the period from 1923 to 1933 the government was concentrating its efforts upon suppressing Russian nationalism and upon providing the Ukrainian and other non-Russian nationalities with schools conducted in their own languages.

● 874 In this period much attention was also given to the Ukrainization
191 of technical and higher educational institutions, but in these institu-
656 tions the lack of teachers knowing Ukrainian, of text-books and of good-will was an even greater handicap than in the Ukrainization of

[25] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini na 15 Grudnja 1927 (Peperedni Pidsumki Škilnogo Perepisy)*, Kharkov, 1928, pp. 20–21. [26] *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

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the general schools. As early as 1923 the government ordered the gradual Ukrainization of various technical schools ("technicums," "workers' faculties," etc.) and of higher educational institutions (medical, art, pedagogical, engineering and other "institutes").[27] Vacancies in their teaching and administrative staffs were to be filled preferably with people knowing Ukrainian; some courses were to be conducted in Ukrainian immediately; all students were obliged to study Ukrainian history, literature, economic geography and language; Ukrainian dictionaries and lists of Ukrainian equivalents for Russian scientific terms were to be issued in order to hasten Ukrainization. After the promulgation of this law the process of Ukrainizing technical and higher educational institutions proceeded under the constant prodding of the Commissariat of Education;[28] but by the summer of 1926 only a small proportion of these schools were considered fully Ukrainized, the chief obstacle being that the faculties did not know Ukrainian: in Odessa and Kharkov, for example, only six percent of the professors in the higher educational institutions had mastered that language.[29] At this time the Central Committee of the Party stepped into the picture and ordered an intensification of efforts to Ukrainize these institutions.[30]

A lively flurry of activity to bring the technical and higher schools into line followed the Central Committee's directive, which was passed along by the local committees.[31] The Commissariat of Education ordered the Ukrainization of all technical schools, except those serving national minorities, by the beginning of the school year 1927–28.[32] The Scientific-Pedagogical Society of the Ukrainian Academy of Science held a series of conferences to improve the teaching of the Ukrainian language, literature and history; to work out and distribute lists of Ukrainian scientific terms; and to establish Ukrainization courses for faculty members.[33] Finally, the Ukrainian government took a long step toward the Ukrainization of these schools when its basic statute on education, adopted in 1927, formulated a series of definite rules pertaining to technical and higher schools.[34] All students entering these institutions were to be examined in their knowledge, unless they had graduated from Ukrainian middle schools. Professors, other teachers and scientific workers were to possess a knowledge of Ukrainian equivalent to that demanded of government officials, and

[27] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . ., 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–897.

[28] E.g. *Kommunist*, Mar. 6, 1925; Mar. 20, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, July 6, 1926.

[29] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 6, 1926. [30] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1926.

[31] This was done, for example, by the Kiev Regional Committee of the Party.—*Ibid.*, July 15, 1926. [32] *Ibid.*, July 14, 1926. [33] *Ibid.*, July 4, 1926, July 22, 1926.

[34] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . ., 1927, part 1, sec. 157, pp. 626–628.

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no professor or other teacher could be appointed unless he could conduct his courses in Ukrainian.[35] Institutions for scientific research and for preparing research workers, including the universities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian; and candidates for degrees in such institutions were not to be accepted until they had passed an examination in that language.

Progress in Ukrainizing the technical and higher educational institutions was indicated by the school census of 1927. The Ukrainian language was used for instruction in educational establishments embracing 14.2 percent of the students in the higher institutes, 33.7 percent of the students in the technicums and 47.4 percent of those in other types of technical schools.[36] Although the actually Ukrainized institutes and technicums were not numerous, many of the others were then undergoing Ukrainization. Establishments using both Ukrainian and Russian contained 74.8 percent of the students in the institutes, 43.7 percent of those in the technicums and 33.3 percent of those in other types of technical schools. Only 7.1 percent of the students in the institutes, 17.7 percent of those in the technicums and 13.7 percent in other technical schools still studied exclusively in Russian.[37]

After 1927 the process of Ukrainization proceeded steadily, but in 1929 the Party and the government still regarded the condition of the higher and technical schools pessimistically. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, stated that a considerable part of the teachers and professors in these institutions were hostile to Ukrainization;[38] and newspaper reports bore him out. In Odessa, for example, Professors Tolstoi and Demetz refused to teach in Ukrainian and considered that all lecturers who did so were "renegades."[39] In 1929 the Commissariat of Education was forced to rule that all students intending to graduate from higher educational institutions would first have to pass an examination in the Ukrainian language equivalent to that demanded of government officials.[40]

[35] Only students and professors coming to the Ukraine from other republics were to be permitted additional time to fulfill the requirements.

[36] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 48–51. In this period technicums were classified with higher educational institutions rather than with other types of technical or "professional" schools, which were in turn classified as middle schools. The other technical schools included "workers' faculties," "workers' evening professional schools," "schools of the working youth," "long-term courses," "schools of brigade apprenticeship," and "trade-union schools."

[37] This data was given in a speech by Kossior, published in *Proletari* (organ of the central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine and of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade-Unions), July 17, 1930. [38] *Ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1929.

[39] *Komsomolec Ukraini* (organ of the Central Committee of the Leninist Communist Union of the Youth of the Ukraine), Mar. 16, 1929. [40] *Proletari*, Apr. 25, 1919.

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At this time, when the whole problem of Ukrainizing the highly Russianized Don Basin and other industrial regions in the Ukraine was being attacked, the failure to Ukrainize the school system was frequently mentioned.[41] Even a directive of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in January 1930, stated that in the industrial regions only the schools for general education and for extirpating illiteracy had been Ukrainized; and the directive ordered the Commissariat of Education to examine the faculty members of the technical and higher schools on their knowledge of Ukrainian, and to take steps to insure that these people possessed such a knowledge.[42]

During 1930 and 1931 the reports on the Ukrainization of technical and higher schools were limited largely to items of "self-criticism" which pointed out obstacles or found fault with specific institutions and individuals. The professors in the Medical Institute in Kharkov now knew Ukrainian, but the process of Ukrainization was being retarded by the lack of Ukrainian text-books.[43] In the Lisenko Theatrical Institute in Kiev the classes were conducted in Ukrainian, but the reporter complained that extra-class work was still being carried on in Russian.[44] An investigation of the Institute of Consumer Coöperation and of the Veterinary Institute revealed that the majority of the students still spoke Russian among themselves and that two professors of the former institution refused to instruct their classes in Ukrainian.[45] Both professors and students in the Construction Institute and the Chemical Institute were reported to be hostile to the use of Ukrainian: one of the professors had been discharged for this reason, and the students had declared Ukrainization to be proper only for the middle schools. Because the library lacked Ukrainian books and only three of the hundred and twenty-two journals received were in Ukrainian, the administration of the Chemical Institute was upbraided for opposition to Ukrainization.[46] The Textile and Mining Institutes were also cited as examples of the failure to Ukrainize properly.[47]

The years up to 1933 constituted the high-pressure period of Ukrainization; after 1933 the government concentrated its attention chiefly upon suppressing the tendency to "over-Ukrainize," where such a tendency was discernible, and upon rectifying the results of this tendency which had already appeared. This was not a new pol-

[41] E. g., *Komsomolec Ukraini*, May 16, 1929, June 26, 1929.
[42] *Proletari*, Jan. 3, 1930. [43] *Ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1930.
[44] *Proletarska Pravda*, Sept. 22, 1931. [45] *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1931.
[46] *Ibid.*, June 30, 1931. [47] *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1931.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

871 563 656 children into Russian or Ukrainian schools. One reporter in 1933 gave evidence to show that some Jewish parents had desired their children to attend non-Jewish schools, but that pressure had been brought to bear upon them by zealous officials to send their children to the Jewish schools newly constructed for them.[60]

As an illustration of the attitude of the children themselves, an experience of the author may be pertinent. Upon visiting a Jewish school in Kiev, he observed that some of the pupils were carrying Russian text-books; and to the enquiry as to whether no Yiddish books existed for those subjects, several pupils replied: "Oh, yes; but we like to read the Russian texts better than the Yiddish." The school happened to be located in the old Jewish section of Kiev, and undoubtedly the children were sent to this school either because they spoke Yiddish at home (but not amongst themselves) or because of the superior facilities offered by a new institution; and if they had been able to decide for themselves, it is possible that many of these children would have chosen to attend Russian or even Ukrainian [191] schools. Russian is the language of a culture stronger than the secular non-Hebrew culture conveyed by the Yiddish language in the Soviet Union; Russian is also the language spoken in Moscow and generally throughout the U.S.S.R.; and all those pupils, and parents, too, who ever expect to move freely about the Union must have complete mastery of the Russian language. What is true of the Jews is also true of the Poles, Germans, Czechs and others.

● 874 563 191 That the children of the minorities had to master the Russian and Ukrainian languages if they desired to continue their education on the higher levels is indicated by the nature of the technical and higher educational institutions in the Ukraine. It was impossible to set up an electrical engineering institute for a handful of Poles or Assyrians, or to establish every type of higher educational institution for the Jews. Hence, as the statistics for 1927 indicated, most of the technical and higher educational institutions taught in Ukrainian, Russian or a mixture of the two. Of the students in the lower technical schools (technical schools other than technicums) only 1.4 percent studied in Jewish schools, 0.1 percent in Polish schools, 0.3 percent in German schools, 0.1 percent in the schools of other minorities, and 3.0 percent studied in schools that had one or more of the minority languages together with either Russian or Ukrainian or both.[61] There were no institutes using exclusively the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian minority languages, although 3.9 percent of the students studied

[60] *Proletarska Pravda*, Mar. 29, 1933.

[61] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–51.

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in institutes that conducted part of their work in Russian or Ukrainian and part in other languages. Of the students in the technicums, 1.5 percent studied in technicums using the Jewish language, 0.5 percent in those using Polish, 0.7 percent in those using German, 0.5 per cent in those using other non-Russian minority languages, and 0.5 percent in technicums using Russian or Ukrainian and one or more of the other languages. These figures do not signify that the Jewish, Polish or German children were deprived of a chance to study in technical and higher schools; on the contrary, the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian student body in these establishments, as will be noted below, was relatively larger than the Ukrainian and Russian student body.

The work of establishing schools using the languages of the smaller nationalities continued after 1927; in fact, it was given additional impetus by the campaign of 1933–35 against nationalist influences in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education. But before examining the effects of this campaign, it is necessary to note the attitude toward Russian schools. At the core of the process of Ukrainization was the transformation of Russian into Ukrainian schools; and it was not surprising that there appeared in at least some areas a tendency to deprive the Russian-speaking population of an opportunity to study in Russian schools. This was, to be sure, not at all the intention of the government. In its decree in expanding general education, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee ordered that "special attention be directed toward assuring schools with instruction in the Russian language for all children of the Russian nationality."[62] But, as has been noted above, the proportion of pupils studying in Ukrainian schools in some places — especially in the larger cities — was greater than the proportion of Ukrainians in the population. A writer in *Proletarska Pravda* (*Proletarian Truth*) claimed in 1926 that the general schools in Kiev were being over-Ukrainized.[63] He was answered by another writer, who argued that whereas the criticism was based on an examination of the number of *schools*, there was still a larger proportion of *classes* being held in Russian than the proportion of Russians in the total population; and the second writer denounced the first for bringing grist to the mill of the enemies of the Soviet national policy.[64] The criticism was proven correct by the school statistics for 1927; but since the process of Ukrainization was in full swing and since at this time the Party considered the Russian nationalists

[62] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1926, part 1, sec. 453, p. 1246.
[63] *Proletarska Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1926. [64] *Ibid.*

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871 one hundred seventeen of every thousand people.[72] The middle schools
162 had expanded greatly by 1937; the fifth to tenth grades embraced
212 1,927,100 pupils in 1937 as compared with 347,900 pupils in 1928, an increase of 554 percent in ten years.[73]

871 While the school system was expanding quantitatively, the number
191 of children studying in Ukrainian schools was also increasing. During the school year 1935–36, the year that marked the end of the campaign to check over-Ukrainization, 83.0 percent of the pupils in the general schools were studying in the Ukrainian language. This percentage coincides roughly with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. It also represents a higher percentage of pupils in Ukrainian schools than attended such schools in 1927, a fact which resulted from the expansion of middle schools in the rural areas and from the decline in the number of children attending schools in some of the other languages. During the school year 1935–36, 12.7 percent of all the pupils in the general schools studied in Russian, 1.4 percent in Jewish, 1.3 percent in German, 0.5 percent in Moldavian and 0.5 percent in Polish schools.[74] In absolute numbers, there had been an increase between 1927 and 1935–36 in the pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Greek languages; there had been a decline in the number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Swedish and Assyrian languages; and schools had been established for Uzbeks, Belorussians, Kirghiz, Kazaks, Turkomens and Latvians.[75]

● 874 With regard to the technical and higher educational institutions, the author has no figures on the number of students in the Ukrainized

[72] The figure for the number of pupils in 1937 is taken from *Socizlističeskoe Stroitelstvo Sojuza S.S.S.R., 1933–1938* gg. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1939), p. 163.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

[74] *Socialistična Ukraina. Statistični Zbirnik* (Kiev, 1937), p. 222.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 222. *Statistika Ukrajni. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–26. A comparison of absolute figures for 1927 and 1935–36 must take into account that the statistics for 1927 gave the total number of pupils in mixed schools but not the number studying in various languages used in these schools. The number of pupils studying in the Russian, German, Moldavian, Tartar, Bulgarian and Czech languages in 1935–36 was greater than the number studying in their own schools in 1927 plus the total number in mixed schools using these languages for some classes. The conclusion that there was a decline in the total number of pupils studying in the Jewish, Polish, Assyrian and Swedish languages is arrived at by considering roughly the number of pupils in mixed schools studying in these languages. For example, in 1927 there were 68,836 pupils in Jewish schools; in 1935–36 there were 69,211 pupils studying in the Jewish language; hence, there were 375 more pupils *studying in Jewish* in 1935–36 than had been *attending Jewish schools* in 1927. But in 1927 there were 11,603 pupils in mixed schools using Jewish and either Russian or Ukrainian; in all probability there were more than 375 pupils in these schools who were being taught in Jewish; and by 1935–36 the surplus above 375 had been lost to Jewish classes, indicating a decline in the total number studying in Jewish.

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schools for the years after 1927; and one might conclude from the lack of such figures in the important statistical collections that Ukrainization has ceased or has been reversed. However, this conclusion would not be consistent with the continued stress on the preparation of "Ukrainian cadres," which was the primary purpose of Ukrainizing these institutions. The need for Ukrainian engineers, agronomists, writers and scientific workers was emphasized both by Kossior and by the resolution of the Thirteenth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1937.[76] Kossior, moreover, stated that there had been a large increase in the number of Ukrainian professors, instructors, scientific workers and candidates for higher degrees. Finally, the number of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technical and higher schools had grown absolutely and relatively. Between 1927 and 1936 the total number of students in the technicums had increased from 29,300 to 133,300; in the workers' faculties, from 7,400 to 53,500; and in the institutes from 28,200 to 108,200.[77] The increase for the technicums was 455 percent, for the workers' faculties 722 percent and for the institutes 384 percent. In the meanwhile, the proportion of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technicums had risen from 58.0 to 75.3 percent; in the workers' faculties from 57.9 to 65.0 percent; and in the institutes from 48.8 to 53.7 percent.[78] The number of students from among the minorities had increased absolutely but had fallen relatively. Since the increasing proportion of the students were Ukrainians (probably chiefly graduates of Ukrainian general schools and therefore favorable to and easily adaptable to courses conducted in Ukrainian), and since the number of Ukrainian faculty members had risen, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the process of Ukrainizing the technical and higher institutions had continued even after the intensive campaign against the nationalists was undertaken in 1933.

As for the obligatory study of the Ukrainian language in the schools of the other nationalities — provided for in laws of 1920 and 1927[79] — no change has taken place. An order of the Commissariat of Education, issued in December 1940 and just received by the author, clearly indicates this fact. The order is designed to facilitate the study of Ukrainian by children who have come from other republics and, having entered non-Ukrainian schools, are handicapped in the study of

[76] *Visti*, May 30, 1937; June 6, 1937. [77] *Socialistična Ukraina* . . . , p. 133.

[78] The percentages for 1927 are taken from *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii (Bilšovikiv) Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–52. The percentages for 1936 are from *Socialistična Ukraina* . . . , p. 152.

[79] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1920, part 1, sec. 509, p. 713; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626.

741 illiterates to learn to read by means of special
517 courses, and it gave scholarships to worthy students. So, it is not surprising that the Poles did not care for the "Prosvita". Thus in the last ten years all of the 600 local groups in Polesia and Volhynia and 70% of all local groups west of the Shan were dissolved. In 1938 Warsaw intensified its war against the "Prosvita"; in that year 104 local groups /95/ were dissolved and in the first five months of 1939 the same happened even to two district centers with 168 local groups. In spite of that, the Ukrainians organized 375 new local groups from 1936 to 1938.

575 Peasants and agriculturists numbering 160,000
874 united in the "Silskyj Hospodar" ("farmer") in order to arrange for or to obtain agricultural training. The "Silskyj Hospodar" employed approximately 150 social agronomists, that is, agriculturists with diplomas, who supervised improvement of the soil, methods of cultivating, seed production and whole farm establishments. They conducted courses and competitions in which the young farmers who were eager for knowledge actively participated. Special veterinarians of the society and of the dairy farm cooperatives supervised the livestock.

562 The Ukrainian women of Galicia were anxious
575 not to be second to the men. Their society "Soyuz Ukrayinok" numbered 60,000 members in 1200 village circles. In the national life of the people the Ukrainian woman occupies a high position, as is the case among all healthy races. In times of national misfortune the mothers are the preservers of the old manners and customs; the children learn the language and the traditional songs from their mothers, to whom the rising generations are entrusted. Their glowing patriotism is not surpassed by the men. At the same time the West Ukrainian woman is deeply religious and tirelessly industrious; she excels in the household.

000 Everything in West Ukraine is education work.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

education of children, and self-control.[42] Generally, however, the clergy was unable to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in several villages the latter even objected to returning the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs.[43]

One of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. How effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of more detailed evidence, but in some cases it evidently did at least provide reading material and some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. There is considerable difference of opinion as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were imbued with Communist ideas.[44]

The great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmitters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for example, the physician, who had been a UNR officer, played the chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. He was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village *feldsher* (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. These constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, who were described as having "no unified outlook," being still "under the influence of Bolshevik ideology." [45] This criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not uncommon in nationalist

[42] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.
[43] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 18–19, 1942, p. 3.
[44] Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 18, 1941, for favorable reports; and Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28–29, for some criticisms of the rural teachers.
[45] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

871 191 256 During 1923 and 1924 several laws designed to provide elementary education for all children specified that this education was to be conducted in Ukrainian where that nationality predominated, and in the languages of the "national minorities" (minorities within the Ukrainian nationality — Poles, Germans, Jews, Czechs and so forth) wherever these minorities formed compact groups.[12] The laws outlined a series of practical measures to make this rule effective: teachers knowing Ukrainian were to be assigned to schools in which they were needed; text-books and other reading materials in Ukrainian were to be increased; pedagogical schools and courses were to be transferred to Ukrainian; pedagogical journals were to be Ukrainized; and all classes for teaching illiterates and semi-literates, except those for the non-Ukrainian minorities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian. Provision was also made for the obligatory study of Ukrainian as a separate subject in all schools being conducted in other languages.

These laws gave impetus to the process of Ukrainizing the "general" (elementary, incomplete middle and middle) schools; and the process was aided by the presence of many nationalists who had formerly opposed the Soviet régime but who had been pardoned and put to work in the Commissariat of Education. In 1923, according to a newspaper report, 47 percent of the general schools had been Ukrainized, while plans had been made to provide the Ukrainian pupils with Ukrainian schools by 1925.[13] During the years from 1923 to 1925 the realization of these plans was proceeding most effectively in the rural areas, where the largest proportion of the Ukrainian population was to be found. In the province of Kharkov, for example, 20 percent of the general schools in the school year 1923–24 were still using Russian and 49 percent were "mixed schools" — schools using Russian in some classes and Ukrainian in others; but 69 percent of the schools in the city of Kharkov were still using Russian exclusively.[14] A picture of the manifold difficulties encountered in this transitional period was presented by the district of Krolevetski in the province of Chernigov.[15] In 1924 instruction in the elementary schools was supposed to be given in Ukrainian; but a majority of the teachers hardly knew the language, and they actually used a jumble of Ukrainian and Russian. In the middle schools the situation was worse: a majority of the teachers not only did not know Ukrainian, but considered themselves exempt from learning it because they had been former

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[12] *Ibid.*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–899; 1924, part 1, sec. 272, p. 801; 1924, part 1, sec. 300, pp. 932–933.

[13] *Visti* (organ of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Executive Committee), Oct. 28, 1923.

[14] *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1923; see also *ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1924. [15] *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1924.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

875 871 191 656

teachers in the gymnasium and therefore possessed "higher qualifications"; and these teachers showed "active or passive resistance" to Ukrainization. In this district, as in many others, the complaint was made that the schools lacked Ukrainian text-books and other such reading materials.[16]

These difficulties were gradually being overcome. By 1924 the publication of text-books and children's literature in Russian had almost ceased in the Ukraine, and the publishing houses were concentrating on Ukrainian materials.[17] Ukrainian was being taught in all pedagogical schools and teacher-training courses.[18] The results of this step were apparent in 1925. In Chernigov province, for example, 67 percent of the teachers had mastered Ukrainian, and the proportion of Ukrainian schools — which then stood at 54 percent — was being raised as rapidly as the teachers who had recently learned Ukrainian could be transferred to the districts where they were needed.[19]

During 1925 and 1926 the whole process of Ukrainization was raised to the status of a "high-pressure (*udarnaja*) campaign. "Attention was directed even to the *crèches* because, as one writer explained, the early years of a child's life are of the utmost significance in his linguistic development.[20] But a report from Chernigov in 1926 stated that the teachers were agitating among the peasantry against the Ukrainization of the schools; they were "striving with all their forces to discredit the Ukrainian language, to arouse the peasants to adopt resolutions against Ukrainizing the schools, and so on."[21] This was denied by the school officials in the region from which the report emanated,[22] but similar items of news came from other regions. One writer cited a specific teacher in the Don Basin: although she was supposed to teach the Ukrainian language as a separate subject, she could hardly speak it and she referred to it as "a terribly ugly and crude language."[23] Another reporter, again from Chernigov, produced evidence to illustrate the hostility of both parents and teachers: because of this hostility a region with an overwhelmingly Ukrainian population contained thirty-five Russian schools, one Ukrainian and one mixed school.[24]

[16] See *ibid.*, Mar. 4, 1924, Mar. 5, 1924.

[17] *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1924. [18] *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1923.

[19] *Kommunist* (organ of the Central Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine), Mar. 21, 1925.

[20] *Proletarska Pravda* (organ of the Kiev Regional Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, of the Kiev Regional Executive Committee and of the Kiev Regional Trade-Union Council), Aug. 26, 1926.

[21] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926. [22] *Ibid.*, July 25, 1926.

[23] *Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1926. [24] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926.

665 in the movies and the /126/ theater are "dedicated
883 to the historic Party Congress". According to
867 Proletarska Pravda of January 5, 1938, popular
857 conversations "about the difficult life of children in capitalist countries, about the international youth movement and the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Council of the USSR are carried on" at such gatherings.

•875 The teaching personnel in Soviet Ukraine consists largely of Russians and Jews. In the "pedagogical technical schools" and the "pedagogical institutes" in which educators are trained, the main emphasis is put on a sound knowledge of the Communist doctrine. It is obvious that in the process other subjects, such as language, spelling, history and the like, are neglected. If even in Leningrad "the struggle against illiteracy among the teachers is being intensified", (72)

72. Kommunistische Aufklärung of December 16, 1935, quoted from Richthofen: Bolschewistische Wissenschaft und Kulturpolitik /Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy/, page 75.

what may one expect to find in the provinces! In a single Ukrainian rayon 400 teachers had inadequate knowledge of orthography. (73) The profes-

73. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Ukraine.

sion of the Soviet Ukrainian teacher is certainly
[665] not enticing. The pay is very small; the village schoolmasters are often paid only in kind, and if they wander off into the factories and the teacher shortage becomes too great, the Komsomol sometimes comes to the rescue and "quickly mobilizes 50,000 members as substitutes". (74)

74. Kommunist of May 19, 1931, quoted by Danko; The Nation in Soviet Chains.

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•876 All these things could be temporary inconveniences.[1] But the evil is more deeply rooted; for the educational principles are decisive in the rearing of the young Ukrainian generation. And in this field conditions are sad, as Pravda in an article of March 23, 1938 on the problems of Soviet schools confesses: "...Our network of schools of which the country can be proud, presents in its pedagogical division a scattered mass of teachers - individualists - and in the student division a mass of scattered classes which are joined purely mechanically by reason of their being under one roof. School as a collective, unified institution is /127/ unknown to the teachers, the children, the family or the Soviet public. And this is precisely the root of a great deal of misfortune... Only in a unified school body can the powerful force of public opinion as a regulatory and disciplinary-educational factor be created in the child's consciousness. Without it the pupils become lazy, break windows, call each other names, besmirch each other and with their boorish conduct demoralize not only themselves but the teachers as well... And then the family, the teachers, in fact even the various organs of the militia reproach each other, or they lay all the blame on the Komsomol, on the organizations of Pioneers and finally on the director of the school."

It must be admitted that the Bolsheviks lacked any kind of example as well as long years of experience in educating their youth according to the theories of Karl Marx and his numerous interpreters. From the beginning there were too few schools and too few teachers, and these shortcomings have even today not been removed. But the "success", as Pravda characterizes it, of the now twenty-year-old Bolshevik education, is primarily the result of the educational ideal

1 [i.e., educational inadequacies; cf. pp. 131-132, cat. 116 -- Analyst]

876 which consists of "training a human being technically so that, equipped with the latest achievements in science and technics and full of creative initiative, he would be able, within the framework of collective endeavor, to conquer nature, to utilize its treasures and its forces in the broadest sense for the benefit of society as a whole, which, consciously and systematically shall carry the struggle for the Communist ideal to its victorious conclusion." (75)

75. Silberstein and Yastrzembsky: System of General Education, Ukrainian Government Publication, 1929. Quoted by Richthofen: Bolshevik Science, page 53.

Where the main task of the school is to educate the perfect technical human being - not the righteous one - training must begin at the nursery school age. The four-year-old child is already told about scientific things, and five- and six-year-old children learn the secrets of politics, of the work /128/ process and of technics. The fairy tales told by grandmother are forbidden; in their place a Bolshevik decorated with medals tells about the success of the Five Year Plan. The Catechism and the Bible are replaced by the Lenin dogma in which "finding favor in the sight of God" is synonymous with meeting production figures. The school, too, is merely a tentacle of the polyp "production process". It has the special task of "reproducing qualified man power" - precisely in the sense in which a machine factory furnishes replacements for worn-out tools of production. (76) It is necessary to

76. Hessen S. and N.Hans: Fünfzehn Jahre Sowjetschulwesen, Langensalza 1933. Quoted by Richthofen, ibid., page 51.

rear human beings who will work with the precision

876 of a machine and who, like a machine, heedless of personal concerns, unencumbered by spiritual impulses will produce the maximum number of revolutions for as long a time as possible. Only when the entire production of the educational factories is standardized does the individual product adapt itself without friction to the process. If the education of children were left to the families as it was before, the entire experiment would be jeopardized from the beginning, the more so since the Soviet Union is still primarily an agrarian country. For this reason the Bolsheviks replace the irreplacable educational force of the family with children's and young people's homes. This has its advantages: family ties are loosened and finally severed, the poison of Ukrainian nationalism is staved off and God is eliminated.

Thus young people are reared, homines technici who "perform their tasks purely automatically like machines, devoid of any moments of emotion, detached from any family ties and from ethnic groups, free from religious prejudice, merely on the basis of a rationally determined plan. But the machine is cruel; it destroys and crushes everything that stands in its way, for it knows no feelings, no former merits, it does not perceive individual greatness. Everything that towers above the measuring rod of the official pattern is mowed down, has its head cut off".(77)

77. Richthofen: Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy, page 76.

000 /Facing page 128/ /A typical workers' settlement near Krivoy Rog. Everywhere around the industrial cities which have sprung up like mushrooms, such loam-huts are built as workers' cottages./A/Facing page 129/ /Richelieu Terrace in Odessa/A/129/

665 883 876 The head of the Komsomol, Kosarev, was justified in making the following statement at the

A [For photos, cf. pp. 222-223, category 116 - Analyst]

665 23rd International Youth Day in Moscow in 1937:
883 "Never in the history of the world have there been
876 and are there such conditions for growth, education and training of the younger generation as have been created for young people among us by the Soviet government, by the Communist Party..." There are countless proofs of the fact that the basic principles of Bolshevik education are refuted by the products of this education.* The Komsomolskaja Pravda, number 83, 1935 admits "that the criminal elements in schools developed more actively than the Komsomols and the Pioneers, and therefore drew a large number of students into their sphere of influence", and Pravda of
[681] February 19, 1935 reports that the following punishments are administered to combat hoodlumism among children of from 8 to 12 years: "The expulsion of the hoodlums from school, legal persecution of their parents, the formation of special divisions of militia to combat youthful criminals, and so forth." (78) This picture is

78. Richthofen, Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy, page 75.

rounded off by the introduction on April 7, 1935 of the death penalty for children beginning at the age of 12 for those of them who can be shown to have committed theft, banditry, murder or to have contemplated murder, and by the purges which began in the autumn of 1937 against the members of the Komsomol, especially in the Ukraine.

/130/ In the Village

181 During the years in which Shevchenko stands watch in the searing heat of the Kirghiz Steppes, his friend Kostomariv formulates for the first time the contrasts between Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups. According to this, a tendency toward spirituality prevails in the social and

* [For a discussion of Bolshevik educational theory and Methods, cf. pp 133-135, category NL - Analyst]

Up to this moment the only open manifestation had been the demand of Skrypnyk that Communists be included in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences but this had apparently been answered satisfactorily and, with slight changes, the Academy was working as before. The most that could be said was that the leaders of Ukrainian thought in the Academy had not properly in their old age kept pace with the development of Marxo-Leninist thought but even this was hardly sufficient for the outburst which was loosed against a group of widely respected scholars.

Another curious aspect of the situation was that the most severe sentences were not given to the announced ringleaders and chief culprits but that there was unearthed on the occasion another society, the SUM, the Society of Ukrainian Youth, which consisted of relatively obscure students, village intelligentsia, peasants and workmen who were shot by the hundreds and thousands without being brought before any tribunal. The head of this group, Mykola Pavlushkiv, was involved in the trial but once again there was no indication that any members of the SUM had been engaged in any form of sabotage or anti-governmental work. Members of the organization who have escaped abroad have testified that the SUM was organized only on the basis of personal friendships and never undertook or planned any deliberate acts of sabotage.

The discovery of the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine with its assumed anti-Communist tinge was the signal for the opening of a campaign against the most respected older non-Communist members of the Academy. The usual method was by the device of demanding Communist self-criticism, and criticism. Its practice was brutally simple and effective.

The Communist organs, especially the GPU-NKVD, decided which of these scholars were to be broken ideologically (and morally) and which were to be removed without fanfare. The latter disappeared. The former group were forced to appear for public "self-criticism." This was preceded by a series of attacks in the newspapers as to the mistakes in Marxo-Leninism which the victim had committed.

668* such as the head of the *oblast* (district) administration, Alexander Iatseniuk, the chief of the city administration, Pavlovs'kyi, and nearly all of his department heads.[50] A wide variety of nationalist organizations sprang up, including Prosvita, churches, and an active theater. Local artists appeared on Ukrainian programs permitted by the German-controlled broadcasting station. [871] Schools, including two *gimnaziias* and a pedagogical institute, were reopened, and a local school administration was established.[51]

[369] The population of the city sank to forty-two thousand (including seven thousand Poles and two thousand Russians) after the [438] deportation of the Jews. However, economic life was stimulated by the reopening of a sugar refinery and other industries; markets were reopened and private trade was encouraged.[52] One hundred [795] and seventy-nine physicians were present, a very high number in [883] proportion to the population.[53] An extremely active youth organization, known, like its counterparts in the West Ukraine, as the Sich, was formed; its activities included sports, choral singing, theatricals, and development of an orchestra.[54]

All of these organizations were under the control of nationalist Ukrainians, although the emphasis appeared to be on the formation of a Ukrainian territorial state which would include all persons, of whatever ethnic origin, living on Ukrainian soil. Thus one of the chief administrative officials, the head of the *raion* administration (i.e., the rural area outside the city) was a Pole, and the director of the economic section of the city administration was a Russian.[55] There appears to have been a large measure of cordiality between the local groups and the OUN representa-

[50] Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2; 454th Sicherungsdivision, Section VII, Report of October 4, 1941, NOKW 2129 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2129).

[51] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 1, 1941, p. 1; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24 and 26, 1941, pp. 2 and 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 25, 1942, p. 5; *Nastup*, September 6, 1941, p. 5.

[52] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1, based on *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Zhitomir), August 3, 1941; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[53] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24, 1941, p. 2; many, however, were apparently Jews who were temporarily spared because of their usefulness (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2).

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 2, and *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2.

1/1 [Zhitomir in the East Ukraine, 1941 -- Analyst]

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Workers of various skills	1,788
Students	560
Liberal professions (journalists, writers, merchants, artists, etc.)	313
Teachers	252
Engineers	343
Administrators	178
Jurists	11

Compared to the occupational differences in nationalist activity, differences of age and sex played a minor role. There is little information on the activity of women. Evidently they carried on most of the welfare work; one German report states that a major reason for permitting the functioning of the Ukrainian Red Cross was a desire to absorb the energies of the women intellectuals, who had been highly "politicized" by the Soviet regime.[23] There are a few cases of prominent nationalist work by women, for example, by the poet Olena Teliha who headed the OUN-M literary circle in Kiev until its suppression by the Germans. In general, nationalist observers agree that the women were less active politically than the men. While there is too little evidence to warrant a firm conclusion on this score, it is just possible that the nationalist movements neglected a useful source of support, which was certainly tapped by the Communist underground.[24] 462 186

Youth, on the other hand, played a prominent part in nationalist work. While a large number of Mel'nyk supporters were drawn from the older generation, and the OUN-B made special efforts to capture the younger group, there was here no "conflict of generations" in respect to adherence to the two factions. Since only physically active persons were useful in the east, even the Mel'nyk organizers were predominantly youthful, and thus could approach their contemporaries more readily. The strength of the youth organizations dominated by the OUN-M in Kiev and Zhitomir has already been described. Other young men, of course, rejected both nationalist groups as too extreme, and formed centers of their own, while still others appear to have arisen in complete independence of outside stimulation. Thus the whole administra- 186 883 [668*]

[Occupation specialization of Ukrainian émigré group in Bohemia - Moravia--analyst]

[23] USSR Exhibit 278.

[24] PS 3876.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

186 tion and cultural life of Pavlograd, a small town east of Dniepro-
883 petrovsk on the way to the Donbas, was organized by a group of graduates from the local *gimnaziia*.[25] They owed their nationalism, according to reports by visitors, entirely to the work of an inspiring teacher (who had in turn received his nationalist indoctrination in Kharkov University) who had taught there until caught by the NKVD some years previously.[26]

[668] The division of nationalist youth among both factions of the OUN, and locally formed groups, parallels closely the division of their elders in the East Ukraine. In one respect, however, the younger generation was different; there was a considerable number of youths who had been active adherents of Communist organizations but who now joined the nationalist movements.[27] The most prominent ex-Komsomol was the son of Alexander Iatseniuk who, after an extremely active career in OUN-M organization in the Zhitomir area, fled to the Volhynian woods where as "Volynets'" he became an important nationalist partisan leader. On the other hand, large numbers of young people were daring enough to praise the Soviet openly, or took part in underground activity, while condemning the Ukrainian language and customs.[28]

On the whole, in their reaction to nationalist political activity, there does not seem to have been any marked difference between the younger and the older generations, at least not nearly so sharp a difference as in Galicia. It is fairly certain that a large percentage of the youth who joined nationalist activities were influenced by their parents. Others—sons of kulaks, priests, and intellectuals who had been persecuted by the Soviet regime—resented the Soviet order because of their parents' misfortune.

Apparently whatever advantage the nationalist movement may have enjoyed among the older generation because of the latter's memory of Petliura and the nationalist activity of the twenties was at least partly offset by the greater appeal of a romantic,

[25] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 12, 1942, p. 3; *Nova Doba* (Berlin), July 5, 1942, p. 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 3, 1942, p. 2.

[26] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 3, 1942, p. 2.

[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 23, 1941, p. 2, based on an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti*.

[28] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1942, p. 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

activist movement like the OUN to youth, or by the latter's desire in other cases to rearrange life to suit themselves. There is a faint suggestion that the Soviet regime may already have become the "old order" against which revolutionary youth is wont to rebel. On the other hand, these very qualities which made the nationalist *political* movement attractive to the younger generation had the effect of keeping it antagonistic to religion. As has already been pointed out, there is almost universal agreement that youth in the East Ukraine was cool, even hostile, to the churches.[29] In the south, the Protestants and dissident Orthodox groups seem to have been somewhat more successful, but they had no direct relation to the nationalist movement.[30]

The OUN-B, it will be recalled, placed special emphasis on securing the allegiance of youth, since its young agitators were unable to attract the support of the intelligentsia.[31] There is a small amount of evidence to indicate that the nationalist movements attracted a broader occupational group from the youth than from among its elders. So little is known concerning the role of the laboring classes, however, that no conclusions can be offered. Historically, the working class in the East Ukraine had been predominantly Russian or Russified. The working class was also generally more loyal to the Soviet system than most of the other social groups. Even if the Ukrainian claim that a large influx of dispossessed peasants and their children during the thirties had resulted in a Ukrainization of the urban laboring class be accepted, there is no evidence that such persons became interested in politics or had any important part in nationalist activity. Probably those who were mature when they left the village continued to be peasants in outlook, while a few rose into the intelligentsia, acquiring its coloration.

As frequently observed in this study, the disproportion of material available is no sure indication of a corresponding difference in the importance of factors involved. Since in many instances only fragmentary evidence is at hand, what is presented may be

[29] Cf. articles in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 12, 1941, p. 3; October 3, 1942, p. 2.

[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 3, 1942, p. 2; PS 1693.

[31] See the clandestine leaflet from the Odessa area previously referred to for sharp OUN-B criticism of the intelligentsia as tools of the Germans.

177 sufficient grounds to deal with him in summary pro-
197 ceeding as a "separatist". Pravda of October 16, 1937 even accuses non-Russian students of "mutilating the great Russian language with all kinds of local linguistic rubbish".

The Russian State Publishing House in Moscow is playing a leading role in the language fight. Of 20 monographs which were published up to midsummer 1939 as a result of the great Shevchenko celebrations, no less than 16 were written in Russian and only 4 in the Ukrainian language.

Finally, a favorite method of Russianization is the granting of prizes, free journeys, and privileged places of work and study to young Ukrainians.

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665 Young people are supposed to spend their
883 leisure time in the Party organizations of the "Yellow Bills", the "Pioneers" and with the
867 "Communistic Socialistic Youth" (Komsomol). /This
857 is an erroneous reading of the Soviet abbreviation of Komministicheski Soiuz Molodiozh; which means Communist League of Young People. Editor/ There they are divided up into "groups of various interests" where they "can develop and satisfy their most urgent needs". There are those interested in the theater, music, sports, politics, the army and similar things. "From the outposts, from groups, from the clubs, from schools, the young people of talent come into the guardianship of the Pioneers every day, every evening, and there they develop, for they are under the supervision of experts..." (71) What "urgent needs" means is

71: H. Furman: Activity and Life of the Pioneers in the Ukraine.

explained by the Kiyev Visti of March 27, 1939, which says that the children conversation hours

665 in the movies and the /126/ theater are "dedicated
883 to the historic Party Congress". According to
867 Proletarska Pravda of January 5, 1938, popular
857 conversations "about the difficult life of children in capitalist countries, about the international youth movement and the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Council of the USSR are carried on" at such gatherings.

875 The teaching personnel in Soviet Ukraine consists largely of Russians and Jews. In the "pedagogical technical schools" and the "pedagogical institutes" in which educators are trained, the main emphasis is put on a sound knowledge of the Communist doctrine. It is obvious that in the process other subjects, such as language, spelling, history and the like, are neglected. If even in Leningrad "the struggle against illiteracy among the teachers is being intensified", (72)

72. Kommunistische Aufklärung of December 16, 1935, quoted from Richthofen: Bolschewistische Wissenschaft und Kulturpolitik /Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy/, page 75.

what may one expect to find in the provinces! In a single Ukrainian rayon 400 teachers had inadequate knowledge of orthography. (73) The profes-

73. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Ukraine.

sion of the Soviet Ukrainian teacher is certainly
[665] not enticing. The pay is very small; the village schoolmasters are often paid only in kind, and if they wander off into the factories and the teacher shortage becomes too great, the Komsomol sometimes comes to the rescue and "quickly mobilizes 50,000 members as substitutes". (74)

74. Kommunist of May 19, 1931, quoted by Danko; The Nation in Soviet Chains.

876 of a machine and who, like a machine, heedless of personal concerns, unencumbered by spiritual impulses will produce the maximum number of revolutions for as long a time as possible. Only when the entire production of the educational factories is standardized does the individual product adapt itself without friction to the process. If the education of children were left to the families as it was before, the entire experiment would be jeopardized from the beginning, the more so since the Soviet Union is still primarily an agrarian country. For this reason the Bolsheviks replace the irreplacable educational force of the family with children's and young people's homes. This has its advantages: family ties are loosened and finally severed, the poison of Ukrainian nationalism is staved off and God is eliminated.

Thus young people are reared, homines technici who "perform their tasks purely automatically like machines, devoid of any moments of emotion, detached from any family ties and from ethnic groups, free from religious prejudice, merely on the basis of a rationally determined plan. But the machine is cruel; it destroys and crushes everything that stands in its way, for it knows no feelings, no former merits, it does not perceive individual greatness. Everything that towers above the measuring rod of the official pattern is mowed down, has its head cut off".(77)

77. Richthofen: Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy, page 76.

000 /Facing page 128/ /A typical workers' settlement near Krivoy Rog. Everywhere around the industrial cities which have sprung up like mushrooms, such loam huts are built as workers' cottages./A/Facing page 129/ /Richelieu Terrace in Odessa/A/129/

665 883 876 The head of the Komsomol, Kosarev, was justified in making the following statement at the

A [For plates, cf. pp 222-223, category 116 - Analyst]

665 23rd International Youth Day in Moscow in 1937:
883 "Never in the history of the world have there been
876 and are there such conditions for growth, education and training of the younger generation as have been created for young people among us by the Soviet government, by the Communist Party..." There are countless proofs of the fact that the basic principles of Bolshevik education are refuted by the products of this education.* The Komsomolskaja Pravda, number 83, 1935 admits "that the criminal elements in schools developed more actively than the Komsomols and the Pioneers, and therefore drew a large number of students
[681] into their sphere of influence", and Pravda of February 19, 1935 reports that the following punishments are administered to combat hoodlumism among children of from 8 to 12 years: "The expulsion of the hoodlums from school, legal persecution of their parents, the formation of special divisions of militia to combat youthful criminals, and so forth." (78) This picture is

78. Richthofen, Bolshevik Science and Culture Policy, page 75.

rounded off by the introduction on April 7, 1935 of the death penalty for children beginning at the age of 12 for those of them who can be shown to have committed theft, banditry, murder or to have contemplated murder, and by the purges which began in the autumn of 1937 against the members of the Komsomol, especially in the Ukraine.

/130/ In the Village

181 During the years in which Shevchenko stands watch in the searing heat of the Kirghiz Steppes, his friend Kostomariv formulates for the first time the contrasts between Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups. According to this, a tendency toward spirituality prevails in the social and

* [For a discussion of Bolshevik educational theory and Methods, cf. pp 133-135, category NL-Analyst]

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both within and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.
[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . .* , 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.